


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THE MAKING OF TO-MORROW

The Validity of American Ideals

By

SHAILER MATHEWS

Dean of the Divinity School, the University of Chicago

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INTRODUCTION

GEORGE SLOCUM BENNETT, a graduate of Wesleyan University in the class of 1864, showed his lifelong interest in the training of youth for the privileges and duties of citizenship by long periods of service as a member of the Board of Education of his home city, and as member of the boards of trustees of Wyoming Seminary and Wesleyan University.

It was fitting, therefore, that, when the gifts made by himself and family to Wesleyan University were combined to form a fund whose income should be used "in defraying the expenses of providing for visiting lecturers, preachers, and other speakers supplemental to the college faculty," it should have been decided that the primary purpose should be to provide each year a course of lectures, by a distinguished speaker, "for the promotion of a better understanding of national problems and of a more perfect realization of the responsibilities of citizenship," and to provide for the publication of such lectures so that they

might reach a larger public than the audience to which they should, in the first instance, be addressed.

To give the third course of lectures on this Foundation, the joint committee for its administration appointed by the board of trustees and by the faculty, selected Shailer Mathews, Dean of the Divinity School in the University of Chicago. The varied and brilliant career of this teacher, administrator, editor, author, and lecturer, has brought him into contact with the people of almost every part of this country. His extensive studies in the fields of religion, history, economics, and sociology have peculiarly fitted him for the task of correlating and interpreting his impressions of American life and character in such a way as to bring out the real significance of those national ideals which have become a part of the American tradition, and in which we are accustomed to find the justification for our type of democracy.

WILLIAM ARNOLD SHANKLIN.

DAVID GEORGE DOWNEY.

ALBERT WHEELER JOHNSTON.

HENRY MERRITT WRISTON.

FRANK EDGAR FARLEY.

PREFACE

ANY brief discussion of the history and significance of America is exposed to the danger of falling into theoretical criticism or nebulous generalization. I am not sure that I have escaped either danger. The validity of American ideals deserves a much fuller treatment than these lectures permit.

Yet I feel that an understanding of the constructive ideals of our nation is indispensable to an intelligent citizenship. Especially in an age like ours, which is suffering from the chaotic conditions that have always followed great wars, is there need to see American life in its perspective and to realize its inner spiritual forces.

There is no lack of men who are eager to point out the shortcomings of America. There are all too many who can see in our social order only an opportunity for arousing the spirit of conflict which a war demands for its success. But the psychology of peace is radically different from that of war. While we are fighting even for the noblest ideals our unity must rest largely upon a common enmity. But in times of peace we must aban-

don hatred as a basis of social unity unless we can perform the almost miraculous feat of making it serve as a basis of united assault upon social injustice and other evils which are a part of our human lot.

A nation in peace has seldom been able to utilize the attitudes developed in war. Even the common hatred which has united us in the face of an enemy becomes a source of internal misunderstandings and conflicts. Now that we have ceased to fight, we must learn to cooperate. The position of our nation as the final arbiter in the great war is being duplicated in the more difficult field of the reestablishment of civilization and the making of a better world. The problem of the citizen is more complicated and difficult than that of a soldier.

In these lectures I have tried to help the generation that bore the brunt of the war to take up the course of development interrupted by that great tragedy. If, despite the obvious insufficiency of presentation, I have in any way succeeded in my effort, I shall feel that I have to some degree fulfilled the purposes of the founders of the lectureship under whose auspices I spoke.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

GEORGE SLOCUM BENNETT FOUNDATION

LECTURES

For the Promotion of a Better Understanding of National Problems and of a More Perfect Realization of the Responsibilities of Citizenship.

THIRD SERIES—1920-21

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LECTURE I

THE TEST OF IDEALS

AN ideal is a working hypothesis of betterment. Its validity is a question of morals, to be established by its ability to draw men toward itself. In morals abstract tests are worthless. An ideal with only theoretical beauty is a bit of social algebra. We are all tempted to drift off into such algebra whenever we discuss social affairs. Accustomed as we are in mathematics to arrive at exact proof by the elimination of concrete realities, we almost instinctively adopt the same method in dealing with human affairs. But even in algebra a formula is true only according to what its letters represent. We say complacently $x + y = z$. But if $x =$ a Bolshevik and $y =$ a capitalist, how shall we describe z ? Similarly in the discussion of social ideals. Innumerable discussions make the word "democracy" a sort of intellectual x which can be thrown into various combinations, each like itself a disembodied reality. We forget that a society is really composed

of folks with their passions and prejudices and ambitions. The validity of an ideal under such conditions cannot be determined until we consider the actual forces which gave it birth and with which it is concerned. An ideal in one society might be reaction in another.

Failure to realize this commonplace truth lies beneath much of the discontent of well-meaning persons who cannot understand why their description of an ideal is so far out of line with actual affairs. A radical invariably neglects the human element. He wants things done immediately. He is impatient with process. Once having convinced himself that a proposal is good in itself he wants everybody to adopt it at once. Yet to urge ideals while oblivious to folks and folk-ways may be as fatal as it would be to give water in unlimited quantities to a man dying from thirst.

The validity of an ideal can be judged by two standards—its origin and its effects. Negatively such judgment is easy. If it springs from socially repudiated motives, reaction, and willful disregard of contemporary human rights; if it is so inapplicable

to a given social order as to produce social anarchy, selfishness, and disregard of personal rights, an ideal is invalid. Such origins we often find proposed as the justification of the actions of privileged classes in periods of reaction like that of the post-Napoleonic era, and as the support of demagogues and terrorists in almost every revolution. Positively, however, valuation of an ideal is not so easy. Yet if an ideal originates in desires to improve the best conditions known to its champions, in forward-reaching religions and governments, in intelligence and strong personalities; if with full recognition of the achievements and actual possibilities of conditions to which it is applied, it makes toward wider opportunity for giving as well as getting justice, and is capable of effective embodiment in social institutions, it certainly has every reason for being judged valid. And unless social conditions have radically changed, its efficiency in the past warrants hope for its validity in the future.

All this is particularly true when we speak about national ideals. It is not uncommon to find political philosophers and literary reformers setting forth contrasting pictures

of America as it is and as it ought to be. Having organized an ideal in disregard of the citizens who must express it, they at once grow discouraged because they see such a difference between it and the realities of American life. A very considerable literature of this sort is at your disposal. But you cannot judge a nation so easily. Our poets, our philosophers, our statesmen, may interpret our national life as expressing certain ideals but such interpretations are by no means infallible. Recall, for example, the interpretation given America by De Tocqueville. The real ideals of America are immanent within its historical tendencies. Their value is pragmatically to be known in the effects of the process of national growth.

There are, of course, abstract and philosophical considerations with which we may properly estimate the validity of American ideals, but they are only secondary. They do not furnish the ideals. They must not be searched for them any more than you would search More's Utopia for the policy of Lloyd George. The only ideals with which we are now concerned are those

which are found by a study of American history and its tendencies. Having found them, we shall have simultaneously discovered their validity, for they were in the social minds which have made America. The only serious question remaining will be not whether they can be justified by abstract ethical considerations, but whether conditions have so changed that the ideals which have been a part of our history can have equal influence in the future.

I do not pretend in these lectures to take a neutral attitude. In an exclusively historical study neutrality is imperative, but when it comes to a valuation of one's own nation one has a right to be swayed by the history he studies. For my part, I do not dissemble pride in America despite its faults. Six years ago I found myself before audiences in Japan endeavoring to set forth the real meaning of American history. The haze of the Pacific is distorting not only when one looks from the West, but when one looks from the East. There were few things, I found, of which we suspected the Japanese, of which the Japanese did not suspect us. It was an altogether new experience. In justi-

fication of our own attitudes I was led to plead our international relations. Without boasting I found it possible to say things of the United States which no other nation could say of itself. Every fair-minded critic of our country must see them. When with wider study I have tried to see the meaning of developments in the United States this patriotic conviction has been deepened. I realize that we have glaring faults. I have too many friends in other countries and I have read too many discussions of America to be left in ignorance in this regard. I am ready to admit that we dislike to catalogue these faults, preferring to give at least a conventional respectability to questionable men and deeds—as an old family not so far from Middletown still marks the empty grave of one of its members, “Lost at sea,” although he really was rescued, but failed to report at home, married a new wife, and established a new family in distant New Hampshire! But the history of America is the history of cautious pioneering in social and political idealism. The American patriot as he pleads for his nation does not need to be a chauvinist or an apologist; he

needs simply to tell the story of our development.

American history is more than the history of people in America. The annals of a nation may be of value as facts, but they may also be quite valueless. Supposing that some one should discover the full record of the life of an Esquimau tribe, who except anthropologists, would be interested? A nation to have a really significant history must have contributed something significant to social evolution. Other nations must have benefited by its experience. Other peoples must have been taught by it to avoid mistakes. Humanity must have found within its political and social experiments material for its betterment. True, there are peoples whose history we must study for other and more sinister reasons. There have been pirate nations who have left a wake of blood across history; contagiously decadent nations who have been the breeding spot of moral weakness and death; vast undeveloped but isolated peoples whose wild awakening may ruin civilization. But America belongs to none of these classes. Its history is a part of the world history. It has made its con-

tribution to the forces which have transformed human life. It has never been a pirate nation; and if only it remains true to its ideals, it will never be a decadent or an anarchic nation.

I

Yet we must face our moral liabilities if only to assure ourselves that our problem is not merely rhetorical.

This is a bad day for idealists. During the Great War we were told that all things were to be made new. It was a rare virtue that was not to find itself embodied in the world after the war. Our young men were to come back and remake the church, the state, the family, and even ourselves. Those of us who knew something about history and the effect of past wars upon human society indulged in no such millennial dreams. It is as difficult to make a historian enthusiastic as it is to make an old man hopeful. He knows too much about human life and its ever-recurring cycles.

But historians were comparatively few, and we were all desperately engaged in helping carry forward a struggle for the very life

of existing society. Our hopes were nourished by oratory, sacred and profane, and the struggle of the day was regarded as a prophecy of the coming day. When the armistice came and the war closed, our optimists looked about for justification of their faith. Their search brought disappointment and lamentation. Army life had left the young men of America about where it found them. The church had found no uplift, industry no brotherhood, politics no new vision. An orgy of spending and a frenzied determination to enjoy oneself and forget the war deadened our consciences. No wonder disillusioned idealists grew cynical!

It is not difficult, you see, to point out conditions which very properly bid us pause in easy-going belief that idealism is regnant in America. But we have much farther to go before pessimism is exhausted. In 1916 the prevailing voice of the American people was for some sort of participation in a League of Nations. In 1920 we heard a general revival of the plans for isolation and the demand that America be prepared to defend herself against a world with which she has not undertaken to cooperate.

It may be argued that the war has left us with a great loyalty to the flag and a keen sensitiveness to our national honor. Our critics admit that such is the case, but aver that it is a long way from national honor to national ideals. They point out that at the very time when this nationalism has been developing there has been an exodus of intelligent foreigners from America back to their homes. In a recent number of the *Atlantic* a writer reports that he questioned two hundred Norwegians who were on board a steamer sailing to Norway and found that only about ten per cent ever expected to return to America. Inquiry brought the almost universal reply that America was all right "except for the people that run it," and that these returning emigrants, many of whom were naturalized Americans, had had enough of America. My own opinion is that such disillusioned folk will soon be seeking return passage—for there is nothing so deadly to an immigrant's homesickness as a visit to his homeland! But none the less this disaffection must be counted among our liabilities.

More serious are doubts as to what we have

been taught to regard as our chief idealistic heritage. You will find in many colleges those "young intellectuals" who insist that American democracy is based upon an out-grown philosophy and is to be renounced as mid-Victorian. Individualism, nationalism, and the refusal to plunge altruistically into the maelstrom of Irish independence and international socialism, not to say Bolshevism, are held by such intellectuals as evidence of hopelessly *bourgeois* minds. As for individualism, there are indeed few among the intellectuals who would say a word in its favor. In their eyes it has disappeared beyond the iridescent haze of class consciousness, never to reappear—except when some class-conscious person undertakes to cooperate with some other class-conscious person! Then it is that the original stuff of which humanity is made reasserts itself, for, paradoxical as it may seem, some of the most individualistic persons alive are those who plead most convincingly for social solidarity.

Back of much of this criticism is suppressed jealousy expressing itself in rhetorical dreams. A friend of mine went to Russia just after the first revolution. As he

came to the frontier he stepped up to the guard and extended to him his felicitations for the success of the revolution by which the Czar had been deposed. He happened to have with him a picture of George Washington, and he showed it to the guard. The Russian looked at it indifferently, without any of the admiration which my friend had supposed one republican should show to the father of republics. But all the soldier remarked was, "He looks like a comfortable gentleman." The full meaning of this retort appeared later in Petrograd when my friend asked a cab driver what he meant by a *bourgeois* person. He replied, "Someone who was comfortable under the old regime." Parlor socialists and revolutionary intellectuals with an income may well give serious thought to that answer of a man who was not a dilettante revolutionist!

There is in America a growing number of people who hate those who have been comfortable and those conditions which have made for their comfort. They respond no more than would the Russian soldier to the praise of our democracy. They believe our democracy is only another term for a capital-

istic social order. They will have none of it. They believe in socialism and communism. And they are consistent. There is a very great difference between what we call democracy and their ideals. The bitterest denunciation of the United States we have heard lately has come from men of this sort. Kings have disappeared, but American democracy has new enemies in men and women who believe it is outgrown.

Even among those who are not champions of class-consciousness there is the suspicion that our institutions, however successful in the past, are incompetent to direct the progress of the future. Such suspicion is sometimes not frankly expressed, but even among some good Americans sincerely devoted to forwarding human interests and welfare, there is a frank avowal of doubt as to the capacity of American institutions to serve what they regard as democracy. Nor is it difficult for such critics to point out the basis of their apprehensions. American life is confessedly by no means perfect and the tension born of the interplay of economic groups in a vast population scattered over an immense area certainly grows no less. The enthusiasm for

liberty in the eighteenth-century sense of the word has certainly waned, and the idea that the best government is one which interferes least with the individual citizen has been replaced by a prompt recourse to governmental activity whenever crises emerge. Political forms which were effective in a sparsely settled country and a nonindustrial civilization are said to be breaking down under our present conditions. Such critics of America do not despair of their country, but they swell the number of those who entertain the hope of a radical change from a representative government chosen by individuals to one of universal referendum.

Nor are political and economic conditions the sole object of attack. With the distrust of democracy as a system of government, goes a distrust of nearly everything that belongs to control set up by the past. Goodness is said to be a form of sham morality. Marriage, religion, law, all alike are treated by one or more groups of the "disillusioned" as debilitating survivals which are outgrown. If you venture a defense of experienced idealism, the response of these antidemocrats is apt to be increased vociferation, the shrug

of superior shoulders, and the charge that you are *bourgeois* and mid-Victorian. With the radical there is no more awful anathema!

II

Are these strictures upon American life and its ideals legitimate? Are the ideals which have characterized the past of America's national life still valid? Are we to stand in terror of to-morrow because we have outgrown the virtues of yesterday? Are our newly naturalized citizens capable intellectually of appropriating these ideals of the fathers? Have they experiences in which Americanism can root itself? It is to such questions as these that I would direct your attention. It may be that to some of you they may seem as academic as they did to me when first I heard them raised years ago, but no such opinion can be held by those who really study the tendencies in to-day's national life. Questions like these cannot be drowned in jazz music. America at the present time is passing through a crisis in morality which cannot be met wisely or effectively if a generation indifferently turns from idealistic ends, measures everything in

terms of money, and substitutes amusement for self-control.

Nor am I thinking only of the foreign-born among us. We who constitute the parental generation may very likely be too concerned about the ways of young people who are to follow us upon the stage of American history, but we cannot overlook the fact that our own youth was spent under conditions our parents could understand. We may have been wayward, but we were wayward within the limits of American conventions and political thinking. Parents and children had a history in common and spoke the same political language. We never questioned America. But is this as true to-day as it was a generation ago? Successive waves of continental immigration diluted our patriotic inheritance and unsettled our national habits, and unless one's observation is quite misleading, we need to educate the rising generation as well as immigrants in the genuine ideals of their country. We cannot suffer them to assume that one sort of social idealism is as good as another.

We all need to be Americanized; we all need to guard against being continentalized.

The continent of Europe never has had the same political or social history, experience or ideals as England and America. The two divisions of European life have always found it hard to understand, much less appreciate, one another. Not merely political and economic rivalry but a different social structure and process have kept them apart. To-day these two ancient opponents are actually intermingled in America. Their opposition continues. Continental political and social ideals have been and are being frankly heralded as superior to those developed in America. To an extent all but startling the war found American education filled with this distrust of American institutions and constructive hopes. The validity of our ideals must now be defended not only conventionally but aggressively before the bar of a generation of Americans who have been subjected to the influences of German and Russian class-idealism. The difficulty of one generation's being understood by its successor lends poignancy to one's efforts to share with young men and women our confidence in the outlook for a genuine America. Having had no share in the production of

the American nation, taking their good fortunes as a matter of course, the patriotism of too many students has been darkened by the criticisms of those who at heart are champions of ideals, institutions, and a social organization developed in a different social order. Let us grant, if we must, that there are misunderstandings between the generation that caused the war and the generation that won the war; but let us not concede that American ideals are any less valuable because men died for them. Once recognized, they will make their own way; once understood, they become the common divisor of generations. And there is no better way to make loyal Americans than to evoke spiritual unity through an understanding of American ideals embodied in American history and institutions. If we cannot "sell" American ideals to the new millions in America, we cannot hope to propagate them by force. If our ideals are not valid, the Republic is indeed in danger. Revolution is the invariable answer of one idealism to another that stubbornly persists after its institutions have become the privileges of its champions.

III

We have said that the validity of an ideal must be judged first by reference to its origin. How shall this test apply to our own ideals? Did they spring from materialistic ambition, from a longing for power? Or did they spring from the noblest experience of their time? Are they children of pride and comfort or of spirituality? Have the dominants in their pedigree been those of conquerors or of martyrs? The answer is one of facts. And facts are eloquent. The social movements which gave birth to our ideals were the noblest of their day. }

To appreciate the origin of American ideals one must recall that they are not simply those which can be found in America. Time would fail if we were to catalogue ideals proposed and propagated on our continent. Many of them are fantastic, some of them are foolish, a few of them are dangerous. Some of them are the more or less illegitimate and sterile progeny of genuine American stock. But original American ideals are developments of English experience and morals. In their earliest forms }

they immigrated hither and grew up with the country.

It is sometimes said that the idealism of the American Constitution was derived from French philosophy. The opposite is more nearly true. French philosophy was born of English political and social experience. The French Revolution was inspired by the American Revolution. The rights of men were derived from the rights of Congregationalists and frontiersmen. They are the children of history, christened and registered by philosophy.

Anglo-Saxon idealism of the seventeenth century is the parent of American ideals. This historical fact is of first importance. German idealism is sentimental and singularly divorced from political and social institutions. French idealism becomes a pyrotechnic enthusiasm giving rise to a program like that of Napoleon or a defense like that of Verdun. But Anglo-American idealism is neither sentimental nor a matter of enthusiasm. It is matter-of-fact—the product of social practice, often born of tragic conflict with privileges men have sought to fasten upon progress. Such restraint has al-

ways failed. Just as the rights of Englishmen long ago became the rights of foreigners in England, so have the rights of Englishmen in America become generalized into rights which everybody ought to have—the rights of man.

Of course, our national history has abounded in impossible promises as to what would come to pass if some party or other should win at an election. But such iridescent promises have never been taken very seriously by a sophisticated electorate. A political platform is not a program. It is rather something upon which a candidate may stand while he is deciding which way the people at large choose to go. This fact saves even the sometimes Munchausenlike optimism of our platforms from hypocrisy. For the hope of to-day if only it is born of justice has been the forecast of the reality of day after to-morrow. The people have been relentless arbiters. Selfishness and quackery have been sensed and discarded as an unworthy ancestry for sane hopes.

We have had every now and then dream-pictures of a better world which was to come when certain theories and

dreams had been realized. But they have not long endured. They did not spring from the common struggle for justice and betterment. As the path of the explorer is strewn with impedimenta abandoned because found unusable, is the history of America strewn with cast-off ideals which have had momentary attention but have never seriously been put into life. Their origin has been in speculation rather than in group-morality born of experience.

The validity of American ideals, I repeat, can be established first of all by the fact that they are the legitimate children of Anglo-Saxon history as it has preserved and extended human rights, both social and individual. They are ours because their development has both determined and been determined by the direction in which our history has proceeded. Springing from practical idealism they have made greater idealism practical. Not, of course, that all our history is idealistic, but this at least is true: if you sight across the two centuries or more during which America has actually been in the process of organization, you can discover that despite variations in pace, despite strug-

gles and even civil war, there are certain outstanding tendencies toward larger personal values in our national life. It is they which give character to American history. They are not superimposed upon American life. They did not, full-grown, antedate American institutions in the sense that they were simply appropriated by America as Japan has appropriated western culture. They are developed expressions of germinant hopes and faiths that gave our history inner self-direction. They were born not of dreams but of experience. They are the outgrowth not of self complacency, but of the highest spiritual loyalties, joined with experience in making the good of to-morrow spring from the best of to-day.

In the second place, our ideals are valid because they sprang from the practical experience of religious groups seeking political liberty.

I make no apology for such a recognition of the worth of religion. If one puts one's self at the beginning of our American history, say about 1600, he will see plainly that among the germinal forces which went to produce our modern world was the rise of

religious liberty. I am aware that an effort is now being made to minimize the importance of this religious element in our origins in favor of an emphasis upon economic life. And certainly economic motives were not strangers to the men who organized the Virginia Company and its fellows. Far be it from the historian to undervalue the rôle which codfish and fur-bearing animals, tobacco and pines played in the seventeenth century. The Pilgrims and the Puritans, as truly as the Frenchmen, were not above such unspiritual goods. But to think of the colonists of New England as primarily or predominantly exploiters of virgin resources is to confuse the Adventurers who stayed at home and waited for their ships to come in, with those strong souls who undertook to found new states where they might follow their conscience and worship their God, as well as make their living. It is true that these pioneers may have been embryo capitalists, but their institutions and ideals were more than those of money makers. Any attempt to separate economic, political and religious forces in the history of colonial America will lead to misinterpretation of facts.

Historically the American colonies are the children of economic distress, political unrest and Protestantism. Not one of them, with the exception of Maryland, is the product of any other phase of life. Each of the thirteen colonies had its independent history, but their pre-national life was rooted in the search of religious minorities to find scope and liberty for the exercise of their religious principles. In this American colonies partook of the general character of Protestantism as something more than a religious movement. The great activity of the sixteenth century can only be described as a social revolution. In the new states which, following the decline of feudalism, were formed throughout Europe, the rise of cities and monarchies, the new learning, the discovery of new national wealth with the consequent dislocation of prices were all as truly important as were those religious motives to which the student of the Reformation so generally gives his attention. Protestantism in the sense of anti-Catholicism was a religious phase of a great social and political movement. It was not originally interested in abstract liberty or in granting concrete lib-

erties to others. Its mind was set on self-determination, and the right of each political unit to establish its own national or municipal church. Just as in the social and political revolution which we call the Reformation there emerged a group of independent monarchies and sovereign states, did there emerge also the national churches. Democracy was either undreamed or perverted into fanaticism. None of the great reformers seem ever to have questioned the right of the state to fix orthodoxy. There was hardly more liberty for non-conformists in the seventeenth century than there was for the Arians in the fourth century.

In this simple fact lies the explanation of much of the development of the seventeenth century. For, as in their search for self-determination, the national churches split off from the imperial Church of Rome, various groups of Independents split off from the national churches. With few exceptions, the colonies were largely organized by such people. They sought religious liberty and wished to escape state churches. In particular the northern American colonies were the product of a new spirit in England which re-

fused to conform to the established church whether that was Episcopal or Presbyterian. The English colonies of the north and many of the French and German colonies further south were founded by groups who had been oppressed and who were here in search of liberty. Similarly in the eighteenth century the large migration of the Presbyterians from the north of Ireland was a search for liberty as well as a new home. The importance of the Irish Presbyterians in the Revolutionary War can hardly be overestimated. They made victory possible.

But the idea of religious liberty as such was not transferred. There was no religious liberty to be transferred. It had to be evolved. When the Stuarts fell the migration of Puritans to Massachusetts Bay all but ceased. The religious liberty at home made the transatlantic liberty unalluring. With the possible exception of little Plymouth and the first settlement in Maryland, not one of the original colonies had at the start any idea of religious liberty in the abstract. Religious liberty was born of the exigency of the situation, in which various self-determining groups found themselves

unable to exclude dissenters from citizenship. The history of early New England was a short-lived epitome of the history of contemporary England. Rhode Island, the first colony in which complete religious liberty was set forth, was the small child of a protesting minority of Massachusetts. But unplanned and it may be undesired, religious liberty came out from the religious life of America; and liberty in one aspect of social life is bound to affect all phases. Faith in a Sovereign God in heaven and on earth government through town-meetings lie behind American liberties of all sorts. But the belief in a Sovereign God was first. A theocracy became a republic because a theocracy was found to be impracticable.

This religious parentage, this birth from the very highest range of ideals which European life had reached, is one guaranty of the validity of our fundamental American ideal—the world of the free individual. Far more than even Switzerland or Holland did the Anglo-American colonies contribute to the world this ideal of self-government born of religion, nourished in the church and destined to evangelize political experience.

IV

The other test of the validity of ideals is pragmatic, the testimony of history itself. American ideals were not thought out. They were lived out. They sprang from hopes and were constantly given opportunity for practical testing. They are improvements on experience suggested by experience. If one looks at the history of these hopes as a phase of our national experience, you can see that they involve four fundamental ideals. First, a society composed of free and equal individuals; second, democracy as an actual way of free individuals living together in equality and in peace; third, a written constitution embodying the principles of such democracy; fourth, cooperative sovereignty. We shall now estimate their validity by examining their evolution and their effect.

LECTURE II

THE FREE INDIVIDUAL

“IF I had to be born again, as I was born, of a family that had no influence worth anything, no money, no lineage—if I had to make my way again, as I had to, against difficulties such that at the age of twenty-five all that I possessed was a hundred dollars of debts—well, in spite of all temptations to belong to other nations, I should have felt that there was only one place for a young man who wanted to tear from life full value for his efforts; in spite of all temptations I should have been born an American.” So says W. L. George, an Englishman.

Some time ago I asked a man who has won distinction in his chosen field of life, what in his opinion was the basis of his patriotism. He immediately replied: “Appreciation for a country that could permit me, a poor boy, to realize some of the ambitions of life.” Such an answer could be made by thousands and millions of Americans. Mary Antin has made it with a beauty and passion which

almost shame our more critical self-estimate. Edward Bok has made it in his interesting autobiography, *The Americanization of Edward Bok*. All such answers express the fundamental American ideal, namely, the free individual and his right to enjoy such opportunities and to meet such social obligations as he may face. Until 1917 it was not uncommon to see men smile over the eighteenth-century ideal that "all men are created free and equal." It availed nothing to show them that Jefferson was a man altogether too well versed in human nature to mean by equality identity of capacity, or that he would have been the last man to say if men are brothers they are therefore twins. The Great War brought us a better understanding of the meaning of liberty and of person. Even the prostitution of "personal liberty" to a meaning little more than man's right to get drunk when he pleases and of a theatrical manager to put on actors and actresses with as little clothing as he pleases, has not destroyed the new pride with which we read the great sentence of the Declaration of Independence. For the United States has been a land of opportunity for the indi-

vidual. It has developed individualism, and individualism rather than social classes is its fundamental ideal. Its goal is the welfare of the individual and not of any social class.

I do not need to remind you that the validity of this ideal, above all others, has been questioned. Especially have we been assured by Socialists and semi-Socialists that society is the supreme end to which we all must yield, that individualism means competition and competition means capitalism and capitalism means wage-slavery. And, in truth, if such an indictment of individualism were correct, we might well feel that our country was mistaken in making it central among its driving motives. But the validity of the ideal is not to be judged by *a priori* assumptions but by the general course of the history within which it has operated. Yet *a priori* tests are not lacking. There can be no question that either an individual is worth something or life is worth nothing. To think that valueless individuals can combine to make an invaluable society is a good deal like saying that one can make a million by adding ciphers. The only thing which makes society worth anything is that it conduces to the

welfare of its constituent members. If their welfare is nonexistent, it is sheer German *Kultur* to talk about the value of a state.

I

Elementary Americanism is the denial of class structure in the state. Its validity does not rest upon *a priori* considerations. You can trace the development of the ever-growing recognition of the individual as the genius of its history.

How, then, did it arise? It certainly was not present in the England of the Stuarts. But English class distinctions did not cross the Atlantic. Neither kings, clergy, nor nobles have been colonists. The Atlantic was a nonconductor of class consciousness. It was men of the middle class, chafing under the pressure of a social order, who dared to cross the Atlantic. An adventurer is bound to be an individualist, else he would not be an adventurer. The men and women who left England were those who wanted liberty, and liberty to Englishmen is a synonym of individualism.

The social stratification of England in the seventeenth century forbade equality of op-

portunity. Various feudal survivals still abounded. The rights of Englishmen were not equally extensive. The farm worker had no equality of opportunity with the lord of the manor; the Catholic and Independent did not have the rights of the member of the state church. A recollection of this inequality, which was less marked in England than on the Continent, must have formed the background of the Declaration of Independence. When the period of English migration set in, members of the great middle class, and they alone, settled in America. Differences in wealth were not sufficiently great to lay the foundation for a new class spirit. It is true that the Puritans of Massachusetts when compared with the Pilgrims of Plymouth seem aristocratic, but the distinction is rhetorical rather than actual. While there were indentured servants in more than one colony, there was nothing of genuine class spirit in the New World, and these servants soon took up land and became citizens. In Virginia there was a somewhat different structure of society than in New England, but even there the "first families" were not titled and the small

farmers on the west of the colony were soon to show that they had political power. In all the colonies there was opportunity for each man to move straight forward into independence; on the farm which he carved out from forests he was proud of the rights which he enjoyed as an Englishman and a citizen.

It is worth noticing that this new individualism involving equal rights and obligations approved itself to men who at the start undertook an approach to community life. At Plymouth the Planters, as the settlers under the various companies of Adventurers were called, agreed to hold land in common. Sometimes this has been spoken of as an attempt at communism, but incorrectly. It was, rather, a case of postponing the distribution of the profits of the company. Land was to be held without distribution for a number of years and then the various shareholders in the company, among them the colonists, were to divide the outcome of their industry and investment. But this plan soon proved to be unworkable, even in a community like that of Plymouth. Those who were industrious found themselves com-

pelled to work for the inefficient and lazy, and soon demanded that the division of the land should be immediate rather than postponed. The individual had triumphed over the Company.

Within the colonies of New England the rights which the members of the colony possessed practically were soon given theoretical confirmation. This was born, not of philosophy but of historical situations. The town meeting and the Congregational churches expressed phases of the same social mind. In the churches the congregation had the right of voting, and this right of participation in administration was also exercised in the town meeting. It was at first natural that the citizens should be yeomen who were church members, but this early limitation of suffrage was soon found to be impracticable and the non-church member was admitted to full rights of citizenship. The religious justification of such equality, however, persisted. The rights of the colonists came to be thought of as the rights of men, granted by a Sovereign God. If Professor Jellinek is to be trusted, the natural rights of the French philosophers, or at least

the Declaration of Rights made by the French constitutions, are to be traced back to similar declarations to be found in these early Congregational states. Thus in New England the two currents of development of English individualism met. The church and the town meeting became the foundation stones of American conception of individual equality.

Geography still furthered the development of the individual. I said just now that the path of opportunity lay forward for each colonist. It ran westward. Beyond the coast there lay the forests where any man could build his home. The colonists were essentially farmers and fishermen. The stores of iron and coal which were later to compel the segregation of workers lay undiscovered in the mountains. Because of climate and other physical conditions the colonists were forced to specialize in their agriculture, and this led to conditions which were to have vast influence on the course of American life. In the South the most profitable crops were tobacco and rice. Both of these were more profitably raised in large plantations than in small farms. In the North, and especially in New

England, however, the chief agricultural product was foodstuff. Grain and root crops are possible on small land holdings, and so the northern section became broken up into small farms where their owners lived. This separation of farmers tended toward independence and self-reliance in character. Frontier farms were tilled by their owners and not by slaves.

As the number of colonists increased, this extension from the tidewater toward the West became ever greater and the frontier began to exert an influence hard to overestimate. In fact, in no small degree American individualism is the child of the frontier farm. One has only to picture half a continent covered with an enormous forest filled with wild beasts and Indians, to realize how severe must have been the testing of the men and women who pushed forward the wave of white settlements and farms. Along this frontier as it spread its concentric lines westward one will find the development of an ever-increasing democratic spirit and at the same time many elements of the new American spirit. Only those with initiative and patience could succeed.

The individual, however, is something more than an economic unit of society. The production of material wealth is not in itself a sufficient explanation of human advance. Geographical influences, which make economic variations inevitable, are not the sole cause of social development. These pioneers, therefore, were something more than pawns of mountains, forests, and rivers. Forced as they were to desperate struggle with nature, they saw before them something more than crops and herds. They built schools where their children might be prepared to live as well as to make a living. If they did not produce great poets, they produced great hopes. American men and women had interests which were of the soul. Religion spread its way from cabin to cabin and from settlement to settlement in the person of itinerant Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian preachers. The Scotch-Irish along the frontier of Pennsylvania and the small farmers of Virginia were particularly responsive to this new type of preaching which heralded the worth of each soul. Revivals were the approved type of religious service and served with the elections as the chief

bond to bring these scattered pioneers together. In the very nature of the case these frontier people were forced to be self-reliant, and distinctions of wealth and social classes were impossible. Men were grappling hand to hand with nature, and a strong arm and a keen eye counted more than gentle blood. While towns on the seaboard were developing a theory of individual equality from their institutions, the frontiersmen were making this equality and independence a national leaven.

These pioneers gave themselves to politics. They believed that they were able to govern themselves. When once the second generation had reached maturity they unhesitatingly cast off the leadership of those elements of society which were content to perpetuate conditions which they had controlled, and elected members of their own class to office and recast all laws that seemed to threaten a re-establishment of social classes.

Few of them were limited by their membership in a common economic adventure. Politics, religion, education, and by degrees philanthropy and business gave them a diversity of interests. The individual thus de-

veloped as a member of several groups with a constant tendency to a multiplication of groups rather than a consolidation of interests in some one association which set bounds upon individual action. The avocations of life offset the vocations which brought daily bread, and, in the midst of an astonishing economic development, prevented class-consciousness and class-control.

Thus actual forces and circumstances, the very land itself, the absence of roads and other means of communication, were developing among men conditions that evoked expanded ideals of freedom and equality. Regard for the individual became a striking characteristic of American life. To appreciate it one has only to recall the course of contemporary social development on the Continent. There a succession of terrible wars resulted in large and small states under the control of absolute rulers, the oppression of the peasantry, the destruction of even partial constitutional rights enjoyed by subjects, the transformation of feudal rights and duties into irresponsible privilege. It was not from philosophers primarily but from the new spirit which was developing in

America that directly or indirectly the revolutions of the eighteenth century were to come. And the justification of these revolutions was found in the conception of the rights of the individual, of which continental Europe knew nothing, but which had been especially recognized and formulated by the nation builders on the North American continent. It is no wonder that America became the haven of the oppressed. Here alone could individuals be free.

In the original individualism of the American people one discovers seriousness and self-control. It is customary to call this type of mind Puritan. Now, if there is anything our young intellectuals abhor, it is Puritanism. To them it is the very consummation of all that restrains what they are pleased to call creative self-expression. Themselves possessed of no particular sense of the necessity of self-restraint either in action or in words, they see only the less attractive elements in the life of the forefathers of our American republic. In their minds to be a Puritan is to be a hypocrite.

It is no accident that most of these critics of Puritanism come from continental stocks.

In many cases the young intellectual is of some oppressed race in revolt against the excessive restraints with which his (or her) fathers had been surrounded. To such minds a fair appreciation of the Puritan is all but impossible. Idealism with them is essentially revolutionary. They think only of the liberty of classes—in particular, the proletariat. The liberty into which such immigrants to America are thrust dissolves all regard for the past and authority in the present. Neither they nor their forbears have had any share in the long spiritual struggle from which springs the American liberty they have fled to enjoy. Indeed, coupled with their contempt of Puritanism is a hatred of English institutions. To decry Puritanism seems an ethnic duty. A glorification of an imagined state of freedom which no race ever enjoyed, least of all that from which they have sprung, seems the only means of expressing their intoxicated souls.

If one examines this new liberty for which the opponents of Puritanism plead, it appears to be a one-sided exposition of the individualism evolved by the Anglo-Saxon in England and America and a rejection of

that self-control which has made Anglo-Saxons capable of originating the very liberty which intellectualism exploits. A man in revolt from all restraints is not capable of producing even the class solidarity which he praises. Society has never been and never will be composed of anarchists. Its very existence depends on authority of some sort. If individuals lack the capacity for self-restraint, if they claim only the right to do as they please and gratify whatever desires may happen to be dominant in their inner being, an authority from without is indispensable. If, on the other hand, individuals have learned to distinguish between permanent and temporary values of life, if they have learned that there is a difference between evil and good, if they have come to see that the significant things of life must often involve the sacrifice of the less significant, if they deliberately set themselves to subordinate physical pleasure to the things of the spirit, they are the sort of men and women who gave the world constitutional liberty, religious freedom, and democracies. Young intellectuals may well rejoice that there have been such men. Otherwise they would never

enjoy the institutions their errant omniscience belittles.

The Puritan was of this serious mind. No caricature drawn from Blue Laws which never existed should be permitted to obscure his real contributions to democratic development. If the colonists and first generation of citizens of the new United States had been devotees of clever phrases and creature comforts, we should never have had the liberties we now enjoy. Pleasure-seekers have never been the ancestors of great states. Intellectual anarchists, despisers of authority, evangelists of Utopias whose chief substance is riotous rhetoric, have never done more than destroy. They have disintegrated authority, but they have never built states. Unrestrained orators of liberty which means only license, they have either been parasites upon the political achievements of men who, like the Puritans, soberly recognize the responsibilities of liberty, or have been creators of reigns of terror.

It is difficult for the historian of America to keep his patience in the presence of the anti-Puritan as he attributes the evils of today to the survival of Puritan attitudes. He

knows the limitations of Puritan life—its too eager buffeting of the self lest it weakly yield to the enjoyment of the senses, its depreciation of beauty, its overemphasis of other-worldliness; but he knows also its idealism, its democratic instinct, its pursuit of spiritual values, its capacity to build self-determining states from self-ruled citizens. While it would have none of that self-indulgent paganism which so appeals to men and women without sense of social responsibility, Puritanism was an enemy of asceticism, the champion of honest pleasures and education, the founder of institutions that have prevented the rapid development of wealth from becoming a new feudalism and absolutism. I would not minimize the contributions of many another spirit to American life. Above all, I would not identify the American with the Englishman. But this fact cannot be denied: back of democracy stands the Puritan and, I had almost said, only the Puritan. Other men have entered into his labors, but he labored first.

It is not for us to reinstate the laws of Massachusetts Bay or the rough-and-ready social life of the frontier; but a nation com-

posed of men and women lacking the first rudiments of self-control, without sufficient insight to choose permanent rather than ephemeral goods, would be one of moral debility and political anarchy. If our young intellectuals would undertake to emulate the constructive virtues of the Puritan, they would be less intolerant of his errors. And they would be taken more seriously. For if in a search for founders of a new social order the choice should be forced between Puritans and men and women who prefer Cabell to Thackeray, Ezra Pound to Tennyson, Lenin to George Washington, parlor socialism to representative government, affinities to homes, momentary pleasure to thrift, and Nietzsche to Jesus Christ; men who know that building a state is something more than writing pamphlets and that a constitution is something more than epigrams and *vers libre*, will choose the Puritan with his serious-minded individualism rather than the young intellectual with his free spirit. For history has proved his ideals valid.

II

The developments of the rights of the in-

dividual did not stop with the colonial and early national period of our country. There were still the slave and the woman, neither of whom fully enjoyed the advantages of the new epoch, and both of whom have during the last century been given rights as persons.

As regards the slave we must again recognize that geographical and economic forces have been the occasion of struggles from which personal rights have emerged. Here again we can see that America has evolved loyalty to ideals under actual conditions rather than through deductive analysis of abstract rights.

To appreciate the real significance of slavery to individualism in America, it is necessary to remember that it passed through a series of stages, each more or less shaped by economic forces. In the eighteenth century slavery was all but universal in the American colonies; one out of every fifty inhabitants of Massachusetts, for instance, being a slave. Yet at the time of the adoption of the Constitution there was all but uniform belief in both North and South that slavery would ultimately disappear be-

cause of the stopping of the slave trade. The Quakers had characteristically opposed slavery on religious grounds, although their relatively small numbers had prevented their having influence sufficient to abolish it throughout the colonies. But opposition to the institution was by no means limited to these earnest Christians. In 1780 a Methodist Ministers' Conference declared that "Slavery is contrary to the golden law of God and the inalienable rights of mankind." In 1789 the Baptist Association of Virginia voted that "Slavery is a violent deprivation of the rights of nature and inconsistent with representative government. We recommend to our brethren to make use of every legal measure to extirpate this horrid evil from the land." By 1804 seven of the original States had abolished slavery and all thirteen, except South Carolina, had prohibited the slave trade. In the course of a few years practically no slaves were held in the North, and the slave trade was forbidden under severe penalties. The political leaders of the South were not committed to the system in any philosophical way and had voted to make the Northwestern Territory free soil. The

slave-holding group was numerically small although autocratic in politics and social life.

That slavery should become the center of sectional policies and a social philosophy was due to an unexpected and vast development in capitalism. The invention of the cotton gin committed the South to King Cotton. Instead of diversified farming, a one-crop system arose which required practically no skilled labor. Sugar and rice became of secondary importance. The tobacco crop, though still a source of great wealth, was destroying the fertility of the soil, and Virginia and the other tobacco-raising States became slave-breeding States for the benefit of those where cotton could be raised.

This economic revolution was to have profound effect upon the political and social theories of the two sections of the country. Manufactories and wage-systems were unknown to the South, and labor, instead of being universal among the whites as in the North, was largely limited to the Negro. In the North the development of capitalism took the form of industrial expansion; in the South it was wholly centered around the labor of the Negro slave. Prior to 1820

these two interests had come into more or less serious conflict in the embargo policy of Jefferson and the War of 1812. In 1820, with almost startling suddenness, the conflict for the maintenance of individual rights appeared in the struggle to maintain a balance of power between the two rival sections of the country in the Senate.

The land between the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Atlantic, which had been ceded by various States to the Union, had been organized in States where the rights of the slave owner were undisputed. The vast Louisiana territory purchased from Napoleon, except in Missouri unsettled, had been left without designation. When Missouri sought admission as a State the two sections immediately clashed. The Northern States demanded that Missouri should be a free State; the Southern States demanded that the existence of slavery already present within its limits should be recognized. For a few months the two policies seemed incapable of agreement. But at last a compromise was reached which permitted the admission of Maine as a free State and Missouri as a slave State, with the decision that slavery

within its limits should not extend north of 36:30. The compromise was epochal not only in that it permitted the extension of slaves in the territory south of 36:30, and in the opinion of a majority of Congress recognized the right of Congress to forbid slavery in the territories; but also in the more important fact that while the Union had been saved, two economic systems and two estimates of the worth of individuals had been brought into irrepressible conflict. From 1820 the South stood for a capitalism that denied personal rights to the workman; the North for a capitalism that regarded workmen as persons. The struggle reached over into religion. In 1835 the Rev. James Smylie declared that slavery was good and righteous according to the Bible. In 1837 the Presbyterian body split over the issue, to be followed in 1844 by the Methodists and in 1845 by the Baptists.

The year 1850 saw the completion of the economic-social philosophy in the attitude of the South. Slavery, instead of being regarded as an incident in the economic life, served as the basis of a complete philosophy of society. The eighteenth-century doctrine

of Jefferson with its insistence that all men were created equal was frankly discarded. A group of political teachers, chief among whom were Thomas R. Dew, of William and Mary College, and Chancellor Harper, of South Carolina, elaborately argued the necessity of social classes. This new philosophy argued that civilization demanded the "forced labor of masses of ignorant people whom to make free would be a social crime." Furthermore, it was claimed that the Bible and the Christian Church sustained slavery as an institution. Chancellor Harper stated in 1837 that "the exclusive owners of property ever have been, ever will be, and perhaps ever ought to be the virtual rulers of mankind. . . . It is as much in the order of nature that men should enslave each other as that animals should prey upon each other." Harper declared that it was palpably untrue to say that every man was born free. The proclivity of the natural man is to dominate or to be subservient, for "if there are sordid, servile, and laborious offices to be performed, is it not better that there should be sordid, servile, and laborious beings to perform them!" At the same time Calhoun openly

declared slavery to be a blessing. "Nothing can be more unfounded and false," he said, "than the opinion that all men are born free and equal; inequality is indispensable to progress; government is not the result of compact, nor is it safe to intrust the suffrage to all." Governor McDuffie, in a message to the Legislature of South Carolina, affirmed that "domestic slavery is the cornerstone of our republic edifice." The philosophy of absolute capitalism and class control was never more radically stated.

As the tide of population moved west into the uninhabited territory, it was inevitable that the struggle should become intense. The two types of economic development as represented by the North and the South were incompatible with each other. Capitalism with free labor did not exist and could not exist by the side of slavery, and capitalism with slavery could not exist in the presence of free labor. The disappearance of the one was necessary for the existence of the other. The bitter struggle over the Fugitive Slave Law and the Kansas and Nebraska struggle were thus phases of a conflict which was irrepressible, not simply

on moral grounds, but also because of the inner tendencies of national expansion. The social order which controlled the vast area west of the Mississippi was to control the nation. American democracy itself was at stake.

I would not minimize the moral elements of the struggle over slavery. But morality is never abstract. It deals with concrete issues, individual rights and social orders. It emerges from economic situations which give motives and evoke ideals for human relationships. There were men in the North who argued the question abstractly and scripturally. But they were agitators rather than constructive forces. The great current of moral convictions as to human individuality was determined in the conflict of two rival social orders. The moral fervor of Garrison and Channing became a leaven in one of these orders and a center of bitterness in the other. Slavery, like the saloon, was doomed by a new social conscience because fatal to individual rights, but its destruction came only in the destruction of an economic and social order of which it had become the nucleus.

The struggle which ensued was ultimately over individuals as such. The South sincerely believed in and championed a social structure which was frankly consistent. The North was developing a modern conception of the capitalistic system in which wage-earners act as free persons, both politically and economically. The factory of the North was manufacturing a social theory, a moral ideal, and a new individualism, as well as cloth. The period of compromise gave time for the development of national forces, and the issue was determined by social evolution fixed by moral idealism rather than by the relative valor of the two parties to the terrible conflict of 1861-65. Appomattox forever banished from America any social theory that denied personality to the worker. The surrender of Lee meant the disappearance of capitalistic absolutism and the triumph of the ideal of individual rights.

The world in which we live seems far removed from 1865, but it contains the elements of a similar but even greater struggle. The opposing forces are no longer separated by a river and a surveyor's line; they run across the social organization of an entire

world. The parties to the struggle, fortunately, are no longer slaves and their masters. To speak of to-day's wage-earner as a slave is to use the rhetoric of the demagogue. None the less, superior as was the wage-capitalism which became dominant in the nineteenth century to the capitalism of the slave-owning class, it bequeathed to the twentieth century the problem as to whether labor is to be treated as a commodity or as a personal contribution to the productive process. That is the great issue in civilization. About it the organized forces of capital and labor are at present struggling. In its magnitude and elements it is a new issue. Our nation must therefore work out its future less in accordance with precedent than with tendencies and forces within the social process itself. These tendencies come over from the immediate past. The evolution of industrial life in the nineteenth century indicates the tendency to which we must look for the answer to our present industrial problems. That answer in brief is this: the true solution of industrial unrest is the recognition of personal elements in the economic processes; of the wage-earner as an individ-

ual. The world of to-morrow must be a better place for men and women to live in—not merely to grow rich in.

How these personal values can be reached will be settled by the trial and failure method which the world now employs. There will be periods of compromise. There will be attempts at radical reorganization such as those proposed by socialists, both revolutionary and evolutionary. Just what will be the precise outcome of these struggles we can no more tell than the men of 1820 and 1850 could foretell the precise outcome of the struggle between the economic and political tendencies of the North and South. But one thing is already certain—America is not headed toward the philosophy of the Southern statesmen. It projects still further the advance from a slave to the wage-earner. It will assure the participation of the wage-earner in the personal control of his contribution to production. There will be no return to autocratic capitalism. The capitalism of to-day will in its turn further personal rights of the individual lest it be swept away like that of the slave-holder. Individualism, subject to new social conditions set by

economic development, is a synonym of Americanism.

The second evolution of personal rights, those of women, has not been so dramatic in America as that which ended slavery, but it is none the less significant of the germinal power of an ideal. It may be surprising that the progress of women's rights in America has been slower than in certain other countries. Years before full suffrage was extended to women in the United States it was given in Australasia, Norway, Finland, Saxony, and various other Continental countries. It would be an interesting topic for speculation as to just why English-speaking people lagged behind others in this regard, but any explanation that might be suggested testifies to the essential conservatism of the very men who were carrying forward liberal ideals in politics, business, education, and religion. It may possibly have been that the high position which women held in America made for certain dilatoriness in enlarging their personal rights. In 1797 Charles Fox doubtless represented the position of liberal Englishmen when he said, "It has never been suggested in all the theories

and projects of the most absurd speculation that it would be advisable to extend the elective suffrage to the female sex." And it is noteworthy that in the extension of suffrage rights to women the leaders have been the frontier rather than the older States. Wyoming, Kansas, Colorado, Michigan, and Minnesota have been the leaders in giving women the right to vote either for some or all offices. It was in 1848 that the first convention to discuss the social, civil, and religious condition and rights of women was held at Seneca Falls, New York. At this meeting there was adopted a sort of declaration of women's independence modeled after that of the famous document of 1776. A study of that declaration will show how far short the American woman came of enjoying the rights which now are hers. But despite conservative forebodings, the extension of these rights has steadily progressed until the Constitution of the government itself has been amended so as to give women the full suffrage rights of men. It is a far cry from the present position of women to that occupied by them a generation ago in practically every State in the Union, but it

is simply the completion of the conception of American individualism. Those that have privilege must have responsibility; those that have responsibility must have liberty to exercise it.

III

This estimate which American history has placed upon the individual is threatened by two conditions in our national life.

There is, first, the rise of class consciousness and class organization. Due in no small degree to the evolution of industrialism, this danger to the American ideal springs from the importation into America of Continental ideas and experience. Most leaders in the attempt at class organization and class conflict are not Anglo-Saxons or native Americans. They are the product of the struggle for liberty in those countries of Europe where class organization still survives and the conception of the individual has been obscured by the existence of class subjection. In such countries efforts for liberty have naturally been those of classes. When such ideals are introduced in America they strike at the foundation of our social life and in-

volve much more than economic adjustment. They would remake America itself. Their success would mean that American institutions have been de-Americanized by persons who are not the products of our social history. Yet the facts that occasion such a program must be recognized.

We are now in the midst of a process the opposite of that which produced our individualism. The occupation of a vast new country served to disintegrate social molecules into their component atoms. Our modern conditions are a new process of integration. If the analogy between social and physical processes were perfect, reintegration might mean the loss of individuality in new social compounds. And that is precisely what our new generation of social philosophers seems to desire. But the analogy is not perfect. Human beings are not unconscious atoms. They are persons, capable of preserving in their new combinations something of the self-reliance and self-estimate gained during the short period of release from the control of highly organized group life. It is impossible to undo completely the results of the development of the

past century. We shall never see a return to slavery or serfdom or the "subjection of women." There is, however, in progress a recombination of social elements due to the economic separation of those who own machines from those who work machines; or, in more general terms, into those who receive profits and interest and those who receive wages. Such segregation may offset the equality of opportunity on the part of individuals. Control over its members by the labor union is pronounced, while freedom of competition and even of initiative on the part of manufacturers is often checked by organizations which, sometimes in collusion with labor leaders, control markets and prices.

Such facts are data, rather than subjects of mere regret. However much certain persons might desire to resolve American society into insulated individuals, such an attempt is impossible. Our present task requires far wider vision and better technique than either the radical individualist or the radical socialist possesses. They both would attempt to run American life into the mold of a formula. What actually must be done is to develop a social order in which the in-

dividual may grow social and enter into group-activity without thereby losing a sense of his own final worth. We have to develop morale not for atomistic individuals but for individuals in their economic groups.

There can be little question that the present increase of such groups is not conducive to that liberty of individual action which made the United States what it is. It is one thing for an immigrant to settle on a farm where he is spatially independent and quite another thing for him to settle in the midst of a great city, work machines which he does not own, and join unions which bargain collectively. The pioneer and children of pioneers in the very nature of the case found themselves self-dependent, each family forming a little world in itself. The children of immigrants who have settled by the millions in the city have no conditions which urge individualistic development and many that demand group action both for defense and for new advantages. The range of opportunity for self-determination under such conditions is limited. Such collective operation as our industrial processes involve tends to make types rather than individuals.

When a sense of freedom sways such persons it too often takes the form of a desire for class liberty and class control—the battle-cries of an alien social history.

If such development is unavoidable, either our American ideal of opportunity for every individual will be abandoned, and instead of the foreigner being Americanized the American will be foreignized, or our conception of the individual must be adapted to new conditions. If, as we must believe, the second alternative is to prevail, we face a task which cannot be escaped: the maintenance of individual liberty in the midst of industrial groups. Hitherto such classification has tended to solidify itself and to make the passage of individuals from one class to another all but impossible. This has been the history of social development on the continent of Europe. From this has come revolution, that is, the determination of one class as a class to enjoy by conquest the privileges shared by another class. In our American life the way has lain and must still lie open to every man who will utilize the opportunities which he may have and will play the game according to the rules which

are now set. To protect this inherited equality of opportunity is an imminent duty. Nor is it impossible.

One corrective to the deindividualizing of those forces into economic groups is an enriched liberty in noneconomic life. As has been already pointed out, American individualism involves something more than economic interests. It concerns the entire personality. A little while ago an interesting little book was written about a New Englander who lost his money and joined the workingmen. He found there a liberty and a group of privileges he never could have enjoyed as a salaried person with a certain social status to maintain. He found opportunities for study furnished free or at small expense, amusements, churches, public parks and playgrounds for his children. Suddenly he realized that as a member of a class that he had judged unfree he was freer to develop his own life than he had been as a respectable salaried person trying to ape the habits of persons with larger incomes. As he himself said, this New Englander had really discovered America.

This discovery, however, must be more

than a mere literary *tour de force*. Our collective life must be so organized that all individuals have this sort of freedom.

But freedom will not come to-day any more than in the past to people who are afraid to take risks. It requires much the same sort of spirit of adventure for a family in touch with families of larger income to practice thrift as it required for our ancestors to break up the prairie. It takes daring for a man of small income to save money. It takes self-control to substitute study for cheap amusements. It is training in individualism for a young man to refuse to go with "his crowd" and for a young woman to decline to follow styles of dress and dancing. All such individualism, however, is possible in America. Social distinctions are economic and not those of opportunity. So long as we build no political or social wall around economic classes, so long the spirit of individualism may hope to survive.

How far it is possible for us to recognize the individual as over against economic groups of individuals has not yet been determined. In this regard as well as others, America is still in the making. Economic

struggle necessitates the consolidation of opposing interests. One moment union labor seems in the saddle, another moment the champions of the open shop. In theory the genuinely open shop (not the open shop which is a closed shop to unionized workers) seems undoubtedly more in accord with the American spirit of giving equal rights to all. It is a fair question, however, whether the open shop could maintain the advantages which its members enjoy if there were not organized labor. But the question is simply one phase of the larger problem as to how individualism can be maintained in the midst of economic collectivism involved in trade unions and collective bargaining of all sorts.

My own faith is that the American life will dare set precedents here as in the past. It developed the agrarian and commercial individualism. It will now develop individualism in an industrial order. But just as agrarian and commercial individualism was dependent upon the actual conditions set by farming and commerce, so industrial individualism will have to reckon with the actual conditions set by our economic life. To prevent the tyranny of class-consciousness

among great bodies of men and women of necessity living in close vicinity to the machines which they run and by the nature of their occupation forced to work in large groups, requires works as well as faith. If we are not to develop a new un-American America—"our America," as the anti-Anglo-Saxon, anti-Puritan, anti-individual leaders dare to call it—it is necessary to prevent the absorption of interests by one economic group life. Every American can and should belong to a variety of groups, each representing different social ideals. In the resulting fellowship class distinctions will be offset. The church is one of these groups, the school, the college, the neighborhood, the political party, the athletic club, the philanthropic association are others, and the list can be indefinitely lengthened. In no country is there the abundance of group interests as in America. To consolidate them in economic classes would be to submerge individuality. To scatter individuals among them is to reproduce in our more complex social life the forces that made toward individual development in early American history. To make social life center about the

economic is an attack on Americanism. Economic interests, whether capitalistic or labor, may unintelligently favor such a consolidation, through the bitterness of strife, but all the more zealously should those who wish America to remain true to its history and genius seek to make diversity of group interest possible and inevitable. Exhortation and denunciation must yield to practical measures. Economic warfare between employers and labor unions must be replaced by cooperation and arbitration. Our public school should be preserved from efforts to use education in the interests of segregated religion or race. Only as individuals share in other than single groups can the individual be preserved from subordination to class. And only thus can genuine Americanism survive.

The second foe of individualism in America is the limitation set by ethnic groups. Statistics make no impression upon most of us, and perhaps it is well, but no one can even superficially examine a census report without being impressed with the problem of our foreign citizenship. If it were simply a matter of birthplace, it would be simple, but the

history of the United States shows plainly that foreign groups tend to segregate. One has only to walk across the lower end of New York City to understand what this means. The same conditions are to be found not only in all cities and larger communities, but in country districts as well. Very few foreign people have migrated as yet to the south of the Mason and Dixon line, but in the North an ethnographic map would show the tendency toward segregation of representatives of the various nations of the world. Nor is this tendency in many of these ethnic groups removed in the second generation. Members of the groups find opportunity in the larger American life for getting wealth and political power, but the ethnic solidarity is locally maintained by churches, schools, and social customs. The individual remains, therefore, to a very considerable extent, a member of a group. Particularly is this true when interested parties maintain propaganda in glorification of the fatherland. In too many cases the immigrant moves from a native group across the seas into a group possessing almost the same characteristics in America.

As an illustration of such ethnic solidarity we may refer, not to a foreign group, but to the Negroes. The curse of slavery has outlived the emancipation of slaves. A few years ago the problem seemed to be one largely of numbers and so confined to the South. Individual Negroes in the North lived as any newcomer might live in our towns and cities. They did not intermarry, they were not given social standing, but the same was largely true of members of other nationalities. But within the last few years there have been decided changes, some of them, I regret to say, decidedly for the worse. The Negro in the North doubtless has more political freedom than in the South, but the increase in the Negro population has tended to transfer to the North some of the most difficult problems of the South. We have lynchings, race riots, bombings, in the North. Labor unions have discriminated against the Negro and race hatred has already expressed itself among people of the lower classes.

At the same time the experience of the Negroes in the Great War has given them a new sense of personal worth. Education

has made them feel an intellectual equality and business success has given them self-respect. Among themselves the cooperation of both these two new conditions is producing a racial self-consciousness that is capable of almost any sort of outcome according to the treatment it is accorded. In Northern cities the border line of population is already experiencing the demand of the Negroes for treatment on the same equality in schools and in social settlements, if not in other ways. That is to say, the Negro problem can to-day no more than in 1861 be detached from that of the worth of individuals as persons. But it must be answered in the light of the indisputable fact that Negroes are segregating themselves and are being segregated into an ethnic group. I shall presently return to this matter and attempt to show that American history makes it plain that an ethnic group is not necessarily antagonistic to the development of the individual. At present I wish only to emphasize the fact that the so-called Negro problem is not unique in the development of our American social order. It has its own peculiar difficulties, but it is not unsolvable,

provided it is answered in the terms of our experience.

What is true in the case of the Negroes is true, although less markedly, of other nationalities, who in America have tended to segregate. Of course, the case of the Negro is particularly difficult because the color question intensifies the racial consciousness. The same is true of the relatively small group of Japanese and Chinese. But whoever is acquainted with the structure of our cities knows that the ethnic lines are not to be ignored. Movement of nationalities is not toward dissipating the members in a city, but to maintain an almost clannish unity of habits.

IV

The dangers in this situation cannot be ignored. Some possible offsets I shall consider in my last lecture. I wish now only to call attention to the historical bearing of this ethnic grouping on the ideal of individualism.

A study of the ethnographic distribution in the United States will show that the segregation of nationalities has always ex-

isted. The original colonists, of course, were largely of English stock, but there were also settlements of Swedes, Germans, French, and Dutch, each of which maintained a certain integrity of life. To this day it is possible to trace in the older sections of the country these ethnic strains. Nor has the Anglo-Saxon, any more than other nationalities, practiced exogamy. Marriages have taken place within each ethnic group. So far is it from being true that the individualism in America means universal distribution of individuals, a *mélange* of disintegrated nationalities.

The individual has developed throughout our history within ethnic groups which have persisted generation after generation. But he has also transcended them. While he has had ties binding him to people of kindred blood, the forces of business, education, philanthropy, reform, and to some extent the church, have been centrifugal. Within the individual atom there have been negative and positive forces making toward a great variety of combinations. Ethnic groups have not made individualism in America tantamount to isolation. The individual can

continue to have a large number of social contacts. Partnership in a number of groups will tend in the future as in the past to offset the solidarity of any one group. Living thus with a variety of interests, the individual has found and can continue to find limitations set by one set of relations offset by experience in quite different groupings. In other words, the individualism developed in and by America is far from being that of the repellant atom or the oversensitive soul oppressed by spiritual loneliness. It is social and productive of democracy.

V

In the furtherance of this ideal there has been developed what might be called the American technique of democracy, in no small degree inherited from our English forbears. What is this technique?

First: the democratizing of a right seen to have become a monopolized privilege of a group. This takes place at the point of tension and does not presuppose a prior reorganization of the social order. Thus, for example, it was in the case of suffrage. The institutions of the country were not de-

stroyed in order to give votes to slaves and later to women. Such persons were simply treated like those who already possessed the suffrage and the class of unprivileged in this respect disappeared.

Second: the readjustment of the social order to the new conditions set by the democratizing of rights at tension points. As the eruption of a volcano leads to changes of the earth's surface over a wide area, so the establishment of a new right is followed in America by gradual readjustments within the great *hinterland* of the social order. To theorists and radicals this seems mere opportunism. To the historical student of society it is healthy evolution, assuring the maintenance of order during periods of transition. It is the opposite of revolution with its destruction of institutions and its aftermath of misery.

Third: the development of a community of interest on the part of individuals in fields which are not those of a single group. Individuals of one economic or ethnic group meet with individuals of other similar groups for the development of some phase of social welfare which is neither economic nor ethnic.

In order that such a community of interest may develop, American life has always abounded in variety of group interest due to the voluntary association of individuals. Self-reliant men with a variety of interests live together in some way which does not subject them one to another. Naturally in an actual human society it is not to be expected that such conditions will be perfectly realized. Economic, social, family, ecclesiastical restraints may serve to repress the individual, but the fact that we disapprove of such oppression is in itself testimony to individualism as our ideal. For the furtherance of this ideal and its expression in actual social relationships American democracy was born. Indeed, democracy in America might almost be defined as the organization of society with such political and social institutions as permit free and equal individuals to develop their personal life through participation in an indefinite number of social groups.

Thus the very process of the extension of rights is in itself an ideal. We believe it can be trusted. We trust the leavening power of any advance toward larger justice. Social

change we therefore do not fear because we have faith in the penetrating power of a new ideal and its inevitable consequents in a democracy. In the new conditions thus established the individual gains new liberty and opportunity.

It is to this technique we look for the preservation of America from that evil genius of abstract political logic, the Great Individual of a social class. Social relations are indispensable, but social solidarity is not the goal of healthy social process. Class control means the death of the free individual. Social life is a noble servant but a terrible master. Atomistic, anarchic individualism we have never sought. Group interests have always been ours. But our institutions have been environment, not ends. They make life richer and freer, not more uniform. The problem of class solidarity can be answered aright only as a way is found by which free individuals can live together without subjection and without denial of the right to exploit social opportunity. Without some group-authority, individualism becomes anarchy; without individualism group-authority means tyranny of lord or class. Democ-

racy is the device by which America has made possible the socializing of rights, the subjection of group-organization to the service of the individual, and the maintenance of order.

LECTURE III

DEMOCRACY

IF the free individual possessed of political, religious and social liberty is the atom of our American system, democracy is its molecule. To this second American ideal we shall now give our attention.

Democracy has been given new importance in the last few years. We fought a war to make the world safe for democracy. We have been told that the evils of democracy can be cured by more democracy and when one wishes to cap the climax of some political oration, he praises democracy. Far be it from one who would apprise ideals to belittle this indiscriminate use of a term which has so many meanings. But he who would understand the democracy of America must clear his mind once and for all of some of the interpretations which have been given the term.

I

To appreciate the real significance of American democracy, it is well to bear in

mind that there never have been any more democratic institutions than those now in the world. And this is true even though by a study of the dictionary one arrives at a definition of the term "democracy" not in accord with the actual situation we find in our country. As a matter of fact, the fathers of our Constitution were not interested in the abstract questions of government. Although innumerable writers from 1776 to 1800 adopted such classical names as Cato, Gracchus, unlike their French contemporaries they were not obsessed with classicism. What they wanted were very concrete things—self-government and sufficient unity between the colonies to prevent internecine war and social disorder. As Theophilus Parsons said in 1787, they were not concerned with social adjustment or reconstructions, but with union. They were not inventing popular government, they were adjusting institutions and political experience to the new conditions which had developed in nearly two centuries' life on a new continent. Individualism was to be made cooperative; a more powerful government was to preserve existing governments with-

out trenching on the life of the citizens. In the minds of the fathers that government was best which governed least. Thus American democracy in seeking to prevent the establishment of conditions all but universal in the older States put few restraints upon individual initiative in state, church, commerce, and school. Therein appears the universal law that a socialized ideal finds expression in those institutions and customs in which efficiency has already been gained. Liberty in America, unlike liberty in France, never sought to protect itself by military conquests. It was the difference between George Washington indignantly refusing to be king, and Napoleon Bonaparte seeking to bring liberties to a reorganized Europe through an empire built up by war.

The American colonies continued that phase of English constitutional development represented by the Whig Party. In the eighteenth century the government of England had fallen into the hands of a German family and into the hands of a king, George III, under whom English Tories undertook to force upon American colonists theories

of government which were being combated by statesmen like Edmund Burke. They sought to compel Englishmen on this side of the water to yield to anti-English conceptions of royal and Parliamentary prerogatives. Englishmen in the American colonies refused to submit, and there ensued on the soil of America a struggle which saved liberalism not only on this side of the Atlantic, but in England itself. When England thus made its contribution to the history of democracy, it little thought that there would appear on American soil a conception of citizenship more extensive and more ideal than that which existed at home. But when the American colonies organized themselves into a Confederation, and later into the United States of America, they extended the rights of Englishmen into the rights of men. In that act the United States made its own contribution to the development of the state and of democracy.

In the establishment of the new nation the fathers not only made the rights of individuals paramount in government, but they made the people exercising those rights the state. Thereby they instituted a new con-

ception of the state. On the continent of Europe the government—the *regierung*—was the state, and the state was not responsible to those it governed. In the United States of America the state and the governed were the same. Nor were Americans even then content. Those two political steps would have marked an epoch; but we did more than that. We offered citizenship, which involved the right of being the governor of oneself, to all the world. Other nations had offered to the oppressed of other peoples the rights and privileges of asylum. England had done this for the Huguenots, Prussia had done it for the Jews. But rights of asylum are by no means identical with citizenship, much less with government itself. In offering this citizenship to the world the United States took a step of which men had hardly dreamed. I fancy the foremost of the fathers could not have imagined it would carry America to its present political situation. For thereby came nationwide representative democracy—not a theoretically developed democracy, it is true, but a germinal conception which opened government and office to every citizen.

Popular government in the early stages of the American nation meant the right of people to choose their representatives to form a government. The town meeting has sometimes been used by theoretical democrats as a model for national life. My guess is that such critics of our theory of government never lived under a town meeting. For if there is anything that characterizes town meetings, it is the election of selectmen to conduct affairs for the ensuing year. The democratic ideal so far as it actually exists in America has been one of representation rather than of continuous voting. All persons are equal in that they have the right of participating in the election of a representative government. When it came to the organization of the United States the framers of the Constitution took a step forward which was to be of far more significance than they could have realized. Instead of the Constitution's being adopted by the various Legislatures, which might have limited democracy to the confederation of sovereign States, it was adopted by the people themselves through conventions. By the Constitution, also, every individual comes in con-

tact with a succession of governments which he has himself helped to elect—the local, county, State, the federal. Thus the rights of the individual are preserved and American democracy is seen to be what it really is—a group of institutions, laws, and authorities which make it possible for citizens possessing an equality of rights to live together without disorder; or more briefly, the ideal of American democracy is not a theoretical participation of all the people in all political activities all the time, but, rather, an equality of opportunity for each individual in all phases of social life to share in determining his government.

During recent years there has emerged a group of writers who are apparently indifferent to the historical fact that the United States is not a democracy in the full theoretical sense, but is a republic possessing a representative government. Attempts have been made to increase the direct responsibility of the people by the establishment of the initiative, the referendum, and the recall, but it seems to be a general opinion that these devices have failed to accomplish fully what it was hoped they would accomplish. The

character of public officials has not materially changed, and the repeated call to the polls has tended to diminish the actual number of voters. A representative government needs some sort of check in the form of a referendum, but the experience we have had makes it plain that government cannot fundamentally be by referendum.

In America sovereignty lies with the people. Its representatives in the government do not originate power but have the right to use it within limits set by law. In the larger governmental system, the Federal government, this basic principle of representation is still further developed. Individuals elect the federal as truly as the local government. By this means our idea of democracy is protected from injury by the class ideals so easily evoked. The opinion of some people seems to be that because they belong to the nation they belong to the government; that they have a right therefore to choose what laws they shall obey and when. Their attitude reminds me of the old Frenchwoman at the time of the Revolution. She was sitting at the door of the meeting place of the Convention. A member of the Girondin party

was about to pass by her without salutation, whereupon she seized him by the hair of his head, pulled his head back and forth, shouting, "Bow your head to the sovereign people!" But in American democracy the sovereign people obey those to whom it delegates the exercise of sovereignty.

This conception of a social technique by which free people can live together without subjection one to another, in the nature of the case involves a respect for law. Here we find a most difficult element in the modern operations of democracy. We have so many representative governments in town, county, State, and nation that the volume of law to be obeyed passes our knowledge. Furthermore, a belief on the part of many good people that a reform can be effected simply by legislation has served to increase the distemper of mind. In consequence there has grown up a dangerous habit of discrimination in our attitude toward law. Individuals frankly claim the right to determine whether or not they approve of a law before they obey it. Such an attitude of mind is clearly dangerous to the very theory of our democracy. The excessive number of

laws cannot safely be permitted to lead to a disregard of law as the expression of the delegated sovereignty of the people. Perhaps here more than anywhere else is it possible for us to make a definite appeal to intelligent citizens. No citizen can safely acquire the habit of choosing which laws he shall obey. Of course he has the right to become a revolutionist, but he cannot be a revolutionist and a law-abiding citizen at the same time. If he wishes to be a revolutionist, he must expect to take the consequences; but if he does not expect to be a revolutionist, he must obey the laws. To do otherwise would be to imperil the very structure upon which property and other rights depend. It is hard to see how respectable citizens who deliberately choose to break the laws covering the manufacture, sale, and transportation of liquor can hope for continued obedience to other laws which they want observed. I am not so foolish as to say that the United States has become lawless, but I think it true that while substantial citizens demand the enforcement of law, they frequently prefer that obedience to law should be rendered by others rather than by themselves.

At this point we face a real test of the validity of our ideal of a democracy governed by representatives with delegated powers. And such a test is also one of the individual. Unless our state is composed of law-abiding citizens, ready to practice self-control in loyal obedience to an established government, it will face the alternative of absolutism or anarchy. No democracy can survive the disrespect of its citizens.

Here again one's faith in our institutions rests upon the history of social attitudes. The development of our democracy has not been without similar crises. But our idealism and the hatred of disloyalty to our institutions have always checked anarchy. With this history in mind no lover of his country can despair in the face of to-day's problems. The effervescence of lawlessness will pass. Not only the government at Washington but the inner life of democracy still lives and progresses.

Such faith is justified because American conceptions of the state and society are born of experience and not of theory. In fact, one cannot go far astray in saying that what we call abstract rights to be found in so many

Declarations are really the generalization of certain concrete rights enjoyed by Englishmen at home and in the colonies. But these rights never involved the abolition of governmental oversight or administration. Laws made by the representatives of the people were to be obeyed.

II

Yet American democracy has not always been quite the same. It has developed its own inner powers of self-direction. Two periods are easily distinguished. The first was that in which leadership and government were in the hands of recognized leaders. For a generation, as political parties began to form themselves, there was a struggle between what might be called the notables of society and the great masses. One can see the various periods in the process by which the conception of democracy, as we now have it, emerged. Different points of view can be seen in the attitude of Winthrop and Cotton as opposed to that of Hooker, even in the seventeenth century. Connecticut certainly had a more democratic attitude toward life and government than had the Puritans of

Massachusetts Bay. In the South, in addition to slaves, the growing population was roughly divided into three classes: the first families, the small farmers, and the landless men. The first families were supposed to control the state. The people who lived on their small frontier farms were supposed to be thankful for the care bestowed upon public affairs by the wealthy and educated, whose names had become synonymous with colonial history. However much we may judge that Professor Beard has over-estimated the economic elements in the origin of our Constitution, it is beyond dispute that from 1760 until the adoption of the Constitution in 1789 there was in the entire range of colonies a persistent rivalry and in many cases open hostility between people who were opening up the new land on the western frontier from New Hampshire to Georgia, and the commercial and the planter groups nearer tidewater. The forefathers of the republic, with the exception of Patrick Henry and one or two others, belonged to this quasi-aristocratic group. There were, of course, elections of officers by the duly constituted voters, but, as in England, the members of

significant families and those who for other reason had social prestige were naturally chosen for office and responsibility. The list of signers of the Declaration of Independence, as well as members of the Constitutional Convention, is a sort of American peerage. "It is a list of the demigods," said Jefferson when he read the names of the signers of the call for that Convention. When the federal government was established in 1789, the same situation is to be found. Hamilton was frankly distrustful of the people and Washington seems to have had some sympathy with that distrust. The Constitution was so organized that the people could not elect the President directly but were to elect those who, after careful consideration, would select the best available person. Thus liberty was almost tantamount to the right of the masses to elect their officials but not, according to practice, from their own number.

And yet during the very period of the incubation of the Constitution, there were forces developing which were to produce a very different party spirit and become a new force in the American society. I do not re-

fer so much to the philosophical democracy of Thomas Jefferson, important as that was. He was a great expounder of natural rights and liberty, but despite this academic, philosophical interest, he seems to me to have belonged to that group of notables who felt that the control of government naturally belonged in their hands as the proper representatives of the masses, who on the one side he idealized and on the other side treated as equal in their inferiority.

The break with this aristocratic democracy came with the expansion of the frontier. There men found not only individualism but a self-confidence which did not brook the idea that they must let notable families carry on affairs. To a very large extent this new attitude, which was not that of revolt but, rather, of self-reliance, was the outcome of new religious currents. To judge from contemporary records the religious life of New England and, in fact, the whole Atlantic seaboard, was one of eminently conventional respectability. I do not think colonial morals were higher than to-day, but they were different. There was, one might say, a larger sense of propriety. On the frontier, how-

ever, religion took on a very much less conventional and more direct sort of character. New Light preachers, Methodist itinerants, Baptist evangelists preached a sort of gospel that was not adjusted to colonial meeting houses and the formalities of the church. They preached in log cabins, under the trees, wherever they could get a crowd together. Their preaching was not in the cunningly devised words of Harvard College and Yale College, or even in those of the College of New Jersey at Princeton. They preached, rather, the worth of the human soul, the dangers that beset it, and the possibility of immediate access to God. Apparently, they never recognized anything like distinction in social standing. People were all poor, pitting themselves against not a too kindly nature, and the little churches which sprang up all along the western frontier from New York to North Carolina, were filled with the belief of their own importance and the personal worth of their members. They furnished the spiritual motives for the social order that was developing along the frontier. Patrick Henry in Virginia was its mouthpiece and Jefferson in no small degree was

its product. But it took another generation for this popular movement with its new consciousness and self-reliance to be sufficiently widespread and relieved from the first hand-to-hand struggle with nature, to become a real power.

Then began the second period in the history of American democracy. It was not appreciated by the old leaders of the country. When popular democracy triumphed in the election of Andrew Jackson as President a shudder ran through the nation. To the notable families and political leaders of the Atlantic seaboard such a transfer of power seemed almost a revolution. But the new democracy was true to its inheritance, and never for an instant undertook to neglect the Constitution or to attack those fundamental rights which the development of colonies had made so complete. From Jackson's time on, an accredited leader has usually been chosen by those whom he is to lead from their own number and not from some notable family.

And here we notice a remarkable fact. American democracy since the days of Andrew Jackson has not followed inherited

leadership. It has produced its own leaders. It has had, so to speak, no General Staff. It has been under the guidance of noncommissioned officers who have been close enough to their squads of citizens to know their will and express it. Herein American democracy has differed from the English, with its consolidated race and history. We have no great families who assume leadership almost by heredity. It is only in rare cases that a father's name is of any particular service to a young man entering politics. The leaders of democracy work their way up through democracy, partaking of its weaknesses as well as of its strength. American democracy has been a self-conscious mass movement, awakened to mass decisions by political campaigns. It has flowed around obstacles like a huge amoeba. Such conduct seems irrational to political theorists who still think a democracy must wait for guidance from without. They lament the lack of leaders; they pray for leaders; every now and then they undertake to be leaders themselves. But in this attitude they are anachronistic, the contemporaries of the fathers rather than of the children. They fail to see

and trust the extraordinary power of American democracy to produce its leaders from its own tendencies and ideals. In America men become leaders unwittingly. Better than somebody else they do something a precinct, a party, a nation wants done. Men gather about them as long as this representative efficiency continues. When it ceases, the people turn to others who can organize new tendencies, and retire the outgrown leaders of their making to whatever fate awaits them. The process is relentless, but it is the hope of our land. We follow men we have produced. Our idealism is of our own begetting, not of enforced adoption.

This self-directing democracy has always been true to the fundamental conception of the government. That is the reassuring fact. Never has it undertaken to be unconstitutional. In fact, the only serious attempts made upon ideals embodied in the Constitution have been by what might be called the privileged classes. Such, for example, were the abortive attempts of the landed gentry of Kentucky and Virginia in 1798, of the commercial classes of New England at the time of the Embargo Act in 1814, and of South

Carolina, in 1832, where an attempt was made to nullify the federal tariff. But the mass-sense of the nation would have none of such policies.

Take, for instance, the attitude of the country to revolutionary France. It can be easily understood why the American people sympathized greatly with the French when they deposed Louis XVI and established a republic. The American people began to establish Jacobin clubs and to profess wild enthusiasm when in 1793 France declared war against Great Britain. In fact, the situation which followed the overthrow of the Czar by Russian revolutionists was not unlike that which followed the triumph of the Jacobins in the Convention. The mission of Mr. Martens as emissary of the Bolshevik movement may serve to interpret the early days of our national life. The French revolutionists attempted to capitalize this American sympathy. A gentleman by the name of Genet was sent as minister to the United States, and with the sublime superiority which revolutionists have to existing laws wherever found, he proceeded to fit out privateers. Washington promptly issued a

proclamation of neutrality, and the next year Congress passed a Neutrality Act. Whereupon Citizen Genet appealed to the people as against their government. This, of course, was little more than an attempt to spread the principles of revolution in America. He had, of course, his hot-headed followers, just as Bolsheviks have their hot-headed followers to-day, but the American people were not to be stampeded into unconstitutional hysteria, and Citizen Genet, recalled by his government, retreated to an American marriage and the comforts of an American home.

Again and again in the history of our country have attempts been made to stampede our democracy away from its constitutional expression. Very frequently such efforts have taken the form of some type of agitation—anti-Catholic, anti-Chinese or anti-Japanese—by which it has been hoped to excite the people to override the government. In every case they have failed and American democracy has left to its delegated representatives the decisions which have to be made. That public opinion has swayed those decisions goes without saying. It

would have been unfortunate if this had not been the case, but until very recent days democracy has not regarded itself as possessing direct power of action. Even in the case of later developments in States where there has been a recall as well as referendum and initiative, democracy has established through its chosen representatives new methods for orderly self-expression.

How different from this actuality is the rodomontade with which persons unacquainted with American history, unaccustomed to dealing with the human element in all social action, assail the ears of the groundlings! To listen to some of their expositions of democracy is like listening to an oration upon quadratic equations. One can make a paper constitution as perfect as John Locke's constitution for North Carolina, but unless in some way it is able to express and direct and respond to the national mass movement governed by public opinion, it will be ineffective. The fact that our constitution is the product of the same social process that produced our democracy is the great reason why our democracy has always acted constitutionally.

Doubtless the outstanding illustration of this self-directive idealism of the American people lies in the great conflict, already mentioned, over slavery. The answer given by the Civil War to the attempt to recast the original purposes of equality, liberty, and union was not simply that of the relative economic strength of geographical sections. It was the outcome of the growth of a truly American conception of democracy. Not only slavery was at stake, but the fundamental conception of the Union as a body of individual citizens who elect their representatives from localities and not from economic classes. Had the Southern theory of society and of the Union prevailed, our republic would have revived the democracy of the Greek states. A capitalistic class would have constituted the democracy and have ultimately built a social order upon slaves and free men without property and suffrage. But such reversion was prevented.

With the rapid growth of the population, the nation entered a new political period. A new democracy spelled the end of slavery and class control. We have amended our Constitution so that our Senators are elected

by the people instead of by the Legislatures, and despite the fact that it was instituted for another purpose, our electoral college has only seldom failed to reflect the will of a popular majority.

This development has a deeper significance than the immediate relationship of the people with the federal government. It has solidified a political conception. While nations possessing the class system have recognized a democracy based on classes, Americanism has as its political essence a union of inseparable states which is at the same time a democracy made up of free men and women. Every attempt at a different sort of political structure, whether it be in Massachusetts Bay or in the South, has been wiped away.

Here is a definite and distinct political achievement born of the undisguised struggle with its opposite. It is our contribution to liberty. On the worth and permanence of such a democracy we stake our political existence.

Democracy of this American type is a great shock absorber. Within it, as within an ocean, antagonistic forces find themselves

stopped from producing results foretold by the man who deals with ideas rather than folks. The human element is one contribution of American history to political idealism. Social forces in the United States are not working out their result in a vacuum but in the midst of a social order experienced in the assimilation and restraint of conflicting groups. At the risk of excessive repetition, I would again point out that Continental Europe has always differed from America in that it has recognized social classes as units in politics and social adjustments. Each marked political change on the Continent has of necessity been a violent revolution in which one of these classes sought to dispossess the other and reign in its stead. Russia at the present time is suffering from a reversed autocracy. The workingmen are the autocrats and the autocrats are the workingmen. The effect of such revolution is represented by a new class of masters and a new class of servants. Individuals count no more than under the Czar. If there had been in Russia anything corresponding to our American citizenship accustomed to political patience, the establishment of a Russian

republic might have been accomplished in a much less sanguinary fashion.

It is to this American democracy, born of actual experiences in the extension of ideals, that we can confidently look for establishing safe conditions for social reconstruction. The American people is capable of extraordinary surface agitation, but the deep current of its life is that of a representative democracy. However elusive may be "the public," it includes all the parties engaged in the economic struggle as truly as those who are not. Our government represents individuals. The nearest approach to the class representation of the soviet system is the organized lobby. And the combination of lobby and geographical representation is the most successful experiment thus far made in adjusting class interests to national well-being. To make classes into political masters is to revert to a theory the nineteenth century tried and repudiated. We are a democracy of individuals, not of economic classes.

The constitutional struggles of the nineteenth century show plainly the wholesome influence of the national mind. It constitutes

an atmosphere in the midst of which Continental political theories have never flourished. To educate faith in our democracy is our new obligation. Citizenship must include the acceptance of the American convictions as to the state and society. Education cannot undertake a more imperative task than the introduction of each new generation of native-born Americans, as well as immigrants from an alien social order, into that which is genuinely American. Such introduction is the great task of every educational institution.

The permanence of these democratic ideals, I believe, is certain, but there still remains the question as to whether it can be assured without struggle. The history of the nineteenth century suggests caution as to too-ready optimism, but I venture to say that in an educational process of such vast importance the American people will not repudiate its past. We are not engaged in a political debate. We are in deadly earnest. Freedom of speech we must unquestionably preserve. Ideas cannot be answered by policemen's clubs. If there are abuses, let us be told them. But freedom of speech does

not mean loose talk and unrestrained agitation to revolution. We cannot play as we wage a life-and-death struggle between two conceptions of the state. If such a struggle is not to result in civil war, as may God forbid, it will be because the American people are sufficiently alive to the reality of the issue as not to mistake sentimentality for liberty. Freedom does not include the duty of American democracy to permit conspiracy against its constitutional foundations. That was settled in the Civil War. The United States emerged from that terrible struggle not because of Garrison's condemnation of the Constitution as a "covenant with death and an agreement with hell," but because of the great volume of human interest and sacrifice which determined that the Constitution should be preserved and that individualism should not be replaced by a class government. When to-day men attack our form of government and the Constitution and our democracy, it is well to bear in mind that a nation, like an individual, has a perfect right to defend itself. There is nothing in American history to argue that democracy means unlimited opportunity for political suicide,

If men do not like American democracy as it exists to-day under the Constitution, it is possible for them to modify it by constitutional methods. If men do not like American democracy and attempt to change it by appeal to force, they may very properly expect that, as in 1861, the country will see to it that their plans for revolution will be checked. If aliens wish to attack the constitutional institutions of a nation to which they do not belong, they have no right to complain if that nation after preserving its political unity and democracy by its own blood, sends them and their Utopias back to lands where Utopias seem greatly needed. American democracy is no child of political dilettanti and does not hold itself as the sport of a world madness.

If our democracy is self-directing, if it does not wait for self-appointed leaders, if it must and can act for itself, if it is too great for any single leader, it must be possessed of a unity of spirit. And this spirit America has. A Bismarck can make an empire, but a democracy is its own maker. It will not act until it acts in accordance with its own inner spirit. It has mouthpieces and inter-

preters, but it bows to no master. America is its own inner mentor. Out from free discussion comes its programs; from its own spirit comes its prophets; from its education comes its leaders. We look to our democracy to make safe its own future by educating its mighty present.

Standing as we do at the beginning of a new epoch, already experiencing the antagonism of conflicting groups and ideals, we are in truth successors to those who made the democracy we have inherited. We honor them as fathers and teachers, but our noblest loyalty will be shown in our adherence to the great ideals of individuality, liberty, union, and democracy for which they shed their blood. Their spirit lives in our hopes, and their experience in our institutions. If they could speak to us they would bid us avoid their mistakes, but not to fear to carry further their accomplishments. They have bequeathed us a democracy of individuals. It is ours to make it a democracy of brothers.

LECTURE IV

THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION

ONE of the most significant contributions made by American political experience to modern life is the written Constitution. If we go back to 1776, we shall discover a world not only little concerned about constitutional monarchy, but without any serious attempt at organizing the principles of government into a written instrument. Great Britain had then, as now, an unwritten constitution made up of the various acts of Parliament and decisions of courts controlled by general rights formulated in such documents as Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of Rights. But no country, if we make possible exception of Holland, had attempted to reduce to a written statement the general principles upon which states were to be founded and to which citizens and governments were to conform. I do not need to remind you that, despite certain recent tendencies, a constitution differs markedly from a statute in that it delimits the field within which statutes must be made. It organizes

the general principles to which the entire state must conform and does not attempt to deal with specific matters. In a sense it may be said to be a formal expression of what a nation demands its government shall regard as its field of action. It thus protects the freedom of the individual by limiting expressly the powers of government. Democratic government in accord with a written constitution adopted by individual citizens is the third of our great American ideals.

I

This ideal, like individualism and democracy, was the product of a long experience in politics. Like them, too, it is rooted in English history.

With the exception of England, the seventeenth century resigned itself to absolute monarchy. According to the piety of the monarch, this absolutism was believed to be founded upon the divine rights of kings. Louis XIV was the brilliant representative of this conception of the state. Whether he actually used the famous expression, "*L'état, c'est moi!*" may be left to the mercy of doctors' theses, but the saying expresses

precise political fact. The Stuarts undertook to carry forward this same conception of the state in England, but with disastrous results to Charles I and James II. The spirit of Protestantism is increasingly hostile to any type of irresponsible control, and when, as in England, this impatience is joined to Scotch Presbyterianism, results are very apt to follow. True, the Civil War in England did not result in the abolition of the monarchy or in the establishment of a government in any sense comparable with the English democracy of to-day. None the less, in the seventeenth century, constitutional government was to gain impetus. For English absolutism in the seventeenth century was one cause of the great migration of well-to-do Englishmen to America.

The Puritans who settled in Massachusetts and in Connecticut were of substantial means and with a good cultural background. They brought to the task of pioneering educational ideals as well as practical experience in business, church, and politics. They belonged to a much larger party of Englishmen who favored a responsible government. The party struggles of the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries make it plain that great bodies of Englishmen who did not migrate were the equals of the colonists in devotion to political liberty and constitutional government. The conditions, however, which were set up in colonial life hastened the development of political ideals which the social structure and inertia of the mother country made difficult.

Particularly is this true in the case of constitution making. Men living together under new conditions seem to turn naturally to written compacts rather than to gentlemen's agreements. Circumstances in which our forefathers found themselves forced approval of this method, but, like so many other things in our history, the written Constitution was not their out-and-out invention. They had certain precedents which must always have suggested development. First and foremost, there was of course Magna Carta, with which every Englishman was familiar and the sentences of which were the very bulwark of English liberties. But there were other documents with which the American Constitution makers of the eighteenth century were familiar. There was,

for instance, the Petition of Rights of 1628—mostly concerned with military oppression, but also providing that there should be no imprisonment except upon a specific charge. Other Petitions were so important as to be among the foundations of the modern constitutional monarchy of England. There was, too, that most interesting Instrument of Cromwell in which he set forth the general plan of government which he hoped to develop for the Commonwealth. It never had any great influence in English history, but it is at least an indication that as early as 1653 the idea of a written constitution which was to be the test of executive and legislative action was already in the minds of Englishmen. In 1689 William and Mary were declared “King and Queen of Great Britain, Ireland and France,” subject to a Declaration of Rights which limited royal absolutism and settled the succession to the crown, and at the close of the same year a Parliamentary Bill of Rights reaffirmed and further limited the conditions contained in the earlier act. In 1701, by the Act of Settlement, the succession of the crown and royal powers were still further defined.

But more important for the development of the American leaning to a written constitution were undoubtedly the Charters in accordance with which the colonies themselves were administered. Every colony had some such fundamental instrument fixing its relation to the crown. In some cases it was an express instrument of powers of self-government which the colony could exercise. In other cases it was a charter granted to some trading company which in turn granted rights and prescribed conditions to the colonies. In the course of time, however, these charters all emerged from the crown, so that self-government under terms stated by a written document was familiar to the colonies. The local affairs of the colonies under these charters were carried on by representative bodies of various names. Thus another element of the American democracy was in process of development. Colonial governments were fundamentally constitutional in germ.

II

The Mayflower Compact naturally occurs to us as the first of the strictly American an-

cestors of our many constitutions. And, indeed, it was to prove of very great importance—the nearest approach which we have to that hypothetical social compact which played such a role in the political thought of the eighteenth century. Strictly speaking, it was not the constitution of a new state but, rather, an agreement of individuals to maintain loyalty to their English king and to live together under certain conditions. The effect of this Compact, drawn by a few weather-beaten Pilgrims in the tiny cabin of an unbelievably small vessel, was to be felt widely throughout the northern migration in the later periods. Straight across the continent in the latitude of New England, and also in some other localities, you will find towns established in the way of the Pilgrims. The settlers accept an agreement, sign it, and live by it. In such political action one can see the true nature of our Constitution. For, although the small number of persons in these new towns permitted each man to sign the agreement in the presence of his fellows, strictly speaking these compacts were no more adopted by the individuals themselves than was the Constitution of the United

States. The people, and not the state government, adopted the Constitution through conventions. Thus, in very truth, every man who becomes a citizen agrees to live by the Constitution of the United States. He is not dependent upon general ideas as to what is right or upon successive legislative acts, but upon that conception of government which the Constitution of his nation prescribes and he accepts.

I call attention to this fact here because there is much loose talk abroad which would seem to indicate that one has a constitutional right to act as if there were no Constitution. But such a view is contrary to the very essence of our national ideal. A constitution is not superimposed upon the people any more than was the Mayflower Compact. It is a general statement as to the rules of the game of American citizenship. We can change it—but until it is changed, we have no right to live contrary to it.

Long before these town covenants, however, what was probably the first real constitution which America, and possibly the world, ever saw appeared in the Organic Articles of Connecticut drawn up and

adopted in 1639. They organize the ideal of a representative government and make plain the limitations as well as the powers of the state. It is worth noticing, also, that one of the most complete expositions of the theory of the written Constitution and of the state is set forth in a sermon preached by Hooker just prior to the adoption of the Articles. And I do not need to remind you that so thoroughly and prophetically American was that conception that Connecticut saw little need of changing the provisions of this ancient document when it became a State of the Union.

This action of Connecticut was followed in 1641 by the Body of Liberties adopted by the General Court of Massachusetts, and in 1643 there was formed the confederation known as the United Colonies of New England, with terms also contained in a written instrument.

The conception of a Constitution as a compact between citizens was given color by the philosophy of Locke, which was popular in the American colonies. Indeed, he had drawn up a Constitution for the Carolinas in 1669, although it was never adopted and as

a matter of fact did not emphasize his philosophy. In 1682 a Frame of Government was drawn up by William Penn as a basis for organizing his colony. In 1772 the citizens of Boston resolved that "the commonwealth is a body politic or civil society of men united together to promote their mutual safety and prosperity by their union." An examination of the Constitutions of the thirteen colonies will disclose constant repetition of this conception of compact. Probably the most striking illustrations are the constitutions of Massachusetts and Virginia. But everywhere we get the American conception of a constitution as an instrument for codifying and maintaining the rights of the people from the oppression of the government. They not only establish representative government, but limit its employment of its representative powers.

In some cases these constitutions are prefaced by a Declaration of Rights. We can say truthfully that these Declarations of Rights are an American improvement upon the Bills of Rights and Petitions of Rights and even the Declaration of Rights of the mother country. They are the outcome al-

most exclusively of the church life of the New England colonies. As I have already pointed out they served as models for the Declarations of Rights of the French Revolution, but their idealism is not that of abstract philosophy. Rather it springs from religious conviction given direction and control by political experience. Whether or not these Declarations are prefixed to the various constitutions of the States, they are none the less involved therein. Such a Declaration was prefixed to the Articles of Confederation, but in the Constitution of the United States was omitted. The first nine amendments to the Constitution, however, may be said to be a statement of rights which had not been definitely asserted in the Constitution itself. These amendments were adopted practically without discussion as expressing the ideals which everybody held. The separation of church and state is perhaps the most advanced of these rights when compared with the ecclesiastical situation in other countries. The others may all be found at least in germ in the constitutional life of England itself.

This simple fact in itself is eloquent of the

entirely practical mood of mind from which the American Constitution sprang. It was not the charting of an untraveled sea. It was, rather, the projection of well-worn paths. What had worked was to work. What experience had favored, experience was to carry forward. French reform in 1789 became revolution in 1792 very largely because men inexperienced in constitutional government undertook to lay down fundamental general principles from which they could deduce a constitution. While they were discussing a Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, human passions swept beyond them so that their constitution was moribund as soon as it was born. The American colonies had practiced rights. They did not stop to discuss them until after they had focused their experiences in an instrument of government. Political theory was the child of political practice.

This practical idealism appeared also in the discussion which sprang up around the Constitution after its adoption. The point at issue was not social theory, abstract democracy, or, in fact, anything abstract. What the American people chose was what

they saw in many cases was the lesser of two evils. Any sort of constitution that could bring about an actual union between the States was better than the anarchy toward which the country was drifting. But order was to come from delegated powers. The American Revolution had been based on the belief that Parliament was violating fundamental laws and natural rights. The new federal government, as far as possible, was to be made incapable of any such unconstitutional action.

Thus the task which our constitutional forbears faced was unprecedented, but they were not without suitable experience. In shaping up government by means of a written instrument, the American colonists were following a course of action with which they were already acquainted and which had already justified itself in the protection of the rights and liberties of Englishmen. It is only what might be expected that, having once undertaken to build a government with power, the American colonists should be anxious lest they should give it too much power. Our Constitution is a formulation of structural law, a protection of the liberty

which the individual already possessed as truly as it was the creator of a government.

III

It has of late been argued that our written Constitution is too rigid; that it would be better for the American people if it had a Constitution susceptible of easier amendment. "Why," it is asked, "should our ancestors control our action?" Such criticism is based largely upon the sufficiency and success of the British constitution, which is not a written document. In my opinion, such criticism, while not without plausibility, is unjustified. The various Commonwealths which compose the British Empire have all adopted written constitutions, and there is a fair question as to the precise accuracy of the statement that the British constitution is beyond documentary control. But quite apart from such considerations, the United States would certainly have been in chaos long ago if it had not possessed a written Constitution which could give permanency of government to millions of naturalized citizens unaccustomed to democracy. Herein we markedly differ from a homogeneous na-

tion with the inhibitions and guidance of experience like England. Again and again has our country been saved from hasty, and what might have proved fatal innovations by the simple fact that because we have a written Constitution changes are not matters of opinion and policies but of law. Proposed changes to the Constitution already number several thousand. Many of these might have become operative had it not been for the necessary delay which the process of amending the Constitution necessitates.

But such criticism of our Constitution as a safeguard of democracy is not widespread. In talking with almost any American who is not addicted to theoretical politics you will discover that he respects the Constitution even more than the government. It is the Constitution, or, if I may be permitted to coin a word, it is the *constitutionism* that he would preserve. He is ready to change the Constitution, but it must be changed in accordance with its own proviso; and so it has really come to pass that the innermost sanctity of American political life is not abstract democracy or liberty, but the Constitution, which makes possible liberty, govern-

ment among equals, and constitutional changes without revolution. Foreign critics of our institutions usually see this but without always justly appreciating it. We Americans understand it because we see in our Constitution something more than a theoretical exposition of abstract principles. It is the codification of workable idealism derived from generations of experience. It formulates rules for playing on a larger scale a game already understood.

Two facts are suggested by this consideration of rigidity in our Constitution. In the first place, the Constitution, although a document, has in the course of national expansion become in reality something not altogether unlike the British constitution. This has come about constitutionally by the passage of acts by Congress which, although widely extending certain grants of power to the federal government, have been pronounced constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. The judge and the legislator have been not only guardians but reinterpreters of the Constitution. One might almost say that we have remade our nation by a broad interpretation of the sen-

tence giving the federal government control of interstate commerce. No one can for a moment believe that legislation like that dealing with child labor, pure foods, safety devices on freight trains was specifically in the minds of the makers of the Constitution. But conditions in 1789 gave rise to general formulas, capable of varied application. Among them was the necessity that the federal government rather than that of the separate States should control commerce between the States. This organic principle has been extended by legislation and judicial decision in accordance with its spirit rather than with its details. Our actual working Constitution has grown with the growth of the nation, notwithstanding the fact that it has been formally amended only eighteen times. Statesmen like Webster, jurists like Marshall have almost as much claim as the members of the Constitutional Convention to be numbered among the fathers of the Constitution.

There are important fields in which this development of the Constitution is still in process, as, for example, the power of the executive; but so thoroughly ingrained is

respect for the Constitution and so effective are the various checks in government which it has embodied, that these elaborations of its principles by which the more complicated life of our day is brought within its jurisdiction will continue to be an expanding interpretation of its paragraphs.

That there are dangers incident to this more or less surreptitious amending, or, if the word be preferred, expanding of the Constitution, cannot be denied. The rapid extension of federal powers by court decisions during the past quarter of a century has undoubtedly resulted from a belief that formal amendments to the same effect would have been impossible. Much of this new legislation springs from an entirely different conception of our federal government than that held by the makers of the Constitution. Some social reform—like the regulation of child labor, the maintenance of pure food, the protection of railway employees, the control of railway charges, the curbing of commercialized vice—becomes a matter of general policy. Its efficiency depends upon a uniformity of provision impossible if sought in the legislation of the various States. Pub-

lic opinion demands nation-wide legislation. Congress passes the necessary laws and the Supreme Court finds them in accord with some clause of the Constitution broadly interpreted. Has such a process any limits? Would it not be more honest to amend the Constitution frankly giving Congress such powers? So it is occasionally argued and the argument is not to be ignored. But whether or not this new revision of the Constitution is strictly logical, even if in some measure it may seem to partake of national self-deception, it is the way American political development is proceeding. And after all allowances have been made, it has in its favor the fact that it maintains caution and continuity. In its light the charge that we are slaves to an outgrown document seems trivial. A constitution drawn as wisely as our own permits a conservative but constant adjustment of our democracy by progressive legislation to new social conditions.

The second fact to be noted is that the amendments to the Constitution have always been in the interest of the extension of rights. No reactionary amendment has ever been

adopted. The Constitution has shown itself capable of change by prescribed means just as soon as a general public opinion has come to feel that new fundamental ideals have grown into national folkways. Thus slavery was abolished, suffrage has been extended, senators have been elected by public vote, an income tax has been permitted, the power of the liquor traffic to injure society has been restricted. Every one of these amendments represents a definite extension of fundamental idealism upon which our national life is built. Not one of them looks toward the development of class consciousness or class control. The welfare of the individual is paramount. The fact that constitutional amendments do thus breed true to a fundamental purpose of democracy is a tremendous argument for the validity, not only of the various provisions of the Constitution, but of the very conception of constitutionalism itself.

There are no limits to which these amendments can go provided only they are adopted according to constitutional methods. It is the method of amendment that is fundamental, not the type of the amendment. If the constitutional number of the States

wishes to have an amendment establishing some different form of government—monarchical, socialistic, communistic, or what not—there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent such amendments from being adopted and the government being changed. But an attempt to change the government in any other than constitutional ways is revolution. The Declaration of Independence expressly recognizes the right of revolution, but it does not undertake to say that revolution is constitutional. When certain extremists plead the constitutional right to freedom of speech to agitate a revolution they seem to me to lack a sense of humor.

IV

Thus it will appear that the Constitution is not something apart from democracy or individualism. It is one phase of what might be called a composite ideal. And so is it regarded. The American respect for the Constitution is not bibliolatry, but is due to our belief that it embodies our conception as to what the state should be. And this ideal of a state so organized that it knows from a written document the limitations and powers of

a representative government established for the purpose of guarding the freedom of individuals, is guaranteed by two outstanding facts.

First: It has made a permanent government. Notwithstanding the fact that the United States was an unprecedented venture in politics, at the present time, with the exception of Great Britain and Turkey, its government is the oldest of all existing states. Such stability was not expected by observers in the eighteenth century. It seemed incredible that there should not arise in the United States as in older countries some family that would become royal. The likelihood of disintegration of the state and consequent collapse of anything like government was argued from the fate of the government erected under the Articles of Confederation, and the tempting of political Providence by offering full citizenship to immigrants. Since the barbarian invasion of the Roman Empire there has been no such mingling of nations as there is daily on the American continent. That in the face of these conditions stability of government should be so marked is a reassurance in a

period of transition like our own. As a nation, we have left undone those things that we ought to have done, and we have done those things that we ought not to have done, but there is health in us.

Second: Testimony to the validity of our constitutional ideal is to be seen in world history. The entire course of political history since 1779 has been corroborative of the American constitutionalism. No sooner had this conception of a government under a constitution been realized on our shores than it became contagious. The history of the world since 1776 has been the record of the slow infiltration of all politics with the American conception of the state as a free citizenship electing its governors in accordance with a constitution. It passed into France. Many liberal Frenchmen had fought in the American Revolution. In the success of the American colonies they saw the possibility of establishing a French state in which the rights of men should be the basis of a constitutional government. And they brought to France this assurance of the success of democracy.

England followed, and in the course of

forty years Englishmen, with characteristic caution and their ability to readjust privileges, passed the various Reform Bills, and, although they adopted no formal instrument of government, developed a democracy with the same basis as that of the United States—that is, a citizenship electing a responsible government. Of course the British have a king, but there are two Georges in England at the present time—the greatly loved George V and the son of a Welsh schoolmaster, Lloyd George. It is the second George who is the active governor of the kingdom.

This conception of a state based upon the rights of men, in which the administrators under the terms of a constitution are responsible to the people, colored the hope of Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century. But except in Great Britain and in France it was everywhere repressed. In Prussia, the conception of a state that recognized no power and right of citizens to express themselves in their own government was enforced by every type of censorship and proscription and military power. The sinister influence in Europe for

thirty-five years after Napoleon was Metternich of Austria, and he looked at the government of England as one to be avoided by all the monarchs of Europe. Frederick William III of Prussia followed in the wake of Austria. His people wanted a constitution, and they were promised it again and again. The people of southern Germany wanted constitutions, and they got them—Bavaria and Baden in 1818, Wurtemberg in 1819, Hesse-Darmstadt in 1819. Saxony gained a constitution so liberal that it became almost a "red kingdom," until Prussia forced Saxons to adopt a constitution of the Prussian sort. But Prussia stood like Gibraltar against constitutional government. When Frederick William III died and his son, the affable Frederick William IV, came to the throne, he refused to give a constitution, uttering words which sound strangely like some recently spoken, "Never will I let a sheet of written paper come like a second Providence between our Lord God in heaven and the land, to govern us by its paragraphs."

In 1848 a new wave of constitutionalism swept over Europe. It was the work of the

grandchildren of the earlier agitators, and it was stronger than that of the grandfathers. The revolution of 1848 in France expressed the undercurrent of the democracy that was working through all Europe. France has ever manfully sought to maintain its republic. Governments have been pushed aside time and again by some *coup d'état*; but in 1848 this persistent loyalty to constitutional government expressed itself anew, and with greater powers. The king was thrust out and the new republic of France was established. A short-lived republic, to be sure, soon to go down at the hands of Napoleon III, but nevertheless, an illustration of the new spirit. The movement swept across Europe to Austria, and it dislodged Metternich himself, forcing him to flee to England and safety.

You know the extension of constitutional government in the second half of the nineteenth century: how nation after nation adopted written constitutions, and how in those constitutions, with ever-increasing emphasis, the government was made responsible to the citizens. You can see this development in France, in the Scandinavian coun-

tries, in Belgium, Spain, Italy and Portugal, in Japan and China. In fact, the only great states that had not yielded to the impulse in 1914 were Prussia, Austria, Turkey, and Russia. To-day Turkey alone of these four nations is a monarchy.

Democracy spread into Russia. In 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, when the kings of Europe were gathered to dismember the Napoleonic conquests, the little republic of Genoa was tossed off to some king. Its representative came to the Czar and protested that a republic should not be so treated. The Czar said, "Republics are no longer fashionable!" A hundred and two years later Russia said to the Czar, "Czars are no longer fashionable." The difference between those two statements is the measure of the influence of the American conception of the state as coextensive with citizenship, and of government as responsible to this citizenship, and of a constitution as the protector of individual rights.

LECTURE V

COOPERATIVE SOVEREIGNTY

THE fourth ideal which has found expression in the development of America has been that of a cooperative sovereignty.

In history sovereignty has been far enough from being cooperative. Every nation has regarded itself as possessing not only the absolute power of administering its own affairs, maintain an army and navy, issue money and enforce its own laws, but the right to extend its control to other nations. Along with this power has existed a national pride peculiarly susceptible to injury and insult. Sovereignty in a nation has thus reflected the sovereignty of the absolute king with his unrestrained power and supreme dignity. Beyond it there lay only God. The sovereign on earth was the visible expression of the Sovereign in heaven.

The stormy rise of nationalities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries kept this conception of sovereignty always in the foreground. Unrestrained by any power su-

perior to itself, a nation was not a moral entity. It could do what it was able to do. War was almost continuous, for out from war came national expansion. Subjects of one sovereign were forced to become subjects of another. To question the right of a state to control its own subjects and attack its neighbors was to limit its sovereignty. To a considerable extent this conception still holds sway in the thoughts of legislators. Conditions which touch the sovereign honor of a nation are not regarded as justiciable. They lie beyond the range of treaties and are regarded as legitimate causes of war.

But between the conceptions of sovereignty universal in the seventeenth century and those of to-day lies a very real difference. Without any definite discussion of international morals, and certainly without any attempt to limit the right of any sovereign power to enter upon war on its own volition, there has grown up a belief that sovereignty must regard advantages which are superior to itself. Nations are beginning to think of humanity. To this change the United States has made important contributions.

I

The ideal of America, albeit still imperfect, that sovereignty can be cooperative as well as independent has sprung not from abstract politics but from national behavior. Incomplete though it may be, its life history is by no means brief. The establishment of the United Colonies of New England (1643) upon the basis of a formal agreement of Connecticut, New Haven, Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay to act together for the sake of protection against the Indians, is a sort of connecting link between the older conception of alliances and the later conception of sovereign states. In a sense it had already been forecast by the forming of little towns into independent colonies. A union of all the English colonies on the Atlantic seaboard seems never to have occurred to the original settlers. The first attempt to find some unity of action sprang from the need of establishing a common defense against the Six Indian Tribes. In 1754 the so-called Albany Conference was summoned with this end in view. At this conference Franklin proposed a plan of union of the

northern colonies. According to this, each colony would give up its particular royal charter and join the others in something like a self-directive state under the suzerainty of the mother country. In a way it was a forecast of the present British Empire. It was to have a president appointed by the Crown, a Grand Council of delegates elected by the Colonial Assembly. Its legislation was to be subject to veto by the President and approved by the Crown. The plan was immediately rejected by Connecticut because of this power of the veto and then by all the colonies and the Crown itself. This interesting plan proved thus impracticable because of unreadiness to modify existing institutions.

In 1765 the struggle of the colonies with the home government over the Stamp Tax led to the summoning in New York of another conference. This Stamp Act Congress was composed of twenty-eight delegates representing all the thirteen colonies except Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, although these colonies were not opposed to the plan. As it turned out, this Congress was a forerunner of the later cooperative actions of the colonies. The care-

ful limitation of powers granted by the colonies to their representatives is worthy of careful consideration by students of the American Constitution. They show very clearly the unwillingness of the colonies to delegate any of their limited powers to a representative body. As was expected, the Congress drew up petitions and memorials to Parliament, protesting against the Stamp Act. What was, however, of more importance, it adopted a Declaration of Rights and Liberties which set forth sharply the colonies' view of their relations with the home government. But this Congress accomplished little beyond giving expression to the growing sense of union among the colonies.

The Stamp Act was repealed within a few months because it brought in no revenue, but this action of Parliament was accompanied by the statement that "Parliament has power to bind the colonies in all cases whatsoever." This in turn served to hasten the coming of American independence. The next ten years were to show that the colonies were unwilling to admit any such limitation of their powers. While they did not in 1765 regard themselves as sovereign states, they

did regard themselves as having power of self-determination in regard to their own affairs. In fact, so independent did they apparently become that in 1769 Parliament undertook an investigation of what it regarded as acts of treason committed in the colonies and sent troops to enforce its decisions. In 1773, the Virginia Assembly appointed a Committee of Correspondence for communicating with the other colonies—an act which was followed by the other colonies. Within the same year Franklin again proposed a Congress for the colonies, and this time his plan was adopted by all the colonies except Georgia. On September 5, 1774, the first Continental Congress met at Philadelphia and during the few weeks it was in session prepared an address to the King, memorials to Great Britain and nonparticipating colonies in America, drew up a Declaration of Rights and on October 20 established an American Association. This was in effect an agreement to stop trade with Great Britain until the unsatisfactory acts had been repealed. When it adjourned it resolved to meet the next year in case it had not gained its desired ends. Because of the

attempt of the British to enforce the Acts, Massachusetts broke into rebellion and war followed.

The American Revolution clearly indicates how little sense of cooperation the colonies had in their first experience of sovereignty. The Continental Congress, indeed, continued throughout the entire period of the war, but it was possessed of practically no power to enforce its decisions. Each colony—or State—was sensitive to any outer control. After the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, on November 15, 1777, the Congress adopted Articles of Confederation and proposals of union between the thirteen States which then regarded themselves as independent and possessed of sovereign power. This union was called the United States of America, but its central idea was that of a confederation. There was no citizenship outside that of the various States. Treaties which were made with France were those of the united states, but the Continental Congress had no power to enforce their provisions upon the various States. Indeed, it was exceedingly difficult to induce these States to engage in

any continued united effort for the war. The armies under Washington and the other generals repeatedly disintegrated. It grew impossible to raise money to pay the soldiers through requisition upon the States, since each State determined just how much financial assistance it would give the United States. The treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain, France, and Spain was a treaty with a Confederation that had no power to compel the action of the citizens of its component States. It could not establish a revenue by imposts. Its currency became worthless, and the treaties were soon violated by various States.

Four years after the close of the Revolutionary War the United States were on the verge of anarchy. There seemed to be no way of producing order. Sovereignty in the thirteen States was of the nature of the sovereignty of European states. Each was jealous of its fellows. The threatened collapse of order and the paralysis of government led to the formation of a new Constitution, which should inaugurate a genuine union in place of a confederation.

Even a superficial study of American

popular opinion in 1789 will show how far the country was from any national unanimity of spirit. Each State claimed to have full sovereignty, and already quarrels were breaking out between them which threatened civil war. A monarchy was out of the question, and a confederation had been found impracticable. Thrust, therefore, into a condition which seemed even to the bravest patriot all but certain to result in anarchy, the little group of men who drew up the new Constitution undertook to build a federal government that should not deny sovereignty to the States, yet should have a sovereignty of its own. This was accomplished by the novel device of delegating certain powers of each of the thirteen sovereign States to the new federal government, by making the citizens of the States citizens of the United States and by having the Constitution adopted by the people rather than by the legislators of the several States. It was thus a form of compact between citizens rather than between governments.

Yet the original States persisted. Never by choice or the growth of precedent have they become mere departments of a unitary

state. Such a national structure as this involves puzzles citizens of highly centralized and departmentalized states like Japan and France. Yet in this local citizenship with its varied legislation lies no small element of our national strength. It conserves and expresses an intimate patriotism at once jealous of local rights and cooperative in national affairs.

For our Constitution fundamentally does not aim at overhead absolutism. The ideal it embodies is not that of political uniformity. By its very origin it aims at union, order, and cooperative efficiency. Its makers had no theoretical interest in the problems of government as such. They took the situation as they found it and made such changes and demanded such concessions as seemed imperative for the building up of a central government which should be capable of national defense, carrying on of foreign affairs, financing itself under certain definite limitations, maintaining public order, and issuing money. These were the powers of a sovereign state, but they were delegated by the thirteen sovereign States to the Federal Government.

So adventurous an undertaking carried in itself many unsettled questions as to the extent of the sovereignty which had been left the original thirteen States. Old ideas persisted. In 1798 Virginia and Kentucky adopted resolutions to the effect that each State had the right to judge for itself just how far the acts of the federal government were binding. Fortunately, the occasion which gave rise to such a dangerous doctrine passed and the wisdom of the early administrations and a number of exceedingly important decisions of the Supreme Court soon made it apparent that the constitutional acts of the federal government were to be accepted by the States and that no State was to pass legislation contrary to the congressional acts.

But the question as to the extent of the sovereignty left in the possession of the States constituting the Union still remained. Nor did it compel a decision until the emergence of slavery as a sectional issue. Even then the right of a State to reassume its independence either by nullification of the acts of Congress or by actual secession from the Union did not become a burning issue until

the expansion of the North made it plain that its political power in Congress would soon be greater than that of the South. The two sections of the country, which had been practically equal in population at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, were becoming a majority and a minority. As long as the balance of power in the Senate was maintained by the admission of an equal number of slave and free States, the question of sovereignty was left in abeyance. When, however, the South became a minority and feared anti-slavery legislation, it magnified the sovereignty of each State. Such a political program had two serious defects. It refused to admit the Union as inseparable, and at the same time demanded that the Union protect the institutions of one State in all other States. This latter demand was necessary, since slavery was evidently doomed unless the entire nation supported it as among the rights enjoyed by certain of its component States. Paradoxically, States' rights, in order to maintain slavery, needed the support of the Union. It denied and yet demanded the cooperative sovereignty.

Thus the economic and social theory

which centered about slavery inevitably became constitutional propaganda. We are not altogether strangers to the issue, for we face a similar difficulty in enforcing the eighteenth amendment, but such a difficulty to-day does not involve geographical divisions. The bitterness of constitutional struggles is not to-day solidified into economic areas. But in the early half of the nineteenth century the country faced a real issue as to the interpretation of our national life. For thirty years after the Missouri Compromise the maintenance of the Union was the supreme purpose of all statesmen. When the Southern social theory was completed, States' rights was its one protection, the Union its great adversary. That the issue should have been settled by civil war was probably inevitable, for the two conceptions of a social order became politically incompatible and antagonistic. The era of compromise gave time for the marshaling of social forces and material resources. History again gave the verdict. The Civil War not only determined that the wage system instead of slavery should be a phase of capitalism, but it also determined that the United

States should be a nation with a national sovereignty instead of a confederacy with a group of local sovereignties; a nation with a national citizenship instead of a confederacy with local citizenship. The fall of slave-capitalism and States' rights meant the rise of a federal democracy. Sovereignty had at last been made cooperative.

With the passage of the fourteenth amendment still further limitations were put upon the independent action of the various sovereign States. By it the federal government was given the power of preventing the States from passing certain laws affecting their citizens. The efficiency of this new control has been to a considerable extent negated by evasive legislation, but as a principle it is a part of the national structure. Restriction has now supplemented cooperation.

Yet the fundamental conception of the Union has not thereby been changed. Our federal government is still one of delegated powers formulated in the Constitution. Extension of these powers is not the destruction of the principle. The ideal of cooperative sovereignty is preserved.

II

The extent of the influence of this ideal of cooperative sovereignty has not been sufficiently appreciated. Like other aspects of the constitutional history of the United States, it has encouraged a new attitude of mind. It has served as a tension point for readjustments in international relations. It will be remembered that the colonists extended the experience of their mother country into the new political conditions demanded by the building of a people in an all but empty continent. Similarly, the experience of Americans in erecting a delegated sovereignty for the common good of sovereign States accustomed Americans to a recognition of the rights of other nations.

Particularly is this true of the relations of the United States and Great Britain, a country which was contemporaneously making the same expansion of English constitutional experience. It is not so many years ago that we were about to celebrate the hundred years of peace between the two world powers. When, however, the time came, Europe was at war and we were neutral.

Lest, therefore, we should in some way violate this neutrality, we curtailed the celebration of a world epoch to a few pageants and the reading of historical essays. It seems a pity that no larger attention was paid to this extraordinary fact. It might have served a very useful purpose in offsetting the anti-English propaganda of continental Europeans and Irishmen. Even now it is worth consideration. For this century of peace was not a century of peaceableness. The United States and Great Britain have quarreled over almost every subject about which other nations have fought. There is not a foot of our northern boundary line, not a codfish on the banks of Newfoundland, but has been submitted to arbitration. Yet we have not fought. Each nation through its experience in a developing democracy has come to see that the rights of humanity are not antagonistic to the rights of sovereignty. Perhaps not always graciously but always effectively, the two countries have yielded to a consideration of the rights of each other.

Take, for example, our much discussed Monroe Doctrine. When President Monroe

wrote his history-making message (1823), the reactionary forces of the continent of Europe had bound themselves, under pious verbiage, to prevent the extension of democracy. They were planning not only the fixing of the peace of Europe but also the permanency of absolute monarchy. According to the doctrine set forth in the President's message: "The American continents are not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power and the extension of the program of the Holy Alliance to these continents would be viewed as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." The more one considers this statement, the more audacious does it sound. In 1823 we had practically no army and a weak navy. Such a recognition of self-defense as involving the protection of other nations would have been hardly more than political bombast if it had not been for the fact that Great Britain took the declaration seriously and made it a basis for international friendship. The British fleet has been the great bulwark of the Monroe Doctrine. Self-interest undoubtedly was operative in both the American and the

British policies, but it is one thing to maintain sovereignty and another thing at the same time to see that national safety is a good only as other nations are respected in their sovereignty. From the point of view of developing an international morality, that is the most significant thing in our Monroe Doctrine. We have never attempted to coerce the states to the south of us into union, but we have made it plain to the world that the Americas are to be treated not as isolated sovereignties but as a continent.

This spirit of subordinating national sensitiveness to international well-being extended over the world. In 1915 the principle of arbitration was expressed in two hundred and fifty-five arbitration treaties in addition to those "bide-a-wee" treaties of Mr. Bryan. Of these arbitration treaties the central powers had made but seven and of these Germany had made but one. The others are between states who have had real or supposed experience in democracy. The United States has not gone as far in relying upon arbitration as some of us would like, but our sympathies and influence have grown con-

stantly more pronounced in this regard. By our experience in cooperative sovereignty at home we have come to feel that war is a useless tragedy to be avoided. Such an attitude of mind is bound to express itself still further in some form or other of international cooperation. A sovereignty which insists exclusively upon its own rights is a breeder of war. Ten years ago this might have seemed hardly more than an abstract generalization. To-day it is a truth of supreme value. We are now engaged in a universal discussion as to how far the sovereign rights of a nation are compatible with cooperation with other nations.

There are those that tell us that nationalism is something to be destroyed, that the proper unity of the race is to be found in the proletariat. There are others, especially old men, who insist that a nation must be self-sufficient and detached from the world to live. Of the two conceptions, the proletarian internationalism is a reform against history and human nature. National boundaries were never more subjects of passionate interest than to-day. As to a self-centered atomistic nationalism it is enough to say that

no nation nowadays can be detached from the world at large. However much one may regret that fact, it must be regarded as a datum of thought. No amount of voting on the part of our legislative bodies can restore the asylum once given by the Atlantic and the Pacific. You cannot put out a conflagration by posting a sign to the effect that you decline to share in the flames that come sweeping down the street. You cannot make yourself immune from smallpox by running a quarantine rope across your sidewalk. We are a sovereign nation in the midst of sovereign nations, knit to them by commerce, subject to the social contagion of their ills. Any exercise of sovereignty that ignores these facts will be as futile as that which Napoleon attempted to exercise over the peoples of Central Europe. We tried assiduously to keep out of the Great War, but the world drew us into the maelstrom of its tragedy. The task of adjusting national sovereignty to a world solidarity is not a matter for phrase makers, impatient idealists, or selfish profiteers. It is for men who, like the fathers of our Constitution, dare face the already existing need of some

sort of solidarity. The nineteenth century taught us that in our land the sovereignty of States must be made cooperative. The twentieth century will teach us the impossibility of any secession from world affairs or nullification of world duties. The force of circumstance is already compelling us. As the new continent forced us to expand our local ideals into national affairs, so a new world is forcing us to find some sort of adjustment by which nations can live together with peace. We want no superstate, but we do want and shall have codified cooperation among states that are sovereign.

Partly because of our experience in the recognition of each other's rights, partly because we have not been forced into fierce competition for territory, we have developed a creditable attitude toward weaker nations. Take, for example, the matter of indemnities. They have come to us from the necessity of cooperation with European nations in wars with weak nations. In 1868 we had a war with Japan. It was just when that country was beginning its new epoch, and the Japanese government, partly from weakness and partly from ignorance, had given offense to

certain European nations. The United States was obliged to cooperate in a war. We had no army in Japan, and no navy, but we hired a gunboat from the Dutch and went to war. When victory came after a few weeks, there also came the inevitable demand for indemnity. Our share of the loot was \$800,000. It was paid over and put into the treasury of the United States, but it was never appropriated, and in 1883 the United States paid back the entire amount with interest.

In 1898 there was the Boxer trouble in China. It was the attempt of a people in terror of subjection to alien powers to push the foreign influence out of China. China was in actual process of dismemberment at the hands of Russia, Great Britain, Germany, France, and Japan. The ambassadors of the various nations were besieged in Peking. An expeditionary force, composed of troops of the various nations, rescued the ambassadors and proceeded to inflict punishment on the Chinese. When the uprising was over, an indemnity of 450,000,000 taels was laid on the country. Our share was something like \$20,000,000. But again the

United States refused the indemnity, and after having received a sum sufficient to make actual reparation for loss of property and lives, and the expense of the expedition, we told China to keep the balance, approximately \$10,000,000. The income from that sum is now being used to send Chinese youths to the United States for an education. And what is even more significant, we insisted that all nations should respect the integrity of China and maintain the open door to commerce of all nations. The world stands pledged to that policy to-day.

When we have been obliged to fight with other nations, we have paid rather than received indemnities. I have no desire to justify the war with Mexico, although it has its valiant defenders, but I wish to remind you that if we did conquer Mexico, we paid her \$15,000,000 for the practically uninhabited land which we annexed. Similarly in the case of the Philippines we paid Spain an indemnity of \$20,000,000 and then undertook to educate the Filipinos into a capacity for self-government. And we have kept our promises to the extent the welfare of the Philippine Islands seems to warrant.

I do not mean to say there has not been arbitrary action in our dealings with the Central American states and Haiti, but we have never looted these states nor annexed them. We have, rather, sought to assist them to stability of government and to protect them from the rapacity of European creditors.

And then there is Mexico. Our refusal to intervene in Mexico, now so thoroughly justified by the course of events, was a continuation of our policy not to let our government be made a cat's-paw by commercial interests. The American soldier has never followed the concessionaire. President Wilson did something more than keep America out of war with Mexico. He showed the South American continent that the United States in applying its democracy to international affairs was not a big bully seeking to aggrandize itself at the expense of other nations. We have recognized sovereignty while protecting states. In so doing we have evolved a new conception of international relations. We have made them a source of helpfulness and cooperation rather than exploitation.

Who can fail to be proud of a country that thus treats weaker nations! We have had our moments of shame and repentance, of ignominy and civil war, but our international behavior increasingly is developing the ideal that strong nations must recognize the rights of weak nations. As President Wilson said, "A weak nation should enjoy self-government." That is not only an international evangel, but is another way of saying that sovereignty must be cooperative.

The war we have just fought was one of self-defense, not merely for ourselves but for democracy as well. We fought to establish a world in which peace should not be at the mercy of any autocracy, but one in which through the mutual recognition of each other's rights, nations should make it possible for men and women to live joyously so controlled by justice that social improvement shall go on to full fruition. In such a world small nations shall be no longer the prey of strong nations, and men and nations alike shall see that it is more blessed to give justice than fight for rights. That this great ideal is not yet realized is no ground for despair. Already it is asserting itself in vari-

ous forms.¹ The British Empire is a group of cooperative sovereignties. The League of Nations is already in action. The Balkan States are forming alliances that promise some approach to common policies. Constitutionalism a century and a half ago was regarded no less chimerical than this peaceful fellowship of nations looking to mutual advantage and a common future. In the world as in America, sovereignty is yet to be co-operative rather than belligerent.

¹ Since the delivery of these lectures there was held the Conference on Limitation of Armaments. It is another illustration of the new power of the ideal of cooperation among sovereign states.

LECTURE VI

AMERICANISM AS AN IDEAL

WE have thus far been considering ideals which are particularly associated with our national development. But these are by no means all that America represents. America itself is an ideal. To attempt to define it, to analyze its elements is almost to destroy its power. In many an immigrant mind the United States is a synonym for the Golden Grail—a deliverance from all subjection, a pledge of peace and plenty. It requires no cynic to point out that the America of actual fact is something very different from this dream, and yet we should be immeasurably poorer if we were content to say the America of to-day is the true America of our hopes. We admit our crudities, our materialism, our bombastic patriotism and all those other evil qualities which the foreign observer so readily discovers. But we deny that the true America can be known fully from the existing America. We look back across three centuries and see an uninhabited continent re-

ceiving a few thousand adventurous souls who sought to tame it into a home land. Across these centuries of development we chart our national development. If growth had stopped, if our present civilization were fastened on us, if the leaven of hope and creative zeal were not yet within our hearts, we might well feel America deserves the criticism to which she has of late been so pitilessly exposed. But still feeling the creative urge, still believing that America is in the making, we demand of our critics that they add this sense of the future to the present they find so unsatisfactory. For there still lies in our minds the promise of a better social order. The past with its rapid development is a promise of a future that shall also see development. America is still becoming.

But what is it to become? Is to-morrow to carry forward the curve of yesterday? Can these ideals which have proved their validity in our larger individual freedom, our democracy, our Constitution, and our sense of international morality, still be trusted to be operative in the world which they have themselves begotten? Or will they become merely

like the glowing pictures of their youth and maturity drawn by the aged?

The temptation is to answer such questions affirmatively or negatively in accordance with one's own prejudices and hopes. To the new intellectuals intent upon the imperfections of our social order and the unwillingness of men to adopt radical reform, the only answer seems one of despair. The America which they see is sordid, filled with grafters, profiteers, petty politicians, enormous aggregations of wealth which hold the masses in subjection, a land without creative imagination, poets, arts, literature, music—a land in which our Puritan inheritance prevents the development of beauty and conventions restrict artistic self-expression. On the other hand, to those who have succeeded and who have shared in the better life of the country, the future seems to herald only a steady increase of comfortable homes, opportunities for wealth, the "triumphant democracy" which Mr. Carnegie preached.

A sober appraisal of the situation, however, will lead to no unqualified reply. As we look into our national life we need to ask whether these ideals which have been con-

structive in the past are still elements in our social mind, and if so, whether readjustments of life are now proceeding, which make them still as potent as in the past. In other words, despite the difficulty of any contemporary estimate, we ask ourselves just what are the creative forces of our own America? The answer will be found not in programs, but in Americans.

I

Mr. Edward Bok, in his interesting and illuminating autobiography, describes his fifty years of life in America as a process of Americanization. He very truly says, and in this he is supported by Lord Bryce, that the approach to a proper understanding of America is not through its capacity to make money, but through its idealism. Yet after an experience of the actual process of being transformed from an immigrant to one of the most significant characters of our day, Mr. Bok goes on to say that the process showed him that Americans were indifferent to thrift, failed to honor thoroughness in the performance of any task, neglected the education of children of foreigners even

though furnishing them with public schools, have too little respect for law and authority, and utterly fail to instruct the new voter in the significance of what Americanism really is. That is a serious indictment, all the more serious because drawn from wide observation. And it raises the fundamental question as to what Americanism really is. Have we as a people any distinguishing characteristics? What is it to be an American?

It certainly is not simply to be an inhabitant of America. Unfortunately, there are too many persons, by no means to be limited to immigrants, who live in America, who are even citizens of the commonwealth, who are indifferent to the hopes, the lives, the creative ideals which have made it a nation.

It is not to be an Anglo-Saxon. Rooted as our institutions are in English history, America is not a second edition of England. We are an English-speaking country, but we are not an English people. We are Americans. This seems sometimes very confusing to the people of the mother land. On the one hand, they want to think of us as Anglo-Saxons. On the other hand, as a recent English writer has said, one must dis-

possess one's "mind of the idea that there is an American people at all, as we understand a people in Europe. To be a people is the dominant ideal of Americans, an ideal which they claim with all appropriate fierceness to have realized, knowing all the while that they have done nothing of this sort, and that their only hope of doing anything of the kind is to do away with their present social system and then wait five centuries for events to develop." But this is to use the term "people" in an ethnic sense.

That we have our own personality is the view of Münsterberg and McDougall. These trained observers from abroad assert that an American people exists and that almost universally Americans possess the same characteristics. Their list of such unifying characteristics is worth considering: "a spirit of self-direction and self-confidence, of independence and initiative of a degree unknown elsewhere, a marvelous optimism or hopefulness in private and public affairs, a great seriousness tinged with religion, a humorousness, an interest in the welfare of society, a high degree of self-respect, and a pride and confidence in the present and still

more in the future of the nation; an intense activity and a great desire for self-improvement, a truly democratic spirit which regards all men (or rather, all *white* men) as essentially or potentially equal, and a complete intolerance of caste."

A careful consideration of this description, as well as our own observation, will show that in our character there are elements which are not necessarily ideal. Indeed, some of them are liable to become anti-ideal. They are not necessarily vulgar or immoral, but they are qualities of personality which make the operation of the highest motives of the past difficult.

Initiative, for instance, is not necessarily an ideal. Certainly Americans possess it. The capacity to think quickly and act almost before one thinks, is universally recognized as an American trait. If there is one word our American vocabulary despises it is *mañana*. "Do it Now" is the motto hanging above the desks of thousands of business men. To this capacity for prompt activity, which waits not for commands but for opportunity, no small share of American accomplishment is due. But initiative is not

idealism. It may become hardly more than the restlessness of a people who even when tired sit in rocking chairs. Even at its best it may be rapacious rather than humane, unscrupulous rather than regardful of human rights. To be really creative, the power of initiative must be consecrated to projects of permanency, plans for the distant future, institutions making for personal welfare.

Nor is efficiency always friendly to ideals. To be able to accomplish results as well as to initiate plans, to standardize effort in such accomplishment, to reduce waste to a minimum, is just now one of the great slogans of progress. We live in the midst of machine-made wealth and we naturally estimate humanity by the standards of a machine. Avocations as distinct from vocations seem unworthy of practical minds. Culture most men leave to their wives or to persons whom they can hire to lecture or write books. We have banished the study of the classics until the student of Greek is getting to be as rare as the student of Hebrew. The "movie" has reduced acting to obeying directions shouted through a director's megaphone. Classical drama is played by those who can

replenish their income by portraying the eternal triangle. The best-paid class of literary workers to-day is undoubtedly the advertisement writers.

I am not belittling efficiency. I suppose all academic people have a suppressed envy of men of affairs, but efficiency undirected by the thought of service to human welfare becomes a veritable tyrant of materialism. We fought a war to protect a democracy from efficiency-worship. We certainly must not blind ourselves to the belief that a power to do things is an end in itself. The true end of efficiency is doing things of value to the human spirit. I know of few more pathetic representatives of success than men who can talk of nothing except business and markets. If we are to become merely an efficient nation, we shall be a pitiful nation. For what shall it profit a nation to gain the entire gold supply of the world and furnish the raw materials for civilization if it shall lose its own soul? Men used to portray hell as a place where men burned forever. It might also be described as a place where men, regardless of the true value of personality, everlastingly seek to become more efficient.

Closely allied to the worship of efficiency is the elevation of wealth to the practical end of activity and the standard of success. Though it is conventional to lament money-getting, I would not appear to join the chorus of those who indiscriminately condemn wealth. There is a struggle for wealth which does not debilitate moral health. Our country abounds in men who, without injuring others, because of foresight, power of organization, and self-denial have accumulated fortunes. To my mind it would be a misfortune if such opportunity should be closed. Along with wealth has come the means for culture. Poor peoples have little art.

But one does not need to be hypercritical of social life to see that the dominance of economic motives deadens all others. A great people cannot be built on wealth alone, or even upon the ambition, energy, and optimism which the opportunity to get wealth evokes. A rich nation may become a heartless, selfish nation, unwilling to mingle in the struggle for human betterment, building itself a house by the side of some international road and watching the struggling peo-

ples pass by. The views of the financier in politics are too seldom marked by a zeal for generosity and helpfulness. Charity is not identical with justice. The search for wealth too often breeds indifference to human welfare, an estimate of men and women as mere economic factors in social life, a fear of social change, a struggle for control over others.

In none of these characteristics of Americans does Americanism as an ideal lie.

II

Americanization is the process of developing attitudes in individuals. It is more than teaching people to speak English, important as that may be. It is more important even than giving them citizenship. That too is important, but to dilute our citizenship with men and women who are not truly in sympathy with our ideals of government is a questionable policy. A democracy like ours cannot be composed of ill-disposed or unintelligent persons. A selective process is imperative. The tests made by the government during the Great War show an alarmingly large number of citizens who are pos-

sessed of inferior minds. Even if these tests fail to disclose the possibility of improving such minds, they make it evident that any increased proportion of inferior human material bodes evil for the republic. An intelligent nation must have an intelligent citizenship. The American people until recently has drawn from the most virile of the Europeans. It cannot hope to maintain its character if composed of unintelligent voters.

To make Americans is to bring men and women under the influence of our institutions and ideals, to instruct them as to their meaning. Even more does it demand that individual citizens become possessed of an attitude of mind which is sympathetic with American ideals, and ready to make them an object of conscious loyalty. Beneath our general political ideals lie those of the individuals composing the nation. These foundation attitudes involve the following elements, which have been the leaven of the national idealism which has made America what it is and must be relied upon to make it what it should become.

1. Social responsibilities must be recog-

nized as the correlate of liberty. The individual who looks to America simply as a place where he is released from police control and left free to satisfy his own desires, has certainly failed to grasp the significance of our country. By its very development America has taught people to bear one another's burdens, as well as to cast off those placed on their shoulders by irresponsible monarchs. The perfect law of liberty is cooperation in the giving of justice. The most imperfect law of liberty is to demand that other people recognize you as a brother, while to you brotherhood becomes an opportunity to acquire something from your brothers.

2. Law must be respected as law while at the same time subject to legal change. A democracy in which individuals disregard the public will is impossible. Given human nature as it is, there must be some way of expressing group authority. To disregard law is to disintegrate social life. No person who sets himself above the law has any license to live in a nation like ours. American individualism, as we have already seen, is not anarchy.

3. The agents of public opinion must be free. In a democracy discussion is imperative. We cannot expect the public press to be impartial, even if such a miracle were desirable. We ought, however, to be protected against the manipulation of facts by those who have ulterior motives for such manipulation. The only limits to be set upon freedom of speech and the press should be the preaching of revolution and the violation of the fundamental moralities and decencies of life.

4. A respect for personality as the final good in life must be recognized as indispensable for carrying forward social and economic adjustments. Nothing can take the place of this attitude. To weaken it is to weaken the whole structure of our American life. A democracy founded upon economic processes alone is doomed. It could not survive its own success. A democracy is made of democrats, not wealth.

5. Public education must be in the hands of those who believe in Americanism and do not further ethnic or religious segregation for the purpose of developing an anti-democratic attitude of mind. This is not to say

that there should be no parochial schools, but it is to insist that the nation should see that such schools as truly as the public schools do not become disintegrating influences in our American life.

6. While it is impossible to expect that an entire society shall be composed of highly moral men, religion and morals must help form our social mind. Such moral qualities as we have seen implied by the development of our American life can be grounded ultimately only in religion. This, of course, is not to say that the state is to be subject to a church, but, rather, to insist that a belligerent, materialistic social mind promises either constant disorders, if not revolution, or drastic control by the state. The churches of America have a great service to render in giving youth its fundamental bent toward respect for the will of God, immanent in nature and regulative in society. If world-history of the last fifty years means anything, an attempt to transform existing authorities and to set up popular liberty without the inhibitions and encouragements of religious faith, means disintegration of public and private morals. A turbulent

proletariat or a reactionary *bourgeoisie* is no substitute for a God of law.

Now, the morality of a world centering about individuals and that of a world centering around classes is likely to be very different. Liberty in the former case will be subject to an experience in self-direction; liberty in the second case will be almost invariably a rebellion against all authority. Illustrations of these principles can be found anywhere one looks. A sincere American looks with no small concern upon a plea for liberty unrestrained by a regard for morals. I am not referring to that pose which overtakes adolescent youth and finds expression in a willingness to cheapen all respect for conventions. Greenwich Village will be outgrown by persons who really have in themselves any specific gravity of character.

I have in mind a much more serious matter, namely, the presence in our society of numbers of young people who find in America no restraint in the form of customs, law, or conventions. To such young anarchists parents are negligible quantities except as providers of rooms, food, and clothes, and America is not a vision or a common task.

They are like barrels which have lost their hoops. They are not becoming Americanized but desocialized.

Such persons need to be taught that America is no social vacuum, that license is not liberty, and that the lessons which America has learned in the past are not to be overlooked. We need to make an entire generation feel that pleasure-seeking and wealth-getting, whether they be by way of capitalism or by way of socialism, are not the meaning of America.

7. The imperfections of the present must suggest and inspire the betterment of the future. To publish evils is not always to promise reform. Discontent becomes constructive only when it is joined by hopefulness. The actual then is seen to be temporal; that which is not seen but which can be brought to pass, becomes the true reality. Restlessness under inequitable conditions has always been a factor in Americanism. But it has been creative rather than pessimistic. When Americans lose this resilient confidence in their future, America will have grown senile.

III

Such ideals as these cannot exist among unintelligent democrats. This is made plain by the fact which has already appeared, that America moves forward by mass instinct and feeling rather than in response to hereditary leadership. If this mass movement is not permeated with intelligent morality, if public opinion is little more than public prejudice and passion, it is quite impossible for Americans to carry on effectively the America they have inherited. Only individuals of loyal sympathy with our national and personal ideals can carry on the adventure of developing Americanism. Such a development, it must needs be repeated, is more than the reproduction of the past. Relatively speaking, the constructive elements of our past were homogeneous. To-day they are drawn from almost every nation on the earth. These elements are historically alien to each other, surcharged with national hatreds. In America they cannot be destroyed. They must be combined. No other people has faced a similar task since the days of the barbarian conquest of the Roman Empire. Can

we hope to produce a true Americanism from these varied elements?

The process of carrying forward the ideals which we have had bequeathed us, which, as we have seen, have sprung from the highest ranges of practical experience, is often described as that of a melting pot. Of course figures of speech are not to be taken too seriously, but the presupposition which lies back of the figure of the melting pot is one to be seriously questioned. If our sketch of the development of the American spirit is correct, it is obvious that the very genius of our nation has been one of combination and adjustment. While we have been regardful of the past we have always felt that new occasions teach new duties. This is the very heart of our democracy. To maintain indefinitely every accomplishment of the past would mean a sort of tyranny to which no one of us would submit. The process of Americanization can much better be described, in the words of President Faunce, as a process of cross-fertilization. Various national groups contribute their customs and their attitudes to a process which would be different if it were not for their contribution.

Or, to change the figure, the American ideals are the warp upon which we must weave the various colored threads of other national cultures until we produce the rich tapestry of the future America. To this end we must give up the idea of thinking that Americanization means the production of colonial New Englanders, Southerners, or Californians. To attempt such reproduction would be political and social atavism.

If this process, in the midst of which we are now involved, is not to be a foreignization of America rather than an Americanization of foreigners, we must deliberately undertake to initiate all our citizens and prospective citizens into a knowledge and understanding of genuinely American institutions. I have been surprised and rather alarmed at the ignorance which otherwise apparently intelligent Americans show as regards our political structure and purpose. I wonder how many graduates of our colleges could offhand tell the difference between the conception of constitutional government in America and in other countries. How far do they understand the place of the Constitution in determining the consistent and yet

cautious expansion of political experience into reform and amendment? How many of them could tell the actual process by which the United States established inspection of meats, control of railroads, the assurance of pure food? How many Americans who use the word "democracy" really think of it as it actually is—a method of government in the interests of individual liberty by representatives of the sovereign people? If we should find difficulty in answering such elementary questions as these, how can we expect to develop the genuine spirit of America among those who come from countries where the class rather than the individual is supreme, where democracy means socialism, where nationalism is regarded as a capitalistic device and religion is held to be a scheme of terror and reward by which the ignorant are kept content in economic subjection? The answer will lie in an educational process interpreted in its widest sense.

Our public school system is here of primary importance. That it can become a source of intelligent appreciation of America is beyond question. But we have not yet clearly seen how this is to be accomplished.

Just at present our educational experts seem to be obsessed with the idea of preparation for vocation; schools are to be places where one learns how to make a living. It would be foolish to overlook the importance of this element in education, but quite as important is it that we seize the opportunity furnished by the schools for a sympathetic exposition of what America has done and what it is trying to do. Nothing is simpler than to point out what it has not done. Anyone can see the fly specks on an old master. Our schools should be conducted the country over by really intelligent teachers rather than, as in so many cases, by young women who regard teaching as a sort of economic interregnum between school and marriage. Only thus can our schools be of influence in preserving the real American ideals and hopes. To put educational processes into the hands of those who are hostile to American ideals is to threaten our future. Education is a public trust. We would not make our teachers the mouthpiece of chauvinism, but even less can we permit our schools to be indifferent to our national mission. The salute to the flag, the pledge of loyalty to the pupils'

country, the instruction in elementary politics, the interpretation of our history, the insistence upon our democracy of free individuals, all are indispensable for the evoking of a proper loyalty to the nation. How great an influence our educational system has been in the production of a healthy Americanism none can fully estimate. To disregard its office to-day is farthest possible from our purpose.

But our new citizenship has its own contribution to make to Americanization. Every community should utilize the cultural elements which foreign groups furnish. Nothing is more reprehensible than the attitude which many smug native-born Americans take toward the foreigners who have drifted into their community. No one who has ever seen pageantry work of schools in the Jewish quarters, who has listened to the music furnished by Hungarians, Italians, Bohemians, and other European peoples, can maintain any arrogant sense of superiority in claiming Anglo-Saxon descent. I have been in touch with thousands of young men as they passed through college, and I doubt if one per cent could play a tune on

the piano, write a strain of music, or enjoy a symphony concert. It is no mere accident that our musicians seldom have Anglo-Saxon names. They are Americans, but they represent the contribution which other than the Anglo-Saxon strain is making to the Americanization process. The same is true in other cultural fields.

The real process of binding the various elements of American life together into a growing nation must needs be spiritual as well as political and economic. We have already called attention to the fact that our democracy has not tended to develop classes and has never regarded Americanism as incompatible with the maintenance of group interests of varied sorts. It is therefore a fair question as to how expedient is indiscriminate assault upon the nationalistic elements. Living as I do in the midst of these great groups, I can see that they possess a common loyalty and pride in America which is superior to ethnic grouping. But when an attempt is made to change a hyphenated American of one sort into a hyphenated American of another, a protective emphasis is laid upon ethnic feeling. A Bohemian

American, for example, objects to being an Anglo-Saxon American as truly as an Anglo-Saxon American would object to be made into a Bohemian American. Nor is it any reply to say that America historically is Anglo-Saxon. The simple fact is that whatever Americanism may have been in 1787, at the present time it is not Anglo-Saxon. Our devotion to the ideals which our country embodies is something quite other than a loyalty to them as Anglo-Saxon ideals. I am proud to know that they have back of them the experience of England, but they are mine whatever their origin, because they are American.

American idealism cannot be hyphenated. It can be claimed by men of all descents because it is not the property of any strictly ethnic group. We are a new people in the making. We should not permit the political issues of Europe to determine the attitudes and patriotism of ethnic groups in American policy and politics.

I know the objections raised to this point of view, on the part of those who think that no persons can be American unless they are of their own particular type. My reply to

such position is twofold. First, that a man who holds such a position simply does not know America. He is provincial and anti-American. And, second, our idealism is a hope and not an accomplishment. America of the eighteenth century was a creature of hope. The America west of the Alleghenies is still a creature of hope. I have traveled hundreds of thousands of miles over the continent. I have met all classes of men and women, and I am convinced that despite economic discontent, one might almost say sometimes because of economic discontent, the American people believes it has a future greater and more significant than its past. But this hopefulness is not that of the stock broker or of the banker. It is that of men and women who produce the raw materials of our wealth. You cannot understand it by listening to the complaints of the farmers, the oration of the labor leader, or the lamentations of the men who have to pay surtaxes on income. You will find it as a great current of conviction running beneath all surface disturbances. To these people who cannot forget the prairie which they or their fathers made into fields, America means

something very different from a space in which to make a living. Only when people are crowded up against the Atlantic do they seem to think less of America's accomplishments and more of its faults.

IV

Thus far I have been speaking as an American from the point of view of our own America. If we step outside the circle and look upon ourselves through the eyes of Europe and Asia, would it be true that such an interpretation of American spirit and life as I have attempted to give would be found in other minds? Any answer to such a question is of course unreliable. No man, least of all a foreigner, can hope to speak as representative of the countless millions who fill the continents. But if we can judge from the literature which is being published, and from the various approaches which are being made to the United States, it would appear that two contradictory judgments are to be found. On the one side are those who, feeling the pressure of the circumstances resulting from the war, are eager to flee to the United States, there to enjoy

peace and prosperity. On the other hand are those who see in the United States the embodiment of selfishness, isolation, and refusal to assume a share of the world's misery.

It is not hard to account for this double interpretation of our national life. On the one side America does possess the advantages which the immigrant seeks; on the other side we have refused to get under the burden of the world's misery, except in so far as we have contributed freely of our substance for the relief of human need. The bitter thing in the latter interpretation is the fact that we have monopolized the prosperity of the world. Unless it be possibly Japan, no country has come forth so unscathed from the war. We know little of famine, poverty, death, when our experiences are compared with those of England or France, or Italy, not to mention the hideous tragedy of Russia and Armenia.

And yet, as we look at Europe and the demands which it makes upon the United States, it is hard to avoid the impression that much of the criticism which is thrown upon us is born of our refusal to undertake to do things which the European nations prefer

to have us do rather than do themselves. We frankly refuse to engage in any political unity. We are not altogether sure of economic solidarity for fear lest there may be concealed behind bank balances some political alliance or secret treaty. I think we shall have to bear the criticism both just and unjust of these Europeans who fail to understand our actual attitude, and who are impatient because we are refusing political fellowship. Some of us are not proud of our refusal to enter the League of Nations but we cannot see in that decision an utter abandonment of our determination to follow ideals. Foreign entanglements have always, and fortunately, been our *bête noir*. In the long run it may prove to the world's advantage that a powerful nation has refused to underwrite continental bankrupts or assume mandates over nations caught between the commercial rivalries of Great Britain and France. We face a mighty task of our own. If we fail, the world will drink the very dregs of the cup of sorrow.

Far more serious than the question of how Europe judges us is that as to how far our development can be continued in the midst

of a world where there is such agony, tragedy, and disorder as we see in Europe. It is idle to think that any experience akin to that of American development will be furnished by immigration. If our immigrants came in any considerable number from England, the outlook would be different. But the immigrants whom we are to receive will come from oppressed peoples without experience in self-government, and whose ignorance of our American life, fashions, and institutions will increase our problems. New elements of discontent will spring from the disappointment men feel when they find the nation they have idealized into an impossible heaven, is a place where men must earn their living, and where economic conditions have not yet found full self-regulation. But such problems are calls to action rather than complaints. We must be strong if we are to help the world. And we must help because we are strong.

V

The magnitude of this responsibility which we face as a nation should appeal particularly to students in college. There, if

anywhere, should be found men and women who have an intelligent grasp of the real meaning of America. No class more thoroughly enjoys the advantages of our social order than do college students. They should go out by the hundreds of thousands into our national life with the distinct ambition to carry on the work of the fathers.

It is, I fear, too much to expect that all these hundreds of thousands of young persons will devote themselves with any passion to national development. But there will always be a vicarious tenth distributed over our great land. Theirs above all others is the possibility of projecting our national ideals into the reconstructive efforts in which we are engaged. If college graduates fail to heed the call of this supreme moment in civilization to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the spread of justice, the maintenance of personal liberty, the extension of democracy in accordance with the great principles contained in our Constitution; if they fail to realize the responsibility America already faces in international affairs; we may well despair of our country. But if they in any considerable number devote

themselves to the highest type of citizenship and refuse to coarsen their patriotism, our nation may have a large share in one of the great creative epochs of history.

We of the older generation are bequeathing youth a country in which we have tried to express our noblest hopes. We pass it over proudly as a heritage which, with all its imperfections and its inequities, is one which no generation should be ashamed to accept.

The next quarter of a century will see our nation pivotal in world history. Already it is becoming perhaps the greatest factor in the hopes of the world. To be loyal to its history as it extends into new conditions, to respect its institutions, its laws, and, above all, to cherish its great ideals of liberty, personality, and democracy is to insure that the America of to-morrow will serve its day as the America of the past has served the past and is serving the present. And our service will be that demanded by a world that has all but lost its hopes and faiths—the maintenance of our idealism at home and the consecration of our resources and experience to the furthering of justice and well being throughout the world.

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