





T H E

True Intellectual System

O F T H E

U N I V E R S E .

V O L . II.

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 A T H E I S M.

C H A P. V.

HAVING in the second chapter revealed all the dark mysteries of atheism, and produced the utmost strength of that cause; and in the third made an introduction to the confutation of those atheistical grounds, by representing all the several forms and schemes of atheism, and shewing both their disagreements amongst themselves, and wherein they all agree together against Theists; we have been hitherto prevented of that full and copious confutation of them, intended by us, by reason of that large account given of the Pagan polytheism: which yet was no impertinent digression neither, it removing the grand objection against the naturalty of the idea of God, as including oneliness in it; as also preparing a way for that defence of Christianity, designed by us against Atheists. Wherefore that we may not here be quite excluded of what was principally intended, we shall subjoin a contracted and compendious confutation of all the premised atheistical principles. The **FIRST** whereof was this, that either men have no idea of God at all, or else none but such as is compounded and made up of impossible and contradictory notions; from whence these Atheists would infer him to be an *unconceivable Nothing*. In answer whereunto, there hath been something done already, it being declared in the beginning of the fourth chapter, what the idea of God is, *viz.* a perfect understanding nature, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. And as there is nothing either unconceivable, or contradictory in this idea, so have we shewed, that these confounded Atheists do not only, at the same time when they verbally deny an idea of God, implicitly acknowledge and confess it, for as much as otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing; but also that they agree with Theists in this very idea; it being the only thing, which Atheists contend for, that

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the first original and head of all things is no perfect understanding nature, but that all sprung from *Tobu* and *Bobu*, or dark and senseless matter fortuitously moved. Moreover, we have not only thus declared the idea of God, but also largely proved, and made it clearly evident, that the generality of mankind in all ages have had a prolepsis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the real and actual existence of such a being; the Pagans themselves, besides their other many Gods (which were understanding beings superiour to men,) acknowledging one chief and sovereign *Numen*, the *Maker* of them all, and of the whole world. From whence it plainly appears, that those few Atheists, that formerly have been, and still are, here and there up and down in the world, are no other than the monsters and anomalies of human kind. And this alone might be sufficient to repel the first atheistical assault, made against the idea of God.

Nevertheless, that we may not seem to dissemble any of the Atheists strength, we shall here particularly declare all their most colourable pretences against the idea of God, and then show the folly and invalidity of them. Which pretences are as follow; first, *That we have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to corporeal sense; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same.* Secondly, *That Theists themselves acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, he may be from thence inferred to be a non-entity.* Thirdly, *That the Theists idea of God including infinity in it, is therefore absolutely unconceivable and impossible.* Fourthly, *That Theology is an arbitrary complement of inconsistent and contradictory notions.* And lastly, *That the idea and existence of God owes all its being, either to the confounded non-sense of astonish'd minds, or else to the fiction and imposture of politicians.*

We begin with the first; That we can have no idea, conception, or thought of any thing, not subject to sense; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same. Thus a modern atheistical writer¹; *Whatsoever we can conceive, hath been perceived first by sense, either at once or in parts; and a man can have no thought representing any thing not subject to sense.* From whence it follows, that whatsoever is not sensible and imaginable, is utterly unconceivable, and to us nothing. Moreover, the same writer adds, *That the only evidence, which we have of the existence of any thing, is from sense;* the consequence whereof is this, that there being no corporeal sense of a Deity, there can be no evidence at all of his existence. Wherefore, according to the tenour of the atheistical philosophy, all is resolved into sense, as the only criterion of truth, accordingly as *Protagoras* in *Plato's Theætetus*² concludes *knowledge to be sense;* and a late writer of our own determines *sense to be original knowledge.* Here have we a wide ocean before us, but we must contract our sails. Were sense knowledge and understanding; then he, that sees light and colours, and feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold, and the like of all other sensible things: neither would there be any philosophy at all concerning them. Whereas the mind of man remaineth altogether unsatisfied, concerning the
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¹ *Heiber's Leviathan*, Part I. cap. I.

² P. 115.

nature of these corporeal things, even after the strongest sensations of them, and is but thereby awakened to a further philosophick inquiry and search about them, what this light and colours, this heat and cold, &c. really should be; and whether they be indeed qualities in the objects without us, or only phantasms and sensations in our selves. Now it is certain, that there could be no suspicion of any such thing as this, were sense the highest faculty in us; neither can sense it self ever decide this controversy; since one sense cannot judge of another, or correct the error of it; all sense as such, (that is, as phancy and apparition) being alike true. And had not these Atheists been notorious dunces in that atomick philosophy, which they so much pretend to, they would clearly have learn'd from thence, that sense is not knowledge and understanding, nor the criterion of truth as to sensible things themselves; it reaching not to the essence or absolute nature of them, but only taking notice of their outside, and perceiving its own passions from them, rather than the things themselves: and that there is a higher faculty in the soul, of reason and understanding, which judges of sense; detects the phantasm and imposture of it; discovers to us that there is nothing in the objects themselves like to those forementioned sensible ideas; and resolves all sensible things into intelligible principles; the ideas whereof are not foreign and adventitious, and meer passive impressions upon the soul from without, but native and domestick to it, or actively exerted from the soul it self; no passion being able to make a judgment either of it self, or other things. This is a thing so evident, that *Democritus* himself could not but take notice of it, and acknowledge it, though he made not a right use thereof; he, in all probability, continuing notwithstanding a confounded and belotted Atheist; *Sextus Empiricus* having recorded this of him: *Εν τοῖς κανόσι δύο Φησὶν εἰναι γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθησεων, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας. ὣν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνώσιν κατὰ γρη, προσμαρτυροῦν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν ἢ ἀληθεὺς κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθησεων σκοτινὴν ὀνομάζει. ἀφαιρούμενη αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διαγνωσιν τῆ ἀληθοῦς ἀπλαγίαι· λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν, Γνώμη δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι· ἡ μὲν γρηστική· ἡ δὲ σκοτική· καὶ σκοτικής μὲν, τὰδε σύμπαυλα, ὄψεις, ἀκοή, ὄσμη, γεύσεις, ψεύσεις· ἡ δὲ γρηστική ἀποκεκρυμμένη δὲ ταύτης.* *Democritus in his Canons affirmeth, that there are two kinds of knowledges, one by the senses, and another by the mind. Of which that by the mind is only accounted knowledge, he bearing witness to the faithfulness and firmness thereof for the judgment of truth. The other by the senses he calleth dark, denying it to be a rule and measure of truth. His own words are these: There are two species of knowledge, the one genuine, the other dark and obscure. The dark and obscure knowledge is seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But the genuine knowledge is another more bidden and recondit. To which purpose there is another fragment also of this *Democritus* preserved by the same *Sextus*: *Νόμῳ γλυκὸν, καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν, νόμῳ ψυχρὸν· νόμῳ χρῆσται· αἰτίαι δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν· ὅπερ νομίζεται εἶναι εἰναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητά, ἐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα.* *Bitter and sweet, hot and cold, are only in opinion or phancy. Colour is only in opinion; atoms and vacuum alone in truth and reality.**

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¹ Lib. VII adverb. *Mathemat.* §. ² *Id. ibid.* §. CXXXV. p. 599.
CXXXVIII, CXXXIX. p. 420.

That which is thought to be, are sensibles; but these are not according to truth, but atoms and vacuum only. Now the chief ground of this rational discovery of the antient Atomists, that sensible things, as heat and cold, bitter and sweet, red and green, are no real qualities in the objects without, but only our own phancies, was because in body there are no such things intelligible, but only magnitude, figure, site, motion and rest. Of which we have not only sensible ideas, passively impressed upon us from without, but also intelligible notions, actively exerted from the mind it self. Which latter notwithstanding, because they are not unaccompanied with sensible phantasms, are by many unskilfully confounded with them. But besides these, we have other intelligible notions, or ideas also, which have no genuine phantasms at all belonging to them. Of which whosoever doubts, may easily be satisfied and convinced, by reading but a sentence or two, that he understands, in any book almost, that shall come next to his hand; and reflexively examining himself, whether he have a phantasm, or sensible idea, belonging to every word, or no. For whoever is modest and ingenuous, will quickly be forced to confess, that he meets with many words, which though they have a sense or intelligible notion, yet have no genuine phantasm belonging to them. And we have known some, who were confidently engaged in the other opinion, being put to read the beginning of Tully's Offices, presently non-plus'd and confounded in that first word *quanquam*; they being neither able to deny, but that there was a sense belonging to it, nor yet to affirm, that they had any phantasm thereof, save only of the sound or letters. But to prove, that there are cogitations not subject to corporeal sense, we need go no further than this very idea or description of God; a substance absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise and powerful, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. Where there is not one word unintelligible to him, that hath any understanding in him, and yet no considerative and ingenuous person can pretend, that he hath a genuine phantasm, or sensible idea, answering to any one of those words, either to *substance*, or to *absolutely perfect*, or to *infinitely*, or to *good*, or to *wise*, or to *powerful*, or to *necessity*, or to *self-existence*, or to *cause*; or indeed to *all*, or *other*, or *things*. Wherefore it is nothing but want of meditation, together with a fond and sottish dotage upon corporeal sense, which hath so far imposed upon some, as to make them believe, that they have not the least cogitation of any thing not subject to corporeal sense; or that there is nothing in human understanding, or conception, which was not first in bodily sense; a doctrine highly favourable to atheism. But since it is certain, on the contrary, that we have many thoughts, not subject to sense, it is manifest, that whatsoever falls not under external sense, is not therefore unconceivable, and nothing. Which whosoever asserts, must needs affirm life and cogitation it self, knowledge or understanding, reason and memory, volition and appetite, things of the greatest moment and reality, to be nothing but mere words without any signification. Nay, fancy and sense it self, upon this hypothesis, could hardly scape from becoming non-entities too, forasmuch as neither fancy nor sense falls under sense, but only the objects of them; we neither seeing vision, nor feeling taction, nor hearing audition, much

less, hearing sight, or seeing taste, or the like. Wherefore though God should be never so much corporeal, as some Theists have conceived him to be; yet since the chief of his essence, and as it were his inside, must by these be acknowledged to consist in mind, wisdom, and understanding, he could not possibly, as to this, fall under corporeal sense (sight or touch) any more than thought can. But that there is substance incorporeal also, and therefore in itself altogether insensible, and that the Deity is such, is demonstrated elsewhere.

We grant indeed, that the evidence of particular bodies, existing *hic & nunc*, without us, doth necessarily depend upon the information of sense; but yet nevertheless, the certainty of this very evidence is not from sense alone, but from a complication of reason and understanding together with it. Were sense the only evidence of things, there could be no absolute truth and falsehood, nor certainty at all of any thing; sense, as such, being only relative to particular persons, seeming and phantastical, and obnoxious to much delusion. For if our nerves and brain be inwardly so moved, and affected, as they would be by such an object present, when indeed it is absent, and no other motion or sensation in the mean time prevail against it and obliterate it; then must that object of necessity seem to us present. Moreover, those imaginations, that spring and bubble from the soul itself, are commonly taken for sensations by us when asleep, and sometimes in melancholick and fanciful persons also, when awake. That atheistical principle, that there is no evidence at all of any thing as existing, but only from corporeal sense, is plainly contradicted by the Atomick Atheists themselves, when they assert atoms and vacuum to be the principles of all things, and the extraneous images of bodies to be the causes both of sight and cogitation: for single atoms, and those extraneous images, were never seen nor felt; and vacuum, or empty space, is so far from being sensible, that these Atheists themselves allow it to be the one only incorporeal. Wherefore they must here go beyond the ken of sense, and appeal to reason only for the existence of these principles: as *Protagoras*, one of them, in *Plato*, professedly doth; *Theat. p. 155. Steph.*
ἀθροὶ περισκοπῶν μῆτις τῶν ἀμύητων ἑπακρόη' εἰσὶ δὲ ἔστοι, οἱ ἄδὲν ἄλλο οἴομαι εἶναι, ἢ ὅσα ἂν δύνωσται ἀπὲρ τῶν χειρῶν λαβεῖσθαι, πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐ ἀποδεχόμενοι, οὐ ἐν ἑστίᾳ μένει. *Have a care, that none of the profane and uninitiated in the mysteries over-hear you. By the profane I mean (saith he) those, who think nothing to exist, but what they can feel with their fingers, and exclude all that is invisible out of the rank of being.* Were existence to be allow'd to nothing, that doth not fall under corporeal sense, then must we deny the existence of soul and mind in our selves and others, because we can neither feel nor see any such thing. Whereas we are certain of the existence of our own souls, partly from an inward consciousness of our own cogitations, and partly from that principle of reason, that nothing cannot act. And the existence of other individual souls is manifest to us, from their effects upon their respective bodies, their motions, actions, and discourse. Wherefore since the Atheists cannot deny the existence of soul or mind in men, though no

such thing fall under external sense, they have as little reason to deny the existence of a perfect mind, presiding over the universe, without which it cannot be conceived, whence our imperfect ones should be derived. The existence of that God, whom no eye hath seen nor can see, is plainly proved by reason from his effects, in the visible phænomena of the universe, and from what we are conscious of within ourselves.

The second pretence of Atheists against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is, because Theists themselves acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, it may be from thence inferred, that he is a non-entity. Which argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things, first, that what is incomprehensible is altogether unconceivable; and then, that what is unconceivable is nothing. The latter of which two, perhaps, may be granted to them, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no man can frame any manner of idea or conception of it, is therefore either in itself, or at least to us, nothing. Because though that of *Protagoras* be not true, in his sense, *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀθρώπου εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν* That man is the measure of all things, either as existing or not existing; he meaning indeed nothing else thereby, but that there was no absolute truth or falsehood of any thing, but all was relative to particular persons, and phantastical or seeming only. And though it must not be granted, that whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot easily and fully comprehend, is therefore presently to be expunged out of the catalogue of beings; which is the reason, or rather infidelity of the Anti-trinitarians; yet is there notwithstanding some truth in that of *Aristotle*, that *ψυχὴ πῶς πάντα, the rational soul or mind is in a manner all things*; it being able to frame some idea and conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath either an actual or possible existence, from the very highest to the lowest. Mind and Understanding is, as it were, a diaphanous and crystalline globe, or a kind of notional world, which hath some reflex image, and correspondent ray, or representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real world of being. And upon this account may it be said, that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely unconceivable, is indeed a non-entity.

But the former is absolutely denied by us, that whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable; and therefore when we affirm, that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect minds cannot have such a conception of his nature, as doth perfectly master, conquer, and subdue that vast object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it doth every way match and equalize it. Now it doth not at all follow from hence, because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow understandings, that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a non-entity. For it is certain, that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of any substantial thing, as
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that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a truth, though abused by the Scepticks, that there is *ἀκατάλητόν τι*, *something incomprehensible* in the essence of the lowest substances. For even body itself, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their fingers, and which is the only substance, that they acknowledge either in themselves or the universe, hath such puzzling difficulties and entanglements in the speculation of it, that they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might instance also in some accidental things, as time and motion. Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature, and are rather apprehenders than comprehenders thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive knowledge, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the essences of things; from whence we ought to be led to this acknowledgment, that there is another perfect Mind or understanding Being above us in the universe, from which our imperfect minds were derived, and upon which they do depend. Wherefore if we can have no idea or conception of any thing, whereof we have not a full and perfect comprehension, then can we not have an idea or conception of the nature of any substance. But though we do not comprehend all truth, as if our mind were above it, or master of it, and cannot penetrate into, and look quite thorough the nature of every thing, yet may rational souls frame certain ideas and conceptions, of whatsoever is in the orb of being proportionate to their own nature, and sufficient for their purpose. And though we cannot fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of its perfection, yet may we have an idea or conception of a Being absolutely perfect; such a one as is *nostro modulo conformis, agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scantling*; as we may approach near to a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it within our arms. Whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely unconceivable, is nothing; but not whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by our imperfect understandings.

It is true indeed, that the Deity is more incomprehensible to us than any thing else whatsoever, which proceeds from the fulness of its being and perfection, and from the transcendency of its brightness; but, for the very same reason, may it be said also, in some sense, that it is more knowable and conceivable than any thing. As the sun, though, by reason of its excessive splendour, it dazzle our weak sight, yet is it notwithstanding far more visible also, than any of the *nebulosæ stellæ, the small misty stars*. Where there is more of light, there is more of visibility; so where there is more of entity, reality, and perfection, there is there more of conceivability and cognoscibility; such an object filling up the mind more, and acting more strongly upon it. Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the Deity, and overcome with its transcendent light, and dazzling brightness, therefore hath it to us an appearance of darkness and incomprehensibility; as the unbounded expansion of light, in the clear transparent æther, hath to us the apparition

of an azure obscurity ; which yet is not an absolute thing in itself, but only relative to our sense, and a mere fancy in us.

The incomprehensibility of the Deity is so far from being an argument against the reality of its existence, as that it is most certain, on the contrary, that were there nothing incomprehensible to us, who are but contemptible pieces, and small atoms of the universe ; were there no other being in the world, but what our finite and imperfect understandings could span or fathom, and encompass round about, look thorough and thorough, have a commanding view of, and perfectly conquer and subdue under them ; then could there be nothing absolutely and infinitely perfect, that is, no God. For though that of *Empedocles* be not true in a literal sense, as it seems to have been taken by *Aristotle**, *γὰρ μὲν γὰρ γαίω, &c.* *That by earth we see earth, by water water, and by fire fire ; and understand every thing by something of the same within ourselves* : yet is it certain, that every thing is apprehended by some internal congruity in that which apprehends, which perhaps was the sense intended by that noble philosophick poet. Wherefore it cannot possibly otherwise be, but that the finiteness, scantness, and imperfection of our narrow understandings must make them asymmetrical, or incommensurate, to that, which is absolutely and infinitely perfect.

And nature itself plainly intimates to us, that there is some such absolutely perfect Being, which, though not inconceivable, yet is incomprehensible to our finite understandings, by certain passions, which it hath implanted in us, that otherwise would want an object to display themselves upon ; namely those of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, together with a kind of ecstasy, and pleasing horror ; which, in the silent language of nature, seem to speak thus much to us, that there is some object in the world, so much bigger and vaster than our mind and thoughts, that it is the very fame to them, that the ocean is to narrow vessels ; so that when they have taken into themselves as much as they can thereof by contemplation, and filled up all their capacity, there is still an immensity of it left without, which cannot enter in for want of room to receive it, and therefore must be apprehended after some other strange and more mysterious manner, viz. by their being as it were plunged into it, and swallowed up or lost in it. To conclude, the Deity is indeed incomprehensible to our finite and imperfect understandings, but not inconceivable ; and therefore there is no ground at all for this atheistical pretence, to make it a non-entity.

We come to the third atheistical argumentation ; That because infinity (which according to theology is included in the idea of God, and pervadeth all his attributes) is utterly unconceivable, the Deity itself is therefore an impossibility, and non-entity. To this sense found sundry passages of a modern writer ; as, *Whatsoever we know, we learn from our phantasms ; but there is no phantasm of Infinite, and therefore no knowledge or conception of it.*
Again,

* *De Animâ, Lib. I. Cap. II. p. 3. Tom. II. Oper.*

Again, *Whatsoever we imagine is finite, and therefore there is no conception or idea of that which we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite time, or of infinite power. Wherefore the name of God is used not to make us conceive him, but only that we may honour him.* The true meaning whereof (as may be plainly gathered from other passages of the same writer) is thus to be interpreted; that there is nothing of philosophick truth and reality in the idea or attributes of God; nor any other sense in those words, but only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own confounded minds. And accordingly the word *infinite* is declared to signify nothing at all in that which is so called, (there being no such thing really existing) but only the inability of men's own minds, together with their rustick astonishment and admiration. Wherefore when the same writer determines, that God must not be said to be finite, this being no good courtship nor compliment; and yet the word *infinite* signifieth nothing in the thing itself, nor hath any conception at all answering to it; he either does plainly abuse his reader, or else he leaves him to make up this conclusion, that since God is neither finite nor infinite, he is an unconceivable nothing. In like manner, another learned well-willer to atheism declareth, that he, who calleth any thing infinite, doth but *rei quam non capit, attribuerenomen, quod non intelligit; attribute an unintelligible name to a thing unconceivable; because all conception is finite, and it is impossible to conceive any thing, that hath no bounds or limits. But that, which is mistaken for infinite, is nothing but a confused chaos of the mind, or an unshapen embryo of thought; when men going on further and further, and making a continual progress, without seeing any end before them, being at length quite weary and tired out with this their endless journey, they sit down, and call the thing by this hard and unintelligible name, infinite.* And from hence does he also infer, that because we can have no idea of infinite, as to signify any thing in that, which is so called; we therefore cannot possibly have *germanam ideam Dei, any true and genuine idea or notion of God.* Of which, they who understand the language of Atheists, know very well the meaning to be this; that there is indeed no such thing, or that he is a non-entity.

Now since this exception against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is made by our modern and neoterick Atheists; we shall, in the first place, shew, how contradictory they are herein to their predecessors, the old philosophick Atheists; and consequently how inconsistent and disagreeing Atheists in several ages have been with one another. For whereas these modern Atheists would have this thought a sufficient confutation of a Deity, that there can be nothing infinite; it is certain, that the ancient philosophick Atheists were so far from being of this persuasion, that some of them, as *Anaximander* expressly, made "Απειρον, or *infinite*, the principle of all things; that is *infinitely extended and eternal matter, devoid of all life and understanding.* For though *Melissus* his "Απειρον or *infinite*, which he made the first principle, was a most perfect being, eminently containing all things (as hath been already shewed) and therefore the true Deity; *Anaximander's*

mander's ἄπειρον, or Infinite, yet however called Θεῖον, or divine by him, (it being the only divinity, which he acknowledged) was nothing but senseless matter, an atheistical Infinite. Wherefore both Theists and Atheists in those former times did very well agree together in this one point, that there was something or other infinite, as the first principle of all things; either infinite mind, or infinite matter; though this latter atheistical infinity of extended matter be indeed repugnant to conception (as shall be proved afterwards) there being no true infinite, but a perfect Being, or the holy Trinity. Furthermore, not only *Anaximander*, but also, after him, *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*, and many others of that atheistical gang, heretofore asserted likewise a numerical infinity of worlds, and therefore much more than an infinity of atoms, or particles of matter. And though this numerical infinity of theirs were also unconceivable and impossible; yet does it sufficiently appear from hence, that these ancient philosophick Atheists were so far from being abhorrent from infinity, as a thing impossible, and a non-entity, that they were on the contrary very fond thereof; and therefore never went about to disprove a Deity after this manner, *because there can be nothing infinite*.

But, in the next place, we shall make it manifest, that these modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason and their very selves also, than they do their predecessors in that impiety, when they thus go about to disprove the existence of a God, because there can be nothing infinite, neither in duration, nor in power, nor in any other regard. For first, though it should be doubted, whether there be a God or no; yet must it needs be acknowledged to be as indubitable, as any thing in all geometry, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal, without beginning; because, if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing, that common notion, or principle of reason, having here an irresistible force, that nothing could ever come from nothing. Now, if there were never nothing, but always something, then must there of necessity be something infinite in duration, and eternal without beginning. Wherefore it cannot be accounted less than extreme sottishness and stupidity of mind in these modern Atheists, thus to impugn a Deity from the impossibility of infinite duration without beginning. But in the next place, we must confess it seems to us hardly conceivable, that any Atheist whatsoever could possibly be so prodigiously sottish, or so monstrously insatuated, as really to think, that once there was nothing at all, but that afterwards senseless matter happened (no body knows how) to come into being, from whence all other things were derived. According to which hypothesis it would follow also, that matter might as well some time or other happen again to cease to be, and so all things vanish into nothing. To conclude therefore, these Atheists must of necessity be guilty of one or other of these two things; either of extreme sottishness and stupidity, in acknowledging neither God, nor matter, nor any thing, to have existed infinitely from eternity without beginning; or else, if they do acknowledge the

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pre-eternity of matter, or its infinite past-duration without beginning, then, of the most notorious impudence, in making that an argument against the existence of a God, which themselves acknowledge to matter.

Nevertheless we shall here readily comply with these modern Atheists thus far, as to grant them these two following things; *First*, That we can have no proper and genuine phantasm of any Infinite whatsoever, because we never had corporeal sense of any, neither of infinite number, nor of infinite magnitude, and therefore much less of infinite time or duration, and of infinite power; these two latter things, time and power, themselves not falling under corporeal sense. *Secondly*, That as we have no phantasm of any infinite, so neither is infinity fully comprehensible by our human understandings, that are but finite. But since it is certain, even to mathematical evidence, that there was something infinite in duration, or without beginning, inasmuch that no intelligent Atheist, upon mature consideration, will ever venture to contradict it; we shall from hence extort from these Atheists an acknowledgment of the falseness of these two theorems of theirs, that whatsoever we have no phantasm or sensible idea of, as also whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by us, is therefore a pure non-entity or nothing; and enforce them to confess, that there is something really existing in nature, which we have neither any phantasm of, nor yet can fully comprehend with our imperfect understandings.

Nay, we will yet go further in compliance with them, and acknowledge likewise, that as for those infinities, of number, of corporeal magnitude, and of time or successive duration, we have not only no phantasm, nor full intellectual comprehension of them, but also no manner of intelligible idea, notion, or conception. For though it be true, that number be somewhere said by *Aristotle*¹ to be infinite, yet was his meaning there only in such a negative sense as this, that we can never possibly come to an end thereof by addition, but may in our minds still add number to number infinitely; which is all one as if he should indeed have affirmed, that there can be no number actually and positively infinite, according to *Aristotle's* own definition of Infinite, elsewhere given², namely, that to which nothing can be added; no number being ever so great, but that one or more may still be added to it. And as there can be no infinite number, so neither can there be any infinity of corporeal magnitude; not only because if there were, the parts thereof must needs be infinite in number, but also because, as no number can be so great, but that more may be added to it; so neither can any body or magnitude be ever so vast, but that more body or magnitude may be supposed still further and further; this addition of finites never making up infinite. Indeed infinite space, beyond the finite world, is a thing, which hath been much talked of; and it is by some supposed to be infinite body, but by others to be an incorporeal infinite; through whose actual distance notwithstanding (measurable by poles and miles) this finite world might roll
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¹ *Metaphys. Lib. XI. Cap. XI. p. 434. Tom. IV. Oper. & Phys. Auscultat. Lib. III. Cap. V. Tom. I. Oper. p. 486. Tom. I. Oper. & Cap. VIII. p. 491.*

² *Phys. Auscultat. Lib. III. Cap. IX. p. 492.*

and tumble infinitely. But as we conceive, all that can be demonstrated here, is no more than this, that how vast soever the finite world should be, yet is there a possibility of more and more magnitude and body, still to be added to it, further and further, by divine power, infinitely; or that the world could never be made so great, no not by God himself, as that his own omnipotence could not make it yet greater. Which potential infinity, or indefinite increasableness of corporeal magnitude, seems to have been mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Whereas, for this very reason, because more could be added to the magnitude of the corporeal world infinitely, or without end, therefore is it impossible, that it should ever be positively and actually infinite; that is, such, as to which nothing more can possibly be added. Wherefore we conclude concerning corporeal magnitude, as we did before of number, that there can be no absolute and actual infinity thereof; and that how much vaster soever the world may be, than according to the supposition of vulgar astronomers, who make the starry sphere the utmost wall thereof; yet is it not absolutely infinite, such as really hath no bounds or limits at all, nor to which nothing more could, by divine power, be added. *Lastly*, We affirm likewise, concerning time, or successive duration, that there can be no infinity of that neither, no temporal eternity without beginning: and that not only, because there would then be an actual infinity, and more than an infinity of number; but also because, upon this supposition, there would always have been an infinity of time past, and consequently an infinity of time past, which was never present. Whereas all the moments of past time must needs have been once present; and if so, then all of them, at least save one, future too; from whence it will follow, that there was a first moment, or beginning of time. And thus does reason conclude, neither the world, nor time itself, to have been infinite in their past duration, nor eternal without beginning.

Here will the Atheist think presently, he hath got a great advantage to disprove the existence of a God; *Nonne, qui æternitatem mundi sic tollunt, eadem operâ etiam mundi conditori æternitatem tollunt? Do not they, who thus destroy the eternity of the world, at the same time destroy also the eternity of the Creator? For if time itself were not eternal, then how could the Deity, or any thing, be so?* The Atheist securely taking it for granted, that God himself could not be otherwise eternal, than by a successive flux of infinite time; but we say, that this will, on the contrary, afford us a plain demonstration of the existence of a Deity. For since the world and time itself were not infinite in their past duration, but had a beginning, therefore were they both certainly made together by some other being, who is, in order of nature, senior to time, and so without time, before time; he being above that successive flux, and comprehending in the stability and immutable perfection of his own being, his yesterday, and to-day, and for ever. Or thus; Something was of necessity infinite in duration, and without beginning; but neither the world, nor motion, nor time, that is, no successive being was such; therefore is there something else, whose being and duration is not successive and flowing, but permanent, to whom this infinity belongeth. The
Atheists

Atheists here can only smile, or make faces, and show their little wit in quibbling upon *nunc-stans*, or a *standing Now* of eternity; as if that standing eternity of the Deity (which with so much reason hath been contended for by the ancient genuine Theists) were nothing but a pitiful small moment of time standing still, and as if the duration of all beings whatsoever must needs be like our own; whereas the duration of every thing must, of necessity, be agreeable to its nature: and therefore, as that, whose imperfect nature is ever flowing like a river, and consists in continual motion and changes one after another, must needs have accordingly a successive and flowing duration, sliding perpetually from present into past, and always posting on towards the future, expecting something of itself, which is not yet in being, but to come; so must that, whose perfect nature is essentially immutable, and always the same, and necessarily existent, have a permanent duration, never losing any thing of itself once present, as sliding away from it, nor yet running forwards to meet something of itself before, which is not yet in being; and it is as contradictory for it ever to have begun, as ever to cease to be.

Now whereas the modern Atheists pretend to have proved, that there is nothing infinite, neither in duration nor otherwise, and consequently no Deity, merely because we have no sense nor phantasm of Infinite, nor can fully comprehend the same; and therefore will needs conclude, that the words *infinite* and *eternal* signify nothing in the thing itself, but either men's own ignorance and inability to conceive, when, or whether, that, which is called *eternal*, began; together with the confounded nonsense of their astonish'd minds, and their stupid veneration of that, which their own fear and fancy has raised up as a bug-bear to themselves; or else the progress of their thoughts further and further backward indefinitely, (tho' they plainly confute themselves in all this, by sometimes acknowledging *matter* and *motion* infinite and eternal, which argues either their extreme foolishness or impudence:) we have shewed, with mathematical evidence and certainty, that there is really something infinite in duration, or eternal; by which therefore cannot be meant men's own ignorance, or the confounded nonsense of their devotion, nor yet the idle progress of their minds further and further indefinitely, which never reaches infinite, but a reality in the thing itself, namely this, that it *never was not*, nor had any *beginning*. Moreover, having demonstrated concerning this infinity and eternity, without beginning, that it cannot possibly belong to any successive being, we confidently conclude against these Atheists also, that it was not matter and motion, or this mundane system, but a perfect immutable nature, of a permanent duration, (that is, a *God*) to whom it belonged. To sum up all therefore, we say, that *infinite* and *eternal* are not words, that signify nothing in the thing itself, nor mere attributes of honour, compliment and flattery, that is, of devout and religious nonsense, error and falsehood; but attributes belonging to the Deity, and to that alone, of the most philosophick truth and reality. And though we, being finite, have no full comprehension and adequate

understanding of this infinity and eternity (as not of the Deity) yet can we not be without some notion, conception and apprehension thereof, so long as we can thus demonstrate concerning it, that it belongs to something, and yet to nothing neither, but a perfect immutable nature. But the notion of this infinite eternity will be yet further cleared in the following explanation and vindication of infinite power.

For the Atheists principally quarrel with infinite power, or omnipotence, and pretend, in like manner, this to be utterly unconceivable and impossible, and subjected in nothing. Thus a modern atheistical writer concludes, that since *no man can conceive infinite power, this is also but an attribute of honour, which the confounded nonsense of astonish'd minds bestows upon the object of their devotion, without any philosophick truth and reality.* And here have our modern Atheists indeed the suffrage and agreement of the ancient philosophick Atheists also with them, who, as appears from the verses before cited out of *Lucretius*, concern'd themselves in nothing more, than asserting all power to be finite, and omnipotence, or infinite power, to belong to nothing.

First, therefore, it is here observable, that this omnipotence, or infinite power, asserted by Theists, has been commonly either ignorantly mistaken, or wilfully misrepresented by these Atheists, out of design to make it seem impossible and ridiculous, as if by it were meant a power of producing and doing any thing whatsoever, without exception, though never so contradictory; as a late atheistical person, seeming to assert this divine omnipotence and infinite power, really and designedly, notwithstanding, abused the same, with this sceptical irony, *That God, by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could turn this tree into a syllogism.* Children indeed have sometimes such childish apprehensions of the divine omnipotence; and *Ren. Cartesius**, (though otherwise an acute philosopher) was here no less childish, in affirming, that all things whatsoever, even the natures of good and evil, and all truth and falsehood, do so depend upon the arbitrary will and power of God, as that, if he had pleased, *twice two should not have been four*, nor the *three angles of a plain triangle equal to two right ones*, and the like; he only adding, that all these things, notwithstanding, when they were once settled by the divine decree, became immutable; that is, I suppose, not in themselves, or to God, but unto us: than which no paradox of any old philosopher was ever more absurd and irrational. And, certainly, if any one did desire to persuade the world, that *Cartesius*, notwithstanding all his pretences to demonstrate a Deity, was indeed but an hypocritical Theist, or personated and disguised Atheist, he could not have a fairer pretence for it out of all his writings, than from hence; this being plainly to destroy the Deity, by making one attribute thereof to devour and swallow up another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. For to suppose God to understand, and to be wise only by his will, is all one as to suppose him to have really no understanding at all. Wherefore

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* Vide Respons. ad Objectiones sextas, §. VI. p. 160. Edit. Amstel. 1685. in 4to.

we do not affirm God to be so omnipotent, or infinitely powerful, as that he is able to destroy or change the intelligible natures of things at pleasure; this being all one as to say, that God is so omnipotent and infinitely powerful, that he is able to destroy, or to baffle and befool his own wisdom and understanding, which is the very rule and measure of his power. We say not therefore, that God, by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could make twice two not to be four, or turn a tree into a syllogism; but we say, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that, which can produce and do all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable, and implies no manner of contradiction; the very essence of possibility being no other than conceivability. And thus has the point been stated all along, not only by Christian Theists, but even the ancient Pagan theologers themselves, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that, which can do all things, that do not imply a contradiction, or which are not un-conceivable. This appearing from that of *Agatho*, cited before out of *Aristotle* ¹, *That nothing is exempted from the divine power, but only to make περὸς αὐτῶν ἀγένητα, what hath been done to be undone*, or the like hereunto. Now infinite power being nothing else but a power of doing whatsoever is conceivable, it is plainly absurd to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is unconceivable.

But, because the Atheists look upon infinity as such a desperate and affrightful thing, we shall here render it something more easy, and take off that frightful vizard from it, which makes it seem such a *mormo*, or bugbear to them, by declaring, in the *next* place, that infinity is really nothing else but perfection. For infinite understanding and knowledge is nothing else but perfect knowledge, that which hath no defect or mixture of ignorance with it, or the knowledge of whatsoever is knowable. So in like manner, infinite power is nothing else but perfect power, that which hath no defect or mixture of impotency in it; a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable. Infinite power can do whatsoever infinite understanding can conceive, and nothing else; conception being the measure of power, and its extent, and whatsoever is in itself unconceivable being therefore impossible. *Lastly*, Infinity of duration, or eternity, is really nothing else but perfection, as including necessary existence and immutability in it: so that it is not only contradictory to such a being to cease to be, or exist, but also to have had a newness or beginning of being, or to have any flux or change therein, by dying to the present, and acquiring something new to itself, which was not before. Notwithstanding which, this being comprehends the differences of past, present, and future, or the successive priority and posteriority of all temporary things: and because infinity is perfection, therefore can nothing, which includeth any thing of imperfection, in the very idea and essence of it, be ever truly and properly infinite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and successive duration. All which can only, *mentiri infinitatem, counterfeit and imitate infinity*, in their having more and more added to them infinitely, whereby notwithstanding they never reach it, or overtake it. There is

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nothing

¹ Lib. VI. ad Nicomach, Cap. II. p. 98. Tom. III. Oper.

nothing truly infinite, neither in knowledge, nor in power, nor in duration, but only one absolutely perfect Being, or the holy Trinity.

Now, that we have an idea or conception of perfection, or a perfect being, is evident from the notion, that we have of imperfection, so familiar to us; perfection being the rule and measure of imperfection, and not imperfection of perfection; as a straight line is the rule and measure of a crooked, and not a crooked line of a straight: so that perfection is first conceivable, in order of nature, before imperfection, as light before darkness, a positive before the privative or defect. For perfection is not properly the want of imperfection, but imperfection of perfection. Moreover, we perceive divers degrees of perfection in the essences of things, and consequently a scale or ladder of perfections, in nature, one above another, as of living and animate things above senseless and inanimate, of rational things above sensitive; and this by reason of that notion or idea, which we first have of that, which is absolutely perfect, as the standard; by comparing of things with which, and measuring of them, we take notice of their approaching more or less near thereunto. Nor indeed could these gradual ascents be infinite, or without end, but they must come at last to that, which is absolutely perfect, as the top of them all. *Lastly*, We could not perceive imperfection in the most perfect of all those things, which we ever had sense or experience of in our lives, had we not a notion or idea of that, which is absolutely perfect, which secretly comparing the same with, we perceive it to come short thereof. And we might add here, that it is not conceivable neither, how there should be any lesser perfection existent in any kind, were there not first something perfect in that kind, from whence it was derived; this of *Boetius*¹ being the very sense and language of nature in rational beings; *Omne, quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id diminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibetur. Quò fit, ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse, necesse sit. Etenim sublata perfectione, unde illud, quod imperfectum perhibetur, existerit, ne fingi quidem potest. Neque enim a diminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum cepit exordium; sed ab integris absolutisque procedens, in hæc extrema, atque effæta dilabitur. Whatsoever is said to be imperfect, is accounted such by the diminution of that, which is perfect; from whence it comes to pass, that if in any kind any thing appear imperfect, there must of necessity be something also, in that kind, perfect. For perfection being once taken away, it could not be imagined, from whence that which is accounted imperfect should have proceeded. Nor did the nature of things take beginning from inconsummate and imperfect things, but proceeding from things absolute and complete, thence descend down to these lower, effete, and languid things. But of this more elsewhere.*

Wherefore since *infinite* is the same with *absolutely perfect*, we having a notion or idea of the latter, must needs have of the former. From whence

¹ De Consolat. Philos. Lib. III. p. 69, 70. Edit. Valliæ.

whence we learn also, that though the word *infinite* be in the form thereof negative, yet is the sense of it, in those things which are really capable of the same, positive, it being all one with absolutely perfect; as likewise the sense of the word *finite* is negative, it being the same with imperfect. So that finite is properly the negation of infinite, as that which in order of nature is before it; and not infinite the negation of finite. However, in those things which are capable of no true infinity, because they are essentially finite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and time, infinity being there a mere imaginary thing, and a non-entity, it can only be conceived by the negation of finite; as we also conceive nothing, by the negation of something; that is, we can have no positive conception thereof.

We conclude, to assert an infinite Being, is nothing else but to assert a Being absolutely perfect, such as never was not, or had no beginning, which could produce all things possible and conceivable, and upon which all other things must depend. And this is to assert a God; one absolutely perfect Being, the original of all things: God, and Infinite, and Absolutely Perfect, being but different names for one and the same thing.

We come now to the fourth atheistical objection, That theology is nothing but an arbitrary complement of inconsistent and contradictory notions. Where, first, we deny not, but that as some theologers (or bigottical religionists) of later times extend the divine omnipotence to things contradictory and impossible, as to the making of one and the same body, to be all of it, in several distant places at once; so may others sometimes unskillfully attribute to the Deity things inconsistent or contradictory to one another, because seeming to them to be all perfections. As for example, though it be concluded generally by theologers, that there is a natural justice and sanctity in the Deity, yet do some notwithstanding contend, that the will of God is not determined by any antecedent rule or nature of justice, but that whatsoever he could be supposed to will arbitrarily, would therefore be *ipso facto* just; which is called by them the divine sovereignty, and looked upon as a great perfection; though it be certain, that these two things are directly contradictory to one another, *viz.* That there is something *φύσει*, in its own nature just and unjust, or a natural sanctity in God; and that the arbitrary will and command of the Deity is the only rule of justice and injustice. Again, some theologers determining, That whatsoever is in God, is God, or essential to the Deity; they conceiving such an immutability to be a necessary perfection thereof, seem thereby not only to contradict all liberty of will in the Deity, which themselves notwithstanding contend for in a high degree, that all things are arbitrarily determined by divine decree; but also to take away from it all power of acting *ad extra*, and of perceiving or animadverting things done successively here in the world. But it will not follow from these and the like contradictions of mistaken theologers, that therefore theology itself is contradictory, and hath nothing of philosophick truth at all in it; no more than because philo-
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sophers also hold contradictory opinions, that therefore philosophy itself is contradictory, and that there is nothing absolutely true or false, but (according to the Protagorean doctrine) all seeming and phantastical.

But in the next place we add, that though it be true, that the nature of things admits of nothing contradictory, and that whatsoever plainly implies a contradiction, must therefore of necessity be a non-entity; yet is this rule, notwithstanding, obnoxious to be much abused, when whatsoever mens shallow and gross understandings cannot reach to, they will therefore presently conclude to be contradictory and impossible. As for example, the Atheists and Materialists cannot conceive of any other substance besides body, and therefore do they determine presently, that incorporeal substance is a contradiction in the very terms, it being as much as to say, incorporeal body¹: wherefore when God is said by theologers to be an incorporeal substance, this is to them an absolute impossibility. Thus a modern writer; *The universe, that is, the whole mass of all things, is corporeal; that is to say, body. Now every part of body is body, and consequently every part of the universe is body; and that which is not body, is no part thereof. And because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing. Therefore when spirits are called incorporeal, this is only a name of honour, and it may with more piety be attributed to God himself, in whom we consider, not what attribute best expresseth his nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour him.* Where, *incorporeal* is said to be an attribute of honour; that is, such an attribute, as expresseth only the veneration of men's minds, but signifieth nothing in nature, nor hath any philosophick truth and reality under it; a substance incorporeal being as contradictory as something and nothing. Notwithstanding which, this contradiction is only in the weakness and childishness of these mens understandings, and not the thing itself; it being demonstrable, that there is some other substance besides body, according to the true and genuine notion of it. But because this mistake is not proper to Atheists only, there being some Theists also, who labour under this same infirmity of mind, not to be able to conceive any other substance besides body, and who therefore assert a corporeal Deity; we shall in the next place shew, from a passage of a modern writer, what kind of contradictions they are, which these Atheists impute to all theology; namely, such as these, that it supposes God to *perceive things sensible, without any organs of sense; and to understand and be wise without any brains. Pious men* (saith he) *attribute to God Almighty, for honour's sake, whatsoever they see honourable in the world, as seeing, bearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c. But they deny him such poor things, as eyes, ears and brains, and other organs, without which we worms, neither have, nor can conceive, such faculties to be: and so far they do well. But when they dispute of God's actions philosophically, then do they consider them again, as if he had indeed such faculties. This is not well, and thence is it, that they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God's nature. He is no fit subject of our philosophy.*

True

¹ Hobbes's Leviath. Cap. XXXIV.

True religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their severall lieutenancies shall ordain. Where the plain and undisguised meaning of the author seems to be this; That God is no subject of philosophy, as all real things are; (accordingly as he declareth elsewhere, that *Religio non est philosophia, sed lex; Religion is not a matter of philosophy, but only of law and arbitrary constitution*) he having no real nature of his own, nor being any true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but (as all other ghosts and spirits) an inhabitant of men's brains only, that is, a figment of their fear and fancy, or a meer political scare-crow. And therefore such attributes are to be given to him, without any scrupulosity, as the civil law of every country shall appoint, and no other; the wise and nature very well understanding, that all this business of religion is nothing but meer pageantry, and that the attributes of the Deity indeed signify neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion towards the object of their fear; the manner of expressing which is determined by civil law. Wherefore to say, that God sees all things, and yet hath no eyes; and that he hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and that he understands, and is wise, and yet hath no brains; and whatsoever else you will please to say of him, as attributes of honour, and only as signifying devotion, is thus far well enough. But when men, not understanding the true cabala, will needs go further, they mistaking attributes of honour for attributes of nature, and of philosophick truth, and making them premises to infer absolute truth, and convince falshood from, or matters to dispute and reason upon; that is, when they will needs suppose such a thing as a God really to exist in the world, then do they involve themselves in all manner of contradiction, nonsense, and absurdity; as for example, to affirm seriously, that this God really sees all things in the world, and yet hath no eyes; and that he indeed hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and lastly, that he understands and is wise, and yet hath no brains, which things are all absolutely contradictory, unconceivable and impossible. The sum of all is this, that when religion and theology, which is indeed nothing but law and phantastry, is made philosophy, then is it all meer jargon and insignificant nonsense. And now we see what those contradictions are, which the Atheists charge upon theology; such as owe all their being only to the grossness, sottishness, and brutishness of these men's own apprehensions. From whence proceedeth likewise, this following definition of knowledge and understanding ², That it is nothing but a tumult of the mind, raised by external things, pressing the organical parts of man's body. *O ye brutish among the people, when will ye understand? and ye fools, when will ye be wise? He that planted the ear, (and gave man's soul a power of hearing thereby) shall not be (though himself have no ears) hear? He that formed the eye (and gave the human soul a power of seeing, by it as an instrument) shall not be (though himself have no eyes) see? Lastly, he that teacheth man knowledge, (or gave him an understanding mind, besides brains) shall not be (though himself be without brains) know and understand?*

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- ¹ De Homine, Cap. XIV.² Leviathan, Cap. XXXI. & Elementa de Cive, Cap. XV.

It is certain, that no simple idea, as that of a triangle or a square, of a cube or sphere, can possibly be contradictory to itself; and therefore much less can the idea of a perfect being (which is the compendious idea of God) it being more simple than any of the other. Indeed this simple idea of a perfect being is pregnant of many attributes; and therefore the idea of God, more fully declared by them all, may seem to be in this respect a compounded idea, or one idea and conception, consisting or made up of many; which if they were really contradictory, would render the whole a non-entity. As for example, this, a plain triangle, whose three angles are greater than two right ones, it being contradictory and unconceivable, is therefore no true idea, but a non-entity. But all the genuine attributes of the Deity, of which its entire idea is made up, are things as demonstrable of a perfect being, as the properties of a triangle or a square are of those ideas respectively, and therefore cannot they possibly be contradictory, neither to it, nor to one another, because those things, which agree in one third, must needs agree together amongst themselves.

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, namely, such as are demonstrable of an absolutely perfect Being, are not only not contradictory, but also necessarily connected together, and inseparable from one another. For there could not possibly be one thing infinite in wisdom only, another thing infinite only in power, and another thing only infinite in duration or eternal. But the very same thing, which is infinite in wisdom, must needs be also infinite in power, and infinite in duration, and so *vice versa*. That, which is infinite in any one perfection, must of necessity have all perfections in it. Thus are all the genuine attributes of the Deity not only not contradictory, but also inseparably concatenate; and the idea of God no congeries either of disagreeing things; or else of such, as are unnecessarily connected, with one another.

In very truth, all the several attributes of the Deity are nothing else but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same simple perfect being, taken in as it were by piece-meal, by reason of the imperfection of our human understandings, which could not fully conceive it all together at once; and therefore are they really all but one thing, though they have the appearance of multiplicity to us. As the one simple light of the sun, diversly refracted and reflected from a roid cloud, hath to us the appearance of the variegated colours of the rainbow.

Wherefore the attributes of God are no bundle of unconceivables and impossibles, huddled up together; nor attributes of honour and compliment only, and nothing but the religious nonsense of astonished minds, expressing their devotion towards what they fear; but all of them attributes of nature, and of most severe philosophick truth. Neither is the idea of God an arbitrary complement of things unnecessarily connected, and separable from one another; it is no factitious, nor fictitious thing, made up by

any feigning power of the soul, but it is a natural and most simple uncompounded idea; such as to which nothing can be arbitrarily added, nor nothing deducted from. Notwithstanding which, by reason of the imperfection of human minds, there may be, and are, different apprehensions concerning it. For as every one, that hath a conception of a plain triangle in general, doth not therefore know, that it includes this property in it, to have three angles equal to two right ones; nor doth every one, who hath an idea of a rectangular triangle, presently understand, that the square of the subtense is equal to the squares of both the sides; so neither doth every one, who hath a conception of a perfect being, therefore presently know all that is included in that idea. Moreover, men may easily mistake things for absolute perfections, which are not such, as hath been partly already shewed.

And now, whereas the Atheists pretend, in the next place, to give an account of that supposed contradictiousness in the idea and attributes of God, namely, that it proceeded principally from fear, or the confounded nonsense of men's astonished minds, huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship and compliment, without any philosophick truth, sense, or signification; as also, in part, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: all this hath been already prevented, and the foundation thereof quite taken away, by our shewing, that there is nothing in the genuine idea of God and his attributes, but what is demonstrable of a perfect Being, and that there cannot be the least either added to that idea, or deducted from it, any more than there can be any thing added to, or deducted from the idea of a triangle, or of a square. From whence it follows unavoidably, that there cannot possibly be any thing either contradictious or arbitrary in the divine idea, and that the genuine attributes thereof are attributes of necessary philosophick truth; namely, such as do not only speak the piety, devotion, and reverence of men's own minds, but declare the real nature of the thing itself. Wherefore, when a modern atheistical writer affirmeth of all those, who reason and conclude concerning God's nature from his attributes, *That, lesing their understanding in the very first attempt, they fall from one inconvenience (or absurdity) to another, without end; after the same manner, as when one, ignorant of court-ceremonies, coming into the presence of a greater person than he was wont to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak; to recover his cloak, lets fall his hat; and so, with one disorder after another, discovers his rusticity and astonishment: we say, that, though there be something of wit and fancy in this, yet, as it is applied to theology, and the genuine attributes of the Deity, there is not the least of philosophick truth.* However, we deny not but that some, either out of superstition, or else out of flattery, (for thus are they stiled by St. Jerome's, *stulti adulatores Dei, foolish flatterers of God Almighty*) have sometimes attributed such things to him as are incongruous to his nature, and, under a pretence of honouring him, by magnifying his power and sovereignty, do indeed most highly

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* Comment. in Habacuc, Lib. I. p. 148. Tom. VI. Oper.

dishonour him; they representing him to be such a Being as is no way amiable or desirable.

But the Atheists are most of all concerned to give an account of that unquestionable phenomenon, the *general persuasion of the existence of a God* in the minds of men, and their *propensity to religion* in all ages and places of the world; whence this should come, if there be really no such thing in nature: and this they think to do in the last place also, partly from men's own fear, together with their ignorance of causes, and partly from the fiction of law-makers and politicians, they endeavouring thereby to keep men in civil subjection under them; where we shall first plainly and nakedly declare the Atheist's meaning, and then manifest the invalidity and foolery of these pretences to solve the forementioned phenomenon.

First, therefore, these Atheists affirm, That mankind, by reason of their natural imbecillity, are in perpetual solicitude, anxiety and fear, concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune to come; and this passion of fear inclining men to imagine things formidable and fearful, and to suspect or believe the existence of what really is not; I say, that this distrustful fear and jealousy in the minds of men, concerning their future condition, raises up to them the phantasm of a most *affrightful spectre, an invisible understanding Being, arbitrarily governing and swaying the affairs of the whole world, and at pleasure tyrannizing over mankind.* And when men's exorbitant fear and fancy has thus raised up to itself such a *Mormo*, or bug-bear, such an affrightful spectre as this, a thing that is really no inhabitant of the world, or of heaven, but only of men's brains, they afterward stand in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worship this creature and figment of their own fear and fancy, as a thing really existing without them, or a God; devising all manner of expressions of honour and reverence towards it, and anxiously endeavouring, by all ways conceivable, to propitiate and atone the same. And thus have they brought upon themselves a most heavy yoke of bondage, and filled their lives with all manner of bitterness and misery.

Again, to this fear of future events the Atheists add also *ignorance of causes*, as a further account of this phenomenon of religion, so generally entertained in the world. For mankind (say they) are naturally inquisitive into the causes of things; and that not only of the events of their own good and evil fortune, but also of the phenomena of the world, and the effects of nature: and such is their curiosity, that wheresoever they can discover no visible and natural causes, there are they prone to feign and imagine other causes, invisible and supernatural. As it was observed of the tragick dramatists, that, whenever they could not well extricate themselves, they were wont to bring in a God upon the stage: and as *Aristotle*¹ recordeth of *Anaxagoras*, that he never betook himself to *Mind*, or *Understanding*, that is, to God for a cause, but only then when he was at a loss for other natural and necessary causes. From whence these Atheists would infer, that nothing but ignorance of causes made *Anaxagoras* to assert a Deity. Wherefore

¹ *Metaphys. Lib. I. Cap. IV. p. 267. Tom. IV. Oper.*

fore it is no wonder (say they) if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes almost of all events and effects of nature, have, by reason of their natural curiosity and fear, feigned or introduced one invisible power or agent omnipotent, as the supreme cause of all things; they betaking themselves thereto, as to a kind of refuge, asylum, or sanctuary for their ignorance.

These two accounts of the phenomenon of religion, from men's fear and solicitude about future events, and from their ignorance of causes, together with their curiosity, are thus joined together by a modern writer: *Perpetual fear of future evils always accompanying mankind, in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse for their evil fortune, but some power or agent invisible.* Moreover, it is concluded, that from the same originals sprang, not only that vulgar opinion of inferior ghosts and spirits also, subservient to the supreme Deity (as the great ghost of the whole world, apparitions being nothing but men's own dreams and fancies taken by them for sensations) but also men's taking things casual for prognosticks, and their being so superstitiously addicted to omens and portents, oracles, and divinations and prophecies; this proceeding likewise from the same phantastick supposition, that the things of the world are disposed of, not by nature, but by some understanding and intending agent or person ¹.

But lest these two forementioned accounts of that phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a Deity, so epidemical to mankind, should yet seem insufficient; the Atheists will superadd a third to them, from the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns, crafty law-makers, and designing politicians: Who perceiving a great advantage to be made, from the belief of a God and religion, for the better keeping of men in obedience and subjection to themselves, and in peace and civil society with one another (when they are persuaded, that besides the punishments appointed by laws, which can only take place upon open and convicted transgressors, and are often eluded and avoided, there are other punishments, that will be inflicted even upon the secret violators of them, both in this life and after death, by a divine, invisible, and irresistible hand) have thereupon dextrously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance, and cherished those seeds of religion in them (being the infirmities of their nature) and further confirmed their belief of ghosts and spirits, miracles and prodigies, oracles and divinations, by tales or fables, publickly allowed and recommended; according to that definition of religion given by a modern writer ², *Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publickly allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition.* And that religion, thus nursed up by politicians, might be every way compliant with, and obsequious to their designs, and no way refractory to the same; it hath been their great care to persuade the people, that

P p p 2 their

¹ Hobbes, Leviath. Cap. XII.

² This is levelled against *Hobbes de Homi-*

ne, Cap. XIII. and *Leviathan*, Cap. XII

³ *Leviathan*. Cap. VI.

their laws were not merely their own inventions, but that themselves were only the interpreters of the gods therein, and that the same things were really displeasing to the gods, which were forbidden by them; God ruling over the world no otherwise, than in them, as his vicegerents; according to that assertion of a late writer, *Deum nullum regnum in homines habere, nisi per eos, qui imperium tenent, that God reigneth over men, only in the civil sovereignty.* This is therefore another atheistical account of religion's so generally prevailing in the world, from its being a fit engine of state, and politicians generally looking upon it as an *arcannum imperii, a mystery of government,* to possess the minds of the people with the belief of a God, and to keep them busily employed in the exercises of religion, thereby to render them the more tame and gentle, apt to obedience, subjection, peace, and civil society.

Tract. Theol.
P. 2.
[L. II. Spi-
nozae Cap.
IX. p. 214.]

Neither is all this the meer invention of modern Atheists, but indeed the old atheistical cabal, as may appear partly from that known passage of the poet, *That the gods were first made by fear;* and from *Lucretius* his so frequently insisting upon the same, according to the mind of *Epicurus.* For in his first book he makes *terrorem animi, & tenebras, terror of mind, and darkness,* the chief causes of theism; and in his sixth, he further pursues the same grounds, especially the latter of them, after this manner;

Lamb 528.
[Verf. 49.]

*Cetera quae fieri in terris caeloque videntur
Mortales,avidis quom pendunt mentibus saepe,
Efficiunt animos humiles formidine divum;
Depressosque premunt ad terram, propterea quod
IGNORANTIA CAUSARUM conferre deorum
Cogit ad imperium res; & concedere regnum, &
Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre
Possunt, haec fieri divino numine rentur.*

To this sense; *Mortals, when with trembling minds they behold the objects both of heaven and earth, they become depressed and sunk down under the fear of the gods; ignorance of causes setting up the reign and empire of the gods. For when men can find no natural causes of these things, they suppose them, presently, to have been done by a divine power.*

And this ignorance of causes is also elsewhere insisted upon by the same poet, as the chief source of religion, or the belief of a God.

Lib. 5. Lamb.
p. 500.
[Verf. 1182.]

*Præterea cæli rationes ordine certo,
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti;
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoscere causas.
Ergo PERFUGIUM sibi habebant, omnia divis
Tradere, & ipsorum nutu facere omnia fletu.*

Moreover, when a modern writer declares the opinion of ghosts to be one of those things, in which consisteth the natural seeds of religion:

2. Petron. in Fragment. p. 676. Edit. Burman.

as also that this opinion proceedeth from the ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense; he seemeth herein to have trod likewise in the footsteps of *Lucretius*, giving, not obscurely, the same account of religion in his fifth book¹:

*Nunc quæ causa deùm per magnas numina gentes
Pervolgarit, & ararum com'levit urbes, &c.
Non ita difficile est rationem reddere verbis.
Quippe etenim jam tum divùm mortalia secla
Egregias animo facies vigilante videbant,
Et magis in somnis, mirando corporis ausu.
His igitur sensum tribuebant, &c.*

That is, *How the noise of the gods came thus to ring over the whole world, and to fill all places with temples and altars, is not a thing very difficult to give an account of; it proceeding first from mens fearful dreams, and their phantasms when awake, taken by them for visions and sensations. Whereupon they attributed not only sense to these things as really existing, but also immortality and great power.* For though this were properly an account only of those inferior and plebeian gods, called *dæmons* and *genii*, yet was it supposed, that the belief of these things did easily dispose the minds of men also to the persuasion of one supreme omnipotent Deity over all.

Lastly, that the ancient Atheists, as well as the modern, pretended, the opinion of a God and religion to have been a political invention, is frequently declared in the writings of the Pagans; as in this of *Cicero*², *Il, qui dixerunt totam de diis immortalibus opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus, reipublice causa, ut quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret; nonne omnem religionem funditus sustulerunt? They, who affirmed the whole opinion of the gods to have been feigned by wise men for the sake of the commonwealth, that so religion might engage those to their duty, whom reason could not, did they not utterly destroy all religion?* And the sense of the ancient Atheists is thus represented by *Plato*; *Θεὸς, ὃ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτον Φασὶν εἶναι τέχνην, ἢ De Leg. l. 10. φύσει, ἀλλὰ τισὶ νόμοις, ἢ τῆς ἄλλης ἄλλαις, ὅπῃ ἕκαστος συνηκολύθησαν νομοθετή- [p. 666.] μιναι.* *They first of all affirm, that the gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only; and that from thence it comes to pass, that they are different to different nations and countries, accordingly as the several humours of their law-makers did chance to determine.* And before *Plato*, *Critias*, one of the thirty tyrants of *Athens*, plainly declared religion at first to have been a political intrigue, in those verses of his recorded by *Sextus*³ the philosopher, beginning to this purpose; *That there was a time at first, when men's life was disorderly and brutish, and the will of the stronger was the only law: after which, they consented and agreed together to make civil laws; that so the disorderly might be punished.* Notwithstanding which, it was still found, that men were only hindered from open, but not from secret injustices: whereupon some sagacious and witty person was the author of a further invention, to deter men as well from secret, as from open injuries:

¹ *Ἐπιτεῦθε.*

¹ *Verf. 1160.*

³ *Lib. VIII. advers. Mathematic. §. LIV.*

² *De Nat. Deor. Lib. I. Cap. XLII. p. 294. p. 562.*

Tom. IX. Oper.

Ἐπεὶ θεὸν εὖ τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο
 ὦ; ἐπὶ δαίμων ἀφ' ὅτι γ' ἑάλλων βίῃ,
 Νόσ τ' ἀκάνω καὶ βλέπων, φρονῶντε·
 Ἵφ' ἢ πᾶν μὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκούσαι,
 Δράμειον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνήσεται.

Namely, by introducing or feigning a God immortal and incorruptible, who bears, and sees, and takes notice of all things. Critias then concluding his Poem in these words ;

Ὅτω δὲ πρῶτον οἴομαι πείσαι τινα
 Θεῆτας νομιζειν δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος.

And in this manner do I conceive, some one at first to have persuaded mortals to believe, that there is a kind of gods.

Thus have we fully declared the sense of the Atheists, in their account of the phænomenon of religion and the belief of a God ; namely, that they derive it principally from these three springs or originals : *First*, from mens own fear and solicitude concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune. *Secondly*, from their ignorance of the causes both of those events, and the phænomena of nature ; together with their curiosity. And, *Lastly*, from the fiction of civil sovereigns, law-makers, and politicians. The weakness and foolery of all which, we shall now briefly manifest. *First*, therefore, it is certain, that such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly and obstinately to believe the existence of that, which there is no manner of ground neither from sense nor reason for, tending also to the great disquiet of mens own lives, and the terrour of their minds, cannot be accounted other than a kind of crazedness or distraction. Wherefore, the Atheists themselves acknowledging, the generality of mankind to be possessed with such a belief of a Deity, when they resolve this into such an excess of fear ; it is all one, as if they should affirm the generality of mankind to be frightened out of their wits, or crazed and distemper'd in their brains : none but a few Atheists, who being undaunted and undismay'd have escap'd this panick terrour, remaining sober and in their right senses. But, whereas the Atheists thus impute to the generality of mankind, not only light-minded credulity and phantastry, but also such an excess of fear, as differs nothing at all from crazedness and distraction or madness ; we affirm, on the contrary, that their supposed courage, stayedness and sobriety, is really nothing else but the dull and sottish stupidity of their minds ; dead and heavy incredulity, and earthly diffidence or distrust ; by reason whereof, they will believe nothing but what they can feel or see.

Theists indeed have a religious fear of God, which is consequent from him, or their belief of him, (of which more afterwards ;) but the Deity itself, or the belief thereof, was not created by any antecedent fear, that is,

▪ To these passages of the antients, wherein the origin of all religion is ascribed to supersticity, add *Seneca, Quæst. Natur. lib. II.*

Cap. XLII. p. 536. Tom. II. Oper. and *Levius Empiric, Lib. VIII. advers. Mathematic. p. 551.*

by fear concerning men's good and evil fortune; it being certain, that none are less solicitous concerning such events, than they who are most truly religious. The reason whereof is, because these place their chief good in nothing that is ἀλλότριον, *aliene or in another's power*, and exposed to the strokes of fortune; but in that which is most truly their own, namely, the right use of their own will. As the Atheists, on the contrary, must needs, for this very reason, be liable to great fears and sollicitudes concerning outward events, because they place their good and evil in the πάθος ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης, *the passion of pleasure and pain*; or at least, denying natural honesty, they acknowledge no other good but what belongs to the animal life only, and so is under the empire of fortune. And that the Atheists are indeed generally timorous and fearful, suspicious and distrustful things, seems to appear plainly from their building all their politicks, civil societies, and justice, (improperly so called) upon that only foundation of fear and distrust.

But the grand error of the Atheists here is this, that they suppose the Deity, according to the sense of the generality of mankind, to be nothing but a *Mormo, Bug-bear, or Terriculum, an affrightful, hurtful, and most undesirable thing*: whereas men every where invoke the Deity in their straits and difficulties for aid and assistance, looking upon it as exorable and plausible; and by their trust and confidence in it, acknowledge its goodness and benignity. *Synefius* affirms, that though men were otherwise much divided in their opinions, yet ἀγαθὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶσιν ἀπαύσις ἀπανταρχῆ καὶ σοφοῖ ἢ ἄσοφοι; *They all every where, both wise and unwise, agree in this, that God is to be praised, as one who is good and benign.*

De Regno, p. 9. [Ofer. Edit. Petavii.]

If among the Pagans there were any, who understood that proverbial speech, Φθονεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the worst sense, as if God Almighty were of an *envious and spiteful nature*; these were certainly but a few ill-natur'd men, who therefore drew a picture of the Deity according to their own likeness. For the proverb, in that sense, was disclaimed and cried down by all the wiser Pagans; as *Aristotle*, who affirmed the *Poets to have lied in this, as well as they did in many other things*; and *Plutarch*, who taxeth *Herodotus* for insinuating, τὸ θεῖον πᾶν Φθονεῖον τε καὶ ταραχῶδες; *the Deity universally, (that is, all the gods) to be of an envious and vexatious or spiteful disposition*; whereas himself appropriated this only to that evil dæmon or principle ascribed by him, as appeareth from the life of *P. Æmilius*, written by him, where he affirmeth, not that τὸ θεῖον πᾶν Φθονεῖον, *the Deity universally was of an envious nature*; but, that there is a certain deity or dæmon, whose proper task it is, to bring down all great and over-swelling human prosperity, and so to temper every man's life, that none may be happy in this world, sincerely and unmixedly, without a check of adversity; which is, as if a Christian should ascribe it to the devil. And *Plato* plainly declares the reason of God's making the world at first, to have been no other than this, ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἀεὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀδίκωτε ἰσχυρίζεται Φθύνει; *Because he was good, and there is*

Metaph. l. i. c. 2. [P. 263. Tom. IV. Oper.]
ἄπει τὸ θεῖον Φθονεῖον ἐνδίκως εἶναι ἀδικὰ πολλά φεύγονται ἀδικίᾳ. c. de Herod. Malign. [P. 857. Tom II. Oper.]

¹ Tom. II. Oper. p. 273. ² In *Timæo*, Cap. XIV. p. 237. Edit. Fabricii.

no manner of envy in that which is good. From whence he also concluded, πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβελήθη γινῆσθαι παρρηλικῶν αὐτῶν; That God therefore willed all things should be made the most like himself; that is, after the b. ft manner. But the true meaning of that ill-languaged proverb seems, at first, to have been no other, than what, besides Hesiod, the Scripture itself also attributes to God Almighty, that he affecteth to humble and abase the pride of men, and to pull down all high, towering, and lofty things, whether as noxious and hurtful to the men themselves, or as in some sense invidious to him, and derogatory from his honour, who alone ought to be exalted, and no flesh to glory before him. And there hath been so much experience of such a thing as this in the world, that the Epicurean poet himself could not but confess, that there was some hidden force or power, which seemed to have a spite to all over-swelling greatneses, and affect to cast contempt and scorn upon the pride of men;

Lamb. 503.
[11b. V.
Vers. 1232]

Usque ad id res humanas vis abdita quædam
Obterit, & pulchros fasces, sævasque secures,
Præculcare, ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.

Where he plainly reel'd and stagger'd in his atheism, or else was indeed a Theist, but knew it not; it being certain, that there can be no such force as this, in *regno atomorum*, in the reign or empire of senseless atoms. And as for those among Christians, who make such a horrid representation of God Almighty, as one who created far the greatest part of mankind, for no other end or design, but only this, that he might recreate and delight himself in their eternal torments; these also do but transcribe or copy out their own ill nature, and then read it in the Deity; the Scripture declaring on the contrary, that God is love. Nevertheless these very persons, in the mean time, dearly hug and embrace God Almighty in their own conceit, as one that is fondly good, kind, and gracious to themselves; he having fastned his affections upon their very persons, without any consideration of their dispositions or qualifications.

It is true indeed, that religion is often expressed in the Scripture by the *fear of God*, and fear hath been said to be *prima mensura Deitatis*, the first measure of the Divinity in us, or the first impression, that religion makes upon men in this obnoxious and guilty state, before they have arrived to the true love of God and righteousness. But this religious fear is not a fear of God, as a mere arbitrary omnipotent Being, much less as hurtful and mischievous, (which could not be disjoined from hatred;) but an awful regard of him, as of one who is essentially just, and as well a punisher of vice and wickedness, as a rewarder of virtue; Lucretius himself, when he describes this religious fear of men, confessing it to be conjoined with a conscience of their duty, or to include the same within itself;

P. 503.
[11b. V.
Vers. 1223]

Tunc populi gentesque tremunt, &c.
Ne quod ob admissum sæcæ distulisse superlè,
Pœnarum grave si: solvendi tempus adactum.

And

And this is the sense of the generality of mankind, that there being a natural difference of good and evil moral, there is an impartial justice in the Deity, which presideth over the same, and inclines it as well to punish the wicked, as to reward the virtuous: *Epicurus* himself acknowledging thus Ep. ad Mem- rax. P. 46. *ἔστιν καὶ μεγίστης βλάβης οἰονταί, τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιπέθεσθαι, καὶ ἀφελείης τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, Θεοῖς suppose, that there are both great evils inflicted upon the wicked from the gods; and also great rewards by them bestowed upon the good.* Gass. [Tom. V. O-per. Vide etiam Diog. Laert. Lib. X. § 124.p.665.]

And this fear of God, is not only beneficial to mankind in general, by repressing the growth of wickedness, but also wholesome and salutary to those very persons themselves, that are thus religiously affected, it being preservative of them both from moral evils, and likewise from the evils of punishment consequent thereupon. This is the true and genuine fear of religion, which, when it degenerates into a dark kind, of jealous and suspicious fear of God Almighty, either as a hurtful, or as a meer arbitrary and tyrannical being, then is it looked upon as the vice or extreme of religion, and distinguished from it by that name of *δυσσεβασμία, superstition.* Thus is the character of a superstitious man given by *Plutarch*, οἶται θεῶς περὶ δευσεβασμῶν [P. 165.] εἶναι, λυπηρὸς δὲ καὶ βλαβερὸς, *That he thinks there are gods, but that they are noxious and hurtful*; and ἀνάσσει καὶ μισεῖν τὸν δευσεβασμίονα, καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς, per.] *a superstitious man must needs hate God, as well as fear him.* The true fear of God (as the son of *Sirach* speaks) is the beginning of his love, and faith is the beginning of cleaving to him. As if he should have said, the first entrance into religion is an awful regard to God as the punisher of vice; the second step forwards therein is faith or confidence in God, whereby men rely upon him for good, and cleave to him; and the top and perfection of all religion is the love of God above all, as the most amiable being. Christianity, the best of religions, recommendeth faith to us, as the inlet or introduction into all true and ingenuous piety; for *he that cometh to God, must not only believe, that he is, but also that he is a rewarder of those that seek him.* Hebr. c. xi. 1.

Which faith is better defined in the Scripture, than by any scholastick, to be the substance of things (that are to be) hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen; that is, a confident persuasion of things, that fall not under sight, (because they are either invisible or future) and which also are to be hoped for. So that religious fear consisteth well with faith, and faith is near of kin to hope, and the result of both faith and hope is love; which faith, hope and love, do all suppose an essential goodness in the Deity. God is such a Being, who, if he were not, were of all things whatsoever most to be wished for; it being indeed no way desirable (as that noble emperor concluded) for a man to live in a world, void of a God and providence. He, that believes a God, believes all that good and perfection in the universe, which his heart can possibly wish or desire. It is the interest of none, that there should be no God, but only of such wretched persons, as have abandoned their first and only true interest of being good, and friends to God, and are desperately resolved upon ways of wickedness.

The reason, why the Atheists do thus grossly mistake the notion of God, and conceive of him differently from the generality of mankind, as a thing,

which is only to be feared, and must consequently be hated, is from nothing but their own vice and ill-nature. For first, their vice so far blinding them, as to make them think, that the moral differences of good and evil have no foundation in nature, but only in law or arbitrary constitution, (which law is contrary to nature, nature being liberty, but law restraint :) as they cannot but really hate that, which hinders them of their true liberty and chief good, so must they needs interpret the severity of the Deity to much spoken of against wickedness, to be nothing else but cruelty and arbitrary tyranny. Again, it is a wretched ill-natured maxim, which these Atheists have, That there is *nulla naturalis charitas, no natural charity*, but that *omnis benevolentia oritur ex imbecillitate & metu, all benevolence ariseth only from imbecillity and fear*; that is, from being either obnoxious to another's power, or standing in need of his help. So that all, that is now called love and friendship amongst men, is, according to these, really nothing, but either a crouching under another's power, whom they cannot resist, or else *Mercatura quedam utilitatum, a certain kind of merchandizing for utilities*. And thus does *Cotta* in *Cicero* declare their sense; *Ne homines quidem censetis, nisi imbecilli essent, futuros beneficos aut benignos; You conceive that no man would be any way beneficent or benevolent to another, were it not for his imbecillity or indigence*. But as for God Almighty, these Atheists conclude, that upon the supposition of his existence, there could not be so much as this spurious love or benevolence in him neither towards any thing; because by reason of his absolute and irresistible power, he would neither stand in need of any thing, and be devoid of all fear. Thus the forementioned *Cotta*. *Quid est prestantius bonitate & beneficentiâ? Quâ cum carere Deum vultis, neminem Deo nec Deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari vultis. Ita fit, ut non moxio homines à diis, sed ipsi dii inter se ab aliis aliâ negligantur. What is there more excellent than goodness and beneficence? which when you will needs have God to be utterly devoid of, you suppose, that neither any God nor man is dear to the supreme God, or beloved of him. From whence it will follow, that not only men are neglected by the gods, but also the gods amongst themselves are neglected by one another*. Accordingly a late pretender to politicks, who in this manner discards all natural justice and charity, determines concerning God¹, *Regnandi & puniendi eos, qui leges suas violant, jus Deo esse à solâ potentiâ irresistibili; That he has no other right of reigning over men, and of punishing those, who transgress his laws, but only from his irresistible power*. Which indeed is all one as to say, *That God has no right at all of ruling over mankind, and imposing commands upon them*, but what he doth in this kind, he doth it only by force and power, right and might (or power) being very different things from one another, and there being no *jus* or *right* without natural justice; so that the word *right* is here only abused. And consentaneously hereunto the same writer further adds²; *Si jus regnandi habeat Deus ab omnipotentia sua, manifestum est obligationem ad præstandam ipsi obedientiam incumbere hominibus propter imbecillitatem; That if God's right of commanding be derived only from his omnipotence,*

Cic. de N. D.
L. 1. 213.
Lamb.
[Cap. XLIII.
p. 194.
Oper.]

Cic. Ibid.

Cic. Ibid.

¹ Hobbes, Elem. de Cive, Cap. XV. §. IV. p. 112. & alias.

² Ibid. §. VII. p. 114.

then it is manifest, that men's obligations to obey him lies upon them only from their imbecillity. Or, as it is further explained by him; *Homines ideò Deu subiectos esse, quia omnipotentes non sunt, aut quia ad resistendum satis virium non habent; That men are therefore only subject to God, because they are not omnipotent, or have not sufficient power to resist him.* Thus do we see plainly, how the Atheists, by reason of their vice and ill-nature, (which makes them deny all natural justice and honesty, all natural charity and benevolence) transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; such an omnipotent Being, as if he were, could have nothing neither of justice in him, nor of benevolence towards his creatures; and whose only right and authority of commanding them would be his irresistible power; whom his creatures could not place any hope, trust and confidence in, nor have any other obligation to obey, than that of fear and necessity, proceeding from their imbecillity, or inability to resist him. And such a Deity as this is indeed a *Mormo* or *Bug-bear*, a most formidable and affrightful thing.

But all this is nothing but the Atheists false imagination, true religion representing a most comfortable prospect of things from the Deity; whereas on the contrary, the atheistical scene of things is dismal, hopeless and forlorn, that there should be no other good, than what depends upon things wholly out of our own power, the momentary gratification of our insatiate appetites, and the perpetual pouring into a *dolium pertusum*, a perforated and leaking vessel: that ourselves should be but a congeries of atoms, upon the dissolution of whose compages, our life should vanish into nothing, and all our hope perish: that there should be no providence over us, nor any kind and good-natured Being above to take care of us, there being nothing without us but dead and senseless matter. True indeed, there could be no spiteful designs in senseless atoms, or a dark inconscionable nature. Upon which account, *Plutarch* would grant, that even this atheistical hypothesis *De Super.^o* itself, as bad as it is, were, notwithstanding, to be preferred before that of an [P. 164. omnipotent, spiteful, and malicious being, (if there can be any such hypothesis as this) a monarchy of the Manichean evil principle, reigning all alone over the whole world, without any corival, and having an undisturbed empire. Nevertheless it is certain also, that there could be no faith nor hope neither in these senseless atoms, both necessarily and fortuitously moved, no more than there could be faith and hope in a whirlwind, or in a tempestuous sea, whose merciless waves are inexorable, and deaf to all cries and supplications. For which reason *Epicurus*' himself confessed, that *Epist. ad Mex.* it was better to give credit to the fable of the gods, (as he calls it) than to p. 49. *Gall.* serve the atheistical fate, or that material necessity of all things, introduced by those atheistical Philosophers, *Leucippus* and *Democritus*; *κεῖντον ἢ τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ καλοκαθεῖν, ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἰμαρμῶν;* *ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραίτητους ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς ἢ διὰ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην* *Because there is hopes,* that the gods may be prevailed with by worship and prayer; but the other [necessity] is altogether deaf and inexorable. And though *Epicurus* thought to mend the matter, and make the atheistical hypothesis more tolerable, by introducing into it (contrary to the tenor of those Principles) liberty of

Q q q q 2

will

* Vide *Diog. Laert. Lib. X. Segm. 134. p. 659.*

will in men; yet this being not a power over things without us, but our selves only, could alter the case very little. *Epicurus* himself was in a panic fear, lest the frame of heaven should sometime upon a sudden crack, and tumble about his ears, and this fortuitous compilement of atoms be dissolved into a chaos;

—————*Tria talia texta*
Una dies dabit exitio; multosque per annos
Sustentata ruet moles & machina mundi.

De Superst.
 [P. 65.
 Tom. II.
 O. 1. c.]

And what comfort could his liberty of will then afford him, who placed all his happiness in security from external evils? *Τὸ αὐτὸ τὰ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι θεῶν, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι*, (saith *Plutarch*;) *The atheistical design in shaking off the belief of a God, was to be without fear*; but by means hereof, they framed such a system of things to themselves, as, under which, they could not have the least hope, faith or confidence. Thus running from fear, did they plunge themselves into fear; for they, who are without hope, can never be free from fear. Endless of necessity must the fears and anxieties of those men be, who shake of that one fear of God, that would only preserve them from evil, and have no faith nor hope in him. Wherefore we might conclude, upon better grounds than the Atheists do of theirism, that atheism (which hath no foundation at all in nature nor in reason) springs first from the imposture of fear. For the faith of religion being the substance or confidence of such things not seen, as are to be hoped for; atheistical infidelity must needs, on the contrary, be a certain heavy diffidence, despondence and misgiving of mind, or a timorous distrust and disbelief of good to be hoped for, beyond the reach of sense; namely, of an invisible Being omnipotent, that exerciseth a just, kind, and gracious providence, over all those who commit their ways to him, with an endeavour to please him, both here in this life, and after death. But vice, or the love of lawless liberty, prevailing over such disbelieving persons, makes them, by degrees, more and more desirous, that there should be no God; that is, no such hinderer of their liberty; and to count it a happiness to be freed from the fear of him, whose justice (if he were) they must needs be obnoxious to.

And now have we made it evident, that these Atheists, who make religion and the belief of a God to proceed from the imposture of fear, do first of all disguise the Deity, and put a monstrous, horrid, and affrightful vizard upon it, transforming it into such a thing, as can only be feared and hated; and then do they conclude concerning it, (as well indeed they may) that there is no such thing as this really existing in nature, but that it is only a *Mormo* or *Bug-bear*, raised up by men's fear and fancy. Of the two, it might better be said, that the opinion of a God sprung from men's hope of good, than from their fear of evil; but really, it springs neither from hope nor fear, (however in different circumstances it raises both those passions in our minds;) nor is it the imposture of any passion, but that whose belief is supported and sustained by the

strongest

strongest and clearest reason, as shall be declared in due place. But the sense of a Deity often preventing ratiocination in us, and urging itself more immediately upon us, it is certain, that there is also, besides a rational belief thereof, a natural prolepsis, or anticipation, in the minds of men concerning it, which, by *Aristotle*, is called *Μαρούς*, a *vaticination*.

Thus have we sufficiently confuted the first atheistical pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a God, so generally entertained, from the imposture of fear. We come now to the second, That it proceeded from the ignorance of causes also, or men's want of philosophy; they being prone, by reason of their innate curiosity, where they find no causes to make or feign them; and from their fear, in the absence of natural and necessary causes, to imagine supernatural and divine; this also affording them a handsome cover and pretext for their ignorance: for which cause these Atheists stick not to affirm of God Almighty, what some philosophers do of occult qualities, that he is but *refugium & asylum ignorantie*; a *refuge and shelter for men's ignorance*; that is, in plain and downright language, *the mere sanctuary of fools*.

And these two things are here commonly joined together by these Atheists both *fear*, and *ignorance of causes*, as which jointly concur in the production of theism; because, as the fear of children raises up bug-bears, especially in the dark, so do they suppose in like manner the fear of men, in the darkness of their ignorance of causes especially, to raise up the *Mormo*, spectre, or phantasm of a God; which is thus intimated by the Epicurean poet¹,

————— *Omnia cecis*
In tenebris metuunt.

And accordingly *Democritus* gave this account of the original of theism or *Steph. Poe.* religion, *ὄραντε τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις παθήματα οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ θάπερ Phil. 158. ex βροντᾶς καὶ ἀστραπᾶς, καὶ κεραυνῶς, ἢ καὶ σελήνης ἐκλείψεις, ἰδιωματῶσι θεῶν οἴομενοι Sexto. [Vide τούτων αἰτίας. That when, in old times, men observed strange and affrightful things in the meteors and the heaven, as thunder, lightning, thunderbolts and eclipses, they not knowing the causes thereof, and being terrified thereby, presently imputed them to the Gods. And Epicurus declares this to have been the reason, why he took such great pains in the study of physiology, that, by finding out the natural and necessary causes of things, he might be able to free both himself and others from the terror of a God, which would otherwise invade and assault them; the importunity of men's minds, when ever they are at a loss for natural causes, urging them so much with the fear, suspicion, and jealousy of a Deity.*

Wherefore the Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out, as they conceive, material and mechanical causes for some of the phenomena of nature, and especially for such of them as the unskilful vulgar sometimes impute to God himself, when they can prove eclipses (for example)

¹ *Lucret. Lib. II. vers. 54; 55.*

example) to be no miracles, and render it probable, that thunder is not the voice of God Almighty himself, as it were roaring above in the heavens, merely to affright and amaze poor mortals, and make them quake and tremble; and that thunderbolts are not there flung by his own hands, as the direful messengers of his wrath and displeasure; they presently conclude triumphantly thereupon, concerning *nature* or *matter*, that it doth

¹ *Ipsa sua per se, sponte, omnia Diis agere expers,*

do all things alone of itself without a God. But we shall here make it appear in a few instances, as briefly as we may, that philosophy, and the true knowledge of causes, leads to God; and that atheism is nothing but ignorance of causes and of philosophy.

For first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless atoms, or matter, is able to assign any cause at all of himself, or give any true account of the original of his own soul or mind, it being utterly unconceivable and impossible, that soul and mind, sense, reason and understanding, should ever arise from irrational and senseless matter, however modified; or result from atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities, that is, from mere magnitude, figure, site and motion of parts: For though it be indeed absurd to say (as these Atheists alledge) that *laughing and crying things* are made out of *laughing and crying principles*,

² *Et ridere potest non ex ridentibus factus;*

yet does it not therefore follow, that sensitive and rational beings might result from a composition of irrational and senseless atoms; which, according to the Democritick hypothesis, have nothing in them but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, or rest, because *laughing and crying* are motions, which result from the mechanism of human bodies, in such a manner organized; but *sense* and *understanding* are neither local motion, nor mechanism. And the case will be the very same, both in the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian, and in the Stratonick or Hylozoick atheism; because *sense* and *conscious understanding* could no more result, either from those qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, contempered together; or from the mere organization of inanimate and senseless matter, than it could from the

³ *Concurfus, motus, ordo, postura, figuræ,*

of atoms devoid of all manner of qualities. Had there been once nothing but senseless matter, fortuitously moved, there could never have emerged into being any soul or mind, sense or understanding; because no effect can possibly transcend the perfection of its cause. Wherefore Atheists supposing themselves, and all souls and minds, to have sprung from stupid and senseless matter, and all that wisdom, which is any where in the world, both political and philosophical, to be the result of mere fortune and chance, must

¹ Lucret. Lib. II. vers. 1091.

² Id. ibid. vers. 985.

³ Id. Lib. I. vers. 686.

needs be concluded to be grossly ignorant of causes; which had they not been, they could never have been Atheists. So that ignorance of causes is the seed, not of theism, but of atheism; true philosophy, and the knowledge of the cause of ourselves, leading necessarily to a Deity.

Again, Atheists are ignorant of the cause of motion in bodies also; by which notwithstanding they suppose all things to be done; that is, they are never able to solve this phenomenon, so long as they are Atheists, and acknowledge no other substance besides matter or body. For first, it is undeniably certain, that motion is not essential to all body as such, because then no particles of matter could ever rest; and consequently there could have been no generation, nor no such mundane system produced as this is, which requires a certain proportionate commixture of motion and rest; no sun, nor moon, nor earth, nor bodies of animals; since there could be no coherent consistency of any thing, when all things fluttered and were in continual separation and division from one another. Again, it is certain likewise, that matter or body, as such, hath no power of moving itself freely or spontaneously neither, by will or appetite; both because the same inconvenience would from hence ensue likewise, and because the phenomena or appearances do plainly evince the contrary. And as for that prodigiously absurd paradox of some few hylozoick Atheists, that all matter as such, and therefore every smallest particle thereof, hath not only life essentially belonging to it, but also perfect wisdom and knowledge, together with appetite, and self-moving power, though without animal sense or consciousness: this, I say, will be elsewhere in due place further confuted. But the generality of the ancient Atheists, that is, the Anaximandrians and Democriticks, attributed no manner of life to matter as such; and therefore could ascribe no voluntary or spontaneous motion to the same, but fortuitous only; according to that of the Epicurean poet¹ already cited,

*Nam certè neque consilio, primordia rerum
Ordine se quæque, atque sagaci mente locarunt;
Nec quos quæque darent motus pepigere profecto.*

Wherefore these Democriticks, as *Aristotle* somewhere² intimates, were able to assign no other cause of motion, than only this, *That one body moved another from eternity infinitely*, so that there was no *πρώτου κινήου*, no *first unmoved mover*, ever to be found; because there is no beginning, nor first in eternity. From whence probably, that doctrine of some atheistical Stoicks in *Alex. Aphrodisius* was derived, *That there is no first in the rank and order of causes*. In the footsteps of which philosophers a modern writer seemeth to have trodden, when declaring himself after this manner³; *Si quis ab esse sui quocunque, ad causam ejus immediatam, atque inde ad remotiorem, ut sic perpetuò ratiocinatione ascenderit, non tamen in æternum procedere poterit, sed defatigatus aliquando deficiet*. *If any one will will from whatsoever effect ascend upward to its immediate cause, and from thence to a remoter,*

¹ Lib. I. Vers. 1020.

² Vide *Physic. Lib. VIII. Cap. I. §. III. p. 796. Tom. I. Oper. & §. XXVII. p. 579.*

³ *Hobbes, Elem. Philosoph. Part. IV. Cap. XXVI. p. 204.*

Alex. Aph. Lib. de Fato, P. §. XXV. P. 118. Edit. Lond.]

and so onwards perpetually, in his ratiocination ; yet shall be never be able to hold on thorough all eternity ; but at length being quite tired out with his journey, be forced to desist, or give over. Which seems to be all one, as if he should have said, one thing moved or caused another infinitely from eternity, in which there being no beginning, there is consequently no first mover or cause to be reach'd unto. But this infinite progress of these Democriticks, in the order of causes, and their shifting off the cause of motion, from one thing to another, without end or beginning, was rightly understood by Aristotle¹, to be indeed the assigning of no cause of motion at all, εἰς ἀπειρον εἶναι, εἰ μὴτι ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν κινῆν πρώτου, *They acknowledging* (saith he) *no first mover according to nature, must needs make an idle progress infinitely* ; that is, in the language of this philosopher, assign no cause at all of motion. Epicurus therefore, to mend the matter, though according to the principles of the atomick physiology, he discarded all other qualities, yet did he notwithstanding admit this one quality of gravity or ponderosity in atoms, pressing them continually downwards in infinite space. In which, as nothing could be more absurd nor unphilosophical, than to make upwards and downwards in infinite space, or a gravity tending to no centre, nor place of rest ; so did he not assign any cause of motion neither, but only in effect affirm, the atoms therefore to tend downwards, because they did so ; a quality of gravity, signifying only an endeavour to tend downwards, but why or wherefore, no body knows. And it is all one, as if Epicurus should have said, that atoms moved downwards by an occult quality, he either betaking himself to this as an asylum, a sanctuary or refuge for his ignorance ; or else indeed more absurdly, making his very ignorance itself (disguised under that name of a quality) to be the cause of motion. Thus the atheists universally either assigned no cause at all for motion, as the Anaximandrians and Democriticks ; or else no true one, as the Hylozoists ; when, to avoid incorporeal substance, they would venture to attribute perfect understanding, appetite or will, and self-moving power to all senseless matter whatsoever. But since it appears plainly, that matter or body cannot move itself, either the motion of all bodies must have no manner of cause ; or else must there of necessity be some other substance besides body, such as is self-active and hylarchical, or hath a natural power of ruling over matter. Upon which latter account Plato rightly determined, that cogitation, which is self-activity or autokinesy, was in order of nature, before the local motion of body, which is heterokinesy. Though motion considered passively in bodies, or taken for their translation, or change of distance and place, be indeed a corporeal thing, or a mode of those bodies themselves moving ; yet, as it is considered actively for the *vis movens*, that *active force*, which causes this translation, or change of place, so is it an incorporeal thing ; the energy of a self-active substance upon that sluggish matter or body, which cannot at all move itself. Wherefore in the bodies of animals, the true and proper cause of motion, or the determination thereof at least, is not the matter itself organized, but the soul either as cogitative, or plastically self-active, vitally united thereunto, and naturally ruling over it. But in the whole world it is either God himself, originally impressing

¹ *Physic. Aulculat. Lib. VII. Cap. II. p. 365. Tom. I. Oper.*

a certain quantity of motion upon the matter of the universe, and constantly conserving the same, according to that of the Scripture, *In him we live and move*; (which seems to have been the sense also of that noble Agrigentine poet and philosopher¹, when he described God to be only a *pure or holy mind, that with swift thoughts agitates the whole world*;) or else it is instrumentally an inferior created spirit, soul, or life of nature; that is, a subordinate hylarchical principle, which hath a power of moving matter regularly, according to the direction of a superior perfect Mind. And thus do we see again, that ignorance of causes is the seed of atheism, and not of theism; no Atheists being able to assign a true cause of motion, the knowledge whereof plainly leadeth to a God.

Furthermore, those Atheists, who acknowledge no other principle of things but senseless matter fortuitously moved, must needs be ignorant also of the cause of that grand phenomenon, called by *Aristotle*, the *τὸ εἶς ἡ καλλῆς*, *the well and fit in nature*; that is, of the most artificial frame of the whole mundane system in general, and of the bodies of animals in particular, together with the conspiring harmony of all. For they, who boasted themselves able to give natural causes of all things whatsoever, without a God, can give no other cause at all of this phenomenon, but only that the world happened by chance to be thus made as it is. Now, they, who make fortune and chance to be the only cause of this so admirable phenomenon, the most regular and artificial frame, and harmony of the universe, they either make the mere absence and want of a cause to be a cause, fortune and chance being nothing else but the absence or want of an intending cause; or else do they make their own ignorance of a cause, and *they know not how*, to be a cause; as the author of the *Leviathan*² interprets the meaning hereof: *Many times* (saith he) *men put for cause of natural events their own ignorance, but disguised in other words; as when they say, that fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is, of things, whereof they know no cause.* Or they affirm, against all reason, one contrary to be the cause of another, as confusion to be the cause of order, pulchritude and harmony; chance and fortune, to be the cause of art and skill; folly and nonsense, the cause of the most wise and regular contrivance: or, lastly, they deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause, and there cannot possibly be any other cause of artificialness and conspiring harmony, than mind and wisdom, counsel and contrivance.

But because the Atheists here make some pretences for this their ignorance, we shall not conceal any of them, but bring them all to light; to the end that we may discover their weakness and foolery. First, therefore, they pretend, that the world is not so artificially and well made, but that it might have been made much better, and that there are many faults and flaws to be found therein; from whence they would infer, that it was not made by a God, he being supposed by Theists to be no bungler, but a perfect Mind, or a Being infinitely good and wise, who therefore should have made all things for the best.

VOL. II.

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¹ Empedocles, cujus Versus duos vide apud Ammianum Comm. in Librum Aristot. *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς*, p. 107. Edit. Aldinæ.

² Cap. XI. & aliâs.

But this being already set down by itself, as a twelfth atheistical objection against a Deity, we must reserve the confutation thereof for its proper place. Only we shall observe thus much here by the way; that those Theists of later times, who, either because they fancy a mere arbitrary Deity; or because their faith in the divine goodness is but weak; or because they judge of things according to their own private appetites, and selfish passions, and not with a free uncaptivated universality of mind, and an impartial regard to the good of the whole; or because they look only upon the present scene of things, and take not in the future into consideration, nor have a comprehensive view of the whole plot of divine providence together; or lastly, because we mortals do all stand upon too low a ground, to take a commanding view and prospect upon the whole frame of things; and our shallow understandings are not able to fathom the depths of the divine wisdom, nor trace all the methods and designs of providence; grant, that the world might have been made much better than now it is; which indeed is all one as to say, that it is not well made: these neoterick Christians (I say) seem hereby to give a much greater advantage to the Atheists, than the Pagan Theists themselves heretofore did, who stood their ground, and generously maintained against them, that Mind being the maker of all things, and not fortune or chance, nor arbitrary self-will, and irrational humour omnipotent, the τὸ βέλτιστον, that which is absolutely the best in every case, so far as the necessity of things would admit, and in compliance with the good of the whole, was the measure and rule both of nature and providence.

Again, the atomick Atheists further alledge, that though there be many things in the world, which serve well for uses, yet it does not at all follow, that therefore they were made intentionally and designedly for those uses; because though things happen by chance to be so or so made, yet may they serve for something or other afterward, and have their several uses consequent. Wherefore all the things of nature happened (say they) by chance to be so made as they are, and their several uses notwithstanding were consequent, or following thereupon. Thus the Epicurean poet:

————— Nil ideo natum est in corpore, ut uti
Possimus, sed quod natum est id procreat usum.

Lucret. l. 4.
p. 367. Lumb.
[Ver. 832,
833.]

Nothing in man's body was made out of design for any use; but all the several parts thereof, happening to be so made as they are, their uses were consequent thereupon. In like manner the old atheistical philosophers in Aristotle, concluded, τὸς ὀδόντας ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἀνατεῖλαι, τὸς μὲν ἔμπροσθεν ὀξεῖς, ἐπιτηδείως πρὸς τὸ διαίρειν, τὸς δὲ γομφίους πλατεῖς, καὶ χρεσίμας πρὸς τὸ λεαίνην τῆν τροφήν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἃ ὅσοις δοκεῖ ἰνάρχευν τὸ ἕνεκά τ'· That the former teeth were made by material or mechanical necessity, thin and sharp, by means whereof they became fit for cutting; but the jaw-teeth thick and broad, whereby they became

Phys. l. 2. c. 8.
[P. 475.
Tom. 1.
Oper.]

became useful for the grinding of food. But neither of them were intended to be such, for the sake of these uses, but happened by chance only. And the like concerning all the other parts of the body, which seem to be made for ends. Accordingly the same Aristotle represents the sense of those ancient Atheists, concerning the other parts of the universe, or things of nature, that they were all likewise made such, by the necessity of material (or mechanical) motions undirected, and yet had nevertheless their several uses consequent upon this their accidental structure. Τί κωλύει τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἕνεκά τῃ ποιεῖν, μηδ' ὅτι βέλτιον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἔει οὐ Ζεὺς, ἢ χ' ὅπως τὸν σίτον αὐξήσῃ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, &c. *What hinders but that nature might act without any respect to ends or good and better, as Jupiter, or the heaven, raineth not intentionally to make the corn grow, but from necessity? because the vapours, being raised up into the middle region, and there refrigerated and condensed, must needs descend down again in the form of water. But this happens by meer chance, and without any intention, that the grain is made to grow thereby; as the contrary sometimes happens by the excess of it.*

But to this we reply, that though a thing, that happens accidentally to be so or so made, may afterwards, notwithstanding, prove often serviceable for some use or other; yet, when any thing consisteth of many parts, that are all artificially proportionated together, and with much curiosity accommodated one to another, any one of which parts having been wanting, or otherwise in the least placed and disposed of, would have rendered the whole altogether inept for such a use; then may we well conclude it not to have been made by chance, but by counsel and design, intentionally, for such uses. As for example, the eye, whose structure and fabrick consisting of many parts (humours and membranes) is so artificially composed, no reasonable person, who considers the whole anatomy thereof, and the curiosity of its structure, can think otherwise of it, but that it was made out of design for the use of seeing; and did not happen accidentally to be so made, and then the use of seeing follow; as the Epicurean poet would fain persuade us,

*Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
Prospicere ut possimus.*

P. 367.
Lamb.
[Lib. IV.
Vers. 823.]

You are by all means to take heed of entertaining that so dangerous opinion (to atheism) that eyes were made for the sake of seeing, and ears for the sake of bearing. But for a man to think, that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing unintended followed; but also, that in all the same animals, ears happened to be so made too, and the use of hearing followed them; and a mouth and tongue happened to be so made likewise, and the use of eating, and (in men) of speaking, was also accidentally consequent thereupon; and feet were in the same animals made by chance too, and the use of walking followed; and hands made in them by chance also, upon which so many necessary uses depend; besides innumerable other parts of the body, both similar and organical, none of which could

have been wanting, without rendering the whole inept or useless: I say, to think, that all these things should happen by chance to be thus made in every one and the same animal, and not designed by mind or counsel, that they might jointly concur and contribute to the good of the whole; this argues the greatest insensibility of mind imaginable. But this absurd and ridiculous conceit hath been long since so industriously confuted, and the folly thereof so fully manifested by that learned Pagan philosopher and physician, *Galen*, in his book of *the use of parts*, that it would be altogether superfluous to insist any more upon it¹.

Wherefore, that the former teeth are made thin and sharp, and the jaw-teeth thick and broad, by chance only, and not for use, was one of the Democritick dotages; as also, that nothing in the clouds and meteors was intended for the good of this habitable earth, within whose atmosphere they are contained, but all proceeded from material and mechanical necessity. Which conceit though *Cartesius* seem to have written his whole book of meteors in favour of, he beginning it with the derision of those, who *seat God in the clouds, and imagine his hands to be employed in opening and shutting the cloisters of the winds, in sprinkling the flowers with dews, and thunder-striking the tops of mountains*; and closing his discourse with this boast, that he had now made it manifest, there was no need to fly to miracles (that is, to bring in a god upon the stage) to solve those phenomena; yet were it easy enough to demonstrate the defectiveness of those his mechanical undertakings in sundry particulars, and to evince, that all those things could not be carried on with such constant regularity, by meer fortuitous mechanism, without any superiour principle to guide and steer them. Nevertheless, we acknowledge, that God and nature do things every where, in the most frugal and compendious way, and with the least operoseness; and therefore that the mechanick powers are not rejected, but taken in, so far as they could comply serviceably with the intellectual model and platform; but still so, as that all is supervised by one understanding and intending cause, and nothing passes without his approbation, who, when either those mechanick powers fall short, or the stubborn necessity of matter proves uncompliant, does over-rule the same, and supply the defects thereof, by that which is vital; and that without setting his own hands immediately to every work too, there being a subservient minister under him, an artificial nature, which, as an *Archeus* of the whole world, governs the fluctuating mechanism thereof, and does all things faithfully, for ends and purposes, intended by its director.

But our atomick Atheists still further alledge, that though it might well seem strange, that matter fortuitously moved should, at the very first jump, fall into such a regular frame as this is, having so many aptitudes for uses, so many correspondencies between several things, and such an agreeing harmony in the whole; yet ought it not to seem a jot strange, if atoms, by motion, making all possible combinations and contextures, and trying all manner of conclusions and experiments, should, after innumerable other

¹ Vide Lactant. de Opificio Dei, Cap. VI. p. 1003.

other freaks, and discongruous forms produced, in length of time, fall into such a system as this is. Wherefore they affirm, that this earth of ours, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals ;

*Orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim ;
Multa sine ore etiam, sine vultu cæca reperta.*

*Lucret. l. 5.
p. 476. Lamb.
[Verf. 838.]*

Some without feet, some without hands, some without a mouth and face, some wanting fit muscles and nerves for the motion of their members. And the old philosphick Atheists were so frank and lavish herein, that they stuck not to affirm, amongst those monstrous shapes of animals, there were once produced Centaurs, and Scyllas, and Chimæras ; βυγών τε ἀνθρώπων, mixtly bo-viform and hominiform, biform and triform animals. But *Epicurus*, a little ashamed of this, as that which must needs look oddly and ridiculously, and seeming more cautious and castigate, pretends to correct the extravagancy of this fancy ;

*Sed neque Centauri fuerunt, neque tempore in ullo
Esse queat duplici natura, & corpore bino,
Ex alienigenis membris compacta potestas.*

*Lucret. l. 5.
p. 479.
[Verf. 876.]*

Nevertheless, there were not then any Centaurs, nor biform and triform animals ; he adding, that they, who feigned such things as these, might as well fancy rivers flowing with golden streams, and trees germinating sparkling diamonds, and such vastly gigantean men, as could stride over seas, and take up mountains in their clutches, and turn the heavens about with the strength of their arms. Against all which, notwithstanding, he gravely gives such a reason, as plainly overthrows his own principles ;

*Res sic queque suo ritu procedit, & omnes
Fœdere naturæ certo discrimina servant.*

*P. 480.
[Verf. 920.]*

Because things, by a certain covenant of nature, always keep up their specifick differences, without being confounded together. For what covenant of nature can there be in infinite chance ? or what law can there be set to the absolutely fortuitous motions of atoms, to circumscribe them by ? Wherefore it must be acknowledged, that, according to the genuine hypothesis of the atomick Atheism, all imaginable forms of inanimate bodies, plants and animals, as Centaurs, Scylla's and Chimæra's, are producible by the fortuitous motions of matter, there being nothing to hinder it, whilst it doth

*Ἐν ὅμοιᾳ κοίτῃ, ἀλλὰ πάντα πειρατῆρα,
ὅσα ἄνευ νόμου καὶ ἀνὰ τύχην ἔσονται
Ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων, ἅπαντα γίνονται κτλ.*

put itself into all kind of combinations, play all manner of freaks, and try all possible conclusions and experiments.

But

‡ *Lucret. Lib. V. Verf. 191.*

But they pretend, that these monstrous, irregular shapes of animals, were not therefore now to be found, because by reason of their inept fabrick, they could not propagate their kind by generation, as neither indeed preserve their own individuals. Thus does *Lucretius* declare the sense of *Epicurus*;

Lamb. p. 476.
[*Lib. V.*
Verf. 844.]

————— *Quoniam natura absteruit auctum,*
Nec potuere cupitum atatis tangere florem,
Nec reperire cibum, nec jungi per veneris res.

Nat. Hist.
L. 2. c. 8.
[*P.* 475.
Tom. I.
Oper.]

And that this atheistical doctrine was older than *Epicurus*, appeareth from these words of *Aristotle*; *ὅπου μὲν ἐν ἀπαντία συνέβη, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάλα ἐπιτηδεύσιος· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἕτως, ἀπόλλετο, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βεγεῶν καὶ ἀνδρόπετρα.* When animals happened at first to be made, in all manner of forms, those of them only were preserved, and continued to the present time, which chanced to be fitly made (for generation,) but all the others perished, as *Empedocles* affirmeth of the partly-ox and partly-man-animals. Moreover, the ancient both *Anaximandrian* and *Democritick* Atheists concluded, that besides this one world of ours, there were other infinite worlds, (they conceiving it as absurd to think, there should be but one only world in infinite space, as that in a vast plowed and sowed field, there should grow up only one ear of corn, and no more;) and they would have us believe, that amongst these infinite worlds (all of them fortuitously made) there is not one of a thousand, or, perhaps, of ten thousand, that hath such regularity, concinnity, and harmony in it, as this world that we chanced to emerge in. Now it cannot be thought strange (as they suppose) if, amongst infinite worlds, one or two should chance to fall into some regularity. They would also confidently assure us, that the present system of things, in this world of ours, shall not long continue such as it is, but after a while fall into confusion and disorder again;

————— *Mundi naturam totius ætas*
Mutat, & ex alio terram status excipit alter,
Quod potuit nequeat, possit quod non tulit antè :

The same wheel of fortune, which moving upward, hath brought into view this scene of things that now is, turning round, will, some time or other, carry it all away again, introducing a new one in its stead: and then shall we have Centaurs, and Scylla's and Chimæra's again, all manner of inept forms of animals, as before.

But because men may yet be puzzled with the universality and constancy of this regularity, and its long continuance through so many ages, that there are no records at all of the contrary any where to be found; the atomick Atheist further adds, that the senseless atoms, playing and toying up and down, without any care or thought, and from eternity trying all manner of tricks, conclusions and experiments, were at length (they know

‡ *Lucret. Lib. V. Verf.* 832.

know not how) taught, and by the necessity of things themselves, as it were, driven, to a certain kind of trade of artificialness and methodicalness; so that though their motions were at first all casual and fortuitous, yet in length of time they became orderly and artificial, and governed by a certain law, they contracting as it were upon themselves, by long practice and experience, a kind of habit of moving regularly; or else being, by the mere necessity of things, at length forced so to move, as they should have done, had art and wisdom directed them. Thus *Epicurus* in his epistle to *Herodotus*¹, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὑποληπίειν καὶ τὴν Φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παυτοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδραχθῆναι τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι. *It must be held, that nature is both taught and necessitated by the things themselves:* or else, as *Gassendus* interprets the words, *quadam veluti naturali necessariaque doctrina sensim imbuta; by little and little imbued with a certain kind of natural and necessary doctrine.* P. 28. *Gass.*

To which atheistical pretences we shall briefly reply, *first*, That it is but an idle dream, or rather impudent forgery, of these Atheists, that heretofore there were in this world of ours all manner of monstrous and irregular shapes of animals produced, *Centaur*s, *Scylla*'s, and *Chimera*'s, &c. and indeed at first none but such; there being not the least footstep of any such thing appearing in all the monuments of antiquity, and traditions of former times; and these Atheists being not able to give any manner of reason, why there should not be such produced as well at this present time, however the individuals themselves could not continue long, or propagate by generation; or at least why it should not happen, that, in some ages or countries, there were either all *Androgyna*, of both sexes, or else no animal but of one sex, male, or female only; or, lastly, none of any sex at all. Neither is there any more reason to give credit to these Atheists, when (though enemies to divination) they would prophecy concerning future times, that, in this world of ours, all shall sometime fall into confusion and non-sense again. And, as their infinity of worlds is an absolute impossibility, so to their bold and confident assertion concerning those supposed other worlds, as if they had travelled over them all, that, amongst ten thousand of them, there is hardly one, that hath so much regularity in it as this world of ours, it might be replied, with equal confidence, and much more probability of reason, that were every planet about this sun of ours an habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having likewise its several other planets or habitable earths moving round about it, and not any one of these desert or uninhabited, but all peopled with animals; we say, were this so extravagant supposition true, that there would not be found any one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all, but that the divine art and wisdom (which being infinite, can never be defective, nor any where idle) would exercise its dominion upon all, and every where impress the sculptures and signatures of itself.

In the next place we affirm, That the fortuitous motions of senseless atoms, trying never so many experiments and conclusions, and making never so many

¹ Apud Diog. Laert. Lib. X. Segm. 75. p. 633.

many combinations and aggregate forms of things, could never be able to produce so much as the form or system of one complete animal, with all the organick parts thereof so artificially disposed (each of these being as it were a little world) much less the system of this great world, with that variety of animals in it; but least of all could it constantly continue such regularity and artificialness every where: for that the fortuitous motions of irrational, senseless and stupid matter should in length of time grow artificial, and contract a habit of acting as regularly and methodically, as if perfect art or wisdom had directed them, this is the most prodigious nonsense imaginable, and can be accounted no other than atheistical fanaticism.

It is no more possible, that the fortuitous motion of dead and senseless matter should ever from itself be taught and necessitated to produce such an orderly and regular system as the frame of this whole world is, together with the bodies of animals, and constantly to continue the same, than that a man perfectly illiterate, and neither able to write nor read, taking up a pen into his hand, and making all manner of scrawls, with ink upon paper, should at length be taught and necessitated, by the thing itself, to write a whole quire of paper together, with such characters, as being deciphered by a certain key, would all prove coherent philosophick sense; or than that we ourselves, writing down the mere letters of the alphabet, transposedly, any how, as it happens, without the least thought, either of words or sense, after our scribbling a long time together what was altogether insignificant, should at length have been taught and necessitated by the thing itself, without the least study and consideration of our own, to write this whole volume. Or, to use another instance, this is no more possible, than that ten or a dozen persons, altogether unskilled in musick, having several instruments given them, and striking the strings or keys thereof, any how, as it happened, should, after some time of discord and jarring, at length be taught and necessitated to fall into most exquisite harmony, and continue the same uninterruptedly for several hours together.

Wherefore, if it be ridiculous for one, that hath read over the works of *Plato* or *Aristotle*, or those six books of *T. Lucretius Carus*, *De natura rerum*, to contend, that possibly the letters of those books might be all put together by chance, or scribbled at random, without the least thought or study of the writer, he having also no manner of philosophick skill in him; or for one, that hears ten or a dozen persons playing in consort upon instruments of musick, and making ravishing harmony, to persuade himself, that none of those players had, for all that, the least of musical art or skill in them, but struck the strings as it happened; it must needs be much more ridiculous and absurd, to suppose this artificial system of the whole world to have resulted from the fortuitous motion of senseless atoms, without the direction of any art or wisdom, there being much more of sense, art and philosophy therein, than in any philosophick volume or poem ever written by men; and more of harmony and proportion, than in any composition

of vocal musick. We conclude therefore with Aristotle, ἀδύνατον δὲ ταῦτα τούτων ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. *that it is absolutely impossible things should have come to pass after this manner*; that is, by meer fortune and chance, and without the direction of any Mind or God. The divine Mind and Wisdom hath so printed its seal or signature upon the matter of the whole corporeal world, as that fortune and chance could never possibly have counterfeited the same.

Notwithstanding all which, the ancient Atheists would undertake, by their wonderful skill in logick, to demonstrate, that the frame of nature could not possibly be made by any intending cause, and for the sake of ends and uses; as for example, that eyes could not be first of all made intentionally for the use of seeing, nor ears intentionally for the use of hearing, and so for the rest; because, forsooth, these things were all of them, in order of time and nature, before their several uses. The argument is seriously propounded by Lucretius, after this manner :

*Nec fuit ante, videre, oculorum lumina nata,
Nec diētis orare, prius quam lingua creata est;
Sed potius longè lingua præcessit origo
Sermonem, multoque creatæ sunt prius aures,
Quam sonus est auditus; Et omnia denique membra
Antè fuere, ut opinor, eorum quam fuit usus.
Haud igitur potuere utendi crescere causâ.*

*Lamb. p. 367.
[Lib. IV.
Vers. 834.]*

To this sense; *There was no such thing as seeing before eyes were made, nor hearing before ears, nor speaking before the tongue. But the original of the tongue much preceded speech: so likewise eyes and ears were made before there was any seeing of colours or hearing of sounds. In like manner, all the other members of the body were produced before their respective uses. And therefore they could not be made intentionally, for the sake of those uses. The force of which argument consisteth in this proposition; That whatsoever is made for the sake of another thing, must exist in time after that other thing, for whose sake it was made: or, That, for which any thing is made, must not only be, in order of nature, but also of time, before that which is made for it. And this that Epicurean poet endeavours to prove by sundry instances;*

*At contra conferre manu certamina pugnae,
Antè fuit multò quàm lucida tela volarent, &c.*

Ibid.

Darts were made for the sake of fighting, but fighting was before darts, or else they had never been invented. Bucklers were excogitated and devised, for the keeping off of blows and strokes, but the declining of strokes was before bucklers. So were beds contrived for the sake of resting and sleeping, but resting and sleeping were older than beds, and gave occasion for the invention of them. Cups were intended and designed for the sake of drinking, which they would not have been, had there not been drinking before. According to the force of which instances, the poet would infer, that whosoever affirms eyes to have been

made for the sake of seeing, must suppose in like manner, there was some kind of seeing or other before eyes. But since there was no seeing at all before eyes, therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing. And this is the atheistical demonstration, that the parts of men's bodies, and other things of nature, could not be made by any intending cause, for the sake of ends and uses.

But it is evident, that this logick of Atheists differs from that of all other mortals, according to which, the end, or that for which any thing is made, is only in intention before the means, or that which is made for it, but in time and execution after it. And thus was the more effectual way of fighting and doing execution, for whose sake darts were invented, in time after darts, and only in intention before them. It is true indeed, that fighting in general was before darts, sleeping before beds, and drinking before cups; and thereby did they give occasion for men to think of means for the more effectual fighting, and more commodious sleeping and drinking; men being commonly excited from the experience of things, and the sense of their needs and wants, to excogitate and provide fit means and remedies. But it doth not therefore follow, that the Maker of the world could not have at once before-hand a preventive knowledge of whatsoever would be useful, and for the good of animals, and so make them intentionally for those uses. Wherefore the argument should have been framed thus; whatsoever any thing is made for, as the end, that must needs be, in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the existence of that, which is made for it. And therefore if eyes were made for the sake or end of seeing, seeing must of necessity be in the knowledge and intention of the maker of eyes, before there were any eyes actually existing. But there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were any eyes. Wherefore eyes could not be made for the sake of seeing.

And this indeed is the genuine scope and drift of the premised atheistical argument, however it were disguised by them in their manner of propounding it. The reason whereof was, because they took it for granted, that all knowledge, as such is derived by sense from the things themselves known pre-existing. From whence it follows, that there could be no knowledge of vision or seeing, before there was actual seeing and eyes; and so they think it to be demonstrated, that eyes could not be made by any Deity for the sake of seeing before there was seeing; no more than spectacles by men for the sake of eyes, before there were eyes. Thus does the Epicurean poet conclude triumphantly;

[L. 3. p. 568.
Lib. IV.
Vers. 851.]

*Illa quidem seorsum sunt omnia, quæ prius ipsæ
Nata, dedere suæ post notitiam utilitatis.
Quo genere imprimis sensus & membra videmus.
Quare etiam atque etiam procul est, ut credere possis,
Utilitatis ob officium potuisse creari.*

That is, *The members of men's bodies, and organs of sense, were first made by themselves, and then did they afterwards give the notice or knowledge of their several utilities; none of which could have been had before. Wherefore we affirm again and again, that it is impossible these things should have been made designedly for their uses.*

So that the controversy is at last resolved wholly into this; Whether or no, all knowledge and understanding, as such, universally does arise from things antecedently existing without the knower? Which being asserted by Atheists, they conclude from thence, that the things of the world could not be made by the previous counsel, contrivance, and intention of any understanding Deity, but that they all blunder'd out themselves, one after another, according to the train or sequel of the fortuitous motions of matter; and that from thence knowledge and understanding, counsel and intention, sprung up afterward, as junior to things, and the world. But this being already made the eleventh atheistical argument against a Deity, *viz. That all knowledge and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing before and without the knower, and a passion from them; and therefore that the world must needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause;* we shall refer the answer to it, and confutation of it, to its proper place; where we shall plainly demonstrate, that knowledge or understanding, is not in its own nature, eçtypal, but archetypal; and that it is older than the world, and the Maker of all things.

But the Atheists yet further urge, against the proving of a God from the τὸ εἶς καὶ ἀλλὰς, *the regular frame of the whole world in general, and the artificial structure of the bodies of animals, after this manner;* That it is altogether unreasonable to suppose, there should be no cause in nature for the phænomena thereof, especially for those things, which are daily generated, as the bodies of animals; but (as by the tragick poets) a god should be introduced, as it were from a machine, forcibly to solve them. And indeed though there were a God, yet they think he ought not to be detruded to such mean offices as this, *viz. to make the body of every the most contemptible animal, as it were with his own hands miraculously; nor ought nature or the world to be supposed so imperfect, as if it must be bungled and botched up every where after this manner. It is nature therefore, which is the cause of these natural productions and generations. Which nature, that it doth not intend nor act designedly for ends and uses, appears not only from hence, because it never consults or deliberates, (which Aristotle intimates to have been the reason, why some of old denied the things of nature to have been made for ends) but also because it hath no animal-sense or consciousness, no understanding or appetite. Wherefore this opinion of intending, and final causality in nature, can be accounted no other than an idolum specus (as some² affect to phrase it) or a-prejudice of men's minds,*

Sfff 2 when

¹ Vide de Nat. Auscultat. Lib. II. Cap. VIII. p. 477. Tom. I. Oper.

² Lord Bacon in his *Novum Organum*, P. II. §. LIII. p. 47.

when they apply their own properties to things without them, and think because themselves intend, and act for ends, that therefore nature doth the like. And they might as well say, that nature laughs and cries, speaks and walks, syllogizes and philosophizes, because themselves do so. But, as a modern philosopher concludeth, *The universe, as one aggregate of things natural, hath no intention belonging to it.* And accordingly, were all final causes rightly banished by Democritus out of physiology, as Aristotle¹ recordeth of him, τὸ ὅ ἐνεκα ἀφείς λέγειν, πάντα ἀνάγει οἷς χρεῖται ἢ φύσιν: *That he reduced all things to natural and necessary causes, altogether rejecting final.*

To all which we briefly reply; That there are indeed two extremes here to be avoided, the one, of those, who derive all things from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter, which is the extreme of the atomick Atheists; the other, of bigotical religionists, who will needs have God *ἄυτεργεῖν ἅπαντα*, to do all things himself immediately; as if all in nature were miracle. But there is a middle betwixt both these extremes; namely, to suppose, that besides God, and in subordination to him, there is a nature (not fortuitous, but) artificial and methodical, which governing the motion of matter, and bringing it into regularity, is a secondary or inferiour cause of generations. Now, this *natura artificiosa*, this *artificial nature*, though itself indeed do not understand the reason of what it doth, nor properly intend the ends thereof, yet may it well be conceived to act regularly for the sake of ends understood and intended by that perfect Mind, upon which it depends. As the manuary officers understand not the designs of the architect, but only drudgingly perform their several tasks imposed by him; and as types or forms of letters, composed together, print coherent philosophick sense, which themselves understand nothing of. (Upon which artificial or spermatick nature, we have largely insisted before, in the Appendix to the third chapter.) And thus, neither are all things performed immediately and miraculously by God himself; neither are they all done fortuitously and temerariouly, but regularly and methodically for the sake of ends, though not understood by nature itself, but by that higher Mind, which is the cause of it, and doth, as it were, continually inspire it. Some, indeed, have unskillfully attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies to inanimate bodies; as when they say, that matter desires forms, as the female doth the male; and that heavy bodies descend down by appetite towards the centre, that so they may rest therein; and that they sometimes again ascend in discretion, to avoid a vacuum. Of which fanciful extravagancies if the Advancer of Learning be understood, there is nothing to be reprehended in this following passage of his; *Incredibile est quantum agmen idolorum philosophiæ immiserit naturalium operationum ad similitudinem actionum humanarum. reductio: It is incredible, how many errors have been transfused into philosophy, from this one delusion, of reducing natural actions to the mode of human; or of thinking, that nature acteth as a man doth.* But if that of his be extended further, to take away all final causes from the things of nature, as if nothing

¹ De Generat. Animal. Lib. V. cap. VIII. p. 713. Tom. II Oper.

nothing were done therein for ends intended by a higher mind, then is it the very spirit of atheism and infidelity. It is no *idol of the cave or den*, (to use that affected language) that is, no prejudice or fallacy imposed upon ourselves, from the attributing our own animalish properties to things without us, to think, that the frame and system of this whole world was contrived by a perfect understanding Being or Mind, (now also presiding over the same) which hath every where printed the signatures of its own wisdom upon the matter. As also, that though nature itself do not properly intend, yet it acteth according to an intellectual platform prescribed to it, as being the manuary opificer of the divine architectonick art, or this art itself as it were transfused into the matter, and embodied in it. Thus *Cicero's* *Balbus* long since declared concerning it, that it was not *vis quædam sine ratione, ciens motus in corporibus necessarios; sed vis particeps ordinis, tanquam via progressus, cujus solertiam nulla ars, nemo artifex consequi potest imitando: Not a force unguided by reason, exciting necessary motions in bodies temerariouſly; but such a force, as partakes of order, and proceeds as it were methodically; whose cunning or ingenuity no art or human opificer can possibly reach to by imitation.* For it is altogether unconceivable, how we ourselves should have mind and intention in us, were there none in the universe, or in that highest principle, from whence all proceeds. Moreover, it was truly affirmed by *Aristotle*², that there is much more of art in some of the things of nature, than there is in any thing artificially made by men; and therefore intention, or final and mental causality, can no more be secluded from the consideration of natural, than it can from that of artificial things. Now it is plain, that things artificial, as a house or clock, can neither be understood, nor any true cause of them assigned, without design, or intention for ends and good. For to say, that a house is stones, timber, mortar, iron, glass, lead, &c. all put together, is not to give a definition thereof, or to tell what indeed it is, it being such an apt disposition of all these materials, as may make up the whole fit for habitation, and the uses of men. Wherefore this is not sufficiently to assign the cause of a house neither, to declare out of what quarry the stones were dug, nor in what woods or forests the timber was felled, and the like: nor, as *Aristotle* addeth, *ἕως τὸν τοῦχος γεγενῆσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρῆα κάτω πίϑουσι φερεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ κῆρα ἐπιπολῆς· διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ Σεμέλια, ἢ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ τὴν κοφύτηνα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα· κοφύτατα γάρ·* if any one should go about thus to give an account of a house from material necessity (as the atheistical philosophers then did of the world and the bodies of animals) *that the heavier things being carried downward of their own accord, and the lighter upward; therefore the stones and foundation lay at the bottom, and the earth for the walls, being lighter, was bigger; and the timber, being yet lighter, bigger than that; but above all the straw, or thatch, it being the lightest of all.* Nor lastly, if, as the same *Aristotle* elsewhere³ also suggesteth, one should further pretend, that a house was therefore made such, *μπίσσι τῶ δερῶν, &c.* merely because the hands of the labourers, and the axes, and hammers and trowels, and other instruments, chanced all to be moved so and so; we say, that none of all these

*Nat. Auf. l. 2^a c. 9. [p. 478.]
Tom. I. Op.]*

¹ De Natur. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXXII. p. 476. Tom. I. Oper.
² 3001. Tom. IX. Oper. ³ De Partib. Animal. Lib. I. Cap. I. p. 473.
⁴ Vide Natur. Aucult. Lib. II. Cap. X. Tom. II. Oper.

these would be to assign the true cause of a house, without declaring, that the architect first framed in his mind a model or platform of such a thing to be made out of those materials, so aptly disposed into a foundation, walls, roof, doors, rooms, stairs, chimneys, windows, &c. as might render the whole fit for habitation, and other human uses. And no more certainly can the things of nature (in whose very essence final causality is as much included) be either rightly understood, or the causes of them assigned, merely from matter and mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion thereof, without design or intention for ends and good. Wherefore to say ¹, that the bodies of animals became such, merely because the fluid seed, by motion, happened to make such traces, and beget such stamina and lineaments, as out of which that compages of the whole resulted; is not to assign a cause of them, but to dissemble, smother, and conceal their true efficient cause, which is the willdom and contrivance of that divine Architect and Geometer, making them every way fit for the inhabitation and uses of their respective souls. Neither indeed can we banish all final, that is, all mental causality, from philosophy or the consideration of nature, without banishing at the same time reason and understanding from ourselves, and looking upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brutes do. However, none of the ancient Atheists would ever undertake to assign necessary causes for all the parts of the bodies of animals, and their efformation, from mere matter, motion, and mechanism; those small and pitiful attempts in order thereunto, that have been made by some of them in a few instances, (as that the *spina dorsa* ² came from the fluxure of the bodies of animals, when they first sprung out of the earth, the intestines from the flux of humours excavating a crooked and winding channel for itself, and that the nostrils were broke open by the eruption of breath;) these, I say, only showing the unfeasibleness and impossibility thereof. And therefore *Democritus* was so wise, as never to pretend to give an account in this way of the formation of the *fœtus*, he looking upon it as a thing absolutely desperate; nor would he venture to say any more concerning it (as *Aristotle* ³ informeth us) than ὅτι ἔτις αἰὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι, that it always cometh so to pass of necessity, but stopp'd all further enquiry concerning it after this manner, τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὸ διὰ τί, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων τινός, τὸ ζητεῖν εἶναι τὴ ἀπίερα ἀρχήν, That to demand, about any of these things, for what cause it was thus, was to demand a beginning of infinite. As if all the motions from eternity had an influence upon, and contribution to, whatsoever corporeal thing was now produced. And *Lucretius*, notwithstanding all his swaggering and boasting, that he and *Epicurus* were able to assign natural and necessary causes for every thing without a God, hath no where so much as one word concerning it. We conclude therefore, that *Aristotle's* judgment concerning final causes in philosophy is much to be preferred before that of *Democritus*, καὶ ἀμφοῖν μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λεκτικῷ

Nat. Aufc. l. 2. c. 9. [p. 47⁸ Tom. I. Op.]

αἰ αἰτίαι, μάλλον, δὲ ἢ τινός ἐνεκα· αἰτίων γὰρ τῆτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' ἂν αὐτῆ τῆ τι-
 λου, That both kind of causes (material and final) ought to be declared
 by a physiloger, but especially the final; the end being the cause of the matter, but the matter not the cause of the end. And thus do

we

¹ This seems to be level'd against Des Cartes's book *de formatione fœtus*.

Cap. I. p. 471, 472.

² Vide *Aristot. de Partib. Animal. Lib. 7.*

³ *De Generat. Animal. Lib. II. Cap. VI. p. 629. Tom. II. Oper.*

we see plainly, that the atomick Atheists are utterly ignorant of the cause, τὸ εἶναι καλῶς, of the regular and artificial frame of the things in nature, and consequently the whole mundane system, the true knowledge whereof necessarily leadeth to a God.

But it is prodigiouſly ſtrange, that theſe Atheiſts ſhould, in this their ignorance and ſottiſhneſs, be juſtified by any profeſſed Theiſts and Chriſtians of later times, who atomizing in their phyſiology alſo, would fain perſuade us in like manner, that this whole mundane ſyſtem, together with plants and animals, was derived merely from the neceſſary and unguided motion of the ſmall particles of matter, at firſt turned round in a vortex, or elſe jumbled all together in a chaos, without any intention for ends and good, that is, without the direction of any mind; God in the mean time ſtanding by, only as an idle ſpectator of this *luſus atomorum*, this *ſportful dance of atoms*, and of the various reſults thereof. Nay theſe mechanick Theiſts have here quite outſtripped and outdone the atomick Atheiſts themſelves, they being much more immodeſt and extravagant than ever thoſe were; for the profeſſed Atheiſts durſt never venture to affirm, that this regular ſyſtem of things reſulted from the fortuitous motions of atoms at the very firſt, before they had for a long time together produced many other inept combinations or aggregate forms of particular things, and nonſenſical ſyſtems of the whole. And they ſuppoſed alſo, that the regularity of things here in this world would not always continue ſuch neither, but that ſome time or other confuſion and diſorder would break in again. Moreover, that, beſides this world of ours, there are at this very inſtant, innumerable other worlds irregular, and that there is but one of a thouſand, or ten thouſand, amongſt the infinite worlds, that have ſuch regularity in them. The reaſon of all which is, becauſe it was generally taken for granted, and looked upon as a common notion, that τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης ἢ τῶν αὐτομάτων, ἔστιν αἰεὶ ἕτερον γίνεſται, as *Ariſtotle* expreſſeth it¹, that *none of thoſe things, which are from fortune or chance, come to paſs conſtantly and always alike.* But our mechanick or atomick Theiſts will have their atoms never ſo much as once to have fumbled in theſe their fortuitous motions, nor to have produced any inept ſyſtem, or incongruous forms at all; but from the very firſt all along, to have taken up their places, and have ranged themſelves ſo orderly, methodically and diſcreetly, as that they could not poſſibly have done it better, had they been directed by the moſt perfect wiſdom. Wherefore theſe atomick Theiſts utterly evacuate that grand argument for a God, taken from the phaenomenon of the artificial frame of things, which hath been ſo much inſiſted on in all ages, and which commonly makes the ſtrongeſt impreſſion of any other upon the minds of men, they leaving only certain metaphyſical arguments for a Deity; which, though never ſo good, yet by reaſon of their ſubtilty, can do but little execution upon the minds of the generality, and even amongſt the learned do ſometimes beget more of doubtful diſputation and ſcepticiſm, than of clear conviction and ſatiſfaction; the Atheiſts in the mean time laughing in their ſleeves,

¹ *Natur. Auſcult. Lib. II. Cap. IV. p. 469. Tom. I. Oper.*

sleeves, and not a little triumphing, to see the cause of theism thus betrayed by its professed friends and assertors, and the grand argument for the same totally flurried by them; and so their work done, as it were, to their hands, for them.

Now, as this argues the greatest insensibility of mind, or sottishness and stupidity in pretended Theists, not to take the least notice of the regular and artificial frame of things, or of the signatures of the divine art and wisdom in them, nor to look upon the world, and things of nature, with any other eyes than oxen and horses do; so are there many phenomena in nature, which being partly above the force of these mechanick powers, and partly contrary to the same, can therefore never be solved by them, nor without final causes, and some vital principle. As for example, that of gravity, or the tendency of bodies downward, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the systole and diastole of the heart, which was before declared to be a muscular constriction and relaxation, and therefore not mechanical but vital. We might also add, amongst many others, the intersection of the plains of the equator and ecliptick, or the earth's diurnal motion, upon an axis not parallel with that of the ecliptick, nor perpendicular to the plain thereof. For though *Cartesius* would needs imagine this earth of ours once to have been a sun, and so itself the centre of a lesser vortex, whose axis was then directed after this manner, and which therefore still kept the same site or posture, by reason of the striate particles, finding no fit pores or traces for their passage thorough it, but only in this direction; yet does he himself confess, that because these two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, would be much more conveniently made upon parallel axes, therefore, according to the laws of mechanism, they should perpetually be brought nearer and nearer together, till at length the equator and the ecliptick come to have their axes parallel to one another; which, as it hath not yet come to pass, so neither hath there been, for these last two thousand years, (according to the best observations and judgments of astronomers) any nearer approach made of them to one another. Wherefore the continuation of these two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, upon axes different or not parallel, is resolvable into nothing, but a final and mental cause, or the τὸ Βέλτιστον, because it was best it should be so, the variety of the seasons of the year depending hereupon. But the greatest of all the particular phenomena is the organization and formation of the bodies of animals, consisting of such variety and curiosity, which these mechanick philosophers being no way able to give an account of from the necessary motion of matter, unguided by mind for ends, prudently therefore break off their system there, when they should come to animals, and so leave it altogether untouched. We acknowledge indeed, that there is a posthumous piece extant, imputed to *Cartesius*, and entitled, *De la Formation du Fœtus*, wherein there is some pretence made to solve all this by fortuitous mechanism. But as the theory thereof is wholly built upon a false supposition,

sufficiently

* Vide Principia ejus Philosoph. Part III. §. CLV. p. 136. & Part IV. §. II. p. 137.

sufficiently confuted by the learned *Harvey*, in his Book of Generation, *that the seed doth materially enter into the composition of the egg*; so is it all along precarious and exceptionable; nor does it extend at all to the differences, that are in several animals, or offer the least reason, why an animal of one species or kind might not be formed out of the seed of another.

It is here indeed pretended by these mechanick Theists, that final causes therefore ought not to be of any regard to a philosopher, because we should not arrogate to ourselves to be as wise as God Almighty is, or to be privy to his secrets. Thus in the metaphysical meditations ¹; *Atque ob hanc unicam rationem totum illud causarum genus, quod à fine peti solet, in rebus physicis nullum usum habere existimo; non enim absque temeritate me puto, investigare posse fines Dei.* And again likewise in the *Principles of Philosophy*: ² *Nullas unquam rationes circa res naturales à fine, quem Deus aut natura in iis faciendis sibi proposuit, admittimus, quia non tantum nobis debemus arrogare, ut ejus consiliorum participes esse possimus.* But the question is not, whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, and know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly make conclusions, that therefore the thing is, or ought to be so; but, whether any thing at all were made by God for ends and good, otherwise than would of itself have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. Nevertheless, we see no reason at all, why it should be thought presumption, or intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to affirm, that eyes were made by him for the end of seeing, (and accordingly so contrived as might best conduce thereunto) and ears for the end of hearing, and the like. This being so plain, that nothing but sottish stupidity, or atheistical incredulity (masked perhaps under an hypocritical veil of humility) can make any doubt thereof. And therefore *Aristotle* ³ justly reprehended *Anaxagoras* for that absurd aphorism of his, διὰ τὸ χεῖρας ἔχειν, Φρονημάτατο εἶναι τῶν ζῴων τὸν ἄνθρωπον, *That man was therefore the wisest, (or most solert) of all animals, because he chanced to have hands.* He not doubting to affirm on the contrary; ἐλογον διὰ τὸ Φρονημάτατο εἶναι τῶν ζῴων χεῖρας ἔχειν ἢ γὰρ φύσις αἰεὶ διαίρει καὶ δάπτει ἄνθρωπον Φρονηματῶ, τῷ δουκίμῳ χεῖρας ἔκαστου προσέκει γὰρ τῷ ὅλλι αὐλητῇ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον αὐλῆς, ἢ τῷ αὐλῆς ἔχοντι προσεῖναι αὐλητικῶν *That it was far more reasonable to think, that because man was the wisest (or most solert and active) of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. For nature (saith he) distributeth, as a wise man doth, what is suitable to every one; and it is more proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him, that hath pipes, to bestow musical skill.*

Wherefore these mechanick Theists would further alledge, and that with some more colour of reason, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to condescend to all those mean and trivial offices, and to do the things of nature himself immediately: as also, that it would be but a botch in nature, if the defects thereof were every where to be supplied by miracle. But to this also the reply is easy, that though the divine Wisdom itself con-

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trived

¹ Meditat. IV. p. 26. Edit. Amstelod. 1685.

² De Partib. Animal. Lib. IV. Cap. X. p.

³ Vide Part I. §. XXVIII. p. 8. & Part

559, 560. Tom. II. Oper.

trived the ſyſtem of the whole world for ends and good, yet nature, as an inferior miniſter, immediately executes the ſame; I lay, not a dead, fortuitous, and meerly mechanical, but a vital, orderly and artificial nature. Which nature, aſſerted by moſt of the ancient philoſophers, who were

Script. Poet.
Theiſts.

Theiſts, is thus deſcribed by Proclus ¹: ἡ Φύσις ἐχάτη μὲν ἐστὶ τῶν τῶν σωματωειδῶν τῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν δημιουργητῶν αἰτίων, καὶ τὸ πῆρας τῶν τῶν ἀσωματῶν ἐστὶν πλάτης· πλήρης δὲ λόγου καὶ δυναμικῶν δι' ὧν κατευθύνει τὰ ἐκείνα· τοιαύτη δὲ ἔσα προελθὺν λαθεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς ζωογονίας θεῶν,

Νῶτοις δ' ἀμφὶ, θεῶν φύσις ἀπλεῖστο κήρηται.

Ἄφ' ἧς πᾶσα ζωὴ πρόεισιν, ἢ τε νοεῖα καὶ ἡ ἀρχαίσι τῶν διοικημένων ἐξουστημένη δ' ἐκείθεν καὶ ἀπληρομένη, φοιτᾷ διὰ πάντα ἀκωλύτως, καὶ πάντα ἐμπνέει, δι' οὗ τὰ ἀψύχως ψυχρῶν μετέχει τῆος, καὶ τὰ φθειρομένα μένει διακαιώς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ταῖς ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν εἰδῶν αἰτίαις συνεχόμενα·

Ἄρχει δ' αὖ φύσις ἀκαμάτη κόσμῳ τε καὶ ἔργῳ
Φησὶ τὸ λόγιον,
Ὅρανος ὄρα καὶ θεῶν δρόμον αἰδίου κατασέρων·
Καὶ τὰ ἔξῃς·

Nature is the last of all causes, that fabricate this corporeal and sensible world, and the utmost bound of incorporeal substances. Which being full of reasons and powers, orders and presides over all mundane affairs. It proceeding (according to the Magick Oracles) from that supreme goddess, the divine wisdom, which is the fountain of all life, as well intellectual, as that which is concrete with matter. Which wisdom this nature always essentially depending upon, passes through all things unbinderably; by means whereof even inanimate things partake of a kind of life, and things corruptible remain eternal in their species, they being contained by its standing forms or ideas, as their causes. And thus does the oracle describe nature, as presiding over the whole corporeal world, and perpetually turning round the heavens. Here have we a description of one universal, substantial life, soul, or spirit of nature, subordinate to the Deity: besides which the same Proclus elsewhere ² supposeth other particular natures, or spermatick reasons, in those words of his, μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαί· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις· After the first soul, are there particular souls, and after the universal nature, particular natures. Where it may be observed, by the way, that this Proclus, though he were a superstitious Pagan, much addicted to the multiplying of gods (subordinate to one supreme) or a bigotick Polytheist, who had a humour of deifying almost every thing, and therefore would have this nature, footh, to be called a goddess too; yet does he declare it not to be properly such, but abusively only (viz. because it was no intellectual thing) as he saith the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, supposed to be animated, were called gods too, they being the statues of the gods. This is the meaning of those words, καὶ θεὸς μὲν τῶ ἐκείθεν, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχουσα τὸ εἶδος θεός· καὶ γὰρ τὰ θεῶν σῶματα, θεὸς καλεῖται, ὡς ἀγάλματα τῶν θεῶν. Nature is a god or goddess, not as having godship properly belonging to it, but as the divine bodies are called gods, because they are statues of the gods.

Where-

¹ Comment. in Timæum Platon. Lib. I. p. 4. Edit. Gronov. ² Ibid. p. 118.

Wherefore we cannot otherwise conclude concerning these our mechanick Theists, who will thus needs derive all corporeal things from a dead and stupid nature, or from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any mind or intention for ends and good; but that they are indeed cousin-germans to Atheists, or possessed, in a degree, with a kind of atheistick enthusiasm, or fanaticism, they being so far forth inspired with a spirit of infidelity, which is the spirit of atheism.

But these mechanick Theists are again counterbalanced by another sort of Atheists, not mechanical nor fortuitous; namely, the Hylozoists, who are unquestionably convinced, that *opera naturæ sunt opera intelligentiæ*, that *the works of nature are works of understanding*; and that the original of these corporeal things was not dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved: upon which account *Strato* derided *Democritus* his rough and crooked atoms, as mere dreams and dotages. But these notwithstanding, because they would not admit of any other substance besides matter, suppose life and perception, essentially to belong to all matter as such; whereby it hath a perfect knowledge of whatsoever itself could do or suffer (though without animal consciousness) and can form itself to the best advantage, sometimes improving itself by organization to sense in brutes, and to reason and reflexive understanding in men. Wherefore, according to the principles of these Hylozoists, there is not any need of a God at all; that is, of one perfect Mind or understanding Being presiding over the whole world; they concluding, accordingly, the opinion of a God to be only a mistaking of the inadequate conception of matter in general, its life and energetick nature taken alone abstractly, for a complete substance by itself. Nevertheless these Hylozoick Atheists are no way able, by this hypothesis of theirs neither, to solve that phenomenon of the regularity and harmony of the whole universe; because every part of matter being, according to them, a distinct percipient by itself, whose knowledge extendeth only to its own concernment; and there being no one thing presiding over all, the things of the whole world (*ἐν ᾧ πάντα ἁρμότιστα συντίθενται*, in which all things are co-ordered together) could never have fallen into one such agreeing and conspiring harmony.

And as for those other Cosmo-plastick Atheists, who suppose the whole world to be as it were but one huge plant, tree, or vegetable, or to have one spermatick, plastick and artificial nature only, orderly and methodically disposing the whole, but without sense and understanding; these can no way do the business neither, that is, solve the forementioned phenomenon, it being utterly impossible, that there should be any such artificial and regular nature, otherwise than as deriving from, and depending upon, a perfect mind or wisdom.

And thus do we see plainly, that no Atheists whatsoever can solve the phenomena of nature, and this particularly of the regular frame and har-

mony of the universe; and that true philosophy, or the knowledge of causes, necessarily leadeth to a God.

But besides these phænomena of cogitation, or soul and mind in animals, local motion in bodies, and the artificial frame of things for ends and uses, together with the conspiring harmony of the whole, which can no way be solved without a Deity; we might here further add, that the fortuitous, that is, the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheists, who universally asserted the novelty of this mundane system, were not able to give any tolerable account neither of the first beginning of men, and those greater animals, that are no otherwise begotten, than in the way of generation, by the commixture of male and female.

Lib. 3. c. ult.
[p. 665, Tom.
II. Oper.]

Aristotle, in his book of the generation of animals, writeth thus; *Περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τετραπόδων γενέσεως, ὑπολάβει τις αὐτῶν, ἕως ἂν ἐπιγνώσῃ ποτὲ γηγενῆσθαι, ὡς περὶ Φασὶ τινες, δύο τρόπων γίνεσθαι τὸν ἕτερον· ἢ γὰρ ὡς σκώληκος ἐκ σαπίσματος τοῦ πρῶτου, ἢ ἐξ ὠῶν· If men and fourfooted animals were ever generated out of the earth, as some affirm, it may be probably conceived to have been one of these two ways, either that they were produced, as worms, out of putrefaction, or else formed in certain eggs, growing out of the earth. And then, after a while, he concludes again, ἕως ἂν τις ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις, εὐλογον δεῖν τούτων εἶναι τὴν ἰτέραν, That if there were any beginning of the generation of all animals, it is reasonable to think it to have been one of these two forementioned ways. It is well known, that *Aristotle*, though a Theist, elsewhere affirmeth the world's eternity; according to which hypothesis of his, there was never any first male nor female in any kind of animals, but one begat another infinitely, without any beginning: a thing utterly repugnant to our human faculties, that are never able to frame any conception of such an infinity of number and time, and of a successive generation from eternity. But here *Aristotle* himself seems staggering, or sceptical, about it, if men were ever generated out of the earth, and if there were any beginning of the generation of animals; as he doth also, in his *Topicks*, propound it for an instance of a thing disputable, *Ἡότερον ὁ κόσμος αἰδῶς ἢ οὐκ;* Whether the world were eternal or no? he ranking it amongst those, *περὶ ὧν λόγος μὴ ἔχουμεν οὐτως μεγάλων, Those great things, for which we can give no certain reason one way nor other.* Now (saith he) if the world had a beginning, and if men were once γηγενῆσθαι, or ἀρχήβοιαι, earth-born, then must they have been, in all probability, either generated, as worms, out of putrefaction, or else out of eggs; he supposing (it seems) those eggs to have grown out of the earth. But the generality of Atheists in *Aristotle's* time, as well as Theists, denying this eternity of the mundane system, as not so agreeable with their hypothesis, because so constant and invariable an order in the world, from eternity, hath not such an appearance or semblance of chance, nor can be easily supposed to have been without the providence of a perfect mind presiding over it, and senior to it (as *Aristotle* conceived) in nature, though not in time; they therefore, in all probability, concluded likewise, men at first*

Lib. 1. c. 9.
[Cap. XI. p.
265, Tom. I
Oper.]

¹ Ibid. p. 666.

first to have been generated one of these two ways, either out of putrefaction, or from eggs; and this by the fortuitous motion of matter, without the providence or direction of any Deity. But after *Aristotle*, *Epicurus* fancied those first men and other animals to have been formed in certain wombs or bags growing out of the earth;

1 Crescebant uteri terræ radicibus apti;

And this no otherwise than by the fortuitous motion of atoms also.

But if men had been at first formed after this manner, either in wombs or eggs (growing out of the earth) or generated out of putrefaction, by chance; then could there be no reason imaginable, why it should not sometimes so happen now, the motions of atoms being as brisk and vigorous, as ever they were, and so to continue to all eternity: so that there is not the least ground at all for that precarious fancy and pretence of *Epicurus*², that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, growing old, became at length effete and barren. Moreover, the men thus at first excluded out of bags, wombs or egg-shells, or generated out of putrefaction, were supposed by these Atheists themselves to have been produced, not in a mature and adult, but an infant-like, weak and tender state, just such as they are now born into the world; by means whereof they could neither be able to feed and nourish themselves, nor defend themselves from harms and injuries. But when the same *Epicurus*³ would here pretend also, that the earth, which had been so fruitful a mother, became afterward, by chance too, as tender and indulgent a nurse of this her own progeny, and sent forth streams or rivers of milk after them out of those gaps of her wounded surface, which they had before burst out of, as *Critolaus* long since observed, he might as well have feigned the earth to have had breasts and nipples too, as wombs and milk; and then what should hinder, but that she might have arms and hands also, and swaddling-bands to boot? Neither is that less precarious, when the same atheistical philosopher adds, that in this imaginary state of the new-born world, there was for a long time neither any immoderate heat nor cold, nor any rude and churlish blasts of wind, the least to annoy or injure those tender earth-born infants and nurslings. All which things being considered, *Anaximander*⁴ seems of the two to have concluded more wisely, that men, because they require a longer time than other animals to be hatched up in, were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and there nourished up for a good while, till they were at length able to defend and shift for themselves, and then were disgorged, and cast up upon dry land. Thus do we see, that there is nothing in the world so monstrous, nor prodigiously absurd, which men, atheistically inclined, will not rather imagine, and swallow down, than entertain the notion of a God.

In Philo. Quod. Mund. Incorr. [p. 945.]

Wherefore here is *dignus vindice nodus*, and this phenomenon of the first beginning of mankind, and other greater animals, cannot be solved otherwise,

¹ Lucr. Lib. V. Vers. 806.

² Vide Lucret. Lib. V. Vers. 823, 824. & Lib. II. Vers. 1149.

³ Vide Lucret. Lib. V. Vers. 810.

⁴ Vide Censorinum de Die Natali, Cap. IV. p. 26. Edit. Lindenbrogii.

wife, than according to the Mosaick history, by admitting of Θεοῦ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, a God out of a machine, that is, an extraordinary manifestation of the Deity, in forming man, and other animals, male and female, once out of the earth; and that not in a rude, tender and infant-like state, but mature and adult, that so they might be able immediately to shift for themselves, multiply and propagate their kind by generation: and this being once done, and now no longer any necessity of such an extraordinary way of proceeding, then putting a stop immediately thereunto, that so no more *terrigonæ*, nor *autochthones*, earth-born men, should be any longer produced. For all these circumstances being put together, it plainly appears, that this whole phænomenon surpasses not only the mechanical, but also the plastick powers; there being much of discretion in it, which the latter of these cannot arrive to neither, they always acting fatally and necessarily. Nevertheless, we shall not here determine, whether God Almighty might not make use of the subservient ministry of angels or superiour spirits, created before man, in this first extraordinary efformation of the bodies of animals out of the earth, in a mature and adult state; as *Plato*, in his *Timæus**, introduceth the supreme God (whom he supposeth to be the immediate Creator of all immortal souls) thus bespeaking the junior gods, and setting them a work in the fabrication of mortal bodies, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτω θεῶν τὸν προσφαινοῦσιν, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῶα κτ' γενῶτε, *It is your work now to adaptate the mortal to the immortal, and to generate or make terrestrial animals*: he afterwards adding †, μετὰ τὸ σπέρμα, τοῖς νέοις παρόντων θεῶν, σάμαλα πλάσειν θεῶν, *That after the sowing of immortal souls (the supreme God) committed to these junior gods the task of forming mortal bodies*. Which of *Plato's* some conceive to have been derived from that of *Moses*, *Let us make man after our own image*.

Moreover, these Atheists are no more able to solve that other common and ordinary phænomenon neither, of the conservation of the species of all animals, by keeping up constantly in the world a due numerical proportion between the sexes of male and female. For did this depend only upon fortuitous mechanism, it cannot well be conceived, but that, in some ages or other, there should happen to be either all males or all females; and so the species fail. Nay, it cannot well be thought otherwise, but that there is in this a providence also, superiour to that of the plastick or spermatick nature, which hath not so much of knowledge and discretion allowed to it, as whereby to be able alone to govern this affair.

Lastly, there are yet other phænomena, no less real, though not physio-logical, which Atheists can no way solve; as that of natural justice, and honesty, duty and obligation; the true foundation both of ethicks and politics; and the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, *liberty of will*, properly so called, not that of fortuitous determination, when there is a perfect equality or indifferency of eligibility in objects; but that whereby men deserve commendation and blame, rewards and punishments, and so become fit objects for remunerative justice to display itself upon, a main hinge upon which religion turneth;

* §. XXVII. p. 250. † §. XXIX. p. 252.

turneth; (though those two be not commonly so well distinguished as they ought.) For when *Epicurus* (an absolute Atheist) departing here from *Democritus*, pretended to solve this by his *exiguum clinamen principiorum*, this attempt of his was no other than a plain delirancy, or atheistical phrenzy in him.

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheistical pretence also, to solve the phenomenon of religion and the belief of a God, so generally entertained; namely, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: we having not only manifested, that there is a natural prolepsis and anticipation of a God, in the minds of men, as the object of their fear, preventing reason; but also that the belief thereof is sustained and upheld by the strongest reason; the phenomena of nature being no way solvable, nor the causes of things assignable, without a Deity; so that religion being founded, both upon the instincts of nature, and upon solid reason, cannot possibly be any fiction or imposture of politicians. Nevertheless, we shall speak something particularly to this also. The Atheists therefore conceive, that though those infirmities of human nature, men's fear and ignorant credulity, do much dispose and incline them to the belief of a God, or else of a rank of beings superiour to men, (whether visible or invisible) commonly called by the Pagans, gods; yet would not this be so generally entertained, as it is, especially that of one supreme Deity, the first original of all things, and monarch of the universe, had it not been for the fraud and fiction of law-makers and civil sovereigns, who, the better to keep men in peace and subjection under them, and in a kind of religious and superstitious observation of their laws, and devotion to the same, devised this notion of a God, and then possessed the minds of men with a belief of his existence, and an awe of him.

Now, we deny not, but that politicians may sometimes abuse religion, and make it serve for the promoting of their own private interests and designs; which yet they could not do so well neither, were the thing itself a mere cheat and figment of their own, and had no reality at all in nature, nor any thing solid at the bottom of it. But since religion obtains so universally every where, it is not conceivable, how civil sovereigns throughout the whole world, some of which are so distant, and have so little correspondence with one another, should, notwithstanding, all so well agree in this one cheating mystery of government, or piece of state-cozenage; nor, if they could, how they should be able so effectually to possess the generality of mankind, (as well wise as unwise) with such a constant fear, awe, and dread, of a mere counterfeit thing, and an invisible nothing; and which hath not only no manner of foundation neither in sense nor reason, but also (as the Atheists suppose) tends to their own great terror and disquietment, and so brings them at once under a miserable vassalage both of mind and body. Especially since men are not generally so apt to think, that how much the more any have of power and dignity, they have therefore so much the more of knowledge and skill in philosophy and the things of nature,

nature, above others. And is it not strange, that the world should not all this while have suspected or discovered this cheat and juggle of politicians, and have smelt out a plot upon themselves, in the fiction of religion, to take away their liberty, and enthral them under bondage; and that so many of these politicians, and civil sovereigns themselves also, should have been unacquainted herewith, and as simply awed with the fear of this invisible nothing, as any others? All other cheats and juggles, when they are once never so little detected, are presently thereupon dashed quite out of countenance, and have never any more the confidence to obtrude themselves upon the world. But though the Atheists have, for these two thousand years past, been continually buzzing into men's ears, that religion is nothing but a mere state-juggle and political imposture; yet hath not the credit thereof been the least impaired thereby, nor its power and dominion over the minds of men abated: from whence it may be concluded, that it is no counterfeit and fictitious thing, but what is deeply rooted in the intellectual nature of man; a thing solid at the bottom, and supported by its own strength. Which yet may more fully appear from Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, nor tending to promote any worldly interest or design; which yet by its own, or the divine force, hath prevailed over the power and policy, the rage and madness of all civil states, Jewish and Pagan, and hath conquered so great a part of the persecuting world under it; and that not by resisting, or opposing force, but by suffering deaths and martyrdoms, in way of adherence to that principle, *That it is better to obey God than men.* Which thing was thus prefigured in the prophetick Scripture; *Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord, and against his Christ, &c. He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; the Lord shall have them in derision. Then shall he speak unto them in his wrath, &c. Yet have I set my king upon my holy hill of Zion. I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Be wise now therefore, O ye kings, &c.*

But that theism, or religion, is no gullery or imposture, will be yet further made unquestionably evident. That the generality of mankind have agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, as a Being eternal and necessarily existent, absolutely perfect and omnipotent, and the maker of the whole world, hath been already largely proved in the foregoing discourse. To which purpose is this of *Sextus* the philosopher; *Καὶνὸν γὰρ πρόβλημα ἔχοντι πάντες ἄθροιστοι περὶ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἂν μακρότερον τι ἔστι ζῶσι καὶ ἀφθαρτοὶ καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, καὶ παντὸς κακῆ ἀνεπιδεῖον.* *All men have this common prolepsis concerning God, that he is a living Being incorruptible, perfectly happy, and incapable of all manner of evil.* And the notion of that God, which *Epicurus* opposed, was no other than this, *An understanding Being, having all happiness, with incorruptibility, that framed the whole world.* Now, I

¹ Acts v. 29.
² Psal. ii. 1.

³ Lib. I. adverb. Physicos. five Lib. VIII. adverb. Mathemat. Sect. I. §. XXXIII. p. 556. Ed. Fabricii.

say, that if there be no such thing as this existing, and this idea of God be a meer fictitious thing, then was it altogether arbitrary. But it is unconceivable, how the generality of mankind (a few Atheists only excepted) should universally agree in one and the same arbitrary fiction. This argumentation hath been formerly used by some Theists, as appeareth from the forementioned *Sextus*; *τελής δέ ἐστιν ἄλογον, τὸ κατὰ τὴν τύχην πάντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν ἰδιώματων, ἀλλὰ μὴ Φυσικῶς ἕως ἐκινεῖσθαι* ³¹⁴. *It is altogether irrational to think, that all men should by chance light upon the same properties (in the idea of God) without being naturally moved thereunto*. Neither is that any sufficient account, which the Atheists would here give, that statesmen and politicians every where thus possessed the minds of men with one and the same idea; the difficulty still remaining, how civil sovereigns and law-makers, in all the distant parts of the world, and such as had no communication nor intercourse with one another, should universally jump in one and the same fictitious and arbitrary idea.

Moreover, were there no God, it is not conceivable how that forementioned idea should ever have entred into the minds of men, or how it could have been formed in them. And here the Atheists again think it enough to say, that this notion or idea was put into the minds of the generality of mankind by law-makers and politicians, telling them of such a being, and persuading them to believe his existence; or that it was, from the first feigner or inventor of it, propagated all along and conveyed down by oral tradition. But this argues their great ignorance in philosophy, to think, that any notion or idea is put into mens minds from without, meerly by telling, or by words; we being passive to nothing else from words but their sounds and the phantasms thereof, they only occasioning the soul to excite such notions, as it had before within itself (whether innate or adventitious) which those words, by the compact and agreement of men, were made to be signs of; or else to reflect also further upon those ideas of their own, consider them more distinctly, and compare them with one another. And though all learning be not the remembrance of what the soul once before actually understood, in a pre-existent state, as *Plato* somewhere would have it, according to that of *Boëtius* 1,

*Quod si Platonis musa personat verum,
Quod quisque discit, immemor recordatur :*

yet is all human teaching but maieutical, or obstetricious; and not the filling of the soul as a vessel, merely by pouring into it from without, but the kindling of it from within; or helping it so to excite and awaken, compare and compound its own notions, as whereby to arrive at the knowledge of that, which it was before ignorant of: as the thing was better expressed by the forementioned philosophick poet, in these words,

*Heret profecto semen introitum veri,
Quod excitatur ventilante doctrina.*

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1 De Consolat. Philos. Lib. III. p. 79, 80.

Wherefore the meer telling of men, there is a God, could not infuse any idea of him into their minds; nor yet the further giving this definition of him, that he is a being absolutely perfect, eternal and self-existent, make them understand any thing of his nature, were they not able to excite notions or ideas from within themselves, correspondent to those several words. However the difficulty still remains, how those civil sovereigns and law-makers, or how *Critias* his very first inventor of that cheat of a God, could form that idea within themselves; since upon supposition of his non-existence, it is the idea of nothing, or of a non-entity. And this was judiciously hinted also by the same *Sextus*; *οἱ δὲ διχμοφοδοκῶντες, φασὶν ὅτι νομοθέται τινες ἐνεπίσθασαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὴν περὶ Θεοῦ δόξαν, μὴ εἰδότες ὅτι τὸ ἀρχαῖον αἰῶνος ἀλλῆς περιεμύει, ἑτηύχοντες αὐτοῖς, πῶθεν δὲ οἱ νομοθέται, μῆδεν ἄλλο παραδόχοντες, ἤλαθον εἰς ἐπίσθασιν Θεοῦ*; *The Atheists affirming, that certain law-makers first put this notion of a God into the minds of men, do not consider, that they still remain intangled in the difficulty, if any one further demands of them, how those law-makers themselves could first form that idea?* From whence it is afterwards concluded; *ἡ τοῦν θεῖς, εἴτε κατὰ τινὰ νομοθεσίαν, παρεδόξατο οἱ πάλαιον τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι Θεοῦ*. *That therefore the notion of a God sprung not from the arbitrary fiction of law-makers and politicians.*

Adv. Math.
313, 314.
[P. 556.]

But some Atheists will yet further reply, that there is a feigning power in the human soul, whereby it can frame ideas or conceptions of such things, as actually never were nor will be, as of a centaur, or of a golden mountain; and that by such a feigning power as this, the idea of God, though there be no such thing existing, might be framed. And here we deny not, but that the human soul hath a power of compounding ideas and things together, which exist severally, and apart in nature, but never were, nor will be, in that conjunction: and this indeed is all the feigning power, that it hath. For the mind cannot make any new cogitation, which was not before, but only compound that which is. As the painter cannot feign colours, but must use such as exist in nature; only he can variously compound them together, and by his pencil draw the figures and lineaments of such things as no where are; as he can add to the head and face of a man the neck, shoulders, and body of a horse. In like manner, that more subtle painter or limner, the mind and imagination of man, can frame compounded ideas of things, which no where exist, but yet his simple colours, notwithstanding, must be real; he cannot feign any cogitation which was not in nature, nor make a positive conception of that, which is absolutely nothing; which were no less than to make nothing to be something, or create something out of nothing. And though the whole of these fictitious ideas (as of a golden mountain) does not any where actually exist, yet for as much as it doth not absolutely imply a contradiction, for it so to do, therefore hath it also a possible entity too, and otherwise it could not be conceivable. As a triangular square, for example, being a contradictory thing, hath not so much as a possible entity, and therefore is not conceivable as such; (though both a triangle and a square severally be conceivable) it being meer nonsense, nothing, and no idea at all. Nay, we conceive, that a Theist may

! Ibid. p. 557.

presume with reverence to say, that God Almighty himself, though he can create more or fewer really existent things, as he pleaseth, and could make a whole world out of nothing, yet can he not make more cogitation or conception, than is, or was before contained in his own infinite mind and eternal wisdom, nor have a positive idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor possible entity.

But the idea of God is not a compilement or aggregation of things, which exist scatteredly and apart in the world; for then would it be a mere arbitrary thing, and it might be what every one pleased, one adding more things together, and another fewer, but each of them writing the name or title of God, as bungling painters did under these their several figments: whereas we have already proved, that the idea of God is one most simple idea of an absolutely perfect Being, though having several partial and inadequate conceptions, so that nothing can be added to it, nor detracted from it, there being nothing included therein but what is demonstrable of a perfect Being, and therefore nothing at all arbitrary.

Moreover, many of those partial conceptions contained in the entire idea of God are no where else to be found in the whole world, existing singly and apart; and therefore, if there be no God, they must needs be absolute non-entities; as immutability, necessary existence, infinity, and perfection, &c. So that the painter, that makes this idea, must here feign colours themselves, or create new cogitation and conception out of nothing, upon the atheistical supposition.

Lastly, If there be no God now existing, it is impossible, that ever there should be any, and so the whole idea of God would be the idea of that, which hath no possible entity neither; whereas those other fictitious ideas, made by the mind of men, though they be of such things as have no actual existence, yet have they all a possible entity, as was said before.

But that we may conceal nothing of the Atheists strength, we must here acknowledge, that some of them have yet pretended further, that besides this power of compounding things together, the human soul hath also another ampliating, or increasing and improving power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him may be fictitiously made; those partial ideas, which are no where else to be found, arising, as they say, from a *μετάβασις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, a transition and gradual procession from men, in way of amplification, augmentation and improvement. Thus do we read in Sextus, *Τὸ αἰδίου εἶναι τὸν Θεόν, ἢ ἀφθαρτον, ἢ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, παρέλθει κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μετάβασιν· ὡς γὰρ τὸν κοινὸν ἀνθρώπου ἀεξήσαντες τῇ φαντασίᾳ, νόησιν ἔχουμεν Κύνλαπτον, ὅπως ἀνθρώπου ἐδαιμόνα νόησαντες ἢ μακάριον ἢ συμπληρωμένον πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἔτα ταῦτα ἐπιπέσαντες, τὸν ἐν αὐλοῖς ἐκεῖνοις ἀερον ἐνόησαμεν Θεόν· ἢ πάλιν πολυχρόσιον τιτὰ φαντασιώσαντες ἀβερρον εἰ πάλαιον, ἐπήλθον τὸν χρόνον εἰς χείρον, ἔτα ἐπέσεν εἰς ἐνοίαν*

Adv. Math. P. 317. [Lib. VIII. seu adv. Physic. Lib. I. Sect. II. §. XLVI. p. 559, 560.] αἰδίου

αἰδίων παραγεγόμενοι, Ἰφασαν κὶ αἰδίων εἶσι τὸν Θεόν. *The ideas of the eternity, incorruptibility, and perfect happiness of the Deity, were fictitiously made by way of transition from men: for as, by increasing a man of an ordinary stature in our imagination, we fictitiously make the phantasm of a Cyclops; so when beholding a happy man, that abounds with all good things, we amplify, intend, and, as it were, swell the same in our minds higher and higher, we then arrive at length to the idea of a Being absolutely happy, that is, a God. So did the ancients, taking notice of a very longevous man, and increasing this length of age further and further infinitely, by that means frame the notion or idea of eternity, and attribute the same to God.*

But to this we reply, first, That according to the principles of the Atheists themselves, there could not possibly be any such amplifying and reigning power of the soul, as whereby it could *make more than is*; because they suppose it to have no active power at all, but all our conceptions to be nothing but mere passions from the objects without; according to that of *Protagoras* in *Plato's Theaetetus*, ἔτι γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάζειν, ἔτι ἄλλα
 P. 167. Serr. πᾶς ἂν πάσῃ. *It is neither possible for a man to conceive that which is not; nor any more or otherwise, than he suffers.* Again, as *Sextus*' the philosopher also intimates, the Atheists are here plainly guilty of that fallacy or error in ratiocination, which is commonly called a *circle*, or δι' ἀλλήλων. For whereas they could not otherwise judge the greatest perfection and happiness, which ever they had experience of in men, to be imperfect, than by an anticipated idea of perfection and happiness, with which it was in their minds compared; (by virtue of which idea also it comes to pass, that they are able to amplify those lesser perfections of men further and further, and can take occasion, from imperfect things, to think of that which is absolutely perfect:) that is, whereas these Atheists themselves first make the idea of imperfection from perfection; they, not attending to this, do again go about to make up the notion or idea of that, which is absolutely perfect (by way of amplification) from that which is imperfect. But that men have a notion of absolute perfection in them, by which, as the rule or measure, they (comparing other things therewith) judge them to be imperfect, and which is therefore in order of nature first, may appear from hence, because all theologians, as well Pagan as Christian, give this direction, for the conceiving of God, that it should principally be done *per viam remotionis*, by way of *remotion of all imperfection from him*. Thus *Aleinous* ², πρῶτη μὲν αὐτῷ νόσος ἢ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν, *the first way of conceiving of God is by remotion or abstraction*. We add, in the last place, that finite things put together can never make up infinite, as may appear from that instance of human longevity proposed; for, if one should amplify that never so much, by adding of more and more past time or years to it, yet would he never thereby be able to arrive at eternity without beginning. God differs not from these imperfect created things in degrees only, but in the whole kind. And though infinite space may perhaps be here objected, as a thing taken for granted, which being nothing but extension or magnitude, must therefore consist, or be made up, of finite parts, as it was before declared, we

¹ Vide Lib. VIII. adv. Mathematic. Sect. II. §. XLVII. p. 560.

² Introd. in Doctrin. Platon. Cap. X. p. 602. printed at the end of *Dan. Heinsius's* edit. of *Maximus Tyrius*.

have no certainty of any more than this, that the finite world might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely, or without end; which infinity of magnitude is but like that of number, potential; from whence it may be inferred as well of the one as the other, that it can never be actually infinite. Wherefore, were there no infinitely perfect being in nature, the idea thereof could never be made up by any amplifying power of the soul, or by the addition of finites. Neither is that of any moment which *Gassendus* * so much objecteth here to the contrary, that though there were no God, or infinite Being, yet might the idea of him as well be feigned by the mind, as that of infinite worlds, or of infinite matter, was by some philosophers: for infinite worlds, and infinite matter, are but words ill put together, infinity being a real thing in nature, (and no fiction of the mind) as well as the world or matter, but yet proper to the Deity only. But it is no wonder, if they, who denied a God, yet retaining this notion of infinity, should misapply the same, as they did also other properties of the Deity, to matter.

To conclude this; our human soul cannot feign or create any new cogitation, or conception, that was not before, but only variously compound that which is; nor can it ever make a positive idea of an absolute non-entity, that is, such as hath neither actual nor possible existence: much less could our imperfect beings create the entity of so vast a thought, as that of an infinitely perfect Being, out of nothing; this being indeed more than for God Almighty, or a perfect Being, to create a real world out of nothing; because there is no repugnancy at all in the latter, as there is in the former. We affirm therefore, that were there no God, the idea of an absolutely or infinitely perfect Being could never have been made or feigned, neither by politicians, nor by poets, nor philosophers, nor any other. Which may be accounted another argument for a Deity.

But that religion is no figment of politicians, will further unquestionably appear from that, which now shall follow. As the religion of an oath is a necessary *vinculum* of civil society; so obligation in conscience, respecting the Deity as its original, and as the punisher of the violation thereof, is the very foundation of all civil sovereignty: for pacts and covenants (into which some would resolve all civil power) without this obligation in conscience, are nothing but mere words and breath; and the laws and commands of civil sovereigns do not make obligation, but presuppose it, as a thing in order of nature before them, and without which they would be invalid. Which is a truth so evident, that the writer *De Civitate* could not dissemble it, (though he did not rightly understand this natural obligation) but acknowledgeth it in these words; *Obligatio ad obedientiam civilem, cujus vi leges civiles validæ sunt, omni lege civili prior est.*—*Quòd si quis princeps summus legem civilem in hanc formulam conciperet, Non rebellabis, nihil efficeret. Nam nisi prius obligentur cives ad obediendum, hoc est, ad non rebellandum, omnis lex invalida est* Imper. c. 14.
Sect. 21.
[P. 109]

* In *Disquisit. Metaphys. seu dubitationibus & instantiis ad Ca. tertii Metaphys. Dubit. IV.* p. 336. Tom. III. Oper.

est ; & si prius obligentur est superflua. The obligation to civil obedience, by the force of which all the civil laws become valid, is before those civil laws. And if any prince should make a law to this purpose, That no man should rebel against him, this would signify nothing, because unless they, to whom it is made, were before obliged to obey, or not to rebel, the law is invalid ; and if they were, then is it superfluous. Now this previous obligation to civil obedience cannot be derived (as the forementioned writer *De Cive*, and of the *Leviathan*, supposes) from men's private utility only ; because every man being judge of this for himself, it would then be lawful for any subject to rebel against his sovereign prince, and to poison or stab him, whensoever he could reasonably persuade himself, that it would tend to his own advantage, or that he should thereby procure the sovereignty. Were the obligation to civil obedience made only by men's private utility, it would as easily be dissolved by the same. It remaineth therefore, that conscience, and religious obligation to duty, is the only basis, and essential foundation, of a polity or commonwealth ; without which there could be no right or authority of commanding in any sovereign, nor validity in any laws. Wherefore religious obligation cannot be thought to be the fiction or imposture of civil sovereigns, unless civil sovereignty itself be accounted a fiction and imposture, or a thing, which hath no foundation in nature, but is either wholly artificial or violent.

Moreover, had a religious regard to the Deity been a mere figment or invention of politicians, to promote their own ends, and keep men in obedience and subjection under them, then would they doubtless have so framed and contrived it, as that it should have been every way flexible and compliant ; namely, by persuading the world, that whatsoever was commanded by themselves, was agreeable to the divine will, and whatever was forbidden by their laws, was displeasing to God Almighty, and would be punished by him ; God ruling over the world no otherwise than by and in these civil sovereigns as his viceregents, and as the only prophets and interpreters of his will to men. So that the civil law of every country, and the arbitrary will of sovereigns, should be acknowledged to be the only measure of just and unjust, (there being nothing naturally such) the only rule of conscience and religion : for, from religion thus modelled, civil sovereigns might think to have an absolute power, or an infinite right of doing or commanding whatsoever they pleased, without exception, nothing being unlawful to them, and their subjects being always obliged, in conscience, without the least scruple, to obey.

But this is but a mere *Larva* of religion, and would be but a mocking of God Almighty ; and indeed this is the only religion, that can be called a political figment. Neither could the generality of mankind be ever yet thus persuaded, that the arbitrary will of civil sovereigns was the only rule of justice and conscience ; and that God Almighty could command nothing, nor reveal his will concerning religion to mankind otherwise than by these, as his prophets and interpreters. True religion and conscience are no such waxen things, servilely addicted to the arbitrary wills of men, but immo-

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rigerous, stiff, and inflexible; they respecting the Deity only, his eternal or everlasting laws, and his revealed will; with which whensoever human laws clash (a thing not impossible) they conclude, that then God ought to be obeyed, and not men. For which cause the profane politicians declare open war against this religion, as a thing utterly inconsistent with civil sovereignty; because it introduces a fear greater than the fear of the Leviathan, namely, that of him, who can inflict eternal punishments after death; as also because it clashes with that monstrous, infinite and unlimited power of theirs, which is such a thing, as is not attributed by genuine Theists to God Almighty himself; a power of making their mere arbitrary will the rule of justice, and not justice the rule of their will. Thus does a modern writer of politicks condemn it for seditious doctrine, tending to the dissolution of a commonwealth; *That subjects may make a judgment of good and evil, just and unjust; or have any other conscience besides the law of the land.* Lev. p. 168. As also this, *That subjects may sin in obeying the commands of their sovereign.* De Civ. ca. 2. Sect. 2. [P. 83.] He likewise adds, *That it is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where any other than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death.* Lev. c. 38. p. 238. Now, eternal life is a greater reward than the life present, and eternal torment than the death of nature. Wherefore, God Almighty being the dispenser of eternal rewards and punishments, this is all one as if he should have said, It is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where the belief of a God, who can punish with eternal torments after this life, is entertained. Thus does the same writer declare, That if the *superstitious fear of spirits* (whereof God is the chief) *and things depending thereupon, were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are, for civil obedience:* Lev. p. 3. and that they, who assert the immortality of souls, or their capability of receiving punishments after death, *fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names,* Pag. 375. *as men fright birds from the corn, with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick.* And accordingly he concludes, that civil sovereigns do not only make justice, but religion also; and that no Scripture or divine revelation can oblige, unless it be first made law, or stamped with their authority. Now, since that, which can make religion and gods, must itself needs be greater than all gods, it follows, according to the tenour of this doctrine, that the civil sovereign is in reality the supreme Numen; or else at least, that the Leviathan (the king over all the children of pride) is the highest Deity, next to senseless-omnipotent matter; the one of these being the Atheists natural, the other their artificial god. Nevertheless we shall here observe by the way, that whilst these atheitick politicians thus endeavour to swell up the civil sovereign, and to bestow upon him an infinite right, by removing to that end out of his way natural justice, conscience, religion, and God himself, they do indeed thereby absolutely divest him of all right and authority, since the subject is now no longer obliged in conscience to obey him; and so instead of true right and authority, they leave him nothing but mere brutish force. Wherefore, since theism and true religion are thus plainly disowned and disclaimed by these politicians,

as altogether inconsistent with their designs, they cannot be supposed to have been the figments of civil sovereigns, or the mere creatures of political art. And thus have we abundantly confuted those three atheistical pretences, to solve the phænomenon of religion; from fear, and the ignorance of causes, and the fiction of politicians.

But since, besides those ordinary phænomena before mentioned, which are no way solvable by Atheists, there are certain other phænomena extraordinary, that either immediately prove a God and Providence, or else that there is a rank of understanding beings, invisible, superiour to men, from whence a Deity may be afterwards inferred; namely, these three especially, apparitions, miracles, and prophecies; (where the Atheists obstinately denying matter of fact and history, will needs impute these things, either to juggling fraud and knavery; or else to men's own fear and fancy, and their ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong imaginations, from vision and sense; or lastly, to certain religious tales or legends, allowed by the publick authority of civil sovereigns, for political ends:) we shall here suggest something briefly, to vindicate the historick truth of those phænomena, against Atheists.

First therefore, as for apparitions, though there be much of fabulosity in these relations, yet can it not reasonably be concluded, that there is nothing at all of truth in them; since something of this kind hath been averred in all ages, and many times attested by persons of unquestionable prudence, and unsuspected veracity. And whereas the Atheists impute the original of these things to men's mistaking both their dreams, and their waking fancies, for real visions and sensations; they do hereby plainly contradict one main fundamental principle of their own philosophy, that sense is the only ground of certainty, and the criterion of all truth: for if prudent and intelligent persons may be so frequently mistaken, in confounding their own dreams and fancies with sensations, how can there be any certainty of knowledge at all from sense? However, they here derogate so much both from sense, and from human testimonies, as that if the like were done in other cases, it would plainly overthrow all human life.

Wherefore other Atheists, being apprehensive of this inconvenience, of denying so many sensible appearances, and testimonies, or relations of fact, have chose rather to acknowledge the reality of apparitions; nevertheless concluding them to be things caused and created, by the power of imagination only: as if the strength of imagination were such, that it could not only create fancies, but also real sensible objects, and that at a distance too from the imaginers, such as whereby the sense of others shall be for the time affected, though they quickly vanish away again. From which prodigious paradox, we may take notice of the fanaticism of some Atheists, and that there is nothing so monstrously absurd, which men infected with atheistical incredulity will not rather entertain into their belief,

belief, than admit of any thing, that shall the least hazard or endanger the existence of a God. For, if there be once any invisible ghosts or spirits acknowledged as things permanent, it will not be easy for any to give a reason, why there might not be one supreme ghost also, presiding over them all, and the whole world.

In the last place therefore we shall observe, that *Democritus* was yet further convinced by these relations of apparitions, so as to grant, that there was a certain kind of permanent beings, and independent upon imagination, superiour to men, which could appear in different forms, and again disappear at pleasure, called by him *idols*, or *images*; he supposing them to be of the same nature with those exuvius effluxes, that stream continually from the surface of bodies; only he would not allow them to have any thing immortal at all in them, but their concretions to be at length all dissolvable, and their personalities then to vanish into nothing. Thus *Sextus* the philo-

sopher, Δημόκριτος εἰδωλά τινα φησὶν ἐκπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τῶτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιὰ, τὰ δὲ κακοποιὰ. εὖθεν καὶ ἐρχεσθαι ἐνλόγων τυχεῖν εἰδωλῶν· εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα μέγιστα τε καὶ ὑπερμεγέθη, καὶ ὀσφρακτα μὲν, ἐκ ἄσφρακτα δὲ, προσσημαίνειν τε τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, θεωρήματα καὶ φωνὰς ἀφιέντα. *Adv. Math.*
p. 311. [Lib. VIII. §. XIX. p. 552.]

Democritus affirmeth, that there are certain idols or spectres, that do often approach to men, some of which are beneficent, and some maleficent. Upon which account he wisheth, that it might be his good hap to meet with fortunate idols. And he addeth, that these are of a vast bigness, and very longeve, but not incorruptible; and that they sometimes do fore signify unto men future events, both visibly appearing to them, and sending forth audible voices. Now, though *Democritus* were much blamed for this concession of his by his fellow-Atheists, as giving thereby too great an advantage to Theists; yet, in his own opinion, did he sufficiently secure himself against the danger of a God from hence, by supposing all these idols of his to be corruptible, they being indeed nothing but certain finer concretions of atoms, a kind of aerial and æthereal animals, that were all body, and without any immortal soul, as he supposed men also to be: so that a God could be no more proved from them, than from the existence of men. For thus he adds in *Sextus*, ὅθεν τῶτων αὐτῶν φησὶν αἰσίου λαβόντες οἱ παλαιοὶ, ὑπενόησαν εἶναι Θεῶν, μηδενὸς ἄλλου παρὰ ταῦτα ὄντος Θεοῦ, τὸ ἄσφρακτου φύσιν ἔχουσιν. Men, in ancient times, having a sense of these apparitions or idols, fell from thence into the opinion of a God, although there be, besides these idols, no other God, that hath an incorruptible nature. However, though *Democritus* continued thus grossly atheistical, yet was he further convinced than our modern Atheists will be, that the stories of apparitions were not all fabulous, and that there are not only terrestrial, but also aerial and æthereal animals; nor this earth of ours alone peopled and inhabited, whilst all those other vast regions above lie desert, solitary and waste. Where it may be observed again, that divers of the ancient fathers, though they agreed not so far with *Democritus*, as to make the angelical beings to be altogether corporeal, yet did they likewise suppose them to have their certain subtle æthereal or aerial bodies. In which respect *St. Austin*, in his 115th epistle, calleth angels, *æthereos*, and devils, *æreos animantes*.

VOL II. **Xxxx** **Thus**

Pag. 29 [vel Thus *Psellus* in his *Dialogue* περι ενεργείας δαιμόνων: ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσώματον, ὡ γυν-
 ναιῆ, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐστὶ Φύλον, μετὰ σώματι δέγει, καὶ ἀμφὶ σώματι διατίττεται. Καὶ
 p.44.45. Edit. τούτῳ ἐστὶ μὲν καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν μαθεῖναι τῶν σεμνῶν πατέρων. Καὶ Βασίλειος δὲ ὁ Σεῖος, οὐ
 Gaulmini] δαίμοσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ἀγγέλοις, ἐνεῖναι σώματα διατίττεται, οἷά τινα πνεύ-
 ματα λεπτὰ καὶ ἀερώδη καὶ ἄχραντα, καὶ ἕξιν. *But you are to know, that demons or
 devils are not altogether incorporeal, but that they are joined to bodies, and so
 converse with bodies; which may be learned also from the fathers, the divine
 Basil contending, that there are bodies, not only in devils, but also in the pure
 angels themselves, as certain subtle, airy, defecate spirits. Where afterwards
 he shows, how the σύμφυτοι ἀγγέλοις σώματα, that body which is connate with an-
 gels, differs from that, which devils are united to, in respect of the radiant
 splendour of the one, and the dark fuliginous obscurity of the other. Moreover,
 that devils are not without bodies, he endeavours further to confirm from the words
 of our Saviour, that they shall be punished with fire; which (saith he) were a thing
 impossible, were they all of them incorporeal. And some perhaps will attempt to
 prove the same concerning angels too, from those other words of our Saviour, where,
 speaking of the resurrection state, he affirmeth, that they, who shall be
 accounted worthy thereof, shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, but be
 ἰσάγγελοι, equal to the angels: which comparative expression of men, as to
 their bodies with angels, would be thought not so proper, were the angels
 absolutely devoid of all body. But of this we determine not.*

To this phenomenon of apparitions might be added those two others of magicians or wizards,
 dæmoniacks or *Energumeni*; both of these proving also the real existence of spirits, and that they
 are not mere phancies, and imaginary inhabitants of men's brains only, but real inhabitants of the
 world. As also, that among those spirits there are some foul, unclean, and wicked ones, (though
 not made such by God, but by their own apostacy) which is some confirmation of the truth of
 Christianity, the Scripture insisting so much upon these evil dæmons or devils, and declaring it
 to be one design of our Saviour Christ's coming into the world, to oppose these confederate
 powers of the kingdom of darkness, and to rescue mankind from the thraldom and bondage thereof.
 As for wizards and magicians, persons who associate and confederate themselves in a peculiar
 manner with these evil spirits, for the gratification of their own revenge, lust, ambition, and
 other passions; besides the Scriptures, there hath been so full an attestation given to them by
 persons unconcerned in all ages, that those our so confident exploders of them, in this present
 age, can hardly escape the suspicion of having some hankering towards atheism. But as for the
 dæmoniacks and *Energumeni*, it hath been wondered, that there should be so many of them in
 our Saviour's time, and hardly any, or none, in this present age of ours. Certain it is, from the
 writings of *Josephus*, in sundry places, that the Pharisæick Jews were then generally possessed
 with an opinion of these δαιμονιζόμενοι, dæmoniacks, men possessed with devils, or infected by them.
 And that this was not a mere phrase or form of speech only amongst them for persons very ill
 affected in their bodies, may appear from hence, that

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Josephus¹ declares it as his opinion concerning the dæmons or devils, that they were πομπῶν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα τοῖς ζῶσιν εἰσδύμενα, *the spirits or souls of wicked men deceased getting into the bodies of the living*. From hence it was, that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, were not at all surpris'd with his casting out of devils, it being usual for them also to exorcise the same; an art, which they pretended to have learn'd from Solomon. Of whom thus Josephus, *παρέχει δ' αὐτῷ μαθεῖν ὁ θεός, καὶ τὴν κατὰ τῶν δαιμόνων τέχνην, εἰς ὠφέλειαν καὶ* *Ant. Jud. Lib. 8. c. 2.*
θεραπείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐπιβάς τε συντάξαι αἷμα ἃς παρηγορεῖται τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ [p. 419, 420.]
τρύφας ἐξαγορεύων κατέλειπεν, οἷς ἐσθόμενα, τὰ δαιμόνια ὡς μακρῆ' ἐπαυελθείν, ἐκδιώκων.
Καὶ αὐτὴ μέχρι νῦν ἡ Θεραπεία πλείστοι ἰχθύνει. *God also taught Solomon an art against dæmons and devils, for the benefit and cure of men; who composed certain incantations, by which diseases are cured, and left forms of exorcisms, whereby devils are expelled and driven away. Which method of curing prevails much amongst us at this very day.* Notwithstanding which, we think it not at all probable what a late atheistical writer² hath asserted, that the heads of the Jews were then all of them so full of dæmons and devils, that they generally took all manner of bodily diseases, such as fevers and agues, and dumbness and deafness, for devils. Though we grant, that this very thing was imputed by Plotinus afterward to the Gnosticks, that they supposed all diseases to be devils, and therefore not to be cured by physick, but expelled by words or charms. Thus he, *En. 2. Lib. 9. c. 14.*³ *νῦν δὲ ὑποσησόμενοι τὰς νόσους δαιμόνια εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξαγεῖν λόγῳ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι, καὶ ἐπαγγελόμενοι, σμιότεροι μὲν αὐτοὶ δοξαζομένους παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἱ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς μέγροις δυνάμεις θαυμάζοντες, τὰς μέντοι εὐφροσύνας ἐκ αὐτῶν πείθοιεν, ὡς ἐκ αἰσίου τὰς αἰτίας ἔχοντες, ἢ πλησμοναίς, ἢ ἐσθίαις, &c. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ αἱ Θεραπείαι αὐτῶν, γαστροῦ γὰρ ρυτίσης ἢ Φαρμάκων δοσῆναι, διεχώρησε κάτω τὸ νόσημα· καὶ αἵματι ἀφρομένην καὶ ἐνδοξὴν δὲ ἰάσαστο· ἢ πενήσασθαι τὰ δαιμόνια, καὶ τὰ Φαρμάκων ποιήσασθαι τήκεσθαι.* Now when they affirm diseases to be dæmons or devils, and pretend, that they can expel them by words, undertaking to do the same, they hereby indeed render themselves considerable to the vulgar, who are wont not a little to admire the powers of magicians. But they will not be able to persuade wise men, that diseases have no natural causes, as from repletion, or inanition, or putrefaction, or the like; which is a thing manifest from their cure, they being oftentimes removed by purgation, and bleeding and abstinence; unless perhaps these men will say, that the devil is by this means starved, and made to pine away. Nor can we think, that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, either supposed all madmen to be dæmoniacks, or all dæmoniacks madmen (though this latter seems to be asserted by an eminent writer of our own) we reading of devils cast out from others besides madmen; and of a woman, which had a spirit of infirmity only, and was bowed together, and could not lift up herself, which is said by our Saviour Christ to have been bowed by Satan. Wherefore the sense of the Jews formerly seems to have been this, that when there was any unusual and extraordinary symptoms in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, this being look'd upon as something more than natural, was imputed by them to the possession or infestation of

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¹ De Bello Judaico, Lib. VII. Cap. VI. §. III.] ² Hobbes. See Leviathan, Cap. XL. p. 417. Tom. II. Edit. Havercampii. ³ P. 212. Oper.

some devil. Neither was this proper to the Jews only at that time, to suppose evil dæmons to be the causes of such bodily diseases as had extraordinary symptoms, and especially madness; but the Greeks, and other Gentiles also, were embued with the same persuasion; as appeareth from *Apollonius Tyanæus* his curing a laughing dæmoniack¹ at *Athens*, he ejection that evil spirit by threats and menaces, who is said, at his departure, to have tumbled down a royal porch in the city with great noise; as also², from his freeing the city of *Ephesus* from the plague, by stoning an old ragged beggar, said by *Apollonius* to have been the plague, which appeared to be a dæmon, by his changing himself into the form of a snagg'd dog.

But that there is some truth in this opinion, and that at this very day evil spirits, or dæmons, do sometimes really act upon the bodies of men, and either inflict or augment bodily distempers and diseases, hath been the judgment of two very experienced physicians, *Sennertus* and *Fernelius*. The former in his book *De Mania*, Lib. 1. cap. 15. writing thus; *Est sine ulla corporis morbosa dispositione, Deo permittente, hominem obfidere & occupare dæmon possit, tamen quandoque morbis, & precipuè melancholicis, sese immiscet dæmon; & forsitan frequentius hoc accidit, quam sæpè creditur. Although the devil may, by divine permission, possess men without any morbid disposition, yet doth he usually intermingle himself with bodily diseases, and especially those of melancholy; and perhaps this cometh to pass oftner than is commonly believed or suspected.* The other in his *De abditis rerum Causis*, where having attributed real effects upon the bodies of men to witchcraft and enchantment, he addeth, *Neque solum morbos, verum etiam dæmonas, scelerati homines in corpora immittunt. Hi quidem visuntur furoris quadam specie distorti; hoc uno tamen à simplici furore distant, quod summè ardua obloquantur, præterita & occultata renuntiant, assentientiumque arcana reserent. Neither do these wicked magicians only inflict diseases upon men's bodies, but also send devils into them; by means whereof they appear distorted with a kind of fury and madness, which yet differs from a simple madness (or the disease so called) in this, that they speak of very high and difficult matters, declare things past and unknown, and discover the secrets of those that sit by.* Of which he subjoins two notable instances of persons, well known to himself, that were plainly dæmoniacal, possessed, or acted by an evil dæmon; one whereof shall be afterwards mentioned. But when maniacal persons do not only discover secrets, and declare things past, but future also, and, besides this, speak in languages, which they had never learn'd; this puts it out of all doubt and question, that they are not mere madmen, or *Maniaci*, but dæmoniacks or *Energumeni*. And that since the time of our Saviour Christ there have been often such, may be made evident from the records of credible writers. *Pselius* in his book Περὶ Ἑνεργείας Δαιμόνων, *De Operat. Dæm.* avers it of a certain maniacal woman, that though she knew nothing but her own mother tongue, yet, when a stranger, who was an *Armenian*, was brought into the room to her, she spake to him presently in the *Armenian* language, ἡμεῖς δὲ τεθηπότες ἦμεν, ὅτι καὶ Ἀρμενίων ἐφ' ἑγγύσειο, γυνὴ μηδέποτε μὲν εἰς ὄψιν ἀφ' ἡμέας τῆστας, μηδὲ κερκιδῶ εἰδῆα πλείον ἐδὲν. *We all stood amazed,*

Rus. 60.
[p. 107.]

Vide Philostrat. de Vita Apollonii Tyanæi, 2 Id. Ibid. Lib. IV. Cap. X. p. 147.
Lib. X. Cap. XX. p. 157.

amazed, when we heard a woman, that had never seen an Armenian before in all her life, nor had learnt any thing but the use of her distaff, to speak the Armenian language readily. Where the relater also affirmeth the same maniacal person to have foretold certain future events, which happened shortly after to himself; *Σὺ δὲ, στραφεὶς πρὸς ἐμέ, μολῶν ἐν χερσὶ συμφορῶν ὑπο-* Page 67.
σῆσθ' ἡλὸν γὰρ σὺ δινώσ τὰ δαιμόνια παραλόντι τὰς αὐτῶν λατρείας· ἀμέλει τοι καὶ [P. 99.]
χαλεπὰς ἐπιρράβουσι καὶ θρασεὶς κινδύους, ἐς οὗ αὖ διαφείξασθαι δυνηθεὶς, εἰ μήτις δι-
ναμὸς κρείττων, ἢ κατὰ δαιμονίας, ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐξέλῃ. Then locking upon me, she (or rather the dæmon) said, *Thou shalt suffer wonderful pains and torments in thy body, for the dæmons are extremely angry with thee, for opposing their services and worship; and they will inflict great evils upon thee, out of which thou shalt not be able to escape, unless a power, greater than that of dæmons, exempt thee from them. All which things* (saith he) *happened shortly after to me, and I was brought very low, even near to death, by them; but was by my Saviour wonderfully delivered.* Whereupon Psellus concludes, *Τίς ἄν ἐκείνου τὸν χειρῶν ἰωρακῆς, ἐρεῖ τὰς μακίας πάσας, ὕλης πλημμελεῖς κινήσεις, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν τραγικὰ δαιμόνων* Who is there therefore, that considering this oracle or prediction, will conclude (as some physicians do) all kind of madnesses to be nothing but the exorbitant motions of the matter or humours, and not the tragick passions of the dæmons. But because this instance is remoter from our present times, we shall set down another remarkable one of a later date, out of the forementioned Fernelius, who was an eye-witness thereof. A young man of a noble family, who was strangely convulsed in his body, having sometimes one member, and sometimes another, violently agitated, inso-much that four several persons were scarcely able to hold them; and this at first without any distemper at all in his head, or crazedness in brain. To whom Fernelius, with other skilful physicians, being called, applied all manner of remedies; blisters, purgations, cupping-glasses, fomentations, unctions, plaisters, and strengthening medicines; but all in vain. The reason whereof is thus given by the same Fernelius: *Quoniam omnes longe aberamus à cognitione veri, nam mense tertio primum deprehensus dæmon quidam totius mali auctor, voce, insuetisque verbis ac sententiis tum Latinis tum Græcis, (quanquam ignarus linguæ Græcæ laborans esset) se proferens; is multa confidentium maximâque medicorum secreta detegebat, ridens, quod irritis pharmacis corpus hoc penè jugulassent.* Because we were all far from the knowledge of the truth; for in the third month, it was first plainly discovered to us, that it was a certain dæmon, who was the author of all this mischief; he manifesting himself by his speech, and by unusual words and sentences, both in Greek and Latin, (though the patient were altogether ignorant of Greek tongue:) and by his revealing many of the secrets of those, who stood by, especially of the physicians, whom also he derided for tormenting the patient in that manner with their frustraneous remedies. Here therefore have we an unquestionable instance of a dæmoniack in these latter times of ours, and such a one, who at first, for two months together, had no manner of madness or mania at all upon him, though afterwards the dæmon possessing his whole body, used his tongue, and spake therewith. Fernelius concludes his whole discourse in this manner: *These things do I produce, to make it manifest, that*

evil

evil dæmons (or devils) do sometimes enter into the very bodies of men, afflicting and tormenting them after an unheard of manner; but that at other times, though they do not enter into, and possess their whole body, yet partly by exagitating and disturbing the profitable humours thereof, partly by traducing the noxious into the principal parts, or else by obstructing the veins and other passages with them, or disordering the structure of the members, they cause innumerable diseases. There are many other instances of this kind, recorded by modern writers unexceptionable, of persons either wholly dæmoniacal, and possessed by evil dæmons, (this appearing from their discovering secrets, and speaking languages which they had never learnt) or else otherwise so affected and infested by them, as to have certain unusual and supernatural symptoms; which, for brevity's sake, we shall here omit. However, we thought it necessary thus much to insinuate upon this argument of dæmoniacks, as well for the vindication of Christianity, as for the conviction of Atheists; we finding some so staggering in their religion, that from this one thing alone of dæmoniacks (they being so strongly possessed, that there neither is, nor ever was any such) they are ready enough to suspect the whole Gospel, or New Testament itself, of fabulosity and imposture.

We come now to the second head proposed, of miracles and effects supernatural. That there hath been something miraculous or above nature, sometimes done even among the Pagans, (whether by good or evil spirits,) appears not only from their own records, but also from the Scripture itself. And it is well known, that they pretended (besides oracles) to miracles also, even after the times of Christianity; and that not only in *Apollonius Tyaneus*, and *Apuleius*, but also in the Roman emperors themselves, as *Vespasian* and *Adrian*, but especially in the temple of *Æsculapius*; thus much appearing from that Greek table therein hung up at *Rome*¹, in which, amongst other things, this is recorded; *That a blind man being commanded by the oracle to kneel before the altar, and then passing from the right side thereof to the left, to lay five fingers upon the altar, and afterwards lifting up his hand, to touch his eyes therewith; all this being done accordingly, he recovered his sight, the people all applauding, that great miracles were done under the emperor Antoninus, &c.* But we have in the Scripture an account of miracles, both greater in number, and of a higher nature; done especially by *Moses*, and our Saviour Christ and his Apostles.

Wherefore it seems, that there are two sorts of miracles or effects supernatural. First, such as though they could not be done by any ordinary and natural causes here amongst us, and in that respect may be called supernatural; yet might notwithstanding be done, God permitting only, by the ordinary and natural power of other invisible created spirits, angels or dæmons. As for example, if a stone or other heavy body should first ascend upwards, and then hang in the air, without any visible either mover or supporter, this would be to us a miracle or effect supernatural; and yet, according to vulgar opinion, might this be done by the natural power of created

¹ Vide Gruteri Inscription. Tom. I. p. LXXI.

created invisible beings, angels or dæmons; God only permitting, without whose special providence it is conceived they cannot thus intermeddle with our human affairs. Again, if a perfectly illiterate person should readily speak Greek or Latin, this also would be to us a miracle, or effect supernatural; for so is the Apostle's speaking with tongues accounted; and yet in Demoniacks is this sometimes done by evil dæmons, God only permitting. Such also amongst the Pagans was that *miraculum cotis*, (as *Apuleius* calls it) that *miracle of the whetstone*, done by *Accius Navius*, when, at his command, it was divided into two with a razor¹. But secondly, there is another sort of miracles, or effects supernatural, such as are above the power of all second causes, or any natural created being whatsoever, and so can be attributed to none but God Almighty himself, the author of nature, who therefore can controul it at pleasure.

As for that late theological politician, who, writing against miracles, denies as well those of the former, as of this latter kind, contending that a miracle is nothing but a name, which the ignorant vulgar gives to *opus nature insolitum*, any unwonted work of nature, or to what themselves can assign no cause of; as also, that if there were any such thing done contrary to nature, or above it, it would rather weaken than confirm our belief of the divine existence²; we find his discourse every way so weak, groundless, and inconsiderable, that we could not think it here to deserve a confutation.

But of the former sort of those miracles, is that to be understood, *Deuter. xiii.* *If there arise among you a prophet, or dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, and serve them; thou shalt not hearken to the words of that prophet, or dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God proveth you, to know, whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul.* For it cannot be supposed, that God Almighty would himself purposely inspire any man to exhort others to idolatry, and immediately assist such a one with his own supernatural power of doing miracles, in confirmation of such doctrine. But the meaning is, that by the suggestion of evil spirits, some false prophets might be raised up to tempt the Jews to idolatry; or at least, that, by assistance of them, such miracles might be wrought in confirmation thereof, as those sometimes done by the Egyptian forcerers or magicians, God himself not interposing in this case to hinder them, for this reason, that he might hereby prove and try their faithfulness towards him. Forasmuch as both, by the pure light of nature, and God's revealed will, before confirmed by miracles, idolatry, or the religious worship of any but God Almighty, had been sufficiently condemned. From whence it is evident, that miracles alone (at least such miracles as these) are no sufficient confirmation of a true prophet, without consideration had of the doctrine taught by him. For though a man should have done never so many true and real miracles amongst the Jews, and yet should persuade to idolatry, he was by them confidently to be condemned to death for a false prophet.

Accordingly

¹ Vide Livium Lib. I. Cap. XX&VI. ² Vide Spinosa's Tractat. Theologico-politic. Cap. VI. p. 67.

Accordingly in the New Testament do we read, that our Saviour Christ forewarned his disciples, that *1* false prophets and false Christs should arise, and show great signs or wonders, in so much, that if it were possible, they should seduce the very elect. And St. Paul foretelleth concerning the man of sin, or antichrist *2*, That his coming should be after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and wonders (or miracles) of a lye. For we conceive, that by *τέρατα ψεύδους*; in this place, are not properly meant feigned and counterfeit miracles, that is, meer cheating and juggling tricks, but true wonders and real miracles, (viz. of the former sort mentioned) done for the confirmation of a lye, as the doctrine of this man of sin is there afterwards called; for otherwise how could his coming be said to be according to the working of Satan, with all power? In like manner also, in St. John's Apocalypse, where the coming of the same man of sin, and the mystery of iniquity, is again described, we read Chap. xiii. of a two-horned beast like a lamb, That he shall do great wonders, and deceive those, that dwell on the earth, by means of those miracles, which he hath power to do, in the sight of the beast. And again, Chap. xvi. Of certain unclean spirits like frogs, coming out of the mouth of the dragon, and of the beast, and of the false prophet, which are the spirits of devils working miracles, that go forth to the kings of the earth. And lastly, Chap. xix. Of the false prophet, that wrought miracles before the beast. All which seem to be understood, not of feigned and counterfeit miracles only, but of true and real also, effected by the working of Satan, in confirmation of a lye, that is, of idolatry, false religion and imposture; God Almighty permitting it, partly in way of probation or trial of the faithfulness of his own servants, and partly in way of just judgment and punishment upon those, who receive not the love of the truth, that they might be saved; as the Apostle declareth *3*. Wherefore those miracles, pretended, for divers ages past, to have been done before the relicks of saints and images, &c. were they all true, could by no means justify or warrant that religious worship by many given to them; because true and real miracles, done in order to the promoting of idolatry, are so far from justifying that idolatry, that they are themselves condemned by it to be *τέρατα ψεύδους*, the miracles of a lye, done by the working of Satan.

But as for the miracles of our Saviour Christ, had they been all of them only of the former kind, such as might have been done, God permitting, by the natural power of created spirits, and their assistance; yet for as much as he came in the name of the Lord, teaching neither idolatry, nor any thing contrary to the clear light and law of nature, therefore ought he, by reason of those miracles, to have been received by the Jews themselves, and owned for a true prophet, according to the doctrine of Moses himself. Who both in the 13th and 18th chapters of Deuter. plainly supposeth, that God would in no other case permit any false prophet to do miracles by the assistance of evil spirits, save only in that of idolatry, and, (which is always understood of what is plainly discoverable by the light of nature

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1 Luke xxiv. 24. *2* Thessal. ii. 9. *3* Thessal. ii. 10.

to be false, or evil.) The reason whereof is manifest, because if he should, this would be an invincible temptation, which it is inconsistent with the divine goodness to expose men unto. And our Saviour Christ was unquestionably that one eximious prophet, which God Almighty, by *Moses*, promised to send unto the Israelites, upon occasion of their own desire made to him at *Horeb*. *Let me not bear again the voice of the Lord my God, nor let me see this great fire any more, that I die not.* Whereupon the Lord said, *They have well spoken that which they have spoken; I will raise them up a prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him; and whosoever will not hearken to the words, which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him.* Which is all one as if he should have said; I will no more speak to them with thunder and lightning, nor reveal my will with a terrible voice out of flaming fire; but the next great manifestation of myself, or further revelation of my will, shall be by a prophet from amongst their own brethren, I putting my words into his mouth, and speaking to them by him. Whose words they shall be as much obliged to hearken to, as if I had spoken them (as before) from the top of the fiery mount. And that they may have no colour for their disbelieving this great prophet especially, or their disobeying of him, I plainly declare, that whosoever cometh in my name, and does true and real miracles, shall be acknowledged undoubtedly for a true prophet sent by me, and accordingly believed and obeyed; and none rejected under the notion of false prophets, but only such, as either do not real miracles, or else if they do, come in the name of other gods, or exhort to idolatry. Nevertheless, our Saviour Christ wrought other miracles also, of a higher nature, by the immediate power of God Almighty himself; as for example, when before himself he raised *Lazarus*, who had been dead four days, to life, since it cannot be conceived to be in the power of created spirits (whether bad or good) whenever they please to bring back the souls of men deceased to their bodies again, or change the laws of nature and fate. However, it must not be thought, that God will ever set this seal of his to a lye, or that which is plainly contrary to the light and law of nature.

The conclusion is, that though all miracles promiscuously do not immediately prove the existence of a God, nor confirm a prophet, or whatsoever doctrine; yet do they all of them evince, that there is a rank of invisible understanding beings, superiour to men, which the Atheists commonly deny. And we read of some such miracles also, as could not be wrought, but by a power perfectly supernatural, or by God Almighty himself. But to deny and disbelieve all miracles, is either to deny all certainty of sense, which would be indeed to make sensation itself miraculous; or else monstrously and unreasonably to derogate from human testimonies and history. The Jews would never have so stiffly and pertinaciously adhered to the ceremonial law of *Moses*, had they not all along believed it to have been unquestionably confirmed by miracles; and that the Gentiles should at first have entertained the faith of Christ without miracles, would itself have been the greatest of miracles.

The last extraordinary phænomenon proposed was that of divination, oracles, prophecies, or predictions of future events, otherwise unforeknowable to men; which either evince a God, or at least that there are understanding beings superiour to men. For if there be presention or foreknowledge of such future events, as are to human understanding alone altogether unforeknowable, then is it certain, that there is some more perfect understanding, or knowledge in the world, than that of men. And thus is that maxim of the ancient Pagan Theists¹, in the genuine and proper sense thereof, unquestionably true; *Si divinatio est, dii sunt*; *If there be divination, or presention of future events, (undiscoverable by men) then are there gods*: which, in their language, was no more than to say, understanding beings superiour to men.

Wherefore we must here distinguish of oracles and predictions, after the same manner as we did before of miracles, that they may be of two kinds: First, such as might proceed only from the natural presaging power of created spirits superiour to men, whether called angels or dæmons. For these being supposed to have not only clearer understandings than men, and a greater insight into nature, but also by reason of their agility and invisibility, opportunity of knowing things remotely distant, and of being privy to men's secret machinations and consultations; it is easily conceivable, that many future events nigh at hand, which cannot be foreknown by men, may be (probably at least) foreseen by them; and that without any miraculous divine revelation, their causes being already in being. As men learned in astronomy can foretel eclipses of the sun and moon, which to the vulgar are altogether unforeknowable; and as princes or statesmen, that are furnished with great intelligence, foreign and domestick, can presage more of war and peace, either at home or abroad, and of the events of kingdoms, than ignorant plebeians. And such were those predictions, which *Democritus*, though otherwise much addicted to atheism, allowed of; *Cicero* writing thus of him, *Plurimis locis, gravis auctor Democritus presentionem rerum futurarum comprobat*; *Democritus, a grave writer, doth in many places approve of the presention of future events*. The reason whereof was, because he supposed certain understanding beings superiour to men, called by him idols, which having a larger comprehension of things, and other advantages of knowledge, could therefore foretel many future events, that men were ignorant of. And though perhaps it may be thought, that *Democritus* would not have entertained this opinion of the foreknowledge of human events, had he not asserted the necessity of all human actions and volitions, but held liberty of will, as *Epicurus* afterwards did; (as if this were inconsistent with all manner of presage, and probable or conjectural foreknowledge;) yet is it certain, that there is not so much contingency in all human actions, by reason of this liberty of will, as heretofore was by *Epicurus*, and still is by many supposed; it being plain, that men act according to an appearance of good, and that in many cases and circumstances it may be foreknown, without any divine revelation, what such or such

persons

¹ The Stoicks. Vide *Cicero*. de *Divinat.* Lib. I. Cap. V, VI p. 313, 314. *1*cm. 12. Oj. et.

De Div. L. 1.
[Cap. III. p.
311. Tom.
IX. Oper.]

persons would do. As for example, that a voluptuous person, having a strong temptation to satisfy his sensual appetite, and that without incurring any inconvenience of shame or punishment, would readily close with the same. Besides which, such invisible spirits, as angels or dæmons, may sometimes predict also what themselves cause and effect.

Secondly, There is another sort of predictions of future events, which cannot be imputed to the natural presaging faculty of any such created spirits, but only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty, or a Being infinitely perfect: as when events remotely distant in time, and of which there are yet no immediate causes actually in being, which also depend upon many circumstances, and a long series of things, any one of which being otherwise would alter the case; as likewise upon much uncertainty of human volitions, which are not always necessarily linked and concatenated with what goes before, but often loose and free; and upon that contingency, that arises from the indifferency or equality of eligibility in objects. Lastly, such things as do not at all depend upon external circumstances neither, nor are caused by things natural antecedent, but by some supernatural power; I say, when such future events as these are foretold, and accordingly come to pass, this can be ascribed to no other but such a Being as comprehends, sways, and governs all, and is, by a peculiar privilege or prerogative of its own nature, omniscient. *Epicurus*, though really he therefore rejected divination and prediction of future events, because he denied providence; yet did he pretend this further reason also against it, because it was a thing absolutely inconsistent with liberty of will, and destructive of the same; *ἡ μαντικὴ ἀνύπαρκτος· εἰ δὲ ὑπάρξειεν, εἶδεν παρ' ἡμᾶς ἢ τὰ γινώμενα.* *Diog. Laert.* *Divination is a thing, which hath no existence, nor possibility in nature: and in V. Epic.* *if there were such a thing, it would take away all liberty of will, and leave* ^{[Lib. X. Segm.} *nothing in men's own power.* Thus also *Carneades*, in *Cicero's*, maintained, ^{135. p. 660.]} *Ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere, nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset.* That Apollo himself was not able to foretell any future events, other than such, as had necessary causes in nature antecedent. And some Christian Theists of later times have, in like manner, denied to God Almighty all foreknowledge of human actions, upon the same pretence, as being both inconsistent with men's liberty of will, and destructive thereof. For, say they, if men's actions be free, then are they unforeknowable, they having no necessary causes; and again, if there be any foreknowledge of them, then can they not be free, they being *ipso facto* necessitated thereby. But as it is certain, that prescience does not destroy the liberty of man's will, or impose any necessity upon it, men's actions being not therefore future, because they are foreknown, but therefore foreknown, because future; and were a thing never so contingent, yet upon supposition that it will be done, it must needs have been future from all eternity: so is it extreme arrogance for men, because themselves can naturally foreknow nothing, but by some causes antecedent, as an eclipse of the sun or moon, therefore to presume to measure the knowledge of God Almighty

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according to the same scantling, and to deny him the prescience of human actions, not considering, that, as his nature is incomprehensible, so his knowledge may well be looked upon by us as such too; that which is *past our finding out, and too wonderful for us*. However, it must be acknowledged for an undoubted truth, that no created being can, naturally, and of itself, foreknow any future events, otherwise than in and by their causes antecedent. If therefore we shall find, that there have been predictions of such future events as had no necessary antecedent causes; as we cannot but grant such things therefore to be foreknowable, so must we needs from thence infer the existence of a God, that is, a Being supernatural, infinitely perfect and omniscient, since such predictions as these could have proceeded from no other cause.

That there is foreknowledge of future events to men naturally unforeknowable, hath been all along the persuasion of the generality of mankind.

De Div. l. 1. Thus Cicero, *Vetus opinio est, jam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque & populi Romani, & omnium Gentium firmata consensu, versari quendam inter homines divinationem, quam Græci ματικὴν appellant, id est, præsentionem & scientiam rerum futurarum.* This is an old opinion derived down all along from the heroick times (or the mythical age) and not only entertained amongst the Romans, but also confirmed by the consent of all nations, that there is such a thing as divination, and presention or foreknowledge of future events. And the same writer elsewhere, in the person of Balbus; *Quamvis nihil tam irri-*

De N.D. l. 2. *det Epicurus, quàm prædictionem rerum futurarum, mihi videtur tamen vel maximè confirmare, Decorum providentia consulti rebus humanis. Est enim profecto divinatio; quæ multis locis, rebus, temporibus apparct, cùm in privatis tum maximè in publicis. Multa cernunt aruspices, multa augures provident, multa oraculis providentur, multa vaticinationibus, multa somniis, multa portentis.* Although Epicurus deride nothing more, than the prediction of future things; yet does this seem to me to be a great confirmation of the providence of the gods over human affairs, because there is certainly divination, it appearing in many places, things, and times, and that not only private, but especially publick. Soothsayers foresee many things, the augurs many; many things are declared by oracles, many by prophecies, many by dreams, and many by portents. And indeed that there were even amongst the Pagans predictions of future events, not discoverable by any human sagacity, which accordingly came to pass, and therefore argue a knowledge superiour to that of men, or that there are certain invisible understanding beings or spirits, seems to be undeniable from history. And that the augurs themselves were sometimes not unassisted by these officious genii, is plain from that of *Attius Navius* before mentioned, as the circumstances thereof are related by historians; that *Tarquinius Priscus* having a mind to try what there was in this skill of augury¹, *Dixit ei se cogitare quiddam, id posse fieri, consuluit. Ille augurio cæso, posse responderet. Tarquinius autem dixit se cogitasse cotem novaculâ posse præcidi; tum Attium jussisse experiri: ita cotem in comitium illatam, inspicente & rege & populo, novaculâ esse discissam; Told Navius, that he thought of something, and he would know*

¹ Cicero de Divinat. Lib. II. Cap. XVII. p. 3129. Tom. IX. Oper.

know of him, whether it could be done or no. Navius having performed his auguring ceremonies, replied, that the thing might be done. Whereupon Priscus declared what his thought was, namely, that a whetstone might be cut in two with a razor. Navius willed them to make trial: wherefore a whetstone being brought immediately into the court, it was in the sight of the king and all the people divided with a razor. But the predictions amongst those Pagans were, for the most part, only of the former kind, such as proceeded merely from the natural prefaging faculty of these dæmons; this appearing from hence, because their oracles were often expressed ambiguously, so as that they might be taken either way; those dæmons themselves, it seems, being then not confident of the event; as also, because they were sometimes plainly mistaken in the events. And from hence it was, that they seldom ventured to foretel any events remotely distant, but only what were nigh at hand, and shortly to come to pass; and therefore might be probably conjectured of from things then in being. Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge, that there are some few instances of predictions amongst the Pagans, of the other kind. Such as that intimated by Cicero in his book of Divination¹, where he declareth the doctrine of Diodorus concerning necessity and contingency; *Non necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quanquam id millesimo antè anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset: That it was not necessary Cypselus the tyrant should reign at Corinth, though that were a thing predicted by Apollo's oracle a thousand years before.* As also this recorded by Varro², of Veftius Valens, an augur in the time of Romulus, who when Rome was a building, from the flying of twelve vultures prefaged, that the continuance of that city would be for twelve hundred years: which seems to have been accordingly fulfilled, in the year of our Lord four hundred fifty and five, immediately after the death of the third Valentinian (whom some make to be the last real emperor of the West or Rome) when Genfericus the Vandal took the city the second time, and fired it. But above all, that of the Sibyls; of whose prophecies such things are recorded by pagan writers, as makes it very suspicious, that they did foretel the coming of our Saviour Christ, and the times of Christianity. But were these, and the like pagan prophecies, real, then must they needs have had some higher original than the natural prefaging faculty of their dæmons, especially those of the Sibyls; who, for aught we know, might be as well assisted supernaturally to predict our Saviour Christ, amongst the Pagans in the West, as Balaam was in the East.

But here the Scripture triumpheth over Paganism, and all its oracles and divinations: there being contained in it so many unquestionable predictions of events to follow a long time after, and such as can be imputed to nothing but the supernatural foreknowledge and omniscience of God Almighty. As for example, those concerning the Messiah, or our Saviour Christ, delivered by Jacob, Moses, David, Iſaias, Jeremy, Daniel, and most of the prophets; foretelling sundry particular circumstances of his coming, and that grand event, which followed after, of the Gentiles or Pa-

¹ It should be, *De Fate*, Cap. vii. p. 325y. ² In the Fragments of the XVIIth Book of his *Antiquitates Rerum Humanarum*.

gans so general reception and entertainment of Christianity; that is, the belief of the Messiah, promised to the Jews; together with the shaking off of their gods and idols. Amongst which Scripture-Prophecies, concerning our Saviour Christ, we must needs reckon for one, and none of the least considerable neither, that of *Daniel's* weeks, or of four hundred and ninety years, to commence from the going forth of the word, or the decree made by *Artaxerxes* the son of *Xerxes*, in the seventh year of his reign, for the return of the people of *Israel*, Priests and Levites, to *Jerusalem*; and to terminate in the death of the Messiah, and the preaching of the gospel to the Jews only: though we are not ignorant, how some learned men, both of the former and latter times, have stretched their wits, they sometimes using no small violence to divert this prophecy another way. For that these prophecies, concerning our Saviour Christ, could have no other original than the immediate supernatural revelation of God Almighty, is evident from the thing itself; it being such as depended on no natural causes, much less upon those constellations of the astrological Atheists', but only upon his own secret will and counsel.

But besides these prophecies concerning our Saviour Christ, there are others contained in the Scripture, concerning the fates and successions of the chief kingdoms, empires, and polities of the world; as of the rise of the Persian monarchy; of its fall and conquest by the Macedonian *Alexander*; of the quadripartite division of this Greekish empire after *Alexander's* death; of the succession of the *Seleucidæ* and *Lagidæ*, a prophetick history, so agreeable with the events, that it was by *Porphyrus*² pretended to have been written after them; and lastly, of the rise and continuance of the Roman empire. For notwithstanding the endeavours of some, to pervert all those Scripture-prophecies, that extend to the present times, it is clearly demonstrable, that this was *Daniel's* fourth ten-horned beast, or the legs and toes of *Nebuchadnezzar's* statue, that fourth empire, strong as iron, which came at length to be broken or divided into ten or many principalities, called in the prophetick language, and according to the *eisbon*, horns; amongst whom was to start up another *horn with eyes, speaking great words against the Most High, and making war with the saints, and prevailing against them, for a time, times, and half a time.* Which prophecy of *Daniel's* is the ground-work of *St. John's* Apocalypse, it being there further insisted upon, filled up, and enlarged, with the addition of several particulars; so that both *Daniel* and *John* have each of them, from their respective ages, set down a prophetick calendar of times, in a continued series, (the former more compendiously and generally, the latter more copiously and particularly) to the very end of the world.

And thus do we see plainly, that the Scripture-prophecies evince a Deity; neither can these possibly be imputed by Atheists, as other things, to men's fear and fancy, nor yet to the fiction of politicians. Nor do they only evince a Deity, but confirm Christianity also; partly as predicted by them

¹ Cardan, &c.

² Vide Hieronymum Comment. in Daniel. Tom. V. Oper. p. 481.

in its several circumstances, a grand one whereof was the Gentiles reception of it; and partly as itself predicting future events, this spirit of prophecy being the testimony of Jesus. Both which Scripture-prophecies, of Christ in the Old Testament, and from him in the New, are of equal, if not greater force to us in this present age, for the confirmation of our faith, than the miracles themselves recorded in the Scripture; we having now certain knowledge our selves of many of those events, and being no way able to suspect, but that the prophecies were written long before.

To conclude; all these extraordinary phænomena of apparitions, witchcraft, possessions, miracles, and prophecies, do evince that spirits, angels or dæmons, though invisible to us, are no phancies, but real and substantial inhabitants of the world; which favours not the atheistical hypothesis: but some of them, as the higher kind of miracles and predictions, do also immediately enforce the acknowledgment of a Deity; a Being superiour to nature, which therefore can check and controul it; and which comprehending the whole, foreknows the most remotely distant, and contingent events.

And now have we not only fully answered and confuted all the atheistical pretences against the idea of God, tending to disprove his existence; but also occasionally proposed several solid and substantial arguments for a Deity: as, that all successive things, the world, motion, and time, are in their own nature absolutely incapable of an ante-eternity; and therefore, that eternal necessity be something else of a permanent duration, that was eternal without beginning: that no Atheist, according to his principles, can possibly give any account of the original of his own soul or mind: that the phænomenon of motion cannot be solved without an incorporeal principle, presiding over the whole: that the τὸ εἶ καὶ καλῶς, *the artificial, regular, and orderly frame of things*, together with the harmony of the whole, demonstrate an understanding and intending cause of the world, that ordered things for ends and good. Besides, that there are several other phænomena, both ordinary and extraordinary, which Atheists being no way able to solve, are forced to deny.

True indeed, some of the ancient Theists have themselves affirmed, that there could be no demonstration of a God: which assertion of theirs hath been by others misunderstood into this sense, as if there were therefore no certainty at all to be had of God's existence, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge or science, but only faith and opinion. Whereas the true meaning of those ancient Theists, who denied that there could be any demonstration of a God, was only this, That the existence of a God could not be demonstrated *a priori*, himself being the first cause of all things. Thus doth *Alexander Aphrodisius*, in his *Physical Doubts and Solutions*, after he had propounded an argument for a God, according to Aristotelick principles, from motion, declare himself; ἡ δειξις κατὰ ἀλόγισιν, ἢ γὰρ δίδόντε τῆς L. 1. c. 2. πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τε καὶ Φανεραῶν ἀρχαίων, κατὰ [P. 2. Edit. Græc. Venet. 1556. fol.] τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνοῦσαν ἀναλόγειν χρωμένους συστήσει τὴν ἐκείνῃ φύσιν. That *this argument*

judgment or proof of his was in way of analysis only; it being not possible, that there should be a demonstration of the first Principle of all. Wherefore (saith he) we must here fetch our beginning from things, that are after it, and manifest; and thence, by way of analysis, ascend to the proof of that first nature, which was before them. And to the same purpose Clemens Alexandrinus, having first affirmed, ὡς διαμεταχειριστάῳ ὁ περὶ θεῶ λόγῳ ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων πραγμάτων διτερείῳ, πάντως πρῶτη ἢ πρώτη ἢ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύναταιῳ, ἥτις ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπανσι αὐτῶν τῷ γενέσθαι, ἢ γενομένου εἶναι. That God is the most difficult thing of all to be discoursed of; because, since the principle of every thing is hard to find out, the first and most ancient Principle of all, which was the cause to all other things of their being made, must needs be the hardest of all to be declared or manifested; he afterwards subjoins, ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη λαμβανόμενοι τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ αὐτῆ γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων ἢ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται τῷ δε ἀγνώστου οὐδὲν προσιπάσκει. But neither can God be apprehended by any demonstrative science: for such science is from things before in order of nature, and more knowable; whereas nothing can exist before that which is altogether unmade. And certain it is, that it implies a contradiction, that God, or a perfect Being, should be thus demonstrated by any thing before him as his cause. Nevertheless it doth not therefore follow, that there can be no certainty at all had of the existence of a God, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge, but faith and opinion only. For we may have a certain knowledge of things, the δότι whereof cannot be demonstrated *à priori*, or from antecedent necessary causes: as for example, that there was something eternal of itself, without beginning, is not at all demonstrable by any antecedent cause, it being contradictory to such a thing to have a cause. Nevertheless upon supposition only, that something doth exist, which no man can possibly make any doubt of, we may not only have an opinion, but also certain knowledge, from the necessity of irrefragable reason, that there was never nothing, but something or other did always exist from eternity, and without beginning. In like manner, though the existence of a God or perfect Being cannot be demonstrated *à priori*, yet may we notwithstanding, from our very selves (whose existence we cannot doubt of) and from what is contained in our own minds, or otherwise consequent from him, by undeniable principles of reason, necessarily infer his existence. And whensoever any thing is thus necessarily inferred from what is undeniable and indubitable, this is a demonstration, though not of the δότι, yet of the εἶναι of it; that the thing is, though not why it is. And many of the geometrical demonstrations are no other.

It hath been asserted by a late eminent philosopher *, that there is no possible certainty to be had of any thing, before we be certain of the existence of a God essentially good; because we can never otherwise free our minds from the importunity of that suspicion, which with irresistible force may assault them; that ourselves might possibly be so made, either by chance, or fate, or by the pleasure of some evil dæmon, or at least of an arbitrary omnipotent Deity, as that we should be deceived in all our most clear and evident perceptions; and therefore in geometrical theorems themselves, and even in our common

* Des Cartes. See his Meditat. Metaphyf. IV. p. 25. and V. p. 31.

common notions. But when we are once assured of the existence of such a God as is essentially good, who therefore neither will nor can deceive; then, and not before, will this suspicion utterly vanish, and ourselves become certain, that our faculties of reason and understanding are not false and imposturous, but rightly made. From which hypothesis it plainly follows, that all those Theists, who suppose God to be a meer arbitrary being, whose will is not determined by any nature of goodness or rule of justice, but itself is the first rule of both (they thinking this to be the highest perfection, liberty, and power) can never be reasonably certain of the truth of any thing, not so much as that two and two are four; because, so long as they adhere to that persuasion, they can never be assured, but that such an arbitrary omnipotent Deity might designedly make them such, as should be deceived in all their clearest perceptions.

Now though there be a plausibility of piety in this doctrine, as making the knowledge of a God essentially good so necessary a præcognitum to all other science, that there can be no certainty of truth at all without it; yet does that very supposition, that our understanding faculties might possibly be so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions, (whereforever it is admitted) render it utterly impossible ever to arrive to any certainty concerning the existence of a God essentially good; so far as this cannot be any otherwise proved, than by the use of our faculties of understanding, reason, and discourse. For to say, that the truth of our understanding faculties is put out of all doubt and question, as soon as ever we are assured of the existence of a God essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive; whilst this existence of a God is in the mean time itself no otherwise proved, than by our understanding faculties; that is, at once to prove the truth of God's existence from our faculties of reason and understanding, and again to prove the truth of those faculties from the existence of a God essentially good: this, I say, is plainly to move round in a circle, and to prove nothing at all; a gross oversight, which the forementioned philosopher seems plainly guilty of.

Wherefore, according to this hypothesis, we are of necessity condemned to eternal scepticism, both concerning the existence of a God, when, after all our arguments and demonstrations for the same, we must at length gratify the Atheists with this confession in the conclusion, that it is possible notwithstanding there may be none; and also concerning all other things, the certainty whereof is supposed to depend upon the certainty of the existence of such a God as cannot deceive.

So that if we will pretend to any certainty at all concerning the existence of a God, we must of necessity explode this new sceptical hypothesis of the possibility of our understandings being so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions; by means whereof we can be certain of the truth of nothing, and to use our utmost endeavour to remove the same. In the

first place therefore we affirm, that no power, how great soever, and therefore not omnipotence itself, can make any thing to be indifferently either true or false, this being plainly to take away the nature both of truth and falsehood, or to make them nothing but words, without any signification. Truth is not factitious; it is a thing, which cannot be arbitrarily *made*, but *is*. The divine will and omnipotence itself (now supposed by us) hath no imperium upon the divine understanding; for if God understood only by will, he would not understand at all. In the next place we add, that though the truth of singular contingent propositions depends upon the things themselves existing without, as the measure and archetype thereof; yet, as to the universal and abstract theorems of science, the terms whereof are those reasons of things, which exist no where but only in the mind itself (whose noemata and ideas they are) the measure and rule of truth concerning them can be no foreign or extraneous thing without the mind, but must be native and domestick to it, or contained within the mind itself, and therefore can be nothing but its clear and distinct perception. In these intelligible ideas of the mind, whatsoever is clearly perceived to be, is; or, which is all one, is true. Every clear and distinct perception is an entity or truth, as that, which is repugnant to conception, is a non-entity or falsehood. Nay, the very essence of truth here is this clear perceptibility, or intelligibility; and therefore can there not be any clear or distinct perception of falsehood: which must be acknowledged by all those, who, though granting false opinions, yet agree in this, that there can be no false knowledge. For the knowledge of these universal abstract truths is nothing but the clear and distinct perception of the several ideas of the mind, and their necessary relations to one another: wherefore, to say, that there can be no false knowledge, is all one as to say, that there can be no clear and distinct perceptions of the ideas of the mind false. In false opinions, the perception of the understanding power itself is not false, but only obscure. It is not the understanding power or nature in us, that erreth, but it is we ourselves, who err, when we rashly and unwarily assent to things not clearly perceived by it. The upshot of all is this, that since no power, how great soever, can make any thing indifferently to be true; and since the essence of truth in universal abstract things is nothing but clear perceptibility, it follows, that omnipotence cannot make any thing, that is false, to be clearly perceived to be, or create such minds and understanding faculties, as shall have as clear conceptions of falsehoods, that is, of non-entities, as they have of truths or entities. For example, no rational understanding being, that knows what a part is, and what a whole, what a cause and what an effect, could possibly be so made, as clearly to conceive the part to be greater than the whole, or the effect to be before the cause, or the like. Wherefore, we may presume with reverence to say, that there could not possibly be a world of rational creatures made by God, either in the moon, or in some other planet, or elsewhere, that should clearly and distinctly conceive all things contrary to what are clearly perceived by us; nor could our human faculties have been so made, as that we should have as clear conceptions of falsehoods as of truths. Mind or understanding facul-

ties in creatures may be made more or less weak, imperfect, and obscure, but they could not be made false, or such as should have clear and distinct conceptions of that which is not, because every clear perception is an entity; and though omnipotence can make something out of nothing, yet can it not make something to be nothing, nor nothing something. All which is no more, than is generally acknowledged by theologians, when they affirm, that God Almighty himself cannot do things contradictory; there being no other reason for this assertion, but only this, because contradictiousness is repugnant to conception. So that conception and knowledge are hereby made to be the measure of all power, even omnipotence, or infinite power itself, being determined thereby; from whence it follows, that power hath no dominion over understanding, truth, and knowledge; nor can infinite power make any thing whatsoever to be clearly conceivable. For could it make contradictory things clearly conceivable, then would itself be able to do them; because whatsoever can be clearly conceived by any, may unquestionably be done by infinite power.

It is true indeed, that sense, considered alone by itself, doth not reach to the absoluteness either of the natures, or of the existence of things without us, it being, as such, nothing but seeming, appearance, and phancy. And thus is that saying of some ancient philosophers to be understood, that *πᾶσα Φαντασία ἀληθής*, every phantasy is true; namely, because sense and phancy reach not to the absolute truth and fallhood of things, but contain themselves only within seeming and appearance; and every appearance must needs be a true appearance. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that sense often represents to us corporeal things otherwise than indeed they are, which though it be not a formal, yet is it a material falsity. Wherefore sense in the nature of it is not absolute, but *πρὸς τὸ*, or *πρὸς τῶν*, relative to the sentients. And by sense alone, without any mixture of reason or understanding, we can be certain of no more concerning the things without us, but only this, that they so seem to us. Hence was that of the ancient atomick philosophers in *Plato*, *ἢ σὺ διηγεῖσθαι αὐτὸς ὡς οἶόν σου Φαντασίου* Tic. et. p. 154.
ἑκάστου χρώμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ καὶ καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ζῶον. [p. 119. Edit. Ficini.] *Neither you nor any man else can be certain, that every other man and brute animal hath all the very same phantasms of colours, that himself hath.* Now were there no other perception in us, but that of sense, (as the old atheistical philosophers concluded knowledge to be sense) then would all our human perceptions be merely seeming, phantastical and relative; and none of them reach to the absolute truth of things. Every one in *Protagoras* 'his language would then *τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν*, *think or opine only his own things*; all his truths being private and relative to himself. And that Protagorean aphorism were to be admitted also in the sense of that philosopher, that *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἑκάστου*, *Every man is the measure of all things to himself; and, that no one man's opinion was righter than another's*, but *τὸ Φανόμενον ἐκάστῳ*, *That which seemed to every one, was to him true, to whom it seemed*; all truth and perception being but seeming and relative. But here lies one main difference betwixt understanding, or knowledge, and sense; that whereas the latter is

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* Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 118.

phantastical and relative only; the former reacheth beyond phancy and appearance to the absoluteness of truth. For as it hath been already declared, whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived in things abstract and universal, by any one rational Being in the whole world, is not a private thing, and true to himself only that perceived it; but it is, as some Stoicks have called it, ἀληθὲς καθολικόν, a publick, catholick, and universal truth: it obtains every where, and, as *Empedocles* sang of natural justice,

Διὰ τ' εὐρομέδον
Αἰθέρα περὶς τέτλιαι, διὰ τ' ἀπλήτε ἀργῆ;

It is extended throughout the vast æther, and through infinite light or space. And were there indeed infinite worlds, all thickly peopled with rational animals, it would be alike true to every one of them. Nor is it conceivable, that omnipotence itself could create any such understanding beings, as could have clear and distinct perceptions of the contrary to all that is perceived by us, no more than it could do things contradictory. But in all probability, because sense is indeed but seeming, phantastical, and relative, this is the reason, that some have been so prone and inclinable to suspect the like of understanding, and all mental perception too, that this also is but seeming and relative; and that therefore men's minds or understandings might have been so made, by an arbitrary omnipotent Deity, as clearly and distinctly to perceive every thing that is false. But, if notwithstanding all that hath been said, any will still sing over the old song again; that all this, which hath been hitherto declared by us, is indeed true, if our human faculties be true, or rightly made; but we can go no further than our faculties; and whether these be true or no, no man can ever be certain: we have no other reply to make, but that this is an over-stiff and heavy adherence to a prejudice of their own minds; that not only sense, but also reason and understanding, and all human perception is merely seeming, or phantastical, and relative to faculties only, but not reaching to the absoluteness of any truth; and that the human mind hath no criterion of truth at all within itself.

Nevertheless, it will probably be here further objected; that this is too great an arrogance, for created Beings to pretend to an absolute certainty of any thing, it being the sole privilege and prerogative of God Almighty to be infallible, who is therefore styled in Scripture, ὁ μόνος σοφός, *the only wise*; to which we briefly answer, that the Deity is the first original fountain of truth and wisdom, which is said to be the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness. The divine Word is the archetypal pattern of all truth; it is ignorant of nothing, and knoweth all things infallibly. But created Beings have but a derivative participation hereof, their understandings being obscure, and they erring in many things, and being ignorant of more. And it seems to be no derogation from Almighty God to suppose, that created minds by a participation of the divine mind,

* Ἀπὸ Ἀριστοτ. Rhetoric. Lib. I. Cap. XIII. p. 737. Tom. III. Ofcr.

mind, should be able to know certainly, that two and two make four; that equals added to equals will make equals; that a whole is greater than the part; and the cause before the effect; and that nothing can be made without a cause; and such like other common notions, which are the principles from whence all their knowledge is derived. And indeed were rational creatures never able to be certain of any such thing as this at all; what would their life be but a meer dream or shadow? and themselves but a ridiculous and pompous piece of phantastick vanity? Besides, it is no way congruous to think, that God Almighty should make rational creatures, so as to be in an utter impossibility of ever attaining to any certainty of his own existence; or of having more than an hypothetical assurance thereof, *if our faculties be true*, (which possibly may be otherwise) then is there a God. We shall conclude this discourse against the Cartesian scepticism with that of Origen's, *Μόνον τῶν ἑνῶν βέβαιον ἐπίστημον, Knowledge is the only thing in the world, which creatures have, that is in its own nature firm*; they having here something of certainty, but no where else.

Wherefore we having now that, which *Archimedes* required, some firm ground and footing to stand upon, such a certainty of truth in our common notions, as that they cannot possibly be false; without which, nothing at all could be proved by reason: we shall in the next place endeavour, not to shake or disettle any thing thereby, (which was the undertaking of that geometrician) but to confirm and establish the truth of God's existence, and that from the very idea of him, hitherto made good and defended against all the assaults of Atheists.

It is well known, that *Cartesius** hath lately made a pretence to do this, with mathematical evidence and certainty, and he dispatches the business briefly after this manner: God, or a perfect Being, includeth necessary existence in his very idea; and therefore he is. But though the inventor of this argument, or rather the reviver of that, which had been before used by some scholasticks, affirmeth it to be as good a demonstration for the existence of a God, from his idea, as that in geometry, for a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, is from the idea of a triangle; yet nevertheless it is certain, that, by one means or other, this argument hath not hitherto proved so fortunate and successful, there being many, who cannot be made sensible of any efficacy therein, and not a few, who condemn it for a meer sophism. As for ourselves, we neither have any mind to quarrel with other men's arguments *pro Deo*; nor yet would we be thought to lay stress, in this cause, upon any thing which is not every way solid and substantial. Wherefore we shall here endeavour to set down the utmost that possibly we can, both against this argument, and for it, impartially and candidly; and then, when we have done, leave the intelligent readers to make their own judgement concerning the same.

Against it in this manner; first, because we can frame an idea in our

* Vide Principia ejus Philosophiæ Part I. §. XIII. p. 4. & Meditat. Metaphysic. V. p. 31. & aliis.

own minds, of an absolutely perfect Being, including necessary existence in it, it will not at all follow from thence, that therefore there is such a perfect Being really existing without our minds; we being able to frame in our minds the ideas of many other things, that never were, nor will be. All that can be certainly inferred from the idea of a perfect Being seems to be this, that if it contain nothing, which is contradictory to it, then it is not impossible, but that there might be such a Being actually existing. But the strength of this argument not lying meerly in this, that because we have an idea of a perfect Being, therefore it is; but because we have such an idea of it, as includeth necessary existence in it, which the idea of nothing else besides doth; therefore may it be here further objected in this manner: That though it be very true, that a perfect Being doth include necessary existence in it, because that cannot be every way perfect, whose existence is not necessary, but contingent; yet will it not follow from hence, that therefore there is such a perfect Being actually existing; but all that can be deduced from it, will be no more than this, that whatsoever hath no necessary and eternal existence, is no absolutely perfect Being. And again, that if there be any absolutely perfect Being, then was its existence always necessary, and will be always such; that is, it did both exist of itself, from all eternity, without beginning, and must needs exist to eternity incorruptibly; it being never able to cease to be. It seems indeed no more to follow, that because a perfect Being includes necessary existence in its idea, therefore there is such a perfect Being actually existing; than because a perfect Being includes necessary omniscience and omnipotence in it, that therefore there is such a perfect omniscient and omnipotent Being: all that follows in both cases, being only this; that if there be any Being absolutely perfect, then it is both omniscient and omnipotent, and it did exist of itself necessarily, and can never cease to be. Wherefore here lies a fallacy in this argumentation, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, or upon a supposition of a perfect Being, the conclusion is made concerning it absolutely. As some would prove the necessity of all human events, as for example of *Adam's* sinning, in this manner, that it always was true before, that either *Adam* would eat the forbidden fruit, or not eat it; and if he would eat it, he would certainly eat it, and not contingently; and again, if he would not eat it, then would he certainly and necessarily not eat it: wherefore whether he will eat it, or not eat it, he will do either necessarily, and not contingently. Where it is plain, that an absolute necessity is wrongly inferred in the conclusion from an hypothetical one in the premises. In like manner, when upon supposition of an absolutely perfect Being, it is affirmed of it, that its existence must not be contingent, but necessary, and from thence the conclusion is made absolutely, that there is such a perfect Being; this seems to be the very same fallacy. From the idea of a perfect Being including necessary existence in it, it follows undeniably, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, it must exist necessarily, and not contingently: but it doth

doth not follow, that there must of necessity be such a perfect Being existing; these two propositions carrying a very different sense from one another. And the latter of them, that there must of necessity be a God, or perfect Being existing, seems to be a thing altogether indemonstrable, it implying, that the existence of God, or a perfect Being, may be proved *a priori*, or from some antecedent necessary cause; which was before declared to be a thing contradictory and impossible.

And now in justice are we obliged to plead the best we can also on the defensive side. Thus therefore, the idea of God, or an absolutely perfect Being, including in it, not an impossible, nor a contingent, but a necessary schesis, or relation to existence, it follows from thence absolutely, and without any *ifs* and *ands*, that he doth exist. For as of things contradictory, having therefore in the idea of them an impossible schesis to existence, we can confidently conclude, that they never were, nor will be; and as of other things not contradictory or impossible, but imperfect only, which therefore have a contingent schesis to existence, we can pronounce also, that possibly they might be, or might not be: in like manner, a perfect Being including in the idea of it a necessary schesis to existence, or an impossible one to non-existence, or containing existence in its very essence; we may by parity of reason conclude concerning it, that it is neither impossible to be, nor yet contingent to be, or not to be; but that it certainly is, and cannot but be; or that it is impossible it should not be. And indeed when we say of imperfect Beings, implying no contradiction in them, that they may possibly either be, or not be, we herein tacitly suppose the existence of a perfect Being, because nothing, which is not, could be possible to be, were there not something actually in being, that hath sufficient power to cause or produce it. True indeed, we have the ideas of many things in our minds, that never were, nor will be; but these are only such as include no necessary, but contingent existence in their nature; and it does not therefore follow, that a perfect Being, which includes necessity of existence in its idea, may, notwithstanding, not be. Wherefore this necessity of existence, or impossibility of non-existence, contained in the idea of a perfect being, must not be taken hypothetically only or consequentially after this manner, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, then its existence both was, and will be necessary; but absolutely, that though contradictory things cannot possibly be, and things imperfect may possibly either be, or not be, yet a perfect Being cannot but be; or it is impossible that it should not be. For otherwise were the force of the argumentation merely hypothetical, in this manner; If there be a perfect Being, then its existence both was, and will be necessary; this would plainly imply, that a perfect Being, notwithstanding that necessity of existence included in its nature, might either be, or not be, or were contingent to existence; which is a manifest contradiction, that the same thing should exist both contingently and necessarily. And this hypothetical absurdity will more plainly appear, if the argument be expressed in other words, as that necessity of existence, and impossibility of non-existence, and actual existence, belong to the very essence of a perfect Being; since it would be then ridiculous to go about to evade in this manner, that if there
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be a perfect Being, then it is, and cannot but be. Which identical proposition is true of every thing else, but absurd. Wherefore there is nothing more to be inferred from the necessity of existence included in the idea of a perfect Being than so; which can be nothing else but this, that it absolutely and actually is. Moreover, no Theists can be able to prove, that God, or a perfect Being (supposed by them to exist) might not happen by chance only to be; if from the necessity of existence included in the idea of God, it cannot be inferred, that he could not but be. Notwithstanding which, here is no endeavour, (as is pretended) to prove the existence of a God, or perfect Being, *à priori* neither, or from any necessary cause antecedent; but only from that necessity, which is included within itself, or is concomitant and concurrent with it; the necessity of its own perfect nature. And now we shall leave the intelligent and impartial reader to make his own judgment concerning the forementioned Cartesian argument for a Deity, drawn from its idea, as including necessity of existence in it, that therefore it is; whether it be merely sophistical, or hath something of solidity and reality in it. However, it is not very probable, that many Atheists will be convinced thereby, but that they will rather be ready to say, that this is no probation at all of a Deity, but only an affirmation of the thing in dispute, and a meer begging of the question; that therefore God is, because he is, or cannot but be.

Wherefore we shall endeavour to make out an argument, or demonstration, for the existence of a God, from his idea, as including necessary existence in it, some other ways. And first, we shall make an offer towards it in this manner. Though it will not follow from hence, because we can frame an idea of any thing in our minds, that therefore such a thing really existeth; yet nevertheless, whatsoever we can frame an idea of, implying no manner of contradiction in its conception, we may certainly conclude thus much of it, that such a thing was not impossible to be; there being nothing to us impossible, but what is contradictory and repugnant to conception. Now, the idea of God, or a perfect Being, can imply no manner of contradiction in it, because it is only the idea of such a thing; as hath all possible and conceivable perfections in it; that is, all perfections, which are neither contradictory in themselves, nor to one another. And they, who will not allow of this consequence, from the idea of a perfect Being, including necessity of existence in it, that it doth therefore actually exist, yet cannot deny, but that this at least will follow, from its implying no manner of contradiction in it, that it is therefore a thing possible, or not impossible to be. For thus much being true of all other contingent things, whose idea implieth no contradiction, that they are therefore possible; it must needs be granted of that, whose very idea and essence containeth a necessity of existence in it, as the essence of nothing else but a perfect Being doth. And this is the first step, that we now make in way of argumentation, from the idea of God, or a perfect Being, having nothing contradictory in it, that therefore God is at least possible, or no way impossible to have been. In the next place, as this particular idea of that, which is possible, includeth necessity of existence in it; from these two things put together at least, the possibility of such a Being, and its necessary ex-

istence (if not from the latter alone) will it according to reason follow, that he actually is. If God, or a perfect Being, in whose essence is contained necessary existence, be possible, or no way impossible to have been; then he is: because upon supposition of his non-existence, it would be absolutely impossible, that he should ever have been. It does not thus follow concerning imperfect Beings, that are contingently possible, that if they be not, it was therefore impossible for them ever to have been; for that, which is contingent, though it be not, yet might it, for all that, possibly have been. But a perfect necessarily existent Being, upon the bare supposition of its non-existence, could no more possibly have been, than it could possibly hereafter be; because, if it might have been, though it be not, then would it not be a necessary existent Being. The sum of all is this, a necessary existent Being, if it be possible, it is; because, upon supposition of its non-existence, it would be impossible for it ever to have been. Wherefore God is either impossible to have been, or else he is. For if God were possible, and yet be not, then is he not a necessary, but contingent Being; which is contrary to the hypothesis.

But because this argumentation may perhaps run the same fate also with the former, and, by reason of its subtlety, do but little execution neither, if not be accounted sophistical too; men being generally prone to distrust the firmness and solidity of such thin and subtle cobwebs, (as these and the like may seem to be) or their ability to support the weight of so great a truth; and to suspect themselves to be illaquetted and circumvented in them: therefore shall we lay no stress upon this neither, but proceed to something, which is yet more plain and downright, after this manner. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no manner of contradiction, this either actually is, or else if it be not, it is possible for it to be. But, if God be not, he is not possible hereafter to be; therefore he is. The reason and necessity of the minor is evident; because, if God be not, and yet possible hereafter to be, then would he not be an eternal and necessarily existent Being, which is contradictory to his idea. And the ground of the major, upon which all the weight lies, hath been already declared, where we proved before, that if there were no God, or perfect Being, we could never have had any conception or idea of him in our minds, because there can be no positive conception of an absolute nothing, that hath neither actual nor possible existence. Here the posture of the argument is only inverted; because we have an idea of God, or a perfect Being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, therefore must it needs have some kind of entity or other, either an actual or possible one; but God, if he be not, is not possible to be, therefore he doth actually exist.

But perhaps this argumentation also, how firm and solid soever, may prove less convictive of the existence of a God to the generality; because whatever is received, is received according to the capacity of the recipient: and though a demonstration be never so good in itself, yet is it more or less such

to particular persons, according to their ability to comprehend it; therefore shall we, in the next place, form yet a plainer demonstration for a God from the idea of him, including necessary existence in it: it being first permitted, that unquestionably something or other did exist from all eternity, without beginning. For it is certain, that every thing could not be made, because nothing could come from nothing; or be made by itself; and therefore if once there had been nothing, there could never have been any thing. Whence it is undeniable, that there was always something, and consequently, that there was something unmade, which existed of itself from all eternity. Now all the question is, and indeed this is the only question betwixt Theists and Atheists; since something did, certainly exist, of itself from all eternity, what that thing is, whether it be a perfect, or an imperfect Being? We say therefore, that whatsoever existed of itself from eternity, and without beginning, did so exist naturally and necessarily, or by the necessity of its own nature. Now, nothing could exist of itself from eternity, naturally and necessarily, but that, which containeth necessary, and eternal self-existence in its own nature. But there is nothing, which containeth necessary eternal existence in its own nature or essence, but only an absolutely perfect Being; all other imperfect things being in their nature contingently possible, either to be, or not be. Wherefore since something or other must and doth exist of itself naturally and necessarily from eternity unmade, and nothing could do this, but what included necessary self-existence in its nature or essence; it is certain, that it was a perfect Being, or God, who did exist of himself from eternity, and nothing else; all other imperfect things, which have no necessary self-existence in their nature, deriving their Being from him. Here therefore are the Atheists infinitely absurd and unreasonable, when they will not acknowledge that, which containeth independent self-existence, or necessity of existence (which indeed is the same with an impossibility of non-existence) in its nature and essence, that is, a perfect Being, so much as to exist at all; and yet in the mean time assert that, which hath no necessity of existence in its nature, the most imperfect of all Beings, inanimate body and matter, to have existed of itself necessarily from all eternity.

We might here add, as a farther confirmation of this argument, what hath been already proved, that no temporary successive Being, (whose duration is in a continual flux, as if it were every moment generated anew) and therefore neither our own souls, nor the world, nor matter moving, could possibly have existed from eternity, and independently upon any other thing, but must have had a beginning, and been caused by something else; namely, by an absolutely perfect Being, whose duration therefore is permanent, and without any successive generation, or flux.

But besides all these arguments, we may otherwise from the idea of God (already declared) be able both exactly to state the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, and satisfactorily to decide the same. In order where-
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unto, there is yet something again to be premised; namely this, that as it is certain every thing was not made, but something existed of itself from eternity unmade; so is it likewise certain, that every thing was not unmade neither, nor existed of itself from eternity, but something was made, and had a beginning. Where there is a full agreement betwixt Theists and Atheists, as to this one point, no Atheist asserting every thing to have been unmade, but they all acknowledging themselves to have been generated, and to have had a beginning; that is, their own souls and personalities, as likewise the lives and souls of all other men and animals. Wherefore, since something certainly existed of itself from eternity, but other things were made, and had a beginning; (which therefore must needs derive their being from that which existed of itself unmade,) here is the state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, whether that, which existed of itself from all eternity, and was the cause of all other things, were a perfect Being and God, or the most imperfect of all things whatsoever, inanimate and senseless matter. The former is the doctrine of Theists, as *Aristotle* affirmeth of those ancients, *Met. l. 12. c.* who did not write fabulously concerning the first principles, οἷον Φερεκύδης, καὶ ἑτεροὶ τινες, τὸ γεννηθῆσαι πρῶτον τὸ Ἄριστον τεθέασιν, καὶ οἱ Μάγοι καὶ τῶν ὑστέρων δὲ σοφῶν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας; *As namely, Pherecydes, and the Magi, and Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and many others; that they agreed in this, that the first original of all things was the best, and most perfect.* [Cap. IV. p. 446. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Where by the way we may observe also, that, according to *Aristotle*, the ancient Magi did not acknowledge a substantial evil principle, they making that, which is the best and most perfect Being, alone by itself, to be the first begetter of all. This, I say, is the hypothesis of Theists, that there is one absolutely perfect Being, existing of itself from all eternity, from whence all other lesser perfections, or imperfect Beings, did gradually descend, till at last they end in senseless matter or inanimate body. But the atheistical hypothesis, on the contrary, makes senseless matter the most imperfect thing, to be the first principle, or the only self-existent Being, and the cause of all other things; and consequently all higher degrees of perfections, that are in the world, to have climbed up, or emerged by way of ascent from thence; as life, sense, understanding, and reason from that, which is altogether dead and senseless. Nay, as it was before observed, there hath been amongst the ancient Pagans, a certain kind of religious Atheists, such as acknowledging verbally a God, or soul of the world, presiding over the whole, supposed this notwithstanding to have first emerged also, out of senseless Matter, Night and Chaos; and therefore doubtless to be likewise dissolvable again into the same. And of these is that place in *Aristotle* to be understood, βροσιλέειν καὶ ἀρχεῖν Φατὴν ἢ τὰς πρῶτες οἷον Νύκτα, καὶ Ὀυρανὸν, ἢ Χάος, ἢ καὶ Ὀκεανὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸν Δία. *They suppose, not the first things, as Night, and the Heaven, and Chaos, and the Ocean, but Jupiter (or God) to rule and govern all.* *Met. l. 12. P. 446. Tom. IV. Oper.]* Where it is intimated, that the Heaven, Night, Chaos, and the Ocean, according to these, were seniors to *Jupiter*, or in order of nature before him; they apprehending, that things did ascend upward from that, which was most imperfect, as Night and Chaos, to the more perfect, and at length to *Jupiter* himself, the mundane Soul, who governeth the whole world, as our soul doth our body. Which same opinion is afterwards again taken notice of, and reprehended

Met. l. 12. c. by Aristotle in these words; ἐκ ὁρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνει ἂδ' εἴτις παρεικάζει τὰς τῷ
c. Du Vall. ὅλα ἀρχαί, τῇ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων δὲ αἰεὶ τὰ τελειότερα· ἀθροισθῆναι γὰρ
 [P. 448. ἀθροισθῆναι γινώσκῃ, καὶ ἐκ ἐστὶ σπέρμα πρῶτον. Nor would he think rightly, who
 Tom. IV. Oper.] should resemble the principle of the universe to that of animals and plants: where, from indeterminate and imperfect things (as seeds) do always arise the more perfect. For even here also is the case otherwise than they suppose; for it is a man, that generates a man; nor is the seed the first.

The controversy being thus clearly stated betwixt Theists and Atheists, it may now with great ease, and to the full conviction of all minds unprejudiced, and unprepossessed with false principles, be determined; it being, on the one hand, undeniably evident, that lesser perfections may naturally descend from greater, or at least from that, which is absolutely perfect, and which virtually containeth all: but, on the other hand, utterly impossible, that greater perfections, and higher degrees of being, should rise and ascend out of lesser and lower, so as that, which is the most absolutely imperfect of all things, should be the first fountain and original of all; since no effect can possibly transcend the power of its cause. Wherefore it is certain, that in the universe things did not thus ascend and mount, or climb up from lower perfection to higher; but, on the contrary, descend and slide down from higher to lower: so that the first original of all things was not the most imperfect, but the most perfect Being. But to speak more particularly; it is certain, notwithstanding all the vain pretences of *Lucretius*, and other Atheists, or Semi-Atheists, to the contrary, that life and sense could never possibly spring out of dead and senseless matter, as its only original, either in the way of atoms, (no composition of magnitudes, figures, sises, and motions, being ever able to produce cogitation) or in the way of qualities, since life and perception can no more result from any mixture of elements, or combinations of qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, &c. than from unqualified atoms. This being undeniably demonstrable from that very principle of reason, which the Atheists are so fond of, but misunderstanding abuse, (as shall be manifested afterward) that nothing can come from nothing. Much less could understanding and reason in men ever have emerged out of stupid matter, devoid of all manner of life. Wherefore we must needs freely declare against the darkness of that philosophy, which hath been sometimes unwarily entertained by such as were no Atheists, that sense may rise from a certain modification, mixture, or organization of dead and senseless matter; as also that understanding and reason may result from sense: the plain consequence of both which is, that senseless matter may prove the original of all things, and the only Numen. Which doctrine therefore is, doubtless, a main piece of the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. But this darkness hath been of late in great measure dispelled by the light of the atomick philosophy, restored, as it was in its first genuine and virgin state, undeflower'd as yet by Atheists; this clearly showing, how far body and mechanism can go, and that life and cogitation can never emerge out from thence; it being built upon that fundamental principle, as we have made it evident in the first chapter, that *Nothing can come from nothing*. And *Strato*
 and

and the hylozoick Atheists were so well aware, and so sensible of this, that all life and understanding could not possibly be generated or made, but that there must be some fundamental and substantial, or eternal unmade life and knowledge, that they therefore have thought necessary to attribute life, and perception (or understanding) with appetite, and self-moving power, to all matter as such, that so it might be thereby fitly qualified to be the original of all things; than which opinion as nothing can be more monstrous, so shall we elsewhere evince the impossibility thereof. In the mean time, we doubt not to aver, that the argument proposed is a sufficient demonstration of the impossibility of atheism; which will be further manifested in our answer to the second atheistical objection against a divine creation, because nothing can come from nothing.

But this controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists may be yet more particularly stated from the idea of God, as including mind or understanding in it essentially, *viz.* Whether mind be eternal and unmade, as being the maker of all; or else, Whether all mind were itself made or generated, and that out of senseless matter? For, according to the doctrine of the Pagan Theists, mind was *πρωτεύειν αἰῶνος, ἡ Κύριον κατὰ φύσιν, the oldest of all things, senior to the world and elements, and by nature hath a princely and lordly dominion over all.* But, according to those Atheists, who make matter, or body, devoid of all life and understanding, to be the first principle, mind must be *ὑστερογενής, a post-nate thing, younger than the world; a weak, umbratile, and evanid image, and next to nothing.*

And the controversy, as thus stated, may be also clearly and satisfactorily decided. For first, we say, that as it is certainly true, that if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing; so is it true likewise, that if once there had been no life in the whole universe, but all had been dead, then could there never have been any life or motion in it; and if once there had been no mind, understanding, or knowledge, then could there never have been any mind or understanding produced. Because, to suppose life and understanding to rise and spring up out of that which is altogether dead and senseless, as its only original, is plainly to suppose something to come out of nothing. It cannot be said so of other things, as of the corporeal world and matter, that if once they had not been, they could never possibly have been; because, though there had been no world nor matter, yet might these have been produced from a perfect, omnipotent incorporeal being, which in itself eminently containeth all things. Dead and senseless matter could never have created or generated mind and understanding, but a perfect omnipotent mind could create matter. Wherefore, because there is mind, we are certain, that there was some mind or other from eternity without beginning; though not because there is body, that therefore there was body or matter from eternity unmade. Now these imperfect minds of ours were by no means themselves eternal or without beginning, but from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being; but since no mind could spring out of dead and senseless matter,
and

and all minds could not possibly be made, nor one produced from another infinitely; there must of necessity be an eternal unmade mind, from whence those imperfect minds of ours were derived. Which perfect omnipotent mind was as well the cause of all other things, as of human souls.

But before we proceed to any further argumentation, we must needs take notice here, that the Atheists suppose no small part of their strength to lie in this very thing, namely, their disproving a God from the nature of understanding and knowledge; nor do they indeed swagger in any thing more than this. We have already set it for the eleventh atheistical argument, that *knowledge being the information of the things themselves known, and all conception the action of that which is conceived, and the passion of the conceiver; the world and all sensible things must needs be before there could be any knowledge or conception of them, and no knowledge or conception before the world as its cause.* Or more briefly thus: the world could not be made by knowledge and understanding, because there could be no knowledge or understanding of the world, or of any thing in it, before it was made. For, according to these Atheists, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things; they meaning by *things* here such only, as are sensible and corporeal. So that Mind and Understanding could not be the creator of the world and these sensible things, itself being the meer creature of them; a secondary, derivative result from them, or a phantastick image of them; the youngest and most creaturely thing in the whole world. Whence it follows, that to suppose mind and understanding to be the maker of all things would be no better sense, than if one should suppose the images in ponds and rivers to be the makers of the sun, moon and stars, and other things represented in them. And upon such a ground as this, does a modern writer presume to determine, that knowledge and understanding are not to be attributed to God Almighty, because they imply imperfection, and dependence upon corporeal things without:

De Civē Rel. Quoniam scientia & intellectus in nobis nihil aliud sunt, quam suscitatus
c. 15. Sect. 14. *à rebus externis organa prementibus animi tumultus, non est putandum ali-*
quid tale accidere Deo. Signum enim est potentie ab alio dependentis. Which

Lev. cap. 31.

is again Englished thus; *Knowledge and understanding being in us nothing else but a tumult in the mind, raised by external things, that press the organical parts of man's body; there is no such thing in God, nor can they be attributed to him, they being things, which depend upon natural causes.* Where this writer thus denying knowledge and understanding to God, upon pretence, that it speaks imperfection, and dependance upon external corporeal things, (it being nothing but a tumult raised by the motions and pressures of them) he must needs absolutely deny the first principle of all things to be any knowing understanding nature, unless he had asserted some other kind of knowledge distinct from that of men, and clearly attributed the same to God Almighty. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.

Now we shall, for the present, only so far forth concern ourselves in confuting this atheistical doctrine, as to lay a foundation thereby for the

the demonstration of the contrary, namely, the existence of a God, or a Mind before the world, from the nature of knowledge and understanding. First, therefore it is a sottish conceit of these Atheists, proceeding from their not attending to their own cogitations, that not only sense, but also knowledge and understanding in men, is but a tumult, raised from corporeal things without, pressing upon the organs of their body; or else, as they declare themselves more distinctly, nothing but the activity of sensible objects upon them, and their passion from them. For if this were true, then would every thing, that suffered and reacted motion, especially polite bodies, as looking-glasses, have something both of sense and of understanding in them. It is plain, that there comes nothing to us from bodies without us, but only local motion and pressure. Neither is sense itself the meer passion of those motions, but the perception of their passions in a way of phancy. But sensible things themselves (as for example, light and colours) are not known or understood either by the passion, or the phancy of sense, nor by any thing meerly foreign and adventitious, but by intelligible ideas exerted from the mind itself, that is, by something native and domestic to it: nothing being more true, than this of *Boetius*¹, that, *Omne, quod scitur, non ex sua, sed ex comprehendentium natura, vi, & facultate cognoscitur*; *Whatsoever is known, is known not by its own force and power, but by the force and power, the vigour and activity of that thing itself, which knows or comprehends it.* Wherefore, besides the phantasms of singular bodies, or of sensible things existing without us, (which are not meer passions neither) it is plain, that our human mind hath other cogitations or conceptions in it; namely, the ideas of the intelligible natures and essences of things, which are universal, and by and under which it understands singulars. It is a ridiculous conceit of a modern atheistical writer, that universals are nothing else but names, attributed to many singular bodies, because whatsoever *is*, is singular. For though whatsoever exists without the mind be singular, yet is it plain, that there are conceptions in our minds objectively universal. Which universal objects of our mind, though they exist not as such any where without it, yet are they not therefore nothing, but have an intelligible entity for this very reason, because they are conceivable; for since non-entity is not conceivable, whatsoever is conceivable, and an object of the mind, is therefore something. And as for axiomatical truths, in which something is affirmed or denied, as these are not all passions from bodies without us, (for what local motions could impress this common notion upon our minds, that things which agree in one third, agree amongst themselves, or any other?) to neither are these things only gathered by induction from repeated and reiterated sensations; we clearly apprehending at once, that is impossible they should be otherwise. Thus *Aristotle*² ingeniously; *ὅτι ἐπιστάσιαι δι' αἰσθησεως ἔστιν, ὅτι καὶ εἴ ἦν αἰσθανεσθαι. ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον ἁπλῶν ὀρθαῖς ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐξητάμεν ἂν ἀποδείξαι, καὶ ὅχι ὡς φασὶ τινες ἐπιστάμεθα· αἰσθανεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἑκάστων, ἢ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τῷ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἔστι.* *It is evident, that there is no knowledge (of the universal theorems of geometry) by sense. For if we could perceive by sense, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right; yet*

¹ Vide Consolat. Philosoph. Lib. V. p. 131.

² Analytic. posterior. Lib. I. p. 226. Tom 1, Oper.

Should we not rest satisfied in this, as having therefore a sufficient knowledge hereof; but would seek further after a demonstration of it: sense reaching only to singulars, but knowledge to universals. When from the universal idea of a triangle, which is neither here, nor there, nor any where, without our mind, but yet hath an intelligible entity, we see a plain necessity, that its three angles must be equal to two right, then do we know the truth of this universal theorem, and not before: as also we understand, that every singular triangle, (so far as it is true) hath this property in it. Wherefore the knowledge of this, and the like truths, is not derived from singulars, nor do we arrive to them in way of ascent from singulars to universals; but, on the contrary, having first found them in the universals, we afterwards descending, apply them to singulars: so that our knowledge here is not after singular bodies, and secondarily or derivatively from them, but in order of nature before them, and preleptical to them.

Now these universal conceptions, some of which are also abstract, (as life, sense, reason, knowledge, and the like) many of them are of such things, whose singulars do not at all fall under sense; which therefore could never possibly be impressed upon us from singular bodies by local motion: and again some such, as though they belong to corporeal and sensible things, yet, as their accuracy cannot be reached to by sense, so neither did they ever exist in that matter of this lower world, which here encompasseth us, and therefore could not be stamped upon us from without: as for example, the ideas of a perfect strait line, and a plain superficies, or of an exact triangle, circle, sphere, or cube; no material thing here amongst us being terminated in so strait lines, but that even by microscopes there may be discovered much irregularity and deformity in them; and very probable it is, that there are no perfectly strait lines, no such triangles, circles, spheres, or cubes, as answer to the exactness of our conceptions, in any part of the whole material universe, nor never will be. Notwithstanding which, they are not absolute non-entities, since we can demonstrate things concerning them, and though they never were nor will be, yet are they possible to exist, since nothing can be conceived, but it either is, or else is possible to be. The human mind therefore hath a power of framing ideas and conceptions, not only of what actually is, but also of things, which never were, nor perhaps will be, they being only possible to be. But when, from our conceptions, we conclude of some things, that though they are not, yet they are possible to be; since nothing that is not, can be possible to be, unless there be something actually in being, which hath sufficient power to produce it; we do implicitly suppose the existence of a God or omnipotent Being thereby, which can make whatsoever is conceivable, though it yet be not to exist; and therefore material triangles, circles, spheres, cubes, mathematically exact.

The result of what we have hitherto said is this, that since singular bodies are not the only objects of our mind and cogitation, it having also universal and abstract ideas of the intelligible natures or essences of things; (some of which are such, whose singulars do not

at all fall under sense ; others, though they belong to bodies, yet sense can never reach to them, nor were they ever in matter ;) moreover, since our mind can conceive of things, which no where actually exist, but are only possible, and can have such a demonstrative science of universal truths, as sense can never ascend to: that therefore human knowledge and understanding itself is not the meer image and creature of singular bodies only ; and so derivative, or ectypal from them, and in order of nature junior to them, but that, as it were hovering aloft over all the corporeal universe, it is a thing independent upon singular bodies, or proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them.

But what account can we then possibly give of knowledge and understanding, their nature and original ? since there must be *Νοητὸν*, that which is intelligible, in order of nature, before *Νόησις*, or intellection ? Certainly no other than this, that the first original knowledge is that of a perfect being, infinitely good and powerful, comprehending itself, and the utmost extent of its own fecundity and power, that is, the possibilities of all things ; their ideas, with their several relations to one another ; all necessary and immutable truths. Here therefore is there a knowledge before the world and all sensible things, that was archetypal and paradigmatical to the same. Of which one perfect mind and knowledge all other imperfect minds (being derived from it) have a certain participation ; whereby they are enabled to frame intelligible ideas, not only of whatsoever doth actually exist, but also of such things, as never were, nor will be, but are only possible, or objects of divine power.

Wherefore, since it is certain, that even human knowledge and understanding itself is not a meer passion from sensible things, and singular bodies existing without (which is the only foundation of that forementioned atheistical argument, that *things made knowledge*, and *not knowledge things*) and consequently it must needs have some other original : moreover, since knowledge and understanding apprehend things proleptically to their existence, (mind being able to frame conceptions of all possible entities and modifications) and therefore in their nature do plainly suppose the actual existence of a perfect being, which is infinitely fecund and powerful, and could produce all things possible or conceivable ; the first original Knowledge, or Mind, from whence all other knowledges and minds are derived, being that of an absolutely perfect and omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or of its communicability, that is, the ideas of all possibilities of things, that may be produced by it, together with their relations to one another, and their necessary immutable truths ; accordingly as wisdom and understanding are described to be, *ἀγνῆς τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως, ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης, ἑσπλίαν τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡθῆς*, &c. *ε. π.* *ἐνεργείας, καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ*, *The breath (or vapour) of the power of God, and an efflux (or emanation) from the glory of the Almighty, a clear mirror (or looking glass) of his active energy or virtue, and the image of his goodness* : I say, the result of all is this, that the nature of knowledge and understanding is so far from being a ground of disproving a Deity (as

the Atheists ignorantly pretend) that it affordeth a firm demonstration to us, on the contrary, of the existence of a God, a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or all possibilities of things ; a mind before the world, and senior to all things ; no ectypal, but archetypal thing, which comprehended in it, as a kind of intellectual world, the paradigm or platform, according to which this sensible world was made.

And this may be further confirmed from what is generally acknowledged, and indeed cannot reasonably be denied by any, *viz.* that there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor can ever be destroyed, or cease to be : as for example, such common notions as these, that equals added to equals make equals ; that the cause is in order of nature before the effect, &c. together with all geometrical theorems ; as *Aristotle* himself declareth, he writing in his *Ethicks* * after this manner, *περὶ αἰδίου οὐδείς βουλευσίαι, οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς διαμέτρου ἢ τῆς πλευρῆς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι.* Concerning eternal (and immutable) things no man does consult ; as for example, concerning the diameter or diagonal of a square, whether it should be incommensurable to the sides, or no. Where he plainly affirmeth this geometrical theorem, that the diameter or diagonal of a square is incommensurable to the sides, to be an eternal truth. Neither are there such eternal truths as these only in mathematicks, and concerning quantity, but also in ethicks concerning morality ; there being here αἰδία δίκαια, as *Justin Martyr* calls them, things eternally just, which were not made such at certain times by law and arbitrary command, but, being such in their own nature immutably, were from everlasting to everlasting, and (as it is said of that eternal Word, which comprehends all truth) the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever ². For of these is that famous passage of *Sophocles* in his *Antigona* ³,

Ὁ γὰρ τι νῦν γε κἄχθές, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ πέτε
Ζῆ ταῦτα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔξ ὅτε φάνη.

These are not things of to-day, or yesterday, but they ever live, and no man knows their date, or from whence they came. No man can declare the time, when all common notions, and geometrical truths were first made and generated out of nothing, or brought out of antecedent non-existence into being. Certain it is, that such truths as these, that the diameter and sides of a square are incommensurable, or that the power of the hypotenuse in a rectangular triangle is equal to the powers of both the sides, were not made by any man's thinking, or by those first geometricians, who discovered or demonstrated the same ; they discovering and demonstrating only that which was. Wherefore these truths were before there was any man to think of them, and they would continue still to be, though all the men in the world should be annihilated ; nay, though there were no material squares and triangles any where in the whole world neither, no nor any matter at all : for they were ever without beginning before the world, and would of necessity be ever after it, should it cease to be.

Now

* *Ethicor.* ad *Nicomach.* Lib. III. Cap. V.
p. 39. Tom. III. Oper.

² *Hebr.* xiii. 8.

³ *Verf.* 467. 468.

Now, if there be eternal truths, which were never made, and could not but be, then must the *rationes rerum*, the *simple reasons* of things also, or their intelligible natures and essences, out of which those truths are compounded, be of necessity eternal likewise. For how can this be an eternal truth, that the diameter of a square is incommensurable with the sides, if the *rationes*, the *reasons* of a square, diameter, and sides, or their intelligible essences, were not themselves eternal? These are therefore called by *Plato* (a man of much meditation, and no contemptible philosopher) not only αἰεὶ ταῦτα ἢ ὡς αὐτῶς ἔχοντα, *things, which are always the same, and unchangeable*, but also, τὰ μὴ γινόμενα, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ὄντα, *things, which were never made, but always are*; and sometimes, μήτε γινόμενα, μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, *things, that were neither made, nor can be destroyed*; sometimes, τὰ ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀνιλέθηρα, *things ingenerable and incorruptible*. Of which *Cicero* thus¹, *Hæc Plato negat gigni, sed semper esse, & ratione & intelligentiâ contineri. These things Plato affirmeth to have been never made, but always to be, and to be contained in reason and understanding*. And, though perhaps it may seem strange, even *Aristotle*² himself also, notwithstanding his so often clashing with *Plato's* ideas, here really agreeth in the main, that the forms and species, or the universal intelligible essences of things, which are the proper and immediate objects of science, were eternal and never made. Thus in his *Metaphysics*, τὸ εἶδος οὐδεὶ ποιεῖ οὐδὲ γεννᾶται, *No man makes the form, or species of a thing, nor was it ever generated*; and again, τῷ σφαιρᾷ εἶναι ἢ ἐκ γένεσις, *There is no generation of the essence of a sphere*; and, ἀνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὰ εἶδη, *The forms or species of things are without any generation or corruption*. And he sometimes calleth these objects of science ἀκίνητος οὐσία³ or φύσις, *an immutable essence or nature*. Lastly, where he writeth against the *Heracliticks*, and those other *Scepticks*, who denied all certainty of science, he first discovers the ground of their error herein to have been this, that they supposed singular bodies, or sensibles existing without, to be the only things or objects of the mind, or knowledge; * αἴτιον τῆς δόξης τούτοις, ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀληθεῖαν ἐζήκωπον, τὰ δὲ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον, ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἢ τὸ ἀόριστον φύσις ἐνωσάσκει ——— ἐτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὀρεώμενην ταύτην κινεμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατέλεγε τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐδὲν ἀληθεύμενον, περιέριγε τὸ πάντως πάντα μείζεσθαι, οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀληθεῖν. The original of these men's mistake was this, because truth is to be look'd for in things, and they conceiv'd the only things to be sensibles, in which it is certain there is much of the indeterminate nature. Wherefore they, perceiving all the nature of sensibles to be moveable, or in perpetual flux and mutation, since nothing can possibly be verified or constantly affirmed concerning that, which is not the same but changeable, concluded, that there could be no truth at all, nor certainty of science; those things, which are the only objects of it, never continuing the same. And then he subjoins in way of opposition to this sceptical doctrine of theirs, and the forementioned ground thereof, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἢ ἄλλου ὡσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ἢ οὐτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει οὐτὲ φθορὰ ἔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν. We would have these men therefore to know, that there is another kind of essence of things, besides that of sensibles, to which belongeth

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¹ De Oratore ad Brutum, Cap. III. p. 695. IV. Oper.

Tom. II. Oper.

³ Ibid. Lib. XIV. Cap. II. p. 472. & Cap.

² Vide *Metaphysic. Lib. VII. Cap. VIII.* VI p. 477.

p. 361. & Lib. XIV. Cap. III. p. 473. Tom.

VI p. 477.

⁴ Ibid. Lib. IV. Cap. V. p. 313.

neither motion, nor corruption, nor any generation at all. By which essences of things, that have no generation nor corruption, he could understand nothing else, but those intelligible natures, species, and ideas, which are the standing and immutable objects of science. And certain it is, that there could be no constant and immutable science at all, were there no other objects of the mind, but singulars and sensibles, because these are all mutable: Wherefore the proper and immediate objects of the geometrical science are no singular and material triangles, squares, spheres, and cubes, &c. not only because none of these are found mathematically exact, and because geometricians, in all the several distant ages and places of the world, could not have the same singular bodies before them, but also because they do none of them continue immutably the same; all corporeal things being more or less in perpetual motion and mutation; whereas, that of which any geometrical theorem is verified and demonstrated, must be immutably and unalterably the same. The triangles and circles, spheres and cubes of *Euclid*, *Archimedes*, *Pappus*, *Apollonius*, and all other ancient and modern geometricians, in all the distant places and times of the world, were both indivisibly one and the same, and also perfectly immutable and incorruptible, the science of geometry being such. For which cause it is affirmed also of these mathematical things, by the forementioned *Aristotle*, that they are no where as in a place, as all singular bodies are, ἀποποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸν τόπον ἅμα τοῖς σπειροῖς τοῖς Μαθηματικοῖς ποιῆσαι, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος τῶν καθ' ἑκάστου ἴδιος· δὲ χωρὶς αὐτόπων τὰ δὲ Μαθηματικά, ἢ πῶς. It is absurd to make mathematical things to be in a place, as solid bodies are; for place belongeth only to singulars, which are therefore separable from one another by place; but mathematical things are not any where. Because they being universal and abstract, are only in minds: nevertheless, for the same reason are they also every where, they being in every mind, that apprehends them. Lastly, these intelligible essences and ideas of things are called also by *Philo*, ἀναγκασιόταται οὐσίαι, the most necessary essences; as being not only eternal, but having likewise necessary existence belonging to them: for though there be no absolute necessity, that there should be matter or body, yet is there an absolute necessity that there should be truth.

Met. l. 12. c.
5.
[Pag. 448.
Tom. IV.
Oper.]

If therefore there be eternal intelligibles or ideas, and eternal truths, and necessary existence do belong to them; then must there be an eternal mind necessarily existing, since these truths and intelligible essences of things cannot possibly be any where but in a mind. For by the essences of things, when they are said to be eternal, must not be meant their very substances, as if every thing were in itself eternal and uncreated; or that God in creation did only, as a modern writer abusively expresseth it, *sorteris instar, vestire essentias rerum novâ existentia*, cloathe the antecedent essences of things with a new garment of existence; but only their esse cognitum, their possible and intelligible natures, as they were objects of infinite power and understanding, before they were made. There must be a mind senior to the world, and all sensible things, and such as at once comprehends in it the ideas of all intelligibles, their necessary schemes and relations to one another,

* *Legis Allogor.* Lib. I. p. 63. Oper.

ther, and all their immutable truths; a mind, which doth not ὅτε μέν νοεῖ, ὅτε δὲ ἢ νοεῖ, (as *Aristotle* writeth of it) sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand, as if it were sometimes awake, and sometimes asleep, or like an eye, sometimes open, and sometimes shut; but ὅτι ἐνεργεῖ, such a mind, as is essentially act and energy, and hath no defect in it. And this, as we have already declared, can be no other than the mind of an omnipotent and infinitely perfect Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or how far itself is communicable, that is, all the possibilities of things, that may be made by it, and their respective truths; mind and knowledge, in the very nature of it, supposing the actual existence of an omnipotent or infinitely powerful Being, as its *Νοητὸν*, or *intelligible*; it being nothing but the comprehension of the extent of infinite or divine power, and the measure of the same.

And from hence it is evident also, that there can be but one only original mind, or no more than one understanding Being self-existent; all other minds whatsoever partaking of one original mind; and being, as it were, stamped with the impression or signature of one and the same seal. From whence it cometh to pass, that all minds, in the several places and ages of the world, have ideas or notions of things exactly alike, and truths indivisibly the same. Truths are not multiply'd by the diversity of minds, that apprehend them; because they are all but ectypal participations of one and the same original or archetypal mind and truth. As the same face may be reflected in several glasses; and the image of the same sun may be in a thousand eyes at once beholding it; and one and the same voice may be in a thousand ears listening to it: so when innumerable created minds have the same ideas of things, and understand the same truths, it is but one and the same eternal light, that is reflected in them all, (*that light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh in the world;*) or the same voice of that one everlasting Word, that is never silent, re-echoed by them. Thus was it concluded by *Themistius*, that one man, by teaching, could not possibly beget in the mind of another the very same notions, conceptions, and knowledges, which himself had in his own mind, εἰ μὴ ταυτὸν ἦν τὸ νόημα τῷ διδάσκοντι ἢ τῷ μαθησάμεντι; *Were not the minds both of the teacher and of the learner, as it were, printed and stamped alike.* As also that men could not possibly so confer together as they do, presently apprehending one another's meaning, and raising up the very same senses in their minds, and that merely by occasion of words and sounds, εἰ μή τις ἦ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἢ πάντες ἐκοινωνήμεν, *Were there not some one mind, which all men did partake of.* As for that anti-monarchical opinion of many understanding beings, or minds, self-originated, and independent, (none of which therefore could be omnipotent) it is neither conceivable, how such should all agree in the same truths, there being no common measure of truth betwixt them, no more than any common rule of their wills; nor indeed how they should have any knowledge or understanding at all, properly so called, that being the comprehension of the possibilities of things, or of the extent of infinite power: whereas according

† Vide *Metaphyf. Lib. XIV. Cap. IX. p. 483.*

to this hypothesis, there is no infinite power at all, the power of each of those many supposed principles or deities being limited and finite, and therefore indeed not creative of any thing neither, since that, which could create one thing, could create all, and consequently would have all depending upon it. We conclude therefore, that from the nature of mind and knowledge it is demonstrable, that there can be but one original and self-existent Mind, or understanding Being, from which all other minds were derived. And now have we, more copiously than we designed, confuted the first atheistical argument; we having not only asserted the idea of God, and fully answered and refuted all the atheistical pretences against the same; but also from this very idea of God, or a perfect Being, demonstrated his existence. We shall dispatch the following atheistical objections with more brevity.

WE come, in the next place, to the *Achilles* of the Atheists, their invincible argument against a divine creation and omnipotence; because, *Nothing could come from nothing*. It being concluded from hence, that whatsoever substantially or really is, was from all eternity of itself unmade or uncreated by any Deity. Or else thus; by God is always understood a Creator of some real entity or other out of nothing; but it is an undoubted principle of reason and philosophy, an undeniable common notion, that *Nothing can be made out of nothing*, and therefore there can be no such creative power as this. And here we shall perform these three things; first, we shall show, that in some senses, this is indeed an unquestionable truth, and common notion, that *Nothing can come from nothing*, and what those senses are. Secondly, we shall make it evident, that in the sense of this atheistical objection, it is absolutely false, that *Nothing can come from nothing*, or be made out of nothing; and that a divine creation and omnipotence can be no way impugned from the forementioned principle rightly understood. Thirdly and lastly, we shall prove, that as from this principle or common notion, *Nothing out of nothing*, there can be no execution at all done against theism, or a divine creation; so from the very same rightly understood, the impossibility of all atheism may be demonstratively proved, it bringing something out of nothing in an impossible sense; as also the existence of a God evinced.

We grant therefore, in the first place, that this is in some sense an undoubted principle of reason, or an undeniable common notion, that *Nothing can come from nothing*. For first, it is unquestionably true, that *Nothing, which once was not, could ever of itself come into being*; or, that *Nothing could bring itself out of non-existence into being*; that *Nothing can take beginning of existence from itself*; or, that *Nothing can be made or produced without an efficient cause*. And from hence, as hath been already intimated, is it demonstratively certain, that every thing was not made, but that there is something necessarily self-existent, and which could not but be. For had every thing

been made, then must something of necessity have been made out of nothing by itself; which is impossible.

Again; As nothing, which was not, could ever of itself come into being, or be made, without an efficient cause; so is it certain likewise, that nothing can be efficiently caused or produced by that, which hath not in it at least equal (if not greater) perfection, as also sufficient power to produce the same. We say, nothing which was not, could ever be brought into being, by that, which hath not formally equal perfection in it; because nothing can give what it hath not, and therefore so much of the perfection or entity of the effect, as is greater than that of the supposed cause, so much thereof must needs come from nothing, or be made without a cause. Moreover, whatsoever hath equal perfection to another thing, could not therefore cause or produce that other thing; because it might either have no active power at all, as matter hath not, it being merely passive, or else no sufficient active and productive power. As for example, though it be not impossible, that motion, which once was not, should be produced; yet is it impossible, that it should be ever produced without a sufficient cause. Wherefore, if there were once no motion at all in the whole world, nor no life, or self-active power in any thing, but all were dead; then is it certain, that there could never possibly arise any motion or mutation in it to all eternity. There being no sufficient cause to produce the same; since nothing can produce motion, but that which hath life, or self-activity in it; and if motion, or any thing else, should begin to be, without a sufficient cause, then must it needs be caused by itself, or of itself come into being: which is a thing impossible. Now no imperfect Being whatsoever hath a sufficient emanative power to create any other substance, or produce it out of nothing; the utmost, that can be done by imperfect beings, is only to produce new accidents and modifications; as human souls can produce new cogitations in themselves, and new local motion in bodies. No imperfect Being is substantially emanative, or can produce another substance out of non-existence. Therefore for any substance to be brought into being, by an imperfect substance, which hath not sufficient emanative or creative power, is a thing plainly impossible; it being all one as to say, that a substance might of itself come out of nothing into being. And thus is it granted, that no substance could be created, or brought out of non-existence into being, but by the sole efficiency of an absolutely perfect Being, which hath both greater perfection, (it eminently containing all things in it,) and also a sufficient emanative or creative power.

And now have we given an account of two senses, wherein it is impossible for *any thing to come from nothing*; one, for a thing, which was not, to bring itself into being, or to be made without an efficient cause. Another, for a thing to be efficiently caused by that, which hath not at least equal perfection in it, or a sufficient emanative or productive power. Both which senses of this axiom respect the efficient cause; and thus was it frequently understood by divers of the ancients, and particularly by *Cicero*¹. We shall

¹ Vide Lib. ejus de Fato.

Will now propound a third sense, wherein this axiom is also verified, that *Nothing can be made out of nothing*, respecting chiefly the material cause. For since no imperfect natural being hath any creative power, or can efficiently produce any new substance, or real entity, which was not before, into being, but only act upon pre-existing matter by motion, and modify the same; and since matter, as such, being merely passive, cannot cause any thing, that was not before, or will not result from the composition or modification of it; it follows undeniably, that in all natural generations and productions out of pre-existent matter (without a divine creation) there can never be any new substance or real entity brought out of non-existence into being. And this was that very thing, and no other, which the ancient physiologers meant, when (as *Aristotle*¹ tells us) they so much insisted upon this principle, *Τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ μηδένων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον*, *That it was impossible, that any real entity should be (naturally) made or generated out of nothing*; or, as it is also otherwise expressed², *Ὅθεν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων*, *that no real entity was either generated or corrupted*. That is, that in natural generations, corruptions, and alterations, (where God is supposed not miraculously to interpose) there is no creation of any new substance, or real entity, out of nothing, nor annihilation, or destruction of any into nothing.

We are not ignorant, that the generality of modern writers have interpreted this doctrine of the old physiologers in *Aristotle* into quite different sense; as designing therein to take away all divine creation out of nothing, (or non-existence;) they making all things to have sprung out of matter (existing of itself from eternity) either without a God, or else rather (because *Parmenides* and *Empedocles*, and other asserters of this doctrine, were undoubted Theists) with him. So that God could not create any new entity out of nothing, but only make things out of pre-existing unmade matter, as a carpenter doth a house, or a weaver a piece of cloth. And thus is it commonly taken for granted, that no Pagan philosopher ever went so far, as to acknowledge a divine creation of any thing out of nothing, in the sense of Christian theologers. And here we grant indeed, that, besides the Stoicks, there have been some other philosophick Theists amongst the Pagans of this persuasion, that nothing was, nor could be made by God, otherwise than out of something præ-existing; as *Plutarchus Chæronensis* for one, who in a place already cited positively affirmeth³, *τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ Θεῶ γενόμεναι, τὴν δὲ ἄσκειν καὶ ἄλλο ἐξ ἧς γένηται, ἢ γενεῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην αἰεὶ τῷ ὀργανῷ*. *That though the world were indeed made by God, yet the substance or matter, out of which it was made, was not made*. And then he subjoins this very reason for it, *ἢ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μὲν ὄντι γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἂν τῷ μὴ καλῶς, μηδ' ἰκανῶς ἔχοντι, ὡς οἰκίαις καὶ ἱματίαις καὶ ἀνδραγάλαις*. *Because there can be no making of any thing out of nothing, but only out of something præ-existing, not rightly ordered, or sufficiently disposed; as in a house, garment, or statue*. From which conceit of *Plutarch's*, though he were otherwise ingenious, it may well be supposed, that

¹ Natural. Auscultat. Lib. I. p. 451. Tom. I. Oper. Vide etiam. Cap. VIII. p. 457, & alibi.

² Ibid. Lib. I. Cap. VIII. p. 457.

³ Libro de procreat. anima. ex Timæo p. 1014. Tom. II. Oper.

the dull Bœotick air had too much effect upon him. However, neither *Plutarch* nor the Stoicks, as we conceive, are for this to be accounted absolute and downright Atheists, but only imperfect, mungrel, and spurious Theists. And therefore were Atheists never so much able to prove, that there could be no creation out of nothing præ-existing, which they cannot at all do; yet would not this overthrow theism in general, there being a latitude therein. Nevertheless, it will undeniably appear from what shall follow, that those ancient Italicks and Phythagoricks were so far from intending here any such thing, to deduce all things out of matter, either without, or with a God, as that they plainly designed the very contrary; namely, to prove, that no new real entity could be made out of matter, and particularly that souls could not be generated out of the same; which therefore of necessity must, according to them, have another divine original, and be made by God, not out of matter, but out of nothing præ-existing: since it could not be supposed by any, that all souls existed of themselves from eternity unmade. And indeed all those Pagan philosophers, who asserted the incorporeity of souls, must of necessity, in like manner, suppose them not to have been made out of præ-existing matter, but by God out of nothing. *Plutarch* being only here to be excepted, by reason of a certain odd hypothesis, which he had, that was peculiarly his own, of a third principle, besides God and matter, a disorderly soul, or evil dæmon self-existent, who therefore seems to have supposed all particular human souls to have been made neither out of nothing, nor yet out of matter or body præ-existing, but out of a certain strange commixture of the substance of that evil soul, and God, blended together: upon which account does he affirm souls to be, not so much ἐργον ἀπὸ Θεοῦ, not so much *the work of God*, as a *part of him*. And now let any one judge, whether upon *Plutarch's* account, there be not yet further reason to complain of this Bœotick air. Wherefore we conclude, that those old physiologers in *Aristotle*, who insisted so much upon that principle, that no real entity could be made or generated out of nothing, acted only as physiologers therein; and not as theologers or metaphysicians; they not opposing a divine creation out of nothing præ-existing, but only contending, that no new entity could be made out of matter, and that in natural generations and corruptions there was no creation or annihilation of any thing.

But what the true scope and meaning of these physiologers indeed was; will more plainly appear from that use or improvement, which themselves made of this philosophick principle; and this was twofold. For first, it is certain, that upon this foundation, they all of them endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either an homœomery, or an anomœomery, a similar or dissimilar atomology. For *Anaxagoras* looking upon this maxim of the Italick philosophers, that nothing could be physically made out of nothing, or no real entity generated or corrupted, as an undoubted principle of reason; and being also not able to conceive otherwise of the forms and qualities of bodies, than that they were real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, or its

modifications; concluded, that therefore in generations, corruptions, and alterations, these were not created out of nothing, and annihilated into nothing, but that every thing was naturally made, *ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων ἢ ἐνυπαρχόντων*, out of *præ-existent*, and *in-existent* things; and consequently that there were, in all things, similar atoms and particles of every kind, though by reason of their parvitute insensible to us, and every thing seemed to be only that, which was most predominant and conspicuous in it. To wit, that bone was made out of bony atoms, and flesh out of fleshy, hot things out of hot atoms, and cold things out of cold, black out of black, and white out of white, &c. and nothing out of nothing, but every thing out of *præ-existent* similar atoms. Thus was the sense of *Anaxagoras* plainly declared by *Aristotle*², that *because contraries were made out of one another, they were therefore before in-existent. For since every thing must of necessity be made, either out of something, or out of nothing, and all physilogers agree, that it is impossible for any thing to be made out of nothing; it follows unavoidably, that whatsoever is generated, must be generated out of things præ-existent and in-existent, though by reason of their parvitute insensible to us; that is, out of similar or homogenous atoms, of which there are some of all kinds in every thing; every thing being mingled in every thing.* Here therefore have we the *Anaxagorean* homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle of reason, as its foundation, that *Nothing can naturally be made or generated out of nothing.*

But the *Italicks* or *Pythagoricks*, as well before *Anaxagoras*, as after him, (with whom also hitherto concurred *Leucippus*, *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*, those atheizers of the *Italick* physiology) did with much better reason from the same fundamental principle conclude, that since these forms and qualities of bodies were unquestionably generated and corrupted, they were therefore no entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications, but only different dispositions or modifications of the insensible parts thereof, causing in us different phantasms: and this was the first original of the dissimilar atomology. In matter or body therefore, as such, there was nothing else to these philosophers conceivable, but only magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; and these were those few elements, out of which *in-existent*, and variously combined together, they supposed all those forms and qualities of bodies, (commonly so called) in generations to result, without the production of any new real entity out of nothing. For as out of a few letters in the alphabet of every language, differently placed and combined, do result innumerable syllables, words, and sounds, signifying all the several things in heaven and earth; and sometimes from all the very same letters, neither more nor fewer, but only transposed, are begotten very different phantasms of sounds in us, but without the production of any new real entity out of nothing: in the very same manner, from those fewer letters in the alphabet of the corporeal nature, variously combined, or from the different modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, are made up and spelled out all those syllables of things, that are in the whole world,

² Natural. Aufcultat. Lib. I. Cap. V. p. 451. Tom. I. Oper.

world, without the production of any new real entity. Many times the very same numerical matter, neither more nor less, only differently modified, causing very different phantasms in us, which are therefore vulgarly supposed to be forms and qualities in the things; as when the same water is successively changed and transformed into vapour, snow, hail, and ice. And to this very purpose is the forementioned similitude elegantly pursued by the Epicurean Poet, in these following verses;

*Quin etiam refert nostris in versibus ipsis,
Cum quibus & quali sint ordine quæque locata.
Namque eadem cælum, mare, terras, flumina, solem,
Significant, eadem fruges, arbuta, animantes.
Sic ipsis in rebus item jam materiai
Concurfus, motus, ordo, postura, figura,
Cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.*

*L. 2. p. 191.
Lamb.
[Vers. 1012.]*

For were those supposed forms and qualities, produced in generations and alterations, entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its different modifications, in respect of the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts, (there being no such things before in-existing, as *Anaxagoras* supposed;) then would they materially proceed from nothing, which is a thing impossible. And this dissimilar atomology of the ancient Italicks, so far as to these material forms and qualities, seems to be undoubtedly the only true physiology; it being built upon this sure principle of reason, that because nothing can give what it hath not, therefore no new substance or real entity can be materially produced in the generations and alterations of nature as such, but only modifications. As when an architect builds a house, or a weaver makes a piece of cloth, there is only a different modification of the præ-existent matter.

This is the first improvement, which the ancient Italick philosophers made of this principle, that *Nothing can be* (physically and materially) *generated out of nothing*; or that *No real entity is naturally generated or corrupted*; that therefore the forms and qualities of bodies were no real entities, but only different modifications. But besides this, there was also another thing, which these philosophers principally aimed at herein, as a corollary deducible from the same principle concerning souls; that since the souls of animals, especially human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter, and all its modifications; (no magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to beget cogitation or consciousness, much less a power of understanding eternal verities) that therefore these could not be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same. Because forms and qualities are continually generated and corrupted, made out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; therefore are they no entities really distinct from matter, and its different modifications: but because souls, at least human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter, and all its modifications; therefore can they not possibly be generated out of matter,

ter, nor corrupted into the same. For if human souls were generated out of matter, then must some real entity be materially produced out of nothing, there being nothing of life and cogitation in matter; which is a thing absolutely impossible. Wherefore, these philosophers concluded concerning souls, that being not generated out of matter, they were insinuated or introduced into bodies in generations. And this was always a great controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists concerning the human soul, as *Lucretius* expresseth it¹;

Nata fit, an contrà nascentibus insinuetur,

Whether it were made or generated out of matter, (that is, indeed out of nothing) or else were *ἑσθη*, from without, insinuated into bodies in generations? Which latter opinion of theirs supposes souls as well to have existed before the generations of all animals, as to exist after their deaths and corruptions; there being properly nothing of them generated, but only their union with those particular bodies. So that the generations, and corruptions or deaths of animals, according to this hypothesis, are nothing but an anagrammatical transposition of things in the universe, præ and post-existent souls being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another. But it doth not therefore follow, because these ancient philosophers held souls to be thus ingenerable, and to have præ-existed before the generation of animals, that therefore they supposed all souls to have existed of themselves from eternity unmade: this being a thing, which was never asserted any more by Theist than Atheist; since even those philosophick Theists, who maintained *æternitatem animorum*, the eternity of human minds and souls, together with the worlds, did notwithstanding assert their essential dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the sun; as if they were a kind of eternal effulgency, emanation, or irradiation from an eternal sun. Even *Proclus*² himself, that great champion for the eternity of the world and souls in this very case, when he writes against *Plutarch's* self-existent evil soul, expressly declaring, that *πᾶσα ψυχὴ γένηται ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ*, there is no self-existent soul; but every soul whatsoever is the work, effect and production of God. Wherefore, when they affirmed souls to be ingenerable, their meaning was no more than this, that they were not meer accidental things, as forms and qualities are, nor any more generated out of matter, than matter itself is generated out of something else; upon which account, as *Aristotle*³ informs us, souls were called also by them, *ἀρχαί*, principles, as well as matter, they being both of them substances in the universe alike original; that is, neither of them made out of the other. But they did not suppose them to be *ἀγενεταί*, ingenerate or unmade in the other sense, as if they had been self-originated, and independent, as *Plutarch's* second and third principles, his evil soul, and matter, were by him imagined to be; but so doubtless, as that if the world had had any beginning, they should then have been all created together with it out of nothing præ-existing. But as for the perpetual creation of new souls, in the successive generations of animals, this indeed is a

¹ Lib. I. Vers. 114.

² Vide Lib. I. de Animâ Cap. II. p. 59.

³ Comment. in *Timæum* Platon. Lib. II. Tom II. Oper.

thing, which these philosophers were extremely abhorrent from, as thinking it incongruous, that souls, which are in order of nature senior to bodies, should be in order of time juniors to them; as also not reasonable, that divine creation (as it were prostituted) should without end perpetually attend and wait upon natural generations, and be intermingled with them.

But as for this præ-existence of souls, we have already declared our own sense concerning it, in the first chapter. Though we cannot deny, but that, besides *Origen*¹, several others of the ancient fathers before the fifth council, seem either to have espoused it, or at least to have had a favour and kindness for it; insomuch that *St. Austin*² himself is sometimes staggering in this point, and thinks it to be a great secret, whether men's souls existed before their generations or no; and somewhere concludes it to be a matter of indifferency, wherein every one may have his liberty of opining either way without offence. Wherefore, all that can be certainly affirmed in this case is, that human souls could not possibly be generated out of matter, but were some time or other created by God Almighty out of nothing præ-existing, either in generations or before them. Lastly, as for brute animals, we must confess, that if they be not meer machines or *automata*, as some seem inclinable to believe, but conscious and thinking beings; then from the same principle of reason it will likewise follow, that their souls cannot be generated out of matter neither, and therefore must be derived from the fountain of all life, and created out of nothing by him; who since he can as easily annihilate as create, and does all for the best, no man need at all to trouble himself about their permanency, or immortality.

And now have we given a full and particular account of all the several senses, wherein this axiom must be acknowledged to be undeniably true, that *Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing, or come from nothing*; namely, these three. First, That *nothing, which was not, could ever bring itself into being, or efficiently produce itself*; or, that *nothing can possibly be made without an efficient cause*. Secondly, that *nothing, which was not, could be produced, or brought into being by any other efficient cause, than such as hath at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power*. For if any thing were made by that, which hath not equal perfection, then must so much of the effect, as transcendeth the cause, be indeed made without a cause (since nothing can give what it hath not) or be caused by itself, or by nothing. Again, to suppose a thing to be produced by that, which hath no sufficient productive power, is really to suppose it also to be produced from itself without a cause, or from nothing. Where it is acknowledged by us, that no natural, imperfect created being can create, or emanatively produce a new substance, which was not before, and give it its whole being. Hitherto is the axiom verified in respect of the efficient cause. But in the third place, it is also true in respect of the material likewise. Not that *nothing could possibly be ever made by any power whatsoever, but only out of*

¹ Vide Petr. Dan. Huetium in Origenianis Lib. II. Quest. VI. §. IV. p. 93. & §. X. p. 97. ² Vide Hen. Norif. Vindic. Augustin. Cap. IV. p. 102.

pre-existent matter; and consequently, that matter itself could be never made, but was self-existent. For the falsity of this is sufficiently evident from what hath been already declared concerning human souls, their being undoubtedly substances incorporeal, which therefore could never be generated out of matter; and it will be further manifested afterwards. But the third and last sense is this; That *nothing, which is materially made out of things præ-existing* (as some are) *can have any other real entity*, than what was either before contained in, or resulteth from the things themselves so modified. Or, that there can be no new entities or substances naturally generated out of matter; and therefore that all natural generations are really nothing else but mixtures, or new modifications of things præ-existing.

These, I say, are all the senses, wherein it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of nothing, or come from nothing; and they may be all reduced to this one general sense, That *nothing can be made out of nothing causally*; or, that *nothing cannot cause any thing, either efficiently or materially*. Which as it is undeniably true, so is it so far from making any thing against a divine creation, or the existence of a God, that the same may be demonstratively proved, and evinced from it, as shall be shewed afterward.

But there is another sense, wherein things may be said to be made *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, or *out of nothing*, when those words are not taken causally, but only so as to signify the *terminus à quo*, or *term from which* they are made, to wit, an antecedent non-existence. And then the meaning of this proposition, that *Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing*, will be this; that *Nothing, which once was not*, could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being. And this is the sense insisted on in this second atheistical argumentation, framed according to the principles of the Democritick or Epicurean atheism; That no real entity, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be made, or brought out of non-existence into being; and consequently, that no creative power out of nothing can possibly belong to any thing, though supposed never so perfect.

In answer whereunto, we shall perform these two things. First, we shall make it appear, that *Nothing out of nothing*, taken in this sense declared, is so far from being a common notion, that it is not at all true. And secondly, we shall prove, that if it were true, yet would it of the two make more against Atheism, than it doth against Theism, and therefore ought by no means to be used by Atheists, as an argument against a Deity. First, therefore, it is unquestionably certain, that this cannot be universally true, that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made, or brought out of non-existence into being; because, if it were, then could there be no such thing as making or causing at all; no action nor motion, and consequently no generation nor mutation in the corporeal universe, but the whole world would be like a stiff immoveable adamantine rock; and this would doubtless be a better argument against motion, than any of *Zeno's* was. But we have all experience within ourselves of a power of producing

producing new cogitations in our own minds, new intellectual and moral habits, as also new local motion in our bodies, or at least new determinations thereof, and of causing thereby new modifications in bodies without us. And therefore are the Atheists forced to restrain the sense of this proposition to substantial things only, that though there may be new accidents and modifications produced out of nothing, yet there can be no new substances made; however they be not able in the mean time to give any reason, why one of those should be in itself more impossible than the other, or why no substance should be makeable. But that some are so stagger'd with the seeming plausibility of this argument, is chiefly upon these following accounts. First, by reason of the confusion of their own conceptions; for, because it is certain, that *nothing can possibly be made out of nothing*, in one sense, to wit, causally; they not distinguishing senses, nor being aware of the equivocation, that is in this *ἐξ οὐκ οὐθέν*, *out of nothing*, inadvertently give their assent to those words in a wrong sense; that no substance (as matter) could possibly be brought out of non-existence into being. Secondly, by reason of their unskilful arguing from artificial things; when, because nothing can be artificially made, but out of præ-existing matter, as a house or garment, and the like, (there being nothing done in the production of these things, but only a new modification of what before substantially was) they over-hastily conclude, that no power whatsoever could produce any thing otherwise, than out of præ-existing matter, and that matter itself therefore could not possibly be made. In which conceit they are again further confirmed from hence, because the old physiologers maintained the same thing concerning natural generations likewise, that nothing was in them produced *ἐξ οὐκ οὐθέν*, *out of nothing* neither; or that there was no new substance or entity made in them really distinct from the pre-existing matter and its modifications; they unwarily extending this beyond the bounds of physicks into metaphysicks, and unduly measuring, or limiting infinite power accordingly. Lastly, because it is undeniably certain concerning ourselves, and all imperfect created beings, that none of these can create any new substance, which was not before; men are therefore apt to measure all things by their own scantling, and to suppose it universally impossible, according to human reason, for any power whatsoever thus to create; whence it follows, that theology must in this be acknowledged to be contradictory to the principles of natural light and understanding. But since it is certain, that imperfect created beings can themselves produce some things out of nothing præ-existing, as new cogitations, and new local motion, new modifications and transformations of things corporeal; it is very reasonable to think, that an absolutely perfect Being could do something more, that is, create new substances out of nothing, or give them their whole being. And it may well be thought to be as easy for God, or an omnipotent Being, to make a whole world, matter and all, *ἐξ οὐκ οὐθέν*, *out of nothing*, as it is for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays, or a candle light; or lastly, for any opake body to produce the image of itself in glasses or water, or to project a shadow; all these imperfect things being but the

energies,

energies, rays, images, or shadows of the Deity. For a substance, which once was not, to be made by God, or a Being infinitely perfect, this is not for it to be made out of nothing, in the impossible sense, it coming from him, who is all. Nor can it be said to be impossible, for any thing whatsoever to be made by that, which hath not only infinitely greater perfection, but also a sufficient active power to produce the same, it being substantially emanative. It is true indeed, that infinite power itself cannot do things in their own nature impossible; and this is therefore the only thing, which the Atheists have to prove, that it is in itself absolutely impossible, for a substance (though not for an accident or modification) to be produced out of non-existence into being. Whereas nothing is in itself absolutely impossible, but what implies a contradiction; and though it be contradictory for a thing to be, and not be, at the same time; yet is there no manner of contradiction at all in this, for any imperfect contingent Being, which before was not, afterwards to be. Wherefore, this being in itself no way impossible, it must be acknowledged to be a due object of infinite power, or that which may be done by a perfect omnipotent Being existing.

If nothing could be made *ex nihilo*, out of nothing, in this latter sense, that is, *Nothing which before was not*, afterwards brought into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance or real entity can be caused by any other substance, so as to receive and derive its whole being from it: and consequently whatsoever substance or real entity is in the whole world, was not only from eternity without beginning, but also existed of itself necessarily, and independently upon any thing else. But first, it hath been already declared, that it is repugnant to the human faculties, that any temporary successive being whatsoever, or that time itself should be eternal without beginning, because upon that hypothesis there would always have been an infinity of time past; and if so, then would there of necessity have been time past, which was never present. But, to make every substantial thing, not only to have existed from eternity without beginning, (which yet hath been done by some mistaken Theists) but also to have existed independently upon any thing else as its cause, or original, and therefore of itself necessarily; this, I say, is itself to make *Something to come from nothing in the impossible sense*, to wit, causally. For as when some Atheists affirm, that *Nothing could ever move itself*, and yet suppose notwithstanding, that there hath been motion from all eternity, they plainly make this motion (however supposed to be eternal) to come from nothing in the impossible sense: so, in like manner, they, who suppose things to have existed of themselves necessarily, which have no self-existence, and necessary existence contained in their nature, (as nothing but a perfect Being hath) do make this necessary existence of such things to have come from nothing. Wherefore though it be certain, that something did exist of itself necessarily from all eternity, namely, a perfect Being, (whose necessary existence is therefore not from nothing, because essentially included in its own nature) yet is it certain likewise, that there can be but one such thing; necessity of existence being natural

and essential to no more. But as for all other things, which are in their own nature contingently possible to be or not to be, reason pronounces of them, that they could not exist of themselves necessarily, but were caused by something else; and derived their original from that one absolutely perfect, and necessarily existent Being. So that Plato's¹ distinction must needs be here allowed of betwixt two kinds of beings, τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ δι, γένηται δὲ ἐκ ἔχου, *That which always is, and was never made, nor had beginning*; and τὸ γιγνώσκου μὲν οὐ δὲ δόξουσι, *That which was made, or had beginning, but never truly is*; it having not a permanent, but successive or flowing duration. Accordingly whereunto, Aristotle also affirmeth², *That there is no necessity all things should be unmade or self-originated; but some things might be made from others unmade.*

Lastly, we shall disprove the truth of this assertion, that whatsoever substantially and really is, did exist of itself from all eternity unmade, after this manner. Because it would follow from thence, that not only matter, and unqualified atoms, (as the Democritick Atheists suppose) but also souls, especially human, must needs have existed of themselves too, from eternity unmade. For as no man can be so sottish, as to conceive himself, or that which thinketh in him, his own soul or mind, and personality to be no real entity, whilst every clod of earth is such; so is it certain, that mind can never be generated out of dead and senseless matter or body, nor result, as a modification thereof, out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, and therefore must needs be a thing really distinct from it, or substance incorporeal; the Democritick Atheists being here grossly deceived in thinking, that because forms and qualities of bodies may be resolved into those forementioned elements of matter, and consequently concluded to be no entities really distinct from the substance thereof, but only different modifications of the same, that therefore the like may be said of souls too, the rational not excepted. Wherefore, if no substance or real entity could ever be brought out of non-existence into being, or be caused by any thing else, then must all human souls and personalities, as well as matter and atoms, have existed not only from eternity, without beginning, but also of themselves independently upon any other thing. But the Atheists are so abhorrent from this eternity of human souls, that they will by no means admit of their post-existence or immortality; they apprehending, that if any living understanding Being should prove immortal, they could not sufficiently secure themselves against the possibility and danger of a God. Some Theists indeed have asserted *æternitatem animorum*, not only the præ-existence, but also the eternity of all human minds, together with the world, as Cicero more than once doth; who also, in his book of Divination³, thus further declares himself concerning it: *Animus, quia vixit ab omni æternitate, versatusque est cum innumerabilibus animis, omnia, quæ in naturâ rerum sunt, videt: Our mind, because it hath existed from all eternity, and conversed with innumerable minds, sees all things that are in nature: and again, Cum animi hominum semper fuerint futuri que sunt: Since the minds of men ever were, and ever will be.*

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Nevertheless,

¹ Vide Phædon. p. 384, 385. & de Repub. Tom. I. Oper.

Lib. VI. p. 479.

³ Lib. I. Cap. LI. p. 3174. Tom IX.² Vide Lib. II. de Cælo. Cap. II. p. 674. Oper.

Nevertheless, none of these ever maintained, that human minds, and their distinct personalities, were thus all, of themselves, independently upon any thing as their cause or original. And, as it was before demonstrated from the nature of knowledge and understanding, (it comprehending the possibilities of all things, and therefore supposing infinite power) that there can be but one mind, or understanding Being, self-existent, all minds partaking of that one mind; so is it hardly possible for any one in good earnest to entertain such a conceit as this, that his own particular soul, mind, and personality, and consequently all human souls, though subject to such laws of fate as now they are, did not only pre-exist before their respective bodies, and were from eternity without beginning, but also existed of themselves necessarily and independently upon any thing else. Wherefore, if human souls, minds, and personalities, being unquestionably substantial things and really distinct from matter, (which therefore could not possibly be generated out of it) did not all exist from eternity of themselves, necessarily, and independently, it is certain, that they must derive their whole Being from the Deity, or be created *ἐξ ἄκτιστων*, out of nothing, or non-existence by it. And if human souls were unquestionably thus created, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that matter or body itself was created likewise out of nothing, or caused by the Deity: for as much as that, which created one thing out of nothing, could create every thing; and there is really more of substance, that is, a higher degree of entity, in minds and souls, conscious self-moving and understanding Beings, than in senseless matter, or unactive bulk.

But for as much as this doctrine of a divine creation out of nothing præ-existing lies under no small prejudice upon this account, because it is to generally taken for granted, that none of the Pagan Theists, who are supposed to have kept close to the simple light of nature, did ever acknowledge in the Deity any such creative power out of nothing, or that God was the cause of any substance; we must of necessity here declare this, how common soever it be, to be a great mistake. For besides that *Plato*, in his *Sophist*¹, having defined the efficient or effective power in general after this manner; Ποικίλον πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἥτις ἀνὰ αἰτία γίνεσθαι τοῖς μὴ πρότερον ὄντι ὑστερον γίνεσθαι, to be a power or causality, whereby that, which was not before, was afterwards made to be; and then dividing this efficiency into divine and human, he immediately subjoins concerning the former, Ζῶα δὲ πάντα, &c. μὴν ἄλλα τινὸς ἢ θεῶ δημιουργήσῃ φάσομεν ὑστερον γίνεσθαι πρότερον ἂν ὄντα; Shall we not then say, that all animals, and other things, were by the divine efficiency alone, after they had not been made to be? Where thus much at least is certain, that *Plato* did not at all question the possibility of a thing's being made out of nothing in this sense; that is, brought into being, after it had not been by a divine power. But because it may be thought, that he meant this no further, than of the first compages of animals, in which notwithstanding every thing, souls and all, might be made out of præ-existing matter; we sha'll here further add, what in his *Timæus*² he declareth concerning the soul, τὴν ψυχὴν ἐχ' ὡς οὐν ὑστερον ἐπιχειρήσας

¹ Pag. 648. Oper. Edit. Ficini.² Pag. 523. Oper.

ἐπιχειρήματι λέγειν, ὅτις ἐμπαλαιότατο καὶ ὁ θεὸς νεώτερον, ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἔσται πρῶτον ἢ ὑστερον ὑπὸ νεώτερον εἶσται, ὁ δὲ καὶ γενεῖται καὶ ἀεὶ πρῶτον καὶ πρῶτον ψυχὴν σώματι, ὡς δεσπότι καὶ ἀρχαίῳ ἀρχομένῳ συνεπίστατο. *That God did not make it after body, and junior to it; since it was not fit, that the elder should be ruled or governed by the younger; but be made soul before body, older than it, and superiour to it, as well in respect of time as dignity.* Which notion is further pursued by him in his tenth de *Legibus*¹, ὁρθῶς ἀρε καὶ κυρίως ἀληθείας τε καὶ τελειότητας εἰρηκότες αὐτῶν, ψυχὴν μὲν πρότερον γερύουσι σώματι ἡμῶν· σῶμα δὲ δευτέρου τε καὶ ὑστεροῦ ψυχῆς ἀρχαίως ἀρχομένου κατὰ φύσιν. *Wherefore it was rightly, properly, and most truly affirmed by us, that soul was made first, as that which ruleth; but body afterward, as that which is to be ruled and governed thereby.* From whence also he draws this confectary, ὡς εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ φανεῖν πρῶτον σώματι ὅσα καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τῶ σώματι εἴητο πρῶτον· τρεῖς καὶ ἦδη καὶ βελήεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξα ἀληθείας, ἐπιμελείαι τε καὶ μνήμαι, πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, εἰν γερύουσι αὐτῶν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματι. *That if the soul be older than the body, then must the things of the soul also be older than those of the body; and therefore cogitation, and the several species of it, must be, in order of nature, not only before local motion, but also before longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies.* From whence it is plain, that *Plato's* first γενεσίς, or production of souls by God, could not be out of any præ-existing body or matter, they being affirmed by him to be before, not only this and that particular body, but all body whatsoever, before longitude, latitude, and profundity. Which may be further confirmed from hence, because in his *Sophist*² he plainly condemns that opinion of some, τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν ὡμᾶται κεκτῆσθαι, *that the soul itself had something of body in it;* and he often elsewhere declares the soul to be incorporeal. It is certain also, that not only *Plato*, but all those other Pagan philosophers too, who asserted the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, could not possibly conceive souls to have been made out of præ-existent matter, but either ἐξ ἑκ ὄντων, *out of nothing*, they being not eternal, but having a newness of being, (as *Plato* himself seemed to suppose;) or else if they were conceived to be eternal by them, (which was the opinion of most of the junior Platonists, yet) to have derived their whole substance from the Deity, and always to depend upon it; as eternal light would depend upon an eternal sun. *Plutarch*, and his followers, being only here to be excepted, who would neither have souls made out of nothing by God, nor yet out of corporeal matter præ-existing, (they being themselves incorporeal;) but out of a strange commixture of the substance of God himself with the substance of a certain disorderly soul, self-existent and uncreated; of which we have spoken already. But that the genuine Platonists did universally suppose, that one substance might be caused by another, and derive its whole being from it, is undeniably evident from hence, because their second divine hypostasis or substance, (though eternal) was according to them derived from, or begotten by their first, and their third hypostasis or substance produced both from the first and second; and other inferior orbs of being, as the particular souls of dæmons and men, from that whole trinity of divine hypostases

¹ Pag. 669.

² Pag. 170.

of corporeal substance præ-existing. An *idolum specus* (if I may use that language) which in all probability had its first original chiefly from men's measuring the extent of all power by their own production of artificial things. Because forsooth, a carpenter or architect cannot make a house, but out of præ-existing timber, bricks, and stones; nor a taylor a garment, but out of præ-existing cloth; nor a cook, puddings or pyes, but out of præ-existing materials or ingredients; that therefore no power whatsoever, no not that of God Almighty, can extend any further, than to the new-modifying of præ-existent matter, but not to the production or causing of any substance. We shall in the next place make it appear, that were this assertion true, That no substance or real entity, which once was not, could be caused or produced, yet would it notwithstanding, of the two, more impugn atheism, than theism (it being possible for falsehoods, though not for truths, to disagree) sofar as the Atheists do bring more out of nothing, or non-existence, than the Theists do; and therefore ought not to make this an objection against theism. For though, according to the true and genuine theology, God, or a perfect Being, be supposed to be the only necessary self-existent thing, and the cause of all other substance, and consequently to have produced all imperfect things, not only souls, but also matter itself, *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, out of nothing, or an antecedent non-existence; yet is there, by reason of the weakness of human understandings, a latitude in theism. Wherefore some there are, who though imposed upon by that *idolum specus*, or imprisoned in it, That *nothing can possibly be made, but out of præ-existing matter*, by the new modification thereof; do notwithstanding devoutly worship a Deity, according to their notion of it, a perfectly understanding Being unmade; though not the creator of matter, yet the maker of the whole world out of it, and the supreme governour of the same; they thus supposing two principles in the universe, an active and a passive one, God and Matter. Besides which, it is not impossible for others to think, that though matter or body be not the only substance, but human souls are incorporeal, yet the substance of these souls was not created out of nothing, no more than that of body, but they were made either out of some præ-existing common soul, (as their intelligible matter) or out of the substance of the Deity itself; or else existed of themselves from eternity unmade: and yet nevertheless may these acknowledge one supreme understanding Being self-existent also, though neither the creator of matter, nor of souls, yet the supreme governour and orderer of all. And it is certain, that *Plutarch's* God was no better than this; and yet was that Pagan, notwithstanding, a devout religionist in his kind, as well as a hearty moralist. And such a theism or theology, as either of those fore-mentioned, (though not genuine and sincere, but imperfect and mongrel things) would perhaps be to the Atheists little less troublesome and uneasy, than the true. Thus have we shewed, that this principle, *That nothing can come out of nothing*, or be made, otherwise than out of præ-existing substance or matter, though it be indeed contradictory to the true and genuine theology, yet is it not absolutely inconsistent with all manner of religion; there being certain spurious, or imperfect forms of theism built upon this foundation. But now, on

the contrary, we shall make it manifest, that this very principle, made use of by the Atheists, is in truth and reality contradictory to all manner of atheism, and destructive of the same; the Atheists universally generating and corrupting real entities, and substantial things, that is, producing them out of nothing, or non-existence, and reducing them to nothing again: forasmuch as they make all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted, (which to them is either no determinate thing, or else nothing but mere bulk, or resisting and divisible magnitude) to come out of nothing, and to go to nothing. Thus does *Aristotle*, in a place before cited, declare the atheistical sence, εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες, οἱ φασιν εἶναι ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι. *There are certain men, who affirm, that nothing is unmade, but all things generated or made.* Whose sence is afterwards more distinctly thus proposed by him, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα γίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, εἷναι δὲ παρῶς εἶναι ἐν δὲ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ ἧ ταῦτα πάντα μεταχρηματίζεσθαι πέφικεν. *That all other things are generated and flow, and none of them firmly is, (they being perpetually educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing) but that there is only one thing, which remaineth; namely that, out of which all the other are made, by the transformation thereof.* Which one thing (to wit, matter) as the same *Aristotle* further adds, they affirmed to be the only substance, and from eternity unmade; but all other things whatsoever, being but πάθη καὶ ἔξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, *passions, affections, and dispositions* thereof, γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀπειράκις, *to be generated and corrupted infinitely*; that is, to be produced out of nothing, or non-existence, and reduced again to nothing without end. And doubtless, this is the true meaning of that passage in *Plato's* tenth *De Legibus* 2, not understood by the Latin interpreters; where being to represent the atheistical hypothesis of the system of the universe, he discovereth their grand arcanum, and that, which they accounted, σοφώτατον ἀπάντων λόγων, *the wisest and most mysterious of all doctrines*, after this manner; λέγουσι περὶ τινὲς ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ γενόμενα, καὶ γενεόμενα: τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχης. *Certain men affirm, that all things are made, and have been made, and will be made; some by nature, and some by art, and some by fortune or chance.* For unquestionably here, *Plato's* λέγουσι περὶ τινὲς ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα, *Certain men affirm, that all things are generated or made, &c.* is the very same with *Aristotle's* εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες, οἱ φασιν, εἶναι ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι, *Certain men affirm, that there is nothing unmade, but that all things are made or generated.* And perhaps this of *Aristotle's* was taken out of that of *Plato's*: which yet nevertheless is so to be understood, as it is afterwards explained by *Aristotle*; all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted. Wherefore it is certain, that either there is no real entity in the whole world, besides the bare substance of matter; that is, besides divisible and separable extension, or resisting magnitude, and consequently that life and cogitation, sense and consciousness, reason and understanding, all our own minds, and personalities, are no real entities; or else, that there are, according to the atheistical hypothesis, real entities produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Whereas

Theists

Theists suppose all the greatest perfections in the universe, as life and understanding, to have been eternal and unmade in a perfect Being, the Deity, and neither brought out of nothing or non-existence, nor reducible to nothing; only imperfect beings to have been made out of nothing, or produced out of non-existence, by this one perfect Being or Deity: the Atheists, on the contrary, supposing the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, matter, bulk, or divisible and resisting extension, to be the only self-existent and unmade thing, conclude all the greatest perfections in the universe, life, cogitation, and understanding, to be made out of nothing, or non-existence, as also to be reduced to nothing again. Indeed the hylozoick Atheists, being sensible somewhat of this inconvenience of making all life and understanding out of nothing, and that there must of necessity be some fundamental life and perception, which is not accidental but substantial, and which was never generated, and cannot be corrupted, have therefore attributed a kind of life and perception to all matter as such. Notwithstanding which, even these also, for as much as they deny to matter animal sense, and consciousness, suppose all animal life or sense, and conscious understanding, to be generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Neither can life, cogitation, and understanding, be reckoned amongst the modes of matter, that is, of magnitude, or divisible and antitypous extension, since they may be conceived without the same; whereas modes cannot be conceived without their substance. Standing, sitting, and walking, cannot be conceived without a body, and that body organized too; and therefore are they nothing but different modes of such a body. When that human body, which before did stand, doth afterwards sit, or walk, no man can think, that here is the miraculous production of any new real entity out of nothing; nor when the same matter, which was square or cubical, is made spherical or cylindrical. But when there is life and understanding, which was not before, then is there unquestionably a new real entity produced. But the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists themselves, according to the tenour of the atomick physiology, acknowledge no other modes of matter or body, but only more or less magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. And upon this very account do they explode qualities, considered as entities really distinct from these modes; because, in the generation and alteration of them, there would be real entities made out of nothing, or without a cause; whereupon they resolve these qualities into mechanism and fancy. But life, cogitation, and understanding, are things, which have more real entity in them, and can no way be solved by mechanism and phancy; wherefore undoubtedly they are no modes of matter or body, but attributes of another kind of substance incorporeal. All cogitative beings, especially human souls, and personalities, are unquestionably substantial things; and yet do the Atheists bring these, and consequently themselves out of nothing, or non-existence, and reduce them to nothing again. The conclusion is, that these very Atheists, who contend against Theists, that *Nothing can be made out of nothing*, do themselves bring all things out of nothing or non-existence, and perpetually reduce them to nothing again; according to whose principles, as once there was

no life nor understanding at all in the universe, so may there be none again. They who deny a God, because there can be no creative power belonging to any thing, do themselves notwithstanding attribute to matter (though a meer passive, sluggish, and unactive thing) a creative power of things substantial (as human souls and personalities) out of nothing. And thus is that formidable argument of the Atheists, that there can be no God, because nothing can be made out of nothing, not only proved to be false, but also retorted upon these Atheists themselves, they bringing all things besides senseless and unqualified matter out of nothing.

We have now declared, first, in what sense this proposition is unquestionably true, that nothing, can be made out of nothing, or come from nothing, *viz.* causally, that nothing, which before was not, could afterward be made without a cause, and a sufficient cause. Or more particularly these three ways; first, that nothing, which before was not, could afterward be brought into being by itself, or without an efficient cause. Secondly, that nothing, which once was not, could be made or produced efficiently by any thing, which had not at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power; and consequently that no new substance can be made, but by a perfect Being, which only is substantially emanative. Thirdly and lastly, that when things are made out of præ-existing matter, as in artificial productions, and natural generations, there can be no new real entity produced, but only different modifications of what before substantially was; the material cause, as such, efficiently producing nothing. And thus was this axiom understood by *Cicero*, that *Nothing could be made out of nothing*, *viz.* causally, in his book *de Fato*, where he reprehendeth *Epicurus* for endeavouring to avoid fate, and to establish liberty of will by that absurd figment of atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular. *Nec cum hæc ita sint, est causa, cur Epicurus situm extimecat, & ab atomis petat presidium, eoque de via declinat; & uno tempore suscipiat res duas inenodabiles, unam, ut sine causâ fiat aliquid, ex quo existet, ut æ nihilo quippiam fiat; quod nec ipsi, nec cuiquam physico placeat.* Nor is there for all that any reason, why *Epicurus* should be so much afraid of fate, and seek refuge in atoms, he supposing them, in their infinite descents, to decline uncertainly from the perpendicular. and laying this as a foundation for liberty of will; whereby he plunged himself at once into two inextricable difficulties, the first whereof was the supposing of something to be made without a cause, or, which is all one, out of nothing; a thing, that will neither be allowed by any philosopher, nor could *Epicurus* himself be pleased or satisfied therewith. The reason whereof is, because it was a fundamental principle of the atomick philosophy, that *Nothing* (in this sense) could be made out of nothing. Moreover, we have in the next place declared, in what other sense this proposition, that *Nothing can be made out of nothing*, is false, namely, when this *out of nothing* is not taken causally, but so as to signify the *terminus* from which; that nothing can be made out of an antecedent non-existence: that no real entity or substance, which before was not, could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being: or, that nothing

thing can possibly be made, but out of something præ-existing, by the new modification thereof. And it appears from that of Cicero, that the true and genuine sense of this proposition, *De nihilo nihil fit*, (according to the mind of those ancient physiologers, who laid so great stress thereupon) was nor, that nothing could by any power whatsoever be brought out of non-existence into being; but only, that *nothing could be made without a cause*. Nor did they here by *cause* mean the material only, in this sense, as if nothing could possibly be made, but out of præ-existing matter; Epicurus being taxed by Cicero for introducing that his third motion of atoms, or *clinamen principiorum*¹, out of nothing, or without an efficient cause; as indeed all motion also was, to those atomick Atheists, in this sense, from nothing. Nevertheless, we have also shewed, that if this proposition, *Nothing out of nothing*, in that atheistical sense, (as levelld against a Deity) were true; yet would it of the two more impugn atheism itself, than it does theism; the Atheists generating and corrupting all things, the substance of matter only excepted, all life, sense and understanding, human souls, minds and personalities, they producing these, and consequently themselves, out of nothing, and resolving them all to nothing again. We shall now, in the third and last place, make it manifest, that the Atheists do not only bring real entities, and substantial things, out of nothing in the second sense, that is, out of an antecedent non-existence, (which yet is a thing possible only to God, or a perfect Being) but also that they bring them out of nothing in the absolutely impossible sense; that is, suppose them to be made without a cause, or *nothing to be the cause of something*.

But we must prepare the way hereunto, by setting down, First, a brief and compendious sum of the whole atheistical hypothesis. The Atheists therefore, who contend, that nothing can be made, but only new accidents, or modifications of præ-existing substance; taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do conclude accordingly, that nothing can be made, but out of præ-existing matter or body. And then they add hereunto, that matter being the only substance, the only unmade self-existent thing, whatsoever else is in the world, besides the bare substance of this matter, was made out of it, or produced by it. So that there are these three things contained in the atheistical hypothesis; First, that no substance can be made or caused by any thing else, but only new modifications. Secondly, that matter or body is the only substance; and therefore whatsoever is made, is made out of præ-existing matter. Thirdly and lastly, that whatsoever there is else in the whole world, besides the substance of matter, it is made or generated out of matter. And now we shall demonstrate the absolute impossibility of this atheistical hypothesis, from that very principle of the ancient physiologers, that *Nothing can be made out of nothing*, in the true sense thereof; it not only bringing real entities, and substantial things, out of an antecedent non-existence, (though nothing but an infinitely perfect Being neither can thus create) but also producing them without a cause.

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First

¹ Vide Lucret. Lib. II. Vers. 292.

First, therefore, when they affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things else whatsoever to be made out of that alone, they hereby plainly suppose all things to be made without an efficient cause, which is to bring them out of nothing, in an impossible sense. For though it be not true, that nothing can be made, but out of præ-existing matter (and consequently that God himself, supposed to exist, could in this respect do no more, than a carpenter or taylor doth;) I say, though it be not universally true, that every thing, that is made, must have a material cause, (so that the quaternio of causes in logick is not to be extended to all things caused whatsoever;) yet is it certain, that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore, if there be any thing made, which was not before, there must of necessity, besides matter, be some other substance existing, as the efficient cause thereof; forasmuch as matter alone could not make any thing; as marble cannot make a statue, nor timber and stones a house, nor cloth a garment. This is our first demonstration of the impossibility of the atheistical hypothesis; it supposing all things, besides the bare substance of matter, to be made out of matter alone, without any other active principle or deity, or to be made without an efficient cause; which is to bring them from nothing, in an impossible sense. To which may be added, by way of appendix, that whereas the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists admit of no other efficient causality in nature, than only local motion, and allow to matter or body, their only substance, no self-moving power, they hereby make all the motion, that is in the whole world, to be without a cause, and from nothing; action without any subject or agent, and the efficiency of all things without an efficient.

In the next place, should we be so liberal, as to grant to the atomick Atheists motion without a cause, or permit *Strato* and the hylozoick Atheists to attribute to matter a self-moving power; yet do we affirm, that this matter and motion both together could not possibly produce any new real entity, which was not before; matter, as such, essentially causing nothing, and motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site, and disposition of parts. Wherefore, if matter, as such, have no animal sense and conscious understanding, essentially belonging to it, (which no Atheists as yet have had the impudence to assert;) then can no motion or modification of matter, no contexture of atoms, possibly beget sense and understanding, soul and mind; because this would be to bring something out of nothing, in the impossible sense, or to suppose something to be made by itself without a cause. Which may serve also for a confutation of those imperfect and spurious Theists, who will not allow to God Almighty (whether supposed by them to be corporeal or incorporeal) a power of making any thing, but only out of præ-existent matter, by the new-modifying thereof; as a carpenter makes a house out of præ-existing timber and stone, and a taylor a garment out of præ-existing cloth. For since animal life and understanding are not by them supposed to belong at all to matter as such; and since they

they cannot result from any modifications, or contextures thereof, it would plainly follow from hence, that God could not possibly make animals, or produce sense and understanding, souls and minds, which nevertheless these Theists suppose him to have done; and therefore ought in reason to acknowledge him, not only to be the maker of new modifications of matter, (and one, who built the world only as a carpenter doth a house) but also of real entities distinct from the same.

And this was the very doctrine (as we have already declared) of the most ancient atomick physiologers; not that *every thing whatsoever might be made out of præ-existing matter*; but, on the contrary, that in all natural generations there is no real entity produced out of the matter, which was not before in it, but only new modifications; and consequently, that souls and minds, being not meer modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, could never be produced out of it, because they must then of necessity come from nothing; that is, be made either by themselves without a cause, or without a sufficient cause. It hath also been before noted out of *Aristotle*, how the old atheistical materialists, being assaulted by those Italick philosophers after that manner, that nothing, which was not before in matter, besides its modifications, could possibly be produced out of it, because nothing can come out of nothing, and consequently, that in all natural generations and corruptions, there is no real entity made or destroyed; endeavoured, without denying the words of that proposition, to evade after this manner; *διὰ τούτο οὐτε γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν οἴομαι, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως αἰὲν σωζομένης, ὡς περὶ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην, &c.* *That there is indeed nothing generated or corrupted, (in some sense,) soasmuch as the same substance of matter always remains, it being never made nor destroyed. For, as men do not say, that Socrates is made, when he is made musical or handsome; nor destroyed, when he loseth these dispositions, because the subject Socrates was before, and still remaineth; so neither is any substantial thing, or real entity in the world, made or destroyed in this sense; because matter, which is the substance of all, perpetually remains; and all other things whatsoever are but πάθη ἢ ἕξεις ἢ διασείσεις, passions and affections, and dispositions thereof, as musicalness and unmusicalness, in respect of Socrates. Which is all one, as if they should say, that all things whatsoever, besides matter, being but accidents thereof, are generated out of it, and corruptible into it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing, or the reduction of any into nothing, so long as the substance of matter, which is the only real entity, remains always the same. Wherefore, though life, sense, and understanding, all souls and minds, be generated out of matter; yet does it not follow from thence, that therefore there is any real entity made or produced, because these are nothing but accidents, and modifications of matter. This was the subtlety of the old hylopathian Atheists.*

Now it is true indeed, that whatsoever is in the universe, is either substance, or accidents; and that the accidents of any substance may be

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generated

* Vide Aristot. Metaphys. Lib. I. Cap. III. p. 264. Tom. IV. Oper.

generated and corrupted, without the producing of any real entity out of nothing, and reducing of any into nothing; for as much as the substance still remains entirely the same. But the Atheists taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do therefore falsely suppose that, which is really incorporeal substance, or else the attributes, properties, and modes thereof, to be the meer accidents of matter, and consequently conclude these to be generable out of it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing. We say therefore, that it does not at all follow, because the same numerical matter, (as for example, a piece of wax) may be successively made spherical, cubical, cylindrical, pyramidal, or of any other figure; and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel, and walk; both without the production of any thing out of nothing; or because a heap of stones, bricks, mortar, and timber lying all together disorderly and confusedly, may be made into a stately palace, and that without the miraculous creation of any real entity out of nothing; that therefore the same may be affirmed likewise of every thing else, besides the bare substance of matter, as namely, life and understanding, soul and mind, that though there be no such thing in matter itself, yet the production of them out of matter would be no production, of something out of nothing. One ground of which mistake hath been from men's not rightly considering, what the accidents of a substance are, and that they are indeed nothing but the modes thereof. Now, a mode is such a thing, as cannot possibly be conceived, without that, whereof it is a mode; as standing, sitting, kneeling, and walking, cannot be conceived, without a body organized, and therefore are but modes thereof; but life and cogitation may be clearly apprehended without body, or any thing of extension: nor indeed can a thought be conceived to be of such a length, breadth, and thickness, or to be hewed and sliced out into many pieces, all which laid together, as so many small chips thereof, would make up again the entireness of that whole thought. From whence it ought to be concluded, that cogitation is no accident, or mode of matter, or bulky extension, but a mode or attribute of another substance, really distinct from matter, or incorporeal. There is indeed nothing else clearly conceivable by us in body or bulky extension, but only more or less magnitude of parts, figures, site, motion, or rest; and all the different bodies, that are in the whole world, are but several combinations or syllables, made up out of these few letters: but no magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, can possibly spell or compound life and sense, cogitation and understanding, as the syllables thereof; and therefore to suppose these to be generated out of matter, is plainly to suppose some real entity to be brought out of nothing, or something to be made without a cause; which is impossible.

But that, which hath principally confirmed men in this error, is the business of sensible qualities and forms, as they are vulgarly conceived to be distinct entities, from those forementioned modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. For since these qualities and forms are unquestionably generated

nerated and corrupted, there seems to be no reason, why the same might not be as well acknowledged of life, sense, cogitation, and understanding, that these are but qualities or accidents of matter also, (though of another kind) and consequently may be generated out of it, without the making of any real thing out of nothing. But the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists themselves have, from the principles of the atomick philosophy, sufficiently confuted and rectified this mistake concerning sensible qualities; they exploding and banishing them all, as conceived to be entities really distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, and that for this very reason, because the generation of them would, upon this supposition, be the production of something out of nothing, or without a cause; and concluding them therefore to be really nothing else but mechanism, or different modifications of matter, in respect of the magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; they only causing different fancies and apparitions in us. And in very truth, this vulgar opinion of real qualities of bodies seems to have no other original at all, than men's mistaking their own phancies, passions, and affections, for things really existing in the objects without them. For as sensible qualities are conceived to be things distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, so are they really nothing but our own phancies, passions, and affections; and consequently no accidents or modifications of matter, but accidents and modifications of our own souls, which are substances incorporeal. Now if these Democritick and Epicurean Atheists themselves concluded, that real qualities, considered as distinct from the modifications of matter, could not possibly be generated out of it, because this would be the production of something out of nothing; they ought certainly much more to have acknowledged the same, concerning life and cogitation, sense and understanding, that the generation of these out of senseless matter would be an impossible production of something out of nothing; and consequently, that these are therefore no corporeal things, but the attributes, properties, or modes of substance incorporeal; since they can no way be resolved into mechanism and phancy, or the modifications of matter, as the vulgar sensible qualities may, and ought to be. For though the Democriticks and Epicureans did indeed suppose all human cogitations to be caused or produced by the incurfion of corporeal atoms upon the thinker; yet did never any of them arrive to such a degree, either of fortifness or impudence, as a modern writer² hath done, to maintain, that cogitation, intellection, and volition, are themselves really nothing else but local motion or mechanism, in the inward parts of the brain and heart; or that *mens nihil aliud præterquam motus in partibus quibusdam corporis organici, that mind itself is nothing but motion in some parts of the organized body*; who therefore, as if *Cartesius* had not been sufficiently paradoxical, in making brute animals, (though supposed by him to be devoid of all cogitation) nothing but meer machines, and not contented herewith, hath advanced much further, in making this prodigious conclusion, that all cogitative beings, and men themselves, are really nothing else but machines and automata; whereas he might as well have affirmed heaven to be earth, colour

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² Hobbes, Vide Physic. Cap. XXV. & Leviathan, Part I. Cap. I. & II.

to be found, number to be figure, or any thing else in the world to be any thing, as cogitation and local motion to be the very self-same thing. Nevertheless, so strong was the atheistical intoxication in those old Democriticks and Epicureans, that though denying real qualities of bodies, for this very reason, because *Nothing could be produced out of nothing*, they notwithstanding contradicting themselves, would make sense, life, and understanding, to be qualities of matter, and therefore generable out of it; and so unquestionably produced real entities out of nothing, or without a cause.

Moreover, it is observable, that *Epicurus* having a mind to assert contingent liberty in men, in way of opposition to that necessity of all human actions, which had been before maintained by *Democritus*, and his followers, plainly acknowledges, that he could not possibly do this, according to the grounds of his own philosophy, without supposing something of contingency, in the first principles, that is, in the motion of those atoms, out of which men and other animals are made:

L. 2. p. 134.
Lamb.
[Verf. 251.]

— *Si semper motus connectitur omnis,
Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine motus,
Nec declinando faciunt primordia motus
Principium quoddam, quod fati fœdera rumpat,
Ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur;
Liberâ per terras unde hæc animantibus extat,
Unde est hæc, inquam, fati avolsa voluntas?*

The reason for which is afterwards thus expressed by him, *Quoniam de nihilo nil fit*, because *Nothing can be made out of nothing*. Upon which account he therefore ridiculously feigned, besides his two other motions of atoms from *pondus* and *plage*, *weight* and *strokes*, a third motion of them, which he calls *clinamen principiorum*, a *contingent* and *uncertain declination*, every way from the perpendicular; out of design to solve this phænomenon of free-will in men, without bringing something out of nothing, according as he thus subjoineth,

† *Quare in seminibus quoque idem fateare necesse est,
Esse aliam præter plagas & pondera causam
Motibus, unde hæc est nobis innata potestas;
De NIHILO quoniam FIERI NIL posse videmus.
Pondus enim prohibet, ne plagis omnia fiant
Externa quasi vi. Sed ne mens ipsa necessum
Inestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis,
Et deviata quasi cogatur ferre patique,
Id facit exiguum CLINAMEN PRINCIPIORUM,
Nec ratione loci certa, nec tempore certo.*

Now if *Epicurus* himself conceived, that liberty of will could not possibly be generated, in men out of matter or atoms, they having no such thing at all

† Lucet. Lib. II. verf. 283.

all in them, (that is, no contingent uncertainty in their motion) without bringing of *something out of nothing*; which was contrary to the fundamental principles of the atomick philosophy, (though this were intolerably absurd in him, thus to suppose contingency, and a kind of free-will in the motions of senseless atoms, so that indeed he brought his liberty of will out of nothing;) certainly sense and understanding, soul and mind in animals and men, could not possibly be generated out of atoms or matter, devoid of all sense and understanding; for the very same reason, *Quoniam de nihilo nil fit, Because nothing can be made out of nothing.* For unquestionably, were all life and understanding, all souls and minds generated out of dead and senseless matter; and were there no substantial or essential life and understanding in the whole universe; then must it of necessity be all made out of nothing, or without a cause, and consequently real entities and substantial things be made out of nothing, which is absolutely impossible. For though we do not say, that life and cogitation, sense and understanding, abstractly considered, are substances; yet do we affirm them to be entities really distinct from matter, and no modifications or accidents thereof, but either accidents and modifications, or rather essential attributes of substance incorporeal; as also that souls and minds, which are the subjects of them, are indeed substantial things. Wherefore, we cannot but here again condemn the darkness of that philosophy, which educes not only species visible and audible, (entities perfectly unintelligible) and real qualities, distinct from all the modes of body, and even substantial forms too, (as they call them) but also sensitive souls themselves, both in men and brutes, *ex potentia materie, out of the power of the matter*; that is, indeed out of nothing. For as much as this prepares a direct way to atheism; because, if life and sense, cogitation and consciousness, may be generated out of dead and senseless matter, then might this well be supposed the first original of all things; nor could there reasonably be any stop made at rational souls, especially by these men, who also conclude them to be *rasæ tabula, meer white sheets of paper*, that have nothing at all in them, but what is scribbled upon them by corporeal objects from without; there being nothing in the understanding or mind of man, which was not before in sense: so that sense is the first original knowledge, and understanding but a secondary and derivative thing from it, more umbratile and evanid.

Hitherto have we demonstrated that all things whatsoever could not possibly be made out of matter, and particularly that life and sense, mind and understanding, being no accidents or modes of matter, could not by motion be generated out of it, without the production of real entities out of nothing. But because some may possibly imagine, that matter might otherwise than thus by motion, by a miraculous efficiency, produce souls and minds, we shall add in the last place, that nothing can efficiently produce any real entity or substantial thing, that was not before, unless it have at least equal perfection to it, and a substantially emanative or creative power. But scarcely any man can be so foolish, as to imagine, that every atom of dust hath equal perfection in it to that of the rational soul in man, or to at-

tribute a creative power to all matter, (which is but a passive thing) whilst this is in the mean time denied by him to a perfect Being; both these assertions also, in like manner as the former, producing real entities out of nothing causally. And thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and non-sense of all atheism, from this very principle, by which the Atheists would assault theism, in the true sense thereof, that *Nothing can be made without a cause*, or that *Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing*.

Now, if there be no middle betwixt atheism and theism, and all things must of necessity either spring from senseless matter, or else from a perfect understanding Being; then is this demonstration of the impossibility of atheism a sufficient establishment of the truth of theism; it being such a demonstration of a God, as the geometricians call a deduction *ad impossibile*, which they allow of for good, and frequently make use of. Thus, either there is a God; or else matter must needs be acknowledged to be the only self-existent thing, and all things else whatsoever, to be made out of it; but it is impossible, that all things should be made out of senseless matter: therefore is there a God. Nevertheless, we shall here, for further satisfaction, show how the existence of a God may be directly demonstrated also from this very principle, which the Atheists endeavour to take sanctuary in, and from thence to impugn theism, *De nihilo nihil*, that *Nothing can be made out of nothing causally*, or that *Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing*.

In the first place therefore, we shall fetch our beginning from what hath been already often declared, that it is mathematically certain, that *Something or other did exist of itself from all eternity, or without beginning and unmade by any thing else*. The certainty of which proposition dependeth upon this very principle, as its foundation, that *Nothing can come from nothing*, or be made out of nothing, or that *Nothing, which once was not, can of itself come into being without a cause*; it following unavoidably from thence, that if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. And having thus laid the foundation, we shall in the next place make this further superstructure, that because something did certainly exist of itself from eternity unmade, therefore is there also actually a necessarily existent Being. For to suppose, that any thing did exist of itself from eternity, by its own free-will and choice, and therefore not necessarily, but contingently, since it might have willed otherwise; this is to suppose it to have existed before it was, and so positively to have been the cause of itself; which is impossible, as hath been already declared. When a thing therefore is said to be of itself, or the cause of itself, this is to be understood no otherwise, than either in a negative sense, as having nothing else for its cause; or because its necessary eternal existence is essential to the perfection of its own nature. That therefore, which existed of itself from eternity, independently upon any thing else, did not so exist contingently, but necessarily; so that there is undoubtedly something actually in being, whose existence is, and always was necessary. In the next place,

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it is certain also, that nothing could exist necessarily of it self, but what included necessity of existence in its own nature. For to suppose any thing to exist of it self necessarily, which hath no necessity of existence in its own nature, is plainly to suppose that necessary existence of it to come from nothing, since it could neither proceed from that thing it self, nor yet from any thing else. Lastly, there is nothing, which includes necessity of existence in its very nature and essence, but only an absolutely perfect being. The result of all which is, that God, or a perfect Being, doth certainly exist; and that there is nothing else, which existed of it self from eternity, necessarily and independently; but all other things whatsoever derived their being from him, or were caused by him, matter or body it self not excepted.

That which hath staggered some Theists here, and made them so inclinable and prone to believe, that matter also existed from eternity unmade, is partly (as hath been already intimated) an idiotical conceit, that because nothing can be artificially made by men, otherwise than out of pre-existing matter, as houses and garments, puddings and pies; and therefore there could be no other making of any thing, by any power whatsoever: though even men themselves can produce something out of no pre-existent matter, as cogitations and local motion. And the same partly proceedeth also from certain false opinions entertained concerning matter. For some Theists have supposed ἕλην ἀσώματον, an *incorporeal first matter*; out of which incorporeal matter, together with an incorporeal form joined to it, they conceived the essence of body to have been compounded, and made up. And no wonder, if these same fanciful philosophers have further added also hereunto, that from this incorporeal matter, by an incorporeal form, were begotten likewise incorporeal qualities of body. Now it is not conceivable, what else should be meant by this incorporeal *Hyle*, or matter, but only a metaphysical notion of the potentiality, or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity; which, because it is indeed eternal, and as much unmade as God himself is, it being nothing but the divine power considered passively, or the reverse of it; therefore, in all probability, were these philosophers so prone to think the physical matter of this corporeal universe to have been eternal and unmade. Neither was this incorporeal *Hyle*, or matter, a novel opinion, entertained only by some junior Platonists, but older than *Aristotle* himself, as appeareth plainly from these following words of his in his *Metaphysics*, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕλην τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγουσι, ἕαντε σῶμα, ἕαντε ἀσώματον τιθῶσιν, *Some speak of the principle as matter; whether they suppose this matter to be body, or to be incorporeal.* But this incorporeal matter in physiology can be accounted no better than a kind of metaphysical nonsense. Again, others seem to have been the more prone to think matter or body to have been self-existent and unmade, because they both conceived it to be really the same thing with space, and also took it for granted, that space was infinite and eternal, and consequently necessarily existent. In answer whereunto, we reply first, that though space and distance should be granted to be positively infinite, or to have

L. 1. c. 6.
[P. 273. Tom.
IV. Oper.]

Thus Porphy.
Τῆς ἕλης τῆς
ἰδία κατὰ τὴν
ἀρχαίης τῆς
ἀσώματαις, &c.
Materia Pre-
cipietates, secun-
dum Veteres, hæ-
sunt; Quod sit
Incorporea, &c.
[In Sentent. ad
Intelligibilia du-
cent bus. XXXI.
p. 220. Ed.
no Cantab.]

no bounds nor limits at all, as also to have been eternal; yet, according to the opinion of some, would it not follow from thence, that matter was infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent; not as if space or distance could exist alone by it self, an accident without a substance, it being plainly impossible, that nothing should have any accidents, modifications and attributes, or be mensurable by yards and poles; but because this space is by them supposed, not to be the extension of body, but the infinite and unbounded extension of the Deity. But, in the next place, if space be concluded to be certainly nothing else but the extension and distance of body, or matter, considered in general, (without respect to this or that particular body) and abstractly in order to the conception of motion, and the mensuration of things; (for space thus considered, is necessarily immovable, as to the parts thereof respectively; as the two extremes of a yard distance can never possibly come nearer to one another :) then do we say, that there appeareth no sufficient ground for this positive infinity of space, we being certain of no more than this, that be the world, or any figurative body, never so great, it is not impossible, but that it might be still greater and greater, without end. Which indefinite increasableness of body and space seems to be mistaken for a positive infinity thereof. Whereas, for this very reason, because it can never be so great; but that more magnitude may still be added to it, therefore can it never be positively infinite. Nor is there perhaps so great an absurdity in this, that another world could not possibly be made a mile distant from this, for as much as there being nothing between them, they must needs touch; or that this finite world could have no mountains and valleys in the exterior surface of it, since it might be either spherical, cubical or cylindrical, or of any other regular figure, whatsoever the maker pleased to form it in. To conclude therefore, by space without the finite world, is to be understood nothing but the possibility of body, further and further, without end, yet so as never to reach to infinity; and such a space as this was there also, before this world was created, a possibility of so much body to be produced. But space and actual distance, as really measurable by yards and poles, though it may be greater and greater without end, yet can it not be positively infinite, so as that there could be no more added to it; and therefore there can be no argument from hence, to prove the necessary existence of matter.

Moreover, the existence of a Deity might be further demonstrated from this common notion, That nothing can come from nothing casually; because, if there were no God, as we could not have had any idea of him, or a perfect Being, since it must have come from nothing, and have been the idea or conception of nothing; so neither could there have been indeed any knowledge or understanding at all. For singular bodies existing without us cannot enter into us, and put understanding in us; nor is there any thing but local motions propagated from them to our organs of sense. The Mind must have its immediate Intelligibles within it self, for otherwise it could not possibly understand any thing; which Intelligibles and their relations to one another, or Verities, are (as was said before) eternal. Moreover, the mind

Mind can frame ideas or conceptions, not only of things actually existing, but also of all possibilities; which plainly implies and supposes the actual existence of a Being infinitely powerful, that could produce them. So that the proper object of Mind and Understanding is a perfect Being, and all the extent of its power; which perfect Being, comprehending it self and the extent of its own power, or the possibilities of all things, is the first original Mind, of which all other minds partake. Wherefore, were there no perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending it self, and its own power, or all the possibilities of things; the intelligible objects of the mind and ideas must have come from nothing.

However, it hath been already proved from this principle, *Nothing from nothing*, that the powers of sense and understanding, or the entities of soul and mind, could never have resulted from any modifications of senseless matter whatsoever. Wherefore, since it is mathematically certain, that our human souls and persons could not possibly have been generated out of matter, one of these two things will undeniably follow; That either they must all have existed of themselves, from eternity unmade; or else have been created *ἐκ τῆς οὐκ ὄντων*, out of an antecedent non-existence, by a perfect understanding Being unmade, or at least have derived their whole substance from it. So that it is altogether as certain, that there is a God, as that our human souls and persons did not all exist from eternity of themselves. And that there must be some eternal, unmade Mind, hath been already demonstrated also from the same principle, *Nothing out of nothing*. Thus, have we abundantly confuted the second atheistical argumentation, that there can be no omnipotence, nor divine creation, because nothing can be made out of nothing; we having plainly shewed, that this very principle, in the true sense thereof, affordeth a demonstration for the contrary.

THE six following atheistical argumentations, driving at these two things, First, the disproving of an incorporeal, and then of a corporeal Deity; (from both which, the Atheists conceive, it must follow of necessity, that there can be none at all;) we shall take them all together, and, in order to the confutation of them, perform these three things. First, we shall answer the atheistical argumentations against an incorporeal Deity, (contained in the third and fourth heads.) Secondly, we shall shew, that from the very principles of the atheistical corporealism, (as represented in the fifth and sixth heads) incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And lastly, that there being undeniably incorporeal substance, the two following atheistical argumentations also, against a corporeal Deity, (in the seventh and eighth sections) prove altogether insignificant.

We begin with the first of these; to shew the invalidity of the atheistical argumentations against an incorporeal Deity. It hath been already observed, that

though all Corporealists be not therefore of necessity Atheists, yet Atheists universally have been Corporealists; this being always their first and grand postulatam, That there is no other substance besides body. Thus *Plato* long ago declared concerning them; διχορριζοῦσι τὸ εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσ-
 Soph. p. 122.] βολὴν καὶ ἐπαφῶν τινῶν, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν οὐκ ὀνομάζουσιν τῶν ἐξ ἄλλων εἶναι Οὐκ ἂν
 Ec. [P. 160.] σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καὶ ἀθεοῦσιν τὸ παραπῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἄλλο εἶναι. *They contend strongly, that that only really is, which is tangible, or can resist their touch; concluding body and substance to be one and the self-same thing: and if any one should affirm, that there is any thing incorporeal, they will presently cry him down, and not bear a word more from him.* For there can be no doubt, but that the persons here intended by *Plato* were those very Atheists, which himself spake of afterward, in the same dialogue; μὴ τῶν πολλῶν διζῶν καὶ ῥήματι χεῖρα μὴ Φύσιν, τὴν οὖν αὐτὰ πάντα γενεῖν, ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης, καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ διανοίας Φύσεως; ἢ μετὰ λόγον καὶ ἐπιστήμης θεῶν, ἀπὸ θεῶν γινόμενης; *Whether shall we assent to that opinion now-a-days entertained by so many, That nature generateth all things from a certain fortuitous cause, without the direction of any Mind or Understanding? or rather, that it produceth them, according to reason and knowledge, proceeding from God?* Indeed the philosopher there tells us, that some of these atheistical persons began then to be somewhat ashamed of making prudence, and justice, and other moral virtues, corporeal things, or bodies, ἀποκρίνοισι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν οὐκ εἶναι σῶμα τι κεντῶσαι, Φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὡς ἠράττικας, αἰχρῶναι τὸ τοῦμα, ἢ μηδὲν τῶν οὐσῶν αὐτὰ ὀνομάζειν, ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σῶματα διχορριζέσθαι. *Though they affirm concerning the soul it self, that this seems to them to be corporeal; yet, concerning prudence, and those other virtues mentioned, some have now scarcely the confidence to maintain these to be either bodies or nothing.* But this (saith he) was indeed no less than the quite giving up of the cause of atheism; εἰ γὰρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐστὶν ἐν τῶν οὐσῶν σιγῶν ἀσώματον, ἔσται, because, if it be but once granted, that there is never so little incorporeal, this will be sufficient to overthrow the atheistical foundation. Wherefore he concludes, that such as these were but mongrel and imperfect Atheists, ἐπεὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἐπαυχουσίᾳ, οἱ γε αὐτῶν παρὰ καὶ ἀτόχουσι, ἀλλὰ ἀλλήκουτ' αἶ, πᾶν δ' ἢ μὴ διαλοῖται χεῖρτι συμπίπτειν, ὡς αἶμα τότε οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ παραπῶν εἶναι. *For they, who are thorough-paced and genuine Atheists indeed, will boggle at neither of those forementioned things, but contend, that whatsoever they cannot grasp with their hands, is altogether nothing.* That is, that there is no other substance nor entity in the world, but only body, that which is tangible, or resists the touch. *Aristotle* also representeth the atheistical hypothesis after the same manner, τὸ καὶ τοῦ σώματος φατὸν εἶναι τὴν ὅσων οὐσίαν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πᾶσι τέτων. *They affirm, that matter, or body, is all the substance, that is; and that all other things are but the passions and affections thereof.* And again, in his *Metaphysics*, ἐν τῷ πᾶν, καὶ μὴ ἐκείνῃ τινι οὐσίᾳ, ὡς ὅτι πᾶσι τέτων, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μεγέθει ἔχουσαν. *These men maintain all to be one, and that there is but one only nature, as the matter of all things, and this corporeal, or endued with magnitude.* And now we see plainly, that the ancient Atheists were of the very same mind with these
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in our days, that body, or that which is tangible and divisible, is the only substantial thing; from whence it follows, that an incorporeal substance would be the same with an incorporeal body, *i. e.* an impossibility, and that there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But in the management of this cause, there hath been some disagreement amongst the Atheists themselves. For first, the Democriticks and Epicureans, though consenting with all the other Atheists, in this, That whatsoever was unextended, and devoid of magnitude, was therefore nothing; (so that there could neither be any substance, nor accident, or mode of any substance, unextended;) did notwithstanding distinguish concerning a double nature. First, that which is so extended, as to be impenetrable, and tangible, or resist the touch, which is body. And secondly, that which is extended also, but penetrably and intangibly; which is space or vacuum: a nature, according to them, really distinct from body, and the only incorporeal thing that is. Now since this space, which is the only incorporeal, can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only give place or room to bodies to subsist in, or pass thorough; therefore can there not be any active, understanding, incorporeal Deity. This is the argumentation of the Democritick Atheists.

To which we reply, That if space be indeed a nature distinct from body, and a thing really incorporeal, as they pretend, then will it undeniably follow from this very principle of theirs, that there must be an incorporeal substance; and (this space being supposed by them also to be infinite) an infinite, incorporeal Deity. Because, if space be not the extension of body, nor an affection thereof, then must it of necessity be, either an accident existing alone by it self, without a substance, which is impossible; or else the extension, or affection, of some other incorporeal substance, that is infinite. But here will *Gassendus* step in, to help out his good friends the Democriticks and Epicureans at a dead lift; and undertake to maintain, that though space be indeed an incorporeal thing, yet it would neither follow of necessity from thence, that it is an incorporeal substance or affection thereof; nor yet that it is an accident existing alone by it self, without a substance; because this space is really neither accident, nor substance, but a certain middle nature or essence betwixt both. To which subterfuge of his, that we may not quarrel about words, we shall make this reply; that unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affection, or mode of something, that doth subsist by it self. For it is certain, that there can be no mode, accident or affection of nothing; and consequently, that nothing cannot be extended, nor measurable. But if space be neither the extension of body, nor yet of substance incorporeal, then must it of necessity be the extension of nothing, and the affection of nothing; and nothing must be measurable by yards and poles. We conclude therefore, that from this very hypothesis of the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists, that space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it follows undeniably, that there must be some incorporeal substance

substance, whose affection its extension is; and because there can be nothing infinite, but only the Deity, that it is the infinite extension of an incorporeal Deity; just as some learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted. And thus is the argument of these Democritick and Epicurean Atheists, against an incorporeal Deity, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that from that very principle of their own, by which they would disprove the same, it is against themselves demonstrable.

To which it might be here further added, that *Epicurus*, who professedly opposed *Plato's* incorporeal God, as an impossibility, did notwithstanding manifestly contradict himself, when he asserted such a Democracy of monogrammous gods, as were not compounded of atoms and vacuum, (though, according to him, the only principles of body,) that so they might be incorporeal; nor yet could touch or be touched, but were penetrable, as is declared in those verses of *Lucretius* ¹,

*Tenuis enim natura deum, longeque remota
Sensibus à nostris, animi vix mente videtur.
Quæ quoniam manuum tactum suffugit & ictum,
Tactile nil nobis quod sit, contingere debet.
Tangere enim non quit, quod tangi non licet ipsum.*

(though tangibility and impenetrability were elsewhere made by him the very essence of body;) and lastly, such as had not *corpus*, but *quasi corpus*, and therefore must needs be really incorporeal. Though there is no doubt to be made, but that *Epicurus* colluded in all this; himself not believing a jot of it, nor any such gods at all.

But other Atheists there were, who concluding likewise, That whatsoever was unextended was nothing, were sensible of the inconvenience of making space thus to be a thing really distinct from body, (from whence it would follow unavoidably, that it was an affection of incorporeal substance;) and therefore acknowledged, not two natures of extended things, but as we had it before in *Aristotle*, *μία τῶν φύσιν καὶ τούτων χωματικὴν*, *one only nature, and that bodily*; space being therefore to them, either a mere imaginary thing, that hath no reality without our minds, but only a phantasm of our own, and, in their modern language, a kind of ghost, apparition, or spectre of a body; or else indeed the very extension of body it self, considered in general, and abstractly, from this or that singular body, moveable. And these men therefore framed their argumentation against an incorporeal Deity after this manner: Nothing truly is, but what is extended, or hath a certain magnitude, (because that which is unextended, and hath no magnitude, is no where, and consequently nothing.) But whatsoever is extended, and in a place, is body. Therefore is there no other substance besides body; and consequently there can be no incorporeal Deity. Or else to put the argument into a more approveable syllogistick form; whatsoever is extended, is body,

¹ Lib. V. ver. 149.

or corporeal; but whatsoever is, is extended. Therefore whatsoever is, is body, or corporeal. And by consequence, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

To which argumentation the assertors of incorporeal substance have replied two manner of ways. For first, the generality of the ancient Incorporealists taking it for granted, that whatsoever was extended in magnitude, and had parts one without another, was divisible, as also probably impenetrable by any thing else extended, because there can be no penetration of dimensions; and therefore no one magnitude can be imbibed or swallowed up into another, but must of necessity stand without it, adding so much to the quantity thereof: they readily gave their assent to that proposition, That whatsoever is extended into longitude, latitude and profundity, is body. But being strongly persuaded of the existence of some other substance besides body, they denied that other proposition of theirs, that whatsoever is, is extended; or what is unextended, is nothing: maintaining, that besides body, or extended substance, there was another substance incorporeal, which therefore was ἀδιάστατος, and ἀμεγέθης, and ἀποκος, and ἀμεγής, and ἀδιαιρέτος, unextended, and devoid of quantity and magnitude, without parts, and indivisible. That Plato himself philosophized after this manner, might be proved from sundry passages of his writings; as that in his tenth *De Legibus*, where he affirmeth, that the soul it self, and those things, which belong to it, as cogitative, are πρότερα μήκους σωματίων ἢ βάρους ἢ πλάτους, in order of nature, before the longitude, and latitude, and profundity of bodies. Where, doubtless, his meaning was not, as if there were longitude, latitude and profundity in souls, but of a different kind from that longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies, and before it; but that longitude, latitude and profundity, being the essential properties of body only, soul and cogitation, as devoid of these, was in order of nature before them. Again, from that in his *Timæus*, where speaking of place, space, and matter, he condemneth this for a vulgar error, That whatsoever is, must of necessity be in some place or other, and what is in no place, is nothing. Τρίτην δὲ αἴτιον τὸ τῆς χώρας, ἧραυ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένησιν πάντων—πρὸς δὲ αὐτῆς οὐκ ἐπιροπαζόμεν βλεπούσας, ἢ φαμέν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πᾶσι, τὸ οὐ ἔσθαι ἐν τινὶ τόπῳ, ἢ κατέχον χώραν τινὰ· τὸ δὲ μήτε ἐν γῆ, μήτε κεν ἐν οὐρανῷ, εἶναι εἶναι. *The third kind is that of space, which gives room to all things, that are generated. And when we look upon this, we dreamingly affirm, That every thing, that is, must of necessity be in some place, and possess a certain room and space, and that whatsoever is not somewhere, either in earth, or in heaven, is nothing. Which drowsy or dreamy imagination, (saith he,) like a ghost, continually haunteth and possesseth men, and that even then, when they think of that true and awakened nature of the Deity.* Whereas this philosopher himself, discoursing elsewhere of God, under the title of πολὺ πύλον τῆ καλῆ, the vast sea of pulchritude, describeth him after this manner; εἴπερ ἐν, ἢ ἐν γῆ, ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ, μετ' αὐτῷ, μονοειδὲς αἰεὶ οὖν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ ἑκείνη μετέχοντα. *As that, which is not any where, either in earth, or in heaven, but it self alone by it self, and with it self, all other beautiful things partaking of it.* And as for Aristotle's sense in this particular; that

that he here departed not, as he did in some other things, from his master Plato, may appear from that whole chapter, or section, at the end of his physics, spent upon this very subject, to prove, ὅτι τῶν ἀμεζῆς ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ μὴδὲ ἔχειν μέγεθος, *That his first Immoveable Mover (which is God Almighty) must of necessity be devoid of parts, or indivisible, and have no magnitude at all.* The conclusion of which section, and his whole book of Physics ¹, is this, διαρισμένον δὲ τούτων, Φανερόν ὅτι ἀδύνατον τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἔχειν τι μέγεθος· εἰ γὰρ μέγεθος ἔχει, ἀνάγκη ἴσθαι πεπερασμένον αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἀπειρον· ἀπειρον μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνδέχεται μέγεθος εἶναι, δεδεικται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς· ὅτι δὲ τὸ πεπερασμένον ἀδύνατον ἔχειν ἀπειρον δύναμιν, δεδεικται οὖν· Οὐκ ἐστὶν οὖν, ὅτι ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀμεζῆς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχειν μέγεθος. *These things being thus determined, it is manifestly impossible, that the first Mover should have any magnitude. For if it hath magnitude, that must of necessity be either finite, or infinite. But that there can be no infinite magnitude, was before demonstrated in the Physics; and that nothing, which hath a finite magnitude, can have infinite power, hath been now proved. Wherefore it is plain, that the first mover is indivisible, and devoid of parts, and hath no magnitude at all.* Which same Doctrine is again taught and asserted by Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐσία τις αἰδήσιμα καὶ ἀκίνησιμα, καὶ μεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, Φανερόν ἐκ τῶν εἰρηγμένων, δεδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ἀμεζῆς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος ἐστὶ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει δύναμιν ἀπειρον πεπερασμένου, καὶ ὅλως οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ἀπειρον· *From what hath been declared, it is manifest, that there is an eternal and immoveable substance, separate from sensibles; as also, that this substance cannot possibly have any magnitude, but is devoid of parts, and indivisible. Because no finite thing can have infinite power, and there is no such thing possible as infinite magnitude.* Neither doth Aristotle appropriate this to the supreme Deity, *To be thus devoid of magnitude and of parts, and consequently indivisible;* he somewhere ² attributing the same also to all other immaterial or incorporeal things, and particularly to the human mind, ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ὕλην ἔχειν, ὡς περὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον οὐς, *every thing, that is devoid of matter, is indivisible, as the human mind.* And the like doth he assert, at once, both concerning the mundane, and the human soul, that they are no magnitudes, though ridiculously (after his manner) imputing the contrary opinion to Plato, καὶ καλῶς τὸ λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα μέγεθος εἶναι. Ὁ δὲ οὐς εἷς καὶ συνεχής, ὡς περὶ καὶ ἡ νόσος· ἢ ἐπὶ νόσους τὰ νοήματα· ταῦτα δὲ τῆ ἐφεξῆς οὐκ, ὡς ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ἀλλ' ὅχι ὡς τὸ μέγεθος· οὗτοι οὐκ εἰς οὐ συνεχής, ἀλλ' ἴσθαι ἀμεζῆς, ἢ ὅχι ὡς τὸ μέγεθος τι συνεχής· πᾶς γὰρ δὲ καὶ νόσος μέγεθος οὐκ, ὅτι οὐ πᾶν μέρος τοῦ αὐτοῦ· μέρος δὲ ἴσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος, ἢ κατὰ σῆμα· εἰ μὲν οὐ κατὰ σῆμα, αὐτὰ δ' ἀπειροί, ὅλον ὡς ὀδόντες διέξισιν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειροί· ἴσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ. Ἐπι δὲ πᾶς ἴσθαι τὸ ἀμεζῆς μοισθῆ· *It is not rightly affirmed either of the mundane, or rational soul, that they are magnitudes. For the Intellect is one and continuous, as Intellection is, which is the same with the Intelligibles. But these are one, not as magnitudes, but as numbers. Wherefore the Intellect is not so continuous, but either devoid of parts, or not continuous as magnitude. For how, being magnitude, could*

P. 14 c. 7.
[P. 480.
Tom. IV.
Oper.]

D. Anal. 1. c. 3.
[P. 9, 10.
Tom. II.
Oper.]

¹ P. 608. Tom. I. Oper.

² Metaphysic L. 14. Cap. IX. p. 484 Tom. IV. Oper.

it understand with any of its parts, whether conceived as points, or as lesser magnitudes; since either way there would be an innumerable company of intelligences? Moreover, how can it conceive any thing, that is indivisible, by what is divisible? Furthermore, in this same book *De Animâ*, Aristotle stily denies souls in general either to be in a place, or to be locally moved, otherwise than by accident, as they are said to be moved together with the motion of the body. Thus *Simplicius* 2, ὅρα ὡς πανταχῶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀποσεῖλαι τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις, See how Aristotle doth every where remove, or exclude from the soul, corporeal (or local) motions. And again, ἀπαραγορεύει μὴ κινεῖσθαι, Fol. 6. τὰ ἀσώματα τῆς κινήσεως αἰτία καὶ πρῶτα καὶ μετὰ καὶ ἐγκατὰ ἔ, Aristotle will by no means allow any incorporeal things whatsoever, whether of the first, second, or lowest rank, (they being all the causes of motion) themselves to be moved. *Philoponus* 3 likewise, ὅρα ὡς πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις ἀποβλέπων, ἕτως αὐτῷ ἀκίνητον εἶναι Θεοῖ· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ σῶμά ἐστιν. You see how Aristotle, respecting corporeal motions, pronounces of the soul, that it is immoveable. For whatsoever is in a place (and moveable) is body. Lastly, in that passage before cited, Aristotle plainly makes the essence of corporeal substance, as opposed to incorporeal, to consist in magnitude.

Besides *Plato* and *Aristotle*, we might here instance in sundry other of the ancient Incorporealists, who clearly maintained the same doctrine *Philo* doth not only assert in general a double essence or substance, ἀδιάστατος, and διασπαστικὴν, a distant, and indistant one; but somewhere writeth thus concerning the Deity, ὑπὸ τῷ Θεῷ πεπλήρωται τὰ πάντα, περιέχουσιν ἢ περιεχο- De Confus. μέν, ἢ πανταχῶ τε καὶ ἑσθλαμὴ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι μόνῳ ἑσθλαμὴ μὲν ὅτι καὶ χῆραυ καὶ τόπου Ling. p. 339! αὐτὸς τοῖς σώμασι συγγεγεννηκε τὸ δὲ πεποικῆς ἐν ἄδει τῶν γενομένων θεμῆς εἰπεῖν περιέχεσθαι· πανταχῶ δὲ, ὅτι τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ δια γῆς καὶ ἑσθλαμὴ αἰέρος τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ τείνας, &c. All things are filled with God, as containing them, but not as being contained by them, or in them; to whom alone it belongeth to be both every where, and no where. No where, because himself created space and place, together with bodies, and it is not lawful to include the Creator within any of his creatures. And every where, because he extendeth his virtues and powers throughout earth and water, air and heaven, and leaveth no part of the world destitute thereof; but, collecting all things together under himself, bath bound them fast with invisible bonds. But none hath more industriously pursued this business, than *Plotinus*, who every where asserts body and magnitude to be one and the same thing; and that, besides this, there is another substance incorporeal, which, consequently, is ἄσπος, and ἀμεγέθης, and ἀμερῆς, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, and of parts, locally distant from one another; ὃ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ποσὸν εἶναι ὑπερέβηκεν, it having in its nature transcended the imperfection of quantity. And who hath also written two whole books* upon this very subject, τὸ ὃ ἐν καὶ ταυτοῦ ἀριθμῷ ἕνα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὄλου, That one and the self-same numerical thing may be all of it entirely every where. Wherein his principal

V O L. II.

5 G principal

1 Lib. I. Cap. IV. p. 12. Tom. II. Oper.
2 Comment. in Libros Aristot. c. Animâ, fol. 6. Ed. Græc. Franc. Aulani, Venet. 1527. fol.

3 Comment. in Libros tres Aristot. de Animâ, fol. 13. Ed. Græc. Venet. 1553. fol. 1
* Lib. IV. & V. Elnead. VI.

P. 667.
[Lib. IV.
Cap. IX.]

cipal design was to prove, that *the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there*; and so much thereof in one place, and so much in another, (as if the very substance of it were mensurable by yards and poles;) but the whole undivided Deity every where, *Ἡδὲ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ἀπάντων* (saith he) *God is before all things, that are in a place.* And ὁ θανμάξεν ἢ δεῖ, εἰ αὐτὸ μὴ ἂν ἐν τόπῳ, παντὶ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ὄντι, ὅλως παύρεσι, Φησὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ πόπον ἐκ εὐληχότης, ἢ πάρεσι, τέρψθαι ὅλου παρεῖναι. *It is not at all to be wondered at, that God, being not in a place, should be present to every thing, that is in a place, wholly and entirely; reason pronouncing, that he, having no place, must therefore of necessity be ὅλως, all of him indivisibly present to whatsoever he is present.* Neither is this, saith he, a thing only deduced by reason, but that, which is before reason, suggested by the instincts of mankind; τὸ ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῶν, πανταξὶ ἄμα ὅλου εἶναι, κοινῆ εὐνοια φησὶν εἶναι, ὅταν πάντες κινούμενοι αὐτοφύως λέγωσι, τὸν ἐν ἐκείτῳ ἡρώου Θεῶν, ὡς ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν. *That one and the same numerical substance (to wit, of the Deity) is at once entirely every where, is agreeable to the common notions, as sentiments of mankind, when we do so often by the instincts of nature speak of that God, who is in every one of us, supposing him to be one and the same in all.* Where the philosopher subjoins, καὶ ἐστὶ πάντων βεβαιωτάτη ἀρχή, ἢ ὡς περ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν φησὶ γενέσθαι, &c. *And this is the firmest of all principles, that, which our souls do, as it were, naturally and of themselves speak; and which is not collected by reason, but comes forth from them before ratiocination.* Moreover, he often affirmeth of the human soul, or rather takes it as a thing for granted, that this is the whole or all of it, in every part of the body, that is, undividedly; ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀριθμῶν, τὸ ἐν τῷ ποδί, καὶ τῇ χειρὶ ὑπάρχει, *As for the human soul, it is one and the same numerically in the hand, and in the foot.* And again, εἴτα πῶς ἐν ποδί καὶ χειρὶ τὴν αὐτήν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷ δὲ μέρει τῷ παντός, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τὴν ἐν τῷ δὲ. *Since we commonly suppose our own soul to be the same, both in our foot and in our hand, why should we not, in like manner, acknowledge that of the mundane soul, or Deity, which is in one part of the universe, to be the same with that in another?* In like manner, *Simplicius*, proving that body is not the first principle, because there must of necessity be something self-moving, and what is so, must needs be incorporeal, writeth thus; τὸ δὲ τοῦτον ἀμερές, εὐθύς ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ἀδιάστατον, μεριστὸν γὰρ καὶ διαστάλον ὑπάρχον, ἢ δύναται ὅλου ὅλου ἑαυτῷ ἐφαρμόσθαι, ὡς τὸ ὅλου εἶναι κινῶν, καὶ ὅλου τὸ αὐτὸ κινούμενον. *Prove what is such, must of necessity be indivisible, and indistant; for were it divisible, and distant, it could not all of it be conjoined with its whole self; so that the whole should both actively move, and be moved.* Which same thing seems further evident in the soul's being all conscious of itself, and reflexive of its whole self; which could not be, were one part of it distant from another. Again, the same philosopher expressly denieth the soul, though a self-moving substance, to be at all locally moved, otherwise than by accident, in respect of the body, which is moved by it, ἢ τὰς σωματικὰς κινούμενοι κινήσεις (κατὰ γὰρ ἐκείνας ἀκίνητον ἐστὶ) ἀλλὰ τὰς ψυχικὰς, αἷς σωματικὰ ἐστὶ σκοπεῖσθαι βεβληένθαι, διαοεῖν, δοξάζειν, κινεῖ τὰ σώματα κατὰ τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις. *The soul, being not moved by corporeal, or local motions,*

2 Lib. IV. Ennead. VI. Cap. III. p. 647.

3 Ubi supra, fol. 7.

tions, (for in respect of these it is immovable) but by cogitative ones only, (the names whereof are Consultation and Deliberation, &c.) by these moveth bodies locally. And that this was really Plato's meaning also, when he determined the soul to be a self-moving substance, and the cause of all bodily motion; that moving itself in a way of cogitation, it moved bodies locally, (notwithstanding that Aristotle would not take notice of it) sufficiently appears from his own words, and is acknowledged by the Greek scholiasts themselves upon Aristotle's *De Animâ*. Thus again *Simplicius* elsewhere, ἐπι δ' ἐκ ἐν τόπῳ ψυχῆ, εἰδ' αὐ κινήσει, τὰς τῶν ἐν τόπῳ οὐτῶν κινήσεις, *Since the soul is not in a place, it is not capable of any local motion.*

We should omit the testimonies of any more philosophers, were it not that we find *Porphyrus* so full and express herein, who makes this the very beginning of his ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ, his *Manuduction to Intelligibles*; Πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, εἰδ' ἐν δὲ τῶν κατ' ἑαυτὸ ἀσωμάτων ἐν τόπῳ, *That though every body be in a place, yet nothing, that is properly incorporeal, is in a place*: and who afterwards further pursues it in this manner, εἰδ' ἐν τοιαύτῃ διέξει τὸ ἀσωματόν ὅπερ ἐξελείπει· ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ τὸ δ' ἀόλου παντελῶς καὶ ἀμείγετες, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ὅσῳ ἀκράτητος, τοιαύτῃ τε κινήσει ἀμείρεται, διαδέσει τοῦ τοῦ ποῖα ἔχει ἐξελείπει, ὅπερ καὶ ἀνακρίεται· καὶ ἐν τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆ φανερὰ ἢ παρυσία αὐτῆ γίνεσθαι. *Neither does that, which is incorporeal, move locally by will, place being relative only to magnitude and bulk. But that, which is devoid of bulk and magnitude, is likewise devoid of local motion. Wherefore it is only present by a certain disposition, and inclination of it to one thing more than another; nor is its presence there discernible otherwise, than by its operations and effects.* Again, concerning the three divine hypostases he writeth thus; ὁ Θεὸς πάνταχῶς ὅτι ἐδαμῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὡς πάνταχῶς ὅτι ἐδαμῶ, καὶ ψυχὴ πάνταχῶς ὅτι ἐδαμῶ, &c. *The supreme God is therefore every where, because he is no where; and the same is true also of the second and third divine hypostasis, Nous and Psyche. The supreme God is every where and no where, in respect of those things which are after him, and only his own, and in himself. Nous, or Intellect, is in the supreme God, every where and no where, as to those things, that are after him. Psyche, or the mundane soul, is both in intellect and the supreme God, and every where and no where, as to bodies. Lastly, body is both in the soul of the world, and in God.* Where he denies God to be locally in the corporeal world, and thinks it more proper to say, that the corporeal world is in God, than God in it; because the world is held and contained in the divine power, but the Deity is not in the locality of the world. Moreover, he further declares his sense after this manner; εἰδ' εἰ κενὸν ἔν τι ἐπινοηθεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐν κενῷ οἷόν τε εἶναι. Νῦν, σῶμα μὲν γὰρ δεκτικὸν αὐ ἐστὶν τὸ κενόν. Νῦν δὲ ἐνεργεῖται χωρήσει ἀμύχων, καὶ τόπον δῶναι ενεργεῖται, *Nor, if there were conceived to be such an incorporeal space, or vacuum, as Democritus and Epicurus supposed) could Mind, or God, possibly exist in this empty space (as co-extended with the same) for this would be only receptive of bodies, but it could not receive the energy of mind or intellect, nor give any place or room to that, that being no bulky thing.* And again, ὁ μὲν κόσμος ἐν τῷ νῦν διὰ τὴν ἀμείρεται, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον τῷ κόσμῳ ἀμείρεται.

P. 220, 230.
[§. XXVIII
Ed. Cantab.]

P. 231;

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1 In Appendice sententiarum, five graduum ad Intelligibilia, §. XLIV. p. 278. Ed. Cantab.

2 Part II. Sententiarum ad Intelligibilia docentium, §. XXXV. p. 241.

ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀδιαιρέτως· τὸ δὲ ἀμερῆς ἐν διαστάσει ὄλον γίνεσθαι κατὰ πᾶν μέρος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐν ἀριθμῷ αὐτὸ ἀμερῶς πάρεστι καὶ ἀπληροῦτος καὶ ἀτίσιμος, κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν, τῶν μεριστῶν, καὶ πεπληρωμένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τόπῳ, *The corporeal world is distantly present to the intelligible, (or the Deity;) and that is indivisibly and indistantly present with the world. But when that, which is indistinct and unextended, is present with that, which is distant and extended; then is the whole of the former one and the same numerically in every part of the latter. That is, it is indivisibly and unmultiplied, and illocally there (according to its own nature) present with that, which is naturally divisible, and multipliable, and in a place.* Lastly, he affirmeth the same likewise of the human soul, that this is also *ὅσκις ἀμεγέθους, a substance devoid of magnitude, and which is not locally present to this or that body, but by disposition and energy; and therefore the whole of it in every part thereof undividedly*.*

And as for Christian writers, besides *Origen*, who was so famous an asserter of incorporeal substance, that (as *Socrates*² recordeth) the Egyptian monks and Anthropomorphites threatened death to *Theophilus* the Alexandrian bishop, unless he would at once execrate and renounce the writings of *Origen*, and profess the belief of a corporeal God of human form; and who also maintained incorporeal substance to be unextended, as might be proved from sundry passages, both of his book against *Celsus*, and that *Peri Archon*; we say, (besides *Origen*, and others of the Greeks) *St. Austin* amongst the Latins clearly asserted the same; he maintaining in his book *De Quantitate Animæ*³, and elsewhere, concerning the human soul, that being incorporeal, it hath no dimensions of length, breadth and profundity, and is *illocabilis*, no where as in a place. We shall conclude with the testimony of *Boëtius*, who was both a philosopher and a Christian; *Quædam sunt* (saith he*) *communis animi conceptiones, per se notæ, apud sapientes tantum; ut incorporali non esse in loco; There are certain common conceptions, or notions of the mind, which are known by themselves amongst wise men only; as this for example, That incorporeals are in no place.* From whence it is manifest, that the generality of reputed wise men were not formerly of this opinion, *Quod nusquam est, nihil est, That what is no where, or in no certain place, is nothing*; and that this was not looked upon by them as a common notion, but only as a vulgar error.

By this time we have made it unquestionably evident, that this opinion of incorporeal substance being unextended, indistinct, and devoid of magnitude, is no novel or recent thing, nor first started in the scholastick age; but that it was the general persuasion of the most ancient and learned asserters of incorporeal substance, especially that the Deity was not part of it here, and part of it there, nor the substance thereof measurable by yards and poles, as if there were so much of it contained in one room, and so

* Vide Part. I. Sententiar. §. XVIII. p. 225.

² Hittor. Eccles. Lib. VI. Cap. VII. p.

310.

³ It is publish'd in the first Tome of the Benedictine Edition of *St. Augustine's Works*.

† *Dr. Cudworth* seems to have quoted this passage from memory out of *Boëtius's* Book, intitled, *Quomodo Substantia in eo, quod nec, bonæ sint, cum non sint Substantia bona*, l. 167.

much and no more in another, according to their several dimensions; but that the whole undivided Deity was at once in every part of the world, and consequently no where locally after the manner of bodies. But, because this opinion seems so strange and paradoxical, and lies under so great prejudices, we shall in the next place show, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavoured to acquit themselves, in repelling the several efforts and plausibilities made against it. The first whereof is this, That to suppose incorporeal substances unextended and divisible is to make them absolute parvities, and by means of that, to render them all (even the Deity itself) contemptible: since they must of necessity be either physical minimums, that cannot actually be divided further by reason of their littleness, (if there be any such thing) or else meer mathematical points, which are not so much as mentally divisible: so that thousands of these incorporeal substances, or spirits, might dance together at once upon a needle's point. To which it was long since thus replied by *Plotinus*, ἔχ' ὅτω δὲ ἀμερῆς ὡς μικρὸν ὅτω γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπλον καὶ μεριστὸν ἔστι καὶ ἡ παρὰ αὐτὸ ἐφαρμόσει· ἔδ' αὖ αὐξεμένη τὸ αὐτὸ συνέειπαι· ἀλλ' ἔδ' ὅπως ὡς σημείον, ἢ γὰρ ἐν σημείῳ ὄργαζε, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα ἐν αὐτῷ, ἔδ' ὡς ἐφαρμόσει. *God, and all other incorporeal substances, are not so indivisible, as if they were parvities or little things, as physical points; for so would they still be mathematically divisible; nor yet as if they were mathematical points neither, which indeed are no bodies nor substances, but only the termini of a line. And neither of these ways could the Deity congrue with the world; nor souls with their respective bodies, so as to be all present with the whole of them.* Again, he writeth particularly concerning the Deity thus; ἅτε ὅπως ἀμερῆς, ὡς τὸ σμικρότατον, μέγιστον γὰρ ἀπάντων, ἢ μέγθει, ἀλλὰ θυώματι· ——— ληπίον δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον αὐτῷ, ἢ τῷ ἀδιεξήγητῳ, ἢ τῷ μεγέθει, ἢ τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπειρολήπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως. *God is not so indivisible, as if he were the smallest or least of things, for he is the greatest of all, not in respect of magnitude, but of power. Moreover, as he is indivisible, so is he also to be acknowledged infinite; not as if he were a magnitude, or a number, which could never be past thorough, but because his power is incomprehensible.* Moreover, the same philosopher condemneth this for a vulgar error, proceeding from sense and imagination, that whatsoever is unextended, and indistant, must therefore needs be little; he affirming, on the contrary, the vulgar to be much mistaken, as to true greatness and littleness; μέγα νομίζοντες τὸ π. 645. κισθῆλον, ἀπορῶμεν πῶς ἐν μεγάλῳ καὶ τοσούτῳ ἐἴσιν ἡ φύσις ἐκτεταταί· τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ το [Ennead. VI. λεγόμενον μέγα μικρὸν ὃ δὲ νομίζεται μικρὸν εἶναι μέγα· ἐπεὶ ὅλον ἐπὶ πᾶν τέτα μέρεσιν. Lib. IV. Φθάνει, μέλλουσι δὲ τὸ πανταχοῦθεν τὸ αὐτὸ μέρεσι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ἐν εὐρίσκει αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ πᾶν καὶ μειζον εἶναυθ. *We commonly, looking upon this sensible world as great, wonder how that (indivisible and unextended) nature of the Deity can every where comply, and be present with it. Whereas that, which is vulgarly called great, is indeed little; and that, which is thus imagined to be little, is indeed great. Forasmuch as the whole of this diffuseth itself through every part of the other; or rather, this whole corporeal universe, in every one of its parts, findeth that whole and entire, and therefore greater than itself.* To the same purpose also *Porphyrius*, τὸ ὅπως δὲ ἅτε μέγα, ἅτε μικρὸν ἔστι· (τὸ γὰρ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν κυρίως οὐκ ἴδια) ἐκτετακὸς δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν· καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ μέγιστον καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, ταῦτα καὶ ἐν ἀεὶ μῶν ὄν· εἰ καὶ εὐρίσκειαι ἅμα ὑπὸ παιδὸς μετ' ἑαυτῶν, καὶ

P. 646. [Ennead. VI. Lib. IV. Cap. XIII]

P. 764. [Ennead. VI. Lib. IX.]

P. 645. [Ennead. VI. Lib. IV. Cap. 11.]

Sent. p. 243; [§. XXXVI.]

ἢ ὑπὸ πλείους ἐλαχίστα εὐρισκόμενον· μήτε ἄρα ὡς μέγιστον αὐτὸ ὑπονοήσεις· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀπορήσεις πῶς μέγιστον ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις ὄντοις πάρεστι, μὴ μειωθῆν, ἢ συσταλῆν· μήτε ὡς ἐλαχίστον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, πάλιν ἀπορήσεις, πῶς ἐλαχίστον ἐν τοῖς μέγιστοις ὄντοις πάρεστι, μὴ πολλαπλασιασθῆν, ἢ ἀξήθηθαι. *The Deity, which is the only true Being, is neither great nor little, (so far as great and little properly belong to corporeal bulk, or magnitude;) but it exceedeth both the greatness of every thing, that is great, and the littleness of whatsoever is little, (it being more indivisible, and more one with itself, than any thing that is little, and more powerful, than any thing that is great;) so that it is above both the greatest and the least; it being found all one and the same by every greatest, and every smallest thing participating thereof. Wherefore you must neither look upon God as the greatest thing, (that is, in a way of quantity) for then you may well doubt, how being the greatest, he can be all of him present with every least thing, neither diminished, nor contracted; nor yet must you look upon him as the least thing neither; for if you do so, then will you be at a loss again, how, being the least thing, he can be present with all the greatest bulks; neither multiplied, nor augmented.* In a word, the sum of their answer amounts to this, that an incorporeal unextended Deity is neither a physical point, because this hath distance in it, and is mentally divisible; nor yet a mathematical one, because this, though having neither magnitude nor substance in it, hath, notwithstanding, site and position; a point being, according to *Aristotle*¹, a monad having site and position. It is not to be conceived as a parvitude, or very little thing, because then it could not *congruere* with all the greatest things; nor yet as a great thing, in a way of quantity and extension; because then it could not be all of it present to every least thing. Nor does true greatness consist in a way of bulk or magnitude, all magnitude being but little; since there can be no infinite magnitude, and no finite magnitude can have infinite power, as *Aristotle* before urged. And to conclude, though some, who are far from Atheists, may make themselves merry with that conceit of *ibonsands of spirits dancing at once upon a needle's point*; and though the Atheists may endeavour to rogue and ridicule all incorporeal substance in that manner, yet does this run upon a clear mistake of the hypothesis, and make nothing at all against it; so far as an unextended substance is neither any parvitude, as is here supposed (because it hath no magnitude at all) nor hath it any place, or site, or local motion, properly belonging to it; and therefore can neither dance upon a needle's point, nor any where else.

But in the next place, it is further objected, that what is neither great nor little, what possesses no space, and hath no place nor site amongst bodies, must therefore needs be an absolute non-entity, so far as magnitude or extension are the very essence of being or entity, as such; so that there can be neither substance, nor accident unextended. Now, since whatsoever is extended, is bodily, there can therefore be no other substance, besides body, nor any thing incorporeal, otherwise than as that word may be taken for a thin and subtle body; in which sense fire was, by some in *Aristotle*², said to be, *μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον, and ἀσωματώτατον, the*

¹ De Animâ, Lib. II. Cap. VI. p. 13. ² De Animâ, Lib. I. Cap. II. p. 6. Tom. II. Vide eii. m. Metaphys. Lib. XIII. Cap. XII. Oper. p. 471. Tom. IV. Oper.

most incorporeal of all the elements; and Aristotle¹ himself useth the word in the same manner, when he affirmeth, that all philosophers did define the soul by three things, motion, sense, and incorporeity; several of those, there mentioned by him, understanding the soul to be no otherwise incorporeal, than as *σώμα λεπτόμερες, a thin and subtle body.* In answer to which objection, we may remember, that *Plato*, in the passage before cited, declareth this to be but a vulgar error, that whatsoever doth not take up space, and is in no place, is nothing. He intimating the original hereof to have sprung from men's adhering too much to those lower faculties of sense and imagination, which are able to conceive nothing, but what is corporeal.

And accordingly *Plotinus*; ἡ μὲν αἰσθησις, ἢ προσέχοντες ἀπιστοῦμεν τοῖς λεγομένοις, λέγει ὅτι ὡς καὶ ὡς ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ ὡς καὶ ὡς φησι, ἐκ ἐκλαστικῶν ὡς καὶ ὡς γεγονόται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκλαθεῖν πᾶν αὐτὸ μετεληθῆναι, οὐκ ἀδιδασκᾶτο αὐτῷ. *Sense indeed, which we attending to, disbelieve these things, tells us of here and there; but reason dictates, that here and there is so to be understood of the Deity, not as if it were extendedly here and there, but because every extended thing, and the several parts of the world, partake every where of that, being indistant and unextended.*

P. 656.

To the same purpose *Porphyrus*, δὲ τούτων ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι κατὰ κράτη τῆς ἐκατέρῃς ιδιότητος μὴ ἐπαλλάττειν τὰς φύσεις· μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ προσόντα τοῖς σώμασιν, ἢ τοιαῦτα, μὴ φαντάζεσθαι καὶ δοξάζειν περὶ τὸ ἀσώμαστον τῶν μὲν χερσὶ σωματικῶν, ἐν συνείδειᾳ πάντων· ἐκείνων δὲ μόλις ἐν γνώσει γίνεσθαι. ἀοριστῶν περὶ αὐτὰ, ἕως αὐτῶν ὑπὸ φαντασίας κρατῆται· *We ought therefore, in our disquisitions concerning corporeal and incorporeal beings, to conserve the property of each, and not to confound their natures; but especially to take heed, that our phancy and imagination do not so far impose upon our judgments, as to make us attribute to incorporeals what properly belongeth to bodies only. For we are all accustomed to bodies; but as for incorporeals, scarcely any one reaches to the knowledge of them; men always fluctuating about them, and diffiding them, so long as they are held under the power of their imagination.*

A. P. 242

Where afterwards he propoundeth a form for this, how we should think of incorporeals, so as not to confound their natures with corporeals; ἐν ἀπειροῖς μέρεσι τὸ διασατὸ παρὸν ὅλον τὸ ἀδιάσπαστον, ὅτε μερικῶν μέρος, τῷ μέρει διδόν μέρους, οὕτε πληθυνθὲν τῷ πλήθει παρέχον ἑαυτὸ πόλλα πλησιαδὲν· ἀλλ' ὅλον πᾶσι τε τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ διωκμένου, ἐνί τε ἐκάσῳ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀμερικῶς καὶ ἀπληθυντως καὶ ὡς ἐν ἀριθμῷ· τὸ δὲ μερικῶς καὶ διηρημένως ἀπολάου ἐν αὐτῷ. *That the indistant and unextended Deity is the whole of it present in infinite parts of the distant world, neither divided, as applying part to part; nor yet multiplied into many wholes, according to the multiplicity of those things, that partake thereof. But the whole of it (one and the same in number) is present to all the parts of the bulky world, and to every one of those many things in it, undividedly and unmultipliedly; that in the mean time partaking thereof dividedly.* It was granted therefore by these ancients, that this unextended, and indistant nature of incorporeals is ἀφάνταστον, *a thing altogether unimaginal*; and this was concluded by them to be the only reason, why so many have pronounced it to be impossible, because they attended only to sense and imagination, and made them the only measure of things and truth; it having been accordingly maintained by divers of them, (as *Porphyrus* tells us) that imagination and intellect are but two different names

for

¹ De Animâ Lib. I. Cap. II. p. 6. Tom. II. Oper.

P 224.
A.P.

for one and the same thing; *ὀνόματι* διαφοράς προσθέσις τῆ τοῦ νοῦ ὑποσεί, ἢ τῆς φαντασίας, ἢ γὰρ ἐν λογικῷ ζῴῳ φαντασία δέδοικτο αὐτοῖς νόησις, *There is a difference of names only, and no more, betwixt mind and phancy; phancy and imagination, in rational animals, seeming to be the same thing with intellection.* But there are many things, which no man can have any phantasm or imagination of, and yet are they, notwithstanding, by all unquestionably acknowledged for entities, or realities; from whence it is plain, that we must have some other faculties in us, which extend beyond phancy and imagination. Reason indeed dictates, that whatsoever can either do, or suffer any thing, must therefore be undoubtedly something; but that whatsoever is unextended, and hath no distant parts one without another, must therefore needs be nothing, is no common notion, but the spurious suggestion of imagination only, and a vulgar error. There need to be no fear at all, lest a Being infinitely wise and powerful, which acts upon the whole world, and all the parts thereof, in framing and governing the same, should prove a non-entity, merely for want of bulk and extension; or, because it swells not out into space and distance, as bodies do, therefore vanish into nothing. Nor does active force and power, as such, depend upon bulk and extension; because then whatsoever had the greater bulk, would have the greater activity. There are therefore two kinds of substances in the universe; the first corporeal, which are nothing but *ἄλκοι*, bulks, or tumours, devoid of all self-active power; the second incorporeal, which are *ἄλκοι δυνάμεις*, substantial powers, vigours, and activities; which, though they act upon bulk and extension, yet are themselves unbulky, and devoid of quantity and dimensions; however, they have a certain *βάθος* in them in another sense, an essential profundity, according to this of *Simplicius*, *μεριστὴ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἢ σωματικῇ οὐσίᾳ πᾶσα, ἄλλων ἀλλαχού τῶν μερίων κειμένων ἀμερίστῃ δὲ εἰδικτικῆς ἢ νοεῶν, πολὺ δὲ βάθος ἔχουσα*, *All corporeal substance is simply divisible, some parts of it being here, and some there; but intellectual substance is indivisible, and without dimensions, though it hath much of depth and profundity in it in another sense.* But that there is something *ἀφελῆστος*, unimaginable, even in body itself, is evident, whether you will suppose it to be infinitely divisible, or not, as you must of necessity suppose one or other of these. And that we ought not always to pronounce of corporeal things themselves according to imagination, is manifest from hence; because, though astronomical reasons assure us, that the sun is really more than a hundred times bigger than the whole earth, yet can we not possibly, for all that, imagine the sun of such a bigness, nor indeed the earth itself half so big, as we know it to be. The reason whereof is, partly because we never had a sense or sight of any such vast bigness at once, as that of either of them; and partly because our sense always representing the sun to us, but *ὡς πεδιῶν*, as of a foot diameter; and we being accustomed always to imagine the same according to the appearance of sense, are not able to frame any imagination of it, as very much bigger. Wherefore, if imagination be not to be trusted, nor made the criterion, or measure of truth, as to sensible things themselves, much less ought it to be, as to things insensible. Besides all which, the

ancient

* Vide Cicero. Acad. Question. Lib. IV. Cap. XXVI. p. 2294. Tom. VIII. Oper.

In Ar. Phys.
p. 3.

ancient Incorporealists argued after this manner, that it is as difficult for us to conceive a substance, whose duration is unextended or unstretched out in time, into past, present and future, and therefore without beginning; as that which is unextended as to parts, place or space, in length, breadth, and thickness; yet does reason pronounce, that there must needs be not only a duration without beginning, but also *ἄχρονος αἰών*, a *timeless eternity*, or a permanent duration, differing from that successive flux of time, (which is one of *Plato's* γυννυτά, *things generated*, or that had a beginning) this parity of reason is by *Plotinus* thus insisted on, διὸ ἐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ παντός p. 66.) χρόνος ἔξω, τὸ μὲν χρόνος συνδυαζόμενος αἰεὶ πρὸς διάστασιν, τὸ δ' αἰώνος ἔτι τῷ αὐτῷ μέ- [Ennead. VI. νούσῳ ἢ κατέλειπῳ, ἢ πλείονος ὄντος δυνάμει αἰδή, τὸ ἐπὶ πολλὰ δοκεῖσθαι ἵνα, Lib. V. χρόνος. For the same reason, that we deny local extension to the Deity, Cap. XI.] must we also deny temporal distance to the same; and affirm, that God is not in time, but above time, in eternity. Forasmuch as time is always scattered and stretched out in length and distance, one moment following after another; but eternity remaineth in the same, without any flux, and yet nevertheless outgoeth time, and transcendeth the flux thereof, though seeming to be stretched and spun out more into length. Now, the reason, why we cannot frame a conception of such a timeless eternity, is only, because ourselves are essentially involved in time, and accordingly are our conceptions chained, fettered and confined to that narrow and dark dungeon, that ourselves are imprisoned in; notwithstanding which, our freer faculties, assuring us of the existence of a being, which far transcendeth ourselves, to wit, one that is infinitely perfect; we have, by means hereof, *μωλιείων τινα*, a certain *vacination*, of such a standing timeless eternity, as its duration.

But as for that conceit, of immaterial or incorporeal bodies, or that God, and human souls are no otherwise incorporeal than as *σῆμα λεπτόμεζες*, a *thin and subtile body*, such as wind or vapour, air or æther; it is certain, that, according to the principles of the most ancient atomick philosophy, (before it was atheized) there being no such real quality of subtilty or tenuity, (because this is altogether unintelligible) but this difference arising wholly from motion, dividing the insensible parts, and every way agitating the same, together with a certain contexture of those parts; it is not impossible, but that the finest and most subtile body, that is, might become as gross, hard, heavy, and opaque, as flesh, earth, stones, lead, or iron; and again, that the grossest of these bodies, by motion, and a different contexture of parts, might not only be crystallized, but also become as thin, soft, and fluid as the finest æther. So that there is no specific difference betwixt a thick and thin, a gross and fine, an opaque and pellucid, an hard and soft body, but accidental only; and therefore is there no reason, why life and understanding should be thought to belong to the one rather than to the other of them. Besides which, the reasons of the ancient Incorporealists, (afterwards to be produced) will evince, that the human soul and mind cannot possibly be any body whatsoever, though never so fine, thin, and subtile, whose parts are by motion dividable, and separable from one another.

But it is further objected against this unextended nature, of incorporeal substances, as they are said to be all in the whole, and all in every part of that body, which they are united into, or act upon; that this is an absolute contradiction and impossibility, because if the whole of the Deity be in this one point of matter, then can there be nothing at all of it in the next adjoining, but that must needs be another whole, and nothing the same with the former. In like manner, if the whole human soul be in one part of this organized body, then can there be none at all of it in any other part thereof; and so not the whole in the whole. To which objection the ancient Incorporealists made this two-fold reply. First, in way of concession, That this is indeed an absolute contradiction for an extended substance, or body,

En. 4. L. 7.
7. 46c.

Thus *Plotinus*; σώματι ἀδύνατον ἐν πλείσι τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσθαι εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ἕπερ τὸ ἔσθαι ὑπέρχειν, *It is impossible for a body, or extended substance, to be one and the same, all of it in every part of that space, which it possesses; and for every part thereof, to be the same with the whole.* But secondly, as for an unextended and indistant substance, which hath no parts one without another, it is so far from being a contradiction, that it should be all of it in every part of that body, which it acts upon; that it is impossible it should be otherwise, only a part in a part thereof, so that an equal quantity of both should co-exist together, because this is to suppose an unextended substance to be extended. We say it is contradictory to the nature of that substance, which is supposed to be, ἀμεγέθους, ἀπειρος, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερῆς, ἀδιαιετός, devoid of magnitude, and of quantity, and of parts indistant, and indivisible; that it should be otherwise united to, or conjoined with an extended body, than

P. 662.

after this way, which is looked upon as such conjuring; namely, that the whole of it should be present with, and act upon every part thereof. Thus *Plotinus*, ἕτος ὁ λόγος ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλότριον εἶναι, εἴ ἐκ τῆς ἐτέρας φύσεως ἐκείνης: *This form of doctrine, concerning Incorporeals, is necessarily taken from the thing itself (viz. the nature of them as unextended) and hath nothing in it aliene from that essence, as confounding the corporeal nature therewith.* Whatsoever is unextended and indistant, cannot possibly co-exist

with an extended substance, point by point, and part by part, but it must of necessity be, ἔσθαι ἐν καὶ ταύτων ἀριθμῶν, *All of it, one and the same numerically; that is, (like itself) undividedly, in every part of that which it acts upon.* Wherefore the word ἔσθαι, in this form, when it is said, that the whole Deity is in every part of the world, and the whole soul in every part of the body, is not to be taken in a positive sense, for a whole consisting of parts, one without another, but in a negative only, for μὴ μεμερισμένον, *an whole undivided; so that the meaning thereof is no more than this, that the Deity is not dividedly in the world, nor the soul dividedly in the body, a part here and a part there; but the* τὸ θεῖον ἵστανται ἔσθαι πανταχῶς ἔσθαι

F. 662.

μὴ μεμερισμένον, *every where all of it, undividedly.* Thus again *Plotinus*, εἰ δὲ πανταχῶς δεῖται, ἔχει δὲ τὸ μεμερισμένον· εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πανταχῶς αὐτὸς

εἶν, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτῆ μέρος, τὸ μὲν ὅδι, τὸ δὲ ὅδι ἔσται, αὐτὸς ἕχ εἰς ἑτι ἔσται, ὡσπερ εἰ τιμηθῆναι τι μέγεθος εἰς πολλά, καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα, καὶ ἑτι τὸ ὅλον ἐκεῖνο ἔσται· πρὸς τέτοις δὲ καὶ σώματα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα, πάλιν αὖ ἀνεφαῖναι τὸ ἀπιστέμενον, ἐν φύσει ἀθρόωτα, ὅμω θεῶν νομίζειν καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι·
If therefore God be every-where, it cannot possibly be, that he should be so dividedly; because then himself would not be every-where, but only a part of him here, and a part of him there, throughout the whole world; himself being not one undivided thing. Moreover, this would be all one, as if a magnitude were cut and divided into many parts, every one of which parts could not be that whole magnitude. Lastly, this would be the very same, as to make God a body. Now if these things be impossible, then must that so much disbelieved thing (look'd upon as such a puzzling gripbus, or rather as contradictory nonsense) be an undoubted truth, according to the common notions of mankind, that God is every where; to wit, that he is all of him the same whole, undividedly, every where. The sum of all is, that though it be an absolute contradiction, for a body, or *quantum*, to be ὅμω πᾶν, *all of it in every part* of that space, which the whole is in; yet it is no contradiction at all for an unextended and indistant being, to be all of it undividedly, in every part of that body it acts upon; but on the contrary, it would be flatly contradictory to it, to say, that it is only part of it in a part; this being to divide an indivisible thing into parts.

The fourth and last objection against incorporeal and unextended substance is from that illocality and immobility (which will follow thereupon) of human souls, and other finite particular spirits, such as dæmons or angels; that this is not only itself very absurd, to suppose these finite and particular beings, to be thus illocal and immovable, no where, and every where; (from whence it would seem to follow, that they might act the whole corporeal universe, or take cognizance of all things therein every where) but also, that this conceit is contradictory to the very principles of religionists themselves, and plainly confuted by the same; they acknowledging universally, that human souls (at death) departing out of this body, do locally move from thence into a certain other place, called *Hades*, *Hell*, or *Inferi*. Now the latter part of this objection is first to be answered. And this is indeed a thing, which the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, were not unaware of; that the vulgarly received tradition, of human souls (after death) going into Hades, might be objected against them. For the satisfying whereof, *Plotinus* suggesteth these two things; First, Τὸ μὲν εἰς Ἄδου γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ Ἄιδει τὸ χεῖρες λέγεται· *That if by Hades be meant nothing but τὸ ἀειδὲς, the invisible,* (as many times it is) *then is there no more signified by the soul's going into Hades, than its no longer being vitally united to this earthly body, and but acting apart by itself, and so hath it nothing of place necessarily included in it.* Secondly, Εἰ δὲ τινος χεῖρας τόπου τι βαρμασθῆναι; ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ κακιστῆρι λέγεται ἐκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐκ οὗτο ἔστι σῶμα· ἢ τὸ εἰδωλον εἰ μὴ ἀποσπαδεῖν, πῶς ἐν ἐκεῖ τὸ εἰδωλον· *But if by Hades be understood a certain worse place, (as sometimes it also is)*

En. 6. 1. 4.
[Cap. XVI.
p. 639]

what wonder is this? since now where our body is, there in the same place is our soul said to be also? But you will reply, how can this be, when there is now no longer any body left? We answer, that if the idol of the soul be not quite separated from it, why should not the soul itself be said to be there also, where its idol is? Where, by the idol of the soul, Plotinus seems to mean an airy or spirituous body, quickned and vitalized by the soul, adhering to it after death. But when the same philosopher supposes this very idol of the soul to be also separable from it, and that so as to subsist apart by itself too, this going alone into Hades, or the worse place, whilst that liveth only in the intelligible world, (where there is no place nor distance) lodged in the naked Deity, having nothing at all of body hanging about it, and being now not a part but the whole, and so situate neither here nor there; in this high flight of his, he is at once both absurdly paradoxical, in dividing the life of the soul as it were into two, and forgot the doctrine of his own school, which, as himself elsewhere intimateth, was this; τὸ δὲ μὴ σῶμα καταλείψων, ἢ πάντη δὲ ἔξω σώματι ἔπιθεῖται. *That our soul, though it shall quit this body, yet shall it never be disunited from all body.* Wherefore Porphyrius answering the same objection, though he were otherwise much addicted to Plotinus, and here uses his language too, yet does he in this depart from him, adhering to the ancient Pythagorick tradition; which,

En. 4. l. 3.
C. 4.
[P. 374.]

Ἀφ. p. 235.

as will appear afterwards, was this, *That human souls are always united to some body or other.* Ὡς περὶ τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς εἶναι ψυχῆς ἐστὶν, ἢ τὸ γῆς ἐπιθεῖσθαι, ὡς τὰ σώματα· τὸ δὲ προσάγει σώματι, ὃ γῆς ἐπιθεῖσθαι ἔτι καὶ ἐν αἴθρῃ εἶναι ἐστὶ ψυχῆς, ἔταν προσήκει εἰδῶν, φύσει μὲν ἔχουσι εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ, σκότει δὲ τῆν ὑπερστανῶν κεντημένῳ ὡς εἰ ὁ Ἄδης ὑπώγειός ἐστι τόπος σκιδνός, ἢ ψυχῆ ἐν αἴθρῃ γήθει ἐφελκυσμένη τὸ εἶδωλον ἐξελεῖσθαι γὰρ αὐτῆ τὰ σέσει σώματι, τὸ Πνεῦμα συμκαθεῖσθαι, ὃ ἐν τῶν Σφαιρῶν συνελέξατο· ἐπεὶ δὲ εἴηται τὸ βαρὺ πνεῦμα, καὶ ἕσθαι, ἀρξαι τῶν ὑπογειῶν τόπων, ἔτι καὶ αὐτῆ λέγεται χωρεῖν ὑπὸ γῆν· ἄρξαι ὅτι ἡ αὐτῆ εἶσαι μεταβαίνει τόπος, καὶ ἐν τόποις γήθει· ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν πεφυκότων σωμάτων, τόπος μεταβαίνει, χέσις ἀναβήθειαι. *As the soul's being here upon earth, (saith he) is not its moving up and down upon it, after the manner of bodies, but its presiding over a body, which moveth upon the earth; so is its being in Hades nothing but its presiding over that idol, or enlivened vaporous body, whose nature it is to be in a place, and which is of a dark subsistence. Wherefore, if Hades be taken for a subterraneous and dark place, yet may the soul nevertheless be said to go into Hades, because when it quits this gross earthy body, a more spirituous and subtle body, collected from the spheres (or elements) doth still accompany it. Which spirit being moist and heavy, and naturally descending to the subterraneous places, the soul itself may be said in this sense to go under the earth also with it, not as if the substance thereof passed from one place to another, but because of its relation and vital union to a body which does so.* Where Porphyrius addeth, contrary to the sense of Plotinus; *That the soul is never quite naked of all body, but hath always some body or other joined with it suitable and agreeable to its own present disposition, (either a purer or impurer one.) But that at its first quitting this gross earthy body, the spirituous body, which accompanieth it, (as its vehicle) may needs go away souled and increased with the gross vapours*

pours and steams thereof, till the soul afterwards by degrees purging itself, this becometh at length a dry splendour, which hath no misty obscurity, nor casteth any shadow.

But because all this doctrine of the ancient Incorporealists, concerning the human soul's being always (after death) united to some body or other, is more fully declared by *Philoponus* than by any other, that we have yet met withal, *Proem. in* we shall here except some passages out of him about it. First, therefore, *Aristot. De* he declareth this for his own opinion, agreeable to the sense of the best phi-^{As.}

lophers; τὴν μὲν λογικὴν χωριστὴν, τὴν δὲ ἀλογον, τοῖσι μὲν χωριστῆν, ἄλλα μὲντοι τῶς σώματι ἄχωριστον, λέγω δὲ τὸ Πνευματικῶν, ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς δόξα, ὡς δεῖξομεν *That the rational soul, as to its energy, is separable from all body; but the irrational part, or life thereof, is separable only from this gross body, and not from all body whatsoever, but hath (after death) a spirituous or airy body, in which it abideth; this I say is a true opinion, as shall be afterwards proved by us.*

And again, ἡ δὲ ἀλογὸς ἐκ ἑτι ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ἐπιδικαμένῃ γὰρ καὶ μετὰ ἔξοδον τὴν ἐκ τούτου τῆς ψυχῆς, Ὀχημα καὶ ὑποκειμένον ἔχουσα τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ μὲν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων, λέγεται δὲ ἐκ τῶ πλεονάζουσι τῶ ἄερος ὡσπερ καὶ τούτο γίνωσκ, λέγεται ἐκ τῶ πλεονάζοντος. *The irrational life of the soul hath not all its being in this gross earthy body, but remaineth after the soul's departure out of it, having for its vehicle and subject, the spirituous body; which itself is also compounded out of the four elements, but receiveth its denomination from the predominant part, to wit, air; as this gross body of ours is called earthy, from what is most predominant therein.* Thus do we see, that, according

to *Philoponus*, the human soul, after death, does not merely exercise its rational powers, and think only of metaphysical and mathematical notions, abstract things, which are neither in time nor place, but exerciseth also its lower sensitive and irrational faculties, which it could not possibly do, were it not then vitally united to some body; and this body then accompanying the soul he calls *pneumatical*, that is, (not spiritual in the Scripture-sense, but) spirituous, vaporous, or airy. Let us therefore, in the next place, see what rational account *Philoponus* can give of this doctrine of the ancients, and of his own opinion agreeably thereunto;

ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἡμέτερη, μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶ σώματος τάτι ἔξοδον, ὁμολογεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπο- *uid*
διδόναι, εἰς ἄθε ἀφαιρεθῆναι, καὶ ποιῆσαι ἐκεῖ τῶν ἢ καλῶς βεβαιωμένων παρέχειν· ἢ γὰρ μόσον τῶ εἶναι ἡμῶν φρονεῖται ἡ πρόνοια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶ εἶναι· διὸ ἐκ ἀμελείται ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐξολιθίσασα, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει τῆς προσοκητῆς ἐπιμελείας· καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀκαταστάσιον αὐτῆ διὰ γλυκοθυμίαν ἐγένετο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ καθαρῶθῆναι δι' ἀλγύσιον αὐτῆ γενέσθαι· καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ εὐκατὰ τῶν εὐκατῶν ἰάματα· διὰ τούτο ἀλγύεται ἡ καθαρὰ μὴ ἐν ταῖς ὑπὸ γῆν δικαιοτηρίαις διὰ κολάσεως. Ἄλλ' εἰ ἀσώματος ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον αὐτῆ παρέσθαι· πῶς ἔν κολάζεται; ἀνάγκη δὲ πᾶσα σῶμα τι αὐτῆς ἐξῆρῆσαι, ὃ δικαιομένον ἀμείτρως ἡ συβριζόμενον, ὑπὸ ψέσεως ἢ καύσεως ἀμείτρως, ἀλγύει τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὴν συμμάθεον· ποῦν δὲ σῶμα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξημέου αὐτῆς; αὐὸ ὅπῃ τούτο ἀναλύθη γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐξ αὐ συβριζομεν, ἀλλὰ τούτοι, τὸ Πνευματικὸν, ὃ λέγομεν ἐν τούτῳ δὲ εἰσι πάντως ἐκ τούτου ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, θεοῦ; καὶ ἐπιθυμία· καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· *Our human soul (in those who are not purged and cleansed in this life) after its departure out*

of this body, is acknowledged, or rather demonstrated, to go into Hades, there to receive punishment for its evil actions past. For providence does not only take care of our being, but also of our well-being. Therefore is the soul, though lapsed into a preternatural state, yet not neglected by providence, but hath a convenient care taken of it, in order to its recovery. And since sinning had its original from the desire of pleasure, it must of necessity be cured by pain: for here also contraries are the cures of contraries. Therefore the soul being to be purged, is punished and pained in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, in order to its amendment. But if the soul be incorporeal, it is impossible for it to suffer. How then can it be punished? There must of necessity be some body joined with it, which being immoderately constricted or agitated, concreted or secreted, and discordantly moved by heat and cold, or the like, may make the soul sensible of pain, by reason of sympathy, as it is here in this life. What body therefore is that, which is then conjoined with the soul, after the dissolution of that earthy body into its elements? Certainly it can be no other than this pneumatical, or spirituous body, which we now speak of; for in this are seated, as their subject, the irascible and concupiscible passions, and they are inseparable from the same; nor could they be in the soul disunited from all body: and that soul, which is freed from these, would be forthwith freed from generation; nor would it be concerned in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, but be carried up aloft to the higher celestial regions, &c. After which he endeavours further to confirm this opinion from the vulgar phenomena, ὅπου δὲ ἐτι μάλλον ὅτι τί ἐστι τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα, καὶ τί τε ἀχώριστα θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνεργείας· πόθεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τάφοις τὰ ζωοειδῆ φαίνονται φαντάσματα; ἢ γὰρ ὄψεαι ἢ ψυχὴ ἐξηματίσται, ἢ ὄλος ἐστὶν ὄρασι; ἀλλὰ φασι τὰς ἀκαθάρις ψυχὰς, μετὰ τὴν ἔξοδον τῶν τῶ σωματικῶν πλανασθῆναι ἐπὶ τινὰ χρόνον μετὰ τῶ πνευματικῶ, καὶ τῶ παραδεικνύουσι περὶ τῶν τῶν διὰ φροντισίου εὐζωίας· ὑπὸ τῶν γὰρ φασι τῶ πνευματικῶ, παχυδέστερος ἐν μοχθηρῆς διαίτης, κατασπᾶσθαι περὶ τὰ παθητὴ τὴν ψυχῆν. Furthermore, that there is such a pneumatical (spirituous, vaporous, or airy) body, which accompanieth souls unpurged after death, is evident also from the phenomena themselves. For what account can otherwise be given of those spectres and phantoms, which appear shadow-like about graves or sepulchres, since the soul itself is neither of any figure, nor yet at all visible? Wherefore these ancients say, that impure souls, after their departure out of this body, wander here, up and down, for a certain space, in their spirituous, vaporous, and airy body, appearing about sepulchres, and haunting their former habitations. For which cause there is great reason, that we should take care of living well, as also of abstaining from a fœul and grosser diet; these ancients telling us likewise, that this spirituous body of ours, being souled and incrustated by evil diet, is apt to render the soul, in this life also, more obnoxious to the disturbances of passions. And here Philoponus goes on to gratify us with a further account of some other of the opinions of these ancients, concerning this spirituous or airy body, accompanying the soul after death; ἔχει γὰρ τι καὶ αὐτόφασι τῶ φυντικῶς ζωῆς, καὶ γὰρ τρέφεται. τρέφεται δὲ ἕχ ἕως ἄς τῶ το σῶμα, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτῶν ἢ ἐκ μέρων, ἀλλ' ὅταν δι' ὅλε, φέρεται εἰπεῖν, ὡς οἱ ἰσχυροὶ εἰχούται

δέχονται τὰς ἀτμὰς· διὰ τὸτο Φροντίζουσιν οἱ Σπαθιαῖοι τῆς λεπτοτέρας διαίτης ἢ ἑπιτόμεας, διὰ τὸ μὴ παχυνεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα ἀλλὰ λεπτύνεσθαι· πρὸς τὸτο ἢ τῆς καθαρμῆς Φασὶ παραλαμβάνειν· τὸτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ἵδαλι πλύνεσθαι, ἐκεῖτο δὲ καθαρμῆς διὰ τῶν ἀτμῶν, διὰ γὰρ ἀτμῶν τινῶν τρέφεται τινῶν δὲ καθαίρεται· ἢ διαργανώσθαι δὲ Φασιν αὐτὸ, ἀλλ' ὅλου δι' ὅλα ἐνεργεῖν, κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἢ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· διὸ ἢ Ἀριστοτέλης Φησὶν ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ Φυσικὰ, ὅτι ἡ κυρίως αἰσθησις μίξ, ἢ τὸ κυρίως αἰσθητικόν ἔσθι· *They further add, that there is something of the plantal and plastick life also, exercised by the soul, in those spirituous or airy bodies after death; they being nourished too, though not after the same manner, as these gross earthy bodies of ours are here, but by vapours; and that not by parts or organs, but throughout the whole of them, (as sponges) they imbibing every where those vapours. For which cause, they, who are wise, will in this life also take care of using a thinner and dryer diet, that so that spirituous body (which we have also at this present time within our grosser body) may not be clogged and incrasated, but attenuated. Over and above which, those ancients made use of catharms, or purgations, to the same end and purpose also: for as this earthy body is washed by water, so is that spirituous body cleansed by cathartick vapours; some of these vapours being nutritive, others purgative. Moreover, these ancients further declared concerning this spirituous body, that it was not organized, but did the whole of it, in every part throughout, exercise all functions of sense, the soul hearing, and seeing, and perceiving all sensibles, by it every where. For which cause, Aristotle himself affirmeth, in his Metaphysics, that there is properly but one sense, and but one sensory; he, by this one sensory, meaning, the spirit, or subtle airy body, in which the sensitive power doth all of it, through the whole, immediately apprehend all variety of sensibles. And if it be demanded, how it comes then to pass, that this spirit appears organized in sepulchres, and most commonly of human form, but sometimes in the form of some other animals? to this those ancients replied, That their appearing so frequently in human form proceedeth from their being incrasated with evil diet, and then, as it were, stamped upon with the form of this exterior ambient body in which they are, as crystal is formed and coloured like to those things, which it is fastned in, or reflects the image of them; and that their having sometimes other different forms proceedeth from the phantastick power of the soul itself, which can at pleasure transform this spirituous body into any shape: for being airy, when it is condensed and fixed, it becometh visible, and again invisible, and vanishing out of sight, when it is expanded and rarified.*

Now, from these passages cited out of *Philosophus*, it further appeareth, that the ancient asserters of the soul's immortality did not suppose human souls, after death, to be quite stript stark naked from all body; but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy body accompanying them, though in different degrees of purity or impurity respectively to themselves. As also, that they conceived this spirituous body (or at least something of it) to hang about the soul also here in this life, before death, as its interior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to it, when that other gross earthly part of the body is, by death,

death, put off, as an outer garment. And some have been inclinable to think (by reason of certain historical phenomena) these two to be things so distinct, that it is not impossible for this spirituous body, together with the soul, to be locally separated from the other grosser body, for some time before death, and without it. And indeed thus much cannot be denied, that our soul acteth, not immediately only upon bones, flesh and brains, and other such like gross parts of this body, but first, and chiefly, upon the animal spirits, as the immediate instruments of sense and phancy, and that, by whose vigour and activity the other heavy and unwieldy bulk of the body is so nimbly moved. And therefore we know no reason, but we may assent here to that of *Porphyrius* *, τὸ αἷμα τροφὴ καὶ τροφή ἐστὶ τῷ πνεύματι, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς; *That the blood is the food and nourishment of the spirit*, (that is, that subtle body called the animal spirits) *and that this spirit is the vehicle of the soul, or the more immediate seat of life.*

Nevertheless, the same *Philoponus* there addeth, that, according to these ancients, besides the terrestrial body, and this spirituous and airy body too, there is yet a third kind of body, of a higher rank than either of the former, (peculiarly belonging to such souls after death, as are purged and cleansed from corporeal affections, lusts and passions) called by them, *σῶμα αὐροειδές*, and *εὐράνιον*, and *αιθέριον*, &c. a *luciform*, and *celestial*, and *æthereal body*. The soul (saith he) continueth either in the terrestrial or the aerial body, so long, ἕως ἑαυτὴν καθάρματα ἀνερχθῆναι, τῆς γενέσεως ἀπαλλαγεῖσθαι· τότε τόνου καὶ τὸν θυμὸν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀποτίθειαι, μὲνὰ τότε τῷ ὀχέματι τῷ πνεύματι λέγω· εἶναι δὲ τι καὶ μὲνὰ τότε ἄλλοι, αἰθέριος αὐτῆς ἐξημῆται, σῶμα εὐράνιον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἰθέριον, ὃ φασι τῶν Αὐροειδῶν ἢ Ἀεραειδῶν· τῶν γὰρ ἰργασμῶν ἔσαν ἀνάγκη πάντως ἔχειν τινα κλύσον ὃν διαιεῖ, μέρος ὅντα τῷ κοίμῳ καὶ εἰ ἀεικίνητος ἐστὶ, καὶ δὲ αὐτὸν ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖν, δεῖ ἔχειν αἰθέριον ἐξημῆται τὸ σῶμα, ὃ ἀεὶ ζωοποιεῖται· διὰ ταῦτα ἔν τὸ αὐροειδῆς φασὶ σῶμα αὐτὸν ἀεὶ ἔχειν, *until that having purged itself, it be carried aloft, and freed from generation. And then doth it put off both the irascible and concupiscible passions at once, together with this second vehicle, or body, which we call spirituous. Wherefore these ancients say, that there is another heavenly body always conjoined with the soul, and eternal, which they call luciform, and star-like: for it being a mundane thing, must of necessity have some part of the world as a province allotted to it, which it may administer. And since it is always moveable, and ought always to act, it must have a body eternally conjoined with it, which it may always enliven. And for these causes do they affirm, the soul always to have a luciform body.* Which lucid and æthereal body of the soul is a thing often mentioned by other writers also; as *Proclus*, in his commentary upon the *Timæus*, καὶ τῆς ἀθεραπίης ψυχῆς ἐξήρηται τι τοῖσιν ὀχημα αἰθέριον, ὡς αὐτὸς φησὶ· ἐπιβεβῆσαι γὰρ εἰς ὄχημα καὶ αἰθῆρ φασὶ τὸν δημιουργόν· καὶ γὰρ πάσαι ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν συνῶν (σώματων, αἰθέριος καὶ ἐκκίνητος) χρῆσθαι σώματι, ὡς καὶ ἑσέως ἔχουσαν τὸ κινεῖν; *The human soul hath also (saith he) such an æthereal vehicle belonging to it, as Plato himself intimates, when he affirmeth the Demiurgus at*

* p. 290.

* Vide Libr. de Antro. Nymphar. p. 257, & 259.

first to have placed it in a chariot. For of necessity every soul, before this mortal body, must have an eternal and easily moveable body, it being essential to it to move. And elsewhere the same Proclus, *ἀνα μόνους ἄθρο διαμεθεα τῶντων τῶν P. 164.*

μεριστῶν ὀργάνων ἃ ἡμῶν συνήρτηται, κατελθῆσιν εἰς γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ τὸ ὄχημα τὸ Ἀυροειδές; πάσας ἔχων κωμώδεις τὰς αἰδησίας. Whilst we remain above, we have no need of these divided organs, which now we have descending into generation; but the uniform, lucid, or splendid vehicle is sufficient, this having all senses united together in it. Which doctrine of the unorganized, luciform, and spirituous vehicles seems to have been derived from Plato, he, in his *Epinomis*, writing thus concerning a good and wife man after death; *ὅς ἢ δι' ἰσχυρίζεται παίζειν ἢ σταθάξεν ἅμα; ἕσπερ θανάτῳ, τὴν αὐτὴ μοῖραν ἀναπλήσει, μήτε μεθέξεν ἔτι πολλῶν τότε, καὶ ἄσπερ νῦν αἰδησιῶν, μίας μοίρας μέγιστα μου, ἢ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα ἐνδείματα ἴσθαι.* Of whom, together I be in jest or earnest, I constantly affirm, that when dying he shall yield to fate, he shall no longer have this variety of senses, which now we have, but one uniform body, and live a happy life. Moreover, Hierocles' much insisteth upon this, *Ἀυροειδές; σῶμα, this luciform and ethereal body, ὃ ἢ ψυχῆς λεπτοῦ ὄχημα οἱ χροσμοὶ καλεῖται, which also (saith he) the oracles call the thin and subtile vehicle or chariot of the soul;* he meaning, doubtless, by these oracles, the magical or Chaldaic oracles before mentioned. And amongst those now extant under that title, there seems to be a clear acknowledgment of these two vehicula of the soul, or interior induments thereof; the spirituous and the luciform body, the latter of which is there enigmatically called *Ἐπίπεδον*, or a plain superficies, in these words²; *Μὴ Πνεῦμα μαλύνῃς, μηδὲ βαθένης τὸ Ἐπίπεδον, take care not to defile or contaminate the spirit; nor to make the plain superficies deep.* For thus *Pellus* glosseth upon that oracle, *δύο χιτῶνας ἐπιπέδουσι τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι; ἢ τὸν μὲν Πνευματικὸν ἀνόμασαν, ἀπὸ τῆ αἰσθητῆ ἔξυφανθέντα αὐτῆ; τὸ δὲ Ἀυροειδῆ, λεπτοῦ ἢ ἀναστῆ, ὑπερ Ἐπίπεδον. The Chaldaic philosophers bestow upon the soul two interior tunics or vestments, the one of which they called pneumatical, or the spirituous body, which is weaved out, as it were, to it, and compounded of the gross sensible body, (it being the more thin and subtile part thereof;) the other the luciform vestment of the soul, pure and pellucid, and this is that, which is here called the plain superficies.* Which, saith *Pletbo*³, is not so to be understood, as if it had not three dimensions (inasmuch as it is a body also) but only to denote the subtilty and tenuity thereof. Wherefore, when the afore said *Hierocles*⁴ also calls this luciform and ethereal body, τὸ Πνευματικὸν Ὄχημα τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, the spiritual vehicle of the rational soul he takes not the word *πνευματικόν*, in that sense, wherein it is used by *Philoponus*, and others; as if he intended to confound this ethereal body with that other spirituous or airy body, and to make but one of them, but rather stiles it spiritual, in a higher sense, (and which cometh near to that of the Scripture) as being a body more suitable and cognate with that highest and divinest part of the soul, mind or reason, than the other terrestrial body is (which, upon that account, is called also, by the same *Hierocles*⁵,

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¹ Comment. in *aurea Pythagor. Carmina*,

P. 214. 215.

² Oracul. Zoroastr. Sect. X. Veis. 275. p. 394. Ed. Clerici.

³ Comment. in *hoc Oraculum.*

⁴ Ubi supra, p. 222.

⁵ Ibid. p. 214.

as well as it is by St. Paul ¹, *σῶμα ψυχικόν, the animal or natural body.*) So that this spiritual body of Hierocles is not the airy, but the ethereal body, and the same with Synesius ² his *θεσπίσιον σῶμα, his divine body.* And that this distinction of two interior vehicles or tunicles of the soul, besides that outer vestment of the terrestrial body (styled in Plato τὸ ὀσσεῖδες, the crustaceous, or straccous body) is not a meer figment of the latter Platonists since Christianity, but a tradition derived down from antiquity, appeareth plainly from *Virgil*, in his sixth *Æneid*, where, though not commonly understood, he writeth first of the spirituous, or airy body, in which unpurged souls receive punishment after death, thus:

*Quin & supremo cum lumine vita reliquit,
Non tamen omne malum miseris, nec funditus omnes
Corporee excedunt peses; penitusque necesse est
Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris.
Ergo exercentur pennis, veterumque malorum
Supplicia expendunt; alie panduntur inanes
Suspense ad ventos; aliis sub gurgite casto
Infernum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni.*

And then again of the other pure ethereal and fiery body, in this manner:

*Donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
Æthereum sensum, atque auram simplicis ignem.*

Now, as it was before observed, that the ancient asserters of the soul's immortality, supposing it to have, besides this terrestrial body, another spirituous or airy body, conceived this not only to accompany the soul after death, but also to hang about it here in this life, as its interior vest or tunicle; (they probably meaning hereby the same with that, which is commonly called the animal spirits, diffused from the brain, by the nerves, throughout this whole body) in like manner it is certain, that many of them supposing the soul, besides those two forementioned, to have yet a third luciform, or ethereal body, conceived this in like manner to adhere to it even in this mortal life too, as its inmost clothing or tunicle; yet, so as that they acknowledged the force thereof to be very much weakened and abated, and its splendour altogether obscured by the heavy weight and gross steams or vapours of the terrestrial body. Thus *Suidas*, upon the word *Ἀυροειδής* tells us out of *Isidore*, *ὡς ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ Ἀυροειδής Ὀχνημα, λεγόμενον ἀυροειδής τε καὶ ἀίδιον καὶ τῦτο μὲν τὸ Ἀυροειδής σῶμα τὰδε ἀπεκλειδίσαι τοῖσι μὲν εἶπω τῆς κεφαλῆς.* That, according to some philosophers, the soul hath a certain luciform vehicle, called also star, or sun-like, and eternal; which luciform body is now shut up within this terrestrial body (as a light in a dark lanthorn) it being supposed by some of them to be included within the head, &c. With which agreeth *Hierocles*, ἐν τῷ *Συλλῶ ἡμῶν σῶματι, τὸ Ἀυροειδής εἶναι, πρὸς πῶτον τῷ ἀψύχῳ σῶματι ζῶντι, καὶ τὴν ἀρμονίαν αὐτῷ συνίσχον.* The *luciform*, or *inciform* body, lieth in this mortal body of ours, continually

P. 293

[P. 214 E. lit.
(Needham.)]

1 Cor. xv. 44.

2 De Incarnatis p. 140. Orger.

ually inspiring it with life, and containing the harmony thereof. The ground of which opinion was, because these philosophers generally conceived the human soul to have pre-existed before it came into this earthly body, and that either from eternity, or else from the first beginning of the world's creation; and being never without a body, and then in a perfect state, to have had a lucid and æthereal body, either co-eternal, or co-eve with it, (though in order of nature junior to it) as its chariot or vehicle; which being incorruptible, did always inseparably adhere to the soul, in its after-laps and descents, into an æreal first, and then a terrestrial body; this being, as it were, the vinculum of union betwixt the soul and them. Thus

Pletho † declares their sense; διὰ δὲ ταύτου σώματι τῷ δὲ ποτε τῷ ἐν τῷ τῆγε ἀνθρώπινῳ ψυχῆν συγγίνεσθαι, ὅλα ὅλα τῷ τῷ ἐμῆρου ζωτικῷ πνεύματι διὰ συγγείακω ἐπιπλεκόμεναι ἅτε πνευματός τινος καὶ αὐτῆ ὅλης. By this æthereal body is our human soul connected with its mortal body; the whole thereof being implicated with the whole vital spirit of the embryo, for as much as this itself is a spirit also. But long before Pletho was this doctrine declared and asserted by Galen, as agreeable both to Plato's and his own sense; he first premising,

that the immediate organ or instrument of sight was αἰγροειδής, a luciform and æthereal spirit; δέοντως ἂν ἐρῶμεν αἰγροειδῆς μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ὄργανον, αἰροειδῆς δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς, αἰρωμοειδῆ δὲ τὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς γεύσεως ὑγρόν, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀφῆς γεώδες, &c. Wherefore we may reasonably affirm, that the organ of sight is a luciform or æthereal body; as that of hearing is æreal; that of smelling vaporous; that of taste moist or watery; and that of touch earthy; like being perceived by like. And he accordingly thus understanding those known verses of Empedocles, which as Aristotle otherwise interprets them, are nonsense;

καὶ τοῦτ' ἀρ' ἦν ὁ βούλειαι θελοῦν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν οἷς φησὶ, Γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαίῳ, &c. αἰσθανόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως τῷ μὲν γεωδιστέρῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, τῆς γεώδης φύσεως, τῷ δ' αἰγροειδιστέρῳ τῆς ὄψεως, τῆς Ἀγροειδοῦς. And this was that, which Empedocles meant to signify, in those famous verses of his; it being certain, that by the most earthy of our senses, the touch, we perceive the earthy nature of sensibles; and by the most luciform, viz. that of sight, the passions of light; by that, which is æreal, sounds; by that, which is moist and sponge-like, tastes; and lastly, by the organ of smelling, which is the extremity of those former cavities of the brain, as replenished with vapours, odours. After which he writeth of the essence or substance of the soul, in this manner;

εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ἑσίας ἀποφίνεσθαι χρεὶ, δεῦν ἑάτερον ἀναγκασίον εἰπεῖν, ἢ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ οἶον Ἀγροειδῆ, καὶ Ἀιθερωδῆς σῶμα λεκτέον αὐτῆν, εἰς ὃ καὶ μὴ βούλειαι κατ' ἀκλεθρίαν ἀφικνοῦνθαι σῶμαί, ἢ αὐτὸν μὲν ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν οὐσίαν, ὄχημά τε τὸ πρώτον αὐτῆς εἶναι τιτὶ τὸ σῶμα, δι' οὗ μέσθ τὴν πρὸς τ' ἄλλα σώματα κοινοῦται λαμβάνει· τοῦτο μὲν οὐ ἀπὸ δι' ὅλα λεκτίον ἡμῶν ἐκείσθαι τοῦ εἰσεφάλα· τῆ δὲ γε πρὸς αὐτὸ κοινωίμ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ὄψεις αὐτῶν πνεῦμα φλοισοειδῆς γίνεσθαι. And if we should now declare any thing concerning the essence or substance of the soul, we must needs affirm one or other of these two things; that either itself is this luciform and æthereal body (which the Stoicks, whether they will or no, by consequence will be brought unto, as also Aristotle himself) or else that the soul is itself an incorporeal substance, but that this luciform æthereal body is its first vehicle, by which, as a middle, it communicates with the other bodies. Wherefore we must say, that this æthe-

Dog. Hip. & Plat. l. 7. [Cap. XIII. P. 1043. Tom. I. Oper.]

† In Orac Chald.

real lucid body is extended throughout the whole brain; whence is that luciform spirit derived, that is the immediate instrument of sight. Now from hence it was, that these philosophers, besides the moral purgation of the soul, and the intellectual or philosophical, recommended very much a mystical or telestick way of purifying this æthereal body in us, by diet and cathartics. Thus the forementioned *Hierocles* 1; ἐπιπέθῃ καὶ τῷ Ἀγγεῖδι ἡμῶν σώματι προσέθετο σῶμα θινόν οὐ, καθαρῆσαι δὲ καὶ τῆτο, &c. Since to our lucid or splendid body, this gross mortal body is come by way of accession, we ought to purify the former also, and free it from sympathy with the latter. And again afterwards, εἰ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεις καὶ τῷ Ἀγγεῖδι δόχημα ὁ προσκεῖται, ὅπως οὐ κινῆται ὑπόπτερον καὶ τῆτο γενόμενος μὴ ἐμποδῶν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν ἀνω πορείαν, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς: Together with the purgations of the rational soul, the purification of the luciform or æthereal vehicle is also to be regarded, that this being made light, and alate or wingy, might no way hinder the soul's ascent upward: but he, that endeavours to purify the mind only, neglecting the body, applies not himself to the whole man. Whereupon he concludes, τὴν Τηλεστικὴν ἐπέχειαι λέγω, τὴν τῷ Ἀγγεῖδι καθαρτικὴν ὄνομαζω. I therefore call this the telestick or mystick operation; which is conversant about the purgation of the lucid or æthereal vehicle. And whereas philosophy was by *Plato* and *Socrates* 2 defined to be a continual exercise of dying (which *Pliny* 3 thought to be nothing but an hypochondriacal or atrabiliar distemper in them, in those words of his, which *Salmasius*, and other critics, can by no means understand, *Est etiam quidam morbus, per sapientiam mori: That the dying by wisdom or philosophy, is also but a certain kind of bodily disease or over-grown melancholy*) though they supposed this principally to consist in a moral dying to corporeal lusts and passions; yet was the design thereof partly mystical and telestick also, it driving at this further thing, that when they should put off this terrestrial body, they might at once die also to the spirituous or æreal; and then their soul have nothing left hanging about it, but only the pure æthereal body, its light-winged chariot: which in *Virgil's* language is

— Purumque relinqui
Æthereum sensum, atque auræ simplicis ignem.

Notwithstanding which, the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem not to have been all of them of this persuasion, that the same numerical æthereal body, which the soul was at first created with, continueth still about it, and adhereth to it inseparably to all eternity, during its descents into other grosser bodies; but rather to have supposed, that, according to the moral disposition of the soul, it always finds or makes a cognate and suitable body correspondently pure or impure; and consequently, that by moral virtue and philosophy, it might again recover that celestial body, which was lost by its fall and descent hither. This seemeth to have been *Porphyrus* 4 his sense, in these words of his; ὡς οὐ διετέθη ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐνίσκει σῶμα τάξει καὶ τοῖς κακίαις ἀνεριστήσιον διὸ καθαρῶτερον μὲν διακειμένη σὺμφύσει τὸ εἶδος τῷ ὅλῳ σῶμα, ἢ πρὶ ἐν τῷ αἰθέριον. However the soul be in itself affected, so does it always

1 Ibid. p. 216

2 Vide Plotin. in Phydron, p. 372.

3 Hist. Natur. Lib. VII. Cap. 50.

4 In Sententiis ad Intelligibilia ducentibus, § XXXII. p. 233

find

find a body suitable and agreeable to its present disposition ; and therefore to the purged souls does naturally accrue a body, that comes next to immateriality ; that is, an ethereal one. And probably Plato ' was of the same mind, when he affirmed, the soul to be always in a body, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another.

Now from what hath been declared, it appeareth already, that the most ancient assertors of the incorporeity and immortality of the human soul supposed it, notwithstanding, to be always conjoined with a body. Thus *Hierocles* plainly, ἡ λογικὴ εὐστασία σὺμφυεῖ ἔχουσα σῶμα, ἢ τῶ παρα τῷ δημιουργῷ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρῆλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν, μήτε ἄνευ σώματος· ἀλλ' αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον, ἀποπερατῆσαι δὲ εἰς σῶμα τὸ ὅλου αὐτῆς εἶδος· *The rational nature having always a cognate body, so proceeded from the demiurgus, as that neither itself is body, nor yet can it be without body ; but though itself be incorporeal, yet its whole form, notwithstanding, is terminated in a body.* Accordingly whereunto, the definition, which he gives of a man, is this, ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ σὺμφυῆς ἀθανάτου σώματος·, *a rational soul, together with a cognate immortal body.* He concluding there afterwards, that this enlivened terrestrial body, or mortal man, is nothing but εἰδωλον ἀνθρώπου², *the image of the true man*, or an accession thereunto, which is therefore separable from the same. Neither doth he affirm this only of human souls, but also of all other rational beings whatsoever, below the supreme Deity, and above men, that they always naturally actuate a body. Wherefore a dæmon or angel (which words are used as synonymous by *Hierocles*) is also defined by him after the same manner, ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ φωτεινῷ σώματι·, *a rational soul together with a lucid body.* And accordingly *Proclus* upon *Plato's Timæus*³ affirmeth, πάντα δαιμόνα τῶν ἡμετέρων κρείττονα ψυχῶν, καὶ νοεῖν ἔχειν ψυχῶν, καὶ ὄχημα αἰθέριον· *That every dæmon, superiour to human souls, hath both an intellectual soul and an ethereal vehicle, the entireness thereof being made up or compounded of these two things.* So that there is hardly any other difference left betwixt dæmons or angels, and men, according to these philosophers, but only this, that the former are lapsable into aerial bodies only, and no further ; but the latter, into terrestrial also⁴. Now *Hierocles* positively affirmeth⁵ this to have been the true cabala, and genuine doctrine of the ancient Pythagoreans, entertained afterwards by *Plato* ; καὶ τὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἦν δόγμα, ὃ δὲ Πλάτων ἔστρεον ἐξέφηνεν, ἀπεικασίας ζυμφοῦτω δυνάμει ὑποπίεξαι ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνίοχου ; πᾶσων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ψυχῶν· *And this was the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, which Plato afterwards declared ; he resembling every, both human and divine soul (that is, in our and modern language, every created rational being) to a winged chariot, and a driver or charioteer, both together : meaning by the chariot, an enlivened body ; and by the charioteer, the incorporeal soul itself acting it.*

And now have we given a full account, in what manner the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, answered that objection

¹ De Legibus, Lib. X.

² P. 214.

³ Lib. V. p. 320.

⁴ Vide Porphyr. de Abinent. ab Esu Animal. lib. II. §. 38. p. 81, & alios.

⁵ Ubi supra, p. 213.

against the illocality and immobility of particular finite spirits, dæmons or angels, and human souls; that these being all naturally incorporate, however in themselves and directly immoveable, yet were capable of being in sense moved, by accident, together with those bodies, respectively, which they are vitally united to. But as for that pretence, that these finite spirits, or substances incorporeal, being unextended, and so having in themselves no relation to any place, might therefore actuate and inform the whole corporeal world at once, and take cognizance of all things therein; their reply hereunto was, That these being essentially but parts of the universe, and therefore not comprehensive of the whole, finite or particular, and not universal beings, (as the three hypotheses of the Platonick trinity are) the sphere of their activity could not possibly extend any farther, than to the quickening and enlivening of some certain parts of matter and the world, allotted to them, and thereby of becoming particular animals; it being peculiar to the Deity, or that incorporeal substance, which is infinite, to quicken and actuate all things.

But it would be no impertinent digression here, (as to the main scope of our present undertaking) should we briefly compare the forementioned doctrine and cabala of the ancient Incorporealists (the Pythagoreans and Platonists) with that of Christianity; and consider the agreement, or disagreement, that is betwixt them. First therefore, here is a plain agreement of these best, and most religious philosophers, with Christianity, in this; That the most consummate happiness, and highest perfection, that human nature is capable of, consisteth not in a separate state of souls, stript naked from all body, and having no manner of commerce with matter, as some high-flown persons in all ages have been apt to conceit. For such amongst the philosophers (and Platonists too) was *Plotinus*; the unevenness and unfitness of whose temper may sufficiently appear from hence, that as he conceived human souls might possibly ascend to so high a pitch, as quire to shake off commerce with all body; so did he on the other hand again imagine, that they might also descend and sink down so low, as to animate not only the bodies of brutes, but even of trees and plants too; two inconsistent paradoxes; the latter whereof is a most prodigious extravagancy, which yet *Empedocles* (though otherwise a great wit) seems to have been guilty of also, from those verses of his in *Athenicus* ¹;

"Ἦδη γὰρ πᾶσι ἰγὼ γένεσθαι κάρτε κέεσθαι τε,
Θάμνωσθαι, τ' οἰωσῶς τε καὶ εἰς ἄλλα ἔλλεσθαι ἰχθύσας.

And amongst the Jews, the famous *Maimonides* was also of this persuasion, it being a known aphorism of his, in his great work, שבעילים הכנה אין ניה, או רריה: *That in the world to come (or state of consummate happiness) there shall be nothing at all of body, but pure incorporeity.* Upon which account, being accus'd as a denier of the resurrection, (an article as well of the Jewish, as of the Christian faith) he wrote that book intitled, *Iggereth Teman* purposely

¹ Deipnosophist. Lib. VIII. p. 510.

purposely to purge himself, and to reconcile those two assertions together, which he doth after such a manner, as that there should be indeed a resurrection, at the first coming of the Jewish Messias, of some certain persons, to live here a while upon the earth, eat and drink, marry and be given in marriage, and then die again; after which, in the world to come, they should for ever continue pure souls, un-united to any body. In which it may be well suspected, that the design *Maimonides* drove at, was against Christianity; which, notwithstanding, as to this particular, hath the concurrent suffrages of the best philosophers, that the most genuine and perfect state of the human soul, which in its own nature is immortal¹, is to continue for ever, not without, but with a body: and yet our high-flown enthusiasts generally (however calling themselves Christians) are such great Spiritualists, and so much for the inward resurrection, (which we deny not to be a Scripture-notion also; as in that of *St. Paul*², *If ye be risen with Christ, &c.* And again³, *If by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead*) as that they quite allegorize away, together with the other parts of Christianity, the outward resurrection of the body; and indeed will scarcely acknowledge any future immortality, or life to come, after death, their spirituality thus ending in Sadducism and infidelity, if not at length in downright atheism and sensuality.

But, besides this, there is yet a further correspondence of Christianity with the forementioned philosophick cabala, in that the former also supposes the highest perfection of our human souls, not to consist in being eternally conjoined with such gross bodies, as these we now have, unchanged and unaltered: for as the Pythagoreans and Platonists have always complained of these terrestrial bodies, as prisons, or living sepulchres of the soul; so does Christianity seem to run much upon the same strain, in these Scripture-expressions⁴, *In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven:* and again⁵, *We that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened, not for that we would be unclothed,* (that is, stript quite naked of all body) *but so clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life:* and lastly⁶, *Ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption* (sonship or inheritance) *namely, the redemption of our bodies;* that is, the freedom of them from all those evils and maladies of theirs, which we here lie oppressed under. Wherefore we cannot think, that the same heavy load and luggage, which the souls of good men being here burdened with, do so much groan to be delivered from, shall, at the general resurrection, be laid upon them again, and bound fast to them, to all eternity: for, of such a resurrection as this, *Plotinus* (though perhaps mistaking it for the true Christian resurrection) might have some cause to affirm, that it would be but *ἀνάστασις εἰς ἄλλου ὕπνου, or resurrection to another sleep;* the soul seeming not to be thoroughly awake here, but, as it were, soporated with the dull steams and opiatick vapours of this gross body. For thus the author of the *Book of Wisdom*⁶, *The corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down*

¹ Col. iii. 1.

² Phil. iii. 21.

³ 2 Cor. v. 2.

⁴ 2 Cor. v. 4.

⁵ Rom. viii. 23.

⁶ Chap. ix. 15.

the mind, that museth upon many things. But the same will further appear, from that account, which the Scripture itself giveth us of the resurrection: and first, in general, when St. Paul, answering that query of the philosophick infidel, *How are the dead raised, or with what body do they come?* replieth in this manner, *Thou fool,* (that is, thou, who thinkest to puzzle or baffle the Christian article of the resurrection, which thou understandest not) *that which thou sowest, is not quickened* (to the production of any thing) *except it first die to what it was.* And *thou sowest not that body, that shall be, but bare grain,* as of wheat, or of barley, or the like; *but God* (in the ordinary course of nature) *giveth it a body, as it hath pleased him* (that is, a stalk, and an ear, having many grains with husks in it, and therefore neither in quantity nor quality the same with that, which was sowed under ground) nor does he give to all seeds one and the same kind of body neither, but to every seed its own correspondent body; as to wheat one kind of ear, and to barley another. As if he should have said; Know that this present body of ours is to be look'd upon but as a kind of seed of the resurrection-body, which therefore is accordingly in some sense the same, and in some sense not the same with it. Besides which general account, the particular oppositions, which the Scripture makes betwixt the present and future body, seem very agreeable to those of the philosophick cabala: for, first, the present body is said¹ to be sowed in *corruption*, but the future raised in *incorruption*. For *the children of the resurrection cannot die any more*². And then *mortality shall be swallowed up of life*³. Wherefore the Christian resurrection-body, as well as that of the philosophick cabala, is *σῶμα ἀθάνατον*, and *ἀίδιον* too, (2 Cor. v. 1.) *an immortal and eternal body*. Again, the body sowed, is said⁴ to be a *dishonourable, ignominious, and inglorious body*; and therefore called also by St. Paul⁵, *τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν*, *The body of our humility, or humiliation*; a body agreeable to this lapsed state of the soul, but the body, which shall be raised, shall be a *glorious body*; and *σῶμα μετ' αὐτῷ* *σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ*, *conformable to that glorious body of Christ*: who, when he was but externally transfigured, his face did *shine as the sun*, and his raiment *was white as the light*. The glory of a body consisteth only in the comeliness of its proportion, and the splendour thereof: thus is there⁶ *one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars*, that is, a different splendour of them. Wherefore the future body of the righteous, according to the Scripture also, as well as the philosophick cabala, will be *σῶμα φωτεινόν*, and *σῶμα ἀσχηματιστόν*, and *σῶμα ἀσχηματιστόν*, a *glorious, splendid, luciform and star-like body*, Wisdom iii. 7. *ἐν καιρῷ ἐπισκοπῆς αὐτῶν ἕνδοξοῦσιν*, *The righteous, in the time of their visitation, shall shine forth*. Daniel xii. 2, 3. *They, that be wise, shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they, that turn many to righteousness, as the stars for ever and ever.* And *Matth. xiii. 43. Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their father.* And therefore probably this future glorious resurrection-body is that *inheritance of the saints in light*, which the Scripture speaks of, *Col. i. 12*. Moreover, there is another difference betwixt this present and that future body of the

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 42.

² Luke xx. 36.

³ 1 Cor. xv. 54.

⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 43.

⁵ Phil. iii. 21.

⁶ 1 Cor. xv. 41.

righteous,

righteous, wherein St. Paul¹ and Hierocles² do well agree; the first being called by both of them, *Σῶμα ψυχικόν*, an animal body, the second *Σῶμα πνευματικόν*, a spiritual body. Which latter expression, in Scripture, does not only denote the subtilty and tenuity thereof; but also as this present body is called an animal body, because it is suitable and agreeable to that animal life, which men have common with brutes, so is that future called spiritual, as bearing a fit proportion and correspondency to souls renewed in the spirit of their mind, or in whom the divine Spirit dwelleth and æteth, exercising its dominion. ³ *There is an animal body, and there is a spiritual body.* And, the first Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam a quickening spirit. And thus are ψυχικοί, in the Scripture, taken for οἱ πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες, they who have not the Spirit. And ⁴ ψυχικὸς ἀνθρώπος οὐ δύναται δεῖξαι τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ Θεοῦ, the animal man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God. Which Spirit is also said, in Scripture, to be the earnest of that our future inheritance, Ephes. i. 14. and the earnest of this spiritual and heavenly body, 2 Cor. v. 5. It is also said to be that, by which (efficiently) these mortal bodies shall be quickned, Rom. viii. 11. *If the Spirit of him, that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; he, that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you.* Neither doth Hierocles fall much short of this Scripture-notion of a spiritual body, when he describes it to be that, ὁ τῇ νοεῖᾳ τελειότερον τῆς ψυχῆς συνάρτησις, which is agreeable to the intellectual perfection of the soul. This spiritual body is that, which the ancient Hebrews called, כנפי תנשר eagles wings; we reading thus in the Gemara of the Sanhedrin, (c. 11. fol. 92. col. 2.) אמתן שנים שעמיר תקבת לחרש נהן את תעולם צריקים מה הן עושין אותן שנים שעמיר תקבת לחרש נהן את תעולם צריקים מה הן עושין If you ask, What shall become of the righteous, when God shall renew the world? the answer is, God shall make them wings like eagles, whereby they shall fly upon the face of the waters. Again, as this present body is called, in Scripture, an earthly body, so is the future body of the righteous styled by St. Paul, as well as the Pythagoreans, a heavenly body, and they, who shall then be possessors thereof, ἐπουράνιοι ἄνθρωποι, heavenly men, 1 Cor. xv. As is the heavenly, such are they, that are heavenly. Besides which, as philosophers supposed both dæmons (or angels) and men, to have one and the same *Σῶμα ἀσώματος, ἄρσενος* and αἰθέριον, or a like lucid, heavenly and ætherial body; so from that of our Saviour, when he affirmeth, that they, who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, will neither marry, nor be given in marriage; nor can die any more; for they are ἰσάγγελοι, equal to the angels. From hence, I say, we may venture to call this resurrection-body of the just also an angelical or isangelical body; and the rather because the ancient Hebrews (as we learn from Nachmonides, in Shaar Haggemul) styled it לבושת הנפש המלאכותי the angelical clothing of the soul; and Tertullian himself, angelificatam carnem, angelified flesh. But, lastly, St. Paul is not only positive in his doctrine here, but also negative⁶; *Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption.* Which place being undoubtedly

P. 297. [P. 217. Edit. Needham.]

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¹ 1 Cor. xv. 44.

⁴ 1 Cor. ii. 14.

² Comment. in aurea Pythag. carmina,

⁵ Luke xx. 36.

p. 214. Edit. Needhami.

⁶ 1 Cor. xv. 50.

³ 1 Cor. xv. 45.

Thus St. Augustine; and Qualia sunt Angelorum.

not to be allegorized, it may be from thence inferred, that the happy resurrection-body shall not be this foul and gross body of ours only varnished and gilded over on the outside of it, it remaining still nasty, flutish, and ruinous within, and having all the same seeds of corruption and mortality in its nature, which it had before, though by perpetual miracle kept off, it being as it were by violence defended from being seized upon and devoured by the jaws of death; but that it shall be so inwardly changed in its nature, as that the possessors thereof cannot die any more. But all this, which hath been said of the resurrection-body, is not so to be understood, as if it belonged universally to all, that shall be raised up at the last day, or made to appear upon the earth in their own persons, at that great and general assizes; that they shall have all alike (wicked as well as good) such glorious, spiritual and celestial bodies; but it is only a description of the *ἀνάστασις τῆς ζωῆς*, the *resurrection of life*; which is emphatically called also by our Saviour Christ ¹, *ἀνάστασις ἡ ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν*, the *resurrection from the dead*, or to a happy immortality; as they, who shall be thought worthy thereof, are likewise stiled by him *ἡοὶ ἀναστάσεως*, the *children of the resurrection*. Of which resurrection only it is that St. Paul treateth, in that fifteenth chapter of his to the *Corinthians*. And we say, that this Christian resurrection of life is the vesting and settling of the souls of good men in their glorious, spiritual, heavenly and immortal bodies. The complete happiness of a man, and all the good that can be desired by him, was by the Heathen poet thus summed up, *Ut sit mens sana in corpore sano*, *That there be a sound mind in a sound body*: and the Christian happiness seems to be all comprised in these two things; *first*, in being inwardly regenerated and renewed in the spirit of their mind, cleansed from all pollution of flesh and spirit, and made partakers of the divine life and nature; and then, *secondly*, in being outwardly clothed with glorious, spiritual, celestial and incorruptible bodies. The Scripture plainly declareth, that our souls are not at home here, in this terrestrial body, and these earthly mansions, but that they are strangers and pilgrims therein; which the patriarchs also confessing, plainly declared, that they sought a country, not that which they came out from, but a heavenly one. From which passages of Scripture some indeed would infer, that souls being at first created by God pure, pre-existed, before this their terrene nativity, in celestial bodies; but afterwards straggled and wandered down hither, as *Philo* for one ², *ἀπολιπῶσα μὲν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸν οὐράνιον τόπον, καθάπερ εἰς ξένην χώραν ἦλθετὸ σῶμα*. Our soul (saith he) *having left its heavenly mansion, came down into this earthly body, as a strange place*. But thus much is certain, that our human souls were at first intended and designed by God Almighty, the maker of them, for other bodies and other regions, as their proper home and country, and their eternal resting-place: however, to us, that *be not first, which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual*. Now though some, from that of St. Paul ³, where he calls this happy resurrection-body, *οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*, *that house of ours, that is from heaven*, or which *cometh out of heaven*, would infer, that therefore it will not be taken out of graves

¹ Luke xx. 25.

narum rerum hæres, p. 519. & aliâ.

² De Agricult. p. 197. & in Libro, quis divi-

³ 2 Cor. v. 2.

graves and charnel houfes; they conceiving alfo, that the individuation and famenefs of men's perfons does not neceffarily depend upon the numerical identity of all the parts of matter, becaufe we never continue thus the fame, our bodies always flowing like a river, and paffing away by infenfible tranfpiration; and it is certain, that we have not all the fame numerical matter, and neither more nor lefs, both in infancy and in old age, though we be for all that the felf-fame perfons: yet, neverthelefs, according to the beft philofophy, which acknowledges no effential or fpecific difference of matter, the fouleft and groffeft body that is, merely by motion may not only be cryftallized, but alfo brought into the purity and tenuity of the fineft æther. And undoubtedly, that fame numerical body of our Saviour Chrift, which lay in the fepulchre, was after his refurrection thus transformed into a fpiritual and heavenly body; the fubtilty and tenuity whereof appeared from his entring in when the doors were fhut, and his vanifhing out of fight; however its glory were for the time fufpended, partly for the better convincing his difciples of the truth of his refurrection, and partly becaufe they were not then able to bear the fplendor of it. We conclude therefore, that the Chriftian mystery, of the refurrection of life, confifteth not in the foul's being reunited to thefe vile rags of mortality, thefe grofs bodies of ours, (fuch as now they are;) but in having them changed into the likenefs of Chrift's glorious body, and in this mortal's putting on immortality.

Hitherto have we feen the agreement, that is betwixt Chriftianity and the old philofophick cabala, concerning the foul, in thefe two things: Firft, that the higheft happinefs and perfection of the human foul confifteth not in a ftate of pure feparation from all body; and fecondly, that it does not confift neither in an eternal union with fuch grofs terreftrial bodies, as thefe unchanged; the foul being not at home, but a ftranger and pilgrim in them, and oppreffed with the load of them: but that at laft, the fouls of good men fhall arrive at glorious, fpiritual, heavenly and immortal bodies. But now as to that point, whether human fouls be always united to fome body or other, and confequently when by death they put off this grofs terreftrial body, they are not thereby quite divefted, and ftript naked of all body, but have a certain fubtile and fpirituos body, ftill adhering to them, and accompanying them? or elfe, whether all fouls, that have departed out of this life, from the very beginning of the world, have ever fince continued in a ftate of feparation from all body, and fhall fo continue forwards till the day of judgment or general refurrection? we muft confefs, that this is a thing not fo explicite determined, or exprefly decided in Chriftianity, either way. Neverthelefs, it is firft of all certain from fcripture, that fouls departed out of thefe terreftrial bodies are therefore neither dead nor afleep, till the laft trump and general refurrection, but *Death, called* ftill alive and awake; our Saviour Chrift affirming, that *they all live unto* νεκρῶν ἐν Χριστῷ *God; the meaning whereof feems to be this, that they, who are faid to be* κατὰ τὸν Θεὸν *dead, are dead only unto men here upon earth; but neither dead unto them-* μας *ſelves, nor yet unto God, their life being not extinct, but only difappear-* ειν *ing*

ing to us, and withdrawn from our sight; for as much as they are gone off this stage, which we still continue to act upon. And thus is it said also of our Saviour Christ himself, and that after his resurrection too, *that he liveth unto God* (Rom. vi. 10.) From whence it is evident, that they, who are said to live to God, are not therefore supposed to be less alive, than they were, when they lived unto men. Now it seemeth to be a privilege or prerogative proper to the Deity only, to live and act alone, without vital union or conjunction with any body. *Querendum*, saith Origen, *si possibile est, penitus incorporeas remanere rationabiles creaturas, cum ad summum* [Cap. II. p. 69. Oper.] *sanctitatis ac beatitudinis venerent? An necesse est eas semper conjunctas esse corporibus? It is worth our inquiry, whether it be possible for rational creatures to remain perfectly incorporeal, and separate from all body, when they are arrived to the highest degree of holiness and happiness? or whether they be always of necessity conjoined with some bodies; and afterwards he plainly affirmeth it to be impossible, *Vivere præter corpus ullam aliam naturam, præter Patrem, & Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum: For any other nature, besides the Father, and the Son, and Holy Ghost, to live quite without a body. Indeed if this were most natural to the human soul, and most perfective of it, to continue separate from all body, then doubtless (as Origen implied) should the souls of good men, rather after the day of judgment, continue in such a state of separation, to all eternity. But on the contrary, if it be natural to souls to enliven and inform some body or other, (though not always a terrestrial one) as our inward sense inclines us to think, then can it not seem so probable, that they should, by a kind of violence, be kept so long in an unnatural or preter-natural state of nakedness and separation from all body, some of them even from Adam till the day of judgment.**

Again, the Scripture also intimates, that souls departed out of this life have a knowledge of one another, and are also capable of the punishment of sense or pain: *Fear him*, (saith our Saviour) *who after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell*, Luke xii. And the soul of the rich man is said to be immediately after death in torments, before the day of judgment; as likewise to have known *Abraham and Lazarus*. And it seems neither agreeable to our common notions, nor yet to piety, to conclude, that the souls of wicked men, departing out of this life, from the beginning of the world in their several ages, till the day of judgment, have all of them no manner of punishment inflicted on them, save only that of remorse of conscience, and future expectation. Now it is not conceivable, how souls after death should know and be knowable, and converse with one another, and have any punishment of sense or pain inflicted on them, were they not vitally united to some bodies. And thus did *Tertullian* reason long ago; *Dolet apud inferos anima cujusdam, & punitur in flamma, & cruciatur in lingua, & de digito animæ salicioris implorat solatium roris. Imaginem existimas, exitum illum pauperis letantis, & divitis mærentis. Et quid illic Lazari nomen, si non in veritate res est? Sed etsi imago credenda est, testimonium erit veritatis. Si enim non habet anima corpus, non caperet imaginem corporis. Nec mentiretur de corporalibus membris scriptura, si non erant. Quid est autem illud,*

τῆς ἀνεχθῆναι
I. 2.
[Cap. II. p. 69.
Oper.]

De An. p. 309.
Rigal.
[Cap. VII.
P. 165.]

*illud, quod ad inferna transfertur, post divortium corporis? quod detinetur, & in diem judicii reservatur? Ad quod & Christus moriendo descendit? puto ad animas patriarcharum? Incorporalitas animæ ab omni genere custodiæ libera est; immunis à pœna & à fovea. Per quod enim punitur aut fovetur, hoc erit corpus. Igitur si quid tormenti sive solatii anima præcepit in carcere, vel diversorio inferum, in igni vel in sinu Abrahæ, probata erit corporalitas animæ. Corporalitas enim nihil patitur, non habens per quod pati possit: aut si habet, hoc erit corpus. In quantum enim omne corporale passibile est; in tantum quod passibile est, corporale est. We read in Scripture of a soul tormented in hell, punished with flames, and desirous of a drop of water to cool his tongue. You will say, perhaps, that this is parabolical and fictitious. What then does the name of Lazarus signify there, if it were no real thing? But if it be a parable never so much, yet must it, notwithstanding, as to the main, speak agreeably to truth. For if the soul (after death) have no body at all, then can it not have any corporeal image, shape, or figure. Nor can it be thought, that the Scripture would be concerning corporal members, if there were none. But what is that, which, after its separation from this body, is carried down into hell, and there detained prisoner, and reserved till the day of judgment? And what is that, which Christ dying descended down unto? I suppose to the souls of the patriarchs. But incorporality is free from all custody or imprisonment, as also devoid of pain and pleasure. Wherefore, if souls be sensible of pain after death, and tormented with fire, then must they needs have some corporeity; for incorporality suffers nothing. And as every corporeal thing is passible or patible, so again whatsoever is passible is corporeal. † Tertullian would also confirm this from a vision or revelation of a certain sister-prophet, (miracles and prophecy being said by him not to be then altogether extinct.) *Inter cætera ostensa est mihi anima corporaliter, & spiritus videbatur, tenera & lucida, & aërii coloris, & formæ per omnia humanæ: There was (said she) amongst other things, a soul corporally exhibited to my view, and it was tender and lucid, and of an aëreal colour, and every way of human form. Agreeably to which, Tertullian himself addeth; Effigiem non aliam animæ humanæ deputandam præter humanam, & quidem ejus corporis, quod unaqueque circumtulit. There is no other shape to be assigned to a human soul, but human; and indeed that of the body, which is before carried about. It is true indeed, that Tertullian here drives the business so far, as to make the soul itself to be corporeal, figurate, and colorate, and after death to have the very same shape, which its respective body had before in this life; he being one of those, who were not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, and therefore being a religionist, concluded God himself to be a certain body also. But the reasons, which he here insisteth on, will indeed extend no further than to prove, that the soul hath after death some body vitally united to it, by means whereof it is both capable of converse, and sensible of pain, for as much as body alone can have no sense of any thing.**

And this is that, which *Irenæus* from the same Scripture gathereth; not that the soul is a body, but that it hath a body, after death, conjoined with

† Ubi supra, Cap. IX. p. 166.

L. 2. c. 62.
[Cap.
XXIV. p.
168. edit.
Maffueti.]

C. 63.
[Cap.
XXIV. p.
168.]

it, and that of the same form and figure with that body, which it had before here in this life; *Plenissimè autem Dominus docuit, non solum perseverare, non de corpore transgredientes animas. sed & characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem; et meminisse eas operum, quæ egerunt hic, & à quibus cessaverunt; in enarratione, quæ scribitur de Divate & de Lazaro, qui refrigeratur in sinu Abrahamæ; in qua ait Divate cognoscere Lazarum post mortem; et manere in suo ordine unumquemque ipsorum.* Our Lord hath most plainly taught us, that souls do not only continue after death, without passing out of one body into another, but also, that they keep the character of body, wherein they are then also adapted, the same, which they had before; as likewise, that they remember the actions and omissions of their life past; in that enarration, which is written concerning the rich man and Lazarus, who was refreshed in Abraham's bosom; wherein he affirmeth the rich man to have known both Lazarus and Abraham after death, as also each of them to remain in their own order. And thus again in the following chapter; *Per hæc manifestissimè declaratum est, & perseverare animas; & non de corpore in corpus exire; & habere hominis figuram; (ut etiam cognoscantur) & meminisse eorum, quæ hic sint; & dignam habitationem unamquamque gentem percipere, etiam ante judicium.* By these things it is most manifestly declared, that souls do both persevere after death, and that they do not transmigrate out of one body into another, and that they have a human figure or shape, (whereby they may be known;) as also that they remember the things here upon the earth, and their own actions; and lastly, that each kind of good and bad have their distinct and suitable habitations assigned them, even before the judgment. Now, that Irenæus did not here mean, that souls are themselves bodily substances, and consequently have a certain character, form and figure of their own, but only that they have certain bodies conjoined with them, which are figurate, is first of all evident from the words themselves, *characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem;* the natural sense whereof is this, that they keep the character of body (wherein they are then also adapted after death) the same with that, which these bodies before had here in this life. And it is further manifest from hence, because he elsewhere plainly declareth souls themselves to be incorporeal; as in his fifth book and seventh chapter, *Flatus autem vite incorporalis est, but the breath of life is incorporeal.*

Furthermore, Origen was not only of the same persuasion, that souls after death had certain subtle bodies united to them, and that those bodies of theirs had the same εἶδος χαρακτεριστικῶν, characterizing form, which these their terrestrial bodies before had; but also thinks, that this, together with the soul's immortality, may be sufficiently proved from the frequent apparitions of ghosts or departed souls; in way of opposition to Celsus, endeavouring to invalidate the Scripture testimonies concerning the apparitions of our Saviour Christ, and imputing them either to magical imposture, or fanatick phrenzy, or the disciples mistaking their own dreams and phancies

phancies for visions and sensations, after the Epicurean way ¹, τὸ το δὲ εἶδεν ἤ-λου
κατὰ Κελσιανόν ἐστι ἀναλκίως δόγμα, ὡς ἔρα ἡ ψυχὴ ὑφέστηκε τῶν ἀποθανόντων
ἢ ἢ μάλιστα πεπίστευκε περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς, ὁ τὸ το δόγμα ἀνελκώς· ὡς ἢ
Πλάτων ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς λόγῳ, Ἐμοιοῖ δὲ φαντάσματα περὶ μνημεῖα τιτὶ γεγε-
νησι τῶν πῶν τεθνηκότων· *Though this might seem to have been smartly opposed by*
Celsus, yet are those very apparitions of ghosts, notwithstanding, a sufficient
argument or proof of a certain necessary opinion, that souls do subsist after
death. Neither did Plato vainly conclude the immortality and permanency of
the soul, besides other things, from those shadow-like phantasms of the dead, that
have appeared to many about graves and monuments. Whereupon he giveth
this further account of these apparitions, τὰ μὲν ἐν γινόμενα περὶ ψυχῆς τεθνηκό-
των φαντάσματα ἀπὸ τινῶν ὑποκειμένων γυῖλαι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὑφέστηκαν ἐν τῷ καλυ-
μένῳ Ἀυροειδῇ Σώματι ψυχῶν· *For these apparitions of the dead are not meer*
groundless imaginations, but they proceed from souls themselves, really remain-
ing and surviving after death, and subsisting in that, which is called a luciform
body. Where, notwithstanding Origen takes this Ἀυροειδὲς Σῶμα, or luci-
form body, in a larger sence, than the Greek philosophers were wont to do;
namely, so as to comprehend under it that airy or vaporous body also,
which belongeth to unpurged souls, who do therein most frequently ap-
pear after death; whereas it is thought proper to the purged souls to be
cloathed with the luciform body only. Besides which, the same Origen
tells us, that the thing, which St. Thomas the Apostle disbelieved, was not
our Saviour's appearing after death, as if he had thought it impossible for
ghosts or souls departed visibly to appear, but only his rising and appearing
in that same solid body, which had been before crucified, and was laid in
the sepulchre; συγκατεθέμετο μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖν τῇ φασματικῇ αὐτὸν ἐωρακίαναι, ὡς ἐκ
ἀδύναται λέγει, τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ τεθνηκότ ἐφθῆναι· ἀκέτι δ' ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ ἐν
σώματι αὐτὸν ἀντιτύπων ἐγνηγέθαι· *Thomas also, as well as the other Apostles,*
assented to the woman affirming, that she had seen Jesus; as not thinking it at all
impossible for the soul of a dead man to be seen: but he did not believe him to
have risen and appeared in that self-same solid body, which before he lived
in; for which cause he said, not only, unless I see him; but added also,
And unless I shall put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my
hand into his side, I will not believe. Where again Origen subjoins, Ταῦτα
δ' ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ τῆ Θωμᾶ, κρίνουσιν ὅτι δύναται Ὁφθαλμοῖς αἰδητοῖς φανῆναι ψυχῆς
Σῶμα πάντα τῷ προτέρῳ εἶδει, ——— μεγαδός τε, ἢ ὄμματα καλ' ἰουκίης, ἢ φωνῆ,

Πολλοὶ οἱ ἢ τοῖα περὶ χροῖ εἶματ' ἐχούσης.

These things were said by Thomas, not as doubting at all, but that the body
of a soul departed (to wit, condensed) might be seen with the eyes of sense,
every way resembling that form which it had before in this life, both in respect
of bigness, figure, colour, and voice; and oftentimes also in the same custo-
mary garments. Wherefore, according to Origen, the Jews were at that
time generally possessed with this opinion, that souls after death had certain
bodies united to them, wherein they might visibly appear; neither is that

¹ Adv. Celsum, Lib. II, p. 97.

of any great moment to the contrary, which a learned criticke objecteth, that *Josephus*, writing of their opinions, maketh no mention hereof; he omitting, besides this, other considerable dogmata of theirs also, as that of the resurrection. However this at least is certain from hence, that *Origen* himself took it for granted, that human souls departed were not altogether naked or unclothed, but clothed with a certain subtile body, wherein they could also visibly appear, and that in their pristine form.

Moreover, it might be here observed also, that when upon our Saviour's first apparition to his disciples, it is said, that they were affrighted, as supposing they had seen a spirit; our Saviour does not tell them, that a spirit or ghost had no body at all, wherein it could visibly appear; but (as rather taking that for granted¹) that a spirit had no flesh and bones (no σώμα σάρκωσ) no such solid body as they might find him to have; bidding them therefore handle him, to remove that scruple of theirs. As if he should have said, Though spirits or ghosts, and souls departed, have bodies (or vehicles) which may by them be so far condensed, as sometimes to make a visible appearance to the eyes of men; yet have they not any such solid bodies as those of flesh and bone; and therefore by feeling and handling may you satisfy yourselves, that I am not a meer spirit, ghost, or soul, appearing, as others have frequently done, without a miracle; but that I appear in that very same solid body, wherein I was crucified by the Jews, by miraculous divine power, raised out of the sepulchre, and now to be found no more there. Agreeable to which of our Saviour Christ is that of *Apolonius* in *Philostratus*², λαβὲ μοι, ἔφη, κἀν μὲν διαφύγω σε, εἶδαι δὲ ἐμὲ εἰ δὲ ὑπομείναιμι ἀπτόμενος, πείθε εἰς ζῆν τε με, καὶ μὴ ἀποθεῖσθαι τὸ σῶμα. *Touch me and handle me, and if you find me to avoid the touch, then may you conclude me to be a spirit or ghost, (that is, a soul departed;) but if I firmly resist the same; then believe me really to live, and not yet to have cast off the body.* And indeed though spirits or ghosts had certain subtile bodies, which they could so far condense, as to make them sometimes visible to men; yet is it reasonable enough to think, that they could not constipate or fix them into such a firmness, grossness, and solidity, as that of flesh and bone is, to continue therein; or at least, not without such difficulty and pain, as would hinder them from attempting the same. Notwithstanding which, it is not denied, but that they may possibly sometimes make use of other solid bodies, moving and acting them, as in that famous story of *Phlegon's*³, where the body vanished not, as other ghosts use to do, but was left a dead carcase behind. Now, as for our Saviour Christ's body, after his resurrection, and before his ascension; which notwithstanding its solidity in handling, yet sometimes vanished also out of his disciples sight: this probably, as *Origen* conceived, was purposely conserved for a time, in a certain middle state, betwixt the crassities of a mortal body, and the spirituality of a perfectly glorified, heavenly, and ethereal body.

But there is a place of Scripture, which, as it hath been interpreted by the generality of the ancient fathers, would naturally imply, even the soul of

¹ Luke xiiii. 37.

² In Vita Apollonii Tyanci, Lib. IX. Cap. XII. p. 355.

³ In Libro de Rebus Mirabilibus, Cap. I. in Jac. Gronovii Thesaur. Antiq. Græcæ. Tom. VII. p. 264.

our Saviour Christ himself, after his death, and before his resurrection, not to have been quite naked from all body, but to have had a certain subtle or spirituous clothing, and it is this of St. Peter, *Ἐνωπιθεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιήθει δὲ τῷ πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι παρεθεῖς ἐκήρυξε*. Which being understood by those ancients, of our Saviour Christ's descending into *Hades* or hell, is accordingly thus rendered in the vulgar Latin, *Put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit: in which (spirit) also, he went and preached to those spirits that were in prison, &c.* So that the word *πνεύματι*, or *spirit* here, according to this interpretation, is to be taken for a spirituous body; the sense being this, *That when our Saviour Christ was put to death in the flesh, or the fleshy body, he was quickened in the spirit, or a spirituous body: in which (spirituous body) also, he went and preached to those spirits that were in prison, &c.* And doubtless it would be said, by the assertors of this interpretation, that the word *spirit* could not here be taken for the soul of our Saviour Christ, because this being naturally immortal, could not properly be said to be quickened and made alive. Nor could he, that is, our Saviour Christ's soul, be so well said to go, in this spirit neither, that is, in itself, the soul in the soul, to preach to the spirits in prison. They would add also, that spirit here could not be taken for the divine Spirit neither, which was the efficient cause of the vivification of our Saviour's body at his resurrection; because then there would be no direct opposition betwixt being put to death in the flesh, and quickened in the spirit; unless they be taken both alike materially. As also the following verse is thus to be understood; that our Saviour Christ went in that spirit, wherein he was quickened, when he was put to death in the flesh, and therein preached to the spirits in prison. By which spirits in prison also would be meant, not pure incorporeal substances, or naked souls, but souls clothed with subtle spirituous bodies; as that word may be often understood elsewhere in Scripture. But thus much we are unquestionably certain of from the Scripture, that not only *Elias*, whose terrestrial body seems to have been, in part at least, spiritualized, in his ascent in that fiery chariot, but also *Moses* appeared visibly to our Saviour Christ and his disciples upon the mount, and therefore (since piety will not permit us to think this a mere prestigious thing) in real bodies; which bodies also seem to have been Ἀυροειδῶν, *luciform* or *lucid*, like to our Saviour's then transfigured body.

Again, there are sundry places of Scripture, which affirm, that the regenerate and renewed have here in this life a certain earnest of their future inheritance; which is their spiritual or heavenly body; as also the quickening of their mortal bodies is therein attributed to the efficiency of the spirit dwelling in them. Which is a thing, that hath been taken notice of by some of the ancients, as *Irenæus*; *Nunc autem partem aliquam spiritus ejus sumimus, ad perfectionem & preparationem incorruptelæ, paulatim assuescentes capere & portare Deum. Quod & pignus dixit apostolus; hoc est, partem ejus honoris, qui à Deo nobis promissus est. — Si ergo pignus hoc habitans in nobis jam spirituales efficit, & absorbetur mortale ab immortalitate.* Now have

Of this St. Austin, in his 12th Book, De Gen. ad Lit. c. 33. Et Christi quidem animam venisse usque ad ea loca, in quibus peccatores cruciantur, ut eos solvere, quos esse solvendo occultata nobis sua justitia judicabat, non immeritis creditur.

L. 5. c. 8. [P. 301 Edit. Maslucci.]

we a part of that spirit, for the preparation and perfection of incorruption; we being accustomed by little and little to receive and bear God. Which also the Apostle hath called an earnest; that is, a part of that honour, which is promised to us from God. If therefore this earnest (or pledge) dwelling in us hath made us already spiritual, the mortal is also swallowed up by immortality. And Novatian ¹, Spiritus Sanctus id agit in nobis, ut ad eternitatem & ad resurrectionem immortalitatis corpora nostra perducatur, dum illa in se assuefacit cum celesti virtute misceri. This is that, which the Holy Spirit doth in us, namely, to bring and lead on our bodies to eternity, and the resurrection of immortality; whilst in itself it accustometh us to be mingled with the heavenly virtue. Moreover, there are some places also, which seem to imply, that good men shall, after death, have a further inchoation of their heavenly body, the full completion whereof is not to be expected before the resurrection or day of judgment. We know, that ² if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan earnestly. And verse 5. He that hath wrought us for the self-same thing is God, who also hath given us the earnest of the Spirit. Now how these preliudiums and prelibations of an immortal body can consist with the soul's continuance, after death, in a perfect separation from all manner of body, till the day of judgement, is not so easily conceivable.

Lastly, it is not at all to be doubted, but that *Irenæus*, *Origen*, and those other ancients, who entertained that opinion, of souls being clothed after death with a certain thin and subtile body, suspected it not in the least to be inconsistent with that of the future resurrection; as it is no way inconsistent for one, who hath only a shirt or waistcoat on, to put on a suit of clothes, or exterior upper-garment. Which will also seem the less strange, if it be considered, that even here in this life, our body is, as it were, twofold, exterior and interior; we having, besides the grossly tangible bulk of our outward body, another interior spirituous body, the soul's immediate instrument, both of sense and motion; which latter is not put into the grave with the other, nor imprisoned under the cold fods. Notwithstanding all which, that hath been here suggested by us, we shall not our selves venture to determine any thing in so great a point, but sceptically leave it undecided.

The third and last thing in the forementioned philosophick or Pythagorick cabala is concerning those beings superiour to men, commonly called by the Greeks, *dæmons*, (which *Philo* ³ tells us are the same with angels amongst the Jews, and accordingly are those words *dæmons* and *angels*, by *Hierocles* ⁴ and *Simplicius*, and other of the latter Pagan writers, sometimes used indifferently as synonymous) viz. That these *dæmons* or *angels* are not pure, abstract, incorporeal substances, devoid of vital union with any matter; but that they consist of something incorporeal, and something corporeal, joined together: so that, as *Hierocles* writeth of them, τὸ μὲν αἰὼν αὐτῶν ἀσώμα-

¹ De Trinitate, Cap. XXIX, p. 450. ad
 esalem Operum Tertulliani

² 2 Cor. v. 1.

³ De Infomniis, p. 586.

⁴ Comment. in Aurea Pythagor. Carmina, Sect. 67. p. 21c.

τος ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ κάτω σωματικὴ, *They have a superiour and an inferiour part in them; and their superiour part is an incorporeal substance; their inferiour corporeal.* In a word, that they all, as well as men, consist of soul and body, united together, there being only this difference betwixt them, that the souls of these dæmons or angels never descend down to such gross and terrestrial bodies, as human souls do; but are always clothed either with ærial, or ethereal ones. And indeed this Pythagorick cabala was universal, concerning all understanding beings, besides the supreme Deity, or Trinity of divine hypostases; that is, concerning all the Pagan inferiour gods; that they are no other than souls vitally united to some bodies, and so made up of incorporeal and corporeal substance, joined together. For thus *Hierocles* plainly expresseth himself in the forecited place¹; ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι οὕτω παρῆλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτῆν μήτε ἄνεν σώματι, &c. *The rational nature (in general) was so produced by God, as that it neither is body, nor yet without body; but an incorporeal substance, having a cognate or congenite body.* Which same thing was elsewhere also thus declared by him, ἐστὶ γὰρ πᾶς μὲν ὁ λογικὸς δianoζόμενος, μετὰ τῷ συμπεφυκότῳ αὐτῷ ἀφθάστῳ σώματι, εἰκὼν ἔστι τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, *The whole rational order, or rank of being, with its congenite immortal body, is the image of the whole Deity, the maker thereof.* Where, by *Hierocles* his rational nature or essence, and by the whole rational order, is plainly meant all understanding beings created, of which he acknowledgeth only these three kinds and degrees; first, the immortal gods, which are to him the animated stars; secondly, dæmons, angels, or heroes; and thirdly, men, called also by him, καταχθόνιοι δαίμονες, *terrestrial dæmons*; he pronouncing of them all, that they are alike incorporeal substances, together with a congenite immortal body; and that there is no other understanding nature than such, besides the supreme Deity, which is complete in itself, without the conjunction of any body. So that, according to *Hierocles*, the ancient Pythagorick cabala acknowledged no such entities at all, as those intelligences of *Aristotle*, and the *Noes* of some high-flown Platonists, (that is, perfectly unbodied minds;) and much less any rank of *Henades* or unities, superiour to these *Noes*. And indeed such particular created beings as these could neither have sense or cognizance of any corporeal thing existing without them; (sense, as *Aristotle* hath observed, resulting from a complication of soul and body, as weaving results from a complication of the weaver and weaving instruments;) nor yet could they act upon any part of the corporeal universe. So that these immoveable beings would be but like adamantine statues, and things unconnected with the rest of the world, having no commerce with any thing at all but the Deity; a kind of insignificant metaphysical gazers, or contemplators. Whereas the Deity, though it be not properly ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, a *mundane soul*, such as, together with the corporeal world, as its body, makes up one complete and entire animal; yet because the whole world proceeded from it, and perpetually dependeth on it, therefore must it needs take cognizance of all, and act upon all in it; upon which account it hath been styled by these *Pythagoreans*, ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος, (not a *mundane*, but a *supra-mundane*

¹ Ibid. 210.

dane soul. Wherefore this ancient Pythagorick cabala seems to be agreeable to reason also, that God should be the only incorporeal being in this sense, such whose essence is compleat, and life intire within itself, without the conjunction or appendage of any body; but that all other incorporeal substances created should be compleated and made up by a vital union with matter, so that the whole of them is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but a complication of both; and all the highest and divinest things in the universe, next to the supreme Deity, are animals consisting of soul and body united together. And after this manner did the ancient asserters of incorporeal substance, as unextended, decline that absurdity objected against them, of the illocality of all finite created spirits, that these being incorporeal substances, vitally clothed with some body, may, by reason of the locality and mobility of their respective bodies, truly be said to be here and there, and to move from place to place.

Wherefore we are here also to shew what agreement or disagreement there is betwixt this part of the Pythagorick cabala, and the Christian philosophy. And first, it hath been already intimated, that the very same doctrine with this of the ancient Pythagoreans was plainly asserted by Origen. Thus, in his first book, *Peri Archon*, c. 6. *Solius Dei*, (saith he) *id est Patris, & Filii, & Spiritus Sancti, nature id proprium est, ut sine materiali substantia, & absque ullâ corporeâ adjectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere. It is proper to the nature of God only, that is, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to subsist without material substance; or the society of any corporeal adjection.* Again, L. 2. c. 2. *Materialem substantiam opinione quidem & intellectu solum separari, à naturis rationalibus, & pro ipsis, vel post ipsas effectam videri; sed nunquam sine ipsa eas vel vixisse, vel vivere: solius namque trinitatis incorporea vita existere rectè putabitur. Material substance in rational natures is indeed separable from them in conception and understanding, it seeming to be made for them, and in order of nature after them; but it is not really and actually separable from the same; nor did they ever, or can they, live without it: for a life perfectly incorporeal is rightly deemed to belong to the Trinity only.* So also, in his fourth book, and his *Anacephaleosis*, *Semper erunt rationabiles nature, que indigent indumento corporeo. Semper ergo erit natura corporea, cujus indumentis uti necesse est rationabiles creaturas. Nisi quis putet se posse ostendere, quod natura rationalis absque ullo corpore vitam degere possit. Sed quam difficile id sit, & quam propè impossibile intellectui nostro, in superioribus ostendimus. There always will be rational natures, which stand in need of a corporeal indument. Wherefore there will be always corporeal nature, as a necessary indument or clothing for these rational creatures. Unless any one could shew, that it is possible for the rational nature to live without a body. Which how difficult and almost impossible it is to our understanding, hath been already declared.* Aquinas affirmeth Origen, in this doctrine of his, to have followed the opinion of certain ancient philosophers; and undoubtedly it was the old Pythagorick cabala, which the learned Origen here adhered to; that ἡ λογικὴ φύσις, as it is in

Hierocles,

* In Summâ Theolog. Part I. Quæst. LI. p. 1.

Hierocles, and πᾶς ὁ λογικός δέσμοσφι, *the rational nature made by God*; that is, all created understanding beings are neither body, nor yet without body, but have always a cognate or congenite body, as their vehicle or indument. So that angels or dæmons, as well according to *Origen* as *Hierocles*, are all of them incorporeal substances, not naked and abstract, but clothed with certain subtle bodies, or animals compounded and made up of soul and body together.

Wherefore *Huëtius*¹, and other learned men, seem not well to have understood *Origen* here, but to have confounded two different opinions together, when they suppose him to have asserted angels, and all understanding creatures, not to have bodies, but to be bodies, and nothing else; and consequently, that there is no incorporeal substance at all besides the Deity; whereas *Origen* only affirmeth, that nothing besides the Trinity could subsist and live alone, *absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate, without the society of any corporeal adjection*; and that the material nature is only a necessary indument or clothing of all rational or understanding creatures. And in this sense is it, that an incorporeal life is said by him to be proper only to the Trinity; because all other understanding beings are animals compounded of soul and body together. But that *Origen* acknowledged even our human soul itself to be incorporeal, as also that there is something in angels incorporeal, might be made evident from sundry passages in his writings; as this particularly in his sixth book against *Celsus*, ἡμεῖς ἀσώματου ὀπίαν ἐκ ἔχμεν ἐκπερμένον, δὲ εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυόμενον τὴν ἀσώματον ψυχὴν, ἢ τὴν ἀγγέλιον ἢ θρόνον, &c. ὑπόστασιν. *We do not think an incorporeal substance to be combustible, nor that the soul of man can be resolved into fire, or the substance of angels, thrones, dominions, principalities, or powers.* Where, by the substance of angels, he doubtless meant the souls of them; *Origen's* sense being thus declared by *St. Jerom*², in libris περὶ ἀγγέλων, angelos, & thronos, & dominationes, & potestates, & res totius mundi & tenebrarum, & omne nomen quod nominatur, dicit, animas esse eorum corporum, que vel desiderio vel ministerio susceperint: that in his book of principles he affirmeth, angels, and thrones, and dominions, and powers, and the governours of the darkness of this world, and every name that is named (in *St. Paul*) to be all of them the souls of certain bodies, such as either by their own desire and inclination, or the divine allotment, they have received. Now there can be no question made, but that he, who supposed the souls of men to be incorporeal, in a strict philosophick sense, and such as could not suffer anything from fire, did also acknowledge something incorporeal in angels. And thus doth he somewhere declare himself, in that book *Peri Archon*³, *Per Christum creata dixit (Paulus) omnia visibilia & invisibilia; per quod declaratur, esse etiam in creaturis quasdam invisibiles, secundum proprietatem suam, substantias; sed hęc, quamvis ipse non sunt corporeę, utuntur tamen corporibus, licet ipse sunt corporeę substantiã meliores. Illa vero substantia trinitatis neque corpus, neque in corpore, esse credenda est; sed in toto incorporeę.* When *Paul* affirmeth all things, visible and invisible, to have been created by *Christ*, or the λόγος, he intimated, that even amongst

¹ In Origenianis, Lib. II. Quest. V. p. 68. *Johan. Hierosolymitani*, Tom. II. Oper. p. 118.

² Epist. LXI. ad Pamachium de Erroribus. ³ Lib. IV. Cap. II.

the creatures, there are some properly invisible substances. Which invisible substances created, though they be not bodies, yet do they use bodies, themselves being better than corporeal substance. But the substance of the Trinity is neither body, nor yet in body, but altogether incorporeal. Wherefore angelical and human souls are not, as *Huctius* supposeth, called incorporeal by *Origen*, only as subtile bodies sometimes are by the more simple and unskilful, but in a strict philosophick sense; only he supposed them to differ from the Deity in this, that though they be not bodies, yet they are always in bodies, or clothed with bodies; whereas the Deity is in both senses incorporeal, it having not so much as any corporeal indument. So that there is here no contradiction at all to be found in *Origen*, he constantly asserting angels to have something incorporeal in them as their superiour part, and not in that vulgar sense of a subtile body, but in the philosophick; nevertheless, to have also a corporeal indument or clothing, as their outside or lower part, and in that regard only he calling them corporeal.

It is true indeed, that there were, amongst the ancient fathers, some, who were so far from supposing angels to be altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them to have nothing at all incorporeal in them, but to be mere bodies. But these either asserted, that there was no such thing at all as any incorporeal substance; and that not only angels, and human souls, but also God himself was a body: or at least they concluded, that nothing created was incorporeal; and that God, though himself incorporeal, yet could create nothing but bodies. These are here the two extremes; one, that angels have nothing corporeal at all belonging to them; the other, that they are altogether corporeal, or have nothing incorporeal in them: a middle betwixt both which is the *Origenick* hypothesis, the same with the *Pythagorick*; that in angels there is a complication of incorporeal and corporeal substance both together, or that they are animals consisting of soul and body. We shall now make it appear, that the greater part of the ancient fathers were for neither of the two forementioned extremes, either that angels were wholly incorporeal, or that they were wholly corporeal; but rather for the middle hypothesis, that they had bodies, and yet were not bodies, but, as other terrestrial animals, spirits or souls, clothed with ætherial or aerial bodies. And that the generality of the ancient and most learned fathers did not conceive angels to be mere unbodied spirits, is unquestionably evident from hence, because they agreed with the Greek philosophers in that conceit, that evil dæmons, or devils, were therefore delighted with the blood and nidours of sacrifices, as having their more gross, airy, and vaporous bodies nourished and refreshed with those vapours, which they did as it were luxuriate and gluttonize in. For thus does *Porphyrius* write concerning them, in his book *De Abſtinentia* †, ἔτοι οἱ χεῖροῦς λαιεῖν τε, κίσητε, δι' ὧν αὐτῶν, τὸ σωμαίνου ἢ πνευματικῶν πιπίεσαι: Ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀτμῶν ἢ ἀναθυμιάμασι. *These are they, who take pleasure in the incense, fumes, and nidours of sacrifices, wherewith their corporeal and spirituous part is as it were pinguified; for this lives, and is nourished, by vapours and fumigations.* And that

† Lib. II. §. XLII. p. 86.

that, before *Porphyrius*, many other Pagan philosophers had been of the same opinion, appeareth from this of *Celsus*; *Χρη γὰρ ἴσως ἔκ ἀπιστεῖν ἀνδράσι σοφοῖς, οἳ δὲ Φασί, διότι τῶν μὲν περιερίων δαιμόνων τὸ πλεῖστον γενέθει σαρκετικὸς, ἢ προσπλω-* Orig. 1 8.
[P. 417.]

μέου ἀμαλῆς ἢ κίση, &c. We ought to give credit to wise men, who affirm, that most of these lower and circumterreneous demons are delighted with genture, blood, and nidour, and such like things, and much gratified therewith; though they be not able to do any thing more in way of recompence, than sometimes perhaps to cure the body, or to foretel good and evil fortunes to men and cities.

Upon which account himself, though a zealous Pagan, persuadeth men to moderation in the use of these sacrifices, as principally gratifying the inferior and worse dæmons only. In like manner *Origen* frequently insisteth upon the same thing, he affirming, that devils were not only delighted with the idolatry of the Pagans in their sacrifices, but also ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν ἀναθυμιάσει ἢ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αἱμάτων ἢ ὀλοκαυτωμάτων ἀποφορεῖς τρέφεται τὰ σώματα Φιληδόντων τοῖς τοῖστος; That their very bodies were nourished by the vapours and fumes arising from them, and that these evil demons therefore did as it were delicate and Epicurize in them. And before *Origen*, most of the ancient fathers, as *Iustin Martyr*, *Athenagoras*, *Tatianus*, *Terullian*, &c. and also many others after him endeavour to disparage those material and bloody sacrifices upon the same account, as things, whereby evil dæmons were principally gratified.

We shall only cite one passage to this purpose out of *St. Basil*, or who ever were the author of that Commentary upon *Ishaiab*, because there is something philosophick in it; *δαίμοσι διὰ τὸ φιλήδονον ἢ ἔμπαθες, αἱ θυσίαι φέρουσι τινα ἡδονὴν ἢ χρεῖαν ἐκθυμιάμενοι, διὰ τῆς καύσεως ἐξατμιζομένη τὰ αἱμάτω, καὶ ἔτω διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης λεπτοποίησης, εἰς τὴν σίσεισιν αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβεκομένη· ὅλοι γὰρ δι' ὅλων τρέφουσι τοῖς ἀτμοῖς, ἢ διὰ μακροσπυροῦς ἢ κοιλίας, ἀλλ' ὡς αἱ τρίχες πάντων ζώων ἢ ὄνυχες, ἢ ὅσα τοιαῦτα εἰς ὅλην ἑαυτῶν τὴν ἐστίαν, τὴν τριφὴν καταδέχεται. Sacrifices are things of no small pleasure and advantage to demons; because the blood, being evaporated by fire, and so attenuated, is taken into the compages and substances of their bodies: the whole of which is throughout nourished with vapours, not by eating, and stomachs, or such like organs, but as the hairs and nails of all animals, and whatsoever other things receive nourishment into their whole substance.*

And thus do we see it undeniably manifest, that many of the ancient fathers supposed devils to have bodies; neither can it at all be doubted, but that they concluded the same of angels too, these being both of the same kind, and differing but as good and evil men. And though they do not affirm this of good angels, but of devils only, that they were thus delighted and nourished with the fumes and vapours of sacrifices, and that they Epicurized in them; yet was not the reason herof, because they conceived them to be altogether incorporeal, but to have pure ætherial or heavenly bodies; it being proper to those gross and vaporous bodies of dæmons only to be nourished and refreshed after that manner. And now, that all these ancient fathers did not suppose either angels or devils to be altogether corporeal, or to have nothing but body in them, may be concluded from hence, because many of them plainly declared the souls of men to be incorporeal; and therefore it

Contra Cels.
l. 7. p. 334

C. 1. [§. 25.
p. 398. Tom.
I. Oper. Ba.
filii in Ap.
pend.]

cannot be imagined, that they should so far degrade angels below men, as not to acknowledge them to have any thing at all incorporeal.

But we shall now instance in some few, amongst many of these ancients, who plainly asserted both devils and angels to be spirits incorporate, and not to be mere bodies, but only to have bodies; that is, to consist of soul and body, or corporeal and incorporeal substance joined together. That angels themselves have bodies, is every where declared by St. *Austin* in his writings; he affirming, that the bodies of good men, after the resurrection, shall be *qualia sunt angelorum corpora, such as are the bodies of angels*; and that they shall be *corpora angelica, in societate angelorum, angelical bodies, fit for society and converse with angels*; and declaring the difference betwixt the bodies of angels and of devils in this manner, *Dæmones, antequam transgredirentur, cælestia corpora gerebant, quæ conversa sint ex pæna in aëream qualitatem, ut jam possint ab igne pati*; That though devils, before the transgression, had celestial bodies, as angels now have, yet might these afterwards, in way of punishment, be changed into aërial ones, and such as now may suffer by fire. Moreover, the same St. *Austin* somewhere¹ calleth good angels by the name of *animæ beatæ atque sanctæ, happy and holy souls*. And though it be true, that in his Retractions he recalleth and correcteth this, yet was this only a scrupulosity in that pious father concerning the mere word, because he no where found in Scripture angels called by the name of souls; it being far from his meaning, even there to deny them to be incorporeal spirits joined with bodies. And certainly he, who every where concludes human souls to be incorporeal, cannot be thought to have supposed angels to have nothing at all but body in them. Again, *Claudius Mamertus*², writing against *Faustus*, who made angels to be mere bodies without souls, or any thing incorporeal, maintaineth, in way of opposition, not that they are mere incorporeal spirits, without bodies (which is the other extreme) but that they consist of corporeal and incorporeal, soul and body joined together; he writing thus of devils, *Diabolus ex duplici diversaque substantia constat; & corporeus est & incorporeus: The devil consisteth of a double and different substance; he is corporeal, and he is also incorporeal*. And again of angels, *Patet beatos angelos, utriusque substantiæ, & incorporeos esse in ea sui parte, qua ipsis visibilis Deus; & in ea itidem parte corporeos, qua hominibus sunt ipsi visibiles. It is manifest, that the blessed angels are of a two-fold substance; that they are incorporeal in that part of theirs, wherein God is visible to them, and again corporeal, in that other part, wherein themselves are visible to men*. Moreover, *Fulgentius* writeth concerning angels in this manner; *Planè ex duplici eos esse substantia asserunt magni & docti viri. Id est, ex spiritu incorporeo, quo à Dei contemplatione nunquam recedunt; & ex corpore, per quod ex tempore hominibus apparent. Corpora vero æthera, id est, ignea, eos dicunt habere; dæmones vero corpus aëreum. Great and learned men affirm angels to consist of a double substance; that is, of a spirit incorporeal, whereby they contemplate God; and of a body, whereby they are sometimes visible to men: as also, that they have*

In Psal. 85.

In Psal. 145.

De Gen. ad

Lit. l. 3. c. 10.

[§. 15. p. 114.]

Tom. III.]

L. 2. c. 11.

L. 3.

L. 3. De Trin.

[p. 119. Oper.

Edr. Sirmond.

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¹ De Musica, Lib. VI. Cap. XVII. §. 59.

p. 401. Tom. I. Oper.

² De Statu Animæ, Lib. III. Cap. VII. p.

178. Edit. Bartini.

ætherial or fiery bodies, but devils aerial. And perhaps this might be the meaning of *Joannes Theſſalonicenſis*, in that dialogue of his, read and approved of in the seventh council, and therefore the meaning of that council itself too, when it is thus declared, *νοερός μὲν αὐτὸς ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησίαι γνώσκει, ἡ μὴ ἀσμάτως πάντα ἢ αὐράτως, λεπτοσώματος δὲ, ἢ αἰετώδεις, ἢ πυρώδεις, &c.* *That the catholic church acknowledges angels to be intellectual, but not altogether incorporeal and invisible; but to have certain subtle bodies, either airy or fiery.* For it being there only denied, that they were altogether incorporeal, one would think the meaning should not be, that they were altogether corporeal; nor indeed could such an opinion be fastened upon the catholic church; but that they were partly incorporeal, and partly corporeal; this being also sufficient in order to that design, which was driven at in that council. However *Pfellus* 1, who was a curious inquirer into the nature of spirits, declares it not only as his own opinion, but also as agreeable to the sense of the ancient fathers, *ὡς ἐκ ἀτόμου τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐστὶ Φύλον, μετὰ σώματος δὲ γέ: That the demoniack or angelick kind of beings is not altogether incorporeal, or bodiless, but that they are conjoined with bodies, or have cognate bodies belonging to them.* Who there also further declares the difference betwixt the bodies of good angels and of evil dæmons, after this manner; *τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀγγελικόν, αἰετὸς τινὰς ἐξαιρέτου ἕνους, τοῖς ἐπιτό: ὀφθαλμοῖς P. 33. [P. 48.] ἐστὶν ἀφώρητον τε ἢ ἀνύψατον· τὸ δαιμονίου δὲ, εἰ μὲν ταύτου δῆποτε ἦν, ἐκ ἴδρα εἰπεῖν, ὅμοιον δ' οὐ, ἑωσφόρου Ἡσαΐου τὸν ἐκπεσόντα καλονομάζουσι· οὐδὲ ἀλλὰ ζοφώδες οἶον ἢ ἀμαυρόν ἐστι, ἢ τοῖς ὕμιασι λυπηρόν, γυμνωθέν τῷ συζύγῳ φωτός· ἢ τὸ μὲν ἀγγελικόν παντάπασι ἐστὶν ἄυλον διὸ ἢ διὰ πάντα ἐστὶ σερῶ διαδύου ἢ διόν, ἢ τῆς ἡλιακῆς ἀκτῆς οὐ ἀπαδείξεον· τὴν μὲν γὰρ διὰ σώματων διαφωτῶν ἰδῶν, ἀποστρέγει τὰ γινώσκαι καὶ ἀλαμπῆ ὡς καὶ κλάσιν ὑπομένειν, ἅτε δὴ ἔνυλον ἔχουσιν τῷ δὲ ἄνδρ ἐστὶ πρόσκατες, οἷα μηδεμίαν ἔχουσι πρὸς μηδὲν ἀντίθεσιν· τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια σώματα, καὶ ὑπὸ λεπτότητι ἀφανῆ καθίστηεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἑυλάπη, καὶ ἐμπαθῆ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅσα τοὺς ὑπὸ γῆν ὑποδιδυκε τόπους· ταῦτα γὰρ τοσαύτην ἔχει τὴν σύστασιν, ὡς καὶ ἀφαῖς ὑποπίπειν, καὶ πλετίζόμενα ἰδουῦσθαι, καὶ περὶ προσομηλήσαντα κίεσθαι·* *The angelical body sending forth rays and splendors, such as would dazzle mortal eyes, and cannot be borne by them; but the demoniack body, though it seemeth to have been once so bright also, (from Isaias his calling him, that fell from heaven, Lucifer) yet is it now dark and obscure, foul and squallid, and grievous to behold, it being deprived of its cognate light and beauty. Again, the angelical body is so devoid of gross matter, that it can pass through any solid thing, it being indeed more impassible than the sun-beams; for though these can permeate pellucid bodies, yet are they hindered by earthy and opaque, and refracted by them: whereas the angelical body is such, as that there is nothing so imporous or solid, that can resist or exclude it. But the demoniack bodies, though, by reason of their tenuity, they commonly escape our sight, yet have they, notwithstanding, gross matter in them, and are patible, especially those of them, which inhabit the subterraneous places; for these are of so gross a consistency and solidity, as that they sometimes fall also under touch, and being stricken, have a sense of pain, and are capable of being burnt with fire.* To which purpose, the Thracian there addeth more afterwards from the information of *Marcus* the monk, a per-

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1 Dialog. de Operationibus Dæmonum, p 44.

P. 94.
[P. 142.]

son formerly initiated in the diabolick mysteries, and of great curiosity ; τὸ δαμονίον ἄρα πνεῦμα δίπλα ὃν κατὰ φύσιν αἰσθητικόν κατὰ πᾶν ἰαυτοῦ μέρος, ἀμέσως ὁρᾷ τε καὶ ἀκνεί, καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ὑπομένει πάθῃ, διαιρούμενον ὀδυνάται κατὰ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ στερεά· ταύτη τούτων διευγνώσκου, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῶν διερεθιζάντων, μόλις ἢ ἔδαμῶς ἄλγεται τὸ δὲ διαιρέμενον ἐυθὺς συμφύεται, καθάπερ αἰεῖται ἢ καὶ ὑδατῶν μέρια μεταξὺ τινῶν ἐπιπίπτοια στερεῶν· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ θάττον ἢ λόγῳ τὸ πνεῦμα συμφύεται, πλὴν ἀναίται κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ γίνεσθαι τῆν διαιρέσειν· *The demoniack spirit or subtle body, being in every part of it capable of sense, does immediately see and bear, and is also obnoxious to the affections of touch; insonmuch that being suddenly divided or cut in two, it hath a sense of pain, as the solid bodies of other animals have; it differing from them only in this, that these other bodies, being once discontinued, are not easily consolidated together again; whereas the demoniack body, being divided, is quickly redintegrated by coalescence, as air or water: nevertheless it is not without a sense of pain at that time, when it is thus divided, &c.* Moreover, the same *Marcus* affirmeth the bodies of these dæmons to be nourished also, though in a different manner from ours; τρέφονται οἱ μὲν δι' ἰσπνοῦς, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρτηρίαις καὶ ἐν νεύροις πνεῦμα· οἱ δὲ δι' ὑστέτην, ἀλλ' ἢ στόματι καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὡπερ σπόγγου καὶ ὀσσεραχόδεσμα, σπῶντες μὲν τῆς παρακλιμένης ὑγρότητι ἔξωθεν· *They are some of them nourished by inspiration, as the spirit contained in the nerves and arteries; others by sucking in the adjacent moisture, not as we do by moutbs, but as sponges and testaceous fishes.* And now we may venture to conclude, that this opinion of angels being not mere abstract incorporeal substances, and unbodied minds, but consisting of something incorporeal, and something corporeal, that is, of soul or spirit, and body joined together, is not only more agreeable to reason, but hath also had more suffrages amongst the ancient fathers, and those of greater weight too, than either of those two other extremes, viz. That angels are mere bodies, and have nothing at all incorporeal in them; or else, that they are altogether incorporeal, without any bodily indument or clothing.

Notwithstanding which, this latter opinion hath indeed prevailed most in these latter ages; time being rightly compared to a river, which quickly sinks the more weighty and solid things, and bears up only the lighter and more superficial. Though there may be other reasons given for this also; as partly because the Aristotelick philosophy, when generally introduced into Christianity, brought in its abstract intelligences along with it; and partly because some spurious Platonists talking so much of their *Henades* and *Noes*, their simple*monads and immoveable unbodied minds, as the chief of their generated and created gods; probably some Christians might have a mind to vie their angels with them: and lastly, because angels are not only called in Scripture *Spirits*, but also by several of the ancients said to be incorporeal; whilst this, in the mean time, was meant only either in respect of that incorporeal part, soul or mind, which they supposed to be in them, or else of the tenuity and subtilty of their bodies or vehicles. For this account does *Pfellus* give hereof, καὶ τοῖς ἡμετέροις καὶ τοῖς θύραθεν, εἰωθός ἐστι, τὰ παχύτερα τῶν σωμάτων σωματώδη λείπειν ὅτι

P. 30. 33.
[P. 47.]

ἢ λεπτομερές ἐστὶ καὶ τὴν ὄψιν διαφυγᾶτον, καὶ τὴν ἀψὺν ἀσώματον, ἢ μόνον οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξίως λέγουσιν. *It is usual both with Christian writers, and Pagans too, to call the grosser bodies corporeal, and those, which, by reason of their subtilty, avoid both our sight and touch, incorporeal.* And before *Pfellus, Joannes Thessalonicensis*, in his dialogue, approved in the seventh Council¹; εἰ δὲ πῦ εἶδος ἀσώματους καλεμῆναι τῶν ἀγγέλων, ἢ δαιμόνων, ἢ ψυχῶν, ὡς μὴ ὄψιν ἐκ συμμίσξεως τῶν ὑλικῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, καὶ τοιαῦτα σώματα παχέα ἢ ἀντίτυπα, οἷα καὶ ἐμεῖς περιέμεθα, ἕως αὐτῶν προσηγορέωσαν. *If you find angels, or demones, or separate souls called sometimes incorporeal, you must understand this in respect of the tenuity of their bodies only; as not consisting of the grosser elements, nor being so solid and antitypous as those, which we are now imprisoned in.* And before them both, *Origen*, in the proeme of his *Peri Archon*, where, citing a passage out of an ancient book, intituled, *The doctrine of Peter*, wherein our Saviour Christ is said to have told his disciples, that he was not δαιμόνιον ἀσώματον, an incorporeal demon, though rejecting the authority of that book, he thus interprets those words; *Non idem sensus ex isto sermone ἀσώματου indicatur, qui Grecis vel Gentilibus auctoribus ostenditur, quum de incorporea naturâ à philosophis disputatur. In hoc enim libello, incorporeum demonium dixit, pro eo, quod ipse ille quicumque est habitus vel circumscriptio demonici corporis, non est similis huic nostro crassiori, vel visibili corpori; sed secundum sensum, ejus qui composuit illam Scripturam, intelligendum est, quod dixit; non esse tale corpus, quale habent demones, quod est naturaliter subtile, & velut aura tenue; & propter hoc vel imputatur à multis, vel dicitur incorporeum; sed habere se corpus solidum & palpabile.* The word ἀσώματον, or incorporeal, is not to be taken here in that sense, wherein it is used by the Greek and Gentile writers, when they philosophized concerning the incorporeal nature. But a demon is here said to be incorporeal, because of the disposition of the demoniack body, not like to this gross and visible body of ours. So that the sense is, as if Christ should have said, I have not such a body as the demens have, which is naturally subtle, thin and soft, as the air, and therefore is either supposed to be by many, or at least called incorporeal; but the body, which I now have, is solid and palpable. Where we see plainly, that angels, though supposed to have bodies, may, notwithstanding, be called incorporeal, by reason of the tenuity and subtilty of those bodies, comparatively with the grossness and solidity of these our terrestrial bodies. But that indeed which now most of all inclineth some to this persuasion, that angels have nothing at all corporeal hanging about them, is a religious regard to the authority of the third Lateran council, having passed its approbation upon this doctrine; as if the seventh Oecumenical (so called) or second Nicene, wherein the contrary was before owned and allowed, were not of equal force, at least to counter-balance the other.

But though this doctrine of angels, or all created understanding beings superiour to men, having a corporeal indument or clothing, does so exactly agree with the old Pythagorick cabala; yet have we reason to think, that it was not therefore merely borrowed or derived from thence by the ancient

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fathers;

¹ In Actis Concilii VII. Oecum. seu Nicæni II, Actiō. V. p. 293. Tom IV. Concilior. Edit. Harduini.

fathers; but that they were led into it by the Scripture itself. For first, the historick phenomena of angels in the Scripture are such, as cannot well be otherwise solved, than by supposing them to have bodies; and then not to lay any stress upon those words of the Psalmist, *who maketh his angels spirits, and ministers a flame of fire*, (though, with good reason, by the ancient fathers interpreted to this sense) because they may possibly be understood otherwise, as sometime they are by rabbinical commentators; nor to insist upon those passages of St. Paul², where he speaks of the tongues of angels, and of the voice of an arch-angel, and such like; there are several other places in Scripture, which seem plainly to confirm this opinion. As first, that of our Saviour before mentioned to this purpose, Luke xx. 35. *They who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels*. For were angels utterly devoid of all bodies, then would the souls of good men, in a state of separation, and without any resurrection, be rather equal to angels, than after a resurrection of their bodies. Wherefore the natural meaning of these words seems to be this, (as St. Austin hath interpreted them) that the souls of good men, after the resurrection, shall have *corpora angelica, angelical bodies, and qualia sunt angelorum corpora, such bodies as those of angels are*. Wherein it is supposed, that angels also have bodies, but of a very different kind from those of ours here. Again, that of St. Jude, where he writeth thus of the devils; *the angels, which kept not their first estate* (or rather, according to the vulgar Latin, *suum principatum, their own principality*) *but left their proper habitation* (or dwelling house) *have been reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day*. In which words it is first implied, that the devils were created by God pure, as well as the other angels, but that they kept not τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχῶν, *their own principality*, that is, their lordly power and dominion over their worser and inferiour part, they having also a certain duplicity in their nature, of a better and worser principle, of a superiour part, which ought to rule and govern, and of an inferiour, which ought to be governed: nor is it indeed otherwise easily conceivable, how they should be capable of sinning. And this inferiour part in angels seems to have a respect to something, that is corporeal or bodily in them also, as well as it hath in men. But then, in the next place, St. Jude addeth, as the immediate result and natural consequence of these angels sinning, that they thereby left or lost, τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον, *suum proprium domicilium*; that is, not only *their dwelling-place* at large, those ethereal countries, and heavenly regions above, but also their proper dwelling-house, or immediate mansion; to wit, their heavenly body. Forasmuch as that heavenly body, which good men expect after the resurrection, is thus called by St. Paul³, τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανό, *Our habitation, or dwelling house that is from heaven*. The heavenly body is the proper house or dwelling, clothing or indument, both of angelical and human souls; and this is that, which makes them fit inhabitants for the heavenly regions. This, I say, was the natural consequence of these angels sinning, their leaving, or

De Gen. ad
Lit. L. 3.

² Psalm civ. 4. ³ 1 Cor. xiii. 1. 1 Theff. iv. 16. ³ 2 Cor. v. 1.

losing their pure and heavenly body, which became thereupon forthwith obscured and incassated; the bodies of spirits incorporate always bearing a correspondent purity or impurity to the different disposition of their mind or soul. But then again, in the last place, that, which was thus in part the natural result of their sin, was also, by the just judgment of God, converted into their punishment; for their ætherial bodies being thus changed into gross, aerial, feculent and vapourous ones, themselves were immediately hereupon, as St. Peter in the parallel place expresseth it ¹, ταρταρωθέντες, *cast down into Tartarus*, and there imprisoned or reserved in chains under darkness, until the judgment of the great day. Where it is observable, that the word ταρταρῶν, used by St. Peter, is the very same that Apollodorus and other Greek writers frequently make use of in a like case, when they speak of the *Titans* being cast down from heaven; which seems to have been really nothing else but this fall of angels poetically mythologized. And by *Tartarus* here, in all probability, is meant this lower caliginous air, or atmosphere of the earth, according to that of St. Austin, concerning these angels, *Post peccatum in hanc sunt detrufi caliginem, ubi tamen est aër; That after their sin, they were thrust down into the misty darkness of this lower air.* And here are they, as it were chained and fettered also by that same weight of their gross and heavy bodies, which first sunk them down hither; this not suffering them to re-ascend up, or return back to those bright ætherial regions above. And being thus for the present imprisoned in this lower *Tartarus*, or caliginous air or atmosphere, they are indeed here kept and reserved in custody, unto the judgment of the great day, and general assizes; however they may, notwithstanding, in the mean time seem to domineer and lord it for a while here. And, lastly, our Saviour's ² *Go ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels*, seems to be a clear confirmation of devils being bodied; because, first, to allegorize this fire into nothing but remorse of conscience, would endanger the rendering of other points of our religion uncertain also; but to say, that incorporeal substances, united to bodies, can be tormented with fire, is, as much as in us lieth, to expose Christianity, and the Scripture, to the scorn and contempt of all philosophers and philosophick wits. Wherefore *Pfellus* lays no small stress upon this place; *εἰμι μὲν παρὰ τῶν τῶ Σωτῆρος λόγων πεπεισμένον ταῦτα, πρὶ κολαθῆσθαι φακόντων τὸς δαιμόνας· ὁ πῶς οἶον παθεῖν ἀσωμάτους ὄντας; τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον ἀμήχανον παθεῖν ὑπὸ σώματι· ἀνάγκη γὰρ σώμασιν αὐτῶς τὴν κόλασιν ὑποδέχεσθαι πεφυκόσι πάσχειν* *I am also convinced of this, that demons have bodies, from the words of our Saviour, affirming, that they shall be punished with fire: which how could it be, were they altogether incorporeal? it being impossible for that, which is both itself incorporeal, and vitally ununited to any body, to suffer from a body. Wherefore of necessity it must be granted, by us Christians, that devils shall receive punishment of sense and pain hereafter, in bodies capable of suffering.*

De Gen. ad Lit. l. 3. c. 10. [P. 114. Tom. III. Oper.]

P. 37. [p. 52.]

Now if angels in general, that is, all created beings superiour to men, be substances incorporeal, or souls vitally united to bodies, though not always

¹ Pet. ii. 4.

² Ma th. xxv. 41.

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the same, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another, and never quite separate from all body; it may seem probable from hence, that though there be other incorporeal substances besides the Deity, yet, *vita incorporea*, a life perfectly incorporeal in the forementioned Origenick sense, or *sine corporeæ adjectionis societate vivere*, to live altogether without the society of any corporeal adjection, is a privilege properly belonging to the holy Trinity only; and consequently therefore, that human souls, when by death they are divested of these gross earthly bodies, they do not then live and act completely, without the conjunction of any body, and so continue till the resurrection or day of judgment; this being a privilege, which not so much as the angels themselves, and therefore no created finite being, is capable of; the imperfection of whose nature necessarily requires the conjunction of some body with them, to make them up complete: without which, it is unconceivable, how they shou'd either have sense or imagination. And thus doth Origen, consentaneously to his own principles, conclude; ἡ τῆ ἰαυτῆς Φύσει ἀσώματος καὶ ἀόρατος ψυχῆ, ἐν παντὶ σωματικῷ τόπῳ τιχάσσα, δέ-
 Cont. Cels. l. 1. 7. P. 355. *ἵαι σώματος δικαίῃ τῆ Φύσει τῷ τόπῳ ἰκεῖνο· ὅπερ ὅτι μὲν Φορεῖ, ἀπικνούσα μὲν πρότερον ἀναλακίῳ μὲν, περίσσει δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ δεύτερα· ὅτι δὲ ἐπενδύσα μὲν ὡ πρότερον εἶχε, δευ- μὲν κρείττονος ἐνδύματος εἰς τὰς καθαρωτέρας καὶ αἰθερίας καὶ ἄρανῶς τόπος·* Our soul, which in its own nature is incorporeal and invisible, in whatsoever corporeal place it existeth, doth always stand in need of a body, suitable to the nature of that place respectively: which body it sometimes beareth, having put off that, which before was necessary, but is now superfluous for the following state; and sometimes again putting on something to what before it had, now standing in need of some better clothing, to fit it for those more pure, æthereal, and heavenly places. But, in what there follows, we conceive, that Origen's sense having not been rightly understood, his words have been altered and perverted; and that the whole place ought to be read thus: Καὶ ἐνδύ- σατο μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆδε γένεσιν ἐρχομένην, τὸ χρησίμου πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ ὕστερα τῆς κύσεως, ἕως ἢν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνδύσατο δὲ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, ὃ ἦν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ἐπιγῆς μέλει διαζῆν· εἶτα πάλιν ὄλος τιπὸς Σκῆνος, καὶ ἐπίσει οἰκίας ἀναγκαίας πρὶ τῷ Σκῆνει, καταλύεσθαι μὲν Φασιν οἱ λόγοι τὴν ἐπιγῆου οἰκίαν τῷ Σκῆνος, τὸ δὲ Σκῆνος ἐπενδύσασθαι οἰκίαν ἀχειροποίη- τον, αἰώνιον ἐν τοῖς ἄρνοις· λέγουσι δὲ οἱ τῷ Θεῷ ἄνθρωποι, τὸ μὲν Φθαρτὸν ἐνδύσασθαι αὐτὸ ἀφθαρσίαν· The sense whereof is this; The soul descending hither into generation, put on first that body, which was useful for it whilst to continue in the womb; and then again afterward such a body, as was necessary for it to live here upon the earth in. Again, it having here a two-fold kind of body, the one of which is called Σκῆνος, by St. Paul, (being a more subtle body, which it had before) the other the superinduced earthly house, necessarily subservient to this Skenos here; the Scripture oracles affirm, that the earthly house of this Skenos shall be corrupted or dissolved, but the Skenos itself, superindue or put on a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens: the same declaring, that the corruptible shall put on incorruption, and the mortal immortality. Where it is plain, that Origen takes that Σκῆνος, in St. Paul (1 Corinib. v. 1.) for a subtle body, which the soul had before its terrene nativity, and

and which continues with it after death; but in good men will, at last, superindue, or put on (without death) the clothing of immortality. Neither can there be a better commentary upon this place of *Origen*, than those *Excerpta* out of *Methodius* the Martyr, in *Photius* 1, though seeming to be vitiated also; where, as we conceive, the sense of *Origen* and his followers is first contained in those words, ἕτερον τὸ σκῆνωμα, καὶ τὸ οὐρανίου ἡ οἰκία, καὶ ἕτερον ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐστὶ τὸ σκῆνωμα, *That in St. Paul the τὸ σκῆνωμα is one thing, and the earthly house of this σκῆνωμα another thing; and we, that is, our souls, a third thing, distinct from both.* And then it is further declared in this that follows, τῆς ζωῆς καὶ ἀλθιεύσεως τῆς ἀκμώρου τὴν πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἔχουσαν οἰκησὺν αἰψυχραὶ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ἕως ἀν ἀνακατισοποιηθῆσαν ἡμῖν ἀπλῶς ἀναλαβώμεν τὴν οἰκίαν ὅθεν καὶ ἐναρξομεν μὴ θίλομεν τὸ σῶμα ἀπεκδύσασθαι ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὴν λοιπὴν ἐπιδύσασθαι ζῶν τὸ γὰρ οἰκῆσει τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ὃ ἐπιδύσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦμεν ἡ ἀθανάσια. *That this short life of our earthly body being destroyed, our soul shall then have, before the resurrection, a dwelling from God, until we shall at last receive it renewed, restored, and so made an incorruptible house. Wherefore in this we groan, desirous not to put off all body, but to put on life or immortality upon the body which we shall then have. For that house, which is from heaven, that we desire to put on, is immortality.* Moreover, that the soul is not altogether naked after death, the same *Origen* endeavours to confirm further from that of our Saviour, concerning the rich man and *Lazarus*; ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ καταζόμενος πλούσιος, καὶ ὁ ἐν κάλποις Ἀβραάμ πένης ἀναπαύομενος, πρὸ τῆς παρασκευῆς τῆ σωτηρίας, καὶ πρὸ τῆς συντελείας τῆ αἰῶνος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως, διδάσκειν ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σώματι χεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ. *The rich man punished, and the poor man refreshed in Abraham's bosom, before the coming of our Saviour, and before the end of the world, and therefore before the resurrection, plainly teaches, that even now also after death, the soul useth a body.* He thinketh the same also to be further proved from the visible apparition of *Samuel's ghost*, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Σαμουὴλ Φαινόμενος, ὡς ὄλλόν ἐστιν ὄρατος ὢν, περιστην ὅτι σῶμα περιέκειτο. *Samuel also visibly appearing after death, maketh it manifest, that his soul was then clothed with a body.* To which he adds in *Photius* 2, τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅμα τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ ἡῆμα, ὁμοιῶδες τῷ παλαιῷ καὶ γινώσκω σώματι, &c. *That the exterior form and figure of the soul's body after death doth resemble that of the gross terrestrial body here in this life; all the histories of apparitions making ghosts, or the souls of the dead, to appear in the same form, which their bodies had before.* This, therefore, as was observed, is that, which *Origen* understands by τὸ σκῆνωμα in *St. Paul*; not this gross terrestrial body, but a certain middle body betwixt it and the heavenly, which the soul after death carries-away with it. Now, this opinion of the learned *Origen's* was never reckoned up by the ancient fathers, or his greatest adversaries, in the catalogue of his errors; nor does *Methodius* the martyr, who was so great an anti-Origenist, where he mentions this Origenick opinion in *Photius*, seem to tax it otherwise, than as Platonical, implying the soul to be incorporeal. *Methodius* himself, on the contrary, contending, not that the soul hath a body conjoined with it after death, as a distinct thing from it, but that itself is a body; ὁ θεός μόνος ἀείλει ἀσώματος ὢν, αἱ δὲ ψυχραὶ ἀπὸ τῶ ἡμιμερῶ καὶ πατρὸς τῶν ὄλων, σώματα νεεῶ ὑπάρχουσαι, εἰς λόγον θεωρητὰ

Thus Origen plainly, in his Fifth Book, (p. 244.) That there is διαφορά ἐπιγινώσκου οἰκίας ἐν ἑστὶ τὸ σκῆνωμα καὶ ἀλθιεύσεως, καὶ ἐκείνου, ἐν ὃ ὅτι οὗτος δικαιοσυνὴν βαρύνεται, μὴ ἀπεκδύσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ σκῆνωματι ἐπιδύσασθαι. A difference betwixt the earthly house, in which the soul is, that will be dissolved; and the soul itself, which retaineth good men groan, lest that they would put it off, but put on immortality upon it.

1 Biblioth. Cod. CCXXIV. p. 919. 2 Apud Phot. ubi supra p. 930.

of the soul's having a body after death, but much less of its being a body : nevertheless does he seem to leave every man to his own liberty therein, in these words ; *Si autem queritur, dum anima de corpore exierit, utrum ad aliqua loca corporalia feratur, an ad incorporea corporalibus similia ; an verò nec ad ipsa, sed ad illud, quod & corporibus & similitudinibus corporum est excellentius ; citò quidem responderim ; ad corporalia loca eam vel non ferri nisi cum aliquo corpore, vel non localiter ferri. Jam utrum habeat aliquod corpus, ostendat, qui potest ; ego autem non puto. Spiritalem enim arbitror esse, non corporalem ; ad spiritalia vero pro meritis fertur, aut ad loca pœnalia similia corporibus.* But if it be demanded, when the soul goes out of this body, whether it be carried into any corporal places, or to incorporeals like to corporals, or else to neither, but to that, which is more excellent than both bodies, and the likenesses of bodies ? the answer is ready ; that it cannot be carried to corporal places, or not locally carried any whither, without a body. Now whether the soul have some body, when it goes out of this body, let them, that can, shew it ; but, for my part, I think otherwise. For I suppose the soul to be spiritual, and not corporal ; and that, after death, it is either carried to spiritual things, or else to penal places, like to bodies, such as have been represented to some in extasies, &c. Where *St. Austin* himself seems to think the punishment of souls, after death, and before the resurrection, to be phantastick, or only in imagination : whereas there could not be then so much as phantastick punishments neither, nor any imagination at all in souls, without a body, if that doctrine of *Aristotle's* * be true, that phancy or imagination is nothing else but a weaker sense ; that is, a thing, which results from a complication of soul and body both together. But it is observable, that in the forecited place that, which *St. Austin* chiefly opposed, was the soul's being a body, as *Tertullian*, *Metbodius*, and others had asserted ; but as for its having a body, he saith only this, *Ostendat qui potest, let him that can shew it* ; he granting, in the mean time, that the soul cannot be locally carried any whither at all after death, nor indeed be in any place without a body. However, the same *St. Austin*, as he elsewhere condemneth the opinion of those, who would take the fire of hell metaphorically, acknowledging it to be real and corporeal ; so does he somewhere think it not improvable, but after death, and before the resurrection, the souls of men may suffer from a certain fire, for the consuming and burning up of their dross ; *Post istius sanè corporis mortem, donec ad illum veniatur, qui post resurrectionem corporum futurus est damnationis & remunerationis ultimus dies ; si hoc temporis intervallo, ejusmodi ignem dicuntur perpeti, quem non sentiant illi, qui non habuerint tales mores & amores in hujus corporis vitâ, ut eorum ligna, & sœnum, & stipula consummantur ; alii vero sentiunt, qui ejusmodi secum ædificia portaverunt, &c. non redarguo, quia forsitan verum est.* If in this interval of time, betwixt the death of the body and the resurrection or day of judgment, the souls of the dead be said to suffer such a fire as can do no execution upon those, who have no wood, hay, nor stubble, to burn up, but shall be felt by such, as have made such buildings or superstructures, &c. I reprehend it not, because perhaps it is true. The opinion here mentioned, is

De Civ. D.
lib. 21. c. 26.
[§. IV. p. 490.
Tom. VII.
Oper.]

C. Celf. l. 5.
P. 240.

thus expressed by *Origen*, in his fifth book against *Celfus*, which very place *St. Austin* seems to have had respect to; ἡ συνιδὼν ὅτι ὡσπερ Ἑλλήνων τισὶν ἔδοξε, τὸ πῦρ καθάρσιον ἐπάγειναι τῷ κόσμῳ· εἰκὸς δ' ὅτι καὶ ἐκάσφ τῶν δοξαζῶν τῆς διὰ τῶ πυρός διου; καὶ οὐ μὲν καὶ ἡ κατακαίουσιν τὰς μὴ ἔχουσας ἴλκην διημέου ἀναλίσθεσθαι ὑπ' ἐμείν τῶ πυρός· καὶ οὐ δὲ καὶ κατακαίουσιν τῆς ἐν τῇ διὰ τῶν πρῶξων καὶ λόγων καὶ νοημάτων προπικῆς λεγομένη ἐκδομῇ ξύλα, χόρτον, ἢ καλῶμεν οἰοσόμεναισιν; *Celfus did not understand, that this fire, as well according to the Hebrews and Christians, as to some of the Greeks, will be purgatory to the world; as also to every one of those persons, who stand in need of such punishment and remedy by fire: which fire can do no execution upon those, who have no combustible matter in them, but will be felt by such, as in the moral structure of their thoughts, words, and actions, have built up wood, hay and stubble.* Now since souls cannot suffer from fire, nor any thing else in way of sense or pain, without being vitally united to some body, we may conclude, that *St. Austin*, when he wrote this, was not altogether abhorrent from souls having bodies after death.

C. Celf. l. 5.
P. 244.

Hitherto have we declared, how the ancient asserters of incorporeal substance, as unextended, did repel the assaults of Atheists and Corporealists made against it; but especially how they quitted themselves of that absurdity, of the illocality and immobility of finite created spirits, by supposing them always to be vitally united to some bodies, and consequently, by the locality of those their respective bodies, determined to *here* and *there*; according to that of *Origen*; ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν διέλιαι σώματος, διὰ τὰς τοιαύτας μεταβάσεις, *our soul stands in need of a body in order to local motions.* We shall in the next place declare, what grounds of reason there were, which induced those ancients to assert and maintain a thing so repugnant to sense and imagination, and consequently to all vulgar apprehension, as a substance in itself unextended, indistant and indivisible, or devoid of magnitude and parts. Wherein we shall only represent the sense of these ancient Incorporealists, so far as we can, to the best advantage, in order to their vindication, against Atheists and Materialists; ourselves in the mean time not asserting any thing, but leaving every one, that can, to make his own judgment; and so either to close with this, or that other following hypothesis, of extended incorporeals.

Now it is here observable, that it was a thing formerly taken for granted on both sides, as well by the asserters as the deniers of incorporeal substance, that there is but one kind of extension only; and consequently, that whatsoever hath magnitude and parts, or one thing without another, is not only intellectually and logically, but also really and physically divisible or discernible, as likewise antitypous and impenetrable; so that it cannot coexist with a body in the same place: from whence it follows, that whatsoever arguments do evince, that there is some other substance besides body, the same do therefore demonstrate, according to the sense of these ancients, (as well Corporealists as Incorporealists) that there is something unextended, it being supposed by them, both alike, that whatsoever is extended, is body.

Never-

Nevertheless we shall here principally propound such considerations of theirs, as tend directly to prove, that there is something unextendedly incorporeal; and that an unextended Deity is no impossible idea; to wit, from hence, because there is something unextended even in our very selves.

Where, not to repeat the forementioned ratiocination of *Simplicius*, that whatsoever can act and reflect upon its whole self, cannot possibly be extended, nor have parts distant from one another; *Plotinus* first argues after this manner, τί τοῦνυ Φήσουσι, οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν σώμα εἶναι λέγοντες, πρῶτον μὲν περὶ ἑκάστη

μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι, πότερον ἑκάστου ψυχῆν, οἷα ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ὅλη; καὶ πάλιν τὸ μέρος τὸ μέρος; ἂν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος συνεβάλλετο τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς· καίτοι ἔδειγε ποσῶ τινος ὄντος· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλον πολλαχῆ, ὅπερ σώμασι παρεῖναι ἀδύνατοι, ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ ἑκάστου τῶν μερῶν, οὐ ψυχῆν Φήσουσι, ἐξ ἀψύχων ψυχῆ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξει. *P. 460. [Enead. IV. Lib. VII. Cap. V.]*

What then will they say, who contend, that the soul is a body (or extended) whether or no will they grant concerning every part of the soul in the same body (as that of it which is in the foot, and that in the hand, and that in the brain, &c.) and again every part of those parts, that each of them is soul, such as the whole? If this be consented to, then it is plain, that magnitude, or such a quantity, could confer nothing at all to the essence of the soul, as it would do were it an extended thing; but the whole would be in many parts or places, which is a thing, that cannot possibly belong to body; that the same whole should be in more, and that a part should be what the whole is. But if they will not grant every part of their extended soul to be soul, then, according to them, must the soul be made up, and compounded of soul-less things.

Which argument is elsewhere thus propounded by him; εἰ δὲ ἑκάστου ζῶνι ἔχοι, καὶ ἐν ἀρκείᾳ· εἰ δὲ μηδεὸς αὐτῶν ζῶνι ἔχουτος ἢ σύνθετος πεποιήμενος ζῶνι, ἀποποιῶν μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον συμφόρησιν σωμάτων ζῶνι ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐ γενῶν τὰ ἀνόητα· *En. 4. l. 7. c. 2. [P. 457.]*

If every one of the parts of this extended soul or mind have life in it, then would any one of them alone be sufficient. But to say, that though none of the parts alone have life in them, yet the conjunction of them altogether maketh life, is absurd; it being impossible, that life and soul should result from a congeries of life-less and soul-less things, or that mind-less things put together should beget mind. The sum of this argumentation is this, that either every part of an extended soul is soul, and of an extended mind, mind; or not. Now if no part of a soul, as supposed to be extended alone, be soul, or have life and mind in it, then is it certain, that the whole, resulting from all the parts, could have no life nor mind, because nothing can (causally) come from nothing. It is true indeed, that corporeal qualities and forms, according to the atomick physiology, result from a composition and texture of atoms or parts, each of which, taken alone by themselves, have nothing of that quality or form in them,

¹ ————— *Ne ex albis alba rearis ;
Aut ea, quæ nigrant, nigro de semine nata.*

You are not to think, that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black; but the reason of the difference here is plain, be-

² Lucret. II. Vers 730. +32

cause these qualities and forms are not entities really distinct from the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts, but only such a composition of them, as cause different phancies in us; but life and understanding, soul and mind, are entities really distant from magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts; they are neither mere phancies, nor syllables of things, but simple and uncompounded realities. But if every supposed part of a soul be soul, and of a mind, then would all the rest of it besides any one part be superfluous; or indeed every supposed part thereof would be the same with the whole: from whence it follows, that it could not be extended, or have any real parts at all, since no part of an extended thing can possibly be the same with the whole.

F. 461.
[Cap. VI.]

Again, the same philosopher endeavours further to prove, that the human soul itself is unextended and indivisible, from its energies and operations, and that as well those of sensation as of intellection. First, therefore, from external sensations, he reasons in this manner; *εἴτι μάλῃσι αἰσθησέσθαι τινας ἐν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ παντὶ ἀνιλαμμένεσθαι καὶ εἰ διὰ πολλῶν αἰσθητηρίων πλείω τὰ εἰσίσυτα, ἢ παλλαὶ περὶ ἐν ποιότητες, καὶ δι' ἐνὸς ποιήλων, οἷον πρόσωπον· ἢ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ῥινὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὄφθαλμῶν, ἄλλὰ ταυτῶν ὅμῃ πάσιων καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι' ἐμμάτων τὸ δὲ δι' ἀκοῆς, ἐν τῷ δεῖ εἶναι εἰς ὃ ἀμφῶ· ἢ πῶς ἀνεῖποι ὅτι ἕτερον ταῦτα, μὴ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ὅμῃ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν ἐλθούτων.* *That, which perceiveth in us, must of necessity be one thing, and by one and the same indivisible perceive all; and that, whether they be more things, entering through several organs of sense, as the many qualities of one substance, or one various and multiform thing, entering through the same organ, as the countenance or picture of a man. For it is not one thing in us, that perceives the nose, another thing the eyes, and another thing the mouth; but it is one and the self-same thing, that perceiveth all. And when one thing enters through the eye, another through the ear, these also must of necessity come all at last to one indivisible, or else they could not be compared together, nor one of them affirmed to be different from another; the several sentiments of them meeting no where together in one. He concludes therefore, that this one thing in us, that sensibly perceives all things, may be resembled to the centre of a circle, and the several senses to lines drawn from the circumference, which all meet in that one centre. Wherefore that, which perceives and apprehends all things in us, must needs be really one and the very same; that is, unextended and indivisible. Which argument is yet further pursued by him, more particularly thus; If that, which sensibly perceiveth in us be extended, so as to have distant parts one without another; then one of these three things must needs be affirmed, that either every part of this extended substance of the soul perceives a part of the object only, or every part of it the whole object, or else all comes to some one point, which alone perceives both the several parts of the object, and the whole, all the other being but as circumferential lines leading to this centre. Now of the former of these three, Plotinus thus; μεγέθει οὐκ ἔχειν ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸ εἶναι μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο αἰσθητικόν. If the soul be a magnitude, then must it be divided together with the sensible object, so that one part of the soul*
must

must perceive one part of the object, and another, another; and nothing in it, the whole sensible: just as if I should have the sense of one thing, and you of another. Whereas it is plain by our internal sense, that it is one and the self-same thing in us, which perceives both the parts and the whole. And of the second, he writeth in this manner; εἰ δὲ ὅτιον παντὸς αἰσθήσειαι· εἰς ἄπειρα διαίρεισθαι τὴν μεγέθος πεφυκότων, ἀπειρῶς καὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἕκαστον αἰσθητὸν συμβῆσεται γίνεσθαι ἐκαστῷ οἷον τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπειρῶς ἐν τῷ ἐγγεμονῶντι ἡμῶν εἰκόνας. *But if every part of the extended soul perceive the whole sensible object, since magnitude is infinitely divisible, there must be in every man infinite sensations and images of one and the same object.* Whereas we are intimately conscious to ourselves, that we have but only one sensation of one object at the same time. And as for the third and last part of this disjunction, that what sensibly perceives in every one, is but one single point, either mathematical or physical; it is certain, first, that a mathematical point, having neither longitude, latitude, nor profundity, is no body nor substance, but only a notion of our own mind, or a mode of conceiving in us. And then, as for a physical point or minimum, a body so little, that there cannot possibly be any less, *Plotinus* asserting the infinite divisibility of body, here explodes the thing itself. However he further intimates, that if there were any such physical minimum, or absolutely least body or extension, this could not possibly receive upon it a distinct representation and delineation of all the several parts of a whole visible object at once, as of the eyes, nose, mouth, &c. in a man's face or picture, or of the particularities of an edifice; nor could such a parvitude or atom as this be the cause of all animal motions. And this was one of *Aristotle's* arguments, whereby he would prove unextended incorporeals, πῶς τῷ ἀμερεῖ τὸ μεγιστόν. *If the soul were indivisible as a point, how could it perceive that, which is divisible?* that is, take notice of all the distinct parts of an extended object, and have a description of the whole of them at once upon itself? The sum of the whole argumentation is this, that if the soul be an extended substance, then must it of necessity be either a physical point or minimum, the least extension, that can possibly be, (if there be any such least, and body or extension be not infinitely divisible) or else it must consist of more such physical points, joined together. As for the former of these, it hath been already declared to be impossible, that one single atom, or smallest point of extension, should be able distinctly to perceive all the variety of things: to which might be added, that to suppose every soul to be but one physical minimum, or smallest extension, is to imply such an essential difference in matter or extension, as that some of the points thereof should be naturally devoid of all life, sense, and understanding, and others again naturally sensitive and rational. Which absurdity, though it should be admitted, yet would it be utterly unconceivable, how there should come to be one such sensitive and rational atom in every man and no more, and how this should constantly remain the same, from infancy to old-age, whilst other parts of matter transpire perpetually. But as for the latter, if souls be extended substances, consisting of more points, one without another, all concurring in every sensation; then must every one of those

points;

¹ De Animâ, Lib I. Cap. III. p. 10. Tom. II. Oper.

points, either perceive a point and part of the object only, or else the whole. Now, if every point of the extended soul perceive only a point of the object, then is there no one thing in us, that perceives the whole, or which can compare one part with another. But if every point of the extended soul perceive the whole object at once, consisting of many parts, then would there be innumerable perceptions of the same object in every sensation; as many, as there are points in the extended soul. And from both those suppositions, it would alike follow, that no man is one single percipient or person, but that there are innumerable distinct percipients and persons in every man. Neither can there be any other supposition made, besides those three forementioned; as, that the whole extended soul should perceive both the whole sensible object, and all its several parts, no part of this soul in the mean time having any perception at all by itself; because the whole of an extended being is nothing but all the parts taken together; and if none of those parts have any life, sense, or perception in them, it is impossible, that there should be any in the whole. But in very truth, to say, that the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is to acknowledge it not to be extended, but to be indivisible, which is the thing that *Plotinus* contends for.

And that philosopher here further insists upon internal sensations also, and that Συμπάθεια, or Ὁμοπάθεια, that *sympathy*, or *homopathy*, which is in all animals, to the same purpose: it being one and the same thing in them, which perceives pain, in the most distant extremities of the body, as in the sole of the foot, and in the crown of the head; and which moves one part to succour and relieve another labouring under it, which could not possibly be by traduction of all to one physical point, as the centre, for divers reasons. Ἐπι τοίνυν κατὰ διάθεσιν ἔχουσιν οἴοντες τὴν αἰσθησὶν τῶ τοιούτῳ γίνεσθαι, μὴ δὲ σώματι ὅθεν ὀύθεν, ἄλλο παθόντι, ἄλλο γυῖσιν ἔχειν (παντός γὰρ μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐστὶ) δεῖ τοιούτων τίσεσθαι τὸ αἰσθησόμενον, ὅσον πανταχῶς αὐτῆ ἐαυτῷ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι· τῆτο δὲ ἄλλω τινι τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ σώματι ποιεῖν προσέκει· Since therefore these sympathetick senses cannot possibly be made by traduction, at last to one thing; and body being bulky or out-swelling extension, one part thereof suffering, another cannot perceive it (for in all magnitude, this is one thing, and that another) it followeth, that what perceives in us, must be every where, and in all the parts of the body, one and the same thing with itself. Which therefore cannot be itself body, but must of necessity be some other entity or substance incorporeal. The conclusion is, that in men and animals there is one thing indivisibly the same, that comprehendeth the whole outside of them, perceiveth both the parts and the whole of sensible objects, and all transmitted through several senses, sympathizeth with all the distant parts of the body, and acteth entirely upon all. And this is properly called, *I myself*, not the extended bulk of the body, which is not one, but many substances, but an unextended and indivisible unity, wherein all lines meet and centre, not as a mathematical point or least *extensum*, but as one self-active, living power, substantial or inside-being, that containeth, holdeth, and connecteth all together.

P. 462.

Last'y,

Lastly, the forementioned philosopher endeavours yet further to prove the human soul to be unextended and devoid of magnitude, and indivisible, from its rational energies or operations, its νοητῶν νοήσεις, and ἀμετέωρον ἀντιλήψεις, *intellections of intelligibles*, and *apprehensions of things devoid of magnitude*, πῶς γὰρ μέγεθος ἂν τὸ μὴ μέγεθος νοήσει; ἢ τῷ μεριστῷ τὸ μὴ μεριστῶν. *For how could the soul (saith he) if it were a magnitude, understand that, which hath no magnitude? and with that, which is divisible, conceive what is indivisible?* Now, it is certain, that we have notions of many things, which are ἀφάνταστα, altogether unimaginable, and therefore have nothing of length, breadth, and thickness in them, as virtue, vice, &c. ἀμέγεδεις δὲ οἷμαι καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρετῶν νόσις. ὥστε καὶ προσόντα καὶ τῷ ἀμερεῖ αὐτῆς ὑποδέχεται, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν ἀμερεῖ κείσεται. *Justice and honesty, and the like, are things devoid of magnitude, and therefore must the intellections of them needs be such too. So that the soul must receive these by what is indivisible, and lodge them in that which is divisible.* We have also a notion not only of meer latitude or breadth, indivisible as to thickness; and of longitude or a line, indivisible both as to breadth and thickness; but also of a mathematical point, that is every way indivisible, as to length, breadth and thickness. We have a conception of the intention of powers and virtues, where-in there is nothing of extension or magnitude. And indeed all the abstract essences of things, (or the αὐτόκεατα) which are the first objects of intellection, are indivisible: εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ἕλῃ εἰδῶν τὰς νοήσεις Φύσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χωρίζομένων γε γίνονται τῷ νῦ χωρίζουτος, οὐ γὰρ μετὰ σαρκῶν, &c. *And though we apprehend forms, that are in matter too, yet do we apprehend them as separated and abstracted from the same; there being nothing of flesh in our conception of a man, &c.* Nay, the soul conceives extended things themselves, unextendedly and indivisibly; for as the distance of a whole hemisphere is contracted into a narrow compass in the pupil of the eye, so are all distances yet more contracted in the soul itself, and there understood indistinctly; for the thought of a mile distance, or of ten thousand miles, or femdiameters of the earth, takes up no more room in the soul, nor stretches it any more than does the thought of a foot or inch, or indeed of a mathematical point. Were that, which perceiveth in us, a magnitude, then could it not be, ἴσον παντὶ ἀισθητῷ, *equal to every sensible*, and alike perceive both lesser and greater magnitudes than itself: but least of all could it perceive such things, as have no magnitude at all. And this was the other part of *Aristotle's* argumentation, to prove the soul and mind to be unextended and indivisible; πῶς γὰρ νοήσει τὸ ἀμερες μεριστῷ; *For how could it perceive, that which is indivisible by what is divisible?* he having before demanded, how it could apprehend things divisible, and of a great extension, by a meer point, or absolute parvitude. Where the soul, or that which perceives and understands, is, according to *Aristotle*, neither divisible, as a continued quantity, nor yet indivisible, either as a mathematical, or as a physical point, and absolute parvitude; but as that, which hath in itself no out-

Plat. p. 462,

⁴ De Animâ Lib. I. Cap. III. p. 10. Tom. II. Oper.

swelling

swelling distance, nor relation to any place, otherwise than as it is vitally united to a body, which (where-ever it be) it always sympathizes with, and acts upon.

Besides which, these ancient asserters of unextended incorporeals would, in all probability, confirm that opinion from hence, because we cannot only conceive extension without cogitation, and again cogitation without extension; from whence it may be inferred, that they are entities really distinct and separable from one another, (we having no other rule to judge of the real distinction and separability of things, than from our conceptions) but also are not able to conceive cogitation with extension. We cannot conceive a thought to be of such a certain length, breadth, and thickness, measurable by inches and feet, and by solid measures. We cannot conceive half, or a third part, or a twentieth part of a thought, much less of the thought of an indivisible thing; neither can we conceive every thought to be of some certain determinate figure, either round or angular; spherical, cubical, or cylindrical, or the like. Whereas, if whatsoever is unextended be nothing, thoughts must either be meer non-entities, or else extended too into length, breadth, and thickness; divisible into parts, and measurable; and also (where finite) of a certain figure. And consequently all verities in us (they being but complex axiomatical thoughts) must of necessity be long, broad, and thick, and either spherically, or angularly figurate. And the same must be affirmed of volitions likewise, and appetites or passions, as fear and hope, love, and hatred, grief and joy; and of all other things belonging to cogitative beings, (souls and minds) as knowledge and ignorance, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, justice and injustice, &c. that these are either all of them absolute non-entities, or else extended into three divisions of length, breadth, and profundity, and measurable not only by inches and feet, but also by solid measures, as pints and quarts; and last of all (where they are finite as in men) figurate. But if this be absurd, and these things belonging to soul and mind (though doubtless as great realities at least, as the things, which belong to bodies) be unextended, then must the substances of souls and minds themselves be unextended also. Thus *Plotinus* of mind, Νῦς ἡ διαστάς ἑαυτοῦ, *mind is not distant from itself*: and indeed were it so, it could not be one thing (as it is) but many; every conceivable part of distant and unextended substance being a substance by itself. And the same is to be said of the human soul, though it act upon distant parts of that body, which it is united to, that itself, notwithstanding, is not scattered out into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, nor infinitely divisible; because then it would not be one single substance, or monad, but a heap of substances. Soul is no more divisible than life; of which the forementioned philosopher thus, Ἐρωγε τὴν ζωὴν μερῶν; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ πᾶν ἢ ζωὴ, τὸ μίση ζωὴ οὐκ ἔσται. *Will you divide a life into two? then the whole of it being but a life, the half thereof cannot be a life.* Lastly, if soul and mind, and the things belonging to them, as life and cogitation, understanding and wisdom, &c. be outspread into distance, having one part without another; then can there be no good reason given, why they should not be as well really and physically, as intellectually divisible; and one part

part of them separable from another : since, as *Plotinus*, πανὸς μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο. *In all magnitude or extension, this is one thing, and that another.* At least, no Theist ought to deny, but that the divine power could cleave or divide a thought, together with the soul, wherein it is, into many pieces ; and remove them to the greatest distances from one another, (for as much as this implies no manner of contradiction, and whatsoever is conceivable by us, may be done by infinite power) in which case, neither of them alone would be soul or mind, life or thought, but all put together make up one entire mind, soul, life, and thought.

Wherefore, the sense of the ancient Incorporealists seems to have been as follows : That there are in nature two kinds of substances specifically differing from one another ; the first, Ὀγκοί, *bulks, or tumours*, a mere passive thing ; the second, Δυνάμεις, *self-active powers or virtues*, or Φύσις δραστήια, *the energetick nature.* The former of these is nothing else but magnitude or extension, not as an abstract notion of the mind, but as a thing really existing without it. For when it is called *res extensa*, the meaning is not, as if the *res* were one thing, and the extension thereof another, but that it is extension, or distance, really existing, or the thing thereof (without the mind) and not the notion. Now, this in the nature of it is nothing but *aliud extra aliud, one thing without another*, and therefore perfect alterity, disunity, and divisibility. So that no *extensum* whatsoever, of any sensible bigness, is trully and really one substance, but a multitude or heap of substances, as many as there are parts, into which it is divisible. Moreover, one part of this magnitude always standing without another, it is an essential property thereof to be antitypous or impenetrable ; that is, to jostle or shoulder out all other extended substance from penetrating into it, and co-existing with it, so as to possess and take up the same room and space. One yard of distance, or of length, breadth, and thickness, cannot possibly be added to another, without making the whole extension double to what it was before, since one of them must of necessity stand without the other. One magnitude cannot imbibe or swallow up another, nor can there be any penetration of dimensions. Moreover, magnitude or extension, as such, is mere outside or outwardness ; it hath nothing within, no self-active power or virtue ; all its activity being either keeping out, or hindering, any other extended thing, from penetrating into it : (which yet it doth merely by its being extended, and therefore not so much by any physical efficiency, as a logical necessity,) or else local motion, to which it is also but passive ; no body or extension, as such, being able to move itself, or act upon itself.

Wherefore, were there no other substance in the world besides this magnitude or extension, there could be no motion or action at all in it ; no life, cogitation, consciousness ; no intellection, appetite, or volition, (which things do yet make up the greatest part of the universe) but all would be a dead heap or lump : nor could any one substance penetrate another, and co-exist in the same place with it. From whence it follows of necessity,

that besides this outside bulky extension, and tumourous magnitude, there must be another kind of entity, whose essential attribute or character is life, self-activity, or cogitation. Which first, that it is not a mere mode or accident of magnitude and extension, is plain from hence, because cogitation may be as well conceived without extension, as extension without cogitation; whereas no mode of any thing can be conceived without that, whereof it is a mode. And since there is unquestionably much more of entity in life and cogitation, than there is in mere extension or magnitude, which is the lowest of all being, and next to nothing; it must needs be imputed to the mere delusion and imposture of imagination, that men are so prone to think this extension or magnitude to be only substance, and all other things besides the mere accidents thereof, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it. For though that secondary and participated life (as it is called) in the bodies of animals be indeed a mere accident, and such as may be present or absent without the destruction of its subject; yet can there be no reason given, why the primary and original life itself should not be as well a substantial thing, as mere extension and magnitude. Again, that extension and life, or cogitation, are not two inadequate conceptions neither, of one and the self-same substance, consider'd brokenly and by piece-meal; as if either all extension had life and cogitation essentially belonging to it, (as the Hylozoists conclude) or at least all life and cogitation had extension; and consequently all souls and minds, and even the Deity itself, were either extended life and cogitation, or living and thinking extension; (there being nothing in nature unextended, but extension the only entity; so that whatsoever is devoid thereof, is, *ipso facto*, absolutely nothing:) This, I say, will also appear from hence, because, as hath been already declared, we cannot conceive a life, or mind, or thought, nor any thing at all belonging to a cogitative being, as such, (as wisdom, folly, virtue, vice, &c.) to be extended into length, breadth, and thickness, and to be mensurable by inches, feet, and yards. From whence it may be concluded, that extension, and life or cogitation, are no inadequate conceptions of one and the self-same thing, since they cannot be complicated together into one, but that they are distinct substances from each other. Lives and minds are such tight and compact things in themselves, and have such a self-unity in their nature, as that they cannot be lodged in that, which is wholly scattered out from itself into distance, and dispersed into infinite multiplicity; nor be spread all over the same, as co-extended with it. Nor is it conceivable, how all the several parts of an extended magnitude, should jointly concur and contribute to the production of one and the same single and indivisible cogitation; or how that whole heap or bundle of things should be one thinker. A thinker is a monad, or one single substance, and not a heap of substances; whereas no body or extended thing is one, but many substances; every conceivable or smallest part thereof being a real substance by itself.

But this will yet further appear, if we consider, what kind of action cogitation is. The action of an extended thing, as such, is nothing but local motion,

motion, change of distance, or translation from place to place, a meer outside and superficial thing; but it is certain, that cogitation, (phancy, intellection, and volition) are no local motions; nor the meer fridging up and down of the parts of an extended substance, changing their place and distance; but it is unquestionably an internal energy; that is, such an energy, as is within the very substance or essence of that, which thinketh, or in the inside of it. From which two kinds of energies we may now conclude, that there are also two kinds of entity or substance in nature; the one meer outside, and which hath nothing within it; the other such a kind of entity, as hath an eternal energy; acteth from itself, and within itself, and upon itself; an inside thing, whose action is within the very essence or substance thereof; it being plain, that the cogitative or thinking nature is such a thing, as hath an essential inside or profundity. Now, this inside of cogitative beings, wherein they thus act or think internally within themselves, cannot have any length, breadth, or thickness in it, because if it had, it would be again a meer outside thing. Wherefore had all cogitative beings (souls and minds) extension and magnitude never so much belonging to them, as some suppose them to have, yet could this, for all that, be nothing but the meer outside of their being; besides which, they must of necessity have also an unextended inside, that hath no outswelling tumour, and is not scattered into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, which therefore could not possibly exist a part in a part of the supposed extension, as if one half of a mind or thought were in one half of that extension, and another in another; but must of necessity be all undividedly, both in the whole of it, and in every part. For had every twentieth or hundredth part of this *extensum* not the whole of a life or mind in it, but only the twentieth or hundredth part thereof, then could none of them have any true life or mind at all, nor consequently the whole have any. Nor indeed is it otherwise conceivable, how a whole quantity of extended substance should be one thing, and have one personality, one *I myself* in it all, were there not one indivisible thing presiding over it, which held it all together, and diffused itself thorough all. And thus do we see, how this whole in the whole and in every part (do men what they can) will, like a ghost, still haunt them, and follow them every where. But now it is impossible, that one and the self-same substance should be both extended and unextended. Wherefore in this hypothesis of extended understanding spirits, having one part without another, there is an undiscerned complication of two distinct substances, extended and unextended, or corporeal and incorporeal, both together; and a confusion of them into one. Where, notwithstanding, we must acknowledge, that there is so much of truth aimed at, as that all finite incorporeal substances are always naturally united to some bodies; so that the whole of these created animals is compleated and made up of both these together, an extended inside, and an unextended outside, both of them substances indeed really distinct, but yet vitally united each to other.

The sum of all is, that there are two kinds of substances in nature, the first extension or magnitude, really existing without the mind, which is a thing, that hath no self-unity at all in it, but is infinite alterity and divisibility, as it is also meer outside and outwardness, it having nothing within, nor any other action belonging to it, but only locally to move, when it is moved. The second, life and mind, or the self-active cogitative nature, an inside being, whose action is not local motion, but an internal energy, within the substance or essence of the thinker himself, or in the inside of him; which therefore, though unextended, yet hath a certain inward recess, *Bzbes*, or essential profundity. And this is a thing, which can act all of it entirely upon either a greater or lesser quantity of extended substance or body, and its several parts, penetrating into it, and co-existing in the same place with it. Wherefore it is not to be looked upon either as a mathematical, or as a physical point, as an absolute parvitude, or the least *extensum* possible, it having not only such an essential inside, bathos, or profundity in it, wherein it acteth and thinketh within itself, but also a certain amplitude of active power *ad extra*, or a sphere of activity upon body. Upon which account, it was before affirmed by *Plotinus*, that an unextended incorporeal is a thing bigger than body, because body cannot exist otherwise than a point of it in a point of space; whereas this one and the same indivisible can at once both comprehend a whole *extensum* within it, and be all of it in every part thereof. And lastly, all finite incorporeals are always naturally united to some body or other; from both which together is compleated and made up in every created understanding being one entire animal, consisting of soul and body, and having something incorporeal, and something corporeal in it, an unextended inside, and an extended outside, by means whereof it is determined to *here* and *there*, and capable of moving locally, or changing place.

Thus have we represented the sense of the ancient unextended Incorporealists to the best advantage, that we could, in way of answer to the promised atheistical argument against incorporeal substance, and in order to the vindication of them from the contempt of Atheists; and we do affirm, that the fore-mentioned argumentations of theirs do evince, that there is some other substance besides body, which therefore, according to the principles of these Atheists themselves, must be acknowledged to be unextended, it being concluded by them, that whatsoever is extended is body. But whether they do also absolutely prove, that there is, *ὅτι ἀμεγέθης, ἀδιαιρέτος, ἀμεγής*, and *ἀδιαιρέτος*, a substance devoid of magnitude, indistinct, without parts, and indivisible; this we shall leave others to make a judgment of. However, it is certain, that Atheists, who maintain the contrary, must needs assert, that every thought, and whatsoever belongeth to soul, mind, (as knowledge, virtue, &c.) is not only mentally and mathematically divisible, so that there may be half, a third part, or a quarter of a thought, and the rest, supposed; but also physically separable, or discernible, together with the soul, wherein it is. They must also deny,

that

that there is any internal energy at all, or any other action besides that outside superficial action of local motion, and consequently make all cogitation nothing but local motion or translation. And lastly, they must maintain, that no substance can co-exist with any other substance (as soul with body) otherwise than by juxta-position only, and by possessing the pores, or filling up the intervals thereof, as a net with the water.

And this is the first answer to the forementioned atheistical argument against incorporeal substance; That though whatsoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended; but that life, or mind and cogitation, are an unextended, indistant and indivisible nature. But, as we have already intimated, there are other learned asserters of incorporeal substance, who, lest God and spirits, being thus made unextended, should quite vanish into nothing, answer that atheistical argumentation after a different manner, by granting to these Atheists that proposition, *that whatsoever is, is extended; and what is unextended, is nothing*; but then denying that other of theirs, *that whatsoever is extended, is body*; they asserting another extension, specifically differing from that of bodies: for, whereas corporeal extension is not only impenetrable, so as that no one part thereof can enter into another, but also both mentally and really divisible, one part being in its nature separable from another; they affirm, that there is another incorporeal extension, which is both penetrable, and also indiscernible, so that no one part thereof can possibly be separated from another, or the whole; and that to such an incorporeal extension as this belongeth life, cogitation, and understanding, the Deity having such an infinite extension, but all created spirits a finite and limited one, which also is in them supposed to be contractible and dilatible. Now it is not our part here to oppose Theists, but Atheists: wherefore we shall leave these two sorts of Incorporealists to dispute it out friendly amongst themselves; and indeed therefore with the more moderation, equanimity, and toleration of dissent mutually, because it seemeth, that some are in a manner fatally inclined to think one way in this controversy, and some another. And whatever the truth of the case be, it must be acknowledged, that this latter hypothesis may be very useful and serviceable to retain some in theism, who can by no means admit of a Deity, or any thing else, unextended; though, perhaps, there will not be wanting others also, who would go in a middle way betwixt these two, or compound them together, by supposing the Deity to be indeed altogether unextended, and all of it every where; but finite incorporeals, or created spirits, to have an unextended inside, a life or mind, diffusing itself into a certain amplitude of outward extension, whereby they are determined to a place, yet so as to be all in every part thereof; which outward extension is therefore not to be accounted body, because penetrable, contractible, and dilatible, and because no one part thereof is separable from the rest, by the rushing or incursion of any corporeal thing upon them. And thus is the Atheists argument against incorporeal substance answered two manner of ways;

ways; first, That there is something unextended; and, secondly, That if there were none, yet must there of necessity be a substance otherwise extended than body is, so as to be neither antitypous nor discernible. And ourselves would not be understood here dogmatically to assert any thing in this point, save only what all Incorporealists do agree in, to wit, that besides body, which is impenetrably and divisibly extended, there is in nature another substance, that is both penetrable of body and indiscernible, or which doth not consist of parts separable from one another. And that there is at least such a substance as this, is unquestionably manifest from what hath been already declared.

But the Atheist will, in the next place, give an account of the original of this error (as he calls it) of incorporeal substance, and undertake to shew from what mistake it proceeded, which is yet another pretended confutation thereof; namely, that it sprung partly from the abuse of abstract names and notions, men making substances of them; and partly from the scholastick essences, distinct from the things themselves, and said to be eternal. From both which delusions and dotages together the Atheists conceive, that men have been first of all much confirmed in the belief of ghosts and spirits, dæmons and devils, invisible beings called by several names. Which belief had also another original, men's mistaking their own phancies for realities. The chief of all which affrightful ghosts and spectres, according to these Atheists, is the Deity, the *Oberon*, or prince of fairies and phancies. But then, whereas men, by their natural reason, could not conceive otherwise of these ghosts and spirits, than that they were a kind of thin, aerial bodies, their understandings have been so enchanted by these abstract names (which are indeed the names of nothing) and those separate essences and *quiddities* of scholasticks, as that they have made incorporeal substances of them; the atheistical conclusion is, that they, who assert an incorporeal Deity, do really but make a scholastick separate essence, or the mere abstract notion of an accident, a substantial thing, and a ghost or spirit presiding over the whole world.

To which our reply in general first of all is, That all this is nothing but idle romantick fiction; the belief of a Deity, and substance incorporeal, standing upon none of those imaginary foundations. And then, as for that impudent atheistical pretence, that the Deity is nothing but a figment or creature of men's fear and imagination, and therefore the prince of fairies and phancies; this hath been already sufficiently confuted in our answer to the first atheistical argumentation, where we have also over and above shewed, that there is not only a natural prolepsis or anticipation of a God in the minds of men, but also that the belief thereof is supported by the strongest and most substantial reason, his existence being indeed demonstrable, with mathematical evidence, to such as are capable, and not blinded with prejudice, nor enchanted by the witchcraft of vice and wickedness, to the debauching of their understandings. It hath been also shewed, that the opinion of other ghosts and spirits, besides the Deity, sprung not
merely

merely from fear and phancy neither, as children's bugbears, but from real phænomena; true sensible apparitions, with the histories of them in all ages, without which the belief of such things could never have held up so generally and constantly in the world. As likewise, that there is no repugnancy at all to reason, but that there may be as well aerial and ethereal, as there are terrestrial animals; and that the dull and earthy stupidity of men's minds is the only thing, which makes them so prone to think, that there is no understanding nature superiour to mankind, but that in the world all is dead about us; and to disbelieve the existence of any thing, which themselves cannot either see or feel. Assuredly, the Deity is no phancy, but the greatest reality in the world, and that, without which there could be nothing at all real, it being the only necessary existent; and consequently atheism is either mere sottishness, or else a strange kind of irreligious fanaticism.

We now further add, that the belief of ghosts and spirits incorporeal, and consequently of an incorporeal Deity, sprung neither from any ridiculous mistake of the abstract names and notions of mere accidents for substances, nor from the scholastick essences, said to be eternal. For, as for the latter, none of those scholasticks ever dream'd, that there was any universal man, or universal horse, existing alone by itself, and separate from all singulars; nor that the abstract metaphysical essences of men, after they were dead, subsisting by themselves, did walk up and down amongst graves, in airy bodies: it being absolutely impossible, that the real essence of any thing should be separable from the thing itself, or eternal, when that is not so. And were the essences of all things look'd upon by these scholasticks as substances incorporeal, then must they have made all things (even body itself) to be ghosts, and spirits, and incorporeal; and accidents also (they having their essences too) to be substantial. But in very truth, these scholastick essences, said to be eternal, are nothing but the intelligible essences of things, or their natures as conceivable, and objects of the mind. And in this sense, it is an acknowledged truth, that the essences of things, (as for example, of a sphere or triangle) are eternal, and such as were never made; because there could not otherwise be eternal verities concerning them. So that the true meaning of these eternal essences is indeed no other than this, that knowledge is eternal; or that there is an eternal mind, that comprehendeth the intelligible natures and ideas of all things, whether actually existing, or possible only, their necessary relations to one another, and all the immutable verities belonging to them. Wherefore, though these eternal essences themselves be no ghosts nor spirits, nor substances incorporeal, they being nothing but objective entities of the mind, or *Noemata*, and ideas; yet does it plainly follow from the necessary supposition of them, (as was before declared) that there is one eternal unmade Mind, and perfect incorporeal Deity, a real and substantial Ghost or Spirit, which comprehending itself, and all the extent of its own power, the possibility of things, and their intelligible natures, together with an exemplar or platform of the whole world, produced the same accordingly.

But our atheistical argumentator yet further urges, that those scholasticks and metaphysicians, who, because life or cogitation can be considered alone abstractly, without the consideration of body, therefore conclude it not to be the accident or action of a body, but a substance by itself, (and which also, after men are dead, can walk amongst the graves) that these (I say) do so far abuse those abstract names and notions of mere accidents, as plainly to make substances incorporeal of them. To which therefore we reply also, that were the abstract notions of accidents in general made incorporeal substances, by those philosophers aimed at, then must they have supposed all the qualities or affections of bodies, such as whiteness and blackness, heat and cold, and the like, to have been substances incorporeal also; a thing yet never heard, or thought of. But the case is far otherwise as to conscious life or cogitation, though it be an abstract also; because this is no accident of body, as the Atheist (serving his own hypothesis) securely takes it for granted, nor indeed of any thing else, but an essential attribute of another substance, distinct from body, (or incorporeal;) after the same manner, as extension or magnitude is the essential attribute of body, and not a mere accident.

And now having so copiously confuted all the most considerable atheistical grounds, we are necessitated to dispatch those that follow, being of lesser moment, with all possible brevity and compendiousness. The four next, which are the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth atheistical argumentations, pretend to no more than only this, to disprove a corporeal Deity; or from the supposition, that there is no other substance in the world besides body, to infer the impossibility of a God; that is, of an eternal unmade Mind, the maker and governour of the whole world: all which therefore signify nothing at all to the assertors of a Deity incorporeal, who are the only genuine Theists. Nevertheless, though none but Stoicks, and such other Corporealists, as are notwithstanding Theists, be directly concerned in an answer to them, yet shall we, first, so far consider the principles of the atheistical corporealism, contained in those two heads, the fifth and sixth, as from the absolute impossibility of these hypotheses to demonstrate a necessity of incorporeal substance, from whence a Deity will also follow.

Here, therefore, are there two atheistical hypotheses, founded upon the supposition, that all is body: the first, in the way of qualities, generable and corruptible, which we call the Hylopathian; the second, in the way of unqualified atoms, which is the Atomick, Corporealism, and Atheism. The former of these was the most ancient, and the first sciography, or rude delineation of atheism. For *Aristotle*³ tells us, that the most ancient Atheists were those, who supposed matter or body, that is, bulky extension, to be the only substance, and unmade thing, that, out of which all things

³ Metaphys. Lib. I. Cap. III. p. 264. Tom. IV. Oper.

things were made, and into which all things are again resolved; whatsoever is else in the world being nothing but the passions, qualities, and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, or producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again. From whence the necessary consequence is, That there is no eternal unmade life or understanding, or that mind is no god, or principle in the universe, but essentially a creature.

And this Hylopathian atheism, which supposeth whatsoever is in the universe to be either the substance of matter and bulk, or else the qualities and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, hath been called also by us Anaximandrian. Though we deny not, but that there might be formerly some difference amongst the Atheists of this kind; nor are we ignorant, that *Simplicius* and others conceive *Anaximander* to have asserted, besides matter, qualities also eternal and unmade, or an homæomery, and similar atomology, just in the same manner as *Anaxagoras* afterwards did, save only that he would not acknowledge any unmade mind or life; *Anaximander* supposing all life and understanding whatsoever, all soul and mind, to have risen up, and been generated from a fortuitous commixture of those similar atoms, or the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, and the like, contempered together. And we confess, that there is some probability for this opinion. Notwithstanding which, because there is no absolute certainty thereof, and because all these ancient Atheists agreed in this, that life and understanding are either first and primary, or else secondary qualities of body, generable and corruptible; therefore did we not think fit to multiply forms of Atheism, but rather to make but one kind of Atheism of all this, calling it indifferently, Hylopathian, or Anaximandrian.

The second atheistick hypothesis is that form of atheism described under the sixth head, which likewise supposing body to be the only substance; and the principles thereof devoid of life and understanding, does reject all real qualities, according to the vulgar notion of them, and generate all things whatsoever, besides matter, meerly from the combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or the contextures of unqualified atoms, life and understanding not excepted: which therefore, according to them, being no simple primitive and primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative, the meer creature of matter and motion, could not possibly be a God or first principle in the universe. This is that atomick atheism called Democritical; *Leucippus* and *Democritus* being the first founders thereof. For though there was, before them, another atomology, which made unqualified atoms the principles of all bodies, it supposing, besides body, substance incorporeal; yet were these, as *Laertius* † declareth, the first, that ever made, *ἀρχαί τῶν ὄλων ἀτόμιαι*, senseless atoms, the principles of all things whatsoever, even of life and understanding, soul and mind.

Indeed it cannot be denied, but that from these two things granted, that all is body, and that the principles of body are devoid of all life and

† Lib. IX. Segm. 44. p. 573.

understanding, it will follow unavoidably, that there can be no corporeal Deity. Wherefore the Stoicks, who professed to acknowledge no other substance besides body, and yet nevertheless had a strong persuasion of the existence of a God, or an eternal unmade Mind, the Maker of the whole world, denied that other proposition of the atheistical Corporealists, that the principles of all bodies were devoid of life and understanding, they asserting an intellectual fire, eternal and unmade, the Maker of the whole mundane system; which postulatam, of a living intellectual body eternal, were it granted to these Stoicks, yet could not this their corporeal god, notwithstanding, be absolutely incorruptible, as *Origen* often inculcatedh:

L. 1. C. Celf.
p. 17.

Ὁ Θεὸς τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἐστὶ σῶμα, ἐκ αἰδηκείας λέγειν αὐτὸν τρεπίδον, καὶ δὲ ὅλων ἀλλοιω-
ατὸν καὶ μεταβλητὸν, καὶ ἀπαξᾶπλῶς θανάμειν Φθαρεῖναι, παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἐν εἶναι τὸ Φθεῖρον
κατὰ τὸν *God to the Stoicks is a body, and therefore mutable, alterable, and
clangible, and he would indeed be perfectly corruptible, were there any other
body to act upon him. Wherefore he is only happy in this, that he wants a
corrupter or destroyer.* And thus much was therefore rightly urged by the
atheistical argumentator, that no corporeal Deity could be absolutely in its
own nature incorruptible, nor otherwise than by accident only immortal, be-
cause of its divisibility. For were there any other matter without this
world, to make inroads and incursions upon it, or to disunite the parts
thereof, the life and unity of the Stoical corporeal god must needs be scat-
tered and destroyed. And therefore of this Stoical god does the same *Origen*
thus further write; Ὁ τῶν Στωικῶν Θεός, ἄτε σῶμα τυχεῖανον, ὅτε μὲν ἡγεμονι-
κὸν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην οἰάν, ὅταν ἡ ἐκπύρωσις ἢ ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ μέρος γίνῃται αὐτῆς, ὅταν ἡ
δικτύσμησις ἔδῃ γὰρ δεδυνῆναι ἔτοι τεταῖωσαι τὴν Φυσικὴν τῶ Θεῦ οἰοικν, ὡς πᾶν ἄφ-
θάρτου καὶ ἀπλῆ, καὶ ἀσυνθῆτε, καὶ ἀδιαιρέτε. *The God of the Stoicks being a body,
haib sometimes the whole for its hegemonick in the conflagration; and sometimes
only a part of the mundane matter. For these men were not able to reach to a
clear notion of the Deity, as a being every way incorruptible, simple, uncom-
pounded, and indivisible.* Notwithstanding which, these Stoicks were not
therefore to be ranked amongst the Atheists, but far to be preferred before
them, and accounted only a kind of imperfect Theists.

P. 169.

But we shall now make it evident, that in both these atheistical corporea-
lisms, (agreeing in those two things, that body is the only substance, and
that the principles of body are not vital) there is an absolute impossibility;
not only because, as *Aristotle* ¹ objecteth, they supposed no active principle;
but also because their bringing of life and understanding (being real entities)
out of dead and senseless matter is also the bringing of something out of
nothing. And indeed the atomick Atheist is here of the two rather the
more absurd and unreasonable, forasmuch as he, discarding all real qualities,
and that for this very reason, because nothing can come out of nothing, doth
himself notwithstanding, produce life, sense, and understanding (unquestion-
able realities) out of meer magnitudes, figures, sizes, and motions, that is, in-
deed out of nothing. Wherefore there being an absolute impossibility of both
these atheistical hypotheses, (neither of which is able to solve the phæn-
omenon

¹ Metaphysic. Lib. I. Cap. III. p. 265. Tom. IV. Oper.

nomenon of life and understanding) from that confessed principle of theirs, that matter, as such, hath no life nor understanding belonging to it, it follows unavoidably, that there must be some other substance besides body or matter, which is essentially vital and intellectual: Ὁς γὰρ πάντα χρεῖται ἐπιανῆς ζωῆς, because all things cannot possibly have a peregrine, adventitious and borrowed life, but something in the universe must needs have life naturally and originally. All life cannot be merely accidental, generable and corruptible, producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again, but there must of necessity be some substantial life, which point (that all life is not a meer accident, but that there is life substantial) hath been of late, with much reason and judgment, insisted upon, and urged by the writer of *the life of nature*. Neither must there be only such a substantial life, as is naturally immortal for the future, but also such as is eternal, and was never made; all other lives and minds whatsoever, (none of which could possibly be generated out of matter) being derived from this eternal unmade fountain of life and understanding.

Which thing the hylozoick Atheists being well aware of, namely, that there must of necessity be both substantial and eternal unmade life, but supposing also matter to be the only substance, thought themselves necessitated to attribute to all matter as such, life and understanding, though not animalish and conscious, but natural only; they conceiving, that, from the modification thereof alone by organization, all other animalish life, not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, was derived. But this hylozoick atheism, thus bringing all conscious and reflexive life or animality, out of a supposed senseless, stupid, and unconscious life of nature in matter, and that merely from a different accidental modification thereof, or contexture of parts, does again plainly bring something out of nothing, which is an absolute impossibility. Moreover, this hylozoick atheism was long since, and in the first emergence thereof, solidly confuted by the atomick Atheists, after this manner: If matter, as such, had life, perception, and understanding belonging to it, then of necessity must every atom, or smallest particle thereof be a distinct percipient by itself; from whence it will follow, that there could not possibly be any such men and animals as now are, compounded out of them, but every man and animal would be a heap of innumerable percipients, and have innumerable perceptions and intelligences; whereas it is plain, that there is but one life and understanding, one soul or mind, one perceiver or thinker in every one. And to say, that these innumerable particles of matter do all confederate together; that is, to make every man and animal to be a multitude or commonwealth of percipients, and persons, as it were, clubbing together, is a thing so absurd and ridiculous, that one would wonder the hylozoists should not rather chuse to recant that their fundamental error of the life of matter, than endeavour to seek shelter and sanctuary for the same, under such a pretence. For though voluntary agents and persons may many of them resign up their wills to one, and by that means have all but as it were one artificial will, yet can

they not possibly resign up their sense and understanding too, so as to have all but one artificial life, sense, and understanding; much less could this be done by senseless atoms, or particles of matter supposed to be devoid of all consciousness or animality. Besides which, there have been other arguments already suggested, which do sufficiently evince, that sense and understanding cannot possibly belong to matter any way, either originally or secondarily, to which more may be added elsewhere.

And now from these two things, that life and understanding do not essentially belong to matter as such, and that they cannot be generated out of dead and senseless matter, it is demonstratively certain, that there must be some other substance, besides body or matter. However, the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheists taking it for granted, that the first principles of body are devoid of all life and understanding, must either acknowledge a necessity of some other substance besides body, or else deny the truth of that axiom, so much made use of by themselves, That *nothing can come out of nothing*. And this was our second undertaking, to shew, that from the very principles of the atheistical corporealism, represented in the fifth and sixth heads, incorporeal substance is against those Atheists themselves demonstrable.

Our third and last was this, That there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two next following atheistical argumentations, built upon the contrary supposition, are therefore altogether insignificant also, and do no execution at all. The first of which (being the seventh) impugning only such a soul of the world, as is generated out of matter, is not properly directed against theism neither, but only such a form of atheism (sometime before mentioned) as indeed cometh nearest to theism. Which, though concluding all things to have sprung originally from senseless matter, *Night* and *Chaos*; yet supposes things from thence to have ascended gradually to higher and higher perfection; first, inanimate bodies, as the elements, then birds and other brute animals (according to the fore-mentioned Aristophanick tradition, with which agreeth this of *Lucretius*,

Principio genus alituum, varique volucres;)

afterward men, and in the last place gods; and that not only the animated stars, but *Jupiter*, or a soul of the world, generated also out of *Night* and *Chaos*, as well as all other things. We grant indeed, that the true and real Theists amongst the ancient Pagans also held the world's animation, and whatsoever denied the same, were therefore accounted absolute Atheists. But the world's animation, in a larger sense, signifies no more than this, that all things are not dead about us, but that there is a living sentient and understanding nature eternal, that first framed the world, and still presideth over it: and it is certain, that in this sense all Theists whatsoever must hold the world's animation. But the generality of Pagan Theists held the

† Lib. V. Vers. 797.

world's animation also in a stricter sense; as if the world were truly and properly an animal, and therefore a god, compleated and made up of soul and body together, as other animals are. Which soul of this great world-animal was to some of them the highest or supreme Deity, but to others only a secondary god, they supposing an abstract mind superiour to it. But God's being the soul of the world in this latter Paganick sense, and the world's being an animal or a god, are things absolutely disclaimed and renounced by us. However, this seventh atheistical argument is not directed against the soul of the world in the sense of the Paganick Theists neither, (this being, as they think, already confuted,) but in the sense of the atheistical Theognists; not an eternal unmade soul or mind, but a native or generated one only, such as resulted from the disposition of matter, and contexture of atoms, the off-spring of night and chaos: the Atheists here pretending, after their confutation of the true and genuine theism, to take away all shadows thereof also, and so to free men from all manner of fear of being obnoxious to any understanding being, superiour to themselves. Wherefore we might here omit the confutation of this argument, without any detriment at all to the cause of theism: nevertheless, because this in general is an atheistical assertion, that there is no life and understanding presiding over the whole world, we shall briefly examine the supposed grounds thereof, which alone will be a sufficient confutation of it. The first of them therefore is this, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; the second, that the principles of bodies are devoid of all life and understanding; and the last, that life and understanding are but accidents of bodies resulting from such a composition or contexture of atoms, as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, and of human form. From all which the conclusion is, that there can be no life and understanding in the whole, because it is not of human form, and organized, and hath no blood and brains. But neither is body the only substance, nor are life and understanding accidents resulting from any modification of dead and lifeless matter; nor is blood or brains that, which understandeth in us, but an incorporeal soul or mind, vitally united to a terrestrial organized body; which will then understand with far greater advantage, when it comes to be clothed with a pure, spiritual, and heavenly one. But there is in the universe also a higher kind of intellectual animals, which, though consisting of soul and body likewise, yet have neither flesh, nor blood, nor brains, nor parts so organized as ours are. And the most perfect mind and intellect of all is not the soul of any body, but complete in itself, without such vital union and sympathy with matter. We conclude therefore, that this passage of a modern writer¹, *We worms, cannot conceive, how God can understand without brains*, is *vox pecudis*, the language and philosophy rather of worms or brute animals, than of men.

The next, which is the eighth atheistical argument, is briefly this; that whereas the Deity by Theists is generally supposed to be a living Being perfectly happy, and immortal or incorruptible; there can be no such living being

¹ Hobbes.

being immortal, and consequently none perfectly happy. Because all living beings whatsoever are concretions of atoms, which as they were at first generated, so are they again liable to death and corruption; life being no simple primitive nature, nor substantial thing, but a mere accidental modification of compounded bodies only, which upon the disunion of their parts, or the disordering of their contexture, vanisheth again into nothing. And there being no life immortal, happiness must needs be a mere insignificant word, and but a romantick fiction. Where first, this is well, that the Atheists will confess, that according to their principles, there can be no such thing at all as happiness, because no security of future permanency; all life perpetually coming out of nothing, and whirling back into nothing again. But this atheistical argument is likewise founded upon the former error, that body is the only substance, the first principles whereof are devoid of all life and understanding; whereas it is certain, that life cannot possibly result from any composition of dead and lifeless things; and therefore must needs be a simple and primitive nature. It is true indeed, that the participated life in the bodies of animals (which yet is but improperly called life, it being nothing but their being actuated by a living soul) is a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible; since that body, which is now vitally united to a living soul, may be disunited again from it, and thereby become a dead and lifeless carcase; but the primary or original life itself is substantial, nor can there be any dead carcase of a human soul. That which hath life essentially belonging to the substance of it, must needs be naturally immortal, because no substance can of itself perish, or vanish into nothing. Besides which, there must be also some, not only substantial, but also eternal unmade Life, whose existence is necessary, and which is absolutely unannihilable by any thing else; which therefore must needs have perfect security of its own future happiness; and this is an incorporeal Deity. And this is a brief confutation of the eighth atheistical argument.

BUT the Democritick Atheist proceeds, endeavouring further to disprove a God from the phenomena of motion and cogitation, in the three following argumentations. First therefore, whereas Theists commonly bring an argument from motion, to prove a God, or first unmoved Mover, the Atheists contend, on the contrary, that, from the very nature of motion, the impossibility of any such first unmoved Mover is clearly demonstrable. For, it being an axiom of undoubted truth concerning motion, that *whatsoever is moved, is moved by some other thing*; or, that *nothing can move itself*; it follows from thence unavoidably, that there is no *eternum Immobile*, no *eternal unmoved Mover*; but on the contrary, that there was *eternum Motum*, an *eternal Moved*; or, that one thing was moved by another, from eternity infinitely, without any first mover or cause, because,

as nothing could move itself, so could nothing ever move another, but what was itself before moved by something else.

To which we reply, That this axiom, *whatsoever is moved, is moved by another, and not by itself*, was, by *Aristotle*, and those other philosophers, who made so much use thereof, restrained to the local motion of bodies only; that no body locally moved, was ever moved originally from itself, but from something else. Now it will not at all follow from hence, that therefore *nihil movetur nisi à moto, that no body was ever moved, but by some other body*, that was alio before moved by something else; or, that of necessity one body was moved by another body, and that by another, and so backwards, infinitely, without any first unmoved or self-moving and self-active mover, as the Democritick Atheist fondly conceits; for the motion of bodies might proceed (as unquestionably it did) from something else, which is not body, and was not before moved. Moreover, the Democritick Atheist here also, without any ground, imagines, that were there but one push once given to the world, and no more, this motion would from thence forward always continue in it, one body still moving another to all eternity. For though this be indeed a part of the Cartesian hypothesis, that, according to the laws of nature, a body moving, will as well continue in motion, as a body resting in rest, until that motion be communicated and transferred to some other body; yet is the case different here, where it is supposed, not only one push to have been given to the world at first, but also the same quantity of motion or agitation to be constantly conserved and maintained. But to let this pass, because it is something a subtle point, and not so rightly understood by many of the Cartesians themselves, we say, that it is a thing utterly impossible, that one body should be moved by another infinitely, without any first cause or mover, which was self-active, and that not from the authority of *Aristotle* only, pronouncing *ἢτε δυνατὸν ὄθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἵνα εἰς ἀπειρον*, &c. *That in the causes of motion, there could not possibly be an infinite progress*; but from the reason there subjoined by *Aristotle*, because, *εἰπερ μηδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως αὐτὸν ὄθεν ἐστὶ*, *If there were no first unmoved mover, there could be no cause of motion at all*. For were all the motion, that is in the world, a passion from something else, and no first unmoved active mover, then must it be a passion from no agent, or without an action, and consequently proceed from nothing, and either cause itself, or be made without a cause. Now the ground of the Atheist's error here is only from hence, because he taketh it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body, nor any other action but local motion; from whence it comes to pass, that, to him, this proposition, *No body can move itself*, is one and the same with this, *Nothing can act from itself, or be self-active*.

And thus is the atheistical pretended demonstration against a God, or first cause, from motion, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that there is no consequence at all in this argument, that because no body can
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move itself, therefore there can be no first unmoved mover; as also having discovered the ground of the Atheist's error here, their taking it for granted, that there is nothing but body; and lastly, having plainly shewed, that it implies a contradiction there should be action and motion in the world, and yet nothing self-moving or self-active: so that it is demonstratively certain from motion, that there is a first cause, or unmoved mover. We shall now further add, that from the principle acknowledged by the Democritick Atheists themselves, *That no body can move itself*, it follows also undeniably, that there is some other substance besides body, something incorporeal, which is self-moving and self-active, and was the first unmoved mover of the heavens or world. For if no body from eternity was ever able to move itself, and yet there must of necessity be some active cause of that motion, which is in the world, (since it could not cause itself) then is there unquestionably some other substance besides body, which having a power of moving matter, was the first cause of motion, itself being unmoved.

Moreover, it is certain from hence also, that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and such as is not *beterokinesy*, but *autokinesy*, or *self-activity*. For since the local motion of body is essentially *beterokinesy*, not caused by the substance itself moving, but by something else acting upon it, that action, by which local motion is first caused, cannot be itself local motion, but must be *autokinesy*, or *self-activity*, *that which is not a passion from any other agent*, but springs from the immediate agent itself, which species of action is called *cogitation*. All the local motion, that is in the world, was first caused by some cogitative or thinking being, which not acted upon by any thing without it, nor at all locally moved, but only mentally, is the immovable mover of the heaven, and vortices. So that *cogitation* is, in order of nature, before *local motion*, and *incorporeal* before *corporeal substance*, the former having a natural *imperium* upon the latter. And now have we not only confuted the ninth atheistical argument from motion, but also demonstrated against the Democritick Atheists from their own principle, that there is an incorporeal and cogitative substance, the first immovable mover of the heavens, and vortices; that is, an incorporeal Deity.

But the Democritick Atheist will yet make a further attempt to prove, that there can be nothing self-moving or self-active, and that no thinking being could be a first cause; he laying his foundation in this principle, *that nothing taketh its beginning from itself*, but from the action of some other agent without it. From whence he would infer, that cogitation itself is *beterokinesy*, the passion of the thinker, and the action of something without it, no cogitation ever rising up of itself without a cause; and that cogitation is indeed nothing but local motion or mechanism, and all living understanding beings machines, moved from without; and then make this conclusion, that therefore no understanding being could possibly be a first cause: he further adding also, that no understanding being

Being as such, can be perfectly happy neither, as the Deity is supposed to be, because dependent upon something without it: and this is the tenth atheistick argumentation.

Where we shall first consider that, which the Democritick Atheist makes his fundamental principle, or common notion to disprove all autokinemy or self-activity by, that *Nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other thing without it.* Which axiom, if it be understood of substantial things, then is it indeed acknowledged by us to be unquestionably true, it being the same with this, *That no substance, which once was not, could ever possibly cause itself, or bring itself into being; but must take its beginning from the action of something else:* but then it will make nothing at all against theism. As it is likewise true, that no action whatsoever, (and therefore no cogitation) taketh beginning from itself, or causeth itself to be, but is always produced by some substantial agent; but this will no way advantage the Atheist neither. Wherefore, if he would direct his force against theism, he ought to understand this proposition thus, that no action whatsoever taketh beginning from the immediate agent; (which is the subject of it) but from the action of some other thing without it; or, that nothing can move or act otherwise, than as it is moved and acted upon by something else. But this is only to beg the question, or to prove the thing in dispute, identically, that nothing is self-active, because nothing can act from itself. Whereas it is in the mean time undeniably certain, that there could not possibly be any motion or action at all in the universe, were there not something self-moving or self-active, for as much as otherwise all that motion or action would be a passion from nothing, and be made without a cause.

And whereas the Atheists would further prove, that no cogitation taketh its beginning from the thinker, but always from the action of some other thing without it, after this manner; because it is not conceivable, why this cogitation, rather than that, should start up at any time, were there not some cause for it, without the thinker: here, in the first place, we freely grant, that our human cogitations are indeed commonly occasioned by the incursions of sensible objects upon us; as also, that the concatenations of those thoughts and phantasms in us, which are distinguished from sensations, (whether we be asleep or awake) do many times depend upon corporeal and mechanical causes in the brain. Notwithstanding which, that all our cogitations are obtruded and imposed upon us from without; and that there is no transition in our thoughts at any time, but such as had been before in sense; (which the Democritick Atheist avers) this is a thing which we absolutely deny. For, had we no mastery at all over our thoughts, but they were all like tennis-balls, banded, and struck upon us, as it were, by rackets from without; then could we not steadily and constantly carry on any designs and purposes of life. But on the contrary, that of *Aristotle*¹ is most true, (as will be elsewhere further proved) that man, and all rational beings, are

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¹ Vide Lib. III. ad Nicomach. Cap. III. Cap. IX. & Cap. XII. p. 202, 204.
p. 37. Tom. III. & Magnor. Moral. Lib. I.

in some sense, ἀρχὴ πρῶτη, a principle of actions, subordinate to the Deity; which they could not possibly be, were they not also a principle of cogitations, and had some command over them; but these were all as much determined by causes without, as the motions of the weathercock are. The rational soul is itself an active and bubbling fountain of thoughts; that perpetual and restless desire, which is as natural and essential to us, as our very life, continually raising up and protruding new and new ones in us; which are as it were offered to us. Besides which, we have also a further self-recollective power, and a power of determining and fixing our mind and intention upon some certain objects, and of ranging our thoughts accordingly. But the Atheist is here also to be taught yet a further lesson, that an absolutely perfect mind, (such as the Deity is supposed to be,) doth not (as *Aristotle* writeth of it) ἐνὶ μὲν οὐκ ἐνὶ οὐκ οὐκ, sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand: it being ignorant of nothing, nor syllogizing about any thing but comprehending all intelligibles with their relations and verities at once within itself; and its essence and energy being the same. Which notion, if it be above the dull capacity of Atheists, who measure all perfection by their own scantling, this is a thing, that we cannot help.

But as for that prodigious paradox of Atheists, that cogitation itself is nothing but local motion or mechanism, we could not have thought it possible, that ever any man should have given entertainment to such a conceit, but that this was rather a meer slander raised upon Atheists; were it not certain from the records of antiquity, that whereas the old religious atomists did, upon good reason, reduce all corporeal action (as generation, augmentation, and alteration) to local motion, or translation from place to place; (there being no other motion besides this conceivable in bodies) the ancient Atheizers of that philosophy (*Leucippus* and *Democritus*) not contented herewith, did really carry the business still on further, so as to make cogitation itself also nothing but local motion. As it is also certain, that a modern atheistical pretender to wit hath publicly owned this same conclusion, that *mind is nothing else but local motion in the organick parts of man's body*. These men have been sometimes indeed a little troubled with the phancy, apparition, or seeming of cogitation that is, the consciousness of it, as knowing not well what to make thereof; but then they put it off again, and satisfy themselves worshipfully with this, that phancy is but phancy, but the reality of cogitation nothing but local motion; as if there were not as much reality in phancy and consciousness, as there is in local motion. That, which inclined these men so much to this opinion, was only because they were sensible and aware of this, that if there were any other action, besides local motion admitted, there must needs be some other substance acknowledged, besides body. *Cartesius* indeed undertook to defend brute animals to be nothing else but machines; but then he supposed that there was nothing at all of cogitation in them, and consequently nothing of true animality or life, no more than is in an artificial automaton, as a wooden eagle, or the like: nevertheless, this was justly thought to be paradox enough. But that cogitation itself should be local motion, and
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men nothing but machines; this is such a paradox, as none but either a stupid and befotted, or else an enthusiastick, bigotical, or fanaticke Atheist, could possibly give entertainment to. Nor are such men as these fit to be disputed with any more than a machine is.

But whereas the Atheistick objector adds also, over and above, in the last place, that no understanding Being can be perfectly happy neither, and therefore not a God, because essentially dependent upon something else without it; this is all one, as if he should say, that there is no such thing as happiness at all in nature; because it is certain, that without consciousness or understanding nothing can be happy, (since it could not have any fruition of itself;) and if no understanding Being can be happy neither, then must the conclusion needs be that of the Cyrenaicks, that *ἡδοναία ἀβυσσος*, *happineſs is a meer dimer*, a phantastick notion or fiction of men's minds; a thing, which hath no existence in nature. These are the men, who afterwards argue from interest also against a God and religion; notwithstanding that they confess their own principles to be so far from promising happiness to any, as that they absolutely cut off all hopes thereof. It may be farther observed also in the last place, that there is another of the Atheists dark mysteries here likewise couched, that there is no scale or ladder of entity and perfection in nature, one above another; the whole universe, from top to bottom, being nothing but one and the same senseless matter, diversely modified. As also that understanding, as such, rather speaks imperfection; it being but a mere whiffing, evanid, and phantastick thing; so that the most absolutely perfect of all things in the universe is grave, solid, and substantial senseless matter: of which more afterwards. And thus is the tenth atheistick argumentation also confuted.

But the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists will make yet a further assault from the nature of knowledge, understanding, after this manner; if the world were made by a God, or an antecedent mind and understanding, having in itself an exemplar or platform thereof, before it was made, then must there be actual knowledge both in order of nature and time, before things; whereas things, which are the objects of knowledge and understanding, are unquestionably in order of nature before knowledge; this being but the signature of them, and a passion from them. Now, the only things are singular sensibles or bodies. From whence it follows, that the mind is the youngest and most creaturely thing in the world; or that the world was before knowledge, and the conception of any mind; and no knowledge or mind before the world as its cause. Which is the eleventh atheistick argumentation.

But we have prevented ourselves here in the answer to this argument, (which would make all knowledge, mind, and understanding junior to the world, and the very creature of sensibles,) having already fully confuted it; and clearly proved, that singular bodies are not the only things, and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its immediate

intelligibles within itself; which intelligibles also are eternal, and that mind is no phantastick image of sensibles, nor the stamp and signature of them, but archetypal to them; the first mind being that of a perfect being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or the possibilities of all things. So that knowledge is older than all sensible things; mind senior to the world, and the architect thereof. Wherefore we shall refer the reader for an answer to this argument, to page 729. and so onwards, where the existence of a God, (that is, a mind before the world) is demonstrated also from this very topick, *viz.* the nature of knowledge and understanding.

We shall in this place only add; that as the Atheists can no way solve the phenomenon of motion, so can they much less that of cogitation, or life and understanding. To make which yet the more evident, we shall briefly represent a syllabus or catalogue of the many atheistical hallucinations or delirations concerning it. As first, that senseless matter being the only substance, and all things else but accidental modifications thereof; life and mind is all a meer accidental thing, generable and corruptible, producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again; and that there is no substantial life or mind any where. In opposition to which, we have before proved, that there must of necessity be some substantial life, and that human souls being lives substantial, and not meer accidental modifications of matter, they are consequently in their own nature immortal, since no substance of itself ever vanisheth into nothing.

Again, the Democriticks, and other Atheists conclude, that life and mind are no simple and primitive natures, but secondary and compounded things; they resulting from certain concretions and contextures of matter, and either the commixtures and contemporations of qualities, or else the combinations of those simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion; and so being made up of that, which hath nothing of life or mind in it. For as flesh is not made out of fleshy particles, nor bone out of bony, (as *Anaxagoras* of old dreamed) so may life, as they conceive, be as well made out of lifeless principles, and mind out of that which hath no mind or understanding at all in it: just as syllables pronounceable do result from combinations of letters, some of which are mutes, and cannot by themselves be pronounced at all, others but semi-vocal. And from hence do these Atheists infer, that there could be no eternal unmade life or mind, nor any that is immortal or incorruptible; since upon the dissolution of that compages or contexture of matter, from whence they result, they must needs vanish into nothing. Wherefore according to them, there hath probably sometime heretofore been no life nor understanding at all in the universe, and there may possibly be none again. From whence the conclusion is, that mind and understanding is no God, or principle in the universe; it being essentially factitious, native, and corruptible; or, as they express it in *Plato's*, *Συνὴς ἐκ Στενῶν, mortal from mortal things*: as also, that the souls of

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men cannot subsist separately after death, and walk up and down in airy bodies; no more than the form of a house or tree, after the dissolution thereof, can subsist by itself separately, or appear in some other body. But all this foolery of Atheists hath been already confuted, we having before shewed, that life and understanding are active powers, vigours, and perfections, that could never possibly result from meer passive bulk, or dead and senseless matter, however modified and compounded; because nothing can come effectively from nothing. Neither is there any consequence at all in this, that because flesh is not made out of fleshy principles, nor bone out of bony, red out of red things, nor green out of green; therefore life and understanding may as well be compounded out of things dead and senseless: because these are no syllables or complexions, as the others are, nor can either the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry; or else magnitudes, figures, sises, and motions, however combined together, as letters spell them out, and make them up; but they are simple and primitive things. And accordingly it hath been proved, that there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind. For though there be no necessity, that there should be any eternal unmade red, or green, because red and green may be made out of things not red nor green, they, and all other corporeal qualities (so called) being but several contextures of matter, or combinations of magnitudes, figures, sises, and motions, causing those several phancies in us: and though there be no necessity, that there should be eternal motion, because, if there were once no motion at all in matter, but all bodies rested, yet might motion have been produced by a self-moving or self-active principle: and lastly, though there be no necessity, that there should be eternal unmade matter or body neither, because had there been once no body at all, yet might it be made or produced by a perfect omnipotent incorporeal being: nevertheless, is there an absolute necessity, that there should be eternal unmade life, and mind, because were there once no life nor mind at all, these could never have been produced out of matter altogether lifeless and mindless. And though the form of a house cannot possibly exist separately from the matter and substance thereof, it being a meer accidental thing, resulting from such a compages of stone, timber, and mortar, yet are human souls and minds no such accidental forms of compounded matter, but active substantial things, that may therefore subsist separately from these bodies, and enliven other bodies of a different contexture. And however some, that are no Atheists, be over prone to conceive life, sense, cogitation, and consciousness in brutes, to be generated out of dead, senseless, and unthinking matter, (they being disposed thereunto by certain mistaken principles, and ill methods of philosophy) nevertheless is this unquestionably in itself a seed of atheism; because if any life, cogitation, and consciousness, may be produced out of dead and senseless matter, then can no philosophy hinder, but that all might have been so.

But the Democritick Atheists will yet venture further to deny, that there is any thing in nature self-moving or self-active, but that whatsoever moveth
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and acteth, was before moved by something else, and made to act thereby; and again, that from some other thing, and so backward infinitely; from whence it would follow, that there is no first in the order of causes, but an endless retro-infinity. But as this is all one, as to affirm, that there is no such thing at all as life in the world, but that the universe is a compages of dead and stupid matter, so has this infinity in the order of causes been already exploded for an absolute impossibility.

Nevertheless, the Atheists will here advance yet an higher paradox; that all action whatsoever, and therefore cogitation, phancy, and consciousness itself, is really nothing else but local motion; and consequently not only brute-animals, but also men themselves meer machines, which is an equal, either fortifinus or impudence, as to assert a triangle to be a square, or a sphere, a cube, number to be figure, or any thing else to be any thing: and it is really all one as to affirm, that there is indeed no such thing in ourselves as cogitation; there being no other action in nature, but local motion and mechanism.

Furthermore, the Democritick and Epicurian Atheists universally agree in this, that not only sensations, but also all the cogitations of the mind, are the meer passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without upon him; though they do not all declare themselves after the same manner herein. For first, the Democriticks conclude, that sense is caused by certain grosser corporeal effluvia, streaming from the surfaces of bodies continually, and entering through the nerves; but that all other cogitations of the mind, and men's either sleeping or waking imaginations, proceed from another sort of simulachra, idols, and images of a more fine and subtle contexture, coming into the brain, not through those open tubes, or channels of the nerves, but immediately through all the smaller pores of the body: so that, as we never have sense of any thing, but by means of those grosser corporeal images, obtruding themselves upon the nerves, so have we not the least cogitation at any time in our mind neither, which was not caused by those finer corporeal images, and exuvius membranes, or effluvia, rushing upon the brain or contexture of the soul. *Λεϊψίππος ἢ Δημόκριτος τὴν Αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν Νόησιν Εἰδώλων ἔχουσαν προΐοντων μὴδὲ γὰρ ἐπιπέλλειν μνηστέρων χωρὶς τῶ προσπιπλώσῃ, Leucippus and Democritus determined, that as well Noesis as Aisthesis, mental cogitation as external sensation, was caused by certain corporeal idols, coming from bodies without; since neither sensation nor cogitation could otherwise possibly be produced.* And thus does Laertius² also represent the sense of these atheistical philosophers, that the effluvia from bodies called idols were the only causes, *τὴν κατὰ ψυχῆν κινήσεων ἢ βελονμάτων ἐκώστων ἢ γένεσιν ἢ παθῶν, of all the motions, passions, and affections, and even the very volitions of the soul.* So that as we could not have the least sensation, imagination, nor conception of any thing otherwise than from those corporeal effluvia, rushing upon us from bodies without, and begetting the same in us, at such a time; so neither could we

have

¹ Plutarch de Placit. Philos. Lib. IV. Cap. VIII. p. 899. Tom. II. Oper.

Leucippus, 1ur. en'y to Democritus, Lib. IX. scgm. 44 p. 573.

² Laertius does not attribute this opinion to

have any passion, appetite, or volition, which we were not in like manner corporeally passive to. And this was the ground of the Democritick fate, or necessity of all human actions, maintained by them, in opposition to the τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν, or *liberty of will*, which cannot be conceived without self-activity, and something of contingency; they supposing human volitions also, as well as all the other cogitations, to be mechanically caused and necessitated from those effluvious images of bodies coming in upon the willers. And, however *Epicurus* sometime pretended to assert liberty of will against *Democritus*, yet, forgetting himself, did he also here securely philosophize after the very same manner;

Nunc age, que moveant animum res, accipe paucis;

Que veniunt veniant in mentem, percipe paucis.

Principiò hoc dico rerum simulacra vagari, &c.

Lucret. L. 4.

p. 358. 360

[*veri. 726.*]

But others there were amongst the ancient Atomists, who could not conceive sensations themselves to be thus caused by corporeal effluvia, or exuvions membranes streaming from bodies continually, and that for divers reasons alledged by them; but only by a pressure from them upon the optick nerve, by reason of a tension of the intermedius air, or æther, (being that, which is called light,) whereby the distant object is touched and felt, οὐκ ἔστι βάρυνγίαις, as it were by a staff. Which hypothesis concerning the corporeal part of sense is indeed much more ingenious, and agreeable to reason, than the former. But the atheizers of this atomology, as they supposed sense to be nothing else, but such a pressure from bodies without; so did they conclude imagination and mental cogitation to be but the reliques and remainders of those motions of sense formerly made, and conserved afterwards in the brain, (like the tremulous vibrations of a clock or bell, after the striking of the hammer, or the rolling of the waves, after that the wind is ceased;) melting, fading, and decaying insensibly by degrees. So that, according to this, knowledge and understanding is nothing but fading and decaying sense, and all our volitions but mechanick motions, caused from the actions, or intrusions of bodies upon us. Now, though it be true, that in sensation there is always a passion antecedent made upon the body of the sentient from without; yet is not sensation itself this very passion, but a perception of that passion: much less can mental conception be said to be the action of bodies without, and the meer passion of the thinker; and least of all volitions such, there being plainly here something ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν, in our own power, (by means whereof we become a principle of actions, accordingly deserving commendation, or blame,) that is, something of self-activity.

Again, according to the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists, all knowledge and understanding is really the same thing with sense; the difference between these two, to some of them, being only this, that what is commonly called sense, is primary and original knowledge, and knowledge but secondary, or fading and decaying sense; but to others, that sense is caused by those more vigorous idols, or effluvia from bodies, intromitted through

* Vide Plutarch. de Placit. Philos. Lib. IV. tert. Lib. VII. Segm. 357. p. 466.
Cap. XV. p. 911. Tom. II. Oper. & La-

through the nerves; but understanding and knowledge by those more weak and thin, umbratile and evanid ones, that penetrate the other smaller pores of the body: so that both ways understanding and knowledge will be but a weaker sense. Now from this doctrine of the atheistical Atomists, that all conception and cogitation of the mind whatsoever is nothing else but sense and passion from bodies without, this absurdity first of all follows unavoidably; that there cannot possibly be any error, or false judgment, because it is certain, that all passion is true passion, and all sense or seeming, and appearance, true seeming and appearance. Wherefore, though some sense and passion may be more obscure than other, yet can there be none false, itself being the very essence of truth. And thus *Protagoras*, one of these atheistical Atomists, having first asserted, that *knowledge is nothing else but sense*, did thereupon admit this as a necessary consequence, that *πᾶσα δόξα ἀληθής* ¹, every opinion is true; because it is nothing but seeming and appearance, and every seeming and appearance is truly such; and because it is not possible for any one to opine that which is not, or to think otherwise than he suffers. Wherefore *Epicurus*, being sensible of this inconvenience, endeavoured to solve this phenomenon of error and false opinion, or judgment, consistently with his own principles, after this manner; that though all knowledge be sense, and all sense true, yet may error arise notwithstanding, *ex animi opinatu* ², from the opinion of the mind, adding something of its own, over and above, to the passion and phancy of sense. But herein he shamefully contradicts himself; for if the mind, in judging and opining, can superadd any thing of its own, over and above to what it suffers, then is it not a meer passive thing, but must needs have a self-active power of its own, and consequently will prove also incorporeal; because no body can act otherwise, than it suffers, or is made to act by something else without it. We conclude therefore, that since there is such a thing as error, or false judgment, all cogitations of the mind cannot be meer passions; but there must be something of self-activity in the soul itself, by means whereof it can give its assent to things not clearly perceived, and so err.

Again, from this atheistical opinion, That all knowledge is nothing else but sense, either primary or secondary, it follows also, that there is no absolute truth nor falsehood, and that knowledge is of a private nature, relative, and phantastical only, or meer seeming, that is, nothing but opinion; because sense is plainly seeming, phantasy, and appearance; a private thing, and relative to the sentient only. And here also did *Protagoras* ³, according to his wonted freedom, admit this consequence, that knowledge being sense, there was no absoluteness at all therein; and that nothing was true otherwise, than *τέτῳ καὶ τῷ*, to this and to that man so thinking; that every man did but *τὸ ἑαυτὸ μόνον δοξάζειν*, opine only his own things; that *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος*, every man was the measure of things and truth to himself; and lastly, *τὸ φαινόμενον ἐκάστῳ τέτῳ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ φαίνεται*, that whatsoever seemed to every one, was true to him, to whom it seemed. Neither could *Democritus* himself, though a man of more diction than *Protagoras*, dissemble this consequence

from

¹ Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 118. & Lactant. Lib. IX. §. 51. p. 576.

² Vide Lucret. L. IV. vers. 464.

³ Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 116, 119, 122, 126, 129.

from the same principle asserted by him, that understanding is phantastical, and knowledge but opinion; he owning it sometimes before he was aware, as in these words of his¹, γινώσκω χρόν ἀνθρώπων τὰδὲ τῆ καλοῦ, ὅτι αἰτίας ἀπὸλλομάται. *We ought to know man, according to this rule, that he is such a thing, as hath nothing to do with absolute truth.* And again, αἰτίη (or ἔπει) οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ ἕθενός, ἀλλ' ἐπιτησίμην ἐκαστοῦ ἢ ἕθενός. *We know nothing absolutely, concerning any thing; and all our knowledge is opinion.* Agreeably to which, he determined, that men's knowledge was diversified by the temper of their bodies, and the things without them². And *Aristotle* judiciously observing both these doctrines, That there is no error or fallie judgment, but every opinion true; and again, That nothing is absolutely true, but relatively only; to be really and fundamentally one and the same, imputeth them both together to *Democritus*, in these words of his³, οὐδὲ εἶσι ἀληθῆς ἄλλος δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνητον μὲν τῆ αἰσθησι, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθῆς εἶσι; *Democritus held, that there was nothing absolutely true; but because he thought knowledge or understanding to be sense, therefore did he conclude, that whatsoever seemed according to sense, must of necessity be true (not absolutely, but relatively) to whom it so seemed.* These gross absurdities did the atheistical Atomists plunge themselves into, whilst they endeavoured to solve the phænomenon of cogitation, mind, or understanding, agreeably to their own hypothesis. And it is certain, that all of them, *Democritus* himself not excepted, were but mere blunderers in that atomick physiology, which they so much pretended to, and never rightly understood the same; for as much as that, with equal clearness, teaches these two things at once, that sense indeed is phantastical and relative to the sentient; but that there is a higher faculty of understanding and reason in us, which thus discovers the phantasticality of sense, and reaches to the absoluteness of truth, or is the criterion thereof.

But the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists will further conclude, that the only things or objects of the mind are singular sensibles, or bodies existing without it; which therefore must needs be, in order of nature, before all knowledge, mind, and understanding whatsoever, this being but a phantastick image or representation of them. From whence they infer, that the corporeal world, and these sensible things, could not possibly be made by any mind or understanding, because essentially junior to them, and the very image and creature of them. Thus does *Aristotle* observe⁴, concerning both *Democritus* and *Protagoras*, that they did ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ δὲ αἰσθητὰ μόνον εἶσι τὰ αἰσθητὰ, *suppose the only things or objects of the mind to be sensibles; and that this was the reason, why they made knowledge to be sense, and therefore relative and phantastical.* But we have already proved, that mind and understanding is not the phantastick image of sensibles or bodies, and that it is in its own nature not ectypal, but archetypal and architectonical of all; that it is senior to the world, and all sensible things, it not looking abroad for its objects any where without, but containing them within

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itself,

Vide Sextum Empiric. Lib. VII. adverb.

¹ *Aristot.* Metaphysic. Lib. IV. Cap. V. p. 312.

Mathematic. seu I. adverb. Logicos, §. 137.

Tom. IV. Oper.

p. 399. 400.

⁴ *Metaphysicor.* Lib. IV. Cap. V. p. 313.² *Ibid.* p. 399.

Tom. IV. Oper.

itself; the first original mind being an absolutely perfect being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or all possibilities of things, together with the best platform of the whole, and producing the same accordingly.

But it being plain, that there are, besides singulars, other objects of the mind universal, from whence it seems to follow, that sensibles are not the only things; some modern atheistical wits have therefore invented this further device to maintain the cause, and carry the business on, that universals are nothing else but names or words, by which singular bodies are called; and consequently that in all axioms and propositions, sententious affirmations and negations (in which the predicate at least is universal) we do but add or subtract, affirm or deny, names of singular bodies; and that reason or syllogism is nothing but the reckoning or computing the consequences of these names or words. Neither do they want the impudence to affirm, that besides those passions or phantasies, which we have from things by sense, we know nothing at all of any thing but only the names, by which it is called; than which there cannot be a greater foolishness or madness: for if geometry were nothing but the knowledge of names, by which singular bodies are called, as itself could not deserve that name of a science, so neither could its truths be the same in Greek and in Latin; and geometricians, in all the several distant ages and places of the world, must be supposed to have had the same singular bodies before them, of which they affirmed and denied those universal names.

In the last place, the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, agreeably to the premised principles, and the tenour of their hypothesis, do both of them endeavour to depreciate and undervalue knowledge or understanding, as a thing, which hath not any higher degree of perfection or entity in it than is in dead and senseless matter; it being, according to them, but a passion from singular bodies existing without, and therefore both junior and inferior to them; a tumult raised in the brain, by motions made upon it from the objects of sense; that which essentially includeth in it dependence upon something else; at best but a thin and evanid image of sensibles, or rather an image of those images of sense, a mere whiffling and phantastick thing; upon which account they conclude it not fit to be attributed to that, which is the first root and source of all things, which therefore is to them no other than grave and solid senseless matter, the only substantial, self-existent, independent thing, and consequently the most perfect and divine. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are to them no simple and primitive natures, but secondary and derivative, or syllables and complexions of things, which sprung up afterwards, from certain combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or contemperations of qualities, contextures either of similar or dissimilar atoms. And as themselves are juniors to senseless matter and motion, and to those inanimate elements, fire, water, air and earth, the first and most real productions of nature and chance, so are their effects, and the things that belong to them, comparatively with those other real things of nature, but slight, ludicrous, and umbratile, as landscape

in picture, compared with the real prospect of high mountains, and low valleys, winding or meandrous rivers, towering steeples, and the shady tops of trees and groves; as they are, accordingly, commonly disparaged under those names of notional and artificial. And thus was the sense of the ancient Atheists represented by *Plato*; *Φασι τὰ μὲν Μείσιχα ἢ Κάλλιστα ἄπερ- γόζεσθαι Φύσει ἢ Τύχῃ, τὰ δὲ Σμικρότερα Τέχνην· ἢν δὴ παρὰ Φύσει λαμβάνουσι, τὴν τῶν μεγάλων ἢ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργον, πλάττειν ἢ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ προσαγορεύουεν· They say, that the greatest and most excellent things of all were made by senseless nature and chance; but all the smaller and more inconsiderable, by art, mind, and understanding; which taking from nature those first and greater things as its ground-work to set upon, doth frame and fabricate all the other lesser things, which are therefore commonly called artificial.* And the mind of these Atheists is there also further declared by that philosopher after this manner: *The first, most real, solid and substantial things in the whole world are those elements, fire, water, air and earth, made by senseless nature and chance, without any art, mind or understanding: and next to these the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and this terrestrial globe, produced out of the foresaid inanimate elements, by unknowing nature or chance likewise, without any art, mind, or God.* The fortuitous concourse of similar or dissimilar atoms begetting this whole system and compages of heaven and earth; *τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον γειομίνην, αὐτὴν συνίην ἐκ θυκτῶν ὕστερα γεγεννημένοι παιδιας τινὰς ἀληθείας ἢ σφόδρα μετεχέουσας, ἀλλ' εἰδὼν' αὐτὰ ξυγγενήεσσι τῶν, οἷον ἢ γεωρικῆ, ἢ τὸ ἐξῆς.* *But that afterwards art or mind, and understanding, being generated also in the last place out of those same senseless and inanimate bodies or elements, (it rising up in certain smaller pieces of the universe, and particular concretions of matter called animals) mortal from mortal things, did produce certain other ludicrous things, which partake little of truth and reality, but are meer images, umbrages, and imitations, as picture and landskip, &c. but above all, those moral differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, the meer figments of political art, and slight umbratile things, compared with good and evil natural, that consist in nothing, but agreement and disagreement with sense and appetite: τὰ γὰρ καλὰ Φύσει μὲν ἀλλὰ νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια ἢ δὲ τὸ παράπαν Φύσει· For, as for things good and honest, those, that are such by nature, differ from those, which are such by law; but as for just and unjust, there is by nature no such thing at all.* The upshot and conclusion of all is, that there is no such scale or ladder in nature as Theists and Metaphysicians suppose, no degrees of real perfection and entity one above another, as of life and sense above inanimate matter, of reason and understanding above sense; from whence it would be inferred, that the order of things in nature was in way of descent from higher and greater perfection, downward to lesser and lower, which is indeed to introduce a God. And that there is no such scale or ladder of perfection and entity, they endeavour further to prove from hence, because, according to that hypothesis, it would follow, that every the smallest and most contemptible animal, that could see the sun, had a higher degree of entity and perfection in it, than the sun itself; a thing ridiculously absurd; or else, according

*De Leg. L. 10.
p. 889.
[P. 665,
665.]*

to *Cotta's* instance; *Idcirco fornicam antepoenendam esse huic pulcherrimæ urbi, quòd in urbe sensus sit nullus, in fornicâ non modo sensus, sed etiam mens, ratio, memoria. That therefore every ant or pismire were far to be preferred before this most beautiful city of Rome, because in the city there is no sense; whereas an ant hath not only sense, but also mind, reason and memory; that is, a certain sagacity superiour to sense.* Wherefore they conclude, that there is no such scale or ladder in nature, no such climbing stairs of entity and perfection, one above another, but that the whole universe is one flat and level, it being indeed all nothing but the same uniform matter, under several forms, dresses, and disguises; or variegated by diversity of accidental modifications; one of which is that of such beings, as have phancy in them, commonly called animals; which are but some of sportful or wanton natures, more trimly artificial and finer *Gamaieus* or pretty toys; but by reason of this phancy they have no higher degree of entity and perfection in them, than is in senseless matter: as they will also be all of them quickly transformed again into other seemingly dull, unthinking and inanimate shapés. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.

But the pretended grounds of this atheistical doctrine, (or rather madness) have been already also confuted, over and over again. Knowledge and understanding is not a meer passion from the thing known, existing without the knower, because to know and understand, as *Anaxagoras*² of old determined, is *καταίεν*, to master and conquer the thing known, and consequently not merely to suffer from it, or passively to lie under it, this being *καταίεσθαι*, to be mastered and conquered by it. The knowledge of universal theorems in sciences is not from the force of the thing known existing without the knower, but from the active power, and exerted vigour or strength of that, which knows. Thus *Severinus, Boëtius; Vidæus, ut in cognoscendo, cuncta sua potius facultate, quam eorum, quæ cognoscuntur, utantur? Neque id injuria, nam cum omne judicium judicantis actus existat, necesse est, ut suam quisque operam, non ex alienâ, sed ex propriâ potestate perficiat.* See you not how all things, in knowing, use their own power and faculty rather, than that of the thing known? For since judgment is the action of that, which judgeth, every thing must of necessity perform its own action, by its own power, strength, and faculty, and not by that of another. Sense itself is not a mere passion, or reception of the motion from bodies without the sentient, for if it were so, then would a looking-glass, and other dead things see; but it is a perception of a passion made upon the body of the sentient, and therefore hath something of the sou's own self-activity in it. But understanding, and the knowledge of abstract sciences is neither primary sense, nor yet the fading and decaying remainders of the motions thereof, but a perception of another kind, and more inward than that of sense; not sympathetic, but unpassionate, the *Noemata* of the mind being things distinct from the *Phantasmata* of sense and imagination; which are but a kind of confused cogitations. And though the objects of sense be only singular bodies, existing without the sentient, yet are not these sensibles therefore the only things and cogitables;

¹ Apud Cicero. de Natur. Deor. Lib. III. Cap. 14. p. 304. Tom. IX. Oper.

² Apud Aristot. de Animâ, Lib. III. Cap. V. p. 48. Tom. II. Oper.

cogitables; but there are other objects of science, or intelligibles, which the mind containeth within itself. That dark philosophy of some, tending so directly to atheism, that there is nothing in the mind or understanding, which was not first in corporeal sense, and derived in way of passion from matter, was both elegantly and solidly confuted by Boëtius his *Philosophick Muse*, after this manner:

Boët. Conf.
L. 5. M. 4.
[P. 132.]

*Quondam porticus attulit,
Qui sensus & imagines
Credant mentibus imprimi;
Mos est equore pagine
Pressas figere literas.
Nihil motibus explicat,
Notis subdita corporum,
Rerum reddit imagines,
Cernens omnia notio?
Aut quæ cognita dividit?
Alternumque legens iter,
Nunc decedit in infima;
Veris falsa redarguit?
Longe causa potentior
Impressas patitur notas.
Et vires animi movens,
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
Tum mentis vigor excitus,
Ad motus similes vocans,*

*Obscuros nimium senes,
E corporibus extimis,
Ut quondam celeri stylo
Quæ nullas habeat notas,
Sed mens si propriis vigens
Sed tantum patiens jacet
Cassasque in speculi vicem
Unde hæc sic animis viget,
Quæ vis singula prospicit?
Quæ divisa recolligit?
Nunc summis caput inserit,
Tum sese referens sibi
Hæc est efficiens magis,
Quam quæ materie modo
Præcedit tamen excitans
Vivo in corpore passio.
Vel vox auribus instrepit:
Quas intus species tenet,
Notis applicat exteris.*

It is true indeed, that the *Nouτὸν*, or *thing understood*, is, in order of nature, before the intellection and conception of it; and from hence was it, that the Pythagoreans and Platonists concluded, that *Nῆς*, *Mind* or *Intellect*, was not the very first and highest thing in the scale of the universe, but that there was another divine hypostasis, in order of nature before it, called by them, *Ἐσ* and *Τὸ ἀγαθόν*, *One* and *the good*, as the *Nouτὸν* or *Intelligible* thereof. But as those three archical hypostases of the Platonists and Pythagoreans are all of them really but one *Θεῖον* or *divinity*, and the first of those three (superiour to that which is properly called by them, *Mind* or *intellect*) is not supposed therefore to be ignorant of itself; so is the first *Mind* or *Understanding* no other, than that of a perfect Being, infinitely good, fecund, and powerful, and virtually containing all things; comprehending itself and the extent of its own goodness, fecundity, virtue, and power; that is, all possibilities of things, their relations to one another, and verities; a *Mind* before sense, and sensible things. An omnipotent understanding Being, which is itself its own intelligible, is the first original of all things. Again, that there must of necessity be some other substance besides body or matter, and which, in the scale of nature, is superiour to it, is evident from hence, because otherwise there could be no motion at all therein, no body being ever able to move itself. There must be some-
thing

thing self-active and hylarchical, something that can act both from itself, and upon matter, as having a natural imperium, or command over it. Cogitation is, in order of nature, before local motion. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are no syllables or complexions of things, secondary and derivative, which might therefore be made out of things devoid of life and understanding; but simple, primitive, and uncompounded natures: they are no qualities or accidental modifications of matter, but substantial things. For which cause souls or minds can no more be generated out of matter, than matter itself can be generated out of something else: and therefore are they both alike (in some sense) principles, naturally ingenerable and incorruptible, though both matter, and all imperfect souls and minds, were at first created by one perfect, omnipotent, understanding Being. Moreover, nothing can be more evident than this, that mind and understanding hath a higher degree of entity or perfection in it, and is a greater reality in nature, than mere senseless matter or bulky extension. And consequently, the things, which belong to souls and minds; to rational and intellectual beings as such, must not have less, but more reality in them, than the things which belong to inanimate bodies. Wherefore, the differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, are greater realities in nature, than the differences of hard and soft, hot and cold, moist and dry. He, that does not perceive any higher degree of perfection in a man than in an oyster, nay, than in a clod of earth or lump of ice, in a piece of paste or pye-crust, hath not the reason or understanding of a man in him. There is unquestionably a scale or ladder of nature, and degrees of perfection and entity, one above another, as of life, sense, and cogitation, above dead, senseless, and unthinking matter; of reason and understanding above sense, &c. And if the sun be nothing but a mass of fire, or inanimate subtile matter agitated, then hath the most contemptible animal, that can see the sun, and hath consciousness and self-enjoyment, a higher degree of entity and perfection in it, than that whole fiery globe; as also than the materials (stone, timber, brick and mortar) of the most stately structure, or city. Notwithstanding which, the sun in other regards, and as its vastly extended light and heat hath so great an influence upon the good of the whole world, plants and animals, may be said to be a far more noble and useful thing in the universe, than any one particular animal whatsoever. Wherefore there being plainly a scale or ladder of entity, the order of things was unquestionably, in way of descent, from higher perfection downward to lower; it being as impossible for a greater perfection to be produced from a lesser, as for something to be caused by nothing. Neither are the steps or degrees of this ladder (either upward or downward) infinite; but as the foot, bottom, or lowest round thereof is **stupid** and senseless matter, devoid of all life and understanding; so is the head, top, and summit of it a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things. A perfect understanding Being is the beginning and head of the scale of entity; from whence things gradually descend downward; lower and lower, till they end in senseless matter. *Νῆς πάντων προγενέσθη, Mind is the oldest of all things, senior to the*
elements,

clements, and the whole corporeal world; and likewise, according to the same ancient Theists, it is Κύριος κατὰ φύσιν, by nature lord over all, or hath a natural imperium and dominion over all, it being the most hegemonical thing. And thus was it also affirmed by *Anaxagoras*, Νῆς βασιλεὺς ἔρατο τε ἡ γῆς, that mind is the sovereign king of heaven and earth.

We have now made it evident, that the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, who derive the original of all things from senseless matter, devoid of all manner of life, can no way solve the phenomenon of cogitation (life and understanding, soul and mind) no more than they can that of local motion. And the reason, why we have insisted so much upon this point, is, because these Atheists do not only pretend to solve this phenomenon of cogitation without a God, and so to take away the argument for a Deity from thence, but also to demonstrate the impossibility of its existence, from the very nature of knowledge, mind, and understanding. For if knowledge be, in its own nature, nothing but a passion from singular bodies existing without the knower; and if life and understanding, soul and mind, be junior to body, and generated out of senseless matter, then could no mind or understanding Being possibly be a God, that is, a first principle, and the maker of all things. And though modern writers take little or no notice of this, yet did *Plato* anciently make the very state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists principally to consist in this very thing, viz. Whether life and understanding, soul and mind, were juniors to body, and sprung out of senseless matter, as accidental modifications thereof, or else were substantial things, and in order of nature before it. For after the passages before cited, he thus concludeth; κινουμένη ὁ λέγων ταῦτα, πῦρ ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ γῆ ἢ ἀέρα, πρῶτα ἠείθεαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι, καὶ τῆν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτὰ, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὑπεροῦ ἔσκει ὁ δὲ κινουμένην, ἀλλὰ ὅτις σημαίνει ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῶ λόγῳ. Ἄρ' ἐν πρὸς Διὸς αἰὼν πηγὴν τινα ἀόρατον εὐχῆς ἀνευρέκαμεν ἀνθρώπων, ὁποῖοι τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐπιψυχοζήτημάτων. *These men seem to suppose fire, water, air and earth, to be the very first things in the universe, and the principles of all, calling them only nature; but soul and mind to have sprung up afterwards out of them. Nay, they do not only seem to suppose this, but also in express words declare the same. And thus (by Jupiter) have we discovered the very fountain of that atheistical madness of the ancient physiologers, to wit, their making inanimate bodies senior to soul and mind.* And accordingly that philosopher addresses himself, to the confutation of atheism, no otherwise than thus, by proving soul, not to be junior to senseless body, or inanimate matter, and generated out of it; ὁ πρῶτον γενέσεως ἢ φθορῆς αἰτίων πάντων, τῶτο ἢ πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ ὑπεροῦ ἀπεφῆσαντο εἶναι γενεῶς, οἱ τῆν τῶν ἀσθενῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργατῆμαιοι λόγοι· ὁ δὲ ὑπεροῦ πρότερον ὅθεν ἡμασθήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὅλης ἐσλίας ψυχῆν ἠποικνεῖαι κινουμένην μὲν ὅλις ἐμπαιτες, αἰὼν τὸ ἐν τυχεῖαι καὶ δύναμιν ἢ ἔχει· τὰν τὲ ἄλλων αὐτῆς περὶ καὶ ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ, σωματῶν ἔμπεροθεν πάντων γενομένων, καὶ μεταβολῆς πάσης ἄρχει. *That which is the first cause of the generation and corruption of all things, the atheistical doctrine supposes not to have been first made; but what is indeed*

² Ibid, p. 667.

the last thing, to be the first. And hence is it, that they err concerning the essence of the gods. For they are ignorant what kind of thing soul is, and what power it hath, as also especially concerning its generation and production, that it was first of all made before body, it being that, which governs the motions, changes, and transformations thereof. But if soul be first in order of nature before body, then must those things, which are cognate to soul, be also before the things, which appertain to body; and so mind and understanding, art and law, be before hard and soft, heavy and light; and that, which these Atheists call nature, (the motion of inanimate bodies) junior to art and mind, it being governed by the same. Now that soul is in order of nature before body, this philosopher demonstrates only from the topick or head of motion, because it is impossible, that one body should move another infinitely, without any first cause or mover; but there must of necessity be something self-moving and self-active, or which had a power of changing itself, that was the first cause of all local motion in bodies. And this being the very notion of soul, that it is such a thing, as can move or change itself (in which also the essence of life consisteth) he thus inferreth ¹, *ἰκανότατα δεικνύσαι ψυχῆν τῶν πάντων προσευτάτη γενόμενι τε ἀρχὴν κινήσεως*: It is therefore sufficiently demonstrated from hence, that soul is the oldest of all things in the corporeal world, it being the principle of all the motion and generation in it. And his conclusion is ², *ὁρθῶς ἄρα εἰρηκότες ἀνὴμεν ψυχὴν μὲν πρότερον γενομένην σώματι ἡμῶν, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερον, τε καὶ ὑστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχόντος, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν*. It hath been therefore rightly affirmed by us, that soul is older than body, and was made before it, and body younger and junior to soul; soul being that, which ruleth, and body that, which is ruled. From whence it follows, that the things of soul also are older than the things of body; and therefore cogitation, intellection, volition, and appetite, in order of nature before length, breadth and profundity. Now it is evident, that Plato in all this understood, not only the mundane soul, or his third divine hypothesis, the original of that motion, that is in the heavens and the whole corporeal universe, but also all other particular lives and souls whatsoever, or that whole rank of beings called soul; he supposing it all to have been at first made before the corporeal system, or at least to have been in order of nature senior to it, as superiour and more excellent, (that which ruleth being superiour to that which is ruled) and no soul or life whatsoever, to be generated out of senseless matter.

Wherefore we must needs here condemn that doctrine of some professed Theists and Christians of latter times, who generate all souls, not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, out of matter; for as much as hereby, not only that argument for the existence of a God, from souls, is quite taken away, and nothing could hinder, but that senseless matter might be the original of all things, if life and understanding, soul and mind, sprung out of it; but also the Atheist will have an advantage to prove the impossibility of a God from hence; because if life and understanding, in their own nature, be factitious, and generable out of matter, then

are

are they no ſubſtantial things, but accidental only; from whence it will plainly follow, that no mind could poſſibly be a God, or firſt cauſe of all things, it being not ſo much as able to ſubſiſt by itſelf. Moreover, if mind, as ſuch, be generable, and educible out of nothing, then muſt it needs be in its own nature corruptible alſo, and reducible to nothing again; whereas the Deity is both an unmade and incorruptible being. So that there could not poſſibly be, according to this hypotheſis, any other God, than ſuch a *Jupiter*, or ſoul of the world, as the atheiſtick Theogoniſts acknowledged, that ſprung out of Night, Chaos, and Non-entity, and may be again ſwallowed up into that dark abyſs. Senſeleſs matter therefore, being the only unmade and incorruptible thing, and the fountain of all things, even of life and underſtanding, it muſt needs be acknowledged to be the only real Numen.

Neither will the caſe be much different, as to ſome others, who, though indeed they do not profeſſedly generate the rational, but only the ſenſitive ſoul, both in men and brutes; yet do nevertheleſs maintain the human ſoul itſelf to be but a meer blank, or white ſheet of paper, that hath nothing at all in it, but what was ſcribbled upon it by the objects of ſenſe; and knowledge, or underſtanding, to be nothing but the reſult of ſenſe, and ſo a paſſion from ſenſible bodies exiſting without the knower. For hereby, as they plainly make knowledge and underſtanding to be, in its own nature, junior to ſenſe, and the very creature of ſenſibles; ſo do they alſo imply the rational ſoul, and mind itſelf, to be as well generated as the ſenſitive, wherein it is virtually contained; or to be nothing but a higher modification of matter, agreeably to that *Leviathan*-doctrin, that men differ no otherwiſe from brute animals, than only in their organization, and the uſe of ſpeech or words.

In very truth, whoever maintaineth, that any life or ſoul, any cogitation or conſciouſneſs, ſelf-perception and ſelf-activity, can ſpring out of dead, ſenſeleſs and unactive matter, the ſame can never poſſibly have any rational aſſurance, but that his own ſoul had alſo a like original, and conſequently is mortal and corruptible. For if any life and cogitation can be thus generated, then is there no reaſon, but that all lives may be ſo, they being but higher degrees in the ſame kind; and neither life, nor any thing elſe, can be in its own nature indifferent, to be either ſubſtance or accident, and ſometimes one, and ſometimes the other; but either all life, cogitation and conſciouſneſs, is accidental, generable and corruptible; or elſe none at all.

That, which hath inclined ſo many to think the ſenſitive life, at leaſt, to be nothing but a quality, or accident of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible into it, is that ſtrange Protean transformation of matter into ſo many ſeemingly unaccountable forms and ſhapes, together with the ſcholaſtick opinion thereupon of real qualities; that is, entities diſtinct from the ſubſtance of body, and its modifications, but yet generable out of it, and corruptible into it; they concluding, that as light and colours, heat

and cold, &c. according to those phancies, which we have of them, are real qualities of matter, distinct from its substance and modifications; so may life, sense, and cogitation, be in like manner qualities of matter also, generable and corruptible. But these real qualities of body, in the sense declared, are things, that were long since justly exploded by the ancient Atomists, and expunged out of the catalogue of entities, of whom *Laertius* † hath recorded, that they did *ἐξέβαλεν τὰς ποιότητες*, quite cashier and banish qualities out of their philosophy; they resolving all corporeal phenomena, and therefore those of heat and cold, light and colours, sife and flame, &c. intelligibly, into nothing but the different modifications of extended substance, viz. more or less magnitude of parts, figure, sife, motion or rest, (or the combinations of them,) and those different phancies caused in us by them. Indeed there is no other entity, but substance and its modifications. Wherefore the Democriticks and Epicureans did most shamefully contradict themselves, when, pretending to reject and explode all those entities of real qualities, themselves nevertheless made life and understanding such real qualities of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it.

There is nothing in body or matter, but magnitude, figure, sife, and motion or rest: now it is mathematically certain, that these, however combin'd together, can never possibly compound, or make up life or cogitation; which therefore cannot be an accident of matter, but must of necessity be a substantial thing. We speak not here of that life (improperly so called) which is, in vulgar speech, attributed to the bodies of men and animals; for it is plainly accidental to a body to be vitally united to a soul, or not. Therefore is this life of the compound corruptible and destroyable, without the destruction of any real entity; there being nothing destroyed, nor lost to the universe, in the deaths of men and animals, as such, but only a disunion, or separation made of those two substances, soul and body, one from another. But we speak here of the original life of the soul itself, that this is substantial, neither generable nor corruptible, but only creatable and annihilable by the Deity. And it is strange, that any men should persuade themselves, that that, which rules and commands in the bodies of animals, moving them up and down, and hath sense or perception in it, should not be as substantial, as that stupid and senseless matter, that is ruled by it. Neither can matter (which is also but a meer passive thing) efficiently produce soul, any more than soul matter; no finite, imperfect substance being able to produce another substance out of nothing. Much less can such a substance, as hath a lower degree of entity and perfection in it, create that, which hath a higher. There is a scale, or ladder of entities and perfections in the universe, one above another, and the production of things cannot possibly be in way of ascent from lower to higher, but must of necessity be in way of descent from higher to lower. Now to produce any one higher rank of being from the lower, as cogitation from magnitude and body, is plainly to invert this order in the scale of the universe from downwards to upwards, and therefore is it atheistical; and by the same reason, that one

† Lib. X. Segm. 44. p. 621.

higher rank or degree in this scale is thus unnaturally produced from a lower, may all the rest be so produced also. Wherefore we have great reason to stand upon our guard here, and to defend this post against the Atheists; that no life, or cogitation, can either materially or efficiently result from dead and senseless body; or that souls, being all substantial and immaterial things, can neither be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same, but only created or annihilated by the Deity.

The grand objection against this substantiality of souls sensitive, as well as rational, is from that consequence, which will be from thence inferred, of their permanent subsistence after death, their perpetuity, or immortality. This seeming very absurd, that the souls of brutes also should be immortal, or subsist after the deaths of the respective animals: but especially to two sorts of men; first, such as scarcely in good earnest believe their own soul's immortality; and secondly, such religionists, as conclude, that if irrational, or sensitive souls subsist after death, then must they needs go presently either into heaven or hell. And *R. Cartesius* was so sensible of the offensiveness of this opinion, that though he were fully convinced of the necessity of this disjunction, that either brutes have nothing of sense or cogitation at all, or else they must have some other substance in them, besides matter, he chose rather to make them meer senseless machines, than to allow them substantial souls. Wherein, avoiding a lesser absurdity or paradox, he plainly plunged himself into a greater; scarcely any thing being more generally received, than the sense of brutes. Though in truth all those, who deny the substantiality of sensitive souls, and will have brutes to have nothing but matter in them, ought consequently, according to reason, to do as *Cartesius* did, deprive them of all sense. But, on the contrary, if it be evident from the phenomena, that brutes are not meer senseless machines or automata, and only like clocks or watches, then ought not popular opinion and vulgar prejudice so far to prevail with us, as to hinder our assent to that, which sound reason and philosophy clearly dictates, that therefore they must have something more than matter in them. Neither ought we, when we clearly conceive any thing to be true, as this, That life and cogitation cannot possibly rise out of dead and senseless matter, to abandon it, or deny our assent thereunto, because we find it attended with some difficulty not easily extricable by us, or cannot free all the consequences thereof from some inconvenience or absurdity, such as seems to be in the permanent subsistence of brutish souls.

For the giving an account of which, notwithstanding, *Plato* and the ancient Pythagoreans proposed this following hypothesis; That souls, as well sensitive as rational, being all substantial, but not self-existent, (because there is but one fountain and principle of all things,) were therefore produced or caused by the Deity. But this, not in the generations of the respective animals; it being indecorous, that this divine, miraculous, creative power should constantly lacquey by, and attend upon natural generations; as also incongruous, that souls should be so much

juniors to every atom of dust, that is in the whole world ; but either all of them from eternity, according to those, who denied the novelty of the world ; or rather, according to others, who asserted the *cosmogonia*, in the first beginning of the world's creation. Wherefore, it being also natural to souls, as such, to actuate and enliven some body, or to be, as it were, clothed therewith ; these, as soon as created, were immediately invested with certain thin and subtle bodies, or put into light ethereal or aerial chariots and vehicles ; wherein they subsist, both before their entrance into other gross terrestrial bodies, and after their egress out of them. So that the souls, not only of men, but also of other animals, have sometimes a thicker, and sometimes a thinner indument or clothing. And thus do we understand *Beëlzebub*, not only of the rational, but also of the other inferiour sensitive souls, in these verses of his ;

*Tu caelis animas paribus vitasque minores
Provebis, & levibus sublimes curribus aptans,
In caelum terramque seris.*

Where his light chariots, which all lives or souls, at their very first creation by God, are placed in, and in which being wasted, they are both together, as it were, sowed into the gross terrestrial matter, are thin, aerial and ethereal bodies. But this is plainly declared by *Proclus* upon the *Timaeus*, after he had spoken of the souls of daemons and men, in this manner ; *ὅτι γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάβη προ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων, αἰθέριος ἢ εὐκίνητος τισι χρεῖσθαι σώμασιν, ὡς κατ' ἄστυν ἔχουσιν τὸ κινεῖν.* And every soul must of necessity have, before these mortal bodies, certain eternal and easily moveable bodies, it being essential to them to move. There is indeed mention made by the same *Proclus*, and others, of an opinion of *ἄλογοι δαίμονες*, irrational or brutish daemons, or *demoniack aerial brutes* ; of which he sometimes speaks doubtfully, as *εἴπερ γὰρ εἰσὶν ἄλογοι δαίμονες, ὡς οἱ Θεουργοί*, If there be any irrational daemons, as the *Theurgists* affirm. But the dispute, doubt, or controversy here only was, Whether there were any such irrational daemons immortal, or no. For thus we learn from these words of *Ammonius* upon the *Porphyrian Isagoge* ; *οἱ μὲν γὰρ Φασιν εἶναί τι δαιμονίων ἀλόγων γένος ἀθάνατον, οἱ δὲ Φασι ἢ τὸ τοιαῦτον γένος θνητὸν εἶναι.* Some affirm, that there is a certain kind of irrational daemons immortal ; but others, that all these irrational, or brutish daemons are mortal. Where, by *irrational daemons immortal*, seem to be understood such, as never descend into terrestrial bodies, (and these are there disclaimed by *Ammonius* ;) but the mortal ones, such as act also upon gross terrestrial bodies, obnoxious to death and corruption. As if *Ammonius* should have said, There are no other brutish, or irrational daemons, than only the souls of such brute animals, as are here amongst us, sometimes acting only aerial bodies. Thus, according to the ancient Pythagorick hypothesis, there is neither any new substantial thing now made, which was not before, nor yet any real entity destroyed into nothing ; not only no matter, but also no soul nor life ; God, after the first creation, neither making any new substance, nor

yet annihilating any thing made. He then creating nothing, that was not fit to be conserved in being, and which could not be well used and placed in the universe; and afterward never repenting him of what he had before done. And natural generations and corruptions being nothing but accidental mutations, concretions and secretions, or anagrammatical transpositions of præ- and post-existing things, the same souls and lives being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another; sometimes in thicker, and sometimes in thinner clothing; and sometimes in the visible, sometimes in the invisible; (they having aerial, as well as terrestrial vehicles;) and never any soul quite naked of all body. And thus does *Proclus* complain of some, as spurious Platonists, οὐ φησίν οὐτοι τὸ ἔχημα ἀναιδέως παρὰ πάντος σώματος ἕξω ποιεῖν τὸν ψυχὴν, *Who, destroying the thinner vehicles of souls, were therefore necessitated sometimes to leave them in a state of separation from all body, or without any corporeal indument.* Which Cabala, probably derived from the Egyptians by *Pythagoras*, was before fully represented by us out of *Ovid*; though that transmigration of human souls there, into serine bodies, hath not been by all acknowledged, as a genuine part thereof. And the same was likewise insisted upon by *Virgil*, *Georg. L. 4.* as also owned and confirmed by *Macrobius* for a great truth; *Constat secundum veræ rationis assertionem, quam nec Cicero nescit, nec Virgilius ignorat, dicendo,*

▪ *Nec morti esse locum; —*

Constat, inquam, nihil intra vivum mundum perire, sed eorum, quæ interire videntur, solam mutari speciem. It is manifest, according to reason and true philosophy, which neither Cicero, nor Virgil were unacquainted with, (the latter of these affirming, that there is no place at all left for death;) I say, it is manifest, that none of those things, that to us seem to die, do absolutely perish within the living world, but on'y their forms changed.

Now, how extravagant soever this hypothesis seem to be, yet is there no question, but that a Pythagorean would endeavour to find some countenance and shelter for it in the Scripture; especially that place, which hath so puzzled and non-plus'd interpreters, *Rom. viii. 19.* For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject unto vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him, who hath subjected the same in hope. Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know, that the whole creation groaneth, and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, even the redemption of our bodies. Where it is first of all evident, that the *vanous*, creature, or creation spoken of, is not the very same with the τέκνα or υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, the children or sons of God, but something distinct from them. Wherefore, in the next place, the Pythagorean will add, that it must of necessity be understood, either of the inanimate creature only, or of the lower animal creation, or else of both these together,

‡ *Georg. Lib. IV. vers. 221.*

In Tim. 330.

Sonn. Sup. 1
2. C. 12.
[p. 161.]

gether. Now, though it be readily acknowledged, that there is a profopocæia here, yet cannot all those expressions, for all that, without difficulty and violence, be understood of the inanimate creation only, or senseless matter; viz. that this hath ἀποικουροδοκία, an earnest expectation of some future good to itself; that it is now made subject ματαιότητι, to vanity, frustration and disappointment of desire; and φθίσι, to corruption and death; and that ἐχέουσα, not willingly, but reluctantly; and yet ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τοῦ, in hope, notwithstanding, of some further good to follow afterward; and that it doth in the mean time συστελλεῖν and συμπόρειν, groan and travel in pain together, till it be at length delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. Moreover, in the generations and corruptions of senseless bodies, as of minerals and vegetables, or when, for example, oil is turned into flame, flame into smoke, water into vapour, vapour into snow or hail, grass into milk, milk into blood and bones, and the like; there is, I say, in all this, no hurt done to any thing, nor any real entity destroyed, all the substance of matter still remaining intirely the same, without the least diminution, and only accidental transformations thereof made. All this is really nothing, but local motion; and there is no more toil nor labour to an inanimate body in motion, than in rest; it being altogether as natural for a body to be moved by something else, as of itself to rest. It is all nothing, but change of figure, distance, site, and magnitude of parts, causing several sensations, phancies, and apparitions in us. And they, who would have the meaning of this place to be, That all such-like mutations, and alternate vicissitudes in inanimate bodies, shall at length quite cease; these groaning in the mean time, and travelling in pain to be delivered from the toilsome labour of such restless motion, and to be at ease and quiet; by taking away all motion thus, out of a fond regard to the ease and quiet of senseless matter, they would thereby, ipso facto, petrify the whole corporeal universe, and consequently the bodies of good men also after the resurrection, and congeal all into rocky marble or adamant. And as vain is that other conceit of some, that the whole terrestrial globe shall at last be vitrified, or turned into transparent crystal, as if it also groaned in the mean time for this. For whatsoever change shall be made of the world in the new heaven and the new earth to come, it is reasonable to think, that it will not be made for the sake of the senseless matter, or the inanimate bodies themselves, to which all is alike; but only for the sake of men and animals, the living spectators and inhabitants thereof, that it may be fitter, both for their use and delight. Neither indeed can those words, for the creature itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God, be understood of any other, than animals; for as much as this liberty of the children of God, here meant, is their being clothed, instead of mortal, with immortal bodies; of which no other creatures are capable, but only such as consist of soul and body. And that πάντα κτίσις, that whole creation, which is said afterwards to groan and travel in pain together, may be well understood of all that of the creation, which can groan, or be

be sensible of evil or misery. Wherefore, the Pythagorean would interpret this place of the lower animal creation only, which is sensible of good and evil; that as this was unwillingly, or against its own inclination (after the fall of man, or lapse of souls) made subject to vanity, and the bondage of corruption, pain, misery, and death, in those gross terrestrial bodies; in the manifestation of the sons of God, when they, instead of these mortal bodies, shall be clothed with celestial and immortal ones, then shall this creature also have its certain share in the felicity of that glorious time, and partake in some measure of such a liberty, by being freed in like manner from these gross terrestrial bodies, and now living only in thin aerial and immortal ones; and so a period put to all their miseries and calamities by him, who made not death, neither hath pleasure in the destruction of the living, but created whatsoever liveth to this end, that it might have its being, and enjoy itself. But however thus much is certain, that brute animals, in this place, cannot be quite excluded; because the *πᾶσα κτίσις*, the whole creation, will not suffer that: and therefore a Pythagorist would conclude it a warrantable inference from this text of scripture, that that whole rank in the creation of irrational and brutish animals below men shall not be utterly annihilated in the consummation of things, or future renovation of the world, quite stript of all this furniture, men being then left alone in it; but that there shall be a continuation of this species or rank of being. And not only so neither; as if there should still be a constant succession of such alternate generations and corruptions, productions or births, and deaths of brute animals, to all eternity; but also, that the individuals themselves shall continue the same, for as much as otherwise there would be none at all delivered from the bondage of corruption. And lastly, that these very souls of brutes, which at this time groan and travel in pain, shall themselves be made partakers of that liberty of the children of God; since otherwise they should be with child, or parturient of nothing; groaning not for themselves, but others. But enough of this Pythagorick hypothesis, which supposing all manner of souls, sensitive as well as rational, to be substantial things, and therefore to have a permanency after death, in their distinct natures, allows them certain thin aerial *Ochemata*, or vehicles, to subsist in, when these gross terrestrial ones shall fail them.

But let these aerial vehicles of the souls of brutes go for a whimsey, or meer figment; nor let them be allowed to act or enliven any other than terrestrial bodies only, by means whereof they must needs be, immediately after death, quite destitute of all body; they subsisting nevertheless, and not vanishing into nothing, because they are not meer accidents, but substantial things: we say, that in this case, though the substances of them remain, yet must they needs continue in a state of insensibility and inactivity, unless perhaps they be again afterwards united to some other terrestrial bodies. Because though intellect be the energy of the rational soul alone, without the concurrence of body, yet is the energy of the sensitive, always conjoined with it; sense being, as *Aristotle* ¹ hath rightly determined,

¹ De Animâ Lib. II. Cap. VI. p. 27. Tom. II. Oper.

mined a complication of soul and body together, as weaving is of the weaver and weaving instruments. Wherefore we say, that if the irrational and sensitive souls in brutes, being substantial things also, be after death quite destitute of all body, then can they neither have sense of any thing, nor act upon any thing, but must continue for so long a time, in a state of insensibility and inactivity. Which is a thing therefore to be thought the less impossible, because no man can be certain, that his own soul in sleep, lethargies, and apoplexies, &c. hath always an uninterrupted consciousness of itself; and that it was never without thoughts, even in the mother's womb. However, there is little reason to doubt, but that the sensitive souls of such animals, as lie dead or asleep all the winter, and revive or awake again, at the approaching warmth of summer, do for that time continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility. Upon which account, though these souls of brutes may be said in one sense to be immortal, because the substance of them, and the root of life in them, still remains; yet may they, in another sense, be said also to be mortal, as having the exercise of that life, for a time at least, quite suspended. From whence it appears, that there is no reason at all for that fear and suspicion of some, that if the souls of brutes be substantial, and continue in being after death, they must therefore needs go either to heaven or hell. But as for that supposed possibility of their awakening again afterwards, in some other terrestrial bodies, this seemeth to be no more, than what is found by daily experience in the course of nature, when the silk-worm, and other worms, dying, are transformed into butterflies. For there is little reason to doubt, but that the same soul, which before acted the body of the silk-worm, doth afterward act that of the butterfly: upon which account it is, that this hath been made by Christian theologers an emblem of the resurrection.

Hitherto have we declared two several opinions, concerning the substantial souls of brutes, supposed therefore to have a permanent subsistence after death; one of *Plato's* and the *Pythagoreans*, that when they are divested of these gross terrestrial bodies, they live, and have a sense of themselves, in thin aerial ones; the other of such, as exploding these aerial vehicles of brutes, and allowing them none but terrestrial bodies, affirm the substances of them, surviving death, to continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility, sleep, silence, or stupor. But now, to say the truth, there is no absolute necessity, that these souls of brutes, because substantial, should therefore have a permanent subsistence after death to all eternity; because though it be true, that no substance once created by God will of itself ever vanish into nothing, yet is it true also, that whatsoever was created by God out of nothing, may possibly by him be annihilated and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore, when it is said, that the immortality of the human soul is demonstrable by natural reason, the meaning hereof is no more than this, that its substantiality is so demonstrable; from whence it follows, that it will naturally no more perish or vanish into nothing, than the substance of matter itself: and not that it is impossible either for it, or mat-

ter, by the divine power to be annihilated. Wherefore the assurance, that we have of our own soul's immortality, must depend upon something else besides their substantiality, namely, a faith also in the divine goodness, that he will conserve in being, or not annihilate, all such substances created by him, whose permanent subsistence is neither inconsistent with his own attributes, nor the good of the universe, as this of rational souls unquestionably is not; they having both morality and liberty of will, and thereby being capable of rewards and punishments, and consequently fit objects for the divine justice to display itself upon. But, for aught we can be certain, the case may be otherwise as to the souls of brute animals, devoid both of morality and liberty of will, and therefore incapable of reward and punishment; that though they will not naturally of themselves vanish into nothing, yet, having been created by God in the generations of the respective animals, and had some enjoyment of themselves for a time, they may by him again be as well annihilated in their deaths and corruptions; and if this be absolutely the best, then doubtless is it so. And to this seemeth agreeable the opinion of *Porphyrus*¹, amongst the philosophers, when he affirmed every irrational power or soul to be resolved into the life of the whole; that is, retracted and resumed into the Deity, and so annihilated as to its creaturely nature: though possibly there may be another interpretation of that philosopher's meaning here, *viz.* that all the sensitive souls of brutes are really but one and the same mundane soul, as it were, overflowing and variously displaying itself, and acting upon all the several parts of matter, that are capable to receive it, but at their deaths retiring again back into itself. But we have sufficiently retunded the force of that objection against the ingenerability of all souls, and the substantiality of those of brutes also, from their consequent permanence after death; we having shewed, that, notwithstanding this their substantiality, there is no absolute necessity of their perpetuity after death, and permanency to all eternity, or else, that if they do continue to subsist, (God annihilating no substance) unless they have æreal vehicles to act, they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility, silence or sleep.

Now therefore, if no souls, no life, nor cogitation, could possibly be ever generated out of dead and senseless matter, they being not mere accidents, but substantial things, which must in this case have come from nothing; then either all souls existed of themselves from eternity, or else there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all the other lives and minds were derived. And that this was the doctrine of the ancient Theists, That no soul or mind, no life or understanding, was ever generated out of matter, but all produced by the Deity, the sole fountain of life and understanding, might be here proved, were it needful, at large, by sundry testimonies; but it may sufficiently appear from those verses of *Virgil*, first in his sixth *Æneid*, where, after he had spoken of God, as a Spirit and Mind diffused throughout the whole world, he addeth,

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Inde

¹ Vide Sententias ad Intelligibilia ducentes, Par. I. §. XXII. p. 227. §. XXIV. p. 228 & aliis.

¹ *Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,
Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus,*

That from thence are the lives of all men and beasts, birds flying in the air, and monsters swimming in the sea. And again in his *Georgicks*, where, after these words,

² ——— *Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, calumque profundum,*

That God passeth through all tracts of earths, seas, and heavens, he subjoineth,

*Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.
Scilicet huc reddi deinde, & resoluta referri,
Omnia, nec morti esse locum.*

And from hence, not only men, but also all manner of brute animals and beasts, when produced into this world, do every one derive their lives or souls, as also at their deaths they render the same back again to him, in whose hand or custody they remain undestroyed; so that there is no place any where in the world left for death. This was therefore undoubtedly the genuine doctrine of the ancient Theists, however some of late have deviated and swerved from it; that no life was generated out of matter, but all created by the Deity, or derived from it, the sole fountain of lives and souls.

And it is a truth so evident, that life being substantial, and not a mere accidental thing generated and corrupted, there must therefore of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all other lives and minds are derived, that the Hylozoick Atheists themselves (in this far wiser than the Atomicks) were fully convinced thereof; nevertheless being strongly possessed with that atheistical prejudice, that there is no other substance besides body, they attribute this first original unmade life and understanding to all matter as such (but without animal consciousness) as an essential part thereof, or inadequate conception of it. From which fundamental life of nature in matter, modified by organization, they phancy the lives of all animals and men to have proceeded. So that though the modified lives of animals and men, as such, according to them, be accidental things, generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; yet this fundamental life of matter, which is the basis, upon which they stand, being substantial, is also eternal and incorruptible. These Hylozoists therefore, to avoid a Deity, suppose every atom of senseless matter to have been, from all eternity, infallibly omniscient, that is, to know all things without either error or ignorance, and to have a knowledge before sense, and underived from sensibles (quite contrary to the doctrine of the atomick Atheists, who make all knowledge, sense,

or

¹ Verse 728.

² Lib. IV. Verse 221.

or the product thereof) though without any animal consciousness and self-perception.

But as nothing can be more prodigiously absurd, than thus to attribute infallible omniscience to every atom of matter ; so is it also directly contradictory to suppose perfect knowledge, wisdom, or understanding, without any consciousness or self-perception, consciousness being essential to cogitation : as also, that the substantial and fundamental life in men and other animals should never perish, and yet notwithstanding their souls and personalities in death utterly vanish into nothing. Moreover, this hypothesis can never possibly solve the phenomenon of men and animals neither ; not only because no organization or modification of matter whatsoever could ever produce consciousness and self-perception in what was before inconscious ; but also because every smallest atom thereof being supposed to be a percipient by itself, and to have a perfect life and understanding of its own, there must be in every one man and animal, not one, but a heap or commonwealth of innumerable percipients. Lastly, whereas these Hylozoick Atheists make every atom of matter omniscient, but nothing at all omnipotent, or assert perfect knowledge, without any perfect power, a knowledge without sense, and undervived from sensibles ; we demand of them, where the intelligibles or objects of this knowledge are ? and whence the ideas thereof are derived ? For since they proceed not in a way of passion from sensibles existing without, nor could result from those atoms neither, as comprehending themselves, they must needs come from nothing, and many of them, at least, be the conceptions of nothing. There cannot possibly be any other original, by the wit of man devised, of knowledge and understanding, than from an absolutely perfect and omnipotent being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own infinite power, or all possibilities of things, that is, all intelligibles. But there can be but one such omnipotent being, and therefore no more than one original, and eternal unmade mind, from whence all the other minds are derived. Wherefore this hylozoick atheism is nothing but the breaking and crumbling of the simple Deity, one perfect understanding Being, into matter, and all the several atoms of it.

And now have we made it manifest, that these Atheists are so far from being able to disprove a God from this topick of cogitation, knowledge or understanding, that they cannot possibly solve the phenomenon thereof, without a God ; it indeed affording invincible arguments of his existence. For, first, if no life or cogitation, soul or mind, can possibly spring out of matter or body, devoid of life and understanding, and which is nothing but a thing extended into length, breadth and thickness ; then is it so far from being true, that all life and understanding is junior to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof, that of necessity either all lives and souls were self-existent from eternity, or else there must be one perfect unmade life and mind, from whence all other imperfect ones were derived : there must be an eternal knowledge before sense and sensibles ; which is that

that hath printed the stamps and signatures of itself, upon the matter of the whole world. Indeed nothing can be more certain than this, that all knowledge and understanding in ourselves is not a meer passion from singular sensibles or bodies existing without us, as the forementioned Atheists also conclude; (from whence they would again infer, that knowledge, as such, is in its own nature junior to sensibles, and the meer creature of them, and consequently no creator;) there being nothing, which comes to us from the objects of sense without, but only local motion and pressure, and there being other objects of the mind, besides singular sensibles; not only all universals, but also such intelligibles, as never were, nor can be in sense. Now, if our human knowledge and understanding be not a passion from things existing without us; then can it have no other original than in way of participation, from a perfect mind, the mind of an infinitely fecund and powerful being, comprehending itself, and in itself all things; all the possibilities of things before they were made, their respects and the verities belonging to them. So that a perfect omnipotent being, together with the possibilities of things contained in it is the first *Noum*, *intelligible*, or *object of mind and understanding*, by which all other singulars are understood. And were there no such perfect, infinitely fecund, and powerful being, there could have been no mind or understanding at all. As also, were there no perfect mind, *viz.* that of an omnipotent Being comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things virtually contained in it; all the knowledge, and intelligible ideas of our imperfect minds, must needs have sprung from nothing. And thus is the existence of a God again demonstrated from that phænomenon of knowledge or understanding.

HAVING quite routed and vanquished the Atheists main body, we shall now blow away the remainder of their weaker and scattered forces, *viz.* their objections against Providence, their queries, and their arguments from interest, with a breath or two. Their first objection is against providence, as to the fabrick of the world, from the faultiness of the mundane system, intellectually considered, and in order to ends; *Quia tantâ stat prædita culpâ*¹; That *because it is so ill-made*, therefore it could not be made by a God. Where the Atheist takes it for granted, that whosoever asserts a God, or a perfect mind, to be the original of all things, does therefore *ipso facto* suppose all things to be well-made, and as they should be. And this doubtless was the sense of all the ancient theologers, however some modern Theists deviate therefrom; these concluding the perfection of the Deity not at all to consist in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. As if to have a will determined by a rule or reason of good, were the virtue of weak, impotent, and obnoxious beings only, or of such as have a superiour over them to give law to them, that is, of creatures; but the prerogative of a being irresistibly powerful, to have a will absolutely indif-

different

¹ Lucret. Lib. II. Vers. 183.

different to all things, and undetermined by any thing but itself, or to will nothing because it is good, but to make its own arbitrary or contingent and fortuitous determination the sole reason of all its actions, nay, the very rule or measure of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself. And this is supposed by them to be the liberty, sovereignty, and dominion of the Deity. Wherefore such Theists as these would think themselves altogether unconcerned in these atheistical objections against Providence, or in defending the fabrick of the world, as faultless, they being as ready as the Atheists themselves, to acknowledge, that the world might really have been much better made than it now is; only that it must be said to be well, because so made, but pretending nevertheless, that this is no impeachment at all of the existence of a God, *Quia Deus non tenetur ad optimum, because God is no way bound or obliged to the best*; he being indeed, according to them, nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. But what do these Theists here else, than what they deny the fortuitous motion of senseless matter to be the first original of all things, themselves in the mean time enthrone fortuitousness and contingency in the will of an omnipotent Being, and there give it an absolute sovereignty and dominion over all? So that the controversy betwixt the Atheists and these Theists seems to be no other than this, whether senseless matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, such as is altogether undetermined by goodness, justice and wisdom, be the sovereign Numen, and original of all things. Certainly we mortals could have little better ground for our faith and hope, in such an omnipotent arbitrary will as this, than we could have in the motions of senseless atoms furiously agitated, or of a rapid whirl-wind. Nay, one would think, that of the two it should be more desirable to be under the empire of senseless atoms, fortuitously moved, than of a will altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, armed with omnipotence; because the former could harbour no hurtful or mischievous designs against any, as the latter might. But this irrational will, altogether undetermined by goodness, justice and wisdom, is so far from being the highest liberty, sovereignty and dominion, the greatest perfection, and the divinest thing of all, that it is indeed nothing else but weakness and impotency itself, or brutish folly and madness. And therefore those ancients, who affirmed, that Mind was Lord over all, and the supreme King of heaven and earth, held at the same time, that Good was the sovereign monarch of the universe, Good reigning in Mind, and together with it, because Mind is that, which orders all things for the sake of Good; and whatsoever doth otherwise, was, according to them, not *Nēs*, but *Ἄνοια*, not *Mens*, but *Dementia*, and consequently no God. And thus does *Celsus* in *Origen* declare the nature of God, *ὁ γὰρ τῆς πικρυμίας ἢ ἀρρυθρίας, ἢ ἀεργείας, ἐστὶ τῆς περιχυμένης ἀνομίας, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὁρθῆς ἢ ἡμετέρας Θεοῦ ἰσότητος*. P. 240
God is not the president or head of irregular and irrational lust or appetite, and of loose erratic disorderliness, but of the just and righteous nature. And though this were there misapplied by him against the Christian doctrine of the resurrection (not understood) yet is the passage highly approved by *Origen*; he adding further, in confirmation thereof, and that

as the general sense of Christians too; *Φαμὲν ὅτι ἢ οὐναίαι αἰχρά ὁ Θεός, ἔπει ἔστι ὁ Θεὸς ἀναμύθη μὴ εἶναι Θεός, εἰ γὰρ αἰχρὸν τι θεῶν ὁ Θεός, ἢ ἔστι Θεός: We Christians (who hold the resurrection) say as well as you, that God can do nothing, which is in itself evil, inept, or absurd; no more than he is able not to be God. For if God do any evil, he is no God. And again, ἢ δὲν μὴ ποίηται ἑαυτῷ ὁ Θεὸς βλάττειται, ἀναρέτικον τυγχάνει τῷ εἶναι αὐτὸν Θεόν, God willeth nothing unbecoming himself, or what is truly indecorous; so far as this is inconsistent with his Godship. And to the same purpose Plotinus, * ποιεῖ τὸ Θεῖον ἄς πέφυκε, π.Φ. με δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς ἔσται, ἢ τὸ καλὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ δίκαιον πύθουε, π.Φ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐκεῖ ταῦτα, πῶς αὖ εἶναι; The Deity acteth according to its own nature and essence; and its nature and essence displayeth goodness and justice: For if these things be not there, where should they else be found? And again, εἰς ἕωθε, Θεὸς ὅπερ ἔχρησεν εἶναι, ἢ τοίνυν ἕτω συνέθη, ἀλλ' ἔδα ἕτω τὸ ὅ' ἔδει τῆτο, ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅσα εἶναι: God is essentially that, which Ought to be; and therefore he did not happen to be such as he is: and this first Ought to be is the principle of all things whatsoever, that ought to be. Wherefore the Deity is not to be conceived, as meer arbitrariness, humour, or irrational will and appetite omnipotent, (which would indeed be but omnipotent chance) but as an overflowing fountain of love and goodness, justly and wisely dispensing itself, and omnipotently reaching all things. The will of God is goodness, justice, and wisdom; or decorousness, fitness, and Ought itself, willing; so that the Τὸ βέλτιστον, that, which is absolutely the best, is νόμος ἀταράχης, an indispensable law to it, because its very essence. God is μέτρον πάντων, an impartial balance, lying even equal and indifferent to all things, and weighing out heaven and earth, and all the things therein, in the most just and exact proportions, and not a grain too much or too little of any thing. Nor is the Deity therefore bound or obliged to do the best, in any way of servility, (as men fondly imagine this to be contrary to his liberty) much less by the law and command of any superiour (which is a contradiction) but only by the perfection of its own nature, which it cannot possibly deviate from, no more than ungod itself. In conclusion, therefore, we acknowledge the Atheist's argument to be thus far good; that if there be a God, then of necessity must all things be well-made, and as they should be; & vice versa. But no Atheist will ever be able to prove, that either the whole system of the world, could have been better made, or that so much as any one thing therein is made ineptly.*

There are indeed many things in the frame of nature, which we cannot reach to the reasons of, they being made by a knowledge far superiour and transcendent to that of ours, and our experience and ratiocination, but slowly discovering the intrigues and contrivances of providence therein; witness the circulation of the blood, the milky and lymphatick vessels, and other things, (without which the mechanic structure of the bodies of animals cannot be understood) all but so lately brought to light; wherefore we must not conclude, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason of, or the use, that

* P. 246.

* P. 247.

So likewise, p. 247. ἀλλὰ καὶ καὶ ἔστι Θεός, εἰ γὰρ αἰχρὸν τι θεῶν ὁ Θεός, ἢ ἔστι Θεός: τὸ παραδοξόν ἐστὶν ὅτι ἂν εἴη ὁ Θεός. Accord- ing to us also, God can do nothing, that is absurd, or besides Reason. * P. 205. [Libro de Provid. Ennead. III. Lib. II. Cap. XIII.] P. 43. [Ennead. VI. Lib. VIII. Cap. IX.]

that it serveth to, is therefore ineptly made. We shall give one instance of this; the *intestinum cæcum*, in the bodies of men and other animals, seems, at first sight, to be but a mere botch or bungle of nature, and an odd impertinent appendix; neither do we know, that any anatomist or physiologer hath given a rational account thereof, or discovered its use: and yet there being a valve at the entrance of it, these two both together are a most artificial contrivance of nature, and of great advantage for animals, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces upward towards the ventricle.

The first atheistical instance of the faultiness of things, in the frame of nature, is from the constitution of the heavens, and the disposition of the æquator and ecliptick, intersecting each other in an angle of three and twenty degrees and upwards; whereby, as they pretend, the terrestrial globe is rendered much more uninhabitable than otherwise it might be. But this is built upon a false supposition of the ancients, that the torrid zone, or all between the tropicks, was utterly uninhabitable by reason of the extremity of heat. And it is certain, that there is nothing, which doth more demonstrate a Providence than this very thing, it being the most convenient site or disposition, that could be devised, as will appear, if the inconveniences of other dispositions be considered, especially these three; first, If the axes of those circles should be parallel, and their plains coincident; secondly, If they should intersect each other in right angles; and thirdly, (which is a middle betwixt both) If they should cut one another in an angle of forty five degrees. For it is evident, that each of these dispositions would be attended with far greater inconveniences to the terrestrial inhabitants, in respect of the length of days and nights, heat and cold. And that these two circles should continue thus, to keep the same angular intersection, when physical and mechanick causes would bring them still nearer together; this is a farther eviſion of a providence also.

In the next place, the Atheist supposes, that, according to the general persuasion of Theists, the world and all things therein were created only for the sake of man², he thinking to make some advantage for his cause from hence. But this seemeth, at first, to have been an opinion only of some strait-laced Stoicks, though afterward indeed recommended to others also, by their own self-love, their over-weaning, and puffy conceit of themselves. And so fleas and lice, had they understanding, might conclude the bodies of other greater animals, and men also, to have been made only for them. But the whole was not properly made for any part, but the parts for the whole, and the whole for the maker thereof. And yet may the things of this lower world be well said to have been made principally, (though not only) for man. For we ought not to monopolize the divine goodness to ourselves, there being other animals superiour to us, that are not altogether unconcerned neither in this visible creation; and it being reasonable to think, that even the lower animals likewise, and whatsoever hath conscious life, was made

77^{re} Plato.
 ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος.
 ἀρετὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος.
 De L. 3. 0
 p. 903.

² Vide Lucret. Lib. V. vers. 201.

² Id. Lib. II. vers. 174, 175.

made partly also, to enjoy itself. But Atheists can be no fit judges of worlds being made well or ill, either in general, or respectively to mankind, they having no standing measure for well and ill, without a God and morality, nor any true knowledge of themselves, and what their own good or evil consisteth in. That was at first but a froward speech of some sullen discontented persons, when things falling not out agreeably to their own private, selfish, and partial appetites, they would revenge themselves, by railing upon nature (that is, Providence) and calling her a stepmother only to mankind, whilst she was a fond, partial, and indulgent mother to other animals; and though this be elegantly set off by *Lucretius* ², yet is there nothing but poetick flourish in it all, without any philosophick truth; the advantages of mankind being so notoriously conspicuous above those of brutes.

But as for evils in general, from whence the Atheist would conclude the God of the Theist to be either impotent or envious; it hath been already declared, that the true original of them is from the necessity of imperfect beings, and the impossibility of things; but that the divine art and skill most of all appeareth in bonifying these evils, and making them, like discords in musick, to contribute to the harmony of the whole, and the good of particular persons.

Moreover, a great part of those evils, which men are afflicted with, is not from the reality of things, but only from their own phancy and opinions, according to that of the moralist ³, *Τυχάσται τὰς ἀδελφείας ἢ τὰ πέραγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ὀργήματα. It is not things themselves, that disturb men, but only their own opinions concerning things.* And therefore it being much in our own power to be freed from these, Providence is not to be blamed upon the account of them. Pain is many times nearly linked with pleasure, according to that Socratick fable ⁴, That when God could not reconcile their contrary natures (as he would) he tyed them head and tail together. And good men know, that pain is not the evil of the man, but only of the part so affected, (as *Socrates* also) *Τὸ ἀλγὺν ἐν τῷ σκέλει μένει, It goes no further than the leg where it is.* But this is many times very serviceable to free us from the greater evils of the mind; upon which all our happiness dependeth. To the Atheists, who acknowledge no *malum culpæ*, no evil of fault, (turpitude, or dishonesty) death is the greatest and most tragical of all evils. But though this, according to their forlorn hypothesis, be nothing less than an absolute extinction of life; yet, according to the doctrine of the genuine Theists, which makes all souls substantial, no life of itself (without divine annihilation) will ever quite vanish into nothing, any more than the substance of matter doth. And the ancient Pythagoreans and Platonists have been here so kind, even to the souls of brutes also, as that they might not be left in a state of inactivity and insensibility after death, as to bestow upon them certain subtle bodies, which they may then continue to act in. Nor can we think otherwise, but that *Aristotle*, from this fountain, derived that doctrine of his in his

¹ Vide Plin. Hist. Natur. Proem. Lib. VII.

² Lib. V. vers. 223.

³ Epictet. in Enchiridio, Cap. V. Vide

etiam M. Antoninum, lib. IV. §. 3. p. 97. & lib. V. §. XIX. p. 159.

⁴ Apud Platon, in Phædone, p. 376.

second book, *De Gen. An. c. 3.* ¹ where, after he had declared the sensitive soul to be inseparable from body, he addeth, *πάσης ἐν ψυχῆς δύναμις ἑτέρας σώματος ἴσκει κεινονοητέα καὶ θεϊότερα τῶν καλημένων στοιχείων ὡς εἰ διαφέρουσι τιμιότητι αἱ ψυχῆς καὶ ἀτιμία ἀλλήλων, ἔτω καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη διαφέρει φύσιν.* All souls therefore seem to have another body, and diviner than that of the elements; and as themselves differ in dignity and nobility, so do these bodies of theirs differ from one another. And afterwards calling this subtile body *πνεῦμα*, or a spirit, he affirmeth it to be, *ἀνάλογον τῷ τῶν ἄστρον στοιχείῳ, analogous to the element of the stars.* Only as *Galen*, and *S. Austin*, and others, have conceived, *Aristotle* deviated here from the *Pythagoreans* in this, that he supposed the sensitive soul itself to be really nothing else, but this very subtile and star-like body, and not a distinct substance from it, using it only as a vehicle. Nevertheless, he there plainly affirmeth the mind or rational soul to be really distinct from the body, and to come into it from without pre-existing; and consequently should acknowledge also its after-immortality. But whatsoever *Aristotle's* judgment were (which is not very material) it is certain, that dying to the rational or human soul is nothing but a withdrawing into the tying-house, and putting off the clothing of this terrestrial body. So that it will still continue after death, to live to God, whether in a body, or without it. Though, according to *Plato's* express doctrine, the soul is never quite naked of all body, he writing thus; *αἱ ψυχῆ ἐπιτεταμένη σώματι, τοτὲ μὲν ἄλλω τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλω* the soul is always conjoined with a body, but sometimes of one kind, *De Leg. 10. p. 903.* and sometimes of another; which many Christian doctors also, as is before [*P. 672*] declared, have thought highly probable. However, our Christian faith assures us, that the souls of good men shall at length be clothed with spiritual and heavenly bodies, such as are, in *Aristotle's* language, *ἀνάλογα τῷ τῶν ἄστρον στοιχείῳ, analogous to the element of the stars.* Which Christian resurrection therefore, to life and immortality, is far from being, as *Celsus* ² reproached it, *σευλήων ἐλπίς, the meer hope of worms.* And thus much shall suffice, in way of confutation, of the first atheistical objection against Providence, which is the twelfth argument propounded in the second chapter.

The thirteenth atheistical argument, or second objection against Providence, is from the seeming confusion of human affairs; that all things fall alike to all; the innocent and the nocent, the pious and the impious, the religious and the prophane: nay, that many times the worse causes and men prevail against the better, as is intimated in that passage of the poet, though in the person of a Theist,

Victris causa Deo placuit, sed vicia Catoni;

And that the unjust and ungodly often flow in all kind of prosperity, whilst the innocent and devout worshippers of the Deity, all their lives long, consist with adversity. Whereas, were there a God and Providence, as they conceive, prophane and irreligious persons would be presently thunderstruck from heaven, or otherwise made remarkable objects of divine ven-

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geance,

¹ P. 618. Tom. II. Oper.

² Apud Origen. contra Celsum, Lib. V. p.

240.

³ Lucan. L'b. I. Vers. 131.

geance, as also the pious miraculously protected and rescued from evil and harms.

Now we grant indeed, that this consideration hath too much puzzled and staggered weak minds in all ages. Because 'sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore is the heart of the sons of men fully set in them to do evil. And the Psalmist himself ² was sometime much perplexed with this phænomenon, the prosperity of the ungodly, who set their souls against heaven, and whose tongue walketh through the earth; so that he was tempted to think, *be had cleansed his heart in vain, and washed his hands in innocency*; (till at length, entering into the sanctuary of God, his mind became illuminated, and his soul fixed in a firm trust and confidence upon divine providence; *Whom have I in heaven but thee, &c. My sight and my heart faileth, but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever.*) For as some will from hence be apt to infer, That there is no God at all, but that blind chance and fortune steer all (*the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God* ³); so will others conclude, That though there be a God, yet he either does not know things done here below, (*how does God know?* and is there knowledge in the Most High ⁴) or else will not so far humble himself, or disturb his own ease and quiet, as to concern himself in our low human affairs.

Thus did some
in Plato from
hence conclude,
εἶναι μὲν Θεῶν,
τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώ-
πων ἀμελεῖται
πραγμάτων.
De Leg. 10.
[P. 664.]

First of all therefore, we here say, that it is altogether unreasonable to require, that divine Providence should miraculously interpose upon every turn in punishing the ungodly, and preserving the pious, and thus perpetually interrupt the course of nature, (which would look but like a botch or bungle, and a violent business) but rather carry things on ἀβίβη καλῶς, in a still and silent path, and shew his art and skill in making things of themselves fairly unwind, and clear up at last into a satisfactory close. Passion and self-interest is blind, or short-sighted; but that, which steers the whole world, is no fond, pettish, impatient and passionate thing, but an impartial, disinterested, and uncaptivated nature. Nevertheless, it is certain, that sometimes we have not wanted instances, in cases extraordinary, of a Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, God appearing, as it were, miraculously upon the stage, and manifesting himself in taking immediate vengeance upon notorious malefactors, or delivering his faithful servants from imminent dangers or evils threatened; as the same is often done also by a secret and undiscerned over-ruling of the things of nature. But it must be granted, that it is not always thus, but the periods of divine providence here in this world are commonly longer, and the evolutions thereof slower; according to that of Euripides ⁵, which yet has a tang of prophaneness in the expression,

Μέλλει τὸ Θεῶν ὄψιν τοιούτων φύσει,

The Deity is slow or dilatory, and this is the nature of it. For it is not from slackness and remittence in the Deity, but either from his patience and long-suffering, he willing, that men should repent, or else to teach us patience by his example (as *Plutarch* ⁶ suggesteth) or that

¹ Eccles. viii. 11.

² Psal. lxxiii.

³ Psal. xiv. 1.

⁴ Psal. lxxii. 2.

⁵ In Oreste, Vers. 420.

⁶ De sera Numinis Vindicta, Tom. II. Oper.

P. 550.

that all things may be carried on with more pomp and solemnity; or lastly, for other particular reasons, as *Plutarch* ventures to assign one, why it might not be expedient for *Dionysius* the tyrant, though so profane and irreligious a person, to have been cut off suddenly. But wicked and ungodly persons oftentimes fail not to be met withall at last, and at the long-run, here in this life, and either in themselves or posterity, to be notoriously branded with the marks of divine displeasure: according to that of the poet², *Rarò antecedentem scelestum, &c. It is seldom, that wickedness altogether escapes punishment, though it come slowly after, limping with a lame foot*; and those proverbial speeches amongst the Pagans³,

Ὅψι θεῶν ἀλεῦσι μύλοι, ἀλεῦσι δὲ λεπίζ.

*Mills of the Gods do slowly wind,
But they at length to powder grind.*

and, *Divine justice steals on softly with woollen feet, but strikes at last with iron hands.*

Nevertheless we cannot say, that it is always thus neither, but that wicked persons may possibly sometimes have an uninterrupted prosperity here in this life, and no visible marks of divine displeasure upon them: but as the generously virtuous will not envy them upon this account, nor repine at their own condition, they knowing, that⁴ ἑὸν κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἔδ' αὐτῷ Φαύλην ἐγαθόν, *There is neither any thing truly evil to the good, nor good to the evil*; so are they so far from being staggered herewith in their belief of a God and Providence, that they are rather the more confirmed in their persuasions of a future immortality and judgment after death, when all things shall be set straight and right, and rewards and punishments impartially dispensed. That of *Plutarch*⁵ therefore is most true here, εἴς ἐν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῷ Θεῷ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἄμα καὶ τὴν διακρίσιν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον ἐκ ἐστὶ ἀπολιπέω ἀναγκάστια θάτερον, *That there is a necessary connexion betwixt those two things, divine providence, and the permanence or immortality of human souls, one and the same reason confirming them both; neither can one of these be taken alone without the other.* But they, who, because judgment is not presently executed upon the ungodly, blame the management of things as faulty, and Providence as defective, are like such spectators of a dramatick poem, as when wicked and injurious persons are brought upon the stage, for a while swaggering and triumphing, impatiently cry out against the dramatist, and presently condemn the plot; whereas, if they would but expect the winding up of things, and stay till the last close, they should then see them come off with shame and sufficient punishment⁶. The evolution of the world, as *Plotinus* calls it⁷, is ἀληθέστερον ποίημα, a *true poem*; and we men histrionical actors upon the stage, who, notwithstanding, insert something of our own into the poem too; but God Almighty is that skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours,

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which

¹ Ibid. p. 557.

² Horat. Odar. Lib. III. Od. II.

³ Vide *Plutarch*, ubi supra, p. 548.

⁴ Vide *Platon*, in *Apolog. Socratis*, p. 369.

& de *Republic*. Lib. X. p. 513.

⁵ Ubi supra, p. 560.

⁶ Vide *Plutarch*, ubi supra, p. 554.

⁷ *Ennead*. III. Lib. II. Cap. XLVI. p. 267. *Oper.*

which went before, with what of his follows after, into good coherent sense and will at last make it appear, that a thread of exact justice did run through all, and that rewards and punishments are measured out in geometrical proportion.

Lastly, It is in itself fit, that there should be somewhere a doubtful and cloudy state of things, for the better exercise of virtue and faith. For as there could have been no *Hercules*, had there not been monsters to subdue; so were there no such difficulties to encounter with, no puzzles and entanglements of things, no temptations and trials to assault us, virtue would grow languid, and that excellent grace of faith want due occasions and objects to exercise itself upon. Here have we therefore such a state of things, and this world is, as it were, a stage erected for the more difficult part of virtue to act upon, and where we are to live by *faith*, and not by *sight*; that faith, which is *the substance of things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen*; a belief in the goodness, power, and wisdom of God, when all things are dark and cloudy round about us. *The just shall live by his faith.*

We have now sufficiently confuted the second atheistical objection also, against Providence, as to the conduct and œconomy of human affairs. Nevertheless this is a large field, and much more might be said in defence of Providence, both as to these and other instances, had we room here to expatiate in. Wherefore, for a supplement of what remains, we shall refer the reader to the writings of others, who have professedly undertaken apologies for Providence, both as to the fabrick and œconomy of the world; but especially the learned and ingenious author¹ of the *Divine Dialogues*. Only we shall here add some few considerations, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as for the better satisfaction of such Religionists, who, too easily concluding, that all things might have been much better than they are, are thereupon apt to call in question the divine attribute of goodness in its full extent, which yet is the only foundation of our Christian faith.

First therefore we say, that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves; and then, because we could fancy much finer things, thereupon blame the Maker of the whole. As if one should attend only to this earth, which is but the lowest and most dreggy part of the universe; or blame plants, because they have not sense; brutes, because they have not reason; men, because they are not dæmons or angels; and angels, because they are not gods, or want divine perfection. Upon which account, God should either have made nothing at all, since there can be nothing besides himself absolutely perfect, or else nothing but the higher rank of angelical beings, free from mortality, and all those other evils, that attend mankind, or such fine things as *Epicurus* his gods were feigned to be, living in certain delicious regions², where there was neither blustering winds, nor any low'ring clouds, nor nipping frosts, nor scorching heat, nor night, nor shadow, but the

¹ Dr. *Henry More*.

² Vide *Lucret. Lib. III. Ver. 19.*

the ca'm and unclouded æther, always smiling with gentle serenity. whereas were there but one kind of thing (the best) thus made, there could have been no musick nor harmony at all, in the world, for want of variety. But we ought, in the first place, to consider the whole, whether that be not the best, that could be made, having all that belongeth to it; and then the parts in reference to the whole, whether they be not, in their several degrees and ranks, congruous and agreeable thereunto. But this is a thing, which hath been so well insisted upon by *Plotinus*, that we cannot speak better to it, than in his words: "Ὁλον γὰρ τι ἐποίησε πάλαι, καὶ ἄστρες, καὶ Φίλων ἀστῶν, καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς αὐτῶ, τοῖς τε κριωτέροις καὶ τοῖς ἐλάττωις ὡνάτως προφῶροις· ὁ τοῖνον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον αἰτιάμενος, ἀποπῶθ' ὃν εἶν τῆς αἰτίας· τότε γὰρ μίση πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον θεῖ σιωπεῖν εἰ σέμδωνα καὶ ἀρμότιοντα ἐνῆρ, καὶ τὸ ὅλον σκοτῶμεου, μὴ πρὸς μίση ἄτῃ μινεὶ βλάπειν· τῶτο γὰρ ἔ τὸν κόσμου αἰτιωμένα ἀλλὰ τινε τῶν αὐτῶ χῆρες λαθεῖντα, ἕνν εἰ, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· God made the whole most beautiful, entire, compleat, and sufficient; all agreeing friendly with itself and its parts; both the nobler and the meaner of them being alike congruous therunto. Whosoever therefore, from the parts thereof, will blame the whole, is an absurd and unjust censurer. For we ought to consider the parts, not alone by themselves, but in reference to the whole, whether they be harmonious and agreeable to the same. Otherwise we shall not blame the universe, but some of its parts only, taken by themselves; as if one should blame the hair or toes of a man, taking no notice at all of his divine visage and countenance; or omitting all other animals, one should attend only to the most contemptible of them; or, lustily, overlooking all other men, consider only the most deformed Therites. But that, which God made, was the whole as one thing; which he that attends to, may hear it speaking to him after this manner: God Almighty hath made me, and from thence came I, perfect and compleat, and standing in need of nothing, because in me are contained all things; plants, and animals, and good souls, and men happy with virtue, and innumerable demons, and many gods. Nor is the earth alone in me adorned with all manner of plants, and variety of animals; or does the power of soul extend at most no further than to the seas; as if the whole air, and æther, and heaven, in the mean time, were quite devoid of soul, and altogether unadorned with living inhabitants. Moreover, all things in me desire good, and every thing reaches to it, according to its power and nature. For the whole depends upon that first and highest good, the gods themselves, who reign in my several parts, and all animals, and plants, and whatsoever seems to be inanimate in me. For some things in me partake only of being, some of life also, some of sense, some of reason, and some of intellect above reason. But no man ought to require equal things from unequal; nor that the finger should see, but the eye; it being enough for the finger to be a finger, and to perform its own office. And again, afterwards, ὡσπερ τεωῖτης ἔ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ζῶνι ὁφθαλμὸς ποιεῖ, ἕτως ἔ ὁ ὀ λόγῳ πάντα θεὸς εἰργάζεται· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν θεὸς, τὰ δὲ δαίμονας δευτέρων φῶσιν, εἴτα ἀθεῶτες, καὶ ζῶα ἐφεῖνε, ἔ φῶσιν, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ ποιικίαν νεράν ἔχοντι· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὡσπερ οἱ ἀπειροὶ γραφικῆς τέχνης αἰτιώμεθα, ὡς ἔ καλὰ τῶ γραμμάτια πανταχῶ, ὁ δ' ἄρα τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ ἀπώδυνον ἐκῆσθ' ὅπωρ ἢ εἴτις δεῖνὰ ἀμφῶτε, ὅτι μὴ πάντες ἕμετε ἐν αὐτῶ, καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἔ) *As an artificer would not*

P. 256.
[Lib. II. de
Providentiâ,
Ennead. III.
lib. II. cap.
III.]

make

make all things in an animal to be eyes; so neither has the divine λόγος, or spermatick reason of the world, made all things gods; but some gods, and some demons, and some men, and some lower animals; not out of envy, but to display its own variety and fecundity. But we are like unskilful spectators of a picture, who condemn the limner, because he hath not put bright colours every where; whereas he had suited his colours to every part respectively, giving to each such as belonged to it. Or else are we like those, who would blame a comedy or tragedy, because they were not all kings or heroes, that acted in it, but some servants and rustick clowns introduced also, talking after their rude fashion. Whereas the dramattick poem would neither be compleat, nor elegant and delightful, were all those worse parts taken out of it.

Again, We cannot certainly conclude, that the works of God and his creation do not transcend those narrow limits, which vulgar opinion and imagination sets them, that commonly terminates the universe, but a little above the clouds, or at most supposes the fixed stars, being all fastned in one solid sphere, to be the utmost wall, or arched roof, and rolling circumference thereof. Much less ought we, upon such groundless suppositions, to infer, that the world might therefore have been made much better than it is, because it might have been much more roomy and capacious. We explode the atheisticalk infinity of distant worlds; nor can we admit that *Cartesian*, seemingly more modest, indefinite extension of one corporeal universe, which yet really, according to that philosopher's meaning, hath *nullos fines, no bounds nor limits at all*. For we persuade ourselves, that the corporeal world is as incapable of a positive infinity of magnitude, as it is of time; there being no magnitude so great, but that more still might be added to it. Nevertheless, as we cannot possibly imagine the sun to be a quarter, or an hundredth part so big as we know it to be; so much more may the whole corporeal universe far transcend those narrow bounds, which our imagination would circumscribe it in. The new celestial phenomena, and the late improvements of astronomy and philosophy made thereupon, render it so probable, that even this dull earth of ours is a planet, and the sun a fixed star in the centre of that *vortex*, wherein it moves, that many have shrewdly suspected, that there are other habitable globes, besides this earth of ours, (which may be sailed round about in a year or two) as also more suns, with their respective planets, than one. However, the distance of all the fixed stars from us being so vast, that the diameter of the great orb makes no discernible parallax in the site of them; from whence it is also probable, that the other fixed stars are likewise vastly distant from one another: this, I say, widens the corporeal universe to us, and makes those *flamantia mœnia mundi*, as *Lucretius*^a calls them, *those flaming walls of the world*, to fly away before us. Now, it is not reasonable to think, that all this immense vastness should lie waste, desert, and uninhabited, and have nothing in it that could praise the Creator thereof, save only this one small spot of earth. *In my father's house* (saith our Saviour) *are many mansions*. And *Baruck*, (chapter iii. appointed by our church to be read publickly) *O Israel, how great*

^a Lib. I. vers. 73, 74.

great is the house of God, and how large is the place of his possession? Great and hath no end, high and unmeasurable. Which yet we understand not of an absolute infinity, but only such an immense vastness, as far transcends vulgar opinion and imagination.

We shall add but one thing more, that, to make a right judgment of the ways of providence, and the justice thereof, as to the œconomy of mankind, we must look both forwards and backwards, or besides the present, not only upon the future, but also the past time. Which rule is likewise thus set down by Plotinus; ἢ δ' ἐκείνου ἀποβλητέου τὸν λόγον, ὃς ἔ' πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἐκείσοιτε φησὶ βλέπειν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς πρόθευ περιόδους, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ μέλλον· *Neither is that doctrine of the ancients to be neglected, that, to give an account of Providence, we ought to look back upon former periods, as well as forward to what is future.* Indeed he, and those other philosophers, who were religious, understood this so, as to conclude a pre-existent state of all particular souls, wherein they were at first created by God pure, but by the abuse of their own liberty degenerated, to be a necessary hypothesis, for the solving that phænomenon of the depraved state of mankind in general here in this life. And not only so, but they endeavoured in like manner to give an account also of those different conditions of particular persons as to morality, from their infancy, and their other different fates here, deriving them all, ἐκ τῶν προεξευμένων, from their several demeanors heretofore in a pre-existent state. And there have not wanted Christian doctors, who have complied with these philosophers in both. But our common Christianity only agrees thus far, as to suppose a kind of imputative pre-existence in *Adam*, in whom all were created pure, and so consequently involved in his after-miscarriage, to solve the perversity of human nature; upon which account we are all said to be, φύσει τέκνα ὀργῆς, by nature children of wrath. But as for the different conditions of persons, and their several fates, more disadvantageous to some than others, this indeed the generality of Christian doctors have been content to resolve, only into an occult, but just Providence. And thus does Origen himself sometimes modestly pass it over, as in his third book against *Celsus* * πολλοῖς καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀναστροφῆς τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι, ὡς μὴδὲ Φωτασίῳ ἐπίραπῆναι τῶν κρείττονων λαβεῖν· ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καὶ ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας ἦνται ἐν παιδικῶσι εἶναι ἀκολάστον ἀνθρώπων, ἢ δισποτῶν ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ καλωσῆ τῆν ψυχῆν ἀναβλέπειν κακοδομιονία· τὰς δὲ περὶ τῶν αἰτίας πύατας μὲν εἶκοι εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς τῆς προνοίας λόγοις· τίπτεν δὲ αὐτὸς εἰς ἀθρώπους ἐκ ἐνχερείς. *It happeneth to many, so to have been brought up from their very childhood, as that, by one means or other, they could have no opportunity at all of thinking of the better things, &c. And it is very probable, that there are causes of these things in the reasons of providence, though they do not easily fall under human notice.*

P. 264.
[Ennead. III.
Lib. II. Cap.
XIII.]

ὅπως Ἡσιότιος,
ἢ ἀμέλειται
ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῶν
ῥημάτων, καὶ
πυλάτων μὴ
ῥημάτων ἐφεί-
κηται σφίματ' α,
* P. 134.

But there is yet a third atheistical objection against Providence behind, That it is impossible any one Being should animadvert and order all things in the distant places of the world at once; and, were this possible, yet would such infinite negotiosity be very uneasy and distracting to it, and altogether inconsistent

sistent with happiness. Nor would a being, irresistibly powerful, concern itself in the good or welfare of any thing else, it standing in need of nothing, and all benevolence and good-will arising from indigency and imbecility. Wherefore such a being would wholly be taken up in the enjoyment of itself, and its own happiness, utterly regardless of all other things.

To which the reply is, first, That though ourselves, and all created beings, have but a finite animadversion, and narrow sphere of activity; yet does it not therefore follow, that the case must be the same with the Deity, supposed to be a Being infinitely perfect, ἀπείρονομαρτον, *that hath no manner of defect*, either of knowledge or power in it. But this is a mere *idolum specus*, an idol of the cave or den; men measuring the Deity by their own scantling and narrowness. And indeed, were there nothing at all but what we ourselves could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Were the sun an animal, and had life co-extended with its rays and light, it would see and perceive every atom of matter, that its outstretched beams reached to, and touched. Now all created beings are themselves, in some sense, but the rays of the Deity, which therefore cannot but feel and sensibly perceive all these its own effluxes and emanations. Men themselves can order and manage affairs in several distant places at once, without any disturbance; and we have innumerable notions of things in our mind, that lie there easily together, without crowding one another, or causing any distraction to us¹.

Nevertheless, the minds of weak mortals may here be somewhat eased and helped, by considering what hath been before suggested; that there is no necessity God Almighty should ἀὐτοργεῖν ἅπαντα, *do all things himself immediately and drudgingly*; but he may have his inferior ministers and executioners under him, to discharge him of that supposed encumbrance. As first of all, an artificial plastick nature, which, without knowledge and animal consciousness, disposes the matter of the universe according to the platform or idea of a perfect mind, and forms the bodies of all animals. And this was one reason, why we did before insift so much upon this artificial, regular, and methodical nature, namely, that divine providence might neither be excluded from having an influence upon all things in this lower world, as resulting only from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter, unguided by any mind; nor yet the Deity be supposed to do every thing itself immediately and miraculously, without the subservient ministry of any natural causes, which would seem to us mortals, to be not only a violent, but also an operose, cumbersome, and moliminous business. And thus did Plato² acknowledge, that there were, ἐμφροῦ Φύσεως αἰτίαι αἷς ὑπερτάτους χεῖνται ὁ Θεός. *Certain causes of a prudent, that is, artificial and orderly nature, which God makes use of, as subservient to himself in the mundane œconomy.* Besides which, those instincts also impressed upon animals, and which they are passive to, directing them to act for ends either not understood, or not attended to by them, in order to their own good

¹ Vide Xenophontem de Memorabilib. So. ² In Timæo, §. XXXVI. p. 256. etatis, Lib. I. p. 575.

and the good of the universe, are another part of that divine fate, which, inserted into things themselves, is the servant and executioner of Providence. Above all which, there are yet other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity, as its eyes and hands; dæmoniack or angelick beings, appointed to preside over mankind, all mundane affairs, and the things of nature; they having their severall distinct offices and provinces assigned them. Of which also *Plato* thus; τῶτοις εἰσὶν ἀρχόντες προϊταμένοι ἐκείνοις, ἐπὶ τὸ μικρῶτατον αἰεὶ πάσης ἢ πράξεως. *There are certain rulers or presidents appointed by the supreme God, who governs the whole world, over all the severall things and parts therein, even to the smallest distribution of them.* All which inferiour causes are constantly overlooked and supervised by the watchful eye of God Almighty himself, who may also sometimes extraordinarily interpose.

We need not, therefore, restrain and confine divine Providence to a few greater things only, as some do, that we may thereby consult the ease of the Deity, and its freedom from distraction; but may and ought to extend it to all things whatsoever, small as well as great. And indeed the great things of the world cannot well be ordered neither, without some regard to the small and little: ἃ δὲ γὰρ ἀνευ μικρῶν τὸς μεγάλους Φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κείσθαι. *as architects affirm, that great stones cannot be well placed together in a building without little.* Neither can generals of armies, nor governours of families, nor masters of ships, nor mechanick artificers, discharge their severall functions, and do their works respectively as they ought, did they not mind small things also, as well as the great. Μὴ τοῦτον (saith the forementioned philosopher *) τόνγε Θεὸν ἀξιώσομεν ποτὲ θνητῶν δημιουργῶν Φαυλότερον, οἱ τὰ προσκίοντα αὐτοῖς ἔργα, ὅσπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ᾖσι, τὸσω ἀκριβοῦστερα ἢ τελεώτερα μᾶλλον τέχνην μικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται. *Let us not therefore make God Almighty inferiour to mortal officers, who, by one and the same art, can order small things as well as great; and so suppose him to be supine and negligent.* Nevertheless, the chief concernment and employment of divine Providence in the world is the oeconomy of souls, or government of rational beings, which is by *Plato* contracted into this compendium; ἃ δὲν ἄλλο ἔργον τῷ περὶ ἐπιλείπειαι πλὴν μετασθέναι τὸ μὲν ἀμεινον γινόμενον ἢ εἰς βελτίω τόπον χεῖρον δὲ εἰς τὸν χείρονα, &c. *There is no other work left for the supreme Governour of all, than only to translate better souls into better places and conditions, and worse into worse; or, as he after addeth, to dispose of every one in the world in such a manner, as might best render victorious, ἡττωμένῳ δὲ κενικῶν, virtuous, and triumphant over vice.* And thus may the slow and imperfect wits of mortals be satisfied, that Providence to the Deity is no moliminous, laborious, and distractious thing.

But that there is no higher spring of life in rational animals, than contracted self-love, and that all good-will and benevolence arises only from indigency and imbecility, and that no being whatsoever is concerned in the welfare of any other thing, but only what itself stands in need of; and lastly therefore, that what is irresistibly powerful, and needs nothing, would

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have

* *Plato* de Legib. Lib. X. p. 671.

* *Ibid.*

have no manner of benevolence, nor concern itself in the good and welfare of any thing whatsoever; this is but another idol of the Atheists den, and only argues their bad nature, low-sunk minds, and gross immorality. And the same is to be said also of that other maxim¹, That what is perfectly happy would have nothing at all to do, but only enjoy its own ease and quiet; whereas there is nothing more troublesome to ourselves, than this ἀπραξία, *this having nothing to do*; and the activity of the Deity, or a perfect Being, is altogether as easy to it, as its essence.

The atheistical queries come next to be answered; which, being but three, are naturally to be disposed in this order: First, *If there were a God, or perfect Being, who therefore was sufficiently happy in the enjoyment of himself, why would he go about to make a world? Secondly, If he must needs make a world, why did he not make it sooner? this late production thereof looking, as if he had but newly awaked out of a long sleep throughout infinite past ages, or else had in length of time contracted a satiety of his solitude. Thirdly and lastly, What tools or instruments? what machines or engines had he? Or how could he move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? because then he would run through all things, and could not lay hold, nor fasten upon any thing.*

To the first therefore we say, That the reason, why God made the world, was from his own overflowing and communicative goodness, that there might be other beings also happy, besides him, and enjoy themselves. Nor does this at all clash with God's making of the world for his own glory and honour; though Plotinus² were so shy of that, γελῶσιν ἢ αὐτῶν τιμῶντι, ἢ μεταφέρουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν τὴν ἐντιχῆρα, *It is ridiculous to say, that God made the world, that he might be honoured; this being to transfer the affections of human artificers and statuaries upon him.* But the chief reason of his saying so was, because that philosopher conceived the world to have proceeded, not so much from the will of the Deity, as the necessity of its nature. Though this be true also, that God did not make the world merely to ostentate his skill and power, but to communicate his goodness, which is chiefly and properly his glory, as the light and splendour of the sun is the glory of it. But the Atheist demands, *What hurt had it been for us never to have been made?* and the answer is easy, We should then never have enjoyed any good, or been capable of happiness; and had there been no rational creatures at all made, it must have been either from impotent sterility in the Deity, or else from an invidious, narrow, and contracted selfishness, or want of benignity, and communicative goodness; both which are inconsistent with a perfect Being. But the argument may be thus retorted upon these Atheists; *What hurt would it be for us to cease to be, or become nothing?* And why then are these Atheists, as well as others, so unwilling to die?

But then in the next place they urge; *Why was not the world made sooner, since this goodness of God was without date, and from everlasting?*

¹ Vide Diogen. Laert. lib. X. Serm. 139. ² Libro contra Gnosticis, Ennrad. II. lib. IX. Cap. LV. p. 202.

But this question may be taken in two different senses; either, *Why was not the world from eternity, as God and his goodness are eternal?* or else, secondly, *If the world could not be from eternity, yet, notwithstanding, why was it not sooner, but so lately made?* In both which queries the atomick Atheists take it for granted, that the system of the world was not from eternity, but had a beginning. Now we say, that the reason, why the world was not made from eternity, was not from any defect of goodness in the divine will, but because there is an absolute impossibility in the thing itself; or because the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindered. For we must confess, that, for our parts, we are prone to believe, that could the world have been from eternity, it should certainly have been so. And just thus does *Philosophonus*, in his confutation of *Proclus* his arguments for the world's eternity, declare himself, and no otherwise: *Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄρα μὴ εἶναι τὸν κόσμον αἰδίου ὑποτιθέμενοι, ἕτε το εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν αἰεὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρέμεθα, ἕτε ἀδύνατον τῆς δημιουργικῆς αὐτοῦ κατηγορουμένης δυνάμεως· ἀλλὰ μὴ δύνασθαι αἰεὶ εἶναι τὸν κόσμον δι' αὐτὴν τὴν τῷ γενόμενῳ φύσιν ὑποτιθέμεθα.* *Ourselves also supposing the world not to have been eternal, do neither ascribe this to any defect either of goodness or of power in the Deity, but only to the impossibility of the thing itself.* Where, in the following words, he gives a two-fold account of this impossibility of the world's eternity; *ὅτι τὸ τὸ ἀπειρον κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑποστῆναι, ἢ διεξίτητον εἶναι, ἀδύνατον ἔνι καὶ ὅτι συναίδιον εἶναι τῷ ποιῆντι τὸ γινόμενον φύσιν ἀνέχει.* *First, because there can be nothing actually infinite, and yet run through, as all the past duration of the world hath been; and secondly, because that, which is made, or brought into being by another, as a distinct thing from it, cannot be co-eternal with its maker.* Where it is probable, that *Philosophonus*, being a Christian, designed not to oppose the eternal generation of the Son of God, but only to assert that nothing, which was properly made or created by God, and nothing, which was not itself God, could be from eternity, or without beginning. And now we see, how those atheitick exceptions against the novelty of the divine creation, as if God must therefore either have slept from eternity, or else have at length contracted a satiety of his former solitude, and the like, do of themselves quite vanish into nothing. But then, as to the second sense of the question, *Why the world, though it could not possibly be from eternity, yet was no sooner, but so lately made?* we say, that this is an absurd question; both because time was made together with the world, and there was no sooner or later before time; and also because whatsoever had a beginning, must of necessity be once but a day old. Wherefore the world could not possibly have been so made by God in time, as not to be once but five or six thousand years old, and no more; as now it is.

And as for the third and last query; *How God could move and command the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal?* we reply; first, that all other things being derived from God, as their only fountain and original, and essentially depending on him, who, by his absolute power also, could annihilate whatsoever he created;

he must needs have a despotick power over all; and every thing whatsoever be naturally subject and obsequious to him. And since no body can possibly move itself, that, which first moved matter, must of necessity be incorporeal; nor could it move it by local motion, as one body moves another, or as engines and machines move by trusion or pulsion, they being before moved, but must do it by another kind of action, such as is not local motion, nor heterokinesy, but autokinesy; that is, by cogitation. Wherefore, that conceit of the Atheists, that an incorporeal Deity could not possibly move the matter of the world, because it would run through it, and could not fasten or lay hold thereupon, is absurd, because this moves matter not mechanically, but vitally, and by cogitation only. And that a cogitative being, as such, hath a natural imperium over matter, and power of moving it, without any engines or machines, is unquestionably certain, even from our own souls; which move our bodies, and command them every way, meerly by will and thought. And a perfect mind, presiding over the matter of the whole world, could much more irresistibly, and with infinitely more ease, move the whole corporeal universe, meerly by will and cogitation, than we can our bodies.

The last head of atheistical argumentation is from interest. And first, the Atheists would persuade, that it is the *interest of mankind in general, and of every particular person, that there should be no God, that is, no Being infinitely powerful, that hath no law, but its own will; and therefore may punish, whom he pleases, eternally after death.*

To which our first reply is, that if there be a God, and souls be immortal, then is it not any man's thinking otherwise, that will alter the case, nor afford the Atheists any relief against those two imagined evils of theirs. For things are fullen, and will be as they are, whatever we think them, or wish them to be; and men will at last discover their error, when perhaps it may be too late. Wishing is no proving; and therefore this atheistical argument from interest is no argument at all against the existence of a God, it being nothing but the ignorant wish, and vain desire of befotted Atheists.

In the next place, this wish of Atheists is altogether founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty too, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent; which indeed is not the most desirable thing. But as it hath been often declared, the will of God is the will of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself omnipotent. His will is not meer will, such as hath no other reason besides itself; but it is law, equity, and chancery; it is the *ratio dei*, or *Ought itself*, decreeing, willing, and acting. Neither does God punish any, out of a delight in punishment, or in the evil and suffering of the persons punished; but to those, who are not *ἀνίατοι*, altogether incurable, *δίκην μάστιγος*, his punishment is physick, in order to their recovery and amendment; so that the source and fountain thereof is goodness to
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the persons themselves punished. But to such as are incurable, the punishment inflicted on them is intended for the good of the whole. So that this attribute of justice in God doth not at all clash with the attribute of goodness, it being but a branch thereof, or particular modification of the same. Goodness and justice in God are always complicated together; neither his goodness being fondness, nor his justice cruelty; but he being both good in punishing, and just in rewarding and dispensing benefits. Wherefore, it can be the interest of none, that there should be no God nor immortality, unless perhaps of such desperately and incurably wicked persons, who abandoning their true interest of being good, have thereupon no other interest now left them, than not to be, or become nothing.

To be without a God, is to be without hope in the world; for Atheists can have neither faith, nor hope, in senseless matter, and the fortuitous motions thereof. And though an understanding being have never so much enjoyment of itself for the present, yet could it not possibly be happy, without immortality, and security of the future continuance thereof. But the Atheists conclude, that there is nothing immortal, and that all life perishes and vanishes into nothing; and consequently also, that *ἕνδαμονία ἀνυπαρκτὸν*, happiness is a thing, that hath no existence in nature, a meer figment and chimæra, or idle wish and vain dream of mortals. Wherefore it cannot be the interest of mankind, that this hypothesis should be true, which thus plainly cuts off all hope from men, and leaves them in an utter impossibility of being ever happy.

God is such a being, as if he could be supposed not to be, there is nothing, which any, who are not desperately engaged in wickedness, no not Atheists themselves, could possibly more wish for, or desire. To believe a God, is to believe the existence of all possible good and perfection in the universe; it is to believe, that things are as they should be, and that the world is so well framed and governed, as that the whole system thereof could not possibly have been better. For peccability arises from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings, left to themselves, and therefore could not by omnipotence itself have been excluded; and though sin actual might perhaps have been kept out by force and violence, yet, all things computed, it was doubtless most for the good of the whole, that it should not be thus forcibly hindered. There is nothing, which cannot be hoped for, by a good man, from the Deity; whatsoever happiness his being is capable of, *and such things, as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor can now enter into the heart of man to conceive.* Infinite hopes lie before us, from the existence of a Being infinitely good and powerful, and our own souls immortality; and nothing can hinder or obstruct these hopes, but our own wickedness of life. To believe a God, and do well, are two the most hopeful, cheerful, and comfortable things, that possibly can be. And to this purpose is that of *Linus*,

‡ Apud Jamblicum de Vita Pythagor. Cap. XXVII. p. 117, 118.

Ἐλπιδαι χερὶ παντ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστ' ἄδεν Ἀελλίου.
 Ῥόδια πάντα Θεῶν τελέσαι, καὶ ἀήνουτου ἄδεν.

Wherefore, as for *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, whose encomiums the Atheists here so loudly sing forth, we say, that however they have made so great a noise in the world, and have been so much cried up of late, yet were they really no better than a couple of infatuated sophists, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind.

And now come we to the last atheistical argumentation, wherein they endeavour to recommend their doctrine to civil sovereigns, and to persuade them, that theism or religion is absolutely inconsistent with their interest; their reasons for which are these three following. First, because the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore, if there be any power and fear greater than the power and fear of the *Leviathan*, civil authority can signify little. Secondly, because sovereignty is in its own nature absolutely indivisible, and must be either infinite, or none at all; so that divine laws (natural and revealed) superiour to it, circumscribing it, would consequently destroy it. Wherefore religion and theism must of necessity be displaced, and removed out of the way, to make room for the *Leviathan* to roll and tumble in. Thirdly and lastly, private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, is also contradictory to the very being of a body politick; which is one artificial man, made up of many natural men united under one head, having one common reason, judgment and will, ruling over the whole. But conscience, which religion introduceth, is private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, and therefore altogether inconsistent with true politicks; that can admit of no private consciences, but only one publick conscience of the law.

In way of answer to the first of which, we must here briefly unravel the atheistical ethics and politicks. The foundation whereof is first laid in the villanizing of human nature; as that, which has not so much as any the least seeds, either of politicalness, or ethicalness at all in it; nothing of equity and philanthropy; (there being no other charity or benevolence any where, according to them, save what resulteth from fear, imbecillity, and indigency) nothing of publick and common concern, but all private and selfish; appetite and utility, or the desires of sensual pleasure, and honour, dominion, and precellency before others, being the only measures of good in nature. So that there can be nothing naturally just or unjust, nothing in itself sinful or unlawful, but every man by nature hath *jus ad omnia, a right to every thing*, whatsoever his appetite inclineth him unto, or himself judgeth profitable; even to other men's bodies and lives. *Si occidere cupis, jus habes; if thou desirest to kill, thou hast then naturally a right thereunto*; that is, a liberty to kill without any sin or injustice. For *jus* and *lex*, or *justitia*, *right* and *law*, or *justice*, in the language of these atheistical politicians, are directly contrary to one another; their right being

a belluine liberty, not made, or left by justice, but such as is founded in a supposition of its absolute non-existence. Should therefore a son not only murder his own parents, who had tenderly brought him up, but also exquisitely torture them, taking pleasure in beholding their rueful looks, and hearing their lamentable shrieks and outcries, there would be nothing of sin or injustice at all in this, nor in any thing else; because justice is no nature, but a meer factitious and artificial thing, made only by men, and civil laws. And, according to these men's apprehensions, nature has been very kind and indulgent to mankind herein, that it hath thus brought us into the world, without any fetters or shackles upon us, free from all duty and obligation, justice and morality, these being to them nothing but restraints and hinderances of true liberty. From all which it follows, that nature absolutely dissociates and segregates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of those appetites of theirs, that are all carried out only to private good, and consequently, that every man is, by nature, in a state of war and hostility against every man.

In the next place therefore, these atheistical politicians further add, that though this their state of nature, which is a liberty from all justice and obligation, and a lawless, loose, or belluine right to every thing, be in itself absolutely the best; yet nevertheless by reason of men's imbecillity, and the equality of their strengths, and inconsistency of their appetites, it proves by accident the worst; this war with every one making men's right or liberty to every thing indeed a right or liberty to nothing; they having no security of their lives, much less of the comfortable enjoyment of them. For as it is not possible, that all men should have dominion, (which were indeed the most desirable thing, according to these principles) so the generality must needs be sensible of more evil in such a state of liberty with an universal war against all, than of good. Wherefore, when men had been a good while hewing, and slashing, and justling against one another, they became at length all weary hereof, and conceived it necessary by art to help the defect of their own power here, and to chuse a lesser evil, for the avoiding of a greater; that is, to make a voluntary abatement of this their infinite right, and to submit to terms of equality with one another, in order to a sociable and peaceable cohabitation: and not only so, but also for the security of all, that others should observe such rules as well as themselves, to put their necks under the yoke of a common coercive power, whose will being the will of them all, should be the very rule, and law, and measure of justice to them.

Here therefore these atheistical politicians, as they first of all slander human nature, and make a villain of it; so do they, in the next place, reproach justice and civil sovereignty also, making it to be nothing but an ignoble and bastardly brat of fear; or else a lesser evil, submitted to meerly out of necessity, for the avoiding of a greater evil, that of war with every one, by reason of men's natural imbecillity. So that according to
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this hypothesis, justice and civil government are plainly things not good in themselves, nor desirable, (they being a hinderance of liberty, and nothing but shackles and fetters,) but by accident only, as necessary evils: and thus do these politicians themselves sometimes distinguish betwixt good and just, that *bonum amatur per se, justum per accidens*; good is that, which is loved for itself, but just by accident. From whence it follows unavoidably, that all men must of necessity be *ἀκωτες δίκαιοι*, unwillingly just, or not with a full and perfect, but mixt will only; just being a thing, that is not sincerely good, but such as hath a great dash or dose of evil blended with it. And this was the old atheistical generation of justice, and of a body politick, civil society, and sovereignty. For though a modern writer affirm this hypothesis (which he looks upon as the only true scheme of politicks) to be a new invention, as the circulation of the blood, and no older than the book *de Civē*, yet is it certain, that it was the commonly received doctrine of the atheistical politicians and philosophers before *Plato's* time; who represents their sense concerning the original of justice, and civil society in this manner:

*De Rep. l. 2. δ' πρώτων ἔφην περὶ τὰτα ἀκοε, τί τε ὄν τυχεύει καὶ ὄθεν γέγυσε δικαιοσύνη· πεφικέαια
p. 358, 359: γὰρ δὲ φασὶ τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν· πλέουσι δὲ κακῶ ὑπερῷ ἄλλοι
[P. 442. Edit. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὡς τε ἐπειδὴν ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖσι τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ
Picini.] ἀμφοτέρωθεν γινώσκειν, τοῖς μὴ δουκμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἰετῶν, δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν
ἐνθῆσθαι ἀλλήλοις, μὴτ' ἀδικεῖν, μὴτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἀρξῆσθαι νόμου τιθεσθαι,
καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τῷ νόμῳ ἐπιτάγμα νόμου τὸ καὶ δίκαιον· I am to declare first what
justice is, according to the sense of these philosophers, and from whence it was
generated. They say therefore, that by nature, lawless liberty, and to do that,
which is now called injustice, and injury to other men, is good; but to suffer it
from others, is evil. But of the two, there is more of evil in suffering it, than
of good in doing it: whereupon when men had clashed a good while, doing and
suffering injury, the greater part, who by reason of their imbecillity were not
able to take the former without the latter, at length compounded the business
amongst themselves, and agreed together by pacts and covenants, neither to do
nor suffer injury, but to submit to rules of equality, and make laws by compact,
in order to their peaceable cohabitation, they calling that, which was required
in those laws, by the name of just. And then is it added; καὶ εἶναι ταῦτην γένεσιν
τε καὶ ὁρίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ ἑσταν τῷ μὲν ἀρίστῳ ὄντι, ἐὰν ἀδικεῖν μὴ δῶσθαι δίκην, τῷ
δὲ κακίῳ, ἐὰν ἀδικεῖσθαι τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατον ἢ τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὄν τῶν ἀυ-
ποτέρων, ἀγαπᾶσθαι ἕχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρώστια τῷ ἀδικεῖν τιμωρῶμενον· And
this is, according to these philosophers, the generation and essence of justice, as
a certain middle thing betwixt the best and the worst. The best, to exercise a
lawless liberty of doing whatsoever one please to other men without suffering
any inconvenience from it; and the worst to suffer evil from others, without
being able to revenge it. Justice therefore, being a middle thing betwixt both
these, is loved, not as that which is good in itself, but only by reason of men's
imbecillity, and their inability to do injustice. For as much as he, that had
sufficient power, could never enter into such compacts, and submit to equality
and subjection. As for example, if a man had Gyges his magical ring, that
he could do whatsoever he listed, and not be seen or taken notice of by any, such*

a one would certainly never enter into covenants, nor submit to laws of equality and subjection. Agreeably whereunto, it hath been concluded also by some of these old atheistical philosophers, that justice was ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, *Not properly and directly one's own good, the good of him, that is just, but another man's good, partly of the fellow-citizens, but chiefly of the ruler, whose vassal he is.* And it is well known, that after Plato's time, this hypothesis concerning justice, that it was a meer factitious thing, and sprung only from men's fear and imbecillity, as a lesser evil, was much insisted on by Epicurus also.

But let us in the next place see, how our modern atheistical philosophers and politicians, will manage and carry on this hypothesis, so as to confociate men by art into a body politick, that are naturally dissociated from one another, as also make justice and obligation artificial, when there is none in nature. First of all therefore, these artificial justice-makers, city-makers, and authority-makers, tell us, that though men have an infinite right by nature, yet may they alienate this right, or part thereof, from themselves, and either simply renounce it, or transfer the same upon some other person; by means whereof it will become unlawful for themselves, afterwards, to make use thereof. Thus a late writer¹, men may by signs declare, *Velle se non licitum sibi amplius fore, certum aliquid facere, quod jure antea fecisse poterant; That it is their will, it shall no longer be lawful for them, to do something, which before they had a right to do;* and this is called by him, a simple renunciation of right. And further, saith he, they may declare again *Velle se non licitum sibi amplius fore alicui resistere, &c. That it is their will, it shall be no longer lawful for them, to resist this or that particular person, whom before they might lawfully have resisted;* and this is called a translation of right. But if there be nothing in its own nature unlawful, then cannot this be unlawful for a man afterwards, to make use of such liberty, as he had before in words renounced or abandoned. Nor can any man, by his meer will, make any thing unlawful to him, which was not so in itself; but only suspend the exercise of so much of his liberty, as he thought good. But however, could a man by his will oblige himself, or make any thing unlawful to him, there would be nothing got by this, because then might he, by his will, disoblige himself again, and make the same lawful as before. For what is made meerly by will, may be destroyed by will. Wherefore, these politicians will yet urge the business further, and tell us, that no man can be obliged but by his own act, and that the essence of injustice is nothing else but *dati repetitio*², the taking away of that, which one had before given. To which we again reply, that were a man naturally unobliged to any thing, then could he no way be obliged to stand to his own act, so that it should be really unjust and unlawful for him, at any time, upon second thoughts, voluntarily to undo, what he had before voluntarily done. But the Atheists here plainly render injustice a meer ludicrous thing, when they tell us³, that it is nothing but such an absurdity in life, as it is in disputation, when a man denies a proposition, that he had before granted;

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which

¹ Hobbes, Elem. de Cive, Cap. II. §. IV.

² Id. ibid. Cap. III. §. III.

³ Id. ibid.

which is no real evil in him as a man, but only a thing called an absurdity, as a disputant. That is, injustice is no absolute evil of the man; but only a relative incongruity in him, as a citizen. As when a man speaking Latin, observes not the laws of grammar, this is a kind of injustice in him, as a Latinist or grammarian; so when one, who lives in civil society, observes not the laws and conditions thereof, this is, as it were, the false Latin of a citizen, and nothing else. According to which notion of injustice, there is no such real evil or hurt in it, as can any way withstand the force of appetite and private utility, and oblige men to civil obedience, when it is contrary to the same. But these political jugglers and enchanters will here cast yet a further mist before men's eyes with their pacts and covenants. For men by their covenants, say they, may unquestionably oblige themselves, and make things unjust and unlawful to them, that were not so before. Wherefore, injustice is again defined by them, and that with more speciousness, to be the breach of covenants. But though it be true, that if there be natural justice, covenants will oblige; yet, upon the contrary supposition, that there is nothing naturally unjust, this cannot be unjust neither, to break covenants. Covenants, without natural justice, are nothing but meer words and breath; (as indeed these atheistical politicians themselves, agreeably to their own hypothesis, call them) and therefore can they have no force to oblige. Wherefore, these justice-makers are themselves at last necessitated to fly to laws of nature, and to pretend this to be a law of nature, that men should stand to their pacts and covenants. Which is plainly to contradict their main fundamental principle, that by nature nothing is unjust or unlawful; for if it be so, then can there be no laws of nature; and if there be laws of nature, then must there be something naturally unjust and unlawful. So that this is not to make justice, but clearly to unmake their own hypothesis, and to suppose justice to have been already made by nature, or to be in nature; which is a gross absurdity in disparagement, to affirm what one had before denied. But these their laws of nature are indeed nothing but juggling equivocation, and a meer mockery; themselves again acknowledging them to be no laws, because law is nothing but the word of him, who hath command over others; but only conclusions or theorems concerning what conduces to the conservation and defence of themselves, upon the principle of fear; that is, indeed the laws of their own timorous and cowardly complexion: for they, who have courage and generosity in them, according to this hypothesis, would never submit to such sneaking terms of equality and subjection, but venture for dominion; and resolve either to win the saddle, or lose the horse. Here therefore do our atheistical politicians plainly dance round in a circle; they first deriving the obligation of civil laws, from that of covenants, and then that of covenants from the laws of nature; and lastly, the obligation both of these laws of nature, and of covenants themselves, again, from the law, command, and sanction of the civil sovereign; without which neither of them would at all oblige. And thus is it manifest, how vain the attempts of these politicians are, to make justice artificially, when there is no such thing naturally; (which is indeed no less than to make something out of nothing)

thing) and by art to confociate into bodies politick those, whom nature had diffociated from one another; a thing as impossible, as to tie knots in the wind or water; or to build up a stately palace or castle out of sand. Indeed the ligaments, by which these politicians would tie the members of their huge Leviathan, or artificial man together, are not so good as cobwebs; they being really nothing, but meer will and words: for if authority and sovereignty be made only by will and words, then is it plain, that by will and words they may be unmade again at pleasure.

Neither indeed are these atheistick politicians themselves altogether unaware hereof, that this their artificial justice and obligation can be no firm vinculum of a body politick, to confociate those together, and unite them into one, who are naturally diffociated and divided from one another; they acknowledging, that *covenants without the sword, being but words and breath, are of no strength to hold the members of their Leviathan, or body politick together.* Wherefore, they plainly betake themselves at length from art to force and power, and make their civil sovereign really to reign only in fear¹. And this must needs be their meaning, when they so constantly declare all obligation, just and unjust, to be derived only from law; they by law there understanding a *command directed to such as by reason of their imbecillity are not able to resist*: so that the will and command of the more powerful obliges by the fear of punishment threatned². Now, if the only real obligation to obey civil laws be from the fear of punishment, then could no man be obliged to hazard his life for the safety of his prince and country; and they, who could reasonably promise themselves impunity, would be altogether disobliged, and consequently might justly break any laws, for their own advantage. An assertion so extravagant, that these confounded politicians themselves are ashamed plainly to own it, and therefore disguise it, what, they can by equivocation; themselves sometimes also confessing so much of truth, that *Pœna non obligat, sed obligatum tenet*³, *punishment does not oblige, but only hold those to their duty, who were before obliged.* Furthermore, what is made by power and force only, may be unmade by power and force again. If civil sovereigns reign only in the fear of their own sword, then is that right of theirs so much talked of, indeed nothing else but might, and their authority, force; and consequently successful and prosperous rebellion, and whatsoever can be done by power, will be *ipso facto* thereby justified. Lastly, were civil sovereigns, and bodies politick, meer violent and contra-natural things, then would they all quickly vanish into nothing, because nature will prevail against force and violence; whereas men constantly every where fall into political order, and the corruption of one form of government is but the generation of another.

Wherefore, since it is plain, that sovereignty and bodies politick can neither be meerly artificial, nor yet violent things, there must of necessity be some natural bond or vinculum to hold them together, such as may both really oblige subjects to obey the lawful commands of sovereigns, and so-

5 Y 2

vereigns

¹ Hobbes, Leviathan, Cap. XV I.² Id. ibid. Cap. XIV. §. II.³ Id. Element. de Cive, Cap. XV. §. V.

vereigns in commanding to seek the good and welfare of their subjects; whom these atheistical politicians, (by their infinite and belluine right) quite discharge from any such thing. Which bond or vinculum can be no other than natural justice; and something of a common and publick, of a cementing and conglutinating nature, in all rational beings; the original of both which is from the Deity. The right and authority of God himself is founded in justice; and of this is the civil sovereignty also a certain participation. It is not the meer creature of the people, and of men's wills, and therefore annihilable again by their wills at pleasure; but hath a stamp of divinity upon it, as may partly appear from hence, because that *ius vite & necis*, that *power of life and death*, which civil sovereigns have, was never lodged in singulars, before civil society; and therefore could not be conferred by them. Had not God and nature made a city; were there not a natural conciliation of all rational creatures, and subjection of them to the Deity, as their head (which is Cicero's¹, *Una civitas deorum atque hominum, one city of gods and men*) had not God made *ἄρχον ἢ ἀρχεῖται*, *ruling and being ruled*, superiority and subjection, with their respective duty and obligation; men could neither by art, or political enchantment, nor yet by force, have made any firm cities or polities. The civil sovereign is no Leviathan, no beast, but a God, (*I have said ye are gods*²;) he reigns not in meer brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and in the right and authority of God himself. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that there is need of force and fear too, to constrain those to obedience, to whom the conscience of duty proveth ineffectual. Nor is the fear of the civil sovereign's own sword alone sufficient for this neither, unassisted by religion, and the fear of an invisible Being omnipotent, who seeth all things, and can punish secret, as well as open transgressors, both in this life, and after death. Which is a thing so confessedly true, that Atheists have therefore pretended religion to have been at first a meer political figment. We conclude therefore, that the civil sovereign reigneth not, merely in the fear of his own power and sword; but first in the justice, and authority, and then in the power and fear also of God Almighty. And thus much for the first atheistical pretence, from the interest of civil sovereigns.

To their second, that sovereignty is essentially infinite, and therefore altogether inconsistent with religion, that would limit and confine it, we reply; that the right and authority of civil sovereigns is not, as these our atheistical politicians ignorantly suppose, a meer belluine liberty, but it is a right essentially founded in the being of natural justice, as hath been declared. For authority of commanding is such a right, as supposes obligation in others to obey, without which it could be nothing but meer will and force. But none can be obliged in duty to obey, but by natural justice; commands, as such, not creating obligation, but presupposing it. For, if persons were not before obliged to obey, no commands would signify any thing to them. Wherefore, the first original obligation is not from will, but nature. Did obligation to the things of natural justice, as many suppose, arise from the will and positive command of God;

¹ De Natur. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. LXII. p. 3043. Tom. IX. Oper.

² Psalm lxxxii. 6.

only by reason of punishments threatened, and rewards promised; the consequence of this would be, that no man was good and just, but only by accident, and for the sake of something else; whereas the goodness of justice or righteousness is intrinsic to the thing itself, and this is that, which obligeth, (and not any thing foreign to it) it being a different species of good from that of appetite, and private utility, which every man may dispense withal. Now there can be no more infinite justice, than there can be an infinite rule, or an infinite measure. Justice is essentially a determinate thing; and therefore can there not be an infinite *jus*, right or authority. If there be any thing in its own nature just and obliging, or such, as ought to be done; then must there of necessity be something unjust, or unlawful, which therefore cannot be obligingly commanded by any authority whatsoever. Neither ought this to be thought any impeachment of civil authority, it extending universally to all, even to that of the Deity itself. The right and authority of God himself, who is the supreme sovereign of the universe, is also in like manner bounded and circumscribed by justice. God's will is ruled by his justice, and not his justice ruled by his will; and therefore God himself cannot command, what is in its own nature unjust. And thus have we made it evident, that infinite right and authority of doing and commanding any thing without exception, so that the arbitrary will of the commander should be the very rule of justice itself to others, and consequently might oblige to any thing, is an absolute contradiction, and a non-entity; it supposing nothing to be in its own nature just or unjust; which if there were not, there could be no obligation nor authority at all. Wherefore the Atheists, who would flatter civil sovereigns with this infinite right, as if their will ought to be the very rule of justice and conscience, and, upon that pretence, prejudice them against religion, do as ill deserve of them, as of religion hereby; they indeed absolutely divesting them of all right and authority, and leaving them nothing, but meer brutish force and belluine liberty. And could civil sovereigns utterly demolish and destroy conscience and religion in the minds of men, (which yet is an absolute impossibility) they thinking thereby to make elbow-room for themselves, they would certainly bury themselves also in the ruins of them. Nevertheless, thus much is true; That they, in whom the sovereign legislative power of every polity is lodged, (whether single persons, or assemblies;) they, who make civil laws, and can reverse them at pleasure, though they may unquestionably sin against God, in making unjust laws, yet can they not sin politically or civilly, as violators or transgressors of those laws cancelled and reversed by them, they being superiour to them. Nor is this all; but these sovereign legislative powers may be said to be absolute also in another sense, as being *ἀνωκενόν*, *unjudicable*, or unaccountable by any human court; because, if they were so obnoxious, then would that court or power, which had a right to judge and censure them, be superiour to them; which is contrary to the hypothesis. And then, if this power were again judicable by some other, there must either be an infinite progress, or endless circulation, (a thing not only absurd, but also utterly inconsistent with government and property; because, there being no ultimate judgment unappealable from, there could never be any final

determinations.

determination of controversies;) or else at last, all must be devolved to the multitude of singulars, which would be a dissolution of the body politick, and a state of anarchy. And thus have we fully confuted the second atheistical pretence also, for the *inconsistency of religion with civil sovereignty*.

Their third and last follows; *That private judgment of good and evil is contradictory to civil sovereignty, and a body politick, this being one artificial man, that must be all governed by one reason and will.* But conscience is private judgment of good and evil, lawful and unlawful, &c. To which we reply, That it is not religion, but, on the contrary, the principles of these atheistical politicians, that unavoidably introduce private judgment of good and evil, such as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty; there being, according to them, nothing in nature of a publick or common good, nothing of duty or obligation, but all private appetite and utility, of which also every man is judge for himself. For if this were so, then, whenever any man judged it most for his private utility to disobey laws, rebel against sovereigns, nay, to poison or stab them, he would be unquestionably bound by nature, and the reason of his own good, as the highest law, to do the same. Neither can these atheistical politicians be ever able to bring men out of this state of private good, judgment and will, which is natural to them, by any artificial tricks and devices, or meer enchantments of words, as *artificial justice*, and an *artificial man*, and a *common person and will*, and a *publick conscience*, and the like. Nay, it is observable, that themselves are necessitated, by the tenour of these their principles, casuistically to allow such private judgment and will, as is altogether inconsistent with civil sovereignty; as, that any man may lawfully resist in defence of his own life; and that they, who have once rebelled, may afterwards justly defend themselves by force. Nor indeed can this private judgment of men, according to their appetite and utility, be possibly otherwise taken away, than by natural justice, which is a thing not of a private, but of a publick and common nature; and by conscience, that obligeth to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, though contrary to men's appetites and private interest. Wherefore conscience also is, in itself, not of a private and partial, but of a publick and common nature; it respecting divine laws, impartial justice and equity, and the good of the whole, when clashing with our own selfish, good, and private utility. This is the only thing, that can naturally confociate mankind together, lay a foundation for bodies politick, and take away that private will and judgment, according to men's appetite and utility, which is inconsistent with the same; agreeably to that of *Plato's* ¹, τὸ κοινὸν συνδέει, τὸ ἴδιον δισπάζει, That, *which is of a common and publick nature, unites; but that, which is of a private, segregates and dissociates.* It is true indeed, that particular persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves, (a publick conscience being nonsense and ridiculous,) and that they may also err therein: yet is not the rule neither, by which conscience judgeth, private; nor itself unaccountable, unless in such mistaken fanaticks, as professedly follow private impulses; but either the natural and eternal laws of God, or else his revealed will, things more publick

¹ De Legib. Lib. IX. p. 660.

lick than the civil laws of any country, and of which others also may judge. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that evil persons may, and do sometimes make a pretence of conscience and religion, in order to sedition and rebellion, as the best things may be abused; but this is not the fault of religion, but only of the men; conscience obliging, though first to obey God, yet, in subordination to him, the laws of civil sovereigns also. To conclude, conscience and religion oblige subjects actively to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, or legislative powers, though contrary to their own private appetite, interest, and utility; but, when these same sovereign legislative powers command unlawful things, conscience, though it here obliges to *obey God, rather than man*, yet does it, notwithstanding, oblige not to resist. *Rom. xiii. Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.* And *Matthew xxvi. All they, that take the sword, shall perish with the sword.* Here is the *patience and the faith of the saints.* And thus does religion give unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, as well as unto God the things that are God's.

And now, having fully confuted all the atheistical grounds, we confidently conclude, That the first original of all things was neither stupid and senseless matter fortuitously moved, nor a blind and nescient, but orderly and methodical plastick nature; nor a living matter, having perception or understanding natural, without animal sense or conscioulness; nor yet did every thing exist of itself necessarily from eternity, without a cause. But there is one only necessary existent, the cause of all other things; and this an absolutely perfect Being, infinitely good, wise, and powerful; who hath made all, that was fit to be made, and according to the best wisdom, and exerciseth an exact providence over all: whose name ought to be hal-
lowed, and separated from all other things; *To whom be all honour, and glory, and worship, for ever and ever. Amen.*

T H E E N D.

C O N T E N T S.

C H A P. I.

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VII. That the famous *Hippocrates* was neither an hylozoick nor Democritick Atheist, but rather an Heraclitick corporeal Theist. 109

VIII. That *Plato* took no notice of the hylozoick atheism, nor of any other, save what derives the original of all things from a meer fortuitous nature; and therefore either the Democritical, or the Anaximandrian atheism, which latter will be next declared. 110

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XII. Concluded from hence, that these Materialists in *Aristotle* were downright Atheists, not merely because they held all substance to be body, forai-

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XIII. And supposed every thing, besides the bare substance of matter, to be generable and corruptible; and consequently, that there could be no other God, than such as was native and mortal. That those ancient theologers and theogonists, who generated all the gods out of Night and Chaos without exception, were only verbal Theists, but real Atheists; senseless matter being to them the highest Numen. *ibid.*

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XX. That *Aristotle's* atheistical Materialists were indeed all the first Ionick philosophers before *Anaxagoras*, *Thales* being the head of them. But that *Thales* being acquitted from this imputation of atheism by several good authors, his next successor, *Anaximander*, is rather to be accounted the *ἀρχηγός*, or prince of this atheistical philosophy. *ibid.*

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XXVIII. Possible, that some in all ages might have entertained this atheistical conceit, that all things are dispensed by one regular and methodical senseless nature; nevertheless it seemeth to have been chiefly asserted by certain spurious Heracliticks and Stoicks. Upon which account this cosmo-plastick atheism may be called pseudo-Zenonian. 133

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XXXII. That they are but meer bunglers at atheism, who talk of sensitive and rational matter specifically differing. And that the canting astrological Atheists are not at all considerable, because not understanding themselves. 137

XXXIII. Another distribution of atheisms, that they either derive the original of all things from a merely fortuitous principle, and the unguided motion of matter; or else from a plastick, regular, and methodical, but senseless nature. What Atheists denied the eternity of the world, and what asserted it. 138

XXXIV. That of these four forms of atheism, the Atomick or Democritical, and the Hylozoick or Stratonical, are the principal: which two being once confuted, all atheism will be confuted. 142

XXXV. These two forms of atheism being contrary to each other, that we ought in all reason to insist rather, upon the atomick: nevertheless we shall elsewhere confute the hylozoick also; and further prove against all Corporealists, that no cogitation nor life can belong to matter. 145

XXXVI. That in the mean time, we shall not neglect the other forms of atheism, but confute them all together, as they agree in one principle. As also, by way of digression here insist largely upon the plastick life of nature, in order to a fuller confutation, as well of the hylozoick, as the cosmo-plastick atheism. 146

1. That these two forms of atheism, are not therefore condemned by us, merely because they suppose a life of nature, distinct from the animal life:

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however this be a thing altogether exploded by some professed Theists, therein symbolizing too much with the Democritick Atheists. Page 146

2. That if no plastick artificial nature be admitted, then one of these two things must be concluded; that either all things come to pass by fortuitous mechanism or material necessity (the motion of matter unguided) or else that God doth ἀνεργεῖν ἀπ᾿αυτῶν, do all things himself immediately and miraculously; framing the body of every gnat and fly, as it were, with his own hands: forasmuch as divine laws and commands cannot execute themselves, nor be alone the proper efficient causes of things in nature. 147

3. To suppose the former of these, that all things come to pass fortuitously, by the unguided motion of matter, and without the direction of any Mind, a thing altogether as irrational as impious; there being many phænomena both above the mechanick powers, and contrary to the laws thereof. That the mechanick Theists make God but an idle spectator of the fortuitous motions of matter, and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant. *Aristotle's* judicious censure of this fortuitous mechanism, and his derision of that conceit, that material and mechanical reasons are the only philosophical. 148

4. That it seems neither decorous in respect of God, nor congruous to reason, that he should ἀνεργεῖν ἀπ᾿αυτῶν, do all things himself immediately and miraculously, without the subserviency of any natural causes. This further confuted from the slow and gradual process of things in nature, as also from those errors and bangles, that are committed, when the matter proves inept and contumacious; which argue the agent not to be irresistible. 149

5. Reasonably inferred from hence, that there is an artificial or plastick na-

ture in the universe, as a subordinate instrument of divine providence, in the orderly disposal of matter: but not without a higher providence also presiding over it; forasmuch as this plastick nature cannot act electively or with discretion. Those laws of nature concerning motion, which the mechanick Theists themselves suppose, really nothing else, but a plastick nature, or spermatick reasons. 150

6. The agreeableness of this doctrine with the sentiments of the best philosophers of all ages. *Anaxagoras*, though a professed Theist, severely censured both by *Plato* and *Aristotle* as an encourager of atheism, merely because he used material and mechanical causes, more than mental and final. Physiologers and astronomers, for the same reason also, vulgarly suspected of atheism in *Plato's* time. 151

7. The plastick artificial nature no occult quality, but the only intelligible cause of that, which is the grandest of all phænomena, the orderly regularity and harmony of things; which the mechanick Theists, however pretending to solve all phænomena, give no account of. A God or infinite Mind asserted by these, in vain and to no purpose. 154

8. Two things here to be performed; to give an account of the plastick artificial nature; and then, to show how the notion thereof is mistaken and abused by Atheists. The first general account of this nature according to *Aristotle*, that it is to be conceived as art it self acting inwardly and immediately upon the matter; as if harmony living in the musical instruments should move the strings thereof without any external impulse. 155

9. Two pre-eminences of nature above human art; first, that whereas human art acts upon the matter without, cumberfomely or moliminously, and in a way of tumult or hurlyburly;

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nature, acting upon the same from within more commandingly, doth its work easily, cleverly and silently. Human art acteth on matter mechanically, but nature vitally and magically.

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10. The second pre-eminence of nature, that whereas human artists are often to seek and at a loss, anxiously consult and deliberate, and upon second thoughts mend their former work; nature is never to seek or unresolved what to do, nor doth she ever repent of what she hath done, and thereupon correct her former course. Human artists themselves consult not as artists, but always for want of art; and therefore nature, though never consulting nor deliberating, may notwithstanding act artificially and for ends. Concluded, that what is by us called Nature, is really the divine art.

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11. Nevertheless, that nature is not the divine art pure and abstract, but concreted and embodied in matter: the Divine art not archetypal but ectypal. Nature differs from the Divine art or wisdom, as the manuary officer from the architect.

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12. Two imperfections of nature, in respect whereof it falls short of human art. First, that though it act for ends artificially, yet it self neither intends those ends, nor understands the reason of what it doth; for which cause it cannot act electively. The difference betwixt spermatick reasons and knowledge. That nature doth but ape or mimick the divine art or wisdom; being it self not master of that reason, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging executioner thereof.

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13. Proved, that there may be such a thing as acteth artificially, though it self do not comprehend that art and

reason, by which its motions are governed. First from musical habits; the dancer resembles the artificial life of nature.

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14. The same further evinced from the instincts of brute animals, directing them to act rationally and artificially, in order to their own good and the good of the universe, without any reason of their own. These instincts in brutes but passive impresses of the divine wisdom, and a kind of fate upon them.

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15. The second imperfection of nature, that it acteth without animal phancy, *συναίσθησις*, *con-sense*, or *consciousness*, and hath no express self-perception and self-enjoyment.

ibid.

16. Whether this energy of the plastick nature be to be called cogitation or no, nothing but a logomachy, or contention about words. Granted, that what moves matter vitally, must needs do it by some energy of its own, distinct from local motion; but that there may be a simple vital energy, without that duplicity, which is in synæsthesis, or clear and express consciousness. Nevertheless, that the energy of nature may be called a certain drousy, unawakened, or astonished cogitation.

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17. Several instances, which render it probable, that there may be a vital energy without synæsthesis, clear and express con-sense or consciousness.

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18. Wherefore the plastick nature, acting neither knowingly nor phantastically, must needs act fatally, magically and sympathetically. The divine laws and fate, as to matter, not meer cogitation in the mind of God, but an energetick and effectual principle in it. And this plastick nature, the true and proper fate of matter, or of the corporeal world. What magick is, and that nature, which acteth fatally, acteth

also

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also magically and sympathetically.

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19. That nature, though it be the divine art, or fate, yet for all that, is neither a god, nor goddess, but a low and imperfect creature, it acting artificially and rationally, no otherwise than compounded forms of letters, when printing coherent philosophick sense; nor for ends, than a saw or hatchet in the hands of a skilful mechanick. The plastick and vegetative life of nature, the lowest of all lives, and inferior to the sensitive. A higher providence, than that of the plastick nature, governing the corporeal world it self. *ibid.*

20. Notwithstanding which, forasmuch as the plastick nature is a life, it must needs be incorporeal. One and the self-same thing having in it an entire model and platform of the whole, and acting upon several distant parts of matter, cannot be a body. And though *Aristotle* himself do no where declare this nature to be either corporeal or incorporeal, (which he neither clearly doth concerning the rational soul) and his followers commonly take it to be corporeal; yet, according to the genuine principles of that philosophy, must it needs be otherwise. 165

21. The plastick nature being incorporeal, must either be a lower power lodged in souls, which are also conscious, sensitive or rational; or else a distinct substantial life by it self, and inferior soul. That the Platonists affirm both; with *Aristotle's* agreeable determination; that nature is either part of a soul, or not without soul. *ibid.*

22. The plastick nature, as to the bodies of animals, a part, or lower power, of their respective souls. That the phenomena prove a plastick nature or *archeus* in animals; to make which a di-

stinct thing from the soul, would be to multiply entities without necessity. The soul endued with a plastick nature, the chief formatrix of its own body, the contribution of other causes not excluded. Page 166

23. That, besides the plastick in particular animals, forming them as so many little worlds, there is a general plastick or artificial nature in the whole corporeal universe, which likewise, according to *Aristotle*, is either a part and lower power of a conscious mundane soul, or else something depending thereon. 167

24. That no less according to *Aristotle*, than *Plato* and *Socrates*, our selves partake of life from the life of the universe, as well as we do of heat and cold from the heat and cold of the universe. From whence it appears, that *Aristotle* also held the world's animation, which is further undeniably proved. An answer to two the most considerable places in that philosopher objected to the contrary. That *Aristotle's* first immoveable mover was no soul, but a perfect intellect abstract from matter, which he supposed to move only as a final cause, or as being loved; and besides this, a mundane soul and plastick nature to move the heavens efficiently. Neither *Aristotle's* nature nor mundane soul the supreme Deity. However, though there be no such mundane soul, as both *Plato* and *Aristotle* conceived, yet may there be, notwithstanding, a plastick or artificial nature depending upon a higher intellectual principle. 168

25. No impossibility of other particular plasticks: and though it be not reasonable to think every plant, herb and pile of grass, to have a plastick or vegetative soul of its own, nor the earth to be an animal; yet may there

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possibly be one plastick artificial nature presiding over the whole terraqueous globe, by which vegetables may be severally organized and framed, and all things performed, which transcend the power of fortuitous mechanism. Page 171

26. Our second undertaking, which was to show, how grossly those Atheists (who acknowledge this artificial plastick nature, without animality,) misunderstand it, and abuse the notion, to make a counterfeit God Almighty, or Numen of it; to the exclusion of the true Deity. First, in their supposing that to be the first and highest principle of the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives, a thing as essentially derivative from, and dependent upon, a higher intellectual principle, as the echo on the original voice. Secondly, in their making sense and reason in animals to emerge out of a senseless life of nature, by the meer modification and organization of matter. That no duplication of corporeal organs can ever make one single unconscious life to advance into redoubled consciousness and self-enjoyment. Thirdly, in attributing (some of them) perfect knowledge and understanding to this life of nature, which yet themselves suppose to be devoid of all animal sense and consciousness. Lastly, in making this plastick life of nature to be merely corporeal; the hylozoists contending, that it is but an inadequate conception of body as the only substance, and fondly dreaming, that the vulgar notion of a God is nothing but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole universe, mistaken for an entire substance by it self the cause of all things. And thus far the digression. 172

XXXVIII. That though the confutation of the atheistical grounds, accord-

ing to the laws of method, ought to have been reserved for the last part of this discourse, yet we, having reason to violate those laws, crave the reader's pardon for this preposterousness. A considerable observation of *Plato's*, *That it is not only gross sensuality, which inclines men to atheize, but also an affectation of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind. As likewise, that the Atheists making such pretence to wit, it is a seasonable and proper undertaking, to evince, that they fumble in all their ratiocinations.* And we hope to make it appear, that the Atheists are no conjurers; and that all forms of atheism are nonsense and impossibility. Page 174

CHAP. IV.

The idea of God declared, in way of answer to the first atheistical argument; and the grand objection against the naturality of this idea (as essentially including unity or oneness in it) from the Pagan polytheism, removed. Proved, that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one supreme Deity. A fuller explication of whose polytheism and idolatry intended; in order to the better giving an account of Christianity.

I. **T**HE either stupid insensibility, or gross impudence of Atheists, in denying the Word of God to have any signification; or that there is any other idea answering to it, besides the meer phantasm of the sound. The disease called by the philosopher *Ἀπαισιμασία τῶ νοητικῶν*, the petrification, or dead insensibility of the mind. 192

II. That the Atheists themselves must needs have an idea of God in their minds, or otherwise, when they deny

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deny his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. That they have also the same idea of him in general with the Theists; the one denying the very same thing, which the others affirm Page 194

III. A lemma, or preparatory proposition to the idea of God, That though some things be made or generated, yet it is not possible, that all things should be made, but something must of necessity exist of it self from eternity unmade, and be the cause of those other things, that are made. *ibid.*

IV. The two most opposite opinions concerning what was self-existent from eternity, or unmade, and the cause of all other things made; one, that it was nothing but senseless matter, the most imperfect of all things. The other, that it was something most perfect, and therefore consciously intellectual. The asserters of this latter opinion, Theists, in a strict and proper sense; of the former, Atheists. So that the idea of God in general is, a perfect consciously understanding Being (or Mind,) self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things. 194, 195

V. Observable, that the Atheists, who deny a God, according to the true Idea of him, do notwithstanding often abuse the word, calling senseless matter by that name; they meaning nothing else thereby but only a first principle, or self-existent, unmade thing: according to which notion of the word God, there can be no such thing at all as an Atheist, no man being able to persuade himself, that all things sprung from nothing. 195

VI. In order to a more punctual declaration of this divine idea, the opinion of those taken notice of, who suppose two self-existent, unmade principles, God and Matter: according to which, God, not the Principle of all things, nor the sole Principle, but only the chief. 196, 197

VII. These Materialians, imperfect and mistaken Theists. Not Atheists, because they suppose the world made and governed by an animalish, sentient and understanding nature; whereas no Atheists acknowledge conscious Animality to be a first principle, but conclude it to be all generable and corruptible: nor yet genuine Theists, because they acknowledge not omnipotence in the full extent thereof. A latitude therefore in theism; and none to be condemned for absolute Atheists, but such as deny an eternal, unmade Mind, the framer and governor of the whole world. 198,

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VIII. An absolutely perfect Being, the most compendious idea of God: which includeth in it, not only necessary existence, and conscious intellectuality, but also omni-causality, omnipotence, or infinite power. Wherefore God the sole Principle of all things and Cause of matter. The true notion of infinite power. And that Pagans commonly acknowledge omnipotence, or infinite power, to be included in the idea of God. 200, 201

IX. That absolute perfection implies yet something more than knowledge and power. A vaticination in men's minds of a higher good than either. That, according to *Aristotle*, God is better than knowledge; and hath morality in his nature, wherein also his chief happiness consisteth. This borrowed from *Plato*, to whom the highest Perfection, and supreme Deity, is goodness it self, substantial, above Knowledge and Intellect. Agreeably with which, the Scripture makes God, and the supreme Good, Love. This not to be understood of a soft, fond, and partial love; God being rightly called also an impartial Law, and the Measure of all things. Atheists also suppose goodness to be included in the idea of that God, whose existence they deny.

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deny. This Idea here more largely declared. Page 202, 203, &c.

X. That this forementioned idea of God essentially includeth unity, oneliness, or solitariness in it; since there cannot possibly be more than one absolutely Supreme, one Cause of all things, one Omnipotent, and one infinitely Perfect. *Epicurus* and his followers professedly denied a God, according to this notion of him. 207

XI. The grand objection against the idea of God, as thus essentially including oneliness and singularity in it, from the polytheism of all nations formerly, (the Jews excepted) and of all the wisest men, and philosophers. From whence it is inferred, that this idea of God is not natural, but artificial, and owes its original to laws and arbitrary institutions only. An enquiry therefore here to be made concerning the true sense of the Pagan polytheism; the objectors securely taking it for granted, that the Pagan polytheists universally asserted many, unmade, self-existent, intellectual beings and independent deities, as so many partial causes of the world. 208, 209.

XII. The irrationality of which opinion, and its manifest repugnancy to the phænomena, render it less probable to have been the belief of all the Pagan Polytheists. 210

XIII. That the Pagan deities were not all of them universally look'd upon as so many unmade, self-existent beings, unquestionably evident from hence; because they generally held a *Theogonia*, or generation of gods. This point of the Pagan theology insisted upon by *Herodotus*, the most ancient profane Greek writer. In whom the meaning of that Question, *Whether the gods were generated or existed all from eternity*, seems to have been the same with this of *Plato's*, *Whether the world were made or unmade*. 211

Certain also, that amongst the Hæliodan gods, there was either but one self-existent, or else none at all. *Hæliodorus's* Love supposed to be the eternal God, or the active Principle of the universe. 212

That the Valentinian thirty gods, or *Æons* (having the greatest appearance of independent deities) were all derived from one self-originated Being, called *Bythus*, or an unfathomable Depth. 213

That, besides the Manichæans, some Pagans did indeed acknowledge a ditheism, or duplicity of unmade gods, one the principle of good, the other of evil. (Which the nearest approach, that can be found, to the supposed polytheism.) *Plutarchus Chæronensis* one or the chief of these, though not so commonly taken notice of by learned men. His reasons for this opinion proposed. 213, &c.

Plutarch's pretence, that this was the general persuasion of all the ancient philosophers and Pagan nations. His grounds for imputing it to *Plato* examined and confuted. 218, &c.

The true account of the Platonick origin of evils, from the necessity of imperfect things. 220

Pythagoras, and other philosophers, purged likewise from this imputation. 221

That the Egyptians probably did but personate evil, (the confusion, and alternate vicissitude of things in this lower world,) by *Typhon*. The only question concerning the *Arimanius* of the Persian Magi. This, whether a self-existent principle, or no, disputed. 222

Plutarch and *Alicius* the only professed asserters of this doctrine among the Greek philosophers; (besides *Nume-nius in Chalcidius*;) who therefore probably the persons censured for it by *Athenæus*. 223, 224

Aristotle's explosion and confutation of *τὰλλα ἄρχα*, many principles. 225

That a better judgment may be made of

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of the Pagan deities, a general survey of them. They all reduced to five heads; The souls of men deceased, or heroes, the animated stars and elements, daemons, accidents and things of nature personated; and lastly, several personal names given to one supreme God, according to the several manifestations of his power and providence in the world; mistaken, for so many substantial deities, or self-existent minds. 226, &c.

Pagans acknowledging omnipotence, must needs suppose one sovereign *Numen*. *Faustus* the Manichæan, his conceit, that the Jews and Christians paganized in the opinion of monarchy. With *St. Austin's* judgment of the Pagans thereupon. 231, 232

XIV. Concluded, that the Pagan polytheism must be understood of created, intellectual beings, superiour to men, religiously worshipped. So that the Pagans held both many gods, and one God, in different senses; many inferiour deities subordinate to one Supreme. Thus *Onatus* the Pythagorean, in *Stoebæus*. The Pagans Creed in *Maximus Tyrius*; *One God the King and Father of all, and many gods the sons of gods*. The Pagan Theogonia thus to be understood, of many gods produced by one God. 233, 234

This Pagan Theogonia really one and the same thing with the Cosmogonia. *Plato's* Cosmogonia a Theogonia, 234, &c.

Hesiod's Theogonia the Cosmogonia. 238

The Persians and Egyptians in like manner, holding a Cosmogonia, called it a Theogonia. 239

This Pagan Theogonia, how by some mistaken. *ibid.*

Both this Theogonia and Cosmogonia of the ancient Pagans to be understood of a temporary production. *ibid.*

That *Plato* really asserted the newness or beginning of the world. 240, 241

Amongst the Pagans, two sorts of

Theogonists, atheistical and divine. *Plato* a divine Theogonist. 242, 243

Other Pagan Theogonists, Theists, or asserters of an unmade Deity. 244, 245, &c.

These divine Theogonists also made Chaos and Night senior to the Gods; that is, to the generated ones. 248

The Orphick *Cabala* of the world's production from Chaos (or Night) and Love; originally Mosaiical. 249

Other Pagan Theists neither Theogonists, nor Cosmogonists; they holding the eternity of the world, and of the gods: as *Aristotle* and the junior Platonists. 250, &c.

These notwithstanding acknowledged all their eternal gods save one, to be γεννῆσι, that is, *to have been derived from that One*; and that there was, in this sense, but εἰς Θεὸς ἀγέννητος, *one only unmade, or self-existent God*. 253, 254

Necessary here to shew, how the Pagans did put a difference betwixt the one supreme, unmade Deity, and their other many inferiour generated gods. 255

This done, both by proper names, and appellatives emphatically used. 256, &c.

Θεοί, or *gods*, often put for inferiour gods only, in way of distinction from the Supreme. 261

Τὸ Θεῖον and Το Δικιμόνιον also the supreme Deity. 263

Other full and emphatical descriptions of the supreme God, amongst the Pagans. 264, 265

XV. Further evidence of this, that the intelligent Pagan Polytheists held only a plurality of inferiour deities subordinate to one Supreme. First, because after the emersion of Christianity, and its contest with Paganism, no Pagan ever asserted many independent Deities, but all professed to acknowledge one Sovereign, or Supreme. 265

Apollonius Tyanæus, set up amongst the Pagans for a rival with our Saviour Christ, 266, &c.

He,

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He, though styled by *Vespiscus* a true friend of the gods, and though a stout champion for the Pagan polytheism, yet a professed acknowledger of one supreme Deity. Page 269, 270

Celsus the first publick writer against Christianity, and a zealous Polytheist; notwithstanding freely declareth for one first and greatest omnipotent God. *ibid.*

The next and most eminent champion for the Pagan cause, *Porphyrius*, an undoubted asserter of one supreme Deity. Who, in *Proclus*, not only opposeth that evil principle of *Plutarch* and *Atticus*, but also contendeth, that even matter it self was derived from one perfect Being. 271

Hierocles the next eminent antagonist of Christianity, and champion for the Pagan Gods, did, in the close of his *Philelethes*, (as we learn from *Lactantius*) highly celebrate the praises of the one supreme God, the parent of all things. 271, &c.

Julian, the emperor, a zealous contender for the restitution of Paganism, plainly derived all his Gods from one. 274, 275

This true of all the other opposers of Christianity, as *Jamblicus*, *Syrianus*, *Proclus*, *Simplicius*, &c. *Maximus Madurensis*, a Pagan philosopher in *St. Austin*, his profession of one sovereign *Numen* above all the Gods. The same also the sense of *Longinianus*. 275, 276

The Pagans in *Arnobius* universally disclaim the opinion of many unmade Deities, and profess the belief of an omnipotent God. 276, 277

These Pagans acknowledged by others of the fathers also, to have held one sovereign *Numen*. 279, &c.

But of this more afterwards, when we speak of the Arians.

XVI. That this was no refinement or interpolation of Paganism, made after Christianity, (as might be suspected) but

that the doctrine of the most ancient Pagan Theologers, and greatest promoters of polytheism, was consonant hereto; which will be proved from unsuspected writings. 281

Concerning the Sibylline Oracles, two extremes. 282, &c.

That *Zoroaster*, the chief promoter of polytheism in the East, professed the acknowledgment of one sovereign Deity, (and that not the sun neither, but the maker thereof) proved from *Eubulus* in *Porphyry*. 285, 286

Zoroaster's supreme God *Oromafdes*. 287

Of the Triplasian *Mitbras*. 288

The Magick, or Chaldaick Trinity. 289

The Zoroastrian Trinity, *Oromafdes*, *Mitbras*, and *Arimanes*. Thus the Persian *Arimanes* no substantial evil principle, or independent god. 290

Concerning the reputed Magick or Chaldaick Oracles. 292, 293

XVII. That *Orpheus*, commonly called by the Greeks the Theologer, and the father of the Grecanick polytheism, clearly asserted one supreme *Numen*. The history of *Orpheus* not a mere romance. 294, 295

Whether *Orpheus* were the Father of the poems called Orphical. 296, 297

Orpheus his polytheism. 298

That *Orpheus*, notwithstanding, asserted a divine monarchy, proved from Orphick Verses, recorded by Pagans: there being other Orphick Verses counterfeited. 300, 301

In what sense *Orpheus*, and other mystical Theologers amongst the Pagans, called God Ἄρρητόθεον, *Hermaphrodite*, or of both sexes, male and female together. 304

Orpheus his recantation of his polytheism a fable; he at the same time acknowledging both one unmade God, and many generated gods and goddesses. 305

That

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That besides the opinion of monarchy, a trinity of divine hypostases subordinate was also another part of the Orphick *Cabala*. *Orpheus* his trinity, *Phanes*, *Uranus*, and *Chronus*. Page 306

The grand arcanum of the Orphick theology, that *God is all things*; but in a different sense from the Stoicks. 306, Page 307

God's being all, made a foundation of Pagan polytheism and idolatry. 308

XVIII. That the Egyptians themselves, the most polytheistical of all nations, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity. The Egyptians the first Polytheists. That the Greeks and Europeans derived their gods from them, and, as *Herodotus* affirmeth, their very names too. A Conjecture, that Αἰνῶν of the Greeks was Νῆϋ or Νῆϋδῶν , the tutelar god of the city *Sais*; a colony whereof the Athenians are said to have been. And that *Neptune*, the Roman sea-god, was derived from the Egyptian *Nephibus*, signifying the *maritime parts*. Of the Egyptians worshipping brute animals. 309, 310

Notwithstanding this multifarious polytheism and idolatry of the Egyptians, that they had an acknowledgment of one supreme God, probable first, from that great fame, which they had for their wisdom. *Egypt* a school of literature before *Greece*. 311

The Egyptians, though attributing more antiquity to the world than they ought, yet of all nations the most constant asserters of the *Cosmogonia*, or novelty and beginning of the world: nor did they think the world to have been made by chance, as the Epicureans; *Simplicius* calling the *Mosaick* history of the creation an Egyptian fable. 312, 313

That besides the pure and mixt mathematicks, the Egyptians had another higher philosophy, appears from hence; because they were the first asserters of the

immortality and transmigration of souls, which *Pythagoras* from them derived into *Greece*. Certain therefore, that the Egyptians held incorporeal subsistence. Page 313, 314

That the Egyptians, besides their vulgar and fabulous, had another arcane and recondite Theology. Their *Spbinges*, and *Harpocrates*, or *Sigalions*, in their Temples. 314, 315

This arcane theology of the Egyptians concealed from the vulgar two manner of ways, by allegories and hieroglyphicks. This doubtless a kind of metaphysicks concerning God, as one perfect being, the original of all things. 316

An objection from *Cheremon* (cited by *Porphyrius*, in an epistle to *Acho*, an Egyptian Priest,) fully answered by *Jamblicus*, in the person of *Abammon*, in his Egyptian Mysteries. 317, 318

That monarchy was an essential part of the arcane and true theology of the Egyptians, may be proved from the *Trismegistick* Writings, though not at all genuine, (as the *Pemander*, and *Sermon in the Mount*, concerning regeneration;) because, though they had been all forged by Christians never so much, yet being divulged in those ancient times, they must needs have something of truth in them: this at least, That the Egyptians acknowledged one supreme Deity; or otherwise they would have been presently exploded. 319, 320

That *Casaubon*, from the detection of forgery in two or three at the most of these *Trismegistick* books, does not reasonably infer them to have been all Christian cheats: those also not excepted, that have been cited by ancient fathers, but since lost. 320, 321

That there was one *Theuth* or *Thoth*, (called by the Greeks *Hermes*) an inventor of letters and sciences amongst the ancient Egyptians, not reasonably to be doubted. Besides whom, there is

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said to have been a second *Hermes*, furnished named *Trismegist*, who left many volumes of philosophy and theology behind him, that were committed to the custody of the priests. Page 321, &c.

Other books also written by Egyptian priests, in several ages successively, called Hermaical, (as *Jamblicus* informeth us) because entitled (*pro more*) to *Hermes*, as the president of learning.

322

That some of those old Hermaick Books remained in the custody of the Egyptian priests, till the times of *Clement Alexandrinus*.

323

Hermaick Books taken notice of formerly, not only by Christians, but also by Pagans and philosophers. *Jamblicus* his testimony of them, that they did really contain Hermaical opinions, or Egyptian learning. Fifteen of these Hermaick Books published together at *Athens* before St. *Cyril's* time.

324, 325

All the philosophy of the present Hermaick Books not merely Grecanick, as *Cassaubon* affirmeth. That nothing periseth; old Egyptian philosophy, derived by *Pythagoras*, together with the transmigration of souls, into *Greece*.

326, 327

The *Asclepien Dialogue*, or *Perseet Oration*, (said to have been translated into *Latin* by *Apuleius*) vindicated from being a Christian forgery.

328

An answer to two objections made against it; the latter whereof from a prophecy taken notice of by St. *Austin*, That the temples of the Egyptian Gods should shortly be full of the sepulchres of dead men.

ibid.

Petavius his further suspicion of forgery, because, as *Lactantius* and St. *Austin* have affirmed, the Christian *Logos* is herein called a second God, and the first begotten Son of God. The answer, that *Lactantius* and St. *Austin* were clearly mistaken, this being there affirmed only of the visible and sensible world.

329, 330

That besides the *Asclepien Dialogue*, others of the present *Trismegistick* Books contain Egyptian doctrine. Nor can they be all proved to be spurious and counterfeit. This the rather insisted on, for the vindication of the ancient fathers.

Page 331, 332

Proved that the Egyptians, besides their many gods, acknowledged one first Supreme, and universal Deity, from the testimonies of *Plutarch*, *Horus Apollo*, *Jamblicus*, (affirming that *Hermes* derived all things, even matter it self, from one divine Principle) lastly of *Damascius* declaring, that the Egyptian philosophers at that time had found in the writings of the ancients, that they held one Principle of all things, praised under the name of the Unknown Darknes.

334, &c.

The same thing proved from their vulgar religion and theology; *Hammon* being a proper name for the supreme God amongst them; and therefore styled the Egyptian *Jupiter*.

337

Though this word *Hammon* were probably at first the same with *Ham* or *Chem* the son of *Noah*, yet will not this hinder, but that it might be used afterwards by the Egyptians for the supreme God.

338

The Egyptian God *Hammon* neither confined by them to the sun, nor to the corporeal world, but, according to the notation of the word in the Egyptian language, a hidden and invisible Deity. This farther confirmed from the testimony of *Jamblicus*.

339

This Egyptian *Hammon* more than once taken notice of in Scripture.

339,

340

That the Egyptians acknowledged one universal *Numen*, farther proved from that famous inscription upon the Saitick temple, *I am all, that was, is, and shall be, and my veil no mortal hath ever yet uncovered*. That this cannot be understood of senseless matter, nor of the corporeal universe, but of a divine Mind, or Wisdom, diffusing it self thorough all.

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The *peplum*, or *veil*, cast over the statue as well of the Saitick as Athenian *Minerva*, hieroglyphically signified the invisibility and incomprehensibility of the Deity which is veiled in its works. From what *Proclus* addeth to this inscription beyond *Plutarch*, *And the sun was the fruit which I produced*; evident, that this was a Demiurgical Deity, the creator of the sun and of the world. Page 341, 342

How that passage of *Hecatæus* in *Plutarch* is to be understood, *That the Egyptians supposed the first God and the universe to be the same*, viz. because the supreme Deity diffuseth it self thorough all things. $\Theta\epsilon\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\upsilon$ a name of God also amongst the Greek philosophers. 343

That *Pan*, to the Arcadians and other vulgar Greeks, was not the corporeal world, as senseless and inanimate, but as proceeding from an intellectual Principle diffuseth it self through all; from *Macrobius* and *Plorutus*. *Socrates* his prayer to *Pan*, as the supreme God, in *Plato's Phædrus*. 343, 344

Our Saviour Christ called the Great *Pan* by dæmons. 345

How the old Egyptian theology, that God is all things, is every where inscribed upon in the Trismegistick Writings. 346

That the supreme God was sometimes worshipped by the Egyptians under other proper, personal names, as *Ifts*, *Ofris* and *Serapis*, &c. 349, &c.

Recorded in *Eusebius*, from *Porphyrius*, that the Egyptians acknowledged one intellectual *Demiurgus*, or *Maker of the world*, under the name of *Cuepb*, whom they pictured, putting forth an Egg out of his mouth. This *Cuepb* said to have produced another God, whom the Egyptians called *Piba*, the Greeks, *Vulcan*, the Soul of the world, and artificial Plastick Nature. The testimony of *Plutarch*, that the Thebaites worshipped only one eternal and immortal God under this name of *Cuepb*. 412

Thus, according to *Apuleius*, the Egyptians worshipped one and the same supreme God, under many different names and notions. *ibid.*

Probable, that the Egyptians distinguished hypostases in the Deity also. *Kroberus* his Egyptian hieroglyphick of the trinity. An intimation in *Jamblichus* of an Egyptian trinity, *Eiffon*, *Emeph*, or *Hemphæta*, (which is the same with *Cuepb*;) and *Piba*. Page 413

The doctrine of God's being all, made by the Egyptians a foundation of polytheism and idolatry, they being led hereby to personate and deify the several parts of the world, and things of nature; (which, in the language of the *Asclepiæan Dialogue*, is to call God by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God,) the wise amongst them nevertheless understanding, that all was but one simple Deity, worshipped by piece-meal. This allegorically signified by *Ofris* his being dismembred and cut in pieces by *Typhon*, and then made up one again by *Ifts*. 354, 355

XIX. That the poets many ways deprav'd the Pagan theology, and made it to have a more Aristocratical appearance. 355, &c.

Notwithstanding which, they did not really assert many self-existent and independent Gods, but one only unmade; and all the rest generated or created. *Homer's* Gods not all eternal and unmade, but generated out of the ocean; that is, a watry Chaos. *Homer's* Theogonia, as well as *Hesiod's*, the Cosmogonia, and his generation of gods, the same thing with the production or creation of the world. 357, 358

Nevertheless, *Homer* distinguished, from all those generated gods, one unmade God, the father or creator of them and of the world. 359

Homer thus understood by the Pagans themselves, as *Plutarch*, *Proclus* and *Aristotle*. 359, 360

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Though *Hesiod's* gods, properly so called, were all of them generated, yet did he suppose also one unmade God, the maker of them, and of the world.

360, 361

Pindar likewise a divine Theogonist; an asserter of one unmade Deity (and no more) the cause of all things; yet nevertheless, of many generated gods, besides his one God to be worshipped far above all the other gods. Page 361, 362

The suspicion, which *Aristotle* sometime had of *Hesiod*, and *Plato* of *Homer*, seems to have proceeded from their not understanding that *Mosaick Cabala*, followed by them both, of the world's being made out of a watry Chaos. 362

That famous passage of *Sophocles*, concerning one God: the maker of heaven, earth and seas, (cited by so many ancient fathers) defended as genuine. 363

Clear places in the extant tragedies of *Euripides* to the same purpose; with other remarkable ones cited out of his now inextant tragedies: besides the testimonies of other Greek poets. 363, &c.

The consent of Latin poets also, in the monarchy of the whole. 365

XX. After the poets of the Pagans, their philosophers considered. That *Empiricus* was the only reputed philosopher, who pretending to acknowledge gods, yet professedly opposed monarchy, and verbally asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade deities, but such as had nothing to do either with the making or governing of the world. He therefore clearly to be reckoned amongst the Atheists. All the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, (a few Ditheists excepted) universally asserted a mundane monarchy.

369, 370

Pythagoras, a polytheist as much as the other Pagans; nevertheless a plain acknowledger of one supreme God, the maker of the universe. 371

Pythagoras his Dyad no evil god, or demon self-existent, as *Plutarch* supposed. 372

But this Dyad of his, whether matter or no, derived from a Monad. One simple Unity the cause of all things.

Page 372, 373

That *Pythagoras*, acknowledging a trinity of divine hypostases, did therefore sometimes describe God as a Monad, sometimes as a Mind, and sometimes as the Soul of the world. 373

The *Pythagorick* Monad and first God the same with the Orphick Love, senior to *Japhet* and *Saturn*, and the oldest of all the gods, a substantial thing. But that Love, which *Plato* would have to be the youngest of the gods, (the daughter of *Penia*, or *Indigency*, and a parturient thing,) nothing but a creaturely affection in souls, personated and deified. *Parmenides* his Love, the first created god, or lower soul of the world, before whose production, necessity is said to have reigned; that is, the necessity of material motions undirected for ends, and good. 374, 375

That *Pythagoras* called the supreme Deity not only a Monad, but a Tetrad, or Tetractys also. The reasons for this given from the mysteries in the number *Four*, trifling. More probability of a late conjecture, that the *Pythagorick* Tetractys was not the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, not altogether unknown to the *Hetrurians* and *Latins*. 375, 376

Xenophanes a plain asserter both of many gods, and of one God, called by him, One and All. *Simplcius* his clear testimony for this theosophy of *Xenophanes*, out of *Theophrastus*. *Xenophanes* misrepresented by *Aristotle*, as an asserter of a spherical corporeal god. 377, 378

Heraclitus, though a cloudy and confounded philosopher, and one who could not conceive of any thing incorporeal, yet both a hearty moralist, and a zealous asserter of one supreme Deity. 378, 379

The Ionick philosophers before *Anaxagoras*, being all of them Corporealists, and some of them Atheists; that

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Anaxagoras was the first, who asserted an incorporeal mind to be a principle, and though not the cause of matter, yet of motion, and of the regularity of things. The world, according to him, not eternal, but made, and out of pre-existent similar atoms; and that not by chance, but by Mind or God. This Mind of his purely incorporeal, as appeareth from his own words, cited by *Simplicius*. Page 380

Probable, that *Anaxagoras* admitted none of the inferiour Pagan gods. He condemned by the vulgar for an Atheist, because he ungodded the stars, denying their animation, and affirming the sun to be but a mass of fire, and the moon an earth. This disliked also by *Plato*, as that, which in those times would dispose men to Atheism. 381

Anaxagoras farther censured, both by *Plato* and *Aristotle*, because, though asserting mind to be a principle, he made much more use of material than of mental and final causes; which was looked upon by them as an atheistical tang in him. Nevertheless *Anaxagoras* a better Theist than those Christian philosophers of later times, who quite banish all mental causality from the world. 382, 383

XXI. *Parmenides* his acknowledgment of one God the cause of Gods. Which supreme Deity, by *Parmenides*, styled One-all immoveable. That this is not to be taken physically, but metaphysically and theologically; proved at large. The first principle of all, to these ancients, one, a simple unity or monad. This said to be all, because virtually containing all, and distributed into all; or because all things are distinctly displayed from it. Lastly, the same said to be immoveable, and indivisible, and without magnitude, to distinguish it from the corporeal universe. 383, &c.

Ἐν τῷ πᾶσι, One All, taken in different senses; by *Parmenides* and *Xenophanes*,

&c. divinely, for the supreme Deity, (one most simple Being, the original of all things;) but by others in *Aristotle* atheistically, as if all things were but one and the same matter diversly modified. But the One-all of these latter, not immoveable but moveable; it being nothing else but body: whereas the One-all immoveable is an incorporeal Deity. This does *Aristotle*, in his *Metaphysics*, close with, as good divinity. That there is one incorporeal immoveable principle of all things. *Simplicius* his observation, that though divers philosophers maintained a plurality or infinity of moveable principles, yet none ever asserted more than one immoveable. Page 385, 386

Parmenides in *Plato* distinguishes three divine hypostases, the first whereof called by him, ἐν τῷ πᾶσι, one all; the second, ἐν ᾧ πάντα, one all things; and the third, ἐν ᾗ πάντα, one and all things. 386, &c.

But that *Parmenides* by his One-all-immoveable really understood the supreme Deity, yet farther unquestionably evident from the verses cited out of him by *Simplicius*; wherein there is also attributed thereunto a standing eternity, or duration, different from that of time. 388

The only difference betwixt *Parmenides* and *Melissus*, that the former called his One-all-immoveable, finite; the latter, infinite; this in words rather than reality: one disagreeing agreement of these two philosophers fully declared by *Simplicius*. *Melissus* his language more agreeable with our present theology. Though *Anaximander's* Infinite were nothing but senseless matter, yet *Melissus* his Infinite was the true Deity. 389

That *Zeno Eleates*, by his One-all-immoveable, meant not the corporeal world neither, no more than *Melissus*, *Parmenides*, and *Xenophanes*; but the Deity, evident from *Aristotle*. *Zeno's* demon-

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demonstration of one God, from the idea of a most powerful and perfect being, in the same *Aristotle*. Page 390

Empedocles his first principle of all things, τὸ εἶ, or a unity likewise, besides which he supposed contention and friendship to be the principles of all created beings; not only plants, brutes, and men, but gods also. 391, &c.

Empedocles his original of all the evil both of human soul and dæmons, from this *νεῦμα*, *Discord* and *Contention*, together with the ill use of their liberty. 393

XXII. The doctrine of divers other Pythagoreans also the same; as *Philolaus*, *Archytas*, *Ocellus*, *Aristæus*, &c. *Timæus Locrus* his God the creator of gods. *Onatus* his many gods, and his one God, the *Corypheus* of the gods. *Euclides Megarensis* his one the very Good. *Antifihenes* his many popular gods, but one natural God. *Diogenes Sinopenfis* his God that filleth all things. 393, &c.

XXIII. That *Socrates* asserted one God, undeniable from *Xenophon*. 398,

399
But that he disclaimed all the other inferior gods of the Pagans, and died, as a martyr, for one only God, in this sense, a vulgar error. 400

What the impiety imputed to him by his adversaries, appeareth from *Plato's Euthyphro*, viz. that he freely and openly condemned those fables of the gods, wherein wicked and unjust actions were imputed to them. 401

That *Plato* really asserted one only God and no more, a vulgar error likewise; and that thirteenth epistle to *Dionysius*, wherein he declared himself to be serious, only when he began his epistles with God, and not with gods, (though extant in *Eusebius* his time,) spurious and supposititious. He worshipping the sun and other stars also

(supposed to be animated) as inferior gods. Page 402

Nevertheless, undeniably evident, that *Plato* was no polyarchist, but a monarchist, no asserter of many independent gods, or principles, but of one original of all things; one first God, one greatest God, one Maker of the world and of the gods. 403, 404

In what sense the supreme God, to *Plato*, the cause and producer of himself, (out of *Plotinus*;) and this notion not only entertained by *Seneca* and *Plotinus*, but also by *Laëtantius*, that *Plato* really asserted a Trinity of universal divine hypostases, that have the nature of principles. The first hypostasis in *Plato's* Trinity properly *ἀρχή*, the original Deity, the cause and king of all things: which also said by him to be ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐρᾱνης, or ὑπερέστιος, above essence. 407

Xenophon, though with other Pagans he acknowledged a plurality of gods, yet a plain asserter also of one supreme and universal Numen. 408

XXIV. *Aristotle* a frequent acknowledged of many gods. And whether he believed any dæmons or no, which he sometimes mentions (though sparingly) and insinuates them to be a kind of aerial animals, more immortal than men; yet did he unquestionably look upon the stars, or their intelligences, as gods. 408, &c.

Notwithstanding which, *Aristotle* doth not only often speak of God singularly, and of the divinity emphatically, but also professedly opposes that imaginary opinion of many independent principles, or unmade deities. He confuting the same from the phenomena or the compasses of the world, which is not *ἁπλοῦς*, but all uniform, and agreeably conspiring into one harmony. 410,

411
Aristotle's supreme Deity, the first immovable

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moveable mover. The difference here betwixt *Plato* and *Aristotle*; *Plato's* original of motion; a self-moving soul *Aristotle's* an immoveable mind. But this difference not so great as at first sight it seems; because *Aristotle's* immoveable Mind doth not move the heavens efficiently, but only finally, or as being loved. Besides which, he must needs suppose another immediate mover, which could be nothing but a soul of them. Page 412

Aristotle's immoveable Mind not only the cause of motion, but also of well and fit; all the order, pulchritude and harmony, that is in the world, called therefore by *Aristotle* the *separate good* thereof. This together with nature, (its subordinate instrument) the efficient cause of the whole mundane system: which however co eternal with it, yet is, in order of nature, junior to it. 413, 414

Aristotle and other ancients, when they affirm Mind to have been the cause of all things, understood it thus, that all things were made by an absolute wisdom, and after the best manner. The divine will, according to them, not a meer arbitrary, humourfome, and fortuitous thing, but decency and fitness it self. 415

From this passage of *Aristotle's*, that the Divinity is either God, or the work of God, evident, that he supposed all the gods to have been derived from one, and therefore his intelligences of the spheres. 415

That according to *Aristotle*, this speculation of the Deity constitutes a particular science by it self, distinct from physiology and geometry: the former whereof (physiology) is conversant about what was inseparable and moveable, the second (geometry) about things immoveable, but not really separable; but the third and last (which is theology) about that, which is both immoveable and separable, an incorporeal Deity. 416

Four chief points of *Aristotle's* theology or metaphysics, concerning God; first, that though all things are not eternal and unmade, yet something must needs be such, as likewise incorruptible, or otherwise all might come to nothing. Secondly, that God is an incorporeal substance, separate from sensibles, indivisible and devoid of parts and magnitude. Thirdly, that the divine intellect is the same with its intelligibles, or containeth them all within it self; because the divine mind, being senior to all things, and architectonical of the world, could not then look abroad for its objects without it self. The contrary to which supposed by Atheists. Lastly, that God being an immoveable substance, his act and energy is his essence; from whence *Aristotle* would infer the eternity of the world. Page 416, 417

Aristotle's creed and religion contained in these two articles, first, that there is a Divinity which comprehends the whole nature, or universe. And secondly, that besides this, there are other particular inferior gods; but that all other things, in the religion of the Pagans, were fabulously superadded herunto for political ends. 417

S. cyprianus, Xenocrates, and Theophrastus, monarchists. 418

XXV. The Stoicks no better metaphysicians than *Hieracitus*, in whose footsteps they trode, admitting of no incorporeal substance. The qualities of the mind also, to these Stoicks, bodies. 419, 420

But the Stoicks, not therefore Atheists; they supposing an eternal unmade Mind, (though lodged in matter) the maker of the whole mundane system. 420

The Stoical argumentations for a God not inconsiderable, and what they were. 421, 422

The Stoical god, not a meer plastick an.

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and metho'dical, but an intellectual fire. The world, according to them, not a plant, but animal; and *Jupiter* the soul thereof. From the supposed oneliness of which *Jupiter*, they would sometimes infer, the singularity of the world: *Platarch* on the contrary affirming, that though there were fifty, or an hundred worlds, yet would there be, for all that, but one *Zeus* or *Jupiter*.)

Page 423

Nevertheless the Stoicks as polytheistical as any sect. But so, as that they supposed all their gods, save one, to be not only native, but also mortal; made out of that one, and resolved into that one again: these gods being all melted into *Jupiter*, in the conflagration. 424,

425

Wherefore during the intervals of successive worlds, the Stoicks acknowledged but one solitary Deity, and no more; *Jupiter* being then left all alone, and the other gods swallowed up into him. Who therefore not only the creator of all the other gods, but also the decreator of them. 425, 426

The Stoicks, notwithstanding this, religious worshippers of their many gods; and thereby sometime derogated from the honour of the Supreme, by sharing his sovereignty amongst them. 426, 427

Nevertheless, the supreme God praised and extolled by them far above all the other gods; and acknowledged to be the sole maker of the world. 427,

Ec.

Their professing subjection to his laws as their greatest liberty: 430

And to submit their wills to his will in every thing, so as to know no other will, but the will of *Jupiter*. *ibid.*

Their pretending to look to God, and to do nothing without a reference to him; as also to trust in him and rely upon him. 431

Their holding him as the author of all good. *ibid.*

Their addressing their devotions to him alone, without the conjunction of any other god; and particularly imploring his assistance against temptations. Page 432

Cleanthes his excellent and devout hymn to the supreme God. 433

XXVI. *Cicero*, though affecting to write in the way of the new academy, yet no sceptick as to theism. Nor was he an asserter of many independent deities. *Cicero's* gods (the makers of the world) the same with *Plato's* eternal gods, or trinity of divine hypostasies subordinate. This language the Pagans in *St. Cyril* would justify, from that of the Scripture, *Let us make man.*

434, 435, &c.

Varro's threefold theology, the fabulous, the natural, and the civil or popular; agreeably to *Stævola* the pontifex his three sorts of gods, poetical, philosophical, and political. The former condemned by him as false; the second, though true, said to be above the capacity of the vulgar; and therefore a necessity of a third or middle betwixt both; because many things true in religion, not fit for the vulgar to know. *Varro's* supreme Numen, the great Soul or Mind of the whole world: his inferiour gods, parts of the world animated. Image-worship condemned by him, as disagreeable to the natural theology. 438, 439

Seneca, a Pagan polytheist, but plain asserter of one supreme Numen, excellently described by him. That in his book of Superstition (now lost) he did as freely censure the civil theology of the Romans, as *Varro* had done the fabulous or theatrical. 440

Quintilian, *Pliny*, *Apuleius*, their clear acknowledgments of one sovereign universal Deity. *Symmachus*, (a great stickler for paganism) his assertion, that it was one and the same thing, which was worshipped

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worshipped in all religions, though in different ways. Page 440, 441

The writer *De Mundo*, though not *Aristotle*, yet a Pagan. His cause that containeth all things, and God from whom all things are. Which passage being left out in *Apuleius* his Latin version, gives occasion of suspicion, that he was infected with *Plutarch's* Dithyrisin, or at least held matter to be unmade. 442

Plutarch, a priest of *Apollo*, however unluckily engaged in those two false opinions, of an evil principle, and matter unmade, yet a maintainer of one sole principle of all good. 443

Dio Chrysostramus, a Sophist, his clear testimony, βασιλευσθαι τὸ ὅλον, that the whole world was under a kingly government or monarchy. *ibid.*

Galen's true hymn to the praise of him, that made us, in his book *De usu Partium*. 444

Maximus Tyrius his short account of his own religion; one supreme God the monarch of the whole world, and three subordinate ranks of inferior gods, the sons and friends of God, and his ministers in the government of the world. 444, 445

A most full and excellent description of the supreme God in *Aristides* his first oration, or hymn to *Jupiter*, wherein he affirmeth, all the several kinds of gods to be but a defluxion and derivation from *Jupiter*. 445, 446

All the latter philosophers after Christianity, (though maintainers of the world's eternity, yet) agreed in one supreme Deity, the cause of this world, and of the other gods. Excellent speculations in them concerning the Deity, especially *Plotinus*; who, though deriving matter and all from one divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods; he supposing, the grandeur and majesty of the supreme God to be declared by the multitude of gods under

him. *Themistius*; that the same supreme God was worshipped by Pagans, Christians, and all nations, though in different forms; and that God was delighted with this variety of religions. Page 446, 447

The full testimony of *St. Cyril*, that the Greek philosophers univversally acknowledged one God, the maker of the universe, from whom were produced into being certain other gods, both intelligible and sensible. *ibid.*

XXVII. This not only the opinion of philosophers and learned men, but also the general belief of the vulgar amongst the Pagans. A judgment of the vulgar and generality, to be made from the poets. *Dio Chrysostramus* his affirmation, That all the poets acknowledged one first and greatest God, the father of all the rational kind, and the king thereof. 447

The testimony of *Aristotle*, That all men acknowledged kingship or monarchy amongst the gods: Of *Maximus Tyrius*, that notwithstanding so great a discrepancy of opinion in other things, yet throughout all the gentile world, as well the unlearned as learned, did univversally agree in this, that there was one God the king and father of all, and many gods the sons of that one God: Of *Dio Chrysostramus* also to the same purpose; he intimating likewise, that of the two, the acknowledgment of the one supreme God, was more general than that of the many inferior gods. 448, 449

That the sense of the vulgar Pagans herein is further evident from hence, because all nations had their several proper names for the one supreme God; as the Romans *Jupiter*, the Greeks *Zeus*, the Africans and Arabians *Hammon*, the Scythians *Pappæus*, the Babylonians *Bel*, &c. *ibid.*

True, that *Origen*, though allowing Christians to use the appellative names.

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for God in the languages of the several nations, yet accounted it unlawful for to call him by those proper names; because not only given to idols, but also contaminated with wicked rites and fables: according to which, they should be indeed rather the names of a demon than of a God. Notwithstanding which, he does not deny, those Pagans ever to have meant the supreme God by them, but often acknowledge the same. But *Laſtantius* indeed denies the Capitoline *Jupiter* to be the supreme God, and that for two reasons. First, because he was not worshipped without the partnership of *Minerva* and *Juno*, his daughter and wife. Granted here, that there was a mixture of the fabulous or poetical theology with the natural to make up the civil. But that wise men understood these to be but three several names or notions of one supreme God. This confirmed from *Macrobius*.

Page 450

Vossius his conjecture, that in this Capitoline Trinity there was a further mystery aimed at, of three divine hypostases. This Roman trinity derived from the Samothracian *Cabiri*. Which word being Hebraical, gives cause to suspect this tradition of a trinity among the Pagans to have sprung from the Hebrews.

451

Laſtantius his second reason, because *Jupiter* being *Juvans Pater*, was a name below the dignity of the supreme God. The answer, that the true etymology thereof was *Jovis Pater*, the Hebrew *Tetragrammaton*.

Ibid.

That the Capitoline *Jupiter* was the supreme God, evident from those titles of *Optimus Maximus*; and of *Omnipotens* in the pontifices in their public sacrifices. *Seneca's* testimony, that the ancient Hetrurians by *Jupiter* meant the mind and spirit, maker and government of the whole world. The Roman soldiers acclamation in *Marcus Aurelius*

his German expedition, (*To Jove the god of gods, who alone is powerful*) according to *Tertullian*, a testimony to the Christians God. Page 452, 453

That as the learned Pagans in their writings, so likewise the vulgar in their common speech, when most serious, often used the word God, singularly and emphatically, for the Supreme, proved from *Tertullian*, *Minutius Felix*, and *Laſtantius*: together with the testimony of *Proclus*, that the one supreme God was more universally believed throughout the world, than the many gods.

453, 454

That *Kyrie Eleeson* was anciently a Pagan lityny to the supreme God, proved from *Arianus*. The supreme God often called by the Pagans also *Kēnos*, or *the Lord*.

454, 455

That even the most sottishly superstitious, idolatrous, and polytheistical amongst the Pagans, did, notwithstanding, generally acknowledge one supreme Deity; fully attested and elegantly declared by *Aurelius Prudentius* in his *Apotheosis*.

455

However, some of the ancient Pagans were said to have acknowledged none but visible and corporeal gods, yet as they conceived these to be endued with life and understanding, so did they suppose one supreme amongst them, as either the whole heaven or ather animated, or the subtle fiery substance, that pervadeth all things, the God of the Heracliticks and Stoicks; or the sun the Cleanthæan god.

455, 456

Though *Macrobius* refer so many of the Pagan gods to the sun, and doubtless himself looked upon it as a great god, yet does he deny it to be *omnipotentissimum Deum*, the most omnipotent God of all; he asserting a Trinity of divine hypostases superiour to it, in the Platonic way.

456, 457

That the Persians themselves, did, notwithstanding,

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withstanding acknowledge a Deity superiour to it, and the maker thereof; proved from *Eubulus*. As also that the Persians country-*Jupiter* was not the sun, confirmed from *Herodotus*, *Xenophon*, *Plutarch*, and *Curtius*. Cyrus his Lord God of heaven, who commanded him to build him a house at Jerusalem; the same with the God of the Jews.

Page 458

That as (besides the Scythians) the Ethiopians in *Strabo*, and other barbarian nations, anciently acknowledged one sovereign Deity; so is this the belief of the generality of the Pagan world to this very day. 458, 459

XXVIII. Besides *Themistius* and *Symmachus*, asserting one and the same thing to be worshipped in all religions, though after different ways, and that God Almighty was not displeas'd with this variety of his worship; *Plutarch's* memorable testimony, that as the same sun, moon, and stars, are common to all, so were the same gods. And that not only the Egyptians, but also all other Pagan nations worshipped one reason and providence ordering all; together with its inferiour subservient powers and ministers, though with different rites and symbols. 459, 460

Titus Livius also of the same persuasion, that the same immortal gods were worshipped every where; (namely, one supreme, and his inferiour ministers) however the diversity of rites made them seem different. 460

Two Egyptian Philosophers, *Heracliscus* and *Asclepiades*, professedly insisting upon the same thing, not only as to the Egyptians, but also the other Pagan nations: the latter of them, (*Asclepiades*) having written a book entitled, *The symphony, or harmony of all theologies or religions*, to wit, in these two fundamentals, that there is one supreme God, and besides him, other inferiour gods, his subservient ministers to be

worshipped. From whence *Symmachus* and other Pagans concluded, that the differences of religion were not to be scrupulously stood upon, but every man ought to worship God according to the law and religion of his own country. The Pagans sense thus declared by *Stobæus*, that the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him together with the world. Page 461

XXIX. That the Pagan Theists must needs acknowledge one supreme Deity, further evident from hence; because they generally believed the whole world to be one animal, actuated and governed by one soul. To deny the world's animation, and to be an Atheist, all one, in the sense of the ancient Pagans. Against *Gassendus*, that *Epicurus* denied the world's animation, upon no other account, but only because he denied a providential deity. This whole animated world, or the soul thereof, to the Stoicks, and others, the Πρωτος Θεός, the first and highest God. 462

Other Pagan theologers, who though asserting likewise the world's animation, and a mundane soul, yet would not allow this to be the supreme Deity, they conceiving the first and highest God to be no soul, but an abstract and immoveable mind superiour to it. And to these, the animated world and mundane soul but δευτερος Θεός, a second God. 463

But the generality of those, who went higher than the soul of the world, acknowledged also a principle superiour to Mind or intellect, called, το εν and τ' υπερον the one, and the good; and so asserted a Trinity of divine hypostases subordinate, Monad, Mind, and Soul. So that the animated world or soul thereof was to some of these, but τριτος Θεός, the third God. *Ibid.*

The Pagans, whether holding soul, or mind, or monad, to be the highest,

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acknowledged only one in those several kinds, as the head of all; and so always reduced the multiplicity of things to a unity, or under a monarchy. Page 464

Observed, that to the Pagan theologers universally, the world was no dead thing, or meer machine and automaton, but had life or soul diffused thorough it all; those being taxed by *Aristotle* as Atheists, who made the world to consist of nothing, but monads or atoms, dead and inanimate. Nor was it quite cut off from the supreme Deity, how much soever elevated above the same: the forementioned trinity, of Monad, Mind, and Soul, being supposed to be most intimately united together, and indeed all but one entire divinity; displayed in the world; and supporting the same. 464, 465

XXX. The sense of the Hebrews in this controversy. That according to *Pbilo*, the Pagan polytheism consisted not in worshipping many independent gods, and partial creators of the world, but, besides the One supreme, other created beings superiour to men. 465, 466

That the same also was the sense of *Flavius Josephus*, according to whom, this the doctrine of *Abraham*; that the supreme God was alone to be religiously worshipped, and no created thing with him. *Aristeus* his assertion in *Josephus*, that the Jews and Greeks worshipped one and the same supreme God, called by the Greeks *Zeus*, as giving life to all. 466, 467

The latter Rabbinical writers generally of this persuasion, that the Pagans acknowledging one supreme and universal Numen, worshipped all their other gods, as his ministers, or as mediators and intercessors betwixt him and them. And this condemned by them for *עבודה זרה* *strange worship* or *idolatry*. The first commandment thus in-

terpreted by *Maimonides*, and *Baal Ikkarim*; *Thou shalt not set up, besides me, any inferior gods as mediators, nor religiously worship my ministers or attendants*. The miscarriage of *Solomon* and other kings of *Israel* and *Judea* this, that believing the existence of the one supreme God, they thought it was for his honour, that his ministers also should be worshipped. *Atracanel* his ten species of idolatry, all of them but so many several modes of creature-worship; and no mention amongst them made, of many independent gods. Page 467, &c.

Certain places of Scripture also interpreted by Rabbinical writers to this purpose; that the Pagan nations generally acknowledged one sovereign Numen. 469, 470

The Jews, though agreeing with the Greeks and other Pagans in this, that the stars were all animated, nevertheless denied them any religious worship. 470, 471

XXXI. This same thing plainly confirmed from the New Testament; that the Gentiles or Pagans, however Polytheists and Idolaters, were not unacquainted with the true God. First from the epistle to the Romans, where that, which is knowable of God, is said to have been manifest amongst the Pagans; and they to have known God, though they did not glorify him as God, but bold the truth in unrighteousness; by reason of their polytheism and idolatry (or image-worship) the latter of which accounted by the Jews the greatest enormity of the Pagans, as is proved from *Pbilo*: and this the reason, why their polytheism called also idolatry. Plainly declared by *St. Paul*, that the Pagan superstition consisted not in worshipping many independent gods and creators, but in joining creature-worship some way or other with the worship of the Creator. *Παρά τὸν Κτίστορα*, how to be understood; and in what sense,

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the Pagans, though acknowledging the Creator, might be said to have worshipped the creature, beyond him. Page

471, 472

Again, from *St. Paul's* oration to the Athenians, where their *unknown God* is said to be that same God, whom *St. Paul* preached, *who made the world and all things in it*. And these Athenian Pagans are affirmed *σεβῆσαι*, religiously and devoutly to worship this true God.

473, 474

Lastly, that *Aratus* his *Zeus* was the true God, whose offspring our souls are, proved not only from the context of that poet himself, undeniably, and from the scholiast upon him, but also from *St. Paul's* positive affirmation. Nor was *Aratus* singular in this; that ancient prayer of the Athenians, commended by *M. Antoninus* for its simplicity, (*Ἰσσοῦ, ἵσσοῦ ᾧ φῖλε Ζεῦ, rain, rain, O gracious Jupiter, &c.*) no otherwise to be understood. And how that other passage of *St. Paul*, *That in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God*, does not at all clash herewith.

475, 476

XXXII. In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, and making it the better appear, that the polytheism thereof was not contradictory to the acknowledgment of one supreme omnipotent Numen; three things to be considered. First, that much of their polytheism was but seeming and phantastical only, and really nothing but the polyonymy of one God. Secondly, That their real and natural polytheism consisted only in religiously worshipping, besides this one supreme universal Numen, many other particular and inferior created Beings; as animated stars, dæmons, and heroes. Thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods, in statues, images, and symbols; these were also sometimes abusively called gods. To

one or other of which three heads, all the Pagan polytheism referrible. Page

477

For the better persuading, that much of the Pagan polytheism, was really nothing, but the polyonymy of one supreme God, or the worshipping him under several personal names; to be remembered again, what was before suggested; that the Pagan nations generally, besides their vulgar, had another more arcane theology, which was the theology of wise men and of truth. That is, besides both their fabulous and poetical, their political and civil theology, they had another natural and philosophick one. This distinction of the vulgar and civil theology, from the natural and real, owned by the Greeks generally, and amongst the Latins, by *Scævola* the pontifex, *Varro*, *Cicero*, *Seneca*, and others. *ibid.*

That the civil theology of the Pagans differed from the natural and real, by a certain mixture of fabulosity in it. Of the Romans suffering the statue of *Jupiter's* nurse to be kept in the very capitol, as a religious monument. *Jupiter's* nativity, or his having a father and a mother, atheistically fabulous; poets themselves acknowledging so much of the natural and true theology, that *Jupiter* being the father of gods and men, the maker of the whole world, was himself eternal and unmade. 478

That the civil as well as poetical theology had some appearance of many independent deities also; they making several supreme, in their several territories and functions; one chief for one thing, and another for another. But according to the natural and philosophick theology, the theology of wise men and of truth, all these but poetical, commentitious, fictitious, and phantastick gods; such as had no distinct substantial essences of their own; and therefore really to be accounted nothing else,

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else, but several names or notions of one supreme God. Page 478, 479

Certain, that the Egyptians had several proper and personal names for that one supreme universal *Numen*, that comprehends the whole world, according to several notions of it, or its several powers: as *Ammon*, *Phiba*, *Osiris*, *Neilk*, *Cnepb*; to which may be added *Serapis* and *Isis* too. Besides *Jamblicus*, *Damascius* his testimony also to this purpose; concerning the Egyptian theology. This the pattern of the other, especially European theologies, the Greek and Roman. 479, 480

That the Greeks and Romans also often made more gods of one, or affected a polyonymy of the same gods, evident from those many proper and personal names bestowed, first upon the sun, (of which *Macrobius*) who therefore had this epithet of *πολύωνυμος*, given to him; and then upon the moon, styled also polyonymous, as well as her brother the sun; and lastly upon the earth, famous likewise for her many names, as *Vesta*, *Cybele*, *Ceres*, *Proserpina*, *Ops*, &c. Wherefore not at all to be doubted, but that the supreme God, or sovereign *Numen* of the whole world, was much more polyonymous. This title given to him also, as well as to *Apollo* in *Hesychius*. He thus invoked by *Cleanthes*. *Zeno*, the writer *De Mundo*, *Seneca*, *Macrobius*, clearly confirm the same. *Maximus Madaurensis* in *St. Austin* his full acknowledgment thereof. 480, 481

The first instances of the polyonymy of the supreme God, amongst the Pagans in such names as these; *Βουτάνος*, *Ίτιος*, *Πολιεύς*, *Μαλίγυς*, *Φάιος*, *Ξεός*, *Σαπός*, &c. And amongst the Latins, *Vidbor*, *Iuvētus*, *Opitulus*, *Stator*, *Tigillus*, *Centupeda*, *Almus*, *Ruminus*, &c. Again, *Άλγυ*, *Είκαρμίν*, *Πετρομίν*, *Μίσις*, *Άδρλεσις*, all several names of the one supreme God, as likewise were *Clotho*, *Lachesis*, and *Atropos*, in the writer *De Mundo*. And amongst

the Latins, not only Fate, but also Nature and Fortune too, as *Cicero* and *Seneca* affirm. Page 482

But besides these, there were other proper names of the supreme God, which had a greater shew and appearance of so many several gods, they having their peculiar temples, and several appropriated rites of worship. And first, such as signify the Deity, according to its more universal nature. As for example, *Pau*; which not the corporeal world inanimate, or endued with a senseless nature only, but a rational, or intellectual principle displaying it self in matter, framing the world harmoniously, and being, in a manner, all things. This also the universal pastor and shepherd of all mankind. 483

Again *Janus*; first invoked by the Romans in their sacrifices, and never omitted. The most ancient God, and first beginning of all things. Described by *Ovid*, *Martial*, and others, as a universal *Numen*. Concluded by *St. Austin* to be the same with *Jupiter*, the Soul or Mind of the whole world. The word *Janus* probably derived from *Zηνός*; the *Ætolian Jupiter*. 483, 484

Ganius also, one of the twenty select Roman gods, according to *Festus*, a universal *Numen*; that God, who is the begetter of all things. And, according to *Varro* in *St. Austin*, the same with *Jupiter*. 484, 485

That *Chronos*, or *Saturn*, no particular Deity but a universal *Numen* also, which comprehends the whole nature of the world, affirmed by *Dionysius Halicarnassensis*. The word *Saturn* *Hetrurian* (and originally from the Hebrew *סתר*) signifies *hidden*; called by the Latins *Deus Latius*, the *Hidden God*; whence *Italy Latium*, and the Italian Latins; as worshippers of this hidden God, or the occult Principle of all things. This, according to *Varro*, he, that produceth out of himself the hidden seeds and forms of all things, and

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and swalloweth them up into himself again; which, the devouring of his male children. This *Sinus quidam Nature*, &c. a certain inward and deep recess of Nature containing all things within it self; as God was sometimes defined by the Pagans. This to St. *Austin* the same with *Jupiter*; as likewise was *Cælus*, or *Uranus*, in the old inscription, another name of God too. The poetick theology of *Jupiter's* being the son of *Saturn*, and *Saturn* the son of *Cælus*; an intimation (according to *Plato*) of a Trinity of divine hypostases universal. Page 485, 486

Though *Minerva* or *Athena* were sometimes confined to a narrower sense, yet was it often taken for a name of God also, according to his universal notion; it being to *Athenagoras* the divine wisdom displaying it self through all things. This excellently described by *Aristides*, as the first-begotten offspring of the original Deity or the Second divine hypostasis, by which all things were made; agreeably with the Christian theology. 486, 487

Apbrodite Urania, or the *Heavenly Venus*, another name of God also, according to his universal notion; it being the same with that love, which *Orpheus*, and other philosophers in *Aristotle*, made the first original of all things. *Plato's* distinction of an elder and a younger *Venus*: the former, the daughter of *Uranus*, without a mother, or the heavenly *Venus*: said to be senior to *Japhet* and *Saturn*. The latter, afterwards begotten from *Jupiter* and the nymph *Dione*, the vulgar *Venus*. *Urania*, or the heavenly *Venus*, called by the oriental nations, *Myliitta*; that is, the mother of all things. Temples in *Pausanias* dedicated to this *Heavenly Venus*. This described by *Æschylus*, *Euripides*, and *Ovid*, as the supreme Deity, and the creator of all the gods. God Almighty also thus described, as a *Heavenly Venus*,

or *Love*, by *Sev. Boetius*. To this *Urania*, or the *Heavenly Venus*, another *Venus* in *Pausanias* near a-kin; called *Ἀποστοχία* or *Verticordia*; as converseive of men's minds upwards, from unchaste love, or unclean lust. 488, 489

Though *Vulcan*, according to the common notion of him, a special god, yet had he sometimes a more universal consideration. *Zeno* in *Laertius*, that the supreme God is called *Vulcan* as acting in the artificial fire of nature. Thus the Soul of the world styled by the *Ægyptians Phisba*; which, as *Jamblichus* tells us, was the same with the Greeks *Hephestus*, or *Vulcan*. Page 489, 490

Besides all which names of the supreme God, *Seneca* informs us, that he was sometimes called also *Liber Pater*, because the parent of all things; sometimes *Hercules*, because his force is unconquerable; and sometimes *Mercury*, as being reason, number, order and knowledge. 490

But besides this polyonymy of God, according to his universal notion, there were other *dii speciales*, or *special gods* also, amongst the Pagans; which likewise were really but several names of one and the same supreme Deity, *variè utentis sua potestate*, (as *Seneca* writeth) *diversly using his power*, in particular cases, and in the several parts of the world. Thus *Jupiter*, *Neptune* and *Pluto* (mistaken by some Christians, for a trinity of independent gods) though three civil gods, yet were they really but one and the same natural and philosophical god; as acting in those three parts of the world; the heaven, the sea, the earth and hell. *Pluto* in *Plato's Cratylus*, a name for that part of divine providence, which is exercised in the government of separate souls after death.

This styled by *Virgil* the Stygian *Jupiter*. But to others, *Pluto* together with *Ceres*, the manifestation of the Deity, in this whole terrestrial globe. The celestial and terrestrial *Jupiter* but

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the Pagan theologers seemed to go yet a strain higher, they supposing God not only to pervade all things, but also to be himself all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology ran so high, evident from the Saitick inscription. A strong tang hereof in *Æschylus*; as also in *Lucan*. Neither was this proper to those, who held God to be the Soul of the world, but the language also of those other more refined philosophers, *Xenophanes*, *Parmenides*, &c. they affirming God to be One and All, with which agreeth the author of the Aclepian Dialogue, that God is *Unus Omnia, one all things*; and that before things were made, he did then *κρύπτειν* *hide them*, or occultly contain them all within himself. In like manner *Orpheus*.

Page 506, 507

This not only a further ground of the polyonymy of one God, according to the various manifestations of himself in the world, but also of another strange phænomenon in the Pagan theology, their personating the inanimate parts of the world, and natures of things, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Thus *Moschopolus* before cited, and *Arnobius*. This *Plutarch* thinks to have been done at first metonymically only, the effects of the gods being called gods; as the books of *Plato*, *Plato*. And thus far not disliked by him. But himself complaineth, that afterwards it was carried on further by superstitious religionists, and not without great impiety. Nevertheless, that inanimate substances, and the natures of things, were formerly deified by the ancient Pagans, otherwise than metonymically, proved from *Cicero*, *Philo*, and *Plato*. For they supposing God to pervade all things, and to be all things, did therefore look upon every thing as sacred or divine; and theologize the parts of the world and natures of things; particularly making them gods and goddesses. But especially such things, as

wherein human utility was most concerned, and which had most of wonder in them.

Page 507, 510

This properly the physiological theology of the Pagans, their personating and deifying the natures of things, and inanimate substances. That the ancient poetick fables of the gods were many of them, in their first and true meaning, thus physiologically allegorical, and not mere herology, affirmed against *Eusebius*, *Zenc*, *Cleantes*, and *Cbryippus*, famous for thus allegorizing the fables of the gods. *Cbryippus* his allegorizing an obscene picture of *Jupiter* and *Juno* in *Samos*. *Plato*, though no friend to these poetick fables, yet confesses some of them to have contained allegories in them: the same doth also *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*; and *Cicero* likewise, who affirmeth this personating and deifying the natures of things, to have filled the world with superstition.

510, 512

Against *Eusebius* again, That the whole theology of the Pagans consisted not in thus deifying the natures of things, and inanimate bodies; because he, that acknowledgeth no animant God, acknowledgeth no God at all, but is a downright Atheist.

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Neither ought this physiological theology of the Pagans, that consisted in personating and deifying the natures of things and inanimate bodies, to be confounded with that natural and philosophical theology of *Varro*, *Scævola* and others, which admitted of no other but animant gods, and such as really existed in nature: for which cause it was called natural, in opposition to the fictitious and phantastick poetick gods.

512

St. Austin's just censure and condemnation of the Pagans, for their thus theologizing of physiology, or fictitiously personating and deifying the natures of things.

512, 513

But though the Pagans did thus verbally personate and deify the things of

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nature, yet did not the intelligent amongst them therefore count these true and proper gods. *Cotta* in *Cicero*, 'though we call corn *Ceres*, and wine *Bacchus*, yet was there never any one so mad, as to take that for a God, which himself feeds upon and devours.' The Pagans really accounted that only for a God, by the invoking whereof they might expect benefit to themselves; and therefore nothing inanimate. This proved from *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Lucretius*, *Cicero* and *Plutarch*. Wherefore these natures of things deified, but fictitious and phantastick gods. Nor can any other sense be made of them than this, that they were really but so many several names of one supreme God, as severally manifested in his works: according to that Egyptian theology, that God may be called by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. With which agreeth *Seneca*, that there may be as many names of God, as there are gifts and effects of his; and the writer *De Mundo*, that God may be denominated from every nature, he being the cause of all things.

Page 513, 515

Wherefore these deified natures of things were not directly worshipped by the intelligent Pagans, but only relatively to the supreme God, or in way of complication with him only; and so not so much themselves, as God worshipped in them. The Pagans pretence, that they did not look upon the world with such eyes as oxen and horses do, but with religious eyes, so as to see God in every thing. They therefore worshipped the invisible Deity, in the visible manifestations of himself; God and the world together. This sometimes called *Pan* and *Jupiter*. Thus was the whole world said to be the greatest God, and the circle of the heavens worshipped by the Persians; not as inanimate matter, but as the visible mani-

festation of the Deity, displayed from it, and pervaded by it. When the Roman sea-captains sacrificed to the waves, their worship intended to that God, who stilleth the waves, and quieteth the billows.

Page 515, 516

These Pagans also apprehended a necessity of permitting men to worship the invisible God in his visible works. This account given by them in *Eusebius*. *Plato* himself approved of worshipping the invisible God in the sun, moon, and stars, as his visible images. And though *Maximus Tyrius* would have men endeavour to rise above the starry heavens, and all visible things, yet does he allow the weaker to worship God in his progeny. And *Secrates* persuades *Euthydemus* to be contented herewith. Besides which, some Pagans worshipping the elements, directed their intention to the spirits of those elements, as *Julian* in *Ammianus*, (these being supposed also to be animated) or else to those dæmons, whom they conceived to inhabit them, or preside over them.

Page 516, 518

XXXIII. Further to be observed, that amongst those natures of things, some were merely accidental, as hope, love, desire, memory, truth, virtue, piety, faith, justice, concord, clemency, victory, echo, night. According to which, the vulgar Athenians supposed *St. Paul* to have deified *Anastasis*, or made a goddess of the resurrection, as well as a God of *Jesus*. Vices also sometimes thus deified by them, as Contumely and Impudence, (to whom were temples dedicated at *Athens*) though to the end, that these things might be deprecated. These accidents sometimes deified under counterfeit proper names, as Pleasure under the name of *Voluptas*, and *Lubentina Venus*; Time under the name of *Chronos* or *Saturn*; Prudence, or Wisdom, under the names of *Athena*, or *Minerva*; against which, *Origen* in his answer to *Celsus*.

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Cicero himself allowed of dedicating temples to mind, virtue, piety, faith, &c. Page 518, 520

But such accidents and affections of things deified could not possibly be accounted true and proper gods, they having not *ὑπόστασις καὶ ἰδέα*, any real subsistence, or substantial essence of their own. And thus does *Origen* again dispute against *Minerva's* godship, as tropologized into prudence. As he doth also elsewhere, upon the same ground, against that of *Memory*, the mother of the muses, and that of the graces; he concluding, these and such like therefore, to be nothing but figments of the Greeks, they being things personated, and feigned with human members. Thus the Pagans condemned by *Prudentius* also, for feigning things incorporeal, with counterfeited members. These gods plainly exploded by *Cotta*, or *Cicero* in disguise; as having only *vim rerum*, but not *deorum*, the force of things, but not of gods in them; or being but *naturæ rerum*, and not *figuræ deorum*. 520, 521

Wherefore the true meaning of these deified natures of things could be no other than this, that God was to be acknowledged and worshipped in all things; or, as the Pagans themselves declare it, that the force of every thing was, both governed by God, and it self divine. *Pliny* of this breaking and crumbling of the Deity into parts, every one worshipping that in God, and for a god, which himself most stood in need of. This dividing of the simple Deity, and worshipping it brokenly by parcels and piecemeal, as manifested in all the several things of nature, and parts of the world, justly censured, and elegantly perstringed, by *Prudentius* against *Symmachus*. Where *Prudentius* grants, that *Symmachus*, who declared, that it was one thing, which all worshipped; when he sacrificed to Victory, did sacrifice to God

Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of victory. This, in the Egyptian allegory, *Osiris* mangled and cut in pieces by *Typhon*. Victory and Virtue, as well as *Neptune*, *Mars* and *Bellona*, but several names or notions of *Jupiter*, in the prologue of *Plautus* his *Amphitruo*. Page 521, 522

Vossius his opinion, that these deified accidents, and natures of things, as well as the other Pagan invisible Gods, were commonly look'd upon by the vulgar, as so many single, substantial minds, or spirits created by the supreme God, and appointed to preside over those several things respectively. Where it is acknowledged, that neither the political, nor the poetical gods of the Pagans, were taken, so much as by the vulgar, for so many independent deities. 523, 524

Probable, that by these gods the wiser Pagans sometimes understood dæmons in general, or collectively; that is, whosoever they were, that were appointed to preside over those several things, or dispense them. As *Æolus* in *Arrianus* seems to be taken for the dæmons appointed by God Almighty to preside over the winds. 524, 525

Lactantius his reason, why the *Conferences* and select gods, vulgarly worshipped by the Romans, could not be single dæmons or angels. 525

And from *Aristotle's* observation, against *Zeno*, That, according to law, or civil theology, one God was chief for one thing, and another for another, concluded, that these political gods were not properly the subservient ministers of the Supreme; and therefore could be nothing but several names and notions of one natural God, according to his various powers and effects. 525, 526

And thus does *Vossius* himself afterwards confess, that, according to the natural theology, all the Pagan gods were but several denominations of one God. Where, notwithstanding, this

learned

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learned and industrious philologer seems to take the natural and philosophick theology for the physiological, he making the god thereof the nature of things. Whereas the natural theology was the true, and real, and philosophical, opposed both to the fictions of the poets, and the institutes of law-makers and politicians. As *Varro* affirmeth, that in cities those things were worshipped and believed, according to false opinions, which had no nature, nor real subsistence, neither in the world, nor without it. The God of the Pagans not the nature of things, which could be the Numen of none but of Atheists; but an understanding Being, the great Mind, or Soul of the whole world, pervading all things. Thus unquestionably true, that the many poetical and political gods were but several names or notions of one natural, real, and true God. Besides which, there were other inferiour ministers of this supreme God, acknowledged to be the instruments of his providence, and religiously worshipped also. A brief, but full account, of the Pagans natural theology, set down by *Prudentius*. Page 526, 527

And when the more high-flown Pagans referred these poetical and political gods to the divine ideas, or patterns of things in the archetypal world; which, besides the Platonists, the Egyptians in *Celsus* are said to have done, making the brute animals worshipped by them, but symbols of the eternal ideas; they hereby made these gods to be but so many partial considerations of one God neither, as being all things, or containing in himself the causes of all things; as *Julian* himself declareth in his sixth oration. 527, 528

An anacephalæosis, that much of the Pagan polytheism was but the polyonymy of one God; he being worshipped under several names. First, according to several general notions of

him; as of *Janus, Genius, Saturn, Minerva, Urania*, or the heavenly *Venus*, or Love, and others before declared. So also of *Summanus*, according to *S. Austin*, and *Ichemis*, afterwards to be mentioned. Page 528, 529

And secondly, according to other more particular notions of them, (in their special gods) as acting in some parts of the world only, or exercising some particular powers. 529, 530

And lastly, as pervading all things, and being all things, or the cause of all things, he was thereupon called by the name of every thing, or every thing by his name. The Pagans in *S. Austin*; that their ancestors were not so sottish, as not to understand, that those things of nature were but divine gifts, and not themselves gods. And the Pagans in *Eusebius*; that the invisible God, the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in his visible effects, wherein he hath displayed himself. 530

Though the two former kinds of these gods only called by *Athanasius* poetical and fictitious, he opposing them to those of the third sort, that were natural and real things; yet may these also be well called poetical, fictitious, and phantastical gods too; because though themselves were real things, existing in nature, yet was their personation, and deification, meer fiction, fancy and poetry. And accordingly, were they before called by *Origen* ἑλληνικὰ ἀναπλάσματα, meer figments of the Greeks. 530, 531

XXXIV. Of those Pagans, who supposed the supreme God to be the whole animated world. Hitherto shewed, that even the most refined of the Pagans agreed in these two things. First, in breaking and crumbling the one simple Deity, and multiplying it into many gods; or parcelling it out into several particular notions, according to its several powers and virtues (Πολύθεοι being,

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being, to these Pagans, the same thing with Πολυθεϊσμος.) And then, in theologizing the whole world, personating and deifying the natures of things, accidents, and inanimate bodies. They supposing God to pervade all things, and himself to be in a manner all things: therefore every thing to the religious, sacred and divine; and God to be worshipped in all. Page 531, 532

We shall now add, that both those forementioned principles, of God's pervading all things, and his being all things, were carried on farther by those Pagan theologians, who had no higher notion of the supreme Deity, than as the soul of the world. For first, whereas the more refined Pagans supposed God to pervade all things unmixedly; these mingled and confounded him with the whole world; some of them supposing him also to be a subtle body.

Again, whereas the other more sublimated Pagans affirmed God so to be all, as nevertheless to be something also above all; these concluded him to be nothing higher than the animated world. 532, 533

And though they supposed, that as well in this mundane animal, as in other animals, there was something principal and hegemonical, (whether the sun, or æther, or fire,) which therefore was emphatically called God; yet did they conceive the whole matter thereof to be animated, and so to be all God. Not barely as matter, but by reason of the soul thereof. 534, 535

Now if the whole world animated be the supreme God, then must all the parts and members of the world be the parts and members of one God; but not themselves therefore properly so many gods. This affirmed by *Origen*, as the true sense of these Pagans, against that unwary assertion of *Celsus*, that if the whole were god, then must

the several parts thereof needs be gods.

Page 535

Wherefore though these Pagans deified the parts of the world and natures of things, as well as the powers of the mundane soul; yet did not the intelligent amongst them worship them severally, as so many true and proper gods, but only as the parts and members of one great animal or god; or rather worship the great mundane Soul (the life of the whole world) in them all. This proved from *S. Austin*. 536,

537

The same plainly declared also by the Pagans in *Albanasius*, that not the divided parts of the world were by them accounted so many several gods, but the whole, made up of them all, one God; which yet might be worshipped in its several parts.

537

The Pagans being thus divided, as to their opinions, concerning the natural and true theology; some of them worshipped the world as the body of God, but others only as his image or temple. Thus *Plutarch*, though disliking the deifying of inanimate things, did notwithstanding approve of worshipping God in the whole world, as his most sacred temple. And the Persian Magi, allowing of no artificial temples, made with mens hands, worshipped God *sub dio*, and upon the tops of mountains, as conceiving the whole world to be his natural temple. For the same reason did they condemn also artificial statues and images, concluding fire, earth, and water, and the like parts of the world, to be the natural images of the Deity. Thus *Dion* in *Clemens Alexandrinus*. This difference amongst the Pagan theologians noted by *Macrobius*. Thus were all the Pagans world-worshippers, in different senses; but not as a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or else as his temple or image.

537, 539

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Furthermore, the Pagans univerſally acknowledging the world to be an animal, thoſe of them, who ſuppoſed it not to be the firſt and higheſt God, conceiv'd it to be either a ſecond, or elſe a third God; and ſo worſhipped it, not only as a temple or image, but alſo as the ſon of the firſt God. *Celſus* pretended the Chriſtians to have called their *Jeſus*, the *Son of God*, in imitation of theſe Pagans, who ſtyled the world ſo. Page

539, 540

Thus have we made it fully to appear, that, according to the ſaying of *Antiſthenes*, the many popular gods of the Pagans were but one and the ſame natural God; or, according to that of *Euclides*, their many gods were but many names. So that neither their poetical, nor yet their political theology, was looked upon by them as true and natural. 540

Nevertheless, the wiſer Pagans generally concluded, that there ought to be another theology, beſides the natural, fitly calculated for the vulgar, and having a mixture of falſhood and fabuloſity in it. *Varro* and *Scævola* agreed, that the vulgar being uncapable of the true and natural theology, it was expedient for them to be deceived in their religion. *Strabo* alſo, that the vulgar cannot by philoſophick reaſon, and truth, be carried on to piety; but this muſt be done by ſuperſtition, and by the help of fables, and prodigious relations. The ſame partly acknowledged by *Syneſius* for true. *Plato* alſo, that it is hard to find out God, but impoſſible to declare him to the vulgar; and therefore a neceſſity of a civil theology, diſtinct from the natural and philoſophical. 540, 542

XXXV. We come now to the next thing propoſed, that, beſides this ſeeming and phantaſtick polytheiſm of the Pagans, which was nothing but the polyonymy of one God, they had ano-

ther real polytheiſm, even in their natural and philoſophick theology it ſelf. But this not of ſelf-exiſtent gods, but generated or created ones only. Thus, according to *Plutarch*, one higheſt unmade God is the maker and father of all the other gods, generated or derived from him. And *Proclus* concludes, all the gods to derive their godſhip from the firſt God; who therefore is the fountain of the Godhead. Page

542, 543

Theſe inferior Pagan gods ſtyled by *Ammianus Marcellinus* ſubſtantial powers, in way of oppoſition to thoſe other poetical and political gods, that were not ſubſtantial or real, but only ſeveral names or notions of one ſupreme God. Thoſe ſubſtantial powers (as divination and prophecy was by them imparted to men) ſaid to be all ſubject to that one ſovereign Deity, called *Themis*, placed by Pagan theologers in the throne of *Jupiter*. This *Themis* alſo another name or notion of the ſupreme God, beſides thoſe before mentioned. Poetry and phantaſtry intermingled by the Pagans with their natural or philoſophick theology. 543,

544

Thus the Pagans held both one God, and many gods, in different ſenſes. *Ornatus* and *Plotinus*, that the majeſty of the ſupreme God conſiſteth in having multitudes of gods dependent on him, and ruled by him; and that the honour done to them redounds to him. The gods of the original Pagans, not meer dead ſtatues and images, but living underſtanding beings, repreſented by them. That Chriſtians aſſerted no ſolitary Deity, as Pagans pretended, but agreed with this of *Seneca*, that God hath generated or created, innumerable underſtanding beings ſuperiour to men, miniſters of his kingdom; the only difference being this, that they gave them no religious worſhip: out of *Læſtantius*. 544, 546

XXXVI.

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XXXVI. That besides the inferiour gods, generally received by all the Pagans, (namely, animated stars, dæmons, and heroes,) the more refined of them, who accounted not the animated world the supreme Deity, acknowledged a Trinity of divine hypostases, superiour to them all. Which doctrine affirmed by *Plotinus* to have been very ancient, and no invention of *Plato's*.

Page 546

Parmenides an asserter of a trinity, long before *Plato*. This imputed to the Pythagoreans, by *Moderatus* in *Simplicius*, and *Jamblicus* in *Proclus*. Before *Pythagoras*, *Orpheus* had his trinity, *Phanes*, *Uranus*, and *Cronus*; the same with *Plato's* three kings or principles. Probable, that *Pythagoras* and *Orpheus* derived the same from the theology of the Egyptian *Hermes*. Some footsteps of such a trinity, in the Mithraick mysteries, amongst the Persians, and the Zoroastrian Cabala. The same expressly declared in the Magick or Chaldaic oracles. A trinity of gods worshipped anciently by the Samothracians, and called by an Hebrew name *Cabiri*, the mighty gods. From thence the Roman Capitoline trinity derived; the second whereof, *Minerva*, or the divine wisdom. The Ternary, a number used by the Pagans, in their religious rites, as mysterious. 546, 547

It being no way probable, that such a trinity of divine hypostases should have sprung from human wit, we may reasonably assent to what *Proclus* affirmeth, that it was at first *θεοπνεύματος θεολογία*, a theology of divine tradition or revelation; as having been first imparted to the Hebrews, and from them communicated to other nations. Nevertheless, as this divine Cabala was but little understood by these Pagans, so was it by many of them depraved and adulterated. 547, 548

This called universally by them, a

trinity of gods; or a first, second, and third god: by some a trinity of causes, and of principles, and of officers. The tradition of the three gods, in *Proclus*, ancient and famous. *Numerius* his three gods, called by him, the father, the son, and the nephew, (or grandson.) *Nous* or Intellect, to *Plotinus*, a second god: as also the world an image of all the three gods. *Plotinus* and *Porphyrius*, their ecstasick union with the first of these three gods. Page 548,

549

That *Philo*, a religious Jew, and zealous opposer of the Pagan polytheism, called, notwithstanding, the divine Word also a second god. This not agreeable to the principles of Christianity. Nevertheless *S. Austin* partly excuses this language in the Pagans. 549,

550

And they perhaps the more excusable, because they sometimes called also those three hypostases, taken all together, the first god. 551

Nor was this trinity of divine hypostases ill-linguaged only by the Pagans, but also the Cabala thereof much depraved and adulterated by some Platonists and Pythagoreans. As first, such as made the world to be the third god. Such a trinity, a confounding of God and creature together. 551, 552

And that this an adulterated notion of the trinity, evident from hence; because no reason, why these philosophers should stop here, since the sun, moon and stars, and their other generated gods, differ not in kind, but only in degree, from the world. 552

Neither will this excuse them, that they understood this chiefly of the soul of the world; since if there were such a mundane soul, as together with the world made up one animal, this it self must needs be a creature also. *ibid.*

This probably the reason, why *Philo*, though explicitly acknowledging the divine Word,

Word,

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Word, as a second god, and second cause, yet no where speaketh of a third god; lest he should thereby seem to deify the whole created world. Though he call God also, in some sense, the soul of the world too, (whether meaning thereby his first, or his second god.) So that *Philo* seems to have acknowledged only a duality, and not a trinity, of divine hypostases. Page 552,

553

Another deprivation of this *ἑσπερολογία*, *theology of divine tradition*, or Cabala of the trinity, that some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans, concluding all those several ideas of the divine intellect, or archetypal world, to be so many distinct substances, animals, and gods; have thereby made their second hypostasis, not one, but a heap of innumerable gods and hypostases; and consequently destroyed their trinity. 553

Though *Philo* again here Platonized so far, as to suppose an incorporeal heaven and earth, and an intelligible sun, moon, and stars, to have been made before the corporeal and sensible; yet does he no where declare them to be so many distinct substances and animals, much less gods; but on the contrary censures that for Pagan idolatry. This pretence of worshipping the divine ideas, in all sensible things, that which gave sanctuary and protection to the foulest and sottishest of all the Pagan idolatries; the Egyptians worshipping brute animals thus, and the Greeks the parts of the world inanimate, and natures of things. 554

A third deprivation or adulteration of the divine Cabala of the trinity, by *Proclus* and other latter Platonists, asserting an innumerable company of Henades, particular unities, superiour to the first *Noes*, or Intellect, their second hypostasis; as also innumerable *Noes*, substantial Minds or Intellects, superi-

our to the first *Psyche*, their third hypostasis. Page 555

These *Noes* seem to be asserted by *Plotinus* also; as likewise the *Henades* and *Agathotes* were by *Simplicius*. 555, 556

A swarm of innumerable Pagan gods from hence; besides their intelligible gods; or ideas, particular *Henades* and *Noes*, unities and intellects. *ibid.*

Now since these particular *Henades* and *Noes* of theirs must needs be creatures; the trinity of *Proclus* and such others, nothing but a scale or ladder of nature, wherein God and the creature are confounded together; the juncture or commixture betwixt them being no where discernible; as if they differed only in degrees: a gross mistake and adulteration of the ancient Cabala of the trinity. 556, 557

This that Platonick, or rather Pseudo-Platonick trinity, by us opposed to the Christian, *viz.* such a trinity, as confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature; bringing the Deity, by degrees, down lower and lower, and at length scattering it into all the animated parts of the world; a foundation for infinite polytheism, cosmolatry or world-idolatry, and creature-worship. Hence the Platonists and Pythagoreans the fittest men to be champions for Paganism against Christianity. 557, 558

Concerning the Christian Trinity, three things to be observed. First, that it is not a trinity of meer names and words, nor logical notions, or inadequate conceptions of God; this doctrine having been condemned by the Christian church, in *Sabellius* and others; but a trinity of hypostases, subsistences, or persons. 558, 559

The second thing observable in the Christian Trinity, that though the second hypostasis thereof were begotten from the first, and the third proceedeth both

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from the first and second; yet neither of them creatures. First, because not made *ἐξ ἄκρων*, or from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being, but both of them co-eternal with the father. Secondly, because all necessarily existent, and unannihilable. Thirdly, because all of them universal, or infinite, and creatures of all other particular beings. Page 559

The third observable as to the Christian Trinity, that the three hypostases thereof are all truly and really one God; not only by reason of agreement of will, but also of a mutual *περιχώρησις* and *ἰσπαρέξις*, permeation of each other, and *inexistence*. Though no instance of the like unity to be found elsewhere in nature; yet since two distinct substances, corporeal, and incorporeal, make one man and person in our selves, much more may three divine hypostases be one God. *ibid.*

Though much of mystery in the Christian Trinity, yet nothing of plain contradiction to reason therein; that is, no nonsense, and impossibility. The ill design of those, who represent the Christian Trinity as absolutely contradictory to reason, that they may thereby debauch men's understandings, and make them swallow down other things, which unquestionably are such. 560

The Christian Trinity much more agreeable to reason, than the Pseudo-Platonick, in the three particulars before mentioned. First, its making their third hypostasis the animated world, or mundane soul. Which, not only too great a leap betwixt the second and third, but also a gross debasement of the Deity, and confounding it with the creature; a foundation for world-idolatry, and worshipping inanimate things, as parts and members of God. *ibid.*

God to Origen, but *quasi anima mundi*, as it were the soul of the world, and not truly and properly such. All

the perfection of this notion to be attributed to God, but not the imperfection thereof. Page 560, 561

Certain, that, according to the more refined Platonists, their third divine hypostasis, not a mundane, but supramundane soul, and the *ἀνυπερέχουσα*, or *οπισθεὶς* of the whole world. So to *Amelius*, *Porphyrus*, and *Platinus*. A double soul of the world to *Piavo* likewise. The third hypostasis, to these, no creature, but a creator. 562

So in their second particular, (whereby the forementioned Pseudo-Platonick trinity, no trinity) its making all the ideas and archetypal paradigms of things, so many hypostases, animals, and gods. This a monstrous extravagancy. Not to be doubted, but that *Plato* well understood these ideas to be nothing but *Nεῖματα*, or conceptions of the divine mind, existing no-where apart by themselves; however called *ἰδέαι*, *εἴδη*, or *substances*, because not such accidental and evanid things as our human thoughts are, they being the standing and eternal objects of all science: As also *ζῷα*, or *animals*; to signify, that they were not meer dead forms, as pictures upon paper, or carved statues. And thus did not only *Amelius* understand *St. John*, concerning the *Logos*, whatsoever was made was life in him, but also divers of the ancient fathers, Greek and Latin. This deifying of ideas but a piece of Pagan poetry. 562, 563

Lastly, whereas *Proclus* and others intermingle many particular gods with those three universal hypostases, and *Henades* and *Agathotes*, unities and goodnesses, substantial above the first intellect; and *Nous*, particular minds or intellects, above the first soul; this hypothesis of theirs altogether irrational and absurd; there being nothing essentially goodness, wisdom, and sanctity, but the three divine hypostases, all other beings having

only

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only a participation thereof. Thus *Origen* expressly; who therefore acknowledgeth no higher rank of created beings, than such as the Platonists call Souls, that are self-moveable, vitally unmutable to bodies, and peccable. With whom agreeth *S. Jerom*, and others of the fathers, that God is the only impeccable Being; but all understanding creatures, free-willed, and lapsable. Page

Page 564, 565

An opinion of *Simplicius*, that even in that rank of beings called Souls (though not essentially immutable, but self-moveable) some are of so high a pitch, as that they can never degenerate, nor sink or fall into vicious habits. Infomuch that he makes a question, whether *Proceresis* belong to them or no.

565, 566

But whatever is to be thought of this, *Origen* too far in the other extreme, in denying any other ranks of souls above human; and supposing all the difference, that is now betwixt the highest angels, and men, to have proceeded only from their merits, and different uses of their free will; his reason being this, because God would be otherwise a *Prosopoleptes*, or accepter of persons. This also extended by him to the soul of our Saviour Christ; as not partially chosen to that dignity, but for its faithful adherence to the divine word in a præ-existent state; which he would prove from Scripture. But if a rank of souls below human, and specifically differing from them, as *Origen* himself confesses those of brutes to be; no reason, why there might not also be other ranks or species superior to them.

566, 567

But least of all can we assent to *Origen*, when from this principle, that all souls are essentially endowed with free will, and therefore in their nature peccable, he infers those endless circuits of souls, upwards and downwards, and conse-

quently denies them any fixed state of holiness and happiness by divine grace: an assertion contrary to the tenour and promises of the gospel. Thus perhaps that to be understood, that *Christ brought life and immortality to light through the gospel*; not as if he were the first, who taught the soul's immortality, a thing believed before by the Pharisaick Jews, and generality of Pagans; but because these held their endless transmigrations and circuits, therefore was he the first, who brought everlasting life and happiness to light. Page

567, 568

That *Origen*, a man well skilled in the Platonick learning, and so much addicted to the dogmata thereof, would never have gone so far into that other extreme, had there been any solidity of reason for either those *Henades*, or *Noes*, of the latter Platonists. This opinion all one, as if a Christian should suppose, besides the first person, or father, a multitude of particular paternities, superiour to the second person; and also besides the one Son, or Word, a multitude of particular sons or words, superiour to the third, the Holy Ghost. This plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, and to introduce a company of such creaturely gods, as imply a contradiction in their very notion. 568

Lastly, this not the catholick doctrine of the Platonick school neither, but a private opinion only of some late doctors. No footsteps of those *Henades* and *Agatbotetes* to be found any where in *Plato*; nor yet in *Plotinus*. This language little older than *Proclus*. Nor does *Plato* speak of any abstract or separate mind, save only one; his second things about the second, being ideas; as his thirds about the third created beings. *Plotinus* also doubtful and staggering about these *Noes*, he seeming sometimes to make them but the heads or summities of souls. Wherefore

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this Pseudo-Platonick trinity to be exploded, as confounding the differences betwixt God and the creature. Whereas the Christian Trinity homogeneal, all Deity or Creator; all other things being supposed to be the creatures of those three hypostases, and produced by their joint-concurrence and influence; they being all really but one God.

Page 568, 570

Nevertheless, these forementioned depravations and adulterations of that divine Cabala of the trinity, not to be charged upon *Plato* himself, nor all the other ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans; some of which approached so near to the Christian Trinity, as to make their three hypostases all truly divine, and creators, other things being the creatures of them.

ibid.

First therefore, *Plato* himself, in his *Timæus*, carefully distinguisheth betwixt God and the creature, and determineth the bounds of each, after this manner. That the first is that, which *always is, and was never made*; the second, that which *is made and had a beginning*, but truly *is not*. His meaning here perverted by junior Platonists, whom *Boetius* also followed. Where *Plato* takes it for granted, that whatsoever hath a temporary and successive duration, had a beginning; and whatsoever had no beginning, hath no successive, but permanent duration: and so concludes, that whatsoever is eternal, is God; but whatsoever exists in time, and hath a beginning, creature.

570, 572

Now to *Plato*, more eternal gods than one. Which not ideas or *Noëmata*, but true substantial things; his first, second, and third, in his epistle to *Dionysius*, or trinity of divine hypostases, the makers or creators of the whole world. *Cicero's* gods, by whose providence the world and all its parts were framed.

572, 573

The second hypostasis in *Plato's* tri-

nity, to wit, Mind or Intellect, unquestionably eternal, and without beginning. The same affirmed by *Plotinus* also of the third hypostasis, or *Psyche*, called the Word of the second, as the second, the Word of the first. *Porphyrius* his testimony to this purpose in *S. Cyril*; where also Mind, or the second divine hypostasis, (though said to have been begotten from the first, yet) called *ἀποπάτρως*, and *ἀπογένεως*, its own-parent, and its own-offspring, and said to have sprung out *αὐτογένως*, self-begottenly.

Page 573, 574

This mysterious riddle expounded out of *Plotinus*. The plain meaning thereof no more than this, that though this second hypostasis proceeded from the first, yet was it not produced by it after a creaturely manner, nor arbitrarily by will and choice, but in way of natural and necessary emanation. Thus have some Christians ventured to call the *Logos*, *αὐτόθεος*, and *ex seipso Deum*, God from himself.

574, 575

Dionysius Petavius, having declared the doctrine of *Arius*, that the Father was the only eternal God, and the Son, or Word, a creature, made in time, and out of nothing; concludes it undeniably manifest from hence, that *Arius* was a germane, true, and genuine Platonist. Whereas it is most certain from hence, that *Arius* was no Platonist at all; and that *Petavius* himself did not well understand the Platonick doctrine. Had *Plato* denied the eternity of his second hypostasis, called *Nous*, he must have denied the eternity of Wisdom and Understanding it self; this being to him that wisdom by which God himself is wise, and whereby he made the world. With which agreeth also *Athanasius*; our Lord is wisdom, and not second to any other wisdom: and, the Father of the Word is not himself Word: and, that was not Word and Wisdom, which produced Word and Wisdom.

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dom. This in opposition to *Arius*, who maintained another word and wisdom, senior to that word and wisdom in Christ. These Platonists, so far from denying the eternity of the word, that they rather attributed too much to it, in making it self-begotten. Wherefore *Plato*, asserting the eternity of his second hypostasis, *Nous* or *Logos*, and not of the world, did thereby, according to *Athanasius* his own doctrine, make it to be no creature. Page 575

Nor is there any force at all in that testimony of *Macrobius*, cited by *Petavius*, to the contrary, wherein the first hypostasis is said to have created Mind from it self, and the second to have created Soul; because these ancient Pagans did not confine the word *creare* to such a narrow sense, as Christians commonly do; but used it generally for all manner of production. *Petavius* his mistake, chiefly from that spurious trinity of the latter Platonists, whose third god is by themselves called *πρόημα*, a creature. But this not the doctrine of the ancients. 576

Nevertheless, some more reason to doubt, whether *Plato's* third hypostasis were eternal, because in his *Timeus*, he generates the mundane Soul, this controvertedly decided, by supposing a double Psyche, *ἐνκόσμιον*, and *ὑπερέκκοσμιον*, a mundane and supra-mundane soul; the first of these called by *Plotinus*, a heavenly *Venus*, and a separate soul. Wherefore, though the lower *Venus*, or mundane soul, according to *Plato*, made in time together with the world; yet the higher divine Soul, or heavenly *Venus*, the son of *Chronus* without a mother, his third hypostasis, eternal, and without beginning. 576, 577

This further evident from hence, because *Plato*, in his epistle to *Dionysius*, affirmeth as well of the second and third, as of the first, that in all those things that are cognate to our human soul, (or creaturely) there is *ὅτι τοῦτο*, nothing like thereunto. 577

Secondly, the three hypostases of *Plato's* trinity, not only all eternal, but also necessarily existent, and absolutely unannihilable. Nor could the first any more exist without the second and third, than the sun without its primary light, and secondary splendour. These also, according to *Plotinus*, the three principles of the universe; so that there could be neither more, nor fewer. They who called the second *autopator*, signified thereby the necessity of its existence. Page 577, 578

Thirdly, these three Platonick hypostases, as eternal and necessary, so likewise universal, or comprehensive of the whole world, that is, infinite and omnipotent. Therefore called principles and causes, and opificers. Though *Nous*, or *Mind*, vulgarly looked upon as the highest principle of all things, yet *Plato* set before it one most simple Good. When *Nous*, said by *Plato* to be *γένεσις*, of the same kind with the first Cause of all things, this all one as if he had affirmed it to be *συσχέσις*, co-essential or con-substantial with it. 578, 579

Plato's third hypostasis, *Psyche* or the superior, mundane Soul, called by him *Zeus*, from *ζῆν*, as also the Cause and Fountain of life, and the Prince and King of all things. And when said to be *ἰχθυος*, the Offspring of the highest Mind, thereby made consubstantial with it also. So that *Plato's* whole trinity *Homocousan*. 579

Though by the *Demiurgus* or *Opificer* *Plato* commonly meant the second hypostasis, Mind or Intellect; yet *Atticus*, *Amelius*, *Plotinus* and others, called the third, or the higher *Psyche* also, by that name. Wherefore, according to the genuine Platonick, and *Parmenidian* trinity, all the three hypostases joint-creatures of the whole world. Thus *Ficinus* often, and *Proclus*. *Porphyrius* his affirmation, that the Deity, according

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to *Plato*, extends to three hypostases

Page 579

Certain therefore, that *Arius* did not Platonize, but rather *Abanesius* and the Nicene fathers; who, notwithstanding, made not *Plato*, but the Scriptures, their foundation. The genuine trinity of *Plato* and *Parmenides*, a middle betwixt that of *Sabellius*, and that of *Arius*; it being neither a trinity of words and names as the former; nor an heteroousious trinity, a confused jumble of God and the creature together; but homoousious and homogeneal: all eternal, necessarily existent, infinite or omnipotent, and creator.

579, 580

But that it may yet more fully appear, how far the most refined Platonick and Parmenidian trinity does either agree, or disagree, with the Scripture and Christian doctrine, two things further to be observed concerning it. First, that the Platonists univversally asserted an essential dependence of their second and third hypostases upon the first, as also a gradual subordination in them. Thus *Platinus*; *Chronos*, or the second hypostasis, is in a middle state betwixt his father, who is greater, and his son, who is inferiour. And that in this eternal generation or emanation no progress upward, but all downward, and a gradual descent.

580, 581

More of the dependence and gradual subordination of the second and third hypostases of the Platonick trinity to the first. Each following hypostasis called *ἴχνος* a *τύπος* and *εἰκών*, and *εἰδολον*, and *μίμημα* of that before it. *Philo's* offensive expression, that the *Logos*, or *Word*, is the shadow of God. This gradation commonly illustrated by the *ἐλαμπύρις*, or *ἀπαύγαυα*, the *effulgency*, or *out-shining splendour of the sun*.

581, 582

The same further manifested from the several distinctive characters given to each hypostasis, in the true Platonick,

or Parmenidian trinity. The first, *ἐν πρὸ πάντων*, *one before all things*; the second, *ἐν παντί*, *one all things*; as to their distinct ideas; the third, *ἐν καὶ πάντων*, *one really producing all things*. The first, Unity and Goodness essential; the second, Understanding and Wisdom; the third, self-active Love and Power. The first, or Father *ἀνεσίγοντος*, *above action*; the second or Son, the *Demiurgus*, *the Maker or contriving Architect of the world*, but an immoveable nature; the third a moveable Deity, and the immediate governor of the whole world. *Amelius* his distinction of them into *τὸν ὄντα τὸν ἕντα*, *τὸν ὄντα*.

582, 583

The greatest difficulty in the distinctive characters of these three Platonick hypostases; that Understanding, Reason and Wisdom, should be made peculiar to the second, as if the first were therefore devoid of Mind, Reason and Wisdom. This an arcanum of the Platonick and Pythagorick theology; that whereas *Anaxagoras*, *Aristotle*, and the vulgar, make Mind and Understanding the oldest of all things, and the highest principle in the universe; this supposes Mind, Knowledge and Wisdom, to be not the first, but second. Partly because there is multiplicity in Knowledge, but there must be unity before multiplicity. And partly because there must be *Νῦν* before *Νῦν*; *an Object* or *Intelligible* before *Intellect*. As also, because Intellection, or Knowledge, is not the highest good, or happiness; and therefore to be some substantial thing, in order of nature superiour to Mind. Hence concluded, that the supreme Deity is better than *Logos*, *Reason*, *Word*, or *Intellect*. That not *Logos*, from whence *Logos* is derived. Thus *Philo*; The God before Reason, or Word, better than all the rational nature. But this difficulty common to Platonism with Christianity; which likewise makes Word, or Reason and Wisdom, not

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the first, but second hypostasis. Thus does *Ambrosius* deny, that there is any word, reason, or wisdom, before the Son of God. What then? Is the first hypostasis therefore *ἄνευ* and *ἄλογος*, devoid of reason and mind? *Plotinus* his attempt to answer this; that the first hath *φῶς ἀπλόον*, a simple light, different from that multiform light of knowledge. Again, that the first is *νόησις αὐτὴ*, intelligence itself, and therefore superiour to intellect, or that which hath intellection. (For *ἡ νόησις ἑ νῆσι*, intelligence it self doth not understand.) Besides which, another attempt also to solve this difficulty. Page 585, 586

The ground of this Platonick dependence and subordination in the divine hypostases; because there is but one fountain of the Godhead; so that the second must needs differ from the first, as the *ἀπαύρασμα* from the *φῶς*, the splendor from the sun. 586, 587

Though the second hypostasis said to have been begotten from the first; yet this not to be taken for such a generation, as that of men, where three men, (father, son, and grandson) all adult, have no essential dependence upon one another, nor gradual subordination. This but an imperfect generation. 587

Furthermore, the Platonists would recommend this their gradation in the Deity, or subordination of hypostases, from hence, because by this means, not so great a leap or jump in the creation, as otherwise there must be; nor the whole Deity screwed up to such a disproportionate height, as would render it incapable of having any intercourse with the lower world. Were the whole Deity, either one simple Monad, or else an immoveable Mind, it could have no such liberty of will as is commonly attributed to it, nor be affectible with any thing here below; nor indeed any fitter object for men's devotion, than an adamantine rock. Where-

as all the phenomena of the Deity solvable by this Platonick gradation.

Page 587, 588

As also, according to this hypothesis, some reasonable satisfaction to be given, why just so many divine hypostases, and neither fewer, nor more. 588

The second thing to be observed, concerning the genuine Platonick, or Parmenidian trinity; that though the hypostases thereof be called three Natures, and three Principles, and three Officers, and three Gods; yet they all really make up but one Divinity. For the world, being created by all three, and yet having but one creation, they must needs be all one Creator. *Porphyrus* in *S. Cyril* explicitly, that, according to *Plato*, the essence of the Deity extendeth to three hypostases. 588, 589

Platonists further add, that were it not for this essential dependence, and subordination, the three divine hypostases must needs be three co-ordinate gods; and no more one god, than three men are one man, or three suns one sun. Whereas the sun, its splendor, and derivative light, may all well be accounted one and the same thing. 589,

589

These Platonists therefore suppose so close a union, and so near a conjunction, betwixt their three hypostases; as no where else to be found in nature. *Plotinus*, that there is nothing between them, and that they are only not the very same. They acknowledge also their Perichoresis or mutual inexistence. The three hypostases one divinity to the Platonists, in the same manner, as the centre, radius distance immoveable, and moveable circumference of a sphere, all one sphere. The first infinite Goodness, the second infinite Wisdom, the third infinite active Love, and power substantial. 590, 591

From this full account of the true and.

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and genuine Platonick trinity, its both agreement and disagreement with the Christian, plainly appeareth. First, its agreement in the three fundamental things before mentioned; and consequently its discrepance from Arianism.

Page 591, 592

Secondly, its disagreement notwithstanding, from the now-recited doctrine, in that it supposes the three hypostases not to have one and the same singular essence, nor yet an absolute co-equality, but a gradual subordination, and essential dependence. Upon which account, said by some, to symbolize with Arianism, however different from it in the main point.

592

Besides which, the best of the Platonists, sometimes guilty of extravagant expressions. *Plotinus* his *ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἴσμεν*, that our human soul is of the same species with the mundane soul, or *bird hypostasis*; that being but the elder sister. Which indeed is to make it co-essential or consubstantial with us men, as *S. Austin* understood it. This a foundation for creature-worship or idolatry. Why the Arians by *Constantine* called *Porphyrianists*. But this doctrine, as repugnant to *Plato*, so elsewhere contradicted by *Plotinus* himself.

593, 594

That notwithstanding, a Platonick Christian would apologize for *Plato* and the genuine Pythagoreans, after this manner. First, that having no scriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct them in the darkness of this mystery, and to guide their language, they the more excusable, if not always uniform, and sometimes extravagant. More to be wondred at, that they should approach so near the Christian truth.

594, 595

And for their gradual subordination of hypostases, and dependence of the second and third upon the first; that these Platonists herein the more excusable, because the majority of Christian

doctors, for the first three centuries, seem to have asserted the same. Page 595, 596

The Platonick Christians further apology; that the Platonists intention in subordinating their three hypostases, only to exclude a plurality of co-ordinate independent gods. That none of *Plato's* three hypostases, creatures, but that the essence of the godhead belongeth to them all; they being all eternal, necessarily existent, infinite, or omnipotent, and creators. Therefore in the sense of the *Nicene* council, consubstantial and co-equal. The essence of the godhead, wherein all the three hypostases agree, as well to the fathers, as Platonists, general and universal.

596, 597

Besides which, the genuine Platonists would acknowledge also, all their three hypostases to be homoousian, co-essential or consubstantial, yet in a further sense, as making up one entire divinity: as the root, stock and branches co-essential to a vine. The Trinity not so undivided, as if three were not three in it. The inequality and subordination in the Platonick Trinity, within the Deity it self only, and in the relation of the hypostases to one another; they being *ad extrâ* all one and the same God, jointly concurring in the same actions, and in that respect, devoid of inequality.

597, 598

Furthermore, the Platonick Christian would urge, that according to the principles of Christianity it self, there must needs be some dependence and subordination in these hypostases, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority of order and dignity: that which is originally of it self, having some kind of priority and superiority, over that which is wholly derived from it. The second and third hypostases, not so omnipotent as the first, because not able to beget or produce that.

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Hence first styled by *Macrobius*, the *most omnipotent of all*. Sundry passages in Scripture favouring this hypothesis, as also orthodox fathers. *Abanafius* his resemblances to the original light and the secondary splendour; to the fountain and the stream, the root and the branch, the water and the vapour. The equality asserted by the orthodox, in way of opposition to the Arian inequality of God and creature; that they equally God, or uncreated. Notwithstanding which, some inequality amongst them allowed by *Petavius* and others, as this God, and that person.

Page 599, 600

However, no necessity of any more inequality and subordination in the Platonick, than in the Christian Trinity; they being but infinite goodness, and infinite wisdom, and infinite active love, and power substantial. Another hypothesis of some Platonists, hinted by *S. Austin* out of *Porphyry*, which makes the third hypostasis a middle betwixt the first and second; and implies, not so much a gradation, as a circulation in the trinity.

600, 601

As for the Platonists supposing their three hypostases (though one entire divinity) to have their distinct singular essences, without which they conceive they could be nothing but three names; the Platonick Christian would make this apology, that the orthodox fathers themselves were generally of this persuasion, that the essence of the Godhead, wherein all the three persons agree, not one singular, but only one common or universal essence. Their distinction to this purpose, betwixt *θεῖα* and *ὑπόστασις*; that the former was common or general, the latter singular or individual. *Theodoret*, *Basil*, and many others. *Petavius* his acknowledgment, that the Greeks universally agreed herein.

601, 602

The opinion of *Gregory Nyssen*, *Cyriel*, *Damascen*, and others, that the persons of the Trinity no otherways one, than as three individuals under the same species, or as three men agree in the same common humanity. These the chief asserters of an absolute, independent, and un subordinate co equality. This the only fault, that *S. Cyril* finds in the Platonists, that they did not assert such a consubstantiality. Whereas this trinity, tritheism; the three persons thereof being no more one God, than three men are one man; however this certain, that these fathers did not suppose, the three hypostases of the trinity to have all the same singular essence. Another extreme, that sprung up afterwards in the room of the former tritheism, and owned by no other authority, than of a Lateran council.

Page 603, 604

And that this sameness of singular essence was not asserted by the Nicene fathers, and first opposers of *Arius*; first, clearly acknowledged by *Petavius*:

604, 605

But this further evident from hence; because the same orthodox fathers, who opposed Arianism, did also condemn Sabellianism; which asserted, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be but one hypostasis, that is, to have but one and the same singular essence; and consequently acknowledged no other Trinity than of names or words.

605

It appeareth also from hence, because the word Homousious had never any other sense, than to signify the agreement of things numerically differing, in some common and general nature or essence. *S. Basil*, that the same thing is not homousious, co-essential, or consubstantial with it self; but always one thing with another. *Τὸ ὁμοῦσιον τὸ ἴδιον* the same with *ὁὐ γίνετα* in *Plotinus*. So also in *Atbanafius*, he affirming the branches to be ho-

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mousious

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homousious and congenerous with the root. Besides which, ὁμογενής, ὁμοειδής, and ὁμοφύης, used by *Abanafius*, and others, as synonymous with ὁμοούσιος. None of which words signify an identity of singular essence, but general or universal only. The council of *Chalcedon*, that our Saviour Christ, as to his humanity, was homousious or consubstantial with us men. Thus does *Abanafius* deny, the Son or Word, as such, to be homousious or consubstantial with creatures; as also he affirmeth men to be consubstantial with one another, every son consubstantial and co-essential with his father. Page 605, 606

Moreover the sense of the Nicene fathers, in their consubstantiality, may more fully appear from the doctrine of *Arius* opposed by them; which made the Son a creature, and therefore (as *Abanefus* writeth) ἑτεροδίου ἢ ἀλλοτριούσιον, of a different essence or substance from the father. Proved clearly from *Abanafius*, that by the consubstantiality of the word was meant no more, than its being not a creature, or uncreated. 606, 608

Further proof, out of *Abanefus*, that by consubstantiality is not meant a sameness of singular, but only of general essence. As also out of *S. Austin*. 608, 611

Lastly, that the homousious fathers did not assert, against *Arius*, a sameness of singular essence, evident from their disclaiming those two other words, ταυτόσιον, and μονούσιον, (as having a Sabellian sense in them,) the former by *Epiphanius*, the latter by *Abanefus*. So that they, who asserted the Son to be homousious, consubstantial with the Father, denied him to be monousious, or tautousious, that is, to have the same singular essence. 612, 613

From all these considerations, concluded by the Platonick Christian, that

as the genuine Trinity of *Plato* agreed with that of the orthodox Christians, in being not heterousious, but homousious, co-essential or consubstantial; not made up of God and creature, but all homogeneous of uncreated, or creator: so did the Trinity of the first orthodox Antiarrians herein agree with the Platonick Trinity, that it was not monousious, or tautousious, one and the same singular essence, under three names or notions only; but really three hypostases or persons. Page 612

Nevertheless, here remaineth a question to be answered; whether *Abanefus*, the Nicene fathers, and all the first Antiarrians did therefore assert the same thing with *Greg. Nyssen*, *Cyril*, and others, that the three persons in the Trinity were but three co-ordinate individuals, under the same species, having only a specifick unity or identity, (besides consent of will;) or that they all agree in the uncreated Nature only. This grossly asserted in the dialogues of the Trinity, vulgarly imputed to *Abanefus*, and to that purpose also, that three men are not three men, but only then, when they dissent from one another in will and opinion. But these dialogues pseudepigraphous. Nevertheless to be granted, that *Abanefus* himself, in that book of the common essence of the persons, seems to lay something too much stress upon this common nature, essence, or substance, of the three persons, as to the making of them all but one God. However, it is certain, he does not there rely upon that alone; and elsewhere acknowledgeth it to be insufficient. The true reason, why *Abanefus* laid so great a stress upon the Homousiotes, not because this alone would make them one God, but because they could not possibly be one God without it. For if the Father be uncreated, and the Son a creature, then can

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can they not both be one God. Several passages of *Albanafus* cited to this purpose. Those expressions in him of one Godhead, and the sameness of the Godhead, and one essence or substance in the Trinity, not so to be understood, as if the three persons were but several names, notions, or modes of one thing.

Page 612, 616

Wherefore, though *Albanafus* lay his foundation in this *εἰδικὴ ἐνότης*, *common specifick unity of the persons*, (which is their consubstantiality,) in order to their being one God; yet does he superadd other considerations also thereunto. As first of all this, that they are not three principles, but only one; the essence of the father being the root and fountain of the Son and Spirit; and the three hypostases, gathered together under one head. Where *Albanafus* implies, that, were they perfectly co-ordinate and independent, they would not be one, but three gods. 616

In the next place, he further addeth, that these three hypostases are not three separated disjoined things, but indivisibly united; as the splendour is indivisible from the sun, and wisdom from him that is wise. That neither of these persons could be without the other; nor any thing come between them: they so immediately conjoined together, as that there is a kind of *συνέχεια*, or *continuity* betwixt them. 616, 617

Thirdly, *Albanafus* goes yet higher; affirming these three hypostases, not only to be indivisibly conjoined, but also to have a mutual inexistence in each other. This afterwards called an Emperichorefsis. That of our Saviour, *I am in the Father, and the Father in me*, therefore quarrelled at by the Arians, because they conceived of things incorporeal, after a corporeal manner. That the Godhead of the Son, is the Godhead of the Father; and the Father

3

exercises a providence over all, in the Son.

Page 617, 619

Lastly, *Albanafus* also in sundry places, supposes the three divine hypostases to make up one entire divinity; as the fountain and the stream make up one entire river; the root, stock, and branches, one entire tree. Accordingly the word *Homoousios* used by *Albanafus*, in a further sense, not only to signify things agreeing in one common and general essence, but also such as essentially concur to the making up of one entire thing. That the three hypostases do outwardly, or *ad extra*, produce all, *μία ἐπέργειαν*, *one and the self-same action*; the Father, by the Word, in the Holy Spirit, doing all things. That all this doctrine of *Albanafus* would have been readily assented to by *Plato* and his genuine followers. The Platonick Christian therefore concludeth, that there is no such real difference betwixt the genuine Platonick trinity, and that of the first orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, as some conceive. From which notwithstanding that tritheistick Trinity, of *S. Greg. Nyssen*, *Cyril*, and others, of three co-ordinate individuals under the same species, (as three men) seems to have been a deviation. 619, 620

Hitherto the Platonick Christians apology, for the genuine Platonick Trinity; or endeavour to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church: where nothing is asserted by our selves, but all submitted to the judgment of the learned in these matters. And whatsoever in *Plato's* trinity shall be found discrepant from the sense of the first orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, utterly disclaimed by us. *Albanafus* a great instrument of divine providence, for preserving the Christian Church from lapsing into a kind of paganick and idolatrous Christianity. *ibid.*

The reason of this apology, for the genuine

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genuine Platonick trinity ; because it is against the interest of Christianity, that this should be made more discrepant from the Christians, than indeed it is. Moreover certain, that this genuine Platonick trinity was Anti-Arian ; or rather the Arian Anti-Platonick. Wherefore *Socrates* wondered, that *Georgius* and *Timotheus* Presbyters should adhere to the Arian faction ; when one of them was accounted much a Platonist, the other an Origenist. Page 620, 621

Furthermore, Platonick Pagans, after Christianity, highly approved of the beginning of *St. John's* Gospel concerning the *Logos*, as exactly agreeing with their Platonick doctrine. Thus *Amelius* in *Eusebius*, and others. A Platonist in *S. Austin*, that it deserved to be writ in golden letters, and set up in some eminent places in every Christian church. But that, which is most of all considerable, to justify this apology, the generality of Christian fathers, before and after the Nicene council, looked upon this Platonick trinity, if not as really the same thing with the Christian, yet as approaching so near thereunto, that it differed chiefly in circumstances, or manner of expression. Thus *Justin Martyr*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Origen*, *St. Cyprian*, or the author of the book *De Spiritu Sancto*, *Eusebius Cesariensis*, and, which is most of all to the purpose, *Athanasius* himself, he giving a signal testimony thereunto. To which may be added *S. Austin* and *Theodoret*. *S. Cyril*, though blaming the Platonick subordination, (himself supposing the Trinity to be three co-ordinate individuals, under the same specifick nature of the Godhead) yet acknowledges, that *Plato* was not altogether ignorant of the truth, &c. But that *Plato's* subordination, of his second hypostasis to the first, was not (as the Arian) of a creature to the

Creator ; already made unquestionably evident. Page 621, 625

Wherefore a wonderful providence of Almighty God here to be taken notice of ; that this doctrine, of a trinity of divine hypostases, should be entertained in the Pagan world before Christianity, as it were to prepare a way for the reception of it amongst the learned. Which the junior Platonists were so sensible of, that besides their other adulterations of the Platonick trinity before mentioned, (for the countenancing of their polytheism and idolatry) they at length innovated and altered the whole Cabala, now no longer acknowledging a trinity, but at least a quaternity of divine hypostases ; namely, before and besides the trinity, another hypostasis superiour thereunto, and standing alone by it self. This first started by *Jamblichus*, carried on by *Proclus*, taken notice of by *St. Cyril* : besides which, *Proclus* also added other phantastick trinities of his own. 625, 627

Another advantage of this Platonick trinity, extending to the present time ; perhaps not unintended also by divine providence, to abate the confidence of those conceited wits, who so boldly decry the Trinity for nonsense, absolute contradiction to reason, and impossibility, when they shall find, that the best and freest wits amongst the Pagans, though having no Scripture-revelation to impose upon them, were yet fond of this hypothesis. 627

And now it sufficiently appears, that the ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans were not to be taxed for polytheists and idolaters, in giving religious worship to their three divine hypostases. One grand design of Christianity, to free the world from idolatry and creature-worship : and this the reason, why the ancient fathers so zealously opposed Arianism, because it thwarted that

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that design, it paganizing and idolatring that, which was intended for the unpaganizing of the world. One remarkable passage of *Atbanafius* to this purpose. Page 627, 629

Where first obfervable, that *Atbanafius* exprefly affirmeth the Pagans to have worfhipped only one uncreated, and many created Gods. Thus *Greg. Naz.* that there was but one divinity amongft the Pagans alfo. And *Irenaeus*, that they attributed the firft place of the Deity to one fupreme God, the maker of this univerfe. And fecondly, that to *Atbanafius*, and all thofe other fathers, who charged the Arians with idolatry, this was fuppofed not to confift in worfhipping many independent and felf-exiftent Gods, but in giving religious worfhip to creatures: as the Arians gave a religious worfhip to the Son or Word, fuppofed by themfelves to be but a creature. 629, 630

But if Arians guilty of polytheifm or idolatry, for beftowing religious worfhip upon the Son or Word, as a creature, (though the chief of creatures, and that, by which all others were made) much more they guilty hereof, who religiously worfhipped other inferiour beings. *Atbanafius*; That no creature the object of religious worfhip, and that the Orthodox worfhipped the divinity in the humanity of our Saviour *Chrift*. *Neftorius* branded with the name of a man-worfhipper. Some fuppofe that neceffary to idolatry, which is impoffible, to worfhip more than one, as omnipotent, or with mental *larva*. 630, 632

And now have we fufficiently answered the objection againft the naturalty of the idea of a God, as including onelinet in it, from the Pagan polytheifm. What farther here intended concerning the fame, (as a foundation for our defence of *Chriftianity*) differed, to make room for a confutation of all the atheiftick arguments.

A particular confutation of all the atheiftick grounds.

THE firft atheiftick argument; That there is no idea of God. That in answer to this, the idea of God hath been already declared; viz. a perfect, understanding Being, unmade, or felf-exiftent from eternity, and the caufe of all other things, in which, nothing unconceivable, nor contradictory. That thefe confounded Atheifts themfelves, who deny, that there is any idea of God at all, muft notwithstanding, of neceffity, fuppofe the contrary; becaufe otherwife, denying his exiftence, they fhould deny the exiftence of nothing. And that they agree alfo with Theifts in the fame idea; the one denying the exiftence of that, which the other affirmeth, That an understanding Nature is the original of all things. This idea of God, as containing onelinet and fingularity in it, not only largely defended and made good againft that objection from the Pagan polytheifm; but alfo proved, that the generality of mankind have a natural *propensity* or *anticipation* in their minds concerning the real and actual exiftence of fuch a Being. Atheifts but monfters, and anomalies of mankind. This a fufficient confutation of the firft atheiftick argument. Page 633, 634

Nevertheless, That Atheifts may not pretend, any of their ftrength to be concealed; all their particular exceptions againft the idea of God here declared, being five. Their firft exception, That we can have no idea nor thought of any thing not fubject to fenfe; much lefs any evidence of the exiftence thereof. The answer. Firft, That whereas the Atheifts fuppofe Senfe

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to be the only Knowledge, or at least original Knowledge; Sense, as such, is not Knowledge, or Understanding; because if it were, then every one; that feels light and colours, or feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold. Plainly proved also from that atomick philosophy, (which the Epicurean Atheists so much pretend to,) that there is a higher faculty of the soul, which judges of sense, detects the phantastry thereof, resolves sensible things into intelligible principles, &c. No passion able to make a judgment, either of it self, or of other things. The confounded *Democritus* himself sometimes acknowledged Sense to be but seeming and phantasy, and not to reach to the absolute truth and reality of things. He therefore exploded qualities out of the rank of entities, because unintelligible; concluding them to be but our own phantasms. Undeniably evident, that we have ideas, notions, and thoughts of many things, that never were in Sense, and whereof we have no genuine phantasms. Atheists attend not to their own cogitations. That opinion, That there is nothing in the understanding, which was not before in Sense, false and atheistical. Men having a notion of a perfect, understanding Being, the cause of all things, as the object of their devotion; the Atheists, notwithstanding, would here persuade them, that they have none, and that the thing is a non-entity, merely because they have no sensible idea, or phantasm thereof. And so may they as well prove, not only Reason and Understanding, Appetite and Volition, to be non-entities, but also Phancy and Sense it self; neither of these falling under Sense, but only the objects of them. Were God indeed corporeal, as some mistaken Theists suppose, yet his essence chiefly consisting in Mind and Understanding, this of him could not possibly be subject to

Sense. But that there is also substance incorporeal, which therefore in its own nature is insensible, and that the Deity is such, will be elsewhere demonstrated.

Page 634, 637

Though the evidence of singular bodies existing, depend upon the information of Sense, yet the certainty of this very evidence, not from Sense alone, but a complication of Reason and Understanding with it. Sense phantastical, not reaching to the absolute truth of things; and obnoxious to delusion. Our own imaginations, taken for sensations and realities, in sleep, and by melancholized persons, when awake. Atomick Atheists themselves assert the existence of such things, as they have no sense of; atoms, membranes, or exuvius images of bodies, nay incorporeal space. If the existence of nothing, to be acknowledged, which falls not under Sense, then not the existence of Soul and Mind. God the great Mind, that rules the whole universe; whence our imperfect minds derived. The existence of that God, whom no eye can see, demonstrated by reason from his effects. 637.

638

The second atheistical pretence against the idea of God, and his existence, from Theists own acknowledging him to be incomprehensible; from whence they infer him to be a non-entity. Here perhaps it may be granted, in a right sense, that whatsoever is altogether unconceivable, is either in it self, or at least to us, Nothing. How that of *Protagoras*, That every man is the measure of all things to himself, in his sense false. Whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot clearly comprehend, not therefore to be presently expunged out of the catalogue of beings. Nevertheless, according to *Aristotle*, the Soul and Mind in a manner all things. This a crystalline globe, or notional world, that hath some image

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in it of whatsoever is contained in the real globe of being. Page 638

But this absolutely false; That whatsoever cannot be fully comprehended by us, is therefore utterly unconceivable and consequently nothing. For we cannot fully comprehend our selves, nor have such an adequate conception of any substance, as perfectly to master and conquer the same. That of the Scepticks so far true, That there is something incomprehensible in the essence of every thing, even of body it self. Truth bigger than our Minds. Proper to God Almighty, (who alone is wise,) perfectly to comprehend the essences of all things. But it follows not from hence, that therefore we have no idea nor conception at all of any thing. We may have a notion or idea of a perfect Being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same by our imperfect minds; as we may see and touch a mountain, though we cannot enclasp it all round within our Arms. This therefore a false theorem of the Atheists, That whatsoever cannot be fully comprehended by Men's imperfect understandings, is an absolute non-entity. 638, 639

Though God more incomprehensible than other things, because of his transcendent perfection, yet hath he also more of conceptibility: as the sun, dazzling our sight, yet hath more of visibility also, than any other object. The dark incomprehensibility of the Deity, like the azure obscurity of the transparent aether, not any thing absolutely in it self, but only relative to us. 639, 640

This incomprehensibility of the Deity, so far from being an argument against its existence, that certain, on the contrary, were there nothing incomprehensible to our imperfect minds, there could be no God. Every thing apprehended by some internal congruity. The scantiness and imperfection of our narrow un-

derstandings must needs make them asymmetrall or incommensurate to what absolutely perfect. Page 640

Nature it self intimates, that there is something vastly bigger than our mind and thoughts, by those passions implanted in us, of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, with ecstasy and pleasing horror. That of the Deity, which cannot enter into the narrow vessels of our minds, must be otherwise apprehended, by their being plunged into it, or swallowed up, and lost in it. We have a notion or conception of a perfect Being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same; because our selves being imperfect, must needs be incommensurate thereunto. Thus no reason at all, in the second atheistick pretence, against the idea of God, and his existence; from his confessed incomprehensibility. *ibid.*

The third follows, that infinity, supposed to be essential to the Deity, is a thing perfectly unconceivable, and therefore an impossibility and non-entity. Some passages of a modern writer to this purpose. The meaning of them, That there is nothing of philosophick truth in the idea or attributes of God, nor any other sense in the words, than only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own minds. That the word infinite signifies nothing in the thing it self so called, but only the inability of our understandings, and admiration. And since God, by Theists, is denied to be finite, but cannot be infinite, therefore an unconceivable nothing. Thus another learned well-willer to atheism, That we have no idea of infinite, and therefore not of God. Which, in the language of Atheists, all one as to say, that he is a non-entity. 640, 641

Answer. This argument, That there can be nothing infinite, and therefore no God, proper to the modern and neoterick Atheists only; but repugnant to the

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the sense of the ancients. *Anaximander's* ∞ , *infinite matter*, though *Melissus* his *Απειρον* the true Deity. Formerly both Theists and Atheists agreed in this; that there must be something or other infinite, either an infinite Mind, or infinite matter. The ancient Atheists also asserted a numerical infinity of worlds. Thus do Atheists confute or contradict Atheists. Page 641, 642

That the modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason also, and their very selves, than they do their predecessors, when they would disprove a God from hence, because there can be nothing infinite. For first, certain, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal without beginning; because, if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. But hardly any Atheists can be so foolish, as in good earnest to think there was once nothing at all, but afterwards senseless matter happened to be. Notorious impudence in them, who assert the eternity of matter, to make this an argument against the existence of a God; because infinite duration without beginning, an impossibility. 642, 643

A concession to the Atheists of these two things; That we neither have a phantasm of any infinite, because there was never any in sense; and that infinity is not fully comprehensible by finite understandings neither. But since, mathematically certain, that there was something infinite in duration, demonstrated from hence, against Atheists, That there is something really existing, which we have neither any phantasm of, nor yet can fully comprehend in our Minds. *ibid.*

Further granted, that as for infinity of number, magnitude, and time, without beginning; as we have no phantasm, nor full comprehension of them, so have we neither any intelligible idea, notion, or conception: from whence it

may be concluded, that they are non-entities. Number infinite in *Aristotle*, only in a negative sense, because we can never come to an end thereof by addition. For which very reason also there cannot possibly be any number positively infinite, since one or more may always be added. No magnitude so great neither, but that a greater may be supposed. By infinite space, to be understood nothing but a possibility of more and more body, further and further infinitely, by divine power; or that the world could never be made so great, as that God was not able to make it still greater. This potential infinity, or indefinity of body, seems to be mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Lastly, no infinity of time past, because then there must needs be time past, which never was present. An argument of a modern Writer. Reason therefore concludes, neither world, nor time, to have been infinite in past duration. Page 643, 644

Here will the Atheist think he has got a great advantage for disproving the existence of a God; they, who thus take away the eternity of the world, taking away also the eternity of a God. As if God could not be eternal otherwise, than by a successive flux of infinite time.

But we say, that this affordeth a demonstration of a God; because, since both the world and time had a beginning, there must of necessity be something, whose duration is not successive; but permanent, which was the Creator of them both. Wherefore the Atheists can here only make grimaces, and quibble upon *nunc-stans*; as if this standing eternity of the Deity was nothing but a pitiful moment of time standing still; and as if all duration must needs be the same with ours, &c. 644, 645

Concluded, that infinite and eternal are not words which signify nothing in the thing it self, but only the idle progress of our minds, or our own ignorance

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rance, stupid astonishment and veneration: not mere attributes of honour and complement, but attributes belonging to the Deity, (and that alone) of the most philosophick truth. And though we have no adequate comprehension thereof, yet must we have some notion of that, which we can demonstrate to be long to something. Page 645, 646

But the thing, which the Atheists principally quarrel with, is infinite power, or omnipotence; which they pretend also to be utterly unconceivable, and impossible, and a name of nothing. Where indeed our modern Atheists have the joint suffrage of the ancients also, who concerned themselves in nothing more than disproving omnipotence, or infinite power. *ib.*

This omnipotence, either wilfully or ignorantly misrepresented by Atheists, as if it were a power of doing things contradictory. An irony of a modern Atheist, that God could turn a tree into a syllogism. The absurd Doctrine of *Cartesius*, that God could have made twice two not to have been four; or the three angles of a triangle not to have been equal to two right. This to make one attribute of the Deity devour and destroy another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. To suppose God to understand and be wise only by will, really to give him no understanding at all. God not so omnipotent, as that he can destroy the intelligible natures of things; which were to baffle and besool his own wisdom. Infinite power, that which can do all that is possible; that is, conceivable, or implies no contradiction. The very essence of possibility, conceivability. And thus all the ancient Theists. Absurd for Atheists to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is unconceivable. *ibid.* 646

But because Atheists look upon infinity as such a *norma*, we shall take off

the vizard from it; by declaring, that it is really nothing else but perfection. Infinite understanding and knowledge, perfect understanding, without any defect, and the knowledge of all things knowable. Infinite power, perfect power, or a power of doing all things possible. Infinite duration, perfection of essence. Because infinity, perfection; therefore nothing, which includeth any thing of imperfection in the essence of it, can be truly and properly infinite; as number, magnitude and time: all which can but counterfeit infinity. Nothing one way infinite, which is not so every way, or a perfect Being. Page 647, 648

Now, that we have an idea of perfection, plain from that of imperfection. Perfection first in order of nature, as the rule and measure. This not the want of imperfection, but imperfection the want of perfection. A scale, or ladder of perfections in nature, perceived by means of that idea, which we have of a Being absolutely perfect, the measure of them. Without which, we could not take notice of imperfection, in the most perfect of all those things which we ever had sense of. *Boëthius*; That whatsoever is imperfect in any kind, implies something in that kind perfect, from whence it was derived. And that the nature of things took not beginning from any thing incompleat and imperfect; but descended downward, from what was absolutely perfect, by steps and degrees, lower and lower. 648

Wherefore, since infinite the same with perfect, we having a notion of the latter must needs have of the former. And though the word infinite be negative, yet is the sense positive. Finite the negation of infinite, as which, in order of nature is before it; and not infinite of finite. However, in things incapable of true infinity; infinity being here a mere imaginary thing and non-entity, can be only conceived by the

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negation of finite, as nothing is, by the negation of something. An infinite being nothing but a perfect being, such as never was not, and could produce all things possible, or conceivable. Page 648, 649

The fourth atheistical pretence against the idea of God; That it is an arbitrary complement of contradictory notions. Where first we deny not, but that as some religionists extend the divine power to things contradictory, so may others compound contradictions together in the nature of the Deity. But it does not follow from thence, that theology itself is therefore contradictory, no more than that philosophy is so, because some philosophers also hold contradictory things; or that nothing is absolutely true, neither in divinity, nor philosophy, but all seeming and phantastical; according to the Protagorean doctrine. 649, 650

But though it be true, that whatsoever really implies a contradiction, is a non-entity; yet is this rule obnoxious to much abuse, when whatsoever men's shallow understandings cannot reach to, is therefore presently cried down by them, as an impossibility, or nothing. As when the Atheists, and Materialists, explode incorporeal substance upon this pretence; or make it only an attribute of honour, expressing the veneration of men's minds, but signifying nothing in nature, nor having any philosophick truth. But the Atheists' true meaning in this objection, and what kind of contradictions they are, which they impute to all theology, may appear from a passage of a modern writer: namely such as these; when God is said to perceive sensible things, and yet to have no organs of sense; as also to understand, and yet to have no brains. The undisguised meaning of the writer, that religion is not philosophy, but law, and all mere arbitrary constitution; nor God a subject of philosophy, as all real things

are; he being no true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but only of men's brains and phancies; and his attributes signifying neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion, towards what they fear. And so may any thing be said of God, no matter what, so it be agreeable to civil law. But when men mistake attributes of honour for attributes of philosophick truth; that is, when they will suppose such a thing as a God really to exist; then is all absurd nonsense and contradiction. God's understanding without brains, no contradiction. 650, 651

Certain, That no simple idea, as of a triangle, or a square, can be contradictory to itself; much less can the idea of a perfect Being, the most simple of all. This indeed pregnant of many attributes, which, if contradictory, would render the whole a non-entity; but all the genuine attributes of the Deity, as demonstrable of a perfect Being, as the properties of a triangle, or a square; and therefore can neither be contradictory to it, nor one another. 652

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, not only not contradictory, but also all necessarily connected together. *ibid.*

In truth all the attributes of the Deity, but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same perfect Being, taken into our minds, as it were by piece-meal. *ibid.*

The idea of God, neither fictitious, nor factitious. Nothing arbitrary in it; but a most natural and simple idea, to which not the least can be added, nor any thing detracted from it. Nevertheless, may there be different apprehensions concerning God; every one that hath a notion of a perfect Being, not understanding all that belongeth to it; no more than of a triangle, or of a sphere. *ibid.* 653

Concluded therefore, that the attributes

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butes of God, no confounded nonsense of religiously astonished minds, huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and complement; but the attributes of necessary philosophick truth; and such as do not only speak the devotion of men's hearts, but also declare the real nature of the thing. Here the wit of a modern atheistical writer ill-placed. (Though no doubt but some, either out of superstition, or ignorance, may attribute such things to the Deity, as are incongruous to its nature.) Thus the fourth atheistical pretence against the idea of God, confuted.

Page 653, 654

In the next place, the Atheists think themselves concerned, to give an account of this unquestionable phenomenon; the general persuasion of the existence of a God, in the minds of men, and their propensity to religion; whence this should come, if there were no real object for it in nature. And this they would do by imputing it, partly to the confounded nonsense of astonished minds, and partly to the imposture of politicians. Or else to these three things; to men's fear, and to their ignorance of causes; and to the fiction of law-makers and civil sovereigns.

654

In the first of these atheistical origins of religion; That mankind, by reason of their natural imbecillity, are in continual solicitude and fear concerning future events, and their good and evil fortune. And this passion of fear raises up in them for an object to it self, a most frightful phantasm; of an invisible, understanding Being, omnipotent, &c. They afterwards standing in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worshipping the creature of their own fear and phancy.

654

The second atheistical origin of theism and religion; That men having a natural curiosity to inquire into the causes of things, wheresoever they can

discover no visible and natural causes, are prone to feign causes invisible and supernatural. As *Anaxagoras* said, never to have betaken himself to a God, but only when he was at a loss for necessary material causes. Wherefore no wonder, if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes of all, or most things, have betaken themselves to a God, as to a refuge and sanctuary for their ignorance.

654, 655

These two accounts of the phenomenon of religion; from men's fear and solicitude, and from their ignorance of causes and curiosity, joined together by a modern writer. As if the Deity were but a *mormo* or bugbear, raised up by men's fear, in the darkness of their ignorance of causes. The opinion of other ghosts and spirits also deduced from the same original. Men's taking things casual for prognosticks, and being so addicted to omens, portents, prophecies, &c. from a phantastick and timorous supposition, that the things of this world are not disposed of by nature, but by some understanding person.

655

But lest these two accounts of the phenomenon of religion should prove insufficient; the Atheists superadd a third, imputing it also to the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns; who perceiving an advantage to be made from hence, for the better keeping men in subjection, have thereupon dextrously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance; and cherished those seeds of religion in them, from the infirmities of their nature: confirming their belief of Ghosts and spirits, miracles, prodigies, and oracles, by tales, publicly allowed and recommended. And that religion might be every way obnoxious to their designs, have persuaded the people, that themselves were but the interpreters of the gods, from whom they received their laws. Religion an engine of state; to keep men busily employed; entertain their

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minds; render them tame and gentle, apt for subjection and society. Page 655, 656

All this not the invention of modern Atheists. But an old atheistical cabal; That the gods made by fear. *Lucretius*; That the causes of religion, terrour of mind and darkness; and that the empire of the gods owes all its being to men's ignorance of causes, as also, that the opinions of ghosts proceeded from men's not knowing how to distinguish their dreams, and other frightful phanics from sensations. 656, 657

An old atheistical furrize also; That religion a political invention. Thus *Cicero*; The Atheists in *Plato*, That the Gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only. *Critias*, one of the thirty tyrants of *Athens*, his poem to this purpose. 657, 658

That the folly and falseness of these three atheistical pretences, for the origin of religion, will be fully manifested. First, as to that of fear and phancy. Such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly believe the existence of that, for which no manner of ground, neither in sense, nor reason, highly tending also to his own disquiet; nothing less than distraction. Wherefore, the generality of mankind here affirmed by Atheists, to be frighted out of their wits, and distemper'd in their brains; only a few of themselves, who have escap'd this panick terror, remaining sober, or in their right senses. The sobriety of Atheists, nothing but dull stupidity, and dead incredulity; they believing only what they can see or feel. 658

True, that there is a religious fear, consequent upon the belief of a God; as also, that the sense of a Deity is often awakened in men's minds, by their fears and dangers. But religion no creature of fear. None less solicitous about their good and evil fortune than the pious and vertuous; who place not their chief

happines in things aliene, but only in the right use of their own will. Whereas the good of Atheists wholly in things obnoxious to fortune. The timorous complexion of Atheists, from building all their politicks and justice upon the foundation of fear. Page 658, 659

The Atheists grand error here; That the Deity, according to the general sense of mankind, nothing but a *terriculum*, a *formidabile*, *burisful* and *undesirable* thing. Whereas men every where agree in that divine attribute of goodness and benignity. *ibid.*

Φθονοςον το δαιμονιον, in the worst sense, taken by none but a few ill natured men, painting out the Deity according to their own likeness. This condemned by *Aristotle* in the Poets, (he calling them therefore liars) by *Plutarch* in *Herodotus*, as spoken univerally; *Plutarch* himself restraining the sense thereof to his evil principle. *Plato's* ascribing the world to the divine goodness, who therefore made all things most like himself. The true meaning of this proverb; That the Deity affecteth to humble and abase the pride of men. *Lucretius* his hidden force, that hath, as it were, a spite to all overswelling greatneses, could be no other than the Deity. Those amongst Christians, who make the worst representation of God, yet phancy him kind and gracious to themselves. 659,

660

• True, that religion often expressed by the fear of God. Fear *prima mensura Deitatis*, the first impression that religion makes upon men in this laps'd state. But this not a fear of God, as mischievous and hurtful, nor yet as a mere arbitrary Being, but as just, and an impartial punisher of wickedness. *Lucretius* his acknowledging men's fear of God to be conjoined with a conscience of duty. A natural discrimination of good and evil, with a sense of an impartial justice presiding over the world, and both

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both rewarding and punishing. The fear of God, as either a hurtful, or arbitrary and tyrannical being, (which must needs be joined with something of hatred) not religion, but superstition. Fear, faith, and love; three steps and degrees of religion, to the son of *Sirach*. Faith better defined in scripture, than by any scholasticks. God such a Being, as if he were not, nothing more to be wished for. Page 660, 661

The reason, why Atheists thus mistake the notion of God, as a thing only to be feared, and consequently hated; from their own ill-nature and vice. The latter disposing them so much to think, that there is no difference of good and evil by nature, but only by law; which law, contrary to nature, as restraint to liberty. Hence their denying all natural charity, and acknowledging no benevolence, or good-will, but what arises from imbecillity, indigency, and fear. Their friendship at best no other than *mercatura utilitatum*. Wherefore, if there were an omnipotent Deity, this (according to the atheistical hypothesis) could not have so much as that spurious love or benevolence to any thing, because standing in need of nothing, and devoid of fear. Thus *Cotta* in *Cicero*. All this asserted also by a late pretender to politics; he adding thereunto, that God hath no other right of commanding, than his irresistible power; nor men any obligation to obey him, but only from their imbecillity and fear, or because they cannot resist him. Thus do Atheists transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; an omnipotent Being, that hath neither benevolence nor justice in him. This indeed a *vermin*, or bug-bear. 661,

662

But as this a false representation of theism, so the atheistical scene of things most uncomfortable, hopeless and dismal, upon several accounts. True, that no spiteful designs in senseless atoms; in

which regard, *Plutarch* preferred even this atheistical hypothesis before that of an omnipotent, mischievous Being. However, no faith, nor hope neither, in senseless atoms. *Epicurus* his confession, that it was better to believe the fable of the gods, than that material necessity of all things, asserted by the other atheistical physiologers, before himself. But he not at all mending the matter, by his supposed free will. The panick fear of the *Epicureans*, of the frame of heaven's cracking, and this compilement of atoms being dissolved into a Chaos. Atheists running from fear plunge themselves into fear. Atheism, rather than theism, from the imposture of fear, distrust, and disbelief of good. But vice afterwards prevailing in them makes them desire, there should be no God. Page 663, 664

Thus the Atheists, who derive the origin of religion from fear, first put an affrightful vizard upon the Deity, and then conclude it to be but a *vermin* or bugbear, the creature of fear and phancy. More likely of the two, that the opinion of a God, sprung from hope of good than fear of evil; but neither of these true, it owing its being to the imposture of no passion, but supported by the strongest and clearest reason. Nevertheless, a natural *prolepsis*, or *anticipation* of a God also, in men's minds, preventing reason. This called by *Plato* and *Aristotle*, a vaticination. 664, 665

The second atheistical pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, from the ignorance of causes, and men's innate curiosity (upon which account the Deity said by them to be nothing but an asylum of ignorance, or the sanctuary of fools,) next to be confuted. 665

That the Atheists, both modern and ancient, here commonly complicate these two together, fear, and ignorance of causes; making theism the spawn of both; as the fear of children in the dark raises bugbears and spectres. *Epicurus* his

his

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his reason, why he took such great pains in the study of physiology; that by finding out the natural causes of things, he might free men from the terror of a God, that would otherwise assault their minds. Page 665

The Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out material causes for some of those phenomena, which the unskilful vulgar solve only from a Deity; therefore confident, that religion had no other original, than this ignorance of causes: as also, that nature, or matter, does all things alone without a God. But we shall make it manifest, that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes lead to a Deity; and that Atheism, from ignorance of causes, and want of philosophy. 665, 666

For first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless matter, can possibly assign any cause of himself, his own soul or mind; it being impossible, that life and sense should be naturally produced from what dead and senseless; or from magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions. An Atheistick objection, nothing to the purpose; that laughing and crying things are made out of not-laughing and crying principles: because these result from the mechanism of the body. The Hylozoists never able neither, to produce animal sense, and consciousness, out of what senseless and inconscious. The Atheists, supposing their own life and understanding, and all the wisdom that is in the world, to have sprung merely from senseless matter, and fortuitous motions; grossly ignorant of causes. The philosophy of our selves, and true knowledge of the cause of our own soul and mind, brings to God. 666, 667

Again, Atheists ignorant of the cause of motion, by which they suppose all things done; this phenomenon being no way solvable, according to their principles. First, undeniably certain,

that motion not essential to all body or matter as such, because then there could have been no mundane system, no sun, moon, earth, &c. all things being continually torn in pieces, and nothing cohering. Certain also, that dead and senseless matter, such as that of *Anaximander*, *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*, cannot move it self spontaneously, by will or appetite. The Hylozoists further considered elsewhere. *Democritus* could assign no other cause of motion than this, that one body moved another from eternity infinitely; without any first cause or mover. Thus also a modern writer. To assert an infinite progress in the causes of motion, according to *Aristotle*, to assign no cause thereof at all. *Epicurus*, though an exploder of qualities, forced here to fly to an occult quality, of gravity. Which, as absurd in infinite space, and without any centre of rest; so indeed nothing but to make his own ignorance, and he knows not why, to be a cause. The motion of body, from the activity of something incorporeal. Though motion taken for translation, be a mode of matter; yet as it is taken for the *vis movens*, a mode, or energy, of something that is incorporeal, and self-active. The motion of the whole corporeal universe, originally from the Deity. Thus the ignorance of the cause of motion, another ground of atheism. Page 667, 669

Thirdly, the Atheists also ignorant of the cause of that grand phenomenon, the $\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\iota\ \nu\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$, the regular and artificial frame of the mundane system, and of the bodies of animals; together with the harmony of all. They, who boast they can give causes of all things, without a God, able to give no cause of this, but only, that it happened by chance so to be. This, either to make the absence of a cause, a cause; (chance being but the absence of an intending cause, or their own very ignorance of the

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the cause, and they know not why, to be a cause; or to make one contrary, the cause of another; (confusion of order and harmony, chance of art and skill,) or lastly, to deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause. Page 669

But here the Atheists make several pretences for this their ignorance. First, that the world is not so well made, but that it might have been much better; and many flaws to be found therein: whereas a God, or perfect being, would have bungled in nothing, but have made all things after the best manner. But this a twelfth atheistical argumentation, and the confutation thereof to be expected afterward. Reason, why some modern Theists give Atheists so much advantage here, as to acknowledge things be ill made; whilst the ancient Pagan Theists stood their ground, and generously maintained, that Mind being the maker of all things, and not blind fortune or chance, nor arbitrary will, and irrational human omnipotent; the *τὸ βέλτιστον*, that which is absolutely the best, in order to the good of the whole, (so far as the necessity of things would admit) the measure and rule of nature, and providence. 669, 670

Again, the Atomick and Epicurean Atheists pretend, that though many things serve for uses, yet it does not therefore follow, that they were made intentionally for those uses; because things that happen by chance, may have uses consequent. Thus *Lucretius*, and the old atheistical philosophers before *Aristotle*, of the parts of the bodies of animals, and all other things. The answer, that when things consist of many parts, all artificially proportioned together, with much curiosity, as for example, the eye; no man who considers the anatomy thereof, and its whole structure, can reasonably conclude, that it happened so to be made; and the

use of seeing followed: but that it was made intentionally for the use of seeing. But to maintain, that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing followed, but also ears, and a mouth, and feet, and hands, and all the other parts organical and simular, (without any of which, the whole would be inept or useles) all their several uses, un-intended, following; gross insensibility, and stupidity. *Galen* of the use of parts. Page 671, 672

Democritus his dotages; countenanced also by *Cartesius* his book of Meteors, (first written with design to solve all those phenomena without a God,) but unsuccessfully. Nevertheless we acknowledge, that God and nature do all things in the most frugal and compeidious way; and that the mechanick powers are taken in, so far as they will serviceably comply with the intellectual platform. But nature not mechanical and fortuitous only, but also vital and artificial; the *Archeus* of the whole world. *ibid.*

Again, Atheists further pretend, that though it may well seem strange, that matter fortuitously moved, should, at the very first, fall into such a regularity and harmony, as is now in the world; yet not at all strange, that atoms, moving from all eternity, and making all manner of combinations and contextures, and trying all experiments, should after innumerable other inept, and discongruous forms, at length fall into such a system as this. They say therefore, that the earth, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals; some wanting feet, some hands, some without a mouth, &c. to which the ancients added Centaurs, Scyllas, and Chimæras; mixtly bovine, and hominiform animals. Though *Epicurus*, ashamed to own these, would seem to exclude them, but without reason. But because we have now no such irregular shapes pro-

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duced out of the earth, they say, that the reason is, because none could continue and propagate their kind by generation, but only such as happened to be fitly made. Thus *Epicurus*, and the Atheists before *Aristotle*. They also add hereunto their infinite worlds; amongst which, they pretend, not one of a thousand, or of ten thousand, hath so much regularity in it as this of ours. Lastly, they preface likewise, that this world of ours shall not always continue such, but after a while, fall into confusion and disorder again; and then we may have Centaurs, Scylla's and Chimæra's as before.

Page 672, 674

Nevertheless, because this univereal and constant regularity of things, for so many ages together, is so puzzling; they would persuade us that the senseless atoms, playing and toying up and down, from eternity, without any care or thought, were at length taught, by the necessity of things, and driven to a kind of trade, or habit of artificialness and methodicalness.

674, 675

To all which atheistical pretences replied, first, That this is an idle dream, or impudent forgery, that there was once an inept mundane system; and in this world of ours, all manner of irregular shapes of animals: not only because no tradition of any such thing; but also because no reason possibly to be given, why such should not be produced out of the earth still, though they could not continue long. That also another atheistical dream, that in this world of ours, all will quickly fall into confusion and nonsense again. And as their infinite worlds an impossibility, so their assertion of the irregularity of the supposed other worlds well enough answered, by a contrary assertion; that were every planet a habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having all more or fewer such habitable planets moving round about them, and none of them desert or uninhabited,

there would not be found so much as one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all; the divine act being infinite.

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Again, that the fortuitous motions of senseless atoms should, in length of time, grow artificial, and contract a habit, or trade of acting as regularly, as if directed by perfect art and wisdom: this atheistical fanaticism.

675, 676

No more possible, that dead and senseless matter, fortuitously moved, should at length be taught, and necessitated by it self, to produce this artificial system of the world; than that a dozen or more persons, unskilled in musick, and striking the strings as it happened, should at length be taught, and necessitated to fall into exquisite harmony; or that the letters in the writings of *Plato* and *Aristotle*, though having so much philosophick sense, should have been all scribbled at random. More philosophy in the great volume of the world, than in all *Aristotle's* and *Plato's* works; and more of harmony than in any artificial composition of vocal musick. That the divine art and wisdom hath printed such a signature of it self upon the matter of the whole world, as fortune and chance could never counterfeit.

676, 677

But in the next place, the Atheists will, for all this undertake to demonstrate, that things could not possibly be made by any intending cause, for ends and uses; as eyes for seeing, ears for hearing; from hence, because things were all in order of time as well as nature, before their uses. This argument seriously propounded by *Lucretius* in this manner; if eyes were made for the use of seeing, then of necessity must seeing have been before eyes: but there was no seeing before eyes; therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing.

677, 678

Evident, that the logic of these Atheists

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Atheists differs from that of all other mortals; according to which, the end, for which any thing is designedly made, is only in intention first, but in execution last. True, that men are commonly excited from experience of things, and sense of their wants, to excogitate means and remedies; but it doth not therefore follow, that the maker of the world could not have a preventive knowledge of whatsoever would be useful for animals, and so make them bodies intentionally for those uses. That argument ought to be thus framed: whatsoever is made intentionally for any end, as the eye for that of seeing, that end must needs be in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the actual existence of that which is made for it: but there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were eyes; therefore eyes could not be made intentionally for the sake of seeing. Page 678

This the true scope of the premised atheistical argument, however disguised by them in the first propounding. The ground thereof, because they take it for granted, that all knowledge is derived from sense, or from the things known, pre-existing without the knower. And here does *Lucretius* triumph. The controversy therefore at last resolved into this; whether all knowledge be in its own nature junior to things: for if so, it must be granted, that the world could not be made by any antecedent knowledge. But this afterwards fully confuted; and proved, that knowledge is not, in its own nature, ectypal, but archetypal; and that knowledge was older than the world, and the maker thereof. Page 679

But Atheists will except against the proving of a God, from the regular and artificial frame of things; That it is unreasonable to think, there should be no cause in nature for the common phenomena thereof; but a God thus intro-

duced to solve them. Which also, to suppose the world bungled and botched up. That nature is the cause of natural things, which nature does not intend, nor act for ends. Wherefore the opinion of final causality for things in nature but an *idolum specūs*. Therefore rightly banished, by *Democritus*, out of physiology. Page 679, 680

The answer: Two extremes here to be avoided, one of the atomick Atheists, who derive all things from the fortuitous motion of senseless matter; another of bigottical religionists, who will have God to do all things himself immediately, without any nature. The middle betwixt both, that there is not only a mechanical and fortuitous, but also an artificial nature, subservient to the Deity, as the manuary officer, and drudging executioner thereof. True, that some philosophers have absurdly attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies, to inanimate bodies. Nevertheless, this no idol of the cave, or den, to suppose the system of the world to have been framed by an understanding Being, according to whose direction, nature, though not it self intending, acteth. *Balbus* his description of this artificial nature in *Cicero*. That there could be no Mind in us, were there none in the universe. That of *Aristotle* true, that there is more of art in some things of nature, than in any thing made by men. Now the causes of artificial things, as a house or clock, cannot be declared without intention for ends. This excellently pursued by *Aristotle*. No more can the things of nature be rightly understood, or the causes of them fully assigned, merely from matter and motion, without intention or mind. They, who banish final or mental causality from philosophy, look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than oxen and horses. Some pitiful attempts of the ancient Atheists, to solve the phenomena of ani-

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mals, without mental causality. *Democritus* and *Epicurus* so cautious, as never to pretend, to give an account of the formation of the fœtus. *Aristotle's* judgment here to be preferred before that of *Democritus*. Page 680, 683

But nothing more strange, than that these Atheists should be justified in this their ignorance by professed Theists and Christians; who atomizing likewise in their physiology, contend, that this whole mundane system resulted only from the necessary and unguided motion of matter, either turned round in a vortex, or jumbled in a chaos, without the direction of any mind. These mechanick Theists more immodest than the atomick Atheists themselves; they supposing these their atoms, though fortuitously moved, yet never to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms; but from the very first, all along, to have ranged themselves so orderly, as that they could not have done it better, had they been directed by a perfect Mind. They quite take away the argument for a God, from the phenomena, and that artificial frame of things, leaving only some metaphysical arguments; which, though never so good, yet by reason of their subtlety, cannot do so much execution. The Atheists gratified to see the cause of theism thus betrayed, by its professed friends; and the grand argument for the same totally flurried by them. 683, 684

As this great insensibility of mind, to look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brute animals do; so are there sundry phenomena, partly above the mechanick powers, and partly contrary to the same, which therefore can never be solved, without mental and final causality. As in animals, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the systole and diastole of the heart (being a muscular contraction and relaxation) to which might be added others

in the macrocosm; as the intersection of the planes of the equator and ecliptick; or the earth's diurnal motion upon an axis not parallel with that of its annual. *Cartesius* his confession, that, according to mechanick principles, these should continually come nearer and nearer together; which since they have not done, final or mental causality here to be acknowledged, and because it was best it should be so. But the greatest phenomenon of this kind, the formation and organization of animals; which these mechanicks never able to give any account of. Of that posthumous piece of *Cartesius*, *De la Formation du Fœtus*.

Page 684, 685

Pretended, that to assign final causes, is to presume our selves to be as wise as God Almighty, or to be privy to his counsels. But the question, not whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, or know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly conclude things therefore to be so; but whether any thing in the world be made for ends, otherwise than would have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. No presumption, nor intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to say, that eyes were made by him intentionally for the sake of seeing. *Anaxagoras* his absurd aphorism, that man was therefore the most solert of all animals, because he chanced to have hands. Far more reasonable to think, (as *Aristotle* concludeth) that because man was the wisest of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. More proper to give pipes to one, that hath musical skill, than upon him, that hath pipes, to bestow musical skill. 685

In the last place, mechanick Theists pretend, and that with some more plausibility, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty, to perform all those mean and trivial offices of nature, himself immediately. This answered again; That
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though the divine wisdom it self contrived the system of the whole for ends, yet is there an artificial nature under him, as his inferior minister and executioner. *Proclus* his description hereof. This nature, to *Proclus*, a god or goddess; but only as the bodies of the animated stars were called gods, because the statues of the gods. Page 685, 686

That we cannot otherwise conclude, concerning these mechanick Theists, who derive all things in the mundane system, from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any Mind, or God; but that they are imperfect Theists, or have a certain tangle of the atheistical enthusiasm, (the spirit of infidelity) hanging about them. 687

But these mechanick Theists counterbalanced by another sort of Atheists, not fortuitous, nor mechanical; namely, the Hylozoists, who acknowledge the works of nature to be the works of understanding, and deride *Democritus* his rough and hooky atoms, devoid of life; they attributing life to all matter as such, and concluding the vulgar notion of a God to be but an inadequate conception of matter, its energetick nature being taken alone by it self as a complete substance. These Hylozoists, never able to satisfy that phenomenon, of the one agreeing and conspiring harmony throughout the whole universe; every atom of matter, according to them, being a distinct percipient; and these unable to confer notions with one another.

687

Nor can the other Cosmo-plastick Atheists (to whom the whole world, but one huge plant, or vegetable, endowed with a spermatick, artificial nature, orderly disposing the whole, without sense or understanding,) do any thing towards the solving of this, or any other phenomena; it being impossible, that there should be any such regular nature, other-

wife than as derived from, and depending on a perfect mind. Page 687

Besides these three phenomena, of cogitation, motion, and the artificial frame of things, with the conspiring harmony of the whole, (no way solvable by Atheists) here further added, that those, who asserted the novelty of the world, could not possibly give an account neither of the first beginning of men, and other animals, not now generated out of putrefaction. *Aristotle* sometimes doubtful, and staggering concerning the world's eternity. Men and all other animals not produced at first by chance, either as worms out of putrefaction, or out of eggs, or wombs, growing out of the earth; because no reason to be given, why chance should not as well produce the same out of the earth still. *Epicurus* his vain pretence, that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, was now grown effete and barren. Moreover, men and animals, whether first generated out of putrefaction, or excluded out of wombs or egg-shells, supposed by these Atheists themselves, to have been produced in a tender, infant-like state, so that they could neither supply themselves with nourishment, nor defend themselves from harms. A dream of *Epicurus*, that the earth sent forth streams of milk after those her new-born infants and nurslings, confuted by *Cri-tolaus* in *Philo*. Another precarious supposition, or signment, of *Epicurus*; that then no immoderate heats, nor colds, nor any blustering winds. *Anaximander's way* of solving this difficulty; that men were first generated and nourished in the bellies of fishes, till able to shift for themselves; and then disgorged upon dry land. Atheists swallow any thing rather than a God. 688, 689

Wherefore here being *dignus vindice nudus*, a *Θεός*; ἀπὸ μηχανῆς reasonably introduced, in the Mosaiick Cabala, to

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olve the same. It appearing, from all circumstances put together, that this whole phenomenon surpasses, not only the mechanic, but also the plastick powers; there being much of discretion therein. However, not denied, but that the ministry of spirits (created before man, and other terrestrial animals) might be here made use of. As in *Plato*, after the creation of immortal souls by the supreme God, the framing of mortal bodies is committed to junior Gods.

Page 689, 690

Furthermore, Atheists no more able to solve that ordinary phenomenon, of the conservation of species, by the difference of sexes, and a due proportion of number kept up between males and females. Here a providence also, superior, as well to the plastick, as mechanic nature. *ibid.*

Lastly, other phenomena, as real, though not physical; which Atheists cannot possibly solve, and therefore do commonly deny; as of natural justice or honesty, and obligation; the foundation of politicks, and the mathematicks of religion. And of liberty of will, not only that of fortuitous self-determination, when an equal eligibility of objects; but also that, which makes men deserve commendation and blame. These not commonly distinguish'd as they ought. *Epicurus* his endeavour to solve liberty of will, from atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular, mere madness and frenzy. 690, 691

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheistical pretence, to solve the phenomenon of theism, from the fiction and imposture of politicians; we having proved, that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes infer the existence of a God. Nevertheless, this is to be here further answered. 691

That statesmen and politicians could not have made such use of religion, as sometimes they have done, had it been

a mere cheat and figment of their own. Civil sovereigns in all the distant places of the world could not have so universally conspired, in this one piece of statecraft or cozenage; nor yet have been able to possess the minds of men every where, with such a constant awe and dread of an invisible nothing. The world would long since have discovered this cheat, and suspected a plot upon their liberty, in the fiction of a God; at least governours themselves would have understood it; many of which, notwithstanding, as much awed with the fear of this invisible nothing, as any others. Other cheats and juggles, when once detected, no longer practised. But religion, now as much in credit as ever, though so long since decried by Atheists for a political cheat. That Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, prevailed over the craft and power of all civil sovereigns, and conquered the persecuting world, by suffering deaths and martyrdoms. This pre-signified by the prophetic spirit.

Page 691, 692

Had the idea of God been an arbitrary figment, not conceivable, how men should have universally agreed in the same, and the attributes belonging thereunto: (this argument used by *Sextus*;) nor that civil sovereigns themselves should so universally have jumped in it. 692, 693

Furthermore; Not conceivable, how this thought, or idea of a God, should have been formed by any, had it been the idea of nothing. The superficialness of Atheists, in pretending, that politicians, by telling men of such a thing, put the idea into their minds. No notions or ideas put into men's minds by words, but only the phantasms of the sounds. Though all learning be not remembrance, yet is all human teaching but maieutical or obstetricious; not the filling of the soul as a vessel, by pouring into it from without; but the

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kindling of it from within. Words signify nothing to him, that cannot raise up within himself the notions, or ideas, correspondent to them. However, the difficulty still remains; how statesmen themselves, or the first inventor of this cheat, could have framed any notion at all of a non-entity. Page 693, 694

Here the Atheists pretend, that there is a feigning power in the soul, whereby it can make ideas and conceptions of non-entities; as of a golden mountain, or a Centaur: and that by this, an idea of God might be framed, though there be no such thing. Answer; That all the feigning power of the soul consisteth only in compounding ideas of things, that really exist apart, but not in that conjunction. The mind cannot make any new conceptive cogitation, which was not before; as the painter or limner cannot feign foreign colours. Moreover, the whole of these fictitious ideas, though it have no actual, yet hath it a possible entity. The Deity it self, though it could create a world out of nothing, yet can it not create more cogitation or conception than is, or was always contained in its own mind from eternity; nor frame a positive idea of that, which hath no possible entity. 694, 695

The idea of God no compilement or aggregation of things, that exist severally, apart in the world; because then it would be a mere arbitrary thing, and what every one pleased; the contrary whereunto hath been before manifested. 695

Again; some attributes of the Deity, nowhere else to be found in the whole world; and therefore must be absolute non-entities, were there no God. Here the painter must feign colours, and create new cogitation, out of nothing. *ibid.*

Lastly, upon supposition, that there is no God, it is impossible, not only that there should be any for the future, but

also that there should ever have been any; whereas all fictitious ideas must have a possible entity, since otherwise they would be unconceivable, and no ideas. Page 695

Wherefore, some Atheists will further pretend, that besides this power of compounding things together, the soul hath another ampliating or amplifying power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him might be fictitiously made; those attributes, which are no where else to be found, arising by way of amplification or augmentation of something found in men. 695, 696

Answer; first, that, according to the principles of these Atheists, that all our conceptions are nothing but passions from objects without, there cannot possibly be any such amplifying power in the soul, whereby it could make more than is. Thus *Protagoras* in *Plato*; No man can conceive any thing but what he suffers. Here also, (as *Sextus* intimateth, the Atheists guilty of that fallacy, called a circle or *diallelus*. For having first undiscernedly made the idea of imperfection from perfection, they then go about again, to make the idea of perfection out of imperfection. That men have a notion of perfection, by which, as a rule, they judge things to be imperfect, evident from that direction given by all theologers, to conceive of God, in way of remotion or abstraction of all imperfection. Lastly, finite things added together can never make up infinite; as more and more time backward can never reach to eternity without beginning. God differs from imperfect things, not in degree, but kind. As for infinite space, said to consist of parts finite; we certain of no more than this, that the finite world might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely; for which very cause it could never be actually infinite. *Gassendus* his objection

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objection, that the idea of an infinite God might as well be feigned, as that of infinite worlds. But infinite worlds are but words or notions ill put together, or combined; infinity being a real thing in nature, but misapplied, it being proper only to the Deity. Page 696, 697

The conclusion; that since the soul can neither make the idea of infinite, by amplification of finite; nor feign or create any new cogitation, which was not before; nor make a positive idea, of a non entity; certain, that the idea of God no fictitious thing. 697

Further made evident, that religion not the figment of civil sovereigns. Obligation in conscience the foundation of all civil right and authority. Covenants, without this, nothing but words and breath. Obligations, not from laws neither, but before them; or otherwise they could not oblige. Lastly, this derived, not from utility neither. Were obligation to civil obedience made by men's private utility, then could it be dissolved by the same. Wherefore if religion a fiction or imposture, civil sovereignty must needs be so too. 697, 698

Had religion been a fiction of politicians, they would then have made it every way pliable, and flexible; since otherwise it would not serve their turn, nor consist with their infinite right 698

But religion in its own nature, a stiff, inflexible thing, as also justice, it being not factitious, or made by will. There may therefore be a contradiction betwixt the laws of God, and of men; and in this case does religion conclude, that God ought to be obeyed, rather than men. For this cause, atheistical politicians of latter times, declare against religion as inconsistent with civil sovereignty; it destroying infinite right, introducing private judgment, or conscience, and a fear greater than that of the Leviathan; to wit, of him, who can

inflict eternal punishment. Senseless matter the Atheists natural God; the Leviathan or civil sovereign his artificial one. Religion thus disowned and disclaimed by politicians, as inconsistent with civil power, could not be the creature of political art. Thus all the three Atheistical pretences, to solve the phenomenon of religion, from fear, ignorance of causes, and fiction of politicians, fully confuted. Page 698, 700

But because, besides those ordinary phenomena, before mentioned, there are certain other extraordinary ones, that cannot be solved by Atheists, which therefore they will impute, partly to men's fear and ignorance, and partly to the fiction and imposture of civil governours, (*viz.* apparitions, miracles, and prophecies;) the reality of these here also to be briefly vindicated. 700

First, as for apparitions; though much of fabulosity in these relations, yet unquestionably something of truth. Atheists imputing these things to men's mistaking their dreams and phancies for sensations, contradict their own fundamental principle, that sense is the only criterion of truth; as also derogate more from human testimony, than they ought. *ibid.*

That some Atheists sensible hereof have acknowledged the reality of apparitions, concluding them nevertheless to be the meer creatures of imagination; as if a strong phancy could produce real substances, or objects of sense. The fanaticism of Atheists, who will rather believe the greatest impossibilities, than endanger the being of a God. Invisible ghosts permanent easily introduce one supreme Ghost of the whole world. 700, 701

Democritus yet further convinced; that there were invisible beings superior to men, independent upon imagination, and permanent (called by him *idols*)

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idols) but having nothing immortal in them; and therefore that God could be no more proved from the existence of them, than of men. Granted by him, that there were, not only terrestrial, but also æreal and æthereal animals; and that all those vast regions of the universe above were not desert and uninhabited. Here something of the fathers, asserting angels to have bodies; but more afterwards. Page 701,

702

To this phenomenon of apparitions may be added those two others, of witches and demoniacks; both of these proving, that spirits are not phancies, nor inhabitants of men's brains only, but of the world: as also, that there are some impure spirits, a confirmation of the truth of Christianity. The confident exploders of witchcraft suspicious for atheism. As for Demoniacks or Energumeni, certain from *Josephus*, that the Jews did not take these Demons or Devils for bodily diseases, but real substances, possessing the bodies of men. Nor probable, that they supposed, as the Gnosticks afterward, all diseases to be the infestation of evil spirits; nor yet, (as some think) all Demoniacks to be madmen. But when there were any unusual and extraordinary symptoms, in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, they supposing this to be supernatural, imputed it to the infestation of some Devil. Thus also the Greeks. 702, 704

That Demoniacks and Energumeni are a real phenomenon; and that there are such also in these times of ours, asserted by *Fernelius* and *Sennertus*. Such maniacal persons, as not only discover secrets, but also speak languages, which they had never learned, unquestionably Demoniacks or Energumeni. That there have been such in the times since our Saviour, proved out of *Pfellus*; as also from *Fernelius*. This for the vindica-

tion of Christianity, against those, who suspect the Scripture-dæmoniacks for figments. Page 704, 706

The second extraordinary phenomenon proposed; that of miracles, and effects supernatural. That there have been such things amongst the Pagans, and since the times of Christianity too, evident from their records. But more instances of these in scripture. 706

Two sorts of miracles. First, such, as, though they cannot be done by ordinary causes, yet may be effected by the natural power of invisible spirits, angels, or demons. As illiterate Demoniacks speaking Greek. Such amongst the Pagans that miracle of the whetstone cut in two with a razor. Secondly, such as transcend the natural power of all second causes, and created beings. 706, 707

That late *Politico-Theological Treatise*, denying both these sorts of miracles, inconsiderable, and not deserving here a confutation. 707

Supposed in *Deut.* that miracles of the former sort might be done by false prophets, in confirmation of idolatry. Wherefore miracles alone not sufficient to confirm every doctrine. *ibid.*

Accordingly in the New Testament do we read of *τίματα ψεύδους*, *lying miracles*; that is, miracles done in confirmation of a lye, and by the power of Satan, &c. God permitting it, in way of probation of some, and punishment of others. Miracles done for the promoting of creature-worship or idolatry, instead of justifying the same, themselves condemned by it. 708

Had the miracles of our Saviour been all of the former kind only, yet ought the Jews, according to *Moses's* law, to have acknowledged him for a true prophet, he coming in the name of the lord, and not exhorting to idolatry. Supposed in *Deut.* that God would not permit false prophets to do miracles,

save

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save only in the case of idolatry; or when the doctrine is discoverable to be false by the light of nature; because that would be an invincible temptation. Our Saviour, that eximious prophet, foretold, by whom God would again reveal his will to the world; and no more out of flaming fire. Nevertheless some miracles of our Saviour Christ's such also, as could be done only by the power of God Almighty. 703, 709

All miracles evince spirits; to disbelieve which is to disbelieve sense, or unreasonably to derogate from human testimony. Had the Gentiles entertained the faith of Christ, without miracles, this it self would have been a great miracle. Page 709

The last extraordinary phenomenon, divination or prophecy. This also evinces spirits, (called gods by the Pagans:) and thus that of theirs true; if divination, then gods. 710

Two sorts of predictions likewise, as of miracles. First, such as might proceed from the natural presaging power of created spirits. Such predictions acknowledged by *Democritus*, upon account of his idols. Not so much contingency in human actions, by reason of men's liberty of will, as some suppose. 710, 711

Another sort of predictions of future events imputable only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty. *Epicurus* his pretence, that divination took away liberty of will; either as supposing, or making a necessity. Some Theists also denying the prescience of God Almighty, upon the same account. Certain, that no created being can foreknow future events, otherwise than in their causes. Wherefore predictions of such events, as had no necessary antecedent causes, evince a God. 711, 712

That there is foreknowledge of future events, unforeknowable to men, formerly the general persuasion of man-

kind. Oracles and predictions amongst the Pagans, which evince spirits, as that of *Actius Navius*. Most of the Pagan oracles, from the natural presaging power of demons. Nevertheless some instances of predictions of a higher kind amongst them; as that of *Vesilius Valens*, and the Sibyls. Thus *Balaam* divinely assisted to predict our Saviour.

Page 712, 713
Scriptures triumphing over Pagan oracles. Predictions concerning our Saviour Christ, and the conversion of the Gentiles. Amongst which that remarkable one of the seventy weeks. 713, 714

Other predictions concerning the fates of kingdoms, and of the church. *Daniel's* fourth ten-horned beast, the Roman empire. This prophecy of *Daniel's* carried on further in the Apocalypse. Both of them prophetick calendars of times, to the end of the world. *ibid.*

That this phenomenon of Scripture-prophecies cannot possibly be imputed by Atheists, as some others, to fear, or ignorance of causes, or to the fiction of politicians. They not only evince a Deity, but also the truth of Christianity. To this purpose, of more use to us, who now live, than the miracles themselves recorded in Scripture. 714, 715

These five extraordinary phenomena all of them evince spirits to be no phancies, but substantial inhabitants of the world; from whence a God may be inferred. Some of them immediately prove a Deity. *ibid.*

Here have we not only fully confuted all the atheistical pretences from the idea of God, but also, by the way, already proposed several substantial arguments for a Deity. The existence whereof will now be further proved from its very idea. *ibid.*

True, that some of the ancient Theists themselves declare God not to be demon-

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demonstrable. Thus *Alexander Aprodis.* *Clemens Alexand.* But their meaning therein no more than this, that God cannot be demonstratèd *à priori* from any antecedent necessary cause. Not follow from hence, that therefore no certainty, or knowledge of the existence of a God; but only conjectural probability, faith, and opinion. We may have a certain knowledge of things, the *δ-έξι*, whereof cannot be demonstratèd *à priori*; as, that there was something or other eternal, without beginning. Whensoever a thing is necessarily inferred from what is altogether undeniable, this may be called a demonstration. Many geometrical demonstrations such; or of the *δ-έξι* only. Page 715, 716

A special position of *Cartesius*; that there can be no certainty of any thing, no not of geometrical theorems, nor common notions; before we be certain of the existence of a God, essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive. From whence it would follow, that neither Atheists, nor such Theists, as assert an arbitrary Deity, can ever be certain of any thing; as that two and two are four. 716, 717

However some appearance of piety in this assertion; yet is it a foundation of eternal scepticism, both as to all other things, and the existence of a God. That *Cartesius* here went round in a circle, proving the existence of a God from our faculties and then the truth of our faculties from the existence of a God; and consequently proved nothing. If it be possible, that our faculties might be false, then must we confess it possible, that there may be no God; and consequently remain for ever sceptical about it. *ibid.*

Wherefore a necessity of exploding and confuting this new sceptical hypothesis, of the possibility of our faculties being so made, as to deceive us, in all our clearest perceptions. Omnipotence

it self cannot make any thing to be indifferently true or false. Truth not factitious. As to the universal theorems of abstract science, the measure of truth no foreign or extraneous thing, but only our own clear and distinct perception. Here whatsoever is clearly perceived, is; the very essence of truth, perceptibility. Granted by all, that there can be no false knowledge or understanding. The perception of the understanding never false, but only obscure. Not nature, that erreth in us, but we our selves, in assenting to things not clearly perceived. Conclusion; that omnipotence cannot create any understanding faculties, so as to have as clear and distinct conceptions of all falsehoods and non-entities, as of truths; because whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived, hath therefore an entity; and omnipotence it self (to speak with reverence) cannot make nothing to be something, or something nothing. This no more, than that it cannot do things contradictory. Conception the measure of power. Page 717, 719

True, that sense as such is but phantastical and relative; and were there no other perception, all truth would be private, relative, and seeming, none absolute. This probably the reason, why some have suspected the same of knowledge also. But mind and understanding reaches beyond phancy and appearance, to the absoluteness of things. It hath the criterion of truth within it self. 719, 720

Objected; that this an arrogance, for creatures to pretend to an absolute certainty of any thing. Answer; that God alone is ignorant of nothing, and infallible in all things: but no derogation from the Deity, to suppose, that he should make created minds such, as to have a certainty of something; as the whole to be greater than the part, and the like: since otherwise they would

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be but a meer mockery. Congruous to think, that God hath made men so, as that they may possibly attain to some certainty of his own existence. *Origen*, that knowledge is the only thing, that hath certainty in it. Page 720, 721

Having now some firm ground or footing to stand upon, a certainty of common notions, without which nothing could be proved by reason; we shall endeavour, by means hereof, to demonstrate the existence of a God from his idea. *ibid.*

Cartesius his undertaking to do this with mathematical evidence; as this idea includeth in it necessary existence. This argument hitherto not so successful, it being by many concluded to be a sophism. That we shall impartially set down all that we can, both for it, and against it; leaving others to make a judgment. 721

First, against the Cartesian demonstration of a God. That because we can frame an idea of a necessarily existent being, it does not at all follow, that it is; since we can frame ideas of things, that never were, nor will be. Nothing to be gathered from hence, but only that it is not impossible. Again, from this idea, including necessary existence, nothing else inferrible, but that what hath no necessary existence, is not perfect; and, that if there be a perfect being, its existence always was, and will be necessary; but not absolutely, that it doth exist. A fallacy, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, the conclusion is made absolutely. Though a perfect being must exist necessarily, yet not therefore follow, that it must and doth exist. The latter a thing indemonstrable. 721, 723

For the Cartesian demonstration of a God. As from the notion of a thing impossible, we conclude, that it never was nor will be; and of that, which

hath a contingent schesis to existence, that it might be, or might not be; so from that, which hath necessary existence in its nature, that it actually is. The force of the argumentation not merely hypothetical, if there be a perfect Being, then is its existence necessary; because this supposes, that a necessary existent being is contingent to be, or not to be: which a contradiction. The absurdity of this will better appear, if, instead of necessary existence, we put in actual. No Theists can otherwise prove, that a God, though supposed to exist, might not happen by chance to be. Nevertheless God, or a perfect Being, not here demonstrated *à priori*, when from its own idea. The reader left to make a judgment. Page

723, 724

A progymnasma, or prælufory attempt, towards the proving of a God from his idea, as including necessary existence. First, from our having an idea of a perfect being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, it follows, that such a thing is possible. And from that necessary existence included in this idea, added to the possibility thereof, it further follows, that it actually is. A necessary existent being, if possible, is; because upon the supposition of its non-existence, it would be impossible for it ever to have been. Not so in contingent things. A perfect being is either impossible to have been, or else it is. Were God possible, and yet not, he would not be a necessary, but contingent being. However, no stress laid upon this. 724, 725

Another plainer argument, for the existence of a God, from his Idea. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no contradiction, this either actually is, or else, if it be not, is possible to be. But if God be not, he is not possible to be. Therefore he is. The major before proved, that

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we cannot have an idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor possible existence.

Page 725

A further ratiocination from the idea of God, as including necessary existence, by certain steps. First, certain, that something or other did exist of it self from eternity, without beginning. Again, whatsoever did exist of it self from eternity, did so exist naturally and necessarily, and therefore there is a necessary existent Being. Thirdly, nothing could exist of it self from eternity naturally and necessarily, but what contained necessary self-existence in its nature. Lastly, a perfect Being, and nothing else, containeth necessary existence in its nature. Therefore it is. An appendix to this argument; that no temporary successive being could be from eternity without beginning. This proved before.

725, 726

Again, the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists first clearly stated from the idea of God, and then satisfactorily decided. Premised; that as every thing was not made, so neither was every thing unmade. Atheists agree in both. The state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists; whether that, which being it self unmade, was the cause of all other things made, were the most perfect, or the most imperfect being. A certain kind of Atheistick Theism, or Theogonism, which acknowledging a God, or soul of the world, presiding over the whole, supposed him, notwithstanding, to have emerged out of Night and Chaos; that is, to have been generated out of senseless matter.

726, 728

The controversy thus stated easily decided. Certain, that lesser perfection may be derived from greater, or from that which is absolutely perfect; but impossible, that greater perfection, and higher degrees of entity, should rise out of lesser and lower. Things did

not ascend, but descend. That life and sense may naturally rise from the more modification of dead and senseless matter, as also reason and understanding from sense; is the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. The Hylozoists so sensible of this, that there must be some substantial unmade life and understanding; that atheizing, they thought it necessary to attribute life and understanding to all matter, as such. This argument a demonstration of the impossibility of atheism. Page 728, 729

The controversy again more particularly stated, from the idea of God, as including mind and understanding in it; viz. whether all Mind were made or generated out of senseless matter; or whether there were an eternal unmade mind the maker of all. This the doctrine of Theists, that Mind the oldest of all things; of Atheists, that it is a post-nate thing, younger than the world, and an umbratile image of real beings.

729

The controversy thus stated again decided. Though it does not follow, that if once there had been no corporeal world or matter, there could never have been any; yet it is certain, that if once there had been no life nor mind, there could have never been any life or mind. Our imperfect minds, not of themselves from eternity, and therefore derived from a perfect unmade mind.

729, 730

That Atheists think their chief strength to lie here, in their disproving a God, from the nature of understanding and knowledge. According to them, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things. All mind and understanding the creature of sensibiles, and a phantastick image of them; and therefore no mind their creator. Thus does a modern writer conclude, that knowledge and understanding is not to be attributed to God, because it implieth

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dependence upon things without; which is all one, as if he should have said, that senseless matter is the more perfect of all things, and the highest Numen.

Page 730

A compendious confutation of the premised Atheistick principles. Knowledge not the activity of sensibles upon the knower, and his passion. Sensible things themselves not known by the passion, or phancy of sense. Knowledge not from the force of the thing known, but of the knower. Besides phantasms of singular bodies, intelligible ideas universal. A late atheistick paradox, that universals nothing but names. Axiomatical truths in abstract sciences no passion from bodies by sense, nor yet gathered by induction from many singulars; we at once perceiving it impossible, that they should be otherwise. An ingenious observation of *Aristotle's*, that could it be perceived by sense, the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right; yet would not this be science, or knowledge, properly so called: which is of universals first, and from thence descends to singulars. 730,

732

Again, we have conceptions of things incorporeal, as also of such corporeals as never did exist, and whose accuracy sense could not reach to; as a perfect straight line, and plain superficies, an exact triangle, circle, or sphere. That we have a power of framing ideas of things, that never were nor will be, but only possible. 732

Inferred from hence, that human science it self, not the meer image and creature of singular sensibles, but proper to them, and in order of nature before them. But since there must be words before *us*, intelligibles before *intelligences*; the only true account of knowledge and its original is from a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending it self, and the extent of its own

power, or the possibilities of all things, their relations and immutable truths. And of this one perfect mind all imperfect minds partake. Page 732, 733

Knowledge therefore, in the nature of it, supposeth the existence of a perfect omnipotent Being, as its *verbo*, or *intelligible*. This comprehending it self, the first original knowledge, a mind before the world, and all sensibles, not ectypal, but archetypal, and the framers of all. Wherefore not Atheism, but Theism, demonstrable from knowledge and understanding. Page 733, 734

This further confirmed from hence; because there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor had any beginning. That the diagonal of a square incommensurable to the sides, an eternal truth to *Aristotle*. *Justin Martyr's* *αιδωτα διακτα*, or *eternal morals*, geometrical truths, not made by any man's thinking, but before all men; as also before the world and matter itself. 734

Now if there be eternal verities, the simple reasons and intelligible essences of things must needs be eternal likewise. These called by *Plato* things, that always are, but were never made, ingenerable and incorruptible. However *Aristotle* quarrels with *Plato's* ideas, yet does he also agree with him in this, that the forms or species of things were eternal, and never made; and that there is no generation of them; and that there are other things besides sensibles, the immutable objects of science. Certain, that there could be no immutable science, were there no other objects of the mind, but sensibles. The objects of geometrical science no material triangles, squares, &c. these, by *Aristotle*, said to be no where. The intelligible natures of things to *Philo*, the most necessary essences. 735, 736

Now if there be eternal truths, and intelligibles, whose existence also is necessary; since these can be no where but

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in a mind; there must be an eternal, necessarily existing Mind, comprehending all these ideas and truths at once, or being them. Which no other than the Mind of a perfect, omnipotent Being, comprehending it self, and all possibilities of things, the extent of its own power.

Page 736, 737

Wherefore there can be but one only original Mind; which all other minds partake of. Hence ideas, or notions exactly alike in several men; and truths indivisibly the same: because their minds all stamp'd with the same original seal. *Themistius*; that one man could not teach another, were there not the same notion both in the learner and teacher. Nor could men confer together, as they do, were there not one Mind, that all partaked of. That anti-monarchical opinion, of many understanding beings eternal and independent, confuted. And now have we not only assered the idea of a God, and confuted all the atheistical pretences against it; but also, from this idea, demonstrated his existence.

737, 738

S E C T. II.

A Confutation of the second atheistical argument, against omnipotence and divine creation; that nothing can, by any power whatsoever, be made out of nothing. In answer to which, three things to be insisted on. First, that *de nihilo nihil, nothing out of nothing*, is in some sense an axiom of unquestionable truth, but then makes nothing against theism, or divine creation. Secondly, that nothing out of nothing, in the sense of the atheistical objectors, *viz.* that nothing, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be brought into being, is absolutely false; and that, if it were true, it would make no more against theism, than it does against athe-

ism. Lastly, that from this very axiom, *nothing from nothing*, in the true sense thereof, the absolute impossibility of atheism is demonstrable. Page 738

De nihilo nihil, nothing from nothing, in some sense, is a common notion of unquestionable truth. For first, certain, that nothing, which once was not, could ever of it self come into being; or, that nothing can take beginning of existence from it self; or, that nothing can be made or produced, without an efficient cause. From whence demonstrated, that there was never nothing, or, that every thing was not made, but something did exist of it self from eternity unmade, or underived from any thing else. 738, 739

Again, certain also, that nothing could be efficiently produced by what hath not at least equal perfection, and a sufficient active or productive power. That of an effect, which transcends the perfection of its supposed cause, must come from nothing, or be made without a cause. Nor can any thing be produced by another, though having equal perfection, unless it have also a sufficient active or productive power. Hence certain, that were there once no motion at all in the world, and no other substance besides body, which had no self-moving power, there could never possibly be any motion or mutation to all eternity, for want of a sufficient cause, or productive power. No imperfect being hath a productive power of any new substance, which was not before, but only of new accidents and modifications; that is, no creature can create. Which two fore-mentioned senses respect the efficient cause.

739

Thirdly, nothing can be materially produced out of nothing *præ*-existing or inexisting. And therefore, in all natural generations (where the supernatural power of the Deity interposes not) no new real entity, or substance produced, which was not before, but only

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new modifications of what substantially præ-existed. Page 739, 740

Nothing out of nothing, so much insisted on by the old physiologers before *Aristotle*, in this sense, commonly misunderstood by modern writers, as if they designed thereby, to take away all divine creation out of nothing præ-existing. Granted, this to have been the sense of the Stoicks and of *Plutarch*; he affirming, the world to have been no otherwise made by God, than a house is by a carpenter, or a garment by a tailor. *Plutarch* and the Stoicks therefore imperfect Theists, but nevertheless zealous Religionists. But the ancient Italic philosophers here acted only as physiologers, and not as theologers, or metaphysicians; they not directing themselves against a divine creation out of nothing præ-existing; but only contending, that neither in natural generations any new real entity was created, nor in corruptions annihilated; but only the modifications of what before existed, changed: or, that no new real entity could be made out of matter. 740, 741

That this was the true meaning of those ancient physiologers, evident from the use, which they made of this principle, *nothing out of nothing*; which twofold. First, upon this foundation, they endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either similar or dissimilar; homœomery or anœomery. *Anaxagoras* from hence concluded, because nothing could be made out of nothing præ-existing and inexisting, that therefore there were in every body similar atoms, of all kinds, out of which, by concretions and secretions, all natural generations made; so that bone was made out of bony atoms præ-existing and inexisting; flesh out of fleshy, and the like. This the *Anaxagorean* homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon

this principle, *nothing out of nothing*

Page 741, 742

But the ancient Italicks, both before and after *Anaxagoras*, (whom *Leucippus*, *Democritus* and *Epicurus* here followed) with greater sagacity concluded, from the same principle, *nothing out of nothing*, that those qualities and forms of bodies, naturally generated and corrupted, were therefore no real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications thereof, causing different phancies in us; and this an anœomery, or dissimilar atomology, the atoms thereof being devoid of qualities. Those simple elements or letters (in nature's alphabet, out of which, variously combined, these philosophers spelled out, or compounded all the syllables and words (or complexions) of corporeal things, nothing but figure, site, motion, rest, and magnitude of parts. Were qualities and forms real entities distinct from these, and not præ-existing, (as *Anaxagoras* dreamed) they must then have come from nothing, in natural generations; which impossible. 742, 743

Another improvement of this principle, *nothing out of nothing*, made by the Italic philosophers; that the souls of animals, especially human, since they could not possibly result from the mere modifications of matter, figure, site motion, &c. were not produced in generations, nor annihilated in deaths and corruptions; but being substantial things, did præ and post-exist. This set down as the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists, in *Lucretius*. Whether souls were generated, or insinuated into bodies. Generations and corruptions of animals, to these Pythagoreans, but anagrammatical transpositions. That those philosophers, who asserted the præ-existence and ingenerability of souls, did not therefore suppose them to have been self-

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self-existent and uncreated, but derived them all from the Deity. Thus *Proclus*, though maintaining the eternity of souls, with the world. The ingenerability of souls in *Plato's Timæus*, no more than this, that they were not generated out of matter; and for this cause also, were they called principles, in the same sense, as matter was so accounted. Souls therefore, to *Plato*, created by God, though not in the generation of animals, but before.

Page 743, 745

Saint *Austin* himself sometime staggering and sceptical, in the point of præ-existence. That we have a philosophick certainty of no more than this, that souls were created by God, out of nothing præ-existing, some time or other; either in generations, or before them. That unless brutes be mere machines, the reason the same also concerning brutish souls; that the senot generated out of matter, but created, some time or other, by the Deity; as well as the matter of their bodies was.

745

That all these three fore mentioned particulars, wherein it is true, that nothing can possibly come from nothing, are reducible to this one general proposition, that nothing can be caused by nothing; which will no way clash with the divine omnipotence or creative power, as shall be shewed afterwards; but confirm the same. But those same words, *nothing out of nothing*, may carry another sense; when that *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, *out of nothing*, is not taken causally, but only to signify the *terminus à quo*, *the term from which*, or *an antecedent non-existence*: and the meaning thereof will be, that nothing, which before was not, could afterwards, by any power whatsoever, be brought into being. And this the sense of the Democritick and Epicurean objectors; *viz.* That no real entity can be made, or brought out of non-existence into being; and there-

fore the creative power of Theists is impossible. Page *ibid.*

Our second undertakings in way of answer hereunto; to shew, that nothing out of nothing, in this sense, is false; as also, that, were it true, yet it would make no more against theism, than it doth against atheism; and therefore ought not to be used by Atheists, as an argument against a God. If this universally true, that nothing at all, which once was not, could ever be brought into being, then could there be no making, nor causing at all, no motion nor action, mutation or generation. But our selves have a power of producing new cogitation in our minds, and new motion in our bodies. Wherefore Atheists forced to restrain this proposition to substantials only. And here some deceived with the equivocation, in this *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, *out of nothing*; which may be taken either causally, or else to signify the term from which, that is, from an antecedent non-existence; they confounding both these together; whereof the first only true, the latter false. Again, others staggered with the plausibility of this proposition; partly because no artificial thing (as a house or garment) can be made by men, but out of præ-existing matter; and partly because ancient physiologers maintained the same also concerning natural generations, that no new real entity or substance could be therein produced; and lastly, because it is certain, that no imperfect created being can create any new substance; they being therefore apt to measure all power whatsoever, by these scantlings. But as easy for a perfect Being to create a world, matter and all, out of nothing, (in this sense, that is, out of an antecedent non-existence,) as for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays. For an imperfect substance, which once was not, to be brought into being by God, this not impossible,

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impossible, in any of the fore-mentioned senses; he having not only infinitely greater perfection, but also sufficient productive or emanative power. True, that infinite power cannot do things in their own nature impossible; but nothing thus impossible, but what contradictory: and though a contradiction for any thing, at the same time, to be and not be; yet none at all, for an imperfect being, (which is in its nature contingent to existence) after it had not been, to be. Wherefore, since the making of a substance to be, which was not before, is no way contradictory, nor consequently in its own nature impossible; it must needs be an object of perfect power.

Page 746, 748

Furthermore, if no real entity or substance could possibly be brought out of non-existence into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance can derive its whole being from another substance. But from hence, it would follow, that whatsoever is substantial, did not only exist from eternity, but also of it self, independently upon any thing else. Whereas, first, the præ-eternity of temporary beings not agreeable to reason: and then, to suppose imperfect substances to have existed of themselves and necessarily, is to suppose something to come from nothing, in the impossible sense; they having no necessary self-existence in their nature. As they, who affirm all substance to be body, and no body to be able to move it self, though supposing motion to have been from eternity; yet make this motion to come from nothing, or be caused by nothing. What in its nature contingently possible to be, or not be, could not exist of it self; but must derive its being from something else, which necessarily existeth. *Plato's* distinction therefore betwixt two kinds of substances must needs be admitted, that, which always is, and was never made; and that, which

was made, or had a beginning. Page 748,

749

Last, if this true, that no substance makeable or producible, it would not only follow from thence, (as the Epicurean *Atheist* supposes) that matter, but also that all souls, (at least human) did exist of themselves, from eternity, independently upon any thing else; it being impossible, that Mind or Soul should be a modification of senseless matter, or result from figures, sites, motions, and magnitudes. Human souls substantial, and therefore, according to this doctrine, must have been never made; whereas *Atheists* stiffly deny both their præ and post-existence. Those Pagan Theists, who held the eternity of human minds, supposed them, notwithstanding, to have depended upon the Deity, as their cause. Before proved, that there can be but one understanding Being, self-existent. If human souls depend upon the Deity as their cause, then doubtless matter also. 749, 750

A common, but great mistake, that no Pagan Theist ever acknowledged any creative power out of nothing; or else, that God was the cause of any substance. *Plato's* definition of effective power, in general, and his affirmation, that the divine efficiency is that, whereby things are made, after they had not been. Certain, that he did not understand this of the production of souls out of matter, he supposing them to be before matter, and therefore made by God out of nothing præ-existing. All philosophers, who held the immortality and incorporeity of the soul, asserted it to have been caused by God, either in time, or from eternity. *Plutarch's* singularity here. Unquestionable, that the *Platonists* supposed one substance to receive its whole being from another; in that they derive their second hypostasis or substance, though eternal, from the first; and their third from both; and

all

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all inferiour ranks of beings from all three. *Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamblicus, Hierocles, Proclus*, and others, derived matter from the Deity. Thus the Chaldee Oracles; and the old Egyptian, or Hermaick theology also, according to *Jamblicus*. Those Platonists, who supposed the world and souls eternal, conceived them to have received their being, as much from the Deity, as if made in time.

Page 750, 752

Having now disproved this proposition, *nothing out of nothing*, in the atheistical sense, viz. That no substance was caused, or derived its being from another, but whatsoever is substantial, did exist of it self from eternity, independently; we are, in the next place, to make it appear also, that were it true, it would no more oppose theism, than it doth atheism. Falshoods (though not truths) may disagree. *Plutarch*, the Stoicks, and others, who made God the creator of no substance, though not genuine, yet zealous Theists. But the ancient Atheists, both in *Plato* and *Aristotle*, generated and corrupted all things; that is, produced all things out of nothing, or non-existence, and reduced them into nothing again; the bare substance of matter only excepted. The same done by the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists themselves, the makers of this objection: though, according to the principles of their own atomick physiology, it is impossible, that life and understanding, soul and mind, should be mere modifications of matter. As Theists give a creative power of all, out of nothing, to the Deity; so do Atheists to passive and dead matter. Wherefore this can be no argument against theism; it equally opposing atheism.

752, 756

An *Anacephalosis*; wherein observable, that *Cicero* makes *de nihilo fieri*, and *sine causa*, to be made out of nothing, and to be made without a cause, one and

the self-same thing; as also, that he doth not confine this to the material cause only. Our third and last undertaking; to prove, that Atheists produce real entities out of nothing, in the first impossible sense; that is, without a cause.

Page 756, 757

A brief synopsis of atheism; that matter being the only substance, is therefore the only unmade thing; and that whatsoever else is in the world, besides the bare substance thereof, was made out of matter, or produced from that alone.

757

The first argument; when Atheists affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things to be made out of that, they suppose all to be made without an efficient cause; which is to bring them from nothing, in an impossible sense. Though something may be made without a material cause pre-existing; yet cannot any thing possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore, if there be any thing made, which was not before, there must of necessity be, besides matter, some other substance, as the active, efficient cause thereof. The atheistical hypothesis supposes things to be made, without any active or effective principle. Whereas the Epicurean Atheists attribute the efficiency of all to local motion; and yet deny matter or body (their only substance) a self-moving power. They hereby make all the motion, that is in the world, to have been without a cause, or to come from nothing; all action without an agent; all efficiency without an efficient.

758

Again, should we grant these Atheists motion without a cause, yet could not dead and senseless matter, together with motion, ever beget life, sense, and understanding; because this would be something out of nothing, in way of causality, local motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site and disposition of parts.

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Hence also those spurious Theists confuted, who conclude God to have done no more in the making of the world, than a carpenter doth in the building of a house, (upon this pretence, that nothing can be made out of nothing;) and yet suppose him to make souls out of dead and senseless matter, which is to bring them from nothing in way of causality.

Page 758, 759

Declared before, That the ancient Italicks and Pythagoricks proved in this manner, that souls could not possibly be generated out of matter; because nothing can come from nothing, in way of causality. The subterfuge of the atheistical Ionicks out of *Aristotle*; that matter being the only substance, and life, sense and understanding, nothing but the passions, affections and dispositions thereof; the production of them out of matter, no production of any new real entity.

759

Answer; Atheists taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, therefore falsely conclude life, sense and understanding to be accidents or modes of matter; they being indeed the modes or attributes of substance incorporeal and self-active. A mode that, which cannot be conceived, without the thing, whereof it is a mode; but life and cogitation may be conceived, without corporal extension; and indeed cannot be conceived with it.

759,

760

The chief occasion of this error, from qualities and forms; as because the quality of heat, and form of fire may be generated out of matter, therefore life, cogitation, and understanding also. But the atomick Atheists themselves explode qualities, as things really distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, for this very reason, because nothing can be made out of nothing causally. The vulgar opinion of such real

qualities in bodies, only from men's mistaking their own phancies, apparitions, passions, affections and seemings, for things really existing without them. That in these qualities, which is distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, not the accidents and modifications of matter, but of our own souls. The atomick Atheists infinitely absurd; when exploding qualities, because nothing can come out of nothing, themselves bring life, sense and understanding, out of nothing, in way of causality. That opinion, that cogitation is nothing but local motion, and men themselves but mere machines, prodigious foolishness, or intolerable impudence. Page 760, 762

Very observable here, that *Epicurus* himself, having a mind to assert contingent liberty, confesseth, that he could not do this, unless there were some such thing in the principles; because nothing can be made out of nothing, or caused by nothing; and therefore does he ridiculously feign a third motion of atoms, to solve that phenomenon of free-will. Wherefore he must needs be guilty of an impossible production, of something out of nothing, when he brings soul and mind out of dead, senseless atoms. Were there no substantial and eternal life and understanding in the universe, there could none have been ever produced; because it must have come from nothing, or been made without a cause. That dark philosophy, which educes, not only real qualities and substantial forms, but also souls themselves, at least sensitive, out of the power of the matter, educes them out of nothing, or makes them without a cause; and so prepares a direct way to atheism. 762, 763

They, who suppose matter, otherwise than by motion, and by a kind of miraculous efficiency, to produce souls, and minds, attribute that creative power to this senseless and unactive matter, which

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which themselves deny, to a perfect Being, as an absolute impossibility. Thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and nonsense of all atheism from this very principle, That nothing can be made from nothing, or without sufficient cause. Page 763, 764

Wherefore, if no middle betwixt these two, but all things must either spring from a God, or matter; then is this also a demonstration of the truth of theism, by deduction to impossible: either there is a God, or else all things are derived from dead and senseless matter: but this latter is impossible; therefore a God. Nevertheless, that the existence of a God may be further directly proved under the same principle, rightly understood, *nothing out of nothing* causally, or nothing caused by nothing, neither efficiently, nor materially. 764

By these steps; first, that there was never nothing, but something or other did exist of it self from eternity, unmade, and independently upon any thing else, mathematically certain; from this principle, *nothing from nothing*. Had there been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. Again, Whatsoever did exist of it self from eternity, must have so existed necessarily, and not by any free will and choice. Certain therefore, that there is something actually in being, whose existence is and always was necessary. Now that, which exists necessarily, of it self, must have necessity of existence in its nature; which nothing but a perfect Being hath. Therefore there is a perfect Being; and nothing else besides this did exist of it self from eternity, but all other things whatsoever (whether souls or matter) were made by it. To suppose any thing to exist of it self necessarily, that hath no necessary existence in its nature, is to suppose

that necessary existence to have come from nothing. Page 764, 765

Three reasons, why some Theists have been so staggering and sceptical about the necessary self-existence of matter. First, from an idiotical conceit, that because artificial things cannot be made by men, but out of pre-existent matter, therefore nothing by God, or a perfect Being, can be otherwise made. Secondly, because some of them have supposed ἕλην ἀσώματον, an incorporeal hyle, or first matter unmade; an opinion older than *Aristotle*. Whereas this really nothing, but a metaphysical notion of the potentiality or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity. Lastly, because some of them have conceived body and space to be really the same thing; and space to be positively infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent. But if space be not the extension of the Deity it self, as some suppose: but of body, only considered abstractly, from this or that, and therefore immoveably; then no sufficient ground for the positive infinity, or the indefinity thereof, as *Cartesius* imagined: we being certain of no more than this, that be the world and its space, or extension, never so great, yet it might be still greater and greater infinitely; for which very cause, it could never be positively infinite. This possibility of more body and space, further and further indefinitely, or without end, as also its eternity, mistaken, for actual space and distance positively infinite and eternal. Nor is there perhaps any such great absurdity, in the finiteness of actual space and distance, (according to this hypothesis,) as some conceive. 765, 766

Moreover, the existence of a God may be further proved from this common notion, *nothing from nothing causally*; not only because were there no God, that idea, which we have of a

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perfect Being, must have come from nothing, and be the conception of nothing; but also all the other intelligible ideas of our minds must have come from nothing likewise, they being not derived from sense. All minds, and their intelligible ideas, by way of participation, from one perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending it self. Page 766,

767

However, certain from this principle, *nothing from nothing*, or *nothing caused by nothing*; that souls and minds could never have emerged out of dead and senseless matter, or from figures, sites and motions; and therefore must either have all existed of themselves, necessarily from eternity; or else be created by the Deity, out of nothing *præ-existing*. Concluded, that the existence of a God is altogether as certain, as that our human souls did not all exist from eternity, of themselves, necessarily. Thus is the second atheistical argumentation against omnipotence or divine creation, from that false principle, *nothing out of nothing*, in the atheistical sense, (which is, that nothing could be brought out of non-existence into being, or no substance derive its whole being from another substance, but all was self-existent from eternity) abundantly confuted; it having been demonstrated, that unless there be a God, or a perfect omnipotent Being, and Creator, something must have come from nothing in the impossible sense; that is, have been caused by nothing, or made without a cause.

767

answer to which, three things. First, to confute the atheistical argumentations against an incorporeal Deity, being the third and fourth. Secondly, to shew, that from the very principles of the atheistical corporealism, in their fifth and sixth arguments, incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And lastly, that therefore the two following atheistical arguments, (built upon the contrary supposition) are also insignificant. Page 767

Before we come to the atheistical arguments, against an incorporeal Deity, premised; that though all Corporealists be not Atheists, yet Atheists universally mere Corporealists. Thus *Plato* in his *Sophist*, writing of those, who maintained, that nature generated all things without the direction of any Mind, affirmeth, that they held body and substance to be one and the self-same thing. From whence it follows, that incorporeal substance is incorporeal body, or contradictory nonsense; and that whatsoever is not body, is nothing. He likewise addeth, that they, who asserted the soul to be a body, but had not the confidence to make prudence and other virtues bodies, (or bodily) quite overthrew the cause of atheism. *Aristotle* also representeth the atheistical hypothesis thus, That there is but one nature, matter; and this corporeal, (or endued with magnitude) the only substance; and all other things, the passions and affections thereof. 767, 769

In disproving incorporeal substance, some difference amongst the Atheists themselves. First, those, who held a vacuum, (as *Epicurus* and *Democritus*, &c.) though taking it for granted, that what is unextended or devoid of magnitude, is nothing; yet acknowledged a double extended nature; the first impenetrable and tangible, body; the second penetrable and intangible, space or vacuum; to them the only incorporeal. Their argument thus;

3

since

S E C T. III.

THE six following atheistical argumentations, driving at these two things, (the disproving, first of an incorporeal, and then of a corporeal Deity) next taken all together. In way of

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since nothing incorporeal besides space, (which can neither do nor suffer any thing) therefore no incorporeal Deity. The answer : If space be a real nature, and yet not bodily; then must it needs be either an affection of incorporeal substance, or else an accident without a substance. *Gassendus* his officiousness here to help the Atheists; that space is neither accident, nor substance, but a middle nature, or essence betwixt both. But, whatsoever is, must either subsist by it self, or else be an attribute, affection, or mode of something, that subsisteth by it self. Space, either the extension of body, or of incorporeal substance, or of nothing: but nothing cannot be extended; wherefore space, supposed not to be the extension of body, must be the extension of an incorporeal substance infinite, or the Deity; as some Theists assert. Page 769, 770

Epicurus his pretended gods, such as could neither touch, nor be touched, and had not *corpus*, but *quasi corpus* only; and therefore incorporeals distinct from space. But granted, that he coluded or juggled in this. 770

Other Atheists, who denied a *vacuum*, and allowed not space to be a nature, but a meer imaginary thing, the phantasm of a body, or else extension considered abstractly, argued thus: Whatsoever is extended, is body, or bodily; but whatsoever is, is extended; therefore whatsoever is, is body. 770, 771

This argument against incorporeal substance answered two manner of ways; some asserters of incorporeal substance denying the minor, whatsoever is, is extended; others the major of it, whatsoever is extended is body. First, the generality of ancient Incorporealists really maintained, that there was something un-extended, indistant, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, without parts, and indivisible. *Plato*, that the soul is before longitude, latitude, and profundity. He also denies, that

whatsoever is in no place, is nothing. *Aristotle's*, first immovable mover also devoid of magnitude. So likewise is Mind, or that which understands, to him. He also denies place, and local motion to the soul, otherwise than by accident with the body. Page 771,

773

Philo's double substance, distant and indistant. God also to him, both everywhere, (because his powers extend to all things) and yet no-where, as in a place; place being created by him, together with bodies. *Pietinus* much concerned in this doctrine. Two books of his upon this subject, that one and the same numerical thing, (*viz.* the Deity) may be all, or the whole every where. God to him, before all things that are in a place; therefore wholly present to whatsoever present. This would he prove also from natural instincts. He affirmeth likewise, that the human soul is numerically the same, both in the hand, and in the foot. *Simplicius* his argument for unextended substance; that whatsoever is self-moving, must be indivisible and indistant. His affirmation, that souls, locally immovable, move the body by cogitation.

773, 775

None more full and express in this, than *Porphyrius*. His assertion, that were there such an incorporeal space, (as *Democritus* and *Epicurus* supposed) Mind, or God, could not be co extended with it; but only body. The whole Deity, indivisibly and indistantly present, to every part of divisible and distant things. 775, 776

Thus *Origen* in his *agat. si. Casus*. *St. Austin*, that the human soul hath no dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness, and is in it self *illoabilis*. *Beëbins* reckons this amongst the common notions, known only to wise men, that incorporeals are in no place. 776

This therefore no novel or recent opinion, that the Deity is not part of it here,

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ere, and part of it there, nor measurable by yards and poles; but the whole undivided, present to every part of the world. But because many objections against this; we shall further shew, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavoured to quit themselves of them. The first objection; that to suppose the Deity, and other incorporeal substances, unextended, is to make them absolute parvities, and so contemptible things. *Plotinus* his answer; that what is incorporeal, not so indivisible as a little tang; either a physical minimum, or mathematical point: for thus God could not *congruere* with the whole world, nor the soul with the whole body. Again, God not so indivisible, as the least, he being the greatest of all, not in magnitude, but power. He so indivisible, as also infinite. This an error proceeding from sense and imagination; that what unextended, therefore little. Incorporeal substance, the whole of which is present to every part of body, therefore greater than body. *Porphyrius* to the same purpose, That God is neither to be looked upon as the least, nor as the greatest, in way of magnitude.

Page 776, 778

The second Objection; that what neither great nor little, and possesss no place, a non-entity. This, according to *Plato*, *Plotinus* and *Porphyrius*, a mistake proceeding from men's adhering to sense and imagination. They grant, that an unextended Being is ἀδιαιρούμενον, *inimaginabile*. *Porphyrius*, that Mind and Phancy are not the same, as some maintain. That, which can neither do, or suffer, not nothing, though it swell not out into distance. Two kinds of substantialities to *Plotinus*; bulky tumours, and unbulky active powers. Which latter, said by *Simplicius* to have nevertheless a certain depth or profundity in them. Something ἀδιαιρούμενον, *unimaginabile*, even in body it self. We can-

not possibly imagine the sun of such a bigness, as reason evinces it to be Urged also by *Plotinus*, that an un-stretched-out duration, or timeless eternity, as difficult to be conceived as an unextended substance; and yet must this needs be attributed to the Deity.

Page 778, 781

That God and human Souls no otherwise incorporeal, than as σώμα λεπτόμενον a thin or subtle body, false. Because the difference of grossness and subtlety in bodies, according to true philosophy, only from motion. That the most subtle body may possibly be made as gross as lead or iron; and the grossest, as subtle as ather. No specifick difference of matter. 781

The third argument against unextended substance; that to be all in the whole, and all in every part, a contradiction, and impossibility. This granted by *Plotinus* to be true of bodies, or that which is extended; that it cannot be ὅμοῦ πάντων but impossible, that what hath no parts, should be a part here, and a part there. Wherefore the word ὅλον (in that, whole in the whole, and whole in every part) to be taken only in a negative sense, for ἀμεμεριστόν, *undivided*. The whole undivided Deity every where; and not a part of it here only, and a part there. 782, 783

The last objection is against the illocality and immobility of finite created spirits, and human souls only. That this not only absurd, but also contrary to that generally received tradition amongst Heathens, of souls moving locally after death, into another place, called *Hades*. Two answers of *Plotinus* to this. First, that by *Hades* may be meant only the invisible, or the soul's acting without the Body. Secondly, that if by *Hades* be meant a worse place, the soul may be said to be there, where its idol is. But when this same philosopher supposeth the soul (in

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(in good men) to be separable also from this idol, he departeth from the genuine Cabala of his own school. That souls always united to some body or other. This asserted here by *Porphyrius*; That the soul is never quite naked of all body; and therefore may be said to be there, wheresoever its body is. Page 784,

785

Some excerpts out of *Philoponus*; wherein the doctrine of the ancients, concerning the soul's spirituous or airy body, (after death) is largely declared.

785, 787

Intimated here by *Philoponus*, that, according to some of these ancients, the soul hath such a spirituous body here in this life, as its interior indument, which then adheres to it, when its outer garment is stript off by death. An opinion of some, that the soul may, in this spirituous body, leave its grosser body for some time, without death. True, that our soul doth not immediately act upon bones and flesh; but certain thin and subtle spirits, the instruments of sense and motion. Of which *Porphyrius* thus; 'The blood is 'the food of the spirit, and the spirit 'the vehicle of the soul.'

787, 788

The same *Philoponus* further addeth, that, according to the ancients, besides both the terrestrial, and this spirituous or airy body, there is yet a third kind of body, peculiar to such as are souls, as are more thoroughly purged after death; called by them a luciform, and heavenly and ætherial, and star-like body. Of this *Proclus* also upon the *Timæus*, (who affirmeth it to be unorganized;) as likewise *Hierocles*. This called the thin vehicle of the soul, in the Chaldee Oracles, according to *Pfellus* and *Pletbo*. By *Hierocles*, a spiritual body, in a sense agreeable to that of the Scripture; by *Synesius*, the divine body. This distinction of two interior vehicles, or tu-

nicles of the soul, besides the terrestrial body (called by *Plato* the ostreaceous) no invention of latter *Platonists* since Christianity; it being plainly insisted upon by *Virgil*, though commonly not understood. Page 788, 790

That many of these *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans* supposed the soul, in its first creation, when made pure by God, to be clothed with this luciform and heavenly body; which also did always inseparably adhere to it, in its ascensions into the aerial and terrestrial; though souled and obscured. Thus *Eletbo*. And the same intimated by *Galen*; when he calls this the first vehicle of the soul. Hence was it, that besides the moral and intellectual purgation of the soul, they recommended also a mystical or telescick way of purifying the ætherial vehicle, by diet and catharms. This much insisted on by *Hierocles*. What *Pliny's* dying by wisdom, or the philosophick death. 790, 792

But this not the opinion of all, that the same numerical ætherial body always adhereth to the soul; but only, that it every where either finds, or makes a body, suitable to it self. Thus *Porphyrius*. *Plato* also seems to have been of that persuasion. 792, 793

This affirmed by *Hierocles*, to have been the genuine Cabala of the ancient *Pythagoreans*, which *Plato* afterwards followed. *Hierocles* his definition of a man, a rational soul together with a cognate immortal body; he declaring, this enlivened terrestrial body to be but the idol or image of the true man, or an accession to him. This therefore the answer of the ancient *Incorporealists*, to that objection against the illocality and immobility of created incorporeals; that these being all naturally united to some body or other, may be thus said to be in a place, and locally moved. And, that it does not follow, that
because

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because created incorporeals are unextended, they might therefore inform the whole corporeal universe. Page 793,

794

That it would be no impertinent digression here, to compare the forementioned Pythagorick Cabala with the doctrine of Christianity; and to consider their agreement or disagreement. First therefore, a clear agreement of these most religious philosophers with Christianity in this, that the highest happiness and perfection of human nature consisteth not in a separate state of souls un-united to any body, as some high-flown persons have conceited. Thus *Plotinus*, who sometimes runs as much into the other extreme, in supposing human souls to animate, not only the bodies of brutes, but also of plants. Thus also *Maimonides* amongst the Jews; and therefore suspected for denying the resurrection. His *Iggereth Toman* written purposely to purge himself of this suspicion. The allegorizers of the resurrection, and of the life to come. 794,

795

Again, Christianity correspondeth with the philosophick Cabala, concerning human souls, in this, that their happiness consisteth not in conjunction with such gross terrestrial bodies as these we now have; Scripture, as well as philosophy, complaining of them, as a heavy load, and burthen to the soul; which therefore not to be taken up again at the resurrection. Such a resurrection as this called by *Plotinus*, a resurrection to another sleep. The difference betwixt the resurrection-body and this present body in Scripture. The resurrection-body of the just, (as that of the philosophick Cabala) immortal and eternal, glorious and lucid; star-like and spiritual; heavenly and angelical. Not this gross fleshy body, gilded and varnished over in the outside only, but changed throughout. This the resur-

rection of life, in Scripture, emphatically called the Resurrection. Our souls strangers and pilgrims in these terrestrial bodies: Their proper home and country, the heavenly body. That the grossest body, that is, according to philosophy, may merely by motion be brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest aether.

Page 795, 799

But whether human souls after death, always united to some body, or else quite naked from all body, 'till the resurrection; not so explicitly determined in Christianity. Souls after death live unto God. According to *Origen*, this a privilege proper to the Deity, to live and act alone, without vital union with any body. If natural to the soul, to enliven a body; then not probable, that it should be kept so long in an unnatural state of separation. 799, 800

Again; probable from Scripture, that wicked souls after death have punishment of sense or pain, besides remorse of conscience: which not easily conceivable, how they should have, without bodies. Thus *Tertullian*. He adding, that men have the same shape, or effigies, after this life, which they had here. Though indeed he drive the business too far, so as to make the soul itself to be a body, figurate and colourate.

800, 801

But *Irenæus* plainly supposed the soul after death (being incorporeal) to be adapted to a body, such as has the same character and figure with its body here in this life. 801, 802

Origen also of this persuasion, that souls after death have certain subtle bodies, retaining the same characterizing form, as their terrestrial bodies had. His opinion, that apparitions of the Dead are from the souls themselves, surviving in that, which is called a luciform body. As also, that Saint *Thomas* had not doubt, but that the body of a soul departed might appear every way like
the

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the former: only he disbelieved our Saviour's appearing in the same solid body, which he had before death. Page 802,

804

Our Saviour telling his disciples, that a spirit had no flesh and bones, that is, no solid body, as himself then had, seems to imply them to have thinner bodies, which they may visibly appear in. Thus in *Apollonius*, is touch made the sign to distinguish a Ghost appearing, from a living man. Our Saviour's body after his resurrection, according to *Origen*, in a middle state betwixt this gross or solid body of ours, and that of a Ghost.

804

A place of Scripture, which, as interpreted by the Fathers, would naturally imply, the soul of our Saviour after death not to have been quite naked of all body, but to have had a corporeal spirit. *Moses* and *Elias* visibly appearing to our Saviour, had therefore true bodies.

804, 805

That the regenerate here in this life have a certain earnest of their future inheritance, (which is, their spiritual or heavenly body) gathered from Scripture by *Ireneus* and *Novatian*. Which prælibations of the spiritual body cannot so well consist with a perfect separation from all body, after death, 'till the day of judgment.

805, 806

This opinion of *Ireneus*, *Origen*, and others, supposed by them, not at all to clash with the Christian article of the resurrection. Nothing in this point determined by us.

806

The last thing in the Pythagorick Cabala, that dæmons or angels, and indeed all created understanding beings, consist, as well as men, of soul and body, incorporeal and corporeal, united all together. Thus *Hierocles*, universally of all the rational nature; and that no incorporeal substance, besides the supreme Deity, is compleat, without the conjunction of a body. God the only

incorporeal in this sense; and not a mundane, but a supra-mundane soul.

Page 806, 808

Origen's full agreement with this old Pythagorick Cabala, that rational creatures are neither body, nor yet without body; but incorporeal substances, having a corporeal indument. 808, 809

Origen misrepresented by *Huetius*, as asserting angels not to have bodies, but to be bodies; whereas he plainly acknowledged the human soul to be incorporeal, and angels also to have souls. He proveth incorporeal creatures from the Scriptures; which, though themselves not bodies, yet always use bodies. Whereas the Deity is neither body, nor yet clothed with a body, as the proper soul thereof.

809, 810

Some of the fathers, so far from supposing angels altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them altogether corporeal; that is, to be all body, and nothing else. The middle betwixt both these, the Origenick and Pythagorick hypothesis, that they consist of incorporeal and corporeal substance, soul and body joined together. The generality of the ancient fathers for neither of those extremes. That they did not suppose angels to be perfectly unbodied spirits, evident from their affirming devils, as the Greek philosophers did demons, to be delighted with the ruidours of sacrifices; as having their vaporous bodies, or airy vehicles, refreshed thereby. Thus *Porphyrius*, and before him *Celsus*. Amongst the Christians, (besides *Origen*) *Justin*, *Athenagoras*, *Tatianus*, &c. *S. Basil*, concerning the bodies of dæmons or devils, being nourished with vapours; not by organs, but throughout their whole substance.

810, 812

Several of the Fathers plainly asserting both devils and angels to consist of soul and body, incorporeal and corporeal substance, joined together. Saint

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Austin, Claudianus, Mamertus, Fulgentius, Joannes Thessalonicensis, and Pfellus, who philosophizeth much concerning this. Page 812, 814

That some of the ancients, when they called angels incorporeal, understood nothing else thereby, but only, that they had not grofs, but subtile bodies. 814, 815

The Fathers, though herein happening to agree with the philosophick Cabala, yet seemed to have been led thereunto by Scripture. As from that of our Saviour, *they who shall obtain the resurrection of the dead, shall be ἰσὺς αὐτοῖς, equal to the Angels*; that is, according to Saint *Austin*, shall have angelical bodies. From that of Saint *Jude*, that angels sinning lost their own proper dwelling-house; that is, their heavenly body, (called οὐρανίον by Saint *Paul*) which made them fit inhabitants of the heavenly regions; and thereupon cast down into the lower *Tartarus*; interpreted by Saint *Austin* to be this caliginous air or atmosphere of the earth. Again, from that fire said to have been prepared for the devils: which being not to be taken metaphorically, therefore (as *Pfellus* concludeth) implies them to be bodied; because an incorporeal substance alone, and not vitally united to any body, cannot be tormented with fire. 815, 817

Now if all created incorporeals, superiour to men, be souls vitally united to bodies, and never quite separate from all body; then probable, that human souls, after death, not quite naked from all body, as if they could live and act compleatly without it; a privilege superiour to that of angels, and proper to the Deity. Nor is it at all conceivable, how imperfect beings could have sense and imagination without bodies. *Origen contra Celsum*, 'Our soul in its own nature incorporeal always standeth in need of a body suitable to the place

' wherein it is. And accordingly, sometimes putteth off what it had before; and sometimes again putteth on some-thing new.' Where the following words being vitiated, *Origen's* genuine sense restored. Evident, that *Origen* distinguisheth the τὸ σκῆνος in St. *Paul*, (translated *tabernacle*;) from the earthly house; he understanding by the former a thin spirituous body, which is a middle betwixt the earthly and the heavenly, and which the soul remaineth still clothed with, after death. This opinion of *Origen's*, that the soul after death, not quite separate from all body, never reckoned up in the catalogue of his errors. *Origen* not taxed by *Methodius*, for asserting souls to have bodies, but for not asserting them to be bodies; there being no truly incorporeal substance, according to *Methodius*, but the Deity. This one of the extremes mentioned. And the *Origenick* hypothesis to be preferred before that of *Methodius*. Page 817, 820.

Already observed, that *Origen* not singular, in this opinion concerning human souls; *Ireneus, Philoponus, Joannes Thessalonicensis, Pfellus*, and others, asserting the same. St. *Austin* in his *de Gen. ad Lit.* granted, that souls after death cannot be carried to any corporal places, nor locally moved, without a body. Himself seems to think, the punishment of souls, before the resurrection, to be phantastical. But gives liberty of thinking otherwise. In his Book *de Civ. D.* he conceives that *Origenick* opinion not improbable, that some souls after death, and before the resurrection, may suffer from a certain fire, for the consuming and burning up of their dross: which could not be without bodies. 820, 822

Hitherto shewed, how the ancient asserters of unextended incorporeals answered all the objections made against them; but especially that of the illocality

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lity and immobility of created incorporeals; namely, that by those bodies, which they are always vitally united to, they are localized, and made capable of motion; according to that of *Origen*, the soul stands in need of a body for local motions. Next to be considered their reasons for this assertion, of unextended and indistant substance, so repugnant to imagination. Page 822

That whatsoever arguments do evince other substance besides body, the same against the Atheists demonstrate, that there is something unextended; themselves taking it for granted, that whatsoever is extended, is body. Nevertheless, other arguments propounded by these ancients, to prove directly unextended substance. *Plotinus* his first, to prove the human soul and mind such. Either every part of an extended soul, is soul; and of mind, mind; or not. If the latter, that no part of a soul, or mind, is by it self soul, or mind; then cannot the whole, made up of all those parts, be such. But if every supposed part of a soul, be soul, and of a mind, mind; then would all but one be superfluous; or every one be the whole: which cannot be in extended things.

822, 824

Again, *Plotinus* endeavours to prove, from the energies of the soul, that it is unextended; because it is one and the same indivisible thing, that perceiveth the whole sensible object. This further pursued; if the soul be extended, then must it either be one physical point, or more. Impossible, that it should be but one physical point. If therefore more, then must every one of those points, either perceive a point of the object, and no more, or else the whole. If the former, then can nothing perceive the whole, nor compare one part of it with another: If the latter, then would every man have innumerable perceptions of the whole object at once. A fourth supposition, that the whole extended soul perceives

both the whole object, and all the parts thereof; (no part of the soul having any perception by it self) not to be made; because the whole of an extended substance nothing but all the parts: and so if no part have any perception, the whole can have none. Moreover, to say the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is indeed to acknowledge it unextended, and to have no distant parts. Page 824, 826

Again, This philosopher would prove the same thing from the sympathy or homopathy, which is in animals; it being one and the same thing, that perceives pain in the head, and in the foot; and comprehends the whole bulk of the body. 826

Lastly, he disputes farther from the rational energies. A magnitude could not understand, what hath no magnitude, and what is indivisible: whereas we have a notion, not only of latitude as indivisible to thickness, and of longitude as to breadth, but also of a mathematical point, every way indivisible. We have notions of things also, that have neither magnitude nor site, &c. Again, all the abstract essences of things indivisible. We conceive extended things themselves unextendedly; the thought of a mile, or a thousand miles distance, taking up no more room in the soul, than the thought of an inch, or of a mathematical point. Moreover, were that, which perceiveth in us, a magnitude, it could not be equal to every sensible, and alike perceive things greater and lesser than it self. 827, 828

Besides which, they might argue thus; that we, as we can conceive extension without cogitation, and again cogitation without extension, (from whence their distinction and separability is inferrible:) so can we not conceive cogitation with extension; nor the length, breadth, and thickness of a thought; nor the half, or a third, or the twentieth part thereof;

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nor that it is figurate, round, or angular. Thoughts therefore must be non-entities, if whatsoever is unextended be nothing; as also metaphysical truths, they having neither dimensions, nor figure. So volitions and passions, knowledge and wisdom it self, justice and temperance. If the things belonging to soul and mind be unextended, then must themselves be so. Again, if mind and soul have distant parts, then could none of them be one, but many substances. If life divided, then a half of it would not be life. Lastly, no reason could be given, why they might not be as well really, as intellectually divisible. Nor could a Theist deny, but that divine power might cleave a thought, together with the soul wherein it is, into many pieces.

Page 828, 829

The sense of the antient Incorporealists therefore this; that in nature, two kinds of substances. The first of them passive bulk, or distant and extended substance; which is all, one thing without another; and therefore as many substances as parts, into which it can be divided. Essentially antitypous; one magnitude joined to another always standing without it, and making the whole so much bigger. Body all outside, having nothing within, no internal energy, nor any action besides local motion; which it is also passive to.

829

Were there no other substance besides this, there could be no motion, action, life, cogitation, intellection, volition; but all would be a dead lump; nor could any one thing penetrate another. Wherefore another substance, whose character *Quis apertus, the active nature*, life, self activity, cogitation: which no mode or accident of extension, it having more of entity in it. Nor are these two, extension and life, inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance. A thinker a monad; or one single substance. Not conceivable, how the several parts of an

extended substance should jointly concur to produce one and the same thought

Page 829, 830

The energies of these two substances very different. The one nothing but local motion, or translation from place to place; a mere outside thing: the other cogitation, an internal energy; or in the inside of that, which thinks. Which inside of the thinking nature hath no length, breadth, or profundity, no out-swelling tumour; because then it would be outside again. Were a cogitative being extended, yet must it have, besides this extended outside, an unextended inside. But one and the same substance cannot be extended and unextended. Wherefore in this opinion of extended incorporeals, a complication of two substances, and a confusion of them together into one. True nevertheless, that all finite incorporeal substance is always naturally united with some extended body, as its outside.

831

All summed up together. 832

Hitherto the sense of the ancient asserters of unextended incorporeals represented to the best advantage. Nothing asserted by us; but that these, and other arguments, do demonstrate, against the Atheists, some other substance besides body: but whether or no they prove this to be indistant and unextended, left to others to make a judgment. The Atheists, who deny this, must acknowledge every thought to be not only mentally, but also physically divisible and separable, together with the soul; as also deny internal energy; and consequently make cogitation nothing but local motion; and lastly, hold, that no substance can co-exist with another substance, more inwardly than by juxtaposition.

832, 833

This is the first answer to the fore-mentioned atheistical argument against incorporeal substance, made by the ancients, by denying the minor, that though whatsoever

whatsoever

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whatsoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended. But the argument otherwise answered by some learned asserters of incorporeal substance, by denying the major; that though every thing be extended, or what unextended nothing; yet whatever is extended is not body; they asserting another extension incorporeal, which is both penetrable, and not made up of parts physically separable from one another; to which belongeth life, self-activity, and cogitation. Probable, that some would compound both the forementioned hypotheses together; by supposing the Deity to be altogether unextended, and indivisibly all every where; but souls, or created incorporeals, to have an unextended inside, diffused, as it were, into an extended outside. Our selves here only to oppose Atheists; and dogmatize no further, than to assert, what all Incorporealists agree in, that, besides body, there is another substance, which consisteth not of parts really separable from one another; which is penetrable of body, and self-active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from local motion. All which is demonstratively certain. This the full answer to the first atheistical Argument against incorporeal substance; that either there is something unextended, or at least extended otherwise than body, so as to be penetrable thereof, and indiscernibly one with it self, and self-active.

Page 833, 834

The second atheistical assault against incorporeal substance; by pretending the original of this mistake to have sprung from the scholastick essences, distinct from the things themselves; and the abuse of abstract names and notions, they being made to be substances existing by themselves. For, though the opinion of ghosts and spirits, (whereof God is the chief) sprung first from fear; yet that these should be incorporeal could

never have entered into the minds of men, had they not been enchanted with these abstract names and separate essences.

Page 834

The first general reply to this, that it is all but romantick fiction. That the opinion of the Deity sprung not from fear, and that all invisible ghosts are not phancies, already sufficiently proved; as also the existence of a God demonstrated by reason. That apparitions are real phenomena; and reasonable to think, that there may as well be invisible aerial and aetherial, as there are visible terrestrial animals. Sottishness to conclude, that there is no understanding nature superior to man.

834, 835

The second particular reply, that the opinion of spirits incorporeal sprung not from the scholastick essences, whether considered concretely as universals only, or abstractly. No man supposing these to be things really and substantially existing without the mind; either an universal man and universal horse, or else humanity and equity: and that these walk up and down in airy bodies; they being only *noëmata*, or the *intelligible essences* of things, as objects of the mind. These essences of things said to be eternal, as their verities. The meaning of these eternal essences, not, that they are so many eternal substances incorporeal; but that knowledge is eternal, and that there is an eternal unmade Mind, that comprehends them; which all other minds partake of.

835, 836

Again, that another atheistical dream, that the abstract names and notions of the mere accidents of bodies were made substances incorporeal; souls, minds, and ghosts. Conscious life no accident of bodies, as Atheists suppose; but the essential attribute of another substance, which incorporeal; as magnitude, or extension, is the essential attribute of body.

836

The following atheistical arguments

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to be dispatched with more brevity. That the four next, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth, proceed only upon this supposition, that there is no other substance in the world, besides body or matter; and therefore signify nothing to the asserters of an incorporeal Deity. Stoicks, and the like, only concerned to answer them. Nevertheless, from the impossibility of these atheistical corporealisms, contained in the fifth, and sixth, a necessity of incorporeal substance will be evinced. Page 836

Here two atheistical corporealisms founded upon these suppositions, that all is body or matter; and, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding. The first in the way of qualities and forms generable and corruptible, called the Hylopathian. This the most ancient atheistical form, as we learn from *Aristotle*; viz. that bulky extension, the only substantial and unmade thing, and all other things but the passions, qualities, and accidents thereof; makeable out of it, and destroyable into it. The consequence from whence, that there is no substantial unmade life and understanding; and that no Mind could be a God, or Creator; it being all accidental, factitious, and creature. 836,

837

This Hylopathian atheism, called also by us Anaximandrian. Though we are not ignorant, that *Simplicius* conceives, *Anaximander* to have held an Homœomery, or similar atomology, of eternal unmade qualities, as *Anaxagoras* afterwards; only, that he acknowledged no unmade Life or Mind, but generated it all from the fortuitous commixture of those qualified atoms. (Which no improbable opinion, though not certain.) Because, however, *Anaximander* supposed life and understanding to be at least secondary qualities, and accidents of body, generable and corruptible. And not fit to multiply forms of atheism. 837

The second atheistical corporealism, in the way of unqualified atoms, producing all things, even life, and understanding, from figures, sises, motions and magnitudes of parts. From whence it will also follow, that Mind is no primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative; creature, and no creator. This called Democritick; not because *Democritus* was the first inventor of the the dissimilar atomology; but because he was the first atheizer of it, or the first, who made dissimilar atoms the principles of all things whatsoever, even of life and understanding. Page 837

Not to be denied, but that from these two things granted, that all is body, and, that the first principles of body are devoid of life and understanding, it would follow unavoidably, that there is no God. Therefore the Stoicks, who were corporeal Theists, denied the latter; they supposing an understanding Fire, eternal and unmade, the maker of the whole mundane system. Truly observed by *Origen*, that this corporeal god of the Stoicks was but by accident incorruptible and happy; and only because wanting a destroyer. This no genuine theism. 837, 838

But an absolute impossibility in both these atheistical corporealisms; not only because they suppose no active principle; but also, because they bring life and understanding, that is, something out of nothing; or make them without a cause. Where the atomick Atheists, of the two, most to be condemned, because so grossly contradicting themselves. From that true principle, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding, an absolute necessity of another substance incorporeal, which is essentially vital and intellectual. That all life cannot possibly be factitious and accidental, generable and corruptible; but there must be substantial life; and also some eternal.

838, 839

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The truth of this understood and acknowledged by the Hylozoists; that there must of necessity be both substantial and unmade life and understanding; who therefore attribute the same to all matter, as such, but without animality; which, according to them, is all factitious and accidental. Wherefore this hylozoick atheism also brings conscious life and animality out of nothing; or makes them without a cause. The argument of the Epicurean Atheists, against Stratonism or Hylozoism, unanswerable: that upon this supposition there must be, in every man and animal, a heap of innumerable percipients, as many as there are atoms of matter; and so no one thinker. The pretence of the Hylozoists, that all the particles of matter in every animal do confederate, ridiculous, and impossible. Page 839, 840

Thus the fifth and sixth atheistical argumentations fully confuted; and from that true supposition in them, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding, incorporeal substance plainly demonstrated: which was our second undertaking. 840

The third and last, that there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two following atheistical argumentations, (built upon the supposition of the contrary) altogether insignificant. The seventh not properly directed against theism, but against a religious kind of atheism or theogonism; which supposed a God or soul of the world generated out of senseless matter, and the offspring of Night and Chaos. A sober and true sense of the world's animation; that there is a living, sentient and understanding Nature, presiding over the whole world. But the sense of Pagan Theists, that the whole corporeal world animated is a God, exploded by us. This argument therefore being not against theism, but theogonism; the confutation thereof might be here well

omitted, without any detriment to our cause. But because the denying of a living understanding nature, presiding over the world, is atheistical, the ground of this assertion briefly declared, that life and understanding are accidents of bodies, resulting only from such a composition of atoms, as produce flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized; and, that there is no reason to be found any where but only in human form: which also confuted. A brutish passage of a modern writer, "that it is unconceivable by men, how God can understand without brains." Page 840, 841

The next, (which is the eighth atheistical argumentation) that there can be no living being immortal, nor perfectly happy; built upon that false supposition also, that all life and understanding results from a contexture of dead and senseless atoms, and therefore is dissolvable and annihilable. But that there is life essential, and substantial, which naturally immortal: as also a necessity of an eternal life, and Mind unmade, and unannihilable; which perfectly happy. 841, 842

SECT. IV.

THE Epicurean Atheists further endeavour to disprove a God, from the phenomena of motion, and cogitation; in the three following argumentations, the ninth, tenth, and eleventh. From motion, thus; that from this principle, *Nothing can move it self, but whatsoever is moved, is moved by another*, it will follow, that there can be no first cause, and unmoved mover, but one thing moved another, from eternity infinitely; because nothing could move another, which was not it self first moved by something else, 842,

843
Answer:

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Answer: The meaning of this axiom; not that nothing can act from itself, as the Atheist supposes; he taking it for granted, that every thing is body, and that all action is local motion; but, that no body resting could ever locally move it self. A false supposition of the Atheists and some Cartesians; that were there but once motion in the matter, this would of it self continue to all eternity. True, that of *Aristotle*; that to make an infinite progress in the causes of motion, and no first mover, is all one as to say, that there is no cause at all thereof; or, that all the motion in the world, is a passon without an agent, or comes from nothing. Clearly impossible, that there should be any motion at all, were there nothing self-moving or self-active. 843

Wherefore from this principle, that no body can move it self, it follows undeniably, that there is some other substance in the world besides body, that hath an active power of moving body. 843, 844

Another corollary from the same principle; that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and which is not heterokinesy, but auto-kinesy. That the action, by which local motion is first caused, could not be it self local motion. All local motion caused originally by cogitation. Thus the ninth atheistical argument from motion confuted; and from hence, that no body can move it self demonstrated, that there is something incorporeal the first cause of local motion, by cogitation. *ibid.*

But the Atheists further pretend to prove, that cogitation it self is heterokinesy, the passion of the thinker, and the action of some other external agent upon him; because nothing taketh beginning from it self; and no cogitation can rise of it self, without a cause. That therefore thinking beings themselves are machines, and cogitation local motion. And, no understanding

being a first cause, nor perfectly happy; because dependent upon something else. Page 844, 845

Answer. True, that no substance beginning from it self; as also, that no action causeth it self. But false, that no action taketh beginning from the immediate agent; or, that nothing can act otherwise, than as acted upon by something else. Atheists here affirm only, what they should prove, and so beg the question. If nothing self-active, then all the motion and action in the universe must come from nothing, or be made without a cause. 845

True also, that our human cogitations are frequently occasioned from external objects, and that the concatenations of thoughts and phantasms often depend upon mechanick causes. But false, that all cogitations are obtruded upon us from without; and that no transition in our thoughts, which was not before in sense. The human soul a principle of actions, and therefore also of cogitations. This a bubbling fountain of thoughts. But that there is such a perfect mind, as at once comprehends all truth, and was before sensibles. 845, 846

This a prodigious paradox, and falsity of Atheists; that cogitation, local motion; and thinking beings, machines. Here a correction of what we wrote before, p. 761. and a change of our opinion, upon further consideration; that not only a modern writer, but also the ancient atheistical Atomists, did conclude cogitation to be really nothing else but local motion. Nevertheless, these men troubled with the phancy of cogitation; which because they cannot make local motion, they would persuade us to be no reality, or nothing. Atheists aware, that if there be any action besides local motion, there must then be some other substance acknowledged besides body. They, who make cogitation local motion, and men machines, no more to

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be disputed with, than senseless machines.

Page 846, 847

To affirm, that no understanding being can be happy, nor a God, because dependent upon something without it, all one as to affirm, that senseless matter is the most perfect of all things; and that knowledge, as such, speaking imperfection, is but a whiffing and phantastick thing. But of this more afterwards. Thus the tenth atheistical argument confuted. 847

Another atheistical argument, from the nature of knowledge and understanding. That the world could not be made by an understanding being, because there was no knowledge before things, which are the objects of it; and the only things are sensibles, which knowledge a passion from. Therefore all mind, as such, a creature, and none a creator. *ibid.*

This already fully answered, page 729, and so forwards. Where proved, that singular bodies are not the only things, and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its intelligibles within it self. And that knowledge is archetypal to the world, and the maker of all. So the existence of a God demonstrable from the nature of knowledge and understanding. 847, 848

That the Atheists can no more solve the phenomenon of cogitation, than that of local motion, evident from their many hallucinations concerning it; whereof a catalogue subjoined. First, that all life and understanding, a meer accidental thing, generable and corruptible, and no life nor mind substantial or essential. This before confuted. 848

Again, that life and mind no simple and primitive natures, but compounded syllables of things; and therefore none immortal nor incorruptible. Answer; that life and understanding are active powers, and could never result from meer passive bulk; nor can any com-

position of dead and senseless matter, possibly beget life and understanding. Though no necessity, that there should be any eternal unmade red or green, because these might be made out of things not red nor green; nor that there should be eternal motion, because motion might be produced from a self-active principle; nor that there should be any eternal unmade matter, because were there none, it might notwithstanding be created, by a perfect incorporeal being: yet an absolute necessity of eternal unmade life and mind; because had there been once none, there could never have been any. Page 848, 849

Another Atheistical hallucination, that there is nothing of self-activity in cogitation; nor any thing could act otherwise, than as it is made to act by something else. This to bring all action from nothing, or to suppose it without a cause. 849, 850

Another madness of theirs already mentioned, that cogitation, local motion, and thinking beings, machines. This equal sottishness or impudence, as to affirm number to be figure, &c. 850

Another paradox of the Epicurean and Democritick Atheists, that mental cogitation, as well as sensation, the meer passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without him; some of them supposing thoughts to be caused by certain finer images than sensations; others, that they are the remainders of the motions of sense, formerly made. Answer; that sensation it self is not a meer corporeal passion, but the perception of a passion, in a way of phancy; much less mental cogitations such; and least of all volitions. 850, 851

But consentaneously hereunto, these Atheists determine, all knowledge and understanding to be really the same thing with sense. From whence follow two absurdities; *first*, That there

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can be no such thing as error, because all passion is true passion, and all sense, true sense; that is, true seeming and appearance. This absurdity owned by *Protagoras*. *Epicurus* endeavoured to avoid this, but in vain, and contradictorily to his own principles. Page 851,

852

A second absurdity consequent thereupon; that there is no absolute truth nor falsehood, but all knowledge private and relative, and nothing but opinion. This freely owned likewise by *Protagoras*. Sometimes also by *Democritus*. Who therefore but a blunderer neither, in the Atomick philosophy; which plainly supposes a higher faculty of reason and understanding, that judges of sense, and discovers the phantasmia thereof; it reaching to absolute truth.

852, 853

Another atheistical error; that singular bodies are the only objects of mental conception, as well as of sensation. This imputed by *Aristotle*, to *Democritus* and *Protagoras*. But sufficiently before confuted.

853, 854

The better to maintain this paradox, added by a modern Atheistical writer, as his own invention; that universals are nothing else but names, by which many singular bodies are called; axioms or propositions, the addition and subtraction of names; and syllogistical reasoning, the reckoning the consequences of them: and that therefore besides the passions of sense, we know nothing at all of any thing, but only the names by which it is called. Whence it would follow, that geometrical truths not the same in *Greek* and in *Latin*, &c.

854

That the Atheists, according to these promised principles, endeavour to depreciate knowledge and understanding, as that which speaks no higher perfection, than is in senseless matter. Thus the Atheists in *Plato* make it but a ludicrous, umbratile and evanid thing;

the meer images of bodies, the only realities. Their design in this, to take away the scale, or ladder of entities.

Page 855, 856

All the grounds of this again briefly confuted, and particularly, that opinion so much favouring Atheism, that there is nothing in the understanding, which was not before in sense, out of *Boëthius*. Just and unjust greater realities in nature, than hard and soft, &c. Unquestionably, a scale or ladder of entities; and therefore certain, that the order of things must be in way of descent, from higher perfection to lower, and not of ascent, from lower to higher. The steps of this ladder not infinite; the foot thereof inanimate matter; the head, a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending in it self all possibilities of things. Mind by nature lord over all; and sovereign king of heaven and earth.

856, 859

The reason, why we so much insist upon this; because Atheists pretend, not only to solve the phenomenon of cogitation without a God; but also from thence to demonstrate the impossibility of his existence. Though modern writers not so much aware hereof, yet is the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists thus stated by *Plato*; whether Soul and Mind juniors to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof; or else substantial things, and in order of nature before it. Accordingly *Plato* confuteth Atheism no otherwise, than by proving Soul not to be junior to inanimate matter, and generated out of the same. Evident, that *Plato* by Soul here understood, not only the mundane Soul, but also that whole rank of beings, called Soul; and that no life was generated out of matter.

859, 860

Those professed Christians, who generate rational souls out of senseless matter, plain betrayers of the cause of Theism.

860, 861

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Nor is the case much different, as to others; who, though they professedly generate only sensitive souls, yet making the rational but meer blanks, which have nothing in them, but what was scribbled upon them by sense; and so knowledge, in its own nature, junior to sense and sensibles; highly gratify the Atheists hereby. Page 861

If any life and cogitation may be generated out of dead and senseless matter, then can no good reason be given, why all should not be. Life not partly accidental, partly substantial; but either all conscious life, accidental, generable and corruptible; or else none at all. *ibid.*

The doctrine of real qualities generable and corruptible, favourable to Atheism also. And though the atheistical Atomists explode all the other qualities, because *nothing can come from nothing*; yet, contradicting themselves again, do they make life and understanding real qualities, generated out of matter, or caused by nothing. 861, 862

There being a scale or ladder of entities in nature, to produce a higher rank of beings, out of a lower; as life and cogitation, out of matter, and magnitude, is to invert the order of this scale, from downwards, to upwards; and so to lay a foundation for atheism. Wherefore great reason to maintain this post against the Atheists; that no souls can be generated out of matter 862, 863

The grand objection against the substantiality of sensitive souls, from that consequence of their permanent subsistence after death. *Cartesius* sensible thereof, that he would rather make brutes to be senseless machines, than allow them substantial souls; which he granted they must have, if thinking beings. What clearly demonstrable by reason, not to be abandoned, because attended with some difficulties, or seemingly offensive consequences. 863

The Pythagorick hypothesis; that

souls all created by God, not in the generation of animals, but in the Cosmogonia. These therefore first clothed with thin and subtle bodies, aerial or ætherial Ochemata, wherein they subsist, both before their ingress into terrestrial bodies, and after their egress out of them. Thus *Boëthius* and *Proclus. Ammonius* his irrational Demons mortal; brutish souls, in aerial bodies. Since the first creation, no new substantial thing made, or destroyed, and therefore no life. This looked upon by *Macrobius* as a great truth. Page 863, 865

That the Pythagoreans would endeavour to gain some countenance for this hypothesis, from the scripture. 865,

867

But if these aerial vehicles of brutish souls be exploded for a whimsey, and none but terrestrial bodies allowed to them; though after death they will not vanish into nothing, yet must they needs remain in a state of insensibility, and inactivity, till re-united to other terrestrial bodies. Wherefore these in one sense mortal, though in another immortal. Silkworms dying, and reviving in the form of butterflies, made an emblem of the resurrection by Christian theologers. 867, 868

But no absolute necessity, that the souls of brutes, though substantial, should have a permanent subsistence after death, either in a state of activity, or inactivity; because, whatsoever created by God may possibly by him be annihilated. The substantiality only of the rational soul demonstrable by reason; or that it will not of itself vanish into nothing; but not that it is absolutely impossible, for it to be annihilated; the assurance of this depending upon a faith in the divine goodness. *Porphyrius* his assertion, that brutish souls are resolved into the life of the universe. The whole answer to this objection, against the substantiality of

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brutish souls; that they may, notwithstanding, possibly be annihilated in the deaths of animals, as well as they were created in their generations: but if they do subsist (without aerial vehicles,) they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility. Page 868, 869

That this the doctrine of the ancient Pagan theologers, that no life, or soul, generated out of dead and senseless matter; but all produced by the Deity, as well as matter; proved out of *Virgil*: though sundry other testimonies also might be added thereunto. 869, 870

The Hylozoick Atheists themselves so sensible thereof, that there must be some substantial and unmade life, (from whence the lives and minds of all animals are derived) that they attribute the same to matter; and conclude, that though the modicated lives of animals, and men, be accidental, generated and corrupted, yet the fundamental life of them is substantial, and incorruptible. These also asserted a knowledge before sense, and undervived from sensibles. 870, 871

This Hylozoick Atheism again confuted. Absurd to suppose, knowledge and understanding without consciousness; as also, that the substantial and fundamental life of men and other animals should never perish, and yet their souls, and personalities, vanish into nothing. That no organization can produce consciousness. These Atheists not able possibly to give an account, whence the intelligible objects and ideas, of this their knowledge of matter, should spring. This Hylozoick atheism nothing but the crumbling of the Deity into matter. 871

Concluded, that the phenomenon of mind and understanding can no way possibly be solved by Atheists, without a God; but affordeth a solid demonstration of his existence. 891, 872

Here now remaining only the Atheistick objections against Providence, their queries, and arguments from interests; their first objection, from the frame of the world, as faulty; or, because things are ill made, that therefore not made by a God. This directed against the sense of the ancient theologers; that God being a perfect Mind, therefore made the world after the best manner. Some modern theologers deviating from this, as if the perfection of the Deity consisted not at all in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. The controversy betwixt these and Atheists; but whether matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, be the original of all things. No ground of faith in a meer arbitrary deity. To have a will undetermined to good, no liberty, nor sovereignty, but impotency. God to *Celsus* the head or president of the righteous nature. This not only the sense of *Origen*, but of the ancient Christians in general. *Plotinus*; the will of God essentially that, which ought to be. God an impartial balance weighing out heaven and earth. The Deity, not servilely bound to do the best; but this the perfection of its nature. No Atheists able to prove, the world to be ill made. Page 872, 874

Not to be concluded, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason or use of, is therefore ineptly made. For example; the *intestinum cæcum*, though seemingly an odd appendix, and which the generality of anatomists give little account of; yet that, with the valve at its entrance, both together, an artificial contrivance of nature, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces. 874, 875

The first atheistick instance of the faultiness of things; in the disposition of

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of the æquator and ecliptick intersecting each other in such an angle, whereby the terrestrial globe rendered not so habitable as it might have been. This objection founded upon a false supposition, that the torrid zone uninhabitable. But this the best disposition; which being contrary to mechanick causes, therefore its continuance, together with the constant parallelism of the earth's axis, a manifest eviotion of providence; and that the τὸ βέλτιστον, *the best*, is a cause in nature. Page 875

In the next place; the Atheists would prove against some Theists, that all things not made for the sake of man. This at first but the doctrine of straight-laced Stoicks only; recommended afterward by men's self-love. Whereas *Plato's* doctrine, that the whole not made for any part; but the parts for the whole. Nevertheless, things in the lower world made principally (though not only) for man. Atheists no judges of the well or ill-making of worlds, they having no standing measure of good. That nature a step-mother to man, but a froward speech of some discontented persons, seeking to revenge themselves, by railing upon nature, that is, Providence. 875, 876

Evils in general from the necessity of imperfect beings, and impossibility of things. 876

Men afflicted more from their own phancies, than reality of things. Pain (which a real evil of sense) often link'd with pleasure, according to the Socratick fable. This not the evil of the whole man, but of the outside only. Serviceable, to free men from the greater evils of the mind. Death, according to the atheistical hypothesis, an absolute extinction of all life; but, according to genuine Theism, only a withdrawing into the tiring-house, and putting off the terrestrial cloathing. The dead live to God. Christian faith gives assurance of

a heavenly body hereafter. The Christian resurrection not the hope of worms. This the confutation of the twelfth atheistical argument. Page 876, 877

The thirteenth; but second objection against Providence, as to human affairs; because all things fall alike to all; and sometimes vicious and irreligious persons most prosperous. 877, 878

Granted, that this consideration hath too much staggered weak minds in all ages. Some concluding from thence, that there is no God, but that blind chance steereth all. Others, that though there be a God, yet he knows nothing done here below. Others, that though he do know, yet he neglecteth human affairs. 878

Unreasonable to require, that God should miraculously interpose at every turn; or to think, that every wicked person should presently be thunder-struck. That, which steers the whole world, no fond and passionate, but an impartial nature. Yet, that there want not instances of an extraordinary providence. Good reasons for the slowness of divine vengeance. The notoriously wicked commonly met with at the long run. 878, 879

The sometimes impunity of wicked persons so far from staggering good men, as to Providence, that it confirms them in their belief of future immortality, and judgment after death. The evolution of human affairs a kind of dramatick poem, and God Almighty the skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours, which went before, with what of his follows after, into coherent sense. A geometrical distribution of rewards and punishments. 879,

880
That there ought to be a doubtful and cloudy state of things, for the exercise of faith, and the more difficult part of virtue. Had there been no monitors to subdue, there could have been no

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Hercules. Here we to live by faith, and not by sight. Page 830

But that to make a full defence of Providence would require a large volume. The reader therefore referred to others for a supplement. Only some few considerations to be here propounded, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as satisfaction of Theists, sometimes apt to call in question the divine goodness, though the very foundation of our Christian faith. *ibid.*

First; that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves, but in order to the whole. Were nothing made but the best, there could have been no harmony, for want of variety. *Plotinus*, that a limner does not make all eye, nor place bright colours every-where; nor a dramatist introduce only kings and heroes upon the stage. 880, 882

Secondly; that we ought not to confine God's creation to the narrowness of vulgar opinion, which extends the universe but little beyond the clouds; and walls it in with a sphere of fixed stars. The world incapable of infinity of magnitude, as well as of time. Nevertheless, as the sun is much bigger than we can imagine it, so much more may the world be. The new celestial phenomena widen the corporeal universe, and make those phancied flaming walls thereof to fly away before us. Not reasonable to think, that all this immense vastness should be desert and uninhabited. 882, 883

Thirdly; that we cannot make a right judgment of the ways of Providence, without looking both forwards upon what is future, and backwards upon what is past, as well as upon the present. That the Platonists and Pythagoreans solved many phenomena, from the τὰ προεξιστάμενα, *things done in a pre-existent state.* Our common Chri-

stianity supposeth but a kind of imputative pre-existence, to solve the pravity of mankind, and the evils of this state. The different fates and conditions of men here in this life to be resolved into a just, though occult providence. Page 883

The third objection against Providence, or fourteenth atheistical argument; that it is impossible, for any one being to animadvert and order all things; and, if it were possible, that it would be distractious, and inconsistent with happiness. Moreover, that an irresistibly powerful and happy being would not concern it self in the welfare of others; benevolence arising only from imbecility. 883, 884

The reply; that because our selves have but a finite animadversion, and narrow sphere of activity; to measure the Deity accordingly, is but an idol of the cave or den. Certain, that were there nothing, but what we could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Had the sun life, equally co-extended with its rays, it would perceive every thing touched by them. Creatures but the rays of the Deity. Men able to manage affairs, in many distant places, without distraction. And innumerable notions lie together in our minds, without crowding one another, or any disturbance to us. 884

But for the easing the minds of weak mortals, already suggested, that there is no necessity, God should himself immediately do all things; he having ministers under him, executioners of his Providence; as, an artificial, plastick nature, (for this reason, partly before insisted on;) instincts also in animals, a part of that divine fate, which is the servant of Providence. Above which, other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity, appointed to preside over human affairs. But all overlooked by the watchful eye of God Almighty,

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Almighty, who may himself extraordinarily interpose. Page 884, 885

Wherefore no need to confine Providence to a few greater things only, to free the Deity from distraction. Small things (upon which greater often depend) not neglected by it. Nevertheless the chief employment of divine Providence, in the œconomy of souls, by *Plato* reduced to this compendium; the translating of them into better or worse states, according to their demeanours. Thus may the slow wits of mortals more easily conceive Providence not to be laborious and distracting to the Deity. 885

But that all benevolence arises from imbecillity, and that what is perfectly happy, would be troubled with no business, but enjoy its own ease; idols of the Atheists den. These other the narrow contractedness of their minds, by vice and immorality. 885, 886

The atheistical queries next to be answered. The first query: If there were a God, who was perfectly happy in himself, why would he go about to make a world? *Ans.* The reason of God's making the world was from his overflowing and communicative goodness, that there might be other beings happy, besides himself. This consistent with God's making the world, for his own glory. The reason why *Plotinus* would explode that. True, that God did not make the world, merely to ostentate his skill and power; but to display his goodness, which is chiefly his glory. The Atheists further demand; What hurt would it have been for us, never to have been made? *Ans.* No other than this, that we could never have enjoyed good, nor been capable of happiness. If no hurt not to have been made, then none to be annihilated; the distance being as great from nothing to something, as from something to nothing. 886

The second atheistical query: If God's goodness were the cause of his making the world, why then was it not made sooner? This question capable of a double sense: First, Why was not the world from eternity? The reply; This not from any defect in the divine goodness, but because there is an impossibility of the thing it self; the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindering it. Our selves prone to think, that could the world have been from eternity, it should have been so. Thus *Philoponus*, in his confutation of *Proclus* his arguments, for the world's eternity. And now no place left for those atheistical cavils, against the novelty of the creation; as if God must therefore have slept from eternity; or had contracted a satiety of his former solitude. Another sense of the question; Why, though the world could not be from eternity, yet was it not made sooner? *Ans.* The world could not possibly have so been made in time, as that it should not have been once, but a day old; and also once, no more than five or six thousand years old. Page 886, 887

The third atheistical query: How could God move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? *Ans.* That all things being derived from the Deity, and essentially depending on him, they must needs be commandable by him, and obsequious to him. And since no body can move it self, that, which first moved the matter, must be incorporeal, and not move it by machines and engines, but by cogitation or will only. That conceit, that an incorporeal Deity could not move matter, because it would run through it, absurd; this moving not mechanically but vitally. That cogitative beings have a natural power of moving matter, evident from our own souls moving our bodies, not by machines

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chines or engines, but merely by thought. More easy for the Deity, to move the whole world by will and cogitation; than for us our bodies. Page 387, 388

The last head of atheistical argumentation, from interest. First; that it is the interest of particular persons, there should be no being infinitely powerful, who hath no law but his own will. The first reply; wishing is no proving. Nor will any man's thinking make things otherwise than they are. 888

But secondly; this wish of Atheists founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty, That he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. God's will not mere will, but law and equity; Ought it self willing. Nor does justice in God clash with goodness; but is a branch, or particular modification thereof. The interest of none, there should be no God, unless perhaps of such as are irreclaimably wicked, and wilfully abandon their own true good. 888, 889

To be without God, to be without hope. No faith nor hope in senseless matter. According to the atheistical hypothesis, no possibility of happiness, nor security of good. 889

God such a Being, as, if he were not, nothing more to be wished for. To believe a God, to believe the existence of all good and perfection; and that things are all made and governed as they should be. Peccability from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings. Infinite hopes from a being infinitely good, and powerful. *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, however cried up so much of late, but infatuated Sophists, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind. 889, 890

The last atheistical argumentation, That theism or religion is inconsistent with the interest of civil sovereigns. Their first pretence for this, that the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and

therefore there must be no power, nor fear greater than that of the Leviathan.

Page 890

In answer to this, the atheistical ethics and politicks to be unravelled. Their foundation laid in the villanizing of human nature. That there is no natural justice, equity, nor charity. No publick nor common Nature in men, but a'l private and selfish. That every man by nature, hath a right to every thing, even to other men's bodies and lives. That an appetite to kill and torment, by nature, gives a right. That nature hath brought men into the world, without any fetters or shackles of duty and obligation, the hinderances of liberty. Lastly, that nature absolutely disociates and segregates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of appetites, and private good. Every man by nature in a state of war against every man. 890, 891

But in the next place, they add, that though this state of nature, which is belluine liberty, and lawless freedom to every thing, be in it self the best; yet by accident, and by reason of men's imbecillity, does it prove the worst. Wherefore, when men had been weary of hewing and flashing, they then bethought themselves at length of helping nature by art; by submitting to a lesser evil, for the avoiding of a greater; abating their infinite right, and yielding to terms of equality with others, and subjection to a common power. 891

Where, these Atheists first slander human nature; and then debase justice and civil authority, making it the ignoble and bastardy brat of fear; or a lesser evil submitted to out of necessity, for the avoiding of a greater. According to which atheistical hypothesis, no man is willingly just. This no new invention of the writer *De Cive*, but the old atheistical generation of justice, and of a body politick, civil society, and sovereignty;

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sovereignty; (before *Plato's* time :) it being fully described in his second book of a common-wealth. Where the philosopher concludes, justice, according to these, to be but a middle thing betwixt the best and the worst; loved, not as good in it self, but only by reason of men's imbecility: or, that justice is indeed another man's good, and the evil of him that is just. The same hypothesis also, concerning justice, as a factitious thing, that sprung only from fear and imbecility, and was chosen but as a lesser evil, insisted on by *Epicurus*.

Page 891, 893

The vain attempts of our modern atheistical politicians, to make justice by art, when there is none by nature. First, by renouncing and transferring men's right, by will and words. For if nothing naturally unlawful, then can no man, by will and words, make any thing unlawful to himself. What made by will, may be destroyed by will. The ridiculous conceit of these atheistical politicians, that injustice is nothing but *dati repetitio*, and such an absurdity in life, as is in disputation, when a man denies a proposition he had before granted; no real evil in the man, but only a relative incongruity in him as a citizen. Again, these justice-makers and authority-makers pretend to derive their factitious justice from pacts and covenants. But pacts and covenants, without natural justice, (as themselves confess) nothing but words and breath; and therefore can have no force to oblige. Wherefore they make another pretence also from certain counterfeit laws of nature, of their own devising, that are nothing but mere juggling equivocation; they being but the laws of fear, or their own timorous and cowardly complexion. They ridiculously dance round in a circle, when they derive the obligation of civil laws from covenants; of covenants from laws of

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nature; and of laws of nature again, from civil laws. Their vain attempt, by art to confociate what nature hath disassociated, like tying knots in the wind or water. Their artificial obligation, or ligaments, by which the members of their Leviathan are held together, more slender than cobwebs. Page 893, 895

These artificial justice-makers and obligation-makers sensible of the weakness of these attempts artificially to confociate, what nature hath disassociated; therefore fly at last from art, to force and power; making their sovereign to reign only in fear. This the true meaning of that opinion, that all obligation is derived from law; that is, the command of him, who hath power to compel. If obligation to obey civil laws only from fear of punishment, then is no man obliged to hazard his life for the safety of his prince; and whoever can promise themselves impunity, may justly disobey. If civil sovereigns reign only in fear, then is their authority nothing but force; and power would justify rebellion. Lastly, if civil right or authority nothing but force and violence, then could it not last long; what natural prevailing against what is violent. 895

Wherefore since civil authority and bodies politick can neither be merely artificial, nor yet violent things, there must be some natural vinculum, to hold them together, such as will both oblige subjects to obey the commands of sovereigns, and sovereigns, in commanding, to seek the good of their subjects; something of a common, publick and conglutinating nature; which no other than natural justice. The authority of God himself founded in justice; of which civil authority a participation. Sovereignty no creature of the people, and of men's wills; but hath a stamp of divinity upon it. Had not God made a city, men, neither by art, or political enchantment, nor by mere force, could

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could have made any. The whole world one city, of God and rational beings. The civil sovereign no Leviathan; that is, no beast, but a God. He reigns not in mere brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and the authority of God himself. Nevertheless, need of force and fear too, to compel some to their duty; nor is the sovereign's sword here alone sufficient, but he must reign also in the fear of God Almighty. Page 895, 896

The second atheistical pretence, to make religion inconsistent with civil sovereignty; because it limits and confines that, which in its own nature is, and ought to be infinite. The reply; That the Atheists infinite right and authority of civil sovereigns is nothing but belline liberty: but true right and authority is essentially founded in natural justice; there being no authority to command, where there is not an obligation to obey; and commands not creating obligation, but presupposing it, without which they would signify nothing. The first original obligation not from will, but nature. The error of those Theists, who derive all obligation to moral things, from the will and positive command of God, as threatening punishments, and promising rewards. From whence it would follow, that no man is good and just, but by accident only, and for the sake of something else. Justice a different species of good from that of private utility. Infinite justice as absurd as an infinite rule or measure. If no infinite justice, then no infinite right and authority. God's own authority bounded by justice: his will ruled by justice, and not justice by his will. Atheists, under a pretence of giving civil sovereigns infinite right, really divest them of all right and authority,

leaving them nothing but brutish force. Proved here, that the *summæ potestates* must of necessity be *divine*. Page 896,

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The last atheistical pretence for the inconsistency of religion with civil power, because conscience is private judgment of good and evil. *Answer*, That not religion, but atheism, introduceth such private judgment, as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it acknowledging nothing in nature, that tends to publick and common good, but making private appetite the only rule or measure of good, and utility of justice. The desperate consequence from hence, that private utility may justify rebellion and parricide. The Atheists professed assertion, that they, who have once rebelled, may justly defend themselves afterward by force. Though private persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves, (the Atheists publick conscience being nonsense and contradiction;) yet is the rule of conscience not private, but publick, except only to mistaken fanatics; who therefore sometimes make a pretence of conscience and religion, in order to sedition and rebellion. Religion and conscience oblige subjects, in all lawful things, actively to obey the sovereign powers; in unlawful, not to resist. 898, 899

The conclusion of the whole Book; That all the atheistical grounds being fully confuted, and the impossibility of atheism demonstrated; it is certain, that the original and head of all things is no blind and unconscious nature, but a perfect understanding Being, self-existent; who hath made all that was fit to be made, and after the best manner, and exerciseth a just providence over all. *To whom be all honour and glory, &c.* *ibid.*

A
DISCOURSE
CONCERNING THE
TRUE NOTION
OF THE
LORD'S SUPPER.

To which are added,
TWO SERMONS;

The First
ON 1 JOHN Chap. ii. Ver. 3, 4.

The Second
ON 1 CORINTH. Chap. xv. Ver. 57.

By R. CUDWORTH D. D.

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T H E

T R U E N O T I O N

O F T H E

L O R D ' S S U P P E R .

The I N T R O D U C T I O N .

AL great errors have ever been intermingled with some truth. And indeed, if Falshood should appear alone unto the world, in her own true shape and native deformity, she would be so black and horrid, that no man would look upon her; and therefore she hath always had an art to wrap up herself in a garment of light, by which means she passed freely disguised and undiscerned. This was elegantly signified in the fable thus: Truth at first presented herself to the world, and went about to seek entertainment; but when she found none, being of a generous nature, that loves not to obtrude herself upon unworthy spirits, she resolved to leave earth, and take her flight for heaven: but as she was going up, she chanced, *Elijab*-like, to let her mantle fall; and Falshood, waiting by for such an opportunity, snatched it up presently, and ever since goes about disguised in Truth's attire.

Pure falshood is pure non-entity, and could not subsist alone by itself; wherefore it always twines up together about some truth, *παραφύσει εινός*, as *Albenagoras* the Christian philosopher speaks, like an ivy, that grows upon some wall, twining herself into it with wanton and flattering embraces, till it have at length destroyed and pulled down that, which held it up. There is alway some truth, which gives being to every error: *Est quædam veritatis anima, quæ corpus omnium errorum agitat & informat; There is ever some soul of truth, which doth secretly spirit and enliven the dead and unwieldy lump of all errors, without which it could not move or stir.*

Though

In Orat. de Resurrect. mo-t.

Though sometimes it would require a very curious artist, in the midst of all Error's deformities, to descry the defaced lineaments of that Truth, which first it did resemble: as *Plutarch* spake sometime of those Egyptian fables of *Isis* and *Osiris*, that they had ἀμύρακι πικρὸν ἐμφάνειαν τῆς ἀληθείας, certain weak appearances and glimmerings of truth, but so as that they needed δεινὸν ἰχθυόεντα, some notable diviner, to discover them.

Lib. de Iside
& Osiride.

And this I think is the case of that grand error of the Papists, concerning the Lord's Supper being a sacrifice; which perhaps at first did rise by degeneration from a primitive truth, whereof the very obliquity of this error yet may bear some dark and obscure intimation. Which will best appear, when we have first discovered the true notion of the Lord's Supper; whence we shall be able at once to convince the error of this Popish tenet, and withal to give a just account of the first rise of it. *Rectum index sui & obliqui.*

See Chap. 5.

CH A P. I.

That it was a custom among the Jews and Heathens, to feast upon things sacrificed; and that the custom of the Christians, in partaking of the body and blood of Christ once sacrificed upon the cross, in the Lord's Supper, is analogical hereunto.

THE right notion of that Christian feast, called, *The Lord's Supper*, in which we eat and drink the body and blood of Christ, that was once offered up to God for us, is to be derived (if I mistake not) from analogy to that ancient rite among the Jews, of *feasting upon things sacrificed*, and eating of those things, which they had offered up to God.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must first consider a little, how many kinds of Jewish sacrifices there were, and the nature of them. Which, although they are very well divided, according to the received opinion, into four, חטאת, אישׁ, שלמים, ערב, *the burnt-offering, the sin-offering, the trespass-offering, and the peace-offering*; yet perhaps I may make a more notional division of them, for our use, into these three species.

First, Such, as were wholly offered up to God, and burnt upon the altar: which were the *holocausts*, or *burnt-offerings*.

Secondly, Such, wherein, besides something offered up to God upon the altar, the priests had also a part to eat of. And these are also subdivided into the *sin-offerings* and the *trespass-offerings*.

Concerning
the difference
between the
two, see *Petit*
in his *Varie*
Lectures.

Thirdly, Such, as in which, besides something offered up to God, and a portion bestowed on the priests, the owners themselves had a share likewise. And these were called שלמים, or *peace-offerings*, which

which contained in them, as the Jewish doctors speak, חלק לשם וחלק לבעל רבהן חלק לכעל, *a portion for God*, and the priests and the owners also; and thence they use to give the etymon of the Hebrew word *Shelamim*. בני זרם הובח שרם בנייהם, because these sacrifices brought peace to the altar, the priests, and the owners, in that every one of these had a share in them.

Now, for the first of these, although (perhaps to signify some special mystery concerning Christ) they were themselves wholly offered up to God, and burnt upon the altar; yet they had ever peace-offerings regularly annexed to them, when they were not קרבניה ציבור, *offerings for the whole congregation*, but for any particular person; that so the owners might at the same time, when they offered up to God, feast also upon the sacrifices.

And for the second, although the owners themselves did not eat of them, the reason was, because they were not perfectly reconciled to God, being for the present in a state of guilt, which they made atonement for in these sacrifices; yet they did it by the priests, who were their mediators unto God, and, as their proxies, did eat of the sacrifices for them.

But in the peace-offerings, because such as brought them had no uncleanness upon them, (*Levit. vii. 20.*) and so were perfectly reconciled to God, and in covenant with him, therefore they were in their own persons to eat of those sacrifices, which they had offered unto God as a federal rite between God and them; which we shall explain at large hereafter.

So then the eating of the sacrifices was a due and proper appendix unto all sacrifices, one way or other, and either by the priests, or themselves, when the person, that offered, was capable thereof. Wherefore we shall find in the Scripture, that eating of the sacrifices is brought in continually as a rite belonging to sacrifice in general. Which we will now shew in divers instances.

Exod. xxxiv. 15. God commands the Jews, that when they came into the land of *Canaan*, they should destroy the altars and images, and all the monuments of idolatry among those Heathens thus; *Lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, and they go a-whoring after their gods, and one call thee, and thou EAT of his sacrifice*: Which indeed afterward came thus to pass, *Num. xxv. 2.* *They called the people to the sacrifice of their gods, and the people did EAT, and bow down to their gods*; or, as it is cited in *Psal. cvi. 28.* *They joined themselves unto Baal-peor, and ATE the sacrifice of the dead.*

When *Jethro*, *Moses's* father-in-law, came to him, *Exod. xviii. 12.* *He took a burnt-offering and sacrifices for God; and Aaron came, and all the elders of Israel, TO EAT BREAD before the Lord*: by sacrifices there are meant peace-offerings, as *Aben-Ezra* and the *Targum* well expound it, which, we said before, were regularly joined with burnt-offerings.

So *Exod. xxxii.* when the Israelites worshipped the golden calf, the text saith, that *Aaron built an altar before it, and made a proclamation, saying, To-morrow is a FEAST unto the Lord*: (see how the altar and the feast were a-kin to one another :) *And they rose up early in the morning, and offered burnt-*

burnt-offerings, and brought peace-offerings, and the people **SAT DOWN TO EAT AND DRINK**. Which passage St. Paul makes use of, being about to dehort the *Corinthians* from eating things sacrificed to idols, *1 Cor. x.* Neither be ye idolaters, as some of them were, as it is written, **The people SAT DOWN TO EAT AND DRINK**: for this was no common eating, but the eating of those sacrifices, which had been offered up to the golden calf.

The first of *Sam. i.* 3. it is said of *Elkanah*, that he went up out of his city yearly to worship, and to sacrifice to the Lord of hosts in *Shiloh*: and when the time was come, that he offered, he gave to *Peninnah* his wife, and to all her sons and daughters, **POR TIONS**; and unto *Hannah* he gave a double **POR TION**; that is, portions to eat of those sacrifices, that had been offered up to God, as *R. David Kimchi* notes. And in the ninth chapter of the same book, when *Saul* was seeking *Samuel*, going towards the city, he met some maidens, that told him *Samuel* was come to the city, for there was a sacrifice for the people that day in the high place: As soon, say they, as you come into the city, you shall find him before he go up to the high place **TO EAT**; for the people will not **EAT** until he come, because he doth bless the sacrifice. Where, though the word *Bamah* properly signifies a high place, or place of sacrifice, whence the Greek word *Βῆμα*; is thought to be derived; yet it is here rendered by the *Targum*, as often elsewhere, **בֵּית אֲחֵרֵיךָ** *Domus accubitus*, a house of feasting; because feasting and sacrificing were such general concomitants of one another.

So again, in the 16th Chap. *Samuel* went to *Bethlehem* to anoint *David*: *I am come* (saith he) *to sacrifice to the Lord*; sanctify yourselves, and come with me to the sacrifice. But when he understood, that *Jesse's* youngest son was absent, he saith to *Jesse*, Send and fetch him, for we will not **SIT DOWN** until he come.

Ver. 11.

So I understand that of the *Sichemites*, according to the judgment of the Jewish doctors, *Judg. ix. 27.* They went into the house of their god, and did **EAT and DRINK**, and cursed *Abimelech*; that is, they went into the house of their god to sacrifice, and did eat and drink of the sacrifice: which perhaps was the reason of the name, by which they called their god, whom they thus worshipped, **BERITH**, which signifies a covenant, because they worshipped him by this federal rite of eating of his sacrifices; of which more hereafter.

Thus likewise the Hebrew Scholiasts expound that in the 16th chapter of the same book, verse 23. concerning the *Philistines*, when they had put out *Sampson's* eyes; They met together to offer a great sacrifice unto *Dagon* their god, and to **REJOICE**; that is, in feasting upon the sacrifices.

Hence it is, that the idolatry of the Jews, in worshipping other gods, is so often described synecdochically under the notion of feasting: *Isa. lvii. 7.* Upon a lofty and high mountain hast thou **SET THY BED**, and thither wentest thou up to offer sacrifice. * For in those ancient times they

Of *Saba*, see we were not wont to sit at feasts, but lie down on beds or couches. *Ezek. xxiii.* You sent for men from far, *Sabæans* from the wilderness, (i. e. idolatrous priests from *Arabia*.) and so they came, for whom thou didst wash thy

thyself, and satest upon a stately bed, with a table prepared before thee. Amos ii. 8. They laid themselves down upon clothes laid to pledge by every altar; i. e. laid themselves down to eat of the sacrifice, that was offered on the altar. And, in Ezek. xviii. 11. eating upon the mountains, seems to be put for sacrificing upon the mountains, because it was a constant appendix to it. He that hath not done any of these things, but hath even eaten upon the mountains, כטוריא פלח לשעותא, i. e. hath worshipped idols upon the mountains; so the Targum renders it. Lastly, St. Paul makes eating of the sacrifice a general appendix of the altar, Heb. xii. 10. We have an altar, whereof they have no right to eat, that serve the tabernacle.

I will observe this one thing more, because it is not commonly understood, that all the while the Jews were in the wilderness, they were to eat no meat at all at their private tables, but that, whereof they had first sacrificed to God at the tabernacle. For this is clearly the meaning of that place, Levit. xvii. 4, 5. *Whatsoever man there be of the house of Israel, that killeth a lamb, or a goat, or an ox, within the camp, or without the camp, and bringeth it not to the door of the tabernacle, to offer an offering to the Lord, blood shall be imputed to him.* And so Nachmonides there glosses, according to the mind of the ancient Rabbins, הנר מתחלה צוה שכל מה שהם אוכלים שלמים, i. e. *Behold, God commanded at first, that all, which the Israelites did eat, should be peace-offerings.* Which command was afterward dispensed with, when they came into the land, and their dwellings were become remote from the tabernacle, so that they could not come up every day to sacrifice. Deut. xii. 21. *If the place, which the Lord thy God hath chosen be too far from thee; then thou shalt kill of the herd and of the flock, and thou shalt eat within thy gates whatsoever thy soul lusteth after.* Only now there were, instead thereof, three constant and set times appointed in the year, in which every male was to come up and see God at his tabernacle, and eat and drink before him; and the sacrifice, that was then offered, was wont to be called by them, עולת ראיה, a sacrifice of seeing.

Thus I have sufficiently declared the Jewish rite of joining feasting with sacrificing; and it will not be now amiss, if we add, as a *mantissa* to that discourse, something of the custom of the Heathens also in the like kind, the rather because we may make some use of it afterward. And it was so general amongst them in their idolatrous sacrifices, that Isaac Abrabanel, a learned Jew, observed it in Pirush Hattorab, כומים קרמינים כל מי שהוא, עושה עבירת אלילים מור היהקושה עליה מכרה, *whosoever sacrificed to idols, made a feast upon the sacrifice.* And the original of it amongst them was so ancient, that it is ascribed by their own authors to Prometheus, as Salmasius, in his Solino-Plinian Exercitationes, notes, P. 129. *Hunc sacrificii morem à Prometheo originem duxisse volunt, quo partem hostiæ in ignem conjicere soliti sunt, partem ad suum vitæum abuti.* Which Prometheus, although, according to Eusebius his Chronicon, and our ordinary Chronologers, his time would fall near about the 3028th year of the Julian period, which was long after Noab; yet it is certain, that he lived much sooner, near about Noab's time, in that he is made to be the son of Japhet, which was Noab's son, from whom the Europeans descended, (Gen.

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 Lib. 1. de Idol.

x. 5.) called therefore by the poet *Iâpeti genus*. For there is no great heed to be given to the chronology of human writers concerning this age of the world, which *Censorinus* from *Varro* calls *Μηθικόν*, the *fabulous time*, or *age*. Although I rather subscribe to the judgment of the learned *Vossius*, that this *Prometheus* was no other than *Noah* himself, the father of *Jaybet*, and not his son, because the other things do so well agree to him; and we may easily allow the Heathens such a mistake as that is, in a matter of so remote antiquity: and then, if this be true, the whole world received this rite of feasting upon sacrifice, at first, together with that of sacrifice, at the same time. Instances of this custom are so frequent and obvious in Heathen authors, that *Homer* alone were able to furnish us sufficiently.

In the α of the *Iliads*, he brings in a description of a hecatomb-sacrifice, which *Agamemnon* prepared for *Apollo* by his priest *Chryses*, and a feast, that followed immediately after it. In β' the same *Agamemnon* offers up an ox to *Jupiter*, and inviteth divers of the Grecian captains to partake of it. In γ' of the *Odysses*, *Nestor* makes a magnificent sacrifice to *Neptune* of eighty two bullocks, with a feast upon it, on the shore. In θ' *Aleinous* offers up a bullock unto *Jupiter*, and then immediately follows,

Δαίμων' ἐρικυδέα δαίτῃα
 Τερόμενοι

Plato, in his second *De Legibus*, acknowledges these feasts under the name of Ἐορταὶ μετὰ θεῶν, *feasts after divine worship* offered up to the gods. Among the Latins, that of *Lycus* in *Plautus* his *Pænulus* belongs to this purpose;

Convivas volo
 Reperire vobis commodos, qui unâ sent,
 Interibi attulerint exta.

And that of *Gelasius* in *Stichus*;

Ἰάννε exta coëτα sunt? quot agnis fecerat?

After this manner he, in *Virgil's Eclogues*, invites his friend,

Cùm faciam vitulâ pro frugibus, ipse venito.

And thus *Evander* entertains *Aeneas*, in the eighth *Aeneid*,

Tum lecti juvenes certatim, aræque sacerdos,
 Viscera tosta ferunt taurorum

Plutarch somewhere observes it as a strange and uncouth rite, in the worship of the goddess *Hecate*, that they which offered sacrifice unto her, did not partake of it. And the same author reports of *Catiline* and his conspirators, ἔτι καλοῦσάωντες ἀνθρώπων ἐγέντατο τῶν σαρκῶν, *that sacrificing a-*
 mars.

man, they did all eat somewhat of the flesh; using this religious rite as a bond to confirm them together in their treachery. But *Strabo* tells us of a strange kind of worship used by the Persians in their sacrifices, where no part of the flesh was offered up to the gods, but all eaten up by those, that brought it, and their guests; they supposing in the mean while, that whilst they did eat of the flesh, their god, which they worshipped, had the soul of the sacrifice, that was killed in honour to him. The author's own words are these in his 15th book; Μερίσκιον δὲ τὸ Μάγν τὰ κρέα τὰ ὑφηνυμέναια τὴν ἱερουργίαν, ἀπιᾶσι διεγόμενοι, τοῖς θεοῖς ἔδου ἀπονεύμαυτες μέρκιον. Τῆς γὰρ ΨΥΧΗΣ Φασι τὰ ἱερεῖα δεῖσθαι τὸν θεόν, ἄλλω δὲ ἕδειός. Ὅμως δὲ τὰ ἐπίπλα τι μικρὸν τιθείασι, ὡς λέγουσι τινες, ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ.—*Sua quisque accepta abeant, nullâ parte diis relata; dicunt enim Deum nihil velle præter hostiæ animam: quidam tamen (ut fertur) omenti partem igni imponunt.*

From this custom of the Heathens of feasting upon sacrifices arose that famous controversy among the Christians in the primitive times, sometimes disputed in the New Testament, whether it were lawful ΕΣΘΙΕΙΝ ΕΙΔΩΛΟΘΥΤΑ, *to eat things sacrificed to idols.*

These Gentile feasts upon the sacrifices were usually kept in the temple, where the sacrifice was offered; as may be gathered from that passage of *Herodotus* in *Clio*, where speaking of *Cleobus* and *Bithene*, and what happened to them after that prayer, which their mother put up to the gods for them, ὡς ἔθυσαν (saith he) καὶ ἐνωχθησαν, κατακοιμηθέντες ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἱερῷ, &c. *As soon as they had sacrificed and feasted, lying down to sleep in the same temple, they died there, and never rose more.* But it is very apparent from that of *St. Paul*, 1 *Cor.* viii. 10. *If any man see thee, which hast knowledge, sit at meat ἐν εἰδωλείῳ*, that is, not, as *Erasmus* translates it, *in epulo simulachrorum*, but as *Beza*, and from him our interpreters, *in the idol's temple*; for so both the Syriack metaphrast expounds it ܒܝܬܝܢ ܕܝܕܘܠܝܡ, and the Arabick ܒܝ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܘܗܝܡ *in the house of idols.*

If any thing were left, when these feasts were ended, they were wont to carry portions of them home to their friends: so that learned scholiast upon *Aristophanes* in *Plutus* tells us, οἱ γὰρ ἐν θυσίαις ἴοντες, ἔφερον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς θυσίας τοῖς οἰκειοῖς κατὰ νόμον τινός. Whence *Petit*, in that excellent collection of *Attick laws*, inserted this for one, *viz. That they, that go home from a sacrifice, should carry part of it to their friends.* And that Greek comedian himself alludeth there to it in these words;

Τὸτο δὲ τὸ κρεάδιον
Τῶν ἑδοθέντων εἰσενεγκάτω λαέων.

Theocritus in his *Bucoliastes* doth express it fully;

Καὶ τὸ δὲ θύσας
Ταῖς νόμφαις, Μέρσωνι καλὸν κρέας αὐτίκα πέμψον.

And *Plautus* in *Miles*;

—————Sacrificant?
Dant inde partem majorem mibi quam sibi.

These portions, which they carried home, were called commonly by the Greeks *μερίδες*, and in the Umbrian language, as *Festus* tells us, *Strobula*. *Theophrastus* in his *characters* uses the word *τόμοι* in this sense, *Καὶ θυσίας καὶ ἀναλίσκουσας ἥλων Τόμον ἀπαιτήσων*, i. e. *ad sacrificantes & epula concelebantes accedit, ut inde portionem auferat*.

And because they thought they did receive some blessing from the gods with it, therefore it was sometime called *ὑγεία*, as we find in *Hesychius* upon that word *ὑγεία*: *ἀλφίνα οἴνω καὶ ἐλαίῳ πεφυραμένα, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐκ θεῶν φερόμενον, εἴτε μέρον, εἴτε θάλλος, ἢ ὑγεία*.

But otherwise, if there were any thing yet remaining, it belonged to the priests, as we learn from that scholiast, which we have already commended, upon *Vespe*, *νόμος ἦν, τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα τῆς θυσίας τὴν ἱερέας λαμβάνειν*: i. e. *It was an ancient law among the Athenians, that the priests should have the remainder*. Which is not only to be understood of the skin and such like parts, but of the flesh of the sacrifice itself; as we learn from *St. Austin* in his exposition upon *Rom. ii.* who tells us also, that these relics were sometimes sold for them in the market; whence that speech of *St. Paul*, *1 Cor. x. 25. Whatsoever is sold in the shambles eat, asking no question for conscience sake*.

I will shut up all with this one observation more, That as we said of the Jews, that in the wilderness they did eat no meat, but of that which they had first sacrificed; in like manner the Heathens were wont to sacrifice before all their feasts: whence it is, that *Athenæus* observes, feasts among the ancient Heathens were ever accounted sacred and religious things. And thus we must understand that speech of *St. Paul* in the 27th verse of the forenamed chapter, *If any one, that believes not, invite you, and you be disposed to go; whatsoever is set before you eat, asking no question for conscience sake*. Nay, it was accounted a profane thing amongst them, to eat any meat at their private tables, whereof they had not first sacrificed to their gods; as appeareth by the Greek proverb, *ἀβία ἰσθίειν*, used by *Anacreon* and others as a brand of a notorious wicked man, *viz. One, that would eat meat, whereof he had not sacrificed*.

Now having thus shewn, that both amongst the Jews under the law, and the Gentiles in their Pagan worship, (for Paganism is nothing but Judaism degenerate) it was ever a solemn rite to join feasting with sacrifice, and to *EAT* of those things, which had been offered up; the very concinnity and harmony of the thing itself leads me to conceive, that that Christian feast under the Gospel, called *THE LORD'S SUPPER*, is the very same thing, and bears the same notion, in respect of the true Christian sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, that those did to the Jewish and Heathenish sacrifices; and so is *EPULUM SACRIFICIALE*, a *sacrificial feast*, I mean, a *feast upon sacrifice*; or, *EPULUM EX OBLATIS*, a *feast upon things offered up to God*. Only this difference arising in the parallel, that because those legal sacrifices were but types and shadows of the true Christian sacrifice, they were often repeated and renewed, as well as the feasts, which were made upon them: but now the true Christian sacrifice being come, and offered up once for all, never to be repeated, we have therefore no more typical sacrifices left amongst us, but only the feasts upon
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the true sacrifice still symbolically continued, and often repeated, in reference to that *ONE GREAT SACRIFICE*, which is always as present in God's sight, and efficacious, as if it were but now offered up for us.

CHAPTER II.

An Objection taken from the Passover answered. Proved, that the Passover was a true Sacrifice, and the Paschal Feast a Feast upon a Sacrifice, from Scripture, and Jewish Authors.

BUT methinks I hear it objected to me, that the true notion of the *Object*: Lord's supper is to be derived rather from the passover among the Jews; it being the common opinion of divines, that the Jews had but two sacraments, *viz.* circumcision and the passover, that answer to those two amongst us, baptism and the Lord's supper: but the Jewish passover had no relation to a sacrifice, being nothing else but a mere *FEAST*; and therefore from analogy to the Jewish we cannot make the Lord's supper to be *EPULUM SACRIFICIALE*, a feast upon sacrifice.

To which I answer, first, That I know not what warrant there is for that *Answ.* divinity so confidently imposed upon us by some, that the Jews had but two sacraments, circumcision and the passover; and that it should thence follow by inevitable consequence, that the Lord's supper must ἀνάστανται, answer only to the Jewish passover. Sure I am, the Jews had many more. For not to instance in that of St. Paul, *Our fathers were all BAPTIZED* 1 Cor. x. unto Moses in the cloud, and in the sea, like our Christian baptism; and did all *EAT* the same spiritual meat, (*viz.* the manna) and did all *DRINK* the same spiritual drink, (*viz.* the water of the rock that followed them) like the bread and wine in the Christian Lord's supper: nor to examine all the other sacramental ceremonies, which they had, that were almost as many sacraments as ceremonies. These feasts upon the sacrifices, which we have all this while insisted on, were nothing else but true and proper *sacraments joined with sacrifices.

But secondly, I will grant, that the Jewish passover hath a special resemblance to the Christian *LORD'S SUPPER*, although upon other grounds; for I say, undoubtedly the passover was a true and proper sacrifice, and therefore the paschal feast a feast upon a sacrifice: so that this shall still advance and improve our former notion.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must understand, that besides those four general kinds of sacrifices among the Jews before-mentioned, the burnt-offering, the sin-offering, the trespass-offering, and the peace-offering; there were some other peculiar kinds of sacrifices, as the masters tell us, *viz.* these three, בכורים ומעשר ופסח, the *Firstlings of Cattel*, and the *Tenck*, and the *Passover*. And the reason, why these, in the distribution

*See *Cloppenburg in Schevta Sacrif.* and of the right Notion of the *Sacrament* see *Vossius in Theol. Theolog.*

of sacrifices, are thus distinguished by them from all the other general kinds of sacrifices, is thus given by the famous *Maimonides* upon the *Misna* of the *Talmud*, in *Massecheth Zebachim*, the sixth Chap. לפי שאיתן הארבע פעמים רבות יתחייב היחיד בכל אהור מהם לפני שני הענינים והציבור הייכים בהם כומנים ואלו אינם בן *Because those four forenamed were such kind of sacrifices, as that a private person was often bound to each of them in several cases, and the whole congregation in several seasons; but these three were not of that nature, being peculiarly restrained to one case or season.* Now these three kinds of peculiar sacrifices were in their nature all nearest of kin to the peace-offerings, and are therefore called by the Jewish doctors רמיס לשלמים, like to peace-offerings, because they were not only killed in the same place, being all קורשים קלים, light holy things, and had the אימורים, or inward parts thereof, to be burnt likewise upon the altar; but also, in that part of them was to be eaten by the owners. Inasmuch that the *Talmudists*, put many cases, in which a lamb, that was set apart for a passover, and could not be offered in that notion, was to be turned into a peace-offering, as that which was near of kin to it.

But yet these masters tell us, there were three precise differences between the *Pascha* and the ordinary peace-offering, בתסמיכה ונסכים ותנופת חזה ושרוק. First, in that there was no laying on of hands upon the passover in the killing of it; for this was no where commanded, as in all the peace-offerings. Secondly, that there was no *Mincab* or meat-offering, nor *Libamen* or drink-offering, to be joined with it; (for so they use to include both in the word *Nesachim*.) Thirdly, that there was no waving of the breast and shoulder for the priests portion; the reason whereof was, because the priests were bound always to have passover-offerings of their own, as it is expressed *Ezra vi.* and so needed not any wave-offering.

But that the passovers were, in other respects, of the same nature with the peace-offerings, and therefore true and proper sacrifices, because it is a thing generally not so well understood, and therefore opposed by divers, I shall labour the more fully to convince it. I say, that the passovers were always brought to the tabernacle or the temple, and there presented and offered up to God by the priest, as all sacrifices were; that the blood of them was there sprinkled upon the altar, of which the Hebrew doctors well observe, * עקר הובח כהויית הרם, *The very essence of a sacrifice is in sprinkling of the blood;* and also that the *Imurim*, (as they call them) that is, the fat and kidneys, were burnt upon the altar: all this I shall endeavour to demonstrate.

Only first I must premise this, that when I say the passover was brought to the tabernacle, and offered by the priests, I do not mean, that the priests were always bound to kill the passovers: for I grant, that the people were wont to kill their own passovers; and so I find it expressly in the *Misna* of the *Talmud*, *Massech. Zebach*, cap. v. sect. 6. שחט ישראל וקבל הכוהן. *Which Talmudical expression alludes to that place, Exod. xii. 6. The whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill it in the evening;* where this seems to be commanded by God. And the practice consonant hereunto, I find intimated

* *Maimon. in Korban Pesach. ch. 2.*

intimated at least in Scripture, in *Hezekiah's* passover, 2 Chron. xxx. 17. *There were many in the congregation, that were not sanctified; therefore the Levites had the charge of killing the passover for every one, that was not clean, to sanctify it unto the Lord.* Where R. Solomon writeth thus: *אל התמה אל העמים למה לא שחטו בעליכם עצמם* Wonder not, why the owners themselves did not kill them, for it followeth, that many in the congregation had not sanctified themselves; therefore the Levites were appointed in their place to sanctify the work unto the Lord. And R. D. Kimchi to the same purpose; *Though many of them did eat the passover in uncleanness, it being a case of necessity, in that they had no time to purify themselves; yet for them to come into the court, and kill the passovers, this was not needful, when it might be done as well by the Levites.* And therefore the same is to be thought likewise of the priests and Levites killing the passover, *Ezra* vi. because the people returning newly from captivity were not yet purified, as it is there also partly intimated.

But this doth not at all hinder our proceeding, or evince the passover not to be a sacrifice: for it is a great mistake in most of our learned writers, to think, that the killing of every sacrifice was proper to the priest; whereas indeed there was no such matter; but as we have already granted, that the people commonly killed their own passovers, so we will affirm, that they did the same concerning any of the other sacrifices. *Levit.* i. 4, 5. it is said concerning the burnt-offering, *If any man bring a burnt-offering to the Lord, he shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering, AND HE SHALL KILL the bullock before the Lord, and the priests, Aaron's sons, shall take the blood.* So concerning the peace-offerings, chap. iii. 2. *He shall lay his hand on the head of his offering, and KILL it at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation:* And concerning the sin-offering, chap. iv. 24. *HE shall lay his hand on the head of the goat, and KILL it at the place, where they kill the burnt-offering before the Lord.* We see then, what incompetent judges our own authors are in Jewish customs and antiquities. The Jewish doctors and antiquaries (which are so much contemned by some of our magisterial dictators in all learning) would have taught us here another lesson. For thus *Maimonides*, in *Biath Hammik*, speaks to this point, *שחוטת קורשים כשרה בורים אפילו קורשי קורשים כן קורשי יחיד וכן קורשי ציבור שנהנין* *ושחט את כן הכני* that is, *the killing of the holy things may lawfully be done by strangers, yea of the most holy things, whether they be the holy things of a private person, or of the whole congregation: as it is said (Levit. i.) And he shall kill the bullock; and the priests, Aaron's sons, shall take the blood.* The same is avouched again afterward, by the same author, in *Maaseh Korban*, chap. v.

But if any one would therefore fain know, what were properly the priests' actions about the sacrifice, which might not be done lawfully by any stranger, the same Jewish authors have a trite rule amongst them concerning it: *מקבלה ואיך מצות כהונה* *the receiving of the blood, and all the other parts, that were to be offered up, and all that followeth after that, belongeth to the priest's office.* And *Isaac Abrabanel* will teach us more particularly, in his comment on *Leviticus*, that there were five things to be done

by

* Of this
vide Magi-
strorum Pla-
cita.

by the owners of the sacrifice that brought it, and five things by the priest that offered it. The first five were, laying on of hands, killing, slaying, cutting up, and washing of the inwards; the other five were the receiving of the blood in a vessel, the sprinkling of it upon the altar, the putting of fire upon the altar, the ordering of the wood upon the fire, and the ordering of the pieces upon the wood. Hence it is, that upon the fore-quoted place of the *Mifna*, (which I brought to shew, that the people did kill the passovers) *Rabbi Obadiab* of *Bartenora* thus glosseth, שחט ישראל, אס ירצה שהשחיטה בישרה ברום ככל הקרבנות, i. e. *The people of Israel might all kill the passovers themselves, if they pleased, because the KILLING OF ANY SACRIFICE might be done lawfully by strangers; but the priests received the blood.*

Now, I come to prove what I have undertaken. And first, that the passover was always brought to the tabernacle or the temple, and there offered unto God as the other sacrifices were, is clear enough from *Deut.* xvi. 5. *Thou shalt not sacrifice the passover within any of the gates, which the Lord thy God giveth thee; but at the place, which the Lord thy God chuseth to place his name there, there thou shalt sacrifice.* And that this is to be understood not of *Jerusalem* in general, but of the tabernacle or temple, appears, both because the same expressions are used of the other sacrifices, *Deut.* xii. ver. 5, 6, 11, 14. where it is clearly meant, that they were to be brought to the temple; and because it is certain, that every thing, that was killed amongst the Jews, was either to be killed at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, or else might be killed indifferently in any part of the whole land.

Let us now see, how the Jewish doctors comment upon this place, men better skilled in these rites than our own authors are, *R. Moses BEN MAIMON*, in *Halacchah Pesach*, cap. 1. אין שוחטין את הפסח, &c. *They kill not the passover but in the court, as the rest of the holy things; yea, in the time, when high places were permitted, they sacrificed not the passover in a private high place; for it is said (Deut. xvi.) Thou mayst not sacrifice the passover in any of thy gates: We have learnt, that this is a prohibition to kill the passover in any private high place, although it be in a time, when high places are permitted.* From which excellent glois of theirs, it appeareth, that there was more preciseness in bringing of the passover to the place, where God's name was put, and offering it at the tabernacle or the temple, than of any of the other sacrifices. And this was the reason, as was before intimated out of *KIMCHI*, why in *Hezekiab's* passover the *Levites* had the charge of killing, because the passovers were to be killed in the court of the temple, whither the people being unclean could not enter; for otherwise, if it had been done without the court, they might as well have killed their own passovers, as have eaten them. And this may be farther confirmed, in that the passover is called a *Korban*: *Numb.* ix. 7. *When certain men were defiled by a dead body, that they could not keep the passover, they came to Moses, and said, Wherefore are we kept back, that we may not OFFER an OFFERING to the Lord in his appointed season? And again, ver. 13. If any one be clean, and forbeareth to keep the passover, even that soul shall be cut off.*

off, because he brought not an OFFERING (or a KORBAN) to the Lord in his appointed season. Nothing was called an OFFERING, or a KORBAN, but that, which was brought, and offered up to God at the tabernacle or temple, where his name was put.

That the blood of the passovers was to be sprinkled by the priest, and fat only to be burnt upon the altar, although this must needs follow from the former, yet I prove it more particularly thus: *Exod. xxiii. 18. Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leavened bread; neither shall the fat of my feast remain until the morning.* For by the general consent of the Jewish scholiasts, and all those Christian interpreters, that I have seen, this place is to be understood only of the passover; and therefore ONKELOS, that famous Chaldee paraphrast, for *רם זבחי* the blood of my sacrifice, made no question but to read it *רם פסחי* the blood of my passover. But it appears undoubtedly from a parallel place in the xxxiv. chapter of the same book, ver. 23, 25, 26. where those 17, 18, and 19. verses of the xxiii. chap. are again repeated; *Thrice in the year shall all your men-children appear before the Lord. — Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven, neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the passover be left unto the morning. The first of the first-fruits of thy land thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God. Thou shalt not seebe a kid in its mother's milk.* Here what was wanting in the former, is supplied; *Neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the PASSOVER be left unto the morning.* And I have set down the whole context with it, because it will be needful, for the better clearing of it, to consider its coherence with other verses, which is the very same in both chapters; and *Isaac Abrabanel* hath set it down excellently in this manner.

First therefore, saith he, when God had spoken of the Jews appearing thrice before him every year, viz. at the feast of the passover or of unleavened bread, the feast of weeks or Pentecost, the feast of tabernacles or in-gathering, *בין שהגיד שלשת החגנים ההם נתן ככל אחד מהם*, i. e. *When he had spoken of these three feasts, he subjoins immediately some rule concerning every one of them in particular:* First, for the passover, in those words, *Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven, neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the passover be left until the morning:* Secondly, for the feast of Pentecost, in those; *The first of the first-fruits of the land thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God:* Thirdly, for the feast of tabernacles or in-gathering; *Thou shalt not seebe a kid in his mother's milk;* which words, for want of this light of the context, were never yet sufficiently explained by any of our interpreters. And the thread of this coherence alone led *Abrabanel* very near the true meaning of them, ere he was aware: *היותר נראה בזה שהיה כמעשה עובדי עבודת אלילים בזמן קרביהם לעשות כן רל לכשל הגרוים בחלב*, i. e. *It seems most probable, that this command was occasioned from a custom among the idolatrous Heathens, that at the time of their gathering in of fruits, they were wont to boil a kid in the dam's milk, thinking, that by this means they were made acceptable to their gods, and did procure a blessing by it.* To confirm which gloss, he tells

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us of a custom somewhat like to this, used in his time in some parts of Spain.

But because *Abrabanel* doth not tell his tale so handsomely as he should, I will help him out a little from an ancient *Karraite*, whose comment I have seen upon the *Pentateuch*, MS. (for the monuments of these *Karraite* Jews were never yet printed, and are very rarely seen in these European parts.) And it is thus: *It was a custom of the ancient Heathens, when they had gathered in all their fruits, to take a kid, and boil it in the dam's milk, and then בשרה ברוך, in a magical way, to go about and besprinkle with it all their trees and fields, and gardens and orchards; thinking by this means they should make them fruitful, and bring forth fruit again more abundantly the following year.* Wherefore, God forbid his people the Jews, at the time of their in-gathering, to use any such superstitious or idolatrous rite. And I produce this the rather, because *Abrabanel*, toward the end of his comment on this place, mentions a gloss of some *KARRAITISH* author upon it, although it be altogether unlike to this, which we have here related. *חכמי הקראים כתבו בטעם לא תבשל גוי שלא תתערב הפרה עם העקרים* *Scribunt sapientes KARRÆORUM, Nè coquas hædum in lacte matris juæ, hoc est, Nè commisceatur germen cum radicibus.*

But to return. As from the coherence of the whole context thus cleared it is manifest, that this verse in both places is to be understood only of the passover; so it may be farther confirmed from the *Talmudists*, who ever expound it in this sense, as appears by the *Misna* in *Zebachin*, chapter the sixth; *השוהט את הפסח על הרמין עובר בלא תעשה*, *He, that killeth the passover with leaven, sinneth against a negative command*, (which is more amongst the Jews, than to sin against a positive,) viz. that in these places already quoted, *Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven*; from whence they collected, as *Maimonides* tells us, that they were to put away leaven the fourteenth day, a day before the killing of the passover. Nay, this place cannot possibly be understood in any other sense, as of sacrifices in general, because leaven was sometimes commanded with sacrifices, as *Levit.* vii. 13.

But that the blood of the passovers was sprinkled, may be demonstrated farther, not only from that of *Hezekiah's* passover, *2 Chron.* xxx. 16. *The priests sprinkled the blood, which they received from the hand of the Levites; for there were many in the congregation, that were not sanctified; therefore the Levites had the charge of killing the passovers*; but also from *Jofiah's*, chap. xxxv. ver. 11. which can no ways be evaded; *They, that is, the Levites, killed the passover, and the priests sprinkled the blood from their hands, and the Levites stayed them.* Now the sprinkling of the blood is the essence of a sacrifice, as before we noted from the Jewish Doctors. And therefore the passover must needs be a sacrifice: *ἕως ἡνίκα δειξάται.*

For a confirmation of all this, I will describe punctually the whole manner of the *PASCHAL SACRIFICE* from the *Misna* of the Jewish *Talmud*, a monument of such antiquity, as cannot be distrusted in these rites. Nothing (say they) was killed before the morning-sacrifice; and after the evening-sacrifice, nothing but the passover.

The evening-sacrifice was usually killed between the eighth and ninth hour, (that is, half an hour after two, in the afternoon,) and offered between the ninth and tenth, (that is, half an hour after three.) But in the evening of the passover, the daily sacrifice was killed an hour sooner; and after that began the killing of the passover, which was to be done between the two evenings; whereof the first began at noon, from the sun's declination towards the west, the second at sun-set. Yet the *Pascha* might be killed before the daily sacrifice, if there were but one to stir the blood, and keep it from coagulating, till the blood of the daily sacrifice were sprinkled; for that was always to be sprinkled first. The passovers were always killed by three several companies. When the court was once full, they shut the doors, and the priests stood all in their ranks, with round vessels in their hands to receive the blood; those that were of gold, in a rank by themselves, and those that were of silver; all without bottoms, lest they should be set somewhere on the ground, and the blood congeal in them. And they killed the passovers, as the peace-offerings, in any part of the court, because they were קורשים קלים, *the less holy things*; as the קורשי קודשים, *the holy of holies*, were always to be killed at the north-side of the altar. The priests then took the blood, and gave it from one to another, till it came to him that stood next the altar; and he sprinkled it all at once toward the bottom of the altar, which was a square of thirty-two cubits, save that the south-east horn had no bottom. After the blood was sprinkled, the lamb was slay'd, and cut up, the *Imurim* or inwards taken out and laid upon the altar; then the owner took up the lamb, with the skin of it, and carried it to his own home. The first company having ended, then the second came in, and afterward the third; and for every company they began a new the HALLEL, and sang all the while the passovers were killing; and when they had finished the *Hallel*, they sang it over a second time; and when they had gone over it a second time, they began it a third time; although it was never known, that the third time they sang out the *Hallel* quite, or came any farther than אהבת* before the priests had done.

But because, besides these Talmudistick Jews, there is another sect of KAR-RAITES, mentioned before, (that reject all Talmudical traditions, which are not grounded upon Scripture) though little known amongst us, yet famous in the orient; I will produce one testimony of theirs also from an ancient manuscript, that so it may appear we have the full consent of all Jewish antiquity for this opinion. The author's name to me is uncertain, because the papers have lost both their beginning and end. But they contain in them divers large and complete discourses upon several arguments in the Karraite way, as about the Jewish year, the sabbath, the passover, &c. Concerning the passover, he divides his discourse into several chapters, whereof the title of one is this, במקום הקרבה הפסח ואכלתו, *concerning the place where the passover was to be offered and eaten*; where he thus begins: רע ליהקרבת הפסח הוא במקום המובהר בכתוב לא תיכל לזבוח את הפסח באחר שערך ומקום שהימתי בעזרה ושפיכת דמו אל יסור המזבח ואימוריו היו נקטרוב במזבח, i. e. Know, that the offering of the passover was always in the place, which God had chosen (to put his name there,) as it is written, Thou shalt not sacrifice the passover within any of thy gates; and the place of the killing of the

* אהבתי

I love the Lord, &c. is the beginning or Psalm 116. being part of the Hallel or Hymn sung at that time, which began at Ps. 113. and reached to the end of Ps. 118.

passover was in the court called HESRA, and the blood of it was poured out toward the bottom of the altar, and the Imurim or inward parts of it were burnt upon the altar, &c.

Hence it was, that when Cestius once demanded what the number of the Jews was that resorted to Jerusalem, at the time of their solemn feasts, the priests made answer, and told him exactly how many lambs and kids were sacrificed at the passover, εικοσιπεντε μυριάδες, πρόσδε πεντακχιλία εξακόσια, twenty five myriads, five thousand and six hundred; which they could not have done, had not they sacrificed them at the temple.

But what need have we of any more dispute? When the passover was first kept in Egypt, were not the paschal lambs there killed in a sacrificial and expiatory way, when the blood thereof was to be sprinkled upon the houses, for God to look upon, and so pass over them? It is true, they were killed in every private house; but the reason of that was, because there were then priests in every family, viz. the * first-born, which were afterward redeemed, when the children of Israel gave up the whole tribe of Levi to God for his service. Such priests as these were those whom Moses sent to sacrifice, Exod. xxiv. 5. called there young men; Moses sent young men of the children of Israel, which offered burnt-offerings, and sacrificed peace-offerings to the Lord; where Onkelos the Chaldee paraphrast reads יְשֻׁלָּה יִת בְּכוֹרֵי, he sent the first-born: to which agreeth the Arabick translation of R. Saadiab, and the Persian of Tawafius, as Mr. Selden notes, whom I cannot without honour mention, as the glory of our nation for oriental learning.

And was not the killing of the passover a special type of the death of Christ, the true sacrifice of the world? Give me leave to note one thing to this purpose, upon the credit of Justin Martyr, in his dialogue with Trypho, that in the ancient Hebrew copies of the bible, there was in the book of Ezra a speech of his, which he made before the passover, expounding the mystery thereof concerning Christ; which, because it favoured the Christians, was timely expunged by the Jews. The speech was this; Καὶ εἶπεν Ἐσδράς τῷ λαῷ, τὸτο τὸ πάσχα ὁ Σωτὴρ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ καταφυγὴ ἡμῶν. Καὶ ἐὰν διανοηθῆτε, καὶ ἀναεῖν ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ὅτι μέλλομεν αὐτὸν ταπεινῶ ἐν σημεῖῳ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλπίσωμεν ἐπ' αὐτόν, ἢ μὴ ἐρημαβῆ ὁ τόπος ὅτι εἰς τὸν ἄπαυλα χρόνον, λέγει ὁ θεὸς τῶν θυμῶν. Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ πισεύσῃτε αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰσακούσῃτε τῶ κερύμαλος αὐτῷ, ἔσθε ἐπίχορμα τοῖς Ἰουδαῖοις. i. e. *Et dixit Esdras populo, Hoc pascha Salvator noster & perfugium nostrum. Et si in animum induxeritis, & in cor vestrum ascenderit, quod humilituri eum finis in signo, & postea speraturi in eum, non desolabitur locus iste in omne tempus, dicit Deus exercituum. Sin in eum non credideritis, neque audieritis annunciationem ejus, deridiculum eritis gentibus.* Remarkable it is, if it be true; and the author deserves the better credit in it, because he was a Samaritan, and therefore might be the better skilled in Jewish writings. But however, I am sure the Apostle tells us, not only that the passover was a type of Christ, in respect of his death, but also that the proper notion of the Paschal feast was to be a feast upon sacrifice, in those words, 1 Cor. v. 7, 8. *Christ our passover is sacrificed for us; therefore let us keep the feast* (that is, the paschal feast upon this sacrificed Christ) *with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.* Where alluding to that common Jewish custom of feasting

* Vide clarif. Seldenum de Succes. in Pontificat. Hebraeor. l. i. c. 1. & de Succes. ad Leges Heb. l. 1. c. 5.

feasting upon sacrifices, of which we have before spoken, he implies, that the paschal supper was a feast of the same nature, a sacrificial feast.

C H A P. III.

An Answer to some Objections against the Passover's being a Sacrifice: and the Controversy about the Day, upon which the Jews kept the Passover about the time of our Saviour's death, discussed. Proved against Scaliger, and others of that Opinion, that no Translations of Feasts from one Feria to another were then in use.

BUT yet we will not dissemble, what there is of any moment, either in antiquity or reason, against our own opinion, ere we let this discourse pass, but subject all to an impartial view.

And first, the authority of *Philo*, who, in his third book *De vita Moysis*, speaks thus concerning the passover: ἐν ἧ ἕκ εἰ μὲν ἰδιῶται προσάγει τῷ θεῷ τὰ ἱερεῖα, θύσει δ' οἱ ἱερεῖς ἀλλὰ νόμον προσάξει σύμπαν τὸ ἔθνος ἱεραῖται, τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐκάστῳ τὰς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν θυσίας ἀνάγκησιν τότε καὶ χειρουργῆσαι. Ὁ μὲν ὅν ἄλλῳ ἅπας λαὸς ἐγενήθη καὶ Φαρισαῖος ἦν, ἐκάστῳ νομίζοντι ἱερωσύνην τετιμηθῆναι. i. e. *In qua non ut alijs plebei homines victimas adducunt ad altare mastrandas à sacerdotibus, sed jubente lege tota gens sacrificat, dum pro se quisque maelat hostiam suis manibus. Tunc universus populus exultabat, unoquoque existimante se sacerdotii dignitate honoratum.* And again, in his book *De Decalogo*, Ἐν ἧ θύσῃ πανδημίαι αὐτῶν ἕκαστος, τὸς ἱερεῖς αὐτῶν ἐκ ἀναμνήσεως, ἱερωσύνην τὴν νόμος χαριστικῶν τῷ ἔθνει πάντι, μίαν ἡμέραν ἐξαίρετον ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔθνος, εἰς ἀπεργίαν θυσιῶν. *Quando populariter singuli sacrificant, non expeclatis sacerdotibus, isfi permisso legis fungentes sacerdotio, quotannis per unum diem destinatum huic negotio.*

But to this we answer, that *Philo* doth not here deny the passover to be a sacrifice, but confirm it rather, in that he calls it often, here and elsewhere, θυσία, and faith, that they did ἀνάγειν, *bring it to the altar*, and that the people did ἱεραῖσθαι, *sacrifice*; and doth only distinguish this paschal sacrifice from all the other sacrifices in this, that here, according to his opinion, every one of the people was ἱερωσύνη τετιμημένῳ, *honoured with the priestly office*, and that the law did ἱερωσύνην πάντι τῷ ἔθνει χαρισθεῖναι, *make every one a priest for that time, to offer up their own passover.* But moreover, it is well known, that *Philo*, though he were a Jew by nation, yet was very ignorant of Jewish customs, having been born and bred up at *Alexandria*: and we have a specimen of his mistakes here, in that he seems to make this difference between the passover and the other sacrifices, that they were only killed by the priest, but the people themselves killed their own passovers, νόμον προσάξει, and νόμος χαριστικῶν, *according to the law*; where he means doubtless that in *Exod. xii. 16.* *The whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill it.* For this is that *solenne delirium* of our late authors also, which we have chastised before. But, if he mean moreover, that the people did not only kill their passovers, but do all other priestly offices concerning them,

when

* Scalig. E. Jemb. Tribær. cap. 22. c. 1. a. fuer. Item in Emond. Temp. de Cyclo Judæorum Karvain. Et Ho. Grotius in Matt. xxvi.

when he says they were *ἰερωσύνη περιμνησέτω* this, as it hath no ground from Scripture, (and, I think, will hardly find a patron now to defend it,) so it doth not prejudice our opinion of the passover's being a sacrifice, but still much confirm it.

Secondly, it may seem to some a kind of impossibility to conceive, how so many sacrifices, as there must be at every passover, could all be offered upon one altar, since there were no more by the law permitted.

To which, nevertheless, I need not answer any thing but this; that there was nothing but the fat, and some of the inwards burnt upon the altar; and that the bigness of the altar was greater, than perhaps is ordinarily conceived: for under the second temple, the area thereof, upon the top, was a square of twenty-eight cubits, as the Talmudists constantly relate; to which *Josephus* also agreeth very near, if the difference of those cubits, which he useth, be allowed. Only they may please to learn from the instance of *Josiah's* passover, which was said to be so great, that *there was no passover like to that, kept in Israel, from the days of Samuel the prophet unto that time*, that this was possible to be done; for it either is, or must be confessed, that then they were all offered upon the altar.

2 Chron.
xxxv.

But lastly, we must confess ingenuously, that there is one great difficulty yet behind, concerning our Saviour's last passover, which, according to the general consent of our best divines, critics and chronologers, was kept a day before the Jews kept their passover: Whether therefore his paschal lamb, which he with his Apostles did then eat, were first sacrificed at the temple; and how could that be?

Where, not to engage ourselves any more than needs we must, in that nice and perplexed, but famous controversy, concerning the time of the Jewish passover about our Saviour's death; it will not be amiss, first to take notice, that the Latin church ever maintained the contrary opinion against the Greeks, *viz.* That the Jews kept the passover on the same night, which our Saviour did: and though it be true, that of later times most of our best-learned authors have quitted that opinion of the Latins, and closed altogether with the Greeks, as *Paulus Burgensis*, *Munster*, *Scaliger*, and *Casaubon*; yet, notwithstanding, our country-man Mr. *Broughton* (understanding, perhaps, better than they did, that the Jewish passover was a true and proper sacrifice, and first, according to God's command, was to be offered up to God, before feasted on,) espied a difficulty here concerning our Saviour's passover, (which they took no notice of,) that could not easily be solved; and therefore he thought good *scindere nodum*, as *Alexander* did, *to cut the knot, which he could not loose*, and absolutely to deny, that the Jewish passover, and our Saviour's, were then celebrated on two several nights. And he is of late seconded by *Johannes Cloppenburg*, a Belgick divine, [in an epistle, written upon this argument to *Ludovicus De Dieu*,] insisting upon the very same ground, because the paschal lamb, which Christ with his disciples did eat, could not have been sacrificed at the temple, unless it had been at the same time, when the Jewish passover was solemnly celebrated. His words to this purpose, expressing fully Mr. *Broughton's* sense, are these;

Non

Non potuit maſtari agnus paſchalis extra templum Hieroſolymitanum: In templo maſtari non potuit citra generalem populi conſenſum: Quare neque dies maſtationis potuit anticipari. It follows, *Vel ergo dicendum Chriſtum comediffe agnum non maſtatum in templo, atque hoc factō (quod abſti) legem violāſſe; (juxta legem enim agnus privatim comedendus ē templo defendus domi erat in aedēs privatas, poſt igne abſumptam in templo adipem, & ſanguinem delatum ad altare;) vel Judæos eodem tempore cum Chriſto paſcha celebrāſſe.*

But I muſt confeſs, although I am as much addicted to that hypotheſis of the paſſover's being a ſacrifice, and as tender of it, as Mr. Broughton could be, or any body elſe; yet I cannot but yield myſelf captive to truth, on which ſide ſoever it preſents itſelf, and though it be εἰς κατὰ γινωσκὴν τῶν ἰδίων, (as Aristotle ſaith a philoſopher ſhould do) to the deſtruction of our own phenomena.

And indeed thoſe two places eſpecially, brought out of S. John's Goſpel, to prove, that the Jews kept their paſſover the day after our Saviour did his, ſeem to me to be unanſwerable, nor any way cured by thoſe σφῆδ φῆμασιν, which are applied to them.

The firſt is chap. xix. ver. 14. where, the next day after Chriſt had kept his paſſover with his diſciples, when Pilate delivered him up to the Jews to be crucified, it is ſaid, that it was then παρασκευαῖον τῷ Πάſχα, the preparation of the paſſover; where they tell us, that by the preparation of the paſſover is meant the preparation of the ſabbath, on which the ſecond day of the paſſover fell. But, en jecur criticum! as Scaliger ſometimes cries out; and what a far-fetch'd conceit is this?

The ſecond is that in chap. xviii. ver. 28. When Jeſus was led into Pilate's judgment-hall, early in the morning, it is ſaid, that the Jews themſelves went not into the judgment-hall, leſt they ſhould be defiled, but that they might eat the paſſover. Here we are told, that by eating the paſſover is meant the eating of the Chagigah, that was killed the day before with the paſſover, whereof ſomething, perhaps, remained till the day following. And this gloſs is little better than the former; for, although they appeal to that place in Deut. xvi. 2. to prove, that the Chagigah was ſometimes called by the name of paſſover, which indeed, if our Engliſh translation were authentick, would make ſomething for them; Thou ſhalt therefore ſacrifice the paſſover unto the Lord thy God of the flock and the herd, as if there had been a paſſover of oxen, as well as of ſheep; yet in the Hebrew the words run thus, וזבחת פסח ליהוה אלהיך צאן ובקר, which, according to a ſeveral punctuation, and a ſeveral ſupplying of ſomething, that muſt be underſtood, may be expounded ſeveral ways; any of which is far better than that, which our Engliſh translators have unhappily pitch'd upon.

Onkelos, in his paraphraſe, (which ſeldom merits that name, being indeed commonly nothing but a rigid verſion, reads it thus, ותנום פכתה קדם יהוה אלהיך מן בני ענא ונכסת קרשיא מן תריי, i. e. And thou ſhalt ſacrifice the paſſover before the Lord thy God of the ſons of the flock, and the peace-offerings (thereof) of oxen; which interpretation is followed by R. Solomon and Aben-Ezra, צאן רחוב הפכה ובקר לשלמים, i. e. ſheep for the paſſover, and oxen for the peace-offerings, or the Chagigah. And it may be confirmed from that of Jeſiab's paſſover, 2 Chron. xxxv. 7. Jeſiab gave to

No Passover of the Herd.

the people, of the stock, lambs and kids, all for the passover-offerings, to the number of thirty thousand, and three thousand bullocks: where the bullocks, or the herd, are divided from the passover-offerings, because they served for the peace-offerings, or the *Chagigab*, as appeareth from ver. 13. They roasted the passovers with fire, according to the ordinance; but the OTHER HOLY OFFERINGS (that is, the peace-offerings, or *Chagigab*) sod they in pots, and cauldrons, and pans. *Nachmanides* hath another interpretation of it to this purpose, וְצֹאן וּבָקָר שְׁהוּבִיד כִּכְר וְצֹאן, i. e. He commandeth here the passover, which was a lamb, as he had said before, (making the pause there;) and וְצֹאן וּבָקָר, the flock and the herd, or the sheep and the kids, and the young bullocks, for the *Chagigab*; giving other instances, in which the conjunctive particle *vau*, which he doth here supply, is in like manner to be understood.

And this exposition is rather approved than the former, not only by *Abrabanel*, but also by the *Karraites*, which I have before commended; who, quoting one *R. Aaron* for the author of it, doth express it thus; וְיִהְיֶה כְאֹמֶר וּזְבַחַת מוֹשֶׁךְ עִזָּמוּ וְאֹהֶר עִמּוּ וּזְבַחַת פֶּסַח לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ וּזְבַחַת וְצֹאן וּבָקָר כִּמוּ וְלֹא לַמִּדְתִּי חֲכֵמָה וְדַעַת קִישִׁים אֲדַע (Thou shalt sacrifice) is to be repeated ἀπὸ κοινῆ before THE FLOCK AND THE HERD, thus, And thou shalt sacrifice the passover to the Lord thy God, and thou shalt sacrifice sheep and oxen, or the flock and the herd; as in like manner *Prov. xxx. 3.* the particle [וְלֹא] is to be repeated ἀπὸ κοινῆ from the former part of the verse. So that it cannot hence be proved, that the peace-offerings, offered with the passover, were ever called by the name of passover.

There is another place in the same Evangelist, that hath not been observed by any one to this purpose, which, if it were rightly understood, would be as clear a testimony, as any of the rest. And it is in the xix. chapter, ver. 31. Ἦν γὰρ μεγάλη ἡ ἡμέρα ἐν αὐτῇ τῷ Σαββάτῳ, For that sabbath-day was a great day. Μεγάλη ἡμέρα, in the Greek of the Hellenists, is used for the first, or the last day of every solemn feast, in which there was a holy convocation to the Lord. This appeareth from *Isa. i. 13.* Your new-moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies, (which was the first and last day of the feast) I cannot away with: which the Septuagint render thus, τῶν Νεμηνίας ἡμῶν καὶ τὰ Σάββατα, καὶ τὰς μεγάλαις ἡμέραις, Your new-moons and sabbaths, and your GREAT DAYS. For the last day of the feast we have it used by our Evangelist, chap. vii. ver. 37. In the last day, the GREAT DAY of the feast, ἡμέρα τῆς μεγάλης τῆς ἑορτῆς; and doubtless by the same Evangelist for the first day of the feast, in this place: and therefore the Jews did not eat their passover, till the night before, which was the same night our Saviour was crucified.

Which may be strengthened farther by this argument; that if the Jews had celebrated their passover the same night, which our Saviour did his, it is certain, they would never have gone about immediately with swords and staves to have apprehended him, and then have brought him to the high-priest's hall, and afterwards have arraigned him at *Pilate's* judgment-seat, and lastly have crucified him; all the same

same day. For the first day of unleavened bread was by the law an holy convocation to the Lord, on which it was not lawful to do any work; and we know the Jews were rigid enough in observing these legal ceremonies.

If then it must be granted, that our Saviour, with his disciples, kept the passover the night before the vulgar Jews did celebrate it, our next work is to shew, how it might be probable, that our Saviour's passover was first sacrificed at the temple.

And here perhaps I might run for shelter to that story in *Suidas*, upon the word Ἰησοῦς, that *Christ* was enrolled into the number of the two and twenty legal priests, that served at the altar, from the pretended confession of an ancient Jew in *Justinian's* time; and then he might possibly sacrifice his own passover at the temple, though the Jews had not solemnized theirs till the day after; but that I hold this to be a mere fable, and that not only ridiculous, but impious.

Or I might take up the opinion of the Greeks, that *Christ* did not keep a true legal passover, but a feast of unleavened bread in imitation of it; or, as the learned *Hugh * Grotius* (who hath lately asserted this opinion) * *In Annot. ad Matth. cap. 26.* expresseth it, not Πάσχα ἑσπερινόν, but μεσημεριανόν, such as the Jews at this day keep, because the temple being down, their sacrifices are all ceased. But this opinion hath been exploded by most of our late authors; and indeed I can no way satisfy my self in it, and therefore will not acquiesce in this answer.

But before we be able to give a true account of this quære, we must search a little deeper into the true ground of this difference between our Saviour's passover and the Jews.

The common opinion is, that the Jews in our Saviour's time were wont to translate their festivals from one *Feria* to another upon several occasions; and whenever two festivals were immediately to follow one another, to join them into one; and therefore when any fell upon the sixth *Feria*, to put it over to the next *Feria* or the Sabbath, to avoid the concurrence of two Sabbaths together; in the same manner, as the Jews use to do in their calendar at this day, where they have several rules to this purpose, expressed by abbreviatures, thus, *Adu, Badu, Gabaz, Zabad, Agu*; wherof each letter is a numeral for some *Feria*. The rule for the passover is כרך, *Badu*; that is, that it should not be kept on the second, fourth, or sixth *Feria*. (There is an extract of a Rabbinical decree to this purpose, under the name of *R. Eliezer*, in *Munster* upon *Matth.* chap. xxvi.) And therefore at this time, when our Saviour was crucified, the passover falling upon the sixth *Feria*, or Friday, was, say they, by the Jews translated, according to this rule, to the next *Feria*, and kept on Saturday, or the Sabbath; but our Saviour not regarding these traditions, observed that day precisely, which was commanded in the law, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει θύσθαι τὸ πάσχα, *Luke* xxii. 7. that is, as they expound it, *Upon which the passover OUGHT to have been killed*; which was Friday, the day before.

But, under favour, I conceive, that all these decrees, together with that *Ratiocinium* or calendar, to which they do belong, were not then in use in our Saviour's time, (although it be so confidently averred by the incom-

parable *Joseph Scaliger*) but long since invented by the Jews. Which I shall make appear ;

First, in that the ancient Jews, about and since our Saviour's time, often solemnized as well the passovers, as the other feasts, upon the *Feria's* next before and after the Sabbaths, and those other *Feria's*, which have been made rejectitious since by that calendar. In the Talmudical title *Succoth*, chapter the last, we read of *לאחריו בן לפניה בן לשבת* *יום טוב הסמוך לשבת*, that is, a feast going immediately before, or following immediately after, the Sabbath. And in *Betzab*, c. i. *יום טוב חל להיות אחר*, and *שחל להיות ערב שבת*, a feast, that falls to be on the evening of the Sabbath, or the day after the Sabbath. In *Chagigab*, the second chapter, *עצרת*, which is to the same purpose with the former. More particularly concerning the passover, *Pesachim*, chap. vii. sect. 10. *Offa, nervi, & omne residuum agni paschalis, cremantor sexto decimo: si is dies SABBATUM, decimo septimo*. From this and divers like places of the Talmud, *Aben Ezra* on *Levit.* xxiii. 4. observes, *ראיית שהיה פסוה כנרו במשנה נכ בתלמוד*, *There be divers instances in the Mishna and the Gemara of the passovers being kept in BADU*, that is, on those days, which were made rejectitious in the late calendar, the second, fourth and sixth *Feria*. Therefore these translations were not in use, when the Doctors of the *Mishna* and *Gemara* lived.

Secondly, in that the Jews ever, while the temple stood, observed their new moons and feasts, according to the *Phasis* or appearance of the moon, and therefore had no calendar for their rule to sanctify their feasts by, but they were then sanctified by the heavens, as the *Mishna* speaks. This is so clearly delivered by *R. Moses Ben Maimon*, in that excellent *Halacbab*, entitled, *KIDDUSH HACCHODESH*, that I wonder so many learned men, that are well skilled in those authors, should miss of it. For having spoken of the rules of observing the *Phasis*, he then adds, that these were never made use of since the *Sanbedrin* ceased in the land of *Israel*, after the destruction of the temple ; since which time they have used a calendar, calculated according to the middle motion of the moon. *ורבר זה הל כה למשרה מינוי הוה שבומן שיש סנהדרין קובעין עלפי הראייה וכוכן שאין שם סנהדרין קיבעין עלפי החשבון הוה שאנו מחשבים בו היום ואין נוקקין לראיה אלא פעמים שהיה יום שקיבעין בחשבון זה והוא יום הראייה או קירם ליו ביום או אחריו ביום* : *Et hæc erat traditio Moysi in monte Sinai, quod omni tempore, quo duraret Sanbedrin, constituerent Neomenias juxta Phasim hoc verò tempore, quo jam cessavit Sanbedrin, constituerent secundum calculum hunc astronomicum, quo nos hodie utimur: nec ullo modo jam ad Phasim nos astringimus, cum sæpe contingat, ut dies legitimus secundum nostrum calculum vel concurrat cum lunari Phasi, vel antevortat eam unicâ die, vel diem subsequatur*. And again, a little after, most punctually ; *ומאימתי התחילו כל ישראל לחשוב בחשוב זה מסוף חכמי תלמוד בעת שחרבה ארץ ישראל ולא נשאר בית רין קבוע אבל בימי חכמי משנה וכן בימי חכמי תלמוד עד ימי אבוי ורבה על קבועת ארץ ישראל היו סמכין* : *Quando primum ceperunt omnes Israelitæ computare secundum hunc calculum? A fine doctorum Talmudicorum, quando jam desolata erat terra Israel, neque erat consisterium aut synedrium, quod determinaret: nam per omnes dies doctorum Mishnæ & doctorum Gemaræ, usque ad Abæum & Rabbæum, acquiescebant*

acquiescebant omnes Judæi in sanctione terræ Israelis. And those rules fore-mentioned of not keeping the several feasts upon such and such *Feria's* were made together with this calendar, as the same author there also avoucheth: אין קביעין בהשנון זה כימי או לפי שהשנון זה הוא לקבוע היתרוהשמש כהלכותה אמצעו לא במקום אמתי לפיכך עשו יום קביעה ויום רחיה, i. e. *In this account they never constituted the new-moon of Tifri upon Adu, because this account was made according to the conjunction of the sun and moon in the middle motion; therefore now they constituted some legitimate and other rejectitious days, which they could not do before, when the new-moon (and therefore all the other feasts) was determined according to the Phasis.*

But the *Talmud* was not completely finished till about the 500 year of the Christian Æra; therefore this Jewish calendar, and these rules concerning the translation of feasts, were not in being till about that time, and so could be no reason of this difference between the tim:, in which our Saviour solemnized the passover, and the other Jews.

For farther confirmation hereof, we may observe, that the *Karraites*, which have rejected the fond traditions of the Pharisees, retain still the ancient custom of reckoning their new-moons ἀπὸ τῆς Φάσις, as * *Scaliger* ^{• Emen. Temp. p. 149, 150.} himself hath well observed: though in this he were mistaken, that he thought they had assumed it of late, merely out of hatred to the other Jews, whereas they have kept it in a constant succession from antiquity, and hold it still as necessary by divine right. אגנס הוא מההעקרה (saith my author) שכל ישראל מורים בה שמוזן המלכות היי סקרשים החדשים בראיית הירח: ועור מהקט כח הרבור ערע הענין כמלת חרש יורע שהיא חרוש הרבר והוא חרוש ירחכל חרש. *This is confessed by all Israel, that from the time of the kingdom they were ever wont to consecrate the new-moons by the Phasis: and the very etymon of the word Chodesh implies so much, for it signifies the renewing of something; so that it is denominated from the change of the moon, or phasis, as the epocha and beginning of it.* And this is one of the great controversies to this day between those two sects of the Jews, the יקראי or *Karræi*, and רבנים, or *Rabbanæi*; which is grown at length to such a height, that the *Karraites*, deciphering the conditions of those witnesses, whose testimonies might be accounted valid for the Phasis, make this for one, that they should no way belong to the sect of *Rabbanists*: which perhaps to observe in the author's own words would not be unpleasant τοῖς Φιλαρχαῖσις ἢ Φιλόλογοις. התנאי השני שלא יהיה חלוק כרעתו בקריש החרש מרעת חכמינו וחבה מזה הצר ראוי לקבל ערות חישמעלים מפני שהם חלוקים אחריו רעת חכמינו בעניי הראייה וברוב הזמנים אנו שוים עמם ואין ראוי לקבל לנו ערות הרבנים מפני שהם חלוקים ממני בוח ואעפ שאחינו ובשרנו הם אמנם בוח מרו ועצנו את רוח קרשו *A second condition is, that they be not such, as hold an opinion concerning the sanctification of the new-moon different from the opinion of our wise-men. And therefore in this regard we may receive the testimony of the Ishmaelites, (that is, the Turks and Saracens) because they follow the opinion of our wise-men concerning the Phasis, and in most of their appointed times they agree with us. But we may not receive the testimony of any one, that is of the sect of the Rabbins, because they are divided from us in this; and although they be our brethren and our flesh, yet herein they have rebelled and grieved his holy spirit.*

Having thus disproved the common and received opinion, and removed the false ground of this difference of time between our Saviour's passover and the Jews, we come, in the next place, to lay down the true, which must be derived from that way of reckoning the months, and of determining the **ראש החדש**, the *head or beginning of the month*, which was in use in our Saviour's time, which (as we have shewed already in general) was by the $\Phi\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota\varsigma$: so it will be expedient to describe the whole manner of it more particularly from authentick authors*.

* Talmud Babyl. in Resp. Habbanan, & Mevot, in K. di. S. Ha. chod.

In the great or outer court of the temple there was a house called *Ecthezek*, where the senate sat all the thirtieth day of every month, to receive the witnesses of the moon's appearance, and to examine them. And here they always had a feast provided for the entertainment of those that came, to encourage men to come the more willingly. In ancient times they did admit of strangers, and receive their testimony, if it were approved upon examination. But when the hereticks (that is, the Christians) afterward grew up, by whom (they say) they were sometimes deluded, they began to grow shy, and to admit of none but such, as were approved of to be of the Jews religion. If there came approved witnesses upon the thirtieth day of the $\Phi\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota\varsigma$ seen, then the chief man of the senate stood up and pronounced **MEK UDDASH**, *It is sanctified*; and the people standing by caught the word from him, and cried out **MEK UDDASH, MEK UDDASH**. Whereupon there was notice presently given to all the country; which was done at first by torches from mountain to mountain, till at length the Christians (they say) abused them in that kind also with false fires; wherefore they were fain to send messengers from place to place over the whole land, to give intelligence of the new-moon. But if, when the consistory had sat all the thirtieth day, there came no approved witnesses of the $\Phi\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota\varsigma$, then they made an intercalation of one day in the former month, and decreed the following one and thirtieth day to be the calends. And yet notwithstanding, if after the fourth or fifth day there should come some witnesses from afar, that testified they had seen the $\Phi\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota\varsigma$ in its due time, nay, though they came toward the end of the month (**אפילו באר כסוף החדש**) the senate, when they had used all means by affrighting them from that testimony, that so, if it were possible, they might decline a new consecration, (after they had already made an *Embolism* in the former month) if the witnesses remained constant, were then bound to alter the beginning of the month, and reckon it a day sooner, to wit, from the thirtieth day.

Here we see the true ground of the difference of a day, that might arise continually about the calends of the month, and so consequently about any of the other feasts, which did all depend on them; *viz.* between the true time of the moon's $\Phi\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota\varsigma$, upon the thirtieth day, and that of the senate's decree, a day after. For since it appears out of their own monuments, how unwilling they were, having once made a consecration of the *Neomenia*, to alter it again; it may be probably conceived, that, in those degenerated times, the senate might many times refuse to accept the testimony of undoubted witnesses: and then, it seems, they had such a canon as this,

בית

בית רין שקרשו את החורש בין שנים בין מוטעים הנה זה מקורש וחייבין חבל לתקן המועים על היום אעפ"י שזו יורעשטעו *That whatsoever time the senate should conclude of for the calends of the men's, though it were certain they were in the wrong, yet all were bound to order their feasts according to it :* Which I cannot think was approved of by our Saviour, and the most pious Jews. And therefore I conceive it most probable, that this was the very case between our Saviour's passover and the Jews, in that he followed the true $\Phi\lambda\tau\iota\varsigma$, confirmed by sufficient and assured witnesses; but the other Jews superstitiously observed the pertinacious decree of the senate of *Sanhedrin*, which was for the day after.

And now, at last, we are come again to the acme of the question, that was first propounded, How our Saviour's passover, notwithstanding all this, might be sacrificed the day before those of the other Jews were.

To which I answer, That upon this ground, not only our Saviour and his Apostles, but also divers others of the most religious Jews, kept the passover upon the fifteenth day from the true $\Phi\lambda\tau\iota\varsigma$ of the moon, and not from the senate's decree: which I may confirm from the testimony of *Epiphanius*, *In Panaric Har. II.* that reports there was, at this time, $\Theta\upsilon\lambda\lambda\iota\varsigma$, a tumult and contention, amongst the Jews about the passover; and so we may easily persuade those other Evangelists, that intimate Christ's passover, to have been solemnized, when many others kept it, to agree with *S. John*, who assures us, that it was also by divers Jews kept the day after. Now, it was a custom among the Jews, in such doubtful cases as these, which oftentimes fell out, to permit the feasts to be solemnized, or passovers kil'd, on two several days together. *Maimonides* affirmeth, that, in the remoter parts of the land of *Israel*, they always solemnized the feast of the new-moons two days together; nay, in *Jerusalem* itself, where the senate sat, they kept the new-moon of *Tifri*, which was the beginning of the year, twice, lest they should be mistaken in it. In the *Talmud* we have an instance of the passover's being kept two days together, because the new-moon was doubtful, in *Gemarab Resh Hefshanah*, cap. 1. Hence the *Karraites*, who still keep the ancient custom of observing the moon's $\Phi\lambda\tau\iota\varsigma$, retain it as a rule to this day, לעשות שני ימים מספק, *observare duos dies propter dubium*. Nay, the Rabbinical Jews themselves, since they have changed the *Phasis* for the synod or conjunction of the moon in the middle motion, in imitation hereof still observe to keep the passover two days together, *iisdem ceremoniis*, as the learned author of the Jewish synagogue reports; and *Scaliger* himself, not only of that, but also of the other feasts, *Judei post institutionem hodierni computi eandem solennitatem celebrant biduo, propterea quod mensem incipiant à medio motu lune: itaque מוספין מחברות המארים propter dubium conjunctionis luminarium, Pascha celebrant 15. & 16. Nisan, Pentecosten 6. & 7. Sivan, Scenopeea 15. & 16. Tifri; idque vocant של נליות של יום טיב שני של נליות, Festum secundum exiliorum.*

Now then we see, that nothing hinders, but that the passover might be a sacrifice. And thus we have hitherto cleared the way.

C H A P. IV.

Demonstrated, that the Lord's Supper in the Christian Church, in reference to the true Sacrifice of Christ, is a Parallel to the Feasts upon Sacrifices both in the Jewish Religion and Heathenish Superstition.

BUT lest we should seem all this while to set up fancies of our own, and then sport with them, we come now to demonstrate and evince, that the Lord's Supper, in the proper notion of it, is EPULUM EX OBLATIS, or a FEAST UPON SACRIFICE; in the same manner with the feasts upon the Jewish sacrifices under the law, and the feasts upon Εἰδωλοθύτα, (*things offered to idols*) among the Heathens: and that from a place of Scripture, where all these three shall be compared together, and made exact parallels to one another.

I CORINTH. Chap. X.

14. *Wherefore, my dearly beloved, flee from idolatry.*
15. *I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say.*
16. *The cup of blessing, which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread, which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?*
18. *Behold Israel after the flesh; are not they, which eat of the sacrifices, partakers of the altar?*
20. *Now I say, that the things, which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God; and I would not, that ye should have fellowship with devils.*
21. *Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils: ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and of the table of devils.*

Where the Apostle's scope being to convince the *Corinthians* of the unlawfulness of eating things sacrificed to idols, he doth it in this manner: shewing, that though an idol were truly nothing, and things sacrificed to idols were physically nothing, as different from other meats [as, it seems, they argued, and *S. Paul* confesses, ver. 19.] yet morally and circumstantially, to eat of things sacrificed to idols in the idol's temple, was to consent with the sacrifices, and to be guilty of them.

Which he doth illustrate, first, from a parallel rite in Christian religion; where the eating and drinking of the body and blood of Christ, offered up to God upon the cross for us, in the Lord's Supper, is a real communication in his death and sacrifice: ver. 16. *The cup of blessing, which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread, which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?*

Secondly, from another parallel of the same rite among the Jews; where always they, that ate of the sacrifices, were accounted partakers of the altar, that

that is, of the sacrifice offered up upon the altar, ver. 18. *Behold Israel after the flesh; are not they, which eat of the sacrifices, partakers of the altar? In veteri lege quicumque admittebantur ad edendum de hostiis oblatis, censebantur ipsius sacrificii, tanquam pro ipsis oblatis, fieri participes, & per illud sanctificari*; as a late commentator fully expresses it.

Therefore, as to eat the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's supper, is to be made partaker of his sacrifice offered up to God for us; as to eat of the Jewish sacrifices under the law was to partake in the legal sacrifices themselves: so to eat of things offered up in sacrifice to idols, was to be made partakers of the idol-sacrifices, and therefore was unlawful.

For, *the things, which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils*; but Christ's body and blood was offered up in sacrifice unto God, and therefore they could not partake of both together, the sacrifice of the true God, and the sacrifice of devils. *Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils; ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and the table of devils.* St. Paul's argument here must needs suppose a perfect analogy between these three, and that they are all parallels to one another; or else it hath no strength. Wherefore I conclude from hence, that the LORD'S SUPPER is the same among Christians, in respect of the Christian sacrifice, that among the Jews the feasts upon the legal sacrifices were, and among the Gentiles the feasts upon the idol-sacrifices; and therefore EPULUM SACRIFICIALE, or EPULUM EX OBLATIS. ΟΠΕΡ ΕΔΕΙ ΔΕΙΞΑΙ.

CHAPTER V.

The Result of the former Discourse; that the Lord's Supper is not a Sacrifice, but a Feast upon a Sacrifice.

THUS having declared and demonstrated the true notion of the Lord's supper, we see then how that theological controversy, which hath cost so many disputes, whether the Lord's supper be a sacrifice, is already decided: for it is not SACRIFICIUM, but EPULUM ΕΚ ΤΗΣ ΘΥΣΙΑΣ, not A SACRIFICE, but a feast upon sacrifice; or else, in other words, not OBLATIO SACRIFICII, but, as Tertullian excellently speaks, PARTICIPATIO SACRIFICII, not the offering of something up to God upon an altar, but the eating of something which comes from God's altar, and is set upon our tables. Neither was it ever known amongst the Jews or Heathens, that those tables, upon which they did eat their sacrifices, should be called by the name of altars. St. Paul, speaking of the feasts upon the idol-sacrifices, calls the places, upon which they were eaten, *The table of devils*, because the devils meat was eaten on them; not the altars of devils: and yet doubtless he spake according to the true propriety of speech, and in those technical words, that were then in use amongst them. And therefore, keeping the same analogy, he must needs

needs call the common-table by the name of the Lord's table, *i. e.* the table, upon which God's meat is eaten; not his altar, upon which it is offered. It is true, an altar is nothing but a table; but it is a table, upon which GOD himself eat-, consuming the sacrifices by his holy fire: but when the same meat is given from GOD unto US to eat of, the relation being changed, the place, on which WE eat, is nothing but a table.

And because it is not enough in any discourse, as *Aristotle* well observeth in his *Ethicks*, to confute an error, unless we can also shew the true notion of *Isidorus*, the cause of that error; having thus discovered the true notion of the Lord's supper, we may easily discern from hence also, how that mistake grew up, and that by the degeneration of this truth. There is a sacrifice in the Lord's supper symbolically, but not there as offered up to God, but feasted on by us; and so not a sacrifice, but a sacrificial feast; which began too soon to be misunderstood.

C H A P. VI.

The farther Improvement of that general Notion, How the Lord's Supper is a Federal Rite between God and us, at large: concluded with a memorable Story out of Maimonides and Nachmanides.

I Should now come to make some farther improvement of this general notion of the Lord's supper, by shewing what these feasts upon the sacrifices did signify under the law; and then applying the same in a more perfect manner to the Lord's supper under the gospel, being warranted thereunto by that analogy, which is between them. But because there may be divers glosses and interpretations of these feasts upon the sacrifices, which are obvious to every common understanding, we will decline them all, and pitch only upon one, which is not so vulgarly understood; and it is this, That the eating of God's sacrifices was a FEDERAL RITE between God and those that offered them; according to the custom of the ancients, and especially in those oriental parts, to confirm and ratify their covenants by eating and drinking together.

Thus when *Isaac* made a covenant with *Abimelech* the king of *Gerar*, the text saith, *He made him and those that were with him a feast, and they did eat and drink, and rose up betimes in the morning, and swore to one another.*

When *Laban* made a covenant with *Jacob*, *Gen. xxxi. 44.* Now therefore come (saith *Laban*) let us make a covenant, I and thou, and let it be for a witness between me and thee: Then it follows in the text, *They took stones, and made a heap, and did eat there upon the heap; and Laban called it JEGAR-SAHADUTHA*, in his Chaldee tongue, but *Jacob* (in the Hebrew language) *GALLEED*, *i. e.* a heap of witness; implying, that those stones, upon which they had eaten and drank together, should be a witness against either of them, that should first violate that covenant. *R. Moses Bar Nachman*, in his Comment, thus glosseth upon this place, אכלושים מעט לזכרון שחוא ררך כאים בכרית לאכול שניהם

שניצחם מלחם אחד לחברה ולאהבה ואהרי ביום בשבועה וכברית זכה ועשרה להם כרה נולה, i. e. *They did eat there a little upon the heap for a memorial; because it was the manner of those, that enter into covenant, to eat both together of the same bread, as a symbol of love and friendship.* And Isaac Abrabanel much to the same purpose, היה כונה בנייהם, i. e. *It was an ancient custom amongst them, that they, which did eat bread together upon the same table, should be accounted ever afterward as entire brethren.* And in this sense he conceiveth that place, *Lamentations* v. 6. may be expounded, *We have given the hand to the Egyptians and to the Assyrians by fulness of bread,* i. e. *We have made a covenant with them.*

Joshua ix. ver. 14. when the Gibeonites came to the Israelites, and desired them to make a league with them, it is said, *The men of Israel took of their victuals, and asked not counsel of the mouth of the Lord;* that is, they made a covenant with them, as *Kimchi* learnedly expounds it, לקחו מצידים, *Acceperunt de viatico ipsorum, & comederunt cum illis per modum fœderis.* For so it follows afterward in the text, *And Joshua made peace with them.*

Hence also was that emphatical expression, *Psalms* xli. 9. spoken literally by *David* of *Achitophel*, *mine own familiar friend, that did eat of my bread, hath lift up the heel against me;* but seeming prophetically to glance at *Judas*, that dipping with *Christ* in the same dish betrayed him. The singular emphasis of which speech we, that are unacquainted with this custom of the oriental nations, cannot easily perceive; neither can we any where better learn it, than from that passage of *Celsus* in *Origen*, who carping at that history of *Judas* his betraying *Christ* in the gospel, as an incredible thing, made, in the mean while, an excellent comment upon this prophecy, when he little thought of it. *Ὅτι ἀθεράπων μὲν ὁ κοινοῦντας τραπέζης ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύσειεν, πολλῶν πλέον ὁ Σεῦ συνουσιῶνθεις ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλῆ ἐγένετο,* i. e. *Si homini nemo infidiaretur ejusdem mensæ particeps, multò minùs Deo;* And *Origen's* reply to him, which shews, that though this were an unusual thing, yet it sometimes came to pass, is very pregnant also for our purpose: *Τι γὰρ ἐν οἷον ὅτι πολλοὶ κοινοῦνσιντες ἄλλων ἢ τραπέζης ἐπιβουλεύσαν τοῖς συνεσίοις; ἢ πλείους ἐστὶν ἢ Ἑλλήνων ἢ Βαρβάρων ἰσορία τοιούτων παραδειγμάτων. Καὶ οὐκ ἐβλῆσαν γὰρ ὁ Πάριος Ἰαμβόσιος τὸν Λικκίθεαυτα μετὰ ἄλλας ἢ τραπέζην συνήκας ἀσπιγνάντα, Φησὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ, Ὅραον δὲ ἐνομοδίτης μέγαν, ἄλλας τε ἢ τραπέζαν* i. e. *Quis ignerat multos ad communionem salis & mensæ adhibitos infidiatos tamen suis contubernaliibus? Plena est historia tam Græcorum quàm Barbarorum exemplis ejusmodi. Et Parius ille Iambærum scriptor, exprobrans Lycambæ violitum sœdus quod sal & mensæ conciliaverat, sic cum alloquitur, sacramentum irritasti magnum, sœlem atque mensam.* All which makes manifest, what an heinous offence it was accounted anciently to be guilty of the breach of a covenant, which had been confirmed by eating and drinking together.

In the seventh verse of *Obadiab*, that prophet speaks of *Edom* in this manner; *All the men of thy confederacy have brought thee to the border; the men, that were at peace with thee, have deceived thee; they, that eat thy bread, have laid a wound under thee.*

Covenants made by Eating and Drinking together.

In the New Testament, that place (*John* iv. 9.) is well observed by *Heinsius*, in his *Aristarchus*, to carry this notion, *How is it, that thou, being a Jew, esteest drink of me, being a woman of Samaria? Suavissimè dictum* (saith that forenamed critick) *ex eorum more, qui, cum peregrini essent, aut alieno fuissent animo, animis conciliandis cibum mutuo ac potum alter alterius gustabant.*

Wherefore I think from all these instances I may conclude, that this is the true etymon of that Hebrew word ברית, which signifies a covenant, or any federal communion betwixt parties, from בררה, comedere, because it was the constant custom of the Hebrews and Oriental nations to establish covenants by eating and drinking together; as hath been shewed.

And as the Jews, so likewise did the Heathens in the same manner, use to ratify their covenants between parties, by eating together. *Lucian* in *Toxaris* reports it of the *Scythians*, that when any one was injured, and could not revenge himself, the manner was, that he should kill an ox, and cut it into small pieces; which being boiled, he was to sit down by them with his hands behind him, (which was a gesture of earnest supplication amongst them) and then whosoever was minded to help him, came, and did eat a piece of his flesh, and so with this ceremony promised to assist him. And this was accounted a covenant of mutual defence between them; whence that Greek proverb, Ἐπὶ βύσσου ἔλαθ' ἰσθίου, *In tergore bovis defecit*, of which *Erasmus* in his *Adagies*.

Herodotus reporteth of the *Persians*, that they made their leagues and covenants at feasts; and of the *Nasamones*, a people of *Lybia*, that they composed peace by stretching out a cup full of wine to each other, and pledging one another in it. *Alexander ab Alexandro* relates this of the *Thracians* and *Egyptians*, that *E cornibus boum (que veteribus poculorum loco erant) vina sibi invicem propinantes, id firmissimum contracti fœderis vinculum esse putabant.* *Curtius* reporteth of the *Macedonians*, *Quòd patrio ritu fœdus, quod sanctissimum vellent haberi, sic inibant, ut panem gladio divisum uterque libaret.*

And therefore *Alexander*, when he fell in love with *Roxana*, commanded bread forthwith to be brought before him; which when he had divided with his sword, and they had both tasted together of, he took her presently to himself as his wife. And there remaineth a custom to this day, something like this, at weddings in many countries, that when the bridegroom and bride are come from church, they have a piece of cake brought them, which when the bridegroom hath tasted, he gives it to the bride to taste of likewise, in token of a covenant between them. The *Germans* still use to conclude of bargains, and ratify friendship between parties, by drinking together, as appeareth by that phrase which they have, *den Friden truncken, Pacem bibere.*

In like manner, I say, the eating of sacrifices, which were God's meat, was a federal rite between God and those that did partake of them, and signified there was a covenant of friendship between him and them.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must observe, that sacrifices, beside the nature of expiation, had the notion of feasts, which

God

God himself did, as it were, feed upon. Which I explain thus: When God had brought the children of *Israel* out of *Egypt*, resolving to manifest himself in a peculiar manner present among them, he thought good to dwell amongst them in a visible and external manner; and therefore, while they were in the wilderness, and sojourned in tents, he would have a tent or tabernacle built, to sojourn with them also. This mystery of the tabernacle was fully understood by the learned *Nachmanides*, who in few words, but pregnant, thus expresseth it, *הוא מקום מנוחת השכינה*; and again, *סוד המשכן הוא שיהיה הכבד אשר טכף על הר סיני שוכן עליו*: that is, *The mystery of the tabernacle was this, that it was to be a place for the Shechinah, or habitation of divinity to be fixed in*: and this, no doubt, as a special type of God's future dwelling in Christ's human nature, which was the TRUE SHECHINAH. But, when the Jews were come into their land, and had there built them houses, God intended to have a fixed dwelling-house also; and therefore his moveable tabernacle was to be turned into a standing temple. Whence, by imitation, came all those temples among the Heathens, which they apprehended as so many places of peculiar residence, or habitation, for their deities, next the heavens, to dwell in; as appears by that of *Silius*, amongst many others.

—————*Tarpeie Pater, qui templa secundam
Incolis à cælo sedem.*—————

Now the tabernacle or temple being thus as a house for God to dwell in visibly, to make up the notion of dwelling or habitation complete, there must be all things suitable to a house belonging to it. Hence, in the holy place, there must be a table and a candlestick, because this was the ordinary furniture of a room; as the fore-commended *Nachmanides* observes, *כמך השלחן והמנורה שהם כל ים כמורתו וידרו על ענף המשכן*, i. e. *He addeth a table and a candlestick, because these suit the notion of a dwelling-house*. The table must have its dishes, and spoons, and bowls, and covers, belonging to it, though they were never used, and always be furnished with bread upon it. The candlestick must have its lamps continually burning.

Hence also there must be a continual fire kept in this house of God's upon the altar, as the focus of it: to which notion, I conceive, the prophet *Isaiab* doth allude, chap. xxxi. ver. 9. *אשר אור לו בציון ותנור כירושלים*, which I would thus translate, *qui habet ignem suum in Sion, & focus suum in Jerusalem*.

And besides all this, to carry the notion still farther, there must be some constant meat and provision brought into this house, which was done in the sacrifices, that were partly consumed by fire upon God's own altar, and partly eaten by the priests, which were God's family, and therefore to be maintained by him. That, which was consumed upon God's altar, was accounted GOD'S MESS, as appeareth from the first chapter of *Mala-* Ve. 12.
chi, where the altar is called GOD'S TABLE, and the sacrifice upon it GOD'S MEAT; *Ye say, the table of God is polluted, and the fruit thereof, his meat, is contemptible*. And often in the Law the sacrifice is called God's ללחם, that is, his bread or food. Whence, in that learned Hebrew

Sacrifices had the Notion of Feasts.

book *Cozri*, the king *Haber* objects to the Jew *Cozar* against his religion, that it seemed to place corporeity in God, in making him to feed upon the flesh of beasts in these sacrifices. To which the Jewish doctor answers cabalistically in this manner ; That as, in men, corporeal meat is a means to unite and continue the soul (which is a spirit) to the body ; so, in the land of *Israel*, the blood of beasts offered up in sacrifice had an attractive power to draw down divinity, and unite it to the Jews. And methinks this may be a little farther convinced from that passage in the 50th *Psalms*, *If I were hungry, I would not tell thee ; for the world is mine, and the fulness thereof. Will I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats ?* For though it be here denied, that God did really feed upon the sacrifices, yet it is implied there was some such allusive signification in them.

Wherefore it is farther observable, that beside the flesh of the beast offered up in sacrifice, there was a *mincab*, or *meat-offering*, made of flour and oil, and a *libamen*, or *drink-offering*, that was always joined with the daily sacrifice, as the bread and drink, which was to go along with God's meat.

It was also strictly commanded, that there should be salt in every sacrifice and oblation, because all meat is unfavoury without salt ; as R. *Moses Bar Nachman* hath here also well observed, השם טפל מבלי מלה, i. e. *Because it was not honourable, that God's meat should be unfavoury, without salt.*

Lastly, all these things were to be consumed on the altar only by the holy fire, that came down from heaven, because they were God's portion, and therefore to be eaten or consumed by himself in an extraordinary manner. And this the devil sometime imitated, in some sacrifices offered up to him. For so I understand that passage of *Pindar* in his *Olympiacks*, Ode VII. speaking of the Rhodians, That when they had prepared, and were come to offer sacrifice to *Jupiter*, they had by chance forgotten to bring fire with them : but *Jupiter*, being conscious of their good intentions, rained down upon them A GOLDEN SHOWER, (as I understand it) A SHOWER of fire ; a pure imitation of the sacred story. Take it in that elegant poet's own words :

Καί τει γὰρ αἰθέρας ἔχουτες
 Σπίρι' ἀνέβω Φλογός τε,
 Τεῦξαν δ' ἈΗΓΥΠΟΙΣ ἸΕΡΟΪΣ,
 Ἄλσθ' ἐν ἀκροπόλει κείνησι μὲν ξαν-
 θὰν ἀγαγὼν νεφέλαι,
 Πολὺν ὕσει χρυσόν.

That is, according to *Benedictus* his metaphrase, *Etenim Rhodii ascenderunt, quamvis non habentes ardentis semen ignis. Verum dum instruunt sacrificiis igni carentibus aram in arce, illis quidem flavam adducens nebulam, multum pluit [Jupiter] aurum.*

And *Selinus* reports it of the Vulcanian hill in *Sicily*, that they, which offered sacrifice upon it, never put fire to it, but expected it should be kindled from heaven. His words, according to *Salmasus's* edition, are these ;

these; *Nec longè indè Collis Vulcanius, in quo qui divine rei operantur, ligna vitea super aras struunt; nec ignis adponitur in banc congeriem. Cum proficiat intulerunt, & adest Deus, si sacrum probatur, sarmenta, licet viridia, spontè concipiunt, & nullo inflagrante bolitu, ab ipso numine fit accendium. Ibi epulantes adludit flamma, quæ, flexuosis excussibus vagabunda, quem contigerit non adurit; nec aliud est quàm imago nuncia perfecti ritè Voti.* The place is very remarkable; and where he says thus, *Epulantes adludit flamma*, he alludeth to that custom of feasting on the sacrifices, which was before explained.

I will add to all this the words of a late learned author, that sometime stumb'ed unawares upon this very notion, which we are now about, and yet express it happily in this manner; *Deus ad suam cum populo Judæorum familiaritatem significandam, sibi ab illo carnes, sanguinem atque fruges in ALTARI atque MENSA offerri voluit, ut ostenderet se quasi COMMUNEM in illo populo habere MENSAM, esse illius CONVIVIAM perpetuum, atque ita familiariter cum illis habitare.*

And as it was thus among the Hebrews, so it seems, that sacrifices had the notion of feasts likewise among the ancient Persians, that worshipped the fire, of whom *Maximus Tyrius* thus relateth, "Ὅτι ἐπιφορῶντες περὶ τρυφῆν ἐπιλέγουσι, Ἦρ θεοποία, ἰσῆς, i. e. bringing in the sacrifices to the fire, which was their god, they were wont to say, *Ignis, Domine, comede.*

The sacrifices then being God's feasts, they that did partake of them must needs be his CONVIVÆ, and in a manner EAT and DRINK with him. And that this did bear the notion of a federal rite in the Scripture's account, I prove from that place, *Levit. ii. 13. Thou shalt not suffer the SALT OF THE COVENANT of thy God to be lacking; with all thine offerings thou shalt offer salt.* Where the salt, that was to be cast upon all the sacrifices, is called THE SALT OF THE COVENANT, to signify, that as men did use to make covenants by eating and drinking together, where salt is a necessary appendix; so God by these sacrifices, and the feasts upon them, did ratify and confirm his covenant with those, that did partake of them, inasmuch as they did in a manner EAT and DRINK with him.

For salt was ever accounted amongst the ancients a most necessary concomitant of feasts, and condiment of all meats. כה אינה סעירה בל כעורה שאין מליח, faith the Jewish proverb in *Beracoth*, *Omne convivium, in quo non est salitum, non est convivium.* And therefore because covenants and reconciliations were made by eating and drinking, where salt was always used, salt itself was accounted among the ancients AMICITIÆ SYMBO- LUM. "Ἄλας ἢ τράπεζα, *sal & mensa*, was used proverbially among the Greeks to express friendship by; "Ἄλας ἢ τράπεζαν παρακλίειν, in the words of *Origen* before quoted out of *Archilocus*, *sal & mensam transgredi*, was to violate the most sacred league of friendship. *Æschines*, in his oration *De perperam habitâ legatione*, hath a passage very pertinent to this purpose; Τὴς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως ἄλας ἢ δημοσίου τράπεζου περὶ πλείους θεῶν ποιεῖσθαι, *Etenim civitatis sales & communem mensam ait se plurimi facere debere.* Thus I understand

The Lord's Supper a Federal Feast.

derstand that symbol of *Pythagoras*, τὸν ἀλα παραιθεσθαι, (by *Erasmus's* leave) for friendship and hospitality. There is a pregnant instance of this very phrase in the Scripture, *Ezra* iv. 14. where our translators read it thus, *Because we have maintenance from the king's palace*: but the words in the Chaldee run after this manner, בען כר- קבל טלה היכלא מלחנא, i. e. quòd sale palatii salivimus, *Because we have eaten of the king's salt*, [that is, because we have engaged ourselves in a covenant of friendship to him, by eating of his meat] therefore it is not meet for us to see the king's dishonour. That proverb mentioned in *Tully* makes to this purpose, *Multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitie munus completum sit*: which was, because that federal symbol had been so often abused. Nay, hence there remaineth a superstitious custom amongst us and other nations to this day, to count the overturning of the salt upon the table ominous, as betting some evil to him, towards whom it falls: *Quia amoris & amicitie symbolum*. And by this time I think I have given a sufficient comment upon מלח הברית, the salt of the covenant in the text.

Only I must not forget, that as in God's sacrifices there was ever salt to be used, so the like was generally observed in the Heathen sacrifices; as that one place out of *Pliny*, amongst many, shall sufficiently testify: *Maxima salis auctoritas è sacris veterum intelligitur, apud quos nulla sacra sine mola salsa conficiebatur*. And the reason of it also is thus given by that famous scholiast upon *Iliad* α. δὲ οἱ ἀλλες Φιλίας σύμβολον, *because salt is a symbol of friendship*; which is the same with that reason given by God, why he would always have salt in his sacrifices, because it was מלח הברית, that is, *sal symbolum fœderis*, as before was shewn. And this phrase, being thus explained, will clearly expound that other phrase, about which critics have laboured so much in vain, where the same words are used, but inverted, and a covenant is called a *covenant of salt*, as *salt* is here called *the salt of the covenant*, *Numb.* xviii. 19. and *2 Chron.* xiii. 5. viz. because covenants were established by eating and drinking together, where salt was a necessary appendix.

Now therefore, that we may return: As the legal sacrifices, with the feasts upon those sacrifices, were FEDERAL RITES between God and men; in like manner, I say, the Lord's supper under the Gospel, which we have already proved to be EPULUM SACRIFICIALE, a *feast upon sacrifice*, must needs be EPULUM FOEDERALE, a *feast of amity and friendship* between God and men; where, by eating and drinking at God's own table, and of his meat, we are taken into a sacred covenant, and inviolable league of friendship with him.

Which I will confirm from that forecommended place, whence I have already proved, that the Lord's supper is a *feast upon sacrifice*. For there the Apostle thus deborts the *Corinthians* from eating of the feasts upon idol-sacrifices, which are a parallel to the feast upon the Christian sacrifice in the Lord's supper, because this was to have fellowship and federal communion with devils: *The things, that the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God; and I would not, brethren, that ye should have FELLOWSHIP (or COMMUNION, κοινωνίαν) with devils*. Where the comment of *St. Chrysostome* is excellent to our purpose;

Εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων τὸ κοινωνεῖν ἄλων ἢ τραπέζης Φιλία; ἄφορμὴ ἢ σύμβολον γίνεται, ἐγχαρῆς ἢ ἐπὶ Δαιμόνων τέτο συμβῆναι: that is, *If among men to communicate of bread and salt be a token and symbol of friendship, it must carry the same notion between men and devils in the idol-feasts.* If therefore to eat the sacrifice of devils be to have federal communion with those devils, to whom it was offered; then to eat the sacrifice of Christ, once offered up to God, in the Lord's supper, is to have federal communion with God.

There is an excellent story in *Maimonides* his *Moreh Nevuchim*, concerning an ancient custom of the *Zabii* of feasting together with their gods in this federal way, which will much illustrate this notion: for, going about to give the reason, why the eating of blood was forbidden in the law, he fetches it from the idolatrous use of it then in *Moses's* time among the *Zabii*; according to his principles, who thought the reason of all the ceremonial precepts was to be fetched from some such accidental grounds, because those laws were not *primæ*, but *secundæ intentionis* in God. *Multarum legum rationes & causæ* (saith he) *mibi innotuerunt ex cognitione fidei, rituum, & cultus Zabiorum.*

By these *Zabii* he means the ancient Chaldeans; the word in the original Arabic, according to the copy of *Joseph Scaliger*, being thus written,

صبياني. *A Vento Apeliote sic dicti, (as he * observes) quasi dicas* *In Epist. 62. ad Isaacum Casaubonum.

Orientalis. And that book, which *Maimonides* so often quoteth concerning that nation, their rites and religion, is still extant among the Mahumetan Arabians, as the same *Scaliger* avoucheth. The story then is this, according to the Hebrew translation of Rabbi *Abben Tibbon*, lib. 3. cap. 46. רע כי הרם הוא טמא מאד בעיני הצאבה ועם כל זה היו אוכלים אותו מפני שהיו חושבים שהוא מזון השדים וכשאל אותו מי שאכלו כבר השתתף עם השדים ויביאוו יוריעוהו העתילות כמו שירמיו ההמון ממעשי השדים; i. e. *Licet sanguis impurus & immundus admodum fuerit in oculis Zabiorum, tamen ab illis comestus fuerit, eò quod existimârunt CIBUM HUNC ESSE DÆMONUM, & quod is, qui eum comedit, hæc ratione COMMUNICATIONEM aliquam cum dæmonibus haberet, ita ut familiariter cum illo conversentur, & futura ei aperiant.* But because others of them did abhor the eating of blood, as a thing repugnant unto nature, they performed this service in a little different manner. והיו שם אנשים שהיה קשה בעיניהם אכילת הדם כי הוא דבר שומאם הו טבע האדם והיו שוחטים בהמה ומקבלים דמו בכלי או בחפציה אוכלים בשר השחוטת והיא סביב דמה היו מרמן במעשה זה שהשדים יאכלו הדם הוא מזונם והם יאכלו הבשר ובוזה תהיה האהבה והאהבה והרעות בהם בעבור שאכלו כלם על שלהן אחד ומשיב א. ד. ויבאו להם שדום ההם לפי מחשבתם בחלום היו מגידים להם העתודות ויעילו להם; i. e. *Mactantes bestiam aliquam, sanguinem in circulo sedentes comedebant; imaginantes sibi in hoc opere, ipsis CARNEM COMEDENTIBUS, Dæmones ILLUM SANGUINEM COMEDERE, & hunc esse IPSORUM CIBUM, hocque medio AMICITIAM, FRATERNITATEM & FAMILIARITATEM inter ipsos contrahi, quia omnes in una mensa edunt, uno consensu accumbunt.*

As for the former part of this story, I find it also in Rabbi *Moses Bar Nachman* upon *Deut.* xii. 23. where he goes about to give the reason why blood

blood was forbidden in the law, as *Maimonides* did, although, in the first place, he saith, it was because blood served in the sacrifices for expiation, otherwise than *Maimonides*, (for there was a great controversy between these two doctors about the nature of sacrifices :) but yet, in the second place also, he brings in this, also, because it was used superstitiously by the Heathens in the worship of their idol-gods. *והיתה העבודה היא נאכילה מן הדרם בני חיו מבצים דרם לשדים והם אובלים עלהו וממנו נאילו הם קדואים לשדים לאכול על שלהן השדום חהם ומת הברים עמהם— והנה חיו מתנבאים בו ומגידים עתידות*; i. e. *They performed their superstitious worship, by eating of blood in this manner; they gathered together blood for the devils their idol gods, and then they came themselves, and did eat of that blood with them, as being the devils GUESTS, and INVITED to EAT at the TABLE of devils; and so were JOINED in federal society with them. And by this kind of communion with devils, they were able to prophecy, and foretel things to come.*



THE
FIRST SERMON:
OR, A
DISCOURSE

On I JOHN, Chap. II. Verſ. 3, 4.

Preached before the Honourable HOUSE of COMMONS, at
Westminster, March 31. 1647.

Εἰσεῖθι, ᾧ τίμων ὁ γὰρ εἰσεῖθαι ἀκροῦς Χριστιανίζει.

To the HONOURABLE
HOUSE of COMMONS.

THE scope of this Sermon, which not long since exercised your patience, Worthy Senators, was not to contend for this or that opinion, but only to persuade men to the life of Christ, as the pith and kernel of all religion; without which, I may boldly say, all the several forms of religion, though we please ourselves never so much in them, are but so many several dreams. And those many opinions about religion, that are every where so eagerly contended for on all sides, where this doth not lie at the bottom, are but so many shadows fighting with one another: so that I may well say of the true Christian, that is indeed possessed of the life of Christianity, in opposition to all those that are but lightly tinged with the opinions of it, in the language of the poet,

ἽΟις πέπυται, τοὶ δ' ὡς σκὰθ' ἀίσουσι.

Wherefore I could not think any thing else, either more necessary for Christians in general, or more reasonable at this time, than to stir them up to the real establishment of the righteousness of God in their hearts, and

that participation of the divine nature, which the Apostle speaketh of. That so they might not content themselves with mere phancies and conceits of Christ, without the spirit of Christ really dwelling in them, and Christ himself inwardly formed in their hearts; nor satisfy themselves with the meer holding of right and orthodox opinions, as they conceive, whilst they are utterly devoid within of that divine life, which Christ came to kindle in men's souls; and therefore are so apt to spend all their zeal upon a violent obtruding of their own opinions and apprehensions upon others, which cannot give entertainment to them: which, besides its repugnancy to the doctrine and example of Christ himself, is like to be the bellows, that will blow a fire of discord and contention in Christian commonwealths; whilst, in the mean time, these hungry and starved opinions devour all the life and substance of religion, as the lean kine in *Pbaraoob's* dream did eat up the fat. Nor, lastly, please themselves only in the violent opposing of other men's superstitions, according to the genius of the present times, without substituting in the room of them an inward principle of spirit and life in their own souls. For I fear many of us, that pull down idols in churches, may set them up in our hearts; and whilst we quarrel with painted glass, make no scruple at all of entertaining many foul lusts in our souls, and committing continual idolatry with them.

This, in general, was the design of this following discourse, which you were pleased, noble Senators, not only to express your good acceptance of, but also to give a real signification of your great undeserved favour to the author of it. Who therefore cannot but, as the least expression of his thankfulness, humbly devote it to you; presenting it here again to your eye in the same form, in which it was delivered to your ear. Desirous of nothing more, than that it might be some way useful to you, to kindle in you the life and heat of that, which is endeavoured here to be described upon paper; that you may express it, both in your private conversatious, and likewise in all your publick employments for the commonwealth. That you may, by your kindly influence, effectually encourage all goodness; and by virtue of your power and authority (to use the phrase of *Solomon*) *scatter away all evil with your eye*, as the sun by his beams scattereth the mists and vapours. That from you *judgment may run down like waters*, and *righteousness like a mighty stream*, to refresh this whole land, that thirsteth after them: which, whilst you distribute them plentifully to others, will bestow both strength and honour to yourselves. For justice and righteousness are the establishment of every throne, of all civil power and authority; and if these should once forsake it, though there be lions to support it, it could not stand long. These, together with a good peace, well settled in a commonwealth, are all the outward felicity we can expect, till that happy time come, which the prophet foretelleth, and is therefore more than a Platonical idea; when *the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf, and the young lion, and the sucking together, and a little child lead them: When the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the cockatrice den: When they shall not hurt nor destroy in all God's holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea.*

I have but one word more, if you please to give me leave; That after your care for the advancement of religion, and the publick good of the commonwealth, you would think it worthy of you to promote ingenuous learning, and cast a favourable influence upon it. I mean not that only, which furnisheth the pulpit, which you seem to be very regardful of; but that, which is more remote from such popular use, in the several kinds of it, which yet are all of them both very subservient to religion, and useful to the commonwealth. There is indeed a *ψευδοπαιδεία*, as the philosopher tells us, a *bastardly kind of literature*, and a *ψευδώνυμος γνώσις*, as the Apostle instructeth us, a *knowledge falsely so called*; which deserve not to be pleaded for. But the noble and generous improvement of our understanding faculty, in the true contemplation of the wisdom, goodness, and other attributes of God, in this great fabrick of the universe, cannot easily be disparaged, without a blemish cast upon the Maker of it. Doubtless, we may as well enjoy that, which God hath communicated of himself to the creatures, by this larger faculty of our understandings, as by those narrow and low faculties of our senses; and yet no body counts it to be unlawful to hear a lesson played upon the lute, or to smell at a rose. And these raised improvements of our natural understandings may be as well subservient, and subordinate to a divine light in our minds, as the natural use of these outward creatures here below to the life of God in our hearts. Nay, all true knowledge doth of itself naturally tend to God, who is the fountain of it; and would ever be raising of our souls up upon its wings thither, did not we *κατέχειν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ*, *detain it*, and hold it down, *in unrighteousness*, as the Apostle speaketh. All philosophy to a wise man, to a truly sanctified mind, as he in *Plutarch* speaketh, is but *ἕλη τῆς Θεολογίας*, *matter for divinity to work upon*. Religion is the queen of all those inward endowments of the soul; and all pure natural knowledge, all virgin and undeflowered arts and sciences, are her handmaids, that rise up, and call her blessed. I need not tell you, how much the skill of tongues and languages, besides the excellent use of all philology in general, conduceth to the right understanding of the letter of sacred writings, on which the spiritual notions must be built; for none can possibly be ignorant of that, which have but once heard of a translation of the Bible. The Apostle exhorteth private Christians to *whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, to think on those things*: and therefore it may well become you, noble Gentlemen in your publick sphere, to encourage so noble a thing as knowledge is, which will reflect so much lustre and honour back again upon yourselves. That God would direct you in all your counsels, and still bless you, and prosper you in all your sincere endeavours for the publick good, is the hearty prayer of

Your most humble Servant,

RALPH CUDWORTH.

I JOHN II. 3, 4.

And hereby we do know, that we know him, if we keep his commandments.

He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.

WE have much enquiry concerning knowledge in these latter times. The sons of *Adam* are now as busy as ever himself was about the tree of knowledge of good and evil, shaking the boughs of it, and scrambling for the fruit; whilst, I fear, many are too unmindful of the tree of life. And though there be now no cherubims with their flaming swords to fright men off from it; yet the way, that leads to it, seems to be so solitary and untrodden, as if there were but few, that had any mind to taste of the fruit of it. There be many, that speak of new glimpses and discoveries of truth, of dawning of gospel-light; and no question but God hath reserved much of this for the very evening and sun-set of the world; for *in the latter days knowledge shall be increased*: but yet I wish we could in the mean time see that day to dawn, which the Apostle speaks of, and that *day-star to arise in men's hearts*. I wish, whilst we talk of light, and dispute about truth, we could walk more as *children of the light*. Whereas, if *S. John's* rule be good here in the text, that no man truly knows Christ, but he that keepeth his commandments; it is much to be suspected, that many of us, which pretend to light, have a thick and gloomy darkness within, over-spreading our souls.

There be now many large volumes and discourses written concerning Christ, thousands of controversies discussed, infinite problems determined concerning his divinity, humanity, union of both together, and what not? so that our bookish Christians, that have all their religion in writings and papers, think they are now completely furnished with all kind of knowledge concerning Christ; and when they see all their leaves lying about them, they think they have a goodly stock of knowledge and truth, and cannot possibly miss of the way to heaven; as if religion were nothing but a little book-craft, a mere paper-skill.

But if *S. John's* rule here be good, we must not judge of our knowing of Christ by our skill in books and papers, but by our keeping of his commandments. And that, I fear, will discover many of us (notwithstanding all this light, which we boast of round about us) to have nothing but Egyptian darkness within our hearts.

The vulgar sort think, that they know Christ enough out of their creeds and catechisms, and confessions of faith; and if they have but a little acquainted themselves with these, and like parrots conned the words of them, they doubt not, but that they are sufficiently instructed in all the mysteries

of

of the kingdom of heaven. Many of the more learned, if they can but wrangle and dispute about Christ, imagine themselves to be grown great proficient in the school of Christ.

The greatest part of the world, whether learned or unlearned, think that there is no need of purging and purifying of their hearts for the right knowledge of Christ and his gospel; but though their lives be never so wicked, their hearts never so foul within, yet they may know Christ sufficiently out of their treatises and discourses, out of their meer systems and bodies of divinity: which I deny not to be useful in a subordinate way; although our Saviour prescribed his disciples another method to come to the right knowledge of divine truths, by doing of God's will; *He that will do my father's will, (saith he) shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.* He is a true Christian indeed, not he, that is only book-taught, but he, that is God-taught; he, that hath an *unction from the Holy One* (as our Apostle calleth it) *that teacheth him all things*; he, that hath the spirit of Christ within him, *that searcheth out the deep things of God: for as no man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man, which is in him; even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God.*

Ink and paper can never make us Christians, can never beget a new nature, a living principle in us; can never form Christ, or any true notions of spiritual things in our hearts. The Gospel, that new law, which Christ delivered to the world, it is not merely a dead letter without us, but a quickening spirit within us. Cold theorems and maxims, dry and jejune disputes, lean syllogistical reasonings, could never yet of themselves beget the least glimpse of true heavenly light, the least sap of saving knowledge in any heart. All this is but the groping of the poor dark spirit of man after truth, to find it out with his own endeavours, and feel it with his own cold and benumbed hands. Words and syllables, which are but dead things, cannot possibly convey the living notions of heavenly truths to us. The secret mysteries of a divine life, of a new nature, of Christ formed in our hearts, they cannot be written or spoken, language and expressions cannot reach them; neither can they be ever truly understood, except the soul itself be kindled from within, and awakened into the life of them. A painter, that would draw a rose, though he may flourish some likenesses of it in figure and colour, yet he can never paint the scent and fragrancy; or if he would draw a flame, he cannot put a constant heat into his colours; he cannot make his pencil drop a sound, as the echo in the epigram mocks at him;

—*Si vis similem pingere, pinge sonum.*

All the skill of cunning artizans and mechanicks cannot put a principle of life into a statue of their own making. Neither are we able to inclose in words and letters the life, soul, and essence of any spiritual truths, and, as it were, to incorporate it in them.

Some philosophers have determined, that ἀγωγή is not διδασκία, *virtue cannot be taught by any certain rules or precepts.* Men and books may propound some directions to us, that may set us in such a way of life and practice, as in which we shall at last find it within ourselves, and be experimen-

tally

tally acquainted with it; but they cannot teach it us like a mechanick art or trade. No, surely, *there is a spirit in man*; and *the inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding*. But we shall not meet with this spirit any where but in the way of obedience: the knowledge of Christ, and the keeping of his commandments, must always go together, and be mutual causes of one another.

Hereby we know, that we know him, if we keep his commandments.

He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.

I come now unto these words themselves, which are so pregnant, that I shall not need to force out any thing at all from them: I shall therefore only take notice of some few observations which drop from them of their own accord, and then conclude with some application of them to ourselves.

I. First then, If this be the right way and method of discovering our *knowledge of Christ*, by our *keeping his commandments*; then *we may safely draw conclusions concerning our state and condition from the conformity of our lives to the will of Christ*.

Would we know, whether we know Christ aright, let us consider whether the life of Christ be in us. *Qui non habet vitam Christi, Christum non habet*; he that hath not the life of Christ in him, he hath nothing but the name, nothing but a phancy of Christ, he hath not the substance of him. He that builds his house upon this foundation, not an airy notion of Christ swimming in his brain, but Christ really dwelling and living in his heart, as our Saviour himself witnesseth, *he buildeth his house upon a rock*; and when the floods come, and the winds blow, and the rain descends, and beats upon it, it shall stand impregnably. But he that builds all his comfort upon an ungrounded persuasion, that God from all eternity hath loved him, and absolutely decreed him to life and happiness, and seeketh not for God really dwelling in his soul; he builds his house upon a quick-sand, and it shall suddenly sink and be swallowed up: *His hope shall be cut off, and his trust shall be a spider's web; he shall lean upon his house, but it shall not stand; he shall hold it fast, but it shall not endure*.

We are no where commanded to pry into these secrets, but the wholesome counsel and advice given us is this, *to make our calling and election sure*. We have no warrant in Scripture to peep into these hidden rolls and volumes of eternity, and to make it our first thing, that we do, when we come to Christ, to spell out our names in the stars, and to persuade ourselves, that we are certainly elected to everlasting happiness, before we see the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness, shap'd in our hearts. God's everlasting decree is too dazzling and bright an object for us at first to set our eye upon. It is far easier and safer for us to look upon the rays of his goodness and holiness, as they are reflected in our hearts, and there to read the mild and gentle characters of God's love to us, in our love to him, and our hearty compliance with his heavenly will; as it is safer for us, if we would see the sun, to look upon it here below in a pail of water, than to cast up our daring eyes upon the body of the sun itself, which is too radiant

and

and scorching for us. The best assurance, that any one can have of his interest in God, is doubtless the conformity of his soul to him. Those divine purposes, whatsoever they be, are altogether unsearchable and unknowable by us; they lie wrapt up in everlasting darkness, and covered in a deep abyss; Who is able to fathom the bottom of them?

Let us not therefore make this our first attempt towards God and religion, to persuade ourselves strongly of these everlasting decrees: for if at our first flight we aim so high, we shall haply but scorch our wings, and be struck back with lightning, as those giants of old were, that would needs attempt to assault heaven. And it is indeed a most gigantick essay to thrust ourselves so boldly into the lap of heaven; it is a prank of *Nimrod*, of a mighty hunter, thus rudely to deal with God, and to force heaven and happiness before his face, whether he will or no. The way to obtain a good assurance indeed of our title to heaven, is not to clamber up to it by a ladder of our own ungrounded persuasions, but to dig as low as hell by humility and self-denial in our own hearts: And though this may seem to be the farthest way about, yet it is indeed the nearest and safest way to it. We must *ἀναβαίνω κάτω*, and *καταβαίνω ἄνω*, as the Greek epigram speaks, *ascend downward*, and *descend upward*, if we would indeed come to heaven, or get any true persuasion of our title to it.

The most gallant and triumphant confidence of a Christian riseth safely and surely on this low foundation, that lies deeper under ground, and there stands firmly and steadfastly. When our heart is once turned into a conformity with the word of God, when we feel our will perfectly to concur with his will, we shall then presently perceive a spirit of adoption within ourselves, teaching us to cry *Abba, Father*. We shall not then care for peeping into those hidden records of eternity, to see whether our names be written there in golden characters; no, we shall find a copy of God's thoughts concerning us written in our own breasts. There we may read the characters of his favour to us; there we may feel an inward sense of his love to us, flowing out of our hearty and unfeigned love to him. And we shall be more undoubtedly persuaded of it, than if any of those winged watchmen above, that are privy to heaven's secrets, should come and tell us, that they saw our names enrolled in those volumes of eternity. Whereas, on the contrary, though we strive to persuade ourselves never so confidently, that God from all eternity hath loved us, and elected us to life and happiness; if we do yet, in the mean time, entertain any iniquity within our hearts, and willingly close with any lust; do what we can, we shall find many a cold quailm ever now and then seizing upon us at approaching dangers; and when death itself shall grimly look us in the face, we shall feel our hearts even to die within us, and our spirits quite faint away, though we strive to raise them and recover them never so much with the strong waters and *aqua-vitæ* of our own ungrounded presumptions. The least inward lust willingly continued in will be like a worm, fretting the gourd of our jolly confidence and presumptuous persuasion of God's love, and always gnawing at the root of it; and though we strive to keep it alive, and continually besprinkle it with some dews of our own, yet it will be always dying and withering in our bosoms. But a good conscience within will be al-

ways better to a Christian, than *health to his navel, or marrow to his bones*; it will be an everlasting cordial to his heart; it will be softer to him than a bed of down, and he may sleep securely upon it in the midst of raging and tempestuous seas, when the winds bluster, and the waves beat round about him. A good conscience is the best looking-glass of heaven, in which the soul may see God's thoughts and purposes concerning it, as so many shining stars reflected to it. *Hereby we know Christ, hereby we know, that Christ loves us, if we keep his commandments.*

II. Secondly, If hereby only we know, that we know Christ, by our keeping his commandments, then *the knowledge of Christ doth not consist merely in a few barren notions, in a form of certain dry and sapless opinions.*

Christ came not into the world to fill our heads with mere speculations, to kindle a fire of wrangling and contentious dispute amongst us, and to warm our spirits against one another with nothing but angry and peevish debates; whilst in the mean time our hearts remain all ice within towards God, and have not the least spark of true heavenly fire to melt and thaw them. Christ came not to possess our brains only with some cold opinions, that send down nothing but a freezing and benumbing influence upon our hearts. Christ was *wisdom's magister, not school*: and he is the best Christian, whose heart beats with the truest pulse towards heaven; not he, whose head spineth out the finest cobwebs.

He that endeavours really to mortify his lusts, and to comply with that truth in his life, which his conscience is convinced of, is nearer a Christian, though he never heard of Christ, than he, that believes all the vulgar articles of the Christian faith, and plainly denieth Christ in his life.

Surely the way to heaven, that Christ hath taught us, is plain and easy, if we have but honest hearts: we need not many criticisms, many school-distinctions, to come to a right understanding of it. Surely Christ came not to ensnare us and entangle us with captious niceties, or to puzzle our heads with deep speculations, and lead us through hard and craggy notions into the kingdom of heaven. I persuade myself, that no man shall ever be kept out of heaven for not comprehending mysteries, that were beyond the reach of his shallow understanding, if he had but an honest and good heart, that was ready to comply with Christ's commandments. *Say not in thy heart, who shall ascend into heaven?* that is, with high speculations, to bring down Christ from thence; or, *who shall descend into the abyss beneath?* that is, with deep searching thoughts to fetch up Christ from thence: but lo, *the word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart.*

But I wish it were not the distemper of our times, to scare and fright men only with opinions, and make men only solicitous about the entertaining of this and that speculation, which will not render them any thing the better in their lives, or the liker unto God; whilst in the mean time there is no such care taken about *keeping of Christ's commandments*, and being renewed in our minds according to the image of God in righteousness and true holiness. We say, *Lo, here is Christ*, and, *Lo, there is Christ*, in the one and these opinions; whereas, in truth, Christ is neither here, nor there, nor any where, but where the spirit of Christ, where the life of Christ is.

Do we not now-a-days open and lock up heaven with the private key of this and that opinion of our own, according to our several phancies, as we please? And if any one observe Christ's commandments never so sincerely, and serve God with faith and a pure conscience, that yet haply skills not of some contended-for opinions, some darling notions, he hath not the right *Sibboleth*, he hath not the true watch-word, he must not pass the guards into heaven. Do we not make this and that opinion, this and that outward form, to be the wedding-garment, and boldly sentence those to outer darkness, that are not invested therewith? Whereas every true Christian finds the least dram of hearty affection towards God to be more cordial and sovereign to his soul, than all the speculative notions and opinions in the world; and though he study also to inform his understanding aright, and free his mind from all error and misapprehensions, yet it is nothing but the life of Christ deeply rooted in his heart, which is the chymical elixir, that he feeds upon. Had he *all faith, that he could remove mountains*, (as St. Paul speaks) had he *all knowledge, all tongues and languages*; yet he prizeth one dram of love beyond them all. He accounteth him, that feedeth upon mere notions in religion, to be but an airy and chameleon-like Christian. He findeth himself now otherwise rooted and centred in God, than when he did before merely contemplate and gaze upon him; he tasteth and reliseth God within himself; he hath *quendam saporem Dei, a certain savour of him*; whereas before he did but rove and guess at random at him. He feeleth himself safely anchored in God, and will not be dissuaded from it, though perhaps he skill not many of those subtleties, which others make the *alpha* and *omega* of their religion. Neither is he scared with those childish affrightments, with which some would force their private conceits upon him; he is above the superstitious dreading of mere speculative opinions, as well as the superstitious reverence of outward ceremonies; he cares not so much for subtilty, as for soundness and health of mind. And indeed, as it was well spoken by a noble philosopher, *ἀνευ ἀρετῆς Θεὸς ὄνομα μόνου*, that *without purity and virtue, God is nothing but an empty name*; so it is as true here, that without obedience to Christ's commandments, without the life of Christ dwelling in us, whatsoever opinion we entertain of him, Christ is but only named by us, he is not known.

I speak not here against a free and ingenuous enquiry into all truth, according to our several abilities and opportunities; I plead not for the captivating and entralling of our judgments to the dictates of men; I do not disparage the natural improvement of our understanding faculties by true knowledge, which is so noble and gallant a perfection of the mind: but the thing, which I aim against, is, the dispiriting of the life and vigour of our religion by dry speculations, and making it nothing but a mere dead skeleton of opinions, a few dry bones without any flesh and sinews tied up together, and the mis-placing of all our zeal upon an eager prosecution of these, which should be spent to better purpose upon other objects.

Knowledge indeed is a thing far more excellent than riches, outward pleasures, worldly dignities, or any thing else in the world besides holiness, and the conformity of our wills to the will of God; but yet our happiness con-

listeth not in it, but in a certain divine temper and constitution of soul, which is far above it.

But it is a piece of that corruption, that runneth through human nature, that we naturally prize truth more than goodness, knowledge more than holiness. We think it a gallant thing to be fluttering up to heaven with our wings of knowledge and speculation; whereas the highest mystery of a divine life here, and of perfect happiness hereafter, consisteth in nothing but mere obedience to the divine will. Happiness is nothing but that inward sweet delight, that will arise from the harmonious agreement between our wills and God's will.

There is nothing contrary to God in the whole world, nothing that fights against him, but self-will. This is the strong castle, that we all keep garri-son'd against heaven in every one of our hearts, which God continually layeth siege unto; and it must be conquered and demolished, before we can conquer heaven. It was by reason of this self-will, that Adam fell in paradise; that those glorious angels, those morning-stars, kept not their first station, but dropt down from heaven like falling stars, and sunk into this condition of bitterness, anxiety, and wretchedness, in which now they are. They all intangled themselves with the length of their own wings, they would needs will more, and otherwise than God would will in them; and going about to make their wills wider, and to enlarge them into greater amplitude, the more they struggled, they found themselves the faster pinion'd, and crowd'd up into narrowness and fervility; insomuch, that now they are not able to use any wings at all, but inheriting the serpent's curse, can only creep with their bellies upon the earth. Now, our only way to recover God and happiness again is, not to soar up with our understandings, but to destroy this self-will of ours; and then we shall find our wings to grow again, our plumes fairly spread, and ourselves raised aloft into the tree air of perfect liberty, which is perfect happiness.

There is nothing in the whole world able to do us good or hurt, but God and our own will; neither riches nor poverty, nor disgrace nor honour, nor life nor death, nor angels nor devils; but willing or not-willing, as we ought. Should hell itself cast all its fiery darts against us, if our will be right, if it be informed by the divine will, they can do us no hurt; we have then (if I may so speak,) an enchanted shield, that is impenetrable, and will bear off all. God will not hurt us, and hell cannot hurt us, if we will nothing but what God wills. Nay, then we are acted by God himself, and the whole divinity floweth in upon us; and when we have cashiered this self-will of ours, which did but shackle and confine our souls, our wills shall then become truly free, being widened and enlarg'd to the extent of God's own will. *Hereby we know, that we know Christ indeed, not by our speculative opinions concerning him, but by our keeping of his commandments.*

III. Thirdly, if hereby we are to judge, whether we truly know Christ, by our keeping of his commandments; so that he, that saith he knoweth him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar: then, this was not the plot and design of the Gospel, to give the world an indulgence to sin, upon what pretence soever.

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Though we are too prone to make such misconstructions of it; as if God had intended nothing else in it, but to dandle our corrupt nature, and contrive a smooth and easy way for us to come to happiness, without the troublesome labour of subduing our lusts and sinful affections: or, as if the Gospel were nothing else but a declaration to the world, of God's engaging his affections from all eternity on some particular persons in such a manner, as that he would resolve to love them, and dearly embrace them, though he never made them partakers of his image in righteousness and true holiness; and though they should remain under the power of all their lusts, yet they should still continue his beloved ones, and he would notwithstanding, at last, bring them undoubtedly into heaven. Which is nothing else but to make the God that we worship, the God of the New Testament, *προσωπολήπις*, an *accepter of persons*, and one, that should encourage that in the world, which is diametrically opposite to God's own life and being.

And indeed nothing is more ordinary than for us to shape out such monstrous and deformed notions of God unto ourselves, by looking upon him through the coloured medium of our own corrupt hearts, and having the eye of our soul tintured by the suffusions of our own lusts. And therefore because we mortals can fondly love and hate, and sometimes hug the very vices of those, to whom our affections are engaged, and kiss their very deformities; we are so ready to shape out a Deity like unto ourselves, and to fashion out such a God as will, in Christ at least, hug the very wickedness of the world, and in those, that be once his own, by I know not what fond affection, appropriated to himself, connive at their very sins, so that they shall not make the least breach betwixt himself and them. Some there are, that question, whether of the two be the worse idolatry, and of the deeper stain, for a man to make a God out of a *piece of wood*, and *fall down unto it and worship it*, and say, *Deliver me, for thou art my God*, as it is expressed in the prophet *Isaiab*; or to set up such an idol-god of our own imagination as this is, fashioned out according to the similitude of our own fondness and wickedness: and when we should paint out God with the liveliest colours, that we can possibly borrow from any created being, with the purest perfections, that we can abstract from them; to draw him out thus with the black coal of our own corrupt hearts, and to make the very blots and blurs of our own souls to be the letters, which we spell out his name by. Thus do we, that are children of the night, make black and ugly representations of God unto ourselves, as the Ethiopians were wont to do, copying him out according to our own likeness, and setting up that unto ourselves for a god, which we love most dearly in ourselves, that is, our lusts. But there is no such god as this any where in the world, but only in some men's false imaginations, who know not all this while, that they look upon themselves instead of God, and make an idol of themselves which they worship and adore for him; being so full of themselves, that whatsoever they see round about them, even God himself, they colour with their own tincture; like him, that *Aristotle* speaks of, that wheresoever he went, and whatsoever he looked upon, he saw still his own face, as in a glass, represented to him. And therefore it is no wonder, if men seem naturally more devoutly affected toward such an imaginary god, as we have now de-

scribed, than to the true real God, clothed with his own real attributes ; since it is nothing but an image of themselves, which, *Narcissus*-like, they fall in love with : no wonder if they kiss and dandle such a baby-god as this, which, like little children, they have dressed up out of the clouts of their own fond phancies, according to their own likeness, of purpose that they might play and sport with it.

But God will ever dwell in spotless light, howsoever we paint him and disfigure him here below ; he will still be circled about with his own rays of unstained and immaculate glory. And though the Gospel be not God as he is in his own brightness, but God veiled and masked to us, God in a state of humiliation, and condescend, as the sun in a rainbow ; yet it is nothing else but a clear and unspotted mirror of divine holiness, goodness, purity ; in which attributes lies the very life and essence of God himself. The Gospel is nothing else but God descending into the world in our form, and conversing with us in our likeness ; that he might allure and draw us up to God, and make us partakers of his divine form. *Θεὸς γέγονε ἄνθρωπος* (as *Athanasius* speaks) *ὡς ἡμεῖς ἐν αὐτῷ θεοποίησαν*, *God was therefore incarnated and made man, that he might deify us* ; that is, (as *St. Peter* expresseth it) make us partakers of the divine nature. Now, I say, the very proper character and essential tincture of God himself is nothing else but goodness. Nay, I may be bold to add, that God is therefore God, because he is the highest and most perfect good ; and good is not therefore good, because God out of an arbitrary will of his would have it so. Whatsoever God doth in the world, he doth it as suitable to the highest goodness ; the idea and fairest copy of which is his own essence.

Virtue and holiness in creatures, as *Plato* well discourseth in his *Euthyphro*, are not therefore good, because God loveth them, and will have them be accounted such ; but rather God therefore loveth them, because they are in themselves simply good. Some of our own authors go a little farther yet, and tell us, that God doth not fondly love himself, because he is himself, but therefore he loveth himself, because he is the highest and most absolute goodness ; so that if there could be any thing in the world better than God, God would love that better than himself : but because he is essentially the most perfect good, therefore he cannot but love his own goodness infinitely above all other things. And it is another mistake, which sometimes we have of God, by shaping him out according to the model of ourselves, when we make him nothing but a blind, dark, impetuous self-will running through the world ; such as we ourselves are furiously acted with, that have not the ballast of absolute goodness to poize and settle us.

That I may therefore come nearer to the thing in hand ; God, who is absolute goodness, cannot love any of his creatures, and take pleasure in them, without bestowing a communication of his goodness and likeness upon them. God cannot make a Gospel to promise men life and happiness hereafter, without being regenerated, and made partakers of his holiness. As soon may heaven and hell be reconciled together, and lovingly shake hands with one another, as God can be fondly indulgent to any sin, in whomsoever it be. As soon may light and darkness be espoused together, and

and midnight be married to noon-day, as God can be joined in a league of friendship to any wicked soul.

The great design of God in the Gospel is to clear up this mist of sin and corruption, which we are here surrounded with, and to bring up his creatures out of the shadow of death to the region of light above, the land of truth and holiness. The great mystery of the Gospel is to establish a god-like frame and disposition of spirit, which consists in righteousness and true holiness, in the hearts of men. And Christ, who is the great and mighty Saviour, came on purpose into the world, not only to save us from fire and brimstone, but also to save us from our sins. Christ hath therefore made an expiation of our sins by his death upon the cross, that we, being thus delivered out of the hands of these our greatest enemies, might serve God without fear, in holiness and righteousness before him all the days of our life. This grace of God, that bringeth salvation, hath therefore appeared unto all men, in the Gospel, that it might teach us to deny ungodliness and worldly lusts, and that we should live soberly, righteously and godly in this present world; looking for that blessed hope, and glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ, who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works. These things I write unto you, (saith our Apostle a little before my text) *that you sin not*; therein expressing the end of the whole Gospel, which is, not only to cover sin by spreading the purple robe of Christ's death and sufferings over it, whilst it still remaineth in us with all its filth and noisomeness unremoved; but also to convey a powerful and mighty spirit of holiness, to cleanse us, and free us from it. And this is a greater grace of God to us, than the former, which still go both together in the Gospel; besides the free remission and pardon of sin in the blood of Christ, the delivering of us from the power of sin, by the Spirit of Christ dwelling in our hearts.

Christ came not into the world only to cast a mantle over us, and hide all our filthy sores from God's avenging eye, with his merits and righteousness; but he came likewise to be a surgeon and physician of souls, to free us from the filth and corruption of them; which is more grievous and burthensome, more noisome to a true Christian, than the guilt of sin itself.

Should a poor wretched and diseased creature, that is full of sores and ulcers, be covered all over with purple, or clothed with scarlet, he would take but little contentment in it, whilst his sores and wounds remain upon him; and he had much rather be arrayed in rags, so he might obtain but soundness and health within. The Gospel is a true *Bethesda*, a pool of grace, where such poor, lame and infirm creatures as we are, upon the moving of God's Spirit in it, may descend down, not only to wash our skin and outside, but also to be cured of our diseases within. And whatever the world thinks, there is a powerful spirit, that moves upon these waters, the waters of the Gospel, spreading its gentle, healing, quickening wings over our souls. The Gospel is not like *Abana* and *Pharpar*, those common rivers of *Damascus*, that could only cleanse the outside; but is a true *Jordan*, in which such leprous *Naamans*, as we all are, may wash and be clean. Blessed indeed are they, whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered: Blessed is
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the man, to whom the Lord will not impute sin : but yet rather blessed are they, whose sins are like a morning-cloud, and quite taken away from them. *Blessed, thrice blessed are they, that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be satisfied : blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.*

Our Saviour Christ came (as *John the Baptist* tells us) *with a fan in his hand, that he might thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into his garner : but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire.* He came (as the prophet *Malachi* speaks) *like a refiner's fire, and like fuller's soap ; to sit as a refiner and purifier of silver, and to purify all the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver, that they may offer unto the Lord an offering in righteousness.*

Christ came not only to write *Holiness to the Lord* upon *Aaron's* forehead, and to put his *Urim* and *Thummim* upon his breast-plate ; but, *This is the covenant, saith the Lord, that I will make with them in those days ; I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts ; and then I will be their God, and they shall be my people. They shall be all kings and priests unto me. God sent his own Son (saith St. Paul) in the likeness of sinful flesh, and by a sacrifice for sin condemned sin in the flesh ; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit.*

The first *Adam*, as the Scripture tells us, brought in a real defilement, which, like a noisome leprosy, hath overspread all mankind ; and therefore the second *Adam* must not only fill the world with a conceit of holiness, and mere imaginary righteousness ; but he must really convey such an immortal seed of grace into the hearts of believers, as may prevail still more and more in them, till it have at last quite wrought out that poison of the serpent.

Christ, that was nothing but Divinity dwelling in a tabernacle of flesh, and God himself immediately acting a human nature, came into the world to kindle here that divine life amongst men, which is certainly dearer unto God, than any thing else whatsoever in the world ; and to propagate this celestial fire from one heart still unto another, until the end of the world. Neither is he, nor was he, ever absent from this spark of his divinity kindled amongst men, wheresoever it be, though he seem bodily to be withdrawn from us. He is the standing, constant, inexhausted fountain of this divine light and heat, that still toucheth every soul, that is enlivened by it, with an out-stretched ray, and freely lends his beams, and disperseth his influence to all, from the beginning of the world to the end of it. *We all receive of his fulness grace for grace ;* as all the stars in heaven are said to light their candles at the sun's flame. For though his body be withdrawn from us, yet, by the lively and virtual contact of his Spirit, he is always kindling, chearing, quickening, warming and enlivening hearts. Nay, this divine life, begun and kindled in any heart, wheresoever it be, is something of God in flesh, and, in a sober and qualified sense, Divinity incarnate ; and all particular Christians, that are really possessed of it, so many mystical Christs.

And God forbid, that God's own life and nature, here in the world, should be forlorn, forsaken, and abandoned of God himself. Certainly, where-ever it is, though never so little, like a sweet, young, tender babe, once born in any heart, when it crieth unto God the father of it, with pitiful and bemoaning looks imploring his compassion, it cannot chuse but move his fatherly bowels, and make them yearn, and turn towards it, and, by strong sympathy, draw his compassionate arm to help and relieve it. Never was any tender infant so dear to those bowels, that begat it, as an infant new-born Christ, formed in the heart of any true believer, to God the father of it. Shall the *children of this world*, the sons of darkness, be moved with such tender affection and compassion towards the fruit of their bodies, their own natural off-spring? and shall God, who is the *father of lights*, the fountain of all goodness, be moved with no compassion towards his true spiritual off-spring, and have no regard to those sweet babes of light, ingendered by his own beams in men's hearts, that, in their lovely countenances, bear the resemblance of his own face, and call him their father? Shall he see them lie fainting and gasping, and dying here in the world, for want of nothing to preserve and keep them, but an influence from him, who first gave them life and breath? No, hear the language of God's heart, hear the founding of his bowels towards them: *Is it Ephraim my dear son? is it that pleasant child? Since I spake of him, I do earnestly remember him; my bowels, my bowels are troubled for him; I will surely have mercy upon him, saith the Lord.* If those expressions of goodness and tender affection here, among the creatures, be but drops of that full ocean, that is in God; how can we then imagine, that this father of our spirits should have so little regard to his own dear off-spring, I do not say our souls, but that, which is the very life and soul of our souls, the life of God in us, (which is nothing else, but God's own self communicated to us, his own Son born in our hearts) as that he should suffer it to be cruelly murdered in its infancy by our sins, and, like young *Hercules*, in its very cradle to be strangled by those filthy vipers? that he should see him to be crucified by wicked lusts, nailed fast to the cross by invincible corruptions, pierced and gored on every side with the poisonous spears of the devil's temptations, and at last to give up the ghost; and yet his tender heart not at all relent, nor be all this while impassioned with so sad a spectacle? Surely, we cannot think he hath such an adamantine breast, such a stony nature, as this is.

What then? must we say, that though indeed he be willing, yet he is not able, to rescue his crucified and tormented son now bleeding upon the cross; to *take him down* from thence, and *save him*? Then must sin be more powerful than God; that weak, crazy and sickly thing more strong than the *rock of ages*; and the devil, the prince of darkness, more mighty than the God of light. No surely; there is a weakness and impotency in all evil, but a masculine strength and vigour in all goodness; and therefore, doubtless, the highest good, the *πῦλον ἀγαθόν*, as the philosopher calls it, is the strongest thing in the world. *Nil potentius summo Bono.* God's power, displayed in the world, is nothing but his goodness strongly reaching all things from height to depth, from the highest heaven to the lowest hell; and irresistibly imparting

imparting itself to every thing, according to those several degrees, in which it is capable of it.

Have the fiends of darkness then, those poor forlorn spirits, that are fettered and chained up in the chains of their own wickedness, any strength to withstand the force of infinite goodness, which is infinite power? or do they not rather sculk in holes of darkness, and fly, like bats and owls, before the approaching beams of this sun of righteousness? Is God powerful to kill and to destroy, to damn and to torment? and is he not powerful to save? Nay, it is the sweetest flower in all the garland of his attributes, it is the richest diadem in his crown of glory, that he is *mighty to save*: and this is far more magnificent for him, than to be styled *mighty to destroy*. For that, except it be in a way of justice, speaks no power at all, but mere impotency; for the root of all power is goodness.

Or must we say, lastly, that God indeed is able to rescue us out of the power of sin and Satan, when we sigh and groan towards him; but yet sometimes, to exercise his absolute authority, his uncontrollable dominion, he delights rather in plunging wretched souls down into infernal night and everlasting darkness? What shall we then make the God of the whole world? Nothing but a cruel and dreadful *Erinny*s, with curled fiery snakes about his head, and firebrands in his hands, thus governing the world? Surely this will make us either secretly to think, that there is no God at all in the world, if he must needs be such; or else to wish heartily there were none. But, doubtless, God will at last confute all these our misapprehensions of him; he will unmask our hypocritical pretences, and clearly cast the shame of all our sinful deficiencies upon ourselves, and vindicate his own glory from receiving the least stain or blemish by them. In the mean time, let us know, that the Gospel now requireth far more of us, than ever the Law did; for it requireth a *new creature*, a *divine nature*, *Christ formed in us*: but yet withall it bestoweth a *quickening Spirit*, an enlivening power, to enable us to express that, which is required of us. Whosoever therefore truly knows Christ, the same also *keepeth Christ's commandments*. But he, *that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him*.

I have now done with the first part of my Discourse, concerning those observations, which arise naturally from the words, and offer themselves to us. I shall, in the next place, proceed to make some general application of them all together.

Now therefore, I beseech you, let us consider, whether or no we know Christ indeed: not by our acquaintance with systems and models of divinity, not by our skill in books and papers; but by our keeping of Christ's commandments. All the books and writings, which we converse with, they can but represent spiritual objects to our understandings; which yet we can never see in their own true figure, colour and proportion, until we have a divine light within, to irradiate and shine upon them. Though there be never such excellent truths concerning Christ and his Gospel, set down in
words

words and letters ; yet they will be but unknown characters to us, until we have a living spirit within us, that can decypher them ; until the same spirit, by secret whispers in our hearts, do comment upon them, which did at first indite them. There be many, that understand the Greek and Hebrew of the Scripture, the original languages, in which the text was written, that never understood the language of the Spirit.

There is a *caro* and a *spiritus*, a *flesh* and a *spirit*, a body and a soul in all the writings of the Scriptures. It is but the flesh and body of divine truths, that is printed upon paper ; which many moths of books and libraries do only feed upon ; many walking skeletons of knowledge, that bury and entomb truths in the living sepulchres of their souls, do only converse with ; such as never did any thing else, but pick at the mere bark and rind of truths, and crack the shells of them. But there is a soul and spirit of divine truths, that could never yet be congealed into ink, that could never be blotted upon paper ; which, by a secret traduction and conveyance, passeth from one soul unto another, being able to dwell or lodge no-where, but in a spiritual being, in a living thing, because itself is nothing but life and spirit. Neither can it, where indeed it is, express itself sufficiently in words and sounds, but it will best declare and speak itself in actions ; as the old manner of writing among the *Egyptians* was, not by words, but things. The life of divine truths is better expressed in actions, than in words, because actions are more living things than words : words are nothing but dead resemblances and pictures of those truths, which live and breathe in actions ; and *the kingdom of God* (as the Apostle speaketh) *consisteth not in word, but in life and power.* *Τὰ πρόβατα ἃ χόρην φέροντα τοῖς ποίμεσιν ἐπιδεικνύει πόσον ἔφωγον* (saith the moral philosopher) *ἀλλὰ τὸν νομὸν ἔσω πέφαντα ἔβιον ἔσω φέρον, καὶ γάλα.* *Sheep do not come and bring their fodder to their shepherd, and shew him how much they eat ; but, inwardly concocting and digesting it, they make it appear by the fleece, which they wear upon their backs, and by the milk, which they give.* And let not us Christians affect only to talk and dispute of Christ, and so measure our knowledge of him by our words ; but let us shew *ἀπὸ τῶν θεωρημάτων πεφάντων τὰ ἔργα*, our knowledge concocted into our lives and actions ; and then let us really manifest, that we are Christ's sheep indeed, that we are his disciples, by that fleece of holiness, which we wear, and by the fruits, that we daily yield in our lives and conversations : for *bercia* (saith Christ) *is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit ; so shall ye be my disciples.*

Let us not, I beseech you, judge of our knowing Christ by our ungrounded persuasions, that Christ from all eternity hath loved us, and given himself particularly for us, without the conformity of our lives to Christ's commandments, without the real partaking of the image of Christ in our hearts. The great mystery of the Gospel doth not lie only in Christ without us, (though we must know also what he hath done for us ;) but the very pith and kernel of it consists in Christ inwardly formed in our hearts.

Nothing is truly ours but what lives in our spirits. Salvation itself cannot save us as long as it is only without us, no more than health can cure us, and make us sound, when it is not within us, but somewhere at distance from us ; no more than arts and sciences, whilst they lie only in books and pa-

pers without us, can make us learned. The Gospel, though it be a sovereign and medicinal thing itself, yet the mere knowing and believing of the history of it will do us no good: we can receive no virtue from it, till it be inwardly digested and concocted into our souls; till it be made ours, and become a living thing in our hearts. The Gospel, if it be only without us, cannot save us, no more than that physician's bill could cure the ignorant patient of his disease, who, when it was commended to him, took the paper only, and put it up in his pocket, but never drank the potion, that was prescribed in it.

All that Christ did for us in the flesh, when he was here upon earth, from his lying in a manger, when he was born in *Bethlehem*, to his bleeding upon the cross on *Golgotha*, it will not save us from our sins, unless Christ by his Spirit dwell in us. It will not avail us to believe, that he was born of a virgin, unless the power of the Most High overshadow our hearts, and beget him there likewise. It will not profit us to believe, that he died upon the cross for us, unless we be baptized into his death by the mortification of all our lusts; unless the old man of sin be crucified in our hearts. Christ indeed hath made an expiation for our sins upon his cross, and the blood of Christ is the only sovereign balm to free us from the guilt of them: but yet, besides the sprinkling of the blood of Christ upon us, we must be made partakers also of his Spirit. Christ came into the world, as well to redeem us from the power and bondage of our sins, as to free us from the guilt of them. *You know* (saith St. *John*) *that he was manifested to take away our sins: whosoever therefore abideth in him, sinneth not; whosoever sinneth, hath not seen nor known him.* Lo the end of Christ's coming into the world! Lo a design worthy of God manifested in the flesh!

Christ did not take all those pains to lay aside his robes of glory, and come down hither into the world, to enter into a virgin's womb, to be born in our human shape, and be laid a poor crying infant in a manger, and having no form or comeliness at all upon him, to take upon him the form of a servant, to undergo a reproachful and ignominious life, and at last to be abandoned to a shameful death, a death upon the cross; I say, he did not do all this merely to bring in a notion into the world, without producing any real substantial effect at all, without the changing, mending and reforming of the world; so that men should still be as wicked as they were before, and as much under the power of the prince of darkness, only they should not be thought so; they should still remain as full of all the filthy fores of sin and corruption as before, only they should be accounted whole. Shall God come down from heaven, and pitch a tabernacle amongst men? Shall he undertake such a huge design, and make so great a noise of doing something, which, when it is all summed up, shall not at last amount to a reality? Surely Christ did not undergo all this to so little purpose; he would not take all this pains for us, that he might be able at last to put into our hands nothing but a blank. *He was with child, he was in pain and travail; and hath he brought forth nothing but wind? hath he been delivered of the east wind?* Is that great design, that was so long carried in the womb of eternity, now proved abortive, or else nothing but a mere windy birth? No surely: the end of the gospel is life and perfection; it is a divine nature; it is a God-
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like frame and disposition of spirit ; it is to make us partakers of the image of God in righteousness and true holiness, without which salvation itself were but a notion.

Christ came into the world to make an expiation and atonement for our sins ; but the end of this was, that we might eschew sin ; that we might forsake all ungodliness and worldly lusts. The Gospel declares pardon of sin to those, that are heavy laden with it, and willing to be disburdened, to this end, that it might quicken and enliven us to new obedience. Whereas otherwise the guilt of sin might have detained us in horror and despair, and so have kept us still more strongly under the power of it, in sad and dismal apprehensions of God's wrath provoked against us, and inevitably falling on us : but Christ hath now appeared like a day-star, with most cheerful beams ; nay, he is the Sun of righteousness himself, which hath risen upon the world with his healing wings, with his exhilarating light, that he might chase away all those black despairing thoughts from us. But Christ did not rise, that we should play and sport, and wantonize with his light ; but that we should do *the work of the day* in it ; that we should walk *εὐχρηστούς* (as the Apostle speaketh) not in our night-clothes of sinful deformity, but clad all over with the comely garments of light. The Gospel is not big with child of a phancy, of a mere conceit of righteousness without us, hanging at distance over us, whilst our hearts within are nothing but cages of unclean birds, and like houses continually haunted with devils, nay, the very rendezvous of those fiends of darkness.

Holiness is the best thing, that God himself can bestow upon us, either in this world, or the world to come. True evangelical holiness, that is, Christ formed in the hearts of believers, is the very cream and quintessence of the Gospel. And were our hearts found within, were there not many thick and dark fumes, that did arise from thence, and cloud our understandings, we could not easily conceive the substance of heaven itself to be any thing else but holiness, freed from those encumbrances, that did ever clog it and accloy it here ; neither should we wish for any other heaven besides this. But many of us are like those children, whose stomachs are so vitiated by some disease, that they think ashes, coal, mud-wall, or any such trash, to be more pleasant than the most wholesome food : such sickly and distempered appetites have we about these spiritual things, that hanker after I know not what vain shews of happiness, whilst in the mean time we neglect that, which is the only true food of our souls, that is able to nourish them up to everlasting life.

Grace is holiness militant, holiness encumbered with many enemies and difficulties, which it still fights against, and manfully quits itself of ; and glory is nothing else but holiness triumphant, holiness with a palm of victory in her hand, and a crown upon her head : *Deus ipse cum omni sua bonitate, quatenus extra me est, non facit me beatum, sed quatenus in me est : God himself cannot make me happy, if he be only without me, and unless he give in a participation of himself, and his own likeness into my soul.* Happiness is nothing but the releasing and unlettering of our souls from all these narrow, scant, and particular good things ; and the espousing of them to the highest and most universal good, which is not this or that particular

good, but goodness itself: and this is the same thing, that we call holiness. Which, because we ourselves are so little acquainted with, (being for the most part ever courting a mere shadow of it,) therefore we have such low, abject, and beggarly conceits thereof; whereas it is in itself the most noble, heroic and generous thing in the world. For I mean by holiness nothing else but God stamped and printed upon the soul. And we may please ourselves with what conceits we will; but so long as we are void of this, we do but dream of heaven, and I know not what fond paradise; we do but blow up and down an airy bubble of our own phancies, which riseth out of the froth of our vain hearts; we do but court a painted heaven, and woo happiness in a picture, whilst in the mean time a true and real hell will suck in our souls into it, and soon make us sensible of a solid woe and substantial misery.

Divine wisdom hath so ordered the frame of the whole universe, as that every thing should have a certain proper place, that should be a receptacle for it. Hell is the sink of all sin and wickedness. The strong magick of nature pulls and draws every thing continually to that place, which is suitable to it, and to which it doth belong; so all these heavy bodies press downwards towards the centre of our earth, being drawn in by it: in like manner hell, wheresoever it is, will by strong sympathy pull in all sin, and magnetically draw it to itself: as true holiness is always breathing upwards, and fluttering towards heaven, striving to embrace itself with God; and it will at last undoubtedly be conjoined with him; no dismal shades of darkness can possibly stop it in its course, or bear it back.

Ὡς αἰεὶ τὸ ἀμικρὸν ἀγχι θεοῦ εἰς τὸ ἴμισον.

Nay, we do but deceive ourselves with names: hell is nothing but the orb of sin and wickedness, or else that hemisphere of darkness, in which all evil moves; and heaven is the opposite hemisphere of light, or else, if you please, the bright orb of truth, holiness and goodness: and we do actually in this life instate ourselves in the possession of one, or other of them. Take sin and disobedience out of hell, and it will presently clear up into light, tranquillity, serenity, and shine out into a heaven. Every true saint carrieth his heaven about with him in his own heart; and hell, that is without him, can have no power over him. He might safely wade through hell itself, and, like the three children, pass through the midst of that fiery furnace, and yet not at all be scorched with the flames of it: he might walk through the *valley of the shadows of death*, and yet fear no evil.

Sin is the only thing in the world, that is contrary to God. God is light, and that is darkness: God is beauty, and that is ugliness and deformity. All sin is direct rebellion against God; and with what notions soever we sugar it, and sweeten it, yet God can never smile upon it, he will never make a truce with it. God declares open war against sin, and bids defiance to it; for it is a professed enemy to God's own life and being. God, which is infinite goodness, cannot but hate sin, which is purely evil. And though

though sin be in itself but a poor, impotent, and crazy thing, nothing but straitness, poverty, and non-entirety, so that of itself it is the most wretched and miserable thing in the world, and needeth no farther punishment besides itself; yet divine vengeance beats it off still farther and farther from God, and, wher soever it is, will be sure to scourge it and lash it continually. God and sin can never agree together.

That I may therefore yet come nearer to ourselves: *This is the message, that I have now to declare unto you, that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say, that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lye, and do not the truth.* Christ and the Gospel are light, and there is no darkness at all in them: if you say, that you know Christ and his Gospel, and yet keep not Christ's commandments, but dearly hug your private darling corruptions, *you are liars, and the truth is not in you*; you have no acquaintance with the God of light, nor the Gospel of light. If any of you say, that you know Christ, and have an interest in him, and yet (as I fear too many do) still nourish ambition, pride, vainglory within your breasts, harbour malice, revengefulness, and cruel hatred to your neighbours in your hearts, eagerly scramble after this worldly pelf, and make the strength of your parts and endeavours serve that blind Mammon, the God of this world; if you wallow and tumble in the filthy puddle of fleshly pleasures, or if you aim only at yourselves in your lives, and make yourself the compass by which you sail, and the star, by which you steer your course, looking at nothing higher, or more noble than your selves; deceive not yourselves, *you have neither seen Christ, nor known him*: you are deeply incorporated (if I may so speak) with the spirit of this world, and have no true sympathy with God and Christ, no fellowship at all with them.

And, I beseech you, let us consider; Be there not many of us, that pretend much to Christ, that are plainly in our lives as proud, ambitious, vainglorious as any others? Be there not many of us, that are as much under the power of unruly passions, as cruel, revengeful, malicious, conforous as others? that have our minds as deeply engaged in the world, and as much envassalled to riches, gain, profit, those great admired deities of the sons of men, and their souls as much overwhelmed and sunk with the cares of this life? Do not many of us as much give ourselves to the pleasures of the flesh, and though not without regrets of conscience, yet ever now and then secretly soak ourselves in them? Be there not many of us, that have as deep a share likewise in injustice and oppression, in vexing the fatherless and the widows? I wish it may not prove some of our cases at that last day, to use such pleas as these unto Christ in our behalf; *Lord, I have professed in thy name*; I have preached many a zealous sermon for thee; I have kept many a long fast; I have been very active for thy cause in church, in state; nay, I never made any question, but that my name was written in thy book of life: when yet, alas! we shall receive no other return from Christ but this, *I know you not; depart from me, ye workers of iniquity.* I am sure there be too many of us, that have long pretended to Christ, which make little or no progress in true Christianity, that is, holiness of life; that ever hang hovering in a twilight of grace, and never seriously

riously put ourselves forward into clear day light, but esteem that glimmering crepusculum, which we are in, and like that faint twilight better than broad open day: whereas *the path of the just* (as the wise man speaks) *is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the perfect day.* I am sure there be many of us, that are perpetual dwarfs in our spiritual stature, like those *filly women* (that St. Paul speaks of) *laden with sins, and led away with divers lusts,* that are ever learning, and never able to come to *the knowledge of the truth*; that are not now one jot taller in Christianity, than we were many years ago, but have still as sickly, crazy, and unfound a temper of soul as we had long before.

Indeed we seem to do something; we are always moving and lifting at the stone of corruption, that lies upon our hearts, but yet we never stir it notwithstanding, or at least never roll it off from us. We are sometimes a little troubled with the guilt of our sins, and then we think we must thrust our lusts out of our hearts; but afterwards we sprinkle ourselves over with I know not what holy-water, and so are contented to let them still abide quietly within us. We do every day truly confess the same sins, and pray against them; and yet still commit them as much as ever, and lie as deeply under the power of them. We have the same water to pump out in every prayer, and still we let the same leak in again upon us. We make a great deal of noise, and raise a great deal of dust with our feet; but we do not move from off the ground, on which we stand, we do not go forward at all: or if we do sometimes make a little progress, we quickly lose again the ground, which we had gained; like those upper planets in the heaven, which (as the astronomers tell us) sometimes move forwards, sometimes quite backwards, and sometimes perfectly stand still; have their stations and retrogradations, as well as their direct motions. As if religion were nothing else but a dancing up and down upon the same piece of ground, and making several motions and friskings on it; and not a sober journeying and travelling onwards toward some certain place. We do and undo; we do *Penelopes telam texere*; we weave sometimes a web of holiness, but then we let our lusts come, and undo and unravel all again. Like *Sisyphus* in the fable, we roll up a mighty stone with much ado, sweating and tugging up the hill; and then we let it go, and tumble down again unto the bottom; and this is our constant work. Like those *Danaides*, which the poets speak of, we are always filling water into a sieve, by our prayers, duties, and performances, which still runs out as fast as we pour it in.

What is it, that thus cheats us, and gulls us of our religion? that makes us thus constantly to tread the same ring and circle of duties, where we make no progress at all forwards, and the farther we go, are still never the nearer to our journey's end? What is it, that thus starves our religion, and makes it look like those kine in *Pharaoh's dream*, ill-favoured and lean-fleshed, that it hath no colour in its face, no blood in its veins, no life nor heat at all in its members? What is it, that doth thus be-dwarf us in our Christianity? What low, fordid, unworthy principles do we act by, that thus hinder our growth, and make us stand at a stay, and keep us always at the very porch and entrance where we first began? Is it a sleepy, slug-

gith conceit, that it is enough for us, if we be but once in a state of grace, if we have but once stepped over the threshold; we need not take so great pains to travel any farther? or is it another damping, choaking, stifling opinion, that Christ hath done all for us already without us, and nothing need more to be done within us? no matter how wicked we be in ourselves, for we have holiness without us; no matter how sickly and diseased our souls be within, for they have health without them. Why may we not as well be satisfied and contented to have happiness without us too to all eternity, and so ourselves for ever continue miserable? *Little children, let no man deceive you; he that doth righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous: but he that committeth sin is of the devil.* I shall therefore exhort you in the wholesome words of St. Peter; *Give all diligence to add to your faith, virtue; and to virtue, knowledge; to knowledge, temperance; and to temperance, patience; to patience, godliness; and to godliness, brotherly-kindness; and to brotherly-kindness, charity: For if these things be in you and abound, they make you, that ye shall neither be barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ.* The Apostle still goes on, and I cannot leave him yet: *But he that lacketh these things is blind, and cannot see far off, and hath forgotten, that he was once purged from his old sins. Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election sure; for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall.* Let us not only talk and dispute of Christ, but let us indeed put on the Lord Jesus Christ. Having those great and precious promises, which he hath given us, let us strive to be made partakers of the divine nature, escaping the corruption, that is in the world through lust: and being begotten again to a lively hope of enjoying Christ hereafter, let us purify ourselves, as he is pure.

Let us really declare, that we know Christ, that we are his disciples, by our keeping of his commandments; and amongst the rest, that commandment especially, which our Saviour Christ himself commendeth to his disciples in a peculiar manner; *This is my commandment, that ye love one another, as I have loved you: and again, These things I command you, that you love one another. Let us follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God. Let us put on as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bows of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering, forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any, even as Christ forgave us: and above all these things let us put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness. Let us in meekness instruct those, that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth; that they may recover themselves out of the snares of the devil, that are taken captive by him at his will. Beloved, let us love one another; for love is of God, and whosoever loveth is born of God and knoweth God.*

O divine love! the sweet harmony of souls! the musick of angels! the joy of God's own heart! the very darling of his bosom! the source of true happiness! the pure quintessence of heaven! that which reconciles the jarring principles of the world, and makes them all chime together! that which melts men's hearts into one another! See how St. Paul describes it, and it cannot chuse but enamour your affections towards it: *Love envieth*
not,

not, it is not puffed up, it doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity; heareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. I may add in a word, it is the best-natured thing, the best complexioned thing in the world. Let us express this sweet harmonious affection in these jarring times: that so, if it be possible, we may tune the world into better musick. Especially in matters of religion, let us strive with all meekness to instruct and convince one another. Let us endeavour to promote the Gospel of peace, the dove-like Gospel, with a dove-like Spirit. This was the way, by which the Gospel at first was propagated in the world: *Christ did not cry, nor lift up his voice in the streets; a bruised reed he did not break, and the smoking flax he did not quench; and yet he brought forth judgment unto victory.* He whisper'd the Gospel to us from mount *Sion*, in a still voice; and yet the sound thereof went out quickly throughout all the earth. The Gospel at first came down upon the world gently and softly, like the dew upon *Gideon's* fleece; and yet it quickly soaked quite through it: and doubtless, this is still the most effectual way to promote it farther. Sweetness and ingenuity will more command men's minds than passion, sourness and severity; as the soft pillow sooner breaks the flint, than the hardest marble. Let us ἀγάπησεν ἐν ἀγάπῃ, follow truth in love; and of the two indeed, be contented rather to mis of the conveying of a speculative truth, than to part with love. When we would convince men of any error by the strength of truth, let us withal pour the sweet balm of love upon their heads. Truth and love are two the most powerful things in the world; and when they both go together, they cannot easily be withstood. The golden beams of truth, and the silken cords of love, twisted together, will draw men on with a sweet violence, whether they will or no.

Let us take heed we do not sometimes call that zeal for God and his Gospel, which is nothing else but our own tempestuous and stormy passion. True zeal is a sweet, heavenly and gentle flame, which maketh us active for God, but always within the sphere of love. It never calls for fire from heaven, to consume those, that differ a little from us in their apprehensions. It is like that kind of lightning (which the philosophers speak of) that melts the sword within, but findgeth not the scabbard: it strives to save the soul, but hurteth not the body. True zeal is a loving thing, and makes us always active to edification, and not to destruction. If we keep the fire of zeal within the chimney, in its own proper place, it never doth any hurt; it only warmeth, quickeneth and enliveneth us: but if once we let it break out, and catch hold of the thatch of our flesh, and kindle our corrupt nature, and set the house of our body on fire, it is no longer zeal, it is no heavenly fire, it is a most destructive and devouring thing. True zeal is an *ignis lambens*, a soft and gentle flame, that will not scorch one's hand; it is no predatory or voracious thing: but carnal and desirous zeal is like the spirit of gun-powder set on fire, that tears and blows up all, that stands before it. True zeal is like the vital heat in us, that we live upon, which we never feel to be angry or troublesome; but though it gently feed upon the radical oil within us, that sweet balsam of our natural moisture, yet it lives lovingly with it, and maintains that, by which it is fed: but that other furious and distempered zeal is nothing else but a fever in the soul. To con-

clude, we may learn what kind of zeal it is, that we should make use of in promoting the Gospel, by an emblem of God's own, given us in the Scripture, those fiery tongues, that, upon the day of *Pentecost*, sat upon the Apostles; which sure were harmless flames; for we cannot read, that they did any hurt, or that they did so much as findge an hair of their heads.

I will therefore shut up this with that of the Apostle; *Let us keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.* Let this soft and silken knot of love tie our hearts together; though our heads and apprehensions cannot meet, as indeed they never will, but always stand at some distance off from one another. Our zeal, if it be heavenly, if it be true Vestal fire kindled from above, will not delight to tarry here below, burning up straw and stubble, and such combustible things, and sending up nothing but gross and earthy fumes to heaven; but it will rise up, and return back pure as it came down, and will be ever striving to carry up men's hearts to God along with it. It will be only occupied about the promoting of those things, which are unquestionably good; and when it moves in the irascible way, it will quarrel with nothing but sin. Here let our zeal busy and exercise itself, every one of us beginning first at our own hearts. Let us be more zealous than ever we have yet been, in fighting against our lusts, in pulling down those strong holds of sin and Satan in our hearts. Here let us exercise all our courage and resolution, our manhood and magnanimity.

Let us trust in the almighty arm of our God, and doubt not but he will as well deliver us from the power of sin in our hearts, as preserve us from the wrath to come. Let us go out against these uncircumcised Philistines, I mean our lusts, not with shield or spear, not in any confidence of our own strength, but in the name of the Lord of hosts; and we shall prevail, we shall overcome our lusts: *for greater is he that is in us, than he that is in them. The eternal God is our refuge, and underneath are everlasting arms; he shall thrust out these enemies from before us; and he shall say, Destroy them.* We shall enter the true *Canaan*, the good land of promise, *that floweth with milk and honey*, the land of truth and holiness. *Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God, that you may be able to withstand. Let your loins be girt about with truth; have on the breast-plate of righteousness; and let your feet be shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace. Above all, take the shield of faith, whereby ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked; and take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God.* And lastly, be sure of this, that ye be strong only in the Lord, and in the power of his might.

There be some, that dishearten us in this spiritual warfare, and would make us let our weapons fall out of our hands, by working in us a despair of victory. There be some evil spies, that weaken the hands and hearts of the children of *Israel*, and bring an ill report upon that land, that we are to conquer, telling of nothing but strange giants, the sons of *Anak*, there, that we shall never be able to overcome. *The Amalekites* (say they) *dwell in the South, the Hittites, Jebusites, Amorites in the mountains, and the Canaanites by the sea-coast*; huge armies of tall invincible lusts: *we shall never be able to go against this people*; we shall never be able to prevail against our corruptions. Harken not unto them, I beseech you, but hear what Ca-

leb and Joshua say; *Let us go up at once and possess it, for we are able to overcome them*; not by our own strength, but by the power of the Lord of hosts. There are indeed sons of Anak there, there are mighty giant-like lusts, that we are to grapple with; nay, there are principalities and powers too, that we are to oppose: but the great Michael, the Captain of the Lord's host, is with us; he commands in chief for us, and we need not be dismayed. *Understand therefore this day, that the Lord thy God is he, which goeth before thee as a consuming fire; he shall destroy these enemies, and bring them down before thy face.* If thou wilt be faithful to him, and put thy trust in him, *as the fire consumeth the stubble, and as the flame burneth up the chaff,* so will he destroy thy lusts in thee: *their root shall be rottenness, and their blossom shall go up as the dust.*

But let us take heed, that we be not discouraged, and, before we begin to fight, despair of victory: but to believe and hope well in the power of our God and his strength, will be half a conquest. Let us not think holiness in the hearts of men here in the world is a forlorn, forsaken, and outcast thing from God, that he hath no regard of holiness; wherever it is, though never so small, if it be but hearty and sincere, it can no more be cut off, and discontinued from God, than a sun-beam here upon earth can be broken off from its intercourse with the sun, and be left alone amidst the mire and dirt of this world. The sun may as well discard its own rays, and banish them from itself into some region of darkness far remote from it, where they shall have no dependence at all upon it, as God can forsake and abandon holiness in the world, and leave it a poor orphan thing, that shall have no influence at all from him to preserve and keep it. Holiness is something of God, wherever it is; it is an efflux from him, that always hangs upon him, and lives in him: as the sun-beams, although they gild this lower world, and spread their golden wings over us, yet they are not so much here, where they shine, as in the sun, from whence they flow. God cannot draw a curtain betwixt himself and holiness, which is nothing but the splendour and shining of himself; he cannot hide his face from it, he cannot desert it in the world. He, that is once *born of God, shall overcome the world,* and the prince of this world too, by the power of God in him. Holiness is no solitary neglected thing; it hath stronger confederacies, greater alliances, than sin and wickedness. It is in league with God and the universe; the whole creation smiles upon it: there is something of God in it, and therefore it must needs be a victorious and triumphant thing.

Wickedness is a weak, cowardly and guilty thing, a fearful and trembling shadow. It is the child of ignorance and darkness; it is afraid of light, and cannot possibly withstand the power of it, nor endure the sight of its glittering armour. It is allied to none but wretched, forlorn and apostate spirits, that do what they can to support their own weak and tottering kingdom of darkness, but are only strong in weakness and impotency. The whole polity and commonwealth of devils is not so powerful as one child of light, one babe in Christ; they are not able to quench the least smoking flax, to extinguish one spark of grace. Darkness is not able to make resistance against light, but ever, as it comes, flies before it. But if
wickedness.

wickedness invite the society of devils to it, (as we learn by the sad experience of these present times, in many examples of those, that were possessed with malice, revengefulness and lust) so that those cursed fiends do most readily apply themselves to it, and offer their service to feed it and encourage it, because it is their own life and nature, their own kingdom of darkness, which they strive to enlarge and to spread the dominions of; shall we then think, that holiness, which is so nearly allied unto God, hath no good genius at all in the world to attend upon it, to help it and encourage it? Shall not the kingdom of light be as true to its own interest, and as vigilant for the enlarging of itself, as the kingdom of darkness? Holiness is never alone in the world, but God is always with it, and his loving Spirit doth ever associate and join itself to it. He, that sent it into the world, is with it, as Christ speaketh of himself; *The Father hath not left me alone, because I do always those things that please him.* Holiness is the life of God, which he cannot but feed and maintain wheresoever it is: and as devils are always active to encourage evil, so we cannot imagine, but that the heavenly host of blessed angels above are busily employ'd in the promoting of that, which they love best, that which is dearest to God, whom they serve, the life and nature of God. *There is joy in heaven at the conversion of one sinner;* heaven takes notice of it; there is a Choir of angels, that sweetly sings the epithalamium of a soul divorced from sin and Satan, and espoused unto Christ. What therefore the wife man speaks concerning wisdom, I shall apply to holiness: *Take just hold of holiness, let her not go, keep her, for she is thy life: keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life, and of death too.* Let nothing be esteemed of greater consequence and concernment to thee than what thou doest and adest, how thou livest. Nothing without us can make us either happy or miserable; nothing can either defile us, or hurt us, but what goeth out from us, what springeth and bubbleth up out of our own hearts. We have dreadful apprehensions of the flames of hell without us; we tremble, and are afraid, when we hear of fire and brimstone; whilst in the mean time we securely nourish within our own hearts a true and living hell,

————— *Et cæco carpimur igni:*

The dark fire of our lusts consumeth our bowels within, and miserably scorched our souls, and we are not troubled at it. We do not perceive, how hell steals upon us whilst we live here. And as for heaven, we only gaze abroad, expecting, that it should come in to us from without, but never look for the beginnings of it to arise within, in our own hearts.

But lest there should yet haply remain any prejudice against that, which I have all this while heartily commended to you, *true holiness*, and the *keeping of Christ's commandments*, as if it were a legal and a servile thing, that would subject us to a state of bondage; I must here needs add a word or two, either for the prevention, or removal of it. I do not therefore mean

by holiness, the meer performance of outward duties of religion, coldly acted over as a task; nor our habitual prayings, hearings, fastings, multiplied one upon another, (though these be all good, as subservient to an higher end;) but I mean an inward soul and principle of divine life, that spiriteth all these, that enliveneth and quickeneth the dead carcase of all outward performances whatsoever. I do not here urge the *dead law of outward works*, which indeed, if it be alone, subjects us to a *state of bondage*; but the inward law of the Gospel, the *law of the spirit of life*, than which nothing can be more free and ingenuous: for it doth not act us by principles without us, but is an inward self-moving principle living in our hearts.

The first, though it work us into some outward conformity to God's commandments, and so hath a good effect upon the world; yet we are all this while but like dead instruments of musick, that sound sweetly and harmoniously, when they are only struck and play'd upon from without by the musician's hand, who hath the theory and law of musick living within himself.

But the second, the living law of the Gospel, the *law of the spirit of life* within us, is as if the soul of musick should incorporate itself with the instrument, and live in the strings, and make them of their own accord, without any touch or impulse from without, dance up and down, and warble out their harmonies.

They, that are acted only by an outward law, are but like *Neurospasts*, or those little puppets, that skip nimbly up and down, and seem to be full of quick and sprightly motion; whereas they are all the while moved artificially by certain wires and strings from without, and not by any principle of motion from themselves within: or else like clocks and watches, that go pretty regularly for a while, but are moved by weights and plummets, or some other artificial springs, that must be ever now and then wound up, or else they cease.

But they, that are acted by the *new law of the Gospel*, by the *law of the spirit*, they have an inward principle of life in them, that from the centre of itself puts forth itself freely and constantly into all obedience to the will of Christ. This *new law of the Gospel* is a kind of musical soul, informing the dead organ of our hearts, that makes them of their own accord delight to act harmoniously according to the rule of God's word.

The law, that I speak of, is a law of love, which is the most powerful law in world; and yet it freeth us in a manner from all law without us, because it maketh us become a law unto ourselves. The more it prevaileth in us, the more it eateth up and devoureth all other laws without us; just as *Aaron's* living rod did swallow up those rods of the Magicians, that were made only to counterfeit a little life.

*Quis legem det amantibus?
Major lex amor est sibi.*

Love is at once a freedom from all law, a state of purest liberty; and yet a law too of the most constraining and indispensable necessity.

The worst law in the world is *the law of sin, which is in our members*; which keeps us in a condition of most absolute slavery, when we are wholly under

under the tyrannical commands of our lusts: this is a cruel *Pharaoh* indeed, that sets his hard task-masters over us, and maketh us wretchedly drudge in mire and clay.

The law of the letter without us sets us in a condition of little more liberty, by restraining us from many outward acts of sin; but yet it doth not disenthral us from the power of sin in our hearts.

But the law of the spirit of life, the Gospel-law of love, it puts us into a condition of most pure and perfect liberty; and whosoever really entertains this law, he hath *thrust out Hagar* quite, he hath *cast out the bond-woman and her children*; from henceforth *Sarah the free woman* shall live for ever with him, and she shall be to him a mother of many children; her seed shall be *as the sand of the sea-shore for number*, and *as the stars of heaven*. Here is evangelical liberty, here is Gospel-freedom, when the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made us free from the law of sin and death; when we have a liberty from sin, and not a liberty to sin: for our dear Lord and Master hath told us, that *whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of it*.

He that lies under the power and vassalage of his base lusts, and yet talks of Gospel-freedom, he is but like a poor condemned prisoner, that in his sleep dreams of being set at liberty, and of walking up and down where-soever he pleaseth, whilst his legs are all the while locked fast in fetters and irons. To please ourselves with a notion of Gospel-liberty, whilst we have not a Gospel-principle of holiness within us, to free us from the power of sin, is nothing else but to gild over our bonds and fetters, and to fancy ourselves to be in a golden cage. There is a straitness, slavery and narrowness in sin: sin crouds and crumples up our souls, which, if they were freely spread abroad, would be as wide and as large as the whole universe.

No man is truly free, but he that hath his will enlarged to the extent of God's own will, by loving whatsoever God loves, and nothing else. Such a one doth not fondly hug this and that particular created good thing, and en-vassal himself unto it; but he loveth every thing, that is lovely, beginning at God, and descending down to all his creatures, according to the several degrees of perfection in them. He enjoys a boundless liberty, and a boundless sweetness, according to his boundless love. He includeth the whole world within his out-stretched arms; his soul is as wide as the whole universe, as big as *yesterday, to-day, and for ever*. Whosoever is once acquainted with this disposition of spirit, he never desires any thing else, and he loves the life of God in himself dearer than his own life. To conclude this therefore; if we love Christ, and keep his commandments, *his commandments will not be grievous to us; his yoke will be easy, and his burden light*: it will not put us into a state of bondage, but of perfect liberty. For it is most true of evangelical obedience, what the wise man speaketh of wisdom, *Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace: She is a tree of life to those that lay hold upon her, and happy are all they that retain her*.

I will now shut up all with one or two considerations, to persuade you farther to the keeping of Christ's commandments.

First, from the desire, which we all have of knowledge. If we would indeed know divine truths, the only way to come to this is by keeping of
Christ's

Christ's commandments. The grossness of our apprehensions in spiritual things, and our many mistakes, that we have about them, proceed from nothing but those dull and foggy steams, which rise up from our foul hearts, and becloud our understandings. If we did but heartily comply with Christ's commandments, and purge our hearts from all gross and sensual affections, we should not then look about for truth wholly without ourselves, and enslave ourselves to the dictates of this and that teacher, and hang upon the lips of men; but we should find the great eternal God inwardly teaching our souls, and continually instructing us more and more in the mysteries of his will; and *out of our bellies should flow rivers of living waters.* Nothing puts a stop and hindrance to the passage of truth in the world, but the carnality of our hearts, the corruption of our lives.

'Tis not wrangling disputes, and syllogistical reasonings, that are the mighty pillars, that underprop truth in the world: if we would but underfet it with the holiness of our hearts and lives, it should never fail. Truth is a prevailing and conquering thing, and would quickly overcome the world, did not the earthiness of our dispositions, and the darkness of our false hearts hinder it. Our Saviour Christ bids the blind man wash off the clay, that was upon his eyes in the pool of *Siloam*, and then he should see clearly; intimating this to us, that it is the earthiness of men's affections, that darkens the eye of their understandings in spiritual things. Truth is always ready and near at hand, if our eyes were not closed up with mud, that we could but open them to look upon it. Truth always waits upon our souls, and offers itself freely to us, as the sun offers its beams to every eye, that will but open, and let them shine in upon it. If we could but purge our hearts from that filth and defilement, which hangeth about them, there would be no doubt at all of truth's prevailing in the world. For *truth is great, and stronger than all things: all the earth calleth upon truth, and the heaven bleisseth it; all works shake and tremble at it. The truth endureth, and is always strong; it liveth and conquereth for evermore. She is the strength, kingdom, power, and majesty of all ages. Blessed be the God of truth.*

Secondly, If we desire a true reformation, as some would be thought to do; let us begin here in reforming our hearts and lives, in *keeping Christ's commandments.* All outward forms and models of reformation, though they be never so good in their kind, yet they are of little worth to us without this inward reformation of the heart. Tin, or lead, or any other baser metal, if it be cast into never so good a mould, and made up into never so elegant a figure, yet is but tin or lead still; it is the same metal, that it was before. If adulterate silver, that hath much alloy or dross in it, have never so current a stamp put upon it, yet it will not pass notwithstanding, when the touchstone trieth it. We must be reformed within, with a spirit of fire, and a spirit of burning, to purge us from the dross and corruption of our hearts, and refine us as gold and silver; and then we shall be reformed truly, and not before. When this once comes to pass, then shall Christ be set upon his throne indeed, then *the glory of the Lord shall overflow the land*; then we shall be a people acceptable unto him, and as *Mount Zion*, which he dearly loved.

T H E
S E C O N D S E R M O N :
O R , A
D I S C O U R S E

On I CORINTH. XV. 57.

*But thanks be to God, which giveth us the Victory through
our Lord Jesus Christ.*

Χριστιανισμός ἐστὶ τῆς Θεῆας Φύσεως μίμνησις.

S. GREGORY NYSSEN.

CHRISt's resurrection, which the Apostle treateth of in the former part of this chapter, is one of the main and principal articles of our Christian faith : for though Christ by his death upon the cross made a propitiatory sacrifice for the world, yet it was his resurrection only, which did manifest his death to be effectual and available for that end, and did evidence its acceptation with God. For if the grave had detain'd Christ, and held him prisoner, this would have been an argument, that the debt, for which he was committed to that dark dungeon, was not yet paid, nor satisfaction made ; for *if Christ be not raised* (saith the Apostle) *your* Verse 17. *faith is in vain, ye are yet in your sins.* But now death and the grave having delivered up Christ out of their custody, his resurrection is an undoubted argument, that they had no more to lay to his charge, as he was a surety and undertaker for mankind ; but the debt, which was owing to the law and divine justice, was in the court of heaven fully acquitted and discharged. For *Christ was delivered from our sins, and rose again for our justification.* Rom. iv.

And though Christ's other miracles ought to have conciliated belief to his doctrine from the Jews ; yet his resurrection from the dead, (bretold

(foretold by himself, and really accomplished) added to all the rest, was a most undoubted and unquestionable confirmation of his prophetic ministry. For if it were supposed, (as the Jews of old, and the Talmudists of later times, maliciously calumniated our Saviour Christ) that a mere wizzard or magician should have appeared, and not only have done many miracles by *Beelzebub* and the powers of darkness, but also have foretold, that after he had been put to death, he should rise again, and have given this as a farther sign to confirm his prophecy, as our Saviour did, *Matth. xii. 39.* it could never be conceiv'd, that Divine Providence should suffer such an impostor miraculously to rise again, in so remarkable a manner, and so often to appear before the eyes of so many spectators, and at last visibly to ascend up to heaven. Because this would have been *tentatio invincibilis* to mankind; it being not imaginable, what greater assurance heaven itself could give, to confirm and seal a prophet, and persuade the world, that what he did was by the finger of God, and not by magical imposture, than this is. And therefore it is observable, that though a good while after our Saviour's time, when the Jews had now forfeited that peculiar Providence, that watched over them, a certain counterfeit Messias, one *David El-Roy*, was permitted to do several strange and miraculous things by magick and witchcraft, if the Jewish relations be true; yet, when he gave this for a sign to the Persian king, to prove himself the Messias, that after he was beheaded by him, he should rise again, he plainly discovered his imposture, to the great disappointment of the deluded Jews, who (as *Maimonides* writes) in vain expected his resurrection a good while after.

In *Iggereth Teman.*

Moreover, If Christ had not risen again after death, the world would not have had sufficient ground to trust and believe in him as a Saviour. *St. Austin* reckoned it as great a miracle as any, that Christ ever did upon earth, that the world should be brought off to believe in a crucified Saviour. For to worship *התלי*, as the Jews by way of disgrace call our Saviour, or *τον διασκαλοπιζόμενον* in *Lucian's* language, one that was hanged, for a God, and to believe in him, could not but seem a monstrous and prodigious thing, both to Jews and Gentiles; and certainly it would never have been brought to pass, had there not been unquestionable assurance given of Christ's resurrection from the dead. For who would be so foolish, as to believe in a dead Saviour, and to expect help and assistance from him, that had not been able to help himself, and therefore had given no proof, that he was able to help others? nay, from him, that, to all human appearance, had now no being at all? Upon which account the Psalmist upbraids the foolish Heathen, that they ate the sacrifices of the dead. Wherefore it is observable, in the Gospel, that when Christ was now dead, and buried in his sepulchre, the hope and expectation of his disciples, who had formerly believed in him, lay, as it were, intomb'd in the same sepulchre with him. And then the two disciples, that went to *Luzars* could only say, *We trusted, that this had been he, which should have remained Israel.* But afterwards, when they were able upon good grounds to affirm, that *Κύριος ἀληθῶς ἀΐστην*, *The Lord was risen indeed*, then their faith revived a-new, and mounted up higher than ever, and grew triumphant in them.

Psal. cvi.

Luke xxiv.

Again,

Again, there was another excellent design in Christ's resurrection from the dead, which the Apostle pursues largely also in this chapter; *viz.* To give the world assurance of a life after death, and a blessed immortality to be enjoyed by all true believers and followers of Christ. Christ, by his resurrection, hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light, as the Apostle speaks, 2 Tim. i. 10. or, as the Church sings in that divine anthem, *After he had overcome the sharpness of death, he opened the kingdom of heaven to all believers.* The reasons of philosophy, that prove the soul's immortality, though firm and demonstrative in themselves, yet they are so thin and subtil to vulgar apprehensions, that they glide away through them, and leave no such palpable impressions on them, as can be able sufficiently to bear up against that heavy weight of gross infidelity, that continually sinks down the minds of men to a distrust of such high things, as be above the reach of sense. Neither are these considerations any longer of force, than men can actually attend to the strength and coherence of the demonstration; and when that actual attention (which is operose and difficult) is taken off, then the truth itself, like a spectre or apparition, suddenly vanishes away, and men question with themselves afterwards, whether there were any such thing, or no. Such thin and evanid things are philosophical speculations about the high mysteries of faith and religion. But Christ his raising of the self-same body, which was laid in the sepulchre, and afterwards appearing in it often to his disciples, gave such evident assurance of the soul's immortality and life after death, as must needs strike more strongly upon vulgar minds, and make more palpable impressions on them, and be always of more present and ready use, than any philosophical reasons and demonstrations.

And the Scripture is herein very harmonious, and agreeable to itself, both in the Old and New Testament; for, as in the one, it makes the original of death's entrance into the world to be the sin and disobedience of the first Adam, who was ἀσθραπῶς ἐκ γῆς, χοϊκός, of the earth, earthy; so, in the other, it attributes the recovery of life and immortality to the meritorious obedience of the second Adam, that was ὁ Κύριος ἐκ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπουράνιος, the Lord from heaven, heavenly, who by his death vanquished and destroyed death. For as Sampson, who was a type of our Saviour, when he was besieged by the Philistines in the city Gaza (Judges xvi.) rose up at midnight, and pulled up the gates of the city, and the posts, and laying them upon his shoulders, carried them up to the top of the hill; in like manner, Christ our Lord, when he was environed and encompassed by death, after he had been a while detained under the custody thereof, he ascended victoriously out of the power of the grave, and carried the gates of hell and death upon his shoulders along with him triumphantly into heaven: he slighted and dismantled that mighty garrison, whose walls were stronger than brass, and gates harder than adamant, that it should be no longer a prison, with doors and bars to shut up those, that believe in him, but an open and free passage, and a broad highway to life and immortality. He is the resurrection and the life, (John xi. 25.) and he that believeth in him, though he were dead, yet shall be live. For he that liveth, and was dead, and is alive for evermore, even he hath the keys of hell and of death, Rev. i. 18.

But that, which I chiefly aim at this time, concerning *Jesus* his resurrection, and ascension into heaven, is this, *That by and after it he was made Lord and Christ, King and Saviour, and Sovereign of his church.* Not but that Christ's Humanity was always hypostatically united to the Divinity; but because: the oeconomical kingdom of Christ, as Mediator, according to the Scripture-calculation, seems not to commence, till after his state of humiliation was, and so begins its epocha from Christ's resurrection, or his exaltation to sit at God's right-hand in heaven. *Acts ii. 36. Let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ.* *Acts v. 31. Jesus, whom ye slew and hanged on a tree, him hath God exalted on his right-hand, to be a prince and a Saviour, &c.* *Philip. ii. 9. Who humbled himself, and became obedient to the death of the cross; wherefore God hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, &c. and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.* And that article of our creed, concerning Christ's sitting at God's right-hand in heaven, signifies thus much unto us; that Christ, after his resurrection and ascension into heaven, hath all power given him, both in heaven and in earth, all things being made subject to him, *excepting him only,* **1 Cor. xv. 27.** *that hath put all things under him.* He being, for the comfort of his church and members here upon earth, according to his humanity, made God's vicegerent, and seated in his Father's throne; and having a mediatorial kingdom bestowed upon him, that shall continue, *till he hath put down all authority and power, and hath subdued all his enemies under his feet;* and then hath delivered up this oeconomical kingdom to God the Father, *that God may be all in all.* **Verse 24.** **Verse 28.**

And this is an unspeakable consolation, that Christian religion affords to us, and a most gracious condescension of the All-wise God; that forasmuch as we, who dwell in these houses of clay, are so far removed from the pure and abstracted Deity, and so infinitely disproportioned unto it, that there should be such a contrivance as this set on foot, that we should have one of our own flesh and blood, that was in all things tempted, like unto us, and had experience of all our difficulties and calamities; who demonstrated his infinite love to us in laying down his life for us, and therefore we cannot doubt, but hath a most tender sympathy and fellow-feeling with us in all our infirmities; I say, that we should have such a one exalted to God's right-hand, and invested with all authority and power, both in heaven and earth, that he might administer all things for the good of his church and members, and supply them in all their wants and necessities. Which consideration must needs be far more comfortable, chearing, and reviving to every true Christian, than it was to the sons of *Jacob*, when they went down to *Egypt* to buy corn and provision for their necessities, to think, that *Joseph* their brother was made lord of all the land.

And yet, notwithstanding, this is wholly eluded and evacuated by those high-flown spiritualists of these latter times, that slight and reject the letter of the New Testament, as a mean and carnal thing, and will acknowledge no other death and resurrection of Christ, no other ascension and sitting at God's right-hand; nay, no other day of judgment, nor resurrection

rection of the body, but what is mystical and allegorical ; whereby they do not only impudently slur the Gospel, according to the history and the letter, in making it no better, than a romantical legend, or a mere Æsopick fable, that contains a good *επιμύθημα*, or moral under it ; but also plainly defeat the counsel of God against themselves and mankind, by antiquating Christianity, and bringing in, instead thereof, old Paganism again, disguised under a few canting phrases of Scripture-language. For though *Moses* had a veil over his face, though there were many obscure umbrages and allegories in the Law, (the children of *Israel* being then not able to bear the brightness of that evangelical truth, that shined under them ;) yet now, under the Gospel, *we do all with open face behold, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord* nakedly represented to us, being *changed into the same image from glory to glory.* 2 Cor. i.

But to let pass these, and still to improve our former meditation farther ; let us in the next place consider, that Christ, who received all this power after his resurrection and ascension, did not receive it in vain and to no purpose, either taking no notice of our human transactions here below, as having removed his pavilion too far into those regions of light and glory from us ; or else remaining, notwithstanding, an idle spectator, and no way concerning or interesting himself in the issues of our human affairs. Which will be so much the more improbable, if we consider what the Scripture and experience tell us, that the devil and apostate spirits are perpetually active and busy in promoting the concerns of the kingdom of darkness. And therefore doubtless he, whom God hath made the shepherd and bishop of our souls, can never be so regardless of his office, nor so careless of his flock and tender lambs committed to his charge, as to suffer those cruel wolves to prey upon them at pleasure ; and to have no pity at all for them, nor to extend his watchful providence over them, whom once he vouchsafed to redeem with his own precious blood. No certainly ; he, that waded through so many difficulties and agonies for us in the days of his flesh ; he, that bore our griefs, and carried our sorrows ; he, that was wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities ; that sweated drops of blood in the garden, and was nailed to the cross for us in *Golgotha* ; he cannot so easily forget those, whom he hath so dearly bought, nor suffer all that power, which God hath invested him with for the good of his church, to lie by him idle and unemployed.

But to the end, that there might not be the least ground of suspicion, or distrust, left in the minds of men concerning this particular, Christ, after his ascension into heaven, thought good to give us a sensible demonstration, both of his kingly power, and of his watchful care and providence over his church, that he would not leave them orphans, and destitute of all assistance, by sending down his Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost, in a visible and miraculous manner, upon his disciples. Acts ii. 32. *This Jesus hath God raised up, of which we are all witnesses : therefore, being by the right-hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this, which ye now see and hear.* And verily, if there had been no news heard of our Lord and Saviour Christ, after he ascended above the clouds out of his disciples sight, no real and visible dem-

monstration of his existence, power, and providence over his church; the distrustful hearts of men would have been too prone to suspect, that the pretence of an invisible kingdom at God's right-hand above had been no better than a mere dream, an airy and phantastick notion; and they would have been too ready to have called in question the truth of all his other miracles, his resurrection and ascension, witnessed only by his own disciples, and to have surmised those several apparitions of his, that we read of after his death, had been nothing else but spectres, or phantasms, like the vulgarly believed apparitions of the ghosts of men in airy bodies. But the sensible and miraculous pouring out of the Holy Ghost upon his disciples, after his ascension into heaven, was a palpable confirmation of all Christ's other miracles, of the validity of his meritorious death and passion, of the truth of his resurrection and ascension; and gives most comfortable assurance to all believers to the world's end, that though his bodily presence be withdrawn from them, yet he hath not left his church utterly forlorn, and destitute of all assistance; but that his Spirit, the Holy Comforter, continueth to be present amongst them, as his vicegerent, and to assist them for all the holy purposes of the Gospel, to the world's end. Now the principal effects of Christ's Holy Spirit, which are to be hoped for, and expected by every true believer and private Christian, are comprised by the Apostle under three heads here in the text, as consisting in a *threefold victory over a threefold enemy. The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law: but thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.*

1. *A victory over sin*, as that which is the cause of death.
2. *A victory over the law*, as that which aggravates the guilt, and exasperates the power of sin.
3. Lastly, *A victory over death*, the fruit and consequent of sin.

First therefore, *There is a victory over sin, to be obtained in and through Christ.*

Some there are, that will acknowledge no other victory over sin, but an external one; that whereby it was conquered for us by Christ upon the cross, sixteen hundred years since, where he *spoiled principalities and powers, and made a shew of them openly, triumphing over them in it*, Col. ii. 15. and where he *redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us*, Gal. iii. 13. And doubtless this was one great end of Christ's coming into the world, to make a propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of mankind: not only that he might thereby put a period to those continually-repeated and ineffectual sacrifices of brute beasts, and the offering of the blood of bulls and goats, that could not take away sin, nor propitiate his Divine Majesty; but also that he might at once give a sensible demonstration, both of God's high displeasure against sin, and of his placableness and reconcileableness to sinners returning to obedience; and therefore, to that end, that the despair of pardon might not hinder any from repentance and amendment of life, promulgate free pardon and remission of sins, through his blood, to all that should repent, and believe the gospel.

But

But it is a very unſound and unwholeſome interpretation of this ſalutary undertaking of Chriſt's in the Goſpel, as if the ultimate end and deſign of it were to procure remiſſion of ſin, and exemption from puniſhment only, to ſome particular perſons ſtill continuing under the power of ſin, and to ſave them at laſt in their ſins, that is, with a mere outward and carnal ſalvation; it being a thing utterly impoſſible, that thoſe undefiled rewards of the heavenly kingdom ſhould be received and enjoyed by men in their unregenerate and unrenewed nature.

For what is this elſe, but to make Chriſt the grand patron of the kingdom of darkneſs, and to ſuppoſe God to be ſuch a Being as may be bribed and corrupted, by ſacrifice and interceſſion, to a partial connivance and fond indulgence of men in their ſins to all eternity? or elſe to inſinuate, that there is no other evil at all in ſin, but only in reſpect of that outward puniſhment conſequent upon it? Which is to deſtroy the nature and reality of ſin, and to make it nothing but a mere name or phancy; as if *good and evil, juſt and unjuſt*, (as ſome philoſophers dreamed) were not Φίσει, but Νόμῳ and Δόξει only, had no reality in nature, but depended only upon arbitrary laws, enforced by outward puniſhments, or mere opinions; and ſo were only Παντα, (as *Democritus* expreſſeth it) mere factitious things, or elſe Φυκτασθη, fictitious and imaginary: either of which opinions, if they were true, then indeed remiſſion of ſin, and exemption from puniſhment, would quite take away all the evil of ſin.

But if ſin be not a mere name or phancy, but that which hath a real and intrinſecal evil in it, greater than that of outward puniſhment; then certainly it cannot be ſo tranſcendent a happineſs, as ſome men carnally conceit, to have an impunity in ſinning to all eternity, that the accompliſhment thereof ſhould be thought the only fit undertaking for the Son of God to engage in, and that which would deſervedly entitle him the Saviour of mankind. For that of *Socrates* in *Plato* muſt then needs be true, Τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μὴ διδοῦναι δίκην, πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν εἶναι, *That* (in thoſe, which are not incorrigible and incurable) *it is the greateſt evil, that can poſſibly befall them, to continue in wickedneſs unpuniſhed; and the greateſt kindneſs, that they can receive, by the leſſer evil of puniſhment and caſtigation, to be cured of the greater evil of ſin:* For (as the ſame philoſopher ſpeaks) Ἰατρικὴ τῆς πονηρίας δίκη, *caſtiſement and correſtion is the natural remedy and cure of wickedneſs;* which our Saviour confirms, when he ſaith, *As many as I love, I rebuke and chaſten:* and ſure the remedy is not worſe than the diſeaſe.

Rev. iii. 19.

Wherefore it was ſo far from being the ultimate end of Chriſt's undertaking to die for ſin, that men might ſecurely live in it, that on the contrary the death of Chriſt was particularly intended as an engine to batter down the kingdom of ſin and Satan, and to bring men effectually unto God and righteouſneſs, as the Scripture plainly witneſſeth, 1 Pet. ii. 24. *His own ſelf bare our ſins in his body on the tree, that we, being dead to ſin, might live to righteouſneſs.* The death of Chriſt conducing to this great end, not only as it was exemplary, and hieroglyphically inſtructed us, that we ought to take up the croſs likewiſe, and follow our crucified Lord and Saviour, ſuffering in the fleſh, and ceasing from ſin; but alſo as it doth moſt lively demonſtrate to us God's high diſpleaſure againſt ſin, and the malignant nature of it,

1 Pet. iv. 1.

that

that could not otherwise be expiated than by the blood of that innocent and immaculate Lamb, the only begotten Son of God; and lastly, as the hope of pardon and free remission of sin, in the blood of Christ, for the truly penitent, might invite and animate men to chearful and vigorous endeavours against sin.

Others there are, that tell us, there is indeed something farther aimed at in the Gospel besides the bare remission of sins, but that it is nothing else but the *imputation of an external righteousness, or another's inherent holiness*, which is so completely made ours thereby to all intents and purposes, as if we ourselves had been really and perfectly righteous; and this upon no other condition or qualification at all required in us, but only of mere faith scrupulously precluded from all holiness and sanctification, or the laying hold or apprehending only (as they use to phrase it) of this external and imputed righteousness; that is, the merely believing and imagining it to be ours: which kind of faith therefore is but the imagination of an imagination, or of that, which really is not, and, as *Pindar* calls man, *Σαῖς ὄντας, the very dream of a shadow.*

For though this be pretended by some to be spoken only of justification as contradistinct from sanctification, the latter of which they conceive must by no means have any conditional influence upon the former; yet it will unavoidably extend to the taking away of the necessity of inherent righteousness and holiness, and all obligation to it: upon which very account it is so highly acceptable, because under a spacious shew of modesty and humility it doth exceedingly gratify men's hypocrisy and carnality: for he, that is thus completely justified by the imputation of a mere external righteousness, must needs have *ipso facto* a right and title thereby to heaven and happiness without holiness; for, *Rom. viii. 30. Whom he justifieth, them he also glorifieth.* Neither can any thing be required inherently in them, where all inherency is perfectly supplied by imputation. And though it be pretended, that sanctification will spontaneously follow after by way of gratitude; yet this is like to prove but a very slippery hold, where it is believed, that gratitude itself, as well as all other graces, is already in them by imputation. Neither can it be reasonably thought, that true holiness should spring by way of gratitude or ingenuity from such a principle of carnality, as makes men so well contented with a mere imaginary righteousness.

But this opinion, as it makes God, in justifying, to pronounce a false sentence, and to conceive of things otherwise than they are, and to do that, which himself hath declared to be abominable, *to justify the wicked* (in a forensick sense) and as it is irreconcilable to those many Scriptures, that assure us *God will render to every man according to his works*; so it also takes away the necessity of Christ's meritorious and propitiatory sacrifice for the remission of sins: for where a complete righteousness is imputed, there is no sin at all to be pardoned. And lastly, it vainly supposes righteousness and holiness to be mere phantastical and imaginary things; for otherwise it were no more possible, that a wicked man should be made righteous by another's righteousness imputed, than that a sick man should be made whole by another's imputed health. *If a brother or sister be naked and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be you warmed, and be*
you

you filled; notwithstanding you give them not those things, which are needful for the body; what doth it profit? James ii. 15, 16. *Even so, what doth it profit, my brethren, if a man say he hath faith (or imputed righteousness) and have not works?* (that is, real and inherent righteousness, or inward regeneration) *can such a faith (that is, imagination or imputation) save him?* Certainly no more than mere words can clothe a naked man's back, or feed a hungry man's belly, or warm and thaw him, whose blood is frozen and congealed in his veins. Nay, it is no more possible for a man to be made holy, than to be made happy, by mere imputation, which latter few men would be contented withal; and, were it not for their hypocrisy, they would be as little contented with the former; and it would as little please them to be *opiniōne tantum iusti*, as *opiniōne tantum beati*, to use Tully's expression against the Epicureans. Nay, since it is most certain, that the greatest part of our happiness consisteth in righteousness and holiness, it will unavoidably follow, that if we have no other than an imputative righteousness, we can have no other than an imputative happiness, and a mere imaginary heaven, which will little please us, when we feel ourselves to be in a true and real hell.

But it is not our intention here to quarrel about words and phrases, as if Christ's meritorious satisfaction might not be said to be imputed to those, that repent and believe the Gospel for remission of sins; much less to deny what the holy Scripture plainly asserts, true and living faith, that worketh by love, which is the very essence of the new creature, or regenerate nature, λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, *to be imputed, or accounted for righteousness* under the Gospel-dispensation, where God will not proceed according to legal rigour and severity with his fallen creatures, but according to that equity and Ἐπιείκειαν, which the philosopher tells us is the truest justice. But our only design is, to caution against that Antinomian error, which is too often insinuated under the notion of imputed righteousness, as if there were no necessity of inherent righteousness, and a real victory over sin, in order to salvation, but that an imputed or imaginary one might serve the turn. Which error springing up very early amongst the Gnostick Christians, St. John gives a very reasonable antidote against it, 1 John iii. 7. *Little children, let no man deceive you; he that doth righteousness, is righteous, even as he is righteous:* and in chap. ii. ver. 4. *He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.* To which purpose is that also in his first chapter, ver. 5. *This is the message, which we have heard of him, and declare to you, that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say, that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth: But if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his son cleanseth us from all sin.* Wherefore the same Apostle, in that epistle, tells us of *overcoming the wicked one*, chap. ii. 14. and of *overcoming the world*, by our faith in Christ, chap. v. 4. And in the *Apocalypse* he propounds, from Christ himself, divers remarkable promises to him that *overcometh*: *That he shall eat of the tree of life, that is in the midst of the paradise of God*, chap. ii. ver. 7. *That he shall not be hurt of the second death*, ver. 11. *That he shall have the hidden manna, and a white stone with a new name written in*

it, which no man knoweth, saving he that receiveth it, ver. 17. That he will give him the morning-star, ver. 28. That he shall be clothed in white raiment, and his name shall not be blotted out of the book of life, chap. iii. ver. 5. That he shall be a pillar in the temple of God, ver. 12. And that he shall sit with Christ in his throne, as he overcame and sat down with his Father in his throne, ver. 21. The condition of all which promises being *overcoming*, we may well conclude from thence, that there is a real, and not an imaginary victory only, to be obtained over the power of sin, as well as the guilt of it.

Nay, it is true, and very observable, that those places, which are usually quoted as the foundation of an imputed righteousness in some other sense than what we before mentioned, are indeed no otherwise to be understood than of a real inward righteousness, that is wrought or infused by the Spirit of Christ. As that principal one, *Philip. iii. 8. Yea doubtless, and I count all things loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord;—that I may win him, and be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is of the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith.* Where Christ, whom the Apostle desires to win, and to be found in, and the righteousness, which is through the faith of Christ, and the righteousness, which is of God through faith, are no external imputed righteousness, but the real inward righteousness of the new creature, wrought by the Spirit of Christ through faith, which is opposed here to *our own righteousness*, and *the righteousness, which is of the law*; that is, the righteousness of outward works done by our own natural power, according to the letter of the law, in our unregenerate state: for so the following words explain the meaning, *That I may know him, and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable unto his death; if by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead.* And this same inward and real righteousness is often elsewhere called *Christ*, and the *new man*, that is said to be *in us*, and which we are exhorted to *put on*, not by conceit or imagination only, but by real conformity to his nature, and participation of his spirit.

And whereas the magnifiers of *free grace* in an *Antinomian* sense, and the decliners of *inherent righteousness*, commonly conceive, that the *free grace* of God consists in nothing but either in the *pardon of sin and exemption from punishment*, or the *imputation of an external holiness*, and accounting men *just* freely, without any condition but only the mere believing of this, that they are so accounted; and that faith is no otherwise considered in the Gospel, than in order to the believing of this imputation; and that our own works, when they are comparatively undervalued to grace and faith, are to be taken for all inherent righteousness and holiness, even the new creature itself: that all these are errors, as it might be abundantly proved from sundry other places of Scripture, so it may sufficiently appear from that one, *Eph. ii. 4, &c. God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love, wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ, (by grace ye are saved,) and hath raised us up together—That in the ages to come he might show the exceeding riches of his grace, and his kindness towards us in Christ Jesus. For by grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves;*

yourselves; it is the gift of God: not of works, lest any man should boast. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works. For when we are here said to be saved by grace, it is plain, that the Apostle means by saved, inwardly quickened and sanctified: *σῶσθαι* (saith Grotius well here) is *purgari à vititiis*: which inward sanctification is here attributed to God's free grace, and denied to ourselves and to works; the meaning whereof is, that it is not effected by our own works (whether of outward morality or legal ceremonies) done by our natural power in the unregenerate state, but by the quickning and enlivening spirit of Christ inwardly creating us a-new. And lastly, faith is plainly made the instrument of this inward sanctification, that is not wrought by our own works, but the grace and spirit of Christ. Whence we may well conclude, that the true object of the Christian faith is not only the blood of Christ shed upon the cross for the remission of sin, but also the renewing spirit of Christ for the inward conquering and mortifying of it, and the quickning or raising of us to an heavenly life.

And I dare be bold to say, that the inward sense of every true and sincere-hearted Christian in this point speaks the same language with the Scripture. For a true Christian, that hath any thing of the life of God in him, cannot but earnestly desire an inward healing of his sinful maladies and distempers, and not an outward hiding and palliation of them only. He must needs passionately long more and more after a new life and nature, and the divine image to be more fully formed in him; insomuch, that if he might be secured from the pains of hell without it, he could not be fully quieted and satisfied therewith. 'Tis not the effects and consequents of sin only, the external punishment due unto it, that he desires to be freed from, but the intrinsical evil of sin itself, the plague of his own heart. As he often meditates with comfort upon that outward cross, to which his Saviour's hands and feet were nailed for his sins; so he impatiently desires also to feel the virtue of that inward cross of Christ, by which the world may be crucified to him, and he unto the world; and the power of Christ's resurrection in him still to raise him farther unto newness of life. Neither will he be more easily persuaded to believe, that his sinful lusts, the malignity and violence whereof he feels within himself, can be conquered without him, than that an army here in *England* can be conquered in *France* or *Spain*. He is so deeply sensible of the real evil, that is in sin itself, that he cannot be contented to have it only histrionically triumphed over. And to fancy himself covered all over with a thin veil of mere external imputation, will afford little satisfactory comfort unto him, that hungers and thirsts after righteousness, and is weary and heavy laden with the burthen of sins, and doth not desire to have his inward maladies hid and covered only, but healed and cured. Neither can he be willing to be put off till the hour of death for a divorce betwixt his soul and sin; nor easily persuaded, that though sin should rule and reign in him all his life-long, yet the last parting groan, that shall divide his soul and body asunder, might have so great an efficacy, as in a moment also to separate all sin from his soul.

But that we may not seem here either to beat the air in generals and uncertainties, or by an indiscreet zeal to countenance those conceited and

Phil. iii. 12. high-flown enthusiasts of latter times, that, forgetting that example of modesty given us by the blessed Apostle, [*Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect—but this one thing I do; forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press towards the mark,*] boldly arrogate to themselves such an absolute perfection, as would make them not to stand in need of any Saviour, nor to be cleansed by the blood of the lamb, which therefore they allegorize into a mystical sense; we must declare, that we speak not here of inherent righteousness, and a victory over sin in a legal or pharisaical sense, but in such an evangelical sense, as yet notwithstanding is true and real.

a John. iii. 9 by the spirit of Christ through faith, (which the Apostle calls *Semen Dei, the seed of God*) inclining it to love God and righteousness, as a thing correspondent to its nature, and enabling it to act freely and ingenuously in the ways of God, out of a living law written upon the heart, and to eschew sin as contrary to a vital principle. For the true Gospel-righteousness, which Christ came to set up in the world, doth not consist merely in outward works, whether ceremonial or moral, done by our own natural power in our unregenerate state, but in an inward life and spirit wrought by God. Which those very philosophers seemed in a manner to acknowledge, that denied *ἀετινὸν* to be *διδασκῶν τι*, that virtue could be taught by outward rules and precepts like an art or trade; and Aristotle himself also, when he inclines to think, that men are *θεῶν μετὰ ἀγαθῶν*, and that their being good depends upon some extraordinary divine influence and assistance. Which I the rather take notice of, because some late pretenders to philosophy have profanely derided this doctrine after this manner, as if it made good thoughts and virtuous dispositions to be *POURED* and *BLOWN* into men by God. But there is a second degree of victory over sin, which every true Christian ought not only to look upon as possible, but also to endeavour after, and restlessly to pursue; which is *such a measure of strength in the inward man*, and such a degree of mortification or crucifixion of our sinful lusts, as that a man will not knowingly and deliberately do any thing, that his conscience plainly tells him is a sin, though there be never so great temptations to it.

Whether or no this be that evangelical perfection, which was the mark, that *S. Paul* pressed towards, and which he seems mystically to call the *resurrection from the dead*, or any thing farther, I leave it to others to make a judgment of. But doubtless, they, that have attained to *such a principle of new life*, and *such a measure of inward strength*, as is already mentioned, that is, to the perfection of unfeigned sincerity, may, notwithstanding the irregularities of the first motions, violent assaults and importunities of tentations, sudden incurSIONS and obreptions, sins of mere ignorance and inadvertency, (which are all wash'd away in the blood of Christ) in a true evangelical sense be said to have attained to a victory over sin.

Wherefore I demand, in the next place, *Why it should be thought impossible by the grace of the Gospel, and the faith of Christ, to attain to such a victory as this is over sin?* For sin owes its original to nothing else but ignorance and darkness. *Ἡ ἄς ἐ πορεύς ἀγνοῖ*, Every wicked man is ignorant

And therefore in that sense that other maxim of the Stoicks may have some truth also, that *ἀνομις ἀμαρτήσιν*, *Men sin against their will*; because if they knew, that those things were indeed so hurtful to them, they would never do them. Now, we all know, how easily light conquers darknes, and upon its first approach makes it fly before it, and, like a guilty shade, seek to hide itself from it, by running round about the earth. And certainly the light of God arising in the soul can with as much ease scatter away the night of sinful ignorance before it. For truth hath a cognation with the soul; and falshood, lyes, and impostures are no more able to make resistance against the power of truth breaking forth, than darknes is able to dispute with light. Wherefore the entrance in of light upon the soul is half a conquest over our sinful lusts.

Again, though sin have had a long and customary possession in the soul, yet it has no just title, much less a right of inheritance in it. For sin is but a stranger and foreigner in the soul, an usurper and intruder into the Lord's inheritance. Sin it is no nature, as St. *Augustin* and others of the fathers often inculcate, but an adventitious and extraneous thing; and the true and ancient nature of the soul of man suffers violence under it, and is oppressed by it. It is nothing else but the preternatural state of rational beings, and therefore we have no reason to think it must needs be perpetual and unalterable. Is it a strange thing, that a jarring instrument by the hand of a skilful musician should ever be set in tune again? Doubtless if an instrument of musick were a living thing, it would be sensible of harmony as its proper state, and abhor discord and dissonancy as a thing preternatural to it. The soul of man was harmonical as God at first made it, till sin, disordering the strings and faculties, put it out of tune, and marr'd the musick of it: but doubtless that great *Harmostes*, that tunes the whole world, and makes all things keep their times and measures, is able to set this lesser instrument in tune again. Sin is but a disease and dyscrasy in the soul; righteousness is the health and natural complexion of it; and there is a propension in the nature of every thing to return to its proper state, and to cast off whatever is heterogeneous to it. And some physicians tell us, that medicaments are but subservient to nature, by removing obstructions and impediments; but nature itself, and the inward *Archæus* released and set at liberty, works the cure. Bodies, when they are bent out of their place, and violently forced out of the natural position of their parts, have a spring of their own, and an inward strong propension to return to their own natural posture, which produceth that motion of restitution, that philosophers endeavour to give a reason of. As for example, air may be forced into much a lesser room, than it would naturally expand itself into: but whilst it is under this violence, it hath a spring or strong *conatus* to return to its proper state, (of which several ingenious observations have been lately published by a learned hand.) Now sin being a violent and preternatural state, and a sinner's returning to God and righteousness being *motus restitutionis & liberationis*, whereby the soul is restored to its true freedom and ancient nature; why should there not be such an *elater* or spring in the soul, (quickened and enlivened by divine grace) such a natural *conatus* of returning to its proper state again? Doubtless there is, and

the Scripture seems sometimes to acknowledge it, and call it by the name of *Spirit*, when it speaketh of our free acting in God's ways from an inward principle. For the spirit is not always to be taken for a breath or impulse from without; but also for an inward propension of the soul, awakened and revived in it, to return to its proper state, as it is intellectual, and then to act freely in it according to its ancient nature. For if the spirit were a mere external force acting upon the soul, without the concurrence of an innate principle, then to be acted by the spirit would be a state of violence to the soul, which it could not delight always to continue under; whereas the state of the spirit is a state of freedom, and not of violence, as the Apostle witnesseth, when he calls it *the freedom of the spirit*: it is the soul's acting from an inward spring and principle of its own intellectual nature, not by a mere outward impulse, like a boat, that is tugged on by oars, or driven by a strong blast of wind. Wherefore the soul's returning from sin to righteousness, which is its primitive nature, must needs have great advantages, it going on *secundo flumine*, according to the genuine current of its true intellectual nature, and having besides the assistance of a gentle gale of the divine spirit from without to help it forwards.

Why should it be thought so great an impossibility for men willingly to do that, which is agreeable to the law of goodness, since this is the genuine nature of the soul, when once it is freed from mistakes and incumbrances, from that which is heterogeneous and adventitious to it, that clogs it and oppresses it; and every life and nature acts freely according to its own propensions? Why should it seem strange, that the superior faculties of the soul should become predominant, since they are *ὀρθοί διαπολιτικαί*, of a lordly nature, and made to rule, and the inferior faculties of a servile temper, and made to be subject? Why should it seem impossible for equity, light, and reason to be enthroned in the soul of man again, and there to command and govern those exorbitant affections, that do so lawlessly rebel against them? For if some grave commanders and generals have been able by the majesty of their very looks to hush and silence a disorderly and mutinous rout of soldiers; certainly Reason re-enthroned in her majestick seat, and re-invested with her ancient power and authority, which is natural and not usurped, would much more easily be able to check and controul the tumultuous rabble of lusts and passions in us.

Doubtless God hath no other design upon us in religion, and the Gospel of his Son, than what is for our good, and to restore us to the rectitude and perfection of our own beings: wherefore he seeks to redeem and call off our affections from the perishing vanities of this world, which being so infinitely below us, do debase and pollute our spirits: wherefore he would not have us to addict ourselves wholly to the gratifications of our lower faculties, which are but the brute in us, but he would have the best in us to be uppermost, the man to rule the brute, and the *τὸ Θεῖον*, that that is of God in us, to rule our manly and rational faculties. He would not have us, *Narcissus*-like, to be always courting our own shadow in the stream; for, according to the ancient Democritical philosophy, this whole visible world is nothing else but mere extended bulk, and hath nothing real in it but atoms or particles of a different magnitude, diversly placed and agitated

tated in a continual whirlpool. But all the colour, beauty and varnish, all that which charms and bewitches us in these objects without us, is nothing but the vital sensations and relishes of our own souls. This gives all the paint and lustre to those beauties, which we court and fall in love withal without us, which are otherwise as devoid of reality and phantastical as the colours of the rainbow. So that this outward world is not unfitly compared to an enchanted palace, which seems indeed mighty pleasing and ravishing to our deluded sense, whereas all is but imaginary and a mere prestigious show: those things, which we are enamoured with, thinking them to be without us, being nothing but the vital energies of our own spirits. In a word, God would have man to be a living temple for himself to dwell in, and his faculties instruments to be used and employed by him; which need not be thought impossible, if that be true, which philosophy tells us, that there is *cognatio quedam*, a certain near kindred and alliance between the soul and God.

Lastly, we must observe, though this inward victory over sin be no otherwise to be effected than by the spirit of Christ through faith, and by a divine operation in us, so that in a certain sense we may be said to be passive thereunto; yet notwithstanding we must not dream any such thing, as if our active co-operation and concurrence were not also necessarily required thereunto. For as there is a spirit of God in nature, which produceth vegetables and minerals, which human art and industry could never be able to effect; namely, that *spiritus intus alens*, which the Poet speaks of, which yet notwithstanding doth not work absolutely, unconditionally, and omnipotently, but requireth certain preparations, conditions, and dispositions in the matter, which it works upon; (for unless the husbandman plow the ground and sow the seed, the spirit of God in nature will not give any increase :) In like manner the Scripture tells us, that the divine spirit of grace doth not work absolutely, unconditionally, and irresistibly in the souls of men, but requireth certain preparations, conditions, and co-operations in us; forasmuch as it may both be quenched, and stirred up or excited in us. And indeed unless we plow up the fallow-ground of our hearts, and sow to ourselves in righteousness, (as the prophet speaks) by our earnest endeavours; we cannot expect, that the divine spirit of grace will shower down that heavenly increase upon us. Wherefore if we would attain to a victory over sin by the spirit of Christ, we must endeavour to *fight a good fight, and run a good race*, and to *enter in at the strait gate*, that so overcoming we may receive the crown of life. And thus much shall suffice to have spoken at this time concerning the first particular, *The victory over sin*.

I shall now proceed to speak something briefly to the two other victories that remain, which are attainable also by Christ over the law and death.

And the law may be considered two manner of ways: first, as an outward covenant of works that pronounceth death and condemnation to all, that do not yield absolute and entire obedience to whatever is therein commanded; and which imposed also with the same severity a multitude of outward ceremonial observations, which had no intrinsical goodness at all in them, but kept men in a state of bondage and servility. Now the law,

law, in this sense, as it is an outward letter and Covenant of works, is already conquered externally for us by Christ's death upon the cross, Gal. iii. 13. *Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written. Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree; that the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith.* And he hath thereby freed us also from our obligation to those commandments that were not good, having broken down the middle wall of partition, that was betwixt Jew and Gentile, abolishing in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments, Eph. ii. 14, 15. *And blotting out the hand-writing of ordinances, that was against us, which was contrary to us, and taking it out of the way, nailing it to his cross,* Col. ii. 14.

Ezek. xx. 25.

Secondly, The law is sometimes also considered in Scripture as an inward state of mind, wrought by the law and truth of God, whether written outwardly in the letter of the Scripture, or inwardly in the conscience, prevailing only so far as to beget a conviction of men's duty, and of the wrath of God against sin, but not enabling them with inward strength and power to do what is commanded, willingly, out of a love of it. It is such a state, when men are only passive to God's law, and unwillingly subject to it (as an enemy) for fear of wrath and vengeance. And this must needs be a state of miserable bondage and servility, distraction and perplexity of mind; when men are at once strongly convinced of the wrath of God against sin, and yet under the power of their lusts halting and dragging of them to the commission of it. It is that state (as I conceive) which St. Paul describes, Rom. vii. after this manner; *The law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin: for that which I do, I allow not; for what I would, that do I not, but what I hate, that do I.* And again, *I see another law in my members warring against my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin.* O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this body of death? Now from the law in this sense, that is, from the bondage and servility of the legal state, we are not delivered, nor made conquerors, by what Christ did outwardly upon the cross, as some imagine; as if he had there purchased for us an indulgence to sin without controul; but by the inward working of his Holy Spirit, freeing us from the power and bondage of sin, and unbewitching us from the love of it.

Wherefore there is a double freedom from this legal state to be taken notice of; a true and a false freedom; which I cannot better explain, than by using the Apostle's own similitude in the beginning of the seventh chapter: *Know ye not, brethren, that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth? (or rather, as long as it, that is, the law, liveth?) For the woman, which hath an husband, is bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth; but if her husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of the husband. So then, if while her husband liveth she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress; but if her husband be dead, she is free from that law; so that she is no adulteress, though she be married to another man.* Where the law is compared to an husband; and one, that is under the law, or in a legal state, to a woman, that hath an husband. And as there are two ways, by which a woman may be freed from her husband; the one, if she break loose from him

him whilst he yet liveth, contrary to the laws of wedlock, and marry to another man; which is an undue and unlawful freedom, for then she is justly stiled an *adulteress*: another, if she stay till her husband be dead, and then, being free from the law of her husband, does lawfully marry to another man: In like manner there are two ways, by which men may be freed from the law, as it is an *inward state of bondage and servility*. The first is, when men do illegally and unlawfully break loose from the law, which is their *husband*, whilst he is yet alive, and ought to have dominion over them, and marry themselves to another husband; which husband's name is *carnal liberty*, or *licentiousness*, too often miscalled in these latter times by the name of *Christian liberty*: and such as these may well be stiled, in the Scripture-language, *adulterers* and *adulteresses*. But there is another freedom from the law, which is a due and just freedom, when we do not make ourselves free before the time, violently breaking loose from it; but when we stay till the law, which is our husband, is dead, and the compulsory power of it taken away by the mortification of our lusts and affections, and so marry another husband, which is *Christ*, or *the Spirit of righteousness*, Rom. viii. 2. *The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death.*

Wherefore there are *three general states of men*, in order to God and religion, that may be here taken notice of. The first is of those, that are *alive to sin, and dead to the law*. This the Apostle speaks of, *Rom. vii. 9. I was alive without the law once.* These are those, whose consciences are not yet considerably awakened to any sense of their duty, nor to the discrimination of good and evil, but sin freely, without any check or controul, without any disquieting remorse of conscience.

The second is, when men are at once alive both to the law and sin, to the conviction of the one, and the power and love of the other; both these struggling together within the bowels of the soul, checking and controuling one another. This is a *broken, confounded, and shattered* state; and these, in the Apostle's language, are said to be *slain by the law. I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died. And the commandment, which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death. For sin taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it slew me.* Here is no peace, rest nor comfort to be had in this state, men's souls being distracted and divided by an intestine and civil war between the *law of the mind* and the *law of the members* conflicting with one another.

Wherefore the third state is, when men are *dead both to the law and sin, and alive unto God and righteousness; the law of the Spirit of life freeing them from the law of sin and death.* In the first of these three states, which is the most wretched and deplorable of all, we are *sin's freemen*, that is, free to commit sin without check or controul. In the second, we are *bondmen to God and righteousness*, and serve God out of a principle of fear, and according to an outward rule only; children of *Hagar* the bondmaid, and of the letter. In the third, we are *God's freemen* and sons, and serve him in the newness of the spirit, out of a love to God and righteousness; children of the New Testament, and of *Sarah* the freewoman.

Wherefore

Wherefore here are two mistakes or errors to be taken notice of, that defeat and disappoint the design of Christ in giving us the victory over the law. The first is of those, that we have already mentioned, that seek to themselves a freedom from the bondage of the law otherwise than by *Christ* and the *Spirit of righteousness*; namely, in a way of *carnal liberty and licentiousness*; whereby, instead of being *bondmen to God and righteousness*, they become perfect *freemen to sin and wickedness*, which is the most deplorable thralldom in the world. Wherefore these men, instead of going forward from the second state unto higher perfection, wheel back again unto the first; just as if the children of *Israel*, after they had been brought out of *Egypt*, and travelled a while in the desert of *Arabia*, where the law was given, instead of entering into *Canaan*, should have wheeled back into *Egypt*, and then, enjoying the garlick and onions, and flesh-pots thereof, should persuade themselves this was indeed the true *land of promise, that floweth with milk and honey*. And there is very great danger, lest when men have been tired out by wandering a long time in the dry and barren wilderness of the law, where they cannot enjoy the pleasure of sin as formerly, and yet have not arrived to the relish and love of righteousness, by reason of their impatience, they should at last make more haste than good speed, being seduced by some false shews of freedom, that are very tempting to such weary travellers, and promise much comfort and refreshment to them, inviting them to sit down under their shadow; such as are a *Self-chosen Holiness, Ceremonial Righteousness, Opinionative Zeal, the Tree of Knowledge* mistaken for the *Tree of Life, high-flown Enthusiasm and Scraphicism, Epicurizing Philosophy, Antinomian Liberty*, under the pretence of *Free Grace* and a *Gospel Spirit*.

The second mistake, that is here to be heeded, is, of those, that would by all means persuade themselves, that there is no higher state of Christian perfection to be aimed at, or hoped for, in this life, than this legal state; *That the good they would do, they do not; the evil they would not do, that they do; That the law of sin in their members still leads them captive from the law of their minds*: having no other ground at all for this, but a novel interpretation of one paragraph in the epistle to the *Romans*, contrary to other express places of Scripture, and the sense of all ancient interpreters; and yet with so much zeal, as if it were a principal part of the Gospel-faith to believe this, (which is indeed arrant infidelity) and as if it were no less than presumption or impiety to expect a *living law written upon our hearts*. But this is nothing else, but, instead of seeking liberty out of the bondage of the law, to fall in love with our bonds and fetters, and plainly to deny the *victory over the law by Christ*, and to affirm, that the Gospel is but the *ministration of a dead and killing letter*, and not of the *Spirit that quickeneth and maketh alive*.

I come now, in the third and last place, to the *victory over death*, expressed by the *resurrection of the body to life and immortality*; which, as it was meritoriously procured for us by Christ's dying upon the cross, (his resurrection afterward being an assured pledge of the same to us,) so it will

be really effected at last by the same Spirit of Christ, that gives us *victory over sin* here. Rom. viii. 11. *If the Spirit of him, that raised up Jesus, dwell in you, he, that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you*: as if he should have said, If the Spirit of Christ dwell in you, regenerating and renewing your souls, the very same Spirit hereafter shall also immortalize your very bodies. *Avicen*, the Mahumetan philosopher, in his *Ahmabad*, hath a conceit, that the meaning of the *resurrection of the body* is nothing else but this, to persuade vulgar people, that though they seem to perish, when they die, and their bodies rot in the grave; yet, notwithstanding, they shall have a real subsistence after death, by which they shall be made capable, either of future happiness, or misery. But because the apprehensions of the vulgar are so gross, that the permanency and immortality of the soul is too subtle a notion for them, who commonly count their bodies for themselves, and cannot conceive, how they should have any being after death, unless their very bodies should be raised up again; therefore, by way of condescension to vulgar understandings, the future permanency and subsistence of the soul, in prophetic writings, is expressed under this scheme of the *resurrection of the body*, which yet is meant *κατά δόξαν* only, and not *κατ' ἀλήθειαν*. Which conceit, how well soever it may besit a Mahumetan philosopher, I am sure it no way agrees with the principles of Christianity; the Scripture here and elsewhere assuring us, that the *resurrection of the body* is to be understood plainly, and without a figure; and that the Saints, departed this life in the faith and fear of Christ, shall not be mere souls without bodies to all eternity, as *Avicen*, *Maimonides*, and other philosophers dreamed, but consist of soul and body united together. Which bodies, though, as the doctrine of the church instructeth us, they shall be both specifically and numerically the same with what they were here; yet, notwithstanding, the Scripture tells us they shall be so changed and altered, in respect of their qualities and conditions, that in that sense they shall not be the same. Ver. 36, 37. *Thou seest, that, which thou sowest, is not quickened, except it die: thou sowest not that body, that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain; but God giveth it a body, as it pleaseth him, and to every seed his own body*. The Apostle here imitating the manner of the Jews, who (as appeareth from the *Talmud*) were wont familiarly to illustrate the business of the *resurrection of the body* by the similitude of *seed sown into the ground, and springing up again*. Accordingly he goes on, *It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; sown in weakness, it is raised in power; sown a natural body, raised a spiritual body*. Which epithet was used also in this case, both by the philosophers and the Jews; for *Hierocles* upon the Golden Verses calls them *ὄχηματα πνευματικά*, *vehicula spiritualia*, spiritual bodies; and R. *Menachem*, from the ancient cabalists, *התלבשוה*, *the spiritual clothing*. Lastly, the Apostle concludes thus; *Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption*. For which cause he tells us elsewhere, that they, which do not die, must of necessity be *changed*. And indeed, if men should be restored after death to such gross, foul and cadaverous bodies, as these are here upon earth, which is the very region of

* See Gemara, in Chetuvot, cap. 13. Ein Israel, num. 50.

d death and mortality, without any change at all ; what would this be else, but, as *Plotinus* the philosopher against the Gnosticks writes, ἐγείσθαι εἰς ἄλλου ὕπνου, to be raised up to a second sleep, or to be entombed again in living sepulchres ? For the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind, that museth upon many things, *Wisdom ix. 15.* Wherefore we must needs explode that old Jewish conceit, commonly entertained amongst the Rabbinical writers to this day, That the future resurrection is to be understood of such gross and corruptible bodies, as these are here upon earth, to eat, drink, marry, and be given in marriage, and (which must needs follow) afterward to die again. *Nachmaniás*, in his *Sbaar Haggemul*, is the only Jewish author, that ventures to depart from the common road here, and to abandon this popular error of the Jews, endeavouring to prove, that the bodies of the just, after the resurrection, shall not eat and drink, but be glorified bodies : but * *Abraham* confutes him with no other argument, than this, *That this was the doctrine and opinion of the Christians.* Let us therefore now consider, how abundantly God hath provided for us by *Jesus Christ*, both in respect of our souls, and of our bodies ; our souls, in freeing us by the Spirit of Christ (if we be not wanting to ourselves) from the slavery of sin, and bondage of the law, as it is a letter only ; our bodies, in that *this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal immortality*, and that these vile bodies shall be made like to *Christ's glorious body.* In both which the complete salvation of man consisteth, the perfection and happiness both of soul and body. For, though our salvation consists chiefly in the former, in the victory over sin, and in the renovation of the mind, yet without the latter, which is the victory over death, and the immortalizing of our bodies, it would be a very lame and imperfect thing. For righteousness alone, if it should *malè habitare*, dwell always in such inconvenient houses, as these earthly tabernacles are, however the high-flown Stoick may brag, it could not render our condition otherwise, than troublesome, solicitous and calamitous. Wherefore the holy men in Scripture, not without cause, longed for this future change. *Rom. viii. 23. We groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our bodies.* *2 Cor. v. 2. In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be clothed upon with our house, which is from heaven.* But there is no obtaining of this future victory over death and mortality, except we first get a victory over sin here. For this is that crown of life, that Christ, the first-begotten from the dead, will set upon the heads of none, but those, that have here fought a good fight, and overcome. For as death proceeds only from sin and disobedience, so the way to conquer death, and to arrive at life and immortality, is by seeking after an inward conquest over sin. For *righteousness is immortal*, *Wisd. i. 15.* and will immortalize the entertainers of it ; and, as the Chaldee oracle speaks,

ἐκτείνεις περιδου νόθον,
* Ἐργον ἐπ' εὐσεβείας φεύσῃ, καὶ σώματα σαώσεις.

Having hitherto shewed, what are the great things we hope for by Christ, and are to endeavour after, namely, to procure an inward and real victory over sin by the Spirit of Christ, that so we may hereafter attain a victory
over

* In *Nachalath A-*
voth, cap. 4. תעב
תעב תעב תעב
וְזוֹ, This is the very
same with the opinion of
the Christians, that hold,
that after the resurrec-
tion men shall not eat,
drink, marry, or be gi-
ven in marriage, or die
again, but continue eter-
nally in those bodies, re-
sembling the heavenly bo-
dies ; and these they vul-
garly call glorified bodies.

over death and mortality; we cannot but take notice briefly of some errors of those, that, either pretending the impossibility of this inward victory over sin, or else hypocritically declining the combat, make up a certain religion to themselves out of other things, which are either impertinent, and nothing to the purpose, or else evil and noxious.

For first, some (as was intimated before) make to themselves a mere phantastical and imaginary religion, conceiting, that there is nothing at all for them to do, but confidently to believe, that all is already done for them, all imputed and accounted to them; that they are dearly beloved of God, without any conditions or qualifications to make them lovely. But such a faith as this is nothing but mere phancy and carnal imagination, proceeding from that natural self-love, whereby men fondly doat upon themselves, and are apt to think, that God loves them as fondly and as partially as they love themselves, tying his affection to their particular outward persons, their very flesh and blood; hereby making God a being like unto themselves, that is, wholly acted by arbitrary self-will, fondness, and partiality; and perverting the whole nature and design of religion, which is not mere phantastical and an historical shew, but a real victory over the real evil of sin, without which God can neither take pleasure in any man's person, nor can there be a possibility of being happy, a real turning of the soul from darkness unto light, from the power of Satan unto God.

Again, Some there are, that, instead of walking in the narrow way, that Christ commendeth to us, of subduing and mortifying our sinful lusts, make to themselves certain other narrow ways of affected singularity in things, that belong not to life and godliness, outward strictnesses and severities of their own chusing and devising; and then persuade themselves, that this is the strait gate and narrow way of Christ, that leadeth unto life. Whereas these are indeed nothing else but some particular paths and narrow slices cut out of the broad way. For though they have an outward and seeming narrowness, yet they are so broad within, that camels with their burdens may easily pass through them. These, instead of taking up Christ's cross upon them, make to themselves certain crosses of their own, and then laying them upon their shoudlers and carrying them, please themselves with a conceit, that they bear the cross of Christ; whereas in truth and reality they are many times too much strangers to that cross of his, by which the world should be crucified to them, and they unto the world.

Some place all their religion in endless scrupulosities about indifferent things, neglecting in the mean time the *τὰ βαρύτερα τῷ νόμῳ*, *the more weighty things* both of Law and Gospel, and (as our Saviour farther expresseth it) *διὸ λίσσονται τὸν κώνωπα, τὴν δὲ κάμηλον καταπίνωσιν*, *straining at a gnat, and swallowing a camel*; that is, being not so scrupulous as they ought to be about the substantial of religion and a good life. For as we ought not to place the chief of our religion in the mere observation of outward rites and ceremonies, whilst in the mean time we hypocritically neglect the morals and substantial; which may deservedly be branded with the name of *superstition*: so we ought to know, that it is equal superstition to have such an abhorrence of indifferent things, as to make it the main of our religion to obtain from them; both of these arguing equal ignorance of the nature of God, as if he

were some morose, humorous, and captious Being; and of that righteousness, which the kingdom of God consisteth in, as if these outward and indifferent things could either hallow or defile our souls, or as if salvation and damnation did depend upon the mere using or not using of them. The Apostle himself instructeth us, that the *kingdom of God* consisteth no more in ἀμεροβυσία than in περιτομή, no more in *uncircumcision* than in *circumcision*; that is, no more in not using outward ceremonies and indifferent things than in using of them. Wherefore the negative superstition is equal to the positive, and both of them alike call off men's attention from the main things of religion, by engaging them over-much in small and little things. But the sober Christian, that neither places all his religion in external observances, nor yet is superstitiously anti-ceremonial, as he will think himself obliged to have a due regard to the commands of lawful authority in adiaphorous things, and to prefer the peace and unity of the Christian church, and the observation of the royal law of charity, before the satisfaction of any private humour or interest; so he will be aware of that ἀμελεία τῆς ἀθροακῆς, which many run into, of banishing away all the solemnity of external worship, the observation of the Lord's day, and and of the Christian sacraments, under the notion of ceremonies, quite out of the world. To conclude; unless there be a due and timely regard had to the commands of lawful authority in indifferent things, and to order, peace, and unity in the church, it may easily be foreseen, that the reformed part of Christendom will at length be brought to confusion, by crumbling into infinite sects and division, and then to utter ruin.

Again, Many mistake the vices of their natural complexion for supernatural and divine graces. Some think dull and stupid melancholy to be Christian mortification. Others, that turbulent and fiery zeal is the vigour of the Spirit. Whereas zeal is one of those things, that *Aristotle* calls τὰ μέσα, of a middle nature, neither good nor bad in itself, but which, as it is circumstantiated, may indifferently become either virtue or vice. For there is a πικρὸς ζῆλος, as the Apostle calls it, a bitter zeal, which is contrary to all Christian love and charity, and is nothing else but the vices of acerbity, envy, malice, cruelty, tintured and gilded over with a religious shew. And there may be also a turbulent and factious zeal, when men, under a pretence of acting for the glory of God, violate just and lawful authority, in order to the advancement of their own private self-interest. Indeed there was amongst the *Jews* a certain right, called *jus zelotarium*, or the *right of zealots*; whereby private persons, acted by a zeal for God, might do immediate execution upon some malefactors, without expecting the sentence of any court of judicature. And some conceive, that our Saviour, by this *right of zealots*, did whip the buyers and sellers out of the temple, and overturn the tables of the money-changers; because he was never questioned by the *Jews* for it. But this was then a legal and regular thing, permitted by the publick laws of that nation in some certain cases, yet so as that those zealots were afterward accountable to the *Sanhedrin* for what they did. However, a little before the destruction of the temple, as *Josephus* tells us, there were a crew of desperate miscreants, that, abusing this right, and calling themselves by the name of *Kannain*, i. e. *zealots*, made a pretence from hence to commit most villainous actions. And I wish some had not too much entertain'd this opinion,
that

that private persons might reform publick abuses, whether belonging to the ecclesiastical or the civil polity, without and against the consent of the supreme magistrate, in a turbulent manner, *jure zelatorum*, by the right of *zealots*; nay, and that actions, that are otherwise altogether unwarrantable in themselves, may notwithstanding be justified by *zeal for God and good ends*. But God needs no man's zeal to promote an imaginary interest of his in the world, by doing unjust things for him. *Will you speak wickedly for God, or talk deceitfully for him? will you accept his person?* 'twas the generous expostulation of *Job* with his friends; and he tells them in the following words, that this was nothing else, but to *mock God as one man mocketh another*.

True divine zeal is no Corybantick fury, but a calm and regular heat, guided and managed by light and prudence, and carried out principally neither for nor against indifferent rites and unnecessary opinions, but those things, that are immutably good and fundamental to Christianity; always acknowledging a due subordination to that authority civil and ecclesiastical that is over us.

Lastly, some there are, whose pretence to religion and the spirit is founded in nothing else but a faculty of rhetoricating and extemporizing with zeal and fervency, which they take to be nothing less than divine inspiration, and that which the Scripture calls *praying in the Holy Ghost*, an undoubted character of a person truly regenerated. Which being a great delusion, whereby many are hindered from seeking after the real effects of the Divine Spirit, by idolizing, instead thereof, that, which is merely natural, (if not artificial;) I think it not impertinent here to speak a little of it. And certainly that, which is frequently attained to in the very height by persons grossly hypocritical and debauched, can never be concluded to be divine inspiration, or to proceed from any higher principle than mere natural enthusiasm. For there is not only a poetical enthusiasm, of which *Plato* discourseth in his *Ion*, but, though oratory be a more sober thing, a rhetorical enthusiasm also, that makes men very eloquent, affectionate and bewitching in their language, beyond what the power of any bare art and precepts could enable them unto; insomuch that both these, poets and orators, have oftentimes conceited themselves to be indeed divinely inspired; as those known verses testify:

Est Deus in nobis, agitante calefcimus illo;

And,

Sedibus aetherei Spiritus ille venit.

And concerning orators, the like might be proved, if the time would here permit, by sundry testimonies: but I shall here instance only in *Aristides*, a famous orator, who not only speaks positively of himself, as inspired in his orations, but affirms the same also concerning rhetorick in general, when it is extraordinary, that it comes by immediate inspiration as oracles and prophecies do, and not from art or nature. Wherefore it is not at all to be wondred at, if when men are employed in religious and devotional exercises,

exercifes, the fame natural enthufiafm, efpecially having the advantage of religious melancholy, which makes men ftill more enthufiaftical, fhould fo wing and infpire the fancies of thefe religious orators, as to make them wonderfully fluent, eloquent and rapturous, fo that they beget ftrange paffions in their auditors, and conclude themfelves to be divinely infpired. Whereas, notwithstanding, they may have no more of divine infpiration in all this than thofe poets and orators before mentioned had; that is to fay, be no otherwife infpired, than by a rhetorical or hypochondriacal enthufiafm, that is merely natural. But it is far from my intention here to difparage the fincere and ardent affections of devout fouls, naturally and freely breathing out their earneft defires unto God in private; although perhaps this be not without fome kind of enthufiafm alfo. For enthufiafm, as well as zeal, and other natural things, may be well ufed, and, being rightly circumftantiated, and fubfervient to a better principle, become irreprehenfible. Some have obferved, that no great work of the brain, that begot much admiration in the world, was ever atchieved without fome kind of enthufiafm; and the fame may be affirmed of the moft transcendently virtuous and heroic actions. But then the goodnefs of thefe actions is never to be eftimated merely by the degree of enthufiaftick heat and ardor, that is in them, but by fuch other laws and circumftances, as moralize human actions. Wherefore my meaning, as I faid before, is only this, to caution againft that vulgar and popular error of miftaking the natural and enthufiaftical fervour of mens fpirits, and the ebulliency of their fancy, when it is tinctur'd with religion, and idolizing of it inftead of the fupernatural grace of God's Holy Spirit; and of looking for the effect of God's Spirit principally in words and talk, or thinking, that God is chiefly glorified with a loud noife, and long fpeeches. For the true demonstration of God's Holy Spirit is no where to be look'd for but in life and action, or fuch earneft and affectionate breathings after a farther participation of the divine image, as are accompanied with real and unfeigned endeavours after the fame; which is the true praying in the Holy Ghoft, though there be no extemporaneous effufion of words. And therefore, when fome *Corinthians* were puffed up, by reafon of a faculty, which they had of rhetoricating religiously, *S. Paul*, 1 Cor. iv. 19. like an Apoftle, tells them, that he would come amongft them, and *know, not the fpeech of them, that were puffed up, but the power. For the kingdom of God (faith he) confifteth not in word, but in power and life.* Wherefore, laying afide thefe and fuch like childish miftakes, and things that are little to the purpofe, let us ferioufly apply ourfelves to the main work of our religion; that is, to mortify and vanquifh our finful lufts by the affiftance of God's Holy Spirit through faith in Chrift; that fo being dead to fin here, we may live with God eternally hereafter.

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