THE WORKS OF

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

IN FOURTEEN VOLUMES

Illustrated

THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY DURING

THE LAST WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN, TO

WHICH IS APPENDED AN ACCOUNT OF

THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS

PART ONE

jgxecutive jgdition

PUBLISHED WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE
PRESIDENT THROUGH SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT
WITH THE CENTURY CO., MESSRS. CHARLES
SCRJBNER'S SONS, AND G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

NEW YORK

P. F. COLLIER & SON, PUBLISHERS

COPYRIGHT 1882
Bv G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

This edition is published under arrangement with
G. P. Putnam's Sons, of New York and London.

PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO

American State Papers.

Brenton, E. P. Naval History of Great Britain, 1783 to
1836. 2 vols, octavo. London, 1837.

Broke, Adm., Memoir of, by Rev. J. G. Brighton. Octavo.
London, 1866.

"Captains' Letters" in Archives at Washington.

Codrington, Adm. Sir E. Memoirs, edited by his daugh
ter. 2 vols, octavo. London, 1873.

Coggeshall, George. History of American Privateers.
New York, 1876.

Cooper, J. F. Naval History of the United States. New
York, 1856.

Dundonald, Earl. Autobiography of a Seaman. London,
1860.

Douglas, Lord Howard. Naval Gunnery. Octavo. Lon
don, 1860.

Emmons, Lieut. G. E. Statistical History of United States
Navy, 1853.

Farragut, Adm. D. G., Life of, by his son, Loyall Farragut.
Octavo. New York, 1878.

Graviere, Adm., J. de la. Guerres Maritimes. 2 vols, oc
tavo. Paris, 1 88 1.

James, William. Naval History of Great Britain. 6 vols.
octavo, London, 1837.

James, William. Naval Occurrences with the Americans.
Octavo, London, 1817.

Lossing, Benson J. Field-book of the War of 1812. Oc
tavo, New York, 1869.

Low, C. R. History of the Indian Navy, 1613 to 1863. 2
vols, octavo. London, 1877.

"London Naval Chronicle."

* t

Principal Authorities Referred To

Marshall. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols, octavo. Lon
don, 1825.

"Masters-Commandant's Letters" in the Archives at Wash
ington.

Morris, Com. Charles. Autobiography. Annapolis, 1880.
Naval Archives at Washington.

Niles "Weekly Register."

Pielat, B. La Vie et les Actions Memorables du St. Michel
de Ruyter. Amsterdam, 1677.

Riviere, Lieut. H. La Marine Franchise sous le Regime
de Louis XV. Paris, 1859.

Tatnall, Commod., Life, by C. C. Jones, Jr. Savannah,
1878.

Toussard, L. de. American Artillerists' Companion. Phila.
1811.

Troude, O. Batailles Navales de la France. Paris, 1868.

Ward, Com. J. H. Manual of Naval Tactics, 1859.

Yonge, Charles Duke/ History of the British Navy. 3
vols, octavo. London, 1866.

PREFACE

THE history of the naval events of the War of
1812 has been repeatedly presented both to the
American and the English reader. Historical writ
ers have treated it either in connection with a gen
eral account of the contest on land and sea, or as
forming a part of the complete record of the navies
of the two nations: A few monographs, which con
fine themselves strictly to the naval occurrences, have
also appeared. But none of these works can be re
garded as giving a satisfactorily full or impartial
account of the war — some of them being of the
"popular" and loosely-constructed order, while oth
ers treat it from a purely partisan standpoint. No
single book can be quoted which would be accepted
by the modern reader as doing justice to both sides,
or, indeed, as telling the whole story. Any one spe
cially interested in the subject must read all, and
then it will seem almost a hopeless task to reconcile
the many and widely contradictory statements he
will meet with.

There appear to be three works which, taken in

(i) VOL. IX.— i

4 Preface

As my only object is to give an accurate narrative
of events, I shall esteem it a particular favor if any
one will furnish me with the means of rectifying
such mistakes; and if I have done injustice to any
commander, or officer of any grade, whether Ameri
can or British, I shall consider myself under great
obligations to those who will set me right.

I have been unable to get access to the original
reports of the British commanders, the logs of the
British ships, or their muster-rolls, and so have been
obliged to take them at second hand from the "Ga
zette," or "Naval Chronicle," or some standard his
tory. The American official letters, log-books, orig
inal contracts, muster-rolls, etc., however, being pre
served in the Archives at Washington, I have been
able, thanks to the courtesy of the Hon. Wm. H.
Hunt, Secretary of the Navy, to look them over.
The set of letters from the officers is very complete,
in three series, — "Captains' Letters," "Masters'
Commandant Letters," and "Officers' Letters," there
being several volumes for each year. The books of
contracts contain valuable information as to the
size and build of some of the vessels. The log
books are rather exasperating, often being very in
complete. Thus when I turned from Decatur's
extremely vague official letter describing the cap
ture of the Macedonian to the log-book of the frigate

Preface 5

United States, not a fact about the fight could be'
gleaned. The last entry in the log on the day of
the fight is "Strange sail discovered to be a frigate
under English colors," and the next entry (on the
following day) relates to the removal of the prison
ers. The log of the Enterprise is very full indeed,
for most of the time, but is a perfect blank for the
period during which she was commanded by Lieu
tenant Burrows, and in which she fought the Boxer.
I have not been able to find the Peacock's log at all,
though there is a very full set of letters from her
commander. Probably the fire of 1837 destroyed a
great deal of valuable material. Whenever it was
possible I have referred to printed matter in prefer
ence to manuscript, and my authorities can thus, in
most cases, be easily consulted.

In conclusion I desire to express my sincerest
thanks to Captain James D. Bulloch, formerly of
the United States Navy, and Commander Adolf
Mensing. formerly of the German Navy, without
whose advice and sympathy this work would prob
ably never have been written or even begun.

NEW YORK CITY, 1882.

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION

1 ORIGINALLY intended to write a companion
volume to this, which should deal with the oper
ations on land. But a short examination showed
that these operations were hardly worth serious
study. They teach nothing new ; it is the old, old
lesson, that a miserly economy in preparation may
in the end involve a lavish outlay of men and money,
which, after all, comes too late to more than partially
offset the evils produced by the original short-sighted
parsimony. This might be a lesson worth dwelling
on did it have any practical bearing on the issues
of the present day; but it has none, as far as the
army is concerned. It was criminal folly for Jeffer
son, and his follower, Madison, to neglect to give
us a force either of regulars or of well-trained vol
unteers during the twelve years they had in which
to prepare for the struggle that any one might see
was inevitable; but there is now far less need of an
army than there was then. Circumstances have al
tered widely since 1812. Instead of the decaying
might of Spain on our Southern frontier, we have
the still weaker power of Mexico. Instead of the
great Indian nations of the interior, able to keep
civilization at bay, to hold in check strong armies,

(7)

8 Preface to Third Edition

to ravage large stretches of territory, and needing
formidable military expeditions to overcome them,
there are now only left broken and scattered bands
which are sources of annoyance merely. To the
North we are still hemmed in by the Canadian pos
sessions of Great Britain; but since 1812 our strength
has increased so prodigiously, both absolutely and
relatively, while England's military power has re
mained almost stationary, that we need now be un
der no apprehensions from her land-forces ; for, even
•if checked in the beginning, we could not help con
quering in the end by sheer weight of numbers, if
by nothing else. So that there is now no cause for
our keeping up a large army ; while, on the contrary,
the necessity for an efficient navy is so evident that
only our almost incredible short-sightedness pre
vents our at once preparing one.

Not only do the events of the war on land teach
very little to the statesman who studies history in
order to avoid in the present the mistakes of the
past, but besides this, the battles and campaigns are
of very little interest to the student of military mat
ters. The British regulars, trained in many wars,
thrashed the raw troops opposed to them whenever
they had anything like a fair chance; but this is not
to be wondered at, for' the same thing has always
happened the world over under similar conditions.
Our defeats were exactly such as any man might
have foreseen, and there is nothing to be learned
from the follies committed by incompetent com
manders and untrained troops when in the presence

Preface to Third Edition 9

of skilled officers having under them disciplined sol
diers. The humiliating surrenders, ahortive at
tacks, and panic routs of our armies can all be paral
leled in the campaigns waged by Napoleon's mar
shals against the Spaniards and Portuguese in the
years immediately preceding the outbreak of our
own war. The Peninsular troops were as little able
to withstand the French veterans as were our militia
to hold their own against the British regulars. But
it must always be remembered, to our credit, that
while seven years of fighting failed to make the
Spaniards able to face the French,1 two years of
warfare gave us soldiers who could stand against
the best men of Britain. On the Northern frontier
we never developed a great general, — Brown's claim
to the title rests only on his not having committed
the phenomenal follies of his predecessors,— but by
1814 our soldiers had become seasoned, and we had
acquired some good brigade commanders, notably
Scott, so that in that year we played on' even terms
with the British. But the battles, though marked
by as bloody and obstinate fighting as ever took
place, were waged between small bodies of men, and
were not distinguished by any feats of generalship,
so that they are not of any special interest to the
historian. In fact, the only really noteworthy feat

1 At the closing battle of Toulouse, fought between the
allies and the French, the flight of the Spaniards was so
rapid and universal as to draw from the Duke of Wellington
the bitter observation, that "though he had seen a good many
remarkable things in the course of his life, yet this was the
first time he had ever seen ten thousand men running a race."

io Preface to Third Edition

of arms of the war took place at New Orleans, and
the only military genius that the struggle developed
was Andrew Jackson. His deeds are worthy of all
praise, and the battle he won was in many ways so
peculiar as to make it well worth a much closer study
than it has yet received. It was by far the most
prominent event of the war; it was a victory which
reflected high honor on the general and soldiers who
won it, and it was in its way as remarkable as any
of the great battles that took place about the same
time in Europe. Such being the case, I have de
voted a chapter to its consideration at the conclusion
of the chapters devoted to the naval operations.

As before said, the other campaigns on land do
not deserve very minute attention ; but, for the sake
of rendering the account of the battle of New Or
leans more intelligible, I will give a hasty sketch
of the principal engagements that took place else
where.

The war opened in mid-summer of 1812, by the
campaign of General Hull on the Michigan frontier.
With two or three thousand raw troops he invaded
Canada. About the same time Fort Mackinaw was
surrendered by its garrison of 60 Americans to a
British and Indian force of 600. Hull's campaign
was unfortunate from the beginning. Near Browns-
town the American Colonel Van Home, with some
200 men, was ambushed and routed by Tecumseh
and his Indians. In revenge Colonel Miller, with
600 Americans, at Maguaga attacked 150 British

Preface to Third Edition n

and Canadians under Captain Muir, and 250 In
dians under Tecumseh, and whipped them, — Te-
cumseh's Indians standing their ground longest.
The Americans lost 75, their foes 180 men. At
Chicago the small force of 66 Americans was sur
prised and massacred by the Indians. Meanwhile,
General Brock, the British commander, advanced
against Hull with a rapidity and decision that
seemed to paralyze his senile and irresolute oppo
nent. The latter retreated to Detroit, where, with
out striking a blow, he surrendered 1,400 men to
Brock's nearly equal force, which consisted nearly
one-half of Indians under Tecumseh. On the Ni
agara frontier, an estimable and honest old gentle
man and worthy citizen, who knew nothing of mili
tary matters, Gen. Van Rensselaer, tried to cross
over and attack the British at Queenstown ; 1,100
Americans got across and were almost all killed
or captured by an equal number of British, Cana
dians, and Indians, while on the opposite side a
larger number of their countrymen looked on,
and with abject cowardice refused to cross to
their assistance. The command of the army was
then handed over to a ridiculous personage named
Smythe, who issued proclamations so bombastic that
they really must have come from an unsound mind,
and then made a ludicrously abortive effort at inva
sion, which failed almost of its own accord. A Brit
ish and Canadian force of less than 400 men was
foiled in an assault on Ogdensburg, after a slight
skirmish, by about 1,000 Americans under Brown;

12 Preface to Third Edition

and with this trifling success the military operations
of the year came to an end.

Early in 1813, Ogdensburg was again attacked,
this time by between 500 and 600 British, who took
it after a brisk resistance from some 300 militia ; the
British lost 60 and the Americans 20, in killed and
wounded. General Harrison, meanwhile, had be
gun the campaign in the Northwest. At French-
town, on the river Raisin, Winchester's command
of about 900 Western troops was surprised by a
force of i, 100 men, half of them Indians, under the
British Colonel Proctor. The right division, taken
by surprise, gave up at once ; the left division, mainly
Kentucky riflemen, and strongly posted in houses
and stockaded inclosures, made a stout resistance,
and only surrendered after a bloody fight, in which
180 British and about half as many Indians were
killed or wounded. Over 300 Americans were slain,
some in the battle, but most in the bloody massacre
that followed. After this, General Harrison went
into camp at Fort Meigs, where, with about 1,100
men, he was besieged by 1,000 British and Cana
dians under Proctor and 1,200 Indians under Te-
cumseh. A force of 1,200 Kentucky militia ad
vanced to his relief and tried to cut its way into the
fort while the garrison made a sortie. The sortie
was fairly successful, but the Kentuckians were scat
tered like chaff by the British regulars in the open,
and when broken were cut to pieces by the Indians in
the woods. Nearly two-thirds of the relieving troops
were killed or captured ; about 400 got into the fort.

Preface to Third Edition 13

Soon afterward Proctor abandoned the siege. Fort
Stephenson, garrisoned by Major Croghan and 160
men, was attacked by a force of 391 British regu
lars, who tried to carry it by assault, and were re
pulsed with the loss of a fourth of their number.
Some four tfrousand Indians joined Proctor, but
most of them left him after Perry's victory on Lake
Erie. Then Harrison, having received large rein
forcements, invaded Canada. At the River Thames
his army of 3,500 men encountered and routed be
tween 600 and 700 British under Proctor, and
about 1,000 Indians under Tecumseh. The battle
was decided at once by a charge of the Kentucky
mounted riflemen, who broke through the regulars,
took them in rear, and captured them, and then dis
mounting attacked the flank of the Indians, who
were also assailed by the infantry. Proctor escaped
by the skin of his teeth and Tecumseh died fighting,
like the hero that he was. This battle ended the
campaign in the Northwest. In this quarter it must
be remembered that the war was, on the part of the
Americans, mainly one against Indians; the latter
always forming over half of the British forces.
Many of the remainder were French Canadians, and
the others were regulars. The American armies,
on the contrary, were composed of the armed set
tlers of Kentucky and Ohio, native Americans, of
English speech and blood, who were battling for
lands that were to form the heritage of their chil
dren. In the West the war was only the closing
act of the struggle that for many years had been

14 Preface to Third Edition

waged by the hardy and restless pioneers of our
race, as with rifle and axe they carved out the
mighty empire that we their children inherit; it was
but the final effort with which they wrested from
the Indian lords of the soil the wide and fair do
main that now forms the heart of our great Re
public. It was the breaking down of the last bar
rier that stayed the flood of our civilization; it
settled, once and forever, that henceforth the law,
the tongue, and the blood of the land should be
neither Indian, nor yet French, but English. The
few French of the West were fighting against a race
that was to leave as little trace of them as of the
doomed Indian peoples with whom they made com
mon cause. The presence of the British mercenaries
did not alter the character of the contest ; it merely
served to show the bitter and narrow hatred with
which the Mother-Island regarded her greater
daughter, predestined as the latter was to be queen
of the lands that lay beyond the Atlantic.

Meanwhile, on Lake Ontario, the Americans
made successful descents on York and Fort George,
scattering or capturing their comparatively small
garrisons, while a counter descent by the British
on Sackett's Harbor failed, the attacking force be
ing too small. After the capture of Fort George,
the Americans invaded Canada; but their advance
guard, 1,400 strong, under Generals Chandler and
Winder, was surprised in the night by 800 British,
who, advancing with the bayonet, broke up the camp,
capturing both the generals and half the artillery.

Preface to Third Edition 15

Though the assailants, who lost 220 of their small
number, suffered much more than the Americans,
yet the latter were completely demoralized, and at
once retreated to Fort George. Soon afterward.
Col. Boerstler with about 600 men surrendered with
shamefully brief resistance to a somewhat smaller
force of British and Indians. Then about 300 Brit
ish crossed the Niagara to attack Black Rrck, which
they took, but were afterward driven off by a large
body of militia with the loss of 40 men. Later in
the season the American General McClure wantonly
burned the village of Newark, and then retreated
in panic flight across the Niagara. In retaliation
the British in turn crossed the river; 600 regulars
surprised and captured in the night Fort Niagara,
with its garrison of 400 men ; two thousand troop
ers attacked Black Rock, and, after losing over a
hundred men in a smart engagement with somewhat
over 1,500 militia whom they easily dispersed, cap
tured and burned both it and Buffalo. Before these
last events took place another invasion of Canada
had been attempted, this time under General Wil
kinson, "an unprincipled imbecile," as Scott very
properly styled him. It was mismanaged in every
possible way, and was a total failure; it was attend
ed with but one battle, that of Chrystler's Farm, in
which T,OOO British, with the loss of less than 200
men, beat back double their number of Americans,
who lost nearly 500 men and also one piece of artil
lery. The American army near Lake Champlain
had done nothing, its commander, General Wade

1 6 Preface to Third Edition

Hampton, being, if possible, even more incompetent
than Wilkinson. He remained stationary while a
small force of British plundered Plattsburg and
Burlington; then, with 5,000 men he crossed into
Canada, but returned almost immediately, after a
small skirmish at Chauteaugay between his advance
guard and some 500 Canadians, in which the former
lost 41 and the latter 22 men. This affair, in which
hardly a tenth of the American force was engaged,
has been, absurdly enough, designated a "battle" by
most British and Canadian historians. In reality
it was the incompetency of their general and not the
valor of their foes that caused the retreat of the
Americans. The same comment, by the way, .ap
plies to the so-called "Battle" of Plattsburg, in the
following year, which may have been lost by Sir
George Prevost, but was certainly not won by the
Americans. And, again, a similar criticism should
be passed on General Wilkinson's attack on La
Colle Mill, near the head of the same lake. Neither
one of the three affairs was a stand-up fight ; in each
a greatly superior force, led by an utterly incapable
general, retreated after a slight skirmish with an
enemy whose rout would have been a matter of cer
tainty had the engagement been permitted to grow
serious.

In the early spring of 1814 a small force of 160
American regulars, under Captain Holmes, fighting
from behind felled logs, routed 200 British with a
loss of 65 men, they themselves losing but 8. On
Lake Ontario the British made a descent on Oswego

Preface to Third Edition 17

and took it by fair assault; and afterward lost 180
men who tried to cut out some American transports,
and were killed or captured to a man. All through
the spring and early summer the army on the Niag
ara frontier was. carefully drilled by Brown, and
more especially by Scott, and the results of this
drilling were seen in the immensely improved effec
tiveness of the soldiers in the campaign that opened
in July. Fort Erie was captured with little resist
ance, and on the 4th of July, at the river Chippeway,
Brown, with two brigades of regulars, each about
1,200 strong, under Scott and Ripley, and a brigade
of 800 militia and Indians under Porter, making a
total of about 3,200 men, won a stand-up fight
against the British General Riall, who had nearly
2,500 men, 1,800 of them regulars. Porter's bri
gade opened by driving in the Canadian militia and
the Indians; but was itself checked by the British
light-troops. Ripley 's brigade took very little part
in the battle, three of the regiments not being en
gaged at all, and the fourth so slightly as to lose but
five men. The entire brunt of the action was borne
by Scott's brigade, which was fiercely attacked by
the bulk of the British regulars under Riall. The
latter advanced with great bravery, but were ter
ribly cut up by the fire of Scott's regulars ; and when
they had come nearly up to him, Scott charged with
the bayonet and drove them clean off the field. The
American loss was 322, including 23 Indians; the
British loss was 515, excluding that of the Indians.
The number of Americans actually engaged did not

1 8 Preface to Third Edition

exceed that of the British; and Scott's brigade, in
fair fight, closed by a bayonet charge, defeated an
equal force of British regulars.

On July 25th occurred the Battle of Niagara, or
Lundy's Lane, fought between General Brown with
3,ioo2 Americans and General Drummond with
3,500 3 British. It was brought on by accident in
the evening, and was waged with obstinate courage
and savage slaughter till midnight. On both sides
the forces straggled into action by detachments.
The Americans formed the attacking party. As
before, Scott's brigade bore the brunt of the fight,
and over half of his men were killed or wounded;
he himself was disabled and borne from the field.
The struggle was of the most desperate character,
the combatants showing a stubborn courage that
could not be surpassed.4 Charge after charge was
made with the bayonet, and the artillery was taken
and retaken once and again. The loss was nearly

8 As near as can be found out; most American authorities
make it much less; Lossing, for example, says, only 2,400.

3 General Drummond in his official letter makes it but
2,800; James, who gives the details, makes it 3,000 rank and
file; adding 13 per cent for the officers, sergeants, and drum
mers, brings it«up to 3,400; and we still have to count in the
artillery drivers, etc.

4 General Drummond writes: "In so determined a manner
were their attacks directed against our guns that our artil
lerymen were bayoneted while in the act of loading, and the
muzzle of the enemy's guns were advanced within a few
yards of ours." Even James says: "Upon the whole, how
ever, the American troops fought bravely ; and the conduct
of many of the officers, of the artillery corps especially,
would have done honor to any service."

Preface to Third Edition 19

equal: on the side of the Americans, 854 men (in
cluding Generals Brown and Scott, wounded) and
two guns; on that of the British, 878 men (includ
ing General Riall captured) and one gun. Each
side claimed it as a victory over superior numbers.
The truth is beyond question that the British had
the advantage in numbers, and a still greater advan
tage in position ; while it is equally beyond question
that it was a defeat and not a victory for the Ameri
cans. They left the field and retired in perfect or
der to Fort Erie, while the British held the field and
the next day pursued their foes.

Having received some reinforcements General
Drummond, now with about 3,600 men, pushed for
ward to besiege Fort Erie, in which was the Ameri
can army, some 2,400 strong, under General Gaines.
Col. Tucker with 500 British regulars was sent
across the Niagara to destroy the batteries at Black
Rock, but was defeated by 300 American regulars
under Major Morgan, fighting from behind a strong
breastwork of felled trees, with a creek in front.
On the night of the I5th of August, the British in
three columns advanced to storm the American
works, but after making a most determined assault
were beaten off. The assailants lost 900 men, the
assailed about 80. After this nothing was done till
September I7th, when General Brown, who had
resumed command of the American forces, deter
mined upon and executed a sortie. Each side had
received reinforcements; the Americans numbered
over 3,000, the British nearly 4,000. The fighting

20 Preface to Third Edition

was severe, the Americans losing 500 men ; but their
opponents lost 600 men, and most of their batteries
were destroyed. Each side, as usual, claimed the
victory; but, exactly as Lundy's Lane must be ac
counted an American defeat, as our forces retreated
from the ground, so this must be considered an
American victory, for after it the British broke up
camp and drew off to Chippeway. Nothing more
was done, and on November 5th the American
army recrossed the Niagara. Though marked by
some brilliant feats of arms this four months' in
vasion of Canada, like those that had preceded it,
thus came to nothing. But at the same time a Brit
ish invasion of the United States was repulsed far
more disgracefully. Sir George Prevost, with an
army of 13,000 veteran troops, marched south along
the shores of Lake Champlain to Plattsburg, which
was held by General Macomb with 2,000 regulars,
and perhaps double that number of nearly worthless
militia; — a force that the British could have scat
tered to the winds, though, as they were strongly
posted, not without severe loss. But the British
fleet was captured by Commodore MacDonough in
the fight on the lake; and then Sir George, after
some heavy skirmishing between the outposts of the
armies, in which the Americans had the advantage,
fled precipitately back to Canada.

All through the war the sea-coasts of the United
States had been harried by small predatory excur
sions ; a part of what is now the State of Maine was
conquered with little resistance, and kept until the

Preface to Third Edition 21

close of hostilities; and some of the towns on the
shores of Chesapeake Bay had been plundered or
burnt. In August, 1814, a more serious invasion
was planned, and some 5,000 troops — regulars, sail
ors, and marines — were landed, under the command
of General Ross. So utterly helpless was the Demo
cratic Administration at Washington, that during
the two years of warfare hardly any steps had been
taken to protect the Capitol, or the country round
about; what little was done was done entirely too
late, and bungled badly in addition. History has
not yet done justice to the ludicrous and painful
folly and stupidity of which the government found
ed by Jefferson, and carried on by Madison, was
guilty, both in its preparations for, and in its way of
carrying on, this war ; nor is it yet realized that the
men just mentioned, and their associates, are pri
marily responsible for the loss we suffered in it, and
the bitter humiliation some of its incidents caused
us. The small British army marched at will through
Virginia and Maryland, burned Washington, and
finally retreated from before Baltimore and re-em
barked to take part in the expedition against New
Orleans. Twice, at Bladensburg and North Point,
it came in contact with superior numbers of militia
in fairly good position. In each case the result was
the same. After some preliminary skirmishing,
manoeuvring, and volley firing, the British charged
with the bayonet. The rawest regiments among the
American militia then broke at once; the others
kept pretty steady, pouring in quite a destructive

22 Preface to Third Edition

fire, until the regulars had come up close to them,
when they also fled. The British regulars were too
heavily loaded to pursue, and, owing to their mode
of attack, and the rapidity with which their oppo
nents ran away, the loss of the latter was in each case
very slight. At North Point, however, the militia,
being more experienced, behaved better than at
Bladensburg. In neither case were the British put
to any trouble to win their victory.

The above is a brief sketch of the campaigns of
the war. It is not cheerful reading for an American,
nor yet of interest to a military student ; and its les
sons have been taught so often by similar occur
rences in other lands under like circumstances, and
moreover, teach such self-evident truths, that they
scarcely need to be brought to the notice of a his
torian. But the crowning event of the war was the
Battle of New Orleans; remarkable in its military
aspect, and a source of pride to every American. It
is well worth a more careful study, and to it I have
devoted the last chapter of this book.

NEW YORK CITY, 1883.

CONTENTS

PA R T ONE
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Causes of the War of 1812 — Conflicting views of America
and Britain as regards neutral rights — Those of the
former power right — Impossibility of avoiding hostili
ties—Declaration of war — General features of the con
test — Racial identity of the contestants— The treaty of
peace nominally leaves the situation unchanged — But
practically settles the dispute in our favor in respect to
maritime rights— The British navy and its reputation
prior to 1812 — Comparison with other European navies
— British and American authorities consulted in the
present work 27

CHAPTER II

Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when Ameri
ca declared war against her — Race identity of the com
batants — The American navy at the beginning of the
war — Officers well trained — Causes tending to make our
seamen especially efficient — Close similarity between
the British and American sailors — Our ships manned
chiefly by native Americans, many of whom had for
merly been impressed into the British navy — Quotas of
seamen contributed by the different States — Navy yards
— Lists of officers and men — List of vessels — Tonnage —

(23)

24 Contents y"'

Different ways of estimating it in Britain and America
— Ratings — American ships properly rated — Arma
ments of the frigates and corvettes — Three styles of
guns used — Difference between long guns and carron-
ades — Short weight of American shot — Comparison of
British frigates rating 38, and American frigates rating
44 guns — Compared with a 74 50

CHAPTER III

1812

ON THE OCEAN

Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of
the Belvidera — Cruise of the Essex — Captain Hull's
cruise, and escape from the squadron of Commodore
Broke — Constitution captures Guerriere — Wasp cap
tures Frolic — Second unsuccessful cruise of Commo
dore Rodgers — United States captures Macedonian —
Constitution captures Java — Essex starts on a cruise
— Summary 105

CHAPTER IV
1812

ON THE LAKES

PRELIMINARY — The combatants starting nearly on an
equality — Difficulties of creating a naval force — Diffi
culty of comparing the force of the rival squadrons —
Meagreness of the published accounts — Unreliability of
James — ONTARIO — Extraordinary nature of the Ameri
can squadron — Canadian squadron forming only a kind

Contents 25

of water militia — Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by
Commodore Earle— Commodore Chauncy bombards
York — ERIE — Lieutenant Elliott captures the Detroit
and Caledonia — Unsuccessful expedition of Lieutenant
Angus 178

CHAPTER V
1813

ON THE OCEAN

Blockade of the American coast— The Essex in the South
Pacific— The Hornet captures the Peacock— American
privateers cut-out by British boats — Unsuccessful cruise
of Commodore Rodgers — The Chesapeake is captured
by the Shannon — Futile gunboat actions — Defence of
Craney Island — Cutting-out expeditions — The Argus
is captured by the Pelican — The Enterprise captures
the Boxer — Summary 201

CHAPTER VI

1813

ON THE LAKES

ONTARIO— Comparison of the rival squadrons— Chauncy
takes York and Fort George — Yeo is repulsed at Sack
ett's Harbor, but keeps command of the lake — Chauncy
sails — Yeo's partial victory off Niagara— Indecisive ac
tion off the Genesee— Chauncy's partial victory off Bur
lington, which gives him the command of the lake —
ERIE — Perry's success in creating a fleet — His victory
— CHAMPLAIN — Loss of the Growler and Eagle — Sum
mary 267

VOL. IX.— 2

NAVAL WAR OF 1812

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Causes of the War of 1812 — Conflicting views of America
and Britain as regards neutral rights — Those of the
former power right — Impossibility of avoiding hostili
ties — Declaration of war — General features of the con
test—Racial identity of the contestants — The treaty of
peace nominally leaves the situation unchanged — But
practically settles the dispute in our favor in respect to
maritime rights — The British navy and its reputation
prior to 1812 — Comparison with other European navies
— British and American authorities consulted in the
present work

THE view professed by Great Britain in 1812
respecting the rights of belligerents and neu
trals was diametrically opposite to that held by the
United States. "Between England and the United
States of America," writes a British author, "a
spirit of animosity, caused chiefly by the impress
ment of British seamen, or of seamen asserted to
be such, from on board of American merchant ves
sels, had unhappily subsisted for a long time" prior
to the war. "It is, we believe," he continues, "an
acknowledged maxim of public law, as well that no
nation but the one he belongs to can release a sub
ject from his natural allegiance, as that, provided
the jurisdiction of another independent state be not
infringed, every nation has a right to enforce the
services of her subjects wherever they may be found.

(27)

28 Naval War of 1812

Nor has any neutral nation such a jurisdiction over
her merchant vessels upon the high seas as to ex
clude a belligerent nation from the right of search
ing them for contraband of war or for the property
or persons of her enemies. And if, in the exercise
of that right, the belligerent should discover on
board of the neutral vessel a subject who has with
drawn himself from his lawful allegiance, the neu
tral can have no fair ground for refusing to deliver
him up; more especially if that subject is proved to
be a deserter from the sea or land service of the
former." *

Great Britain's doctrine was "once a subject al
ways a subject." On the other hand, the United
States maintained that any foreigner, after five
years' residence within her territory, and after hav
ing complied with certain forms, became one of her
citizens as completely as if he was native born.
Great Britain contended that her warships possessed
the right of searching all neutral vessels for the
property and persons of her foes. The United
States, resisting this claim, asserted that "free bot
toms made free goods," and that consequently her
ships when on the high seas should not be molested
on any pretext whatever. Finally, Great Britain's
system of impressment,2 by which men could be
forcibly seized and made to serve in her navy, no

1 "The Naval History of Great Britain," by William James,
Vol. IV, p. 324. (New edition by Captain Chamier, R. N.,
London, 1837.)

8 The best idea of which can be gained by reading Marry-
at's novels.

Introductory 29

matter at what cost to themselves, was repugnant to
every American idea.

Such wide differences in the views of the two
nations produced endless difficulties. To escape the
press-gang, or for other reasons, many British sea
men took service under the American flag; and if
they were demanded back, it is not likely that they
or their American shipmates had much hesitation in
swearing either that they were not British at all,
or else that they had been naturalized as Americans.
Equally probable is it that the American blockade-
runners were guilty of a great deal of fraud and
more or less thinly veiled perjury. But the wrongs
done by the Americans were insignificant compared
with those they received. Any innocent merchant
vessel was liable to seizure at any moment; and
when overhauled by a British cruiser short of men
was sure to be stripped of most of her crew. The
British officers were themselves the judges as to
whether a seaman should be pronounced a native
of America or of Britain, and there was no appeal
from their judgment. If a captain lacked his full
complement there was little doubt as to the view
he would take of any man's nationality. The wrongs
inflicted on our seafaring countrymen by their im
pressment into foreign ships formed the main cause
of the war.

There were still other grievances which are thus
presented by the British Admiral Cochrane.3 "Our

8 "Autobiography of a Seaman," by Thomas, tenth Earl of
Dundonald, Admiral of the Red, Rear- Admiral of the Fleet,
London, 1860, vol. I, p. 24.

jo Naval War of 1812

treatment of its (America's) citizens was scarcely
in accordance with the national privileges to which
the young Republic had become entitled. There
were no doubt many individuals among the Ameri
can people who, caring little for the Federal Gov
ernment, considered it more profitable to break than
to keep the laws of nations by aiding and supporting
our enemy (France), and it was against such that
the efforts of the squadron had chiefly been directed ;
but the way the object was carried out was scarcely
less an infraction of those national laws which we
were professedly enforcing. The practice of taking
English (and American) seamen out of American
ships without regard to the safety of navigating
them when thus deprived of their hands has been
already mentioned. To this may be added the de
tention of vessels against which nothing contrary to
international neutrality could be established, where
by their cargoes became damaged, the compelling
them, on suspicion only, to proceed to ports other
than those to which they were destined; and gener
ally treating them as though they were engaged in
contraband trade. . . . American ships were not
permitted to quit English ports without giving se
curity for the discharge of their cargoes in some
other British or neutral port/' On the same subject
James4 writes : "When, by the maritime supremacy
of England, France could no longer trade for her
self, America proffered her services, as a neutral, to
trade for her; and American merchants and their

« L. c.? IV, 325.

Introductory 31

agents, in the gains that flowed in, soon found a
compensation for all the perjury and fraud necessary
to cheat the former out of her belligerent rights.
The high commercial importance of the United
States, thus obtained, coupled with a similarity of
language and, to a superficial observer, a resem
blance in person between the natives of America
and Great Britain, has caused the former to be the
chief, if not the only, sufferers by the exercise of the
right of search. Chiefly indebted for their growth
and prosperity to emigration from Europe, the
United States hold out every allurement to foreign
ers, particularly to British seamen, whom, by a
process peculiarly their own, they can naturalize as
quickly as a dollar can exchange masters and a blank
form, ready signed and sworn to, can be filled up.5
It is the knowledge of this fact that makes British
naval officers when searching for deserters from
their service so harsh in their scrutiny, and so scep
tical of American oaths and asseverations."

The last sentence of the foregoing from James is
a euphemistic way of saying that whenever a Brit
ish commander short of men came across an Ameri
can vessel he impressed all of her crew that he
wanted, whether they were citizens of the United
States or not. It must be remembered, however,
that the only reason why Great Britain did us more
injury than any other power was because she was
better able to do so. None of her acts were more
offensive than Napoleon's Milan decree, by which

* This is an exaggeration.

32 Naval War of 1812

it was declared that any neutral vessel which per
mitted itself to be searched by a British cruiser
should be considered as British, and as the lawful
prize of any French vessel. French frigates and
privateers were very apt to snap up any American
vessel they came across, and were only withheld at
all by the memory of the sharp dressing they had
received in the West Indies during the quasi-war of
1799-1800. What we undoubtedly ought to have
done was to have adopted the measure actually pro
posed in Congress, and declared war on both France
and England. As it was, we chose as a foe the one
that had done, and could still do, us the greatest
injury.

The principles for which the United States con
tended in 1812 are now universally accepted, and
those so tenaciously maintained by Great Britain
find no advocates in the civilized world. That Eng
land herself was afterward completely reconciled
to our views was amply shown by her intense indig
nation when Commodore Wilkes, in the exercise of
the right of search for the persons of the foes of
his country, stopped the neutral British ship Trent;
while the applause with which the act was greeted
in America proves pretty clearly another fact, that
we had warred for the right, not because it was the
right, but because it agreed with our self-interest to
do so. We were contending for "Free Trade and
Sailors' Rights" ; meaning by the former expression,
freedom to trade wherever we chose without hin
drance save from the power with whom we were

Introductory 33

trading ; and by the latter, that a man who happened
to be on the sea should have the same protection
accorded to a man who remained on land. Nomi
nally, neither of these questions was settled by, or
even alluded to, in the treaty of peace; but the im
mense increase in reputation that the navy acquired
during the war practically decided both points in our
favor. Our sailors had gained too great a name for
one to molest them with impunity again.

Holding views on these maritime subjects so radi
cally different from each other, the two nations could
not but be continually dealing with causes of quar
rel. Not only did British cruisers molest our mer
chantmen, but at length one of them, the 5o-gun
ship Leopard, attacked an American frigate, the
Chesapeake, when the latter was so lumbered up that
she could not return a shot, killed or disabled some
twenty of her men, and took away four others, one
Briton and three Americans, who were claimed as
deserters. For this act an apology was offered, but
it failed to restore harmony between the two nations.
Soon afterward another action was fought. The
American frigate President, Commodore Rodgers,
attacked the British sloop Little Belt, Captain Bing-
ham, and exchanged one or two broadsides with her,
— the frigate escaping scot-free while the sloop was
nearly knocked to pieces. Mutual recriminations
followed, each side insisting that the other was the
assailant.

When Great Britain issued her Orders in Council
forbidding our trading with France, we retaliated

34 Naval War of 1812

by passing an embargo act, which prevented us from
trading at all. There could be but one result to
such a succession of incidents, and that was war.
Accordingly, in June, 1812, war was declared; and
as a contest for the rights of seamen, it was largely
waged on the ocean. We also had not a little fight
ing to do on land, in which, as a rule, we came out
second-best. Few or no preparations for the war
had been made, and the result was such as might
have been anticipated. After dragging on through
three dreary and uneventful years it came to an end
in 1815, by a peace which left matters in almost pre
cisely the state in which the war had found them.
On land and water the contest took the form of a
succession of petty actions, in which the glory ac
quired by the victor seldom eclipsed the disgrace in
curred by the vanquished. Neither side succeeded
in doing what it intended. Americans declared that
Canada must and should be conquered, but the con
quering came quite as near being the other way.
British writers insisted that the American navy
should be swept from the seas; and during the
sweeping process it increased fourfold.

When the United States declared war, Great Brit-
am was straining every nerve and muscle in a death
struggle with the most formidable military despot
ism of modern times, and was obliged to entrust the
defence of her Canadian colonies to a mere handful
of regulars, aided by the local fencibles. But Con
gress had provided even fewer trained soldiers, and
relied on the militia. The latter chiefly exercised

Introductory 35

their fighting abilities upon one another in dueling,
and, as a rule, were afflicted with conscientious scru
ples whenever it was necessary to cross the frontier
and attack the enemy. Accordingly, the campaign
opened with the bloodless surrender of an American
general to a much inferior British force, and the war
continued much as it had begun; we suffered dis
grace after disgrace, while the losses we inflicted,
in turn, on Great Britain were so slight as hardly
to attract her attention. At last, having crushed her
greater foe, she turned to crush the lesser, and, in
her turn, suffered ignominious defeat. By this time
events had gradually developed a small number of
soldiers on our northern frontier, who, commanded
by Scott and Brown, were able to contend on equal
terms with the veteran troops to whom they were
opposed, though these formed part of what was then
undoubtedly the most formidable fighting infantry
any European nation possessed. The battles at this
period of the struggle were remarkable for the skill
and stubborn courage with which they were waged,
as well as for the heavy loss involved ; but the num
ber of combatants was so small that in Europe they
would have been regarded as mere outpost skir
mishes, and they wholly failed to attract any atten
tion abroad in that period of colossal armies.

When Great Britain seriously turned her attention
to her transatlantic foe, and assembled in Canada
an army of 14,000 men at the head of l!ake Cham-
plain, Congressional forethought enabled it to be
opposed by soldiers who, it is true, were as well dis-

36 Naval War of 1812

ciplined, as hardy, and as well commanded as any in
the world, but who were only a few hundred strong,
backed by more or less incompetent militia. Only
Macdonough's skill and Sir George Prevost's inca
pacity saved us from a serious disaster ; the sea-fight
reflected high honor on our seamen, but the retreat
of the British land-forces was due to the commander
and not to their antagonists. Meanwhile a large
British fleet in the Chesapeake had not achieved
much glory by the destruction of local oyster-boats
and the burning of a few farmers' houses, so an
army was landed to strike a decisive blow. At Bla-
densburg6 the five thousand British regulars, utterly
worn out by heat and fatigue, by their mere ap
pearance, frightened into a panic double their num
ber of American militia well posted. But the only
success attained was burning the public buildings of
Washington, and that result was of dubious value.
Baltimore was attacked next, and the attack repulsed,
after the forts and ships had shelled one another
with the slight results that usually attend that spec
tacular and harmless species of warfare.

The close of the contest was marked by the ex
traordinary battle of New Orleans. It was a per
fectly useless shedding of blood, since peace had
already been declared. There is hardly another con
test of modern times where the defeated side suf
fered such frightful carnage, while the victors came
off almost scathless. It is quite in accordance with

6 See the "Capture of Washington," by Edward D. Ingra-
ham (Philadelphia, 1849).

Introductory 37

the rest of the war that the militia, hitherto worse
than useless, should on this occasion win against
great odds in point of numbers ; and, moreover, that
their splendid victory should have been of little con
sequence in its effects upon the result. On the whole,
the contest by land, where we certainly ought to
have been successful, reflected greater credit on our
antagonists than upon us, in spite of the services of
Scott, Brown, and Jackson. Our small force of
regulars and volunteers did excellently ; as for the
militia, New Orleans proved that they could fight
superbly; and the other battles that they generally
would not fight at all.

At sea, as will appear, the circumstances were
widely different. Here we possessed a small but
highly effective force, the ships well built, manned
by thoroughly trained men, and commanded by able
and experienced officers. The deeds of our navy
form a part of history over which any American can
be pardoned for lingering.

Such was the origin, issue, and general character
of the war. It may now be well to proceed to a
comparison of the authorities on the subject. Allu
sion has already been made to them in the preface,
but a fuller reference seems to be necessary in this
connection.

At the close of the contest, the large majority of
historians who wrote of it were so bitterly ran
corous that their statements must be received with
caution. For the main facts I have relied wherever

38 Naval War of 1812

it was practicable upon the official letters of the
commanding officers, taking each as authority for
his own force and loss.7 For all the British victories
we have British official letters, which tally almost
exactly, as regards matters of fact and not of opin
ion, with the corresponding American accounts. For
the first year the British also published official ac
counts of their defeats, which, in the cases of the
Guerriere, Macedonian, and Frolic, I have followed
as closely as the accounts of the American victors.
The last British official letter published announcing
a defeat was that in the case of the Java, and it is
the only letter that I have not strictly accepted. The
fact that no more were published thereafter is of
itself unfortunate; and from the various contradic
tions it contains it would appear to have been tam
pered with. The surgeon's report accompanying it
is certainly false. Subsequent to 1812 no letter of
a defeated British commander was published,8 and I
have to depend upon the various British historians,
especially James, of whom more anon.

The American and British historians from whom
we are thus at times forced to draw our material

7 As where Broke states his own force at 330, his antago
nist's at 440, and the American court of inquiry makes the
numbers 396 and 379, I have taken them as being 330 and 379
respectively. This is the only just method ; I take it for
granted that each commander meant to tell the truth, and
of course knew his own force, while he might very naturally
and in perfect good faith exaggerate his antagonist's.

8 Except about the battles on the Lakes, where I have ac
cordingly given the same credit to the accounts both of the
British and of the Americans.

Introductory 39

regard the war from very different standpoints, and
their accounts generally differ. Each writer natur
ally so colored the affair as to have it appear favor
able to his own side. Sometimes this was done inten
tionally and sometimes not. Not infrequently errors
are made against the historian's own side ; as when
the British author, Brenton, says that the British
brig Peacock mounted 32*5 instead of 24*5, while
Lossing in his "Field Book of the War of 1812"
makes the same mistake about the armament of the
American brig Argus. Errors of this description
are, of course, as carefully to be guarded against as
any others. Mere hearsay reports, such as "it has
been said," "a prisoner on board the opposing fleet
has observed," "an American (or British) news
paper of such and such a date has remarked," are of
course to be rejected. There is a curious parallelism
in the errors on both sides. For example, the Amer
ican, Mr. Low, writing in 1813, tells how the Con
stitution, 44, captured the Guerriere of 49 guns,
while the British Lieutenant Low, writing in 1880,
tells how the Pelican, 18, captured the Argus of 20
guns. Each records the truth but not the whole
truth, for although rating 44 and 18 the victors car
ried respectively 54 and 21 guns, of heavier metal
than those of their antagonists. Such errors are
generally intentional. Similarly, most American
writers mention the actions in which the privateers
were victorious, but do not mention those in which
they were defeated ; while the British, in turn, record
every successful "cutting-out" expedition, but ig-

40 Naval War of 1812

nore entirely those which terminated unfavorably.
Other errors arise from honest ignorance. Thus,
James in speaking of the repulse of the Endymion's
boats by the Neufchatel gives the latter a crew of
1 20 men; she had more than this number originally,
but only 40 were in her at the time of the attack.
So also when the captain of the Pelican writes that
the officers of the Argus report her loss at 40, when
they really reported it at 24 ; or when Captain Dacres
thought the Constitution had lost about 20 men in
stead of 14. The American gunboat captains in
recounting their engagements with the British frig
ates invariably greatly overestimated the loss of the
latter. So that on both sides there were some inten
tional misstatements or garblings, and a much more
numerous class of simple blunders, arising largely
from an incapacity for seeing more than one side
of the question.

Among the early British writers upon this war,
the ablest was James. He devoted one work, his
"Naval Occurrences," entirely to if; and it occupies
the largest part of the sixth volume of his more ex
tensive "History of the British Navy." 9 Two other
British writers, Lieutenant Marshall10 and Captain
Brenton,11 wrote histories of the same events, about
the same time; but neither of these naval officers
produced half as valuable a work as did the civilian

9 A new edition, London, 1826.

10 "Royal Naval Biography," by John Marshall (London,
1823-1835).

11 "Naval History of Great Britain," by Edward Pelham
Brenton (new edition, London, 1837).

Introductory 41

James. Marshall wrote a dozen volumes, each filled
with several scores of dreary panegyrics, or memoirs
of as many different officers. There is no attempt at
order, hardly anything about the ships, guns, or
composition of the crews ; and not even the pretence
of giving both sides, the object being to make every
Englishman appear in his best light. The work is
analogous to the numerous lives of Decatur, Bain-
bridge, Porter, etc., that appeared in the United
States about the same time, and is quite as un
trustworthy. Brenton made a far better and very
interesting book, written on a good and well-con
nected plan, and apparently with a sincere desire to
tell the truth. He accepts the British official ac
counts as needing nothing whatever to supplement
them, precisely as Cooper accepts the American offi
cials'. A more serious fault is his inability to be ac
curate. That this inaccuracy is not intentional is
proved by the fact that it tells as often against his
own side as against his opponents. He says, for
example, that the guns of Perry's and Barclay's
squadrons "were about equal in number and weight,"
that the Peacock (British) was armed with 32*5 in
stead of 24's, and underestimates the force of the
second Wasp. But the blunders are quite as bad
when distributed as when confined to one side; in
addition, Brenton's disregard of all details makes
him of but little use.

James, as already said, is by far the most valuable
authority on the war, as regards purely British af
fairs. He enters minutely into details, and has evi-

42 Naval War of 1812

dently laboriously hunted up his authorities. He has
examined the ships' logs, the Admiralty reports, va
rious treaties, all the "Gazette" reports, gives very
well-chosen extracts, has arranged his work in chron
ological order, discriminates between the officers that
deserve praise and those that deserve blame, and in
fact writes a work which ought to be consulted by
every student of naval affairs. But he is unfortu
nately afflicted with a hatred toward the Americans
that amounts to a monomania. He wishes to make
out as strong a case as possible against them. The
animus of his work may be gathered from the not
over complimentary account of the education of the
youthful seafaring American, which can be found in
Vol. VI, p. 113, of his "History." On page 153 he
asserts that he is an "impartial Historian" ; and about
three lines before mentions that "it may suit the
Americans to invent any falsehood, no matter how
barefaced, to foist a valiant character on them
selves." On page 419 he says that Captain Porter
is to be believed, "so far as is borne out by proof
(the only safe way where an American is con
cerned)," — which somewhat sweeping denunciation
of the veracity of all of Captain Porter's compatriots
would seem to indicate that James was not, perhaps,
in that dispassionate frame of mind best suited for
writing history. That he should be biased against
individual captains can be understood, but when he
makes rabid onslaughts upon the American people
as a whole, he renders it difficult for an American,
at any rate, to put implicit credence in him. His

Introductory 43

statements are all the harder to confute when they
are erroneous, because they are intentionally so.
It is not, as with Brenton and Marshall, because he
really thinks a British captain can not be beaten, ex
cept by some kind of distorted special Providence,
for no man says worse things than he does about
certain officers and crews. A writer of James' un
doubted ability must have known perfectly well that
his statements were untrue in many instances, as
where he garbles Hilyar's account of Porter's loss,
or misstates the comparative force of the fleets on
Lake Champlain.

When he says (p. 194) that Captain Bainbridge
wished to run away from the Java, and would have
done so if he had not been withheld by the advice
of his first lieutenant, who was a renegade English
man,12 it is not of much consequence whether his
making the statement was due to excessive credulity
or petty meanness, for, in either case, whether the
defect was in his mind or his morals, it is enough
to greatly impair the value of his other "facts."
Again, when James (p. 165) states that Decatur
ran away from the Macedonian until, by some mar
velous optical delusion, he mistook her for a 32, he
merely detracts a good deal from the worth of his
own account. When the Americans adopt boarding
helmets, he considers it as proving conclusively that
they are suffering from an acute attack of cowardice.
On p. 122 he says that "had the President, when she

11 Who, by the way, was Mr. Parker, born in Virginia, and
never in England in his life.

44 Naval War of 1812

fell in with the Belvidera, been cruising alone . . .
Commodore Rodgers would have magnified the Brit
ish frigate into a line-of -battle ship, and have done
his utmost to avoid her," which gives an excellent
idea of the weight to be attached to the various
other anecdotes he relates of the much abused Com
modore Rodgers.

But it must always be remembered that untrust
worthy as James is in anything referring purely to
the Americans, he is no worse than his compeers of
both nationalities. The misstatements of Niles in
his "Weekly Register" about the British are quite
as flagrant, and his information about his own side
even more valuable.13 Every little American author
crowed over Perry's "Nelsonic victory over a greatly
superior force." The Constitution was declared to
have been at a disadvantage when she fought the
Guerriere, and so on ad infinitum. But these writers
have all faded into oblivion, and their writings are
not even referred to, much less believed. James, on
the contrary, has passed through edition after edi
tion, is considered as unquestionable authority in

13 In Niles, by the way, can be found excellent examples of
the traditional American "spread-eagle" style. In one place
I remember his describing "The Immortal Rodgers," balked
of his natural prey, the British, as "soaring about like the
bold bald eagle of his native land," seeking whom he might
devour. The accounts he gives of British line-of-battle ships
fleeing from American 44*5 quite match James' anecdotes of
the latter's avoidance of British 38*8 and 36*8 for fear they
might mount twenty-four-pounders. The two works taken
together give a very good idea of the war ; separately, either
is utterly unreliable, especially in matters of opinion.

Introductory 45

his own country and largely throughout Europe,
and has furnished the basis for every subsequent ac
count by British authors. From Alison to Lieuten
ant Low, almost every English work, whether of a
popular character or not, is, in so far as it touches
on the war, simply a "rehash" of the works written
by James. The consequence is that the British and
American accounts have astonishingly little resem
blance. One ascribes the capture of the British frig
ates simply to the fact that their opponents were "cut
down line-of-battle ships" ; the other gives all the
glory to the "undaunted heroism," etc., of the Yan
kee sailors.

One not very creditable trait of the early Ameri
can naval historians gave their rivals a great advan
tage. The object of the former was to make out
that the Constitution, for example, won her victo
ries against an equal foe, and an exact statement of
the forces showed the contrary; so they always
avoided figures, and thus left the ground clear for
James* careful misstatements. Even when they
criticised him they never went into details, confin
ing themselves to some remark about "hurling" his
figures in his face with "loathing." Even Cooper,
interesting though his work is, has gone far less into
figures than he should, and seems to have paid little
if any attention to the British official statements,
which of course should be received as of equal
weight with the American. His comments on the
actions are generally very fair, the book never being
disfigured by bitterness toward the British ; but he is

46 Naval War of 1812

certainly wrong, for example, in ascribing the loss
of the Chesapeake solely to accident, that of the
Argus solely to her inferiority in force, and so on.
His disposition to praise all the American com
manders may be generous, but is nevertheless un
just. If Decatur's surrender of the President is at
least impliedly praised, then Porter's defence of the
Essex" can hardly receive its just award. There is
no weight in the commendation bestowed upon Hull,
if commendation, the same in kind though less in
degree, is bestowed upon Rodgers. It is a great pity
that Cooper did not write a criticism on James, for
no one could have done it more thoroughly. But
he never mentions him, except once in speaking of
Barclay's fleet. In all probability this silence arose
from sheer contempt, and the certainty that most of
James' remarks were false; but the effect was that
very many foreigners believe him to have shirked
the subject. He rarely gives any data by which the
statements of James can be disproved, and it is for
this reason that I have been obliged to criticise the
latter's work very fully. Many of James' remarks,
however, defy criticism from their random nature,
as when he states that American midshipmen were
chiefly masters and mates of merchantmen, and does
not give a single proof to support the assertion. It
would be nearly as true to assert that the British
midshipmen were for the most part ex-members of
the prize-ring, and as much labor would be needed
to disprove it. In other instances it is quite enough
to let his words speak for themselves, as where he

Introductory 47

says (p. 155) that of the American sailors one-third
in number and one-half in point of effectiveness were
in reality British. That is, of the 450 men the Con
stitution had when she fought the Java 150 were
British, and the remaining 300 could have been as
effectively replaced by 150 more British. So a very
little logic works out a result that James certainly
did not intend to arrive at ; namely, that 300 British
led by American officers could beat, with ease and
comparative impunity, 400 British led by their own
officers. He also forgets that the whole consists of
the sum of the parts. He accounts for the victories
of the Americans by stating (p. 280) that they were
lucky enough to meet with frigates and brigs who
had unskilful gunners or worthless crews; he also
carefully shows that the Macedonian was incompe
tently handled, the Peacock commanded by a mere
martinet, the Avon's crew unpracticed at the guns,
the Epervier's mutinous and cowardly, the Pen
guin's weak and unskilful, the Java's exceedingly
poor, and more to the same effect. Now the Amer
icans took in single fight three frigates and seven
sloops, and when as many as ten vessels are met
it is exceedingly probable that they represent the fair
average; so that James' strictures, so far as true,
simply show that the average British ship was very
apt to possess, comparatively speaking, an incompe
tent captain or unskilful crew. These disadvantages
were not felt when opposed to navies in which they
existed to an even greater extent, but became very
apparent when brought into contact with a power

48 Naval War of 1812

whose few officers knew how to play their own parts
very nearly to perfection, and, something equally im
portant, knew how to make first-rate crews out of
what was already good raw material. Finally, a
large proportion of James' abuse of the Americans
sufficiently refutes itself, and perhaps Cooper's
method of contemptuously disregarding him was the
best; but no harm can follow from devoting a little
space to commenting upon him.

Much the best American work is Lieutenant
George E. Emmons' statistical "History of the
United States Navy." Unfortunately it is merely
a mass of excellently arranged and classified statis
tics, and while of invaluable importance to the stu
dent, is not interesting to the average reader. Al
most all the statements I have made of the force,
tonnage, and armament of the American vessels,
though I have whenever practicable taken them
from the Naval Records, etc., yet could be just as
well quoted from Emmons. Copies of most of the
American official letters which I have quoted can be
found in Niks' "Register/'' volumes i to 10, and all
of the British ones in the "London Naval Chronicle"
for the same years. It is to these two authorities
that I am most indebted, and nearly as much so to
the "American State Papers," Vol. XIV. Next in
order come Emmons, Cooper, and the invaluable, al
beit somewhat scurrilous, James; and a great many
others whose names I have quoted in their proper
places. In commenting upon the actions I have,
whenever possible, drawn from some standard work,

Introductory 49

such as Jurien de la Graviere's "Guerres Maritimes,"
Lord Howard Douglas* "Naval Gunnery," or, bet
ter still, from the lives and memoirs of Admirals
Farragut, Codrington, Broke, or Durham. The titles
of the various works will be found given in full as
they are referred to.14 In a few cases, where ex
treme accuracy was necessary, or where, as in the
case of the President's capture, it was desirable that
there should be no room for dispute as to the facts,
I have given the authority for each sentence; but in
general this would be too cumbersome, and so I have
confined myself to referring, at or near the begin
ning of the account of each action, to the authorities
from whom I have taken it. For the less important
facts on which every one is agreed I have often
given no references.

14 To get an idea of the American seamen of that time
Cooper's novels, "Miles Wallingford," "Home as Found,"
and the "Pilot," are far better than any history; in the
"Two Admirals" the description of the fleet manoeuvring is
unrivaled. His view of Jack's life is rather rose-colored
however. "Tom Cringle's Log" ought to be read for the in
formation it gives; Marryat's novels will show some of the
darker aspects of sailor life.

VOL. IX.— 3

CHAPTER II

Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when Ameri
ca declared war against her — Race identity of the com
batants — The American navy at the beginning of the
War — Officers well trained — Causes tending to make our
seamen especially efficient — Close similarity between
the British and American sailors — Our ships manned
chiefly by native Americans, many of whom had for
merly oeen impressed into the British navy — Quotas of
seamen contributed by the different States — Navy yards
— Lists of officers and men — List of vessels — Tonnage —
Different ways of estimating it in Britain and America
— Ratings — American ships properly rated — Arma
ments of the frigates and corvettes — Three styles of
guns used — Difference between long guns and carron-
ades — Short weight of American shot — Comparison of
British frigates rating 38, and American frigates rating
44 guns — Compared with a 74

DURING the early years of this century Eng
land's naval power stood at a height never
reached before or since by that of any other nation.
On every sea her navies rode, not only triumphant,
but with none to dispute their sway. The island folk
had long claimed the mastery of the ocean, and they
had certainly succeeded in making their claim com
pletely good during the time of bloody warfare that
followed the breaking out of the French Revolu
tion. Since the year 1792 each European nation, in
turn, had learned to feel bitter dread of the weight
of England's hand. In the Baltic, Sir Samuel Hood
(so)

Naval War of 1812 51

had taught the Russians that they must needs keep
in port when the English cruisers were in the offing.
The descendants of the Vikings had seen their whole
navy destroyed at Copenhagen. No Dutch fleet ever
put out after the day when, off Camperdown, Lord
Duncan took possession of Van Winter's shattered
ships. But a few years before 1812, the greatest
sea-fighter of all time had died in Trafalgar Bay,
and in dying had crumbled to pieces the navies of
France and of Spain.

From that day England's task was but to keep
in port such of her foes' vessels as she had not de
stroyed. France alone still possessed fleets that
could be rendered formidable, and so, from the
Scheldt to Toulon, her harbors were watched and
her coasts harried by the blockading squadrons of
the English. Elsewhere the latter had no fear of
their power being seriously assailed ; but their vast
commerce and numerous colonies needed ceaseless
protection. Accordingly in every sea their cruisers
could be found, of all sizes, from the stately ship-of-
the-line, with her tiers of heavy cannon and her
many hundreds of men, down to the little cutter
carrying but a score of souls and a couple of light
guns. All these cruisers, but especially those of the
lesser rates, were continually brought into contact
with such of the hostile vessels as had run through
the blockade, or were too small to be affected by it.
French and Italian frigates were often fought and
captured when they were skirting their own coasts,
or had started off on a plundering cruise through the

52 Naval War of 1812

Atlantic, or to the Indian Ocean; and though the
Danes had lost their larger ships they kept up a spir
ited warfare with brigs and gunboats. So the En
glish marine was in constant exercise, attended with
almost invariable success.

Such was Great Britain's naval power when the
Congress of the United States declared war upon
her. While she could number her thousand sail,
the American navy included but half a dozen frig
ates, and six or eight sloops and brigs; and it is
small matter for surprise that the British officers
should have regarded their new foe with contemptu
ous indifference. Hitherto the American seamen
had never been heard of except in connection with
two or three engagements with French frigates, and
some obscure skirmishes against the Moors of Trip
oli; none of which could possibly attract attention
in the years that saw Aboukir, Copenhagen, and
Trafalgar. And yet these same petty wars were the
school which raised our marines to the highest
standard of excellence. A continuous course of vic
tory, won mainly by seamanship, had made the En
glish sailor overweeningly self-confident, and caused
him to pay but little regard to manoeuvring or even
to gunnery. Meanwhile the American learned, by
receiving hard knocks, how to give them, and be
longed to a service too young to feel an over-confi
dence in itself. One side had let its training relax,
while the other had carried it to the highest possible
point. Hence our ships proved, on the whole, vic
torious in the apparently unequal struggle, and the

Naval War of 1812 53

men who had conquered the best seamen of Europe
were now in turn obliged to succumb. Compared
with the great naval battles of the preceding few
years, our bloodiest conflicts were mere skirmishes,
but they were skirmishes between the hitherto ac
knowledged kings of the ocean, and new men who
yet proved to be more than their equals. For over
a hundred years, or since the time when they had
contended on equal terms with the great Dutch
admirals, the British had shown a decided supe
riority to their various foes, and during the latter
quarter of the time this superiority, as already said,
was very marked indeed ; in consequence, the victo
ries of the new enemy attracted an amount of atten
tion altogether disproportionate to their material
effects. And it is a curious fact that our little navy,
in which the art of handling and fighting the old
broadside, sailing frigate in single conflict was
brought to the highest point of perfection ever
reached, that this same navy should have contained
the first representative of the modern war steamer,
and also the torpedo — the two terrible engines which
were to drive from the ocean the very white-winged
craft that had first won honor for the starry flag.
The tactical skill of Hull or Decatur is now of mere
ly archaic interest, and has but little more bearing
on the manoeuvring of a modern fleet than have the
tactics of the Athenian galleys. But the war still
conveys some most practical lessons as to the value
of efficient ships and, above all, of efficient men in
them. Had we only possessed the miserable gun-

54 Naval War of 1812

boats, our men could have done nothing; had we
not possessed good men, the heavy frigates would
have availed us little. Poor ships and impotent
artillery had lost the Dutch almost their entire
navy; fine ships and heavy cannon had not saved
the French and Spanish from the like fate. We
owed our success to putting sailors even better
than the Dutch on ships even finer than those built
by the two Latin seaboard powers.

The first point to be remembered in order to
write a fair account of this war is that the difference
in fighting skill, which certainly existed between the
two parties, was due mainly to training, and not to
the nature of the men. It seems certain that the
American had in the beginning somewhat the ad
vantage, because his surroundings, partly physical
and partly social and political, had forced him into
habits of greater self-reliance. Therefore, on the
average, he offered rather the best material to start
with ; but the difference was very slight, and totally
disappeared under good training. The combatants
were men of the same race, differing but little from
one another. On the New England coast the En
glish blood was as pure as in any part of Britain;
in New York and New Jersey it was mixed with
that of the Dutch settlers — and the Dutch are by
race nearer to the true old English of Alfred and
Harold than are, for example, the thoroughly Angli
cized Welsh of Cornwall. Otherwise, the infusion
of new blood into the English race on this side of the
Atlantic has been chiefly from three sources — Ger-

Naval War of 1812 55

man, Irish, and Norse; and these three sources rep
resent the elemental parts of the composite English
stock in about the same proportions in which they
were originally combined — mainly Teutonic, largely
Celtic, and with a Scandinavian admixture. The
descendant of the German becomes as much an An
glo-American as the descendant of the Strathclyde
Celt has already become an Anglo-Briton. Looking
through names of the combatants it would be diffi
cult to find any of one navy that could not be matched
in the other — Hull or Lawrence, Allen, Perry, or
Stewart. And among all the English names on both
sides will be found many Scotch, Irish, or Welsh —
Macdonough, O'Brien, or Jones. Still stranger ones
appear: the Huguenot Tattnall is one among the
American defenders of the Constellation, and an
other Huguenot Tattnall is among the British as
sailants at Lake Borgne. It must always be kept
in mind that the Americans and the British are two
substantially similar branches of the great English
race, which both before and after their separation
have assimilated, and made Englishmen of many
other peoples.1 The lessons taught by the war can
hardly be learned unless this identity is kept in
mind.2

1 The inhabitants of Great Britain are best designated as
"British"— English being either too narrow or too broad a
term, in one case meaning the inhabitants of but a part of
Britain, and in the other the whole Anglo-Saxon people.

1 It was practically a civil war, and was waged with much
harshness and bitterness on both sides. I have already spoken
of the numerous grievances of the Americans; the British,
in turn, looked upon our blockade-runners which entered

56 Naval War of 1812

To understand aright the efficiency of our navy,
it is necessary to take a brief look at the character
and antecedents of the officers and men who served
in it.

When war broke out the United States Navy was
but a few years old, yet it already had a far from
dishonorable history. The captains and lieutenants
of 1812 had been taught their duties in a very prac
tical school, and the flag under which they fought
was endeared to them already by not a few glorious
traditions — though these, perhaps, like others of
their kind, had lost none of their glory in the telling.
A few of the older men had served in the war of
the Revolution, and all still kept fresh in mind the
doughty deeds of the old-time privateering war
craft. Men still talked of Biddle's daring cruises
and Barney's stubborn fights, or told of Scotch Paul
and the grim work they had who followed his for
tunes. Besides these memories of an older genera
tion, most of the officers had themselves taken part,
when younger in years and rank, in deeds not a whit
less glorious. Almost every man had had a share in
some gallant feat, to which he, in part at least, owed

the French ports exactly as we regarded, at a later date, the
British steamers that ran into Wilmington and Charleston.
It is curious to see how illogical writers are. The careers of
the Argus and Alabama, for example, were strikingly similar
in many ways, yet the same writer who speaks of one as a
"heroic little brig," will call the other a "black pirate." Of
course there can be no possible comparison as to the causes
for which the two vessels were fighting; but the cruises
themselves were very much alike, both in character and
history.

Naval War of 1812 57

his present position. The captain had perhaps been
a midshipman under Truxton when he took the Ven
geance, and had been sent aboard the captured
French frigate with the prize-master ; the lieutenant
had borne a part in the various attacks on Tripoli,
and had led his men in the desperate hand-to-hand
fights in which the Yankee cutlass proved an over
match for the Turkish and Moorish cimeters. Nearly
every senior officer had extricated himself by his
own prowess or skill from the dangers of battle or
storm; he owed his rank to the fact that he had
proved worthy of it. Thrown upon his own re
sources, he had learned self-reliance ; he was a first-
rate practical seaman, and prided himself on the
way his vessel was handled. Having reached his
rank by hard work, and knowing what real fighting
meant, he was careful to see that his men were
trained in the essentials of discipline, and that they
knew how to handle the guns in battle as well as pol
ish them in peace. Beyond almost any of his coun
trymen, he worshiped the "Gridiron Flag," and,
having been brought up in the Navy, regarded its
honor as his own. It was, perhaps, the Navy alone
that thought itself a match, ship against ship, for
Great Britain. The remainder of the nation pinned
its faith to the army, or rather to that weakest of
weak reeds, the militia. The officers of the Navy,
with their strong esprit dc corps, their jealousy of
their own name and record, and the knowledge, by
actual experience, that the British ships sailed no
faster and were no better handled than their own.

$8 Naval War of 1812

had no desire to shirk a conflict with any foe, and
having tried their bravery in actual service, they
made it doubly formidable by cool, wary skill. Even
the younger men, who had never been in action, had
been so well trained by the tried veterans over them
that the lack of experience was not sensibly felt.

The sailors comprising the crews of our ships
were well worthy of their leaders. There was no bet
ter seaman in the world than the American Jack ; he
had been bred to his work from infancy, and had
been off in a fishing dory almost as soon as he could
walk. When he grew older, he shipped on a mer
chantman or whaler, and in those warlike times,
when our large merchant-marine was compelled to
rely pretty much on itself for protection, each craft
had to be well handled ; all who were not were soon
weeded out by a process of natural selection, of
which the agents were French picaroons, Spanish
buccaneers, and Malay pirates. It was a rough
school, but it taught Jack to be both skilful and self-
reliant ; and he was all the better fitted to become a
man-of-war's man, because he knew more about fire
arms than most of his kind in foreign lands. At
home he had used his ponderous ducking gun with
good effect on the flocks of canvasbacks in the reedy
flats of the Chesapeake, or among the sea-coots in
the rough water off the New England cliffs; and
when he went on a sailing voyage the chances were
even that there would be some use for the long guns
before he returned, for the American merchant
sailor could trust to no armed escort.

Naval War of 1812 59

The wonderful effectiveness of our seamen at the
date of which I am writing as well as long subse
quently to it was largely due to the curious condi
tion of things in Europe. For thirty years all the
European nations had been in a state of continuous
and very complicated warfare, during the course of
which each nation in turn fought almost every other,
England being usually at loggerheads with all. One
effect of this was to force an enormous proportion
of the carrying trade of the world into American
bottoms. The old Massachusetts town of Salem
was then one of the main depots of the East India
trade; the Baltimore clippers carried goods into the
French and German ports with small regard to the
blockade; New Bedford and Sag Harbor fitted out
whalers for the Arctic seas as well as for the South
Pacific ; the rich merchants of Philadelphia and New
York sent their ships to all parts of the world;
and every small port had some craft in the coasting
trade. On the New England seaboard but few of
the boys would reach manhood without having made
at least one voyage to the Newfoundland Banks
after codfish; and in the whaling towns of Long
Island it used to be an old saying that no man could
marry till he struck his whale. The wealthy mer
chants of the large cities would often send their
sons on a voyage or two before they let them enter
their counting-houses. Thus it came about that a
large portion of our population was engaged in sea
faring pursuits of a nature strongly tending to de
velop a resolute and hardy character in the men

60 Naval War of 1812

that followed them. The British merchantmen
sailed in huge convoys, guarded by men-of-war,
while, as said before, our vessels went alone, and
relied for protection on themselves. If a fishing
smack went to the Banks it knew that it ran a chance
of falling in with some not overscrupulous Nova
Scotian privateer. The barks that sailed from Sa
lem to the Spice Islands kept their men well trained
both at great guns and musketry, so as to be able to
beat off either Malay proas, or Chinese junks. The
New York ships, loaded for the West Indies, were
prepared to do battle with the picaroons that
swarmed in the Spanish Main; while the fast craft
from Baltimore could fight as well as they could
run. Wherever an American seaman went, he not
only had to contend with all the legitimate perils of
the sea, but he had also to regard almost every
stranger as a foe. Whether this foe called him
self pirate or privateer mattered but little. French,
Spaniards, Algerines, Malays, from all alike our
commerce suffered, and against all our merchants
were forced to defend themselves. The effect of
such a state of things, which made commerce so
remunerative that the bolder spirits could hardly
keep out of it, and so hazardous that only the most
skilful and daring could succeed in it, was to raise
up as fine a set of seamen as ever manned a navy.
The stern school in which the American was brought
up forced him into habits of independent thought
and action which it was impossible that the more
protected Briton could possess. He worked more

Naval War of 1812 61

intelligently and less from routine, and while per
fectly obedient and amenable to discipline, was yet
able to judge for himself in an emergency. He
was more easily managed than most of his kind-
being shrewd, quiet, and, in fact, comparatively
speaking, rather moral than otherwise ; if he was a
New Englander, when he retired from a sea life he
was not unapt to end his days as a deacon. Alto
gether there could not have been better material for
a fighting crew than cool, gritty American Jack.
Moreover, there was a good nucleus of veterans to
begin writh, who were well fitted to fill the more
responsible positions, such as captains of guns, etc.
These were men who had cruised in the little Enter
prise after French privateers, who had been in the
Constellation in her two victorious fights, or who,
perhaps, had followed Decatur when with only
eighty men he cut out the Philadelphia, manned by
fivefold his force and surrounded by hostile bat
teries and war vessels, — one of the boldest expe
ditions of the kind on record.

It is to be noted, furthermore, in this connection,
that by a singular turn of fortune, Great Britain,
whose system of impressing American sailors had
been one of the chief causes of the war, herself be
came, in consequence of that very system, in some
sort a nursery for the seamen of the young Repub
lican navy. The American sailor feared nothing-
more than being impressed on a British ship — dread
ing beyond measure the hard life and cruel discipline
aboard of her; but once there, he usually did well

62 Naval War of 1812

enough, and in course of time often rose to be of
some little consequence. For years before 1812,
the number of these impressed sailors was in reality
greater than the entire number serving in the Ameri
can navy, from which it will readily be seen that
they formed a good stock to draw upon. Very
much to their credit, they never lost their devotion
to the home of their birth, more than two thousand
of them being imprisoned at the beginning of the
war because they refused to serve against their
country. When Commodore Decatur captured the
Macedonian, that officer, as we learn from Mar
shall's "Naval Biography" (II, 1019), stated that
most of the seamen of his own frigate, the United
States, had served in British war vessels, and that
some had been with Lord Nelson in the Victory,
and had even been bargemen to the great Admiral,
— a pretty sure proof that the American sailors did
not show at" a disadvantage when compared with
others.3

3 With perfect gravity, James and his followers assume
Decatur's statement to be equivalent to saying that he had
chiefly British seamen on board ; whereas even as quoted by
Marshall, Decatur merely said that "his seamen had served
on board a British man-of-war," and that some "had served
under Lord Nelson." Like the Constitution, the United
States had rid herself of most of the British subjects on
board, before sailing. Decatur's remark simply referred to
the number of his American seamen who had been impressed
on board British ships. Whenever James says that an
American ship had a large proportion of British sailors
aboard, the explanation is that a large number of the crew
were Americans who had been impressed on British ships.
It would be no more absurd to claim Trafalgar as an Ameri-

Naval War of 1812 63

Good seaman as the impressed American proved
to be, yet he seldom missed an opportunity to escape
from the British service, by desertion or otherwise.
In the first place, the life was very hard, and, in
the second, the American seaman was very patriotic.
He had an honest and deep affection for his own
flag1, while, on the contrary, he felt a curiously
strong hatred for England, as distinguished from
Englishmen. This hatred was partly an abstract
feeling, cherished through a vague traditional re
spect for Bunker Hill, and partly something very
real and vivid, owing to the injuries he, and others
like him, had received. Whether he lived in Mary
land or Massachusetts, he certainly knew men whose
ships had been seized by British cruisers, their
goods confiscated, and the vessels condemned. Some
of his friends had fallen victims to the odious right
of search, and had never been heard of afterward.
He had suffered many an injury to friend, fortune,
or person, and some day he hoped to repay them
all; and when the war did come, he fought all the
better because he knew it was his own quarrel. But,
as I have said, this hatred was against England,
not against Englishmen. Then, as now, sailors
were scattered about over the world without any
great regard for nationality; and the resulting in
termingling of natives and foreigners in every mer
cantile marine was especially great in those of

can victory because there was a certain number of Americans
in Nelson's fleet, than it is to assert that the Americans were
victorious in 1812, because there were a few renegade British
on board their ships.

64 Naval War of 1812

Britain and America, whose people spoke the same
tongue and wore the same aspect. When chance
drifted the American into Liverpool or London,
he was ready enough to ship in an Indiaman or
whaler, caring little for the fact that he served under
the British flag; and the Briton, in turn, who found
himself in New York or Philadelphia, willingly
sailed in one of the clipper-built barks, whether it
floated the Stars and Stripes or not. When Cap
tain Porter wrought such havoc among the British
whalers in the South Seas, he found that no incon
siderable portion of their crews consisted of Ameri
cans, some of whom enlisted on board his own ves
sel ; and among the crews of the American whalers
were many British. In fact, though the skipper
of each ship might brag loudly of his nationality,
yet in practical life he knew well enough that there
was very little to choose between a Yankee and a
Briton.4 Both were bold and hardy, cool and in-

4 What choice there was, was in favor of the American.
In point of courage there was no difference whatever. The
Essex and the Lawrence, as well as the Frolic and the Rein
deer, were defended with the same stubborn, desperate, cool
bravery that marks the English race on both sides of the At
lantic. But the American was a free citizen, any one's equal,
a voter with a personal interest in his country's welfare, and,
above all, without having perpetually before his eyes the de
grading fear of the press-gang. In consequence, he was
more tractable than the Englishman, more self-reliant, and
possessed greater judgment. In the fight between the Wasp
and the Frolic, the latter's crew had apparently been well
trained at the guns, for they aimed well ; but they fired at
the wrong time, and never corrected the error ; while their
antagonists, delivering their broadsides far more slowly, by

Naval War of 1812 65

telligent, quick with their hands, and showing at
their best in an emergency. They looked alike and
spoke alike; when they took the trouble to think,
they thought alike ; and when they got drunk, which
was not an unfrequent occurrence, they quarreled
alike.

Mingled with them were a few seamen of other
nationalities. The Irishman, if he came from the
old Dano-Irish towns of Waterford, Dublin, and
Wexford, or from the Ulster coast, was very much
like the two chief combatants; the Celto-Turanian
kern of the west did not often appear on shipboard.
The French, Danes, and Dutch were hemmed in at
home; they had enough to do on their own sea
board, and could not send men into foreign fleets.
A few Norse, however, did come in, and excellent
sailors and fighters they made. With the Portu
guese and Italians, of whom some were to be found
serving under the Union Jack and others under the
Stars and Stripes, it was different ; although there
were many excellent exceptions they did not, as a
rule, make the best kind of seamen. They were
treacherous, fond of the knife, less ready with their
hands, and likely to lose either their wits or their
courage when in a tight place.

intelligently waiting until the proper moment, worked fright
ful havoc. But though there was a certain slight difference
between the seamen of the two nations, it must never be for
gotten that it was very much less than that between the vari
ous individuals of the same nation; and when the British had
been trained for a few years by such commanders as Broke
and Manners, it was impossible to surpass them, and it needed
our best men to equal them.

66 Naval War of 1812

In the American navy, unlike the British, there
was no impressment ; the sailor was a volunteer, and
he shipped in whatever craft his fancy selected.
Throughout the war there were no "picked crews"
on the American side,5 excepting on the last two
cruises of the Constitution. In fact (as seen by the
letter of Captains Stewart and Bainbridge to Secre
tary Hamilton), there was often much difficulty in
getting enough men.6 Many sailors preferred to
serve in the innumerable privateers, and the two

5 James' statements to the contrary being in every case ut
terly without foundation. He Is also wrong in his assertion
that the American ships had no boys; they had nearly as
many in proportion as the British. The Constitution had
31, the Adams 15, etc. So, when he states that our midship
men were generally masters and mates of merchantmen ; they
were generally from eleven to seventeen years old at the be
ginning of the war, and, besides, had rarely or never been in
the merchant marine.

6 Reading through the volumes of official letters about this
war, which are preserved in the office of the Secretary of the
Navy, one of the most noticeable things is the continual com
plaints about the difficulty of getting men. The Adams at
one time had a crew of but nineteen men — "fourteen of whom
are marines," adds the aggrieved commander. A log-book of
one of the gun-boats records the fact that after much difficulty
two men were enlisted — from the jail, with a parenthetical
memorandum to the effect that they were both very drunk.
British ships were much more easily manned, as they could
always have recourse to impressment.

The Constitution on starting out on her last cruises had an
extraordinary number of able seamen aboard, viz., 218, with
but 92 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 44 marines, making,
with the officers, a total of 440 men. (See letter of Captain
Bainbridge, Oct. 16, 1814; it is letter No. 51, in the fortieth
volume of "Captains' Letters," in the clerk's office of the
Secretary of the Navy.)

Naval War of 1812 67

above-mentioned officers, in urging the necessity of
building line-of-battle ships, state that it was hard
work' to recruit men for vessels of an inferior grade,
so long as the enemy had ships of the line.

One of the standard statements made by the
British historians about this war is that our ships
were mainly or largely manned by British sailors.
This, if true, would not interfere with the lessons
which it teaches ; and, besides that, it is not true.

In this, as in everything else, all the modern
writers have merely followed James or Brenton,
and I shall accordingly confine myself to examin
ing their assertions. The former begins (Vol. IV,
p. 470) by diffidently stating that there is a "simi
larity" of language between the inhabitants of the
two countries — an interesting philological discovery
that but few will attempt to controvert. In Vol.
VI, p. 154, he mentions that a number of blanks
occur in the American Navy List in the column
"Where Born" ; and in proof of the fact that these
blanks are there because the men were not Ameri
cans, he says that their names "are all English and
Irish."7 They certainly are ; and so are all the other

7 For example, James writes: "Out of the 32 captains one
only, Thomas Tingey, has England marked as his birth
place. . . . Three blanks occur, and we consider it rather
creditable to Captains John Shaw, Daniel S. Patterson, and
John Ord Creighton that they were ashamed to tell where
they were born." I have not been able to find out the lat-
ter's birth-place, but Captain Shaw was born in New York,
and I have seen Captain Patterson incidentally alluded to as
"born and bred in America." Generally, whenever I have
been able to fill up the vacancies in the column "Where
Born," I have found that it was in America. From these

68 Naval War of 1812

names in the list. It could not well be otherwise,
as the United States navy was not officered by
Indians. In looking over this same Navy List (of
1816) it will be seen that but a little over five per
cent of the officers were born abroad — a smaller
proportion by far than would exist in the popula
tion of the country at large — and most of these had
come to America when under ten years of age. On
p. 155 James adds that the British sailors com
posed "one third in number and one half in point
of effectiveness" of the American crews. Brenton
in his "Naval History" writes : "It was said, and I
have no reason to doubt the fact, that there were
200 British seamen aboard the Constitution."8
These statements are mere assertions unsupported by
proof and of such a loose character as to be diffi
cult to refute. As our navy was small, it may be
best to take each ship in turn. The only ones of
which the British could write authoritatively were,
of course, those which they captured. The first one
taken was the Wasp. James says many British
were discovered among her crew, instancing es
pecially one sailor named Jack Lang; now Jack
Lang was born in the town of Brunswick, New
Jersey, but had been impressed and forced to serve
in the British Navy. The same was doubtless true
of the rest of the "many British" seamen of her
crew; at any rate, as the only instance James men-
facts it would appear that James was somewhat hasty in con
cluding that the omission of the birth-place proved the owner
of the name to be a native of Great Britain.
8 New edition, London, 1837, Vol. II, p. 456.

Naval War of 1812 69

tions (Jack Lang) was an American, he can hardly
be trusted for those whom he does not name.

Of the 95 men composing the crew of the Nau
tilus when she was captured, "6 were detained and
sent to England to await examination as being sus
pected of being British subjects."9 Of the other
small brigs, the Viper, Vixen, Rattlesnake, and
Syren, James does not mention the composition of
the crews, and I do not know that any were claimed
as British. Of the crew of the Argus "about 10 or
12 were believed to be British subjects; the American
officers swore the crew contained none" (James,
"Naval Occurrences," p. 278). From o to 10 per
cent can be allowed. When the Frolic was cap
tured "her crew consisted of native Americans" (do.
p. 340). James speaks ("History," p. 418) of "a
portion of the British subjects on board the Essex''
but without giving a word of proof or stating his
grounds of belief. One man was claimed as a
deserter by the British, but he turned out to be a
New Yorker. There were certainly a certain number
of British aboard, but the number probably did not
exceed thirty. Of the President's crew he says

9 Quoted from letter of Commodore Rodgers of September
12, 1812 (in Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters," Vol. XXV,
No. 43), inclosing a "List of American prisoners of war dis
charged out of custody of Lieutenant William Miller, agent
at the port of Halifax," in exchange for some of the British
captured by Porter. This list, by the way, shows the crew
of the Nautilus (counting the six men detained as British)
to have been 95 in number, instead of 106, as stated by James.
Commodore Rodgers adds that he has detained 12 men of the
Guerrilre's crew as an offset to the 6 men belonging to the
Nautilus.

jo Naval War of 1812

("Naval Occurrences," p. 448) : "In the opinion of
several British officers there were among them many
British seamen" ; but Commodore Decatur, Lieuten
ant Gallagher, and the other officers swore that
there were none. Of the crew of the Chesapeake,
he says, "about 32" were British subjects, or about
10 per cent. One or two of these were afterward
shot, and some 25, together with a Portuguese
boatswain's mate, entered into the British service.
So that of the vessels captured by the British, the
Chesapeake had the largest number of British (about
10 per cent of her crew) on board, the others rang
ing from that number down to none at all, as in the
case of the Wasp.

As these eleven ships would probably represent a
fair average, this proportion, of from o to 10 per
cent, should be taken as the proper one. James,
however, is of the opinion that those ships manned
by Americans were more apt to be captured than
those manned by the braver British; which calls
for an examination of the crews of the remaining
vessels. Of the American sloop Peacock, James
says ("Naval Occurrences," p. 348) that "several
of her men were recognized as British seamen";
even if this were true, "several" could not probably
mean more than sixteen, or 10 per cent. Of the
second Wasp he says, "Captain Blakely was a na
tive of Dublin, and, along with some English and
Scotch, did not, it may be certain, neglect to have
in his crew a great many Irish." Now Captain
Blakely left Ireland when he was but 16 months

Naval War of 1812 71

old, and the rest of James's statement is avowedly
mere conjecture. It was asserted positively in the
American newspapers that the Wasp, which sailed
from Portsmouth, was manned exclusively by New
Englanders, except a small draft of men from a
Baltimore privateer, and that there was not a for
eigner in her crew. Of the Hornet James states
that "some of her men were natives of the United
Kingdom" ; but he gives no authority, and the men
he refers to were in all probability those spoken of
in the journal of one of the Hornet's officers, which
says that "many of our men [Americans] had been
impressed in the British service." As regards the
gunboats, James asserts that they were commanded
by "Commodore Joshua Barney, a native of Ire
land." This officer, however, was born at Baltimore
on July 6, 1759. As to the Constitution, Brenton,
as already mentioned, supposes the number of Brit
ish sailors in her crew to have been 200; James
makes it less, or about 150. Respecting this, the
only definite statements I can find in British works
are the following: In the "Naval Chronicle," Vol.
XXIX, p. 452, an officer of the Java states that most
of the Constitution's men were British, many being
from the Gucrrierc; which should be read in con
nection with James's statement (Vol. VI, p. 156)
that but eight of the Gucrrierc's crew deserted, and
but two shipped on board the Constitution. More
over, as a matter of fact, these eight men were all
impressed Americans. In the "Naval Chronicle" it
is also said that the Chesapeake' s surgeon was an

72 Naval War of 1812

Irishman, formerly of the British Navy; he was
born in Baltimore, and was never in the British
navy in his life. The third lieutenant "was sup
posed to be an Irishman" (Brenton, II, 456). The
first lieutenant "was a native of Great Britain, we
have been informed" (James, VI, 194) ; he was
Mr. George Parker, born and bred in Virginia. The
remaining three citations, if true, prove nothing.
"One man had served under Mr. Kent" of the Guer-
riere (James, VI, p. 153). "One had been in the
Achille" and "one in the Eurydice" (Brenton, II,
456). These three men were most probably Ameri
can seamen who had been impressed on British ships.
From Cooper (in "Putnam's Magazine," Vol, I, p.
593) as well as from several places in the Consti
tution's log,10 we learned that those of the crew who
were British deserters were discharged from the
Constitution before she left port, as they were afraid
to serve in a war against Great Britain. That this fear
was justifiable may be seen by reading James, Vol.
IV, p. 483. Of the four men taken by the Leopard
from the Chesapeake, as deserters, one was hung
and three scourged. In reality the crew of the Con
stitution probably did not contain a dozen British
sailors; in her last cruises she was manned almost

10 See her log-book (Vol. II, Feb. i, 1812, to Dec. 13, 1813) ;
especially on July i2th, when twelve men were discharged.
In some of Hull's letters he alludes to the desire of the Brit
ish part of the crew to serve on the gun-boats or in the ports ;
and then writes that "in accordance with the instructions
sent him by the Secretary of the Navy" he had allowed the
British-born portion to leave the ship. The log-books are in
the Bureau of Navigation.

Naval War of 1812 73

exclusively by New Englanders. The only remain
ing vessel is the United States, respecting whose
crew some remarkable statements have been made.
Marshall (Vol. II, p. 1019) writes that Commodore
Decatur "declared there was not a seaman in his
ship who had not served from 5 to 12 years in a
British man-of-war," from which he concludes that
they were British themselves. It may be questioned
whether Decatur ever made such an assertion ; or if
he did, it is safe to asume again that his men were
long-impressed Americans.11

11 At the beginning of the war there were on record in the
American State Department 6,257 cases of impressed Ameri
can seamen. These could represent but a small part of the
whole, which must have amounted to 20,000 men, or more
than sufficient to man our entire navy five times over. Ac
cording to the British Admiralty Report to the House of
Commons, February i, 1815, 2,548 impressed American sea
men, who refused to serve against their country, were im
prisoned in 1812. According to Lord Castlereagh's speech in
the House, February 18, 1813, 3,300 men claiming to be Ameri
can subjects were serving in the British navy in January,
1811, and he certainly did not give anything like the whole
number. In the American service the term of enlistment ex
tended for two years, and the frigate United States, referred
to, had not had her crew for any very great length of time as
yet. If such a crew were selected at random from American
sailors, among them there would be, owing to the small num
ber serving in our own navy and the enormous number im
pressed into the British navy, probably but one of the former
to two of the latter. As already mentioned the American al
ways left a British man-of-war as soon as he could, by deser
tion or discharge; but he had no unwillingness to serve in
the home navy, where the pay was larger and the discipline
far more humane, not to speak of motives of patriotism.
Even if the ex-British man-of-war's-man kept out of service
for some time, he would be very apt to enlist when a war

VOL. IX.-4

74 Naval War of 1812

Of the Carolina's crew of 70 men, five were
British. This fact was not found out till three
deserted, when an investigation was made and
the two other British discharged. Captain Henly,
in reporting these facts, made no concealment of
h'is surprise that there should be any British at
all in his crew.12

From these facts and citations we may accord
ingly conclude that the proportion of British seamen
serving on American ships after the war broke out,
varied between none, as on the Wasp and Consti
tution, to ten per cent, as on the Chesapeake and
Essex. On the average, nine-tenths of each of our
crews were American seamen, and about one-twen
tieth British, the remainder being a mixture of va
rious nationalities.

On the other hand, it is to be said that the British
frigate Guerriere had ten Americans among her
crew, who were permitted to go below during action,
and the Macedonian eight, who were not allowed
that privilege, three of them being killed. Three
of the British sloop Peacock's men were Americans,
who were forced to fight against the Hornet" one
of them was killed. Two of the Epervier's men
were Americans, who were also forced to fight.
When the crew of the Nautilus was exchanged, a
number of other American prisoners were sent with
them; among these were a number of American

broke out, while his country undertook largely to avenge
his own wrongs.

12 See his letter in "Letters of Masters-Commandant,"
1814, I. No. 116.

Naval War of 1812

75

seamen who had been serving in the Shannon,
Acasta, Africa, and various other vessels. So there
was also a certain proportion of Americans among
the British crews, although forming a smaller per
centage of them than the British did on board the
American ships. In neither case was the number
sufficient to at all affect the result.

The crews of our ships being thus mainly native
Americans, it may be interesting to try to find out
the proportions that were furnished by the different
sections of the country. There is not much difficulty
about the officers. The captains, masters comman
dant, lieutenants, marine officers, whose birthplaces
are given in the Navy List of 1816, — 240 in all,—
came from the various States as follows :

N. H.,

Conn., 6

f-N.y., 17]

4

Middle States ££

Southern States

fMd.,

46]

Va.,

42

N.C.,

4

S. 0,

16

Ga,,

2

La.,

4

[Ky.,

2

42

Del.,
District of Columbia | D. C, 4 | 4

no

Total of given birthplaces

240

76 Naval War of 1812

Thus, Maryland furnished, both absolutely and
proportionately, the greatest number of officers,
Virginia, then the most populous of all the States,
coming next ; four-fifths of the remainder came from
the Northern States.

It is more difficult to get at the birthplaces of the
sailors. Something can be inferred from the num
ber of privateers and letters of marque fitted out.
Here Baltimore again headed the list; following
closely came New York, Philadelphia, and the New
England coast towns, with, alone among the South
ern ports, Charleston, S. C. A more accurate idea
of the quotas of sailors furnished by the different
sections can be arrived at by comparing the total
amount of tonnage the country possessed at the out
break of the war. Speaking roughly, 44 per cent
of it belonged to New England, 32 per cent to the
Middle States, and 1 1 per cent to Maryland. This
makes it probable (but of course not certain) that
three-fourths of the common sailors hailed from the
Northern States, half the remainder from Maryland,
and the rest chiefly from Virginia and South
Carolina.

Having thus discussed somewhat at length the
character of our officers and crews, it will now be
necessary to present some statistical tables to give
a more accurate idea of the composition of the navy,
the tonnage, complements, and armaments of the
ships, etc.

At the beginning of the war the Government pos-

Naval War of 1812 77

sessed six navy yards (all but the last established
in 1801) as follows:13

Minimum number of
Place. Original cost. men employed.

1. Portsmouth, N. H., $ 5,500 10

2. Charleston, Mass., 39,214 20

3. New York, 40,000 102

4. Philadelphia, 37,000 13

5. Washington, 4,000 36

6. Gosport, 12,000 16

In 1812 the following was the number of officers
in the navy:14

12 captains,

10 masters commandant,
73 lieutenants,
53 masters,
310 midshipmen,
42 marine officers.

500

At the opening of the year, the number of seamen,
ordinary seamen, and boys in service was 4,010,
and enough more were recruited to increase it to
5,230, of whom only 2,346 were destined for the
cruising war vessels, the remainder being detailed
for forts, gun-boats, navy yards, the lakes, etc.15
The marine corps was already ample, consisting of
1,523 men.10

No regular navy lists were published till 1816,
and I have been able to get very little information
respecting the increase in officers and men during

18 Report of Naval Secretary Jones, Nov. 30, 1814.
14 "List of Vessels," etc., by Geo. H. Preble, U.S.N.
(1874).

" Report of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb. 21, 1812.
»• Ibid

Naval War of 1812

1813 and 1814; but we have full returns for 1815,
which may be summarized as follows :17

30 captains,
141 lieutenants,
510 midshipmen,

50 surgeons,

50 pursers,

45 captain's clerks,

25 masters commandant,
24 commanders,
230 sailing-master0
12 chaplains,
10 coast pilots,
80 surgeon's mates,

530 boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sail*

makers,

268 boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, etc.,
1,106 quarter gunners, etC',
5,000 able seamen,
6,849 ordinary seamen and boys.

Making a total of 14,960, with 2,715 marines.18

Comparing this list with the figures given before,
it can be seen that during the course of the war
our navy grew enormously, increasing to between
three and four times its original size.

At the beginning of the year 1812 the navy of
the United States on the ocean consisted of the fol
lowing vessels, which either were, or could have
been, made available during the war:19

Rate K.mp
(Guns)

Where Built.

When
Built.

Ton-
nage.

Cost.

44 United States,
44 Constitution,

Philadelphia,
Boston,

'797
'797

1576
.576

$299,336
302,718

44 President,

New York,

1800

1576

220,910

38 Constellation,
38 Congress,

Baltimore,
Portsmouth,

'797
'799

1265
1268

314,21*
197,246

38 Chesapeake,

Norfolk,

'799

1244

220,677

32 Essex,

Salem,

'799

860

<39,36a

28 Adams,

New York,

1799

560

76,6*2

18 Hornet,

Baltimore,

• 805

480

52,603

18 JfiM/,
1 6 Argus,

Washington,
Boston,

1806
1803

4So
298

40,000
37,4*8

1 6 Syren,

Philadelphia,

.803

250

32,521

14 Nautilus,
14 Vijcen,

Baltimore,
Baltimore,

'803
1803

'85
185

'8,763
20,872

12 Enterprise,

Baltimore,

'799

•65

16,240

12 I'iper,

Purchased,

1810

'48

17 Seybert's" Statistical Annals," p. 676 (Philadelphia, 1818).

18 Report of Secretary B. W. Crowninshield, April 18, 1816.

19 Letter of Secretary Benjamin Stoddart to Fifth Con-

Naval War of 1812 79

There also appeared on the lists the New York,
36, Boston, 28, and John Adams, 28. The two
former were condemned hulks; the latter was en
tirely rebuilt after the war. The Hornet was orig
inally a brig of 440 tons, and 18 guns; having been
transformed into a ship, she was pierced for 20
guns, and in size was of an intermediate grade
between the Wasp and the heavy sloops, built some
what later, of 509 tons. Her armament consisted
of 32-pound carronades, with the exception of the
two bow-guns, which were long I2's. The
whole broadside was in nominal weight just 300
pounds; in actual weight about 277 pounds.
Her complement of men was 140, but during the
war she generally left port with I5O.20 The Wasp
had been a ship from the beginning, mounted the
number of guns she rated (of the same calibres as
the Hornet's) and carried some ten men less. She
was about the same length as the British i8-gun
brig-sloop, but, being narrower, measured nearly
30 tons less. The Argus and Syren were similar
and very fine brigs, the former being the longer.
Each carried two more guns than she rated ; and

gress, Dec. 24, 1798; Letters of Secretary Paul Hamilton,
Feb. 21, 1812; "American State Papers," Vol. XIX, p. 149.
See also "The History of the Navy of the United States," by
Lieut. G. E. Emmons, U. S. N. (published in Washington,
MDCCCLIII, under the authority of the Navy Department.
80 In the Hornet's log of Oct. 25, 1812, while in port, it is
mentioned that she had 158 men; four men who were sick
were left behind before she started. (See, in the Navy
Archives, the Log-book, Hornet, Wasp, and Argus, July
20, 1809, to Oct. 6, 1813).

8o Naval War of 1812

the Argus, in addition, had a couple thrust through
the bridle-ports. The guns were 24-pound carron
ades, with two long I2's for bow-chasers. The
proper complement of men was 100, but each sailed
usually with about 125. The four smaller craft
were originally schooners, armed with the same
number of light long guns as they rated, and carry
ing some 70 men apiece; but they had been very
effectually ruined by being changed into brigs, with
crews increased to a hundred men. Each was armed
with 1 8-pound carronades, carrying two more than
she rated. The Enterprise, in fact, mounted 16
guns, having two long nines thrust through the
bridle-ports. These little brigs were slow, not very
seaworthy, and overcrowded with men and guns;
they all fell into the enemy's hands without doing
any good whatever, with the single exception of
the Enterprise, which escaped capture by sheer good
luck, and in her only battle happened to be pitted
against one of the corresponding and equally bad
class of British gun-brigs. The Adams after sev
eral changes of form finally became a flush-decked
corvette. The Essex had originally mounted
twenty-six long I2's on her main-deck, and sixteen
24-pound carronades on her spar-deck; but official
fwisdom changed this, giving her 46 guns, twenty-
four 32-pound carronades, and two long i2's on
the main-deck, and sixteen 32-pound carronades
with four long I2's on the spar-deck. When Cap
tain Porter had command of her he was deeply
sensible of the disadvantages of an armament which

Naval War of 1812 81

put him at the mercy of any ordinary antagonist
who could choose his distance; accordingly he pe
titioned several times, but always without success,
to have his long i2's returned to him.

The American 38'$ were about the size of the
British frigates of the same rate, and armed almost
exactly in the same way, each having 28 long i8's
on the main-deck and 20 32-pound carronades on
the spar-deck. The proper complement was 300
men, but each carried from 40 to 80 more.21

Our three 44-gun ships were the finest frigates
then afloat (although the British possessed some
as heavy, such as the Egyptienne, 44). They were
beautifully modeled, with very thick scantling, ex
tremely stout masts, and heavy cannon. Each car
ried on her main-deck thirty long 24*5, and on her
spar-deck two long bow-chasers, and twenty or
twenty-two carronades — 42-pounders on the Presi-

11 The Chesapeake, by some curious mistake, was frequently
rated as a 44. and this drew in its train a number of attend
ant errors. When she was captured, James says that in one
of her lockers was found a letter, dated in February, 1811,
from Robert Smith, the Secretary of War, to Captain Evans,
at Boston, directing him to open houses of rendezvous for
manning the Chesapeake, and enumerating her crew at a
total of 443. Naturally this gave British historians the idea
that such was the ordinary complement of our 38-gun frig
ates. But the ordering so large a crew was merely a mis
take, as may be seen by a letter from Captain Bainbridge to
the Secretary of the Navy, which is given in full in the "Cap
tains' Letters," Vol. XXV, No. 19 (Navy Archives). In it he
mentions the extraordinary number of men ordered for the
Chesapeake, as it equals in number the crews of our 44-gun
frigates, whereas the Chesapeake is of the class of the Con
gress and Constellation.

82 Naval War of 1812

dent and United States, 32-pounders on the Consti
tution. Each sailed with a crew of about 450 men
— 50 in excess of the regular complement.22

It may be as well to mention here the only other
class of vessels that we employed during the war.
This was composed of the ship-sloops built in 1813,
which got to sea in 1814. They were very fine
vessels, measuring 509 tons apiece,23 with very thick
scantling and stout masts and spars. Each carried
twenty 32-pound carronades and two long I2's, with
a crew nominally of 160 men, but with usually a
few supernumeraries.24

'M The President when in action with the Endymion had
450 men aboard, as sworn by Decatur ; the muster-roll of the
Constitution, a few days before her action with the Guerriere,
contains 464 names (including 51 marines); 8 men were ab
sent in a prize, so she had aboard in the action 456. Her
muster-roll just before the action with the Cyane and Levant
shows 461 names.

23 The dimensions were 117 feet n inches upon the gun-
deck, 97 feet 6 inches keel for tonnage, measuring from one
foot before the forward perpendicular and along the base
line to the front of the rabbet of the port, deducting \ of the
moulded breadth of the beam, which is 31 feet 6 inches; mak
ing 50911 tons. (See in Navy Archives, "Contracts," Vol.

II, P- I37-)

24 The Peacock had 166 men, as we learn from her com
mander, Warrington's, letter of June ist (Letter No. 140 in
"Masters-Commandant's Letters," 1814, Vol. I). The Frolic
took aboard "10 or 12 men beyond her regular complement."
(See letter of Joseph Bainbridge, No. 51, in same Vol.) Ac
cordingly, wjien she was captured by the Orpheus, the com
mander of the latter, Captain Hugh Pigot, reported the
number of men aboard to be 171. The Wasp left port with
173 men, with which she fought her first action; she had a
much smaller number aboard in her second.

Naval War of 1812 83

The British vessels encountered were similar, but
generally inferior, to our own. The only 24-pounder
frigate we encountered was the Endymion, of about
a fifth less force than the President. Their 38-gun
frigates were almost exactly like ours, but with
fewer men in crew as a rule. They were three times
matched against our 44-gun frigates, to which they
were inferior about as three is to four. Their 36-
gun frigates were larger than the Essex, with a
more numerous crew, but the same number of guns ;
carrying on the lower deck, however, long i8's in
stead of 32-pound carronades, — a much more effec
tive armament. The 32-gun frigates were smaller,
with long I2's on the main-deck. The largest sloops
were also frigate-built, carrying twenty-two 32-
pound carronades on the main-deck, and twelve
lighter guns on the quarter-deck and forecastle, with
a crew of 180. The large flush-decked ship-sloops
carried 21 or 23 guns, with a crew of 140 men.
But our vessels most often came in contact with
the British i8-gun brig-sloop; this was a tubby
craft, heavier than any of our brigs, being about
the size of the Hornet. The crew consisted of
from no to 135 men; ordinarily each was armed
with sixteen 32-pound carronades, two long 6's, and
a shifting 1 2-pound carronade; often with a light
long gun as a stern-chaser, making 20 in all. The
Reindeer and Peacock had only 24-pound carron
ades; the Epervicr had but eighteen guns, all car
ronades.25

w The Epervier was taken into our service under the same
name and rate. Both Preble and Emmons describe her as of

84 Naval War of 1812

Among the stock accusations against our navy
of 1812 were, and are, statements that our vessels
were rated at less than their real force, and in par
ticular that our large frigates were "disguised line-
of-battle ships." As regards the ratings, most vessels
of that time carried more guns than they rated ; the
disparity was less in the French than in either the
British or American navies. Our 38-gun frigates
carried 48 guns, the exact number the British 38's
possessed. The worst case of underrating in our
navy was the Essex, which rated 32, and carried
46 guns, so that her real was 44 per cent in excess
of her nominal force; but this was not as bad as
the British sloop Cyane, which was rated at 20 or
22, and carried 34 guns, so that she had either 55
or 70 per cent greater real than nominal force. At
the beginning of the war we owned two i8-gun
ship-sloops, one mounting 18 and the other 20 guns;
the i8-gun brig-sloops they captured mounted each
19 guns, so the average was the same. Later we
built sloops that rated 18 and mounted 22 guns,
but when one was captured it was also put down
in the British navy list as an i8-gun ship-sloop.
During all the combats of the war there were but
four vessels that carried as few guns as they rated.
Two were British, the Epervier and Levant, and
two American, the Wasp and Adams. One navy

477 tons. Warrington, her captor, however, says: "The
surveyor of the port has just measured the Epervier, and
reports her 467 tons." (In the Navy Archives, "Masters-
Commandant's Letters," 1814, I, No. 125.)

For a full discussion of tonnage, see Appendix A.

Naval War of 1812 85

was certainly as deceptive as another, so far as un
derrating went.

The force of the statement that our large frigates
were disguised line-of-battle ships, of course de
pends entirely upon what the words "frigate" and
"line-of-battle ship" mean. When, on the loth of
August, 1653, De Ruyter saved a great convoy by
beating off Sir George Ayscough's fleet of 38 sail,
the largest of the Dutch admiral's "33 sail of the
line" carried but 30 guns and 150 men, and his own
flagship but 28 guns and 134 men.20 The Dutch
book from which this statement is taken speaks in
differently of frigates of 18, 40, and 58 guns.
Toward the end of the eighteenth century the terms
had crystallized. Frigate then meant a so-called
single-decked ship ; it in reality possessed two decks,
the main, or gun-deck, and the upper one, which
had no name at all until our sailors christened it
spar-deck. The gun-deck possessed a complete bat
tery, and the spar-deck an interrupted one, mounting
guns on the forecastle and quarter-deck. At that
time all "two-decked" or "three-decked" (in reality
three and four-decked) ships were liners. But in
1812 this had changed somewhat; as the various
nations built more and more powerful vessels, the
lower rates of the different divisions were dropped.

M "La Vie et les Actions Memorables du Sr. Michel de
Ruyter a Amsterdam, Chez Henry et Theodore Boom,
MDCLXXxvn." The work is by Barthelemy Pielat, a surgeon
in de Ruyter's fleet, and personally present during many of
his battles. It is written in French, but is in tone more
strongly anti-French than anti-English.

86 Naval War of 1812

Thus the British ship Cyane, captured by the Con
stitution, was in reality a small frigate, with a main-
deck battery of 22 guns, and 12 guns on the spar-
deck ; a few years before she would have been called
a 24-gun frigate, but she then ranked merely as a
22-gun sloop. Similarly the 50 and 64-gun ships
that had fought in the line at the Doggerbank,
Camperdown, and even at Aboukir, were now no
longer deemed fit for that purpose, and the 74 was
the lowest line-of-battle ship.

The Constitution, President, and States must then
be compared with the existing European vessels that
were classed as frigates. The French in 1812 had
no 24-pounder frigates, for the very good reason
that they had all fallen victims to the English 18-
pounders ; but in July of that year a Danish frigate,
the Nayaden, which carried long 24*5, was destroyed
by the English ship Dictator, 64.

The British frigates were of several rates. The
lowest rated 32, carrying in all 40 guns, 26 long
I2's on the main-deck and 14 24-pound carronades
on the spar-deck — a broadside of 324 pounds.27
The 36-gun frigates, like the Phoebe, carried 46
guns, 26 long i8's on the gun-deck and 32-pound
carronades above. The 38-gun frigates, like the
Macedonian, carried 48 or 49 guns, long i8's below
and 32-pound carronades above. The 32-gun frig
ates, then, presented in broadsides 13 long I2's be
low and 7 24-pound carronades above; the 38-gun

57 In all these vessels there were generally two long 6's or
g's substituted for the bow-chase carronades.

Naval War of 1812 87

frigates, 14 long i8's below and 10 32-pound car-
ronades above; so that a 44-gun frigate would nat
urally present 15 long 24'$ below and 12 42-pound
carronades above, as the United States did at first.
The rate was perfectly proper, for French, British,
and Danes already possessed 24-pounder frigates;
and there was really less disparity between the force
and rate of a 44 that carried 54 guns, than there was
in a 38 that carried 49, or, like the Shannon, 52.
Nor was this all. Two of our three victories were
won by the Constitution, which only carried 32-
pound carronades, and once 54 and once 52 guns;
and as two-thirds of the work was thus done by this
vessel, I shall now compare her with the largest
British frigates. Her broadside force consisted of
15 long 24's on the main-deck, and on the spar-
deck one long 24, and in one case 10, in the other
1 1 32-pound carronades — a broadside of 704 or 736
pounds.28 There was then in the British navy the
Acasta, 40, carrying in broadside 15 long i8's and
1 1 32-pound carronades ; when the spar-deck bat
teries are equal, the addition of 90 pounds to the
main-deck broadside (which is all the superiority
of the Constitution over the Acasta) is certainly not
enough to make the distinction between a frigate
and a disguised 74. But not considering the Acasta,
there were in the British navy three 24-pounder
frigates, the Cornwallis, Indefatigable, and Endy-
mion. We only came in contact with the latter in

88 Nominally ; in reality about 7 per cent less on account of
the short weight in metal.

88 Naval War of 1812

1815, when the Constitution had but 52 guns. The
Endymion then had an armament of 28 long 24*5, 2
long i8's, and 20 32-pound carronades, making a
broadside of 674 pounds,29 or including a shifting
24-pound carronade, of 698 pounds — just six
pounds, or i per cent, less than the force of that
"disguised line-of-battle ship" the Constitution!
As the Endymion only rated as a 40, and the Con
stitution as a 44, it was in reality the former and not
the latter which was underrated. I have taken the
Constitution, because the British had more to do
with her than they did with our other two 44*3 taken
together. The latter were both of heavier metal than
the Constitution, carrying 42-pound carronades. In
1812 the United States carried her full 54 guns,
throwing a broadside of 846 pounds; when cap
tured, the President carried 53, having substituted
a 24-pound carronade for two of her 42's, and her
broadside amounted to 828 pounds, or 16 per cent
nominal, and, on account of the short weight of her
shot, 9 per cent real excess over the Endymion. If
this difference made her a line-of-battle ship, then
the Endymion was doubly a line-of-battle ship com
pared to the Congress or Constellation. Moreover,
the American commanders found their 42-pound
carronades too heavy; as I have said the Constitu
tion only mounted 32*5, and the United States land
ed 6 of her guns. When, in 1813, she attempted to
break the blockade,- she carried but 48 guns, throw-

29 According to James 664 pounds; he omits the chase guns
for no reason.

Naval War of 1812 89

ing a broadside of 720 pounds — just 3 per cent
more than the Endymion.*0 If our frigates were
line-of-battle ships the disguise was certainly mar-
velously complete, and they had a number of com
panions equally disguised in the British ranks.

The 44*s were thus true frigates, with one com
plete battery of long guns and one interrupted one
of carronades. That they were better than any
other frigates was highly creditable to our ingenuity
and national skill. We can not, perhaps, lay claim
to the invention and first use of the heavy frigate,
for 24-pounder frigates were already in the service
of at least three nations, and the French 36-pound
carronade, in use on their spar-decks, threw a heav
ier ball than our 42-pounder. But we had enlarged
and perfected the heavy frigate, and were the first
nation that ever used it effectively. The French
Forte and the Danish Nayadcn shared the fate of
ships carrying guns of lighter calibre; and the Brit
ish 24-pounders, like the Endymion, had never ac
complished anything. Hitherto there had been a
strong feeling, especially in England, that an 18-
pound gun was as effective as a 24 in arming a frig-

30 It was on account of this difference of 3 per cent that
Captain Hardy refused to allow the Endymion to meet the
States (James vi, p. 470). This was during the course of
some challenges and counter-challenges which ended in noth
ing, Decatur in his turn being unwilling to have the Mace
donian meet the Statira, unless the latter should agree not
to take on a picked crew. He was perfectly right in this;
but he ought never to have sent the challenge at all. as two
ships but an hour or two out of port would be at a frightful
disadvantage in a fight.

90 Naval War of 1812

ate; we made a complete revolution in this respect.
England had been building only i8-pounder ves
sels when she ought to have been building 24-pound-
ers. It was greatly to our credit that our average
frigate was superior to the average British frigate;
exactly as it was to our discredit that the Essex was
so ineffectively armed. Captain Porter owed his
defeat chiefly to his ineffective guns, but also to hav
ing lost his topmast, to the weather being unfavor
able, and, still more, to the admirable skill with
which Hilyar used his superior armament. The
Java, Macedonian, and Guerriere owed their defeat
partly to their lighter guns, but much more to the
fact that their captains and seamen did not display
either as good seamanship or as good gunnery as
their foes. Inferiority in armament was a factor
to be taken into account in all the four cases, but it
was more marked in that of the Essex than in the
other three ; it would have been fairer for Porter to
say that he had been captured by a line-of-battle
ship, than for the captain of the Java to make that
assertion. In this last case the forces of the two
ships compared almost exactly as their rates. A 44
was matched against a 38 ; it was not surprising that
she should win, but it was surprising that she should
win with ease and impunity. The long 24's on the
Constitution's gun-deck no more made her a line-of-
battle ship than the 32-pound carronades mounted
on an English frigate's quarter-deck and forecastle
made her a line-of-battle ship when opposed to a
Frenchman with only 8's and 6's on his spar-deck.

Naval War of 1812 91

When, a few years before, the English Phoebe had
captured the French Ncrcidc, their broadsides were
respectively 407 and 258 pounds, a greater disparity
than in any of our successful fights; yet no author
thought of claiming that the Phoebe was anything
but a frigate. So with the Clyde, throwing 425
pounds, which took the Vestale, throwing but 246.
The facts were that i8-pounder frigates had cap
tured 12-pounders, exactly as our 24-pounders in
turn captured the i8-pounders.

Shortly before Great Britain declared war on us,
one of her i8-pounder frigates, the San Florcnzo,
throwing 476 Ibs. in a broadside, captured the 12-
pounder French frigate Psyche, whose broadside
was only 246 Ibs. The force of the former was
thus almost double that of the latter, yet the battle
was long and desperate, the English losing 48 and
the French 124 men. This conflict, then, reflected
as much credit on the skill and seamanship of the
defeated as of the victorious side; the difference in
loss could fairly be ascribed to the difference in
weight of metal. But where, as in the famous ship-
duels of 1812, the difference in force is only a fifth,
instead of a half, and yet the slaughter, instead of
being as five is to two, is as six to one, then the vic
tory is certainly to be ascribed as much to superi
ority in skill as to superiority in force. But, on the
other hand, it should always be remembered that
there was a very decided superiority in force. It is
a very discreditable feature of many of our naval
histories that they utterly ignore this superiority,

92 Naval War of 1812

seeming ashamed to confess that it existed. In real
ity it was something to be proud of. It was highly
to the credit of the United States that her frigates
were of better make and armament than any others ;
it always speaks well for a nation's energy and ca
pacity that any of her implements of warfare are of
a superior kind. This is a perfectly legitimate rea
son for pride.

It spoke well for the Prussians in 1866 that they
opposed breech-loaders to the muzzle-loaders of the
Austrians ; but it would be folly to give all the credit
of the victory to the breech-loaders and none to
Moltke and his lieutenants. Thus, it must be re
membered that two things contributed to our vic
tories. One was the excellent make and armament
of our ships ; the other was the skilful seamanship,
excellent discipline, and superb gunnery of the men
who were in them. British writers are apt only to
speak of the first, and Americans only of the last,
whereas both should be taken into consideration.

To sum up: the American 44-gun frigate was a
true frigate, in build and armament, properly rated,
stronger than a 38-gun frigate just about in the
proportion of 44 to 38, and not exceeding in
strength an i8-pounder frigate as much as the latter
exceeded one carrying 12-pounders. They were in
no way whatever line-of -battle ships ; but they were
superior to any other frigates afloat, and, what is
still more important, they were better manned and
commanded than the average frigate of any other
navy. Lord Codrington says ("Memoirs," I, p.

Naval War of 1812 93

310) : "But I well know the system of favoritism
and borough corruption prevails so very much that
many people are promoted and kept in command
that should be dismissed the service, and while such
is the case the few Americans chosen for their merit
may be expected to follow up their successes except
where they meet with our best officers on even
terms." 31 The small size of our navy was probably
to a certain extent effective in keeping it up to a high
standard; but this is not the only explanation, as
can be seen by Portugal's small and poor navy. On
the other hand, the champions or pick of a large
navy ought to be better than the champions of a
small one.32

31 To show that I am not quoting an authority biased in
our favor I will give Sir Edward Codrington's opinion of
our rural better class (i, 318). "It is curious to observe the
animosity which prevails here among what is called the bet
ter order of people, which I think is more a misnomer here
than in any other country I have ever been. Their whig
and tory are democrat and federalist, and it would seem for
the sake of giving vent to that bitterness of hatred which
marks the Yankee character, every gentleman (God save the
term) who takes possession of a property adopts the opposite
political creed to that of his nearest neighbor."

w In speaking of tonnage I wish I could have got better
authority than James for the British side of the question.
He is so bitter that it involuntarily gives one a distrust of
his judgment. Thus, in speaking of the Penguin's capture,
he, in endeavoring to show that the Hornet's loss was greater
than she acknowledged, says, "several of the dangerously
wounded were thrown overboard because the surgeon was
afraid to amputate, owing to his want of experience" ("Naval
Occurrences," 492). Now what could persuade a writer to
make such a foolish accusation? No matter how utterly de
praved and brutal Captain Biddle might be, he would cer-

94 Naval War of 1812

Again, the armaments of the American as well
as of the British ships were composed of three very
different styles of guns. The first, or long gun, was

tainly not throw his wounded over alive because he feared
they might die. Again, in vol. vi, p. 546, he says: "Captain
Stewart had caused the Cyane to be painted to resemble a
36-gun frigate. The object of this was to aggrandize his
exploit in the eyes of the gaping citizens of Boston." No
matter how skilful an artist Captain Stewart was, and no
matter how great the gaping capacities of the Bostonians,
the Cyane (which, by the way, went to New York and not
Boston) could no more be painted to look like a 36-gun
frigate than a schooner could be painted to look like a brig.
Instances of rancor like these two occur constantly in his
work, and make it very difficult to separate what is matter
of fact from what is matter of opinion. I always rely on the
British official accounts when they can be reached, except in
the case of the Java, which seem garbled. That such was
sometimes the case with British officials is testified to by
both James (vol. iy, p. 17) and Brenton (vol. ii, p. 454,
note). From the "Memoir of Admiral Broke" we learn that
his public letter was wrong in a number of particulars. See
also any one of the numerous biographies of Lord Dundon-
ald, the hero of the little Speedy 's fight. It is very unfor
tunate that the British stopped publishing official accounts
of their defeats; it could not well help giving rise to unpleas
ant suspicions.

It may be as well to mention here, again, that James' ac
cusations do not really detract from the interest attaching to
the war, and its value for purposes of study. If, as he says,
the American commanders were cowards, and their crews
renegades, it is well worth while to learn the lesson that
good training will make such men able to beat brave officers
with loyal crews. And why did the British have such bad
average crews as he makes out? He says, for instance, that
the Java's was unusually bad; yet Brenton says (vol. ii, p.
461) it was like "the generality of our crews." It is worth
while explaining the reason that such a crew was generally
better than a French and worse than an American one.

Naval War of 1812 95

enormously long and thick-barreled in comparison
to its bore, and in consequence very heavy; it pos
sessed a very long range, and varied in calibre from
two to forty-two pounds. The ordinary calibres in
our navy were 6, 9, 12, 18, and 24. The second
style was the carronade, a short, light gun of large
bore ; compared to a long gun of the same weight it
carried a much heavier ball for a much shorter dis
tance. The chief calibres were 9, 12, 18, 24, 32, 42,
and 68 pounders, the first and the last being hardly
in use in our navy. The third style was the colum-
biad, of an intermediate grade between the first two.
Thus it is seen that a gun of one style by no means
corresponds to a gun of another style of the same
calibre. As a rough example, a long 12, a colum-
biad, 1 8, and a 32-pound carronade would be about
equivalent to one another. These guns were mount
ed on two different types of vessel. The first was
flush-decked; that is, it had a single straight open
deck on which all the guns were mounted. This
class included one heavy corvette (the Adams),
the ship-sloops, and the brig-sloops. Through
the bow-chase port, on each side, each of these
mounted a long gun ; the rest of their guns were
carronades, except in the case of the Adams, which
had all long guns. Above these came the frig
ates, whose gun-deck was covered above by an
other deck ; on the fore and aft parts ( forecastle and
quarter-deck) on this upper, open deck were also
mounted guns. The main-deck guns were all long,
except on the Essex, which had carronades ; on the

96 Naval War of 1812

quarter-deck were mounted carronades, and on the
forecastle also carronades, with two long bow-
chasers.

Where two ships of similar armament fought one
another, it is easy to get the comparative force by
simply comparing the weight in broadsides, each
side presenting very nearly the same proportion of
long guns to carronades. For such a broadside we
take half the guns mounted in the ordinary way;
and all guns mounted on pivots or shifting. Thus
Perry's force in guns was 54 to Barclay's 63; yet
each presented 34 in broadside. Again, each of the
British brig-sloops mounted 19 guns, presenting 10
in broadside. Besides these, some ships mounted
bow-chasers run through the bridle-ports, or stern-
chasers, neither of which could be used in broad
sides. Nevertheless, I include them, both because it
works in about an equal number of cases against each
navy, and because they were sometimes terribly ef
fective. James excludes the Guerriere's bow-chaser ;
in reality he ought to have included both it and its
fellow, as they worked more damage than all the
broadside guns put together. Again, he excludes
the Endymion's bow-chasers, though in her action
they proved invaluable. Yet he includes those of
the Enterprise and Argus, though the former's were
probably not fired. So I shall take the half of the
fixed, plus all the movable, guns aboard, in compar
ing broadside force.

But the chief difficulty appears when guns of one
style are matched against those of another. If a

Naval War of 1812 97

ship armed with long I2's meets one armed with
32-pound carronades, which is superior in force?
At long range the first, and at short range the sec
ond ; and of course each captain is pretty sure to in
sist that "circumstances" forced him to fight at a
disadvantage. The result would depend largely on
the skill or luck of each commander in choosing po
sition.

One thing is certain ; long guns are more formid
able than carronades of the same calibre. There are
exemplifications of this rule on both sides ; of course,
American writers, as a rule, only pay attention to
one set of cases and British to the others. The
Cyane and Levant threw a heavier broadside than
the Constitution but were certainly less formidably
armed; and the Essex threw a heavier broadside
than the Phoebe, yet was also less formidable. On
Lake Ontario the American ship General Pike threw
less metal at a broadside than either of her two
chief antagonists, but neither could be called her
equal ; while on Lake Champlain a parallel case is
afforded by the British ship Confiance. Supposing
that two ships throw the same broadside weight of
metal, one from long guns, the other from carron
ades, at short range they are equal ; at long, one has
it all her own way. Her captain thus certainly has
a great superiority of force, and if he does not take
advantage of it it is owing to his adversary's skill
or his own mismanagement. As a mere approxi
mation, it may be assumed, in comparing the broad
sides of two vessels or squadrons, that long guns

VOL. IX. -5

98 Naval War of 1812

count for at least twice as much as carronades of
the same calibre. Thus on Lake Champlain Captain
Downie possessed an immense advantage in his
long guns, which Commodore Macdonough's ex
ceedingly good arrangements nullified. Sometimes
part of the advantage may be willingly foregone, so
as to acquire some c"ier. Had the Constitution
kept at long bowls with the Cyane and Levant she
could have probably captured one without any loss
to herself, while the other would have escaped ; she
preferred to run down close so as to ensure the cap
ture of both, knowing that even at close quarters
long guns are somewhat better than short ones (not
to mention her other advantages in thick scantling,
speed, etc.). The British carronades often upset in
action; this was either owing to their having been
insufficiently secured, and to this remaining undis
covered because the men were not exercised at the
guns, or else it was because the unpracticed sailors
would greatly overcharge them. Our better-trained
sailors on the ocean rarely committed these blun
ders, but the less-skilled crews on the lakes did so
as often as their antagonists.

But while the Americans thus, as a rule, had heav
ier and better-fitted guns, they labored under one
or two disadvantages. Our foundries were gener
ally not as good as those of the British, and our
guns, in consequence, more likely to burst ; it was an
accident of this nature which saved the British Bel-
videra; and the General Pike, under Commodore
Chauncy, and the new American frigate Guerriere

Naval War of 1812 99

suffered in the same way; while often the muzzles
of the guns would crack. A more universal disad
vantage was in the short weight of our shot. When
Captain Blakely sunk the Avon he officially reported
that her four shot which came aboard weighed just
32 pounds apiece, a pound and three-quarters more
than his heaviest; this would make his average shot
about 2l/2 pounds less, or rather over 7 per cent.
Exactly similar statements were made by the officers
of the Constitution in her three engagements. Thus
when she fought the Java, she threw at a broadside,
as already stated, 704 pounds : the Java mounted 28
long i8's, 1 8 32-pound carronades, 2 long I2's, and
one shifting 24-pound carronade, a broadside of 576
pounds.

Yet by the actual weighing of all the differ
ent shot on both sides it was found that the dif
ference in broadside force was only about 77
pounds, or the Constitution's shot were about 7 per
cent short weight. The long 24*5 of the United
States each threw a shot 4% pounds heavier than
the long i8's of the Macedonian; here again the
difference was about 7 per cent. The same differ
ence existed in favor of the Penguin and Epervier
compared with the Wasp and Hornet. Mr. Feni-
more Cooper 33 weighed a great number of shot
some time after the war. The later castings, even,
weighed nearly 5 per cent less than the British shot,
and some of the older ones, about 9 per cent. The
average is safe to take at 7 per cent less, and I shall

33 See "Naval History," i, p. 380.

ioo Naval War of 1812

throughout make this allowance for ocean cruisers.
The deficit was sometimes owing to windage, but
more often the shot was of full size but defective in
density.

The effect of this can be gathered from the fol
lowing quotation from the work of a British artil
lerist : "The greater the density of shot of like cali
bres, projected with equal velocity and elevation,
the greater the range, accuracy, and penetration." 34
This defectiveness in density might be a serious in
jury in a contest at a long distance, but would make
but little difference at close quarters (although it
may have been partly owing to their short weight
that so many of the Chesapeake' 's shot failed to pen-
trade the Shannon's hull). Thus in the actions with
the Macedonian and Java the American frigates
showed excellent practice when the contest was car
ried on within fair distance, while their first broad
sides at long range went very wild; but in the case
of the Guerriere, the Constitution reserved her fire
for close quarters, and was probably not at all af
fected by the short weight of her shot.

As to the officers and crew of a 44-gun frigate,
the following was the regular complement estab
lished by law :35

34 "Heavy Ordnance," Captain T. F. Simmons, R. A., Lon
don, 1837. James supposes that the "Yankee captains" have
in each case hunted round till they could get particularly
small American shot to weigh ; and also denies that short
weight is a disadvantage. The last proposition carried out
logically would lead to some rather astonishing results.

35 See State Papers, vol. xiv, 159 (Washington, 1834)

Naval War of 1812 101

1 captain, purser,

4 lieutenants, surgeon,

•2 lieutenants of marines, surgeon's mates,

2 sailing masters, clerk,

2 master's mates, carpenter,

7 midshipmen, carpenter's mates

1 boatswain, cook,

2 boatswain's mates chaplain,
i yeoman of gun-room,

i gunner, 50

ii quarter gunners. 120 able seamen,

coxswain, 150 ordinary seamen,

sail maker, 30 boys,

cooper, 50 marine,
steward,

armorer, 400 in all.
master of arms,

An i8-gun ship had 32 officers and petty officers,
30 able seamen, 46 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and
20 marines — 140 in all. Sometimes ships put to sea
without their full complements (as in the case of
the first Wasp), but more often with supernumer
aries aboard. The weapons for close quarters were
pikes, cutlasses, and a few axes ; while the marines
and some of the topmen had muskets, and occasion
ally rifles.

In comparing- the forces of the contestants I have
always given the number of men in crew; but this
in most cases was unnecessary. When there were
plenty of men to handle the guns, trim the sails,
make repairs, act as marines, etc., any additional
number simply served to increase the slaughter on
board. The Gucrriere undoubtedly suffered from
being short-handed, but neither the Macedonian nor
Java would have been benefited by the presence of
a hundred additional men. Barclay possessed about
as many men as Perry, but this did not give him an
equality of force. The Penguin and Frolic would

102 Naval War of 1812

have been taken just as surely had the Hornet and
Wasp had a dozen men less apiece than they did.
The principal case where numbers would help would
be in a hand-to-hand fight. Thus the Chesapeake
having fifty more men than the Shannon ought to
have been successful; but she was not, because the
superiority of her crew in numbers was more than
counterbalanced by the superiority of the Shannon's
crew in other respects. The result of the battle of
Lake Champlain, which was fought at anchor, with
the fleets too far apart for musketry to reach, was
not in the slightest degree affected by the number of
men on either side, as both combatants had amply
enough to manage the guns and perform every other
service.

In all these conflicts the courage of both parties
is taken for granted ; it was not so much a factor in
gaining the victory, as one which if lacking was
fatal to all chances of success. In the engagements
between regular cruisers, not a single one was
gained by superiority in courage. The crews of
both the Argus and Epervier certainly flinched ; but
had they fought never so bravely they were too un
skilful to win. The Chesapeake' s crew could hardly
be said to lack courage ; it was more that they were
inferior to their opponents in discipline as well as in
skill.

There was but one conflict during the war where
the victory could be said to be owing to superiority
in pluck. This was when the Neufchatel privateer
beat off the boats of the Endymion. The privateers-

Naval War of 1812 103

men suffered a heavier proportional loss than their
assailants, and they gained the victory by sheer
ability to stand punishment.

For convenience in comparing them I give in
tabulated form the force of the three British 38*8
taken by American 44*5 (allowing for short weight
of metal of latter).

CONSTITUTION GUEKRIRKK

30 long 24's, 30 long i8's,

2 long 24*8, 2 long i2's,

22 short 32*5, 16 short 32*5,

i short 18.

Broadside, nominal, 736 Ibs

real, 684 Ibs. Broadside, 556 Ibs.

UNITED STATES, MACEDONIAN

30 long 24*8, 28 long i8's,

2 long 24's, 2 long i2's,

22 short 42*5, 2 long g's,

16 short 32's,

Broadside, nominal, 846 Ibs. i short 18

real, 786 Ibs.

Broadside, 547 Ibs.

CONSTITUTION JAVA

30 long 24*5, 28 long i8's,

2 long 24*8, 2 long i2's,

20 short 32*8. 18 short 32*5,

i short 24.

Broadside, nominal, 704 Ibs.

real, 654 Ibs. Broadside, 576 Ibs.

The smallest line-of-battle ship, the 74, with only
long i8's on the second deck, was armed as follows:

28 long 32*8,
28 " i8's,

6 " I2*S,

14 short 32*8,

7 " i8's,

or a broadside of 1,032 Ibs., 736 from long guns,
296 from carronades; while the Constitution threw

104 Naval War of 1812

(in reality) 684 Ibs., 356 from long guns, and 328
from her carronades, and the United States 102 Ibs.
more from her carronades. Remembering the dif
ference between long guns and carronades, and con
sidering sixteen of the 74/8 long i8's as being re
placed by 42-pound carronades36 (so as to get the
metal on the ships distributed in similar proportions
between the two styles of cannon), we get as the
74's broadside 592 Ibs. from long guns, and 632
from carronades. The United States threw nomin
ally 360 and 486, and the Constitution nominally
360 and 352 ; so the 74 was superior even to the
former nominally about as three is to two; while
the Constitution, if "a line-of-battle ship," was dis
guised to such a degree that she was in reality of but
little more than one half the force of one of the
smallest true liners England possessed!

36 That this change would leave the force about as it was,
can be gathered from the fact that the Adams and John
Adams, both of which had been armed with 42-pound car
ronades (which were sent to Sackett's Harbor), had them
replaced by long and medium i8-pounders, the?e being con
sidered to be more formidable; so that the substitution of 42-
pound caronnades would, if anything, reduce the force of
the 74-

CHAPTER III
1812

ON THE OCEAN

Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of
the Belvidera — Cruise of the Essex — Captain Hull's
cruise, and escape from the squadron of Commodore
Broke — Constitution captures Guerrierc — Wasp cap
tures Frolic — Second unsuccessful cruise of Commo
dore Rodgers — United States captures Macedonian —
Constitution captures Java — Essex starts on a cruise
— Summary

AT the time of the declaration of war, June 18,
1812, the American navy was but partially
prepared for effective service. The Wasp, 18, was
still at sea, on her return voyage from France; the
Constellation, 38, was lying in the Chesapeake river
unable to receive a crew for several months to come ;
the Chesapeake, 38, was lying in a similar condition
in Boston harbor; the Adams, 28, was at Washing
ton, being cut down and lengthened from a frigate
into a corvette. These three cruisers were none
of them fit to go to sea till after the end of the
year. The Essex, 32, was in New York harbor,
but, having some repairs to make, was not yet ready
to put out. The Constitution, 44, was at Annapolis,
without all of her stores, and engaged in shipping
a new crew, the time of the old one being -up. The

(105)

io6 Naval War of 1812

Nautilus, 14, was cruising off New Jersey, and the
other small brigs were also off the coast. The
only vessels immediately available were those tinder
the command of Commodore Rodgers, at New York,
consisting of his own ship, the President, 44, and
of the United States, 44, Commodore Decatur,
Congress, 38, Captain Smith, Hornet, 18, Captain
Lawrence, and Argus, 16, Lieut. Sinclair. It seems
marvelous that any nation should have permitted
its ships to be so scattered and many of them in
such an unfit condition, at the beginning of hostil
ities. The British vessels cruising off the coast were
not at that time very numerous or formidable, con
sisting of the Africa, 64, Acasta, 40, Shannon, 38,
Guerriere, 38, Behidera, 36, ^Eolus } 32, Southamp
ton, 32, and Minerva, 32, with a number of cor
vettes and sloops; their force was, however, strong
enough to render it impossible for Commodore
Rodgers to make any attempt on the coast towns
of Canada or the West Indies. But the homeward
bound plate fleet had sailed from Jamaica on May
2Oth, and was only protected by the Thalia, 36,
Capt. Vashon, and Reindeer, 18, Capt. Manners.
Its capture or destruction would have been a serious
blow, and one which there seemed a good chance
of striking, as the fleet would have to pass along
the American coast, running with the Gulf Stream.
Commodore Rodgers had made every preparation,
in expectation of war being declared, and an hour
after official intelligence of it, together with his
instructions, had been received, his squadron put to

On the Ocean ' 107

sea, on June 2ist, and ran off toward the southeast1
to get at the Jamaica ships. Having learned from
an American brig that she had passed the plate fleet
- four days before in lat. 36° N., long. 67° W., the
Commodore made all sail in that direction. At
6 A.M. on June 23d a sail was made out in the
N.E., which proved to be the British frigate Bcl-
videra, 36, Capt. Richard Byron.2 The latter had
sighted some of Commodore Rodgers' squadron
some time before, and stood toward them, till at
6.30 she made out the three largest ships to be
frigates. Having been informed of the likelihood
of war by a New York pilot boat, the Belvidera
now stood away, going N.E. by E., the wind being
fresh from the west. The Americans made all sail
in chase, the President, a very fast ship off the
wind, leading, and the Congress coming next. At
noon the President bore S.W., distant 2 3-4 miles
from the Belvidera. Nantucket shoals bearing 100
miles N. and 48 miles E.3 The wind grew lighter,
shifting more toward the southwest, while the ships
continued steadily in their course, going N.E. by E.
As the President kept gaining, Captain Byron cleared
his ship for action, and shifted to the stern ports
two long eighteen-pounders on the main-deck and
two thirty-two pound carronades on the quarter
deck.

1 Letter of Commodore John Rodgers to the Secretary of
the Navy, Sept. i, 1812.
* Brenton, v, 46.
4 Log of Belvidera, June 23, 1812.

io8 ' Naval War of 1812

At 4.30* the President's starboard forecastle
bow-gun was fired by Commodore Rodgers himself ;
the corresponding main-deck gun was next dis
charged, and then Commodore Rodgers fired again.
These three shots all struck the stern of the Belvi-
dera, killing and wounding nine men, — one of them
went through the rudder coat, into the after gun
room, the other two into the captain's cabin. A few
more such shots would have rendered the Belvidera's
capture certain, but when the President's main-deck
gun was discharged for the second time it burst,
blowing up the forecastle deck and killing and
wounding 16 men, among them the Commodore
himself, whose leg was broken. This saved the
British frigate. Such an explosion always causes a
half panic, every gun being at once suspected. In
the midst of the confusion Captain Byron's stern-
chasers opened with spirit and effect, killing or
wounding six men more. Had the President still
pushed steadily on, only using her bow-chasers until
she closed abreast, which she could probably have
done, the Belvidera could still have been taken ; but,
instead, the former now bore up and fired her port
broadside, cutting her antagonist's rigging slightly,
but doing no other damage, while the Belvidera
kept up a brisk and galling fire, although the long
bolts, breeching-hooks, and breechings of the guns
now broke continually, wounding several of the men,

4 Cooper, ii, 151. According to James, vi, 117, the Presi
dent was then 600 yards distant from the Belvidera^ half a
point on her weather or port quarter.

On the Ocean 109

including Captain Byron. The President had lost
ground by yawing, but she soon regained it, and,
coming up closer than before, again opened from
her bow-chasers a well-directed fire, which severely
wounded her opponent's main-top mast, cross-jack
yard, and one or two other spars ;5 but shortly after
ward she repeated her former tactics and again lost
ground by yawing to discharge another broadside,
even mode ineffectual than the first. Once more she
came up closer than ever, and once more yawed ;
the single shots from her bow-chasers doing consid
erable damage, but her raking broadsides none.6
Meanwhile the active crew of the Belvidera repaired
everything as fast as it was damaged, while under
the superintendence of Lieutenants Sykes, Bruce,
and Campbell, no less than 300 shot were fired from
her stern guns.7 Finding that if the President
ceased yawing she could easily run alongside, Cap
tain Byron cut away one bower, one stream, and two
sheet anchors, the barge, yawl, gig, and jolly boat,
and started 14 tons of water. The effect of this was
at once apparent, and she began to gain, meanwhile
the damage the sails of the combatants had received
had enabled the Congress to close, and when abreast
of his consort Captain Smith opened with his bow-
chasers, but the shot fell short. The Belvidera soon
altered her course to east by south, set her starboard

* James, vi, 119. He says the President was within 400
yards.

• Lord Howard Douglas, "Naval Gunnery," p. 419 (third
edition).

1 James, vi, 118.

no Naval War of 1812

studding-sails, and by midnight was out of danger;
and three days afterward reached Halifax harbor.
Lord Howard Douglas7 criticisms on this en
counter seem very just. He says that the President
opened very well with her bow-chasers (in fact the
Americans seemed to have aimed better and to have
done more execution with these guns than the Brit
ish with their stern-chasers; but that she lost so
much ground by yawing and delivering harmless
broadsides as to enable her antagonist to escape.
Certainly if it had not been for the time thus lost
to no purpose, the Commodore would have run
alongside his opponent, and the fate of the little 36
would have been sealed. On the other hand it must
be remembered that it was only the bursting of the
gun on board the President, causing such direful
confusion and loss, and especially harmful in dis
abling her commander, that gave the Belvidera any
chance of escape at all. At any rate, whether the
American frigate does, or does not, deserve blame,
Captain Byron and his crew do most emphatically
deserve praise for the skill with which their guns
were served and repairs made, the coolness with
which measures to escape were adopted, and the
courage with which they resisted so superior a force.
On this occasion Captain Byron showed himself as
good a seaman and as brave a man as he subsequent
ly proved a humane and generous enemy when en
gaged in the blockade of the Chesapeake.8

8 Even Niles, unscrupulously bitter as he is toward the
British, does justice to the humanity of Captains Byron and

On the Ocean in

This was not a very auspicious opening of hostili
ties for America. The loss of the Belvidcra was not
the only thing to be regretted, for the distance the
chase took the pursuers out of their course probably
saved the plate fleet. When the Belvidcra was first
made out, Commodore Rodgers was in latitude 39°
26' N., and longitude 71° 10' W., at noon the same
day the Thalia and her convoy were in latitude 39°
N., longitude 62° W. Had they not chased the
Bclvidera the Americans would probably have run
across the plate fleet.

The American squadron reached the western edge
of the Newfoundland Banks on June 29th,9 and on
July ist, a little to the east of the Banks, fell in with
large quantities of cocoa-nut shells, orange peels,
etc., which filled every one with great hopes of over
taking the quarry. On July 9th, the Hornet cap
tured a British privateer, in latitude 45° 30' N., and
longitude 23° W., and her master reported that he
had seen the Jamaica-men the previous evening ; but
nothing further was heard or seen of them, and on
July 1 3th, being within twenty hours' sail of the
English Channel, Commodore Rodgers reluctantly
turned southward, reaching Madeira July 2ist.
Thence he cruised toward the Azores and by the
Grand Banks home, there being considerable sick
ness on the ships. On August 3ist he reached Bos
ton after a very unfortunate cruise, in which he had

Hardy — which certainly shone in comparison to some of the
rather buccaneering exploits of Cockburn's followers in
Chesapeake Bay.
' Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. ist.

ii2 Naval War of 1812

made but seven prizes, all merchantmen, and had
recaptured one American vessel.

On July 3d the Essex, 32, Captain David Porter,
put out of New York. As has been already ex
plained she was most inefficiently armed, almost en
tirely with carronades. This placed her at the mercy
of any frigate with long guns which could keep at
a distance of a few hundred yards; but in spite of
Captain Porter's petitions and remonstrances he was
not allowed to change his armament. On the nth
of July at 2 A.M., latitude 33° N., longitude 66° W.,
the Essex fell in with the Minerva, 32, Captain
Richard Hawkins, convoying seven transports, each
containing about 200 troops, bound from Barbadoes
to Quebec. The convoy was sailing in open order,
and, there being a dull moon, the Essex ran in and
cut out transport No. 299, with 197 soldiers aboard.
Having taken out the soldiers, Captain Porter stood
back to the convoy, expecting Captain Hawkins to
come out and fight him; but this the latter would
not do, keeping the convoy in close order around
him. The transports were all armed and still con
tained in the aggregate 1,200 soldiers. As the Es
sex could only fight at close quarters these heavy
odds rendered it hopeless for her to try to cut out
the Minerva. Her carronades would have to be
used at short range to be effective, and it would of
course have been folly to run in right among the
convoy, and expose herself to the certainty of being
boarded by five times as many men as she pos
sessed. The Minerva had three less guns a side,

On the Ocean 113

and on her spar-deck carried 24-pound carronades
instead of 32*5, and, moreover, had fifty men less
than the Essex, which had about 270 men this
cruise ; on the other hand, her main-deck was armed
with long I2's, so that it is hard to say whether she
did right or not in refusing to fight. She was of the
same force as the Southampton, whose captain. Sir
James Lucas Yeo, subsequently challenged Porter,
but never appointed a meeting-place. In the event
of a meeting, the advantage, in ships of such radical
ly different armaments, would have been with that
captain who succeeded in outmanoeuvring the other
and in making the fight come off at the distance best
suited to himself. At long range either the Minerva
or Southampton would possess an immense superi
ority; but if Porter could have contrived to run up
within a couple of hundred yards, or still better, to
board, his superiority in weight of metal and num
ber of men would have enabled him to carry either
of them. Porter's crew was better trained for
boarding than almost any other American com
mander's; and probably none of the British frigates
on the American station, except the Shannon and
Tcnedos, would have stood a chance with the Essex
in a hand-to-hand struggle. Among her youngest
midshipmen was one, by name David Glasgow
Farragut, then but thirteen years old, who after
ward became the first and greatest admiral of the
United States. His own words on this point will
be read with interest. "Every day," he says,10 "the

10 "Life of Farragut" (embodying his journal and letters),
p. 31. By his son, Loyall Farragut, New York, 1879.

ii4 Naval War of 1812

crew were exercised at the great guns, small arms,
and single stick. And I may here mention the fact
that I have never been on a ship where the crew of
the old Essex was represented but that I found them
to be the best swordsmen on board. They had been
so thoroughly trained as boarders that every man
was prepared for such an emergency, with his cut
lass as sharp as a razor, a dirk made by the ship's
armorer out of a file, and a pistol." n

On August 1 3th a sail was made out to wind
ward, which proved to be the British ship-sloop
Alert, 1 6, Captain T. L. O. Laugharne, carrying 20
eighteen-pound carronades and 100 men.12 As soon

11 James says: "Had Captain Porter really endeavored to
bring the Minerva to action we do not see what could have
prevented the Essex, with her superiority of sailing, from
coming alongside of her. But no such thought, we are sure,
entered into Captain Porter's head." What "prevented the
Essex" was the Minerva's not venturing out of the convoy.
Farragut, in his journal, writes: "The captured British offi
cers were very anxious for us to have a fight with the
Minerva, as they considered her a good match for the
Essex, and Captain Porter replied that he should gratify
them with pleasure if His Majesty's commander was of their
taste. So we stood toward the convoy, and when within gun
shot hove to and awaited the Minerva, but she tacked and
stood in among the convoy, to the utter amazement of our
prisoners, who denounced the commander as a base coward,
and expressed their determination to report him to the Ad
miralty." An incident of reported "flinching" like this is
not worth mentioning; I allude to it only to show the value
of James' sneers.

12 James (History, vi, p. 128) says "86 men." In the
Naval Archives at Washington in the "Captains' Letters"
for 1812 (vol. ii, No. 182) can be found inclosed in Porter's
letter the parole of the officers and crew of the Alert signed

On the Ocean 115

as the Essex discovered the Alert she put out drags
astern, and led the enemy to believe she was trying
to escape by sending a few men aloft to shake out
the reefs and make sail. Concluding the frigate to
be a merchantman, the Alert bore down on her;
while the Americans went to quarters and cleared
for action, although the tompions were left in the
guns, and the ports kept closed.13 The Alert fired
a gun and the Essex hove to, when the former
passed under her stern, and when on her lee quarter
poured in a broadside of grape and canister ; but the
sloop was so far abaft the frigate's beam that her
shot did not enter the ports and caused no damage.
Thereupon Porter put up his helm and opened as
soon as his guns would bear, tompions and all.
The Alert now discovered her error and made off,
but too late, for in eight minutes the Essex was
alongside, and the Alert fired a musket and struck,
three men being wounded and several feet of water
in the hold. She was disarmed and sent as a cartel
into St. Johns. It has been the fashion among
American writers to speak of her as if she were
"unworthily" given up, but such an accusation is
entirely groundless. The Essex was four times her
force, and all that could possibly be expected of her
was to do as she did — exchange broadsides and
strike, having suffered some loss and damage. The

by Captain Laugharne; it contains either 100 or 101 names
of the crew of the Alert, besides those of a number of other
prisoners sent back in the same cartel.
18 "Life of Farragut," p. 16.

n6 Naval War of 1812

Essex returned to New York on September 7th,
having made 10 prizes, containing 423 men.14

The Belvidera, as has been stated, carried the
news of the war to Halifax. On July 5th Vice-
Admiral Sawyer despatched a squadron to cruise
against the United States, commanded by Philip
Vere Broke, of the Shannon, 38, having under him
the Belvidera, 36, Captain Richard Byron, Africa,
64, Captain John Bastard, and ^Eolus, 32, Captain
Lord James Townsend. On the 9th, while off Nan-
tucket, they were joined by the Guerriere, 38, Cap
tain James Richard Dacres. On the i6th the squad
ron fell in with and captured the United States brig
Nautilus, 14, Lieutenant Crane, which, like all the
little brigs, was overloaded with guns and men. She
threw her lee guns overboard and made use of every
expedient to escape, but to no purpose. At 3 P.M.
of the following day, when the British ships were
abreast of Barnegat, about four leagues off shore,
a strange sail was seen and immediately chased, in
the south by east, or windward quarter, standing to
the northeast. This was the United States frigate

14 Before entering New York the Essex fell in with a Brit
ish force which, in both Porter's and Farragut's works, is
said to have been composed of the Acasta and Shannon,
each of fifty guns, and Ringdove, of twenty. James says it
was the Shannon, accompanied by a merchant vessel. It is
not a point of much importance, as nothing came of the
meeting, and the Shannon alone, with her immensely su
perior armament, ought to have been a match twice over for
the Essex; although, if James is right, as seems probable, it
gives rather a comical turn to Porter's account of his "extra
ordinary escape."

On the Ocean 1 17

Constitution, 44, Captain Isaac Hull.15 When the
war broke out he was in the Chesapeake River get
ting a new crew aboard. Having shipped over 450
men (counting officers), he put out of harbor on
the 1 2th of July. His crew was entirely new, drafts
of men coming on board up to the last moment.16
On the 1 7th, at 2 P.M., Hull discovered four sail,
in the northern board, heading to the westward.
At 3, the wind being very light, the Constitution
made sail and tacked, in 18^/2 fathoms. At 4, in
the N.E., a fifth sail appeared, which afterward
proved to be the Guerridre. The first four ships
bore N.N.W., and were all on the starboard tack;
while by 6 o'clock the fifth bore E.N.E. At 6.15
the wind shifted and blew lightly from the south,
bringing the American ship to windward. She then
wore round with her head to the eastward, set her
light studding-sails and stay-sails, and at 7.30 beat
to action, intending to speak the nearest vessel, the
Guerrttre. The two frigates neared one another
gradually and at 10 the Constitution began making
signals, which she continued for over an hour. At

15 For the ensuing chase I have relied mainly on Cooper;
see also "Memoir of Admiral Broke," p. 240; James, vi, 133;
and Marshall's "Naval Biography" (London, 1825), ii, 625.

16 In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy ("Captains' Let
ters," 1812, ii, No. 85), Hull, after speaking of the way his
men were arriving, says: "The crew are as yet unacquainted
with a ship of war, as many have but lately joined and have
never been on an armed ship before. . . . We are doing all
that we can to make them acquainted with their duty, and
in a few days we shall have nothing to fear from any single
decked ship."

n8 Naval War of 1812

3.30 A.M. on the 1 8th the Guerriere, going gradual
ly toward the Constitution on the port tack, and but
one half mile distant, discovered on her lee beam the
Belvidera and the other British vessels, and sig
nalled to them. They did not answer the signals,
thinking she must know who they were — a circum
stance which afterward gave rise to sharp recrim
inations among the captains — and Dacres, conclud
ing them to be Commodore Rodgers' squadron,
tacked, and then wore round and stood away from
the Constitution for some time before discovering
his mistake.

At 5 A.M. Hull had just enough steerage way on
to keep his head to the east, on the starboard tack;
on his lee quarter, bearing N.E. by N., were the
Belvidera and Guerriere and astern the Shannon,
£Lolus, and Africa. At 5.30 it fell entirely calm,
and Hull put out his boats to tow the ship, always
going southward. At the same time he whipped
up a 24 from the main-deck, and got the forecastle-
chaser aft, cutting away the taffrail to give the two
guns more freedom to work in and also running
out, through the cabin windows, two of the long
main-deck 24*5. The British boats were towing
also. At 6 A.M. a light breeze sprang up, and the
Constitution set studding-sails and stay-sails; the
Shannon opened at her with her bow guns, but
ceased when she found she could not reach her. At
6.30, the wind having died away, the Shannon be
gan to gain, almost all the boats of the squadron
towing her. Having sounded in 26 fathoms, Lieu-

On the Ocean 119

tenant Charles Morris suggested to Hull to try kedg-
ing. All the spare rope was bent on to the cables,
paid out into the cutters, and a kedge run out half
a mile ahead and let go; then the crew clapped on
and walked away with the ship, overrunning and
tripping the kedge as she came up with the end of
the line. Meanwhile, fresh lines and another kedge
were carried ahead, and the frigate glided away
from her pursuers. At 7.30 A.M. a little breeze
sprang up, when the Constitution set her ensign and
fired a shot at the Shannon. It soon fell calm again
and the Shannon neared. At 9.10 a light air from
the southward struck the ship, bringing her to wind
ward. As the breeze was seen coming, her sails
were trimmed, and as soon as she obeyed her helm
she was brought close up on the port tack. The
boats dropped alongside ; those that belonged to the
davits were run up, while the others were just lifted
clear of the water, by purchases on the spare spars,
stowed outboard, where they could be used again at
a minute's notice. Meanwhile, on her lee beam the
Guerridre opened fire; but her shot fell short, and
the Americans paid not the slightest heed to it.
Soon it again fell calm, when Hull had 2,000 gal
lons of water started, and again put out his boats
to tow. The Shannon, with some of the other
boats of the squadron helping her, gained on the
Constitution, but by severe exertion was again left
behind. Shortly afterward, a slight wind springing
up, the Belvidera gained on the other British ships,
and when it fell calm she was nearer to the Con-

120 Naval War of 1812

stitution than any of her consorts, their boats being
put on to her.17 At 10.30, observing the benefit
that the Constitution had derived from warping,
Captain Byron did the same, bending all his hawsers
to one another, and working two kedge anchors at
the same time by paying the warp out through one
hawse-hole as it was run in through the other op
posite. Having men from the other frigates aboard,
and a lighter ship to work, Captain Byron, at 2
P.M., w.as near enough to exchange bow and stern-
chasers with the Constitution, out of range however.
Hull expected to be overtaken, and made every ar
rangement to try in such case to disable the first
frigate before her consorts could close. But neither
the Belvidera nor the Shannon dared to tow very
near for fear of having their boats sunk by the
American's stern-chasers.

The Constitution's crew showed the most excel
lent spirit. Officers and men relieved each other
regularly, the former snatching their rest any where
on deck, the latter sleeping at the guns. Gradually
the Constitution drew ahead, but the situation con
tinued most critical'. All through the afternoon the
British frigates kept towing and kedging, being
barely out of gunshot. At 3 P.M. a light breeze
sprung up, and blew fitfully at intervals ; every puff

1T Cooper speaks as if this was the Shannon ; but from
Marshall's "Naval Biography" we learn that it was the Bel
videra. At other times he confuses the Belvidera with the
Guerriere. Captain Hull, of course, could not accurately
distinguish the names of his pursuers. My account is drawn
from a careful comparison of Marshall, Cooper, and James.

On the Ocean 121

was watched closely and taken advantage of to the
utmost. At 7 in the evening the wind almost died
out, and for four more weary hours the worn-out
sailors towed and kedged. At 10.45 a little breeze
struck the frigate, when the boats dropped along
side and were hoisted up, excepting the first cutter.
Throughout the night the wind continued very
light, the Belvidera forging ahead till she was off
the Constitution's lee beam; and at 4 A.M. on the
morning of the iQth, she tacked to the eastward, the
breeze being light from the south by east. At 4 .20
the Constitution tacked also; and at 5.15 the &Lolus,
which had drawn ahead, passed on the contrary tack.
Soon afterward the wind freshened so that Captain
Hull took in his cutter. The Africa was now so far
to leeward as to be almost out of the race ; while the
five frigates were all running on the starboard tack
with every stitch of canvas set. At 9 A.M. an Amer
ican merchantman hove in sight and bore down tow
ard the squadron. The Bch'idcra} by way of de
coy, hoisted American colors, when the Constitution
hoisted the British flag, and the merchant vessel
hauled off. The breeze continued light till noon,
when Hull found he had dropped the British frigates
well behind ; the nearest was the Belvidera, exactly
in his wake, bearing W.N.W. 2l/> miles distant.
The Shannon was on his lee, bearing N. by W. J4
W. distant 3^ miles. The other two frigates were
five miles off on the lee quarter. Soon afterward
the breeze freshened, and "Old Ironsides" drew
slowly ahead from her foes, her sails being watched

VOL. IX.— 6

122 Naval War of 1812

and tended with the most consummate skill. At 4
P.M. the breeze again lightened, but even the Belvi-
dera was now four miles astern and to leeward. At
6.45 there were indications of a heavy rain squall,
which once more permitted Hull to show that in sea
manship he excelled even the able captains against
whom he was pitted. The crew were stationed and
everything kept fast till the last minute, when all
was clewed up just before the squall struck the ship.
The light canvas was furled, a second reef taken in
the mizzen topsail, and the ship almost instantly
brought under short sail. The British vessels see
ing this began to let go and haul down without
waiting for the wind, and were steering on different
tacks when the first gust struck them. But Hull as
soon as he got the weight of the wind sheeted home,
hoisted his fore and maintop gallant sails, and went
off on an easy bowline at the rate of n knots. At
7 .40 sight was again obtained of the enemy, the
squall having passed to leeward; the Belvidera, the
nearest vessel, had altered her bearings two points
to leeward, and was a long way astern. Next came
the Shannon; the Guerriere and &olus were hull
down, and the Africa barely visible. The wind now
kept light, shifting occasionally in a very baffling
manner, but the Constitution gained steadily, wet
ting her sails from the sky-sails to the courses. At
6 A.M. on the morning of the 2Oth the pursuers were
almost out of sight; and at 8.15 A.M. they aban
doned the chase. Hull at once stopped to investi
gate the character of two strange vessels, but found

On the Ocean 123

them to be only Americans; then, at midday, he
stood toward the east, and went into Boston on July
26th.

In this chase Captain Isaac Hull was matched
against five British captains, two of whom, Broke
and Byron, were fully equal to any in their navy;
and while the latter showed great perseverance, good
seamanship, and ready imitation, there can be no
doubt that the palm in every way belongs to the cool
old Yankee. Every daring expedient known to the
most perfect seamanship was tried, and tried with
success; and no victorious fight could reflect more
credit on the part of the conqueror than this three
days' chase did on Hull. Later, on two occasions,
the Constitution proved herself far superior in gun
nery to the average British frigate; this time her
officers and men showed that they could handle the
sails as well as they could the guns. Hull out
manoeuvred Broke and Byron as cleverly as a month
later he out-fought Dacres. His successful escape
and victorious fight were both performed in a way
that place him above any single ship captain of the
war.

On August 2d the Constitution made sail from
Boston18 and stood to the eastward, in hopes of fall
ing in with some of the British cruisers. She was
unsuccessful, however, and met nothing. Then she
ran down to the Bay of Fundy, steered along the
coast of Nova Scotia, and thence toward Newfound
land, and finally took her station off Cape Race in

18 Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 28, 1812.

124 Naval War of 1812

the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where she took and burned
two brigs of little value. On the I5th she recap
tured an American brig from the British ship-sloop
Avenger, though the latter escaped; Capt. Hull
manned his prize and sent her in. He then sailed
southward, and on the night of the i8th spoke a
Salem privateer which gave him news of a British
frigate to the south; thither he stood, and at 2 P.M.
on the i Qth, in lat. 41° 30' N. and 55° W., made
out a large sail bearing E.S.E. and to leeward,19
which proved to be his old acquaintance, the frigate
Guerriere, Captain Dacres. It was a cloudy day
and the wind was blowing fresh from the north
west. The Guerriere was standing by the wind on
the starboard tack, under easy canvas;20 she hauled
up her courses, took in her topgallant sails, and at
4.30 backed her maintopsail. Hull then very de
liberately began to shorten sail, taking in topgallant
sails, staysails, and flying- jib, sending down the
royal yards and putting another reef in the top
sails. Soon the Englishman hoisted three ensigns,
when the American also set his colors, one at each
masthead, and one at the mizzen peak.

The Constitution now ran down with the wind
nearly aft. The Guerriere was on the starboard
tack, and at five o'clock opened with her weather-
guns,21 the shot falling short, then wore round and
fired her port broadside, of which two shots struck

19 Do., Aug. 3oth.

90 Letter of Capt. James R. Dacres, Sept. 7, 1812.

81 Log of Guerriere.

On the Ocean 125

her opponent, the rest passing over and through her
rigging.22 As the British frigate again wore to
open with her starboard battery, the Constitution
yawed a little and fired two or three of her port
bow guns. Three or four times the Guerriere re
peated this manoeuvre, wearing and firing alternate
broadsides, but with little or no effect, while the
Constitution yawed as often to avoid being raked,
and occasionally fired one of her bow guns. This
continued nearly an hour, as the vessels were very
far apart when the action began, hardly any loss
or damage being inflicted by either party. At 6 .00
the Guerriere bore up and ran off under her topsails
and jib, with the wind almost astern, a little on her
port quarter ; when the Constitution set her maintop
gallant sail and foresail, and at 6.05 closed within
half pistol-shot distance on her adversary's port
beam.23 Immediately a furious cannonade opened,
each ship firing as the guns bore. By the time the
ships were fairly abreast, at 6.20, the Constitution
shot away the Gucrricre's mizzenmast, which fell
over the starboard quarter, knocking a large hole in

92 See in the Naval Archives (Bureau of Navigation) the
Constitution's Log-Book (vol. ii, from Feb. i, 1812, to Dec.
13. 1813). The point is of some little importance because
Hull, in his letter, speaks as if both the first broadsides fell
short, whereas the log distinctly says that the second went
over the ship, except two shot, which came home. The hy
pothesis of the Guerrtlre having damaged powder was
founded purely on this supposed falling short of the first
two broadsides.

M "Autobiography of Commodore Morris" (Annapolis,
1880), p. 164.

126 Naval War of 1812

the counter, and bringing the ship round against her
helm. Hitherto she had suffered very greatly and
the Constitution hardly at all. The latter, finding
that she was ranging ahead, put her helm a-port and
then luffed short round her enemy's bows,24 deliv
ering a heavy raking fire with the starboard guns
and shooting away the Guerriere's mainyard. Then
she wore and again passed her adversary's bows,
raking with her port guns. The mizzenmast of the
Guerriere, dragging in the water, had by this time
pulled her bow round till the wind came on her star
board quarter; and so near were the two ships that
the Englishman's bowsprit passed diagonally over
the Constitution's quarterdeck, and as the latter
ship fell off it got foul of her mizzen-rigging, and
the vessels then lay with the Guerriere's starboard-
bow against the Constitution's port, or lee quarter-
gallery.25 The Englishman's bow guns played havoc
with Captain Hull's cabin, setting fire to it ; but the
flames were soon extinguished by Lieutenant Hoff
mann. On both sides the boarders were called
away; the British ran forward, but Captain Dacres
relinquished the idea of attacking26 when he saw
the crowds of men on the American's decks. Mean
while, on the Constitution, the boarders and marines
gathered aft, but such a heavy sea was running that
they could not get on the Guerriere. Both sides
suffered heavily from the closeness of the musketry

84 Log of Constitution.

26 Cooper, in "Putnam's Magazine," i, 475.

26 Address of Captain Dacres to the court-martial at Halifax.

On the Ocean 127

fire; indeed, almost the entire loss on the Constitu
tion occurred at this juncture. As Lieutenant Bush,
of the marines, sprang upon the taffrail to leap on
the enemy's decks, a British marine shot him dead ;
Mr. Morris, the first lieutenant, and Mr. Alwyn,
the master, had also both leaped on the taffrail, and
both were at the same moment wounded by the mus
ketry fire. On the Gucrricrc the loss was far heav
ier, almost all the men on the forecastle being picked
off. Captain Dacres himself was shot in the back
and severely wounded by one of the American miz-
zen topmen, while he was standing on the starboard
forecastle hammocks cheering on his crew ;27 two of
the lieutenants and the master were also shot down.
The ships gradually worked round till the wind was
again on the port quarter, when they separated, and
the Guerriere's foremast and mainmast at once went
by the board, and fell over on the starboard side,
leaving her a defenceless hulk, rolling her main-
deck guns into the water.28 At 6.30 the Constitu
tion hauled aboard her tacks, ran off a little dis
tance to the eastward, and lay to. Her braces and
standing and running rigging were much cut up and
some of the spars wounded, but a few minutes suf
ficed to repair damages, when Captain Hull stood
under his adversary's lee, and the latter at once
struck, at 7.00 P.M.,29 just two hours after she had
fired the first shot. On the part of the Constitution,
however, the actual fighting, exclusive of six or

r James, vi, 144. w Brenton, v, 51.

** Log of the Constitution.

128 Naval War of 1812

eight guns fired during the first hour, while closing,
occupied less than 30 minutes.

The tonnage and metal of the combatants have
already been referred to. The Constitution had, as
already said, about 456 men aboard, while of the
Guerriere's crew, 267 prisoners were received aboard
the Constitution; deducting 10 who were Americans
and would not fight, and adding the 15 killed out
right, we get 272 ; 28 men were absent in prizes.

COMPARATIVE FORCE

Compara-

Broad- Compara- live loss

Tons Guns side Men Loss tive Force Inflicted
Constitution 1576 27 684 456 14 i.oo i.oo

Gtierriere 1338 25 556 272 79 .70 .18

The loss of the Constitution included Lieutenant
William S. Bush, of the marines, and six seamen
killed, and her first lieutenant, Charles Morris, mas
ter John C. Alwyn, four seamen, and one marine,
wounded. Total, seven killed and seven wounded.
Almost all this loss occurred when the ships came
foul, and was due to the Guerriere's musketry and
the two guns in her bridle-ports.

The Guerriere lost 23 killed and mortally
wounded, including her second lieutenant, Henry.
Ready, and 56 wounded severely and slightly, in
cluding Captain Dacres himself, the first lieutenant,
Bartholomew Kent, master Robert Scott, two mas
ter's mates, and one midshipman.

The third lieutenant of the Constitution, Mr.
George Campbell Read, was sent on board the prize,
and the Constitution remained by her during the

On the Ocean

129

This diagram is taken from Commodore Morris' autobiography and
the log of the Gutrriert; the official accounts apparently consider
"larboard" and "starboard" as interchangeable terms.

130 Naval War of 1812

night; but at daylight it was found that she was in
danger of sinking. Captain Hull at once began re
moving the prisoners, and at three o'clock in the
afternoon set the Guerriere on fire, and in a quarter
of an hour she blew up. He then set sail for Bos
ton, where he arrived on August 3Oth. "Captain
Hull and his officers," writes Captain Dacres in his
official letter, "have treated us like brave and gener
ous enemies; the greatest care has been taken that
we should not lose the smallest trifle."

The British laid very great stress on the rotten
and decayed condition of the Guerriere; mentioning
in particular that the mainmast fell solely because
of the weight of the falling foremast. But it must
be remembered that until the action occurred she
was considered a very fine ship. Thus, in Brighton's
"Memoir of Admiral Broke," it is declared that
Dacres freely expressed the opinion that she could
take a ship in half the timea the Shannon could.
The fall of the mainmast occurred when the fight
was practically over; it had no influence whatever
on the conflict. It was also asserted that her powder
was bad, but on no authority ; her first broadside fell
short, but so, under similar circumstances, did the
first broadside of the United States. None of these
causes accounts for the fact that her shot did not hit.
Her opponent was of such superior force — nearly in
the proportion of 3 to 2 — that success would have
been very difficult in any event, and no one can
doubt the gallantry and pluck with which the Brit
ish ship was fought; but the execution was very

On the Ocean 131

greatly disproportioned to the force. The gunnery
of the Guerriere was very poor, and that of the
Constitution excellent; during the few minutes the
ships were yardarm and yardarm, the latter was not
hulled once, while no less than 30 shot took effect
on the former's engaged side,30 five sheets of copper
beneath the bends. The Guerriere, moreover, was
out-manceuvred ; "in wearing several times and ex
changing broadsides in such rapid and continual
changes of position, her fire was much more harm
less than it would have been if she had kept more
steady." 31 The Constitution was handled fault
lessly ; Captain Hull displayed the coolness and skill
of a veteran in the way in which he managed, first
to avoid being raked, and then to improve the ad
vantage which the precision and rapidity of his fire
had gained. "After making every allowance claimed
by the enemy, the character of this victory is not
essentially altered. Its peculiarities were a fine dis
play of seamanship in the approach, extraordinary
efficiency in the attack, and great readiness in re
pairing damages ; all of which denote cool and capa
ble officers, with an expert and trained crew; in a
word, a disciplined man-of-war."32 The disparity
of force, 10 to 7, is not enough to account for the
disparity of execution, 10 to 2. Of course, some
thing must be allowed for the decayed state of the
Englishman's masts, although I really do not think

10 Captain Dacres' address to the court-martial.
81 Lord Howard Douglas' "Treatise on Naval Gunnery"
(London, 1851), p. 454.
88 Cooper, ii, 173.

132 Naval War of 1812

it had any influence on the battle, for he was beaten
when the mainmast fell ; and it must be remembered,
on the other hand, that the American crew was ab
solutely new, while the Guerriere was manned by
old hands. So that, while admitting and admiring
the gallantry, and, on the whole, the seamanship, of
Captain Dacres and his crew, and acknowledging
that he fought at a great disadvantage, especially in
being short-handed, yet all must acknowledge that
the combat showed a marked superiority, particu
larly in gunnery, on the part of the Americans. Had
the ships not come foul, Captain Hull would prob
ably not have lost more than three or four men; as
it was, he suffered but slightly. That the Guerriere
was not so weak as she was represented to be can
be gathered from the fact that she mounted two
more maindeck guns than the rest of her class ; thus
carrying on her maindeck 30 long i8-pounders in
battery to oppose to the 30 long 24*8, or rather (al
lowing for the short weight of shot) long 22's, of
the Constitution. Characteristically enough, James,
though he carefully reckons in the long bow-chasers
in the bridle-ports of the Argus and Enterprise, yet
refuses to count the two long eighteens mounted
through the bridle-ports on the Guerriere' 's main-
deck. Now, as it turned out, these two bow guns
were used very effectively, when the ships got foul,
and caused more damage and loss than all of the
other maindeck guns put together.

Captain Dacres, very much to his credit, allowed
the ten Americans on board to go below, so as not

On the Ocean 133

to fight against their flag; and in his address to the
court-martial mentions, among the reasons for his
defeat, "that he was very much weakened by per
mitting the Americans on board to quit their quar
ters." Coupling this with the assertion made by
James and most other British writers that the Con
stitution was largely manned by Englishmen, we
reach the somewhat remarkable conclusion, that the
British ship was defeated because the Americans on
board would not fight against their country, and
that the American was victorious because the Brit
ish on board would. However, as I have shown,
in reality there were probably not a score of British
on board the Constitution.

In this, as well as the two succeeding frigate ac
tions, every one must admit that there was a great
superiority in force on the side of the victors, and
British historians have insisted that this superiority
was so great as to preclude any hopes of a success
ful resistance. That this was not true, and that the
disparity between the combatants was not as great
as had been the case in a number of encounters in
which English frigates had taken French ones, can
be best shown by a few accounts taken from the
French historian Troude, who would certainly not
exaggerate the difference. Thus on March i, 1799,
the English 38-gun i8-pounder frigate Sybil, cap
tured the French 44-gun 24-pounder frigate Forte,
after an action of two hours and ten minutes.33 In

» "Batailles Navales de la France." O. Troude (Paris,
1868), iv, 171.

134 Naval War of 1812

actual weight the shot thrown by one of the main-
deck guns of the defeated Forte was over six pounds
heavier than the shot thrown by one of the main-
deck guns of the victorious Constitution or United
States*4

There are later examples than this. But a very
few years before the declaration of war by the
United States, and in the same struggle that was
then still raging, there had been at least two victo
ries gained by English frigates over French foes
as superior to themselves as the American 44/5 were
to the British ships they captured. On Aug. 10, 1805,
the Phoenix, 36, captured the Didon, 40, after 3%
hours' fighting, the comparative broadside force
being :35

PHCENIX DIDON

13X18 14X18

2X 9 2X 8

6X32 7X36

21 guns, 444 Ibs. 23 guns, 522 Ibs.

(nominal; about
600, real)

On March 8, 1808, the San Plorenzo, 36, captured
the Piedniontaise , 40, the force being exactly what
it was in the case of the Phoenix and Didon.3*
Comparing the real, not the nominal, weight of
metal, we find that the Didon and Piedmontaise
were proportionately of greater force compared to
the Phoenix and San Plorenzo, than the Constitu
tion was compared to the Guerriere or Java. The

^.See Appendix B, for actual weight of French shot.

35 Ibid, iii, 425.

36 "Batailles Na vales de la France," iii, 199.

On the Ocean 135

French i8's threw each a shot weighing but about
two pounds less than that thrown by an American
24 of 1812, while their 36-pound carronades each
threw a shot over 10 pounds heavier than that
thrown by one of the Constitution's spar-deck 32*3.

That a 24-pounder cannot always whip an 18-
pounder frigate is shown by the action of the Brit
ish frigate Enrotas with the French frigate Chlor-
inde, on Feb. 25, i8i4.37 The first with a crew
of 329 men threw 625 pounds of shot at a broadside,
the latter carrying 344 men and throwing 463
pounds; yet the result was indecisive. The French
lost 90 and the British 60 men. The action showed
that heavy metal was not of much use unless used
well.

To appreciate rightly the exultation Hull's victory
caused in the United States, and the intense an
noyance it created in England, it must be remem
bered that during the past twenty years the Island
Power had been at war with almost every State
in Europe, at one time or another, and in the course
of about two hundred single conflicts between ships
of approximately equal force (that is, where the
difference was less than one-half), waged against
French, Spanish, Italian, Turkish, Algerine, Rus
sian, Danish, and Dutch antagonists, her ships had
been beaten and captured in but five instances.
Then war broke out with America, and in eight
months five single-ship actions occurred, in every
one of which the British vessel was captured.

* James, vi, 391.

136 Naval War of 1812

Even had the victories been due solely to superior
force this would have been no mean triumph for
the United States.

On October 13, 1812, the American i8-gun ship
sloop Wasp, Captain Jacob Jones, with 137 men
aboard, sailed from the Delaware and ran off south
east to get into the track of the West India vessels ;
on the 1 6th a heavy gale began to blow, causing
the loss of the jib-boom and two men who were on
it. The next day the weather moderated somewhat,
and at 11.30 P.M., in latitude 37° N., longitude
65° W., several sail were descried.38 These were
part of a convoy of 14 merchantmen which had
quitted the bay of Honduras on September I2th,
bound for England,39 under the convoy of the Brit
ish i8-gun brig-sloop Frolic, of 19 guns and no
men, Captain Thomas Whinyates. They had been
dispersed by the gale of the i6th, during which
the Frolic's main-yard was carried away and both
her top-sails torn to pieces;40 next day she spent in
repairing damages, and by dark six of the missing
ships had joined her. The day broke almost cloud
less on the i8th (Sunday), showing the convoy,
ahead and to leeward of the American ship, still
some distance off, as Captain Jones had not thought
it prudent to close during the night, while he was
ignorant of the force of his antagonists. The Wasp
now sent down her top-gallant yards, close reefed

38 Capt. Jones' official letter, Nov. 24, 1812.

39 James' History, vi, 158.

40 Capt. Whinyates' official letter, Oct. 18, 1812.

- On the Ocean 137

her top-sails, and bore down under short fighting
canvas; while the Frolic removed her main-yard
from the casks, lashed it on deck, and then hauled
to the wind under her boom main-sail and close-
reefed foretopsail, hoisting Spanish colors to decoy
the stranger under her guns, and permit the convoy
to escape. At 1 1.32 the action began — the two ships
running parallel on the starboard tack, not 60 yards
apart, the Wasp firing her port, and the Frolic her
starboard guns. The latter fired very rapidly, de
livering three broadsides to the Wasp's two,41 both
crews cheering loudly as the ships wallowed through
the water. There was a very heavy sea running,
which caused the vessels to pitch and roll heavily.
The Americans fired as the engaged side of their
ship was going down, aiming at their opponent's
hull ;42 while the British delivered their broadsides
while on the crests of the seas, the shot going high.
The water dashed in clouds of spray over both
crews, and the vessels rolled so that the muzzles
of the guns went under.43 But in spite of the rough
weather, the firing was not only spirited but well
directed. At 11.36 the Wasp's maintop-mast was
shot away and fell, with its yard, across the port
fore and foretop-sail braces, rendering the head
yards unmanageable; at 11.46 the gaff and miz-
zentop-gallant mast came down, and by 11.52 every
brace and most of the rigging was shot away.44 It
would now have been very difficult to brace any

41 Cooper, 182. 4« Niles* Register, iii, p. 324.

48 Do. " Capt. Jones' letter.

138 Naval War of 1812

of the yards. But meanwhile the Frolic suffered
dreadfully in her hull and lower masts, and had
her gaff and head braces shot away.45 The slaugh
ter among her crew was. very great, but the survi
vors kept at their work with the dogged courage
of their race. At first the two vessels ran side by
side, but the American gradually forged ahead,
throwing in her fire from a position in which she
herself received little injury; by degrees the ves
sels got so close that the Americans struck the
Frolic's side with their rammers in loading,46 and
the British brig was raked with dreadful effect.
The Frolic then fell aboard her antagonist, her jib-
boom coming in between the main and mizzen-rig-
ging of the Wasp and passing over the heads of
Captain Jones and Lieutenant Biddle, who were
standing near the capstan. This forced the Wasp
up in the wind, and she again raked her antagonist,
Captain Jones trying to restrain his men from board
ing till he could put in another broadside. But they
could no longer be held back, and Jack Lang, a
New Jersey seaman, leaped on the Frolic's bowsprit.
Lieutenant Biddle then mounted on the hammock
cloth to board, but his feet got entangled in the
rigging, and one of the midshipmen seizing his
coat-tails to help himself up, the lieutenant tumbled
back on the deck. At the next swell he succeeded
in getting on the bowsprit, on which there were
already two seamen whom he passed on the fore
castle. But there was no one to oppose him; not

45 Capt. Whinyates' letter. 46 Capt. Jones' letter.

On the Ocean

139

twenty Englishmen were left unhurt.47 The man
at the wheel was still at his post, grim and undaunt
ed, and two or three more were on deck, including
Captain Whinyates and Lieutenant Wintle, both so
severely wounded that they could not stand without
support.48 There could be no more resistance, and
Lieutenant Biddle lowered the flag at 12.15 — just
43 minutes after the beginning of the fight.49 A
minute or two afterward both the Frolic's masts

DIAGRAM

WASP

atoue

41 Capt. Whinyates' letter. 48 James, vi, 161.

49 Capt. Jones' letter.

60 It is difficult to reconcile the accounts of the manoeuvres
in this action. James says "larboard" where Cooper says
"starboard"; one says the Wasp wore, the other says that
she could not do so, etc.

140 Naval War of 1812

went by the board — the foremast about fifteen feet
above the deck, the other short off. Of her crew,
as already said, not twenty men had escaped unhurt.
Every officer was wounded; two of them, the first
lieutenant, Charles McKay, and master, John
Stephens, soon died. Her total loss was thus over
90 ;51 about 30 of whom were killed outright or
died later. The Wasp suffered very severely in her
rigging and aloft generally, but only two or three
shots struck her hull; five of her men were killed —
two in her mizzen-top and one in her maintop-mast
rigging — and five wounded, chiefly while aloft.

The two vessels were practically of equal force.
The loss of the Frolic's main-yard had merely con
verted her into a brigantine, and, as the roughness
of the sea made it necessary to fight under very
short canvas, her inferiority in men was fully com
pensated for by her superiority in metal. She had
been desperately defended; no men could have
fought more bravely than Captain Whinyates and
his crew. On the other hand, the Americans had
done their work with a coolness and skill that could
not be surpassed; the contest had been mainly one
of gunnery, and had been decided by the greatly
superior judgment and accuracy with which they
fired. Both officers and crew had behaved well;
Captain Jones particularly mentions Lieutenant
Claxton, who, though too ill to be of any service,

51 Capt. Whinyates' official letter thus states it, and is, of
course, to be taken as authority ; the Bermuda account makes
it 69, and James only 62.

On the Ocean 141

persisted in remaining on deck throughout the en
gagement.

The Wasp was armed with 2 long i2's and 16
32-pound carronades; the Frolic with 2 long 6's, 16
32-pound carronades, and i shifting 1 2-pound car-
ronade.

COMPARATIVE FORCE

Tons No. Guns Weight Metal Crews Loss

Wasp 450 9 250 135 10

Frolic 467 10 274 no 90

Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Graviere comments on
this action as follows :52

"The American fire showed itself to be as accu
rate as it was rapid. On occasions when the rough
ness of the sea would seem to render all aim exces
sively uncertain, the effects of their artillery were
not less murderous than under more advantageous
conditions. The corvette Wasp fought the brig
Frolic in an enormous sea, under very short canvas,
and yet, forty minutes after the beginning of the ac
tion, when the two vessels came together, the Amer
icans who leaped aboard the brig found on the deck,
covered with dead and dying, but one brave man,
who had not left the wheel, and three officers, all
wounded, who threw down their swords at the feet
of the victors." Admiral de la Graviere's criticisms
are especially valuable, because they are those of an
expert, who only refers to the War of 1812 in order
to apply to the French navy the lessons which it
teaches, and who is perfectly unprejudiced. He

M "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 287 (Septteme Edition, Paris,
1881).

142 Naval War of 1812

cares for the lesson taught, not the teacher, and is
quite as willing to learn from the defeat of the
Chesapeake as from the victories of the Constitution
— while most American critics only pay heed to the
latter.

The characteristics of the action are the practical
equality of the contestants in point of force and the
enormous disparity in the damage each suffered ; nu
merically, the Wasp was superior by 5 per cent,
and inflicted a ninefold greater loss.

Captain Jones was not destined to bring his prize
into port, for a few hours afterward the Poictiers,
a British 74, Captain John Poer Beresford, hove in
sight. Now appeared the value of the Frolic's des
perate defence ; if she could not prevent herself from
being captured, she had at least ensured her own
recapture, and also the capture of the foe. When
the Wasp shook out her sails they were found to
be cut into ribbons aloft, and she could not make off
with sufficient speed. As the Poictiers passed the
Frolic, rolling like a log in the water, she threw a
shot over her, and soon overtook the Wasp. Both
vessels were carried into Bermuda. Captain Whin-
yates was again put in command of the Frolic. Cap
tain Jones and his men were soon exchanged; 25,-
ooo dollars prize-money was voted them by Con
gress, and the Captain and Lieutenant Biddle were
both promoted, the former receiving the captured
ship Macedonian. Unluckily the blockade was too
close for him to succeed in getting out during the
remainder of the war.

On the Ocean 143

On Oct. 8th Commodore Rodgers left Boston
on his second cruise, with the President, United
States, Congress, and Argus,™ leaving the Hornet
in port. Four days out, the United States and Ar
gus separated, while the remaining two frigates
continued their cruise together. The Argus*4 Cap
tain Sinclair, cruised to the eastward, making prizes
of 6 valuable merchantmen, and returned to port on
January 3d. During the cruise she was chased for
three days and three nights (the latter being moon
light) by a British squadron, and was obliged to cut
away her boats and anchors and start some of her
water. But she saved her guns, and was so cleverly
handled that during the chase she actually suc
ceeded in taking and manning a prize, though the
.enemy got near enough to open fire as the vessels
separated. Before relating what befell the United
States, we shall bring Commodore Rodgers' cruise
to an end.

On Oct. roth the Commodore chased, but failed
to overtake, the British frigate Nymphe, 38, Cap
tain Epworth. On the i8th, off the great Bank of
Newfoundland, he captured the Jamaica packet
Swallozv, homeward bound, with 200,000 dollars in
specie aboard. On the 3ist at 9 A.M., lat. 33° N.,
long. 32° W., his two frigates fell in with the Brit
ish frigate Galatea, 36, Captain Woodley Losack,
convoying two South Sea ships, to windward. The
Galatea ran down to reconnoitre, and at 10 A.M.,

M Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Jan. i, 1813.
64 Letter of Capt. Arthur Sinclair, Jan. 4. 1813.

144 Naval War of 1812

recognizing- her foes, hauled up on the starboard
tack to escape. The American frigates made all
sail in chase, and continued beating to windward,
tacking several times, for about three hours. Seeing
that she was being overhauled, the Galatea now
edged away to get on her best point of sailing; at
the same moment one of her convoy, the Argo, bore
up to cross the hawse of her foes, but was inter
cepted by the Congress, who lay to to secure her.
Meanwhile the President kept after the Galatea;
she set her topmast, topgallant mast and lower stud
ding-sails, and when it was very dusk, the President
lost sight of the chase, and, toward midnight, hauled
to the wind to rejoin her consort. The two frigates
cruised to the east as far as 22° W., and then ran
down to 17° N. ; but during the month of Novem
ber they did not see a sail. They had but slightly
better luck on their return toward home. Passing
120 miles north of Bermuda, and cruising a little
while toward the Virginia capes, they re-entered
Boston on Dec. 3ist, having made 9 prizes, most of
them of little value.

When four days out, on Oct. I2th, Commodore
Decatur had separated from the rest of Rodgers'
squadron and cruised east ; on the 25th, in lat. 29°
N., and long. 29° 30', W., while going close-hauled
on the port tack, with the wind fresh from the
S. S. E., a sail was descried on the weather beam,
about 12 miles distant.55 This was the British 38-
gun frigate Macedonian, Captain John Surnam Car-

65 Official letter of Commodore Decatur, Oct. 30, 1812.

On the Ocean 145

den. She was not, like the Guerriere, an old ship
captured from the French, but newly built of oak,
and larger than any American i8-pounder frigate;
she was reputed (very wrongfully) to be a "crack
ship." According to Lieut. David Hope, "the state
of discipline on board was excellent; in no British
ship was more attention paid to gunnery. Before
this cruise the ship had been engaged almost every
day with the enemy ; and in time of peace the crew
were constantly exercised at the great guns." 56
How they could have practiced so much and learned
so little is certainly marvelous.

The Macedonian set her foretopmast and top
gallant studding-sails and bore away in chase,57
edging down with the wind a little aft the star
board beam. Her first lieutenant wished to con
tinue on this course and pass down ahead of the
United States,58 but Captain Garden's over-anxiety
to keep the weather-gage lost him this opportunity
of closing.59 Accordingly he hauled by the wind
and passed way to windward of the American. As
Commodore Decatur got within range, he eased off
and fired a broadside, most of which fell short;60
he then kept his luff, and, the next time he fired,
his long 24*5 told heavily, while he received very
little injury himself.61 The fire from his main-deck

M Marshall's "Naval Biography, " vol. iv, p. 1018.
" Capt Garden to Mr. Croker, Oct. 28, 1812.
M James, vi, 166.

89 Sentence of Court-martial held on the San Domingo, 74,
at the Bermudas. May 27, 1812.
«° Marshall, iv, 1080. « Cooper, ii, 178.

VOL. IX.— 7

146 Naval War of 1812

(for he did not use his carronades at all for the first
half-hour)62 was so very rapid that it seemed as
if the ship was on fire ; his broadsides were delivered
with almost twice the rapidity of those of the En
glishman.63 The latter soon found he could not play
at long bowls with any chance of success ; and, hav
ing already erred either from timidity or bad judg
ment, Captain Garden decided to add rashness to the
catalogue of his virtues. Accordingly he bore up,
and came down end on toward his adversary, with
the wind on his port quarter. The States now
(10.15) laid her maintopsail aback, and made heavy
play with her long guns, and, as her adversary came
nearer, with her carronades also. The British ship
would reply with her starboard guns, hauling up to
do so; as she came down, the American would ease
off, run a little way and again come to, keeping
up a terrific fire. As the Mecedonian bore down to
close, the chocks of all her forecastle guns (which
were mounted on the outside) were cut away ;64 her
fire caused some damage to the American's rig
ging, but hardly touched her hull, while she herself
suffered so heavily both alow and aloft that she
gradually dropped to leeward, while the American
forereached on her. Finding herself ahead and to
windward, the States tacked and ranged up under
her adversary's lee, when the latter struck her col
ors at 11.15, just an hour and a half after the begin
ning of the action.65

68 Letter of Commodore Decatur. 63 James, vi, 169.

64 Letter of Captain Carden.
65 Letter of Com modore Decatur.

On the Ocean

"47

148 Naval War of 1812

The United States had suffered surprisingly little ;
what damage had been done was aloft. Her miz-
zen topgallant mast was cut away, some of the spars
were wounded, and the rigging a good deal cut ; the
hull was only struck two or three times. The ships
were never close enough to be within fair range of
grape and musketry,66 and the wounds were mostly
inflicted by round shot and were thus apt to be
fatal. Hence the loss of the Americans amounted
to Lieutenant John Messer Funk (5th of the ship)
and six seamen killed or mortally wounded, and only
five severely and slightly wounded.

The Macedonian, on the other hand, had received
over a hundred shot in her hull, several between
wind and water; her mizzenmast had gone by the
board; her fore and maintopmasts had been shot
away by the caps, and her mainyard in the slings;
almost all her rigging was cut away (only the fore
sail being left) ; on the engaged side all of her car-
ronades but two, and two of her maindeck guns,
were dismounted. Of her crew 43 were killed and
mortally wounded, and 61 (including her first and
third lieutenants) severely and slightly wounded.67
Among her crew were eight Americans (as shown
by her muster-roll) ; these asked permission to go
below before the battle, but it was refused by Cap
tain Garden, and three were killed during the ac
tion. James says that they were allowed to go be
low, but this is untrue; for if they had the three

66 Letter of Commodore Decatur.

67 Letter of Captain Carden.

On the Ocean 149

would not have been slain. The others testified that
they had been forced to fight, and they afterward
entered the American service — the only ones of the
Macedonian's crew who did, or who were asked to.
The Macedonian had her full complement of 301
men ; the States had, by her muster-roll of October
2oth, 428 officers, petty officers, seamen, and boys,
and 50 officers and privates of marines, a total of
478 (instead of 509 as Marshall in his "Naval Bi
ography" makes it).

COMPARATIVE FORCE

Broadside

Weight

Size

Guns

Metal

Men

United States

'5?6

27

786

478

Macedonian

1325

25

547

.101

Comparative
Force

Comparative
Inflicted

Loss

States

IOO

IOO

Macedonian

66

II

Loss

12
104

That is, the relative force being about as three
is to two,68 the damage done was as nine to one !

68 I have considered the United States as mounting her
full allowance of 54 guns; but it is impossible that she had
no more than 49. In Decatur's letter of challenge of Jan. 17,
1814 (which challenge, by the way, was a most blustering
affair, reflecting credit neither on Decatur, nor his opponent,
Captain Hope, nor on any one else excepting Captain Stack-
pole of H. M. S. Sfatira), she is said to have had that num
ber; her broadside would then be 15 long 24*3 below, i long
24, i 12-pound, and 8 42-pound, carronades above. Her real
broadside weight of metal would thus be about 680 Ibs., and
she would be superior to the Macedonian in the proportion
of 5 to 4. But it is possible that Decatur had landed some of
his guns in 1813, as James asserts; and though I am not at all
sure of this, I have thought it best to be on the safe side in
describing his force.

150 Naval War of 1812

Of course, it would have been almost impossible
for the Macedonian to conquer with one-third less
force; but the disparity was by no means sufficient
to account for the ninefold greater loss suffered, and
the ease and impunity with which the victory was
won. The British sailors fought with their accus
tomed courage, but their gunnery was exceedingly
poor; and it must be remembered that though the
ship was bravely fought, still the defence was by
no means so desperate as that made by the Essex
or even the Chesapeake, as witnessed by their re
spective losses. The Macedonian, moreover, was
surrendered when she had suffered less damage
than either the Guerriere or Java. The chief cause
of her loss lay in the fact that Captain Garden was
a poor commander. The gunnery of the Java, Guer
riere, and Macedonian was equally bad; but while
Captain Lambert proved himself to be as able as he
was gallant, and Captain Dacres did nearly as well,
Captain Carden, on the other hand, was first too
timid, and then too rash, and showed bad judgment
at all times. By continuing his original course he
could have closed at once ; but he lost his chance by
over-anxiety to keep the weather-gage, and was cen
sured by the court-martial accordingly. Then he
tried to remedy one error by another, and made a
foolishly rash approach. A very able and fair-
minded English writer says of this action : "As a
display of courage the character of the service was
nobly upheld, but we would be deceiving ourselves
were we to admit that the comparative expertness

On the Ocean 151

of the crews in gunnery was equally satisfactory.
Now, taking the difference of effect as given by Cap
tain Garden, we must draw this conclusion — that the
comparative loss in killed and wounded (104 to 12),
together with the dreadful account he gives of the
condition of his own ship, while he admits that the
enemy's vessel was in comparatively good order,
must have arisen from inferiority in gunnery as
well as in force." 69

On the other hand, the American crew, even ac
cording to James, were as fine a set of men as ever
were seen on shipboard. Though not one-fourth
were British by birth, yet many of them had served
on board British ships of war, in some cases volun
tarily, but much more often because they were im
pressed. They had been trained at the guns with
the greatest care by Lieutenant Allen. And finally
Commodore Decatur handled his ship with abso
lute faultlessness. To sum up: a brave and skilful
crew, ably commanded, was matched against an
equally brave but unskilful one, with an incompetent
leader; and this accounts for the disparity of loss
being so much greater than the disparity in force.

At the outset of this battle the position of the
parties was just the reverse of that in the case of the
Constitution and Guerrtire; the Englishman had the
advantage of the wind, but he used it in a very dif
ferent manner from that in which Captain Hull had
done. The latter at once ran down to close, but
manoeuvred so cautiously that no damage could be

•' Lord Howard Douglas, "Naval Gunnery," p. 515.

152 Naval War of 1812

done him till he was within pistol shot. Captain
Garden did not try to close till after fatal indecision,
and then made the attempt so heedlessly that he was
cut to pieces before he got to close quarters. Com
modore Decatur, also, manoeuvred more skilfully
than Captain Dacres, although the difference was
less marked between these two. The combat was a
plain cannonade; the States derived no advantage
from the superior number of her men, for they were
not needed. The marines in particular had nothing
whatever to do, while they had been of the greatest
service against the Guerriere. The advantage was
simply in metal, as 10 is to 7. Lord Howard Doug-
las' criticisms on these actions seem to me only
applicable in part. He says (p. 524) : "The Ameri
cans would neither approach nor permit us to join
in close battle until they had gained some extraordi
nary advantage from the superior faculties of their
long guns in distant cannonade, and from the in
trepid, uncircumspect, and often very exposed ap
proach of assailants who had long been accustomed
to contemn all manoeuvring. Our vessels were
crippled in distant cannonade from encountering
rashly the serious disadvantage of making direct
attacks; the uncircumspect gallantry of our com
manders led our ships unguardedly into the snares
which wary caution had spread."

These criticisms are very just as regards the
Macedonian, and I fully agree with them (possibly
reserving the right to doubt Captain Garden's gal
lantry, though readily admitting his uncircumspec-

On the Ocean 153

tion). But the case of the Guerriere differed widely.
There the American ship made the attack, while the
British at first avoided close combat; and, so far
from trying to cripple her adversary by a distant
cannonade, the Constitution hardly fired a dozen
times until within pistol shot. This last point is
worth mentioning, because in a work on "Heavy
Ordnance," by Captain T. F. Simmons, R.A. (Lon
don, 1837), it is stated that the Guerriere received
her injuries before the closing, mentioning especially
the "thirty shot below the water-line"; whereas, by
the official accounts of both commanders, the re
verse was the case. Captain Hull, in his letter, and
Lieutenant Morris (in his autobiography) say they
only fired a few guns before closing; and Captain
Dacres, in his letter, and Captain Brenton, in his
"History," say that not much injury was received
by the Guerriere until about the time the mizzen-
mast fell, which was three or four minutes after
close action began.

Lieutenant Allen was put aboard the Macedonian
as prize-master; he secured the fore and mainmasts
and rigged a jury mizzenmast, converting the vessel
into a bark. Commodore Decatur discontinued his
cruise to convoy his prize back to America; they
reached New London Dec. 4th. Had it not been for
the necessity of convoying the Macedonian, the
States would have continued her cruise, for the dam
age she suffered was of the most trifling character.

Captain Garden stated (in Marshall's "Naval
Biography") that the States measured 1,670 tons,

154 Naval War of 1812

was manned by 509 men, suffered so from shot un
der water that she had to be pumped out every watch
and that two eighteen-pound shot passed in a hori
zontal line through her mainmast; all of which
statements were highly creditable to the vividness
of his imagination. The States measured but 1,576
tons (and by English measurement very much less),
had 478 men aboard, had not been touched by a
shot under water-line and her lower masts were
unwounded. James states that most of her crew
were British, which assertion I have already dis
cussed; and that she had but one boy aboard, and
that he was seventeen years old, — in which case 29
others, some of whom (as we learn from the "Life
of Decatur") were only twelve, must have grown
with truly startling rapidity during the hour and a
half that the combat lasted.

During the twenty years preceding 1812, there
had been almost incessant warfare on the ocean,
and although there had been innumerable single con
flicts between French and English frigates, there had
been but one case in which the French frigate, sin
gle-handed, was victorious. This was in the year
1805, when the Milan captured the Cleopatra. Ac
cording to Troude, the former threw at a broadside
574 pounds (actual), the latter but 334; and the
former lost 35 men out of her crew of 350; the lat
ter 58 out of 200. Or, the forces being as 100 to 58,
the loss inflicted was as 100 to 60; while the States'
force compared to the Macedonian's being as 100 to
66, the loss she inflicted was as 100 to n.

On the Ocean 155

British ships, moreover, had often conquered
against odds as great; as, for instance, when the
Sea Horse captured the great Turkish frigate Ba-
dere-Z offer; when the Astrea captured the French
frigate Gloire, which threw at a broadside 286
pounds of shot, while she threw but 174; and when,
most glorious of all, Lord Dundonald, in the gal
lant little Speedy, actually captured the Spanish
xebec Gamo, of over five times her own force ! Sim
ilarly, the corvette Comus captured the Danish frig
ate Fredrickscoarn, the brig Onyx captured the
Dutch sloop Manly, the little cutter Thorn captured
the French Courier-National, and the Pasley the
Spanish Virgin; while there had been many in
stances of drawn battles between English 1 2-pound
frigates and French or Spanish i8-pounders.

Captain Hull having resigned the command of
the Constitution she was given to Captain Bain-
bridge, of the Constellation, who was also entrusted
with the command of the Essex and Hornet. The
latter ship was in the port of Boston with the Con
stitution, under the command of Captain Lawrence.
The Essex was in the Delaware, and accordingly
orders were sent to Captain Porter to rendezvous at
the island of San Jago; if that failed several other
places were appointed, and if, after a certain time,
he did not fall in with his commodore he was to act
at his own discretion.

On October 26th the Constitution and Hornet
sailed, touched at the different rendezvouses, and
on December I3th arrived off San Salvador, where

156 Naval War of 1812

Captain Lawrence found the Bonne Citoyenne, 18,
Captain Pitt Barnaby Greene. The Bonne Cito
yenne was armed with 18 32-pound carronades and
2 long nines, and her crew of 150 men was exactly
equal in number to that of the Hornet; the latter 's
shprt weight in metal made her antagonist supe
rior to her in about the same proportion that she
herself, was subsequently superior to the Penguin,
or, in other words, the ships were practically equal.
Captain Lawrence now challenged Captain Greene
to single fight, giving the usual pledges that the
Constitution should not interfere. The challenge
was not accepted for a variety of reasons; among
others the Bonne Citoyenne was carrying home half
a million pounds in specie70 Leaving the Hornet

10 Brenton and James both deny that Captain Greene was
blockaded by the Hornet, ard claim that he feared the Con
stitution. James says (p. 275) that the occurrence was one
which "the characteristic cunning of Americans turned
greatly to their advantage"; and adds that Lawrence only
sent the challenge because "it could not be accepted," and
so he would "suffer no personal risk." He states that the
reason it was sent, as well as the reason that it was refused,
was because the Constitution was going to remain in the
offing and capture the British ship if she proved conqueror.
It is somewhat surprising that even James should have had
the temerity to advance such arguments. According to his
own account (p. 277) the Constitution left tor Boston on Jan.
6th, and the Hornet remained blockading the Bonne' Citoyenne
till the 24th, when the Montagu, 74, arrived. During these
eighteen days there could have been no possible chance of
the Constitution or any other ship interfering, and it is ridic
ulous to suppose that any such fear kept Captain Greene
from sailing out to attack his foe. No doubt Captain Greene's
course was perfectly justifiable, but it is curious that with all

On the Ocean 157

to blockade her, Commodore Bainbridge ran off to
the southward, keeping the land in view.

At 9 A.M., Dec. 29, 1812, while the Constitution
was running along the coast of Brazil, about thirty
miles off shore in latitude 13° 6' S., and longitude
31° W., two strange sail were made,71 inshore and
to windward. These were H. B. M. frigate Java,
Captain Lambert, forty-eight days out of Spithead,
England, with the captured ship William in com
pany. Directing the latter to make for San Salva
dor, the Java bore down in chase of the Constitu
tion.72 The wind was blowing light from the
N.N.E., and there was very little sea on. At 10 the
Java made the private signals, English, Spanish, and
Portuguese in succession, none being answered ;
meanwhile the Constitution was standing up toward
the Java on the starboard tack; a little after n
she hoisted her private signal, and then, being satis
fied that the strange sail was an enemy, she wore
and stood off toward the S.E., to draw her antago
nist away from the land,78 which was plainly visible.
The Java hauled up, and made sail in a parallel
course, the Constitution bearing about three points

the assertions made by James as to the cowardice of the Ameri
cans, this is the only instance throughout the war in which a
ship of either party declined a contest with an antagonist
of equal force (the cases of Commodore Rodgers and Sir
George Collier being evidently due simply to an overestimate
of the opposing ships).

11 Official letter of Commodore Bainbridge, Jan. 3, 1813.

w Official letter of Lieutenant Chads, Dec. 31, 1812.

11 Log of the Constitution,

158 Naval War of 1812

on her lee bow. The Java gained rapidly, being
much the swifter.

At 1.30 the Constitution luffed up, shortened her
canvas to topsails, topgallant sails, jib, and spanker,
and ran easily off on the port tack, heading toward
the southeast; she carried her commodore's pendant
at the main, national ensigns at the mizzen-peak
and main topgallant masthead, and a Jack at the
fore. The Java also had taken in the mainsail and
royals, and came down in a lasking course on her
adversary's weather-quarter,74 hoisting her ensign
at the mizzen-peak, a union Jack at the mizzen top~
gallant masthead, and another lashed to the main-
rigging. At 2 P.M., the Constitution fired a shot
ahead of her, following it quickly by a broadside,75
and the two ships began at long bowls, the English
firing the lee or starboard battery while the Amer
icans replied with their port guns. The cannonade
was very spirited on both sides, the ships suffering
about equally. The first broadside of the Java was
very destructive, killing and wounding several of
the Constitution's crew. The Java kept edging
down, and the action continued, with grape and
musketry in addition; the swifter British ship soon
fore-reached and kept away, intending to wear
across her slower antagonist's bow and rake her;
but the latter wore in the smoke, and the two com
batants ran off to the westward, the Englishman

74 Lieutenant Chads' Address to the Court-martial, April
23, 1813.
15 Commodore Bainbridge's letter.

On the Ocean 159

still a-weather and steering freer than the Consti
tution, which had luffed to close.76 The action
went on at pistol-shot distance. In a few minutes,
however, the Java again forged ahead, out of the
weight of her adversary's fire, and then kept off, as
before, to cross her bows; and, as before, the Con
stitution avoided this by wearing, both ships again
coming round with their heads to the east, the
American still to leeward. The Java kept the
weather-gage tenaciously, fore-reaching a little, and
whenever the Constitution luffed up to close,77 the
former tried to rake her. But her gunnery was now
poor, little damage being done by it; most of the
loss the Americans suffered was early in the action.
By setting her foresail and mainsail the Constitu
tion got up close on the enemy's lee beam, her fire
being very heavy and carrying away the end of the
Java's bowsprit and her jibboom.78 The Constitu
tion forged ahead and repeated her former manoeu
vre, wearing in the smoke. The Java at once hove
in stays, but owing to the loss of headsail fell off
very slowly, and the American frigate poured a
heavy raking broadside into her stern, at about two
cables' length distance. The Java replied with her
port guns as she fell off.79 Both vessels then bore
up and ran off free, with the wind on the port quar
ter, the Java being abreast and to windward of her
antagonist, both with their heads a little east of
south. The ships were less than a cable's length

16 Log of the Constitution. " Do.

18 Lieutenant Chads' letter. " Lieut. Chads' letter.

160 Naval War of 1812

apart, and the Constitution inflicted great damage
while suffering very little herself. The British lost
many men by the musketry of the American topmen,
and suffered still more from the round and grape,
especially on the forecastle,80 many marked instances
of valor being shown on both sides. The Java's
masts were wounded and her rigging cut to pieces,
and Captain Lambert then ordered her to be laid
aboard the enemy, who was on her lee beam. The
helm was put a-weather, and the Java came down
for the Constitution's main-chains. The boarders
and marines gathered in the gangways and on the
forecastle, the boatswain having been ordered to
cheer them up with his pipe that they might make a
clean spring.81 The Americans, however, raked the
British with .terrible effect, cutting off their main
topmast above the cap, and their foremast near the
cat harpings.82 The stump of the Java's bowsprit
got caught in the Constitution's mizzen-rigging, and
before it got clear the British suffered still more.
Finally the ships separated, the Java's bowsprit
passing over the taffrail of the Constitution; the lat
ter at once kept away to avoid being raked. The
ships again got nearly abreast, but the Constitution,
in her turn, fore-reached; whereupon Commodore
Bainbridge wore, passed his antagonist, luffed up
under his quarter, raked him with the starboard

80 Testimony of Christopher Speedy, in minutes of the
Court-martial on board H. M. S. Gladiator, at Portsmouth,
April 23, 1813.

81 Testimony of James Humble, in do., do.

82 Log of Constitution.

On the Ocean 161

guns, then wore, and recommenced the action with
his port broadside at about 3.10. Again the ves
sels were abreast, and the action went on as fu
riously as ever. The wreck of the top hamper on the
Java lay over her starboard side, so that every dis
charge of her guns set her on fire,83 and in a few
minutes her able and gallant commander was mor
tally wounded by a ball fired by one of the American
maintopmen.84 The command then devolved on the
first lieutenant, Chads, himself painfully wounded.
The slaughter had been terrible, yet the British
fought on with stubborn resolution, cheering lustily.
But success was now hopeless, for nothing could
stand against the cool precision of the Yankee fire.
The stump of the Java's foremast was carried away
by a double-headed shot, the mizzenmast fell, the
gaff and spanker boom were shot away, also the
main-yard, and finally the ensign was cut down by
a shot, and all her guns absolutely silenced ; when at
4.05 the Constitution, thinking her adversary had
struck,85 ceased firing, hauled aboard her tacks, and
passed across her adversary's bows to windward,
with her topsails, jib, and spanker set. A few
minutes afterward the Java's mainmast fell, leaving
her a sheer hulk. The Constitution assumed a
weatherly position, and spent an hour in repairing
damages and securing her masts ; then she wore and
stood toward her enemy, whose flag was again fly-

M Lieut. Chads' Address.

84 Surgeon J. C. Jones' Report. .

85 Log of the Constitution (as given in Bainbridge's letter).

1 62 Naval War of 1812

ing, but only for bravado, for as soon as the Con
stitution stood across her forefoot she struck. At
5.25 she was taken possession of by Lieutenant Par
ker, ist of the Constitution , in one of the latter's
only two remaining boats.

The American ship had suffered comparatively
little. But a few round shot had struck her hull,
one of which carried away the wheel; one 18-
pounder went through the mizzenmast ; the foremast,
maintopmast, and a few other spars were slightly
wounded, and the running rigging and shrouds were
a good deal cut; but in an hour she was again in
good fighting trim. Her loss amounted to 8 sea
men and i marine killed; the 5th lieutenant, John
C. Aylwin, and 2 seamen, mortally, Commodore
Bainbridge and 12 seamen, severely, and 7 seamen
and 2 marines, slightly wounded; in all 12 killed and
mortally wounded, and 22 wounded severely and
slightly.86

"The Java sustained unequally injuries beyond
the Constitution" says the British account.87 These
have already been given in detail ; she was a riddled
and entirely dismasted hulk. Her loss (for discus
sion of which see further on) was 48 killed (in
cluding Captain Henry Lambert, who died soon
after the close of the action, and five midshipmen),
and 1 02 wounded, among them Lieutenant Henry
Ducie Chads, Lieutenant of Marines David Davies,
Commander John Marshall, Lieutenant James Saun-

86 Report of Surgeon Amos A. Evans.
«i "Naval Chronicle," xxix, 452.

On the Lakes 163

ders, the boatswain, James Humble, master, Batty
Robinson, and four midshipmen.

In this action both ships displayed equal gallantry
and seamanship. "The Java," says Commodore
Bainbridge, "was exceedingly well handled and
bravely fought. Poor Captain Lambert was a dis
tinguished and gallant officer, and a most worthy
man, whose death I sincerely regret." The manoeu
vring on both sides was excellent; Captain Lam
bert used the advantage which his ship possessed in
her superior speed most skilfully, always endeav
oring to run across his adversary's bows and rake
him when he had fore-reached, and it was only owing
to the equal skill which his antagonist displayed that
he was foiled, the length of the combat being due
to the number of evolutions. The great superiority
of the Americans was in their gunnery. The fire
of the Java was both less rapid and less well-directed
than that of her antagonist ; the difference of force
against her was not heavy, being about as ten is to
nine, and was by no means enough to account for
the almost fivefold greater loss she suffered.

On next page is a diagram of the battle. It
differs from both of the official accounts, as these
conflict greatly both as to time and as regards some
of the evolutions. I generally take the mean in cases
of difference ; for example, Commodore Bainbridge's
report makes the fight endure but i hour and 55
minutes, Lieutenant Chads' 2 hours and 25 minutes ;
I have made it 2 hours and 10 minutes, etc., etc.

The tonnage and weight of metal of the comba-

164

Naval War of 1812

On the Ocean 165

tants have already been stated ; I will give the com
plements shortly. The following is the

COMPARATIVE FORCE AND LOSS

Tons Weight Metal No. Men Loss
Constitution 1576 654 475 34

Java 1340 576 426 150

Relative Relative Loss

Force Inflicted

Constitution 100 zoo

Java 89 23

In hardly another action of the war do the ac
counts of the respective forces differ so widely;
the official British letter makes their total of men at
the beginning of the action 377, of whom Commo
dore Bainbridge officially reports that he paroled
378 ! The British state their loss in killed and mor
tally wounded at 24; Commodore Bainbridge reports
that the dead alone amounted to nearly 60! Usu
ally I have taken each commander's account of his
own force and loss, and I should do so now if it
were not that the British accounts differ among
themselves, and whenever they relate to the Ameri
cans are flatly contradicted by the affidavits of the
latter's officers. The British first handicap them
selves by the statement that the surgeon of the Con
stitution was an Irishman and lately an assistant
surgeon in the British navy ("Naval Chronicle,"
xxix, 452) ; which draws from Surgeon Amos A.
Evans a solemn statement in the Boston "Gazette"
that he was born in Maryland and was never in the
British navy in his life. Then Surgeon Jones of
the Java, in his official report, after giving his own

1 66 Naval War of 1812

killed and mortally wounded at 24, says that the
Americans lost in all about 60, and that 4 of their
amputations perished under his own eyes; where
upon Surgeon Evans makes the statement ("Niles'
Register/' vi, p. 35), backed up by affidavits of his
brother officers, that in all he had but five amputa
tions, of whom only one died, and that one a month
after Surgeon Jones had left the ship. To meet the
assertions of Lieutenant Chads that he began action
with but 377 men, the Constitution's officers pro
duced the Java's muster-roll, dated Nov. I7th, or
five days after she had sailed, which showed 446
persons, of whom 20 had been put on board a prize.
The presence of this large number of supernumer
aries on board is explained by the fact that the Java
was carrying out Lieutenant-General Hislop, the
newly-appointed Governor of Bombay, and his suite,
together with part of the crews for the Cornwallis,
74, and gun-sloops Chameleon and Icarus; she also
contained stores for those two ships.

Besides conflicting with the American reports,
the British statements contradict one another. The
official published report gives but two midshipmen
as killed; while one of the volumes of the "Naval
Chronicle" (vol. xxix, p. 452) contains a letter from
one of the Java's lieutenants, in which he states that
there were five. Finally, Commodore Bainbridge
found on board the Constitution, after the prisoners
had left, a letter from Lieutenant H. D. Cornick,
dated Jan. i, 1813, and addressed to Lieutenant
Peter V. Wood, 22d Regiment, foot, in which he

On the Ocean 167

states that 65 of their men were killed. James
("Naval Occurrences") gets around this by stating
that it was probably a forgery; but aside from the
improbability of Commodore Bainbridge being a
forger, this could not be so, for nothing would have
been easier than for the British lieutenant to have
denied having written it, which he never did. On
the other hand, it would be very likely that in the
heat of the action, Commodore Bainbridge and the
Java's own officers should overestimate the latter's
loss.88

Taking all these facts into consideration, we find
446 men on board the Java by her own muster-list ;
378 of these were paroled by Commodore Bain
bridge at San Salvador ; 24 men were acknowledged
by the enemy to be killed or mortally wounded ; 20
were absent in a prize, leaving 24 unaccounted for,
who were undoubtedly slain.

The British loss was 48 men killed and mortally
wounded, 102 wounded severely and slightly. The
Java was better handled and more desperately de
fended than the Macedonian or even the Guerriere,
and the odds against her were much smaller ; so she
caused her opponent greater loss, though her gun
nery was no better than theirs.

88 For an account of the shameless corruption then exist
ing in the Naval Administration of Great Britain, see Lord
Dundonald's "Autobiography of a Seaman." The letters of
the commanders were often garbled, as is mentioned by
Brenton. Among numerous cases that he gives, may be
mentioned the cutting out of the Chtvrette, where he dis
tinctly says, "our loss was much greater than was ever ac
knowledged." (Vol. i, p. 505, edition of 1837.)

168 Naval War of 1812

Lieutenant Parker, prize-master of the Java, re
moved all the prisoners and baggage to the Consti
tution, and reported the prize to be in a very dis
abled state; owing partly to this, but more to the
long distance from home and the great danger there
was of recapture, Commodore Bainbridge destroyed
her on the 3ist, and then made sail for San Salvador.
"Our gallant enemy/' reports Lieutenant Chads,
"has treated us most generously"; and Lieutenant-
General Hislop presented the Commodore with a
very handsome sword as a token of gratitude for the
kindness with which he had treated the prisoners.

Partly in consequence of his frigate's injuries,
but especially because of her decayed condition,
Commodore Bainbridge sailed from San Salvador
on Jan. 6, 1813, reaching Boston Feb. 27th, after
his four months' cruise. At San Salvador he left
the Hornet still blockading the Bonne Citoyenne.

In order "to see oureslves as others see us," I
shall again quote from Admiral Jurien de la Gra-
viere,89 as his opinions are certainly well worthy of
attention both as to these first three battles, and as
to the lessons they teach. "When the American
Congress declared war on England in 1812," he
says, "it seemed as if this unequal conflict would
crush her navy in the act of being born; instead, it
but fertilized the germ. It is only since that epoch
that the United States has taken rank among mari
time powers. Some combats of frigates, corvettes,
and brigs, insignificant without doubt as regards

89 "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 284 (Paris, 1881).

On the Ocean 169

material results, sufficed to break the charm which
protected the standard of St. George, and taught
Europe what she could have already learned from
some of our combats, if the louder noise of our de
feats had not drowned the glory, that the only in-
vincibles on the sea are good seamen and good ar
tillerists.

"The English covered the ocean with their crui
sers when this unknown navy, composed of six frig
ates and a few small craft hitherto hardly numbered,
dared to establish its cruisers at the mouth of the
Channel, in the very centre of the British power.
But already the Constitution had captured the Guer-
riere and Java, the United States had made a prize
of the Macedonian, the Wasp of the Frolic, and the
Hornet of the Peacock. The honor of the new
flag was established. England, humiliated, tried to
attribute her multiplied reverses to the unusual size
of the vessels which Congress had had constructed
in 1799, and which did the fighting in 1812. She
wished to refuse them the name of frigates, and
called them, not without some appearance of reason,
disguised line-of-battle ships. Since then all mari
time powers have copied these gigantic models, as
the result of the war of 1812 obliged England her
self to change her naval material; but if they had
employed, instead of frigates, cut-down 74*5 (vais-
seaux rases), it would still be difficult to explain
the prodigious success of the Americans. . . .

"In an engagement which terminated in less than
half an hour, the English frigate Guerriere, com-

VOL. IX.— 8

170 Naval War of 1812

pletely dismasted, had fifteen men killed, sixty-three
wounded, and more than thirty shot below the water-
line. She sank twelve hours after the combat. The
Constitution, on the contrary, had but seven men
killed and seven wounded, and did not lose a mast.
As soon as she had replaced a few cut ropes and
changed a few sails, she was in condition, even by
the testimony of the British historian, to take an
other Guerriere. The United States took an hour
and a half to capture the Macedonian, and the same
difference made itself felt in the damage suffered by
the two ships. The Macedonian had her mast shat
tered, two of her maindeck and all her spardeck guns
disabled; more than a hundred shot had penetrated
the hull, and over a third of the crew had suffered
by the hostile fire. The American frigate, on the
contrary, had to regret but five men killed and seven
wounded; her guns had been fired each sixty-six
times to the Macedonian's thirty-six. The combat
of the Constitution and the Java lasted two hours,
and was the most bloody of these three engagements.
The Java only struck when she had been razed like a
sheer hulk; she had twenty-two men killed and one
hundred and two wounded.

"This war should be studied with unceasing dili
gence; the pride of two peoples to whom naval af
fairs are so generally familiar has cleared all the de
tails and laid bare all the episodes, and through the
sneers which the victors should have spared, merely
out of care for their own glory, at every step can be

On the Ocean 171

seen that great truth, that there is only success for
those who know how to prepare it.

"It belongs to us to judge impartially these ma
rine events, too much exalted perhaps by a national
vanity one is tempted to excuse. The Americans
showed, in the War of 1812, a great deal of skill
and resolution. But if, as they have asserted, the
chances had always been perfectly equal between
them and their adversaries, if they had only owed
their triumphs to the intrepidity of Hull, Decatur,
and Bainbridge, there would be for us but little
interest in recalling the struggle. We need not seek
lessons in courage outside of our own history. On
the contrary, what is to be well considered is that
the ships of the United States constantly fought with
the chances in their favor, and it is on this that the
American Government should found its true title
to glory. . . . The Americans in 1812 had secured
to themselves the advantage of a better organiza
tion [than the English]."

The fight between the Constitution and the Java
illustrates best the proposition, "that there is only
success for those who know how to prepare it."
Here the odds in men and metal were only about as
10 to 9 in favor of the victors, and it is safe to say
that they might have been reversed without vitally
affecting the result. In the fight Lambert handled
his ship as skilfully as Bainbridge did his; and the
Java's men proved by their indomitable courage that
they were excellent material. The Java's crew was

172 Naval War of 1812

new shipped for the voyage, and had been at sea
but six weeks; in the Constitution's first fight her
crew had been aboard of her but five weeks. So
the chances should have been nearly equal, and the
difference in fighting capacity that was shown by
the enormous disparity in the loss, and still more
in the damage inflicted, was due to the fact that
the officers of one ship had, and the officers of the
other had not, trained their raw crews. The Con
stitution's men were not "picked," but simply aver
age American sailors, as the Java's were average
British sailors. The essential difference was in the
training.

During the six weeks the Java was at sea, her men
had fired but six broadsides, of blank cartridges;
during the first five weeks the Constitution cruised,
her crew were incessantly practiced at firing with
blank cartridges, and also at a target.90 The Java's
crew had only been exercised occasionally, even in
pointing the guns, and when the captain of a gun
was killed the effectiveness of the piece was tem
porarily ruined, and, moreover, the men did not
work together. The Constitution's crew were exer
cised till they worked like machines, and yet with
enough individualityto render it impossible to cripple
a gun by killing one man. The unpracticed British
sailors fired at random ; the trained Americans took

90 In looking through the logs of the Constitution, Hornet,
etc., we continually find such entries as "beat to quarters,"
"exercised the men at the great guns," "exercised with mus
ketry," "exercised the boarders," "exercised the great guns,
blank cartridges, and afterward firing at mark."

On the Ocean 173

aim. The British marines had not been taught any
thing approximating to skirmishing or sharpshoot-
ing; the Americans had. The British sailors had
not even been trained enough in the ordinary duties
of seamen; while the Americans in five weeks had
been rendered almost perfect. The former were at
a loss what to do in an emergency at all out of their
own line of work ; they were helpless when the wreck
fell over their guns, when the Americans would have
cut it away in a jiffy. As we learn from Commo
dore Morris' "Autobiography," each Yankee sailor
could, at need, do a little carpentering or sail-mend
ing, and so was more self-reliant. The crew had
been trained to act as if guided by one mind, yet
each man retained his own individuality. The petty
officers were better paid than in Great Britain, and
so were of a better class of men, thoroughly self-
respecting; the Americans soon got their subor
dinates in order, while the British did not. To sum
up : one ship's crew had been trained practically and
thoroughly, while the other crew was not much bet
ter off than the day it sailed; and, as far as it goes,
this is a good test of the efficiency of the two
navies.

The U. S. brig Vixen, 12, Lieutenant George U.
Read, had been cruising off the southern coast; on
Nov. 22d she fell in with the Southampton, 32,
Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, and was captured
after a short but severe trial of speed. Both vessels
were wrecked soon afterward.

174 Naval War of 1812

The Essex, 32, Captain David Porter, left the
Delaware on Oct. 28th, two days after Commodore
Bainbridge had left Boston. She expected to make
a very long cruise and so carried with her an un
usual quantity of stores and sixty more men than or
dinarily, so that her muster-roll contained 319 names.
Being deep in the water she reached San Jago after
Bainbridge had left. Nothing was met with until
after the Essex had crossed the equator in long.
30° W. on Dec. nth. On the afternoon of the next
day a sail was made out to windward, and chased.
At nine in the evening it was overtaken, and struck
after receiving a volley of musketry which killed one
man. The prize proved to be the British packet Noc-
ton, of 10 guns and 31 men, with $55,000 in specie
aboard. The latter was taken out, and the Nocton
sent home with Lieutenant Finch and a prize crew
of 17 men, but was recaptured by a British frigate.

The next appointed rendezvous was the Island
of Fernando de Noronha, where Captain Porter
found a letter from Commodore Bainbridge, inform
ing him that the other vessels were off Cape Frio.
Thither cruised Porter, but his compatriots had left.
On the 29th he captured an English merchant ves
sel ; and he was still cruising when the year closed.

The year 1812, on the ocean, ended as gloriously
as it had begun. In four victorious fights the dis
parity in loss had been so great as to sink the dis
parity of force into insignificance. Our successes
had been unaccompanied by any important reverse.

On the Ocean 175

Nor was it alone by the victories, but by the cruises,
that the year was noteworthy. The Yankee men-
of-war sailed almost in sight of the British coast
and right in the track of the merchant fleets and their
armed protectors. Our vessels had shown them
selves immensely superior to their foes.

The reason of these striking and unexpected suc
cesses was that our navy in 1812 was the exact
reverse of what our navy is now, in 1882. I am
not alluding to the personnel, which still remains ex
cellent ; but, whereas we now have a large number
of worthless vessels, standing very low down in
their respective classes, we then possessed a few ves
sels, each unsurpassed by any foreign ship of her
class. To bring up our navy to the condition in
which it stood in 1812 it would not be necessary
(although in reality both very wise and in the end
very economical) to spend any more money than at
present ; only instead of using it to patch up a hun
dred antiquated hulks, it should be employed in build
ing half a dozen ships on the most effective model.
If in 1812 our ships had borne the same relation
to the British ships that they do now, not all the
courage and skill of our sailors would have won us
a single success. As it 'was, we could only cope with
the lower rates, and had no vessels to oppose to the
great "liners" ; but to-day there is hardly any for
eign ship, no matter how low its rate, that is not
superior to the corresponding American ones. It is
too much to hope that our political short-sightedness
will ever enable us to have a navy that is first-class

176 Naval War of 1812

in point of size ; but there certainly seems no reason
why what ships we have should not be of the very
best quality. The effect of a victory is twofold,
moral and material. Had we been as roughly han
dled on water as we were on land during the first
year of the war, such a succession of disasters would
have had a most demoralizing effect on the nation
at large. As it was, our victorious sea-fights, while
they did not inflict any material damage upon the
colossal sea-might of England, had the most impor
tant results in the feelings they produced at home
and even abroad. Of course they were magnified
absurdly by most of our writers at the time; but
they do not need to be magnified, for as they are any
American can look back upon them with the keenest
national pride. For a hundred and thirty years
England had had no equal on the sea; and now she
suddenly found one in the untried navy of an al
most unknown power.

BRITISH VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED IN 1812

Name Guns Tonnage Remarks

Guerriere 49 Ii34°

Macedonian 49 i ,325

Java 49 1,340

Jprohc 19 477 Recaptured

Alert 20 325

186 4,807

19 477 Deducting Frolic

167 4,330

AMERICAN VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED

Name Guns Tonnage

IV asp 1 8 450

Nautilus 14 185

Vixen 14 185

46 820

On the Ocean

VESSELS BUILT IN 1812

Name Rig Guns Tonnage Where Built Cost

Nonsuch Schooner 14 148 Charleston $15,000
Carolina Schooner 14 230 Charleston 8,74^

Louisiana Ship 16 341 New Orleans 15,500

PRIZES MADE"'

Ship No. of Prires

President .

7

United States

2

Constitution

9

Congress
Chesapeake
Essex .

2
II

Wasp .

2

I lorn t- 1

I

Argus

6

Small craft

5

91 These can only be approximately given; the records are
often incomplete or contradictory, especially as regards the
small craft. Most accounts do not give by any means the full
number.

CHAPTER IV
1812

ON THE LAKES

PRELIMINARY — The combatants starting nearly on an
equality — Difficulties of creating a naval force — Diffi
culty of comparing the force of the rival squadrons —
Meagreness of the published accounts — Unreliability of
James — ONTARIO — Extraordinary nature of the Ameri
can squadron — Canadian squadron forming only a kind
of water militia — Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by
Commodore Earle — Commodore Chauncy bombards
York — ERIE — Lieutenant Elliott captures the Detroit
and Caledonia — Unsuccessful expedition of Lieutenant
Angus.

AT the time we are treating of, the State of
Maine was so sparsely settled, and covered
with such a dense growth of forest, that it was prac
tically impossible for either of the contending parties
to advance an army through its territory. A con
tinuation of the same wooded and mountainous dis
trict protected the northern parts of Vermont and
New Hampshire, while in New York the Adirondack
region was an impenetrable wilderness. It thus
came about that the. northern boundary was formed,
for military purposes, by Lake Huron, Lake Erie, the
Niagara, Lake Ontario, the St. Lawrence, and, after
an interval, by Lake Champlain. The road into the
States by the latter ran close along shore, and with
out a naval force the invader would be wholly un-
(178)

On the Lakes 179

able to protect his flanks, and would probably have
his communications cut. This lake, however, was
almost wholly within the United States, and did not
become of importance till toward the end of the war.
Upon it were two American gunboats, regularly
officered and manned, and for such smooth water
sufficiently effective vessels.

What was at that time the western part of the
northern frontier became the main theatre of mili
tary operations, and as it presented largely a water
front, a naval force was an indispensable adjunct,
the command of the lakes being of the utmost im
portance. As these lakes were fitted for the manoeu
vring of ships of the largest size, the operations upon
them were of the same nature as those on the ocean,
and properly belong to naval and not to military
history. But while on the ocean America started
with too few ships to enable her really to do any
serious harm to her antagonist, on the inland waters
the two sides began very nearly on an equality.
The chief regular forces either belligerent possessed
were on Lake Ontario. Here the United States had
a man-of-war brig, the Oncida, of 240 tons, carrying
1 6 24-pound carronades, manned by experienced
seamen, and commanded by Lieutenant M. T. Wool-
sey. Great Britain possessed the Royal George, 22,
Prince Regent, 16, Earl of Moira, 14, Gloucester,
10, Seneca, 8, and Simco, 8, all under the command
of a Commodore Earle ; but though this force was
so much the more powerful it was very inefficient,
not being considered as belonging to the regular

i8o Naval War of 1812

navy, the sailors being undisciplined, and the offi
cers totally without experience, never having been
really trained in the British service. From these
causes it resulted that the struggle on the lakes
was to be a work as much of creating as of using a
navy. On the seaboard success came to those who
made best use of the ships that had already been
built; on the lakes the real contest lay in the build
ing. And building an inland navy was no easy task.
The country around the lakes, especially on the
south side, was still very sparsely settled, and all the
American naval supplies had to be brought from the
seaboard cities through the valley of the Mohawk.
There was no canal or other means of communica
tion, except very poor roads intermittently relieved
by transportation on the Mohawk and on Oneida
Lake, when they were navigable. Supplies were
thus brought up at an enormous cost, with tedious
delays and great difficulty; and bad weather put a
stop to all travel. Very little indeed, beyond tim
ber, could be procured at the stations on the lakes.
Still a few scattered villages and small towns had
grown up on the shores, whose inhabitants were
largely engaged in the carrying trade; the ves
sels used for the purpose were generally small
sloops or schooners, swift and fairly good sailers,
but very shallow and not fitted for rough weather.
The frontiersmen themselves,- whether Canadian or
American, were bold, hardy seamen, and when prop
erly trained and led made excellent man-of-war's-
men ; but on the American side they were too few in

On the Lakes 181

number and too untrained to be made use of, and
the seamen had to come from the coast. But the
Canadian shores had been settled longer, the inhabi
tants were more numerous, and by means of the St.
Lawrence the country was easy of access to Great
Britain; so that the seat of war, as regards getting
naval supplies, and even men, was nearer to Great
Britain than to us. Our enemies also possessed in
addition to the squadron on Lake Ontario another
on Lake Erie, consisting of the Queen Charlotte, 17,
Lady Prevost, 13, Hunter, 10, Caledonia, 2, Little
Belt, 2, and Chippeway, 2. These two squadrons
furnished training schools for some five hundred
Canadian seamen, whom a short course of disci
pline under experienced officers sufficed to render
as good men as their British friends or American
foes. Very few British seamen ever reached Lake
Erie (according to James, not over fifty) ; but on
Lake Ontario, and afterward on Lake Champlain,
they formed the bulk of the crews, "picked seamen,
sent out by government expressly for service on the
Canada lakes." 1 As the contrary has sometimes
been asserted it may be as well to mention that Ad
miral Codrington states that no want of seamen con
tributed to the British disasters on the lakes, as their
sea-ships at Quebec had men drafted from them
for that service till their crews were utterly de
pleted.2 I am bound to state that while I think that

1 James vi, 353.

* Memoirs, i, 322, referring especially to battle of Lake
Champlain.

1 82 Naval War of 1812

on the ocean our sailors showed themselves superior
to their opponents, especially in gun practice, on the
lakes the men of the rival fleets were as evenly
matched, in skill and courage, as could well be. The
difference, when there was any, appeared in the
officers, and, above all, in the builders; which was
the more creditable to us, as in the beginning we
were handicapped by the fact that the British al
ready had a considerable number of war vessels,
while we had but one.

The Falls of Niagara interrupt navigation be
tween Erie and Ontario; so there were three inde
pendent centres of naval operations on the northern
frontier. The first was on Lake Champlain, where
only the Americans possessed any force, an'd, singu
larly enough, this was the only place where the Brit
ish showed more enterprise in shipbuilding than we
did. Next came Lake Ontario, where both sides
made their greatest efforts, but where the result was
indecisive, though the balance of success was slightly
inclined toward us. Our naval station was at Sack-
ett's Harbor; that of our foes at Kingston. The
third field of operations was Lake Erie and the
waters above it. Here both sides showed equal dar
ing and skill in the fighting, and our advantage must
be ascribed to the energy and success with which
we built and equipped vessels. Originally we had
no force at all on these waters, while several ves
sels were opposed to us. It is a matter of wonder
that the British and Canadian governments should
have been so supine as to permit their existing force

On the Lakes 183

to go badly armed, and so unenterprising as to build
but one additional ship, when they could easily have
preserved their superiority.

It is very difficult to give a full and fair account
of the lake campaigns. The inland navies were
created especially for the war, and, after it were al
lowed to decay, so that the records of the tonnage,
armament, and crews are hard to get at. Of course,
where everything had to be created, the services
could not have the regular character of those on the
ocean. The vessels employed were of widely differ
ent kinds, and this often renders it almost impos
sible to correctly estimate the relative force of two
opposing squadrons. While the Americans were
building their lake navy, they, as make-shifts, made
use of some ordinary merchant schooners, which
were purchased and fitted up with one or two long.
heavy guns each. These gun-vessels had no quar
ters, and suffered under all the other disadvantages
which make a merchant vessel inferior to a regu
larly constructed man-of-war. The chief trouble
was that in a heavy sea they had a strong ten
dency to capsize, and were so unsteady that the guns
could not be aimed when any wind was blowing.
Now, if a few of these schooners, mounting long
32*5, encountered a couple of man-of-war brigs,
armed with carronades, which side was strongest?
In smooth water the schooners had the advantage,
and in rough weather they were completely at the
mercy of the brigs ; so that it would be very hard to
get at the true worth of such a contest as each side

1 84 Naval War of 1812

would be tolerably sure to insist that the weather
was such as to give a great advantage to the other.
In all the battles and skirmishes on Champlain, Erie,
and Huron, at least there was no room left for doubt
as to who were the victors. But on Lake Ontario
there was never any decisive struggle, and when
ever an encounter occurred, each commodore al
ways claimed that his adversary had "declined the
combat," though "much superior in strength." It
is, of course, almost impossible to find out which
really did decline the combat, for the official letters
flatly contradict each other ; and it is often almost as
difficult to discover where the superiority in force
lay, when the fleets differed so widely in character
as was the case in 1813. Then Commodore
Chauncy's squadron consisted largely of schooners;
their long, heavy guns made his total foot up in
a very imposing manner, and similar gun-vessels did
very good work on Lake Erie ; so Commodore Yeo,
and more especially Commodore Yeo's admirers,
exalted these schooners to the skies, and conveyed
the impression that they were most formidable craft,
by means of which Chauncy ought to have won
great victories. Yet when Yeo captured two of
them he refused to let them even cruise with his
fleet, and they were sent back to act as coast gun
boats and transports, which certainly would not have
been done had they been fitted to render any effectual
assistance. Again, one night a squall came on
and the two largest schooners went to the bottom,
which did not tend to increase the confidence felt

On the Lakes 185

in the others. So there can be no doubt that in all
but very smooth water the schooners could almost
be counted out of the fight. Then the question
arises in any given case, was the water smooth?
And the testimony is as conflicting as ever.

It is not too easy to reconcile the official letters
of the commanders, and it is still harder to get
at the truth from either the American or British his
tories. Cooper is very inexact, and, moreover, paints
everything coulcur dc rose, paying no attention to
the British side of the question, and distributing so
much praise to everybody that one is at a loss to
know where it really belongs. Still, he is very use
ful, for he lived at the time of the events he nar
rates, and could get much information about them
at first hand, from the actors themselves. James is
almost the only British authority on the subject ; but
he is not nearly as reliable as when dealing with
the ocean contests, most of this part of his work be
ing taken up with a succession of acrid soliloquies
on the moral defects of the American character.
The British records for this extraordinary service
on the lakes were not at all carefully kept, and so
James is not hampered by the necessity of adhering
more or less closely to official documents, but lets his
imagination run loose. On the ocean and seaboard
his account of the British force can generally be re
lied upon; but on the lakes his authority is ques
tionable in everything relating either to friends or
foes. This is the more exasperating because it is
done wilfully, when, if he had chosen, he could have

186 Naval War of 1812

written an invaluable history; he must often have
known the truth when, as a matter of preference, he
chose either to suppress or alter it. Thus he ignores
all the small "cutting out" expeditions in which the
Americans were successful, and where one would
like to hear the British side. For example, Captain
Yeo captured two schooners, the Julia and Growler,
but Chauncy recaptured both. We have the Amer
ican account of this recapture in full, but James
does not even hint at it, and blandly puts down both
vessels in the total "American loss" at the end of his
smaller work. Worse still, when the Growler again
changed hands, he counts it in again, in the total, as
if it were an entirely different boat, although he in
variably rules out of the American list all recap
tured vessels. A more serious perversion of facts
are his statements about comparative tonnage. This
was at that time measured arbitrarily, the depth of
hold being estimated at half the breadth of beam;
and the tonnage of our lake vessels was put down ex
actly as if they were regular ocean cruisers of the
same dimensions in length and breadth. But on
these inland seas the vessels really did not draw
more than half as much water as on the ocean, and
the depth would of course be much less. James,
in comparing the tonnage, gives that of the Ameri
cans as if they were regular ocean ships, but in the
case of the British vessels, carefully allows for their
shallowness, although professing to treat the two
classes in the same way; and thus he makes out a
most striking and purely imaginary difference. The

On the Lakes 187

best example is furnished by his accounts of the fleets
on Lake Erie. The captured vessels were appraised
by two captains and the shipbuilder, Mr. Henry
Eckford, their tonnage being computed precisely as
the tonnage of the American vessels. The appraise
ment was recorded in the Navy Department, and
was first made public by Cooper, so that it could not
have been done for effect. Thus measured it was
found that the tonnage was in round numbers as fol
lows : Detroit, 490 tons ; Queen Charlotte, 400; Lady
Prevost, 230; Hunter, 180; Little Bell, 90; Chippc-
way, 70. James makes them measure respectively
305, 280, 1 20, 74, 54, and 32 tons, but carefully
gives the American ships the regular sea tonnage.
So also he habitually deducts about 25 per cent from
the real number of men on board the British ships ;
as regards Lake Erie he contradicts himself so much
that he does not need to be exposed from outside
sources. But the most glaring and least excusable
misstatements are made as to the battle of Lake
Champlain, where he gives the American as greatly
exceeding the British force. He reaches this conclu
sion by the most marvelous serious of garblings and
misstatements. First, he says that the Confiance and
the Saratoga were of nearly equal tonnage. The
Confiance being captured was placed on our naval
lists, where for years she ranked as a 36-gun frigate,
while the Saratoga ranked among the 24-gun cor
vettes; and by actual measurement the former was
half as large again as the latter. He gives the
Confiance but 270 men; one of her officers, in a

i88 Naval War of 1812

letter published in the "London Naval Chronicle," 3
gives her over 300 ; more than that number of dead
and prisoners were taken out of her. He misstates
the calibre of her guns, and counts out two of them
because they were used through the bow-ports;
whereas, from the method in which she made her
attack, these would have been peculiarly effec
tive. The guns are given accurately by Cooper,
on the authority of an officer,4 who was on board
the Constitution within 15 minutes after the Linnet
struck, and who was in charge of her for two
months.

Then James states that there were but 10 British
galleys, while Sir George Prevost's official account,
as well as all the American authorities, state the
number to be 12. He says that the Finch grounded
opposite an American battery before the engagement
began, while in reality it was an hour afterward,
and because she had been disabled by the shot of . the
American "fleet The galleys were largely manned
by Canadians, and James, anxious to put the blame
on these rather than the British, says that they
acted in the most cowardly way, whereas in reality
they caused the Americans more trouble than Dow-
nie's smaller sailing vessels did. His account of the
armament of these vessels differs widely from the
official reports. He gives the Linnet and Chubb a
smaller number of men than the number of prisoners

3 Vol. xxxii, p. 272. The letter also says that hardly five
of her men remained unhurt.

4 Lieutenant E. A. F. Lavallette.

On the Lakes 189

that were actually taken out of them, not including
the dead. Even misstating Downie's force in guns,
underestimating the number of his men, and leav
ing out two of his gunboats, did not content James ;
and to make the figures show a proper disproportion,
he says (Vol. VI, p. 504) that he shall exclude the
Finch from the estimate, because she grounded, and
half of the gunboats, because he does not think they
acted bravely. Even were these assertions true, it
would be quite as logical for an American writer to
put the Chesapeake' s crew down as only 200, and say
he should exclude the other men from the estimate
because they flinched; and to exclude all the guns
that were disabled by shot, would be no worse than
to exclude the Finch. James' manipulation of the
figures is a really curious piece of audacity. Nat
urally, subsequent British historians have followed
him without inquiry. James' account of this battle,
alone, amply justifies our rejecting his narrative en
tirely, as far as affairs on the lakes go, whenever
it conflicts with any other statement, British or
American. Even when it does not conflict, it must
be followed with extreme caution, for whenever he
goes into figures the only thing certain about them
is that they are wrong. He gives no details at all
of most of the general actions. Of these, however,
we already possess excellent accounts, the best being
those in the "Manual of Naval Tactics," by Com
mander J. H. Ward, U. S. N. (1859), and in Los-
sing's "Field-Book of the War of 1812," and
Cooper's "Naval History." The chief difficulty oc-

190 Naval War of 1812

curs in connection with matters on Lake Ontario,5
where I have been obliged to have recourse to a
perfect patchwork of authors and even newspapers,
for the details, using Niles' "Register" and James as
mutual correctives. The armaments and equipments
being so irregular I have not, as in other cases,
made any allowance for the short weight of the
American shot, as here the British may have suf
fered under a similar disadvantage; and it may be
as well to keep in mind that on these inland waters
the seamen of the two navies seem to have been
as evenly matched in courage and skill as was pos
sible. They were of exactly the same stock, with
the sole exception that among and under, but en
tirely distinct from, the Canadian-English, fought
the descendants of the conquered Canadian-French ;
and even these had been trained by Englishmen,
were led by English captains, fought on ships built
by English gold, and with English weapons and
discipline.

5 The accounts of the two commanders on Lake Ontario
are as difficult to reconcile as are those of the contending
admirals in the battles which the Dutch waged against the
English and French during the years 1672-1675. In every
one of De Ruyter's last six battles each side regularly
claimed the victory, although there can be but little doubt
that on the whole the strategical, and probably the tactical,
advantage remained with De Ruyter. Every historian ought
to feel a sense of the most lively gratitude toward Nelson ; in
his various encounters he never left any possible room for
dispute as to which side had come out first best.

On the Lakes 191

ON LAKE ONTARIO

There being, as already explained, three inde
pendent centres of inland naval operations, the
events at each will be considered separately.

At the opening of the war Lieutenant Woolsey,
with the Oncida, was stationed at Sackett's Harbor,
which was protected at the entrance by a small fort
with a battery composed of one long 32. The Ca
nadian squadron of six ships, mounting nearly 80
guns, was of course too strong to be meddled with.
Indeed, had the Royal George, 22, the largest vessel,
been commanded by a regular British sea-officer,
she would have been perfectly competent to take
both the Oncida and Sackett's Harbor; but before
the Canadian commodore, Earle, made up his mind
to attack, Lieut. Woolsey had time to make one or
two short cruises, doing some damage among the
merchant vessels of the enemy.

On the iQth of July Earle's ships appeared off
the Harbor; the Oncida was such a dull sailor that
it was useless for her to try to escape, so she was
hauled up under a bank where she raked the entrance,
and her off guns landed and mounted on the shore,
while Lieut. Woolsey took charge of the "battery,"
or long 32, in the fort. The latter was the only
gun that was of much use, for after a desultory can
nonade of about an hour, Earle withdrew, having
suffered very little damage, inflicting none at all,
and proved himself and his subordinates to be
grossly incompetent.

192 Naval War of 1812

Acting under orders, Lieut. Woolsey now set
about procuring merchant schooners to be fitted and
used as gun-vessels until more regular cruisers
could be built. A captured British schooner was
christened the Julia, armed with a long 32 and two
6's, manned with 30 men, under Lieut. Henry Wells,
and sent down to Ogdensburg. "On her way
thither she encountered and actually beat off, with
out losing a man, the Moira, of 14, and Gloucester,
of 10 guns."6 Five other schooners were also pur
chased ; the Hamilton, of 10 guns, being the largest,
while the other four, the Governor Tompkins,
Growler, Conquest, and Pert had but n pieces be
tween them. Nothing is more difficult than to
exactly describe the armaments of the smaller lake
vessels. The American schooners were mere make
shifts, and their guns were frequently changed;7 as
soon as they could be dispensed with they were laid
up, or sold, and forgotten.

It was even worse with the British, who mani
fested the most indefatigable industry in intermit
tently changing the armament, rig, and name of
almost every vessel, and, the records being very
loosely kept, it is hard to find what was the force

6 James, vi, 350.

7 They were always having accidents happen to them that
necessitated some alteration. If a boat was armed with a
long 32, she rolled too much, and they substituted a 14; if
she also had an 1 8-pound carronade, it upset down the hatch
way in the middle of a fight, and made way for a long 12,
which burst as soon as it was used, and was replaced by two
medium 6's. So a regular gamut of changes would be rung.

On the Lakes 193

at any one time. A vessel which in one conflict
was armed with long i8's, in the next would have
replaced some of them with 68-pound carronades;
or, beginning life as a ship, she would do most of
her work as a schooner, and be captured as a brig,
changing her name even oftener than anything else.
On the first of September Commodore Isaac
Chauncy was appointed commander of the forces
on the lakes (except of those on Lake Champlain),
and he at once bent his energies to preparing an
effective flotilla. A large party of ship-carpenters
were immediately despatched to the Harbor; and
they were soon followed by about a hundred offi
cers and seamen, with guns, stores, etc. The keel
of a ship to mount 24 32-pound carronades, and to
be called the Madison, was laid down, and she was
launched on the 26th of November, just when navi
gation had closed on account of the ice. Late in the
autumn, four more schooners were purchased, and
named the Ontario, Scourge, Fair American, and
Asp, but these were hardly used until the following
spring. The cruising force of the Americans was
composed solely of the Oneida and the six schooners
first mentioned. The British squadron was of near
ly double this strength, and had it been officered
and trained as it was during the ensuing summer,
the Americans could not have stirred out of port.
But as it was, it merely served as a kind of water
militia, the very sailors, who subsequently did well,
being then almost useless, and unable to oppose
their well-disciplined foes, though the latter were so

VOL. IX.— 9

194 Naval War of 1812

inferior in number and force. For the reason that
it was thus practically a contest of regulars against
militia, I shall not give numerical comparisons of
the skirmishes in the autumn of 1812, and shall
touch on them but slightly. They teach the old les
son that, whether by sea or land, a small, well-
officered, and well-trained force, can not, except
very rarely, be resisted by a greater number of mere
militia; and that in the end it is true economy to
have the regular force prepared beforehand, with
out waiting until we have been forced to prepare
it by the disasters happening to the irregulars. The
Canadian seamen behaved badly, but no worse than
the American land forces did at the same time;
later, under regular training, both nations retrieved
their reputations.

Commodore Chauncy arrived at Sackett's Har
bor in October, and appeared on the lake on Novem
ber 8th, in the Oneida, Lieutenant Woolsey, with the
six schooners Conquest, Lieutenant Elliott; Ham
ilton, Lieutenant McPherson; Tompkins, Lieuten
ant Brown; Pert, Sailing-master Arundel; Julia,
Sailing-master Trant; Growler, Sailing-master Mix.
The Canadian vessels were engaged in conveying
supplies from the westward. Commodore Chauncy
discovered the Royal George off the False Duck
Islands, and chased her under the batteries of Kings
ton, on the Qth. Kingston was too well defended
to be taken by such a force as Chauncy's; but the
latter decided to make a reconnaissance, to discover
the enemy's means of defence and see if it was

On the Lakes 195

possible to lay the Royal George aboard. At 3 P.M.
the attack was made. The Hamilton and Tompkins
were absent chasing, and did not arrive until the
fighting had begun. The other four gunboats, Con
quest, Julia, Pert, and Growler, led, in the order
named, to open the attack with their heavy guns,
and prepare the way for the Oncida, which followed.
At the third discharge the Peri's gun burst, putting
her nearly hors dc coinbat, badly wounding her
gallant commander, Mr. Arundel (who shortly
afterward fell overboard and was drowned), and
slightly wounding four of her crew. The other
gunboats engaged the five batteries of the enemy,
while the Oneida pushed on without firing a shot till
at 3.40 she opened on the Royal George, and after
20 minutes' combat actually succeeded in compelling
her opponent, though of double her force, to cut
her cables, run in, and tie herself to a wharf, where
some of her people deserted her ; here she was under
the protection of a large body of troops, and the
Americans could not board her in face of the land
forces. It soon began to grow dusk, and Chauncy's
squadron beat out through the channel against a
fresh head-wind. In this spirited attack the Ameri
can loss had been confined to half a dozen men,
and had fallen almost exclusively on the Oncida.
The next day foul weather came on, and the squad
ron sailed for Sackett's Harbor. Some merchant
vessels were taken, and the Simco, 8, was chased,
but unsuccessfully.

The weather now became cold and tempestuous,

196 Naval War of 1812

but cruising continued till the middle of November.
The Canadian commanders, however, utterly refused
to fight; the Royal George even fleeing from the
Oneida, when the latter was entirely alone, and leav
ing the American commodore in undisputed com
mand of the lake. Four of the schooners continued
blockading Kingston till the middle of November;
shortly afterward navigation closed.8

LAKE ERIE

ON Lake Erie there was no American naval force ;
but the army had fitted out a small brig, armed
with six 6-pounders. This fell into the hands of
the British at the capture of Detroit, and was named
after that city, so that by the time a force of Ameri
can officers and seamen arrived at the lake there
was not a vessel on it for them to serve in, while
their foes had eight. But we only have to deal with
two of the latter at present. The Detroit, still
mounting six 6-pounders, and with a crew of 56
men, under the command of Lieutenant of Marines
Rolette, of the Royal Navy, assisted by a boatswain
and gunner, and containing also 30 American pris
oners, and the Caledonia, a small brig mounting two
4-pounders on pivots, with a crew of 12 men, Cana
dian-English, under Mr. Irvine, and having aboard
also 10 American prisoners, and a very valuable
cargo of furs, worth about $200,000, moved down

8 These preliminary events were not very important, and
the historians on both sides agree almost exactly, so that I
have not considered it necessary to quote authorities.

On the Lakes 19?

the lake, and on Oct. 7th anchored under Fort
Erie.9

Commander Jesse D. Elliott had been sent up to .
Erie some time before with instructions from Com
modore Chauncy to construct a naval force, partly
by building- two brigs of 300 tons each,10 and partly
by purchasing schooners to act as gunboats. No
sailors had yet arrived : but on the very day on
which the two brigs moved down and anchored
under Fort Erie, Captain Elliott received news that
the first detachment of the promised seamen, 51 in
number, including officers,11 was but a few miles
distant. He at once sent wrord to have these men
hurried up, but when they arrivel they were found
to have no arms, for which application was made
to the military authorities. The latter not only gave
a sufficiency of sabres, pistols, and muskets to the
sailors, but also detailed enough soldiers, under Cap
tain N. Towson and Lieutenant Isaac Roach, to
make the total number of men that took part in the
expedition 124. This force left Black Rock at one
o'clock on the morning of the 8th in two large boats,
one under the command of Commander Elliott, as-

9 Letter of Captain Jesse D. Elliott to Secretary of Navy,
Black Rock, Oct. 5, 1812.

10 That is, of 300 tons actual capacity ; measured as if they
had been ordinary sea vessels they each tonned 480. Their
opponent, the ship Detroit, similarly tonned 305, actual
measurement, or 490, computing it in the ordinary manner.

11 The number of men in this expedition is taken from
Lossing's "Field-book of the War of 1812," by Benson J.
Lossing, New York, 1869, p. 385, note, where a complete
list of the names is given.

198 Naval War of 1812

sisted by Lieutenant Roach, the other under Sailing-
master George Watts and Captain Tbwson. After
two hours' rowing they reached the foe, and the
attack was made at three o'clock. Elliott laid his
boat alongside the Detroit before he was discovered,
and captured her after a very brief struggle, in
which he lost but one man killed, and Midshipman
J. C. Cummings wounded with a bayonet in the leg.
The noise of the scuffle roused the hardy provincials
aboard the Caledonia, and they were thus enabled
to make a far more effectual resistance to Sailing-
master Watts than the larger vessel had to Captain
Elliott. As Watts pulled alongside he was greeted
with a volley of musketry, but at once boarded and
carried the brig, the twelve Canadians being cut
down or made prisoners; one American was killed
and four badly wounded. The wind was too light
and the current too strong to enable the prizes to
beat out and reach the lake, so the cables were cut
and they ran down stream. The Caledonia was
safely beached under the protection of an American
battery near Black Rock. The Detroit, however,
was obliged to anchor but four hundred yards from
a British battery, which, together with some flying
artillery, opened on her. Getting all his guns on
the port side, Elliott kept up a brisk cannonade till
his ammunition gave out, when he cut his cable and
soon grounded on Squaw Island. Here the Detroit
was commanded by the guns of both sides, and
whichever party took possession of her was at once
driven out by the other. The struggle ended in her

On the Lakes 199

destruction, most of her guns being taken over to
the American side. This was a very daring and
handsome exploit, reflecting great credit on Com
mander Elliott, and giving the Americans, in the
Caledonia, the nucleus of their navy on Lake Erie;
soon afterward Elliott returned to Lake Ontario,
a new detachment of seamen under Commander S.
Angus having arrived.

On the 28th of November, the American general,
Smith, despatched two parties to make an attack
on some of the British batteries. One of these con
sisted of 10 boats, under the command of Captain
King of the I5th infantry, with 150 soldiers, and
with him went Mr. Angus with 82 sailors, including
officers. The expedition left at one o'clock in the
morning, but was discovered and greeted with a
warm fire from a field battery placed in front of
some British barracks known as the Red House. Six
of the boats put back ; but the other four, containing
about a hundred men, dashed on. While the soldiers
were forming line and firing, the seamen rushed in
with their pikes and axes, drove off the British,
captured their commander, Lieut. King, of the Royal
Army, spiked and threw into the river the guns,
and then took the barracks and burned them, after
a desperate fight. Great confusion now ensued,
which ended in Mr. Angus and some of the seamen
going off in the boats. Several had been killed ;
eight, among whom were Midshipmen Wragg, Dud
ley, and Holdup, all under 20 years old, remained
with the troops under Captain King, and having

200 Naval War of 1812

utterly routed the enemy found themselves deserted
by their friends. After staying on the shore a
couple of hours some of them found two boats and
got over; but Captain King and a few soldiers were
taken prisoners. Thirty of the seamen, including
nine of the twelve officers, were killed or wounded
— among the former being Sailing-masters Sisson
and Watts, and among the latter Mr. Angus, Sail
ing-master Carter, and Midshipmen Wragg, Hold
up, Graham, Brailesford, and Irvine. Some twenty
prisoners were secured and taken over to the Ameri
can shore; the enemy's loss was more severe than
ours, his resistance being very stubborn, and a good
many cannon were destroyed, but the expedition
certainly ended most disastrously. The accounts of
it are hard to reconcile, but it is difficult to believe
that Mr. Angus acted correctly.

Later in the winter Captain Oliver Hazard Perry
arrived to take command of the forces on Lake
Erie.

CHAPTER V
1813

ON THE OCEAN

Blockade of the American coast — The Essex in the South
Pacific— The Hornet captures the Peacock — American
privateers cut-out by British boats — Unsuccessful cruise
of Commodore Rodgers — The Chesapeake is captured
by the Shannon — Futile gunboat actions — Defence of
Craney Island— Cutting-out expeditions — The Argus
is captured by the Pelican — The Enterprise captures
the Boxer — Summary

BY the beginning of the year 1813 the British
had been thoroughly aroused by the American
successes, and active measures were at once taken to
counteract them. The force on the American sta
tion was largely increased, and a strict blockade be
gun, to keep the American frigates in port. The
British frigates now cruised for the most part in
couples and orders were issued by the Board of
Admiralty that an i8-pounder frigate was not to
engage an American 24-pounder. Exaggerated ac
counts of the American 44/5 being circulated, a new
class of spar-deck frigates was constructed to meet
them, rating 50 and mounting 60 guns ; and some
74's were cut down for the same purpose.1 These
new ships were all much heavier than their intended
opponents.

1 James, vi, p. 206.

(201)

202 Naval War of 1812

As New England's loyalty to the Union was, not
unreasonably, doubted abroad, her coasts were at
first troubled but little. A British squadron was
generally kept cruising off the end of Long Island
Sound, and another off Sandy Hook. Of course
America had no means of raising a blockade, as
each squadron contained generally a 74 or a razee,
vessels too heavy for any in our navy to cope with.
Frigates and sloops kept skirting the coasts of New
Jersey, the Carolinas, and Georgia. Delaware
Bay no longer possessed the importance it had
during the Revolutionary War, and as the only war
vessels in it were some miserable gunboats, the
British generally kept but a small force on that sta
tion. Chesapeake Bay became the principal scene
of their operations; it was there their main body
collected, and their greatest efforts were made. In
it a number of line-of -battle ships, frigates, sloops,
and cutters had been collected, and early in the sea
son Admiral Sir John Warren and Rear-Admiral
Cockburn arrived to take command. The latter
made numerous descents on the coast, and frequent
ly came into contact with the local militia, who gen
erally fled after a couple of volleys. These expedi
tions did not accomplish much, beyond burning the
houses and driving off the live-stock of the farmers
along shore, and destroying a few small towns — one
of them, Hampton, being sacked with revolting
brutality.2 The Government of the United States

8 James (vi, 340) says: The conduct of the British troops
on this occasion was "revolting to human nature" and "dis
graceful to the flag."

On the Ocean 203

was, in fact, supported by the people in its war
policy very largely on account of these excesses,
which were much exaggerated by American writers.
It was really a species of civil war, and in such a
contest, at the beginning of this century, it was im
possible that some outrages should not take place.
The American frigate Constellation had by this
time got ready for sea, and, under the command of
Captain Stewart, she prepared to put out early in
January. As the number of blockaders rendered a
fight almost certain within a few days of her depar
ture, her crew were previously brought to the high
est state of discipline, the men being exercised with
especial care in handling the great guns and in firing
at a target.3 However, she never got out ; for when
she reached Hampton Roads she fell in with a Brit
ish squadron of line-of-battle ships and frigates.
She kedged up toward Norfolk, and when the tide
rose ran in and anchored between the forts ; and a
few days later dropped down to cover the forts
which were being built at Craney Island. Here she
was exposed to attacks from the great British force
still lying in Hampton Roads, and, fearing they
would attempt to carry her by surprise, Captain
Stewart made every preparation for defence. She
was anchored in the middle of the narrow channel,
flanked by gunboats, her lower ports closed, not a
rope left hanging over the sides ; the boarding net
tings, boiled in half-made pitch till they were as

8 Life of Commodore Tatnall, by C. C. Jones (Savannah,
1878), p. 15.

204 Naval War of 1812

hard as wire, were triced out-board toward the yard-
arms, and loaded with kentledge to fall on the at
tacking boats when the tricing lines were cut, while
the carronades were loaded to the muzzle with mus
ket balls, and depressed so as to sweep the water
near the ship.4 Twice, a force of British, estimated
by their foes to number 2,000 men, started off at
night to carry the Constellation by surprise; but
on each occasion they were discovered and closely
watched by her guard-boats, and they never ventured
to make the attack. However, she was unable to get
to sea, and remained blockaded to the close of the
war.

At the beginning of the year several frigates and
smaller craft were at sea. The Chesapeake, Cap
tain Evans, had sailed from Boston on Dec. 13,
i8i2.5 She ran down past Madeira, the Canaries,
and Cape de Verde, crossed the equator, and for six
weeks cruised to the south of the line between longi
tudes 1 6° to 25° W. Thence she steered to the west,
passing near Surinam, over the same spot on which
the Hornet had sunk the Peacock but a day previous.
Cruising northward through the West Indies, she
passed near the Bermudas, where she was chased by
a 74 and a frigate ; escaping from them she got into
Boston on April Qth, having captured five merchant
men, and chased unsuccessfully for two days a brig-
sloop. The term of two years for which her crew

4 For an admirable account of these preparations, as well
as of the subsequent events, see Cooper, ii, 242.

5 Statistical "History of the U. S. Navy," by Lieutenant
C. E. Emmons.

On the Ocean 205

were enlisted now being up, they, for the most part,
left, in consequence of some trouble about the prize-
money. Captain Evans being- in ill health, Captain
James Lawrence was appointed to command her.
He reached Boston about the middle of May ° and
at once set about enlisting a new crew, and tried,
with but partial success, to arrange matters with the
old sailors, who were now almost in open mutiny.
When the year 1812 had come to an end, the
Essex, 32, was in the South Atlantic, and Captain
Porter shortly afterward ran into St. Catherines to
water. Being at a loss where to find his consorts,
he now decided to adopt the exceedingly bold meas
ure of doubling Cape Horn and striking at the Brit
ish whalers in the Pacific. This was practically go
ing into the enemy's waters, the Portuguese and
Spanish countries being entirely under the influ
ence of Britain, while there were no stations where
Porter could revictual or repair in safety. How
ever, the Essex started, doubled the Horn, and on
March I3th anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso.
Her adventurous cruise in the Pacific was the most
striking feature of the war ; but as it has been most
minutely described by Commodore Porter himself,
by his son, Admiral Porter, by Admiral Farragut,
and by Cooper, I shall barely touch upon it.

6 He was still on the Hornet at New York on May roth, as
we knew from a letter of Biddle's, written on that date (in
letters of "Masters-Commandant," 1813, No. 58), and so
could hardly have been with the Chesapeake two weeks be
fore he put out ; and had to get his crew together and train
them during that time.

206 Naval War of 1812

On March 2Oth the Essex captured the Peruvian
corsair Nereyda, 16, hove her guns and small arms
overboard, and sent her into port. She made the
island of San Gallan, looked into Callao, and thence
went to the Gallipagos, getting everything she
wanted from her prizes. Then she went to Tumbez,
and returned to the Gallipagos; thence to the Mar
quesas, and finally back to Valparaiso again. By
this year's campaign in the Pacific, Captain Porter
had saved all our ships in those waters, had not cost
the government a dollar, living purely on the enemy,
and had taken from him nearly 4,000 tons of ship
ping and 400 men, completely breaking up his whal
ing trade in the South Pacific.

The cruise was something sui generis in modern
warfare, recalling to mind the cruises of the early
English and Dutch navigators. An American ship
was at a serious disadvantage in having no harbor
of refuge away from home; while on almost every
sea there were British, French, and Spanish ports
into which vessels of those nations could run for
safety. It was an unprecedented thing for a small
frigate to cruise a year and a half in an enemy's wa
ters, and supply herself during that time, purely from
captured vessels, with everything — cordage, sails,
guns, anchors, provisions, and medicines, and even
money to pay the officers and men ! Porter's cruise
was the very model of what such an expedition
should be, harassing the enemy most effectually at
no cost whatever. Had the Essex been decently
armed with long guns, instead of carronades, the

On the Ocean 207

end might have been as successful as it was glorious.
The whalers were many of them armed letters-of-
marque, and, though of course unable to oppose the
frigate, several times smart skirmishes occurred in
attacking them with boats, or in captured ships ; as
when Lieutenant Downs and 20 men in the prize
Georgiana after a short brush captured the Hector,
with 25 men, two of whom were killed and six
wounded ; and when, under similar circumstances,
the prize Greenwich, of 25 men, captured the Serin-
gapatam of 40. The cruise of the Esse.i", the first
American man-of-war ever in the Pacific, a year and
a half out and many thousand miles away from
home, was a good proof of Porter's audacity in
planning the trip and his skill and resource in carry
ing it out.

To return now to the Hornet. This vessel had
continued blockading the Bonne Citoycnnc until
January 24th, when the Montagu, 74, arrived to
ward evening and chased her into port. As the
darkness came on the Hornet wore, stood out to sea,
passing into the open without molestation from the
74, and then steered toward the northeast, cruising
near the coast, and making a few prizes, among
which was a brig, the Resolution, with $23,000 in
specie aboard, captured on February I4th. On the
24th of February, while nearing the mouth of the
Demerara River, Captain Lawrence discovered a
brig to leeward, and chased her till he ran into quar
ter less five, when, having no pilot, he hauled off
shore. Just within the bar a man-of-war brig was

208 Naval War of 1812

lying at anchor ; and while beating round Caroband
Bank, in order to get at her, Captain Lawrence dis
covered another sail edging down on his weather-
quarter.7 The brig at anchor was the Espiegle, of
1 8 guns, 32-pound carronades, Captain John Tay
lor;8 and the second brig seen was the Peacock,
Captain William Peake,9 which, for some unknown
reason, had exchanged her 32-pound carronades for
24*5. She had sailed from the Espiegle' s anchorage
the same morning at 10 o'clock. At 4.20 P.M. the
Peacock hoisted her colors ; then the Hornet beat to
quarters and cleared for action. Captain Lawrence
kept close by the wind, in order to get the weather-
gage; when he was certain he could weather the
enemy, he tacked, at 5.10, and the Hornet hoisted
her colors. The ship and the brig now stood for
each other, both on the wind, the Hornet being on
the starboard and the Peacock on the port tack,
and at 5.25 they exchanged broadsides, at half pis
tol-shot distance, while going in opposite directions,
the Americans using their lee and the British their
weather battery. The guns were fired as they bore,
and the Peacock suffered severely, while her an
tagonist's hull was uninjured, though she suffered
slightly aloft and had her pennant cut off by the
first shot fired.10 One of the men in the mizzen-top
was killed by a round shot, and two more were
wounded in the main-top.11 As soon as they were

7 Letter of Captain Lawrence, March 29, 1813.

8 James, vi, 278. 9 Do. 10 Cooper, p. 200.

11 See entry in her log for the day (In "Log-Book of

On the Ocean 209

clear, Captain Peake put his helm hard up and wore,
firing his starboard guns; but the Hornet had
watched him closely, bore up as quickly, and coming
down at 5.35, ran him close aboard on the star
board quarter. Captain Peake fell at this moment,
together with many of his crew, and, unable to with
stand the Hornet's heavy fire, the Peacock surren
dered at 5.39, just 14 minutes after the first shot;
and directly afterward hoisted her ensign union
down in the fore-rigging as a signal of distress. Al
most immediately her mainmast went by the board.
Both vessels then anchored, and Lieutenant J. T.
Shubrick, being sent on board the prize, reported
her sinking. Lieutenant D. Connor was then sent
in another boat to try to save the vessel ; but though
they threw the guns overboard, plugged the shot
holes, tried the pumps, and even attempted bailing,
the water gained so rapidly that the Hornet's offi
cers devoted themselves to removing the wounded
and other prisoners; and while thus occupied the
short tropical twilight left them. Immediately after
ward the prize settled, suddenly and easily, in 5^2
fathoms of water, carrying with her three of the
Hornet's people and nine of her own, who were
rummaging below; meanwhile four others of her
crew had lowered her damaged stern boat, and in
the confusion got off unobserved and made their
way to the land. The foretop still remained above
water, and four of the prisoners saved themselves

Hornet, Wasp, and Argus, from July 20, 1809, to October
6, 1813,") in the Bureau of Navigation, at Washington.

2io Naval War of 1812

by running up the rigging into it. Lieutenant Con
nor and Midshipman Cooper (who had also come
on board) saved themselves, together with most of
their people and the remainder of the Peacock's
crew, by jumping into the launch, which was lying
on the booms, and paddling her toward the ship with
pieces of boards in default of oars.

The Hornet's complement at this time was 150,
of whom she had 8 men absent in a prize and 7
on the sick list,12 leaving 135 fit for duty in the
action;13 of these one man was killed, and two
wounded, all aloft. Her rigging and sails were a
good deal cut, a shot had gone through the fore
mast, and the bowsprit was slightly damaged; the
only shot that touched her hull merely glanced
athwart her bows, indenting a plank beneath the
cat-head. The Peacock's crew had amounted to
134, but 4 were absent in a prize, and but I2214 fit
for action; of these she lost her captain, and seven
men killed and mortally wounded, and her master,
one midshipman, and 28 men severely and slightly
wounded, — in all 8 killed and 30 wounded, or about
13 times her antagonist's loss. She suffered under
the disadvantage of light metal, having 24*8 op
posed to 32's; but judging from her gunnery this
was not much of a loss, as 6-pounders would have
inflicted nearly as great damage. She was well
handled and bravely fought; but her men showed

12 Letter of Captain Lawrence.

13 Letter of Lieutenant D. Conner, April 26, 1813.

14 Letter of Lieutenant F. W. Wright (of the Peacock},
April 17, 1813.

On the Ocean

21 I

a marvelous ignorance of gunnery. It appears that
she had long been known as "the yacht," on ac

count of the tasteful arrangement of her deck; the
breechings of the carronades were lined with white
canvas, and nothing could exceed in brilliancy the

212 Naval War of 1812

polish upon the traversing bars and elevating
screws.15 In other words, Captain Peake had con
founded the mere incidents of good discipline with
the essentials.16

The Hornet's victory can not be regarded in any
other light than as due, not to the heavier metal,
but to the far more accurate firing of the Ameri
cans; "had the guns of the Peacock been of the
largest size they could not have changed the result,
as the weight of shot that do not hit is of no great
moment." Any merchant-ship might have been as
well handled and bravely defended as she was; and
an ordinary letter-of-marque would have made as
creditable a defence.

During the entire combat the Espiegle was not
more than 4 miles distant and was plainly visible
from the Hornet; but for some reason she did not
come out, and her commander reported that he knew
nothing of the action till the next day. Captain
Lawrence of course was not aware of this, and made
such exertions to bend on new sails, stow his boats,
and clear his decks that by nine o'clock he was
again prepared for action,17 and at 2 P.M. got under
way for the N.W. Being now overcrowded with
people and short of water he -stood for home, an
choring at Holmes' Hole in Martha's Vineyard on
the i Qth of March.

On their arrival at New York the officers of the

15 James, vi, 280.

16 Codrington ("Memoirs," i, 310) comments very forcibly
on the uselessness of a mere martinet.

17 Letter of Captain Lawrence.

On the Ocean 213

Peacock published a card expressing in the warmest
terms their appreciation of the way they and their
men had been treated. Say they : "We ceased to
consider ourselves prisoners; and everything that
friendship could dictate was adopted by you and
the officers of the Hornet to remedy the inconven
ience we would otherwise have experienced from
the unavoidable loss of the whole of our property
and clothes owing to the sudden sinking of the
Peacock."19 This was signed by the first and sec
ond lieutenants, the master, surgeon and purser.

Weight
Tonnage Guns Metal Men Loss

Hornet 480. 10 279 135 3

Peacock 477 10 210 122 38

Relative Relative Loss

Force Inflicted

Hornet i.oo i.oo

Peacock .83 .08

That is, the forces standing nearly as 13 is to n,
the relative execution was about as 13 is to i.

The day after the capture Captain Lawrence re
ported 277 souls aboard, including the crew of the
English brig Resolution which he had taken, and
of the American brig Hunter, prize to the Peacock.
As James, very ingeniously, tortures these figures
into meaning what they did not, it may be well to
show exactly what the 277 included. Of the Hor
net's original crew of 150, 8 were absent in a prize,
i killed, and 3 drowned, leaving (including 7 sick)
138; of the Peacock's original 134, 4 were absent

18 Quoted in full in Miles' "Register" and Lossing's "Field
Book."

214 Naval War of 1812

in a prize, 5 killed, 9 drowned, and 4 escaped, leav
ing (including 8 sick and 3 mortally wounded)
112; there were also aboard 16 other British pris
oners, and the Hunter's crew of n men — making
just 277. 19 According to Lieutenant Connor's let
ter, written in response to one from Lieutenant
Wright, there were in reality 139 in the Peacock's
crew when she began action; but it is, of course,
best to take each commander's account of the num
ber of men on board his ship that were fit for duty.
On January lyth the Viper, 12, Lieutenant J. D.
Henly, was captured by the British frigate Narcis
sus, 32, Captain Lumly.

On February 8th, while a British squadron, con
sisting of the four frigates Belvidera (Captain
Richard Byron), Maidstone, Junon, and Statira,
were at anchor in Lynnhaven Bay, a schooner was
observed in the northeast standing down Chesa
peake Bay.20 This was the Lottery, letter-of-
marque, of six 12-pounder carronades and 25 men,
Captain John Southcomb, bound from Baltimore
to Bombay. Nine boats, with 200 men, under
the command of Lieutenant Kelly Nazer, were
sent against her, and, a calm coming on, over-

19 The 277 men were thus divided into: Hornet's crew, 138;
Peacock's crew, 112; Resolution's crew, 16; Hunter's crew,
n. James quotes "270" men, which he divides as follows:
Hornet, 160; Peacock, 101 ; Hunter, 9 — leaving out the
Resolution's crew, n of the Peacock's, and 2 of the
Hunter's.

20 James, vi, 325.

On the Ocean 215

took her. The schooner opened a well-directed fire
of round and grape, but the boats rushed forward
and boarded her, not carrying her till after a most
obstinate struggle, in which Captain Southcomb and
19 of his men, together with 13 of the assailants,
were killed or wounded. The best warship of a
regular navy might be proud of the discipline and
courage displayed by the captain and crew of the
little Lottery. Captain Byron on this, as well as
on many another occasion, showed himself to be as
humane as he was brave and skilful. Captain
Southcomb, mortally wounded, was taken on board
Byron's frigate, where he was treated with the
greatest attention and most delicate courtesy, and
when he died his body was sent ashore with every
mark of the respect due to so brave an officer.
Captain Stewart (of the Constellation) wrote Cap
tain Byron a letter of acknowledgment for his great
courtesy and kindness.21

On March i6th a British division of five boats
and 105 men, commanded by Lieutenant James
Polkinghorne, set out to attack the privateer
schooner Dolphin of 12 guns and 70 men, and the
letters-of-marque, Racer, Arab, and Lynx, each of
six guns and 30 men. Lieutenant Polkinghorne,
after pulling 15 miles, found the four schooners
all prepared to receive him, but in spite of his great
inferiority in force he dashed gallantly at them.

$1 The correspondence between the two captains is given
in full in Niles' "Register," which also contains fragmen
tary notes on the action, principally as to the loss incurred.

216 Naval War of 1812

The Arab and Lynx surrendered at once ; the Racer
was carried after a sharp struggle in which Lieuten
ant Polkinghorne was wounded, and her guns turned
on the Dolphin. Most of the latter 's crew jumped
overboard; a few rallied round their captain, but
they were at once scattered as the British seamen
came aboard. The assailants had 13, and the pri-
vateersmen 16 men killed and wounded in the fight
It was certainly one of the most brilliant and daring
cutting-out expeditions that took place during the
war, and the victors well deserved their success.
The privateersmen (according to the statement of
the Dolphin's master, in "Niles' Register,") were
panic-struck, and acted in anything but a brave
manner. All irregular fighting-men do their work
by fits and starts. No regular cruisers could be
have better than did the privateers Lottery, Chas
seur, and General Armstrong; none would behave
as badly as the Dolphin, Lynx, and Arab. The
same thing appears on shore. Jackson's irregulars
at New Orleans did as well, or almost as well, as
Scott's troops at Lundy's Lane; but Scott's troops
would never have suffered from such a panic as
overcame the militia at Bladensburg.

On April Qth the schooner Norwich, of 14 guns
and 6 1 men, Sailing-master James Monk, captured
the British privateer Caledonia, of 10 guns and 41
men, after a short action in which the privateer lost
7 men.

On April 3Oth Commodore Rodgers, in the
President, 44, . accompanied by Captain Smith in

On the Ocean 217

the Congress, 38, sailed on his third cruise.22 On
May 2d he fell in with and chased the British sloop
Curlew, 1 8, Captain Michael Head, but the latter
escaped by knocking away the wedges of her masts
and using other means to increase her rate of sail
ing. On the 8th, in latitude 39° 30' N., long. 60°
W., the Congress parted company, and sailed off
toward the southeast, making four prizes, of no
great value, in the North Atlantic;23 when about
in long. 35° W. she steered south, passing to the
south of the line. But she never saw a man-of-
war, and during the latter part of her cruise not
a sail of any kind, and after cruising nearly eight
months returned to Portsmouth Harbor on Decem
ber 1 4th, having captured but four merchantmen.
Being unfit to cruise longer, owing to her decayed
condition, she was disarmed and laid up; nor was
she sent to sea again during the war.24

Meanwhile Rodgers cruised along the eastern
edge of the Grand Bank until he reached latitude
48°, without meeting anything, then stood to the
southeast, and cruised off the Azores till June 6th.

94 Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 30, 1813.

18 Letter of Captain Smith, Dec. 15, 1813.

*4 James states that she was "blockaded" in port by the
Tenedos during part of 1814, but was too much awed by
the fate of the Chesapeake to come out during the "long
blockade" of Captain Parker. Considering the fact that she
was too decayed to put to sea, had no guns aboard, no crew,
and was, in fact, laid up, the feat of the Tenedos was not
very wonderful; a row-boat could have "blockaded" her
quite as well. It is worth noticing, as an instance of the

way James alters a fact by suppressing half of it.

VOL. IX.— 10

218 Naval War of 1812

Then he crowded sail to the northeast after a
Jamaica fleet of which he had received news, but
which he failed to overtake, and on June I3th, in
lat. 46°, long. 28°, he gave up the chase and shaped
his course toward the North Sea, still without any
good luck befalling him. On June 27th he put into
North Bergen in the Shetlands for water, and thence
passed the Orkneys and stretched toward the North
Cape, hoping to intercept the Archangel fleet. On
July i Qth, when off the North Cape, in lat. 71°
52' N., long. 20° 18' E., he fell in with two sails
of the enemy, who made chase; after four days'
pursuit the commodore ran his opponents out of
sight. According to his letter the two sail were
a line-of-battle ship and a frigate; according to
James they were the 12-pounder frigate Alexandria,
Captain Carthcart, and Spitfire, 16, Captain Ellis.
James quotes from the logs of the two British ships,
and it would seem that he is correct, as it would not
be possible for him to falsify the logs so utterly. In
case he is true, it was certainly carrying caution to
an excessive degree for the commodore to retreat
before getting some idea of what his antagonists
really were. His mistaking them for so much
heavier ships was a precisely similar error to that
made by Sir George Collier and Lord Stuart at a
later date about the Cyane and Levant. James
wishes to prove that each party perceived the force
of the other, and draws a contrast (p. 312) between
the "gallantry of one party and pusillanimity of
the other." This is nonsense, and, as in similar

On the Ocean 219

cases, James overreaches himself by proving too
much. If he had made an i8-pounder frigate like
the Congress flee from another i8-pounder, his
narrative would be within the bounds of possibility
and would need serious examination. But the lit
tle 12-pounder Alexandria, and the ship-sloop with
her 1 8-pound carronades, would not have stood the
ghost of a chance in the contest. Any man who
would have been afraid of them would also have
been afraid of the Little Belt, the sloop Rodgers cap
tured before the war. As for Captains Cathcart
and Ellis, had they known the force of the President,
and chased her with a view of attacking her, their
conduct would have only been explicable on the
ground that they were afflicted with emotional
insanity.

The President now steered southward and got
into the mouth of the Irish Channel ; on August 2d
she shifted her berth and almost circled Ireland;
then steered across to Newfoundland, and worked
south along the coast. On September 23(1, a little
south of Nantucket, she decoyed under her guns and
captured the British schooner Highflyer, 6, Lieut.
William Hutchinson, and 45 men; and went into
Newport on the 27th of the same month, having
made some 12 prizes.

On May 24th Commodore Decatur in the United
States, which had sent ashore six carronades, and
now mounted but 48 guns, accompanied by Captain
Jones in the Macedonian, 38, and Captain Biddle in
the Wasp, 20, left New York, passing through Hell

22O Naval War of 1812

Gate, as there was a large blockading force off the
Hook. Opposite Hunter's Point the main-mast of
the States was struck by lightning, which cut off
the broad pendant, shot down the hatchway into
the doctor's cabin, put out his candle, ripped up the
bed, and entering between the skin and ceiling of
the ship tore off two or three sheets of copper near
the water-line, and disappeared without leaving a
trace! The Macedonian, which was close behind,
hove all aback, in expectation of seeing the States
blown up.

At the end of the Sound, Commodore Decatur
anchored to watch for a chance of getting out. Early
on June 1st he started; but in a couple of hours met
the British Captain R. D. Oliver's squadron, con
sisting of a 74, a razee, and a frigate. These chased
him back, and all his three ships ran into New Lon
don. Here, in the mud of the Thames River, the two
frigates remained blockaded till the close of the war ;
but the little sloop slipped out later, to the enemy's
cost.

We left the Chesapeake, 38, being fitted out at
Boston by Captain James Lawrence, late of the
Hornet. Most of her crew, as already stated, their
time being up, left, dissatisfied with the ship's ill luck,
and angry at not having received their due share of
prize-money. It was very hard to get sailors, most
of the men preferring to ship in some of the numer
ous privateers where the discipline was less strict
and the chance of prize-money much greater. In
consequence of this an unusually large number of

On the Ocean 221

foreigners had to be taken, including about forty
British and a number of Portuguese. The latter
were peculiarly troublesome; one of their number,
a boatswain's mate, finally almost brought about a
mutiny among the crew, which was only pacified by
giving the men prize-checks. A few of the Constitu
tion's old crew came aboard, and these, together
with some of the men who had been on the Chesa
peake during her former voyage, made an excellent
nucleus. Such men needed very little training at
either guns or sails; but the new hands were un-
practiced, and came on lx>ard so late that the last
draft that arrived still had their hammocks and
bags lying in the boats stowed over the booms
when the ship was captured. The officers were
largely new to the ship, though the first lieutenant,
Mr. A. Ludlow, had been the third in her former
cruise; the third and fourth lieutenants were not
regularly commissioned as such, but were only mid
shipmen acting for the first time in higher positions.
Captain Lawrence himself was of course new to all,
both officers and crew.25 In other words, the CJicsa-
peakc possessed good material, but in an exceeding
ly unseasoned state.

" On the day on which he sailed to attack the Shannon,
Lawrence writes to the Secretary of the Navy as follows:
"Lieutenant Paige is so ill as to be unable to go to sea with
the ship. At the urgent request of Acting-Lieutenant Pierce
I have granted him, also, permission to go on shore; one in
ducement for my granting his request was his being at vari
ance with every officer in his mess." "Captains' Letters,"
vol. 29, No. i, in the Naval Archives at Washington. Neither
officers nor men had shaken together.

222 Naval War of 1812

Meanwhile the British frigate Shannon, 38,
Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, was cruising off
the mouth of the harbor. To give some idea of
the reason why she proved herself so much more
formidable than her British sister frigate it may be
well to quote, slightly condensing, from James :

"There was another point in which the generality
of British crews, as compared with any one Ameri
can crew, were miserably deficient; that is, skill in
the art of gunnery. While the American seamen
were constantly firing at marks, the British seamen,
except in particular cases, scarcely did so once in a
year ; and some ships could be named on board which
not a shot had been fired in this way for upward of
three years. Nor was the fault wholly the cap
tain's. The instructions under which he was bound
to act forbade him to use, during the first six months
after the ship had received her armament, more
shots per month than amounted to a third in number
of the upper-deck guns ; and, after these six months,
only half the quantity. Many captains never put a
shot in the guns till an enemy appeared; they em
ployed the leisure time of the men in handling the
sails and in decorating the ship." Captain Broke
was not one of this kind. "From the day on which
he had joined her, the I4th of September, 1806,
the Shannon began to feel the effect of her captain's
proficiency as a gunner and zeal for the service.
The laying of the ship's ordnance so that it may be
correctly fired in a horizontal direction is justly
deemed a most important operation, as upon it de-

On the Ocean 223

pends in a great measure the true aim and destruct
ive effect of the shot ; this was attended to by Captain
Broke in person. By draughts from other ships,
and the usual means to which a British man-of-
war is obliged to resort, the Shannon got together a
crew; and in the course of a year or two, by the
paternal care and excellent regulations of Captain
Broke, the ship's company became as pleasant to
command as it was dangerous to meet." The
Shannon's guns were all carefully sighted, and,
moreover, "every day, for about an hour and a half
in the forenoon, when not prevented by chase or the
state of the weather, the men were exercised at
training the guns, and for the same time in the after
noon in the use of the broadsword, pike, musket,
etc. Twice a week the crew fired at targets, both
with great guns and musketry; and Captain Broke,
as an additional stimulus beyond the emulation ex
cited, gave a pound of tobacco to every man that
put a shot through the bull's eye." He would fre
quently have a cask thrown overboard and suddenly
order some one gun to be manned to sink the cask.
In short, the Shannon was very greatly superior,
thanks to her careful training, to the average Brit
ish frigate of her rate, while the Chesapeake, owing
to her having a raw and inexperienced crew, was
decidedly inferior to the average American frigate .
of the same strength.

In force the two frigates compared pretty
equally,26 the American being the superior in just

M Taking each commander's account for his own force.

224 Naval War of 1812

about the same proportion that the Wasp was to
the Frolic, or, at a later date, the Hornet to the Pen
guin. The Chesapeake carried 50 guns (26 in
broadside), 28 long i8's on the gun-deck, and on
the spar-deck two long I2's, one long 18, eighteen
32-pound carronades, and one 1 2-pound carronade
(which was not used in the fight, however). Her
broadside, allowing for the short weight of metal,
was 542 Ibs. ; her complement, 379 men. The Shan
non carried 52 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long i8's
on the gun-deck, and on the spar-deck four long Q'S,
one long 6, 16 32-pound carronades, and three 12-
pound carronades (two of which were not used in
the fight). Her broadside was 550 Ibs.; her crew
consisted of 330 men, 30 of whom were raw hands.
Early on the morning of June ist, Captain Broke
sent in to Captain Lawrence, by an American pris
oner, a letter of challenge, which for courteousness,
manliness, and candor is the very model of what
such an epistle should be. Before it reached Boston,
however, Captain Lawrence had weighed anchor,
to attack the Shannon, which frigate was in full
sight in the offing. It has been often said that he
engaged against his judgment, but this may be
doubted. His experience with the Bonne Citoy-
enne, Espiegle and Peacock had not tended to give
him a very high idea of the navy to which he was op
posed, and there is no doubt that he was confident
of capturing the Shannon.21 It was most unfortu-

27 In his letter written just before sailing (already quoted
on p. 221) he says: "An English frigate is now in sight from

On the Ocean 225

nate that he did not receive Broke's letter, as the
latter in it expressed himself willing to meet Law
rence in any latitude and longitude he might appoint ;
and there would thus have been some chance of the
American crew having time enough to get into shape.
At midday of June I, 1812, the Chesapeake
weighed anchor, stood out of Boston Harbor, and
at i P.M. rounded the Light-house. The Shannon
stood off under easy sail, and at 3.40 hauled up and
reefed top-sails. At 4 P.M. she again bore away
with her foresail brailed up, and her main top-sail
braced flat and shivering, that the Chesapeake might
overtake her. An hour later, Boston Light-house
bearing west distant about six leagues, she again
hauled up, with her head to the southeast, and lay
to under top-sail, top-gallant sails, jib, and spanker.
Meanwhile, as the breeze freshened the Chesapeake
took in her studding-sails, top-gallant sails, and roy
als, got her royal yards on deck, and came down very
fast under top-sails and jib. At 5.30, to keep under
command and be able to wear if necessary, the
Shannon filled her main top-sail and kept a close
luff, and then again let the sail shiver. At 5.25
the Chesapeake hauled up her foresail, and with

our deck. ... I am in hopes to give a good account of her
before night." My account of the action is mainly taken
from James' "Naval History" and Brighton's "Memoir of
Admiral Broke" (according to which the official letter of
Captain Broke was tampered with) ; see also the letter of
Lieut. George Budd, June 15, 1813; the report of the Court
of Inquiry, Commodore Bainbridge presiding, and the court-
martial held on board frigate United Slates, April 15, 1814,
Commodore Decatur presiding.

226 Naval War of 1812

three ensigns flying, steered straight for the Shan
non's starboard quarter. Broke was afraid that
Lawrence would pass under the Shannon's stern,
rake her, and engage her on the quarter; but either
overlooking or waiving this advantage, the Ameri
can captain luffed up within 50 yards upon the
Shannon's starboard quarter, and squared his main-
yard. On board the Shannon the captain of the
1 4th gun, William Mindham, had been ordered not
to fire till it bore into the second main-deck port
forward; at 5.50 it was fired, and then the other
guns in quick succession from aft forward, the
Chesapeake replying with her whole broadside. At
5.53 Lawrence, finding he was forging ahead, hauled
up a little. The Chesapeake 's broadsides were do
ing great damage, but she herself was suffering even
more than her foe; the men in the Shannon's tops
could hardly see the deck of the American frigate
through the clouds of splinters, hammocks, and other
wreck that was flying across it. Man after man was
killed at the wheel ; the fourth lieutenant, the master,
and the boatswain were slain; and at 5.56, having
had her jib sheet and foretop-sail tie shot away, and
her spanker brails loosened so that the sail blew out,
the Chesapeake came up into the wind somewhat, so
as to expose her quarter to her antagonist's broad
side, which beat in her stern-ports and swept the men
from the after guns. One of the arm chests on the
quarter-deck was blown up by a hand-grenade
thrown from the Shannon.28 The Chesapeake was

28 This explosion may have' had more effect than is com
monly supposed in the capture of the Chesapeake. Commo-

On the Ocean 227

now seen to have stern-way on and to be paying
slowly off ; so the Shannon put her helm a-starboard
and shivered her mizzen top-sail, so as to keep off
the wind and delay the boarding. But at that mo
ment her jib stay was shot away, and, her headsails
becoming becalmed, she went off very slowly. In
consequence, at 6 P.M. the two frigates fell aboard,
the Chesapcake's quarter pressing upon the Shan-
non's side just forward the starboard main-chains,
and the frigates were kept in this position by the
fluke of the Shannon's anchor catching in the Chesa-
peake's quarter port.

The Shannon's crew had suffered severely, but
not the least panic or disorder existed among them.
Broke ran forward, and seeing his foes flinching
from the quarter-deck guns, he ordered the ships
to be lashed together, the great guns to cease firing,
and the boarders to be called. The boatswain, who
had fought in Rodney's action, set about fastening

dore Bainbridge, writing from Charlestown, Mass., on June
2, 1813 (see "Captains' Letters," vol. xxix, No. 10), says:
"Mr. Knox, the pilot on board, left the Chesapeake at 5
P.M. ... At 6 P.M., Mr. Knox informs me, the fire opened,
and at 12 minutes past six both ships were laying alongside
one another as if in the act of boarding; at that moment an
explosion took place on board the Chesapeake, which spread
a fire on her upper deck from the foremast to the mizzen-
mast, as high as her tops, and enveloped both ships in smoke
for several minutes. After it cleared away they were seen
separate, with the British flag hoisted on board the Chesa
peake over the American." James denies that the explosion
was caused by a hand-grenade, though he says there were
some of these aboard the Shannon. It is a point of no
interest.

228 Naval War of 1812

the vessels together, which the grim veteran suc
ceeded in doing, though his right arm was literally
hacked off by a blow from a cutlass. All was con
fusion and dismay on board the Chesapeake. Lieu
tenant Ludlow had been mortally wounded and car
ried below; Lawrence himself, while standing on
the quarter-deck, fatally conspicuous by his full-
dress uniform and commanding stature, was shot
down, as the vessels closed, by Lieutenant Law of
the British marines. He fell dying, and was car
ried below, exclaiming: "Don't give up the ship"
— a phrase that has since become proverbial among
his countrymen. The third lieutenant, Mr. W. S.
Cox, came on deck, but utterly demoralized by the
aspect of affairs, he basely ran below without stay
ing to rally the men2 and was court-martialed after
ward for so doing. At 6.02 Captain Broke stepped
from the Shannon's gangway rail on to the muzzle
of the Chesapeake' s aftermost carronade, and thence
over the bulwark on to her quarter-deck, followed
by about 20 men. As they came aboard, the Chesa-
peake's foreign mercenaries and the raw natives
of the crew deserted their quarters; the Portuguese
boatswain's mate removed the gratings of the berth-
deck, and he ran below, followed by many of the
crew, among them one of the midshipmen named
Deforest. On the quarter-deck almost the only man
that made any resistance was the chaplain, Mr.
Livermore, who advanced, firing his pistol at Broke,
and in return nearly had his arm hewed off by a
stroke from the latter's broad Toledo blade. On

On the Ocean 229

the upper deck the only men who behaved well were
the marines, but of their original number of 44 men,
14, including Lieutenant James Broom and Cor
poral Dixon, were dead, and 20, including Sergeants
Twin and Harris, wounded, so that there were left
but one corporal and nine men, several of whom
had been knocked down and bruised, though re
ported unwounded. There was thus hardly any
resistance, Captain Broke stopping his men for a
moment till they were joined by the rest of the
boarders under Lieutenants Watt and Falkiner.
The Chesapeake's mizzen-topmen began firing at
the boarders, mortally wounding a midshipman,
Mr. Samwell, and killing Lieutenant Watt ; but one
of the Shannons long nines was pointed at the
top and cleared it out, being assisted by the Eng
lish main-topmen, under Midshipman Coshnahan.
At the same time the men in the Chesapeake's main
top were driven out of it by the fire of the Shannon's
fore-topmen, under Midshipman Smith. Lieutenant
George Budd, who was on the main-deck, now for
the first time learned that the English had boarded,
as the upper-deck men came crowding down, and at
once called on his people to follow him; but the
foreigners and novices held back, and only a few
of the veterans followed him up. As soon as he
reached the spar-deck, Budd, followed by only a
dozen men, attacked the British as they came along
the gangways, repulsing them for a moment, and
killing the British purser, Aldham, and captain's
clerk, Dunn ; but the handful of Americans were at

230 Naval War of 1812

once cut down or dispersed, Lieutenant Budd being
wounded and knocked down the main hatchway.
"The enemy," writes Captain Broke, "fought des
perately, but in disorder." Lieutenant Ludlow, al
ready mortally wounded, struggled up on deck, fol
lowed by two or three men, but was at once disabled
by a sabre cut. On the forecastle a few seamen
and marines turned to bay. Captain Broke was
still leading his men with the same brilliant per
sonal courage he had all along shown. Attacking
the first American, who was armed with a pike, he
parried a blow from it, and cut down the man; at
tacking another he was himself cut down, and only
saved by the seaman Mindham, already mentioned,
who slew his assailant. One of the American ma
rines, using his clubbed musket, killed an English
man, and so stubborn was the resistance of the little
group that for a moment the assailants gave back,
having lost several killed and wounded; but im
mediately afterward they closed in and slew their
foes to the last man. The British fired a volley or
two down the hatchway, in response to a couple of
shots fired up; all resistance was at an end, and at
6.05, just fifteen minutes after the first gun had
been fired, and not five after Captain Broke had
come aboard, the colors of the Chesapeake were
struck. Of her crew of 379 men, 61 were killed
or mortally wounded, including her captain, her
first and fourth lieutenants, the lieutenant of ma
rines, the master (White), boatswain (Adams),
and three midshipmen, and 85 severely and slightly

On the Ocean 231

wounded, including both her other lieutenants, five
midshipmen, and the chaplain, total, 148; the loss
falling almost entirely upon the American portion
of the crew.

Of the Shannon's men, 33 were killed outright
or died of their wounds, including her first lieuten
ant, purser, captain's clerk, and one midshipman,
and 50 wounded, including, the captain himself and
the boatswain; total, 83.

The Chesapeake was taken into Halifax, where
Captain Lawrence and Lieutenant Ludlow were
both buried with military honors. Captain Broke
was made a baronet, very deservedly, and Lieuten
ants Wallis and Falkiner were both made com
manders.

The British writers accuse some of the American
crew of treachery; the Americans in turn, accuse
the British of revolting brutality. Of course in
such a fight things are not managed with urbane
courtesy, and, moreover, writers are prejudiced.
Those who would like to hear one side are referred
to James; if they wish to hear the other, to the
various letters from officers published in "Miles'
Register," especially Vol. V, p. 142.

Neither ship had lost a spar, but all the lower
masts, especially the two mizzen-masts, were badly
wounded. The Americans at that period were
fond of using bar shot, which were of very ques
tionable benefit, being useless against a ship's hull,
though said to be sometimes of great help in un
rigging an antagonist from whom one was desirous

232

Naval War of 1812

of escaping, as in the case of the President and
Endymion.

It is thus seen that the Shannon received from
shot alone only about half the damage the Chesa
peake did; the latter was thoroughly beaten at the
guns, in spite of what some American authors say
to the contrary. And her victory was not in the

t.SS

ttummt

"^S&-."

^T^T

S.fff

" ciutSAfBAica " tnoac BY

" SHANNON " STKUCK t»

V) eighteen-pound shot,
9$ thirty-two-pound shot,
a nine-pound shot.
306 giape,

363 sbot.

12 eighteen-pound choi.
13 thirty-two-pouod shot.
14 bar shot,-
119 £r»p*.

1 58 shot

slightest degree to be attributed to, though it may
have been slightly hastened by, accident. Training
and discipline won the victory, as often before; only
in this instance the training and discipline were
against us.

It is interesting to notice that the Chesapeake
battered the Shannon's hull far more than either the
Java, Guerriere, or Macedonian did the hulls of
their opponents, and that she suffered less in re-

On the Ocean 233

turn (not in loss but in damage) than they did.
The Chesapeake was a better fighter than either the
Java, Guerriere, or Macedonian, and could have
captured any one of them. The Shannon of course
did less damage than any of the American 44*5,
probably just about in the proportion of the differ
ence in force.

Almost all American writers have treated the
capture of the Chesapeake as if it was due simply
to a succession of unfortunate accidents; for ex
ample, Cooper, with his usual cheerful optimism,
says that the incidents of the battle, excepting its
short duration, are "altogether the results of the
chances of war," and that it was mainly decided by
"fortuitous events as unconnected with any particu
lar merit on the one side as they are with any
particular demerit on the other."29 Most naval
men consider it a species of treason to regard the
defeat as due to anything but extraordinary ill
fortune. And yet no disinterested reader can help
acknowledging that the true reason of the defeat
was the very simple one that the Shannon fought
better than the Chesapeake. It has often been said
that up to the moment when the ships came to
gether the loss and damage suffered by each were

99 The worth of such an explanation is very aptly gauged
in General Alexander S. Webb's "The Peninsula; McClel-
lan's Campaign of 1862" (New York, 1881), p. 35, where he
speaks of "those unforeseen or uncontrollable agencies which
are vaguely described as the 'fortune of war,1 but which usu
ally prove to be the superior ability or resources of the an
tagonist."

234 Naval War of 1812

about the same. This is not true, and even if it
was, would not affect the question. The heavy loss
on board the Shannon did not confuse or terrify
the thoroughly trained men with their implicit re
liance on their leaders; and the experienced officers
were ready to defend any point that was menaced.
Aq equal or greater amount of loss aboard the
Chesapeake disheartened and confused the raw
crew, who simply had not had the time or chance
to become well disciplined. Many of the old hands,
of course, kept their wits and their pluck, but the
novices and the disaffected did not. Similarly with
the officers; some, as the Court of Inquiry found,
had not kept to their posts, and all being new to
each other and the ship, could not show to their
best. There is no doubt that the Chesapeake was
beaten at the guns before she was boarded. Had
the ships not come together, the fight would have
been longer, the loss greater, and more nearly equal ;
but the result would have been the same. Cooper
says that the enemy entered with great caution, and
so slowly that twenty resolute men could have re
pulsed him. It was no proof of caution for Cap
tain Broke and his few followers to leap on board,
unsupported, and then they only waited for the
main body to come up; and no twenty men could
have repulsed such boarders as followed Broke.
The fight was another lesson, with the parties re
versed, to the effect that want of training and disci
pline is a bad handicap. Had the Chesapeake's
crew been in service as many months as the Shan-

On the Ocean 235

non's had been years, such a captain as Lawrence
would have had his men perfectly in hand; they
would not have been cowed by their losses, nor
some of the officers too demoralized to act properly,
and the material advantages which the Chesapeake
possessed, although not very great, would probably
have been enough to give her a good chance of
victory. It is well worth noticing that the only
thoroughly disciplined set of men aboard (all ac
cording to James himself, by the way, native Ameri
cans), namely, the marines, did excellently, as
shown by the fact that three-fourths of their num
ber were among the killed and wounded. The
foreigners aboard the Chesapeake did not do as
well as the Americans, but it is nonsense to ascribe
the defeat in any way to them ; it was only rendered
rather more disastrous by their actions. Most of
the English authors give very fair accounts of the
battle, except that they hardly allude to the peculiar
disadvantages under which the Chesapeake suf
fered when she entered into it. Thus, James
thinks the Java was unprepared because she had
only been to sea six weeks; but does not lay any
weight on the fact that the Chesapeake had been
out only as many hours.

Altogether the best criticism on the fight is that
written by M. de la Graviere.30 "It is impossible
to avoid seeing in the capture of the Chesapeake
a new proof of the enormous power of a good or
ganization, when it has received the consecration

10 "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 272.

236 Naval War of 1812

of a few years' actual service on the sea. On this
occasion, in effect, two captains equally renowned,
the honor of two navies, were opposed to each
other on two ships of the same tonnage and num
ber of guns. Never had the chances seemed better
balanced, but Sir Philip Broke had commanded the
Shannon for nearly seven years, while Captain
Lawrence had only commanded the Chesapeake for
a few days. The first of these frigates had cruised
for eighteen months on the coast of America; the
second was leaving port. One had a crew long
accustomed to the habits of strict obedience; the
other was manned by men who had just been en
gaged in mutiny. The Americans were wrong to
accuse fortune on this occasion. Fortune was not
fickle, she was merely logical. The Shannon cap
tured the Chesapeake on the first of June, 1813,
but on the I4th of September, 1806, the day when
he took command of his frigate, Captain Broke had
begun to prepare the glorious termination to this
bloody affair."

Hard as it is to breathe a word against such a
man as Lawrence, a very Bayard of the seas, who
was admired as much for his dauntless bravery as
he was loved for his gentleness and uprightness, it
must be confessed that he acted rashly. And after
he had sailed, it was, as Lord Howard Douglas
has pointed out, a tactical error, however chivalric,
to neglect the chance of luffing across the Shannon's
stern to rake her; exactly as it was a tactical error
of his equally chivalrous antagonist to have let him

On the Ocean 237

have such an opportunity. Hull would not have
committed either error, and would, for the matter
of that, have been an overmatch for either com
mander. But it must always be remembered that
Lawrence's encounters with the English had not
been such as to give him a high opinion of them.
The only foe he had fought had been inferior in
strength, it is true, but had hardly made any effec
tive resistance. Another sloop, of equal, if not
superior force, had tamely submitted to blockade
for several days, and had absolutely refused to fight.
And there can be no doubt that the Chesapeake,
unprepared though she was, would have been an
overmatch for the Guerrierc, Macedonian, or Java.
Altogether it is hard to blame Lawrence for going
out, and in every other respect his actions never
have been, nor will be, mentioned, by either friend
or foe, without the wannest respect. But that is
no reason for insisting that he was ruined purely
by an adverse fate. We will do far better to recol
lect that as much can be learned from reverses as
from victories. Instead of flattering ourselves by
saying the defeat was due to chance, let us try to
find out what the real cause was, and then take
care that it does not have an opportunity to act
again. A little less rashness would have saved
Lawrence's life and his frigate, while a little more
audacity on one occasion would have made Com
modore Chauncy famous for ever. And whether
a lesson is to be learned or not, a historian should
remember that his profession is not that of a

238 Naval War of 1812

panegyrist. The facts of the case unquestionably
are that Captain Broke, in fair fight, within sight
of the enemy's harbor, proved conqueror over a
nominally equal and in reality slightly superior
force; and that this is the only single-ship action of
the war in which the victor was weaker in force
than his opponent. So much can be gathered by
reading only the American accounts. Moreover
accident had little or nothing to do with the gain
ing of the victory. The explanation is perfectly
easy; Lawrence and Broke were probably exactly
equal in almost everything that goes to make up
a first-class commander, but one had trained his
crew for seven years, and the other was new to
the ship, to the officers, and to the men, and the
last to each other. The Chesapeake 's crew must
have been of fine material, or they would not have
fought so well as they did.

So much for the American accounts. On the
other hand, the capture of the Chesapeake was, and
is, held by many British historians to "conclusively
prove" a good many different things; such as, that
if the odds were anything like equal, a British frig
ate could always whip an American, that in a hand-
to-hand conflict such would invariably be the case,
etc.; and as this was the only single-ship action of
the war in which the victor was the inferior in force,
most British writers insist that it reflected more
honor on them than all the frigate actions of 1812
put together did on the Americans.

These assertions can be best appreciated by ref-

On the Ocean 239

erence to a victory won by the French in the year
of the Battle of the Nile. On the I4th of Decem
ber, 1798, after two hours' conflict, the French 24-
gun corvette Bayonnaise captured, by boarding, the
English 32-gun frigate Ambuscade. According to
James the Ambuscade threw at a broadside 262
pounds of shot, and was manned by 190 men,
while the Bayonnaise threw 150 pounds, and had
on board supernumeraries and passenger soldiers
enough to make in all 250 men. According to
the French historian Rouvier'*1 the broadside force
was 246 pounds against 80 pounds; according to
Troude32 it was 270 pounds against 112. M. Leon
Guerin, in his voluminous but exceedingly preju
diced and one-sided work,:j:{ makes the difference
even greater. At any rate the English vessel was
vastly the superior in force, and was captured by
boarding, after a long and bloody conflict in which
she lost 46, and her antagonist over 50, men. Dur
ing all the wars waged with the Republic apd the
Empire, no English vessel captured a French one
as much superior to itself as the Ambuscade was
to the Bayonnaise, precisely as in the war of 1812
no American vessel captured a British opponent as
much superior to itself as the Chesapeake was to
the Shannon. Yet no sensible man can help acknowl-

81 "Histoire des Marins Frangais sous la Republique," par
Charles Rouvier, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Paris, 1868.

M "Batailles Na vales."

n "Histoire Maritime de France" (par Leon Guerin, His-
torien titulaire de la Marine, Membre de la Legion d' Hon-
neur), vi, 142 (Paris, 1852).

240 Naval War of 1812

edging, in spite of these and a few other isolated
instances, that at that time the French were inferior
to the English, and the latter to the Americans.

It is amusing to compare the French histories
of the English with the English histories of the
Americans, and to notice the similarity of the argu
ments they use to detract from their opponents5'
fame. Of course I do not allude to such writers
as Lord Howard Douglas or Admiral de la Gra-
viere, but to men like William James and" Leon
Guerin, or even O. Troude. James is always re
counting how American ships ran away from British
ones, and Guerin tells as many anecdotes of British
ships that fled from French foes. James reproaches
the Americans for adopting a " Parthian" mode of
warfare, instead of "bringing to in a bold and be
coming manner." Precisely the same reproaches
are used by the French writers, who assert that the
English would not fight "fairly," but acquired an
advantage by manoeuvring. James lays great stress
on the American long guns; so does Lieutenant
Rouvier on the British carronades. James always
tells how the Americans avoided the British ships,
when the crews of the latter demanded to be led
aboard; Troude says the British always kept at
long shot, while the French sailors "demanderent a
grands cris, Tabordage." James says the Ameri
cans "hesitated to grapple" with their foes "unless
they possessed a twofold superiority;" Guerin that
the English "never dared attack" except when they
possessed "une superiorite enorme." The British

On the Ocean 241

sneer at the "mighty dollar"; the French at the
"eternal guinea/' The former consider Decatur's
name as "sunk" to the level of Porter's or Bain-
bridge's; the latter assert that the "presumptuous
Nelson" was inferior to any of the French admirals
of the time preceding the Republic. Says James:
"The Americans only fight well when they have
the superiority of force on their side;" and Lieu-
tenant Rouvier: "Never have the English van-
quished us with an undoubted inferiority of force."

On June 12, 1813, the small cutter Surveyor, of
six 12-pound carronades, was lying in York River,
in the Chesapeake, under the command of Mr. Wil-
liam S. Travis; her crew consisted of but 15 men.34
At nightfall she was attacked by the boats of the
Narcissus frigate, containing about 50 men, under
the command of Lieutenant John Creerie.35 None
of the carronades could be used; but Mr. Travis
made every preparation that he could for defence.
The Americans waited till the British were within
pistol shot before they opened their fire; the latter
dashed gallantly on, however, and at once carried
the cutter. But though brief, the struggle was
bloody; 5 of the Americans were wounded, and of
the British 3 were killed and 7 wounded. Lieu-
tenant Creerie considered his opponents to have
shown so much bravery that he returned Mr. Travis

M Letter of W. S. Travis, June 16, 1813.
85 James, vi, 334.

VOL. IX.— ii

Naval War of 1812

his sword, with a letter as complimentary to him
as it was creditable to the writer.36

As has been already mentioned, the Americans
possessed a large force of gunboats at the begin-
ning of the war. Some of these were fairly sea-
worthy vessels, of 90 tons burden, sloop or schooner-
rigged, and armed with one or two long, heavy
guns, and sometimes with several light carronades
to repel boarders.37 Gunboats of this kind, to-
gether with the few small cutters owned by the
government, were serviceable enough. They were
employed all along the shores of Georgia and the
Carolinas, and in Long Island Sound, in protecting
the coasting trade by convoying parties of small ves-

36 The letter, dated June i3th, is as follows: "Your gallant
and desperate attempt to defend your vessel against more
than double your number, on the night of the i2th instant,
excited such admiration on the part of your opponents as I
have seldom witnessed, and induced me to return :you the
sword you had so nobly used, in testimony of mine. Our
poor fellows have suffered severely, occasioned chiefly, if not
solely, by the precautions you had taken to prevent surprise.
In short, I am at a loss which to admire most, the previous
arrangement aboard the Surveyor, or the determined man-
ner in which her deck was disputed inch by inch. I am,
sir," etc.

87 According to a letter from Captain Hugh G. Campbell
(in the Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters," 1812, vol. ii,
Nos. 21 and 192), the crews were distributed as follows: ten
men and a boy to a long 32, seven men and a boy to a long
9, and five men and a boy to a carronade, exclusive of petty
officers. Captain Campbell complains of the scarcity of men,
and rather naively remarks that he is glad the marines have
been withdrawn from the gunboats, as this may make the
commanders of the latter keep a brighter lookout than
formerly.

On the Ocean 243

sels from one port to another, and preventing them
from being molested by the boats of any of the
British frigates. They also acted as checks upon the
latter in their descents upon the towns and planta-
tions, occasionally capturing their boats and tend-
ers, and forcing them to be very cautious in their
operations. They were very useful in keeping pri-
vateers off the coast, and capturing them when they
came too far in. The exploits of those on the south-
ern coast will be mentioned as they occurred. Those
in Long Island Sound never came into collision
with the foe, except for a couple of slight skirmishes
at very long range; but in convoying little fleets
of coasters, and keeping at bay the man-of-war
boats sent to molest them, they were invaluable;
and they also kept the Sound clear of hostile
privateers.

Many of the gunboats were much smaller than
those just mentioned, trusting mainly to their sweeps
for motive power, and each relying for offence on
one long pivot gun, a 12 or i8-pounder. In the
Chesapeake there was quite a large number of these
small galleys, with a few of the larger kind, and
here it was thought that by acting together in flotil-
las the gunboats might in fine weather do consider-
able damage to the enemy's fleet by destroying
detached vessels, instead of confining themselves to
the more humble tasks in which their brethren else-
where were fairly successful. At this period Den-
mark, having lost all her large ships of war, was
•Confining herself purely to gun-brigs. These were

244 Naval War of 1812

stout little craft, with heavy guns, which, acting
together, and being handled with spirit and skill,
had on several occasions in calm weather captured
small British sloops, and had twice so injured frig-
ates as to make their return to Great Britain neces-
sary; while they themselves had frequently been the
object of successful cutting-out expeditions. Con-
gress hoped that our gunboats would do as well as
the Danish; but for a variety of reasons they failed
utterly in every serious attack that they made on
a man-of-war, and were worse than useless for all
but the various subordinate employments above
mentioned. The main reason for this failure was
in the gunboats themselves. They were utterly use-
less except in perfectly calm weather, for in any
wind the heavy guns caused them to careen over so
as to make it difficult to keep them right side up,
and impossible to fire. Even in smooth water they
could not be fought at anchor, requiring to be kept
in position by means of sweeps ; and they were very
unstable, the recoil of the guns causing them to
roll so as to make it difficult to aim with any ac-
curacy after the first discharge, while a single shot
hitting one put it hors de combat. This last event
rarely happened, however, for they were not often'
handled with any approach to temerity, and, on the
contrary, usually made their attacks at a range
that rendered it as impossible to inflict as to receive
harm. It does not seem as if they were very well
managed; but they were such ill-conditioned craft
that the best officers might be pardoned for feeling

On the Ocean 245

uncomfortable in them. Their operations through-
out the war offer a painfully ludicrous commentary
on Jefferson's remarkable project of having our
navy composed exclusively of such craft.

The first aggressive attempt made with the gun-
boats was characteristically futile. On June 2Oth
15 of them, under Captain Tarbell, attacked the
Junon, 38, Captain Sanders, then lying becalmed
in Hampton Roads, with the Barossa, 36, and Lau-
restinus, 24, near her. The gunboats, while still at
very long range, anchored, and promptly drifted
round so that they couldn't shoot. Then they got
under way, and began gradually to draw nearer to
the Junon. Her defence was very feeble; after
some hasty and ill-directed volleys she endeavored
to beat out of the way. But meanwhile, a slight
breeze having sprung up, the Barossa, Captain Sher-
riff, approached near enough to take a hand in
the affair, and at once made it evident that she was
a more dangerous foe than the Junon, though a
lighter ship. As soon as they felt the effects of the
breeze the gunboats became almost useless, and,
the Barossa' s fire being animated and well aimed,
they withdrew. They had suffered nothing from
the Junon, but during the short period she was en-
gaged, the Barossa had crippled one boat and
slightly damaged another; one man was killed and
two wounded. The Barossa escaped unscathed and
the Junon was but slightly injured. Of the com-
batants, the Barossa was the only .one that came
off with credit, the Junon behaving, if anything,

246 Naval War of 1812

rather worse than the gunboats. There was no
longer any doubt as to the amount of reliance to
be placed on the latter.38

On June 20, 1813, a British force of three 74/3,
one 64, four frigates, two sloops, and three trans-
ports was anchored off Craney Island. On the
northwest side of this island was a battery of 18-
pounders, to take charge of which Captain Cassin,
commanding the naval forces at Norfolk, sent
ashore one hundred sailors of the Constellation,
under the command of Lieutenants Neale, Shu-
brick, and Saunders, and fifty marines under Lieu-
tenant Breckenridge.39 On the morning of the
22d they were attacked by a division of 15 boats,
containing 700 men,40 seamen, marines, chasseurs,
and soldiers of the iO2d regiment, the whole under
the command of Captain Pechell, of the San Do-
mingo, 74. Captain Hanchett led the attack in the

38 Though the flotilla men did nothing in the boats, they
acted with the most stubborn bravery at the battle of Bla-
densburg. The British Lieutenant Gleig, himself a spectator,
thus writes of their deeds on that occasion ("Campaign at
Washington," p. 119): "Of the sailors, however, it would
be injustice not to speak in the terms which their conduct
merits. They were employed as gunners, and not only did
they serve their guns with a quickness and precision which
astonished their assailants, but they stood till some of them
were actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands; nor was
it till their leader was wounded and taken, and they saw
themselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers, that they
quitted the field." Certainly such men could not be accused
of lack of courage. Something else is needed to account for
the failure of the gunboat system.

39 Letter of Captain John Cassin, June 23, 1813.

40 James, vi, 337.

On the Ocean 247

Diadem's launch. The battery's guns were not fired
till the British were close in, when they opened
with destructive effect. While still some seventy
yards from the guns the Diadem's launch grounded,
and the attack was checked. Three of the boats
were now sunk by shot, but the water was so shal-
low that they remained above water; and while the
fighting was still at its height, some of the Con-
stellation's crew, headed by Midshipman Tatnall,
waded out and took possession of them.41 A few
of their crew threw away their arms and came
ashore with their captors; others escaped to the
remaining boats, and immediately afterward the
flotilla made off in disorder, having lost 91 men.
The three captured barges were large, strong boats,
one called the Centipede being fifty feet long, and
more formidable than many of the American gun-
vessels. The Constellation's men deserve great
credit for their defence, but the British certainly
did not attack with their usual obstinacy. When
the foremost boats were sunk, the water was so
shallow and the bottom so good that the Americans
on shore, as just stated, at once waded out to
them; and if in the heat of the fight Tatnall and
his seamen could get out to the boats, the 700
British ought to have been able to get in to the
battery, whose 150 defenders would then have
stood no chance.42

41 "Life of Commodore Josiah Tatnall," by Charles C.
Jones, Jr. (Savannah, 1878), p. 17.

4> James comments on this repulse as "a defeat as discred-
itable to those that caused it as honorable to those that suf-

248 Naval War of 1812

On July 14, 1813, the two small vessels Scorpion
and Asp, the latter commanded by Mr. Sigourney,
got under way from out of the Yeocomico Creek,43
and at 10 A.M., discovered in chase the British brig-
sloops Contest, Captain James Rattray, and Mo-
hawk, Captain Henry D. Byng.44 The Scorpion
beat up the Chesapeake, but the dull-sailing Asp
had to re-enter the creek; the two brigs anchored
off the bar and hoisted out their boats, under the
command of Lieutenant Rodger C. Curry; where-
upon the Asp cut her cable and ran up the creek
some distance. Here she was attacked by three
boats, which Mr. Sigourney and his crew of twenty
men, with two light guns, beat off; but they were
joined by two others, and the five carried the Asp,
giving no quarter. Mr. Sigourney and 10 of his
men were killed or wounded, while the British also
suffered heavily, having 4 killed and 7 (including

fered in it." "Unlike most other nations, the Americans in
particular, the British, when engaged in expeditions of this
nature, always rest their hopes of success upon valor rather
than on numbers." These comments read particularly well
when it is remembered that the assailants outnumbered the
assailed in the proportion of 5 to i. It is monotonous work
to have to supplement a history by a running commentary
on James' mistakes and inventions; but it is worth while to
prove once for all the utter unreliability of the author who
is accepted in Great Britain as the great authority about the
war. Still, James is no worse than his compeers. In the
American CoggeshalPs "History of Privateers," the mis-
statements are as gross and the sneers in as poor taste — the
British, instead of the Americans, being the objects.

43 Letter of Midshipman McClintock, July 15, 1813.

44 James, vi, 343.

On the Ocean 249

Lieutenant Curry) wounded. The surviving Ameri-
cans reached the shore, rallied under Midshipman
H. McClintock (second in command), and when
the British retired after setting the Asp on fire, at
once boarded her, put out the flames, and got her
in fighting order; but they were not again mo-
lested.

On July 29th, while the Junon, 38, Captain
Sanders, and Martin, 18, Captain Senhouse, were
in Delaware Bay, the latter grounded on the out-
side of Crow's Shoal; the frigate anchored within
supporting distance, and while in this position the
two ships were attacked by the American flotilla in
those waters, consisting of eight gunboats, carry-
ing each 25 men and one long 32, and two heavier
block-sloops,45 commanded by Lieutenant Samuel
Angus. The flotilla kept at such a distance that an
hour's cannonading did no damage whatever to
anybody; and during that time gunboat No. 121,
Sailing-master Shead, drifted a mile and a half
away from her consorts. Seeing this the British
made a dash at her in 7 boats, containing 140 men,
led by Lieutenant Philip Westphal. Mr. Shead
anchored and made an obstinate defence, but at
the first discharge the gun's pintle gave way, and
the next time it was fired the gun-carriage was al-
most torn to pieces. He kept up a spirited fire of
small arms, in reply to the boat-carronades and
musketry of the assailants; but the latter advanced
steadily and carried the gunboat by boarding, 7

a Letter of Lieutenant Angus, July 30, 1813.

250 Naval War of 1812

of her people being wounded, while 7 of the British
were killed and 13 wounded.46 The defence of
No. 121 was very creditable, but otherwise the honor
of the day was certainly with the British; whether
because the gunboats were themselves so worthless
or because they were not handled boldly enough,
they did no damage, even to the grounded sloop,
that would seem to have been at their mercy.47

On June i8th the American brig-sloop Argus,
commanded by Lieutenant William Henry Allen,
late first of the United States, sailed from New
York for France, with Mr. Crawford, minister for
that country, aboard, and reached L'Orient on July
nth, having made one prize on the way. On July
1 4th she again sailed, and cruised in the chops
of the Channel, capturing and burning ship after
ship, and creating the greatest consternation among
the London merchants; she then cruised along
Cornwall and got into St. George's Channel, where
the work of destruction went on. The labor was
very severe and harassing, the men being able to
get very little rest.48 On the night of August I3th,

46 Letter of Mr. Shead, Aug. 5, 1813.

47 The explanation possibly lies in the fact that the gun-
boats had worthless powder. In the Naval Archives there is
a letter from Mr. Angus ("Masters-Commandant's Letters,"
1813, No. 3; see also No. 91), in which he says that the frig-
ate's shot passed over them, while theirs could not even
reach the sloop. He also incloses a copy of a paper, signed
by the other gunboat officers, which runs: "We, the officers
of the vessels comprising the Delaware flotilla, protest against
the powder as being unfit for service."

48 Court of Inquiry into loss of Argus, 1815.

On the Ocean 251

a brig laden with wine from Oporto was captured
and burnt, and unluckily many of the crew suc-
ceeded in getting at some of the cargo. At 5 A.M.
on the 1 4th a large brig-of-war was discovered
standing down under a cloud of canvas.49 This
was the British brig-sloop Pelican, Captain John
Fordyce Maples, which, from information received
at Cork three days previous, had been cruising
especially after the Argus, and had at last found
her; St. David's Head bore east five leagues (lat.
52° 15° N. and 5° 50' W.).

The small, fine-lined American cruiser, with her
lofty masts and long spars, could easily have es-
caped from her heavier antagonist; but Captain
Allen had no such intention, and, finding he could
not get the weather-gage, he shortened sail and ran
easily along on the starboard tack, while the Pelican
came down on him with the wind (which was from
the south) nearly aft. At 6 A.M. the Argus wore
and fired her port guns within grape distance, the
Pelican responded with her starboard battery, and
the action began with great spirit on both sides.50
At 6.04 a round shot carried off Captain Allen's
leg, inflicting a mortal wound, but he stayed on
deck till he fainted from loss of blood. Soon the
British fire carried away the main-braces, main-
spring-stay, gaff, and try-sail mast of the Argus;
the first lieutenant, Mr. Watson, was wounded in

0 Letter of Lieutenant Watson, March 2, 1815.
60 Letter of Captain Maples to Admiral Thornborough,
Aug. 14, 1813.

Naval War of 1812

the head by a grape-shot and carried below; the
second lieutenant, Mr. U. H. Allen (no relation
of the captain), continued to fight the ship with
great skill. The Pelican's "fire continued very
heavy, the Argus losing her spritsail-yard and most
of the standing rigging on the port side of the
foremast. At 6.14 Captain Maples bore up to pass
astern of his antagonist, but Lieutenant Allen luffed
into the wind and threw the main-topsail aback,
getting into a beautiful raking position;51 had the
men at the guns done their duty as well as those
on the quarter-deck did theirs, the issue of the fight
would have been very different; but, as it was, in
spite of her favorable position, the raking broad-
side of the Argus did little damage. Two or three
minutes afterward the Argus lost the use of her
after-sails through having her preventer-main-
braces and top-sail tie shot away, and fell off be-
fore the wind, when the Pelican at 6.18 passed
her stern, raking her heavily, and then ranged up
on her starboard quarter. In a few minutes the
wheel-ropes and running-rigging of every descrip-
tion were shot away, and the Argus became ut-
terly unmanageable. The Pelican continued raking
her with perfect impunity, and at 6.35 passed her
broadside and took a position on her starboard
bow, when at 6.45 the brigs fell together, and the
British "were in the act of boarding when the Argus
struck her colors," 52 at 6.45 A.M. The Pelican

61 Letter of Lieutenant Watson.
52 Letter of Captain Maples.

On the Ocean 253

carried, besides her regular armament, two long
6's as stern-chasers, and her broadside weight of
metal was thus :53

i x 6
i x 6

I X 12

8 x 32

or 280 Ibs. against the Argus':

I X 12

9 X 21

or, subtracting as usual 7 per cent for light
weight of metal, 210 Ibs- The Pelican's crew con-
sisted of but 116 men, according to the British ac-
count, though the American reports make it much
larger. The Argus had started from New York
with 137 men, but having manned and sent in sev-
eral prizes, her crew amounted, as near as can be
ascertained, to 104. Mr. Low in his "Naval His-
tory," published just after the event, makes it but
99. James makes it 121 ; as he placed the crew of
the Enterprise at 125, when it was really 102; that
of the Hornet at 162, instead of 135; of the Pea-
cock at 185, instead of 166; of the Nautilus at 106
instead of 95, etc., it is safe to presume that he has
over-estimated it by at least 20, which brings the
number pretty near to the American accounts.
The Pelican lost but two men killed and five wound-
ed. Captain Maples had a narrow escape, a spent
grape-shot striking him in the chest with some
force, and then falling on the deck. One shot
had passed through the boatswain's and one through

M James, vi, 320.

254 Naval War of 1812

the carpenter's cabin; her sides were filled with
grape-shot, and her rigging and sails much in-
jured; her foremast, main-topmast, and royal masts
were slightly wounded, and two of her carronades
dismounted.

The injuries of the Argils have already been de-
tailed ; her hull and lower masts were also tolerably
well cut up. Of her crew, Captain Allen, two mid-
shipmen, the carpenter, and six seamen were killed
or mortally wounded; her first lieutenant and 13
seamen severely and slightly wounded; total, 10
killed and 14 wounded.

In reckoning the comparative force, I include the
Englishman's six-pound stern-chaser, which- could
not be fired in broadside with the rest of the guns,
because I include the Argus' 1 2-pound bow-chaser,
which also could not be fired in broadside, as it was
crowded into the bridle-port. James of course,
carefully includes the latter, though leaving out the
former.

COMPARISON

Weight
Tons. No. Guns. Metal. Men. Los«.

Argus 298 to 210 104 24

Pelican 467 II 280 116 7

Comparative Comparative Loss

Force. Inflicted.

Argus .82 .2Q

*&*fl

Pelican i.oo i.oo

<.tt *•** 9J»

JKGVS
C.eff A."

On the Ocean 255

Of all the single-ship actions fought in the war
this is the least creditable to the Americans. The
odds in force, it is true, were against the Argus,
about in the proportion of 10 to 8, but this is neither
enough to account for the loss inflicted, being as 10
to 3, nor for her surrendering when she had been
so little ill used. It was not even as if her antago-
nist had been an unusually fine vessel of her class.
The Pelican did not do so well as either the Frolic
previously, or the Reindeer afterward, though per-
haps rather better than the Avon, Penguin, or Pea-
cock. With a comparatively unmanageable antag-
onist, in smooth water, she ought to have sunk her
in three quarters of an hour. But the Pelican's not
having done particularly well merely makes the con-
duct of the Americans look worse; it is just the
reverse of the Chesapeake 's case, where, paying the
highest credit to the British, we still thought the
fight no discredit to us. Here we can indulge no
such reflection. The officers did well, but the crew
did not. Cooper says : "The enemy was so much
heavier that it may be doubted whether the Argus
would have captured her antagonist under any ordi-
nary circumstances." This I doubt; such a crew
as the Wasp's or Hornet's probably would have
been successful. The trouble with the guns of the
Argus was not so much that they were too small, as
that they did not hit ; and this seems all the more in-
comprehensible when it is remembered that Captain
Allen is the very man to whom Commodore Decatur,
in his official letter, attributed the skilful gun-prac-

256 Naval War of 1812

tice of the crew of the frigate United States. Cooper
says that the powder was bad; and it has also been
said that the men of the Argus were over-fatigued
and were drunk, in which case they ought not to
have been brought into action. Besides unskilful-
ness, there is another very serious count against the
crew. Had the Pelican been some distance from
the Argus, and in a position where she could pour
in her fire with perfect impunity to herself, when the
surrender took place, it would have been more justi-
fiable. But, on the contrary, the vessels were
touching, and the British boarded" just as the colors
were hauled down ; it was certainly very disgraceful
that the Americans did not rally to repel them, for
they had still four fifths of their number absolutely
untouched. They certainly ought to have suc-
ceeded, for boarding is a difficult and dangerous ex-
periment ; and if they had repulsed their antagonists
they might in turn have carried the Pelican. So that,
in summing up the merits of this action, it is fair
to say that both sides showed skilful seamanship and
unskilful gunnery; that the British fought bravely
and that the Americans did not.

It is somewhat interesting to compare this fight,
where a weaker American sloop was taken by a
stronger British one, with two or three others, where
both the comparative force and the result were re-
versed. Comparing it, therefore, with the actions
between the Hornet and Peacock (British), the
Wasp and Avon, and the Peacock (American) and
Epervier, we get four actions, in one of which, the

Pelican (British)

I.OO

2.00

Argus (American)

.82

.29

Hornet (American)

I.OO

1,00

Peacock (British)

.83

.07

Wasp (American)

I.OO

I.OO

Avon (British)

.80

.07

Peacock (American)

I.OO

I.OO

Epcrvier (British)

.81

.08

On the Ocean 257

first-named, the British were victorious, and in the
other three the Americans.

Comparative Comparative Per cent.
Force. Loss Inflicted. Low.

.06
•*3
.02

£i

.02

•33
.01

.20

It is thus seen that in these sloop actions the
superiority of the force on the side of the victor was
each time about the same. The Argus made a much
more effectual resistance than did either the Peacock,
Avon, or Epervicr, while the Pelican did her work in
poorer form than either of the victorious American
sloops ; and, on the other hand, the resistance of the
Argus did not by any means show as much bravery
as was shown in the defence of the Peacock or Avon,
although rather more than in the case of the
Epcrvier.

This is the only action of the war where it is
almost impossible to find out the cause of the inferi-
ority of the beaten crew. In almost all other cases
we find that one crew had been carefully drilled, and
so proved superior to a less-trained antagonist; but
it is incredible that the man, to whose exertions
when first lieutenant of the States Commodore De-
catur ascribes the skilfulness of that ship's men,
should have neglected to train his own crew; and
this had the reputation of being composed of a fine

258 Naval War of 1812

set of men. Bad powder would not account for the
surrender of the Argus when so little damaged. It
really seems as if the men must have been drunk or
over-fatigued, as has been so often asserted. Of
course drunkenness would account for the defeat, al-
though not in the least altering its humiliating
character.

"Et tu quoque" is not much of an argument ; still
it may be as well to call to mind here two engage-
ments in which British sloops suffered much more
discreditable defeats than the Argus did. The fig-
ures are taken from James ; as given by the French
historians they make even a worse showing for the
British.

A short time before our war the British brig
Carnation, 18, had been captured, by boarding, by
the French brig Palinure, 16, and the British brig
Alacrity, 18, had been captured, also by boarding,
by the corvette Abeille, 20.

The following was the comparative force, etc.,
of the combatants :

Weight Metal No. Crew Loss

Carnation 262 217 40

Palinure 174 100 20

Alacrity 262 100 18

Abeille 260 130 19

In spite of the pride the British take in their hand-
to-hand prowess both of these ships were captured
by boarding. TheCarnation was captured by a much
smaller force, instead of by a much larger one, as
in the case of the Argus; and if the Argus gave up
before she had suffered greatly, the Alacrity sur-

On the Ocean 259

rendered when she had suffered still less. French
historians asserted that the capture of the two brigs
proved that "French valor could conquer British
courage"; and a similar opinion was very com-
placently expressed by British historians after the
defeat of the Argus. All that the three combats
really "proved" was, that in eight encounters be-
tween British and American sloops the Americans
were defeated once; and in a far greater number
of encounters between French and British sloops the
British were defeated twice. No one pretends that
either navy was invincible; the question is, which
side averaged best?

At the opening of the war we possessed several
small brigs; these had originally been fast, handy
little schooners, each armed with 12 long sixes, and
with a crew of 60 men. As such they were effective
enough; but when afterward changed into brigs,
each armed with a couple of extra guns, and given
40 additional men, they became too slow to run,
without becoming strong enough to fight. They
carried far too many guns and men for their size,
and not enough to give them a chance with any
respectable opponent; and they were almost all
ignominiously captured. The single exception was
the brig Enterprise. She managed to escape capture,
owing chiefly to good luck, and once fought a vic-
torious engagement, thanks to the fact that the
British possessed a class of vessels even worse than
our own. She was kept near the land and finally
took up her station off the eastern coast, where she

260 Naval War of 1812

did good service in chasing away or capturing the
various Nova Scotian or New Brunswick privateers,
which were smaller and less formidable vessels than
the privateers of the United States, and not calcu-
lated for fighting.

By crowding guns into her bridle-ports, and over-
manning herself, the Enterprise, now under the com-
mand of Lieutenant William Burrows, mounted 14
eighteen-pound carronades and 2 long Q'S, with 102
men. On September 5th, while standing along shore
near Penguin Point, a few miles to the eastward of
Portland, Me., she discovered, at anchor inside, a
man-of-war brig54 which proved to be H.M.S.
Boxer, Captain Samuel Blyth, of 12 carronades,
eighteen-pounders and two long sixes, with but 66
men aboard, 12 of her crew being absent.55 The
Boxer at once hoisted three British ensigns and
bore up for the Enterprise, then standing in on the
starboard tack; but when the two brigs were still
4 miles apart it fell calm. At midday a breeze
sprang up from the southwest, giving the American
the weather-gage, but the latter manoeuvred for
some time to windward to try the comparative rates
of sailing of the vessels. At 3 P.M. Lieutenant Bur-
rows hoisted three ensigns, shortened sail and edged
away toward the enemy, who came gallantly on.

54 Letter from Lieutenant Edward R. McCall to Commo-
dore Hull, September 5, 1813.

56 James, "Naval Occurrences," 264. The American ac-
counts give the Boxer 104 men, on very insufficient grounds.
Similarly, James gives the Enterprise 123 men. Each side
will be considered authority for its own force and loss.

On the Ocean 261

Captain Blyth had nailed his colors to the mast,
telling his men they should never be struck while
he had life in his body.56 Both crews cheered
loudly as they neared each other, and at 3.15, the
two brigs being on the starboard tack not half pistol-
shot apart, they opened fire, the American using the
port, and the English the starboard, battery. Both
broadsides were very destructive, each of the com-
manders falling at the very beginning of the action.
Captain Blyth was struck by an eighteen-pound shot
while he was standing on the quarter-deck ; it passed
completely through his body, shattering his left arm
and killing him on the spot. The command, there-
upon, devolved on Lieutenant David McCreery. At
almost the same time his equally gallant antagonist
fell. Lieutenant Burrows, while encouraging his
men, laid hold of a gun-tackle fall to help the crew
of a carronade run out the gun ; in doing so he raised
one leg against the bulwark, when a canister shot
struck his thigh, glancing into his body and inflict-
ing a fearful wound.57 In spite of the pain he re-
fused to be carried below, and lay on the deck, crying
out that the colors must never be struck. Lieu-
tenant Edward McCall now took command. At 3.30
the Enterprise ranged ahead, rounded to on the star-
board tack, and raked the Boxer with the starboard
guns. At 3.35 the Boxer lost her main-topmast
and top sail yard, but her crew still kept up the fight
bravely with the exception of four men who deserted

. M "Naval Chronicle," xxxii, p. 462.
" Cooper, "Naval History," ii, p. 259.

262 Naval War of 1812

their quarters and were afterward court-martialed
for cowardice.58 The Enterprise now set her fore-
sail and took position on the enemy's starboard bow,
delivering raking fires; and at 3.45 the latter sur-
rendered, when entirely unmanageable and defence-
less. Lieutenant Burrows would not go below until
he had received the sword of his adversary, when
he exclaimed, "I am satisfied, I die contented."

Both brigs had suffered severely, especially the
Boxer, which had been hulled repeatedly, had three
eighteen-pound shot through her foremast, her top-

gallant forecastle almost cut away, and several of
her guns dismounted. Three men were killed and
seventeen wounded, four mortally. The Enterprise
had been hulled by one round and many grape ; one
1 8-pound ball had gone through her foremast, and
another through her main-mast, and she was much
cut up aloft. Two of her men were killed and ten
wounded, two of them (her commander and Mid-
shipman Kervin Waters) mortally. The British
court-martial attributed the defeat of the Boxer
"to a superiority in the enemy's force, principally
in the number of men, as well as to a greater degree

58 Minutes of court-martial held aboard H.M.S. Surprise,
January 8, 1814.

On the Ocean 263

of skill in the direction of her fire, and to the de-
structive effects of the first broadside." But the
main element was the superiority in force, the
difference in loss being very nearly proportional to
it; both sides fought with equal bravery and equal
skill. This fact was appreciated by the victors, for
at a naval dinner given in New York shortly after-
ward, one of the toasts offered was : "The crew of the
Boxer; enemies by law, but by gallantry brothers."
The two commanders were both buried at Portland,
with all the honors of war. The conduct of Lieu-
tenant Burrows needs no comment. He was an
officer greatly beloved and respected in the service.
Captain Blyth, on the other side, had not only shown
himself on many occasions to be a man of distin-
guished personal courage, but was equally noted
for his gentleness and humanity. He had been one
of Captain Lawrence's pall-bearers, and but a month
previous to his death had received a public note of
thanks' from an American colonel for an act of
great kindness and courtesy.59

The Enterprise, under Lieut.-Com. Renshaw, now
cruised off the southern coast, where she made sev-
eral captures. One of them was a heavy British
privateer, the Mars, of 14 long nines and 75 men,
which struck after receiving a broadside that killed
and wounded 4 of her crew. The Enterprise was
chased by frigates on several occasions; being once
forced to throw overboard all her guns but two, and
escaping only by a shift in the wind. Afterward,

» "Naval Chronicle," xxxii, 466.

264 Naval War of 1812

as she was unfit to cruise, she was made a guardship
at Charlestown; for the same reason the Boxer was
not purchased into the service.

On October 4th some volunteers from the New-
port flotilla captured, by boarding, the British priva-
teer Dart,™ after a short struggle, in which two of
the assailants were wounded and several of the
privateersmen, including the first officer, were killed.

On December 4th, Commodore Rodgers, still in
command of the President, sailed again from Provi-
dence, Rhode Island. On the 25th, in lat. 19° N.
and long. 35° W., the President, during the night,
fell in with two frigates, and came so close that the
headmost fired at her, when she made off. These
were thought to be British, but were in reality the
two French 4O-gun frigates Nymphe and Meduse,
one month out of Brest. After this little encounter
Rodgers headed toward the Barbadoes, and cruised
to windward of them.

On the whole the ocean warfare of 1813 was de-
cidedly in favor of the British, except during the
first few months. The Hornet's fight with the
Peacock was an action similar to those that took
place in 1812, and the cruise of Porter was unique
in our annals, both for the audacity with which it
was planned, and the success with which it was
executed. Even later in the year the Argus and the
President made bold cruises in sight of the British
coasts, the former working great havoc among the
merchantmen. But by that time the tide had

60 Letter of Mr. Joseph Nicholson, Oct. 5, 1813.

On the Ocean 265

turned strongly in favor of our enemies. From the
beginning of summer the blockade was kept up so
strictly that it was with difficulty any of our vessels
broke through it; they were either chased back or
captured. In the three actions that occurred, the
British showed themselves markedly superior in two,
and in the third the combatants fought equally well,
the result being fairly decided by the fuller crew
and slightly heavier metal of the Enterprise. The
gunboats, to which many had looked for harbor de-
fence, proved nearly useless, and were beaten off
with ease whenever they made an attack.

The lessons taught by all this were the usual ones.
Lawrence's victory in the Hornet showed the superi-
ority of a properly trained crew to one that had not
been properly trained ; and his defeat in the Chesa-
peake pointed exactly the same way, demonstrating
in addition the folly of taking a raw levy out of port,
and, before they have had the slightest chance of
getting seasoned, pitting them against skilled veter-
ans. The victory of the Enterprise showed the wis-
dom of having the odds in men and metal in our
favor, when our antagonist was otherwise our equal ;
it proved, what hardly needed proving, that, when-
ever possible, a ship should be so constructed as to
be superior in force to the foes it would be likely to
meet. As far as the capture of the Argus showed
anything, it was the advantage of heavy metal and
the absolute need that a crew should fight with pluck.
The failure of the gunboats ought to have taught the
lesson (though it did not) that too great economy in

VOL. IX.— ia

266 Naval War of 1812

providing the means of defence may prove very ex-
pensive in the end, and that good officers and men
are powerless when embarked in worthless vessels.
A similar point was emphasized by the strictness of
the blockade, and the great inconvenience it caused ;
namely, that we ought to have had ships powerful
enough to break it.

We had certainly lost ground during this year;
fortunately we regained it during the next two.

BRITISH VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN

Name Guns Tonnage

Peacock 20 477

Boxer 14 181

Highflyer 6 96

40 754

AMERICAN VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN

Name. Guns. Tonnage.

Chesapeake 50 1,265

Argus 20 298

Viper 10 148

80 1,711

VESSELS BUILT OR PURCHASED

Name. Rig. Guns. Tonnage. Where Built. Cost.

Rattlesnake Brig 14 278 Medford, Pa. $18,000

Alligator Sch'r 4 80

Asp Sloop 3 56 2,600

PRIZES MADE.
Name of Ship. No. of Prhws.

President 13

Congress 4

Chesapeake 6

Essex 14

Hornet . 3

Argus 21

Small craft 18

79

CHAPTER VI
1813

ON THE LAKES

ONTARIO— Comparison of the rival squadrons— Chauncy
takes York and Fort George — Yeo is repulsed at Sack-
ett's Harbor, but keeps command of the lake — Chauncy
sails — Yeo's partial victory oil Niagara — Indecisive ac-
tion off the Genesee — Chauncy's partial victory off Bur-
lington, which gives him the command of the lake —
ERIE— Perry's success in creating a fleet— His victory
— CHAMPLAIN— Loss of the Growler and Eagle— Sum-
mary

ONTARIO

WINTER had almost completely stopped prep-
arations on the American side. Bad
weather put an end to all communication with Al-
bany or New York, and so prevented the transit of
stores, implements, etc. It was worse still with the
men, for the cold and exposure so thinned them out
that the new arrivals could at first barely keep the
ranks filled. It was moreover, exceedingly difficult
to get seamen to come from the coast to serve on
the lakes, where work was hard, sickness prevailed,
and there was no chance of prize-money. The
British government had the great advantage of being
able to move its sailors where it pleased, while in
the American service at that period the men en-
listed for particular ships, and the only way to get

(267)

268 Naval War of 1812

them for the lakes at all was by inducing portions
of crews to volunteer to follow their officers thither.1
However, the work went on in spite of interruptions.
Fresh gangs of shipwrights arrived, and, largely
owing to the energy and capacity of the head builder,
Mr. Henry Eckford (who did as much as any naval
officer in giving us an effective force on Ontario)
the Madison was equipped, a small despatch sloop,
The Lady of the Lake, prepared, and a large new
ship, the General Pike, 28, begun, to mount 13 guns
in each broadside and 2 on pivots.

Meanwhile Sir George Prevost, the British com-
mander in Canada, had ordered two 24-gun ships
to be built and they were begun; but he committed
the mistake of having one laid down in Kingston
and the other in York, at the opposite end of the
lake. Earle, the Canadian commodore, having proved
himself so incompetent, was removed; and in the
beginning of May Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo
arrived, to act as commander-in-chief of the naval
forces, together with four captains, eight lieutenants,
twenty-four midshipmen, and about 450 picked sea-

1 Cooper, ii, 357. One of James* most comical misstate-
ments is that on the lakes the American sailors were all
"picked men." On p. 367, for example, in speaking of the
battle of Lake Erie he says: "Commodore Perry had picked
crews to all his vessels." As a matter of fact Perry had
once sent in his resignation solely on account of the very
poor quality of his crews, and had with difficulty been in-
duced to withdraw it. Perry's crews were of hardly average
excellence, but then the average American sailor was a very
good specimen.

On the Lakes 269

men, sent out by the home government especially for
service on the Canada lakes.2

The comparative force of the two fleets or squad-
rons it is hard to estimate. I have already spoken
of the difficulty in finding out what guns were
mounted on any given ship at a particular time, and
it is even more perplexing with the crews. A
schooner would make one cruise with but thirty
hands; on the next it would appear with fifty, a
number of militia having volunteered as marines.
Finding the militia rather a nuisance, they would be
sent ashore, and on ber third cruise the schooner
would substitute half a dozen frontier seamen
in their place. It was the same with the larger
vessels. The Madison might at one time have her
full complement of 200 men ; a month's sickness
would ensue, and she would sail with but 150 ef-
fectives. The Pike's crew of 300 men at one time
would shortly afterward be less by a third in conse-
quence of a draft of sailors being sent to the upper
lakes. So it is almost impossible to be perfectly
accurate; but, making a comparison of the various
authorities from Lieutenant Emmons to James, the
following tables of the forces may be given as very
nearly correct. In broadside force I count every
pivot gun, and half of those that were not on pivots.

CHAUNCY'S SQUADRON

. Broadside

Name Ri« Tonnage Crew Mctal.lbs. Armament

Pikt ship 875 300 360 a8 lonp 24*3

Madison 593 200 364 a4 short 32*3

Omeida brig 243 100 17* 16 " 24*8

1 James, vi, 353.

270

Naval War of 1812

Broadside
Rig. Tonnnage.Crew. Metal; Ibs. Armament.

long 32

Hamilton, schooner

112

So

80 -

*6'»

Scourge,

tio

SO

80

sh
i

rti2's

Conquest,

82

40

56

K

ng 32

12

6's

32

Totnpkins, "

96

4°

6a

12

6's

Julia,

82

85

44

12

Growler,

81

35

44

12

Ontario,

53

35

44

12

Fair A merican, "

53 „

30

36

24
12

Pert, "

5°

25

24

24

Asp,
Lady of the Lake,

g

>5

34
9

24

9

14

2,576

980

1,399 *"

This is not materially different from James' ac-
count (p. 356), which gives Chauncy 114 guns,
1,193 men> and 2,121 tons. The Lady of the Lake,
however, was never intended for anything but a
despatch boat, and the Scourge and Hamilton were
both lost before Chauncy actually came into col-
lision with Yeo. Deducting these, in order to com-
pare the two foes, Chauncy had left n vessels of
2,265 tons> with ^65 men and 92 guns throwing a
broadside of 1,230 pounds.

Name.

Wolfe,

' Royal George i

VEO'S SQUADRON.

Broadside

Rig. Tonnage. Crew. Metal; Ibs. Armament.

i long 24
8 " «8's

ship

637

320

360

On the Lakes 271

Broadside
Name. Rig. Tonnage.Crew. Metal; Ibs. Armament.

M.MU,. brig y,79 too 3IO {.,;:JS;S

"•*" '" «<*> '53 {,'&&,$

Sydnty Smith, schooner 216 80 172 \ » long 12'$

/ ro stiort 3? s
( i lung 24

Btrtsford, 187 70 87 < i " 9

( 6 short i8's

2.°9« 77° M74 «}i

This differs but slightly from James, who gives
Yeo 92 guns throwing a broadside of 1,374 pounds,
but only 717 men. As the evidence in the court-
martial held on Captain Barclay, and the official
accounts (on both sides) of Macdonough's victory,
convict him of very much underrating the force in
men of the British on Erie and Champlain, it can
be safely assumed that he has underestimated the
force in men on Lake Ontario. By comparing the
tonnage he gives to Barclay's and Downie's squad-
rons with what it really was, we can correct his
account of Yeo's tonnage.

The above figures would apparently make the
two squadrons about equal, Chauncy having 95
men more, and throwing at a broadside 144 pounds
shot less than his antagonist. But the figures do
not by any means show all the truth. The Ameri-
cans greatly excelled in the number and calibre of
their long guns. Compared thus, they threw at
one discharge 694 pounds of long-gun metal and
536 pounds of carronade metal ; while the British
only threw from their long guns 180 pounds, and
from their carronades 1,194. This unequal dis-
tribution of metal was very much in favor of the

Naval War of 1812

Americans. Nor was this all. The Pike, with her
15 long 24's in battery, was an overmatch for any
one of the enemy's vessels, and bore the same rela-
tion to them that the Confiance, at a later date, did
to Macdonough's squadron. She should certainly
have been a match for the Wolfe and Melville to-
gether, and the Madison and Oneida for the Royal
George and Sydney Smith. In fact, the three heavy
American vessels ought to have been an overmatch
for the four heaviest of the British squadron, al-
though these possessed the nominal superiority.
And in ordinary cases the eight remaining Ameri-
can gun-vessels would certainly seem to be an over-
match for the two British schooners, but it is just
here that the difficulty of comparing the forces comes
in. When the water was very smooth and the wind
light, the k>ng 32'$ and 24*5 of the Americans could
play havoc with the British schooners, at a distance
which would render the carronades of the latter
useless. But the latter were built for war, pos-
sessed quarters and were good cruisers, while
Chauncy's schooners were merchant vessels, with-
out quarters, crank, and so loaded down with heavy
metal that whenever it blew at all hard they could
with difficulty be kept from upsetting, and ceased
to be capable even of defending themselves. When
Sir James Yeo captured two of them he would not
let them cruise with his other vessels at all, but
sent them back to act as gunboats, in which capacity
they were serving when recaptured; this is a toler-
able test of their value compared to their opponents.

On the Lakes 273

Another disadvantage that Chauncy had to contend
with, was the difference in the speed of the various
vessels. The Pike and Madison were fast, weatherly
ships; but the Oneida was a perfect slug, even going
free and could hardly be persuaded to beat to wind-
ward at all. In this respect Yeo was much better
off; his six ships were regular men-of-war with
quarters, all of them seaworthy, and fast enough
to be able to act with uniformity, and not needing
to pay much regard to the weather. His force
could act as a unit ; but Chauncy's could not.
Enough wind to make a good working breeze for
his larger vessels put all his smaller ones hors dc
combat; and in weather that suited the latter, the
former could not move about at all. When speed
became necessary the two ships left the brig hope-
lessly behind, and either had to do without her, or
else perhaps let the critical moment slip by while
waiting for her to come up. Some of the schooners
sailed quite as slowly; and finally it was found out
that the only way to get all the vessels into action
at once was to have one half the fleet tow the other
half. It was certainly difficult to keep the com-
mand of the lake when, if it came on to blow, the
commodore had to put into port under penalty of
seeing a quarter of his fleet founder before his
eyes. These conflicting considerations render it
hard to pass judgment; but on the whole it would
seem as if Chauncy was the superior in force, for
even if his schooners were not counted, his three
square-rigged vessels were at least a match for

274 Naval War of 1812

the four square-rigged British vessels, and the two
British schooners would not have counted very
much in such a conflict. In calm weather he was
certainly the superior. This only solves one of the
points in which the official letters of the two com-
manders differ : after every meeting each one in-
sists that he was inferior in force, that the weather
suited his antagonist, and that the latter ran away,
and got the worst of it; all of which will be con-
sidered further on.

In order to settle toward which side the balance
of success inclined, we must remember that there
were two things the combatants were trying to
do, viz. :

(1) To damage the enemy directly by capturing
or destroying his vessels. This was the only object
we had in view in sending out ocean cruisers, but
on the lakes it was subordinated to :

(2) Getting the control of the lake, by which
invaluable assistance could be rendered to the army.
The most thorough way of accomplishing this of
course was by destroying the enemy's squadron;
but it could also be done by building ships too pow-
erful for him to face or by beating him in some
engagement which, although not destroying hi.t
fleet, would force him to go into port. If one side
was stronger, then the weaker party by skilful
manoeuvring might baffle the foe, and rest satisfied
by keeping the sovereignty of the lake disputed ; for,
as long as one squadron was not undisputed master
it could not be of much assistance in transporting

On the Lakes 275

troops, attacking forts, or otherwise helping the
military.

In 1813 the Americans gained the first point by
being the first to begin operations. They were
building a new ship, afterward the Pike, at Sackett's
Harbor; the British were building two new ships,
each about two-thirds the force of the Pike, one at
Toronto (then called York), one at Kingston. Be-
fore these were built the two fleets were just on
a par; the destruction of the Pike would give the
British the supremacy; the destruction of either of
the British ships, provided the Pike were saved,
would give the Americans the supremacy. Both
sides had already committed faults. The Ameri-
cans had left Sackett's Harbor so poorly defended
and garrisoned that it invited attack, while the
British had fortified Kingston very strongly, but
had done little for York, and, moreover, ought not
to have divided their forces by building ships in
different places.

Commodore Chauncy's squadron was ready for
service on April igth, and on the 25th he made sail
with the Madison, Lieutenant-commander Elliott,
floating his own broad pennant, Oneida, Lieutenant
McPherson, Scourge, Mr. Osgood, Tompkins, Lieu-
tenant Brown, Conquest, Lieutenant Pettigrew,
Growler, Mr. Mix, Julia, Mr. Trant, Asp, Lieuten-
ant Smith, Pert, Lieutenant Adams, American, Lieu-
tenant Chauncy, Ontario, Mr. Stevens, Lady of the
Lake, Mr. Hinn, and Raven, transport, having on
board General Dearborn and 1,700 troops, to at-

276 Naval War of 1812

tack York, which was garrisoned by about 700
British regulars and Canadian militia under Major-
General Sheafe. The new 24-gun ship was almost
completed, and the Gloucester logun brig was in
port; the guns of both vessels were used in defence
of the port. The fleet arrived before York early
on April 27th, and the debarkation began at about
8 A.M. The schooners beat up to the fort under a
heavy cannonade, and opened a spirited fire from
their long guns; while the troops went ashore un-
der the command of Brigadier-General Pike. The
boats were blown to leeward by the strong east
wind, and were exposed to a galling fire, but landed
the troops under cover of the grape thrown by the
vessels. The schooners now beat up to within a
quarter of a mile from the principal work, and
opened heavily upon it, while at the same time
General Pike and the main body of the troops on
shore moved forward to the assault, using their
bayonets only. The British regulars and Canadian
militia, outnumbered three to one (including the
American sailors) and with no very good defensive
works, of course had to give way, having lost heav-
ily, especially from the fire of the vessels. An ex-
plosion immediately afterward killed or wounded
250 of the victors, including General Pike. The
Americans lost, on board the fleet, 4 killed, includ-
ing midshipmen Hatfield and Thompson, and 8
wounded;3 and of the army,4 14 killed and 32

3 Letter of Commodore Chauncy, April 28, 1813.

4 James, "Military Occurrences" (London, 1818) i, p. 151.

On the Lakes 277

wounded by the enemy's fire, and 52 killed and 180
wounded by the explosion: total loss, 288. The
British regulars lost 130 killed and wounded, includ-
ing 40 by the explosion;5 together with 50 Cana-
dians and Indians, making a total of 180, besides
290 prisoners. The 24-gun ship was burned, her
guns taken away, and the Gloucester sailed back to
Sackett's Harbor with the fleet. Many military and
naval stores were destroyed, and much more shipped
to the Harbor. The great fault that the British had
committed was in letting the defences of so impor-
tant a place remain so poor, and the force in it so
small. It was impossible to resist very long when
Pike's troops were landed, and the fleet in position.
On the other hand, the Americans did the work in
good style; the schooners were finely handled, fir-
ing with great precision and completely covering the
troops, who, in turn, were disembarked and brought
into action very handsomely.

After being detained in York a week by bad
weather the squadron got out, and for the next
fortnight was employed in conveying troops and
stores to General Dearborn. Then it was determined
to make an attack on Fort George, where the British
General Vincent was stationed with from 1,000° to
i,8oo7 regulars, 600 militia, and about 100 Indians.
The American troops numbered about 4,500, prac-
tically under the command of Colonel Scott. On

• Lossing's "Field-Book of the War of 1812." p. 581. The
accounts vary somewhat.
6 James, "Military Occurrences," i. p. 151.
' Lossing, 596.

278 Naval War of 1812

May 26th Commodore Chauncy carefully recon-
noitred the place to be attacked, and in the night
made soundings along the coast, and laid buoys
so as to direct the small vessels, who were to do the
fighting. At 3 A.M. on the 27th the signal was made
to weigh, the heavy land artillery being on the
Madison, and the other troops on the Oneida, the
Lady of the Lake, and in batteaux, many of which
had been captured at York. The Julia, Growler, and
Ontario moved in and attacked a battery near the
lighthouse, opening a cross-fire which silenced it.
The troops were to be disembarked further along the
lake, near a battery of one long 24, managed by
Canadian militia. The Conquest and Tompkins
swept in under fire to this battery, and in 10 minutes
killed or drove off the artillerymen, who left the
gun spiked, and then opened on the British. "The
American ships with their heavy discharges of round
and grape too well succeeded in thinning the British
ranks." 8 Meanwhile the troop-boats, under Cap-
tain Perry and Colonel Scott dashed in, completely
covered by a heavy fire of grape directed point-
blank at the foe by the Hamilton, Scourge, and Asp.
"The fire from the American shipping committed
dreadful havoc among the British, and rendered
their efforts to oppose the landing of the enemy in-
effectual." 9 Colonel Scott's troops, thus protected,
made good their landing and met the British regu-
lars; but the latter were so terribly cut up by the
tremendous discharges of grape and canister from

8 James, "Military Occurrences," i, p. 151. * Loc. cit.

On the Lakes 279

the schooners, that in spite of their gallantry and
discipline they were obliged to retreat, blowing up
and abandoning the fort. One sailor was killed and
two wounded;10 seventeen soldiers were killed and
forty-five wounded;11 making the total American
loss sixty-five. Of the British regulars 52 were
killed, 44 wounded and 262 "wounded and miss-
ing," 12 in addition to about forty Canadians and
Indians hors de combat and nearly 500 militia cap-
tured; so that in this very brilliant affair the as-
sailants suffered hardly more than a fifth of the loss
in killed and wounded that the assailed did ;
which must be attributed to the care with which
Chauncy had reconnoitred the ground and prepared
the attack, the excellent handling of the schooners,
and the exceedingly destructive nature of their fire.
The British batteries were very weak, and, more-
over, badly served. Their regular troops fought ex-
cellently, it was impossible for them to stand against
the fire of the schooners, which should have been
engaged by the batteries on shore; and they were
too weak in numbers to permit the American army
to land and then attack it when away from the
boats. The Americans were greatly superior in
force, and yet deserve very much credit for achiev-
ing their object so quickly, with such slight loss
to themselves, and at such a heavy cost to the foe.
The effect of the victory was most important, the

10 Letter of Commodore Chauncy, May 29. 1813.

11 Letter of General Dearborn. May 27. 1813.
>• Letter of Brig.-Gen. Vincent, May 28, 1813.

280 Naval War of 1812

British evacuating the whole Niagara frontier, and
leaving the river in complete possession of the Amer-
icans for the time being. This offered the opportu-
nity for despatching Captain Perry up above the
falls to take out one captured brig (the Caledonia)
and four purchased schooners, which had been lying
in the river unable to get past the British batteries
into Lake Erie. These five vessels were now carried
into that lake, being tracked up against the current
by oxen, to become a most important addition to the
American force upon it.

While Chauncy's squadron was thus absent at
the west end of the lake the Wolfe, 24, was launched
and equipped at Kingston, making the British force
on the lake superior to that of the Americans. Im-
mediately Sir George Prevost and Sir James Lucas
Yeo, the commanders-in-chief of the land and water
forces in the Canadas, decided to strike a blow at
Sackett's Harbor and destroy the General Pike, 28,
thus securing to themselves the superiority for the
rest of the season. Accordingly, they embarked
on May 2/th, in the Wolfe, Royal George, Moira,
Prince Regent, Simcoe, and Seneca, with a large
number of gunboats, barges, and batteaux; and on
the next day saw and attacked a brigade of 19
boats transporting troops to Sackett's Harbor, un-
der command of Lieutenant Aspinwall. Twelve
boats were driven ashore, and 70 of the men in
them captured; but Lieutenant Aspinwall and 100
men succeeded in reaching the Harbor, bringing
up the total number of regulars there to 500 men,

On the Lakes 281

General Brown having been summoned to take the
chief command. About 400 militia also came in,
but were of no earthly service. There were, how-
ever, 200 Albany volunteers, under Colonel Mills,
who could be relied on. The defences were mis-
erably inadequate, consisting of a battery of one long
gun, and a block-house.

On the 29th Sir George Prevost and 800 regulars
landed, being covered by the gunboats under Sir
James Lucas Yeo. The American militia fled at
once, but the regulars and volunteers held their
ground in and around trie block-house. "At this
point the further energies of the [British] troops
became unavailing. The [American] block-house
and stockade could not be carried by assault nor re-
duced by field-pieces, had we been provided with
them ; the fire of the gunboats proved insufficient to
attain that end; light and adverse winds continued,
and our larger vessels were still far off." 13 The
British re-embarked precipitately. The American
loss amounted to 23 killed and 114 wounded; that
of the British 52 killed and 211 wounded,14 most
of the latter being taken prisoners. During the fight
some of the frightened Americans set fire to the
storehouses, the Pike and Gloucester; the former
were consumed, but the flames were extinguished
before they did any damage to either of the vessels.
This attack differed especially from those on Fort
George and York, in that the attacking force was

18 Letter of Adj. -Gen. Baynes, May 30, 1813.
14 James, "Military Occurrences," p. 173.

282 Naval War of 1812

relatively much weaker; still it ought to have been
successful. But Sir George could not compare as
a leader with Col. Scott or Gen. Pike ; and Sir James
did not handle the gunboats by any means as well
as the Americans did their schooners in similar at-
tacks. The admirers of Sir James lay the blame on
Sir George, and vice versa; but in reality neither
seems to have done particularly well. At any rate
the affair was the reverse of creditable to the British.
The British squadron returned to Kingston, and
Chauncy, having heard that they were out, came
down the lake and went into port about June 2d.
So far the Americans had had all the success, and
had controlled the lake; but now Yeo's force was
too formidable to be encountered until the Pike was
built, and the supremacy passed undisputed into his
hands, while Chauncy lay in Sackett's Harbor. Of
course with the Pike soon to be built, Yeo's uncon-
tested superiority could be of but short duration;
but he used his time most actively. He sailed from
Kingston on the 3d of June, to co-operate with the
British army at the head of the lake, and intercept
all supplies going to the Americans. On the 8th
he discovered a small camp of the latter near Forty
Mile Creek, and attacked it with the Beresford,
Sydney Smith, and gunboats, obliging the Ameri-
cans to leave their camp, while their equipages, pro-
visions, stores, and batteaux fell into the hands of
the British, whose troops occupied the post, thus as-
sisting in the series of engagements which ended in
the humiliating repulse of General Wilkinson's ex-

On the Lakes 283

pedition into Canada. On the I3th two schooners
and some boats bringing supplies to the Americans
were captured, and on the i6th a depot of provisions
at the Genesee River shared the same fate. On the
igth a party of British soldiers were landed by the
fleet at Great Sodas, and took off 600 barrels of
flour. Yeo then returned to Kingston, where he
anchored on the 27th, having done good service in
assisting the land forces.15 As a small compensa-
tion, on the 1 8th of the same month the Lady of the
Lake, Lieut. Wolcott Chatincy, captured off Presqu'
Isle the British schooner Lady Murray, containing
I ensign, 15 soldiers, and 6 sailors, together with
stores and ammunition.16

During the early part of July neither squadron
put out in force; although on the first of the month
Commodore Yeo made an abortive attempt to sur-
prise Sackett's Harbor, but abandoned it when it
was discovered. Meanwhile the Americans were
building a new schooner, the Sylph, and the for-
midable corvette Pike was made ready to sail by
July 2 1 st. On the same day the entire American
squadron, or fleet, sailed up to the head of the lake,
and reached Niagara on the 27th. Here Col. Scott
and some of his regulars were embarked, and on the
3Oth a descent was made upon York, where 1 1 trans-
ports were destroyed, 5 cannon, a quantity of flour,
and some ammunition carried off, and the barracks

'» Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo to Mr. Croker, June 29,
1813.

16 Letter of Lieut. Wolcott Chauncy to Com. Chauncy,
June 18, 1813.

284 Naval War of 1812

burned. On the 3d of August the trocps were dis-
embarked at the Niagara, and 1 1 1 officers and men
were sent up to join Perry on Lake Erie. As this
left the squadron much deranged 150 militia were
subsequently lent it by General Boyd, but they
proved of no assistance (beyond swelling the num-
ber of men Yeo captured in the Growler and Julia
from 70 individuals to 80), and were again landed.
Commodore Yeo sailed with his squadron from
Kingston on Aug. 2d, and on the 7th the two fleets
for the first time came in sight of one another, the
Americans at anchor off Fort Niagara, the British
six miles to windward, in the W.N.W. Chauncy's
squadron contained one corvette, one ship sloop, one
brig sloop, and ten schooners, manned by about 965
men, and throwing at a broadside, 1,390 Ibs. of shot,
nearly 800 of which were from long guns. Yeo's
included two ship sloops, two brig sloops, and two
schooners, manned by 770 men, and throwing at a
broadside 1,374 Ibs., but 180 being from long guns.
But Yeo's vessels were all built with bulwarks, while
ten of Chauncy's had none ; and, moreover, his ves-
sels could all sail and manoeuvre together, while, as
already remarked, one half of the American fleet
spent a large part of its time towing the other half.
The Pike would at ordinary range be a match for the
Wolfe and Melville together; yet in actual weight
of metal she threw less than the former ship alone.
In calm weather the long guns of the American
schooners gave them a great advantage; in rough
weather they could not be used at all. Still, on the

On the Lakes 285

whole, it could fairly be said that Yeo was ad-
vancing to attack a superior fleet.

All through the day of the 7th the wind blew
light and variable, and the two squadrons went
through a series of manoeuvres, nominally to bring
on an action. As each side flatly contradicts the
other it is hard to tell precisely what the manoeu-
vres were; each captain says the other avoided him
and that he made all sail in chase. At any rate it
was just the weather for Chauncy to engage in.

That night the wind came out squally ; and about
I A.M. on the morning of the 8th a heavy gust struck
the Hamilton and Scourge, forcing them to careen
over till the heavy guns broke loose, and they foun-
dered, but 1 6 men escaping, — which accident did not
open a particularly cheerful prospect to the remain-
der of the schooners. Chauncy's force was, by this
accident, reduced to a numerical equality with Yeo's,
having perhaps a hundred more men,17 and throw-
ing 144 Ibs. less shot at a broadside. All through
the two succeeding days the same manoeuvring went
on ; the question as to which avoided the fight is
simply one of veracity between the two commanders,

17 This estimate as to men is a mere balancing of proba-
bilities. If James underestimates the British force on On-
tario as much as he has on Erie and Champlain, Yeo had as
many men as his opponent. Chauncy, in one of his letters
(preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval
Archives), says: "I enclose the muster-rolls of all my ships,"
but I have not been able to find them, and in any event the
complements were continually changing completely. The
point is not important, as each side certainly had plenty of
men on this occasion.

286 Naval War of 1812

and of course each side, to the end of time, will be-
lieve its own leader. But it is not of the least con-
sequence,-as neither accomplished anything.

On the loth the same tedious evolutions were
continued, but at 7 P.M. the two squadrons were
tolerably near one another, Yeo to windward, the
breeze being fresh from the S.W. Commodore
Chauncy formed his force in two lines on the port
tack, while Commodore Yeo approached from be-
hind and to windward, in single column, on the
same tack. Commodore Chauncy's weather line
was formed of the Julia, Growler, Pert, Ash, On-
tario, and American, in that order, and the lee line
of the Pike, Oneida, Madison, Tompkins, and Con-
quest. Chauncy formed his weather line of the
smaller vessels, directing them, when the British
should engage, to edge away and form to leeward
of the second line, expecting that Sir James would
follow them down. At 1 1 the weather line opened
fire at very long range; at 11.15 it was returned,
and the action became general and harmless; at
11.30 the weather line bore up and passed to lee-
ward, .except the Julia and Growler, which tacked.
The British ships kept their luff and cut off the two
that had tacked, while Commodore Chauncy's lee
line "edged away two points, to lead the enemy
down, not only to engage him to more advantage,
but to lead him from the Julia and Growler" 1S Of
course the enemy did not come down, and the Julia
and Growler were not saved. Yeo kept on till he

18 Letter of Commodore Isaac Chauncy, Aug. 13, 1813.

On the Lakes

287

had cut off the two schooners, fired an ineffectual
broadside at the other ships, and tacked after the
Growler and Julia. Then, when too late, Chauncy

£ ~i

~ « a
~2. >> o

Hi

•2. -

* z

!i

s £

« V-o

^ii

tacked also, and stood after him. The schooners,
meanwhile, kept clawing to windward till they were
overtaken, and, after making a fruitless effort to run

288 Naval War of 1812

the gantlet through the enemy's squadron by put-
ting before the wind, were captured. Yeo's account
is simple : "Came within gunshot of Pike and Madi-
son, when they immediately bore up, fired their
stern chase guns, and made all sail for Niagara,
leaving two of their schooners astern, which we
captured." 19 The British had acted faultlessly, and
the honor and profit gained by the encounter rest-
ed entirely with them. On the contrary, neither
Chauncy nor his subordinates showed to advantage.
Cooper says that the line of battle was "singu-
larly well adapted to draw the enemy down," and
"admirable for its advantages and ingenuity." In
the first place it is an open question whether the
enemy needed drawing down; on this occasion he
advanced boldly enough. The formation may have
been ingenious, but it was the reverse of advanta-
geous. It would have been far better to have had the
strongest vessels to windward, and the schooners,
with their long guns, to leeward, where they would
not be exposed to capture by any accident happen-
ing to them. Moreover, it does not speak well for
the discipline of the fleet, that two commanders
should have directly disobeyed orders. And when
the two schooners did tack, and it was evident that
Sir James would cut them off, it was an extraordi-
nary proceeding for Chauncy to "edge away two
points ... to lead the enemy from the Growler and
Julia." It is certainly a novel principle, that if part
of a force is surrounded the true way Jto rescue

19 Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, Aug. 10, 1813.

On the Lakes 289

it is to run away with the balance, in hopes that the
enemy will follow. Had Chauncy tacked at once,
Sir James would have been placed between two fires,
and it would have been impossible for him to cap-
ture the schooners. As it was, the British com-
mander had attacked a superior force in weather
that had just suited it, and yet had captured two
of its vessels without suffering1 any injury beyond
a few shot holes in the sails. The action, however,
was in no way decisive. All next day, the nth, the
fleets were in sight of one another, the British to
windward, but neither attempted to renew the en-
gagement. The wind grew heavier, and the vil-
lanous little American schooners showed such strong
tendencies to upset, that two had to run into Ni-
agara Bay to anchor. With the rest Chauncy ran
down the lake to Sackett's Harbor, which he reached
on the 1 3th, provisioned his squadron for five weeks,
and that same evening proceeded up the lake again.
The advantage in this action had been entirely
with the British, but it is simply nonsense to say,
as one British historian does, that "on Lake Ontario,
therefore, we at last secured a decisive predomi-
nance, which we maintained until the end of the
war." 20 This "decisive" battle left the Americans
just as much in command of the lake as the British ;

«• "History of the British Navy," by Charles Duke Yonge
(London, 1866), iii, p. 24. It is apparently not a work of any
authority, but I quote it as showing probably the general
feeling of British writers about the action and its results,
which can only proceed from extreme partisanship and igno-
rance of the subject.

VOL. IX.— 13

290 Naval War of 1812

and even this very questionable "predominance"
lasted but six weeks, after which the British squad-
ron was blockaded in port most of the time. The
action has a parallel in that fought on the 22d of
July, 1805, by Sir Robert Calder's fleet of 15 sail
of the line against the Franco-Spanish fleet of 20
sail of the line, under M. Villeneuve.21 The two
fleets engaged in a fog, and the English captured
two ships, when both sides drew off, and remained
in sight of each other the next day without either re-
newing the action. "A victory therefore it was that
Sir Robert Calder had gained, but not a 'decisive*
nor a 'brilliant' victory." 22 This is exactly the criti-
cism that should be passed on Sir James Lucas
Yeo's action of the loth of August.

From the i3th of August to the loth of Septem-
ber both fleets were on the lake most of the time,
each commodore stoutly maintaining that he was
chasing the other; and each expressing in his let-
ters his surprise and disgust that his opponent should
be afraid of meeting him "though so much superior
in force." The facts are of course difficult to get at,
but it seems pretty evident that Yeo was determined
to engage in heavy, and Chauncy in light, weather ;

21 "Batailles Navales de la France," par O. Troude, Hi, 352.
It seems rather ridiculous to compare these lake actions,
fought between small flotillas, with the gigantic contests
which the huge fleets of Europe waged in contending for
the supremacy of the ocean ; but the difference is one of de-
gree and not of kind, and they serve well enough for pur-
poses of illustration or comparison.

93 James' "Naval History," iv, 14.

On the Lakes 291

and that the party to leeward generally made off.
The Americans had been reinforced by the Sylph,
schooner, of 300 tons and 70 men, carrying four
long 32's on pivots, and six long 6's. Theoreti-
cally her armament would make her formidable; but
practically her guns were so crowded as to be of
little use, and the next year she was converted into
a brig, mounting 24-pound carronades.

On the nth of September a partial engagement,
at very long range, in light weather, occurred near
the month of the Genesee River; the Americans suf-
fered no loss whatever, \vhile the British had one
midshipman and three seamen killed and seven
wounded, and afterward ran into Amherst Bay.
One of their brigs, the Melville, received a shot so
far under water that to get at and plug it, the guns
had to be run in on one side and out on the other.
Chauncy describes it as a running fight of 3^/2 hours,
the enemy then escaping into Amherst Bay.23 James
(p. 38) says that "at sunset a breeze sprang up
from the westward, when Sir James steered for the
American fleet; but the American commodore
avoided a close action, and thus the affair ended."
This is a good sample of James' trustworthiness;
his account is supposed to be taken from Commo-
dore Yeo's letter,24 which says : "At sunset a breeze
sprang up from the westward, when I steered for
the False Duck Islands, under which the enemy
could not keep the weather-gage, but be obliged to

*» Letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 13, 1813.
84 Letter to Admiral Warren, Sept. 12, 1813.

292 Naval War of 1812

meet us on equal terms. This, however, he carefully
avoided doing." In other words, Yeo did not steer
for but away from Chauncy. Both sides admit that
Yeo got the worst of it and ran away, and it is only
a question as to whether Chauncy followed him or
not. Of course in such light weather Chauncy's long
guns gave him a great advantage. He had present
10 vessels ; the Pike, Madison, Oneida, Sylph, Tomp-
kins, Conquest, Ontario, Pert, American, and Asp,
throwing 1,288 Ibs. of shot, with a total of 98
guns. Yeo had 92 guns, throwing at a broadside
1,374 Ibs. Nevertheless, Chauncy told but part of
the truth in writing as he did : "I was much disap-
pointed at Sir James refusing to fight me, as he was
so much superior in point of force, both in guns and
men, having upward of 20 guns more than we have,
and heaves a greater weight of shot." His inferi-
ority in long guns placed Yeo at a great disadvan-
tage in such a very light wind; but in his letter
he makes a marvelous admission of how little able
he was to make good use of even what he had. He
says: "I found it impossible to bring them to close
action. We remained in this mortifying situation
five hours, having only six guns in all the squadron
that would reach the enemy (not a carronade being
fired)." Now according to James himself ("Naval
Occurrences," p. 297) he had in his squadron 2 long
24*3, 13 long i8's, 2 long I2*s, and 3 long 9's, and,
in a fight of five hours, at very long range, in smooth
water, it was a proof of culpable incompetency on
his part that he did not think of doing what Elliott

On the Lakes 293

and Perry did in similar circumstances on Lake Erie
— substitute all his long guns for some of the car-
ronades on the engaged side. Chauncy could place
in broadside 7 long 32*5, 18 long 24*5, 4 long I2's,
8 long 6's ; so he could oppose 37 long guns, throw-
ing 752 Ibs. of shot, to Yeo's 20 long guns, throwing
333 Ibs. of shot. The odds were thus more than two
to one against the British in any case ; and their com-
mander's lack of resource made them still greater.
But it proved a mere skirmish, with no decisive re-
sults.

The two squadrons did not come in contact again
till on the 28th, in York Bay. The Americans had
the weather-gage, the wind being fresh from the
east. Yeo tacked and stretched out into the lake,
while Chauncy steered directly for his centre. When
the squadrons were still a league apart the British
formed on the port tack, with their heavy vessels
ahead; the Americans got on the same tack and
edged down toward them, the Pike ahead, towing
the Asp; the Tompkins, under Lieut. Bolton Finch,
next; the Madison next, being much retarded by
having a schooner in tow; then the Sylph, with an
other schooner in tow, the Oneida, and the two other
schooners. The British, fearing their stemmost ves-
sels would be cut off, at 12.10 came round on the
starboard tack, beginning with the Wolfe, Commo-
dore Yeo, and Royal George, Captain William
Howe Mulcaster, which composed the van of the
line. They opened with their starboard guns as
soon as they came round. When the Pike was

294 Naval War of -1812

abeam of the Wolfe, which was past the centre of
the British line, the Americans bore up in succes-
sion for their centre.

The Madison was far back, and so was the Sylph,
neither having cast off their tows; so the whole
brunt of the action fell on the Pike, Asp, and Tomp-
kins. The latter kept up a most gallant and spirited

ROW CfOSGl

fire till her foremast was shot away. But already
the Pike had shot away the Wolfe's maintopmast
and main yard, and inflicted so heavy a loss upon
her that Commodore Yeo, not very heroically, put
dead before the wind, crowding all the canvas he
could on her forward spars, and she ran completely
past all her own vessels, who of course crowded sail

On the Lakes 295

after her. The retreat of the commodore was most
ably covered by the Royal George, under Captain
Mulcaster, who was unquestionably the best British
officer on the lake. He luffed up across the com-
modore's stern, and delivered broadsides in a man-
ner that won the admiration even of his foes. The
Madison and Sylph, having the schooners in tow,
could not overtake the British ships, though the
Sylph opened a distant fire; the Pike kept on after
them, but did not cast off the Asp, and so did not
gain; and at 3.15 the pursuit was relinquished;25
when the enemy were running into the entirely un-
defended port of Burlington Bay, whence escape
would have been impossible. The Toinpkins had
lost her foremast, and the Pike her foretopgallant
mast, with her bowsprit and mainmast wounded ;
and of her crew five men were killed or wounded,
almost all by the guns of the Royal George. These
were the only injuries occasioned by the enemy's fire,
but the Pike's starboard bow-chaser burst, killing
or wounding 22 men, besides blowing up the topgal-
lant forecastle, so that the bow pivot gun could not
be used. Among the British ships, the Wolfe lost
her maintopmast, mizzentopmast, and mainyard, and
the Royal George her foretopmast; both suffered
a heavy loss in killed and wounded, according to
the report of the British officers captured in the
transports a few days afterward.

As already mentioned, the British authorities no
longer published accounts of their defeats, so Com-

«* Letter of Commodore Chauncy, Sept. 28, 1813.

296 Naval War of 1812

modore Yeo's report on the action was not made
public. Brenton merely alludes to it as follows (Vol.
II, p. 503) : "The action of the 28th of September,
1813, in which Sir James Yeo in the Wolfe had his
main and mizzentopmasts shot away, and was
obliged to put before the wind, gave Mulcaster an
opportunity of displaying a trait of valor and sea-
manship which elicited the admiration of friends
and foes, when he gallantly placed himself between
his disabled commodore and a superior enemy."
James speaks in the vaguest terms. He first says,
"Commodore Chauncy, having the weather-gage,
kept his favorite distance," which he did because
Commodore Yeo fled so fast that he could not be
overtaken; then James mentions the injuries the
Wolfe received, and says that "it was these and not,
as Mr. Clark says, 'a manoeuvre of the commodore's'
that threw the British in confusion." In other
words, it was the commodore's shot and not his ma-
noeuvring that threw the British into confusion —
a very futile distinction. Next he says that "Com-
modore Chauncy would not venture within car-
ronade range," whereas he was within carronade
range of the Wolfe and Royal George, but the lat-
ter did not wait .for the Madison and Oneida to get
within range with their carronades. The rest of his
article is taken up with exposing the absurdities of
some of the American writings, miscalled histories,
which appeared at the close of the war. His criti-
cisms on these are very just, but afford a funny in-
stance of the pot calling the kettle back. This much

On the Lakes 297

is clear, that the British were beaten and forced to
flee, when but part of the American force was en-
gaged. But in good weather the American force
was so superior that being beaten would have been
no disgrace to Yeo, had it not been for the claims
advanced both by himself and his friends, that on
the whole he was victorious over Chauncy. The
Wolfe made anything but an obstinate fight, leav-
ing almost all the work to the gallant Mulcaster, in
the Royal George, who shares with Lieutenant Finch
of the Tompkins most of the glory of the day. The
battle, if such it may be called, completely estab-
lished Chauncy's supremacy, Yeo spending most of
the remainder of the season blockaded in Kingston.
So Chauncy gained a victory which established his
control over the lakes; and, moreover, he gained it
by fighting in succession, almost single-handed, the
two heaviest ships of the enemy. But gaining the
victory was only what should have been expected
from a superior force. The question is, Did
Chauncy use his force to the best advantage? And
it can not be said that he did. When the enemy bore
up it was a great mistake not to cast off the schooners
which were being towed. They were small craft,
not of much use in the fight, and they entirely pre-
vented the Madison from taking any part in the con-
test, and kept the Sylph at a great distance ; and by
keeping the Asp in tow the Pike, which sailed faster
than any of Yeo's ships, was distanced by them.
Had she left the Asp behind and run in to engage
the Royal George she could have mastered, or at

298 Naval War of 1812

any rate disabled, her; and had the swift Madison
cast off her tow she could also have taken an effective
part in the engagement. If the Pike could put the
British to flight almost single-handed, how much
more could she not have done when assisted by the
Madison and Oneida? The cardinal error, however,
was made in discontinuing the chase. The British
were in an almost open roadstead, from which they
could not possibly escape. Commodore Chauncy
was afraid that the wind would come up to blow a
gale, and both fleets would be thrown ashore; and,
moreover, he expected to be able to keep a watch
over the enemy, and to attack him at a more suit-
able time. But he utterly failed in this last; and
had the American squadron cast off their tows and
gone boldly in,they certainly ought to have been able
to destroy or capture the entire British force before
a gale could blow up. Chauncy would have done
well to keep in mind the old adage, so peculiarly
applicable to naval affairs : "L'audace ! toujours 1'au-
dace! et encore 1'audace!" Whether the fault was
his or that of hfs subordinates, it is certain that while
the victory of the 28th of September definitely set-
tled the supremacy of the lake in favor of the Amer-
icans, yet this victory was by no means so decided
as it should have been, taking into account his su-
periority in force and advantage in position, and the
somewhat spiritless conduct of his foe.

Next day a gale came on to blow, which lasted
till the evening of the 3ist. There was no longer
any apprehension of molestation from the British,

On the Lakes 299

so the troop transports were sent down the lake by
themselves, while the squadron remained to watch
Yeo. On Oct. 2(1 he was chased, but escaped by his
better sailing; and next day false information in-
duced Chauncy to think Yeo had eluded him and
passed down the lake, and he accordingly made
sail in the direction of his supposed flight. On the
5th, at 3 P.M., while near the False Ducks, seven ves-
sels were made out ahead, which proved to be Brit-
ish gunboats, engaged in transporting troops. All
sail was made after them; one was burned, another
escaped, and five were captured, the Mary, Drum-
mond, Lady Gore, Confiance, and Hamilton,20 — the
two latter being the rechristened Julia and Growler.
Each gun-vessel had from one to three guns, and
they had aboard in all 264 men, including seven
naval (three royal and four provincial) and ten mili-
tary officers. These prisoners stated that in the ac-
tion of the 28th the Wolfe and Royal George had
lost very heavily.

After this Yeo remained in Kingston, blockaded
there by Chauncy for most of the time; on Nov.
loth he came out and was at once chased back into
port by Chauncy, leaving the latter for the rest of the
season entirely undisturbed. Accordingly, Chauncy
was able to convert his small schooners into trans-
ports. On the 1 7th these transports were used to
convey 1,100 men of the army of General Harrison
from the mouth of the Genesee to Sackett's Harbor,
while Chauncy blockaded Yeo in Kingston. The

•• Letter of Commodore Chauncy, Oct. 8, 1813.

300 Naval War of 1812

duty of transporting troops and stores went on till
the 27th, when everything had been accomplished;
and a day or two afterward navigation closed.

As between the Americans and British, the suc-
cess of the season was greatly in favor of the for-
mer. They had uncontested control over the lake
from April igth to June 3d, and from Sept. 28th to
Nov. 29th, in all 107 days; while their foes only
held it from June 3d to July 2ist, or for 48 days;
and from that date to Sept. 28th, for 69 days, the
two sides were contending for the mastery. York
and Fort George had been taken, while the attack
on Sackett's Harbor was repulsed. The Americans
lost but two schooners, both of which were recap-
tured ; while the British had one 24-gun ship nearly
ready for launching destroyed, and one lo-gun
brig taken, and the loss inflicted upon each
other in transports, gunboats, storehouses, stores,
etc., was greatly in favor of the former. Chauncy's
fleet, moreover, was able to co-operate with the army
for over twice the length of time Yeo's could (107
days to 48).

It is more difficult to decide between the respective
merits of the two commanders. We had shown so
much more energy than the Anglo-Canadians that
at the beginning of the year we had overtaken them
in the building race, and the two fleets were about
equally formidable. The Madison and Oneida were
not quite a match for the Royal George and Sydney
Smith (opposing 12 32-pound and 8 24-pound car-
ronades to 2 long i8's, i long 12, i 68-pound and 13

On the Lakes 301

32-pound carronades) ; and our ten-gun-schooners
would hardly be considered very much of an over-
match for the Melville, Moira, and Beresford. Had
Sir James Yeo been as bold and energetic as Bar-
clay or Mulcaster he would certainly not have per-
mitted the Americans, when the forces were so equal,
to hold uncontested sway over the lake, and by re-
ducing Fort George, to cause disaster to the Brit-
ish land forces. It would certainly have been better
to risk a battle with equal forces than to wait till
each fleet received an additional ship, which ren-
dered Chauncy's squadron the superior by just about
the superiority of the Pike to the Wolfe. Again,
Yeo did not do particularly well in the repulse be-
fore Sackett's Harbor; in the skirmish off Genesee
River he showed a marked lack of resource ; and in
the action of the 28th of September (popularly
called the "Burlington Races" from the celerity of
his retreat) he evinced an amount of caution that
verged toward timidity, in allowing the entire brunt
of the fighting to fall on Mulcaster in the Royal
George, a weaker ship than the Wolfe. On the other
hand, he gave able co-operation to the army while he
possessed control of the lake ; he made a most gallant
and successful attack on a superior force on the loth
of August; and for six weeks subsequently by skil-
ful manoeuvring he prevented this same superior
force from acquiring the uncontested mastery.
It was no disgrace to be subsequently block-
aded; but it is very ludicrous in his admirers to
think that he came out first best.

302 Naval War of 1812

Chauncy rendered able and invaluable assistance
to the army all the while that he had control of the
water; his attacks on York and Fort George were
managed with consummate skill and success, and on
the 28th of September he practically defeated the
opposing force with his own ship alone. Neverthe-
less he can by no means be said to have done the best
he could with the materials he had. His stronger
fleet was kept two months in check by a weaker
British fleet. When he first encountered the foe,
on August loth, he ought to have inflicted such a
check upon him as would at least have confined him
to port and given the Americans immediate supe-
riority on the lake; instead of which he suffered a
mortifying, although not at all disastrous, defeat,
which allowed the British to contest the supremacy
with him for six weeks longer. On the 28th of Sep-
tember, when he only gained a rather barren victory,
it was nothing but excessive caution that prevented
him from utterly destroying his foe. Had Perry
on that day commanded the American fleet there
would have been hardly a British ship left on On-
tario. Chauncy was an average commander; and
the balance of success inclined to the side of the
Americans only because they showed greater energy
and skill in shipbuilding, the crews and commanders
on both sides being very nearly equal.

On the Lakes .303

LAKE ERIE •

Captain Oliver Hazard Perry had assumed com-
mand of Erie and the upper lakes, acting under
Commodore Chauncy. With intense energy he at
once began creating a naval force which should be
able to contend successfully with the foe. As al-
ready said, the latter in the beginning had exclusive
control of Lake Erie; but the Americans had cap-
tured the Caledonia, brig, and purchased three
schooners, afterward named the Sowers, Tigress,
and Ohio, and a sloop, the Trippc. These at first
were blockaded in the Niagara, but after the fall
of Fort George and retreat of the British forces,
Captain Perry was enabled to get them out, tracking
them up against the current by the most arduous
labor. They ran up to Presque Isle (now called
Erie), where two 2O-gun brigs were being con-
structed under the directions of the indefatigable
captain. Three other schooners, the Arid, Scorpion,
and Porcupine, were also built.

The harbor of Erie was good and spacious, but
had a bar on which there was less than seven feet
of water. Hitherto this had prevented the enemy
from getting in; now it prevented the two brigs
from getting out. Captain Robert Heriot Barclay
had been appointed commander of the British forces
on Lake Erie ; and he was having built at Amherst-
burg a 2O-gun ship. Meanwhile he blockaded
Perry's force, and as the brigs could not cross the
bar with their guns in, or except in smooth water,
they of course could not do so in his presence. He

304 Naval War of 1812

kept a close blockade for some time; but on the 2d
of August he disappeared. Perry at once hurried
forward everything; and on the 4th, at 2 P.M., one
brig, the Lawrence, was towed to that point of the
bar where the water was deepest. Her guns were
whipped out and landed on the beach, and the brig
got over the bar by a hastily improvised "camel."

"Two large scows, prepared for the purpose, were
hauled alongside, and the work of lifting the brig
proceeded as fast as possible. Pieces of massive
timber had been run through the forward and after
ports, and when the scows were sunk to the water's
edge, the ends of the timbers were blocked up, sup-
ported by these floating foundations. The plugs
were now put in the scows, and the water was
pumped out of them. By this process the brig was
lifted quite two feet, though when she was got on
the bar it was found that she still drew too much
water. It became necessary, in consequence, to
cover up everything, sink the scows anew, and block
up the timbers afresh. This duty occupied the
whole night." 27

Just as the Lawrence had passed the bar, at 8 A.M.
on the 5th, the enemy reappeared, but too late ; Cap-
tain Barclay exchanged a few shots with the
schooners and then drew off. The Niagara crossed
without difficulty. There were still not enough men
to man the vessels, but a draft arrived from On-
tario, and many of the frontiersmen volunteered,
while soldiers also were sent on board. The squad-

87 Cooper, ii, 389. Perry's letter of Aug. sth is very brief.

On the Lakes 305

ron sailed on the i8th in pursuit of the enemy, whose
ship was now ready. After cruising about some
time the Ohio was sent down the lake, and the
other ships went into Put-in-Bay. On the Qth of
September Captain Barclay put out from Amherst-
burg, being so short of provisions that he felt com-
pelled to risk an action with the superior force
opposed. On the loth of September his squadron
was discovered from the masthead of the Laurence
in the northwest. Before going into details of the
action we will examine the force of the two squad-
rons, as the accounts vary considerably.

The tonnage of the British ships, as already stated,
we know exactly, they having been all carefully
appraised and measured by the builder, Mr. Henry
Eckford, and two sea-captains. We also know the
dimensions of the American ships. The Lawrence
and Niagara measured 480 tons apiece. The Cale-
donia, brig, was about the size of the Hunter, or
1 80 tons. The Tigress, Somers, and Scorpion were
subsequently captured by the foe and were then
said to measure, respectively, 96, 94, and 86 tons;
in which case they were larger than similar boats
on Lake Ontario. The Ariel was about the size of
the Hamilton; the Porcupine and Trippe about the
size of the Asp and Pert. As for the guns, Captain
Barclay in his letter gives a complete account of
those on board his squadron. He has also given a
complete account of the American guns, which is
most accurate, and, if anything, underestimates
them. At least Emmons in his "History" gives the

306 Naval War of 1812

Trippe a long 32, while Barclay says she had only
a long 24; and Lossing in his "Field-Book" says
(but I do not know on what authority) that the
Caledonia had 3 long 24*5, while Barclay gives her
2 long 24*5 and one 32-pound carronade; and that
the Somers had two long 32*3, while Barclay gives
her one long 32 and one 24-pound carronade. I
shall take Barclay's account, which corresponds with
that of Emmons, the only difference being that Em-
mons puts a 24-pounder on the Scorpion and a 32 on
the Trippe, while Barclay reverses this. I shall also
follow Emmons in giving the Scorpion a 32-pound
carronade instead of a 24.

It is more difficult to give the strength of the re-
spective crews. James says the Americans had 580,
all "picked men." They were just as much picked
men as Barclay's were, and no more; that is, the
ships had "scratch" crews. Lieutenant Emmons
gives Perry 490 men; and Lossing says he "had
upon his muster-roll 490 names." In Vol. XIV, p.
566, of the American State Papers, is a list of the
prize-moneys owing to each man (or to the survi-
vors of the killed), which gives a grand total of
532 men, including 136 on the Lawrence and 155 on
the Niagara, 45 of whom were volunteers — frontiers-
men. Deducting these we get 487 men, which is
pretty near Lieutenant Emmons' 490. Possibly
Lieutenant Emmons did not include these volun-
teers; and it may be that some of the men whose
names were down on the prize list had been so sick
that they were left on shore. Thus Lieutenant Yar-

On the Lakes 307

nail testified before a Court of Inquiry in 1815, that
there were but 131 men and boys of every descrip-
tion on board the Lawrence in the action ; and the
Niagara was said to have had but 140. Lieutenant
Yarnall also said that "but 103 men on board the
Lawrence were fit for duty'* ; as Captain Perry in his
letter said that 31 were unfit for duty, this would
make a total of 134. So I shall follow the prize-
money list; at any rate the difference in number is
so slight as to be immaterial. Of the 532 men whose
names the list gives, 45 were volunteers, or lands-
men, from among the surrounding inhabitants ; 1 58
were marines or soldiers (I do not know which,
as the list gives marines, soldiers, and privates, and
it is impossible to tell which of the two former heads
include the last) ; and 329 were officers, seamen,
cooks, pursers, chaplains, and supernumeraries. Of
the total number, there were on the day of action,
according to Perry's report, 116 men unfit for duty,
including 31 on board the Lawrence, 28 on board
the Niagara, and 57 on the small vessels.

All the later American writers put the number of
men in Barclay's fleet precisely at "502," but I have
not been able to find out the original authority.
James ("Naval Occurrences," p. 289) says the Brit-
ish had but 345, consisting of 50 seamen, 85 Cana-
dians, and 210 soldiers. But the letter of Adjutant-
General E. Bayne, Nov. 24, 1813, states that there
were 250 soldiers aboard Barclay's squadron, of
whom 23 were killed, 49 wounded, and the balance
(178) captured; and James himself on a previous

308 Naval War of 1812

page (284) states that there were 102 Canadians
on Barclay's vessels, not counting the Detroit, and
we know that Barclay originally joined the squad-
ron with 19 sailors from the Ontario fleet, and that
subsequently 50 sailors came up from the Dover.
James gives at the end of his "Naval Occurrences"
some extracts from the court-martial held on Cap-
tain Barclay. Lieut. Thomas Stokes, of the Queen
Charlotte, there testified that he had on board "be-
tween 1 20 and 130 men,. officers and all together," of
whom "16 came up from the Dover three days be-
fore." James, on p. 284, says her crew already
consisted of no men; adding these 16 gives us 126
(almost exactly "between 120 and 130"). Lieu-
tenant Stokes also testified that the Detroit had more
men on account of being a larger and heavier ves-
sel; to give her 150 is perfectly safe, as her heavier
guns and larger size would at least need 24 men
more than the Queen Charlotte. James gives the
Lady Prevost 76, Hunter 39, Little Belt, 15, and
Chippeway 13 men; Canadians and soldiers, a total
of 143 ; supposing that the number of British sailors
placed on them was proportional to the amount
placed on board the Queen Charlotte, we could add
21. This would make a grand total of 440 men,
which must certainly be near the truth. This num-
ber is corroborated otherwise: General Bayne, as
already quoted, says that there were aboard 250
soldiers, of whom 72 were killed or wounded. Bar-
clay reports a total loss of 135, of whom 63 must
therefore have been sailors or Canadians, and if the

On the Lakes

309

loss suffered by these bore the same proportion to
their whole number as in the case of the soldiers,
there ought to have been 219 sailors and Canadians,
making in all 469 men. It can thus be said with
certainty that there were between 440 and 490 men
aboard, and I shall take the former number, though
I have no doubt that this is too small. But it is
not a point of very much importance, as the battle
was fought largely at long range, where the number
of men, provided there were plenty to handle the
sails and guns, did not much matter. The following
statement of the comparative force must therefore be
very nearly accurate:

PERRY'S SQUADRON.

Name.

Rig.

Tons.

Crevr. fit for

side;

Armament.

Duty.

Ibs.

Lawrence.

brig

480

136 105

300

a long 12'$
18 short 32*1

Niagara.

••

480

I5S "7

300

18 short 32'*

Caledonia,

«

180

53'

80

2 long 24'*
i short 32

Ariel, schooner

112

36

48

4 long u's

Scorpion,

"

86

35

«4

i short 32

Sowers,

••

94

3<>

.84

56 i

!i long 24
i short 32

Porcupine,

u

83

25

3>

i long 32

Tigress,

11

96

17

3»

Trippe,

•loop

60

35J

24

i " 24

g vessels,

i^T

53* (4>6)

936 Ibs.

During the action, however, the Laurence and
Niagara each fought a long 12 instead of one
of the carronades on the engaged side, making a
broadside of 896 Ibs., 288 Ibs. being from long
guns.

310

Naval War of 1812

BARCLAY'S SQUADRON.

Name. Rig.
Detroit, ship

Broadside

490

Queeit Charlotte, " 400

Lady Prcvost, schooner 230

ffunttr,

180

schooner 70
Little Belt, sloop 90

Crew.

Ibs. Armament.

i long 1 8

a " 24*8

150

n8

6 " 12*8

8 " 9J8

t short 24

i ' 18

i long is

126

189

a " 9*8
14 short 24'*

86

75

i long 9
a " 6's

10 short 12*8

4 long 6's

45

so

a " 4's

*

a " 2*8

2 short ia'»

15

9 i long 9

18

,0 i 1 " 12

18 \ a " 6'»

6 vessels,

1,460 440 459 Ibs.

These six vessels thus threw at a broadside 459
Ibs., of which 195 were from long guns.

The superiority of the Americans in long-gun
metal was therefore nearly as three is to two, and
in corronade metal greater than two to one. The
chief fault to be found in the various American ac-
counts is that they sedulously conceal the compara-
tive weight of metal, while carefully specifying the
number of guns. Thus, Lossing says : "Barclay had
35 long guns to Perry's 15, and possessed greatly
the advantage in action at a distance"; which he
certainly did not. The tonnage of the fleets is not
so very important; the above tables are probably
pretty nearly right. It is, I suppose, impossible to
tell exactly the number of men in the two crews.
Barclay almost certainly had more than the 440
men I have given him, but in all likelihood some
of them were unfit for duty, and the number of his

On the Lakes 311

effectives was most probably somewhat less than
Perry's. As the battle was fought in such smooth
water, and part of the time at long range, this, as
already said, does not much matter. The Niagara
might be considered a match for the Detroit, and
the Laurence and Caledonia for the five other Brit-
ish vessels ; so the Americans were certainly very
greatly superior in force.

At daylight on Sept. loth Barclay's squadron was
discovered in the N.W., and Perry at once got under
way; the wind soon shifted to the N.E., giving us
the weather-gage, the breeze being very light. Bar-
clay lay to in a close column, heading to the S.W.
in the following order : Chippeway, Master's Mate J.
Campbell ; Detroit, Captain R. H. Barclay ; Hunter,
Lieutenant G. Bignell ; Queen Charlotte, Captain R.
Finnis; Lady Prevost, Lieutenant Edward Buchan;
and Little Belt, by whom commanded is not said.
Perry came down with the wind on his port beam,
and made the attack in column ahead, obliquely.
First in order came the Ariel, Lieut. John H. Packet,
and Scorpion, Sailing-Master Stephen Champlin,
both being on the weather bow of the Laurence,
Captain O. H. Perry; next came the Caledonia,
Lieut. Daniel Turner ; Niagara, Captain Jesse D. El-
liott; Somers, Lieutenant A. H. M. Conklin ; Por-
cupine, Acting-Master George Serrat; Tigress,
Sailing-Master Thomas C. Almy, and Trippe, Lieu-
tenant Thomas Holdup.28

98 The accounts of the two commanders tally almost ex-
actly. Barclay's letter is a model of its kind for candor and

312 Naval War of 1812

As, amid light and rather baffling winds, the
American squadron approached the enemy, Perry's
straggling line formed an angle of about fifteen de-
grees with the more compact one of his foes. A*
11.45 the Detroit opened the action by a shot from
her long 24, which fell short; at 11.50 she fired a
second which went crashing through the Lawrence,
and was replied to by the Scorpion's long 32. At
11.55 tne Lawrence, having shifted her port bow-
chaser, opened with both the long i2's, and at me-
ridian began with her carronades, but the shot from
the latter all fell short. At the same time the action
became general on both sides, though the rearmost
American vessels were almost beyond the range of
their own guns, and quite out of range of the guns
of their antagonists. Meanwhile the Lawrence was
already suffering considerably as she bore down on
the enemy. It was twenty minutes before she suc-
ceeded in getting within good carronade range, and
during that time the action at the head of the line
was between the long guns of the Chippeway and
Detroit, throwing 123 pounds, and those of the
Scorpion, Ariel, and Lawrence, throwing 104

generosity. Letter of Captain R. H. Barclay to Sir James,
Sept. 2, 1813; of Lieutenant Inglis to Captain Barclay, Sept.
loth ; of Captain Perry to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept.
loth and Sept. isth, and to General Harrison, Sept. nth and
Sept. i3th. I have relied mainly on Lossing's "Field-Book
of the War of 1812" (especially for the diagrams furnished
him by Commodore Champlin), on Commander Ward's
"Naval Tactics," p. 76, and on Cooper's "Naval History."
Extracts from the court-martial on Captain Barclay are
given in James' "Naval Occurrences," Ixxxiii.

On the Lakes 313

pounds. As the enemy's fire was directed almost
exclusively at the Lawrence she suffered a great
deal. The Caledonia, Niagara, and Sowers were
meanwhile engaging, at long range, the Hunter and
Queen Charlotte, opposing from their long guns
96 pounds to the 39 pounds of their antagonists,
while from a distance the three other American gun-
vessels engaged the Prevost and Little Belt. By
12.20 the Laurence had worked down to close quar-
ters, and at 12.30 the action was going on with
great fury between her and her antagonists, within
canister range. The raw and inexperienced Ameri-
can crews committed the same fault the British so
often fell into on the ocean, and overloaded their
carronades. In consequence, that of the Scorpion
upset down the hatchway in the middle of the action,
and the sides of the Detroit were dotted with marks
from shot that did not penetrate. One of the Ariel's
long I2's also burst. Barclay fought the Detroit
exceedingly well, her guns being most excellently
aimed, though they actually had to be discharged by
flashing pistols at the touchholes, so deficient was the
ship's equipment. Meanwhile the Caledonia came
down too, but the Niagara was wretchedly handled,
Elliott keeping at a distance which prevented the
use either of his carronades or of those of the Queen
Charlotte, his antagonist; the latter, however, suf-
fered greatly from the long guns of the opposing
schooners, and lost her gallant commander, Captain
Finnis, and first lieutenant, Mr. Stokes, who were
killed early in the action; her next in command,

VOL. IX.-14

314 Naval War of 1812

Provincial Lieutenant Irvine, perceiving that he
could do no good, passed the Hunter and joined in
the attack on the Lawrence, at close quarters. The
Niagara, the most efficient and best-manned of the
American vessels, was thus almost Kept out of the
action by her captain's misconduct. At the end of
the line the fight went on at long range between the
Somers, Tigress, Porcupine, and Trippe on one side,
and Little Belt and Lady Prevost on the other; the
Lady Prevost making a very noble fight, although
her 12-pound carronades rendered her almost help-
less against the long guns of the Americans. She
was greatly cut up, her commander, Lieutenant
Buchan, was dangerously, and her acting first lieu-
tenant, Mr. Roulette, severely, wounded, and she
began falling gradually to leeward.

The fighting at the head of the line was fierce
and bloody to an extraordinary degree. The Scor-
pion, Ariel, Lawrence, and Caledonia, all of them
handled with the most determined courage, were
opposed to the Chippeway, Detroit, Queen Char-
lotte, and Hunter, which were fought to the full
as bravely. At such close quarters the two sides
engaged on about equal terms, the Americans being
superior in weight of metal, and inferior in number
of men. But the Lawrence had received such dam-
age in working down as to make the odds against
Perry. On each side almost the whole fire was di-
rected at the opposing large vessel or vessels ; in con-
sequence the Queen Charlotte was almost disabled,
and the Detroit was also frightfully shattered, es-

On the Lakes 315

pecially by the raking fire of the gunboats, her first
lieutenant, Mr. Garland, being mortally wounded,
and Captain Barclay so severely injured that he was
obliged to quit the deck, leaving his ship in the
command of Lieutenant George Inglis. But on
board the Laurence matters had gone even worse,
the combined fire of her adversaries having made
the grimmest carnage on her decks. Of the 103
men who were fit for duty when she began the ac-
tion, 83, or over four-fifths, were killed or wounded.
The vessel was shallow, and the ward-room, used as
a cock-pit, to which the wounded were taken, was
mostly above water, and the shot came through it
continually, killing and wounding many men under
the hands of the surgeon.

The first lieutenant, Yarnall, was three times
wounded, but kept to the deck through all ; the only
other lieutenant on board, Brooks, of the marines,
was mortally wounded. Every brace and l^owline
was shot away, and the brig almost completely dis-
mantled ; her hull was shattered to pieces, many shot
going completely through it. and the guns on the
engaged side were by degrees all dismounted. Perry
kept up the fight with splendid courage. As the
crew fell one by one, the commodore called down
through the skylight for one of the surgeon's as-
sistants; and this call was repeated and obeyed till
none was left; then he asked, "Can any of the
wounded pull a rope?'* and three or four of them
crawled up on deck to lend a feeble hand in placing
the last guns. Perry himself fired the last effective

316 Naval War of 1812

heavy gun, assisted only by the purser and chaplain.
A man who did not possess his indomitable spirit
would have then struck. Instead, however, although
failing in the attack so far, Perry merely determined
to win by new methods, and remodeled the line ac-
cordingly. Mr. Turner, in the Caledonia, when or-
dered to close, had put his helm up, run down on the
opposing line, and engaged at very short range,
though the brig was absolutely without quarters.
The Niagara had thus become the next in line astern
of the Lawrence, and the sloop Trippe, having
passed the three schooners in front of her, was next
ahead. The Niagara now, having a breeze, steered
for the head of Barclay's line, passing over a quarter
of a mile to windward of the Lawrence, on her port
beam. She was almost uninjured, having so far
taken very little part in the combat, and to her Perry
shifted his flag. Leaping into a row boat, with his
brother and four seamen, he rowed to the fresh brig,
where he arrived at 2.30, and at once sent Elliott
astern to hurry up the three schooners. The Trippe
was now very near the Caledonia. The Lawrence,
having but 14 sound men left, struck her colors, but
could not be taken possession of before the action re-
commenced. She drifted astern, the Caledonia pass-
ing between her and her foes. At 2.45 the
schooners having closed up, Perry in his fresh ves-
sel, bore up to break Barclay's line.

The British ships had fought themselves to a
standstill. The Lady Prevost was- crippled and
sagged to leeward, though ahead of the others. The

On the Lakes 317

Detroit and Queen Charlotte were so disabled that
they could not effectually oppose fresh antagonists.
There could thus be but little resistance to Perry,
as the Niagara stood down, and broke the British
line, firing- her port guns into the Chippcway, Little
Belt, and Lady Prevost, and the starboard ones into
the Detroit, Queen Charlotte, and Hunter, raking on
both sides. Too disabled to tack, the Detroit and
Charlotte tried to wear, the latter running up to lee-
ward of the former ; and, both vessels having every
brace and almost every stay shot away, they fell
foul. The Niagara luffed athwart their bows, with-
in half pistol-shot, keeping up a terrific discharge of
great guns and musketry, while on the other side the
British vessels were raked by the Caledonia and
the schooners so closely that some of their grape
shot, passing over the foe, rattled through Perry's
spars. Nothing further could be done, and Bar-
clay's flag was struck at 3 P.M., after three and a
quarter hours' most gallant and desperate fighting.
The Chippeu'ay and Little Belt tried to escape, but
were overtaken and brought to respectively by the
Trippe and Scorpion, the commander of the latter,
Mr. Stephen Champlin, firing the last, as he had the
first, shot of the battle. "Captain Perry has be-
haved in the most humane and attentive manner, not
only to myself and officers, but to all the wounded,"
writes Captain Barclay.

The American squadron had suffered severely,
more than two-thirds of the loss falling upon the
Lawrence, which was reduced to the condition of a*

318 Naval War of 1812

perfect wreck, her starboard bulwarks being com-
pletely beaten in. She had, as already stated, 22
men killed, including Lieutenant of Marines Brooks
and Midshipman Lamb; and 61 wounded, including
Lieutenant Yarnall, Midshipman (acting second
leutenant) Forrest, Sailing-master Taylor, Purser
Hambleton, and Midshipmen Swartout and Clax-
ton. The Niagara lost 2 killed and 25 wounded (al-
most a fifth of her effective), including among
the latter the second lieutenant, Mr. Edwards, and
Midshipman Cummings. The Caledonia had 3,
the Somers 2, and Trippe 2, men wounded. The
Ariel had i killed and 3 wounded; the Scorpion 2
killed, including Midshipman Lamb. The total loss
was 123; 27 were killed and 96 wounded, of whom
3 died.

The British loss, falling most heavily on the De-
troit and Queen Charlotte, amounted to 41 killed
(including Capt. S. J. Garden, R.N., and Captain R.
A. Finnis), and 94 wounded (including Captain
Barclay and Lieutenants Stokes, Buchan, Roulette,
and Bignall) : in all 145. The first and second in
command on every vessel were killed or wounded,
a sufficient proof of the desperate nature of the
defence.

The victory of Lake Erie was most important,
both in its material results and in its moral effect.
It gave us complete command of all the upper lakes,
prevented any fears of invasion from that quarter,
increased our prestige with the foe and our confi-
dence in ourselves, and ensured the conquest of up-

On the Lakes 319

per Canada; in all these respects its importance has
not been overrated. But the "glory" acquired by it
most certainly has been estimated at more than its
worth. Most Americans, even the well educated, if
asked which was the most glorious victory of the
war, would point to this battle. Captain Perry's
name is more widely known than that of any other
commander. Every schoolboy reads about him, if
of no other sea-captain ; yet he certainly stands on
a lower grade than either Hull or Macdonough,
and not a bit higher than a dozen others. On Lake
Erie our seamen displayed great courage and skill ;
but so did their antagonists. The simple truth is,
that, where on both sides the officers and men were
equally brave and skilful, the side which possessed
the superiority in force, in the proportion of three to
two, could not well help winning. The courage
with which the Lawrence was defended has hardly
ever been surpassed, and may fairly be called heroic;
but equal praise belongs to the men on board the
Detroit, who had to discharge the great guns by
flashing pistols at the touchholes, and yet made such
a terribly effective defence. Courage is only one
of the many elements which go to make up the char-
acter of a first-class commander; something more
than bravery is needed before a leader can be really
called great.

There happened to be circumstances which ren-
dered the bragging of our writers over the victory
somewhat plausible. Thus they could say with an
appearance of truth that the enemy had 63 guns

320 Naval War of 1812

to our 54, and outnumbered us. In reality, as well
as can be ascertained from the conflicting evidence,
he was inferior in number; but a few men more or

The following diagrams will serve to explain the movements.

less mattered nothing. Both sides had men enough
to work the guns and handle the ships, especially
as the fight was in smooth water, and largely -at

On the Lakes 321

long range. The important fact was that though
we had nine guns less, yet, at a broadside, they
threw half as much metal again as those of our
antagonist. With such odds in our favor it would

••-.. s> aiLf

- "^ ;-...

tm»it '**** tnt

^ f . rm**r * *rm +*A " "

T& tiff ft

i

AltCA/tl

1^0 P.M.

have been a disgrace to have been beaten. The
water was too smooth for our two brigs to show
at their best ; but this very smoothness rendered our
gunboats more formidable than any of the British

322 Naval War of 1812

vessels, and the British testimony is unanimous,
that it was to them the defeat was primarily due.
The American fleet came into action in worse form
than the hostile squadron, the ships straggling badly,
either owing to Perry having formed his line badly,
or else to his having failed to train the subordinate
commanders how to keep their places. The Niagara
was not fought well at first, Captain Elliott keeping
her at a distance that prevented her from doing any
damage to the vessels opposed, which were battered
to pieces by the gunboats without the chance of re-
plying. It certainly seems as if the small vessels
at the rear of the line should have been closer up,
and in a position to render more effectual assistance ;
the attack was made in too loose order, and, whether
it was the fault of Perry or of his subordinates, it
fails to reflect credit on the Americans. Cooper, as
usual, praises all concerned; but in this instance
not with very good judgment. He says the line-
of-battle was highly judicious, but this may be
doubted. The weather was peculiarly suitable for
the gunboats, with their long, heavy guns; and yet
the line-of-battle was so arranged as to keep them
in the rear, and let the brunt of the assault fall on
the Lawrence, with her short carronades. Cooper
again praises Perry for steering for the head of
the enemy's line, but he could hardly have done any-
thing else. In this battle the firing seems to have
been equally skilful on both sides, the Detroit's long
guns being peculiarly well served; but the British
captains manoeuvred better than their foes at first,

On the Lakes 323

and supported one another better, so that the dis-
parity in damage done on each side was not equal
to the disparity in force. The chief merit of the
American commander and his followers was indom-
itable courage, and determination not to be beaten.
This is no slight merit ; but it may well be doubted
if it would have ensured victory had Barclay's force
been as strong as Perry's. Perry made a headlong
attack ; his superior force, whether through his fault
or his misfortune can hardly be said, being brought
into action in such a manner that the head of the
line was crushed by the inferior force opposed.
Being literally hammered out of his own ship, Perry
brought up its powerful twin-sister, and the already
shattered hostile squadron was crushed by sheer
weight. The manoeuvres which marked the close
of the battle, and which ensured the capture of all
the opposing ships, were unquestionably very fine.
The British ships were fought as resolutely as
their antagonists, not being surrendered till they
were crippled and helpless, and almost all the offi-
cers, and a large proportion of the men placed hors
de combat. Captain Barclay handled his ships like
a first-rate seaman. It was impossible to arrange
them so as to be superior to his antagonist, for the
latter's force was of such a nature that in smooth
water his gunboats gave him a great advantage,
while in any sea his two brigs were more than a
match for the whole British squadron. In short,
our victory was due to our heavy metal. As regards
the honor of the affair, in spite of the amount of

324 Naval War of 1812

boasting it has given rise to, I should say it was a
battle to be looked upon as in an equally high degree
creditable to both sides. Indeed, if it were not for
the fact that the victory was so complete, it might
be said that the length of the contest and the trifling
disparity in loss reflected rather the most credit on
the British. Captain Perry showed indomitable
pluck and readiness to adapt himself to circum-
stances; but his claim to fame rests much less on
his actual victory than on the way in which he pre-
pared the fleet that was to win it. Here his energy
and activity deserve all praise, not only for his
success in collecting sailors and vessels and in build-
ing the two brigs, but above all for the manner
in which he succeeded in getting them out on the
lake. On that occasion he certainly out-generaled
Barclay; indeed the latter committed an error that
the skill and address he subsequently showed could
not retrieve. But it will always be a source of sur-
prise that the American public should have so glori-
fied Perry's victory over an inferior force, and have
paid comparatively little attention to Macdonough's
victory, which really was won against decided odds
in ships, men, and metal.

There are always men who consider it unpatriotic
to tell the truth, if the truth is not very flattering;
but, aside from the morality of the case, we never
can learn how to produce a certain effect unless we
know rightly what the causes were that produced
a similar effect in times past. Lake Erie teaches us
the advantage of having the odds on our side;

On the Lakes 325

Lake Champlain, that, even if they are not, skill
can still counteract them. It is amusing to read
some of the pamphlets written "in reply" to Cooper's
account of this battle, the writers apparently regard-
ing him as a kind of traitor for hinting that the vic-
tory was not "Nelsonic," "unsurpassed." etc. The
arguments are stereotyped : Perry had 9 fewer guns,
and also fewer men than the foe. This last point
is the only one respecting which there is any doubt.
Taking sick and well together, the Americans un-
questionably had the greatest number in crew; but
a quarter of them were sick. Even deducting these
they were still, in all probability, more numerous
than their foes.

But it is really not a point of much consequence,
as both sides had enough, as stated, to serve the
guns and handle the ships. In sea-fights, after there
are enough hands for those purposes additional ones
are not of so much advantage. I have in all my
accounts summed up as accurately as possible the
contending forces, because it is so customary with
British writers to follow James' minute and inac-
curate statements, that I thought it best to give
everything exactly; but it was really scarcely nec-
essary, and, indeed, it is impossible to compare
forces numerically. Aside from a few exceptional
cases, the number of men, after a certain point was
reached, made little difference. For example, the
Java would fight just as effectually with 377 men,
the number James gives her, as with 426, the num-
ber I think she really had. Again, my figures make

326 Naval War of 1812

the Wasp slightly superior in force to the Frolic,
as she had 25 men the most; but in reality, as the
battle was fought under very short sail, and decided
purely by gunnery, the difference in number of crew
was not of the least consequence. The Hornet had
nine men more than the Penguin, and it would be
absurd to say that this gave her much advantage.
In both the latter cases, the forces were practically
equal, although, numerically expressed, the odds
were in favor of the Americans. The exact reverse
is the case in the last action of the Constitution.
Here, the Levant and Cyane had all the men they
required, and threw a heavier broadside than their
foe. Expressed in numbers, the odds against them
were not great, but numbers could not express the
fact that carronades were opposed to long guns, and
two small ships to one big one. Again, though in
the action on Lake Champlain numbers do show a
slight advantage both in weight, metal, and number
of men on the British side, they do not make the
advantage as great as it really was, for they do not
show that the British possessed a frigate with a
main-deck battery of 24-pounders, which was equal
to the two chief vessels of the Americans, exactly
as the Constitution was superior to the Cyane and
Levant.29 And on the same principles I think that

29 It must always be remembered that these rules cut both
ways. British writers are very eloquent about the disadvan-
tage in which carronades placed the Cyane and Levant, but
do not hint that the Essex suffered from a precisely similar
cause, in addition to her other misfortunes; either they

On the Lakes 327

every fair-minded man must admit the great supe-
riority of Perry's fleet over Barclay's, though the
advantage was greater in carronades than in long
guns.

But to admit this by no means precludes us from
taking credit for the victory. Almost all the victo-
ries gained by the English over the Dutch in the
1 7th century were due purely to great superiority
in force. The cases have a curious analogy to this
lake battle. Perry won with 54 guns against Bar-
clay's 63 ; but the odds were largely in his favor.
Blake won a doubtful victory on the i8th of Feb-
ruary, 1653, with 80 ships against Tromp's 70; but
the English vessels were twice the size of the Dutch,
and in number of men and weight of metal greatly
their superior. The English were excellent fighters,

should give the Constitution more credit or the Phoebe less.
So the Confiance, throwing 480 pounds of metal at a broad-
side, was really equal to both the Eagle and Saratoga, who
jointly threw 678. From her long guns she threw 384 pounds,
from her carronades 96. Their long guns threw 168, their
carronades 510. Now the 32-pound carronade, mounted on
the spar-deck of a 38-gun frigate, was certainly much less
formidable than the long 18 on the main-deck; indeed, it
probably ranked more nearly with a long 12, in the ordinary
chances of war (and it must be remembered that Downie
was the attacking party and chose his own position, so far
as Macdonough's excellent arrangements would let him).
So that in comparing the forces, the carronades should not
be reckoned for more than half the value of the long guns,
and we get, as a mere approximation, 384 -(- 48 = 432, against
168 4- 255 — 423. At any rate, British writers, as well as
Americans, should remember that if the Constitution was
greatly superior to her two foes, then the Confiance was
certainly equal to the Eagle and Saratoga , and vice versa.

328 Naval War of 1812

but no better than the Dutch, and none of their
admirals of that period deserves to rank with De
Ruyter. Again, the great victory of La Hogue was
won over a very much smaller French fleet, after
a day's hard fighting, which resulted in the capture
of one vessel! This victory was most exultingly
chronicled, yet it was precisely as if Perry had
fought Barclay all day and only succeeded in captur-
ing the Little Belt. Most of Lord Nelson's suc-
cesses were certainly won against heavy odds by
his great genius and the daring skill of the captains
who served under him,; but the battle of the Baltic,
as far as the fighting went, reflected as much honor
on the defeated Danes as on the mighty sea-chief
who conquered them. Many a much- vaunted vic-
tory, both on sea and land, has really reflected less
credit on the victors than the battle of Lake Erie
did on the Americans. And it must always be re-
membered that a victory, honorably won, if even
over a weaker foe, does reflect credit on the nation
by whom it is gained. It was creditable to us as a
nation that our ships were better made and better
armed than the British frigates, exactly as it was
creditable to them that a few years before their ves-
sels had stood in the same relation to the Dutch
ships.30 It was greatly to our credit that we had

30 After Lord Duncan's victory at Camperdown, James
chronicled the fact that all the captured line-of-battle ships
were such poor craft as not to be of as much value as so
many French frigates. This at least showed that the Dutch
sailors must have done well to have made such a bloody and

On the Lakes 329

been enterprising enough to fit out such an effective
little flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this Perry de-
serves the highest praise.31

Before leaving the subject it is worth while mak-
ing a few observations on the men who composed
the crews. James, who despised a Canadian as
much as he hated an American, gives as one excuse
for the defeat, the fact that most of Barclay's crew
were Canadians, whom he considers to be "sorry
substitutes." On each side the regular sailors, from
the seaboard, were not numerous enough to permit
the battle to be fought purely by them. Barclay
took a number of soldiers of the regular army, and
Perry a number of militia, aboard ; the former had
a few Indian sharp-shooters, the latter quite a num-
ber of negroes. A great many men in each fleet
were lake sailors, frontiersmen, and these were the
especial objects of James' contempt; but it may be
doubted if they, thoroughly accustomed to lake navi-
gation, used to contests with Indians and whites,
naturally forced to be good sailors, and skilful in
the use of rifle and cannon, were not, when trained
by good men and on their own waters, the very best
possible material. Certainly the battle of Lake Erie,
fought mainly by Canadians, was better contested

obstinate fight as they did, with the materials they had.
According to his own statements, the loss was about propor
tional to the forces in action. It was another parallel to
Perry's victory.

81 Some of my countrymen will consider this but scant ap-
probation, to which the answer must be that a history is not
a panegyric.

330 Naval War of 1812

than that of Lake Champlain, fought mainly by
British.

The difference between the American and British
seamen on the Atlantic was small, but on the lakes
what little there was disappeared. A New Eng-
lander and an Old Englander differed little enough,
but they differed more than a frontiersman born
north of the line did from one born south of it.
These last two resembled one another more nearly
than either did the parent. There had been no long-
established naval school on the lakes, and the British
sailors that came up there were the best of their
kind; so the combatants were really so evenly
matched in courage, skill, and all other fighting
qualities, as to make it impossible to award the palm
to either for these attributes. The dogged obstinacy
of the righting, the skilful firing and manoeuvring,
and the daring and coolness with which cutting-out
expeditions were planned and executed, were as
marked on one side as the other. The only un-
English element in the contest was the presence
among the Canadian English of some of the de-
scendants of the Latin race from whom they had
conquered the country. Otherwise the men were
equally matched, but the Americans owed their suc-
cess— for the balance of success was largely on their
side — to the fact that their officers had been trained
in the best and most practical, although the smallest,
navy of the day. The British sailors on the lakes
were as good as our own, but no better. None of
their commanders compares with Macdonough.

On the Lakes 331

Perry deserves all praise for the manner in which
he got his fleet ready ; his victory over Barclay was
precisely similar to the quasi-victories of Blake over
the Dutch, which have given that admiral such
renown. Blake's success in attacking Spanish and
Algerian forts is his true title to fame. In his
engagements with the Dutch fleets (as well as in
those of Monk, after him) his claim to merit is no
greater and no less than Perry's. Each made a
headlong attack, with furious, stubborn courage, and
by dint of sheer weight crushed or disabled a greatly
inferior foe. In the fight that took place on Feb.
18, 1653, De Ruyter's ship carried but 34 guns,32
and yet with it he captured the Prosperous of 54;
which vessel was stronger than any in the Dutch
fleet. The fact that Blake's battles were generally
so indecisive must be ascribed to the fact that his
opponents were, though inferior in force, superior
in skill. No decisive defeat was inflicted on the
Dutch until Tromp's death. Perry's operations were
on a very small, and Blake's on a very large, scale:
but whereas Perry left no antagonists to question
his claim to victory, Blake's successes were suffi-
ciently doubtful to admit of his antagonists in almost
every instance claiming that they had won, or else
that it was a draw. Of course it is absurd to put
Perry and Blake on a par, for one worked with a

w "La Vie et Les Actions Memorables de Lt.-Admiral
Michel De Ruyter" (Amsterdam, 1677), p. 23. By the way.
why is Tromp always called Van Tromp by English writers?
It would be quite as correct for a Frenchman to speak of
MacNelson.

332 Naval War of 1812

fleet forty times the strength of the other's flotilla;
but the way in which the work was done was very
similar. And it must always be remembered that
when Perry fought this battle he was but 27 years
old; and the commanders of his other vessels were
younger still.

CHAMPLAIN

The commander on this lake at this time was
Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, who had super-
seded the former commander, Lieutenant Sydney
Smith, — whose name was a curious commentary on
the close inter-relationship of the two contesting
peoples. The American naval force now consisted
of two sloops, the Growler and Eagle, each mount-
ing ii guns, and six galleys, mounting one gun
each. Lieutenant Smith was sent down with his
two sloops to harass the British gunboats, which
were stationed round the head of Sorel River, the
outlet to Lake Champlain. On June 3d he chased
three gunboats into the river, the wind being aft,
up to within sight of the fort of Isle-aux-noix. A
strong British land-force, under Major-General Tay-
lor, now came up both banks of the narrow stream,
and joined.the three gunboats in attacking the sloops.
The latter tried to beat up the stream, but the cur-
rent was so strong and the wind so light that no
headway could be made. The gunboats kept out
of range of the sloop's guns, while keeping up a
hot fire from their long 24'$, to which no reply
could be made; but the galling fire of the infantry
who lined the banks was responded to by showers

On the Lakes 333

of grape. After three hours' conflict, at 12.30,
a 24-pound shot from one of the galleys struck the
Eagle under her starboard quarter, and ripped out
a whole plank under water. She sank at once, but
it was in such shoal water that she did not settle
entirely, and none of the men were drowned. Soon
afterward the Growler had her forestay and main-
boom shot away, and, becoming unmanageable, ran
ashore and was also captured. The Growler had
i killed and 8 wounded, the Eagle n wounded;
their combined crews, including 34 volunteers,
amounted to 112 men. The British gunboats
suffered no loss; of the troops on shore three
were wounded, one dangerously, by grape.33 Lieu-
tenant Smith had certainly made a very plucky
fight, but it was a great mistake to get cooped up
in a narrow channel, with wind and current dead
against him. It was a very creditable success to
the British, and showed the effectiveness of well-
handled gunboats under certain circumstances. The
possession of these two sloops gave the command
of the lake to the British. Macdonough at once
set about building others, but with all his energy
the materials at hand were so deficient that he could
not get them finished in time. On July 3ist, 1,000
British troops, under Col. J. Murray, convoyed by
Captain Thomas Everard, with the sloops Chubb
and Finch (late Growler and Eagle) and three gun-

88 Letter from Major-General Taylor (British) to Major-
General Stone, June 3, 1813. Lossing says the loss of the
British was "probably at least one hundred"— on what au-
thority, if any, I do not know.

334

Naval War of 1812

boats, landed at Plattsburg and destroyed all the
barracks and stores both there and at Saranac. For
some reason Colonel Murray left so precipitately
that he overlooked a picket of 20 of his men, who
were captured; then he made descents on two or
three other places, and returned to the head of the
lake by Aug. 3d. Three days afterward, on Aug.
6th, Macdonough completed his three sloops, the
President, Montgomery, and Preble, of 7 guns each,
and also six gunboats; which force enabled him to
prevent any more plundering expeditions taking
place that summer, and to convoy Hampton's troops
when they made an abortive effort to penetrate into
Canada by the Sorel River on Sept. 2ist

BRITISH LOSS ON THE LAKES DURING 1813.

Name.

Tons.

Guns.

Ship,

600

24

Gloucester,

180

10

Mary,

80

3

Drummond,
Lady Gore,

80
80

3

3

Schooner,

80

3

Detroit,

490

'9

Queen Charlotte^

400

>7

Lady Prevost,
Hunter,

Z

'3
to

Chippeway,

70

t

little Belt,

90

3

Remarks.

Burnt on stocks.
Taken at York.
Burnt.
Captured.

12 vessels,

Name.
Growler*

2,560

109

AMERICAN LOSS.*

.2 vessels,

Tons.

112
110

••'•i ••••

222

Guns.

II
fl

22

Remarks.
CapjHired.

Excluding the Growler and /#//#, which were recaptured.

S

0>

•
O)

\D S^
CO *S

§ S

5 £

University of Toronto

Library

DO NOT

REMOVE

THE

CARD

FROM

THIS

POCKET

Acme Library Card Pocket

U»der Pat. "Rel. Index Flit"
Made by LIBRARY BUREAU