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■  ^'-M^. 


«i  tx.'i'i^A^a'^r?) 


i 


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in  2007  with  funding  from 

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LAND    &  ^?C^ATER 


lor  "LdiKi  ("Hf    Il'a'er." 


Bj;  loui«  KaemafJ.crs. 


THEIR    SACRIFICE. 

For  Humanity's  Sake. 


LAND      AND      W  A  T  p:  R 


Janua'-/  6,  1916. 


1  FICi  1  en  to  buy  for  your  own 
use  and  to  give  to  your  friends  on 
Active   Service  is  the 

Always  Reliable 


Read  this  from  DR.  DILLON,  just 
to   hand   from  Rome — 

.  "  Dec.  7th,  1915. 
"  I  liiive  pleasure  in  testifying  my  appreciation  of  the  Waterman's 
Ideal  Fountain  Pen.  1  first  tested  it  in  Kurdi.staii  on  my  way  to 
Arnieii'.a  in  18?4,  and  1  use  I  it  in  describing  the  Armenian  inasf^acres 
of  that  and  the  following  years.  1  employed  it  during  the  Boxer 
trouble  in  China,  at  ihe  Peace  Negotiations  in  Portsmouth,  the 
insurrectionary  movement  in  Uu.'^sia,  the  revolution  in  Portugal, 
at  the  London  Peace  Conference,  and  at  the  Conference  in  Bucharest. 
1  have  had  most  of  the  important  Treaties  of  recent  years  signed 
with  the  Waterman's  Ideal  Fountain  Pen,  which  I  take  with  me 
wherever   I   go." 


i.l 


bj^ 


For  iKe  Regular  Type.  10^6andupwatds. 
Kor  the  SAFETY  anHlhe  New  Lever 
f'ocliei    Seli-FiUins   Typis.     18/6  *i>d 

upwards- 


Safely  Type,  best  for  Active  Service. 

Nibi  'o  suit  all    hands  (fKchanse'*   grnlil 

jf    ot  right'.     Every  pen  gua  anteed.       In 

silver  an    gold  for  i  reieotation. 


01  Slatio'irrs  and  Jeifelltrs  all  oier  the  world.     Vooklet  free  from 

L.  G.  Sloan,  CI)c'|leii<!^OTuer  Kingsway,  London. 


To  H.M.    War    Office,    H.M.  Colonial 

Office,   India  Office.    London    County 

Councit,  Metropolitan  Asylums  Board, 

Guy's  Hospital,  &c. 

the  British  Red 


Garrould's 

Offioial  Contractors : — To  t 
Cross  Society  and  the  St.  John  Ambulance 
Association.. 

Complete  Equipment  of  Nurses  oP  A  T^  fW  W  A  D 
for  Home  Detachments  and  the  Oi:<A.  1    VJC    VV  n.tS. 

Ladies  are  invited  to  visit  th: 

HOSPITAL    NURSES'     SALOON 

All    Surgical    Implements   and    Appliances   in   Stock. 

.IUu$trated    Catalogue    of    Nurses*    Uitifonns,    etc. 
Post  Free. 


^PV    Official  Coat  for  Ihe 

St.        John        Ambulance, 

V.A.D.  Members. 

In  special   Urey   Serge  for 

Winter  wear,  25/6. 
To  special  measure,  28/6. 
In  Black  Cravenettc  for 
.  Warm  .Cliiiiatcs,  31/6. 
OfDcial  Hat  in  best 
quality  Blacli  Felt,  post 
tree,   6/11. 


The  Official  Coat  of 
the  British  Red  Cross 
Society.  0|^> 

jtlade  of  good  quality  West 
of   Krigland  Serge."  29/6. 

In     Fine     tjravenette, 
for  Warm  Climates,  31/6. 

Oaidal  Hat.  in  good 
quality  .Navy  Felt,  po^t 
free,  6/6. 


Also  nniL'ial  Coat  and 
Skirt  (Douijle  Breasted), 
in  Blaik  Serge.  Kl-  and 
52/6 

Write  for  Official  Uniform  Catalogue 

Cross  Society.     Post  tret. 

INVALID      CHAIRS      of      every 

di'scrij'tian.  Prices  and  illustfatiolis 
?cnl  post  free. 

CRUTCHES  in  maple,  polished 
wood,  4/6  pair;  with  nitttier  .sliuos 
5/6  pair.  Black  polished  with 
padded  heads  and  rubber  slioes 
12/6  pair. 

HOT     WATER 
BOTTLES. 
(Ruld)er.) 
Kniili.'.h    Manii- 
frtcture.         l-;ach 
Bottle       guaran- 
teed    at     sfteeial 
ttrice>. 

10  hv  «  in.  3/3 
1:;  by  e  in.     3/11 

10  by  8  In.  4 '3 
I'i  bv  g  in.  4/9 
H  by  8  in.  6/3 
M  liy  18  in.     6/6 

11  t'v  10  in.  6/3 
K   b\    1(1  ill.      6/9 


Also      Onii'iiil     Coat     and 

Skirt    (Single    Breasted). 

in  all  wtwl   Serge.  Tailor 

made   42/-,  I'iiie   Coatinji 

I        Serge.  52/6. 

of   Ihe   St.   John    Ambulance 


and    British    Red 


APRON,  as  illus. 
tration.  in  Atout 
linen-flnislicd  Cloth 
-mn        2/6  i-ach. 

NEW    REGULATION 
CAP,  made  of  fine 
bemstiti-hed   Lawn, 
two  sizes. 
27  X  is)   ,,  , 

SLEEVES.  SSd.  pair 
COLLAR,  as  illus. 
trati'T-.    6|d.    eai  li. 

REGULATION 
OVERALL,   in  blue- 
grcv   (fitton   Cloth, 
7/6  cub,         iw 

BLACK  PATENT 
LEATHER      BELT. 

to  wear  with  Over- 
all,   l)in.,   1/3t   ea. 

irrmiiil.     Loniinri  ' 


liiiiiiiiimiimiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiKiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiniiiiU: 


I  WAR 

I  Accuracy 

=  Send  him  this 

=  fine     Wristlet 

S  He  will  be  proud  to  wear  it, 

=:  delighted   that    your    afiection 

=  for    him    should   take    such  a 

=  practical  form. 

=  In  War  as  in  Peace,   the  Waltham 

=  marvellously  accurate   timekeeper.     Right    through       — 

=  the    long    striggle    on    iln  Western    Front,   in  the       — 

=  Dardanelles,     and     on    the     North     Sea,    Wristlet       s 

=  Walthams    have    been     found    to    be    thoroughly       S 

=  ttuitwcrthy.                                                                         — 

=  This   is  real  War  Accuracy,  tlu-  hardest  test  of  all      S 

=  for  a  watch.                                                                              — 

=  Send  him  a  Waltham — he's  wortliy  of  the  best.                 S 

I  WalihamWatches  | 

ZZ  0/  all   Reliable    Watchmalters  and  Jeue'-'crs.                         — 

=  WALTHAM     WRISTLETS    IN    SILVKH    CASES.                 = 


For    Gentlenen 
.Maximus        £11156  Su   lf.S  £4  1€S 
Kiverside  fl  00  No.  16;      S  99 

Lady  Waltham  €98  .No.  100     S  S  0 


Maximus 
Kiverside 

Ruby 
Sapphire 


For   Ladies. 


ill  II 
«  0 
7  fl 
6  13 


ALSO  IX  GOLD  Ac  ItOLLEl)  GOLD   CASKS.      LUMIXOCS  DIALS  EXTltA. 

SEND  TO-DAY  FOR 
WRISTLET  WATCH  PAMPHLET. 


FREE. 


~  WALTHAM  WATCH  CO    Depi.  63).  125  HigliHo'.born,  London  W.C.      S 

^IllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllJr 


E.  &  R.  GARROULD,  150-1V2'  edgware  RD.rLONDON,  w. 


Hotel  Cecil 

THE 

COST  of  LIVING  REDUCED 

DURING  THE  WAR 

Exceptional  inclusive  terms  to 

RESIDENTS  and  OFFICERS. 

Self-contained  Suites  and  Bedrooms 
with  Private   Bathrooms. 


Telephone  :    GERRARD  60.        jJpply,    MANAGER, 

HOTEL   CECIL.   STRAND. 


Od'i 


January  G,  1916. 


L  A  N  D      A  N  I)      \\  A  T  E  R  . 


OUR    MOBILISABLE   STRENGTH. 

By     HILAIRE      BELLOC. 

NOTE.-TI.i8  Article  has  been  submitted  to  the  Press  Bureau,  which  do3S  not  object  to  the  publication  as  censored,  and  lakes  no 

responsibility  for  the  correctness  of  the  statements. 

In  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  the  Press  Bureau,  the  positions  of  troops  on  Plans   illustrating   this   Article   must  only  be 
regarded  as  approximate,  and  no  definite  strength  at  any  point  is  indicated. 


THE  most  interesting  points  arising  with 
regard  to  the  great  war  this  week— 
that  is,  up  to  the  moment  of  writing- 
are  not  points  concerning  movements  of 
troops  or  susceptible  of  analysis  by  description  of 
ground.  They  rather  concern  the  two  questions 
of  (i)  British  numbers,  which  have  so  powerfully 
affected  and  even  divided  opinion  in  this  country 
during  the  last  few  days,  and  the  very  interesting 
minor  points  of  (2)  the  reliability  of  German  com- 
muniques, both  with  regard  to  wastage  and  other 
matters  as  tested  by  the  recent  striking  object- 
lesson  of  the  Hartsmannweilerkopf  figures  wiiich 
we  have  been  able  to  submit  to  analysis  in  a  rather 
exceptional  fashion,  from  the  presence  of  Neutral 
and  British  witnesses  and  from  the  striking 
contradiction  between  the  French  and  the  German 
figures. 

Let  us  suppose  that  Great  Britain  and  Ireland 
were  a  Continental  group,  possessed  of  the  popula- 
tion they  have  to-day,  self-contained,  so  far  as  the 
sheer  necessities  of  civil  life  were  concerned,  and 
suffering  or  enduring  a  complete  system  of  con- 
scription, such  as  the  French  alone  of  the  great 
Powers  have  established. 

What  would  be  the  mobilisable  strength  of  the 
nation  under  these  conditions  ?  (To  which  may 
be  added  the  necessity  of  supporting  a  much  smaller 
fleet,  but  not  the  necessity  of  building  or  main- 
taining or  manning  any  considerable  mercantile 
marine). 

Such  a  nation  would,  before  the  outbreak  of 
this  great  war,  have  "  budgetted  "  (if  one  may 
apply  this  word  to  an  estimate  of  man-power) 
for  a  total  armed  force,  available  in  the  first  year 
of  war  of  about  4^^  million — counting  the  men 
required  for  the  work  of  the  fleet. 

Under  the  strain  of  the  war  it  would,  if  we 
are  to  follow  the  analogy  of  the  French  and  German 
man-power,  have  worked  very  hard  to  put  into  the 
field  some  additional  number,  and  it  would,  under 
the  same  analogy,  have  succeeded.  It  would  ha\'e 
produced  first  and  last  by  the  beginning  of  .\ugust 
1915  (counting  its  naval  contingent)  something 
between  5|  miUion  and  5|  million. 

Great  Britain  is  not  a  continental  power,  and 
is  not  self-sufficing  for  its  civihan  needs. 

Its  main,  strength  lies  in  a  navy  which  (count- 
ing mobilised  man-power  and  the  man-power 
required  for  the  upkeep  of  munitionment  thereof 
and  addition  thereto  during  the  war),  accounts 
immediately  for  more  than  half  a  million  men. 
This  half  million,  it  is  true,  is  not  rapidly  subject 
to  wastage  ;  but  still  it  is  a  definite  permanent 
deduction  from  the  mobilisable  strength  by  land. 

Next,  Great  Britain  depends  (has  come  to 
depend — I  do  not  say  it  is  a  necessity,  I  note  it 
only  as  a  condition  which  cannot  be  changed  in 
the  course  of  a  war,  nor  indeed  for  a  very  long 
time  to  come)  upon  o\-er-sea  trade  for  her  civihan 
necessities. 

Now  what  does  this  mean  in  absorption  or 
subtraction  of  man-power  ? 


It  means  the  absorption  of  man-power  in 
two  great  categories,  exterior  to  the  categories 
present  in  a  self-contained  continental  nation. 
These  two  categories  are  : 

(i)  The  man-power  required  to  produce  goods 
for  export  by  which  alone  the  imports  necessary 
to  existence  can  be  secured. 

(2)  The  man-power  required  to  build,  repair 
and  conduct  the  ships  and  other  instruments 
bringing  such  imports  to  the  islands  and  taking 
such  exports  out  of  them. 

Let  us  examine  these  two  categories. 

(i)  The  man-power  required  to  produce  goods 
for  export,  with  which  we  pay  for  imports,  is  not 
in  its  entirety  a  subtraction  from  the  man-power 
which  a  continental  power  would  be  able  to 
mobilise. 

There  is  a  certain  amount  of  over-lap.  We 
import  dairy  produce,  for  instance,  as  against 
certain  exports.  Those  exports  are  made  not 
only  by  mobilisable  men  but  by  women  and  by  men 
miUtarily  inefficient,  or  above  or  below  military 
age.  The  labour  necessary  to  produce  this  export 
corresponds  to  the  labour  required  in  a  continental 
self-sufficing  country  to  raise  the  dairy  produce. 

Nevertheless,  though  there  is  a  considerable 
over-lap  in  the  main  export,  trade  demands  a  far 
higher  proportion  of  mobilisable  man-power  to  be 
deducted  for  its  maintenance  than  does  the  corre- 
sponding production  of  domestic,  civilian  neces- 
sities. 

Such  export  takes  the  form  largely  of  ma- 
chinery, coal,  textile  fabrics  ;  and  in  the  latter 
alone  is  there  any  considerable  proportion  of  non- 
mobilisable  labour.  A  self-contained  nation  at 
war  can  reduce  its  domestic  production  down  and 
down  till,  excluding  munitions  of  war  and  the 
machinery  necessary  thereto,  it  is  producing  little 
more  than  food.  It  can  postpone  its  building  and 
to  some  extent  its  repair  of  building.  It  can  very 
largely  reduce  its  production  of  machinery,  barely 
keeping  up  what  is  required  for  domestic  com- 
munications on  a  highly  reduced  scale.  It  can 
economise  on  its  production  of  coal,  already 
reduced  by  a  reduction  of  domestic  industry,  and 
it  can  very  largely  reduce  its  production  of  textiles. 

But  a  nation  to  which  import  is  vital,  and  to 
which  export  is  therefore  also  vital,  cannot  act 
thus.  It  cannot  export  what  it  chooses.  Still 
less  can  it  reduce  indefinitely  its  domestic  pro- 
duction for  export.  It  must  jiroduce  what  its 
customers  need  or  it  will  have  no  market,  and  it 
must  produce  a  certain  amount  of  economic  value 
for  export  in  such  goods  or  it  will  get  no  food. 

It  may  seem  superfluous  to  add  the  reason 
why  export  is  thus  essential,  if  imports  are  to  be 
obtained  ;  but  for  the  sake  of  clearness  such  an 
addition,  though  to  most  people  redundant,  may  be 
advisable. 

There  are  only  four  wa\s  of  getting  imports 
from   abroad.     Payment    in   gold,  the  release   of 

{Copyright  in  America  by  "  The  New  York  Awerican."] 


LAND     AND     WATER 


January  G,  1916. 


foreign  debt,  the  establishment  of  a  foreign  credit, 
and  export  trade  balancing  import. 

The  limits  of  the  first  category  are  sharp  and 
very  narrow.  If  all  the  gold  in  the  country  were 
exported  in  the  first  year  of  a  war  to  pay  for 
necessities  from  abroad  it  would  not  nearly  meet  the 
bill.  But  of  course  the  hypothesis  is  absurd. 
Even  in  time  of  peace,  the  medium  of  exchange 
(which  is  in  the  main  a  mass  of  instruments  of 
credit),  reposes  upon  a  certain  gold  reserve.  In 
time  of  war  it  is  the  first  and  most  necessary  pre- 
caution which  every  nation  observes,  to  export 
as  little  as  it  possibly  can  of  its  gold,  to  withdraw 
all  it  possibly  can  even  from  domestic  circulation, 
and  to  centralise  the'  whole  stock  as  far  as  possible 
under  national  control.  This  first  form  of  payment 
is  almost  neghgible.  ■ 

The  second  form  of  payment  is  apparently 
largely  available  for  such  a  traffic,  if  a  nation 
jjosscsses,  as  does  Great  Britain,  very  large  foreign 
investments.  But  it  is  in  reality  severely  limited 
by  the  market  available  for  the  purchase  of  these 
foreign  investments.  A  man  resident  in  this  coun- 
try possesses  an  estate  in  the  Argentine,  or  rather 
a  share  in  it,  in  the  shape  of  stock,  which  he  holds 
in  some  Argentine  Company.  Beef  is  needed  for 
the  army.  He  is  taxed  to  pay  for  the  beef.  The 
demand  for  the  beef  goes  to  the  Argentine.  Let  us 
suppose,  to  make  the  problem  simple,  that  he  pays 
his  tax  by  selUng  his  Argentine  stock.  That  is  an 
example  of  the  release  of  debt,  and  of  the  obtaining 
of  foreign  supply  without  corresponding  export 
at  the  moment.  What  is  happening  in  practice 
under  the  complex  veil. of  modern  finance  is  that 
he  is  going  to  the  Argentine  owner  of  beef  and 
offering  him  in  exchange  for  the  beef  the  possession 
of  so  many  acres  of  Argentine  land.  He  is  losing 
what  was  English  control  over  powers  of  production 
and  transferring  it  to  Argentine  possession. 

One  man  can  do  this  with  ease  and  rapidity. 
He  has  a  market.  A  hundred  men  can  do  it  with 
a  hundred  moderate  holdings.  But  many 
thousand  men  with  such  holdings  cannot  do  it, 
nor  a  few  men  with  very  large  holdings  if  they 
enter  the  market  at  once.  The  purchasers  are  not 
available.  To  put  it  in  ordinary  terms  the  liquida- 
tion of  such  assets  can  only  be  gradual.  However 
successful  the  operation  is,  moreover,  and  in  pro- 
portion to  its  success,  you  are  impoverishing  your 
own  country  and  enriching  the  foreigner. 

The  third  method  of  obtaining  imports,  with- 
out corresponding  exports  at  the  moment,  is  the 
creation  of  a  credit.  That  is,  the  persuading  of 
the  foreign  producer  to  let  you  have  the  goods 
on  your  own  promise  to  give  him  more  goods  in  ex- 
change at  some  future  date.  It  is  a  postpone- 
ment of  export. 

This  method  though  less  limited  than  the  first 
is  more  limited  than  the  second,  and  has  no  very 
great  powers  of  expansion.  A  nation  at  war  must 
promise  very  high  rates  of  profits  upon  such  a 
transaction,  because  it  is  a  gamble  upon  its  future 
power  to  pay.  Even  if  that  future  power  be 
believed  in  by  the  foreign  country,  it  is  a  novel  and 
doubtful  method  which  the  modem  machinery  of 
commerce  cannot  extend  over  a  very  wide  field 
Another  way  of  putting  it  is  that  if  you  try  to 
float  a  loan  for  your  nation  at  war  among  the 
citizens  of  another  nation  you  have  to  offer  very 
high  rates  of  interest  and  you  cannot  be  certain  of 
more  than  a  comparatively  small  total  result. 

There  remains  the  fourth  method — export  : 
the    only    natural    and     stable    one.    and     the 


only    one    capable    of   producing    a    permanent 
equilibrium. 

As  to  the  number  of  mobilisabli-  men  with- 
drawn by  export  produce  from  the  moliilisable 
strength  of  a  nation  in  this  position  that  is  a  matter 
of  expert  calculation  to  which  I  do  not  pretend. 

Those  who  have  spent  years  upon  the  matter 
and  who  are  best  informed  ha\e  arrived  at  very 
different  results.  There  is  a  wide  margin  between 
the  maximum  estimate  and  the  minimum. 

But  the  point  to  remember  is  that  e\'en  the 
minimum  calculation  withdraws  from  the  possible 
mobilisable  strength  of  the  nation  dependent  upon 
import  a  very  large  proportion  of  mobilisable. 
In  the  case  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  certainly 
not  less  than  a  sixth,  and  perhaps  more. 

(2)  The  second  category  of  the  men  who 
must  be  withdrawn  from  the  mobilisable  strength 
of  such  a  country  as  Gi^eat  Britain  is  the  man- 
power required  to  build,  repair  and  conduct  the 
ships  and  other  instruments  for  bringing  such  im- 
ports to  the  island  and  taking  such  exports  out. 

SHIPPING. 

It  matters  little  whether  the  ships  are  owned, 
built,  manned  and  repaired  within  Great  Britain, 
or  whether  the  carrying  trade  is  carried  on  by 
foreigners  ;  for  in  the  second  case  Great  Britain 
would  have  to  produce  extra  goods  for  export 
equivalent  to  all  this  cost  in  man-pow-er.  She 
would  have  to  pay  for  the  freight  of  the  foreign 
ships.  But  the  alternative  is  purely  academic, 
for  as  a  matter  of  fact  much  the  greater  part  of 
our  necessary  exports  and  imports  takes  place  in 
English  ships,  largely  manned  and  wholly  directed 
by  people  in  these  islands,  and  built  and  repaired 
and  added  to  by  people  in  these  islands  ;  coaled 
by  the  labour  of  people  within  these  islands,  and 
of  course  necessarily  loaded  and  unloaded  by  the 
labour  of  people  within  these  islands. 

It  is  here  that  the  expression  "  and  other 
instruments  "  comes  in. 

In  much  of  the  discussion  that  has  taken  place 
with  regard  to  recruitment,'  men  have  confined 
themselves  to  the  actual  produce  of  necessary 
exports  within  the  factories,  the  actual  manning 
and  repairing  of  the  ships  which  carry  the  goods. 
But  the  absolutely  essential  connecting  hnks  arc 
also  very  expensive  in  men. 

Any  day  in  the  streets  of  Manchester  what 
you  will  notice  (if  j'ou  are  a  stranger)  especially 
distinguishing  that  town  is  the  perpetual  procession 
of  heavy  lorries  loaded  with  textile  goods  on  their 
way  from  one  process  to  another,  or  from  the  last 
process  to  the  dock  or  the  railway  station.  To  a 
less  extent  you  will  notice  the  corresponding 
arterial  flow  of  raw  material  from  the  ship  to  the 
factory. 

Every  system  ot  docks  in  the  kingdom  has  its 
similar  necessary  complement  of  vehicles  for 
distribution.  Such  and  such  a  proportion  of  all 
our  railway  labour  is  absorbed  in  this  flow  in  and 
out  of  export  and  import. 

Here  again  it  is  for  experts  to  calculate  what  is 
the  minimum  number  required  of  adult  male  labour 
of  military  age  to  build,  command,  in  some  part 
to  man,  and  to  repair  ships  ;  to  berth  and  wharf 
them  ;  to  load,  and  unload  them,  and  to  take  the 
goods  by  horse  traction  and  motor  from  the 
factory  to  the  ship  or  from  the  ship  to  the  factory 

Here,  as  in  the  case  just  quoted,  there  are 
many  different  calculations  widely  separate.  But 
even  the  minimum  is  a  very  serious  item.     It  is 


January  6,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


the  shortage  of  carters  to-day,  for  instance,  which, 
I  hear,  is  the  chief  difficulty  at  the  water  fronts. 

The  conclusion  of  the  matter  would  seem  to 
be  something  after-  this  fashion. 

Great  Britain  and  Ireland  may  support  in 
theory  an  armed  force  of  four  million  men,  or 
rather  more,  excluding  any  particular  function 
we  may  serve  of  provisioning  or  financing  (which 
is  the  same  thing  under  another  name)  our  allies, 
and  excluding  any  necessity  we  may  be  under  of 
ol^taining  from  them  and  for  ourselves  impoi'ts  of 
a  purely  military  nature  from  neutral  countries. 
If  the  limit  be  raised  to  four  and  a  half  millions, 
we  have  almost  certainly  reached  the  maximum  ; 
and  this  figure,  of  course  does  not  mean  the  army 
in  the  field,  but  for  the  army  with  all  the  drafts  in 
sight  behind  it  to  repair  wastage,  and  includes  all 
forms  of  the  naval  service  (you  have  by  the  way, 
in  the  latter  a  considerable  number  of  men  over 
and  below  what  is  called  military  age  on  land, 
especially  in  the  auxiliary  forms  of  naval  service  : 
e.g.,  mine-sweeping). 

Over  and  above  such  a  number  you  have  only 
the  annual  contingents  of  the  young  men  growing 
up.  These  are,  to  any  given  mobilisable  number 
in  the  first  year  of  war,  something  between  one- 
eight  and  one-tenth  at  the  most,  according  to  the 
population  and  birth-rate  of  twenty  years  ago. 

It  is  perhaps  as  well  to  add  that  calculations 
of  this  sort  should  in  common  decency  during 
such  a  crisis  be  kept  free  from  the  personal  am- 
bitions of  petty  individual  politicians  and  news- 
papermen, and  especially  from  that  spirit  of 
advocacy  which  is  the  worst  enemy  of  wisdom, 
and  whose  chief  ingredient  is  the  great  solvent 
of  wisdom,  cunning.  The  mobilisable  strength 
of  Great  Britain  at  this  moment  is  a  very  grave 
national  matter,  which  it  is  not  rhetorical  to  call  a 
matter  of  life  and  death.  Those  who  bring  to  it 
anything  but  their  best  judgment  and  reason  and 
sober  conclusions,  those  who  act  with  motives  in 
any  way  personal  and  not  national,  are  traitors. 

THE    HARTMANS    WEILERKOPF 
FIGURES. 

We  have  had  this  week  a  very  interesting 
example  of  two  elements  in  the  present  situation 
which  all  close  students  of  the  war  are  aware  of 
and  regard  as  important. 

These  two  elements  are  first,  the  type  of  false- 
hood which  we  do  well  to  expect  in  the  enemy's 
official  communiques  ;  and  secondly,  the  appear- 
ance, now  many  weeks  old  and  necessarily  in- 
creasing, of  inefficients  among  the  enemy's  drafts. 

The  example  of  a  single  action  very  carefully 
noted  has  brilliantly  illuminated  both  these  points 
in  the  last  few  days.  I  refer  to  the  action  on  the 
Hartmansweilerkopf  or  Vicl  Armand,  the 
]>yramidical  foothill  of  the  Vosges  which  directly 
overlooks  the  Plain  of  Alsace. 

My  readers  will,  I  hope,  allow  me  to  repeat  that 
the  study  of  an  enemy's  inaccuracies  or  falsehoods 
has  no  military  value,  and  does  not  help  us  to  any 
military  judgment,  unless  we  discover  the  kind 
of  falsehood.  Merely  to  find  one's  enemy  telling 
untruths  and  to  blackguard  him  for  it  is  a  sheer 
waste  of  time.  First,  because  all  commands  in 
war  must  use  every  method  at  their  disposal  to 
deceive  the  enemy,  and  secondly  because  no  con- 
ceivable practical  result  could  follow  from  indulging 
in  such  abuse  alone. 

But  if  we  discover  the  sort  of  falsehood  to 
which  the  enemy  inclines  then  we  lun-c  sometliing 


whereby  to  judge  his  communiques  as  evidence. 
"  The  enemy  communiques  have  said  so  and  so 
and  so  and  so,  but  I  have  found  by  experience 
that  tuch  and  such  a  part  of  his  statement  is 
usually  accurate  and  such  and  such  another  part 
usually  false,  and  that  in  such  and  such  a  manner. 
With  this  knowledge  of  his  methods  I  can  read 
the  whole  tiuth  into  the  communiqiies  and  use 
it  as  evidence  on  which  to  judge  the  war." 

Now  the  characteristic  of  the  German  official 
communiques,  as  we  have  often  had  occasion  to 
find  out,  is  their  extreme  accuracy  when  they  are 
telhng  the  truth,  and  what  I  may  call  their  detailed 
enormity  when  they  desire  to  deceive.  There 
is  no  nuance.  The  modern  North  German  training 
leads  men  to  abhor  exaggeration,  inaccuracy, 
romance,  phantasy.  Therefore  a  statement  pro- 
ceeding from  such  an  authority  intended  to  be 
false  and  intended  to  deceive,  is  nearly  always  a 
bald  absurdity.  It  is  One  of  the  many  weak 
sides  of  a  character  which  has  corresponding 
strong  sides,  and  it  is  a  weakness  inevitable  to 
lack  of  imagination  and  great  attention  to 
detail. 

The  extreme  accuracy  of  German  communiques 
when  they  are  telling  the  truth  has  misled  opinion 
in  this  country,  especially  in  the  later  phases  of  the 
war.  One  finds  men  of  good  judgment  who 
hesitate  to  believe  that  German  casualty  Usts  are 
not  complete.  The  other  day  one  of  our  best 
contemporary  students  of  war  maintained  the 
thesis  that  the  German  communiques  were  in- 
variably truthful. 

Well,  we  have  had  many  examples  of  the  sort 
of  contrast  I  am  examining  between  detailed 
accuracy  and  equally  detailed  absurdity.  Nearly 
a  year  ago  we  were  startled  by  the  tomfool  boast 
that  the  great  assault  east  of  Rheims  was  met  and 
broken  by  a  single  di^'ision  of  Rhinelanders. 
Later  on,  to  mention  one  case  out  of  hundreds, 
we  had  the  monstrous  assertion  that  of  all  the 
men  hit  on  the  German  side  in  trench  warfare 
nine-tenths  came  bacR  hale  and  hearty  to  the 
firing  line  !  I  myself  have  actually  met  competent 
and  sensible  people  in  this  country  who  were  so 
impressed  by  the  decimal  figures  in  which  the 
percentage  was  stated  (89.7)  and  the  solemn  fake 
of  accuracy  about  the  whole  thing,  that  they  were 
half  inclined  to  beUeve  the  miracle.  They  attri- 
buted it  vaguely  to  those  two  great  wooden  gods, 
"Efficiency"  and  "Organisation":  the  things 
that  lost  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 

But  I  am  not  sure  that  the  Hartmansweiler- 
kopf affair  will  not  carry  conviction  to  everyone, 
however  occupied  with  the  Prussian  legend — that 
legend  which  has  bitten  so  deeply  into  the  academic 
mind  of  this  country  during  the  last  two  genera- 
tions. 

Here  is  the  whole  story. 

The  French,  after  an  intense  bombardment, 
captured  a  group  of  trenches  upon  the  disputed 
summit  of  this  hill  a  few  days  before  Christmas. 

The  Germans  counter-attacked  and  recovered 
a  portion  of  their  ground.  All  that  is  plain  sailing 
and  the  enemy's  account  of  his  counter-offensive 
though  omitting,  of  course,  much  of  the  debit  side, 
is  perfectly  accurate  in  as  far  as  it  goes.  But  there 
follows  upon  this  the  following  dialogue  : — 

The  French  announced  that  they  had  taken 
in  prisoners — and  they  only  count  unwounded 
prisoners  capable  of  being  paraded  and  of  marching 
past — over  1,300  men.  At  the  close  of  operations 
tl-.c  exact  number  announced  was  1.668  prisoners ; 


L  A  N  D     A  X  D     W  A  T  E  R 


January  6,  1916. 


but  the  main  batch  first  announced  was  precisely 
1,381,  of  whom  only  21  were  officers. 

To  this,  the  German  communiques  rephed 
denying  the  French  claim  and  saying  that  it  was 
nnpossible,  because  their  total  losses  of  all  kinds, 
whatsoever,  dead,  wounded  and  missing,  were  not 
more  than  1,100.  ,  . 

This  amazing  statement  (and  how  amazmg  it 
is  we  shall  see  in  a  moment)  mav  be  read  in  our 
London  papers  of  Friday  the  24th  of  December. 
It  is  the  German  official  communique  from  Berlin 
of  the  dav  before,  Thursday  the  23rd.  It  con- 
tradicts a"  French  announcement  alread\'  48  hours 
old  and  it  was  made  after  the  local  German  com- 
mand had  had  two  davs  in  which  to  check  then- 
lists.  ,  ,  ( 
Before  analysing  this  sharply-cut  example  ot 
the  enemx's  method,  the  reader  will  do  well  to 
consider  what  this  sort  of  trench  warfare  means. 

For  a  period  varying  from  a  few  hours  to 
two  or  three  days,  guns  of  all  calibres  shell  a  zone 
of  trenches  from  a  couple  of  hundred  yards  to 
perhaps    500    yards    in    depth.    The    works    are 
knocked  to  pieces,  the  dug-outs  ca\e  m,  the  ela- 
borate little  shelters  which  conceal  the  machine 
guns  are  blown  to  pieces,  many  men  are  buned, 
many  more  killed  and  maimed,  and  a  much  larger 
number  stunned  and  dazed  by  the  intensity    of 
the  fire.     But  both  sides  know  that  such  artillery 
actiyity  on  the  part  of  an  enemy  means  a  forth- 
coming assault.    The  party  thus  attacked,  there- 
fore, leaves  as  few  men  as  it  dares  in  the  front 
lines  and  keeps  the  mass  of  its  men  behind,  where 
the  losses  will  be  slighter.     The  moment  the  intense 
artillery  preparation  stops,  the  assault  leaps  from 
its  trenches  and  rushes  over  the  short    interval 
between  the  two  lines,  probably  overwhelms  the 
first  trench  with  its  dazed  occupants,  and  perhaps  a 
trench  or  two  beyond.     The  extent   of  the  belt 
thus  swarmed  over  differs  with  the  magnitude  of 
the  artillery  preparation  and  of  the  forces  involved. 
But  such  an  assault  is  checked  alter  its  first  drive 
by   two   things.     First,   that  it   comes  upon  the 
less    damaged    further    portion    of    ground    upon 
which  the  artillery  preparation  has  not  been  so 
thorough  and  where  a  number  of  machine  guns  are 
still  in"  action  and  the  men  in  the  trenches  still 
able   to   reply.     Secondly,    the   enemy's   reserves 
come  pouring  up  the  communication  trenches  and 
meet  their  opponents  by  a  counter-offensive. 

It  will  be  seen  by  anyone  who  visualises  this 
type  of  action  that'  the'  number  of  unwounded 
prisoners  remaining  in  the  hands  of  the  assailants 
when  they  thus  seize  a  narrow  belt  of  trench  w^ork 
is  necessarily  but  a  small  proportion  of  the  enemy's 

total  casualties.  .  ,    ,.rr 

The  proportion  differs,  oi  course,  with  different 
actions,  but  the  experiences  of  many  months  upon 
both  sides  and  the  drawing  up  of  hundreds  of  lists 
by  our  ow^n  commanders  showing  our  own  losses 
w-hen  the  enemy  thus  attacked,  i)ermit  us  to  give 
a  rough  estimate  and  to  say  that  the  proportion 
of  unwounded  prisoners  to  total  casualties  will 
hardly  ever  be  less  than  one  in  fire. 

If  the  enemy  can  strike  so  hard  as  to  get,  say, 
I  000  of  our  men  prisoners  when  he  overwhelms 
our  first  trenches,  then  he  will,  first  and  last,  have 
inflicted  upon  us  at  least  5,000  casualties. 

The  proportion  during  the  French  offensive 
in  Champagne  was  more  nearly  one  in  seven,  and 
far  over  one  in  six.  , 

In  other  words,  for  every  prisoner  capable  ol 
inarching  and  parading  taken  by  the  French  there 


were  certainly  more  than  five  and  nearly  six  other 
men  killed  and  wounded  on  the  German  side  who 
cUd  not  fall  into  our  hands.  There  have,  of  course, 
been  innumerable  actions,  smaller  and  greater,  in 
which  the  proportion  was  very  much  higher. 
There  have  been  actions  where  the  enemy  made  us 
lose  very  heavily  and  hardly  took  any  prisoners, 
and  vice' versa.  But  I  am  speaking  of  the  case  of 
trenches  successfully  rushed,  and  I  say  that  a 
proportion  of  one  in  five  is  the  very  highest  you 
can  get. 

Observe  then,  what  the  German  communique 
means.  It  means  that  when  the  French  seized 
this  quite  narrow  belt  of  trenches  after  their  inten- 
sive bombardment,  if  they  were  telling  the  truth 
and  had  really  captured  1,300  prisoners,  certainly 
7,000  Germans  were  out  of  action  and  pro- 
bably a  great  many  more.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  Germans  arc  telling  the  truth,  and  their 
total  casualties,  dead,  wounded  and  missing  were 
1,100  only,  then  it  would  be  exceedingly 
unlikely  that  the  French  should  hold  more  than 
200  unwounded  prisoners  and  hardly  possible 
that  the\-  should  hold  300. 


CONCLUSIVE    EVIDENCE. 

How  are  we  to  decide  which  of  the  two  state- 
ments was  true  ? 

Mr.  Warner  Allen  was  present  at  the  French 
Headquarters  immediately  after  the  German  c()m- 
munique  w^as  issued,  anci  we  have  the  following 
simple  and  clear  piece  of  evidence  from  him  :-— 

"I  am  able  to  give  personal  evidence,"  he 
writes,  "  as  I  saw  the  prisoners  taken  march  past 
the  General  commanding  the  Army  of  the  Vosges. 
There  w^ere  21  officers,  1,360  non-commissioned 
officers  and  rank  and  file."  A  neutral  observer 
present  confirmed  these  figures. 
That  is  conclusive. 

I  hope  that  none  of  my  readers  will  blame  mc 
for  having  dealt  with  the  point  at  such  great  length. 
The  number  of  men  involved  is  very  small  in  such 
a  campaign  as  this,  the  action  was  a  mere  local 
affair,  the  line  did  not,  perhaps,  fluctuate  by  an 
average  of  fifty  yards,  but  as  a  particularly  clear 
example  of  the  "point  I  am  driving  at  you  could 
not  better  it  in  the  whole  course  of  the  war,  and 
the  general  conclusion  is  this  : — 

Where  you  may  reasonably  believe  the  state- 
ment of  a  German  communique,  accept  it  as 
rigidly  accurate.  Where  you  may  with  equal 
reason  think  it  exaggerated,  you  are  free  to  treat 
the  exaggeration  as  enormous  in  almost  any  degree 
— as  deserving  no  credence  at  all. 

It  is  a  \ery  important  point  in  judging  this 
war.  It  confirrns  what,  on  the  analogy  of  other 
nations'  communiques,  so  many  obser\-ers  have 
hitherto  doubted,  the  \aluelessness  of  the  more 
erratic  German  claims. 

The  second  point  equally  illustrated  by  this 
affair  was  that  of  the  type  of  drafts  the  enemy  is 
now  using.  In  his  evidence  upon  this  point,  Mr. 
Warner  Allen  is,  of  course,  only  adding  his  testi- 
mony to  what  is  now  a  commcmplace  with  the 
troops  all  along  the  500  miles  of  the  Allies'  western 
line. 

It  is  perfectly  clear  that  the  German  Empire 
has  long  ago  fallen  back  upon  its  first  groups  of 
inefficients  for  drafts  and  has  for  a  fully  efficient 
reserve  nothing  but  the  lads  of  the  two  new  classes. 

I  hope  it  is  not  superfluous  to  point  out  again 
for  fear  of  misunderstanding  that  this  does  not 
mean   that   the  German   forces  arc  approacliing 


January  G,  H)i6. 


A  i\  i )      A  .\  I ) 


W  A  1  1-:  R  .  * 


dissolution,  that  the  proportion  of  ineflficients  is  so 
large  as  to  have  already  greatly  affected  the  enemy's 
men,  or  that  the  ineihcients  "in  question  are  deaf, 
dumb  or  bhnd. 

The  phrase  means  no  more  than  it  says.  But 
what  it  says  is  exceedingly  significant.  The  drafts 
for  filling  wastage  have  now  largelv  to  be  drawn 
from  the  first— that  is,  the  least  inefficient — cate- 
gories of  inefficients.  The  process  can  go  on  for  a 
long  time,  but  its  effect  increases  in  more  than 
arithmetical  progression,  for  you  are  compelled  to 
go  on  from  one  category  of  inefficients  to  another 
worse  one,  until  you  seriously  affect  the  stuff  of 
your  whole  army. 

It  should  be  remarked  that  the  prisoners  to 
whose  dilution  with  inefficients  Mr.  Warner  Allen 
bears  witness,  were  (i)  troops  used  in  positions 
where  it  is  necessary  to  have  your  best  and  not 
your  worst  material.  Though  the  numbers  with 
which  you  hold  the  first  trenches  are  thin,  yet  you 
have  to  put  into  them  the  men  whom  you  think 
can  best  stand  the  terrible  effect  of  an  intensive 
bombardment,  and  will  be  best  able  after  it,  when 
the  enemy  assault  begins,  to  meet  that  assault  with 
steady  nerves  and  accurate  fire.  (2)  Troops  be- 
longing to  formations  of  a  specially  selected  and 
supposedly  superior  type.  They "  were  Jaeger 
troops.  Perhaps  one  ought  not  to  make  much  of 
this  last  point  after  seventeen  months  of  war,  and 
after  a  wastage  which  has  largely  obhterated  such 
distinctions  from  the  German  service,  still  it  must 
be  noted  for  what  it  is  worth.  , 

BATTLES    IN    BESSARABIA. 

The  contemporary  enemy  preparation  for 
threatening  Egypt  and  the  canal  I  will  postpone 
till  next  week,  as  also  the  very  interesting  point  of 
the  consideration  of  Salonika  as  a  base  for  any 
offensive  movement,  remarking  only,  before  under- 
taking that  analysis,  that  the  main  effort,  the  only 
chance  for  a  true  decision,  must  necessarily  remain 
in  the  West,  and  whether  the  enemy  will  or  no 
he  must  concentrate  there  and  even  attempt  to 
attack  there,  before  he  either  admits  defeat  or 
claims  victory. 

For  the  moment  the  threat  to  Egypt  is  still, 
and  will  long  be,  a  matter  of  preparation  only, 
and  the  position  of  Salonika  as  a  base  for  an 
offensive  movement  is  in  the  same  position.' 

There  is  only  one  considerable  movement  of 
troops  and  change  of  ground  upon  which  our  atten- 
tion can  be  fixed,  and  that  is  the  Austro-German 
offensive  against  the  southern  portion  of  the 
Russian  line  and  the  Russian  counter-offensive 
which  is  at  present  proceeding. 

Our  accounts  of  this  whole  business  are  con- 
fused and  somewhat  contradictory.  The  affair 
is  still  in  progress,  and  nothing  approaching  even 
a  local  result  is  determined.  But  if  we  put  together 
the  various  brief  messages  received  we  arrive  at 
some  such  conclusion  as  the  foUorwing  :— 

The  enemy  attacked  in  force  (along  the  arrow 
I  in  Sketch  I)  along  the  railway  Jeading  eastward 
from  Kovel  towards  the  lateral  Hue  which  runs 
down  south  through  Rovno  and  Dubno  to  Lem- 
berg.  It  was  pointed  out  during  tie  great  Austro- 
German  advance  last  summer  that  the  capture  of 
this  lateral  line  running  from  Galicda  up  through 
the  Pinsk  marshes  to  Baranovichi  and  Vilna,  and 
so  to  Dvinsk  and  Riga  was  the  objective  (after 
the  attempts  to  enclose  one  or  other  of  the  Russ  an 
armies  in  the  great  salients  had  f^aUed;^  of  all  the 
end  of  the  enemy's  eastward  thntst,     Jt  will  also 


.III   ifci,'    '    I    '    >   I    I  m  I 

ITchartDi'iisk 


I. 


10  to 


f^?^/A 


be  remembered  that  when  the  Austro-Germa.n 
armies  had,  in  Lord  Kitchener's  words  "  shot  their 
bolt  "  last  autumn,  they  remained  possessed  of  no 
more  than  a  portion  of  this  lateral  railway.  They 
prevented,  indeed,  its  complete  possession  by  the 
Russians  (which  would  have  been  enormously 
useful  to  the  latter)  but  they  also  failed  to  obtain 
possession  of  it  for  themselves. 

It  was  widely  held  in  this  country,  and  in 
France,  when  the  news  of  this  new  attack  from 
Kovel  along  the  arrow  i,  Sketch  I,  was  first  heard 
of,  that  a  new  attempt  was  being  made  to  get 
hold  of  the  southern  portion  of  this  eastern  lateral 
railway. 

The  conclusion  seems  to  me  unsound.  It 
would  not  be  in  the  depth  of  winter  and  just  after 
a  bad  thaw  in  the  Pinsk  marshes  into  the  bargain, 
that  the  enemy  would  make  a  stroke  of  this  kind. 
It  is  much  more  probable  that  his  violent  local 
offensive  upon  the  region  of  Tchai-tariisk  (which 
is  the  point  upon  the  Kovel  railway  where  the  two 
fronts  cross  it)  was  made  from  information  received 
that  the  Russians  were  going  to  make  a  diversion 
further  south,  near  the  Roumanian  harder. 

At  any  rate,  what  happened  was  this.  The 
moment  the  Austro-German  attack  jusi:  south  of 
the  Pinsk  marshes  in  the  region  of  Tchartoriisk 
developed,  the  Russians  countered  hea'vily  by  a 
thrust  just  north  of  the  Roumanian  harder  from 
Bessarabia.  They  began  a  violent  offens  ive  along 
the  arrow  2  in  Sketch  I,  for  the  possession  of  the 
heights  immediately  above  Czernowitz,  tl  le  capital 
of  the  Bukowina,  defended  by  very  strong  and 
continuous  Austrian  entrenchments  wh?  ch  reach 
up  northward  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Buczacz 
and  follow  a  line  nearly  north  or  south.     At  the 


L  A  xN  D      AND      WATER. 


January  G,  1916V 


LEMBERG 


5& 


If  we  recollect  how  matter?;  stand  in  the- 
Balkans  ;  if  we  further  recollect  that  Roumania 
is  the  great  unknown  factor  and  that  the  Rou- 
manian army  would  make  all  the  difference  to  the 
immediate  future  of  the  campaign  one  way  or  the 
other  from  the  three  factors  of  its  position,  its 
numbers  and  its  freshness  ;  if  we  add  to  all  this  a 
consideration  of  the  main  truth  which  every  General 
Staff  in  Europe  has  first  in  mind— the  enemy's 
anxiety  in  the  matter  of  numbers— we  shall  see  the 
purpose  of  such  an  offensive  as  Russia  has  appar- 
ently undertaken,  though  perhaps  only  local  and 
temporary,  upon  the  southern  end  of  her  line. 

Russia  in  Bessarabia  threatens  to  some  extent 
the  enemy  position  in  the  Balkans.  It  is  all  very 
well  to  say  that  we  do  not  believe  Roumania  will 
allow  a  march  through  the  Dobrudja  or  that  no 
considerable  Russian  forces  are  massed  near  the 
mouths  of'  the  Danube,  but  the  mere  fact  that 
Russia  can  concentrate  there  quickly  keeps  the 
enemy— Bulgarian  and  Austro-German— on  the 
watch  and  under  the  necessity  of  leaving  troops 
watching  the  frontier  along  C.C.C.  in  sketch  III. 
Meanwhile,  along  comparatively  short  lines  of 
communication  in  Bessarabia,  Russian  forces  can 
strike  at  or  threaten  either  end  of  the  com- 
paratively short  arc  A-B  in  the  same  sketch.   The 


same  time,  or  immediately  afterwards,  another 
separate  offensive  of  the  Russians  along  the  arrow 
3  towards  Buczacz  developed.  At  the  moment 
of  writing  (upon  Tuesday  evening,  January  4th) 
these  two  offensives  in  the  south  have  become 
much  the  biggest  part  of  the  activity  along  all  this 
southern  portion  of  the  Russian  line. 

Each  side  claims  comparatively  small  numbers 
of  prisoners.  There  has  been  a  slight  advance 
of  our  AUies  along  their  two  main  lines  of  attack 
(2)  and  (3)  in  Sketch  I,  but  nothing  in  any  way 
conclusive  or  definite  has  yet  developed. 

It  is  perhaps  not  too  much  to  suggest  that  the 
real  objixt  upon  the  Russian  side  of  this  new- 
offensive,  which  has  thus  suddenly  attracted  the 
attention  of  Europe,  is  for  the  moment  no  more 
than  to  compel  a  corresponding  concentration 
of  troops  upon  the  enemy's  side,  and  that  with 
an  object  quite  as  much  poUtical  as  strategic 


enemy  front  to  the  corresponding  Russian  front 
runs  north  from  the  Roumanian  frontier,  and  is 
roughly  that  of  the  dotted  line  on  Sketch  III.  The 
Russian  forces  now  gathered  in  Bessarabia  are 
in  the  position  to  compel  the  enemy  to  concentrate 
with  difficulty  over  very  long  exterior  lines. 

A  comparatively  slight  movement  upon  their 
part  towards  A  or  towards  B  compels  movements 
by  the  enemy  along  the  much  longer  ine  D.D.D. 

Whether  a  n.ovement  towards  A,  such  as  now 
appears  to  be  taking  place,  is  a  feint  to  be  followed 
by  a  movement  across  the  Danube,  or  whether  it 
is  a  main  attack  the  enemy  cannot  tell.  By  an 
alternation  of  pressure  or  by  threatening  at  either 
end  A  and  B  of  the  shorter  arc  the  enemy  is  com- 
pelled always  to  anxiety  and  sometimes  to  concen- 
tration  at  "either   end   of   the  longer   arc  D.D.D. 

That  is  the  advantage  which  the  strategic 
possession  of  Bessarabia  and  of  the  Russian  forces 
in  it,  gives    to  our   ally    at    this   moment.    'Ihc 


January  6,  igib. 


la^jda.nd    water 


Russians  by  a  vigorous  offensive,  or  even  by  the 
mere  massing  of  troops,  can  compel  considerable 
agglomerations  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  They 
can  inflict  wastage  uponenemy  units — and  he  fears 
wastage  now  more  than  anything.  But  it  is  im- 
probable that  they  can  as  yet  advance  seriously. 
Remember  the  conditions. . 

An  advance  against  a  strongly  and  continu- 
ously entrenched  position  involves  very  heavy 
preliminary  artillery  preparation.  The  Russians 
have  not  yet,  it  may  be  presumed,  a fuUequipment, 
as  compared  with  the  enemy's  provision. 

Even  if  they  had,  the  function  of  this  arm  in 
modern  warfare  depends  mainly  upon  motor  trans- 
port. But  motor  transport  in  Volhynia  and  Bess- 
arabia at  this  moment — at  least  motor  transport 
of  very  heavy  material — is  almost  out  of  question. 

AN    EXAMPLE    OF    MISLEADING. 

Talking  of  wastage,  is  it  not  an  extraordinary 
thing  that  after  a  full  sixteen  months  of  this  great 
war  the  last  ten  of  which  at  least  have  turned  en- 
tirely upon  the  factor  of  wastage,  and  at  a  moment 
when  every  single  commander,  enemy  or  Allied, 
has  that  one  matter  in  his  head  to  the  exclusion 
almost  of  all  others,  our  .  a'aily  Press  in 
London  should  continue  to  ignore  this  absolutely 
fundamental  point  ? . 

I  find,  in  the  Daily  Mail  of  New  Year's  Day, 
a  column  and  a  half  of  editorial  advice  proffered 
to  the  General  Officers  who  are  conducting  the  great 
war,  and  I  learn  from  this  singular  essay  in  the 
military  art  the  fact  that  a  modern  entrenched  line 
cannot  be  worn  down.  It  cannot  be  forced,  and 
therefoi-e  two  such  lines  facing  each  other  constitute 
an  eternal  deadlock.  The  original,  but  anony- 
mous counsellor  of  war  goes  on  to  suggest  that  the 
only  solution  is  to  fly  over  the  enemy's  head  with  a 
very   great  number  of  aeroplanes. 

Now  cannot  the  writer  of  such  matter 
be  got  to  see  his  folly  ?  Can  one  not  make  him 
and  his  readers  ashamed  ?  How  will  you  land, 
say,  one  division  (and  half  your  one  division 
must  be  trained  aviators !)  behind  a  Une  of 
nearly  a  hundred  divisions,  unless  you  have  at 
least  10,000  machines?  And  what  on  earth  is 
that  one  division  going  to  do,  coming  down  in 
hostile  country  without  guns,  without  sheUs,  with- 
out limbers,  without  horses,  without  waggons, 
without  food,  without  hospital  equipment,  without 
explosives,  without  petrol,  without  oats,  without 
field  kitchens- — without  anything  at  all  except 
men's  bodies,  rifles  and  a  few  cartridges  ? 

It  will  go  to  prison. 

Now  suppose  you  were  to  say  to  a  man  of 
this  sort — to  a  man  who  writes  like  this  and  thinks 
he  can  teach  the  Higher  Command  the  art  of  war — 
"  Could  you  hold  the  Hne  from  the  Swiss  moun- 
tains to  the  North  Sea  with  lo  men  and  ten 
machine-guns  ?  "  He  would  be  compelled  to 
answer  :  "  No,  I  could  not."  Even  he  could  not. 
For  you  must  remember  that  this  kind  of  talk  is 
not  the  product  of  lunacy,  but  of  ignorance. 

Then,  suppose  you  were  to  go  on  and  say  : 
"  Could  you  hold  it  with  a  thousand  men  and  a 
thousand  machine  guns  ?  "  He  would  perhaps 
be  able  to  visualise  500  miles  as  something  like  50, 
and  he  would  see  that  1,000  men  with  1,000 
machine  guns  would  be  done  for  in  half  an  hour 
upon  a  front  not  of  500  miles  or  50,  but  a  front  of 
a  day's  walk. 


RAEMAEKERS'    CARTOON. 

The  supreme  poiver  of  genius  lies  in  its  ability 
to  illumine  by  a  flash,  to  transfigure^.iuto  concrete 
form  by  a  few  strokes  of  pen  or  pencil  the  desires, 
aspirations  and  anguish  of  humanity.  Never  has 
this  power  been  more  nobly  illustrated  than  in  the 
cartoon  "Their  Sacrifice," /which  Mr.  Louis  ^ 
Raeniaekers  has  draivn  specially  for  Land  and  ' 
Water  and  -which  is  our  frontispiece  to-day.  During 
the  Christmas  of  igi$  good  wishes  have  been  checked 
upon  the  lips,  thoughts  of  happiness  have  been 
chilled  within  the  heart  by  the  remembrance  of  all 
the  sorrows  and  sufferings  of  the  war.  The  only 
gift  which  this  sad  winter  the  festival  of  the  Christ 
Child  bj^ught  into  thousands  of  homes  of  Christen-  ■ 
dom  it'as  the  sword  i&hich  pierced  through  the  soul 
of  the  Virgin- Mother. 

It  is  "  their  sacrifice  '[ — the  sacrifice  of  the 
mothers  of  Christendom  "  for  the  sake  of  humanity" 
■ — which  is  in  truth  to  win  for  the  iforld  freedom ' 
and  peace  in  the  future.  Contrast  this  vieiv  of  one 
Neutral  with  that  view  of  the  other  Neutral,  which 
found  expression  in  popular  verse  "  I  did  not  raise 
my  son  to  be  a  soldier."  Which  is  the  higher  and 
truer  concept — "  Their  Sacrifice  "  or  "I  did  not 
bear  a  son  to  be  a  Saviour  "  ? 

Ciirious  testimony  to  Hhe  poiver  of  Mr.  Rae- 
maekers  work  has  been  given  us  by  an  anonymous 
postcard  in  disguised  handwriting,  which  has  come 
from  Torquay.  It  is  reproduced  on  page  670  0/ 
this  issue.  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  who 
the  writer  of  it  may  be. 

Ultimately,  by  this  tedious  but  socratic 
method,  the  self-appointed  adviser  to  the  French 
and  British  armies  in  the  field  would  discover  that 
there  was  some  minimum  necessary  to  the  holding 
of  the  line.  He  would  perhaps  be  astonished 
to  hear  that  this  minimum  has  been  thoroughly 
thought  out  by  the  enemy's  commanders  as  well 
as  our  own,  and  that  we  know  it  to  within  a  fairly 
small  fraction.  One  might  next  proceed  to  the 
necessary  instruction  of  such  a  man  by  telling  him 
what  minimum  is  necessary  to  the  holding  of 
any  given  front,  and  what  therefore  to  the  holding 
of  1,500  miles  of  front,  and,  one  might  further  show 
him  by  the  use  of  a  map  and  of  tables  after  what 
point  the  holding  of  such  fronts  would  become 
perilous  and  after  what  further  point  disastrous 
to  forces  suffering  a  given  rate  of  wastage  and 
commanding  only  another  given  rate  of  recruit- 
ment— unless  before  the  catastrophe  they  should 
have  obtained  a  decision. 

When  the  lesson  had  proceeded  so  far  one, 
might  go  on  to  more  technical  but  very  necessary 
details,  such  as  the  role  of  the  machine  gun.  The 
writer  could  be  made  to  look  at  little  sketches  of 
how  a  machine  gun  is  put  into  a  trench.  He 
could  be  made  to  carry  one  about  and  appreciate 
its  relative  mobility  compared  to  that  of  the  rifle. 
He  might  be  taken  to  some  sector  where  he  would 
observe  the  effects  of  distant  bombardment  upon 
the  machine  gun  shelters,  and  after  all  this  ex- 
pansion of  his  ideas  he  would  be  ready  for  the 
startling  truth  that  you  can  have  too  much  of 
any  given  weapon  in  the  delicate  compromise  of 
armament.  And  that  this  is  why  no  matter 
what  the  neiv  instruments  devised  to  strengthen  the 
defensive,  a  certain  minimum  of  men  is  always 
necessary  to  the  holding  of  a  given  line.  The 
Allies  arc  fighting  to  reduce  the  enemy  plus  that 
miniraura.  H.  Belloc. 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


January  6,  lyiG. 


BATTLE    versus    SIEGE. 

By    ARTHUR     POLLEN. 


THE  New  \t'HY  has  opened  witli  two  very 
dreadful  naval  trjigedies.  The  destruc- 
tion of  Natal,  with  many  hundred? 
of  gallant  and  irreplaceable  officers 
and  men,  and  amongst  them  the  last  and  not  the 
least  distinguished  of  her  Captains,  Eric  Back,  is 
an  appalling  misfortune.  Two  more  liners  have 
.been  sunk  in  the  Mediterranean,  in  the  case  of 
the  Persia  with  a  hideous  loss  of  life.  In  normal 
times  the  destruction  of  Xatal  and  the  Persia  would 
have  thrilled  the  world  with  horror.  The  loss  of 
Xatal  was  most  probably  due  to  nothing  but  an 
accident,  but  the  destruction  of  the  Persia  is,  of 
course,  sheer  murder  and  nothing  more  nor  less. 
It  ma\-  and  should  have  a  ^•er\•  important  bearing 
on  the  future  history  of  the  war.  Now  that  five 
liners  have  been  sunk  in  the  Mediterranean  almost 
within  a  few  da\s  of  each  other,  the  attitude  of 
America  towards  the  Central  Powers  cannot 
remain  what  it  has  been.  I  do  not  suggest  that 
it  is  inevitable  that  America  will  go  to  war. 
President  Wilson  has  found  so  many  ways  of 
avoiding  this  liitherto  that  prophecy  on  such  a 
matter  is  useless.  But  it  must  ha\e  a  negative 
effect  on  American  action.  I  mean  it  has  become 
impossible  for  tliat  community  to  take  any  strong 
line  which  is  hostile  to  the  Allies'  blockade. 
Whether  resentment  in  America  takes  the  form  of 
belligerency  or  not,  there  is  no  question  that 
very    bitter   resentment    exists. 

THE    PARIAH. 

These  repeated  murders  or  attempts  to  murder 
have  shown  the  civilised  world  two  things.     The 
first  is  that  Germany  is  a  pariah  among  the  nations 
- — for  it  is  beyond  question  that  in  this  matter 
Austria  has   taken    her    pohcy    from   Germany  ; 
and  next,  that  if  ci\'ilisation  is  to  be  saved,  it  must 
be  saved  by  the  defeat  of  Germany.     The  German 
Emperor  has  been  informing  his  troops  that  his 
enemies  in  their  madness  are  reckoning  for  victory 
on    three   elements,     h^irst   their   masses—  that   is 
the  number  of  men  they  can  put  into  the  field  is 
vastly  superior  to  that  which  the  Germans  and 
Austrians  can  put  in  ;    next,  their  effort  to  starve 
the  entire  German  people-  he  is  alluding  not  to 
the  effort  which  has  been  made  but  which  un- 
doubtedly should  and  will  be  made  ;   thirdly,  "  the 
mischievous  and  malicious  calumnies"  which  they 
are  spreading  about  the  Fatherland  and  its  leaders 
— and   by   this    no   doubt    his    Im]iorial    Majesty 
indicates   the    unpleasant    but    undoubted    truth, 
that  Germany  has  lost  caste  amongst  the  peoples 
of  the  world.     But  that  she  has  engaged  in  the 
murder  of  non-combatants  in  Belgium  and  twenty 
times  at  sea   is  not  a   calumny  invented  by  her 
enemies.   It  is  an  achievement   in   which   she  has 
gloried-  whicli,  even  at  the  threat  of  war  from 
America,  she  will  neither  disown  nor  discontinue. 
She  has  invoked  upon  herself  and  upon  her  children 
the  blood  of  the  innocent  and  the  curse  of  Cain. 
The   Emperor   then   has   stated   the   crime,    and 
prescribed   the   method   of  its   ])unishment.     The 
method    is    masses    and    hunger.     The    time    has 
come  for  the  Alhes  to  inform  the  neutral  world 
that  the  full  rigour  of  war  has  to  be  enforced 


against  the  active  enemy  of  the  Allies  and  the 
avowed  enemy  of  the  civilisation  of  all  countries, 
and  the  announcement  will  surprise  the  neutrals 
far  less  than  the  enem\'. 

The  full  rigour  of  war  !  War  is  waged  prm- 
cipalh-  bv  two  processes,  battle  and  siege.  Victory 
is  attained  either  by  the  defeat  of  the  enemy's 
main  armed  force  in  battle,  or  by  it  being  made 
impotent  for  battle  b\-  direct  privation  or  by 
being  bereft  of  the  spiritual  support  of  the  civil 
population  from  wliich  it  is  drawn.  The  civil 
population  cannot  support  the  army  when  it  is 
demoraUsed  bv  the  privations  of  war.  To  defeat 
the  enemy  in  "battle  involves  maintaining  against 
him  larger  armies  than  he  possesses,  and  armies 
better  equipped,  capable  of  suffering  and  wiUing 
to  endure  greater  sacrifices  of  life  to  finish  the 
business.  Siege  only  invoh-cs  the  making  of  the 
blockade,  both  of  our  enemy's  ports  and  of  the 
neutral  ports  which  supply  him,  an  effective 
instead  of  a  farcical  procedure.  Siege  involves  no 
risk  to  any  Allied  belligerent,  and  therefore  no 
sacrifice  of  life.  It  need  involve  no  sacrifice  or 
real  loss  to  any  neutral.  By  real  loss  I  mean 
deprivation  of  any  profitable  trade  which  existed 
between  neutrals  before  the  war.  Siege  then  is  a 
form  of  war  which  is  far  more  economical  in  life 
and  treasure  than  is  battle. 

Is  it  as  effective  ?  If  the  blockade  can  be 
made  absolute,  there  is  little  question  that  it  would 
inflict  hardships  and  privations  on  the  German 
civil  population,  which  might  easily  become  in- 
tolerable the  moment  that  population  reahsed  that 
its  governors  were  powerless  to  reheve  them.  They 
would  be  quickened  in  reahsing  that  defeat  must 
be  acknowledged  if,  at  the  same  time,  it  was  made 
clear  to  them  that  neither  Great  Britain  nor  any 
Ally  intended  at  any  future  time  to  allow  a  German 
ship  to  put  to  "sea,  or  any  trade  to  pass  between 
Germany  and  any  Allied  country,  until  full  repara- 
tion had  been  made  for  all  the  losses  which  Germany 
has  inflicted  in  Belgium,  France,  Poland  and 
Serbia,  and  on  merchant  shipping.  Whether 
the  blockade  could  by  itself,  and  without  battle, 
cause  the  surrender  of  Germany,  is  doubtful.  But 
it  is  not  doubtful  that  it  could  assist  towards 
causing  it,  still  less  doubtful  that  the  more  the 
blockade  is  mitigated,  the  more  the  Allies  will 
have  to  increase  their  military  effort. 

\t  this  moment  we  are  in  the  throes  of  a 
political  crisis  in  England  precisely  because  our 
own  contribution  to  the  military  force  of  the  Allies 
is  insufficient.  It  has  become  necessary,  if  our 
army  is  to  grow  to  the  required  dimensions,  to  use 
compulsion  to  obtain  recruits.  Compulsion  has 
raised  two  forms  of  opposition.  Some,  like  Sir 
John  Simon,  object  on  conscientious  grounds  to 
Englishmen  being  deprived  of  what  an  ingenious 
French  writer  calls  their  *'  primordial  ri^t  "  to 
light  only  when  they  volunteer.  Another  form  of 
opposition  arises  from  the  fear  that  once  the  prin- 
ciple of  compulsion  is  admitted,  there  itlay  be  no 
limit  to  military  demands  and  certainly  no  means  of 
opposing  them.  But  if  the  army  grows  from 
three  million  to  four  and  from  four  to  five  and  from 
five  to  six,  it  cannot  so  grow  without  ruining  Great 


January  0,  igib. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


Britain's  productive  capacity,  destroying  her 
economic  eq.uilibrium,  and  making  her  incapable  of 
giving  to  the  Alliance  that  financial  support  which 
is  necessary  to  its  continuance  and  to  its  victory. 
It  has  been  ignorantly  argued  against  this  form 
of  objection  that  it  is  an  opposition  which  "  prefers 
money-making  to  victory."  But  the  verdict  of 
history  is  on  the  side  of  the  objectors.  The 
defeat  of  Napoleon  would  have  been  impossible 
but  for  the  finance  of  Great  Britain,  and  the  wealth 
of  Great  Britain  was  the  direct  fruit  of  her  sea- 
povver,  rightly  and  ruthlessly  employed  to  maintain 
and  conserve  it.  Napoleon  was  finally  the  victim 
of  defeat  in  battle.  But  Waterloo-  was  un- 
questionably the  fruit  of  the  lorig  siege  which 
the  British  Fleet  had  maintained  from 
Trafalgar  until  1815.  But  if  Great  Britain  had 
in  1806,  1807  and  1809  raised  collossal  armies  in 
England  and  dislocated  her  trade  and  ruined  her 
finances  to  do  so,  she  would  not  have  been  able  to 
maintain  her  navy,  she  would  not  have  been  able 
to  subsidise  first  Spain  and  Portugal,  and  then 
Austria  and  Prussia,  she  would  have  failed  in  encom- 
passing Napoleon's  defeat.  ,  h^or  it  is  very  doubt- 
ful if  she  could  have  achieved  with  her  own  forces  in 
battle  what  she  finally  achieved  by  the  other  war 
process  which  she  adopted. 

The  moral  of  the  situation  then  should  be 
plain.     There  is  a  limit  to  the  number  of  men 
that  we  can  put  into  the  field,   but  it  does  not 
follow  that  there  is  a  limit  to  the  services  which 
Great  Britain  can  contribute  to  the  Allied  cause. 
Had  the  siege  of  Germany  been  ruthless  and  com- 
plete  from    the   beginning,    had   we   never   been 
hampered    by    the    imbecile    provisions    of    the 
Declaration   of   London,   had   Germany   received 
no    cotton    from    overseas    since    August,    1914, 
had  our  blockade  when  it  was  proclaimed  in  March 
last  been  a  real  blockade  and  its  effectiveness  not 
frittered   away    by   concessions   to   neutrals   here 
and  to  neutrals  there,  Germany  might  already  have 
been  brought  to  the  point  when  further  resistance 
would  not  only  be  hopeless  but  would  be  recognised 
by    all  to   be  hopeless.       Our   failure   to   make 
the  siege  a  real  one  has  made  it  necessary  for  us 
to  contribute  more  and  more  largely  to  our  share 
'  in  the  other  process  of  war,  namely  battle.     Indeed 
the  measure  of  our  increased  military  sacrifice  is 
in  itself  a  measure  of  our  naval  failure.     Every 
shipload  of  goods  that  goes  into  Holland  for  trans- 
ference to  Germany  must  now  be  balanced  by  a  ship- 
load of  soldiers  from  England  to  France.     And, 
to  our  shame  be  it  said,  the  supplies  which  are 
reaching  Germany  through  neutral  countries  to- 
day are  by  no  means  all  of  them  neutral  supplies. 
It  'is  not  to  be  doubted  that  great  quantities  of 
British  exports  either  find  a  German  destination, 
or  replace  for  neutral  consumption,  neutral  goods 
exported.     Bad  as  the  present  state  of  things  is 
there  is  a  distinct  danger  of  -their  becoming  worse. 
The  Washington  correspondent  of  the  Times  has 
been  openly  urging  that  America  should  be  allowed 
to  send  tinned  milk  to  German  babies.     But  there 
is  ample  milk  in  Germany  for  the  babies 

The  sophistry  of  the  argument  is  transparent. 
That  it  should  be  uttered  at  all  is  an  index  to  the 
want  of  firmness  with  which  the  whole  business  of 
the  blockade  has  been  managed.  But  that  it  has 
been  managed  without  firmness  should  not  sur- 
prise us.  It  has  been  managed  almost  entirely 
by  diplomatists  and  civilians— men  of  the  highest 
aiid  most  honourable  character,  of  the  most  generous 
instincts,  and  of  proved  supremacy  in  their  calling. 


But  the  point  and  object  of  that  calling  is  to 
prevent  hostilities  and  to  preserve  peace  and 
kindly  relations  with  all,  and  siege  is  a  process  of 
■aar.  If  it  is  to  be  made  effective  for  war  it 
should  be  handled  and  directed  by  men  of  war 
and  not  by  men  of  peace.  It  is  a  naval  process  and 
the  men  of  war  should  be  naval  men,  and  as  it 
is  a  process  on  which  all  the  Allies  are  united, 
and  are  commonly  interested,  the  blockade  should 
not  be  a  British  blockade  but  an  Allied  blockade, 

THE     WHITE    PAPER. 

The  White  Paper  published  on  Tuesday  morn- 
ing shows  that  our  blockade  to-day  is  a  sterner 
affair  than  it  was.  But  it  does  not  show  that 
it  is  as  stern  as  it  could  be.  The  omission  of  the 
statement  is  that  we  are  not  told  the  total  of  the 
imports  that  actually  reach  Germany.  No  agree- 
ments with  traders  can  really  prevent  or  seriously 
check  such  imports  because,  if  importation  is 
free,  goods  cannot  be  followed  by  a  private  associa- 
tion from  owner  to  owner  until  they  reach  the 
actual  exporters'Jiands.  Again  what  is  the  use  of 
forbidding  the  exjiort  to  Germany  of  Chicago  lard 
taken  into  Holland,  if  all  the  Dutch  lard  is  exported, 
and  the  Hollanders  live  on  the  foreign  a.rticle  im- 
ported to  replace  it  ?  There  is  no  alternative,  if  the 
embargo  is  to  be  absolute,  to  making  the  neutral 
Governments  party  to  it.  And  the  White  Paper 
shows  how  this  can  be  done,  without  illegality 
or  warlike  threats. 

We  are  then  face  to  face  with  a  very  grave 
situation,  in  which  the  necessity  for  a  new  kind 
of  action  and  of  prompt  action  is  quite  vital  to 
us.  V/e  have  set  our  hands  to  the  conquest  of 
Germany  and  we  must  conquer  in  battle.  But 
the  stricter  the  siege  the  lighter  the  task  of  those 
who  fight.  We  can,  if  we  choose,  make  the  siege 
absolute.  It  seems  madness  not  to.  We  must 
get  from  the  fleet  the  ablest  officers  that  can  be 
spared,  we  must  make  them,  say  Second  and  Third 
Sea  Lords  at  the  Admiralty,  and  put  the  blockade 
absolutely  into  their  hands. 

The  blockade  may  involve  and  very  probably 
will — forbidding  all  imports  entering  the  neutral 
countries  contiguous  to  Germany,  except  under  a 
definite  pledge  from  the  Governments  that  neither 
they  nor  their  equivalent  in  home  produce  shall  be 
exported  over  land  or  by  sea  into  Germany.  If 
it  is  objected  that  this  course  is  virtually  forcing 
the  neutrals  into  war,  the  reply  is  obvious  To 
the  extent  to  which  neutrals  are  feeding  Germany 
to-day  they  are  taking  part  in  the  war  already,  and 
there  are'obvious  forms  of  persuasion  that  cannot 
be  confused  with  threats  of  force.  There  is  not 
a  single  belligerent  Allied  country  that  covets  a 
square  yard  of  territory  of  Sweden,  Denmark, 
Norway  or  Holland.  There  is  not  one  of  them 
that  is  not  prepared  to  guarantee  their  territorial 
integrity,  and,  that  is  not  willing  to  repay  to  them 
any  loss  of  their  normal  neutral  trade  which  com- 
pliance with  these  demands  may  involve. 

LOSS    OF    THE     "NATAL." 

There  appears  to  be  no  reason  for  supposing 
that  the  loss  of  the  Natal  was  occasioned  by  any- 
thing but  an  accident.     It  would  be  easier  to  bear 
had  it  occurred  in  battle.     As  it  is  the  tragedy 
seems  senseless  and  without  compensation  of  any 
kind  whatever.  My  personal  connection  with  th' 
ship   was   longer   and   more   intimate   than   v 
any  other.     In  the  years  1909  and  1910  sh-- 
designated  for  a  series  of  experiments  w' 


Q 


V 


L-AND      AND     WATER: 


January  6, '1916., 


fire  control  invention.   In  the  first  period -she  was 
connnanded  by  Captain  Frederick -Ogilvy  who  died 
of  typhoid  before  the  end  of  the  year.     No  man  at 
that  time  stood  higher  as  an  authority  on  gunnery, 
and  his  loss  was  so  deeply  felt  that  the  honour  was 
paid  him  of  founding  an  annual  prize  in  his  mem- 
ory.    Curiously    enough    Ogilvy    had    not    been 
trained  as  a  gunnery  officer  but  as  a  torpedo-man. 
But  it  was  his  good  fortune  to  have  served  under 
Sir  Percy  Scott  when  he  was  initiating  the  renaiss- 
ance  of  gunlaying   on   the  China  station,  and  he 
became  Scott's  riglit  hand  man  in  working  out  and 
developing  the  appliances,  necessary  for  teaching 
gunlayers  to  overcome  the  initial  difliculty  of  naval 
marksmanship,  \'iz.,  keeping  the  gun  steady  on 
the  target  while  the  ship  is  moving.     Ogilvy  un- 
doubtedly possessed  a  mechanical   and  scientific 
genius  of  a  very  high  order,  and  once  started  by 
Scott  on  the  study  of  gunnery,  he  soon  passed  be- 
yond the  rudiments,  and  began  the  investigation 
of  the  far  more  subtle  and  far  more  important 
department  of  fire  control.     In  the  South  African 
War  he  had  been  in  command  of  a  battery  of  12 
pounder  guns,  so  that  he  realised  from  the  first 
that  no  matter  how  perfected  the  art  of  gun  laying 
might  be,  it  would  be  less  use  for  war  unless  it 
were  combined  with  a  development  of  fire  control 
adequate  to  the  conditions  of  action.     In   1907 
and  1908  he  was  in  command  of  the  Revenue  \ust 
when  the  first  eftorts  to  find  a  system  for  long 
range   firing  were   being   tested   practically.     All 
these  systems  were  more  or  less  based  upon   the 
theory  first  instrumentally  embodied  in  the  gear 
we  had  tried  unsuccessfully  in    the    Jupilcr.  in 
1905-6.     In  1909  we  had  carried  the  thing  to  a 
much  farther  point,  but  we  were  still  far  short  of 
action  requirements.     The  main  deficiency  of  our 
igog  system  was  that  it  was  designed  to  deal  only 
with  the  conditions  when  the  firing  ship  kept  a 
S^tcady  course.     It  was  really  Ogilvy  who  brushed 
difficulties  on  one  side,  and  forced  us  on  the  only 
path  that  could  lead  to  success. 
.   •    Had  he  lived  there  can  be  little  question  that 
the  history  of  naval  gunnery  would  have  taken  a 
very  different  course  to  that  which  in  fact  it  did. 
He  had  been    designated    to    the    command    of 
Excellent  before  his  death,  and  it  was  intended  that 
his    appointinent    should    coincide    with    the    co- 
ordinal  ioi  of  all  the  gunnery  schools  and  establish- 
ments.    Already  in  1909  there  was  a  marked  con- 
fiict  in  policy  between  the  Inspector  of  Target 
Practice   and   that   of    the     Director   of    Naval 
Ordnance.     The  Inspector  of  Target   Practice  at 
that  time,  Sir  Richard   Peirse,   assisted  with   his 
Staff — of  whom,  by  the  way,  Captain  Eric  Back 
was  chief — at  every  battle  practice  held  by  the 
Fleet   in   home  waters  or  in   the  Mediterranean. 
He  thus   became   the   depository   of  the   Fleet's 
experience  in  long-range  firing,  and  the  one  man 
who  knew  exactly  what  was  required  to  bring  long 
range  gmmery  to  battle  worthiness.     But  while 
he  had  the  knowledge,  he  had  no  authority  what- 
c\er  vis  a  vis  t)  the  Board  of  .Admiralt}'.     Officially, 
the  only  adviser  to  the  Board  in  fire  control  was 
the   Director  of  Naval  Ordnance,  whose  practical 
experience  in  the  matter  might  be,  and  for  some 
years    indeed     actually     was,     negligible.      The 
spectacle  therefore  presented  itself  of  the  experts 
in  the  Fleet  being  in  absolute  opposition  to  the 
official  policy  of  Whitehall  in  the  most  vital  of  all 
points  of  preparation  for  war.     The  reorganisation 
that  was   to   follow  on  Ogilvy 's  ap])ointmcnt   to 
Whale  Island  was  to  have  terminated  this  coulUct. 


The  direction  of  methods  of  naval  gunnery  was  to 
be  dissoci^tod  from  the  direction  of  the  provision 
of  naval  ordnance,  ammunition  and  mountings — 
subjects  quite  large  and  arduous  enough  to  mono- 
polise the  time  and  attention  of  even  the  ablest 
officer.  But  Ogilvy's  death  was  followed  by 
changes  at  Whitehall,  and  no  alteration  was  made. 
The  conflict  between  the  Inspector  of  Target 
Practice  and  Whitehall  consequently  became-'more 
and  more  marked  until,  in  1913,  it  was  terminated 
by  the  abolition  of  the  Inspectorship.  It  was  a 
curious  way  out  of  the  difficulty.  For  four,  5"ears 
there  had  been  an  official  representative  protesting 
in  the  name  of  the  Fleet  against  the  retrograde 
policy  of  Whitehall.  The  obvious  thing,  it  would 
seem,  would  be  to  have  ensured  that  Whitehall  was 
in  harmony  with  the  experts.  It  certainly  was 
one  way  of  obtaining  peace  to  secure  that  the 
experts  should  be  silenced.  But  it  was  not  the 
way  to  secure  the  right  gunnery. 

A    BREAKER    OF    RECORDS. 

A  few  months  before  Ogilvy  died.  Natal, 
with  Eric  Back  on  board,  broke  all  records  in  the 
gunlayers'  test.  William  James  was  Gunnery 
Lieutenant.  So  great  was  the  sensation  created  by 
this  performance  that  James  was  shifted  from 
Natal  to  Whale  Island,  so  as  to  make  Ogilvy's 
training  methods  available  to  the  entire  Fleet. 
But  under  Ogilvy's  successor,  Captain  W.  R.  Hall. 
Natal  in  igio  surpassed  even  her  own  records  and 
put  up  a  performance  which  it  is  safe  to  say  can 
never  be  beaten.  When  Captain  Hall  was  com- 
missioned Xo  Queen  Mary,  the  former  Gunnery 
Lieutenant  of  Natal  became  his  Commander, 
and  the  Queen  Mary  forthwith  proceeded  to  break 
all  gunnery  records  as  successfully  as  Natal  had. 
Hall  was  succeeded  by  Captain  Greatorex,  and 
throughout  all  three  commissions  Natal  was 
easily  the  smartest  and  most  brilliant  ship  in  her 
.squadron.  One  of  the  secrets  of  her  successes 
was  that  Captain,  wardroom,  and  men  seemed 
always  actuated  by  a  common  purpose,  a  common 
spirit,  and  a  common  aim.  It  is  a  tradition  that  I 
have  no  doubt  Eric  Back  carried  on  without 
difficulty,  for  he,  like  his  predecessors  in  that 
devoted  ship,  was  one  of  those  who  command  and 
lead  naturally  and  easily,  because  their  accom- 
plishments and  character  make  their  leadership 
seem  both  natural  and  inevitable. 

If  Natal  was  a  happy  ship  she  was  a 
singularly  ill-fated  one.  She  lost  an  officer  killed 
on  board  during  her  first  commission.  Ogilvy,  on 
the  whole  the  most  brilliant  man  I  have  e\ cr 
known,. died  as  I  have  said,  before  he  had  been  in 
her  a  year.  Gathorne  Hardy,  who  was  Com- 
mander under  both  Ogilvy  and  Hall,  died  from 
blood  poisoning  within  a  few  months  of  Ogilvy. 
Hardy  was  a  man  who,  everyone  was  agreed, 
must  have  gone,  had  he  lived,  to  the  very  top  of 
the  naval  hierarchy.  Gifted  with  quite  extra- 
ordinary personal  cliarm  and  a  manner  whose 
gentleness  was  almost  feminine,  he  possessed  an 
authority  over  brother  officers  and  men  of  the 
most  convincing  kind  imaginable.  ^  And  now  Eric 
Back  has  gone  as  the  result  of  an  accident, that 
might  just  as  well  lia\'e  happened  in  peace  as  in 
war.  It  certainly  is  curious  that  a  ship  that  was 
only  commissioned  eight  years  ago  should  have 
lost  three  such  brilliant  and  exceptional  officers 
as  Ogilvy,  Gathorne  Hardy  and  Back,  each  by 
sheer  misadventure.  Such  are  the  vicissitudes  of 
the  naval  career.  ARTHUR.  POLLEN. 


10 


January  6^  1916. 


L'AND      AND     WATER 


THE    FORUM. 

A     Commentary     on     Present-day    Problems. 


A  GERMAN  phrase-maker  has  capped  the 
Napoleonic  appreciation  of  us  as  a  nation 
of  shopkeepers  by  dubbing  us  in  liis 
spleen  a  nation  of  week-enders.  At  this 
season  of  the  year  which  is  consecrated  by  a 
venerable  tradition  to  the  wholesome  practice  of 
reviewing  our  pasts  and  making  resolutions  for 
the  future,  it  may  be  worth  while  examining  our 
national  conscience  in  the  light  of  criticisms  by 
disgruntled  enemies  and  candid  friends.  We  may 
profitably  give  the  devil's  advocate  a  free  hand  and 
reserve  our  defence. 

A  nation  of  week-enders  !  It  is  a  phrase  with 
a  sting  and  the  sting  of  it  is  the  measure  of  truth 
in  it.  Unquestionably,  habits  and  sports  which 
used  to  be  the  privilege  of  a  relatively  small  class 
have  been  extended  to  the  very  large  class  of  the 
substantial  or  at  least  well-paid  men  of  business. 
All  standards  of  food,  clothing,  housing  and 
recreation  have  been  raised.  There  is  a  very 
much  less  widespread  habit  of  saving.  Our 
fathers  tell  us,  with  a  greater  measure  of  accuracy 
than  often  characterises  the  praisers  of  departed 
days,  that  they  came  to  their  work  earlier  and 
left  it  later  than  we,  nor  had  they  such  holidays. 
And  if  that  seems  to  us  rather  a  matter  for  com- 
passion than  imitation,  and  we  urge,  what  is  indeed 
the  fact,  that  work  is  of  no  such  particular  ^sanctity 
in  itself  ;  and,  what  is  equally  true,  that -we  work 
at  a  greater  pace  and  pressure  than  they  and  need 
more  relaxation,  then  our  German  friendpokes  up 
his  square  head  and  reminds  us  with  a  sheaf- of 
Board  of  Trade  returns  that  business  goes  to  the 
keen.  .  .  .  We  have  great  responsibilities, 
great  estates  to  keep  up.  That  is  why  we  do 
really  need  a  little  closer  attention  to  business. 

A  plain  trader  recently  gave  as  the  reason 
for  a  certain  great  trade  gradually  dropping  out 
of  British  into  German  and  American  hands,  the 
reluctance  of  the  British  w-orkman  to  put  in  a  long 
succession  of  good  days  of  work,  adding  that  the 
employer  largely  set  the  bad  example.  If  he  had 
worked  for  a  fortnight  he  felt  he  needed  a  long 
week-end  at  Brighton.  His  week-end  habit  was 
the  equivalent  of  the  workman's  many  ruined 
Mondays.  Of  course  there  is  a  more  congenial 
explanation  which  is  to  put  down  all  differences 
in  our  rivals'  favour  to  tariffs  and  dumpings. 

Elderly  men  of  business  complain  that  in- 
telligent young  men  from  the  universities  now 
present  themseh-es  (of  course  we  speak  of  that 
almost  forgotten  age  before  the  war)  as  ready  to 
fill  any  well-paid  posts  which  may  be  available 
instead  of  climbing  by  the  hard  way  of  preliminary 
drudgery  and  experience.  They  think  perhaps 
that  such  posts  have  already  been  won  on  the 
playing  fields  of  Eton.  But  the  men  in  authority 
in  such  businesses  are  beginning  to.  ask  ■  whether 
school  and  university  should  not  be  expected  to 
produce  something  more  than  character— narnely 
equipment.  Men  of  mature  age  with  commissions 
in  the  new  armies,  men  who  have  been  accustomed 
to  sustained  hard  work,  note  a  general  disposition 
in  the  new  young  officer  to  look  on  soldiermg  as 
anything  from  a  solemn  dedication  at  the  best 
moments  to  a  bore  at  tho  worst.  l-"it  tint  ns  n 


tough,  compressed  job  of  work  against  time, 
needing  the  full  stretch  of  all  the  energies.  Said  a 
candid  subaltern  challenged  on  the  point,  "  Yes,  I 
daresay  it's  so.  I  supjiose  we  rely  on  our  being 
EngHshmento  pull  us  through."  "An  army 
of  week-enders  !  "  says  the  sneering  German  with 
renewed  emphasis. 

"  You  Britishers  never  finish  anything,"  says 
a  Transatlantic  critic,  illustrating  the  charge  by 
the  homely  but  significant  parable  of  the  screw- 
driver— which  runs  as  follows  :  The  English  tool- 
maker  makes  a  well  finished,  exceedingly  strong 
implement,  with  its  working  end  bevelled,  whicli 
will  in  fact  put  in  and  take  out  screws.  The 
American  proceeds  to  make  the  quite  obvious 
deduction  that  a  blade-end  with  all  but  parallel 
sides  will  be  the  most  serviceable  for  use  with  a 
straight  slot  and  finishes  his  screw-driver  so  as 
best  to  engage  and  keep  the  slot.  He  further  notes 
that  time  and  energy  can  be  saved  by  the  addition 
of-  a  ratchet.  He  then  adds  the  principle  of  the 
Archimedan  drill  and  produces  still  greater  power 
and  speed  ;•  and  finally  overcomes  the  last  remain- 
ing difficulty,  namely  the  holding  of  the  screw  in 
position  before  driving,  by  attaching  a  spring 
holder  to  the  blade.  .  .  .  The  English  tool- 
maker  still  makes  a  well  finished,  exceedingly 
strong  implement,  with  bevelled  working  endi, 
which  will  in  fact  put  in  and  take  out  screw& 
Voila  tout  ! 

Even  if  the  Americans'  weakness  is  to 
assume  that  civihsation  is  too  inclusively-  a 
matter  of  steam-heating,  express  elevators,  aiid 
telephones  at  the  bedside,  his  defence,  that;  if -he 
is  the  great  benefactor  of  human-kind  who  makes 
two  blades  of  grass  to  grow  where  one  grev/  before, 
he  who  drives  three  screws  in  the  time  which  it 
formerly  took  to  drive  one,  also  deserves  con- 
siderable credit.  As  long  as  screws  have -to  be 
driven  let  them  be  driven  with  the  greatest 
economy  of  means.  There  is  no  real  case  against 
finishing  the  screw-driver. 

Ask  a  doctor  or  surgeon  in  his  laboratory 
why  he  is  using  the  Zeiss  microscopes.  He  will 
tell  you  that  apart  from  their  fine  quality 
which  is  unsurpassed,  in  contradiction  of  a 
popular  legend  which  attributes  inferior  finish, 
the  instruments  are  handier,  because,  witb 
their  shorter  tube  length  contrived  without 
loss  of  power  owing  to  the  skilful  arrangement 
of  the  prisms,  the  hands  can  get  at  theit 
work  better  ;  that  moreover  they  are  planned  for 
the  whole  range  of  microsopic  work  with  all  parts 
standarised  ;  while  w'ith  the  English  models,  a 
new  main  instrument  is  often  required  for  new 
branches  of  work,  or  clumsy  and  expensive  adapters 
required.  The  enemy  victory  in  fact  is  not  so 
notably  due  to  the  fine  Jena  glass,  which  special 
privileges  and  subsidies  denied  to  our  own  makers 
helped  to  produce,  as  to  the  mere  painstaldng 
development  of  a  plan  of  absolutely  elementary 
simplicit}-.  We  don't  finish  things,  say  the  critics, 
with  some  justice. 

We  betray,  says  another  critic,  this  time  of  oui 
nwn  household,  an  astonishins  lack  of  imaginntion 


II 


LAND      AND     ^\  A  i  K  R  . 


January  6,  1916.; 


n  business.  And  above  all  we  don't  honour  our 
own  prophets.  One  of  our  foremost  artists,  a 
brilliant  colourist,  relates  how  he  had  been  com- 
missioned by  a  German  manufacturer  to  produce  a 
design  for  a  car-pet  at  a  fee  of  two  hundred  guineas. 
He  declared  that  he  had  never  been  offered  a  larger 
sum  than  ten  guineas  by  an  English  manufacturer. 
Yet  the  English  man  of  business  has  not,  to  say  the 
least,  the  reputation  of  being  less  generous  than  his 
German  rival.  It  is  merely  that  he  has  not  the 
curiosity  to  discover,  or  the  imagination  to  employ 
suitabh'  the  high  talent  which^  happens  to  be  at 
his  command. 

This  manner  of  dealing  \nth  our  prophets  is  of 
course  notorious.  America  and  Germany  wel- 
comed the  teaching  of  \\'illiam  Morris  in  the  sphere 
of  printing,  and  besidts  approving  if  for  its  own 
artistic  values,  also  contrived  to  turn  it  into 
dollars  and  marks.  Whereupon,  characteristic- 
ally enough,  our  men  of  business  began  to  take  an 
interest  in  the  revived  craft  thus  presented  tousrm 
these  refracting  media.  We  possess  to-day  the  most 
distinguished  formal  calligi-apher  in  Emope.  No 
English  typefounder  has  thought  it  worth  while  to 
put  him  to  the  task  of  designing  a  new  type.  He 
has  been  commissioned  to  produce  four  or  five 
such  designs  for  German  houses.  The  mournful 
story  of  the  aniline  dyes  is  too  clearly  in  e\ery- 
body's  memory  to  need  comment.  The  incredible 
neglect  of  Science  by  Government  on  the  (mic 
hand  and  by  manufacturers  on  the  other  is  the 
joke  of  Europe.  The  history  of  modern  British 
commerce  is  largely  a  history  of  lost  opportunity 
due  to  lack  of  imagination. 

If  we  turn  to  development  the  story  is  much 
the  same.  We  note  the  contrast  of  the  co-opera- 
tive dairj-  farming  movements  of  Holland  and 
Denmark  with  our  own.  Denmark's  success  is 
particularly  significant  as  she  wrests  her  triumph 
from  a  harder  climate.  The  garden  of  England 
and  the  incredible  Kentish  railways  make  another 
mournful  parable.  The  neglect  of  the  fisheries  is  a 
signal  instance  of  the  failure  of  national  imagina- 
tion, as  also  is  the  tolerance  of  the  vagaries  of  the 
fishmarket.  As  to  agriculture,  the  partial  and 
gratifying  success  of  Sir  Horace  Plunkett  in 
Ireland  is  more  than  balanced  by  its  all  but 
entire  failure  in  Great  Britain,  a  failure  due  to 
apathy  and  mutual  suspicions.  We  might 
profitably  note  the  sublime  recklessness  by  which 
we  have  allowed  and  still  allow  almost  un- 
diminished the  waste  of  fuel  which  is  represented 
by  incomplete  combustion  in  open  household  fires 
and  the  antiquated  furnaces  used  in  industry' — a 
waste  which  brings  in  its  train  other  wastes  such 
as  fogs,  involving  darkness  and  therefore  extra 
consumption  of  artificial  light,  delays  innumer- 
able, depreciation  of  buildings,  the  by  no  means 
negligible  menace  to  health,  and  the  pro\-ed 
stunting  of  vegetation — besides  all  the  dirt,  gloom, 
and  extra  household  work  involved.  The  damning 
facts  are  not  in  dispute  and  the  battle  for  sanity 
is  carried  on  mainly  by  a  small  (if  sturdy)  private 
society.  As  one  characteristic  result  of  its  acti- 
\-ities,  a  firm,  successfully  prosecuted  for  the 
nuisance  of  emitting  black  smoke  and  fighting  the 
action  with  bitterness — saved  some  £3,500  a  year 
in  its  coal  bill  by  the  enforced  change  to  scientific 
combustion  furnaces. 

Contemplate  a  city  iike  i^oncion,  Mecca  of 
pilgrims  of  all  the.  world,  and  \on  find  it  all  but 


uncatalogued  ;  its  streets  frequently  unnamed,  its 
public  services  difticult  to  find,  its  houses  un- 
juunbered,  or,  if  numbered,  then  so  inconspicuoush' 
that  the  numbers  are  invisible  by  night  when  most 
wanted.  The  District  Railway  with  its  carefully 
thought-out  signs,  maps,  arrows,  and  coded  colour 
schemes,  alone  seems  to  have  set  an  example  of 
rational  order. 

The  general  conditions  are  strangely  similar 
to  those  already  noted  in  industry.  \Ve  have  the 
essential  services  and  amenities  but  we  have  not 
taken  the  trouble  to  make  them  completely 
available.  "  You  Britishers  don't  finish  anything." 
And  while  London  is  in  the  picture,  a  glance  may 
be  spared  for  the  preposterous  waste  of  its  municipal 
government,  its  o\Trlapping  and  conflicting  au- 
thorities. And  we  may  recall  the  bitter,  un- 
imaginative opposition  to  the  unification  of  its 
electrical  system  and  the  refusal  to  face  the  problem 
of  the  co-ordination  of  its  railways  and  goods 
distribution. 

A  good  deal  of  all  this  is  no  doubt  the  ex- 
travagance of  a  careless  rich  man  not  to  be  troubled 
with  small  economies.  The  shock  of  war  will 
effect  greater  changes  in  habit  and  outlook  than 
can  ever  be  compassed  by  reflection. 

Will  it  shake  us  from  that  supreme  indifference 
to  the  things  of  the  mind  which  has  left  us  hitherto 
content  with  the  least  intelligent  national  educa- 
tion policy  in  Western  Europe  ?  Perhaps  it  would 
not  be  fair  to  press  too  far  the  fact  that  the  chief 
war  economy  conceived  by  the  Government  of 
London  should  be  the  docking  of  its  education 
grant.  But  it  is  true  beyond  dispute  that  the 
whole  national  system  has  been  starved  b}-  neglect. 
Our  rich  men  purchase  honours  instead  of  de- 
serving them  by  possessing  the  zeal  and  discretion 
necessary  to  endow  colleges  and  chairs.  Parha- 
ment  is  indift'erent. 

To  take  just  a  single  random  instance, 
the  .project  of  a  Museum  of  Science  which  should 
provide  opportunity  and  apparatus  for  students 
to  carry  on  their  studies  and  experiments,  urgently 
recommended  by  a  Royal  Commission  in  the 
early  seventies— is  still  a  project  !  There  are  a 
few  posts  of  honour,  a  few  considerable  emoluments 
at  the  top  of  the  scholastic  profession  ;  but  both  pay 
and  status  in  the  rank  and  file,  whether  in  higher 
or  elementary  education,  have  been  a  disgrace  to  a 
wealthy  country.  In  particular  the  treatment 
of  the  elementary  teachers,  working  in  the  main 
with  a  fine  zeal  against  the  heavy  discouragements 
of  grotesquely  overcrowded  classes  and  painfully 
restricted  standard  of  life,  deserves  the  severest 
c:ondemnation.  The  educational  ladder  is  seem- 
ingly constructed  so  that  as  few  as  possible  shall 
be  enabled  to  climb  by  it. 

'Vhat  we  have  starved  in  our  abundance  we 
must  feed  in  our  povert\-.  It  is  for  plain  citizens  to 
thmk  out  the  implications  of  this  fatal  flaw  in  our 
national  structure  so  that  when  we  rebuild  we 
ma\-  build  on  surer  foundations. 


n  .■•  c  ,M:"""'  (^''airman  of  the  Sub-Committee  of  tlie 
1  iihhc  Schools  Alpine  .Sports  Club,  mentions  that  liis  Com- 
mittee has  accepted  an  offer  of  the  Palace  Hotel,  Montana  (in 
Switzerland),  to  place  that  hotel  ac 'their  disposal,  rent  free, 
during  the  winter  for  the  reception  of  convalescent  officers. 
A  charge  will  be  made  to  each  officer  of  6s.  6d.  per  day  to 
cover  co.st  of  food  and  other  expanses,  and  friends  who 
accompany  them  will  pay  «s.  per  dav.  'ihose  who  would  like 
to  avail  themselves  of  this  arrangement  should  write  to  Lady 
\\aterl<.w  r,  Maresfield  Gardens,  Hampstead.  who  is  the 
llonorarv  Secrotarv  ol   the   Sub-rommittce 


12 


January  G,  1916. 


LANDAND     WATER. 


A    SONG    OF    THE    GUNS. 

By    gilbert    FRANKAU. 

["  A  Song  of  the  Guns  "  is  a  true  war  poem,  for  it  was  written  under  these  condi- 
tions. The  author,  who  is  no'w  serving  -with  the  Royal  Field  Artillery  in  Flanders,  was 
present  at  the  Battle  of  Loos  and  during  a  lull  in  the  fighting — -when  the  gunners  who  had 
been  sleepless  for  five  nights  were  resting  like  tired  dogs  under  their  guns — he  jotted 
down  the  main  theme  of  the  poem.  After  the  battle  the  Artillery  Brigade  to  ivhich  he 
was  attached  was  ordered  to  Ypres,  and  it  was  during  the  long  trench  warfare  in  this 
district,  within  sight  of  the  ruined  tower  of  Ypres  Cathedral,  that  the  poem,  was  finally 
completed.  The  last  three  verses  were  written  at  midnight  in  Brigade  Headquarters  with 
the  German  shells  screaming  over  into  the  ruined  town.  Mr.  Gilbert  Frankau  has  previously 
won  good  reputation  as  a  poet  with  his  two  long  poems  "  One  of  Jjs  "  and  "  Tid  'Apa".] 

1.— THE    VOICE    OF    THE    SLAVES. 


We  arc  the  slaves  of  the  guns, 

Serfs  to  the  dominant  things  ; 
Ours  are  the  eyes  and  the  ears, 

And  the  brains  of  their  messagings. 

Ours  arc  the  hands  that  unleash 

The  bUnd  gods  that  raven  by  night. 
The  lords  of  the  terror  at  dawn 

When  the  landmarks  are  blotted  from  sight 
By  the  lit  curdled  churnings  of  smoke. 

When  the  lost  trenches  crumble  and  spout — 
Into  loud  roaring  fountains  of  flame ; 

Till,  their  prison  walls  down,  with  a  shout 
And  a  cheer,  ordered  line  after  line, 

Black  specks  on  the  barrage  of  gray 
That  we  lift — as  they  leap — to  the  clock, 

Oiu:  infantry  storm  to  the  fray. 

These  are  our  masters,  the  slim 

(irim  muzzles  that  irk  in  the  pit  ; 
.  That  chafe  for  the  rushing  of  wheels, 
For  the  teams  plunging  madly  to  bit 

As  tb.e  gunners  swing  down  to  unkey. 
For  the  trails  sweeping  haif-circle-right, 


For  the  six  breech-blocks  clashing  as  one 
To  a  target  viewed  clear  on  the  sight— 

Uun  masses  the  shells  search,  and  tear 
Into  fragments  that  bunch  as  they  run— 

For  the  hour  of  the  red  battle-harvest, 
The  dream  of  the  slaves  of  the  gun  ! 

We  have  bartered  our  souls  to  the  guns ; 

Every  fibre  of  body  and  brain 
Have  we  trained  to  them,  chained  to  them.  Serfs  ? 

Aye  !  but  proud  of  the  weight  of  our  chain — 
Of  our  backs  that  are  bowed  to  their  workings. 

To  hide  them  and  guard  and  disguise — 
Of  our  ears  that  are  deafened  \\ith  service. 

Of  hands  that  are  scarred,  and  of  eyes 
Grown  hawklike  with  marking  their  prey— 

Of  wings  that  are  ripped  as  with  swords 
When  we  hover,  the  turn  of  a  blade 

From  the  death  that  is  sweet  to  our  lords. 

By  the  ears  and  the  eyes  and  the  brain, 
By  the  limbs  and  the  hands  and  the  wings. 

We  arc  slaves  to  our  masters  the  guns  .  .  . 
But  their  slaves  are  the  masters  of  langs  ! 


2. -HEADQUARTERS. 

A  league  and  a  league  from  the  trenches— from  the  traversed  maze  of  the  linos, 
Where  daylong  the  sniper  watches  and  daylong  the  bullet  whines, 
And  the  cratered  earth  is  in  travail  with  mines  and  with  coimtermines— 

Here,  Mherc  haply  some  woman  dreamed,  (are  those  her  roses  that  bloom 

In  the  garden  beyond  the  windows  of  my  pttered  working-room  ?) 

We  have  decked  the  map  for  our  masters  as  a  bride  is  decked  for  the  groom. 

Fair,  on. each  lettered  numbered  square— cross-road  and  mound  and  wire, 
Loophole,  redoubt  and  emplacement— lie  the  targets  their  mouths  desire  ; 
Gay  with  purples  and  browns  and  blues,  have  we  traced  them  their  arcs  of  fire. 

And  ever  the  type-keys  clatter  ;  and  ever  our  keen  wires  bring 

\\'ord  from  the  watchers  a-crouch  below,  word  from  the  watchers  a-wing  ; 

And  e\-er  we  hear  the  distant  growl  of  our  hid  guns  thundering 

Hear  it  hardly,  and  turn  again  to  our  maps  where  the  trench-lines  crawl, 
Red  on  the  gray  and  each  with  a  sign  for  the  ranging  shrapnel's  fall- 
Snakes  that  our  masters  shall  scotch  at  dawn,  as  is  written  here  on  the  wall. 

For  the  weeks  of  our  waiting  draw  to  a  close.     .     .     .     There  is  scarcely  a  leaf  astir 
In  the  garden  beyond  my  windows  where  the  twilight  shadows  bliur 
The  blaze  of  some  woman's  roses    ... 

"  Bombardment  orders,  sir  \  " 


N.B.— A  Son)*  of  the  Guns  will  be  continued  in  our  next  issue. 


LAND     AND'     WATER. 


January  6,  19I6. 


THROUGH    THE    AMBROSIAL    NIGHT. 

By  J.  D.  Symon. 


THE  last  train  came  in  exactly  to  the  minute. 
It  had  all  the  outward  appearance  of  that 
scheduled  on  the  time  tablc^vidclicil,  it  was 
steam-driven  and  not  electric.  There  could 
be  no  mistake.  In  good  faith,  therefore,  the  traveller 
seized  a  corner  seat  and  opened  the  book  that  would 
beguile  the  ne.xt  three-quarters  of  an  hour.  But  in 
live  minutes  a  grinding  of  brakes  proclaimed  a  halt  and 
the  cry  of  "  All  Change  "  warned  at  least  one  passenger 
that  something  unusual  had  happened.  The  worst,  in 
fact,  had  happened.  This  was  vot  the  last  train,  but  a 
precursor,  a  few  minutes  late,  masquerading  as  the  last, 
worse  still  the  true  last  would  not  stop  at  this  wayside 
station.  In  due  time  it  flashed  through  with  a  pitiless 
indifference  to  the  stranded  and  belated,  whose  only 
hope  now  was  the  last  electric  which  would  stop  twelve 
miles  from  his  abode.  Another  quarter  of  an  hour  and 
the  only  hope  in  the  way  of  conveyance  had  done  its 
duty.     After  that,   Shanks's  mare. 

Well,  it  was  a  fine  night.  The  tramp  would  be 
agreeable  and  would  yield,  perhaps,  some  new  experience. 
The  clock  at  the  terminus  said  midnight  as  the  victim 
alighted,  to  find  that  he  was  not  alone  in  adversity.  Two 
other  late-homing  pigeons  had  been  beguiled,  like  himself, 
by  that  deceitful  late  penultimate  train.  They  compaied 
notes  and  grumbles.  One  was  lucky,  he  had  only  three 
miles  between  him  and  bed,  the  other  had  seven.  Three- 
niiles  had  already  found  the  only  cab  the  country  town 
had  to  offer  at  that  time  of  night,  and  was  bargaining 
for  transport.  Twelve-miles  tried  to  arrange  a  deal, 
wiiich  would  include  Seven-miles,  who  frankly  declared 
that  cabs  were  beyond  his  commission.  But  Three-miles 
would  not  come  to  terms.  Ke  suspected  some  inex- 
plicable form  of  swindle,  and  refused  to  believe  in  any 
equitable  division,  if  the  others  should  finally  persuade 
Jehu  to  take  them  a  little  further  on  their  way.  Perhaps 
it  was  a  case  for  the  differential  calculus.  Less  science 
would  have  done,  but  Three-miles  was  obdurate.  It 
was  his  cab,  he  would  stick  to  it.  No  share  was  possible. 
So  off  he  drove  in  soHtary  state. 

*T '  A  Long  March. 

^^  The  remainder,  glad  of  each  others  company,  faced 
,flie  long  march,  and  began  to  make  acquaintance.  The 
Traveller  found  that  his  chance  companion  was  a  post- 
man ;  what  the  postman  discovered  about  the  Traveller 
does  not  matter.  For  the  first  mile  or  so,  under  the 
frosty  starUght,  conversation  was  not  very  lively.  Both 
were  sleepy  and  smarting  under  injury,  the  way  was 
long,  the  wind  was  cold ;  the  iron  ground,  slippery  as 
glass  here  and  there,  told  upon  feet  already  weary.  Even 
a  postman  can  have  his  (ill  of  walking.  But  gradually, 
the  brilliant  air,  the  splendour  of  the  night,  prevailed 
over  sulkiness  and  the  Traveller,  at  least,  began  to  enjoy 
himself  hugely.  Then  the  Postman  spake  and  uttered  a 
very  human  note. 

The  way  now  led  under  high  branching  trees  into  a 

{)retty  village  of  renown  in  the  home  counties.  Darkness 
ay  close  about  the  wayfarers  and  out  of  the  darkness 
came  a  groan.  The  postman  knew  where  he  was. 
"  That's  the  Starling  we're  passing,"  he  sighed,  "and  no 
chance  o'  a  drink."  Night  and  the  hour  had  sounded  for 
him  the  top  note  of  Tragedy.  Consolation  there  was 
none.  The  Starling,  lightlcss  and  silent,  slept  inhospitable, 
a  mockery  of  brighter  hours.  Across  the  village  street, 
darkling,  stole  two  furtive  cats.  On  these  the  Postman 
moralised  and  found  relief. 

Anon  he  talked  of  his  profession  and  of  the  Territorial 
Army,  of  which  he  was  a  well-deserving  pillar.  War 
was  still  far  away,  as  men  ti.ought,  but  the  letter  carrier 
had  the  patriotic  conscience.  One  wonders,  has  he  ere 
now  proved  it  to  the  utmost,  this  simple,  quaint  good 
fellow.  Luck  to  him.  wherever  he  be  to-night!  He 
had  a  keen  sense  for  night  sounds  which  may  have  been 
useful  in  the  field.  In  a  tree  by  the  wajsidc  he  spotted 
a  roosting  cock,  which  the  more  urban  eyes  of  Twelve- 
miles  would  have  missed.  The  fowl  resented  the  ap]>roach 
of  the  foot-pads  and  crowed  lustily.  Tabellarius  told  the 
bird  he  was  a  fool  and  admonished  him  to  shut  up.    Then 


the  eyes  of  Tabellarius  went  skyward.  He  made  a  cliancc, 
curious  remark  about  the  stars,  and  wondered  what  they 
were.  A  little  drawing-out  proved  that  this  civil  servant, 
with  a  Board-School  education,  had  not  the  remotest  idea 
about  the  hosts  of  heaven.  He  had  never  even  heard  that 
they  were  named.  Twelve-miles,  beginning  with  the 
Pole-star  and  the  Great  Bear,  imparted  a  little  very 
elementary  astronomy  and  found  the  man  of  letters  apt 
and  interested.  Aldebaran,  Bellatrix  and  Betelgeuse, 
the  belt  and  nebula  of  Orion,  the  electric  flash  of  Sirius, 
the  wonder  of  Vega,  some  day  to  usurp  the  Pole,  the 
svvtet  influence  of  Pleiades,  with  these  dignitaries 
of  the  firmament  the  Postman  scraped  acquaintance  ; 
he  learned  to  distinguish  planets  from  fixed  stars 
and  heard  a  little  about  their  distances  and  movements 
taking  it  in  with  the  eagerness  of  a  child  who 
listens  to  a  fairy-tale.  It  was  almost  enviable  to  have 
ri'ached  years  of  discretion  with  no  faintest  knowledge 
of  the  starry  Universe.  What  would  not  the  sophisticated 
give  to  enter  that  world  consciously  for  the  first  time. 

First  View  of  the  Stars. 

Such  an  experience,  keyed  to  the  highest  pitch  of 
revelation,  fell  to  the  lot  of  agood  friend  of  the  Traveller's 
in  early  boyhood.  A  victim  of  very  short  sight,  he  had 
never  even  seen  the  stars,  until,  with  the  fitting  of  stronger 
spectacles,  he  at  last  gazed  out  into  the  infinite.  It  was 
his  good  fortune  to  look  up  for  the  first  time  with  clear 
vision  on  a  brilliant  Northern  night — just  such  a  night 
as  Masson  celebrates  in  his  "  Memories  " — and  the  pageant 
of  the  constellations  thrilled  him  to  awe  and  wonder. 
Hitherto  hp  had  not  known  what  men  meant  when  they 
spoke  of  the  stars.  At  that  moment  he  understood 
better  perhaps  than  any  living  person  the  mystery  and 
the  poetry  of  the  rolling  spheres.  Nor  has  the  memory 
of  that  vision  ever  left  him.  Wc,  to  whom  the  heavens 
are  too  familiar  from  infancy,  can  only  guess  at  that 
ineffable  ecstisy. 

The  seven  miles  were  done,  before  the  travellers  had 
begun  to  count  them.  Suddenly  the  Postman  welcomed 
the  lights  of  home  on  an  upland  heath,  and  descending 
to  earth  dwelt  lovingly  on  the  supper  waiting  within. 
There  would  be,  he  said,  cold  beef  and  a  long  drink  o' 
beer,  and  he  needed  it.  He  added  that  an  adjacent  light 
was  the  baker's,  who  would  now  be  getting  to  work  on  the 
morning's  loaves.  Twelve-miles,  feeling  somewhat  empty, 
bade  his  friend  farewell  and  tackled  the  remaining  fi\-c 
miles. 

Voices  of  the  Night. 

Alone,  lie  realised  the  full  wonder  and  mvstery  of  the 
hour.  The  frost  struck  keener,  the  road  rang  metallic  to 
the  footfail.  Sounds,  unheard  by  dav,  started  into  loud 
prominence  ;  the  trickling  of  a  iunlct  seemed  almost  a 
rushing  brook ;  shy  creatures  of  the  night  crept  rustHng 
through  the  underwood.  The  very  brushing  of  the  sleeve 
upon  the  coat  was  now  almost  thundrous.  And  exquisite 
subtle  scents  of  the  countryside  came  down  the  faint 
breeze.  Never  had  the  smell  of  the  haystack  been 
wafted  to  the  sense  with  such  delicate  and  delicious 
purity.  It  is  not  the  summer  night  alone  that  is 
ambrosial.  The  winter  night,  so  it  be  clear  and  quiet, 
can  hold  its  own  with  high  June. 

The  last  mile  lay  over  wide  common-land,  where  the 
furze  encrusted  with  rime  glittered  under  a  now  risen 
moon.  And  so,  just  as  Orion's  belt  swung  low  and 
touched  the  horizon,  the  Traveller,  a  little  footsore  but 
joyful,  reached  his  own  door.  His  time  for  the  twelve 
miles  was  five  minutes  short  of  the  three  hours.  Fair 
heel  and  toe,  like  Christopher  North's  midnight  tramp 
over  the  same  Chiltern  hills  from  Oxford  to  London  long 
ago — i-vKTa  <S(  anfipoa-i-nv,  in  vcry  truth. 


Mr.  Heincinann  will  shortly  publish  a  now  hook  by  Dr. 
riiarles  Sarolca.  entitled  Europe's  Debt  to  Russia. '  Dr. 
Sarolca's  work  is  a  systematic  attempt  to  remove  the  pre- 
conceptions against  Russia  wliicii  arc  still  vcry  widclv 
uccepteil,  and  particularlv  the  niisconccijtioiis  which  it  has 
suited  Cicrnianv  to  publish  in  neutral  countries. 


January  6,  iQiG.  .LAND     AND     WATER. 

V         THE    CULT    OF    KIPLING. 

By  the  Editor. 


THE  cult  of  Kipling  grows.  This  was  the  almost 
inevitable  result  of  the  war  and  of  the  close 
union  of  the  British  Empire  which  has  resulted 
from  it.  For  thirty  years  and  rhore  he  has 
been  the  Voice,  bidding  the  younger  nations  make  ready  . 
for  the  last  great  fight  of  all.  All  that  appertains  to  his 
writings  has  therefore  gained  a  new  interest  in  the  eyes  of 
thousands  of  his  fellow-countrymen,  and  for  this  reason 
a  hearty  welcome  is  assured  for  Mr.  Thurston  Hopkins' 
literary  ajiprcciation  {Rudyard  Kipling  :  A  Literarv 
Appreciation  by  R.  Thurston  Hopkins.  Simpkin,  Marshall, 
Hamilton,  Kent.  los.  6d.)  which  has  just  been  published. 
Anyone  who  turns  to  this  volume  in  order  to  find  per- 
sonal tittle-tattle  about  the  celebrated  author  will  be 
disappointed.  Mr.  Hopkins  has  confined  himself  almost 
entirely  to  his  work,  thus  carrying  out  Kipling's  own  idea 
that  the  work  is  greater  than  the  man,  which  he  expresses 
in'his  poem  on  Patrols,  written  only  this  winter  : 

Sing  welcome  Fate's  discourtesy 
Whereby  it  is  made  clear 
flow  in  all  time  of  our  distress 
As  in  our  triumph  too, 

The  game  is  more  than  the  player  of  the  game, 
And  the  ship  is  more  than  the  crew ! 

A  thoughtful  person  on  reading  reviews  and  criti- 
cisms of  the  writings  of  famous  men  of  letters,  cannot  fail 
to  be  struck  at  the  implication  which  critics  find  reviewers 
frequently  convey  that  a  writer,  once  he  takes  pen  in 
hand,  ceases  to  be  an  honest  workman,  doing  the  best 
in  his  power  without  thought  or  care  what  his  own  or 
later  generations  may  think  about  him,  but  at  once 
becomes  a  poseur,  who  picks,  chooses  and  selects  merely 
to  impress,  and  is  ever  prepared  to  "  baulk  the  end  half- 
won  for  an  instant  dole  of  praise."  Dr.  Stopford  Brooke, 
than  whom  there  could  be  no  higher  living  authority, 
once  told  the  writer  that  the  deadliest  sin  which  besets 
the  man  of  letters  is  vanity,  and  that  once  the  sin  is  yielded 
to,  no  little  of  the  virtue  goes  out  of  the  work.  Sincerity 
is  a  balm  that  preserves  from  corruption,  and  we  have 
only  to  glance  round  our  own  bookshelves'  in  order  to 
understand  the  truth  of  the  saying. 

The  Deadly  Sin. 

No  living  writer  has  been  more  careful  to  giiard  himself 
against  this  deadly  sin  than  Rudyard  Kipliiig.  The  last 
of  the  "Just  So  Stories,"  contains  a  small  incident, in 
the  life  of  Suleiman-bin-Daoud  who  "  very  seldom  showed 
off  and  when  he  did  he  was  sorry  for  it."  You  may 
remember  "he  tried  to  feed  all  the  animals  in  all  the 
world  in  one  day,  but  when  the  food  was  ready  an  Animal 
came  out  of  the  deep  sea  and  ate  it  up  in  {three  mouth- 
fuls."  That  is  frcvquently  the  way  with  the  reputation  of 
writers  (as  well  as  children)  who  show  off.  "  Suleiman- 
bin-Daoud  fell  flat  on  his  face  and  said,  '  O  Animal  !  I 
gave  that  dinner  to  show  what  a  great  and  rich  king  I 
was,  and  not  because  I  really  wanted  to  be  kind  to  the 
animals.  Now  I  am  ashamed,  and  it  serves  me  right.'  " 
Writers  court  the  same  fate  who  start  out  to  show  the 
world  what  great  and  clever  men  they  are  and  not  honestly 
to  give  of  the  best  that  is  in  them. 

'  Rudyard  Kipling,  as  Mr.  Thurston  Hopkins  reminds 
us,  began  his  career  when  in  his  later  teens  in  an  Anglo- 
I  ndian  newspaper  office  in  Lahore.  Being  a  good  j  ournalist 
.  he  did  what  lay  in  his  power  to  make  his  newspaper 
interesting.  Short  stories  and  occasional  verse  are  the 
oldest  features  of  Anglo-Indian  journalism.  It  is  not 
always  easy  to  fill  the  columns  of  an  Indian  daily  paper 
with'news';  the  profits  of  the  business  do  not  permit  of 
any  extravagant  staff ;  the  work  has  to  be  done  by  two 
or  three  men  and  in  the  hot  weather  more  often  by  one  or 
two.  But  all  the  time  there  is  passing  through  the 
country  an  ever-changing  stream  of  specially  selected 
British  brains,  men  who  for  the  most  part  would  not  be 
there  if  they  had  not  proved  themselves  the  superior  of 
their  fellows  in  the  examination  halls.  They  bring  with 
them  their  women,  who  have  to  endure  the  tedium  of  the 
long  long  Indian  day.  '  Nothing  can  dull  the  intensity  of 
the  first  imprdssions  of  the  Orient;   its  keenness  is  only 


surpassed  by  the  gnawing  pangs  of  home-sickness  afterthe 
glamour  has  worn  off. 

Anglo-Indian  Journalism. 

These  clever  folk  are  glad  to  use  their  pens  for  pleasure 
or  rehcf.  So  it  comes  about  that  one  of  the  niain  duties 
of  an  Anglo-Indian  editor  is  to  read  through  piles  of  MS. 
describing  either  directly  or  under  a  thin  disguise  of  fiction 
actual  sensations  and  episodes.  The  liana ck-rooms  of 
British  regiments  are  not  infrequent  contributors. 
Kipling  wrote  short  stories  and  verse  because  there  was  a 
demand  for  them.  He  put  the  best  workmanship  he 
could  into  the  job,  and  his  short  stories  survive  and  will 
survive  for  the  same  reason  that  the  vamped  historical 
plays  of  Shakespeare  have  outlasted  all  others  of-  liis 
.contemporaries,  because  each  gave  the  best  that  was;in 
him  to  what  at  the  moment  appeared  to  be  merely 
ephemeral  work,  and  their  best  chanced  to  be  touched  by 
the  authentic  fire  of  genius. 

One  of  the  commonest  charges  against  this  part  of 
Kipling's  work  is  that  it  showed  up  his  fellow-exiles  in  ..a 
most  unfavourable  light.  They  who  make  and  repeat 
this  accusation  which  on  the  face  of  it  seems  just,  are 
apparently  ignorant  of  the  Preface  that  appeared  in  the 
original  paper  volume  Under  the  Deodars,  which  we 
notice  has  escaped  Mr.  Hopkins,  who,  as  a  rule,  is  a  most 
careful  collector  of  these  sideli.ghts.  This  volume  con- 
tained, among  other  stories,  "  At  the  Pit's  Mouth,'' 
which  opens,  you  may  remember,  with  this  sentence : 
"  Once  upon  a  time  there  was  a  Man  and  his  Wife  and  a 
Tertium  Quid."  This  is  what  Kipling  himself  said  about 
his  Simla  stories,  as  they  are  now  usually  called  : 

Strictly  speaking,  there  should  be  no  preface  to 
this,  because  it  deals  with  things  that  are  not  pretty 
and  uglinesses  that  hurt.'  But  it  may  be  as  well  to  try 
to  assure  the  ill-informed  that  India  is  not  entirely 
inhabited  by  men  and  women  playing  tennis  with  tlie 
Seventh  Commandment  ;  while  it  is  a  fact  that  very 
many  of  the  lads  in  the  land  can  be  trusted  to  bear  thenv 
selves  as  bravely  on  occasion  as  did  my  friend  the  late 
Robert  Hanna  Wick.  The  drawback  of  collecting  dirt 
in  one  corner  is  that  it  gives  a  false  notion  of  the  filth 
of  the  room.  Folk  who  understand  and  have  knowledge 
of  their  own  will  be  able  to  strike  fair  averages.  The 
opinions  of  people  who  do  not  understand  cire  somewhit 
less  valuable. 

Charge  of  Brutality. 

"  Brutal  "  is  a  favourite  epithet  of  abuse  that  stav[- 
at-home  critics  fling  at  him.  It  is  one  which  Mr.  Hopkiri|s 
carefully  examines.  As  a  matter  of  fact  Kipling  is  never 
one  half  as  brutal  as  the  life  to  which  he  has  held  a  mirror 
up.  All  his  short  stories  (or  practically  all)  are  based 
on  actual  incidents  ;  not  a  few  are  merely  reports  of  events, 
and  not  one,  so  far  as  the  writer  is  aware,  is  morel  horrible 
or  painful  than  actual  occurrences  in  India.  Here  is  an 
example  which  fell  within  the  writer's  own  experience. 
An  Englishman  in  an  out-of-the-way  station  was  bitten 
one  morning  by  his  favourite  dog.  The  dog  developed 
hydrophobia  and  was  shot.  It  was  before  the  days  of 
Pasteurism.  A  few  evenings  later  the  man  was  dihing 
with  friends.  He  was  seized  by  the  madness ;  his 
paroxysms  were  awful;  all  his  friends  could  do  was  to 
shut  him  in  an  empty  room  and  fling  to  him  handkerchiefs 
soaked  in  chloroforrii ;  he  died  before  sunrise.  Had  that 
occurrence  been  described  by  Kipling,  doubtless  afore- 
times  it  would  have  been  deemed  further  irrefutable 
evidence  of  his  "  brutality  "  by  cream-faced  critics  to 
whom  "  seeing  life  "  implied  making  beasts  of  themselves 
in  the  dark  hours  of  the  night  amid  the  vicious  haunts 
of  Western  cities  knowing  that  their  bodies  were  safe- 
guarded by  the  police  and  the  common  hangman. 

I  say  purposely  "  aforetimes  "  for  sorrowful  evidence 
accumulates  that  a  new  value  is  being  affixed  to  the  word 
"  brutal  "  in  these  months  of  grief  and  suffering.  All  are 
being  taught  that  Death  is  no  longer  the  discreet  visitor 
he  was  thought  to  be,  who  when  he  knocked  at  door  of 
cottage  or  palace  was  introduced  by  a  polite  physit'ian, 
and  left  behind  him  a  smooth- voiced  family  lawyer  and 


LAND      AND      W  A  i  E  R 


January  6,  1916. 


An  obsequious  undertaker  to  make  everything  as  easy  and 
cheerful  as  possible.  Now  we  see  Death  as  India  knows 
liim  to  bo,  a  bloodj'-jawed  maniac  snapping  at  any  one 
within  reach,  careless  of  age  or  sex,  and  never  attempting 
to  conceal  or  to  ease  the  honid  wounds  which  he  leaves 
behind  him. 

In'  the  Preface  quoted  above  reference  is  made  to 
"  my  friend  the  late  Robert  Hanna  Wick."  The  story 
in  which  he  figures  is  called  "  Only  a  Subaltern  "  and  at 
its  head  stands  this  extract  from  the  Bengal  Army  Regu- 
lations :— "  Not  only  to  enforce  by  command  but  to  encourage 
bv  example  the  energetic  discharge  of  dutv  and  the  steady 
endurance  of  the  difficulties  and  privations  inseparable 
from  Militarv  Service."  We  know  now  how  great  and 
noble  is  the  company  of  Bobby  Wicks  who  in  their  life- 
time were  only  subalterns,  they  who  knew  no  fear  either 
of  the  disease  that  walketh  at  noon-tide  or  of  the  flying 
bullet  or  bursting  shell.  It  is  the  same  honest  workman 
who  gave  us  this  pathetic  picture  of  a  subaltern  which 
as  everyone  is  only  too  well  aware  to-day.  is  absolutely 
true  to  life,  who  also  drew  the  "Soldiers  Three."  The 
first  time  the  famous  Three  were  introduced  was  "  in  the. 
I'mballa  Refreshment  Room  while  we  were  waiting  for  an 
lip  train.  I  supplied  the  beer.  The  tale  was  cheap  at  ;i 
gallon  and  a  half."     And  the  story  ends  in  this  fashion  ; 

"  Young  man,  what's  t'  notebook  for  ?  "  said  Learoyd. 

"  Let  be,"  said  Afulvaney  ;  "  this  time  next  month  we're 
in  the  ^herapis.  'Tis  immortial.  lame  the  gentleman's  goin' 
to  give  us.  But  kape  it  dhark  till  we're  out  av  the  range  av 
me  little  frind  Bobs  Bahadur." 

Antl  I  have  obeyed  Mulvancy's  order. 

This  first  experiment  was  too  successful  to  end  here. 
No  more  was  heard  of  the  Sherapis  and  the  Three  have 
passed  into  "  immortial  fame."  though  their  glory  will 
ever  be  greater  among  those  who  realise  that  they  stand 
less  for  the  rank  and  file  of  the  British  Army  than  for  the 
rank  and  file  of  that  unenlisted  Grand  Army  who,  not- 
withstanding faults  and  failings,  despite  excesses  and 
distresses,  and  in  the  face  of  errors  and  perplexities,  have 
linked  Hindustan  to  the  British  Empire  and  given  new 
values  to  the  old  Anglo-Saxon  ideals  of  courage,  tenacity, 
truth  and  justice.  The  author  never  made  any  pretence 
that  the  Three  were  those  creatures  of  flesh  and  blood 
which  many  of  his  critics  assume  them  to  be  just  to  puU 
them  to  pieces.  This  is  how  he  wrote  of  them  in  his 
Dedication  to  the  original  volume  : 

Lo,  I  have  wrought  in  common  clay 
Rude  figures  of  a  rough  hewn  race. 
Since  pearls  strew  not  the  market  place 
In  this  my  town  of  banishment, 
Where  with  the  shifting  dust  I  play 
And  eat  the  bread  of  discontent. 

Yet  is  there  life  in  that  I  make 

O  thou  who  knowest.  turn  and  see  — 

As  thou  hast  power  over  me 

So  have  I  power  over  these, 

Because  I  wrought  them  for  thy  sake, 

And  breathe  in  them  my  agonies. 

What  some  of  these  agonies  may  have  been,  we  may 
learn  from  "  The  Madness  of  Private  Ortheris  "  :  "  I'm 
sick  for  London  again  ;  sick  for  the  soimds  of  'er  an  '  the 
sights  of  'er  and  the  stinks  of  'er  ;  orange-peel  an<l 
hasphalte  and  gas  coming  in  over  Vaux'all  Bridge." 
Were  this  not  sufficient  evidence  of  the  pains  of  exile  which 
gat  hold  of  Kipling  as  they  have  got  hold  of  soniany  of 
his  fellow-countrymen,  are  there  not  the  poems  "Christmas 
in  India  "  (that  originally  appeared  m  print  over  the 
nom  de  plume  of  "  A  Dyspeptic")  and  "  In  Spring  Time," 
— "  Give  me  back  one"  day  in  England  for  it's  Spring 
in  England  now." 

It  is  a  strange  commentary  on  the  ways  of  critics — 
even  Mr.  Hopkins  misses  it— that  scarcely  one  of  them 
pays  heed  to  this  cry,  which  is  the  very  voice  of  Anglo- 
India,  wrung  from  the  heart  of  her  by  the  bitterness  of 
failure  and  death,  in  the  weariness  and  torment  of  "  a 
toil  that  knows  no  breaking."  "  He  jests  at  scars  that 
never  felt  a  wound,"  and  this  wound  of  home  sickness  is 
mere  phantasy  to  those  who  have  not  suffered  it.  But 
it  is  the  true,  minted  stamp  of  honest  workmanship  in  the 
eyes  of  all  who  have  lived  the  life. 

Do  you  remember  how  "  With  the  Main  Guard  " 
ends— that  night  of  terrible  heat  in  the  Lahore  Fort, 
when   Learoyd  came  near  to  dying  of   apoplexy,   and 


Mulvaney  kept  him  going  with  his  talk  ?  One  cannot 
forbear  recalling  it  now  when  the  pitiless  day  again  breaks 
for  the  splendid  writer  of  the  story  and  for  so  many  other 
over-burdened  souls,  whom  he  has  ever  honestly  and  to 
the  full  height  of  his  genius  striven  to  strengthen,  hearten 
and  console  : 

'■  Oh,  Terence !  "  I  said,  dropping  into  Mulvaney's 
speech  when  we  were  alone.  "  It's  you  that  have  the 
Tongue !  " 

He  looked  at  me  wearily  ;  his  eyes  were  sunk  in  his 
liead  and  his  face  was  drawn  and  white.  "  Eyah  !  "  said  he. 
"  I've  blandandhered  thim  through  the  night  somehow, 
but  can  thim  that  helps  others  help  themselves  ?  Answer  me 
that,  Sorr !  " 

And  over  the  bastion  ol  J*ort  .^mara  broke  the  pitiless 
dav. 


"  With  Our    Indiuns    at    Marseilles."     By   Magsia    Bibikoff.     (Smith, 
Elder  and  Co.;     5s.  net. 

The  enthusiasm  of  this  young  Russian  artist,  a  pupil  of 
Detaille,  led  her  to  view  e%erything  an  couleur  de  rose,  and  her 
written  impressions  of  the  Indian  camps  at  Marseilles  may  be 
gatiiered  from  her  anticipation  of  an  interview  with  Maharajah 
Sher  Singh.  "  1  am  going  to  see  tlie  Ix-ing  wiio  thrilled  in\- 
childish  imagination,"  she  writes,  "  and  appeared  in  my  earliest 
dream>  amid  the  flash  of  jewels  that  scintillated  with  every 
colour.  With  sucii  expectations,  it  is  little  wonder  that  she 
founl  in  the  Indian  contingents  much  to  admire.  Tlie  book 
is  an  appreciation,  not  a  criticism,  and  even  when  the  Indians 
threw  away  the  food  on  which  her  shadow  had  fallen  she 
accepted  the  fact  without  comment. 

Her  sketches  are  gossamer  things,  confessedly  the  work 
of  five  or  ten  minutes  each,  and  bearing  the  mark  of  impres- 
sionism, not  of  detailed  work.  Text  and  sketches  together  give 
a  good  idea  of  the  Marseilles  camps,  and  though  the  book  is 
exceeclingly  slight  it  will  assist  in  giving  an  idea  of  what  the 
Marseilles  camps  were  really  like.  The  brief  introduction  by 
-Maurice  Barres  marks,  not  only  his  appreciation  of  the 
artist's  work,   but  also  of  the   Indians  in  France. 


"  The  Furniture  Collector.' 
Jenkins.) 


By  Edward    W.  Gregory.      (Herbert 


Mr.     Edward     W. 

Gregory  ts  a  writer  on 
domestic  architecture, 
decoration  and  furni- 
ture, very  favourably 
known  both  here  and  in 
the  United  States.  He 
has.  a  most  pleasant 
style,  is  singularly  well- 
informed,  and  without 
ever  posing  as  infallible, 
lias  come  to  be  accepted 
with  good  reason  as  a 
reliable  authority  on 
these  subjects. 

This  volume  is  an 
introduction  to  the 
study  of  English  styles 
of  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries, 
and  contains  illustra- 
tions of  typical  pieces 
of  furniture  from  public 
and  private  collections. 
It  includes  no  doubt 
some  information  which 
is  already  known  to 
professional  collectors,  but  to  amateurs,  whose  name  is 
legion,  the  book  will  be  a  sheer  dehght,  for  it  holds  so 
many  little  bits  of  side  knowledge,  and  sheds  new  light  on 
trophies  of  the  sales-rooms  or  heirlooms  handed  down  for 
generations,  which  are  the  special  pride  of  many  homes. 

There  is  an  interesting  account  of  the  furnishing  of  a 
house  of  a  prosperous  farmer  or  yeoman  in  the  time  of  Mary 
Tudor.  .\n  inventory  of  the  "  best  chamber "  in  Eliza- 
beth's reign  is  given.  A  chaj>ter  all  to  itself  is  devoted  to 
the  old  Windsor  chair  and  well  it  deserves  it.  Chippendale, 
Heppelwhite,  Sheraton  have  also  their  own  chapters,  and 
some  very  practical  advice  is  given  on  the  vexed  question  of 
"  Buying  and  Selling."  Mr.  Gregoiy  has  laid  all  furniture 
collectors  vmder  a  big  debt  of  gratitude ;  this  volume  will  be 
one  of  standard  reference  for  the  periods  to  which  it  refers. 


RARE    TYPE    OF     WINDSOR 
CHAIR. 


Dr.  .Maria  Montessori's  International  Training  Course, 
announced  for  January  15th,  has  been  postponed  to  Fehrttary 
i^tk  owing  to  the  stidden  death  of  the  Dottoressa's  father. 
Chevalier  Alexandre  Montessori.     It  will  last  three  months. 


Jaiiuary  6,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


One  Second 

before  leaving  for 
the  trenches  is  not 
too  late  to  discover 
that    your    pen    is 

,|-._^  empty  if  it    is    an 

^  Onoto. 

In  less  time  than  it  takes  to  tell,  the 
Onoto  fills  itself  from  any  ink  supply  and 
cleans  the  nib  while  filling. 

The  Perfect  pen  for  soldiers,  it  needs 
no  filler. 

Onoto 


Needs 
no 

Fib 


THE  Pen 

THOMAS  DE  LA  RUE  &  CO.,  LTD 


Pyjamas 


Mad^  oj  "Liata"  are  ailky-soft 
and  hfialth/ul.  Lirr  The  lusfroua 
finish  of  "Isista"  is  natural  and  is 
therefore  not  loat  in  the  laundry 
but  lasta  always,  re^:  "  Lista"  is 
British  made  to  stand  hard  wear. 


i//ji  your  Outfitur  far  patttrm^  and  look  for    ♦ 
the   word  "  Luta  "  itan-.^fd  en  the  ttk:.^rt      ♦ 


The  burberry 

I  Ensures  complete  immunity  from  discomfort 
in  wet  or  cold  weather,  and  reduces  the 
dangers  of  prolonged  exposure  to  a  minimum." 

illustrated 
Military 
Catalogue 
Post    Free 


THE  WORLD  OVER-  experienced  soldiers- 
men  whose  lives  are  spent  in  making  the  best 
of  existing  weather  conditions — all  agree  that  only 
ONE  Top-coat  will  stand  the  critical  tests  to 
which  they  put  it — and  that  is 

THE  BURBERRY 

THE  SUCCESS  of  THE  BURBERRY  has 
been  phenomenal.  It  >  inestimable  value  on 
Active  Service  has  been  attested  by  thousands  of 
Officers  who  keenly  appreciate  its  wet-resisting 
properties — warmth  in  cold  weather — airylight- 
ness  —  self  -  ventilation  —  freedom  —  workmanlike 
appearance — its  strength  and  durability. 

BURBERRY  SERVICE  KIT,  including  Uniforms,  Trench- 
Warms,  Tielocken  Coats,  and  every  detail  of  equipment, 
READY  FOR  USE  or  to  measure  in  2  to  4  days. 

A'./j'. — Minn/  1915  VU'iliuii    Toii-coalK  and  Suits,  us  ivcll  us  Lurlies' 

Coa(s  anil  Cowns.  iirp   beiiii/  sold  during  January  lit   ONKHALF 

THE  USUAL  I'lUCES.     lis)  nn  application. 

DTTDDI7DDVQ     Haymarket 
OUtxOllitxIx  I  O    LONDON 

8  &  10  Bd.  Malesherbes  PARIS  ;  &  Provincial  Agents 


667 


LAND      A  N  I)      W  A  T  E  R 


January  6,    i^ib. 


^ 


The  King  and  Queen  have  been  at  York  Cottage  through  the 
holidays;  H  s  Majesty  coming  up  to  town  on  busine-s  for 
a  day.  The  weather  was  very  bad,  but  this  does  not 
affect  His  Majesty,  who,  if  anything,  rather  hkes  it. 
In  these  days  when  economy  is  on  everybody's  Ups, 
it  may  be  pointed  out  that  there  is  probably  no 
household  in  the  kingdom  where  truer  economy  and 
simpler  living  is  practised  than  at  York  Cottage,  which 
is  certainly  the  humblest  home  any  King  and  Emperor 
(Kcupies.  "  But  their  Majesties  thoroughly  enjoy  that 
absence  of  State  possible  at  their  quiet  Norfolk  home. 

Lord  Dalkeith  who  came  of  age  on  December  30th,  bore  the 
courtesy  title  of  Lord  Whitchester  until  his  father  suc- 
ceeded to  the  Dukedom  of  Buccleuch.  a  little  over  a 
year  ago.  Like  his  father  before  him,  Lord  Dalkeith 
is  one  of  eight  children,  but  the  present  Duke  has  three 
sons  and  five  daughters,  while  his  father  had  six  sons 
and  two  daughters.  Large  famihcs  and  long  Ufe  have 
always  been  characteristic  of  the  Scotts.  Though  the 
Dukedom  was  created  over  two  hundred  and  fifty  years 
ago  and  has  been  uninterruptedly  enjoyed,  the  present 
peer  is  only  the  seventh  to  hold  it.  I  believe  this  wonder- 
ful record  of  longevity  to  be  entirely  unrivalled. 

The  Duke  of  Buccleuch  sits  in  the  House  of  Lords  as  Earl 
of  Doncaster,  which  is  one  of  the  finest  sounding  titles 
on  the  Roll  of  the  Lords  Temporal. 

There  are  eighty-three  ^'iscounties  in  the  peerage  of  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  Sir  John  French  will  therefore 
make  the  round  seven  dozen.  This  honour  has  been 
conferred  more  freely  in  recent  years,  nine  new  Viscounts 
having  been  created  since  1910.  Territorial  titles  have 
not  always  been  chosen,  preference  being  shewn,  especially 
by  poUticians,  to  cling  to  the  family  name,  e.g.,  Viscounts 
Morley.  Gladstone,  Haldane,  Bryce,  and  Buxton. 

H«w  many  people  are  aware  that  Canada  has  a  peerage  of  her 
own.  It  is  not  a  large  one,  for  it  consists  of  a  single 
dignity — the  feudal  barony  of  de  Longueuil  in  the 
province  of  Quebec.  This  was  conferred  by  Louis  XIV 
on  Charles  le  Moyne,  for  distinguished  services  in  1700, 
with  inheritance  to  his  descendants,  male  and  female. 
This  barony  has  been  held  continuously  since  those 
times,  three  of  the  Barons  having  been  Governors  of 
Montreal,  and  it  was  officially  recognised  by  the  British 
Government  in  1889.  Grant  is  the  surname  of  the 
prjsent  and  eighth  Baron  de  Longueuil. 

This  very  interesting  piece  of  news  has  been  sent  to  me  from 
Fishmongers'  Hall : — "  Oysters  are  in  excellent  condition, 
better  than  for  many  years.  Supplies  are  ample,  prices 
most  reasonable  and  the  dietetic  value  of  oysters  excep- 
tionally high."  But  why,  if  prices  are  so  reasonable, 
are  oysters  as  costly  as  ever  at  all  places  where  men  and 
women  do  congregate  to  satisfy  their  hunger  ^ 

Thirty  years  back  London's  restaurants  were  few  and  far 
between,  and  even  fifteen  years  ago  they  were  looked  on 
as  pale  imitations  of  their  Paris  confreres.  Now,  however, 
they  have  come  into  their  own  and  these  holidays  they 
have  fully  justified  their  existence.  It  might  have  been 
thought  that  the  liquor  restrictions  would  have  sounded 
their  knell,  but  so  far  from  this  being  the  case,  never  have 
they  been  more  greatly  patronised.  At  the  Carlton,  for 
instance,  the  difficulty  is  to  find  room  for  all  who  would 
lunch  or  dine  there  ;  on  Christmas  Day  and  again  on 
New  Year's  Eve  people  had  to  be  turned  away. 

The  London  restaurant  to-day  attracts  all  classes  ;  one  sits 
cheek  by  jowl  with  Bishops  and  Abbots,  Cabinet  Ministers 
and  Diplomatists  to  say  nothing  of  actors  and  actresses, 
authors,  journalists  and  politicians.  It  makes  no 
difference  whether  spirituous  beverages  are  or  are  not 
available.     People    don't    go    to    restaurants    to    drink 


but  to  eat  their  food  amid  pleasant  and  exhilarating 
surroundings,  and  there  seems  no  reason  why  thi.s 
gregarious  custom  should  not  spread  to  all  classes. 

It  is  therefore  very  disappointing  to  find  how  little  publicans 
have  adapted  themselves  to  the  changed  conditions. 
It  was  hoped  that  by  now  serious  attempts  would  have 
been  made  to  convert  the  corner  pub  into  a  cheerful 
cafe  ;  the  old  ground-glass  windows  removed,  partitions 
abolished  and  everything  done  to  encourage  people  to 
enter  by  giving  a  new  air  of  brightness,  spaciousness, 
and  cleanliness  to  the  old  surroundings.  Public-houses 
have  for  the  most  part  excellent  frontages,  and  though 
such  changes  would  have  cost  money  the  outlay  surely 
would  have  been  cheaper  than  by  practically  putting  up 
the  shutters  for  the  greater  part  of  the  day. 

Stag  hunting  is  in  full  swing  in  Somersetshire  and  Devonshire, 
and  there  have  been  some  fine  runs  and  gooi  sport 
lately.  Many  officers  home  from  the  front  on  a  few 
days'  leave  have  seized  their  opportunity  and  run  down 
to  Exmoor  for  a  day  with  the  stag-hounds,  thcugh  the 
weither  for  the  most  part  has  not  Iseen  good. 

"  Martin  Ross,"  the  very  clever  Irish  writer  whose  death 
occurred  last  month  was  in  private  life  Miss  Violet  Martin, 
the  eleventh  and  youngest  child  of  Mr.  James  Martin, 
of  Ross.  Her  eldest  brother  was  the  well-known  "  Bob  " 
Martin,  the  writer  of  "  Ballyhooly."  "  Killaloe."  etc. 
But  all  the  Martins  could  write.  There  was  another 
brother,  Mr.  Charles  Martin,  who  won  a  commission  in 
the  Connaught  Rangers  through  the  ranks  of  the  12th 
Lancers,  and  was  kUled  by  a  fall  from  his  horse  in  Perak. 
He  was  a  brilliant  journalist,  verse,  short  stories, 
epigrams,  and  leaders  coming  with  equal  readiness  from 
his  pen.  The  Martins  of  Ross  derive  descent  from  a 
crusader  under  Richard  Coeur-de-Lion. 

German  supremacy  is  to  be  overthrown  in  every  field  of  life, 
even  in  places  where  sausages  are  made.  This  Christmas 
the  French  chef  of  the  Piccadilly  hotel  compounded  a 
liver  sausage  which  was  far  better  than  any  of  Teutonic 
origin.  There  is  no  real  reason  why  German  sausages 
should  ever  come  from  Germany  ;  it  would  be  far  better 
in  the  future  for  many  reasons  that  they  did  not. 

That  exacting  critic,  the  Young  Person,  speaks  warmly  in 
praise  of  Mr.  Algernon  Blackwood's  "  The  Starlight 
Express,"  which  Miss  Lena  .\shwell  has  produced  at  the 
Kingsway  Theatre.  This  fairyland  play  strikes  much 
the  same  note  as  we  had  in-  the  "  Blue  Bird  "  ;.  it> 
characters  are  symbols.  The  scenery  and  the  music,  by 
Sir  Edward  Elgar,  are  beautiful,  especially  the  singing 
of  Mr.  Charles  Mctt.  Miss  Elsie  Hall  as  Monkey,  and 
Master  Ronald  Hammond  as  Jimbo  (our  old  friend, 
Jimbo)  are  excellent  little  players.  The  "  Starlight 
Express  "  is  a  train  de  luxe,  which  carries  the  children 
rapidly  through  an  enchanted  land. 

Miss  Zoe  Windley,  who  is  playing  the  leading  part  in  the 
Odds  on  Revue  at  the  Oxford,  is  an  English  singer  of 
exceptional  talent,  as  well  as  being  a  very  clever  actress. 
Miss  Windley  has  a  comely  presence,  and  she  is 
mainly  responsible  for  the  success  of  the  revue. 

Christmas  at  Harefield  Park,  which  is  now  turned  into  a 
hospital  for  Australian  wounded,  was  celebrated  in 
traditional  manner,  but  instead  of  the  Australians  being 
entertained  by  the  village,  the  village  was  entertained 
by  the  AustraUans.  All  the  children  were  invited  to  a 
monster  Christmas  Tree  at  the  hospital.  Huts  have  been 
put  up  in  the  Park  Grounds  in  order  to  provide  sufficient 
accommodation,  and  have  been  made  into  wards.  All 
the  wards  were  decorated  with  holly,  mistletoe,  etc.,  and 
on  Christmas  Day  itself,  prizes  we're  given  for  the  best 
decorated  wards  by  the  hospital  staff.  Hermes. 


66b 


TULUiDAV,    JASIAEV    J3,    19tC. 


I^ATSTD    &   AV^AHTER 


■  ,r  tII^W«)KB«<«W>= '  •  ■ 


■^■■i^m9mwiC'P^?'ims^y>^ 


Hg  Louis  tiaemaeken. 


--J^-jx>tM^I'"*\5ierr>aekjgrs:.  — | 


Drawn  exclusivelu   'or,  "Land  and    Water.'* 


THE    SINKING    OF    THE    ^'PERSIA." 


The    New    Year's    Feast   of    Kultur. 


LA^D      AND     WATER 


January  13,  iqi6. 


Dunlop  :  I  can't  ofTer  you  a  drink  in 
these  teetotal  days,  but  I  can 
offer  you  some  advice. 

The  Youngster  :    What's  that  ? 

Dunlop :  Believe  in  other  people's 
experience  occasionally  instead 
of  always  buying  your  ovs'n. 

The  Youngster  :    You  mean  ? 

Dunlop  :  Follow  the  Motor  Trans- 
port Officers' lead.  They  always 
put  "Dunlops  preferred"  on 
their  requisitions  and  think 
themselves  lucky  if  they  get 
them. 


DUNLOP 

RUBBER     COMPANY,     LTD., 

Founders  of  the  Pneumatic  Tyre  Industry 
throughout  the  World, 

Aston  Cross,  Birmingham ;     14  Regent  Street, 
London,  S.W. ;    PARIS  :  4  Rue  du  Colonel  MolL 


Hotel  Cecil 

THE 

COST  of  LIVING  REDUCED 

DURING  THE  WAR 

Exceptional  Inclusive  terms  to 

RESIDENTS  and  OFFICERS. 

Self-contained  Suites  and  Bedrooms 
with  Private   Bathrooms. 


I 


Telephone  :   GERHARD  60.        jJpP^y.    MANAGER, 

HOTEL   CECIL,   STRAND. 


Lieul.-Colonet  W.  E.   LLOYD,    39  (S)  Bn.  Man- 
chester Eegt.  urites.  6(/i  Sept.,  19^5; — 
*  * .     .     .  Their  durability  is  intense    .     .     .     Un- 
doubtedly  they    last  several    times  longer    than  a 
leather  sole. 

'*  }  ne    smoothness    of    tread    is   a    revelation. 
.  They  prevent  slipping-  and  I  cannot  speak 
iuo  highly  of  them  " 

^HTHIN  rubber  plates,  with 
j1  raised  studs,  to  be  attached 
on  top  of  ordinary  soles  and  heels, 
giving  complete  protection  from 
wear.  flThe  rubber  used  is  six 
times    more    durable    than    leather. 

PHILLIPS"  'MILITARY*  SOLES  AND 
HEELS  imparl  smoothness  to  ihe  tread,  give 
grip,  lessen  fatigue  and  are  essential  lo  'marching 
comfort."      Feet  kept  dry  in  wet  weather. 

INVALUABLE  lo  MILITARY   &    NAVAL 
OFFICERS.  VOLUNTEERS.  &c..  &c. 

FROM  ALL  BOOTMAKERS 

Trice  3/9  per  set  (Soles  and  Heels  for  one  pait 
iif   Koois)    with    slight    extra   charge   for   fixing 

If  any  difficulty  in  ohtatning,  send  ouiline  of 

M.lc  and  heel   pencilled  on   paper,  with    P.O. 

3/g  fur  .Sample  Sel  to  ttic  Makens  : — 

PHILLIPS'  PATENTS.  Ltd.(Dept.F) 

142-6  Old  Street,  London.  E.C. 


Patent. 
DcfKjM  Itegd. 


fi85> 


January  13.  iQiG.  L  A  N  D      \  X  D     W  A  T  E  R  . 

THE    APPROACHES    TO  EGYPT. 

6y     HILAIRE      BELLOC. 

NOTE.— This  Article  has  been  submitted  to  the  Press  Bureau,  which  d02S  not  object  to  ihe  publication  as  censored,  and  takes  00 

responsibility  for  the  correctness  of  the  statements. 

',In  aoc9rdanc2  with  the  requirements  of  the  Press  Bureiu,  the  pasitions  of  troops  on  Plans   Illustrating   this   Article  must  only  be 
regarded  as  approximate,  and  no  definite  strength  at  any  point  is  indicated. 


THE  activity  upon  the  Southern  Russian 
front  continues,  and  our  ally  claims  an 
advance  in  the  districts  of  the  centre 
and  the  left,  that  is,  upon  the  middle 
Strypa  and  in  the  Bukowina,  of  about  two  miles 
a  day.  On  the  extreme  right,  south  of  the  Pripet 
marshes,  where  the  railway  crosses  the  Styr  at 
Tchartoriisk,  the  line  fluctuates  with  very  little 
variation  west  or  cast.  But  the  passage  of  the 
river  and  the  ruined  village  itself,  which  forms  a 
bridgehead  for  the  Russians,  remains  at  the 
moment  of  writing  in  Russian  hands. 

The  meaning  of  these  three  developments 
put  together,  the  uncertain  lighting  in  the  north 
with  the  taking  and  retaking  of  Tchartoriisk, 
the  clearing  of  the  eastern  bank  of  the  middle 
Strypa  and  the  occupation  of  the  heights  five  miles 
east  of  Czernowitz,  is  what  was  pointed  out  last 
week  in  these  columns.  Our  allies  are  putting  all 
the  strength  of  their  new  attack  into  the  centre  and 
the  left — that  is,  on  the  Strypa  and  in  front  of 
Czernowitz.  The  Austro-Germans  are  countering 
by  a  corresponding  pressure  in  the  north  at 
Tchartoriisk,  where  the  Kovel  railway  crosses 
the  Styr. 

Neither  party  has  achieved  any  appreciable 
advance  as  yet.  It  is  not  probable  that  either 
party  will  achieve  such  an  advance  just  now,  and 
the  reasons  for  that  judgment  are  as  follows  : 

The  Hne  between  the  Pripet  marshes  and  the 
frontier  of  Roumania,  though  not  a  continuous 
line  of  trenches  like  that  upon  the  western  front, 
is,  in  direct  distance,  not  much  over  two  hundred 
miles  and,  with  all  the  sinuosities  of  the  front, 
certainly  less  than  300.  The  enemy  can  con- 
centrate upon  that  front,  counting  all  local 
reserves  at  least  3,000  men  a  mile  :  the  Russians 
say  5,000  men  a  mile.  He  has  behind  him, 
in  the  southern  part  of  it  especially,  good  roads. 
There  are  continual  gaps  across  which  no  good 
defensive  organisation  can  be  made,  but  also 
across  which  no  offensive  is  possible  on  account 
of  the  nature  of  the  ground  at  this  season  ;  there- 
fore the  real  line  to  be  held  is  shorter  than  that 
on  the  map.  It  is  therefore,  though  not  a  con- 
tinuously entrenched  line,  yet  for  the  purposes  of 
this  winter  fighting  a  line  which  can  only  be 
broken  or  shifted  by  a  success  against  the  specially 
entrenched  sections. 

Now  we  know  from  all  the  experience  01  tnis 
war  that  such  a  success  is  only  achieved  by  the  use 
of  heavy  artillery.  We  further  know  that  the 
successful  use  of  heavy  artillery  depends  upon 
motor  traction,  and  we  know,  again,  that  the 
condition  of  the  ground  in  Volhynia  and  the  Buko- 
wina at  this  season  hampers  such  traction  in  the 
highest  possible  degree.  It  is  hardly  conceivable, 
therefore,  that  a  really  successful  offensive  on  a 
large  scale  should  develop  against  the  Austro- 
German  trenches  between  the  Pripet  marshes  and 
the  Roumanian  frontier  at  this  moment. 


{Copyright  in  America  by  "  The  New  York  American."]         Egypt. 


What  tlie  new  Russian  ettort  has  done  is  in 
the  first  place  to  concentrate  great  numbers  of 
the  enemy's  effectives  upon  this  line. 

Secondly,  a  political  result,  to  affect  ttie 
impression  on  neutrals  in  the  East  and  to  weaken 
the  legend  which  Germany  in  particular  had 
industriously  spread,  that  no  Russian  offensive, 
even  a  local  one,  could  be  undertaken  for  many 
months — if  then. 

Thirdly,  the  new  Russian  offensive  must  have 
some  effect  upon  domestic  opinion  in  Germany 
and  Austro-Hungary,  which  was  no  more  than 
three  months  ago  persuaded  that  the  power  of  the 
Russian  armies  to  undertake  a  new  offensive  was 
finally  broken. 

that  the  hurried  concentration  of  the  enemy's 
men  north  of  the  Roumanian  frontier  has  had  some 
effect  on  the  Balkan  situation  cannot  be  denied. 
But  it  would  be  foolish  to  exaggerate  that  effect. 
The  delay  of  the  enemy  before  Salonika,  apart 
from  political  considerations  which  do  not  concern 
these  articles,  is  mainly  due  to  the  necessity  of 
repairing  the  railway'  thoroughly  before  any 
advance  can  be  undertaken.  The  munitionment 
of  the  heavy  pieces,  with  which  alone  an  attack 
can  be  undertaken,  depends  entirely  upon  un- 
interrupted railway  commincation  to  the  ad- 
vanced rail-heads  whence  the  big  shell  are  distri- 
buted to  the  batteries.  Now  in  the  case  of  the 
attack  on  Salonika  there  is  but  one  such  rail-head 
—that  of  the  Vardar  railwa\\  The  fine  was 
wrecked  by  the  Serbians  and  French  ;  and  even 
in  peace  there  is  at  the  best  only  one  single  line, 
and  a  single  line  which,  lunning  as  it  docs  often 
through  gorges  and  upon  ledges  of  rock,  could 
only  be  doubled  at  a  very  great  expense  of  time. 

The  bridge  over  the  Save  in  front  of  Belgrade 
has  been  repaired.  (The  roUing  stock,  I  believe, 
already  crosses  it.)  But  the  line  along  the  Upper 
Maritza  and  down  the  Upper  Vardar  has  not  been 
completely  repaired  as  yet,  and  even  when  it 
furnishes 'a  through  communication  it  will  take 
some  time  before  a  large  accumulation  of  heavy 
shell  at  the  advance  base  of  the  enemy  in  front  of 
Salonika,  will  be  possible, 

CONDITIONS    OF    AN    ADVANCE 
ON     EGYPT. 

The  value  of  Salonika  as  a  base  for  Allied 
offensive  action  is  the  academic  question  of  greatesi 
interest  in  anv  discussion  of  the  strategics  of  tht 
Near  East.  But  it  remains  an  academic  question 
only  until  we  have  seen  what  effort  the  enemy  car 
make  against  that  fortified  base,  for  until  he  has 
failed  in  his  attempt  to  reduce  the  port  of  entry 
upon  his  flank  there  can  be  no  use  made  by  the 
.\llies  of  Salonika  for  a  forward  movement.  And 
for  that  attempt  we  are  still  waiting. 

Meanwhile  the  position  of  Salonika  and  of 
the  control  by  the  Allies  of  the  Eastern  :\Iediter- 
ranean,  is  bound  up  with  the  enemy's  menace  to 


LAND      AND     ^V  A  T  E  R 


January  13,    101^ 


The  Allies,  possessing  as  they  do .  the  comniiiisd ' 
of  niarino  comiminicatinn,  arc  licre  upon  interior 
lines.     That   is,   tiiey   can   transfer   troops  across 
from  one  point  to  another  upon  the  shores  of  the 
Levant  (e.g.,    Salonika-  to   the   Gallipoli   Penin- 
sula-:   Alexandria  to  Salonika  ;    Salonika  to  the 
Gulf  of  Alexandretta,  etc.,  far  more  rapidly  than 
the    enemy,    even    with    the    new    railways,  can 
transport  them  by  land  round  from  one  point  to 
another.     That  is  the  capital  strategic  factor  of 
the  whole  situation.     Rut  if  the  rnmiy  develops 
'.as  he  threatens  to  do,  a  serious  advance  against 
the   Suez   Canal,   it   would   mean   that   Salonika 
:Could  -only   be   held   defensively   during   such   a 
period,  and  that  the  mass  of  the  Alliecl,  or  cer- 
tainly of  the  British,  troops  in  the  whole  region 
.would  be  employed  to  counter  the  threat  against 
Egypt. 

The  moment  is  therefore  suitable  for  some 
examination  of  the  conditions  governing  the  ene- 
my's menace  to  Egypt 'and  of  the  Canal. 

•  The  military  and  political  conditions — that 
is,  the  objects  and  methods  of  an  enemy  advance 
against  Egypt,  are  better  known  than  those  upon 
any  other  frontier  except  the  Western.  This  is 
due  to  the  comparative  simplicitj-  of  the  problem 
to  be, solved. 

Politically,  the  object  is  self-evident.  It  is 
threefold  and  aimed  entirely  at  this  country. 

First,  it  aims  at  alarming  and  confusing 
general  opinion  in  England  in  the  highest  degree — 
that  is  the  general  moral  object  of  the  enemy  in 
all  he  does  and  has  done  for  months  past,  for  he 
believes  that  he  can  thus  best  shake  the  Alliance. 

Secondly,  it  proposes  the  more  concrete  and 
tangible  object  of  cutting  off  the  canal  route  to 
the  East,  thereby  rendering  communications  with 
India  difficult  or  more  tardy,,  and  affecting  to 
that  extent  the  political  position  of  Great  Britain 
in  her  great  Dependency — perhaps  also  affecting 
the  whole  world  of  Islam. 

Thirdly  :  It  proposes  the  putting  of  a  very 
heavy  economic  strain  iipon  the  Alliance  and  par- 
ticularly upon  England  by  compelling  a  certain 
considerable  proportion  of  seaborne  material  from 
the  East  to  come  round  by  the  Cape  route. 

It  is  important  that  these  three  objects  should 
be  kept  clearly  in  mind — and  particularh'  the 
fact  that  the  Canal  is  the  objective — because,  as 
we  shall  see  in  a  moment,  they  will  profoundly 
affect  the  strategics  of  the  campaign  which  would 
present  very  different  military  problems  if  the 
Canal  were  not  there,  or  if  the  conquest  of  Egypt 
itself  were  the  main  objective. 

The  methods  wherewith  these  objects  may  be 
attempted  are  equally  obvious.  They  consist  in 
.'the  use  of  a  large  force  recruited  from  the  recruiting 
held  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  organised  by  the  aid 
of  Austro-Gernians,"  possibly  but  not  probably, 
including  a  small  proportion  of  German  infantry, 
but  certainly  including  and  depending  upon  a 
et>ntihgent  of  Austro-German  heavy  artillery  and 
0f  A«stro-German  engineers.  The  provocation 
of  unrest  in  Egypt  itself  is  a  subsidiary  method 
that  will  also  be  employed  to  the  best  of  the 
enemy's  ability. 

I'pon  such  a  general  presentation  of  the  case 
we  are  able  to  build  an  analysis  of  its  strategics. 

The  first  point  to  note  is  that  the  army  to 
be  directed  against  the  canal,  though  it  must  be 
large,  need  not  be  of  that  immense  size  which 
sdirle  students  of  the  war  have  presupposed.  It 
must  be  large  because  the  forces  which  this  country 


"can  draw  up  in  Egypt  arfi  very  considerable  in 
number,  and  were  they  opposed  by  a  force  much 
smaller  than  their  own  they  could  organise  any 
action  at  leisure;  prt^pared  even  with  suitable 
material  for  pusliing-  forward  water  supply,  to 
take  an  offensive  in  the  Desert  itself.  Only 
against  forces  superior  in  number  would  our  forces 
be  compelled  to  a  defensi\e,  and  even  so,  that 
defensive,  against  anything  but  considerably  su- 
perior numbers  could  be  organised  beyond  the 
Canal.  On  the  other  hand,  very  greatly  superior 
numbers  are  not  demanded  by  the  strategics  of 
the  main  objective  which,  .be  it  remembered,  is 
not  necessarily,  or  as  a  minimum  the  occupation 
of  fertile  Egypt,  but  the  interruption  of  the  use  of 
the  Canal.  A  serious  effort  cannot  be  made  with 
less  than  a  third  of  a  million  men.  That  it  need 
be  made  with  much  over  half  a  million  may  be 
doubted. 

These  figures,  of  course,  are  of  the  broadest 
and  roughest  kind.  They  would  be  immediately 
subject  to  moditication  if  the  situation  changed. 
For  instance,  an  attack  upon  the  enemy's  lines  of 
communication  would  affect  them  at  once  and  so 
would  any  one  of  half  a  dozen  other  contingencies, 
but    I    am    taking   the   situation    as   it   stands. 

AVAILABLE     MATERIAL. 

The  opportunities  for  ultimately  raising  such 
a  force  are  ample  because  the  margin  of  recruit- 
ment present  in  the  recruiting  field  of  the  Turkish 
hZmpire  is  more  than  eufticient  for  such  an  ex- 
pedition, most  of  the  units  of  which  are  already  in 
existence.  How  far  or  at  what  rate  these  can  be 
equipped  we  do  not  know.  Such  equipment 
would  very  largely  depend  upon  the  manufacturing 
capacity  of  Austria-Germany.  Partial  equipment, 
of  course,  already  exists.  But  generally  speaking 
there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  such  a  force  could 
not  be  equipped  in  tinie  for  an  advance  before  the 
beginning  of  the  summer.  The  munitionment  of 
such  a  ,force  with  shell,  especially  heavy  shell, 
would  be  almost  entirely  dependent  upon  Austro- 
German  industry,  as  would  its  provision  with  the 
special  machinery  necessary  to  such  a  campaign, 
notably  the  machinery  for  providing  water  during 
the  last  portion  of  the  advance. 

So  far  all  the  main  elements  of  the  problem  are 
plain  sailing.  The  Central  Empires  have  an  open 
road  by  the  Danube  and  Bulgaria  to  the  Turkish 
Empire.  They  will  in  a  few  weeks  have  through 
railway  communication  as  well.  The  interest  pf 
the  problem  rather  begins  with  the  question  of  the 
communications  of  such  a  force  from  its  ultimate 
base  upon  the  Bosphorus.  What  those  com- 
munications are,  and  will  be,  is  fairly  well  known, 
and  what  we  have  to  examine  is  their  capacity 
and  vulnerabTlify.  ^ 

The  main  avenue  of  such  communications  is, 
of  course,  the  so-called  "  Bagdad  Railway."  This 
railway,  German  in  direction,  has  for  its  main  line 
a  trace  followirig  the  immemorial  road  which 
crosses  Asia  Minor  from  the  Bosphorus  to  the 
Gulf  of  Alexandi^f'ttci,  the  road  of  the  First  Crusade. 
It  serves  Iconium  (Konieh),  and  Adana,  receiving 
two  main  branches  from  the  east  and  the  west, 
the  former  coming  in  from  Angora,  the  latter  from 
Smyrna. 

But  before  reaching  Adana  there  is  a  gap  of 
20  miles  still  unfinished,  where  the  railway  has  to 
pass  through  the  Taurus  mountains ;  a  gap 
including    several    tunnels,    viaducts    and    one 


January  13,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


[Cluuige  of  Gauge) 


J  -Jerasa 
Vi- Hebron 
'S>=ieers/ieda 


particularly  long  tunnel,  which  is  far  from 
completion.  This  gap  I  have  marked  in  Sketch  I 
by  the  letter  A.  There  is  a  second  gap  over  the 
mountain  range  coincident,  with  the  Gulf  of 
Alexandretta,  marked  B  upon  Sketch  I. 

But  both  these  gaps,  although  they  involve 
a  transhipment  of  munitions  and  men,  are 
bridged  by  roads  which  have  been  improved  since  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  and  are  said  to  be  in  good 
condition.  The  gaps  will  cause  delay,  but  not  of 
themselves  any  interruption.,  in  supply.  From 
Aleppo  onwards  the  main  line  to  Bagdad  is  not 
yet  completed.  A  branch  line  strikes  southward 
from  Aleppo  to  Damascus  and  then  follows  along 
the  old  pilgrim  track  upon  the  barren  tableland 


east  of  Jordan,  proceeding  towards  the  western 
Arabian  littoral  and  serving  Mecca.  South  of 
Damascus,  at  Deraa,  a  branch  line  has  loqg  been 
constructed  leading  to  the  sea.  But  for  tjip  pur- 
pose of  an  advance  on  Egypt  our  interest,  lies  in 
the  construction,  undertaken  in  the  course  of  the 
war,  of  a  new  line  marked  C  C  upon  the  map  and 
leading  through  the  Holy  Land  past  Jerusalem 
at  J,  Hebron  at  H,  to  Beersheba  at  B. 

It  is  with  the  direct  object  of  menacing  the 
Suez  Canal  and  Egypt  that  this  further  branch  line 
has  been  under  construction  from  the  junction 
at  Deraa,  just  south  of  Da;nascus  down  through 
the  Holy  Land  to  the  last  considerable  inhabited 
point  of  that  country,  the  Well  of  (the)  Seba,  Bir-cs- 


L  A  X  D      A  N  D     W  A  T  E  R  . 


January  13,  1916. 


Seba,  which  is  the  Beersheba  of  the  Bible.  It  is 
the  extreme  southern  limit  of  the  habitable  land, 
and  is  upon  the  last  continuous  source  of  super- 
ficial water  supply,  the  Wady-es-Seba.  Southward 
and  eaiitward  from  the  mouth  of  the  valley  on 
which  Beersheba  stands  opens  that  desert  region, 
Et-tih,  or  the  Sinaitic  Desert,  which  has  through- 
out human  history  formed  the  principal  obstacle 
to  an  invasion  of  Egyi)t. 

The  water  supply  therein  is  exceedingly 
scanty.  Upon  an  organisation  and  proper  use  of 
it  has  dejjendod  throughout  history  the  advance 
of  armies  from  lCg\pt  into  Asia  or  Asia  into  Egj'pt. 
Apart  from  this  difficulty  of  water  supply  there 
arises  as  Egypt  is  approached  a  difficulty  of 
ground.  The  Eastern  portion  of  the. Desert  is  for 
the  greater  part  hard.  Good  going  is  not  so  much 
cut  up  by  differences  of  level  as  to  pre\'ent  roads 
"being  engineered  without  too  much  difficulty, 
but  the  belt  near  the  sea,  and  so  round  by  the  west 
to  the  Isthmus  of  Suez  e\'ery where  along  the  east 
of  the  Canal  itself,  is  a  surface  formation  of  drift 
sand  which  is,  after  marsh,  the  worst  obstacle  to 
modern  construction.  This  is  particularly  the  case 
with  the  belt,  a\eraging  o\er  thirty  miles  wide, 
which  lies  immediately  to  the  east  of  the  Canal 
from  Kantara  (the  bridge)  right  down  to  Suez  itself. 

Tlie  railway  through  Palestine  is,  we  believe, 
completed  as  far  as  Beersheba.  at  which  point  has 
already  begun  the  accumulation  of  stores  which 
will  make  it  the  base  of  any  campaign  directed 
against  the  Canal.  To  this  I  shall  return  in  a 
moment. 

DIGRESSION     ON     A     FUNCTION 
OF    THE     CENSORSHIP. 

My  readers  will,  I  hope,  permit  me  at  this 
point  to  digress  for  a  moment  upon  an  aspect  of 
the  censorship  which  has  been  greatly  misunder- 
stood. It  is  frequently  said  that  we  should  only 
keep  silent  upon  points  which  might  inform  the 
enemv  and  that  there  is  no  sense  in  forbidding  the 
])ublication  of  matter  on  which  he  is  alread\' 
informed.  But  this  is  an  error.  It  is  often  just 
as  important  to  prevent  the  enemy  knowing  how 
much  you  know  about  his  plans  as  it  is  to  prevent 
his  knowing  things  which  he  as  vet  ignores  about 
yourself. 

To  take  a  simple  tactical  ni^tance.  The 
enemy  in  an  attempt  to  outflank  you  detaches  a 
certain  body  from  his  force  and  sends  it  round  the 
end  of  your  line  to  catch  you  unawares.  While 
his  force  is  on  the  march  it  is,  if  the  flanking 
movement  be  a  wide  one,  in  peril  of  being  cut  off 
bv  vou  should  you  liave  wind  of  the  movement. 
Should  he  know  that  you  have  heard  of  his  de- 
taching this  force,  should  he  become  aware  of 
your  being  informed  while  he  still  had  time  to  go 
back,  he  would,  of  course,  go  back ;  becau-;e  to  go 
forward  under  such  circumstances  would  mean 
the  cutting  of  his  detachment's  communciations 
and  its  destruction.  So  long  as  he  thinks  you 
ignorant  of  his  movement  and  of  the  road  it  has 
taken,  so  long  he  believes  himself  in  safety. 
If,  as  a  fact,  you  are  aware  all  the  time  of  that 
movement  and  of  the  road  it  has  taken,  every 
day  that  he  advances  and  every  moment  of  his 
advance  puts  him  into  greater  peril  and  gives  you 
an  increasing  chance  of  cutting  him  off.  Under 
such  circumstances  it  is  clearly  imperative  for 
the'  commander  upon  your  side  to  prevent  any 
news  being  jniblished  of  the  enemy's  flanking 
movement,  not  because  it  would  inform  the  cnemv 


with  regard  to  that  movement,  which  he  knows 
in  far  greater  detail  than  you  can,  but  because  if 
he  learns  in  time  that  you  do  know  it  he  can  save 
himself  from  destruction,  whereas  if  he  cannot 
measure  the  weight  of  your  information  he  may 
very  well  walk  into  the  trap  and  be  destroyed. 

The  whole  of  war  is  full  of  opportunities  of 
this  kind  in  which  it  is  just  as  essential  to  keep 
one's  information  upon  the  enemy  private  as 
it  is  necessary  to  prevent  the  ei'.emy  having 
information  upon  one's  own  movements.  The 
authorities  are  therefore  amply  justified  in  keeping 
silence  as  they  have  done  so  far  upon  the  extent 
and  nature  of  the  enemy's  preparations  in  Palestine 
and  beyond,  and  it  must  be  clearly  understood 
that  such  remarks  as  those  of  this  week  in  this 
place  are  either  based  upon  what  has  already 
been  admitted  to  publication  in  the  foreign  or 
British  Press  or  to  conjectures  only,  based  upon 
such  publication. 

To  continue  the  examination  of  the  Desert 
conditions  : 

THREE     MAIN    APPROACHES. 

One  may  state  without  indiscretion  this 
much,  which  is  common  knowledge  : 

The  railway  has  reached  Beersheba  and  this 
point  already  serves  as  a  base  for  any  force  con- 
templating an  attack  upon  Egypt. 

From  Beersheba  to  the  canal  is,  as  the  crow 
flies,  175  miles,  and  the  first  40  miles  or  so  of  these 
are  through  territory  technically  Turkish  by 
international  agreement,  up  to  tlae  point  of  El 
Aigua,  or  Audja,  just  beyond  which  runs  the 
abritrary  line  established  a  little  while  Itelore  the 
war  in  that  desert  country  as  the  last  frontier 
.  between  Egypt  and  Syria. 

From  Beersheba  to  El  Audja  it  would  seem 
that  the  line  is  not  only  surveyed,  but  its  embank- 
ments, culverts,  etc.,  prepared,  onlv  the  rails  not 
yet  laid  down. 

It  is  to  be  remarked  that  the  provision  of 
water  for  these  30  to  40  miles  (nearer  50  as  the 
turns  of  the  railway  will  make  it)  is  a  problem 
that  has  to  be  surmounted  and  that  this  will 
necessarily  delay  the  completion  of  the  railway 
even  to  that  point. 

From  the  Egyptian  frontier,  as  established 
before  the  war  by  Treaty  between  the  Egyptian 
Ciovernment  and  the  Porte,  there  are  three  main 
approaches  to  Egypt  on  the  Suez  Canal,  that  is 
to  the  Isthmus  of  Suez. 

The  first  is  the  immemonal  caravan  route, 
(marked  upon  Sketch  II  i,  1),  upon  the  coast  line 
of  the  Mediterranean.  It  is  the  best  watered  of  all 
(though  the  water  supply  is  very  scanty,  the  wells 
far  between  and  often  brackish) ;  it  is  in  touch 
with  the  sea  for  succour  or  for  supply,  and  it  is 
the  shortest  direct  line  from  fertile  land  in  the 
Philistine  Plain  to  fertile  land  in  the  Delta  of 
the  Nile.  It  has  a  starting  place  at  Rafa,  a  point 
already  well  within  the  Desert  region,  and  strikes 
the  Canal  at  the  point  where  there  used  to  be  a 
bridge  across  the  last  arm  of  the  lagoon.  It  was 
this  bridge  which  gave  the  name  Kantara  to  this 
point,  which  is  now  a  station  upon  the  railway, 
and  the  Canal,  about  37  miles  south  of  Port  Said. 

From  Rafa  to  Kantara,  is,  as  the  crow  flies, 
rather  less  than  150  miles,  and  by  the  track  about 
160,  but  the  edge  of  the  really  habitable  land  near 
Gaza  is  at  least  another  day's  march  behind  Rafa. 

The  second  line  of  advance  is  that  central 
one  marked  in  Sketch  II  by  the  figures  2,  2,  2. 


January  13,  1916. 


LAND     A  N  D     W  A  T  E  R 


whicli  was  taken  by  the  Turkish  Army  in  their 
first  abortive  attempt  against  the  Canal  last 
February.  It  is  towards  this  line  that  the  railwa>! 
is  now  making  for  El  Audja.  The  trail  thence 
makes  its  way  fairly  directly  from  well  to  well 
until  it  comes  at  about  X  to  the  edge  of  the  drift 
sand  region  and  the  end  of  the  mountain  groups, 
Maghara  and  Yelleg,  between  which  it  has  passed. 

This  edge  of  the  drift  sand  region  is  here  not 
30  miles  from  the  Bitter  Lakes — the  nearest 
jioint  of  the  Canal — and  is  not  40  from  the  most 
vulnerable  points  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Ismailia 
where  the  chief  blow  was  delivered  last  February. 
Tlie  water  supply  upon  this  central  route  remained 
throughout  history  until  modern  times  of  the  very 
scantiest,  the  wells  far  apart  and  often  unservice- 
able. In  one  place  there  was  at  least  "50  miles 
without  any  trace  of  water,  in  another  over  40,  and 
such  water  as  could  be  fcund  on  the  rare  spots 
marked  as  wells  was  quite  innufficient  for  an}- 
considerable  force.  It  was  clearly  not  to  the 
advantage  of  anyone  possessing  Egypt  to  improve 
that  supply  by  using  the  methods  of  modern 
science. 

The  third  line  of  advance  from  i^sia  to  the 
Isthmus  of  Suez  was  described  in  some  detail  in 
Land  and  Water  a  year  ago.  It  has  been  used 
for  centuries  by  the  Egyptian  Pilgrimage "  to 
Mecca  and  has  in  some  ways  an  advantage  over 
the  main  caravan  route  along  the  coast,  so  far  as 
mere  going  is  concerned,  thoiagh  the  water  supply 
is  much  worse  and  the  road  leads  nowhere  except 
to  the  Arabian  Desert.  It  starts  from  the  Head  of 
the  Gulf  of  Akaba  and  the  fortified  point  of  the 
same  name,  climbs  up  a  precipitous  escarpment 
and  makes  for  the  central  point  of  Nakhl  (line 
3.  3,  3  on  Sketch  II),  the  Well  of  the  Palm  Tree, 
about  half  way  across  the  desert,  and  rather  more 
than  100  miles  from  Akaba. 


At  Nakhl  are  cisterns  of  water,  but  the  road 
from  the  Gulf  to  Nakhl  is  >very  ill  supplied. 
Proceeding  westward  from  Nakhl  you  have  the 
same  desert  condition  until  the  wells  within  a 
day's  march  of  Suez  are  reached,  but  the  point  of 
this  road  is  that  it  has  the  best  surface  of  any 
trajectory  across  the  Desert  Peninsula.  It  runs 
over  a  fairly  broad  plateau  of  hard  ground  with 
only  two  difficult  portions,  the  first  the  steep 
climb  up  of  several  thousand  feet  from  the  Gulf  of 
Akaba,  the  second  the  descent  down  to,  and  the 
crossing  of,  the  drift  sand  near  the  Suez  Canal  ;  the 
belt  of  which  drift  st\nd  is,  however,  at  this  place 
not  more  than  a  day's  march  across. 

Between  the  second  and  the  third  of  these 
three  roads,  the  Wady-el-Arish,  a  depression 
lunning  across  tlie  Desert  from  south  to  north, 
furnishes  a  convenient  junction  ;but  it  is  upon  the 
surface  almost  ent'ixely  waterless. 

Along  what  line  the  enemy  will  push  his  main 
communication  an  d  therefore  the  extension  of  his 
railway  we  have  ao  public  information.  But  it 
seems  most  proba.blc  that  it  will  be  along  the 
second  of  the  thre«  roads  (2,  2,  2),  which  would 
leave  him  at  a  coi  avenient  distance  from  the  sea 
and  danger  therefrom,  and  which  would  put  his 
main  force  in  position  for  an  attack  upon  the 
central  portion  of  the  Canal  which,  as  we  have 
already  said,  is  the'  Jiiost  vulnerable. 

The  sea  route  he  certainly  cannot  take  for  all 
the  first  part  of  it  is  exposed  to  fire  from  a  Fleet, 
and  if  lie  ran  his  1  .-aihvay  further  inland  he  would 
have  difficulty  with  the  natvuc  of  the  ground. 
Both  along  the  cc  ast  and  further  inland  this  way 
has  to  deal  main'  iy  with  drift  sand,  that  capital 
obstacle  to  railwa  y  construction  in  desert  regions ; 
it  has  for  a  deca  ide  held  iip  the  French  railway 
extension  southw  rard  from  the  Algerian  border. 
It  is  unlikely  tha  t  he  would  divert  his  line  up  the 


L  AND     AND     NN'  A  T  1-  R 


JaniKin-  13,  Jf)iC). 


Wady-el-Arish  to  Xakhl  and  so  westward,  for 
that  "would  simplv  mean  the  extending  of  the 
mileage  with  at  "least  double  the  difficulty  in 
obtaining  water  supply.  It  would  come  out,  it 
■  is  true,  at  a  point  where  the  belt  of  drift  sand 
which  strategically  protects  the  canal  is  narrowest, 
but  not  at  that  central  point  where  a  blow  would 
have  the  greatest  effect. 

Again,  whate\Tr  road  the  enemy  chooses  for 
his  main  advance  will  be  largely  governed  by  the 
existing  wells  ;  and  t4ie  best  line  of  these,  short 
of  the  seacoast,  is  that  of  the  second  road. 

He  will  not  be  so  led  by  the  fact  that  he  will 
use  the  existing  wells— they  are  far  too  insuflicient 
for  his  purposes — but  they  guide  him  to  points 
where,  with  modern'  methods  and  deep  boring 
he  can  hope  to  obtain  a  fuller  supply,  and  they 
give  him  a  trajectory  which,  thoiigh  not  surveyed, 
is  already  familiar  to  enemy  informants  and  would 
save  thegreat  expense  of  time  and  energy  required 
in  plotting  out  a  new  trace.  It  has  also  been 
rumoured  that  he  proposes  a  pipe  line  to  be  laid 
along  the  railway,  but  in  connection  with  that 
lumcu'  several  things  must  be  remembered  : 

First,  that  there  is  a  very  small  supply  of 
water  even  at  the  habitable  base  from  which  he 
starts,  Beersheba  ;  secondly,  that  a  line  at  euch 
different  levels  would  Require  extensive  pumping 
arrangements  to  maintain  a  pipe  line  ;  and 
thirdly,  that  the  distance  of  something  over  200 
miles  is  a  v-ery  serious  consideration,  to  which 
may  be  added  the  fact  that  complete  dependence 
upon  a  single  line  of  this  sort  would  spell  immediate 
disaster  if  it  were  tampered  with  or  broke  down 
accidentally.  Such  a  line  may  be  laid  as  an 
auxiliary,  but  the  main  advance  would  surely 
depend  upon  large  stores  of  water  locally  collected 
and  presumably  upon  new  wells. 

Now  upon  the  hypothesis  that  the  line  is  laid 
and  that  a  large  force  with  heavy  guns  and  ample 
munitionment  for  the  same  can  be  produced  a.ufi. 
maintained  on  the  edge  of  that  belt  of  drift  sand 
which  protects  the  Canal  from  the  east,  what 
would  be  the  eneiTiy's  most  obvious  way  of 
achieving  his  object  ? 

Remember,  that  object  is  mainly  the  interrup- 
tion of  the  use  of  the  Canal  and  that  the  invasion 
df  Egypt  itself  is  lubsidiary  or  posterior  to  that 
main  object. 

It  is  clear  that  the  attainment  of  this  object 
depends  upon  the  successful  or  superior  u^e  of 
heavy  pieces. 

What  are  the  conditions  of  such  a  use  of 
heavy  artillery  ? 

There  is  one  fundamental  necessity  for  this 
arm,  and  that  is,  ample  comm^anication  behind  it 
for  the  supply  of  its  heavy  munitionment.  That 
means  a  railway. 

Now  the  problem  of  the  railway  is  fourfold. 

First,  the  capacity  of  any  r  ailway  for  supply. 

Secondly,  the  continuity  of  its  line. 

Thirdly^  the  vulnerability  of  points  upon  the 
line  to  hostile  attack  (for  a  line  once  interrupted 
anywhere  by  an  enemy  force  as  useless)  and 

Fourthly,  the  opportunities  for  extension. 

To  take  these  points  in  th  eir  order. 

Given  a  railway  to  exist  continuously  from 
the  arsenals,  depots  and  base;'>  of  the  enemy  to 
the  front  against  the  Suez  Canal— at  but  a  few 
thousand  yards  from  that  water «-way — its  capacity 
for  delivery  depends  mainly  rrpon  rolling  stock. 
Wliat  the  rolling  stock  availal  )le  may  be  we  do 
aot  know.     It  can  be  supplem<mted  rapidly  now 


that  there  is  a  clear  road  for  the  enemy  to  the 
Bosphorus  and  beyond. 

As  to  the  ■second  point,  the  continuity  of  the 

railwa\\ 

We  have  seen  that  there  are  two  interrup- 
tions at  the  mountain  ranges  in  the  south-east  of 
Asia  Minor.  But  they  are  interruptions  covered 
by  newly  engineered  good  roads  invohnng  in 
transhipment  and  unloading  and  re-loading  of 
munitions  and  supply  a  delay  of  less  than  a  week 
for  both  gaps  combined.  There  is  a  break  of  gauge 
in  the  railway  through  Syria,  I  believe  at  Aleppo. 
This,  again,  is  a  thing  remediable  with  time. 
But  more  important  is  the  amount  of  rolling- 
stock  available  on  the  narrower  gauge ;  for 
though  the  main  line  down  as  far  as  a  point 
North  of  Adana  can  be  supplied  with  new  rolling- 
stock  from  Europe,  the  Syrian  line  can  hardly 
be  so  supplied.  There  will  presumably  be  another 
break  of  gauge,  for  the  extension  which  will  be 
attempted  across  the  Sinai  peninsula  desert  west- 
ward of  El  Audja  can  hardly  be  other  than  a 
light  railway. 

it  would  be  impossible  to  build  a  full  double- 
track  railway  across  that  desert  within  the  time 
during  which  alone  an  attack  on  the  canal  will  be 
of  service.  For  we  must  always  remember  that 
the  enemy  is  as  keenly  alive' to  his  rate  of  wastage 
as  are  our  own  higher  commands,  and  is  calcu- 
lating time  far  more  closely  than  the  general  opinion 
of  the  West  as  yet  comprehends. 

There  will  be,  then,  three  gauges,  three  sets 
of  rails,  between  the  Bosphorus  and  the  objective 
of  the  expedition,  and  with  regard  to  the  first, 
two  breaks  in  the  continuity  of  the  rail. 

In  the  matter  of  rolling-stork  we  know 
nothing. 

As  to  the  vulnerabihty  ot  the  line.  All 
observers  have  been  struck  by  the  proximity  of  its 
trajectory  to  the  sea  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
Gulf  of  Alexandrctta  or  Aleppo.  But  iMs  vulner- 
able section  is  a  fairly  short  one.  There  has  been 
ample  time  to  protect  it  from  an  offensive  based 
on  the  sea.  Moreover,  the  whole  of  that  question 
of  where  the  line  may  most  easily  be  cut  by  an 
allied  offensive  is  unfit  for  public  discussion.  It 
may  well  prove  that  the  most  vulnerable  sector 
may  not  be  the  mountainous  stretch  in  the  south- 
east corner  of  Turkey-in-A?ia,  but  at  any  rate 
it  is  clear  that  the  line  lies  open  to  seme  strong 
offensive  from  the  sea  during  nearly  its  whole 
course,  as  well  north  of  Adana  as  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Aleppo,  and  probably  again  in  its 
trajectory  through  Palestine. 

"  )The  last  point — the  power  of  continuing  the 
line  is  worthy  of  especial  observation.  As  we  have 
seen,  the  line  is  already  completed  with  a  double 
track  as  far  as  Beersheba,  at  which  point  we  may 
conceive  that  large  stores  of  munitions  are  already 
beginning  to  accumulate. 

From  Beersheba  to  the  frontier  at  El  Audja. 
as  we  have  also  seen,  the  line  is  surveyed  and  the 
road-bed  made,  but  the  rails  not  laid  down,  nor, 
presumably,  water  supply  yet  arranged  for. 

Now  what  arc  the  opportunities  for  continuing 
the  supply  of  railway  acioss  the  desert  of  the 
])eninsula  towards  the  Suez  Canal  ?  The  mere 
trace  is  not  too  difficult.  There  arc  no  very  abrupt 
slopes  along  the  middle  of  the  three  lines  (2,  2,  2 
upon  Sketch  II),  which  we  have  presumed  to  be 
the  probable  trajectory  of  the  light  railway. 
The  Wady-el-Arish  is  a  shallow  depression,  the 
descent  into  it   and  the'  rise  from  it  easy.     At 


January  13,  1916. 


LAND      AND     WATER 


the  point  of  crossing  where  the  track  passes 
between  the  two  mountain  masses,  marked  A  and 
B  on  Sketch  II  (the  Maghara  and  the  Yelleg) 
there  is  perhaps  some  difficulty  from  the  drifting 
sand.  But  the  latter  hardly  extends  to  the 
southern  edge  of  A  along  which  the  old  track,  and 
presumably  the  light  railway  would  run.  The 
summit,  at  C  on  Sketch  II,  is  little  more  than 
1,300  feet  above  the  sea  and  is  approached  so 
gradually  that  the  elevation  is  insignhcant  to 
railway  construction,  especially  of  the  light  kind  ; 
though  |the  descent  upon  the  western  side  is  some- 
what more  abrupt.  The  real  difficulty  begins  at 
about  the  point  X  on  Sketch  II,  where  the  hard 
surface,  which  the  light  railway  would  hitherto 
have  been  able  to  use,  is  exchanged  for  the  drift- 
ing sand.  All  that  region  is  also  very  broken, 
even  before  the  drifting  sand  and  its  dunes  are 
reached.  Its  contours  would  demand  many  turns 
and  lengthenings  of  a  rapidly  laid  light  railway 
line.  But  that  is  nothing  comparable  in  diffi- 
culty to  the  dealing  with  drifting  sand  in  the  last 
two  or  three  days'  march  east  of  the  canal. 

The  defences  undertaken  by  the  Allied,  and 
particularly  by  the  British  forces,  for  preventing 
the  emplacement  of  heavy  guns  within  range  of 
the  Canal,  are  not  a  matter  for  public  discussion. 
But  the  other  side  of  the  (luestion,  the  problem 
presented  to  the  enemy  upon  the  same  ground  is 
open  to  examination,  and  has  an  interest  of  its 
own.  And  it  is  probably  the  presence  of  this 
formation  of  loose  and  shifting  sandhills  for  so 
considerable  a  distance  east  of  the  railway  that 
will  most  heavily  handicap  the  enemy  when  his 
advance  is  thus  far  prepared 

In  this  connection  there  must  also  be  remem- 
bered what  was  said  above,  that  he  is  calculating 
time  very  closely.  The  season  for  such  an 
advance  is  limited  within  no  very  broad  space  of 
time — it  is  generally  believed  that  the  month  of 
IVIarch  will  be  his  best  opportunity.  Though  in 
the  main  a  Turkish  adventure,  its  fortunes  will 
necessarily  depend  ultimately  upon  the  state  of 
affairs  in  Europe  where  alone  the  campaign  as  a 
whole  can  be  decided,  and  the  state  of  affairs  in 
Europe  depends  in  its  turn  upon  the  rate  of  Austro- 
German  wastage:  so  rapid,  and- already  proceeded 
50  far,  that  every  subsidiary  campaign  is  subject  to 
that  factor. 

For  the  attack  upon  Egypt,  however  largely 
it  develops,  or  with  whatever  energy  it  is  pursued, 
must  (and  it  is  exceedingly  important  to  remember 
this)  remain  subsidiary  to  the  campaign  as  a  whole. 

I  have  seen  printed  in  more  than  one  paper, 
what  the  Government  should  never  have  allowed 
to  have  been  printed— the  statement  that  a 
successful  enemy  invasion  of  Egypt  would  niean 
to  this  country  the  loss  of  the  war.  It  would  mean 
nothing  of  the  sort.  Even  a  disaster  of  this  kind, 
powerfully  as  it  would  affect. public  imagination  in 
this  country,  and  certainly  as  it  would  be  used  to 
our  detriment  by  the  sensational  Press,  could 
have  no  final  effect  upon  the  fortunes  of  Germany 
in  Europe,  and  therefore  oa^the  whole  campaign. 
That  vast  campaign  was  probably  determined  at 
the  battle  of  the  Marne.  It  will  in  any  case 
certainly  be  determined  upon  the  gi:eat  eastern 
or  western  fronts  in  Russia,  or  in  France,  and, 
much  the  most  probably  upon  the  latter. 

H.  Belloc. 


RAEMAEKERS'    CARTOON. 

We  know  that,  ivhen  the  "  Lusitania  "  was 
sunk  by  a  German  submarine,  and  1,134  P^ysons 
■perished,  including  women  and  children,  schools  in 
Germany  were  given  a  public  holiday  and  the  event 
was  celebrated  as  a  great  victory.  Since  then  public 
acclamation  in  Germany  of  these  wholesale  murders 
at  sea  has  been  modified  for  reasons  of  Stale,  but 
only  this  week  the  civilised  world  learned,  definitely 
through  the  correspondence  that  passed  between  the 
Foreign  Office  and  the  American  Ambassador  over 
the  expatriation  of  Austrian  xvomen  and  children 
from  India,  that  this  inhuman  form  of  warfare  is 
part  of  the  settled  and  premeditated  policy  of  the 
German  and  Austrian  Governments. 

Well  may  Mr.  Louis  Raemaekers  speak  of  the 
loss  of  the  P.  and  0.  Mail  Steamer,  "  Persia,"  as 
"The  Neia  Year's  Feast  of  Kultur."  Forty-nine 
women  and  twelve  children  perished,  when  the  vessel 
sank  within  five  minutes  of  being  struck  by  the 
torpedo.  The  cartoon  is  a  terrible  one  but  it  repro- 
duces not  only  vividly  but  with  truth  the  full  horror 
of  the  crime.  Who  knows  but  that  it  may  even 
touch  the  conscience  of  the  enemy. 


A    GERMAN    APPRECIATION. 

THE  anonymous "  postcard  from  Torquay,  a. 
facsimile  of  which  we  published  last  week; 
which  was  signed  "  Jolui  Bull  "  and  expressed 
strong  objection  to  L.-vnd  and  Water  piib-; 
lishing  "  the  coarse  and  vulgar  Cartoons  by  Kae- 
mackcr,"  has  caused  no  little  amusement  to  our  readers, 
many  of  whom  have  written  pointing  out  other  evidences 
of  its  Teuton  origin.  Moreover,  the  Fine  Art  Society 
of  148,  New  Bond  Street,  where  the  exhibition  of  Rae- 
maekers' cartoons  is  being  held,  has  informed  us  that  an 
almost  identical  postcard  was. received  by  them  ;  the 
writer  of  it  stated  that  owing  to  the  exhibition  ",  your 
Business  is  being  materially  damaged  in  the  eyes  of 
many  of  your  Customers  at  Torquay."  Notice  how 
the  Teuton  mind  only  recognises  material  interests. 

Another  anonymous  letter  has  reached  Land  and 
W.-VTER  Office,  objecting  to  l^aemaekers'  work  and  on 
this  ground  :  "  While  the  conception  and. ideals  of  these 
cartoons  are  excellent,  the  crudeness  of  the  execution 
does  most  certainly  not  appeal  to  me."  The  letter 
from  Bristol  is  signed  "  John  Bull  No.  2."  There  are 
evidently  plenty  of  John  Bulls  in  inverted  commas— the 
equivalent  of  hyphenated  Americans — at  large  in  this 
country,  and  this  little  incident  should  open  the  eyes  of 
the  authorities  to  the'underground  way  in  which  they  work 
to  the  detriment  of  the  Allied  cause  and  for  the,  advan- 
tage of  Germany. 

These  letters  refer  to  the  postcard  of  last  week.: 

SiR^ — I  think  you  are  probably  right  in  thinking  tlic 
postcard  was  from  a  Teuton.  In  German  substantives  aje 
spelt  with  a  capital.  And  you  will  notice  that  all  the  sub- 
stantives in  the  postcard  are  spelt  with  a  big  capital. 

United  University  Club,  H.  A.  Hadden. 

Pall  Mall  East. 


The  photograph  of  Mr.  Louis  Raemaekfei'sl  which  appeared  in 
Land  anu  Watkr  of  Ueccniber  ,',oth,  is  the  oopyright-of  Miss  Compton 
Collier  of  7b,  Hcrvey  Way.  Church  End.'  Fiuchlev. 


Sir,— If  you  look  closely  at  the  Torquay  postcard  you 
will  see  that  the  letter  S  whenever  it  occurs  is  not  written 
by  an  Englishman.  With  the  possible  exception  of  the  s 
in  1^'riend's  the  rest  are  German.  '  And  why  the  apostrophe 
in  Friends  ?  Edw.\kd  Hill. 

The  Engineers'  Club, .Manchester. 

SiR_ — In  the  5th  line  of  the  Torquay  postcard  the  use 
of  "shall  "  for  "  will  "  points  to  a  Hunnish  origin,  this  being 
a  common  error  of  the  Hun  communis. 
19,  Ewer  Street,  S.E.,  Charles  Silcock. 

Sir, — No  doubt  you  have  noticed  that  your  anonymous 
postcard  writer  has  i  misspelt  "  Raemacker."  This  is  a 
(lUrman  name,  whereas  "  Raemaekers "  is  unmistakably 
Dutch.  J-  G.  RcssELL  Harvey. 

Ardmore,  Leigh  WoodS;  Chfton. 


LAND     AND     ^V  A  T  E  R 


January  ij,  KjiO. 


THE    FLEET    AT    WAR. 

By    ARTHUR     POLLEN. 


ON  Friday  of  last  week,  I  had  the  liuuoui 
of  accompanying  a  party  of  journalists 
on  a  visit   to   one  of  the  minor  naval 
bases,     the     headquarters     of     certain 
squadions      and      flotillas      of     light      cruisers, 
destroyers,  and  submarines.     There  is  something 
extraordinarily  stirring  in  seeing  such  craft  and 
r^ien  as  we  saw  and  met  on  the  occasion.     Sub- 
marines, destroyers,  cruisers, — they  were  all  just 
in  from  sea,  just  on  the  point  of  going  out  again. 
We  caught  them,  as  it  were,  on  one  of  their  all 
too  short  rests  from  toil  and  danger.     The  ships 
and  men  bore  ample   exidence  of  both.     Some 
like    Arethiisa    were    badly    battle-scarred    from 
stem  to  stern  ;   on  others  the  cicatrices  of  the  sea 
had  hardly  healed.  Cheery  and  brave  hearted  in 
speech  and  bearing  as  were  all  we  met,  there  was, 
to  the  discerning  eye,  a  certain  gravity  behind 
their  pleasant  civilities  that  enhanced  the  dignity 
that  always  seems  either  innate  or  acquired  by 
sailors.     To  converse  with  them,  fresh  from  their 
work,  the  honours  of  war  upon  them,  makes  one 
long  for  a  fuller  record  of  the  daily  doings  of  the 
comrades  the  world  over.     What  would  one  not 
give  for  a  full  account  of  the  tales  of  the  Kingani 
on  Lake  Tanganyika,  of  the  naval  brigades  in  the 
Cameroons,   of  the   river  boats  on  the  Tigris  ? 
How  real  are  the  dangers  of  the  sea,  quite  apart 
from  action,  might  have  been  brought  home  to  us 
from  the  fact  that  Arethusa  had  lost  her  Gunnery 
Lieutenant— washed  overboard — in  the  course  of 
the  last  trip.     One  of  the  submarines,  just  like 
those  we  saw,  had  been  driven  on  to  the  beach  in 
Holland  during  the  week.     Almost  while  we  were 
there    King   Edward    VII.    had   gone    down   all 
standing — fortunately    without    loss    of    life,    a 
triumph  of  good  discipline  and  seamanship.     It 
was  barely  a  week  since  the  Naial  had  blown  up 
with  all  on  board.     The  sea  hardly  really  needs 
war  to  make   it  terrible  ;     and    warships    carry 
their  perils  with  them. 

GERMANY    AND    AMERICA. 

Telegrams  from  Washington  assure  us  that 
the  trouble  between  the  German  and  the  American 
Government  is  about  to  be  terminated  in  a  manner 
satisfactory  to  both  sides.  We  have  heard  the 
story  of  this  impending  settlement  so  often — 
the  words  of  Germany's  undertaking  seem  to  be 
singularly  like  those  gi\en  in  August — that  it  is  as 
well  to  reserve  judgment  as  to  the  character  of  the 
solution  until  the  fact  that  there  is  a  solution  is 
officially  announced.  But  the  defiance  of  Wash- 
ington could  not  continue  indehnitely.  President 
Wilson,  after  all,  sent  Berlin  an  ultimatum  in 
the  month  of  July,  and  to  that  iiltimatum  there 
has  as  yet  been  no  answer  whatever.  America 
has  taught  us  so  many  new  lessons  in  the  art  of 
trying  to  remain  dignified  under  sustained  injury 
and  inJ'alt,  that  it  may  seem  rash  to  say  that 
there  was  any  obvious  limit  to  what  she  could 
endure  at  Berlin's  hands.  Still,  appearances 
notwithstanding,  I  have,  as  my  readers  perhaps 
weariedly  remember,  insisted  throughout  that 
either  Germany  would  surrender,  or  America 
would  light.     It  was  not  the  second  of  these  two 


ihiags  that  was  most  likely  to  happen.  It  will 
therefore  be  no  surprise  to  me  if  in  the  end 
Germany's  surrender  is  in  such  terms,  and  accom- 
panied by  such  substantial  cash  compensation 
and  such  solemn  promises  as  to  future  conduct, 
as  would  actually  set  the  question  of  the  past 
murders  at  rest,  and  apparently  set  the  whole 
future  conduct  of  submarine  war  upon  a  new  and 
more  civilised  basis. 

The  first  thing  to  strike  the  detached  observer 
of  these  events  is  that,  knowing  Germany's 
record  from  August,  1914,  to  the  present  time,  the 
American  Government  should  find  it  possible  to 
accept  Germany's  word  as  to  her  future  conduct. 
It  cannot  be  given  more  solemnly  to  the  United 
States  than  it  was  given  to  Belgium.  A  signature 
to  an  understanding  made  in  Washington  is  surely 
no  more  sacred  than  one  made  at  the  Hague, 
yet  it  was  here  that  Germany  bound  herself 
not  to  sink  a  Prize  without  securing  the  safety 
of  all  persons  on  hoard  the  Prize;  nor  to 
scatter  loose  mines  upon  trade  routes  ;  nor  to  sink 
vessels  of  fishers  and  other  poor  men  of  the  sea. 
However,  it  is  for  America  to  judge  the  value 
of  German  paper.  If  memory  serves  me  right, 
seven  liners  have  been  sunk  since  Mr.  Wilson 
stated  that  a  single  instance  of  such  conduct 
would  be  regarded  as  "  deliberately  unfriendly." 
Will  he  take  Berlin's  word  to  mean  peace,  when 
he  does  not  take  her  acts  to  mean  war  ? 

A  SETTLEMENT    ALTERS    NOTHING. 

What  cQncerns  us  more  nearly  is,  the  effect 
such  a  settlement,  if  it  is  arrived  at,  will  have 
upon  the  war.  Very  few  people  in  this  country 
suppose  that  the  interests  either  of  Great  Britain 
particularly,  or  of  the  Allies  generally,  have  been 
at  all  gravely  prejudiced  by  the  submarine 
campaign.  Our  feelings  have  been  harrowed,  and 
our  indignation  inflamed  by  the  murders  it  has 
involved.  But  they  have  not  deterred  our  mer- 
chant seamen  from  going  to  sea.  Judging  by  the 
'Note  verbale  Germans  and  Austrians  are  far 
more  frightened  of  submarines  than  we. 
Grievous  as  our  losses  in  brave,  innocent 
and  valuable  lives  have  been,  they  have  not 
affected  our  capacity  to  subdue  our  enemy  by 
battle  and  siege.  Our  losses  in  material  have 
been  high  too,  but  not  high  relatively  to  what  we 
have  suffered  in  previous  wars — certainly  not 
high  relatively  to  the  total  of  national  merchant 
shipping.  They  are  inconsiderable  compared  with 
the  total  of  national  wealth,  and  the  national 
economic  sacrifices  that  we  have  to  endure  whether 
the  submarine  campaign  exists  or  not.  And  it 
follows  that  if  the  campaign  does  not  hurt  us, 
it  cannot  help  Germany.  If  then  the  American 
settlement  were  to  end  the  submarine  attacks 
altogether  -  and  this,  be  it  remembered,  was  the 
l)osition  President  Wilson  took  in  his  first  Notes 
on  this  subject — it  would  not  affect  the  war  un- 
favourably to  Germany,  or  favourabty  to  the 
Allied  cause  in  any  material  manner  whatever. 

But  the  converse  of  course,  is  not  true.  Were 
America  to  decide  that  the  militarism  of  which 
the  German  Government  is  the  expression  is  the 


Januarj-  13.  19 16, 


LAND     AND     WATER 


avowed  enemy  of  human  libeity  and  rights,  and 
that  to  remain  at  peace  with  so  diabohcal  a  thing 
was  altogether  inconsistent  witli  the  hberal  and 
noble  traditions  of  a  self-governing  people,  if, 
while  Christian  Europe  was  fighting  to  save  public 
faith,  it  seemed  intolerable  that  America  should 
not  resent  the  murders  of  which  her  own  people 
have  been  victims,  but  stand  idly  by  exchanging 
smug  courtesies  with  the  assassins — why,  then,  the 
course  of  the  war  might  be  altered  decisively 
indeed.  It  is  already  a  mere  matter  of  time 
before  right  is  vindicated  and  Germany  beaten 
to  her  knees.  Were  the  United  States  to  join 
in  that  vindication  the  time  might  be  made  very 
short.  But  we  do  not  ask,  nor  need,  America's 
active  alliance. 

If  America  will  not  help  the  Allies,  will  she 
help  the  enemy  ?  Many  and  specious  efforts  will 
be  made  to  get  this  help.  There  are  three  forms 
of  action  which  can  give  it  most  effectually.  If 
Congress  forbids  merchant  ships  from  arming 
in  self-defence,  the  power  of  submarines  will  be 
enormously  enhanced.  It  is  to  be  presumed 
that  no  settlement  will  be  made  that  does  not 
stop  submarines  from  sinking  at  sight.  But  if 
many  merchant  ships  are  armed,  submarines  will 
not  dare  to  approach  any  on  the  surface.  If, 
then,  they  are  cut  off  from  sinking  at  sight,  their 
occupation  will  be  largely  gone.  Next,  Congress 
mav  forbid  the  export  of  munitions.  But  in  this 
matter  the  Allies  have  the  commercial  interests 
of  the  ordnance  makers  as  a  strong  bulwark 
against  a  pro-German  policy.  Finally,  America, 
having  refused  to  condemn  the  lawless  actions 
of  Germany  in  Europe  or  to  help  Christendom 
in  its  new  Crusade,  may  be  urged  to  show  its 
impartiality  by  trying  to  relieve  Germany  of  the 
burden  of  our  sea  siege  !  Already  we  have  received 
Notes  from  the  Secretary's  Department  couched 
in  language  far  more  brusque  than  any  addressed 
to  Germany.  Doubtless  if  the  letter  of  the  law 
is  more  important  than  its  spirit,  the  new  con- 
ditions of  modern  sea  hostilities  leave  much 
of  our  action  unprovided  for  by  international 
precedent.  Should  America  hrmk  down  our  siege, 
she  will  be  doing  as  much,  and  more,  for  Germany 
than  if  she  forbade  the  export  of  rifles,  guns  and 
shells.  She  would  be  assisting  her  in  point  of 
fact  to  escape  from  a  form  of  military  pressure 
from  which  her  own  mihtary  and  naval  forces  are 
inadequate  to  relieve  her. 

ORDER  IN  COUNCIL  OR  BLOCKADE? 

We  must,  I  fear,  be  prepared  for  new  efforts 
of  this  kind  from  Washington.  It  would  be  as 
well  if,  before  these  efforts  are  made,  our  siege 
were  put  upon  a  better  regulated  basis.  It  has  for 
long  seemed  an  error  in  policy  to  base  these  pro- 
.ceedings  on  the  Order  in  Council  of  last  March. 
Until  the  German  submarine  blockade  had  shown 
its  true  character,  there  was  some  sense  in  relying 
upon  this  Order.  But  since  we  borrowed  a  leaf 
from  the  German  book  and  sent  our  submarines  to 
the  Baltic,  our  embargo  on  shipping  has  been 
more  effective  than  any  blockade  recorded  in 
history.  A  very  small  understanding  of  the 
American  character  should  make  it  clear  that  if 
President  Wilson's  Government  intervenes  to 
relieve  Germany  from  our  sea  pressure,  it  does  so 
not  from  sympathy  with  Germany,  but  in  a  sort  of 
blind  obedience  to  the  counsels  of  lawyers.  If 
we  can  regulate  our  legal  position,  we  shall  be 
safe  from  American  interference.     Now  Americans 


have  no  very  great  respect  for  British  Orders  in 
Council.  They  savour  a  little  too  much  of  events 
that  led  to  the  Colonies  throwing  off  their  allegiance 
to  the  British  Crown.  But  Blockade  is  a  different 
matter  altogether.  It  arouses  no  memories  but 
those  of  her  own  exploits  in  the  Civil  War.  It 
would  seem  then  that  our  controversial  case  would 
be  made  far  stronger  if  the  Allies  proclaimed  a 
joint  blockade  of  Germany,  and  our  proceedings 
at  sea  no  longer  appealed  for  justification  to  a 
British  Order  in  Council.  The  Arnerican  doctrine 
of  a  blockade,  joined  with  the  equally  American 
doctrine  of  continuous  voyage,  could,  I  should 
think,  be  made  to  justify  legally  all  the  proceed- 
ings necessary  to  making  our  siege  of  Germany 
effective. 

SUCCESSFUL    END    OF  A  FAILURE. 

The  first  paper  I  wrote  for  Land  and  Water 
dealt  with  the  early  and  fragmentary  accounts  of 
how  the  men  had  been  put  ashore  at  Cape  Hellas. 
"  It  will  probably  be  found,"  I  said,  "  when  the 
full  details  of  the  great  landing  at  the  Gallipoli 
peninsula  are  published,  that  the  most  remarkable 
combined  naval  and  military  operation  in  face  of 
strong  opposition  has  been  accomplished."  All 
we  have  learned  since  confirms  tlie  truth  of  these 
words.  I  little  expected  that  within  six  months 
I  should  be  commenting  on  operations  still  more 
singular  and  extraordinary,  namely  the  with- 
drawal of  two  armies  landed  in  circumstances  of 
such  furious  opposition  having  been  withdrawn 
without  any  opposition  at  all  !  It  was  marvellous 
enough  that  Anzac  and  Suvla  Bay  should  have 
been  evacuated  without  the  enemy  being  aware 
that  the  e\'acuation  was  going  forward.  That  the 
thing  should  have  been  repeated  at  Cape  Hellas 
is  almost  a  miracle.  We  have  learned  something 
of  the  ruses  that  enabled  the  first  withdrawal  to 
be  made.  For  the  second,  an  entirely  new  system 
of  deceiving  the  enemy  must  have  been  adopted. 
In  each  case  the  service  of  mere  transportation, 
that  is  the  purely  naval  service,  must  have  been  a 
marvel  of  efficient  organisation  and  of  perfectly 
incredible  work. 

The  thing,  indeed,  could  not  have  been  a 
more  complete  success  if  the  enemy,  instead  of 
being  deceived,  had  been  a  party  to  the  proceed- 
ings. It  is  right  that  the  Admirals  and  other 
officers  concerned  should  be  honoured  for  so  un- 
precedented a  feat. 

The  lay  reader  of  military  and  naval  history 
dwells  for  preference  on  the  purple  patches  of 
victory.  But  it  is  a  mere  comfnonplace  to  say  that 
the  deeper  student  reserves  his  soberer  enthusiasm 
for  the  retreats,  the  withdrawals,  the  leading  of 
lost  causes,  for,  by  a  curious  fatality,  it  is  often 
enough  in  these  that  the  highest  genius  is  shown. 
Until  the  full  history  of  this  extraordinary  adven- 
ture is  told  it  will  be  impossible  to  guess  what  the 
final  verdict  of  history  on  it  will  be..  But  it  seems 
certain  that,  but  for  the  strange  idea  that  the 
battleships  could  for  themselves  force  a  passage 
through  the  Dardanelles,  there  would  have  been  no 
mihtary  force  sent  to  Gallipoli  at  all.  The  ex- 
pedition seems  to  have  been  an  afterthought,  not 
because  it  was  thought  that  the  battleships  could 
fail,  but  because  it  was  hoped  that  the  soldiers 
would  make  their  success  more  rapid  and  more 
complete.  It  seems  to  have  been  entirely  over- 
looked that  the  unsuccessful  early  efforts  of  the 
ships  ensured  the  soldiers'  task  being  made  im- 
possii^le.     As  the  battleships'  task  was  impossible 


LAND      A  N  D     W  A  1  1'.  R 


January  13,  1916, 


Irom  the  beginning,  it  was,  from  tlie  standpoint  of 
national  strategy,  a  sorr\-  nndertaking  from  first  to 
last,  redeemed  only  by  brilliant  generalship,  by 
heroic  fighting  and  by  the  amazing  service  by  the 
seamen. 

A     PERSONAL    NOTE. 

It  was  only  the  other  day  that  I  heard  the 
news  of  a  naval  ofticer  being  killed  in  Ciallipoli, 
Commander  George  Gipps,  who  was  associated 
with  me  in  my  work  from  1910  till  191 2. 
Shortly  after  he  rejoined  he  was  sent  to  China 
as  second  in  command  of  Newcastle.  When  war 
broke  out  he  was  detailed  for  special  work  in  the 
far  East.  Triumph,  not  at  that  time  com- 
missioned, was  at  once  liastily  got  ready  for  sea, 
and  Gipps  joined  as  Senior  Lieutenant  Com- 
mander. He  served  through  all  the  operations 
of  the  attack  on  Tsing  Tau,  and  was  constantly 
in  action.  In  February  Triumph  joined  up  with 
Sir  Sackville  ("arden's  fleet  off  Gallipoli.  How 
often  she  was  in  action  altogether  I  do  not  know, 
but  it  must  have  been  nearer  thirty  than  twenty 
times.  In  all  these  affairs  Gipps  distinguished 
himself  greatly.  His  knowledge  of  gunnery  was 
almost  unique,  and  the  new  problems  of  fire  control 
which  bombardments  presented,  insoluble  as  they 
actually  were,  came  as  near  being  solved  by  him 
as  they  could  be.  He  was  in  Triumph  when  she 
went  down,  and  the  small  loss  of  hfe  was  a  proof 
of  how  thorough  had  been  his  work  as  an  executive 
officer.  When  he  had  lost  his  shiphcvelunteered 
to  build  and  equip  a  heavy  battery  for.  Hellcs, 
and  remained  in  command  of  it  for  some  time. 
The  battery  was  then  turned  over  to  the  army 
and  Gipps  was  detailed  to  prepare  a  naval  siege 
train,  a  business  which  entailed  much  preparation 
in  Egypt.  The  failure  at  Suvla  left  the  siege  train 
without  an  object  and  Gipps  became  N.T.O.  at 
Anzac.  He  was  one  of  the  few  who  was  present 
first  at  the  landing  and  then  at  the  evacuation  of 
that  much-contested  area. 

There  have  been  few  men  of  more  brilliant 
promise.  He  got  every  first  that  a  sub-lieutenant 
could  get  and  won  the  earliest  possible  promotion 
to  lieutenant's  rank.  When  he  specialised  in 
gunnery  at  Whale  Island  he  passed  so  brilliantly 


that  he  was  selected  tor  the  special  course  at" 
Greenwich,  and  got  an  easy  first  in  one  of  the, 
most  .  exacting  mathematical  ordeals  there  is. 
But  no  one  who  knew  him,  either  in  his  pro- 
fessional work  or  in  private  life,  would  have  taken 
him  primarily  for  a  student.  Brimful  of  energy, 
activity,  enterprise  and  initiative,  he  was  crazily 
fond  of  sport,  rode  to  hounds  with  the  hardest 
and  was  a  lirst-class  slujt,  and  in  working  for  a 
private  firm  was  as  indefatigable  as  he  had  been 
when  gunnery  lieutenant  of  a  battleship.  Gipps 
had  a  kind  of  fury  for  getting  things  done  in  the 
way  they  should  be  done,  and  his  friends  in  the 
Navy — and  no  man  had  more— sometimes  wondered 
whether  what  seemed  a  sort  of  ungovernable  im- 
patience with  those  who  were  slower  witted, 
slower  footed,  slower  handed  than  himself,  could 
ever  be  sufficiently  got  under  to  make  him  a 
real  leader.  No  man  is  a  great  leader  unless  he 
has  the  gift  of  making  all  those  around  him  work 
towards  his  aim  as  a  single  whole-hearted  unit. 
Organisation  is  after  all  only  a  long  word  for  the 
art  of  making  others  understand  what  we  want, 
training  them  how  to  do  it,  arid  making  them  wish 
to  do  it  in  our  way.  You  cannot  attain  these 
objects  unless  you  win  their  affection  as  well  as 
their  respect  and  admiration,  and  affection  is  not 
won  unless  you  are  tender  to  all  faults  that  are  not 
those  of  heart  and  spirit.  Nelson,  the  greatest 
of  all  organisers,  owed  his  success  to  the  recognition 
of  these  simple  truths. 

His  friends,  I  say,  sometimes  wondered 
whether  George  would  ever  learn  the  "  long- 
suflering  "  essential  to  such  success,  but  I  take 
it  from  Ins '  admirable  war  record  and  its  recog- 
nition in  the  promotions  last  July,  that,  once 
faced  with  the  real  thing,  he  learned  this  lesson 
just  as  easily  ias  he  learned  every  other.  If  he  was 
sometimes  impatient  and  rough  spoken  to  sub- 
ordinates, the  least  cjuick  witted  must  have  recog- 
nised the  generosity  of  his  spirit,  and  that,  after 
all,  in  nothing  was  he  so  exacting  as  in  his  example. 
Death  has  taken  him  as  I  think  he  would  have 
preferred  to  die,  and  once  more  it  is  his  example 
that  is  his  sternest  legacy  to  those  that  follow  him. 
God  rest  his  gallant  soul. 

ARTHUR  POLLEN. 


A     PLAYER    IN    THE    GREAT    GAME. 


By  Lewis  R.   Freeman. 


{All  who-  have  read  "  Kim "  will  remember 
Mr.  Kipling's  description  of  the  Great  Game. 
Persons  unacquainted  'with  India  sometimes  deem 
it  mere  fiction,  tut  this  account  from  the  pen  of  an 
American  journalist  will  show  how  the  Great  Game 
was  played  in  Mesopotamia  only  three  years  ago.] 

I  had  noted  on  several  occasions  tlie  surprising 
amount  of  detailed  information  concerning 
.\rabia  and  the  Lower  Tigro-Euphrates  Valley 
displayed  by  certain  Anglo-Indian  militarv 
uHicers  whom  I  encountered  at  Peshawar,  Quetta  and 
other  points  along  the  North-Western  Border  during  my 
visit  of  1911-12,  b\it  no  adequate  e.xplanation  of  how 
they  came  to  be  so  informed  was  vouchsafed  until  my 
friend.  Captain  Landers'  (I  will  call  him  by  that  nam'j 
because  it  carries  no  suggestion  of  his  real  one)  succumbed 
to  the  influence  of  the  seductive  atmosphere  that  broods 
on  spring  nights  over  the  storied  "  Iran's  Sea,"  lifted  the 
mask  of  his  reserve  and  took  me  into  his  confidence  for 
one  memorable  and  magic  half  hour. 

1  had  played  through  a  Bengal  tennis  tournament 
with  L^nd' rs,  followed  the  cheetah  and  shot  panther  with 


him  in  Jammu,  and  circled  in  his  company  the  big  bend 
of  the  Upper  Indus  ;  but  never  until  the  "night  that  our 
old  British  India  Coaster  lay  oft  the  Shat-cl-.Arab  bar 
waiting  for  the  turn  of  the  tide  to  run  up  to  Basra,  did 
1  hear  him  speak  of  the  things  that  were  really  next  hii- 
heart.  .\  lounging  chair,  a  pipe  and  a  tropical  sea  are 
conducive,  to  confidences  the  world  over,  but  the  com- 
bination is  niver  so  compelling  as  on  the  deck  of  a  Persian 
(iulf  Mail  Packet,  with  a  crisp  slice  of  new  moon  setting 
behind  the  date  palms,  the  waves  lip-lapping  under  the 
stern,  the  whine  of  Arab  pipes  welling  up  from  the  waist, 
and  the  half-guessed  odours  of  goats,  camels,  musk  and 
rugs  mingling  intlu^  mjlk-warm  off-shore  breeze.  At  any 
rate.  Landers  yielded' to  the.intluence,  and  I,  as  a  conse- 
quence, w^ds  granted  'transient  vision  of  the  outer  strands 
of  the  previsionai-y  weh  Britain  was  weaving  beyond  the 
marches  of  India  against  the  menace  to  come. 

"  For  the  best  part  of  the  last  live  years,"  he  began 
suddenly  after  a  long  spell  of  silence,  "I  have  been  coming 
to  Arabia  and  ^lesopptamia  on  '  language  study.'  In  all 
that  time  I  haVe  no^  been  back  to  England,  and  I  am 
almost  a  straixger  to  the  officers  of  my  own  regiment. 
-My  speech. arid  liientgir processes  are  alreadv  more  those 
of  the  Arab  than  the  white  man,  and,  what  with  sunlight 


January  13,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


and  dirt  that  have  gone  so  deep  under  my  epidermis  that 
they  will  never  come  out,  I  shall  shortly  have  the  appear- 
ance of  an  Arab.  Perhaps  in  time— you'd  never  believe 
the  appeal  of  the  Koran  till  you've  bowed  toward  Mecca, 
with  a  Bedouin  on  either  side  of  you,  morning  and  evening 
for  six  months  at  a  stretch — I  shall  pray  like  an  Arab. 
I  have  had  small-pox,  dysentery — which  has  become 
practically  chronic — and  a  dozen  varieties  of  skin  diseases, 
and  I'm  mottled  from  head  to  foot  with  '  Aleppo  Button  ' 
scars,  two  of  which  have  never  healed.  I've  been  alone 
so  much  that  I  talk  to  myself  even  in  Calcutta  and  Simla. 
The  Persians  in  this  region  distrust  me  ;  the  Russians  and 
Germans  hate  me,  and  the  Turks  are  perfectly  frank  in 
saying  that  they,  will  send  me  on  '  the  long  pilgrimage ' 
if  ever  a  fair  chance  offers. 

"AH  that  my  Government  does  is  to  allow  my  pav 
to  go  on  and  provide  me  with  a  passport  that  will  land 
:rie  at  Koweit,  Basra,  or  Bagdad.  If  I  get  into  trouble 
they  will  not— cannot,  in  fact — do  as  much  for  me  as  they 
would  for  a  spindle-legged  Hindu  coolie.  And  all  this 
on  the  chance  that  sometime  before  I  am  retired  for  old 
age  or  invalided  home,  the  Russian  Bear  nosing  after 
warm  water,  or  the  Prussian  Eagle  scratching  after  '  places 
in  the  sun,'  may  take  it  into  their  heads  to  wander  this 
way.  In  either  of  these  contingencies,  of  course,  there  is 
no  denying  the  fact  that  I  shall  be  very  much  in  demand, 
especially  if  operations  are  carried  on  in  my  own  '  sphere,' 
that  of  North-Eastern  Arabia,  and  Lower  Mesopotamia 
up  to  about  a  line  drawn  from  Bagdad  to  Hitt. 

"Afoot,  or  by  horse  or  camel,  I  have  traversed 
almost  every  square  mile  of  this  region.  There  is  not 
a  bazaar  from  Kerbela  to  Koweit  in  which,  disguised,  I 
cannot  mingle  unsusjiected  in  the  throng,  or,  in  case  of 
need,  call  upon  friends  who  will  do  anything  from  giving 
me  a  "cigarette  or  a  handful  of  dates  to  risking  their  lives 
to  save  my  own.  i 

Blood  Brotherhood. 

"  I  also  know  every  one  of  tlie  greater,  as  well  as  most 
of  the  lesser.  Bedouin  sheikhs  whose  peoples  roam  the 
deserts  between  Basra  and  Damascus  ;  and  with  one  of 
the  most  powerful  of  these — his  camels  and  "goats  are 
numbered  in  hundreds  of  thousands — I  have  gone'through 
the  '  blood  brotherhood  '  ceremony.  The  blood  of  our 
arms  has  actually  mingled,  and  each  is  pledged  to  stop  at 
no  act  to  serve  the  other.  My  friends,  I  need  hardly  say, 
are  all  Arabs,  Chaldeans,  Syrians,  Armenians,  Jews,  or 
people  of  one  of  the  other  subject  races  of  t|iis  region  ; 
totheTurk,  courteous  as  he  is  to  mc  socially  in  Bagdad  and 
Basra,  my  name  is  anathema. 

"  A  week  hence,  for  instance,  I  shall  exchange 
Oriental  amenities  with  the  Vali  of  Bagdad  in  his  garden 
on  the  bank  of  the  Tigris.  He  will  toast  me  in  scented 
coffee  and  drink  to  the  success  of  my  visit ;  and  all  the 
while  a  double  guard  of  '  zaptichs'  or  mounted  police  will 
be  watching  the  gates  to  prevent  my  getting  away  to  the 
desert  and  my  Arab  friends.  Personally,  I  kno^v  it  would 
pain  him  immensely  if  I  were  to  be  shot  in  the  'dark  for — 
'  let  us  say — refusing  to  answer  a  sentry's  challenge  :  but 
Dflicially  he  is  dead  keen  that  something  of  the  kind  may 
;ventuate,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  would  do  him  a 
lot  of  good  in  Stamboul,  where  he  is  not  in  verv  high 
favour  at  present. 

"  The  whole  thing,  when  all  is  said  and  done,  resolves 
itself  down  to  about  this  :.  If  a  war  involving  operations  in 
this  '  sphere  '  comes  within  the  next  twenty  years,  I — • 
and  several  other  chaps  who  are  doing  the  same  sort  of 
work — provided  I  do  not  lose  my  life,  or  my  health,  or  the 
best  of  my  faculties  in  the  interim,  \<i]l  probably  break  all 
records  outside  of  a  Central  American  revolution  for 
quick  promotion.  I  might  easily  be  a.  brigadier-general  at 
forty,  with  ten  or  a  dozen  letters  after  rny  name.  But  if, 
as  is  overwhelmingly  likely,  there'  is  ho  war,  I  shall 
probably  continue  these  little  jaunt^'intp  the  desert  until 
my  health  gives  out,  when,  at,  best,  ^  shall  be  invalided 
home  on  the  half  pay  of  a  ci;iptain  or  major.  At  the 
worst — well,  since  some  of  the  best  (yes,  aiidthe  happiest, 
too)  years  of  my  life  will  have  been  spent  out  here.  I 
should  probably  sleep  better  under  six  fe^l  of  desert  soil 
than  in  the  family  vault.  ;',    .,'.,«,, 

"  So  you  see,"  Landers  concluded  wi'th  a  whimsical 
smile,  "  my  future  depends  entirely  upon  whether  or  not 
some  of  our  neighbours,  or  would-be  .neiglibours,  see  fit 
to  start  somethintr  in  this  littlq  neck  of  Central  Asia 


within  the  next  decade  or  two.  And  now  that  wc  arc  in  the 
Entente  with  Russia,  and  acting  entirely  in  concert  with 
her  in  Persia.  I'm  very  much  afraid  that  it's  going  to  be 
a  case  of  the  '  hope  deferred  making  the  heart  sick.'  " 

In  Bagdad. 

The  following  day  we  caught  the  river  steamer  at 
Basra,  and  four  days  later  arrived  at  Bagdad,  Landers 
putting  up  at  the  grim  brown  fort  which  housed  the  British 
Consulate,  post-office  and  telegraph  station.  I  saw  him 
on  and  off  for  a  week,  usually  at  tiffins  or  dinners  given 
for  him  by  some  of  his  British  friends.  At  other  times 
he  was  not  to  be  found.  "  Landers  Sahib  gone  to  bazaar," 
his  Pathan  bearer  invariably  answered  my  enquiries ; 
and  Landers  himself  volunteered  no  more  than  that  he 
was  spending  a  good  deal  of  time  "  renewing  old  ac- 
quaintances." Then,  at  the  end  of  about  ten  days, 
without  a  good-bye  to  anybody,  so  far  as  I  could  learn, 
he  dropped  from  sight. 

"  Landers  is  off  again  to  his  Arabs,"  said  his  friends, 
but  all,  knowing  that  the  Turks  had  been  watching  him 
like  cats,  were  more  or  less  worried  until  the  Vali,  with  a 
wry  smile,  admitted  to  the  British  Consul  one  day  that 
"  the  bird  had  slipped  through  his  nets." 

"  I  am  much  reheved,"  the  Consul  admitted  to  me 
that  afternoon.  "  They  hung  on  him  like  leeches  this 
time,  but  Landers  finally  got  away  by  togging  up  as  an 
Armenian  stage-coach  driver  when  they  were  expecting 
him  as  an  Arab.  The  iVrmenian  came  to  a  native  house 
which  Landers  had  taken,  went  inside  for  a  few  minutes, ' 
presently  to  reappear,  climb  into  his  arabanah  (stage- 
coach) and  drive  off  with  a  load  of  passengers  to  Kerbela. 
In  reality  this  was  Landers,  who  had  stained  his  face 
and  put  on  the  Armenian's  clothes.  The  Turks  nabbed 
the  latter  when  he  finally  ventured  out  to  the  street,  but 
got  little  out  of  him,  and  I  don't  think  they  know  j'et 
exactly  what  happened. 

"  Landers  is  undoubtedly  far  into  the  desert  by  this 
time,  and  the  Turks  know  the  futility  of  going  after  him 
among  the  Bt^douins.  We  shall  probably  not  hear  of  him 
again  for  six  or  eight  months.  Either  he  will  come  back,  or  he 
will  not  come  back  ;  and  if  he  does  come,  what  he  has  to  , 
report  will  go  to  Indian  Army  Headquarters  at  Simla, 

not  to  me.     Captain  X ,  who  is  working  in  the  same 

'  sphere  '  as  Landers — and  whom  you  may  have  heard 
of  as  having  been  awarded  high  honours  by  the  Royal 
Geographical  Society  for  the  most  important  work  of  the  i 
year  in  exploration,  was  in  North-Central  Arabia  for: 
something  like  eight  or  ten  months  without  a  word  coming 
out  from  him.  When  he  finally  did  slip  into  Bagdad,  he 
was  so  burned  and  dirty,  and  his  English  was  so  halting 
from  long  disuse,  that  the  Sikh  sentry  at  the  gate  of  the 
Consular  compound  would  not  pass  him  in.  Landers 
himself,  in  fact,  returned  from  his  last  jaunt  in  such  a 
condition  that  he  refused  to  Approach  within  ten  yards  of 
any   of  us  until  he  had  had  a  bath. 

"It's  a  queer  game,  isn't  it  ?  And  all  against  a 
contingency  which  maj'  never  materialize — at  least  not 
for  years." 

German  Activities. 

This  happened  in  1912,  and  at  that  time  no  one  that  I 
met — least  of  all  Landers,  who  had  the  most  to  gain  by 
such  an  event — appeared  to  dream  tliat  the  blood- 
drenched  plains  of  ancient  Babylonia  and  Assyria  were 
likely  to  echo  for  many  years  to  the  tramp  of  hostile 
armies.  The  broad  scope  of  Germany's  activities,  ex- 
tending far  beyond  the  mere  construction  of  the  Bagdad 
Railway,  was -evident  to  everyone;  that  the  Germans  had 
ambitious  plans  for  controlling  the  incalculably  rich 
Tigro-Euphrates  Valley  no  one  doubted,  but  that  German 
influence  should  prevail  over  that  of  Great  Britain  and 
Russia  in  Constantinople  appeared  not  to  be  dreamed  ol 
in  Mesopotamia,  even  by  the  Turks  themselves. 

The  page  or  two  which  I  have  been  able  to  give 
from  my  friend  Landers'  life  is  probably  as  far  as  it  would 
be  proper  to  go  at  this  time  in  discussing  certain  of  the 
ways  in  which  knowledge  of  the  country  and  its  peoples 
have  been  gained.  It  is  an  interesting  commentary  on 
the  cfficency  of  the  system  employed  that  the  region 
most  thoroughly  "  worked  " — Lower  Mesopotamia — was 
also  the  one  in  which  the  Expeditionary  Force  carried  oq 
all  its  operations  with  scarcely  a  hitch 


LAND      AND      W  A  T  E  R 


January,  13,  1916. 


THE    BATTLE    OF    CTESIPHON. 


Bv  Sir  Thomas  Holdich. 


0\  the  I2th  November  General  Townshends 
force  was  encamped  at  Lajj,  about  seven 
miles  from  the  Turkish  position  which  covered 
the  village  and  ruins  of  Ctesiphon  and  the  road 
to  Bagdad.  On  the  night  of  the  21st  to  22nd.  under  a 
clear,  bright  moon  the  force  marched  out  in  three 
columns  for  attack  at  early  dawn. 

Column  A  consisted  of  six  battalions  and  two  batteries 
and  moved  out  about  seven  miles  to  the  north.  Column 
B  had  ID  miles  of  marching  "to  reach  their  position,  and 
the  cavalry  about  twelve,  extending  northward  be- 
yond A,  Column  C  remained  between  A  and  the  base 
camp.  All  of  them  reached  the  fronts  determined  without 
cUfticulty  and  "  dug  in  "  till  daylight.  At  sunrise  many 
of  the  enemy  were  obserx-ed  retiring  northward.  It 
appeared  as  if  Nasr-i-din  Pasha  had  decided  to  retire  on 
Dialah  (nearer  Bagdad)  and  await  reinforcements.  Column 
B  and  the  cavalry  at  once  attacked  the  retreating  'lurks 
and  found  themselves  faced  with  a  force  of  abo\it  twice 
their  number. 

This  time,  however,  the  Turks  who  had  learned  their 
lesson  at  Kiit,  did  not  break  but  put  up  a  strong  resistance. 
Meanwhil:^   Column   .\   advanced   to   the   attack   of   th- 


Turkish  position  at  V  which  they  carried  ;.ftcr  a  fierce 
fight  involving  considerable  loss.  Four  battalions  were 
then  sent  northward  to  help  Column  B  which  was  having 
a  hot  time  of  it,  as  the  Turks  not  only  refused  to  run 
but  were  gaining  ground.  They  succeeded  in  stopping 
the  advance  of  the  lurks  and  took  eight  guns.  The 
other  two  battalions  of  Column  A  (Delamain's  Brigade) 
were  sent  to  the  assistance  of  Column  C  whicli  liad  ad- 
vanced later  against  the  Turkish  position  at  X,  the  two 
batteries  remaining  with  Pelamain  and  his  staff  at  V. 
Then  followed  some  hours  of  lighting. 

The  first  advance  was  made  at  8.45.  V  was  taken 
at  II,  and  X  was  linally  captured  about  1.30,  the  whole 
of  the  first  Turkish  p(isition  thus  falling  into  our  hands. 
Meanwhile  a  strong  column  of  Turks  was  observed  ad- 
vancing against  V,  where  there  was  practically  no  in- 
fantry defence.  It  was  a  case  of  collecting  all  the  details 
possible  for  defence  (numbering  about  100  men  in  all), 
and  holding  on  at  all  costs.  It  was  an  anxious  time,  but 
t'lc  Turks  were  repulsed,  and  when  their  position  was 
occupied  at  X  matters  improved. 

The  fight  north  of  V  was  still  raging  so  Delamain 
recovered  his  battalions  from  X  (the  hard  tried  Dorsets, 


Mahrattas,  and  ^4th  Punjab  Infantry)  and  started  to  the 
assistance  of  B  about  3  p.m.  Column  C  followed  and  co- 
operated, so  that  the  whole  force  was  together  to  meet  what 
was  evidently  the  main  body  of  the  Turkish  army.  The 
Turks  counter-attacked  with  great  determination,  and  in 
tlie  evening  succeeded  in  forcing  back  our  troops  into 
tlic  first  line  of  trenches.  They  recovered  their  guns. 
Column  A,  however,  occupied  the  village  of  Sulman  Pak  ; 
whilst  the  rest  were  sheltered  in  the  first  Turkish  position. 
The  Turks  had  had  enough  for  the  time  being  and  the 
opposing  forces  passed  a  quiet  night. 

On  the  22nd  the  Turks  attacked  again  in  great  force, 
and  about  3  p.m.  made  a  desperate  attempt  to  recapture 
the  trenches.  The  attack  failed,  and  by  6  p.m.  all  was 
quiet.  The  Turks  dug  themselves  in  about  a  mile  from 
the  British  position.  During  the  night  they  made  three 
more  attacks  which  were  easily  repulsed  with  but  few 
casualties.  Then  the  Turks  withdrew  their  guns  before 
following  themselves.  There  is  no  doubt  that  they  put 
up  a  very  gallant  fight.  They  lost  1,500  prisoners  and 
(according  to  the  latest  estimate)  10,000  in  killed  and 
wounded.  They  stood  up  to  the  bayonet  charge  and 
counter-attacked  no  less  than  five  times.  Their  losses 
(if  the  estimate  is  correct)  nearly  equalled  the  whole 
strengtli  of  Townshend's  force. 

On  the  other  hand  our  losses  were  very  heavy, 
particularly  in  officers,  including  the  staff,  and  tlie  divi- 
sion at  the  end  of  the  battle  was  minus  one-third  of  its 
strength.  Eventually  it  was  withdrawn  to  Kut  as  we 
know.  The  wounded  reached  Kut  on  the  27th.  On  the 
28th  a  band  of  Arabs  held  the  river  between  Kut  and 
.■\mara  and  were  dislodged  with  some  difficulty  with  the 
help  of  a  gunboat,  bcforccommunicationwith  Amara  was 
icstored.  This  may  account  for  the  Turkish  report  that 
conmiunications  had  been  destroyed  between  Kut  and 
Amara — a  rumour  which  has  never  been  either  confirmed 
or  denied  othcially,  and  which  would  have  been  most 
serious  news  if  it  had  been  true. 

A  word  or  two  about  the  Turk  from  a  very  competent 
authority  may  be  of  interest.  The  Turk  is  noi  effete,  or 
half-trained,  or  mutinous,  or  neglected.  On  the  contrary, 
he  is  as  well  equipped  as  the  British  soldier,  and  better 
than  the  Indian.  The  Turks  possess  tons  of  ammunition 
and  do  not  hesitate  to  abandon  it  if  there  is  any  difficulty 
in  carrj'uig  it  away.  The  nearer  they  are  to  Bagdad  the 
better  arc  they  supported  and  supplied.  In  short  the 
Turk  is  a  formidable  nut  to  crack  in  Mesopotamia,  and  it 
is  simple  folly  to  tackle  him  with  insufficient  force. 

[Since  fill's  article  icas  written  ur.  hare  learnt  definitely 
that  tlic  position  at  Kut  has  been  isolated .—Emiou.] 


THE    CULT    OF    KIPLING. 

To  the  Editor  of  Land  and  Water. 

Sir,— Every  lover  of  Kipling  will  thank  you  for  vour 
article  in  L.\.\t)  and  Water,  and  especially  for  your  verdict 
that  no  writer  is  more  free  from  the  deadly  sin  of  literary 
vanity.  I  met  Mr.  Kipling  on  board  a  home-bound  African 
steamer,  and  after  telling  him  a  story  of  adventure  that  I  ha<i 
gathered  "  half  told  "  from  a  South  African,  I  expressed  a 
wish  that  he  would  tell  some  of  these  tales,  "  because,"  I 
said,  "  they  are  such  dumb  dogs  ;   they  can't  tell  a  story." 

"  Of  course  they  can't,"  he  retorted,  "  if  they  could  talk 
about  the  thing,  they  wouldn't  do  it.  You  want  a  fellow  like 
me  to  tell  the  story." 

If  I  ever  had  doubted  his  greatness  I  should  have,  known 
it  tlien ;  it  is  the  third-rate  scribbler  who  thinks  that  "  the 
sun  has  risen  to  hear  him  crow."  To  Mr.  Kipling  deeds  are 
far  above  words  ;  his  one  aim  and  object  is  to  shew  us  the 
deeds  and  sufferings  Of  the  men  on  whose  bones  "  the  English 
Hag  is  stayed,"  and  it  is  this  utter  singleness  of  pur^iosejthat 
gives  his  stories  their  dramatic  force  and  their  marvellous 
vitality.  His  worship  of  "  that  great  idol  Pax  Britannica  that 
dwells  between  the  Himalayas  and  Cape  Comorin  "  links  him 
to  all  who  die  m  her  service,  and  if  he  sometimes  shews  a  seamy 
side  of  their  lives,  he  does  them  splendid  justice  in  "  The  White 
Man's  Burden,"   and  "  The  Galley  Slaves." 

And  our  Laureate  is  a  Mr.  Robert  Bridges,  whose  poems 
arc  about  as  inspiring  as  a  rice-pudding  !— Yours  gratefullv, 
KiRBY  Stephen-.  I    C  S 


January  13,  19  iG. 


LAND      AND     WATER 


THE    FORUM. 

A     Commentary     on    Present-day    Problems. 


DETACHMENT  is  an  admirable  quality 
but  it  may  be  carried  to  extreme 
limits.  It  is  being  so  carried  by  a 
number  of  admirable  people,  who  while 
claiming,  not  always  with  complete  candour,  not 
to  be  averse  from  the  effective  prosecution  of  the 
war,  are  engaged  in  presenting  so  coldly  balanced 
a  case  that  plain  folk,  anxious  to  be  fair-minded 
and  immeasurably  saddened  by  the  tragic  slaughter 
and  intolerable  delays  of  the  War  are  apt  to  be  a 
little  bewildered.  An  air  of  sweet  reasonableness 
which  is  the  weapon  of  the  detached  is  always  a  most 
persuasive  thing.  And  there  are  singularly  few, 
if  any,  cases  so  good  that  a  skilful  intellectualist, 
taking  advantage  of  partial  flaws  inevitable  in 
human  affairs,  cannot  contrive  to  give  them  an 
appearance  of  weakness. 

Let  us  suppose  a  man  brought  up  on  a  charge  of 
robbing  a  traveller  in  circumstances  of  exceptional 
brutality  and  violence.  Suppose  the  facts  attested 
on  unbiassed  evidence.  It  would  be  perfectly 
possible  for  a  magistrate  to  point  out  that  the 
world  was  in  fact  arranged  on  a  very  inequitable 
plan.  The  traveller  was  rich,  and  in  a  perfectly, 
ordered  state  there  would  be  no  such  inequalities 
to  excite  the  passion  of  envy.  There  would 
clearly  have  been  no  assault  if  the  traveller  had 
been  poor.  Moreover  it  was  clear  that  the  traveller 
when  attacked  had  struck  at  his  assailant,  so  that 
obviously  he  could  not  honestly  raise  the  point 
that  violence  was  criminal.  It  was  the  fact  that 
the  rich  man,  though  he  bore  a  good  character 
in  general,  had  in  the  past  sanctioned  some  lesser 
transaction  that  was  not  strictly  honest.  It  was 
reasonably  certain  that  his  ancestors  had  been 
rascals.  We  were  all  extraordinarily  imperfect 
and  it  was  not  for  so  essentially  frail  a  mortal  as 
himself  to  judge  between  plaintiff  and  defendant. 
The  assailant  could  not  reasonably  be  expected 
to  restore  the  money  because  he  held  the  unusual 
but  apparently  perfectly  sincere  view  that  the 
rich  man  had  no  right  to  it.  Moreover  he  had 
spent  it  and  they  were  therefore  both  equally 
deprived  of  it.  And  as  for  punishment  that  was  a 
sterile  thing.  Beings  gifted  as  the  defendant 
was  with  the  high  endowment  of  human  reason 
were  more  susceptible  to  argument  than  to  force 
which  never  yet  solved  any  difficulty.  The  de- 
fendant was  the  victim  of  an  opportunity  ;  of  a 
system.  It  was  our  duty  to  set  to  work  to  alter 
the  system.  The  case  would  be  accordingly 
dismissed. 


That  is  admirable  as  an  exercise  in  philosophic 
detachment,  but  it  is  poor  administration  of  the 
law.  It  meets  no  difficulties  of  the  situation.  It 
provides  no  guarantee  that  the  defendant  will  not 
fall  upon  the  plaintiff  as  he  leaves  the  court  and 
relieve  him  of  his  replenished  purse  ;  nor  that  the 
loafers  in  the  gallery  will  not  proceed  to  follow  his 
example.  .Such  mischief  indeed  will  be  done  long 
before  "the  system  is  altered."  And  the  magis- 
trate unless  protected  by  stout  minions  of  the  law 
will  share  the  traveller's  fate. 


Nor  is  this  by  any  means  so  malicious  or  ex- 
travagant a  travesty  of  the  trend  of  speech  and 
writing  of  many  of  our  detached  intellectuals. 

Is  such  detachment  human  ?  Is  it  not 
essentially  the  reverse,  too  cold,  too  dispassionate 
and  disembodied  ?  We  live  under  a  human  law, 
man-made,  administered  by  men  for  men.  Divine 
sanctions  there  may  be,  not  less  real  because 
veiled,  but  no  divine  interferences.  Man  in  his 
upward  progress  or  (to  beg  no  question)  in  his 
complex  development  has  elaborated  a  mode  of 
living  ;  he  laboriously  builds  order  out  of  chaos  by 
a  series  of  agreed  codes  without  which  a  stable  life 
is  impossible  ;  in  commerce,  honest  currency  and 
fulfilment  of  obligations  ;  in  marriage,  fidelity  ; 
in  professional  counsel,  secrecy  ;  in  friendship, 
truth  ;  in  international  relations,  faith  in  treaties  ; 
in  sport,  fair  play ;  even  in  war,  agreed  and 
definite  mitigations  of  its  worst  horrors. 

The  embodiment  of  all  these  elaborate  codes 
ot  greater  and  less  essential  significance  is  law. 
Its  ultimate  sanction  may  be  force  or  the  threat 
of  force  ;  but  its  daily  operation  is  the  result  of 
united  good-will  and  a  higher  human  faith  and 
honour  in  which  force  has  no  part.  To  break 
down  this  faith  and  honour  is  the  greatest  of  crimes 
against  humanity.  It  is  of  the  essence  of  the 
German  crime.  We  may  be  all  guilty  of  this  war, 
which  is  the  first  premiss  of  our  detached  ones  (just 
as  our  judge  assumed  we  were  all  guilty  of  the 
system  under  which  our  traveller  was  robbed), 
but  that  is  ah  abstract  and  academic  guilt  com- 
pared with  the  red  guilt  of  action. 

Can  anyone  seriously  maintain  that  that  guilt 
was  ours  ?  Assume  Germany  ringed  round  with 
enemies  Was  that  ring  forged  in  aggression  01 
defence  ?  In  the  light  of  the  after  German  con- 
duct, of  hymns  of  hate,  of  the  sickening  iteration 
"  England"  is  the  enemy,"  "England  planned  the 
war  "  can  we  on  the  analogy  of  normal  life  draw 
no  true  deduction  favourable  to  ourselves  ?  Does 
not  our  almost  fatuous  innocence  cry  to  heaven 
for  recognition  ?  In  the  days  of  our  unchallenged 
supremacy  what  right  was  denied  her,  what 
pathway  to  her  ships,  what  privileges  to  her 
trade  or  her  subjects  ?  Does  no  one  remember 
when  in  the  first  decade  of  this  century  a  very 
few  truculent  spirits  of  the  extreme  blue  water 
school  murmured  in  their  clubs  and  at  their 
dinner  tables  that  Germany  meant  us  ill  (as  in  fact 
she  did)  and  that  we  had  best  strike  at  her  when 
we  could  break  her,  did  any  among  us  pay  the 
very  slightest  attention  to  them  ?  There  is  more 
support  for  our  cause  in  the  significant  impotence 
of  those  few  truculents  than  in  reams  of  document- 
ary evidence.  Who  supposes  that  -a  war  could 
have  ever  been  made  acceptable  to  us  as  a  nation 
on  grounds  like  these. 

Could  the  German  challenge  when  it  did 
come  have  been  in  honour .  refused  ?  Such 
grossly  obvious  questions  must  be  asked  to 
straighten  out  this  all  important  matter,  for 
on  the  answer  depends  the  answer  to  further 
question    which    may    at    any    time    be   pressed 


LAND      AND     WATER 


January  13,  1916. 


by  a  certain  section  among  us,  namely  :  Are  we 
justilied  in  weakening  in  our  resolution,  surfeited 
with  horror  and  tired  of  a  iob  that  is  tougher  than 
it  seemed  ? 

Could  England,  refusing  the  challenge 
have  ever  held  up  her  head  again  among  the 
nations  ?  That  may  seem  an  unimportant  thing 
to  the  sublimely  detached.  Is  it  so  unimportant 
to  men  of  llesh  and  blood  by  whom  the  round  world 
is  peopled  ?  Is  the  betrayal  of  nations  a  lesser 
crime  than  the  betrayal  of  friends  ?  We  have 
seized  or  had  thrust  upon  us,  it  does  not  matter 
which  for  the  moment,  responsibilities  of  over- 
lordship.  Is  the  German  record  such  as  to  suggest 
she  would  make  a  better  guide  for  subject  races 
than  ourselves  ?  We  remember  Denshawi  and 
most  of  us  are  ashamed  of  it.  Does  it  go  near 
the  immeasurable  infamy  of  the  starvation  of  the 
rebellious  Herreroi?  ? 

If  Germany,  the  ringcd-in  one,  had  indeed  no 
other  purpose  but  to  break  the  ring,  if  her  own 
conscience  did  in  fact  seem  clear  to  her  in  shoulder- 
ing the  immense  responsibility  of  war,  could  not 
a  campaign,  prepared  as  it  unquestionably  was,  re- 
sourceful as  it  proved  itself ,  if  waged,  not  without 
horror  and  destruction,  for  that  indeed  is  impossible, 
but  with  an  honourable  clemency,  have  gone  far 
to  prove  the  reality  of  her  innocence  and  the 
greatness  of  her  spirit  ?  If  it  had  been  waged  as, 
for  instance,  Russia  and  Japan  waged  their  bitter, 
but  (on  the  testimony  of  our  military  attaches) 
essentially  chivalrous  war  ?  Could  anything  worse 
have  been  done  than  what  in  fact  has  been  done 
by  her  to  the  people  and  places  in  her  power  ? 
Has  anything  worse  ever  been  practised  on  the 
weak  since  Alva's  infamies  in  the  Low  Countries  ? 
Could  any  charges  to  prove  the  essential  wrong- 
ness  of  her  aims  have  been  devised  by  calumny 
more  damning  than  afe  written  in  the  authentic 
liistory  of  these  scxenteen  months  ? 

These  things  should  not  be  forgotten.  And  it 
is  by  no  means  so  easy  to  remember — with  con- 
viction. The  human  mind  is  a  strangely  con- 
stituted thing.  All  our  values  alter  as  the  tragedy 
of  the  war  drags  on.  We  are  surfeited  with 
horrors  on  paper — and  paper  horrors  have  a  way  of 
losing  weight  by  repetition.  But  we  are  sheltered 
from  actual  contact  with  them  and  that  makes 
possible  the  detachment  of  our  philosophers. 

These  things  should  not  be  forgotten.  Not 
that  hate  may  be  nourished,  which  leads  to  excess 
and  is  a  futile  and  degrading  passion,  but  to  keep 
alive  that  anger  in  us  which  is  a  righteous  thing. 
After  all  there  is  a  right  and  a  tvrong  in  the  matter. 
Put  aside,  for  sake  of  argument,  every  individual 
outrag(!  of  lust  or  blood  ;  admit  the  doul)tful  plea 
that  all  the  vandalism,  asat  Louvain  and  Kheinis, 
was  dictated  by  real  military  necessity ;  distrust 
all  testimony  even  at  first  hand  of  terrified 
folk  and  take  only  the  accredited  evidence 
substantiated  by  neutrals  or  by  the  admissions 
and  justifications  of  the  enemy.  Yet  you  must 
remember  the  machine-gun  massacres  of  civilians 
at  Dinant  and  Tamines,  400  at  Tamines, 
700  at  Dinant  ;  the  lesser  but  still  considerable 
slaughter  at  Aerschot  and  Termonde,  all  carried 
out  under  disciplined  orders.  Put  aside  the 
repeated  charges  of  the  use  of  civilian  screens, 
because  it  is  not  always  easy  in  the  confusion  of 
battle  to  distinguish  between  fugitives  flying  and 


captives  deliberaU*ly  driven.  Biit  credit  the  boast 
of  a  Bavarian  lieutenant  in  a  Munich  Newspaper 
that  he  had  "  the  excellent  idea  "  of  seating 
three  civilians  in  chairs  in  the  middle  of  a  street. 
"  The  fire  directed  at  our  men  diminished  and 
my  men  were  the  masters  of  the  principal  street. 
...  As  I  learned  later  the  Bavarian  Reserve 
Regiment  .  .  .  made  a  similar  experiment. 
Four  civilians  whom  they  also  placed  in  chairs 
in  the  middle  of  the  street,  wore  killed  by  French 
bullets.  I  saw  them  myself  King  in  the  middle 
of  the  street  near  the  hospital."  Is  it  likely  that 
all  the  other  charges  as  to  the  use  of  human 
screens  are  false  ? 

Receive  with  great  reserve  the  stories  of 
mutilations,  but  give  credit  to  the  American 
journalist  PowixL  who  said  in  an  interview  with 
GiiNEKAL  VON  BoLiiN,  "  I  mvself  have  seen  the 
mutilated  bodies.  .  .  .  "How  about  the 
women  I  saw  with  their  hands  and  their  feet  cut 
off  ?  How  about  the  little  girl  two  years  old, 
shot  in  her  mother's  arms  ?  How  about  the  old 
man  hung  from  the  rafters  of  his  house  and  roasted 
to  death  by  a  bonfire  built  under  him  ?  "  Is  it 
really  well  to  forget  or  to  forgive  such  things  ? 

Or  the  gas  at  the  second  battle  of  Ypres, 
causing  such  agonies  that  doctors  and  nurses 
accustomed  to  every  sort  of  horror  could  not  do 
their  work  for  tears  ;  or  the  liquid  fire  at  Hooge  ? 

Or  Falaba,  Amiral  Ganteaume,  Lusitania, 
Arabic,  A  ncona,  Persia,  and  the  attempted  hospital 
ship  Asturias  ?  Or  the  shelling  of  the  defenceless 
E  13  in  Danish  territorial  waters,  its  crew  ranged 
on  Its  deck  with  folded  arms  ?  We  have  the 
Baralong  case  against  us,  but  the  submarine  crew 
were  fresh  from  their  murders  of  the  Arabic. 
Witli  what  face  could  they  claim,  even  if — it  is 
driving  h'uman  nature  hard — we  should  have 
given  ([uarter  ? 

IJo  our,  detached  ones  tell  us  that  there  is 
no  difference  between  replying  in  kind  to  out- 
rages and  initiating  them  ?  Is  a  duellist  fighting 
with  swords  still  to  use  his  sword  only  if  his 
adversary  draws  a  pistol  on  him  ?  Does  not  the 
breach  of  honour  in  the  one  make  the  other's 
similar  action  no  least  breach  of  honour  at  all  ? 

These  things  would  not  be  worth  the  saying 
were  it  not  that  our  philosophers  do  in  fact  put 
forward  these  pallid  suggestions.  They  are  wont 
now  to  speak  as  if  it  were  an  academic  point  to 
demand  from  the  enemy  recognition  of  defeat. 

The. recognition  of  the  full  defeat  of  their 
purpose  by  the  German  leaders  is  worth  any  sacri- 
fice we  can  make.  We  write  these  words  with  the 
fullest  recognition  of  the  solemn  responsibiUty 
which  rests  upon  non-combatant  penmen.  To 
demand  less  is  to  betray  our  belief  in  human  i"ight, 
to  deny  our  hope  of  a  cleaner  world.  It  is  to 
make  vain  tlic  sacrifices  of  oiu"  splendid  dead — 
an  intolerable  apostasy.  What  each  man  and 
woman  of  us  needs  is  to  make  or  renew  a  sacred 
decision  from  the  standpoint  of  there  being  in 
human  affairs  judge  by  human  standards  a  right 
and  a  wrong.  Substantially  we  stand  for  that 
right.  Our  judged  who  with  an  elaborate  assump- 
tion of  philosophic  calm  escapes  the  agony  of 
decision  and  ridesoff  on  phrases  about  the  common 
weakness  of  plaintiff  and  defendant  is  simply  an 
unjust  judge.  Tlie  issue  is  as  clear  as  eny  that 
has  ever  been  stated  in  a  human  quarrel,  and  de- 
mands a  definite  judgment.  That  judgment  needs 
adequate  sanction.     That  sanction  is — victory. 


January  13,  1916. 


I^AND     AND     WATER 


A    SONG    OF    THE    GUNS. 

By    gilbert    FRANKAU. 

3.-GUN  -  TEAMS. 

Their  rugs  are  sodden,  their  heads  are  down,  their  tails  are  turned  to  the  storm. 

(Would  you  know  them,  you  that  groomed  them,  in  the  sleek  fat  days  of  peace, 
^^■hen  the  tiles  rang  to  their  pawings  in  the  lighted  stalls  and  warm. 

Now  the  foul  clay  cakes  on  britching  strap  and  clogs  the  quick-release  ?  ) 

The  lilown  rain  stings,  there  is  never  a  star,  the  tracks  arc  nvcrs  of  slime, 
(Vou  must  harness-up  by  guesswork  with  a  failing  torch  for  light, 

[nstcp-dcep  in  unmade  standings  ;  for  it's  active-service  time  , 
And  our  resting  weeks  are  over,  and  we  move  the  guns  to-night.) 

The  iron  tyres  slither,  the  traces  sag,   their  blind  hooves  stumble  and  slide  ; 

They  are  war-worn,  they  are  weary,  soaked  with  sweat  and  sopped  with  rain. 
(You  must  hold  them,  you  must  help  them,  swing  your  lead  and  centre  wide 

\\'hcre  the  greasy  granite  pave  peters  out  to  squelching  drain.) 

There  is  shrapnel  bursting  a  mile  in  front  on  the  road  that  the  gims  must  take  : 
(You  are  nervous,  you  are  thoughtful,  you  are  shifting  in  your  scat. 

As  you  watch  the  ragged  feathers  flicker  orange,  flame  and  break) 
But  the  teams  are  pulling  steady  down  the  battered  village  street. 

You  have  shod  them  cold,  and  their  coats  are  long,  and  their  bellies  gray  with  the  mud  : 
They  have  done  with  gloss  and  polish,  but  the  fighting  heart's  unbroke  : 

We,  who  saw  them  hobbling  after  us  down  white  roads  flecked  with  blood, 
Tatient,  wondering  why  we'  left  them,  till  we  lost  them  in  the  smoke  ; 

Who  have  felt  them  shiver  between  our  knees,  when  the  shells  rain  black  from  the  skies 
When  the  bursting  terrors  find  us  and  the  lines  stampede  as  one ; 

Who  have  watched  the  pierced  hmbs  quiver  and  the  pain  in  stricken  eyes — 
Know  the  worth  of  humble  servants,  foolish-faithful  to  their  gun. 


N.B. — A  Song  of  the  Guns  will  be  continued  in  our  next  issue. 


INTERNED    IN    HOLLAND. 


By  a  Prisoner  of  War. 


THESE  notes  are  written  from  a  forgotten 
backwater  imtouciied  by  the  hurricane  of  war 
that  is  rending  the  world.  Hardly  had  we 
entered  the  fringe  of  the  storm  than  we  were 
swept  as  it  were  by  an  eddy  into  this  quiet  place.  A 
backwater  L  have  called  it.  Water  still  and  placid  lies 
all  around  us,  with  clustering  reeds  on  the  banks  and  in 
the  summer  great  water  lilies  white  and  yellow  lying 
lazily  upon  the  surface.  It  is  in  a  I^utch  fortress  that 
we  are  confined.  A  moated  fortress,  very  old  and  so  ill- 
designed  that  after  one  short  campaign  it  was  declared 
obsolete  and  since  then  has  been  used  only  a's  a  small 
depot  for  munitions.  It  was  hastily  ronstructed  to  form 
part  of  the  defences  against  the  invading  army  of  Louis 
XIV.,  but  it  bore  an  inglorious  part,  being  betrayed  by  its 
own  commandant  almost  before  a  shot  was  lired. 

Now  elm  trees,  seventy  feet  high,  dark  and  slender, 
grow  on  the  sunken  earth  ramparts.  They  are  grouped  in 
clusters  on  the  rhomboid  bastions  which  guarded  the 
corners' of  the  fort.  They  line  the  banks  which  form  a 
courtyard  containing  the  barn-like -ijiagazines  where  the 
garrison  is  housed.  Outside  this  courtyard,  surrounded 
by  a  double  fence  of  barbed  wire,  ^\c  rough  one-storied 
barracks  which  have  been  turned"'ihto  our  quarters. 
They  arc  comfortable  enough 'how,'  yet  woefully  inade- 
quate when  first  we  arrived  on' a  wet  day  in  mid-winter. 
It  is  not  good  for  men  to  be  shut  off  from-  the  world. 
The  universe  shrinks  to  the  tiny  island,  with  its  barbed 
wire  fences,  its  lights,  its  sentries,  all  ratlier, incongruous 
amid  this  peaceful  fertile  country,  and  eveain.the  over- 
grown forsaken  fortress.  The  mpadows  with  their 
clusters  of  puny  trees,  poplar,  willow  dhd  elm,' which  form 
an  uneven  fringe  around  the  hdrizbri,^  sfeerA'fo  us  remote 


as  the  stars,  though  in  measure  of  space  only  fifty  yards 
of  water  divide  them  from  us. 

It  is  a  somnolent  land  where  work  proceeds  method- 
ically and  leisurely.  It  is  strange  to  see  a  brown  sail 
rise  up  apparently  from  the  midst  of  the  fields,  for  the 
canals  have  low  banks  which  slope  by  an  imperceptible 
gradient  from  the  level  of  the  pasture.  Like  the  roads, 
the  banks  of  the  larger  canals  are  often  lined  with  trees 
whose  foliage  envelops  all  but  the  topmost  rigging  of 
the  barges.  The  country  is  very  flat,  as  though  at  some 
])eriod  a  smooth  and  mountainous  glacier  had  passed 
over  it,  sweeping  away  in  its  course  even  the  smallest 
hillocks.  There  are  few  hedges,  but  the  meadows  arc 
divided  by  waterways  or  large  ditches.  There  is  no 
land  within  view  under  plough.  It  is  all  pasture,  and 
everywhere  are  herds  of  black  and  white  cattle.  In  the 
evening  it  can  become  very  still  ;  still  as  the  depths  of  a 
great  forest,  and  in  certain  lights  the  trees  frown  upon 
us   like   giants   awakened  and   displeased. 

.  The  effects  upon  one  are  curiously  paradoxical. 
They  are  both  narrowing  and  broadening.  Narrowing 
because  a  small  community  can  be  shaken  to  the  founda- 
tions by  incidents  that  would  pass  unnoticed  in  the 
world  beyond.  One  is  apt  to  fall  into  the  smallness,  the 
fiissiness,  the  exaggerated  self-consciousness  of  dwellers 
in  islands  and  small  countries  which  hold  hard  to  their 
peculiar  characteristics.  Yet  it  is  broadening,  for  the 
mind  becomes  contemplative,  as  the  mind  of  an  Oriental 
to  whom  time  is  nothing,  to  whom  it  matters  not  whether 
a  problem  be  solved  in  a  year,  a  week  or  a  day.  Here 
one  ponders  over  past  experience  and  the  jumbled, 
unorganised  store  of  knowledge  can  be  set  straight.  The 
vital  can  be  separated  from  the  trivial.      One  can  learn 


I"? 


Land    a  X  d    \\-  A  T  E  R  . 


January  13,  iQiG. 


to  recognise  root  principles.  Reading  and  experiences  ; 
they  clashed  in  chaos.  It  was  all  disopdercd.  The  world 
knew  no  laws,  oxporiment  led  to  no  conclusions.  I", very- 
thing  seemed  haphazard.  The  atmosphere,  damp  and 
heavy ;  the  surroiuidings,  the  circumstances ;  throw 
npon  us  a  cloak  of  apathy  enveloping  and  stifling.  Life 
passes  monotonously  ;  there  is  little  to  distinguisii  one 
day  from  another.  p:vcr>onc  has  sunk  into  his  own 
groove,  getting  up  at  the  same  hour,  eating  the  same 
food,  playing  tennis  with  tlie  same  people.  It  is  wonder- 
ful how  closely  each  one  knows  the  habits  of  the  other. 
I  suppose  our  conversation  is  only  so  much  repetition. 

There  are  plans  of  escape  ever  being  discussed. 
During  the  simimer  ten  aviators  who  had  been  at  Gronin- 
gen,  where  the  men  of  our  luckless  brigade  are  interned, 
gave  in  their  parole  and  were  sent  here.  It  was  amusing, 
though  at  the  same  time  rather  pathetic  to  hear  them 
turn  over  and  discuss,  at  first  with  confidence  which 
soon  melted  away,  plans  that  we  had  thrashed  out  and 
rejected  long  ago".  The  desire  to  escape  expresses  itself 
in  very  varj-ing  degree  of  intensi"t\'.  NVTiile  most  are  ever 
ready  to  seize  or  to  make  opportunities,  they  do  not  allow 
the  subject  to  be  for  ever  in  their  minds  and  on  their  lips  : 
with  a  few  it  has  become  almost  an  obsession.  Two  of 
our  number,  aided  by  some  luck,  managed  to  get  away, 
but  since  then  several  weak  points  have  been  rendered 
impregnable.  There  was  great  activity  for  some  days, 
more  lights,  more  barbed  wire,  possible  cover  cut  away 
and  a  doubled  patrol  on  the  other  side  of  the  moat. 

Schemes  of  Escape. 

Then  a  scheme  of  escape,  conceived  soon  after  our 
arrival  but  abandoned  after  two  abortive  attempts,  was 
revived    and    begun    on    more    thorough    and     better 
organised  lines.     A  tunnel  was  projected  from  one  of  the 
sleeping  rooms,  under  a  brick  patii  outside,  through  the 
earth  rampart  to  the  moat-.     \\c  dug  out  a  large  hole, 
running  the  whole  length  of  the  room,  packing  the  earth 
in  a  space  nine  inches  high,  between  the  floor  and  the 
concrete  foundation.     Into  this  reser\-oir,  we  stored  the 
earth  from  the  tunnel  proper.     We  picked  through  the 
brick  wall  of  the  foundation  and  mined  six  feet  deep 
below  the  path.     Lower  we  could  not  go  for  already  the 
earth  was  wet.     We  had  cut  nearly  half  fray  through  the 
rampart,  before  by  merest  chance  a  Dutch  servant  dis- 
covered the  trap  door  under  the  linoleum  and  found  what 
lay  beneath.     The  work  in  the  narrow  stuffy  tunnel  had 
become  so  hard  that  no  one  dug  for  longer  than  fifteen 
minutes  at  a  time.     The  air  was  so  bad  that  no  candle 
would  stay  ahght  and  we  worked  by  the  light  of  an  electric 
torch.     There  could  be  no  darkness  more  blinding  and 
more  intense,  than  of  that  long  hole,  so  narrow  that 
one  could  hardly  turn  from  side  to  side.     There  was  no 
light  from  the  entrance  for  we  had  curved  the  passage 
to  avoid  the  roots  of  a  tree.     The  tunnel  had  meant  more 
to  us,  even  than  the  path  to  freedom.     In  a  life  of  idle- 
ness or  at  the  best,  of  work  which  could  be  done  when  and 
how  we  wished,   this  was  a  definite  task,   regular  and 
insistent.     When  it  was  discovered  pur  one  occupation 
was  gone.     We  had  only  old  amusements  and  hobbies 
to  fail  back  on. 

In  the  winter  we  play  football  in  a  disused  magazme 
with  boarded  floor.  It  is  a  fast,  exciting  game,  in  which 
shoes  are  worn,  and  the  doors  at  each  end  are  the  goals. 
In  the  spring  two  cement  tennis  courts  were  laid  down, 
and  they  have  pro\aded  the  staple  amusement  and 
exercise  "ever  since.  Three  times  a  week  there  are  short 
route  marches  under  heavy  guard.  Occasional  leave 
on  parole  is  granted.  At  "first  it  was  f(»r  one  day  once 
in  about  six  weeks,  for  it  was  granted  only  to  one  officer 
at  a  time.  Then  the  Dutch  authorities  grew  gradually 
more  generous,  and  now  three  days  a  month  are  allowed. 
Those  days  away  from  the  fort',  usually  spent  at  the 
Hague,  halve  the  irksomeness  of  our  prison. 

The  newspapers  arrive  every  morning,  only  a  day 
late.  Monday,  when  there  are  no  papers,  J^undays  and 
Tuesdays  with  no  Knglish  mail,  produce  a  faint  irritation, 
and  remind  us  that  all  days  are  not  the  same.  There  are 
plenty  of  books  but  very  little  serious  reading  is  done. 
Almost  every  profession,  and  more  than  a  dozen  public 
schools  have  contributed  to  our  number.  The  majority 
has  been  at  one  time  or  another  in  the  Army  or  Navy 
(chiefly  the  latter)  for  we  are  nominally  a  naval  brigade. 


The  dominant  characteristic  of  the  group  is  the  diversity 
of  the  units.  The  days  do  not  vary  and  nothing  happens. 
It  is  lucky  that  among  individuals  is  variety  of  outlook, 
interests,  experience  and  temperament.  A  few  senior 
officers  have  their  own  rooms,  but  for  most  there  is  no 
privacy  possible,  except  in  summer,  or  at  least  when  it 
is  fine — on  most  days  it  rains— when  one  can  find  a 
sheltered  comer  of  the  ramparts. 

Loss  of  Liberty. 

One  feels  the  loss  of  liberty  when  at  sunset,  or  in 
summer  time  at  seven  o'clock,  the  Dutch  soldiers,  search- 
ing every  nook  and.  cranny,  sweep  us  inside  the  barbed 
wire  fences  which  enclose  our  quarters.  Ne\er  before 
has  the  shortening  of  the  days  meant  so  much.  No  one 
realised  how  rapidly  the  days  of  autumn  draw  in.  The 
lights  are  lit  at  su'ndown  ;  their  strong  rays  shining  on 
the  clustering  trees,  turn  the  leaves  almost  to  snow*  white, 
and  the  effect  is  strangely  picturesque.  Tor  miles  round 
can  be  seen  the  glare  of  the  blaze  of  light. 

It  is  pleasant  on  warm  days  to  lie  on  the  bank  almost 
on  a  level  with  tlie  moat.     A  dense  forest  of  marine  weed 
grows  in    the  clear  water  and  .shoals  of  small  fish  thread 
their  way  through  the  dark  vegetation.     Further  out  the 
water  is  "blue  as  the  sky.     To  the  south  lie  the  spires  and 
chimneys  of  Gondar,  rising  above  trees  transmuted  by 
distance  from  green  to  misty  grey.     To  the  north  there 
is  a  meadow  of  vivid  pasture,  bounded  by  a  bank  of  silver 
willows  and  deep    coloured    poplars.     It  appears  like  a 
jagged  bar  of  green  shades,  light  and  dark,  suspended 
between  the  blue  of  water  and  sky.       In  April  and  Ma> 
the  flowers  turned  the  fields  to  sheets  of  vivid  yellow 
and  delicate  white,  covering  the  green  like  a  thin  veil  ; 
the  orchards  in  the  farms  near  the  fort  were  a  cloud 
of  pink  blossom.     How  keenly  we  enjoyed  the  first  days 
of  spring,  even  in  March  it  was  often  warm  enough  to 
lie  in  the  sun,  looking  forward  in  expectation  of  summer. 
Even  this  life  has  certain  compensations.     One  can 
wear  what  one  likes  ;  usually  flannels  and  an  old  coat 
in  the  day  time  and  uniform  in  tht-  evening.     The  absence 
of  women  and  the  peculiar  frankness  of  the  gun-rooms 
where  most  of  us  have  served,  enables  candid  and  out- 
spoken discussion.     It  is  a  Bohemian  society,  in  spite  of 
several    restraints,    some    obviously    necessary,    others 
rather  needless,   imposed  by   the   Dutch   commandant. 
Such  long  and  intimate  association  is  a  hard  tc'-ting. 


Rumble  of  Distant  Guns. 

It  is  strange  that  in  this  old  fort  amid  peaceful 
meadows,  we  can  hear  on  still  days,  faint  in  the  distance, 
the  rumble  of  guns.  Very  plain  was  this  shadow  of 
reality  during  the  great  actions  of  the  war  ;  at  the  times 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  the  attack  on  Hill  60  and  the  advance 
in  October.  It  is  little  more  than  a  long-drawn  murmur, 
a  sound  which  one  feels  rather  than  hears,  and  that  only 
when  the  wind  is  still.  Now  winter  is  again  upon  us, 
and  the  days  are  very  short.  The  leaves  fell  rapidly  in 
the  first  days  of  November.  They  lay  all  around,  wet, 
hectic  and  battered  ;  too  sodden  to  be  stirred  into  motion  ^ 
by  the  wind.  For  long,  thin  yellow  foliage  clung  to  the  » 
poplars  and  elms,  but  the  chestnuts  which  bloomed  early 
in  the  spring  were  in  autumn  withered  and  bare  before 
their  time.  Sometimes  the  da\s  were  brilliantly  fine 
and  the  sun  was  hot.  Then  the  trees  with  their  golder 
colouring  were  half-hidden  by  shimmering  mists.  Now 
gales  of  wind  and  rain  sweep  for  days  over  the  open 
country.  It  is  a  drenching  rain.  The  ditches  and  canals 
rise  till  they  are  on  a  level  with  tlieir  banks.  The  meadows 
are  marshy,  the  roads  rutted  and  impassable  ;  the  path 
round  the  ramparts  is  drenched  and  slippery.  Some- 
times the  wind  is  still  and  the  sky  is  grey  and  lowering. 
The  sun  cannot  shine  and  the  horizon  is  obscured  by  low 
banks  of  fog. 

There  is  a  single  railway  line  between  Utrecht  and 
J.eyden  which  passes  quite  close  to  the  fort.  The  trains 
rattle  by  every  day,  well  up  to  time,  an  irritating  reminder 
of  the  world  from  which  we  are  shut  off.  Some  of  us 
would  rather  there  were  in  view  no  roads,  no  railway,  nc 
houses,  but  only  a  sweeping  expanse  of  deserted  meadow. 
Yet  perhaps  these  things  arc  good,  lest  we  resign  ourselves 
more  and  more  to  this  tiny  island  which  for  the  time 
constitutes  our  world.  1 


Printed  bv  J.  G    Hammond  &  Co.,  Limitkd,  32  36,  Fleet  I.,anc.  Loiuton.  E.C. 


January  13,  igi6. 

BRITISH 
RED  CROSS, 

The  Society  which 
brings  comfort  and 
healing  to  our  gillant 
soldiers,  is  in  urgent 
need  of  funds.  Send 
whatever  you  ca 
spare  to — 

The    Briti  h    Red 

Cross,    Room    99, 

83PallMalI.S.W. 


LAND      AND      WATER. 

TIELOCKEN 
BURBERRY 

Selected  by  LORD  KITCHENER  as  the 
most  serviceable  weather-resisting  cam- 
paigning coat,  after  a  critical  examination 
of  other  models;  and  worn  during  his 
recent  visits  to  the    Front. 

THE  TIELOCKEN  Patent 
coat  has  overlapping  fronts 
which  completely  cover  the 
most  vulnerable  parts  of  the 
body,  providing,  from  the 
throat  to  the  knees,  a  double 
safeguard  of  the  greatest  value 
during  prolonged  exposure  to 
heavy   rain   or   biting  wind. 

£ASY        ADJUSTMENT       is 

assured  by  doing  away  with 
the  usual  buttons  and  replacing 
them  with  a  single  strap-and- 
buckle,  which  enables  the  coat 
to  be  fastened  or  taken  off 
with   the   utmost   expedition. 

THE  SKIRTS  are  so  arranged 
that  it  is  impossible  for  the 
legs  to  be  exposed,  thus  ob- 
viating the  difficulty  of  keeping 
the  lower  part  of  the  body  dry 
in  stormy  weather. 

Tielocken  coats  provide  double  protection 
over  the  vital  parts  of  the  body  where  it  is 
most  needed.  The  overlapping  fronts  keeping 
the  chest  and  legs  safeguarded  against  bitingly 
cold  winds  or  driving  rain.  There  is  no  pos- 
sibility of  these  fronts  blowing  open  and  letting 
in  unwelcome  draughts  and  damp,  and  so  the 
Tielocken  models  are  the  most  perfectlvprotective 
wraps  imaginable  or  .  b/ainablc." 

—BADMINTON   MAGAZINE. 


Burberry    War    Kit 

Including  The  Burherry,  Inrantry  or  Cavalry 
Patterns  ;  Uniforms  in  Tenace  Whipcord,  Trench- 
Warms,  Airman  Kit,  Great  Coats,  British  Warms, 
Caps,  Shirts,  Puttees,  Sleeping  Bags,  and  every 
detail  of  Service  Dress  and  Hquipment. 

READY     FOR     USE 

or  to  measure  in  2  to  4  days. 


THE  TIELOCKEN  BURBERRY— Infantry  or  Cavalry  Pattern— i.  made  in  Burberrys' 
famous  wet-  and  wind-proof  Gabardine,  lined  Pioofed  Wool,  Camel  Fleece,  or 
Proofed  Felt — equals  Fleece  in  warmth  yet  is  lest  than  half  its  weight  and  substance. 


ILLUSTRATED   MILITARY 
CATALOGUE  POST  FREE. 

Many  1915  Civilian  Top-coats  and  SuiU  as 
as  Ladies'  Coats  and  Gowns  are  being  sold  durins 
January  at  ONE-HALF  USUAL  PRICES.  Full  list  of 
bargains  on  request. 


BURBERRYS 


HAYMARKET    S.W.    LONDON 

Bd.  Malesherbes  PARIS  &  Provincial  Agents 


68^ 


LAND      AND       W  A  T  E  R  . 


January  13,  1916. 


The  Prince  of  Wales  came  home  on  a  few  days'  leave  last 
week,  Prince  Albert  having  come  up  to  Buckingham 
Palace  to  meet  him  in  London.  The  appointment  of 
H.R.H.  to  the  Chairmanship  of  the  Committee  of  War 
Pensions  is  in  every  way  an  excellent  one.  The  Prince 
while  in  France  has  gained  the  confidence  of  all  ranks, 
and  the  fact  that  he  will  be  at  the  head  of  this  difficult 
and  onerous  work  will  be  taken  as  a  guarantee  of  straight- 
forward and  generous  dealing.  Pensions  Committees 
in  the  past  have  not  altogether  enjoyed  a  good  reputation, 
the  tendency  having  been  to  allow  the  duties  to  fall  into 
the  hands  of  one  or  two  individuals,  who  have  often 
been  of  the  cast-iron  red-tape  type. 

Lady  Dorothy  Bhgli,  whose  marriage  with  Mr.  D.  S.  Peploe, 
loth  Hussars,  will'  shortly  be  celebrated,  is  the  only 
daughter  of  the  Earl  and  Countess  of  Darnley.  Cobham 
Hall,  the  family  seat  near  Gravesend,  is  one  of  the  most 
beautiful  places  within  easy  reach  of  London.  In  a 
favourable  summer  the  rhododendrons,  when  in  full 
blossom,  are  a  sight  once  seen  never  to  be  forgotten. 
Lady  Dorothy's  first  cousin  is  Baroness  Clifton  of 
Leighton  Bromswold,  in  her  own  right,  while  her  elder 
brother  is  Lord  Clifton  of  Rathmore,  for  the  Blighs 
enjoyed  two  baronies  of  CUfton,  one  inherited  by  marriage 
in  1713  and  the  other  conferred  in  1721. 

The  rescue  of  Lord  Montagu  of  Beaulieu  was  miraculous,  and 
it  is  to  be  hoped  that  he  will  be  able  to  shake  off  the  effects 
of  the  severe  fatigue  and  shock  through  which  he  has 
passed.  Like  Clivc,  he  must  feel  himself  reserved  for 
great  things,  and  he  will  be  encouraged  thereto  by  the 
tributes  of  affection  which  were  written  in  several  papers 
and  by  more  than  one  friend.  In  some  of  these  it  struck 
one  that  unnecessary  emphasis  was  laid  on  his  receiving 
the  Kaiser  at  Beaulieu  as  an  English  gentleman  should 
do.  After  all  it  was  only  what  one  might  e.xpect  from 
a  descendant  of  the  "  bold  Buccleuch,"  who,  according 
to  tradition,  put  Queen  Bess  in  her  place — a  much  more 
ditticult  job  one  would  think. 

It  was  the  father  of  the  "bold  Buccleuch,  "  also  Walter 
Scott,  who  won  the  reputation  of  being  "  a  man  of  rare 
qualities,  wise/true,  stout  and  modest  "—  qualities  and 
attributes  which  are  evidently  in  the  blood. 

Sir  Alexander  Henderson,  by  assuming  the  title  of  Lord 
Faringdon,  is  laying  up  trouble  for  his  correspondents, 
many  of  whom  will  invariably  spell  it  with  two  "  r's  " 
Farringdon  Street  being  so  much  more  familiar  Not 
far  from  Farringdon  Street  is  the  home  of  that  famous 
great  daily,  the  Standard,  the  full  control  of  which  Sir 
Alexander  took  over  only  a  few  months  ago,  after  it 
had  passed  through  troublous  times.  Already  it  has 
responded  to  the  new  and  healthier  influences,  for  on 
all  sides  one  hears  good  spoken  of  it,  so  it  should  only 
be  a  matter  of  time  for  its  old  cjlories  to  be  restored. 

Six  new  peerages  were  created  on  the  first  of  this  month 
During  the  last  fifteen  years,  since  the  death  of  Queen 
Victoria,  117  peerages  have  been  made.  Had  this  rate 
of  creation  been  maintained  say  since  James  I.  came  to 
the  Throne,  the  Roll  of  the  Lords  Temporal  would  have 
included  about  2,500  names  instead  of  700  as  at  present. 
The  bumper  crop  of  new  coronets  occurred  in  1906,  when 
the  total  reached  17,  in  1905  and  again  in  1910  there 
were  14,  and  in  191 1  13.  As  against  these  figures 
it  is  interesting  to  notice  that  in  the  Diamond  Jubilee 
year  there  were  only  six  new  peers.    , 

In  that  year  of  Jubilee  twenty-one  baronetcies  and  218  knight- 
hoods were  conferred,  but  in  1911  the  accolade  was 
bestowed  on  351  worthy  men,  whereas  the  record  year 
for  baronetcies  was  1905,  when  eight  and  twenty  gentlemen 
were  granted  hereditary  honours.  During  the  fifteen 
years  since  1901  the  number  of  new  baronets  has  been 


273  and  of  new  .knights  2,723.     For  these  remarkable 
figures  I  am  indebted  to  Debrett's  peerage. 

The  baronetcy  of  Wake,  which  has  just  passed  from  father 
to  son,  stands  eighteenth  on  the  Official  Roll,  having 
been  bestowed  on  December  5th,  1621  ;  the  premier 
baronetcy,  that  of  Sir  Hickman  Bacon,  was  founded 
just  ten  years  previously  -in  i6ti.  It  is  accepted  that 
the  Wakes  of  Courteenhall  derive  descent  from  the 
Last  of  the  Saxons,  though  it  was  only  in  comparatively 
recent  times  that  the  famous  baptismal  name  of  Herewald 
was  revived,  Charles  and  William  having  for 
generations  been  the  favourite  first  name.  In  the 
seventeenth  century  there  was  an  Isaac  Wake,  which 
sounds  incongruous,,  and  the  sixth  baronet  was  Sir 
Charles  Wake- Jones,  a  Miss  Jones  having  brought 
to  the  family  as  her  dowry  the  manor  of  Courteenhall, 
among  other  possessions. 

It  really  seems  as  if  London  has  at  last  reached  the  limit  of 
war  restrictions  ;  the  streets  can  hardly  be  darker  at 
night  and  unless  all  alcohol  is  to  be  stopped  because, 
broadly  speaking,  one  per  10,000  of  its  inhahitants  is  un- 
able to  keep  sober,  notwithstanding  the  present  obstacles 
between  drinker  and  drink,  it  looks  as  if  there  can  be  no 
further  interference  in  this  direction.  The  restaurants 
continue  to  be  better  patronised  than  ever  ;  Prince's 
which  is  in  Piccadilly,  and  therefore  right  in  the  very 
heart  of  things,  seems  always  full.  There  is  no  pleasanter 
place  for  a  quiet  luncheon  than  its  grill  room. 

Sarah  Bernhardt  is  receiving  her  usual  great  welcome  in 
London,  Oueen  Alexandra  and  Queen  Amehe  being 
present  on  her  opening  day.  Besides  the  huge  audience 
inside  the  Coliseum,  a  crowd  of  equally  devoted  admirers 
waited  patiently  for  the  great  actress  outside  to  see  her 
arrive.  Mme.  ISernhardt  presented  I.es  Cathedrales,  by 
M.  Eugene  Moraud,  with  music  by  Gabriel  Pierno,  ht'r 
own  part  being  the  masterpiece.  The  singing  of  the 
Marseillaise  at  the  end  rose  into  a  regular  ovation. 

I  am  told  by  one  who  was  present  that  New  Year's  Eve  at 
the  Piccadilly  Hotel  was  a  wonderful  sight.  Casali 
had  some  delightful  table  decorations  in  the  shape  of 
china  British  bull  dogs  guarding  Union  Jacks  which 
fetched   everybody.     These  were  delightful. 

The  National  Portrait  Society  will  hold  an  exhibition  at  the 
Grosvenor  Gallery  about  the  middle  of  February,  and 
arrangements  are  already  in  progress  to  secure  it  its 
full  meed  of  success.  Even  in  war  time  it  is  an  event 
which  an  increasing  number  of  people  would  be  sorry 
to  lose,  and  the  opening  day  is  always  an  interesting 
and  amusing  occasion. 

Sidmouth  is  among  the  first  favourites  of  South  Coast  watering 
places  this  winter.  There  is  a  charm  about  the  place 
which  draws  back  people  year  after  year.  Tucked 
away  in  the  beautiful  Vale  of" the  Sid  it  is  sheltered  and 
warm,  and  now  that  it  has  excellent  hotels,  the  number 
of  its  annual  visitors  has  increased  greatly.  Among  the 
hotels  the  Fortfield  occupies  the  front  rank  for  it  is  so 
comfortable  and  delightfully  situat(>d.  It  overlooks 
the  sea  from  which  it  is  only  separated  by  the  famous 
cricket  ground,  one  of  the  most  picturesque  in  England. 
The  hotel  is  as  it  were  the  Society  hub  of  the  town,  for 
its  guests  find  that  every  place 'they  visit  is  in  close 
proximity  to  it.  Sidmouth  this  winter  has  done  better 
than  ever,  though,  it  always  regards  the  early  spring  as 
its  peculiar  season.  "Hermes. 


NEW  LIGHTING  REGULATIONS.— Motorist.s,  whose  cars  are 
fitted  with  C.A.V.  Side  lamps,  models,  "  E.S.,"  "  G.S.,"  "  E.S.," 
or  "  B.S.,"    should  write  for  a  pair  of  perforated  discs  to'c.  A.  Van- 

dervell  and  Co.     (Ltd.),   Electrical  Engineers,   Acton,  London    W 

THE  CAR  LIGHTING  SPECI.\LISTS.— (Advt.) 


684 


TannsDAT,  Janpary  20,  1916. 


LAND    &   ^?C^ATER 


K:>^!^^:.':rt»v.*r 


m. 


M 


■.■^3Jr 


'^■: 


Bg  Louis  Raemaekeri. 


Drawn  e.> 


for  "Land  and   Water." 


AHASUERUS    RETURNS. 

Once  I  drove  the  Christ  out  of  my  door ;    now  I  am  doomed   to  walk  from  the  Northern  seas  to  the 
Southern,  from  the  Western  shores  to  the  Eastern  mountains  asking  for  Peace,  and  none  will  give  it 

to  me.— Prom  the  Legend  of  "The  Waaderiag  Jew." 


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January  20,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATliR 


CONTROL    OF    THE    LEVANT. 

By     HILAIRE      BELLOC. 


THE  mere  strategics  of  war  are  often 
compared  by  a  very  loose  simile  to 
chess.  Indeed  the  simile  is  so  loose 
that  it  is  exceedingly  misleading,  and 
has  caused  too  many  students  of  military  history 
to  state  in  merely  mathematical  term  5  problems 
which  are  essentially  organic  and  human. 

But  there  is  at  least  this  great  point  in  com- 
mon .between  the  strategics  of  a  widely-developed 
campaign  and  a  game  of  chess  ;  that  not  the  best 
player  in  the  world  can  see  more  than  a  few  moves 
ahead.  In  other  words,  there  is  in  both  forms  of 
effort  the  factor  which  may  be  called  "  uncon- 
trolled "  development.  In  both  things  one  may 
say  that  the  development  of  each  situation  in  turn 
is  ultimately  controlled,  because  each  is  ultimately 
created  by  the  human  will  acting  upon  certain 
known  materials.  But  everybody  knows  that 
when  you  play  chess  you  arrive  at  one  situation 
after  another,  which  is  the  product  of  two  opposing 
wills  and  never,  or  hardly  ever,  entirely  foreseen 
by  either  of  those  wills. 

Now  there  has  arisen  in  the  mere  strategics 
of  the  Levant  (I  mean  by  "mere"  stategics  the 
strategic  problems  there  presented  as  distinct 
from  the  political  problems  intermixed  with  them) 
a  situation  which  many  are  beginning  to  realise, 
but  which  certainly  neither  the  enemy  nor  the 
Allies  intended  a  short  while  ago.  Briefly,  this 
situation  may  be  deiined  as  "  the  control  of  the 
Levant  through  the  possession  by  the  Allies  of 
interior  lines." 

It  is  an  exceedingly  important  point  in  the 
mere  theory  of  this  war.  It  may  well  become  in 
the  next  few  weeks  a  capital  point  in  the  practice 
of  the  war. 

Not  that  the  great  war  can  possibly  be 
decided  south  of  the  Danube  or  east  of  the  Adriatic, 
but  that  subsidiary  operations  morally  damaging 
to  the  enemy  or  to  ourselves,  and  certainly  creat- 
ing for  either  party  a  drain  in  men  and  material, 
may  develop  here  in  such  a  fashion  as  to  affect  all 
the  rest  of  the  war  ;  just  as  the  Peninsula  frorn 
1808  onwards  affected  the  fortune  of  Napoleon, 
though  that  fortune  was  not  decided  until  Leipsic, 
nor  e\'en  given  a  downward  direction  until  the 
Russian  blunder  of  1812. 

In  order  to  appreciate  what  is  meant  by  this 
formula  "  the  strategic  control  of  the  Levant  by 
the  Allies  through  their  possession  of  interior  lines," 
I  will,  with  my  readers'  leave,  begin  at  the  begin- 
ning. For  though  everybody  knows  the  elements 
of  so  simple  a  statement,  the  more  fundamental 
one's  origins  in  a  description  the  clearer  the 
result. 

To  "  possess  interior  lines  "  means  to  be  so 
situated  that  one  can  concentrate  upon  a  suc- 
cession of  decisive  points  more  rapidly  than  one's 
opponent. 

The  crudest  and  simplest  example  of  course,  is 
the  position  of  forces  within  an  ample  semicircle, 
the  communications  within  which  are  of  the  same 
type  and  number  as  the  communications  outside. 
Supposing  there  is  a  man  commanding  a  force 
from  the  Centre  A  and  he  has  to  deal  with  an 

[Copyright  in  America  by  "  The  New  York  American."] 


enemy  in  equal  numbers  who  must  attack  him  at 
some  point  of  the  half-circle  B  C  D,  it  is  clear  that 
the  Genetal  Officer  in  command  at  A  will  be  able 


B 

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to  concentrate  against  such  an  attack  more  rapidly 
than  his  enemy  will  ;  supposing  always  that  his 
.enemy  and  he  have  the  same  sort  of  communica- 
tions at  their  disposal — equally  good  roads  and 
railways,  equally  ample  rolling  stock  and  all  the 
rest  of  it. 

Any  movement  that  the  enemy  with,  let  us  sa}', 
his  headquarters  at  E,  makes  against  the  semi- 
circle lines  BCD  involves  greater  distances  and 
therefore  presumably  a  greater  expenditure  of 
time  than  is  the  case  with  his  opponent  at  A. 
The  General  Officer  in  command  at  E  is  manoeuv- 
ring to  attack  A  somewhere  along  the  line  BCD. 
He  can  only  send  his  forces  from  place  to  place  by 
following  the  outer  lines  parallel  to  the  semicircle 
BCD.  He  sends  orders  for  instance,  to  his  force 
at  e,  e,  e  to  concentrate  at  F  and  .there  deliver  their 
attack  upon  A's  force  within  the  semicircle.  A  can 
gather  a  similar  force  in  much  shorter  time,  getting 
his  men  from  a,  a,  a.  Because,  in  a  number  of 
concentric  or  parallel  curves  the  inner  ones  will 
always  be  shortei'  than  the  outer  ones.  Con- 
versely, if  A  takes  the  initiative  he  can  gather 
his  men  to  surprise  E  at  such  a  point  as  F  more 
rapidly  than  E  can  gather  his  men  to  meet  that 
surprise.  And,  in  general,  any'.  Commander 
possesses  essentially  interior  lines  when  he  has 
the  advantage  of  rapidity  in  concentration  against 
any  threatened  point  over  his  opponent. 

Therefore  the  above  rule  of  thumb  text-book 
type  of  diagram  to  explain  what  is  meant  by 
"  interior  lines  "  requii-es  a  modification,  par- 
ticularh'  important  in  modern  times. 

We  take  it  for  granted  in  that  elementary 
sketch  that  time  can  be  measured  by  distance. 
But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this  never  has  been  quite 
accurately  the  case,  and  in  modern  times  with 
the  use  of  the  railway  and  of  the  steamship  it  is 
hardlv  ever  the  case.  In  the  old  days  wheu  men 
marched   bv  roads,  when  good  roads  were  few 


LAND      AND      WAT  E  R 


Janj'ary  20,  1916 


and  when  most  nations  had  the  same  advantages  in 
them,  when  transport  by  sea  was  precarious  and 
dependent  upon  tlie  wind,  it  was  legitimate,  as  a 
rough  rule  of  thumb,  to  measure  the  distance  by 
the  land  map  and  call  that  man  the  possessor  of' 
interior  linos  whose  conmiunirations  to  the  various- 
parts  ot  his  front  were  the  shorter  in  mere  miles. 
it  is  the  method  Napier  uses  in  his  diagrams.  It 
was  the  ob\'ious  one  for  his  time.  To-day  this 
is  not  the  case.  Districts  differ  widely  in  the 
amount  of  railway  Accommodation  they  have-and  ' 
a  railway  has  many-fold  the  capacity  of  a  road. 
They  also  differ  very  widely  even  in  road  accommo- 
dation. Again,  railway's  having  grown' ixp  mainly 
on  commercial  lines  and  not  for  strategic  reasons 
have  very  different  strategic'  values."  Again, 
the  amount  of  rolling  stock,  lacking  which  mobility 
is  at  once  affected — is  an  important  element  in 
the  problem.  Since  the  possession  of  interior 
lines  and  all  the  multiplications  of  power  given  by 
such  a  possession  lies  in  the  factor  of  time,  and 
not  of  distance,  it  very  often  happens  under 
modern  conditions  that  one  party  to  a  struggle 
possesses  interior  lines  although  on  the  map  they 
seem  to  be  exterior.  We  have  had  a  tremendous 
instance  of  this  on  a  large  scale  in  the  great  Polish 
salient  originally  in  "the  hands  of  the  Russian 
armies. 


you  saw  along  the  Austro-German  lines  a  whole 
railway  system  as  in  Sketch  III,  whereby  the 
great  trunk  lines  A  A  A  could  bring  up  troops 
and  materials  from  the  bases  within  Austria 
and  Gerpiany  to  the  front.  While  all  along 
'then-  positions  at  that  front  a  lateral  line  B  B  B 
with  feeders  at  C  C  C"  going  out   from  it,  per- 


il yoii  merely  drew  the  position  of  the 
Russian  armies  on  the  map  in  the  earlier  phase 
of  the  war  you  saw  them  occupying  a  great  bow 
from  East  iPrussia  to  the  Carpathians,  as  on  the 
line  A  A  A  on  Sketch  II,  and  faced  b\'  German 
and  Austrian  forces  as  along  the  line  B  B  B ;  the 
situation  nearly,  but  not  exactly,  corresponding  to 
the  old  political  frontier  which  bulged  out  between 
Russian  Poland  and  the  German  and  Austrian 
Empire.  But  the  Russians  did  not  possess 
"  interior  lines "  at  all,  as  they  appeared  to 
do  upon  the  map,  because  their  communications 
were  so  unsuited  to  concentration.  If,  instead 
of  considering  the  curve  of  the  forces,  \ou  were 
to  consider  the  nature  of  the  communications. 


mitted  a  very  rapid  concentration  at  any  desitea 
point.  The  Russians  on  the  other  side  Had 
only  three  divergent  railways  in  the  fashion 
of  the  arrows  D  D  D  to  help  them  and  no  trans- 
verse hues  at  all,  such  as  the  dotted  line  e  e  repre- 
sents. They  could  not  concentrate  upon  any 
one  point  without  either  going  right  back  to  dis>' 
tant  raiKvay  centres  where  the  lines  converged,  or 
marching  their  msn  across  country.  Therefor^ 
when  you  represent  the  problem  in  terms  of  time  the 
Austro-Germans  could  always  concentrate  such 
and  such  a  number  of  men  at  such  and  such  a 
point  upon  the  front  in  much  less  time  than  the 
Russians.  Therefore,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  on 
the  map  the  Austro-Germans  held  the  outside  of  a 
semicircle,  they  were,  in  fact,  "  possessed  of 
interior  lines." 

When  we  have  once  grasped  the  truth  that 
the  possession  of  interior  lines  is  an  advantage 
measured  in  terms  of  time,  and  is  an  advantage  in 
mobility  alone,  we  can  appreciate  in  how  very 
high- a  degree  the  present  phase  of  the  war  in  the 
Levant,  properly  handled,  favours  the  Allies. 

The  Allies  at  this  moment  possess  in  that  field 
of  action  (defining  the  Levant  as  the  countries 
bordering  the  Eastern  Mediterranean)  three 
formidable  elements  of  advantage  in  mobility, 
each  one  of  which  gives  them  the  possession  of 
interior  Hues  :  that  is,  the  power  of  concentrating 
at  any  point  of  action  with  greater  mobility  than 
the  enemy. 

These  three  factors  arc  : — 

(i)  Conhguration  of  the  coast. 

(2)  The  monopoly  of  sea  communication. 

(3)  The  lack  of  homogeneity  and  the  lack  of 
good  communications  upon  the  enemy's  exterior 
lines.  '"''■ 

The   following   Sketch    IV  will  show    what   I 
mean. 

(i)  A  mere  glance  at  the  outline  of  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  sliows  that  if  that  Sea  from  the 
Straits   of   Otranto   to   the   shores   of   Syria   be 


January  20,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WA  T  E  R 


regarded  as  the  field  of  operations  of  the  Allies  ; 
whale  all;  the  shaded  portion  up  to  the  Suez  Canal 
be  regarded  as  the  enemy  field  of  operation,  the 
Allies  possess  in  mere  geographical  outline  a  very 
high  example  of  interior  lines.  If  we  appreciate 
that  action  between  the  two  opponents  must 
develop  near  the  sea-coast  (where  it  is  emphasised 
by:  a  thicker  line)  we  see  at  once  the  relatively 
short  distances  through  which  an  Allied  con- 
centration must,  pass  compared'  with  those 
through  which  an  enemy  concentration  must 
pass.  An  enemy  going  right  round  by  land  to 
attempt  an  attack  upon  the  Suez  Canal,  for 
instance,  or,  profiting  by  the  British  concen- 
1  ration  against  such  an  attack,  attempting 
another .  surprise  movement  elsewhere,  has  the 
immensely  long  exterior  lines  through  the  shaded 
portion  alone  open  to  him. ,  The  Allies  have  the  far 
shorter. lines  across  the. sea  from  coast  to  coast. 

(2)  If  there  were  no  more  than ,  this  element 
it  would  already'  be  a  serious  advantage.  But 
there  is  again  the.  fact  that  these  interior  com- 
munications are  communications //y6-e«. 

There  are  indeed  modern  conditions  under  which 
a  communication  by  sea,  in  spite  of  the  great 
tonnage  of  modern  shipping  and  the  certitude  of 
arrival  within  fairly  exact  limits  of  delay,  is  inferior 
in  mobility  to  communications  by  land.  Where 
there  is  poor  wharfage  accommodation  at  few 
ports,  and  on  the  land  ample  railway  siding 
accommodation,  ample  rolling  stock  and  a  great 
number  of  double  lines,  there  land  communication 
has  superior  mobility  over  sea  communication, 
even  for  great  masses  of  troops.  This  is  un- 
doubtedly the  case,  for  mstance,  -vvitli  the  shores 
of  Belgium  and  Picardy..  From  tiie  nioutli  of  the 
Scheldt  to  the  mouth  of  the  Seine  armies  operating 
by   land  could  concentrate  their   men   and   Xheu 


material  more  rapidly  from  one  point  to  anothe 
than  armies  with  communications  entirely  con" 
fined  to  the  sea.  But  such  conditions  are  rare- 
They  are  only  found,  in  places  where  the  portions 
of  the  land  near  the  sea  are  part  of  a  high  civilisa- 
tion. 

The  Levant  is  a  very  conspicuous  instance  to 
the  contrary.  Hardly  any  good  metalled  roads, 
only  one  trunk  line  of  railway,  stand  upon  the  one 
side,  opposed  to  the  indefinite  power  of  expansion 
of  sea  communication  upon  the  other. 

From  the  Straits  of  Otranto  to  the  Suez  Canal 
oy  sea  is  for  any  individual  transport  at  a  moderate 
speed  a  matter  of  a  hundred  hours.  Transport  by 
rail  and  road  from  the  same  neighbourhood  to  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Suez  Canal-^even  were  a 
railway  built  from  Palestine  to  the  confines  o( 
Egypt — would  be  a  matter  not  of  a  hundred  hours, 
but  of  anything  you  Hke  :  double  or  treble  01 
tenfold  that  time. 

And  as  against  a  single  railway  line  supple- 
mented by  no  proper  trunk  roads,  you  have  ar 
indefinite  amount  of  shipping  at  your  disposal  for 
the  sea  routes. 

A  force  concentrating  on  the  southern  shores 
of  Asia  Minor,  say  near  Adana,  with  the  object 
of  striking  at  the  one  railway  the  enemy  possesses 
for  his  exterior  communications  round  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean,  is,  in  time,  only  40  hours  by  trans- 
port at  moderate  speed  from  the  shores  of  Egypt 
The  force  to  be  marched  in  opposition  to  it  drawr 
round  by  land  is  four,  five  or  six  times  that  number 
of  hours  distant. 

The  same  is  true  of  an  attack  at  any  other 
\ita]  point,  such  a?  the  concentration  of  forces 
against  the  Gulf  of  Alexandretta.  where  the  rail- 
way line  approaches  the  sea.  It  is  perhaps  50 
hours  from  Egypt,  perhaps  15c  from  the  Adriatic, 


LAND      AND     WATER 


January  20,  1916. 


about  100  from  Salonika.  And  all  these  routes 
of  concentration  by  sea  are  far  more  rapid  in  mere 
time  apart  from  the  actual  conditions  of  land 
transport  in  that  region.  That  is,  even  if  the  rail- 
way were  of  the  best  equality,  even  if  the  land  were 
well  supplied  with  petrol  vehicles  and  rolling 
stock  upon  the  railways,  the  sea  would  still  have 
the  advantage. 

(3)  This  leads  me  to  my  third  point.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  !and  communication  in  the  Levant 
is  quite  peculiarly  handicapped. 

There  is,  what  we  have  already  remarked, 
the  handicap  of  only  one  railway.  That  railway 
is  not  continuous.  Further,  it  is  broken  in  gauge 
at  one  point,  though  this  may  be  remedied  later, 
(iood  roads  are  very  nearly  absent,  and  on  the 
top  of  all  this  you  have  the  lack  of  homogeneitjan 
the  ground.  All  the  North-western  part  at  A- - 
the  Balkans— is  a  mass  of  mountains.  Communi- 
cations over  the  plateau  (B)  of  Asia  Minor  is 
easier,  but  there  are  the  great  mountain  ranges  at 
C  and  C.     There  is  the  desert  at  D 

Put  together  all  these  points  and  it  is  clear 
that  the  situation  of  the  Allies  in  the  Near  I^ast, 
that  is  upon  the  coast  of  the  Levant,  presents  a 
case  of  possession  of  interior  lines  almost  unique 
in  military  history. 

RELATIVE    STRENGTHS. 

But  having  reached  that  conclusion,  certain 
other  considerations  arise  which  must  be  carefully 
noted,  if  wc  are  neither  to  overestimate  the 
advantage  here  described  nor  to  misunderstand  it. 

In  the  first  place,  while  the  field  of  operations 
is  for  the  Allies  essentially  subsidiary,  it  is  for  one 
of  the  parties  to  the  enemy  group  of  primary 
importance.  It  is  of  primary  importance  to  the 
Turkish  Empire.  To  which  fact  must  be  added 
the  further  fact  that  the  .Allies,  though  now 
superior  in  men  and  in  munitions  to  the  enemy, 
particularly  upon  the  main  western  front,  have 
no  indefinitely  large  margin  of  men  to  spare  for 
s^ubsidiary  operations.  In  other  words,  the  pos- 
session of  interior  lines  in  this  region,  which 
would  be  of  importance  if  it  were  the  only  theatre 
of  war  and  if  the  two  forces  were  there  numerically 
equal,  is  modified  by  the  fact  that  the  enemy  will 
in  this  region  almost  certainly  have  for  months 
to  come  a  numerical  superiority,  and  that  his  forces 
there  engaged  will  not  be  called  elsewhere. 

The  Bulgarian  and  Turkish  bodies  combined, 
even  with  but .  small  Austro-German  additions, 
working  all  around  the  Plastern  Mediterranean 
upon  such  a  point  as  the  front  before  Salonika  to 
such  a  point  as  the  front  of  the  Suez  Canal, though 
immensely  handicapped  by  their  exterior  position 
will,  when  their  equipment  is  complete,  count  more 
presumably  in  men  and  in  material  than  will  the 
Allies  (as  at  present  acting)  in  the  same  field. 

It  may  further  be  noted,  though  it  is  not  a 
point  to  insist  upon  too  heavily,  that  of  the  allies 
one  only,  Great  Britain,  is  here  seriously  menaced. 
I  sa^'^  it  is  not  a  point  to  insist  upon  too  much 
because  the  cause  of  the  Allies  is  manifestly  one, 
and  a  heavy  blow  delivered  at  this  country  would 
be  equally  delivered  at  the  resisting  power  of 
France,  Italy  and  Kussia. 

Another  point  to  be  remembered  is  that 
though  we  do  possess  the  great  advantage  of 
interior  lines  in  the  Levant  our  ultimate  bases,  our 
manufactories  and  our  accumulated  stores  are 
very  far  distant.  They  are,  for  our  own  forces, 
more  than  a  fortnight  away,  taking  the  average  of 


steam,  and  that  Power  which  is  most  immediately 
concerned  with  security  in  the  Levant,  Great 
Britain,  is  also  that  one  of  the  Allies  most  distant 
from  the  scene  of  operations.       . 

Another  modification  of  the  position  is  the 
presence  of  the  submarine  in  Levantine  waters. 
That  is  a  point  which  I  must  leave  to  my  colleague 
who  deals  with  naval  matters  in  this  paper,  but 
the  experience  which  has  been  before  everyone  in 
the  last  few  weeks  is  sufficient  to  show  that  this 
factor  is  not  decisive.  Ships  and  stores  have  been 
lost  through  submarine  activity,  but  in  so  small  a 
proportion  compared  with  the  vast  amount  of 
coming  and  going  in  men  and  materials,  that  it 
has  not,  hitherto,  at  least,  seriously  modified  the 
control  of  sea  communications  upon  which  all  this 
argument  is  foimded. 

One  last  consideration  seems  to  me  of  especial 
moment.  It  is  obvious  enough  and  has  been 
mentioned  (a  little  timidly  perhaps)  in  various 
sections  of  the  Allied  press.     It  will  bear  repetition. 

Any  strategic  position  wherein  fate  has  given 
the  advantage  of  mobility  to  one  side  is  only  of 
value  if  a  moral  element  Idc  present  for  the  use  of 
this  mobility.  And  that  moral  element  is  Unity 
Of  Command.  It  is  no  good  having  three  days' 
advantage  over  my  enemy  in  the  capacity  of 
rapidly  concentrating  troops  upon  a  particular 
point  if  I  am  condemned  to  spend  a  week  in 
arguing  the  matter  before  starting.  It  is  even 
true  that  mobility  is  a  snare  rather  than  an 
aid  when  unity  of  command  is  lacking.  The 
very  fact  that  you  know  that  you  can  in  the  last 
resort  move  more  quickly  than  your  enemy, 
tempts  you  to  negotiation  and  delays  if  unity  of 
command  be  lacking.  Just  as  an  undecided  ancl 
unpunctual  person  is  more  likely  to  miss  his  traiiy 
if  he  has  a  motor  car  to  a  distant  station  than  if 
he  is  compelled  to  walk — because  he  has  always  at 
the  back  of  his  mind  the  idea  that  a  very  rapid 
move  at  the  last  moment  is  open  to  him— so  a 
higher  command  which  knows  that  in  the  last 
resort  it  has  rapid  means  of  communication  open 
to  it,  will,  if  divided,  only  the  more  tend  to  delay. 

To  say  that  unity  of  command  is  vital  does 
not  mean  that  its  absence  necessarily  connotes 
disagreement,  but  what  it  does  ahcays  and 
necessarily  connote  is  difficulty  and  therefore 
delay  in  co-ordination.  Even  if  no  time  is  lost  in 
discussion  from  lack  of  unity  of  command,  time 
is  lost  from  the  necessity  of  co-ordinating  the 
plans  of  A  with  the  plans  of  B,  when  A  and  B 
have  an  equal  authority. 

In  plain  English  the  advantage  now  enjoyed 
by  the  Allies  in  the  Levant,  and  it  is  for  the  moment 
very  considerable,  is  directly  conditioned  upoii 
the  control  of  that  advantage  lying  in  one  will. 
Lacking  this  all  the  advantage  is  thrown  away. 

THE    SIX    FRONTS. 

Of  the  six  fronts,  actual  or  threatened,  upon 
which  the  great  war  for  the  moment  turns  (i)  (the 
French,  (2)  the  Italian  and  the  (3)  Russian,  the 
(4)  Balkan,  the  (5)  Syrian  and  the  (6)  Meso- 
potamian)  only  one  has  in  the  news  of  the  last 
week  shown  any  movement  worth  recording. 
One  has  produced  a  pohtical  result  (that  of  the 
Balkan  in  the  matter  of  Montenegro)  :  one  has 
been  the  scene  of  very  great  activity  (the  Southern 
Russian  front)  but  without  anv  corresponding 
fluctuations  of  line.  Only  the  last,  the  Mesopo- 
tamian  which,  for  all  the  exiguity  of  the  forces 


January  20,  1916. 


LAND     AND      WATER 


engaged  is  of  high  interest,  has  shown  some 
development.  It  may  be  weU  to  sinnmarise  the 
news  of  the  various  fronts,  conchiding  with  this 
last  one  upon  the  Tigris. 

(1)    THE   WESTERN    FRONT    DURING 
THE    WEEK. 

Upon  the  Western  front  there  has  been 
nc" "change.  The  only  remarkable  feature  in  the 
week's  communiques  being  the  long  range  firing 
of  the  heavy  artillery  on  the  Allied  side.  This 
practice  has  done  some  damage  in  the  French 
town  of  Lens  behind  the  German  lines  and  shells 
have  also  been  dropped  at  long  range  on  to 
Lille.  The  enemy  has  given  out  in  his  official 
communiques  that  the  shells  killed  and  wounded 
such  and  such  a  number  of  civilians.  It  is  remark- 
able that  the  authorities  in  this  country  have 
not  explained  to  the  public  the  meaning  of  this 
long-distance  fire  ;  its  contrast  with  recent  enemy 
long-distance  fire  and  the  reason  that  the  enemy 
emphasises  the  loss  (if  they  are  telling  the  truth) 
of  French  civilian  life. 

The  enemy  some  months  ago  against  Dun- 
kirk and  the  other  day  against  Nancy  has  delivered 
shell  at  extreme  ranges,  unaimed  and  designed 
only  for  moral  effect  upon  the  civilian  population. 
In  each  of  these  cases  he  has  emplaced  a  gun  very 
securely  with  apparently  no  freedom  of  movement 
and  aimed  to  drop  a  shell  somewhere  in  a  dense 
centre  of  population.  In  each  case  his  gun  thus  used 
after  a  fashion  really  puerile,  has  been  discovered 
and  destroyed.  The  enemy  apparently  imagines 
that  a  few  large  shells  dropped  indiscriminately 
in  a  considerable  town  will  coerce  the  French  or 
the  English  towards  peace.  It  is  a  complete 
misunderstanding  of  the  nature  of  this  war.  It 
i§;6h  a  par  with  the  silly  air  raids  upon  London, 
\i'hich  do  not  advance  the  enemy's  military 
objects  by  the  smallest  fraction. 

The  Allied  long-distance  fire  is  obviously 
not  designed  to  terrorise  the  friendly  population 
of  a  French  town.  It  is  designed  to  interfere 
i&ith  enemy  communications.  It  does  interfere 
with  enemy  communications  badly.  Hence  the 
enemy's  official  news  about  unfortunate  wounded 
civihans.  It  is  directed  to  destroy  depots,  rail- 
way junctions  and  sidings.  It  is  not  delivered 
at  random  at  extreme  range  by  fixed  guns,  but 
with  calculation  at  a  particular  range  and  aimed. 
The  more  the  enemy  tells  us  that  it  is  hurting  our 
friends  the  more  may  we  be  certain  that  we  are 
interfering  with  his  transport. 

For  the  rest  the  only  other  news  upon  the 
Western  front  has  been  the  check  of  an  enemy 
attack  in  the  open  Champagne  country  east  of 
Rheims  and  west  of  Argonne.  It  was  delivered 
with  about  three  divisions  and  was  checked  with 
very  heavy  loss  because  it  exposed  itself  at  one 
critical  moment  to  the  full  sweep  of  the  French 
field  artillery.  It  cannot  have  been  intended  for 
anything  but  a  local  offensive  of  the  sort  to  which 
the  enemy  is  compelled  if  he  is  to  maintain  his 
lines  in  spite  of  his  anxiety  for  men.  He  lost  a 
considerable  number  of  prisoners — how  many  the 
French  have  not  told  us — and  he  did  nothing. 
That  it  was  the  beginning  of  any  offensive  on  a 
large  scale  is  not  credible.  Such  an  experiment 
in  the  West  may  come  from  the  enemy  before  the 
end  of  the  winter.     It  is  more  likely  to  come  later. 

(2)    THE     ITALIAN    FRONT. 

Upon  this  front  the  only  event  of.thepast  week 
hasbeen  the  re-occupation  of  the  trenches  just  out- 


side Oslavia  by  our  Allies.  The  position  has  nothing 
determining  about  it  at  all,  as  would  have,  for 
instance,  a  similar  short  advance  upon  the  Podgora 
ridge,  but  it  has  shown  the  incapacity  here  of  the 
enemy  to  hold  even  a  short  captured  section  for 
more  than  a  day  or  two  against  a  counter-offensive. 
Along  all  this  front  Austria  is  hanging  on  with  just  a 
minimum  of  troops.  They  are  very  good  troops, 
carefully  chosen  ;  the  best  she  has.  It  is, 
paradoxically  enough,  an  expensive  policy  in  men 
for  it  puts  your  Hne  to  a  heavy  strain.  It  is  a 
gamble  upon  the  war's  not  lasting  more  than  three 
or  four  months  more,  for  we  know  that  Austria  is 
drafting  in  continually  numbers  out  of  proportion 
to  her  permanent  strength  upon  this  front.  Her 
very  high  proportion  of  loss  here  is  due  to  the 
weight,  number  and  excellence  in  handling  of  the 
Italian  heavy  artillery,  which  stands  very  high 
indeed  as  an  arm,  and  behind  which  is  all  the 
intensive  mechanical  power  of  modern  Lombardy 
directed  against  a  front,  the  Izonzo  front,  even 
shorter  than  the  British  front  in  Flanders. 

(3)  THE    RUSSIAN    FRONT. 

Upon  the  Russian  front  the  cessation  of 
our  Ally's  advance  which  was  taken  for  granted  in 
these  columns  last  week  and  the  week  before,  was 
clearly  marked  in  the  present  week.  It  is  due,  as 
was  pointed  out  in  these  columns,  to  the  fact  that 
upon  a  front  of  less  than  300  miles,  with  many 
interruptions  due  to  the  nature  of  the  ground, 
the  enemy  has  men  sufficient  to  hold  a  line  of 
trenches  which,  though  not  actually  continuous, 
forms  a  virtually  continuous  defence.  To  force  such 
a  line  we  know  from  the  whole  experience  of  this 
war  that  nothing  will  suffice,  save  a  concentration 
of  heavy  artillery  and  its  extremely  immobile 
munitionment.  Now  such  a  concentration  in  a 
period  of  alternate  frost  and  thaw  and  over  a 
country  without  hard  roads  is  impossible,  for  it 
depends  nowadays  upon  motor  traction.  What  the 
Russian  effort  "has  done  has  been  strategically 
and  generally  to  compel  a  concentration  of  enemy 
forces  just  when  the  enemy  most  wanted  to  spare 
men  for  the  Balkans.  It  has  had  a  political  effect 
within  the  enemy's  territory  and  perhaps  upon  the 
politicians  of  Roumania.  Tactically  and  locally 
it  has  cleared  the  enemy  from  the  eastern  bank  of 
the  Strypa,  it  has  established  a  firm  bridgehead  at 
Chartoriysk,  and  it  has  occupied  the  heights  which 
overlook  Czernowitz  from  a  few  miles  eastward. 
It  has  thus  established  a  straight  line  north  and 
south  from  the  Pripet  marshes  to  the  Roumanian 
frontier,  and  there  it  has  halted. 

(4)  THE    BALKAN     FRONT. 

Upon  the  Balkan  front  nothing  strategical 
has  developed  during  the  week.  Politically  we 
have  had  the  arranged  surrender  of  official 
Montenegro  to  the  enemy.  Strategically  this 
means  nothing  whatsoever,  beyond  what  we  knew 
last  week,  that  with  the  capture  of  Lovtchen 
Montenegro  was  overrun.  Such  of  its  few  thou- 
sands as  are  free  to  join  the  remnant  of  the  Serbian 
•  Army  towards  the  sea  will  join  it.  The  event  is  oi 
no    importance    to    the    campaign    as    a    whole. 

(5)    THE    SYRIAN     FRONT. 

From  what  may  be  called  the  Syrian  front, 
which  is  as  yet  potential,  that  is,  the  menace  tc 
Egypt,  nothing  has  been  reported.  Air  recon- 
naissance informs  us  that  no  railway  work  has 
^•et  been  even  begun  or  apparently  so  much  as 


LAND      AND     WATER 


January  20,  1916. 


surv'oyca   m   tiio   desert  of   Et-tih—and   we    are 
already  nearing  the'end  of  January  !  1 

(6)     THE     MESOPOTAMIAN     FRONT. 

The  Mesopotamian  front.  liiough  con- 
rerned  with  very  small  numbers,  is  of  acute 
interest  in  this  country,  has  a  considerable  political 
signilicance  in  the  East,  and  therefore  deserves  a 
fairly  full  analysis. 

A  British  Expeditionary  force,  which  may  be 
called  a  division  in  strength,  but  which  was  sup- 
jiorted  by  auxiliaries,  after  advancing  to  the 
neighbourhood  of  Bagdad  up  the  Tigris  and 
lighting  successfully  at  Ctesiphon,  found  itself  in 
the  presence  of  \ery  large  forces,  and  fell  back  a 
week's  march  down  the  Tigris  to  the  point  where 
the  Shatt-al-Gharaf  comes  in  to  the  main  river. 
Thisjunction  is  called  the"  Kut,"or  fort,  of  Amara. 
The  British  force  here  entrenched  itself  on  the 
northern  or  left  bank  of  the  Tigris,  controlling 
also  the  further  southern  bank.  The  Turks  cut 
it  'off  upstream  (as  along  the  line  B  on  Sketch  V) 
and  downstream  (as  along  the  line  C)  and  the 
original  British  Expeditionary  Force  against 
Bagdad  was  thus  isolated.  A  relieving  force  was 
meanwhile  coming  up  the  river  Tigris  from  the 
Sea.  On  the  7th  of  this  montli  it  fought  a  success- 
fill  action  at  the  point  of  Sheik  Sa-ad,  between 
25  and  30  miles  east  of  the  beleagured  position 
of  Kut  El-Amara,  and,  down  stream,  perhaps 
something  under  50  miles.  It  must  clearly  be 
understood  that  the  Turkish  forces  thus  beaten 
and  forced  back  along  the  Tigris  by  the  relieving 
force  were  only  screens  thrown  out  (as  along  the 
lines  I,  2,  and  3  upon  Sketch  V.)  to  fall  back  to  some 
main  position  where  the  real  test  would  come. 
Their  retirement  has  nothing  decisive  about  it 
and  is  no  definite  point  in  our  favour.  The 
Turkish  bodies  hitherto  met  are,  at  such  a  distance 
from  their  main  business  (the  containment  of  the 
British  force  at  Kut)  only  bodies  of  observation. 

In  the  following  week,  that  is,  up  to  the  last 
icw  days,  the  relieving  British  force  advanced 
along  the  river  as  far  as  the  point  G,  which  is 
marked  b}'  the  ruins  of  Orah.  There  it  dispersed 
yet  another  stand  made  by  the  Turkish  army  of 


observation,  and  it  has  in  the  last  few  days  ad- 
vanced up  to  the  Wady,  or  watercourse  (a  gully  in 
the  dry  season,  marked  upon  Sketch  V  by  the 
letter  F).  Meanwhile  the  Turkish  army  of  obser- 
vation, which  in  retirement  lost  prisoners  and 
guns,  has  fallen  back  to  the  main  position. 

jThere  lies  north  of  the  river  Tigris  at  this  point, 
and.  between  it  and  the  frontier  mountains^  ot 
Persia,  a  vast  expanse  of  salt  marsh,  impassable  in 
this  wet.seaijon,  and  in  the  dry  season  a  huge  flat 
of  salt.  It  is  in  shape  a  wedge,  the  apex  of 
which  comes  down  to  the  Tigris.  It  is  marked 
upon  Sketch  V  with  the  letter  E. 

Now  here  is  a  position.  From  the  marsh 
there  flows  towards  the  Tigris  a  stream,  its  line  is 
continued  by  the  bend  of  the  ri\'er.  Beyond  the 
river  to  the  south  are  certain  mounds.  From  the 
marsh,  therefore,  southward,  there  is  a  continuous 
line  (marked  upon  sketch  V  with  the  letters  DD  D) 
which  may  be  held  against  the  force  advancing 
from  the  east.  This  is  that  position  upon  which 
the  main  Turkish  army  has  now  retired,  and  there 
it  is  awaiting  the  advance  of  the  British  relieving 
force  still  advancing  up  river.  The  relieving  force 
is  a  small  one.  It,  has  a  numerically  superior 
enemy  in. front  of  it.  It  has  the  advantage  that 
it  comes  up  the  river  fully  equipped,  especially-  with 
bridging,  materials  which  the  enemy  lacks.  Tlif 
British  can  operate. on  either  bank  of  the  stream. 
The  Turks  arc  under  difficulties  in  crossing  from 
the  northern  bank.  The  old  l^ridgt?  of  boats 
which  once  existed  at  the  point  X  on  Sketch  V  has 
been  removed  by  the  British  at  Kut-el- Amara. 
The  passage  of  the  Tigris,  rapid  at  this  season  a|Kl 
broad  at  this  lower  portion  of  its  course,  is. thus  , a 
capital  element  in  the  situation,  and  the  power 'of ' 
the  British  relieving  force  to  .fight  on  either  sjcl^ 
of  th,e  obstacle  at  will  is  an  advantage.  But  t^ic 
advantage  in  numbers  is,  as  I  have  said,  upon  tK^ 
other  side. 

We  shall  be  assured  in  the  next  few  da,ys 
of  the  effort  of  this  relieving  force  coming  up  the 
Tigris  to  force  the  main  Turkish  position  along 
D  DD  and  to  relieve  the  original  British  force 
which  lies  cut  off  at  A. 

H.  Beli.cc. 


V 


■    ■    ■ 


JFMies 


January  20,  igi6. 


LAND      AND     WATER 


NAVAL    DIPLOMACY. 

By    ARTHUR     POLLEN. 


^^HE  contents  of  the  von  Papen  papers 
have  very  obvious  lessons  for  America. 
Their  seizure  has  no  less  obvious  lessons 
for  us.  We  can  leave  it  to  our  cousins 
across  the  water  to  draw  their  own  inferences 
from  events  which  are  no  longer  novel,  but  of 
which  we  have  now  supplied  them  with  further 
and  quite  convincing  proof.  It  is  not  for  us  to 
tell  them  what  to  do  in  such  a  situation.  But  we 
shall  be  fools  if  we  do  not  see  and  learn  our  own 
lesson  from  this  event. 

For  a  second  time  in  the  siege  of  Germany 
we  have  completely  outwitted  the  enemy — and 
outwitted  him  not  in  war,  but  in  diplomacy.  He 
asked  for  a  safe  conduct  for  an  emissary  already 
unwelcome  in  America  and  he  got  it.  But  he 
did  not  ask  for  a  safe  conduct  for  the  emissary's 
letters  and  passbooks,  and  he  is  furious  that  he  has 
not  been  given  what  he  omitted  to  beg.  Readers 
of  the  White  Paper  published  a  few  weeks  ago  will 
remember  that  prominent  amongst  the  measures 
that  enabled  us  to  get  neutral  shipping  companies 
to  observe  our  Umits  on  neutral  imports,  was  mak- 
ing the  use  of  our  world-wide  coaling  stations  by 
such  companies  dependent  upon  their  compliance 
with  our  wishes.  Now,  neither  this  measure  nor 
the  seizure  of  poor  von  Papen's  cheque-book,  were 
combative  acts  of  the  ordinary  kind.  '  They  were 
mere  examples  of  intelligence  in  perceiving  our 
advantages  and  of  resolution  in  using  them  to  the 
lifmost  in  negotiation.  They  are  examples  of  a 
kind  of  skill  we  should  more  often  expect  amongst 
barristers,  solicitors  and  diplomatists  than  amongst 
soldiers  and  sailors.  V/hat  is  significant  is  this  : 
The  credit  of  both  of  these  acts  is  due  to  naval 
officers.'  Their  minds  were  stimulated  by  war- 
sense  to  perceive  the  importance  of  things  the 
civilian  diplomatist  might  have  overlooked. 
Incidentally  they  show  hov/  many  sided  is 
naval  training,  how  varied  the  attainments  and 
proficiencies  which  the  seaman,  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  his  very  exacting  profession,  acquires. 

What  is  more  to  the  point  at  the  moment  is 
this.  I  fear  I  have  for  many  weeks  now  wearied 
my  readers  by  reiterating  that  the  siege  of  Germany 
is  the  principal  naval  operation  of  the  moment. 
A  sea  siege  obviously  cannot  be  carried  on  with- 
out touching,  if  not  on  the  rights,  at  any  rate  on 
the  convenience  of  neutrals.  And  dealing  with 
neutrals  in  matters  of  this  kind^  is,  in  -times  of 
peace,  a  purely  diplomatic  affair.  -  Where  we  have 
gone  altogether  wrong  ove/  out  siege  is  that  because 
it  incidentally  involved  dealing  diplomatically 
with  neutrals,  and  consequently  correspondence 
and  negotiation,  which  as  a  matter  of  form,  must 
go  through  the  Foreign  Office,  we  have  treated 
the  whole  siege  as'if  it  were  a  diplomatic ,  and  not 
a  war  measure.  ■  This  is  the  initial  mistake  of 
'  the  whole  thing,  and  I  recall  it  to  the  reader's 
attention  now,  primarily  to  remind  him  that, 
looking  at  the  thing  purely  diplomatically,  our 
two  greatest  diplomatic  siege  successes  have  been 
originated  and  engineered  by  naval  officers. 

Does  this  not  rather  encourage  one  to  suppose 
that  the  thing  would  gain  in  vigour  and  efiiciency — 
'  and  consequently  accelerate  tlie  effect  so  impatient- 
ly awaited— if  \vc  -  pushed  the  principle    a    httle 


further  and  reversed  the  roles  which  the  Admiralty 
and  Foreign  Office  are  now  playing  ?  The  siege 
is  admittedly  an  operation  of  war,  and  necessarily 
involves  diplomacy.  But  the  diplomacy  is  a 
secondary  matter.  Why  should  not  the  siege,  be 
in  Admiralty  hands  and  the  diplomats  be  subor- 
dinate to  the  seamen  ?  A  much  respected  corres- 
pondent reproaches  me  that  in  this  matter  I  ani 
agitating  to  inflict  a  humiliation  upon  Sir  Edward 
Grey!  Sir  Edward,  he  points  out  to  me,  is  the 
one  statesman  in  Europe  whose  clearness  of  view 
from  the  beginning,  and  integrity  of  conduct 
throughout,  have  ensured  the  moral  judgment  of 
the  world  being  on  the  Allied  side.  We  must, 
he  reminds  me,  look  on  present  events  as  con- 
tinuous with  what  has  gone  before,  and  as  con- 
tinuous with  what  will  follow  after.  It  will  be 
no  gain  to  us  in  the  end  to  finish  the  war  more 
swiftly  if  it  means  any  weakening  of  that  reputation 
for  high  principle  and  honour  which  we  have 
successfully  maintained  so  far.  To  inflict  a 
pubhc  snub  upon  our  Foreign  Secretary,  undoubt- 
edly the  most  eminent  and  most  honoured  of  the 
Allied  Ministers,  would  go  far  towards  suggesting 
that  Great  Britain  was  contemplating  a  moral 
plane  below  that  which  to-day  she  occupies. 

A    FALLACIOUS    ARGUMENT. 

Now,  with  great  respect,  the  whole  of  this 
argument  seems  to  me  to  be  nonsense.  Let  , us 
assume  in  the  first  place  that  my  correspondent  is 
rigiit,  and  that  to  take  the  siege  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  Foreign  Office  will,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  inflict 
a  serious  snub  upon  the  one  public  man  who  has 
not  lost  in  reputation  in  the  last  eighteen  months. 
If  by  so  doing  we  could  secure  an  end  to  the  war 
— of  course,  without  the  adoption  of  barbarous 
and  inhumane  methods — then  certainly  it  would  be 
our  duty  not  only  to  ourselves  but  to  our  Allies 
to  make  this  sacrifice.  The  last  man  in  the  world 
to  object  to  this  sacrifice  would  be  Sir  Edward  Grey 
himself. 

But  of  course  no  humiliation  of  any  kind 
to  the  Foreign  Secretary,  and  no  derogation  of 
principle  would  be  involved  in  the  proposal  at  all. 
The  thing  would  not  be  without  precedent — and 
that  a  recent  one.  Lord  Kitchener  and  the  War 
Council  have  had  the  entire  provision  of  munitions 
and  army  supplies  taken  out  of  their  hands.  Why 
was  this  done  ?  Eighteen  months  ago  there  was 
machinery  at  the  War  Office  for  dealing  with  these 
matters — a  machinery  which  was  adequate  in  the 
numbers  of  its  personnel  for  the  supply  of  the 
army  of  its  then  dimensions,  and  adequately 
trained  to  deal  with  the  industrial  conditions  that 
then  prevailed.  So  long  as'  for  every  army  con- 
tract there  were  ten  competing  manufacturers, 
the  procedure  of 'running  army  supplies  was  simple 
enough.  But  when  the  demands  of  the  army  out- 
ran the  manufacturing  capacity  of  the  country, 
the  problem  of  supply  changed  altogether.  It  wa? 
no  longer  a  matter  of  taking  the  cheapest  tender, 
but  demanded  state  production  on  a  scale  of 
unprecedented  magnitude.  A  vast  experiment 
in  state  socialism  had  to  be  made,  and  to 
make  this  experiment  an  entirely  new  depart- 
ment had   to  be  created.       To  the  credit   of  all 


LAND      AND     WATER. 


January  20,  1916. 


concerned,  practically  every  man  oLexperiencp  in 
production  was  willing  to  serve  in  this  department 
regardless  of  his  personal  interest,  and  from  those 
willing  a  selection  of  men  of  ability  has  given 
most  amazing  results.  Has  this  recognition  of 
entirely  new  conditions  inflicted  any  humiliation 
on  J.ord  Kitchener  of  Khartoum  on  the  Army 
Council,  or  upon  the  very  able  and  devoted  public 
servants  who  have  jjut  in  years  of  excellent  ser\ice 
at  the  W ar  Office  ?  What  was  in  point  of  fact 
an  activity  in  which  only  civilians  could  possibly 
excel  seemed  to  be  imposed  by  necessity  on  the 
War  OfBce  which  had  no  training  and  no  aptitude 
for  it.  The  anomaly  was  frankly  recognised, 
and  simply  remedied.  The  matter  was  taken 
from  soldiers'  and  officials'  hands  and  put  into 
professional  and  commercial  hands. 

SIEGE    BY    SEA. 

It  is  the  reverse  process  that  we  want  with 
regard  to  the  siege  to-da}'.  The  siege  is  in  the 
hands  of  diplomatists  and  lawyers — probably  the 
best  diplomatists  and  the  best  lawyers  in  the 
world.  But  diplomatists  and  lawyers  are  not  men 
of  war  and  the  siege  is  a  work  of  war.  Their  share 
in  the  siege  is  real  but  incidental.  It  is  vitally 
important,  but  it  is  subordinate.  The  poHcy  of 
the  siege  should  be  settled  by  the  Cabinet,  and 
its  conduct  decided  by  the  Navy.  Of  course 
the  Navy  will  need  the  help  of  the  diplomatists 
and  the  lawyers  in  the  framing  of  their  measures, 
and  in  the  conduct  of  negotiations. 

Throughout  this  difiicult  business — and  it 
would  be  the  blackest  ingratitude  to  the  Foreign 
(3fiice  not  to  recognise  the  enormous  extent  to 
which  the  skill  of  its  diplomacy  has  reduced  the 
difficulties,  narrowed  the  field  of  controversy  and 
introduced  an  enormously  higher  efftciency  into.the 
siege — it  certainly  looks  as  if  the  main  strength  of 
the  Allied  position  had  hardly  been  used  to  the  full. 
This  main  strength,  of  course,  is  that  vis  a  vis  both 
to  America  and  the  other  neutrals,  the  moral  posi- 
tion of  the  Allies  is  unassailable,  and  the  moral  posi- 
tion of  Germany  indefensible.'  Germany's  crimes 
against  America  call  to  Heaven,  if  not  to  Washing- 
ton, for  vengeance.  To  murder  American  citizens 
upon  the  high  seas  was  bad  enough.  To  do  it  in  face 
first  of  American  protest,  then  of  American  prayers, 
and  finally  of  American  threats,  was  to  add  the  most 
humiliating  kind  of  insults  to  the  most  monstrous 
kind  of  injury.  To  intrigue  against  the  sover- 
reignty  of  the  American  Government  by  stirring 
up  disorder,  organising  the  slaughter  of  peaceful 
citizens  by  explosions,  and  wrecking  bridges  and 
waterworks — surely  these  would  have  been  bad 
enough  if  they  had  been  conducted  by  secret 
agents  of  Berlin,  whose  crimes  at  any  rate  could 
have  been  decently  disowned.  But  to  do  these 
things  by  the  representatives  accredited  by  the 
Emperor  to  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
was  surely  to  show  a  cynicism  of  contempt  un- 
paralleled since  Gondomar  terrified  James  I.  into 
cutting  off  Sir  Walter  Raleigh's  head  !  For 
reasons  which  .seemed  good  to  the  American 
Government,  it  has  submitted— not  without  a 
murmur  but  without  a  blow  to  this  treatment. 
What  apparently  our  Government  fail  to  realise 
is  that  this  submission  makes  it  quite  impossible 
for  America  actively  to  resent  it,  if  we  take  the 
punishment  of  Germany  into  our  own  hands.  Such 
indirect  injury  as  we  have  done  to  American  trade 
by  a  logical  enforcement  of  the  siege  is  relati\ely 
trivial.     It  is  not  as  if  American  trade  in  bulk  bad 


diminished.  It  has  grown  vastly.  And  remem- 
ber that  this  trade  has  been  protected  the  world 
over,  not  by  the  American,  but  by  the  British  Fleet. 

There  is  but  one  weakness  in  our  position. 
This  is,  that  the  siege  of  Germany  is  carried  out, 
not  by  the  Allies  as  a  bod^^  but  by  Great  Britain 
alone,  and  not  under  a  blockade,  but  under  an 
Order  in  Council,  the  legal  validity  of  which  can 
manifestly  be  questioned.  Surely  it  should  not 
need  much  resolution  to  take  the  requisite  steps 
for  putting  the  whole  thing  on  to  an  impregnable 
basis.  Let  me  tabulate  once  more  what  these 
steps  seem  to  be. 

(i)  The  siege  of  Germany  must  be  by  block- 
ade and  not  under  an  Order  in  Council. 

(2)  It  must  be  a  blockade  proclaimed  jointly 
by  all  the  Allies. 

(3)  The  main  conduct  of  the  siege  should  be 
in  the  hands  of  the  British  Admiralty,  as  agent 
of  the  Allies. 

(4)  The  Board  must  be  strengthened  by  the 
addition  of  war-trained  officers  from  the  fleet,  so 
that  the  best  naval  brains  may  be  available  for 
this  work. 

(5)  So  far  as  the, siege  involves  the  necessary 
negotiations  or  communication  with  neutrals,  the 
Foreign  Office  and  diplomatists  should  conduct  these 
negotiations,  but  acting  on  Admiralty  instructions. 

(6)  The  import  of  ALL  goods  beyond  the 
average  consumption  of  the  neutral  countries 
in  previous  years,  or. not  intended  for  our  AlUes, 
should  be  prohibited  absolutely. 

MOUNT    LOVTCHEN. 

The  Italians,  and  particularly  the  Italian., 
seamen,  have  been  somewhat  severely  criticised.  1 
for  allowing  Mount  Lovtchen  to  fall,  initq!.' 
the  hands  of  Austria.  The  unconditional  sur-; 
render  of  Montenegro  is  the  dramatic,  sequel 
to  this  victory.  It  is  clear  that  the  strategic, 
importance  of  the  stronghold  in  question 
was  not  exaggerated.  But  with  great,  respect,  ; 
the  defence  of  Mount  Lovtchen  does  not  seem 
to  me  to  be  primarily  a  naval  question  at  all. 
We  do  not  know  the  details  of  the  operation  by 
which  it  was  captured,  but  I  should  think  it  exceed- 
ingly doubtful  that  the  Austrian  Dreadnoughts 
were  of  material  assistance.,  At  any  rate  it  was 
quite  certain  that,  as  far  as  this  capture  was  due 
to  artillery,  the  heavy  Austrian  howitzers  could 
have  done  the  work' just  as  well  as  the  naval  guns. 
Even  if  the  artillery  of  the  Viribus  Unitis,  of  the 
Prince  Eugen,  or  the  Tegethof  helped  materially,  it 
was  doubtful  if  such  help  was  in  any  case  necessary. 
If  .we  assume  that  it  >vas  necessary,  and  there- 
fore it  was  a  matter  vital  to  the  safety  of  Monte- 
negro that  the  Austrian  Dreadnoughts  should  have 
been  prevented  .from  taking  part  in  this  operation, 
there  were  clearly  but  two  ways  open.  One  was 
to  prevent  this  squadron  entering  the  Bocche 
di  Cattaro,  the  other  tp  destroy  them  when  they 
were  inside.  But  the  whple  Dalmatian  coast 
from  Pola  almost  to  Cattaro  is  veiled  by  a  strung- 
out  archipelago  of  islands,  so  that  of  the  three 
hundred  mile  journey  there  is  nowhere  more  than 
fifty  miles-  at  the  outside  three  hours'  steaming 
that  need  be  done  in  open  water.  To  have 
prevented  the  Austrian  Dreadnoughts  from  reach- 
ing Cattaro  then,  the  Italian  Navy  would  have 
been  compelled  eitjher  to  hold  the  whole  series 
of  passages  between  these. islands  in  force,  or  to 
have  maintained  a  close  blockade  of  the  mouth 


January  20,  1916. 


LAND ' AND     WATER 


of  the  Cattaro  harbour.  Neither  of  these  opera- 
tions is  exceedingly  simple.  Indeed  the  problems 
presented  are  far  more  serious  than  those  which 
the  Grand  Fleet  would  have  to  face  if  told  to  make 
it  impossible  for  the  German  Fleet  to  indulge  in 
their  rare  but  quite  safe  little  outings  in  the  North 
Sea.  Once  past  the  entrance,  and  anchored  oppo- 
site the  town  of  Cattaro  in  the  inner  harbour,  the 
Austrian  Fleet  would  be  at  least  11,000  yards 
away  in  a  direct  line  from  the  nearest  point  of  the 
coast.  To  bombard  them  would  present  problems 
of  almost  incredible  difficulty.  Nothing  in  our 
experience  of  the  Dardanelles  justifies  us  in  the 
hope  that  this  bombardment  could  have  been 
made  effective.  I  am  saying  this  without  having 
verified  the  actual  heights  of  the  intervening  hills. 
I  leave  out  of  account  altogether  the  third  course, 
that  the  Italians  might  have  seized  Cattaro  by 
destroying  the  forts  and  forcing  an  entrance. 
Agam  nothing  in  our  own  experience  in  the  bom- 
barding or  amphibious  line  justifies  us  in  supposing 
that  this  was  a  feasible  operation. 

HONOURS    TO    SEAMEN. 

Perhaps  it  is  late  to  comment  on  the  Honours 
List,  but  there  were  reasons  for  postponing  its 
discussion.  It  is,  of  course,  quite  without  pre- 
cedent that  44  naval  officers  should  be  decorated 
all  at  one  time,  and  I  think  I  am  right  in  adding, 
that  never  before  has  a  large  number  of  honours 
gone'  simultaneously  to  the  Navy  in  this  way, 
unless  the  services  all  arose  from  the  same  and 
those  recent  events.  In  this  instance  many  old 
debts  have  been  paid  off.  Lord  Charles  Beres- 
ford's  peerage  is  a  belated  acknowledgment  that 
on  many  points  of  naval  pohcy  he  had  warned  us 
m  'Vain  for  years,  and  had  to  wait  for  war  to 
vindicate  the  Tightness  of  his  foresight.  All  ranks 
of  the  Navy,  and  the  service  as  a  whole,  lose  by 
this  elevation  their  only  spokesman  in  the  House 
of  Commons.  It  certainly  wiU  be  a  most  for- 
tunate matter  if  Sir  Hedworth  Meux  succeeds 
him  at  Portsmouth.  When  Prince  Louis  retired 
frona  the  Board  in  November  last,  a  very  large 
section  of  the  Navy  hoped,  but  without  expecting, 
that  Admiral  Meux  would  succeed  him.  He  is 
one  of  the  few  men  whom  everyone  in  the  Navy 
would  accept  as  the  best  possible  exemplar  of  a 
service  in  v/hich  two  principles  compete— 
thoroughness  in  the  mastery  of  professional 
accomplishments  and  knowledge,  and  an  ardent 
—and  almost  sentimental— regard  for  the  loftiest 
principles  of  conduct. 

Admiral  Sturdee's  baronetcy  comes  14 
months  late.  It  is  a  gracious  reminder  of  his 
great  services  at  the  Falkland  Islands.  Would 
it  not  have  been  more  gracious  had  it  followed 
hot  foot  on  that  faultlessly  conducted  engagement  ? 
Sir  Reginald  Bacon's  K.C.B.  preceded  the  publi- 
cation of  his  most  interesting  despatch— a  de- 
scription of  the  work  of  his  fleet  of  monitors. 
Fourteen  naval  officers,  one  marine  ofiicer  and 
two  naval  surgeons  have  received  knight  com- 
panionships in  the  Orders  of  the  Bath  and  of  St. 
Michael  and  St.  George.  Seventeen  Rear  Ad- 
mirals and  post  captains,  one  acting  commander, 
two  marine  officers,  three  engineer  officers,  one 
fleet  surgeon  and  one  Captain  R.N  R.  receive 
companionships  in  these  two  orders.  Some  of  the 
admissions  and  promotions  to  the  Bath  and  all, 
except  one,  of  those  to  St.  Michael  and  St.  George, 
are  for  services  in  the  Mediterranean,  the  excep- 
tion being  that  given  to  Captain  Gaunt,  whose 


RAEMAEKERS'    CARTOON. 

To  understand  Mr.  Louis  Raemaekers  haunt- 
ing picture  of  the  Kaiser,  one  must  know  the  legend 
of  "  The  Wandering  Jew."  The  traditional  episode 
on  which  it  is  based  may  be  thus  briefly  related  : — 

Now  ivhen  Jesus  passed  from  the  hall  of 
fudgment,  He  paused  in  the  porch  and  imuld 
have  rested.  But  Cartaphilus,  the  doorkeeper, 
mocked  and  smote  him,  saying  "  Thou  shall 
not  rest  here.  Hasten  on.  This  is  no  place 
for  Thee  to  stay."  And  Jesus,  turning,  looked 
on  him  and  said  :  "  Presently  I  shall  rest  and 
have  peace,  but  thou  shall  ever  wander  on 
and  never  find  peace." 

There  are  variations  of  this  version  but  this 
is  the  oldest.  "  The  Wandering  Jew  "  has 
been  familiar  in  all  countries  of  Christendom  ;  he 
came  into  prominence  in  England  in  the  thirteenth 
century,  when  he  bore  the  name  of  Joseph.  We 
next  hear  of  him  in  Germany  in  the  sixteenth  century. 
He  appeared  then  at  Hamburg,  and  had  assumed 
the  name  of  Ahasuerus.  This  is  the  Ahasuerus 
ivhose  return  Raemaekers  depicts.  The  West  Indies, 
Italy,  Belgium,  Spain  and  France  are  other 
countries  that  have  known  him,  and  strange  to 
relate  in  Picardy  untirquite  recent  times  {possibly 
the  saying  persists  even  noiv)  when  a  very  violent 
storm  broke  over  that  country,  the  peasants  would 
remark  :   "  C'est  le  juif  errant  qui  passe." 

Germany  now  realises  the  effect  which  Rae- 
maekers' cartoons  are  exercising  on  the  mind  and 
soul  of  civilisation,  and  as  is  natural' she  bullies 
and  threatens.  The  "  Cologne  Gazette,"  in  a 
leading  article  on  Holland  writes  : — "  After  the 
war  we  will  settle  our  accounts  with  you  (Holland). 
For  each  calumny,  for  each  cartoon  of  Raemaekers. 
for  each  insult,  J  or  each  cinematograph  film,  for 
each  theatrical  performance  which  is  offensive  to 
us,  we  shall  demand  payment  with  the  interest 
that  is  due  to  us." 


work  as  naval  attache  in  America  has  been  of 
almost  unparalleled  skill,  tact  and  efficiency. 

What  is  peculiar  about  this  hst  is,  that  in  no 
single  instance  are  the  services  rewarded  specified. 
In   certain   cases,   as   for   instance   those   of   Sir 
Michael   de    Robeck,    Sir   Sackville    Garden,    Sir 
Arthur  Limpus,  Sir  Henry  Oliver,  Sir  Reginald 
Bacon,    Rear- Admiral    Singer    and    Commodores 
and  Captains  Keyes,   Hope  and  Greatorex,   the 
field  and  manner  of  the  services  which  have  won 
honour   are    known   to   the   public.     As   to    the 
employment  of  the  rest,  the  Navy  hst  has  long  been 
silent  ;    so  that  three-quarters  of  those  who  are 
selected   for   honours   are   without   other   pubHc 
fame   except   such   as   being   honoured  confers  ! 
Could   anything   testify   more   eloquently   to   the 
secrecy  with  which  the  Navy  must  do  its  work  ? 
And  this  is  a  secrecy  into  which  the  public  will  do 
well  not  to  pry.    One  comment  seems  permissible 
and  it  arises  as  much  from  the  promotion  list, 
which  again  is  exceptionally  large,  as  from  the 
honours  list.     We  all   recognise   that   we    cannot 
have  from  Sir  John  Jellicoe  and  the  other  Com- 
manders-in-Chief,   anything    approaching    to    the 
very  full,  and  in  some  cases  very  brilliant  dis- 
patches, as  those  in  which  the  Field  Marshal  and 
Generals  on  land  have  described  the  operations 
in    Flanders,    France,     Gallipoli    and    elsewhere^ 
But    clearly    their    full    dispatches    on    all    the 


LAND      AND     WATER. 


January  20,  igi6. 


operations  all  over  the  world  must  exist,  and  asirfthe 
case  of  the  land  dispatches,  these  must  have  been 
accompanied  by  very  full  lists  of  the  officers*  whose 
services  have  been  conspicuously  meritorious  both 
in  naval  actions,  in  amphibious  operations,  and 
what  is  certainly  not  less  important  than  either, 
in  the  maintenance  of  the  efficiency  and  readiness 
of  their  squadrons,  their  ships  and  of  special 
departments  of  their  ships.-  Now  in  the  case  of 
land  operations,  not  only  are  the  dispatches 
published,  but  also  the  full  list  of  those  so  men- 
tioned. We  have  had  either  three  or  four  such 
lists  from  Lord  French  and  Sir  Ian  Hamilton, 
and  the  numbers  of  officers  and  men  already 
selected  for  the  distinction  of  "  mentioned  "  runs 
to  a  great  man}'  thousands.  Is  there  any  reason 
\\  hy  the  much  smaller  lists  of  naval  officers  and 
men  selected  for  praise  by  their  Commanders 
should  not  be  published  ?  Large  as  is  the  number 
of  naval  honours  conferred,  it  is  exceedingly  un- 
likely that  once  you  have  got  past  the  highest 
ranks,  one  honour  is  given  for  every  ten  officers 
recommended.  When  you  are  dealing  with  pro- 
motions from  Commander  to  Captain'  and  from 
Lieutenants  to  Commander,  it  is  again  probable 
that  at  '  least  three  officers  are  recommended 
for  every  one  that  is  fortunate  enough  to  meet 
with  selection.  Is  not  the  reputation  these  officers 
and  men  would  get  by  the  publication  of  their 
praise,  theirs  by  right  ?  If  it  is  why  should  it  be 
withheld?  Such  pubHcation  involves  no  evasion  of 
the  secrecy  which  we  all  admit  to  be  necessarv  to 
naval  operations. 

That  Torty-four  naval  names  should  be  in- 
cluded in  one  honours'  list  is,  as  I  have  said,  un- 
precedented, and  the  comment  has  been  made 
that  it  is  a  large  crop  of  honours  for  a  relatively 
small  amount  of  actual  fighting.  It  is  pointed 
out  that,  if  military  officers  are  to  be  rewarded 
on  the  same  scale  the  number  of  knights  would 
be  legion.  But  this  is  surely  a  very  illogical  way 
of  looking  at  things.  Naval  actions  have  a  way 
of  being  decisive  ;  in  all  wars  the  proportion  of  sea 
to  land  fighting  is  and  must  be  small.  In  normal 
times  the  Army  necessarily  sees  more  actual  service 
than  the  Navy,  and  for  generations  has  had  ten 
knight  companionships  to  the  Navy's  one.  The 
Navy's  service  must  be  looked  on  as  a  whole,  and 
it  must  be  realised  that  the  number  of  naval 
officers  eligible  for  the  highest  decorations  is  ex- 
ceedingly small.  Note  also  that  these  are  the 
first  titles  conferred  on  naval  officers  since  the  war 
began.  There  is  indeed  one  exception.  Rear 
Admiral  Sir  Archibald  Moore  was  gazetted  to 
K.C.B.  in  August,  1914.  But  the  honour  was 
conferred  not  for  his  work  as  second  in  command 
to  Sir  David  Beatty,  but  for  long  service  at  the 
Admiralty.  Here-  except  for  six  months  as  flag 
captain  in  the  Dreadnought ,  and  another  six  months 
as  Captain  of  the  Fleet — he  served,  I  believe,  con- 
tinuously from  i()07  to  T014,  successively  as  naval 
assistant  to  the  First  Sea  Lord,  as  Director  of  Naval 
Ordnance,  as  Controller  and  as  Third  Sea  Lord. 

Indeed,  far  from  the  Navy's  receiving  too 
many  honours,  it  is  obvious  that  it  receives  far  too 
few.  and  partly  because  the  flow  of  honours  is 
arbitrarily  restricted  by  the  rule  that  no  officer 
of  the  rank  of  post  captain  can  receive  a  knight 
companionship.  Now  there  are  only  94  officers 
on  the  active  list  above  the  rank  of  captain,  and 
of  these,  the  three  Admirals  of  the  Fleet  are  seldom 
if  ever  employed, and  even  in  time  of  war  a  large 
proportion  of  the  full,  Vice,  and   Rear   Admirals 


have  to  ,bt  without  posts.  For  obvious  reasons 
many  coni^mands  which  are  of  equal  importance 
to  many  Rear  Admirals'  commands,  are  given 
to  Officers  of  junior  rank  because  of  their  proved 
ability  and  genius  for  leadership.  The  greater 
part  of  the  operations  of  the  Heligoland  Bight 
for  instance,  were  under  the  personal  command 
of  Captain  Reginald  Tyrwhitt  serving  as  Com- 
modore in  command  of  light  cruisers  and  des- 
troyers. In  the  fifth  and  last  of  his  engagements 
on  that  historic  day  he  was  relieved  of  the  atten- 
tions of  the  German  cruiser  Mainz  by  another  light 
cruiser  squadron  commanded  by  another  post 
captain,  Commodore  (ioodenough.  Again  keep- 
ing to  this  operation  only,  remember  that  it  was 
only  made  possible  by  the  extensive  and  very 
astonishing  reconnaissance  which  the  submarines 
had  carried' but,  and  they  too  had  been  under  the 
command  of  a  third  post  Captain,  Commodore 
Roger  Keyes.  It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  th-o 
instances  in  which  captains  have  acted  on  their  own 
as  senior  naval  officers,  either  of  considerable 
bodies  of  ships  or  in  command  of  extensive  opera- 
tions. The  case  of  Captain  Cyril  Fuller  on  the 
African  Coast  is  an  obvious  instance.  Nor  should 
the  vast^y  responsible  staff  work  at  Whitehall, 
now  carried  on  by  Captains  be  forgotten.  What- 
ever the'  table  of  relative  military  and  naval 
precedeirce  may  say,  not  only  is  work  of  this  kind 
far  more  comparable  to  that  which  in  the  Army 
is  discharged  by  men  whose  rank  entitles  them  to 
knight  companionships,  but  it  is  really  open  to 
question  whether  the  colossal  multiplication. ,  of 
responsibility  which  the  increase  in  size  and 
power  of  'the  modern  battleship  has  brought 
about  does  not,  rightly  considered,  put  the  Captains 
of  all  the  latest  capital  ships  on  a  level  at  whicb  it 
is  absurd  to  deny  them  the  right  to  a  title  for  q^ip- 
spicuously.  meritorious  service.  And  this  sugg^sJfs 
a  further  refiection.  '  ..- 

A  man  who  serves  his  country  20  years, io 
the  volunteer  force  is  entitled  to  a  long  service 
decoration,  a  distinction  which  is  no  doubt 
thoroughly  earned.  But  a  man  may  serve  40  years 
with  credit, in  the  Navy  and  letire  as  Captain  or 
Rear  Admiral  with  no  honorr  of  any  kind  what- 
ever. The  honours  fall  to  those  who  by  good 
fortune  or  superior  merit  have  exceptional  oppor- 
tunities, and  to  those  whose  agreeable  personal 
qualities  make  them  acceptable  to  the  distinguished 
civilians  who  from  time  to  time  govern  the  Navy. 
But  remember  that  no  man  can  be  prom.oted  from 
lieutenant  to  commander  and  from  commander  to 
Captain  and  serve  his  due  time  at  sea,  without 
rendering  to  his  country  a  service  with  w  hich 
20  years  in  the  volunteer  force  cannot  be  com- 
pared at  all.  RejTiember  that  he  has  carried  his 
own  life^  and  the  life  of  hundreds  in  his  hands  'ji 
years.  He  has  been  responsible  for  ships  whose 
value  may  come  to  n;illions.  It  is  true  he  may 
retire  with  the  title  of  Captain,  but  a  few  years 
service  in.  the  Army  has  entitled  thousands  ol 
young  men  to"  such  distinction  as  this  title  gives 
Is  it  not  time  to  recognise  that,  merely  to  read 
captain's  rank  argues  a  debt  from  the  country  that 
should  be  recognised  by  some  mark  that  will  dis- 
tinguish a  man  from 'his  neighbours  on  public 
occasions  ?  The  Imperial  Service  Order  is  already 
conferred  for  years  of  meritorious  work  in  the 
different  civilian  services.  Service  in  the  Navy  is 
conspicuously  imperial.  Wh\'  should  not  every 
Captain  receive  this  order  on  retirement  ? 

ARTHUR     POLLEN 


January  20,  1916. 


LAND      AND,     WATER 

THE    FORUM. 


A     Commentary     on    Present-day    Problems. 


IN  The  Forum  of  the  issue  before  last,  the 
present  writer  dealt  in  the  manner  of  a 
devil's  ad\'ocate  with  some  British  charac- 
teristics tending  to  hamper  the  '■■  effective- 
ness of  British  work.  That  informal  commentary 
has  brought,  among  other  documents,-  two  of 
exceptional  interest  :  the  one  a  letter  of  protest 
against  the  doctrine  of"  finishing  the  screw-driver," 
thr"  other  a  fantastic  little  book,  beautifully 
printed  and  boldly  illustrated,  with  the.  title  of 
The  Devil's  Devices*  sent  by  its  author.  It  is 
not  likely  to  be  a  coincidence  that  the  writer  of 
the  letter  is  the  illustrator  of  the  book.  But 
though  it  may  be  prudent  to  be  on  one's  guard 
against  such  amiable  little  conspiracies  in  the 
future,  and  to  beware  of  establishing  awkward 
precedents,  the  writer  of  these  comments  gladly 
confesses  that  he  would  have  been  sorry  to  have 
missed  the  wit  and  wisdom  of  The  Devil's  Devices, 
and  is  happy  to  have  the  opportunity  of  introduc- 
ing it  to  readers  of  this  page. 

The  burden  of  both  letter  and  book  is  that 
efficiency  and  organisation  are — the  Devil.  The 
assumption  of  both  correspondents  was  that 
''eflficiency  and  organisation  "  were  tlie, chief  and 
only  gods  set  up  for  worship  in  the  commentary 
under  discussion.  .       .;  ,    . 

--Says  the  writer  of  the  letter  : — "May  I  point 
olit'  that  there  Vs  '  a  real  case  against  finishing  the 
sci'c\'v-driver  '  as  ahycae  who  has  used  Specialised 
td61s  Well  knows:  \\'hatever  may  be  the  state  of 
.aifairs  in  factories  (the  further  extension  of  the 
methods  suitable  to  which  wouldbfe  a  doubtful 
j:;;ood),  the  tool  which  will  do  only  one  job  and 
that  only  in  one  Way  is  a  nuisance' and  an  ex- 
fi-dvagant  nuisance."  But  can  this  position  be> 
reasonably'maintained  ?  Is  it  not  really,  the  result 
of  the  craftsman's  bias  against  any  threatening  of 
the  liand-worker's  primitive  processes?  Such  a 
bids  is  eminently  justifiable  in  the  case  of  such 
monstrosities  as  machine  carving  and  the  various 
fakements  and  imitations  to  which  the  machine 
is  prostituted  in  modern  production.  But  a 
very  clear  distinction  needs  drawing  between  work 
which  the  machine  does  as  well  as  or  better  than 
the  man,  and  that  which  the  man  does'better  than 
the  machine.  '■       • 

To  return  to  screw-driving.  After  all  the 
screw  is  itself  a  machine.  EVen^  the  most 
primitive  screw-driver  must  be  a  tool  tnore  or  less 
specially  adapted  for  the  purpose  of  drivnng  screws, 
and  can  only  have  a  quite  secondary,  and  as  one  is 
inclined  to  think,  misapplied  usefulness  dn  opening 
packing-cases  or  as  a  weapon  of  offence.  '  Indeed, 
this  plea  against  specialised  tools'  is  hard"  to  under- 
stand. No  craftsman  does,  ill  actual  fact,  use  a 
chisel  for  screw-driving,  nor  does  one  cut  the  pages 
of  a  book  with  one's  razor.  If  the  ratcheted,  semi- 
automatic screw-driver  does  intact  drive  screws  as 
well  as  the  primitive  tool,  who  or  what  in  the  world 
is  the  worse  if  it  drives  them  quicker  ?  If  the 
improved  angle  of  its  blades  drives  them  better, 


•  •■The  Devil's  Pevicps,"  or  "  Control  vcrsu.s  Service,"  by 
Pnuglas  Pepler,  with  woodcut.^  by  Eric  Gill.'  Published  at  the  Hamp- 
shire House  workshops.  Hammersmith.     I9'5' 


is  there  anything  but  gain  ?  Indeed,  if  an  absolutely 
automatic  screw-driving  ni<u.?hine  were  economic- 
ally profitable,  there  could  be  no  possible  objec- 
tion to  its  adoption,  or  at  any  rate  no  pssible  way 
of  preventing  its  adoption.  There  is  no  logical 
position  save  that  of  going  back  to  the  wc-^den 
dowel — if  that  indeed  be  logical !  ; 

For  what  the  writer  of  the  letter  really  means 
is  that  he  regrets  the  whole  development  of  the 
machine  era.  But  no  solution  of  our  problems 
can  ever  be  sound  which  ignores  the  facts  of  our 
actual  environment.  We  are. not,  nor  are  likely 
ever  to  find  ourselves  in  reformed  Ercwhon  where 
the .  wise  folk,  .  seeing  the  mastery  which  the 
machines  threatened  to  acquire  over  men,  broke 
them  all  and  made  it  a  crime  to  invent  one.  Only 
such  a  solution  as  accepts  the.  actual,  substantial 
and  irrevocable  facts  of  our  day,  which  tries  to 
eradicate  certain  obvious  weaknesses  and  make 
certain  practicable  improvements  within  the 
general  lines  of  what  we  had  best  call  our  develop- 
ment rather  than  our  progress,  is  worthy  of  atten- 
tion.    The  rest  is  crying  for  the  moon. 

It  does  indeed  seem  a  much  more  reasonable 
because  a  more  practicable  proposition  to  hold 
that  a  machine  should  be  contrived,  to  do  everv- 
thing  that .  it  can  do  better  and  quicker  than  a 
man,  and  that  the  fine  of  advance  of  the  man  should 
be  to  provide  himself  with  the  leisure  and  the  educa^ 
tion  andto  develop  the  healthful  energy  necessary,  to 
create  those  things  which  it  is  certain  that  the 
machine  can  never  create.  Such  things,  for  in- 
stance, as. works  of  art,, which  only  the  unreflective 
consider  to  be  of  secondary  importance  in  life.  . 

To  a  certain  extent  the  artist  can  and  should 
even  capture  and  control  the  machine.  This  is  quite 
obvious,  for  instance,  in  the  case  of  printing.  It  still 
remains  true  that  the  more  closely  the  craftsman 
is  in  touch  with  the  machine  and  the  more  direct 
the  process,  the  more  personality  can  be  got  into 
the  reproduced  picture.  For  instance,  hand-inked 
and  hand-pulled  lithographs  are  of  a  finer  artistic 
quality  than  any  printed  on  the  most  accurate 
machine  with  mechanically  distributed  ink  and 
perfect  impression.  .  But  very  tolerable  results 
are  produced  by  purely  mechanical  printing  pro- 
cesses. The  lithograph  remains  a  good  example 
because  there  does  not  arise  the  controversial 
question  as  to  the  iniquity  or  otherwise  of  photo- 
mechanical engraving.  If  the  original  lithograph 
be  beautiful  in  design  and  rich  in  colour,  all  but 
those  most  subtle  nuances,  which  rightly  have 
value  for  the  instructed  connoisseur,  will  be 
retained  by   skilled  mechanical  printing. 

The  application  of  this  can  be  made  very 
obviously  to  extend  to  furniture.  If  a  table  is 
rightly  planned,  machine  sawing,  planing  and 
mortising,  with  only  the  final  fitting  and  finishing 
performed  by  the  craftsman,  will  produce  more 
quickly  and  more  economically  a  thing  as  useful, 
and  all  but  as  beautiful  as  one  that  is  worked 
throughout  by  hand.  This  matter  is  more  signi- 
ficant than  might  at  first  appear.  It  is  unques- 
tionable that  the  English  craftsman  of  the  later 
decades  of  the  nineteenth  century,  who  inspired 


TT 


LAND      AND     WATER 


January  20,  1916. 


the  crafts  revival  in  America  and  German\',  always 
committed  the  fault  of  holding  aloof  fpom  the 
machine.  They  always  assumed  that  the  machine- 
made  article  was  radicalh^  bad  ;  when  the  fact  is 
that  it  may  be  either  good  or  bad.  It  is  the 
planning  and  the  treatment  that  matter.  When 
they  might  have  designed,  advised,  controlled, 
our  craftsmen  maintained  a  detached  superiority. 
They  might  have  saved  our  manufacturers  from 
producing  shopfuls  of  "  artistic"  horrors. 

Which  leads  me  to  the  second  indictment  of 
my  correspondent—  perhaps  I  may  be  allowed  for 
the  occasion  to  put  aside  the  formal  solemnity  of 
impersonality — namely  that  I  claim  that  the 
(iermans  have  honoured  the  prophets  of  our  house- 
hold whom  we  ha\'e  preferred  to  leave  unrecog- 
nised. Well,  it  is  simply  true.  The  doctrine 
preached  by  Morris  and  developed  by  Professor 
Lethabv  of  honest  intention  in  manufacture, 
has  been  seized  upon  in  Germany  and  put  to 
excellent  use.  Perhaps  I  may  be  allowed  in 
explanation  to  quote  what  I  have  written  else- 
where. This  doctrine  "steers  us'past  alfsuch  mistakes 
as  making  wall-paper  to  represent  tiles,  or  linoleum 
to  simulate  parquet  work  ;  plaster  pilasters  or 
iron  mantel-shelves  to  look  like  marble  ;  deal  doors 
grained  like — well,  like  nothing  actually  on  earth, 
but  alleged  to  be  like  oak  ;  transparent  paper  to 
imitate  stained  glass,  and  a  score  of  other  such 
imbecihties. 

"  If  you  want  a  biscuit  box  yott  really  ought 
not  to  make  it  look  like  a  bag  of  golf  clubs,  or  six 
volumes  of  Shakespeare,  or  a  Chippendale  cabinet 
— all  current  examples.  vSuch  monstrosities  make 
thoroughly  bad  boxes.  Design  your  box  frankly 
for  what  it  is  meant  to  be,  a  receptacle  to  hold 
sweets  or  biscuits  ;  decorate  it  gaily  with  an 
amusing  pattern,  bold  or  delicate  as  your  fancy 
dictates,  and  your  biscuit  box  may  become  really 
a  thing  of  beauty,  and  long  after  its  contents  are 
consumed  may  serve  as  a  work-box  or  tea-caddy 
that  a  princess  might  be  content  to  use.  You  will 
find,  as  is  common  in  such  returns  to  sanity,  you 
have  also  decreased  the  cost  of  manufacture." 

The  Germans  have  had  the  imagination  to 
apply  on  these  lines  the  admirable  maxims  which 
were  made  in  England  by  the  Arts  and  Crafts  fellow- 
ship. On  the  other  hand,  as  I  wrote.  "  the  history  of 
modem  British  commerce  is  largely  the  history  of 
lost  opportunity  and  lack  of  imagination."  To  make 
his  point  that  the  German  passion  for  organisation 
and  efficiency  has  run  amok  with  disastrous 
re.sults,  my  correspondent  has  added  the  gloss  of 
"  and  art  "  after  the  word  "  commerce."  But  I 
deliberately  refrained  in  this  connection  from 
speaking  of  art,  that  desperately  controversial 
thing.  Art  certainly  cannot  be  organised  !  But 
I  see  no  serious  danger  in  a  wide  application  or 
adaptation  of  tW  principles  of  honest  crafts- 
manship to  manufacture. 

"  The  history  of  modern  German  commerce 
and  art  is  largely  the  history  of  opportunities 
seized  and  exploited  with  an  even  greater  lack  of 
imagination,"  retorts  the  critic.  Yet  I  think  we 
need  to  concern  ourselves  less  with  these  Teutonic 
excesses  than  with  our  own  defects  in  this  matter. 
It  may  show  lack  of  imagination  to  run  the  whole 
business  to  death  by  the  feverish  application  of 
principles,  but  it  surely  shows  less  to  make  no 
attempt  to  apply  them  at  all. 

But  let  me  be  fair  to  my  critic,  who  is  not  :i 


mere  iminstructed  grumbler,  but  a  recognised 
authority  in  his  craft.  "  Itis  one  of  the  greatest 
difficulties — -the  difficulty  of  contending  with  those 
who  imagine  that  because  the  Germans  take  up 
everything  with  such  astonishing  voracity  and 
thoroughness,  that  therefore  they  do  it  well. 
Now  the  particular  case  of  Morris  and  the 
English  attempt  to  revive  good  printing  and  calli- 
graphy is  an  excellent  example  to  the  contrary. 
The  Germans'  exploitation  of  the  distinguished 
scribe  to  whom  your  contributor  refers,  their 
translations  of  his  books,  *the  institution  of  classes 
for  the  study  and  imitation  of  his  '  style,'  the 
foundation  of  factories  for  the  production  of 
special  pens  to  make  special  lettering  (just  like 
the  American  screw-driver) — all  these  have  re- 
sulted in  a  flood  of  the  most  abominable,  sham- 
artistic,  quasi-mediaeval  and  utterly  German  letter- 
ing, which  no  one  but  a  modest  English  journalist 
viewing  it  with  eyes  blurred  by  tears  and  com- 
paring it  with  the  smaller  and  wavering  stream  of 
English  work,  could  regard  as  anything  but  a 
nightmare." 

As,  to  which  it  seems  pertinent  to  distin- 
guish as  follows  :  If  the  books  are  well-written 
the  translation  can  be  no. crime;  if  the  classes 
are  less  for  the  study  of  the  calligrapher's 
style  than  for  the  study  of  his  craft  through 
examples,  which  surely  is  a  reading  the  facts 
will  bear,  that  is  well  enough ;  if,  in  fact, 
the  chief  discovery  of  the  modern  English  calli- 
graphers  was  the  old  method  of  working  with  a 
blunt  "  point,"  and  getting  thicks  and  thins  by 
a  turn  of  the  pen,  not  by  pressure,  then  I  see  no 
fault  in  the  manufacture  of  special  pens  capable 
of  being  used  in  that  effective  way.  Nor  is  this 
of  course  in  the  very  least  degree  '  like  the  Ameri- 
can screw-driver  !  '  From  my  own  observation  in 
this  field,  I  can  assert  that  far  from  merely  imitating, 
these  aggressive  German  traders  had  produced,  to- 
gether with  much  that  was  good,  a  good  deal  more 
of  the  rather  deplorable,  clumsy,  "utterly  German" 
lettering.  But  let  me  repeat,  we  need  not  be 
concerned  with  their  failures.  Their  general  atti- 
tude shows  a  willingness  to  learn,  to  exploit  if 
you  will.  If  my  eyes  are  blurred  by  tears,  it  if^ 
because  (in  general,  and)  in  particular  with  regard 
to  the  honourable  craft  of  printing,  with  which  I 
have  some  special  acquaintance,  it  is  rare  in 
England  to  find  a  master  printer  who  knows  ov 
cares  an^'thing  about  the  history  or  high  tradition 
of  his  manufacture,  which  is  still  so  nearly  a  craft. 

Natm-a,lly  all  this  has  more  significance 
to  those  practical  men  who  are  quite  reasonably 
intent  upon  "  capturing  German  trade  " 
than  to  artist-craftsmen,  whose  detachment  is,  as 
one  is  glad  to  cotifess  with  respect,  one  of  their 
fine  qualities.  But  I  will  hazard  this  conclusion  : 
avoid  the  German  excesses  in  this  matter  ;  recog- 
nise that  there  are  limits  to  the  exploitation  of 
craftsmen  in  manufacture:  but  recognise  also 
that  there  is  a  distinct  and  important  function 
that  they  should  be  allowed  or  induced  to  fulfil, 
and  that  there  are  definite  principles  by  which 
the  course  of  manufacture,  the  reproduction  of 
articles  in  bulk  according  to  pattern,  should  be 
controlled.  In  general  the  English  craftsmen  ha\-e 
failed  by  undue. detachment  as  the  manufacturers 
have  failed,  by  indifference.  The  matter  of  the 
Devil's  Devices,  and  tiie  more  general  case  against 
efficiency  and  organisation  must  be  held  over 
til!  the  next  issue. 


Tanuary  20,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


CAPTURING    GERMAN    TRADE. 


ByTArthur   Kitson. 


MUCH  time,  energy  and  money  are  being  ex- 
ix'nded  in  the  laudable  endeavour  to  get  our 
merchants  and  manufacturers  to  realise  the 
unique  opportunity  presented  by  the  War  for 
capturing  much  of  the  trade  hitherto  enjoyed  by  our 
Enemy.  The  Board  of  Trade  has  opened  a  department 
for  furnishing  useful  information  regarding  foreign 
markets,  our  Consuls  are  beginning  to  send  reports  of 
foreign  wants   and  conditions. 

The  British  manufacturer  has  been  severely  lectured 
and  criticised  for  his  lack  of  enterprise,  for  his  refusal  to 
adopt  new  methods,  his  conservatism  and, general  thick- 
headedness. No  doubt  much  of  this  is  well  deserved. 
The  foreign  agent,  anxious  to  supply  British  goods,  has 
shed  many  a  bitter  tear  over  the  stupidity  of  the  Briton 
who  argues  that  because  his  manufactures  are  recognised 
as  satisfactory  in  his  own  country,  they  should  therefore 
be  good  enough  for  the  foreigner.  His  refusal  to  under- 
stand or  to  try  to  understand  the  foreign  want  has  cost 
this  country  dearly.  But  when  all  this  is  admitted  there 
remains  much  that  requires  further  elucidation. 

Great  Britain  in  the  past  has  been  easily  the  first 
and  leading  industrial  power.  Her  early  inventors,  the 
enterprise  of  her  capitalists  and  merchants;  the  skill  and 
perseverance  oi  her  artisans  made  this  land-  the  world's 
home  of  industry.  For  over  a  century  we  reigned  supreme 
in  the  Industrial  World  until  we  began  to  find  ourselves 
challenged  first  by  the  United  States  and  then  by  Ger- 


many. 

New  Competition. 

The  advent  of  American  and  German  competition  has 
however/entirely  changed  the  character  and  methods  of 
trade.'  Since  the  days  when  Richard  Cobden  preached  his 
gosjiel  of  the  civilising  and  pacific  influences  :of  trade,  trade 
methods  have  undergone  a  complete  revolution.  Far 
ffoni  being  pacific,  modern  trade  involves  a  merciless 
system  of  warfare.  It  is  war  to  the  knife,  in  which  the 
financially  weak  must  succumb  to  the  financially  strong. 
Nowadays  business  success  requires  something  more  than 
brains  and  more  than  skill.  Success  is  usually  on  the 
side  of  the  big  bank  account.  Finance  has  become 
more  and  more  the  dominating  factor  in  the  international 
trade  warfare  which  has  been  waged  with  such  deter- 
mination and  ruthlessness  during  the  past  thirty-five 
or  forty  years.  And  it  is  this  particular  factor  which  is 
never  referred  to  in  all  the  literature  which  the  authorities 
are    distributing    so    generously. 

A  comparison  of  the  methods  by  which  the  Germans 
have  captured  so  much  of  the  world's  trade,  with  our  own 
will  throw  a  flood  of  light  on  this  subject.  For  the  past 
fifteen  or  twenty  years  Cierman  trade  with  Russia  and 
Turkey,  for  example,  has  increased  at  an  enormous  rate. 
Notwithstanding  the  Germans  are  and  have  been  personally 
disliked  by  the  people  of  both  countries — owing  to  their 
insolence,  coarseness  and  trickiness — the  Turks  and 
Russians  have  found  that  their  wants  have  been  better 
supplied  on  more  reasonaole  terms  than  by  those  of  any 
other  nation.  The  Russian  dealer  likes  long-time  credit. 
The  German  firm  gives  him  all  he  demands.  I  have  seen 
German  bills  drawn  against  Russian  .firms  for  terms  of 
three,  four  and  even  five  years. 

Again,  the  German  merchant  not  only  learns  and 
speaks  the  language  of  the  country  he  wishes  to  trade 
with,  but  prints  all  his  catalogues  and  price  lists  in  the 
same  language,  and  adopts  the  same  monetary,  weight, 
and  measure  units.  His  prices  usually  include  delivery 
to  tile  customers'  doors.  He  distributes  samples  of  his 
goods  freely.  He  measures  the  character  of  those  he 
deals  with,  and  acts  accordingly.  He  has  no  scruples. 
No  Oriental  politician  can  rival  the  smart  Teut-on  sales- 
man in  matters  pertaining  to  bribery  and  corruption 

But  behind  all  this  stands  the  German  Government 
in  the  persons  of  the  German  Ambassadors  and  Consuls, 
whose  duty  it  is  to  assist  in  every  possible  way  the  intro- 
duction and  extension  of  German  trade.  No  German 
prince,  not  even  the  Kaiser  himself,  has  ever  considered 
it  beneath  his  dignity  to  solicit  favours  and  privileges  from 


foreign  Rulers  on  behalf  of  German  merchants.  Much 
of  the  loyalty  and  patriotism  of  the  average  German  is 
directly  attributable  to  the  belief  that  his  King  and 
Government  are  interested  in  his  particular  welfare  and 
make  it  ore  of  their  duties  to  support  him  in  his  efforts 
to  secure  success.  But  the  chief  factor  in  Germany's 
industrial   success   is   undoubtedly   its   banking   system. 

German  Bankers. 

Tiie  German  banker  understands  that  his  chief  and 
most  important  client  is  his  own  countryman,  and  he  stands 
ready  to  assist  him  to  the  best  of  his  abihty.  The  German 
manufacturer,  inventor,  merchant,  tradesman,  agri- 
culturist and  producer  generally,  have  little  difficulty  in 
securing  whatever  financial  support  they  require,  provided, 
of  course,  they  can  satisfy  their  banker  of  their  ability 
to  produce  and  sell  goods  at  a  reasonable  profit.  The 
German  banker  shares  in  the  profits  of  the  industry  he 
supports,  and  hence  the  holders  of  his  bank  shares  do 
not  depend  upon  the  mere  interest  charges  on  loans. 
German. banks  are  therefore  part  and  parcel  of  (Jerman 
industries,  aiding  and  supporting  them,  ready  to  assist 
in  every  emergency  and  in  every  industrial  development 
which  promises  success. 

Now,  contrast  all  this  with  our  British  methods. 
The  average  Briton  knows  no  language  but  his  own^- 
and  that  often  imperfectly.  He  produces  only  the  goods 
he  has  been  accustomed  to  all  his  life  and  makes  littl^ 
or  no  effort  to  improve  his  methods  or  understand  the 
wants  of  foreigners.  He  sends  his  English  catalogues 
abroad  and  quotes  in  English  currency,  F.O.B.  London, 
Liverpool,  Hull,  Glasgow,  or  some  other  British  port.' 
His  terms  are  cash  against  documents,  or  so  many  days 
after  receipt  of  invoice.  There  are  of  course,  many 
exceptions,  but  I  am  referring  to  the  avcraf^e  British 
firm.  And  unhke  the  German,  he  meets  with  little  or 
no  support  from  his  own  Government.  Neither  his 
Ambassador  nor  his  Consul  will,  as  a  rule,  move  a  finger 
to  help  him  sscure  a  contract  or  develop  his  foreign 
business.  He  stands  absolutely  alone  !  Not  only  so. 
Very  frequently  he  will  find  his  Consul  addressing  him  in 
Teutonic  accents.  For  some  inscrutable  reason,  the 
British  Foreign  Office  has,  for  the  last  half-century  or 
more,  considered  that  British  interests  in  foreign  ports 
were  as  safe  or  safer  in  the  hands  of  Germans  as  in  those 
of  the  British  themselves. 

British  Consular  Service. 

In  an  article  entitled  "  Consular  Service  Reform," 
published  in  the  Open  Kevieiv  (July.  1909),  Mr.  Percy 
F.  Martin,  F.R.G.S.,  says  :  "  From  a  long  and  intimate 
acquaintance  with  the  methods  of  modern  Consular 
Service,  gathered,  I  may  add,  in  every  part  of  the  world, 
I  am  firmly  convinced"  that  a  more  \lumsily  conceived 
or  a  more  indifferently  conducted  system  of  Consular 
representation  does  not  exist  than  that  of  Great  Britain 
.  .  .  Many  persons  who  occupy  the  position  of 
British  Consul  are '  British  '  neither  by  birth  nor  sentiment 
nor  in  method.  ...  It  was  proved  that  throughout 
the  great  Empire  (Germany),  which  is  opposed  so  much 
to  British  trade  and  commerce,  and  between  whose  com- 
mercial representatives  and  ourselves  has  so  long  existed 
and  must  ever  exist  the  keenest  rivalry,  nine- tenths  of  the 
Vice-Consuls  are  of  German  birth  and  origin."  This 
was  written,  bear  in  mind,  just  five  years  before  the 
war. 

In  addition  to  all  these  disadvantages,  the  British 
manufacturer  and  merchant  reap  no  financial  benefit 
at  the  hands  of  their  banker  by  reason  of  their  being 
British  citizens.  The  English  banking  system  has  been 
extolled — mostly  by  the  monevlendiiig  classes  and 
foreigners— throughout  the  world.  Viewed  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  foreigner,  there  is  no  question  that  it 
is  a  wonderful  institution.  For  it  collects  the  savings 
and  earnings  of  the  British  people  and  distributes  them 
with  the  utmost  impartiality  to  the  highest  bidder 
whether  British  or  foreign,  all  over  the  world.  TheLondoc 


LAND      A  M  J:>      W  a  T  E  R 


January  zo,  1916. 


Danker  is  essentially  an  internationalist.  .Hip  , regards 
all  nations  with  an  entiiely'  impartial  eye.  He  is 
swayed  by  one  motive  only — namely,  the  detern'.ination 
to  win  big  dividends  with  the  least  possible  risk.  If 
the  foreign  competitor  requires  financial  accommoda- 
tion and  is  willing  to  pay  a  higher  rate  of  interest  than 
the  British  producer  (with  the  same  security)  tiie  foreigner 
win^  There  are  dozens  of  (ierman  industries  nourishing 
to-dav.  built  up  and  supported  by  British  capital. 
It  has  long  been  the  cry  of  English  lirms  that  their  banks 
offer  them  little  or  no  support  in  the  development  of 
their  businesses. 

The  Two  Banking  Systems. 

Tile  broad  distinction  between  the  British  and 
(ierman  Banking  System  is  that  whilst  the  former 
deiJv-nds  for  its  rewards  upon  what  the  ancients  termed 
usurv  (that  is,  ))ayment  for  use),  the  latter  depends  upon 
production.  .\nd  between  these  two  systems  a  great  gulf 
i<  fi.ved.  For  the  one  is  less  concerned  with  the  industrial 
success  of  its  own  country  than  the  other.  It  is  not  of 
such  serious  moment  to"  the  London  banker  whether 
British  trade  is  dull  as  the  decline  of  (kunian  trade  is  to 
the  German  banker,  for  the  London  banker  regards  the 
world  as  his  oyster.  If  the  British  ]>roduccr  tinds  trade 
too  dull  to  employ  the  bank  funds  profitably,  there  are 
others.  The  (ierman.  or  American,  the  Canadian  or 
Argentine  merchant  will  be  glad  to  employ  them.  Hence 
the  dividends  of  our  banking  companies  show  com- 
paratively little  variation  regardless  of  our  trade  con- 
ditions. But  industrial  depression  of  the  Fatherland 
nuans  financial  depression  for  the  German  banks,  and 
'i>icc-vcrsa.  Hence  it  is  entirely  to  the  advantage  of  the 
German  banker  to  assist  to  the  best  of  his  ability  in 
stimulating  the  industrial  prosperity  of  his  own  people. 
Our  ban'rcing  system  deserves  a  chapter  to  itself.  As  a 
safe  system  for  earning  steady  dividends  for  bank  share- 
holders it  stands  almost  unrivalled.  For,  as  was, demon- 
strated in  August,  i()i4,in  times  of  crisis  it  has  the  credit 
of  the  nation  behind  it  without  having  any  well-defined 
responsibilities  thru  .t  upon  it,  so  that  whilst  the  banks 
are  allowed  to  reap  all  the  profits,  the  nation  is  compelled 
to  take  the  risks.  There  are  no  obligations  on  the  part 
jf  anv  of  our  banks  to  render  aid  or  facilities  to  any  British 
industries  whatsoever.     Such  help  is  purely  optional. 

As  a  national  institution,  our  banking  system  is  one 
of  the  most  expensive  and  harassing  that  could  possibly 
be  devised.  It  taxes  the  British  producer  for  the  benefit 
of  the  foreigner.  It  compels  him  to  provide  at  all  times 
a  free  gold  market  and  a  fixed  level  for  gold,  chiefly  for 
the  benefit  of  foreign  merchants.  It  subjects  him  to  the 
most  variable  bank  rate  in  the  world  !  !  It  has  been 
variously  estimated  that  every  advance  of  i  per  cent. 
ill  the  bank  rate  costs  this  country  from  £50,000  to 
£100,000  per  week  ! 

In  addition  to  all  the  advantages  enumerated  and 
possessed  by  the  German  producer,  there  is  the  further 
one  that  he  is  protected  to  a  large  extent  from  foreign 
competition  in  his  home  market.  Every  Government 
dejwrtment  in  the  Fatherland  is  forbidden  to  order  goods 
from  foreign  firms  where  similar  goods  are  purchasable 
in  Germany.  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  long  since  been 
the  settled  policy  of  our  own  Governments,  Railway 
Companies,  Municipalities  and  (Corporations  generally, 
to  buv  in  the  cheapest  market,  regardless  of  consetjuences. 
Wlicil  f>ossib!c  chance  lhcH\is  there  lor  British  firms  to 
capture  Germun  trade  ?  The  ansivcr  is  that  there  is  no 
chance    unless    the    conditions    are    completely    changed.  ■  \ 

Before  the  War. 

Prior  to  the  war.  the  man  or  firm  who  made  such  an 
ittempl.  soon  discovered  that  he  was  fighting  not 
merely  a  (ierman  competitor  but — the  entire  (ierman 
nation.  .\nd  just  as  many  of  the  small  shopkeeper- 
have  been  driven  out  by  the  great  departmental  stores, 
just  as  the  small  producer  has  been  wiped  out  by  the 
Trust  and  Combine,  so  many  of  our  manufacturer*  alid 
merchants  have  found  successful  competition  with 
(jerman  houses — backed  as  they  are  by  all  the  strengtl; 
of  the  Gennan  Government — impossible  I  Since  the  war 
started,  many  instances  have  come  tt)  our  knowledge 
of  enemy  firms  having  been  guaranteed  certain  dividend- 
by  their  Government,   provided  they  used  e\ery  etlorl 


to  o\ist  jival  nations  from  loreign  markets.  These  finrii 
were  even  advised  to  offer  goods  below  cost,  until  all 
competitors  were  driven  out,  such  losses  being  made 
good  by  the  State. 

Again,  the  interest  of  the  (ierman  authorities  in 
every  branch  of  industry  is  illustrated  by  their  policy  of 
furnishing  'gratuitious  help  to  (ierman  inventors  andjdis- 
coverers.  Take,  for  example,  the  glass  industry.  Heat- 
resisting  glass  is  a  comparati\ely  modern  discovery,  and 
was  practically  a  German  monopoly  when  the  w-aj-  started, 
'i'he  story  of  the  rise  of  this  industry  was  told  me  by  a 
(ierman  professor  of  Jena  some  years  ago.  Two  pro- 
fessors of  the'  University  of  that  town  stumbled  upon  a 
method  of  manufacturing  glass  which  could  withstand 
both  high  and  low  temperatures  without  breaking. 
Recognising  the  value  of  their  discovery  they  applied  to 
the  (iovernment  for  financial  assistance,  and  it  is  said 
the  (iov.erument  immediately  responded  with  a  gift  of 
.500,000  marks  for  the  purpose  of  lompleting  their  experi- 
ments and  starting  the  industrj^  This  industry  employed 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  many  thousands  of  people, 
and  represented  some  millions  of  pounds  of  revenue  to 
the  German  nation. 

Again,  compare  the  German  Government's  attitude 
towards  their  dyi:  industry,  which  has  become  another 
vast  monopoly,  to  the  treatment  accorded  this  industry 
by  our  own.  Here  was  an  original  British  invention  made 
the  basis  for  a  German  monopoly  I  Is  it  not  a  fact  that 
hundreds  of  British  inventors  have  had  to  go  abroad  or 
sell  their  inventions  to  foreigners  in  order  to  get  them 
taken  up?  Have  not  many  of  our  progressive  manu- 
facturers been  compelled  to  import  German  chemists 
and  scientists  to  assist  them  in  the  development  of  their 
manufactures  ?  Can  we  possibly  wonder  at  the  enor- 
mously greater  progress  of  (ierman  industries  when  we 
contrast  the  entirely  different  attitudes  of  the  two  races 
and  their  Governments  ? 

Business  Patriotism. 

What  advantage — economically  speaking — has  it 
been  to  an  inventor  or  manufacturer  or  business  man 
generally  speaking,  to  belong  to  the  British  nation? 
What  privilege  or  advantage  has  his  British  birth  and 
citizenship  conferred  upon  him  which  the  foreigner  is  not 
equally  entitled  to  ?  Except  for  the  purpose  of  taxing 
him  or  soliMting  his  vote,  w'hat  evidence  is  there  that  our 
Governments  have  been  actively  interested  in  the 
success  of  the  average  Briton  ? 

In  conclusion,  (German  trade  can  be  captured  only 
by  the  nation  that  can  emulate  (iermany  in  her  enter- 
prise, her  knowledge,  her  organisation  (where  the  (iovern- 
ment lends  its  wholehearted  support  to  its  producing 
classes),  and. finally,  in  her  banking  methods,  where  the 
banks  recogr^ise  their  chief  functions  to  be  the  support 
and  development  of  this  nation's  trade  and  industries. 

The  lesson  of  business  patriotism  has  yet  to  be  learned 
both  by  our  (iovernment  and  j)eople.  No  German  could 
have  written  such  a  letter  as  that  recently  published  by  a 
well-known  Earl,  who  asked  if  it  was  conceivable  that  the 
British  jiublic  would  stand  being  compelled  after  the  war 
to  pay  more  for  certain  goods  instead  of  buying  them  from 
(iermany  ?  If' we  are  to  win  in  our  future  trade  w-arfare, 
we  must  pj-esent  a  solid  front  to  the  enemy.  We  must 
mobilise  all  our  forcesi  of  production.  We  must  con- 
solidate our  credit.  The  (iovernment  and  people  mu-^t 
unite  to  support  aiid  help  each  other.  Our  Ambassadors 
and  Consuls  must  all  be  British  to  the  core.  They  should 
,  be  conversant  with  trad(^  and  commerce  in  all  its  branches, 
and  constidite  the  advance  guards  for  opening  up  new 
fields  for  conquest  by  our  merchants  and  manufacturers. 
The  Government  should  nationalise  our  banking  system 
and  plaice 'bJiAiking  facilities  on  easy  terms  within  the 
reach  of  all  classes.  Inventors,  discoverers  and  scientists 
should  obtain  social -^ recognition  .  proportional  to,  their 
attainmcnts,;and<the  conferring  of  titles  on  men  of  wealth 
regardless  pf  the  means  by  which  their  wealth  has  been 
acquired  should  cease. 

In  s'plte'  of  our  many  shortcomings,  this  nation 
possesses"  alh'tlie'Hfaterial  and  resources  for  leading  the 
world  industrially, -intellectually  and  spiritually,  to  greater 
heights -than. ha,vc^cvtr,y4it  been  foreshadowed.  For  the 
accomplishp\t;nt  of,  this,  all  we  need  are  leaders  who  have 
t!)c  knowlc'dgc.  the  wilT  and  the  ability  to  organise  and 
develop  these  resources. 


I 
I 


January  20,   1916.  LAND      AND      WATER. 

A    SONG    OF    THE    GUNS. 

By    gilbert    FRANKAU. 

4.-EYES    IN    THE    AIR. 

Our  guns  arc  a  league  behind  us,  our  target  a  mile  below. 

And  there's  never  a  cloud  to  Wind  us  from  the  haunts  of  our  lurking  fo^- 

Sunk  pit  whence  his  shra|mertore  us,  support-trench  cresf-roncealed. 

As  clear  as  the  charts  before  us,  his  ramparts  lie  revealed. 

His  panicked  watchers  spy  us,  a  droning  threat  in  the  void. 

Their  whistling  shells  outfly  lis— puff  upon  puff,   deployed 

Across  the  green  beneath,. us.  .across  the  flanking  gray. 

In  fume  and  fire  to  sheath' us  and  baulk  us  of  our  prev. 

Below,   beyond,   above   her 

Their  iron  web*  is  spun: 
Flicked  butunsnared  we  hover. 

Edged  ■  planes  against   the   sun  : 
Eyes  in  the  air  above  his  lair. 

The  hawks  that  guide  the  gun  ! 

No  word  from  earth  may,  r(;ach  us  save,  white  against  th3  ground, 
The  strips  outspread  to  teaoh  us  whose  ears  are  deaf  to  sound  : 
But  down  the  winds  that  sear  us,  athwart  our  engine's  shriek, 
We  send — and  know  they  hear  us,  the  ranging  guns  we  speak. 
Our  visored  eyeballs  show  uS;  their  answering  pennant,  broke 
Eight  thousand  feet  below  us,  a  whorl  of  flame-stabbed  smoke— 
Tne  burst  that  hangs  to  ^uide  us,  while  numbed  gloved  fingers  tap 
From  wireless  key  beside  us  the  circles  of  the  map. 

,  ,  Line — target — short  or  over — 

--ijil-    .    .  ,•  .... 

fcfff  <:t?'>.r;'  ■  '  Come,  .plain  as  clock  hands  nm, 

iwiifiv  Words  from  the  birds  that  hover, 

Unblinded,    tail    to    sun : 
Word  out  of  air  to  range  them  fair. 
From  hawks  that  guide  the  gun  ! 

Your  (lying  shells  have  failed  you,  your  landward  guns  are  dumb  : 
Since  earth  hath  naught  availed  you,  these  skies  b3  open  !    Come 
Where,  wild  to  meet  and  mate  you,  flame  in  their  beaks  for  breath. 
Black  doves  !   the  white  hawks  wait  you  on  the  wind-tossed  bouglis  of  death. 
These  boughs  be  cold  without  you,  our  hearts  are  hot  for  this ; 
Our  wings  shall  beat  aboiit^  yOu,  our  scorching  breath  shall  kiss : 
Till,  fraught  with  that  we  gave  you,  fulfilled  of  our  desire. 
You  bank — too  late  to  sav:;  you  from  bitincr  beaks  of  fire- 

Turn  sideways  from  your  lover. 

Shudder  and  swerve  and  run. 
Tilt ;     stagger ;    and   plunge   over 

Ablaze  .  against   the   sun  : 
Doves  dead  in  air,  who  clomb  to  dare 

The  hawks  that  guide  the  gun  I 


;:i,   ,U 


N.B.— A  Song  of  the  Guns  will  be  contf  iued  in  our  next  issue. 

SPENCER    PRYSE'S    WAR    LITHOGRAPHS. 

We  publish  to-day  the  first  of  a  series  of  War  Lithographs,  which  iVir.  Spencer  Pryse  drew  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  He  was  the  first  English  Artist  to  find  himself  within  sound  of  the  guns. 
Events  in  those  days  moved  quickly,  and  he  covered  numberless  miles  in  order  to  see  all  there  was 
to  be  seen,  passing  from  Antwerp  to  Bordeaux,  through  Belgium  and  France,  and  again  along  the 
French  trenches  in  Artois  and  Champagne.  His  views  of  the  Western  Front  are  unrivalled  and  have 
acquir  J  strong  histoi^ical  interest.  Many  of  them  ware  drawn  direct  on  the  stone,  and  so  they  have 
an  actuality  which  is  uncommon  in  lithographs.  Mr.  Spencer  Pryse's  work  is  too  well  known  in  this 
country  to  need  any  commendation  from  us:  he  stands  on  an  eminence  by  himself. 

15 


LAND      AND      WATER. 


January  20,  1916, 


FRENCH    WAR    BOOKS^ 


By  F.  Y,   Eccles. 


THE  publishing  house   of   Larousse,    ^^"^"^  f " 
over  the  world  for  the  enterprise  with  which 
it   disseminates    useful  knowledge   in  popular 
forms,  has  begun  to  issue  a  series  of  selections 
from  French  war  literature  for  circulation  in  neutral  ana 
allied  Countries.     1  think  it  was  well  worth  doing,     ton- 
verts  to  our  cause  are  hardly  to  be  gained  at  this  time 
3f  day  by  anv  arguments  short  of  evident  successes  in 
the  field  •    bift  something  may  be  done  to  conhrm  the 
timid   s\nnpathies  of   neutrals  by   the  mere  echo  of   a 
reasoned  confidence  and  determination  which  have  hitherto 
perhaps  been  most  effectively  expressed  in  the  brencn 
language.     It  is.  however,  among  the  allies  of  France 
that  such  a  scries  is  likely  to  be  most  useful ;    for/"  .the 
sphere  of  opinion  our  service  de  liaison  is  still  flet^ctwe. 
and  from  dav  to  day  misapprehensions  are  bred  by  the 
debauch  of  idle  or  interested  rumour      It  is  real'y  im- 
portant  to  realise  what  Frenchmen   believe  that   they 
and  we  are  out  to  destrov.  and  why  compromise  is  in- 
coaceivable  to  them  ;    and  the  best  way  is  to  read  the 
authors  whose  credit  with   their  countrymen   stood  high 
before  the  war  and  has  risen  with  their  utterances  since 
The  union  of  the  national  intelligence  with  the  national 
will  has  never  been  so  intimate  as  now. 

The  series  begins  with  MM.  Maurice  Barres  and 
Emile  Boutroux.  Each  author  is  introduced  by  a  short 
appreciation  of  his  whole  work.  The  excellent  account 
of  Maurice  Barres  is  from  the  pen  of  a  fellow  \osgian, 
M  Fernand  Baldensperger,  the  distinguished  professor 
at  the  Sorbonne,  who  is  serving  at  the  front  M. 
Boutroux  is  introduced  bv  a  philosopher  M.  Marcel 
Drouin  I  do  not  quite  understand  how  it  happens  that 
the  introductions  are  printed  in  English  as  well  as  in 
French    while  the  text  itself  is  not  translated. 

The  selections  from  Barres  consist  of  articles  contri- 
buted to  the  Echo  dc  Paris.  Many  of  these  p(g;-s 
choisics  formed  part  of  a  volume  already  noticed  m 
these  columns,  and  the  rest  are  no  doubt  reappearing  in 
its  sequel,  which  is  just  announced  under  the  title  ot 
"  Les  Saints  de  France."  It  is  probably  superfluous  to 
recommend  these  admirable  writings,  in  which  there 
is  not  a  word  which  does  not  tend  to  action,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  illustrate  that  reflective  and  rehgious 
quality  which  reinforces  the  instinctive  patriotism 
of  the  humblest  as  of  the  most  cultivated  Frenchman. 

M.  Emile  Boutroux.  the  philosopher— more  exactly 
the  critic  and  historian  of  philosophy— has  a  universal 
reputation  as  a  representative  of  the  speculative  French 
intellect  of  to-dav.     His  superior  eclecticism  supposes  a 
rare  familiarity  with  (ierman  thought,  and  his  articles 
and  lectures  on  subjects  connected  with  the  war  are  a 
solid  contribution  to  the  knowledge  of  the  German  soul. 
Even   in    France,   where   Teutomania  never   flourished 
there  must  be  thinkers  who  have  felt  latterly  obliged 
to  vindicate   their   patriotism  at    the   expensfe   of   their 
penetration    or    their    consistency,    or    who    have    only 
avoided  a  rather  ridiculous  retractation  by  fostering  the 
legend  of  ■■  the  two  (iermanies  "    M.  Boutroux,  who  has 
lived  in  Germany  before   1870  and  since,  who  has  an 
immense  respect  for  Leibniz,  knows  Fnuslhy  heart,  and  is 
not    disposed    to    underrate    the    positive    achievements 
of  German  science  and  erudition,  has  nothing  to  retract 
He  is  not  one  of  those  who  explain  the  aggression  of 
IQ14  as  the  effect  of  a  sudden  or  at  least  a  recent  aberration 
on  the  part  of  the  rulers  of  Germany.     He  knows  that 
the  firing  of  Louvain.  the  horror  of  Gcrbevillcr,  and  the 
sinking   of   the   Lusitania   are  consistent  with   theories 
which' it  is  not  at  all  fantastic  to  trace  back  to  certain 
illustrious  German  metaphysicians.      They  are  justified 
by  that  divinisation  of  "  Deutschtum  "  which  is  at  least 
as  old  as  Fichtc.  and  is  by  no  means  unconnected  with 
what  philosophers  call  subjective  idealism. 

•The  ego,  says  Fichte,  is  effort  •  thus  it  implies 
something  to  resistit,  namely,  that  which  we  call  matter. 
The  master-people  commands  :  there  must  iherefori'  bo 
nations  made  to  obey  it.     Indeed,  those jiations.  which 

""  t  K^vaiiis^  Fiutnais  pendant  la  Onme.  i.  Wdtarice  Barris 
(pages  f  hoisies).  2,  Kmile  B.jutroux  (pages  choisies).  Pans :  I.ihra.ne 
Larousse,  1915. 


are  to  the  master-people  what  the  non-ego  is  to  the  ego 
must  resist  the  action  of  the  superior  nation      For  that 
resistance   is   necessary,   in   order   that   the   latter   may 
develop  and  utilise  its' strength  and  become  itself  in  the 
fullest  sense  " 
But  the  close  and  lucid  reasoning  of  the  atticle  on 
"Germany  and   War."    and   of   the   lecture   on      The 
Development  of  German  Thought,"  do  not  lend  themselves 
readily  to  quotation.      M.    Boutroux   heard  Treitschke 
lecture  against    the  French,   and  was  scandahsed   when 
Zeller    (whose    History   of    Greek     Phi^losophy    he    was 
after%vards    to     translate),    opened    a  lecture  ^vlth   this 
announcement  :     •'  To-day  I  propose  to  construct  God. 

The  next  volume  of  these  "  Ecnvains  Francjais 
pendant  la  Guerre,"  will  contain  selections  from  the 
veteran   historian    Ernest   Lwisse. 


.'HJUlr.-     Belloc,     The    Man    and    His   W.rk."     By_G.    Gr.iiihton 
Mlndell   and    Edward    Shanks,    with  an    mtroduct.on    by    G.    K. 
Cheslerton.     (Methuen  and  Go.)    2s.  fid. 
Readers  of  L.\Nn  .\nd  W.^ter  wlio  have  come  to  regard 
Mr   Hilaire  Belloc  as  the  lucid  expositor  o    the  progress  and 
events  of  the  Great  War,  the  student  of  military  history,  who 
interprets  for  them  the  significance  of  strategy  and    actics  as 
they  are  unfolded  week  bv  week,  are  inclined  to  overlook  that 
he  is  also  one  of  the  most  charming  hving  essayists  in  the 
Fngiish  language,  a  writer  of  "nonsense     verses  which  aie 
aSv  Clares  and  a  man  who  has  earned    the  fine  art   of 
travel'to  as  high  a  level  as  it  has  ever  attained. 

In  this  little  book  these  truths  are  well  set  out.  and  not 
the  least  part  of  its  value  lies  in  the  numerous  citations  from 
his  works  which  are  for  the  most  part  excellently  chosen^ 
Mr  Belloc  has  run  a  tilt  against  many  of  the  worst  abuses  of 
Party  Government,  and  has  stripped  the    tinsel  and  gaudy 
deceits  from  that  old  idol,  whose  worship  so  many  Knglish- 
men  find  it^  hard  to  abandon,  even  in  these  hours  of  eartli- 
Se  and  whirlwind.     But  in  this  direction  his  work  ma 
Se  said  to  be  only  at  its  beginning,  and  we  b^heve  he     m11 
accomplish  much  more  in  the  years  to  come  than  anyth  ng 
he  Ims  achieved  hitherto.     Though  Mr.   Belloc  has  writ  en 
1  ttle  poetry,  the  most  of  it  is  of  the  highest  order,  and  has 
alreadv   been    the    begetter    of    rhyme.      It    is    mentioned 
in  these  pages  that  Rupert  Brooke  acknowledged  his  indebted- 
ness to  Hilaire  Belloc.  and  the  extraordinary  resemblance 
be  ween  Brooke's  well-known    sonnet    "The    Soldier.      and 
one  of  Belloc's  poems  in  "  The  Four  Men       is  too  close  to  be 
accidental.    The  first  two  verses  of  Belloc  s  poem  run  . 

He  does  not  die  that  can  bequeath 

Some  influence  to  the  land  he  knows, 
Or  dares,  persistent,  interwrcath 

Love  permanent  with  tlic  wild  hedgerows  : 
He  does  not  die  but  still  remains 
Substantiate  with  his  darlihg  plains. 

The  spring's  superb  adventure  calls 

His  dust  athwart  the  woods  to  flame  ; 
His  boundary  river's  secret  falls 
Peri)Ptuate  and  repeat  his  name. 

He  rides  his  loud  October  sky  ; 
He  does  not  die.     He  docs  not  die. 
Leaving  aside  his  writings  on  war,  it  is  as  a  traveller  that 
Hilaire  Belloc  has  won  the  affections  of  so  many  readers,  and 
tirciapter  in  this  volume  on  this  part  of  us  literary  career 
seems  to  the  reviewer  to  he  inadequate      In  one  paragraph 
he  is  unjustly  praised  for  committing  thehcmous  sm  of     1  im 
Writing'"     Belloc  is  much  too  great  an  artist  to  be  guil  v  of 
dtler  •'  Fine  Writing,"   or  "  Superfine  Writing."     But  where- 
eve'he  wanders  he  ttkes  us  by  L  hand,  and  ^howY^/"  ^ha 
is  visible  to  himself.     That  is  the  true  spirit  of    he  lionest 
lover  of  Earth,  the  mother  of  us  all.     We  are  aU  children  to- 
gether and  but  he  has  the  longer  sight,   and  lus  delight   is 
to  disclose  for  others  all  he  himself  sees.    And  nothing  better  on 
travel  has  been  written  than  these  few  sentences  from  Belloc  s 
pen,  with  which  we  will  end  this  brief  review  :— 
1.00k  you,  good  people  all,  in  V""'  little  passage  through  the  dayligM 
get  to  see  as  many  hills  and  buildings  and  rivers,  ^f '!«•  '>"°«^' 
men,  horses,  ships  and  precious  stones  as  you  can  possibly  manage^ 
Or  else  slay  in  .ine  village  and  marry  in  it  and  <lie  tber'--     I-or  one 
of  these  two  fates  is  the  best  fate  for  every  man.     luther  to  Le 
what  i  have  been,  a  wanderer  with  all  t"t  bitterness  of  .     or    to 
stay  af  Home  and  to  hear  in  one's  garden  the  voice  of  Cod. 

Me-,srs.  George  Allen  and  Unwin.  Ltd..  announce 
new  editions  of  "  The  Autobiography  of  Frnebel  and 
Pestaloz/.i's  famous  svork,  "  How  Gertrude-  Teaches  Her 
Children  \"  _ 


January  20,  igi6. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


ARTISTS    IN    PEACE    AND    WAR. 


By  a  Correspondent. 


THERE    has    been     opened     at     the    Leicester 
Galleries,  Leicester  Square,    an    exhibition    of 
paintings  and  etchings  by  the    members  "  of 
that  famous   corps,    the     Artist    Rifles      The 
first  impression  which  a  walk  round  the  galleries  creates 


is  the  singularly  high  general  standard  oTm;n  -every     fn The^fedment      No"  IsfT^'"' 
picture  has  individuaHtv.   and   it  .x,o„iri  k.  ^;«;„.,i.  Z     \.  ^"^  regiment.     No.  68,  a  drinkin 


picture  has  individuahty,  and  it  would  be  difficult  to 
bring  together  a  collection  so  exempt  from- poor  work- 
manship. ^ 

Artists  evidently  soldier  as  well  as  they  paint  •  so  we 
can  readily  understand  the  tribute  of  praise '  which 
General  Viscount  French  of  Ypres  paid  to  them  on  his 
departure  from  France— a  tribute  of  which  the  regiment 
IS  naturally  proud.     "  Officers  and  Men."  he  said   "  it  is 


Eolm'  SlTne."^"''''"   "'"'   "    ^^   Lance-Corporal 
In   the   Reynold's   Room   where   the   paintings   are 
hung     one    meets    again    with    pleasure    the    Egyptian 
paintings  of  Mr.  Lance  Thackeray,  now  a  Lance-Corporal 


angularly    appropriate 
and.  nothing  could  give 
me     greater     pleasure 
than    that    your    regi- 
ment,   the   Artists' 
Rifles,    should    be    the 
last  British  troops  that 
I  shall  see  in  France. 
You  have  done  wonder- 
ful work  since  you  came 
out.     You     have    fur- 
nished   some    of     the 
finest    leaders    of    the 
army  from  your  ranks, 
and   in    doing    so   you 
have   suffered   perhaps 
greater  losses  than  any 
other      regiment     out 
here.      You  have  done 
great  work,  and  I  have 
no  doubt  that  you  will 
continue  to  do  so  till  the 
«nd  of  the  campaign. 
I  am  very  pleased  that 
the  Guard  of  Honour 
on  my  leaving  France 
should  be  supplied  by 
the  Artists'  Rifles.       I 
wish  you  good-bye  and 
good  luck." 

This  exhibition  is 
not  by  any  means  a 
war  exhibition,  much 
of  the  work  was  done 
previous  to  August, 
1914,  and  in  some  in- 
stances this  very  fact 
gives  a  new  significance 
to  the  exhibit ;  thus 
No.  49  shows  us 
"  Ypres,  April  1914," 
by  Private  Eric  Sharpe. 
This  must  be  among 
one  of  the  last  pictures 
to  be  made  of  the  old 
capital  of  Flanders 
before    the    Hun    fury 


f^. 


^ 


^ 


A*- 


P. 

uM- 

^A^ 

1   ' 

~: 

HIGH     BEACH:    SEPTEMBER    1915. 
By    Lance-Corporal   James  Thorpe. 


TTr^r^or-  T?  ^^  :-:-•  *•"•  ^ —  "  -wMiig  pkcc  at  Dicrout, 
Upper  Egypt,  is  a  perfect  example  of  his  exceptional 
power  in  reproducing  the  atmosphere  of  the  desert 
Corporal  Gerald  Ackermann  shows  two  excellent  pictures' 
one  of_^  Corfe  Castle"  and  the  other  of  "Richmond 
Lastle,  and  there,  is  a  touch  of  the  Futurist  that  is 
very  pleasing  in  Private  Paul  Nash's  "Tree-Tops" 
(83)  and  Summer  Garden  "  (91).  Breadth  of  vision 
and   treatment   characterises   Captain   Gerard   Chowne's 

"  The      Chff  "       (66)  ; 

Sergeant  C.  Maresco 
Pearce's  "  Mentone  "  is 
a  splendid  presentation 
o  f  Italian  domestic 
architecture,  and  Lieu- 
tenant W.  Lee  ^an- 
key's  "  France  in  1914- 
1915  "  (74  and  78)  are 
admirably    expressed. 

"  Somewhere  in 
France  "  (93),  by  Ser- 
geant E.  Handley 
Read,  is  a  vigorous 
painting  of  a  typical 
willow-avenued  road 
flooded  with  rain  ;  and 
2nd  Lieutenant  Adrian 
Klein  (we  notice  from 
the  catalogue  that  he 
has  been  given  a  com- 
mission .since  he  gave 
up  etching  and  took 
to  painting,  although 
whether  on  account  of 
it  or  not  is  not  men- 
tioned), has  a  pathetic 
painting  of  the  "  Flem- 
ish Mill,  Ypres." 

Other  contributors 
to  this  admirable  ex- 
hibition are  Colonel 
Walter  C.  Horsley, 
Captain  Charles  J. 
Blomfield,  Captain 

Hall,  Second  Lieu- 
tenant A.  E.  Cooper. 
Corporal  Montague 

Smyth,  Lance-Corporal 
Dobson,  and  Private 
W.  H.  Fisher.  Glanc- 
ing through  the  names 
and  at  the  work  on  the 
walls  of  which  these 
men  are  capable,  the 
thought  very  naturally 
arises  what  will  be  the 


.*^*c 


--ili^ 


broke  against  it  and  battered    it  into  a  mass  of  ruin,     result  of  actual  experiences  in  thTfidd''  undent J'oDiS 
^?f,  '1  gams  new  deep  pathos.     Next  to  it  is  an  etching     conditions,  on  the  future  output  of  these  artists      Thev 


of  ;•  The  Belfry,  Bruges,"  by  and  Lieut.  W:  I-e  Hai^ey     ^^fPv^^^''^;:^^^'^ :Snr:S%^ 

' t'l'±.JlZrtl!'T.      e„M„^^„^..!T;--  ^°.«-^  f^^"-  and  it  seems  ob'vioS 


which  IS  a  very  fine  piece  ^.  ......         ....  .,.(,'-  — "  ^^  icei   me  emouons  to  tne  lull,  and  it  seems  obviou'« 

Belgium,     reproduced  on  the  opposite  page,  is  by  the  that  the  new  life  in  which  some  of  them  are  even  Z- 

same    artist.     Lance-Corporal    E.    L.    Pattison    has    a  engaged   will   cut   deep   into   their   work^     SrSneZr 

stnking  etching   of   "Magdalen  Tower,   Oxford."     Ser-  Pryse,  whose  hthographs  enjoy  a  urque  reputa^En  fn 

geant  Garrard's  lithograph  "The  Port  of  London,"  is  a  the  world  of  art,  has  already  showZT ho7deeply  no^ 

hne  study      Something  which  is  out  of  the  common,  and  only  the  sadness,  but  the  sliarp  contrasts  that    iro  in 

Which   will   necessarily   command   attention   in   that   it  evitable  in  war-time  impress  him      One  could  not  wi^h 

shows  how  intertwined  in  these  bloodstained  days  are  for  a   better    example  of  this  than  the  litho"ranh  that 

peace  and  war,  is  the  sketch  of  the  proposed  "  Govern-  appears   in   the   present   issue     British   Artillerv   af    T  ^. 

ment  Bmldmg  "  at  Ottawa,  by  2nd  Lieutenant  T.  H.  Mans-English  guns  resting  under  the  shelter  of  the  oM 

Hughes.     "St.  Omer  from  the  Abbey"  by  Cadet  Adrian  French   Cathedral.     The   scene   at   first  Xnce   at  '  ^^^^ 

B.   Klein,   is  sure  to  arrest  many  a  Staff  Officer  from  by  its  incongruity,  but  in  its  dramatic  power  lies  the  auiet 

l-orcl  brench  downwards.     It  woidd  be  difficult  to  give  strength  of  the  glorious  building  and  the  restless  activitv 

a  better  idea  of  the  beauty  of  this  part  of  the  exhibition  of  the  gunners  and  their  battery.     It  seems  to  shadow 

than  by  a  glance  at  the  bottom  picture  on  the  opposite  forth   the  quiet  potency  and  immutability  of    religion 

699 


LAND      AND      WATER 


January  20,  1916. 


and  tnc  petty  unrest  and  activity  of  human  hatred  and 

destructiveness.  ,        j   fu^*   th^ 

At  one  time  there  was  an  idea  abroad  that  the 
artist  was  the  stormy  petrel  of  humanity  ;  that  he  tclt 
instinctively  the  coming  storm  before  its  approach  was 
reahscd  by  the  rest  of  mankind,  and  that  all  the  revolt 
against  conventions  which  found  its  loudest  expressions 
in  the  Futurist  Exhibitions  (the  Futurist  often  being 
only  a  man  who  was 
trying  to  revive  all 
that  was  best  in  the 
Primitive  and  to  be 
finished  with  Artili- 
ciality),  was  merely  a 
symptom  of  the  politi- 
cal   and    social    cata 

clysm   which  has   now 

engulfed  Europe.        It 

is  more  than  doubtful 

whether  this  idea  can 

hold   water,    especially 

when      we     remember 

the    particular    school 

was  but   a  small   one, 

but  what  it  does  prove 

is  that    before  the  war 

there     was     a     strong 

movement  in  existence 

for  greater  sincerity  in 

life.      Nor  wts  it  only 

confined  to  art  circles. 

The  war  naturally  has 

ijuickened    this    move- 
ment and  imparted  to 

it    intense    vitahty. 

None  the  less,  conven- 
tionality and  insincerity 


REVIEWS  OF  BOOKS. 


M.  Atkinson 


••  Me-nolrs  of  M.  Thiers,  1870.1873.''     Translated  by  F. 
{George  Allen   and   Unwin,    Ltd. J 

These  Memoirs  of  M.  Thiers,  covering  tne  penod  l.om 
September  1870,  when  the  great  French  ^tatesiuan  started 
on  hTrtour  o^f  he  European  capitals  on  behal  of  Prance 
until  May  24th,  1873,  when  he  resigned  the  I^resKlency  of  the 
l^l..Jafler'his^ifeat  in  the  ^^^/^^t:^^. 

tune  moment.     In  read- 
ing  them    through    one 
often    finds    it    hard   to 
realise     that     forty-five 
years   have  elapsed    be- 
tween    then    and    now, 
so   naturally  do  present 
events    appear    as     the 
corollary  of  the  happen- 
ings     of      those     days. 
How    many    people   are 
aware    that   but.  for   the 
firmness     of    M.    Thiers 
Belfort  would  have  been 
a    German    town.      On 
this  point  he  was  adam- 
ant,   and  finally  France 
had    to    choose  between 
the    humiUation    of   the 
German  triumphal  march 
through     Paris     or    the 
cession   of  Belfort.     She 
unhesitatingly  cliose  the 
former.      Very   different 
might     have    been     the 
story    of    this  war    had 
she,  to  escape  the  tem- 
porary   degradation,    let 
go   her  permanent   hold 
on  Belfort. 


THE    FLIGHT    FROM     BELGIUM. 
By  2nd  Liculenant  W.  Lee  Haokey. 


We  strongly  recommend  a  perusal  of  this  book  to  all 
who  take  an  interest  in  the  political  complicities  which  he 
behind  and  follow  on  a  great  war.  History  repeats  itself  with 
surprising  exactitude  in  this  respect. 

By  Moore  Ritchie.     (Longmans  Green 


the  Field.' 
28.  6d.  net. 


With  Botha 
and  Co.)     -- 

Little  has  been  written  on  the  campaigns  in  South  Africa, 


"'  — -  "o--- ,  talent  among  men  wno  are  lu^u-  Little  has  been  written  on  tae  Ltuupug..:,  "'■:;:        ""■7- 

there  is  ^{^3^^"^^"'!^°;  duty  to  Their  country,  and  have     ^j^ich  rank  among  the  most  notable  successes  of  the  war  .for 
fully  discharging  their  duty  to  tn  y  ^^        ^^^^^  ^^^^^^  ^         .^1  ^^^1^^^^  ^U3t  ^  bestowed  on  this  book. 


aSS'^lar^^e  L^^h  a;;!  palette  to  go  forth 

and  defend  the  right. 

Pnhlished  in  aid  of  the  BelgkiT  Red  Cross  and  other 
Bel/an  c  larfti  s,   Bekian  Art  in  Exile   (Colour  Publishing 
Co    5  net)  is  on;  of  the  most  sumptuously  produced  volume 
thai  the  war  has  called  forth,  and  is  one  which  will  appeal  to  all 
lovers  ofTrl      Nearly  a  hundred  Belgian  artists  and  sculptors 
are  represented  in  the  volume  ;    many  of  these  men  are  m 
England        at       the 
present    time,    others 
are  prisoners  in  Ger- 
many, and  vet  others 
are  with  the  Belgian 
army.       The  best  of 
Belgian    art  is   repre- 
sented,   and   the   col- 
lection is  sufficiently 
complete  to  give  even 
an    amateur    a    com- 
prehensive idea  of  the 
range    of   colour    and 
form  in  the  work  of 
Belgian  painters  and 
sculptors.  Apart 

from  the  aims  which 
the  book  is  intended 
to  further,  it  is  a  work 
of  permanent  interest 
from  the  artistic  point 
of  view,  while  literary 

SSand  Mau&aeterlinck  add  to  its  national  value 


An  echo  of  Rupert  Brooke's  work  is  to  be  found  in  The 
Volunl^er  and  other  Poem.,  by  Herbert  Asquith  (Sidgwnck 
and   Jackson,   is.   net).     This  is  specially  notable  in      The 

^~""  ■"Ind'thoTe.'who  come  this  way  in  days  hereafter. 

Will  know  that  here  a  boy  for  England  fell. 
The  rest  o"  the  poems  are  characterised  by  a  similar  note. 
It  is  good  verse  of  the  Oxford  order. 


this  reason  a  special  welcome  must  be  bestowed  on  this  book. 
Mr  Moore  Ritchie  was  a  member  of  General  Botha  s  Body- 
guard, and  took  part  both  in  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion 
and  in  the  conquest  of  Damaraland.  , 

The  author  makes  no  attempt  to  go  into  strategical  ques- 
tions or  political  problems  ;  he  gives  us  a  vivid  picture  of  the 
hardships  which  the  troops  had  to  endure,  and  endured  wilhngly^ 
under  General  Botha,  whom  theyidohsed.  He  never  spared 
himself  or  them,  and  their  marches  across  the  desert  will  rank 

liigh  as  a  military 
achievement.  This 
book  is  the  more  in- 
teresting in  that  it  is 
copiously  illustrated 
with  photographs. 

.\nd  when  the 
lighting  was  over 
and  the  victory  won, 
kindliness  was  shown 
to  the  conquered 
Germans.  "  The  con- 
duct of  the  South 
.\frican  troops,"  writes 
Mr.  Ritchie,  "  should 
assuredly  be  noted. 
The  very  confidence 
of  these  German 
townspeople  that  they 
had  nothing  to  fear 
from  the  hated  troops 
CHiNON    CASTLE.  of  the  British    Union 

By  L.nce-Corpor.1  M.lcolm  CHborne.  of   South     Africa     WaS 

eloauent  The  thing  stood  out,  a  piece  of  bitterest  irony  in 
connect  on  with  a  people  whose  kindred  across  the  seas  were 
mrking  civilisation  shudder  at  their  atrocities  afloat  and 
^hore  General  Botha's  forces  had  crossed  a  desert  th rough 
;tch  it  was  the  open  boast  of  the  enemy  that  it  was  strewn 
with  mines  and  with  every  well  Pl"^""':'^- .  ^^^^  t"^  ! 
defenceless  citi7,en  of  Windhuk  or  Karibib  the  wor,e  for  it 
aaer  the  occupation?  Not  one.  It  was  magnanimous 
ft  was  magnificent.  But  I  wonder  if  the  chivalrous  Teuton 
would  caU  it  war  I  "     We  also  wonder. 


700 


TlIOIlSDAy,   J  IM'ARY   27,    1916. 


LAND    &   ^VC^ATER 


'^-  •  iniiiitrriniiiiiiinii mnnriM 


|M|t5«l(diMiaRHU^*>aeiSB««Kan)iwKmC8^^ 


"T'Tii   ilr'"n — r-inini 1  r    n     r  ji' — ^ 


iuoMii  faclujico/j/  /or  ■/.and  and    Water." 


PRIVATE    JOSEPH    WALKER. 

No.  16,0!»2  BEDFORDSHIRE   REGIMENT. 

On  September  9,  1914,  Joseph  Walker  enlisted  in  the  Bedfordshire  regiment  for  the  duration  of  the  war; 
on  January  11,  1916,  the  sea  gave  up  the  body  of  No.  16,09  i  Private  Joseph  Walker,  Bedfordshire  regiment, 
on  the  dyke  at  West  Capelle  in  Holland.  And  the  kindly  Dutchmen,  as  a  last  tribute  to  the  British  soldier, 
sent  for  an  English  clergyman,  and  v^ith  the  Union  Jack  as  his  pall  and  the  prayers  ot  his  Church 
read  over  the  coffin,  his   body  was  laid  to  rest  in   consecrated   ground.      The   full  story   is  told  on  page  9. 


OS 


January  27,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


MR.    TENNANT'S    FIGURES. 

By    HILAIRE    BELLOC. 


PUBLIC  opinion  in  the  present  phase  of 
the  war  hesitates  in  judgment  much 
more  than  it  did  in  the  earlier  phases. 
That  hesitation  may  turn  ill.  It  may 
produce  weariness  or  an  unreasonable  depression 
or  perhaps,  what  is  worst  of  all,  confusion. 

Against  such  a  danger  there  is  a  preventive 
to  hand,  which  I  will  take  the  liberty  of  suggesting 
to  those  in  authority  at  this  moment.  It  is 
possible  for  them  to  undertake  a  policy  which 
would,  I  am  convinced,  be  of  the  greatest  value  in 
strengthening  and  moderating  that  general  civilian 
judgment  upon  which  ultimately  all  governments 
at  war  depend,  and  which,  therefore,  in  the  last 
resort,  decides  the  fate  of  the  armies  themselves. 

This  policy  consists  in  the  official  publication 
at  fairly  regular  and  jairly  short  intervals  of  state- 
ments upon  the  general  position — e.g.  :  upon  the 
enemy's  presumed  condition  of  supply,  wastage 
and  recruitment ;  upon  the  nature  of  the  ground 
in  this  or  that  field  of  action  ;  summaries  of  the 
results  of  special  actions,  criticisms  of  enemy 
statements,  etc. 

It  may  be  of  value  to  give  first  the  arguments 
in  favour  of  such  a  policy  before  proceeding  to 
examples  which  show  what  follows  in  its  absence. 

The  public  now  receives  its  information  upon 
the  war  in  the  following  form  : — 

1.  Oihcial  Communiques,  very  brief  and  un- 
digested, issued  daily  by  the  various  belligerent 
Powers.  The  average  educated  and  intelligent 
man  who  is  concerned  to  understand  the  course  of 
the  war  (and  therefore  his  own  fate  !)  reads  daily 
half  a  dozen  things  like  this  :  "On  the  Strypa 
near  Zudka-Gora  we  occupied  yesterday  2  kilo- 
metres of  the  enemy's  trenches  and  successfully 
repelled  three  important  counter-attacks.  In  the 
region  of  Chartoriysk  we  have  maintained  all  our 
positions." 

To  aid  his  assimilation  of  such  a  statement 
there  is  nothing  :  no  map,  no  recapitulation  of 
the  past,  no  commentary. 

2.  He  further  receives  (what  is  more  valuable 
to  him)  expanded  descriptions  from  the  pens  of 
accredited  correspondents,  a  very  few  of  whom  are 
permitted  to  visit  the  actual  fronts.  These  give 
him  pictures  often  enough  vivid  and  always 
interesting.  They  are  written  by  men  of  abihty 
and  not  infrequently  they  convey  a  real  military 
lesson.  But  they  are  not  consecutive.  They  are 
even  highly  sporadic.  Piece  together  all  such 
description  provided  in  our  Press  during  the  year 
1915  and  you  obtain  no  more  view  of  the  war  than 
does  a  traveller  on  the  railway  along  the  Ligurian 
Coast  obtain  an  impression  of  the  general  landscape 
from  the  brief  gUmpses  of  sea  that  he  gets  between 
the  tunnels. 

3.  You  have  further  the  expansion,  explana- 
tion and  commentary  upon  all  the  information 
that  reaches  us  written  by  writers  who  collect  it 
here  and  whose  business  it  is  to  put  it  into  a  general 
and  comprehensible  form.  Such  work  is  being 
done,  for  instance,  upon  the  Manchester  Guardian, 
by  that  very  excellent  writer  who  signs  himself 
"  A  Student  of  the  War  "  and  by  the  "  military 
correspondents  "  of  all  the  great  dailies  and 
weeklies.  •  The  Monthly  reviews  also  publish  such 


summaries ;  as  does  this  paper.  This  form  of 
information  is  that  upon  which  the  public  as  a 
whole  most  relies.  But  it  suffers  from  two 
disabilities.  First  that,  as  it  represents  the  judg- 
ment of  varying  men,  it  is  not  homogeneous  : 
Secondly  that,  in  a  campaign  where  the  necessity 
for  secrecy  has  been  so  thoroughly  realised  it  is  not 
"  official  "  and  does  not  carry  to  the  public  that 
hall-mark  it'hich,  under  present  circumstances,  is 
of  the  highest  possible  value. 

This  leads  me  to  the  next  category  of  informa- 
tion : — 

4.  Brief  statements — often  mere  sentences — 
are  given  from  time  to  time,  irregularly,  and 
often  at  very  great  intervals,  either  in  reply  to 
questions  in  Parliament  or  by  men  holding  public 
authority  and  speaking  from  the  platform.  These, 
being  official,  are  in  spite  of  their  rarity  and 
incompleteness  universally  believed  and  always 
produce  a  deep  effect.  It  is  this  category  in 
particular  for  the  expansion  and  regularising  of 
which  I  am  pleading.  At  present  it  is  of  all  forms 
of  information  at  once  the  most  accepted  and  the 
rarest — as  also  the  least  regularly  supplied. 

5.  Lastly,  there  is  the  flood  of  suggestion  and 
"  tendency  writing "  with  which  the  Press  is 
filled  and  which  whether  it  is  calculated  to  depress 
our  spirits  unduly  or  to  raise  them  unduly  is 
almost  equally  pernicious.  It  takes  the  form 
chiefly  of  headlines — that  is,  its  efifect  of  suggestion 
upon  the  mind  is  principally  an  affair  of  head-lines 
— and  it  only  too  frequently  represents  individual 
and  personal  policy,  the  desire  to  influence  the 
public  for  such  and  such  private  ends.  This  last 
element  of  information  has  but  little  weight  in 
contrast  to  official  pronouncement  when  the  one 
can  be  set  against  the  other.  But  for  one  official 
statement  there  are  hundreds  or  thousands  of 
such  unofficial  suggestions  and  their  effect  upon 
public  opinion  is  unfortunately  profound.  It 
would,  in  the  face  of  regular  official  information, 
disappear. 

These  various  sources  of  information  stand 
in  the  proportion  described  above  so  far  as  this 
country  is  concerned.  The  proportion  is  far 
different  in  other  belligerent  countries.  The 
French  Government  has,  wisely  I  think,  added 
largely  to  expanded  official  statement  and  has  at 
the  same  time,  by  a  strict  Censorship,  curtailed  the 
bad  influence  of  mere  political  suggestion.  The 
German  and  Austrian  governments  have  virtually 
reduced  all  information  to  official  information  or 
comment  agreeable  to  the  official  point  of  view. 
That  is  an  extreme  we  are  not  likely  to  follow, 
and  it  is,  further,  a  policy  which  has,  on  the  side 
of  the  enemy,  been  abused,  though  the  abuse  is 
not  yet  fully  apparent  because  the  time  for 
liquidating  the  moral  debt  it  implies  has  not  yet 
come.  Other  belligerent  governments  have  in 
other  different  proportions  combined  correspond- 
ence at  the  front,  domestic  commentary  and 
oificial  statement.  In  this  country  alone  has  the 
Matter  been  almost  negligible  in  amount. 

Now,  having  put  the  arguments  in  favour  of 
such  a  policy  as  briefly  as  possible,  let  me  proceed 

[Copyright  in  America  by  "  The  New  York  Atnerican."] 


LAND      AND      WATER 


January  27,  1916. 


by  way  of  example  to  show  what  results  from  its 
absence. 

I  will  take  for  this  object-lesson  two  things  ; 
one  positive,  one  negative.  The  first  is  a  case  of 
insufficient  official  pronouncement  upon  a  funda- 
mental matter  guiding  all  our  judgment  ;  the  other 
an  actual  omission  to  provide  official  information 
in  a  matter  where  that  information  abundantly 
e.xists  and  where  its  public  statement  would  have 
been  of  the  highest  value. 

The  first  of  these  examples  consists  in  the 
figures  twice  read  out  recently  to  the  House  of 
C'ommons  by  the  Under-Secretary  of  War,  Mr. 
Tennant,  upon  German  losses  ;  the  second  consists 
in  the  analysis  of  enemy  casualties  and  enemy 
statements  in  connection  with  the  great  offensive 
of  last  September. 

GERMAN    CASUALTIES. 

On  Tuesday,  the  21st  of  last  December,  Mr. 
Tennant,  in  answer  to  a  question  put  him  by  Lord 
Kerry,  quoted  the  following  figures  for  the  German 
casualties  published  in  all  the  lists  for  the  Land 
Forces  of  the  German  Empire  up  to  the  30th  of 
November,  1915  : 

He  gave  the  total  of  those  casualty  lists  at 
2,524,460. 

He  further  told  us  that  of  this  total  484,218 
represented  killed  or  died  of  wounds,  384,198 
represented  the  severely  wounded,  27,674  repre- 
sented those  who  had  died  from  disease,  381,149 
represented  the  missing. 

It  would,  I  think,  astonish  the  authorities 
were  they  able  to  see  the  mass  of  correspondence 
and  private  calculation  which  followed  imme- 
diately upon  this  very  imperfect  official  statement. 
Because  it  was  official  the  great  mass  of  opinion 
seized  upon  it,  took  it  for  a  complete  and  exact 
piece  of  evidence,  and  drew  conclusions  accord- 
ingly- 

It  drew,  especially,  the  utterly  false  conclusion 

that  these  figures  represented  the  Official  British 
view  of  the  total  German  losses  up  to  the  end  of 
November — that  is,  during  sixteen  full  months  of 
fighting.  The  figures  so  given — because  they 
were  officiallj'  given — formed  the  basis  of  innum- 
erable private  calculations,  the  general  conclusion 
of  which  was  that  as,  of  the  total  a  certain  balance 
not  named  presumably  represented  light  cases  of 
wounded,  most  of  whom  would  return  to  the 
front,  the  dead  loss  of  the  German  forces  in  the 
first  sixteen  months  of  fighting  was  a  little  over  a 
million  and  a  quarter  men  I 

Now,  the  War  Office  never  intended  so  farcical 
a  result.  It  was  not  giving  its  own  calculation. 
It  was  merely  giving  the  German  official  total. 
It  knew  that  this  official  German  total  of  November 
30th  referred  to  a  date  many  weeks  earlier.  It 
knew  that  the  lists  even  so  were  incomplete.  It 
knew  that  the  only  doubt  about  total  German 
dead  loss  up  to  the  end  of  November  is  whether 
it  is  about  3!  millions  or  about  3f  millions — the 
only  real  discussion  in  the  matter  is  on  the  margin 
of  the  quarter  million.  The  War  Office  also  knew 
that  not  a  man  in  Europe  who  is  following  these 
things  with  attention  (out  of  the  hundreds  of 
men  so  engaged)  would  put  the  absolute  losses  in 
the  first  sixteen  months  of  the  war  at  less  than 
3,200,000,  while  very  few  would  put  them  as 
high  as  four  million — though  the  French  General 
Staff,  in  its  detailed  and  exhaustive  calculations, 
based  upon  the  widest  possible  range  of  evidence, 
is  not  short  of  that  fieure. 


We  all  know  then  that  Mr.  Tennant  did  not 
intend  to  convey  by  that  answer  the  astonish- 
ing conclusions  to  which  his  hearers  none 
the  less  came — that  German  losses  were  about 
one-third  of  the  truth.  We  all  know  that  the 
highly-trained  and  competent  permanent  officials 
who  furnished  him  with  those  ligures  were  npt 
within  a  thousand  miles  of  such  an  intention. 

All  those  figures  meant  was  that  the  enemy's 
own  ofticial  total  of  killed  and  wounded  only 
(not  sick) — which  happened  to  be  dated  the  30tli 
of  November,  and  referred  to  early  October — was 
2. I  milhon  odd,  divided  as  wc  have  seen,  into 
killed,  missing,  etc.  The  enemy's  own  authorities 
would  be  the  first  to  admit  themselves  the  two 
great  modifications  :  First,  that  the  lists  are 
belated,  secondly,  that  they  leave  out  all  cases 
of  sickness  (except  deaths  from  sickness).  Every 
single  observer  in  Europe  could  further  prove 
that  the  lists  were  incomplete — for  there  is 
abundant  evidence  of  this — and  that  in  particular 
the  category  "  Deaths  from  Disease  "  was  so  falsely 
stated  as  to  be  unworthy  of  notice. 

For  all  this  of  course  neither  Mr.  Tennant 
nor  the  Permanent  Officials  who  supplied  the 
figures  are  in  any  way  to  blame.  They  were  asked 
to  say  how  the  German  totals  stood,  and  they 
replied  accurateh*  :  "  The  German  totals  published 
on  the  30th  of  November  give  such  and  such 
figures." 

So  far  so  good — or  so  bad.  The  meaning  and 
extent  of  an  official  statement  had  been  wholly 
misunderstood  by  the  public  not  because  the 
statement  was  slipshod  or  false,  but  because  it 
was  so  unexpanded  that  the  misunderstanding 
was  almost  bound  to  occur. 

But  something  was  to  follow  much  worse 
even  than  this  misunderstanding  due  to  incom- 
plete statement. 

Exactly  four  weeks  later  on  Wednesday, 
January  19th,  Mr.  Tennant  again  read  out  in  the 
House  of  Commons  in  answer  to  a  question,  a  new 
set  of  "  revised  "  figures  which  were  obviously  at 
variance  with  his  first.  This  new  set  of  figures 
referred  to  totals  later  arrived  at  here  by  a  careful 
revision  of  the  individual  German  lists  up  to  some 
date  before  the  end  of  the  year. 

But  all  the  public  could  grasp  in  so  brief  and 
incomplete  a  statement  was  the  idea  that  this 
second  set  of  figures  was  again  the  official  view  of 
our  Government  of  the  German  losses  up  to 
December  31st,  supplementary  to  the  one  given 
"  up  to  November  30th."  In  other  words  they 
imagined  that  our  Government  had  given  them 
its  official  and  considered  view  of  the  total  Germ.iii 
losses  during  December. 

The  result  was  startling. 
•  This  second  set  of  figures  was  as  follows  : — 
The  dead  now  came  to  588,986  ;    the  wounded 
to  1,566,549.     The  dead  from  disease  to    24,08c 
and  the  missing  to  356,153. 

That  general  instructed  public  which  had 
taken  such  a  hold  upon  the  first  set  of  figures 
immediately  began  to  analyse  this  second  set  and 
was  very  naturally  bewildered.  They  noticed  the 
following  points  :  — 

I.  That  apparently  in  this  one  month  of 
December,  when  there  had  been  the  least  fighting 
of  all,  the  17th  month  of  the  war,  104,768  Germans 
had  been  killed  ! 

In  other  words  the  Germans  during  that 
astonishing  month  had  been  killed  off  more  than 
twice  as  fast  as  they  had  during  the  heavy  fighting 
of  the  summer  and  autumn  I 


January  27,  1916. 


LAND      A  N  D     WA  T  E  R  . 


Of  the  wounded  about  60,000  had  become 
unwonnded — time  and  space  and  the  four  rules  of 
arithmetic  had  abdicated  during  this  month  of 
miracle  ! 

In  the  same  apocalyptic  lour  weeks  3,594 
of  the  Germans  "  dead  from  disease  "  had  come 
to  life  again  ! 

Lastly,  24,996  of  the  missing  Germans  had 
turned  up  again  safe  and  sound  without  a  scratch  ! 

It  is  no  wonder  that  after  this  second  set  of 
figures  the  calculating  public  was  in  despair. 
One  military  writer  of  high  competence  and 
deservedly  influencing  a  great  number  of  readers 
gravely  remarked  in  a  great  London  daily  that 
"  there  was  little  more  than  11,000  difference 
between  the  two  total  figures,  surely  far  too  low  a 
figure  for  the  average  monthly  loss."  He  said 
nothing  of  the  resurrection  of  the  dead,  nor  of  the 
sudden  and  appalling  mortality,  he  only  wrote 
that  one  sarcastic  sentence.  For  11,000  German 
losses  in  a  month  is  indeed  too  low  !  It  is  at  least 
i9/20ths  too  low  ! 

Well,  all  this  confusion  and  all  this  mis- 
understanding would  have  been  saved  and  the 
public  solidly  informed  upon  the  most  fundamental 
element  of  all  in  our  judgment  of  the  war  if,  instead 
of  two  brief  answers  in  Parliament,  the  Press 
Bureau  had  issued  some  such  statement  as 
follows  : — 

"  The  official  figures  given  by  the  German 
Government  of  losses  in  their  casualty  lists  up  to 
and  including  those  of  the  ;^oth  of  November,  but 
excluding  the  losses  at  sea,  give  a  total  of  just  over 
tivo  and  a  half  fnillions  :  2,524,460.  These  lists 
do  not  include  losses  from  disease  (save  deaths 
from  disease)  ;  they  do  not  refer,  upon  the  average, 
to  a  later  date  than  the  early  days  of  October  and 
certain  features  in  them  also  point  to  their  incom- 
pleteness. For  instance,  the  small  proportion  of 
ivoimded  compared  with  the  dead  clearly  indicates 
the  omission  of  many  light  cases.  Again,  the 
figures  set  down  for  deaths  from  disease  are  mani- 
festly misleading.  They  can  only  refer  to  some 
particular  category,  such  as  deaths  in  the  base 
hospitals,  or  deaths  from  a  particular  set  of  diseases. 
We  knoiv  that  this  is  the  case  because  the  figures 
given  are  actually  less  than  half  the  death  rate  from 
disease  of  men  of  military  age  in  time  of  peace. 
The  number  of  German  prisoners  in  the  hands  of 
the  various  Allies  further  proves  that  the  figures 
for  the  missing  are  insufficient,  allowing  as  we  must 
a  considerable  margin  foi^  the  missing  who  are  not 
prisoners  hut  deserters  or  dead.  The  total  losses 
of  the  German  Empire  alone  up  to  the  date  in  question, 
November  ;^oth  (and  not  the  early  days  oj  October 
to  which  at  latest  the  official  German  figures  refer) , 
are,  upon  every  line  of  evidence,  somew'hat  over  four 
million.  Of  these,  however,  close  upon  a  million 
must  have  returned  to  service  after  recovery  from 
wounds  or  sickness,  and  we  may  set  the  total  loss 
of  fighting  men  from  the  forces  of  the  German  Empire 
up  to  November  ^oth  at  not  less  than  3I  mJllion, 
more  probably  2 2  or  even  over." 

Such  a  statement  issued  by  the  Press  Bureau 
officially  would  at  once  have  raised  the  value  of 
official  pronouncements — for  every  competent 
observer  would  have  endorsed  it — and  would 
have  been  a  most  salutary  piece  of  food  for  the 
public.  It  would  have  had  an  utterly  different 
effect  from  the  short,  hurried  and  misleading  state- 
ment made  in  Parliament  just  before  Christmas. 
The  Permanent  Officials  who  gave  those  totals 
would  have  been  particularly  pleased  to  have  told 


the  whole  truth  and,  necessary  as  a  rigid  censorship 
is  in  time  of  war,  there  was  nothing  here  that 
could  have  benefited  the  enemy. 

Then  when  the  time  came  for  the  second 
statement,  made  the  other  day,  the  Press  Bureau 
might  have  issued  something  like  this  :  — 

"  Since  the  estimate  issued  last  month  upon 
German  losses  giving  the  official  German  totals 
and  showing  how  false  and  misleading  these  were, 
the  lists  have  been  carefully  revised  in  this  country 
and  the  totals  so  arrived  at  are  of  even  greater 
significance.  •  Thus  we  find  that  in  the  individual 
lists  over  600,000  are-  accounted  for  as  dead  ;  the 
official  German  totals  give  barely  more  than  500,000. 
We  further  fi.nd  that  the- proportion  of  wounded  to 
dead  is  still  lower  than  that  originally  given  ;  there- 
fore even  more  certainly  false.  While  the  number 
appearing  in  the  individual  lists  as  "deaths  from 
disease  "  is  lower  again  :  a  point  which  conclusively 
proves  that  the  enemy  delays  or  suppresses  portions 
of  this  item  in  the  individual  lists.  The  Press 
Bureau  will  issue  from  time  to  time  statements 
contrasting  German  official  totals  with  the  results 
arrived  at  by  our  own  analysis  of  his  individual 
lists  and  will  continue  to  show  how  these  mislead 
neutral  opinion  by  the  belittling  of  the  real  German 
losses." 

Were  our  authorities  to  act  in  this  fashion, 
apart  from  the  moral  effect  which  it  would  produce 
upon  opinion,  one  of  two  other  results  would  also 
certainly  follow.  Either  the  enemy  would  be 
driven  to  draw  up  really  full  up-to-date  lists 
(inevitably  thereby  betraying  himself  to  our 
advantage)  or  he  would  continue  his  old  method. 
In  this — as  our  permanent  officials  are  well  aware 
— a  greater  and  a  greater  difference  would  appear 
between  his  statement  and  the  obvious  truth,  and 
his  official  presentation  of  his  case  to  neutrals  would 
be  more  and  more  weakened. 

I  can  see  no  reason  why  a  policy  of  this  kind 
should  not  be  adopted.  As  things  are,  those  who 
know  the  truth  talk  and  discuss  among  themselves 
in  a  tone  quite  different  from  that  which  the 
meagre  public  pronouncements  would  warrant. 
They  leave  the  public  ignorant  of  the  evidence 
most  in  favour  of  the  Allies,  and  they  leave  the 
field  free  for  the  dissemination  of  false  suggestion 
and,  on  occasion,  panic. 

So  much  for  the  principal  example  which  I 
proposed  to  give. 

THE    GERMAN    LOSSES    DURING 
THE    GREAT    OFFENSIVE. 

The  second  one  though  of  less  extent  in 
application  is  perhaps  no  less  significant. 

The  great  offensive  delivered  by  the  British 
at  Loos  and  the  French  in  Champagne  three 
months  ago  produced  a  certain  set  of  casualties 
in  the  German  ranks  which  the  French  estimated 
at  the  time  as  equivalent  to  about  six  army  corps 
at  full  strength,  or  say  about  240,000  men. 

Since  that  date  everyone  in  Europe  who  is 
observing  and  following  the  figures  has  been 
concerned  to  establish  the  real  damage  the 
Germans  suffered.  The  Germans  themselves 
issued  an  official  communique  in  which  they 
said  that  the  main  shock  in  the  Champagne  had 
been  resisted  by  a  single  division  !  They  flooded 
the  American  press  with  a  statement  that  the 
Allied  losses  were  quite  three  times  their  own  or 
more,  their  own  being  therefore  presumably  about 
50,000  men.  (We  may  remark  in  passing  that  that 
is,  to  begin  with,  more  than  two  divisions  in  losses 


LAND     AND     WATER 


,  January  27,  1916* 


alone ;     but    the    original    statement    about    one 
division  was  so  grotesque  that  no  one  beHeved  it.) 

Now  evidence  of  the  minimum  German  loss 
— the  loss  admitted  by  the  enemy — began  to 
dribble  in  with  the  third  week  of  October.  It  was 
then  (October  17th,  i8th,  19th)  that  we  began 
to  see  in  the  German  lists  the  casualties  referring 
to  units  we  know  to  have  been  engaged  against 
the  great  Allied  offensive  of  last  September. 
The  big  lists  of  prisoners  were  already  noticeable 
in  the  lists  of  October  29th.  These  items  extended 
on  week  after  week  (so  belated  are  the  German 
returns),  until  after  a  full  three  months  only  does 
one  begin  to  appreciate  in  round  numbers  what  the 
(iermans  themselves  admit  in  the  hsts  to  have  been 
their  losses  on  that  occasion. 

These  lists  give  us  not  much  less  than  300,000 
men.  By  the  end  of  November  they  had  provided 
us  with  the  names  of  266,752  of  whom  about 
24,000  were  prisoners,  about  44,000  killed  and 
rather  more  than  198,000  wounded.  But  all 
during  November  more  names  kept  on  appearing 
in  the  belated  lists — 12,000  for  the  Infantry  alone— 
and,  on  the  analogy  of  German  lists  in  the  past, 
yet  more  names  will  continue  to  appear  dtiring 
January.  The  total  must  be  already,  as  I  have 
said,  close  on  300,000.  It  will  probably  pass  that 
figure  even  in  the  German  official  lists,  incomplete 
as  they  are,  before  the  whole  tale  is  told;  and  even 
this  enormous  total  makes  no  mention  of  the  men 
suffering  from  shock  and  of  all  the  other  casualties 
apart  from  wounds — the  sick  list  consequent  upon 
a  strain  of  that  kind. 

I  say  this  work  has  been  done  very  thoroughly 
and  completely  by  numerous  observers — by  none 
better  than  the  neutral  (by  no  means  adverse  to 
the  enemy)  who  carries  the  greatest  authority 
at  the  present  moment  in  Europe — Colonel  Feyler. 
I  am  sure  that  work  on  much  the  same  lines  has 
been  done  by  our  own  officials  in  this  country. 

Would  it  not  be  of  real  advantage  to  opinion 
and  to  the  judgment  of  the  public  if  our  govern- 
ment were  to  issue  from  the  Press  Bureau  with 
regard  to  this  one  item  of  news  some  such  state- 
ment as  the  following  ?  — 

"  The  Press  Bureau  authorises  the  following 
statement :  It  is  now,  after  a  delay  of  more  than 
three  months,  possible  to  establish  from  the  German 
casualty  lists  themselves  the  extent  of  the  catas- 
trophes suffered  by  the  German  armies  during  the 
great  blows  delivered  upon  them  in  the  British 
offensive  at  Loos  and  the  French  contemporary 
offensive  in  Champagne,  at  the  end  of  last  September. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  the  enemy  put  forward 
the  obviously  untenable  claim  that  the  main  shock 
of  this  offensive  was  met  in  Champagne  by  no  more 
than  a  division,  say  in  full  strength  20,000  men. 
This  statement  carried  no  weight  and  has  deservedly 
been  forgotten,  but  it  is  remarkable  how  much  greater 
Ms  losses  were  even  than  ivas  at  the  moment  the 
Allied  estimate  of  them.  The  highest  stich  estimate 
hitherto  made  by  the  victors  upon  that  occasion  put 
the  enemy  losses  at  some  240,000  men.  So  far 
we  can  already  discover  from  the  German  lists  alone 
a  loss  of  close  on  300,000  men,  excluding  all-  ca.';es 
of  shock,  sickness,  etc.,  necessarily  arising  in  large 
numbers  from  so  intense  an  action. 

"  We  must  further  remark  upon  the  delays  in  the 
publication  of  the  German  lists  and  their  consequent 
incompleteness.  Even  during  the  third  month  after 
the  action,  the  Infantry  lists  alone  included  12,000 
names  checked  and  admitted  after  so  great  a  lapse  of 
time,  and  this  fourth  month  after  the  action,  January, 


is  still  providing  us  with  new  names  in  the  lists. 
It  will  probably  be  found  when  the  history  of  the 
war  is  written  that  counting  all  casualties,  the  enemy 
suffered  no  less  than  350,000  of  loss  and  certainly 
more  than  a  third  of  a  million  in  those  memorable 
days." 

I  say  that  a  statement  made  in  those  terms 
officially  (and  it  would  be  strictly  accurate)  would 
be  of  immense  advantage  and  I  say  that  a  policy 
of  issuing  such  statements  sometimes  for  the 
sobering  of  opinion,  sometimes  for  the  enlightening 
and  heartening  of  it,  has  become  an  immediate 
duty  of  those  in  authority. 

THE    FRONTS. 

In  the  six  main  areas  of  the  war  there  is  no 
news  of  movement  save  in  connection  with  the 
threats  made  by  the  Allies  against  Bagdad  and 
the  Mesopotamian  communications  of  the 
Turkish  "  Caucasian  "  army.  Of  these  that  of 
most  interest  to  this  country  is  o'^  course  the 
advance  of  the  British  up  the  Tigris  in  their 
attempt  to  relieve  the  force  belcagured  at  Kut-el- 
Amara. 

WESTERN    FRONT. 

On  the  western  front  the  only  point  of  interest 
has  been  yet  another  of  these  curious  little  local 
offensives,  in  which  the  enemy  is  now  perhaps 
compelled  to  indulge.  This  week  the  attacks  were 
delivered  first  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Arras, 
later  about  100  miles  off  on  the  extreme  north  of 
the  line,  and  then  again  near  Arras.  In  both 
cases  there  was  the  usual  intense,  but  short  bom- 
bardment against  a  very  short  sector  of  front 
(about  a  mile),  followed  by  an  attack  with  con- 
siderable bodies  of  men.  In  two  cases  this  attack 
set  foot  in  the  French  trenches  for  a  moment,  in 
the  other  case  it  did  not  even  succeed  to  that 
extent.  In  both  cases  the  compara'ivelv  small 
local  offensive  broke  down.  It  is  not  too  much  to 
say  that  in  all  these  cases  it  was  expected  to  break 
down — the  talk  of  the  sensational  newspapers 
about  an  attempted  piercing  of  the  Allied  lines — 
"  A  bid  for  Calais  " — in  such  manceuvres  is,  of 
course,  nonsense.  When  the  enemy  shall  try  to 
break  the  western  line  he  will  not  proceed  in  this 
fashion,  but  in  a  fashion  ve  y  different  indeed. 
It  will  not  be  a  matter  of  a  few  thousand  shells, 
but  of  a  few  million  ;  not  of  a  brigade  or  two,  but 
of  massed  armies  ;  and  not  of  a  kilometre  or  two, 
but  of  a  twenty-mile  front  at  the  least. 

If  we  ask  ourselves  why  the  enemy  is  perhaps 
compelled  to  indulge  in  these  local  attacks,  which 
are  very  expensive  to  him  and  which  have  abso- 
lutely no  permanent  result,  the  best  answer  is  by 
a  metaphor. 

If  you  are  trying  to  hold  a  door  against 
pressure  from  without  and  you  are  already  in  a 
state  when  you  find  it  difficult  to  hold  that  door, 
you  will  almost  inevitably  be  led  to  a  succession 
of  sudden  jerks  against  your  opponents,  each 
destined  to  give  you  something  of  a  breathing 
space.  This  necessity  is  not  only  a  material,  but 
a  moral  one.  Little  local  offensives  of  this  kind, 
even  when  you  only  get  a  few  yards  of  ground 
and  a  handful  of  prisoners  for  your  money, 
hearten  troops.  They  are  probably  valuable 
when  new  drafts  have  reached  the  front.  They 
also  test  troops.  But  they  are  not  the  tactics 
of  a  defensive  line  which  feels  itself  immovable. 
In  neither  case  was  the  attack  delivered  against 
anything  of  even  local  importance.     It  was  not 


January  27,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


meant  for  the  seizure  of  a  good  observation  point 
or  of  a  knot  in  local  communications,  or  for 
anything  definable  at  all  except  the  general 
necessity  of  keeping  up  such  local  offensives  as 
part  of  the  enemy's  defensive  policy  in  the  West. 

\ITALIAN,     BALKAN    AND 
RUSSIAN    FRONTS. 

On  the  Italian  front  there  has  been  even  less 
movement ;  before  Salonika  nothing  but  the  great 
French  air  raid  agains';  Monastir  ;  and  on  the 
Russian  front  only  further  details — of  the  greatest 
interest,  hower-or — upon  the  nature  of  the  recent 
hghting  in  Volhynia.  There  came  through  in  the 
course  of  the  week  a  most  vivid  description  of  the 
way  in  which  this  almost  immobile  lighting  on  the 
300  miles  south  of  the  Pinsk  marshes  inflicts  waste 
upon  the  enemy. 

We  have  had,  in  some  detail  and  most  vividly 
related  to  us,  the  crossing  of  the  frozen  Strypa 
by  one  Austrian  division  at  the  moment  when,  a 
fortnight  ago,  the  Russians  cleared  the  Austro- 
(iermans  off  all  the  eastern  bank  of  the  river.  The 
single  wooden  bridge  was  destroyed.  The  troops 
could  only  cross  through  slushy  water  more  than 
ankle  deep,  covering  the  rotten  ice.  This  ice 
had  not  the  strength  to  bear  wagons,  and  though 
it  appears  that  the  artillery  had  already  been 
withdrawn  over  the  bridge  before,  a  considerable 
mass  of  the  wheeled  material  must  have  fallen 
into  Russian  hands.  The  crossing  had  hardly 
begun  before  it  was  subjected  to  the  fire  of  the 
Russian  field  artillery  and  before  it  was  concluded 
great  numbers  of  the  unfortunate  division  had 
been  drowned  where  the  ice  had  proved  treacher- 
ous or  been  shot  down  or  destroyed  by  the  breaking 
of  the  ice  in  which  it  was  fired.  Many  more  had 
been  left  behind  upon  the  eastern  bank,  wounded 
or  stragglers,  and,  in  thg  result  of  this  particular 
unit  perhaps  one-third  reached  the  western  bank, 
of  whom  we  know  not  what  proportion,  but  some 
fragment  or  other,  may  still  be  fit  for  service. 

It  would  be  of  the  utmost  value  if  pictures 
of  this  kind  could  be  multiplied,  and  if  we  in  the 


west  could  actually  visualise,  as  we  can  now  only 
occasionally  do  from  inteUigently  described 
glimpses  of  this  kind,  what  the  Polish  campaign 
has  come  to  mean  for  the  enemy.  To  most  of  us 
in  the  west  that  campaign  is  but  a  series  of  un- 
pronounceable names.  Even  to  a  close  daily 
student  of  the  war  it  is  but  an  unmoving  line 
across  a  map,  to  which  may  be  added  by  those 
who  know  how  to  reason  upon  such  affairs,  cer- 
tain rates  of  wastage.  But  the  reality  which  would 
make  us  understand  how  the  Austro-German  forces 
will  lie  when  the  ordeal  is  over,  what  the  strain  is, 
and  what  this  winter  is  costing  in  general  health 
and  nerve  as  well,  to  great  numbers  of  the  enemy, 
are  only  got  by  such  very  rare  examples  as  that 
which  i  have  quoted. 

THREE    MOVEMENTS    IN  ASIA. 

The  Asiatic  movements  are,  as  I  have  said,  the 
most  arresting  to  us  in  this  country. 

There  arc  at  present  in  the  Asiatic  field  of  the 
war  three  movements.  Their  unity  is  recognised 
by  the  general,  if  imperfect,  term  "  Caucasian  '' 
invented  by  the  enemy  and  particularly  by  the 
German  General  Staff,  to  designate  the  forces 
operating  in  this  field. 

There  is  in  the  first  place  the  Russian  army  of 
the  Caucasus  proper  at  A,  A,  of  what  strength  we 
do  not  know,  but  operating,  perhaps,  against  four 
Turkish  corps,  or  perhaps  five.  These  forces  have 
defeated  the  Turks  thoroughly  in  the  last  few  days 
and  are  now  holding  various  points  in  the  rough 
mountain  land  between  Lake  Van  and  the  Black 
Sea,  but  their  main  advance  has  been  up  the 
only  road  worth  calling  a  road  in  the  whole  dis- 
trict :  To  wit,  the  road  leading  from  the  Russian 
railhead  to  Erzerum.  , 

The  Russians  have  pushed  along  this  road, 
captured  numerous  Turkish  prisoners  and  guns 
and  are  now  in  touch  with  the  outer  forts  of 
Erzerum,  which  they  have  already  begun  to  shell : 
— though  we  may  be  quite  certain  that  they  have 
not  there  at  present  any  heavy  siege  train.         , 


I 


O       SO     iOO  20PMl^S 

'Mocm^zuwus  // 
jjunfrif  &US 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


January  27,  1916. 


^o^ 


t^       nowjulbj  /hodec{         ) 


II 


O  I  2  3  4-  S 
t— I — I I i__i 


I?Mc^s 


The  second  movement  is  of  the  Russians  in 
Persia  at  B  B. 

They  have  advanced  also  along  the  only  road 
to  be  discovered  for  many  days'  marching  in  those 
regions,  the  road  from  Teheran  to  Bagdad.  They 
have  tiken  the  town  of  Hamadan,  crossed  the 
mountain  ridge  called  the  Alvvan  and  come  down 
to  the  plain  of  Kangawar  upon  the  further  side. 
A  German  wireless  affirms  that  the  Turks  have 
retaken  the  town  of  Kangawar  itself  and  pushed 
up  to  the  roots  of  the  Alwan  mountains,  retaking, 
for  instance,  the  village  of  Assadabad  immediately 
at  their  feet.  At  any  rate,  the  limits  of  the 
Russian  attack,  so  far,  is  marked  roughly  by  this 
short  and  steep  Alwan  mountain  range. 

Finally,  there  is,  of  course,  south  of  Bagdad, 
the  British  force  coming  up  the  Tigris  with  the 
object  of  relieving  the  original  Expedition  now 
encircled  by  the  Turks  at  Kut-el-Amara. 

Now  the  nerve  of  all  this  business,  the 
channel  of  communications  which,  if  it  be  main- 
tained, certainly  gives  the  enemy  a  superiority 
in  Mesopotamia  both  in  numbers  and  munitions 
against  anything  that  is  likely  to  come  against  it, 
is  the  so-called  Bagdad  railwaj'. 

We  must  estimate  the  value  of  any  move- 
ment made,  whether  by  the  Russians  or  by  our- 
selves in  terms  of  that  avenue  of  communication. 

Let  us  first  of  all  see  how  the  Bagdad  railway 
at  present  stands. 

We  have,  of  course,  no  public  information 
upon  the  limits  it  has  reached  at  this  moment, 
but  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  rail  stands  much 
as  is  suggested  upon  Sketch  II. 

The  railway  was,  at  the  moment  when  the  war 
broke  out,  in  process  of  completion  by  work  done 
from  both  ends.  It  has  been  pushed  forward 
from  the  Aleppo  end  eastward  and  also  northward 
and  westward  from  the  Bagdad  end.  It  had  from 
the  Aleppo  end  reached  and  passed  the  river 
Euphrates  and  was  being  pushed  eastward.  We 
may  well  imagine  that  in  the  long  interval  of  time 
since  war  broke  out  everything  has  been  done  to 
extend  it.  It  is  almost  certainly  workable  as  far 
as  Raslain  and  quite  possibly  as  far  as  Nisi  bin. 


At  the  other  end  it  extends  up  to  the  Tigris, 
at  least  as  far  as  Samarra,  probably  to  Tekrit, 
and  may  even  possibly  have  already  reached 
the  point  above  Shoreimieh,  where  the  Tigris 
passes  through  narrows  between  higher  ground 
upon  either  side.  The  extension,  however,  up 
the  river  is  not  here  so  \-ery  important  because, 
especially  at  this  season,  the  river  itself  is  an 
excellent  avenue  of  communicat'on.  The  real 
breach  in  continuity  to  the  Turkish  armies  in 
Mesopotamia  at  this  moment  is  between  Ras-el-Ain 
(or  possibly  Nisibin)  and  Mosul.  Along  that 
stretch  a  road  is  already  in  existence  which  has 
been  undoubtedly  of  importance  to  the  enemy 
in  the  last  few  months. 

There  are  no  very  appreciable  difficulties,  no 
sharp  contours  and  no  peculiarities  of  soil  that  would 
interfere  with  its  rapid  construction  and  main- 
tenance. And  the  whole  distance  is  no  more  than 
200  miles  at  the  most,  at  the  least  130  to  140 
miles,  say  three  weeks  to  a  fortnight's  marching, 
with  the  exception  of  certain  very  heavy  munition- 
ment.  The  gap  is  not  so  serious  as  comment  in 
this  country  sometimes  regards  it.  And  we  may 
take  it  that  the  Turkish  armies,  whose  main 
business  it  is  to  maintain  a  position  in  Mesopo- 
tamia, and  particularly  Bagdad,  are  in  fairly 
rapid  touch  with  their  distant  bases. 

Now  the  threat  to  that  central  nerve  upon 
which  the  whole  depends  is  extremely  remote. 
The  Russians  advancing  upon  Krzerum  are  20c 
miles  away  with  the  enormous  mass  of  the 
Armenian  Taurus  between  them.  The  Russians 
ou  Lake  Van  are  much  nearer,  but  with  the  very 
worst  of  the  mountains  in  front  of  them,  and  no 
sort  of  good  road  whereby  they  can  advance. 

The  Russians  on  the  Persian  side  are  com- 
paratively few  in  number.  There  is  here  again  at 
least  200  miles  between  their  present  ])osition 
and  Bagdad.  And,  moreover,  the  whole  tangle 
of  mountains,  the  escarpment  which  has  from 
tmie  immemorial  politically  separated  the  plateau 
of  Persia  from  the  Plains  of  Mesopotamia,  the 
heights  to  which  Persia  owes  its  national  existence 
and  history,  stand  between. 


January  27,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


There  is  no  real  threat  to  the  communications 
of  the  Turkish  Army  at  Bagdad,  still  less  a  threat 
to  the  city  itself  until  the  alHcd  troops  are  on  the 
further  side  of  this  Persian  escarpment  on  the 
east  and  with  the  Armenian  Taurus  on  the 
north. 

We  shall  be  most  unwise  if  we  regard  either  of 
those  events  as  probable  in  the  near  future. 

Our  forces,  which  are  now  attempting  to 
relieve  the  original  expeditionary  force  beleagured 
at  Kut-el-Amara,  will  not  enjoy  the  effect  of  any 
appreciable  pressure  exercised  upon,  the  enemy 
elsewhere. 

What  1he  position  now  is  in  this  critical  spot 
(it  is  critical  for  us,  small  as  are  the  forces  engaged 
compared  with  the  total  forces  of  the  Allies)  the 
despatches  read  in  the  House  of  Commons  last 
Monday  sufhciently  explain. 

The  reheving  force  has,  as  we  said  in  these 
columns  last  week  it  was  bound  to  do,  come  into 
contact  with  and  taken  its  shock  against  the  main 
Turkish  positions,  which  lie  a  couple  of  hours' 
march  east  of  Kut-el-Amara.  Those  positions  it 
has  been  imable  to  force.  The  advance  of  the 
relieving  force  up  to  the  river  Tigris  and  the 
retreat  of  the  Turks  before  it  at  Sheik  Said  first, 
and  then  at  Orah,  were  but  a  preliminary  to  this 
main  action,  the  first  phase  of  which  we  have 
just  seen  to  end  without  any  success  to  the 
relieving  expedition. 

There  has  been  very  heavy  loss  upon  both 
sides,  but  it  is  to  be  feared  that  that  loss  can  be 
better  replaced  by  the  far  more  numerous  enemy 
than  by  ourselves. 

The  Tigris,  for  some  days  past  bank-high, 
nas  flooded  the  low-lying  regions  :  an  impedi- 
ment to  either  party,  but  obviously  more  of  an 
advantage  to  the  defence  and  of  disadvantage  to 
the  attack.  And  there  the  matter  stands.  The 
only  refreshing  element  in  the  news  from  this 
quarter,  and  that  unfortunately  not  a  permanent 
element,  is  the  information  that  the  force  con- 
tained at  Kut-el-Amara  is  still  well  supplied. 

GERMAN    POLICY    OF    SHELLING 
OPEN    TOWNS. 

Certain  correspondents  of  mine  have  asked 
for  proof  of  the  statement  that  the  enemy  policy 
of  bombarding  distant  open  towns  differed  from 
the  allied  policy  of  long  range  fire  against  special 
points  in  the  same. 

The  proof  of  that  contention  lies  in  measure- 
ments upon  the  map  first,  and  secondly,  in  the 
nature  of  the  raids  affected  and  the  damage 
done. 

In  order  to  appreciate  how  strong  is  the  con- 
trast between  the  two  policies,  how  truly  the  allied 
policy  is  mihtary  and  the  German  policy  in  this 
respect  political,  consider  the  following  points. 

The  enemy  in  the  past  shelled  no  open  French 
towns  except"  Dunkirk  in  this  fashion.  They 
dropped  very  large  shell  into  Dunkirk  at  a  range 
of  30,000  yards  or  thereabouts.  At  such  a  range, 
with  the  calibre  of  the  piece  employed,  there  was 
no  question  of  aiming  at  a  particular  mark.  So 
long  as  the  shell  fell  somewhere  within  the  inhabited 
area  of  Dunkirk  all  that  was  desired  was  achieved. 
You  cannot  at  these  extreme  ranges  take  an  aimed 
shot.  Moreover,  when  the  French  discovered 
the  piece  and  destroyed  it,  they  found  it  not  em- 
placed,  but  set  perrrianently  at  its  angle  of  maxi- 
mum range  and  incapable  of  changes  of  elevation 

^Continued  on  page  10.) 


RAEMAEKERS'    CARTOON. 

The  nation's  debt  of  gratitude  to  the  rank  and 
file  of  the  British  Army  can  never  he  fully  repaid, 
it  is  as  a  small  tribute  to  these  brave  men  that  L.\nd 
AND  Water  publishes  to-day  as  its  frontispiece 
in  the  place  of  the  usual  cartoon,  Raentaekers' 
illustration  of  a  pathetic  incident  K'hich  occurred 
in  Holland  earlier  in  the  month.  The  report  of 
this  incident  ithich  icas  published  at  the  time  in  the 
Amsterdam  "  Telegraaf,"  is  translated  below. 
*  *  * 

"  The  burial  will  take  place  at  once ;  the 
clergyman  is  only  waiting  for  the  Vice-Consul  who 
has  just  arrived  by  tram  from  Flushing."  So  spoke 
to  me  the  policeman  at  West  Capelle. 

.  I  'walked  past  West  Capelle's  big  light  house — - 
past  the  church  tower  of  trhich  the  church  itself 
had  disappeared,  and  I  stood  before  the  chapel  in 
the  churchyard.  Through  the  open  door  I  saw 
on -.a  bier  the  white  ze'ooden  coffin  in  which  rested 
the  body  of  Private  Joseph  Walker,  an  English 
soldier  of  the  Bedfordshire  Regiment,  regimental 
number,  16,092. 

On  September  gth,  1914,  Joseph  Walker  enlisted 
for  the  duration  of  the  ~war  ;  on  January  nth,  1916, 
the  sea  bore  his  dead  body  to  the  dyke  at  West  Capelle. 
Usually,  a  body  washed  ashore  in  this  neigh- 
bourhood is  buried  at  the  foot  of  the  dunes,  without 
coffin,  ifithout  ceremony.  But  not  this  time. 
This  afternoon  at  i  p.m.  while  the  north-west  wind 
whistled  over  Watcher  en,  the  English  soldier  was 
buried  in  the  churchyard  of  West  Capelle.  Behind 
the  icalls  of  the  tower  where  "we  sought  protection  from 
the  gale  the  Burial  Service  was  read. 

First  the  Vice-Consul  in  the  name  of  Eftgland 
spread  the  British  flag  over  him  who  for  England 
had  sacrificed  his  young  life.  Four  men  of  West 
Capelle  carried  the  coffin  outside  and  placed  it  at 
the  foot  of  the  tower,  that  old  grey  giant,  which  has 
witnessed  so  much  world's  woe,  here  opposite  the 
sea.  The  Reverend  Mr.  Eraser,  the  English  clergy- 
man at  Kortryk,  himself  an  exile,  said  we  were 
gathered  to  pay  the  last  homage  to  a  Briton  who 
had  died  for  his  country.  It  was  a  simple,  but 
touching  ceremony. 

"  Man  that  is  born  of  a  woman  hath  but  a 
short  time  to  live.  .  ,  .  He  cometh  forth  like  a 
floicer  and  is  cut  doivn."  Thus  spoke  the  voice  of 
the  minister  and  the  wind  carried  his  words,  and 
the  wind  played  with  the  flag  of  England,  the  flag 
that  flies  over  all  seas,  in  Flanders,  in  France,  in 
the  Balkans,  in  Egypt,  as  the  symbol  of  threatened 
freedom — the  flag  whose  folds  here  covered  a  fallen 
warrior.  Deeply  were  we  moved,  when  the  clergy- 
man in  his  prayer  asked  for  a  "  message  of  comfort 
to  his  home." 

Who,  tell  me,  oh  silent  field. 
Who  lies  buried  here  ?  Here  ? 
Yes,  who  is  Walker,  No.  16092,  Private  Joseph 
Walker,  Bedfordshire  regiment  ?  Who,  in  loving 
thoughts,  thinks  of  him  zciih  hope  even  now  zehen  xve, 
strangers  to  them,  stand  near  to  him  in  death  P  Where 
is  his  home  ?  We  knoiv  it  not,  but  in  our  inmost 
hearts  it'e  pray  for  a  "  message  of  comfort  and 
consolation  "    for  his  people. 

And  in  the  roaring  storm  we  went  our  zi>ay. 
There  le-as  he  carried,  the  soldier  come  to  rest,  and 
the  flag  fluttered  in  the  -wind  and  wrapped  itself  round 
that  son  of  England.  Then  the  coffin  sank  into 
the  ground  and  the  hearts  of  us,  the  departing  iint- 
nesses,  were  sore.  Earth  fell  on  it,  and  the 
preacher  said  :    "  Earth  to  earth,  dust  to  dust." 


LAND      AND      WA  T  E  R 


Jarrnar}'  27,  1916. 


such  as  would  have  been  necessary  to  the  correction 
of  fire  had  an  aimed  shot  (impossible  as  that  was) 
been  intended. 

Now  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  when  you  drop 
big  shell  thus  into  an  open  town  (full  of  hospitals, 
by  the  way)  your  only  object  can  be  to  terrorise. 
It  is  a  strictly  political  object,  and  on  a  par  with 
very  much  else  that  the  enemy  has  done. 

But  more  than  this,  you  have  the  fact  that 
the  enemy  had  been  acting  in  precisely  the  same 
way  in  his  raids  upon  England.  He  had  not 
struck  at  points  of  military  importance  upon  the 
coast.  He  bombarded  Scarborough,  a  watering- 
place.  He  had,  in  dropping  bombs,  dropped 
them  mainly  upon  places  where  he  thought  they 
would  have  an  effect  upon  civilians.  In  thus 
dropping  very  large  shell  at  extreme  ranges— that 
is,  at  random — upon  Dunkirk,  he  was  also  aiming 
at  affecting  British  civilian  opinion,  both  because 
Dunkirk  was  the  nearest  point  upon  the  Continent 
to  England  which  he  could  reach,  even  at  extreme 
range,  by  the  use  of  his  artillery,  and  also  because 
it  was  packed  full  of  English  wounded  and  con- 
tained a  considerable  number  of  English  civilians 
at  the  time.  After  an  interval  of  many  months 
he  begins  exactly  the  same  trick  against  the 
French  open  town  of  Nancy.  He  has  got  it  into 
his  head  that  the  French  will  be  more  willing  to 
spare  their  enemy  if  he  destroys  some  architectural 
monument  or  a  certain  number  of  civilian  lives 
by  such  bombardment.  Here  also  he  aims  at  no 
restricted  area  of  military  importance  for  the 
simple  reason  that  he  is  not  aiming  at  all.  He  is 
dropping  shells  at  extreme  range  with  the  know- 
ledge that  they  will  fall  somewhere  within  a  very 
large  inhabited  district,  and  that  is  all  his  concern. 
We  know  perfectly  well,  from  his  first  experiment 
against  Dunkirk  and  indeed  from  the  nature  of 
the  case,  that  when  the  gun  is  found  by  the  French 
and  duly  destroyed,  it  will  be  found  emplaced  in 
such  a  fashion  that  it  is  incapable  of  movement. 

Another  characteristic  of  this  kind  of  action 
and  a  proof  that  the  enemy  believes  it  to  be  of 
great  value,  is  the  enormous  expenditure  con- 
nected with  it.  When  he  loses  one  of  these  guns  he 
loses  a  very  large  sum  of  money.  He  similarly 
risks  very  large  sums,  and  by  their  occasional  loss 
loses  those  sums,  in  the  Zeppelin  raids  upon 
England,  the  military  effects  of  which  are  insignifi- 
cant and  are  not  intended  to  be  significant. 

If  one  were  to  prove  the  thesis  on  more  general 
lines  one  would  only  have  to  consider  the  Prussian 
attitude  during  peace  towards  a  population  be- 
lieved to  be  hostile.  The  only  method  ever 
attempted  is  the  method  of  terror.  It  requires  no 
subtlety  of  suggestion  or  comprehension,  it  is 
suited  to  the  most  base  and  mechanical  type  of 
brain,  it  is  first  cousin  to  "  efficiency  and  organ- 
isation," and  it  is  the  only  method  known  against 
the  Poles  or  the  natives  of  Alsace  Lorraine.  Since 
the  war  you  have  had  exactly  the  same  thing  in 
Belgium  and  in  Serbia.  You  will  have  the  same 
thing  wherever  the  Prussian  goes,  because  he  is 
incapable  of  pennanent  organic  work  in  political 
matters.  He  cannot  govern.  This  policy  of 
terrorising  civiUans  in  order  to  get  better  terms 
when  he  is  losing  is  all  of  a  piece  with  that  very 
simple  cast  of  mind  which  surely  by  this  time  is 
sufficiently  famihar  even  to  his  admirers. 

Note  at  the  same  time  that  the  German 
aeroplanes  never  carry  out  long  air  reconnais- 
sances behind  the  Allied  lines,  very  rarely  attempt 
to  attack  railway  junctions  or  stores  behind  those 


lines,  and  have  not  risked  a  single  Zeppelin  for 
mihtary  purposes  of  this  ?ort. 

Now  contrast  with  such  a  policy  what  the 
Allies  have  done  and  at  once  you  perceive  that  while 
the  Prussian  policy  is  pivoting  upon  the  political 
motive,  the  Allied  policy  is  pivoting  upon  a 
military  one.  The  shells  dropped  on  Lille  were 
dropped  upon  two  very  important  specified  res- 
tricted areas  of  military  value,  and  only  of 
military  value.  They  were  dropped  at  ranges  of 
16,000  to  18,000  yards— that  is,  ranges  sus- 
ceptible of  correction  and  of  aimed  fire.  This  is 
still  more  true  of  the  shells  dropped  on  the  railway 
junction  at  Lens,  which  is.  of  course,  at  a  much  • 
shorter  range  from  the  Allied  heavy  batteries 
behind  the  lines.  The  same  is  conspicuously 
true  of  the  French  heavy  gun  work  in  Alsace.  The 
shells  are  aimed  at  the  railways,  particularly  the 
railway  junctions,  at  the  enemy's  barracks,  at  his 
sidings  and  at  his  stores  of  goods  and  material. 
They  are  never  delivered  at  extreme  ranges,  but 
always  at  objects  susceptible  to  correct  and 
particular  aim  from  comparatively  short  distances. 

Let  me  give  an  example  with  which  I  have 
personal  acquaintance.  The  Germans  dropped 
a  shell  into  St.  Die  in  the  Vosges  a  little  while 
before  I  visited  that  place.  The  shell  was  sent 
from  extreme  range,  aimed  at  nothing  in  par- 
ticular save  the  general  area  of  the  town,  fell  in  an 
outlying  street  and  killed  a  child.  The  French,  by 
way  of  reprisal,  dropped  an  aimed  shell  into  the  gas 
works  of  St.  Marie  on  the  other  side  of  the  moun- 
tains and  blew  them  up.  They  desired  to  attain 
a  particular  object  and  they  attained  it.  They 
threw  all  those  arrangements  which  depended 
upon  a  gas  supply  into  disorder.  If  any  civilian 
life  was  lost  it  was  incidental  to  a  purelv  military 
operation. 

Again  the  allied  air  work  is  constantly  pene- 
trating to  great  distances  behind  the  German  lines 
and  undertakes  reconnaissances  pushed  as  far  as 
possible  eastward,  and  with  very  few  exceptions 
never  drops  bombs  with  the  mere  object  of  terror- 
ising civilian  populations.  Those  very  few  excep- 
tions, of  which  Freiburg  was  one,  were  strictly 
reprisals.  The  enemy  was  warned  that  on  account 
of  his  contempt  for  his  engagements  and  his  breach 
of  the  conventions  hitherto  obtaining  between 
belligerent  white  naf.ons,  he.  would  be  made  to 
suffer  in  the  same  way  that  he  had  made  others 
;  uffer,  and  only  after  such  warning  was  the  punish- 
ment of  the  civilian  populations  in  one  or  two 
towns  upon  the  Rhine  undertaken.  It  wa  suc- 
cessfu'  and  for  some  time  after  obviously  affected 
his  policy.  It  may  be  necessary  to  undertake  these 
repr  sals  again,  and  so  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  they 
will  be  as  thorough  and  decisive  as  possible.  But 
it  will  still  be  t  ue  that  the  allied  policy  as  a  whole 
pivots  upon  purely  mi  itary  considerations  in  w  rk 
of  this  kind  and  the  Prussian  policy  does  not.  And 
anyone  who  doubts  this  has  only  to  measure  ranges 
and  to  note  the  objects  upon  which  the  Allied  borribs 
fall  as  compared  with  the  enemy's  bombs. 

When  the  Zeppelins  reached  the  London 
area  they  knew  perfectly  well  that  they  could 
not  effect  any  milita  y  result  there.  They  were 
not  intending  any  military  result.  What  they 
wanted  was  to  get  up  a  clamour  against  the 
authorities.  They  knew  how  weak  the  authorities 
had  been  in  failing  to  suppress  treasonable  journal- 
ism and  they  hoped  to  add  to  our  domestic  con- 
fusion by  some  lucky  shot. 

H.  Belloc. 


January  2"],  iqtG. 


LAND      AND     W  A  T  It  R 


BLOCKADE    AND    RUMOURS. 

By    ARTHUR     POLLEN. 


WITHOUT  doubt  the  most  urgent  question 
of  the  day  for  us  is  to  lind  out  if  the 
siege  of  Germany  can  be  made  effective 
and  to  make  it  so  if  it  can  be.  The  past 
week  has  revealed  gratifying  advances  in  public 
opinion,  not  only  in  this  country,  but  in  America, 
on  this  question.  There  is  now  a  practical  unani- 
mity that  the  siege  should  be  proclaimed  to  be, 
and  in  fact  become,  the  common  work  of  all  the 
Allies,  whether  the  lion's  sh  -.re  in  actually  en- 
forcing it  continues  to  fall  to  (ireat  Britain  or  not. 
There  is  next  an  increasing  opinion  in  favour  of 
proceeding  by  a  regular  blockade  instead  of 
pleading  the  sanction  of  an  Order  in  Council, 
whose  legality  seems  dubious  to  American  jurists, 
and  there  is  a  marked  advance  towards  agree- 
nient  that  we  shall  be  more  likely  to  find — and 
certainly  more'  prompt  in  adopting — means  to 
make  the  siege  a  reality,  if  its  conduct  is  more 
under  naval  than  diplomatic  authority.  So  far 
there  is  legitimate  ground  for  a  very  genuine 
satisfaction  on  the  part  of  those  \vho,  for  the 
last  six  months,  have  been  urging  these  three 
points  on  public  attention. 

Finally,  there  have  been  published  in  New 
"V'ork  the  returns  of  the  quantities  and  destina-  • 
tions  of  American  exports  during  part  of  the  ye^x 
1915.  These  have  been  largely  reprinted  in  the 
London  Press,  and  though  accurate  and  well- 
informed  analysis  will  greatly  alter  their  apparent 
meaning,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  those 
who  during  the  previous  half-year  have  main- 
tained that  our  methods  of  carrying  out  Mr. 
Asquith's  threat  to  prevent  "  all  commodities  from 
entering  or  leaving  Germany,"  have  been  so  far 
fruitless  as  to  rob  our  siege  of  its  war  value,  are 
substantially  right.  For  to  subject  a  civil  popula- 
tion of  a  country  to  inconvenience  is  only  irritating, 
while  to  subject  it  to  real  privation  and  famine 
is  to  reduce  its  army  to  impotence. 

But  the  past  week  has  also  brought  us  evidence 
of  another  result  of  this  campai^^n  of  education 
by  no  means  as  satisfactory.  There  has 
appeared  in  the  Daily  Telegraph  an  article,  signed 
by  Mr.  Archibald  Hurd,  which  emphasised  the 
incalculable  degree  to  which  the  fortune  of  the 
Allies  is  bound  up  with  the  right  use  of  the  British 
Navy.  Mr.  Hurd  draws  two  lessons  from  the 
Napoleonic  War.  The  parallels  of  1805  and 
1812  are,  he  tells  us,  an  illumination  and  a  warning 
as  to  what  we  should  do  now  and  why  we  should 
do  it.  We  need  at  the  helm  the  firm  and  ex- 
perienced hand  of  such  a  master  of  sea  war  as 
was  Lord  Barham  ;  if  the  Navy  is  to  do  its  work 
the  "  Nelson  touch "  must  be  restored  to  the 
Admiralty;  if  trouble  with  America  is  to  be 
avoided  we  shall  need  statesmanship  at  Whitehall 
as  well  as  consummate  professional  ability  ;  if 
public  confidence  is  to  be  maintained,  we  need  a  head 
of  the  navy  whose  authority  is  unquestioned  and 
unquestionable.  The  application  of  these  lessons 
is  obvious.  Lord  Fisher,  he  urges,  is  the  man  and 
must  replace  Mr.  Balfour  at  the  Admiralty. 

It  is  then  a  sort  of  summary  of  the  position  to 
say  that  there  is  absolute  unanimity  as  to  the 
importance    of   making   the    siege    a    reality ;     a 


general  unanimity  that  this  must  be  an  Allied  and 
not  a  British  operation  ;  a  growing  inclination 
towards  procedure  by  blockade  ;  a  growing  dis- 
satisfaction with  the  authorities  so  far  responsible 
for  the  siege — a  dissatisfaction  that  has  resulted 
in  thinking  that  it  would  be  better  run  if  it  were 
in  naval  hands.  But  it  is  also  recognised  that  this 
cannot  be  done  without  changes  at  the  Admiralty  ; 
and  the  fact  that  such  changes  may  be  desirable 
re-opens  the  (juestion  "  How  is  the  capacity  of 
Whitehall  to  run  the  naval  war  to  be  increased  ?  " 
Is  it  best  to  look  to  the  Fleet  itself,  for  new  blood, 
and  choose  new  advisers  from  those  who  have 
had  eighteen  months'  experience  of  the  real 
thing  ?  Or  is  it  better  once  more  to  place  our 
confidence  in  so  old  and  distinguished  a  public 
servant  as  Lord  Fisher  ?  As  it  is  folly  not  to 
recognise  that  all  these  questions  are  inter- 
dependent, and,  as  the  successful  termination  of 
the  wa:r  depends  upon  the  right  course  being  taken 
in  each  particular,  let  us  briefly  look  at  the 
various  questions  in  detail. 

SHOULD    THE    SIEGE    BE    ALLIED 
OR    BRITISH  ? 

There  are  two  reasons  why  it  should  be 
allied.  First,  Grea  Britain  is  taking  great 
responsibilities  vis-a-vis  with  America  and  other 
neutral  Powers,  by  acting  solely  in  this  matter. 
It  is  not  fair  that  this  should  fall  solely  upon  us. 
Secondly,  the  fundamental  difficulty  of  the  sea 
position  is  to  reconcile  neutrals  to  the  course  which 
the  Allies  require  to  be  adopted.  The  most 
important  of  the  neutrals  in  America,  and  for  a 
hundred  reasons  the  public  of  the  United  States — 
to  whom  Mr.  Wilson  professedly  looks  for  guid- 
ance as  to  his  conduct  towards  ihe  belhgerents — 
would  regard  controversy  with  the  Allied  Powers 
as  something  different  altogether  from  a  con- 
troversy with  (ireat  Britain  alone.  But  as  on 
this  point  there  is  virtual  unanimity  no  more  on  it 
need  now  be  said. 

(2)    ORDER    IN     COUNCIL    VERSUS 
BLOCKADE. 

The  argument  in  favour  of  proceeding  by 
blockade  is  twofold.  The  neutrals  question  the 
validity  of  the  Order  in  Council.  The  legality 
of  a  blockade  seems  easier  of  estabhshment. 
If  the  validity  of  the  blockade  can  be  legally 
maintained,  the  blockading  powers  have  the  right 
to  confiscate  not  contraband  goods  onl}',  but  both 
goods  and  the  ships  car  ying  them  when  they 
attempt  to  break  throxigh  the  blockade.  It  is 
then  a  more  efficient  process.  If  the  supplies 
entering  Germany  have  to  be  carried  by  ships 
that  must  insure  against  the  risks  the  blockade 
runner  has  to  face,  two  results  would  follow. 
Only  a  very  small  proportion  of  ship  owners  would 
face  the  risk,  and  supplies  would  not  only  auto- 
matically become  less  in  bulk,  but  enormously 
more  costly.  It  might  be  thought,  if  the  United 
States  has  protested  so  vigorously  against  our 
proceedings  in  the  matter  of  contraband,  that  they 
would  protest  still  more  vigorously  if  we  adopted 


LAND      AND     WATER. 


January  27,  1916. 


the  infinitely  more  drastic  measure  of  blockade. 
If  the  hanging  up  of  American  ships  seemed  a 
hardship  would  not  the  confiscation  or  destruction 
ol  the  chartered  ships  seem  intolerable  ?  As  to 
this  we  have  something  to  guide  us  in  the  character 
of  the  Notes  which  the  United  States  have 
addressed  to  the  Cierman  (iovernment.  Omitting 
the  case  of  the  William  P.  Frye,  a  grain  ship 
destroyed  by  a  German  cruiser  after  the  cargo  had 
been  removed,  there  is  not  amongst  Mr.  \\'ilson's 
published  notes  to  Germany  a  single  word 
of  jirotest  against  the  destruction — without 
legal  trial  or  any  prize  court  procedure  — 
of  a  single  capture  made  by  the  Germans 
either  by  surface  ships  or  by  submarines. 
So  far  as  we  know  the  whole  of  the  Washington- 
Berlin  correspondence  is  concerned  with  the 
inhumanity  and  injustice  only  of  the  German  pro- 
ceedings. Indeed,  there  seems  no  other  inter- 
pretation that  can  be  put  upon  the  third  Lusitania 
note,  than  that  Mr.  Wilson  accepts,  as  a  necessary 
development  of  modern  naval  war,  that  prizes 
should  be  destroyed  on  the  high  seas.  He  is  only 
conceinvxl  that  if  this  destruction  is  carried  out  by 
subi^iai  ines,  the  safety  of  the  non-combatant 
passengers  and  crews  should  be  properly  secured. 
If  then  a  plausible  legal  argument  can  be  made 
out  for  the  blockade,  it  is  unlikely  that  the 
Americans,  having  waived  the  right  to  trial,  will 
raise  against  our  proceedings  objections  they  have 
not  raised  against  Germany's. 

IS    A    LEGAL    BLOCKADE    POSSIBLE? 

The  main  question  is,  can  the  legality  of  a 
blockade  of  Germany  be  sustained  ?  The  prin- 
ciple of  naval  law  is,  that  no  blockade  is  valid 
unless  it  is  effective.  Those  that  have  advocated 
the  blockade  of  Germany  have  had  to  meet  this 
objection,  "  How  can  you  blockade  Germany, 
when  the  w'hole  Baltic  coast  is  open  to  Danish  and 
Swedish  trade  coming  from  ports  East  of  the 
Sound,  and  when  you  have  no  hold  over  any 
capture  that  you  allow  to  enter  'the  Sound 
when  bound  for  any  neutral  port  beyond  it  ?  " 
There  are  two  main  lines  on  which  these  objections 
can  be  met. 

In  the  first  place,  from  the  date  of  the  third 
Lusitam'a  note,  when  Mr.  Wilson  gave  his  sanction 
to  the  summary  destruction  of  prizes,  it  became 
obvious  that  the  most  powerful  of  the  neutrals 
would  oppose  no  obstacle  to  our  carrying  out 
through  submarines  those  privileges  of  the  sea 
that  hitherto  have  been  limited  to  the  Power  that 
has  general  command  of  the  sea  by  surface  boats. 
Although  Mr.  Wilson  finally  adopted  this  attitude 
in  July  last,  it  was  not  until  October  that  we 
availed  ourselves  of  the  liberty  which  it  mani- 
estly  gave  us.  But  since  October  we  have  main- 
tained a  submarine  force  in  the  Baltic,  the  efficiency 
of  which  in  preventing  trade  between  Sweden, 
l^enmark  and  Germany,  has  no  doubt  varied  ; 
but,  allowance  for  all  such  variations  being  made, 
it  has  imposed  an  obstacle  quite  as  effective  as 
that  which  in  pre\-ious  cases  has  been  held  suffi- 
cient to  maintain  the  legality  of  the  blockading 
operations. 

The  second  point  is  this.  The  Baltic  is  an 
niland  sea  which  can  be  approached  only  through 
narrow  and  territorial  waters.  The  conditions  of 
modern  warfare  oppose,  to  the  passage  of  narrow 
waters  by  a  surface  fleet  considerable  enough  to 
seize  and  hold  the  command  of  the  Baltic,  ob- 
stacles of  a  kind  which  are  insuperable. 


Mines  and  the  employment  of  torpedoes  by 
submarines  and  destroyers  have  admittedly  intro- 
duced new  factors  into  naval  war.  These  must 
be  taken  into  account  in  all  their  bearings. 
Amongst  the  new  effects  must  be  recognised  that 
of  converting  inland  waters  as  the  Baltic  and 
the  Sea  of  Marmora,  into  closed  seas  to  surface 
ships.  Suppose  the  United  States  to  be  at  war 
with  say  Germany  and  Japan,  and  Germany  to 
be  blockading  the  Atlantic  coast  and  Japan 
to  be  blockading  the  Pacific,  and  both  blockades 
to  be  generally  effective,  could  it  be  pretended 
that  any  court  in  the  world  would  deny  the 
legality  of  either  on  the  ground  that  neutral  ships 
could  communicate  freely  with  Milwaukee 
Chicago,  Detroit,  Cleveland  and  Buffalo  ? 
Similarly  it  could  not  be  held  that  Germany  had 
allowed  the  blockade  to  become  ineffective  if  it 
permitted  British  ships  to  enter  the  St.  Lawrence 
with  goods  on  board  whose  destination  it  was 
sworn  was  wholly  neutral.  The  Baltic  is  a  parallel 
case  to  the  (ircat  Lakes.  It  can  then,  it  would 
seem,  be  convincingly  maintained,  that  to  blockade 
the  Sound  is  to  blockade  the  German  coast  beyond 
it,  and  that  to  permit  neutral  ships  with  cargoes 
of  a  neutral  destination  to  pass  the  Sound  would 
not  necessarily  invalidate  the  blockade  at  all. 

Again,  although  the  blockade  can  be  pro- 
claimed and  will  be  valid,  there  still  remains  the 
same  problem  that  faces  the  allies  to-day,  namely 
how  to  deal  with  neutral  ports  on  both  this  and 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Sound  itself.  Frankly 
there  is  no  other  way  of  tackling  this  problem 
except  pushing  the  doctrine  of  "  continuous 
voyage"  to  its  logical  hmit,  and  rationing  the 
neutral  countries.  'I  he  dependence  on  agreements 
with  bodies  of*  private  traders  is,  on  the  face  of 
it,  worthless.  There  is  no  other  alternative  to 
making  the  business  an  affair  between  the 
neutral  and  belligerent  governments. 

IS    THERE    TO    BE    A    LORD    HIGH 
ADMIRAL: 

It  goes  very  much  against  the  grain  with  me 
to  deal  contro\crsially  with  the  name  of  anj'  sea- 
man. It  is  doubly  so  when  that  seaman  is  so  old 
a  public  servant,  so  widely  and  so  rightly  honoured 
in  the  Navj-,  so  gratefully  and  even  affectionately 
looked  upon  by  his  countrymen.  But  if  Mr. 
Hurd  is  free  to  advocate  the  supercession  of 
Mr.  Balfour  by  Lord  Fisher,  those  who  disagree  are 
compelled  to  e.xercise  an  equal  frankness  in  stating 
their  case.  The  situation  is  altogether  too  serious 
for  false  delicacy.  Mr.  Hurd  is  conjuring  with 
the  magic  of  a  great  name.  His  own  reputation 
for  cool  judgment  and  wide  and  unusual  know- 
ledge of  the  profession  which  he  interprets  so 
clearly,  stands  very  high  indeed.  And  in  this 
matter  he  speaks  not  only  for  himself,  but  for 
a  jourral  which  throughout  the  war  has  been 
distinguished  by  a  patriotism  as  sane  as  it  has 
been  ardent.  Mr.  Hurd's  advocacy  then  is  not 
a  thing  that  can  be  ignored,  and  it  would  be  no 
comphment  to  his  hero  to  do  so. 

His  argument  is  briefly  as  follows.  The 
fortunes  of  the  Allied  cause  depend  upon  the  British 
Fleet.  The  Fleet  depends  upon  the  men  at  White- 
hall. There  supreme  power  is  vested  in  Mr. 
Balfour,  and  Mr.  Balfour  knows  nothing  of  sea 
force.  He  has  as  counsellors  men  whose  names  are 
utterly  unknown,  and  he  is  not  even  bound  to  ac- 
cept their    uncon\incing  ad\ice.     These  are   not 


January  27,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


reflections  on  the  First  Lord  and  his  colleagues. 
"  They  are  merely  facts  which  no  one  would  deny." 
His  predecessor  illustrated  his  rashness  and  faulty 
judgment  by  ignoring  the  seamen,  and  we  have 
the  Dardanelles  fiasco  as  a  consequence.  Mr. 
Balfour  may  not  be  rash,  but  he  too  may  fail  through 
being  too  cautious  or  too  indolent.  When  Pitt  saw 
the  Navy  at  a  standstill  in  1805,  he  chose  Lord 
Barham,  a  full  admiral  and  eighty  years  of  age, 
as  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  and  in  six  months 
got  the  reward  of  his  foresight  in  the  Battle  of 
Trafalgar.  Once  more  sea  supremacy  is  vital 
and  has  yet  to  be  won.  Lord  Fisher  is  the  creator 
of  the  Navy  on  whose  power  to  win  supremacy  we 
rely.  The  Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands,  our 
success  in  crushing  the  submarine  piracy — these 
are  samples  of  the  work  he  has  already  done.  We 
have  not  exhausted  German  naval  plans  for  our 
discomfiture.  Plans  to  counter  them  must  be 
prepared.  Is  it  not  obvious  that  we  must  have  a 
sailor  answerable  for  sea  policy  and  a  sailor  who 
enjoys  the  full  confidence  of  the  nation  ?  It  must 
be  a  sailor,  for  with  his  naval  colleagues  on  the 
Board  he  must  carry  on  the  Blockade  and  make 
the  war  his  care.  He  must  have  seniority,  wide  ex- 
perience, and  a  long  and  honourable  career  behind 
him,  or  he  will  not  carry  conviction  with  the  public 
and  reassure  us,  as  he  should,  from  his  place  in 
the  House  of  Lords.  Lord  Fisher,  in  short,  must 
go  to  the  Admiralty  because  he  is  our  only  em- 
bodiment of  the  Barham  traditions  and  "  the 
Nelson  touch."     These  are  Mr.  Hurd's  arguments. 

AN     ELOQUENT    PLEA. 

It  is  an  eloquent  and  sincere  plea.  But  I 
submit  that  we  need  hardly  go  beyond  the  principles 
Mr.  Hurd  lays  down,  to  find  its  refutation.  The  ideal 
First  Lord  must  be  a  sailor  whose  professional 
attainments  and  knowledge  are  such  as  to  secure 
infallibihty  ;  he,  "  with  his  naval  colleagues  on 
the  Board  "  are  carrying  on  the  administration  of 
the  Navy.  Now  Lord  Fisher  was  from  November 
till  May,  First  Sea  Lord  of  the  Adrniralty.  He  was 
principal  naval  adviser  when  the  Dardanelles 
project  was  first  proposed,  and,  he  signed  every 
order  necessary  for  carrying  on  the  naval  operations 
there  until  he  went  out  of  office.  Mr.  Hurd  tells 
us  that  this  fiasco  was  due  to  the  faulty  judgment 
and  to  the  rashness  of  the  admiralty's  lay  chief.  We 
know  from  Mr.  Churchill's  own,  words  that  he  was 
misled  by  the  analogy  of  the  fate  of  Liege,  Namur 
and  Maubeuge  into  thinking  that  naval  12-inch 
and  15-inch  guns  could  repeat  on  the  Dardanelles 
forts  the  work  which  the  Austrian  howitzers  had 
done  on  land.  Once  seized  with  this  delusion,  he 
planned  to  send  pre-Dreadnoughts  and  the 
Queen  Elizabeth  to  carry  out  an  operation  which 
seemed  to  him  to  be  manifestly  within  their  power. 
Lord  Fisher  seems  throughout  to  have  been 
haunted  with  vague  misgivings  that  the  business 
was  unwise.  But,  he  aas  never  aware  that,  from 
the  first,  success  was  impossible.  Had  his  ac- 
quaintance with  modern  gunnery  practice  been 
either  intimate  or  recent,  he  would  have  realised 
that  all  the  pre-Dreadnoughts  in  the  world  and  all 
the  Queen  Elizabeths  that  could  be  built,  could 
never,  unless  aided  by  land  forces  victoriously 
occupying  the  heights  above  them,  destroy  the 
Turkish  forts  of  the  Narrows  by  gun  fire.  Had  his 
professional  grasp  of  this  elementary  technical 
truth  been  of  that  infallible  character  so  necessary 
to  the  desired  new  chief  at  Whitehall,  he  could  have 


nipped  the  whole  Churchill  project  in  the  bud 
by  forbidding  it  on  technical  grounds.  These  not 
even  Mr.  Churchill  could  have  questioned. 

Taking  then  the  first  of  Mr.  Hurd's  points,  it 
would  seem  that  the  moral  is  this.  To  use  the 
modern  navy  with  effect,  it  must  be  in  hands  that 
in  technical  matters  are  guided  by  exact  knowledge 
of,  and  familiarity  with,  the  limitations  in  the 
use  of  naval  force.  The  unhappy  history  of  the 
Dardanelles  adventure  shows  that  we  did  wrong 
to  rely  for  this  knowledge  on  anyone,  however 
eminent,  whose  sea  experience  ended  long  before 
the  development  of  modern  methods  began. 

Now  let  us  take  Mr.  Hurd's  second  point. 
The  ideal  First  Lord  "is  to  act  with  his  naval 
colleagues."  When  Lord  Fisher  returned  to  the 
Admiralty  in  November,  1914,  he  found  the 
administration  of  the  Navy  as  he  had  left  it  in 
1910  with  one  somewhat  startling  difference. 
Lord  Cawdor,  Lord  Tweedmouth  and  Mr.  Mac- 
Kenna  had  adopted  the  principle  that  having 
chosen  Lord  Fisher  as  their  principal  adviser,  it 
was  both  logical  and  loyal  to  give  him  a  free  hand. 
So  from  the  autumn  of  1904  till  Christmas,  1910, 
while  the  supreme  authority  at  Whitehall  was 
nominally  lay,  it  was  actually  naval  and  was  in 
fact  in  Lord  Fisher's  hands  alone.  Mr.  Churchill 
revived  the  principal  of  autocracy,  but  he  made 
it  his  own  and  not  a  professional  autocracy.  It 
was  a  state  of  affairs  which  everyone  familiar  with 
the  course  of  naval  events,  since  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  had  recognised  as  a  growing  danger. 
Had  Lord  Fisher  recognised  this  danger  ;  had  he 
realised  that  the  remedy  was  that  which  Mr. 
Hurd  suggests,  viz.,  the  co-operation  of  the  seamen 
on  the  Board,  Lord  Fisher  could  have  averted 
not  only  the  disaster  of  the  Dardanelles  but  a 
great  many  other  very  undesirable  things  that 
happened.  And  with  regard  to  the  Dardanelles 
question,  let  this  too  be  added.  We  have  seen 
that  Lord  Fisher  did  not  perceive  the  primary 
fallacy  that  inspired  that  operation.  He  had 
misgivings  and  doubts  as  to  its  wisdom,  but  they 
were  apparently  not  doubts  for  which  he  could 
give  any  cogent  reasons.  •  But  it  is  characteristic 
of  Lord  Fisher  to  have  brilliant  inspirations. 
Many  of  his  most  valuable  naval  reforms  have 
arisen  from  an  instinct  for  the  right  thing.  The 
value  of  the  reforms  has  had  to  be  realised  by  the 
work  of  others.  If  these  instincts  and  intuitions  are 
to  be  of  value  they  must  be  subjected  to  naval 
criticism.  If,  in  those  eventful  days  of  January 
and  February  last  year,  he  had  put  his  doubts 
befoi-e  his  naval  colleagues  and  insisted  upon  the 
question  of  the  Dardanelles  being  made  a  Board 
question,  it  is  certain  that  no  more  would  have 
been  heard  of  that  unhappy  project. 

Taking  then  Mr.  Hurd's  own  principles,  it  is 
not  necessary  for  us  to  argue  whether  Lord  Fisher's 
very  wonderful  record  as  aj^peace  administrator 
encourages  us  to  entrust  him  in  war  with  the 
sole  control  of  the  Navy.  For  it  is  clear  that  on 
the  two  points  vital  to  success,  he  has  already 
been  tested  and  found  wanting.  And,  again  to 
quote  Mr.  Hurd,  in  pointing  these  things  out,  lam 
not  reflecting  on  a  famous  man  whom  an  unfor- 
tunate loyalty  has  placed  in  a  false  position,  but 
merely  recording  facts  "  which  no  one  would 
deny."  ARTHUR  POLLEN. 

P.S. — The  above  was  written  be/ore  the  War  Trade 
Departments  analysis  of  the  recent  figures  oj 
neutral  imports  was  published. 


LAND       AND    WATER 


January  27,  191G1 


POLICY   OF  THE  BLOCKADE. 


IT  is  clear  that  the  Government  uf  this  countr\" 
stands  at  the  present  moment  at  a  turning 
point  in  the  policy  of  the  blockade. 
We  need  waste  not  a  moment  o'  our 
readers'  time  nor  the  least  o  our  own  space  in 
ridiculing  the  violent  nonsense  that  has  been  talked 
\ipon  one  side  in  fa\our  of  a  sort  of  revolution  in 
policN'  probably  involving  a  universal  war  or  in  de- 
nouncing upon  the  other  the  muddle  headed  and 
contemptible  rubbish  about  "  sparing"  the  civilian 
population  the  impossibility  of  crushing  a  nation 
of  such  and  such  a  number  of  million  men  or  the 
"  claims  o  humanity  "  against  the  power  which 
is  not  only  determined  to  destroy  this  country  but 
lias  tortured  and  burnt  without  mercy  wherever 
it  has  passed.  Those  who  arc  in  authority  at  the 
-present  moment  are  necessarily  concerned  to  win 
the  war.  They  are  concerned  in  this  to  an  extent 
far  greater  thun  any  other  men  with  the  exception 
of  the  soldiers  in  the  held. 

Being  in  touch  with  the  million  details  of 
affairs  so  enormously  complex  they  must  neces- 
sarily avoid  extremes,  and  were  one  to  put  sud- 
denly in  place  of  any  one  of  these  men  any  one 
of  those  who  have  been  clamouring  for  extremes 
the  new  comer  would  either  evoke  a  disaster  or, 
much  more  probably,  break  down  under  the 
weight  of  his  new  responsibility. 

In  the  maze  of  detail,  every  item  of  which 
has  to  be  weighed  and  balanced,  two  great 
groups  have  necessarily  presented  themselves  to 
the  Government  in  the  past  year. 

The  first  of  these  groups  was  the  mass  of 
neutral  interests  closely  interlocked  not  only  with 
our  own  commercial  interest  but  with  our  own 
power  of  obtaining  essential  supplies  for  the 
campaign.  The  second  group  was  the  simpler 
group  of  aggressive  policies  open  to  the  power 
which  commanded  the  sea  :  the  group  of  actions 
which  in  various  ways  would  solate  the  enemy 
and  check  his  power  for  production  (especially 
in  material  for  war),  cut  off  his  food  as  far  as 
po  sible  (a  most  legitimate  operation  based  upon 
his  own  precedents  and  pohcy)  and  in  general 
establish    the    strictest  possible  blockade. 

To  arrive  at  a  working  compromise  between 
these  two  motives  neither  of  which  could  be 
neglected  without  peril  of  disaster— has  been  the 
anxious  business  of  all  departments  but  especially 
of  the  Treasury,  tlie  Admiralty,  the  Board  of 
Trade,  and  the  Foreign  Office. 

It  is  possible  that  a  determined  policy  of 
maximum  blockade  declared  immediately  upon 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  would,  in  the  shock  of  the 
moment,  ha\e  been  possible  without  the  challeng- 
ing of  neutrals  to  arms  or  even  interfering  with 
our  own  supply  from  neutrals.  It  would  have  been 
an  extremel\-  risky  gamble  at  ^^ery  great  odds  and, 
r. member,  with  I  aly  and  the  Mediterranean  then 
involved.  At  any  rate  the  discussion  of  this  is 
merely  academ  c  to-day  for,  like  universal  service 
and  many  other  dra~.tic  po'icies  that  one  psycho- 
logical moment  was  essential  to  such  a  move,  and 
once  the  moment  had  passed  every  succeeding 
week  made  it  more  and  more  difficult  The  way 
in  which  the  Government  actually  attempted  to 
reconcile  the  weighty  opposing  motives  acting 
upon  them  was  to  exercise  an  increasing  pressure-  - 
a  pressure  increasing  s  owly  but  none  the  less 
increas'ng  to  wait  the  entry  of  Italy  into  the 
A  liance  before  making  cotton,  for  instance,  con- 


traband of  war  (for  how  could  we  prevent  a 
potential  ally  from  obtaining  what  might  be  and 
in  the  end  proved  to  be  material  for  our  own 
explosives  ?).  to  treat  the  small  North  Sea  nations, 
in  separate  categories,  favouring  the  more  friendly, 
and  in  the  result  to  establish  a  curve  of  gradually 
increasing  strictness  in  the  starvation  of  the  Austro- 
Germans  and  the  Turks  in  the  matter  of  essentials 
not  only  for  war  but  for  civilian  hfe. 

That  policy  has  now  reached  a  certain  critical 
state  in  which  for  the  first  time  it  is  useful  and 
legitimate  for  pubhc  criticism  to  be  directed  upon 
it.  It  will  in  the  immediate  future  be  of  some 
consequence  both  to  the  support  the  Govern- 
ment shall  receive  at  home — a  matter  of  very 
great  mihtary  importance — and  to  the  successful 
prosecution  of  the  war  that  henceforward,  of  the 
two  motives  present  that  of  the  blockade  shall 
more  and  more  outweigh  the  other. 

The  reasons  for  this  conclusion  are  already 
apparent  to  most  men  of  sober  judgment  and  are 
beginning  to  find  expression  in  quarters  which 
deserve  and  obtain  the  attention  of  the  Cabinet. 
The  first  and  main  reason  is  one  even  better  known 
to  the  authorities  than  to  even  the  best  instructed 
portion  of  the  public  ;  it  is  the  fact  that  the  block- 
ade has  at  last  begun  to  tell  very  seriously  upon 
the  enemy.  Now  it  is  a  maxim  in  every  kind  of 
struggle  that  in  such  critical  moments  you  must 
exercise  a  novel  and  peculiar  pressure.  To  tighten 
the  screw  just  when  there  is  a  touch  of  panic  or 
breakdown  is  the  essential  of  every  sound  pohcy 
of  success  in  every  form  of  combat.  The  chief 
Prussian  bombardment  of  Paris  coincided  with 
the  first  sharp  rise  in  the  death  rate,  especially  of 
children,  and  with  the  serious  pinch  of  famine. 

Next  we  have  the  fact  that  after  a  year's 
careful  observation  and  a  very  methodical  and 
thorough  tracing  of  that  curve  of  increase  of  pres- 
sure of  which  we  have  spoken,  our  Government 
and  tiiose  of  the  neutrals  can  establish  a  close 
estimate  of  what  imports,  and  in  what  quantities, 
are  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  neutral  pro- 
duction and  trade,  and  what  margin  may  be 
fraudulently  going  to  the  enemy. 

In  the  third  place  we  have  aiTived  at  a  point 
where  we  are  far  more  independent  than  we  have 
been  in  the  past  of  external  material  from  neutrals. 

All  these  things  combined  do  mean  not  that 
this  is  the  moment  for  any  revolution  in  policy,  or 
for  any  violent  departure  ;  but  for  the  transference 
of  weight  as  it  were  from  the  consideration  of 
foreign  complexities  to  the  consideration  of  the; 
enemy's  really  acute  need.  A  man  stands  on  two 
legs  but  in  action,  in  fencing  or  'n  boxing,  he  is 
depending  mon-  upoji  one  than  upon  the  other 
according  to  the  work  of  the  moment.  His  weight 
reposes  upon  one  or  upon  the  other.  It  is  easy  to 
understand  how  during  all  the  anxious  middle  part 
of  the  past  year  and  even  late  on  into  the  autumn 
the  weight  lay  upon  the  "  leg "  so  to  speak 
represented  by  the  careful  and  singularly  success- 
ful work  of  the  Foreign  Office  in  handling  the 
complex  problem  of  the  neutrals,  in  safeguarding 
at  lea  t  one  of  the  few  routes  into  Russia  and  in 
increas  ng  our  own  suppHes.  But  the  time  would 
se  m  to  have  come  when  there  shou'd  be  an  abso- 
lute transference  of  that  weight  to  the  other 
''leg"  of  the  Navy.  F'or  at  last  we  have 
many  essential  supplies  of  the  enemy  in  our 
power. 


January  27,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


BRITAIN'S    BANKING    SYSTEM.- 1. 


By  Arthur   Kitson. 


IN  his  remarkable  book  "  Germany  and  the  next 
War,"  Bernhardt  mentions  the  following  as 
one  of  the  many  advantages  gained  by  war  : — 
"  All  the  sham  reputations  which  a  long  spell  of 
peace  nndoubtedly  fosters,  are  unmasked."  The  pre- 
sent war  has  undoubtedly  "  tmmasked  "  the  "  sham 
reputations  ' '  of  several  of  our  most  venerable— and 
hitherto  admired — institutions — both  politico!  and 
economic.  Among  these  may  be  mentioned  the  doctrine 
of  "  laissez  faire  "  which  has  long  been  the  accredited 
gospel  of  our  Governing  classes.  Free  trade  appears 
also  to  have  fallen  from  its  lofty  pedestal  during  the  past 
few  months,  judging  from  the  recent  parliamentary 
debates  and  editorials  in  certain  Liberal  journals.  But 
our  one  idol  that  is  at  present  in  the  greatest  disrepute 
is  Britain's  banking  system. 

Scathing  Criticisms. 

Nowadays,  it  is  almost  impossible  to  peruse  either  a 
trade  journal  or  newspaper  without  noticing  some  scathing 
criticism  of  the  system  which  has  hitherto  been  hekl 
up  as  a  shining  example  of  iinancial  strength  and  efficiency. 
The  Daily  News,  which  prior  to  the  war  never  expressed 
anything  but  blind  and  absolute  faith  in  this  national 
idol,  publishes  an  article  (January  15th)  by  the  Kditor, 
entitled  "  Monej'  for  all,"    in  which  he  says  :— 

When  the  war  came,  the  false  bottom  fell  out  of  our  banking 
system  and  we  made  a '  startling  discovery.     We  found 
that  the  banks  were  an  imposing  fair  weather  structure 
which  tottered  like  a  house  of  cards  when  the  storm  came 
and  only  survived  because  in  one  swift  hour    Mr.  Lloyd 
George  gave  them  the  security  of  the  nation.     It  was 
discovered  that  behind  all  the  appearances  of  strength, 
the  banks  woie  a  fiction  and  the  reality  on  which  they 
traded  was  the  credit  of  tlie  State,  yours  and  mine  and 
everybody's.      Gold    disappeared     from    circulation  and 
there   flowed   forth   a    torrent   of    notes  issued    by    the 
Treasury  and  represented  nothing  but  the  credit  of   the 
Nation. 
Writer  Besant  once  said  tliat  "  the  art  of  banking  was  to 
get  otiicr  people's  money  and  use  it  for  your  own    ad- 
vantage."    There  has  been  no  more  illuminating  revelation 
during  the  war,  and  the  question  for  us  to  ask  is  whether 
this  private  monopoly  of  the  national  credit  can  be  per- 
mitted to  continue  ?     Can  we  start  the  future  with  a 
"  corner  "    in  money?     Or  must  we  not  see  that  money 
like  political  power  must  be  democratised  ?     If  money  is 
only  a  symbol  representing  the  whole  credit  of  the  com- 
munity why  should  that  symbol  not  be  at  the  command 
of  +Vif  w'hnip  ^oi-r-rviii-itv  whose  credit  it  represents  ?  " 
Now   the   remarkable   thing   about   this    article   is   not 
that  it  should  be  written  at  this  time  when  "  sham  repu- 
tations "    are  falling  in  all  directions,  but  that  the  writer 
did  not  make  these  discoveries  and  disclosures  sooner. 
During  the  past  forty  years  quite  a  library  of  publications 
have  appeared,  exposing  the  rotten  foimdation  of  Britain's 
financial  system  and  predicting  a  collapse  sooner  or  later. 
This  danger  has  been  the  subject  of  many  discussions  and 
resolutions  at  various  meetings  of  our  Trade  bodies  and 
Chambers  of  Commerce  all  over  the  United  Kingdom 
for  the  last  thirty-five  years.     Some  of  the  most  ^•igorous 
criticisms  have  been  written  by  members  of  the  banking 
profession  themselves,  such  as  Sir  William  Holden,  and 
by  financial  writers  like  Walter  Bagehot,  and  on  one  or 
two  occasions  no  less  an  authority  than  the  late  Lord 
Goschen   (when   Chancellor   of  the   Exchequer)    uttered 
words  of  warning  about  the  volcano  upon  which  we  were 
living.     But  like  the  warnings  of  the  late  Lord  Salisbury, 
Frederick  Harrison,  Lord  Roberts,  and  a  host  of  others 
to  prepare  for  the  war  in  which  we  are  now  engaged,  these 
utterances  fell  on  deaf  ears.     For  it  has  been  the  policy  of 
the  Press,  with  a  few  exceptions,  to  refuse  a  hearing  to 
prophets  who  foretell  danger  or  evil. 

Now  that  the  murder  is  out,  it  will  be  instructive  and 
interesting  to  examine  the  wonderful  financial  edifice  — 
the  sham  Gibraltar— which  collapsed  days  before  even 
hostilities  had  begun  or  a  single  shot  had  been  iired. 
In  his  well-known  work,  "  Lombard  Street,"  Walter 
Bagehot  wrote  :  — "  The  peculiar  essence  of  our  banking 
system  is    an   unprecedented    trust  between   man    and 


man,  and  when  that  trust  is  much  weakened  by  hidden 
causes,  a  small  accident  may  greatly  hurt  it,  and  a 
great  accident  for  a  moment  may  almost  destroy  it," 

Inherently  Weak. 

To  an  outsider  who  for  the  first  time  learns  IKj 
true  nature  of  banking,  it  will  appear  amazing  that  in- 
telligent men  shoiild  de\'isc  a  system  so  inherently  weak 
and  seriously  regard  it  as  a  basis  for  a  great  nation's 
trade  and  industry  !  That  it  has  lasted  so  long  speaks 
volumes  for  the  honesty  and  faith  of  the  British  people — 
the  most  trusting  people  in  the  world.  That  the  system 
should  have  been  facetiously  termed  "The  Great  Confi- 
dence Game  "  is  not  surprising,  for  it  is  apparent  that 
the  basis  of  our  banking  business  is  public  confidence. 
It  is.however.only  fair  to  say  that  the  ])resent  system  was 
neither  designed  nor  foreseen  by  its  founders  as  we  now 
know  it.  It  is  a  development,  a  sort  of  monstrosity— 
an  abnormal  growth— like  a  man's  body  attached  to  an 
infant's  feet  and  legs. 

In  184.4  Sir  Robert  Peel,  a  well  meaning  but  narrow- 
minded  statesman,  placed  British  banking  in  a  pair  of 
iron  boots.  The  foundation  of  the  system  was  rigid  and 
narrow.  Little  or  no  provision  was  made  for  the  future 
development  of  commerce.  Th(>  only  question  that 
appears  to  have  been  considered  by  Sir  Robert  Peel  was 
how  to  conserve  the  value  of  the  sovereign.  The  develop- 
ment of  industry  and  its  needs  was  quite  a  side  issue, 
indeed,  it  seems  hardly  to  have  received  any  considera- 
tion. Consequently  as  the  banking  needs  of  the  nation 
increased,  accommodation  had  to  be  provided  by  enlarg- 
ing the  superstructure  without  any  attempt  to  enlarge 
the  foundation  to  a  corresponding  extent.  The  system, 
therefore,  came  to  be  likened  to  an  inverted  pyrainid. 

The  system  is  briefly  as  follows  :— The  ^  Bank  of 
England  (which  by  the  way  is  a  private  stock  bank 
and  is  not  in  any  way  a  national  institution  so  fir  as  its 
control  and  management  are  concerned)  is  the  financial 
rock  upon  which  all  other  British  banks  and  financial 
firms  and  institutions  repose.  It  is  known  as  the  Bank 
of  the  Bankers.  "  All  our  credit  system  depends  upon 
the  Bank  of  England  for  its  security  "  says  Walter 
Bagehot  ;  "on  the  wisdom  of  the  Directors  of  that  one 
Joint  Stock  Company,  it  depends  whether  England  shall 
be  solvent  or  insolvent.  This  may  seem  too  strong,  but 
it  is  not.  All  banks  depend  on  the  Bank  of  England,  all 
merchants  depend  upon  some  banker." 

Banking  Laws. 

Our  financial  system  is  the  result  of  certain  Acts  of 
Parliament  such  as  our  Legal  Tender  laws,  and  the 
Bank  Charter  Act.  The  former  defines  specifically  the 
manner  and  form  in  which  debts  must  be  paid.  The 
latter  defines  restrictions  imder  which  the  Banks  arc 
permitted  to  supply  the  public  demand  for  the  debt-pay- 
ing commodity.  And  although  the  one  created  the  neces- 
sity for  an  ever  increasing  supply  of  legal  tender,  the 
Bank  Act  not  only  made  no  provision  for  such  a 
supply,  it  even  made  such  provision  both  difficult  ancl 
expensive.  So  that  it  became  more  profitable  for 
the  banks  to  find  a  substitute  for  legal  tender— thereby 
increasing  the  public  risks.  Hence  the  invention 
of  the  cheque  system.  Debts  beyond  forty  shillings, 
both  public  and  private,  were  made  specifically  payable  in 
gold  on  demand.  The  mints  were  opened  to  the  coinage  of 
gold  in  unlimited  amounts  at  the  fixed  rate  of  £3  17s.  10 Jd. 
per  ounce.  The  Bank  of  England  was  allowed  the 
privilege  of  issuing  notes  to  the  extent  of  whatever  gold 
it  possessed,  at  the  above  rate.  An  additional  issue 
of  what  has  been  termed  "  inconvertible  "  notes  was 
allowed  against  securities  and  the  National  Debt  to  the 
bank  (£11,000,000)  at  present  amoimting  altogether  to 
about' £1^,500,000.  Subsidiary  coinage  was  also  pro- 
vided for.  But  the  main  fact  in  the  Bank  Charter  Act, 
ivhich  constitutes  the  inherent  weakness  of  the  'whole  svslem 
was  that  the  amount  of  legal  tender  available  for  carrving  on 
the  nation's  trade  and  commerce  depended  not  on  our 
domestic  needs  hut  upon  the  conditions  of  the  tnoney  markets 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


January  27,  1916. 


^OW~W 


ah/oad  !  If,  for  c\anii)li\  a  trade  boom  in  Germany  or 
America  created  an  urgent  demand  for  gold,  the  only 
method  the  Bank  of  England  possessed  for  retaining  its 
reser\'es  was  to  raise  the  Bank  Rate.  Whilst  this,  tended 
to  cut  off  some  of  the  foreign  demand  it  also  jvnalised 
our  own  people  by  taxing  their  banking  facilities.  It 
became  a  double-edged  sword  tiiat  cut  both  ways,  and 
althougli  it  has  proved  a  wonderful  instrument  for  booming 
the  value  of  bank  shares,  it  has  proved  a  dead-weight 
upon  the  backs  of  our  producing  classes  and  a  serious 
brake  upon  the  wheels  of  industry. 

Our  economic  system  has  been  ingeniously  illustrated 
by  this  inverted  pyramid.     It  is  supported  upon  its  gold 

apex,  which  carries  all 
the  credit  of  the  coun- 
try. Upon  this  we  have 
reared  all  our  trade, 
manufactures  and  busi- 
ness generally.  The 
amount  of  gold  has 
been  a  very  varying 
quantity — but  in  any 
case  it  has  represented 
an  extremely  insignifi- 
cant sum  in  proportion  to  the  load  it  has  had  to 
:arry.  Just  prior  to  the  war  the  total  amount  of  gold 
available  throughout  the  country  was  estimated 
at  less  thnn  £"60,000,000.  The  volume  of  credit  resting 
upon  this  ran  into  hundreds  of  millions.  The  bank 
deposits  alone— subject  to  withdrawal  at  sight — was  at 
least  ten  times  all  the  gold  available.  It  is  safe  to  say 
that  altogether,  the  volume  of  credit  redeemable  in  gold 
on  demand  on  August  ist,  iqi4,  was  more  than  25  times 
all  the  gold  that  the  bankers  could  possibly  scrape 
together  !  The  truth  is,  that  ever  since  the  passing  of  the 
Bank  Charter  Act,  every  bank  in  this  country  has  been 
doing  business  on  a  margin  of  bankruptcy  ! 

The  engineer  who  constructs  a  bridge  or  machine, 
estimates  the  sizes  and  chooses  his  material  on  the  basis 
of  a  margin  of  safety.  He  first  calculates  the  maximum 
strains  to  which  the  bridge  or  machine  will  be  subjected. 
He  then  multiplies  this  by  two  or  three  and  builds  accord- 
ingly. The  Bank  Charter  Act  compelled  our  bankers 
to  adopt  a  margin  of  risk.  No  provision  was  made  for 
any  extraordinary  event,  such  as  war  or  panic.  The  one 
door  of  safety  was— suspending  the  Act.  This  was  actu- 
ally done  on  three  different  occasions  during  the  life  of 
its' famous  author,  with  the  result  that  the  nation  was 
saved  from  bankruptcy  on  each  occasion.  Imagine  a 
Government  passing  an  Act  ostensibly  for  the  protection 
of  the  public,  which  has  to  be  suspended  periodically  to 
rave  the  nation  from  its  disastrous  effects  ! 

But  the  danger  to  which  this  Act  exposed  the  country 
was  not  merely  apparent  in  times  of  war  crises.  It 
was  liable  to  arise  at  any  moment  through  foreign  events 
which  otherwise  would  "have  been  of  little  or  no  conse- 
quence to  us.  The  removal  of  the  cotton  crops  in  Egypt 
or  in  the  United  States,  the  speculations  of  financial 
"  plungers  "  in  New  York,  Chicago  or  San  Francisco,  the 
decision  of  a  Board  of  Railroad  Directors  in  Argentina 
to  extend  their  system,  a  presidential  election  in  the 
United  States,  and'hundreds  of  similar  events  which  have 
little  or  no  direct  relation  to  our  home  trade — any  one  of 
these  was  sufficient  to  affect  our  bank-rate  by  causing 
withdrawals  of  gold  from  the  Bank  of  England  and  to 
influence  our  commerce  disastrously.  So  sensitive  is  our 
money  market,  in  consequence  of  this  stupid  Bank  Act, 
that  we  actually  experience  greater  and  more  acute 
financial  disturbances  on  account  of  foreign  events  than 
is  experienced  in  the  countries  themselves  in  which  these 
events  are  happening. 

When  the  Germans  were  beseiging  Paris  m  1870.  our 
bank-rate  stood  at  10  per  cent.,  whilst  the  rate  of  the  Bank 
of  l'"rance  was  only  7  per  cent.  The  German  Minister  of 
I'i nance  has  boasted  that  no  such  panic  occurred  in 
Brrlin  when  war  was  declared  in  August,  1014.  as  that 
which  was  experienced  in  London  at  the  same  time.  The 
wond<r  is  not  so  much  that  our  banks  collapsed  at  the 
more  rumour  of  war.  but  that  they  have  been  enabled  to 
( ontinue  so  successfully  for  so  long  on  so  unstable  at 
foimdation.  Can  we"  wonder  that  foreigners  have 
christoned  the  British  banking '  system,  the  "  Grent 
Confidence  Game  "  ? 

iro    li(  coniinued.) 


BRITAIN'S    FIGHTING    FORGES. 

Military  brevity',  wliidi  characterises  right  from  be- 
ginning to"  end.  Field-Marslial  Sir  Evelyn  Wood's  new 
work  (Our  Fighting  Services.  Cassell  and  Co.,  21s.  nei). 
is  rendered  absolutely  necessary  by  the  magnitude  ol 
the  subject,  for  the'  book  is  no  less  than  a  history 
of  the  Navy  and  Army- especially  the  Army— of  Britain 
from  the  Norman  Conquest  to  the  end  of  the  South  African 
War.  Since  the  book  concerns  tlie  way  in  which  the  "  fightmg 
forces  "  made  tiie  Empire,  reference  to  the  present  war  is 
ver>'  wisely  omitted,  for  in  the  first  place  this  present  war 
has"  little  connection  with  Empire-making,  and  in  the  second 
place  it  is  impossible  to  write  history  without  historical 
perspective,  either  in  sevenpenny  parts  or  in  volume  form. 

To  many  readers  the  first  part,  dealing  with  the  rise  of 
the  Navy  and  Army  from  the  time  of  the  Conquest  to  the  end 
of  the  Tudor  period,  will  prove  the  most  interesting,  though 
Hastings  and  Crecv  are  dismissed  in  brief  paragraphs.  The 
author  has  been  at  pains  to  trace  the  tactical  developments  of 
each  period,  and  to  show  the  modifications  of  method  arising 
out  of  the  changes  in  armament.  On  the  framework  of 
history  he  has  built  up  a  book  essentially  militarj^  in  form 
and  principle.  He  has  not,  however,  neglected  the  romance 
of  military  histor\-,  and-  its  stirring  incidents.  Beside  the 
story  of  the  death"  of  Wolfe  is  set  the  equally  pathetic  story 
of  the  death  of  Montcalm  ;  the  anti-chmax  to  the  stor^'  of 
Hawke's  daring  naval  strategy  is  given  in  a  few  lines  that 
relate  how  in  London  the  great  commander's  effig>'  was  being 
burnt  in  the  belief  that  he  had  failed  in  his  duty.  One  of  the 
chief  features  of  the  book  is  the  way  in  which  the  salient 
features  of  each  event  are  seized  on  and  presented,  giving  the 
reader  adequate  grasp  on  each  phase  of  the  great  stor>'. 

In  the  chapters  devoted  to  the  oft-described  Waterloo 
campaign,  the  events  leading  up  to  the  great  battle  are  given 
their  due  prominence,  making  of  the  campaign  a  coherent 
whole,  and  this  is  characteristic  of  the  whole  work.  It  is  the 
strategist,  as  well  as  the  historian,  who  writes,  omitting 
irrelevant  detail,  and  careful  that  no  operation  with  a  direct 
bearing  on  the  historic  sequence  shall  lack  its  due  place. 
Thus  the  whole  of  the  Marlborough  campaigns  do  not  occupy 
half  the  space  given  to  the  Peninsular  War,  for  the  former 
were  barren  of  result,  while  the  latter  had  direct  bearing  on 
the  downfall  of  Napoleon  and  the  re-making  of  Europe. 
Sound  military  judgment  is  united  with  conscientious  accuracy 
in  the  compilation  of  this  story  of  the  fighting  services,  and 
the  comprehensive  bibliography  gi\cn  at  the  end  of  the  book 
shows  that  it  is  intended  as  an  introduction  to  the  study  of 
military'  history,  a  purpose  which  it  worthily  fulfils. 

Expressions  of  personal  opinion  are  few  in  these  pages  ; 
the  bare  story  is  given,  and  the  reader  may  form  his  own 
opinion,  for  the  book  is  a  record  of  duty  done,  not  a  critical 
study.  In  this,  as  in  tha  end  which  such  a  book  serves,  more 
especially  among  the  younger  generation,  it  is  consonant  with 
its  author's  career. 


The  Machine-Gunners'  Pocket  Book,  by  "  An  M.G.O* 
in  Flanders "  (Graham  and  Lathom,  is.  6d.  net),  is  an 
encyclopsedia  of  the  Vickers  or  Maxim  machine-gun.  In 
addition  to  instructions  on  fire  direction  and  control,  the 
book  gives  full  details  of  the  mechanism  of  the  gun,  and  of 
the  action  of  the  mechanism,  with  causes  of  stoppage  of  fire 
and  the  method  of  remedying  them.  It  forms  a  handy  little 
training  manual  for  machine-gun  officers,  and  is  one  that 
every  officer  or  N.C.O.  on  machine-gun  work  ought  to  possess. 

A  cheap  edition  of  The  Grenadiers  of  Potsdam,  by  J.  R. 
Hutchinson,  issued  by  Messrs.  Sampson,  Low  and  Co.,  at  is. 
net,  provides  evidence  of  the  fact  that  the  Prussian  bully 
is  not,  as  is  sometimes  alleged,  a  growth  of  the  last  forty 
years,  but  has  been  evolving  since  the  time  of  the  first 
Frederick  William  of  Prussia.  The  way  in  which  the  giant 
grenadiers  were  crimped  and  kidnapped  makes  interesting 
reading,  and  the  story  of  the  regiment,  fully  told  in  this  book, 
forms  a  good  commentary  on  Prussian  methods,  especially 
when  it  is  remembered  that  the  book  was  written  before  the 
war,  and  thus  is  without  the  prejudice  the  war  has  caused  tc 
appoar  in  the  work  of  many  writers. 

Published  at  2s.  net  by  Messrs.  Holden  and  Hardingham, 
Biggs  and  Potter,  by  J.  Beard  Francis,  provides  the  class  of 
light  comedy  that  would  make  the  book  a  welcome  one  in  a 
ho.^pital  ward,  or  for  any  occasion  on  which  the  object  is  to 
divert  the  mind  of  the  reader  rather  than  to  instruct  him. 
The  doings  of  Higgs — and  Potter — at  their  seaside  boarding 
house  are  decidedly  amusing,  and  the  obvious  garrulousness 
of  the  author,  a  sort  of  free  and  easy  method  of  writing  that 
brings  in  a  multitude  of  side  issues,  adds  to  the  humour  of  the 
work.     Both  Higgs  and  Potter  are  worth  knowing— in  print- 


January  27,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


THE    SIGNALLERS. 


By  Boyd  Cable. 


"  It  is  reported  that  .  .  .  " — Extract  from 
OiiiciAL  Despatch. 

THE  "  it"  and  the  "  that"  which  were  reported, 
and  which  the  despatch  related  in  another  three 
or  four  Hnes,  concerned  the  position  of  a  forward 
line  of  battle,  but  have  really  nothirig  to  do 
with  this  account,  which  aims  only  at  relating  something 
of  the  method  b}/  which  "  it  was  reported"  and  the  men 
whose  particular  work  was  concerned  only  with  the  report 
as  a  report,  a  string  of  words,  a  jumble  of  letters,  a  huddle 
of  morse  dots  and  dashes. 

The  Signalhng  Company  in  the  forward  lines  wa-; 
situated  in  a  very  damp  and  very  cold  cellar  of  a  half 
destroyed  house.  In  it  were  two  or  three  tables  com- 
mandeered from  upstairs  or  from  some  houses  around. 
That  the  one  was  a  rough  deal  kitchen  table  and  that 
another  was  of  polished  wood,  with  beautiful  inlaid  work, 
and  artistic  curved  and  carven  legs,  the  spoils  of  some 
drawing-room  apparently,  was  a  matter  without  the 
faintest  interest  to  the  signallers  who  used  them.  To 
them  a  table  was  a  table,  no  more  and  no  less,  a  thing  to 
hold  a  litter  of  papers,  message  forms,  telephone  gear,  and 
a  candle  stuck  in  a  bottle.  If  they  had  stopped  to  consider 
the  matter,  and  had  been  asked,  they  would  probably  have 
given  a  dozen  of  the  delicate  inlaid  tables  for  one  of  the 
rough  strong  kitchen  ones.  There  were  three  or  four  chairs 
about  the  place,  just  as  miscellaneous  in  their  appearance 
as  the  tables.  But  beyond  the  tables  and  chairs,  there 
was  no  furniture  whatever,  unless  a  scanty  heap  of  wet 
straw  in  one  corner  counts  as  furniture,  which  indeed  it 
might  well  do  since  it  counted  as  a  bed. 

Towards  Midnight. 

There  were  fully  a  dozen  men  in  the  room,  most 
of  them  orderlies  for  the  carrying  of  messages  to  and  from 
the  telephonists.  These  men  came  and  went  continually. 
Outside  it  had  been  raining  hard  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
day  and  now,  getting  on  towards  midnight,  the  drizzle 
stiil  held  and  the  trenches  and  fields  about  the  signallers' 
quarters  were  running  wet,  churned  into  a  mass  of  gluey 
chalk-and-clay  mud.  The  orderlies  coming  in  with 
messages  were  daubed  thick  with  the  wet  mud  from 
boot-soles  to  shoulders,  often  with  their  puttees  and 
knees  and  thighs  dripping  and  running  water  as  if  they 
had  just  waded  through  a  stream.  Those  who  by  the 
carrying  of  a  message  had  just  completed  a  turn  of  duty 
reported  themselves,  handed  over  a  message  perhaps, 
slouched  wearily  over  to  the  wall  furthest  from  the  door, 
dropped  on  the  stone  floor,  bundled  up  a  pack  or  a  haver-  ■ 
sack,  or  anything  else  convenient  for  a  pillow,  lay  down 
and  spread  a  wet  macintosh  over  them,  wriggled  and 
composed  their  bodies  into  the  most  comfortable,  or 
rather  the  least  uncomfortable  possible  position,  and  in  a 
few  minutes  were  dead  asleep. 

It  was  nothing  to  them  that  every  now  and  again  the 
house  above  them  shook  and  quivered  to  the  shock  of  a 
heavy  shell  exploding  somewhere  on  the  ground  round  the 
house,  that  the  rattle  of  rifle  fire  dwindled  away  at  times 
to  separate  and  scattered  shots,  brisked  up  again  and  rose 
to  a  long  roll,  the  devil's  tattoo  of  the  machine  guns 
rattling  through  it  with  exactly  the  sound  a  boy  makes 
running  a  stick  rapidly  along  a  raihng.  The  bursting 
shells  and  scourging  rifle  fire,  sweeping  machine  guns, 
banging  grenades  and  bombs  were  all  affairs  with  whicli 
the  Signalling  Company  in  the  cellar  had  no  connection. 
For  the  time  being,  the  men  in  a  row  along  the  wall 
were  as  unconcerned  in  the  progress  of  the  battle  as  if 
they  were  safely  and  comfortably  asleep  in  London. 
Presently  any  or  all  of  them  might  be  waked  and  sent 
out  into  the  flying  death  and  dangers  of  the  battlefield, 
but  in  the  meantime  their  immediate  and  only  interest 
was  in  getting  what  sleep  they  could.  Every  once  in  a 
while  tiie  signallers'  Sergeant  would  shout  for  a  man, 
go  across  to  the  line  and  rouse  one  of  the  sleepers  ;  then 
the  awakened  man  would  sit  up  and  blink,  rise  and  listen 
to  his  instructions,  nod  and  say  "  Yes,  Sergeant  !  All 
right,  Sergeant  !  "  when  these  were  completed,  pouch  his 


message,  hitch  his  damp  macintosh  about  him  and  button 
it  close,  drag  heavily  across  the  stone  floor  and  vanislj 
into  the  darkness  of  the  stone  staired  passage. 

A  Journey  in  Darkness. 

His  journey  might  be  a  long  or  a  short  one,  he  might 
only  have  to  find  a  company  commander  in  the  trenches 
one  or  two  hundred  yards  away,  he  might  on  the  otiier 
hand  have  a  several  hours'  long  trudge  ahead  of  him,  a 
bewildering  way  to  pick  through  the  darkness  across  a 
maze  of  fields  and  a  net-work  of  trenches,  over  and  be- 
tween the  rubble  heaps  that  represented  the  remains  of  a 
village,  along  roads  pitted  with  all  sorts  of  blind  traps  in 
the  way  of  shell  holes,  strings  of  barbed  wire,  overturned 
carts,  broken  branches  of  trees,  flung  stones  and  beams  ; 
and  always,  whether  his  j  ourney  was  a  short  one  or  a  long ,  he 
would  move  in  an  atmosphere  of  risk,  with  sudden  death 
or  searing  pain  passing  him  by  at  every  step,  and  waiting 
for  him,  as  he  well  knew,  at  the  next  step  and  the  next 
and  every  other  one  to  his  journey's  end. 

Each  man  who  took  his  instructions  and  pocketed  his 
message  and  walked  up  the  cellar  steps,  knew  that  he 
might  never  walk  down  them  again,  that  he  might  not 
take  a  dozen  paces  from  them  before  the  bullet  found  liiin. 
He  knew  that  its  finding  might  come  in  black  dark  and 
in  the  middle  of  an  open  field,  that  it  might  drop  him 
there  and  leave  him  for  the  stretcher  bearers  to  find  some 
time,  or  for  the  burying  party  to  lift  any  time.  Each 
man  who  carried  out  a  message  was  aware  that  he  might 
never  deliver  it,  that  when  some  other  hand  did  so,  and 
the  message  was  being  read,  he  might  be  past  all  naessagcs, 
lying  stark  and  cold  in  the  mud  and  filth  with  the  rain 
beating  on  his  grey  unheeding  face  ;  or  on  the  other  hand 
that  he  might  be  lying  warm  and  comfortable  in  the 
soothing  ease  of  a  bed  in  the  hospital  train,  swaying  gently 
and  hilled  by  the  song  of  the  flying  wheels,  the  rock  and 
roll  of  the  long  compartment,  swinging  at  top  speed 
down  the  line  to  the  base  and  the  hospital  ship  and 
home.  An  infinity  of  possibilities  lay  between  the  two 
extremes.  They  were  undoubtedly  the  two  extremes, 
the  death  that  each  man  hoped  to  evade,  the  wound  whose 
painful  prospect  held  no  slightest  terror  but  only  rather 
the  deep  satisfaction  of  a  task  performed,  of  an  escape 
from  death  at  the  cheap  price  of  a  few  days  or  weeks 
pain,  or  even  a  crippled  limb  or  a  broken  body. 

A  man  forgot  all  these  things  when  he  came  down 
the  cellar  steps  and  crept  to  a  corner  to  snatch  what  sleep 
he  could,  but  remembered  them  again  only  when  he  was 
wakened  and  sent  out  into  their  midst,  and  into  all  the 
toils  and  terrors  the  others  had  passed,  or  were  to  go  into 
or  even  then  were  meeting. 

Hardly  More  than  Shadows. 

The  signallers  at  the  instruments,  the  sergeants  who 
gathered  them  in  and  sent  them  forth,  gave  little  or  no 
thought  to  the  orderlies.  These  men  were  hardly  more 
than  shadows,  things  which  brought  them  long  screeds 
to  be  translated  to  the  tapping  keys,  hands  which  would 
stretch  into  the  candle-light  and  lift  the  messages  that  had 
just  "  buzzed  "  in  over  their  wires.  The  sergeant  thought 
of  them  mostly  as  a  list  of  names  to  be  ticked  off  one  by 
one  in  a  careful  roster  as  each  man  did  hjs  turn  of  duty, 
went  out,  or  came  back  and  reported  in.  And  the  man 
who  sent  messages  these  men  bore  may  never  have 
given  a  thought  to  the  hands  that  would  carry  them,  unless 
perhaps  to  wonder  vaguely  whether  the  message  could 
get  through  from  so  and  so  to  such  and  such,  from  this 
map  square  to  that,  and  if  the  chance  of  the  messages 
getting  through — the  message  you  will  note,  not  the 
messenger — seemed  extra  doubtful,  orders  might  be  given 
to  send  it  in  duplicate  or  triplicate,  to  double  or  treble 
the  chances  of  its  arriving. 

The  night  wore  on,  the  orderlies  !:lept  and  woke, 
stumbled  in  and  out  ;  the  telephonists  clroned  out  in 
monotonous  voices  to  the  telephone,  or  "  buzzed  "  even 
more  monotonous  strings  of  longs  and  shorts  on  the 
"  buzzer,"      And   in   the   open    about   them,     and    all 


LAND      AND     WATER 


January  27,  1916- 


unheeded  by  them,  men  fought,  and  suffered  wounds  and 
died,  or  fought  on  in  the  scarce  lesser  sutlenng  of  cold  and 
wet  and  hunger. 
Fluctuations  of  the  Fight. 

In  the  signallers'  room  all  the  fluctuations  of  the 
fight  were  translated  from  the  pulsing   fever,  the   human 
living   tragedies   and  heroisms,   the   violent    liopes   and 
f^ars^nd  Lxieties  of  the  battle  line,  to  curt  cold  words 
to  scribbled  letters  on  a  message  form.      At  tunes  these 
messages  were  almost  meaningless  to  them    or  at  least 
their  red  tragedy  was   unheeded.     Their  hrst   thought 
when  a  message  was  handed  in  for  transmission   usually 
Their  tirst  question  when  the  signaller  at  the  other  end 
called  to  take  a  message,  was  whether  the  message  vvas 
a  long  one  or  a  short  one.     One  telephonist  was  handed 
au  ui^-ent  message  to  send  oft,  saying  that  bombs  were 
running  short  in  the  fonvard  line  and  that  further  s^uppies 
were  reciuired  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  that    he 
line  was  being  severely  bombed  and  unless  they  had  the 
means  to  reply  must  be  driven  out  or  destroyed       Ihc 
signaller  took 'that  message  and  sent  it  through   but  his 
instrument  was  not  working  very  clearly  and  he  was  a 
^uod  deal  more  concerned  and  his  mind  was  much  more 
fully  taken  up  with  the  exasperating  difticulty  of  making 
the  signaller  at  the  other  end  catch  word  or  letter  correctly 
than  it  was  ^nth  all  the  close  packed  volume  of  ineamng 
it  contained.     It  was  not  that  he  did  "ot  understand 
the  meaning  ;  he  himself  had  known  a  line  bombed  out 
before   now,    the    trenches    rent   and    torn    apart,   the 
shattered  limbs  and  broken  bodies  of  the  defenders,  the 
horrible  ripping  .rash  of  the  bombs,  the  blinding  tlaim 
the    .umbing  shock,  the  smoke  and  reek  and  noise  of  the 
explosions;    but  though  all  these  things  were  known  to 


also  that  fairly  heavy  fire  was  being  maintained  on  the 
open  ground.   After  that  there  was  silence. 

When  the  signaller  had  time  to  look  about  him.  to 
light  a  cigarette  and  to  listen  to  the  uproar  of  battlc 
that  filtered  down  the  cellar  steps  and  through  the  closed 
door,  he  spoke  to  the  sergeant  about  the  nf/f^  /^"^  the 
sergeant  agreed  with  him  that  it  was  getttmg  louder, 
whkh  meant  either  that  the  fight  was  getting  hotter 
or  coming  closer.  The  answer  to  their  doubts  came 
swiftly  to  their  hands  in  the  shape  of  a  note  from  the  O.t. 
wUh  a  message  borne  by  the  orderly  that  it  was  to  be  sent 
through  anyhow  or  somehow,  but  at  once. 

Now  the  O.C.  be  it  noted,  had  already  had  a  report 
that  the  telephone  wire  was  cut  ;  but  he  still  scribbled  liis 
note,  sent  his  message  and  thereafter  P^t  the  matter  out 
of  h  s  mind.  He  did  not  know  how  or  m  what  fashion 
the  1^-  sage  would  be  sent  ;  but  he  did  know  the  Signalling 
Company^nd  that  was  sufficient  for  hmi.  In  this  he  was 
doing  nothing  out  of  the  usual.  There  are  many  com- 
manders who  do  the  same  thing,  and  this,  if  you  read 
it  aright,  is  a  compliment  to  the  signalling  companies  bt- 
Void  all  the  praise,  of  General  Orders  or  the  sweet  flattery 
of  the  G  O.C  despatch— the  men  who  sent  the  messages 
put  them  out  of  their  mind  as  soon  as  they  were  written 
and  handed  to  an  orderly  with  a  curt  order,  bignalhng 
company  to  scn^^^    s.^.^  ^^.^  ^  ^^^^^^  .^^^  ^^^^  ^.jj^^  ^ 

consider  it,  allowing  due  time  for  its  journey,  as  good 
as  delivered  at  the  other  end  ;  by  so  doing  you  pay  an 
unconscious  compliment  to  all  manners  and  grades  ot 
men,  from  high  salaried  managers  down  to  humble 
Vjorters  and  postmen.  But  the  somewhat  similar  com- 
pliment that  is  paid  by  the  men  who  send  messages  across 
The  battlefield  ^s  paid  in  the  buk   to  one  little  sdc 


explosions;    but  though  all  these  things  were  l^n'^^ "  to     ^JJ-   ^-^-^  ^^  ^^^f^^^^l  ^rawn  and  blood,   the  spiritual 
him,  the  words  "  bombed  out  "   meant  no  mo  e  now  than     arc  e ^    t        ^^^  ^^^  ^^^.^^  ^^^  ^  1^ 

nine  letters  of  the  alphabet  and  t^he  "^^ddenuig^s^tuF^^^^^       ^^^^  perseverance,  the  endurance,  the  grit  and  the  deter- 
mination of  the  Signalling  Companies. 

Very  Urgent. 


.         ^t  and  the  maddenhig  stupidity  ^^^^^:''^  ^^^  ^e  grit  and  the  deter- 

o    the  man  at  the  other  end,  who  would  misunderstand  tlt^fJ^^'J^fZ^l^Mu,^  Companies. 
the  sound  and  meaning  of  "  bombed       and  had  to  have 
it  in  time-consuming  letter  by  letter  spellmg^ 


When  he  had  sent  that  message,  he  took  otf  and  wrote 
down  one  or  two  others  from  the  signalling  station  he  was 
in  touch  with.     His  own  station  it  will  be  remembered 
was  close  up  to  the  for^vard  firing  line,  a  new  firing  line 
which   marked   the   limits   of    thg   advance   made   that 
morning.     The  station  he  was  connected  with  was  back 
"n  rear  of  what,  previous  to  the  attack,  had  been  the 
British  forward  line.     Between  the  two  the  thin  insignifi- 
cant thread  of  the  telephone  wire  ran  twisting  across  the 
iumble  of  the  trenches  of  our  old  firing  line,  the  neutral 
ground  that  had  lain  between  the  trenches  and  the  other 
maze  of  trench,  dug-out,  and  bomb-proof  shelter  P.its  that 
had  been  captured  from  the  enemy.  1  hen  in  the  middle  of 
sending  a  niessage,  the  wire  went  dead,  gave  no  answer 
o  repeated  calls  on  the  "  buzzer."      Ihe  sergeant,  cal  ed 
to   c<ksultation.   helped   to   overlook   and   examine  the 
instrument.     Nothing  could  be  found  wrong  with  it,  but 
to  make  quite  sure  tlie  fault  was  not  there,  a  spare  instni- 
ment  was  coupled  on  to  a  short  length  of  wire  between  it 
and  the  old  one.     They  carried  the  message  perfectly,  so 


and  the  old  one.     Ihev  carnea  tne  message  pciic^ui>,  ^     ^^^-^^  instructions,  drew  tneir  wet  coaxs  auuut  w....  . 
with  curses  of  angry  disgust,  the  wire  was  pronounced     ■       shoulders,  relieved  their  feelings  in  a  few-  growled 
disconnected,  or  "  disc  "   as  the  signaller  called  it.  ,.  ^^^ntences  about  the  dog's  Ufe  a  man  led  in  that  Con 

and  departed  into  the  wet  night 


When  the  sergeant  took  his  message  and  glanced 
through  it,  he  pursed  his  hps  m  a  low  whistle  and  asked 
the  signaller  to  copy  while  he  went  and  roused  thrc^ 
messengers.  His  quick  glance  through  the  note  had  to  d 
him,  even  without  the  O.C.'s  message,that  it  w-as  to  the 
last  degree  urgent  that  the  message  should  go  back  and 
be  delivered  at  once  and  without  fail  ;  therefore  he  sent 
three  messengers,  simply  because  three  men  trebled  the 
chances  of  the  message  getting  through  without  delay. 
If  one  man  dropped,  there  were  two  to  go  on  ;  if  two  tell 
the  third  would  still  carry  on  ;  if  he  fell-well,  after  that 
the  matter  was  beyond  the  sergeant's  handling  ;  he  must 
leave  it  to  the  messenger  to  find  another  man  or  means 
to  carry  on  the  message. 

The  telephonist  had  scribbled  a  copy  of  the  note  to 
keep  by  him  in  case  the  wire  was  mended  and  the  message 
could  be  sent  through  after  the  messengers  started  anc 
before  they  reached  the  other  end.  The  three  received 
their  instructions,  drew  their  wet  coats  ^^^o^t  |heir  shivejj 

Company. 


Repairing  a  Break. 

This  meant  (hat  a  man  or  men  had  to  be  sent  out 
along  the  line  to  find  and  repair  the  break,  and  that  until 
this  were  done,  no  telephone  niessage  could  pass  between 
that  portion  of  the  forward  fine  and  the  headquarters  m 
the  rear  The  situation  was  the  more  serious,  inasmuch 
as  this  was  the  only  connecting  line  for  a  considerable 
distance  along  the  new  front.  A  corporal  and  twcj  men 
took  a  spare  instrument  and  a  coil  of  wire,  and  set  out  on 
their  dangerous  journey. 

The  break  of  course  had  been  reported  to  the  U.L., 
and  after  that  there  was  nothing  more  for  the  signaller  at 
the  dead  instrument  to  do.  except  to  listen  for  the  buzz 
that  would  come  back  from  the  repair  party  as  they  pro- 
gressed along  the  line,  tapping  in  occasionally  to  make 
ture  that  they  still  had  connection  with  the  forward  sta- 
tion, their  getting  no  reply  at  the  same  time  from  the 
rear  station,  being  of  course  sufficient  proof  that  they  had 

not  passed  the  break. 

Twice  the  signaller  gota  message,  the  second  one  benig 
from  the  forward  side  of  the  old  neutral  ground  m  what 
had  been  the  German  front  line  trenclV;  the  report  said 


The  sergeant  came  back,  re-read  the  message  and 
discussed  it  with  the  signaller.  It  said  :  '  Heavy  attacl 
is  developing  and  being  pressed  strongly  on  our  centre 
a-a-a.*  Our  losses  have  been  heavy  and  line  is  con- 
siderably weakened  a-a-a  WHll  hold  on  here  to  the  las 
but  urgently  request  that  strong  reinforcements  be  seni 
up  if  the  line  is  to  be  maintained  a-a-a  Additional  artillery 
support  would  be  useful  a-a-a."  .  ,     ,  . 

"Sounds    healthy,    don't    it?"    said    the   sergeant 
reflectively.     The  signaller  nodded  gloomily  and  listened 
apprehensively  to  the  growing  sounds  of  battle.   Jsow 
that  his  mind  was  free  from  first  thoughts  of  telephonic 
worries,  he  had  time  to  consider  outside  matters,     i'oi 
nearly  ten  minutes  the  two  men  hstened    and  talked 
in  short   sentences,   and   listened  again.      1  he   rattle   ot 
rifle  fire  was  sustained  and  unbroken,  and  punctuated 
liberally  at  short  intervals  by  the  boom  of  exploding 
grenades  and  bombs.     Decidedly  the  whole  action  wa^ 
hea\ier— or  coming  back  closer  to  them. 


*   lliic-  us  indicate  a  lull  stop. 


Tanuary  27    1916.  LAND      AND      WATER. 

A    SONG    OF    THE    GUNS. 

By    gilbert    FRANKAU. 

5.-SIGNALS. 

The  hot  wax  drips  from  the  flares 

On  the  scrawled  pi^nk  forms  that  Htter 

The  bench  where  he  sits  ;    the  ghtter 
Of  stars  is  framed  by  the  sand-bags  atop  of  the  dug-out  stairs. 

.\nd  the  lagging  watch  hands  creep  ; 

And  his  cloaked  mates  murmur  in  sleep — 

Forms  he  can  wake  with  a  kick — 
And  he  hears,  as  he  plays  with  the  pressel-switch,  the  strapped  receiver  click 

On  his  ear  that  listens,  Hstens  ; 

And    the    candle-flicker   glistens 
On  the  rounded  brass  of  the  switch-board  where  the  red  wires  cluster  thick. 

Wires  from  the  earth,  from  the  air  ; 

Wires   that   whisper   and   chatter 

At  night,  when  the  trench-rats  patter 
And  nibble  among  the  rations  and  scuttle  back  to  their  lair ; 

Wires  that  are  never  at  rest — 

For  the  linesmen  tap  them  and  test, 

And  ever  they  tremble  with  tone  : 
And  he  knows  from  a  hundred  signals  the  buzzing  call  of  his  own. 

The  breaks  and  the  vibrant  stresses. 

The  Z,  and  the  G,  and  the  Esses, 
That  call  his  hand  to  the  answering  key  and  his  mouth  to  the  microphone. 

For  always  the  laid  guns  fret 

On  the  words  that  his  mouth  shall  utter, 

When   rifle  and  Maxim   stutter  ' 

And  the  rockets  volley  to  starward  from  the  spurtmg  parapet ; 

And  always  his  ear  must  hark 

To  the  voices  out  of  the  dark, 

For  the  whisper  over  the  wire, 
From  the  bombed  and  the  battered  trenches  where  the  wounded  moan  in  the  mire  ; 

For  a  sign  to  waken  the  thunder 

Which  shatters  the  night  in  sunder 
With  the  flash  of  the  leaping  muzzles  and  the  beat  of  battery-fire. 


N.B. — A  Song  of  the  Guns  will  be  continued  in  our  next  issue. 

INCREMENT     VALUE      DUTY.  'ssued  writs  to  enforce  their  claims.      In  Mr.  Lumsden's  case 

they  write  that  unless  £22,  the   Duty  demanded,  and  costs 

To  the  Editor  of  Land  and  Water.  amounting    to  £249  as.  4d.    are    paid,  they  wiU  take  legal 

proceedmgs  without  further  notice  or  delay. 

Sir,— Although   the   Land   Union   is   anxious   to   avoid  The  Land  Union  deplores  this  action  as  likely  to  provoke 

anything  in  the  nature  of  political  controveisy  at  the  present  ill-feeling  at   the  present   time,   and   urges   that   either  the 

time,  it  nevertheless  considers  it  a  duty  to  draw  attention  to  promised  Bill  should  be  passed  without  delay,  or  in  the  event 

the  following  facts.  of  that  being  impossible,  the  Commissioners  of  Inland  Revenue 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  recognised  the  unfairness  of  the  claim  should  be  instructed  not  to  press  their  claims  in  these  cases 

•for  Increment  Value  Duty  in  the  Lumsden  case.    Wlien  the  until  Parliament  shall  have  had  time  to  deal  with  the  matter. 

Revenue  Bill  was  in  Committee  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  Yours    obediently, 

August  1st,    I9r3,    he    stated    that    Clause    2    in    that  Bill  Desborough, 

was  inserted  "  in  order  to  protect  people  like  Mr.  Lumsden."  Chairman  of  the  Council,   Land  Union. 

Unfortunately  the  Bill  did  not  reach  the  Statute  Book,  and  St.  Stephen's  House,  Westminster, 

the  same  fate  befell  the  Bill  of  the  following  year  into  whicl  January,  1916. 

a  similar  Clause  was  introduced.     Nevertheless,  the   Prime  . _ 

Minister  and  the  Secretary  to  the  Treasury  on  July  23rd,  In  the  Memoirs  of  M.  Thiers,  reviewed  in    these    pages 

19T4,  undertook,  on  behalf  of  the  Government,  to  intioduce  last  week,  a  remarkable    passage   occurs.     The  negotiations 

a  one-clause  Bill  to  annul  the  effect  of  the  Lumsden  Judgment  for  an  armistice  were  being  discussed   between    M.    Thiers 

and  to  bring  the  assessment  to  Increment  Value   Duty  into  and  Count  Bismarck  in  November  1870,  when  the  question  of 

harmony  with  the  original  proposals  put  forward  when  the  the  fleets  of  the  two  nations  came  up.     M.  Thiers   proceeds: 

Budget  of  1909  was  introduced  into  the  House  of  Commons —  "  As  to  the  German  fleet,  whose  position  Count  Bismarck 

namely,  that  there  must  be  a  rise  in  the  value  of  the  bare  site  did  not  know,  it  was  agreed  that  it  should  stay  wherever 

Lefore  Increment  Value  Duty  is  demandable.  it  was  at  the  time.     At  this  point  Count  Bismarck  spoke  to 

War  having  broken  out,  the  Land  Union  makes  no  com-  me  of  the  thirty-five  merchant  ships  that  we  had  taken,  and 
plaint  that  the  Government  has  been  unable  to  introduce  whose  captains  had  been  made  prisoners.  That,  he  said, 
this  Bill,  but  it  does  complain  that  after  the  injustice  suffered  was  an  intolerable  abuse  of  force.  The  Germans  had  there- 
by Mr.  Lumsden  was  fully  recognised  by  the  Government,  fore  taken  in  our  towns  forty  citizens  whom  they  were  equally 
the  Commissioners  of  Inland  Revenue  continue  to  demand,  holding  as  prisoners  in  Germany."  Verily  Germany  has 
under  threat  of  legal  proceedings.  Increment  Value  Duty  travelled  a  long  distance  backward  since  the  mere  imprison- 
under  the  Lumsden  Judgment  when  it  is  agreed  that  there  ment  of  captains  of  mercharrt  ships  in  time  of  war  was  con- 
has  been  no  rise  in  the  value  of  the  bare  site,  and  have  actually  sidered  "  an  intolerable  abuse  of  force." 

19 


LAND      AND      W  A  T  1-:  R  . 


January  27,  igi6. 


BOOKS    THAT    EXCEL. 


SIR    JOHN     MOORE. 


'The    Oxfordshire    and    Buckinghamshire    Light    Infantry."     By  Sir 
Henry  Newbolt.     ("Country  Life"   Library).     6s.   net. 

For  the  earlier 
chapters  of  this  vol- 
ume, the  chapters 
which  concern  the  old 
43rd  and  52nd  regi 
ments  of  foot,  tiu- 
.lutiior  has  very  evi- 
dently relied  mainly 
on  general  history 
more  than  on  the 
histories  of  the  two 
regiments,  and  he  has 
specialised  on  the  43rd 
more  than  on  the 
52nd.  Full  promin- 
ence is  given  to  the 
association  of  the  32nd  with  Sir  John  Moore,  who  was 
colonel  of  the  regiment,  and  made  of  it  and  of  the  42nd 
units  in  the  famous  light  division  which  under  Wellington 
assisted  so  largely  in  the  Peninsular  struggle.  Moore's 
retreat  to  Corunna  is  graphically  described,  and  these 
earlier  chapters,  more  especially  those  in  which  the  taking 
of  Quebec  and  the  American  War  of  Independence  are 
detailed  form  the  best  part  of  the  book. 

The  work  of  the  two  battalions  in  the  Mutiny  is  very 
briefly  summarised,  and  their  service  in  the  East  as  a  whole 
is  mentioned  rather  than  described.  The  author  has  been  at 
some  pains  to  trace  the  doings  of  the  Oxford  and  Buckingham- 
shire Light  Infantry  in  the  present  war  up  to  the  first  battle 
of  Ypres,  and  this  part  of  the  book  is  in  keeping  with  the  earlier 
chapters.  It  is  a  stirring  story  rather  than  a  regimental 
record  ;  we  look  vainly  for  the  point  at  which  the  regiment's 
present  title  was  conferred  on  it,  for  the  author  is  concerned 
more  with  action  than  with  dry  detail,  and  is,  as  every  good 
historian  should  be,  thoroughly  in  love  with  his  subject. 

"  The   Balkan   Peninsula."     By    Frank    Fox.     (A.    and    C.    Black.) 
7s.  6d.  net. 

The  problems  that  have  vexed  the  Balkan  States  for  so 
long  arise,  for  the  most  part,  out  of  the  diversity  of  races 
inhabiting  the  Peninsula,  and  in  this  book — or  rather,  in  the 
first  part  of  it — an  outline  of  the  various  races  is  given.  The 
later  chapters  are  devoted  to  the  experiences  of  the  author 
as  a  war  correspondent  during  the  Balkan  War  which  preceded 
the  present  great  conflict — the  book  was  written  prior  to  the 
outbreak  of  the  European  War.  The  historical  sketch,  out- 
lining the  rise  and  fall  of  Turkish  power  in  the  Balkans,  forms 
a  concise  and  useful  summary  with  regard  to  the  causes  of 
Balkan  unrest. 

The  later  chapters  extol  the  Balkan  peasant  and  execrate 
his  rulers,  for  the  most  part  ;  there  is  little  to  choose,  the 
author  says,  between  Turk  and  Christian.  "  Always  Turks 
and  E.xarchate  Christians  and  Patriarchate  Christians  are 
plotting  against  one  another  new  raids  and  murders,"  but  "  if 
freed  from  the  promptings  of  priests  and  politicians  the  Balkan 
peasants  of  any  race  are  quite  decent  folk."  These  conclusions 
are  based  on  experience  of  Balkan  life,  and  mainly  on  life 
among  nations  at  war  with  each  other. 

The  work  is  interesting  throughout,  and  many  of  its 
chapters  form  useful  matter  on  which  to  form  a  judgment  of 
the  various  states  described,  but  probably  the  author's  estimate 
of  Bulgaria  has  been  modified  to  a  certain  extent,  since  the 
writing  of  the  book,  by  recent  disclosures  and  events. 

"The  Note  Book  of  an  Attache."     By  Erie  Fisher    Wood.     (Grant 
Richards).     6s.  net. 

As  voluntary  attach^  to  the  American  Embassy  at  Paris 
Mr.  Wood  saw  the  effect  of  the  opening  stages  of  the  war  on 
the  French  capital,  and  lived  through  the  breathless  expect- 
ancy that  preceded  the  battle  of  the  Marne,  He  visited  the 
Marne  and  Ai-ne  battlefields,  went  to  Berlin,  to  London, 
to  Berlin  again,  to  Vienna,  and  to  Buda  Pesth.  A  shrewfi 
observer,  he  made  deductions  from  the  facts  that  he  saw,  and 
many  of  these  deductions  are  distinctly  unpleasant  to  any 
reader  of  AlUed  nationality — and  even  more  unpleasant  for 
American  readers.  The  book  is  an  honest  and  unbiassed 
rep)ort  of  things  seen,  and  is  also  useful  evidence  of  certain 
phases  of  the  first  seven  months  of  war. 

It  must  be  read,  however,  with  a  consciousness  of  later 
happenings.  Mr.  Wood  saw  an  undisturbed  Germany,  and 
the  German  war  machine  was  at  its  st  ongest  in  the  days 
of  which  he  writes.  His  conclusions,  for  instance,  with  regard 
to  the  French  medical  services  and  the  relative  strengths  of 
aeroplane  services,  true  in  the  time  of  which  he  writes,  need 
revision  now.     Still,  the  value  of  his  work,  due  mainly  to  his 


impartial  honesty,  remains,  and  the  interest  of  his  comment 
on  what  is  already  matter  of  history  is  unquestionable. 

"  The  Individual."     By  Muriel  Hine.     (John  Lane.)     6s. 

In  spite  of  the  difficulty  of  her  subject,  Miss  Hine  has 
managed  to  make  this  new  novel  as  attractive  and  as  stimulat- 
ing as  those  which  ],vcreded  it.  The  problem,  in  this  case,  is 
the  reconciliation  of  theory  with  life  ;  Tavcmer,  successful 
doctor  and  eugenist,  was  confronted  by  tlie  problem  of  either 
living  up  to  his  own  theories  with  regard  to  the  continuity 
of  the  race,  or  tacitly  admitting  himself  a  renegade.  The 
way  out  that  he  chose  was  a  selfish  one,  in  that  it  affected  his 
wife  more  than  himself — but  in  the  end  the  problem  was 
solved  for  him,  and  tlie  book  thus  becomes  an  illustration  of 
the  fact  that  life  solves  its  own  problems.  The  title  is  merely 
a  compression  of  the  statement  that  the  individual  should 
be  sacrificed  to  the  community  where  the  interests  of  individual 
and  community  are  at  variance, 

Taverner,  sympathetically  drawn,  is  interesting.  Elisma, 
his  wife,  is  more  harshly  lined  in,  and  we  cannot  help  feeling 
that  her  side  of  the  case  miglit  have  been  more  definitely 
stated.  In  spite  of  this,  however,  there  is  no  denying  the 
interest  of  the  book  as  a  whole,  while  the  delicate  problem 
of  which  it  treats  is  handled  in  a  way  that  clears  it  of  sugges- 
tiveness  and  makes  for  success.  In  spite  of  traces  of  mid- 
night oil,  this  is  undoubtedly  among  the  novels  of  the  year 
that  count. 

"  Thornley  Colton."       By    Clinton  H.    Stagg.      (Simpkins,   Marshall 
and  Co.)     6s. 

The  eight  "  problems  "  that  are  solved  by  Thornley 
Colton  in  the  pages  of  this  book  are  of  a  nature  to  make  even 
the  seasoned  reader  of  detective  stories  forget  about  bed-time 
and  go  on  reading.  Colton,  in  direct  succession  to  Sherlock 
Holmes  in  ingenuity,  is  a  bhnd  man,  and  his  theory  is  that 
sight  is  a  drawback  rather  than  an  aid  to  the  detection  of 
crime,  since  in  seeing  the  obvious  people  miss  tjie  really 
important  things.  The  problems  include  such  weird  things 
as  a  pistol,  held  by  no  human  hand,  shooting  a  man  stone 
dead,  and  a  ruby  vanishing  in  mist  from  the  hand  that  held  it. 
How  these  things  are  accomplished  is  all  explained  by  the 
wonderful  Colton,  who,  to  tell  the  truth,  is  almost  too  wonder- 
fxil  for  full  credence— if  the  reader  stops  to  think.  The 
power  of  the  stories  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  reader  does  not 
stop  to  think,  but  is  so  engrossed  in  the  mystery  and  its 
solution  that  he  reads  on  fo  the  end— and  then  begins  another 
problem.  Dramatic  situations  abound,  and  in  spite  ol  a 
'certain  reiteration  of  detail  in  some  of  the  stories  Thornley 
Colton  has  few  equals  in  detective  fiction. 

Lessons  in  Thrift,  by  G.  C.  Pringle  (Teachers'  War 
Service  Committee,  Edinburgh,  3d.  net)  is  a  series  of  notes 
on  the  subjects  of  thrift  in  general  and  thrift  in  time  of  war. 
The  writer  has  outlined  in  these  notes  a  series  of  lectures 
suited  not  only  for  use  in  schools  and  colleges,  but  also  for 
lecturers  to  adult  audiences.  The  work  is  an  admirable 
summary  of  the  doctrine  and  practice  of  thrift  in  war  time 
forming  a  brief  but  complete  exposition  of  the  subject  in 
outline.  All  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  book  are  devoted 
to  the  Teachers'  War  Fund,  but,  apart  from  this,  the  circula- 
tion of  such  a  work  should  be  furthered  in  every  way,  since 
the  work  itself  is  of  distinct  service  to  the  natiori  in  such 
times  as  the  present. 

A  complete  and  authoritative  summary  of  the  various 
aspects  of  tlie  great  war  is  provided  in  The  British  Dominions 
Year  Book  for  19T6,  issued  by  the  British  Dominions  General 
Insurance  Co.,  of  Royal  Exchange  Avenue,  London.  The 
compilers  of  the  work  have  secured  the  work  of  specialists  in 
military  and  naval  subjects,  in  finance,  international  law,  and 
other  subjects  bearing  on  the  war,  so  that  the  book  is  of 
definite  historical  and  statistical  value  as  a  record  of  the 
year  1915.  In  addition  to  war  articles  the  book  contains 
much  interesting  and  useful  general  information,  and  on  the 
whole  .it  must  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  best  of  the 
many  annual  handbooks  issued. 

The  January  number  of  the  Asiatic  Review  provides  an 
exceptionally  long  and  well-varied  hst  of  contents.  Note- 
worthy articles  are  "  Some  Parallels  of  the  Present  Situation  " 
by  a  military  correspondent,  which  deals  with  current  fallacies 
in  comparing  the  present  war  with  the  Napoleonic  campaigns, 
and  incidentally  provides  a  summary  of  the  mihtary  situation  ; 
"  Carmen  Sylva,"  by  Oliver  Bainbridge,  a  sketch  of  the 
Queen  of  Roumania,  and  a  literary  supplement  which  gives 
special  prominence  to  recent  works  on  the  Near  and  Far  East 
An  article  giving  "  Impressions  "  of  Persia  and  Mesopotamia 
will  also  be  found  of  great  interest  at  the  present  time. 


20 


Thohsday,  February  3,  19W. 


LAND    &   ^?C^AnrER 


,.»i«*f>  r  i  I  ■>■;  h^in^(^  m  n  «►(<«  '^^  • 


/!»  tcwjs  Kaemaekert. 


Drawn  ezcliuively  tor  "Land  and   Water." 


*'  Those  shameless   EngHsh  !      They   have   now   sacrificed   their  most   sacred   principle  of 

voluntary  service !     The  barbarians  !  " 


February  3,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


LAND  &  WATER 

Empire    House,    Kingsway,    London,    W.C. 

Telephone  :     H  JLBORN     2828. 


THURSDAY,    FEBRUARY    3,    1916. 


OPTIMISM  &  PESSIMISM. 

Two  words  wliich  have  come  into  constant  use  with 
regard  to  the  war  are  the  words  "  optimism  " 
and  "  pessimism,"  nnd  they  are  used  to  mean 
statements  or  opinions  supporting  a  hopehil 
view  for  the  Alhes,  and  statements  or  opinions  support- 
ing an  unhopeful  view. 

We  need  not  delay  upon  the  misuse  of  terms  which 
properly  only  relate  to  systems  of  philosophy  and 
properly  have  no  meaning  in  this  connection.  The  word 
"  optimist  "  no  more  means  a  liopefiil  man,  or  the  word 
"  pessimist  "  a  despairing  man,  with  regard  to  a  par- 
ticular event  than  the  word  Cow  means  Mangel-wurzel. 
But  tliese  journalistic  expressions  take  root  and  wise 
pe  p  2  do  not  waste  time  in  discussing  their  origins  or 
ultunate  value.  For  the  mass  of  linglish  people  to-day 
these  two  words  mean  hopeful  and  unhopeful  statements 
of  opinion  with  regard  to  the  progress  of  the  campaign. 

Now  there  arises  in  this  connection  a  curious  and  even 
dangerous  confusion  of  mind  which  must  be  carefully 
guarded  against  by  anyone  who  desires  to  preserve  a 
just  view  of  the  tremendous  business  upon  which  the  whole 
future  of  Europe  and  of  this  country  turns. 

From  noting,  ..s  every  sensible  person  must,  that  a 
passing  mood,  quite  apart  from  reason  or  from  original 
motive,  will  affect  action,  one  passes  to  dishking  bad  news 
or  unpleasant  but  reasonable  conclusions  to  thinking 
such  statements  or  judgments  positively  harmful  to  the 
nation,  and  one  may  easily  end  by  regarding  them,  how- 
ever true,  as  treasonable  if  they  are  expressed. 

On  the  other  side,  from  fearing  that  neglect  or 
belittling  of  the  war  or  of  our  peril  may  lead  to  slackness 
in  recruiting  and  in  munitioning  effort  and  the  rest,  and 
thence  to  disaster,  a  man  may  very  easily  begin  by 
suspecting  every  favourable  statement  or  hopeful  judg- 
ment, and  soon  end  by  regarding  any  such  with  anger  and 
aversion. 

In  the  first  case  a  man  decries  what  he  calls  "  pessim- 
ism and  the  pessimists"  and  tries  to  counteract  or  to 
deny  every  statement  or  judgment  that  would  increase 
his  alarm  ;  in  the  second  case  he  is  compelled  to  the 
exact  opposite  and  is  led  to  counteract  or  deny  almost 
every  statement  or  judgment  that  would  make  him  hope- 
ful. The  nation  in  a  moment  of  highly  anxious  tension, 
never  relieved  ard  exasperated  by  the  immobihty  of 
the  great  siege  lines,  gets  divided  into  two  groups.  The 
one  suspecting  or  hating  what  it  calls  "  optimism  "  ; 
the  other  what  it  caUs  "  pessimism."  Very  much  worse 
than  this  the  nation  gets  to  swing,  in  the  great  mass  of 
its  opinion,  from  one  pole  to  the  other.  There  will  be 
weeks  (like  those  of  last  April)  when  warnings  are  disre- 
garded and  the  chances  of  immediate  victory  are  absurdly 
exaggerated  ;  there  will  be  months  (like  those  of  last 
October  and  November)  when  the  great  bulk  of  men  are 
at  the  opposite  extreme,  will  hardly  believe  the  simplest 
and  most  obvious  truths  that  would  make  for  their 
heartening,  and  violently  suspect  all  favourable  conclu- 
sions, however  moderate  and  guarded,  to  be  deliberately 
misleading  and  ruinous  to  the  national  temper. 

It  will  be  clear  to  everyone  who  thinks  over  the 
matter  at  leisure  that  both  these  moods  are  irrational. 
But  it  is  also  common  knowledge  backed  up  by  all  human 
experience  that  unreason — irrational  moods — are  the 
very  gravest  peril  any  individual  or  society  can  run 
when  they  are  under  a  strain.  Panic,  which  is  the  deadly 
poison  of  an  army,  wild  speculation,  which  is  the  ruin  of 
a  man,  proceed  equally  from  the  one  mood  or  the  other. 
Everyone  is  agreed  when  the  matter  is  soberly  stated 
that  the  chief  requisite  for  action,  especially  in  com- 
petition or  struggle  against  other  human  wills,  is  to  keep 
the  whole  problem  quite  steadily  in  view,  playinsi  one's 


judgment  upon  it  coolly  and  tenaciously  as  every  new 
development  arises.  That  spirit  is  not  one  which  gradu- 
ally fades  off  into  vaguer  and  less  efficient  moods  ;  it  is 
something  very  highly  limited  and  rapidly  dissolved. 
When  a  man  loses  grip  of  reality  under  a  strain,  he  tends 
to  lose  it  at  once  and  altogether.  The  curve  is  very 
steep  from  the  moment  that  the  process  of  a  dissol'itio' 
in  judgment  begins.  But  a  short  interval  sepc.rate;,  k. 
times  of  great  crisis,  the  solid  use  of  reason  from  the  folly 
of  rashness  or  despair.  Experience  tells  us  that  this  is 
so,  and  we  know  that  it  must  be  so  from  the  very  na'ure 
of  things  :  since  men  in  a  great  crisis  are  peculiarly 
susceptible  to  nervous  revolutions. 

The  moral  would  seem  to  be  that  we  should,  during 
the  progress  of  this  awful  task,  constantly  feed  upon 
reality. 

In  the  question  of  numbers,  for  instance,  we  should 
concern  ourselves  not  with  whether  this  or  that  state- 
ment is  depressing  or  the  reverse,  but  rather  with  the 
proofs  attaching  to  it.  In  the  matter  of  movements  we 
should  not  incline  to  the  description  of  our  own  side  or 
our  opponent's,  we  should  weigh  with  as  ample  experi- 
ments as  possible  the  probable  bases  of  either  statement. 
Your  own  side  claims  in  a  subsidiary  local  action  in  Alsace, 
rather  more  thaii  a  thousand  unwounded  prisoners  from 
the  enemy.  The  enemy  in- another  action  on  the  Somme 
claims  a  similar  number.  It  is  a  simple  matter  but  a 
good  test  of  mood,  whether  the  little  success  i  doubtt  (.1 
because  it  would  lead  to  optimisrii  and  the  little  failure 
accepted  with  exaggerated  headlines  because  it  is  bad 
news.  Both  attitudes  are  as  foolish  and  dangerous  as 
would  be  the  reverse,  an  exaggeration  of  the  first,  a 
behttlement  of  the  second.  The  sane  man  accepts  both, 
and  sees  that  both  are  trilling. 

Again,  the  whole  of  military  history  is  there  to  tell 
one  the  significance  of  the  occupation  of  enemy  territory 
during  the  course  of  a  war ;  its  political  effect  ;  the 
crucial  matter  of  the  extension  of  front  it  usually  in- 
volves ;  the  nature  of  communications  to  the  occupied 
territory ;  the  economic  effect,  and  the  effect  upon 
neutrals.  You  have  a  hundred  campaigns  in  the  past 
to  guide  your  judgment  in  such  a  matter.  If  you  say 
the  occupation  of  enemy  territory  is  negligible  simply 
because  it  solves  no  strategical  problem  you  are  mis- 
taken. If  you  say  that  it  is  decisive  and  final — a  test 
of  strategical  success — you  are  making  a  far  worse 
mistake.  Were  the  enemy  to  evacuate  Brussels  and 
Lille  to-morrow  without  great  loss  and,  according  to 
his  own  plan  and  on  his  own  initiative  fall  back  upon  a 
shorter  line,  he  would  be  stronger  and  his  chances  of  pro- 
longing the  war  would  be  greater.  It  would  be  im- 
possible to  avoid  an  immense  wave  of  enthusiasm  in  the 
Allied  countries  should  that  event  take  place,  but  the 
wise  man  in  judging  that  event  would  not  yield  to  that 
enthusaism. 

The  converse  is  equally  true.  It  would  be  foolish  to 
say  that  the  occupation  of  all  Serbia  and  Montenegro 
was  not  of  high  political  effect  in  the  Eastern  theatre  of 
war,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  perilously  extends  the 
obligations  of  the  half-exhausted  enemy. 

The  whole  matter  may  be  summed  up  by  saying  that 
those,  though  a  minority,  who  are  concerned  only  with 
positive  facts  and  reasonable  deductions  therefrom,  will 
be  the  best  fitted  to  judge  the  future  trend  of  the  war. 
They  will  by  their  sobriety  probably  profit  as  individuals. 
That  nation  which  most  nearly  reaches  and  maintains 
such  a  stand  will  certainly  profit  most  in  the  final  settle- 
ment. It  is  of  good  augury  to  note  that  of  all  the 
belligerent  nations,  that  one  most  hopslessly  out  of  touch 
with  reality  to-day  is  the  mass  (not  the  higher  command) 
of  the  German  Empire. 

The  present  war  fully  justifies  the  prediction  made  in 
Among  the  Ruins,  by  Gomez  Carillo  (Heinemann,  3s.  6d.  net) 
to  the  effect  that  the  complete  disappearance  of  permanent 
fortifications  will  be  one  of  its  results.  M.  Carillo's  book  is  a 
record  of  sightseeing  among  the  wreckage  of  war,  which  he 
visited  after  the  battle  of  the  Marne.  His  descriptions  of 
Epernay,  Rheims,  Clermont  in  Argonnc,  etc..  form  yet  another 
indictment  of  the  infamous  methods  lof  the  Germans.  One 
of  the  most  striking  incidents  in  the  book  is  the  burning  of 
Auve,  a  village  in  which  no  act  of  war  took  place,  but  which 
was  utterly  destroyed  by  the  Germans  as  a  sort  of  revenge 
for  their  defeat  on  the  Marne.  Tragic  though  the  book  is  in 
character,  it  expresses  the  belief  of  the  French  people — as 
distinct  from  the  Army — in  ultimate  victory. 


LAND     AND     WATER.  February  3,  1916. 

WAR  SUMMARY   OF  THE   WEEK. 

In  a  message  delivered  upon  Wednesday,  January  26th,  in  London,  news  was  received  that  the  Turks 
before  Kut  had  been  heavily  reinforced  and  that  the  weather  during  the  course  of  the  day's  fighting  already  reported 
(which  was  five  days  before,  upon  Friday,  January  21st)  had  been  very  bad,  strong  winds  and  heavy  rain  flooding 
much  of  the  ground  and  hampering  operations. 

The  Turkish  official  message  with  regard  to  the  same  action  describes  the  British  attack  as  having  taken  place 
under  the  protection  of  river  gun  boats  and  as  having  developed  upon  both  banks  of  the  Tigris.  It  claims  that  our 
force  retired  some  kilometres  after  attacks  and  counter-attacks  lasting  Six  hours  and  that,  after  the  British  retire- 
ment 3,003  dead  were  counted  upon  the  field  and  mentions  the  granting  of  an  armistice  for  the  burial  of  the  dead. 
The  same  communique  claims  a  check  administered  to  another  British  column,  with  the  loss  of  about  100  dead  at 
the  junction  of  the  Tigris  and  the    Euphrates. 

Upon  the  same  day  a  message  was  received  from  General  Townshend  that  his  force  contained  by  the  enemy 
at  Kut  el  Amara  was  amply  supplied. 

On  Tuesday,  January  25th,  two  German  aeroplanes  dropped  15  bombs  upon  Dunkirk,  killing  five  parsons  and 
wounding  three,  at  about  6  in  the  morning.  Two  hours  later  a  British  machine  off  the  coast  to  the  North-East  of  that 
town  forced  a  German  seaplane  to  descend  upon  the  water.  On  the  same  day  a  German  aeroplane  squadron  dropped 
bombs  upon  Nancy. 

On  Wednesday  the  26th,  after  a  heavy  artillery  duel  the  French  re-occupied  the  last  of  the  crater  the  enemy's 
min=  explosions  had  formed  near  Neuville  in  Artois.  The  sameday  a  Zeppelin  dropped  some  bombs  on  villages  near 
Ep^rnay,  and  there  was  heavy  artillery  work  against  the  German  positions  on   the   Bois   le   Protein  Lorraine. 

Upon  Thursday  the  27th,  news  reached  London  of  an  action  against  the  Senussi  delivered  by  General  Wallace's 
force  on  the  previous  Sunday,  the  23rd.  The  enemy  was  driven  back  in  the  course  of  the  morning.  His  Camp  was 
occupied  and  about  80  tents  burnt.  The  strength  of  the  enemy  is  estimated  at  about  4,500  with  three  guns  and 
three  or  four  machine  guns,  the  Arabs  evidently  handled  by  trained  soldiers. 

On  Friday,  the  28th,  a  German  local  attack  upon  the  British  near  Loos  was  repelled. 

The  German  official  report  on  the  same  day  gave,  since  October  1st,  the  loss  of  63  Allied  aeroplanes  as  against  15 
Germap.  This  statement  can  only  be  understood  in  connection  with  the  fact  that  the  Allies  crossed  the  German  lines 
and  proceeded  far  Eastward  of  them,  the  German  machines  very  rarely  crossing  our  lines.  While  the  Allies,  and  espec- 
ially the  British,  record  more  than  four  flights  to  the  German  one. 

On  the  same  day,  Friday  the  28th,  a  number  of  local  attacks  were  delivered  by  the  enemy  in  Artois,  the  object 
of  which  it  is  not  easy  to  decide.  They  were  all  repelled.  As  a  reprisal  for  the  Zeppelin  raid  of  the  previous  Tuesday  a 
French  dirigible  balloon  dropped  in  the  night  between  Thursday  and  Friday,  eighteen  6  inch  and  twenty  4  inch 
bombs  upon  Freiburg,  especially  upon  the  station  and  the  barracks. 

On  the  British  front  there  was  another  local  attack  near  Loos,  delivered  by  the  enemy  and  repelled,  and  a  certain 
amount  of  mining  work  near  Givenchy. 

News  was  received  the  same  day  of  considerable  local  Russian  successes  near  Erzerum,  notably  just  West 
of  Melazghert,  north  of  Lake  Van,  where  a  large  amount  of  arms  and  munitions  were  captured,  many  ammunition 
carts  and  a  certain  number  of  prisoners.  The  town  of  Kynsskala  was  entered  and  held  in  the  pursuit  with  many 
munitions  and  a  great  amount  of  stores,  the  Turks  retiring  towards  Mush.  A  similar  success  was  obtained  in  Persia 
ssuth  of  Lake  Urmia  ;  while  at  the  furthest  southern  point  of  the  Russian  line  on  the  road  from  Hamadan  to  Bagdad 
ths  Russians  further  advanced.  It  is  probable  that  the  Russians  in  this  move  reached,  or  even  passed,  Kangawar, 
where  the  Turks  had  recently  counter-attacked  with  success. 

On  ( aturday,  the  29th,  a  strong  German  attack  against  the  French,  on  the  Somme,  resulted  in  a  considerable 
success  for  the  enemy,  1,300  prisoners,  and  13  machine  guns  taken  from  the  French  at  Frise,  south  of  the  Somme, 
and  trenches  of  the  first  line  over  a  space  of  some  two  miles.  The  French  account  shows  that  this  action  developed 
over  a  muci  wider  front,  and  that  the  German  attack  was  completely  unsuccessful  in  all  the  Southern  section,  only 
succeeding  on  the  bank  of  the  river  itself. 

On  Sunday,  the  30th,  the  first  counter-attacks  of  the  French  had  re-occupied  portions  of  the  lost  ground. 

On  Saturday  night,  the  29th,  in  conjunction  with  this  expensive,  but  successful,  effort  upon  the  enemy's 
part  at  Frise,  a  Zeppelin  dropped  bombs  over  Paris,  causing  53  casualties,  nearly  half  of  which  were  deaths. 

On  the  following  night,  Sunday  the  30th,  a  Zeppelin  appeared  again  and  dropped  ten  bombs,  none  of  which  took 
effect.  The  airships  were  flying  at  some  11,000  feet,  from  which  height  it  was  impossible  to  take  aim.  The  bombs 
were  dropped  quite  at  random,  and  in  the  second  case  appear  to  have  missed  the  city  altogether  and  to  have  falUn 
only  upon  waste  land  upon  the  outskirts. 

In  Alsace  the  French  heavy  artillery  set  fire  on  the  same  day  to  a  munitions  store  east  of  Munster.  News 
renched  London  upon  the  same  day  (Saturday  the  29th i,  that  upon  Friday  the  28th,  the  Greek  fort  of  Karaburn,  com- 
manding th?  entry  to  the  Gulf  of  Salonika,  had  been  occupied  by  the  French,  British,  Russian  and  Italian  Marines. 

On  Saturday,  the  29th,  St.  Giovanni  di  Medua  and  Alessio,  on  the  Adriatic,  were  occupied,  according  to  the  un- 
contradicted Austrian  Communique,  by  Austrian  troops,  representing  an  advance  of  about  20  miles  from  Scutari, 


February  3,  1916. 


LAND      AND      \\  A  1  E  R  . 


GERMAN    ACTIVITY     IN    THE    WEST. 


By  Hilaire   Belloc. 


BY  far  the  most  important  part  of  the  war  news  is 
tlic  suddenly  renewed  activity  of  the  Germans 
upon  the  Western  front. 
Three  or  four  strong  local  offensives  ha\-e 
been  delivered  between  the  end  of  the  great  Soissons 
salient  and  the  North  Sea  in  the  last  few  days.  They 
have  been  delivered  over  narrow  fronts,  but  at  the  expense 
of  considerable  mnnbers,  and  all  have  failed  save  one  — 
\\itli  which  we  will  deal  in  a  moment. 

The  policy  of  these  continued  local  attacks— which 
are  not  aimed  at  breaking  the  line  at  all,  being  on  far 
too  small  a  scale  for  that  object' — has  been  already 
described  last  week.  It  is  the  act  of  a  man  who,  to  keep 
a  door  shut  against  the  pressure  of  stronger  forces  outside, 
jerks  it  forward  at  intervals.  As  the  system  develops 
it  has  a  further  object  (very  often)  of  concentrating  men 
against  particular  parts  of  the  line  in  the  hope  of  weaken- 
ing those  parts  elsewhere  where  a  really  strong  attack  is 
later  intended. 

Whatever  the  policy,  the  enemy,  at  this  very  consider- 
able expense  in  men,  achieved,  after  nearly  a  fortnight 
of  such  efforts,  a  marked  success.  It  was  of  the  following 
nature. 


►ALBERT 


I 


Zaft  Torfion. 


'Ruins  of  ViUnqe 
of  DcmpLfrrr 


The  Upper  Somme  betwcci  Peronne  and  Bray  is  a 
small,  but  not  fordable,  very  sluggish  stream,  winding 
through  a  belt,  from  three  to  si.x  hundred  yards  wide, 
or  even  more,  of  marshy  ground  impassable  to  troops. 
It  was  this  same  belt  of  marsh  which  Henry  V.  crossed 
with  so  much  difificulty,  in  the  great  march  to  Agincourt, 
using  the  remains  of  the  Roman  causeway  some  few  miles 
above  the  point  we  are  here  concerned  with. 

At  a  place  where  this  belt  of  marsh  with  the  small 
and  sluggish  stream  winding  through  it,  makes  a  great 
hook  (the  loop  is  cut  off  at  its  base  by  the  lateral  canal  of 
the  Somme)  stands  the  village  of  Frise — now  of  course  in 
ruins.  Due  south  of  it  lies  the  village  of  Dompierre, 
now  also  in  ruins.  North  of  the  river  the  line  runs  directly 
northwards,  covering  Albert. 

It  is  in  this  region  that  the  French  and  English  lines 
met  for  many  months,  although  there  has  been  a  slight 
extension  of  the  English  line  since  last  autumn.  There 
was,  at  any  rate,  an  English  element  present  in  the  forces 
at  Frise,  when  the  attack  was  delivered. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  forces  at  Frise  and  those  in 
the  trenches  just  in  front  of  that  ruined  \'illage  had  their 
back  to  the  marshy  belt  of  the  unfordable  Somme,  and 
were  at  a  disadvantage  on  that  account  if  they  were  really 
hard  pressed.  Disadvantageous  as  such  a  position  is, 
in  the  present  war  of  trenches  there  is  no  great  considera- 
tion for  such  points.  When  lines  have  been  once  estab- 
lished-— "  crystallised  "  is  the  current  phrase — pretty  well 
liaphazard  in  the  last  few  days  of  mobile  fighting,  they 
remain  as  the  chance  of  that  fighting  has  left  them  save 
for  an  occasional  advance  and  retirement  by  a  few  hundred 
yards  upon  either  side,  the  result  of  such  episodes  as  the 
one  we  are  examining. 

The  German  attack  was  preceded  by  a  very  \'iolent 
bombardment    over    several    miles    of    front    from    the 


Somme  southwards.  There  followed  the  attack  of  two 
or  three  divisions.  All  that  part  of  it  which  struck  to 
the  south  or  right  of  the  French  at  Dompierre  was  thrown 
back  with  very  heavy  loss.  In  the  loop  of  the  ri\'er  and 
north  of  the  "canal  it  was  otherwise.  The  Germans,  at 
an  expense  estimated  by  the  French  at  something  ovei; 
10,000  casualties,  occupied  the  ruins  of  the  \-illage  of 
]"-rise  and  the  trenches  there  lining  the  river,  claiming  as 
a  result,  probably  justly,  as  many  prisoners  as  the  French 
took  the  other  day  oil  the  Hartmansweilerkopf,  about 
1,300. 

It  does  not  seem  that  the  enemy  was  able  to  advance 
from  the  marshy  belt,  up  to  the  edge  of  which  he  had 
reached,  or  that  he  had  any  success  north  of  the  river. 
It  will  be  interesting  to  note  from  six  weeks  to  two 
months  hence  what  losses  are  admitted  in  this  action  in 
the  enemy  casualty  lists,  when  we  have  ascertained  the 
units  he  was  emploj'ing  at  this  point. 

Position    in    Mesopotamia.  1 

There  has  been  no  change  in  the  position  of  the 
relieving  forces  held  up  by  the  Turks  upon  the  Tigris 
or,  unfortunately,  in  that  of  (icneral  Townshend's  dixision, 
which  they  are  attempting  to  succour.  The  relieving 
force  has  been  unable  to  move  since  the  heavy  action  of 
a  fortnight  ago.  The  Turkish  trenches  up  river  to  the 
West,  that  is,  those  containing  General  Townshend's 
force  on  the  far  side,  have  been  moved  a  mile  further  up- 
stream, presumably  to  avoid  flooded  ground;  btit  the 
movement  is  of  no  effect  upon  the  general  situation. 

Meanwhile  an  error,  which  should  be  noted  by  all 
those  who  are  following  the  war  carefully,  was  committed 
by  the  India  Office  in  transmitting  the  first  telegram. 
To  this  error  was  due  a  corresponding  error  in  the  Sketch 
Map  published  in  these  columns  last  week. 

The  first  telegram  described  the  shock  between  the 
relieving  force  and  the  Turks  as  ha\'ing  taken  place  on 
the  position  of  El-Essin,  between  six  and  seven  miles 
ea;st  of  Kut.  This  is  the  main  Turkish  position,  and  was 
that  upon  which  we  were  all  prepared  that  the  action 
should  take  place. 

A  second  telegram  from  the  India  Office  corrected  the 
error  of  the  first  and  told  us  that  the  action  had  as  a  fact 
taken  place  between  23  and  25  miles  east  of  Kut ;  in  other 
words,  upon  the  line  of  the  Wady,  or  watercour.se,  up  to 
which  the  relieving  force  reached  at  the  end  of  its  pursuit 
of  the  retiring  Turkish  advanced  bodies  a  month  ago. 

The  Turks  appear  to  have  lain  upon  either  side  of  the 
Tigris  and,  upoft  the  left  bank  or  north,  were  imme- 
diately behind  the  Wadj'.  Exceptional  rains  had  filled 
this  watercourse  and  even  flooded  the  neighbourhood,  and 
to  this,  as  well  as  to  the  superiority  in  numbers  of  the 
enemy,  the  check  received  by  the  British  force  must  be 
ascribed. 

The  difference  between  the  first  supposed  position 
of  the  action  and  the  second  position  which  we  now  know 
it  to  be,  is  shown  in  the  following  sketch. 

The  error  is  not  really  a  material  one,  for  whether  the 
relieving  forces  were  checked  seven  or  twenty-five  miles 
from  its  object  is  of  little  ultimate  consequence.  The 
real  point  is  the  power  of  resistance  of  the  enemy,  and  this, 
unfortunately,  appears  to  be  sufficient  for  its  purpose. 

The  Italian  Resume. 

An  exceedingly  important  document  has  been  issued 
this  week  in  Rome.  The  public  had  it  last  Saturday. 
It  has  been  about  three  weeks  preparing,  and  it  is  most 
unfortunate  that  our  Press — with  the  exception  of  the 
Morning  Post — has  not  given  it  more  prominence. 

This  document  is  the  official  account  under  the 
authority  of  the  Italian  Commander  in  Chief,  General 
Cadorna,  of  the  results  of  the  operations  upon  the  Italian 
■front  up  to  the  end  of  the  year  1915. 

With  regard  to  the  movement  of  the  lines  nothing 
need  be  said  because  in  the  first  place  they  have  been 
slight — involving  not  more  than  the  complete  security  of 
the  Italian  Plain  from  in\'asion  at  least  with  such  forces 

[Copyriglu  tn  America  by  "  The  Xac  York  American."! 


LAND      AND     WATER. 


February  3,  1916. 


1 


Shielc 


Miles 


as  the  Aiistrains  could  sparo  ;  in  the  second  place  because, 
they  are  fairly  familiar  to  all  those  who  follow  the  war  at 
all  carefulU'. 

What  is  really  important  in  this  campaign  of  attrition 
is  the  estimate  our  Allies  make  of  the  enemy  forces  the\' 
have  drawn  to  this  front,  and  the  figures  of  prisoners. 

General  Cadorna  does  not  hesitate  to  give  the  total 
Austrian  forces  between  the  Trentino  and  the  Adriatic 
at  twelve  corps.  Opinion  most  favourable  to  Italy  has  not 
hitherto  mentioned  anything  like  that  figure.  In  the 
columnsof  Land  AND  W.\ti:r  six  have  been  suggested  as  a 
minimum,  and'just  possibly  ten  as  the  very  outside  maxi- 
mum. The  general  (and  woithless)  "  conversational  " 
estimate — if  6ne  may  use  the  term — has  put  the  Austrian 
figures  ridiculously  low  ;  five  corps  or  less. 

General  Cadorna's  high  estimate  is  to  be  accepted 
with  little  reserve,  for  the  Italian  higher  command  is 
alone  in  a  position  to  judge  the  matter,  and  its  accounts 
have  always  been  moderate  and  restrained  after  the 
fashion  happily  set  by  all  the  Allies,  perhaps  better 
followedbyltaly  than  by  any  other.  But  even  if  we  do  not 
admit  the  full  complement  of  the  corps  mentioned,  we 
are  dealing  with  something  not  far  short  of  400,000  men. 
And  considering  the  excellence  of  the  Italian  heavy 
artillery,  the  immense  rate  of  munitionment  which  \tsS.y 
(to  the  great  increase  of  her  prestige)  has  successfully 
maintained,  and  the  now  notorious  precision  of  Italian  fire, 
we  can  judge  upon  the  analogy  of  all  other  fronts  what 
wastage  in  enemy  strength  these  figures  mean.  The 
Italian  front  has  not  cost  Austria  in  the  eight  months  less 
than  200,000  men  dead  loss — probably  more.  The 
number  of  prisoners  alone  in  Italian  hands  is  over  ;50,ooo. 
It  will  be  no  surprise  when  the  official  histor\-  of  the  war 
comes  to  be  written  from  collattxl  documents,  if  the  total 
enemy  wastage  due  to  Italian  effort  does  not  prove  to 
exceed  a  quarter  of  a  million  upon  this  front  alone. 

That  is  most  admirable  \\T»rk,  and  when  we  think  of 
quahty  as  well  as  quantity  it  means  even  more.  All 
these  months,  at  any  rate  since  July.  Austria  has  been 
able  to  send  her  best  units  to  this  South-Western  front 
of  hers.  It  is  these  that  have  been  bioken  and  harried 
after  such  a  fashion,  and  we  must  bear  in  mintl  in  leadint^ 
such  figures  what  they  mean  for  the  future. 

How  will  that  front  look  when  the  opening  year 
permits  more  general  offensives  ?  When  the  rearma- 
ment of  Russia  is  accomplished  and  when  Austria-Hungarv 
will  be  s)ibject  to  the  imperative  need  of  finding  some  men 
from  somewhere  to  fight  uT>on  two  fronts  at  least  and 
more  probaoly  upon  three  ? 

Of  the  really  significant  documents  issued  in  the  last 
five  months,  this  is  perhaps  the  most  significant. 

I  would  refer  my  readers  in  particular  to  the  full 
account  published  in  the  Morning  Post  of  Monday, 
January  ;ust,  with  its  two  excellent  and  detailed  mai^s. 


A  Further  Note  upon  Mr.  Tennant's  Figures. 

My  readers  will  remember  that  the  figures  gi\-en  by 
Mr.  Tennant  in  Parliament — which  were  no  more  than 
the  German  totals  as  given  by  the  enemy  himself — were 
subject  to  very  grave  criticism  and  were,  indeed,  mani- 
festly erroneous.  In  connection  with  this,  of  which  the 
analysis  made  will  convince  anyone  who  followed  it, 
there  has  appeared  a  new  piece  of  evidence  which  is 
conclusive  ;  though  that  really  was  hardly  needed,  for 
probably  no  one  took  the  original  figures 'seriously. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  Mr.  Tennant's  figures 
the  total  gross  losses  (not  net)  of  the  Germans  for  the  one 
month  of  December  (excluding  sickness)  were  given  at 
about  11,000.  It  will  also  be  remembered  that  the  well- 
deserved  sarcasm  of  one  of  our  principal  military  writers 
was  quoced  in  connection  with  that  absurd  figure. 

The  new  piece  of  evidence  to  which  I  refer  is  the 
evidence  of  the  British  losses  during  the  same  month. 

They  are  now  officially  given  as  just  short  of  double 
the  German  losses  !  Over  21,000. 

One  has  but  to  mention  so  ridiculous  a  contrast  to  settle 
the  credibility  of  the  first  set  of  figures. 

The  British  forces  during  the  month  of  December 
have  no  casualties  in  action  of  any  appreciaolc  size  save 
upon  the  French  front.  They  have  no  fighting  in 
Salonika,  none  in  GalHpoli,  none  in  Egypt.  Of  all  the 
very  large  proportion  of  British  forces  in  the  East  only 
the  quite  small  body  in  Mesopotamia  was  engaged  af  all. 

The  forces  on  the  French  front  were  engaged  in  no 
considerable  actions.  The  whole  period  was  one  of  lull. 
Those  forces  are  mainly  responsiole  for  the  figure  of  total 
casualties  for  December— which  we  know  upon  the  Eng- 
lish side  to  be  very  accurately  kept  and  up  to  date. 

"The  German  armies  in  the  field  were  during  the 
same  month  continually  engaged.  There  was  some 
lighting  in  the  Balkans  (on  no  very  large  scale  it  is  true), 
very  heavy  fighting  indeed,  with  very  high  casualties, 
on  the  southern  part  of  the  Russian  front,  and  the  usual 
measure  of  activity  upon  the  French  front.  The  German 
forces  engaged  during  that  same  month  and  often  engaged 
in  ver\'  heavy  and  expensive  operations,  numbered  some- 
thing between  four  and  five  limes  the  British  forces 
engaged,  and  we  are  asked  to  believe  that  their  total 
losses  were  only  half  as  many  ! 

The  thing  is,  of  course,  manifestly  ridiculous,  and 
it  is  perhaps  a  waste  of  space  to  allude  to  it  again,  bin  if 
anyone  is  still  in  doubt  as  to  the  valuelessness  of  the 
original  figures  given  this  argument  should,  I  think, 
convince  such  a  one. 

The  total  German  losses  during  the  month  of  Decem- 
ber, counting  the  sick,  permanent  and  temporary,  may 
have  been  a  good  deal  below  the  usual  average,  for  on  the 
whole  it  was  a  month  of  lull  save  for  the  rather  heavy 


i 


February  3,  1916. 


LAND     AUD     water 


fighting  on  the  Russian  front,  but  the  fantastic  figure 
pf  11,000  given  in  the  House  of  Commons  is    negligible. 

Reprissls. 

In  the  present  mood  of  the  enemy  it  is  exceedingly 
important  that  opinion,  in  this  country  especially,  should 
be  clear  headed  upon  the  question  of  reprisals. 

Reprisals  in  war,  which  cannot  be  often  repeated, 
must  have  a  military  object,  and  a  mihtary  object  alone. 
In  other  words,  if  during  war  you  forgot  even  for  a  moment 
the  prime  object  of  war — if  you  turn  to  consider 
revenge  for  mere  "  scoring  "  or  occupation  of  territory,  or 
the  discomtiture  of  important  persons,  you  are  not  only 
losing  your  own  power  but  you  are  inevitably  lowering 
your  general  fighting  strength. 

Reprisals,  then,  are  essentially  political  acts  under- 
taken with  a  political  object,  which  political  object  is 
expected  to  react  upon  the  whole  military  situation. 
Short  of  that  they  are  worth  nothing.  If,  for  instance, 
you  are  fighting  an  enemy  who  tortures  his  prisoners, 
as  savage  tribes  have  done  in  warfare  against  Europeans, 
there  would  be  nothing  but  waste  of  energy  and  worse 
in  torturing  the  prisoners  you  took  unless  you  thought 
that  such  an  action  might  weaken  the  moral  of  the 
enemy.  The  punishment  you  propose  to  inflict  upon  an 
imscrupulous,  barbaric,  or  insane  enemy,  should  in  all 
military  common  sense  be  postponed  to  the  period  of 
execution  which  follows  victory. 

If  we  only  keep  this  first  principle  steadily  in  mind, 
it  will  be  a  sure  guide  to  the  actions  wherewith  we 
should  meet  the  enemy's  consistent  and  increasing 
tendency  to  savage  or  insane  action  in  the  present  struggle. 
It  is  always  from  the  enemy's  side  that  the  first  breaches 


of  common  morals  have  come.  They  began  with  the 
murder  of  innocent  civilians,  nuirders  committed  with  the 
object  of  striking  terror  and  securing  the  passage  of  his 
armies.  They  proceeded  to  indiscriminate  murder  at 
sea,  then  to  the  use  of  poison  gases  on  land,  and  to  the 
dropping  of  high  explosives  upon  open  towns.  They 
may  perfectly  well  in  the  near  future  go  on  to  the  employ- 
ment of  poison  in  ordinary  life,  they  may  attempt  to 
taint  the  water  supplies  of  our  great  cities  ;  they  may 
go  from  that  to  the  massacre  of  prisoners.  They  have 
no  very  clear  object  in  what  they  are  doing.  Their 
action  is  spasmodic  and  sometimes  particularly  exulted  in 
because  they  are  inexcusable.  Their  general  motive 
is  obvious  enough.  They  propose  to  cause  confusion 
in  the  political  organisation  of  the  Alhes,  dissatisfaction 
of  citizens  with  their  Government,  and  weariness  with 
the  war  in  general.  As  against  these  attempts  we  must 
remember  that  the  modern  German  is  politically  vulner- 
able for  reprisals  for  two  reasons  :  first  of  all,  he  is  ner- 
vous in  type,  mainly  a  town  dweller,  and,  as  the  whole 
course  of  the  war  has  proved,  peculiarly  unstable  under 
a  nervous  strain.  He  is,  especially  during  this  struggle, 
in  a  mood  of  "  exultation."  Secondly,  he  has  been  almost 
entirely  immmie  so  far  as  his  own  soil  and  his  own  political 
organisation   are  concerned. 

The  conclusion  is  that  sharp  reprisals  undertaken 
as  soon  as  possible  after  eacla  of  his  crimes  would 
be  of  real  service,  though  reprisals  should  be  thorough., 
but  should  occupy  as  little  of  the  energy  and  the  time 
of  the  Allies  as  possible.  And  it  is  to  be  concluded 
with  fair  certitude  that  if  a  few  really  vigorous  examples 
were  made  with  certain  of  the  Rhenish  towns,  for  instance, 
together  with  action  against  enemy  property,  it  would 
infiuence  him  in  the  immediate  future.     H,  Belloc. 


AN    EVENTFUL    WEEK. 


By   Arthur  Pollen. 


THE  past  week  has  been  interesting  for  three 
exceedingly  important  developments.  In  the 
Blockade  debate,  the  Government  did  not  dis- 
close either  the  character  of  the  steps  to  make 
the  siege  of  Germany  more  strict,  nor  indeed  that  greater 
stringency  was  to  be  enforced.  Yet  the  debate  as  a 
whole  made  this  intention  obvious.  That  the  American 
attitude  towards  the  belligerents  is  on  the  verge  of 
dramatic  change  can  hardly  be  questioned.  On  Thurs- 
day, January,  27th,  the  summary  of  Mr.  Lansing's  new 
note  on  submarine  war  and  the  arming  of  merchantmen, 
was  published,  and  it  was  followed  immediately  by  a 
series  of  speeches  by  Mr.  Wilson,  all  couched  in  a  tone 
entirely  new  to  that  strong  but  singular  man.  It  is 
significant  that  the  Note  and  the  speeches  coincided 
with  the  stay  in  Berhn  of  Colonel  House,  reputed  to  be 
Mr.  Wilson's  unofiicial  emissary  to  Europe.  Finally  the 
news  that  anchored  German  mines  had  been  found  oH 
the  Spanish  coast  and  that  ships  had  been  lost  by  them, 
indicate  new  and  tragic  departures  by  the  enemy. 

The   Blockade    Debate. 

The  case  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  to  meet  in  the  debate 
was,  that  the  Government  had  not  carried  out  Mr.  Asquith's 
threat  that  we  would  prevent  commodities  of  any  kind 
from  entering  or  leaving  Germany.  It  was  part  of  the 
case  that  this  failure  could  partly  be  explained  by  the 
fact  that  we  had  proceeded  by  a  method  of 
our  own,  under  an  Order  in  Council,  instead  of  by  strict 
blockade,  which  the  facts  of  the  naval  situation  and  a 
reasonable  interpretation  of  the  American  doctrine  of 
"  continuous  voyage  "  would  have  enabled  us  to  do.  It 
is,  of  course,  only  by  an  appeal  to  this  doctrine  that  we 
establish  our  title  to  hit  at  Germany  through  the  neutral 
ports  at  all.  A  blockade,  it  was  maintained,  would  add 
nothing  to  the  diplomatic  difficulties  of  the  position, 
would  indeed  in  some  respects  simplify  it,  by  resting 
our  case  on  a  better  legal  basis,  and,  if  feasible,  must 
certainly  be  more  effective.  It  was  also  urged  that,  in 
proceeding  against  Germany  at  sea  we  should  act  as  the 


agent  of  all  the  Allies,  and  not  as  if  the  cause  were  our 
own  singly. 

Such  was  the  case  put  forward  by  Mr.  Benn  and  Mr. 
LesHe  Scott,  and  it  is  substantially  identical  with  the 
suggestions  put  forward  in  these  columns  since  September 
last.  On  only  one  of  the  points  raised  did  Sir  Edward 
Grey  give  any  direct  satisfaction  to  his  critics.  He  inade 
it  clear  that  for  the  future  all  discussion  with  America  is 
to  be  carried  on  by  Great  Britain  and  France  jointly. 
I  have  urged  this  now  for  five  months,  and  the  concession 
seems  to  me  both  useful  and  important.  For  the  rest 
Sir  Edward  Grey  made  no  attempt  to  answer  any  of  these 
criticisms  ;  nor  did  he  see  his  way  to  accept  any  other  of 
the  suggestions  made.  Indeed  he  made  light  of  his 
opponents.  A  certain  proportion  of  goods  had  no  doubt 
got  past  us  to  the  enemy,  but  Lord  Faringdon,  who  had 
made  special  enquiries  into  the  matter,  was  S  itisfied  that 
much  less  had  gone  through  "  than  could  have  been 
expected  " — a  not  very  specific  method  of  indicating  the 
success  or  failure  of  our  efforts.  The  figures  that  had 
recently  been  published  had  been  subjected  on  the 
j>revious  day  to  a  somewhat  damaging  criticism  in  a 
White  Paper  issued  by  the  War  Trade  Department. 
Sir  Edward  pushed  this  form  of  criticism  still  further, 
and  repudiated  with  complete  success  the  accusation  that 
the  Foreign  Office  had  interfered  with  the  action  of-  the 
Admiralty.  He  also  asserted  with  great  force  and  vigour 
that  if  we  attempted  a  strict  blockade  of  all  the  neutrals 
in  Europe,  we  might  indeed  end  the  war  more  quickly, 
but  in  a  fashion  disastrous  to  ourselves.  Indeed  nearly 
ten  out  of  the  sixteen  columns  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  speech 
in  Hansard  are  devoted  to  these  three  points,  the  mis- 
leading figures  of  the  American  exports,  the  alleged 
interference  by  the  diplomatists  with  the  navy,  the  folly 
of  threatening  all  Eiuope  with  a  blockade  for  tlic  sake  ol 
starving  Germany.  But  no  one  in  the  House  of  Commons 
had  made  himself  responsible  for  any  of  these  accusations 
or  proposals,  so  that  Sir  Edward  was  demolisliing  critics 
who  hadn't  appeared  in  the  lists  against  him. 

Up  to  this  point  it  was  as  if  he  had  said  that  the 
blockade  was  so  well  managed  that  it  could  hardly  be 


LAND       AND      WATER. 


February  3,  iqiO. 


improved,  and  except  for  the  concession  about  co-opera- 
tiiif,'  with  France,  nowilHngness  to  adopt  a  more  stringent 
or  a  more  forward  poUcy  was  expressed.     Why  then  m  as 
Sir  Edward  Grey's  speech  recei\ed  with  such  universal 
— and  quite  proper — satisfaction?     It  was  because  he 
challenged  all  the  neutral  countries  to  question  or  oppose' 
the  AUies'  right  to  use  their  sea  power  to  the  full.     We 
iiad  no  right  he  said,  to  deprive  neutrals  of  goods  genuinely 
intended  for  their  own  use,  but  we  could  not  give  up  our 
right  to  interfere  with  enemy  trade.     The  main  question 
for  neutrals  was  tliis.     Do  they  admit  our  rigiit  to  apply 
the  principles  employed  by  the  American  (iovernments 
in  the  war  betewen  North  "and  South  ?     In  fairness  they 
are  bound  to  admit  it,  and  if  they  do,  surely  they  should 
assist — at  least  through  corporations  of  private  traders— 
to  make  our  exercise  of  that  right  as  easy  and  as  effective 
as  possible.     But  if  any  neutral  takes  upon  himself  to 
deny  that  right,  the  Allies  ulll  regard  siicli  a  cloiial  as  a 
departure  from   netilralily.     In  saying  this   the   Foreign 
Secretary  took  the  highest  tone  it  was  possible  for  him 
to  take,  and  he  put  the  policy  of  this  country  and  of  its 
Allies  upon  a  foundation  which  it  is  impossible  for  any 
neutral  to  misunderstand.     Such   plain   speaking  could 
not  have  been  necessary — except  that  the  situation  called 
for  new  departures,  and  that  new  departures  were  coming. 
If  drastic  step's  for  tightening  the  bonds  on  Germany 
are  in  contemplation,  the  neutral  powers  have  to  be 
prepared  for  their  employment.     And,  as  if  to  reconcile 
them  to  this  new  and  sterner  policy.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
ended  with  an  indictment  of  German  conduct  at  sea  that 
left  nothing  to  be  desired  in  scathing  vigour.     Those  of 
us,   then,    who    have    been  urging    a  stricter    siege    so 
patiently,  can,  it  seems  to  me,  rest  satisfied  with  the 
situation. 

Part  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  indictment  of  Germany's 
sea  policy  was  that  she  had  continually  sunk  merchant 
vessels  w'ithout  notice  or  warning  or  attempting  to  safe- 
guard passengers  and  crews,  and  that  she  had  done  this, 
not  only  by  submarines,  but  by  sowing  the  sea  with 
mines,  by  w-hich  ships  that  were  not  even  bound  for  any 
port  within  the  so-called  war  zone  had  been  destroyed. 
And  he  noted  that  no  protest  has  been  made  by  neutral 
governments  to  Germany  in  this  matter  of  the  kind  made 
against  our  own  quite  civilised  proceedings.  Our  action 
could  indeed  be  questioned  on  the  grounds  at  law,  but 
it's  illegality  was,  at  its  worst,  doubtful.  But  German 
action  was  not  only  obviously  illegal,  but  scandalously 
inhumane  to  boot.  In  emphasing  this  point.  Sir  Edward 
was  no  doubt  anticipating  a  part  of  the  reply  to  Mr. 
Lansing's  latest  proposals. 

Reckless    Mine  laying. 

The   recent    great   and   reckless   extension    of   the 
German   mine-laying    poHcy   must  also  be  taken    into 
account.      The  restrictions   imposed  upon    mine-laying 
by  the  Hague  Conventions  are  well  known.     Germany 
has  never  observed  these  restrictions  and  the  develop- 
ment  of   mine-laying   submarines    confers    on   her  the 
capacity  to  lay  these  mines  where  she  will.     It  is  obviously 
impossible  for  any  system  of  sweeping  to  keep  the  channels 
leading, to  all  commercial  ports  constantly  swept,  and  the 
fact  that  mines  are  laid  so  far  afield  as  the  Spanish  coast 
is  a  final  evidence  that  there  is  no  pretence  that  they  are 
laid  with  anv  military  object,  or  so  as  to  destroy  belligerent 
shipping   only.     Indeed,   the   fact   that   neutral   vessels 
mostly  not  bound  for  belligerent  ports  at  all  have  been 
sunk  at  the  rate  cf  nearly  eight  a  month  since  the  war 
began,  is  conclusive  evidence  of  the  character  of  (German 
contempt  for  civilised  opinion.     Wc  must,   I   fear,    be 
pripared  for  an  increase  in  the  loss  of  merchant  shipping 
both  from  this  cause  and  from  attacks— at  least  on   our 
own  shipping — by  submarines  in  areas  in  which  these 
boats  have  not  hitherto  operated.     Nor  can  wi;  reason- 
ably hope  very  greatly  to  restrict  the  operations  of  sub- 
marines in  the  open  sea  by  the  kind  of  counter-offensive 
tiiat  has  been  effective  in  home  waters.     The  only  effective 
means  of  limiting  their  action  would  be  by  making  the 
>uppiy  of  oil  and  other  necessaries  to  them  impossible. 
Bui  w  ithout  the  co-operation  of  powers  now  neutral,  this 
cutting  off  of  supplies  is  exceedingly  difiicuU.     The  only 
limitation    then    to    the    destructive    malignity    of    oiu- 
•nemies   will    be    the    opportunity    afforded    to    them, 
and.  for  practical  purposes,  the   only  way  of   hmitm^- 


their    opportimities,    is    for    all    merchantmen    to     be 
armed. 

The   New   American   Proposals. 

When  then  we  come  to  consider  America's  latest 
proposals  we  must  bear  these  two  fundamental  facts  in 
mind.  First,  Germany's  breach  of  the  canons  of  civilised 
war  is  not  limited  to  the  sinking  of  merchantmen  and 
liners  by  submarines,  but  has,  from  the  very  outbreak  of 
hostilities,  included  the  most  dastardly  of  all  crimes  the 
wholesale  sowing  of  mines  upon  tlie  sea,  a  policy  which 
the  minelaying  submarine  now  enables  her  to  extend  in- 
definitely. And,  secondly,  the  sole  means  of  protecting 
merchantmen  and  liners  against  submarines,  outside  of 
home  waters,  is  for  the  trading  ship  to  carry  guns.  This 
is  so  because,  if  the  ship  is  defenceless,  a  modern  sub- 
marine can  operate  safely  as  a  surface  ship  armed  with 
guns  uverhaul  and  run  down  almost  any  ship  afloat,  thus 
making  every  merchantman  seen  a  certain  victim  unless 
rescued  by  a  patrol  :  whereas,  if  the  submarine  can  only 
mancEUvre  to  attack  when  submerged  and  is  limited  to 
the  use  of  the  torpedo  as  a  weapon,  the  number  of  her 
victims  is  necessarily  reduced  to  those  ships  that  she  has 
been  successful  in  waylaying.  Such  ships  as  she  waylays 
she  will  sink  on  sight,'  and  there  will  no  doubt  be  a  hcAvy 
loss  of  life  in  each  case.  If  no  .ships  arc  armed  three  or 
four  times  as  many  ships  will  be  sunk,  and  the  loss  of  life 
will  depend  upon'  the  inclination  or  convenience  of  the 
submarine  commander  who  sinks  them. 

The  official  text  of  Mr.  Lansing's  proposal  has  not 
been  published,  but  the  summaries,  if  correct,  show  that 
America  proposes  to  forbid  the  Allies  to  arm  merchant- 
men, and  Germany  to  sink  merchantmen  without  pro- 
viding for  the  safety  of  those  on  board.  If  the  AUies 
decline  this  request,"^  their  ships  are  to  be  forbidden  the 
use  of  American  ports,  except  on  warship  terms.  If 
Germany  declines,  or  having  accepted  breaks  her  word, 
the  penalties  are  not  specified.  What  should  our  attitude 
towards  these  proposals  be  ? 

The  two  most  obvious  objections  are  these,     .^s  we 
have  seen,  the  disarmament  of  merchantmen  makes  the 
destruction  of  our  sea  trade  incalculably  easier  for  the 
submarine.     Consequently  to  fall  in  with  the  proposal 
would  be  to  condemn  our  merchant  shipping  to  far  niore 
serious  losses  than  it  has  yet  endured.     The  next  objec- 
tion is  that  we  should  get  nothing  for  this  sacrifice  except 
Germany's  word  that  no  sinkings  at  sight  would  take 
place,  nor  any  sinkings  without  passengers  and  crew  being 
secured.     There  are  two  difficulties  in  accepting  Germany's 
word  in  this  matter.     The  first  is  that  no  one  outside  o  f 
(iermany  believes  that  that  country's  plighted  word  will 
ever  be  kept  a  moment  longer  than  convenience  dictates. 
And  they  believe  this  because  no  one  inside  Germany 
has  ever  professed  any  other  doctrine.     Our  disinclination 
to  accept  Germany's  word  then,  is  based  not  only  on  her 
many  and  atrocious  breaches  of  it,  but  more   firmly  on 
the  fact  that  she  glories  in  her  freedom  to  break  it  when 
she  needs  to.     But  supposing  this  difficulty  could  be  got 
over,  a  large  assumption,  what  is  the  worth  of  any  under- 
taking given  by  submarine  captains  that  the  safety  of 
those  on  board  sunk   merchantmen  should  be  secured  ? 
There  is  only  one  method  of  providing  for  this  safety.     It 
is  to  put  passengers  and  crews  into  properly  manned  and 
properly  provided  boats,  and  to  turn  them  adrift  to  make 
their  best  way  to  port.     Whether  this  is  virtual  safety 
v>r  not  depends  upon  a  great  number  of    things— the 
distance  from  port,  the  weather,  the  currents  to  be  encoun- 
tered, the  frequented  or  imfrequented  state  of  the  sea 
neighbourhood  amongst  others.     Is  a  code  of  rules  to  be 
drawn  up  in  these  matters  and  to  be  accepted  by  the 
Germans  ?     Can  turning  women  and  children  adrift  in 
these  circumstances  more  than,  say,  twelve  hours  from 
port,  in  any  circumstances  be  regarded  as  a  civilised 
proceeding  ? 

Nor  is  this  all.  The  excuse  given  for  sinking  the 
Arabic  was  that  the  submarine  commander  suspected  her 
intention  to  ram  him.  Disarming  merchantmen  will  not 
necessarily  make  submarines  safe  from  merchantmen. 
The  submarine  captain  with  guns  and  torpedoes  at  his 
disposal  must  be  left  with  a  free  hand  to  jtidge  the  military 
necessity.  Wiiat  kind  of  guarantee  can  there  be  here  that 
life  will  be  respected  ?  Merely  on  the  merits  of  the  pro- 
posals, then,  one  sees  certain  objections  almost  impossible 

{Conlinued  on  i>oge  lu.) 


February  j,  1916  LAND      AND      WATER. 

A    SONG    OF    THE    GUNS. 

By    Gilbert    Frankau. 

6.-THE    OBSERVERS. 

Eiv  the  last  light  that  leaps  the  night  has  hung,  and  shone,  and  died, 
While  yet  the  breast-high  fog  of  dawn  is  swathed  about  the  plain, 

By  hedge  and  track  our  slave;;  go  back,  ths  waning  stars  for  guide     .     .     . 
Eyes  Oi  our  mouths,  ths  mists  have  cleared,  the  guns  would  speak  again  ! 

Faint  on  the  ear  that  strains  to  hear,  their  orders  trickle  down : 

"  D.^grees— twelve— left  of  zero  line— ::orrector  one  three  eight— 

Threa  thousand  "...     Shift  our  trails  and  lift  the  muzzles  that  shall  drod'u 
The  rifle's  idle  chatter  when  our  sendings  detonate. 

Sending  or  still,  these  serve  our  will  ;    the  hidden  eyes  that  mark, 

From  gutted  farm,  from  laddered  tree  that  scans  the  furrowed  slopj, 

From  coigns  of  slag  whose  pit-props  sag  on  burrowed  ways  and  dark. 
In  open  trench  where  sandbags  hold  the  steady  periscope. 

Waking,  they  know  the  instant  foe,  the  bullets  phutting  by,. 

The  blurring  lens,  the  sodden  map,  the  wires  that  leak  or  break  ; 
Sleeping,  they  dream  of  shells  that  scream  adown  a  sunless  sky     .     .     . 

And  the  splinters  patter  round  them  in  their  dug-outs  as  they  wake. 

Not  theirs,  the  wet  glad  bayonet,  the  red  and  racing  hour, 

The  rush  that  clears  the  bombing-post  with  knife  and  hand-grenade  ; 

Not  theirs  the  zest  when,  steel  to  breast,  the  last  survivors  cower     .     . 
Yet  can  ye  hold  the  ground  ye  won,  save  these  be  there  to  aid  ? 

Tn?se,  that  observe  the  shell's  far  swerve,, these  of  the  quiet  voice 

That  bids  "  go  on,"  repeats  the  range,  corrects  for  fuie  or  line     .     .     . 

Though  dour  the  task  their  masters  ask,  what  room  for  thought  or  choice  ? 
This  is  ours  by  right  of  service,  heedless  gift  of  youthful  eyne  ! 

Careless  they  give  while  yet  they  live  ;   the  dead  we  tasked  too  sore 
Bear  witness  we  were  naught  begrudged  of  riches  or  of  youth  ; 

Careless  they  gave,  across  their  grave  our  calling  salvoes  roar. 

And  those  we  maimed  come  back  to  us  in  proof  our  dead  speak  truth  ! 

7.-AMMUNITION    COLUMN. 

I  am  only  a  cog  in  a  giant  machine,  a  link  of  an  endless  chain  : 

Ani  the  rounds  are  drawn,  and  the  rounds  are  fired,  and  ths  empties  return  again  ; 

Railroad,  lorry,  and  limber,  battery,  column,  and  park  ; 

To  the  shelf  where  the  set  fuze  waits  the  breech,  from  the  quay  where  the  shells  embark. 

We  have  watered  and  fed,  and  eaten  our  beef :   the  long  dull  day  drags  by, 

As  I  sit  here  watching  our  "  Archibalds  "  strafing  an  empty  sky  : 

Puff  and  flash  on  the  far-off  blue  round  the  speck  one  guesses  the  plane — 

Smoke  and  spark  of  the  gun-machine  that  is  fed  by  the  endless  chain. 

I  am  only  a  cog  in  a  giant  machine,  a  little  link  of  the  chain. 

Waiting  a  word  from  the  wagon-lines  that  the  guns  are  hungry  again  : 

Column-wagon  to  battery-wagon,  and  battery-wagon  to  gun  ; 

To  the  loader  kneeling  'twixt  trail  and  -wheel  from  the  shops  where  the  steam-lathes  run. 
There's  a  lone  mule  braying  against  the  line  where  the  mud  cakes  fetlock-decp  ; 
There's  a  lone  soul  hurnming  a  hint  of  a  song  in  the  barn  where  the  drivers  sleep  ; 
And  I  hear  the  pash  of  the  orderly's  horse  as  he  canters  him  down  the  hne  — 
Another  cog  in  the  gun-machine,  a  link  in  the  self-same  chain. 

I  am  only  a  cog  in  a  giant  machine,  but  a  vital  link  of  the  chain  ; 

And  the  Captain  has  sent  from  the  wagon-line  to  fill  his  wagons  again  -. 

From  wagon-limber  to  gunpit  dump  ;  from  loader's  forearm  at  breech. 

To  the  working  party  that  melts  away  lohen  the  shrapnel  bullets  screech. 

So  the  restless  section  pulls  out  once  more  in  column  of  route  from  the  right. 

At  the  tail  of  a  blood-red  afternoon  ;   so  the  flux  of  another  night 

Bears  back  the  wagons  we  fill  at  dawn  to  the  sleeping  column  again.     ... 

Cog  on  cog  in  the  gun-machine,  link  on  link  in  the  chain  ! 


N.B.— A  Song  of  the  Guns  will  be  concluded  in  our  next  issue. 


LAND     AND      WATER 


February  3,  1916. 


(Continued  tram  JWffr  8.) 

to  overcome.  The  final  objection  to  the  bargain  is,  as  I 
have  said  above,  that  added  to  all  its  disadvantages  as  a 
bargain,  it  deals  with  one  aspect  of  Germany's  sea 
criminalities  onlv. 

The  Washington  Government  has  access  to  naval 
advice  of  the  highest  authority  and  skill.  Its  whole 
conduct  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  shows  it  to  be 
deeply  concerned  to  maintain  the  claims  of  justice  and 
humanity.  It  is  obvious  then  that  the  Cabinet  must 
thoroughly  understand  all  the  objections  to  its  proposals 
—a  few  of  which  I  have  just  set  out.  What  is  its  inten- 
tion in  putting  these  proposals  forward  ?  In  this  matter 
we  can  only  guess  at  an  explanation.  Two  are  current. 
The  first  is  "that  Mr.  Wilson  hopes,  by  the  threat  of  closing 
American  ports  to  British  traders,  to  force  acceptance  by 
the  Allies,  and  by  the  threat  of  war  to  force  Germany's 
compliance — if  indeed  (iermany  would  need  any  forcing 
into  the  acceptance  of  a  bargain  so  extremely  favourable 
to  herself.  Once  the  new  arrangement  came  into  work- 
ing we  should  iind  ourselves  face  to  face  with  the  helpless- 
ness of  our  sea  trade  in  the  presence  of  German  submarine 
warfare.  \\'ould  not  this  be  a  favomable  moment  for 
reopening  that  question  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  to 
which  Mr.  \\'ils(>n  has  always  ''been  committed";  to 
which  Ormany — defeated  at  sea— is  now  so  ardent  a 
convert  ?  So  long  as  the  siibmarine  war  was  carried  on 
only  in  the  war  zone,  the  counter  campaign  could  not 
only  keep  it  under,  but  make  it  far  more  costly  to  Ger- 
many than  to  ourselves.  Make  the  destruction  of  com- 
merce on  the  high  seas  easy,  put  it  out  of  the  Allies' 
power  to  defend  their  trading  "ships,  and  then  probably  they 
will  prove  amenable  to  American  and  German  reason. 

There  is  another  view  which  is  not  untenable.  It  is 
obvious  that  the  United  States  community  is  gravitating 
towards  the  view  that  the  Administration's  attitude 
towards  Germany 'has  been  entirely  too  long  suffering. 
The  time  has  come  when  the  Administration  must  take 
some  action.  How  could  it  take  action  which  will  carry 
the  anti-German  sentiment  with  it  without  alienating 
the  pro-Germans  too  violently  ?  It  can  only  do  so  by 
appearing  to  impose  its  will  upon  both  belligerents.  Are 
the  Lansing  proposals  made  with  a  view  to  ultimate 
intervention  on  the  Allies'  side,  but  under  the  guise  of  an 
impartial  policy  ?  The  Administration  may  think  that 
(iermany  cannot  act  in  good  faith,  and  that  a  breach  is 
therefore  inevitable.  If,  when  the  breach  came,  the 
Administration  could  point  to  good  faith  on  our  side 
and  perfidy  on  the  other,  it  might  secure  unanimity. 

Whatever  the  intentions  of  the  Administration  are, 
it  seems  to  me  highly  improbable  that  events  will  afford 
an  opportunity  of  demonstrating  them.  In  other  words, 
the  Lansing  proposals  appear  to  me  to  be  still  born.  No 
suggestion  for  our  acceptance  of  Germany's  word  can  or 
should  receive  consideration.  And  this  after  all  is  the 
root  of  the  matter. 

The  Renascence  of  the  "  Appam." 

The  Appam  has  reappeared,  and  startled  the  world 
as  if  she  had  risen  from  the  dead.  The  Germans  have 
scored  grimly,  but  greatly,  over  the  Navy.  That  it  was 
possible  for  an  armed  cruiser  to  break  the  Blockade  out- 
wards and  get  upon  the  trade  routes,  is  a  possibility  which 
naval  o"fficers  have  always  foreseen.  If  we  arc  astonished 
it  is  not  because  of  the  difiliculty  of  the  thing  that  has  been 
done,  but  largely  because  it  has  not  been  done  sooner. 
Manifestly  it  is  hot  a  thing  which  can  be  done  very  often, 
or  on  a  large  scale.  It  is  impossible,  for  instance,  to 
suppose  that  warships  could  escape  except  by  the  merest 
lluke.  A  tramp  could  conceivably  be  seen  and  not 
pursued.  Could  a  warshij-)  be  so  disguised  as  to  be  seen 
and  escape  detection  ?  It  is  unlikei> .  The  news  arrives 
too  near  the  time  for  going  tr)  press  for  this  incident  to 
be  treated  fully.  The  question  which  excites  the  greatest 
curiosity  at  the  moment  is  this.  At  the  time  of  waiting 
we  only  know  the  Appam  has  arrived  at  Norfolk  with  a 
prize  crew  of  twelve  on  board.  This,  of  course,  cannot  be 
the  whole  personnel  of  the  -Mocier.  There  is  no  other 
news  of  the  Moewc.  Is  she  still  at  large,  or  have  her 
oflicers  and  men  been  transferred  to  one  of  the  captures, 
and  is  the  capture  at  large  as  a  rover  on  the  high  seas  ? 
If  she  is,  a  pretty  problem  is  propounded  to  the  British 
Navv  What  success  will  she  have  before-  her  inevitable 
end  ■?  ■  ARTHUR  POLLEN. 


RATIONAL    REFORM. 

THERE  has  come  by  chance  into  the  possession   of 
the  writer  a  slim,  brown-covered  magazine,  bearing 
the  title  of  The  Trust.  Review.     Its  name  docs  not 
at  first  siglit  reveal  its  purpose,  so  let    me   add 
forthwith   tliat  it  is  "  a  quarterly  review  published 
for  promoting  the  principles   of    disinterested    management 
in  the  retail  sale  of  alcoholic  liquors  in  Great  Britain."     This 
is  its  first  number. 

Time  flies  quickly  and  one  hardly  realises  more  than  fifteen 
3'ears  have  slipped  by  since  Lord  Grey  founded  the  Home 
Counties  Public  House  Trust.  Other  and  isolated  efforts 
were  even  then  in  progress  to  reform  the  ale-house  and 
liquor  bar  on  sensible  lines.  The  Trust,  as  Lord  Lytton 
remarks  in  the  editorial  cohimns  of  the  Review,  was  founded 
in  the  behef  tliat  in  any  community,  whether  village,  town  or 
district  of  town,  or  even  a  club,  public  sentiment  favours 
temperance  and  abominates  druniicnness.  "  Drunkenness 
is  a  vice  of  the  individual,  not  of  the  community."  Will 
anyone  to-day  question  the  absolute  truth  of  this  assertion  ? 
It  is  a  httle  difficult  at  the  moment  to  realise  fully  the 
extraordinary  cliasm  that  divided  total  abstainers  from  even 
the  most  moderate  "  drinkers  "  in  the  latter  half  of  the  Vic- 
torian era.  The  Blue  Ribbon  army  is  apparently  as  dead  as 
a  doornail,  but  at  tlie  end  of  the  seventies  and"  in  the  early 
eighties  of  last  century,  it  was  most  vigorous,  and  every  man 
or  boy  who  had  signed  "  The  Pledge  "  vaunted  a  bit  of  blue 
ribbon  in  his  buttonhole,  one  effect  of  which  was  to  stimuate 
the  weaker  brother  to  indulge  in  inebriation  "  just  to  prove  his 
independence."  At  that  time,  in  a  commercial  establish- 
ment of  the  City,  it  occurred  to  a  wit,  irritated  by  the  flaunting 
virtue  tliat  thrust  bits  of  blue  ribbons  in  his  face,  to  carry  the 
war  into  the  enemies'  country,  and  ripping  the  red  silk  tape 
with  which  it  was  then  customary  to  keep  cigars  in  their 
place  from  an  old  cigar  box,  he  divided  them  into  short 
lengths,  distributing  them  among  friends  of  like  feeling  witli 
liimself.  The  idea  promptly  caught  on  ;  the  custom  spread, 
and  thus  came  into  existence  the  Red  Ribbon  army,  the  only 
covenant  of  which  consisted  in  its  members  being  pledged  to 
indulge  in  at  least  one  alcoholic  drink  a  day.  It  was  the 
very  last  thing  which  the  founders  of  the  Blue  Ribbon  army 
had  in  mind,  but  it  is  typical  of  the  spirit  which  fanaticism 
awakens  among    he  peoples  of  this  Realm. 

Then  in  the  last  year  of  the  nineteenth  century  came 
Lord  Grey,  the  Bishop  of  Rochester,  the  Bishop  of  Chester, 
and  two  or  three  other  common-sensible  Englishmen,  who  had 
faith  in  their  fellows  and  honestly  believed  it  were  easier  to 
induce  a  stubborn  Anglo-Saxon  to  adhere  to  the  paths  of 
sobriety  than  to  force  him  there  under  compulsion.  And  so 
was  born  an  enterprise  which  for  years  the  writer  has  believed 
and  is  more  than  ever  convinced  t  )-day,  is  sooner  or  later  to 
solve  a  social  problem  which  has  h'therto  defied  both  the  most 
sincere  and  the  most  strenuous  efforts  of  reformers. 

"  Surely  a  time  will  come  some  day  when  the  fact  that 
the  working-classes  must  go  into  separate  houses  for  food  and 
liquor  will  be  a  thing  of  the  past."  This  from  the  Trust 
Review.  It  is  a  point  which  the  present  'writer  has  been 
hammering  at  for  a  dozen  years  or  more.  Why  should  not  the 
working-classes  be  given  the  same  facilities  for  alcoliol  with 
their  food  which  are  granted  in  every  restaurant  to  the  upper 
and  middle  classes  ? 

But  the  Trust  would  proceed  even  beyond  this  and  wisely 
so.  Says  its  Review  :  "  We  should  have  Uked  to  combine  in 
many  places  the  provision  of  cheap  meals  with  a  little  music, 
but  in  the  present  =.tate  of  the  law  and  practice  this  is  con- 
sidered a  criminal  offence,  and  those  who  attempt  to  carry  out 
the  idea  arc  liable  to  be  proceeded  against  for  keeping  a  dis- 
orderly house."  Oh  dear  !  Oli  dear  !  How  heavily  do  the 
sins  of  our  fathers  and  our  fathers'  fathers  ride  upon  our 
shoulders ! 

But  all  those  who  struggle  for  the  cause  of  true  temper- 
ance may  take  heart  of  grace  from  Tli^  Trust  Review.  Lord 
(irey  contributes  to  it  a  series  of  verses  which  that  rabid 
teetotaller,  l)ut  perfect  gentleman,  tlie  late  Sir  Wilfrid  Lawson, 
wrote  on  the  movement  at  its  inception.  They  are  excellent 
evidence  of  the  advance  in  public  opinion  on  this  momentous 
question.  In  fact,  all  the  satire  of  Sir  \\'ilfrid's  lines  has 
entirely  evaporated  and  to  most  of  us  it  is  a  little  difficult 
to  realise  the  uncompromising  spirit,  and,  one  must  add,  the 
narrow-mindedness    which    gave    them   utterance. 

Drunkenness  nine  times  out  of  ton  is  not  a  vice  but 
a  symptom,  and  if  only  we  could  rescue  the  State  once 
and  for  all  from  the  mistaken  and  pernicious  view  of 
regarding  alcohol  merely  as  a  revenue-earning  commodity, 
the  battle  of  temperance  would  be  more  than  two-thirds  won. 
This  is  what  Lord  Grey's  Trust  is  doing.  The  Trust  Review 
is  a  rallying  point  for  all  rational  temperance  reformers. 
It  may  be  obtained,  post  free,  for  sixpence,  from  The  Editor, 
Home"  Counties  P.H.  Trust,  J,td.,  Radlctt,  Herts. 


February  3,  1916. 


LAND      AND     WATER 


ENEMY    PROPAGANDA    IN    THE 

UNITED    STATES. 


OPINION  in  this  country  and  elsewhere  among 
the  Alhes  has  been  somewhat  exercised  upon 
the  ([uestion  whether  the  cause  of  European 
civihsalion  in  this  great  struggle  were  being 
properly  represented  to  the  greatest  of  the 
neutral    countries. 

The  enemy  (or  rather  the  Prussians,  who  are  the 
directing  force  of  all  the  enemy's  remaining  power)  had 
])repared  for  their  abominable  aggression,  as  we  know, 
in  every  way  that  suggested  itself  to  their  mechanical 
and  limited  minds. 

There  was  the  very  elaborate  spy  system — almost 
comically  enormous  in  scale,  not  very  efhcient,  and 
characteristically  missing  the  most  important  point  of 
all,  which  was  the  probable  action  of  the  governing  classes 
in  this  country  in  case  of  a  sudden  war  of  aggression  waged 
by  Prussia  uj^on  the  Continent.  Their  spies  seem  to 
have  mixed  with  and  tapped  the  opinion  of  every  one  in 
England  who  didn't  count. 

There  was  the  accumulation  of  material  for  war, 
more  successful,  and  yet  so  rigidly  conceived  that  when 
it  was  put  to  the  test  it  broke  down  at  the  Marne  against 
forces  little  more  than  half  those  of  the  invasion. 

There  was  the  honeycombing  of  Russian  administra- 
tion-which  was  to  have  baulked  the  Russian  mobihsation, 
and  later  to  have  procured  a  separate  peace. 

There  was  not,  indeed,  any  adequate  preparation  for 
striking  at  the  English  Mercantile  Marine  on  a  large  scale, 
because  that  would  have  meant  the  entertainment  by 
Prussia  of  alternative  plans  ;  and  alternative  plans  involve 
rapidity  of  judgment  and  elasticity  of  mind  :  Two  things 
incompatible  with  mere  mechanical  organisation. 

There  was,  on  the  other  hand,  the  highly  successful 
and  long  prepared  raid  upon  the  London  markets  which, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  was  a  very  real  asset  to  the 
enemy. 

A  Minutely  Organised  Plan. 

At  the  end  of  the  list  comes  the  expensive,  mmutely 
organised  and  very  widely  cast  plan  for  the  influencing  of 
American  opinion.  We  know  how  America  has  been 
deluged  with  pamphlets  and  magazine  and  newspaper 
articles,  her  special  correspondents  from  America  have 
been  welcomed  and  methodically  fed  with  just  the  state- 
ments Prussia  desired  to  be  believed,  and  we  know 
how  the  most  distinguished  subjects  of  Prussia  (to  the 
work  of  one  of  whom  we  will  turn  in  a  moment)  has  been 
put  to  the  task  of  aiding  in  this  moral  campaign. 

All  that  has  impressed,  perhaps  a  little  too  much, 
certain  sections  of  opinion  upon  this  side  of  the  Atlantic. 
But  if  we  look  closely  at  the  affair  we  shall  find  that  it 
suffers  from  the  same  sort  of  faults  as  are  to  be  discovered 
in  every  other  branch  of  the  general  aggressive  effort 
which  Prussia  had  planned  for  so  many  years.  It  is  not 
finished  work.  It  is  extensive  but  clumsy.  It  carries 
the  stamp  which  the  spy  system  in  England  also  carried 
of  a  vast  amount  of  energy  wasted  and  not  properly 
fitted  to  its  aim. 

Among  the  minor  examples  of  this  one  may  note  the 
apparent  incapacity  of  the  Germans  to  see  that  you  will 
moie  easily  persuade  a  man  in  his  own  tongue,  orjn  your 
own,  than  in  a  mixture  of  both. 

It  may  be  unreasonable,  but  we  arc  all  prejudiced 
against  the  person  who  argues  with  us  in  a  foreign  accent. 
It  would  liave  been  perfectly  possible  for  the  Ciermans  to 
get  hold  of  any  number  of  "people  who  could  write  idio- 
matic English,  or  better  still,  English  characterised  by  the 
modern  American  idioms.  These  could  have  been  em- 
ployed to  write  the  pamphlets,  they  could  have  trans- 
lated some  good  German  prose  into  equally  good  English 
prose  of  the  American  model.  Instead  of  that  you  have 
continually  appearing  in  the  Propagandist  literature 
sent  out  by  the  enemy  the  most  ridiculous  slips  in  Englisli 
idiom  whiclt  almost  makes  one  feel  as  tliougii  one  were 
li>tcning  to  a  German  barber  talking  to  one  after  a  few 
vears  residence  in  ICnglantl.  We  all  remember,  for  in- 
slanc'-,  how  a  certain  (iNfunl  Dmi  wlio  liad  the  misfortune 


to  be  inclined  towards  the  enemy  became  the  "  so-learned 
Professor  Conybeare  "  ;  occasionally  one  got  the  verb  at 
the  end  of  the  sentence,  and  peryjetually  the  characteristic' 
use  of  German  academic  phrases  which  no  Englishman  or 
American  could  conceivably  write.  Indeed,  you  will 
hardly  find  one  of  these  innumerable  documents  wliich  is 
not  on  the  face  of  it  a  bad  piece  of  English  marred  by 
direct  Teutonisms. 

It  was  an  error  in  the  same  field  to  print  so  mucli 
of  the  matter  in  German  type.  Nothing  affects  the  nfind 
more  comically,  except  perhaps  a  foreign  accent,  than  the 
sight  of  one's  language  printed  in  a  foreign  type.  Nothing 
would  have  been  easier  than  for  the  Germans  to  have 
printed  their  appeals  to  America  in  that  country  itself,  or 
at  any  rate  with  type  of  the  American  sort.  They  were 
preparing  this  sort  of  thing  for  years,  and  it  was  really 
inexcusable  to  overlook  so  simple  a  precaution. 

The  Intellectual  Atmosphere. 

But  these  and  dozens  of  other  similar  little  points, 
though  exceedingly  significant,  are  negligible  compared 
with  the  general  intellectual  "  atmosphere  "  of  the  thing. 
Enghsh  readers  are  already  familiar  with  the  mass  of  self- 
contradiction  and,  not  infrequent  nonsense,  which  has 
increasingly  marred  this  German  work  in  the  United 
States.  Only  the  other  day  one  of  their  correspondent'^, 
describing  in  a  very  lengthy  article  the  delights  of  life 
in  Belgium  under  Prussian  rule,  gave  a  touching  picture 
of  the  Picture  Galleries  in  Brussels.  These  were  alway-s 
open,  as  in  time  of  peace,  and  the  visitor  noted  "  German 
private  soldiers  looking  at  the  picture-,  not  with  the 
vacant  stare  of  men  of  similar  social  rank  in  other  coun- 
tries, but  with  intelligence  and  appreciation ;  some  even 
slopping  to   make  sketches  of  the  more  important  masters  !  " 

Another  informed  his  compatriots  in  the  United 
States  that  German  losses  were  about  one-third  those  of 
the  Allies  in  proportion  to  their  numbers.  Nearly  all 
were  concerned  in  the  summer  to  expound  the  very  simple 
strategy  of  suddenly  taking  away  the  German  armies  from 
Poland  and  using  them  somewhere  else. 

But  the  touchstone  of  the  whole .  business  still  is, 
and  will  continue  to  be,  the  astonishing  performances 
of  General  Bernhardi. 

One  has  a  right  to  use  that  word  "  astonishing  " 
because  it  is  really  out  of  all  ordinary  experience  to  see  a 
man  highly  distinguished  in  one  walk  of  life  turned,  by 
the  chunsiness  of  his  superiors,  on  to  work  which  he  has 
never  studied  and  for  which  he  is  completely  unfitted. 

There  is  something  almost  indecent  in  having  to 
criticise  the  antics  in  one  field  of  a  man  dignified  and 
respected  in  another.  Bernhardi's  studies  of  Modern 
War  have  not  perhaps  carried  the  same  weight  as  those  of 
Foch.  The  Fr.nch  book  is  probably  the  better.  But 
at  any  rate  he  was  one  of  the  very  few  men  whom  all 
other  men  in  his  own  profession  listened  to  with  high 
respect  and  read  knowing  that  they  should  rise  from  their 
reading  informed.     When  he  takes  to  journahsing  he  is 


SORTES     SHAKESPEARIAN^, 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE. 


THE    CLOSING    OF    MUSEUMS. 

Sweet  recreation  barred,  what  doth  ensue. 
But  moody  and  dull  melancholy. 
Kinsman  to  grim  and  comfortless  despair  ? 

COMEDY  OV  ERRORS,  v.  i.,  78-80. 


LAND      AN  D      NN'  A  T  E  K  . 


February  3,  191G. 


Contemptible.  Ktail,  lui  ln^lalK^.  the  ejctraordinary 
blulf  ^\l^icll  appeared  in  the  New  York  Tribtmc  over  his 
name,  towards   the  end  of  the  year  : — 

"  It  is  rumoured  that  the  ItaUan  army  is  destined  to 
defend  Egypt  on  behalf  of  the  English." 

"  France  and  Russia  have  been  so  thoroughly  beaten 
that  were  they  left  to  themselves  thpy  would  renounce 
all  hope  of  victory." 

"  England  sends  countless  legions  into  the  field 
against  us." 

(The  total  force  voted  so  far  by  Great  Britain  is 
about  half  the  German  mobihsed  forces  for  the  war,  and 
the  numbers  actually  in  the  field  against  Germany  proper 
less  than  an  eighth.  This  nonsensical  sentence  is  speciti- 
eally  applied  by  Bernhardi  not  to  the  Allies  in  general, 
regarded  as  the  miserable  servants  of  Britain,  but  to  the 
British  and  Colonial  soldiers.) 

"  By  the  time  these  lines  are  read  Roumania  and 
Greece  will  have  definitely  settled  upon  their  line  of 
conduct." 

Then,  of  the  strokes  in  the  Champagne  and  Loos, 
vou  have  the  following  : — That  they  were  "  driven  back 
with  heavy  loss  .  .  .  "  and  that  "  the  recapture  of 
such  German  positions  as  were  lost  is  being  actively  pro- 
ceeded with." 

"  The  Russian  armies  were  driven  to  a  retreat  \vith 
the  utmost  precipitation  "  (just  under  one  mile  a  day). 

"  The  Russian  offensive  in  (ialicia  has  exhausted 
its  strength.  They  have  ceased  their  attacks  and  have 
retreated."  (This  was  on  the  eve  of  the  recent  vigorous 
movement  in  Bessarabia.) 

"  The  evacuation  of  Kiev  has  already  begun."  (!) 

"  It  is  in  the  cause  of  English  and  French  financiers 
that  the  present  war  is  being  waged  "  (which  shows  that 
these  gentlemen  were  able  to  command  at  will  an  ultima- 
tum from  Berlin  to  St.  Petersburg  and  Paris  !) 

"The  Itahans  on  the  Isonzo  front  are  ten  times  more 
numerous  than  their  adversaries."  (That  is,  the  Italians 
on  the  Isonzo  front  have  from  three  and  a  half  million  to 
five  milUon  men.) 

"  The  King  of  Italy  is  suffering  from  a  complete 
mental  collapse." 

Only  Samples. 

These  are  only  samples  of  the  sort  of  thing  for  which, 
coming  on  the  top  of  much  else,  a  little  less  vague  and 
rhetorical,  but  increasingly  unconvincing,  the  highest 
name  in  German  military  hterature  is  made  responsible 
in  the  United  States  newspapers  at  this  moment. 

There  is  something  more  :  There  is  something  which 
would  be  inconceivable  from  the  hps  or  the  pen  of  say 
Joffre  or  Castelnau  or  Haig  or  Cadoma  or  Foch,  to  wit, 
specific  prophesy  of  the  cheery  detailed  sort,  surely  never 
written  before  except  by  quite  irresponsible  young  journal- 
ists who  were  not  bound  to  sign  their  names. 

Thus  we  are  told  that  the  Austro-Germans  must 
of  course  take  Dvinsk  and  Rovno  and  that  quite  probably 
all  this  will  have  been  done  "  before  the  present  article 
appears  in  print." 

The  same  jolly  and  really  futile  temper  breaks  out 
about  the  Senussi.  They  are  just  going  to  bowl  over  the 
English  in  Egypt.  (This  in  November.)  India,  mean- 
while, is  about  to  break  out  into  a  "  dangerous  revolt." 
(Also  in  November).  The  British  in  the  Gallipoli  Penin- 
sula will  not  be  able  to  get  away,  they  will  be  destroyed  by 
the  winter  storms  which  will  prevent  their  getting  food. 
And,  in  general,  the  German  Army  (not  the  Magyars,  or 
the  Bulgarians,  or  the  Austrians,  or  the  unfortunate 
Poles  and  Roumanians  and  Alsace-Lorrainers ,  and 
Servians,  pressed  into  the  service)  has  already  won  the 
war,  and  the  reason  of  this  now  accomplished  victory  is 
that  the  "  mental  and  moral  "  value  of  the  writer's 
compatriots  is  so  immensely  superior  to  those  of  anybody 
else.  He  writes  thus  knowing  that  half  the  German 
effectives  are  lost  for  ever,  that  the  whole  policy  of  his 
country  is  to  save  what  can  be  saved,  and  that  he  is 
consciously  and  deliberately  making  worthless  rhetorical 
and  pohtical  points,  not  only  false  in  themselves,  but  not 
within  a  thousand  miles  of  sober  military  analysis. 

The  whole  thing  is  pitifully  weak  and  inefficient  and 
it  may  quite  possibly  be  true  that  we  gain  more  by  lotting 
Prussia  thus  make  a  fool  of  her  principal  men  and  of  lier 
whole  cause,  than  by  competing  with  her  in  the  same  field. 


NOVELS  AND  SHORT  STORIES. 

"  Exile."     Dolf  Wyllarde.     (T.   Fisher  Unwin.)     6s. 

Clautlia  Everard,  the  wife,  Edgar  Everard,  the  husband, 
and  Richard  Hervey,  the  other  man,  are  the  protagonists  uf 
this  book.  A  concurrent  plot,  with  a  fresh  young  Englisli 
girl  and  her  love  affairs  for  interest,  bores  the  reader  and 
dilutes  rather  than  relieves  the  main  story,  which  is  that 
Claudia,  having  found  out  that  Everard  is  a  dishonourable 
l)rute,  ;md,  moreover,  being  threatened  with  nmrder  at 
his  hands,  goes  over  entirely  to  Hervey,  whom  she  loves. 
Thereat  one  IS  inchned  to  question  whether  two  wrongs  make 
a  right,  or  whether,  under  all  the  circumstances,  Claudia  was 
wrong. 

Tlie  setting  of  the  story  is  leminiscent  of  Aden,  a  sort  of 
tropical  station  where  the  temptations  to  drink,  to  talk 
scandal,  and  to  make  material  for  scandal — if  only  as  subject- 
matter  for  conversation— are  almost  irresistible.  The  subject 
of  Claudia  and  the  other  man  is  handled  frankly,  but  the 
author  is  slightly  lacking  in  tlie  sense  of  proportion,  and 
totally  lacking  in  the  sense  of  humour,  which  is  very  mucli 
akin  to  that  of  proportion.  Still,  it  is  an  interesting  and  well- 
told  storj',  a  stimulating  variant  of  an  eternal  problem. 

"  Moby  Lane  and  Thereabouts."    By  A.  Neil  Lyons.    (John  Lane.) 
6s. 

Mr.  Lyons  has  transferred  his  affections  from  London 
streets  to  Sussex  byways,  and  in  his  book  he  presents  the 
habitants  of  Sussex  with  the  mixture  of  humour,  pathos, 
and  even  tragedy  that  characterised  "  Arthur's"  and  "  Six- 
penny Pieces."  He  is  not  quite  so  happy  in  his  rendering 
of  the  Sussex  dialect  as  in  the  reproductions  of  Cockneyisnis, 
but  in  the  presentment  of  village  character  his  touch  is  as 
sure  as  ever. 

The  Mobies,  the  butcher's  boy,  the  Chickun-fatter,  and 
the  rest  of  the  people  in  these  short  sketches,  are  real  people  ; 
their  weaknesses  are  ruthlessly  reproduced,  so  that  we  either 
shudder  at.  them,  laugh  at  them,  or  sympathise  with  them, 
and,  whatever  the  emotion  riiay  be,  it  is  a  real  emotion.  The 
book  is  mainly  in  lighter  vein,  and  gives  much  cause  for 
laughter,  but  a  sketch  here  and  there  gi\es  cause  for  thought 
as  well.  A  better  collection  of  short  stories  than  this  from  the 
pen  of  a  single  author  will  be  hard  to  find. 

"  Many    Thanks — Ben    Hassett."      By    H.    de    Hamet.      (Simpkinr 
Marshall  and  Co.)    6s. 

Ben  Hassett  is  one  of  the  most  irritating  criminals  that 
ever  figured  in  a  book  of  detective  stories,  for  the  reader 
never  knows  whether  Ben  Hassett  is  Ben  Hassett,  or  whether 
he  is  Cliarles  Manning's  uncle,  or  somebody  else.  Manning 
starting  in  the  story  as  a  private  detective,  loses  liis  post 
through  being  outwitted  by  Hassett  in  the  first  attempt  at 
capture  of  the  criminal,  and  the  book  takes  us  through  a 
series  of  sucli  attempts,  until  at  the  end  Hassett  is  trapped  by 
the  merest  chance. 

Tlie  book  is  unlike  other  detective  mysteries  in  that 
neither  criminal  nor  detective  is  infaUible  ;  it  is  breezily 
written,  and  a  love  interest  is  not  lacking,  though,  as  is  usual 
in  such  books,  the  lady  of  the  romance  is  a  very  shadowy 
figure.  A  distinct  sense  of  humour  and  a  good  deal  of  origin- 
ality combine  to  make  this  a  relief  from  the  general  run  of 
detective  fiction,  and  we  heartily  recommend  it  as  diverting 
work. 

"  In   Pastures    Green."    By    Peter    McArthur.     (J.    M.    Dent     and 
Sons.)     6s.   net. 

Apparently  the  only  reason  Mr.  McArthur  had  for  taking 
up  farming  was  that  of  making  a  living  by  journalism,  and  the 
experiment  proved  a  howling  success.  "  Lecturers  for  the 
farmers'  institutes  made  it  a  point  to  call  on  me  when  they  were 
in  the  neighbourhood,  and  after  the  first  shock  was  over  pro- 
ceeded to  gather  specimen?  of  noxious  weeds  that  they  found 
it  hard  to  get  elsewhere,"  for  the  farming  was  done  in  a  "  ranili- 
hng,  desultory  way,"  between  spells  on  the  typewriter. 

The  book  makes  a  picture  of  a  Canadian  year  that  cannc^t 
be  read  without  laughter,  and  it  is  characterised  throughout  by 
little  bits  of  wisdom  and  shrewdness,  as  well  as  by  evidence  of  a 
strong  love  of  nature  and  study  of  country  life.  "  In  spite  of 
the  Shorter  Catechism,"  says  the  author,  "  the  chief  end  of 
man  is  to  make  a  living,"  and  obviously,  since  his  journalism 
is  so  good,  it  would  be  a  pity  if  he  tooic  to  farming  seriously 
and  abandoned  the  making  of  books  of  this  kind. 

The  beauty  and  fertility  of  Ontario,  and  the  superiority 
of  country  life  over  city  existence,  are  well  brought  out,  but 
they  are  mere  incidentals,  all  the  same.  Whether  he  is  specu- 
lating on  ethics,  strugghng  with  refractory  cows,  or  out  fox- 
hunting with  the  boys,  the  author  is  always  witty  and  inter- 
esting, and  wlien  he  sets  out  to  raise  a  laugh,  which  happens 
with  commendable  frequency,  he  succeeds. 


February  3,  1916. 


LAND      AND     \V  A  T  E  R 


THE    LONDON    GOLD    MARKET. 


By  Arthur   Kitson. 


[This  is  the  third  of  the  articles  which  Mr.  Arthur  Kitson 
is  contributing  to  Land  and  Watf.r  on  the  British 
Banking  system,  more  particularly  in  its  relation 
to  British  trade  and  commerce.  The  first,  "Capturing 
German  Trade,"  appeared  in  the  issue  of  January 
20th  ;  the  second  on  the  "  British  Banking  System," 
in  the  issue  of  January  2jth.] 

r 

FINANCE,  as  taught  in  our  standard  financial 
books  and  by  our  orthodox  professors,  reminds 
one  of  Enghsh  history  as  it  was  taught  in  British 
schools  fifty  and  more  years  ago.  At  that 
time  the  average  scholar  could  recite  from  memory  the 
names  of  all  the  Kings  and  Queens  of  England  from 
the  Saxon  invasion  to  the  accession  of  Queen  Victoria  in 
( hronological  order.  He  could  tell  you  the  dates  of  all 
the  great  English  battles  and  which  side  won  ;  but  of 
the  intellectual,  economic  and  social  development  of 
the  English  people — in  fact  of  the  real  history  of 
Englancl — he  knew  nothing,  for  the  simple  reason  that 
the  history  books  told  him  nothing.  It  was  assumed 
that  the  lives  of  monarchs  and  their  Court  favourites, 
their  virtues,  vices,  intrigues  and  wars  were  the  only 
things  that  mattered,  and  chronicles  of  these  events, 
interlarded  with  Court  gossip,  passed  for  EngUsh  history. 
-Similarly,  British  books  on  Finance  such  as  one  finds 
recommended  by  our  Schools  of  Political  Economy  and 
by  the  Press  generally,  are  usually  confined  to  a  history 
of  the  rise  of  the  Baiik  of  England,  a  description  of  the 
money  market,  the  rules  and  practices  of  our  Banking 
Companies  and  a  eulogy  of  the  whole  system  as  well 
as  the  usual  tribute  to  the  honesty  of  our  bankers.  In 
short,  the  writers  of  these  books  tell  their  readers  only 
one  part  and  the  least  important  part  of  their  subject. 
They  show  how  efficient,  safe  and  profitable  (to  the 
banker)  is  the  British  Banking  system,  how  advantageous 
(to  the  banker  and  bullion  dealer)  is  London's  free  gold 
market,  what  a  wonderfully  elastic  and  economic  currency 
the  cheque  system  provides.  But  the  most  important 
and  essential  part,  viz.,  the  relation  of  this  system  to 
industry,  its  effect  upon  British  enterprise — whether 
stimulating  or  deadening — its  cost  to  the  nation,  etc.,  in 
short,   the   public   side   of   the   question,  is  ignored. 

Banking,  in  the  eyes  of  the  banker  and  his  share- 
holders, may  possibly  be  nothing  more  than  a  dividend- 
making  business,  first  and  last,  but  from  the  public 
standpoint,  it  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  great  National 
Economic  Machinery  for  the  production,  exchange  and 
distribution  of  wealth.  And  the  raison"  d'etre  of  the 
banker  and  his  institution  upon  whom  special  privileges 
have  been  conferred  by  British  Gov^ernments,  is  to  be 
justified  by  showing  that- he-  is  "doing  his  bit"  in 
sujiporting  and  developing  British  trade  and  production. 

Like  all  inventions.  Banking  Systems  are  merely 
means  to  certain  ends,  and  they  should  be  judged  solely 
by  their  efficiency  in  accomplishing  those  ends.  And  just 
as  an  Eastern  traveller,  who  having  confined  his  visits  and 
observations  to  some  Sultan's  palace  with  all  its  riches 
and  glories,  without  noticing  the  degradation,  the  poverty 
and  misery  of  the  inhabitants,  might  write  of  the  wealth 
and  prosperity  of  that  country,  so  the  average  financial 
authority  is  apt  to  write  of  the  marvellous  success  of  our 
Financial  System,  because  he  has  seen  only  the  prosper- 
ous side,  the  big  dividends  and  the  wealth  which— thanks 
to  our  special  laws — our  bankers  are  able  to  amass, 
whilst  the  bankruptcies  and  failures,  the  burdens  and 
anxieties  which  this  system  imposes  on  labour  and  capital 
are  unknown  to  him.  An  example  will  make  this  clear. 
The  most  popul^ir  and  recent  book  on  this  subject  is 
"  The  Meaning  of  Money,"  by  Hartley  Withers,  a  well- 
known  financial  writer  for  the  Press  and  at  present  the 
holder  of  a  recently  created  office  in  the  Treasury. 

In  a  chapter  extolling  London's  banking  methods, 
Mr.  'Withers  instances  the  great  money  crisis  of  1907 
which  struck  the  United  States  and  created  such  havoc 
in  industrial,  commercial  and  financial  circles.  This 
crisis,  which  it  is  now  known  was  deliberately  engmeered 
by  a  clique  of  Wall  Street  gamblers,  reacted  on  all  the  money 
markets  of  the  world,  particularly  that  of  London,     "  The 


business  of  nmnaging  the  exchanges  of  the  world  during 
commercial  crises, "says  Mr.Withers,  "  is  obviously  thrown 
on  London,  as  things  are  at  present,  by  its  position  as 
the  only  monetary  city  which  is  prepared  to  produce 
gold  on  demand."  Gold  was  shipped  from  Europe  to 
New  York  in  large  quantities — estimated  at  some 
{25,000,000  sterling,  according  to  Mr.  Withers — most  of 
which  went  from  London.  As  this  amount  would  have 
depleted  the  reserves  of  the  Bank  of  England,  the  bulk 
of  it  had  to  be  drawn  from  abroad  by  the  usual  method 
of  raising  the  Bank  Rate.  "  It  was,"  says  Mr.  Withers, 
"  a  very  remarkable  demonstration  of  London's  complete 
control  over  the  World's  exchanges  "  since  "  four-fifths 
of  the  amount  shipped  to  the  United  States  were  sup- 
plied by  foreign  contributions."     He  adds  : — 

It  was  thus  shown  by   the  events  of  tliis  memorable  crisis, 
that    London's   tremendous    responsibility   of    providing 
gold  when  it  is  required  anywhere  by  a  pressing  emergency, 
is  one  that  can  be  bravely  and  cheerfully  borne  as  long 
as  England  is  in  a  position,  by  applying  sufficient  twists 
of  the  monetary  screw,  to  force  other  nations  to  contribute 
<thcir   share   to   the   common   necessit}'. 
Now    this    is]  very   comforting    and   reassuring    to 
the  reader  who  knows  little  or  nothing  of  the  practical 
side  of  the  question.     But  the  most  interesting  part  of 
the  story  has  been  conveniently  omitted.     It  is  true  that 
our   banks  "  weathered  the  financial  storm  with  ease," 
as  the  late   Lord   Avebury  expressed   it,   but  at  whose 
expense?    The  Bank  Kate  was  raised  to  seven  per  cent., 
and  kept  there  for  nearly  three  months,  and  although 
this  enabled    the  banks  to  "  weather  the  storm  "    by 
acquiring  gold  from  abroad,  incidentally  it  ruined  hun- 
dreds of  British  merchants  and  producers  and  played 
havoc  with  our  trade  generally. 

If  there  is  any  truth  in  the  statements  made  so  fre- 
cjuently,  that  every  advance  in  the  Bank  Rate  of  one  per 
cent,  costs  British  borrowers  somewhere  between  £50,000 
to  £100,000  per  week,  then  this  "  twisting  of  the  monetary 
screw  to  force  other  nations  to  contribute  their  share 
to  the  common  necessity  "  served  also  to  squeeze  from 
the  British  i>roducers  somewhere  between  £2,500,000  and 
£5,000,000  in  the  shape  of  increased  interest  charges,  to 
enable  our  bankers  to  save  the  American  banks  from  the 
result  of  the  machinations  of  a  gang  of  unscrupulous  Wall 
Street  gamblers  !  But  this  is  only  a  part  of  the  story. 
When  the  Bank  Rate  runs  up,  as  it  did  in  1907,  all  our 
banks  begin  reducing  overdrafts  and  refuse  accommoda- 
tion to  thousands  of  British  merchants  and  manufacturers 
who  are  often  in  sore  need  of  such  help.  In  consequence, 
enterprise  '  checked,  production  decreases,  workmen  are 
thrown  out  of  employment  or  put  on  half-time,  the  public 
reduces  its  demand  for  goods,  and  business  generally 
is  depressed  !  Moreover,  it  takes  months  and  sometimes 
years  for  the  nation  to  recover  from  the  effects  of  such  a 
crisis.  If  the  total  losses  caused  to  this  nation  by  the  1907 
panic  could  have  been  carefully  estimated,  it  would 
have  been  found  to  far  exceed  in  amount  all  the  gold 
sent  by  our  philanthropic  bankers  to  save  the  American 
bankers  from  the  just  punishment  their  recklessness  and 
unscrupulousness  deserved. 

The  necessity  which  our  bankers  find  imposed  upon 
them  of  rendering  aid  to  foreign  banks  during  financial 
crises,  is  one  of  the  penalties  this  country  is  compelled 
to  pay  for  the  questionable  advantage  of  maintaining 
a  free  gold  market — the  only  one  in  the  world. 

Perhaps  it  will  be  convenient  at  this  point  to  deal, 
once  and  for  all,  with  this  question  of  a  free  gold 
market.  The  bankers'  bogey,  which  is  invariably  raised 
whenever  a  drastic  change  is  proposed  in  our  Banking 
or  Currency  laws,  is  the  fear  that  London  may  cease 
to  be  the  World's  monetary  centre.  Any  interference 
with  the  system  which  compels  us  to  provide  a  free  gold 
market  (chiefly  for  the  convenience  of  foreigners)  Ls 
represented  as  fraught  with  the  gra\est  commercial  ami 
financial  dangers  to  this  country.  What  advantage  is 
it  then  to  our  industries,  our  trade  and  commerce  that 
London  should  maintain  its  financial  position  as  the 
World's  banking  centre  ?  Soon  after  the  United  States 
currency  crisis,  the  present  writer  put  this  question    to 


LAND      AND      WATER 


February  3,  1916. 


the  late  Mr.  Arthur  Loc,  a  well  known  financial  nnd 
commercial  authority  who  had  fjivcn  j'ears  of  study  to 
this  particular  subject.  The  reader  need  hardly  be 
reminded  of  the  vast  importance  of  this  particular  ques- 
tion— especially  at  this  time — when  we  are  threatened 
with  a  stupendous  trade  war  at  the  conclusion  of  hostilities. 
As  our  industrial  and  commercial  classes  will  not  be 
able  to  afford  to  carry  any  unnecessary  burdens,  it  is  wise 
now  to  consider  closely  whether  this  luxury  of  a  free 
gold  market  is  worth  to  the  nation  what  it  is'costing. 

Mr.  Arthur  Lee  was  a  member  of  the  I.ondon  Chamber 
of  Commerce  and  at  one  time  President  of  the  Bristol 
Chamber  of  Commerce,  and  in  reply  to  an  enquiry  as 
to  what  advantages,  if  any,  ftlir  free  market  for  gold  con- 
ferred upon  British  trade  and  industries,  he  wrote  : — 

It  would  be  true  to  say  that  a  free  gold  market  in  London  is 
of  assistance  in  securing  to  us  sucli  advantages  as  may 
accrue  from  I-ondon  being  the  clearing  house  of  the  world. 
So  long  as  London  is  the  market  of  the  world  where  gold 
may  I'C  most  freely  bought  and  sold,  and  so  long  as  a 
monopoly  is  conferred  upon  gold  in  respect  to  its  debt- 
redeeming  power,  so  long  will  the  exchange  bankers  and 
bullion  dealers  retain  the  enormously  jirofitable  fmancial 
business  in  which  they  have  been  engaged  ever  since 
modern  laws  conferred  a  monopoly  value  upon  gold.  This 
would  be  an  exact  and  truthful  statement  of  the  case. 
^V'hcnever  the  pronoun  "  we "  is  used,  I  am  always 
tempted  to  ask  the  question,  who  are  "  we  ?  "  I  have 
lieard  from  the  lips  of  a  working  man  words  somewhat 
similar  to  those  you  say  j'ou  found  in  a  recent  article 
on  the  subject  of  "  London's  l^ree  Gold  Market."  I 
asked  him  if  he  had  thought  whether  "  we  "  included 
himself,  and  if  not,  would  it  not  be  well  for  purposes  of 
argument  if  he  used  the  correct  noun  instead  of  an  in- 
correct pronoun  ?  The  advantages  of  a,  free  gold  market 
to  certain  classes  are  obvious  enough,  but  the  advantages 
to  the  country  as  a  whole  are  counterbalanced  by  such 
serious  disadvantages  that  it  seems  probable  that  the 
latter  outweigh  the  former.     The  advantages  are : — 

t.  The  expenditure  in  this  country  of  the  profits  made  by  a 
very  small  class  of  financiers  (mostly  cosmopolitan). 

2.  The  deposit  in  this  country  of  balances  due  to  foreigners, 
payable  on  demand,  or    at  very  short  notice. 

3.  The  ready  negotiability  in  a  foreign  country  of  a  bill  of 
exchange  payable  in  London.     This  may  possibly  enable 


a  British*  l-.uyor  to  buy  foreign  goods  at  n  low^r  pi  ice 

than  a  buyer  in  another  coimtrj'. 
'Ihe  disadvantages  are:  — 
J.  The  constaht    distnilvance   to  business  caused   by   rapi<l 

fluctuations  in  the  rate  of  discount. 

2.  The  opportunity  given  to  foreign  speculators  to  make 
profit  at  the  expense  of  traders  in  this  country  by  mani- 
]nilating  the  oj)en  gold  market. 

3.  The  diaining  of  the  savings  of  the  people  confided  to  country 
bankers  in  the  direction  of  Lombard  Street  and  thence 
to  the  financing  of  foreign  speculators. 

4.  The  discouraging  of  what  is  termed  "  the  fixing  of  capital  " 
in  this  country,  which  is  another  term  for  money  sunk  in 
sowing  the  seed  which  will  spring  up  for  the  future  benefit 
of  our  home  industries. 

5.  The  fmancial  danger  to  the  country  of  holding  upon  loan, 
large  floating  balances  payable  on  demand,  or  at  short 
notice,  to  foreigners. 

The  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  a  free  gold  market  may 
be  shortly  summed  up  thus  :  It  gives  us  facilities  for  get- 
ting into  debt  and  it  places  debtors  poculiarlv  at  the  mercy 
of  creditors.  ^ 

This  letter  appears  to  give  a  fair  and  complete 
summary  of  the  whole  question.  As  to  the  enormous  value 
our  banking  methods  and  free  gold  market  have  been  to 
foreigners — particularly  to  the  Cermans,  in  creating 
German  industries  which  have  successfully  competed  witii 
our  own,  the  following  extract  from  Mr.  Hartley  Withers' 
"  Meaning  of  Money  "  will  show  :— "  Foreign  financiers 
were  quick  Jo  detect,  the  advantages  of  the  English  crecht 
system  and  to  turn  them  to  their  own  profit  and  to  the 
furtherance  of  the  trade  of  the,  countries  that  they  repre- 
sent. It  is  often  contended  that  ilie  rapid  expansion  of 
German  trade,  which  pushed  itself  largely  by  its  elasi.iciiv 
and  adaptability  to  the  wishes  of  its  ciistotners,  could  never 
have  been  achieved  if  it  had  not  been  assisted  by  cheap 
credit  furnished  in  London,  by  means  of  which  German 
merchants  ousted  English  manufacturers  ivith  offers  of  long 
credit  facilities  to     their  foreign  customers." 

Could  any  indictment  of  our  Banking  System  be 
stronger  than  the  words  italicised  here  ? 

London  bankers  ..av-.  nevei  Jiscnminatcd  against  foreigners  in 
favour  of  British  merchants.  A  foreign  biivcr  can  as  readily  arranse 
to  have  his  bills  drawn  on  London,  as  the  British  buyer,  and  so  obtain 
the  same  advantages.  N'o  one  can  lighily  accuse  London  Bankers 
of  any  excess  of  patriotism  ! — A.K. 


THE    FORUM. 

A  Commentary   on  Present-day  Problems. 


THIS  page  of  commentary  in  the  last  issue  dealt 
with  a  vigorous  letter  of  protest  against  the 
modern  spirit  of  organisation  and  eflicicncy, 
and  promised  to  concern  itself  this  week  with 
a  brilliant  little  satire,  The  Devil's  Devices,  written  by  Mr. 
Douglas  Peploe  and  illustrated  by  Mr.  Eric  Gill  in  which 
essentially  the  same  protest  was  attractively  elaborated. 
The  general  ideas  which  the  author  of  this  exceedingly 
able  little  satire  seeks  to  establish  are  :  That  under  the 
general  formula  of  organisation  and  efficiency  an  enormous 
amount  of  fussy,  grandmotherly  and,  at  worst,  tyrannisal 
legislation  is  being  forced  upon  the  simple  folk  by  a  law- 
making caste  ;  that  the  liberty  of  the  worker  is  being 
threatened  in  the  name  of  democracy  as  it  was  never 
threatened  by  monarchy  or  oligarchy;  that,  in  fact, 
not  merely  Conservatives  and  Liberals  of  the  landowning 
or  manufacturing  classes,  together  with  the  theorising 
Radicals,  but  that  the  very  extremists  among  the  leaders 
of  Labour  and  Socialism  are  all  combining  to  forge  new 
fetters  for  the  w'orker  ;  that  the  whole  paraphernalia  of 
Compulsory  Educaton,  State  Insurance,  Old  Age  Pensions, 
School  meals  form  but  successive  links  of  the  fetters. 
This  last  idea  is,  of  course,  not  new,  but  it  is  usually  urged 
by  the  people  who  have  more  natural  sympathy  with  the 
managing  tlian  the  exploited  classes. 

Some  patience  is  necessary  to  disentangle  the  real 
meaning  from  the  fantastic  form  in  which  our  author 
has  chosen  to  present  his  vision.  "  The  Devil  "  of  this 
satire  is  a  very  plausible  person,  the  ser\-ant  of  the 
capitalists,  the  lawj-ers  and  the  politicians,  who  presents 
the  case  for  organisation  and  efticiencj-  with  an  immense 
show  of  good  feeling  for  the  worker,  much  sweet  reason- 
ableness, and  a  fine  zeal  for  ordered  accomplishment  and 


all  the  modern  watch  cries — education,  health,  increased 
production,  scientific  management,  success. 

The  chief  idea  that  the  author  seems  to  wish  to 
canvass  is  that  the  true  line  of  progress  for  Labour  is  to 
throw  off  the  policy  of  d^manding  doles  and  accepting 
controls,  controls  which  are  only  making  of  the  man 
more  and  more  a  mere  cog  in  the  industrial  machine  ; 
and  to  demand  and  take  on  more  responsibility,  to  show 
less  "  funk."  The  significance  of  all  this  is  that  it  rein- 
forces a  judgment  which  from  quite  chfferent  points  of 
view  other  thoughtful  students  of  the  labour  tangle  arc 
making.  Most  casual  observers  of  the  Labour  move- 
ment, as  well  as  most  employers,  are  apt  to  sum  it  up  as 
an  organised  attempt  to  get  ir^rjrc  pay  and  do  less  work, 
and  to  say  that  the  case  at  issue  between  Capital  and 
Labour  is  merely  the  question  of  the  distribution  of 
profits.  The  idea  that  the  real  demand  of  Labour  is  a 
demand  for  status  rather  than  for  wages,  and  that  the 
essential  bitterness  of  Labour,  by  no  means  confined  to 
agitators  and  extremists,  is  formed  by  the  growing  sense 
that  they  are  not  their  own  masters,  but,  increasingly, 
other  peoples'  pawns,  is  well  worth  the  jleep  consideration 
of  those— and  what  men  of  vision  or  reflection  arc  not 
amongst  them  ? — who  view  the  re-opening  of  the  Labour 
question  after  the  war  with  serious  apprehension. 

It  is  of  course  true,  as  it  is  natural,  that  the'Labour 
issues  are  most  often  expressed  in  terms  of  wages,  hours, 
limitations.  These  are  the  tangible,  immediate  gains 
proposed  by  "  practical  "  leaders  who  ajipreciate  the 
difficulties  of  holding  men  together  merely  by  the  larger 
visions  and  hopes  which,  however  substantial,  are  neces- 
sarily hopes  deferred.     But  go  deeper  and  you  find  (he 


February  3,  1916. 


LAND      AND     ^\'  A  T  E  R 


natural  passion  for  liberty  asserting  itsolf — and  that  in 
men  who  have  least  of  the  agitator  about  them. 

A  partnership  of  Labour  and  Capital  in  production,' 
not  merely  in  the  matter  of  proiits  (that  partnership  exists 
now  in  a  sense  though  it  turns  itself  into  a  quarroi  about 
shares) ,  but  in  the  much  more  essential  matters  of  respon- 
sibility and  control,  seems  the  only  possible  termination 
of  a  barren  struggle  of  which  the  effects  are  on  the  material 
plane,  immeasurable  waste  which  the  world  can  nowadays 
ill  afford,  and  on  the  spiritual  plane,  hatreds  and  sus- 
picions which  dissolve  the  essential  fellowship  that 
patriotism  should  primarily  mean. 

Unquestionably  the  Guild  Socialists  and  Syndicalists, 
the  vanguard  of  self-conscious  labour,  by  their  doctrines 
and  intrigues  hope  to  effect  something  more  than  is 
either  just  or  profitable  ;  as  employers  in  their  opposition 
wish  to  yield  something  less.  But  a  problem  goes  some 
way  to  being  solved,  if  its  essentials,  as  distinct  from  its 
accidental  accretions,  canjje  stated.  On  neither  side  of 
a  quarrel  do  men  rally  to  what  is  unjust  in  their  cause, 
but  to  that  which  is  right  and  just.  That  is  a  funda- 
mental truth  on  which  all  hopes  of  real  progress  are  based, 
and  it  is  a  demonstrable  truth,  not  a  mere  figment  of 
irresponsible  optimism.  The  paramount  ideal  that  is 
simmering  in  the  ranks  of  Labour  is  the  spiritual  idea  of 
freedom.  Those  who  wish  to  understand  and  meet  the 
difficulties  of  the  coming  Labour  struggle  will  be  enor- 
mously helped  by  realising  this. 

Timid  souls,  who,  very  reasonably,  would  be 
frightened  of  such  thoughts  if  they  met  them  in  syndi- 
calists' journals,  might  very  well  be  induced  to  give  them 
consideration  in  The  Devil's  Devices,  coming  as  they  do 
from  one  who  has  reached  his  conclusions  by  quite  un- 
exceptionable paths.  An  official  of  the  L.C.C.,  who 
retired  on  grounds  of  conscience  after  discovering  in  the 
actual  personal  experience  of  the  administration  of 
ameliorative  legislation  that  it  tends  to  sap  character 
and  interfere  with  liberty,  that  it  is  vitiated  by  the  fact 
that  essentially  it  is  the  contrivance  of  one  caste,  the 
comfortable  managers,  for  the  improvement  and  control 
of  another  caste,  the  impecunious  managed,  has  such  good 
right  to  a  hearing  as  experience  gives  over  theory.  If  the 
somewhat  disconcerting  form  of  rather  bizarre  satire — 
"  The  Broad  Road  to  Heaven- — a  Cinema  Comedy 
(Satan's  Circuit)  "  and  the  like — and  a  certain  amount 
of  irrelevant  fooling  for  the  sheer  fun  of  the  thing  does 
not,  as  it  should  not,  affright  the  reader,  he  may  be 
referred  to  The  Devil's  Devices  for  illuminating  chapters, 
whose  excellent  sense  could  not  be  conveyed  by  means  of 
paragraphs  wrenched  from  their  context. 

And  now  I  must  address  myself  to  the  challenge  which 
the  writer  offers  in  his  attack  on  the  devil's  devices  of 
cHiciency  and  organisation.  On  this  score  his  argument 
may  be  summed  up  not  altogether  unfairly  in  this  wise. 
<  icrmany  is  a  deplorable  State :  Germany  is  highly 
efficient,  superbly  organised.  Therefore  efficiency  and 
organisation  are  deplorable  things  ;  and  by  inference 
British  slackness  and  the  habit  of  "  not  finishing  things  " 
is  excellent.  But  what  we  need  is  more  inefficiency  and 
disorganisation  for  of  such  is  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven. 

Which  has  only  to  be  stated  to  suggest  its  refutation 
in  terms  of  a  middle  way.  The  wrong  things  may  be 
organised  or  the  right  things  disorganised,  or  one  efficiency 
(say  material)  may  be  pressed  at  the  expense  of  a  higher 
efficiency,  the  spiritual. 

* 

Organisation  is  but  due  economy  of  means,  the 
elimination  of  waste.  There  is  nothing  inherently  vicious 
in  it.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  an  ideal  which  cannot  in 
itself  be  assailed,  but  only  in  the  range  and  manner  of 
its  application.  It  seems  a  pity  tlxat  the  author  of  The 
Devil's  Devices  should  allow  entirely  visionary  aspirations 
a  place  alongside  his  generally  sane  philosophy  of  life. 
There  is  an  undercurrent  of  desire  (one  suspects  tliat  he  has 
been  unduly  infiuenced  by  his  craftsman  illustrator)  for 
a  return  to  the  pre-machine  era.  Now  it  is  a  quite  argu- 
able (but  by  no  means  obvious)  proposition  that  we  are 
none  the  better  for  steam,  the  telephone,  gramophone, 
rotary  press,  wireless,  photographs,  cinematographs,  or 
the  mechanical  triumphs  of  the  nineteenth  century,  be- 
cause progress  is  to  be  measured  exclusively  in  terms  of 


the  spirit.  But  it  is  a  wholly  unprofitable  thing  to  .sigh 
for  a  machinelcss  age,  or  build  aiiy  hopes  of  spiritual 
reform  upon  its  return.  Let  us  face  the  clear  fact  that  we 
shall  neVer  again  have  such  an  age.  Our  line  of  progress 
is  not  to  abolish,  but  to  control  the  machine,  and  it  is 
certain  that  there  is  nothing  inherently  wicked  or  im- 
spiritual  in  the  production  of  things  by  machinery. 
While  the  machine  in  industry  has  brought  its  special 
horrors,  it  is  not  difficult  to  prove  that  the  general  rise 
in  the  standard  of  living  and  the  improvement  of  com- 
munications have  given  valuable  gifts  to  humanity  ;  nor 
is  it  foolish  to  foresee  the  possibility  of  a  day  when  the 
machine  shall  be  entirely  the  servant  of  all  mankind,  not 
the  servant  of  the  few  and  the  master  of  the  many.  At 
any  rate,  to  work  towards  such  a  day  is  a  better  and  a 
wiser  thing  than  to  cry  for  a  day  that  is  for  ever  gone. 

And  as  to  the  bogey  of  organisation.  Clearly  there 
are  some  things  that  must  be  very  highly  organised  in  a 
day  of  enormous  cities.  The  apparatus  of  health,  for 
instance,  about  the  details  of  which  our  author  is  apt  to  be 
scornful.  Sewers  and  dust  destructors  are  but  co-operative 
slop-emptying.  They  are  better  than  the  good  old  habits 
of  the  days  of  freedom  when  garbage  was  bestowed  in 
the  streets.  This  kind  of  organisation  may  be  expected  to 
be  developed  and  rightly  developed  amongst  us.  Our 
media^valists  sighing  for  the  very  old  days  are  inclined  to 
remember  the  pleasant  sense  of  freedom  (pleasanter  in 
prospect  than  in  fact)  and  forget  the  Black  Death. 
Transport,  too ;  here  must  be  scheduled  times ;  the 
individual  whim  sacrificed  to  the  collective  convenience. 
The  mere  complexity  of  our  daily  life  calls  for  an  amount 
of  regimenting  and  dictation  that  can,  perversely,  be 
represented  as  a  limitation  of  freedom,  whereas  it  is  rather 
a  fuller  freedom  from  the  ills  which  the  lack  of  such  res- 
trictions would  bring.  Certainly  in  this  kingdom  of 
material  contrivance  and  convenience  there  seems  hardly 
any  hmit  to  the  proper  function  of  organisation.  It  is 
certain  that  we  have  not  come  near  to  reaching  that  limit. 
One  has  heard  such  a  proposal  as  that  every  street  and 
house  in  a  city  be  duly  labelled  and  numbered  in  such  a 
way  that  the  street  or  house  could  be  found  by  a  stranger, 
denounced  as  a  regrettable  manifestation  of  the  modern 
spirit  of  interference  with  personal  liberty.  Whereas 
no  one  denies  that  a  fifty-thousand  volume  library 
needs  a  catalogue  and  numbered  shelves.  We 
should  distrust  the  opponents  of  organisation  and  effi- 
ciency less  if  they  admitted  its  efficacy  where  there  is 
nothing  but  real  gain. 

In  the  production  of  commodities,  efficiency  and 
organisation  are  not  mere  barren  watchwords,  or  sym- 
bols of  a  regrettable  tyranny.  When  Labour  comes  to 
its  own  as  a  responsible  partner  in  industry  it  will  discern 
that  essential  truth.  It  has  a  hard  lesson  to  learn,  for 
which  it  has  been  ill-prepared — to  discipline  itself. 

It  is  well,  however,  to  remember  the  real  truth  at 
the  back  of  the  protests  against  our  organisation.  To 
lay  organising  hands  on  the  things  of  the  mind  and  the 
spirit,  or  to  make  so  admirable  a  machine  of  a  subject, 
whether  for  industry  or  war,  as  to  suppress  the  ])uin — 
that  is  the  great  danger.  It  is  the  German  danger,  and 
it  is  no  doubt  the  natural  tendency  of  those  among  us  who 
recognise  the  convenience  of  the  method  without  recog- 
nising its  hmitations. 

The  convenience  is  obvious  enough.  And  if  there 
were  any  divine  law  which  pre-supposed  a  set  of  govern- 
ing minds  and  another  set  of  minds  destined  only  to  be 
directed  and  governed,  a  set  of  rulers  on  the  one  hand, 
and  of  instruments  on  the  other,  there  would  be  little  to 
say  against  it. 

But  it  is  the  proud  discovery  of  our  race  that  there 
is  something  in  every  man  which  gives  him  a  right, 
balanced  by  the  just  rights  of  others,  to  control  his  own 
destiny.  It  is  a  doctrine  not  without  its  difficulties  in 
application,  but  it  is  essentially  the  fundamental  doctrine 
of  our  political  creed.  We  are  in  less  danger  from  its 
being  pressed  too  far  by  some  than  from  its  being  limited 
by  others  with  a  modifying  clause  to  the  effect  that  it  is 
well  for  us,  "  the  right-thinking  minority  to  impose  its 
will  on  the  non-thinking  majority."  This  is  the  doctrine 
attributed  to  the  De\il  of  our  author's  fantasia.  It  is 
a  just  ascription 


LAND     AND     W  .\  T  E  R  . 

OPEN    WEATHER. 

By  J.  D.  Symon. 


Fobraar\'  3,  19 16. 


UNDER  a  climate  that  seems  resolutely  determined 
to  deny  us  what  is  conventionally  known  as 
seasonable  winter  weather,  we  have  almost 
forgotten  what  snow  and  frost  were  really  like. 
They  are  rapidly  becoming  a  myth,  and  might  indeed 
liave  passed  out  of  remembrance  were  it  not  for  the  per- 
sistence of  the  tradition  in  the  pages  of  illustrated  journals 
and  occasionally  on  a  Christmas  card.  Elderly  peoples 
remember  or  profess  to  remember  long  weeks  of  snow 
when  skating  was  the  daily  pastime,  and  they  tell  wonder- 
ing children  most  enviable  stories  of  parties  on  the  ice, 
prolonging  their  exercise  sometimes  initil  the  small  hours 
imder  a  wintry  moon,  and  able  to  celebrate  the  season  as 
the  season  should  be  celebrated  until  it  reached  its 
glorious  and  proper  end  on  Twelfth-night. 

But  for  such  winters  we  iiave  almost  ceased  to  hope. 
They  have  little  snatches  of  that  old-fashioned  pleasure  in 
!>cotland  still,  but  in  this  1-ondon  latitude  we  have  had  no 
such  good  fortime  since  the  January  of  1895.  The  onset 
of  that  memorable  frost  had  its  herald  in  another  now 
less  familiar  feature  of  Cockayne,  to  wit,  a  genuine 
"  London  particular."  of  which  throat  and  eyes  still 
retain  a  vivid  and  imwelcome  memory.  An  age  of 
electricity  and  the  efforts  of  Sir  William  Richmond 
would  seem  to  have  had  some  effect,  for  the  worst  fog 
is  certainly  rarer  nowadays.  One  may  have  missed 
more  recent  %nsitations,  but  that  in  question  remains 
the  finest  example  in  a  rather  long  private  experience. 

Women  at  the  Well. 

Jack  Frost,  playing  the  historian  that  bygone 
January,  revived  another  incident  of  a  still  older  London, 
for  water  had  to  be  drawn  from  stand-pipes  in  the  street, 
and  therewith  reappeared  the  ancient  congregations  of 
women  at  the  well,  who  fell  at  once  into  the  antique 
habit  of  their  great  grandmothers  and  made  the  occasion 
subser\'e  the  ends  of  gossip.  For  to  the  women  of  an 
earlier  day  the  well  was  what  the  shop  of  Figaro  was  to 
their  lords.  Perhaps  they  missed  this  daily  rendezvous 
when  the  thaw  came,  and  may  have  thought  more 
lightly  of  "  every  modern  convenience,"  and  counted  the 
toil  of  water-carrying  worth  its  added  opportunities  of 
exchanging  the  universal  cordial  of  human-nature. 
But  the  glory  of  a  wintry  I^ondon  has  sadly  declined 
since  the  brave  days  when  Bob  Cratchit  went  so  gaily 
and  so  often  down  a  slide  in  Cornhill.  A  slide  in  Cornhill  ! 
Incredible !  Even  1895  hardly  paralleled  that  giddy 
dissipation.  To  such  delights  the  present  generation  is 
a  stranger.  It  gives  one  more  or  less  a  shock  to  realise 
that  that  means  twenty  years  of  almost  uniformly  open 
weather  in  winter.  It  means  also  that  to  tho\isands  of 
young  people  seasonable  winter  weather  is  merely  hearsay, 
and  to  very  little  children  it  must  seem  like  a  fairy  tale. 

In  this  connection  there  arises  a  point  of  some  remark, 
which  was  made  by  an  acute  French  journalist  during  that 
spell  of  skating  which  came  to  surprise  Paris  in  the 
winter  of  1013-14,  as  if  to  allow  the  city  a  moment  of 
keener  enjoyment  before  the  dark  days  that  were  so  near 
and  so  little  suspected.  All  Paris,  young  and  old.  turned 
out  to  share  it,  and  the  excellent  scribe,  writing,  I  think, 
in  the  Figaro,  called  upon  all  men  to  behold  a  miracle. 
It  was  nearly  twenty  years  since  Paris  had  skated  before, 
whence  then  had  come  the  extraordinary  proficiency 
which  the  younger  people  displayed  in  the  art  ?  Certainly 
not  from  roller-skating,  which  is  quite  different.  But  the 
answer  was.  after  all,  not  very  far  to  seek,  for  it  lay  in 
Alpine  Winter  Sports  for  the  well-to-do  and  for  the  less 
well-to-do  in  the  exceeding  ease  with  which  a  nation  of 
accomplished  dancers  can  learn  to  skate.  Our  discerning 
writer  did  not  raise  his  point  until  the  young  people  whoso 
grace  and  dexterity  he  so  much  admired  had  profited  by 
quite  a  week's  practice,  and  no  doubt  should  King  Frost 
graciously  favour  us  in  these  ensuing  days  we  shall  sec 
a  similar  marvel  on  every  skating  pond.  But  pending 
such  joys,  we  must  make  the  best  of  our  open  weather. 

The  mere  term  "  open  weather "  has  a  peculiar 
charm,  not  to  gardeners  and  masons  alone.  It  is  however, 
the  gardener  and  the  farmer  who  must  have  invented 
it,  with  a  peculiar  satisfaction,  as  they  thought  of  ground, 


unfettered  by  lio^l,  lying  open  to  planting  and  sowing. 
.\nd  to  the  mason,  open  weather  means  work,  for  in  time 
of  frost  he  dare  not  attempt  to  cut  the  stone.  To  the 
fox-hunter,  open  weather  is  the  thing  chiefly  to  be  desired, 
with  a  southerly  wind  and  a  cloudy  sky. 

Endless  Delight. 

But  to  one  who  is  no  tiller  of  the  soil,  nor  huntsman, 
nor  mason,  but  a  mere  rambler  about  the  countryside  in 
the  intervals  of  an  entirely  superlluous  occupation,  open 
weather  is  a  thing  of  endless  delight.  Its  charm  lies  to 
a  great  extent  in  its  negation  of  what  we  fondly  believe 
to  be  the  characteristics  of  winter,  although  it  is  really 
high  time  that  we  revised  our  opinion  on  that  point. 
But  with  some  deep-rooted  faith  in  the  eternal  unccrtaint  \- 
of  our  climate,  we  assume  that  the  last  twenty  years  of 
open  winters  is  only  another  if  rather  prolonged  freak  of 
the  clerk  of  the  weather,  and  will  certainly  be  succeeded, 
before  our  time  is  out,  by  the  bracing  rigours  of  which  our 
fathers  have  told  us. 

In  the  open  winter  morning,  when  the  quiet  yellow 
sunlight,  slightly  watery  perhaps,  lies  level  over  the  fields 
and  makes  a  golden  filigree  of  the  thin  stems  in  the  coppice, 
winter  can  put  on  the  disguise  of  spring,  so  cunningly 
sometimes,  perhaps  so  cnielly,  that  the  foolish  buds  are 
tempted  out  untimely.  On  such  days,  despite  the  softness 
of  the  roads,  it  is  good  to  make  an  early  start,  piously 
resolved  to  spend  all  the  short  light  in  the  open  air,  with 
only  a  brief  halt  now  and  then  at  a  wayside  inn  for  homely 
countrj'  fare,  which  must  never  be  more  elaborate  than 
bread  and  cheese.  .\t  such  times  many  tracks  are  for- 
bidden, for  the  floods  may  be  out,  and  meadows  which 
at  other  times  offered  the  pleasantest  of  paths  are  now 
either  under  water,  or  so  marshy  that  no  going  is  possible. 
But  the  grateful  sense  of  abundant  moisture  on  the  earth 
and  in  air  is  of  the  essence  of  these  days  of  open  weather, 
and  where  there  has  been  overflow  of  the  river  or  the 
brook,  the  landscape  takes  on  a  new  character  and  reveals 
new  tricks  of  light  and  shade,  while  a  humid  sweetness 
comes  up  from  the  land,  telling  of  forces  that  are  preparing 
in  secret  depths  for  the  lush  richness  of  June. 

Galdecott's  Hunting  Pictures. 

But  none  the  less  does  open  weather  permit  of  drier 
and  more  bracing  days  than  these.  Then  it  is  that  stripped 
fields  and  trees  give  the  setting  for  such  hunting  pictures 
asCaldecott  used  to  draw.  His  hand,  cunning  as  it  was 
at  the  snowy  landscape,  with  its  good  old-fashioned  sug- 
gestions of  warm  cheer  to  follow  for  those  who  had  to  face 
the  rigours  of  winter,  had  as  deft  a  trick  of  suggesting 
winter  without  its  conventional  accompaniments.  He 
caught  the  cold  light  on  the  lields  with  a  delicate 
economy  of  means,  a  single  flat  wash  of  colour  was  sufli- 
cient  to  secure  his  effect,  and  there  you  had  the  very 
sotting  and  no  other  that  called  for  the  Three  Jovial 
Huntsmen. 

Without  breaking  the  spell  of  open  weather,  a  fleeting 
touch  of  frost  will  often  nip  the  air  at  sunset,  and  thus  it  is 
that  the  western  lights  are  purely  those  of  winter  and  not 
of  borrowed  spring.  Your  spring  sunset  is  not  counter- 
feited here,  and  the  mild  winter  tinds  in  its  suaset  some 
assertion  of  that  severer  character  which  may  or  may  not 
be  a  fable.  There  is  no  mistaking  these  wintry  sunsets 
with  their  low-hung  mists,  their  gorgeous  trails  of  crimson 
reaching  up  into  the  earlier  darkening  sky  ;  there  is  no 
mistaking  such  for  the  longer  lingering  light  of  spring. 
Here  at  the  end  of  the  day  is  winter's  self  indeed,  and 
were  there  no  other  sign  to  tell  us  the  real  name  of  the 
season,  there  is  always  the  position  of  the  sun. 
This  sector  of  the  horizon  and  no  other  is  that  of  the 
wintry  sunset,  and  in  this  no  other  season  has  part  or 
lot.  Not  only  our  own  consciousness  may  tell  us  this, 
but  the  sub-consciousness  of  generations  back  stirs  in  us 
and  makes  us  feel,  without  dclinitc  realisation,  that  here, 
whatever  its  disguise,  however  open  the  w-eather,  is 
potentially  the  inhospitable  season  of  the  year.  To-day 
it  may  be  spring  ;  to-morrow  icicles  may  hang  by  the  wall 
and  Dick  the  Shepherd  blow  his  nail. 


16 


I'ebruary  3,  191G. 


LAND     AND     WATER 

THE    SIGNALLERS. 

By  Boyd  Cable. 


ITJic  upcniiig  of  this  story  was  published  in  "Land  and 
WcUcr  "  of  January  27th,  and  told  the  difficulties  under 
Tvhich  the  signallers  work  whose  duty  it  is  to  convey 
despatches  from  and  to  the  firing  Hue.  An  action 
was  in  progress,  and  it  sounded  as  if  it  ivcre  coming 
back  closer  to  the  signallers  who  were  carrying  on  their 
work  in  the  cellar  of  a  half  destroyed  house.'] 

The  sergeant  was  moving  across  the  door  to  open 
it  and  Usten  when  a  shell  struck  the  house  above  them. 
The  building  shook  violently,  down  to  the  very  tlags  of 
the  stone  Hoor  ;  from  overhead,  after  the  first  crash,  there 
came  a  rumble  of  falling  masonry,  the  sphntering  cracks 
of  breaking  wood-work,  the  clatter  and  rattle  of  cascad- 
ing bricks  and  tiles.  A  shower  of  plaster  grit  fell  from  the 
cellar  roof  and  settled  thick  upon  the  papers  littered  over 
the  table.  The  sergeant  halted  abruptly  with  his  hand 
on  the  cellar  door,  three  or  four  of  the  sleepefs  stirred 
restlessly,  one  woke  for  a  minute  sulhciently  to  grumble 
curses  and  ask  "  what  the  blank  was  that  "  ;  the  rest  slept 
on  serene  and  undisturbed.  The  sergeant  stood  there 
until  the  last  sounds  of  falling  rubbish  had  ceased.  "  A 
shell  "  he  said  and  drew  a  deep  breath,  "  Plunk  into 
upstairs  somewhere." 

The  signaller  made  no  answer.  He  was  quite  busy 
at  the  moment  rearranging  his  disturbed  papers  and 
blowing  the  dust  and  grit  off  them. 

A  telephonist  at  another  table  conunenced  to  take 
and  write  down  a  message.  It  came  from  the  forward 
trench,  on  the  left  and  merely  said  briefly  that  the  attack 
on  the  centre  was  spreading  to  them  and  that  they  were 
holding  it  with  some  difficulty.  The  message  was  sent 
up  to  the  O.C.  "  Whoever  the  O.C.  may  be,"  as  the 
sergeant  said  softly.  "If  the  Colonel  was  upstairs  when 
that  shell  hit,  there's  another  O.C.  now,  most  hke."  But 
the  Colonel  had  escaped  tliat  shell  and  sent  a  message 
back  to  the  left  trench  to  hang  on,  and  that  he  had  asked 
for  reinforcements. 

Reinforcements. 

"  He  did  ask,"  said  the  sergeant  grimly,  "  but 
when  he's  going  to  get  'em  is  a  dilferent  pair  o'  shoes. 
It'll  take  those  messengers  most  of  an  hour  to  get  there, 
even  if  they  dodge  all  the  lead  on  the  way." 

As  the  minutes  passed,  it  "became  more  and  more 
plain  that  the  need  for  reinforcements  was  growing  more 
and  more  urgent.  The  sergeant  was  standing  now  at 
the  open  door  of  the  cellar,  and  the  noise  of  the  conflict 
swept  down  and  clamoured  and, beat  about  them 

"  Think  I'll  just  shp  up  and  have  a  look  round,"  said 
the  sergeant.     "  I  shan't  be  long." 

When  he  had  gone,  the  signaller  rose  and  closed  the 
door  ;  it  was  cold  enough,  as  he  very  sensibly  argued, 
and  his  being  able  to  hear  the  fighting  better  would  do 
nothing  to  affect  its  issue.  Just  after  came  another  call 
on  his  instrument,  and  the  repair  party  told  him  they 
had  crossed  the  neutral  ground,  had  one  man  wounded 
in  the  arm,  that  he  was  going  on  with  them,  and  they  were 
still  following  up  the  wire.  The  message  ceased,  and  the 
telephonist  leaning  his  elbows  on  the  table  and  his  chin 
on  his  hands,  was  almost  asleep  before  he  realised  it. 
He  wakened  with  a  jerk,  lit  another  cigarette,  and  stamped 
up  and  down  the  room  trying  to  warm  his  numbed  feet. 

First  one  orderly  and  then  another  brought  in 
messages  to  be  sent  to  the  other  trenches,  and  the  sig- 
naller held  them  a  minute  and  gathered  some  more 
particulars  as  to  how  the  fight  was  progressing  up  there. 
The  particulars  were  not  encouraging.  We  must  have 
lost  a  lot  of  men,  since  the  whole  place  was  clotted  up 
with  casualties  that  kept  coming  in  quicker  than  the 
stretcher  bearers  could  move  them.  The  rifle  fire  was 
hot,  the  bombing  was  still  hotter,  and  the  shelling  was 
perhaps  the  hottest  and  most  horrible  of  all.  Of  the  last 
the  signaller  hardly  required  an  account ;  the  growling 
thumps  of  heavy  shells  exploding,  kept  sending  little 
shivers  down  the  cellar  walls,  the  shiver  being,  oddly 
enough,  more  emphatic  when  the  wail  uf  the  falling  shell 
ended  in  a  muJfled  thump  that  proclaimed  the  missile 


"  blind "  or  "  a  dud."  Another  hurried  messenger 
plunged  down  the  steps  with  a  note  written  by  the 
adjutant  to  say  the  colonel  was  severely  woimded  and 
had  sent  for  the  second  in  command  to  take  over.  Ten 
niorc  dragging  minutes  passed,  and  now  the  separate 
little  shivers  and  thrills  that  shook  the  cellar  walls  had 
merged  and  run  together.  The  rolling  crash  of  the  falling 
shells  and  the  bursting  of  bombs  came  close  and  fast 
one  upon  another,  and  at  intervals  the  terrific  detonation 
of  an  aerial  torpedo  dwarfed  for  the  moment  all  the  other 
sounds. 

The  Sleepers   Awake. 

By  now  the  noise  was  so  great  that  even  the  sleepers 
began  to  stir,  and  one  or  two  of  them  to  wake.  One  sat 
up  and  asked  the  telephonist  sitting  idle  over  his  instru- 
ment, what  was  happening.  He  was  told  briefly,  and 
told  also  that  the  line  was  "  disc."  He  e.\pressed  con- 
siderable annoyance  at  this,  grumbling  that  he  knew 
what  it  meant — more  trips  in  the  mud  and  under  lire  to 
take  the  messages  the  wire  should  have  carried. 

"  Do  you  think  there's  any  chance  of  them  pushing 
the  line  and  rushing  this  house  ?  "  he  asked.  The  tele- 
phonist didn't  know. 

"  Well,"  said  the  man  and  lay  down  again.  "  It's 
none  o'  my  dashed  business  if  they  do  anyway.  I  only 
hope  we're  tipped  the  wink  in  time  to  shunt  out  o'  here  ; 
I've  no  particular  fancy  for  sitting  in  a  cellar  with  the 
Boche  cock-shying  their  bombs  down  the  steps  at  me." 
Then  he  shut  his  eyes  and  went  to  sleep  again. 

The  morsed  key  signal  for  his  own  company  buzzed 
rapidly  on  the  signaller's  telephone  and  he  caught  the 
voice  of  the  Corporal  who  had  taken  out  the  repair  party. 
They  had  found  the  break,  the  corporal  said,  and  weie 
mending  it.  He  should  be  through — he  was  througli — 
could  he  hear  the  other  end  ?  The  signaller  could  hear 
the  other  end  calling  him  and  he  promptly  tapped  off 
the  answering  signal  and  spoke  into  his  institmient.  He 
could  hear  the  morse  signals  on  the  buzzer  plain  enough, 
but  the  \'oice  was  faint  and  indistinct.  The  signaller 
caught  the  corporal  before  he  withdrew  his  tap-in  and 
implored  him  to  search  along  and  find  the  leakage. 

"  It's  bad  enough,"  he  said,  "  to  get  all  these 
messages  through  by  voice.  I  haven't  a  dog's  chance  of 
doing  it  if  I  have  to  buzz  each  one." 

The  rear  station  spoke  again  and  informed  him  that 
he  had  several  urgent  messages  waiting.  The  forward 
signaller  replied  that  he  also  had  several  messages,  and 
one  in  particular  was  urgent  above  all  others. 

"  The  blanky  line  is  being  pushed  in,"  he  said. 
"  No  it  isn't  pushed  in  yet — I  didn't  say  it — I  said  being 
pushed  in — being — being,  looks  like  it  will  be  pushed 
in — got  that  ?  'The  O.C.  has  '  stopped  one  '  and  the 
second  has  taken  command.  This  message  I  want  you 
to  take  is  shrieking  for  reinforcements — what  ?  I  can't 
hear — no  I  didn't  say  anything  about  horses — I  did  not. 
Reinforcements  I  said ;  anyhow,  take  this  message  and 
get  it  through  quick." 

A   Terrific   Crash. 

He  was  interrupted  by  another  terrific  crash,  a 
fresh  and  louder  outburst  of  the  din  outside  ;  running 
footsteps  clattered  and  leaped  down  the  stairs,  the  door 
flung  open  and  the  sergeant  rushed  in  slamming  the  door 
violently  behind  him.  He  ran  straight  across  to  the 
recumbent  figures  and  began  violently  to  shake  and  kick 
them  into  wakefulness. 

"  Up  with  ye  !  "  he  said,  "  Every  man.  If  you  don't 
wake  quick  now,  you'll  maybe  not  have  the  chance  to 
wake  at  all." 

The  men  rolled  over  and  sat  and  stood  up  blinking 
stupidly  at  him  and  listening  in  amazement  to  the  noise 
outside. 

"  Rouse  yourselves,"  he  cried.  "  Get  a  move  on. 
The  Germans  are  almost  on  top  of  us.  The  front  line's 
falling  back.  They'll  stand  here."  He  seized  one  or 
two  of  them  and  pushed  them  towards  the  door.  "  You." 


17 


LAND       AN  1)      ^^"  A  T  E  R 


Fifbruary  3,   1916 


he  said,  "  and  you  and  you,  get  outside  and  round  tha 
back  there.  See  if  you  can  get  a  pickaxe,  a  t-en:hing  tool, 
anytiiing,  and  break  down  that  grating  and  knock  a  bigger 
lioie  in  the  window.  Wc;  may  have  to  crawl  out  there 
presently.  The  rest  o'  ye  come  with  me  an'  help  block  ' 
up  the  door.  " 

Through  the  din  that  followed,  the  telephonist 
fought  to  get  his  messag,;  through  ;  he  had  to  give  up  an 
attempt  to  speak  it  while  a  hatchet,  a  crowbar  and  a 
picka.ve  were  noisily  at  work  breaking  out  a  fresh  exit 
from  the  back  of  the  cellar,  and  even  after  that  work  had 
been  completed,  it  was  diflicult  to  make  himself  heard. 
He  comiilcted  the  urgent  message  for  reinforcements  at 
last,  listened  to  some  confused  and  confusing  comments 
upon  it,  and  then  made  ready  to  take  some  messages 
from  the  other  end. 

"  You'll  have  to  shout,"  he  said,  "  no,  shout — speak 
loud,  because  I  can't  'ardly  'ear  myself  think — no,  'ear 
myself  think.  Oh,  all  s^rts,  but  the  shelling  is  the  worst, 
and  one  o"  them  beastly  airj^ale  torpedoes.  All  right, 
go  ahead." 

The  earpiece  receiver  strapped  tightly  over  one  ear, 
left  his  right  hand  free  to  use  a  pencil,  and  eis  he  took 
the  spoken  message  word  by  word,  he  wrote  it  on  the  pad 
for  message  forms  vndjr  his  hand.  Under  the  circum- 
stances it  is  hardly  surprising  that  the  message  took  a 
good  deal  longer  than  a  normal  time  to  send  through,  and 
M'hile  he  was  taking  it,  the  signaller's  mind  was  altogether 
too  occupied  to  pay  any  attention  to  the  progress  of 
events  above  and  around  him.  But  now  the  sergeant 
.came  back  and  warned  him  that  he  had  better  get  his 
things  ready  and  put  together  as  far  as  he  could,  in  case 
they  had  to  make  a  quick  and  sudden  move. 

"  "  The  game's  up,  I'm  afraid,"  he  said  gloomily, 
and  took  a  note  that  was  brought  down  by  another 
orderly.  "  I  thought  so,"  he  commented,  as  he  read  it 
hastily  and  passed  it  to  the  other  signaller.  "  It's  a 
message  warning  the  right  and  left  flanks  that  we  can't 
hold  the  centre  any  longer,  and  that  they  are  to  commence 
falhng  back  to  conform  to  our  retirement  at  ^.20  acemma, 
which  is  ten  minutes  from  now." 

Over  their  heads  the  signallers  could  hear  tramping 
scurrying  feet,  the  hammering  out  of  loopholes,  the 
dragging  thiunp  and  flinging  down  of  obstacles  piled  up 
w  an  additional  defence  to  the  rickety  walls.  Then  there 
«*,ere  more  hurrying  footsteps  and  presently  the  jarring 
rap-yap- rap  of  a  machine  gun  immediately  over  their 
heads. 

Falling    Back. 

"  That's  done  it !  "  said  the  sergeant.  "  We've  got 
no  orders  to  move,  but  I'm  going  to  chance  it  and  establish 
an  alternative  signalling  station  in  one  of  the  trenches 
iomewhere  behind  h?re.  This  cellar  roof  is  too  thin  to 
stop  an  ordinary  Fizzbang,  much  less  a  good  solid  Crump, 
and  that  machine  gun  upstairs  is  a  certain  invitation  to 
sudden  death  and  the  German  gunners  to  down  and  out 
us." 

He  moved  towards  the  new  opening  that  had  been 
made  in  the  wall  of  the  cellar,  scrambled  up  it  and  dis- 
ippeared.  All  the  signallers  lifted  their  attention  from 
their  instruments  at  the  same  moment  and  sat  listening 
to  the  fresh  note  that  ran  through  the  renewed  and  louder 
clamour  and  racket.  The  signaller  who  was  in  touch  with 
the  rear  station  called  them  and  began  to  tell  them  what 
Avas  happening. 

"  We're  about  all  in,  I  b'lieve,"  he  said.  "  Five 
minutes  ago  we  passed  word  to  the  flanks  to  fall  back  in 
ten  minutes.  What  ?  Yes,  it's  thick.  I  don't  know  how 
many  men  we've  lost  hanging  on  and  I  suppose  we'll 
lose  as  many  again  taking  back  the  trench  we're  to  give  up. 
What's  that  ?  No.  I  don't  see  how  reinforcements  could 
be  here  yet.  How  long  ago  you  say  you  passed  orders  for 
them  to  move  up  ?  An  hour  ago  !  That's  wrong,  because 
the  messengers  can't  have  been  back — telephone  mes- 
sage ?  That's  a  lot  less  than  an  hour  ago.  I  sent  it 
myself  no  more  than  half  an  hour  since.  Oo-oo  !  did  you 
get  tha*.  bump  ?  Dunno,  couple  o'  big  shells  or  something 
droppal  'ust  outside.  I  can  'ardly  'ear  you.  There's 
a  most  almighty  row  going  on  all  round.  'Hiey  nmst  be 
charging  I  think,  or  our  front  line's  fallen  back,  because 
the  rifles  is  going  nineteen  to  the  dozen,  a-a-ah  !  Tliey're 
getting  stronger  too,  and  it  sounds  like  a  lot  more  bombs 
going;    hold  on,  there's  that  blighting  maxim  again.  ' 


He  .stopped  speaking  while  upstairs  the  maxim 
clattered  off  belt  after  belt  of  cartridges.  The  other 
signallers  were  shuffling  their  fc,:t  anxiously  and  looking 
about  them. 

"  Are  we  going  to  stick  it  here  ?  "  said  one.  "  Didn't 
the  sergeant  say  something  about  'opping  it  ?  " 

"  If  he  did,"  said  the  other,  "  he  hasn't  given  any 
orders  that  I've  heard.  I  suppose  he'll  come  back  and 
do  that  and  we've  just  got  to  carr}^  on  till  then." 

The  men  had  to  shout  now  to  make  themselves  heard 
to  each  other  abovb  the  constant  clatter  of  the  ma.Nim 
and  the  roar  of  rifle  lire.  By  now  they  could  hear  too, 
shouts  and  cries  and  the  trampling  rush  of  many  foot- 
steps.    The  signaller  spoke  into  his  instrument  again. 

"  I  think  the  line's  fallen  back,"  he  said.  "  I  can 
hear  a  heap  o'  men  runninj(  about  there  outside  and  now 
I  suppose  us  here  is  about  due  to  get  it  in  the  neck." 

There  was  a  scuffle,  a  rush  and  a  plunge  and  the 
sergeant  shot  down  through  the  rear  opening  and  out 
into  the  cellar. 

"  The  flank  trenches  "  he  shouted.  "  Quick,  get 
on  to  them — right  and  left  flank — tell  them  they're 
to  stand  fast.  Quick  now,  give  them  that  first.  '  Stand 
fast  ;   do  not  retire.'  " 

The  signallers  leaped  to  their  instruments,  buzzed 
off  the  call  and  getting  through,  rattled  their  messages  off. 

"  Ask  them,"  said  the  sergeant  anxiously.  "  Had 
they  commenced  to  retire."  He  breathed  a  sigh  of  relief 
when  the  answers  came.  "  No,"  that  the  message  had 
just  stopped  them  in  time. 

"  Then,"  he  said,  "  You  can  go  ahead  now  and  tell 
them  the  order  to  retire  is  cancelled,  that  the  reinforce- 
ments have  arrived,  that  they're  up  in  our  forward  line, 
and  we  can  hold  it  good— oh  !  " 

He  paused  and  wiped  his  wet  forehead  ;  "  You," 
he  said,  turning  to  the  other  signaller,  "tell  them  behind 
there  the  same  thing." 

"  How  in  thunder  did  they  manage  it  sergeant  ?  " 
said  the  perplexed  signaller.  "  They  haven't  had  time 
since  they  got  my  message  through." 

"  No,"  said  the  sergeant,  "  but  they've  just  had  time 
iince  they  got  mine." 

"  Got  yo'urs  ?  "  said  the  bewildered  signaller. 

"  Yes,  didn't  I  tell  you  ?  "  said  the  sergeant.  "  When 
I  went  out  for  a  look  round  that  time,  I  found  an  artillery 
signaller  laying  out  a  new  line  and  I  got  him  to  let  me  tap 
in  and  send  a  message  through  his  battery  to  head- 
quarters." 

"  You  might  have  told  me,"  said  the  aggrieved  sig- 
naller. "It  would  have  saved  ms  a  heap  of  sweat  getting 
that  message  through."  After  he  had  finished  his  message 
to  the  rear  station  he  spoke  reflectively  :  "  Lucky  thing 
you  did  get  through,"  he  said.  "  'Twas  a  pretty  close 
shave.  The  O.C.  should  have  a  '  thank  you  '  for  you 
over  it." 

"  I  don't  suppose,"  answered  the  sergeant,  "  the 
O.C.  will  ever  know  or  ever  trouble  about  it ;  he  sent  a 
message  to  the  signalling  company  to  send  through— 
and  it  was  sent  through.  There's  the  beginning  and  the 
end  of  it." 

And  as  he  said,  so  it  was  ;  or  rather  the  end  of  it  was 
in  those  three  words  that  appeared  later  in  the  despatch  : 
"  It  is  reported." 


THE  NINETEENTH   CENTURY 

AND    AFTER. 

FEBRUARY. 
The  Pact  Of    Konopijht:   Kaiser  and  Archduke,   June  15,   1914. 

)!v    HKNIIV    WlCKHAM    STKHI) 

Victory  and  IMo  Alternati»c.  V.y    In.   \i:tp.lii   ShabwhL 

Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  W.iri  an  Analysis  and  some  Proposals. 

I!>    .1.    lil.lis  llABKl:ll 
The  Ttirift   Campaign: 

(1)  Some   Personal   Impressions.  B.v   .J.   A.  U.  JUBRIOtT 

m  Will  It  be  in  time?  I'.v  I-"''}'  Chancb 

The  Monrot  Doctrine  and. the  Great  War.  By  .MORtTON  FREWtN 

Is  anything  wrong  with  German  Protestantism? 

liv  ihe  Ki'ilit  \W\.  Ilijlifiii  Bi  v.v  (Hishnp  lor  .Vorlft  and  Crnlral  Bumne) 
The  General    Stall,    liv  Goiieral    Sir  OMoork  Cre.igh,   V.C,    G.C.D.,   G.C.S.I. 

(/,if''  Commathiur-in-Chief  in   India) 
Balzjc   Re  read.  By  W.  8.  LILLY 

The  War  and  Episcopal  Penitence.  Uy  tlie  Rev.  Hubkp.t  H.»ndiet. 

Contrasts:   Benjamm   Disraeli  and  Abraham  Lincoln.  by  lli»;u  s.\dler 

The  Poetry  of  Lionel  Johnson.  By  Ar.TiiiT.  W.\«cii 

Humour   and   War.  H.v   tli.    i;iflit  Ucv.    Bishop  Mkrcek 

Social  Traming  and  P,itriotism   m  Germany   and  in  England.     By  U.   8.  NoL,»N 
Britisli   Mcrchan;  Sailors  under  War  Conditions.  By  W.  H.  11en«ick 

The  National  Railways  alter  tiie  War.  By  H.   M.  HVM>JHN 

Education  anrl  Mic  Public  Service 

r.i    .--ii;    mi;iiV    11.  .TOIINSTON,  (i.C.M.C,  K.C.B. 

London  :    Spottiswoodc  &  Co.,  Ltd.,    5  New  Street  Square. 


i8 


Febi'uar 


y  3. 


1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


COMMONSENSE  ABOUT  MONTENEGRO 

By   Alfred  Stead. 


FAR  too  much  has  been  made  of  the  Austrian  occu- 
pation of  Montenegro.  Now  that  the  Monte- 
negrin episode  is  finished  and  the  country  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy,  it  is  possible  to  deal  more 
comprehensively  with  the  participation  of  the  country  of 
King  Nicolas  in  the  war.  For  many  months  Montenegro 
had  ceased  to  be  an  active  ally,  it  is  doubtful  whether 
there  was  ever  a  moment  during  the  war  when  her  rulers 
were  not  actuated  solely  by  a  desire  that  any  participation 
in  hostilities  should  be  directly  beneficial  to  themselves, 
they  gave  no  thought  to  the  common  good,  and  in  some 
instances  worked  deliberately  against  it. 

Much  has  been  written  and  spoken  of  this,  the  srriallest 
of  the  nations  banded  together  to  combat  the  German 
menace,  and  sentiment  has  magnified  the  doings  of  the 
Montenegrins  in  inverse  proportion  to  the  importance  of 
their  efforts.  Bluntly,  we  must  eliminate  from  our  minds 
all  the  official  Montenegrin  communiques,  issued  in  the 
various  European  capitals,  noting  only  en  passant  that  for 
some  time  these  inspired  documents  have  not  been  issued 
in  London.  Facts  are  stubborn  things,  but  a  skilful  use 
of  official  communiques  on  a  basis  of  an  uncomprehending 
glamour  may  do  much  to  give  an  idealised  impression, 
and  Montenegro  resembles  most  of  all  the  self-starting 
device  on  modern  motor-cars,  which  only  are  in  action 
until  the  main  engine  starts.  It  has  been  the  r6le  of 
Montenegro  to  be  among  the  starters,  generally  even  to  steal 
a  few  lengths,  but  serious  application  to  war  is  quite  another 
matter.  Not  that  anyone  should  seek  to  say  that  the 
Montenegrins  are  not  a  courageous  people ;  they  can  be 
that  in  excelsis  and  yet  be  of  small  value  as  a  fighting  ele- 
ment in  the  present  great  war. 

Not  a  Feat  of  Arms. 

Lying  outside  the  regular  beat  of  special  newspaper 
correspondents  Montenegro  has  enjoyed  during  this  war 
the  role  of  fixing  for  the  outside  world  her  own  desired 
estimate  of  Montenegrin  valour  and  fighting  work.  There 
has  been  no  means  of  cstabHshing  a  perspective,  indeed  it 
is  doubtful  whether  the  newspapers  would  have  cared  for 
the  truth,  when  the  fiction  was  so  much  more  picturesque. 
But  now  the  time  has  come  for  a  detached  and  objective 
summing  up  of  the  Montenegrin  situation,  so  that  the 
Allies  can  gain  some  adequate  idea  of  the  value  of  the  most 
recent  success  of  the  Central  Powers.  It  may  be  said  at 
once  that,  from  a  military  standpoint,  the  loss  of  Montene- 
gro as  it  was  utilised,  has  no  importance  whatever.  From 
the  moral  effect  standpoint  the  importance  is  small  in  the 
circles  where  the  truth  is  known,  however  much  it  may 
have  been  boomed  in  an  endeavour  to  enthuse  the  public 
in  Vienna  or  Berhn.  At  the  Ballplatz  and  Friedrichstrasse 
they  know  well  that  the  conquest  of  Montenegro  is  primarily 
a  commercial  financial  operation  and  not  a  brilliant  feat 
of  arms. 

From  the  Allies'  point  of  view  the  only  military  value 
ot  Montenegro  was  that  within  the  frontiers  of  that  country' 
were  situated  the  dominating  artillery  positions  overlooking 
the  Bocche  di  Cattaro.  But  since  in  the  eighteen  months 
of  the  war  no  real  effort  had  been  made  to  utilise  these 
positions,  no  heavy  modern  guns  placed  on  them  to  render 
the  Bocche  impossible  for  the  Austrian  fleet,  the  present 
loss  of  the  Lovchen  positions  makes  no  real  difference  to 
us.  It  makes  the  Austrian  position  surer  and  enables  the 
bulk  of  the  Austrian  fleet  to  remain  in  this  magnificent 
natural  harbour  ;  it  also  makes  the  task  of  conquering  the 
Bocche  a  much  more  possible  one.  Such  attack,  if  it  ever 
comes,  must  necessarily  be  preceded  by  the  recapture  of 
the  Lovchen  positions  above  Cattaro.  And  the  Austrians 
are  not  likely  to  leave  these  positions  without  adequate 
means  of  defence. 

The  reason  why  the  Allies,  and  especially  Italy,  did 
nothing  to  send  heavy  guns  to  Lovchen  is  a  m.ystery, 
since  the  advantages  are  so  obvious.  The  only  excuse 
given  is  that  had  such  an  attempt  been  made,  the 
Austrians  would  have  occupied  Lovchen  before  the  guns 
could  have  reached  there.  There  is  one  thing  certain, 
and  that  is,  that  had  Montenegro  been  an  ally  of  Germany 
and  the  Bocche  in  our  hands  with  our  men-of-war  sheltering 
in  it,  there  would  have  been  heav}'  guns  on  all  the  positions 


above  Cattaro.  I  was  present  at  the  first  attack  made  by 
the  Austrians  on  the  northern  extremity  of  the  Lovchen 
ridge,  which  was  the  first  indication  of  the  coming  of  the 
end  of  Montenegro. 

A  Bird's  Eye  View. 

I  stood  at  the  farthest  Montenegrin  outpost  and  saw  the 
whole  Bocche,  with  its  forts  and  warships  at  anchor  spread 
out  below  me,  as  from  an  aeroplane.  The  Ccttigne-Cattafc 
road,  close  to  whicJi  are  the  gun  positions,  is  over  nine 
hundred  yards  above  the  sea-level,  the  highest  Austrian 
fort  is  not  much  over  seven  hundred.  It  was  a  curious 
feeling,  looking  down  on  the  forts  and  seeing  their  guns 
firing  at  the  Montenegrin  positions  while  the  traops  around 
me  could  have  thrown  pebbles  into  the  chimneys  of  the 
barracks  of  the  Austrian  garrisons.  And  there  were  no  guns 
worth  looking  at.  The  French,  in  bitter  jest,  did  send  some 
120  mm.  long  guns  of  old  pattern  firing  black  po  A-der,  which 
were  blown  out  of  action  by  the  twelve-inch  gims  of  the 
Austrian  warships  anchored  in  the  Bocche.  For  it  was  not 
only  possible  to  see  the  forts,  but  the  smallest  detail  of  the 
daily  life  of  the  ships'  crews  on  the  warships  was  as  an  open 
book  to  the  spectator  on  Lovchen.  And  with  it  all  nothing 
was  done — until  the  Austrians  decided  to  remove  what 
must  ever  have  been  a  terrible  menace,  and  occupied 
Lovchen. 

They  first  built  roads  towards  the  northernmost  point 
which  was  also  the  highest  and  dominating  one — zigzag 
miHtary  roads  constructed  with  infinite  patience  and  labour 
— and  the  defenders  looked  on  while  the  Allies  continued  to 
ignore  the  good  existing  roads  of  Montenegro,  up  which 
guns  could  have  been  dragged  to  destroy  both  the  Austrian 
road  and  its  makers.  When  all  was  ready  the  Austrians 
poured  a  tremendous  fire  from  all  their  heavy  guns  on  this 
chosen  point,  Ratkova  Gova,  and  captured  it — the  Mon- 
tenegrins lost  five  men  killed  and  the  whole  of  the  Lovchen 
positions  as  well  as  Cettigne  itself  was  at  the  mercy  of  the 
Austrians.  With  the  taking  of  Ratkova  Gova  the  military 
value  of  Montenegro  to  the  Allies  disappeared.  The  sub- 
sequent happenings,  the  signing  and  tearing  up  of  armistice 
or  capitulation,  were  af  quite  minor  importanca.  After 
Ratkova  Gova  was  in  the  Austrian  hands  at  least  one 
Foreign  Legation  took  steps  to  place  its  papers  in  security 
beyond  the  frontiers,  a  wise  precaution,  as  things 
eventually  turned  out. 

The  expected  denouement  could  not'  long  be  delayed, 
the  only  question  was,  what  exact  form  would  it  take. 
The  generally  expected  termination  was  a  reversion  to  the 
former  arrangement  with  Austria  whereby  Montenegro 
should  make  a  semblance  of  warfare  without,  howe\'er, 
doing  anything  serious  enough  to  necessitate  large  Austrian 
military  concentration  on  the  Montenegrin  fronts.  There 
were  indications  that  negotiations  were  being  carrL^d  on  to 
this  end,  not  only  in  Montenegro,  but  in  Vienna. 

Russia's  Foresight. 

Russia  had  already  regarded  the  situation  as  lost,  and 
for  some  time  previous  had  removed  her  active  rep  -esonta- 
tives  from  Cettigne.  The  country  was  overrun  with  Austrian 
agents,  and  in  Cettigne  well-known  Austrians  could  be  seen 
in  the  streets  any  day,  quite  unembarrassed.  On  one 
occasion  I  saw  the  former  commander  of  the  Austrian 
cniiser  Qen/a  busily  employed  selecting  billets  for  coming 
staff-officers  among  the  houses  of  Cettigne.  Everything 
that  was  known  in  Cettigne  was  known  in  Cattaro  ;  through 
Budua  there  was  easy  and  convenient  contact.  There  was 
no  question  of  spies,  because  these  are  persons  supposed 
to  work  in  secret,  the  Austrian  agents  in  Cettigne  worked 
openly,  nor  were  they  looked  upon  as  enemies,  save 
by  the  Servians  from  Dalmatia  and  Bosnia  who  had 
sought  shelter  and  immunity  from  Austrian  military 
ser\-ice  in  Montenegro.  It  was  a  curious  state  of  affairs, 
perhaps  more  comprehensible  when  it  is  remembered  that 
Montenegro's  whole  economic  existence  was  bound  up  with 
Austria  and  with  no  other  country. 

It  must  be  said,  however,  that  the  mass  of  the  Mon- 
tenegrin people  are  intensely  patriotic,  and  in  this  differ 
strongly  from  those  who  governed  them  ;  but  the  mass  had 
little  say  in  the  decisions  of  Cettigne.     Foimerlv  Prince 


10 


LAND       AND     W  A  T  E  R 


February  3,  1916. 


Nicolas  ruled  autocratically,  hampered  largely  by  an 
entourage  of  relations  nnd  parasites.  The  idea  of  a  con- 
stitution rerommended  ilsell  to  him  as  a  means  of  freeing 
liimself  from  his  relatives,  and  lie  adoj^ted  it.  At  first, 
Itovvever,  it  threatened  to  lie  a  most  dangerons  enemy  to 
t  he  antorrary,  and  a  coiif>  d' Hat  was  needed  to  bring  matters 
to  the  condition  in  which  they  found  themselves  at  the 
beginning  of  tlie  recent  wars. 

King  Nicolas  had  secured  autocratic  power  with 
constitutional  lack  of  responsi*bility.  The  governing  few, 
having  lirmly  grasped  the  opportunity  of  enriching  them- 
selves, showed  a  callous  disregard  to  the  welfare  of  the 
.Montenegrin  people,  almost  unprecedented  in  any  country. 
Thus  the  patriotic,  imdoubtedly  courageous  mass  was 
helpless  in  the  iiands  of  the  self-seeking  few — the  governing 
regime,  as  a  Montenegrin  deputy  said  in  the  Parliament 
a  few  weeks  ago,  was  imworthy  of  the  traditions  of  the 
coimtry  and  had  betraytd  the  people.  Even  the  chari- 
table funds  raised  in  England  and  elsewhere  were  diverted 
from  the  people  into  the  pockets  of  the  ("iO\'ernment.  The 
Palace  and  the  Ministers  seemod  perfectly  ready  to  allow 
the  people  to  star\e  and  the  army  to  go  without  bread,  so 
long  as  there  was  a  chance  of  filling  their  pockets.  Thi-s 
being  the  case  it  would  have  been  perfectly  idle  to 
exix-ct  a  fierce  pushing  of  the  war  on  ^the  part  of  the 
Montenegrin  (iovcrnmcnt. 

Always  seeking  to  arrive  at  the  headship  of  the  whole 
Serbian  race,  King  Nicolas  rejoiced  in  the  disaster  which 
had  o\ercome  the  Serbians  and  sought  rather  to  exaggerate 
the  dehade  than  to  momn  it.  The  open  ])leasure  shown 
at  the  Palace  was  hard  to  bear  by  the  Serbian  officers 
forming  the  General  Staff  of  the  Montenegrin  army.  The 
feeling  that  Russia  had  chosen  Serbia  as  her  favourite 
protege,  helped  on  the  cause  of  Austria  in  Montenegro 
enormously.  Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  there  was  a 
\ery  general  belief  in  Montenegro  that  the  Central  Powers 
had  already  won,  and  as  one  very  highly-placed  personage 
said,  "  Why  does  England  go  on  with  the  war — Germany 
has  won  alread3^" 

Austria  the   Real   Power. 

To  the  Palace  and  the  Government  Austria  is  a  real 
power,  while  even  Russia  is  only  an  unknown  one.  Few 
Montenegrins  have  been  in  England,  and  the  power  of  a 
dominating  fleet  is  unknown  to  them.  In  the  matter  of 
fleets,  all  they  know  is  that  the  Austrian  submarines  were 
able  to  sally  out  of  Cattaro  when  they  wished  and  sink 
Montenegrin  transports.  Then  there  came  Austrian 
aeroplanes  over  Cettigne  and  all  the  towns,  while  the  whole 
of  the  Montenegrin  coast  was  mined  and  blocked  by  the 
Austrian  Navy.  It  is  a  small  wonder,  therefore,  that  in  the 
Governing  circles  of  Montenegro  there  was  a  very  strong 
desire  to  "  keep  in  "  with  Austria. 

Despite  the  Italian  marriage,  relations  with  Rome 
were  far  from  good,  and  it  was  openly  said  that  Italy  was 
not  able  to  do  anything  against  Austria.  Austrian  influ- 
ence was  very  strong  in  all  departments  ;  it  paralysed  any 
national  action.  A  notable  success  was  when  the  Montene- 
grin Go\'emment  was  "  persuaded  "  not  to  construct  the 
road  through  the  mountains  to  Ipek,  although  this  was  an 
essential  undertaking  to  secure  contact  with  the  Serbian 
armies.  The  absence  of  this  road  meant  later  the  loss  of 
all  the  Serbian  artillery  and  train  and  of  many  soldiers. 
And  this  is  only  one  instance.  The  Italian  wireless  station 
on  Lovchen,  which  reported  the  movements  of  the  Austrian 
vessels  in  the  Bocche,  had  its  telephone  wire  to  Cettigne 
cut  several  t'mes  a  week,  and  notably  when  any  vessels 
were  leaving  the  harbour.  All  movements  of  transports 
arriving  for  Montenegro  were  known  immediately  in 
Cattaro,  with  obvious  results.  Indeed  it  would  seem  as  if 
much  of  the  cargo  in  some  of  the  ships  was  destined  for  the 
Austrians,  not  for  the  Montenegrins.  There  were  instances 
■^i  vessels  being  captured  by  Austrian  submarines  off  the 
Boyana  River,  conducted  to  the  Bocche  di  Cattaro  nnd 
then  sent  back  again  after  the  Austrian  goods  had  been 
discharged.  The  whole  atmosphere  at  Cettigne  was  one 
of  unreality,  and  all  those  who  were  working  for  the  Allies 
were  convinced  that  they  were  flogging  a  dead  horse,  and 
that  the  Ciovenmient  was  simply  seeking  to  get  a.=;  much  as 
possible  out  of  the  Allies  without  ha\'ing  any  intention 
of  being  loyal. 

"  The  truth  was  not  in  them,"  is  the  only  way  to 
describe  the  tactics  of  the  Montenegrin  Government.  This 
was  esjwcially  so  at  the  time  of  their  occupation  of  Skutari. 


Austria's  most  popular  move  was  when  she  gave  her 
sanction  to  a  Montenegrin  occupation  of  this  Albanian 
town,  even  during  war  time.  It  was  obviously  better  for 
Austria  to  have  her  ]iuj>pet  there  than  to  see  either  Italy  or 
an  independent  .Albania  at  Skutari.  But  the  Montenegrins 
were  crazy  to  have  Skutari,  and  so  went  there  "  to  receive 
the  keys  of  the  tfiwn  from  Austrian  notaries,"'  as  a  Monte- 
negrin deputy  put  it.  It  was  the  dominating  jjassion,  this 
cult  of  Skutari.  A  most  serious  Montenegrin  Professor,  a 
leading  opponent  of  the  King  and  the  governing  clique, 
told  me  quite  calmly  that  he  would  break  his  word  of  honour 
or  lie  if  by  so  doing  he  would  secure  Skutari  to  Montenegro. 
And  Austria  gained  ground  by  ac(]uiescing,  by  pushing 
Montenegro  into  Skutari  ;the  .Allies  o])posing  and  refusing 
to  recognise  the  occupation,  lost,  ground  considerably. 
It  was  commonly  said  that  King  Nicolas  was  quite  ready  to 
barter  the  Lovchen  positions  for  Skutari — indeed,  to  Mon- 
tenegro the  Lo\  chen  positions  were  of  small  value,  however 
formidable  they  might  ha\e  been  to  a  great  Power. 

Serbia's  Steadying   Influence. 

The  steadying  influence  on  the  Government  was  the 
army  and  the  Serbian  General  Staff.  The  Serbians  took 
on  their  shoulders  much  of  the  cost  and  burden  of  feeding 
the  army  and  undoubtedly  a  great  majority  of  the  troops 
were  more  ready  to  follow  their  Serbian  oflicers  in  the 
defence  of  their  country  than  desirous  of  acquiescence  in 
surrender,  if  ordered  by  their  King.  But  it  must  not 
be  rated  too  high.  The  Montenegrin  army,  its  methods 
of  fighting  are  not  those  of  modern  warfare.  The  highest 
number  of  soldiers  was  about  .40,000  ;  but  there  were  few 
moments  when  even  a  quarter  of  these  were  at  the  front 
or  firing  line. 

Cettigne  was  thronged  with  men  of  military  age,  and 
so  were  nearly  all  the  towais.  But  there  was  not  any  real 
need  for  the  army  to  be  busy.  The  Austrians  did  anything 
but  press  them,  even  after  the  defeat  and  retreat  of  the 
Serbian  armies.  The  numbers  of  Montenegrin  killed  and 
wounded  are  insignificant  and  bea,  no  comparison  to  the 
reports  circulated  by  the  official  communiques  abroad.  To 
tell  the  truth  the  Montenegrin  army  has  done  propor- 
tionately less  fighting  in  this  war  than  any  other.  The 
combats  reported  and  exaggerated  ha\'e  been  largely 
affairs  of  patrols — recently  even  orders  had  been  sent  to 
the  troops  not  to  fight.  It  was  only  the  efforts  of  some 
Serbian  Montenegrin  patriots  who  exhorted  the  soldiers 
that  some  attacks  were  made  and  engagements  occurred. 
The  army  had  ammunition,  but  was  short  of  food  ;  it  had, 
however,  no  reason  for  despair  now  rather  than  formerly. 

The  population  of  Montenegro  was  tired  of  the  war 
because  there  was  a  very  great  shortage  of  food.  In 
many  respects  the  country  resembled  a  besieged  city- 
there  was  only  one  means  of  sending  in  food,  and  that 
was  by  San  Giovanni  de  Medua  and  the  Borjana  River. 
The  proximity  of  Cattaro  and  the  openness  of  the  Medua 
anchorage  made  the  supply  of  food  very  precarious. 
In  normal  times  it  is  only  tlie  Montenegrin  towns  which 
are  dependent  upon  outside  food.  The  country  people 
raise  and  store  enough  for  their  own  needs.  Thanks, 
however,  to  the  passage  of  the  Serbian  army,  which 
enabled  the  Montenegrins  to  realise  fabulous  sums  for 
their  stores  and  tempted  them  to  deplete  their  stocks  of 
food — and  also  owing  to  the  quartering  of  local  regiments 
near  the  villages,  the  normal  self-sufficiency  of  the  country 
side  had  disappeared  and  the  whole  people  was  short  of 
food.  They  are  still  short  of  food  to-day,  and  this  is 
undoubtedly  one  of  the  great  problems  which  the  Austrians 
will  have  to  deal  with  at  once. 

Food   for  the   People. 

The  difficultj^  of  finding  fo#»d  for  the  people  wa? 
complicated  by  the  venality  of  the  governing  regime, 
by  the  lack  of  distributing  machinery — while  the  Monte- 
negrin grain-ships  at  Medua  were  much  more  frequently 
lost  than  those  coming  for  the  Serbian  army.  The 
attitude  of  the  Government  to  the  question  of  famine 
reminded  one  of  an  episode  in  one  of  Voltaire's  plays  where 
the  prophet  comes  to  announce  to  King  David  that  he 
has  sinned  and .  must  be  punished  but  can  choose  his 
punishment.  The  first  suggestion  is  three  days'  pestilence. 
The  second,  three  weeks'  discomfiture  at  the  head  of  his 
troops.  David  rejects  both  as  being  personally  danger- 
ous, but  accepts  the  suggestion  of  three  months'  famine 


February  3,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


because  as  he  says  "  There  will  always  be  something  to 
cat  in  the  palace."  And  that  was  undoubtedly  the 
attitude  at  Cettigne.  But  the  lack  of  food  was  an  ex- 
excellent  talking  point  whereby  to  ask  for  money  aid, 
or  explain  how  resistance  must  become  impossible.  The 
gradual  starving  of  the  people  was  an  excellent  method 
of  making  them  desire  a  cessation  of  hostilities,  a  recon- 
cihug  them  to  an  arrangement  with  Austria,  always  a 
very  present  actualite  in  Cettigne.  In  his  interviews 
with  the  diplomats  King  Nicolas  had  been  preparing  the 
way  for  some  time  past — ever  since  the  Serbian  army 
had  arrived  in  his  country.  While  they  were  there 
nothing  detinite  could  be  done,  it  was  too  dangerous,  but 
as  soon  as  the  bulk  of  the  forces  had  readied  Skutari, 
matters  became  acute. 

Warning  of  the  Attack. 

There  was  a  delightful  naivete  about  the  whole 
proceedings.  A  high  foreign  office  official  drove  round 
to  the  allied  diplomats  one  evening  and  announced  that 
the  Government  had  information  that  the  Austrians  would 
make  a  general'  attack  on  the  evening  of  the  orthodox 
Chiistmas.  This  was  home  four  days  previous.  The 
Montenegrins  would  do  all  they  could  to  defend  them- 
selves but  —of  course  the  men  were  starving  and  short  of 
everything.  Incidentally  I  may  say  that  when  I  was  on 
the  Lovchen  positions  the  men  were  receiving  bread — it 
was  the  third  day.  for  two  days  they  had  only  had 
potatoes — the  stories  of  twelve  days'  starvation  had  no 
foundation.  On  the  night  of  the  Austrian  attack.  King 
Nicolas  himself  visited  the  alhed  ministers  and  informed 
them  that  all  was  lost,  and  that  they  should  flee.  He 
also  sent  a  telegram  to  the  Servian  General  Staff  at 
Skutari  in  which  he  announced  that  all  was  lost,  and 
that  he  had  refused  both  armistice  and  peace,  but  that 
his  men  had  no  food  nor  ammunition.  This  was  all  so 
nmch  setting  of  the  stage  for  the  capitulation.  It  is 
practically  certain  that  the  Austrian  advance  was  no 
surprise  to  King  Nicolas  nor  to  the  Government,  which 
lie  had  changed  shortly  before  to  one  composed  ofrnen 
ready  to  do  his  bidding  blindly.  The  Austrian  contention 
that" an  armistice  and  possibly  a  capitulation  was  .'^igned, 
is  most  probably  true,  and  also  that  they  were  signed 
either  by  King  Nicola?,  Prince  Peter  or  the  Government. 
So  far  the  arrangement  had  been  carried  out,  but  then 
the  army  put  down  its  foot.  The  capture  of  the  Lovchen 
]jositions  was  one  thing,  but  the  occupation  of  Montenegro 
and  the  disarming  of  the  entire  population  was  another. 
The  bulk  of  the  army  therefore  refused  to  be  bound  by 
the  signatures  of  their  governors  and  decided  to  tight  on. 

Escape  to  Skutari. 

Many  were  in  no  position  to  do  so.  They  were  in 
outlying  parts  of  the  coimtry  without  any  means  of 
supply  or  retreat.  Such  forces  as  could  escape  made 
their  way  to  Skutari— with  them  went  Prince  Mirko, 
General  Martinovitch,  an  honest  man  who  was  recently 
in  this  country.  General  Vukotitch,  the  brother  of  the 
Queen  and  the'Serbian  officers.  King  Nicolas  and  Prince 
Peter,  who  was  thoroughly  Austrian  fled  the  country, 
dreading  both  the  anger  of  the  Montenegrin  army  and 
the  rage  of  the  Austrians  who  found  that  the  arrange- 
ment made  had  gone  astray  and  that  they  were  not 
going  to  have  an  easy  walk  over.  Exactly  who  was  the 
biter  and  who  the  bitten  it  is  hard  to  tell,  but  there  is 
no  denying  that  the  last  days  of  Montenegro  were  rather 
tarnished  than  glorious,  the  capture  of  Lovchen  was 
not  accompanied  by  any  heavy  fighting  although  there  was 
heavy  hring.  Afterwards  the  role  of  such  of  tlie  army 
as  declined  to  surrender  was  simply  that  of  retiring  on 
the  Serbian  rearguard  at  Skutari,  preserving  the  national 
honour  and  remaining  an  embryo  of  hope  for  the  future. 

The  occupation  of  Montenegro,  while  it  enables 
Austria  to  complete  the  subjugation  of  the  Serbian  peoples 
and  secure  her  occupation  of  Cattaro,  must  mean  leaving 
a  large  garrison  in  the  country.  It  also  means  feeding  the 
whole  population  since  otherwise  there  will  undoubtedly 
be  guerilla  warfare.  The  chance  of  using  the  inanhood 
vl  Montenegro  as  soldiers  (as  has  been  done  in  Serbia) 
does  not  present  manv  attractions,  since  the  Montenegrin 
lighter  is  of  small  value  in  a  modern  army.  One  result 
is  that  now  the  ultimate  inclusion  of  Montenegro  into  a 


greater  Serbia  is  hasrened — in  any  event  it  was  only  a 
question  oi  a  short  time. 

The  military  assistance  given  to  the  Allied  cause  \\  as 
never  great,  the  anxieties  and  worries  in  connection  witli 
keeping  the  governing  regime  supplied  with  money,  and 
at  the  same  time  endeavouring  to  benefit  the  deserving 
population,  w^ere  very  great.  It  is  probably  no  exaggera- 
tion to  say  that  to-day  the  conclusion  of  the  Montenegrin 
chapter  comes  as  a  relief  to  the  Allies  rather  than  as  a 
surprise.  For  long  it  has  been  known  that  it  only  needed 
an  opportunity  or  an  Austrian  desire  to  accomplish  the 
occupation,  partial  or  total,  of  Montenegro.  And  it  must 
not  be  forgotten  that  the  future  of  Montenegro  is  not 
settled  to-day  nor  will  be  until  the  final  settlement  after 
the  war — and  in  that  settlement  the  evidence  of  the  past 
four  years  will  be  weighed  and  known.  Whatever  may 
be  the  judgment  of  the  arbiters  of  the  new  map  of 
Europe,  it  is  certain  that  the  sins  of  commission  and  omis- 
sion of  those  recently  responsible  for  the  Government  of 
Montenegro  will  not  be  laid  at  the  door  of  a  brave  and 
patriotic  mountain  people,  whose  history  entitles  them  to 
respect,  whose  recent  sufferings  to  pity.  There  have  been 
instances  of  Governments  being  betrayed  by  individuals, 
in  Montenegro  we  have  an  instance  of  a  people  being 
betrayed  not  once  but  several  times  by  a  Government. 
The  future  of  Montenegro  is  inextricably  bound  up 
with  that  of  Serbia,  if  that  be  safeguarded  then  we  do  not 
need  to  be  anxious  as  to  the  results  of  the  Austrian  occu- 
pation of  King  Nicolas'  kingdom.  As  the  wave  of 
Austro-German  occupation  of  the  lands  of  the  Serbians 
is  rolled  back,  a  free  Montenegro  people,  untrammelled 
by  corrupt  government  will  play  a  part  and  in  so  doing 
achieve  a  real  national  existence. 


"BLACK    JACKS." 

To  the  Editor  of  Land  and  Wafer. 

SiK, — Apropos  of  the  paragraph  in  a  recent  issue  of  your 
journal  respecting  the  old  Black  Jacks  at  the  Merryweathcr 
Museum  at  (ireenwich,  there  are,  of  course,  other  places  in 
the  London  area  where  these  interesting  relics  can  be  seen  by 
the  general  public.  Six  remarkably  fine  specimens  are  kept 
in  the  Great  Hall  at  Chelsea  Hospital.  These  are  all  of  the 
same  size  and  shape  and  appear  to  be  in  an  excellent  state  of 
preservation.  They  are  large  Jacks,  each  about  22  inclies 
high  and  date  from  the  lytli  century.  In  the  Tudor  Room 
of  the  London  Museum  tliere  are  three  lOth  century  Black 
Jacks,  one  of  which  was  found  in  a  well  on  the  site  of  the 
Aquarium,  Westminster. 

Although  the  use  of  this  once  popular  drinking'  vessel  — 
a  relic  of  the  days  when  the  lord  and  master  partook  of  his 
meals  in  the  company  of  his  retainers — has  completely  dietl  out 
the  glamour  of  its  old  associations  still  Ungers. 

SiLENUS. 


Mr.  John  Lane  has  just  published  A  Book  of  Belgium's 
Gratitude,  which  has  been  designed  as  an  expression  of  the 
gratitude  felt  by  Belgians  for  the  help  and  hospitality  of  (ireat 
Britain  and  the  Colonies.  The  contributors  include  all  tiie 
most  distinguished  Belgians  in  politics,  society,  literature, 
and  art,  among  tliem  being  the  King  and  Queen  of  the  Belgians, 
H.  E.  Paul  Hymans,  M.  Uavignon,  M.  Lambotte,  Maurice 
Maeterlinck,  Emile  Verhaeren,  Emile  Cammaerts,  etc.  Tiie 
translators  also  include  distinguished  people,  among  them 
being  Lord  Curzon,  Lord  Cromer,  Sir  Claude  Phillips,  Lord 
Latymer,    and   Mr.    John   Buchan. 

Field  Gunnery,  by  Donald  A.  MacAlister.  (John  Murray. 
IS.  6d.  net),  is  a  manual  prepared  with  special  reference  to  the 
work  of  the  lieavy  batteries.  The  work  will  be  found  \ery 
useful  by  junior  ofiicers  in  heavy  artillery  works  as  well  as  by 
those  belonging  to  field  batteries.  The  author  explains  the 
elements  of  ranging  and  teaches  men  to  get  out  their  own 
forniulffi. 

Lieut. -Commander  Taprell  DorUng,  R.N.,  has  compiled 
a  very  useful  little  handbook  in  Ribbons  and  Medals  (G. 
Philip  and  Sons.  2S.  net.),  which  illustrates  and  describes 
II  hundred  and  twenty-five  naval,  military,  and  civil  medal 
ribbons  in  colour,  and  gives  numerous  reproductions  of  the 
various  orders  and  medals  which  these  ribbons  represent. 
The  book  is  not  intended  as  a  cyclopa'dia  of  the  subject,  but 
is  designed  to  jierniit  of  recognition  of  the  most-worn  decora- 
tions by  the  curious  observer,  aud  to  furnish  particulars  of 
the  service  by  which  the  decorations  in  t[uestion  were  earned. 
'Ihis  purjjose  it  fulfils  admirably,  and  as  a  reliable  text-book 
on  the  subject  at  ;i  popular  price  it  is  to  be  recommended. 


21 


LAND     AND     WATER 


February  3,  1916. 


Cliaya,  a  Romance  ot  the  South  Scai.] 


Ulhittrated   by  Joicph   Simpton.    KB. A. 


**  Well  Sir  !     I  tell  you  it  didn't  take  long  for  those  fellows  to  do  their  work.' 


February  3,  igi6. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


CHAYA. 

A  Romance  of  the  South  Seas. 
By  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoole. 

We  begin  to-day  one  of  the  hist  stones  of  adventure  that  has  ever  been  mritten  on  the  South  Seas.      Mr.  de 

Vere  Stacpoole  won  fame  with  his  hmutiful  tale  "  The   Blue  Lagoon."     He  not  onlv  knows,  hut  he  makes 

fits  readers  realise  the  mystery  and  exquisite  loveliness  of  those  distant  regions  ivhcre   '"  every  prospect  pleases 

and  only  man  is  vile." — hid  not  all  men.     The  story  opens  in  Sydney. 


Macquart. 

DAY  was  breaking  over  the  Domain,  §lorious,  gauzy 
with  mist,  warm  and  blue. 
The  larrikins  and  loafers,  drunkards  and  un- 
employed who  had  spent  the  night  on  the  grass 
were  scratching  themselves  awake.  Houghton  on  a  seat 
had  ceased  yawning  and  stretching  himself.  He  was  talking 
to  a  stranger,  a  man  slightly  over  the  middle-age  who  had 
slept  beside  him,  and  who  was  now  making  his  toilet  with  a 
bit  of  comb,  nmning  it  through  his  hair  and  his  grizzled 
beard  and  talking  all  the  time  in  an  easy,  garrulous,  volumin- 
ous manner,  more  suggestive  of  long  intimacy  than  of  total 
unacquaintanceship. 

Houghton,  who  had  awoken  surly  and  stiff  and  out  of 
temper  with  the  world,  was  sitting  now  with  his  arm  across 
the  seat  back,  his  legs  crossed,  and  his  foot  swinging,  listening 
to  the  other  who  was  making  the  conversation,  and  wondering 
vaguely  what  manner  of  man  he  might  be.  He  had  never 
eetn  anyone  at  all  Uke  him. 

"  And  the  strangest  thing,"  went  on  the  gentleman 
with  the  comb,  "  is  the  fact  that  the  off-scourings  of  the  city 
sleep  in  this  splendid  place,  fill  their  lungs  with  good  air 
and  wake  refreshed,  whilst  the  prosperous  folk  sleep  in  dog- 
holes — bedrooms,  if  you  like  the  term  better — and  wake  half 
poisoned  by  their  own  effluviums.  But  don't  think  I  am  a 
crank.  Oh,  dear  no.  When  I  am  well  off,  I  am  just  as  tough 
to  common  sense  as  the  rest  of  humanity.  I  sleep  in  a 
bedroom,  eat  too  much,  drink  too  much,  and  smoke  too 
much;  but  between  whiles  as  now,  for  instance,  when  I 
am  driven  to  the  simple  Hfe  I  enjoy  it,  and  I  get  a  glimpse  of 
what  might  have  been  if  men  had  stuck  to  tents  instead  of 
building  houses.  Freedom,  air,  light,  simplicity,  great  open 
spaces — those  are  the  things  that  make  Ufe.  Yes,  sir,  those 
are  the  things  that  count." 

"  You  have  been  about  the  world  a  lot  ?  "  said  Hough- 
ton. 

The  other,  having  finished  his  toilet,  was  now  regarding 
his  boots  with  a  critical  eye ;  one  of  them  showed  a  crack 
where  the  upper  met  the  sole  at  the  instep.  He  made  this 
crack  open  and  shut  like  a  mouth  for  a  moment,  viewed  it 
with  his  head  on  one  side,  and  then  said  :  i 

"  Almost  all  over  the  place.  North,  south,  east  and 
west,  doing  almost  everything  that  has  got  excitement  in  it. 
Living,  you  may  say — that's  the  word.  How  old  may  you 
be,  if  it's  not  an  impertinent  question  ?  Twenty-three,  and 
you  are  English,  I  can  see  that.  You  belong  to  the  class  they 
call  in  England  the  gentleman  class,  and  you're  out  here 
sleeping  with  old  rovers  like  me  and  all  that  hoggery  over 
there  on  the  grass  in  the  Domain  of  Sydney,  without  maybe 
more  than  a  shilling  in  j'our  pocket.  "  Well,  I  was  like  you 
once,  and  if  you  keep  on  as  you  are  going,  you'll  maybe  one 
day  be  like  me.  Look  at  me.  I  am  forty-seven  years  of 
age,  or  maybe  forty-eight,  for  I've  always  gone  by  dead 
reckoning — and  I  haven't  lost  a  tooth,  I  could  digest  an 
ostrich,  I  haven't  a  care  in  the  world,  and  I'm  always  alive 
because  I'm  always  interested.  I  have  made  three  fortunes 
and  lot  them,  Nowio  you  think  I  set  out  to  make  those  for- 
tuties  with  a  view  to  sitting  down  on  the  Hudson  or  on  Nob's  Hill 
or  in  the  city  of  Paris  or  London  and  enjoying  them  ?  I  never 
had  a  view  to  that.  I  never  had  a  view  to  a  palace  and  a 
fat  woman  covered  in  diamonds  for  a  wife,  and  sons  and 
daughters  and  all  such  like.  No,  sir,  I  fought  for  money  for 
the  fight  of  the  thing.  Money  !  I  love  it ;  it's  my  dream ; 
I  hunt  for  it  like  a  pig  for  truffles,  but  when  the  durned  thing 
is  in  my  hands  it  turns  to  lead  if  I  don't  use  it  to  make  more, 
and  that's  what  breaks  me.  For  I'm  like  this,  lucky  as  you 
like  when  I'm  on  the  make  adventuring  in  out-of-the-way 
places,  but  unlucky  as  Satan  when  I'm  speculating.  For 
instance,  I  made  a  big  pile  over  the  Klondyke  and  lost  every 
cent  m  the  wheat  pit  at  Chicago. 

"  1  was  going  about  Chicago  on  my  uppers  same  as  I'm 
going  about  Sydney  now,  had  to  accept  a  loan  to  get  away, 
then  I  bought  an  i.sland." 

"  You  bought  an  island  ?  " 

"  To  speak  more  truly,  I  bought  the  lease  of  one.  You 
can  buy  islands,  mind  you,  and  if  you  knew  the  Pacific  as  I 
do,  you'd  open  your  eyes  at  the  trades  that  have  been  done 
over  islands  in  these  seas.     There's  Ten  Stick   Island,   for 


instance,  in  the  New  Hebrides.  It's  nothing  much  ^  f  a  place, 
just  a  rock  sticking  up  out  of  the  sea.  You  Britishers  wanted 
a  target  for  gun  practice,  and  they  bought  the  durned  thing 
for  ten  sticks  of  tobacco  from  the  chief  who  owned  it.  At  one 
time  big  fortunes  were  made  by  fellows  who  came  along  and 
picked  up  islands  and  stuck  to  them,  shell  lagoons  and 
copra  islands ;  but  nowadays  the  governments  have  all 
closed  in  on  everything  bigger  than  a  mushroom,  oven  bits  of 
places  like  Takutea  and  god-forsaken  sand  banks  like  Gougli 
Island  have  their  owners.  W^H.  the  island  I  came  to  negoti- 
ate for  was  in  the  New  Hebrides.  It  was  valuable  because  its 
top  part  was  one  solid  block  of  guano.  An  old  whaler  captain 
brought  news  of  it  to  me.  I  met  him  in  a  bar  just  off  a  cruise. 
'  But  Where's  the  use.'  said  ho.  '  It  belongs  to  the  Australian 
Government,  and  at  the  first  wind  of  guano  they'll  close 
down  on  it.'  That  was  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  by 
four  o'clock  next  day  I  had  got  a  syndicate  together,  and  not 
long  after  we  had  a  lease  of  the  place  for  ten  years  for  almost 
nothing.  And  when  we  got  to  the  place  to  work  it,  it  was 
gone,  nothing  but  a  vigia  left.  Islands  go  like  that.  King- 
man Island  and  Dindsay  Island  and  a  hundred  others  ha\-o 
ducked  under,  leaving  only  a  reef  a' wash  or  lea\-ing  nothing. 
Well,  there  we  were— done  with  long  faces  and  empty  puises 
— Gimme  a  match." 

He  took  out  a  pipe  and  some  tobacco  wrapped  up  in  a 
scrap  of  the  Sydney  Bidklin.  Houghton  supplied  him  with 
a  match  and  he  began  to  smoke. 

Houghton  was  young  for  his  years.  He  had  left  Oxford 
without  a  degree  to  spend  two  thousand  pounds  which  came 
to  him  on  his  majority.  A  woman  had  helped  him  to  spend 
the  two  thousand  and  had  died  of  gallopmg  consumption, 
leaving  him  broken  and  heart-broken  at  the  same  tim;; 
without  a  profession,  with  expensive  tastes  and  no  earthly 
means  of  making  mone\'  save  with  his  hands. 

And  you  cannot  make  money  with  your  hands  in  England, 
so  he  came  to  the  Colonies,  fell  in  with  some  bar  acquaint- 
ances, risked  his  last  penny  on  a  horse  race  and  lost.  He  had 
rooms  in  Sydney  and  some  gear,  but  he  could  not  pay  his  rent, 
he  owed  for  board  and  lodging,  and  for  the  last  two  days  had 
been  living  from  hand  to  mouth.  No  one  need  starve  in 
Sydney,  it  is  the  most  tolerant  city  towards  loafers  in  the  world, 
not  that  Houghton  was  a  loafer  ;  he  was  just  a  man  without 
a  job. 

He  sat  looking  at  the  other  for  a  moment,  then  he  said, 
"  My  name  is  Houghton.  I'm  Enghsh,  as  you  say.  What  are 
you — American  ?  " 

"  No,  sir,"  'replied  the  stranger,  "  there's  no  American 
about  me.  I'm  the  most  thoroughbred  mongrel  that  ever 
crawled  on  God's  green  footstool  and  jumped  for  scraps. 
Macquart  is  my  name.  Simon  Macquart,  a  prospector  by 
nature  and  profession,  and  as  you  see  me  sitting  here  talking 
to  you  I  don't  look  much,  maybe,  but  I'm  out  after  a  fortune. 
A  dead  sure  thing.  Money  enough  to  make  a  do^en  men 
rich." 

He  stopped  short  and  puffed  at  his  pipe,  his  eyes  fixed 
away  towards  the  sea  as  though  the  fortune  had  suddenly 
materialised  itself  and  were  visible.  His  profile  seen  like 
this  hinted  at  a  characterjboth  daring  and  predatory.  Remem- 
ber that  a  man's  essential  character  is  exhibited  in  his  profile 
more  surely  than  in  any  other  outhne  or  combination  of  out- 
lines, and  the  character  of  Macquart  spoke  bud  at  that 
moment  as  he  sat  with  the  pipe  firmly  clenched  i^etween  his 
teeth  and  his  eyes  straining  towards  the  distance. 

"  What  is  it  ?  "  said  Houghton,  "  a  mine  ?  " 

"  Mine !  "  said  the  other,  returning  from  his  thoughts, 
"  Oh,  lord  no  !  It's  a  proposition,  and  this  very  morning  I 
am  going  to  lay  it  before  one  of  the  biggest  bags  in  Sydney. 
I've  been  carrying  it  about  in  my  skull  for  a  matter  of  some 
years,  always  hoping  to  be  able  to  find  money  of  my  own  to 
work  it  with — Couldn't.  Laid  hold  of  it  first  up  there, 
Bomco  way — never  mind  exactly  where,  reached  Portuguese 
Timor  and  sjunded  one  of  the  biggest  men  there,  a  Dutch- 
man, he  only  laughed  at  me — d d  ijit.     I  was  so  broke 

there  that  I  had  to  help  lading  ships  with  copra — they've 
taken  to  growing  cocoanut  palms  in  Timo:. — Then  I  took  a 
voyage  to  Frisco  for  my  health,  in  the  foc's'le.  Had  no  lark 
in  F"risco  and  drifted  to  Valdivia.  Th;re  I  nearly  had  a 
chance  in  a  loose  way  of  business  ;   starte  I  a  faro  table  with  a 


2.3 


LAND      AND     W A  T  E  R 


February  3,  1916. 


Spaniard,  and  was  piling  up  the  chips  when  my  partner 
scooped  the  pile  and  the  police  rlid  the  rest.  I-ord,  I  never 
was  so  beat  as  that  time.  I  g.it  a  boat  that  took  me  to 
Liverpool.  I  did  not  want  to  go  to  f.iverpool  a  bit,  but  the 
boat  did  and  as  1  was  one  of  the  hands  I  had  to  go  with 
her," 

He  tapped  the  dottle  out  of  his  pipe  against  his  boot  heel, 
and  as  ho  did  so  Houghton  cauglit  a  glimjise  of  tlie  fluke  of  a 
')Iue  anchor  tatoocd  on  his  wrist  and  exposed  by  the  stretching 
A  his  arm.  It  was  the  only  thing  about  the  man  suggestive 
jf  the  fact  that  he  had  lieen  a  sailor. 

"  From  that  I  worked  back  to  New  York,"  he  went  on, 
"  and  from  .New  York  here  and  there  till  I  arrived  in  the  old 
Colony,  ahcayx  with  an  eye  on  my  proposition  and  another 
eye  out  for  a  suitable  man  to  lay  it  before.  I  was  near  giving 
up  when  I  fell  in  with  a  likely  chap,  a  gentleman  bom  ;  met 
liini  in  a  bar  on  Market  Street,  cottoned  to  him  at  once,  just 
us  I've  done  to  you,  gave  him  a  whisper  of  what  was  in  my 
mind  and  set  him  alight  with  it.  He's  in  the  swim  here 
thougli  he  hasn't  much  money  of  his  own.  Bobby  Tillman  is 
his  name,  and  he's  going  to  lay  me  and  my  proposition  before  a 
likely  man  this  very  morning  :  eleven  o'clock's  the  hour. 
If  we  can  fix  things  up,  Tillman  is  the  man  to  collect  the  hands 
for  the  job  and  find  a  likely  \-essel ;  he's  in  with  all  the  water- 
side. Money  is  useful  in  a  thing  like  this,  but  it's  the  men 
that  pull  it  through  ;  get  the  wrong  ones  and  you're  done." 

"  Look  here,"  said  Houghton.  "  I  don't  know  what 
this  job  of  yours  may  be,  and  I  don't  want  to  be  inquisitive, 
but  it  seems  adventurous  and  you  seem  to  want  men.  Would 
there  be  any  show  for  me  in  it  ?  " 

"  And  why  not  ?  "  asked  Macquart,  "  if  you're  game  for 
roughing  it.  'Pears  to  me  I've  been  telling  you  a  lot  of  things 
I  wouldn't  have  told  to  a  casual  stranger.  Well,  it's  just 
l)ecause  I  seem  to  cotton  to  you.  Mind  now,  and  don't  be 
flying  away  with  things,  building  up  on  a  treasure  venture 
as  if  there  was  a  fortune  for  everyone  in  it ;  there's  not  that. 
There's  the  chap  with  money  to  be  considered,  there's  me  and 
there's  Tillman.  Rut  you'd  have  your  share  and  you'd  see 
things,  and  maybe  you'd  be  better  off  than  on  any  job  likely 
to  turn  up  in  Sydnej-.     Can  you  handle  a  boat  ?  " 

"  I've  done  a  good  deal  of  yachting  in  a  small  way." 

Macquart  laughed. 

"  That's  the  English  all  over,"  said  he,  "  bred  up  in 
idleness  and  sport,  and  then,  when  the  pinch  comes,  in  out-of- 
the-wav  places  the  sport  helps  them  through.  And  I  suppose 
you  know  the  which  end  of  a  gun  ?  " 

"  Yes,  I'm  a  fair  shot." 

"  You'll  do  all  right.  Oh,  I  reckon  you'll  do  all  right, 
if  we  can  only  collar  the  bug  with  the  money,  which  is  my 
business,  though  maybe  you  can  help  a  bit  in  that,  too.  I'm 
not  much  to  look  at,  but  your  clothes  are  all  right ;  you  only 
want  a  wash  and  a  brush  up  to  be  the  English  gentleman  new 
to  the  colonies.  There's  nothing  like  a  bit  of  good  appearance 
to  help  a  deal  through.  Tillman  is  good  enough,  but  he's  a 
bit  off  the  handle.  His  father  was  a  big  marine  store-dealer 
and  lie  died  worth  a  good  deal ;  left  his  pile  to  Bobby,  who 
spent  half  of  it  and  was  choused  out  of  the  rest — or  nearly  so, 
for  he's  got  a  bit  left,  not  much  but  enough  to  keep  him  idle. 
Well,  shall  we  get  a  move  on  ?  I'm  going  to  a  place  I  know 
for  some  breakfast — have  you  any  money  ?  " 

"  Two  shillings,"  said  Houghton,  without  any  shame  in 
stating  the  fact  of  his  destitution. 

"  Well,  keep  your  money  in  your  pocket.  I'll  pay.  I 
have  tick  at  the  place  I  know.  You'll  want  something  for 
drinks,  maybe,  and  I  expect  by  to-night  we'll  be  a  durned 
sight  better  off  if  I  can  touch  this  chap  with  the  money." 

They  left  the  Domain  and  entered  the  city.  The  morning 
was  now  blue  and  blazing,  the  streets  brilliant  with  sunlight, 
and  Houghton,  walking  beside  Macquart.  felt  a  wonderful 
uplift  of  mind  and  spirit. 

Macquart  was  practically  a  tramp,  though  better  dressed 
than  the  ordinary  hobo  ;  a  man  without  money  or  home  or 
prospects,  yet  of  such  an  extraordinary  personality  that  in 
iiis  companionship  all  these  details  of  life  seemed  of  little 
account.  This  dreamer  of  wealth  had  the  power  of  inspiring 
others  with  his  dreams— or  his  disease.  With  him  something 
wonderful  was  always  going  to  happen,  a  sure  thing  that  would 
shower  gold  on  himself  and  his  companions.  Given  a  man 
with  a  grain  of  imagination  and  placed  long  in  the  company 
of  Macquart.  and  that  man  would  be  lost — or  at  least  his 
money  would  be  lost,  but  at  least  he  would  have  had  excite- 
ment' for  his  money,  fabulous  dreams  of  wealth,  and  the 
vision  of  a  gorgeous  future. 

Houghton  was  under  this  spell  now.  Macquart  had  told 
him  quite  definitely  that  his — Houghton's— share  in  the 
Venture  would  be  small  ;  that  did  not  matter,  the  Venture 
was  the  main  thing,  the  atmosphere  of  romance  and  new  life 
that  Macquart  was*  able  to  cast  around  him  without  any 
effort,  the  spirit  of  youth  he  was  able  to  conjure  up  to  assist 
in  his  infernal  projects. 


No  man  can  influence  without  being  influenced  himself, 
no  man  can  make  others  feel  what  he  does  not  feel  himself. 
Macquart 's  whole-hearted  entiiusiasm  in  pursuit  of  his  own 
ideals,  his  genuine  joy  in  their  pursuit,  and  his  abandonment 
to  imagination  were  the  factors  no  doubt  of  his  success.  The 
old  clothes  that  covered  this  walking  romance  were  forgotten 
by  they  who  read  him,  the  dubious  morality  hinted  at  in  his 
j)iiysiognoniv  was  jiassed  over  ;  the  fact  that  he  was  a  walking 
parable  on  Poverty  was  unheeded — he  showed  men  Fortune, 
talked  of  her  as  his  mate,  and  made  them  believe. 

He  led  the  way  past  the  post-oftice  and  town-hall,  of 
which  splendid  buildings  he  seemed  as  proud  as  any  Sydneyite, 
and  then,  expatiating  on  the  palms  growing  in  front  of  the 
latter  building,  on  the  tramway  trafhe  of  the  streets  and  the 
general  prosperity  of  the  city,  led  on  down  a  by-way  to  the 
doors  of  the  modest-looking  cafe  where  he  possessed  tick. 

CHAPTER  II. 

Thi;  Man  Without  IntAGTNATiox. 

AT  ten  o'clock,  Macquart  leading  the  way,  they  entered 
Lamperts  bar  at  the  corner  of  Holt  Street.  Lam- 
perts  is  the  most  extensive  and  expensive  place  of 
Its  kind  in  Sydney,  and  that  is  saying  a  good  deal. 
After  and  before  a  race-meeting  it  is  crowded,  and  it  is  said 
that  more  money  is  made  and  lost  here  than  on  the  Wool 
Exchange.  Here  you  may  meet  a  great  many  notabilities, 
from  the  men  who  write  and  draw  for  the  first  paper  in  the 
Eastern  Hemisphere  to  the  man  who  has  won  the  last  sweep- 
stake. Lamperts  has  known  Phil  May,  his  pictures  are  on 
the  walls  ;  and  it  was  towards  a  young  gentleman  contemplat- 
ing one  of  these  pictures  that  Macquart  now  advanced. 

Tillman,  for  it  was  the  redoubtable  Bobby  Tillman 
himself,  turned  at  the  footstep  of  the  other,  recognised  him, 
and  taking  his  cigarette  from  his  mouth  gave  him  greeting. 

Tillman  looked  about  eighteen  ;  he  was  in  reality  twenty- 
seven  ;  fresh  complexioned,  clean-shaved,  and  well-dressed  in 
a  suit  of  blue  serge,  wearing  a  straw  hat  on  the  back  of  his 
head  and  his  hands  in  his  trousers'  pockets,  he  was  a  typical 
"  boy." 

Every  race-course  knew  him,  every  bookmaker  had 
made  money  out  of  him  ;  he  had  spent  a  little  fortune  on 
dissipation,  yet  he  remained  to  all  intents  and  purposes  quite 
fresh,  innocent,  and  young. 

Houghton  took  a  liking  at  once  to  this  new  acquaintance, 
and  having  been  introduced  by  Macquart  as  "  My  friend,  Mr. 
Houghton,  just  arrived  from  England,"  found  himself  leaning 
against  the  bar  counter,  a  soft  drink  at  his  elbow  and  his 
attention  entirely  occupied  by  Tillman,  who  was  talking  to 
Macquart  yet  including  him  in  the  conversation. 

"  Wliat  I  like  about  j'ou  is  your  punctuality,"  he  was 
sa5ang.  "  A  man  who  doesn't  keep  his  appointments  is  a 
man  who,  ten  to  one,  doesn't  keep  his  word.  Well,  here's 
to  3'ou." 

"  Here's  to  you,"  said  Macquart ;  "  and  how  about  the 
business  ?  " 

"  Oh,  that's  all  right,"  said  Tillman.  "  I  saw  Curlewis 
again  last  night  and  reminded  him.  We  are  to  be  at  his 
office  at  eleven  sharp  ;  he's  interested  and  that's  the  great 
thing.     Does  your  friend  know  anything  of  the  affair  ?  " 

"  Enough  to  make  him  want  to  lend  a  hand,"  replied 
Macquart,  half  turning  towards  Houghton.  "  He  can't  put 
any  money  into  the  thing " 

"  Not  a  cent,"  cut  in  Houghton,  with  a  laugh. 

"  But  he's  a  yachtsman,"  went  on  Macquart,  "  and  a 
good  shot  and  used  to  roughing  it — just  the  man  we  want." 

"  Good  Lord !  I  should  think  so,"  said  Tillman  en- 
thusiastically. "  Blow  the  money  ;  a  good  man  is  better  than 
riches  in  an  affair  like  this;  strength  in  the  after-guard  is 
what  we  want  and  chaps  that  aren't  afraid  of  the  weather. 
Houghton,  I'll  be  glad  to  have  you  with  us." 

"  I've  told  him  that  the  pay  won't  be  great  as  viewed  in 
proportion  to  the  takings,"  said  Macquart. 

"  There  you  go,"  cried  the  enthusiastic  Tillman,  "  talking 
of  pay  as  if  you  were  going  to  open  a  fried  fish  shop.  What 
comes  to  us  will  be  shared  in  proportion  to  what  we  do  or  what 
we  put  into  the  business.  You  see,  in  a  safe  land  show  it's 
all  very  well  talking  of  salaries,  but  in  an  affair  where  we  all 
risk  being  eaten  by  fishes  or  chewed  by  tigers,  shares  is  a 
better  word  than  salaries." 

The  word  "  tigers  "  made  Houghton  look  up. 

"  There  aren't  any  tigers,"  said  Macquart ;  "  tree  cats 
and  "leopards,  nothing  worse." 

1  don't  want  to  ask  too  many  questions,"  said  Houghton. 
"  or  make  you  give  tlie  show  away  before  you  want  to,  but 
would  it  be  too  much  to  ask  where  we  are  going  ?  " 

"  Mean  to  say  you  don't  know  ?  "  cried  Tillman. 

"  Not  in  the  least." 

"  Well,    you    take    the   biscuit.     You   do,    indeed.     By 


24 


February  3,  1916. 


LAND      AND     WATER 


George,  tfiat's  the  spirit  I  like,  ready  to  sign  on,  maybe  for 
Hades    without  a  question  !  " 

Mr.  Tillman  did  not  say  Hades.  I  doubt  if  his  classical 
knowledge  included  the  meaning  of  the  word.  He  clung  to 
the  Anglo-Saxon,  and  Houghton  laughed. 

"  I'd  just  as  soon  sign  on  for  there  as  stay  in  Sydney 
without  a  cent  in  my  pocket,"  said  he,  "  and  it  couldn't  be 
hotter." 

"  Well,  it's  not  far  from  here  we  are  going,"  said  Tillman 
"  It's  up  north." 

"  New  Guinea,"  put  in  Macquart. 

"  Up  a  river  in  New  Guinea  to  find  something  that's 
there,"  said  Tillman.  "  You'll  hear  it  all  when  Macquart 
spins  his  yarn  to  Curlewis.  Well,  shall  we  be  .going?  It's 
some  way  "from  here,  and  it's  no  harm  to  be  a  bit  ijefore  time." 

He  led  the  way  out  of  the  bar  and  they  passed  down  the 
street,  Tillman  saluting  nearly  every  second  person  tliey  met. 
He  seemed  to  be  a  well-known  character  and  the  greetings  he 
received — so  Houghton  fancied — spoke  of  amiability  and 
good-fellowship  rather  than  high  respect.  Houghton's  interest 
in  this  strange  budding  venture  was  concentrated  now  less  on 
the  main  than  the  immediate  objective.  How  would  Curlewis 
receive  his  irresponsible  visitor  ?  How  would  he  receive  the 
seedy  Macquart  ?  He  felt  himself  to  be  a  fifth  wheel  in  this 
ramshackle  chariot  so  boldly  setting  out  on  the  road  to  riches, 
and  outside  the  wool  broker's  office  he  frankly  said  so,  sug- 
gesting that  he  should  wait  in  the  street  till  the  interview 
was  over. 

But  Tillman  would  have  none  of  that.  He  declared 
Houghton's  presence  to  be  an  indispensable  factor  in  the  pro- 
ceedings. He  was  one  of  the  "  crew,"  why  should  he  skulk 
in  the  street  whilst  the  others  were  putting  in  hard  work  ? 

"  Hard  work — by  Gad,  all  the  rest  will  be  nothing  to  this 
— raising  money,  why,  it  will  be  more  like  lifting  it.  I  tell 
you,  we  have  to  carry  this  chap  by  assault ;  he's  as  good  as 
they  make  them,  but  y'see  they  made  him  a  business  man 
and  that's  the  worst  sort.  However,  we'll  do  it,  if  only 
Screed  isn't  there.  Screed's  his  partner,  hard  as  nails,  no 
ideas  about  anything  but  wool.     Well,  come  on." 

They  entered  the  building,  found  Curlewis'  office,  and 
were  ushered  right  into  the  great  man's  private  room. 

Curlewis  was  standing  with  his  back  to  the  empty  stove. 
He  was  a  joyous  and  opulent-looking  young  man  of  some 
thirty  years,  immaculately  dressed,  easy-going,  an  optimist 
and  enthusiast  by  birth,  judging  from  all  appearances. 
Houghton,  at  sight  of  this  gentleman,  felt  his  spirits  rising. 
Here  was  surely  a  man  to  further  adventure,  or,  at  least,  not 
to  cast  cold  water  on  the  adventurous. 

He  scarcely  noticed  a  mean-looking  man  like  a  cierK 
seated  at  the  desk  near  the  window,  till  he  heard  Curlewis 
say  in  answer  to  Tillman,  "  Oh,  Screed  won't  be  disturbed 
by  you  ;  he's  busy  with  his  letters  and  he  has  no  ears  or  eyes 
for  anything  else.     Chatter  away  as  much  as  you  like." 

He  saw  in  Screed  the  rock  on  which  their  venture  might 
split,  and  he  hated  Screed  accordingly. 

But  Tillman  was  talking  now  : 

"  Well,"  said  he,  "  we'll  get  to  business  then,  at  once, 
and  if  this  is  a  fool's  holiday,  maybe  we'll  prove  we're  not 
such  fools  as  we  look." 

"  Tillman,"  put  in  Macquart,  now  speaKmg  tor  tne  hist 
time,  "  there's  no  manner  of  use  in  blowing  a  man's  own 
trumpet  in  the  first  lines  of  a  prospectus.  Whether  we're 
fools  or  whether  we're  not  doesn't  matter  a  row  of  pins  if  the 
proposition  is  a  good  one.  I'd  a  durned  sight  rather  be  led 
to  a  fortune  by  a  fool  than  stick  round  making  a  living  under 
the  guide  of  a  wise  man."  Then  turning  to  Curlewis  :  "  I'm 
the  head  and  front  of  this  business,  and  looking  at  me  you 
might  say,  '  Here's  a  nice  sort  of  chap  to  come  talking  of 
fortune — why,  he's  broke.'  "  Well,  maybe  I  am  ;  but  if  I 
am,  it's  because  I  have  been  going  about  with  knowledge  in 
my  head  that's  worth  more  than  the  fools  who  won't  listen  to 
me  will  ever  make  in  business.  Did  you  ever  see  a  pros- 
pector who  wasn't  broke  till  he  managed  to  make  good  and  hit 
the  stuff  he  was  after  ?  Well,  the  long  and  the  short  of  it  is, 
I'm  alter  John  Lant's  treasure  and  I  mean  to  lift  it." 

"  John   Lant  ?  "   said   Curlewis,   tentatively. 

"  The  same,"  rephed  Macquart.  "  You  don't  know  who 
lie  IS— or  who  he  was,  to  speak  more  properly.  Well,  he  was 
one  of  the  chaps  who  used  to  trade  from  Sydney  in  the  old 
days.  It's  not  so  very  long  ago  either,  but  long  enough  to 
have  covered  his  traces." 

Curlewis  had  takeja  a  box  of  cigars  from  a  side  table, 
and  was  offering  tlie  narrator  a  smoke.  The  box  was  passed 
round  and  Houghton  fit  up  cheerfully.  Curlewis  was  evidently 
interested  ;  only  the  infernal  Screed,  who  evidently  was  a 
nun-smuker,  remained  outside  the  charmed  circle,  and  the 
occasional  scratching  of  his  pen  could  be  heard  like  a  comment 
on  the  words  of  Macquart. 

"  Every  one  of  them.  '  continued  Ihe  Prospector,  '  and 
tne  tricks  he  didn't  find  to  his  hand  he  in\ented  ;    and  the 


ones  lie  found  he  embroidered  on.  Well,  he  went  like  that 
laying  up  the  chips,  till  one  day  he  had  a  dust  up  with  the 
Dutch  Government  ;  and  what  he'd  done  I  don't  know,  but 
the  Dutch  Government  confiscated  his  property.  He'd 
invested  his  plunder  in  land  at  Macassar,  and  land  in  other 
parts  owned  by  the  Dutch.  They  say  there  was  a  big 
gambling  shop  in  Macassar  owned  by  him  ;  anyhow,  all  his 
savings  were  under  the  thumb  of  the  Dutch.  You  see,  he'd 
been  doing  so  many  shad}'  things,  I  expect  he  didn't  like  to 
have  ownings  where  the  British  Government  could  touch  them, 
which  proves  he  was  a  fool,  for  the  British  Goveriunent  is 
the  best  friend  to  a  chap  like  that  who  has  money  enough  to 
work  the  law.  The  Dutch  Government  didn't  bother  about 
the  law  ;  they  knew  he  was  a  rogue  and  they  scooped  his 
property. 

"  It  was  wnen  he  called  at  Macassar  with  his  ship  that 
he  got  the  news,  and  they  impounded  the  ship.  Tiiey  im- 
pounded iiim  and  his  crew,  too,  in  an  old  calaboose  place.  He 
had  stepped  right  off  the  blue  sea  into  blue  ruin,  but  that  did 
not  check  Lant.  He  got  wind  in  prison  one  day  that  a  Dutch 
ship  from  Amsterdam  had  just  come  into  the  roads  and  that 
she  was  loaded  up  to  her  hatches  with  specie,  to  say  nothing  of 
general  cargo.  The  TcrscheUing  was  her  name.  It  was 
during  the  rains,  and  Lant  and  his  men  broke  out  of  the; 
calaboose  that  night,  rowed  oft  to  the  Terschelling  and 
boarded  her,  shouting  out  "  Customs  "  to  the  cliap  that  was 
on  duty.     He  flung  them  a  ladder  to  help  them  on  board. 

"  Well,  sir,  I  can  tell  you  it  didn't  take  long  for  tliose 
fellows  to  do  their  work,  the  anchor  watch  being  below 
sheltering  from  the  rain  and  wind,  all  except  tlie  man  who'd 
helped  them  aboard.  They  clapped  the  foc's'le  hatch  to, 
stunned  the  look-out  man  and  shoved  him  in  the  lee  scuppers, 
knocked  the  shackle  off  the  anchor  chain  and  loosed  the 
topsails,  all  before  you  could  say  '  knife.'  Lant  and  his  crew 
were  handy  men,  and  they  had  that  brig  away  like  picking 
a  purse  from  a  pocket,  and  there  was  nothing  to  chase  them  ; 
the  Dutch  gunboat  on  the  Macassar  station  was  poking  about 
after  pirate  praus  on  the  Bomean  coast,  and  the  biggest  bit  of 
piracy  ever  done  in  those  waters  going  on  right  before  Macassar. 
It  all  fell  in  like  a  tune,  besides,  no  one  wanted  to  chase  them, 
for  no  one  knew,  till  tlie  next  morning  when  sun  up  showed 
the  Terschelling  gone. 

"  All  the  same,  Lant  would  have  been  had  most  certanuy 
and  surely  if  he'd  been  an  ordinary  man  ;  for  where  couki  hi- 
have  taken  the  Tefschelling  ?  What  port  in  God's  earth  coukl 
he  have  taken  her  to,  she  smelhng  of  Schiedam  and  Amsterdam 
a  mile  off,  with  all  her  papers  made  out  in  Dutch  and  the 
very  timbers  of  her  shouting  her  nationahty.  No,  sir,  it 
couldn't  be  done.  And  then  the  specie.  How  could  he  have 
dealt  witli  that.  What  would  the  Customs  have  said  ? 
You  can  fancy  him  getting  those  treasure  chests  ashore  in 
any  harbour,  can't  you,  just  'bout  as  easy  as  you  can  fancy  a 
dromedary  playing  a  fiddle.  Well,  Lant  knew  better  tlian 
that ;  he  knew  of  a  river  on  a  certain  coast,  a  river  that  came 
down  and  disembogued  itself  among  coral  reefs  and  sea 
lagoons,  places  where  the  Chinese  go  for  trepang  and  wlierc 
the  pirate  praus  used  to  wash  up  and  brush  themselves  after 
a  fight,  and  he  knew  the  chaps  who  were  chief  men  there,  for 
he  had  traded  with  them  and  fought  with  tliem  till  they  were 
all  as  friendly  as  the  members  of  a  Baotist  tea-party  when  the 
Sally  Lunns  are  going  round. 

"  You  see,  gentlemen,  the  Malays  ana  the  Sea  Dyaks 
nave  their  vices  no  doubt,  but  they're  not  wild  animals  any 
more  than  you  and  me.  They  have  lots  of  straight  in  theni, 
and  once  you  have  got  their  confidence  by  punching  tiieir 
heads,  you  can  depend  on  them  so  long  as  you  act  straight 
by  them. 

"  Now  this  river  I'm  speaking  ot  was  not  situateu  m 
Borneo,  as  I've  told  Mr.  Tillman.  It  was  and  is  situated  on 
the  New  Guinea  coast.  The  people  that  live  on  its  banks 
aren't  New  Guinea  folk  but  Sea  Dyaks  from  Borneo.  What 
drove  those  Sea  Dyaks  to  colonise  a  New  Guinea  river,  [  don't 
know,  but  there  they  are,  hke  a  plum  graft  planted  on  au 
apple  tree,  as  you  may  say. 

"  Lant  brought  the  Terschelling  in  here,  telUng  the  Dyaks 
tnat  she  was  a  new  ship  of  his,  and  he  got  her  up  tliat  river 
by  warping  and  kedging  till  she  was  lying  safe  and  sound 
in  one  of  the  upper  reaches,  with  the  mangroves  brushing  her 
yard  arms  and  the  monkeys  playing  the  fool  in  lier  rigging, 
brought  her  up  to  the  steep  bank  sajne  as  if  it  had  been  a  quay 
side. 

"  The  rams  were  on,  as  I  said,  and  that  gave  nnn  very 
deep  water,  thougli  it  didn't  need  the  rains,  for  these  rivers 
are  scoured  out  deep  and  always  have  a  big  command  of 
water.  Some  of  the  biggest  liills  in  the  world  are  in  tiie  middle 
of  New  Guinea  and  one  of  the  finest  lakes,  too. 

"  Lant  told  the  Dyaks  that  he  was  tired  of  sea  roving 
and  had  comt;  to  live  among  them  for  awhile.  He  had  got 
such  a.  name  for  tigliting  that  they  almost  looked  on  him  as 
an  immortal,  which  he  pretty  near  was,  for  he  was  riddled  with 


25 


LAND     AND     WATER 


February  3,  1916. 


bullet  wuuud.  like  a  sieve  yet  as  full  of  Ufe  as  a  grig.    1  reckofi 
he  was  the  sort  of  immortal  u  crocodile  is. 

••  VVeU  Laut  played  up  to  that  game,  and  the  cargo  of 
the  Tcnchellim  being  of  no  manner  of  use  to  him.  he  makes 
uge  presents 'to  the'chief  men.  and  by  night  on  the  sly  he 
L'Pts  his  cases  of  specie  ashore  and  caches  them.  The  value 
bf  that  'pecie  ran  to.  roughly,  half  a  m.Uion  as  counted  in 
EiiKhsh  gold  com,  or  pretty  near  seven  tons  of  gold. 

^Macquart  paused^^for  a  moment  to  deal  with  Ins  ciga  . 
and  let  the  statement  sink  into  the    mtelhgences    of    his 

audience. 

Curlewis  alone  spoke.  „  , 

"  You   are   pretty   precise,"    said   he.        Yet   all   that 

''•^^^■^"N^aUnirMvTfimsrd'-^sidXcquart.  "and  you'll 

^^^  '^^l^tSZ  d^iS'elerything  of  worth  out  of  the 
laschclling.  set  alight  to  her  by  accident,  and  that  s  the 
blackest  btt  of  the  business,  for  it  seems  she  caught  fire 
while  the  crew  was  aboard,  and  somehow  or  another  the 
tuc's'le  hatch  had  been  lastened,  so  the  whole  lot  were  fried 

said    Curlewis.     "Why,    this    chap 


"  Good    God  !  " 

"^"'■•S'eiunS^'it,"  said  Macquart :  "  but  one  man  of  them 
escaped,  a  lellow  to  whom  Lant  had  taken  a  fancy  ;  he  vvas 
' lurigltly  chap  and  Lant■^  right  hand  and  so  he  escaped 

•'Well  Lant  settled  down  among  the  Dyaks.  waiting  till 
thinKS  had  blown  over  in  Macassar  and  his  name  was  forgotten, 
and  he  fell  into  the  life  there  and  grew  l^^^v/J^,^  t°ok  a  wife 
to  pass  the  time.  The  young  fellow  he  h^^  saved  from  the 
crew  didn't  like  this;  he  fancied,  and  nghtly  enough,  that 
Lant  was  done  for,  sprung  in  the  imtiative  and  grown    ?.t 

1  the  intellect  ;  besides.  Lant  began  to  treat  hmi  as  a  sub- 
ochnate  Besides,  he  had  a  wish  for  that  lump  of  specie 
aU  for  himself,  and  Lant  didn't  give  him  even  the  promise 
of  a  sniff  in.  Besides,  one  day  Lant's  Dyak  wife  presented 
h  ,n  v^  h  a  baby.     Chaya  was  the  wife's  name  and  Chaya 

hey  Tailed  the  girl,  and  the  young  feUow  saw  that  with  a 
ianiily  growing  up  his  chance  of  the  specie  was  growing  smaUer, 
mi  lie  tixed  it  in  his  mind  to  do  Lant  in. 

'  What  was  that  youim  fellow's  name  ?  "  suddenly  asked 
Curlewis   with  his  eyes  steadily  fixed  on  Macquart 

The  question  brought  the  tale-teller  up  aU  standing.    He 

hesitated  a  moment.  „  ,  •     c    -ii    t^^  t'„, 

"  Smith  was  his  name.  Or  let  us  call  him  Smith,  for  I  m 
not  free,  under  promise— though  hes  dead  now— to  give 
the  real  thing.     We'll  call  him  Smith.' 

"  Go  on,"   said  Curlewis.  .    ,       j    t 

"  Well,  this  Smith,  he  fixed  it  in  his  mind  to  do  Lant  m, 
and  so  it  happened.  Lant  one  day  disappeared  He  d  kept 
his  dignity  with  the  Dyaks  and  his  distance,  so  that  they 
still  bdieved  in  him  as  a  sort  of  God,  not  a  real  God.  you 
unde^tand.  but  an  Atu  Jalan.  White  people  among  the 
Dyak?Sd  the  name  once  of  being  Atu  Jalans.  soit  of  spirits 
returned  from  the  dead.  They  thought  Lant  had  gone  a 
trip  to  heaven  or  somewhere,  and  would  return,  sure. 

"  Well   Smith  found  himself  free  of  Lant.  but  he  hadn  t 
.eckoned  on  Lant's  wife,  Chaya.     There's  nothing  more  sure 
than  that  women  and  dogs  hunt  by  scent    and  have  some 
means  of  finding  out  things  that  men  don  t  suspect      Any- 
how Lant 's  Nvife  took  a  down  on  Smith.     You  see  she  didn  t 
think  Lant  a  god  for  the  very  good  reason  that  he  was  her 
hu  band,  and  fhe  susi^cted  Smith  of  having  done  him  in  and 
she  got  up  a  yarn  about  him,  said  he  had  witched  her  baby 
which  wa^  only  three  months  old  then   and  she  got  lots  of 
dicvers     They  had  never  cottoned  to  Smith  from  the  firs^t, 
and  Ihey  went  for  him,  and  he  escaped  down  that  nver  by 
the  skin  of  his  teeth-that  was  sixteen  years  ago.     He  got 
01  in  a  prau  and  was  picked  up  by  an  Engli^li  ^hiP.  but  lie  d 
?akeii  w?tli  him  the  bearings  of  the  cache  and  the  chart  ot 
just  where  it  was.     Much  good  they  did  him. 

"  Three  years  he  knocked  about  the  world,  and  then  he 
had  a  dust  tip  somewheie  in  the  French  colonies  and  killed 
uf reicTman  and  got  sent  to  Noumea  for  life  He  was  stuck 
the le  S.v?n  yearsliid  escaped.  He  still  had  his  chart  and 
^knowledge  of  the  cache.  Much  good  they  did  him.  Lhe 
u^iH  is  so  chock-full  of  fools  he  could  get  no  one  to  listen 
to  him.  Then  I  met  him  two  years  back  and  did  him  a  service 
Sid  before  he  pegged  out  he  gave  me  fuU  directions  and  the 
Sart  and  more  than  that,  the  New  Guinea  coast  map  with 
the  riVer  marked  down.  It  was  easy  for  him  to  put  his  finger 
on  the  point.-There's  no  mistaking  the  entrance  to  that 

"''""^kacquart  rose  and  threw  his  cigar  end  into  the  grate. 

Then  he  sat  down  again.  „     "  fi,,f  =    o 

'  WeU  "  said  Tillman,  breaking  silence,  that  s  a 
straiuht  yarn  if  ever  there  was  one  ;  all  the  details  and  a 
cW  t  o  back  them.  I'm  ready  to  risk  my  life  on  the  thing 
^'id  n>-  bottom  dollar.    Well,  Curlewis,  what  do  you  say  i 


Now  Bobbv  Tillman  had  up  to  this  known  only  the 
lighter  side  of  "Curlewis.  He  had  played  cards  with  him 
attended  race  meetings,  met  him  at  the  clubs  and  grown  to 
regard  him  as  a  good  companion,  an  easy-going  man  ready 
to  fling  his  monev  about,  and  asking  nothing  better  than 
amusement.  He  fancied  that  he  knew  Curlewis :  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  he  only  knew  the  surface  of  that  gentleman. 

Curlewis,  despite  his  surface  irregularities,  was  one  of  the 
most  level-headed  men  in  Sydney,  one  of  the  hardest  business 
men  in  the  Colonies,  one  of  the  least  imaginative  of  traders. 
His  business  self  and  his  social  self  were  as  widely  ditferent 
from  the  other  as  the  two  profiles  of  Janus,  and  the  business 
side  of  the  man  was  the  real  side.  u-       ^  .*k 

"  Well  "  said  Curlewis,  taking  the  cigar  from  his  mouth 
and  tipping  the  ash  mto  the  grate.  "  It's  an  interesting  story, 
but  I  am  not  inclined  to  back  you  in  any  financial  undertaking 

^^^"  But  'good  heavens!"    said  Tillman,   "think  for    a 
moment.    .This  isn't  a  financial  undertaking  but  a  specula- 
tion  the  grandest  speculation  that  ever  flew  in  Sydney. 
'"  Tiiat's  just   my  reason,"    said  Curlewis.       I   nevei 

speculate."  .     ,    ,  •      -, 

"  Never  speculate.    Why.  what  s  horse  racing  i 
"  Gambling— and  I  never  gamble." 
"  Oh,  good  Lord  I  "    said  Tillman.        Why,  I  ve  seen 

"  Yes.  you  have  seen  me  back  a  horse  for  a  few  pounds, 
and  I  think  you  have  even  seen  me  lose  a  few  pounds  at 
Bridge— but  I  never  gamble.  When  I  say  I  never  gamble, 
I  don't  refer  to  the  few  shillings  I  amuse  myself  by  losing  or 
winning  at  the  card-table  or  on  the  race-course,  and  even  in 
that  feeble  way  mv  losings  and  winnings  are  negligible— Last 
year— he  took  a"  small  note-book  from  his  pocket  and  re- 
ferred to  it.  "  my  losings  on  the  race-course  amounted  to 
seven  pounds,  and  my  winnings  at  Bridge—  "  he  turned  to 
another  page—"  to  four  pounds  ten.  Two  pounds  ten,  you 
see  I  spent  last  year  on  this  sort  of  work,  and  if  my  memory 
serves  me,  I  came  out  the  year  before  five  pounds  to  the 

^  °  Tillman,  dumbfounded  at  the  mechanical  and  orderiy 
and  entirely  sane  and  sedate  individual  disclosing  before 
his  eyes,  said  nothing.  It  was  like  watching  a  butterfly 
breaking  to  pieces  and  a  grub  emerging  from  the  debris. 

"  Now  if  I  were  to  put.  say,  a  thousand  pounds,  into 
this  venture  of  yours.  I  might  lose  it  or  I  might  win  it  back 
and  a  good  deal  of  money  on  top  of  it.  But  win  or  lose  would 
not  alter  the  fact  that  I  would  have  broken  my  principle. 

"  Besides,  though  the  story  bears  the  evidence  of  genuine- 
ness, I  do  not  think,  honestly  and  speaking  as  a  business  man 
without  any  intention  of  giving  offence,  that  any  sane 
business  man  would  risk  his  money  on  it.  I  don't  think  you 
will  carry  that  story  about  in  Sydney  to  a  profit.  I  am  cruel 
only  to  be  kind.     I  think  you  are  wasting  your  time  all  of  you 

unless — " 

"  Yes  ?  "  said  Tillman. 

"The  three  of  you  put  your  lieads  together  and  write 


it  oiil.     The  Bulletin  might  give  you  something  for  it. 

It  was  Macquart  who  broke  the  stony  silence  that  followed 
on  this  piece  of  advice,  and  he  broke  it  in  an  unexpected 

way. 

"  Mr.  Curiewis  is  right,"  said  he.  "  No  sane  man  m 
Sydney  would  part  on  such  a  prospectus.  I'm  not  wishing 
to  be  rude  to  Mr.  Curlewis,  but  sane  men  don't  do  these  things, 
it's  only  the  insane  men  that  rise  to  a  big  occasion.  I  reckon 
Rhodes  or  some  chap  like  that  is  what  we  want  and  we  won  t 
find  him  in  Sydney,  but  I'm  going  to  put  my  hand  on  that 
stuff  if  I  have  to  walk  to  New  Gumea  'long  the  great  Barrier 
Reef  and  dig  for  it  with  my  teeth  when  I  get  there.  I  ve 
been  held  back  from  it  too  long.  My  constitution  wont 
stand  it.  WeU,  thank  you  for  the  cigar  and  good-day  to  you, 
and  when  I  see  you  again,  I  hope  you'll  be  tearing  your  hair 
at  having  been  out  of  it.     Come  along,  boys."  ■ 

He  had  come  in  last,  he  went  out  first,  leading  the  others 
and  looking  not  in  the  least  dejected. 

When  they  were  gone.  Screed  stopped  his  writing  and 
turned  to  Curlewis. 

"  Do  you  know  what  I  am  thinking  ?      said  Screed,      1 
am  thinking  that  chap  Macquart  never  met  anyone  called 
Smith.     It's  his  story,  first-hand." 
"  How  do  you  mean  ?  " 

"  I  mean,  it  was  he  that  did  the  other  man  in,  Lant— or 
whatever  his  name  was— and  that  it  was  he  who  was  sent  to 
Noumea."  ,, 

"  Anyhow,  he  won't  get  any  of  my  money,  said  Cur- 
lewis. "  Lot  of  d— d  lunatics— but  I  won't  say  it  was  a  bad 
story.     That  chap  can  pitch  a  yam." 

Screed  finished  his  letter,  then  he  rose  and  went  out, 
telling  the  other  as  he  took  his  hat  from  the  peg  by  the  door 
that  he  would  not  be  long. 

(To  he  contitiued.) 


26 


I 


February  3,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER. 


^^  One  Second 


I 


■"-^^/'/ 


Need. 

no 
FiJie 


before   leaving   for 

the  trenches  is  not 

too  late  to  discover 

that    your    pen    is 

(jr-^  '  empty  if  it   is    an 

^  Onoto. 

In   less    time    than    it    takes    to    tell,  the 

Onoto  fills  Itself  from  any  ink  supply  and 

cleans  the  nib  while  filling. 

The    Perfect    pen   for   soldiers,  it    needs 
no  hller. 

Onoto 

Pen 


THE 


THOMAS  DB  LA  RUE  &  CO.,  LTD 


Actual  I 


THE    "WESTFIELD"   SOFT    SERVICE    CAP 

with  or  without  back  curtain. 

Fitted  with  waterproof  lining  and  greaseproof  shields, 

15/6 

The  accepted  design  for    both    home    and    active    service  wear 
grips  the  head  without  pressure,  and  will  neither  blow  nor  falloflF. 

WEST  &  SON  ^i'/^/s^-^^^^^^- 


13 


MAKERS 
51   NEW  BONO  STREET,  LONDON,  W. 


OHS,      I 
.ERS,     I 


Mills  Equipment  Cleaner  does 
not  cover  the  dirtiness  of  web 
equipment  —  it  removes  it  and 
restores  the  original  color  of  the 
fabric.  It  also  waterproofs  the 
web.     Absolutely  non-injurious. 

It  is  the  original  web  equipment 
cleaner  —  approved  by  the  War 
Office.  Clean  to  use.  Does  not 
rub  off.  A  little  goes  a  long  way, 

3d.   per  Packet  at  Canteens.        Sample  Packet  sent  for  4d. 

in    stamps. 

MIU.S  CLEANER  CO.,  I'.  Nile  Street,  City  Road,  I.onHon,  N. 


BURBERRYS 

SERVICE    DRESS 


THE    se:^vice 

*  UNIFORM  was 
designed  hy  Bur- 
berrys  under  the 
instructions  of  the 
War  Office,  and  is, 
in  fact,  a  modified 
form  of  the  famous 
Burberry  Sporting 
Suit  which  is  recog- 
nized as  the  pertect 
embodiment  of 
Freedom,  Comfort 
and  Protection. 


DURBERRYS' 
"    SERVICE 
CLOTHS  —  woven 
and      proofed      by 
txclusive  processes 
—have     stood     the 
test  of  many  >  ears' 
usage  both  in  Peace 
and  War,  and  their 
splendid  protective 
and  wearing  quali- 
ties have  been  vin- 
dicated   on  Active 
Service    by  distin- 
guished   Officers 
whose    names    are 
household      words 
throughout   the 
world. 

D U  RBE  RRY 
"  SERVICE 
DRESS  is  unri- 
valled for  its  powers 
ol  excluding  wet  or 
cold,  and,  whilst 
lightweight, 
strong  and 
wearing    as 

capable     of 

standing  prolonged 
exposure  to  every 
kind  of  weather,  as 
well  as  the  rough 
usage  and  rigorous 
conditions  inevit- 
able in  campaigning 


is  so 
hard- 
to  be 
with 


Every  Genuine 
liurberry  Garment 
is  label 'ed 
"  Burberrya." 


BURBERRY   SERViCE~Krf 

unic,   Serge  ...      from  ft    t  n    p-:i:.i.    \x,  * 


Tunic,  Serge  ...  from  £3  3  0 
,,  Whipcord  ...  from  £4  4  0 
Knicker-Rreeches.  Serge  ■ .  £2  2  0 
D-j  "  o  "  1  Whipcord  £2  12  6 
Riding  Breeches  ...  from  £330 
Slacks from  £\  l\  g 


Ihe  Burberry,  Infantry        £3    3  0 
Ihe  Burberry,  Cav.Iry        £3  ,3  g 
Liabardine  Trench- Warm, 
lined       Wo  o  1 ,       and 
interlined  Batiste  £4     4  0 


-----         —i.ciiiuea   oacisle  ■ 

,r^-r.  ""^^  PATTERNS   ON  APPLICATION 

a?Lf~T}!^Jlf'^''l   T'^"    '^''^!  ^"'"■<=  ^'"•'/'^  trenches  is  sold 


During  February  a    lim  ted   number  of   Service   Tunic.    SI  7U7~^~^T~ 
Breeches,  Riding    Breech,,  and  Short  Wan^TTeft  on   hkni   f     '  *^""=>«'- 

HAYMARKET      LONDON 

8  and  10  Boul.  Malesherbes    PARIS  ;    also  at 


Basingstoke. 


27 


ii 


LAND      AND      WATER. 


February  3,  19 16 


The  King  came  to  town  for  a  day  again  last  week,  in  order  to 
attend  a  meeting  of  the  Privy  Council.  The  Queen  had 
intended  to  accompany  him  but  was  detained  at  York 
Cottage  by  indisposition.  It  was  only  a  cold,  but  Her 
Majesty  enjoys  such  exceptionably  strong  health,  that 
to  read  of  the  Queen's  illness  came  almost  as  a  shock. 
Both  their  Majesties  hope  to  be  present  at  the  Royal 
Albert  Hall  on  Saturday  afternoon,  when  Verdi's  requiem 
will  be  rendered  by  the  Royal  Choral  Society  in  memory 
of  those  who  have  fallen  in  the  war. 

Among  the  latest  to  be  thrown  into  mourning  by  the  war  is 
the  Duchess  of  Bedford,  who  has  lo^t  her  brother,  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel C.  W.  Tribe,  41st  Dogras,  who  has  fallen 
in  the  Mesopotamian  fighting.  Colonel  Tribe  was  a 
distinguished  officer  of  the  Indian  Army  and  had  seen 
much  active  service  along  its  frontiers.  His  father  was 
an  Indian  chaplain,  at  one  time  Archdeacon  of  Simla, 
and  it  was  at  Simla  that  the  Duke,  then  Lord  Herbrand 
Russell,  an  A.D.C.  on  the  staff  of  Lord  Lansdowne,  met 
and  married  the  Duchess. 

Lord  and  Lady  Granby  had  not  an  ideal  day  for  their  wedding  ; 
it  was  dull,  damp  and  dreary  out-of-doors,  but  once 
within  St.  Margaret's  the  atmosphe.e  was  different. 
The  church  had  been  beautifully  decorated  with  palms 
and  ferns  and  flowers  by  Goodyear,  and  the  con- 
trast with  the  greyness  without  made  it  seem  all  the  more 
lovely.     Marriage  and  giving  in  marriage  seems  to  be 


epidemic  in  the  Prime  Minister's  family  circle  ;  we  do 
not  suppose  that  any  First  Minister  of  the  Crown  has  so 
often  appeared  as  the  kind  uncle  at  the  bridal.  In 
old-fashioned  days  of  wedding  breakfasts  it  w  mid  have 
meant  a  speech  each  time,  but  Mr.  Asquith  is  spared  this. 

Now  that  the  year  is  on  the  turn  and  flowers  herald  the  ap- 
proach of  spring,  no  place  in  Town  is  more  sought  after  than 
the  Zoo — the  Zoo  where  it  is  a  pleasure  to  loiter  in  the 
open,  and  watch  the  birds  and  beasts  at  one's  leisure. 
In  former  days  it  used  to  be  a  scamper  from  one  over- 
heated building  to  another,  and  the  chief  impression 
left  on  the  bored  child  on  leaving  was  how  extraordinary 
were  the  number  of  nasty  smells  in  so  small  an  area. 
But  that  way  of  seeing  the  Zoo  has  gone  for  ever,  and 
everybody  who  goes  there  just  potters  around.  If  the 
weather  be  warm,  it  is  pleasant  to  bask  in  the  sun  and 
sit  before  the  Mappin  terraces  or  the  big  aviaries. 

Tho  Duke  of  Portland  is  the  President  of  the  Entente  Cordiale 
Society  for  the  current  year.  Few  people  realise  the 
splendid  work  which  this  Society  has  accomplished 
since  it  was  founded  close  on  twenty  years  ago.  It 
was  the  first  beginning  of  that  better  understanding 
between  Britain  and  France,  which  found  official  ex- 
pression when  King  Edward  cam^  to  the  throne  and 
which,  of  course  had  its  consumm  ition  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war.  The  Entente  Cordiale  Society  has  been 
worked  on  thoroughly  sensible  and  practical  lines.     The 


The     WOMEN 
beKifid    tKe    Gun. 

We  all  rightly  think  of  our  men  who  are 
fighting,  let  us  also  think  of  the  unfulfilled  needs 
of  millions  of  women  toiling  today  under  diffi- 
cult circumstances  at  home.     As  Lord  Sydenham 

has  said :  "  To  these  brave  women 
whose  courag-e  and  endurance 
are  helping:  us  \Me  owe  more 
than  expressions  of  g-ratitude." 

The  enormous  influ.x  of  women  into  munition 
and  war  material  factories  is  a  remarkable 
feature  in  our  national  life.  Thousands  are  now 
engaged  on  this  vitally  urgent  and  necessary 
work. 

Young  worn sns  Christian  Associofion. 

If  the  need  of  huts  for  men,  where  rest  and  food  is  provided,  is  great, 
as  it  certajnly  is,  there  can  be  no  doubt  the  need  of  our  girls  is  greater. 

FUNDS  ARE  IMMEDIATELY  NEEDED  for  the  erection 
of  REST  RCJO.MS,  HOSTELS  and  CANTEENS.  Will  you 
help   by   sending  a  donation   or  subscription   NOW? 

The  Queen    ha»  sent  a  handsome  donation 
and  expresttd  full  sympathy. 

Amounts,  large  or  small,  will  be  gratefully 
acknowledged  by  the  Duchess  of  Sutherland,  9, 
Stratford  Place,  London.  W.,  or  by  Lord 
Sydenham,  at  the  Y.W.C.A.,  26,  George  St., 
Hanover  Sq.,   W. 


£25,000 

Urgently  Needed 


m 


im 


1  GREENS  l!° 


SALE 

OF  FINE 

CIGARS 
&WINES 


FEB.  7-21 

FULL  LIST  FREE 


Greens,Ltd.,beg  to  announce  that 
their  half-yearly  stocktaking  Sale 
commences  Feb  y.  Ti>  relieve  the 
ci>;arstock-rooms  and  afford  much 
needed  bin-room  in  the  cellars, 
fine  wines  and  cigars  are  being 
offered  at  genuine  price  reductions. 
Order  promptly  to  secure  the 
choicest  bargains.  Any  goods  not 
approved  will  beexchaiiiiedormoney 
reiiirned.  No  stock  Dousht  for  sale. 
Here  are  some  specimen  bargains: 

A  Wine  Bargain 

J50  Doren  'Quinta  Royal'  Port.  A  6ne 
example  of  ruby,  tawny  wjnc  Oelic  tte, 
I)  ature,  and  of  fine  6avour.  A  perfect 
after-dinner  uine,  al-o  hit^hly  rfcnmmen- 
dt-d  for  invalids.  Per  dozen  O  C  /^ 
cairiage  paid,  cases  included  OOf  O 
To  members  of  the  ti.E.F.  in  F'U'ce 
30\-  fer  iiot  ,  lixrect  from  Bond.    No  extras. 

Havana  Cigars 

i8  o  La  Carolina  Bouquet  Finos,  a  choice, 
small,  after-dinner  cigar   well 
worth  70/-.    Offered  at  per  loo 

4  ooo  Fernandez  Gar.  ia 


small,  after-tHnner  cigar   well     /*  O  / 

_  I 
excellent    cig.ir    for    gen  ral 


M: 


>  arquisas     An 
sinoking- 
Cntidition  perlect.  Wonh  35;-    OQ  /^ 
Ofieredat    per  100  ^^^O 

GREENS,  LTD. 

30.  CORNHII.L.  LONDON.  E.G. 

{  op/x.ii;^  ihe  Royal  Exchange) 


•WINE  MERCHANTS    SINCE  1820 


-W«: 


28 


Supplement  lo  Land  and  Water,  February  10,  1916. 


AQUASCUTUM 

FIELD  <S  TRENCH 
COATS. 


The  opinion  of  Officers 
who  have  been  in  the 
Trenches  during  the  cold, 
wet  months  of  the  War 
must  be  most  helpful  to 
those  who  have  not  had 
that  experience,  and  the 
letters  received  from  them 
prove  beyond  any 
possible  doubt  that  the 
"AQUASCUTUM'"  is 
the  ONE  COAT  to  be 
relied  upon- 


AQUASCUTUM,   Ltd., 

Waterproof  Coal  Speciatlih  for  over  50  years. 
By  Appointment  lo  Hi»  Majesty  the  King. 

100    REGENT    STREET,    LONDON,   W. 


^^m 

^ 

pr^ 

^^ 

k 

/'''~\/  M           ^1^91^ 

f  ^^-^ 

I     ^ 

Cy  'vS) 

PRACTICAL  HAT 

DEBENHAM 

in    black,    navy,    nigger,    beige, 
and  wine,  picot  itraw,    trimmed 
with   ribbon    band    and  cock'jde 

& FREEBODY 

(Dehenkam  s,  Ltd.), 

in  artistic  colourings. 

Wigmore  St.,    CavenJith 

Price     42/= 

Square,      Lond»n,       W. 

The  Original  Cording  s.  Estd.  1839. 

High-grade  Military  Waterproofs. 


New  Illustrated  List  of  waterproof 

coats  and   boott,    trench  waders,    &c.,    at 
request. 


THE 


•EQUITOR"  COAT 

(Regd.) 


Officers  speak  highly  of  the 
special  provision  for  mounted  wear 

ill  the  attactied  apron  buttoning 
on  one  side.  This  absolutely 
shuts  out  any  rain,  and  when  not 
in  use  fastens  conveniently  (out 
of  sight)  on  the  inside  of  coat, 
which  then  serves  just  as  well  for 
ordinary  wear  afoot.  The  coat 
can  be  had  fitted  with  belt  if 
desired. 

The   "Equitor"   Coat    is    also 

made      with     warm      fleece 

lining  to  detach. 

When  ordering  an  "Equitor"  or  "Service" 
Coat  (the  'Service"  Coat  Is  made  without 
the  attached  apron)  or  directing  that  one 
be  sent  on  approval,  height  and  chest 
measure    and    reference    should    be    given. 


J.  G.  CORDING  &  GS 

IVaterproofers  to  H.M.  the  King 

Only     Addresses : 

19  PICCADILLY,  W.  &35ST.  jamess  st. 


Aldershot  Agents:  BAVERSTOCK  &  SON,  Grosvenor  Road. 


S.W 


Sherrij  Sir? 

gHERRY  is  the  only  wine,  the    flavour  of 
which  can  be  appreciated  while  smoking. 

HARVEY'S 

Bristol  Milk 

Price  80/-  pfr  dox. 
Sample  half  bottle  3/6  po>t  frre. 

Booklet  and  full  price  list  on  application. 

JOHN  HARVEY  &  SONS,  Ltd.,  BRISTOL. 

Naval  and  Military  Wine  Merchinf^ 


CROPS  are  safe  where 
Empire  Fence  is  used. 
The  heavia<!t  beast  can- 
not break  through.  Each 
wire  is  tested  to  bear 
a    strain    of    2,240    lbs. 

It  is  rustless,  has  no  sharp  points, 
will  not  sas  or  dent.  Easy  to  erect, 
requires  no  .Tttention,  and  is  prac- 
tically everlastinc-  TWO  MEN 
CAN  ERECT  A  MILE  PER  DAY. 

Mr.  T.  Collier,  Henley-on-Thames, 
writes : — "  /  am  verv  pleased  with 
the  '  Empire  Wire  Fence  now  it  is 
fixed,  and  consider  it  to  be  a  most 
excellent  fence' 

Write    for    Illustrated    Catalogue. 

PARSER.  W'NDER  i.  AGHURCH,  LO., 

BIRMINQHAM. 


HHRD 
STEEL, 


EMPIRE 

FENCE 


WOVEN 
WIRE 


xvu 


tupplimtnt  t»  I^KD  AND  Water,   February  10.  I81«. 


ACCURACY 

under  fire 


from  heavy  puns,  on  the  inarch,  in 
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Somewhere  in  France 

Dunlop  :  Tyres  all  right  ? 

Driver  :     Yes,  sir,  thanks 
to  you. 


HAVE  YOU  CONSIDERED 


that  the  speed  and  comfort  with  which  the 
wounded  are  transported  by  road  are  due  to 
DUNLOPS,  the  tyres  that  made  motoring 
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The  Dunlop  Company  produced  the  first 
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Verb.  sap. 

THE    DUNLOP    RUBBER    CO.,    LTD., 

Founders   of  the    Pneumatic    Tyre    Industry 

throughout  the  World, 
ASTON  CROSS,  BIRMI    GHAM  ;     14  REGENT  STREET, 
LONDON,     S.W.       PARIS:  4  RUE  DU  COLONEL  MOLL. 


XVUl 


LAND  &W  ATER 


Vol.  LXVII  No.  2805. 


THURSDAY,  FEBRUARY   10    iqi6     T^'^^'-'shed  ast  pr  ice  sixpence 
X,    -i  j^jjivi.^xvx     xu,    ±yiu.     La  newspaperJ  published  weekly 


f^ 


B^  Li/nii  Raemaskers 


i/ruicn  excluiivety  lor  "Land  and    Water." 


Von  Bissing  :    "  Life  has  now  resumed  Its  normal  course  in  Belgium." 


"LAND     AND     WATER"     WAR     LITHOGRAPHS     No.     4. 


By    G.     SPENCER     PRYSE. 


FRANCE'S  150-mm.  GUN  IN  ACTION  IN  CHAMPAGNE. 


rubrimry  lo,  1916. 


LAND     AND      WATER. 


LAND  &  WATER 

Empire    House,    Kingsway,    London,    W.G. 

Telephone  :     HJLBORN     2828. 


THURSDAY,    FEBRUARY    10,    1916. 

OUR    AIR    SERVICE 

THE  current  talk  about  forming  a  "  Ministry  of  the 
Air"  requires  careful  consideration,  for  public 
opinion  has  undoubtedly  been  moved  to  some 
anxiety  and  to  some  questioning  in  the  matter 
of  aerial  defence  in  general,  quite  apart  from  articles  in 
the  daily  newspapers.  There  has,  indeed,  been-  no 
general  demand  for  a  creation  of  a  "  Ministry  of  the  Air." 
It  is  not  a  solution  upon  which  the  public  mind  has  turned, 
or,  for  that  matter,  \\'hich  most  men  would  be  able  to 
define.  But  that  portion  of  the  Press  which  has  mentioned 
the  subject  is,  in  raising  a  debate  upon  the  matter  at  all, 
expressing  public  opinion  insomuch  at  least  as  lliat 
opinion  is  now  rather  doubtful  and  disturbed  about  tlie 
whole  matter. 

Now  the  first  thing  that  strikes  one  in  this  connection 
is  that  uncertainty  and  debate  of  this  sort  is  precisely  what 
the  enemy  would  have  desired.  That  is  not  in  itself  a 
sutheient  reason  for  avoiding  the  subject.  It  is  a  sound 
rule  ia  wdr,  at  least  where  definite  mihtary  plans  are 
concerned,  to  do  other  than  that  which  your  enemy  wishes 
you  to  do.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  in  so  vague 
a  matter  as  a  general  debate  upon  aerial  defence  the 
abandonment  of  it  merely  because  the  enemy  desired 
to  create  anxiety  and  confusion  would  be  wise.  There 
must  be  an  eleuient  of  debate  in  the  affair  and  conclusions, 
to  stand  firmly,  must  repose  upon  reason. 

But  it  is  precisely  when  we  apply  the  rules  of  reason 
to  the  case  that  the  value  of  the  suggested  policy  become 
more  and  more  doubtful.  The  more  rigidly  we  examine 
the  pros  and  cons  the  less  does  the  prospect  of  any  such 
change  as  the  creation  of  this  new  poUtical  department 
reinsure  one.  The  fundamental  principle  in  this  matter, 
as  in  any  other  matter  subsidiary  to  the  war,  whether  it 
be  the  policy  of  reprisals  or  economic  policy,  or  this  one 
of  aerial  defence,  is  simply  this  :  How  far  does  such  and 
such  a  suggested  policy  or  change  conduce  to  victory  ? 

The  function  of  aircraft  in  the  attainment  of  a  victory 
is  novel — but  it  is  entirely  military.  Soldiers  only — 
especially  now  after  many  months  of  this  modern  war — 
can  decide  how  aircraft  should  be  used,  in  what  numbers 
and  with  what  object.  Even  among  soldiers  it  is  only 
one  particular  expert  branch  which  can  be  consulted  in 
this  highly  technical  matter.  It  is  exceedingly  important 
to  remember  this. 

In  every  science  there  are  general  principles  appre- 
ciable to  the  layman,  though  even  these  he  will  grasp  less 
'  thoroughly  and  certainly  or  much  more  imperfectly 
than  the  man  whose  trade  it  is  to  follow  that  science. 
But  the  further  you  get  into  any  science  the  more  you  dis- 
cover departments  which  require  thoroughly  detailed  and 
expert  knowledge  for  the  barest  comprehension  of  them. 
And  this  is  true  of  the  science  of  war.  Any  civilian,  for 
instance,  may  see  the  importance  of  numbers  and  insist 
upon  a  policy  which  produces  numbers,  but  no  civilian 
worth  considering  would  give  ad\'ice  upon  the  disposition 


of  a  macliine  gun  shelter  or  the  probable  margin  ot  error 
upon  a  windy  day  for  such  and  such  a  piece  firing  at  such 
and  such  a  range.  No  civilian  would  give  his  opinion 
upon  the  handling  of  cavalry  in  particular  circumstances. 
And  in  the  Service  itself  no  one  would  presume  to  give  his 
advice  outside  the  arm  in  which  he  had  been  trained ; 
at  least,  where  that  advice  regarded  highly  technical 
matters. 

Now  if  there  is  one  department  of  which  this  is 
peculiarly  true  it  is  the  new  fourth  arm.  The  men 
actually  fiying,  and  especially  those  commanding  the 
flying  of  others  at  the  front,  are  alone  competent  to  decide 
not  only  the  use  but  the  number  and  type  of  weapons 
required.  The  creation  of  a  civilian  department  (which 
at  the  best  could  only  repeat  what  was  told  it  by  the 
soldiers,  but  at  the  worst  might  and  very  probably  would  ■ 
interfere  ^vith  the  soldiers)  serves  no  apparently  useful 
purpose  at  that  best  and  quite  clearly  serves  a  very  bad 
jjurpose  at  the  worst.  But  there  is  much  more  than  this. 
If  the  particular  service  in  question  were  a  failure,  if  the 
soldiers  connected  with  it  had  blundered  in  any  conspicuous 
fashion,  there  would  be  an  argument,  though  it  would 
hardly  be  a  valid  one,  for  the  replacing  of  the  expert  by 
the  amateur.  If  there  had  been  any  timidity  in  general 
policy  there  might  be  an  argument  for  the  presence  of  a 
strong  will,  though  that  will  were  possessed  by  civilians, 
to  govern  the  weaker  wills  of  more  expert  men. 

In  the  particular  case  of  the  British  Air  Service  it  is 
notorious  that  these  conditions  are  exactly  reversed. 
The  British  Air  Service  has  been  the  most  conspicuous 
success  of  the  whole  war.  It  has  led  the  Allies  in  almost 
every  new  departure.  It  showed  its  supremacy  at  the 
very  outbreak  of  hostihtics.  It  has  brilliantly  maintained 
that  supremacy  through  all  these  months.  It  has  ex- 
hibited in  every  part  of  it  a  unity  of  direction  and  a 
rapidity  of  development  which  are  nothing  short  of  a 
triumph  for  the  British  Service  among  all  the  beUigerent 
powers.  To  interfere  with  iuid  to  change  an  achievement 
of  that  kind  at  such  a  moment  could  not  possibly  be  other 
than  a  blunder..  Nor  does  that  exhaust  the  case.  Even 
supposing  that  we  were  dealing  not  with  a  triumphantly 
successful  thing  but  with  a  thing  which  had  badly  failed, 
and  even  supposing  that  one  could  amend  that  failure 
by  the  admixture  in  its  direction  of  vigorous  though 
amateur  ability,  that  might  be  an  argument  for  choosing 
some  man  conspicuous  for  his  qualities  in  this  particular 
field  and  appointing  him  to  .the  direction  of  it.  But  there 
is  no  question  even  of  that. 

,Ve  all  know  in  practice  that  the  creation  of  the 
proposed  "  Ministry  of  the  Air  "  merely  means  a  post  for  a 
politician,  and  there  is  no  one  at  this  time  of  day  still  eager 
to  create  more,  posts  for  civilian  politicians  wherein  at  the 
expense  of  an  enormous  salary  some  one  selected  from  a 
very  small  set  of  men,  in  no  way  trained  to  the  business, 
should  be  deputed  to  over-ride  the  decisions  of  soldiers. 
To  anyone  who  really  grasps  the  enormity  of  this  cam- 
paign and  the  quahty  of  the  issues  dependent  upon  it 
there  is  something  grotesque  in  the  suggestion  that  one 
of  its  most  vital  factors,  which  happens  to  be  also  one 
of  its  most  successful  factors  in  favour  of  our  side,  should 
suddenly  suffer  disturbance  and  rearrangement  for  no 
better  object  than  to  provide  yet  another  salary  and  to 
lend  a  chance  for  experiments  to  yet  another  incom- 
petent, because  untrained  and  inexperienced,  layman. 

Everything  connected  with  this  war  by  land,  save 
the  direction  of  its  general  political  ends,  is  clearly  a 
matter  for  soldiers  and  for  soldiers  alone.  But  as  much 
at  least  as  the  most  technical  of  its  branches,  as  much  as 
the  artillery  or  the  staff  work,  more  perhaps  than  any 
other,  this  is  true  of  the  military  air  craft.  It  is  not 
likely  that  the  blunder  will  be  committed.  Were  it 
committed  it  would  be  unpardonable. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


February  lo,  19  lO- 


CHANCES  OF  A  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE. 


By  Hilaire   Belloc. 


THE  elder  and  greater  Moltkc  said  :    "  There  are 
always    three    courses    open    to  the  enemy — 
and  he  takes  the  fourth." 
That    epigram  illustrates  completely  the 
folly  of  prophesy  in  war. 

But  the  following  of  a  campaign,  while  it  does  not 
ever  permit  of  e."«ict  forecast,  does  show  one,  with  a 
clearness  in  proportion  to  the  closeness  of  the  study,  the 
conditions  under  which  alone  the  futiue  can  develop. 

For  instance,  no  one  could  tell  during  the  Russian 
retreat  of  last  sunmicr  upon  what  line  the  equilibrium 
would  be  restored  and  the  Austro-Cierman  forces  compelled 
to  halt.  But  what  any  competent  observer  coi/Wsayand 
what  all  competent  observers  did  say  was  that  unless 
some  organic  portion  of  the  Russian  armies  was  destroyed 
such  a  line  of  "  balance  "  or  equilibrium  between  advance 
and  retreat  would  be  established,  and  that  when  or  if  it 
was  the  Austro-German  stroke  would  have  missed  its 
object. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  whole  development  of  the 
affair  proved  the  truth  of  so  elementary  a  statement. 
We  saw  the  Austro-Germans  entirely  devoted  for  four 
months  to  the  destruction  of  some  organic  portion  of  the 
Russian  Army.  We  saw  them  again  and  again  (six 
times  in  all)  create  a  great  salient  or  bulge  in  the  Russian 
line  by  massing  their  immense  superiority  in  heavy  gims 
against  two  separate  sectors.  We  saw  them  try  hard 
to  cut  off  that  bulge— and  fail.  The  particular  line  upon 
which  equilibrium  was  reached  after  these  si.\  failures 
(the  last  of  which  was  the  great  effort  round  Vilna)  was 
the  line  with  which  we  are  now  so  familiar  from  the  Gulf  of 
Riga  to  the  Bukovina.  But  this  halting  place  of  the 
Austro-Germans  was  forced  upon  them.  It  was  not 
deliberately  chosen.  They  stopped  when  their  advance 
had  weakened  them  to  a  degree  after  which  they  could  no 
longer  compel  a  further  Russian  retirement ;  and  this  was 
clear  from  the  way  in  which  they  went  on  week  after  week 
throwing  men  away  without  avail  against  the  Dvina  line. 
They  had,  in  Lord  Kitchener's  exceedingly  exact  phrase, 
"  shot  their  bolt,"  words  which  so  unduly  angered  the 
Press  of  all  Berlin  and  part  of  London. 

The  same  set  of  ideas  applies  to  the  present  situation. 
To  prophesy  that  the  enemy  will  make  a  great  offensive 
here  or  there,  that  he  will  make  it  before  we  do,  or  any- 
thing of  that  kind,  would  be  futile.  But  to  say  that 
whatever  he  does  must  be  done  under  certain  conditions, 
to  establish  the  limits  within  which  his  action  and  our 
own  must  turn,  is  both  possible  and  useful,  and  a  study 
of  that  kind  will  enable  us  to  understand  the  future. 

Decline  of  Numbers  Governs  the  Enemy's  Plan. 

The  one  fundamental  condition  governing  all  the 
present  plan  of  the  enemy,  is  that  which  has  been 
emphasised  repeatedly  in  these  columns  :  The  exhaustion 
of  the  enemy's  useful  reserve. 

r  That  phrase  does  not  mean  that  his. armies  in  the 
iield  have  grown  less  or  will  grow  less  for  some  little  time 
to  come.  It  means  that  the  period  has  arrived  in  which 
the  enemy  can  only  by  an  abnormal  treatment  of  his 
human  material  maintain  himself  at  full  strength,  and 
that  the  limit  of  time  within  which  that  abnormal  treat- 
ment can  be  sustained  is  at  once  short  and  its  duration 
clearly  appreciated. 

Somewhere  towards  the  end  of  November  or  the 
beginning  of  December,  what  I  have  just  called  the 
"  period  of  abnormal  treatment  "  had  begun.  That  is, 
the  drafts  necessary  for  the  tilling  up  of  gaps  in  his  units 
at  the  front  had  to  be  found  in  a  novel  and  unsatisfactory 
fashion. 

Up  to  that  date  the  drafts  had  been  furnished  nor- 
mally. The  normal  fashion  of  furnishing  drafts  is  to 
take'  men  of  military  age  and  fully  efficient  :  to  train 
them  ;  when  they  are  trained,  to  keep  them  in  depots  ; 
from  such  a  reserve  in  hand  to  "feed"  the  units  at  the 
front  and  keep  them  at  their  full  strength.. 


Rather  more  than  two  months  ago  this  normal 
source  was  drying  up.  It  remained  possible  only  to 
draft  men  younger  than  those  of  full  military  age,  or 
older,  or  to  begin  to  trespass  upon  the  held  of  what  arc 
called  "  inefiicients."  There  is  no  precise  Hue  of  demar- 
cation between  the  efficient  and  the  inefficient.  But 
the  rough  rule  is  that  when  you  begin  to  sift  out  again, 
and  yet  again,  for  recruits,  a  mass  already  rejected  you 
are  getting  near  the  line. 

The  nrst  drafts  of  inefficients  but  very  slightly 
we.iken  your  units,  for  they  are  few  and  their  level  of 
efficiency  is  comparatively  high.  But  the  process  is 
cumulative,  and  the  curve  soon  gets  steep.  The 
moment  you  trespass  on  the  "  inefficient  "  field  'your 
anxieties  have  begun. 

We  know  perfectly  well — at  least  all  soldiers  know 
■ — that  this  was  already  clearly  the  state  of  affairs 
about  a  month  before  the  end  of  the  year,  and  it  is 
also  perfectly  well  known  by  what  abnormal  method  the 
enemy  met  it. 

He  ceased  to  develop  any  considerable  and  expensive 
attacks  ;  he  turned  to  some  extent  to  the  younger  men 
as  volunteers,  to  some  extent  as  conscripts.  He  began 
to  include  what  was  at  first  a  very  small  proportion  (and 
what  still  remains  no  great  proportion)  of  inefficients  ;  and 
he  deliberately  kept  back  the  lads  (the  boys  from  18  to 
19)  whose  ren)aining  numbers  (not  yet  volunteered)  may 
amount  to  Soo.ooo  and  are  probably  not  less  than  600,000. 

Briefly,  the  process  might  be  called  "  Trusting  to  a 
lull  and  to  filling  the  gaps  with  inefficients  in  order  to 
keep  back  the  remaining  efficient  but  very  j'outhful 
groups  for  the  last  chance  of  decisive  operations  later  on." 

Comparative  Position  of  the  Allies. 

Here,  of  course,  we  must  remember  that  the  enemy's 
exhaustion  thus  described  must  be  compared  with  the 
condition  of  his  opponents. 

Had  all  the  belligerents  been  from  the  beginning 
fully  conscript  nations,  all  fighting  at  their  top  strength 
also  from  the  beginning,  and  all  suffering  proportionately 
equal  loss,  then  this  fundamental  factor,  the  exhaustion 
of  the  enemy  reserves,  would  not  have  the  consequences 
we  shall  point  out  in  a  moment.  It  would  apply  equally 
to  both  sides  and  would  leave  either  party  free  to  act 
almost  as  Ihey  had  acted  in  the  past. 

But  in  point  of  fact  the  two  sides  differ  verj'  greatly 
in  this  respect. 

Only  one  of  the  Allied  services  has  been  fighting  at 
full  strength  from  the  beginning,  and  that  is  the  French 
—whose  numbers  are  but  a  third  of  the  Austro-German. 
The  Russians,  the  British,  the  Italians  possess  untouched 
very  great  reseiyes  of  men,  and  even  the  French,  though 
they  ha\-e  called  up  their  \ery  young  classes  (which  the 
(iermans  have  not  yet  fully  done)  are  in  proportion 
to  their  numbers,  less  severely  hit  than  the  enemy.  They 
have  not  begun  to  think  of  touching  inefficient  reserves. 
They  have  not  severely  sifted  the  rejected  over  and  over 
again  as  the  enemy  has  been  compelled  to  do.  They 
feel  themselves  free,  in  particular,  to  abstain  from  using 
the  older  classes  which  the  enemy  has  been  compelled  tc 
use  up  largely  in  the  field. 

What  the  disproportion  of  losses  between  the 
French  fully  conscript  force  fighting  from  the  beginning 
at  full  strength,  and  the  enemy  similarly  fighting, 
may  be  exactly  we  do  not  know.  For  though  \\e 
can  now  estimate  to  within  10  per  cent,  one  way  or 
the  other  the  total  German  losses,  we  have  not  the  same 
data  for  the  I'rench.  The  l'"rench  proportion  of  losses  to 
their  numbers  may  be  as  low  as  five-sixths  that  of  the 
enemy,  or  as  high  as  nine-tenths.  It  is  not  very  material, 
because  the  two  main  facts  are  known  :  h'irst,  that  the 
French  losses  are  somewhat  inferior  in  jiroportion 
Secondly,  that  the  difference  is  not  so  great  as  to  affccl 

[Copyright  in  'America  bv  "  Th:  New  York  American."] 


February  lo,  1916. 


LAND      AND    /WATER 


the  wliole  character  of  the  campaign.  It  is  the  very  great 
reserve  of  men  in  all  the  other  Allied  countries  which 
makes  the  difference.  .  .: 

Effect   on    the    Enemy's   Present   Plans. 

Once  wc  have  grasped  this  fundamental  factor  of  the 
enemy's  condition  in  numbers,  it  is  clear  that  both  his 
strategy  and  his  policy  governing  strategy  arc  dictated 
by  it.  With  every  week  that  has  passed  since  the  autumn 
the  enemy  has  clearly  relied  more  and  more  upon  political 
factors.  He  has  issued  threats  of  no  real  consequence, 
but  threats  the  wildness  of  which  were  characteristic  'of 
the  situation.  He  has  trusted  the  licence  of  the  Press  of 
one  country,  the  unpopularity  of  parliamentary  govern- 
ment in  another,  and  the  ignorance  of  a  third.  He  has 
greatly  increased  the  violence  of  his  appeals  to  neutrals, 
and  he  has  done  his  utmost  to  produce  dissension  between 
the  Allies.  At  the  same  time  he  has  begun  to  protest 
against  a  "  war  of  mere  extermination,"  to  explain  through 
various  agents  of  his  that  "  neither  side  can  really  win," 
and  to  foster  the  comicallv  unmilitary  conception  of  "  a 
stale-mate."  ■ 

With  all  that  political  effort  of  his  (though  it  is  the 
most  important  of  his  present  activities),  we  need  not 
here  deal  except  to  notice  that  it  is  proof  of  his  now  play- 
ing rapidly  against  time. 

With  the  strategical  effect  of  the  same  situation  we 
are  directly  concerned. 

The  Enemy  Requires  an  Offensive. 

In  such  a  situation  as  we  have  described,  the  enemy 
must  necessarily  attack—  if  lie  is  allowed  to  "do  so  and  is 
able.  He  must  be  laying  a  plan  for  some  action  which, 
if  it  is  completely  successful,  will  give  him  a  decision  and 
which,  even  if  it  is  only  partially  successful,  will  at  least 
lend  great  and  novel  support  to  his  political  efforts  and 
will  give  him  a  better  moral  basis  for  arranging  an  incon- 
clusi\-e  peace. 

I  do  not  say  that  such  an  offensive  action  on  his 
part  is  nearer  or  further,  or  may  not  be  forestalled  by  a 
stroke  of  the  Allies.  What  I  do  say  is  that  anyone  stand- 
ing in  the  shoes  of  the  enemy's  higher  command  at  this 
moment,  must  be  conten^)lating  somewhere  a  vigorous 
offensive  upon  a  large  scale.  To  let  all  the  winter  and 
spring  go  by  without  it  would  be  to  play  directly  into 
the  hands  of  the  Allies. 

To  undertake  such  an  offensive  would  mean  a  further 
sharp  step  in  the  rapid  exhaustion  of  his  numbers.  But 
it  would  be  capital  well  spent,  even  if  its  success  \vere 
quite  incomplete,  so  long  as  it  had  the  mere  political 
sffect  the  enemy  desires.  While  if  it  were  more  success- 
ful ;  if  (to  suppose  an  extreme  case)  it  really  gave  him  a 
decision,  it  would  be  remaining  capital  invested  to  the 
very  best  possible  advantage. 

For  instance,  let  us  suppose  a  violent  attack  upon  a 
broad  front  in  the  West  resulting  in  the  capture  of  some 
thousands  of  prisoners  and  some  scores  o!  guns — and  no 
more.  Mter  so  incomplete  an  effort  the  enemy  could  count 
upon  the  Press  in  certain  of  the  Allied  countries  taking  it 
as  a  proof  that  his  numbers  were  still  far  from  exhaustion. 
He  could  count  in  the  same  Press  upon  a  clamour  for,  let 
us  say,  the  evacuation  of  Salonika,  or  at  least  growing  com- 
plaints against  the  formation  of  that  place  d'armcs.  The 
loss  he  would  have  sustained  would  be  well  worth  his 
while.  While  if  the  result  of  such  an  attack  were  seriously 
to  modify  our  lines  on  the  West  and  to  give  him  the  occu- 
pation of  any  considerable  further  area  of  territory,  he 
could  count  on  a  very  serious  effect  indeed. 

The  same  would  be  true  in  a  lesser  degree  of  corre- 
sponding losses  in  the  south-east  or  upon  the  Russian 
hue. 

Left  to  himself  then,  and  supposing  he  is  able  to  act 
or  allowed  to  act  before  corresponding  action  upon  the 
part  of  his  opponents,  the  enemy  must,  by  all  calculation 
be  projecting  a  considerable  offensive  movement. 

Where  would  such  an  Offensive  be  Delivered  ? 

There  are,  of  cour3e,.three  fields  in  which  such  a 
movemjsnt  can  take. place.  _^_^,_. _.  .  .._  „.    „„  .  .. 

There  is  the  comparatively  narrow  south-eastern 
front  before  Salonika  ;    there  is  the  Polish  field  :    and 


RAEMAEKERS'    CARTOON. 

*  Desolation  and  heart-broken  women  by  the  n'ay- 
-side — it  is  the  normal  slate  of  I3elf;iuni  nnder  German 
ocQUpation.  But  we  who  live  only  such  a  Jew  miles 
'tncay,  find  it  all  hut  impossible  to  realise  the  misery 
of  Belgium,  and  the  cold  calculated  brutality  of  her 
oppressors.  It  is,  therefore,  -well  that  we  should 
be  reminded  of  it  noxv  and  again. 

M.  Louis  Raemaekers  is  at  present  in  Paris, 
where  an  exhibition  of  his  cartoo)is  has  been  opened. 
The  'well-knoivn  French  cartoonist,  \Forain,  who 
is  nocv  in  the  army,  wearing  his  uniform,  presented 
Raemaekers  'with  the  Cross  of  the  Legion  of  Honour, 
'which  M.  Poincare  has  bestowed  on  him.  The 
Dutch  cartoonist  is  being  feted  both  officially  and 
tmofficially.  There  is  a  reception  at  the  Hotel  de 
Ville,  a  banquet  at  the  Quai  d' Or  say,  and  a  public 
reception  at  the  Trocadero,  all  in  his  honour.  His 
exhibition  is  as  croicded  in  Paris  as  it  was  in  London, 
and  the  Minister  of  Fine  Arts  has  intimated  toM. 
Raemaekers  that  the  State  desires  to  purchase  several 
of  his  cartoons,  -which  it  is  said  are  to  be  placed  in 
the  Luxembourg. 

France  appreciates  the  great  work  Raemaekers 
has  done  at  its  true  value. 


there  is  the  Western  field. 

There  is  indeed  a  fourth  possible  field  on  the  Italian 
front.  A  vigorous  offensive  there  could  be  imagined  in 
connection  with  the  prevention  of  an  advance  from 
Salonika — for  what  the  enemy  must  most  fear  in  that 
iield  is  Italian  co-operation  towards  Monastir  from  the 
Adriatic,  and  violent  action  on  the  Isonzo  would  paralyse 
that  for  the  moment.  But  the  conclusive  and  main 
action  of  the  enemy  could  hardly  be  against  the  Italians, 
(i)  because  that  front  is  exceedingly  strongly  held  ;  (2) 
because  it  has  lying  behind  it  a  wide  mass  of  mountains, 
the  communications  in  which  are  ill  suited  to  supply  a 
great  bod}'  of  men  ;  (3)  still  more  because  it  is  far  too 
narrow  to  deploy  a  very  great  body  of  men  ;  and  (4) 
lastly  because  no  effort  here  could  be  really  decisive. 

As  for  action  in  Mesopotamia  or  against  Egypt,  it  is 
obvious  that  this  could  only  be  subsidiary  to  the  main 
war. 

The  Western  Field  is  the  Most   Obvious. 

Now  of  the  three  main  fronts  thus  involved,  the 
strongest  arguments  are  obviously  in  favour  of  such,  an 
offensive  developing  in  the  ^^'est.  This  has  been  so  clear 
to  all  observers  that  it  has  perhaps  been  the  chief  cause 
of  the  recent  talk  of  such  an  offensive.  The  telegrams 
from  Holland  talking  of  a  great  concentration  of  guns 
and  men  against  our  lines,  whether  true  or  false,  are 
negligible.  The  Intelligence  Departments  of  the  Allies 
upon  the  West  have  fairly  full  and  continuous  knowledge 
of  the  enemy  movements  and  vague  paragraphs  of  the 
sort  mentioned  are  only  sent  for  civilian  consumption. 
But  the  solid  reasons  for  an  enemy  offensive  taking  place 
upon  the  Western  lines  are  of  a  different  nature  'from 
mere  rumour  and  are  well  worth  consideration.  A  great 
portion  of  them  are  summed  up  by  a  French  Service 
Journal,  La  France  Militaire,  in  a  recent  issue. 

This  journal  begins  by  noting  the  cardinal  factor  in 
the  whole  affair,  that  the  enemy  reserves  for  the  making 
good  of  wastage,  particularly  in  Germany,  arc  now 
strictly  limited  in  time.  It  repeats  the  elementarv 
truth  (common  to  all  students  of  the  campaign),  that  this 
limit  of  time,  even  if  the  use  of  a  proportion  of  inefficients 
during  the  winter  prove  successful,  is  strictly  calculable 
and  does  not  extend  into  the  early  summer.  With  spring 
it  will  be  necessary  either  to  call  up  frankly  inefficient 
categories  (such  as  the  elder  men  hitherto  immune)  or 
to  suffer  a  diminution  in  tlie  numerical  strength  of  the 
units  at  the  front. 

As  a  consequence  of  this  state  of  things  the  enemy 
will,  according  to  the  argument  advanced  in  La  France 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


February  lo,  1916. 


MilUairc  be  strongly  tempted  to  o]>tain  a  decision  where 
the  conditions  of  ground  favour  early  action. 

Now  it  is  clear  that  tlie  Western  front  here  offers 
great  advantages  over  the  Eastern  :  Inniunerable  roads 
(juite  practicable  in  any  weather  serve  on  that  front,  and  a 
great  mass  of  railways.  Supply  can  be  brought  up  at  any 
time  and  in  any  weather,  and  even  infantry  attack  only 
has  to  wait  for  a  dry  spell.  In  this  it  differs  radically 
from  the  Eastern  front.  The  communications  leading 
up  to  the  Western  front  from  the  German  arsenals  and 
supply  centres  are  not  long  and  the  great  mass  of  the 
German  forces  is  gathered  there. 

It  is  next  to  be  remarked  that  if  Germany  must  get 
decision  within  a  brief  limit  of  time — or  retire  to  shorter 
lines — the  Western  front  would  have  another  most  obvious 
advantage  over  the  Eastern.  It  is  upon  the  Western 
front  that  the  really  formidable  menace  to  the  Central 
Empires  exists.  It  is  there  that  you  have  the  over- 
whelming supply  of  munitionmcnt  piling  up  ;  it  is  there 
that  you  have  much  the  greater  number  of  the  Allies 
present,  and  it  is  there  that  you  have  the  most  intense, 
complex  and  efficient  civilisation  opposed  to  the  aggressor. 
It  is  again  the  Western  front  which  is  most  nearly  in  touch 
with  neutral  supply  and,  in  general,  it  is  from  the  West 
that  the  German  lines,  if  or  when  they  weaken,  must 
fear  the  worst  peril  of  breaking.  It  is  on  the  Western 
front,  therefore,  alone,  that  a  true  decision  is  possible  ; 
in  the  near  future,  thoiigh  later  when  the  season  has 
changed  and  Russian  rcannament  is  completed,  the 
difference  between  the  liast  and  the  West  will  be  less 
marked.  The  argument  is  that  knowing  tliis  and  knowing 
that  the  delay  within  which  such  a  decision  is  necessary 
to  him  is  brief,  the  enemy's  next  great  effort — the  last 
one  which  he  will  be  able  to  deliver  in  full  force — will 
develop  in  France  and  Flanders. 

To  these  arguments  there  may  be  added  one  which 
the  French  study  omits,  but  which  would  seem  to  be  of 
considerable  weight.  An  offensive  in  the  West  cotild  be 
delivered  leith  German  forces  alone. 

An  offensive  in  the  East  would  demand  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  Austrian  service  in  a  very  large  proportion. 
United  though  the  control  now  is  in  Prussian  hands,  there 
is  a  lack  of  homogeneity  necessarily  present  in  any  further 
operations  in  Poland.  The  strong  stiffening  of  first  rate 
German  troops  present  nine  months  ago  disappeared  in 
the  enormous  losses  of  the  summer  lighting. 

An  operation  against  Salonika  again  (it  could  not 
possibly  be  decisive  of  the  war  nor  even  immediately 
productive  of  negotiations  for  an  inconclusive  peace) 
would  be  still  more  heterogeneous  in  composition.  The 
material  conditions  for  undertaking  it  will  be  present 
when  the  Vardar  railway  is  so  thoroughly  restored  as 
to  be  capable  of  bringing  up  grea*  masses  of  heavy  shell, 
which  riiay  be  in  anything  from  a  few  days  to  a  month. 
But  the  infantry,  which  would  have  to  clench  the  artillery 
attack,  would  be  of  all  sorts  and  conditions,  principally 
Bulgar,  perhaps  partly  Turk,  and  the  whole  thing  com- 
plicated by  political  considerations  highly  divergent  as 
between  the  Austrians,  Germans,  Bnlgars  and  Turks, 
with  the  further  element  of  confusion  presented  by  the 
.  fact  that  Greek  soil  would  be  invaded. 

If  then,  the  ^irguments  in  favour  of  the  enemy's 
attempt  of  an  offensive  in  the  West  are  the  strongest,  as 
they  clearly  are,  of  what  nature  would  such  an  attack 
be,  and  what  would  be  the  chances  of  its  success  ? 

Chances  of  Success. 

Here  the  answer  can  only  be  on  the  analogy  of  the 
past.  Such  an  attack  would  apparently  be  an  attack 
upon  not  less  than  two  main  sectors,  the  largest  upon 
a  front  of  not  less  than  some  fifteen  miles,  and  more  pro- 
bably twenty,  the  smaller  certainly  at  least  ten,  and  the 
two  separated  by  so  considerable  an  interval  as  to  be 
sufficient  to  form  a  dangerously  large  salient,  should  the 
Allied  line  be  bent  back  at  the  two  separated  points  of 
attack.  At  each  such  point  the  preliminary  to  that 
attack  would  be  the  same  massed  lieavy  artillery  fire 
which  the  French  were  the  first  to  develop  in  this" cam- 
paign a  year  ago  in  Champagne,  and  which  the  enemv 
ropied  so  successfully  three  months  later  upon  the 
Dunajec. 

All  analogies,  by  the  way,  with  the  fighting  in  front 
of  Yprcs  at  the  end  of  1914  may  iirovc  misleading.     At 


that  time  the  "  drum  fire  "  of  a  vast  number  of  heavy 
pieces  concentrated  on  one  comparatively  small  area  was 
neither  possible  nor  attempted.  There  has  h:cn  no  rv- 
pericHcc  yet  in  the  West  of  the  enemy  attacking  in  this 
form.  The  present  economy  of  shell  practised  by  the 
enemy  is  no  guide.  He  is  certainly  accumulating  ammu- 
nition this  winter  as  he  did  last.  It  is  possible,  or 
probable,  that  the  artillery  preparation  would  be  pre- 
ceded by  very  active  trench  work ;  the  attempt  to 
bite  into  and  to  weaken  sections  of  the  line  by  an  in- 
crease in  the  number  and  rate  of  fire  of  the  trench 
weapons.  There  is  even  a  theory  that  the  future  of 
the  war  will  see  a  modification  of  heavy  artillery  attack 
in  favour  of  a  great  development  in  this  concentrated 
short  range  work  delivered  from  the  trench  line  itself. 
It  is  a  theory  which  cannot  be  judged  by  the  observer 
at  a  distance.  It  is  one  which  only  practical  experience 
can  judge  ;  but  it  is  already  debated. 

At  any  rate,  after  such  a  preparation,  mainly  presum- 
ably of  highly  concentrated  fire,  long  maintained  from 
heavy  pieces,  will  come,  as  it  has  already  come  from  our 
side  in  the  past,  the  massed  infantry  attack  with  a  hope 
at  the  best  of  breaking  the  fine,  at  second  best  of  occupy- 
ing, as  the  Allies  occupied  in  September,  a  wide  belt  of 
first  line  trenches,  capturing  some  thousands  of  prisoners 
and  some  scores  of  guns. 

Now  the  possibility  of  prosecuting  such  a  plan 
depends  upon  two  things  :  (i)  The  power  to  concentrate 
either  unobserved  or  undisturbed,  and  (2)  the  inability 
or  unwillingness  of  your   opponent  to  create  a  diversion. 

The  great  French  and  British  concentration  before 
the  attack  of  last  September  was  imperfectly  observed 
by  the  enemy  because  his  air  work  was  not  adequate 
to  the  task.  He  certainly  had  information  sufficient 
to  make  him  obtain  a  rough  judgment  of  tliat  concentra- 
tion, but  he  seems  to  Iiavc  missed  the  details  of  it. 
Further,  he  was  in  doubt  as  to  the  moment  when  the 
infantry  attack  would  be  launched.  This  was  particu- 
larly tiie  case  in  Champagne  where  the  "  drum  fire  " 
would  be  checked  for  a  moment  as  though  an  assault 
were  to  take  place,  the  German  communication  trenches 
would  be  immediately  filled  with  men  coming  up  to 
repel  that  assault,  and  once  those  trenches  were  en- 
cumbered with  moving  troops  the  drum  fire  would  begin 
again  with  murderous  results. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Germans  last  September 
were  not  in  a  position  to  check  our  concentration  by  an 
earlier  counter-attack  upon  our  line  elsewhere.  The 
number  of  their  pieces,  and  of  their  men,  and  the  amount 
of  their  munitionment  collected  on  the  West  was  calcu- 
lated to  a  minimum  for  defensive  purposes.  Their 
weight  was  in  the  East ;  and  they  had  just  completed  a 
very  laborious  concentration  of  weapons  and  munition- 
ment upon  the  Danube. 

It  is  clear  that  in  both  these  respects  the  Allied  line 
as  against  a  German  offensive  in  the  near  future  would  be 
in  a  very  different  position  from  what  the  Germans  were 
in  when  they  received  the  Allied  attack  of  last  September. 
The  new  German  monoplanes  have,  partly  and  for  the 
moment  checked,  but  not  in  any  decisive  manner,  the 
extended  flights  of  obsen-ation  still  taken  by  Allied 
aircraft  over  the  German  lines.  It  would  be  quite  im- 
possible to  prevent  the  higher  command  of  the  French 
and  British  having  a  thorough  and  detailed  acquaintance 
with  the  enemy's  concentration  of  men  and  guns.  His 
junctions,  once  sncli  a  concentration  was  in  full  swing, 
would  be  under  bomb  attack  from  the  air  and  long  range 
artillery  attack  from  the  land. 

In  the  second  point  also  the  Allies  arc  in  a  very 
different  position  from  what  the  Germans  were  four 
months  ago.  They  are  not  cut  down  to  a  bare  defensive. 
They  have  a  great  superiority  in  number  whether  of  men 
or  of  guns  or  of  munitions.  There  is  nothing  to  prevent, 
their  meeting  an  enemy  concentration  by  a  violent 
diversion  elsewhere. 

One  side  lesson  would  seem  to  emerge  very  strongly 
from  these  considerations,  and  that  is  tiie  extreme  im- 
portance of  leaving  our  airwork  at  such  a  moment  un- 
touched by  any  interference  foreign  to  the  military 
organisation  which  has  given  i  such  perfection.  The 
keeping  back  of  aircraft  to  calm  the  nen-cs  of  civilians  at 
home,  indeed  any  kind  of  publicity  with  regard  to  the 
production  and^use  of  the  machines  or  open  criticism  of 
that  use  would,  at  such  a  moment,  be    criminal    and 


February  lo,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


treasonable.  Those  two  words  arc  very  strong  words, 
but  they  are  not  too  strong  for  the  occasion.  Airwork 
is  so  much  the  pivot  upon  which  all  the  elements  of  sur- 
prise and  of  discovery  (which  are  capital  to  the  enemy's 
offensive  or  to  our  counter-offensive)  turns  that  in  these 
next  few  weeks  especially  it  is  plain  duty— which  the 
Government  should,  if  necessary,  enforce— to  prevent 
any  confusion  of  the  air-service  by  political  or  civilian 
intrigue  at  home. 

Two  More  Examples  of  the  Necessity  for 
Fuller  Official  Statements. 

My  readers  will  remember  the  analysis  I  gave  of 
the  statement  of  German  losses,  too  briefly  stated 
by  IMr.  Tennant  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  21st 
December,   and  again  a  month  later  on  January  17th. 

The  ligures  were,  in  the  one  case  apparently  taken 
from  certain  totals  issued  by  the  enemy,  and  in  the  other 
case  corrected  by  a  careful  consideration  of  his  detailed 
lists.  They  did  not  tally  and  in  some  features  were  self- 
contradictory. 

It  is,  of  course,  universally  known  by  those  who 
study  the  matter  that  these  lists  are  imperfect,  and  the 
e\idence  of  this  has  been  so  often  set  forth  in  Lanu  and 
NV.VTEK  that  the  briefest  of  repetition  is  suthcient  ;  on 
the  face  of  it,  they  arc  from  six  weeks  to  two  months 
late,  and  often  contain  namc^  far  more  belated — some 
times  six  months,  very  often  three  or  four.  They  omit 
all  mention  of  the  sick  (shock  to  the  system,  frostbite,  lung 
diseases,  laming,  accident,  etc.,  etc.),  and  many  of  the 
lighter  cases  of  wounded. 

We  pointed  out  how,  if  these  modified  lists  had  been 
soberly  stated  in  an  enlarged  ofticial  announcement,  the 
result  would  have  been  of  the  greatest  value  to  the  con- 
iirming  of  pubhc  opinion  ;  not  to  its  heartening  or  dis- 
heartening— the  time  has  passed  for  looking  at  news  either 
way— but  simply  to  its  knowledge  of  facts.  Those  facts, 
coupled  with  other  sources  of  evidence,  as  they  would 
appear  in  any  reasoned  official  statement,  give  a  total  dead 
loss  (counting  permanent  margin  of  temporary  losses)  of 
at  least  more  than  three  and  a  half  millions. 

That  is  a  mere  commonplace  for  all  military  opinion, 
and  it  agrees  roughly  with  the  proportionate  losses  of 
all  the  other  belligerents\ 

The  very  great  harm  done  by  the  negative  policy  of 
not  making  such  expanded  and  reasoned  othcial  announce- 
ments, may  be  seen  in  the  current  issue  of  the  National 
Review. 

Here  is  a  publication  very  widely  read  among  the 
educated  classes,  commanding  considerable  influence, 
and  edited  by  a  public-spirited  man,  undoubtedly  desirous 
of  supporting  opinion  to  the  best  of  his  abihties  during 
this  strain.  Yet  I  find  on  pages  825  and  826  matter 
which  would  never  have  appeared  if,  what  is  common 
knowledge  throughout  Europe  to  those  who  are  following 
these  matters,  it  had  only  appeared  in  the  form  of  an 
official  document— as  it  does  in  France  for  instance. 

Mr.  Maxse  in  the  National  Review,  has  taken  the 
iokil  German  losses  up  to  the  end  of  1915  to  be  "  ofiicially 
stated"  .by  our  own  Government  as  not  more  than  2i 
million  men  ! 

Mr.  Tennant  did  not  desire,  of  course,  to  give  that 
grotesque  impression.  But  the  impression  has  been 
given  and  is  widely  believed  in  this  country  simply  because 
the  German  figures  quoted  in  the  House  of  Commons 
were  cut  down  to  the  barest  possible  limit  without  any 
explanation  or  comment. 

In  the  same  connection  Mr.  Maxse  remarks  that 
while  Germany  is  only  losing  500,000  killed  per  annum, 
her  new  recruits  actually  approximate  this  number. 
The  idea  behind  this  remark  being  that  wastage  is  pretty 
well  replaced  by  recruiting. 

As  wc  all  know,  the  amount  of  German  dead  is  very 
much  more  than  the  figure  mentioned — it  is,  to  the  end 
of  1915  at  least  700,000— and  the  total  wastage  of  any 
army  is  a  high  multiple  of  its  dead  ;  always  at  least  five 
times  as  nuich,  and  usually  nearer  six. 

The  whole  matter  is  a  detail  which  it  would  be  hardly 
worth  wasting  space  upon  were  it  not  for  a  considera  i  >n 
of  the  effect  such  nonsense  may  have  on  opinion.  We 
have  seen  plenty  of  other  nonsense ;  Russians  passing 
through  England  in  whole  divisions  and  arniy  corps  ; 
the  "  steam  Kuller  "  ;   the  new  short  ranire  German  aero- 


plane making  flights  over  the  Midlands ;  German  sub- 
marine boats  walking  along  the  bottom  of  the  Channel 
and  coming  up  on  the  beach  at  Dover.  (It  is  true  that 
this  was  in  a  popular  paper.)  The  immediate  entry  of  the 
United  States  upon  our  side — and  heaven  knows  what 
other  rubbish.  Now  we  have  the  scare  that  the  enemy 
wastage  is  in  some  miraculous  way  only  half  of  the  corre- 
sponding wastage  of  the  Allies,  and  involves  the  coming  to 
life  of  dead  men. 

It  is,  of  course,  nonsense,  but  it  is  nonsense  worth 
checking  at  the  moment  of  its  appearance  ;  though  it 
will  be  as  dead  as  mutton  when  the  present  mood  of 
depression  is  past. 

The  second  example  of  the  same  necessity,  furnished 
in  the  past  week,  is  to  be  found  in  connection  with  the 
Mesopotamian  expedition.  An  oflicial  message  from 
Delhi,  of  the  briefest,  reached  London  Tuesday,  the  cjth, 
to  the  effect  that  the  British  force  at  Kut  would  stay 
there  (they  can  hardly  do  otherwise  for  the  moment  !) 
and  that  General  Aylnier's  force  is  not  so  mUfch  a  relieving 
force  as  a  "  support."  Now  the  only  possible  expanded 
meaning  of  such  a  statement  is,  that  the  force  at  Kut 
has  ample  supplies  for  a  very  prolonged  resistance,  and 
that  therefore  the  contaiimient  of  it  by  the  enemy  in- 
volves it  in  no  innnediate  danger.  That  is  excellent 
news.  But  with  such  a  valuable  piece  of  public  infor- 
mation in  hand  of  no  conceivable  advantage  to  the 
enemy,  one  moreover  admitted  by  implication,  why 
not  publish  it  openly  and  at  some  length  explaining  the 
added  strength  such  a  situation  gives  to  further  opera- 
tions on  the  Tigris  ?  It  would  be  all  to  the  good  and 
very  little  trouble.  H.  Belloc." 


KNOWLEDGE    FOR    WAR. 

We  liavc  received  a  little  work  from  the  pen  of  Major 
B.  C.  Lake,  King's  Own  Scottish  Borderers,  entitled  Know- 
ledge for  Way  (Messrs.  Harrison  and  Sons,  St.  Martin's  Lane.) 
This  book  may  be  mo5t  heartily  recommended,  and  that  at  a 
moment  when  the  output  of  such  elementary  and  practical 
text  books  is  considerable  and  increasing.  It  is  specially 
marked  by  an  immediate  i)ractical  quaUty  which  distinguishes 
it  from  the  greater  part  of  similar  work  and  includes  a  great 
mass  of  observation  and  experience  entirely  gained  in  tiie 
last  few  months  of  the  present  campaign. 

To  those  who  'would  test  the  value  of  this  frankly 
laudatory  criticism  we  would  suggest  a  reading  of  pages  47-63 
whicli  deal  with  the  practical  side  of  trench  work,  or  again 
()g-74,  which  deal  with  the  practical  work  of  entanglements 
and  obstacles.  It  is  rare  indeed  to  see  so  muc'i  uscfur state- 
ment immediately  available  put  into  so  small  a  space,  and  the 
drawings  which  illustra,te  the  text  are  exactly  what  is  needed 
to  convey  the  fullest  and  most  rapid  instruction.  Not  only 
soldiers  but  civilians  who  desire  to  understand  the  present 
trench  warfare  will  do  well  to  possess  themselves  of  the  book 
and  to  note  the  points  it  describes.  It  is  difficult  to  pick  out 
individual  passages  from  what  is  so  good,  but  further  praise 
may  be  extended  to  the  notes  upon  the  "  hasty  improvement 
of  ground  "  on  page  21,  or  the  few  very  valuable  notes  on  the 
drawing  of  a  trench  trace  on  page  39. 

'Hie  book  is  ])rovidcd  within  the  outer  cover  with  a 
certain  number  <jf  blank  pages  for  notes,  and  wth  a  fairly 
sufficient  list  of  contents  at  the  beginning.  It  is  a  convenient 
small  size  for  the  pocket  and  not  too  thick.  It  is  a  defect  that 
no  price  is  mentioned  upon  the  cover  or  within  the  book,  so  wc 
are  not  ourselves  able  in  this  notice  to  mention  at  what  sum 
the  work  is  sold.  Author  and  publisiier  would  do  well  to 
remedy  this.  It  may  also  be  noted  that  the  thin  red  card 
binding  chosen  will  very  soon  go  to  pieces  in  field  use,  and 
those  responsible  for  so  valuable  a  little  work  may  accept 
the  suggestion  tliat  the  issue  of  a  certain  number,  leather 
covered,  and  perhaps  at  a  sUghtly  higher  price,  would  be 
gratefully  received. 

Mr.  C.  Arthur  Pearson  has  started  a  sale  of  "  Regimental 
Rings  "  on  be-half  of  the  blinded  soldiers  at  S.  Dunstan's, 
Regent's  Park.  Everybody  wishing  to  help  these  brave 
men  who  have  suffered  so  cruelly  for  us  should  buy  one. 
They  are  made  in  gold  shell  at  2s.  6d.  each,  or  in  9  carat  gold 
at  a  guinea,  and  each  one  is  engraved  with  any  crest  required. 

MR.     ARTHUR     KITSON'S     ARTICLES. 

We  re'^ret  that  owing  to  pressure  on  our  space  Mr.  Arthur 
Kitson's  current  article  on  "  The  British  Banking  System  " 
has  to  bj  held  over  until  next  iceck.  It  deals  with  the  effect 
the  ~war  has  had  on  our  b:inl\S. 


LAND     A-ND     WATER.  February  lo,  1916. 

A    SONG    OF    THE    GUNS. 

By    Gilbert    Frankau. 

8.-THE    VOICE    OF    THE    GUNS. 

We  are  the  guns,  and  your  masters  !     Saw  ye  our  flashes  ? 
Heard  ye  the  scream  of  our  shells  in  the  night,  and  the  shuddering  crashes  ? 
Saw  ye  our  work  by  the  roadside,  the  shrouded  things  thick -lying, 
Moaning  to  God  that  He  made  them— the  maimed  and  the  dying  ? 

Husbands  or  sons, 
Fathers  or  lovers,  we  break  them.     We  are  the  guns  ! 

Wo  are  the  guns,  and  ye  serve  us  !     Dare  ye  grow  weary, 

Steadfast  at  night-time,  at  noon-time ;   or  waking,  when  dawn  winds  blow  dicury 

Over  the  fields  and  the  flats  and  the  reeds  of  the  barrier-water, 

To  wait  on  the  hour  of  our  choosing,  the  minute  decided  for  slaughter  ? 

S\vift  the  clock  runs ; 
Yea,  to  the  ultimate  second.     Stand  to  your  guns  I 

We  are  the  guns  and  we  need  you  !   h^e,<mthe  timbered 

Pits  that  are  screened  by  the  crest,  and  We  copse  where  at  dusk  ye  unlimbered ; 
Pits  that  one  found  us— and,  finding,  gave  life  (Did  he  flinch  from  the  giving  ?) ; 
Laboured  by  moonlight  when  wraith  of  the  dead  brooded  yet  o'er  the  living, 

Ere,   with  the  Sun's  - 

Rising,  the  sorrowful  spirit  abandoned  its  guns. 

Who  but  the  guns  shall  avenge  him?,    Strip  us  for  action;  • 
Load  us  and  lay  to  the  centremost  hair j>f  the  dial-sight's  refraction  ; 
Set  your  quick  hands  to  our  levers  to  compass  the  sped  soul's  assoiling  ; 
Brace  your  taut  limbs  to  the  shock  when  the  thrust  of  the  barrel  recoiling 

Deafens  and  stuns ! 
Vengeance  is  ours  for  our  servants  :   trust  ye  the  guns  1 

Least  of  our  bond-slaves  or  greatest,  grudge  ye  the  burden  ? 
Hard,  is  this  service  of  ours  which  has  only  our  service  for  guerdon  : 
Grow  the  limbs  lax,  and  unsteady  the  hands,  which  aforetime  we  trusted ; 
Flawed,  the  clear  crystal  of  sight ;  and  the  clean  steel  of  hardihood  rusted  ? 

Dominant  ones,     '  •■.' 
Are  we  not  tried  serfs  and  proven — true,  to  lour  guns?  ■ 

Ye  are  the  guns  /   Are  we  worthy  ?   Shall  not  these  speak  for  ns, 

Out  of  the  woods  where  the  tree-trunks  are  slashed  with  the  vain  bolts  that  seek  for  us,. 

Thunder  of  batteries  firing  in  unison,  swish  of  shell  flighting,  ' 

Hissing  that  rushes  to  silence  and  breaks  Jo  the  th<ud.pf  alighting  ,■ 

Death  that  outruns- \:  "  ' 

~-.--».,4,.     ■   '  , 

Horseman  and  foot?  Are  we  justified?,.  Answer,'  0- guns  ! 

Yea  !   by  your  works  are  ye  justified — toil  unreUeved  ; 
Manifold  labours,  co-ordinate  each  to  liie  sending  achieved  ; 
Discipline,  not  of  the  feet  but  the  soul,  unremitting,  unfeigned; 
Tortures  unholy,  by  flame  and  by  maiming,  known,  faced,  and  disdaihed ; 

-Courage  that  shuns 
Only  foolhardiness  ;   even  by  these,  are  ye  worthy  your  guns. 

Wherefore — and  unto  ye  only — power  hath  been  given  ; 

Yea !  beyond  man,  over  men,  over  desolate  cities  and  riven  ; 

Yea !   beyond  space,  over  earth  and  the  seas  and  the. skies  high  dominions ; 

Yea !   beyond  time,  over  Hell  and  the  fiends  and  the  Death-angel's  pinions. 

Vigilant  ones, 
Loose  them,  and  shatter,   and  spare  not !    We  are  the  guns ! 

Finis. 

N.B.— Mr.  Gilbert  Frankau's  poem  *'  A  Song  of  the  Guns"  which  has  been  appearing  in 
LAND  AND  WATER  during  the  past  few  weeks,  wilt  be  published  'Snimediately  in 
book  form  at  one  shilling  net  by  Messrs.  Chatto  and  Winilus  under  the  title  of  "  The  Guns." 


February  lo,  1916. 


LAND      A  N  I?  i^W  A  T  E  R  . 


AMERICA    AND    GERMANY. 


By   Arthur  Pollen. 


IT  looks  as  if  the  controversy  between  Washington 
and  BcrUn  must  at  last  be  terminated  one  way 
or  the  other.  The  issue  which  President  Wilson 
raised  in  May  is  quite  simple.  Mr.  Wilson  laid 
down  in  language  that  is  fresh  in  our  memory,  that  it  was 
contrary  to  justice  and  humanity  that  private  ships 
should  be  sunk  upon  the  high  seas,  without  both  the 
formahties  of  search  and  provision  for  the  safety  of 
those  on  board.  The  reconciliation  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany  depends  upon  Germany  accept- 
ing this  view,  and  squaring  her  future  conduct  by 
Mr.  Wilson's  code.  And  Germany  cannot  accept  this 
code  without  in  terms  disavowing  her  previous  acts, 
and  disavowing  them  because  they  are  illegal.    This 


ance  of  the  American  view  and  a  breach  between  Berlin 
and  Washington.  But  further,  unless  Mr.  Wilson  sur- 
renders, there  seems  no  prospect  of  a  breach  between  the 
two  countries  being  very  long  postponed.  By  this  1  mean 
that  if  Germany  yields  now,  as  very  likely  she  will,  it 
can  only  be  as  a  purely  temporary  expedient.  It  will  be 
done  with  the  idea  of  putting  off  the  evil  day  of  an  open 
quarrel  with  America  for  as  long  as  possible.  The  open 
quarrel  is  finally  inevitable  because  our  blockade,  unless 
checked,  must,  in  the  course  of  six  months  or  so  prove 
fatal  to  Germany,  and  a  ruthless  and  relentless  submarine 
war  is  Germany's  only  possibly  reply.  That  it  has  already 
brought  her  extremely  low  in  many  necessaries  of  life  is 
obvious.     —       • 


That  it  can  and  will  be  made  far  more  stringent 


1.  E. 


M 


N 


na  JNJ  m 


113  4  J  6  7  8  9  lOH  141JH  I'lil?  I819  M'2111  JjVjjiii?  I«'29'30'3t 


A3N 


2.  □ 


m 


N 


N 


nQ 


I  1  3  4  5  6   7  8  9  10 11 12  1314 15 16  17  18  t9  20  21  22  i3  24  251627  28  2$  30 


.aAAfi 


1  n  griNi 


N 


N 


b 


)  a  3  4  56  7  8  9  10 1112  13  M  15 16  J7  18 19  2021 222324  25  25  27282930  31 


I 


1  n  [ntd  .  n 


JDU  1213  1415  16  17  18  19  20  21  222s  2*  25  26  27  28  29  30  31 


The  above  diagrams  show  ships  att>cke>}  or  sunk  by  mines  and     submarines  in  the  months  of  October,   November  and  December,   1915,  and 
January,   1916.      Circles  denotes  ships  sunk  in  the  Mediterranean  ;  squares  the  ships  sunk  elsewhere.       Blanks    indicate    British    ships  ;  the 

letter  A  Allied  ships,  and  N  Neutral  ships. 


has  been  Mr.  Wilson's  contention  since  May  last.  This 
has  been  the  point,  and  the  only  point,  which  has  kept 
controversy  open  to  the  present  time.  Germany  has  long 
since  offered  to  pay  compensation  and  has  already  assured 
tlie  United  States  that  instructions  have  been  given  to 
the  submarine  commanders  that  are  co«sonant  with 
America's  wishes.  The  controversy  then  has  been  kept 
alive  solely  on  the  points  of  disavowal  and  illegality, 
and  on  these  Germany  will  not  surrender. 

The  American  correspondents  of  the  London  papers 
assure  us  now  that  a  form  of  words  will  be  found  that 
will  get  over  this  difficulty.  But  there  can  be  no  form 
of  words  that  saves  German  pride  that  does  not  involve 
America  iui  the,  humiliation;. .which  •  Germany  avoids, 
i^nd  this'being'sQ.i  caiiJiot„ji;pr..iKi}^  ojvn.  part  ajC.cept  t^e 
view  of  the  sifuafioifwhicli'fiFie  correspondents, have  put 
forward.     I  see  no  alternative  between  a  German  accept-' 


and  effective  is  certain.  And  a  relentless  submarine 
blockade  is  Germany's  only  answer,  because  if  submarines 
have  to  comply  with  Mr.  Wilson's  rules  their  power  for 
mischief  is  reduced  to  a  point  of  virtual  impotence. 

Are  there  any  evidences  that  Germany  has  a  very 
severe  submarine  campaign  in  contemplation  ?  The 
record  of  the  submarine  and  mine  campaign  of  the  last 
four  months  shows  that  there  were  21  successes  in 
October,  53  in  November,  43  in  December  and  25  in 
January,  The  Mediterranean,  campaign  shows  five  in 
October,  25  in  November,  17  in  December  and  seven  in 
January.  The  home  waters  campaign,  16  in  October 
28  in  November,  26  in  December  and  18  in  January.  It 
.  looks  then  as  if  the  Mediterranean  campaign  had  been 
.got  in  hand  and  that  the  home  wafers  campaign  liad 
never  recovered  from  the  ligure  it  was  reduced  to  after  the 
'heavy  toll  our  counter  campaign  had  taken  of  the  pirates 


LAND     AND     WATER 


February  lO,  1916. 


in  the  montli  of  Aiif:;ust  and  Soptcmbor.  But  it  would 
be  a  iE;rcat  error  to  deduce  from  these  figures  that  the  on- 
slaught on  our  trade  will  be  or  can  be  kept  to  these  com- 
parativelj'  low  figures.  The  toll  \\hich  was  taken  of 
the  German  submarines— a  toll  by  the  way,  which  still 
continues — limits  the  number  of  boats  activelj'  engaged 
against  us.  But  it  is  not  the  only  limiting  element. 
There  are  fewer  boats  out,,  not  because  there  is  a 
paucity  of  boats,  but  because  there  is  a  paucity  of  trained 
crews  to  man  them. 

Of  the  German  capacitj'  to  produce  submarines,  and 
subrnarines  of  a  larger  and  more  formidable  tj-pc — more 
formidable  because  clesigned  for  a  greater  radius  of  action 
and  carrying  a  heavier  gun  armament — there  can  be  no 
doubt  whatever.  Indeed  it  is  a  capacity  that  has 
certainly  shown  a  progressive  increase  since  the  war 
began.  The  inference  is  then  that  Germany  probably 
possesses  many  more  submarines  than  she  can  man,  and 
that  many  of  those  that  she  can  man  are  withdrawn  from 
hostilities  for  training  purposes.  The  situation  that 
existed  in  the  months  of  October,  November,  December 
and  January,  1914,  and  1915,  has  in  all  probability  been 
recreated.  A  reasonable  inference  is  that  as  soon  as  the 
new  crews  are  ready  a  more  violent  and  a  more  extensive 
onslaught  on  our  trade  will  be  made,  and  will  be  made  in 
the  light  of  the  very  costly  experience  which  Germany 
lias  already  had  of  our  counter  efforts.  It  will  therefore 
probably  be  made  with* sea-going  submarines,  in  the  0]>en 
sea,  and  as  far  as  may  be  from  the  narrow  waters  which 
we  have  learnt  to  protect.  I  say  that  this  is  a  reasonable 
inference  because  no  other  counter  stroke  to  our  blockade 
is  conceivable. 

Should  this  prove  to  be  the  situation  is  it  not  inevit- 
able that  cither  America  must  stand  by  while  Germany 
sinks  indiscriminately,  or  that  a  broach  between  America 
and  Germany  must  take  place  ?  It  might  seem  at  first 
sight  as  if  to  force  America  into  hostilities  could  only 
defeat  Germany's  ends  by  ensuring  the  blockade  being 
made  more  stringent.  The  truth  probably  is  that  Ger- 
many knows  that  even  without  American  assistance  the 
blockade  will  be  made  stringent  enough  to  do  the  work. 
The  indications  are,  then,  that  there  will  either  be  an 
immediate  breach  between  Washington  and  Berlin  or 
that  German}'  will  yield  for  the  moment,  knowing  per- 
fcctlj'  well  that  the  exigencies  of  the  situation  will  compel 
her  to  throw  over  the  American  code  as  soon  as  her 
submarines  are  ready  for  business.  It  is  quite  incon- 
ceivable that  having  stood  out  for  a  principle  for  nine 
months,  that  Mr.  Wilson  should  waive  that  jirinciplc  now. 
Finally,  it  would  be  a  useless  humiliation  if  he  submitted. 
America  cannot  stand  by  in  the  new  campaign,  if  it  is  one 
that  disregards  Mr.  Wilson's  code.    And  it  must  do  so. 

The  High  Seas  Raider. 

The  raider  that  held  up  the  Appam  i,s  supposed  to  be 
a  new  merchant  ship,  the  Potif;a,  that  was  building  at 
Hamburg  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  If  this  supposition  is 
correct,  it  is  unlikely  that  her  speed  is  greater  than  14  or 
15  knots.  Lieutenant  Berg  has  been  telling  American 
reporters  that  she  is  so  enormously  fast  that  our  work  will 
be  cut  out  if  we  try  to  catch  her.  If  this  is  so,  some  very 
radical  changes  must  have  been  made  in  her  construction. 
People  on  the  Appam  describe  her  as  displacing  something 
more  than  4,000  and  certainly  Jess  than  6,000  tons.  No 
ship  of  this  displacement,  built  on  the  lines  of  a  merchant- 
man, can  possibly  be  driven  at  25  knots.  Captain  Harri- 
son, it  is  true,  said  that  her  above  water  hull  was  shaped 
as  a  tramp,  but  that  her  lines  under  water  were  those  of 
a  yacht.  But  this  hardly  satisfies  the  conditions  that 
Lieutenant  Berg  i^roclaims.  lentil  it  is  proved  there 
is  no  rca.son  for  supposing  that  her  speed  is  anything 
exceptional,  and  speed  would  be  a  material  fact  or  in 
her  power  for  mischief.  . 

Her  story  up  to  her  encounter  with  the  Appam 
seems  fairly  clear —but  the  date  of  her  escape  is  not  given. 
She  escaped  through  our  patrol  lines  disguised  as  a  tramp 
and  flying  false  colours.  There  is  nothing  remarkable  in 
this.  Not  every  neutral  ship  leaving  the  North  Sea  has 
been  stopped  and  searched  as  is  every  ship  that  enters  it. 
This,  at  least,  has  probably  been  the  rule  ;  but  it  can  be 
the  rule  no  longer.  It  will  have  to  be  a  very  clever  raider 
that  gets  through  now.  Where  has  the  Ponga  gone  ? 
There  is  still  no  news  of  her.    No  new  captures  have  been 


announced.  There  is  no  news  r-f  sliips  being  overdue* 
For  the  moment  then  no  new  captures.can  be  presumed. 
We  can,  of  course,  onty  conjecture  as  to  her  whereabouts. 
Her  two  obvious  choices  are  as  follows  :  If  she  is  look- 
ing only  for  a  place  of  safe  concealment,  the  innumerable 
inlets  round  Cape  Horn  offer  the  best  prospect.  It  was 
here  that  the  Dresden  sheltered  so  long.  It  is  possibly 
here  that  the  Macedonia,  once  in  von  Spec's  fleet,  may  still 
be  hiding.  But  this  would  give  her  safety  only. 
But  the  best  combination  of  refuge  and  raiding  oppor- 
tunity is  undoubtedly  to  be  found  on  the  old  hunting 
grounds  of  the  Karlsruhe.  The  north  coast  of  Soutli 
America,  with  its  many  inlets,  the  West  Indian  Islands, 
with  their  innumerable  coves  and  anchorages  and 
the  trade  route  that  passes  Pernambuco  to  fall  upon 
— this  is  unquestionably  the  ideal  field.  The  Karlsruhe, 
it  will  be  remembered,  captured  16  ships  in  ten  weeks 
in  this  neighbourhood.  But  the  Karlsruhe  could  show 
a  clean  pair  of  heels  to  almost  everything  we  had  in  the 
Atlantic,  and  the  Ponca,  as  we  suppose,  has  no  such 
advantage. 

If  she  has,  we  have  cruiser  resources  to-da^'  which 
we  did  not  possess  in  August,  1914.  At  that  time,  we 
had  under  construction  ih  fast  cruisers — eight  Arcthusas 
and  eight  Calliopes — all  sixteen  must  long  since  have  gone 
into  commission,  and  others  as  fast  have  no  doubt  suc- 
ceeded them  on  the  slips,  \\ith  the  Indian  Ocean,  the 
Pacific  and  the  North  and  South  Atlantic  otherwise 
free  from  enemy  surface  shijos,  the  demands  on  the 
services  of  our  cruisers  is  limited  to  (a)  the  scouting  and 
screening  work  demanded  by  the  (irand  Fleet  and  the 
warships  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  (b)  the  enforcement 
of  the  blockade  of  (iermany.  Things  are  thus  very 
chffercnt  from  what  they  were  in  the  first  six  months  of 
the  war.  It  is  obvious  then  that  the  cniiser  force 
available  for  running  down  this  or  any  other  raider,  is 
not  only  enormously  greater  in  numbers,  but  may  with 
perfect  safety  be  made  very  different  in  quality  from  that 
which  could  be  employed  against  the  cruisers  and  anned 
merchantmen  sent  out  against  our  commerce  when  war 
began.  Note  first  then  that  the  career  of  any  raider  is 
neither  likely  to  be  long  nor  destructive  while  it  lasts. 
But  it  is  also  worth  remarking  that  if  the  Germans  have 
inaugurated  this  raiding  adventure  in  the  hope  of  distract- 
ing counsel  or  weakening  the  cruiser  force  in  the  North 
Sea,  her  expectations  are  likely  to  be  disappointed.  Our 
available  cruiser  strength  is,  for  once  in  our  history, 
greater  than  our  immediate  needs  call  for.  Had  Germany 
expected  war  with  Great  Britain,  had  she  put  a  sufficiency 
of  armed  ships  upon  the  trade  routes  before  war  began, 
the  story  would  have  been  very  different.  It  will  be  very 
different  if  fast  ocean-going  submarines  come  out  in  the 
spring.     But  for  the  moment  the  situation  is  satisfactory. 

German  Plans. 

As  I  remarked  last  week,  the  most  obvious  comment 
on  this  incident  is  that  it  surprises  us  only  because  the 
inertia  of  the  German  Fleet  during  the  last  eighteen 
months  has  been  so  extraordinary.  Just  as  our  sub- 
marines, both  in  the  Baltic  and  in  the  Sea  of  Marmora, 
have  completely  eclipsed  the  doings  of  the  German  sub- 
marines, so  would  the  naval  resources  of  Gennany,  had 
they  been  in  the  hands  of  British  officers,  have  done  some- 
thing either  in  the  North  Sea  or  in  the  Baltic  in  this  long 
interval  of  time.  There  are  those  who  would  have  us 
believe  that  the  coyness  of  the  (ierman  Fleet  masks 
subtle  and  deep  laid  plans  for  our  confusion.  We  should 
be  foolish  indeed  if  we  supposed  that  because  (iermany 
was  taking  no  overt  action  against  us,  she  was  not  prepar- 
ing— and  as  sedulously  as  she  could — some  action  in  the 
future.  But  the  particular  form  of  action  with  wlvich 
we  arc  threatened  does  not  seem  well  authenticated  by 
evidence,  nor  intrinsically  very  probable,  nor,  if  true, 
very  formidable.  About  Germany's  shipbuilding  resources 
there  is  after  all  no  mystery.  As  she  did  not  expect  war 
with  England,  it  is  unlikely  that  before  the  middle  oi 
1914  she  had  made  any  vast  naval  preparati'--  "  that 
were  secret.  That  she  has  done  all  the  shipbi  di  •  in 
her  power  since  August,  1914,  we  can  take  for  ^  ...ited. 
But  when  all  allowances  are  made,  it  is  imlikely  that  be- 
yond the  Kronprinz,  Lutzow  and  the  Salami's  she  can 
have  added  more  than  a  single  ship  so  far,  or  can  add  more 
than  four  ships  before  the  end  of  the  current  year.    What 


,10 


February  to,  1916. 


LAND     ANDWATER' 


we  are  asked  to  believe  is  that  tlie  ships  Germany  has  in 
preparation  are  more  formidable  than  anything  afloat, 
and  that  she  is  changing  the  character  of  the  ships  she 
already  possesses. 

The  17  in.   Gun  Scare — and  its  Purpose. 

It  is  now  nearly  eight  weeks  since  an  effort  was  first 
made  to  work  up  a  kind  of  scare  by  spreading  the  story 
that  the  Germans  had  built  a  17-inch  gun,  and  were 
arming  all  their  new  ships  and  re-arming  their  old  ones 
with  this  formidable  weapon.  For  some  time  the  censor- 
ship succeeded  in  keeping  this  story  out  of  the.  papers, 
but  somewhat  more  than  a  fortnight  ago — all  other 
efforts  having  failed — Mr.  James  Douglas  of  all  people, 
got  the  story  into — the  Daily  Slews  I  Unfortunately 
Mr.  Douglas  gave  his  reasons,  instead  of  his  authority, 
for  his  statements.  And  the  reasons  resolved  them- 
selves into  this,  that  a  17-inch  shell  had  been  fired 
into  the  town  of  Dimkerque  from  a  naval  gun.  The 
facts  which  are  fairly  well  known  arc,  that  some  time 
last  spring  a  few  rounds  of  heavy  shell  were  fired  into 
Dunkerque,  but  they  were  15-inch,  and  not  17-inch,  and 
an  airship  reconnaissance  showed  that  they  were  fired 
from  a  giant  howitzer  and  not  from  a  naval  gun  !  Mr. 
Douglas  illogically  deduces  from  his  wrong  information 
that  as  it  was  a  naval  gun,  it  must  have  been  built  by 
Krupps,  that  the  Ersatz  Hcrtha — now  christened  the 
Hiudcnbur^ — must  be  armed  with  it,  that  probably  a 
homogeneous  squadron  of  such  ships  are  already  afloat 
and  in  commission,  that  the  whole  German  Fleet  fs being 
re-armed  with  this  weapon,  and  that  any  way  monitors, 
or  some  surli  craft,  carrying  it  will  be  sent  on  some 
(undefined)  mission  for  our  destruction. 

The  talc  was  from  the  beginning  a  flight  of  imagina- 
tion and  would  not  be  worth  commenting  on  but  for  the 
discxission  to  which  it  has  given  rise.  '  It  may  be  said 
to  have  culminated  in  the  Daily  Telegraph  and  The 
Observer  calling  for  Lord  Fisher's  return.  The  argument 
for  Lord  Fisher's  return  has  durin.g  the  last  few  months 
been  based  on  the  following  curious  series  of  statements. 

1.  He  is  our  greatest  sailor  and  naval  strategist  since 
Nelson. 

2.  If  he  is  a  very  old  man — a  disadvantage  in  war 
— well,  so  was  Lord  Barham. 

3.  He  is  the  creator  of  the  Dreadnought  fleet — 
and  therefore  the  only  person  capable  of  using  it  ! 

4.  He  discovered  the  means  of  destroying  German 
submarinesin  home  waters. 

5.  No  sooner  had  he  left  the  Admiralty  than  sub- 
marines began  to  appear  in  the  Mediterranean — a  tiling 
he  would  not  liave  allowed. 

6.  Gennany  has  adopted  a  gun  bigger  even  than 
Lord  Fisher  adopted,  and  therefore  Lord  Fisher  must 
return  to  produce  a  bigger  one  ! 

7.  Germany  is  preparing  a  series  of  naval  surprises 
for  us.  Lord  Fisher  is  the  only  person  who  can  discount 
these  surprises  and  invent  counter  surprises  of  a  still 
more  astonishing — and  no  doubt — practical  nature. 

8.  Lord  Fisher  was  the  author  of  the  Falkland 
Islands  success. 

q.  Although  as  first  sea  Lord  he  could  have  preven- 
ted the  Dardanelles  fiasco,  his  failure  may  be  excused 
because  naval  opinion  was  divided  on  the  possibilities 
of  effective  bombardment.  Hence  the  fact  that  he  signed 
svery  order  necessary  for  the  Garden  and  dc  Robeck 
attacks,  leaves  him  in  no  sense  responsible  for  the  policy 
that  dictated   them  ! 

All  the  above  statements  are  quoted  almost  textually 
from  the  columns  of  various  papers  of  influence — many 
of  them  from  the  signed  articles  of  professed  naval 
correspondents.  They  are  all  cither  untrue,  or  non- 
sequiturs.  It  is  somewhat  of  a  task  to  attempt  a 
reply  to  statements  of  this  kind.  How  are  we  to  com- 
pare any  seaman  with  Nelson  until  some  sailor  has 
handled  fleets  in  war  and  in  action  with  some  results 
comparable  to  Nelson's  ?  There  hangs  in  front  of  me 
as  I  write  an  old  picture  of  Nelson  surrounded  by  the 
effigies  of  26  sail  of  the  line  at  whose  capture  he  had 
assisted  between  1793  and  1801,  that  is  before  he  had 
accounted  for  Villcneuve's  fleet  at  Trafalgar.  What 
common  ground  is  there  between  the  career  of  a  man 
who' had  seen  thi«  amnnni-  nf  fighting  before  he  was  43, 


and  the  record  of  a  sailor  statesman  whose  sole  experience 
of  war  was  the  bombardment  of  Alexandria  ?  It  is 
impossible  to  go  through  these  arguments  in  detail.  The 
truth  is  that  Lord  Fisher's  friends  are  more  enthusiastic 
thanchscriminating.  Note  that  it  is  purely  a  Press  cam- 
paign. In  the  navy,  where  admiration  for  Lord  Fisher  is 
genuine,  but  instructed,  a  very  different,  but  perhaps  saner 
view  is  taken  of  that  remarkable  man's  career  and  capacity. 
To  the  majority  of  officers,  the  objection  to  Lord  Fisher's 
returning  to  power  is  twofold.  First,  his  failure  either  to 
formulate  a  sound  technical  judgment  of  his  own,  or  to 
organise  his  staff  so  as  to  ensure  the  best  technical  guid- 
ance, was  absolute  ;  and  this  failure  was  Mr.  Churchill's 
only  defence  for  the  lamentable  blunder  of  last  February. 
Secondly,  if  Lord  Fisher  were  once  more  put  in  authority 
the  loyalty  of  the  Navy  to  Whitehall  would  be  strained  to 
an  intolerable  point.  "  The  Band  of  Brothers  "  would 
be  split  into  cliques.  And  this  is  a  matter  I  would  seri- 
ously ask  the  newspapers  to  weigh.  It  is  really  more 
important  that  the  navy,  which  knows  it  business,  should 
be  satisfied  with  its  rulers,  than  either  the  public  or  those 
that  guide  the  pubhc.  For  they  do  not,  and  cannot  know 
the  navy's  business  so  well  as  do  the  men  on  the  active  list. 
A  very  distinguished  officer,  holding  a  high  and  important 
command,  was  discussing  a  day  or  two  ago  the  latest 
manifestations  of  the  Fisher  campaign.  "  Is  Fleet  Street," 
he  asked,  "  so  called  because  real  knowledge  of  naval 
stratcg3'  and  of  the  inner  working  of  the  British  Navy  is 
onlj'  to  be  found  there  ?  " 

Arthur  Pollen. 


The  Two-Stroke  Enf;ine,  by  Dr.  A.  M.  Low,  D.Sc.  (Temple 
?res^,  IP.  6d.  net),  the  first  full  manual  on  the  subject  of 
the  two-stroke  engine,  is  designed  to  redncc  technicalities  to 
such  a  level  that  the  layman  will  be  able  to  comprehend  them, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  be  of  such  a  qualitv  that  it  shall  not 
be  beneath  the  notice  of  tlic  expert. 

Dr.  Low  has  fa\  ourcd  the  ex|  crt  rather  than  the  layman, 
andsomeof  his  sayings  will  ;.rove  hard  to  the  common  under- 
standing. Such  a  compromise  as  he  has  attempted,  however, 
is  a  very  difficult  matter,  and  in  fairness  i't  must  be  said  that 
tlic  merest  tyro  will  gain  from  the  l-.ook  a  very  good  idea  of  the 
two-stroke  engine,  its  advantages,  its  defects,  and  its  various 
patterns.  The  book  is  fully  illustrated  with  diagrams  that 
assist  an  easy  comprehension  of  the  text,  and  the  work 
throughout  is  as  authoritative  as  it  is  complete. 


SORTES     SHAKESPEARIANyE, 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE. 


THE    ZEPPELIN    RAIDS. 

Some  airy  devil  hovers  m  the  sky 
And  pours  down  mischief. 

KING  JOHN,  III.,  ii.,  2-4. 

"The  War  OfTice  has  control  of  the  defences  of    London.      The 
COflSC-line  and  the  rest  of  Enfllnnd  are  the  care  of  the  Admiralty.*' 

—  THE  ;/;MfiS,   FebniBryllh 

My  soul  aches 
To  knoiv,  wJten  huo  authorities  are  tip. 
Neither  supreme,  how  soon  confusion 
May  enter  'iwixt  the  gap  0/  both. 

CORIOLANUS,  III.,  i..  108.11. 


THE  FATE  OF  L19. 

For  tvhat  doth  cherish  weeds  but  gentle 

air? 
And  ivhat   makes    robbers   bold,    b\U    too 

much  lenity  ? 

3  HENRY,  Vr.,  U.,  vi.,  21-2. 


II 


:L  A  J\  D      AiN  J)       W  ATE  R 


February  lo,  1916. 


THE    IMPERIAL    TASK. 


By  Neoimperialist. 


RELUCTANCE  to  discuss  after-war  develop- 
ments till  after  the.  war  be  won  is  normally 
the  mark  of  the  practical  intelligence.  It  is 
waste  of  time  buildiilg  airy  structures  on 
foundations  of  prophecy,  or  on  calculations  of  which  so 
many  terms  are  unknown  that  they  have  all  the  dis- 
advantages and  uncertainties  of  prophecy. 

A  very  important  exception  must  be  made  in  favour 
of  as  free  and  detailed  a  discussion  as  can  be  contrived 
amidst  our  tragic  preoccupations  and  anxieties,  of  the 
great  question  of  the  Imperial  settlement. 

It  is  certain  that  the  urgency  of  that  question  and 
the  general  lines  of  the  settlement  will  be  unaffected  by 
any  possible  issue  of  the  war.  The  utmost  that  the 
already  chastened  imagination  of  the  directors  of  the 
Central  Powers  can  now  'envisage  in  the  way  of  success 
is  the  stalemate  which  may  give  them  the  pause  for  tiie 
rebuilding  of  their  grandiose  plans.  Such  a  result, 
disastrous  as  it  would  be  to  us,  could  only,  under  the  driving 
sense  of  a  common  danger  now  intimately  realised, 
precipitate  that  process  of  setting  our  house  in  order, 
and  welding  the  peoples  of  Greater  Britain  into  a  duly 
organised  state,  as  opposed  to  the  mere  casual  and 
indeterminate  alliance  which  the  British  Empire  is  now 
in  actual  fact — an  alliance  with  certain  very  definite 
factors  of  disintegration  conflicting  with  the  more 
obvious  factors  of  unification. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  victory  crowns  the  arms  of 
the  Allies,  as  the  resolute  temper  of  the  allied  peoples  and 
conservative  calculation  of  their  resources  alike  give 
the  most  abundant  hope,  there  will  be  given  to  the  British 
race  an  opportunity  of  erecting  the  most  solidly  based 
system  of  defences  of  personal  and  poHtical  freedom  of> 
which  the  world  yet  holds  record.  It  is  indeed  a  destiny 
that  beckons  with  an  heroic  gesture. 

Let  the  reader  not  think  that  such  phrases  are 
lightly  set  down  in  a  mood  of  rhetorical  exuberance.  It 
is  easy  to  wa.x  vaguely  eloquent  over  the  obviously 
spectacular  aspects  of  JBritish  Imperialism.  The  least 
imaginative  of  those  amongst  us  who  have  a  little  free- 
dom and  leisure  in  our  lives  can  be  inspired  by  the  acreage 
of  a  territory  amounting  to  but  little  less  than  a  quarter 
ji  the  earth's  surface,  and  by  the  grand  muster  of  its 
peoples,  numbering  substantially  more  than  a  quarter  of 
the  human  race. 

These  vast  figures  cover  a  variety  of  types  and  stages 
of  political  development,  a  series  of  problems  of  widely 
differing  character  and  complexity.  They  convey  k 
generalsense  of  enormous  responsibility,  or,  to  those  who 
still  think  in  terms  of  dominion,  of  enormous  power. 
Clear  thought  about  this  immense  conglomerate  can  only 
begin  when  the  problems  are  sorted  into  their  various 
categories.  Naturally  the  first  problem  which  detaches 
itself,  the  key- problem  in  fact,  is  that  of  the  relations 
between  the"  Mother  Country  and  the  self-governing 
dominions.  It  is  that  problem,  referred  to  as  the  Im- 
perial settlement  and  separated  so  far  as  is  possible  from 
the  question  of  the  relations  between  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment and  the  less-developed  races,  which  will  be  con- 
sidered in  this  series  of  Imperial  studies. 

The  thinking  that  must  go  to  its  Imal  and  adequate 
solution  cannot  be  postponed  till  the  happy  issue  of  the 
war,  because  only  very  slowly  can  the  principles  which 
a  somewhat  intricate  problem  involves  be  apprehended, 
canvassed  and  established  in  the  public  mind.  It  is 
indeed  more  than  likely  that  our  own  preoccupation  with 
clamorous  domestic  problems  of  demobilisation  and  the 
labour  troubles,  with  the  recriminations  and  inquisitions 
as  to  Ihe  preparedness  for  and  conduct  of  the  war,  wJien  the 
general  peace  breaks  our  particular  political  truces, 
may  then  prevent  this  qiicstion  being  seen  in  its  proper 
perspective.  It  is  really  the  fact,  though  it  may  soimd 
paradoxical,  that  the  days  of  our  trial  provide  a  better 
occasion  for  those  who  are  not  directly  engaged  in  the 
business  of  war  to  think  out  this  problem  of  the  comple- 
tion of  the  unfinished  constitution  of  the  British  Empire, 
than  thie  davs  that  follow  the  declaration  of  peace. 

The  paramount  fact  that  the  writer  seeks  to  establish 
.n  these  articles  is  that  the  real  issue  is  shirked.     That 


real  issue  is:  that  the  self-governing  nations,  The 
Dominion  of  Canada,  The  Commonwealth  of  Australia, 
New  Zealand,  and  the  Union  of  South  Africa,  conveniently 
but  loosely  referred  to  as  the  Dominions- — a  term  whicJi 
carries  mischievous  implications — must,  as  the  essential 
token  of  their  free  fellowship  in  the  Imperial  Federation, 
be,  on  demand,  admitted  to  a  responsible  share  in  the 
control  of  imperial  foreign  policy  ;  with  the  corollary  that 
thev  must  also  share  the  financial  responsibility  in  some 
justly  calculated  proportion.  Control  of  voted  funds  is 
an  essential,  not  merely  an  accidental,  attribute  of 
responsible  self-government. 

No  doubt  the  issue  is  often  not  clearly  seen.  A  vague 
cloud  of  good  will,  good  will  now  immeasurably  increased 
by  the  splendid  fellowship  of  the  war,  tends  to  obscure 
the  fact  that  a  ciuite  definite  and  precise  solution  of  a 
tangible  difficulty  must  be  sought — a  difficulty  which  un- 
solved may  imperil  the  unity  of  Greater  Britain,  as  a 
not  altogether  dissimilar  difficulty,  left  unsolved,  actually 
sheared  the  American  colonies  from  England  with  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  on  that  fateful  fourtli  of 
July  in  1776. 

In  a  recent  review  in  these  columns  of  The  Nciv 
Empire  Partnership  occasion  was  taken  to  observe  how 
two  w(iIl-informed  and  zealous  Imperialists,  Messrs.  Percy 
and  .■\rchibald  Hurd,  forecasting  the  future  of  the  Empire, 
curiously  failed  to  face  this  essential  issue.  The  whole 
trend  of  their  argument  seemed  to  lead  their  horses  to 
this  particular  fence,  but  they  refused  the  jump.  Another 
notable  instance  may  be  recalled  in  Sir  Joseph  Ward's 
motion  at  the  Imperial  Conference  of  191 1.  Whether 
from  a  prudent  decision  not  to  press  a  point  for  which 
the  occasion  seemed  in  his  judgment  unfavourable,  or 
from  actual  confusion  of  thought  as  from  the  context 
seems  more  likely,  he  allowed  the  President  (Mr.  Asquith) 
to  ride  him  off  the  essential  ground  of  discussion. 

It  is  quite  possible  that  the  President's  action  on  that 
occasion  was  deliberate.  Politicians  do  not  want  prob- 
lems with  sharp  edges.  Seriou?  changes  and  I'eal  diffi- 
culties are  involved  in  preparing  for  the  final  and  irrevoc- 
able step  of  the  "  self-governing  "  dominions  from  re- 
stricted to  full  responsibility  of  government. 

Reasons  for  the  general  reluctance  of  statesmen  and 
writers  to  approach  a  direct  solution  must  be  discussed  in 
due  place. 

Meanwhile  the  general  procedure  is  to  assume  quite 
rashly  that  good  will  and  loyalty  will  carry  us  through 
all  troubles  as  they  have  already  carried  us  in  strengthened 
unity  through  this  testing  crisis  of  war.  But  "  sentiment 
is  not  government  "  though  it  prepare  the  way  for  a 
solution  of  the  problems  of  government.  It  is  the 
business  of  statesmanship  to  put  this  admirable  mutual 
regard  to  use  in  steering  through  the  undoubted  diflicul- 
ties  of  the  future  settlement. 

It  will  make  clearer  the  general  argument  of  these 
papers  if  the  thesis,  which,  as  the  writer  begs  leave  to 
argue,  states  the  logical  and  only  safe  solution  of  the 
Imperial  problem,  be  here  outlined. 

The  Dominions  must  be  allowed  to  claim  a  share  of 
responsibility  for  Imperial  and  Foreign  policy,  co-ordin- 
ate with,  and  of  the  same  essential  nature  as,  the  res- 
ponsibility of  Great  Britain.  The  Imperial  Executive 
must  be  answerable  to  the  electorate  of  the  Dominions 
as  well  as  to  the  electorate  of  Great  Britain  which 
now  alone*  decides  questions  of  foreign  policy  and  a 
war  ;  because  no  other  solution  is  consistent  with  the 
fundamental  rights  of  self-government,  the  unassailable 
heritage,  as  it  has  now  become  by  accumulated  precedent 
and  c(  mmon  consent,  of  every  British  subject  fit  to  exer- 
cise political  responsibility  ;  because  no  other  can  prevent 
ambiguous  loyalties,  causes  of  quarrel  and  disintegration 
of  which  significant  episodes  of  our  history  give  us 
warning. 

There  can  be  no  half-way  house  between  organised 
unity  on  the  one  hand  and  inevitable  disintegration  on 
the  other.  And  the  ^Mother  of  Parliaments  must  realise 
that  she  has  to  face  sacrifices  of  privilege  which  she  has 
grown  to  think  established  in  the  nature  of  things^-she 
has  to  pay  the  price  of  Admiraltj-  and  of  Serxicc. 


I 


February  lo,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


BRITAIN'S    AEROPLANE    POLICY. 


By  F.  W.  Lanchester. 


[The  pnhlic  have  been  dazzled  from  time  to  time  bv 
accounts  of  monster  aeroplanes  capable  of  carrying 
a  numerically  large  crew  and  many  guns  of 
various  calibre.  Sections  of  the  British  Press 
have  asked  it'hy  we  are  behindhand  in  the 
development  of  the  big  aeroplane.  In  the  present 
articles,  Mr.  Lanchester  points  outthe  limitations 
of  the  big  machine  and  some  of  the  advantages 
to  be  derived  from  concentrating  our  national 
resources  on  numbers  rather  than  on  individual 
size  or  power.] 

THERE  is  a  degree  of  attractiveness,  and  to  the 
more  adventurous  an  almost  fatal  fascination, 
in  any  extreme,  no  matter  in  wfiat  direction  it 
may  be,  which  is  not  possessed  or  excited  by 
anything  moderate  or  ordinary  ;  the  ordinary  thing  by 
contrast  frequently  wears  the  aspect  of  the  humdrum. 
This  attractiveness  or  fascination  is  commonly  greater 
when  bigness  rather  than  smallness  is  in  question.  A 
proposal  to  do  something  or  anything  on  a  scale  larger 
than  has  ever  been  done  before  is  rarely  found  to  lack 
advocates.  It  is  to  this  that  many  of  the  "white  elephants" 
of  history  have  owed  their  existence ;  thus  for  example, 
the  anticipation  of  the  mammoth  liner  of  to-day  in  the 
building  of  the  Great  Eastern — incidentally  a  strik- 
ing monument  to  the  genius  of  Brunei — was,  broadly 
speaking,  a  fruitless  enterprise  ;  it  was  premature.  Again 
the  attempts  made  by  engineers  (mainly  on  the  Continent), 
to  build  gas-engines  of  large  individual  units,  i.e.,  cyHn- 
ders  of  30  inches  bore  or  even  greater,  were  foredoomed 
to  failure — failure  which  might  have  been  predicted  by 
any  scientific  engineer  of  the  period,  and  probably  would 
have  been  so  predicted  had  not  those  concerned  been 
hypnotised  or  dazzled  by  the  hopes  of  big  achievement— 
by  the  very  idea  of  bigness. 

Fearlessness    of  Pioneers. 

On  the  other  hand  one  cannot  be  other  than  filled  with 
admiration  for  the  fearlessness  of  the  pioneers  of  the  steam 
engine  when  confronted  with  some  of  their  handiwork.  Take 
for  example  a  large  Cornish  pumping  engine,  or  the  engines 
of  the  Great  Eastern  itself,  cylinders  of  colossal  size  almost 
unknown  in  modern  practice,  and  this  at  a  time  when 
available  resources  in  material  and  knowledge  were  not 
a  tithe  of  what  they  are  to-day.  And,  let  it  be  said,  this 
early  work  has  stood  the  test  of  time  to  a  degree  and  in 
a  manner  that  even  its  authors  can  scarcely  have  antici- 
pated ;  examples  have  survived  as  much  as  a  century's 
continuous  usage. 

To  a  certain  extent  therefore  we  must  regard  the 
craving  for  bigness  as  one  of  the  factors  in  history  which 
has  contributed  materially  to  progress,  in  fact  it  is  prob- 
able that  there  is  scarcely  a  man  who  has  made  a  mark 
in  the  world,  who  has  not  at  one  time  or  another  derived 
inspiration  from  the  mere  thought  or  conception  of 
something  bigger  or  finer  than  anything  of  which  he  has 
experience. 

When  it  comes  to  execution  or  realisation  in  any 
problem  it  is  necessary  to  strike  a  balance  ;  on  the  one 
hand  we  must  not  be  carried  away  by  an  access  of  mild 
megalomania,  neither  on  the  other  hand  must  we  be 
incapable  of  imagining  a  courageous  thing  and  of 
carrying  it  into  execution  when  the  circumstances 
warrant.  We  must  be  ever  prepared  to  adopt  a  bold 
and  fearless  policy  when  once  after  due  consideration 
we  have  decided  that  it. is  right  ;  it  is  in  the  niatter  of 
reaching  the  correct  decision  that  the  scientific  training 
of  the  modern  engineer  should  if  anywhere  justify  itself. 

There  is  a  popular  tendency  which  frequently  mani- 
fests itself  to  jump  to  conclusions  by  founding  a  too  hasty 
judgment  on  analogy.  To  postulate  an  analogy  ,is 
dangerous  ;  it  is  dangerous  in  any  case,  but  it  is  often  the 
more  dangerous  by  its  very  plausibility,  at  the  best  it 
is  a  mere  imitation  of  true  reasoning.  We  may  grayt 
that  experience  has  demonstrated  the  commanding  im- 
portance of  the  bitr  warship,  whether  battleship  or  cruiser  ; 


also  experience  has  demonstrated  the  value  of  big  guns 
both  in  warfare  by  land  and  by  sea  ;  big  ship  must  be 
met  by  big  ship,  big  gun  must  be  answered  by  big  gun. 
But  it  does  not  follow  from  this  in  the  least  degree  that 
tlie  big  aeroplane  will  require  to  be  met  or  answered  by 
big  aeroplane,  or  indeed  that  an  extension  in  the  direc- 
tion of  bigness  will  in  the  aeroplane  be  of  any  advantage 
whatever.  This  is  a  matter  which  must  be  settled  by 
the  properties  or  characteristics  of  the  aeroplane  as  an 
instrument  of  war,  and  in  this  connection  the  aeroplane, 
and  more  generally  the  Aeronautical  Arm,  must  be 
studied  as  a  thing  sui  i^encris. 

Cheap   Analogies. 

The  foregoing  might  be  deemed  as  bordering  on  the 
obvious,  but,  that  it  is  not  so,  witness  the  enormous 
number  of  "  cheap  "  analogies  which  are  made  the  basis 
of  so-called  inventions,  and  dished  up  for  the  delectation 
of  the  various  inventions  committees  and  sub-committees 
• — much  to  their  pain  and  sorrow. 

As  a  prelude  to  entering  on  the  main  subject  of  dis- 
cussion it  may  be  pointed  out  that  the  most  appropriate 
size  of  aeroplane,  and  number  required,  for  the  perform- 
ance of  any  stated  duty  will  in  any  case  depend  upon  a 
balance  of  advantages  and  disadvantages.  There  are 
some  factors  which  in  any  case  are  without  material  or 
serious  influence,  and  which  in  the  language  of  the 
mathematician  may  be  regarded  as  constants  ;  at  the  out- 
set it  is  necessary  to  form  some  true  appreciation  of  the 
relative  importance  of  those  other  factors  and  considera- 
tions on  which  the  issue  may  be  definitely  said  to  depend. 

Firstly  it  may  be  laid  down  that  the  basis,  on  the 
material  or  economic  side,  must  be  that  of  cost.  It  may 
be  asked,  wlien  so  many  hundreds  of  millions  are  being 
spent  annually  and  when  so  relatively  small  a  part  of 
this  mighty  total  is  being  spent  upon  aircraft,  why  worry 
as  to  cost.  If  big  machines  are  better  than  small  why 
not  order  big  machines  in  the  same  numerical  quantity  ? 
The  reason  is  that  just  as  cost  qua  cost  ceases  to  be  im- 
portant, it  follows  that  the  manufacturing  resources 
of  the  country,  and  we  may  say  the  world,  will  be  occupied 
to  the  full,  and  so  cost  as  a  measure  of  the  facility  of 
manufacture  becomes  again  paramount,  or,  we  may  say, 
remains  paramount. 

Cost   and   Size. 

Now  as  to  the  relation  between  cost  and  size  of 
machine.  There  is  no  invariable  rule  relating  the  cost 
to  the  size  (or  weight  in  the  present  case)  of  any  manu- 
factured article.  Expressing  the  cost  at  per  lb.  or  per 
ton  there  are  cases,  as  in  yacht  or  ship  building  for 
example,  where  for  a  certain  class  or  quality  of  article 
the  cost  per  unit  weight  is  little  affected  by  size.  It  so 
happens  that  the  military  aeroplane  comes  roughly 
speaking  within  this  category  ;  it  can  be  manufactured 
and  sold  at  the  present  time  complete  with  engine,  at  a 
figure  round  about  15s.  per  lb.  whether  it  be  large  or  small. 
This  figure  is  no  actual  guide  to  the  future  ;  eventually  it 
may  become  lower,  but  for  some  time  it  may  rise,  since 
the  tendency  is  for  the  power  installation  to  increase, 
and  this  is  the  most  expensive  portion  of  the  whole. 
Beyond  this  the  greater  part  of  the  cost  is  involved  in 
removing  or  cutting  away  superfluous  material,  and  so 
far  as  improvement  is  effected  in  this  direction  the 
weight  is  reduced  and  the  cost  increased  so  that  the 
price  per  lb.  goes  up  on  two  counts. 

The  point  of  importance  here  is  not  so  much  the 
actual  present  day  or  future  cost  figure  or  selling  value, 
it  is  the  fact  that  cost  and  weight  go  together,  and  that 
consequently  the  military  problem,  as  concerning  con- 
structive policy,  is  to  determine,  for  any  given  duty, 
whether  a  certain  limited  aggregate  weight  of  tonnage 
of  machines  is  best  disposed  by  the  provision  of  a  certain 
number  of  large  machines,  or  by  a  greater  number  of 
smaller  ones.  Put  tersely  the  problem  is,  given  a  certain 
total  tonnage  to  what  extent  it  is  desirable  that  it  should 
be  subdivided  in  order  to  obtain  the  highest  military 
\^aJue    There  may  arise  special  reasons  why  a  machine  for 


LAND     AND     WATER 


February  lo,  1916. 


some  particular  duty  needs  to  bu  uf  a  definite  mininuun 
weight,  appropriate  to  the  load  it  may  have  to  bear. 
Thus  if  for  some  purpose  it  is  deemed  that  a  giant  bomb, 
weighing  say  one  ton,  is  necessary,  the  aeroplane  to  carry 
it  must  weigh  in  the  region  of  four  tons.  To  exceptional 
cases  such  as  this  the  present  discussion  does  not  of 
course  apply. 

In  all  cases  where  no  such  condition  exists  there  is 
one  very  strong  argument  in  favour  of  employing  units 
as  small  as  conveniently  possible  in  great  numerical 
strength.  This  reason  is  tliat  of  fire  concentration.  In 
my  "  Aircraft  in  Warfare  "  I  have  shown  that  this  is 
determined  by  a  law  which  I  have  termed  the  "  N*  "  Law ; 
this  law,  which  rests  ultimately  on  mathematical  de- 
monstration, but  which  is  independently  supported 
(quantitatively)  by  an  analysis  of  Nelson's  dispositions 
prior  to  tlic  battle  of  Trafalgar,  informs  us  that  if  a  fleet, 
m  the  present  application  our  air  fleet,  meets  an  enemy 
fleet  in  battle,  its  fighting  strength  or  value  is  propor- 
tional to  the  square  of  its  number  of  units,  and  directly 
i:)roportional  to  the  unit  \'alue  or  power. 

Relative  Strengths. 

In  the  simplest  case  if  the  units  of  both  fleets  are'of  the 
same  value,  the  relative  strengths  of  two  opposed  fleets  is 
proportional  to  the  squares  of  their  numbers  respectively  ; 
thus  a  fleet  50  strong  could  meet  and  destroy  a  fleet  of  40 
and  the  residue  could  meet  ua  equal  terms  a  fleet  jo  strong, 
because  so'''  ^  30''  plus  40-. 

In  practice  the  chances  would  be  very  much  in 
favour  of  the  single  fleet  of  50,  for,  flesh  and  blood  being 
what  it  is,  some  remnant  of  the  first  fleet  to  be  engaged 
would  assinedly  quit  the  scene  when  it  becomes  evident 
that  the  alternative  is  anihilation. 

In  the  case  of  machines  of  different  individual 
fighting  value,  the  advantage  of  seeking  strength  by 
number  rather  than  by  individually  powerful  units 
becomes  immediately  demonstrable.  Thus  let  the  one 
belligerent  be  assumed  to  place  his  reliince  on  machines 
of  great  individual  gun  power,  and  build  a  fleet  of 
"  battle  planes  "  mounting  three  machine  guns  apiece  ; 
let  the  enemy  on  the  other  hand  send  into  action  a  fleet 
of  the  same  tonnage  of  single  gun  machines — we  may 
fairly  assume  of  three  times  the  numerical  strength — thus 
if  the  numerical  strength  of  the  first  fleet  be  .m,  by  the 
N-square  law  that  of  the  second  will  be  3«,  the  fighting 
value  of  the  first  fleet  wfll  therefore  be  «-  by  3  and  that 
of  the  second  will  be  (3»)  "^  by  i  =  9?t-  or  three  times  the 
value  of  the  other.  That  is  to  say  for  a  given  expenditure 
on  the  creation  of  a  fleet,  and  for  the  same  number  of 
men  and  guns,  the  policy  of  the  small  one-man  machine 
gives  a  superiority  over  the  large  three  man  machine 
in  the  ratio  of  three  to  one  in  effective  fighting  strength, 
an  advantage  which  can  only  be  described  as  overwhelm- 
ing. 

It  is  always  to  be  admitted  that  there  is  the  personal 
factor  which  cannot  be  taken  into  account  by  any  mathe- 
matical comparison.  Also  there  are  such  questions  as 
the  direction  of  light  and  the  other  unforeseen  conditions 
which  in  any  actual  engagement  contribute  to  a  potent 
degree  to  the  ifltimate  result.  All  and  any  of  these, 
however,  are  as  likely  to  favour  one  belligerent  as  the  other 
and  the  arithmetical  computation  of  relative  strength  as 
a  generalisation  is  in  no  wise  invalidated  by  these  con- 
siderations. 

The  N-Square  Law. 

It  is  not  without  interest  to  follow  out  the  working  of 
the  N-square  law  in  detail  in  the  example  above  given. 
Let  it  be  first  assumed  that  the  large  machine  offers  as 
good  a  target,  but  no  better  than  the  small  machine. 
Now  we  will  suppose  one  large  machine  which  we  will  call 
the  Battle  Plane  with  its  three  guns  to  be  attacked  by 
three  of  the  single-man  craft  of  the  enemy,  whicii  we 
wiUcall  Fokkers, to  fix  our  ideas;  let  it  be  supposed  tliat 
each  of  the  three  guns  of  the  Battle  Plane  are  dirc'clcd  at 
one  of  the  Fokkers,  then,  under  the  return  fire  of  one  of 
the  Fokkers  the  Battle  Plane  will  be  hit  just  as  often  as 
it  itself  "  gets  one  home,"  and  if  \vc  count  only  hits  which 
are  deemed  mortal,  the  Battle  Plane  will  be  mortally 
hit  three  times  over  (once  by  each  of  its  assailants)  whilst 
each  of  the  said  assailants  are  hit  once  each.  Hence  where 
large  numbers  are  concerned  a  given  onnage  of  sin;^le  gun 
machines  would  destroy  three  successive  fleets  of  equal 


tonnage  of  three  gun  machines  before  its  own  power  is 
completely  broken.* 

Now  as  to  the  assumption.  The  actual  target  pre- 
sented by  the  three  gun  machine  is  considerably  greater 
than  the  one  gun  machine  ;  this,  so  far  is  it  a  vulnerable 
target  in  respect  of  which  one  hit  is  mortal,  is  stifl  further 
against  the  three  gun  type.  In  this  category  we  may  in- 
clude engine,  petrol  tank,  and  such- like.  The  three 
gunners,  although  presenting  three  times  the  vulnerable 
target  of  one,  will  commonly  require  three  hits  for  their 
destruction,  and  this  may  be  taken  as  neutralising  the 
larger  target  they  present  since  with  equally  good  gunnery 
they  will  coflectively  receive  three  hits  to  one  given. 
Thus  the  net  result  is  to  place  the  three  gun  machine  at 
a  disadvantage  beyond  that  which  the  N-square  law 
indicates. 

As  a  mode  of  defence  against  counter  aircraft  artillery 
also  the  importance  of  numerical  strength  is  paramount, 
though  perhaps  not  so  decisive  as  in  aerial  combat.  Thus 
one  well  directed  shell  of  large  calibre  is  sufficient  to  put 
an  end  to  an  aeroplane  large  or  small,  in  fact  the  large 
machine  presenting  a  greater  vulnerable  target  is  at  a 
disadvantage.  The  destruction  of  a  fleet  of  raiders, 
therefore  is  the  more  difilcult  as  the  number  of  aeroplanes 
is  the  greater.  Conversely  llu'  injury  inflicted  in  "  loss 
of  tonnage  "  per  unit  time  will  be  inversely  as  the  number 
of  machines  employed.  From  this  j)oint  of  view  there- 
fore the  smaller  the  individual  machines  the  more  effi- 
ciently and  economically  will  their  duties  hr.  jxTlormed. 

In  the  present  article  the  case  has  been  fully  presented 
for  numerical  strength  as  against  the  individually  powerful 
unit.  In  a  second  article  the  arguments  will  be  given 
on  the  other  side,  and,  so  far  as  it  is  possible,  conclusions 
will  be  formulated  as  to  the  general  lines  which  in  my 
opinion  should  be  followed  in  our  constructive  pro- 
gramme. 

Our  Pre-ent  State  of  Knowledge. 

I  will  say,  however,  here  that  in  my  opinion  there  are 
no  satisfactory  arguments  which  can  be  fornmlatedin  the 
present  state  of  knowledge  in  support  of  the  large  machine 
for  conducting  aerial  w'arfare,  the  "  Battle  Plane  "  as  if 
has  been  popularly  termed.  I  am  fairly  convinced  that 
in  any  case  the  numerically  strong  fleet  of  one-man  one- 
gun  macliines  represents  the  best  line  of  policy  both  for 
the  time  being  and  for  the  more  immediate  futmx. 
A  dav  may  come  when  the  size  of  air  fleets  will  be  so 
unwieldy  that  the  only  possibility  of  increasing  fighting 
strength  will  be  by  augumentation  of  the  power  of  the 
unit,  but  this  is  so  far  distant  that  it  cannot  legitimately 
be  allowed  to  influence  our  present  policy.  Above 
everything  in  the  fighting  machine  for  defensive  purposes, 
whether  for  anihilating  the  reconnaissance  service  of  the 
enemy,  or  for  defeating  his  aerial  raids,  the  big  three  or 
four-man  aeroplane  is  radically  out  of  jjlace.  Such 
heavy  type  will  never  be  able  to  give  a  good  account  of 
itself  in  comparison  with  an  equal  tonnage  of  the  smaller 
machine. 

We  have  heard  in  the  daily  press  much  talk  about 
the  German  "  Fokker,"  the  supposed  wonderful  qualities 
of  which  machine  have  been  lavishly  praised.  It  is  not 
the  technical  excellence  of  the  Fokker  which  we  have  to 
fear  or  watch,  it   is — if  I  may  say  so— the  Fokker  policy. 


In  ^foll  Davis,  bv  Bernard  Capss  (Gco-ge  Allen  and  Unwin) 
f)S.,  a  pretty  conTJcly  of  Kestoratiou  days,  more  depends 
on  manner  than  on  nuitter  ;  the  author  has  evidently  a  horror 
of  solecisms,  wliicli,  i)erliaps,  is  the  reason  why  he  spares  us 
the  entry  of  Charles  himself,  although  the  scene  is  mainly 
at  Whitehall,  and  stops  short  at  tlie  Duke  of  York  as  a  figure 
in  the  play.  Moll  Davis,  gay  and  heartless,  is  set  by  George  ' 
Hamilton  to  complete  the  estrangement  between  Lord 
Cliesterlield  and  his  wife,  (leorgC  having  designs  on  the  wife 
after  the  cu.stom  of  the  times.  Since  Cliesterlield  and  his  lady 
are  not  on  speaking  terms,  Moll  enters  their  house  as  guest, 
letting  each  suppose  that  the  x)tlier  had  invited  her  ;  the 
result  is  comedy,  never  degenerating  to  farce,  but  with  many 
wittv  touches  ititersi)ersed  among  the  incidents  of  the  story. 

The  author  has  been  cariful  to  avoid  exaggeration  of  the 
manners  of  the  period,  and  his  book  serves  to  pass  a  pleasant 
hour  or  two— as  a  well-told  story  ought. 

•  A  tarcful  c.xiimination  of  the  argument  as  here  given  shows  that 
it  is  not  exact  ;  it  imis,t  be  taken  as  a  jjopulariscd  version  of  that 
wliicli  is  proved  more  rigidly  in  my  '  .Aircraft  in  Warfare  "  (CouiiaWe. 
Loudou)  in  whicli  many  examples  and  appUcatious  are  given. 


February  lo,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WA  T  E  R 


SAVE    THE    SERBIAN    ARMY. 


By   Alfred   Stead. 


[We  have  made  many  mistakes  in  the  Balkans — there  is 
danger  of  yet  another.  There  is  one  -paramount  and 
pressing  duty  before  the  Allies  to-day.  It  is  to  lose  no 
more  time  but  at  once  reorganise  the  Serbian  army 
and  add  a  hundred  thousand  men  to  the  Allied  armies 
The  writer,  Mr.  All  red  Stead,  has  only  recently 
returned  from  the  Balkans.] 

SERBIA  has  suffered  more  cruelly  and  more 
uselessly  in  this  war  than  any  of  theAllicd  Powers. 
And  to-day  the  Allies  have  a  great  duty  to 
fulfil  towards  the  remnants  of  the  Serbian 
nation  and  army,  a  duty  which  must  be  fulfilled  at  once. 
Delay  is  impossible,  unthinkable.  We  have  already 
sacrificed  the  Serbian  people  through  delay,  and  cannot 
now  sit  down  and  watch  the  final  destruction  of  the  few 
thousands  of  fighting  men  who,  undaunted  by  hardships 
and  undiscouraged  by  abandonment,  only  ask  to  be 
allowed  to  fight  again.  For  that  is  all  that  the  Serbian 
army  asks  to-day  to.  be  allowed  to  reorganise  itself 
and  re-equip  so  that  in  a  few  short  months,  a  Serbian 
force  may  co-operate  with  the  British,  French  and 
Italian  troops  in  the  Balkans.  Let  us  therefore  bend 
every  effort  on  making  the  Serbian  army  an  active 
fighting  force  again  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  Allied  policy  in  the  Balkans  has  centred  around 
one  principal  crroi-,  which  nothing  seemed  capable  of 
driving  out  of  the  heads  of  those  in  power  in  London, 
Petrograd  or  Paris.  The  belief  in  Bulgarian  friendliness 
to  the  Allied  cause  was  able  to  resist  all  the  onslaughts  of 
facts — proof  of  a  treaty  between  Bulgaria  and  Germany 
before  the  war,  a  Bulgarian  loan  from  Germany  during 
the  war,  Turkish  cession  of  territory  to  Bulgaria,  all 
these  were  unavailing.  It  vvas,  therefore,  no  wonder  that 
the  warnings  from  Bucarcst  and  the  apprehensions  of 
Nish  went  unheeded. 

Reasoned   Advice. 

We  choose  to  ignore  the  reasoned  advice  of  the  Ser- 
bian Government,  treating  the  Serbian  aUies  as  if  they 
were  prejudiced,  narrow-minded  self-seekers — quite  over- 
looking the  fact  that  the  earher  months  of  the  war  had 
given  the  Allies  ample  proof  of  the  value  of  Serbian 
aid  to  the  common  cause.  The  Serbian  armies  had  been 
able  totally  to  disorganise  the  Austrian  military  machine, 
but  the  Serbian  Government  was  not  worth  listening  to 
when  it  came  to  be  a  question  of  Bulgaria.  And  so 
inevitably  the  allied  policy  towards  Serbia  became 
warped,  and  instead  of  regarding  the  Serbians  as  loyal 
allies,  it  became  almost  a  habit  to  look  upon  them  as 
pig-headed  and  undisciplined  fellows  standing  in  the  way 
of  an  arrangement  with  Bulgaria. 

On  the  Serbian  side,  every  day  brought  a  growing 
belief  in  the  certainty  of  a  Bulgarian  attack,  and  an 
increasing  disinclination  to  embark  in  any  action  until 
the  Bulgarian  question  had  been  disposed  of.  Led  by 
the  nose  by  the  astute  sovereign  of  Bulgaria,  the  Allies 
bullied  Serbia,  forced  her  to  agree  to  relinquishing  much 
of  her  territory  to  satisfy  Bulgarian  demands,  and  all 
this  without  any  real  certainty  of  winning  Bulgaria. 
Had  the  Serbians  not  been  very  loyal  such  an  allied 
pohcy  might  well  have  had  I'he  effect  hoped  for  in  Vienna 
and  Berlin,  that  is  to  say,  Serbia  disgusted,  and  rightly, 
would  have  been  driven  into  a  separate  peace  and  an 
advantageous  arrangement  with  the  Central  Powers. 
But  Serbia  has  always  been  too  loyal  to  allied  policy  and 
alhed  advice  ;  it  would  have  been  better  for  her  and  for 
her  Allies  had  she  disregarded  much  of  the  advice  and 
gone  her  own  way  deciding  her  own  course  of  action. 

In  one  thing  only  did  Serbia  go  counter  to  the  allied 
desires,  and  that  was  in  the  occupation  of  the  strategic 
points  of  Albania  and  the  support  of  Essad  Pasha.  And 
to  this  alone  the  Serbian  army  owed  its  sole  refuge  in 
disaster  and  was  able  to  pass  through  the  Albanian  tribes 
with  a  minimum  of  loss. 

The  obvious  project  of  an  attack  by  Allied  and 
Serbian  troops  towards  Budapest  in  the  early  part  of 
last  year  was  not  proceeded  with.  This  attack  would 
have  pierced  the  Achilles  heel  of  the  Central  Powers, 


would  have  brought  in  the  Roumanians  and  enabled 
the  Russians  to  pass  the  Carpathians — it^  would  also 
have  brought  P>ulgaria  to  reason  anl  the  Turks  to 
their  knees.  But  there  were  no  men  to  be  found  to  send 
to  Serbia.  It  was  only  later  when  the  Dardanelles  ex- 
pedition was  decided  on  that  men  were  found  for  the 
Near  East.  Having  lost  the  chance  of  an  offensive 
there  still  remained  the  possibility  of  a  successful  de- 
fensive. The  German-Austrian  offensive  was  long  in 
preparing ;  adequate  information  as  to  numbers  and 
weight  of  artillery  gathering  on  the  Northern  banks  of  the 
Danube  and  Save  was  forthcoming  in  ample  time.  At  the 
same  time,  the  Serbians  had  accurate  information  as  to  the. 
decision  of  Bulgaria  to  attack,  even  before  the  order  of 
mobilisation. 

The    Main    Object. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Allies,  the  main  object 
to  be  secured  was  to  prevent  a  contact  between  the 
Central  Powers  and  Bulgaria.  They  took  the  view  that 
the  Bulgarians  would  not  attack  "the  Serbians  if  the 
Austrians  and  Germans  did  not  cross  the  Danube  and 
Sive.  Therefore,  they  said,  "  Mass  all  your  men  in  the 
North,"  and  we  will  protect  the  railway  "line  to  Salonika. 
The  Serbians,  seeing  the  greater  peril  from  the  East, 
wished  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  there  before  the  northern 
forces  could  cross  the  rivers.  They  accordingly  concen- 
trated their  forces  principally  against  Bulgaria,  and  at  the 
moment  when  Bulgaria  ordered  mobilisation  were  in  a  posi- 
tion to  throw  some  120,000  men,  concentrated  near  Pirot, 
straight  at  Sofia,  only  defended  by  20,000  Bulgarians. 
In  a  week  the  Bulgarian  capital  would  have  been  in 
Serbian  hands,  and  if  the  German  attack  developed  the 
whole  Serbian  force  would  have  been  available  to  en- 
counter them.  The  Serbian  plan  was  the  axiomatic 
military  one  of  deahng  with  your  enemies  separately. 
But  the  Allies  put  their  foot  down  on  this  idea,  motiving 
their  refusal  by  the  negotiations  still  proceeding  in  Sofia. 

It  was  the  unforgivable  mistake.  The  Serbians 
loyally  obeyed  orders,  unfortunately.  The  Serbian 
armies  sat  still  near  the  frontiers  until  the  whole  of  the 
enemy  forces  were  ready,  the  Germans,  the  Austrians, 
and  the  Bulgarians,  and  then  were  attacked  at  thirtcjn 
different  points.  When  the  Serbians  were  denied  the 
right  to  attack  the  Bulgarians,  Serbia  was  lost. 

Orders  were  given  to  retire  slowly,  saving  the  army 
intact  as  much  as  possible.  Thus  there  were  few  serioiis 
engagements  and  the  armies  made  their  way  southwards 
and  westwards  in  good  order,  expecting  always  to  find  the 
pressure  being  relieved  by  the  advance  of  allied  troops 
from  the  south.  But  as  no  help  came,  and  as  the 
hydraulic  pressure  of  enemy  troops  became  ever  greater 
on  the  right-angled  front,  the  Serbian  anny,  denied  the 
right  to  sweep  back  the  invaders  as  it  had  done  in  the  last 
Austrian  invasion,  was  condemned  to  continuous  retreat, 
culminating  in  disappearance  as  an  offensive  force. 

That  the  Serbian  army,  as  it  was  at  the  beginning  of 
the  offensive  in  October,  1915,  could  have  been  expected 
to  defend  its  long  line  against  the  heavy  artillery  of  the 
Central  Powers  and  the  heavy  infantry  superiority  of  the. 
Bulgarians  was  quite  impossible.  The  wonder  is  not  thai 
the  Serbian  army  did  not  do  better,  but  that  it  did  so  well. 

Dominant   Guns. 

The  Germans  and  Austrians  passed  the  Danube  and 
the  Save,  thanks  to  their  heavy  guns,  which  pounded  the 
Serbians  out  of  their  positions  without  any  chance  of 
retaliation.  Belgrade  was  practically  denuded  of  troops, 
but  the  positions  behind  cost  the  Germans  some  regiments 
when  it  came  to  infantry  fighting.  But  the  guns  always 
dominated  the  situation  and  the  Serbians  were  forced  to 
retire  continuously.  In  the  north  there  was  little  serious 
fighting  after  the  first  two  weeks,  but  against  the  Bul- 
garians there  was  plenty  of  fighting  and  successful.  The 
Serbians  were  more  than  able  to  hold  their  own  against 
the  Bulgarians,  although  they  consider  the  Bulgarian 
infantryman  as  superior  to  Qither  the  German  or  the 
Austrian.  But  success  against  the  Bulgarians  did  not 
suffice,  since  it  was  always  necessary  to  retreat  westward 


LAND      AND     WATER 


February  lo,  1916. 


to  .ivoid  tho  Gorman  descent  upon  llip  nnlv  road  open  for 
retirement.  " 

A  Curious  Fact. 

One  of  the  most  curious  features  of  the  campaifjn 
was  that  the  Serbian  troops  were  pven  specific  dates 
until  which  positions  Iiad  to  be  lieid.  as  if  there  was  some 
liopc  of  relief  coming.  In  every  case  the  positions  were 
held  longer  than  required,  but  nothing  happened. 
Gradually,  inevitably,  the  Germans  secured  contact  witli 
the  Bulgarians  ;  they  freed  the  Danube  ;  they  captured 
Nish  and  possessed  the  direct  line  to  Sofia,  but  they  were 
never  able  to  capture  the  army.  The  Russian  retreat  was 
child's  play  compared  to  the  Serbian  ;  the  Russians  had  a 
straight  line  of  defence  and  gradually  retired.  The  Ser- 
bians had  aright-angled  lineandhad  always  to  be  looking 
over  their  shoulders,  sometimes  only  finishing  a  successful 
attack  eastward  to  sec  the  shells  bursting  in  the  hills 
to  the  north  of  their  line  of  retreat.  Also,  as  the  forces 
fell  back,  all  the  principal  depots  of  food  had  to  be 
destroyed  and  there  was  a  shortage  of  everything.  The 
services  of  distribution  also  became  dislocated,  it  being 
impossible  to  reorganise  supply  when  the  army  was  never 
for  more  than  a  few  days  in  one  place. 

The  Bulgarian  coup  in  occupying  Vranje  and  thus 
cutting  the  line  south,  was  a  terrible  blow,  since  it  pre- 
vented intercommunication  between  the  forces  in  Old 
Serbia  and  the  weak  Macedonian  forces  and  the  Allies. 
Vcr>'  soon  the  army  was  on  short  rations,  and  as  the 
retreat  went  on  food  became  more  and  more  scarce. 
The  fact  that  the  mountainous  nature  of  the  country  left 
only  available  a  few-  valleys  and  passes  for  the  escape  of 
the  armies  made  the  question  of  transport  far  more 
difiicult.  But  notwithstanding  all  this  much  of  the  army 
made  the  retreat  in  very  good  order  and  without  dis- 
organisation. When  it  is  remembered  that  there  was 
never, too  much  discipline  in  the  Serbian  anny  ;  it  was 
wonderful  to  see  how  orderly  was  the  retreat.  It  was 
always  a  retreat  never  a  rout. 

This  was  especially  the  case  up  to  Prishtina.  It  was 
in.  tliis  town  that  definite  news  came  that  there  was  no 
hope  of  any  real  offensive  on  the  part  of  the  Allies  in 
the  south  and  the  army  had  to  resign  itself  to  further 
and  still  more  hopeless  retreat  towards  Albania.  Up  till 
then  the  army  was  still  an  offensive  force,  afterwards  it 
became  only  a  defensive  one.  But,  despite  the  fact 
that  there  were  practically  no  roads,  some  of  the  heavy 
siege  guns  were  dragged  as  far  as  Ipek. 


Serbian  Psychology. 

The  psychology  of  the  Serbian  soldier  must  be 
taken  into  account.  The  Serbians  are  a  people  who  have 
never  emigrated,  and  to  leave  Serbia  is  a  terrible  thing 
to  the  peasant.  He  is  thus  a  wonderful  defensive  soldier, 
out  of  much  less  value  as  an  offensive  element  outside  his 
country.  The  effect  on  the  army  after  it  had  left  the  old 
boundaries  of  Serbia  was  very  marked  ;  the  homing 
instinct  began  to  become  irresistible  and  desertions  took 
place  much  more  frequently.  Also  there  was  much  less 
vim  in  the  army.  The  further  the  retreat  took  them  the 
more  the  feehng  of  all  being  lost  grew.  The  Serbian 
soldier  also  does  not  understand  retreating  without 
fighting,  giving  up  without  a  blow  of  large  portions  of 
his  beloved  country.  All  this  sapped  the  moral  of  the 
troops  still  more  even  than  did  starvation  and  privation. 

"  Why  go  to  Montenegro  to  die  of  starvation  like 
women  and  children?"  was  frequently  asked.  It  was 
held  to  be  much  better  to  stay  and  die  fighting.  "  But, 
of  course,  if  there  is  a  chance  of  starting  again,  let  us  go 
to  Montenegro  or  Albania."  When  before  the  frowning 
walls  of  the  Montenegrin  and  Albanian  inountains  it 
was  necessary  to  destroy  all  the  artillery,  automobiles 
and  much  of  the  baggage  train,  the  army  passed  a  terrible 
moment.  To  cross  the  moimtains  looked  like  bidding  a 
long  farewell  to  their  homes  and  going  out  into  the  im- 
known,  where  they  would  no  longer  each  be  an  inde- 
pendent landowner,  but  dependent  upon  the  bounty  of 
others. 

But  the  desire  to  start  again  conquered,  and  gradually 
but  surely  more  and  more  men  arrived  in  Skutari.  They 
::ame  lumgry  and  wearied,  many  without  guns,  without 
good  shoes,  with  uniforms  in  rags  hanging  loosely  on 
them,  but  they  came.  Even  the  Serbian  officials  were 
astonished  that  there  were  so  many.     But  at  Skutari  the 


Serbians  had  further  .proof  that  the  Allies  had  not  yet 
reached  the  point  of  pFo\'ision-or  antiripntorv  preparation. 
It  had  heeu  evident  for  a  considerable  t'ime  that  the 
Serbian  army  must  arrive  in  Montenegro  and  Albania, 
and  that  it  would  arrive  starving.  It  would  have  seemed 
natural  that  the  Allies  should  have  taken  prompt  steps 
to  accumiilate  food  along  the  line  of  retreat  in  Montenegro 
and  in  the  towns  of  Albania  before  th<^  arrival  of  the 
troops.  B\it  this  was  not  done  and  the  starving  soldiers 
had  to  wait  nearly  two  \\eeks  before  any  real  store  of  food 
arrived. 

It  was  an  incomprehensible  additional  cnielty. 
After  all  its  sufferings  and  sacrifices,  the  Serbian  nation 
found  itself  forced  into  the  position  of  a  suppliant  for 
alms.  As  one  Serbian  minister  put  it,  "  Tears  came  into 
my  eyes  when  I  wrote  the  telegrams  imploring  aid  whicli 
we  had  to  send."  It  was  an  unworthy  recompense  for 
all  the  Serbian  effort,  and  yet  the  Serbians  desire  only  to 
go  on  co-operating  with  us.  But  to  be  a  member  of  one 
of  the  great  Allies  of  Serbia  in  Skutari  was  to  be  ashamed, 
very  ashamed. 

It  ^\•as  physically  impossible  for  the  worn  troops 
arnvmg  in  Skutari  to  ]M-ocecd  over  mud  tracks  to  Durazzo, 
without  rest  or  food.  If  they  had  found  the  expected 
stores  there,  they  could  have  set  out  at  least  two  weeks 
earlier.  Little  or  nothing  had  been  done  to  improve  the 
roads  south,  and  save  for  a  swing  bridge  over  the  Matia 
river  nothing  material  had  been  accomplished  in  the 
month's  pause  which  the  Bulgarians  and  Austrians  kindly 
gave,  in  the  way  of  facilitating  the  salving  of  the  Serbian 
armj-. 

The   Original   Plan. 

The  original  idea  of  the  Serbian  Government  was 
that  the  army  should  go  to  South  Albania  to  reorganise, 
protected  by  the  Italians  and  the  Greeks.  This'dcsire 
was  based  on  the  necessity  to  keep  the  Serbians  on  the 
mainland.  South  Albania  was  barred  to  them  by  the 
Italians  who  fixed  the  Skumbi  river  as  the  southernmost 
limit,  and  then  Albania  became  impossible,  since  there 
was  no  guarantee  for  security.  And  troops  which  have 
been  retreating  for  weeks  need  a  feeline  of  security  to 
reorganise. 

There  has  been  a  terrible  spectacle  of  divided  coimsel 
since  the  Serbian  armies  arrived  in  Albania.  The  Allies 
could  not  decide  who  should  do  what.  Consequently,  the 
unfortunate  soldiers  died  of  starvation  or  ran  the  risk  of 
capture  by  the  enemy  while  their  friends  argued  who 
should  take  each  department  in  hand.  There  was  no  one 
power  ready  to  take  responsibility  and  command.  And 
yet  only  that  can  save  the  situation.  Otherwise  the 
Austrians  from  the  north  and  the  Bulgars  from  the  east 
will  force  the  Serbians  to  do  what  they  never  dreamed 
of  doing  even  during  the  most  terrible  moments  of  the 
retreat — that  is,  to  capitulate. 

The  Serbians  believe  that  the  Allies  will  win,  and 
their  faith  in  this  is  largely  because  we  are  amongst  her 
allies.  Let  England  be  worthy  of  this  confidence  and 
lose  no  time  in  putting  the  whole  of  her  effort  into  saving 
the  Serbian  army  and  placing  it  safe  from  outside  in- 
fluences, where  it  can  re-organise  itself  in  the  shortest 
possible  time.  All  that  is  needed  is  a  little  decision  and 
real  desire  to  help.  Surely  we  have  enough  on  our 
consciences  in  respect  of  Serbia  without  wishing  to  put  the 
crown  on  our  shame  and  while  promising  that  the  Serbian 
nation's  future  is  as  our  own,  callously  allow  the  Serbian 
army  to  be  lost  and  wasted. 

It  is  no  use  to  say  the  French  will  do  this  or  the 
Italians  will  not  do  that.  The  question  before  us  to-day 
is,  "  What  arc  we  going  to  do  for  Serbia,"  and  on  our 
answer  will  depend  the  possibility  of  turning  defeat  in 
the  Balkans  into  the  first  step  towards  decisive  victory. 


Tlie  reply  to  the  request  from  the  Postmaster-General 
for  books  and  magazines  for  the  troops  has  been  good  but 
not  good  enough.  Two  Inmdred  and  fifty  thousand  hooks 
and  periodicals  are  needed  every  week,  and  one  Inindred 
and  forty  thousand  arc  forthcoming.  The  shortage  therefore 
is  over  a  hinidrcd  thousand.  The  process  is  so  simple  and 
many  people  get  such  large  accumulations  of  literature  that 
it  is  amazing  the  response  has  not  been  better.  All  anybody 
need  do  is  to  collect  their  superfluous  books  anrl  magazines 
and  hand  them  witJiont  packing,  payment,  or  address,  over 
tlie  counter  of  the  nearest  post  office! 


February  lo,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


EVACUATION    OF    ANZAC. 


By  a  Naval  Chaplain. 


THE   personal   impressions  of  one  who  saw    the 
closing  of  an  heroic  chapter  in  the  history  of 
tlie  war    may  be  of  some    interest  to    those 
who  have  followed  the  conrse  of  the  campaign 
in  the  Gallii^oh  Peninsula. 

As  a  Naval  Chaplain,  I  had  the  jnivilcge  of  being 
in  a  ship  which  took  part  in  the  covering  of  our  troops 
at  tiie  Suvla  Bay  landing,  and  which,  from  August  7th 
to  the  ringing  down  of  the  curtain  on  December  nitli, 
was  almost  daily  lying  off  Anzac  as  a  covering  ship  to  tlu; 
New  Zealand  and  Austrahan  Forces.  During  those  five 
months,  a  very  strong  feeling  of  comradeship  sprang  up 
between  us  in  the  ship  and  our  colonial  brothers  on 
shore.  Wc  took  an  intense  personal  interest  in  their 
welfare.  On  two  occasions  officers  from  the  ship 
visited  the  trenches,  and  several  times  officers  of  the 
New  Zealand  and  Australian  Divisions  came  out  to  the 
ship  as  our  guests. 

We  had  the  first  definite  news  of  the  proposed 
evacuation  of  Anzac  and  Suvla  a  few  days  before  the 
operations  took  place.  The  thought  of  the  magnitude 
of  the  task  was  overwhelming.  Many  thousands  of  men, 
a  great  number  of  guns,  a  large  quantity  of  ammunition 
and  stores,  the  sick  and  the  wounded,  the  animal  trans- 
port, had  all  to  be  removed  from  a  narrow  front  of  twelve 
miles,  from  open  beaches.  Everyone  of  those  beaches 
could  be  swept  by  the  enemy's  fire,  and  all  this  had  to 
take  place  without  the  enemy  being  aware  that  a  single 
man,  or  gun,  or  mule  or  waggon  had  been  withdrawn. 
No  wonder  we  shook  our  heads  and  doubted.  How  could 
it  be  possible  to  maintain  such  secrecy  as  would  entirely 
deceive  the  enemy  ?  In  some  cases  the  opposing  trenches 
were  within  whispering  distance  of  each  other,  and  the 
Nvhole  shore  from  Brighton  Beach  to  Suvla  Point  was 
under  enemy  observation. 

For  the  success  of  the  withdrawal,  calm  weather  was 
essential.  The  difficulty  of  conveying  thousands  of 
troops  in  boats  and  lighters  from  a  gale-swept  shore 
through  a  stormy  sea  to  the  waiting  transports  would  be 
immense.  Throughout  the  days,  December  i8th  and 
i()th,  there  was  a  great  calm  ;  there  was  scarce  a  ripple 
on  the  water.  The  nights  were  light,  but  from  land  and 
sea  there  arose  a  kindly  mist ;  not  sufficient  to  hinder  our 
movements,  but  tliick  enough  to  hide  them  from  the 
eneniy.  During  the  day,  the  enemy  could  see  transports 
waiting  in  Kephalo  Bay,  some  eleven  miles  away.  They 
could  see  lighters  plying  between  the  beach  and  the  ships 
lying  off  Suvla  and  Anzac.  But  everything  points  to 
the  fact  that  the  Turks  were  completely  deceived.  The 
liglitcrs,  they  supposed,  were  being  used  in  the  ordinary 
daily  routine  of  bringing  stores  to  the  beach,  not  of 
removing  stores  to  the  ships. 

Sunday,  December  19th;  was  the  critical  day.  A 
twelve-mile  front  was  being  held,  with  very  few  guns, 
against  an  enemy  at  least  six  times  superior  in  mnnbers. 
Would  they  discover  that  ?  li  so,  the  evacuation  would 
end  in  tragedy.  The  tension  of  that  Sunday  was  great. 
From  noon  to  i  p.m.  was  an  an.xious  hour.  The  Turkish 
batteries  suddenly  began  to  shell  Lala  Baba  and  Hill  60 
very  heavily.  The  bombardment  of  the  latter  position 
lowered  our  hopes.  As  we  watched  the  heavy  black 
smoke  of  th(;  shells  hanging  in  the  still  air,  we  thouglit 
tlie  enemy  had  discovered  all,  and  were  preparing  to 
launch  an  attack.  On  the  other  hand,  the  slielling  of 
Lala  Baba  raised  our  hopes.  However,  after  about 
an  hour  all  w-as  quiet  again  ;  no  attack  of  any  kind 
had  been  attempted.  Meanwhile,  three  monitors,  a 
cruiser  and  two.  destroyers  had  left  Kephalo  to  take  up 
positions  off  the  south  end  of  the  Peninsula,  and  pro- 
ceeded, during  that  afternoon,  to  put  the  fear  of  God  into 
the  heart  of  tlie  Turk.  The  land  batteries  at  Helles 
co-operated.  This  bombardment  lasted  all  through  the 
afternoon,  and  developed  into  a  fierce  battle  which  went 
un  far  into  tlie  night. 

After  dinner  that  Sunday  evening,  I  went  up  on 
deck  and  stayed  tliere,  except  for  occasional  intervals, 
vmtil  4.30  a.m.  It  was  an  ideal  night  for  tlie  operations. 
The  moon  was  at  its  full,  but  a  light  mist  lay  over  land 


and  sea.  Everywhere  except  at  distant  ,  Helles  there 
was  an  imcanny  quiet.  The  sea  was  dead  calm.  Some- 
times subdued  voices  were  heard  coming  across  the 
water  ;  a  ship's  bell,  perhaps  a  mile  away,  was  heard 
striking — seven  bells,  eight  bells.  ^lidnight  was  passed. 
Through  the  mist  wi-re  faintly  to  be  discerned  the  ghostly 
forms  of  transports  lying  off  the  beach.  At  intervals  the 
sliarp  I'eport  of  a  rifie  would  pierce  the  stillness,  followed 
by  the  "  tat-tat-tat  "  of  a  machine-gun.  The  eneniy 
were  undoubtedly  nervous  ;  possibly  they  were  expecting 
an  attack  in  force.  How  anxiously  too,  we  watched  for 
any  sign  that  the  withdrawal  had  been  discovered. 

At  3.25  a.m.  the  strain  was  relaxed.  A  message 
came  through  from  the  last  wireless  station  on  the  beacli 
at  Anzac.  "Evacuation  complete";  not  a  single 
man,  hale  or  wounded,  left  behind.  All  that  remained 
were  six  guns  which  had  been  kept  back  in  case  of  emergr 
ency,  and  were  blown  up  at  the  last  moment  ;  some  odd 
stores  of  bully  beef  and  biscuits,  a  few  hospital  tents 
and  certain  fixtures  such  as  water  tanks.  At  3.26  a.m. 
there  was  a  great  heaving  explosion  under  the  trenches 
in  the  position  known  as  the  Nek,  near  Russell's  Top. 
A  mine  connected  up  with  the  wireless  station  on  the 
beach  had  been  blown  up.  The  explosion  was  followed 
by  a  most  furious  burst  of  rifle  fire  from  the  Turks  which 
continued  for  forty  minutes.  To  us  it  was  ludicrous,  yet 
weird  and  uncanny  for  we  knew  they  were  firing  at  empty 
trenches.  Soon  afterwards,  a  great  fire  blazed  up  on 
the  beach  at  Suvla.  Stores  which  were  riot  worth  remov- 
ing had  been  soaked  with  petrol  and  fired.  The  peninsula 
for  miles  round  was  lit  up,  and  the  covering  ships  at 
Suvla  stood  out  against  the  fierce  light  in  sharp  silhouette. 

At  daybi^eak  on  Monday  we  could  afford  to  laugh  ; 
an  operation  unparalleled  in  military  history  had  been 
most  successfully  carried  out.  And  laugh  we  did,  for 
at  6.45  a.m.  the  Turks  began  to  shell  the  late  Australian 
position  at  the  Lonesome  Pine,  and  afterwards  attacked. 
Then  they  discovered  for  the  first  time  that  the  tnMiches 
were  empty  !  Not  even  then  did  the  enemy  understand 
what  had  happened,  for  they  continued  desultory  shcllin* 
all  through  the  morning  ;  and  that  in  spite  of  ouf  fiaving 
begun  at  7.15  a.m.  to  bombard  odd  collections  of  stores 
and  the  tanks  on  the  beach  at  Anzac.  By  mid-day,  the 
Turks  had  realised  that  we  had  withdrawn  ;  we  could 
see  them  swarming  over  the  chffs,  in  and  out  of  the  dug- 
outs. Later  on  parties  of  the  enemy  reached  Lala  Baba, 
and  there  an  insolent  German  officer  hoisted  the  German 
flag.  Large  bodies  of  Turks  were  seen  coming  across  the 
Salt  Lake.  We  opened  fire  on  them  with  shrapnel,  and 
were  ourselves  fired  on  by  a  field  gun  which  the  enemy 
troops  had  brought  down  with  them.  After  a  time  we 
withdrew  and  once  more  lay  off  Anzac,  now  no  longer 
a  covering  ship  to  the  New  Zealand  and  Australian 
Divisions. 

At  4.15  p.m.,  after  evening  quarters,  we  held  a  thanks- 
giving service  on  deck,  and  sang  the  To  Deum — a  thanks- 
giving to  God  for  the  entire  success  of  the  evacuation 
which  might  so  easily  have  been  a  great  tragedy;  a 
thanksgiving  too  for  the  marvellous  weather  which  had 
made  the  withdrawal  possible.  That  evening  was 
wonderfully  beautiful.  The  sun  was  setting,  a  glowing 
ball  of  fire,  behind  rugged  Imbros.  Twilight  came 
tpiickly.  The  moon  was  up,  and  as  dayliglit  died  away 
the  sea  became  all  a-shimmer  with  silver  light.  A 
message  came  ordering  us  to  return  to  our  base.  The 
screws  began  to  churn  up  the  quiet  deep  blue  of  the  sea 
into  foaming  white,  and  soon  we  were  under  way — the 
last  ship  to  leave  Suvla  Bay  and  Anzac.  I  stood  in  the 
stern  of  the  ship  and  watched  the  land  being  swallowed 
up  in  the  gathering  mists.  Three  great  fires  were  still 
burning  on  the  beach,  and  as  we  drew  further  away, 
they  became  three  twinkling  stars.  It  was  with  a  full 
heart  that  one  thought  of  the  heroes  wiio  had  fought  so 
valiantly  and  died  so  nobly  ;  who  now  lie  buried  on  an 
alien  shore.  I  commended  their  souls  to  the  mercy  of 
(iod,  then  turned  and  went  below.  So  has  ended  an 
epic  of  heroism. 

That  night  a  great  gale  sprang  up  from  the  south-west. 


T7 


LAND      AND     WATER. 


February  lo,  1916. 


WINTER    FLOWERING    SHRUBS. 


By    Eden    Phillpotts. 


THIS  vxar  some  of  the  flowering  shrubs  of  autumn 
were  belated,  for  that  fine  evergreen  Hoherea 
pupulnca.  tlie  laee  bark,  from  New  Zealand,  only 
opened  its  snow-white  flower  clusters  in  late 
T'Jovember ;  Collctia  cruciala,  a  singular  Chilian,  whose 
flowers  I  expect  during  October,  is  blooming  now,  in  mid- 
January,  with  tiny  white  bells  clustering  among  its  thorny 
anchors  ;  and  Pitlosporum  Tohira  was  in  full  splendour  at 
Christmas.  But  to  atone  for  such  delay  one  seldom  remem- 
bers so  interesting  an  exhibition  as  this  which  opens  the 
new  year  in  many  a  West  Country  garden.  E\cn  fax oured 
Sou  h  Devon  remembers  no  such  a  genial  January,  and 
abundance  of  early  blossom. 

Of  rhododendrons,  R.  Nobleanum  is  gay  with  unusually 
fine  pink  trusses,  and  the  little  deciduous  hybrid,  R.  prcecox 
has  covered  its  naked  limbs  with  pale  purple  blossoms.  Too 
often  an  unforeseen  frost  will  destroy  these  beauties  in  a 
night,  for  though  all  rhododendrons,  save,  of  course,  the  Java- 
nese and  some  from  low  Himalayan  levels,  are  hardy,  their 
blossoms  are  not,  and  when  the  bud  grows  pale  green  and  the 
first  glimmer  of  colour  shows,  then,  unless  the  weather  be 
above  suspicion,  they  should,  where  possible,  be  screened  to 
break  frcst.  A  hue  hybrid  between  R.  arborea  and  R.  Shilsoni, 
is  at  this  fascinating  stage  of  swelling  bud  in  a  snug  corner, 
and  one  watches  the  evening  sky  sharply  for  its  sake. 

I'ei.mus  citriudora  frt>m  ChiU,  is  not  a  generous  flowerer. 
Last  spring  I  found  the  first  promise  of  inflorescence  and  now 
after  many  months  of  slow  development,  the  cymes  of  little 
cream-coloured  stars  with  orange  eyes  have  opened  amid  the 
shining,  ever-green  foliage.  Peumus  loves  a  shady  spot  and 
abundant  moisture.  The  fruit  is  a  Chilian  delicacy,  which 
wc  are  not  likely  to  sec  in  the  open  here,  but  there  is  nothing 
finer  and  richer  in  the  garden  than  the  aromatic  fragrance 
of  the  yruslied  leaf. 

Evergreen   Barberries. 

Berberis  japonica  is  already  in  full  flower,  with  clusters 
of  sweet  lemon  blossoms ;  but  a'  daintier  shrub  having 
larger  leaves  and  most  graceful  pendulous  tresses  of  bloom 
is  B.  Bealii,  now  at  its  best.  The  flower-scent  is  that  of  lily- 
of-the-valley.  These  e\  ergreen  barberries  love  half  shade  and  a 
cool,  moist  soil ;  but  that  kinsman  of  the  daphnes,  Edgivorthia 
:hrysantha,  from  China,  will  thank  you  for  full  sunshine 
above  and  a  light  loam  to  live  in.  The  flower  buttons  are 
annually  formed  at  the  ends  of  the  new  growth  and,  when 
the  leaf  falls,  they  shine  there  silver  bright.  This  year  they 
have  already  opened  and  Edgworthia  is  now  covered  with 
rosettes  of  fragrant  orange-coloured  flower  clusters  as  great 
as  lalf-crowns.  The  Mezcreiitn  daphnes  are  also  out-r-pale 
])urple,  dark  purjile  and  pure  white.  They  stud  the  naked 
raniage  with  countless  flowers ;  and  the  white  mezereum 
furnishes  sunmier  beauty  also,  for  its  sparkling  fruit  is 
orange  yellow  and  makes  the  shrub  gay  again  in  August. 
Daphne  indica,  which  dwells  just  outside  my  Stove  and  enjoys 
that  comfort  in  wintertime,  is  just  about  to  open  its  pink 
blo;som-  and  shed  its  oriental  fragrance  on  the  winter  air. 

Dcndromecon  rigida,  the  great  tree  poppy  from  California, 
is  seldom  without  a  flower,  and  despite  harsh  treatment  under 
our  winter  storms,  which  have  robbed  it  of  many  a  branch, 
still  flaunts  five  orange  cups  to-day,  though  itself  a  miserable 
object  until  a  new  crop  of  leaves  opens  to  hide  the  skeleton. 
Against  a  wall  it  grows  twelve  feet  high  in  the  West  Country 
and  must  be  very  nearly  hardy.  A  dainty  little  plant  is 
Sarcocca  mscijolia,  from  China.  This  evergreen  resembles 
a  ruscus  and  is  now  bright  with  crimson  fruit  and  sweet 
with  little  sprays  of  snow-white  blossoms.  It  likes  a  shady 
corner  in  jjeat  and,  if  happy,  soon  makes  a  specimen.  Cliimon- 
anihtis  jragrans,  the  winter-sweet,  was  in  full  splendour  at 
Christmas,  and  its  strange,  pale,  transparent  stars  clustering 
on  their  leafless  branches  made  welcome  decoration  and 
b-(  ug'it  rare  fragrance  to  the  dwelling-rooms.  No  garden 
should  lack  this  great  treasure  from  Japan,  yet  it  is  surjirising 
how  rare  it  continues  to  be,  though  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  is 
of  ancient   introduction. 

The  Hamamelis  folk  are  in  full  flower  ;  indeed,  H.  mollis, 
the  handsomest  of  afl  witch-hazels,  is  almosfsped.  Its  bright 
yellow  spiders  with  purple  bodies  covered  the  shrub,  and  their 
tender  scent  reminds  one  of  the  bluebell  and  the  coming  of 
spring.  //.  ziiccarina  and  H.  arborea  are  now  flowering 
abundantly.  The  brown,  dead  leaves  of  the  latter  cling  to 
thiyr  boughs  and  make  a  beautiful  harmony  with  the  little 
yeUow  stars  of  the  inflorescence.  Buddleia  axialica  has 
opened  fresh  racemes  of  creamy  bloom  ever  since  the  autumn 
and  is  still  flowering  freely.    It  lacks  the  rare  purple  and  gold 


of  the  great  summer  buddleias,  but  has  an  incomparable 
sweetness— the  very  soul  of  ripe  fruit.  Parrotia  persica  is 
in  flower  also,  with  strange  little  pale  pink  clusters  of  blossom 
after  the  fashion  of  an  elm  tree.  This  hamamelid  comes 
from  Northern  Persia  and  its  kinsman,  Parrotia  Jacijue- 
montiana,  from  Kashmir,  has  a  more  showy  and  developed 
blossom  ;  but  its  flower  belongs  to  summer. 

Tree  Peonies. 

The  C)'</o«/rts— pink  and  scarlet  and  cream — are  all 
bursting  their  buds  and  the  tree  peonies  are  breaking,  so  that 
we  may  see  the  promise  of  bloom  long  before  we  wish  to  do  so. 
In  the  west  these  noble  plants  will  bud  too  soon  for  their 
comfort  and  ours,  and  incur  much  danger  as  a  result. 

Camellia  on  the  other  hand  is  safe  enough  and  its  tight 
buds  will  not  open  their  scarlet  and  snowy  blossoms  until  all 
danger  be  past.  Too  often  one  sees  camellia  planted  in  full 
sunshine,  which  is  more  than  it  can  stand  ;  but  given  half  shade 
and  cool  soil  these  e\crgreens  will  prove  hardier  than  most 
gardeners  imagine.  The  queen  of  the  group :  Camellia 
relictdaia.  however,  should  have  the  support  of  a  wall  facing 
westerly,  and  if  the  bud  is  far  advanced  in  early  spring  this 
glorious  shrub  is  worthy  of  a  little  protection.  All  the 
species  revel  in  peat. 

Azara  microphylla  is  in  full  bloom,  though  the  tiny 
inflorescence  does  not  appear ;  but  lift  the  bright  green 
sprays  and  beneath  them  you  will  find  the  gold  dust  of  the 
flower  and  smell  its  strong  perfume  of  vanilla.  Corn' s 
mas,  the  Cornel  an  cherry,  has  also  covered  its  naked  limbs 
with  gold.  This  is  the  variegated  fo:m  and  it  generally  sits 
a  go  id  jprinkling  of  red  autumn  fruits ;  but  the-:e  are  ah  stone 
and  of  no  value  even  to  the  birds. 

In  these  favoured  scenes,  that  grand  climber,  Stauntonia 
lafitoiia,  from  the  Himalayas,  is  as  hardy  as  ivy  and  makes  enor- 
mous plants.  It  will  cover  the  side  of  your  house,  or  cUmb  up  an 
elm  tree  with  equal  industry.  The  i)ale  green,  fragrant 
blossom  is  just  about  to  open  in  sheltered  gardens,  and  the 
double  crimson  fruits  hang  still  on  the  branches.  Ercilla 
spicata  from  Peru — another  climber — is  late  and  its  buds  have 
not  yet  broken  into  ])ale  pink  trusses  ;  but  the  winter  flowering 
Clematis  cirrliosa,  from  Southern  Europe,  is  in  full  bloom,  witli 
clusters  of  little  pendant  butter- coloured  bells,  crimson 
spattered  in  the  cup.  The  wands  of  the  familiar  Kcrria 
japonica  are  also  breaking  into  bright  yellow  stars,  and  the 
purple  prune,  whose  dark  foliage  masses  and  light  habit  are 
so  precious  in  a  shrubbery  landscape,  is  wliite  with  blossom. 
I  have  never  seen  this  shrub  flowering  so  richly  ;  but  its  dark 
cherry-shaped  fruits,  that  make  such  beautiful  house  decora- 
tions in   Italy,  are  seldom  set  in  this  country. 

Devastating  Bullfinches. 

The  bullfinches  devastate  Prunus  Pissardii ;  beneath  the 
branches  one  finds  a  sad  litter  of  the  pink,  unopened  blossom 
bud.  Forsythia  suspensa  is  another  of  their  favourites  and 
my  heart  sinks  as  1  hear  their  soft  rail  and  see  the  faithful 
pair  arrive  together,  with  gentle  undulation  of  flight.  C)ften 
they  bring  last  year's  family  also,  for  the  young  of  the  bull- 
finch IS  p  one  to  stop  wi.h  its  elders  till  pairing  time.  All 
birds  are  welcome  here,  save  the  "  bud-hawks,"  but  they  are 
the  deadly  enemy  of  deciduous  shrubs  as  well  as  pear  and  plum. 
To  them  therefore  one  extends  a  frosty  welcome — or 
even  a  fiery  one.  Forsythia  would  be  in  full  bloom  now, 
with  the  yellow  jasmine,  but  the  birds  have  marred  its  per- 
formance as  usual,  and  the  lemon  coloured  blossoms  that  have 
escaped  are  scattered  but  thinly  on  the  drooping  boughs. 

Spring  has  indeed  over-run  winter  for  the  moment,  though 
we  must  be  prepared  for  winter  to  catch  her  sister  again, 
albeit  there  are  many  signs  that  no  great  severity  of  cold 
need  now  be  anticipated.  I  am  disposed  to  trust  my  missel- 
thrush.  He  has  arrived  with  his  bride  and  certainly  intends  to 
nest  once  more  in  a  great  poplar  here.  Already  he  sings 
full-throated— a  song  that  lacks  the  quaUty  and  variety  of  the 
song-thrush,  or  the  mellow  charm  of  the  blackbird  and  ring- 
ousel  ;  but  his  music  of  live  or  six  fine  notes  rings  pleasantly 
from  his  perch  aloft  upon  the  poplar.  He  sits  there  in  the 
winter  sunlight  like  a  little  star  entangled  on  the  tree  top. 

The  Log  of  H.M.S.  Bristol,  by  William  Buchan  (West- 
minster Press,  4s.  net)  is  the  first  published  naval  record  of  the 
war  from  the  participator's  point  of  view,  and  the  book 
provides  a  good  account  of  the  hunt  for  the  Dresden  and 
Karlsruhe  and  the  Bristol's  share  in  the  battle  of  the  Falk- 
1  ands.  As  leading  signalman  on  the  Bristol,  the  author  was  able 
to  keep  an  accurate  log  of  events  in  which  his  ship  took  part. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


February  lo,  iqi6. 


CHAYA. 

A  Romance  of  the  South   Seas. 
By  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoole. 


[Synopsis  :  MacquaH,  who  describes  himself  as  lucky 
with  adventuring,  hut  unlucky  as  Satan  when  speculating,  finds 
himself  in  Sydney  down  on  his  luck.  He  has  a  wonderful 
story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in  New  Guinea  and  a  chance 
acquaintance,  a  sporting  man  about  town,  Tillman,  offers  to 
introduce  him  to  an  apparently  sporting  and  really  wealthy 
wool-broker ,  Citrlewis,  with  a  view  to  financing  his  scheme. 
The  night  before  the  interview  Macqitart,  sleeping  in  a  park, 
not  having  the  price  of  a  bed  on  him,  makes  the  acquaintance 
of  Houghton,  a  well-educated  Englishman,  also  out  of  a  job. 
Tillman,  Macqtiart  and  Houghton  go  to  Cnrlewis'  office,  and 
Macquart  tells  his  story  :  Screed  the  partner  of  Curtewis,  is 
also  present,  but  takes  no  part  in  the  conversation,  going  on 
steadily  with  his  work.  They  resent  his  presence,  and  when 
Curlewis  turns  down  their  proposition,  they  feel  it  is  due  in  an 
uncanny  way  to  Screed's  antagonism.  Macquart's  story  of 
how  the  gold  came  to  be  lidaen  and  deserted  is  most  thrilling 
but  conveys  the  impression  tlat  he  himself  took  an  active  paH 
in  the  work,  though  he  talks  of  a  dead  man  named  Smith. 
Macquart  walks  out  of  the  office  le/ith  a  bold  air,  telling  Curleieis 
that  it  needs  a  great  man  like  Rhodes,  not  "  a  sane  business 
man,"  to  grasp  the  proposition.  Soon  after  the  three  have  left 
Screed  leaves  the  office  telling  his  partner  he  wilt  not  be  long.] 

CHAPTER  III. 

Screed. 

BUT  out  in  the  street,  Tillman  was  the  first  to  speak. 
"  Well,"  said  he,  "  I  never  thought  Curlewis 
would  have  drawn  blank  hke  that.  I  though  it 
was  a  dead  certain  thing  ;  he  was  the  last  man  I'd 
have  expected'to  put  forward  all  those  objections.  I  thought  he 
was  a  sportsman.  'Pears  I  was  wrong.  Seems  to  me  you 
never  know  what's  really  back  of  a  man  till  it  comes  to  the 
pinch.  Well,  we'll  have  to  do  without  him  and  find  someone 
else.  I  tell  you,  I'm  not  going  to  be  done  on  this  thing. 
It  has  got  into  my  blood." 

"  The  worst  thing  about  it,  for  me,  is  that  I  can't  wait," 
said  Houghton.  "I'm  broke.  I  simply  must  get  some 
money,  if  only  to  pay  my  landlady." 

"  How  much  do  you  owe  her  ?  "  asked  Tillman. 

"  Oh,  it's  not  much,  less  than  two  pounds  ;  but  there 
you  are,  two  pounds  wants  a  lot  of  getting  when  you're  on 
your  beam  ends  and  haven't  a  trade." 

Tillman  laughed. 

He  had  only  known  Houghton  for  a  few  hours,  but  m 
Sydney  a  few  hours  in  certain  circles  is  equal  as  far  as 
acquaintanceship  goes,  to  many  days  in  England. 

The  Expedition  also  had  woven  its  bonds  between  them, 
and  then  Houghton  was  a  man  to  get  on  with  at  sight.  ^ 

"  You  don't  worry  about  that,"  said  Tillman.  "  I'll 
see  you  through  if  I  have  to  borrow  the  money.  The  thing 
we  want  now  is  a  drink  ;  let's  get  back  to  Lampert's.  Who 
knows  but  we  may  get  someone  there  to  help." 

It  was  now  a  httle  after  twelve  o'clock.  The  day  was 
blazing  hot,  and  they  got  on  a  passing  tram,  Tillman  paying 
for  the  tickets.  ,  ■   j    • 

Lampert's  bar,  the  favourite  place  of'  its  kind  in 
Sidney,  was  crowded.  Men  from  up-country,  tanned  and 
fresh  from  the  sun-swept  desolation  of  vast  spaces  ;  men 
from  the  sea,  from  western  ports  or  the  hazy  heat-ndden  har- 
bours of  the  China  coast  or  Dutch  Settlements  ;  clerks  from 
business  houses  ;  newspaper  men  ;  racing  men  ;  men  on  the 
look-out  for  something  to  turn  up;  Yankees,  Colonials 
English,  Irish,  Scotch,  a  German  or  two  ;  all  in  a  haze  of  blue 
cigar  smoke,  laughing,  drinking,  chattering,  or  dumb,  and  on 
the  watch.  . 

Tillman,  releasing  himself  from  his  numerous  triends, 
herded  his  fellow  adventurers  in  a  corner  by  the  bar  and  stood 

drinks.  ,         .    ^,  . ,  „ 

"  There's  not  a  bit  of  good  in  being  down  in  the  mouth, 
said  he  "  We'll  all  go  and  have  luncheon  presently,  and 
I'll  see  about  that  money  for  you,  Houghton.  There's  a  man 
called  Drake  I'm  expecting  to  see  in  here  ;  he  s  richer  than 
Curlewis.  I  wish  I'd  thought  of  him  first;  anyhow,  its 
better  late  than  never."  ,  .    ,       ,  j 

Macquart,  standing  with  his  dnnk  in  his  hand,  seemed 
for  the  first  time  to  have  lost  something  of  his  enthusiasm 

"  You  don't  expect  me  to  tell  that  yarn  twice  in  one  day, 
do  you  ?  "  he  asked.  "  It's  not  as  if  it  was  a  made-up  yarn 
then  one  might  sling  it  as  often  as  you  want.  Being  what 
it  is,  it  takes  it  out  of  one."  ,    ..,      c    u 

"  You'll  be  able  to  sUng  it  all  right  after  a  bottle  of  cham- 


pagne,"   said   Tillman.     "  You'll   be— hello  1  "     He   stopped 
short. 

The  door  had  just  opened,  and  a  man  who  had  entered 
was  pushing  his  way  through  the  crowd  towards  the  bar. 

It  was  Screed. 

He  had  sighted  Tillman  and  his  friends,  and  was  making 
towards  them. 

Now  Screed  was  rarely  seen  about  town,  very  rarely  seen 
in  bars.  This  dry-as-dust  individual  was  ungiven  to  con- 
viviality. 

Men  looked  on  Screed  somewhat  as  we  look  on  the  un- 
pleasant necessities  of  hfe  ;  he  was  considered  to  be  the 
buckram  at  the  back  of  Curlewis.  the  thing  that  gave  stiffen- 
ing and  solidity  to  the  business.  Curlewis  fostered  this  idea. 
It  suited  him  to  pose  as  the  butterfly,  the  ornamental  partner, 
the  easy-going,  irresponsible,  kindly,  clap-you-on-the-shoulder 
unbusiness  man,  with  a  testy,  level-headed  partner.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  Arthur  Curlewis  was  the  genius  of  the  firm, 
the  keenest  business  man  in  Sydney. 

Requests  for  loans,  time  extension  and  so  forth,  were 
always  granted  by  Curlewis  and  negatived  by  Screed. 
Curlewis  had  never,  or  scarcely  ever,  shown  his  hand  so 
openly  as  he  did  to  Bobby  Tillman  that  morning.  With 
most  other  men  he  would  have  referred  the  proposition  to 
Screed  with  secret  instructions  to  refuse  it.  But  he  had  a 
great  contempt  for  Tillman,  and,  besides  that,  he  wished  to 
set  Tillman  down.  : 

Bobby  had  been  a  bit  too  familiar  of  late,  and  Curlewis 
was  not  over-pleased  at  the  confidence  with  which  Mr.  Tillman 
had  brought  forward  his  wild-cat  scheme  as  though  he, 
Curlewis,  were  a  fair  mark  for  the  first  adventurer  to  shoot  at. 

"  Why,  it's  Mr.  Screed,"  said  Tillman,  and  it  will  be 
noticed  that  whilst  Curlewis  was  Curlewis  to  him,  Screed 
had  the  honour  of  the  prefix.  "  Why,  this  is  quite  a  surprise. 
Won't  you  join  us  in  a  drink  ?  " 

"  No,  thanks,"  said  Screed.  "  I  never  drink  between 
meals.  I  came  down  here  thinking.it  was  likely  I  might  meet 
you.     I  want  to  have  a  word  with  you." 

He  led  Tillman  to  the  door. 

"  Bring  those  two  men  to  my  rooms  this  evening  at 
seven,"  said  he.  "  No,  not  seven,  eight.  I  want  to  have  a 
talk  with  the  three  of  you." 

"  A  talk  with  us  ?  " 

"  About  that  business  you  brought  to  Curlewis.  I  may 
be  able  to  do  something." 

"  You?" 

"  Yes.  Me.  And  don't  you  say  a  word  on  this  matter 
to  anyone.     Not  even  to  Curlewis." 

"  Well,  I'm  d d,"  said  Bobby. 

"  That's  maybe  likely,"  said  Screed  ;  "  but  all  the  same, 
bring  your  men  along,  and  don't  enter  into  any  negotiations 
over°the  business  with  any  other  party.     I'm  interested." 

"  Oh,  I  say,  this  is  good,  this  is  ripping  !  You  of  all 
people  !    Say,  won't  you  have  a  drink  ?  " 

"  No,  thank  you  ;  and  don't  go  drinking  yourself  if  you 
want  me  to  do  business." 

"  I,"  said  the  other,  "  I  haven't  touched  anything  this 
morning,  only  soft  drinks.  Think  I'm  such  a  fool  ?  No,  sir, 
when  I  have  business  on  hand,  I'm  a  Quaker.     Eight  o'clock  ?  " 

"  Eight  o'clock  at  my  rooms  ;    lo.  Bury  Street." 

Screed  open  the  door  and  shpped  out  hurriedly,  as 
though  ashamed  of  his  visit  to  the  place  ;  and  Tillman  re- 
turned to  the  others  radiant. 

"  We're  safe,"  said  he.  "  It's  a  sure  thing.  Screed  is 
going  to  take  it  up."     He  told  of  the  conversation  with  Screed. 

Macquart  listened  attentively,  then  he  said  : 

"  That  fixes  it.  I  noticed  that  all  the  time  he  was 
writing,  he  had  one  ear  on  my  story  ;  he's  harpooned.  Well, 
he's  a  clever  man,  a  much  cleverer  man  than  his  partner ; 
and  he  has  the  money,  you  say  ?  " 

"  Oh,  he's  full  of  money,"  said  the  enthusiastic  Tillman. 
"  He's  always  making  it  and  he  never  spends  anything." 

"  You  can  never  tell  what  a  man  spends,"  replied 
Macquart,  "  or  how  he  spends  it." 

CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Chart. 

Sydney,  taking  it  all  together,  is  one  of  the  most 
delightful  cities  in  the  world.  It  breathes  the  air  of  the 
Pacific,  and  the  poetry  of  the  Islands  mixes  with  the  roar 
and  rumble  of    trade.     No  other  maritime  citv  has  such  a 


LAND      AND      WATER 


February  lo,  1916. 


ehaya.  a'llumance  cf  the  South  ieas  \  lif.uitrated   bj)  Joseph   Simpien,   R.H.A. 

"  I  think  we  may  take  it   your  map   is  not  in  error,"  said  Screed. 


February  lo,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


harbour,  few  cities  of  the  world  such  a  sky  ;  Cadmus  would 
have  loved  it.  Here  above  everything  else  is  the  spirit  of 
Youth  ;  Daring  and  High  Adventure  breathe  in  the  Pacific 
wind  and  fill  the  lungs  of  the  men  who  pursue  Trade  to  the 
confines  of  the  earth. 

in  this  city  of  youth,  the  three  adventurers  were  at  no 
loss  for  amusement  during  the  hours  separating  them  from 
their  appointment  with  Screed.  Tillman,  having  raised 
some  money,  invited  them  to  luncheon  at  a  restaurant,  after 
which  they  took  themselves  off  to  Farm  Cove,  where  Tillman 
had  some  friends  amongst  the  Navy  people.  Here  he  secured 
the  loan  of  a  boat  and  went  fishing  for  bream. 

"  This  is  better  than  sitting  in  restaurants  and  places," 
said  the  ingenuous  Tillman.  "  There's  no  drink  to  be  had, 
and  you  get  the  fresh  air  and  you  get  fish^sometimes. 
Besides,  you  can  think  out  here  better  than  ashore." 
I  Macquart  in  the  stern  sheets,  lounging,  with  one  foot 
across  the  gunnel,  and  his  old  hat  tilted  over  his  eyes,  nodded. 
He  had  done  nothing,  neither  rowed  nor  helped  with  the  hnes. 
He  seemed  the  concretion  of  laziness.  When  manual  work 
was  forward,  it  was  always  the  same,  the  engineer  of  fortune 
shrank  into  himself,  and  it  was  noticeable  now  that  the 
two  younger  men,  so  far  from  even  mildly  resenting  or  jesting 
at  the  supineness  of  the  Wonder  Worker,  accepted  it.  He 
was  the  thing  that  interested  them  at  this  moment  more  than 
any  other  thing  in  hfe.  Leaving  aside  the  fact  that  he  held 
all  the  threads  from  which  they  hoped  to  weave  their  fortune, 
the  man  himself  exercised  a  potent  spell  on  their  imagination. 
The  fishing  proved  good,  but  even  the  excitement  of 
hauling  in  red  bream  and  trevally  did  not  entirely  obliterate 
the  figure  of  Fortune  in  the  stern  of  the  boat,  or  the  fascina- 
tion of  the  thought  of  what  it  might  lead  them  to. 

fAt  five  o'clock  they  hauled  in  their  hnes.  Tillman 
presented  the  fish  they  had  caught  to  the  owner  of  the  boat  in 
return  for  the  loan  of  it,  then  they  went  off  to  tea  at  an  inn, 
and  at  eight  o'clock  punctually  they  appeared  in  Bury 
Street.  Bury  Street,  in  the  suburbs  of  the  city,  has  a  touch 
of  France  about  it,  bright-looking  little  villas  set  in  prim 
Uttle  gardens  alternate  with  semi-detached  residences.  At 
one  extremity  it  tails  off  into  workmen's  cottages,  and  it 
ends,  frankly  discarding  the  higher  respectabilities,  in  a 
steam  laundry.  .Screed's  house  was  at  the  better  end  of  the 
street,  and  he  was  working  in  his  garden  when  they  arrived. 

He  had  a  passion  for  gardening.  Screed  was  one  of  those 
broody  individuals  very  difficult  to  assess  at  their  proper 
value  either  in  morals  or  money.  He  had  risen  from  nothing, 
yet  he  was  reputed  to  be  exceedingly  well-off.  He  had  the 
reputation  for  wealth,  yet  he  never  gave  away  a  penny  and  he 
made  no  show  at  all.  He  was  plain  almost  to  ugliness  and  he 
dressed  abominably.  All  these  facts  stood  him  well  in  busi- 
ness ;  they  had  gained  for  him  the  reputation  of  being  a  solid 
man.  Dingy  as  a  moth,  he  corrected  the  gaudiness  of  his 
partner,  Curlewis,  and  he  knew  it.  With  one  of  the  most 
brilhant  business  intellects  in  Sydney,  he  was  condemned  to 
hide  his  shining  Ught  behind  the  shutters  of  the  firm,  to  do  all 
the  thinking  and  let  Curlewis  do  all  the  talking. 

He  might  have  escaped  from  all  this  by  starting  in  busi- 
ness for  himself,  yet  he  did  not.  There  was  some  want  in 
his  nature,  some  timidity  in  entering  upon  a  lone  venture, 
some  defect  that  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  row  alone — 
and  he  knew  it,  and  he  hated  Curlewis  for  it. 

It  was  not  a  melodramatic  hatred.  He  would  not  have 
hurt  his  partner  in  business  or  in  person  for  the  world  ;  it  was 
more  in  the  nature  of  a  good  substantial  disUke  based  on  the 
firm  foundation  of  his — Screed's — Umitations. 

Now  when  Macquart  had  told  his  tale  that  morning  in 
the  office,  Screed's  unerring  instinct  for  truth  where  money 
was  concerned  had  warned  him  that  here  was  Truth.  He  did 
not  think  it  highly  probable  that  an  expedition  started  after 
this  long-buried  gold  would  succeed  in  bringing  it  back,  but 
he  considered  it  highly  possible.  He  saw  in  Macquart  an 
adventurer  of  a  new  type,  he  felt  his  soul  ;  with  that  pro- 
found instinct  for  men  that  never  erred,  he  was  not  baffled 
by  the  strangeness  of  this  new  specimen  of  humanity  that 
had  come  before  him. 

He  had  listened  to  Curlewis  casting  cold  water  on  the 
story  and  he  had  made  up  his  mind.  He  would  investigate 
the  matter  for  himself,  and  if  he  saw  a  chance  of  success  in 
it,  he  would  push  it.  The  thing  might  fail—if  it  succeeded, 
the  money  returns  would  be  less  to  him  than  the  triumph 
over  Curlewis.  Besides  this,  Screed  was  a  man  of  imagina- 
tion with  an  instinct  for  adventure,  but  no  stomach  for  it, 
Besides  this,  he  possessed  the  gambUng  instinct  none  the 
less  strong  from  long  suppression. 

He  gave  his  guests  good-evening,  put  away  the  hose 
with  which  he  had  been  watering  the  garden  and  led  them 
into  the  house. 

Houghton  looked  around  him  as  they  entered.  It  was 
a  long,  long  time  since  he  had  felt  the  atmosphere  of  comfort 
and  home.     He  had  been  condemned  to  lodging-houses  and 


cheap  hotels,  and  life  on  ship- board  as  a  second  class  passenger, 
and  he  was  a  man  who  possessed  a  fine  sense  for  all  the  things 
that  make  for  ease  and  quiet  enjoyment  of  existence. 

The  lamps  were  lighted  in  the  little  hall  where  Maori 
paddles  and  spears  slewed  on  the  walls,  with  here  and  there 
an  etching  or  a  rare  p  int,  and  the  room  into  which  Screed 
led  them,  half  library,  half  sitting-room,  gave  more  evidence 
of  the  quiet  good  taste  of  the  owner. 

Whiskey,  a  syphon  of  soda-water  and  cigars  stood  on  a 
side  table,  and  Screed,  having  helped  his  guests  and  asked 
them  to  be  seated,  plunged  into  the  business  on  hand. 

Standing  before  the  fireplace  with  his  hands  in  his  pockets, 
he  cross-questioned  Macquart  upon  points  in  his  story,  and 
the  latter  answered  up  without  hesitation  or  demur,  evidently 
pleased  with  the  business-hke  manner  of  his  questioner. 

"And  now,"  said  Screed,  after  he  had  finished,  "let 
us  look  at  that  map  you  told  me  of." 

Macquart  rose  up,  fetched  his  hat,  which  he  had  placed 
on  a  chair  by  the  door,  and  took  from  the  fining  of  it  a  folded 
piece  of  paper  yellow  as  parchment.  He  spread  it  on  the 
table  before  Screed,  and  the  others  gathering  round  looked 
over  the  wool  broker's  shoulder  as  he  sat  with  his  spectacles 
on  his  nose  and  the  paper  before  him. 

It  was  a  rough  map  of  the  southern  coast  of  New  Guinea, 
very  rough  in  detail  except  for  a  certain  section  of  the  coast 
almost  due  north  of  Cape  York  on  the  Australian  shore. 
Here  the  marking  was  much  more  minute,  shewing  several 
rivers  and  one  whose  disemboguement  was  indicated  by  a 
cross. 

"  That's  the  river,"  said  Macquart,  "  that  one  with  the 
cross  to  it.  The  shore  is  pretty  hilly  around  there  and  there's 
a  big  rock  standing  up  on  the  shore  to  the  east  of  the  mouth. 
The  Pulpit  Rock  it's  called.  It  looks  like  a  Hght-house 
from  the  sea  and  you  can  sight  it  a  long  way  out.  All  round 
there  is  coral  reef,  but  the  course  into  the  river  is  a  clear  fair 
way.  You  see,  the  fresh  water  has  eaten  the  coral  down. 
There's  no  difficulty  in  navigating  at  all,  though  it  looks  bad 
enough  from  seaward." 

Screed  got  up  and  going  to  a  portfolio  lying  on  a  ledge 
of  one  of  the  book-cases,  took  some  charts  from  it. 

"  I  borrowed  these  to-day,"  said  he.  "  Let's  see  what 
they  have  to  say  on  the  matter." 

He  spread  out  a  chart  of  the  waters  from  the  northern 
boundary  of  the  great  quadrangle  of  the  Gulf  of  Carpentaria 
right  up  to  the  New  Guinea  coast  and  including  Torres  Straits. 
and  by  it  another  chart  of  the  northern  part  of  Torres  Straits 
and  the  New  Guinea  coast  directly  north  of  Prince  of  Wales' 
Island. 

This  was  the  important  chart,  as  it  gave  more  particularly 
the  reef  soundings  and  the  rivers. 

"  Ah,  that's  something  hke,"  said  Macquart.  "  Now 
you  can  see  whether  my  map  is  correct  or  not.  Look,  there's 
the  river,  there  are  the  reefs,  there's  where  she  comes  out. 
Look  at  the  soundings  of  the  channel,  ten  fathom  water  and 
seven  fathom  right  up  to  the  mouth  where  it  rises  to  twelve. 
You  see,  there's  no  sand  to  silt  up  the  mouth,  that  river  brings 
down  very  little  stuff  with  it,  too.  It's  different  from  the  other 
New  Guinea  rivers,  that  mostly  come  out  through  mud 
banks  and  mangroves.  It's  gin-Jaright  from  that  big  reach 
right  down  to  the  mouth.  1  reckon  it's  such  an  old  river 
that  it  has  eaten  its  way  right  down  to  bed  rock.  You  see,  it 
draws  most  of  its  water  from  the  big  lakes,  it  doesn't  draw 
from  a  lot  of  mushy  little  streams." 

Screed  said  nothing  ;  he  was  still  intent  on  the  soundings 
and  on  the  comparison  of  the  chart  with  the  rough  map  of 
Macquart. 

"  Well,"  said  he,  at  last,  "  I  think  we  may  take  it  that 
your  map  is  not  in  error.  Now  let  us  get  to  business.  I 
will  go  into  your  venture,  on  conditions." 

Tillman  drew  a  deep  breath,  and  Houghton,  who  had 
been  hanging  in  breathless  suspense,  glanced  at  him.  Then 
they  went  to  the  other  side  of  the  table  and  took  their  seats, 
whilst  Macquart,  bright  of  eye,  drew  a  chair  up  and  sat  down 
close  to  Screed.  The  meeting  had  suddenly  become  a  con- 
ference, and  the  papers  upon  the  table  did  not  detract  from 
that  impression. 

"  The  business,"  went  on  Screed,  "  is  the  biggest  gamble 
that  was  ever  placed  on  the  market  in  Sydney.  My  partner . 
Curlewis  gave  you  his  ideas  about  gambling  this  morning, 
and  he  was  right  ;  but  he  did  not  entirely  touch  the  point. 
Gambling  is  only  dangerous  and  only  wrong  from  a  business 
point  of  view  when  indulged  in  outside  limits.  Now  if  I  were 
to  take  a  thousand  pounds  and  use  it  in  speculation  or  horse- 
racing  for  the  purpose  of  winning  money,  the  danger  to  me 
would  be  not  the  danger  of  losing  my  thousand,  but  the 
danger  of  losing  it  and  trying  to  get  my  losses  back.  Men 
never  are  ruined  by  their  first  losses  in  gambling ;  they  are 
always  ruined  by  trying  to  get  those  losses  back. 

"  But  if  I  take  a  thousand  pounds  and  put  it  in  this 
venture  of  yours,  and  if  this  venture  fails,  I  lose  my  thousand 


21 


February  lo,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


but  by  no  means  would  I  risk  more  money  to  get  my  thousand 
back  in  this  particular  venture.  I  hope  I  am  not  worrying 
you,  but  1  always  like  to  explain  what  is  in  my  mind." 

"  Not  at  all — not  at  all,"  cried  Tillman  and  Houghton. 
Macquart  said  nothing  ;  he  was  rubbing  his  hands,  palms 
together,  under  the  table.  He  nodded  to  the  others  in 
approval,  but  not  a  word  escaped  his  lips. 

"  I  have  determined,  then,  to  take  a  thousand  pounds," 
went  on  Screed,  "  and — lose  it." 
Macquart  broke  into  a  laugh. 

"  That  is  the  spirit  I  like,"  said  he.  "  That's  what 
brings  success." 

"  My  terms,"  finished  Screed,  rather  coldly,  "  will  be 
half  profits." 

"  Half  profits,"  said  Tillman. 
Macquart  said  nothing. 

"  There  are  three  of  us,"  began  Houghton,  then  he 
stopped  and  glanced  at  the  others  as  if  to  find  out  what  was 
in  their  minds,  but  they  gave  him  no  lead. 

Screed,  who  had  taken  a  paper  and  pencil  from  his  pocket, 
placed  the  paper  on  the  table  and  holding  the  pencil  between 
his  fingers  went  on  : 

"  U  the  money  is  there,  and  if  it  amounts  to  the  sum 
named,  a  third  share — after  deducting  my  allowance — will 
mean  that  each  of  you  receives  a  very  large  fortune. 

"  I  am  not  against  Mr.  Scieed  taking  half  profits,"  said 
Macquart,  speaking  to  the  others.  "  He  fits  out  the  ex- 
pedition, we  are  no  use  at  all  without  him.  A  thousand  that 
brings  him  in  two  hundred-and-fifty  per  cent,  will  be  a  good 
investment — but  then  there's  the  risk." 

"  Oh,  I'm  not  objecting,"  said  Houghton.  "  I'm  only 
thinking  that  there  are  three  of  us,  you,  Tillman,  and  myself. 
How  do  we  stand  towards  one  another  in  the  matter  of 
sharing  ?  " 

"  That's  the  rub,"  said  Tillman. 

Screed  moved  restlessly,  and  Macquart,  as  though 
fearful  of  any  friction  making  the  wool-broker  break  away 
from  the  business,  cut  in  : 

"  We  won't  quarrel  over  that,"  said  he.  "  Right  here 
and  now  I'll  settle  it.  We  are  the  three  working  partners 
and  will  share  alike.  ,  Eighty  thousand  is  enough  for  me,  I'm 
no  dud  to  go  scraping  after  the  last  halfpenny.  I  only  want 
enough  to  be  comfortable  while  I  live — what  do  you  say  ? 

This  splendid  generosity  nearly  did  for  the  business. 
For  a  moment,  Screed  took  fright,  and  whilst  Tillman  was 
shaking  the  generous  one's  hand,  the  turn  of  a  hair  would  have 
made  the  wool  broker  cry  off. 

Instinct  told  him  that  Macquart  and  Generosity  formed  a 
suspicious  alliance,  instinct  told  him  that  this  man  would 
most  certainly  diddle  his  partners  ii  he  had  the  change.  Then 
Reason  reassured  him.  The  gold  was  useless  to  Macquart 
without  a  man  to  handle  it  for  him  and  get  rid  of  it,  and  he — 
Screed — was  the  only  man  for  that  purpose.  This  was  not 
exactly  a  shady  job,  but  it  was,  so  to  speak,  an  extra-govern- 
mental job.  Macquart  trying  to  dispose  of  the  treasure  off 
his  own  bat  would  rouse  enquiries,  and  then  all  sorts  of  claims 
would  come  down  on  the  money,  it  would  be  held  up,  and  if 
the  treasure  seekers  received  a  tithe  of  it  after  years  of  worry, 
they  would  be  fortunate.  Screed  had  the  means  to  obviate 
all  that. 

^  Besides,  though  Macquart  might  try  to  diddle  his  partners, 
Tillman  and  Houghton  were  not  children,  but  very  wide- 
awake individuals  indeed,  and  well  able  to  look  after  their 
own  interests  and  the  interests  of  Screed  as  well. 

So,  instead  of  breaking  off  from  the  business,  he  opened 
the  paper  which,  he  had  taken  from  his  pocket  and  spread  it 
on  the  table  beside  the  charts. 

"  I  have  made  out  a  few  lines  with  reference  to  this  busi- 
ness," said  he.  "  It's  not  exactly  an  agreement,  for  between 
you  and  me  a  legal  agreement  is  not  of  much  count,  con- 
sidering the  fact  that  not  one  of  us  will  be  able  to  invoke  the 
law,  seeing  that  the  law  if  it  stepped  in  would  place  its  hand 
most  cert amly  on  the  money.  It's  just  a  letter  of  promise, 
so  to  speak,  from  the  three  of  you,  stating  that  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  I  am  fitting  out  your  expedition  you  agree  to  divide 
equally  with  me  all  moneys  accruing  from  that  expedition. 
Then,'"'  finished  Screed,  with  cold  jocularity,  "  in  the  unlikely 
event  of  the  death  of  any  one  of  you,  I  would  be  assured  of 
half  his  share,  and  in  the  more  unlikely  event  of  the  three  of 
you  trying  to  play  me  false — don't  say  anything,  Mr.  Tillman, 
I  am  only  making  a  legal  joke— I  would  be  able  to  pursue  you 
and  call  the  law  in,  not  to  get  me  my  money  but  to  prevent 
you  from  enjoying  yours,  and  this  document,  you  will 
notice,"  finished  Sere  d,  "  says  nothing  about  treasure  at  all. 
So  that  should  I  be  driven  to  pursue  you  in  law,  I  am  free  to 
make  any  statement  I  fike  about  the  object  of  your  venture  ; 
for  instance,  I  might  say  it  was  a  pearling  venture,  leaving 
a  lawyer  to  dig  out  of  you  in  open  court  all  about  the 
treasure." 

Macquart  said  nothing  ;  the  tortuous,  cautious  and  trap- 
like nature  of  Screed's  mind  thus  suddenly  disclosed  seemed  to 


have  disconcerted  him.  Tillman  flushed  and  Houghton,  with 
a  spark  in  his  eyes,  looked  straight  across  the  table  at  the 
wool-broker. 

"  We  aren't  going  to  chisel  you,"  said  he.  "  You  are 
dealing  with  gentlemen,  I  hope." 

"  Mr.  Houghton,"  said  Screed,  "  there  are  no  such 
things  as  gentlemen  in  business,  there  are  only  men.  There 
is  no  such  thing  as  friendship  in  business,  only  calculation  and 
Profit  and  Loss.  In  business,  one  must  secure  the  safety  of 
one's  interests  by  every  possible  means,  and  in  going  into  a 
wild-cat  venture  of  this  sort,  I  am  going  to  tie  }ou  all  up  to 
my  interests  by  every  possible  means.  There,  you  have  it 
quite  plain.  Now  will  you  all  sign  this  paper,  please — if  you 
want  my  thousand  pounds." 

Macquart  signed  first,  then  Tillman,  then  Houghton. 

Screed  put  the  document  away  in  a  drawer  and  lit  a  cigar, 
the  first  he  had  smoked  that  evening. 

"  Now,"  said  he,  "  we  have  settled  that  and  we  can  get  to 
work.  I  have  my  hand  on  the  boat  you  want ;  she  a  fifty- 
foot  fishing  yawl  built  by  Bowers,  she's  only  six  years  old, 
she  has  been  in  the  pearling  business  and  she  was  re-fitted 
last  year.  I  have  some  interest  in  shipping  matters  and  only 
a  week  ago  Mr.  Culloch  took  me  over  her,  wanting  me  to  buy. 
I  telephoned  to  him  this  afternoon  and  found  she  was  still 
unsold,  so  I  told  him  to  hold  her  for  me  on  an  option.  You 
are  a  good  schooner  sailor,  Tillman  ;  what  do  j^ou  say  to  a 
yawl  ?  " 

"  I'd  sooner  handle  a  yawl  than  a  schooner,"  said  Till- 
man ;  "  best  rig  in  the  world  if  one  is  short-handed." 

"  I  know  all  about  yawls,"  said  Houghton.  "  Ought 
to  ;  I  owned  one  for  a  year  and  lived  in  her — only  a  thirty- 
footer  though." 

"  I  haven't  used  yawls,  but  I've  used  every  other  rig 
from  a  jackass  barque  to  a  catamaran,"  said  Macquart. 
"  Sail  handling  is  pretty  much  a  matter  of  instinct,  I  reckon  ; 
besides,  I'm  ready  to  do  the  navigating.  I'm  not  an  Ai 
navigator,  but  I've  got  all  the  essentials  and  I  know  the  rnad. 
Give  me  a  chronometer  properly  wound  and  set,  and  a  decent 
sextant  and  charts,  and  I  reckon  I  can  make  good.  Why, 
down  Sooloo  way  I  sailed  with  a  Dutchman  ;  he  had  a  pearl 
boat,  but  he  was  crazy  with  rum  most  of  the  time,  and  I 
guess  he  was  the  first  sailor  after  Noah.  He'd  got  one  of  those 
Amstel  Charts  of  the  Sooloo  waters,  made  in  Amsterdam  they 
were,  and  they've  got  dolphins  and  mermaids  figured  on  them, 
and  for  sextant  he  used  a  back-stick,  one  of  the  first  sextants 
ever  used.  That  hooker  would  have  been  the  Flying  Dutch- 
man, only  she  didn't  fly,   yet  we  made  out    somehow." 

"  I  can  do  a  bit  of  navigating  myself,"  said  Tillman, 
"  and  Houghton  here  tells  me  he  has  got  the  rudiments." 

"  Not  much  more,"  said  Houghton. 

"  That's  all  to  the  good,"  replied  Screed,  who  was  putting 
the  charts  away.  "  The  question  was  uppermost  in  my  mind 
whether  we  would  require  a  navigating  officer,  and  I  didn't 
much  like  the  idea.  We  don't  want  any  more  than  we  can 
help  in  this  job,  but  you  can" take  a  black  fellow  with  you  to 
give  a  hand." 

Macquart  rose  to  his  feet. 

"  Well,"  said  he,  "  that's  settled  ;  and  when  can  we  see 
the  hooker  and  how  long  do  you  expect  to  be  in  getting  stores 
on  board  ?  " 

"  We  will  arrange  all  that  to-morrow,"  said  Screed.  "  I 
want  the  three  of  you  to  be  here  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
sharp  at  six  ;  I  have  to  be  at  the  office  at  nine.  The  yawl  is 
lying  near  Farm  Cove  and  I  want  to  take  you  over  her.  I  will 
have  some  coffee  and  sandwiches  here  for  you  at  six.  And 
now,  one  point  more.  This  business  is  a  secret.  I  don't 
want  my  partner  to  know  of  it,  I  don't  want  my  friends  to 
know  of  it,  and  I  don't  want  the  authorities  to  know  of  it. 
You  are  going  on  a  pearling  venture,  that  is  your  explanation 
to  anyone  who  may  poke  his  nose  into  the  affair.  If  the  real 
business  leaks  out,  I  will  throw  up  everything." 

"  We'll  be  mum,"  said  Tillman.  "  You  may  rest  assured 
— and  now  about  ready  money.  I  have  enough  for  myself, 
but  Houghton  here  is  badly  placed  ;  in  fact,  he's  on  the  rocks 
— and  as  to  Mr.  Macquart " 

"  Oh,  a  hundred  dollars  will  do  me,"  said  Macquart,"  or 
less  ;  I'm  not  bothering  about  present  money,  I  m  only  think- 
ing of  the  ixpedition." 

"  Ten  pounds  would  do  me,"  said  Houghton.  "  I  owe 
four  pounds  to  my  landlord  and  six  will  carry  me  on." 

Screed  took  ten  sovereigns  from  a  drawer  and  divided 
them  between  Macquart  and  Houghton. 

"  That  will  carry  you  on  for  the  present,"  said  he,  "  and 
mind,  six  sharp  to-morrow." 

"  By  the  way,"  said  Tillman,  as  they  took  their  de- 
parture, "  what's  the  name  of  the  yawl  ?  " 

"  The  Barracuda,"  rephed  Screed." 

(To    be   continued.) 
[The  story  began  in  Land  a.nd  Water,  February  3.] 


Supplement  tn  T.Axn    Axn  TViTrn.  Fchrtmn/   17,    mifl 


REFUGEES.      "EARLY    DAYS    IN    BELGIUM." 

By  G.  Spenceb   Pryse. 

These  two  lithographs  are  included  in  the  Portfolo  of  Examples  which  have  been  published  by  the  Leicester 

Galleries  at  16  guineas-    The  edition  is  limited  to  80  copies. 
A  set  will  be  sent  on  approval  on  application  to  the  Leicester  Galleries,  Leicester  Square,  London,  W. 

XV 


iuptiteuKOt  ^u  i^-^^   *>">   Maiui.  rtoruatii  il,   ISIO. 


iUllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllli 


liliiil 


THE 


THRESHER 

For  Comfort,  Security  and  Service 
at  any  period  of  the  year  rely  on 
a  Threslier,  and  make  sure  it 
bears  the   Label    Thresher    &    Glenny. 


Thoroughly  tested  throughout  the  campaign  of 
last  Winter,  this  much-copied  coat  has  staunchly 
befriended  many  Officers  in  the  Field.  For  com- 
fort and  durability  its  supremacy  is  established 
without  dispute.  It  is  warm,  waterproof,  nuid 
and  wind-proof,  and  its  weight  is  the  minimum 
consistent  with  the.se  qualities.  Combining  as  it 
does  the  functions  of  a  greatcoat,  British  Warm, 
and  raincoat,  considerations  as  to  weight  lender 
this  garment  invsJuable. 


Trench  Coat,  with  detachable 

'*  Kamelcott "  lining, 

£5    10  0 

With  detachable  Sheepskin  lining, 
£7   1    0 


A  glance  through 
Thresher's  "Guide  to 
Kit  and  Equipment," 
will  prove  that  the  pur- 
chase of  Military  Outfits 
from  the  leading  Military 
Tailors  is  not  costly, 
and  guarantees  quality, 
workmanship  and  cor- 
rect details.  Copy 
tent      on      application. 


For  Mounted  Officers,  with  knee  flaps  fitting  over  1 5/6 
and  round  the  knee,  and  waterproof  saddle  gusset    extra 

Send   size    of    chest    and   approximate    height,    and    to   avoid 

delay  enclose  cheque  with  order.     Payment  refunded  if  coat 

not  suitable.     Trade  supplied. 


NOTE:— A  Thresher  Trench  Coat  with 
inierchangeable  Sheepskin  and  Kamelcott 
linings  provide  all  that  is  necessary  in  the 
way  of  outer  protection  for  winter,  spring  and 
summer.     Coat  with  both  linings,   £8  6  0. 


King's  Lynn,  11th  Jany.,  1916. 
Dear  Sirs,— I  enclose  a  cheque  £5  10s.  for  the  Trench 
Coat.     My  son,  writing  from  Suvla  Bay,  describes   it  as 
"a  miracle  of  waterproofing."— Yours  truly, 

F.  U.   PARTRIDGE. 
Messrs.   Thresher  <fc  Glenny. 


Thresher  &  Glenny 


JHCililary  'bailors  &  Outfitters, 

152  &   153  Strand, 

LONDOxN, 
W.G. 


iiiiiii 


XVI 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVII  No.   2806. 


THURSDAY,  FEBRUARY  17,  1916.    [r.v"J;^v'|'A'^p^|]  IS^^ii.i^i;^ 


By  Louis   Haemachers 


Urawn  exclusively  for  "  Land   and    Water." 


Father,  what  will  it  be  like  when  we  take  to  honest  work  again  ? 


February  17,  1916. 


LAND     AND     ^^'  A  T  E  R 


LAND  &  WATER 

Empire    House,    Kingsway,    London,    W.G. 

Telephone  :    HOLBORN    2828. 


THURSDAY,    FEBRUARY    17,    1916. 


FIGURES    AND    CRITICISM. 

THERE  are  two  points  which  have  been 
continually  emphasised  in  the  columns 
of  this  journal  by  our  military  critic. 
One  is  that  a  just  estimate  of  the  military 
situation  can  only  be  obtained  by  constant  reference  to 
the  all-important  factor  of  numbers,  especially  to  the 
enemy's  original  man-power,  to  his  rate  of  wastage,  and 
thence  to  his  probable  reserves.  The  other  is  the  need 
of  sober  and  authoritative  guidance  in  these  matters  in 
order  that  such  a  just  estimate  might  be  accessible  to  and 
accepted  by  ordinary  civilian  opinion. 

The  first  point,  long  so  amazingly  neglected,  is  now 
conceded  by  all.  Of  the  second  an  excellent  illustration 
can  be  found  in  the  misleading  effect  produced  by  the 
publication  by  Mr.  Tennant  of  the  German,  casualty 
figures  without  any  such  sober  and  authoritative  guide 
to  their  criticism. 

On  January  7th  this  year  the  Times  published  an 
article  from  its  military  correspondent  which  contained 
the  following  passage  : 

The  military  situation  of  Germany,  in  spite  of  her  successes  on 
land,  is  not  brilliant.  Out  of  some  nine  million  men  of 
military  age  which  the  writer  assumed  to  be  her  niobilisable 
total  early  in  the  war,  she  lias  probably  lost  3,500,000  in 
killed,  badly  wounded,  prisoners,  and  sick.  .  .  .  She 
has  suffered,  since  the  war  began,  an  average  loss  of  nearly 
200,000  men  a  month,  and  it  is  probably  the  loss  of  men  that 
affects  her  most.  If  the  war  preserves  in  the  future  its  past 
character  she  must  find  herself,  at  some  date  between  May 
and  October,  imable  to  maintain  her  effectives  at  the  front 
with  men  of  a  military  age,  and  she  is  therefore  bound,  before 
this  date,  which  will  be  known  to  her,  to  force  a  decision  at 
one  front  or  another. 

Our  readers  will  be  familiar  with  the  figures  given 
above  since  they  are  approximately  the  same  as  those 
given,  and  constantly  repeated  by  our  military  critic  ; 
at  least  they  are  within  the  margin  of  possible  error  for 
which  he  allowed.  They  are  based  on  careful  calculation 
and  a  similar  result  has  been  reached  along  quite  separate 
lines  of  reasoning  by  several  competent  authorities  in 
Europe. 

Then  comes  the  publication  by  Mr.  Tennant  of  the 
"  official  "  German  figures — official,  be  it  observed,  so 
far  as  the  German  Empire  is  concerned,  not  as  regards 
our  own  War  Office.  The  Tivies  military  correspondent 
then  executes  a  surprising  "  volte  face  "  and  proceeds 
to  demolish  his  own  figures.  In  the  Times  of  February 
9th  he  says  : — 

"  All  things  considered  the  net  German  losses  during  the  past 
eighteen  months  of  war  may  be  approximately  estimated 
at  2,627.085  total  casualties]^    minus   790,000  wounded  re- 
turned to  the  front,  and  plus  630,000  invahded  and  150,000 
sick  in  hospital,  or  on  the  whole  estimate  a  net  loss  of  nearly 
2,600.000  in  round  figures,  and  an  average  monthly  loss  of 
a  little  over  144,000  men."_ 
In  other  words,  he  reduces  the  total  German  casual- 
tics  by  nearly  a  million,  and  the  monthly  wastage  by 
over  50,000  ! 

This  astonishing  calculation  brings  him  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  Germans  must  have  2,000,000  men  in 
reserve  and  that  consequently  their  effectives  will  not 
begin  to  fail  until  February,  1917.  The  climax  is  reached 
when  he  accepts  the  preposterous  estimate  of  36,000 
German  losses  for  the  month  of  January,  to  which  he 
adds  -.  "If  we  dispose  of  no  more  Germans  per  month 
than  we  did  during  the  month  which  has  just  elapsed, 
namely,  36,000,  there  is  no  particular  reason  on  the  basis 


of  numbers  alone  why  we  should  set  any  particular  term 
on  the  war  !  " 

One  could  almost  afford  to  leave  the  matter  there  ; 
but  it  becomes  more  amazing  when  the  writer's  own 
statement  as  to  the  character  of  the  German  lists  is 
examined.     Here  it  is  : — 

Can  we  trust  these  casualty  lists  ?  Up  to  a  point  we  probably 
can.  They  arc  often  belate<],  but  so  are  ours.  They  contain 
many  errors  which  are  subsequently  rectified,  but  so  do  ours. 
They  only  contain  the  names  of  some  men  Avho  have  died  of 
sickness,  probably  in  the  army  zone,  and  omit  altogether,  as 
do  ours,  the  names  of  men  invalided  and  the  floating  popula- 
tion of  hospitals  and  sanatoria. 

Now  if  it  were  absolutely  certain  that  the  German 
lists  were  exact  and  exhaustive,  a  military  critic  might  be 
quite  right  to  reduce  on  their  authority  his  own  estimate 
by  something  approaching  a  third,  though  it  might  be 
thought  that  he  could  hardly  do  so  without  some  shock 
to  men's  confidence  in  his  judgment.  But  it  is  obvious 
from  the  passage  quoted  above  that  the  writer  cannot 
even  pretend  that  these  lists  are  either  exhaustive  or 
exact.  They  are  "  belated  "  ;  they  "  contain  many 
errors  "  ;  they  refer  to  only  a  proportion  of  those  who 
die  of  sickness ;  and  they  "  omit  altogether  the  names 
of  men  invalided  and  the  floating  population  of  hospitals 
and  sanatoria." 

Nevertheless  the  military  correspondent  of  tlic 
Times  accepts  them  ;  and  by  a  series  of  wild  guesses  at 
the  missing  items,  guesses  wholly  unsupported  by  any 
kind  of  evidence  and  containing  the  perfectly  pre- 
posterous suggestion  of  fifty  per  cent,  of  wounded  return- 
ing to  their  original  duties— we  know  that  the  real 
proportion  in  all  armies  is  something  between  a  quarter 
and  a  third— succeeds  in  bringing  out  a  figure  almost 
exactly   the   same   as   the   German   "  ofiicial "   figure. 

As  we  go  to  press  there  appears  still  another  article  in 
the  Times  in  which  the  same  critic  admits  that  the  German 
casualty  lists  are  open  to  grave  suspicion,  though  he  does 
not  suspect  the  enemy  of  anything  so  base  as  deliberate 
falsification.  He  agrees  under  pressure,  that  the  number 
of  36,000  officially  quoted  as  the  German  losses  in 
January  cannot  be  accepted  ;  in  which  case  we  are 
entitled  to  ask  what  is  the  value  of  his  conclusion  on 
February  9th,  based  on  this  same  figure  of  36,000,  that 
there  is  no  reason  "  to  set  any  particular  term  on  the 
war  ?  " 

When  asked  to  account  for  the  fact  that  the  "  official  " 
list  of  German  casualties  on  all  fronts  appears  to  be  only 
equal  to  those  of  the  Allies  on  the  Western  front,  he 
ascribes  it  to  "  the  superior  numbers  and  armament  of 
the  enemy."  An  explanation  which  leaves  much  to  be 
desired. 

Finally,  he  declares  that  none  of  the  press  criticisms 
which  he  has  received  give  him  convincing  reasons  for 
changing  his  figures.  What,  then,  was  the  "  convincing 
reason  "  which  produced  the  startling  change  between 
his  figures  on  January  7th  and  on  February  gth,  a  process 
by  which  he  brought  to  life  again  very  nearly  a  million 
of  the  enemy  ? 

For  a  detailed  examination  of  the  strange  methods" 
by  which  this  result  is  reached,  we  must  refer  our  readers 
to  Mr.  Belloc's  article  in  another  column.  It  is  hardly 
necessary  to  emphasise  the  point  which  he  makes  suffi- 
ciently plain  that  the  "  so  do  ours  "  argument  really 
tells  not  for  but  against  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  the 
Times  military  correspondent.  If  it  be  true  that  the 
figures  given  by  all  Governments  are  belated  and  contain 
large  categories  of  omission,  that  is  a  reason  for  augmenting 
and  not  for  diminishing  thfc  additions  which  we  must 
make  to  the  German  figures  if  we  are  to  arrive  at  a  true 
estimate.  If  the  German  returns  can  be  shown — as  they 
have  been  shown  by  a  careful  comparison  with  our  own 
figures  and  those  of  our  Allies — to  be  in  certain  respects 
exceptionally  defective,  and  if  in  addition  all  figures  of 
the  kind  are  somewhat  defective,  then  we  have  two 
allowances  to  make— one  for  the  normal  and  one  for  the 
abnormal  defect. 

But  the  main  lesson  remains  unchallengeable.  It 
is  the  duty  of  the  Government  when  it  publishes  such 
enemy  figures  to  accompany  them,  as  the  French  Govern- 
ment does,  by  a  competent  and  authoritative  criticism. 
§uch  criticism  would  not  only  enable  the  public  to  forn 
a  true  instead  of  a  false  estimate  of  the  facts,  but  it  would' 
prevent  or  render  innocuous  such  errors  as  those  witl 
which  we  have  been  dealing. 


LAND      A  ND      WATER 


February  17,  igi6. 


THE    NEW    SESSION 


THE  session  which  opened  tliis  week  must  o£ 
necessity  be  mainly  occupied  with  linancial 
business.  It  is  true  that  from  various  quarters 
other  questions  will  be  pressed  upon  the  House. 
With  the  agitation  for  an  Air  Ministry  we  dealt  last  week, 
and  in  spite  of  rumours  to  the  contrary  there  is  good 
reason  to  hope  that  the  (rONcrnnieut  will  negative  this 
newspaper  scheme.  Possibly  ten  years  hence  warfare 
in  the  air  may  have  developed  to  such  a  degree  that  it 
may  be  necessary  for  us  to  have  air  fleets  almost  on  the 
same  scale  as  our  sea  fleets,  and  in  that  e\ent  it  is  possible 
that  a  separate  air  department  might  be  ad\-isable.  But 
for  the  needs  of  the  present  war,  aircraft  are  required 
mainly  for  assisting  the  operations  of  the  army,  and  it  is 
essential  that  the  aircraft  employed  should  be  controlled 
by  the  army.  The  navy  also  has  its  special  equipment 
of  air  planes  and  seaplanes  and  these,  in  the  same  way, 
must  of  necessity  be  under  na\  al  control.  Even  if  a 
separate  Air  Ministry  were  to  be  created  it  could  not  in 
any  reasonable  period  obtain  the  aircraft  necessary  for 
a  third  service,  because  all  the  aircraft  that  wc  can  now 
build  arc  urgently  required  either  for  army  or  navy. 

Another  question  that  may  come  up  for  discussion 
is  the  effectiveness  of  our  na\'al  blockade.  I'ntil  recent 
months,  as  is  now  generally  admitted,  our  naval  blockade 
was  defective,  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  the  defect 
was  ultimately  traceable  to  the  unwillingness  of  the  Foreign 
Office  to  abandon  its  pre-war  conceptions  of  the  use  of 
sea-power.  Latterly  the  Foreign  Ofhce  has  moved  a 
long  way,  and  though  it  may  still  be  true  that  a  consider- 
able quantity  of  goods  is  getting  through  neutral  countries 
to  Germany,  we  are  undoubtedly  ufing  our  naval  power 
\-ery  much  more  effectively  than  we  were  before.  Whether 
there  is  still  room  for  impro\  ement  is  i-ather  a  question 
of  technical  detail  than  of  general  principle. 

A  third  issue  which  may  be  raised,  though  from  an 
entirely  different  quarter,  is  the  question  of  the  operation 
cf  theMilitary  Service  Act.  The  pacifists,  though  com- 
pletely defeated  in  the  House  of  Commons  arid  even  more 
completclV  discredited  in  the  country,  are  doing  their 
best  to  stir  up  resistance  to  military  compulsion  and  may 
succeed  in  making  a  certain  amount  of  trouble.  Their 
proceedings  will  be  sure  to  find  some  echo  in  the  House  of 
CommcJns,  which  still  contains  members  hke  Mr.  Ramsay 
Macdonald,  Mr.  Philip  Snowden,  etc.,  who  in  defiance 
of  the. wishes  of  their  constituents,  retain  their  seats  and 
misrepresent  those  who  sent  them  to  Parliament. 

When  Parliament  decided  to  prolong  its  existence 
beyond  the  quinquennial  period  it  ought  to  have  intro- 
duced some  provision  for  dealing  with  those  member? 
whose  moral  claim  to  sit  in  the  House  of  Commons  has 
come  to  an  end.  The  simplest  plan  would  be  to  authorise 
a  constituency  by  means  of  a  plebiscite  to  compel  its 
member  to  resign  when  he  persistently  follows  a  policy 
which  is  at  variance  with  the  wishes  of  his  constituents. 
It  is  a  subject  that  demands  consideration. 

But  the  main  work  of  the  ses.Mon,  at  any  rate  for 
several  months  to  come,  is  bound  to  be  financial.  Although 
the  Government  must  continue  borrowing  to  meet  the 
major  cost  of  the  war,  it  is  imperative  that  steps  should  be 
taken  with  very  little  delay  to  increase  taxation,  and 
already  there  are  rumours  of  a  very  big  Budget. 

The  case  for  taxation  may  be  \ery  briefly  stated. 
In  the  first  place  it  has  always  been  the  honourable  tradi- 
tion of  this  country  to  meet  a  very  considerable  part  of 
the  cost  of  each  war  out  of  current  revenue.  Undoubtedly 
it  is  right  that  posterity  should  pay  part  of  the  cost  be- 
cause posterity  will  enjoy— at  least  so  we  hope -a  very 
large  part  of  the  gain,  yet  it  has  always  to  be  remembered 
that  posterity  will  have  its  own  burdens  to  face,  and  it  is 
more  than  possible  that  those  burdens  will  include  new- 
wars.  Even  to-day  we  have  not  yet  paid  off  half  of  the 
debt  accumulated  during  the  Napoleonic  Wars.  The 
second  reason  for  high  taxation  at  tiie  present  time  is 
the  great  prosperitv  of  the  countrv.     That  prosperity 


is  ultimately  traceable  to  the  artificial  demand  for  labour 
which  the  war  itself  has  created.  Nearly  all  the  wage- 
earning  classes  are  doing  better  than  they  have  ever  done 
in  their  lives  before,  and  the  open-handedness  with  which 
they  are  spending  their  money  creates  prosperity  in  all 
businesses  that  cater  for  their  comforts,  for  their  luxuries, 
and  for  their  amusements.  Thus  there  is  no  question 
that  the  great  majority  of  the  population  could  at  Ae 
present  time  easily  bear  a  much  higher  scale  of  taxation 
than  has  yet  been  imposed. 

By  imposing  extra  taxes  now  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exche<iuer  will  be  able  to  secure  an  increased  contribu- 
tion to  the  outgoings  upon  war,  and  when  the  war  ends 
he  will  be  in  a  position  to  remit  taxation  ;  whereas  if  the 
opposite  course  were  adopted  and  our  revenue  were  con- 
fined to  an  amount  just  sufticient  to  cover  the  interest 
on  loans  the  end  of  the  war  would  find  us  compelled  to 
maintain  the  same  rate  of  taxation  indefinitely.  As 
far  as  can  be  foreseen  the  chances  are  that  when  the  war 
ends  the  present  prosperity  will  end  also,  and  there  will 
be  a  general  decline  both  in  wages  and  in  profits.  A 
remission  of  taxation  under  such  conditions  would  be  of 
enormous  assistance  to  the  coimtry  in  the  recovery  of  its 
economic  strength. 

As  regard  the  actual  taxes  which  will  have  to  be 
imposed,  there  will  probably  be  no  general  disagreement, 
though  each  particular  tax  is  certain  to  arouse  particular 
opposition.  On  all  hands  there  has  been  a  demand  for 
a  tax  on  cinema  tickets,  theatre  tickets  and  other  forms  of 
popular  amusement.  The  amount  that  could  be  obtained 
is  certainly  appreciable  and  there  is  no  tax  in  theory  more 
justifiable.  It  may  also  be  assumed  that  the  scale  of 
import  duties  will  be  very  widely  extended,  not  only  for 
the  sake  of  obtaining  re\cnue,  but  also  to  check  importa- 
tion. It  is  a  matter  of  the  first  importance  to  decreac 
the  sums  which  we  have  to  pay  abroad,  and  to  diminish 
the  demand  upon  our  mercantile  marine  for  carrying 
across  the  sea  goods  with  which  we  could  afford  to  dis 
pense.  On  this  jioint  it  is  satisfactory  to  see  that  with 
xexy  few  exceptions  the  keenest  free-traders  have  ex- 
])ressed  their  willingness  to  suspend  their  pre-war  theories 
in  order  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  war  facts. 

Neither  taxes  on  anmsements  nor  taxes  on  imports 
will  alone  suffice  to  raise  the  additional  revenue  that  is 
required.  There  must  be  a  considerable  increase  of  the 
income-tax.  In  September  last  it  was  anticipated  that 
Mr.  McKenna  would  put  up  the  income-tax  to  5s.  in  the 
£.  He  contented  himself  with  fixing  the  general  scale 
at  3s.  6d.,  which  only  becomes  fully  operative  in  the 
coming  financial  year.  To  this,  however,  has  to  be  added 
a  rising  scale  for  super-tax,  so  that  the  larger  incomes  will 
be  paying  more  than  5s.  in  the  /,  even  without  any  fresh 
addition.  Some  addition  there  must  be ;  but  if  the 
wealthier  classes  are  asked  to  give  up  more  than  a  quarter 
of  their  incomes  for  the  necessities  of  the  war  it  is  only 
right  that  the  poorer  classes  should  all  of  them,  without 
distinction,  make  some  direct  contribution  in  proportion 
to  their  means.  There  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that  if 
the  Go\ernment were  to  appeal  to  the  patriotic  instincts 
of  the  working  classes  there  would  be  a  general  willingness 
expressed  to  accept  an  income-tax  on  wages  as  a  neces- 
sary part  of  our  war  finance. 

Happily  the  whole  position  of  the  Government  is 
x'ery  much  better  than  it  was  a  few  months  ago.  The 
successful  passing  of  the  Military  Service  Act  has  im- 
mensely strengthened  Mr.  Asquith's  hands,  and  the 
complete  failure  of  Sir  John  Simon  to  lead  a  revolting 
party  has  acted  as  a  warning  to  other  dis.'idents.  The 
main  fault  of  the  Gox'ernment  now,  as  in  the  earlier 
nronths  of  the  war,  is  a  la<k  of  confidence  in  its  own 
strength.  From  the  beginning,  the  country  has  been 
more  willing  to  make  sacrifices  than  the  Government 
has  beliex-ed.  and  if  Ministers  can  bring  themselves  to 
treat  with  a  little  more  indifference  indiA  du  I  grumbhngs 
in  the  House  of  Commons  they  will  find  :  n  e.iger  response 
from  the  country  as  a  whole 


February  17,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WAT>ER 


TRUE    AND    FALSE    IMPRESSIONS 

OF    THE    WAR. 


By  Hilaire   Belloc. 


IT  has  become  apparent  in  the  course  of  the  last  few 
weeks  that  the  main  danger,  so  far  as  this  country 
is  concerned,  hcs  in  the  misleading  of  public 
opinion  ;  that  is,  a  tendency  to  exaggerate  every- 
thing in  favour  of  the  enemy  and  to  belittle  everything 
in  favour  of  the  Allies.  Short  of  actual  incompetence  in 
the  field,  there  is  nothing  so  ruinous  for  a  nation  at  war. 
The  authorities  have  an  easy  and  obvious  antidote. 
They  have  but  to  issue  from  time  to  time  reasoned  and 
fairly  detailed  statements  of  the  military  situation,  such  as 
have  already  been  advocated  in  these  columns,  and  the 
effect  on  the  public  would  be  instantaneous.  If  the 
very  grave  importance  of  this  subject  were  appreciated, 
if  the  magnitude  of  the  negative  effect  attaching  to  its 
neglect  were  grasped,  I  am  confident  there  would  be  no 
hesitation  in  adopting  a  policy  so  necessary. 

Example  of  Mr.  Tennant's  Figures. 

The  Government  hardly  seems  to  realise,  for 
instance,  the  effect  of  those  brief  unmodified  statements 
upon  enemy  and  British  wastage  made  by  the  Under- 
Secretary  for  War  in  the  House  of  Commons.  In  the 
form  in  which  the  statements  were  made,  the  public  were 
left  to  infer  that  the  enemy  permanently  lost  at  the  rate 
of  50  per  cent,  of  his  strength  in  seventeen  months — that 
is,  hardly  3  per  cent,  a  month.  Almost  in  the  same 
breath  we  have  another  official  announcement  that  the 
wastage  of  British  infantry  is  five  times  as  great,  that  is, 
15  per  cent,  a  month  ! 

When  the  thing  is  put  as  baldly  as  that  no  one  can 
miss  it ;  and  of  course  the  authorities  responsible  for  such 
statements  will  tell  us  that  they  never  intended  to  create 
such  grotesque  misunderstandings.  But  those  misimder- 
standings  are  created,  and  necessarily  created,  when  un- 
critical partial  statements  are  the  only  official  information 
vouchsafed. 

The  other  day  the  Italian  Government  issued  a 
document  of  capital  importance  to  which  only  one 
newspaper,  the  Morning  Post,  did  anything  like  justice. 
In  this  excellent  resume,  the  Italian  authorities  showed 
the  extreme  importance  and  value  of  the  work  that  had 
been  done  on  the  Alpine  and  Adriatic  front.  They  gave 
a  most  vivid  and  accurate  summary  of  the  present  position 
and  of  the  solid  foundation  on  which  it  was  based.  They 
estimated  for  us  the  permanent  numbers  occupied  upon 
the  enemy's  side  and  their  rate  of  wastage.  They  des- 
cribed the  stategical  value  of  the  work  done  so  that  any 
man  reading  the  summary  rose  from  his  reading  wth  a 
clear  perception  of  how  the  alliance  stood  in  that  particular 
field. 

But  until  that  document  appeared,  what  was  the 
general  impression  which  had  been  given  to  our  public  in 
this  country  ?  It  was  of  the  most  ludicrously  insufficient 
type  followed  by  what  is  graver  than  insufficiency,  misap- 
prehension. 

Irresponsible  telegrams  from  time  to  time  announced 
the  fall  of  Gorizia,  simply  because  such  "  news  "  was 
sensational.  Of  the  solid  work  accomplished  by  the 
Itahan  Service,  of  their  excellent  and  dominating  heavy 
artillery,  and  of  the  mountain  warfare,  and  of  its  meaning 
in  the  general  campaign,  there  was  but  little  said  in  the 
.  Press,  and  nothing  official. 

Example  of  Salonika. 

Take  the  position  of  Salonika.  To  read  a  certain 
sort  of  comment  upon  this  undertaking,  the  successful 
fortification  of  that  base,  its  present  ample  munitionment 
and  now  completed  value  as  a  threat  upon  the  flank  of 
all  the  enemy's  work  towards  the  East,  one  would 
imagine  that  the  general  officers  directing  the  Allies  had 
blundered  there  with  no  precise  plan  in  their  minds  and 
were  staying  there  with  no  clear  idea  of  why  they  should. 


Nothing  would  have  been  easier  than  to  issue  from  time  to 
time,  Avithout  telling  the  enemy  anything  he  did  not 
know,  a  reasoned  statement  showing  of  what  value  the 
move  was,  or  at  least,  of  how  the  enemy  regarded  it.  One 
could  construct  from  German  criticism  alone,  as  it  has 
appeared  since  the  expedition  was  undertaken,  a  mo«it 
illuminating  document  which  would  give,  to  the  mass  of 
educated  opinion  at  least,  a  view  of  the  whole  business 
in  its  right  perspective  and  with  its  proper  weight.  As 
it  is,  the  public  is  left  either  mystified  or  suspicious 
and  ready,  when  the  first  strain  comes,  to  be  alarmed. 

Example  of  Trench  Work. 

Or  take  this  example  :  The  veiy  meaning  of  trench 
work.  There  is  a  great  mass  of  opinion — I  do  not  say 
it  is  universal,  but  it  is  formidable — which  conceives  that 
unless  there  is  a  movement  upon  the  map  nothing  is 
happening :  That  a  besieged  enemy  in  his  trenches 
suffers  no  loss,  and  that  shells  arc  exchanged  as  a  sort 
of  "  reprisals."  Why  could  we  not  have  from  time  to 
time  an  exposition  for  the  public  guidance  of  what 
trench  work  is,  and  of  how  the  enemy  is  suffering  under 
it  ?  It  is  only  a  question  of  building  a  bridge  from  the 
experience  of  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  abroad 
to  the  appreciation  of  the  millions  of  the  public  at  home. 

The    Times    Figures. 

Now  it  is  generally  accepted  that  the  total  mobilis- 
able  strength  of  efficients  in  the  German  Empire  is  more 
than  eight  and  less  than  nine  million  men  for  the  first  two 
years  of  the  war.  The  military  correspondent  of  The  Times, 
in  an  article  which  appeared  in  that  paper  cm  February 
9th,  emphasises  the  point  (it  is  rather  late  in  the  day  to 
do  so)  that  numbers  form  the  one  fundamental  factor  in 
the  situation,  and  that  a  just  estimate  of  enamy  losses 
is  the  only  way  to  judge  the  present  nature  of  the  war. 
The  article  in  question  slightly  overestimates  the  total 
mobilisable  force  of  the  German  Empire,  but  this  is  due 
to  an  odd  and  unsatisfactory  way  of  arriving  at  the 
figures,  for  it  takes  vague  guesses  at  the  proportion  of 
various  trades  that  can  be  mobilised  instead  of  following 
the  more  direct  and  exact  methods  of  analogy — e.g., 
the  known  percentage  of  inefficients,  the  known  maximum 
percentage  mobilisable  in  a  population — wth  other 
countries. 

't  wisely  warns  its  readers  against  counting  in  men  o\-er 
military  age  who  may  be  summoned  because  these,  though 
they  swell  numbers  on  paper,  have  little  military  value. 
But  the  gist  of  the  article  is  none  the  less  an  example 
of  the  vicious  method  contrasted  with  the  right  method  ol 
appreciating  the  present  state  of  the  campaign.  It  is 
essentially  a  plea — an  argument  to  a  brief — instead  of  a 
cold  and  dispassionate  analysis.  Its  object  is  to  get  the 
eaders  of  The  Times  to  believe  in  the  smallest  possible 
amount  of  German  dead-loss,  just  as  the  object  of  a 
barrister  in  Couil  is  to  get  the  judge  and  jury  to  believe 
everything  they  possibly  can  in  f;.'vour  of  their  client. 

I  will  begin  my  criticism  of  the  article  in  question, 
and  of  the  numbers  at  which  it  arrives,  by  pointing  out 
the  really  remarkable  contrast  between  its  conclusions 
and  those  printed  in  the  very  s.ame  coliunns  only  a  few 
weeks  ago.  The  Times  military  correspondent,  in  an 
article  which  appeared  on  January  7  th,  estimated  the 
German  losses  at  three  and  a  i'aalf  million. 

The  article  which  I  am  ab<3ut  to  criticise  suddenly 
reduces  the  original  estimate  by  nearly  a  million  ! 
That  is  startling  to  say  the  least  of  it ! 
It  lessens  the  value  of  the  reasoning  to  follow.  When 
one  sees  the  same  writer  pass  from  the  admission  of  three 
and  a  half  milHon  to  a  novel  plea  for  a  milhon  less,  and 
make  this  amazing  diminution  without  apology  or 
introduction,  one  cannot  but  be  rihaken  in  one's  confidence. 


LAND      AND      WATER. 


Fobruarj'  17,  1916. 


however  ignorant  one  may  be  of  the  metliods  whereby  such 
things  are  computed. 

But  when  we  look  into  those  metliods  we  shall,  I 
think,  be  amply  satisfied  that  they  arc  imperfect  and 
indeed,  almost  valueless. 

The  writer  begins  with  the  foundation  for  all  these 
calculations,  the  lists  pubhshed  officially  by  the  German 
authorities. 

He  adds  these  together,  including  those  which 
appeared  during  the  month  of  January,  and  arrives  at  a 
total  of  2,627,085  casualties,  up  to  and  before  February 
ist,  1916. 

But  when  he  comes  to  the  criticism  of  these  figures, 
he  breaks  down  altogether. 

The  Four  Griticalx  Points. 

There  are  four  essential  departments  in  this  criticism  : 
(i)  We  have  to  find  out  what  proportion  of  wounded 

and  dead  these  hsts  either  delay  in  publishing  or  omit 

altogether. 

(2)  We  have  to  find  out  what  proportion  of  those 
appearing  in  the  lists  return  to  active  service  of  the  same 
sort  as  that  which  they  left  when  they  were  wounded  or 
invalided. 

(3)  We  have  to  estimate  what  proportion  over  and 
above  those  mentioned  in  the  casualty  lists  are  men  off 
the  strength  at  any  moment  from  sickness,  because  that 
category,  as  we  have  seen,  is  not  mentioned  at  all  in  the 
casualty  lists. 

(4)  We  liave  to  estimate  the  "  permanent  margin  of 
temporary  losses." 

Unless  we  can  get  somewhere  near  a  rough  estimate 
of  these  four  points  om:  calculations  are  obviously 
worthless. 

Now  the  writer  of  the  article  makes  no  sort  of 
attempt  to  arrive  at  and  to  prove  any  one  of  these  four 
fundamental  estimates. 

Suppose  you  want  to  know  what  a  man's  available 
cash  is  at  any  moment.  He  gives  you  an  account  dated 
upon  the  ver.y  day  of  your  enquiry.  He  admits,  however, 
that  the  account  does  not  include  his  last  transactions, 
but  is,  in  all  its  items,  more  or  less  belated  ;  Of  one  set 
of  items  ttiere  is  no  record  for  three  months  past,  of  another 
for  two  Baonths,  etc.  He  further  admits  that  one  whole 
category  of  expenditure  is  never  mentioned  at  all.  Finally, 
he  does  not  tell  you  in  his  accounts  what  proportion  of 
his  cxp<  -nditure  is  in  the  form  of  loans  subject  to  repay- 
ment, Irmt  only  tells  you  that  "  a  large  part  of  it  "  is  of 
this  SOI  t. 

It  is  obvious  that  liis  accounts  so  stated  are,  for  the 
purpoJ^e  f»f  an  exact  estimate,  worthless.  You  could  only 
arrive  at  such  an  estimate  by  judging  from  other  of  the 
man's  actions  or  from  the  analogy  of  other  men  similarly 
placed  :  (i)  What  is  the  average  delay  in  the  appearance 
of  an  ii.cm  upon  the  accounts  ;  (2)  What  proportion  of  the 
expcn($ture  is  in  the  shape  of  good  debts  which  have  been 
repaid  ;  (3)  what  proportion  of  the  whole  is  formed  by  that 
category  of  expense  which  he  has  refused  to  mention  ; 
and  (4)  what  money  is  still  out  on  loan. 

It  is  perfectly  clear  that  if  you  do  not  know  anything 
about  these  four  things  the  accounts  he  has  rendered  you 
are  worthless. 

It  is  precisely  the  same  with  a  set  of  casualty  lists. 

The  delay  between  any  financial  transaction  and  its 
mention  in  the  accounts  corresponds  to  the  delay  in  the 
appearance  of  names  upon  the  casualty  lists. 

The  proportion  of  expenditure  consisting  of  loans 
wliich  are  repaid  corresponds  to  the  sick  and  wounded 
vho  come  back  to  full  ictive  sers'ice  again. 

The  categorv-  of  expenditure  which  your  informan 
refuses  to  mention  and  which  he  admits  does  not  appea 
in  his  accounts  at  all,  ccrrcsponds  to  the  cases  of  sickness 
as  distinguished  from  wounds. 

WTiile  the  amount  of  cash  which  is  not  at  the  moment 
available  because  it  is  still  out  on  loan  and  has  not  been 
returned,  corresponds  to  that  number  of  sick  and  wounded 
men  which,  at  any  gn-cm  moment,  arc  off  the  strength 
although  thev  will  at  so«ne  fut>'—  time  bo  back  on  the 
strength  again  after  their  <urc.  I  is  this  which  is  called 
i.'  ike  -permanent  margin  of  temporary  losses." 


Now  when  we  turn  to  the  article  in  the  Times  of 
February  Oth  we  find  no  sort  of  argument  upon  these 
four    fundamental    essentials. 

On  the  first  point,  the  average  delay  m  the  mention 
of  the  names,  we  have  the  exceedingly  vague  sentence  : 
"  They  are  often  belated — but  so  are  ours." 

The  sentence  is  not  only  worthless  as  a  piece  of 
exact  calculation,  but  it  is  obviously  bad  in  logic.  What 
has  our  rate  of  delay  got  to  do  with  an  estimate  of  the 
enemy's  losses  ?  Though  we  should  pubhsh  no  casualty 
lists  at  all  there  would  yet  remain  the  problem  of  ascer- 
taining what  his  losses  were.  As  a  way  of  excusing  the 
enemy  from  deliberate  bad  faith  such  a  remark  may  have 
some  purpose,  but  as  a  method  of  belittling  the  enemy's 
losses  it  is  meaningless.  If  our  own  lists  are  very  much 
belated  the  only  conclusion  useful  to  the  pres  nt  purpose 
which  could  be  drawn  from  that  fact  would  be  that  the 
German  losses  were  even  larger  than  was  supposed.  For 
instance,  if  the  average  British  .'Vrmy  in  the  field  were  a 
fifth  of  the  average  German  Army  in  the  field  and  if  we 
were  working  only  on  the  analogy  of  our  own  figures,  wc 
should  multiply  our  casualties  by  5  to  arrive  at  theirs. 
But  if  our  real  casualties  (on  account  of  delay  in  publica- 
tion) were  at  any  given  date  half  as  much  again  as  the 
numbers  published  to  that  date,  then,  on  the  same 
analogy  the  real  German  losses  to  date  would  be  half  as 
much  again  as  the  published  ones. 

The  first  part  of  the  sentence  is  clearly  useless. 
Everybody  knows  that  the  German  lists,  like  all  lists,  are 
somewhat  belated.  The  whole  point  is  how  much  belated. 
Unless  you  can  answer  that  question  within  certain 
approximate  limits  you  are  not  calculating  at  all,  but  only 
talking  at  large. 

Now  the  readers  of  this  journal  are  familiar  with  the 
methods  by  which  the  average  amount  of  delay  can  be 
arrived  at.  It  varies,  of  course,  with  the  amount  and 
the  severity  of  the  fighting,  with  the  distance  over  which 
the  information  must  travel,  with  the  opportunities  for 
ascertaining  and  checking  the  results — opportunities  that 
differ  with  ground,  climate,  and  a  hundred  other  things. 
But  the  average  rate  of  delay  we  know  to  be  from  six  to 
eight  weeks. 

How  do  we  know  this  ?  We  know  it  by  noting  af  tci 
what  delay  certain  losses,  the  exact  date  of  which  the 
Allies  can  determine,  appear  in  the  lists. 

For  instance,  a  particular  German  company  was 
captured  almost  entire  on  the  26th  of  September  by 
the  French.  It  appears  in  the  German  lists  on  the  29th 
of  October.  Certain  German  dead  identified  by  the 
French  in  the  first  days  of  October  do  not  appear  until 
December.  Even  in  the  month  of  January  there  is  a 
respectable  number  of  names  appearing,  the  casualties 
referring  to  which  took  place  more  than  three  months 
earlier. 

The  work  has  been  done  with  minute  care  all  over 
Europe.  Its  results  are  fairly  well  known.  The  general 
conclusions  are  published  from  time  to  time,  particularly 
by  the  authorities  in  Paris.  There  is  no  excuse  for 
ignoring  exact  results  of  this  kind,  and  if  one  does  ignore 
them  one's  conclusions  have  no  value  at  all. 

The  very  figures  given  in  the  article  to  which  I  am 
referring  are  amply  sufficient  to  prove  so  obvious  a  truth. 

For  instance,  the  Times  gives  the  German  losses  in 
August  1914 — killed,  missing,  severely  wounded,  lightly 
wounded — all — at  9,213  !  August  was  the  month  of  the 
great  assaults  on  Lif-ge,  of  the  cavalry  skirmishes  througli 
Belgium,  of  the  tremendous  struggle  on  the  Sambrc,  ol 
Guise,  of  Le  Cateau,  of  Sarrail's  violent  and  successful 
stroke  against  the  Crown  Prince  which  saved  Verdun ; 
the  first  two  days'  fighting  of  the  bloodiest  battle  of  the 
lot,  the  Grand  Couronne,  took  place  on  the  last  two  days 
of  August ;  finally,  August  saw  the  smashing  of  the  twc 
.\rmy  Corps  defending  East  Prussia  and  the  tremendous 
counter-stroke  of  Tannenberg. 

The  total  German  losses  in  that  month  may  have 
been  15  times  9,000  or  may  have  been  20  times  or  25 
times  9,000 ;  but  the  figure  9,000  for  all  those  August 
losses  is  obviously  nonsense. 

What  then  does  it  mean  ?  It  means  that  the  lists 
compiled  and  checked  up  to  and  including  the  31st  of 
August,  1914,  were  only  the  first  tlriblcts  and  referred 
only  to  the  very  first  stages  of  the  fighting. 


February  17,  1916. 


LAND     AND      WATER. 


Tliere  is  no  need  to  elaborate  the  point.  The  average 
two  months  delay  is  perfectly  clear.  You  do  not  begin 
to  get  the  big  figures  of  the  early  fighting  until  the  Sep- 
tember lists.  They  are  not  even  near  completion  till 
October,  when  the  highest  totals  are  reached  and  the 
full  effect  of  the  Marne,  etc.,  is  felt. 

On  this  first  count  then  the  calculation  is  worthless 
because  there  is  not  even  an  attempt  to  estimate  the 
average  of  delay. 

II. 

Now  for  the  second  point.  What  is  the  proportion 
of  those  appearing  in  the  lists  who  return  to  active 
service  ? 

This  article  in  the  Times  rightly  says  that  the  German 
claim  to  over  80  ])er  cent,  is  false,  but  it  goes  on  to  say, 
"If  we  assume  that  50  per  cent,  of  the  whole  number 
of  wounded  return  to  the  front  "  we  get  such  and  such 
a  result.  On  what  ground  is  50  per  cent,  chosen,  and  in 
what  time  do  these  50  per  cent,  return  to  the  front  ? 
Wh-Ai  proportion  of  them  at  any  one  time  are  still  in 
hospital  ?  How  many  should  be  added  for  the  sick  who 
return  to  the  front  ?  On  those  questions  there  is  no 
answer  nor  even  any  attempt  at  an  answer.  Yet  they 
;ue  vital  to  even  the  roughest  conclusion.  It  has  already 
lieen  determined,  by  careful  analysis  of  our  own  casualty 
lists,  that  the  proportion  of  those  appearing  in  these  lists 
who  subsequently  return  to  active  service  is  not  more 
than  one-fourth  of  the  total.  As  we  have  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  the  German  hospitals  are  superior  to  our 
own,  or  that  the  German  methods  of  healing  the  wounded 
excel  our  own,  an  estimate  of  50  per  cent,  is  obviously 
far  in  excess  of  the  true  figures.  All  that  counts  in  war 
as  a  true  "return  "  is  the  man  who,  having  been  wounded 
or  fallen  sick,  actually  returns  to  his  original  duties,  and 
can  be  maintained  there. 

III. 

The  third  necessity  of  the  calculation  is  to  estimate 
the  unmentioned  number  of  sick.  Without  some  such 
estimate  it  is  obvious  that  our  calculations  are  valueless. 
A  man  off  the  strength  from  sickness  is  just  as  much  off 
the  strength  as  though  he  were  a  prisoner  or  dead.  If 
he  is  back,  but  only  at  light  work,  he  and  others  like  him 
are  soon  absorbed,  and,  though  hght  work  .may  be 
made  for  them  and  their  discharge  refused,  they  are 
still  no  part  of  the  true  army. 

Now  as  the  Germans  do  not  tell  us  anything  about 
these  cases  we  have  only  two  ways  of  making  our  estimate. 
The  first  is  through  the  Intelhgence  Department,  which 
gets  news  from  prisoners,  from  spies,  from  captured  docu- 
ments, and  from  the  putting  together  of  evidence  (printed 
or  otherwise)  published  within  the  enemy's  country.  The 
second  way  is  by  analogy  with  our  own  figures. 

Tile  results  of  these  methods — though  the  first  is 
accurate  enough,  and  the  second  exact  as  far  as  our  own 
ligures  are  concerned — are  not  communicated  to  the 
public.  But  they  arc  pretty  widely  known,  and  their 
effect  upon  a  general  estimate  of  wastage  is  perfectly 
well  known  because  one  of  the  Allied  higher  commands, 
the  French,  has  had  the  sense  to  publish  those  general 
conclusions  from  time  to  time. 

In  this  article  in  The  Times  those  conclusions  are 
not  so  much  as  alluded  to  !  We  have  nothing  but  a 
personal  affirmation  admittedly  uncertain,  and  based 
apparently  upon  nothing.  We  are  told  that  the  in- 
\'aUded  men  "  may  amount  "  to  35,000  men  a  month, 
or  "  may  be  more,  or  less."  We  are  further  told  that  the 
"  floating  population  of  the  sick  in  hospitals  may  be 
150,000 — or,  again,  more  or  less." 

IV. 

Finally,  on  the  fourth  point,  the  permanent  margin  of 
temporary  losses— which  we  have  to  add  to  the  dead  loss 
in  order  to  get  the  total  amount  off  the  strength  at  any 
given  moment — there  is  complete  silence  ! 

So  much  for  the  way  in  which  this  ''apital  problem 
is  attacked  and  treated— I  will  not  say  solved,  for  there 
is  not  even  an  approximate  solution. 

At  the  end  of  these  few  lines  of  statement,  without 
any  exposition  of  the  method  of  calculation,  and  in 
startling  contradiction  to  the  results  arrived  at  by  the 


RAEMAEKERS'    CARTOON. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  Land  and  Water, 

January  zyth,  in  the  place  of  the  tisual  cartoon 
as  the  frontispiece,  we  published  a  picture  by 
Raemaekers  of  the  funeral  oJNo.  16092  Private  Joseph 
Walker,  Bedfordshire  Regiment.  Private  Walker's 
body  li'tts  cast  up  by  the  sea  on  the  dyke  at  West 
Capelle,  and  kindly  Dutchmen  arranged  for  a 
funeral,  conducted  by  a  British  Chaplain.  In  the 
account  of  the  scene  published  in  the  Amsterdam 
"  Telegraaf,"  the  ivriter  asked,  "  Where  is  his 
home  ;  ivho  in  loving  thoughts  thinks  of  him  ?" 

A  day  or  tieo  ago  a  letter  reached  the  Editor, 
from  Offley,  a  village  in  Hertfordshire,  written  by 
Mrs.  Walker,  the  mother  of  Private  Joseph 
Walker.  This  picture  was  the  fir'it  intimation  she 
had  had  0}  her  son's  death,  and  she  is  very  grateful 
to  those  good  souls  in  Holland,  who  had  arranged 
for  his  burial  with  this  impressive  ceremony.  A 
framed  2rtist's  proof  of  Raemaekers'  picture  is 
being  sent  to  Mrs.  Walker  by  Land  AND  Watek  as 
a  memorial  of  her  son's  death. 


same  writer  on  January  7th,  we  get  the  abrupt  con- 
cluding sentence  that  "  the  nett  permanent  loss  of  the 
German  army  during  the  past  eighteen  months  of  war  " 
is  nearly  2,600,000.  And  there  the  matter  ends — except 
for  an  estimate  of  remaining  drafts,  itself  based  upon  such 
exceedingly  vague  and  erroneous  matter. 

To  sum  up  : — - 

(a)  The  article  begins  by  suddenly  cutting  down  the 
original  estimate  in  the  The  Times  by  a  million.  (6) 
It  takes  for  the  losses  of  eighteen  months,  killed,  missing 
and  wounded,  what  are  really  the  losses  of  about  sixteen. 

(c)  It  makes   no   allowance  for  the  omission  of  names. 

(d)  Its  allowance  for  the  proportion  of  sick  (who  are  not 
mentioned)  is  based  upon  no  analogy  and  no  evidence. 

(e)  It  says  nothing  of  permanent  temporary  losses.  (/)  It 
leaves  wholly  out  of  account  all  the  numerous  forms  of 
evidence  which  have  been  supplied  for  the  solution  of  this 
problem  and  with  which  the  readers  of  this  journal  are 
familiar  (the  losses  of  particular  corporations,  the  counted 
losses  upon  particular  occasions  where  the  Allies  have 
had  the  opportunity  to  make  such  calculation,  the  analogy 
of  tiie  Allied  losses,  etc),  (g)  It  ends  by  a  bald  un- 
supported statement  reducing  the  enemy  losses  to  the 
lowest  possible  figure. 

This  illustration  of  numbers  emphasises  the  need  for 
clear  and  regular  official  statements  which  will  serve  as  a 
guide  to  public  opinion.  Nothing  is  more  fatal  than  the 
alternation  between  confidence  and  depression,  which 
can  readily  be  produced  by  the  Press  without  any  relation 
to  the  actual  facts.  We  are  all  familiar  with  the 
alternation. 

When  the  Austrians  suffered  their  defeat  before 
Lemberg,  we  were  told  that  their  army  had  gone  to 
pieces  and  no  longer  counted.  When  the  Russians  first 
advanced  into  East  Prussia,  that  advance  was  magnified 
with  the  ridiculous  metaphorical  name  of  "  The  Steam 
Roller."  When  the  Germans  were  approaching  Paris 
we  had  the  infamous  account  of  panic  and  rout  as  a 
travesty  of  that  admirable  retreat  which  led  to  the  Marne 
and  saved  Europe.  When  hopes  were  thus  revived  the 
Russians  were  to  be  in  Berlin  "  in  two  months."  When 
the  guns  of  a  corps-artillery  were  caught  in  the  marshes 
of  St.  Gond,  those  pieces  miraculously  became  "  the 
artillery  of  a  whole  corps." 

Suddenly  the  order  changed.  There  came  months 
when  the  whole  object  to  be  attained  was  to  depress  public 
opinion.  When  the  Austro-German  line  pursuing  the 
Russian  Armies  halted,  exhausted,  short  of  the  Dvina, 
we  were  assured  that  its  advance  would  be  continued. 
Just  before  this  the  Austro-Germans  had  failed  signally  in 
their  attempt  to  destroy  the  Russian  armies  at  Vilna. 
During  those  critical  days  everything  that  could  lead  us 
to  belie\e  in  the  coming  of  that  disaster  was  emphasised 
and  trumpeted  abroad. 

Even  as  I  write  the  one  chief  triuuipU  of  the  British 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


February  17,  1916' 


mmiio 


VALONA 


1 

jLake 
Ostrova 


\  \ 


6    / 


2S 


IvTUes 


— J 


service  during  the  whole  campaign,  the  Air  Service,  is 
the  butt  of  just  such  an  attack. 

The  Press  has  great  power,  for  gooa  or  evil,  but  if  it  is 
used  to  distort  facts,  to  depress  pubhc  opinion,  there  is 
grave  danger  that  it  will  and  so  lead  to  an  inconclusive  and 
therefore  disastrous  peace. 

The  Western  Front. 

The  continued  attacks  upon  the  northern  part  of  the 
French  front  may  or  may  not  be  preliminary  to  a  general 
attack,  but  it  is  the  almost  universal  opinion  of  con- 
tinental observers  that  they  are  ;  the  reason  for  this 
growing  conviction,  the  value  of  which  the  future  alone 
can  show,  is  largely  the  similarity  of  the  method  now 
being  used  in  the  \\'est  with  that  which  preceded  the 
great  offensive  against  the  Russian  Front  in  Galicia 
last  April.  It  is  true  that  the  conditions  here  and  now 
are  vastly  different.  There  the  enemy  knew  that  his 
opponent  was  gravely  inferior  in  munitionment  and 
almost  without  heavy  pieces  -  at  any  rate  without  any 
of  large  calibre.  Here  he  knows  that  his  opponent  is 
his  superior  in  munitionment  and  his  equal  in  pieces. 
There  he  had  on  the  whole  lesser  numbers  opposed  to 
him  ;  here  he  has  far  greater  numbers  opposed  to  him. 
Here  he  knows  that  a  \iolent  diversion  could  be  created 
against  him  at  any  part  of  an  open  line  500  miles  long  ; 
there  no  such  diversion  was  possible.  There  he  had  far 
the  superiority  in  his  observ-ation  over  the  enemy's 
lines  to  discover  any  concentration  on  the  Russian 
part  and  to  hide  any  of  his  own  ;  here  it  is  exactly  the 
other  way.  It  is  we  -who  know  more  easily  where  and 
when  he  is  concentrating  and  he  who  discovers  less  easily 
the  corresponding  movements  upon  our  side.  Never- 
theless we  know  from  the  past  that  the  German  Higher 
Command  always  tries  to  repeat  in  detail  any  former 
success,  and  it  is  on  this  that  the  conjecture  of  a  coming 
attempt  at  a  decision  is  largely  founded. 

For  the  rest  the  little  local  attacks  continue  ;  they 
rarely  cover  a  front  of  more  than  one  mile,  never  of 
three  ;  they  are  expensive  to  the  enemy  but  worth  his 
while  if  in  the  course  of  them  he  can  discover  points  of 
weakness.  They  are  being  carried  on  so  continuously 
that  if  they  have  not  some  such  ulterior  object  they  are 
already  guilty  of  waste  ;  for  every  one  of  them  costs 
some  thousands  of  men  and  the  completely  unsuccessful 
ones,  which  arc  the  majority,  are  pure  loss. 

Salonika. 

On  the  Macedonian  front  the  sending  of  detachments 
west  of  the  Vardar  is  chiefly  important  as  showing  tlic 
rapidly  increasing  strength  "of  the  Allied  Forces  behind 
the  lines  of  Salonika.     .\s  a  base  for  a  direct  offensive 


northwards  against  the  main  enemy  line  of  communica- 
tions which  it  is  intended  to  threaten,  the  Port  is  badly 
handicapped.  Immediately  in  front  of  it  stretches  the 
mass  of  mountains  which  marks  the  great  frontier  and 
through  these  there  are  but  two  avenues  by  which  large 
bodies  can  advance — the  valleys  of  the  Vardar  and  the 
Struma,  but,  with  a  superiority  in  numbers,  there  is  an 
obvious  method  of  driving  the  enemy  northward,  and 
that  is  by  attacking  in  Hank  from  the"  west  from  Valona 
and  the  Adriatic  in  synchrony  with  a  direct  attack  from 
Salonika  itself.  There  is  practicable  going  for  troops  and 
guns  directly  from  west  to  east,  and  the  whole  situation 
^vere  it  to  develop  thus  would  exactly  reverse  the  con- 
ditions under  which  the  Austro-Germans  and  Bulgarians 
attacked  Serbia  in  the  autumn. 

They  came  from  the  north  supported  by  a  powerful 
attack  in  flank  from  the  east;  they  had  far  superior 
numbers.  The  combined  frontal  and  flank  attack 
compelled  the  retirement  of  the  Serbian  army  south- 
westward  with  a  loss  of  half  their  effectives  and  all  theii 
guns  ;  the  .\llied  counter-attack  when  or  if  it  is  possessed 
of  similar  superior  numbers  would  come  in  front,  north- 
ward and  in  flank  from  the  west  compelling  an  enemy 
retirement  north-eastwards.  But  there  is  this  great 
difference  between  the  two  operations  !  First,  that  the 
enemy  is  not  as  the  Serbians  were^ — strictly  limited  ;  he 
can  reinforce  his  menaced  front  by  a  continuous  rail 
communication  ;  secondly,  the  Allies  have  the  power, 
which  is  capital  in  value,  of  creating  sudden  pressure  on 
the  Galician  front  the  moment  the  enemy  tries  to  reinforce 
in  Macedonia.  Thirdly,  the  enemy  can  retire  intact 
(unless  Koumania  decides  in  our  fa\oiir).  There  is  no 
boundary  near  by  such  as  was  the  Adriatic  shore  to  the 
Serbians  against  which  their  retreat  could  be  driven. 
But  the  whole  of  this  hypothesis  depends  upon  the 
presence  of  very  large  forces  acting  from  tlie  Adriatic 
against  the  Germans  and  Bulgarians  towards  Monastir. 
Failing  that  a  direct  and  isolated  ad\ance  from  Salonika 
would  do  nothing. 

The  present  movement  of  troops  across  the  Vardar 
presages  nothing  of  the  kind.  It  is  no  more  than  the 
securing  of  the  bridge  heads  where  the  Monastir  road 
and  railway  cross  the  Vardar,  perhaps  the  securing  of  the 
low  hills  beyond  which  at  long  range  tiireaten  the  Vardar 
front  of  tlie  Salonika  lines,  but  it  proves,  as  has  been  said, 
the  continually  increasing  force  within  those  lines. 

H.   BliLLOC. 

\Mr.  Belloc's  analysis  of  the  militayy  operations 
oj  the  ueek  is  .unavoidably  brief,  owing  to  his  tem- 
porary absence  in  France  on  a  special  mission.  He 
icill  deal  fully  icith  several  important  questions  next 

week.] 


February  17,  1916, 


LAND     AND     WATER 


THE    NEW    PIRACY. 


By  Arthur  Pollen. 


THE  week  has  been  remarkable  for  a  serious  nayal 
calamitj' — the  loss  of  Arelhusa  ;  for  an  unex- 
pected raid  by  German  destroyers  on  some  small 
craft  in  the  North  Sea ;  for  an  absurdly  bragging 
account  of  this  incident  by  the  German  Admiralty  ;  for 
the  announcement  of  a  new  j^iracy,  a  brusque  reminder 
from  Berlin  to  Washington  that  Ciermany  is  not  to  be 
trifled  with  ;  and  for  Mr.  Garrison's  resignation  from 
Mr.  Wilson's  Cabinet.  ,  The  arming  of  merchantmen  has 
naturally  come  once  more  into  discussion,  and  there  is  a 
lull  in  the  agitation  for  upsetting  the  Board  of  Admiralty. 

As  for  the  loss  of  the  Arclhusu,  the  sense  of  relief 
that  her  Commodore — who  is  simply  irreplaceable — her 
exceptionally  able  Captain,  her  war  trained  officers  and 
almost  all  her  gallant  crew  have  escaped  destruction,  is 
so  great,  that  the  loss  of  the  ship  itself  seems  almost 
unimportant.  Not  that  it  is  realh*  unimportant,  for, 
whatever  the  activities  of  the  builders  may  have  been 
since  August,  1914,  we  never  can  have  too  many  fast 
cruisers,  and  we  began  the  war  with  lamentably  too  few. 
But  such  casualties  are  to  be  expected.  "  The  pitcher 
that  goes  oftenest  to  the  well  "...  and  Arelhusa 
certainly  had  a  bellyful  of  fighting  and  of  risk  in  her 
brief  but  brilliant  career.  Like  King  Edward  ]'II., 
she  has  fallen  to  a  mine.  It  seems  that  no  vigilance,  no 
practicable  completeness  in  arrangements  for  sweeping, 
no  protective  additions  to  ships,  can  render  cruising  in 
the  North  Sea  safe.  The  laying  of  mines  by  submarines 
introduces  new  elements  into  a  form  of  warfare  distin- 
guished by  uncertainties  and  dangers  that  are  great  enough 
already  ;  and  it  throws  new  burdens  on  a  section  of  our 
naval  force,  of  whose  doings  we  hear  but  little,  but  whose 
task  is  second  to  none  in  importance  or  in  peril. 

The  reality  of  these  risks  is  exemplified  by  the  (ier- 
nian  announcement  of  a  great  naval  victory  on  the 
Dogger  Bank — an  announcement  that  has  thrown  the 
German  press  into  transports  of  happiness.  The  Father- 
land's destroyers — so  the  story  ran — swept  majestically 
into  the  North  Sea,  where  some  British  cruisers — one 
so  modern  that  the  name  does  not  even  appear  in  the 
Navy  List  ! — had,  contrary  to  the  lurking  British  habit, 
too  boldly  ventured.  They  were  made  to  paj^  dearly  for 
their  temerariousness.  One,  the  Arabis,  was  svmk,  and 
some  of  the  officers  and  crew  actually  rescued,  captured, 
and  brought  home  as  prisoners  !  A  most  surprising  thing. 
Another  was  badly  injured — a  third  and  fourth  put  to 
ignominious  flight.  Their  superior  speed — now  said  to 
be  f6  knots — one  supposes,  alone  explains  their  e\'asion 
of  their  determined  German  conquerors. 

The  Hun  civilians  are  a  simple  credulous  folk,  strangly 
ignorant  of  sea  affairs.  But  c\'en  to  such  an  audience 
as  that,  this  story  should  surely  have  been  too  thin. 
The  sort  of  cruiser,  modern  or  not,  tha.t  destroyers  can 
conquer,  is  surely  not  the  sort  that  can  escape  !  For  the 
slowest  destroyer  has  a  speed  of  28  knots,  and  no  cruiser 
of  this  speed  would  be  inferior  in  armament.  The 
Admiralty  version  of  the  incident  affords  an  explanation 
more  in  harmony  with  the  credible  elements  of  the  Ger- 
man stoiy.  The  Arabic  and  her  consorts  were  not  cruisers, 
but  mine-sweepers ;  coasting  craft  or  trawlers,  and 
probably  imarmed,  certainly  unescorted  by  even  the 
feeblest  of  war  vessels.  Thus  then  is  the  German  success 
explained.  It  probably  never  occurred  to.  anyone  that 
an  escort  could  be  necessary  ;  it  has  certainly  never 
lieen  necessary  before.  So  rare  a  thing  as  a  German 
dash  into  the  North  Sea  will  not  deter,  other  sweepers 
from  carrying  on  exactly  as  if  the  incident  had  not 
occurred.  What  then  is  singular  about  the  incident, is 
first,  that,  like  the  Ponga's  escape,  it  is  without  precedent, 
next  that  so  trival  a  success  should  be  so  stupidly  exag- 
gerated. 

Submarine  Extensions. 

But  a  certain  verbal  stupidity  seems  to  characterise 
an  German  pronuriciamentos.  The  proclamation  of  a 
new  f rightfulness — the  sinking  of  all  British  merchantmen 


at  sight,  because  they  are  armed— does  not  annmmce 
a.new  practice,  or  explain  an  old  one  by  a  new  excuse. 
At  most,  it  promises  an  extension  to  wider  fields  of 
jmelhods  already  as  infamous  as  they  are  familiar.  On 
February  4th  last  year,  Germany  announced  the  creation 
of  a  "  war  zone  "  in  which  "  all  British  vessels"  were  to  be 
destroyed  without  regard  to  the  safety  of  the  non- 
combatants  on  board — and  neutrals  were  told  that  to 
distinguish  between  their  ships  and  ours  would  not  always 
be  possible.  It  was  thus  the  most  comprehensive  murder 
progranune  ever  put  out.  It  was  not  a  programme  that 
could  be  extended.  Bvit  the  submarine  was  the  only 
specified  agent  of  this  threatened  destruction.  When 
America  protested — February  12th — that  she  recognised 
search  and  capture,  but  no  other  form  of  action  against 
neutrals,  and  would  hold  Germany  to  strict  account  for 
any  other — Berlin  retorted — on  February  i6th,  three  days 
before  the  campaign  officially  began — that  as  Great 
Britain  had  armed  its  merchantmen,  and  acknowledged  the 
use  of  false  colours,  distinction  between  belligerents  and 
neutrals  would  not  be  possible.  (Germany  had  to  strike 
back,  for  Britain  was  trying  to  starve  her — to  kill  on 
sight  was  then  a  German  necessity.  And  she  would  as 
far  as  she  could  close  the  war  area  by  mines — which 
cannot  distinguish  between  friend  and  foe — and  destroy 
all  shipping  by  every  means  in  her  power. 

How  consistently  Germany  has  acted  up  to  her  creed 
a  long  tale  of  outrage  and  piracy  proclaims.  The  new 
threat  is  then  neither  novel  in  method  or  pretext. 
And  it  is  singular  only  for  its  bearing  on  the  controversy 
with  \\'ashington.  The  position  there  is  as  obscure  as 
ever  it  has  been.  Mr.  Garrison,  one  of  Mr.  Wilson's 
able  colleagues,  has  resigned,  apparently  because  he  was 
unsupported  in  his  demands  for  a  larger  and  better 
military  force — but  it  is  suspected  that  he  questions  Mr. 
\\'ilson's  latest  policy  towards  Germany. 

If  this  is  well  founded,  we  have  the  first — and  only. — 
confirmation  of  those  who  think  Mr.  Wilson  will  surrender. 
But  in  spite  of  the  omen,  this  still  seems  tome  impossible. 

And  now,  while  the  final  issue  of  the  controversy 
is  still  in  doubt,  Germany,  as  if  to  close  her  side  of  it, 
announces  with  every  circumstance  of  insolence  that  this 
persistence  will  continue.  It  is  not  a  disavowal  of  her 
crime — it  is  a  reversion  to  the  attitude  of  February  4th 
and  i6th  of  last  year,  and  to  the  childish  plea  of  her 
last  published  retort  on  the  Lusitania — a  case,  she  said, 
which  showed  "  with  horrible  clearness  the  jeopardy  to 
human  life  to  which  the  barbarous  methods  of  war  of 
Germany's  adversaries  must  lead."  From  first  to  last 
she  has  had  no  other  argument  than  the  parrot  cry 
"  England  has  completely  interrupted  neutral  navigation 
and  thus  Germany  was  driven  to  submarine  war  on  trade." 
There  has  never  been  any  weakening  of  the  principle 
that  German  necessity  justifies  anything ;  never  any 
pretence  that  this  principle  is  compatible  with  that 
which   America   champions. 

What  will  be  ]\Ir.  Wilson's  final  decision  ?  The 
issue,  so  precisely  defined,  so  categorically  raised,  in- 
sisted upon  with  such  threats — "  the  United  States  would 
omit  no  act  necessary  to  safeguarcUng  her  citizens  in  the 
exercise  of  their  acknowledged  right  to  pursue  their 
lawful  errands  as  passengers  in  the  merchantmen  of 
belligerents  " — cannot  be  evaded.  The  words  are  care- 
fully chosen  and  lea\e  the  principles  "  which  are  immut- 
able and  on  which  the  United  States  must  state  "  free  of 
all  ambiguity.  They  are  laid  down,  the  disavowal  is 
demanded,  the  menace  is  repeated  after,  not  before, 
Germany  had  pleaded  the  hollow  excuse  that  our  mer- 
chantmen were  armed.  Indeed  this  issue  is  distinctly 
met  in  the  second  Note  after  the  Lusitania  murders. 
That  ship,  declared  the  President,  was  not  "  offensively 
armed,"  and  a  defensive  armament  would  not,  of  course, 
change  her  civil  character.  For  America,  then,  there 
is  only  one  answer  open  consistent  with  her  profession; 
only  one  thing  to  do  that  squares  with  "  the  sovereignty 
and   dignity   of    a   neutral    Power."      The    arming    of 


LAND     AND     WATER 


merchantmen  does  not  create  a  new  political  situation. 
Nor  is  it  a  naval  novelty. 

The  Theory  of  Armed  Merchantmen. 

There  seems  to  be  much  confused  thinking  on  the 
subject  of  arming  merchantmen.  In  the  earliest  times 
there  was  no  distinction  between  lighting  ships  and 
trading  ships,  simply  because  sea  lighting  was  not  carried 
on  by  any  special  ship  weapon,  but  by  warriors  on 
board ;  and  all  trading  ships  had  to  defend  themselves 
in  almost  all  seas  and  against  all  comers.  Indeed  Mr. 
Hannay  tells  us  in  his  excellent  Shoi-t  History  of  the  Royal 
Navy  that,  until  the  days  of  the  Tudors,  there  was  little 
distinction  between  the  calling  of  the  pirate  and  the 
calling  of  the  trader.  Right  into  the  i8th  century 
merchant  ships  plying  in  distant  seas  had  still  to  arm 
themselves.  The  great  East  Indiamen  continued  the 
practice  almost  to  modem  times.  And  all  these  ships 
were  armed,  not  as  is  erroneously  supposed  solely  against 
pirates.  The  sea  trader  has,  by  the  common  consent  of 
ci\'ilised  mankind,  always  been  free  to  protect  himself — 
if  lie  could — against  the  warships  of  his  country's  avowed 
enemies,  and  to  be  so  armed  as  to  protect  himself,  neither 
constituted  him  a  man  of  war,  as  some  American  writers 
have  ignorantly  suggested,  nor  yet  a  pirate,  as  the 
<iermans  have  quite  dishonestly  proclaimed.  The  reason 
that  merchantmen  have  ceased  to  arm  themselves  is 
twofold.  It  is  partly  because,  as  State  navies  have 
become  more  highly  organised  and  more  numerous,  the 
necessity  for  self-protection  grew  less,  but  much  more 
because  as  the  lighting  ship  became  specialised,  self- 
protection  became  hopeless.  This  was  indeed  a  necessary 
consequejnce  of  guns  becoming  the  principal  armament 
of  warships,  for  it  is  clear  that  no  ship  could  carry  a 
formidable  battery  together  with  a  crew  to  man  the  guns, 
and  still  retain  the  hold  space  necessary  for  a  profitable 
trade.  So  long,  then,  as  the  only  enemy  to  be  encountered 
at  sea  was  a  gun-armed  enemy  the  handicap  on  trading 
ships  was  prohibitive,  and  when  to  the  possibility  of  a 
heavier  battery  a  more  protective  method  of  construction 
\yas  added,  the  disparity  in  lighting  value  between  the 
lightest  of  warships  and  a  merchantman  carrying  the 
heaviest  possible  armament  became  so  great  that  any 
useful  arming  of  traders  was  out  of  the  question 

But  with  the  appearance  on  the  sea,  and  its  employ- 
nient  for  the  attack  on  trade,  of  a  warship  that  was  quite 
defenceless  against  even  the  lightest  of  guns,  the  situation 
of  the  15th  and  i6th  centuries  revived.  It  so  happens 
that  this  particular  form  of  defenceless  warship  is  also 
incapable,  as  Mr.  Wilson  pointed  out  in  one  of  the 
Lnsitauia  notes,  of  visiting  a  ship  in  due  and  proper  order 
at  sea,  of  making  her  a  prize,  or  of  sinking  her  without 
leaving  the  non-combatants  on  board  of  her  to  the  me'rcy 
of  the  sea  in  open  boats — adiotis  or  omissions  incon- 
sistent with  civilised  practice.  Consequently,  the  Presi- 
dent continued,  it  was  manifest  that  this  class  of  vessel 
cannot  be  used  against  trade,  without  "inevitable  viola- 
tions of  many  sacred  principles  of  justice  and  humanity." 
If  then  it  is  said  that  in  arminjg  merchantmen  we  are 
reverting  to  the  practices  of  baabarism,  the  answer  is 
simple.  We  have  done  so  because  the  practices  of 
barbarism  have  been  revived  against  our  merchantmen. 

It  has  been  the  object  of  Count  Bernstorff's  amaz- 
ingly successful  press  campaign  at  Washington  to  cloud 
this  issue  by  saying  that  British  mercliantmen  are  armed 
by  the  Admiralty,  and  their  guns  manned  by  naval 
ratings,  and  that  the  object  of  this  is  to  use  trading 
vessels  offensively  against  submarines.  Every  armed 
merchantman  thus  necessarily  becomes  an  auxiliary 
cniiser.  Our  own  government  has  not  so  far  replied  on 
the  alleged  facts.  But  on  the  theory  of  the  thing  the  reply 
is  obvious.  No  one  has  ever  questioned  the  right  of 
trading  ships  to  arm  themselves  defensively.  It  is  a 
right  admitted  generally  by  the  American  government, 
and  specifically,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  second  Lusitania 
note.  Nor  need  it  be  disputed  that  if  used  offensively, 
armed  merchantmen  are  virtually  cruisers.  The  thing 
turns  on  this.  Are  they  so  used  ?  It  cannot  be  pre- 
sumed. We  have  had  a  year's  experience  of  submarine 
war,  and  there  is  something  more  to  appeal  to  than 
theory. 

Of  the  general  fact — that  Germany  has  not  once 
or  ten  times,  but  many   hundreds  of   times,  destroyed 


February  17,  1906. 

belligerent  and  neutral  shipping,  both  by  submarines 
and  by  mines  and  in  each  case  without  warning — there 
is  no  dispute  whatever  on  either  side.  All  that  Germany 
has  claimed  is  that  she  was  justified  in  doing  it.  If, 
as  America  has  always  contended,  to  sink  civihan  ships 
unsearched-and  unwarned  is  inhuman  and  unprecedented, 
then  the  criminaUty  of  the  submarine  is  established  and 
acknowledged  beyond  argument.  It  is  now  contended, 
not  for  the  first  time,  but  as  the  foundation  for  a  new 
argument,  that  merchantmen  are  armed  for  offensive 
purposes.  They  have,  one  presumes,  been  armed  for  a 
considerable  time.  Also  a  considerable  number  of 
merchantmen  must  have  been  armed.  If  the  purpose  of 
this  was  offensive,  one  is  entitled  to  ask,  has  this  armament 
ever  been  offensively  used  ?  Where  merchantmen  have 
rammed  submarines  they  have  not  been  slow  to  tell  the 
story,  but  we  have  never  heard  of  any  gallant  merchant 
seaman  who  has  sunk  a  submarine  with  a  well  aimed  shot. 
We  have  never  heard  that  Germany  has  alleged  that  this 
has  in  fact  ever  taken  place.  If  no  such  case  has  been  re- 
ported or  alleged,  it  seems  a  fair  inference  that  no  one 
has  sought  to  use  merchantmen  offensively.  Indeed, 
had  so  many  ships,  over  so  long  a  period,  been  so  cm- 
ployed,  there  must  surely  have  been  one  success.  At 
any  rate  if  there  has  been  none,  then  the  uselessness  of 
so  arming  them,  and  therefore  the  futihty  of  the  com- 
plaint of  their  being  so  armed,  is  manifest. 

But  if  they  have  not  been  so  used,  and  yet  tha 
Germans  complain  most  bitterly  of  the  fact  of  arming  them, 
and  are  toiling  to  pervert  American  opinion  on  thissub- 
jesct,  what  is  the  obvious  inference  ?  Why,  that  the 
presence  of  guns  on  board  merchant  .ships  has  put  the 
fear  of  the  Lord  into  the  submarines,  and  made  them 
to  a  great  extent  useless  for  their  piratical  purposes. 
Hence,  doubtless,  the  Germanjtears.  But  this  is  exactly 
why  they  were  armed.  It  has  been  purely  defensive  in  its 
intention,  and  what  is  far  more  to  the  point,  entirely 
successful  in  carrying  that  intention  out. 

^Vhethe^  in  fact  it  is  wise  and  advantageous  to  arm 
merchantmen  depends  entirely  upon  one»thing — namely, 
the  efficiency  of  the  armament  for  the  purfose.  That 
Germany  contemplates  a  new  and  wider  submarine  cam- 
paign, and  probably  with  submarines  capable  of  a  higher 
surface  speed,  of  a  larger  pelagic  radius,  and  armed  in  all 
probability  with  greater  calibred  guns  is  highly  probable. 
Mr.  Hurd  announces  in  Tuesday's  Daily  Telegraph,  that 
our  enemy  has  already  produced  a  kind  of  submarine 
monitor,  with  a  continuous  armoured  battery  extending 
like  an  elongated  hood  for  a  great  part  of  the  length  of 
the  hull.  He  seems  to  suppose  that  this  submarine  can 
emerge  this  battery  above  the  water  and  engage  a  gunned 
ship  with  all  the  advantage  that  results  from  being  itself 
impenetrable  to  small  shells.  I  have,  for  various 
reasons,  a  difficulty  in  accepting  this  story.  But  if  it  be 
true  one  of  two  alternative  results  must  follow.  If  the  bulk 
of  the  enemy's  submarines  are  armoiu'ed  and  therefore 
impenetrable  to  small  guns,  small  guns  will  then  become 
useless.  If  merchantmen  can  be  armed  with  larger 
calibres,  and  hitherto  6-inch  have,  at  least  by  the 
Americans,  been  considered  within  the  defensive  limit,  it 
will  be  a  case  of  "  as  you  were." 

In  any  event  it  is  obvious  that  the  arming  of  mer- 
chantmen turns  upon  the  old  considerations.  There  i3 
in  all  probability  no  limit,  in  theory,  to  the  size  and, 
therefore,  to  the  defensive  qualities  of  the  submarine. 
There  is  obviously  a  limit  to  the  gun  carrying  capacit\'  of 
merchant  ships.  The  question  has  arisen  solely  from  the 
vulnerability  of  the  under  water  boats  of  the  present  type. 
It  is  a  state  of  affairs  that  might  not  endure  even  through- 
out this  war.  It  is  certainly  unlikely  to  recur  in  future 
wars.  It  will  be  strange,  if  it  turned  out  to  be  true,  that 
Mr.  Lansing's  demarche  on  the  arming  of  merchantmen 
was  provoked  by  suggestions  from  the  Navy  Department, 
At  least  it  will  be  strange  if  the  Department's  suggestion 
had  any  professional  origin.  The  American  Navy  De- 
partment, like  our  own  Admiralty,  has  suffered  before 
and,  I  hope  unlike  our  Admiralty,  may  suffer  again,  from 
ignorant  civilian  interference  both  in  policy  and  adminis- 
tration. But  it  is  quite  impossible  to  believe  that 
American  naval  officers,  many  of  whom  are  conspicuous 
for  their  historical  knowledge  and  their  firm  hold  on  naval 
doctrine,  could  have  put  forward  so  untenable  a  theory 
as  is  attributed  to  them.  Arthur  Pollen. 


10 


February  17,  1916. 


LAND     AND      WATER. 


SOME  LESSONS  FROM  THE  AMERICAN 

CIVIL    WAR.-I. 


By  John  Buchan. 


WE  have  ail  been  taught  that  history  is  philosophy 
teaching  by  examples,  and  that  if  we  are  to  get 
the  value  of  the  past  we  must  be  quick  to  seize 
its  lessons  for  the  present.  But  we  must  set 
about  the  task  cautiouslj',  for  nothing  is  easier  than  to 
mis-read  history.  We  find  a  fancied  resemblance  between 
some  old  event  and  an  incident  of  to-day,  but  too  often 
the  resemblance  is  trivial  and  superficial. 

During  the  summer  many  honest  souls  were  greatly 
depressed  about  GallipoH,  because  they  could  not  get  the 
Syracusan  E.xpcdition  out  of  their  head.  That  was  a 
case  where  you  had  an  amazingly  close  surface  parallel. 
The  chief  sea  power  and  the  chief  democratic  power, 
Athens,  was  at  war  with  Sparta,  the  chief  land  power 
and  the  exponent  of  oligarchy.  Athens,  under  the 
influence  of  a  brilliant  but  erratic  politician,  Alcibiades, 
undertook  a  divergent  operation  in  the  shape  of  an 
expedition  against  Syracuse.  It  was  commanded  by  a 
general  who  was  much  under  the  influence  of  politicians 
at  home,  and  L^machus,  the  ablest  practical  soldier, 
was  not  listened  to.  It  was  an  amphibious  expedition, 
an  attack  by  a  landing  force  with  the  support  of  the  navy. 
At  first  it  won  some  small  successes,  and  then  the  thing 
fell  into  a  stalemate  and  the  besiegers  became  the  be- 
sieged. Presently  a  Spartan  army,  under  Gylippus, 
arrived  to  help  the  Syracusans.  And  so  matters  went 
from  bad  to  worse,  till  that  disasLTous  autumn  when 
Nicias  laid  down  his  arms,  and  the  flower  of  the  youth  of 
Athens  perished  in  the  quarries.  The  expedition  was  the 
death-blow  of  the  Athenian  Empire. 

It  was  very  easy  -to  read  modern  names  into  the  story 
— Britain,  Germany,  Turkey ;  Mr.  Churchill,  Sir  Ian 
Hamilton,  von  Mackensen.  It  was  easy,  but  it  was  quite 
misleading,  for  there  was  no  real  parallel  between  the 
two  enterprises.  Happily  the  issue  of  GallipoU  has 
stultified  the  prophets. 

After  the  brilliant  success  of  the  German  armies  in 
1870  it  was  the  fashion  for  many  years  to  regard  the 
Franco-Prussian  war  as  the  most  illuminating  subject  for 
a  soldier's  study  and  as  the  type  to  which  all  successful 
campaigns  must  approximate.  The  Napoleonic  wars  were 
neglected  as  out  "of  date,  and  the  American  Civil  War 
was  contemptuously  dismissed  by  the  German  staff  as  a 
struggle  of  mobs  of  skirmishers.  The  view  was  scarcely 
sound,  for  the  Franco-Prussian  war  was  by  no  means  the 
only  or  the  most  fruitful  object  tor  a  soldier's  attention.  Its 
conditions  were  abnormal,  and,  though  nothing  can 
detract  from  the  merits  of  Moltke's  strategic  plan  and  the 
perfection  of  his  preparations,  it  was  a  war  in  which  the 
victors  made  countless  mistakes  and  followed  many 
false  doctrines.  The  surprising  success  of  the  German 
invasion  was  due  less  to  any  great  brilliance  on  their  part 
than  to  the  hopeless  disorganisation  of  the  French. 

During  the  last  twenty  years  the  study  of  the 
Napoleonic  campaigns  has  come  to  its  own  again  under 
the  guidance  of  many  distinguished  French  officers, 
such  as  Colonel  Colin.  The  mihtary  student  will  still 
find  in  the  operations  of  the  greatest  of  all  soldiers  the 
most  useful  guide  to  his  profession.  And  for  British 
soldiers  the  story  of  the  American  Civil  War  is  not  less 
important,  for  it  was  a  war  fought  under  the  kind  of  con- 
ditions which  Britain  must  necessarily  face  in  any  great 
struggle. 

I  propose  in  the  following  notes  to  collect  some  of  the 
parallels  to  the  present  case  which  we  may  find  in  the 
American  conflict,  and  to  suggest  a  few  of  the  lessons  to  be 
learned  from  it.  You  will  get  little  identity  as  to  incidents, 
or  striking  likenesses  as  to  persons,  but  in  the  case  of  the 
North  you  will  find  many  of  the  essential  difficulties  with 
which  Britain  was  confronted  in  August,  1914.  It  is  an 
inquiry  which  should  make  for  encouragement  rather 
than  for  depression,  for  after  every  kind  of  mistake,  and 
after  a  most  desperate  and  heart-breaking  struggle,  the 
North  won  a  complete  victory. 

The  causes  of  the  quarrel  need  not  detain  us.     The 


North  stood  for  the  larger  civic  organism,  the  nation  ;  the 
South  for  the  smaller  organism,  the  State.  Slavery, 
we  know  from  Lincoln's  own  words,  was  not  the  main 
issue.  It  was  the  immediate  cause  of  the  conflict,  but  the 
real  causes  lay  deeper.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  the  Civil 
War  was  a  genuine  conflict  of  idealisms,  of  theories  of 
Government,  each  in  itself  reasonable,  and  each  forming 
the  highest  allegiance  for  the  men  who  had  been  brought 
up  under  a  particular  kind  of  tradition.  We  may  say, 
too,  that  the  ideals  of  both  North  and  South  were  neces- 
sary to  the  creation  of  a  complete  national  life.  Because 
each  side  stood  for  no  mean  cause  it  was  one  of  the 
cleanest  and  most  chivalrous,  as  well  as  one  of  the  most 
heroic  campaigns  ever  fought.  The  North  won  and 
deserved  to  win,  for  its  creed  was  more  in  unison  with  the 
main  march  of  humanity.  But  there  is  no  honest  Ameri- 
can of  to-day  who  would  not  rejoice  to  claim  kinship  with 
the  great  men  who  led  the  Confederate  armies. 

Assets  of  the  Combatants. 

The  North  started  with  all  the  advantages  but  two. 
It  had  a  population  of  20,000,000  whites,  while  the  South 
had  only  a  little  over  7,000,000.  It  had  the  great  in- 
dustries, the  mineral  fields,  the  big  shipbuilding  yards. ' 
It  had  practically  all  the  navy  there  was.  It  had  great 
wealth,  far  greater  than  the  South,  and  was  not  only 
more  self-supporting,  but  owing  to  its  ships  could  import 
what  it  did  not  produce  from  overseas.  It  had  all  the 
rank  and  file  of  the  regular  army,  and  four-fifths  of  the 
oflicers.  The  South,  on  the  other  hand,  had  few  industries 
and  few  ships.  It  was  mainly  agricultural,  a  land  of  vast 
estates  worked  by  negro  slaves,  with  only  a  scanty  white 
popvilation.  It  was  poor,  in  the  sense  that,  if  driven  back 
upon  itself,  it  had  within  its  own  borders  only  a  limited 
number  of  the  necessaries  of  life  and  of  war. 

I  have  said  that  the  North  had  all  the  advantages 
except  two.  But  these  two  were  vital.  They  made  the 
South  triumphant  in  the  first  phases  of  the  war,  and  more 
than  once  almost  gave  it  the  victory.  The  first  was  that 
its  aristocratic  squirearchy  could  be  more  easily  adapted 
to  military  organisation  and  discipline  than  the  Northern 
democracy.  The  vast  majority  of  its  citizens  were 
countryfolk  who  could  march  and  shoot  and  were  better 
natural  material  for  making  soldiers  from  than  the  towns- 
men of  the  North.  It  was  a  nation,  too,  of  horsemen 
and  horse-masters.  Obviously  such  a  people,  if 
armies  have  to  be  improvised,  have  less  to  learn  than 
men  who  come  from  a  different  kind  of  environment. 
This  advanatge  was  a  real  one,  but,  of  course,  it  was 
terminable.  In  time  the  South  had  to  recruit  townsmen, 
and  the  North  enrolled  the  liardy  pioneers  of  the  West. 
Besides  the  townsman  when  he  was  trained,  made  as 
good  a  soldier  as  the  countryman. 

In  the  second  place,  it  was  the  fortune  of  the  South 
to  have  fighting  on  its  side  by  far  the  abler  generals.  Lee 
and  Stonewall  Jackson  have  had  few  equals  in  the  art  of 
war.  The  North  produced  many  competent  soldiers, 
such  as  Grant,  Sherman,  Sheridan,  and  Thomas,  but  no 
one  of  them  reaches  the  small  and  select  brotherhood  of 
the  greatest  captains.  If,  taking  the  whole  of  history, 
you  limit  that  brotherhood  to  five  names,  j-ou  must 
include  Lee  ;  if  you  extend  it  to  a  score  you  will  scarcely 
include  Grant. 

Problem  of  the  North. 

Now  wars  are  won  by  superior  strength — by  weight  of 
numbers,  if  the  numbers  are  properly  trained  and  supplied 
and  decently  led.  Military  history  shows  no  exceptions 
to  this  maxim.  .'\  splendid  genius  or  some  extraordinarv 
initial  advantage  may  give  to  the  weaker  side  an  imme- 
diate victory,  which  paralyses  and  disintegrates  the 
enemy.  But  if  the  enemy  refuses  to  be  paralysed,  if  he 
still  fights  on,  if  he  develops  a  stubborn  defensive,  if  he 


LAND      AND     WATER 


February  17,  1916. 


learn;;  his  lesson?,  anrl  if  lie  has  greater  resources  than  his 
antagonist,  in  the  cncj  he  will  win. 

Against  material  preponderance,  if  it  be  reasonably 
liandled.  the  most  inspired  generalship  will  beat  in- 
clfertiial  wings.  Hannibal  in  the  long  ran  is  worn  down 
by  tlic  much  inferior  Scipio.  Napoleon  falls  beneath  the 
accumulated  weight  of  the  Allies.  But — and  it  is  a  vital 
proviso — the  nation  which  is  strongest  in  human  and 
material  resources  must  learn  to  use  these  resources. 
Until  it  learns  to  use  them  it  will  go  on  being  beaten. 

That  was  the  fate  of  the  North.  It  had  to  assemble 
its  greater  man-power,  it  had  to  train  it,  it  had  to  find  a 
Commander-in-Chief  who  could  use  it  reasonably  well, 
it  had  to  discover  how  its  greater  wealth  could  be  best 
applied  to  cripple  its  adversary.  It  took  it  four  years  to 
learn  these  things,  and  when  it  had  learned  them  it  won. 
There  was  a  time  when  it  looked  like  never  learning  them, 
and  in  consequence  it  was  very  nearly  beaten. 

Is  that  position  so  remote  from  our  own  ?  We 
and  our  Allies  have  greater  reserves  of  man-power  than 
the  Teutonic  League,  but  at  the  begining  of  the  war  it 
was  not  oganised  in  armies.  Like  the  North,  Britain, 
and  to  a  large  extent  Russia  and  France,  have  had  to 
improvise  their  armies,  and  Britain,  hke  the  North,  had 
not  only  to  do  this  but  to  improvise  more  or  less  an  army 
system.  Again,  we  and  our  Allies,  like  the  North,  have 
greater  wealth,  but  wc  have  had  to  learn  how  to  mobilise 
that  wealth  for  war.  We  and  our  Allies  have  command 
of  the  sea,  as  the  North  had,  and  we  have  to  learn  how  to 
use  that  command  of  the  sea  to  the  uttermost  so  as  to 
stifle  the  enemy.  Lastly,  we  have  to  find  the  leaders — 
admirals,  generals  and  statesmen — who  can  so  use  our 
strength  in  personnel  and  materiel  that  we  get  the  good  of 
it.  These  were  the  problems  of  the  North  and  they  are 
ours.  When  we  solve  them,  as  the  North  did,  we  shall 
be  victorious. 

.  Let  us  look  a  little  more  closely  at  these  urgent 
questions.  Abraham  Lincoln  was  beyond  doubt  one  of 
the  two  or  three  greatest  men  ever  born  of  our  blood. 
He  seems  to  me  to  be  in  many  respects  the  foremost  states- 
man of  our  race^-foremost  in  courage  and  in  the  essen- 
tials of  wisdom — since  Chatham.  But  as  a  war  minister 
Lincoln  had  his  job  to  learn,  and  he  took  a  long  time 
learning  it.  If  he  had  died  before  Gettysburg  history 
would  have  recorded  that  he  was  a  great  leader  of  his 
people,  a  great  inspirer,  a  great  prophet,  but  it  would 
also  have  recorded  that  he  was  one  of  the  worst  war 
ministers  that  ever  hved.  He  had  no  natural  aptitude 
foi  the  task,  except  an  iron  courage,  exhaustlcss  patience, 
and  a  calm  beUef  in  God.  He  was  a  man  of  peace,  as 
remote  as  John  Bright  from  any  dreams  of  military  glory. 
But  he  had  that  complete  intellectual  honesty  which  can 
look  squarely  at  factr,  even  unwelcome  facts,  and  after 
many  tips  and  downs  he  led  his  people  to  victory.  Let  us 
see  how  it  was  done. 

How  the  Armies  were  Raised. 

His  first  business  was  to  raise  the  men.  He  had 
about  18,000  regulars,  most  of  them  serving  on  the 
Western  frontier,  and  he  had  four-fifths  of  the  regular 
officers.  A  good  many  of  these  officers  had  had  ex- 
perience in  the  Mexican  war  fourteen  years  before,  just 
as  many  of  our  officers  in  1914  had  had  South  African 
experience.  Lincoln  showed  how  little  he  appreciated  the 
magnitude  of  the  coming  conflict  by  asking  for  only  75,000 
vohmteers,  and  these  to  serve  for  only  three  months. 
Then  came  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  which  opened  his  eyes. 

He  was  empowered  by  Congress  to  raise  500,000 
volunteers  for  three  years'  ser\'icc,  and  a  little  later  the 
number  was  increased  to  1,000.000.  Recruits  came  in 
magnificently.  If  wc  remember  the  small  population  of 
the  North  I  think  we  must  rank  the  effort  as  among 
the  most  remarkable  ever  made  by  a  system  of  voluntary 
enlistment.  The  President  began  by  asking  for  600,000 
men,  and  he  got  700,000.  After  Fredericksburg  he  asked 
for  300,000  more  and  he  got  430,000.  Then  he  asked  for 
another  300,000.  of  which  each  State  should  provide  its 
quota.  But  he  onlv  got  87,000,  a  little  more  than  a 
quarter  of  his  demands.  The  South,  it  should  be  remem- 
bered, had  for  many  months  before  this  adopted  con- 
scription. It  was  now  a  year  and  a  half  since  the  first 
battle,  and  the  campaign  had  entered  on  that  period  of 
drag  which  was  the  tim.e  of  blackest  depression  in  the 
Korth.    Then  Lincohi  took  the  great  step.    The  North  was. 


of  all  parts  of  the  world  at  the  moment,  that  in  which  the 
idea  of  indi\ddual  liberty  was  most  deeply  implanted. 
It  was  a  country  which  had  always  gloried  in  being  un- 
mihtary,  in  contradistinction  to  the  effete  monachies  of 
Europe.  The  American  Constitution  had  shown  the  most 
scrupulous  regard  for  individual  rights.  The  mode  of 
political  thought  which  we  call  democracy — for  demo- 
cracy is  rather  a  mode  of  thought  than  a  system  of 
government — was  universally  accepted.  The  press  was 
unbridled,  and  the  press  was  very  powerful.  The  country, 
too,  was  full  of  philosophic  idealists  who  preferred  dogmas 
to  facts  and  were  very  vocal  in  the  papers  and  on  the 
platforms.  Moreover,  there  was  a  General  Election 
coming  on,  and,  since  the  war  had  gone  badly,  there  was 
a  good  chance  that  Lincoln  might  be  defeated  if  he  in  any 
way  added  to  his  unpopularity. 

Lincoln  and  Compulsion. 

There  were  not  wanting  crowds  of  men — some  of 
them  very  able  and  distinguished  men — who  declared  that 
it  was  far  better  to  lose  the  war  than  to  win  it  by  trans- 
gressing one  article  of  the  current  political  faith.  There 
were  others,  Lincoln's  friends  and  advisers,  who  warned 
him  solemnly  that  no  hint  of  compulsion  would  ever  be 
tolerated  by  free-born  Americans,  and  that  if  he  dared 
to  propose  the  thing  he  would  have  an  internal  revolution 
to  add  to  his  difficulties.  Again  and  again  he  was  told 
— in  langtiage  familiar  to  our  ears — that  the  true  friends 
of  the  enemy  were  the  Compulsionists.  Remember,  too, 
that  Lincoln  was  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word  a  demo- 
cratic statesman,  believing  that  government  must  not 
only  be  for  the  people,  but  by  the  people.  W'hen  he  was 
faced  with  the  necessity  of  finding  some  other  way  of 
raising  men  than  as  volunteers,  he  was  faced  with  the 
task  of  jettisoning— I  will  not  say  the  principles,  for 
they  are  hardier  plants — but  all  the  sentiments'  and 
traditions  of  his  political  life. 

But  Lincoln,  being  a  very  great  man,  knew  that  it 
was  the  business  of  a  statesman  to  lead  the  people,  to  act, 
to  initiate  a  policy-,  and  not  to  wait  like  a  dumb  lackey 
in  the  ante-chamber  of  his  masters.  He  knew  that 
politics  should  be  not  an  abstract  dogma,  but  a  working 
creed  based  upon  realities.  He  knew  also  that  in  a  crisis 
it  is  wisest  to  grasp  the  nettle.  He  saw  the  magnitude 
of  the  crisis,  that  it  was  a  qiicstion  of  life  or  death,  what- 
ever journalists  or  demagogues  might  say.  So  he 
took  the  plunge,  and  on  March  3rd,  1863,  a  law  was  passed 
to  raise  armies  by  conscription.  He  answered  those  who 
met  him  with  the  famous  "thin  edge  of  the  wedge" 
argument  in  words  which  should  be  remembered  :  that 
"  He  did  not  believe  that  a  man  could  contract  so  strong 
a  taste  for  emetics  during  a  temporary  illness  as  to  insist 
on  feeding  upon  them  during  the  remainder  of  a  healthful 
life."  There  was  some  resistance  at  the  start.  There  were 
violent  mass  meetings  and  much  wild  talk,  and  there  were 
riots  in  New  York,  where  a  number  of  lives  were  lost. 
But  the  trouble  soon  passed  and  the  good  sense  of  the 
country  prevailed. 

It  was  one  of  the  two  greatest  acts  of  Lincoln's  life  ; 
the  other  was  when  he  decided  to  fight  for  the  intcgrit}? 
of  the  nation.  And  like  all  great  acts  of  courage  it  had 
its  reward.  Four  months  later  Gettysburg  was  won, 
Vicksburg  surrendered  to  Grant,  and  the  tide  turned. 
Recruits  came  in — 300,000  in  October  1863,  nearly 
1,300,000  in  1864,  and  the  curious  thing  is  that  85  per 
cent,  of  them  were  volunteers.  The  effect  of  con- 
scription was  to  revive  voluntary  enlistment.  The  total 
number  of  recruits  in  the  Nortji  from  first  to  last  was 
3,000,000,  and  thai  out  of  a  population  of  20,000,000 
is  surely  a  remarkable  figure.  The  men  had  been  found, 
the  resources  of  the  North  were  fully  mobilised,  and  two 
years  after  the  passing  of  the  Act  came  that  April  day 
when  Lee  surrendered  to  Grant  at  Appomatox. 


PhologrmtK  of  the  Year  (IlaxcU.  Watson  and  Vincy, 
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February  17,  I9i6.  LAND     AND     WATER. 

ROUMANIA'S    DECISION. 

By  Alfred  Stead. 

,  filf;'.  Alfred  Stead,  who  ivas  in  Bucarest  joy  nine  months  last  year,  fighting  the  German  propaganda,  and 
■previously  -in  Athens,  was  formerly  Roumanian  Consid-General  in  London  for  five  years.  Hts  connection 
with  the  Balkan  States  dates  back  to  1903,  and  during  this  period  he  has  at  one  time  or  another  been 
brought  into  contact  with  the  leading  personalities  of  that  troubled  region.  Last  October  on  leaving  Bucarest 
he  was  attached  to  the  Serbian  Army,  was  with  it  from  the  fighting  on  the  Danube  to  its  retreat  through 
Montenegro,  and  after  witnessing  the  capture  of  Mount  Lovchen  returned  to  England  by  way  of  Skutari  and  San 
Giovanni  di  Medtia.  There  is  no  living  Englishman  more  conversant  with  Balkan  problems  than  Mr.  Alfred  Stead.] 


IN  all  the  welter  of  the  world-war  it  has  been  reserved 
to  Roumania  to  remain  aloof,  openly  bound 
neither  to  one  camp  nor  the  other,  master  of  the 
national  destinies.  The  sphinx  of  Europe  has  not 
yet  spoken,  but  when  the  Ministers  of  the  Allies 
or  of  the  Central  Powers  quit  Bucarest,  a  decision  most 
momentous  to  the  peoples  at  war  will  have  been  taken. 

To-day  the  enigma  of  Roumanian  policy  is  puzzling 
the  majority  of  the  statesmen  and  generalissimos.  For 
it  lies  with  the  Dauubian  monarchy,  with  its  si.K  hundred 
thousand  or  more  fresh  troops,  to  play  a  decisive  part  in 
the  determining  phases  of  the  war.  But  which  way  will 
the  cat  jump  ?  That  is  the  question  of  the  moment. 
The  Government  at  Bucarest  has  shown  masterly  quali- 
ties of  keeping  its  own  counsel,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether 
the  majority  of  the  Roumanian  nation  are  any  wiser  as 
to  the  real  position  of  their  country  in  the  international 
grov pings  than  are  the  people  of  London,  Paris  or  Berlin. 
It  isija  singular  triumph  for  M.  Bratiano,  the  Roumanian 
Premier,  who  stands  out  almost  alone  as  an  astute 
statesman  at  a  time  when  diplomacy  and  statesmanship 
are  at  a  very  low  level.  Holding  in  his  hands  all  the 
strings,  practically  Minister  of  War  and  Minister  for 
Foreign  \ffairs  as  well  as  Prime  Minister,  this  compara- 
tively young  man  has  succeeded  in  pursuing  an  eminently 
national  policy.  This,  despite  the  blandishments  or  the 
threats,  the  offers  or  the  menaces  of  the  belligerents. 

In  Roumania  the  power  is  in  the  hands  of  the 
Monarch  and  of  the  Government  more  perhaps  than 
in  any  other  constitutional  country  blessed  or  cursed 
with  a  parliamentary  system.  The  mass  of  public 
opinion,  scarcely  formed  and  incoherent,  plays  no  part 
in  the  government's  decisions,  the  Opposition  and  the 
leaders  of  the  parties  not  in  power  have  very  little  weight. 
They  are  those  who  talk  more  freely  than  members  of 
the  government,  and  thus  impress  a  semblance  of  their 
importance  upon  the  outside  world  ignorant  that  much  of 
their  speeches  and  utterances  have  rather  a  local  than  an 
international  object  in  view. 

The   King. 

Thus,  to-day,  in  seeking  to  divine  what  Roumania  is 
going  to  do,  it  is  necessary  to  plumb  the  depths  of  the 
minds  of  King  Ferdinand  and  M.  Bratiano,  not  to 
listen  too  eagerly  to  the  speeches  of  the  Opposition  or  be 
affected  unduly  by  the  leanings  of  the  majority  of  the 
thinking  population.  The  mass  of  the  population  does 
not  interest  itself  in  the  war  or  its  details  unless  we  except 
a  certain  universal  idea  that  the  time  has  come  to  "  liber- 
ate "  the  Roumanians  in  the  Dual  Empire.  But  the 
Roumanian  nation  is  not  swept  off  its  feet  by  any  idea 
of  a  greater  Roumania  or  a  reunion  of  all  the  Roumanian 
peoples. 

While  undoubtedly  the  Koumanian  people  would 
wish  to  see  Roumania  greater  and  the  acquisition  of 
Transylvania  and  Bessarabia,  they  have  as  foundation  of 
their  idea  the  natural  desire  to  retain  the  Roumania  of 
to-day.  They  do  not  wish  to  share  the  fate  of  the  two 
other  small  States  which  have  had  the  privilege  of  joining 
in  the  war.  The  earlier  fate  of  Belgium  and  the  recent 
destruction  of  Serbia  do  not  tempt  Roumania  to  go  and 
do  likewise.  This  sane  national  attitude  in  Roumania 
has  aided  largely  in  the  achievement  of  successful  non- 
intervention. And  this,  although  the  country  is  fringed 
with  warring  peoples  and  possesses  a  longer  frontier 
facing  war  than  any  other  nation. 

King  Ferdinand,  a  Hohenzollern  of  the  elder  branch, 
whose  aunt  was  the  mother  of  the  heroic  King  of  the 
Belgians,  has  been  much  too  frequently  regarded  as  a 
certain  German  element  in  Roumania.  The  King  of 
Roumania  to-day  is  a  Roumanian  so\'ercign,  desirous  of 


furthering  the  welfare  of  his  subjects  and  promoting  the 
future  of  his  country.  He  is  a  Roumanian  first  and  last, 
just  as  his  beautiful  Queen,  the  daughter  of  our  Duke 
of  Edinburgh  is  Roumanian,  although  English  and 
Russian  by  blood.  The  Throne  will  decide  on  national, 
not  on  family  lines. 

M.  Bratiano  bears  an  historic  name,  and  his  actions 
and  'decisions  must  inevitably  be  affected  bj'  the  traditions 
of  his  father,  who  guided  Roumania  througli  the  stormy 
times  of  the  Russo-Turkish  war,  and  saw  both  the  \ictory 
of  the  Roumanian  army  at  Plevna  and  the  treacherous 
filching  by  Russia  of  the  Roumanian  Province  of  Bessa- 
rabia— tearing  up  the  "  scrap  of  paper  "  by  which  tiie 
Tsar  had  guaranteed  Roumanian  integrity.  Keeping 
his  own  counsel,  refusing  to  answer  questions  in  Parlia- 
ment, or  outside,  M.  Bratiano  has  to-day  the  destinies  of 
Roumania  in  liis  keeping.  His  very  success  in  maintain- 
ing a  policy  of  aloofness  so  far,  strengthens  his  hands. 

Learning  from  the  Past. 

If  it  is  impossible  to  gain  any  real  idea  of  what  M. 
Bratiano  thinks  or  decides,  it  is  possible  to  gather  some 
very  valuable  indications  from  the  attitude  of  Roumania 
during  the  past  months  of  war.  It  must  not  be  forgotten, 
that  before  the  autumn  of  1914  Roumania  was  a  party  to 
the  Triple  Alliance,  her  participation  depending  upon 
Italian  inteivention.  The  country  had  Ijeen  financed 
and  developed  economically  by  (German  capital  and 
German  energy.  Owing  to  an  artificially  developed 
prejudice  in  England  and  France  against  the  country 
because  of  supposed  persecution  of  the  Jews,  the  purse- 
strings  of  London  and  Paris  were  not  untied  for  Bucarest. 
It  was  only  after  the  British  Navy  began  to  look  to 
the  Roumanian  oilfields  for  fuel  that  it  was  realised  that 
Roumania  offered  excellent  fields  for  investment  and 
development.  But  the  antidote  to  German  influence 
was  only  beginning  to  be  applied. 

The  few  months  before  the  outbreak  of  war  were 
occupied  by  very  real  and  partially  successful  efforts  on 
the  part  of  the  Triple  Entente  to  detach  Roumania  from 
the  Central  Powers.  The  great  personal  friendship  of 
the  late  King  Charles  for  the  Emperor  of  Austria  made 
it  difticult  to  secure  anything  more  than  a  probability  of 
neutrality.  But  in  view  of  the  former  certainty  of 
Roumanian  action  on  the  side  of  Germany,  this  was  a 
great  gain.  As  will  be  shown,  the  neutrality  of  Rou- 
mania has  been  a  very  precious  aid  to  the  Allies.  It  has 
been  the  unforgivable  sin  in  the  eyes  of  Vienna  and 
Berlin.  As  a  Roumanian  politician  said,  plaintively : 
"  The  only  people  who  are  sure  that  we  are  with  the 
Allies  are  the  Germans,  the  Allies  do  not  seem  to  believe 
it."  And  yet  Roumania  has  given  proof  on  proof  of 
her  goodwill  towards  the  Allies — and  this  at  great  risk  and 
peril  to  herself. 

A  National  Policy. 

The  moment  the  idea  of  a  national  policy  forms  the 
foundation  of  Roumanian  diplomacy,  it  is  evident  that  a 
premature  decision  on  one  side  or  the  other  must  force 
intervention.  And  while  a  large  State  can  look  forward 
with  equanimity,  if  not  with  satisfaction,  to  a  war  lasting 
months  and  years,  a  small  State  has  seriously  to  considci 
her  staying  powers.  And  therefore  it  has  seemed  well  for 
Roumania  to  reserve  her  forces  until  proportionstely 
they  represent  a  greater  value  and  can  hope  to  hasten  the 
end  of  the  war  within  a  measurable  period. 

The  Koumanian  policy  is  an  eminently  sane  one  ;  it 
i?  not  quixotic,  it  is  not  suicidal.  But  in  order  to  be  able 
to  avoid  an  earlier  entry,  it  has  been  necessary  to  devise 
means  and  methods  of  procrastination  —to  create  a  buffer 
zone  of  uncertainty  in  the  minds  of  possible  adversaries. 


LAND      AND     WATER. 


February  17,  1916. 


The  simplest  method  was  to  bargain  as  to  territorial 
recompense,  for  ncutraUty  or  for  active  participation. 
This,  not  because  it  was  vitally  essential  to  be  assured 
beforehand  of  the  Transylvanian  territory  or  the  Bernat, 
but  simply  because  by  asking  both  sides,  it  was  possible 
to  make  Berlin  or  Vienna,  Paris  or  Petrograd  believe 
that  the  decision  had  not  yet  been  reached. 

It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  the  Bucarcst  Govern- 
ment would  have  been  very  seriously  embarrassed  if  at 
any  moment  either  group  of  Powers  had  suddenly  acceded 
all  her  demands.  As  they  did  not,  the  equilibrium  was 
maintained.  M.  Bratiano  availed  himself  very  cle\  erly 
of  the  various  members  of  his  government  and  of  the 
Opposition,  of  the  pro-allj'  I\I.  Costinescu,  the  Minister 
of  Finance,  of  the  pro-German  M.  Marghiloman,  one  of 
the  Opposition  leaders,  &c.  M.  Bratiano's  task  was 
always  to  create  an  unclear  situation,  so  that  the  Central 
Powers  could  never  come  down  on  him  and  say,  "  You 
are  with  the  Allies." 

The  Russian  Factor. 

Roumania  has  to-day  contact  only  with  one  of  the 
Allies,  and  that  the  one  least  able  to  help  and  the  least 
trusted  at  Bucarest.  The  loss  of  Bessarabia  is  more 
recent  than  the  loss  of  Alsace  Lorraine,  and  whereas 
Germany  wai-  the  enemy  of  France,  Russia  had  just  been 
saved  on  the  slope?  of  Plevna  by  the  young  Roumanian 
army.  Also  Roumania  lies  between  Russia  and  Bulgaria, 
and  the  way  to  Constantinople.  Two  dominant  forces 
exert  influence  in  Roumania,  mistrust  and  fear  of  Russia 
and  dread  of  a  Greater  Bulgaria.  And  unfortunatelv 
the  Allies  have  left  much  of  their  negotiations  at  Bucarest 
in  the  hands  of  the  Russians, and  the  Roumanians  have- 
seen  Russia  leading  the  Allies  at  Sofia  bhndlj'  to  endeavour 
to  create  a  greater  Bulgaria  at  the  expense  of  Serbia, 
which  country  had  already  made  sacrifices  and  won  \'ic- 
tories  for  the  Allies. 

The  Germans  have  been  very  active,  they  have  been 
extraordinarily  clever.  The  whole  country,  has  been 
inundated  for  months  by  German  agents  and  money, 
the  newspapers  have  been  bought,  money  has  been 
lavishly  spent.  In  Bucar(>st there  were  Germans  en  every 
hand,  there  were  no  workers  for  the  Allies,  especially 
none  from  England  or  France.  It  is  true  there  were 
occasional  special  missions,  who  generally  arri\-ed  from 
Sofia  and  worsened  the  situation  by  explaining  to  the 
Roumanians  that  the  Bulgarians  wer'e  with  the  Entente 
and  that  they  were  surer  of  Sofia  than  of  Bucarcst.  And 
in  Roumania  there  vvas  no  doubt  that  Bulgaria  was  in 
alliance  with  Germany— the  Roumanian  Government  in- 
formed theAllies  of  this  months  before  the  recent  events. 

Oil  and  Agriculture. 

Roumania  is  a  country  depending  upon  agriculture 
and  oil  for  revenue,  and  is  in  no  position  to  manufacture 
munitions.  Nor  had  she  a  large  stock  in  hand.  Tiie 
ammunition  ordered  and  paid  for  in  Germany  before  the 
war  was  not  delivered,  has  never  been  delivered  —a 
significant  indication  of  how  little  sure  Berlin  is  of 
Bucarest.  But  it  was  essential  of  Roumania,  before  em- 
barking on  war,  to  have  adequate  supplies  accumulated 
or  assured.  The  Salonika  line,  even  at  its  best,  was  a  poor 
line  to  rely  on,  change  of  gauge  arid  transhipment  made 
arrivals  slow.  From  Russia  munitions  were  not  to  be  had. 
Also,  when  the  Russians  were  forced  back  from  Bukovina 
and  Galicia  the  railway  connection  through  Moldavia 
was  imperilled. 

Roumania  demanded  guarantees  from  the  Allies, 
and  it  depends  not  upon  Bucarest,  but  upon  the  Allied 
Governments,  if  the  Roumanian  army  enters  into  action. 
The  whole  attitude  of  Roumania  has  been  unmistakably 
pro-Ally  all  along  but  the  Roumanian  Government  i's 
not  going  to  war  without  being  sure  that  there  are 
enough  Allied  troops  to  co-operate  and  to  make  success 
probable.    To  do  otherwise  would  be  foolish. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Balkan  situation  be  not 
taken  seriously,  Roumania  will  remain  neutral.  Tliere  is 
no  question  of  bargaining,  the  situation  is  quite  clear. 
The  Germans  and  the  Bulgarians  arc  alarmed  at  the 
prospect  because  Roumania  is  as  a  knife  at  their  throat. 
The  tortoise  has  put  out  its  head  and  its  neck  is  at 
the  mercy  of  Roumania.  Had  the  iMench  not  literally 
forced  us  to  remain  in  Salonika,  all  jiope  of  Roumanian 
intervention  would  have  gone.     To-day  the  danger  is 


rather  that  the  Central  Powers,  seeing  themselves  con- 
fronted with  the  almo^'t  certainty  of  Roumania  joining 
the  Allies,  will  force  the  pace.  But  it  is  doubtfid  whether 
they  feel  ready  to  bring  into  play  a  fresh  body  of  six 
hundred  thousand  men,  well  equipped  and  trained, 
occupying  an  ide.iUy  dangi;rou>  position.  Unless  the 
Allies  make  some  supreme  blunder — and  who  can 
guarantee  that  they  will  not  after  the  experience  of 
Sofia— the  Roumanian  situation  is  very  satisfactory. 

Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  Roumania  has  already 
done  much  for  the  Allies  during  the  past  months.  The 
only  country  which  has  found  neutrality  to  .spell  economic 
and  financial  ruin,  Roumania  would  have  every  right  to 
regard  the  recent  purchase  of  wheat  for  ten  millions  as  a 
mere  drop  in  the  bucket.  For  two  years  there  h.as  been  a 
practical  cessation  of  export  of  cereals,  the  bulk  of  two 
years'  crop  are  lying  in  the  country,  much  at  the  frontier 
railway  stations.  The  whole  wealth  of  Roumania  is  in 
cereals  and  petroleum,  and  botli  those  are  in  a  terribly 
bad  way.  At  the  time  when  the  .\ilies  had  the  idea  of 
starving  out  (iermany,  I^oumani:i  by  refu^-ing  to  allow  her 
railway  truck:  to  pass  the  frontier,  practically  stopped 
the  export  of  grain. 

It  is  of  course  an  arguable  point  that  perhaps  Germany 
would  have  suffered  more  had  Roumania  sold  her  grain 
for  gold,  the  drain  of  gold  being  more  disastrous  to  Germany 
than  the  disadvantage  to  the  Allies  of  allowing  some  four 
weeks'  food  supply  to  go  out  of  Roumania  —incidentally, 
Roumania  would  have  then  had  a  strong  financial  position. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  the  bulk  of  the  grain  stayed  in  the 
country,  and  as  all  the  financial  institutions  are  founded 
on  agricultural  wealth,  the  financial  situation  became 
bad.  The  few  sales  at  high  prices  of  an  odd  lot  of  grain 
to  Germany,  in  exchange  for  coal  or  other  commodity, 
had  no  real  influence.  The  prohibition  of  the  cx])ort 
of  petrol  and  some  other  products  of  j>etroleum  crippled 
the  oil  industry.  In  the  first  six  months  of  i()i4  131,204 
tons  of  petrol  were  exported,  in  the  corresponding  period 
of  1015  only  S,092  tons.  The  petroleum  industry  is  at  a 
standstill,  the  production  has  fallen,  all  the  tanks  are 
full,  prices  are  practically  non-existent.  Germany  and 
Austria  have  not  grain  or  petrol  from  Roumania,  but 
Roumania  is  ruined. 

Proofs  of  Friendliness. 

But  there  is  still  more  proof  of  Roinnaniau  friendli- 
ness. Until  the  occupation  of  Serbia  gave  the  Central 
Powers  contact  with  Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  Roumania 
consistently  stopped  the  passage  of  war  stores  to  Con- 
stantinople and  Sofia.  Whole  trains  were  held  up  at  the 
frontier,  while  truck-loads  clandestinely  introduced  were 
seized  at  Bucarest.  Every  manner  of  device  was  resorted 
to  in  the  hopes  of  securing  the  passage  of  vital  parts  of 
shells,  etc.,  but  the  vigilance  of  the  searchers  let  httle 
past.  But  it  was  necessary  to  do  this  stopping  work 
very  circumspectly  because  iihc  long  frontier  with  Austria 
and  Hungary  rendered  reprisals  easy.  But  Roumania 
loyally  stopped  the  bulk  of  the  munitions.  On  the  other 
hand  she  took  a  large  view  of  tlie  uso  of  the  Danube  for 
the  passage  of  stores  between  Russia  and  Serbia. 

With  the  practical  ruin  of  her  resources  Roumiaan 
has  been  faced  with  the  dislocation  and  expenditure  of 
maintaining  the  bi\lk  of  her  army  mobilised.  She  has 
seldom  had  less  than  300,000  men  ander  arms,  with  a 
result  that  her  army  is  in  a  state  of  extraordinary  effi- 
ciency to-day.  The  line  of  the  Carpathians  is  in  an 
admirable  state  of  defence,  many  of  the  heavy  guns  from 
the  Bessarabian  frontier  having  been  transferred.  The 
enemy  cannot  surprise  Roumania,  an  attack  must  dispose 
of  at  least  half  a  million  men — nor  can  heavy  guns  be 
used  in  the  mountains.  The  southern  frontier  is  the 
more  dangerous,  a  crossing  of  the  Danube  covered  by 
heavy  artillery  having  been  jiroved  to  be  quite  feasible 
but  with  an  allied  army  at  Salonica,  Italian  troops  in 
Albania  and  Russians  at  Czernovits  to  cross  the  Danube 
would  be  a  hazardous  adventure. 

Roumania  dreads  a  Greater  Bulgaria,  she  believe.? 
the  Allies  will  win  because  lingland  is  determined  to  win 
— let  us  lose  no  time  in  being  worthy  of  the  confidence 
placed  in  us  and  if  necessary  let  us  remove  any  fear  that 
Roumania  may  be  shut  in  after  the  war  by  Russia  at 
Constantinople,  by  offering  her  a  way  out  to  tlie  .Egean 
through  the  territory  which  was  once  Bulgaria  and  no\> 
is  eastern  Germany.  The  Roumanians  wait  on  us — 
the  moment  has  come  for  the  great  stroke  of  the  war. 


February  17,  1916.' 


LAND     AND      WATER 


BRITISH    AEROPLANE    POLICY. 


By  F.  W.  Lanchester. 


ONK-oI  the  most  common  reasons  put  forward 
for  the  justification  of  an  increase  in  the  size 
and  weight  of  the  miUtary  aeroplane,  is  the 
need  for  increased  petrol  capacity  in  order  to 
command  a  greater  range  or  radius  of  action. 

Whatever  the  nature  of  the  military  duty  happens 
to  be,  there  is  always  some  definite  number  of  men  (some- 
times a  pilot  alone,  at  other  times  also  an  observer  or 
kinematograph  operator,  or  one  or  more  gunners)  which 
is  appropriate  and  necessary,  and  the  dead  weight  this 
represents  has  to  be  deducted  from  the  total  freight- ' 
carrying  capacity  of  the  machine,  and  correspondingly 
limits  the  amount  of  fuel  which  can  be  carried.  In  an 
extreme  case,  if  this  dead  weight,  or  militarv  load  as  we 
may  call  it,  be  equal  to  the  total  freight  capacity,  there 
will  be  no  margin  for  carrying  petrol,  and  the  design 
must  be  considered  useless.  If  we  consider  the  total 
freight-carrying  capacity  as  one  definite  percentage  of 
the  gross  weight  of  the  machine,  then  the  bigger  the 
machine,  the  greater  will  be  the  relative  pcti^ol  capacity 
and  range  or  radius  of  action. 

If  it  be  assumed  in  the  present  state  of  the  construc- 
tors' art  that  30  per  cent,  of  the  gross  weight  can  be  carried 
as  freight,  the  freight  capacity  for  a  machine  2,000  lbs. 
gross  is  600  lbs.  and  supposing  the  military  load  to  be 
400  lbs.,  the  difference,  200  lbs.,  is  the  petrol  capacity, 
equal  to  10  per  cent,  of  the  gross  weight  of  the  machine. 
The  range  of  flight  will  then  be  about  .,00  miles.  If  we 
take  the  machine  as  of  twice  the  above  wjight,  namely, 
4,000  lbs.,  the  total  freight^at  30  per  cent.,  becomes  1,200 
lbs.  ;  deducting  the  military  load  400  lbs.  (as  before)there 
remains  800  lbs.  or  20  per  cent,  of  the  gross  weight  for 
petrol,  with  a  range  or  radius  of  action  of  about  600  miles 
and  so  the  calculation  may  be  made  for  any  other  size  of 
machine. 

Such  is  the  argument  in  its  most  bald  simplicity. 
When,  however,  the  conditions  are  examined  critically, 
it  is  found  that  the  story  has  not  half  been  told.  There 
are  factors  of  vital  and  commanding  importance  which 
have  yet  to  be  taken  into  consideration. 

Weight  of  Wing  Structure. 

The  weight  of  the  wing  structure  in  a  flying  machine 
is  itself  not  constant  in  relation  to  tlie  gross  weight.  When 
discussing  the  weight  of  the  wing  structure  and  its  influ- 
ence, we  have  to  be  careful  to  avoid  being  misled  by 
appearances ;  figures  given  by  different  constructors 
are  not  properly  comparable.  The  factors  of  safety 
used  at  the  present  time  by  aeronautical  constructors 
differ  mdely  ;  in  my  James  Forrest  Lecture*,  it  is  given 
that  the  factor  of  safety  varies  from  three  in  certain  ma- 
chines (which  shall  be  nameless),  to  as  high  as  seven  or 
eight  in  the  case  of  certain  of  the  machines  constructed 
at  the  Royal  Aircraft  Factory.  The  recommendation  of 
the  Advisory  Committee  for  Aeronautics,  formulated  after 
duly  considering  the  conditions  with  which  military 
aeroplanes  have  to  comply,  is  that  the  factor  .should  not 
be  less  than  five  or  six.  Now  with  this  great  variation  of 
nearly  three  to  one  in  existing  practice  in  the  matter  of 
wing  strength,  it  is  necessary  to  be  careful  in  comparing 
different  designs  of  machine,  for  it  is  evident  that  in  some 
cases  the  petrol  capacity  might  be  nearly  doubled  merely 
by  cnttin.g  down  the  weight  of  wing  structure  without 
going  outside  the  limits  of  existing  practice. 

In  dealing  with  the  question  of  wing  structure 
weight,  therefore,  the  comparison  between  one  aeroplane 
and  another  must  be  based  on  the  assumption  of  a  con- 
stant or  uniform  factor  of  safety.  On  this  basis  for  a  given 
type  and  class  of  construction  the  wing-structure  weight 
will  vary  as  the  cube  of  the  span.  Also  for  a  given  flight 
velocity,  which  is  the  proper  criterion  to  take,  the  gross 
load  supported  varies  as  the  square  of  the  span,  and  con- 
sequently, the  weight  of  the  wing  structure,  expressed 
as  a  percentage  of  the  gross  weight,  increases  in  proportion 
as  the  span  in  increased. 

The  following  are  not  actuaj  figures,  but  they  arc 
sufficiently  near  actual  figures  for  the  purpose  of  illus- 

•rroc.Inst.CE.,   Vol.   OXCVIU, 


tration.  We  will  assume  the  gross  weight  of  a  ma- 
chine as  2,000  lbs.,  and  its  span  as  40  feet,  and  we  will 
take  the  \reight  of  the  aerofoil  or  wing  structure  for  this 
machine  to  be  20  per  cent,  of  the  gross  total,  that  is  to 
say,  it  will  be  400  Ibs.f  We  will  take  it  that  in  this 
machine  the  total  freight  capacity  is  30  per  cent,  as  in  the 
earlier  example. 

The  Big  Machine. 

Now  let  us  take  a  machine  of  twice  the  span, 
namely,  80  feet.  The  gross  weight  will  be  4x2,000  lbs. 
=8,000  lbs.,  and  the  weight  of  the  wing  structure,  on  the 
law  just  given,  will  be  eight  times  as  great  as  previously, 
that  is  to  say,  3,200  lbs.  or  40  per  cent,  of  the  gross 
weight ;  this  will  encroach,  to  the  extent  of  20  per  cent., 
on  the  freight  capacity  which  is  now  reduced  to  10  per 
cent,  as  compared  with  the  previous  30  per  cent.  Hence, 
although  a  gain  may  be  made  by  an  increase  in  the  size 
of  a  machine,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  relatively 
less  military  load,  this  gain  will  be  partially,  wholly 
or  more  than  wholly,  discounted  by  the  increase  in  the 
weight  of  the  wing  structure  ;  we  have  only  to  go  a  little 
further  than  in  the  above  example  and  the  machine  will 
have  no  surplus  or  freight-carrying  cay>acity  at  all.  Clearly 
an  advantage  in  flight  range  can  only  be  secured  by  in- 
creasing the  size  up  to  a  certain  point,  after  which,  any 
further  increase  is  detrimental. 

The  forcgomg  figures  are  only  given  for  the  purpose 
of  illustration,  if  I  were  to  give  real  figures  the  results 
would  not  be  greatly  different,  though  it  may  be  said  in 
fairness  to  the  big  machine  that  the  foregoing  figures 
have  been  based  on  a  high  factor  of  safety,  and  the  result 
given  may  therefore  be  looked  upon  as  in  the  direction  of 
t)eing  an  exaggeration. 

By  a  simple  mathematical  demonstration  (which  it  is 
not  necessary  to  enter  into  here)  it  may  be  shown  that  the 
size  of  machine  of  greatest  range  or  duration  of  flight  (as 
determined  by  its  petrol  capacity)  may  be  defined 
for  any  given  type  of  wing  structure  (monoplane 
or  biplane,  for  example),  and  tor  some  stated  factor  of 
safety,  as  that  at  which  the  weight  of  the  win9  structure 
is  equal  to  twice  the  weight  represented  by  the  military 
load. 

This  is  an  important  result ;  it  is  not  altogether  exact 
lor  many  reasons— it  may,  from  a  mathematical  stand- 
point, be  regarded  as  a  "  first  approximation  "  ;  but  it 
can  never  be  far  from  the  truth,  and  it  is  a  result  which 
should  be  "  writ  large  "  wherever  the  question  of  aero- 
plane size  is  debated,  to  prevent  those  with  whom  the 
decision  rests  from  being  carried  away  by.  the  grandiose 
suggestions  of  the  charlatan. 

Factors  of  Safety. 

It  is  so  easy  to  juggle  with  factors  of  safety,  and 
questions  of  strength  and  scantling,  so  as  to  show  an 
imaginary  advantage  in  the  design  of  a  large  machine, 
that  the  present  warning  requires  the  maximum  pubUcity 
possible.  In  some  cases,  and  I  think  we  may  be  generou5 
enough  to  say  that  in  most  cases,  the  designer  who  thinks 
he  can  get  everything  he  wants  out  of  the  bigger  machim 
actually  deceives  himself  ;  also  the  fact  that  not  infre- 
quently he  may  be  comparing  a  construction  based  or 
all  the  latest  knowledge  and  improvements  in  material 
with  something  inferior,  may-be  a  design  dating  from 
two  or  three  years  back.  This  may  lead  to  a  false  con- 
clusion. Thus  any  improved  material  or  methods  of 
construction  which  may  be  applied  to  a  large  machine 
may,  with  unimportant  exceptions,  be  likewise  applied 
to  a  small  machine. 

The  matters  which  tend  in  some  slight  degree  to  modify 
the  result  above  given  as  defining  the  design  of  greatest 
range  do  not  lend  themselves  to  discussion  in  a  non- 
technical article  ;  I  propose  to  deal  with  these  elsewhere. 
It  may  be  said  here,  however,  that  the  influence  of  these 
disturbing  factors  is  not  serious  ;  I  am  convinced  that  some 
of  the  large  machines  which  have  recently  been  projected, 
and  in  some  cases  actually  constructed,  will  not  in  the 

t  Incli.ding  other  flight  organs  whose  weight  varies  in  like  ratio. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


February  17,  1916- 


lonfj  run  justify  thoir,  oxi<;toncc  ;' cither, their  range  of' 
flight  will  lint  be  so  great  as  hoped  or  their  powers  of 
thght  will  be  sacrilired  in  some  respect,    or  possibly  they 
will  be  found  structurally  deficient.     The  best  that  can 
be  hoped  is  that  they  will  demonstrate  that  the  factor 
of  safety  really  necessary  is  less  than  has  hitherto  been 
regarded    as    essential.        Or    perhaps    that    there    arc 
better  methods  of  wing  construction  available  than  those 
at  present  adopted.     Either  of  these  eventualities,  if  tnie, 
would  justify  some  increase  in  weight  in  accordance  with 
the  rule  given  above  ;  the  size  of  machine  at  which  the 
weight  of  wing  structure  is  twice  the  constant  load,  will 
be  greater  if  the  factor  of  safety  be  lowered  or  if  wing 
stnirture  design  in  the  matter  of  weight  saving  be  found 
capable  of  improvement. 

As  a  numerical  illustration  two  examples  may  be 
given,    illustrating    condition    of    maximum    (relative) 
capacity  : 

(i)  Single-seat    machine.     Military    load    assumed 
r=  160  lbs.  : 

Lb.  Per  cent. 

MiHtary  Load         ..         .  ..        160  8.0 

Wing  Structure,  etc.  ..         ..        320  16.0 

Petrol  Capacity       ..  ..  ..        520  26.0 

Fuselage    complete    with    landing 
chassis  and  Power  Installation  . .     1,000  50.0 


Gross  Total  Weight 


2,000 


100.  o 


(2)  Two-seat  machine.  MiHtary  load  assumed  ==  320  lb. : 


Lb. 
320 
640 
640 
1,600 

3.200 


Per  cent. 
10. o 
20.0 
20.0 
50.0 

100.0 


Military  Load 
Wing  Structure 
Petrol  Capacity 
Fuselage,  etc. 

Gross  Total  Weight 

Question  of  Resistance. 

We  may  now  pass  from  the  question  of  weight  saving 
to  the  question  of  resistance.  It  is  frequently  stated, 
and  it  is  to  some  extent  true*  that,  in  the  matter  of  the 
coefficient  of  resistance,  the  big  machine  possesses  some 
advantage.  Evidently  an  increase  in  size  only  renders  it 
possible  to  reduce  the  coefhcient  of  resistance,  it  is"  up 
to  "  the  designer  to  make  the  most  of  this  possibility. 
Clearly,  if  it  can  be  shown  that  in  practice  the  exigencies 
of  constructional  art  allow  of  a  big  machine  being  built 
with  a  less  coefficient  of  resistance  than  a  smaller  machine, 
the  range  of  flight  will  be  increased  proportionately,  that 
is  to  say,  the  range  of  flight,  for  a  given  percentage  of 
the  total  weight  in  petrol,  is  inversely  as  the  coefficient 
of  resistance. 

It  is  to-day  well  understood  that  the  resistance  of  a 
flying  machine  may  be  treated  as  made  up  of  two  com- 
ponents— the  aerodynamic  resistance  due  to  the  flight 
organs  proper  and  the  direct  or  "  head  "  resistance  due  to 
the  body  and  its  appendages.  The  large  machine  may 
imdoubtedly  have  somewhat  lower  relative  resistance  as 
due  to  its  flight  organs,  that  is  to  say,  its  aerodynamic 
resistance  per  unit  weight  is  less  ;  but  the  extent  to  which 
the  small  machine  is  at  a  disadvantage  from  this  cause 
is  comparatively  unimportant,  it  is  not  a  serious  handicap. 
The  difference  in  the  body  or  fuselage  resistance  is  more 
considerable  ;  it  is  sometimes  possible  to  design  a  large 
machine  for  the  execution  of  any  given  duty  with  com- 
paratively little  increase  in  the  Juselage. 

If  we  could  assume  the  resistance  of  the  fuselage  to 
be  an  invariable  or  constant — no  matter  what  the  size  of 
the  machine  may  be — it  would  be  possible  to  make  out  a 
case  for  a  very  much  larger  machine  and  that  based  on  the 
consideration  of  weight  alone.  If  the  military  load  be 
taken  to  be  the  same  in  any  case  (the  problem  being  to 
specify  for  a  given  duty  the  machine  of  greatest  flight 
range),  the  fuselage  might  be  designed  to  vary  but  little 
with  variations  of  size,  but  the  same  does  not  apply  to 
the  landing  chassis  and  other  sources  of  direct  resistance, 
at  the  best  the  saving  in  the  case  of  two  machines  whose 
weights  are  in  the  ratio  2  :  i,  does  not  amount  to  more 
than  10  per  cent,  of  the  total.  The  portion  of  the 
direct  resistance  which  is  due  to  the  alighting  gear,  and 
in  the  case  of  the  naval  type  or  seaplane,  due  to  the  hull 

•James  Forrest  Lecture.     Proe.Inst.C.E.,   C  XCVIII.,  p.  388. 


or  float,  will  inevitably  increase  the  larger  the  machine, 
and  so  in  respert  of  these  the  increase  in  size  will  be  of 
little  relief  to  the  designer. 

In  most  of  the  designs  which  have  at  present  been 
prepared  or  carried  into  execution,  the  relief  which  is 
theoretically  to  be  obtained  by  a  careful  design  of  the 
fuselage  has  certainly  not  been  realised  to  the  f\ill,  and  it 
would  almost  seem  as  if  the  designers  were  not  alis'e  to  its 
importance.  Sometimes  two  or  more  engines  have  been 
fitted  independently,  external  to  the  fuselage,  and  in  such 
a  case  it  is  at  least  doubtful  whether  any  saving;  of  resist- 
ance has  been  achie\-ed  at  all.  '       ' 

The  employment  of  more  than  one  engine  in  an  aero- 
plane instead  of  diminishing  may  seriously  increase  the 
risk  of  failure.  Unless  so  powerful  an  installation  is 
fitted  that  one  engine  alone  (or  two  engines  out  of  three) 
will  fly  an  aeroplane,  no  increased  reliability  or  advantage 
from  the  .subdivision  of  the  power  unit  is  secured.  The 
usual  reason  for  more  than  one  engine  being  specified  is 
that  at  present  the  aeronautical  motor  of  three  or  four 
hundred  horse-power  is  virtually  non-existent  in  this 
country.  Thus  it  is  at  present  scarcely  possible  so  to 
design  as  to  take  advantage  of  size  in  the  one  respect  in 
which  size  may  in  some  degree  justify'  itself. 

Military  Future.    ' 

In  conclusion,  it  is  manifest  that  the  future — the 
military  future — does  not  and  cannot  lie  with  the 
machine  of  great  weight  and  dimensions.  Even  if  the 
methods  of  aerofoil  construction  of  the  future  permit  ol 
the  necessary  factor  of  safety  being  obtained  on  half  the 
weight  so  far  found  possible  (which  does  not  seem  highlj 
probable)  the  machine  of  o^'cr  two  or  three  tons  weight 
will  remain  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule. 

It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  in  exceptionaT 
cases  large  machines  of  special  type  may  be  needed  foi 
the  carrying  of  giant  bombs  or  torpedoes,  or  perhaps 
for  the  transport  of  some  heavy  material  unit  such  as  a 
mountain  or  field  gun  either  as  a  whole  or  in  parts.  Also 
the  Naval  aeroplane  may  in  certain  cases  require  to  be 
built  on  a  larger  scale  than  would  otherwise  be  necessary 
or  desirable  in  order  to  permit  of  it  being  sufficiently 
seaworthy  when  afloat  in  bad  weather.  These  special 
types  however  come  outside  the  scope  of  the  present 
articles,  Each  case  requires  to  be  considered  or  discussed 
on  its  individual  merits. 

The  full  and  complete  theory  of  maximum  range 
has  not  been  dealt  with  as  being  too  highly  technical ; 
if  some  of  the  disturbing  factors  are  taken  into  account 
it  is  possible  to  make  out  a  case  for  machines  somewhat 
larger,  perhaps  20  per  cent,  larger  or  heavier  than  given  ; 
on  the  other  hand,  the  best  size  of  machine  will  ordinarily 
be  less  than  stated  since  the  last  few  miles  of  range  are 
only  obtained  at  the  expense  of  a  disproportionate  in- 
crease of  total  weight  which  means  tonnage  ill  disposed 
and  an  undue  expenditure  of  petrol  in  the  performance 
of  any  given  duty. 


The  February  number  of  the  Asiatic  Review  is  speciallj 
devoted  to  Russian  writers  and  affairs,  and  is  noteworthj 
for  the  inclusion  of  an  article  by  Mmc.  Olga  NovikofY,  in 
which  the  writer  shows  clearly  tlie  unity  pervading  Russians 
of  all  classes  with  regard  to  the  war  and  the  necessity  for  a 
successful  issue.  Those  familiar  with  Mme.  Novikoff  and 
her  work  will  see,  from  this  article,  the  tremendous  change 
that  the  war  has  wrought  on  Russia,  and  the  way  in  which 
social  and  domestic  problems  have  been  shelved  for  the 
pursuit  of  the  more  vital  issue.  An  article  on  German  finance 
and  the  Caucasian  campaign  in  the  Review  is  of  more  than 
ordinary  interest,  and  as  a  whole  it  may  be  said  that  the 
character  of  the  Asiatic  Review  is  more  than  maintained  in 
this  distinctively  Russian  number. 

A  History  of  the  Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers,  by  Howel  Thoma; 
(T.  Fisher  Unwin,  3s.  6d.  net)  is  a  breezy  little  summary  o; 
the  doings  of  this  famous  regiment  from  the  time  of  its 
formation  up  to  the  end  of  the  South  African  war,  and  is, 
at  the  same  time,  an  accurate  liistorical  record  of  the  Roj'a' 
Welsh  Fusiliers,  for  the  author,  himself  evidently  a  Welshman, 
has  been  sufticicntly  jealous  of  the  honour  of  the  regiment 
he  describes  to  miss  nothing,  and  to  ensure  that  liis  work 
shall  be  of  unquestionable  veracity.  It.  is  worthy  of  note 
that  lie  has  been  but  little  concerned  witii  history'  that  does 
not  directly  affect  his  subject.  The  result  is  an  admirablv 
concise  volume,  extremely  intcrcstine  in  character 


J 


February  17,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


WAR    AND    THE    BANKERS. 


By  Arthur   Kitson. 


THE  present  safety  and  strength  of  British  Banks 
is  due  neither  to  the  so-called  "  gold  basis," 
nor  to  the  abihty  or  honesty  of  the  men  who 
manage  them,  but  to  the  public  belief  that  under- 
neath the  ridiculously  small  quantity  of  gold — which 
is  nothing  more  than  a  very  thin  veneer,  in  comparison 
with  the  credit  resting  on  it — rests  the  national  credit 
comprising  the  entire  wealth  of  Great  Britain.  Our 
legal  tender  paper  money  is  "  as  good  as  gold,"  not 
because  the  Bank  of  England  holds  sufficient  gold  for  its 
redemption — which,  of  course,  it  never  does — nor  any- 
thing like  sufficient,  but  becausti  this  money  is  backed 
by  over  /i8,ooo, 000,000  of  wealth  of  every  description  ! 

If  Great  Britain  had  been  blessed  at  any  time  during 
the  past  half-century  with  a  statesman  who  really  under- 
stood this  subject,  and  who  had  had  sufficient  inde- 
pendence and  moral  courage,  the  present  system  would 
have  been  scrapped,  and  a  sound,  rational  banking 
system  would  have  replaced  it  which  nothing  could  shake. 
What  basis  for  bank  credit  can  be  safer  or  stronger  than 
the  National  Wealth  ?  W'hich  would  a  Foreign  Power 
prefer,  the  guarantee  of  a  London  Bank  or  that  of  the 
British  Government  ?  How  determined  British  bankers 
were  that  the  obvious  lesson  of  the  1914  crisis  should 
be  construed  to  their  advantage,  may  be  seen  from  the 
writings  of  one  of  their  most  able  apologists,  Mr.  Hartley 
Withers.  Mr.  \\'ithers'  book  War  and  Lombard  Street 
was  published  at  the  end  of  1914,  andhere  is  his  diagnosis 
of  the  trouble  and  the  lesson  he  wishes  us  to  learn.  In 
his  preface  he  says  :  "I  only  produce  this  brief  outhne, 
because  there  is  one  good  reason  for  trying  to  make  the 
meaning  of  these  events  clear  at  once.  This  is,  that  they 
gave  a  wonderful  proof  of  the  enormous  strength  of  Eng- 
land's monetary  power,  and  a  full  recognition  of  their 
strength  may  be  useful  now."  In  his  first  chapter 
(page  3)  he  says  : — 

It  (the  financial  crisis  of  July  and  August,  1014)  was  an 
unpleasant  string  of  surprises,  but  it  was  not  brought 
about  by  any  internal  weakness  in  the  English  banking 
system.  The  fury  of  tlic  tempest  was  such  that  no 
credit  system  could  possibly  have  stood  up  against  it. 
In  fact,  as  will  be  shown,  the  chief  reason  far  the  sudden- 
ness and  fullness  of  the  blow  that  fell  on  London  was  no- 
thing else  but  her  own  overwhelming  strength.  She  was 
so  strong,  and  so  lonely  in  her  strength  that  her  strength 
overcame  her.  She  held  the  rest  of  the  world  in  fee  with 
so  mighty  a  grip  that  when  she  said  to  the  rest  of  the 
world  "  Please  pay  what  you  owe  me,"  the  world  could 
only  gasp  out !  But  how  can  I  pay  you  if  you  don't 
lend  me  the  wherewithal .-' 

Curious  Reasoning. 

It  is  a  little  difficult  to  know  how  to  answer  such 
reasoning.  Let  us  examine  his  version  of  these  important 
events.  Financial  authorities  have  been  educating  the 
public  to  believe  that  the  safety  of  bank  credit  is  due 
entirely  to  the  fact  that  it  is  all  redeemable  in  gold  on 
demand.  They  have  also  fostered  the  belief  that  credit, 
unsupported  by  gold,  is  dangerous.  They  talk  of  Ger- 
many's "  paper  money  pyramid  "  as  worthless.  Naturally, 
therefore,  as  soon  as  the  Balkan  trouble  arose  in  the 
summer  of  1914,  the  holders  of  cheques,  bills,  promissory 
notes  and  other  forms  of  credit  took  the  bankers  at  their 
word  and  rushed  to  have  these  credit  instruments  re- 
deemed in  gold.  And  the  bankers  couldn't  produce  5 
per  cent,  of  the  gold  needed  !  The  hollow  pretence  of 
gold-redemption  was  at  once  exposed.  Any  commercial 
firm  unable  to  meet  its  bills  of  acceptance  when  due 
is  considered  unsound,  and  is  forced  into  liquidation,  and 
the  fact  that  various  sums  are  due  to  the  firm — but 
unavailable — is  insufficient  to  save  it.  Why  does  not 
the  same  rule  apply  to  the  banks  ?  Everyone  knows 
that  the  moratorium  was  a  confession  of  insolvency  for  the 
time  being  and  ruin  was  only  avoided  through  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  prompt  assistance  in  offering  the  National  Credit 
as  security,  and  in  issuing  an  abundance  of  one  pound 
and  ten  shilling  notes  as  legal  tender — a  measure  sug- 
gested years  ago  by  the  late  LordGoschen  and  vigorously 


opposed  by  Lombard  Street  and  Thrcadneedle  Street. 

Our  banking  system  is  surely  reduced  to  hard 
straits  when  excuses,  as  those  made  by  Mr.  Hartley 
Withers,  are  offered  as  an  explanation  of  the  Crisis  of 
1914  !  Expressed  in  plain  terms,  the  gist  of  Mr.  Withers' 
argument  is  as  follows  .—  Whilst  the  payment  of  fbUgalioiis 
in  gold  on  demand  may  be  an  evidence  of  financial  strength, 
the  inabililty  to  do  so  is  an  evidence  of  "  ovcrivhelming 
strength  !  "  Mr.  Withers  even  intimates  that  the  crisis 
was  due  to  the  "madness  or  wickedness  "  of  the  public  in 
demanding  fulfilment  of  the  bankers'  obligations  ! 

An   Analogy. 

Supposing  the  Captain  of  a  passenger  ship  should 
advise  his  passengers  that  in  time  of  danger  their  only 
safety  lay  in  each  one  possessing  a  ship's  life  belt,  why 
should  he  consider  it  an  evidence  of  their  madness  or 
wickedness  if  during  a  heavy  storm  or  collision  there 
should  be  a  general  rush  foj-  life  belts  ?  And  what  would 
one  say  if,  when  the  ship  was  sinking  and  the  passengers 
had  discovered  that  there  were  not  enough  life  belts  for 
even  5  per  cent,  of  those  on  board,  the  Captain  should 
say  to  those  doomed  to  be  drowned  :  "  My  friends, 
your  fate  is  not  due  to  any  '  inherent  weakness  '  in  our 
method  of  safeguarding  the  lives  of  those  committed 
to  our  charge.  The  truth  is,  your  predicament  is  a 
'  wonderful  proof '  of  its  '  overwhelming  strength.' 
We  have  a  monopoly  of  life  belts,  but  we  don't  happen 
to  have  more  than  a  few  here.  We  lend  them  to  other 
shipowners  and  our  position  is  so  '  overwhelmingly 
strong  '  that  we  are  always  lending  and  consequently  we 
can  never  keep  more  than  a  small  percentage  for  our- 
selves !  " 

Can  we  wonder  that  the  so-called  "  Gresham  Law," 
which  is  a  complete  denial  of  the  law  of  efficiency,  is 
accepted  as  a  mathematical  axiom  among  men  who 
can  reason  in  the  fashion  of  this  financial  expert  ?  If 
our  "  overwhelming  strength"  is  due  to  the  uncollected 
amount  of  gold  oie>ing  to  us,  what  becomes  of  the  much- 
vaunted  "  payable  on  demand  "  claims  ?  The  Gresham 
Law — which  is  another  of  the  many  economic  fallacies 
found   in   orthodox   financial   treatises,    and   which  has 


SORTES     SHAKESPEARIAN.^, 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE. 


PARLIAMENT  :    ORDER  OF  THE  DAY. 

T^e  Hvte  approaches, 
That  will  with  due  decision  ni'ike  us  know 
What  we  shtll  say  we  have  and  what  we 

ewe. 
Thoughts   speculatize   their    unsure  hopes 

relate, 
But  certain  issue  strokes  must  arbitrate : 
Towards  which  advance  tht  war. 

MACBETH,  v..  iv.,  16-21. 


MINISTERS   ON    THRIFT. 

It  is  a  good  divine  that  follows  his  own 
instructions;  I  can  easier  teach 
twenty  what  were  good  to  be  done 
than  be  one  of  the  twenty  to  follozv 
mine  oivn  teaching. 

MERCH.\NT  OF  VENICK,  I.,  U..  13* 


17 


LAND      AND     WATER. 


February  17,  icjiG, 


done  duty  for  the  bankers  for  several  centuries — ought 
to  be  given  its  quietus.  Put  into  plain  English;  it  means 
tliat  the  only  good  money  is  that  which  the  Bankers 
provide  or  promise  to  provide.  This  "  Law "  says, 
"  bad  money  drives  out  good  money,  but  good  money 
cannot  drive  out  bad  money."  The  acceptance  of  this 
"  law  "  depends  entirely  upon  one's  interpretation  of 
the  tenns  "  good "  and  "  bad."  It  was  observed 
centuries  ago  that  where  a  cheap  money  (that  is, 
clipped  coins,  paper  money),  was  circulating  freely, 
any  attempt  to  cause  the  circulation  of  gold  coins  of  full 
weight,  failed,  l)ecausb  there  were  always  enough  smart 
and  tricky  people  about  to  m(^t  or  clip  such  "  good  " 
coins  and  make  a  profit  by  selling  the  gold  clippings. 
And  naturally  if  paper  was  acceptable  as  currency  it 
was  extravagance  to  use  an  expensive  metal  like  gold. 

The  Gresham  Law. 

Now  the  curious  thing  about  this  law  is,  that  it  is 
contradictory  to  all  the  laws  of  efficiency,  evolution,  and 
common  sense.  To  take  one  out  of  thousands  of  every-day 
examples  roofing  material  formerly  consisted  of  expensive 
metals,  such  as  lead  and  copper.  Tliis  gave  place  to 
tiles  and  slating  which  were  much  cheaper  and  far  more 
sanitary.  According  to  "  Gresham's  Law,"  "  bad " 
roofing  has  driven  out  "  good  "  roofing.  Similarly  cheap 
Bessemer  steel  has  driven  out  expensive  wood,  brass, 
and  stone,  for  thousands  of  purposes,  thereby  increasing 
the  safety  and  comforts  of  society.  In  the  language  of 
the  "  Grtshamites,"  this  means  that  "  bad  "  material 
has  driven  out  the  "  good."  Cheap  paper  printing  and 
bookbinding  have  driven  out  expensive  parchment, 
engrossing  and  engraving.  Hence  the  "  bad  "  printing 
jness  and  machinery  have  driven  out  the  "  good " 
liandicraft  !  In  all  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life  we  judge  of 
the  comparative  merit  of  two  things  by  actual  trial,  and 
the  one  that  survives  is  pronounced  the  better,  that  is 
better  for  the, conditions  under  which  the  trial  was  made. 
Why  should  money  be  any  exception  to  this  general 
rule  ?  If  paper  money  can  perform  all  the  functions  of  a 
gold  currency,  why  use  the  expensive  metal  ?  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  to-day,  98  per  cent,  of  our  currency  is 
paper,  and  the  alleged  necessity  for  gold  is  a  pretence, 
but  it  enables  the  bankers  to  draw  the  same  interest  for 
the  use  of  paper  as  they  charge  for  the  use  of  gold.  This 
I  bcUeve  is  the  real  secret  of  their  insistence  on  main- 
taining the  so-called  ''  gold  basis." 

Had  Sir  Thomas  Gresham  been  born  two  centuries 
later,  his  observations  on  currency  would  doubtless  have 
led  him  to  a  totally  different  conclusion  from  that  ex- 
pressed in  the  so-called  "  law  "  which  goes  by  his  name. 
He  would  most  probably  have  formulated  his  conclusions 
as  follows : — "  Our  greatest  philosopher,  Sir  Isaac 
Newton,  has  shown  us  that  the  direction  of  motion  is 
always  along  the  hne  of  least  resistance.  Applying  this 
truth  to  the  industrial  world,  to  the  activities  of  man- 
kind, we  lind  that  men  always  seek  to  gratify  their 
wants  with  the  least  expenditure  of  energy.  Expressed 
in  economic  firms,  the  tendency  of  industry  and  trade 
is  constantly  towards  cheapness — towards  the  abolition 
of  value.  Under  free  conditions,  therefore,  cheap  money 
must  necessarily  drive  out  dear  money.  This  follows 
from  the  teachings  of  philosophy  and  is  confirmed  by 
experience  and  observation."  "Cheap"  money  does  not 
necessarily  mean  money  that  is  inefficient.  Steel  is 
enormously  cheaper  than  gold,  but  a  steel  bridge  is 
infinitely  safer  and  better  than  one  of  gold.  Financial 
writers — like  Withers — who  extol  our  bank  cheque 
currency,  are  unconsciously  denying  the  validity  of  the 
Gresham  Law  which  they  profess  to  uphold.  Cheque 
currency  is  the  cheapest  form  of  money  ever  known,  and 
has  driven  out  gold  currency  to  an  extraordinary  extent. 
And  but  for  our  legal  tender  laws,  gold  currency  would 
disappear  entirely.  As  l.mg  as  it  performs  the  function 
of  money,  cheap  money  is  the  best  money,  and  must 
of  necessity  drive  out  dear  money. 

Much  satisfaction  has  been  enjoyed  by  our  Press 
over  Sir  Edward  Holden's  reply  to  the  bombastic  speeches 
of  Herr  Helferich,  the  German  Minister  of  Finance. 
Sir  Edward's  reply  is  said  to  be  "  crushing."  No  doubt 
our  enemy  is  getting  into  serious  financial  difficulties. 
The  mark  is  falling  rapidly  in  comparison  with  the 
monetary  units  of  neutrals.  He  may  already  have  had 
to  sell  all  liis  investments  abroad.     He  may  have  to  part 


with  all  his  gold.  But,  I  repeat  what  I  have  said  in  a 
previous  article,  so  long  as  our  enemy's  industrial  and 
productive  activities  remain  unimpaired,  so  long  as  he  is 

{)ermitted  to  exchange  his  products  in  sufficient  quantities 
or  such  material  and  goods  which  he  cannot  produce 
and  which  are  necessary  for  his  food  and  manufactures, 
he  cannot  be  economically  destroyed,  even  if  the  mark 
should  lose  90  per  cent,  of  its  former  value  !  A  nation 
can  exist  without  gold — a  metal  which,  except  for  use  in 
certain  arts  such  as  jewellery  and  dentistry,  is  probably 
the  most  useless  and  most  readily  dispensable  we  have. 

Let  us  give  the  Devil  his  due.  Let  us  reverse  the 
conditions.  Supposing  Germany  had  destroyed  our 
Navy  and  blockaded  our  coasts,  where  would  our  precious 
banking  system  be  to-day  ?  Where  would  our  pound 
sterhng  be  ?  Does  anyone  imagine  that  our  banking 
system  would  have  stood  the  strain  that  Germany's  has 
without  crumbhng  up  ?  We  have  seen  that  before  a 
single  shot  was  fired  our  system  collapsed  !  Indeed, 
the  London  banks  depend  absolutely  upon  foreign  com- 
merce backed  by  the  credit  of  a  wealthy  nation  possessing 
the  freedom  of  the  seas,  without  which  our  gold  supplies 
could  never  be  renewed.  Were  our  coasts  blockaded 
they  would  collapse  in  a  week  ! 

A  Real  Comparison. 

The  real  comparison  of  Germany's  banking  systpm 
with  that  of  Great  Britain's  is  to  be  found  in  their  relation 
to  the  industries  of  each  country  respectively.  The 
Germans  themselves  admit  that  they  owe  their  unpre- 
cedented commercial  and  industrial  development  largely 
to  the  policy  of  their  bankers.  Judged  by  the  highest 
standard — namely,  the  development  and  growth  of  a 
nation's  industries,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  German 
system  has  proved  itself  to  be  immeasurably  superior  to 
ours.  Do  our  bankers  intend  to  assist  British  manu- 
facturers to  capture  German  trade  in  the  future  ?  If 
they  do,  they  must  alter  their  policy.  \Miich  is  best  for 
a  nation,  the  possession  of  great  and  varied  manu- 
factures, of  numerous  engineering  works,  ship-building 
yards,  electrical  undertakings  and  general  industries, 
or  a  monopoly  of  the  world's  banking  business  ? 

How  much  employment  does  the  latter  give  in  com- 
parison to  the  former  ?  Would  cither  the  United  States 
or  Germany  be  willing  to  exchange  its  iron,  steel  and 
electrical  industries  for  the  whole  of  our  banking  busi- 
ness ?  Is  it  not  better  for  a  nation  morally,  pecuniarily, 
physically  and. socially  to  be  able  to  employ  its  people 
as  scientists,  agriculturists,  mechanics,  engineers, 
chemists,  electricians  than  as  bank  clerks,  chauffeurs, 
footmen  and  butlers  ?  I  repeat  that  the  thing  that 
matters  to  us  is,  whether  our  industrial  and  productive 
activities  are  to  be  developed  ?  Are  we  producing  com- 
modities, food,  minerals  and  other  necessities  as  well  as 
manufactured  goods  in  sufficient  quantities  to  meet  the 
public  needs,  and  to  meet  the  national  expenses  ? 

The  loss  of  our  banking  monopoly  may  injure  a  few 
hundred  or  at  most  a  few  thousand  people.  But  our 
loss  of  the  world's  markets  in  trade  and  commerce  will 
mean  the  beginning  of  the  downfall  of  the  British  Empire. 


TO    HELLAS. 

Long,  long  ago,  in  times  forever  gone. 

Was  dreamt  that  mighty  dream  of  peoples  free, 

Its  immortalities  of  Marathon, 

Of  Salamis  and  of  Thermopylae  ; 

Heroic  love  that  shrank  not,  could  not  shrink 

From  risk  which  daunts  the  mediocre  heart 

Won  victories  through  worth  to  do  and  think — 

The  Titan  worth  to  play  the  Titan's  part  : 

Hellenic  ranks  to  valour  nature-nursed, 

Hellenic  rulers  of  Hellenic  race. 

In  daring  practised  and  in  peril  versed, 

Rejected  weakness,  failure  and  disgrace — 

And  now  can  thine  'neath  bribes  or  threatcnings  covvet 

Where  fraud's  force  failed  and  Persia's  utmost  power  ? 

':-.  \y.  R.'VGG. 

Glimpses  of  Inner  Russia,  by  Gustay  Genrychowitch 
(Simpkin,  Marshall  and  Co.,  is.  net),  is  a  little  volume  of 
Russian  sketches  from  which  one  may  learn  much  of  the 
real  Russia.  Some  of  its.  sketches  are  concerned  with  the 
effect  the  war  has  had  on  Rxissia. 


.0 


February  17,  igib. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


CHAYA. 

A   Romance   of  the   South   Seas. 
By  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoole. 


[Synopsis  :  Macquart,  who  describes  himself  as  lucky 
when  adventuring,  hut  unlucky  as  Satan  when  speculating,  finds 
himself  in  Sydney  down  on  his  luck.  He  has  a  wonderful 
story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in  'New  Guinea  and  a  chance 
acquaijitance,  a  sporting  man  about  town,  Tillman,  offers  to 
introduce  him  to  an  apparently  sporting  and  really  wealthy 
wool-broker,  Curlewis,  with  a  view  to  financing  his  scheme. 
The  night  before  the  interview  Macquart,  sleeping  in  a  park, 
not  having  the  price  of  a  bed  on  him,  makes  the  acquaintance 
of  Houghton,  a  well-educated  Englishman,  also  out  of  a  job. 
Tillman,  Macquart  and  Houghton  go  to  Curlewis'  office,  and 
Macquart  tells  Ms  story  ;  Screed  the  partner  of  Curlewis,  is 
also  present,  but  takes  no  part  in  the  conversation,  going  on 
steadily  with  his  work.  They  resent  his  presence,  and  when 
Curlewis  turns  down  their  proposition,  tJiey  feel  it  is  due  in  an 
uncanny  way  to  Screed's  antagonism.  Macquart's  story  of 
how  the  gold  came  to  be  hidden  and  deserted  is  most  thrilling 
but  conveys  the  impression  that  he  himself  took  an  active  part 
in  the  work,  though  he  talks  of  a  dead  man  named  Smith. 
Macquart  walks  out  of  the  office  with  a  bold  air,  remarking 
that  it  needs  a  great  man  like  Rhodes,  not  "  a  sane  business 
man,"  to  grasp  the  proposition.  Soon  after  the  three  have  left 
Screed  leaves  the  office  telling  his  partner  he  will  not  be  long. 
He  finds  the  three  adventurers  at  a  well-known  bar  ;  he  mentions 
lothem  Macquart's  story  has  interested  him,  and  asks  them  to  his 
house  that  evening.  They  go.  He  provides  them  with  cigars 
and  whisky  and  sodas,  and  together  they  pore  over  maps  and 
charts  of  New  Guinea.  Screed  finds  Macquart's  chart  is 
confirmed  by  an  Admiralty  chart.  He  agrees  to  put  up  £1,000, 
having  first  carefully  tied  up  Macquart  and  his  friends  by  a 
cleverly  worded  letter  of  promise.  He  also  undertakes  to  find 
them  a  ship,  he  himself  having  secured  an  option  on  a  suitable 
vessel — a  yawl.  They  are  to  meet  next  Monday  to  go  over  the 
"Barracuda,"  as  the  yawl  is  called.'] 

CHAPTER  V. 
Captain  Hull. 

SAN  FRANCISCO  might  have  possessed  the  greatest 
harbour  in  the  world,  the  chance  was  thrown  away 
for  want  of  a  genius  who  would  have  included  all 
the  great  waterways  known  now  as  San  Francisco 
Bay,  San  Pablo  Bay  and  Suisun  Bay  under  the  generic  name 
Harbour.  Sydney  was  wiser  and  gave  the  great  bay  which 
Nature  presented  to  her  its  ''proper  name,  it  is  really  a  nest 
of  harbours  ;  all  sorts  of  creeks  and  coves  give  wht  riage  and 
anchorage  to  all  sorts  of  craft. 

Farm  Cove  is  the  naval  anchorage,  and  beyond  Farm 
Cove,  in  the  direction  of  the  Heads,  lies  a  narrow  bay  used 
mostly  for  fishing  boats  and  yachts  of  small  tonnage.  The 
Barracuda  was  anchored  here,  and  here  next  morning  at  seven 
o'clock,  Screed  and  his  companions  turned  up  to  inspect  the 
yawl.  They  hired  a  boat  and  Tillman  sculled  them  across 
to  her.  There  was  no  watchman  on  board,  and  so  whilst 
making  their  survey  they  could  talk  unhindered. 

Tillman  was  at  once  taken  with  the  craft.  He  was  a 
born  sailor  and  his  life  in  Sydney  had  not  dimmed  the 
instinctive  eye  that  told  him  at  a  glance  the  worth  of  the 
Barracuda  as  a  sea  boat.  She  was,  as  Screed  had  said,  a  fifty- 
footer,  decked  over  all,  possessing  a  cabin  aft  that  woul  give 
accommodation  to  five  at  a  pinch,  a  tiny  fo'c'sle  forward  and  a 
caboose  where  one  could  scarcely  swing  a  cat,  but  which  was 
good  enough  for  all  their  purposes.  She  had  two  boats,  a 
collapsible  and  a  four-oared  clinker-built  scow,  possessing 
mast  and  lug  sail.  She  was  white  painted  and  the  brass-work 
had  been  polished  up  till  it  shone  in  the  morning  light,  the 
rigging  both  standing  and  running  was  in  perfect  condition, 
as  were  the  spars,  including  the  spare  booms  and  gaffs  stowed 
on  deck  ;  the  blocks  were  in  perfect  order,  the  narrow  white 
planking  of  the  deck  holy-stoned  and  scrubbed  till  each 
teak  dowel  showed,  and  there  was  not  a  scrap  of  raffle  or 
canvas  bucket  out  of  place  or  a  loose  rope  end  to  be  seen. 

"  She's  a  peach,"  said  Tillman. 

He  led  the  way  down  below  to  the  cabin.  Though  the 
tiny  ports  were  closed  and  the  sky-light,  there  was  no  trace 
of  must  or  cockroaches,  or  that  fusty  smell  that  comes  to  an 
old  ship  or  a  vessel  that  has  been  neglected  ;  the  bunk  bedding 
was   good.     Tillman,   who  had   taken  command  of  the  in- 


specting party,  poked  his  nose  everyv/here,  into  the  tiny  pan- 
try, which  contained  everything  in  the  form  of  crockery  ware 
necessary,  into  the  lazarette  and  the  lockers.  He  opened  the 
ports,  glanced  at  the  tell-tale  compass  overhead,  then,  leading 
the  way  on  deck  again,  he  inspected  the  fo'c'sle,  noted  that 
all  the  cooking  arrangements  in  the  caboose  were  in  order, 
that  the  Rippingille  stove  was  next  to  new,  and  the  pots  and 
pans  poUshed  and  speckless. 

Then  he  turned  to  Screed. 

"  Well,"  said  he,  "  all  I  can  say  is  she  is  ready  for  sea, 
and  I'd  start  in  her  this  afternoon  if  the  provisions  and  water 
were  aboard." 

"  There's  nothing  wanting,"  said  Macquart,  "  except  the 
charts  and  chronometer  and  the  sailing  orders." 

"  I'm  glad  you  are  of  my  way  of  thinking,"  said  Screed. 
"  I'm  not  a  practical  seaman  myself,  but,  as  I  told  you,  I  have 
some  interest  in  shippving,  and  I  was  sure  this  boat  would  fill 
the  requirements.  She  is  easily  handled,  I  know  that  from 
Mackenzie,  her  last  skipper." 

"  She'll  handle  herself."  said  Tillman.  "  I  shouldn't 
mind  taking  her  round  the  world  with  only  Houghton  here 
to  help.  You  could  heave  her  to  for  a  rest  whenever  you 
wanted,  she'd  sleep  hove  to.  Well,  I  will  sign  on  for  one, 
and  there's  no  use  wasting  time  asking  Macquart  or  Houghton 
if  they  object  to  coming  because  the  dinner  napkins  haven't 
pink  fringes.  How  long  will  it  take  you  to  get  the  provisions 
and  everything  on  board  ?  " 

"  A  week  will  do  it,"  said  Screed. 

"  Let's  fix  it,  then,"  said  Macquart.  "  To-day  is 
Wednesday.  We'll  start  this  day  week,  weather  permitting— 
that  is  to  say,  unless  there's  a  hurricane  blowing." 

"  This  day  week,"  said  Screed,  "  and  now  I  must  get 
back  to  the  office  ;  unlike  you  people,  I  am  the  slave  of  Time. 
I  will  figure  out  the  stores  list  during  the  day  and  put  it  in  the 
hands  of  Macdermott.  He'll  do  everything,  charts — stores — 
everything.  However,  the  three  of  you  might  drop  in  and 
see  me  to-night  after  supper  to  go  more  closely  over  details, 
and  I  will  have  a  duplicate  of  the  stores  list  to  show  you." 

They  rowed  ashore,  and  Screed  went  off  in  a  hurry  to  his 
office,  leaving  the  others  to  return  to  the  city  at  their  leisure. 

"  Screed's  ashamed  to  be  seen  with  us,"  said  Tillman, 
"  not  that  we  are  so  disreputable,  but  he's  an  awful  old  stick, 
or  pretends  to  be,  and  I  suppose  I  have  a  reputation,  rather, 
for  jocularity  and  high  hving  ;  well,  it  don't  matter  as  long 
as  he  stumps  up  the  coin.  Come  along,  you  chaps,  I'm  going 
to  have  some  breakfast." 

The  three  proceeded  from  the  waterside  to  the  city.  It 
was  a  glorious  morning,  with  a  blue  and  blazing  sky  and  wind 
enough  to  temper  the  heat.  The  white  gulls  fishing  in  the 
harbour  came  drifting  on  the  wind  occasionally  right  overhead 
and  their  creaky  cries  mixed  with  the  rumble  of  traffic  and 
the  bustle  of  the  wharves ;  the  spirits  of  early  morning 
and  summer,  of  youth  and  adventure  were  abroad,  and 
Houghton  knew  again  that  it  was  good  to  be  alive. 

Macquart  was  in  high  good  humour.  That  mysterious 
person  never  smiled,  his  gaiety  only  finding  expression  in  a 
certain  contained  vivacity  of  manner  and  movement  unmis- 
takable when  you  knew  the  man.  This  morning,  as  he  walked 
side  by  side  with  Tillman  and  the  other,  it  was  very  noticeable  ; 
Macquart  was  in  feather.  Everything  was  going  well  with 
him,  his  plans  were  succeeding  to  a  charm,  the  ghostly 
treasure  he  had  been  carrying  about  the  world  for  the  last 
fifteen  years,  the  phantom  treasure  that  had  nearly  ruined 
him,  was  about  to  materialise,  soon  he  would  be  touching  gold, 
red,  warm,  chinking  gold. 

Macquart,  as  he  walked,  scarcely  heard  the  chatter  of 
his  companions  ;  he  was  seeing  yellow,  his  past  was  forgotten, 
the  present  scarcely  felt  and  the  future  entirely  absorbing 
his  thoughts,  when,  turning  a  street  corner,  a  hand  clapped 
him  on  the  shoulder  and  a  voice  cried  : 

"  B y  Joe,  by  all  the  Powers  !  " 

Tillman,  wheeling  round  at  the  sound  of  the  voice,  saw 
the  questioner  with  his  hand  still  on  Macquart's  shoulder. 
A  big,  sailor-like  man  he  was,  rough-looking  and  badly  dressed, 
yet  with  no  touch  of  the  fo'c'sle  about  him. 

Macquart  looked  blighted,  the  blood  had  left  his  face, 
leaving  it  a  dingy  yellow ;  he  seemed  at  a  loss  for  words  or 
breath,  but  only  for  a  moment. 

"  Why,  it's  Captain  Hull,"  said  he.  Then  turning  swiftly 
to  Tillman  :  "  I'll  see  you  to-night,"  he  cried,  "  at  the  place 
— you  know.  I  want  to  have  a  word  with  my  friend,  Captaiti 
Hull  ;  haven't  seen  him  for  years."     He  gave  Tillman  a  wink 


19 


LAND      AND      WATER 


February  17,  19 16 


as  if  to  imply  that  there  was  more  in  all  this  than  he  could 
explain  at  the  moment,  then,  turning,  he  walked  off  with  the 
Captain,  leaving  Tillman  and  Houghton  to  go  their  way  won- 
dering at  this  new  development  and  somewhat  disturbed  in 
mind. 

Hull  said  nothing  for  twenty  yards  or  so.  He  was  chuck- 
Ung  to  himself  as  if  over  some  joke  he  had  just  heard.  Then 
he  said  : — 

"  Who  were  them  guys  ?  " 

"  O,  two  men  I  picked  up,"  said  Macquart.  "  Sydney 
chaps — What  are  you  doing  here  ?  " 

"Sydney  chaps  were  they,"  said  Hull,  seeming  deaf  to 
the  question.     "  Mugs  for  sure,  un-fort'nate  mugs." 

He  slapped  his  thigh  as  he  walked,  seeming  to  commune 
with  himself  still  over  some  joke  ;  his  last  words  were  scarcely 
compUmentary  to  Macquart,  but  that  gentleman  did  not  show 
umbrage.  Macquart  was  not  indeed  in  the  position  to  take 
umbrage  at  anything  Captain  Hull  might  choose  to  say  to 
him.  He  looked  now,  as  he  walked  along  with  his  com- 
panion, Uke  a  predatory  bird  subdued  and  led  by  its  captor. 
Captain  Hull,  after  a  few  moments  more  of  internal  com- 
munion, suddenly  broke  silence.  All  at  once  he  began 
speaking  as  though  he  and  Macquart  had  only  just  met.  Up 
to  this,  he  had  been  gloating  over  his  prey,  now,  of  a  sudden, 
he  struck.  , 

"  Well,"  said  he,  "  this  is  a  surprise.  It  is  so  ;  and  to 
think  it's  lower  year  and  more  since  we  parted.  Fower  year 
and  more  since  you  left  me  blind  with  tlie  drink  in  that  pub 
at  San  Lorenzo  and  bolted  with  me  money." 

"  That  I  did  not,"  said  Macquart.  "  It  was  an  accident. 
I  was  as  drunk  as  you.     I  was  nailed  by  a  crimp." 

"  O,  you  was  nailed  by  a  crimp,  was  you,"  said  Hull,  as 
though  quite  open  to  be  convinced  ;  "  pore  chap,  and  was  you 
shanghaied,  maybe  ?  " 
"  I  was." 

"  And  yet  four  days  later  you  was  cutting  the  cards  at 
Black  Sam's  on  the  Barbary  Coast  and  gaoled  for  assault 
an'  drink  same  night,  paying'  your  fine  next  morning  with  the 
money  you  choused  me  of.     How  do  you  make  that  out  ?  " 

"  It's  not  true,"  said  Macquart.  "  I  don't  know  who 
stuffed  you  up  with  those  hes.  It's  not  true — that's  all  I 
can  say,  and  I  leave  it  there." 

"  And  are  you  still  on  the  old  treasure  liftin'  job,"  asked 
Captain  Hull  tenderly,  and  quite  ignoring  the  denials  of  the 
other,  "  or  was  that  a  lie  as  well  £is  the  others  you  spun 
me?  " 

"  That  was  no  He,"  cried  Macquart,  flushing  under  the 
torture  of  the  last  five  minutes  ;  without  a  rag  of  his  new-found 
self-respect  and  self-satisfaction  left  he  caught  at  the  one  bit  of 
truth,  as  a  naked  man  might  catch  at  a  cloth  to  cover  himself 
with.  "  That  was  no  lie  ;  the  treasure  was  there,  it's  there 
now  and  only  waits  lifting." 

"  I  believe  you  ain't  wrong,"  said  Captain  Hull.  "  I've 
always  took  notice  that  the  biggest  liars  haven't  no  mem'ries, 
but  gives  different  change  every  time  they  spins  the  same  yarn  ; 
but  you  always  stuck  consistent  to  that  yarn  of  yours,  and 
so  it  was,  maybe,  I  put  up  my  two  hundred  dollars  on  a  half- 
share  lay — Come  in  here."  He  stopped  at  the  door  of  a 
restaurant. 

"  What  do  you  want  going  in  there  for  ?  "  asked  Mac- 
quart. 

"  I'll  soon  show  you — you  follow  me,  for  you've  got  to 
pay." 

He  entered  and  took  a  seat  at  a  table  near  the  door, 
Macquart  sitting  down  also. 

"  Have  you  any  money  ?  "  asked  Macquart. 
"  Money  ?  "  rephed  Captain  Hull,  taking  up  the  menu. 
"  What's  that — is  it  a  herb  ?  Money — let's  see  ;  0,  ay,  money, 
I  remember  now,  round  stuff  it  was,  made  o'  metal,  if  I  remem- 
ber right.  No,  I  ain't  got  no  money,  and  ain't  had  none  since 
I  can  remember.  Power  years  ago  I  saw  the  last  of  my  money 
— you  boned  it.     Waiter,  kim  here." 

The  waiter  approached,  and  with  a  huge  forefinger,  Hull 
indicated  his  desires  upon  the  menu. 

"  A  porterhouse  steak,  two  kidneys  and  bacon  to  toiler, 
scrambled  eggs,  toast  and  coffee,  and  look  sharp — for  two, 
yes,  make  it  for  two  and  this  gentleman  pays." 

Macquart  seemed  resigned.  He  said  nothing  whilst 
the  food  was  being  brought,  then,  when  it  was  on  the  table, 
he  fell  to  on  it  as  readily  as  the  other.  During  the  meal,  the 
two  men  were  entirely  amicable,  Uke  two  jackals  that  had  dis- 
covered a  carcase  they  fell  to,  and  all  disputes  were  put  aside 
till  the  meal  was  done  with. 

Nearlj'  a  sovereign's  worth  of  food  having  been  destroyed, 
Macquart  paid,  and  the  pair  left  the  cafe  and  took  their  way 
towards  Market  Street.  Captain  Hull,  well  fed  now,  was 
slightly  more  amicable  in  his  manner  towards  Macquart. 

Captain  Hull  had  pretty  keen  instincts.  He  had  met 
Macquart  when  the  latter  was  walking  with  two  "  Sydney 
chaps,"  Micquart  had  exhibited  ready  money  in  the  cafe, 
Macquart  was  evidently  on  some  job  here  in  Sydney,  and  Hull 


determined  in  his  own  mind  to  stick  to  Macquart  like  a 
leech. 

He  scented  money. 

Hull,  to  describe  him  more  fully,  was  a  big,  blonde,  blue- 
eyed  man,  much  battered  by  the  sea  and  the  world  and 
himself.  Children  Uked  him.  There  were  terrible  things  in 
his  life,  he  had  fought  and  drank  and  rogued  and  ranged 
through  all  the  parallels  of  latitude  and  all  the  years  of  his 
discretion  ;  not  a  shipowner  from  'Frisco  to  London  Docks 
would  have  employed  him,  unless  on  a  sinking  job,  and  those 
sort  of  things  aren't  done  now,  much.  He  had  been  kicked 
out  of  New  Ireland,  he  had  smelt  Norfolk  Island,  he  had  a  bad 
name  in  Callao — yet,  somehow,  children  liked  him.  But  he 
was  a  hard  case  all  tiie  same,  with  one  redeeming  virtue, 
however,  only  to  be  expressed  in  his  own  language — he  had 
never  gone  back  on  a  pal. 

Ttie  streets  were  crowded,  and  as  they  walked  along, 
Captain  Hull  looked  into  the  shop  windows,  examining  the 
goods  displayed  therein  and  making  remarks  upon  them  to 
his  companion.  The  two  men  might  have  been  the  best  com- 
panions taking  a  morning  stroll  through  the  city,  but  it  might 
have  been  noticed  that  the  conversation  was  mostly  on  the  part 
of  Captain  Hull.  That  gentleman  having  inspected  ladies' 
petticoats,  jewellery,  and  the  contents  of  a  hardware  shop, 
paused  before  a  tobacconist's  and,  seized  with  the  desire  to 
smoke,  entered,  bought  two  ci|ars,  keeping  his  eye  on  Mac- 
quart  all  the  time  through  the  fascia,  paid  for  them,  lit  one, 
and  came  out  again— to  find  Macquart  gone. 

The  thing  seemed  impossible.  He  had  never  lost  sight 
of  the  elusive  one,  or  only  for  the  momentary  time  required 
to  pick  up  his  change  and  hght  his  cigar  ;  all  the  same,  Macquart 
had  vanished.  Not  a  sign  of  him  was  to  be  seen  in  the  crowded 
and  bustling  street. 

"  Fitchered,"  said  the  Captain.  He  stood  looking  to 
right  and  left.  He  could  see  quite  a  long  way,  and  the  crowd 
was  not  dense  enough  to  prevent  him  from  picking  out  Mac- 
quart's  figure  had  it  been  visible,  but  Macquart  had  vanished 
just  as  the  rabbit  vanishes  when  the  conjuror  places  it  under 
the  tall  silk  hat,  and  just  as  surprisingly.  Captain  Hull 
might  b"^e  asked  himself  whether  the  whole  business  was 
not  an  illusion,  only  for  the  fact  that  he  was  a  man  ungiven 
to  self-questioning. 

"  Well,  of  all  the  swine,"  said  he,  recovering    his 

breath  and  his  swearing  capacity  at  the  same  time.  "  Give 
me  the  slip,  has  he  ?  Turned  hisself  inside  out  whiles  I  was 
lightin'  a  see-gar?     Blest  if  it  ain't "San  Lorenzo  over  again, 

and  if  he  ain't  sold  me  the  same  old  dog,  b him.     Well, 

"we'll  see."       He  walked  along  in  the  direction  of  the  Paris 
House,  passed  it,  and  entered  a  bar. 

Here  he  stood  with  his  elbow  on  the  counter,  and  a  whiskey 
before  him,  thinking  things  over. 

Losing  Macquart  was  like  losing  his  purse.  The  Captain 
was  very  hard  up  indeed,  broke  to  the  world — to  use  his  own 
expression,  and  Macquart  seemed  flush  ;  but  the  money  part 
of  the  question  bulked  small  in  his  eyes  beside  the  fact  that 
he  had  been  done.  And  now,  as  he  stood  thinking  things  over 
and  feehng  his  defeat  and  weighing  it,  a  new  idea  came  to 
him.  Macquart  was  on  some  paying  job  ;  the  fact  that  he  had 
money,  and  the  fact  that  he  was  so  anxious  to  get  rid  of  him 
— Hull — pointed  in  the  same  direction. 

He  had  lost  not  only  the  few  pounds  he  might  have 
squeezed  out  of  Macquart,  but  the  chance  of  standing  in  over 
some  shady  business.  i 

This  thought  so  infuriated  him  that  he  finished  off  his 
whiskey  at  a  gulp  and  started  off  for  pastures  new.  He  wan- 
dered into  Lamperts,  and  the  first  person  he  saw  there  was 
Tillman,  who  was  standing  at  the  bar  with  Houghton  and  talk- 
ing to  several  jovial- looking  strangers. 

Tillman  was  in  high  feather.  Somehow  or  another,  news 
that  he  was  leaving  .Sydney  on  a  venture  had  leaked  out, 
probably  from  his  own  hps.  Before  taking  Houghton  and 
Macquart  to  Curlewis,  he  had  talked  of  something  mysterious 
that  he  had  up  his  sleeve,  something  in  which  the  profits 
would  be  enormous — if  it  panned  out.  You  can  fancy  him 
with  his  straw  hat  on  the  back  of  his  head  and  a  cigarette 
between  his  fingers  telling  one  of  the  boys  of  what  he  was  going 
to  do.     "  Never  you  mind  where — a  new  place  and  a  new  thing 

and  fids  of  money  in  it,  bags  of  coin " 

Curlewis  had  also  been  talking. 

"  Well,  I  must  be  off,"  Tillman  was  saying.  "  Can't 
waste  any  more  time  on  you,  Billy.  I've  business  to  attend 
to."  He  took  Houghton's  arm  and  led  him  off.  Neither  of 
them  noticed  Hull,  whom  they  would  certainly  have  recognised 
as  the  man  who  had  taken  Macquart  off  that  morning,  and  the 
swing  door  had  scarcely  closed  on  them  when  criticism  broke 
out  at  the  counter. 

"  God  help  the  business  that  B  )')by  is  attending  to," 
said  Billy,  a  bibulous-looking  youth  i.i  check-tweed  and  with 
a  cigarette  in  the  corner  of  his  mouth.  "  I  reckon  I  know  it, 
too.     They've  got  a  new  barmaid  at  the  Paris  House." 

"  No,  it  aren't  that,"  said  a  gentleman,  with  a  face  like 


February   17,  1916. 


LAND       AND      WATER 


Chaya,  a  iiomancc  of  the  South  Seas-i 


tiated    by  Joseph   Simpion,   R.H.A. 


Macquart  looked  blighted,  the  blood  had  left  his  face,  leaving  it  a  dingy  yellow. 


a  horse  and  a  diamond  horse-shoe  in  his  cravat.  "  Bobby's 
on  some  sure  enough  lay  ;  he's  been  tryin'  to  get  Curlewis  into 
it.  I  heard  a  chap  sayin'  Cur  had  told  him  all  about  it,  a  gold 
mine  hid  somewhere  up  north.  Bobby  has  been  goin'  about 
the  last  few  days  with  a  crazy-lookin'  guy  that's  got  the  loca- 
tion of  the  mine,  a  chap  with  the  hair  growin'  through  his  hat 
an'  his  ten  toes  stickin'  through  his  boots." 

Captain  Hull,  who  had  obtained  a  whiskey,  stood  wth  it 
in  his  hand,  waiting  to  hear  more,  but  the  conversation  turned 
away  from  Tillman  to  horses,  and,  finishing  his  drink,  the 
Captain  went  to  the  telephone-box  in  the  corner,  took  the 
directory,  and  turned  its  pages  laboriously  till  he  found  what 
he  wanted.  Then,  with  the  address  of  Curlewis  and  Screed 
in  his  mind,  he  started  off. 

Certain  that  the  crazy-looking  guy  referred  to  by  the 
horsey  man  was  Macquart,  he  was  now  more  convinced  than 
ever  that  something  was  up,  and  quite  determined  to  be  in  it 
or  to  spoil  everything. 

He  reached  Curlewis'  office,  went  upstairs,  gave  his  name 
to  the  clerk,  and  in  a  few  minutes  was  admitted  to  the  inner 
office  and  sanctum  of  the  firm,where  Curlewis  was  standing  with 
his  back  to  the  stove,  with  his  hands  in  his  pockets,  talking 
to  Screed  who  was  seated  at  his  desk. 


Hull,  hat  in  hand,  made  a  scrape,  half  turned  to  see  that 
the  door  was  shut,  and  then  spoke. 

"  Which  of  you  gentlemen  is  Mr.  Curlewis,"  said  he. 
"  I've  somethin'  to  say  to  Mr.  Curlewis  and  it  won't  bear 
repeatin'  before  anyone  else." 

"  My  name  is  Curlewis,"  replied  the  chief  of  the  firm, 
"  and  you  can  say  whatever  you  Uke  here.  This  is  Mr.  Screed, 
my  partner — sit  down." 

"  Well,  now,"  said  the  Captain,  taking  the  seat  pointed 
out  to  him  and  placing  his  hat  on  the  floor.  "  Did  you  by 
any  chance  in  the  last  day  o  •  two  come  across  a  guy  by  the 
name  of  Macquart.  I'm  not  askin'  to  be  inquisitive.  I  have 
my  meanin'." 

"  I  take  you,"  replied  Curlewis,  "  and  I  can  give  you  an 
answer  straight.  I  have  during  the  last  day  or  two  come 
across  a  guy  by  the  name  of  Macquart — What  about 
him  ?  " 

"  Ah.  there's  the  rub,"  said  Hull.  "  I'm  not  askin'  to 
be  inquisitive,  but  did  this  chap  lay  any  proposal  before  you 
with  regard  to  money  or  mines  or  such  like  ?  " 

"  You  may  take  it  from  me  that  he  did,"  said  Curlewis  ; 
"  a  very  big  proposal — what  more  ? 

The  Captain  was  silent  for  a  moment.     Then  ue  said  : 


LAND      AND      WATER 


February  17,  1916. 


"  Well,  that's  what  I  wanted  to  be  at.  I  reckon  you  are 
goin'  in  with  him  on  some  deal,  and  all  I  have  to  say  is,  where 
he  goes,  1  goes." 

"  I  don't  quite  understand,"  said  Curlewis. 

"  This  way.  If  I  don't  get  half  shares  with  Macquart, 
I'll  blow  the  gaff  on  him  and  bust  up  the  business." 

Screed,  who  was  writing,  or  pretending  to  write,  moved 
uneasily.     Curlewis  smiled. 

"  Well,  my  dear  sir,"  said  he,  "  go  and  blow  the  gaff  on 
this  person  as  much  as  you  please,  it  is  no  affair  of  mine.  I 
have  nothing  to  do  with  him.  I  refused  his  plan  to  hunt  for 
gold  in  New  Guinea  and  there's  an  end  of  it." 

"  New  Guinea,"  said  Hull.  "  So  he's  on  the  old  lay. 
1  ought  to  a'  guessed  it ;  swab !  Well,  I'm  sorry  to  have 
taken  up  your  time,  but  might  I  ask  you  where  he's  livin'  now 
or  where  I  might  find  him  ?  " 

"  I  should  think  most  probably  if  you  wait  long  enough, 
you  might  find  him  in  gaol,"  said  Curlewis.  "  No,  I  cannot 
tell  you  where  he  hves,  the  gentleman  did  not  leave  his  visiting 
card  behind  him." 

The  Captain  picked  his  hat  up  from  the  floor,  rose  from 
his  chair  and  hung  in  irons  for  a  moment ;  Screed,  at  the  same 
time  rose  in  a  leisurely  fashion,  put  on  his  hat,  and 
collected  some  letters  as  if  for  the  purpose  of  taking  them  to 
the  post. 

"  Well,  good-day  to  you,  gentlemen,"  said  Hull  at  last. 
"  I've  lost  my  time  and  yours,  and  there's  no  more  to  be  said  ; 
but  let  me  once  lay  my  hands  on  that  gink,  and  Lord  !  won't 
I  treat  him  lovely." 

He  went  out,  and,  disregarding  the  lift,  thundered  down 
the  stairs. 

In  the  street,  he  took  off  his  hat  and  \viped  his  brow  with 
his  coat-sleeve. 

It  was  a  comfort  to  think  that  Macquart  had  failed  to 
rope  in  Curlewis,  but  it  was  rather  a  cold  comfort,  considering 
the  fact  that  the  Captain  was  at  his  last  half-crown.  He  walked 
away  down  the  street,  revolving  this  latter  fact  in  his  mind. 

The  fo'c'sle  stared  him  in  the  face,  To  the  after-guard 
users  of  the  sea,  the  fo'c'sle  is  the  last  resort,  the  last  threat 
of  Fate.  Hull,  a  once  Master-mariner  of  decent  repute,  had 
been  driven  into  the  fo'c'sle  time  and  again  these  latter  years, 
and  now  the  prospect  was  opening  before  him  once  more. 
At  the  corner  of  the  street,  he  was  standing  with  his  hands 
in  his  pockets  cursing  his  luck  and  Macquart,  alternately, 
when  someone  spoke  to  him. 

It  was  Screed. 

"  Captain  Hull,"  said  Screed,  "  a  word  with  you." 

"  Good  Lord  !  "  said  Hull,  recognising  the  other,  "  why 
it's  Mr.-^" 

"  Screed,  yes,  that's  my  name.  I  want  to  speak  to  you 
for  a  minute,  walk  with  me  down  the  street  and  we  can  talk 
as  we  go.  I  may  be  of  ilse  to  you.  Now,  see  here,  what's 
all  this  about  that  man  Macquart  ?  What  do  you  know 
about  him  ?  " 

"  What  do  I  know  about  him,"  burst  out  the  Captain. 
"  I  know  this,  he's  the  biggest  blackguard  that  ever  walked  on 
two  feet." 

"  I  know  that,"  said  Screed,  "  or,  at  least,  that  he  is  a 
very  considerable  scamp;  what  I'm  getting  at  is  this  :  became 
to  a  friend  of  mine  with  a  proposition  about  buried  treasure 
in  New  Guinea.  Now,  clear  your  mind  of  all  prejudice — 
do  you  know  anything  against  that  proposition.  I  mean,  is 
it  wild-cat  or  genuine  ?  " 

The  Captain  was  silent  for  a  moment.  Then  he  said  : 
"  It's  right  enough.  I  b'lieve  the  stuff's  there  and  the  fellow's 
been  tryin'  after  it  for  years,  but  he's  such  an  onnatural  bad 
'un,  he's  never  been  able  to  pull  the  thing  off.  He  had  me  on 
to  it ;  we  all  but  got  a  chap  in  'Frisco  to  put  up  the  coin 
for  an  expedition,  then  he  ran  crooked  with  a  friend  of  the 
chap's — ran  crooked  over  a  ten  cent  business — and  the  deal 
was  off.  He  finished  up  by  boning  all  my  coin  and  leavin' 
me  drunk  in  a  pub  in  San  Lorenzo  fower  years  ago.  Now,  I 
ain't  much,  but  I'm  straight  over  a  deal  and  I've  run  guns 
and  smuggled  and  done  many  another  job  off  the  O.K.,  but  I 
ain't  an  out-and-outer.  No,  I  ain't  an  out-and-outer.  Mac  is, 
an'  that's  why  I  want  to  g  t  hold  on  him.  I  wants  to  punch 
that  chap's  head,  I'm  sufferin'  to  punch  that  chap's  head^ 

I'm " 

"  Don't  talk  of  punching  heads,"  said  Screed.  "  That's 
not  business,  and  you  are  wasting  time.  Macquart  has  got 
his  expedition  together  through  a  friend  of  mine,  and  he  is 
starting  with  two  other  men  to  pull  this  gold  ;  the  only  doubt 
I  have  is  that  he  seems  such  an  extraordinary  villain,  he  may 


more  intimate  knowledge  of  this  man.  Now,  Captain,  I  have 
here  a  job  for  you.  Take  yourself  out  of  Sydney  to-day  so 
that  there  may  be  no  cliance  of  your  meeting  Macquart,  and 
call  upon  me  to-morrow  morning  at  eight  o'clock.  Here's  my 
card  with  my  address." 

The  Captain  took  the  card  between  an  immense  finger 
and,  thumb. 

"  I'll  come,"  said  he,  "  but  I'll  let  you  know  pretty  plainly 
I'm  bust,  broke  to  the  world  ;  half-a-crown  is  all  I  have,  and 
God  knows  where  I'm  to  get  the  next  happenny." 

"  Here's  a  sovereign,"  said  Screed,  "  and  go  slow  with 
it.  Don't  get  on  the  liquor,  whatever  you  do,  for  that  would 
spoil  all,  and  Sydney  is  full  of  temptation.  Get  out  some- 
where on  the  harbour  side,  have  as  much  food  as  you  want, 
but  no  drink — and,  above  all,  don't  talk.  Don't  mention  this 
affair  and  don't  mention  my  name.  If  you  do,  I'll  call  off 
and  you  may  whistle  for  Macquart.  See  here.  Captain,  you 
may  pull  out  of  this  a  rich  man.  Remember  that,  and  don't 
spoil  the  chance  of  your  life.  I'm  reckoned  a  lucky  man, 
and  any  business  I  take  up  goes  through.  Nine  hundred 
and  ninety-nine  men  out  of  a  thousand  would  not  go  on  with 
this  affair  knowing  what  I  know  about  Macquart.  Well,  it 
does  not  put  me  off.  I  don't  care  a  dump  for  a  man's  charac- 
ter, so  long  as  his  scheme  is  good  and  so  long  as  I  know  his 
character  and  can  take  precautions  against  it." 

"  I  reckon  you'll  have  to  take  a  pocketful  of  precautions 
if  you're  dealing  with  Macquart,"  said  Hull. 

"  I  have  come  to  that  conclusion,"  replied  Screed. 


T 


by  some  chance "  , 

"  I  get  you,"  cut  in  the  Captain.  "  Be  some  chance,  he'll 
do  these  two  guys  in.     He  will  so." 

"  They  are  good  men,"  went  on  Sceed,  "  and  I  have 
warned  them  to  be  on  the  look-ou' ,  an  1  1  will  warn  them 
again,  but  one  must  take  all  preca  tioi,  and  that's  where 
you  come  in.      You  are  older  than  tUc^  are,  and  you  have  a 


CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Outfittixg. 

ILLMAI?  and  Houghton,  little  knowing  of  the  Hull 
incident,  and  Macquart  Uttle  knowing  of  Screed's 
interview  with  Hull,  the  work  of  storing  the 
Barracuda  and  getting  her  ready  for  sea  went  on 
apace. 

One  thing  Tillman  noticed.  Macquart  took  up  his 
residence  on  the  yawl  and  would  not  leave  her.  Once,  when 
Tillman  wanted  a  messenger  to  go  up  town  after  some  fittings 
that  had  not  arrived,  he  asked  Macquart  to  go,  and  Macquart 
refused,  alleging  a  sore  foot. 

Macquart  slept  on  board  and  did  his  own  cooking.  Held 
by  the  deadly  fear  of  Hull,  he  scarcely  shewed  himself  on 
deck,  and  when  a  boat  put  off  from  shore  he  inspected  her 
through  one  of  the  ports  before  coming  up  to  receive  her. 

"  1  can't  make  out  what's  up  with  Macquart,"  said 
Tillman  to  Houghton.  "  Looks  to  me  as  if  he  was  keeping 
hid  from  something." 

"  He's  a  rum  customer,"  replied  Houghton.  "  I  expect, 
maybe,  he  owes  money  ashore  ;  anyhow,  it's  none  of  our 
business." 

They  had  indeed  plenty  of  business  to  attend  to  without 
troubhng  about  Macquart.  Though  the  Barracuda  was 
reckoned  ready  for  sea,  there  were  all  sorts  of  matters  to  be 
put  right  and  adjusted,  all  sorts  of  things  to  be  thought  of 
considering  the  fact  that  the  expedition  might  last  six  months 
or  more.  Caulking  tools  and  material,  for  instance,  had 
not  been  supplied  or  thought  of,  and  they  were  faced  with 
the  difficulty  that  Screed  was  no  sailor  and  therefore  they  had 
to  overhaul  everything  for  themselves.  Screed,  moreover, 
though  he  had  mentioned  the  fact  that  he  was  putting  up 
a  thousand  pounds,  had  a  terrible  eye  towards  expense,  and 
they  had  to  submit  every  item  to  him  and  often  fight  to  obtain 
what  they  wanted. 

"  I'm  blest  if  I'd  have  imdertaken  the  job  if  I'd  known 
Screed  was  such  a  crab  over  halfpence,"  said  Tillman  one 
day  in  disgust.  "  I've  been  fighting  him  over  the  provisions. 
I  want  victuals  for  nine  months,  and  he  has  only  made  out 
for  six.  I  told  him  plain  it  wouldn't  do  ;  he  seemed  to  think 
we  could  victual  up  there  on  the  Guinea  Coast ;  he  doesn't 
care  if  we  go  short — well,  I  knocked  him  on  that.  I  told  him 
we  couldn't  get  anythirg  up  there  but  Beche  de  mer  and 
cocoanuts ;  of  course,  1  was  talking  through  my  hat.  I 
don't  know  but  that  we  mayn't  strike  a  co-operative  stores, 
though  it's  not  likely  ;  anyhow,  he  gave  in.  Then  there's 
guns.  Three  Winchesters  and  three  Colts  automatics  was 
my  ultimatum,  with  two  hundred  rounds  apiece.  Lord  1 
how  he  squealed  ;  but  I  got  'em." 

"  He  talked  a  lot  about  that  thousand  pounds,"  said 
Houghton.  "  I  don't  believe  this  set  out  will  cost  him  more 
than  three  hundred.  The  Barracuda  isn't  lost  money,  he 
can  sell  her  when  we  come  back." 

"  You  mean,  if  we  come  back,"  said  Tillman.  "  We 
are  taking  an  awful  big  risk,  and  don't  you  make  any  mistake 
about  that." 

(To   he  continued.) 

[The  opening  chapters  of  Chaya  have  appeared  in  Land  and  Waikb  of 
February  3  and  10.] 


22 


Supplement  to  Land  and  Watkii,   t'l-rnuary  '24,  lfil6. 


AQUASCUTUM 

FIBLD  6  TRENCH 
COATS. 


The  opinion  of  Officers 
who  have  been  in  the 
Trenches  during  the  cold, 
wet  months  of  the  War 
must  be  most  helpful  to 
those  who  have  not  had 
that  experience,  and  the 
letters  received  from  them 
prove  beyond  any 
possible  doubt  that  the 
"AQUASCUTUM"  is 
the  ONE  COAT  to  be 
relied  upon. 


AQUASCUTUM,   Ltd.. 

Waterproof  Coat  Specialists  for  over  50  years. 
By  Appointment  to  Hia  Majesty  the  King. 

100    REGENT    STREET,   LONDON,  W. 


PERFECTION  IN  TAILORING 


There  Is  an  indeftnahle  line  Detwcen  the  "  Expensively  "  dressed  man  and 

the  "  Perfectly  "   dressed. 

Difficult    to    define    with   civilians,    it    is   doubly   difficult  in    the  case  of 

Military  or  Naval  men. 

*'  Wilkinson's  "  tailorins  carries  the   cnohet   of  "  Pprfwtion."     Their  chief 

cutter  is  an  artist  famous  in  the  West  End.  their  materials  are  right,  and 

experience    in    all    Service   matters    invaluahlo. 

That  is  why  the  "Wilkinson  Tailoring  "  Oept.  is  so  dc^iervedly  popular. 

Their   prices  are  distinctly    moderate  and 

?4    Hours 

is  f^nfficient  time  when   necessary, 

Wilkinson  Sword  Company 

53  Pall  Mall,  London    S.W.  LTD. 

There  is  no  article  required  in   an  Officer  s  Equipment  which  Wilkinsons 
Jo   not  stock- 


The  Original  Cording  s.  Estd.  1839, 
High-Grade 

Military  Waterproofs. 


New  Illustrated  List  of  water- 
proof coats,  boots,  trench  waders, 
portable  baths,  &c.,  at  request. 

THE  "CORWARD"  CAPE 

This  capacious  coat-length  cape  reaches 
well  beluw  the  knees  and  goes  on  easily 
over  equipment  and  even  thickest  mili- 
tary clothing.  In  the  fore-part  are  wide 
slits,  covered  with  flaps  to  button, 
through   which  the  arras  pass. 

The  garment  is  fitted  with  readily  ad- 
justed strap-s,  buckling  in  front,  which 
also  serve  to  carry  the  cape  if  it  be 
thrown  back  temporarily  to  give  entire 
freedom  to  the  arms.  Further,  these 
straps  are  a<lapted  so  that  the  cape 
(rolled  up  into  a,  small  attached  wrap) 
may  be  carried  either  knapsack  fashion, 
m  position  for  immediate  use,  or  slung 
from   the  shoulder. 

A  really  satisfactory  waterproof  outfit 
is  provided  by  supplementing  the  "  Cor- 
ward"  Cape  with  a  pair  of  loose  overall 
leggings,  which  would  be  neatly  hi'ld  in 
the  large  button-to  inside  pocket  of  cape. 

When  ordering  a  "  Corward "  cape, 
or  if  to  be  sent  on  approval,  height 
and  chest  measure,  and  reference 
should  be  fiven. 


J.  G.  CORDING  &  GS 

Waterproofers  to  H.M.  the  King 

Ortly     Addresses : 

19  PICCADILLY,  W.  &35st.  jamess  st. 

S.W. 


INEXPENSIVE 
REST     GOWNS 


Suitable  for  all  manner  of 
occasions.  Designed  by  our 
own  artists  and  made  in  our 
own  workrooms  from  rich 
quality  materials.  The  value 
of  these  gowns  is  quite  ex- 
ceptional, while  the  cut, 
style  and  finish  is  of  a  par- 
ticularly high  order. 

REST  GOWN,  as  sketch,  in 
silk  crepe  de  chine,  with  full 
pleated  skirt,  made  in 
various         lengths,  folded 

bodice  with  collar  of  ecru 
lace  with  gold  threads,  and 
pleated  chiffon  elbow  sleeves. 
Stocked  in  black,  lavender, 
hydrangea  shades  of  blue  and 
pink,  heliotrope,  rose,  two 
shades  of  saxe,  grey,  white, 
sky  and  purple. 


Price   69/6. 


Also     in 
crepe  at 


a    heavier     quality 


84/. 


DebemKam 
firFreebodlv 

Vt'iflrrtore  Street. 

iCovendish  Square)  London.W 


XI 


Sapplemtnt  to  Laxb  *sd  Water.  Februam  54.  WW. 


Famous  War  Correspondent  Returns. 


Mr.  Sydney  A.  Moseloy 
(the  official  war  correspon- 
dent with  the  Mediterra- 
nean Expeditionary 
Force),  who  has  been  in- 
valided home,  writes  from 
the  Press  Club,  Feb.  4th, 
1916: 

"  Waterman's  certainly 
deserved  the  name  of 
'  Ideal  '  in  the  Dardan- 
elles. I  saw  it  in  use 
very  often.  Apart  from 
my  private  work,  I  wrote 
about  100,000  woixis  with 
H — despatches,  artirlta, 
and  a  book.  When  I  lost 
it  after  Suvla  I  realised 
I  "hid  lost  a  friend 
indeed." 


;Miiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiuiiiimi| 


Plutto  :  .VrtPi  JUt.stralioim  Co, 


GIVE  ONE  TO  EACH   OF   YOUR   FRIENDS  ON    ACTIVE  SERVICE. 

Safety  Type  best  for  Naval  and  Military  use. 

Can  be  carried  ■»*ide  down  or  in  any  position. 


3  tTPe* — RKsUr  '  0/6  and  upwardi- 
Safety  •■d  »h«  New  Lever  Pocket 
Se4f-Fillial  Type*.  12  6  and  up- 
ward*, la  Silver  and  Gold  for 
prcactitation. 

Of  Stationtrs  and  Jatcllers 


Fullest  jatUfaction  Juaranteed  Nlb» 
exchangeable  if  not  Buitable.  Call,  or 
icnd    to    ■■  The    Pen  Corner.  Full 

rantc   of  pent  on  view  for  ioapection 
and  trial. 


_  Booklet  trie  from  : 

L.  G.  Sloan,  Z\viiPin<lcxtix.r,  Kingsway,  London. 


i  A   Message  | 

=  FROM    THE    TRENCHES.  S 

S  An  Officer  writes  :  "  My  Waltham  watch  keeps  splendid  = 

—  time  on  Active  Service.                                  .  — 

=  "  Out  here  in  the  East  it  stands  climatic  change  and  _ 

=  an  atmosphere  charged  with  sand,  etc.,  in  a  truly  splen-  ^ 

SS  did  manner.                                                                ,  .    •     .  ^ 

=  "I  know  from  observation  that  a  cheap  watch  is  a  — 

S  delusion  and  a  snare  on  Active  feervice,  and  that  8  why       ^  = 

S  I  prefer  my  Waltham."  — 

=  The    bett    Watch   money   can    bay.      In    tiloer    cat*  ^ 

=  with   strap  and  buckle   from   £3     3s.     Od,  _ 

I  WallhamWatches  I 

=  are  regarded  a.  the  most  dependable  of  »''  VTh}*^?!!;!,-  pT^  — 

:=  Watcbes.  ^ 

S  01  oil  reliable    Waiehmakert  and  Jeaeneu.  j_ 

=  Watch    Booklet     FREE.  = 

=  Wa!tham  Watch  Cj.  (Dipt  63),  125,  High  Holbcm,  tondon,  W.C.  = 


rhe  Major:  Hullo,  Dunlop!  Glad  I 
met  you.  1  particularly  wanted 
to  ask  you  something.  Is  there 
a  shortage  of  Dunlop  tyres?  1 
don't  mean  for  the  Army,  of 
course,  but  for  the  private  user. 

Lrtinlop:       No,  why? 

The  Major:  A  friend  of  mine  is 
wanting  a  Dunlop  and  the  local 
agent  says  he's  not  got  one  and 
can't  get  one, 

Dunlop:  Some  other  firm  has 
pushed  a  few  sets  on  to  him,  I 
expect  We  were  rather  pressed 
some  time  ago,  but  that  is  all 
over  now. 
rhe  Major:  Thanks,  I'll  tell  my  friend, 
and  no  doubt  he'll  insist  on 
having  a  Dunlop. 

Dunlop:  I  should— it  will  pay  him, 
and  I  am  sure  you  will  agree 
with  me  that  one  ought  to  support 
British  firms  if  one  can. 


DUNLOP 

RUBBER    CO.,    LIMITED, 

Foundersof  the  PneumafieTyre  Industry, 

Aston      Cross,      Birmingham. 

14   Regent  Street,  l.ondon.  S.W. 

Paris;  4  Rue  du  Colonel  Moll. 


/- 


Trad* 


Mark. 


y    • 


XII 


LAND  &W  ATER 


Vol.  LXVII  No.  2807. 


THURSDAY,  FEBRUARY  24,  1916.    [^"^J-'s"^°  *^t  price  sixpence 


jewspaperJ  published  weekly 


llll  ho'iis   Raemaeken 


Uravcn  eiciutively  lor  "  Land  and    H'od'r.' 


THE     BLOCKADE. 


February  24,  1916. 


L  .\  X  D      A  X  D      \Y  .\  T  E  R . 


LAND  &  WATER 

Empire    House,    Kingsway,    London,    W.G. 

Telephone:     H'3LBORN     2S28. 


THURSDAY,    FEBRUARY    24,    1916. 

THE  AMERICAN  CRISIS. 

A  WASHINGTON  telegram  quotes  Mr.  Lansing 
to  the  effect  that  Germany's  policy  regai'ding 
submarines  makes  the  situation  between  that 
'  country  and  America  as  grave  as  it  was  when  the 
case  of  the  Liisitania  was  recent.  But  this  surely  must  be 
an  under-statement.  The  issue  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments then  was  not  merely  that  Americans  had  been 
killed,  and  killed  without  justification.  It  was  that  they 
had  been  killed  in  spite  of  the  clearest  kind  of  warning 
that  America  would  hold  Germany  to  account  if,  in  the 
sinking  of  merchantmen  which  Germany  had  threatened, 
any  American  citizens  should  suffer.  The  injury  therefore 
was  not  an  injury  only  to  the  victims.  It  was  an  outrage 
on  the  sovereign  dignity  of  the  State  which,  by  its  warning 
had  pledged  itself  to  protect — or  avenge — them.  And 
if  this  was  the  situation  in  May  and  June  of  last  year, 
how  does  the  case  stand  as  between  two  countries  in 
February  of  this  ?  Has  Germany  done  anything  to 
assuage  the  wounded  pride  of  the  great  Republic  of  the 
West  ?  Regrets  and  apologies  she  has  always  been  willing 
to  offer.  That  she  had  no  wish  or  intention  to  murder 
Americans  she  has  always  been  ready  to  profess,  though 
the  profession  must  sound  strangely  to  those  who  saw  the 
advertisements  published  by  the  German  Embassy 
cautioning  Americans  against  taking  ship  in  the  doomed 
liner.  She  has  been  prepared  to  compound  her  felony 
by  proffering  blood-money  to  the  widowed,  orphaned 
and  bereaved.  But  from  the  first  Mr.  Wilson  has  made  it 
clear  that  such  things  would  not  be  enough.  Expressions 
of  regret,  he  said,  might  suffice  in  ordinary  cases,  but  where 
life  had  been  taken  by  an  illegal  and  inhuman  act,  unpre- 
cedented in  the  history  of  modern  war,  where  over  a  thousand 
men,  women, and  children  had  been  sent  without  challenge 
or  warning  to  their  deaths,  nothing  short  of  a  disavowal 
could  suffice.  Twice — in  May  and  June — was  this  point 
insisted  on.  In  July  the  President  sounded  a  sterner  note. 
Even  disavowal  and  reparation  could  not  wash  out  a 
rjpctition  of  the  offence.  If  murder  was  risked  a  second 
time,  such  an  act,  said  Mr.  Wilson,  must  be  "  looked  upon 
as  deliberately  unfriendly."  If  Germany  persisted, then 
she  would  be  steering  straight  for  war.  And  as  the  cases 
of  the  Arabic,  Persia  and  Ancona  show,  Germany  has 
persisted.  When,  therefore,  Mr.  Lansing  is  reported  as 
saying  that  the  situation  is  as  grave  now  as  it  was  in  IMay 
last  year,  it  can  only  mean  that  a  breach  seems  very  near 
indeedr 

For  obviously,  the  diplomatic  position  is  greatly 
aggravated.  And  it  is  not  aggravated  only  by  many 
repetitions  of  acts  previously  defined  as  "  dehberately 
unfriendly."  It  is  almost  a  greater  aggravation  that  the 
Kaiser's  personal  representative  in  the  American  capital, 
has  been  profuse  in  promises,  glibly  made  in  his  august 
master's  name,  that  Germany  would  not  only  sink  no  un- 
warned liners,  but  no  ships  at  all,  without  securing  the 
safety  of  their  passengers  and  crew.  That  this  promise 
was  definitely  made  after  the  sinking  of  the  Arabic  cannot 
be  questioned.  But  it  was  a  promise  that  Berlin  never 
has  confirmed.  And  now  it  seems  evident  that  Berlin 
never  will  confirm  it  Nor  can  it  he  doubted  that  each 
and  all  of  Count  Bernstorff's  promises  have  been  made  in 
the  full  knowledge  that  they  would  not  rccci\-e  the  (lucs- 


tionable  honour  of  the  Emperor's  endorsement.  How, 
then,  has  the  situation  been  kept  open  so  long  ?  It  can  be 
partly  explained  by  Count  Bernstorff's  singularly  fascinat- 
ing personality — more,  possibly,  by  his  unscrupulous 
dexterity  as  a  diplomat.  But  the  master  cause  of  Mr. 
Wilson's  long-suffering  has  been  his  countrymen's  aversion  ^ 
innate  and  deeply  felt,  for  any  participation  in  any  Euro- 
pean quarrels.  To  avoid  such  entanglements  might 
almost  be  called  a  death-bed  bequest  of  the  Father  of  his 
Country.  To  become  a  party  to  such  entanglements  •  is 
complicated  to-day  by  the  very  recent  descent  of  so  many 
iVmericans  from  the  peoples  now  at  war.  No  Govern- 
ment could  be  blamed  for  hesitating  over  a  decision  that 
would  seem  to  many  of  its  citizens  to  involve  them  in  a 
parricidal  strife.  If  we  add  to  this,  as  our  columns  show 
to-day,  that  the  Germans  have  played  upon  this  string 
by  a  not  too  skilful,  but  singularly  effective  press  cam- 
paign, we  shall  realise  that  to  Mr.  Wilson  and  his  associates 
have  been  hai^d  put  to  to  find  an  honourable  excuse  for 
peace.  But  National  honour  is  a  thing  more  sacred  than 
traditions,  a  bond  more  forceful  than  any  sentiment  of 
ancestry.  And  America,  once  forced  into  a  national 
decision,  will  not  be  threatened  by  any  divided  sentiment. 
However  good  a  German  the  hyphenated  may  wish  to 
be,  when  tlie  country  of  his  adoption  speaks  as  a  nation, 
it  will  be  his  chief  anxiety  to  be  a  good  American. 

What  then  will  the  upshot  be  ?  Our  Naval  Corre- 
spondent, Mr.  Pollen,  has  maintained  in  these  columns 
from  the  first  publication  of  the  first  Lusitania  Note, 
that  there  could  be  but  one  issue  to  the  controvers^^ 
America  may  not  wish  to  become  a  belligerent.  But 
she  will  not  be  left  with  the  option  of  remaining  neutral. 
The  breach  with  Berlin  is  inevitable  because  Germany's 
persistence  in  high  seas  murder  is  inevitable.  Twenty 
months  of  hostilities  have  opened  the  eyes  of  the  War 
Lord  and  what  is  of  more  moment,  the  eyes  of  his  people, 
to  the  realitj''  of  sea  power,  and  its  appalling  consequences 
to  the  sea  impotent.  It  is  a  reality  that  cannot  be 
evaded  or  concealed  by  keeping  the  High  Seas  Fleet  in 
harbour  and  so  saving  it  from  destruction  in  battle.  The 
purposes  of  sea  power  are  manifold,  but  they  can  all  be 
achieved  without  battle  and  they  can  be  achieved  simul- 
taneously. To  seize  the  command  of  the  sea,  to  use  the 
sea  for  the  transport  of  armies,  to  destroy  the  trade  of  the 
enemy,  to  protect  our  own  trade  from  the  enemy's  attack, 
to  organise  the  overseas  supply  of  those  who  possess  the 
command,  these  are  things  that  were  not  done  in  succes- 
sion, but  all  at  once.  For  the  most,  the  forces  that 
secured  the  one  secured  the  other,  and  by  the  same  action. 
As  Mr.  Pollen  points  out  to-day,  we  threw  away  perhaps 
the  greatest  of  our  wasted  opportunities  in  not  including 
with  all  these  assertions  of  sea  sovereignty  the  most 
effective  of  them  all — namely,  an  instant  strict  blockade. 
To  have  done  this  while  the  blood  of  Belgium  still  ran 
red,  while  the  civilised  world  still  quivered  with  anger 
and  pity,  would  doubtless  have  made  it  possible  for  us  to 
announce  such  applications  of  the  doctrine  of  the  con- 
tinuous voyage  as  would  have  made  the  economic  isola- 
tion of  Germany  complete. 

At  first  sight  it  seems  sheer  madness  that  Germany 
by  quarrelling  with  America  now  should  jeopardise  the 
receipt  of  such  American  supplies  as  still  reach  her 
through  the  neutrals.  That  she  takes  this  risk  is  an 
index  of  her  graver  internal  difficulties.  Something 
worse  than  the  actual  sufferings  of  the  people  must 
threaten  the  people's  leaders.  If  the  overseas  supplies 
of  the  Germans  have  been  grievously  straitened,  those 
of  the  Allies  are  already  ample,  and  in  war  material  are 
growing  daily.  It  is  not  merely  that  these  things  mean  a 
steadily  growing  military  strength  of  the  other.  They 
are  intolerable  because  it  is  becoming  apparent  to  the 
people  that  their  leaders  have  misled  them — misled 
them  in  saying  that  Germany's  future  was  upon  the  sea, 
misled  them  into  a  war  which  their  failure  on  the  sea  must 
turn  into  a  crushing  defeat.  The  war  party,  if  it  cannot 
save  Germany,  must  at  least  try  to  save  itself.  It  must 
then  strike  at  these  continual  manifestations  of  Great 
Britain's  sea  strength  with  any  weapons  and  any  means 
that  offer.  To  men  in  so  desperate  a  position  as  this  it 
is  mere  wapouring  to  talk  of  moral  right  and  %vrong. 
Hmuanity,  justice,  legal  precedents — these  things  are  all 
uf  less  account  even  than  the  scraps  of  paper  Germany 
has  so  consistently  ignored. 


LAND      AND     WATER. 


February  2J,,  I'jiO 


GERMAN    LOSSES. 

A  FINAL    STATEMENT  CALCULATED    TO   THE    END 

OF   THE  YEAR    1915. 

By  Hilaire  Belloc. 


A  VISIT  to  what  is  ^^•ithout  doubt  tlie  best  source 
of  information  in  Europe,  the  permission  to 
publish  some  part — and  asutficient  part — of  the 
evidence  there  obtainable,  and  what  I  hope  to 
be  a  clear  exposition  of  this  evidence  enable  me  this  week 
to  put  before  my  readers  a  statement  of  the  enemy's 
losses  up  to  the  end  of  last  year,  which  will,  I  trust,  be 
conclusive. 


I  have  hitherto  published  in  this  journal  frequent 
examinations  of  the  enemy's  losses. 

In  the  earlier  days  of  the  war,  an  analysis  of  this  kind 
was  necessarily  very  uncertain.  The  methods  whereby 
results  could  ije  controlled  and  corrected,  were  not  yet 
based  upon  any  full  experience.  A'arious  forms  of  e\i- 
dence  later  obtainable  with  increasing  amplitude  were  in 
the  first  months  of  the  campaign  totally  lacking.  It  was 
not  until  the  course  of  tirne  produced  a  greater  exactitude 
that  the  analysis  of  the  enemy's  losses  could  achieve  its 
full  value. 

Roughly  speaking,  the  uncertain  period  with  a  large 
margin  of  error  lasted  into  the  early  months  of  1915. 

It  svas  with  the  spring  of  that  year  that  the  oppor- 
tunities of  analysing  the  German  lists,  of  comparing  them 
with  other  forms  of  evidence,  and  of  reducing  the  margin 
of  error  to  reasonable  proportions  began.  With  the  sum- 
mer, these  methods  were  fully  developed  and  by  the 
autumn  they  were  complete. 

To  give  but  one  example.  In  the  early  days  of 
the  war,  the  average  delay  in  tlie  publication  of 
names  upon  the  enemy's  lists'  was  not  established  at  all. 
It  was  not  until  well  "into  the  winter  that  this  essential 
factor  in  the  calculation  could  be  set  down  even  approxi- 
mately. It  was  not  till  the  following  summer  that  we 
f  ould  arrive  at  our  average  of  delay  with  exactitude.  And 
this  tarcUness  in  reaching  so  important  a  result  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  certain  names  were  not  included  until 
several  months  after  the  date  of  the  casualties  referred 
to. 

Here  is  another  example ;  in  the  first  fightmg  which 
was  open  fighting  with  troops  in  perpetual  and  rapid 
movement,  one  was  only  able  to  calculate  the  proportion 
of  wounded  to  dead  upon  the  known  average  of  the  past. 
Given  a  certain  number  of  dead,  one  multiplied  by  six  or 
seven,  and  reached  a  very  approximate  and  doubtful  figure. 
No  one  had  any  idea  what  the  proportion  would  be  when 
the  novel  form  of  trench  warfare  which  has  now  charac- 
terised the  war  for  fifteen  months,  began.  It  was  not 
until  this  novel  form  of  warfare,  trenches  subjected  to 
the  modern  high  explosive  shell  of  all  calibre?  and  to  the 
shrapnel  of  the  quick-firing  gun,  and  to  high  explosive 
mining,  casualties  from  sickness  under  those  conditions, 
from  shock,  etc.,  were  present  in  a  very  large  number  and 
over  a  cpnsiderable  space  of  time,  that  the  proportion  of 
wounded  and  sick  to  dead  could  be  exactly  established 
for  such  conditions. 

In  the  last  few  months  my  readers  will  have  noticed 
that  the  calculations  published  in  these  columns  not  only 
claimed  a  much  greater  exactitude  than  had  been  possible 
in  the  past,  but  also  repeated  without  hestitation  con- 
clusions already  arrived  at.  There  was  no  need  to  correct 
and  diminish  former  estimates,  because  the  mass  of  evi- 
dence available  had  become  so  large  that  the  results 
obtained  were  certain.  The  margin  of  error  had  been 
reduced  to  a  very  small  fraction  indeed. 

II. 

!Huch  about  the  time  when  this  mass  of  evidence  had. 
as  it"  were,  crystallised,  and  was  beginning  to  give  ils 
permanent  and  indisputable  results,  it  happened  that  (for 


various  reasons  which  need  not  here  be  discussed)  a  change 
of  mood  came  over  great  sections  of  opinion  in  this  country. 
There  was  a  great  increase  in  the  depression  of  those  who 
had  always  exaggerated  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  and 
there  was  a  considerable  increase  in  the  numbers  of  tliuso 
who  seemed  actually  to  delight  in  taking  the  gloomiest 
possible  view  of  the  situation.  It  was  only  a  mood  ; 
but  it  was  a  mood  which  spread  rapidly,  wliich  sometimes 
took  violent  forms,  and  which,  in  the  absence  of  a  strong 
censorship,  began  to  take  a  general  possession  of  the 
public. 

Nevertheless,  there  is  one  authority  to  which, 
happily,  the  public  has  lent  attention,  even  at  the  worst 
moment  of  this  mood — which  one  may  set  at  about  two 
or  two  and  a  half  months  ago.  That  authority  consisted 
in  "  official  "  pronouncements. 

It  was  recognised  that  the  men  who  had  made  it 
their  business  all  their  lives  to  compile  and  correct  such 
statistics  were  worthy  of  a  hearing.  And  it  was  guessed, 
though  perhaps  only  imperfectly  understood,  that  the 
soldiers  at  Headquarters  in  the  great  AUiance,  and  particu- 
larly in  France,  had  through  the  mass  of  their  own  sta- 
tistics, through  the  enormous  number  of  documents, 
taken  upon  the  field,  public  and  private,  through  the 
nij'riad  examinations  of  prisoners,  a  power  at  their 
chsposal  of  arriving  at  exact  conclusions,  which  power 
was  infinitely  superior  to  anything  that  could  be  exer- 
cised by  any  private  individual. 

The  conclusions  thus  arrived  at  by  the  Bureaux 
of  the  Higher  Command,  particularly  by  the  French,  were 
to  some  extent  made  public.  The  French  Government 
gave  not  infrequently,  certain  large  and  general  results 
which  had  been  arrived  at. 

In  a  greater  degree,  though  in  a  degree  highly  res- 
tricted, details  of  the  methcds  used  were  communicated 
to  not  a  few  of  those  whose  business  it  was  to  follow  and 
explain  the  war  in  public  journalism.  Much  of  what  was 
told  them  was  not  for  publication.  It  could  be  used,  but 
its  nature  was  not  to  "be  divulged. 

The  ^•ery  lengthy  articles  which  have  appeared  in 
L.VXD  ASD  Watkk  in  the  past  enjoyed  certain  advantages 
of  this  kind.  Most  of  what  appeared  in  them  had  no 
such  oflicial  basis,  but  were  due  to  the  author's  own 
deductions.  Occasionally  an  important  piece  of  evidence, 
however,  was  available  and  was  used.  In  neither  case 
could  the  author  claim  any  official  authority  and  the  critics 
of  this  journal,  together  with  those  who,  while  not  directly 
attacking  its  conclusions,  published  of  late  almost  any 
statistics,  however  wild,  that  could  feed  or  continue  tin; 
depression  now  passing,  wcve  free  to  quote  what  was  said 
here  as  no  more  than  a  baseless  private  opinion.  It  was  as 
a  fact,  in  any  case,  much  more  than  that,  for  it  was 
always  backed  up  by  detailed  reasoning  and  the  full 
quotation  of  the  sources  upon  which  that  reasoning  was 
based.     But,  it  had  no  sanction. 

I  have  recently  obtained  permission  to  give,  with 
regard  to  a  considerable  part  of  the  evidence  obtained, 
such  publicity  as  will,  I  think,  confirm  my  readers  in  what 
they  arc  about  to  follow. 

I  shall  begin  by  showing  how  we  can  arrive  with  an 
absolute  certainty  that  we  are  at  least  not  exaggerating, 
at  a  certain  minimum  of  the  German  dead  up  to  the  end 
of  the  year  IQ15. 

It  '  is  upon  the  total  real  number  of  dead  at 
any  moment  that  the  greater  part  of  casualty  statistics 
must  be  built,  and  that  is  why  I  make  it  the  first 
point  in  this  final,  and  I  hope  decisive,  study.  If  I 
were  merely  to  say  that  we  know  the  German  dead,  u); 
to  the  end  of  the  year  1915,  to  exceed  one  million,  it  would 
be  mere  alfirmation.  My  readers  will  see  that  such  a 
statement  can  be  rigidly  proved. 


February  24,  1916. 


LAND      AND      W  A  1  H.  K 


The   minimum  certain  number  of  German  dead 
up  to  the  end  of  the  year  1915. 

In  what  follows,  wc  sliall  bo  dealing,  of  course,  only 
with  tlic  deaths  of  men  actually  mobilised  and  forming 
part  of  the  German  armies.  We  leave  out  of  account 
altogether  the  indirect  effect  of  war  upon  the  vital  sta- 
tistics of  civilians  and  of  all  auxiliary  persons,  not  actually 
forming  part  of  the  mobihsed  force. 

Our  point  of  departure  is  the  official  lists  published 
by  the  German  Government  from  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  to  the  31st  of  January  1916. 

Note,  at  the  outset,  that  to  take  this  date,  January 
31st,  1916,  is  to  weight  the  scales  heavily  against  our- 
selves. One  must  always  do  that  in  any  calculation 
where  an  emotional  bias  may  be  present.  It  is  the  pro- 
cess known  in  commerce  as  "  taking  a  conservative  esti- 
mate." 

The  actual  average  of  delay  between  the  death  of  a 
German  soldier  and  the  appearance  of  his  name  in  the 
lists  is  still  over  six  weeks.  From  the  end  of  191 5  to 
January  31st,  1916,  is  barely  four  weeks  and  a  half  ; 
conclusions  based  upon  the  lists  published  up  to,  and 
including,  January  31st,  ^1916,  are  certainly  therefore 
within  the  truth  on  that  account  alone. 

The  number  of  lists  published  from  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  to  January  31st,  1916,  is  860  ;  the  last  of  these, 
the  860th  list,  was  published  on  January  31st  itself. 

The  total  number  appearing  upon  these  lists  as 
dead,  after  all  corrections  have  been  made  for  errors  and 
for  repetitions  and  admitted  omissions,  is  651,768. 

If,  therefore,  the  official  German  lists  were  complete 
on  this  point,  our  fundamental  piece  of  statistic  would  be 
already  arrived  at.  We  should  know  the  German  dead 
to  be  somewhat  more  than,  but  certainly  not  less  than 
650,000  up  to,  and  including,  the  last  dav  of  the  year 

1915- 

We  know,  as  a  fact,  from  many  other  sources, 
which  will  be  dealt  with  later,  that  the  German  official 
lists  are  inaccurate,  misleading  and  incomplete.  But 
the  particular  methods  by  which  this  particular  figure 
has  been  upset,  and  the  true  figure  arrived  at,  are  at  once 
striking  and  conclusive. 

(i)  In  the  first  place  the  number  openly  given 
(651,768)  is  not,  even  by  the  enemy's  own  showing  the  full 
number.  There  is,  by  imphcation,  another  number  to 
be  added  from  another  part  of  these  same  lists. 

Over  and  above  the  number  officially  admitted  as 
dead,  the  lists  give  a  certain  figure  for  the  "  missing." 

Now  the  "  missing  "  can  only  conceivably  cover  three 
categories  ;  (a)  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  Allies  ;  {b) 
deserters  ;  (c)  dead. 

The  first  of  these  three  categories  (a)  is  known  \\itli 
precision.  It  is  not  allowed  to  be  published,  but  the 
figures  are  the  common  property  of  the  Higher  Command 
in  all  the  Allied  countries ;  the  second  category  (b)  is 
certainly  an  extremely  small  one,  desertions  from  the 
German  army,  over  the  Dutch  frontier  are  known  within 
a  small  degree  of  error  and  arc  quite  insignificant.  Deser- 
tions into  the  lines  of  the  Allies,  now  happily  growing  in 
frequency,  appear  in  category  [a]  among  the  prisoners 
held  by  the  Allies.  The  remainder,  category  (c)  inus(, 
and  can  only,  consist  of  the  dead,  who  have  been  left  upon 
the  battlefield  after  an  enemy  retirement,  or  in  captured 
trenches  without  there  being  evidence  among  the  enemy 
of  theii'  death.  The  only  other  possible  category  con- 
ceivable would  be  that  of  desertions  within  Germany 
itself,  and  the  hiding  of  the  deserters  by  their  friends  and 
families  within  the  German  lines.  Without  for  a  moment 
exaggerating,  as  is  so  often  foolishly  done,  the  political 
organisation  of  the  Germans,  it  will  be  admitted  that  the 
number  of  these  must  be  quite  negligible. 

From  this  part  of  the  calculation  then,  we  can  arrive 
at  a  certain  minimum  number  of  dead,  over  and  above 
those  appearing  as  "  Fallen  "  in  lists.  We  deduct,  then, 
the  known  number  of  prisoners  ;  we  allow  some  small 
percentage  for  desertion,  and  we  arrive  at  a  remainder 
which  represents  the  very  minimum  number  of  the 
Germans  who,  though  dead,  appear  under  the  category 
of  "  missing." 

If  that  category  is  as  much  cut  down  and  falsified  as 
are  others  later,  to  be  dealt  with,  then  the  remainder  so 
arrived  at — the  minimum  of  "  missing  "  who  are,  as  a 
fact,  dead — may  be  very  largely  increased.     But,  at  anv 


rate,  it  cannot  be  diminished.  And  that  minimum,  that 
remainder  which  we  get  from  German  lists  of  "  missing  " 
themselves,  compared  with  our  known  number  of 
prisoners  gives  a  figure  of  well  over  160,000. 

The  German  lists,  therefore,  officially  admit  as  dead, 
either  directly  or  by  implication,  over  810,000  men  up 
to,  and  including,  the  last  day  of  1915. 

That  the  real  number  is  ver>'  much  more,  we  shall 
proceed  to  prove. 

Special   Lists. 

(2)  It  has  frequently  been  remarked  in  th'ese  columns 
that  an  excellent  way  of  checking  the  German  official 
lists  was  the  careful  comparison  of  them  with  lists  pub- 
lished by  private  authority,  by  trade-unions,  professional 
corporations,  and  the  like.  The  results  of  this  method 
has  been  cited  in  L.\nd  and  Water  in  the  past,  but  no 
particular  cases  have  been  quoted  except  those  which  were 
available  to  all  from  their  publication  in  the  daily  papers. 

I  am  now  in  a  position-to  give  particulars  which  ought 
I  think,  to  close  the  discussion  upon  this  point. 

They  are  {a)  parochial  lists  drawn  up  in  the  villages 
and  published  there  with  a  legitirrtate  pride  as  a  proof  of 
patriotism  and  for  the  information  of  the  villagers ;  {b) 
a  great  number  of  unions  of  various  kinds,  religious  and 
industrial,  who  also  give  lists  of  their  dead  from  date  to 
date  to  their  subscribers  ;  {c)  similar  lists  given  by  large 
employers  of  labour  from  time  to  time  ;  what  similar 
employers  in  this  country  call  a  "  roll  of  honour  "  ;  {d) 
associations  formed  for  the  purposes  of  sport ;  great  clubs 
of  this  nature,  etc.,  which  pubhsh  similar  lists. 

Now,  before  beginning  our  examination  of  this  very 
valuable  supplementary  evidence,  let  me  describe  its 
peculiar  weight. 

The  German  Empire  publishes,  as  we  have  seen, 
official  lists  of  dead,  wounded'  and  missing.  We  shall 
later  be  able  to  show  how  and  why,  these  are  gravely 
and  increasingly  incomplete.  But  it  also  furnishes  in  a 
larger  measure  notice  to  the  families  of  men  who  have 
fallen. 

There  are  great  masses  of  the  population  who  have 
no  opportunity  of  seeing  the  official  lists,  and  who  would 
not  be  able  to  search  them  thoroughly  even  if  they  were 
available. 

The  Government,  after  certain  unavoidable  delaj^s, 
privately  notifies  the  family  of  the  deceased.  It  is  clear 
that  any  considerable  failure  to  do  this  would  soon  cause 
.grave  discontent.  Those  alHccl  countries  which  actually 
forbid  the  publication  of  any  general  lists,  are  equally 
constrained  to  notify  the  families  privately  when  one  of 
their  members  is  killed. 

It  is  from  these  private  informations  that  the  special 
evidence  we  are  about  to  examine  is  compiled. 

It  will  be  clear  that  if  there  is  any  concealment  and 
diminution  of  the  real  numbers  in  public  lists,  that  con- 
cealment and  diminution  will  much  less  affect  the  private 
communications  referred  to. 

To  take  the  averages  of  deaths  per  1,000  mobilised 
men  at  any  date,  arrived  at  from  these  private  lists  as  the 
full  and  absolute  total  of  losses  by  death,  would  probably 
be  to  make  too  great  a  concession  to  the  enemy.  But  at 
any  rate,  we  are  certain  that  the  averages  are  not  less 
than  those  appearing  from  such  lists.  The  authorities 
may  conceal  even  from  a  certain  proportion  of  the 
families,  or  very  gravely  delay,  the  notification  of  death. 
But  it  will  hardly  send  notification  of  death  as  certain 
imtil  it  is  beyond  doubt.  There  may  be  a  tiny  fraction 
of  error  from  occasional  misinformation,  as  we  know 
happens  in  our  own  case,  but  it  is  quite  insignificant  in  the 
.general  total.  The  chance  of  error  is  all  the  other 
way. 

Now,  before  giving  the  results  of  these  lists,  and 
giving  the  reader  the  averages  shown  by  them,  I  must 
first  make  it  clear  that  the  method  is  reaUy  representative 
and  wide  spread.  I  will  take  the  categories  therefore, 
one  by  one. 

(a)  The  local  lists  (published  and  obtainable  in  Ger- 
many for  some  months)  are  the  first  category  of  evidence 
to  which  we  turn  for  the  checking  of  the  official  lists. 

Of  a  \'ery  large  number,  those  which  were  specially 
selected  for  minute  and  continual  analysis  were  taken 
from  the  most  widely  differentiated  parts  of  the  Empire. 
The  greatest  care  was  used  to  avoid  any  partial  effect  of 
trade,  race,  or  locality  ;  so  that  the  combined  result  might 


LAND      AND      WATER 


February  24,  1916. 


be  tIioroii.e;hly  roprosontative.  TIum.  h>is  (wiiich  are 
j;,'ot  lip  by  private  initiative  and  refer  to  special  districts 
which  desired  an  exact  record  of  their  sacrifices  and  of 
tlicir  patriotism  to  be  maintained)  are  based,  of  course, 
upon  the  private  not-ices  received  by  the  families  of  those 
fallen.  They  afford  an  excellent  check  by  which  to  test 
the  official  lists,  and  to  prove  their  incompleteness.  For 
these  local  lists  give  us  not  only  the  dead  but  also  the 
exact  total  of  men  mobilised  in  each  district,  so  that 
we  can  mark  upon  any  particular  date  the  per- 
centage of  deaths  at  that  date,  andur  ctui  cslabUsh  exactly 
the  rate  at  which  the  number  of  deaths  iiureases. 

(b)  The  next  category  consists  of  lists  drawn  up  by 
a  number  of  great  unions  or  associations,  mainly  prole- 
tarian. 

Some  of  these  are  religious,  some  industrial.  Like 
the  first  category,  these  also  are  based  upon  the  notices 
of  death  which  the  Government  sends  individually  to 
each  family,  and  are  far  more  complete  than  the  general 
official  lists.  They  give  us,  of  course,  the  total  number 
of  men  mobilised  as  well,  so  that  the  percentage  of  deaths 
for  any  given  moment  can  be  exactly  ascertained  The 
figures  to  follow  cover  no  less  than  14  such  lists  and  apply 
to  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  ]>opulation. 

(c)  The  third  category  consists  of  what  we  call  in 
this  country  "  Rolls  of  Honour."  The  great  employers 
of  labour  in  the  German  Empire  were  in  the  habit,  for 
some  time,  of  publishing  in  continually  extending  lists 
the  names  of  all  those  of  their  employees  who  had  been 
called  up  as  soldiers,  and  showing  at  frequent  intervals 
the  number  who  had  given  their  lives  for  their  country. 
l*"or  the  purposes  of  the  e%'idence  I  am  about  to  call,  three 
such  rolls  of  honour  were  specially  selected  upon  the 
same  principle  as  governed  the  first  two  categories  :  to 
wit.  their  universality.  The  first  Roll  of  Honour  is  that 
issued  by  a  great  industrial  enterprise  which  has  branches 
and  shops  throughout  the  whole  Empire.  The  two 
others  are  concerned,  one  with  the  grocer\-  trade,  the  other 
with  the  refreshment  trade  ;  and  ])Oth  are  distributed 
throughout  the  whole  Empire  in  hundreds  of  branches. 

(d)  Lastly,  the  fourth  category  in  this  kind  of  evi- 
dence is  that  of  the  clubs  or  associations  formed  for  the 
encouragement  of  various  forms  of  sport.  These  lists 
also  contain  a  very  great  number  of  names,  and  the  five 
which  have  been  chosen  in  particular  for  this  analysis 
arc  distributed  more  or  less  indifferently  up  and  down 
the  country. 

Now  the  first  point  which  emerges  from  an  analysis  of 
these  private  lists  is  this  :  That  for  the  first  few  months 
of  the  war,  these  private  detailed  lists  do  not  differ  very 
ap]jreciably  from  the  official  lists.  H  you  contrast  the 
results  obtained  from  both  forms  of  evidence,  it  is  not 
till  the  beginning  of  the  winter  of  1914  that  any  very 
grave  disparity  between  them  clearly  appears.  It  has, 
however,  already  appeared  very  sensibly  by  the  month 
of  January.  1915,  and  if  we  take  some  time  about  the 
middle  of  January  for  our  point  of  departure,  we  shall 
arrive  a  few  months  later  at  a  very  remarkable  result. 
W'c  shall  see  the  course  of  the  death-rate  established  by 
the  detailed  private  lists  rising  regularly  and  uninter- 
ruptedly, while  the  course  of  the  death-rate  drawn  from 
the  general  public  and  official  lists  as  regularly  declines. 

After  seven  months  from  January,  191 5 — that  is 
by  about  the  middle  of  August,  n)  15— the  difference 
between  the  total  of  deaths  obtainable  from  the  average 
of  the  private  lists  and  that  obtainable  from  the  public 
lists  (which  alone  have  hitherto  been  rjuoted  in  this 
country)  is  already  well  over  150.000. 

Here  is  another  way  of  putting  it  ;  the  official  lists, 
although  the  fighting  is  exceedingly  severe  up  to  tli(> 
autumn  of  the  year,  1915,  and  particularly  through  the 
summer  of  1915,  show  upon  the  whole  a  regularly  declin- 
ing rate.     The  private  lists  show  no  such  decline. 

If  the  selection  of  priAate  lists  were  a  small  one  this 
peculiarity  might  be  due  to  the  accident  of  some  particu- 
lar occupation  or  some  particularly  heavily  tried  locality. 
But  scores  of  such  lists" grouped  in  four  great  categories, 
and  covering  great  masses  of  the  army  drawn  from  all 
classes,  from  all  occupations  and  from  all  regions,  cannot 
possibly  suffer  from  such  a  cause  of  error. 

I  have  already  said  that  the  rate  of  increase,  month 
by  month,  of  the  dead  in  these  private  lists  was  singularly- 
even.  How  regular  it  is.  the  following  statement  will 
sliow. 


Taking  the  deaths  reached  by  the  middle  of  January 
as  one  hundred,  about  fifteen  on  the  average  were  added 
for  the  month  of  February  ;  twelve  more  for  March, 
twelve  more  for  April,  between  fifteen  and  sixteen  for 
May  (when  there  was  the  first  tremendous  fighting  in 
Galicia)  ;  rather  more  than  sixteen  for  June  (which  was 
the  month  of  the  long  struggle  on  the  San)  ;  and  about 
the  same  amount  for  July.  Not  all  the  lists  carry  us  as 
far  as  August.  Those  that  do,  show,  as  might  be  ex- 
pected, no  apjjreciablc  diminution  for  that  month. 

Now,  the  reader  who  is  merely  given  these  short 
results  of  a  detailed  and  prolonged  analysis  might  object 
that  some  particular  small  list  thus  privately  drawn  up 
could  conceivably  be  exposed  to  influences  vitiating  its 
accuracy.  The  oflicially  published  lists  are  biassed  to- 
wards reducing  the  number  of  dead.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  private  lists  might  not  think  it  worth  while 
to  print  all  the  names  of  their  men  mobihsed,  but  would 
naturally  take  a  pride  in  showing  how  great  had  been  the 
sacrifice  of  a  particular  corporation  or  district. 

An  inspection  of  the  actual  lists  would,  of  course, 
make  an  end  of  that  argument,  but  as  that  is  impossible, 
I  can  cpiotc  figures  which  are,  1  think,  equally  con- 
clusive. 

It  is  clear  that  if  the  private  lists  were  drawn  up 
\\ithout  regularity  and  precision  they  would  show  very 
great  differences  among  themselves,  as  a  fact,  thej'^  agree 
in  such  a  fashion  as  to  compel  the  conviction  that  they 
represent  a  true  average  of  wastage  by  death. 

If  the  reader  will  compare  the  numbers  appearing  in 
each  category  mf)nth  by  month,  and  see  the  monthly 
rate  by  wliich  the  number  of  deaths  grows,  he  can  hardly 
avoid  the  obvious  conclusion  that  so  dose  an  agreement 
of  such  independent  witnesses  demonstrates  their 
accuracy. 

Thus  if  we  start  with  the  third  week  of  January,  1915, 
and  note  the  numbers  as  they  increase  month  by  month 
in  each  category,  for  the  months  during  which  this 
e\'idencc  was  obtainable,  we  disco\er  the  following  very 
similar  tables.  : 

(a)  Here  is  the  growth  for  the  first  category,  that  of 
the  village  parislie-,  mainly  peas:intry  : 

January  . .  .  .   100     May      . .  . .  . .    156 

I'^bruarv         . .  . .   115     June 171 

March  ..         ..128     July 187 

April  . .         . .   139     August  . .     '      .   204 

(b)  Here'is  the  growth  for  the  second  category,  the 
various  reHgious  and  industrial  unions,  drawn  mainly 
from  the  industrial  proletarian;  : 

January  . .  . .   100  May      . .  . .  . .   155 

February  ..  ..   108  Juno     ..  ..  ..172 

March  ..  ..   125  July 186 

April  . .  . .  140  August  -  . .  . .   203 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  rate  is  very  nearly  the  same 
as  the  first  group  ;  the  only  difference  being  that  the 
peasants  were  suffering  more  severely  in  the  earlier  part 
of  the  year,  as  might  be  expected  from  the  fact  that  the 
industrial  population  would  in  some  trades  be  called  upon 
later. 

(c)  The  "  Rolls  of  Honour  "  drawn  up  by  great  em- 
ployers of  certain  forms  of  labour  mentioned  above, 
give  the  following  rate  : — 

January  .  .  . .   100     May 155 

February  (not  before  me)  June     . .          . .          . .  172 

March  ..  ..   128    July 1S2 

April                 . .          . .   142  August             . ,          . .  198 

(d)  The  sporting  Clubs  and  Societies  give  : 
January  . .  . .   100  (estimated  not  all  give  statis- 
tics so  early) 

February  . .  . .   117    (full  statistics) 

March  . .   128     May 156 

April  . .  . .   139     Juiic 175 


me. 


The  figures  after  June  in  this  category  are  not  before 


It  is  impossible  in  the  face  of  such  close  agreement 
in  averages  clrawn  from  hundreds  of  sources  and  covering 
the  whole  country  to  doubt  their  accuracy. 

The  argument  put  forward  in  this  section  may,  then, 
be  summarised  thus  : 

You  have,  in  spite  of  continued,  ceaseless  violent 
•  art;..'.    Hv-  number  of  deaths  in  the  official  lists  declining 


February  24,  1916. 


LAND     ANE      WATER 


t.oco.ooo 
900,000 
aoo.ooo 
Too,  000 

boo,  000 
S60.000 

4oo,ooo 

'500,000 
200,000 

[toe.ooo 


.up  " 


£^S.?!l 


10 


to 


(on  the  whole)  from  January  1915  on  into  the  summer  of 
that  year.  This  decline  in  the  number  of  deaths  appears 
in  public  documents,  quoted  throughout  the  press  of 
Europe  and  America.  It  is  immensely  to  the  advantage 
of  the  enemy  to  hide  in  such  documents,  which  arc  in- 
tended for  general  cjuotation,  the  real  rate  of  his  losses, 
particularly  as  these  become  really  serious  and  approach 
the  margin  of  his  reserves. 
«  On  the  other  hand,  you  have  a  series  of  documents, 

suffering  from  no  such  motives,  regarded  as  private,  not 
quoted  abroad  and  the  value  of  which  the  enemy  seems 
for  some  time  to  have  failed  to  seize.  These  last  are 
compiled  from  the  most  accurate  source  possible,  the 
individual  notices  of  death  sent  separately  to  each  family. 
They  are  in  some  cases  connected  with  the  fmances  of  a 
trade  union  or  benefit  society,  which  must  keep  an  accurate 
record  or  suffer  ruin,  but  which  on  the  other  hand,  would 
certainly  not  exaggerate  its  liabilities.  These  private 
lists  cover  many  hundreds  of  thousands  of  the  population. 
Though  showing  noe.xact  mechanical  agreement,  they  tally 
closely,  precisely  as  good  independent  pieces  of  evidence 
dra\\-n  from  various  and  quite  separate  sources  will 
always  tally  closely.  Finally,  the  death-rate  obtainable 
from  this  source  of  evidence  is  precisely  what  would  be 
expected  from  the  nature  of  the  fighting  over  the  time 
it  covers,  while  the  death-rate  discoverable  in  the  public 
lists  is  more  and  more  incredible  as  time  goes  on. 

The  conclusion  is  inevitable.  The  private  lists 
gave  us  the  true  death  rate,  the  public  lists,  at  first  care- 
fully and  fully  maintained,  gave  us  as  the  year  proceeded 
figures  less  and  less  reliable. 

Now  what  is  the  ligure  we  arrive  at  for  the  true  num- 
ber of  deaths  at,  say,  the  beginning  of  November  ?  The 
reason  for  taking  that  date,  two  months  before  the  end 
of  the  year,  will  be  apparent  in  a  moment. 

In  order  to  answer  that  question,  we  have  but  to 
conti^ast  two  curves  each  representing  the  increase  in  the 
number  of  deaths  between  the  middle  of  January  and  the 
middle  of  August  1915.  Tiie  lower  of  the  two  curves,  the 
dotted  line  represents  the  incomplete  official  death  lists,  the 
upper  full  curve,  represents  the  far  more  complete  rate 
discovered  by  the  private  lists. 

We  cannot  draw  from  known  figures  the  latter  full 
curve  to  the  end  of  October,  as  wc  can  the  lower  dotted 
curve,  because  many  of  the  private  lists  cease  to  be  ob- 
tainable before  that  date,  but  we  can  prolong  it  in  a  Une 
of  dashes  at  its  existing  rate  for  the  remaining  ten  weeks. 
We  have  a  right  to  regard  it  as  continuous  because  fighting 
of  the  heaviest  kind  went  on  during  those  ten  weeks 
which  included  the  great  offensive  in  the  west,  the  end 
of  the  violent  struggle  in  Poland,  and  the  invasion  of 
the  Balkans.  It  will  be  seen  that  by  this  method,  we 
get,  even  as  early  as  the  beginning  of  November,  a  ligure 
of  over  the  million. 

Now,  making  the  fullest  possible  allowance  for  a 
fall  in  the  real  curve  after  the  moment  in  August  to 
which  it  can  be  traced,  and  for  the  decline  in  the  death 
rate  during  November  and  December,  during  which  there 
has  been  little  fighting,  it  remains  absolutely  certain 
that  the  total  of  deaths  by  the  end  of  tlie  year  is  well  over 
the  million.    How  much  over  we  have  not  full  evidence  to 


1915 

guide  us.  It  has  been  put  by  very  competent  authority 
at  a  million  one  hundred  thousand,  but  admittedly  only 
as  an  estimate.  That  it  passes  the  million  is  mathe- 
matically certain.  Even  the  ofhcial  lists,  by  impUcation 
or  by  direct  statement,  come  to  within  19  per  cent,  of 
that  minimum  ;  and  that  although  they  omit  much  the 
greater  part  of  deaths  from  disease,  shock,  accident  and 
exposure.  The  figure  of  at  least  one  million,  therefore, 
at  which  we  have  arrived  by  the  calculation  just  given, 
for  the  deaths  up  to  December  31st,  1915,  regarded  as  a 
minimum  and  as  a  minimum  certainly  below  the  truth,  is 
not  to  be  denied. 

Other  evidence  of  the   incompleteness  of  the 
OflBcial  Lists. 

When  one  presents  a  mathematical  argument,  how- 
ever cogent,  it  is  inevitable  that  some  fatigue  should 
accompany  the  following  of  it.  There  are  many  upon 
whom  detailed  calculations  of  this  sort  have  no  hold. 
I  can  imagine  such  a  one  saying  :  "  Lengthy  calculations 
have  never  convinced  me.  ^^'hat  I  do  feel  is  that,  from 
what  I  know  of  the  accuracy  of  the  Prussian  lists,  a  genera- 
tion ago,  in  the  war  of  1870,  and  from  what  I  know  of 
the  whole  Prussian  system  to-day,  I  have  a  general  belief 
in  the  accuracy  of  any  official  Prussian  document  ;  and 
I  shall  not  regard  the  othcial  lists  as  inaccurate  unless  you 
can  provide  some  simpler  and  even  self-evident  test  of 
their   inaccuracy." 

It  is  fortunately  perfectly  easy  to  meet  that  kind  of 
objection.  Wc  have  to  hancl,  among  many  proofs  that 
these  official  lists  are  thoroughly  unsatisfactory  and  incom- 
plete, and  wilfully  so,  two  separate,  particular,  pieces  of 
proof  which  are  final. 

The  first  is  drawn  from  the  official  German  Usts  of 
wounded  during  the  great  offensive  in  Champagne  last 
September.  It  can  be  shown  now  beyond  doubt  that 
those  lists  are  thoroughly  incomplete. 

The  second  proof  is  based  upon  the  demonstrable 
omission  of  prisoners  from  the  official  lists. 

I  ^^•ill  now  gi\-e  these  forms  of  proof  in  their  order. 

L 

Proof  of  the   falsity  of   the   German    OflScial 
Lists  by  an  Analysis  of  losses 
in  Champagne. 

Two  months  after  the  great  offensive  in  Champagne, 
it  was  thought  by  those  who  were  occupying  themselves 
with  these  figures  that  the  time  had  come  to  contrast 
the  official  German  lists  with  the  reahties  of  that  battle. 

The  average  delay  in  publishing  the  casualties  upon 
these  lists,  is,  as  we  have  said,  six  weeks  or  a  little  over. 
Two  months,  therefore,  it  was  imagined,  would  give  one  a 
sufficient  margin  of  time  upon  which  to  work.  No  atten- 
tion was  paid  to  the  general  German  statement  that  "  one 
division  had  fallen  back  a  mile  or  two  and  had  successfully 
stood  the  shock  while  the  reserves  came  up."  As  a  mili- 
tary statement  that  announcement  was  without  meaning 
and  was  made  merely  for  the  benefit  of  neutral  civilians. 


LAND      AND     WATER 


February  24,  1916. 


The  prisoners  alone  amounted  on  this  sector  to  the 
tqiiivalcnt  of  about  one  division  and  came  from  very  many 
divisions.  But  tlie  official  hsts  were  another  matter. 
Those  units  which  were  known  to  ha\e  been  present  on 
the  sector  attacked  were  noted,  and  tlie  casualties  referring 
to  them  in  the  Hsts  were  set  down. 

Wounded,  killed  and  missing  the  total  number  of 
names  appearing  at  the  end  of  the  two  months  was 
85,032.  Of  these  the  dead  were  just  barely  over  24,000, 
the  prisoners  just  under  20,000,  hut  the  number  of  ■d--ounded 
admitted  on  the  lists  was  only  a  little  more  than  41,000. 

We  cannot  here  apply  any  exact  lest  to  the  omissions 
of  dead.  The  only  way  of  knowing  the  number  of 
German  dead  in  that  particular  action  was  counting  the 
dead  left  behind  by  the  enemy  and  these,  of  course,  were 
inferior  to  the  real  total  ;  for  the  radius  of  action  of  the 
artillery  went  much  farther  than  the  limit  reached  by  the 
French  advance.  But  when  we  return  to  the  proportion 
of  wounded,  we  get  clear  proof  that  the  lists  are  mislead- 
ing. 

You  have  here  a  proportion  of  wounded  to  dead  of 
1.7  :  that  is,  17  wounded  to  10  dead.  Now  a  proportion 
of  that  sort  is  impossible.  Sometimes  when  you  are 
dealing  with  very  small  bodies  and  a  purely  local  effect, 
you  may  get  proportions  of  that  kind.  But  where  large 
numbers  are  concerned  you  never  get  anywhere  neai^  it. 
If  we  take  the  corresponding  figures  for  the  French  and 
for  the  English  at  the  same  moment,  we  get  on  the  average 
forty-five  wounded  for  ten  killed. 

It  is  clear  that  the  compilers  of  the  German  lists  did 
not  mention  a  great  number  of  the  wounded.  Perhaps 
they  omitted  the  lesser  cases. 

A  further  watching  of  the  lists  throughout  December 
and  January  which  might  have  modified  this  conclusion 
merely  confirmed  it.  Names  kept  on  coming  in,  and  it 
will  probably  be  found  when  the  lists  for  February  arc 
complete  that  even  in  these  five  months  after  the  battle 
names  continue  to  appear.  But  the  new  names  do  not 
change  the  incredibly  small  proportion  of  wounded  to 
dead. 

II. 

Proofs   of  the  falsity  of  the    German  Official 

Lists   by   an   Analysis  of  ihe  number 

of   prisoners. 

It  occurred  to  those  who  are  following  this  matter 
in  detail  that  the  most  conclusive  tests  of  the  accuracy 
or  falsity  of  the  German  lists  would  be  afforded  if  it  were 
possible  to  analyse  with  exactitude  the  statistics  of 
prisoners  now  in  the  hands  of  the  Allies.  It  was  a  cate- 
gory in  which  there  would  be  a  special  temptation  to 
inexactitude,  and  therefore  one  which,  if  it  proved  accurate 
would  be  a  conclusive  test  in  favour  of  the  German  official 
record. 

The  task  was  not  an  easy  one  because  the  prisoners 
taken  from  a  particular  unit  would  be  taken  at  \'arious 
times  and  also  Ijecause  the  units  were  in  many  cases  moved 
from  east  to  west  and  vice-versa. 

In  order  to  be  certain  of  one's  result  one  had  further 
to  be  very  careful  not  to  confuse  the  active,  reserve,  and 
Landwehr  regiments  of  the  same  number. 

A  series  of  imits  were  therefore  chosen  with  regard  to 
which  one  could  be  certain  that  they  had  never  left  the 
front  upon  which  they  were  originally  engaged,  and  that 
there  was  no  confusion  between  active,  reserve,  and 
Landwehr  fractions.  The  calculation  was  made  with 
much  more  than  tlie  ordinary  allowance  of  delay  in  the 
publication  of  names,  because  it  was  rightly  imagined 
that  this  category'  of  losses  would  appear  upon  the  lists 
more  slowly  than  any  other. 

Now  here  is  the  result. 

A  list  was  drawn  up  by  the  French  .Vuthorities 
giving  the  names,  regiments,  etc.,  of  a  great  number  of 
prisoners  drawn  from  the  units  thus  chosen.  This  list 
was  then  carefully  compared  with  the  names  appearing 
in  the  German  hsts.  The  difference  between  tiiis  com- 
plete French  list  and  the  admitted  losses  upon  the 
official  German  lists  was  not  only  greater  than  in  any 
other  category,  but  was  almost  ludicrous.  It  was  over 
69  per  cent. 

Out  of  every  hundred  names  of  prisoners  detailed 
by  the  French,  30.8  only  ai>peared  as  corresponding  names 
upon  the  German  hst  of  losses  i 


There  were  very  great  differences  between  different 
units.  In  the  worst  case  the  German  Commander,  for 
some  reason  best  known  to  himself,  or  the  German 
Central  Authorities,  had  virtually  suppressed  all  they 
could  of  the  capture  :  less  than  6  per  cent,  of  the  real 
mmibers  were  admitted  upon  the  lists— 94  per  cent, 
were  not  recorded  by  the  enemy  ! 

In  the  best  case  nearly  65  pei  cent,  were  admitted 
and  only  just  over  35  per  cent,  were  omitted  from  flie 
enemy's  record. 

But  the  average  was  that  which  I  have  given  above. 
Very  nearly  seventy  per  cent,  of  the  names  standing  upon  the 
French  lists  and  representing  prisoners  actually  in  the  French 
camps  were  found  to  be  omitted  from  the  German  lists. 

I  shall  show  next  week  what  this  loss  of  certainly 
one  miUion  in  dead  by  December  31st,  1915,  means  in 
total  losses  to  the  Gejrnian  Army  up  to  that  date,  but 
meanwhile  a  word  may  not  be  amiss  upon  the  significa- 
tion of  that  figure  of  one  million  dead  in  17  months  of 
war. 

It  does  not  mean  anything  excessive  in  comparison 
with  the  general  losses  in  this  war.  It  is  a  somewhat 
higher  amount  in  proportion  than  the  losses  of  the  Allies 
in  the  West— but  then  the  Germans  have  been  fighting 
on  two  and  e\'cn  three  fronts.  It  is  more  than  they  them- 
selves admit — but  only  19  per  cent.  more.  It  does  not 
mean  that  a  mobilised  force  of  nine  millions  is  exhausted 
in  men  (though  nearly  exhausted  in  reserves) .  There  is 
nothing  marvellous  or  abnormal,  as  this  great  campaign 
goes,  that  a  force  should  lose  by  death  .64  per  cent, 
(or,  say,  one  man  in  153 — for  that  is  all  it  .comes  to)  per 
month  of  the  fighting. 

What  would  be  remarkable,  abnormal  and  actually 
miraculous,  would  be  the  ridiculous  figure  of  half  a  milhon 
which  was  current  a  short  time  ago.  It  would  be  utterly 
incredible  in  connection  with  the  known  losses  of  the 
Allies  and  with  the  known  character  of  the  fighting.  Such 
statements  are  only  put  forward  to  defend  a  brief  or  to 
support  a  policy.  That  sort  of  bias  is  worthless  in  war. 
All  that  should  be  tolerated  in  so  extreme  a  peril  is  the 
sober  grasp  of  reality. 


SOME    TEST    GASES. 

[Independent  evidence  of  the  flagrant  inaccuracy  of  the 
German  casualty  lists  is  provided  by  Mr.  H.  Warner 
Allen,  the  special  representative  of  the  British  Press 
juith  the  French  armies.     He  writes  as  follows.] 

"  I  have  received,  on  unquestionable  authority,  figures 
which  make  it  at  least  legitimate  to  regard  with  the  gravest 
suspicion  all  information  provided  by  the  enemy  as  to  his 
losses.  The  French  have  often  noticed  that  the  total  German 
losses  in  killed,  wounded,  missing  and  prisoners  announced 
for  a  gi\'en  regiment  during  a  gi\'en  i)eriod  is  considinabl\' 
less  than  the  number  of  prisoners  alone  taken  from  that  same 
regiment  during  the  same  time.  The  result  has  been  tiiat  the 
department  specially  charged  with  this  task  has  been  able 
again  and  again  to  "convict  the  official  German  casualty  lists 
of  flagrant  and  deliberate  mistakes  by  merely  comparing  them 
with  the  French  lists  of  prisoners. 

"The  following  statistics  concern  four  regiments  which 
have  been  continuously  engaged  on  the  Western  front. 
The  108th  Regiment  of  the  I2tli  German  Army  Corps  lost 
during  a  certain  period  403  ])risoners  according  to  the  French 
official  records.  The  German  casualty  lists  acknuwledged 
■during  the  same  period  259  prisoners,  and  of  these  2i>  arc  not 
included  in  the  French  returns.  There  is  a  shortage  therefore 
of  144  men,  or  35.7  per  cent,  of  the  total. 

"The  Ii2th  Regiment  of  the  I4lh  German  Army  Corps 
lost  234  prisoners  according  to  the  French,  but  the  German 
lists  acknowledge  only  4H,  of  whom  34  do  not  figure  in  the 
I'rench  records"  In  this  case  there  is  an  omission  of  186, 
or  79.4  per  cent. 

"The  i44tli  Regiment  of  the  i6th  Army  Corps  lost  94 
prisoners,  of  whom  only  five  figure  in  the  German  lists,  and 
the  other  89  men,  or  94.6  of  the  total,  are  supposed  by  their 
misguided  countrymen  to  be  still  fighting,  whereas  they  are 
certainly  in  French  hands. 

'"  The  153rd  Regiment  of  the  4th  German  Anny  Corps 
lost  196  jirisoncrs,  but  the  Germans  officially  acknowledged 
only  58  of  these,  of  whom  six  are  not  named  in  the  I'rench 
returns.  Therefore,  r38,  or  70.4  per  >i-nt.  of  the  15  irdj 
have  been  omitted  from  the  German  list." 


February  24,  1916. 


LAND      AND     WATER. 


CAPTURE    OF    ERZEROUM. 


Absence  abroad  upon  work,  the  results  of  wliich 
appear  in  the  preceding  article,  compels  me  to 
complete  my  notes  of  this  week  twenty-four  hours 
earlier  than  usual.  I  am  writing  them  upon  the  Monday, 
instead  of  the  Tuesdaj',  and  the  telcgrartis  upon  which 
they  are  based  carry  me  no  further  than  those  received 
in  Paris  by  three  o'clock  of  the  same  Monday  afternoon, 
the  twenty-first  of  Februai-y. 

Erzeroum  was  fortified,  mainly  by  German  engineers 
in  a  fashion  of  which  the  elements  appear  in  the  accom- 
panjdng  sketch. 

Erzeroum  is  covered  on  the  East,  the  South,  and  the 
West  by  high  ranges. 

There  is  high  land  also  to  the  West  of  the  town,  but 
it  does  not  concern  the  system  of  fortification,  as  no 
works  seem  to  have  been  erected  upon  it.  To  the  Nortli 
this  small  enclosed  plain  in  which  Erzeroum  stands 
lies  open  ;  it  is  protected  only  by  a  marsh  tl^rough  which 
and  from  which  flows  the  western  Euphrates,  the  upper 
waters  and  sources  of  that  river. 

In   such   a   district    an   army,   especially    an  army 


^^^ 


Gorge  of  Gurdji  Bo^ha.z 


<ni« 


''^""'t%.''» 


Soad  to  'Mbusch. 
and  the  South. 


Great  Maia  Eastern 
Upai  isTtxmtCur 
&Kars,&  to  Rail- 
head at  San^kamish 
tiotfcu-distant,and 
possibhj  bz^mighf 
nearer  to  pass 
since  outbreak,  of 
theUkr-. 


operating  in  winter,  and  more  especially  an  army  de- 
pendent for  its  success  upon  some  kind  of  siege  train 
[we  are  not  told  of  what  calibre  were  the  largest  present 
with  the  Russian  forces,  but  it  may  be  doubted  whether 
anything  very  heavy  was  present]  is  tied  to  roads. 

Three  roads  lead  through  the  Southern  and  Eastern 
Ranges  covering  Erzeroum.  One  from  Oltv,  ultimately 
from  Batoum  and  the  Russian  Black  Sea  httoral,  takers 
advantage  of  the  gorge  at  A ,  the  Gurgi  Boghar,  to  pass 
the  mountains. 

The  second— by  far  the  best  to-day  and  the  great 
main  road  of  in\-asion  at  all  epochs — comes  through  the 
Eastern  range  by  the  "  Camel's  Pass  "  at  B  :  the  Bcoe 
Boyonn.  Its  summit  is  but  a  few  hundred  feet  above 
Erzeroum,  the  town  itself  standing  some  6,000  feet  above 
the  sea.  Not  only  is  this  road  by  far  the  best  of  the 
three,  but  it  also  leads  to  the  Russian  railhead  some 
70  miles  off,  from  which  a  further  light  railway  may 
have  been  built  in  the  last  few  months.  It  is  far  the 
best  avenue  of  communication  and  could  supply  munition- 
ment  more  rapidly  than  either  of  the  other  roads. 

A  third  road  comes  in  from  the  South,  crossing  the 
very  high  ridge  of  that  range  (it  has  summits  of  over 
9,000  feet)  by  a  pass  at  C,  which  is  the  nearest  of  the 
three  to  the  city. 

It  was  clear  to  those  who  designed  the  defences  of 
Erzeroum  that  on  these  three  gaps  or  "  gates  "  in  the 
hills  were  the  very  points  of  any  system  of  fortification. 
Each  was  guarded  by  a  system  of  its  own. 

Supposing  the  main  one  of  these  three  gaps  to  be 
forced— that  of  the  Deve  Boyoun,  which  was  most  in 
peril,  from  its  leading  directly  to  the  Russian  bases,  a 
rather  inexplicable  inner  series  of  works  had  been  con- 
trived of  which  it  is  difficult  to  see  the  ultimate  use,  and 
which  appear  to  have  done  nothing  to  help  the  place, 
during  the  recent  fighting. 

At  T  there  is  a  sort  of  rocky  horseshoe  of  high  hills, 
precipitous  to  the  east  and  south— that  is  towards  the 
Deve  Boyoun  Pass,  and  the  main  road— but  sloping 
away  gradually  down  to  the  north.  This  height  is  called 
the  "  Top  "  Mountain  :  the  "  Top-Dagh,"  'and  on  its 
escarpment  a  whole  line  of  works  were  stretched— r,  2. 
and  3  are  called  the  "  Azizie  "  works,     i  and  3  closed 


works,  2,  the  middle  one,  open.  4  and  5  two  isolated 
closed  forts  facing  south.  Lastly,  on  an  isolated  hill  at 
D,  enfilading  the  valley  east  of  the  Top-Dagh  and  com- 
manding the  high  road  is  the  fort  called  Ahkali. 

I  have  said  that  it  is  not  very  easy  to  see  why  these 
inner  works  were  constructed  at  all :  at  any  rate,  under 
modern  conditions  of  range  and  observation.  For  if 
the  Deve  Boyoun  at  B  is  forced  and  the  heights  on  each 
side  occupied  these  dominate  T  and  D  and  master  all 
the  plain  below. 

Lastly,  there  has  been  constructed — still  more 
puzzling  and  apparently  equally  useless  in  these  last 
few  days —  a  continuous  line  of  ditch  and  rampart  all 
round  the  town  at  E,  E,  E,  from  a  quarter  to  half  a  mile 
outside  the  built-on  area  and  nearly  eight  miles  in 
perimeter. 

None  of  these  inner  works  appear  to  have  had  effect 
last  Aveek.  The  hills  covering  the  town  appear  to  have 
been  mastered  first  by  a  force  carrying  the  northernmost 
gap  at  A,  the  Gurdji  Boghaz,  and  then,  by  an  almost 
simultaneous  successful  attack  on  B. 

It  was  this  attack  along  the  main  road,  delivered 
with  all  the  advantage  of  a  neighbouring  railhead  and  a 
good  road  for  the  artillery  (so  far  as  that  could  count  in 
the  depth  of  the  snow)  which  decided  the  affair. 

The  point  B  on  sketch  I  is,  as  we  have  said,  the  pass 
called  Deve  Boyoun.  It  has  been  much  more  strongly 
fortified  than  either  of  the  other  two  "  gates  "  through 
the  moimtains  and  was  thought  to  be  impregnable. 

Let  us  examine  the  details  of  this  piece  of  ground. 

The  fortifications  01  tne  Deve  lioyouii  pass  cuiisist 
in  four  groups  of  works. 

To  the  north  of  the  pass  (which  at  its  summit  runs 
through  a  very  narrow  gorge)  rises  very  steeply  a  height 
called  the  Tafta.  The  escarpment  is  towards  the  gorge 
and  road.  From  the  summit  northwards  the  ground 
slips  away  and  downwards  till  it  rises  again  in  another 
escarpment  which  we  will  describe  in  a  moment. 

On  these  Tafta  heights  which  flank  the  north  of  the 
pass  are  three  works  which  we  may  call  the  first  group. 
I  have  numbered  them  on  sketch  II.  :  i,  2,  and  3.  i  is 
a  very  important  closed  work  and  sweeps  with  its  fire 
the  whole  of  the  road  rising  up  to  the  summit  of  the  pass, 
2,  and  3  are  open  works  which  serve  merely  as  supports 
to  the  principal  fort  i,  and  help  it  to  sweep  the  approaches 
towards  the  summit  of  the  pass,  and  to  prevent  the 
principal  fort  i  from  being  turned  by  its  Eastern  flank, 
where  there  is  a  certain  amount  of  dead  ground. 

This  first  group  of  works  is  the  one  demanding  our 


6^ 


n. 


TromKarsSc 

^^Sarykamish 

r      andthe  ^ 

^ 'Railhead.^ 


■To  ^si^ 


'BattEryofY- 
Lah.  Hm  -y 


chief  attention  because,  as  we  shall  see  in  a  moment,  it  is 
the  master-group  of  the  whole  system. 

Behind  it  and  further  to  the  north  lies  what  may  be 
called  the  second  group,  which  I  have  marked  upon 
sketch  II,  with  the  numbers  :  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  g.  This  gro'^p 
of  six  works  contains  one  closed  work.  No.  5,  the  others 
are  all  open  batteries.    7,  8,  and  9  are  advanced  works 


LAND      AND     WATER 


February    24,  1016. 


delaying  the   approach    to  5.  while  4  and  6  are  only  of 
use  as  (lankinR  5  and  prcvcntint;  its  bcinp  turned. 

Now  it  is:  imjHirtant  at  this  stage  of  the  description 
to  grasp  the  fact  that  the  ridge  upon  which  4,  5,  and  6  are 
placed  does  not  dominate  and  control  the  Tafta  hill  just 
above  the  pass.  The  idea  of  building  fort  5  with  its 
Hanking  and  supporting  works  was  not  to  stand  up 
against  a  force  which  might  already  have  captured  the 
great  principal  fort  i  on  Tafta.  The  idea  was  rather  to 
prevent  fort  i  from  being  turned. 

The  German  engineers  appear  to  have  argued  thus  : 
"  Tafta  is  too  strong  to  be  rushed  and  can  stand  against 
anything  the  Russians  have  by  way  of  a  siege  train.  It 
is  true  that  the  munitionment  and  th(?  main  strength  of 
the  army  must  come  along  the  road.  But  still,  some 
slight  deviation  from  the  road  is  possible  ;  and  unless 
we  guard  the  flanks  of  the  principal  work  on  Tafta,  the 
enemy  can  turn  it  round  by  the  north.  So  we  will  create 
a  new  set  of  works  to  prevent  this."  To  this  decision  the 
position  owes  the  group  4,  5,  6,  7,  8.  9,  which  I  have 
callod  the  second  gro\ip.  But  Tafta  once  taken  the 
second  group  loses  its  value  at  once  and  the  northern  side 
pf  the  pass  is  clear. 

On  the  southern  side  of  the  pass  just  eastward  of  the 
summit,  is  the  spur  or  ridge  called  "  The  Mountain  of 
Ahmed,"  the  Ahmed  Dagh.  Its  highest  point  at 
10  is  crowned  with  a  closed  work.  AH  roimd  its  edges 
arc  a  series  of  open  batteries  which  command  the  road 
las  it  rises  up  towards  the  pass)  and  the  plain  of  Passine 

10  the  East;  while  an  isolated  work  upon  the  lower 
hill  towards  the  plain  (marked  11,  on  sketch  II)  server,  as 
a  support  to  retard  anv  attack  upon  the  Ahmed  Dagh. 
]-inally  this  set  of  fortifications  (which  may  be  called 
tlie  third  group)  contains  upon  a  summit  at  the  extreme 
west  the  battery  of  Lala  hill,  which  guards  the  flank  of 
the  principal  work  10,  but  does  not  comniand  the  road 
in  any  way.  No.  10  and  batteries  all  round  the  edge  of 
the  Ahmed  Dagh  are  useless  if  Tafta  be  once  taken,  for 
Tafta  commands  the  road  more  thoroughly  than  10  docs 
and  the  open  batteries  on  the  northenr  edge  of  the  Ahmed 
Dagh  just  south  of  the  road  could  not  stand  against 
whoever  was  the  master  of  Tafta. 

The  fourth  group  is  to  the  Ahmed  Dagh  or  third 
group  what  the  second  group  is  to  Tafta,  the  first.  It 
is  a  system  designed  to  prevent  the  Ahmed  Dagh  from 
being  turned  by  the  south  just  as  the  group  4,  3,  6,  7, 
8,  9,  is  a  systeni  designed  to  prevent  Tafta  being  turned 
by  the  north. 

This  fourth  group  consists  in  a  closed  work,  No.  12 
on  sketch  II,  with  two  batteries,  above  and  below  it,  at 

11  and  14.  The-^e  stand  on  the  edge  of  another  spur  or 
ridge  ovcrlookin,^  the  plain.  Finalh',  this  fourth  group  also 
has  its  support,  two  large  batteries,  standing  on  two  twin 
summits  to  the  south  and  called  (from  the  names  of  villages 
near  them)  the  battery  of  Ekhlikhan  and  the  battery  of 
Tchatarli.  The  object  served  by  these  last  two  works  is 
threefold ;  they  prevent  any  force  from  using  the  track 
which  here  goes  over  the  hills  to  rejoin  the  main  road 
beyond  the  summit  of  the  pass,  and  so  turn  the  Ahmed 
Dagh  position.  Thej'  sweep  all  the  approaches  to  12, 
I";  and  14.  And  they  prevent  any  body  of  the  enemy 
from  using  the  very  steep  dead  grounil  at  A  on  the 
northern  side  of  a  deep  ravine  which  here  would  give  an 
opportunity,  were  its  approaches  undefended,  for  a 
comparatively  small  force  to  turn  the  whole  of  the  fortifi- 
cations by  the  south. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  above  that  the  whole  system 
is  based  upon  Tafta  :  It  has  been  constructed  with  the 
idea  that  no  one  would  attempt  to  take  Tafta  directly 
but  the  Russians  would  try  to  reduce  the  main  position 
gradually  by  the  two  flanks,  northern  and  southern. 

But  the  Russians,  aided  by  circumstances  of  which 
we  know  nothing,  struck  directly  for  the  main  position 
and  carried  Tafta  before  most  of  the  other  works  were 
reduced.  The  struggle  Ix-gan  upon  the  afternoon  of 
Friday  the  nth.  By  the  14th,  two  works  at  least  had 
already  been  caixied  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  The 
afternoon  of  Tuesday  tlie  15th,  so  far  as  one  can  gather 
from  the  telegrams  as  yet  to  hand  (in  Paris  up  to  3  o'clock 
of  Monday  the  21st)  tlie  whole  position  uas  mastered 
and  the  road  over  the  simimit  of  the  pass  was  held  by  our 
Allies,  who  were  then  marching  directly  upon  Erzeroum 
beyond.  Those  units  (portions  of  three  army  corps) 
which  were  garrisoning  the  city  evacuated  it.  leaving 


behind  them,  however,  a  great  mass  of  material  and 
stores,  all  the  heavy  guns  in  the  forts,  and  a  very  large 
number  of  lield  pieces  as  well. 

A  little  before  midday  on  Wednesday,  the  i6th, 
the  Russian  cavalry  rocfe  into  the  city  and  was 
soon  joined  by  the  separate  columns  which  had  been 
coming  up  tlvough  the  passes  A  and  C  (on  sketch  I) 
through  the  hills  to  the  north  and  the  south.  All  next 
day,  Thursday,  and  Friday  afterwards,  were  occupied 
in  pursuing  the  rapid  and  partly  disorderlj'  retreat  of  the 
Turks.  What  was  left  of  one  division,  the  34th,  was 
captured  wholesale,  and  by  the  evening  of  the  day  240 
field  pieces  were  in  Russian  hands.  The  Turkish  troops 
were  already'  scattered  into  three  separate  fragments,  one 
retreating  north-west  towards  Trebizond,  the  other  due 
westwards  by  the  road  Erzinguian,  and  a  third  south- 
ward along  the  road  to  Diarbekir.  Which  was  the  largest 
of  these  fragments  or  whether  any  one  of  them  can  be 
said  to  constitute  the  main  body  we  afe  not  told. 


V^       Kavs 


1 


Tci  (ci;ista 


0^^^  N^  Mosul  , 

Q  ...  »  ;;, «  k  Jqo    ii30<yJruiad  Mouatdinoas  ///// 


It  was  inevitable  that  a  success  so  rapid  and  so 
unexpected,  and  one  of  so  much  political  consequence, 
should  give  rise  to  a  great  mass  of  speculation  with  regard 
to  its  strategical  results.  These  speculations  are  premature. 
We  do  not  know  the  concjition  of  the  roads  nor  what  num- 
ber of  men  the  Russians  can  spare  for  what  will  now  be 
their  lengthening  communications  far  away  from  their  rai.' 
head  beyond  the  frontier.  We  do  not  even  know  how 
far  they  command  the  Black  Sea,  though  we  may  guess 
that  their  command  has  been  suHkicntly  complete  to 
prevent  reinforcements  and  munitions  from  reaching 
Trebizond  ;  since  the  fall  of  Erzeroum  was  most  pro- 
bably due  to  the  interruption  of  this  line  of  communica- 
tion. They  may  find  it  necessary  to  march  north  and 
hold  Trebizond  before  they  do  anything  else.  If  they 
are  not  compelled  to  use  a  large  force  thus,  their  most 
obvious  course  will  clearly  be  to  try  and  strike  at  the 
Bagdad  railway,  and  the  most  convenient  point  for  that 
would  be  Diarbekir — 140  miles  from  Erzeroum  :  they 
are  already  at  Mousch  with  their  southern  or  left  wing. 
Any  considerable  Russian  force  at  Diarbekir  would 
menace  the  existence  of  all  Turkish  forces  in  Mesopotamia, 
but  the  march  is  a  difiicult  one  through  a  mass  of  des- 
perately confused  and  high  mountain  ridges  of  the 
Armenian  Taurus.  The  only  certain  thing  we  can  say  is 
this  upon  the  strategical  situation  created  by  the  fall 
of  Erzeroum  :  that  it  will  compel  a  Turkish  concentration 
towards  Armenia.  It  may  relieve  the  pressure  upon  the 
small  British  forces  in  Mesopotamia,  it  must  almost 
certainly  postpone  to  another  season  the  difficult  and 
now  perhaps  impossible  scheme  for  invading  Egypt. 

This  latter,  once  it  is  fully  appreciated,  will  release 
for  the  general  purposes  of  the  Allies,  much  the  greater 
part  of  the  forces  concentrated  for  the  defence  of  the 
Suez  Canal.  And  it  is  perhaps  the  renewed  availability 
of  this  force  for  action  elsewhere  which  is  the  chief 
consequence  of  the  fall  of  the  capital  of  Turkish  Armenia. 

H.  Bi:i.LOC. 


10 


Febraary  24,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


NEW    SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN. 


By  Arthur  Pollen. 


A  BOUT  ten  years  ago,  when  the  Navy  was  sup- 
/%  posed  to  be  divided  between  the  historical 
/  %  and  the  viateriel  schools,  a  distinguished 
A.  JL  admiral — of  the  latter  persuasion — is  said  to 
have  given  this  extraordinary  reason  for  declining  certain 
measures  for  encouraging  the  study  of  naval  history. 
"  There  was  no  advantage,"  he  said,  "  to  be  got  from  it, 
because  history  was  after  all  only  the  record  of  other 
people's  mistakes."  As  if  the  principle  of  the  drunken 
Helot  had  not  always  been  the  most  fruitful  stimulus 
to  wisdom  !  Certainly  this  war  has  been  no  less  fecund 
than  previous  wars  in  teaching  by  the  method  of  trial 
and  error.  The  catalogue  of  unquestioned  sea  blunders 
is  too  long  a  one  to  exhaust.  There  have  been  gross 
errors  on  both  sides  in  the  preparation  of  naval  force 
and  in  the  theory  of  its  use.  What  have  we  paid  and 
what  have  we  yet  to  pay  for  our  failure  so  to  organise 
the  brain  power  of  our  navy,  that  Admiralty  programmes. 
Admiralty  plans  and  Admiralty  administration  were 
projected ,  laid  and  conducted  according  to  doctrines 
which  the  clearest  thinkers  have  always  held,  and  eighteen 
months  of  war  have  once  more  proved  to  be  right  ? 
What  is  the  price  that  the  Allies  must  pay  for  the  failure 
of  Great  Britain  to  reahse  from  the  lirst  that  our  sea 
power  was  the  Allies'  greatest  asset,. and  should  therefore, 
from  the  first  day  of  the  war,  have  been  used  with  the 
completest  rigour  that  was  possible  ?  Had  our  reply  to 
the  outrages  on  Belgium  been  the  proclamation  of  a 
strict  blockade,  no  neutrals  would  have  dared  to  protest, 
for  all  neutrajs  were  then  boiling  hot  with  indignation 
at  the  hideous  and  recent  iniquity  which  had  been  done. 
W'hat  has  the  shortage  of  cruisers  cost  us  ?  What  might 
it  have  cost  us  had  the  Germans  expected  a  war  with  us  ? 
The  humorist  who  said  that  our  1910  fleet  consisted 
of  "Dreadnoughts  that  submarines  would  chase  off  the  sea, 
and  of  submarines  that  would  not  even  have  a  Dread- 
nought to  chase,"  was  not  so  grossly  wrong  after  all. 
We  had  no  defensive  plans  against  submarines  ready. 
Our  neglect  of  mines  was  inexplicable.  Our  failure  to 
provide  for  the  orderly  and  scientific  development  of 
na\'al  gvmnery  was  almost  insane,  when  it  is  remembered 
that  the  Dreadnought  policy  could  only  be  justified 
by  the  use  of  guns  being  brought  to  perfection. 

Non-Use  of  Naval    Power. 

What  saved  us  from  the  worst  features  of  our  de- 
fective preparations  was  that  our  enemies  fell  into  almost 
precisely  the  same  errors.  Still  we  did  much  by  our 
non-use  or  mis-use  of  naval  power  to  make  things  easier 
for  them.  The  folly  of  limiting  the  Fleet's  action  bj'  the 
Declaration  of  London  no  longer  needs  emphasis  now 
that  a  Minister  of  Blockade  is  to  be  added  to  the  Cabinet — 
a  tardy  recognition  tliat  in  this  matter  we  still  have  our 
sea  power  to  use.  The  blunder  of  trying  to  take  the 
Dardanelles  by  ships  alone,  the  far  greater  blunder  of 
failing  to  recognise,  when  its  impossibility  had  been 
proved,  that  military  success  had  been  made  impossible 
by  it ;  the  rejection  of  the  advice  to  treat  the  bombard- 
ments as  demonstrations  only,  and  on  their  failing  to  send 
the  army  destined  for  Gallipoli  into  Serbia — all  these  things 
can  be  traced  to  the  non-recognition  of  the  truth  that  the 
application  of  the  principles  of  right  strategy  and  right 
technique,  is  not  a  matter  of  instinct  or  of  impulse, 
but  can  be  ensured  only  where  a  duly  constituted  staff 
brings  the  weight  of  universally  accepted  and  imper- 
sonally expressed  principles  to  bear  on  practice.  What 
would  we  not  have  given  in  October,  1915,  to  have  had 
in  Serbia  the  200,000  men  put  out  of  action  in  Gallipoli  ? 
Yet  in  Mafch,  1915,  they  could  have  been  sent  through 
Salonika  to  our  Allies'  help  without  difhculty  or  opposi- 
tion. 

Germany's  blunders  at  sea  have  been  even  more 
flagrant  and  far  more  disastrous  than  our  own.  We 
do,  after  all,  possess  in  our  capital  ship  fleet  an  asset  too 
(A'erwhelmingly  powerful  for  our  command  of  the  seas 


to  be  questioned.  The  enemy  could  not  take  that  com- 
mand from  us,  though  we  were  free  to  misuse  it.  All 
Germany's  naval  action  has  followed  from  three  things  : 
Her  folly  in  not  foreseeing  that  Great  Britain  must  be 
arrayed  against  her  ;  her  folly  in  going  on  light-heartedly 
with  the  war  after  our  opposition  became  certain — in 
the  apparent  belief  that  the  land  fighting  would  be  over 
before  the  sea  pressure  began  ;  her  folly  in  expressing 
by  mere  savagery  her  resentment  at  her  £300,000,000 
fleet  being  valueless.  The  submarine  campaign  was, 
though  the  most  effective,  not  the  only  one  of  her  cruel 
and  senseless  expressions  of  her  anger.  The  mine  cam- 
paign against  trading  ships,  the  bombardment  of  the 
undefended  coast  towns,  the  attacking  of  ships  by  air 
bombs — each  of  these  was  but  an  outlet  of  the  same 
unmeasured  fury. 

The  little  neutrals — Holland,  Denmark,  Sweden 
and  Norway— have  never  had  it  in  their  power  to  deal 
with  Germany  over  these  atrocities  to  puissance  en 
puissance.  America,  manifestly  sincere  in  wishing  to 
keep  out  of  the  war,  and  no  less  sincere  in  trying  to 
bring  back  naval  war  to  its  old  legal  standards  of 
humanity,  could  alone  so  deal  with  Germany.  And 
she  will  do  so  before  the  eventful  chapter  is  closed.  If 
it  is  inevitable  that  Germany  should  proceed  with  a  new 
and  more  devastating  campaign  with  a  larger  and  more 
powerful  submarine,  then  it  is  also  inevitable  that  the 
condemnation  by  neutral  countries  of  her  conduct — so 
long  held  in  abeyance — must  take  active  shape.  The 
quarrel  between  Germany  and  America/'so  long  and  so 
patiently  kept  within  bounds,  must  then  become  an 
open  one,  and  when  America  finally  speaks  out,  the 
other  neutrals  can  hardly  remain  silent. 

Germany's   Counterstoke. 

Is  the  new  German  submarine  campaign  inevitable  ? 
It  seemingly  is.  The  first  campaign  has  failed  to  lift 
the  blockade — its  professed  object.  Our  losses  in  mer- 
chant shipping  have  been  heavy.  Between  500  and 
600  out  of  8,000  in  ig  months  of  war.  But  our  shortage 
of  tonnage  to-day  does  not  arise  primarily  from  the  toll 
which  the  enemy  has  taken.  The  requirements  of  the 
fleet,  the  still  greater  requirements  of  our  military  ex- 
peditions over  sea,  have  taxed  the  merchant  navy  four  or 
five  times  more  greatly  than  the  enemy.  Nor  is  this  all. 
The  merchant  tonnage  of  the  world,  British  as  well  as 
neutral,  is  less,  not  only  by  British  ships  sunk  and  with- 
drawn for  military  purposes.  It  is  less  by  the  whole 
German  merchant  mariile  that  has  escaped  capture. 
And  the  demands  of  the  belligerents  both  for  war  supplies 
and  for  food,  clothes  and  other  necessaries  from  overseas, 
has  become  enormously  greater.  Notwithstanding,  then, 
war's  inroads  on  trade,  a  greatly  diminished  merchant 
shipping  has  witnessed  enormously  greater  demands  on 
its  carrying  capacity.  And  in  this  fact  will  probably  be 
found  the  governing  consideration  that  makes  the  new 
German  campaign  inevitable.  Its  object  is  no  longer 
to  terrify  Great  Britain  into  letting  food  enter  Germany. 
Its  object  is  to  prevent  food  entering  France. 

To  cut  off  the  sea  communications  of  an  enemy,  to 
keep  them  open  for  ourselves  and  our  friends,  these 
are  the  equal  and  immediate  objects  of  commanding  the 
sea.  How  valuable  the  achievement  of  this  object  in 
the  case  of  France  has  been  may  be  gathered  from  the 
single  fact  that  £90,000,000  of  goods  left  the  port  of  New 
York  for  France  in  1915,  whereas  in  normal  years 
£30,000,000  represents  the  total  exports  of  America  tc 
that  country.  French  imports  from  other  countries  arf 
no  doubt  as  strikingly  increased.  The  imports  of  al 
belligerent  countries,  and  especially  those  that  Russis 
is  getting  from  Japan,  must  be  fabulous.  While,  then, 
Germany  feels  every  day  the  growing  strain  of  her  isola- 
tion, the  Allies  are  showing  every  day  a  growing  strength 
from  their  sea  supplies.  It  is  to  sap  this  form  of  strength 
that  the  new  submarine  campaign  will  be  directed- 


U 


L  A  N  D      A  X  n     W  A  T  E  R 


February  24,  1916- 


Ha';  Germany  any  other  possible  sea  counter-stroke 
open  to  lior  ?  The  simplest  and  most  ob%-ions  would  be 
ti)  strike  (^nt  and  defeat  the  Grand  Fleet.  Is  this  possible 
t D  Germany  to-day  ?  \Nill  it  ever  be  po?^sible  ?  There 
have  not  been  wanting  those  who  would  make  us  believe 
that  the  danger  is  a  real  one.  Mr.  Hurd  is  determined 
that  we  shall  not  forget  that  Germany's  resources  in 
ship  building  are  "  almost,  if  not  quite,  equal  to  our  own." 
"  If  we  had  worked  our  hardest  in  this  country  since 
the  opening  of  war  and  Gennany  had  done  the  same, 
we  could  not  have  maintained  the  margin  of  superiority 
that  we  possessed  when  the  war  opened.  That  is  one  fact. 
Germanv,  moreover,  would  have  been  gaining  on  sea  in 
ships  which  the  lessons  of  the  war  had  shown  to  be  of 
the  greatest  military  value." 

Of  course,  if  (iermany  can  build  ships  as  fast  as  we 
can,  and  botli  build  as  fast  as  possible,  it  is  obvious 
that  our  percentage  superiority  rruist  decline.  But  it 
may  be  consoling  to  remind  ourselves  of  what  that  per- 
centage s\iperiority  was.  We  began  in  the  North  Sea 
with  24  capital  ships  to  19,  a  difYcreuce  of  five— about 
2/1  per  cent.  In  the  Mediterranean  we  had  Admiral 
Milne's  three  battle  cruisers,  from  which  the  Goebcn 
escaped,  and  one  battle  crvtiser  was  not  commissioned. 
Since  those  days,  as  Mr.  Churchill  told  us  in  November 
of  that  year,  we  should  have  been  able  to  add  15  new- 
ships  to  Germany's  three  ;  and  presumably  Australia  has 
becoinc  available  for  the  main  theatre  of  war.  Of  ships 
built  and  building  in  August,  1914,  then,  if  there  had  been 
no  losses  on  cither  side,  we  should  have  the  24  Dread- 
noughts in  commission  at  the  Spithead  Review,  plus  five 
plus  15,  or  44  ships  toGermany's  22.  The  margin  is  obviously 
enormous,  especiallv  when  it  is  remembered  that  behind 
the  British  fleet  stands  the  French  fleet  of  capital  ships, 
entirely  without  obvious  employment  at  the  present 
moment.  It  is  still  more  striking  when  we  remernbcr 
that  nine  of  our  ships  carr\  15-inch  guns,  two  14-inch 
guns,  17.  13.5-inch  guns,  and  17,  12-inch  guns.  Against 
these,  Germany  lias  15  armed  with  12-inch  guns,  and  seven 
svith  ii-inch.  The  gun  strength  must  be  something 
like  three  to  one. 

17-inch  Gun  Controversy. 

The  point  of  Mr.  Kurd's  warning,  is  an  echo  of  the 
17-inch  gun  controversy.     When  he  says  Germany  is 
"  gaining  "  on  us,  he  cannot  mean  that  Germany  will 
have  built  more  new  ships,  but  that  while  in  ships  of 
pre-war  design  we  have  a  superiority,  in  the  new  type 
the  numbers  would  be  more  likely  to  be  equal.     Every- 
thing then  seems  to  depend  upon  the  lessons  of  the  war 
and  the  use  which  each  side  has  made  of  them.     The 
main  lesson  of  the  war  has  surely  been  the  higher  hitting 
efticicncy  of  the  bigger  gun.     The  Falkland  Islands  really 
taught  us  nothing  new  on  this,  because  no  one  has  ever 
doubted  that  a  12-inch  gun  really  must  be  \-astly  superior 
to  an  8-inch.     But  the  Dogger  Bank  might  have  taught 
the  Germans  that  their  old  theory  that  11  inch  and  12-inch 
guns  would  be  as  effective  as  12-inch  and  13.5s.,  was 
utterly  fallacious.     Their  theory  was  wrong,  because  this 
imderestimated   the   range   at   which   actions   could   be 
fought.   We  may  also,  it  seems,  assume  that  a  lesson  was 
learned  at  the   Dardanelles,  and  one  as  obvious  to  the 
Germans  as  to  ourselves.  The  Queen  Elizabeth  could  not, 
of  course,  destroy  and  take  the  Narrows  forts,  but  the 
testimony  that  her  guns  were  more  effective,  because 
more  accurate,   than   any  others,   is  both  general   and 
widely  known.     By   the  end  of  either   January   or   of 
March,  1915,  then,"  the  new  lesson  of  the  war  may  be 
said  to  have  become  clear.     It  was  that  there  was  a 
material  advantage  in  increasing  the  cahbre  of  the  guns. 
Is  this   the  lesson  which  Mr.  Hurd  has  in  mind  ?     The 
matter  is  of  considerable  interest  because  in  the  spring  of 
1914  there  was  a  very  general  impression  that  the  Gcs- 
mans  had  already  then  resolved  on  putting  15-inch  guns 
into  the  four  ships  of  the  "  Ersatz  Worth  "  class,  then  in 
contemplation.     But  if,  instead  of  proceeding  with  their 
15-inch  programme,  they  have,  "  profiting  by  the  lesson 
of  the  war,"  gone  to  17-inch,  it  is  clear  that  they  cannot 
have  made  this  departure  before  the  Do.gger  Bank  fight, 
for  until  then  no  conclusive  evidence  of  the  bigger  gun's 
superiority  over  the  already  very  big  gun  was  available. 
\\'hile  if  Germany  waited  until  April  for  evidence  of  the 
suoerioritv  of  the  monster  gun,  then  she  cannot  have  begun 


her  plans  for  a  17-inch  gun  until  very  much  later.  In 
either  case,  it  will  be  long  before  one  is  seen  afloat.  But 
in  either  escnt,  as  it  would  take  at  least  thirty  months 
to  design  and  make  and  build  new  guns  and  mountings 
and  ships  to  carry  such  guns,  we  arc  not  likely  to  sec 
17-inch  guns  afloat  for  another  eighteen  or  twenty 
months.  But,  if  GermanV  began  in  August,  1914,  with 
the  deteriuination  to  build  17-inch  gun  ships,  it  would  be 
a  diftercnt  matter. 

The  advantages  of  the  big  gun  in  naval  war  arc 
briefly  these  : — 

(i)  At  long  range  it  is  more  uniform  in  its  shooting. 
This  arises  largely  from  the  fact  that  its  initial  velocity 
is  lower.  In  guns  of  the  same  calibre,  those  of  the  higher 
velocity  are  less  accurate  than  those  of  the  lower. 

(2)  Heavier  shells  maintain  their  momentum  longer 
than  lighter  shells.  The  greater  the  range  the  greater 
the  danger  space.  Consequently  an  error  in  range  which 
would  be  fatal  to  lighter  guns  hitting  r^ight  not  be  fatal 
to  the  heavier  gun  doing  so. 

(3)  The  larger  shell  makes  a  splash  in  the  water, 
which  is  much  greater  both  in  height  and  in  volume  than 
the  lighter  shell.  It  is  therefore  easier  to  see  this  splash 
at  a  great  distance,  and  so  it  is  easier  in  the  first  instance 
to  find,  and  afterwards  to  recover  when  lost,  the  range  at 
which  the  gun  will  hit. 

(4)  Finally,  the  heavier  shell  delivers  a  more  smashing 
blow,  and  as  it  can  carry  a  far  greater  blasting  charge,  its 
destructive  charge  is  very  much  greater. 

The  public  discussion  of  the  17-inch  gun  shows  that 
there  is  some  misapprehension  on  points  i  and  2  above. 
The  point  to  bear  in  mind  is  this  :  In  choosing  a  gun  for 
long  range  fire  we  want  the  ma.\imum  velocity  combined 
with  the  maximum  uniformity  of  shooting  at  the  desired 
distance.  Diagram  I  shows  how  three  shells  of  different 
weights  and  starting  at  different  velocities  lose  their  speed. 


Timiqe^fOOqydi.  lOOOOj^ds.  ISDOOj/df-  SOCWjds. 
30001 1 ■ 


2S001 
feet 
/>er 
second' 

2000' 


iSOO'r 


lOOOV 


\2S00. 
\/eet 


I 


SOO'^ 


klosicfVebcitifin&soii.pT^a:^!^  hi/to! Vdjd^Joa^persec. 
B     .  "        .   &70U>.     .  .         „     29S0fi:,.     . 

C 870li.      ..  .  „     2100ft..     . 

V    -  n         ,17^011)     „  „  „     2300ft.    . 


(A)  is  the  velocity  curve  of  the i:\merican  5-inch  gun, 
which  it  will  be  seen,  starts  at  3,000  feet  a  second,  falls  to 
1,700  feet  a  second  at  3,000  yards  ;  to  1,100  feet  at  6,000 
yards,  and  to  just  over  900  feet  at  9,000.  The  weight  of 
the  5-inch  shell  is  50  lbs. 

(B)  is  the  American  12-inch  gun  with  a  muzzle  velocity 
of  2,950  feet,  and  firing  an  870-lbs.  shell.  This  gun  loses 
400  feet  velocity  in  the  first  3,000  yards  ;  300  feet  in  the 
next  3,000  yards  ;  250  feet  inthe  next  3,000. 

(C)  is  a  gun  of  the  same  cahbre  firing  the  same  shell, 
with  a  muzzle  velocity  of  2,100  feet  only.  This  gun  loses 
less  of  its  velocity  because  it  starts  slower.  These  three 
instances  show  iis  that  the  lighter  the  shell  the  greater 
the  drop  in  velocity,  the  higher  the  velocity  the  greater 
the  loss  of  velocity  ;  the  heavier  the  shell  the  greater  the 
maintenance  of  velocity. 

(D)  is  a  conjectured  cur\-e  for  a  15-inch  gun,  which 
we  will  assume  to  start  with  a  velocity  of  2,300  feet,  and 
to  fire  a  projectile  of  about  1,750  lbs. 'Such  a  shell  might 
lose  less  speed  initially  than  any  of  the  other  three  and 


12 


February  24,  igi6. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


continue?  to  lose  less  and  less  as  it  went  on. 

The  second  series  of  diagrams  will  make  the  meaning 
of  the  first  clearer.  In  this  series  I  show  what  may  be 
called  the  stages  of  a  race  in  which  A,  B  and  D  engage. 
The  5-inch,  the  12-inch  and  the  15-inch  shells  arc  seen 
starting  level.  At  1,000  yards  the  5-inch  lias  already 
fallen  behind  the  12-inch  but  it  leads  the  15-inch.  At  6,000 
yards  the  5-inch  shell  has  fallen  greatly  behind,  though  the 
i2-inch  still  leads  the  15-inch.  At  9,000,  the  5-inch  has 
long  been  out  of  the  race,  and  the  15-inch  leads  the 
12-inch  by  a  short  head.  At  20,000  the  15-inch  has 
beaten  the  12-inch  by  four  and  one-tenth  seconds  ;  the 
12-inch  has  beaten  the  5-inch  by  nearly  half  a  minute. 
Nothing  can  better  illustrate  the  staying  power  of  the 
heavier  shell,  for  in  this  case  remember,  the  starting  speed 
of  the  12-inch  was  something  like  750  feet  per  second  the 
greater. 

Now  mark  with  regard  to  these  diagrams  of  the  race 
that  the  advantage  which  the  15-inch  shell  has  over  the 
12-inch  is  enormously  less  than  that  which  the  12-inch 
has  over  the  5-inch.  The  advantage  of  the  17-inch  over 
tiie  15-incli  would  be  correspondingly  reduced.  In  fact, 
for  practical  purposes,  it  may  be  said  to  have  no  advantage 
at  all.  And  consequently,  we  are  reduced  to  points  3 
and  4,  namely,  the  greater  visibility  of  the  splash  and  the 
greater  the  smashing  effect  of  the  bigger  shell,   g 

Weight  and  Numbers. 

Now,  when  we  get  to  these  points  we  have  a  second 
matter  to  consider.  And  it  is  this  :  If  you  decide  to 
adopt  the  bigger  gun,  it  means  that  you  can  only  carry  a 
smaller  number  of  them  for  any  given  displacement  or 
expenditure.  It  is  no  answer  to  say  that  you  can  build 
bigger  ships  to  carry  the  same  number  of  bigger  guns. 
For  your  total  shipbuilding  and  gun-making  effort  you 
will  still  have  a  smaller  number  of  guns.  As  a  rough 
formula,  the  weight  of  guns  with  their  mountings,  ammu- 
nitions, etc.,  tompare  as  do  the  cubes  of  the  calibres.  On 
this  principle,  a  17-inch  gun  double  turret  would  represent 
37  times  the  weight  of  an  ii-inch  turrent  ;  2-8  times  a 
12-inch  turret  ;  twice  the  weight  of  a  13-5  turret,  and  be 
one  and  a  half  times  as  heavy  again  as  a  15-inch  turret. 
If  Germany  then  has  decided  on  the  17-inch  gun  for  her 
new  ships,  her  total  shipbuilding  and  gun-making  capacitv 
can  be  expended  upon  half  as  many  more  15-inch  gunned 
ships  as  17-inch  gunned  ships.  It  seems  to  me  that  she 
could  only  decide  upon  a  smaller  number  of  ships  with  the 
more  powerful  gun  if  she  were  perfectly  certain  first,  that 
the  17-inch  gun  is  more  likely  to  hit  at  a  great  range  than 
the  15-inch ;  secondly,  that  the  decisive  naval  battle 
would  be  fought  at  a  range  at  which  this  advantage  of 
17-inch  guns  would  have  full  play.  For  not  otherwise 
would  a  Power  already  so  inferior  in  numbers  sacrifice 
the  very  great  and  undoubted  advantage  which  numbers 
confer. 

Now  as  we  have  s(5en,  it  is  improbable  that  the  17-mch 
gun  would  have  any  hitting  superiority  over  the  15-inch. 
But  it  is  quite  undoubted  that  fifteen  guns  have  a  very 
great  hitting  advantage  over  ten  guns.  For  at  long 
range  so  many  uncertainties  nuist  necessarily  be  present  ' 
— uncertainties  of  range,  of  aim,  etc.,  that  the  probability 
of  making  hits  increases  out  of  proportion  to  the  increase 
of  the  number  of  guns.  A  broadside  of  eight  guns  would 
have  a  great  deal  more  than  double  the  chance  of  hitting 
than  a  broadside  of  four.  Nor  would  the  splashes  of  six 
17-inch  guns,  be  more  visible  than  those  of  eight  15-inch. 
Those  that  choose  the  17-inch  gun  therefore,  would  choose 
solely  on  the  ground  that  a  single  shot  would  have  a 
better  hope  of  sinking  or  disabling,  and  would  probably 
not  so  choose  unless  they  were  extraordinarily  confident 
of  bringing  a  greatly  improved  standard  of  marksmanship 
into  use.  A  further  consideration  must  be  added.  Off 
Heligoland  we  fought  at  6,000  yards — we  could  see  no 
further.  Is  it  wise  to  build  for  long  range  only  ?  At 
short  range  numbers  are  everything.  So  much  for 
general  theory. 

As  to  the  practical  question  as  to  whether  as  a  fact 
the  Germans  have  decided  upon  the  17-inch  gun  and  are 
actually  re-arming  their  old  ships  witli  it,  and  have  done 
both  as  a  result  of  war  experience,  I  have  to  confess  a 
considerable  scepticism.  War  experience,  as  we  have  seen, 
would  not  have  been  available  till  April  last.  Is  it 
conceivable  that  Germany  would  have  decided  upon  a 
revolutionary  na\'al  policy  at  so  late  a  date  in  the  war  ? 


She  would  hardly  delay  making  up  the  lost  ground. 
No  battleship  has  ever  yet  been  built  in  a  shorter  time 
than  two  years  from  the  completion  of  the  design,  The 
Dreadnought  was  actually  constructed  in  eighteen  months 
from  the  lajing  down  of  the  first  plate,  but  in  this  case, 
four  of  the  five  turrets  were  taken  from  ships  previously 
ordered,  so  that  the  element  which  takes  longest  in  the 


production  of  a  battleship,  viz. 
were  already  provided. 


the  guns  and  turrets, 


1% 

IS 


Jleioooj^ds. 


soo/t. 


J^e  9000j^ds 


f: 


15' 


Jit  20000i^ards 
SOSecozids 


4-1  Sees 


1 


As  for  tlie  re-arming  of  old  ships,  it  is  no  doubt 
physically  possible  that  Germany's  five 'ii-inch  gunned 
Dreadnoughts  could  be  converted  from  carrying 
six  turrets  of  these  pieces  into  ships  carrying  two  single 
17-inch  guns  and  two  ii-inch  turrets.  But  it  would 
mean  the  virtual  re-construction  of  the  entire  ship,  and  it 
would  probably  take  longer  to  change  over  these  five 
ships  than  to  get  ten  17-inch  guns  afloat  in  two  new  ships. 
The  12-inch  Dreadnoughts  could  ,iot  be  converted  to 
17-inch  ships,  without  a  similar  reconstruction. 

Finally,  two  reflections  are  in  place.  It  is  no  use 
our  making  ourselves  unhappy  on  the  question  of  the 
surprises  in  naval  construction  that  Germany  has  in 
store  for  us.  Nothing  we  can  do  now  in  the  way  of  deter- 
mining on  new  ships  can  bear  fruit  in  completed  shi]:is  for 
at  least  twenty  months.  If  Germany  actually  got  ahead 
of  us  between  last  January  and  last  May,  as  Mr.  Hurd 
seems  to  think,  it  is  too  late  for  the  present  Board  to 
remedy  the  mistakes  of  Mr.  Churchill  and  his  colleagues. 
We  must  trust — as  it  seems  to  me  we  can  trust — with 
absolute  confidence  to  the  very  great  margin  of  strength 
which  we  possessed  in  August,  10x4,  and  to  the  great 
additions  to  that  strength  which  the  purchase  of  foreign 
ships  and  the  completion  of  those  already  in  hand,  have 
enabled  us  to  make.  Half-a-dozen  ships  carrying  17-inrh 
guns  could  make  no  material  difterence  to  naval'strengtli. 
We  ought  to  have  added  between  twelve  and  eighteen 
15-inch  gunned  ships  before  a  single  German  ship  with 
the  large  guns  is  afloat.  Akthur  Pollen. 


That  virtue  brings  its  own  reward  and  evil  its  own 
punishment  is  the  keynote  of  Unrest,  Mr.  Warwick  Deeping's 
new  novel  (Cassell  and  Co..  6s.).  A  temperamental  lit,  of 
i-estlessness  led  Martin  Frenshani  to  run  away  from  his  wife 
\yith  a  bold,  black-eyed  American  woman,  of  whom  he  soon 
tires.  For  his  wife,  in  the  meantime,  there  rem»«ns  the 
problem  of  how  to  comport  herself  and  gloss  over  liis  absence 
so  as  to  deceive  friends  until  he  shall  return  to  her,  as  she 
confidently  expects  he  will.  •  The  book  is  a  study  in  cun- 
trasts,  in  high  fights  and  strong  shadows --tlR  re  "arcf  vury 
few  haU-tones  iu  it.    But  its  inti-rest  is  sustainta. 


T    ivn      A>-D     WATER.  Felrrriaiy  24.  1:^^ 

THE    AMERICAN    CIML    W  AR.-II. 

Some  Lessons  to  be  Learnt  from  it. 
By  Jote  Puci— 


tfe 


tihaX  a  _ 

to  — >  *^  i^^.B&i— t^  »ewr  ■heed  »  « 

a  BB  1MSI  be  left  to 

K  tfc  svWcr's  tzaai^  fe^^»t  *  ^^  °*^ 

Z^mT^^Ur^^  •«  «^   5*^^   of  sdf^tooewt- 
TfcpIiriiM  h<n  «<  Ak  L^*  Dtrscc.  via  ttrrr 

^  wiik  a  ^canr.  «BKa  ^^j_  ^^  ,^  fp|»«»  — Jimms  -A  Rate,  aao  tMS  wMt- 

— ^.?  iiiiiiii  T  ^^o  kars*  ScImbk  das'  cap*3?^  ^"<'  ~   '^^x  Sac  a  "w^ 

^     ^_, ^  .^aa  SEiTC  wSn^  '  .         _ 

i^^jerfed  to  Aar  ■■rflB'f**- •**  ^^^  Tfe  resalt  of  i^  N      ~  -  -  -   - 

cacTv  Aor  E^m     Hoobr.    Ar-'-  "  raeaa 

___   _je»u's»  t^ai  al     ao  X<»Aer-  -^  ^•'•^  ' 

1^^        ^I_r*li|^IaKr'  '  Xmonr  3ed.  a«i  the 

*  ^  ^  "  Aat  tkc  RsA  «P    be     «^  a  series  '^i^[5^  .£ 


0»  -  II  ■■!   «■«  t»c  iBH  ^ —  «     was  a  serae-  ^fLa'TlirLjf  .k<. 
.  ..ii.                ^MEHK-rssir  g^hff  a  we  wmasoaa    ^srtme^  was  exprc                              i»  mii j  ^^p  »" 


sack  as 


i-,.=«  B«ikeN«tkka«dtfceleso^A««^tkE 

loorid     was  latter.    TW  tMC  c«r  wten  LJBCCJQ  at  fasa  »^«g> 

tke  li^  s«*al  aad  g^e 

Ct^  vs  aat  tke  a^  to 
-^x  -cs*  »  »«-»^  «~     ^fceprafccBdlfcekirfoii— — —     - 


TktaxarfsBcmisv.  tke  heaite  of  moBt  anves:    tbey  *xjrfd  hxvt  iMai 

tr'-    IWBtrndi  destrorod  the  cn^al  m— es  ei  Ae  fe^  w^b  c*  - - 

-,.-1^'  ir:=v    'fet  the  farces  B«  the  ««a{na  had  bees  iof?^  a«i  ^^a«<i  - 

3  War  »ee  dU  aoK  ta«^^    l*e  XotA  had  pae^  Ae  watm^ 
mnmUeM.     h  h^  aat  q«iy  11    ■■■* i*  t^  ■■  I'"  '^^ 

^a^s^wfeihe  litithadtniaedit^aadboA  iwiwr  and  11     it^^ 

,«dsd  ie*  to  t*e- f  '*?^!!S:^    ,^°g«*^^  ^,.- 

^^^^cec~  ««R  eiecaed  fcr  tie  v««es  of  tor  laaic  aaa  dMfasabes.    We  ■anaj 


-,  .-.-.  -^  Wtkervac    ¥<m  amt  ^aod    m  ooail  ada|A  to 

J«e  Wt«y  piaii^fc  Iwies  are  of  the.\»ena«gy^              «  ik«  ™  . 

-,  ^^                       ^  ,e«x  seem  aae  patnotk  aad  sfaadad  «f  cA-atiaa  bew»d  thy  <^  **^.  "^  /^^ 

f^™L!L.  -    .  -   .^  ,  -     UcksTA  thr  l*^  Cci-ad  Frzaic  nwiwiiir  too.  Oat  Ob 


H^*r--^  ^^^^^^^^^  The  strfy  «*  that 

"  "^^l^ifi^ilfiL  "aTr   -      »d  Lerfas  «i  ^  CwS  Wa 


Febrnary  24,  1916. 


LAND      AND     WATER 


in&vidaal.  and  we  most  eucoarage  that  individnal  to  nse 
hBfanins  and  good  sense  and  to  kara  sdi-^diance. 
These  qoahties  come  readay  to  Tohmteefs.  If  dkfwJi^ 
^  neva  foiigotten.  yon  can  produce  cut  of  the  votentecr 
the  feiest  soitfieT  in  the  wwfcL  The  present  canmaiai 
has  dtOTO  It-  Look  at  the  adnevonents  of  the  London 
Temtoriak  and  the  Ianra<Jrire  Toritorials.  Or  taW 
divisions  of  the  new  volmteer  annv.  sndi  as  the^di  and 
the  15th.  If  you  nnite  a  strict  corporate  training  with 
ipdividDal  initiative  and  rehance  you  evolve  the  periect 

hghting  "lan 

There  is  one  other  point  in  this  connectioo  on  wlucfa 
we  may  get  some  iostmction  from  American  experience. 
It  is  the  question  of  drafts.  \Tha>e\-CT  new  levies  are 
raised  on  a  brge  scale  there  is  a  taodency  to  make  than 
into  new  nnits.  and  to  forget  the  importance  <rf  keecins 
jP,  tfre  stro^th  of  the  old  onits,  who  have  had  some 
Bg^itzi^  experioKe.  In  the  earlier  part  <rf  the  Civil  War 
new  recmtts  were  formed  into  new  regiments,  and  the 
old  battalions  wwe  soon  rednced  to  a  conple  of  com- 
panies. It  was  a  veiy  bad  s\-:ftOTi,  and  ^lennan.  in  a 
^Aoos  passage  m  hf?  ^frT-H.■^  recoants  the  tTOoMe  it 
led   to.    One    St  resohiteiv   refused   to 

create  new  re.-n^  Ji  its  original  regiments 


2.  \\  r^-,---y=m 


"BMtJt  was  morthanonlimij.  i«^jm- 

^«  o«nsehf«s  lore  not  been  free  front  Has 
"?^«F™*d  Territflrial  battafioos  ^n  been  sercir 
*Ped-^  Thar  second  ine  ii»«»aK«^  wttrli  ihiriJi  have 
been  drafting  battafions  far  dbe  fvst  !?■>■.  vse  afcned  to 
««>*r  themselves  independeu  nsats^  „tod  tUod 
battaions  were  oeated  far  diafting  pvpob-v 
at^tlHse  defiebed  battafians^  aoai^bl 

^"^   ^*?.  ^  ^""^  *^  ^ort  of  the  ^eA   mxns 
m  tte  wodd  if  yoa  orer-straiB  than.  ^^ 

Alagypntt  of  trcadi  warfare  oocagts  in 
^^  c.  m  <  Whr>l  antly  aifeeting  airf  imj^i  w.  U^ 
Btt  to  do  th^  yon  mast  have  rnnnt.1i  nmi  If  jon  bave 
not^c  them  the  positian  iaevftaUv  gets  j^rffitfd.  Ae 
pai^i^^d  trenches  are  poor.  aad'isTry  gjdbotsoldKx^ 
«o««taii^to  n«fc»  dbonfan  and.  if  there  is  an 
yac^  to  neejgs  danger.  It  e  a  sobfect  epon  nttch 
ttaeanbeno<«baiceofoi»wn.  To  keep  a  nnber 
Mweaknnite  oniflie  &t  and  to  treat  these  Mils  » if  thev 
tadtliOTfan«ri«gth.isan^)|ytoconrtdBBter.  It  k 
""■^  «i*a  to  die   battaScns  ^eneeives  and   to   the 

!^^i^    ^  is  one  practical  point  on  which  w? 
might  wen  leam  from  Ax3»ican 


GERMANY    AND    THE    U.S.A.    PRESS. 

By  Cyril   H.    Brvtheftoo. 


IN  exvn-  town  of  coii>ideraUe  size  in  the  United 
-  there  was  at  the  oatbreak  of  the  war  at 
;t^-.  one  agon  of  the  German  Gorcnunent. 
His  bosmess  was  to  see  that  the  s\-nnathie5  of 
the  Gemaan-.^mericans  were  translated  into  anv  sort  of 
actoMi  that  might  be  beneficial  to  the  Fatheriand,  to 
spoid  Gennanv  >  mone\-  for  this  purpose  if  necessarv 
and  to  remain  imT^ibl^.  The  practical  ofaiccts  of  Iik 
n  n  mctuded  ac>-tlmig  from  circrdatiw  bunis 
p^utioiB  to  stop  the  sale  of  mnnitions  to  the  AbIk  to 
Wowmg  np  bridges.  To  speak  more  accnratelv  his 
m^^  was  to  cause  these  things  to  be  done:  His 
firstbosin^  wonid  be  to  get  in  tooch  with  some  locaBv 

mflnenml  German  wbr«;  zeal  for  the  Fatherland  extwded 
il  possible  his  own.  Throi^  the  latter  the  business  of 
marshalhng  all  the  available  political  and  financial 
mflnencem  the  town  cooid  be  carried  on  withott  dffi- 
CT^-.  The  hrst  thing  to  be  done  was  to  get  money  or 
the  pr«n^  of  it  for  the  purposes  in  rantempbtioo 
oeaiKc  the  German  Gotexnment,  with  its  cnstonarv 
?!!Pr5L™,  ^^  niatters.  insisted  that  the  Impexi^ 
sto^fnnd  shotiki  not  be  depleted  as  long  ^fmds 
tor  the  carrymg  00  of  the  good  work  conld  be  rais^ 
HKaUy. 

••  Slush  Funds." 

The  mon«r  being  raised  or  promised,  the  first  effect 
]^  <l^t«i  to  bnnsmg  newspaper  iRiaence  to  hear 
mpobhc  opmion.  In  many  cities  there  woe  aheadv 
German  newspapers.  In  others  thev  inoneAateh- 
WareA  A«»«derabfepartofthepaperwaswritteii 
n  &,ghsh.  mo«K  campaign  raaterial.nBT  order  to  get 
tnose  papers  widdy  citcnlated.  the  newsnndors  wire 

given  not  only  the  whoie  of  the  monej- reoa.^  fc«B  tW 
the  papers,  bat  a  bonas  as  wcfl.     The  cost  of 

,  the  paper  was  paid  by  focal  patriots  oc  ont  o€ 
r.r^  '^"^V^  \  '°  addition  to  the  daily  Genian 
F -iw.  anjtetrated  weekly  was  sometimes  i^ned. 
«=*  J«T^°^^°^  howENTer.  that  the  fact  that  a  paper  is 
ostexsTb^  a  German  paper  miK  necessarilv  detriTfawi 

possible  a  daOy  or  weekly  paper  pnrportiH'  to  be  an 

5n^^^^  5^  "^  •"""^^  It  was  conceived  to  be 
^moremportanttogetootan-Irish  paMT.  .\nd 
^«^  these  (osualh  issoed  far  econootr'^*^  h«n 

tne  Geriian  paper  s  press' appeared  in  dne  <:o«Ke. 

mnif  S?^  r.^^  ****  «*«Sv  sevvxal  New  York 

^2«ster  \  week,  once  a  writer  of  pocncnaphic^^ 
Or.   Dember*    which   makes   a  speoalit^  ^Tah^     I 


r««=  v.y^^  "^  ^  Opn  ^Wrt.  e&ed  bv  Pari 
^-arn^aMaayjrbepmtoeniovanation-^rid  " 
and  noe  sold  tm  most  Bieral'texiK  to  the 
^^aaades^  In  tks  naiy  t^  JkaaicaB  ws 
c^">»hMe  with  a  farndaUe  ^*^  f£ 
hleaalure  windi  far  fa»»TTyi  nasons  ifci 
i^anxionstop^thesalefll 
.™^  2^  ■■  ^"^^^  «^  •'^r  was  fivwr  at  fl^ 
<■  OK  war.  Oe  '  invisible  ^;ent  "  was  aT 
r"  ^'"'*?*''qP°^*g''faftfcc  Santa  F^ 
'**"  Been  dBnonaaraUv  iKhIhim  ii  Vm.  -* 

In  oOcr  otKs,  Bb  San  FnuKBOD  i^t  «e  ^w  (^  tfi» 
dnty  work   we  done   thnHeh   tie  TTmrAir-       "^ 
more  viaMe  actor  was  a  ridTaad 
keeper  oamed  Schwartz.    He  it 


SORTES     SRAKESPEARL\N.€. 

%    Sa   SOKSEY    LEE. 


THE   M:aSIAXS   IN 

Bttitr  ieamus  tie  frrr  cittks  mf  Oe  emsL 


THE  .\DMIKALTY  A.VD   T^   -TONNAGS* 
DEBATE. 

^•^^    *f*    ii*j    thmi    en    u«r   zkrr 
^*fTf9t*^mi,    amd   cmm   pmt    *^m    t» 


AW»  ABOCr  XOIHiJWi.  H.  S.  SMI 


FAITH   IN   L':!vD    TERST. 

ll^tn  OMTj  ^  did  sttm  t»stiiis  stm^ 
T«  fKit  Ae  wmrU  mssmrwmtr  wf  m  mot. 


LAND      AND      WATER. 


February  24,  1916. 


tlie  German  brewers  while  the  latter  in  their  clubs  and 
elsewhere  dealt  with  the  merchants  and  bankers.  Their 
publirations  included  a  German  daily,  a  (ierman  weekly, 
u  purported  American  weekly,  and  an  "  Irish  "  weekly. 

An  Amusing  Incident. 

An  amusing  incident  occurred  in  connection  with 
the  last-named.  The  President  of  a  bank,  with  many 
Irish  depositors,  a  loj-al  Canadian  with  numerous  rela- 
tiv-es  at  the  front,  was  asked  to  advertise,  without  charge, 
in  the  first  number  of  the  Irish  Times,  which  was  repre- 
sented to  be  a  denominational  organ  dealing  with  local 
affairs.  He  rather  thoughtlessly  consented.  To  his 
horror  when  the  first  mmiber  appeared  (from  the  press 
of  the  local  German  daily),  it  was  devoted  exclusively  to 
the  most  violent  abuse  of  the  Allies  and  panegyrics  on 
ticrman  Kultur,  while  he  himself  was  depicted  as  a  warm 
supporter  of  the  venture. 

It  is  plain,  however,  that  only  a  very  small  section 
of  the  American  public  could  be  reached  by  such  publica- 
tions as  these.  The  real  business  was  to  control  the 
sentiments  of  the  established  American  daily  papers 
wherever  that  could  be  done.  Such  papers  were  too 
expensive  to  buy  outright  nor  could  their  owners  or 
editors  be  bribed  directly,  except  in  a  few  cases.  They 
could,  however,  be  reached  in  another  and  a  very  simple 
v/ay.  A  representative  of  the  influential  Germans  of  the 
town  waited  upon  the  newspaper  owner  and  said  in  effect, 
"  Discover  an  immediate  sympathy  for  the  German 
cause  or  we  will  take  our  advertising  out  of  your  paper." 
And  as  there  was  no  one  to  perform  a  like  office  for  the 
AUies,  it  immediately  became  plain  to  the  newspaper 
owner  that  he  had  everything  to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose 
by  complying  with  their  request. 

Successful  and  well-established  papers  could  not,  of 
course,  be  reached  in  this  way  or,  in  fact,  in  any  way 
Several  Eastern  papers  with  which  the  \vriter  is  familiar 
were  offered  ten  thousand  dollars  if  they  would  print  six 
"  inspired "  editorials,  and  all  refused.  But  many 
struggling  papers  and  papers  with  venal  editors  succumbed 
and  commenced  to  "  root,"  as  the  baseballers  say,  for  the 
Germans.  Thus  in  one  Western  city  of  nearly  600,000 
inhabitants,  at  least  eighty  per  cent,  of  which  arc  pro- 
Ally  in  sympathy,  all  six  of  the  daily  papers  arj  pro- 
German.  In  one  case  a  sum  of  over  fourteen  thousand 
dollars  was  subscribed  by  the  German  brewers  to  the 
campaign  fund  of  a  candidate  of  the  paper  in  question, 
part  of  the  consideration  being  that  the  paper  should 
))rint  a  series  of  articles  by  or  rather  furnished  by  the 
("lorman  authorities  to  the  notorious  "  Jimmy  "  Archi- 
bald. 

Advertising  as  a  Bludgeon. 

In  this  way,  that  is  to  say  by  using  their  advertising 
as  a  bludgeon  in  some  cases,  by  the  direct  payment  of 
money  or  the  promise  of  political  support  in  others,  the 
Germans  in  America  have  been  able  to  command  a 
ridiculously  large  volume  of  newspaper  support  for  their 
cause.  It  has  had  little  effect  on  the  opinions  of  the  mass 
of  the  people,  however,  for  the  reason  that  most  people 
road  the  daily  papers  for  news  only  and  the  news,  dealing 
largely  as  it  has  done  with  the  exploits  of  Papen,  Boy-Ed 
and  tiieir  subordinate  bombsters  and  arsoneers,  passport 
forgers,  purvej'ors  of  fraudulent  manifests  and  affidavits, 
suborners  of  congressmen  and  bank  officials,  etc.,  to  say 
nothing,  of  such  trifles  as  the  Lusitania  and  Persia 
massacres,  has  had  anything  but  the  desired  effect. 
Besides  which  the  weekly  papers  which  are  widely 
and  thoroughly  read,  like  Life,  Harper's  Weekly,  Collier's 
Weekly,  The  Saturday  Evening  Post,  The  Outlook  and  the 
New  Republic,  have  never  wearied  of  the  task  of  showing 
the  Germans  up  in  their  true  light. 

More  subtle  and  therefore  somewhat  more  have 
been  the  efforts  of  Mr.  Hearst.  When  the  Germans 
"  secured "  his  support,  the  Kolnischc  Zeitung  en- 
thusiastically observed  that  it  was  worth  three  army 
corps.  Hearst  owns  directly  about  a  score  of  papers,  all 
of  the  "  yellow  "  variety,  including  one  printed  in  (ierman. 
It  was  in  this  paper  that  a  cut  appeared  entitled  "  This 
is  how  the  German  soldiers  make  the  British  run,"  or 
words  to  that  effect,  the  same  cut  having  previously 
been  printed  in  one  of  his  other  organs  under  the  in- 


scription "British  Infantry  pursuing  a  retreating  German 
Column." 

These  papers  being  known  as  Hearst  papers  cannot 
do  much  lirfrm  except  among  the  poor  foreign  element  in 
New  York  and  Chicago,  where  they  are  most  widely  circu- 
lated. But  in  addition  to  these  Hearst  .controls  the 
policies  of  many  papers  with  which  to  all  outward  appear- 
ances he  has  nothing  to  do.  In  some  cases  as,  for  example, 
that  of  the  Washiii'^ton  Post,  he  simply  threatened  to 
start  a  rival  paper  m  the  City  if  he  were  not  allowed  to 
control  the  policy  of  the  incumbent  journal.  In  other 
cases  struggling  papers  who  bought  his  news  service 
have  got  into  his  debt  and  have  to  do  his  bidding  or  be 
put  out  of  business.  These  papers  controlled  by  Hearst 
arc  much  more  violently  pro-German  as  a  rule  than  the 
papers  he  owns  outright. 

Hearst's  News  Service. 

Hcarsfs  International  News  Service  is  really  his  most 
insidious  weapon,  for  not  onlj-  does  it  serve  many  hundreds 
of  papers,  many  of  them  journals  of  the  highest  standing 
that  cannot  get  the  Associated  Press  franchise,  which  is 
limited  to  one  paper  in  most  large  towns,  but  it  ser\'es  out 
pro-German  campaign  material  in  the  guise  of  news. 
For  example,  the  average  daily  paper  getting  this  serv^icc 
would  not  have  time  to  stop  and  wonder  why  it  received 
thirteen  pages  of  telegraphic  matter  on  the  Baralong 
incident,  an  amount  out  of  all  proportion  to  its  news 
value.  The  editor  would  not  sec  it  and  the  telegraphic 
editor  would  pass  it  as  news.  They  would  not  realise 
that  it  was  really  German  campaign  material.  In  the 
same  way  a  statement  purported  to  have  been  made  by 
Miss  Boardman,  head  of  the  American  Red  Cross,  that 
Britain  had  held  up  Red  Cross  supplies  destined  for 
Germany,  and  referring  to  it  as  the  "  most  inhumane 
act  of  the  war,"  was  given  tremendous  emphasis.  But 
the  denial  of  the  fact  by  the  British  Ambassador  and  of 
both  the  fact  and  the  alleged  statement  by  Miss  Board- 
man  herself  were  never  sent  out. 

These  few  incidents  must  suffice  to  give  English 
readers  an  idea  of  what  Germany  has  done  to  control  the 
American  Press  and  influence  the  American  people 
through  it.  The  results  have  been  trifling  as  far  as 
Americans  are  concerned,  but  have,  of  .^course,  conveyed 
the  impression  abroad  that  innumerable  American  papers 
are  pro-German  because  they  reflect  public  sentiment, 
whereas  they  are  simply  hired  or  coerced  into  a  vain 
endeavour  to  control  it.  The  real  fact  is  that  newspapers 
or  no  newspapers,  ninety  per  cent,  of  the  American  people 
are  and  will  remain,  whatever  the  British  Government 
may  do  or  fail  to  do,  whole  -hearted  supporters  of  the 
Allies'  cause. 


TO    FRANCE. 


Go  forward  soul  of  France  that  when  aroused 
Art  pulsed  with  chivalry's  intensest  thrills  ; 
In  perils  greatest  need  the  greatness  housed 
Within  thee  to  its  passion's  fulness  fills  : . 
Foe  of  humanity's  relentless  foe, 
Blood  thirsting  power  with  its  unholy  chains. 
Oh  champion  of  the  weak,  that  dost  not  know 
The  weakling's  mood  which  palters  and  refrains- 
Go  forward :  to  subdue  that  power  malign — 
Its  fury  fails  before  the  native  steel 
Of  that  great  attitude,  that  temper  fine, 
Its  stern  endurance  and  its  lofty  zeal — 
(}o  forward  soul  !    The  Sacrificial  might 
Of  offered  Self  ensures  triumphant  Right. 

F.  W.  Ragg. 


The  .^nglo-Ru-sian  Hospital  is  now  working  in  close  con- 
junction with  the  Russian  Flag  Day  Committee  who  last  year 
raised  ^50,000.  There  are  to  be  no  dual  collections  in  the  future. 

A  shilling  book  on  The  Art  of  Driving  a  Motorcycle 
(Temple  Press)  forms  the  first  manual  of  driving,  as  distinct 
from  mechanism.  Motor  cyclists  will  find  this  an  extremely 
useful  handbook  on  driving  and  management,  both  of  solo 
machines  and  sidecar  outfits.  Gear  changing,  brakes,  corner- 
ing and  skidding  are  fully  dealt  with,  and  the  reader  will  find 
himself  fully  grounded  in"the  road  management  of  his  machine. 


February    24,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


THE    GREAT    SECESSION. 


By  Neoimperialist. 


THE  essence  of  the  Imperial  Task  is  to  complete 
the  safeguards  of  union  in  liberty.  We  dare 
never  again  risk  any  tragedy  of  disintegration 
like  that  of  the  Great  Secession  of  1776.  Such 
a  catastrophe  may  well  seem  unthinkable  to-  those  who 
sec  such  abundant  e\'idence  of  the  strengthened  fellowship 
of  the  Five  Nations.  But  again  sentiment  is  not.  Govern- 
ment. Itmust  be  remembered  that  the  issues  may  never 
be  so  crystal  clear  as  in  this  present  war.  Should  any 
cause  of  quarrel  on  some  such  lines  as  that  threatened 
with  America  in  i8c)5  again  arise  where  the  issue  does  not 
involve  such  a  fundamental  challenge  to  liberty,  there 
might  well  be  danger.  At  any  rate,  we  must  leave  no 
tares  among  the  fine  grain  now  sowing. 

If  the  tangled  history  of  thu  troubles  that  led  to  the 
Declaration  of  Indepentlence  be  examined,  it  will  be 
found  that  it  resulted  rather  from  lack  of  foresight  and 
political  wisdom  and  experience  than  from  any  tyranny 
on  the  one  side,  or  any  lack  of  good-will  or  rather  the 
existence  of  any  serious  ill-will  on  the  other.  As  a  fact, 
apathy  and  indifference,  which  is  so  easily  born  of  irre- 
sponsibility, was  the  pre\-ailing  mood  among  the  colonists. 

Those  who  give  their  minds  to  this  important 
question  of  the  settlement  of  the  Imperial  problems 
are  encouraged  by  the  profoundly  different  temper 
and  conditions  which  now  prevail.  Towards  the 
end  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  American  colonies — 
Virgmia,  Louisiana,  Maryland,  New  England,  New 
York — were  entirely  disunited,  distracted  by  incredible 
jealousies.  The  meanest  limitation  of  outlook  had  been 
bred  by  the  purelj'  commercial  views  of  life  and  admini- 
stration which  they  had  naturally  adopted,  and,  under 
the  shelter  of  the  British  Government,  had  never  found 
compelling  reason  to  modify.  Tiieir  sectionalism  was 
carried  to  such  a  pitch  that  they  would  not  even  help 
each  other  or  organise  a  common  defence  against  the 
Indian  raiders  or  the  threat  of  the  French. 

The  truth  is, .  that  while  the  colonists  had  carried 
out  from  England  a  certain  general  idea  of  the 
principles  of  representative  government,  they  had 
never  made  more  than  a  merely  local  application  of  them. 
A  common  danger  would  have  organised  them  into  a 
united  American  nation  if  they  had  not  been  cossetted 
by  Great  Britain  assuming  the  full  responsibility  of  their 
defence.  As  it  was  they  were  merely  a  collection  of 
inconsiderable  and  relatively  impotent  provinces.  All 
American  problems,  the  chief  problem  of  defence  and 
questions  relating  to  any  but  merely  local  aspects  of 
trade  and  matters  of  purely  local  administration,  had 
been  left  to  the  King's  Government  in  London.  They 
laboured  under  most  of  the  disadvantages  of  decentralisa- 
tion without  the  advantages  of  responsible  freedom. 
They  formed  not  a  state  nor  a  nation,  but  a  mere  collec- 
tion of  hostile  crowds,  and  it  \\as  more  or  less  as  crowds 
that  they  revolted,  as  \\'ashington  found  in  the  heart- 
breaking task  with  which  he  was  confronted  when 
organising  them  after  the  Declaration  into  an  ordered 
and  disciplined  State. 

As  a  contrast  to  all  this  we  have  now  in  free  alliance 
with  Great  Britain,  four  politically  self-conscious  nations 
whose  several  provincial  Governments  have  been  welded 
by  a  deliberate  and  reasoned  process  under  the  hammer 
of  experience  into  a  coherent  whole.  While  Grenville 
in  England  and  General  Amherst  in  America  were 
unable  to  find  any  central  authoritative  body  to  treat 
with,  but  were  bandied  about  from  one  independent 
local  assembly  to  another,  four  fully  accredited  executives 
are  available  to  treat  with  the  Governments  of  Great 
Britain. 

As  regards  the  vital  matter  of  defence,  we  may  recall 
that  while  the  Americans  of  those  days  had  actually  to 
be  paid  by  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  to  defend 
their  own  territories,  to-day  the  four  nations  freely  send 
admirably  equipped  expeditionary  forces  to  the  other 
end  of  the  earth  at  their  own  charges.  Again,  from  the 
side  of  the  mother  country  there  is  a  complete  abandon- 
ment of  all  ideas  of  dominion,  po.ssession,  coeixion.  If 
a  loose  terminology,  fruitful  parents  of  cloudy  thought, 


still  encourages  certain  survivals  of  false  ideas,  they  are 
rapidly  disappearing.  It  must  indeed  be  realised  by 
our  overseas  brethren  that  we  are  almost  too  sensitive 
about  wounding  their  susceptibilities. 

We  may  well  recall  that  such  an  unlightened  states- 
man as  Burke  could  think  of  nothing  more  liberal  than 
a  policy  of  divide  ct  impcra  with  regard  to  the  various 
colonics.  Since  Lord  Durham's  Hash  of  sympathetic 
genius  contrived  the  Canadian  settlement  and  the  tact 
of  Lord  Elgin  equitably  administered  it,  we  have 
learnt  many  things.  Mid- Victorian  statesmen  looked  as 
a  matter  of  course  to  the  day  when  the  colonies,  develop- 
ing into  considerable  and  politically  self-conscious  nations, 
would  demand  their  complete  independence.  Truly  we 
builded  better  than  we  knew.  The  links  of  Empire 
have  been  welded  stronger  by  every  concession.  So 
much  more  powerful  is  fellowship  than  force.  This  single 
fact  is  of  all  the  most  significant  in  view  of  the  demands 
that  must  be  made  upon  us  by  the  dominions  in  fulfil- 
ment of  their  obvious  destiny. 

We  have  had  experience.  We  have  also  vision. 
There  is  indeed  much  in  current  history  to  comfort  those 
who  realise  that  not  by  trade  alone  do  nations  live  ; 
that  a  fundamental  ideal  which  burns  away  dross  and 
lights  to  a  better  path  is  an  essential  preliminary  to  just 
go\ernment.  None  doubts  now  the  existence  of  such  an 
ideal  which  is  far  above  all  merely  selfish  and  sectional 
interests,  even  if,  in  human  fashion,  it  also  embraces  them. 

What  then  in  brief  are  the  lessons  that  can  be  learnt 
from  the  Great  Secession?  First,  that  altogether  too 
much  has  been  made  of  the  money  question.  There  can 
be  no  doubt,  as  the  latest  historical  researches  abundantly 
prove,  that  Great  Britain  throughout  the  controversy 
was  most  patient,  even  if,  judged  by  the  standards  of  our 
time,  her  statesmen  were  rather  undiscerning.  She  never 
put  forward  much  less  pressed,  a  claim  for  taxes  for 
imperial  defence,  but  joy  a  part  only  of  the  money  neces- 
sary to  secure  the  safety  of  the  American  settlements 
against  their  neighbour  enemies.  It  is  often  forgotten 
that  Grenville  was  not  in  the  least  intransigeant  about 
the  Stamp  Act  or  the  Tea  Duties.  He  offered  to  accept 
any  alternative  plan  to  be  devised  by  the  colonists  them- 
selves for  raising  the  necessary  funds,  only  declaring  the 
simple  truth  that  Great  Britain  impoverished  by  the 
Seven  Years  War,  could  no  longer  be  responsible  for  the 
entire  cost  of  American  local  defence.  He  even  considered 
the  question  of  American  representation  in  the  British 
Parliament.  It  was  a  curious  leap  of  imagination  for  so 
conventional  a  statesman,  and  he  was  overwhelmed  with 
eloquent  ridicule  by  Burke,  who  with  the  essential 
conservatism  of  his  temper  resented  the  considerable 
reforms  which  he  rightly  foresaw  would  be  necessary  in 
the  British  Parliament.  Perhaps  we  cannot  fairly 
blame  Bukke  for  not  seeing  so  much  further  than  the 
horizon  of  this  time,  but  it  is  likely  that  had  he  supported 
instead  of  opposed  Grenville's  liberal  idea  the  fatal 
schism  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  would  never  have  taken 
place. 

Again  it  is  not  always  realised  that  there  was  in 
general  no  passionate  anger  against  the  mother  country 
and  no  spontaneous  demand  among  the  colonists  for 
secession.  A  capable  energetic  miniority  of  extremists 
adroitly  handled  an  apt  occasion  of  quarrel  provided  by 
the  blunders  of  unseeing  statesmen.  Apathy  and  in- 
difference was  indeed  the  general  atmosphere,  while  the 
considerableloyalistminority  was  too  far  away  from  home 
and  too  distracted  in  council  to  prevent  the  catastrophe. 
Even  a  year  after  Lexington  it  was  with  difficulty  that 
the  Declaration  was  carried  and  that  only  as  the  price 
of  the  active  help  of  France  for  the  Secessionists'  cause. 
It  seems  clear  that  if  the  colonists  had  even  gone  part  of 
the  way  to  solve  their  own  American  problems  and  had 
organised  themselves  into  a  nation  the  fatal  breach  would 
have  been  much  less  likely  to  occur.  The  catastrophe 
was  inevitably  the  result  of  the  facile  policy  of  drift. 
Great  Britain  must  not  after  a  century's  added  experience 
and  the  chaos  of  an  even  more  exhausting  war  repeat 
her  mistake. 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


February  24,  1916. 


ARTISTS  AS  WAR  RECORDERS. 

IT  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  the  pageantry  of  war  aad 
the  clash  of  arms  has  all  through  the  ages  failed  at  the 
time  of  enactment  to  arouse  the  artist's  talent  to 
portray  them.  Even  during  the  centuries  when 
internecine  strife  was  incessant  and  when  men  of  genius 
abounded,  capable  of  using  the  magnificent  scenic  material 
at  tlieir  disposal,  inspiration  never  seems  to  have  impelled 
them  to  hand  down  verisimilitudes  of  subjects  that  must 
have  been  present  at  their  very  doors.  Even  Velasquez, 
the  greatest  artist  of  all  time,  could  only  depict  with  courtly 
dignity  a  scene  devoid  of  all  action,  "  The  Surrender  of 
Breda."  Turner,  who  was  in  his  prime  during  the  Napoleonic 
era  (a  landscapa  and  seascape  painter,  it  is  true,  but  one  by  no 
means  devoid  of  the  idea  that  he  could  limn  the  human  figure) 
never  put  on  to  canvas  what  might  have  been  triumphs  in 
colour,  both  earthly  and  aerial,  but  rested  content  with  a 
very  uninspired  "  Battle  of  Trafalgar." 

Of  reputations  founded  on  the  painting  of  warlike 
themes  there  have  been  many,  but  with  few  exceptions 
none  have  been  gained  contemporaneously  with  the  event. 
Meissonier  arose  half  a  century  after  his  "  1815,"  and  Miss 
Thompson  a  quarter  of  a  century  after  the  "  Roll  Call.  ' 
De  Neu\ille,  the  greatest  of  all  battle  painters,  Detaille  and 
X'erestchagin  are  practically  the  only  artists  of  renown  who 
participated  in  the  events  which  they  chronicled  or  have 
had  anything  more  to  insure  their  accuracy  and  trutli  in 
detail  than  hearsay  evidence. 

And  now  it  would  seem  as  if  even  to-day  the  greatest 
war  scenes  that  the  world  has  ever  witnessed  would  pass 
away  without  any  of  the  great  combatant  nations  producing 
an  artist  whose  genius  would  impel  him  to  hand  on  to 
posterity  the  unriyallcd  feats  of  heroism  and  gallantry,  let 
alone  the  tragic  sides,  that  have  marked  its  progress.  As- 
suredly had  one  such  been  forthcoming  the  compelling 
spirit  would  have  caused  his  appearance  ere  the  war  had  gone 
so  far  into  its  second  year. 

A  Great  Exception. 

It  would  really  appear  as  little  less  than  certain  that  the 
only  mantle  that  has  fallen  has  alighted  on  the  shoulders  of 
a  denizen  of  a  country  and  a  race  less  likely  than  almost 
any  other  to  produce  an  artist  of  fiery  impetuosity  and  de- 
nunciation, and  on  a  man  whp  has  not  had  innate  in  his  blood 
the  great  incentive  of  patriotism  to  impel  him  forward,  as 
has  been  the  case  with  Mr.  Louis  Raemaekers,  the  Dutch 
artist,  since  the  very  outset  of  the  war. 

The  public  of  every  nation  on  whose  behalf  he  has  taken 
up  his  pencil,  owes  him  a  debt  of  gratitude  that  can  only  be 
repaid  by  furthering  the  propaganda  which  he  so  earnestly 
strives  to  disseminate,  and  this  can  in  no  wise  be  better  done 
than  by  .encouraging  the  reproduction  in  their  most  accurate 
forms  of  the  grim  realities,  the  scenes  of  rapine,  slaughter, 
and  desolation,  and  the  indictment  that  he  has  brought  against 
those  who  are  answerable  for  them. 

It  is  fortunate  that  not  only  do  his  cartoons  lend  them- 
selves admirably  to  the  reproducer's  skill,  but  that  that 
skill  has  never  been  so  capable  as  to-day  of  translating  work 
created  by  the  pencil,  the  crayon,  or  the  flat  tints  of  colour. 
Meissonier,  Miss  Thompson  and  others  owed  their  vast 
popularity  to  the  skill  of  engravers  who  were  able  to  repro- 
duce in  their  thousands  pictures  which  would  otherwise  have 
been  seen  only  in  public  galleries  or  private  collections. 
But  present  processes  of  reproduction  allow  of  its  l-,eing  done 
witiiout  the  intervention  of  another's  hand  ;  iience  their 
groat  merit.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  tlic  thousands 
of  visitors  who  still  flock  to  the  Exhibition  of  Raemaekers' 
Cartoons  at  the  Fine  Art  Society's  in  New  Bond  Street,  and 
who  have  the  opportunity  of  comparing  originals  with  repro- 
ductions side  by  side,  cannot  distinguish  b.-twecn  them  save 
by  a  slight  reduction  in  size. 

The  enterprise  of  Raemaekers'  publishers  wliichhas  pro- 
duced these  fascimiles,  enables  the  public  to  obtain  practically 
all  of  them  that  are  deemed  desirable  for  publication  at  a  cost 
for  one  iiundred  of  two  shillings  each  ;  for  that  number  of 
subjects,  selected  by  the  artist,  will  be  published  very  shortly 
for  tlie  sum  of  ten  guineas,  in  a  sum{)tuous  volume  which 
will  furnish  not  only  to  the  present  day,  but  to  the  future, 
the  most  unexampled  record  of  an  altogether  unexampled 
event  in  the  world's  history 


SOME    BOOK    REVIEWS. 

In  a  four  volume  work  entitled  The  War  Manual,  Lieut. - 
Col.  C.  C.  Anderson  has  set  out  to  combine  the  various  military 
text  books  in  existence  into  one  single  manual.  Two  volumes 
have  already  been  published  by  Messrs.  T.  Fisher  Unwin 
at  five  shillings  each  ;  the  first  of  these  deals  with  the 
theoretical  side  of  war,  strategy,  the  laws  and  usages  of  war, 
martial  law,  and  general  information  concerning  the  British 
Empire  and  other  nations  from  the  military  point  of  view, 
as  well  as  a  section  devoted  to  first  aid  to  the  wounded. 
The  second  volume,  just  published,  is  devoted  to  recon- 
naissance, strategical  concentration,  marches,  intercom- 
munication, the  attack,  the  defence,  and  field  work  generally. 

It  must  be  said  that  the  author  has  done  his  work  well, 
extracting  from  the  dry  bones  of  text  books  the  essence  of 
their  matter,  and  presenting  it  in  such  a  form  that  the  junior 
officer,  in  search  of  a  method  for  getting  at  his  work  in  the 
quickest  and  best  possible  way,  cannot  do  better  than  take 
these  two  volumes  to  help  him  in  his  study. 

We  await  the  following  volumes  of  the  series  with  con- 
siderable interest,  and  trust  that  the  high  level  set  by  the 
first  two  parts  of  the  work  may  be  maintained  to  its  end, 
for  by  that  means  a  concise  cyclop;edia  of  military  informa- 
tion, of  extreme  value  to  the  soldier,  will  have  been  produced. 


"  War    Letters    of   an    American  Woman."       By    Marie    van    Vorst 
(John  Lane.)     6s. 

These  letters  are  addressed  to  various  friends,  and  they 
all  concern  the  writer's  experiences  of  the  war,  in  France, 
in  England,  and  in  Italy.  Since  the  writing  is  often  done  from 
the  American  .Ambulance  in  Paris,  there  is  much  of  the  extreme 
pathos  of  the  hospital  wards  expressed— and  much  of  the 
writer's  sympathy  with  the  Allied  cause  and  realisation  of 
German  infamies  in  the  first  days  of  the  war.  Thus — "  We 
speak  of  the  German  system.  What  is  it  ?  Within  the  con- 
fines of  a  single  country,  a  forced,  autocratic  materialism. 
Whereas,  as  you  see,  this  wide  response  of  the  British 
Empire  from  shore  to  shore  .  .  .  this  mighty  answer, 
this  evidence  of  affection,  this  consolidation  without  com- 
pulsion, why.  it  seems  to  me,  that  it  is  one  of  the  finest 
things  in  history  ...  1  believe  it  all  comes  from  a  certain 
idealism." 

And  again,  with  regard  to  the  Crown  Prince — "  He  packed 
up  boxes  full  of  her  treasures,  tliem  marked  with  the  Red 
Cross  to  ensure  their  resjxjct  by  the  .'Mlied  armies,  and  shipped 
them  to  Germany,  a  robber  who  should  have  been  a  prince, 
a  murderer  wlio  should  have  been  a  knight." 

Such  expressions  of  opinion  are  numerous  throughout 
the  book,  and  the  temptation  to  quote  is  hard  to  resist.  There 
is,  on  every  page,  a  broad  understanding  and  depth  of  sym- 
pathy that  comes  of  having  seen  and  experienced  the  rcall  ics 
of  war,  The  letters  as  a  whole  form  one  of  the  best  and  most 
human  stories  that  the  war  has  produced. 

Lovers  of  detective  fiction  will  probably  not  have  for- 
gotten Cleek,  the  "  man  of  forty  faces."  In  The  Riddle 
of  the  Night  (Simpkin,  Marshall  and  Co.,  6s.),  Mr.  T.  W.  Han- 
shew  recalls  CIcek  for  the  solving  of  a  murder  mystery  that 
takes  us  little  farther  than  Wimbledon  Common,  and  yet 
for  breathless  excitement  and  complexity  will  be  hard  to  beat. 
Unhke  most  detectives  of  fiction,  Cleek  is  human  enough  to 
acknowledge  himself  at  fault  more  than  once  in  the  course 
of  his  work,  though  the  clues  that  lead  nowhere  are  so  many, 
and  the  possibilities  of  this  particular  crime  are  so  great,  that 
the  most  perfect  detective  would  be  forced  to  confess  himself 
bafiled  at  times.  The  identity  of  the  miscreant  is  well  con- 
cealed to  the  end,  and,  save  that  there  are  almost  too  many 
characters  and  too  many  false  scents,  a  fault  that  many  readers 
will  commend,  the  story  is  thrilling  enough  to  satisfy  the  most 
exacting. 

There  is  much  to  amuse  in  Youth  Unconquerable,  by 
Percy  Ross  (Heincmann,  6s.  net),  although  the  book  consists 
of  frankly  impossible  situations  and  a  good  proportion  of  the 
characters  are' impossible  people.  The  main  exponent  of 
unconquerable  youth  is  Cherry  Hawthorn,  who  is  introduced 
to  the  reader  in  the  midst  of  her  Oxford  career,  just  as  she  is 
faced  by  the  knowledge  that,  owing  to  her  father's  impro\'i- 
dence,  she  will  be  compelled  to  earn  her  own  living.  \ 
delightful  Scotch  duke,  an  extremely  witty  aviator,  and  a 
guardian  with  ideas  of  coercion  more  attuned  to  the  middle 
ages  tlian  to  these  times,  are  incidental  to  Cherry's  career 
and  development.  The  cliief  attraction  of  the  book  lies 
in  the  interest  attendant  on  happenings  which  we  know  to 
have  been  quite  impossible  ;  this,  and  the  witty  method  of 
writing,  maintain  the  "  grip  "  of  the  work  to  its  end,  and, 
for  the  rest,  it  is  a  pleasure  to  meet  with  a  book  utterly  devoid 
of  immorals,  and  frankly  designed  to  amuse  rather  than  to 
point  a  lesson, 


February  24,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


CHAYA. 

A  Romance  of  the  South   Seas. 
By  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoole. 


Synopsis  :  Macqiiart,  an  adventurer  who  has  spent 
most  of  his  life  at  sea,  finds  himself  in  Sydney  on  his  beam  ends. 
He  has  a  wonderful  story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in  New 
Guinea  and  a  chance  acquaintance,  Tillman,  a  sporting  man 
about  town,  fond  of  yachting  and  racing,  offers  to  introduce  him 
to  a  wealthy  woolbroker,  Curlewis,  with  a  view  to  financing  the 
scheme.  Macquart  also  makes  the  acquaintance  of  Houghton, 
u  well-educated  Englishman  out  of  a  job,  who  has  done  a  good 
deal  of  yachting  in  his  time.  Curlewis  turns  down  the  scheme, 
Ihougit  Macquart  tells  his  story  in  a  most  convincing  manner. 
His  silent  partner  Screed  believes  in  it,  and  unbeknown  to 
Curlezfis,  follows  the  three  men,  asks  them  to  his  house,  and 
agrees  to  find  the  ship  and  the  money,  on  seeing  that  Macquart' s 
hidden  treasure  map  agrees  with  an  Admiralty  chart.  The 
ship  is  the  yawl  "  Barracuda."  Screed,  on  the  morrow,  takes 
ihe  three  men  over  the  "  Barracuda,"  with  which  they  are  de- 
lighted. Coming  away  Macquart  is  overtaken  by  an  old  friend, 
■one  Captain  Hull,  who  hails  him  as  B — y  Joe,  and  accuses 
him  of  many  mean  crimes.  Macquart  gives  Captain  Hull 
the  slip,  but  unbeknown  to  him  Hull  gets  in  touch  iinth  Screed, 
and  enlightens  him  on  the  real  character  of  Macquart.  Screed, 
thereupon  plans  a  surprise.  Tillman  and  Houghton,  busy 
on  the  "  Barracuda,"  talk  of  the  prospects  of  the  voyage  and 
agree  they  are  in  for  a  big  risk.] 

CHAPTER  VI.— {Continued.) 

"  I'm  not  afraid  of  the  risk,"  replied  Houghton. 

"Afraid  of  it!"  said  Tillman;  "Why,  the  risk  is  ah 
the  pleasure  of  the  business.  I  tell  you,  I'm  sick  of  living 
here  in  Sydney  and  knowing  every  day  what's  coming  next. 
I  want  to  get  out  and  live." 

"  I'm  the  same,"    said  Houghton. 

The  collapsible  boat  of  ths  Br.rracuda,  proved  rotten 
m  parts  of  its  canvas.  Screed  suggested  patching  but 
Tillman  stood  out  either  for  a  dinghy  or  a  new  collapsible.  He 
carried  his  point  ;  also  the  spare  mainsail,  if  tried,  would 
have  blown  to  tatters  in  any  squall ;  canvas,  especially  in 
the  tropics,  has  only  a  certain  length  of  life  even  if  little  used 
— this  point  was  put  right.  A  patent  sea  anchor  was  the  last 
infliction  put  upon  Screed  by  Tillman,  and  Screed  bore  it, 
though  badly.  Screed  had  this  peculiarity,  though  he 
fought  over  halfpence  and  about  little  things,  he  was  lavish 
when  what  he  considered  to  be  the  essentials  were  at 
stake.  Thus,  whilst  he  groaned  and  moaned  over  a  few 
square  yards  of  extra  canvas,  the  charts,  compass,  sextants — 
there  was  a  spare  one — and  chron  meter  were  of  the  best. 

The  outfitting  of  the  expedition  took  a  fortnight  instead 
of  a  week,  and  on  the  evening  before  the  day  of  starting, 
Tillman,  having  given  a  last  look  round  to  see  that  everything 
was  good,  took  his  seat  on  deck  beside  Houghton  and  Macquart 
who  were  seated  by  the  saloon  hatch. 

"  Well,  that's  done  with,"  said  Tillman.  "  Everything 
is  aboard  even  to  the  tobacco  ;  twenty-five  pounds  of  Navy 
plug  ought  to  last  us,  and  I  made  the  outfitters  throw  in  five 
boxes  of  Borneo  cigars  by  way  of  langnyappe. — There's  no 
■drink — only  six  bottles  of  whiskey  by  way  of  medicine,  and 
a  bottle  of  chlorodyne." 

Said  Houghton.  "  You've  forgot  one  thing.  Suppose 
we  have  accidents  ?  " 

"  Well,"    said  Tillman,  "  What  then  ?  " 

"  Where's  your  surgical  instruments  and  things  ?  " 

Tillman  sniffed.     "  Much  good  they  would  be  without  a  . 
surgeon.     We    haven't    got    to    have    accidents.     We    can't 
afford  luxuries  of  that  sort.     What  do  you  think  you're  going 
on — a  yachting  cruise  ?  " 

"  I  know  something  of  bone  setting,"  said  Macquart, 
■ '  and  I  can  stop  bleeding  from  an  artery — -used  to  be  able  to 
do  so." 

As  he  spoke,  a  dusky  form  emerged  from  the  fo'c'sle 
hatch,  stood  erect,  and  then  going  to  the  side  leaned  over 
the  rail  looking  shoreward. 

It  was  Jacky,  the  black  fellow  secured  by  Screed  to  act 
as  cook  and  deck-hand.  Jack  was  used  to  the  sea,  he  could 
steer  and  was  a  first-rate  boat  hand.  Two  natives  had  been 
in  the  original  programme,  but  on  second  thoughts  Screed 
had  declared  for  only  one,  and  wisely  ;  in  an  expedition  of 
this  sort  the  native  element  is  always  best  reduced  to  a 
minimum.  Natives  can't  think  much  unless  they  can  talk 
together. 

Tillman,  having  seen  the  anchor  light  swung,  smoked 
another  pipe,  then  the  three  adventurers  went  below  and 


turned  in,  unconscious  of  the  surprise  that  Screed  was  abo\n 
to  spring  upon  them  in  the  morning. 

CHAPTER   VII. 
The  "  Barracud.\  "  S.-mls, 

TILLMAN  was  on  deck  just  before  sunrise,  and  as 
the  sun  broke  over  the  hills  Macquart  and 
Houghton  appeared,  rubbing  the  sleep  from 
their  eyes  and  yawning.  Jacky  was  skipping 
about  in  and  out  of  the  caboose  getting  breakfast  ready, 
and  the  sounds  and  smell  of  bacon  being  fried  filled  the  air. 

It  was  a  lovely  morning,  the  white  gulls  were  fishing  on 
the  ruffled  blue  water  of  the  harbour  and  a  warm,  stead\- 
land  wind  was  blowing  favourable  for  the  Heads. 

Jacky,  leaving  the  cooking  for  a  moment  in  abeyance, 
skipped  below  to  lay  the  table  in  the  cabin,  whilst  the  others 
hung  on  deck  talking  and  leaning  on  the  rail  with  an  eye 
shoreward  for  the  boat  that  would  bring  off  Screed  and  the 
pilot. 

"  I'm  blest  if  that  nigger  doesn't  remind  me  of  a  bounding 
kangaroo,"  said  Tillman,  "  and  he  seems  to  have  a  dozen 
pair  of  hands  ;  look  at  him  cooking  the  breakfast  and  laying 
the  table  at  the  same  time,  and  he  was  more  use  getting  the 
stores  on  board  than  half  a  dozen  thumb-fisted  stewards 
would  have  been." 

"  Look,"    said  Houghton.     "  Here's  the  boat." 

A  white  painted  boat  was  putting  off,  two  men  at  the 
oars  and  two  men  in  the  stern  sheets. 

"  It's  not  the  pilot  boat,"  said  Tillman.  "  It's  Screed  ; 
but  who  is  the  chap  beside  him  ?  " 

Macquart  was  standing  with  his  hand  shading  his  eyes 
watching  the  approaching  boat,  then  he  turned  and  went 
below. 

As  the  boat  came  alongside,  Tillman  threw  the  ladder 
down  and  Screed  came  on  deck  followed  by  his  companion  ; 
it  was  Captain  Hull. 

"  So  3'ou  are  all  ready  to  start,"  said  Screed.  "  Well, 
I  -have  brought  you  a  new  man,  a  friend  of  mine.  Captain 
Hull.  He  is  also  an  old  friend  of  Macquart 's.  He  is  going 
with  you  as  supercargo.  ■  He  understands  all  about  the 
business,  and  as  you  are  a  bit  short-handed,  you  will  find 
him  useful — but  where 's  Macquart  ?  " 

"  He's  below,"  said  Tillman,  taken  aback  at  this  new 
move  ;  "  but  this,  I  must  say,  is  a  surprise.  A  word  with 
you." 

He  led  Screed  forward. 

"  What  on  earth  have  you  brought  that  chap  for,"  said 
he.  "  I  remember  him  ;  he  met  Macquart  one  morning  in 
the  street  and  they  went  off  together.  What's  the  meaning 
of  it  ?     How  do  we  stand  ?  " 

"  You  stand  just  this  way,"  said  Screed.  "  Macquart 
is  one  of  the  biggest  blackguards  on  God's  earth.  I  didn't 
know  all  about  him  till  recently.  Hull  is  the  antidote  to 
him.  Please  trust  me  in  this  matter,  for  my  interests  are 
yours.  Macquart  would  have  done  you  and  Houghton  in 
like  the  babes  in  the  wood  if  you  had  gone  alone  with  him. 
Hull  is  the  iron  grip  I  will  keep  on  him.  Hull  has  been  let 
down  by  him.  Hull  knows  enough  to  hand  Macquart  over  to 
the  police,  and  he's  strong  enough  to  hold  Macquart  down, 
and  he's  straight  enough  to  suit  me  ;  he's  a  spirit  level  com- 
pared to  Macquart." 

"  My  God  !  "  said  Tillman.  "  What  a  ship's  compaay 
packed  away  in  this  ten-cent  boat." 

"  Oh,  you'll  get  on  all  right,  but  you  must  never  forget 
there's  a  live  bomb-shell  aboard,  and  that  is  Macquart.  Put 
your  trust  in  Hull  and  back  him  if  there's  trouble.  I  have 
told  him  I  would  tell  you  everything  and  warn  you.  Don't 
ever  lose  your  temper  on  this  job,  don't  get  heated  up  with 
the  idea  that  Macquart  is  a  rogue  and  worse — of  course  he 
is.  A  half  million  of  bidden  money  means  roguery  somewhere. 
Macquart  most  likely  did  John  Lant  in  years  ago.  I'm 
pretty  sure  he  did,  but  we  mustn't  trouble  about  that  ;  what 
we  want  is  to  lay  hands  on  the  money.  Now  come  aft ; 
Macquart  is  down  below,  you  say,  hiding  from  Hull  most 
likely.     I'm  going  to  confront  them." 

He  led  the  way  aft,  and  then  he  went  down  to  the  littk 
cabin,  followed  by  Tillman,  Houghton  and  Hull.  Macquart 
was  seated  at  the  table.  He  had  started  breakfast  on  some 
bread  and  a  tin  of  sardines.  Dumbfounded  at  the  apf)earance 
of  Hull  coming  off  with  Screed,  he  fancied  that  the  whole 


19 


LAND      AND      WATER 


February  24,  1916. 


expedition  was  blown   upon,  and    he  was  filling  up  before 
receiving  his  marching  orders. 

But  Screed,  when  he  entered  the  cabin,  appeared  quite 
unconcerned,  in  fact  he  was  smiling. 

"  I've  brought  a  friend  of  yours  on  board."  said  he, 
"  Captain  Hull  ;  he  has  asked  to  join  this  e.xpedition  and 
1  have  let  him.  He  is  saihng  with  you  as  supercargo— this 
is  him." 

Hull,  entering  the  cabin  last,  stood  for  a  moment  gazing 
11  Macquart,  who  was  now  standing  up,  a  smile  gradually 
beaming   across   his   broad   face.     One   might   have    fancied 
Macquart  to  have  been  his  long  lost  brother. 

"  Why,  it's  me  dear  friend  Joe,"  said  Captain  Hull, 
"  or  do  me  eyes  deceive  me  !  Why,  Joe,  you've  grown  fat 
since  I  lost  y'  last,  fat  you've  grown  and  bustin'  witli  pros- 
perity you  look — well,  if  this  don't  beat  all!  " 

Macquart's  face  shewed  nothing  of  what  was  going  on 
inside  of  him.     He  held  out  his  hand  to  Hull. 

"  This  is  unexpected,"  said  he.  "  So  you're  going  with 
us  ?  Well,  that's  to  the  good  ;  a  capable  navigator  is  always 
useful  even  if  we  are  a  bit  crowded." 

He  sat  down  and  helped  himself  to  another  sardine,  and 
in  that  moment  Screed  seemed  to  glimpse  the  full  formid- 
ableness  of  this  man  who  had  suddenly  received  such  a 
knockout  blow  in  such  a  manner. 

Jacky  had  followed  them  down  .with  a  huge  dish  of  fried 
bacon  and  eggs,  and  the  whole  crowd  now  took  their  places 
at  the  table,  a  terrible  squeeze,  whilst  Jacky,  skipping  on 
deck  again,  fetched  the  coffee.  Houghton  was  the  only  one 
at  that  breakfast  party  who  did  not  understand  the  new 
development.  It  astonished  him  that  Screed  should  have 
sprung  this  stranger  upon  them  at  the  last  moment  ;  he 
remembered  vaguely  Hull's  face,  which  he  had  glimpsed  that 
morning  more  than  a  fortnight  ago,  but  he  said  nothing. 
It  was  some  move  of  Screed's,  and  if  Tillman  was  satisfied 
it  was  not  for  him  to  complain. 

"  Well,  gentlemen,"  said  Screed,  as  the  meal  drew  to- 
wards an  end,  "  we'll  soon  have  the  pilot  on  board  now  and 
the  wind  is  favourable.  One  last  word  to  you.  This  ex- 
pedition means  a  lot  to  us  all.  Captain  Hull  here  knows 
what  we  are  after,  and  his  share  will  be  arranged  between 
him  and  Mr.  Macquart  without  touching  either  your  shares 
or  mine  ;  let  there  be  no  dissensions  between  any  of  you  ; 
work  for  the  common  end,  for  only  in  that  wav  will  you  pull 
the  thing  off  to  a  profit.  When  you  come  back  here  with 
what  you  are  going  in  search  of  you  will  find  no  worrv,  no 
difficulty  in  taking  your  profits.  Once  I  have  touched  and 
.  told  the  stuff,  I  will  give  each  of  you  a  cheque  for  your  amount. 
You  may  think  my  share  in  this  business  only  consists  in 
fitting  out  this  vessel  and  starting  you  off.  Far  from  that, 
my  real  help  comes  in  when  you  are  back  with  the  stuff. 
Remember  this,  if  you  had  the  Barracuda  up  to  the  hatches 
in  sovereigns,  you  would  be  poor  men,  simply  because  you 
could  not  convert  your  sovereigns  into  credit  at  a  bank  ; 
to  no  port  in  the  world  could  you  take  them  with  safety  and 
without  being  sniffed  over  by  money-changers  or  customs — 
that's  all  I  have  to  say." 

He  rose  from  the  table ;  he  had  narrowly  watched 
Macquart's  face  during  this  speech  and  fancied  he  had  caugl  t 
the  faintest  trace  of  a  smile,  the  vaguest  ghost  of  a  hint  at 
derision.  He  could  not  be  sure,  but  the  fancy  made  him 
more  than  ever  satisfied  that  Hull  was  in  this  business. 

They  came  on  deck  just  as  the  pilot  came  alongside  in 
his  petrol  launch.  Tillman,  who  had  taken  on  the  duties 
of  skipper,  knowing  more  about  the  management  of  small 
craft  even  than  Hull,  had  arranged  the  watches  in  a  general 
conference  on  the  day  before,  picking  Jacky  to  act  with  him 
as  port  watch,  and  Houghton  and  Macquart  for  the  starboard. 
The  advent  of  Hull  would  not  disturb  this  arrangement.  Hull 
declared  himself  ready  and  willing  to  act  as  spare  hand  and 
to  assist  in  any  way  that  might  be  useful. 

"  I  ain't  particular,"  said  he.  "  I've  all  my  life  been 
used  to  masts  and  yards  and  a  quarter  deck  a  body  can  turn 
on.  I'm  free  to  admit  this  soap-dish  is  a  new  thing  to  me 
and  this  pocket  handkerchief  work  with  gaffs  and  booms  is 
outside  my  line.  If  Mr.  Tillman  here  has  a  better  clutch  on 
'em  than  me,  well,  then,  he's  my  skipper  ;  if  he's  a  bit  dicky 
on  the  navigatin',  well  then  he  can  reckon  on  me  to  lend  him 
a  hand." 

He  meant  it.  Hull  on  board  the  Barracuda  was  as  much 
out  of  his  element  as  a  trout  in  a  child's  aquarium.  He  had 
been  used  to  space  ;  fore  and  aft  rig  confused  him  ;  though 
used  to  vast  spaces  of  canvas,  the  mainsail  of  the  Barracuda 
seemed  to  him  vast  in  proportion  to  the  hull,  the  swing  of 
the  main  boom  agitated  him.  He  was  obsessed,  in  fact, 
with  the  idea  of  the  smallnoss  of  the  craft,  an  obsession  that 
would  wear  off  in  time.  The  pilot  was  a  friend  of  Tillman's 
who  supposed  they  were  off  to  the  islands,  and  he  came,  not 
because  he  was  wanted,  but  to  give  them  a  send  off. 

When  he  came  on  board.  Screed  shook  hands  all  round 


and  departed  for  shore.  Then  the  anchor  was  hove  short- 
Hull,  Houghton  and  Jacky  at  the  windlass,  the  jib  and 
mainsail  was  set  and  the  anchor  brought  home. 

The  live  feel  of  the  little  craft  when  she  was  free  0;' 
the  mud  sent  a  thrill  through  Tillman  who  was  at  the  wheel, 
the  way  she  answered  to  lier  helm  delighted  him.  Followed 
by  the  pilot  boat,  she  passed  cove  after  cove  of  the  lovely 
harbour,  gliding  like  a  gull  on  the  wind  she  opened  the  Heads 
and,  now,  before  them,  like  an  enchantress  holding  the  gifts 
of  death  or  fortune,  stretching  towards  them  the  lure  of 
youth,  lay  the  blue  and  boundless  Pacific. 

CHAPTER   VIII. 

The  Argonauts. 

THEY  had  dropped  the  pilot,  the  Heads  were  passed 
and  the  white  digit  of  Macquarie  lighthouse  lay 
behind  them  and  on  the  port  quarter. 

Tillman,  at  the  wheel,  was  feeling  more  and 
more  the  fine  qualities  of  the  Barracuda  as  a  sea  boat,  for  out 
here  the  sea  was  fresh  and  strong,  the  tide  coming  up  against 
the  wind  and  foam  caps  breaking  across  the  hard  shoreward 
green  and  meadows  of  distant  azure. 

The  old  Greeks  knew  seas  like  this  when  they  spoke  ot 
the  sea  as  a  country  haunted  by  Proteus  shepherding  the  (locks 
of  ocean,  and  Jason  might  have  steered  the  Argo  through  the 
same  blue  fresh  weather  when  he  set  out  on  the  same  old 
quest  of  treasure  and  adventure. 

If  Tillman  had  ever  heard  of  Jason  and  the  Golden 
Fleece,  he  had,  no  doubt,  forgotten  them,  nor  would  he  have 
been  in  a  humour  to  draw  parallels  even  had  he  remembered 
that  far-off  adventure.  Yet  the  Argo  departing  on  her  won- 
derful voyage  was  a  sister  ship  of  the  Barracuda  spreading  her 
sails  to  the  winds  of  the  Pacific,  freighted  with  dreamers, 
and  bound  on  a  business  equally  adventurous — and  almost 
equally  fantastic. 

Houghton  was  standing  holding  on  to  the  weather  rail 
and  talking  to  Hull.  Macquart  had  taken  his  seat  plump  on 
deck  by  the  galley  and  was  engaged  with  a  needle  and  thread 
on  a  rent  in  his  coat,  which  he  had  taken  off.  Jacky,  the 
native,  was  in  and  out  of  the  tiny  fo'c'sle  putting  things  in 
order,  and  as  Tillman  looked  at  his  companions,  at  the  bound- 
less sea  and  the  receding  Heads,  for  the  first  time  the  true 
inwardness  of  'his  business  broke  upon  him  and  the  true  nature 
of  the  responsibility  he  had  taken  up  so  lightly. 

Bobby  Tillman  had  been  one  of  the  Sydney  Boys.  Spend- 
ing money,  yacht  and  horse-racing,  living  too  well  and  recover- 
ing from  the  elfects,  lial  been  amongst  his  main  occupations 
in  life.  An  adventure  to  a  New  Guinea  river  for  the  puj-pose 
of  recovering  half  a  mi  lion  of  gold  there  cached  had  seemed 
to  him  a  gorgeous  and  light-hearted  business.  Out  here, 
faced  by  the  sea  and  his  companions,  the  full  knowledge  of 
the  fact  that  this  was  an  undertaking  of  all  undertakings  the 
most  desperate  and  dangerous,  was  now  coming  to  him,  and 
with  it  the  sense  of  his  responsibility. 

Had  the  crew  of  the  Barracuda  consisted  of  religious 
sailormen,  and  had  the  oijject  of  their  quest  been  a  cache  of 
Bibles  for  distribution  amongst  the  heathen,  this  voyage 
would  not  have  been  destitute  of  danger.  But  the  quest  was 
gold,  and  gold  in  its  most  dangerous  form — abandoned 
treasure. 

Tillman  was  not  thinking  of  this  as  he  steered.  He  was 
reviewing  his  dubious  companions,  seeing  them  as  though  it 
were  for  the  first  time  Houghton  he  knew  and  could  trust, 
Macquart  he  guessed  to  be  a  scoundrel,  both  from  Screed's 
words  about  him  a  'i  from  the  promptinj^s  of  a  vague  instinct  ; 
and  about  Macquart  the  most  disturbing  fact  was  this  peep 
of  the  devil  through  a  fascinating  personality.  Hull  was  much 
more  understandable.  Hull,  sp.ung  on  them  at  the  last 
moment  by  Screed  as  a  check  upon  Macquart,  carried  his 
certificate  of  character  in  his  face,  and  it  was  not  a  first-class 
certificate  by  any  means.  Still,  instinctively  Tillman  felt 
Hull  to  be  far  more  reliable  than  Macquart. 

Jacky,  the  black  fellow,  was  an  entirely  unknown 
quantity. 

This,  then,  was  the  crowd,  small  in  number,  yet  full  of 
possibilities  which  Tillman  had  to  deal  with  and  hold  tog'.ther, 
and  with  which  he  had  to  face  tiie  sia,  the  weather,  unknown 
natives  and  the  passions  possibly  to  be  roused  through  the 
nature  of  the  quest  and  the  natures  of  the  seekers. 

Tillman  never  turned  a  hair.  This  irresponsible  and  light- 
hearted  optimist,  this  trifler  with  life,  this  haunter  of  race- 
courses and  main  prop  of  Lami)?rts,  recognised  all  the  difh- 
culties  and  dangers  of  his  ])osition  to  the  full,  yet  heeded  them 
not.  He  felt  himself  standing  on  a  sure  rock,. and  that  rock 
was  the  fact  that  the  Barracuda  was  proving  herself  a  splendid 
sea-boat.  So  he  stood,  twirling  the  wheel,  till,  Macquarie 
Lighthouse  wiped  away  by  distance,  he  called  Jacky  to  the 
helm,  gave  him  the  course  and  joined  Hull  and  Houghton  at 
the  weather  rail ;  then  the  three  sat  down  on  deck  by  Macquart, 


20 


r 


February  24,  igi6. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


iiuitLc  0/  ttie  Houth  Heas.i 


[itlustiattU,   bjj  Jvoep/i    aimpiiott,   HM.A.. 


"  Well,  I  have  brought  you  a  new  man,  a  friend  of  mine,  Captain  Hull." 


who  had  finished  his  mending,  and  Tillman  producing  a  rough 
chait  of  the  East  Australian  seaboard  began  to  lay  down  their 
course  for  the  instruction  of  the  others. 

Here  we  are,"  said  he,  "  almost  level  with  Broken  Bay, 
twenty-eight  hundred  miles  or  more  from  Cape  York  and 
Torres  Straits.  We  keep  our  present  course  till  we  strike 
Longitude  30° — that's  just  level  with  the  Sohtary  Islands. 
Then  we  strike  more  north,  so,  'till  we're  level  with  Great 
Sandy  Island  ;  keep  on  so  till  we  hit  Latitude  20°,  avoiding 
the  tail  of  the  Great  Barrier  Reef  and  then  strike  bold  nor'- 
nor'-west  through  the  Coral  Sea,  and  then  nor'-west  for  the 
Straits.  We  are  going  outside  the  Barrier  Reef,  you  see  ; 
all  the  steamer  lines  and  most  of  the  trading  ships  go  inside 
the  reef,  but  we're  going  outside.  I've  talked  it  out  with 
Screed.  He  wanted  me  to  go  inside  and  hug  the  coast,  but  I 
decided  not ;  we're  in  no  hurry,  and  1 11  take  plenty  of   sea 


room.  Level  with  Cape  Grafton  it's  pretty  difficult  water. 
There's  the  Madelaine  Cays,  there's  Holmes  Reef — ^we  have  to 
strike  between  those  two." 

"  How  long  will  it  take  us  to  hit  the  Straits  ?  "  asked 
Houghton. 

"  All  thirty  days  if  we  have  good  weather,"  replied  Till- 
man. "  Maybe,  two  months  if  we  haven't — you  see,  we've 
got  the  current  against  us." 

"  Well,  I'm  not  the  man  to  complain  if  it  took  us  a  twelve- 
month," said  Hull.  "  Good  grub  and  plain-sailin'  is  all  I 
asks,  s'long  as  I'm  not  divided  from  my  friend,  here,  Mac. 
Mac  and  me  is  Si'mese  pals — ain't  we,  Mac  ?  " 

Macquart  grunted  ;  lie  had  taken  a  pipe  and  some  tobacco 
from  his  pocket  and  was  bu.y  cutting  up  twist.  Tillman 
listened  and  wondered.  He  knew  from  Screed  that  Hull 
had  a  "  clown  "  on  Macquart,  that  Macquart  had  played  HuD 


21 


LAND       AND      W  A  T  E  K 


February  24,   1916. 


false.  He  did  not  know  the  full  extent  of  the  division  that 
existed  between  the  precious  pair  ;  all  the  same,  he  did  not 
hke  Hull's  bantering  tone  and  tried  to  change  the  subject, 
but  Hull  persisted. 

"  We  ve  sailed  the  seas  together  and  always  shared  equal, 
haven't  we,  Mac  ?  and  now  we're  sailin'  anci  sharin'  again, 
just  as  in  old  times." 

"  Just  so."  said  Macquart. 

"  And  we'll  be  rich  together  when  we've  hit  the  stroke  ; 
why,  Mac,  we  11  be  drivin'  in  kerridges,  you  and  me." 

"  That's  so,"  said  Macquart.  "  There's  enough  for  all. 
I'm  a  plain  man  and  want  little  in  the  way  of  worldly  goods  ; 
there's  enough  for  the  lot  of  us — when  we  get  the  stuff  back 
safe  and  sound." 

Houghton,  who  did  not  catch  the  undercurrent  in  this 
conversation,  struck  in. 

"  Lord  !  "  he  said.  "  It  will  be  splendid,  if  we  pull  it 
off.  I  never  knew  what  money  meant  till  I  found  myself 
without  it,  and  I  never  believed,  really,  in  this  expedition, 
'till  now  we've  started." 

"  We've  got  to  pull  it  through,"  said  Tillman,  "  and 
it  will  take  some  pulling."  He  rose  to  his  feet  and  went  aft, 
Houghton  following  him. 

Hull  and  Macquart  found  themselves  alone  for  the  first 
time,  and  Hull,  who  had  just  finished  filling  a  pipe,  lit  it  and 
took  a  few  pulls.  He  was  silent  for  a  moment,  then  he 
spoke : 

"  Mac,"  said  he,  "  who  are  them  two  guj'S  you've  let  into 
this  bizziness  ?  " 

"  Well,  you  ought  to  know,"  replied  Macquart,  "  seeing 
you've  been  up  Screed's  sleeve  for  the  last  fortnight." 

"  That's  true,"  said  the  Captain,  "  but  it  was  precious 
black  up  that  sleeve.  He  hid  me  away  and  fed  me  well,  but 
not  one  word  did  he  let  out,  only  the  promise  to  put  me  even 
with  me  dear  friend  Mac." 

"  Do  you  mean  to  say,  he  didn't  tell  you  all  about  this 
expedition  ?  " 

He  did,"  said  Hull  ;  "  told  me  enough  to  make  me  know 
it's  the  same  old  lay  you've  been  on  for  years.  Why,  Mac,  it 
was  the  New  Guinea  gold  you  was  singin'  about  in  'Frisco 
fower  years  ago,  that  time  you  laid  me  out  with  a  dope-drop 
and  left  me  stranded  at  San  Lorenzo,  and  it's  the  New  Guinea 
gold  you're  after  still.  I  know  that  much.  What  I  want  to 
know  now  is  two  things  :  first  of  all,  who  are  them  two  guys 
and  wha    are  they  worth  on  this  job  ?  " 

"  Oh,  they're  just  Sydney  chaps,"  said  Macquart. 
"  Nothing  much  ;  f'ou  ;hton  hails  from  England,  got  stranded 
in  Sydney  and  I  me  him  in  the  Domain.  Tillman,  he's  a 
first-rate  hand  at  aili  ig  a  boat  like  this.  Did  you  expect  me 
to  go  on  this  joy   iide  single-handed  ?  " 

"  Not  by  no  manner  of  means,  else  I  wouldn't  have  come 
aboard  to  help  you,  Mac.  Why,  I  hunted  for  you  like  a  lost 
child  after  you  give  me  the  slip  outside  the  'bacca  shop. 
I  wouldn't  have  you  go  alone  on  this  traverse,  not  on  no 
account,  you  may  be  sure  of  that.  Well,  now,  to  come  to  the 
second  point.     What  are  you  after  ?  " 

"  What  do  you  mean  ?  " 

"  I  means  what  I  says.  You've  been  always  a-gettin' 
up  expidishins  or  tryin'  to  get  them  up  to  go  for  this  stuff  ; 
is  it  flap-doodle  or  is  it  real  ?  Is  the  stuff  there,  or  is  it  bun- 
kum ?  " 

"  I  give  you  my  word  of  honour " 

"  I  wouldn't  take  your  word  of  honour  on  no  account," 
said  the  Captain.  "  I  wouldn't  deprive  you  of  it,  Mac  ; 
answer  me  up  :  is  it  real  ?  and  if  it  ain't,  answer  me  up  what 
you  are  af  er.  If  j'ou  plays  me  crooked,  I  gives  you  my  word 
of  honour  I  11  twist  your  neck.  There's  no  police  here,  Mac, 
and  no  crowner  s  jury." 

"  You  may  take  it  from  me  it's  the  solid  truth,"  said 
Macquart.  "  The  gold's  there  and  only  waiting  to  be  lifted." 
.\s  he  spoke,  he  raised  his  head  and  expanded  his  nostrils, 
as  though  sniffing  the  treasure. 

A  great  gull  passed  in  the  blue  sky  above,  its  shadow 
swept  the  white  deck  and  bellying  mainsail  of  tne  Barracuda, 
and  its  voice  came  on  the  wind  as  it  glided  away  to  leeward. 

Houghton  had  gone  below,  Tillman  was  at  the  after-rail, 
leaning  o  er  smoking  and  contemplating  the  wash  of  the  yawl. 
Jacky  was  at  the  wheel. 

"  It's  there  as  sure  as  I'm  here,"  went  on  Macquart, 
■'  unless  an  earthquake  has  swallowed  'he  river  bank." 

Once  Maccjuart  go:  on  the  subject  of  the  treasure,  he 
became  almost  a  different  man.  There  could  be  no  doubt  at 
all  of  his  genuineness  on  that  subject. 

"  Or  someone  has  been  and  scooped  it,"  put  in  Hull. 

"  What  d  you  mean  ?  "  said  Mac([uart. 

"  I  moan  this  way.  I  meets  you  fower  j^'ears  ago  and  you 
was  talkin  of  this  hive  ;  I  meets  you  to-day  and  you're  talkin' 
of  it  still.  Ho.v  many  people  have  you  given  the  office  to 
over  this  here  bu   ness  that's  what  I  want  to  know  ? 

"  No   one."    said    Macquart.    "  not    a   soul.     It's   God's 


truth  that  since  I  saw  you  in  'Frisco  four  years  ago  till  the 
other  day,  I  have  not  hit  one  man  who  would  have  been  of  use 
to  me.  How  could  I  ?  going  about  the  world  in  rags.  Once 
or  twice  I  had  a  chance  to  make  some  money,  and  I  did,  but 
the  luck  turned  against  me.  No,  it  s  the  cold  truth,  since  I 
seen  you  last  I  haven't  had  a  dog's  chance.  Then  I  met 
Tillman,  there,  in  a  bar  in  Sydney,  and  I  was  so  gravelled  I 
told  him  the  whole  yarn  over  a  drink  ;  he  took  it  up  hot,  then 
I  met  Houghton,  tliat  other  chap,  in  the  Domain  and  intro- 
duced him  to  Tillman,  and  the  result  is  we're  here." 

"  That's  so,"  said  Hull.     "  We're  here  right  enough," 

Macquart  looked  at  the  other  out  of  the  corner  of  his 
eye. 

"  The  thing  I  can't  understand,"  said  he,  "  is  how  you 
are  here.  We'll  be  better  friends  if  we  are  straight  with  one 
another."  Hull  gave  a  short  laugh  at  this.  "  And  leaving 
friendship  alone,  you  have  set  my  curiosity  working — how 
the  deuce  did  you  pick  up  Screed  .'  " 

"  I'll  tell  VQU,"  said  Hull.  "  When  you  played  me  that 
dog's  trick  and  slipped  your  cable  outside  that  'baccy  shop. 
I  saw  them  two  guys,  Tillman  and  Houghton,  in  a  bar.  1 
remembered  sightin'  them  with  you,  and  I  listened  to  their 
talk.  Then  I  put  two  and  two  together,  and  got  my  claws 
on  Screed.  Screed's  got  no  great  opinion  of  you,  Mac,  speci- 
ally after  the  yarn  I  spun  him  of  how  you  choused  me  in 
'Frisco.  Screed  knows  I  know  you  and  your  dog  tricks,  and 
he's  put  me  aboard  to  see  fair  play  between  you  and  them  two 
pore  unfortunits.  I'm  your  natural  guardian,  Mac,  till  we 
get  the  boodle  safe  to  Sydney,  and  then  I'll  be  your  pardner. 
You've  got  to  give  me  half  of  your  scoop.  D'you  understand 
that,  Mac  ? 

"  When  we  get  that  stuff  to  Sydney,  you  can  have  half 
my  share,"  said  .Macquart.  "  There  s  no  use  in  my  pretending 
that  I'm  satisfied  you  have  a  right  to  it,  but  there  it  is  ;  you 
have  got  the  bulge  on  me  and  there's  no  use  kicking." 

"  Not  a  bit,"  said  Hull,  "  and  I'm  agreeable  to  be  friendly 
through  the  voyage  and  home  again,  but  don't  you  never 
imagine  I'm  asleep.  Snorin'  on  my  back,  I'll  still  have  one 
eye  open  on  you,  Mac,  and  both  fists  ready  to  scrag  you  if  you 
play  any  of  your  monkey  tricks." 

He  rose  up  and  went  aft  to  take  his  turn  at  the  wheel 
leaving  Macquart  still  seated  on  the  deck  and  revolving,  no 
doubt,  the  situation  in  his  mind. 

(To   be  continued.) 


Most  people  admire,  and  a  good  many  are  going  to  wear, 
the  tiny  turban  hats  of  tulle  with  a  huge  tulle  bow  gathered 
and  poised  with  great  lightness  on  the  top  of  the  crown. 
Some  of  these  tulle  turbans  are  gathered  into  a  close-fitting 
border  of  velvet,  others  into  a  circle  of  conventional  and 
flatly  placed  leaves. 

Sleeveless  coats  are  being  worn,  and  are  almost  inevitable 
accompaniments  of  the  tea  frock.  Taffetas  and  ninon  are 
being  much  used  together,  and  a  charming  little  tea-time  gown 
seen  the  other  day  had  a  skirt  in  alternate  bands  of  black 
taffetas  and  ninon  mounted  on  soft  white  silk.  The  short 
coat  was  of  taffetas  only,  the  deep  cut  armholes  opening  to 
show  the  ninon  sleeves  and  body  of  the  dress  below. 

There  is  a  future  and  big  business  before  the  enterprising 
tailor  who  will  feature  severely  tailored  coats  and  skirts  cut 
with  enough  flair  to  mark  them  as  up-to-date.  Nothing 
looks  better  than  a  plain  coat,  fitting  well  in  at  the  waist, 
and  from  there  branching  downwards  in  strongly  marked 
pleats.  All  it  then  needs  is  a  well  cut  full  skirt  of  corres- 
ponding plainness. 

Fine  net  pretty  blouses  with  deep  net  shoulder  capes  are 
amongst  the  latest  arrivals.  The  capes  are  cut  in  very  prim 
Early  Victorian  fashion,  and  in  some  cases  button  right  up 
the  front  and  up  the  throat.  Attractive  though  these  blouses 
are,  they  will,  even  with  the  most  careful  handling,  be  difficult 
to  wear  beneath  the  average  coat  without  much  creasing 
and  tumbling.  The  idea  is,  however,  that  they  will  be  worn 
outside  like  the  usual  turn-over  white  collar,  and  the  effect 
will  be  a  picturesque  one. 

Attractive  spring  gowns  of  sprigged  and  quaintly  pat- 
terned silk  are  being  shown  at  all  the  big  dressmakers,  and 
these  are  ruched,  puffed,  and  flounced  to  such  an  extent  that 
even  the  most  slender  wearers  will  verge  on  the  voluminous. 
There  are  no  very  strong  colourings  or  startUng  desigi.\s.  The 
patterns  are  small  and  unobtrusive. 

OFFICERS'  LE.W.E  BRIGHTENED  BY  BILLIARDS.— A.s  an 
indoor  sport  Riving  endless  opportunities  for  the  exercise  of  skill, 
nothing  can  equal  Billiards  -played  on  a  Burrouglies  and  Watts' 
Table.     Its    fascination    is    inexhaustible. 


22 


Suppltmtnt  to  Land  and  Watek,  Mm 


AQUASCUTUM 

FIELO  S  TRENCH  COATS. 


So  many  worthless  imitations  are 
being  advertised  that  it  is  most 
essential  thdt  Officers,  for  their 
own  protection,  should  read  the 
GENUINE  letters  from  those  who 
have  been  in  the  Trenches,  and  have 
therefore  proved  the  superior  merits 
of  the  AQUASCUTUM  over  all 
other  coats. 

FROM  THE  TRENCHES  : 

"  It  Stood   the  Wilder  in  the  Trenches 
shnply  spleodidlv.  I  know  no  better  coat.*' 
Capt.  P. 

"  I  have  nothing  but  praise  for  its  web 
and   rain-resisting    qualities."     Col     N. 

"  I  cannot  speak  too  hijihly  of  my 
Aqnascutum.  as  it  has  had  many  severe 
tests  and  has  always  proved  to  be  abso- 
lutely waterproof."  Lieut.   N, 

"  Continuous  wear  in  and  out  of  the 
Trenches  had  naturally  told  on  it  a  bit. 
but  otherwise  it  is  perfectly  good.  I  can 
never  wish  for  a  better  eoat."    Capt.  B. 

"  I  wore  it  continuously  from  the  13th 
to  the  18th.  and  slept  in  it  in  muddy  and 
damp  trenches,  and  for  the  major  part 
of  the  time  It  was  raining.  I  am  j:Iad  to 
sny  the  coat  kept  me  absolutely  dry  the 
whole  time."  Lieut.  0. 

"  I    have   used    one   out    here    for    six 
months,  and  though  it  is  now  very  shabby, 
it  is  still  quite  proof  against  any  rain." 
Lt.  Col.  L. 

^he  Originals  of  the  above  letlers 
can    be  sken    by    anyone    interested. 


AQUASCUTUM     Ltd., 

Waterproof  Coat  Specialists  for  over  50  years. 
By  Appointment  to  His  Majesty  the  King. 

100    REGENT    STREET,   LONDON,  W, 


THE  FASHION 

FOR                                        ,                  ^r 

PErricoATS      ifff^^ 

III  view  of  the  fashion  for             H^^ln^ln 
with;  skirts,  petticoats  arc             ^^^^^V  ^sm 
now  in  great  (iciuand.  Our            ^^^^^K 
.stock  contains  an  infinite            ^^^^^^B             M 

ica.sonable  prices                            ^^^^^^P^^^^H 

i'KTTICOAT,    as                       ^^^^B                ^^ 
quality  taii'eta,                ^^^^^^^R               ^^^^ 

waved  edge  finished  with      ^^^^^^^B                 ^^R 
In      ^^^^^^^H                 •^^^ 
nary,  grey,  mole,  niggei'.     ^^^^^^^^^B.                         ^k 

sky      and    ^^^^^^^^^H                          ^^ 
]>iirple.                          piu'ple  ^^^^^^^^^H 
and  black,  red  and  black. ^^^^^^^^^^K 

blue                              ^^^^^^^^^^^p                                    V 

16/9.     ^^               1 

i 

Llebenham    ^^fW     ^J^?^ 
&Freebod[y          f  l    Jf 

Vl'ijiTnore  Street.                     '                             ;'            ^ 
iCovcndish  Squore)  London.W                          '^          ^ 

Famous  for  over  a  Century  for                         *_»^ 
Taste,  for  Quality,  for    Value.                           SS" 

The  Original  Cording  s.  Estd.  1839. 
High-Grade 

Military  Waterproofs. 


New  Illustrated  List  °f  water- 
proof coats,  boots,  trench  waders 
portable  baths,  &c.,  at  request. 


THE    "EQUITOR" 


Officers  sp?ak  highly  of  the 
special  provsion  for  mounted   wear 

in  the  attached  ajnou  buttoning  on 
one  .side.  This  absolutelj-  shuts  out 
any  rain,  and  when  not  in  use  fastens 
conveniently  {.out  of  sight)  on  the 
inside  of  coat,  which  then  serves  ju.st 
as  well  for  ordinary  wear  afoot.  The 
coat  can  be  had  fitted  with  belt  if 
desired. 

One  of  the  special  materials, 
No.  31,  in  colour  an  approved  mili- 
tary fawn,  is  a  tough  though  fiuely- 
wovcn  fabric,  light  in  weight,  yet 
absolutely  reliable  for  hard  wear  and 
tear. 

The  "Equitor"  Coat  is  also  made 
with  warm  fleece  1  ning  to  detach. 
When  ord  ring  an  "  Equitor "  or 
"Service"  Coat  (the  "Service'  Coat 
is  made  without  the  attached  apron), 
or  directing  that  one  be  sent  on 
approval,  height  and  chest  measure 
and  reference  should  given. 


COAT 

(Ketd). 


i--»^j 


o. 

Ltd 


J.  C.  CORDING  &  C 

Waterproofers  to   H.M.  the  King 

„         _        Only     Addresses: 

19  PICCADILLY,  W.  & 35 st.  jamess  st. 

s.w. 


J.  W.  BENSON 


LTD. 


Military  Badge  Brooches. 

/}ny  Regimental  !Bodge  Perfectly  Modelled. 
PRICES    ON    APPLICATION. 


Large  Selection  in  Diamonds,  or  Gold 

and  Enamel.  Sketches  sent  /or  approval 

"Aclioe  Serufce"  WEISTLET  WATCH 
Fully   Luminous  Figures  and  Hands 

Warranted  Timekeepers. 

In    Silver    Cases    with    Screw     Bezel 

and  Back.     ;C«t  Us. 

With    the     new   self-closing    cover. 

Xa    7a.    »id. 

Others   in   Silver   from   iiti    lOs. 

Gold   from  ii.~  lOs. 


25   OLD  BOND  STREET,  W. 

and  62  &  64  LUOaATE  HILL.  E.C. 


THE    NEW    TRIANGULAR 


PolisKi  1   I 


Impretfnated   ready  for   use. 

VVITH     A0JLISTA15LI-       C/O 
HANDV- HANDLE -HINQE       Oj C 
Cleans  as  it  Polishes.     Gets  into  tlie  Corners  and 
does  in  a   few  minutes   every   morning — without 
stooping  or  kneeling — work  that  hitherto  neces- 
sitated a  special  day. 

FREE  TRIAL.— Deposit  the  price  S«.  2d.  with  your 
dealer,  and  if  after  a  fiw  days  you  are  not  satisfitd, 
your  money  will  be  returned. 

When  yonrifop  getsdry  feedit  withO-CedarPoUsh 

:    If  unobtainable  of  your  dealer,  sent  direct   I 
on  receipt  of  price  by  the  Manufacturers,   j 

CHANNELL  CHEMICAL   CO.,    LTD., 

41—45     Old     S<recl,     London,     E.C. 


Bvppliment  to  Land  and  Watix,  March  2.  :9l«. 


Dunlop :    How  are  the  tyres  sticking  it  ? 

Tommy:    Like    ourselves,    sir,   for    the 
duration  of  the  war! 


Extract  from  a  letter  from  a  Lance-Corporal  in  the 
M.T.A.S.C  at  the  Front : — "  My  speedometer  at  the 
present  time  shows  a  mileage  of  7,345  miles, 
and  for  the  first  5,000  of  them  I  had  one  of 
your  tyres  on  a  back  wheel,  and  it  was  replaced 
by  a  non-skid  and  fixed  on  to  a  front  wheel,  where 
I  am  pleased  to  inform  you  it  Sj^ill  remains  and 
is  making  me  wonder  if  it  will  last  the  war  out" 


y  M  LOP 


RUBBER     CO.,     LIMITED, 

Founders  of  the  Pneumatic  Tyre  Industry, 

Aston     Cross,    Birmingham.       14  Regent  Street. 
London,  S.W.      Paris:      4  Rue     du    Colonel    Moll. 


Tiadc  Mark. 


Thresher  Trench  Goat. 

Officially  brought  to  the  notice  of  all  Officers  commanding 
Corps  in  the  Expeditionary  Force  by  the  War  Office  last 
winter.  Although  more  copied  than  any  other  garment  the 
Thresher  has  never  yet  been  equalled. 

1  ne    1  nreSner  successfully  met  the  severest  tests 
of  last  winter's  campaign,  and  has  this  winter  estab- 
lished itself  supreme  for  comfort,   warmth  and 
service.      Wind-proof  and  waterproof. 

With  detachable  'Kamelcott' lining  £5  10  0 
With  fixed  Sheepskin  lining  -  -  £6  6  0 
With  Sheepskin  hning  detachable         £7      10 

For  Mounted  Officers,  with  Knee  Flaps  and  Saddle  Gusset,  15/6  extra. 

IMMEDIATE    DELIVERY. 

Send  size  of  chest  and  approximate  height,  and  to  avoid 

delay  enclose  cheque  when  ordering.    Payment  refunded 

if  coat  not  suitable. 

Thresher  &  Glenny 

152  &  153  STRAND,  LONDON,  W.C. 


Outfitters  by  appointment  to  H.M.  the  King. 


xiv 


LAND&WATER 


Vol.  LXVI  No.   2808. 


THIIRSD-W     MARTH    c>     rnrft  i-publishf.d  ast   pr  ic  e  sixpence 

iiiuxvoi^x-v  1 ,   ivirti%.<^n    z,    xyiu.  La  nkwspapkrJ  published  weekly 


/Ji/   Louis   Raemaclcers 


THE    PROMISE. 


"  We  shall    never  sheath    the  sword   until  Belgium  recovers  all,  and   more  than  all    that  she  has  sacrificed."— 
Mr.  Asquith,  The  Guildhall.   November  9,    1914.     (Repeated  in  the  House  of  Commons,  February  23,    19i6.) 


LAND       AND      W   A   I   !■.  U 


M;n(  li   .;.    i()r(), 


Mttinii  a  («iin  in  u   Turret  at   Krupp's. 


Luccvvork  of  Steel,  N'lilcan  Works. 


Hut  of  the  Cnpe  of  Hope,  Oberhauscn. 

LUnOGKAPUS     BY     MR.    JOSHPIl     PHNNELL,     NOW    ON      MEW 

LEICESTER    GALLERIES. 
[Major  Haldanc  Macfall  writes  on  this  exhibition  on  page  18.| 


AT     THi: 


March  2,  TqiCy. 


LAND       AND      \VA  1  !•  R 


LAND  &  WATER 

Empire    House,    Kingsvvay,     l.ondon,    W.C. 


Tcleplionc  :    HaLUORN    2H28. 


THUKSDAY.    MARCH    2,    1916. 


AMERICA'S    CHOICE. 

THE  hitter  which  Prt.'sidcnt  Wilson  has  addressed 
to  Senator  Stone  brings  the  United  States  to 
tlic  brink  of  the  great  choice.  Is  it  to  be  a 
sovereign  nation  or  is  it  to  be  an  amorphous 
system.  miKhty  in  potentiahties,  but  lacking  the  central 
])nri)ose,  the  will  to  live  and  to  preserve  its  rights  and  its 
iionour,  that  is  (he  soul  of  a  nation?  The  question  is  in 
the  balance— has  been  in  the  balance  since  the  outbreak 
of  war.  That  catastrophe  harl  vast  repercussion  across 
the  Atlantic.  Nowhere  had  the  idea  that  the  world  of 
the  futme  would  be  wholly  subject  to  pacific  and  arbitral 
methods  taken  so  deep  a  root  as  in  the  United  States; 
nowhere  had  democratic  development  assumed  directions 
0  entirely  contrary  to  the  idea  of  the  State  as  an  organised 
military  system  ;  nowhere  did  the  war  come  -..  ■■>  nuhv 
hock  to  the  cuniiit  tendencies  of  thought. 

I'rom  the  first  the  dominant  sympathy  of  the  country 
was  with  the  Allies.  This  was  due  in  jiart  to  the  intimate 
nlations-speec  h,  trade,  tradition,  literature,  and  so  on— 
between  the  United  States  and  England  and  the  spiritual 
sympathy  with  RepubHcan  France,  but  still  more  to  the 
leiocity  of  the  (ierman  invasion  of  Belgium,  which 
revolted  the  moral  sense  of  the  people  in  an  unparalleled 
d-^M-ee.  There  wero,  however,  very  powerful  discordant 
<1(  in(!nts  in  the  sentiment  of  the  country,  some  definitely 
l)ro-German,  some  merely  anti-English,  some  who,  like 
the  extreme  pacifi-^ts  of  the  Bryan  school,  were  driven 
into  a  kind  of  pro-(,erman  i)osition  by  their  determination 
to  resist  the  prevailing  tendency. 

Nor  were  there  wanting  encumbrances  which  gave 
strength  to  these  impulses.  The  operation  of  the  blockade 
inevitably  led  to  friction  with  this  country.  It  would  be 
unjust  to  suggest  that  American  opinion  ever  seriously 
regarded  that  fri(  lion  as  in  the  same  category  as  the 
piratical  crimes  of  Germany,  but  it  seemed  to  check  the 
strong  current  of  feeling.  It  periodically  diverted  atten- 
lion  from  the  grttat  issues  of  humanity  to  the  meaner 
;<rievances  of  trade,  and  gave  a  certain  groimd  for  that 
balancing  of  one  against  the  other  which  fitted  in  with 
the  essential  puri)ose  of  the.  country. 

That  purpos;;  was  to  avoid  being  involved  in  the 
struggle.  Broadly  speaking,  it  is  true  to  say  that  there 
is  not  and  never  has  been  an  uncompromising  pro-war 
party  in  the  United  States.  The  majority  of  those  who 
sympathise  most  strenuously  with  the  Allies  have  not 
really  advocated  intervention.  They  have  not  seriously 
contemplated  more  than  a  breach  of  diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany.  The  reasons  for  this  are  many  ;  the 
tradition  of  isolation  from  the  Ivuropean  fjuarrels,  the 
lack  of  means  of  prompt  intervention,  the  strong  cross- 
currents of  interest  and,  finally,  the  sellisii  desire  to  enjoy 
the  unparalleled  harvest  which  the  war  has  brought  to 
the  American  merchant,  farmer,  trader,  and  financier. 
The  country  has  never  experienced  such  a  period  of 
overflowing  prosperity.  Indeed,  no  country  in  the 
worid's  history  has  had  such  an  inrush  of  sudden  wealth. 
It  is  converting  the  United  States  magically  into  the 
great  credit  country  of  the  world,  and  tbc  continuance  of 
the  war  promises  to  leave  New  York  the  financial  centre 

of  the  nations.  ,. 

But  meanwhile  there  is  a  de^p  undercurrent  of  dis- 
quiet  which  finds  its  e.xpression,  strwlcntly  m  the  fa"«!  "i 
Mr.  Roosevelt,  gravely  and  anxiously  in  the  case  of  Mr. 


Ivliot  of  Harvard.  It  is  fell  that  the  vast  profits  which  the 
United  States  is  deriving  from  the  agonies  of  Euro|)e  arc 
deariy  bought  if  the  moral  leadership  of  the  nation  in  the 
worUl  is  being  sacrificed  to  obtain  them.  The  view 
that  the  country  has  no  part  in  the  great  issue  that  is 
l)eing  fought  out  in  Kuro|)e  wears  thin  and  false.  That 
i>sue  is  seen  to  be  wlK^ther  demoi-racy,  of  which  the 
United  States  has  been  th<-  standard-bean  r,  is  to  survive 
on  this  earth  or  to  jjerish  under  the  heel  of  Prussian 
militarism.  The  Ututed  States  cannot  be  indifferent 
to  that  great  issue.  Behind  all  this  there  is  the  con- 
sciousness that  in  IIk;  light  of  the  war  the  isolation  of 
America  is  discovered  to  be  a  fiction.  There  are  many 
candid  Americans  wlio  admit  llial  the  name  endorsed 
on  the  back  of  tlu^  .Monroe  l^)clritie  is  not  the  name  of 
the  United  States,  b\it  the  name  of  Gn-at  Britain-  -that  it 
is  the  British  Navy  alone  that  to-day  gives  validity  to 
that  Doctrine  and  stands  between  Prussia  and  the 
realisation  ot  its  dream  of  comjuest  in  South  America. 

It  is  considerations  like  these  which  are  distiiri)ing 
the  best  minds  and  leading  them  to  ask  whether  the 
United  States  is  proving  equal  to  the  great  challenge 
that  has  come  upon  the  country  in  common  with  the 
rest  of  th<!  worUl,  whether,  in  short,  the  United  States 
can  finally  stand  aloof  from  the  struggle  without  sufffiring 
a  profound  moral  defeat.  Presidi-nt  Wilson  througliout 
has  been  conscious  of  the  challenge,  but  he  has  conceiv<d 
if  to  be  his  fimction  not  to  force  (jpiniini,  but  to  leave  it 
to  mature  and  only  act  when  a<;tion  would  give  him  the 
maximum  of  public  sui)port  and  the;  facts  wotild  provide 
him  with  an  indi>i>utabie  case.  He  has  sought  to  give 
effect  to  the  two  main  jMirnoses  of  America— the  desire 
to  keep  out  of  the  war,  ayd  the  dettirmination  to  secure 
respect  for  the  rights  of  the  nation.  Those  i)urposes, 
however,  cannot  be  reconciled  without  a  strain.  Germany, 
realising  the  difficulties  of  his  position,  has  sought  to 
(hvcrt  the  mind  of  America  to  the  contemplation  (ti  \tt 
own  interests,  and  hungry  traders  have  not  bren  unwilling 
to  believe  that  the  British  mastery  of  the  seas,  which 
interfered  with  their  commerce,  was  an  encroachment 
upon  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  United  States. 

But  the  essential  falsity  of  the  balance  between  the 
piratical  crimes  of  (k-rmany  and  the  British  Navy's 
interpretation  of  the  laws  of  sea  warfare  has  become  too 
flagrant  to  be  ignored,  and  it  would  be  an  entire  mis- 
reading of  President  Wilson's  jjolicy  to  assume  that  he  has 
sought  to  igncjre  it.  He  would  not  have  a  breach  if  it 
could  be  avoided  because  he  believed  that  not  only  was 
it  in  Ameri(;a's  interest  that  it  should  te  outside  the 
struggle,  but  also  because  lu;  was  conscious  that  the 
preservation  of  its  neutrality  might  prove  to  be  an  im- 
portant service  to  the  belligerents  and  might  give  the 
worid  the  advantage  of  a  powerful  and  impartial  influence 
in  the  hour  of  settlement. 

But  the  challenge  which  Germany  has  thrown  out 
to  him  on  the  subject  of  armed  merchantmen  brings  the 
President  to  the  brink  oi  the.  precipice.  Germany  has 
declared  her  intention  to  sink  armed  merchantmen,  the 
President  has  refused  to  regard  defensive  armaments  as 
ajnstituting  a  ship  of  war.  This  refusal,  coupled  with 
his  determination  not  to  forbid  Americans  to  travel  in 
British  ships,  makes  the  clash  betwec.n  the  two  countries 
apparently  inevitable, 

The  letter  to  Mr.  Stone,  in  our  opinion,  leaves  no 
doubt  that  the  decision  of  the  President  has  been  taken. 
No  one  who  has  studied  his  can;cr  can  doubt  the  iron  will 
that  dwells  behind  this  calm  and  peace-loving  personality. 
He  would  go  into  the  war  with  the  grief  that  possessed 
the  great  souls  of  IJncoln  and  nl  i>ee,  but  he  would  go 
into  it  with  the  stern  resolution  that  was  theirs  also. 

"  These  are  the  times  that  try  men's  souls,"  said 
Thomas  Paine  in  the  first  of  those  clarion  calls  which  he 
wrote  by  Washington's  camp  fires  in  the  dark  nights 
when  the  American  nation  was  (X)ming  to  birth.  I'he 
soul  of  America  bore  the  trial  and  came  through  it  ,with 
boundless  possibilities.  Eighty  year,  later  came  thi; 
second  great  ordeal,  and  again  the  United  Statc:s  emerged 
purified,  enlarged  in  outlook,  united  as  it  had  never  been. 
To-day  it  stands  on  the  brink  of  yet  an<;ther  searching 
test.  It  will  be  the  greatest  test  of  all.  It  will  decide 
whether  the  United  States  is  only  a  miscellaneous  aggrega- 
tion of  appetites  or  whether  it  is  a  nation  grown  fo  man- 
hood and  shouldering  its  task  in  this  world  in  the  spirit 
of  the  mighty  founders  of  its  greatness. 


J,  A  X  1 )    A  N  L)    w  A  r  1-:  R 


March  2,  iQi6- 


THE     BATTLE    OF    VERDUN. 


By  Hilaire  Belloc. 


THE  enemy  lias  laumlied,  with  the  (icrnian  por- 
tion of  his  forces,  that  fn"Pat  offensive  in  the 
West  which  was  expected  and  upon  which  will 
turn  the  future  of  the  war. 

It  is  already  generally  known  as  the  battle  of  Verdun. 

All  opinion  has  by  this  time  clearly  seized  the  vast 
import  of  the  affair. 

Whether  the  enemy's  action  be  premature  or  not, 
whether  he.  has  struck  too  soon  and  must  pay  the  price 
for  having  struck  too  soon,  wo  cannot  tell  until  the  issue 
is  decided.  Nor  shall  we  know  until  the  ofhcial  history 
of  the  war  can  be  written  (if  then)  whether  he  was  at 
liberty  to  strike  later,  e\en  had  he  so  willed. 

Let  us  not  forget  at  the  outset  what  may  be  lost  sight 
of  in  the  intense  anxiety  of  the  moment  and  in  the  dramatic 
interest  of  a  battle  at  last  joined,  that  Ihc  whole  thing  is 
yd  que  more  proof — if  proof  ivere  needed — of  hoiv  numbers 
tire  now  ihc  determining  factor  of  the  u'holc  campaign. 

In  a  sense,  this  has  always  been  true.  In  a  sense  it 
is  true  of  all  war.  But  it  is  particularly  true  now  ;  and 
that  truth  will  be  the  better  emphasised  if  I  take  the 
opportunity  of  recalling  to  the  i^eadcr  wliat  wa.;  pubhi.hed 
in  Land  and  Watkr  with  regard  to  the  impending  attack 
not  longer  ago  than  February  lotli,  under  the  title  "  The 
Chances  of  a  (ierman  Offensive." 

What  I  put  forward  in  these  columns  upon  tlic  loth 
February  was  as  follows  : — 

1.  That  the  enemy's  whole  strategic  plan  was  already 
governed  by  the  exhaustion  of  his  useful  reserve.  As 
against  this  exhaustion  the  Allied  superiority  in  numbers 
was  getting  more  and  more  striking. 

2.  In  such  a  numerical  situation  the  enemy  was  in 
need  of  a  very  immediate  offensive.  To  quote  the  words 
written  "  Anyone  standing  in  the  shoes  of  the  enemy's 
Higher  Command  at  this  momenE  must  be  contemplating 
somewhere  a  vigorous  offensi\e  upon  a  large  scale.". 

.  .3.  Such  an  offensive  would  have  an  immediate 
]wlitical  object.  If  it  could  do  more,  well  and  good  for 
the  enemy  ;  but  e\en  if  there  was  only  tlie  capture  of  some 
thousands  of  prisoners  and  some  scores  of  guns  the  enemy 
would  hope  to  produce  an  effect  both  at  home  and 
among  neutrals.  His  ultimate  object  would,  of  course 
be  much  more  the  breaking  of  a  front. 

4..  This  coming  great  offensive  would  almost  certainly 
be  delivered  upon  the  Western  Line. 

5.  It  would  probably  be  delivered  upon  two  selected 
sectors  in  conformity  with  the  successful  strategy  of  the 
enemy  last  summer  in  the  East. 

All  this  the  enemy  has  done. 

The  plan  is  fully  developed  after  ten  days  of  action, 
save  for  the  last  point  which  only  the  future  can  show 
to  be  well  or  ill  founded.  I-'or  we  cannot  yet  tell  whether 
the  enemy,  as  is  still  expected,  will  proceed  to  strike  at 
vet  another  point  in  order  to  create  a  great  salient  between 
the  two,  or  whether  he  will  confine  himself  to  developing 
the  present  action  solely  upon  the  sector  already  engaged. 

The  German  and  French  Objects  in  this  Battle. 

The  essential  fact  to  remember  is  that  it  is  the 
balance  arrived  at  by  the  end  of  a  struggle  which 
alrtne  decides  its  value.  This  is  true  in  all  war.  It  is 
true  of  the  most  dramatic  and  conclusive  decisions,  such 
as  Sedan,  in  which  one  side  is,  in  a  military  sense,  des- 
trov'ed  in  a  few  hours,  at  no  grievous  expense  to  the  other 
sidfe.  It  is  equally  true  of  the  longest,  dullest,  and  most 
inconclusive  of  military  operations,  sUch  as,  for  instance, 
the  last  campaign  of  Marlborough. 

We  have  in  the  case  of  the  Battle  for  Verdun 
particular  examples  of  this  truth. 

There  are  three  points  which  are  the  objects  of  the 

enemy. 

His  main  object,  of  course  is  to  break  the 
French  front.  He  proposes  to  deliver  a  blow  so 
violent  or  so  prolonged  that  at  some  moment  during 
its  delivery  the  French  resistance  shall  crumble 
and    the    whole     of     that    part    of     the    line    go    to 


pieces.  In  that  case  he  obtains  a  decision.  .\t  the  very 
best,  for  }iim,  he  might  conceive  the  possibility  of  getting 
right  through,  separating  the  French  armies,  linding  him- 
self able  to  act  upon  the  flank  of  either  part,  and  in  general 
determining  the  campaign  in  his  favour,  so  far  as  the 
Western  held  is  concerned.  If  he  can  achieve  this, 
enormous  losses  (spread  over  a  fortnight  of  the  most 
violent  lighting)  and  the  expenditure  of  the  greater  part 
of  his  accumulated  munitions,  are  well  worth  his  while; 
he  migiit  have  300,000  men  hit.  and  yet  achieve  his 
object.  For  in  the  end.  not  hundreds  of  thousands,  but 
millions,  of  his  opponents  would  be  out  of  action,  and  the 
decision  in  his  favour  arrived  at. 

Scrond  in  importance  is  something  very  different. 
His  desire  to  break  the  French  front  he  must  have  known 
to  be  an  enterprise  very  doubtful  of  achievement.  Failing 
this  he  might  yet  obtain  results  of  high  political  value  to 
him  at  the  moment,  ^hc  capture  of  very  numerous 
prisoners,  guns,  stores  and  other  trophies  would  impress 
neutral  opinion  at  a  moment  when  it  is  essential  that  he 
should  prevent  one  army  at  least,  and  perhaps  two,  from 
appearing  in  the  near  future  in  the  field  against  him.  He 
,  would  impress  the  insxifhcicntly  censored  and  insufficiently 
disciplined  Press  (and  tlie  financial  powers  behind  it)  in 
the  \\'est.  He  would  affect  the  parliamentary  form  of 
(iovernment,  which  is  so  thoroughly  imadapted  to  war. 
At  the  loss  of  many  men  he  would  have  prevented  the 
appearance  of  more  fresh  men  against  him,  and  could  hope 
to  shake  the  moral  of  his  foe,  at  least  on  the  civilian  side. 

Even  if  he  did  not  obtain  a  great  measure  of  positive 
success;  e\'en  if  he  were  not  able  to  point  to  numerous 
guns  captured,  great  masses  of  munitions  fallen  to  him 
as  booty,  and  thousands  of  unwounded  prisoners,  he 
could  still  have  a  singular  effect  upon  that  same  opinion  of 
neutral,  disaffected,  and  independent  or  treasonable 
elements  of  the  Alliance,  by  the  mere  name  of  Verdun. 
It  is  a  point  with  which  the  soldiers  in  command  ai'e  least 
concerned,  for  in  the  military  sense  it  is  meaningless. 
But  it  is  still  a  p.  int  of  political  valu3  and  the  enemy 
knows  it  well. 

Supposing  at  the  end  of  such  a  business  he  could  only 
point — at  the  expense  of  a  quarter  of  a  m.illion  men — 
to  a  few  thousand  prisoners,  and  a  normal  number 
of  pieces  remaining  in  his  hands  as  the  result  of  an 
advance  over  live  or  six  miles  of  country,  but  could 
say  that  his  troops  had  entered  even  so  much  as  the 
eastern  ruins  of  Verdun,  beyond  the  Meuse  river,  the 
name  "  A'erdun  "  would  still  do  its  work.  Men  continue  to 
think  of  this  geographical  area — this  single  circle  of  a 
few  miles  in  500  miles  of  line — as  though  it  were  a  fortress 
of  the  old  days  of  fortresses.  It  has  become  in  the 
minds  of  miUions  during  the  last  few  days  the  test  of 
success  to  discover  whether  the  enemy  does  or  does  not 
attain  even  the  ruined  houses  in  the  suburbs. 

Still  greater  would  be  the  effect,  of  course,  if  the 
whole  French  line  were  to  fall  back  behind  Verdun  and 
that  area  as  a  whole  to  be  occupied  by  the  enemy.  That 
the  line  should  fall  back  intact,  that  its  new  position 
should  be  stronger  than  the  old,  that  the  French  losses 
should  be  not  a  third  of  the  (iermans,  that  those  German 
losses  should  be  such  that  their  offensive  power  should  be 
crippled  in  the  West  for  months  to  come  —all  that  would 
be  set  against  the  accomplishment  and  counted  little. 

The  merC'  attainment  of  the  area  called  Verdun 
on  the  map— no  matter  at  what  price —would  have  the 
political  effect  I  have  described. 

These  three  points,  therefore,  the  first  alone  a  military 
consideration,  are  in  the  enemy's  mind. 

Unlike  what  is  the  fase  with  simpler  situations,  the 
corresponding  French  object  is  not  a  mere  negation  of 
these  German  objects.  You  cannot  in  this  instance 
simply  contrast  the  two  opponents  and  state  the  success 
of  the  one  in  tenns  of  the  failure  of  the  other. 

The  main  French  object  in  the  whole  matter  is  the 
infliction  of  such  military  losses  on  the  enemy,  in  com- 
parison to  those  suffered  by  themselves,  that  this  great 


March  2,  igi6. 


L  A  N  D      AND      WATER. 


offensive  of  liis  shall  be,  a  strategical  defeat.  Gn  that 
alone  is  the  whole  energy  of  the  French  command  deter- 
mined. Whether  upon  this  single  sector  of  the  heights 
of  Verdun,  or  as  is  now  possible,  rather  than  probable, 
upon  another  sector  also  (should  the  enemy  extend  his 
own  plan  to  a  double  movement,  attacking  upon  two 
distant  sectors  before  the  offensive  is  concluded),  the 
object  of  the  Alliance  is  to  render  that  offensive  as 
expensive  as  it  can  possibly  be  made. 

The  retirement  of  the  French  from  one  line  to  another 
until  the  main  position  was  reached  was  conducted  solely 
with  that  view.  Each  new  position  chosen,  but  in 
particular  the  main  ridge  which  has  been  the  scene  of 
the  tremendous  fighting  sjnce  Friday  last,  is  regarded 
strictly  and  solely  as  a  condition  which  compels  the  enemy 
to  sacrifice  masses  upon  masses  of  men.  And  the  test  (jf 
French  success  or  failure  at  the  close  of  the  great  adventure, 
if  the  line  can  hold  unbroken,  will  not  be  the  ultimate 
position  of  that  line,  but  the  higher  proportional 
exhausting  and  dwindling  of  military  capacity  which  the 
effort  may  have  imposed  upon  the  Germans. 

The  Contrast  in  Method. 

Such  a  calculation  or  scheme  on  either  side  is  possible 
from  the  contrasting  ideas  of  the  two  commands. 

We  have  in  the  whole  of  this  great  battle  a  contrast 
between  a  certain  French  strategical  conception  and^  a 
certain  German  tactical  tradition,  each  enriched  by  new 
experience  gained  in  this  war. 

The  general  French  strategical  conception  at  work 
is  familiar  to  readers  of  these  columns.  In  all  its  forms 
there  underlies  that  conception  the  detaining  of  an  enemy 
superior  offensi\-e  by  the  smallest  number  which  can 
sustain  the  shock,  and  the  maintaining  in  reserve  of  all 
that  can  possibly  be  so  spared,  with  the  object  of  bringing 
such  fresh  forces  into  play  just  at  the  right  moment  to 
achieve  a  maximum  result.  From  the  smallest  details 
to  the  largest  plans,  this  strategical  conception  is  seen 
underlying  the  operations  of  the  French  command. 
You  have  it  in  that  vast  business  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  ; 
you  have  it  in  the  particnlar  instance  of  the  two  fresh 
divisions  which  were  launched  witTl  exact  art  at  the 
precise  moment  necessary  to  reco\er  the  plateau  of 
Douaumont  last  Saturday. 

It  is  obvious,  and  has  been  ob\-ious  all  the  years 
during  which  this  conception  has  been  discussed,  for 
and  against,  up  and  down  Europe— it  has  been  obvious 
especially  during  the  present  campaign— that  such  ideas 
can  only  be  translated  into  reality  by  the  successful 
exercise  of  a  \ery  accurate  calculation  in  things  as  much 
moral  as  material.  Upon  the  moral  side  comes  in  the 
peril  (and  therefore  the  art  as  well)  of  all  such  methiods. 

If  you  overestimate  the  resisting  power  of  your  few 
troops  which  take  the  first  .shock,  you  suffer  irremediable 
disaster.  If  you  mistake  the  exact  moment  for  the  counter 
offensive,  you  suffer  disaster  no  less. 

It  is  a  method  perilous  in  the  extreme,  but,  like  all 
risky  work,  yielding  a  harvest  corresponding  to  its 
peril  if  it  succeeds. 

We  do  not  know  with  what  number  of  men  the 
first  shock  was  received  at  the  week-end  ten  days  ago. 
We  know  that  the  enemy  launched  against  the  first 
French  line  from  Brabant  round  to  Herbebois  elements 
drawn  from  at  least  fourteen  divisions.  The  first  shock 
was  probably  taken  by  elements  drawn  from  not  more 
than  three  French  divisions. 

As  the  operation  developed  larger  bodies  were 
brought  into  play  by  the  enemy.  By  Saturday  last 
men  from  25  German  divisions  wer«  already  at  work. 
Correspondingly  the  French  resistance,  as  it  fell  back 
from  line  to  line  was  fed  by  new  material.  We  do  not 
know,  again,  how  many  French  units  took  the  assault, 
last  Saturday  from  assaulting,  bodies  representing  25 
divisions  of  the  enemy,  but  we  know  tiiat  they  were  still 
deliberately  left  inferior  in  numbers  to  their  assailants. 

We  can  be  fairly  certain  that  even  by  Friday — after 
a  week  of  the  strain — the  French  Higher  Command  had 
not  moved  its  general  reserve  at  all  ;  and  that  all  the 
work  done  round  Verdun  had  been  done  by  the  troops 
assigned  to  that  sector,  including  the  local  reserve; 
though  it  is  possible  that  before  the  close  of  Saturday, 
the  26th,  certain  new  units  had  come  up  from  another 
portion  of  the  line. 


The  German  assault  showed  once  niore  the  unbroken 
tactical  traditions  inherited  from  two  centuries  of  War. 
and  this  coupled  with  the  extension  and  confirmation  ol 
it  by  the  experience  of  the  present  campaign.  It  was  a 
blow  struck  upon  a  comparatively  narrow  front  with  .i 
very  dense  mass  of  infantry  whose  charge  had  been 
prepared  by  the  heaviest  of  artillery  work — that  is.,  the 
whole  of  his  method.  Just  as  the  French  proposi  to 
succeed  through  exactitude  in  an  art  and  through  a 
perilously  close  calculation  which  suits  their  genius;  so 
does  the  Prussian  tradition  rely  upon  the  peculiar  advan- 
tage it  possesses,  the  certitude  that  no  losses  will  destroy 
the  cohesion  of  its  infantry.  The  Prussian  claims,  not 
without  justice,  that  his  type  of  discipline  can  maintain  in 
being  for  days  a  "  battering  ram  "of  a  density,  weight  and 
momentum  superior  to  any  other  service.  That  it  can 
therefore  deliver  a  blow  of  an  intensity  superior  to  what 
any  other  service  could  deliver ;  because  no  matter  how 
packed  the  achancing  bodies,  and  no  matter  how  enor- 
mous the  consequent  losses,  eitlier  they  will  not  break, 
or,  if  they  break,  fresh  bodies  will  at  once  b^  ready  to 
renew  the  charge. 

We  saw  that  principle  at  work  upon  the  Grand 
"CouronneiS  months  ago,  where  it  broke  down  altogether 
and  failed.  We  saw  it  months  afterwards  upon  the 
Dunajetz,  where  the  new  lesson  taught  Ijy  the  Wav  of  the 
new  scale  upon  which  heavy  munitions  must  be  pro- 
vided, had  been  learnt  by  the  Prussian  Higher  Conunand. 
and,  where  it  was  aided  by  the  great  inferiority  of  the 
enemy  in  that  same  matter. 

We  are  now  seeing  precisely  the  same  tactical  tradi- 
tion being  put  to  the  supreme  test  against  the  steep, 
straight  hills  of  the  Meuse. 

II. 

THE   ACTION    ITSELF. 

The  public  has  noted  from  the  telegrams  of  the  last 
ten  days  the  advance  of  German  troops  over  a  certain  belt 
of  ground  (five  miles  in  width  at  the  broadest  and  a  little 
over  three  at  the  narrowest).  There  is  a  danger,  as  wa 
have  seen,  that  this  movement  may  distract  our  attention 
from  the  real  nature  of  the  fight  and  confuse  in  our  judg- 
ment the  main  issue. 

The  advance  of  the  enemy  and  the  retirement  of  the 
French  were  throughout  all  the  first  live  days  of  the 
great  battle  no  more  than  preliminaries  leading  up  to  the 
final  situation,  which  was  fully  reached  not  earlier  than 
the  seventh  day,  Friday,  February  25th. 

Upon  the  previous  evening,  that  of  Tinu'sday, 
February  24th,  the  h>ench  line,  falling  back  in  a  manner 
to  be  later  described,  had  reached  its  principal  dTensive 
organisation,  a  certain  ridge  to  which  we  will  gi\'e  a  nam: 
for  the  sake  of  clearness  (though  it  has  no  local  nam.',  as 
a  whole)  and  will  call  "  The  ridge  of  Louvemont  "— 
from  the  nam?  of  the  principal  village  standim;  upon 
those  heights. 

It  was  only  at  this  moment,  the  evening  of  Thurs- 
day,'the  24th,  that  the  last  dispositions  of  the  French  for 
meeting  the  great  attack,  which  had  been  so  long  fore- 
seen and  prepared  for,  were  fully  taken.  And  it  is  onl\' 
on  the  next  day  (Friday)  that  the  body  of  the  action 
takes  final  form. 

In  other  words,  what  happened  from  Saturday,  the 
igth  February,  up  to  the  evening  of  Thursday,  the 
24th,  was  no  more  than  the  successive  abandonment 
by  the  French  in  good  order — with  the  loss  of  guns  indeed, 
and  with  the  falling  into  the  enemy's  hands  of  perhaps  a 
tenth  of  their  first  line  men — of  one  line  after  another 
until  they  had  reached  that  upon  which  they  had  jilanned 
to  stand.  On  the  fortunes  of  that  last  line  the  issue 
would  turn.  I  shall  brietfy  r\-eicw  the  details  of  thes3 
preliminary  retirements. 


Details  of   the  Retirements. 


\ 


It  was.  as  we  have  said,  during  the  course  of  Saturday, 
the  19th  Fcoruary,  that  the  enemy  opened  the  action 
by  an  intensive  bombardment  with  his  heavy  artillery, 
against  the  first  advance  line  of  the  French,  .\fter  this 
intense  bombardment,  co\ering  about  forty-eight  hours 
of  time  and  extending  from  the  Meus'e  at  Brabant  to  the 
neighbourhood  of  Ornes   (that  is,   over  a  shallow   bow 


L  A  N  D      AND      W  A  T  E  R  . 


Marrh   z,  1916. 


curved  northwards,  tlie  full  extent  of  which  was  about 
eight  and  a  half  miles  in  length)  upon  -Monday,  the  21st 
Febniar\',  the  artillery  preparation  ceased  and  the 
enemy  launched  his  fust  infautry,  drawn,  as  obsen-ation 
showed,  from  th;;  elements  of  some  fomteen  divisions. 

It  is  especially  important  to  obser\-e  at  this  moment, 
tlie  morning  of  February  21st,  the  difference  which  already 
begins  to  appear  betwei-n  the  French  and  German 
tactics  in  these  great  offensives. 

The  corresponding  action  of  the  French  in  Cham- 
pagne five  jnonths  ago  will  be  remt^mbered.  There,  as 
here,  the  offcnsi\o  was  preceded  by  forty-eight  hotirs' 
bombardment  with  hcav\-  artillery  at  long  range.  There, 
as  here,  the  infantry  assault  was  laimchcd  immediately 
after.  There  as  here,  the  fust  line  trenches  and  all  their 
organisation  were  swept  over  by  that  advance  ;  the 
survivors  of  the  defensive,  dazed  and  almost  impotent 
under  the  effect  of  the  recent  bombardment,  were  cap- 
tured. ' 

But  when  so  much  is  said  of  the  similarity  between 
the  two  situations,  a  great  contrast  at  once  appears. 
The  French  attack  had  been  delivered  against  the  German 
line,  which  had  been  bidden  at  all  costs  to  hold,  which 
was  full  of  men,  and  had  trusted  to  its  power,  even  after 
bombardment,  of  breaking  the  French  infantry  attack 
by  rille  and  machine-gun  fne  before  the  trenches  w-ere 
reached  or  carried.  No  gims  were  moved  back.  So  far 
from  their  men  being  moved  back,  reinforcements  were 
ordered  to  push  up  to  the  front  the  moment  the  bom- 
bardment should  cease.  As  a  consequence,  upon  a  front 
of  rather  over  twelve  miles,  the  French  captured  20,000 
imwounded  prisoners,  some  scores  of  guns,  the  whole  of 
the  first  line  organisation,  killed  more  than  30,000  of  the 
enemy,  and  put  out  of  action  the  equivalent  of  several 
corps,  all  the  work  of  the  first  blow. 

Here,  before  Verdun,  five  months  later,  the  French 
line  (which  was  now  the  defending  one),  had  received  no 
such  orders  to  hold  indefinitely,  but  had,  on  the  contrary, 
been  regarded  as  no  more  than  an  advanced  position  from 
which  retirement  would  be  conducted  back  and  back 
until  the  main  organised  defensive  position  was  reached. 

As  a  consequence,  the  enemy  when  he  attacked  over 
this  front  (of  eight  to  nine  miles  in  all  its  sinuosities) 
upon  Monday  the  21st,  cut  off  perhaps  3,000  men,  in- 
cluding woimded,  and  found  himself  at  the  end  of  the 
day  in  possession  of  two  small  batches  of  the  front  only, 
not  two  miles  in  e.\tcnt.  the  largest  of  which  w'as  the 
wood  of  Haumont  and  a  portion  of  the  wood  of  Caures. 
Upon  the  flanks,  in  front  of  Herbebois  and  in  front  of 
Brabant,  he  was  stopped.  Meanwhile,  under  the  cover 
of  this  first  line  of  resistance  the  retirement  was  continuing. 


During  the  following  day,  Tuesday  the  22nd.  the 
covering  troops  left  in  the  front  line  delivered  sharp 
counter  offensives,  retaking  part  of  the  wood  of  Caures, 
and  still  holding  the  enemy  up  upon  the  wings.  These 
blows  were  only  struck  to  cover  the  retreat  that  was 
proceeding  behind  them.  On  the  night  of  that  Tuesday, 
the  French  again  retired  on  to  a  third  line,  and  on  the 
morning  of  \\'cdncsday  were  standing  along  positions 
stretching  from  in  front  of  Samogneu.\  to  Ornes  ; 
these  positions — the  two  ends  of  the  line — are  protected 
by  steep  banks  shelving  tip  to  them.  In  the  middle  they 
pass  through  the  valley  and  village  of  Beaumont. 

It  is  to  be  remarked  that  upon  every  series  of  posi- 
tions thus  taken  up  by  the  French  as  they  retired,  a 
difficult  assault  by  the  enemy  had  to  be  delivered.  He 
was  compelled  to  lose  heavily  in  each  process  :  \ery  much 
more  heavily  than  the  defenders. 

The  assailant  still  coming  on  in  dense  bodies  and  the 
covering  line  still  being  left  far  inferior  in  number  and 
still  subject,  of  course,  to  preliminary  intensive  bombard- 
ments before  each  attack,  holds  this  line  As  well  as  it 
can  during  the  Wednesday  but  is  beaten  bacK  at  Beau- 
mont in  the  valley,  the  wings  with  their  ravines  to  protect 
them  standing  firm. 

By  the  Thursday' morning  it  is  found  that  the  French 
have  withdrawn  in  the  night  to  yet  a  third  line  which 
runs  from  near  Champneuville — from  the  Meuse  in  that 
neighbourhood — very  slightly  north  of  east,  terminating 
south  of  Ornes,  which  has  been  abandoned. 

On  that  Thursday  the  German  attack,  in  which 
elements  from  fifteen  or  sixteen  di\'isions  have  already 
been  noted,  swarms  through  the  intervening  space 
and  assaults  at  the  usual  price  the  third  line  so  formed. 

When  darkness  fell  upon  the  Thursday,  the  French 
again  drew  back  to  their  final  disposition,  that  is  the  main 
ridge  covering  Verdun— on  which  this  struggle  was  to  be 
decided. 

They  abandoned  Champneiuille  leaving  only  com- 
paratively small  forces  upon  the  narrow  hill  which  stands 
in  the  bend  of  the  Meuse.  Their  last  line  now  lay  on  the 
ridge  of  Louvemont  to  make  its  stand.*  It  stretched  from 
Vacherauville  round  by  Louvemont  in  front  of  the  Farm 
of  Chambrettc  and  so  round  eastwards  and  southward 
again  across  the  Douaumont  plateau  until  it  fell  to  the 
plain  of  the  Woeuvre  to  the  east  below,  and  in  that  plain 
it  was  being  withdrawn  somewhat  nearer  to  the  base  of 
the  hills.  This  last  portion  of  the  retirement,  that  on 
the  plain,  was  conducted  without  molestation  throughout 
the  whole  of  the  next  day,  Friday,  the  25th. 

Meanwhile  upon  the  morning  of  this  same  Friday 
the  25th,  the  French  forces  stood  massed  upon  the  main 


^mmi^mi'^v~*9  I 


I 


^VERDUN     ^^%         \     "^N 


VIZ 


f  .  f     T  Mik^ 


Marcli  2,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER. 


ridge,  which  wc  have  called  the  ridge  of  Louvemont,  and 
awaited  the  final  and  decisive  shock. 

In  each  stage  of  these  four  retirements  they  took 
their  toll  from  the  enemy  in  his  increasingly  numerous 
bodies  of  attack,  but  the  climax  of  the  fight  would  only 
begin  after  this  Friday,  when  the  final  dispositions  had 
been  reached. 

The  battle,  extending  over  five  days,  had  given 
the  enemy  results  in  prisoners  somewhat  inferior  to  the 
two  days  in  Champagne,  in  guns  much  the  same.  The 
action  was  but  begun  and  already  the  expense  at  which 
the  assailants  had  attained  these  results  was  far  higher 
than  the  corresponding  losses  had  been  in  Champagne. 

So  far  the  French  had  fallen  back  through  broken 
country.  They  now  had  reached  a  main  position  which 
is  essentially  one  great  connected  height  opposed  like  a 
wall  to  the  enemy's  assault. 

The  battle  for  Verdun  is  a  battle  for  the  possession  of 
that  wall  :  The  French  hold  it  with  the  object  of  inflicting 
the  greatest  possible  amount  of  losses  upon  the  enemy. 
The  enemy  suffer  those  losses  day  after  day  with  the 
object  of  piercing  the  French  defensive  line  or  turning 
it  by  the  left  or  the  right.  The  test  of  success  in  the 
one  case  is  an  enormous  wastage  in  the  enemy's  military 
power  through  losses  and  through  exhaustion  of  munitions; 
in  the  other,  at  the  best,  the  breaking  of  the  French  front 
(an  unlikely  thing),  at  the  least  the  occupation  of  the 
area  of  Verdun,  five  miles  behind  the  ridge,  which  area  of 
course  no  longer  represents  a  fortress,  but  is  simply  a 
geographical  expression  for  one  portion  of  the  five 
hundred  mile  line,  the  occupation  of  which,  even  if  there 
were  no  military  results  attached  to  it,  would  have  for 
the  enemy  the  very  high  political  value  already  described. 

To  understand  the  action  which  is  still  proceeding 
wc  must  examine  in  detail  the  nature  ot  this  ridge,  the 
success  or  failure  in  holding  which  js  for  the  moment  the 
test  of  this  great  action. 

The  Ridge  of  Louvemont. 

The  elements  of  this  position  may  be  judged  by  the 
accompanying  sketch.  Upon  the  :\Vest  runs,  in  its 
deep  trench,  the  obstacle  of  the  river  Meuse  and  it 
could  not  be  passed*  by  the  enemy  with  the  object  of  turn- 
ing this  position  because  it  is  everywhere  under  fire  of 
the  French  from  the  left  bank.  The  water  level  of  the 
River  Meuse  gives  the  lowest  point  in  the  ground,  and  wc 
will  reckon  heights  from  that  water  level. 

On  the  East  is  the  tumbled  clay  plain  of  Woeuvre, 
the  many  wooded  streams  of  which  carry  water  levels  of 
50  or  60  ft.  higher  than  that  of  the  Meuse.     Between 

•  Just  in  front  of  Vacherauville  at  the  point  marked  A  in  the 
sketch  map  II  there  is  a  ford  which  can  be  used  with  difficulty  in  peace 
time,  but  it  is  under  the  guns  of  Charny  ridge  and  at  the  same  time 
under  tlioss  of,  or  rather  just  behind,  the  summit  of  Poivre. 


the  Meuse  and  the  Woeuvre  rise  tliose  hills  called  "  the 
Heights  of  the  Meuse,"  a  portion  of  which  form  the  ridge 
in  question. 

These  hills  are  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  plains  of  the 
Woeuvre  below  them.  They  rise  from  it  very  sharply 
indeed,  as  sharply  as  do  the  north  and  south  downs  rising 
in  the  escarpment  from  the  Weald.  The  heights  are  not 
ranges  of  peaks,  nor  even  rounded  summits,  but  large 
plateaux  up  to  which  there  lead  from  the  Meuse  valley  on 
the  one  side,  and  from  the  Woeuvre  plain  on  the  other, 
steep  coombes  often  wooded;  ravines  which  bite  deeply  into 
the  plateau  formation.  They  ha\'c  very  steep  banks. 
The  plateau  is  not  absolutely  level,  of  course.  It  has 
slightly  culminating  points,  low  waves  of  land,  as  it  were  ; 
but  the  general  aspect  once  one  is  up  on  the  top  of  it  is 
that  of  a  plain.  The  highest  line  of  this  plateau  linked 
together  in  one  imaginary  line  forms  the  Fi-ench  position 
covering  Verdun.  The  main  portion  of  it,  that  from  the 
Meuse  to  Douaumont,  is  in  immediate  contact  with  the 
German  assault.  Further  south  the  French  line  is  still 
pushed  out  in  front  of  the  hills  and  lies  parallel  to  their 
base  through  the  plain  at  their  feet. 

It  will  be  observed  from  the  sketch  map  II  that  the 
semicircular  position  from  the  Meuse  round  along  the 
highest  points  of  the  hill  of  Poivre,  passes  just  behind  the 
village  of  Louvemont,  comes  round  the  little  wood  just 
south  to  the  Farm  of  Chambrettes,  thence  begins  to  curl 
round  southwards,  and  finally  reaches  the  culminating 
point  of  the  plateau  of  Douaumont  just  in  front  of  the 
village  of  that  name  and  at  the  point  where  the  old  Fort, 
which  has  now  been  dismantled  for  eighteen  months, 
used  to  stand. 

This  defensive  position,'which  I  hav^e  marked  upon 
sketch  II  by  a  thick  black  line,  rises  gradually  from  the  hill 
of  Poivre  to  the  cirJminating  point  where  the  old  Fort 
of  Douaimiont  used  to  stand.  The  highest  part  of  the 
Poivre  ridge  is  not  400  feet  abo\-e  the  river,  the  neck 
of  land  just  north  of  Louvemont  is  20  ft.  higher.  The 
little  wood  in  front  of  the  farm  of  Chambrette  is  well 
over  500  ft.  above  the  river,  indeed,  nearly  600  ft., 
while  the  culminating  point  of  the  })lateau  of  Douaumont, 
where  the  old  Fort  used  to  stand,  is  560  ft.  above  the 
Meuse.  The  plater lU  further  south,  which  has  not  yet 
been  attacked,  is  of  much  the  same  nature.  It  continues 
to  bear  for  sixty  miles  the  name  of  "Heights  of  the 
Meuse." 

It  will  be  clear  from  the  above  that  the  main  part 
of  the  French  pos  ition,  that  which  lias  stood  the  tre- 
mendous assault  of  the  last  week,  is,  in  its  most  general 
elements,  a  horsesh  oe,  with  its  culminating  or  terminating 
point  at  Douaumoj  at. 

If  one  were  i;o  express  it  in  the  simplest  possible 
form,  eliminating  ;  ill  the  complexity  of  the  ravines  which 
intersect  it,  one  wi  juld  express  it  as  in  the  accompanying 


LAND      AND     WATER 


March  2,  1916. 


sketch  III.,  and  from  this  will  bo  at  onco  apparent 
the  decisive  clmracter  of  that  culminating  point  where 
tlie  Fort  of  Douaumont  once  stood. 


^  7[A<  suaxeduw  stagts 
qfche  rctirejtunt 


We  shall  sec  in  a  moment  the  critical  character  of 
the  successful  German  attack  upon  that  decisive  point 
and  the  effect  hitherto  obtained  by  the  French  counter- 
offensives  "against  it.  Had  the  enemy  not  set  foot  upon 
the  heights  of  Douaumont,  the  whole  ridge  would  ha\'e 
remained  intact  in  the  hands  of  the  French,  and  all  the 
assaults  against  it  would  have  been  so  much  piu'c  loss. 
The  battle,  \yhich  closely  resembles  the  great  defence  of 
Grand  Couronne  in  front  of  Nancy  that  laid  the  founda- 
tions of  Marne,  would  in  that  case  \\z\c  formed  an 
exact  parallel  to  this  fonner  action,  and  would  ha\c 
promised  a .  complete  success.  But  the  enemy  ha\c 
carried  .one. point' of  the  ridge,  and  that  the  highest  point, 
transforming  the  whole  situation.  (This  was  the  reason 
that  the  news  of  the  capture  of  Douaumont  summit  so 
gra\ely  affected  those  who  knew  the  ground  and  caused 
them  to  await  so  an.\iously  further  news  of  the  develop- 
ments resulting  from  it.) 

Next  let  us  examine,  by  turning  again  to  sketch 
II.,  the  conditions  under  which  this  main  defensive 
position  must  be  attacked  by  the  enemy.  We  would 
again  begin  by  the  left  or  west,  and  work  round  to  the 
right.  The  hill  «i  Poivre  stands  up  sharply  from  the 
Mcuse,  and  can  only  be  carried  by  charges  directed 
right  up  its  wooded  western  side  or  southern  end.  The 
steep  slopes,  which  begin  to  rise  gradually  before  the 
ridge  is  reached,  are  nearly  400  ft.  in  height  and  their  aver- 
age slope  is  about  one  in  nine,  with  some  steeper  portions 
here  and  there.  Immediately  at  the  foot  of  these  slopes, 
which  lead  up  to  the  narrow  plateau  of  the  Hill  of  Poivre, 
is  the  high  road  leading  from  Beaumont  to  Vacherau\illei 
which  lies  in  a  deep  valley.  Beyond  that  valley  there 
is  a  second  ridge  running  from  the  big  bend  in  the  Meuse 
in  front  of  the  villages  of  Champneuville  and  Samogneux 
out  northwards  and  eastwards.  This  ridge  is  lower  than . 
and  is  dominated  by,  the  Hill  of  Poivre.  It  is  not  a 
united  line,  but  is  cut  by  a  saddle  which  the  road  from 
Samogneux  to  Vacherauville  takes  advantage  of.  The 
western  part  of  this  ridge,  that  part  lying  immediately 
in  front  of  Champneuvilk',  is  called  the  Hill  of    Talou. 

We  have  next  in  order  the  village  of  Louvemont 
(or  to  be  more  accurate,  its  ruins).  In  front  of  this  sector 
the  ground  slopes  away  for  some  distance  gently  and  we 
only  get  steep  banks  just  before  it  phuiges  down  to  the 
Bcaumont-Vacherauville  road.  It  is  a  country  of  open 
fields,  thus  sloping  down  from  the  village  of  Louvemont, 
presenting  a  clear  lield  of  tire. 

Next,  as  we  go  westwards,  the  Wood  of  Les  Fosses 
at  the  head  of  a  deep  ramified  ravine,  is  in  German  hands. 
But  the  highest  point  of  the  jilateau  lying  back  from  the 
wood  is  in  I'rench  hands,  ;ind  thence  to  the  wood  is  a  good 
field  of  hre  for  the  defensive. 

When  we  reach  the  little  wood  which  stands  before 
the  Farm  of  Chambrette,  we  are  at  1:he  only  point  in  the 
whole  defensive  line  which  is  not  the;  stronger  for  rapidly 
falling  ground  in  front  of  it.  There  is  here  a  sort  of  neck 
of  high  ground,  joining  the  horseshoe  ridge  with  the  hills  to 
the  north.  This  "  neck  "  is  defined',  by  a  country  road 
which  follows  it.  It  is  very  narrow,  the  rising  slopes  of 
the  combe  on  the  west  being  separated  from  the  falling 
escarpment  of  the  bank  on  the  east  by  only  800  yards. 

From  this  point  the  plateau  of  Douaumont  begins. 
Steep  slopes  everywhere  impede  the  momentum  of  "the 
assailants.  These  slopes,  however,  from  their  very  steep- 
ness, give  their  assailants  this  ad\-anta  ge  that  they  present 


not  a  little  dead  ground  :    that    is.  ground  so  steep  that 
the  fire  of  men  on  the  height  abo\e  cannot  reach  it. 

From  the  plateau  of  Douaumont  onwards,  the  line 
falls  down  on  to  the  [)lain  of  the  Woeuvre  and  ceases  to 
be  connected  with  the  ridge  of  Louvemont,  but  runs 
through  the  plain  of  the  Woeuvre,  which  is  here  about  four 
hundred  and  fifty  feet  below  the  hills  and  very  sharply 
marked  by  an  extremely  steep  escarpment.  It  passes 
in  front  of  the  station  of  liix  and  thence  in  afi  almost 
straight  line  south-eastwards. 

The  Attack  on  the  Ridge. 

On  Friday,  the  25th.  the  Germans  began  their  attack    ' 
upon  this  horseshoe  of  the  Louvemont  ridge. 

There  were,  as  we  have  seen,  two  points  the  mainto 
nance  of  which  was  essential  to  the  French.  The  Hill  of 
Poivre  at  one  end  of  the  horseshoe  and  the  plateau  of 
Douaumont  at  the  other. 

If  the  Hill  of  Poivre  were  carried,  the  whole  of 
the  horseshoe  was  turned,  the  Germans  would  be  in  the 
liollow  of  it  behind  the  ridge.  The  troops  upon  the  ridge 
would  have  to  withdraw  as  best  they  could.  Those' at 
the  far  end  by  Douaumont  might  succeed  in  getting  back  ■ 
to  Verdun,  but  those  on  the  Hill  of  Poivre  itself,  and  those 
in  Louvemont,  and  e\en  many  to  the  cast  or  right  of 
Louvemont,  would  be  destroyed.  At  the  best  only  the 
southern  and  eastern  part  would  escape.  Meanwhile 
the  entry  to  the  town  of  \'crdim  from  the  north  would 
lie  open. 

The  other  and  more,  dangerous  point  was  the  plateau 
of  Douaumont  itself,  which  is  somewhat  higher  than  the 
Hill  of  Poivre.  We  have  seen  of  what  effect  its  capture 
would  be.  It  would  be  a  more  decisive  blow  even  than 
the  rushing  of  the  Hill  of  Poivre,  for  it  would  cut  off  the 
whole  mass  of  the  defence  on  the  ridge  and  would 
dominate  Verdun  itself — an  uninterrupted  view  of  less 
than  five  miles.  » 

The  enemy  attacked  on  FViday  all  round  the  ridge, 
from  the  Meusc  right  round  to  the  escarpment  of  the 
Plateau  of  Douaumont,  losing  \ery  hea\ily,  and  effecting 
nothing.  But  he  coulcl  not  make  as  full  an  artillery  pre- 
jiaration  as  he  desired,  for  he  had  not  yet  fully  brought 
up  his  heavy  gims.  It  w-as  not  till  the  early  morning  of 
the  Saturday,  February  26th,  that  the  full"  blast  of  the 
attack  was  at  work.  It  struck,  of  course,  all  around  the 
ridge.  Indeed,  with  such  great  masses  of  men,  it  was  in- 
credibly dense  upon  that  very  short  curved  line  of  six 
miles.  But  while  the  attack  came  from  all  roimd  the 
curve  the  main  objects  were  still,  of  course,  the  Hill  of 
Poivre  on  the  extreme  left  and  the  tableland  of  Douau- 
mont on  the  extreme  right. 

Now  the  Hill  of  Poi\  re  has  in  front  of  it,  filling  up  the 
bend  in  the  Meuse,  a  narrow  falling  ridge  of  land  called, 
as  we  have  seen,  the  Hill  of  Talou. 

A  few  men  may  ha\c  been  left  for  a  short  time 
by  the  French  upon  this  advanced  ridge,  but  not  for  any 
purpose  of  holding  it  permancntlj'.  For  the  Meuse 
was  behind  it,  and  the  retirement  of  any  large  bodies 
from  it  would  therefore  have  been  difficult. 

Already  in  the  course  of  FMday  it  had  been  aban- 
doned. 

On  the  other  hand  Talou  could  not  serve  as  a  point 
from  whence  the  Germans  could  work  against  the  hill  of 
Poivre  on  account  of  a  factor  which  is  very  important 
in  all  this  fighting  and  which  we  have  not  hitherto 
mentioned.  All  the  further  bank  of  the  Meuse  (a  great 
"  S  "  of  hills  from  north  of  Chattancourt  to  the  abandoned 
fort  upon  the  ridge  of  Charnv),  remains  in  the  hands 
of  the  I'-rench  and  has  indeed  not  been  attacked  by  the 
Germans  as  yet,  save  with  distant  heavy  artillery  fire. 
At  ranges  of  from  3,000  to  8,000  yards  from  the  left  bank 
of  the  river,  the  French  guns  beyond  the  Meuse  can 
direct  their  fire  against  the  Hill  of  Talou  and  its  neigh- 
bourhood. Most  of  them  can  also  fire  upon  troops 
attacking  the  river  end  of  the  sides  of  the  Hill  of  Poivre. 
Poivre  resisted  successfully  all  that  day,  Saturday,  the 
26th,  and  still  stands  at  the  moment  of  writing. 

The  Germans  came  in  mass  after  mass  up  Poivre 
Hill,  up  against  the  easier  slopes,  which  stand  north  of 
and  in  front  of  Louvemont,  out  of  the  wood  of  F'osses 
and  through  the  Farm  of  Chambrette  (which  they 
occupied),  hut  with  f articular  wcif^ht  ai^ainsl  the  Plateau 
oj  Douaumont.     It  was  on  this  sector  that  the  Germans 


March  2,  1916. 


LAND      AND     WATER 


at  last  came  near  to  effecting  their  purpose.  It  is  liero 
that  they  will  perhaps  continue  to  attempt  success,  and 
we  must  particularly  note  the  way  in  which  their  assault 
upon  it  was  delivered  upon  that  Saturday  morning. 

We  have  already  seen  upon  the  sketch  map  II  and 
noted  in  the  text  the  numerous  deep  ravines  which  bite 
right  into  the  tableland  of  Douaumont.  Ravines  with 
steep  and  usually  wooded  slopes,  the  ends  of  which  reach 
up  to,  and  fade  upon,  the  flat  of  the  plateau. 

It  was  up  one  of  these  thus  biting  deep  into  the 
plateau  that  the  great  attack  of  last  Saturday  morning, 
the  26th,  was  launched  by  the  enemy  and  the  result  of  it 
was  successful  in  seizing  the  highest  point  of  the  table- 
land above. 

The  nature  of  this  d':tail,  which  might  lia\e  deter- 
mined the  whole  battle,  deserves  our  close  attention,  and 
I  will  describe  it  as  ininutcly  as  is  possible  from  the  rare 
and  disjointed  accounts  which   have  come  to  hand. 

The  reader  will  first  note  isolated  on  the  plain  of  the 
Woeuvre,  a  [double  hill  (which  1  have  marked  L  upon 
sketch  II)  and  which  is  known  in  that  covmtrysidc  as  "Th<' 
Twins  of  Or'nes  "  from  the  village  at  its  feet.  The  heavy 
artillery  of  the  enemy  which  concentrated  upon  the  plateau 
of  Uouaumont  lay  largely  behind  these  heights  and  in 
the  woods  immediately  beyond  to  the  north  at  a  range  of 
from  7,500  to  8.000  yards.  It  is  said  that  the  German 
Emperor  watched  the  operations  from  the  soutliern 
slopes  of  these  twin  hills,  which  command  in  their  \ie\\ 
the  ravine  leading  up  to  the  plateau  of  Douaumont. 

This  ravine  I  have  marked  upon  the  sketch  map  H 
with  letter  R — R.  It  is  known  in  the  neighbourhood  as 
the  "Val"  or  Valley  of  Bezoneau.x.  Its  upper  part  is 
wooded  upon  high  steep  banks  and  the  semicircle 
at  the  end,  the  wood  being  generally  known  as  that  of 
La  Vauche.  It  was  up  this  ravine  and  through  the  covering 
of  the  woods  clothing  it  that  the  great  attack  of  last 
Saturday  morning  was  launched.  The  German  infantry 
also  swarmed  up  the  spur  which  stretches  north-east- 
wards from  Douaumont  and  the  site  of  the  old  Fort. 
As  they  passed  tlirough  the  wood  and  as  they  approached 
it  in  the  oj^en  valley  below,  they  were  subjected  to  a  very 
murderous  fire  from  the  I-'rench  artillery  ;  they  received 
the  full  force  of  the  French  rifle  and  machine  gun  fire  as 
they  left  the  wood  and  began  to  top  the  slopes. 

There  would  seem  to  have  been  at  least  five,  and 
perhaps  si.x,  separate  attacks,  all  of  which  were  beaten 
back  with  very  severe  losses.  A  seventh  attack  launched 
just  before  10  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  undertaken  by 
the  24th  Brandenburg  regiment  carried  the  300  yards 
between  the  edge  of  the  escarpment  and  the  ruined  remains 
of  the  old  Fort.  The  survivors  swarmed  over  the  broken 
heaps  of  concrete  and  masonry  which  afforded  perfect 
cover  from  the  rifle  and  machine  guns  in  front  of  them, 
but  also,  of  course,  afforded  a  strictly  limited  area  from 
which  they  could  not  immerge,  and  which  the  French 
could,  in  turn,  deluge  with  long  range  shell  fire.  If  at 
this  moment,  before  midday  on  Saturday,  the  26th,  the 
assailants  had  had  the  momentum  to  go  further  than  the 
ruined  site  of  the  old  Fort,  the  wliole  position  would  have 
been  turned  and  lost  as  surely  as  if  the  Poivre  at  its 
other  end  had  been  forced. 

The  French  counter-offen.sive  was  launched  inmie- 
diately  with  the  strength  of  two  diyisions,  which  probably 
suffered  heavily  enough,  but  which  succeeded  in  flooding 
past  the  ruins  of  the  Fort  upon  either  side  and  holding  the 
plateau,  with  the  exception  of  the  "  pocket  "  formed  by 
the  ruins  of  the  Fort,  which  apparently  the  survivors  of  the 
24th  Brandenburg  regiment  continued  to  hold.  It  would 
seem  that  they  were  still  holding  those  ruins,  though 
nearly  encircled,  when  darkness  fell  upon  the  evening  of 
Monday,  the  28th. 

The  position  of  the  Fort  of  Douaumont,  giving  a  view 
right  down  to  the  Meuse  valley,  five  miles  away,  and  to 
the  higher  towers  of  Verdun  itself,  as  well  as  slightly 
dominating  the  whole  plateau,  was,  obviously,  of  great 
value  to  the  enemy. 

It  is  tr;tic  that  taking  and  holding  a  culminating 
point  of  this" kind  does  not  exactly  mean  what  it  meant  in 
the  older  warfare,  when  bombardment  by  the  liigh 
explosives  at  very  long  range  did  not  exist.  You 
cannot  bring  up  artillery  for  instance  to  such  a  position, 
nor  does  its  slight  advantage  of  a  few  feet  in  height  over 
the  sitrrounding  fields  enable  you  from  it  to  carry  the 
trenches  that  face  you.  But  if  it  could  be  freely  used,  it 
would  give  observation,  and  the  reinforcement  of  those 


who  first  seized  it  would  admit  a  turther  advance  which 
would  henceforth  •  be  easy  through  being  down  hill. 
To  lise  a  loose  metaphor,  to  stjcurc  the  position  of 
D.)uaumont  heights  by  a  large  body  with  ample  com- 
munication behind  it,  would  mean  the  scaling  o(  tjie 
parapet.  But  a  small  body  nearly  surrounded  and  not 
having  good  communications  behind  it  for  ample  rein- 
forcement, is  in  a  \ery  different  position.  .Until  we 
know  thaf  all  attempts  to  seize  formally  the  plateau  of 
Douaiunont  have  failed,  the  position  remains  critical.  But 
the  successful  counter-offensive  of  the  F'rench  on  Saturday 
morning  destroyed  the  immediate  advantage  which  the 
cnemv  had  for  one  moment  clearlv  obtained. 


Trench  Line  021 7^ndcu/7/i^Ii^28 


£R 


The  situation  by  noon  of  Saturday  and  continuously 
through  Sunday  and  Monday  was,  in  this  narrow  field, 
that  of  sketch  IV. 

Meanwhile  the  action  continued  and  developed 
further  south  and  east.  While  assaults  were  being 
delivered  all  the  way  round  the  horse-shoe  from  the 
Meuse  to  Douaumont  itself,  further  attacks  were  launched 
during  Sunday  in  the  plain  against  the  little  projecting 
knob  "of  the  "plateau  of  Douaumont  which  stands  jtist 
north  of  the  village  of  Vaux,  and  down  in  the  plain 
there  was  very  heavy  fighting  for  the  station  of  Fix 
on  the  main  line  frorn  Paris  to  Metz.  This  station  is 
shown  on  sketch  I,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the 
village,  which  gives  it  its  name.  All  this  part  of  the 
plain  is  commanded  by  a  conspicuous  lump  or  billow  of 
land  that  is  flatteringly  called  "  Hill  255."  This 
lump,  or  open  field,  is  nowhere  more  than  100  ft.  above 
the  brooks  of  the  neighbourhood,  and  is  50  or  60  ft. 
above  the  level  meadows  round  its  base.  It  is  not 
marked  on  my  sketch,  but  stands  about  z\  miles  due 
south  of  Fix  station.  But  field  artillery  working  from 
the  slopes  just  behind  it  commands  the  fields.  .\ 
very  \'iolent  effort  was  therefore  made  by  the  enemy  to 
take  this  height  all  during  Sunday  and  Monday,  but  up  to 
Monday  evening  they  had  failed.  During  the  Monday 
also,  the  28th,  the  operations  continued  to  develop  south- 
wards as  far  as  Manheulles,  which  was  violently  attacked 
from  the  east  all  day,  but  where  the  French  held  the  line 
and  no  impression  was  made  beyond  a  slight  retirement 
to  the  western  end  of  the  village. 

At  this  incomplete  stage  in  the  great  operation,  we 
are  compelled  to  leave  the  account  at  the  moment  of 
writing,  Tuesday,  February  2qth.  I'urther  news,  whicii 
may  decide  whether  the  continued  enemy  offensive  shall 
obtain  the  ad\'antage,  or  whether  the  defence  shall  be 
securely  established,  has  not  come  to  hand. 

But  in  the  news  of  the  next  few  days  this  point 
must  be  clearly  and  constantly  borne  in  mind  :  if  the 
defence  holds  the  enemy  has  suffered  a  severe  defeat, 
probably  of  lasting  effect,  for  his  tosses  in  the  attack, 
deli\ered  as  he  has  delivered  it  and  continued  for  so  long 
hjive  been  incomparably  heavier  than  his  opponents. 

H.   Belloc. 

[O'ccing  to  the  exceptional    importance   of  ike 

battle  of  Verdun,  and  the  space  therefore  given  to 

it,    the    continuation    of   Mr.    Belloc's    article    on 

German  losses  has  had  to  be  held  over  tintil  next  iceek. 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


March  2,  1916. 


A    CALL    TO    ARMS. 


[This  is  Ihc  sona  oj  a  sailoniuin,  ■written  on  hoard  a  buttle  ship  in  the  North  Sea.  The  poet,  ivho  prefers  anonv- 
mity,  gives  utterance  here  to  the  very  spirit  of  the  British  Fleet,  well  knowing  that  in  any  hour  he  and  his 
comrades  may  bs  "  called  out  to  ihc  fray  once  more  "  to  bear -their  part  in  "  the  desperate  dcathward  dance."] 


"M       /TEN  of  Great  Britain,  Sons  of  a  stalwart  race : 
%    /■       Sparks  of  tho  fierce  eternal  Fire 
I  ^U   I       Tlwt  springs  from  your  breeding  place  : 
-L  ▼  -M..     Knights  of  a  World-flung  Chivalry  : 

Males  of  majestic  ire  : 
Heralds  of  Freedom's  \'ictory, 
Can  it  be  that  ye  faint  or  tire  ? 
That  your  arras  grow  weak  and  j-our  ardour  cold, 
That  ye  talk  of  Honour  but  seek  for  gold, 
TJiat  your  he:uls  are  cast  in  a  craven  mould 
And  shrink  from  the  iron  task. 

Mem'ries  of  mighty  men  of  old, 

Deeds  of  the  men  they  led, 

Flung  on  the  screen  of  Tim3  unfold 

The  valour  that  Britain  bred  ; 

Wellington,  Nelson,  Cochrane,  Drake, 

Nicholson,  Anso.i,  Moore, 

Cromwell,  Gordon,  Grenville,  Blake, 

ilen  great  and  grim  and  dour  ; 

Tlic  blood  they  shed  and  the  deeds  they  ilia. 

Form  they  a  mighty  pyramid 

'Neath  which  the  crumbling  bones  lie  liid  - 

Bones  of  a  Race  that  is. 


As  babes  ye  sat  at  your  mother's  feet. 

And  listened  with  bated  breath 

To  the  tales  of  the  heroes  to  whom  defeat 

Had  only  one  synonym— Death. 

Fear  ye  to  weave  for  your  babes  afresh 

The  tales  that  ye  once  lield  dear  ; 

Of  bullet-scored,  shell-shattered,  war-scarred  flesn. 

And  its  Spirit  that  knew  no  fear  ? 

Years  on  in  the  cool  of  the  evening's  calm. 

In  country  homestead  and  peaceful  farm. 

Shall  your  children  hear  of  your  strong  right  arm 

Or  cowardly  selfishness  ? 

Backward  for  many  a  hundred  years 
Stretches  your  Roll  of  Fame, 
\\ctted  with  many  a  myriad  tears 
But  never  a  tear  of  shame  ; 
Fonvard  into  the  Mists  of  Time 
Flashes  the  search-light  beam, 
Lighting  the  heights  that  you  must  climb 
By  the  light  of  the  dreams  you  dream  :  — 
Dreams  of  a  mighty  work  begun. 
Dreams  of  a  duty  yet  undone, 
Dreams  of  a  fearless  Freedom  won 
For  Nations  as  yet  unborn. 

Come  !    Rally  your  wrathful,  resistless  ranks, 

Out  to  the  fray  once  more  ; 

Render  yoiu-  gentle  and  knightly  thanks 

To  these  Teutons  who  ask  for  war  ; 

Gird  up  your  loins  and  get  you  forth, 

"  Ouit  you  like  men,  be  strong," 

Teach  them  the  strength  and  the  weighty  worth 

Of  the  swords  that  your  fathers  swung. 

Doffing  your  caps  with  a  courtly  grace. 

Blast  with  your  cannons  and  bid  them  trace 

The  course  of  the  currents  which  interlace 

Round  the  lockers  of  Da\y  Jones. 


Tender  to  women,  but  stern  to  men, 
Knightly  in  word  and  deed, 
Fierce  be  your  Goillikc  angtr  wlicn 
Felons  transgress  your  Creed  : 


Short  be  the  shrift  of  the  Loveless  hound 
W'lio  rapes,  pleading  riglit  of  war — 
Captain  and  private  alike  are  bound 
By  Chivalrie's  changeless  Law. 
In  the  Courts  of  Heaven  a  mau  is  great 
Not  by  his  rank  in  a  Tinu-bound  State 
But  by  tlie  measure  he  doth  create 
Of  Love  pure  and  undefiled. 

Swift,  stern  and  clean  be  your  sword  and  heart, 

Fearless  your  foe-ward  glance, 

Staunchly  and  steadily  bear  your  part 

In  the  desperate,  death-ward  dance. 

Wide  are  the  doors  of  A'alhalla's  Halls 

Ye  Bearers  of  Britain's  Might, 

Jovous  the  voice  of  old  Odin  calls 

"  5lore  Britons  to  dine  to-night.'' 

Onward  ye  Sons  of  the  Deathless  Dead, 

Onward  ye  Warriors  grim  and  dread. 

With  lofty  mien  and  measured  tread, 

Jiiward  to  Victory, 

ENVOI. 

Where  the  winds  of  the  earth  are  scattered 

.^ud  torn  by  the  shrieking  shell. 

And  the  blood-sodden  earth  and  shattered 

Reeks  foul  witii  the  stench  of  Hell, 

Fare  ye  woU  m^rrs'  mm,  bear  ye  well  m.rry  lujii, 

What  of  blood,  what  of  grim:;,  wliat  of  tears  ? 

In  trench  or  in  town,  where's  thj  iieart  that  is  down  ? 

What's  this  fretwork  of  folly  called  f^^ars  ? 

Fare  ye  well  m3rry  m^n,  bear  ye  we'll  msrry  mm, 

Wliat  of  Love  msrry  men,  wha:t  of  hate  ? 

When  all's  said  and  done,  why  hurl  hate  at  a  Hun, 

When  by  Loving  ye  prove  yourselves  great  ? 

Bear  ye  well  m^rry  msn,  fare  ye  well  m^rry  men, 

What  of  Life  merry  men,  what  of  Death  ? 

Lose  Freedom,  lose  Love,  and  the  Heavens  above 

Shall  mock  at  your  panting  for  breath. 

[Here  the  poem  properly  ends,  but  the  poet  has  been  moved 
to  add  these  two  stanzas,  entitling  one  "  A  Hops  "  and 
the  other  "  A  Prayer."] 


A    HOPE. 

Great  God  Most  Mighty  of  Love  and  Peace, 

Is  Thy  Message  for  ever  \aiu  ? 

Strikes  never  tlie  hour  of  Thv  sons'  release 

From  the  self-riven  bonds  of"  Cain  ? 

Must  brother  for  ever  with  brother  fight  ? 

Is  Love  lost  for  evermore  ? 

Or  is  it  that  Wrong  siiall  give  birth  to  Right, 

And  that  Peace  shall  be  born  of  War  > 

As  boys  shake  hands  wlicn  their  hght  is  done. 

And  vonquislied  hand  clasps  the  hanrl  that  has  won, 

Great  God,  shall  it  be  that  this  war  begun 

In  hatred  shall  cease  in  Love  ? 


A  PRAYER, 

We  crave  no  remittance  for  sins  that  are  oast, 

Let  us  pay  our  just  debts  and  be  free. 

No  shelter  we  seek  from  the  shell's  sudden  blast 

Such  thmgs  as  must  be,  let  them  be. 

We  kneel  at  Thy  feet  with  no  boast  on  our  lips 

'I  hat  our  cause  is  more  just  than  our  foe's. 

With  no  priest-ridden  follies  for  blasphemous  "  tips  " 

Du  we  dare  to  insult  Him  who  Knows. 

13ut  this.  Mighty  God  of  our  Fathers,  we  plead, 

Iho'  Thou  smitcst  Thy  sons,  keep  us  true  to  our  Creed, 

I  hat  our  King  and  our  ICmpire  may  never  have  need 

1  o  blusii  for  one  act  or  feel  shame  for  one  deed 

I  hat  is  wrouglit  by  the  hand  of  a  Briton. 

Finis, 


March  2,  1916. 


LAND      AND      W  A  T  E  R 


A    TEST    OF    NERVE, 


By  Arthur  Pollen. 


BEFORE  these  pages  are  in  the  reader's  hands, 
the  second  chapter  of  the  submarine  war  that 
commenced  just  over  a  year  ago  will  have 
begun.  As '  has  been  pointed  out  in  these 
columns  many  times,  the  only  novelty  we  may  expect  in 
the  attack  on  the  ships  that  now  supply  Great  Britain 
and  her  Allies,  is  that  it  may  be  carried  out  by  means 
more  effective  for  their  purpose  than  those  which  Germany 
has  hitherto  employed.  There  will  be  no  addition  to 
our  enemy's  ruthlessness,  for  the  simple  reason  that  he 
has  exhausted  ruthlessness  already.  The  threat  to  stick 
at  nothing  is  not  a  new  threat,  nor  is  his  excuse  that 
British  ships  are  armed  a  new  pretext.  The  whole  pro- 
gramme will  be  found  complete  in  the  Note  sent  to  the 
United  States  a  week  before  the  first  submarine  campaign 
was  due  to  begin.  As  270  British,  Allied  and  Neutral 
vessels  have  been  sunk  or  attacked  by  submarines,  mines 
or  aircraft,  xmtkout  waniins,  it  is  a  programme  that  can- 
not have  any  new  f rightfulness  added  to  it.  The  only 
question  then  is  :  are  the  new  German  submarines  likely 
to  be  very  greatly  more  effective  than  their  predecessors  ? 
It  is  well  to  remember  that  they  might  be  twice  and 
three  times  as  effective  without  coming  near  bringing 
any  of  the  Allies  to  the  straits  they  must  be  brought 
to  if  Germany  is  to  benefit  materially  by  her  new  effort. 
I  say  "  materially  "  advisedly,  because  it  is  clear  that 
she  may  benefit  morally  if  losses  on  a  new  scale  at  sea  result 
in  any  serious  disturbance  of  the  public  mind.  The  success 
of  the  Zeppelin  raids  in  creating  the  appearance  of  a 
])anicky  condition  will  no  doubt  fortify  the  Germans  in 
the  ho]:)e  that  a  larger  and  more  destructive  \  o  icy  at  sea 
must  intensify  whatever  unsettlement  of  opinion  is 
already  manifest.  And  if,  as  seems  not  unlikely,  the 
stroke  at  Verdun  is  the  beginning  of  a  determined  effort 
to  do  something  decisive,  then  we  may  expect  that  the 
new  submarine  campaign  will  be  far  from  being  the  only 
naval  effort  that  Germany  will  make.  For  that  matter 
the  Moewe  is  still  at  large,  and  only  last  week  we  heard 
of  further  victims  that  have  fallen  to  her.  Their  pas- 
sengers and  people  were  c.irried  to  Teneriffe  by  the 
Wcstbwn,  which  was  subsequently  scuttled.  My  con- 
jecture of  February  loth  that  the  Moewe  would  operate 


Trinidad 

Aug.  18 


Jan.lO.i9is 


in  the  hunting  grounds  of  the  Karlsruhe  has  been  con- 
firmed. And  it  may  interest  the  reader  to  be  rerninded 
of  the  previous  captures  which  have  been  made  in  this 
neighbourhood.  The  sketch  map  shows  the  sequence  of 
the  Karlsmhe's  successes  between  August  and  October, 


1914,  and  of  the  captures  made  by  the  Kronprinz  Wilheltn 
and  the  Prinz  Eitcl  Friedrich  in  December  of  the  same 
year  and  in  the  spring  of  1915.  The  great  majority  of 
these  captures,  it  will  be  noted,  were  taken  withii)  a 
hundred  miles  or  so  of  Fernando  de  Noronha,  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  which  the  Moewe's  new  victims  have 
been  captured.  Running  down  a  ship  like  the  Moeivc  is 
never  a  simple  business  even  when  the  area  of  activities 
can  be  almost  exactly  defined,  simply  because  the 
area  is  so  extensive.  A  larger  question  is  :  does  she 
carry  guns  for  equipping  other  German  ships  that  may 
have  escaped  from  internment  ?  As  to  this  we  have  no 
information,  but  the  thing  is  clearly  not  impossible.  In 
addition  then  to  a  fresh  submarine  campaign,  we  may 
have  to  prepare  ourselves  for  further  depredations  by 
surface  ships. 

But  if  Germany's  effort  on  land  is  to  be  supplemented 
by  the  utmost  she  can  do  at  sea,  she  can  hardly  confine 
herself  solely  to  the  destruction  of  merchant  shipping, 
although  in  destroying  merchant  shipping,  it  is  hardly 
necessary  to  remind  the  reader,  she  would  be  doing  much 
more  than  inflicting  so  much  commercial  loss  upon  her 
jcnemies.  For  it  is  on  this  shipping  that  France  and 
Great  Britain  are  wholly  dependent  for  their  ability  to 
carry  on  the  war  with  success— a  point  that  those  should 
remember  who  arc  tempted,  when  they  hear  that  our 
shipbuilders'  activity  has  been  deflected  from  war  ships 
to  merchant  ships,  to  jeer  at  "Commerce"  being  pre- 
fen^ed  to  war.  F'or  obviously  our  command  of  the  sea, 
even  if  established  by  an  overwhelming  naval  victory, 
would  be  a  Pyrrhic  success  if  we  were  unable  to  use  the 
highways  of  the  sea  which  we  command. 

Chances   of   Battle. 

The  question,  then,  remains  :  will  Germany  dispute 
this  command  ?  She  might  challenge  Sir  John  Jellicoe's 
fleet  to  a  decisive  battle.  The  challenge  might 
take  the  form  of  a  sortie  of  the  whole  High  Seas 
Fleet,  with  every  auxiliary  in  the  way  of  destroyer 
and  submarine  at  its  disposal,  and  with  every  ship 
furnished  with  all  the  mines  it  could  carry.  This 
fleet  might  either  attempt  to  break  north  about,  thus 
making  an  engagement  with  the  Grand  Fleet  inevitable  ; 
or  it  might  strike  boldly  into  the  Channel,  cut  our  com- 
munications with  France,  and  thus  drive  us  to  defend 
those  communications  by  a  Fleet  action.  An  alternative 
course,  the  possibility  of  which  I  have  already  discussed, 
is  a  delaying  action  in  northern  waters,  half  of  the  high 
seas  fleet  being  sacrificed  to  enable  the  other  half  to 
gain  the  Atlantic.  The  objective  of  the  escaped  vessels 
would  be  to  join  hands  with  as  many  as  possible  of  the 
fast  liners  now  interned  in  North  American  ports  ;  to 
arm  them,  and  then  attempt  a  complete  if  only  a  temporary, 
blockade  of  the  coasts  of  France  and  Great  Britahi.  If 
this  mixed  fieet  of  battleships  and  armed  meichantinen 
could  isolate  Great  Britain  and  cut  off  the  whole  of  its 
supplies,  it  would  obviously  not  be  many  weeks  before 
the  country  would  be  reduced  to  very  serious  straits. 

Neither  of  these  alternatives  seems  to  me  in  the  least 
degree  probable.  I  disbelieve  in  the  first  because  I 
cannot  persuade  myself  that  Germany  can  have  so 
redressed  the  inequality  of  her  naval  forces  as  to  make 
a  set  battle  a  likely  undertaking.  We  saw  last  week 
that  if  both  sides  completed  their  known  programmes  as 
they  stood  in  August,  1914,  our  numbers  would  be  more 
than  double  the  German  numbers  now,  and  our  gun 
power  considerably  more  than  three  times  as  great. 
We  do  not  know  what  either  side  has  done  in  the  way  of 
shipbuilding    bej^ond    their    known    programmes. 

The  following  table  shows  the  date  (in  Roman  figures) 
of  the  laying  down  of  each  German  Dreadnought,  and  (in 
Arabic  numerals)  of  its  completion.  From  this  it  appears 
that  Germany  has  never  completed  more  than  four  capital 
ships  in  one  single  recent  year.  Next,  in  the  last  three 
years,  the  average  time  that  ha^;  elapsed  between  the 
laying  down  and  the  completion  of  each  ship,  has  been 


LAND      A  N  D      W  A  T  E  R 


March  z,  1916. 


34.1  months.  Now  it  is  a  rommonplace  of  shipbuilding 
that  the  time  taken  to  build  a  ship  bears  very  httle 
relation  to  the  time  necessary  for  constructing  the  hull, 
engines  and  equipment,  other  than  armament.  The 
lest  of  shipbuilding  capacity  is  to  build  gims,  mountings 
and  turrets. 

Now  the  maximum  production  of  Germany  up  to  the 
year  iqi4.  was  nineteen  12-inch  gun  double  turrets 
ior  the  jjrogrannne  for  a  single  year.  But  for  our  pro- 
gramme of  i()i4,  the  ships  promised  for  completion  for 
the  Koyal  Navy,  Brazil.  Turkey,  and  Chili  aggregated 
1 1  ships  against  the  German  nia.ximum  of  four,  and  a 
tonnage  of  28^,500  against  the  tierman  104.000.  These 
siiips  were  to  carry  thirty-eight  13.5  double  turrets,  eight 
13-inch  double  turrets,  and  seven  1 2-inch  double  turrets, 
liearing  in  mind  tiiat  the  amount  of  work  in  producing 
larger  guns,  turrets, <;-tc.,  increases  roughly  as  the  cube  of 
the  calibre,  then  lifty-three  12.  13.5  and  13-inch  turrets 
are  equivalent  to  more  than  scvcnh-live  j2-indi  turrets 
It  will  thus  be  seen  that  while  in  tonnage  our  1914  pro- 
grannne  was  a  little  less  than  three  times  greater  than 
(iermany's  maximum  output,  our  ordnance  production  was 
practically  four  times  greater. 


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23* 

It  is  now  barely  twenty  months  since  the  war  began. 
Is  it  conceivable  that  a  country  which  had  never  built  a 
larger  gun  than  the  12-inch,  had  never  built  war  ships 
at  a  faster  rate  than  jour  per  annum,  and  had  taken 
nearly  three  year;  for  the  construction  of  each,  that 
had  never  produced  more  than  a  cjuarter  of  our  proved 
capacity  in  armament — could  so  have  multiplied  its 
resources  as  to  produce  in  twenty  months  a  homogeneous 
squadron  of  say  six  15-inch  gun  ships  ?  It  would  mean 
that  Krupps  had  multiplied  its  productive  capacity  by 
nearly  five,  even  if  we  ignore  altogether  the  time  that 
must  be  devoted  to  making  the  new  plant,  new'  designs, 
and  experiments  and  tests  before  guns  and  mountings  of 
he  new  calibre  could  be  undertaken  at  all.  For  this 
reason  then,  if  for  no  other,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  first 
alternative,  viz.,  of  Germany  seeking  a  decisive  action  at 
sea,  is  unlikely. 

As  to  the;  second,  the  whole  thing  turns  upon  this. 
Could  a  sufficiently  large  portion  of  the  German  l^'leet 
get  away  from  our  ileet  into  the  .\tlantic,  and  hold  the 
.Vlantic  even  with  the  help  of  the  escaped  liners,  lotv^ 
( nough  to  bring  about  the  military  result  required  ? 
This,  of  course,  is  no  less  than  to  bring  Great  Britain  to 
a  starving  point.  Let  us,  for  purposes  of  argument, 
assume  that  Germany  has  completed,  say  three,  heavily 
armed  units  and  that  we  have  completed  nothing  beyond 
the  iqi5  programme.  That  *vould  give  Germany  25 
ships  to  light  our  42.  Let  us  further  assume  that  by 
sacriticing  every  destroyer  and  light  cruiser  she  has 
got,  Germany  could  force  the  British  squadron  into 
dcfensi\c  manoeuvres  and  so  get  half  her  force  past 
us  unengaged.  What  start  can  this  force  obtain?  it  is 
inconceivable  that  it  would  be  more  than  a  very  few 
boura'  s*art.     If  Sir  David  Beatty  has  all  the  available 


battle  cruisers  under  las  command,  i.e..  the  ^4  Lions,  the 
Indefatigable,  the  3  InftexilAcs.  with  the  Neie' Zealand  and 
Australia,  he  would  have  a  squadron  of  10  ships  with  a 
maximum  of  speed  of  28  knots  and  a  minimum  of  25.  In 
a  race  across  the  Atlantic,  say  3,000  miles,  he  could  give 
a  20  knot  fleet — and  as  a  fleet  the  escaped  12  German 
ships  could  not  go  faster  than  this — nearly  a  day's  start, 
and  still  get  there  lirst.  .'\ud  this  leaves  out  of  account 
altogether  that  the  pursuit  would  be  followed  up  by  such 
of  the  32  slower  British  capital  ships  that  survived 
the  action  with  the  German  13.  The  problem  of  such  a 
manoeuvre  as  this,  it  seems  to  me.  needs  only  to  be  stated 
for  the  improbability  of  its  success  to  be  apparent.  For 
6ven  if  the  whole  (ierman  programme  succeeded  up  to  the 
point  of  arming  the  escaped  liners,  all  our  modern  ships 
would  be  moved  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Atlantic, 
and  the  Germans  would  be  kept  far  too  busy  trying  to 
save  themselves,  for  their  programme  of  isolating  Great 
Britain  to  ha\e  any  chanco  of  being  realised. 

But  a  third  course  is  not  impossible.  This  would 
take  the  form  of  attempting  to  draw  the  British  Fleet 
into  action  on,  or  south-east  of,  the  Dogger  Bank,  where 
the  water  is  both  .shallow  and  near  enough  to  Heligoland 
to  lend  itself  to  preparation  for  action  on  German  lines. 

This  preparation  would  include  the  laying  of  minc- 
lields  and  the  pro\ision  of  submarine  rendcivous.  The 
tactics  of  battle  would  be  directed  towards  drawing  the 
British  Fleet  into  areas  so  prepared — the  idea  being  that 
the  mines  and  torpedoes  could  rectify  the  inequality  in 
the  gun  power  of  the  two  sides.  It  is  precisely  this  form 
of  battle  which  the  British  Commander-in-Chief  will  most 
certainly  decline.  So  long  as  the  German  I-Teet  is.  as  a 
fleet,  powerless  to  question  our  use  of  the  high  seas,  to 
seek  its  destruction  at  any  risk  is  unnecessary.  .\nd 
bearing  in  mind  again  that  Germany's  objective,  in  all 
this  sea  activity,  is  at  least  as  clearly  the  destruction  of 
her  enemy's  moral  stability  as  the  destruction  of  her 
military  power,  the  public  must  be  prepared  to  hear  a 
(ierman  boast  that  the  North  Sea  has  been  entered,  the 
British  Meet  challenged  and  the  challenge  declined. 

Administration  and  Agitation. 

Looking  then  all  round  the  subject  we  have  quite 
plainly  and  frankly  to  face  a  position  in  which  our  enemy 
will  use  every  sea  resource  he  has,  with  the  utmost 
resolution  and  ruthlessness.  Such  incidents  as  the 
destruction  of  the  Maloja  will  be  repeated,  and  next 
time  not,  perhaps,  within  sight  of  Dover,  but  on  the 
high  seas.  How  are  we  going  to  bear  ourselves  under 
this  strain  ?  It  is  fervently  to  be  hoped  that  should 
things  become  serious  there  will  be  no  recrudescence  of 
agitation  to  shake  public  faith  in  the  Admiralty.  The 
attempt  to  make  us  believe  that  Germany  had  built 
a  squadron  of  17-inch  gun  ships  and  was  re-arming  her 
old  ships  with  them,  has  failed,  but  it  was  an  excuse  for 
calling  for  greater  \igour.  Next  we  had  the  suggestion 
that  the  .\dmiralty  was  out  of  touch  with  the  fleets,  and 
incapable  of  giving  unity  to  our  naval  action.  The 
inference  was  that  only  one  man  was  capable  of  restoring 
the  reality  of  power  to  our  sea  forces.  The  British  people 
have  a  curious  inclination  to  believe  that  when  things  are 
wrong,  it  must  be., in  the  power  of  some  person,  with 
whose  name  they  are  familiar,  to  put  things  right.  But 
things  are  not  wrong,  and  if  they  were  they  are  far  too 
complex  for  so  simple  a  solution. 

There  is  no  way  now  of  making  good  the  absence  from 
our  administration  of  that  staff  organisation  which  would 
ensure  right  doctrine  and  the  best  methods  being  applied  in 
any  case.  But  in/the,  course  of  actual  war  something 
like  it  has,  as  a  fact,  been  evolved.  The  Nation  said, 
in  its  issue  of  I'ebruary  iq,  that  a  closer  co-operation 
between  Whitehall  and  Sir  John  JeHicoe  was  imperatively 
necessary.  But  it  is  ^  necessity  that  has  never  been 
ignored.  Mr.  Balfour,  Sir  Henry  Jackson,  Sir  Henry 
01i\-er — these  are  not  men  who  decline  or  forbid  confi- 
dence. The  Fleet  is  to-day  in  closer — because  in  less 
formal — contact  with  headquarters  than  at  any  time. 
If  ever  it  was  governed  and  directed  by  its  own  best 
brains,  and  in  the  light  of  its  own  experiences,  it  is  now. 
And  no  other  method  of  governing  it  is  either  desirable.or 
possible.  Let  11s,  then,  be  ready  to  bear 'whatever  we 
must  bear,  in  the  certainty  that  the  best  is  being  done 
—  and  will  be  done.  Akthl'K  Pollkn. 


March  2,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


THE    AMERICAN    CIVIL    WAR.-III. 

Some  Lessons  to  be  Learnt  from  it. 
By  John  Buchan. 


[Mr.  John  Buchan  in  these  admirable  articles  points  out 
the  parallels  that  exist  between  the  North  in  the 
American  Civil  War  and  Great  Britain  in  the  present 
conflict.  Some  of  these  arc  extraordinarily  exact, 
notahly  the  lack  0/  trained  men  and ,  the  engrained 
objection  to  compulsory  service  ivhich  President  Lincoln 
in  face  of  great  opposition  passed  into  law  and  which 
once  it  was  law  the  country  readily  accepted.] 

THE  North  found  the  men  ;    after  many  months 
it  found  out  the  way  to  train  them  ;  it  had' 
also    to    find    the    riglit    kind    of     leadership. 
Strength,    even  discipHned    strength,    is    not 
enough. 

■  Lincohi,  as  we  have  seen,  began  the  war  without 
any  kind  of  aptitude  or  experience.  His  Cabinet  was  in 
the  same  position.  It  contained  several  able  men,  such 
as  Seward,  Chase,  and  Stanton,  and  of  these  Stanton  did 
his  best  to  make  it  impossible  for  the  President  to  con- 
tinue in  office.  Lincoln's  most  dangerous  foes  were  those 
of  his  own  household.  It  was  not  the  first  time  in  history 
that  a  great  war  had  revealed  members  of  Govern- 
ment intriguing  against  each  other.  Moreover,  the 
North  had  no  generals  of  such  commanding  ability  and 
experience  that  they  could  safely  be  trusted.  Again, 
the  President  of  the  I'nited  States  was  in  a  peculiar 
position.  Under  the  Constitution  he  was  the  chief  execu- 
tive olficer  of  the  country,  and  performed  many  of  the 
functions  which  elsewhere  belonged  to  the  monarch. 
Lincoln,  therefore,  whether  he  wanted  it  or  not,  had  to 
assume  the  direction  of  the  war. 

We  sometimes  talk  lightly  as  if  the  only  thing  in 
war  was  to  find  a  good  general  and  give  him  a  free  hand, 
rnfortunatelj"  in  a  modern  war,  in  which  the  existence  of 
the  nation  is  at  stake,  the  matter  is  not  nearly  so  simple. 
To  beat  the  enemy  you  have  not  only  to  win  field  victories; 
or  rather  to  win  the  right  kind  of  field  victory  you  must  do 
more  than  turn  out  good  troops  and  good  generals.  You 
have  to  use  the  whole  national  strength  against  your 
opponent,  military,  naval  and  economic,  and  therefore, 
unless  the  great  soldier  is  also,  like  Napoleon,  a  great 
statesman,  the  supreme  direction  of  the  campaign  must 
lie  in  the  hands  of  a  civilian  Cabinet.  That  is  to  say," 
the  Cabinet  decides  upon  the  main  strategic  plan,  which 
involves  all  kinds  of  questions  of  policy,  and  having 
so  decided  it  chooses  the  best  men  it  can  find  to  carry  out 
the  military  and  naval  parts  of  it.  Once  these  com- 
manders have  been  chosen  they  should  not  be  interfered 
with.     Till  they  ha\e  failed  they  should  be  trusted. 

Now  to  discover  and  apply  a  continuous  strategic 
policy  you  need  a  Cabinet  loyal  within  itself,  and  a 
Cabinet  instructed  by  the  best  expert  advice  which  can 
be  procured.  Lincoln  had  an  extremely  disloyal  Cabinet. 
All  its  members  wanted  to  beat  the  South,  but  they  all 
thought  that  thej'  could  do  the  job  "better  than  the  Presi- 
dent. They  were  amateurs,  but  'unfortunately  they 
believed  that  they  were  expferts.  That  was  bad  enough. 
In  addition  there  was  Congress,  which  was  filled  with  a 
collection  of  talkative  people  who  did  their  best  to  hamper 
the  Government.  Rarely  has  any  representative  assembly 
cut  such  a  poor  figure  in  a  great'crisis  as  Congress  did  in 
the  American  Civil  War.  Artemus  Ward  said  •the  last 
word  on  the  subject.  He  observed  that  at  the  previous 
election  he  had  deUberately  voted  for  Henry  Clay.  It  was 
true,  he  said,  that  Henry  was  dead,  but  since  all  the 
politicians  that  he  knew  were  fifteenth- rate  he  preferred 
to  vote  for  a  first-class  corpse. 

There  was  also  the  Press,  which  was  quite  uncensored, 
and  which  spent  its  time  in  futile  criticisms  of  generals 
and  statesmen  and  in  insisting  upon  policies  which  would 
have  given  the  enemy  a  complete  and  speedy  victorj'.  It 
was  always  trying  to  make  journalistic  reputations  for 
generals  and  so  foist  them  upon  the  Government.  But 
the  worst  thing  of  all  was  that  there  was  no  body  of  experts 
to  advifc  the  Cabinet.    There  was  no  General  Staff  at 


Washington.  The  good  soldiers  were"  all  in  the  field. 
There  had  never  been  any  real  Staff  in  peace  time  and  it 
was  impossible  to  improvise  one  easily  in  war.  Hence 
Lincoln  had  to  conduct  the  campaign  himself,  with  small 
assistance  from  his  colleagues,  with  no  help  from  Congress 
— very  much  the  other  way — with  no  real  military  expert 
advice  at  his  elbow,  and  under  a  perpetual  cross-fire  of 
journalistic  criticism. 

The    First    Northern    Generals. 

The  result  might  have  been  foreseen.  The  first 
generals  were  appointed  largely  because  of  political  and 
journalistic  clamour.  Indeed  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
they  could  have  been  appointed  in  any  other  way,  for 
there  were  no  real  formed  reputations.  The  good  men 
had  still  to  discover  themselves.  General  after  general 
failed  and  was  recalled.  Transient  and  protesting 
phantoms,  they  flit  over  the  page  of  history.  Some  of 
them  were  men  of  real  ability,  like  McClellan,  who  was 
enthusiastically  hailed  in  the  North  as  the  "  Young 
Napoleon."  He  failed,  largely  no  doubt  owing  to  Lincoln's 
interference,  and  he  disappeared.  Others  succeeded,  some 
of  them  competent  men  like  Meade  and  Burnside,  some  of 
them  by  no  means  competent  like  Hooker  and  Pope  and 
Banks.  Lee  used  to  complain  in  his  gentle  way  that  the 
North  always  dismissed  its  generals  just  as  he  was  getting 
to  know  and  like  them. 

They  usually  began  with  flamboyant  proclamations 
announcing  that  they  were  going  to  whip  the  rebels  in  a 
month,  and  then  they  were  hunted  from  pillar  to  post 
by  Lee  and  Jackson.  Pope,  for  example,  declared  when 
he  took  command  that  his  headquarters  would  be  in  the 
saddle  ;  and  Lee,  when  he  heard  it,  observed  drily  that 
that  would  be  a  more  proper  place  for  his  hind-quarters. 
The  chief  army  of  the  North,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
was  commanded  by  no  less  than  six  generals,  and  all 
but  one  were  dismissed  for  failure.  But  while  these 
unfortunate  people  were  degraded,  all  sorts  of  incom- 
petents who  had  strong  political  interest  were  retained 
in  their  commands.  Most  of  the  generals  of  the  North 
had  one  leg  in  the  camp  and  the  other  in  Congress.     It 


RAEMAEKERS'    CARTOON. 

The  Prime  Minister  repeated  in  clear  and 
emphatic  tones  in  the  House  of  Commons  last  week, 
the  pledge  -which  he  had  given  at  the  Guildhall 
on  November  gth,  1914,  using  identical  uords  7f''"' 
oite  slight  addition  : — ■ 

We  shall  never  sheathe  the  sword  which  we 
have  not  lightly  drawn  until  Belgium  and  I 
will  add  Serbia — recovers  in  full  measure  all 
and  more  than  all  which  she  has  sacrificed, 
until  France  is  adequately  secured  against 
the  menace  of  aggression,  until  the  rights  of 
the  smaller  nationalities  of  Europe  are  placed 
upon  an  unassailable  foundation,  and  until 
the  military  domination  of  Prussia  is  wholly 
and  finally  destroyed. 

When  this  promise  was  originally  made  at  the 
Guildhall,  the  cartoon  which  is  reproduced  as 
our  frontispiece  was  drawn  by  Louis  Raemaekers. 
It  is  evidence  of  the  deep  impression  which  the 
declaration  made  on  the  mind  of  Neutrals — an 
impression  zahich  has  been  increased  by  the  em- 
phatic manner  in  ivhich  the  declaration  was 
restated  at  Westminster  last  week.  Germanv  under- 
stands its  significance. 


L  A  nm:>    and    wa  t  e  r  . 


March  2,  1916. 


remind?;  one  of  those  armies  of  seventeenth-century 
Scotland  whicii  were  directed  by  the  General  Assembly 
or  the  Scottish  Parhament  and  were  terribly  harried  by 
Montrose.  In  Macaulay's  phrase,  an  army  is  not  likely 
to  succeed  if  it  is  commanded  by  a  debating  society. 

Lincoln  showed  his  greatness  by  hving  through  this 
dismal  period  and  not  losing  his  courage.  Gradually 
he  brought  Congress  to  heel.  Gradually  lie  established 
a  dominance  over  his  colleagues,  and  even  the  impossible 
Stanton  fell  under  his  spell.  Gradually  he  purged  the 
army  of  politiccd  influence.  Above  all,  as  the  war  ad- 
vanced, he  made  a  zealous  inquest  for  military  capacity, 
and  he  began  to  discover  leaders  on  whom  he  could  rely. 
He  has  been  much  blamed  for  interfering  with  his  com- 
manders during  the  earUer  campaigns,  and  the  charge  is 
just.  But  he  was  in  an  almost  hopeless  position.  He  had 
the  howling  politicians  beliind  him  and  before  him 
generals  who  showed  no  real  grasp  of  the  situation.  He 
conceived  it  his  duty  to  interfere,  and  he  often  interfered 
foolishly,  for  he  was  still  learning  his  job.  But  by  and 
by  he  discovered  the  true  soldiers— men  who  had  fought 
their  way  up  by  sheer  ability — men  like  Hancock  and 
Thomas,  Sherman  and  Sheridan.  And  above  all  he 
discovered  Grant. 

Grant. 

There  is  surely  no  romance  in  all  military  history 
raore  striking  than  the  rise  of  Grant.  At  the  beginning 
the  North  had  cried  out  for  brilliant  generals,  people  who 
made  "  silver-tongued "  speeches,  people  who  could 
be  hailed  as  young  Napoleons.  But  the  Napoleons  and 
the  silver-tongues  vanished  into  obscurity,  and  the  North 
found  its  salvation  in  a  little  rugged  homely  man  from 
the  West,  who  had  done  well  in  the  Mexican  war,  but  had 
failed  since  in  every  business  he  had  undertaken  and  had 
become  a  byword  in  his  family  for  unsuccess.  He  never 
spoke  a  word  more  than  was  necessary,  he  was  unpre- 
possessing in  appearance  and  uncouth  in  manner,  but 
he  was  a  true  leader  of  men,  ■  His  habits  had  not  always 
been  regular,  and  the  Pharisees  of  the  North  cried  out 
against  his  appointment,  declaring  that  no  blessing  could 
go  with  such  a  man.  Lincoln  replied  by  asking  what 
was  Grant's  favourite  brand  of  whiskey  that  he  might 
send  a  cask  of  it  to  his  other  generals. 

If  Grant  can  hardly  stand  in  the  first  rank  of  the 
world's  soldiers  he  was  the  very  man  for  the  task  before 
him.  He  had  iron  nerve,  iron  patience,  and  an  iron 
grip  of  the  fundamentals  of  the  case.  Lincoln  inter- 
fered with  his  earlier  generals,  but  he  never  interfered 
with  Grant.  He  knew  a  man  when  he  saw  him.  There 
is  a  pleasant  story  in  Grant's  Memoirs  of  his  first  inter- 
view with  the  President  after  he  took  supreme  command. 
"  The  President  told  me  that  he  did  not  want  to  know 
what  I  proposed  to  do.  But  he  submitted  a  plan  of 
campaign  of  his  own  which  he  wanted  me  to  hear  and 
then  do  as  I  pleased  about  it.  He  brought  out  a  map 
of  Virginia  and  pointed  out  on  that  map  two  streams 
which  empty  into  the  Potomac,  and  suggested  that  the 
army  might  be  moved  in  boats  and  landed  between  the 
mouths  of  these  streams.  We  would  then  have  the 
Potomac  to  bring  our  suppUes,  and  the  tributaries  would 
protect  our  flanks  while  we  moved  out.  I  listened 
respectfully,  but  did  not  suggest  that  the  same  streams 
would  protect  Lee's  flanks  while  he  was  shutting  us  up." 

Lincoln  made  no  more  suggestions.  He  supported 
Grant  during  the  terrible  days  in  the  Wilderness  when 
the  whole  North  was  crying  out  against  what  seemed 
to  be  needless  slaughter.  The  President  had  learned  the 
truth  of  a  favourite  saying  of  Scharnhorst's  : — "  In  war 
it  is  not  so  niuch  what  one  does  that  matters,  but  that 
whatever  action  is  agreed  upon  shall  be  carried  out  with 
unity  and  energy." 

Staff  Work. 

The  confusion  in  the  leadership  was  reproduced  in 
the  very  general  dislocation  of  the  Staff  work.  The 
problem  of  the  North  was  very  much  our  own  problem. 
The  original  regular  officers  had  been  excellent.  One 
French  critic  considers  that  the  West-Pointers  were  better 
trained  than  any  other  officers  in  the  world  at  the  time. 
But  they  were  too  fcft  to  go  round.  The  large  new  armies 
soon    outgrew    the  supply  of  competent  Staff  oflicers, 


and  a  trained  Staff  is  the  one  thing  most  difficult  to  im- 
provise. 

•  We  are  all  too  apt  to  ask  from  the  Staff  an  impossible 
perfection.  Even  the  great  Berthier  nodded,  and  a 
volume  could  be  filled  with  the  mistakes  of  Napoleon's 
Staff  officers.  Efiicient  Staff  work  in  the  modern  sense 
really  dates  from  Moltke,  and  it  was  efficient  simply 
because  his  whole  Staff  had  been  organised  and  trained 
before  the  war.  In  a  struggle  of  improvised  armies 
the  Staffs  will  rarely  show  anything  like  a  high  average 
of  competence.  There  will  be  some  officers  of  the  first 
quality  and  very  many  hopelessly  bad.  Both  North  and 
South  suffered  in  this  respect.  Hooker's  Staff  work  at 
Chancellorsvillc  was  little  worse  than  Longstreet's  at 
Gettysburg.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  North 
made  the  mistake  of  ranking  Staff  duties  too  low,  and  it 
was  only  much  rough  handling  which  drove  out  this 
heresy. 

'Towards  the  end  of  the  war  the  Staffs  on  both  sides 
had  enormously  improved,  and  remain  to  this  day  ex- 
amples of  what  can  be  done  towards  training  Staff  officers 
in  the  stress  of  a  campaign.  Lee's  amazing  stand  in  the 
Wilderness  and  Grant's  ultimate  victory  would  alike 
have  been  impossible  with  the  Staff  organisation  of  the 
first  two  years. 


Light  and  most  interesting  are  the  "  Priixstan  Memories 
1864 — 1914,"  of  Mr.  Poultncy  Bigelow,  which  Messrs.  (i. 
P.  Putnam's  Sons  have  just  published.  These  memories 
go  back  to  the  time  of  the  Franco- Prussian  War,  and  they 
throw  many  vivid  sidelights  01.  Prussian  character  Iwth  iu 
comparatively  humble  and  exceedingly  exalted  quarters. 
The  Kaiser  and  Prince  Henry  were  playfellows  of  Mr.  Bigelow 
in  his  boyhood  ;  they  were  Red  Indians  together,  and  it  is 
evident  that  the  author  has  a  liking  for  Wilhelm  II.  Bismarck 
he  particularly  disliked,  and  the  whole  atmosphere  of  tiie 
Prussian  Court  seems  to  have  jarred  on  him.  It  is  a  book 
to  be  read  by  all  who  wish  to  gain  insight  into  German 
character.  The  experiences  described  are  all  first  hand  ; 
and  the  general  effect  which  they  leave  on  the  mind  of  the 
reader  is  the  extraordinary  ignorance  that  has  prevailed  and 
that  still  to  some  degree  does  prevail  in  this  country  on 
the  true  nature  of  the  German  people. 

The  latest  addition  to'  Messrs.  Duckworth's  admirable 
half-crown  Readers'  Library  is  Life's  Great  Adi'cntme,  a 
book  of  essays  by  Francis  Stopford,  which  was  originally 
published  in  1912.  These  essays  deal  Ughtly  with  the  deeper 
problems  of  life — problems  which  nowadays  occupy  the  minds 
of  so  many  more  persons  than  they  did  four  years  ago.  It 
may  be  remembered  that  a  favourite  topic  four  or  five  years 
ago  was  England's  decadence,  mainly  the  result,  as  we  know 
now,  of  German  inspiration.  The  writer  would  have  none 
of  it.  "  Neitlier' you  nor  anyone  else,"  he  obsei'ves  to  his 
friend  Epicurus,  '•will  convince  me  that  the  day  of  our 
decline  has  dawned."  The  following  brief  passage  reads 
e\en  more  to  the  point  to-day  than  when  it  was  written.  "  The 
true  test  of  right  living  is  not  death  in  the  odour  of  sanctity, 
but  readiness  to  so  fight,  to  so  suffer,  and  last  of  all,  if  need  be, 
to  so  die,  that  whatever  calamity  confronts  us,  the  noblest 
traditions  of  our  race  shall  continue  vigorous  through  our 
actions.  This  may  appear  so  small  a  matter,  regarded  from 
a  personal  point  of  view,  that  it  can  well  be  left  to  chance  ; 
yet  the  life  of  the  nation  must  hang  on  it  one  day — whether 
in  this  decade,  or  a  century  lience,  who  can  tell  ?  " 


THE    NINETEENTH    CENTURY 

AND    AFTER 

MAnCH. 
Tho  Reoraanisation  of  the  Empire:  Couiiaeh  of  Pprffictlon. 

liv  SiK  FRASris  I'locoTi  (late  Cilicf  Justioe  of  FIoiic  Konc). 
One  Conilition  of  Vktorv.  Hy  Cai-tain   V^am.  Battink. 

Vox  PoiMili.  By  tiie  KT.  Hon.  the  Kap.l  of  Cromer,  (i.e. I!..  o.M. 

The  Cry  for  Authority  in'  Fraiiep.  lly  the  Abui;  ¥.v.\R»t  DliiNET. 

•  In   Oremio  Deonim  "':   a  Kuper-Hiiitorical   Pliantaisy   (Berlin,   19-  ?). 

By   SIR  Thomas  Barci.av. 
Er.isinns.  the  VAacnioT  of  Kiirope.  By  PROP.  Fosrnir  Watson.  H.l.lt. 

La  Itataille  .!e  I'Vuer:    Imprcssjons  d'un  T(-nioin.        By   KMILE   Vakuervei.uk. 
I  his   Worhl's   PLioe  in   the   Universe.  By   A.    P.   Sivsttt. 

Infant  Mortality;  a  I'rohlem  of  the  Land.    By  WlUIAM  A.  BRENn.  M.D.,  B.Sc. 
The  Chilflren's  Fowl.  Bv  Consihnoe  K.   JlAin. 

'The  Riime  Tongue  hut  not  the  Same  Langnage':  some  Impressions   in  tlie 
Tnitejl  States,   1914-15.  By   Gertride  Kincstox. 

'  Holy    Uus.<.ia.'     By    the   III.   IlEV.    BISHOP    BURI    (Bishop    for    Xorth    and 

Central  Kurope). 
Tile  Return  of  Rouiseau:  a  Reply  to  Mr.  Mallock.         By  CECii.  Chesterton. 
Wilful   Wuote,   Woful   Want.  By    F.DiTH    Sellers. 

The  Forests  of  Kussia  and  their  Present  Importanc*  to  the  Allies.     By  E.  P. 

STCBBiKd  (Head  of  the  Forestry  Department,  Edinburgh   University). 
Lord  Hardirigc's  Viceroyalty.     By  A.  TCBUP  ALL 

London  :   Spott'iswoode  &  Co.,  Ltd.,   5  New  Street  Square. 


Marcn  z,  19 16. 


LAND     AND     WATER. 

THE    GOLD    FETISH. 

By  Arthur  Kitson. 


THE  meeting  of  the  Associated  Chambers  of  Com- 
merce this  week  wll  mark  an  important  step 
in  our  foreign  trade  pohcy.  The  members  of 
our  commercial  bodies  are  fully  aroused  to  the 
necessity  of  preparing  for  the  coming  trade  war  which 
will  be  waged  relentlessly  at  the  conclusion  of  present 
hostilities.  The  most  urgent  question,  however,  which 
will  doubtless  occupy  the  attention  of  these  bodies  will 
be  the  establishment  of  Industrial  banks  for  assisting 
British  merchants  in  extending  their  trade  and  commerce 
throughout  the  world.  Tariff  measures  will  prove  of 
little  avail  against  the  enemy,  unless  accompanied  by  a 
radical  change  in  our  banking  and  iinancial  methods. 

Many  members  of  our  Chambers  of  Commerce  have 
written  expressing  their  interest  in — and  in  many  cases 
their  agreement  with — the  articles  on  the  Banking  Ques- 
tion in  Land  and  Water.  Some  correspondents, 
however,  have  expressed  surprise  that  they  have  been 
devoted  principally  to  a  criticism  of  our  existing  Financial 
.System,  whilst  little  has  been  said  to  indicate  what 
system  should  replace  the  present  one.  To  such  critics 
it  is  sufficient  to  say,  that  before  one  can  erect  a  new 
building  on  the  site  of  an  old  one,  it  is  necessary  first  to 
clear  away  all  the  rubbish  and  obstructions. 

Our  Banking  System  as  I  have  hitherto  pointed  out, 
is  founded  on  several  glaring  fallacies.  It  is  the  product 
of  greed,  ignorance  and  superstition.  I  have  already 
exposed  one  or  two  of  these  fallacies,  such  as  the  Gold 
Basis  fiction,  and  the  so-called  "  Gresham  "  law,  but 
other  errors  equally  glaring  remain  to  be  exposed  and 
eradicated  before  we  can  attempt  to  replace  the  present 
institution  with  a  better  one. 

Fallacious   Principles. 

Already  many  proposals  have  been  offered  to  the 
Government  regarding  what  their  authors  believe  would 
prove  salutary  changes  in  our  credit  and  monetary  arrange- 
ments, but  these  proposals  are  not  likely  to  receive 
serious  consideration  by  the  authorities  until  the  current 
theories  and  principles  of  finance  are  shown  to  be 
fallacious. 

The  chief  object  of  the  writer  of  these  articles  is  to 
endeavour  to  convince  the  British  public  not  only  that  the 
existing  financial  system  is  ,  inadequate,  dangerous  and 
costly,  but  that  owing  to  the  false  teachings  of  financial 
writers,  the  public  has  been  defrauded  of  the  free  use  of  its 
own  credit  for  industrial  and  commercial  purposes.  Since 
the  War  started,  events  have  shown  that  the  credit  of 
Great  Britain  is  worth  several  thousands  of  milhons  of 
]wunds  sterhng.  On  the  other  hand,  the  credit  of  all 
tlic  British  banking  companies  combined  is  only  a  frac- 
tion of  that  of  the  British  nation.  How  is  it  then,  that 
the  British  Government  compels  the  nation  to  sell  its 
superior  credit  for  Bank  credit  and  pay  interest  charges 
for  the  exchange  ?  That  "  the  whole  is  greater  than  a 
part  "  is  an  elementary  mathematical  axiom.  Why  does 
not  the  axiom  hold  good  in  financial  matters  ? 

The  credit  of  Great  Britain  comprises  that  of  all  the 
British  people  and  its  institutions.  Why  then  does  the 
Government  enter  into  such  an  apparently  foolish 
l)argain  as  the  exchange  of  the  more  valuable  credit  for 
the  less  valuable  and  pay  a  premium  ?  The  answer 
is  that  the  gold  superstition  still  dominates  the  minds — 
not  only  of  the  Government — but  of  the  vast  majority 
of  the  citizens  of  this  country.  The  average  man  still 
believes  that  there  is  some  special  virtue  in  gold  when 
used  for  currency  purposes  which  does  not  exist  in  paper. 
It  is  the  prevalence  of  this  superstition  that  has  cost  this 
country  untold  millions  in  interest  charges  which  might 
have  been  saved.  And  just  as  the  poor  benighted  heathen 
are  victimised  by  their  priests  and  sorcerers  and  induced 
to  pay  to  have  their  homes  freed  from  imaginary  devils 
and  evil  spirits,  so  the  average  Britisher  has  been  willing 
to  pay  for  the  use  of  gold  where  paper  would  have  answered 
equally  well  and  would  have  facilitated  his  business  to 
precisely  the  same  degree. 

The  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  is  reported  to  have 
boasted  in  a  recent   speech  in  the  House  of  Conunons 


that  every  £1  note  issued  by  the  Government  is  redeem- 
able in  gold  on  demand.  It" is  to  be  hoped  the  public  vnll 
not  take  Mr.  McKenna  at  his  word,  otherwise  we  shall 
have  a  repetition  of  the  Midsummer  crisis  of  1914.  The 
inference  the  Chancellor  wishes  us  to  draw  from  his 
statement  is,  that  our  legal  tender  notes  are  valuable 
because  they  can  he  redeemed  in  gold.  So  long  as  this 
superstition  prevails,  so  long  will  our  producing  classes 
be  taxed  for  the  use  of  credit  and  currency,  which,  under 
more  enlightened  conditions,  they  might  have  at  practic- 
ally little  or  nothing  save  the  cost  of  service  plus  a  small 
tax  for  insurance. 

Actual  Facts.  ' 

Let  us  at  once  face  the  actual  facts.  7/  in  the  fulttre 
our  currency  and  credit  are  to  be  based  on  gold,  aiid  if  they 
a,re  to  he  made  redeemable  in  gold  on  demand,  then  our 
industries,  our  trade  and  commerce  must  bs  restricted.  In 
other  words,  the  limit  of  enterprise  and  industry  must  be 
the  amount  of  gold  that  our  banks  are  able  to  control  and  are 
zailling  to  make  available,  and  as  for  capturing  German 
trade,  we  may  as  laell  abandon  all  our  efforts.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  the  people  of  this  country  hope  greatly  to  increase 
their  trade  and  commerce,  if  they  have  any  serious  inten- 
tions of  capturing  German  trade,  the  gold  basis  will  have  to 
he  abandoned  as  being  insecure  and  insufficient,  and  the 
much  safer  and  broader  bxsis  of  the  national  credit  will 
have  to  replace  it. 

The  statement  made  by  Mr.  McKenna  regarding  the 
ability  of  the  banks  to  redeem  their  obligations  in  gold 
•  has  already  proved  to  be  incorrect.  The  real  test  was 
made  at  the  end  of  July  and  the  beginning  of  August 
1914,  and  nothing  has  happened  since  then  to  invalidate 
or  alter  the  result  of  that  test.  -Of  course,  what  Mr. 
McKenna  means  and  what  the  bankers  undoubtedly 
mean  when  they  speak  of  "  gold  redemption  "  is,  that 
so  long  as  the  public  is  content  to  take  gold  in  small 
quantities,  the  banks  are  able  to  perform  their  obhgations. 
If  the  question  of  time  be  ehminated,  any  bank  might 
undertake  to  issue  a  million  pounds  of  credit  on  a  gold 
reserve  of  one  hundred  pounds.  But  in  financial  matters, 
time  is  always  the  essence  of  the  contract.  If  the  pubhc 
demand  gold  redemption,  they  want  redemption  im- 
mediately on  demand,  and  not  some  months  later — at 
the  banker's  convenience. 

It  would  undoubtedly  be  possible  in  the  course  of 
six  months  for  London  Bridge  to  carry  all  the  traffic  that 
now  passes  across  the  Thames  in  a  single  month.  Sup- 
posing during  a  Zeppelin  raid,  all  the  Thames  bridges 
were  destroyed  except  one.  Naturally  the  traffic  would 
be  seriously  disorganised.  At  the  same  time,  this  one 
remaining  bridge  would  no  doubt  enable  the  traffic  to 
continue,  although  greatly  reduced,  and  at  very  serious 
cost  and  delay  to  the  London  merchants  and  manufactur- 
ers. The  same  is  true  in  regard  to  the  redemption  of 
credit  in  gold.  In  short,  the  gold  standard  and  the  gold 
basis  mean  that  trade  and  commerce  must  bs  cut  down 
solely  in  the  interests  of  the  money-lending  classes,  in  order 
that  they  may  be  allowed  to  continue  their  control  of  credit. 

A  Serious  Indictment. 

One  of  the  most  serious  indictments  brought  against 
the  gold  basis  will  be  found  in  a  paper*  read  by  Sir 
Edward  Holden  of  the  London  City  and  Midland  Banking 
Co.  before  the  Liverpool  Bankers'  Institute,  in  December, 
1907,  immediately  after  the  United  States  currency  panic! 
I  cannot  do  better  than  reproduce  Sir  Edward's  ex- 
planation of  the  depreciation  of  securities  in  gold  at  that 
time.  His  illustrations  form  one  of  the  most  complete 
exposures  of  the  blighting  and  depressing  effects  upon 
trade  and  industry  exercised  by  this  gold  superstition, 
ever  pubUshed.  Sir  Edward  illustrated  the  condition  of 
the  banks  by  a  triangle  which  showed  that  credit 
is  necessarily  restricted  by  gold,  regardless  of  the  enormous 
wealth  possessed  by  the  nation  in  other  forms.     He  first 


*  "  The  Depreciation  of  Securities  in  Relation  to  Gold 
by  Blad?s,  East  and  Blades.^ 


(Publishod 


LA:^D      AiND      WATER^. 


March  2,  1916. 


ria  '• 


the    line 
dcmancl 


states — what  is  often  forgotten — that  loans  create  bank 
credits,  and  if  we  regard  all  the  Banks  in  London  as  one, 
the  business  of  banking  becomes  little  more  than  a  matter 
ot  book-keeping — the  transfer  of  credit  from  one  person 
to  another.     He  then  proceeds  as  follows  : — 

The  right  sfde  of  the  triangle  shown  here  represents  the 
loans  of  tln'  whole  of  tli:  banks,  and  the  left  side  represents 
the  cash  Inilanoc  or  reserve.  If,  then,  you  draw  a  line  from 
the  left  of  the  base  and  equal  to  the  base,  you  get  the  cash 
credits  in  existence.  If  Iheli.iansand  credits  as  represented  by 
the  two  sides  of  the  triangle  were  the  only  two  elements  which 

bankers  had  to  take  into 
consideration,  then  there 
would  be  no  necessity 
for  them  to  restrict  their 
loans  at  all.  and  tradei-s 
could  increase  their 
.^ ,  ^  business  and  obtain  loans 

-JP/  N^      ad  lili'.um.   Hut  there  is 

^/  — - — ^^     another  element,  and   a 

most   imj^wrtant  one,  to 
be  taken  into  considera- 
tion, and  it   iti  the  fact 
that    all    the   credits  as 
represented  by  the  left 
side  of  the  triangle  and 
drawn    from   the  base,  are  practically  payable  on 
and    in    gold,    assuming    of   course,    that   I5ank  of 
England  notes  represent  gold. 

Itverv  banker  must  therefore,  make  up  his  mind  by  what 
amounts  his  credits  are  liable  to  be  diminished,  both  in  ordin- 
ary and  extraordinary  times,  and  when  he  has  thus  made  up 
his  mind,  he  ought  to"  keep  that  amount  of  available  resources 
in  gold,  or  as  a  means  of  olitainmg  gold.  Let  us  consider, 
then,  (hit  th^  base  of  the  triangle  consists  of  gold,  and  it 
is  the  ratio  of  the  base  of  the  triangle  to  the  total  credits 
(both  created  and  cash  credits)  which  restrict  bankers  from 
increasing  undulv  their  loans.  If  business  increases  imduly, 
and  if  bankers  continue  to  increase  the  loan  side  of  the 
triangle,  of  course  concurrently  increasing  tlieir  credits,  and 
not  Ix'ing  able  to  increase  tlu-'gold  base  of  the  triangle,  then 
evidently  thev  are  getting  into  danger,  and  the  only  judicious 
course  which  "they  can  pursue  is  to  curtail  their  loans,  curtail- 
ing an  undue  increase  of  business,  which  curtails  the  credits, 
and  thus  re-establish  the  ratio. 

You  here  see  the  direct  connection  between  trade  on  the 
one  hand  and  gold  on  the  other,  and  that  it  is  not  so  much 
the  production  of  gold  as  the  amount  of  gold  which  can  be 
obtained  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  bankers'  reserves. 
I  venture  to  think  that  the  above  explanation  will  enable  you 
to  come  to  the  conclusion  that,  if  the  gold  base  of  the  triangle 
cannot  be  increased,  then  the  danger  spot  is  the  LO.\x. 

I  want  you  to  remember  that  the  banking  system  of 
every  country  has  its  triangles,  and  that  the  principles  enuncia- 
ted above,  exist  in  every  triangle  of  every  banking  system 
based  on  gold  in  the  world  ;  that  being  so,  it  is  clear,  generally 
speaking,"  that  the  business  of  tht-  world  is  carried  on  by 
means  of  loans,  that  loans  create  credits,  that  the  stand-by 
for  the  protection  of  credits  is  gold,  and  that  therefore  gold 
controls  trade. 

It  may  happen  that  the  trade  of  one  country  grows  by 
leaps  and  bounds,  the  loans  and  credits,  of  course,  following, 
while  the  trade  of  other  countries  remaips  normal.  What, 
then  takes  place  ?  The  gold  base  of  the  triangle  of  the  lonner 
becomes  too  small,  and  it  is  necessary  to  enlarge  it.  How  is 
the  increase  effected  ?  It  is  effected  hj:  the  representative 
bank  of  the  more  prosperous  country  attacking  the  gold  Imsis 
of  the  triangle  of  other  countries,  and  the  instrument  by  which 
th.'  attack  is  made  is  the  rate  of  discount.  By  this  means 
L'uld  will  !)(' attracted  from  the  bases  of  the  triangles  of  other 
countries,  and  unless  those  bases  are  too  great  for  the  adequate 
protection  of  the  credits,  the  representative  banks  of  those 
countries  will  meet  the  attack  bv  also  putting  up  their  rates. 
But  it  may  happen  that  the  trade  of  every  country  has  in- 
creased bv  leaps  and  bounds,  and  that  all  loans  and  credits 
havCalsuincreased.  Then  the  light  biggins  by  c-very  country 
putting  up  its  rate,  first  to  prevent  its  base  being  dimmished, 
and,  secondly,  to  increase  it  if  possible. 

Let  us  clearly  understand  the  meaning  of  this  very 
lucid  and  tnithfiil  illustration.  Our  producing  classes 
are  being  urged  to  dt)  their  best  to  capture  German  trade. 
Now  no  extension  of  trade  is  possible  under  present 
conditions  except  through  the  increase  of  bank  loans. 
Supposing  that  these  loans  are  granted  and  the  enterprise, 
skill  and  industry  of  our  peoole  are  rewarded  by  a  great 
increas'j  in  trade.  NN'hat  certainty  have  they  that  they 
will  Ix-  permitted  to  kc(;p  this  trade  ?     And  wliat  is  to 


The  answers  are  (i)  that  since  trade  depends  upon 
the  credit  allowed  by  the  banks,  which  in  turn  depends 
upon  the  amount  of  the  gold  reserves,  there  is  absolutely 
no  certainty.  (2)  That  the  limit  is  gauged  neither  by 
the  cnterpri.se  of  our  people  nor  the  extent  of  the  markefK 
open  for  British  goods,  but  by  the  same  accidents,  ev;^nts 
and  conditions  which  make  all  our  industrial  operations 
so  uncertain,  viz  : — the  imports  and  exports  of  gold. 
Now  London  is  the  only  free  gold  market  in  the  world. 
Supposing  therefore  that  after  the  War,  Germany  or  the 
L'nited  States,  or  both,  determine  to  wage  a  relentless 
commercial  war  for  the  World's  markets.  Not  only  will 
they  attack  by  endeavouring  to  undersell  us.  but  they  will 
try  to  cripple  us  in  our  most  vulnerable  spot  : — viz,  oju 
Gold  Market.  By  withdrawing  gold  from  London  they 
can  compel  our  banks  to  reduce  their  loans  to  British 
merchants,  and  our  efforts  at  capturing  German  trade  will 
be  fruitless.  And  the  only  weapon  of  self-defence  our 
bankers  control  is  the  Bank  rate  !  In  a  former  article  1 
gave  an  illustration  of  the  relation  of  gold  to  credit  and 
commerce  by  means  of  this  inverted  pyramid. 

If  we  apply  Sir  Edward  Holden's  conclusion-,  to  th.e 
hgure  of  this  inverted  pyramid,  we  shall  see  at  a  glance 
how  the  movements  of  "gold  affect  our  trade  and  com- 
merce. We  have  as  before  a  comparatively  smrll  amount 
of  gold  supporting  an  enormous  \olume  of  credit,  bank 

loans,  etc.,  on  which 
rests  the  vast  business 
interests  of  the  nation. 
Now  this  volume  of 
credit  is  supposed  to 
bear  a  certain  relation 
to  the  gold  reserves 
held  by  the  banks. 
Exactly  what  this  is. 
the  public  can  never 
tell,  for  the  reason 
that  only  two  banks 
in  London  publish  their  gold  holdings,  viz.  :— the  Bank 
of  England  and  the  London  City  and  Midland  Bank,  of 
which  Sir  Edward  Holden  is  its  very  able  chairman. 

Of  course,  tliis  relation  necessarily  varies  from  time 
to  time,  but  no  banker  would  go  on  indelinitely  increasing 
his  loans  without  increasing  his  gold  reserves.  And  vice 
versa,  if  his  gold  reserves  are  shrinking  the  prudent 
banker  will  necessarily  be  compelled  to  call  in  that  pro- 
portion of  his  loans  corresponding  to  the  redtiction  in  his 
reserves.  Now  the  ratio  of  gold  to  bank  credit  m  practice 
i^  supposed  to  vary  from  10  to  20  per  cent.  Supposing  our 
foreign  competitors  succeeded  in  withdrawing  £5,000,000 
in  gold  from  the  Bank  of  England.  The  bank  loans 
must  be  reduced  to  the  extent  of  £25,000,000  to 
£50,000,000  to  preserve  the  previously  existing  ratio. 
And  by  withdrawing  this  credit,  of  course  the  trade  and 
commerce  dependent  on  such  loans  are  destroyed. 

Our  Fig.  2  graphically  represents  the  disastrous 
elTect  on  credit  and  commerce  by  this  export  of  gold. 
Sir  Edward  Holden's  Liverpool  address  was  a  very  frank 
admission  that  the  gold  basis— together  with  our  free 
gold  market— places  British  trade  and  industry  at  the 
mercy — not  only  of  our  trade  competitors  but— of  the 
buUion  dealers"  and  speculators  of  the  world!  His 
illustrations  show  that  any  long  continued  period  of 
indu.strial  prosperity  is  made  impossible  by  the  restric- 
tions imposed  by  the  gold-redemption  system.  He 
further  shows  (no  doubt  unconsciously)  that  the  gold 
basis  is  a  brake  upon  the  wheels  of  industry,  continually 
interfering  with  the  rate  of  production.  Here  also  is  the 
explanation  of  the  phenomenon  that  periods  of  prosperity 
are   inevitably  followed  by  periods  of  depression. 

Increased  trade  demands  increased  banking  facilities 
-  -increased  loan.s— but  the  moment  credit  is  increased  to 
meet  this  demand,  tlK;  gold  reserves  are  strained,  the  bank 
rate  is  raised,  loans  are  called  in.  the  brake  is  applied  .0 
the  wheels  of  industr\-,  production  is  checked,  employees 
are  discharged,  enterprise  is  discouraged,  and  the  extra 
demand  for  nicmey  and  credit,  which  prosperous  times 
retpiire,  is  choked  off  ! 

In  short,  our  financial  system  destroys  prosperity, 
and  reduces  trade  to  tlu^  amount  of  gold  available.  So 
that  the  mechanism  of  exchange,  instead  of  facilitating 
trade  at  all  times,  actuallv  checks  it.  It  first  stimulates 
industry,  and  then  destroys  it.  The  gold  basis  has 
bL'come  both  the  life  and  death  of  Trade. 


March  2,  19 16. 


LAND      AND       WATER. 


OF    SUCH    IS    OUR    KINGDOM 


By    Eden    Phillpotts. 


SO  close   to   the   sere  waste  was  the  colour  of  him, 
that  not  until  .alongside  did    one  perceive  this 
snuidge  of  tawny  was  no  part  of  the  dead  heath 
and  fern,  but  a  youth  in  khaki  resting  on  a 
boulder  beside  the  highway. 

"  Bit  off  more  than  I  can  chew,"  he  said.  "  This  is 
my  hrst  dav  without  crutches  and  I've  gone  too  far." 

He  had  one  stout  stick  beside  him  and  no  more. 

"  Could  you  get  on  with  an  arm  t'other  side  ?  " 

"  Yes,  to  rights,  if  it  han't  asking  too  much." 

His  village  home  lay  two  miles  off  and  we  started 
for  it. 

"  I  came  up  over  as  gay  as  you  please,  and  thought 
I  was  all  right  ;  but  I  can't  travel  like  I  could  afore  I 
was  hit  and  my  foot's  properly  tired  "  he  explained. 

"  Wounded  in   France  ? 

"  No— (ialhpoli.  Only  a  touch  and  I'm  well  again, 
but  it  gets  tired.  Got  a  week  at  home  after  hospital  ; 
then  I  join  up." 

"  You're  pretty  young  j'et." 

"  In  sight  of  twenty,"  he  said.  "  But  ten  3'ears  older 
than  that  I  reckon.  " 

"  The  war's  turned  a  good  many  boys  into  men." 

"  In  a  way.  It's  funny  being  back  to  Widecombe 
and  seeing  what  was  my  hfe,  and  what  seemed  good 
enough  not  much  more  than  a  year  ago.'! 

'■  It's  all  shrunk  a  bit  —eh  ? 

"  That's  just  it,  "  he  said  eagerly.  "  If  that  iddcn 
the  ver}'  word  !  It's  all  shrunk — all  of  it.  Afore  I  went, 
Dartymoor  seemed  a  tidy  big  place  and  I  couldn't  picture 

a  bigger  ;    but  now "     He  broke  off  and  laughed. 

'  When  I  came  out  of  hospital  and  down  to  Newton,  I 
lifted  my  eyes  and  said,  '  Now  for  old  Dartymoor.'  And 
if  vou'd  believe  it,  I  looked  for  Hey  Tor  Rock  up  in  the 
s'.<y  !  And  then  suddenly  I  see  two  little  grey  mole-hills 
far  down  under,  and  there  was  Hey  Tor  Rock.  I  left  it 
a  mighty  big  thing  and  come  home  to  find  nought  at  all  !   " 

"You've  seen   some  real  mountains  meantime  .■*  " 

"  So  I  have  then.  Home's  shrunk — that's  the  word. 
E\ervthing's  shrunK' — the  blessed  people  have  shrunk 
1  reckon  !  " 

"  It's  your  new  point  of  view.  Shall  you  go  back 
farming  ?  " 

"  I  wonder  about  that,"  he  said.  "  There's  some- 
thing good  to  it.  It  never  seemed  particular  good  much 
before,  but  just  life.  I'm  very  fond  of  cattle.  But  it 
wouldn't  be  the  same  again.  Though  home's  got  small 
in  one  wa\',  it's  got  big  in  another.  You  take  it  for 
granted  till  you've  been  away  from  it  and  got  knocked 
about.  Then  when  you  came  back  you  find  there  was  a 
lot  more  to  it  than  you  thought." 

"  You  see  more  of  the  truth  of  it?  "       He  nodded. 

He  presented  the  interesting  spectacle  of  an  intelli- 
gent man,  whose  ideas  ran  beyond  his  power  of  ex- 
pression ;   but  it  was  easy  to  see  what  he  was  feeling. 

"  Do  you  want  to  go  back  ?  " 

"  I  do.  It's  not  the  same  things  being  up  against 
Turks  as  Germans.  I  want  to  do  my  bit  against  Germans. 
There's  more  to  it.  I'd  sooner  knock  out  one  German 
than  ten  Turks." 

"  I  can  understand  that.  But  you  don't  want  to  be 
a  soldier  all  your  time  ?  " 

"  No.  I'll  be  very  glad  to  come  back  to  my  father 
I  believe.  All  the  same  I  wouldn't,  have  missed  it. 
You  can't  never  be  the  same  again.  I  tell  the  starred 
chaps  that  they  don't  know  they're  born  and,  what's 
more,  they  don't  know  they're  'fenglish.  dood  Lord  ! 
If  they  was  to  go  out  into  the  world '&nd  see  what  our 
pals  in  the  war  think  of  tiie  Lnglish.  And  our  own 
—the  Canadians  and  Anzacs— every  riiother's  son." 

■  We  rested  awhile  and  looked  down  through  twilight 
at  the  tiny  hamlet  of  Widecombe— a  nest  of  cots  with 
little  fields  spread  on  the  hills  round  about  under  the  moor, 
and  a  church  tower  above  grey,  naked  sycamores. 

"  That's  my  home,"  he  said,  pointing  to  a  farmhouse 
on  the  nearer  slope.  "  I  see  trenches  wherever  I  look 
nowadays.  I  thought  I  knew  how  to  dig  before  I  joined, 
but  I  didn't  even  know  how  to  dig.  'Tis  funny  to  see 
labouring  men  digging  now.     You  want  to  yell  at  'em." 


Wc  parted  presently  at  his  outer  gate  and  he  was 
generous  of  thanks. 

"  Four  of  us  have  joined  up  since  I  came  back," 
he  said  as  we  shook  hands.  "  Of  course,  I  can't  put  it 
before  'em  like  truth  ;  but  so  soon  as  the  chaps  begin  to 
scent  out  a  bit  what  it  means,  the  right  sort  go  along." 

"  And  the  wrong  sort  ? 

"  They  ain't  no  blank  good  whether  or  no,"  he  said. 
"  There's  men  down  there  who  say  to  your  face  that  'tis 
all  one  to  them  whether  Bill  or  (ieorge  reigns  over  'em. 
And  you  can't  make  'em  sse  different.  You  can  put  'em 
into  khaki,  of  course,  and  get  'em  a  bit  nearer  to  being 
men  ;  but  there  ain't  no  brains  to  work  on." 

He  limped  off  climbing  the  hill  again  ;  and  where 
the  moors  sank  to  amorplious  masses  of  gloom  under 
gatliering  darkness,  onr  returned  with  imagination 
(piickened  and  an  emotion  of  large  satisfaction  after  the 
soldier's  talk. 

For  it  echoed  the  mo\'ement  at  work  in  millions  of 
youthful  minds  ;  it  promised  the  certainty  that  in 
measure  of  their  intellect,  the  potei^.tial  fathers  of  the 
race  to  come  will  face  life  after  the  war  in  a  larger  spirit, 
with  heightened  imderstanding  and  far  wider  \-ahies  than 
of  old.  And  that  comprehension,  like  a  dawn,  is  brighten- 
ing the  eyes  of  all  the  Empire's  children,  now  meeting  in 
the  flesh  for  the  first  time,  and  mingling  in  such  sacred 
service  for  their  common  ^Mother,  that  henceforth,  from 
])alm  to  pine,  and  pole  to  pole,  must  quicken  a  mightier 
spirit  and  throb  a  steadier  heart. 

On  the  morning  of  this  day  I  had  read  the  biggest 
word  on  the  subject  that  had  yet  appeared  in  a  public 
print  —a  word  of  flame,  well  showing  how  once  again 
the  soul  that  inspires  our  Empire's  self-governing  colonics 
may  be  sought  to  breathe  wisdom  and  the  new  life  into 
the  aged  Motherland  ;  for  in  Canada,  Australia,  New 
Zealand  and  the  Cape  shall  be  found  a  Medea  with  en- 
chantments great  enough  to  bring  new  youth  to  the 
I'nited  Kingdom.  IMr.  Hughes,  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Australia,  has  been  sworn  a  Member  of  the  Canadian 
Privy  Council  and  attended  a  meeting  of  the  Cabinet  — 
an  event  at  once  unparalleled  in  the  chronicles  of  limpire 
and  golden  with  infinite  possibility. 


SORTES      SHAKESPEARIANv^, 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE. 


THE     KAISER. 

He  hath  iiu  friends  bul  who  arc  friends 

for  fear, 
Which  in  his  greatest  need  tvi'l    shrink 

from  him. 

RICHARD    HI.,  V.   ii..  201. 


THE    VOTE     OF     CREDIT. 

The  strongest  castle,  tciver  cr  tiivn, 
The  go/den  Inllcf  ben's  it  dczvn. 

THE     PASSIONATE     PILGRIM,     xix..    29  30. 


TO   THE    CONSCIENTIOUS     OBJECTOR. 

77iere  are  inore  things  in  heaven  and  earth, 

Hora'io, 
Than  are  dreamt  of  in  )our  philosophy. 

HAMLET.    L.    v..     165-7. 


LAND     AND     WATER 


^farch  2,  1916. 


THE    ART    OF    PENNELL. 

And  the  Graft  of  Germany  at  Work. 
By  Haldane  Macfall. 


BECAUSE  of  these  things  that  Pennell's  sKJlk-d 
hand  has  limned,  I  write  these  impressions  of 
the  latest  phase  of  his  art  in  a  vast  camp  of 
armed  men  where  battalions  upon  battalions 
lie  along  the  ridges  as  a  division  prepares  itself  for  battle. 
One's  mind  travels  back  some  thirty  years  to  the  day 
when  one  was  learning  the  craft  and  subtlety  of  battle 
oneself,  little  foreseeing  the  world  tumult  that  lay  forward  ; 
and,  curiously  enough,  out  of  that  distant  calm  comes  to 
me  amongst  many  impressions  the  work  of  a  young 
American  —Joseph  Penncll.  He  and  his  charming  wife 
were  cycling  over  the  Canterbury  Pilgrimage  and  he  was 
laying  the  foundations  of  that  sound  reputation  for 
journalistic  art  which  he  has  steadily  increased  ever  since 
— he  illustrating  and  she  writing  their  delightful  ad- 
ventures. I  use  the  word  "  journalistic  "  in  its  best  sense. 
The  pen  line  was  harder  and  the  hand  more  mechanical  in 
those  days  ;  but  the  drawings  were  fine  stuff,  and,  like 
most  of  Pennell's  work,  are  amongst  my  art  treasures. 
Pennell,  like  several  of  the  young  American  illustrators, 
must  have  been  under  the  intluence  of  Viergo  in  his 
beginnings  ;  but  as  his  hand's  skill  increased,  he  rapidly 
developed  a  free  use  of  the  pen  line  which  led  nj^  to  the 
s?rics  of  exquisite  pen-and-ink  landscapes  that  make 
the  HifiJiways  and  Byways  series  of  English  County 
histories  one  of  the  finest  achievements  of  modern 
illustration. 

Poems  of  Masonry. 

From  the  best  artists  of  the  age,  Pennell  has  taken 
and  added  to  his  technical  mastery  of  the  pen-line,  until 
his  large  drawings  of  cathedrals  and  other  buildings 
have  become  poems  in  the  interpretation  of  masonry. 
Curiously  enough,  his  small  pen-and-ink  work  always 
holds  something  of  the  large  vision  ;  his  very  large 
drawings  lack  this  largeness,  and,  for  all  their  charm,  seem 
to  be  deficient  in  strength  and  breadth.  This  paradox 
of  technique  is  easily  accounted  for,  when  we  come  to 
weigh  the  strength  and  the  weakness  of  Pennell's  vision 
and  utterance,  and  above  all  his  psychology  and  artistic 
character,  with  a  glimpse  at  his  intellectuality.  One 
does  not  take  the  trouble  to  examine  an  artist's  soul  to 
this  extent  imless  he  be  a  tiiie  artist  —and  Pennell  is  a 
true  artist.  Nor  can  these  drawings  of  "  Germany  at 
Work,"  which  appear  on  page  2  of  this  issue,  be 
appreciated  at  their  real  value  until  we  under- 
stand sometiiing  of  the  psychology  and  craft  of 
the  man  who  made  them  ;  and  who,  all  unv.itting  of 
the  thing  he  has  done,  has  by  his  very  coldness  of  vision 
and  lack  of  jiassion  added  to  the  damning  indictment 
against  the  Prussian. 

Perhaps  the  worst  inlUience  under  which  Pennell 
came  was  the  masterful,  aggressive,  and  mentally  un- 
scrupulous soul  .of  Whistler.  No  man  ever  talked  more 
utter  trash  about  art  and  in  a  more  exquisite  way  than 
Whistler :  no  man  when  he  set  to  work  to  create  art 
more  ruthlessly  rid  himself  of  his  intellectual  falsities 
and  surrendered  himself  more  to  the  thoroughly  emotional 
achic\ement  of  the  impression  he  desired  to  utter. 
Pennell,  realising  the  high  artistic  achievement  of  the 
man,  accepted  and  became  missionary  to  the  falsities  of 
his  intellect,  and  thereby  limited  his  own  powers.  We 
see  it  again  and  again  in  the  notes  which  he  sets  down 
in  his  catalogue  to  "  Germany  at  Work."  For  instance, 
"  all  great  work,  like  great  art,  is  the  carrying  on  of 
tradition."  This  is  a  half-truth  which  fails  utterly 
to  grasp  the  significance  of  art ;  it's  just  the  old 
beauty  fallacy  in  its  nightshirt.  Obviously  art  is  eternal 
but  craftsmanship  has  evolved,  and  it  is  precisely  in  the 
aping  of  a  dead  tradition  that  all  art  endeavour  finds  its 
grave.  We  see  Pennell's  intellectual  .self-deception  again 
in  such  a  passage  as  "  the  gasomet(Ms  are  built  inside  the 
great  castles,  and  so  become  picturesque  instead  of 
eyesores,"  bywhich  he  reallymeans  that  the  thing  which 
man  calls  a  gasometer  is  a  hideous  thing  and  astutely 
faked  by  the  Germans  in  liiding  it  inside  an  old  castle ; 


yet  the  greater  part  of  his  notes  are  given  to  glorifying 
factories  and  workshops  to  the  disparagement  of  castles 
and  cathedrals  !  Now  this  dishonesty  of  intellect  you 
will  never  find  in  Pennell's  artistry  :  the  moment,  like 
Whistler,  he  stops  talking  about  art  and  sets  to  work  to 
create  it,  he  reaches  fine  achievement.  It  is  Dr.  Jekyll 
and  Mr.  Hyde. 

His  Artistic  Utterance. 

Let  all  Pennell's  talk  about  art  go.  What  are 
the  limits  and  the  heights  of  his  artistic  utterance  ?  The 
chief  lack  is  absence  of  that  passion  or  intensitv  of  feeling 
by  which  alone  the  mightiest  art  is  created.  On  the  other 
hand  there  is  a  serene  sincerity  of  vision  that  gives  a 
rare  dignity  to  the  vision  of  the  man.  Take  for  instance 
the  drawing  of  "  Within  the  Lacc-Work  of  Steel  "  in 
the  Vulcan  Shij)yard  at  Hanaburg,  with  its  fine  perspec- 
tive and  cadence.  Pennell  confides  to  us  that  it  was 
"difficult  to  draw"  and  "  e.vciting  "  ;  we  realise  the 
draughtsmanship  but  we  get  no  hint  of  the  excitement. 
Or  take  the  fine  lithograph  of  "  The  Hut  of  the  Cape  of 
Good  Ho])e  Steel  Works  at  Oberhausen,"  with  its  beauty 
of  spacing  and  arrangement,  and  compare  the  cold 
hard  eye  of  this  man  who  saw  it  with  the  eye  of  such  a 
poet  as  Rrangwyn  or  Millet  or  Meunier.  Think  of  the 
dramatic  intensity  of  the  appeal  of  this  thing  to  Brangwyn, 
and  imagine  what  he  would  have  given  us,  and  we  see  the 
vast  gulf  that  separates  what  one  may  call  in  its  highest 
sense  "  pictorial  journalism  "    from  "  dramatic  art." 

I  am  dwelling  perhaps  a  little  unduly  and  with 
some  insistency  on  this  point  of  the  cold  deliberate 
%  ision  and  freedom  from  all  temper  in  Pennell's  display  of 
"Germany  at  Work"  in  order  to  press  its  high  value  to-day 
from  its  very  lack  of  passion.  Brangwyn  and  Meunier 
and  Millet  led  the  way  in  modern  art  to  the  revelation  of 
the  glory  and  wonder  of  work  ;  but  they  did  it  with 
intensity  of  temper  and  vision.  Look  at  one  of  Brang- 
wyn's  men  carrying  a  load  along  a  plank  gangway  from 
a  great  ship,  and  he  gets  the  power  of  the  thing  with  the 
joy  that  an  old  Greek  sculptor  got  out  of  carving  an  athlete 
in  marble.  With  Pennell,  no.  There  is  the  record, 
stated  with  exquisite  detail  and  balance,  of  a  witness. 
In  order  to  convince  one  of  his  joy  in  the  thing  he  has  to 
j)rint  it  in  the  catalogue  ;  he  has  subordinated  his  art 
to  his  intellect,  and  confined  his  emotional  statement  to 
his  self-criticism  of  the  limits  of  his  powers 

Proof  of  German  Intentions. 

It  so  happens  that  it  is  as  well  so.  If  we  needed 
proof  of  (icrmany's  vast  intention  to  set  out  and  over- 
whelm the  world,  it  could  be  found  in  this  cold-blooded 
evidence  of  Pennell's  that  is  without  bias  or  exaggeration 
or  sentiment — evidence  indeed  that  is  rather  admiration 
than  condemnation.  It  seemed  to  thinking  men  until 
a  few  years  ago  an  unthinkable  thing  that  a  whole  people 
could  have  been  organised  into  an  ambition  to  one  end. 
But  the  German  did  it ;  his  ver\'  narrowness  of  skuli 
and  that  aggressive  ignorance  called  Kultur  helping 
and  binding  his  sinews  to  the  fantastic  endeavour. 

The  day  the  Royal  House  of  Prussia  dropped  the  Pilot 
in  1890,  Bismarck,  as  he  stepped  from  the  helm  of  State, 
must  have  been  filled  with  a  strange  wonder  as  to  where 
his  teachings  were  going  to  lead  the  realm  that  he  had 
created  with  such  astounding  sKill  and  unscrupulousness. 
He  shook  his  head  at  the  councils  of  the  new  bloods  ;  he 
foretold  the  wreckage,  be  sure  of  it,  or  he  had  not  been 
dismissed  the  ship.  But  even  Bismarck  must  have 
stood  a-wonder  at  the  work  the  professors  had  already 
achieved— the  inoculation  of  high  and  low  with  the 
views  of  Germany's  destiny  as  the  lord  of  the  earth. 
Every  schoolboj',  every  student,  spectacled  doctor  and 
lawyer,  grocer's  boy,  waiter,  labourer,  soldier,  sailor, 
l^arson,  pauper,  poop,  and.  king,  had  decided  that  this 
slave-race  of  which  they  were,  could  by  organisation 
create  Germany  into  a  world-empire  and  niler  over  the 
earth.  To  that  end  they  bent  their  commerce,  their 
philosophy,  their  religionj  their  thinking,  their  God. 


■March  2,  iqxO. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


GHAYA. 

A  Romance  of  the  South   Seas. 
By  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoole. 


■  Synopsis  :  Macquart,  an  adventurer  who  has  spent 
most  Of  his  lite  at  sea,  finds  himself  in  Sydney  on  his  beam  ends. 
He  has  a  wonderful  story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in  New 
Guinea  and  a  chance  acanaintance,  Tillman,  a  sporting  man 
about  town,  fond  of  yachting  and  racing,  offers  to  introduce  him 
to  a  wealthy  woolbroker ,  Curlewis,  with  a  view  to  financing  the 
scheme.  Macquart  also  snakes  the  acquaintance  of  Houghton, 
a  ivell-educated  Englishman  out  of  a  job,  -who  has  done  a  good 
deal  of  yachting  in  his  time.  Curlewis  turns  down  the  scheme, 
though  Macquart  tells  his  story  in  a  most  convincing  manner. 
His  silent  partner  Screed  believes  in  it,  and  unbeknown  to 
Curle-ivis,  folloivs  the  three  men,  asks  them  to  his  home,  and 
agrees  to  find  the  ship  and  the  money,  on  seeing  that  Macquart' s 
hidden  treasme  map  agrees  with  an  Admiralty  chart.  The 
ship  is  the  yawl  "  Barracuda."  Screed,  on  the  morrow,  takes 
(he  three  men  over  the  "  Barracuda,"  with  which  they  are  de- 
lighted. Coming  away  Macquart  is  overtaken  by  an  old  friend, 
one  Captain  Hull,  who  hails  him  as  B — y  Joe,  and  accuses 
him  of  many  mean  crimes.  Macquart  gives  Captain  Htdl 
the  slip,  but  unbeknown  to  him  Hull  gets  in  touch  with  Screed, 
arid  enlightens  him  on  the  real  character  of  Macquart.  Just  as 
the  "  Barracuda  "  is  about  to  sail  Screed  takes  Htdl  on  board 
and  unexpectedly  introduces  him  to  Macquart  as  a  men}ber  of 
the  crew.  Before  the  ship  is  a  day  out  Captain  Htdl  makes  it 
plain  to  Macquart  he  is  on  the  look-out  for  his  "  monkey  tricks." 

CHAPTER  IX. 
A  V'isioN  OF  THE  Deep. 

THEY  passed  the  latitude  of  Point  Danger  with 
the  land  a  hundred  and  thirty  miles  to  port, 
drawing  closer  ashore  till  they  reached  25  degs. 
with  Great  Sandy  Island  showing  away  across 
the  blue  and  sparkling  sea. 

Never  were  adventurers  more  blessed  by  weather  ;  days 
of  azure  and  nights  of  stars  brought  them  steadily  north 
with  a  warm,  favourable  wind  that  made  life  a  delight.  The 
sails  needed  scarcely  any  handling,  watches  were  kept  anyhow 
and  Macquart,  who  had  promised  great  things  in  the  way 
■of  assistance  in  working  and  navigating  the  boat,  "  let  go 
all  holts,"  to  use  the  expression  of  Hull,  and-  retired  into 
himself,  snoozing  most  of  the  day  in  his  bunk  below. 

Hull,  on  the  contrary,  having  promised  nothing  and  com- 
ing on  board  in  fact  as  a  supercargo,  did  much.  He  took 
his  trick  at  the  wheel,  helped  in  the  navigation  and  slowly  and 
surely  from  the  very  first  day,  rose  in  ascendancy. 

He  was  an  older  man  than  any  on  board,  except  Macquart; 
he  was  a  very  big  man  physically  and  it  would  seem  that  he 
possessed  some  pinch  of  that  iron  stuff  of  the  soul  that  makes 
for  ascendancy.  However  that  might  be,  the  fact  remains 
that  by  the  time  they  had  reached  the  Point  Danger  latitude 
the  crew  of  the  Barracuda  had  shaken  themselves  down  just 
as  a  chemical  mixture  precipitates  itself.  Tillman,  who  had 
started  as  captain  had,  without  recognising  the  fact,  all  but 
given  up  his  position  to  Hull.  Jacky,  the  black  fellow,  owing 
to  his  practical  knowledge  of  the  sea,  immense  activity  and 
quickness  in  the  uptake,  had  come  out  of  the  galley,  so  to 
speak,  and  risen  to  a  sphere  of  usefulness  even  above  Hough- 
ton's. Macquart,  who  ought  to  have  been  leader  of  the 
whole  party,  if  not  captain,  had  sunk  to  the  bottom,  and  it 
was  the  plain  truth  that  here,  faced  with  the  actualities  of  the 
expedition,  he  appeared  to  have  no  more  sway  upon  the 
fortunes  of  the  business  than  any  cockroach  crawling  in  the 
cabin. 

I  say  "  appeared,"  for  Macquart  was  one  of  those  men  of 
whom  it  is  impossible  to  speak  definitely,  one  of  those  men 
who  are  never  ro  potent  or  so  dangerous  as  when  they  appear 
idle  or  innocuous. 

Things  were  like  this  when  an  event  occurred  thUt  brought 
Hull  even  more  to  the  forefront  and  consolidated  his  position. 
They  had  passed  the  latitude  of  the  Cumberland  Islands,  the 
tail  of  the  Great  Barrier  Reef  lay  by  computation  fifty  miles 
to  port  and  ahead  all  that  tangle  of'  reefs  and  cays  stretchmg 
from  the  Madelaine  Cays  to  Flinders  Reef.  The  wind  that 
had  been  holding  fair  and  steady  suddenly  dropped  and  they 
awoke  one  morning  to  find  themselves  drifting  in  a  glacial 
calm. 

Tillman  came  on  deck  at  six  lr>^  his  pyjamas  and  with  a 
tOTv-el  over  his  arm  ;  he  found  that  ^-cky  had  left  the  wheel 
and  was  busy  in  tlie  gallev.  The  Barracuda  with  her  beam  to 
the  swell  was  rolling  slightly  to  the  tune  of  creaking  cordage 
and  swinging  boom,'  the  air  was  still  and  breathless,  and  the 


great  sun  was  blazing  upon  a  world  of  water  and  sky  infinite 
and  wonderful  in  its  depths  and  shades  of  azure. 

The  sea  like  a  great  veil  of  sapphire-tinted  satin,  heaved 
in  wide  meadows  of  swell,  there  was  not  a  ruffle  on  its  surface 
and  all  to  the  east  it  blazed  back  the  light  of  the  sun  like  a 
mirror. 

"  My  word  !  "  said  Tillman.  He  stood  for  a  moment 
whistling  and  skimming  the  horizon  with  his  eyes,  when  he 
undressed  and  began  to  tub.  Jacky  leaving  the  galley  for 
the  purpose  of  throwing  buckets  of  water  over  him. 

As  he  dried,  Houghton  came  on  deck  followed  by  Hull. 

"  It's  a  dead  flat  cam,"  said  Hull,  standing  with  his 
hands  clasping  the  bulwark  rails  and  his  gaze  fixed  across  the 
sea,  "  and  I'd  sooner  see  a  gale  o'  wind — I  would  so — I'd 
sooner  see  a  gale  o'  wind." 

"  What  are  you  croaking  about  ?  "    said  Tillman. 

Hull  ruffled  at  this  and  for  the  first  time  on  the  voyage, 
showed  irritation. 

"  You're  a  damn  longshoreman."  said  he.  "  If  you  ain't 
alive  to  the  meanin'  of  a  ca'm  in  these  waters  with  the  drift 
we've  got,  you'll  maybe  liven  up  when  we're  aground  on 

some  b y  reef.     She's  been  drifting  half  the  night  and 

this  thing  may  last  for  days.     We're  a  long  sight  too  close  to 
that  there  Barrier  to  please  yours  trooly — that's  my  meanin'." 

Tillman,  seeing  the  other's  frame  of  mind,  went  below  to 
dress  whilst  Hull,  cutting  a  chew  of  tobacco,  stood  with 
his  back  to  the  bulwark  rail,  watching  and  criticising  Hough- 
ton, who  was  now  being  swilled  by  Jacky. 

"  I  never  can  understand  what  you  chaps  find  in  that 
sort  of  thing,"  said  the  Captain  who  was  ungiven  to  super- 
fluous washing.  "  If  a  chap  was  to  swill  water  on  me  like 
that  I'd  kick  him  blind  instead  of  payin'  him  tebbacca  to  do 
it  same  as  you  pay  Jacky.     It  ain't  nach'ral." 

"  It  bucks  one  up,"   said  Houghton. 

The  Captain,  having  no  answer  to  this,  walked  aft.  Then 
seeing  Jacky  coming  from  the  galley  with  a  steaming  coffee-pot 
in  his  hand,  he  went  below,  Houghton  followed  him,  and 
breakfast  was  served.  Canned  kippered  herrings,  fried  bacon, 
and  tomatoes  formed  the  meal.  Jacky  had  baked  some  rolls 
the  night  before  and  there  was  ship's  bread — which  nobody 
touched. 

Hull's  bad  temper  vanished  before  the  food.  His  appetite 
was  enormous,  and  he  was  proud  of  it ;  Macquart,  never  a 
great  eater,  had  come  from  his  bunk  unshaved  and  disre- 
putable-looking and  was  seated  before  a  cup  of  coffee.  Till- 
man and  Houghton,  fresh  from  their  tub  and  fiUed  with  the 
good  spirits  of  youth  were  talking  and  laughing  and  Jacky, 
having  served  the  food,  had  skipped  on  deck  again  on  Hull's 
order  to  keep  a  look-out  for  anything  he  might  see. 

The  Barracuda,  rolling  gently  to  the  swell,  kept  up  a  con- 
tuiuous  whine,  cordage,  blocks,  spars  and  timbers  all  lending 
voice. 

"  She  don't  like  hanging  idle,"  said  Tillman,  "  but 
there's  no  use  in  her  grumbling.  The  glass  is  steady  for  one 
thing." 

"  Ay,  it's  steady  enough,"  said  Hull.  "  I'd  sooner  see 
it  dropping  a  bit,  ca'ms  like  this  get  on  my  spine,  for  why 
I  don't  know.  It's  maybe  becos  I  was  laid  up  in  one  once 
in  the  old  Monterey,  a  three  master,  she  were,  forty  days  out 
of  London  bound  for  Durban.  Head  winds  right  to  Bathurst 
and  a  dead  flat  ca'm  on  the  line.  There  we  lay  and  rotted 
two  weeks,  short  o'  water,  and  seventeen  dozen  sharks  pokin' 
their  noses  round  her  starn  !" 

At  half-past  eleven  that  day — three  bells — Tillman, 
who  was  rigging  up  an  awning  with  the  help  of  a  spare  sail, 
had  his  attention  drawn  to  Hull  who  was  standing  shading  his 
eyes  with  his  hand  and  staring  over  the  sea  to  port. 

Tillman  left  his  work  and  looked.  A  quarter  of  a  mile, 
(jr  less,  away  a  strange  oily  patch  was  visible  on  the  surface 
of  the  water  and  even  as  he  gazed,  suddenly,  a  little  burst  of 
foam  broke  the  sea  surface. 

He  had  no  time  to  speak  before  Hull  was  on  him. 
"  We're  driftin'  on  to  shoals,"  cried  Hull.  "  Get  the 
boat  out  for  towin,  it's  our  only  chance."  He  rushed  to 
the  cabin  hatchway  and  called  to  the  fellows  below,  then, 
turning,  and  helped  by  Jacky  and  Tillman,  he  began  lowering 
the  boat  ;  when  she  was  water-borne  and  floating  alongside 
he  looked  round. 

"  Where's  Mac  ?  "   he  cried. 

"  He  hasn't  come  up  yet,"  repUed  Houghton. 

Hull  turned,  went  to  the  cabin  companion-way  and  dived 
below,  a  sound  of  shouting  and  struggling  was  heard  and  next 


LAND      AND      WATER 


March  2,   1916. 


moment  Macquart,  crimson  in  the  face  and  seeming  half 
strangled,  was  literally  shot  upwards  on  deck  as  though 
blown  by  an-  explosion. 

Hull  on  going  below  had  found  Macquart  lying  in  his  bunk 
reading  an  old  copy  of  the  Bulletin.  Ordered  on  deck  and 
refusing  the  order,  he  had  found  himself  suddenly  seized, 
half-throttled,  and  thrust  up  the  liatchway. 

All  the  animosity  of  Hull  for  this  old  time  partner  of  his. 
all  the  hatred  which  he  suppressed  and  kept  under  and 
covered  over  with  fair  or  jesting  words  had  suddenly  blazed 
out.  Tillman,  though  he  had  httle  time  to  think  recognised 
this  fact  and  took  a  momentary  chill  at  the  si{;ht  of  the  fury 
that  had  dwelt  among  them,  hid  away  and  sealed,  suddenly 
unbottled  like  this. 

Seizing  Macquart  by  the  scruff  of  his  neck,  Hull  rushed 
him  to  the  port  bulwarks  till  the  buttons  of  his  coat  clashed 
against  the  rail. 

"  Over  you  get."   he  cried. 

Next  moment  Macquart  was  in  the  boat,  the  tow  rope 
was  made  fast  and  she  forged  ahead,  Tillman,  Jacky,  Macquart 
and  Houghton  at  the  oars. 

Hull  remained  on  board  shouting  directions  and  attending 
to  the  tow  rope. 

As  Tillman  rowed,  some  instinct  prompted  him  to  take 
a  peep  over  the  gunnel  of  the  boat.  In  the  brilliant  water 
and  seeming  only  a  few  yards  beneath  the  surface,  he  saw 
rocks  streeling  fantastic  and  variegated  weeds  to  the  tide. 

Few  things  could  be  more  disturbing  than  that  sight  here, 
far  from  land  and  seemingly  in  the  midst  of  the  deep,  deep 
ocean.  It  had  a  touch  of  the  uncanny  ;  and  the  swell  made 
it  more  terrifying  still ;  for  the  swell,  though  so  wide-spaced 
as  scarcely  to  be  noticeable,  had  the  lift  and  fall  of  a  fathom 
so  that  now  the  rocks  would  be  clear-viewed  and  now  more 
vague,  and  nothing  is  more  soul  searching  than  that  trick 
of  the  sea  when  it  is  played  upon  one  in  mid-ocean.  But 
the  work  on  hand  gave  little  time  for  thought.  Of  all  the 
labours  of  the  sea,  towing  is  the  most  heart-breaking  when 
the  tow  is  of  any  size  and  unless  the  towing  boat  is  properly 
manned.  They  were  unused  to  this  special  work,  the  idle 
life  on  board  the  Barracuda  had  put  them  out  of  training  and 
the  heat  of  the  sun  was  terrific. 

Macquart  suffered  even  more  than  the  others  being  older 
and  having  less  use  of  his  muscles. 

Tillman,  who  rowed  stroke,  kept  his  eye  on  Hull  and  took 
his  orders,  and  the  Barracuda,  now  with  her  head  turned  away 
from  the  threatened  danger,  was  making  slow  progress  almost 
due  east. 

■'  There's  a  baling  tin  somewhere  in  the  bottom  of  the 
boat,"  said  Tillman,  "  fetch  it  up,  one  of  you  and  give  us  a 
shrice  all  round." 

Houghton  found  it  and  did  as  he  was  told,  and  then  the 
weary  work  went  on. 

After  nearly  an  hour  of  it,  dazed,  beaten,  with  scarcely 
an  ounce  of  energy  left,  they  were  suddenly  brought  to  hfe 
and  full  consciousness  by  a  hail  from  the  Captain. 

A  breeze  was  coming  up  from  the  southward.  A  huge 
violet  fan  of  ruffled  water  was  spreading  towards  the  Barracuda 
still  prisoned  in  the  dead,  crystalline  calm. 

They  laid,  the  boat  alongside  and  scrambled  on  board 
just  as  the  breeze  touched  the  canvas  and  the  main  boom 
swung  to  port.  Hull  had  unlashed  the  wheel  and  when 
they  were  on  deck  he  ordered  the  boat  to  be  streamed  astern. 

"  No  time  to  waste  pickin'  her  up  till  we're  clear  of  this 
tangle,"    he  shouted.     "  Get  to  your  places." 

)  The  mainsail  had  been  set  with  two  reefs  in  it  for  fear 
of  a  sudden  squall,  the  reefs  were  shaken  out,  then  foresail 
and  flying  jib  were  set  and  the  Barracuda  began  to  talk. 
Making  six  knots  and  with  the  dancing  boat  following  her  like 
a  dog  on  a  lead,  she  drew  off  steadily  to  the  east  nor'  east, 
leaving  the  region  of  shoals  and  reefs  behind  her. 

Hull  kept  the  lead  going  at  intervals.  Then  when  he 
considered  all  clear  water  ahead  he  brought  the  boat  in  and 
set  a  course  to  the  northward.  He  had  taken  command  of  the 
Barracuda.  Without  a  word  to  Tillman  or  the  others,  he 
bad  stepped  into  the  position  of  chief  man  on  board  and 
leader  of  the  expedition. 

When  the  boat  was  secured,  Hull,  who  was  now  at  the 
wheel,  began  to  talk. 

"  We've  been  near  done  for  by  lazing  and  bad  seaman- 
ship." said  he.  "  That  was  a  point  of  the  Barrier  Reef, 
which  means  to  say  we're  out  of  our  course  by  scores  of  miles, 
and  that's  your  fault,  Tillman.  I  should  a'  took  the  sun 
mjreelf  and  worked  the  reckonin'.  No  use  in  complainin' 
now,  we've  got  to  make  right  and  there's  no  manner  o'  use 
talkin'.  Then,  again,  the  watches  are  all  upside  down, 
we've  kep'  no  proper  look  out,  chaps  have  been  lyin'  in  their 
bunks  that  o  ght-  to  a'  been  on  deck.  That's  got  to  be  set 
right.     Now  then,  you,  whater  you  goin'  below  for  ?  " 

"  I'm  going  to  fetch  my  pipe,"  said  Macquart,  who  had 
his  foot  on  the  top  step  of  the  cabin  companion-way. 


"  You  stay  here  on  deck  till  I've  finished  talkin',"  said 
Hull.     "  You've  got  to  do  your  bit  along  with  the  rest  of  us 
and  no  skulkin'.     Up  with  you  and  stand  there  by  Jacky. 
I'm  going  to  pick  watches  with  Mr.  Tillman." 
Macquart  obeyed. 

"  I  takes  Mac,"    said  Hull. 

"  And  I  take  Houghton,"    said  Tillman. 

"  Right  you  are."  said  the  Captain,  "  and  Jacky  can  help 
as  wanted.  Now  then,  Mr.  Tillman,  you  can  go  below  with 
the  starboard  watch,  and  you,  Mac,  can  go  down  and  fetch 
your  pipe  and  don't  you  be  two  minutes  huntin'  for  it,  or  I'll 
come  after  you  and  liven  you." 

.As  Macquart  went  below,  Houghton  caught  the  glance 
he  shot  at  Hull  and  at  the  same  time  a  glimpse  of  the  enmity 
that  lived  between  these  two  men. 

CHAPTER   X. 

Torres  Straits. 

\HEY  passed    Latitude    15°  S.  and    entered  the  Coral 
Sea,  the  weather  growing  warmer  and  the  sea  bluer 
day  by  day,  and  the   nights  more   tremendous   with 
stars. 

To  Houghton  the  farther  they  went  the  more  did  the  world 
of  the  tropics  open  like  some  vast  and  mysterious  azure  flower. 
The  steamer  that  brought  him  to  New  South  Wales  had 
shown  him  little  of  the  true  mystery  of  this  world  of  the  sun, 
but  here,  in  the  Barracuda,  so  close  to  the  sea,  so  dependent  on 
the  winds,  so  touched  by  the  sun,  life  became  a  new  thing 
and  the  world  a  wonderland. 

Nautilus  fleets  passed  them  and  the  foam  flickers  flung 
from  the  fore  foot  of  the  yawl  looked  like  marble  shavings 
on  the  lazulite  of  the  sea.  White  gulls  chased  them  and 
flittered  hke  snowflakes  against  the  burning  azure  of  the  sky, 
and  ever  and  ever  the  tepid  wind  pursued  them  whilst  the 
Barracuda  snored  to  it,  lifting  her  stern  to  the  heave  of  the 
swell  and  filling  the  hull  with  the  whispering  and  slapping  of 
the  bow  wash. 

Black  fish  walloped  along,  sometimes,  as  though  racing 
them,  and  gulls,  fish,  nautilus  fleets  and  wind  all  seemed 
bound  and  hurrying  in  the  same  direction — the  Line  ;  the  very 
sea  that  bore  the  Barracuda  seemed  racing  towards  the  same 
goal,  as  though  the  world  and  all  in  it  were  pressing  forward 
to  some  great  carnival  of  colour  and  light. 

One  evening  they  sighted  Banks  Island,  swimming  in  a 
pearly  haze  on  the  far  horizon. 

iSanks  and  Malgrave  Islands  stand  out  in  Torres  Straits 
from  the  point  of  Cape  York  like  twins. 

"  That's  Banks,"  said  Hull,  "  it's  not  the  first  time  I've 
seen  it.     What  you  say,  Mac  ?  " 

'•  Well,"  said  Macquart,  "  if  you  are  sure  of  it  what's 
the  good  of  asking  me — yes,  it's  Banks  Island  right  enough." 

"  Well,  then,  why  can't  you  say  so  like  a  Christian  ?  " 
flared  out  Hull.  "  Blest  if  you  ain't  growin'  more  like  a 
m'hogany  image  every  day." 

"  We're  nearly  into  the  Straits,"  cut  in  Tillman,  who 
had  been  looking  at  the  chart,  "  isn't  it  a  bit  dangerous  to 
hold  on  like  this  at  night  ?  How  would  it  be  to  heave  to  oft 
the  coast  till  morning  ?  " 

"  Heave  to  ?  "  said  Hull.  "  Why,  it's  a'most  a  full 
moon,  and  she  rises  less  than  an  hour  after  sundown  ;  no,  sir, 
we'll  hold  as  we  are  and  run  the  Straits  with  the  help  o'  the 
wind.  I've  no  notion  of  hangin'  about  waitin'  for  another 
ca'm  or  maybe  a  gale,  to  pile  us  on  them  rocks  ;  glass  is  steady, 
but  glass  or  no  glass,  I'm  goin'  to  push  on.  I'm  mighty 
anxious  to  raise  that  river." 

Jacky  was  at  the  wheel.  Houghton,  belonging  to  Till- 
man's watch,  was  below.  They  went  down,  and  Hull,  getting 
the  charts  on  the  table,  laid  them  out.  There  was  the  big 
chart  of  the  New  Guinea  Coast  and  Torres  Straits  and  the 
track  chart  showing  their  course  and  Banks  Island. 

Hull  pondered  over  the  big  chart  on  which  was  marked 
the  point  of  disemboguement  of  Macquart's  river.  J 

"  When  we  pass  Banks,"  said  he,  "  we'll  be  a  hundred 
and  eighty,  or  maybe,  two  hundred  miles  from  the  river 
mouth,  allowin'  for  current  and  not  wishin'  to  pile  her  on  the 
reefs,  I  take  it  we'll  be  nosin'  into  the  mouth  of  that  river  day 
after  to-morrer  mornin'.  //  the  wind  holds.  It's  just  on  the 
edge  of  Dutch  Guinea.  Y'see,  up  here,  if  the  chart  showed  it, 
would  be  the  Fly  River,  that's  all  British.  Well,  Mac,  you'll 
have  some  pilotin"  to  do  day  after  to-morrer  mornin'." 

Macquart's  eyes  were  singularly  bright  and  he  seemed 
to  have  shaken  off  the  black  dog  that  had  been  on  his  back 
for  the  last  week  or  so.  Maybe  it  was  the  near  approach 
to  the  scene  of  his  dreams,  or  maybe  it  was  some  other  cause, 
but  cheerfulness  had  him  in  her  keeping. 

Houghton,  who  had  tumbled  out  of  his  bunk  to  help  in 
the  consultation,  noticed  the  fact. 
"  Yes,"  said  Macquart,  "  I  seem  to  smell  the  place  already, 


\ 


20 


March  2,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 

ii'ii>iip,jj(<yiwrgw>?.wr»'- 


Chaya,  «  Romance  of  the  South  Seat  j 


[inuslnilcd  b<j  Juieph   Simpson,  li.B.A. 


"Over  you  get,"  he  cried. 


and  I'm  thinking  you'll  have  your  work  cut  out  too,  towing 
her  up  unless  the  wind  is  dead  astern." 

"  We'll  do  our  endeavours."  said  the  captain.  "  And 
now,  whiles  we've  got  the  chance  with  a  good  offin'  and  nuthin' 
to  trouble  us,  let's  lay  our  dispositions.  '  It's  fifteen  years  and 
more  since  you've  been  up  that  river,  Mac— oh,  I  know  all 
that  yarn  of  jiow  you  got  the  chart  and  location  from  a  chap 
named  Smith,  but  we'll  suppose  you  was  one  of  Lant's  crew 
—we're  all  gentlemen  here  together,  and  there's  no  use  in 
hidin'  things  up.  I  don't  want  to  get  at  none  of  your  secrets 
they  wouldn't  be  no  use  to  me,  but  what  I  do  want  to  know 
is  this :  How  were  them  natives  disposed  that  time  you  were 
here,  were  they  a  fightin'  lot  or  mugs  readv  to  play  their 
souls  for  coloured  beads  ?  " 


"  The  natives  are  all  right,"  said  Macquart,  "  if  they  arc 
treated  right." 

Houghton,  who  had  heard  Macquart'sstorv  as  told  to  Cur- 
lewis,  felt  aghast  at  Macquart'scool  half  acceptance  of  Hull  s 
suggestion  that  Macquart  had  been  one  of  Lant's  crew.  If 
that  were  so,  then  it  was  almost  certainly  Macquart  who  had 
assisted  Lant  in  the  sinking  of  the  Terschelling  with  her  crew 
aboard,  and  who  had,  in  turn,  done  away  with  Lant  himself, 

■'  Well,"  said  Hull,  "  we  must  leave  it  at  that.  I've  never 
more  than  snuffed  the  New  Guinea  coast,  but  whether  they're 
friendly  or  not,  we've  got  the  arms  and  the  bullets  to  down 
them  with  if  they  make  trouble.  Now  we'll  go  o\'er  them. 
Mr.  Tillman,  will  you  fetch  out  your  rifles  and  small  arms  for 
an  overhaul ?  " 


2T 


LAND      AND      WATER 


March  2,  1916. 


Tiilman  went  to  the  locker  where  the  arms  were  stored. 

He  had  arranged  with  Screed  for  the  arming  of  himself 
Houghton  and  Macquart.  Tliere  were  three  Winchesters  and 
three  Savage  automatic  pistols  with  ammunition. 

He  brought  them  to  the  table  and  Hull,  having  cleared 
away  the  ch  rts,  the  weapons  were  placed  on  it  for  inspection. 
The  ammunition  was  kept  in  another  locker.  Tillman  fetched 
the  cases  of  cartridges  and  placed  them  by  the  rifles. 

Hull  made  a  careful  examination  of  the  lot ;  then  he 
said  : 

"  There's  a  rifle  and  a  pistol  apiece  for  us  three.  Mac, 
here,  is  not  a  fighting  man,  Iiis  business  is  to  nose  out  the 
stuff,  our  business  is  to  s  and  by  with  the  guns.  Did  you  ever 
by  any  chance  see  chaps  out  shootin'  with  a  dog  ?  The  dog 
noses  out  where  the  birds  is  hid  and  the  chaps  with  the  guns 
stand  by  to  lire.     Well,  Mac's  our  dog — ain't  you,  Mac  ?  " 

Macquart  made  no  reply  for  a  moment,  then  he  laughed. 

"  You  can  put  it  like  that,"  said  he.  "  Well  what 
more's  to  be  done  ?  " 

The  (  aptain  loaded  one  of  the  automatic  pistols  and  put 
it  in  his  pocket  with  a  packet  of  cartridges.  Then  he  loaded 
the  two  others  and  gave  one  to  Hougliton  and  one  to  Till- 
man, also  a  packet  of  cartridges  apiece. 

"  Being  nearly  on  the  spot,"  said  he,  "  it's  time  for  us 
to  get  ourselves  in  trim  ;  the  rifles  can  go  back  in  the  locker  and 
I'll  keep  the  key."  He  placed  the  Winchesters  and  ammuni- 
tion in  the  locker  and  pocketed  the  key. 

As  they  went  on  deck  Houghton  recognised  that  what  had 
just  taken  place  was  not  only  the  arming  of  himself  and  his 
companions,  but  the  disarming  of  Macquart. 

He  took  Tillman  aside.  'The  moon  had  just  risen  and 
was  hanging  like  a  great  shield  of  burnished  brass  above  the 
sea  line.  Banks  Island  lay  on  the  port  quarter  and 
before  them  To  res  Straits  lay  spread  in  the  mysterious  light 
of  the  new  risen  moon  and  the  waxing  stars. 

"  Tillman,"  said  Houghton.  "  Did  you  hear  what  the 
Captain  said  to  Macquart  ?  " 

"  I  did,"  said  Tillman. 

"  You  remember  Macquart's  tale,  how  John  Lant,   the 
Captain  of  the  Terschelling,  took  his  ship  up  the  river,  cached 
•  the  gold  and  tlien  sank  the  ship  with  the  crew  in  the  fo'c'sle, 
and  how  one  of  the  crew,  John  Smith,  had  helped  him  ?  " 

"  I  do." 

"  How  Lant  married  a  native  woman,  Caya." 

"  Chaya,"   corrected  Tillman. 

■'  Yes,  Chaya — and  how  Smith  did  away  with  Lant,  and 
then  had  to  escape  without  the  gold  because  Chaya  suspected 
him." 

"Yes." 

"Well,  Smith  was  Macquart." 

"  It  looks  hke  it." 

"  Macquart  it  was  that  helped  in  the  sin  king  of  the  ship;  it 
was  Macquart  who  did  away  with  John  Lant.  It's  as  plain  to 
me  as  that  moon.  My  God,  Tillman,  if  I  had  known  I'd  never 
have  come  on  this  expedition." 

"  There's  no  use  worrying  now  "  said  Tillman.  "  We're 
here  and  we  have  togo  through  with  it  even  if  we  are  bound  to 
go  hand-m-hand  with  a  murderer." 

"  There's  more  still,"  said  Houghton.  "  I  see  now  why 
Macquart  let  fifteen  years  go  by  without  returning  to  look  for 
that  gold." 

•  Why  ?  " 

"  Why  ?  Can't  you  see.  Lant  s  wife,  that  native  woman. 
Chaya,  was  after  him  for  his  life  when  he  escaped  ;  he  would 
not  have  dared  to  return  till  she  was  dead  or  had  forgotten 
him.  He  told  me  a  yarn — he  told  us  all — that  he  had  been 
years  hunting  about  the  world  before  he  could  get  anyone  to 
join  him  in  an  expedition  ;  that  was  bunkum.  The  plain  truth 
is  that  he  had  not  the  courage  to  go  back,  he  was  afraid  of 
this  woman.  I  feel  it  by  instinct  that  he  is  afraid  even  now. 
But  fifteen  years  is  a  long  time  and  he  reckons  that  she  is 
either  dead  or,  if  alive,  that  she  will  not  recognise  him." 

"  If  she  is  alive,  and  if  she  recognises  him,  we'll  never 
leave  that  river  with  our  heads  o>  us,"  said  Tillman. 

"  You  have  put  it  exactly  "  replied  Houghton.  "  But 
I'm  not  afraid  of  that.  I  don't  lay  much  store  by  life,  what 
daunts  me  is  Macquart." 

"  How  ?  " 

"  He  makes  my  stomach  crawl,  he  seems  to  me  now  the 
incarnation  of  everything  evil.  I  hate  to  be  on  the  same  boat 
with   him.     He's  a   nightmare." 

"  He's  not  a  bad  imitation."  said  Tillman.  "And  the 
funny  thing  is  that  up  till  a  few  weeks  ago  he  was  a  pleasant 
■enough  fellow.  He's  been  slowly  getting  disagreeable,  some- 
how, though  he  has  done  nothing  and  said  nothing  much  ;  it's 
as  if  there  was  something  in  the  sea  air  or  the  life  a'board 
that  has  made  the  badness  in  the  blighter  ooze  out  without 
his  knowing  it — then  this  business  to-night  puts  a  cap  on 
everything." 

"  I'm  afraid  of  him,  and  that's  the  truth,"  said  Hough- 


ton. "  I'm  not  funking  anything  he  may  do  to  me  or  to  us. 
I'm  afraid  of  him  just  as  a  man  is  afraid  of  a  ghost  or  a  devil. 
I've  often  heard  parsons  talk  of  Evil  and  Wickedness  and  all 
that,  but  I've  never  felt  the  thing  till  now.  Yes,  he  seemed 
all  right  at  first  ;  that  morning  I  met  him  in  the  Domain  at 
Sydney  he  fascinated  me  same  as  a  fairy  tale  might  fascinate 
one — but  now — ugh  !  " 

"  Well,  there's  no  use  in  bothering  about  that,"  replied 
the  other.  "  If  you're  out  on  the  gold  trail  you  can't  expect 
saints  along  with  you,  there's  nothing  collects  devils  like  gold. 
The  thing  for  us  to  do  now  we  are  forewarned  is  to  be  fore- 
armed. \Ve  have  to  keep  a  precious  sharp  eye  on  this  chap, 
for  I  tell  you,  it's  my  humble  opinion  he'd  do  the  lot  of  us 
in  just  for  the  pleasure  of  the  business,  leaving  alone  the  profit. 
He  hates  Hull  like  all  possessed,  and  Hull's  got  the  bulge  on 
him.  Did  you  notice  how  neatly  the  Captain  has  left  him 
without  a  gun — Hull's  a  peach." 

"  I  tell  you,"  said  Houghton  earnestly,  "  that  though  I'm 
afraid  of  this  chap,  just  because  of  what's  in  him,  the  thing  I'm 
really  afraid  of,  as  far  as  our  success  and  safety  go  is,  not 
Macquart,  but  the  woman — if  she's  alive." 

■'  Well,  let's  hope  she's  dead,"  said  Tillman. 

He  shaded  his  eyes  and  looked  ahead.  Houghton,  looking 
in  the  same  direction,  saw  a  smudge  on  the  sea  and  in  the 
midst  of  it  a  spark  of  hght. 

"  It's  a  steamer,    said  Tillman. 

He  called  Hull,  who  was  standing  by  the  wheel,  to 
look. 

"  She  s  coming  up  fast."  said  the  Captain.  "  A  lot  too 
fast  for  a  freighter,  she's  the  Hong  Kong-Brisbane  mail  boat 
most  like  ;  well,  them's  that  are  fond  of  steam  may  use  it,  but- 
give  me  masts  and  yards.  Now,  there's  half-a-dozen  chaps 
in  brass-bound  hats  aboard  that  hooker  as'd  turn  up  their 
noses  at  the  hkes  of  you  and  me,  but  give  'em  a  head  wind  and 
half  a  sea  and  what  are  they  on  ?  A  shower  bath !  Swep' 
fore  and  aft  they'd  be.  I've  had  one  turn  as  foremast  hand  on 
a  Western  Ocean  tank  and  I  was  swimmin'  most  of  the  way  to 
N'  York.     Look  at  her." 

She  was  passing  a  quarter  of  a  mile  away.  A  big  white- 
painted  boat,  grey  in  the  moonlight,  crusted  with  lights  and 
with  the  green  starboard  light  staring  full  at  the  little  Barra- 
cuda. 

A  faint  strain  of  music  came  across  the  water  with  the 
murmur  of  the  engines. 

"They'll  be  after  their  dinner,"  said  Hull,  "with  the 
ladies  sitting  on  the  deck  and  chaps  in  b'iled  shirts  smokin' 
cigars  over  them.  I've  been  deck  hand  on  a  Union  boat  for 
a  voyage,  and  I've  seen  'em  and  I'd  sooner  be  greaser  on  a 
Western  Ocean  cattle  truck  than  first  officer  on  one  of  them 
she  male  boats.     There's  some  sense  in  qattle." 

Houghton  watched  whilst  the  big  liner  pounded  away  mto 
the  moonlight  and  star  shimmer  of  the  night.  That  glimpse 
of  civilisation  was  inexpressibly  strange,  seen  here  from  the 
deck  of  the  Barracuda,  bound  upon  the  wildest  of  adventures 
and  surrounded  by  the  wastes  of  the  tropic  sea. 

{To   be  cotitimtctl.) 


Some  of  the  most  unostentatious,  but  none  the  less 
invaluable  war  workers,  are  those  women  who  go  to  the  differ- 
ent hospitals  one  or  more  days  a  week  and  help  to  mend  the 
linen  there.  Every  day  there  is  plenty  of  work  in  a  hospital 
linen-room  and  help  is  always  wanted.  Expert  needlewomen 
have  rarely  been  able  to  use  their  skiU  to  better  advantage 
than  by  keeping  sheets,  table  linen,  etc.,  in  good  repair. 

The  latest  way  of  arranging  tulips  is  to  place  them  in  deep- 
stemmed  glass  goblets,  cutting  the  stalk  to  such  a  length  that 
none  of  it  is  seen  above  the  edge  of  the  vase  only  the  pink, 
red,  or  yellow  of  the  flower  itself.  The  tulips  are  packed 
closely  together,  so  that  they  are  very  hke  a  'Victorian  posy, 
and  the  effect  is  certainly  an  original  one,  even  if  it  lacks 
somewhat  in  grace  in  the  eyes  of  those  to  whom  the  stalk  of 
a  flower  is  one  of  its  most  beautiful  parts. 

Once  again  there  is  a  decided  effort  towards  the  crinoline. 
If  it  is  not  the  crinoline  in  actual  reaUty,  it  is  as  passable  an 
imitation  as  can  possibly  be  achieved  in  these  days.  This  is 
brought  about  by  means  of  the  hooped  skirt,  the  hoops  being 
introduced  just  below  the  hips,  and  swaying  rather  gracefully 
with  each  movement  of  the  wearer. 

The  cold  winds  of  the  first  months  of  the  year  will  find 
an  antidote  in  the  fur-lined  motoring  veils  which  protect  the 
ba  k  of  the, head  and  the  ears  in  the  most  efficacious  manner. 
These  veils  are  lined  downwards  for  al)out  a  quarter  of  their 
length,  and  the  fur  used  is  generally  squirrel  lock  on  account 
of  its  exceptional  ligh  ness.  They  fit  cosily  over  close- 
fitting  hat,  and  make  all  the  difference  to  the  motorist. 


}<;,ltwtnt    to   LAN*    ASB    Water,    March   9, 


AQUASCUTUM 

FIELD  i  TRENCH  COATS. 


So  many  worthless  Imitations  are 
being  advertised  that  it  is  most 
essential  that  Officers,  for  their 
own  protection,  should  read  the 
GENUINE  letters  from  those  who 
have  been  in  the  Trenches,  and  have 
therefore  proved  the  superior  merits 
of  the  AQUASCUTUM  over  all 
other  coats. 

FROM  THE  TRENCHES  : 

"  It  stood  the  Winter  in  the  Trenches 
simply  splendidly.  I  know  no  better  coat." 
Capt.  P. 

"  I  have  nothing  but  praise  for  its  wet 
and    rain-resisting   qualities.'*     OoL    N. 

"  I  cannot  speak  too  highly  ol  my 
Aquascutum,  aa  it  has  had  many  severe 
tests  and  has  always  proved  to  be  abso- 
lutely waterproof."  Lieut.  N. 

"  Continuous  wear  in  and  out  of  the 
Trenches  had  naturally  told  on  it  a  bit, 
but  otherwise  it  is  perfectly  good.  I  can 
never  wish  for  a  better  coat."    Capt.  B. 

"  I  wore  it  continuously  from  the  13th 
to  the  I8th,  and  slept  in  it  in  muddy  and 
damp  trenches,  and  for  the  major  part 
of  the  time  it  was  raining.  I  am  glad  to 
say  the  coat  kept  me  absolutely  dry  the 
whole  time."  Lieut.  0. 

"  I    have   used    one   out    here    for    six 
months,  and  though  it  is  now  very  shabby, 
it  Is  still  quite  proof  against  any  rain." 
Lt.  Col.  L. 

"Che  Originals  of  ihe  above  letters 
can   be  seen    by    anyone   Interested. 


AQUASCUTUM     Ltd., 

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THE     "SERVICE"       COAT., 

A  trustworthy  waterproof  is  a  pos- 
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since  getting  wet  is  so  often  followed 
by  ill-health,  and,  at  least,  must 
cause  real  discomfort.  Mounted  or 
afoot,  the  "  Service  "  Coat  ensures 
complete  protection  through  any 
rain.  It  is  a  slip-on  which  gives  to 
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,\  "  Service  "  Coat,  with  this  snug  woollen 
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.       When  ordering  a   "Senrict"    Coat,    or  II    to  b. 
W       sent  on  approval,  height  and  chest  measure,  and 
reference,  should  be  given. 


J.  C.  CORDING  &  C?- 

Waterproofers  to   H.M.  the  King 

Only     Addresses  ■' 

19  PICCADILLY,  W.  &35ST.  jamess  st. 


1 


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LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVi  No.  2809. 


THTTT?c;nAV     \TAT?rH    n     mrfi  tpublished  asi   pr  ic  r  sixpence 

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Drawn   exclusively  /or   "Land  and    Water." 


VERDUN  :    STORMING    "  L'HOMME    MORT." 

Hohenzollern  Madness. 


Ill 

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> 

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V) 

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B 
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March  g,  1916. 


LAND      AND      \\'  A  T  E  R 


LAND  &  WATER 

Empire    House,    Kingsway,    London,    W.C. 

Telephone  :     HOLBORN     2828. 

THURSDAY^,    MARCH    9,    1916. 

THE    TWO    OBJECTIVES. 

A  LTOGETHER  apart  from  its  purely  military 
/^L  siiE;niricance,  the  struggle  still  going  on  around 
/■ — ^  Verdun  possesses  a  very  special  interest  as 
■^  -*-  illustrating  the  marked  difference  of  motive 
which  now  dictates  the  military  policy  of  the  contending 
powers.  These  motives  will  in  all  probability  become 
more  and  more  divergent  as  the  war  proceeds  ;  and  it 
will  be  well,  if  wo  are  to  take  a  just  view  of  the  future 
progress  of  the  war,  to  take  this  opportunity  of 
examining  them. 

For  about  a  fortnight  the  German  forces  have  been 
engaged  in  a  prolonged  and  very  violent  attack  against 
that  section  of  the  French  line  which  may  be  called  the 
salient  of  Verdun.  The  attack  has  been  deUvered  with 
great  determination  and  at  an  extravagant  cost  in  lives. 
So  far  it  has  met  with  no  solid  success.  The  French  have 
met  it  \vith  forces  kept  deliberately  inferior  in  number  to 
those  of  their  opponents,  and  at  an  expense  of  life  smaller, 
out  of  all  proportion,  than  that  which  they  have  been  able 
to  exact.  They  have  fallen  back  deliberately  and  at  a 
moment  chosen  by  themselves  from  their  original  ad- 
vanced positions,  thus  yielding  certain  ground  ;  but  the 
attempt  to  dislodge  them  from  the  line  of  heights  which 
forms  their  present  main  defensive  position  has  so  far 
failed.  That  is  what,  up  to  the  moment  of  writing,  has 
actually  happened  ;  but  it  may  be  well  to  go  further  and 
ask  what  the  German  command  was  really  attempting 
and  why  it  was  attempting  it. 

Of  course,  if  the  encny  could  have  succeeded  in 
breaking  through  the  French  line  and  rolling  it  up,  north 
and  south,  such  a  result  would  be  well  worth  the  utmost 
sacrifice  of  men  that  he  could  commatid  ;  for  it  would 
be  a  decision  and  would  for  the  moment,  at  least,  put  an 
end  to  all  danger  to  his  security  from  the  west.  Most 
probably  he  thought  that  he  could  do  this.  But  even 
if  he  could  only  have  hoped  to  have  found  himself  in 
a  position  to  compel  the  French  to  abandon  the  salient 
of  Verdun,  and  to  fall  back  upon  some  other  line  behind 
that  city,  a  result  which  he  valued  would  have  been 
attained. 

Now,  it  is  cjuite  certain  that  that  objective  would  not, 
from  the  purely  military  point  of  view,  be  worth  the 
sacrifice  of  much-needed  men  which  the  enemy  has 
already  made  and  which  he  must  continue  to  make  for 
some  time  to  come  if  he  is  to  pursue;  his  end.  If  it  occurred 
— which  now  seems  far  from  probable — it  would  not  be  a 
decision,  it  would  not  put  the  Allied  armies  out  of  action 
or  relieve  the  enemy  from  apprehension  as  to  the  safety 
of  his  \\'ostern  front.  The  importance  of  Verdun  as  a 
fortress  has  virtually  ceased  to  exist,  and  all  that  the 
Germans  would  have  gained  would  have  been  so  many 
more  square  miles  of  almost  useless  standing  ground.  The 
inference  is  that  the  objective]  of  the  enemy  is  not  [only 
military,  but  also  moral  or,  as  one  might  say,  political. 

In  pure  strategy  the  capture  of  Verdun— or  of  the 
ground  upon  which  the  forts  of  Verdim  had  once  stood — 
would  be  no  great  thing  ;  but  the  Germans  evidently 
think  that  it  might  have  far  reaching  and  important 
political  results.  Not  only  would  it  reassure  civilian 
opinion  in  Germany  itself,  but  it  might  prevent  certain 
neutral  nations  from  coming  in  on  our  side,  while  pro- 
ducing in  others  an  im]M-ession  that  the  Germanic  powers 


were  still  moving  from  victory  to  victory,  ri^ully  it 
might  affect  in  the  same  fashion  civilian  opinion  in  the 
Allied  countries,  and  especially  in  this  country,  and  so 
make  it  possible  for  Germany  to  conclude  a  peace  on 
terms  more  favourable  than  she  can  otherwise  hope  to 
obtain. 

It  would  be  easy  to  tind  in  the  enemy's  own  dispatches 
conlirmation  of  this  view  of  his  present  objective.  Mr. 
Belloc  gives  a  striking  example  elsewhere  in  this  paper. 
The  temporary  cajjture  of  an  important  part  of  the 
plateau  of  Douaumont  was,  so  far  as  it  went,  a  genuine 
military  success,  and  might  well  have  been  claipied  as 
such.  The  capture  of  the  jort  of  Douaumont  was  merely 
the  capture  of  an  empty  shell.  Nevertheless  the 
Germans  claimed  the  capture,  not  of  the  plateau  but  of 
the  "  fortress."  That  means  that  they  were  appealing 
not  to  military,  but  to  civihan  judgment. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  principle  of  the  f  rench 
commanders  to  take  note  of  military  considerations  alone. 
They  will  yield  ground  wherever  they  choose,  an4  allow 
the  Germans  to  claim  "  victories  "  wherever  they  choose 
provided  they  can  make  each  advance  sufficiently  expen- 
sive to  the  enemy.  They  will  meet  each  assault  with 
the  minimum  number  of  men  inflicting  the  maximum 
amount  of  loss.  They  will  be  careful  to  keep  in  being  as 
large  an  untouched  reserve  as  possible  against  the  time 
when  in  their  judgment  a  decisive  blow  against  the 
enemy   may   most    hopefully   be   struck. 

Now  these  two  policies,  which  appear  in  such 
marked  contrast  throughout  recent  operations,  really 
depend  upon  the  same  consideration,  which  from  hence- 
forward must  necessarily  pro\-e  the  dominant  factor 
in  the  war.  It  is  a  consideration  which  has  from  the  first 
been  continually  einphasised  in  these  columns.  It  is 
now  admitted,  even  by  those  who  were  at  most  pains  to 
deny  or  belittle  it.  It  is  the  approaching  exhaustion 
of  the  German  reserves. 

A  foolish  suggestion  has  been  put  forward  in  some 
quarters  that  this  approaching  exhaustion  is  di.sproved 
by  the  gigantic  effort  which  the  Germans  are  now  piaking. 
This,  of  course,  is  the  exact  reverse  of  the  trutji.  The 
effort  does  not  disprove  the  fact  referred  to  ;  but  the  fact 
explains  the  purpose  of  the  effort.  No  one  ever  sug- 
gested that  the  enemy  was  already  seriously  crippled  by 
the  lack  of  effectives.  What  has  been  maintained,  and 
what  is  now  admittedly  true,  is  that  he  must  ev'entually 
iind  himself  so  crippled — and  that  at  no  very  distant 
date — because  he  possesses  no  reserves  sufficient  to  keep 
his  army  at  full  strength  by  replacing  losses.  Therefore 
he  cannot  afford  to  w^ait.  Before  that  time  arrives  when 
his  reserves  fail  him,  he  must  cither  obtain  a  decision,  of 
which  he  probably  now  despairs,  or  alternatively  must 
produce  so  considerable  an  effect  on  opinion  in  Allied 
and  neutral  countries  as  may  enable  him  to  make  peace 
on  terms  which  shall  at  least  leave  his  military  power  in 
being.  He  has  no  choice  save  to  make  some  move 
which  may  give  him  the  chance  of  producing  such  an 
effect.     If  he  awaits  the  event  he  virtually  accepts  defeat. 

The  ^ame  considerations  which  make  it  necessary 
for  the  Germans  to  force  an  immediate  issue  if  they  can, 
dictate  the  wise  policy  of  the  Allies  in  refusing,  so  far  as 
possible,  such  an  issue,  until  the  enemy  is  further  weak- 
ened, and  the  exhaustion  of  his  reserve  begins  to  tell.  This 
is  the  settled  policy  of  the  soldiers,  both  French  and 
British,  and  it  is  an  eminently  sound  one. 

But  the  enemy's  attack  is  primarily  on  civihan  opinion, 
and  it  should  be  our  business  to  see  to  it  that  that  attack 
is  ineffective.  The  soldiers,  who  alone  are  qualified  to 
judge  in  such  matters,  have  the  whole  business  in  their 
hands,  as  they  ought  to  have.  Th«y  are  determined  upon 
the  military  annihilation  of  Prus.sia  as  the  only  end  worthy 
of  the  sacrifices  of  this  war.  Tlicy  believe  that  they  can 
achieve  it.  It  should  be  our  affair  to  see  that  they  are 
not  embarrassed  or  diverted  from  their  task  by  ajiy  such 
civilian  clamour  as  the  enemy  ardently  desires  to  see 
raised  in  this  country  and  elsewhere.  They  will  strike 
when  they  arc  ready,  and  what  we  can  all  do  is  to  await  the 
event  with  reasoned  and  therefore  increasing  confidence. 


1.  A  \  D      AND      ^^'  A  T  E  R 


March  o.   I0i6. 


ATTACK  ON  WEST  OF  THE  MEUSE. 


By  Hilaire  Belloc. 


WITH  Monday,  the  fiftccntli  day  of  this  great 
battle  of  Verdun,  and  the  seventeenth  since 
the  cannonade  first  opened,  the  German 
offensive  developed  a  new  feature,  the  fate 
of  which  only  the  future  can  determine,  the  motive  of 
which  we  can  <Mily  estimate. 

I  suggest  that  this  motive  is.  immediately,  to  free 
the  ground  in  front  of  Poi\re  Hill  from  French  artillery 
fire  and  so  permit  a  -direct  attack  there  unmolested 
upon  its  flank.  Ultimately,  if  the  push  is  unexjjectedU- 
successful  and  rapid,  to  turn  the  main  position  which  the 
I'Vench  have'now  sucoessfulK'  held  for  so  manv  davs 
frnni  Uras  to  Douaumont. 

It  is  clear  that  an  ad\ance  along  the  Western  >ide 
of  the  Meusc  up  to  \'erdun  would  turn  the  main  position 
from-  Bras  to  Douaumont  ;  that  is,  would  get  behind 
and  rend  cr  it  untenable.  The  now  large  French  force  on 
that  main  position  would  have  to  retireor  would  be  lost. 

The  emniy's  success  or  failure  in  this  main  or  ulti- 
mate object,  does  not  depend  upon  his  capture  of  the 
advanced  lines  upon  the  (ioose  Crest  or  behind  Chattan- 
court.  I  It  depends  upon  his  approach  to  and  seizing  of 
the  height  marked  on  my  map  with  a  thieli  black  line  H^li. 
und  Inioun  in  that  country  side  as  Charny  Ridge. 

1  will  take  these  points  in  their  order. 

The   First  Advance. 

If  the  reader  will  look  at  the  general  map  printed 
over  page,  which  I  must  make  tlie  general  reference 
for  the  whole  of  this  article,  he  will  percei\-e  that  from 
the  point  marked  A  where  there  is  a  small,  pronounced 
bend  in  the  Mcuse  v'wqv,  to  the  point  marked  B  nearly 
h  miles  away,  a  sinuous  succession  of  heights  from  two 
to  three  hundred  feet  abo\-e  the  le\e]  of  the  stream  com- 
mands its  left  bank. 

In  the  first  phase  of  the  battle  the  enemy  attacked 
a  thin  F'rcnch  covering  line  which  lay  from  the  \illage 
of  Brabant  opposite  the  point  "  A,"  ran  through  the 
wood  and  in  front  of  the  village  of  Hauniont,  then  tluough 
the  big  wood  of  Caures  and  so  Xo  Herbebois  Wood  and 
in  front  of  Ornes  to  "  C."  By  successive  retirements 
(as  we  have  seen)  the  French  on  the  Thursday  night,  the 
fourth  day  of  their  retreat,  the  24th  of  February,  had 
reached  their  main  position  nmning  from  the  \illage 
of  Bras  along  the  crest  beliind  the  \illage  of  Louvemont 
and  so  in  a  horseshoe  to  the  plateau,  village  and  fort 
of  Douaumont.  This  main  position  I  liave  indicated  by 
a  line  of  crosses  upon  the  map.  All  this  German  advance 
was  pursued  along  the  right  or  eastern  bank  of  the  river 
Meuse,  with  the  result  that  the  Frendi  batteries  upon  the 
sinuous  line  of  hills  across  the  stream  commanded  all  the 
coimrty  occupied  by  the  Germans  in  their  ad\ance  and 
abandoned  by  tlie  French  in  their  retirement.  French 
batteries  posted  everywhere  among  these  hills  swept  the 
castcili  country  beyond  the  river  in  the  lines  of  the 
arrows  and  rendered  the  ground  very  diflicult  for  con- 
tinuous enemy  action.  The  only  relief  from  this  dominat- 
ing fire  was  found,  first  in  the  \ery  hea\y  bombardment 
to  which  the  Germans  subjected  the  French  batteries 
on  this  western  side,  secondly,  of  course,  in  the  di.gging  of 
trenches  by  night  to  shelter  the  German  troops  occupying 
the  eastern  side,  and  thirdly  in  the  portions  of  grciund 
which  lay  behind  the  slopes  and  were  sheltered  from  the 
shells.  But  all  these  three  combined  did  not  prevent 
German  action  in  this  newly  occupi(>d  belt  being  gravely 
hampered,  and  in  particular  the  Cote  du  Poivre  or 
Pepper  Hill,'  the  capture  of  which  would  have  turned 
the  whole  F'rench  position,  could  not  be  successfully 
assailed.  The  French  position  ujwn  it  held  firm  because 
all  the  valley  in  front  running  u]>  from  V'aucherauville 
and  the  hill  called  Talou  was  untenable  under  the  French 
enfilading  fire  from  the  further  bank. 

If  the  French  had  held  their  first  line  in  strength  as 
the  Germans  chd  in  Champagne  five  months  ago.  and 
had  the  Germans  broken  this  first  line,  which  thev  j^ro- 
bably  believed  to  constitute  the  main  French  front  (the 


ilnc  A-C  from  Brabant  to  Ornes),  then  the  fact  that  the 
French  still  held  the  western  side  of  the  Meuse  woukl 
have  been  of  little  advantage  to  them  or  hurt  to  the  enemy. 

The  front  once  broken  the  whole  I'Vench  line  would 
have  had  to  retire.  At  the  worst  a  fatal  gap  would  iia\«- 
appeared  in  it.  at  the  best  it  would  ha\e  had  to  fall  back 
behind  Verdun.  But  of  cmirse,  the  French  were  followin.,' 
anentirely  diflerent  tactic,  as  we  now  know.  So  far  from 
attempting  io  hold  their  foremost  positions  in  strength, 
they  left  the  smallest  number  of  men  possible  to  cover  a 
successive  retreat  and  did  not  projiose  to  stand  until  the 
main  jxi.-iition,  the  ridge  from  Bra>  Village  to  the  l^latiau 
of  Douaiuuont  was  reached.  Therefore  the  German 
advance  between  the  very  foremost  French  lines  at  At" 
and  the  main  position  on  the  hor.seshoe  ridge  between 
Bras  and  Douaumont,  an  advance  covering  about  one 
mile  a  day  at  the  broadest,  as  it  did  not  so  much  as  shake 
the  I-'rench  line,  left  the  l-'rcnch  beyond  the  river  quite 
free  to  pound  all  that  belt  from  the  further  bank  of  the 
Meuse.  The  French  batteries  lying  behind  t  he  hills  and  in 
the  woods  of  the  Goose  Ridge,  of  Chattancourt  of  Mai  re, 
etc.,  and  their  fire  observed  and  corrected  from  (h:- 
summits,  continually  shelled  the  ground  beyond  the 
stream  at  effective  ranges  of  from  _;  to  8  thousand  yards. 

This,  as  we  ha\c  just  seen,  rendering  the  capture  of 
the  hill  of  Pfjivre  impossible,  the  great  (ierman  effort 
was  launched  on  Douaimiont  Plateau  upon  Saturday  thi? 
26th  of  February  and  nearly  succeeded,  coming  uj)  the 
ravine  marked  R-R  on  the  map.  Such  an  attack  was 
quite  Tuimolested  by  the  F'rench  guns  on  the  West  of  the 
Meuse,  and  moreover  had  it  succeeded  would  have  cut 
off  all  the  h'rench  upon  the  main  ])osition  and  would  have 
invohed  the  destruction  of  the  force  there  occupied. 
The  fate  of  that  attack  we  know.  It  got  no  further  than 
Douaumont  Fort  and  Douaumont  Village  where  it  now 
stands  apparently  checked  and  lea\ing  the  French  main 
position  intact.  The  battle  reached  tliis  final  form  last 
Saturday  night,  ^larch  4th,  and  remained  in  the  same 
situation  on  Sunday,  March  5tli.  For  ten  days  the  belt 
of  territory  between  Brabant  and  Poivre  Hill  had  lain 
largely  at  the  mercy  of  the  F-rench  guns  upon  the  further 
or  western  bank  of  the  Meuse.  If  the  attack  by  Douau- 
mont was  to  fail  there  remained  the  possibility  of  again 
combining  it  with  an  attack  upon  Poivre  Hill,  if  only 
the  belt  in  front  of  Poivre  Hill,  particularly  the  Hill  of 
Talou,  could  be  saved  the  menace  of  French  lire  from  the 
other  side  of  the  river.  With  the  immediate  object  of 
achieving  this,  the  enemy  last  Monday  at  the  opening  of 
the  third  week  of  tlie  great  struggle  began  his  first  infantry 
attack  upon  the  left  or  western  bank  of  the  Meuse. 

There  happened  there  exactly  what  happened  in  the 
initial  great  effort  east  of  the  river.  The  I'rcnch  front 
line  had  run  before  the  battle  from  D  to  A,  just  in  front 
of  the  village  of  Forges.  The  Germans  carried  that 
position  upon  Monday  morning  and  apparently  upon  the 
same  day  before  the  evening,  attacked  the  long  ridge 
called  the  Cote  De  I'Oie  or  "Goose  Crest."  Before 
evening  thev  had  carried  RegncHille  and  then  tackled 
the  hill  itself. 

This  crest  (from' winch  you  dominate  all  the  northern 
part  of  the  belt  the  Germans  had  just  occupied  beyond 
the  ri\-er)  is  a  fairly  level  ridge  with  two  rather  higher 
summits  at  either  end,  4,000  yards  apart.  That  mwx 
Regni(-\ille.  some  250  feet  above  the  Meuse,  is  called 
Hill  265  from  its  "height  in  metres  above  the  sea  ;  the 
other  summit  about  66  fefet  higher  is  called  the  Mort 
Homme.  The  enemy  launched  a  division  at  Hill  265 
and  carried  it.  Early  the,  next  morning  they  were  in 
occu])ation  of  the  wood  of  C'orbeau.\  or  "  C  ow  Wood  " 
at  the  foot  of  the  Mort  Homme. 

So  far  and  no:  further  goes  the  news  received  in 
London  at  the  moment  of  writing  this,  Tuesday  after- 
noon. The  heights  directly  overlooking  the  occupied 
belt  beyond  the  rivci-  from  A  to  as  far  as  E  are  no  longer 
under  the  direct  observation  of  the  French  gunners,  and 
the  French  line  upon  the  western  side  of  the  Meuse  runs. 


Marcli  9,  1916. 


LAND      AND      \^'  A  T  E  R 


of  this  h'eight  ? 


or  ran  when  the  despatch  left  Paris  on  Monday  night, 
from  in  front  of  Bethincourt  (which  was  still  held)  down 
to  the  river  somewhere  abont  F,  following  the  dots  and 
dashes  upon  the  plan. 

Charny  Ridge. 

The  immediate  object,  then,  of  this  move  is  to  clear 
the  left  or  western  bank  of  the  river  of  French  gun 
))ositions  which  render  a  decisive  attack  upon  the  left 
of  the  French  main  positions  Poivre  Hill,  impossible. 
The  ultimate  object  may  be  a  new  development  upon  this 
front  as  active  and  determined  as  that  which  appears 
to  be  now  held  in  check  upon  the  further  front  at  Douau- 
mont. 

1  have  said  that  such  an  ultimate  object  would  be 
tlie  turning  of  the  main  French  position  on  the  Douaumont 
heights,  by  an  advance  direct  on  Verdun  along  the 
western  side  of  the  Meuse.  I  have  also  said  that  the  test 
of  such  a  policy  would  not  be  the  clearing  of  the  advanced 
positions  but  an  approach  to  and  capture  of  the  Ridge  of 
Charny. 

\\'hat  is  the  importance 

(i)  It  is  the  continuation  of  the  Main  position  on 
tlie  other  side  of  the  river.  Though  lower  (it  is  only  300  feet 
above  the  river)  it  exactly  prolongs  the  hill  of  Poivre. 

(2)  It  is  the  last  main  position  on  this  side  covering 
^'erdun.  It  is  supplied  by  a  railway  running  parallel 
behind  it  and  is  close  to  every  form  of  accumulated 
supi^h'.  It  was  the  line  of  advanced  works  in  the  days 
when"  \'erdun  was  a  fortress.  Two  dismantled  and 
abandoned  forts  stand  on  it  to  this  day. 

(3)  It  is  a  united  open  and  continuous  height  from 
the  wood  at  H  to  the  River  at  B  with  a  long  bare  natural 
glacis  sloping  down  northward  gently  without  an  inch 
of  dead  ground  anywhere  and  enfiladed  from  the  spur  at 
K  so  long  as  this  is  held. 

On  all  these  counts  the  reaching  to  and  carrying  of 
th'j  Ridge  of  Charny  would  seem  to, be  here  the  test  of 
enemy  success  or  failure  on  the  western  bank  as  the 
failure  to  carry  the  ridge  Poivre- jjouaumont  was  the  tes  ■. 
of  failure  on  the  eastern. 

The  Difficulty  of  Attack  by  the  Woeuvre. 

Meanwhile,  the  question  has  -Occurred  to  many 
people  in  this  country  why  the  German  attack,  if  it  were 
rhecked  at  Douaumont  was  not  renewed  further  down  to 
the  south  from  the  \\'oeuvre  Plain,  so  as  to  turn  the  whole 
position  round  by  the  extreme  right;  There  has,  as  we 
know,  been  a  violent  attack  upon  the;  village  at  Vaux, 
and  there  have  been  some  days  ago  attacks  on  I'.ix 
Station  and  half  the  village  of  Manheulles  has  ])een 
carried, 


Upon  the  analogy  of  other  actionsin  this  wai;  when 
the  Germans  have  similarly  attacked  heights  upon  a 
narrow  sector  and  have  failed,  we  might  expect  the  battle 
to  extend  gradually  along  the  only  line  open  to  it— in 
this  case  to  the  south.  The  Meuse  forbids  co-operation 
between  two  attacks  upon  either  side  of  it  and  one  might 
imagine,  indeed  many  critics  have  stated  it  as  probable, 
that  an  attack  foiled  along  the  northern  sector  would 
try  its  charges  further  and  further  southward  in  the  hope 
of  effecting  somewhere  a  breach  in  the  defence  of  Verdun, 
trying  for  weak  places  in  succession  one  after  the  other 
along  the  escarpment  of  the  hills  where  they  fall  into  the 
plain  of  the  Woeuvre. 

That  is  what  happened  at  the  curiously  similar 
battle  of  the  Grand  Couronne  eighteen  months  ago  when 
the  Ciermans  were  broken  in  their  attempt  to  force  a 
corresponding  sharp  set  of  heights  covering  Nancy. 

Moreover,  the  fact  that  they  attacked  Vau.x  without 
success  upon  Friday  the  3rd  of  March,  a  week  after  their 
main  assault  on  Douaumont  was  checked,  might  lead 
one  to  such  a  conclusion. 

But  there  are  difficulties  in  working  from  thp 
Woeuvre  up  to  the  heights  of  the  Meuse  which  are  not 
apparent  from  the  map  alone,  and  it  is  the  ignorance  of 
these  difficulties  which  has,  I  think,  misled  not  a  little  of 
contemporary  study  on  the  estimation  of  this  action. 

The  Woeuvre  is  a  mass  of  clay,  full  of  marsh  9,nd 
stagnant  ponds  at  this  season  of  the  year,  and  especially 
after  such  a  winter  as  this,  a  very  difficult  ground  of 
manoeuvre,  and  difficult  or  impossible  save  along  special 
lines  for  the  motor  traffic  and  heavy  guns.  1  hjive 
myself  seen  whole  patches  in  it  where  the  trenches  were 
interrupted  by  wet  land.  Neither  side  could  dig,  and 
the  marsh  as  effectively  caused  a  gap  in  the  lines  as  would 
a  lake. 

Now  in  such  a  situation  the  only  main  line  of  attack 
possible  is  along  tlst  high  roads  and  the  made  causeways 
of  the  railways.  You  can  deploy  troops,  of  course, 
over  the  wet  land — you  can  make  some  sort  of  going. 
But  the  supply  even  cf  small  arm  ammunition  in  a  big 
amount,  and  virtually  all  your  pieces,  tied  to  these 
roads.  Now  the  sketch  map  will  show  that  these  oppor- 
tunities of  advance  are  e.xceedingly  rare.  To  be  accurate 
they  are  exactly  four  in  number. 

There  is  the  road  leading  to  Vaux  from  Diejijie 
■•^which  last  village  the  French  abandoned  many  days  ago 
ri  the  withdrawing  of  their  line).  This  road  (marked 
'  on  the  map),  served  for  the  narrow  column  of  attack 
which  attempted  Vaux  and  failed  last  In-iday. 

Two  miles  south  of  this  is  the  great  main,  national 
road  from  Paris  to  Longwy  and  Luxembourg,  by  wav 
of  VAinn  and  Longuyon  (one  of  the  many  places  where 
the  clergy  were  massacred  in  the  early  days  of  the  wm) 


L  A  NM)      AND     \\'  A  T  E  R  . 


March  9,  1916. 


along  which  a  similar  narrow  column  of  attack  advanced 
successfully  against  Kix  Station  a  week  ago  and  was 
repelled.  Closely  following  this  road  runs  the  railway, 
and  I  have  marked  it  upon  the  above  sketch  map  with 
the  number  2. 

The  third  road  is  a  small  country  road,  but  hard  and 
with  a  good  surface,  which  runs  eastward  as  far  as 
Moran\ille  and  then  turns  southwards  making  for 
Chatillon,  only  on  the  reaching  and  taking  of  which 
village  can  the  assault  of  the  heigiits  with  their  crowning 
batteries  begin. 

This  road  I  have  marked  "  j  "  upon  tiie  sketch. 
It  presents  a  characteristic  making  it  very  difticuit  for 
use  in  attack,  which  is  that  on  reaching  Moranville  a 
column  following  it  -is  presented  in  flank,  and  at  the 
short  range  of  only  j,4(M)  yards,  to  batteries  behind,  and 
obser\ing  from  the  little  lum])  of  clay  in  tiie  I'lain 
called  "  Hill  255."'  The  approach  to  Moranville  itself 
is  hidden  from  the  observers  by  a  little  depression,  but 
the  road  going  southward  out  of  Moran\ille  towards 
Chatillon  follows  a  slight  cle\'ation  above  the  brook  called 
Voche,  and  is  murderously  exposed,  not  onl\-  to  the  field 
guns  just  under  the  escarpment,  but  to  the  batteries  on 
the  escarpment  itself,  and  is  under  full  observation  from 
the  summit  of  the  hills.  That  is  why  the  Germans  the 
other  day  made  so  determined  an  attempt  to  capture 
this  obser\ation  point  and  shelter  for  field  batteries 
called  Hill  235.  As  we  know,  they  failed,  and  probably 
if  we  knew  the  details  we  should  lind  that  they  failed  from 
the  state  of  the  ground  once  the  high  road  was  left  bv 
the  troops  deploying  northward  against  Hill  255. 

But  after  this  Moran\ille-Chatillon  road,  which  is 
so  inconvenient  for  their  purpose,  there  is  nothing  they 
can  use  until  you  get  to  the  great  national  road  from 
Paris  to  Metz,  more  than  five  miles  away.  This  road  I 
have  marked  4  upon  the  sketch. 

It  in  its  turn  was  the  a\-enue  of  approach  for  a  dense 
and  narrow  column  (supported  by  troops  in  a  wood  to 
the  north  of  the  place)  which  did  succeed  in  carrying 
ManheuUes  village  ten  days  ago,  but  could  not  quite 
reach  the  west  end  of  those  ruins. 

It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  while  we  might  reason 
from  our  knowledge  of  the  country  that  the  enemy  could 
only  use  the  few  roads  for  his  advance,  and  would  there- 
fore be  compelled  to  advance  in  narrow  columns,  we  also 
find  from  experience  that  he  has  so  attacked  and  has  been 
confined  to  that  attack  and  has  been  unable  to  deploy  in 
the  horrible  mud  of  the  W'ocuvre. 

There  is  a  further  point  to  be  considered  in  this 
connecl.'on.  Not  only  is  the  Wocuvre  the  impossible 
soil  I  have  described,  but  precisely  because  the  enemy  is 
entirely  confined  in  it  to  artificial  causeways  the 
junctions  of  those  catiseways  are  very  vulnerable  points  in 


his  communications.  Etain,  Warcq,  the  cross  roads  of 
Aulnois  (which  get  their  name  from  a  farm  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood) Henneville,  and  the  little  bit  of  road  just 
south  of  Fromezey  with  its  branches  leading  north  and 
south,  Abaucourt  and  Moranville  itself  are  under  the 
long  range  guns  concealed  in  the  woods  upon  the  heights 
of  the  Meuse.  The  very  longest  range  involved,  that  of 
E*tain  and  Warcq,  is  only  11,000  yards.    The  other  ooints 


are  at  lesser  ranges  averaging  =5,000  to  8,000.  Further, 
the  roads  of  approach  over  the  Woeuvre  are,  in  nearly  all 
their  length,  observable  from  the  sunnnits,  lying  below 
one  as  upon  a  natural  map.  All  these  things  combined 
make  attack  in  strength  from  the  \\'oeuvre  at  this  time 
of  year  exceedingly  difficult,  and  break  the  parallel  with 
the  Battle  of  the  (irand  Couronnc  which  developed  south- 
ward indeed  when  the  first  Northern  attacks  had  failed, 
but  from  much  harder  soil  and  in  the  height  of  the 
summer. 

Certain   General  Considerations. 

While  the  great  battle  thus  stands  still  undecided, 
it  may  be  well  lo  recapitulate  certain  general  considera- 
tions, most  of  them  I  fear  already  familiar  to  the  reader, 
but  necessary  to  be  borne  constantly  in  mind,  if  we  are 
to  understand  the  objects  and  methods  of  the  opposing 
forces. 

(i)  The  French  deliberately  refuse  to  make  a  main 
point  of  their  foremost  positions.  Their  whole  theory 
in  tactics  as  in  strategy  reposes  upon  the  reser\ed  mass 
of  manoeuvre. 

(2)  Consequently  we  must  alwaj-s  expect  advanced 
positions  at  the  beginning  of  an  action  of  delay,  that  is, 
when  they  are  on  the  defensive,  to  be  successi\-ely 
abandoned,  and  this  is  not  done  without  a  loss  of  prisoners 
and  guns. 

(j)  The  enemy  is  probably  calculating  in  the  main 
upon  a  superiority  of  munitionment  for  the  moment. 
Hence  his  lavish  expenditure  for  already  more  than  a 
fortnight.  The  lulls  in  the  battle  have  nothing  to  do 
with  bringing  up  of  guns,  which  occupy  much  the  same 
positions  they  did  on  February  25th,  the  fourth  day  of 
the  battle  and  the  end  of  the  retirement  of  covering 
troops.  They  have  to  do  with  the  replenishment  of 
shell,  especiaily  heavy  shell. 

(4)  Even  now  after  more  than  a  fortnight  of  battle 
the  French  have  not  moved  their  general  reserve. 

(5)  Failing  the  breaking  of  the  French  defensi\-e 
front  as  a  whole,  the  only  criterion  of  success  or  failure 
is  in  the  purely  military  sense,  the  comparative  expendi- 
ture in  men.  The  whole  French  effort  is  aimed  at  making 
this  expenditure  immensely  greater  upon  the  enemy's 
side. 

(6)  But  from  the  enemy's  point  of  view  there  is  an 
obvious  immediate  political,  as  well  as  an  ultimate 
military  object  to  be  obtained.  He  will  therefore  cer- 
tainly be  prepared  to  sacrifice  a  very  much  larger  number 
of  men  than  he  has  already  sacrificed  if  by  that  ex-penditurc 
he  can  put  a  few  soldiers  into  the  ruined  suburbs  of  Verdun 
town,  as  he  has  put  a  few  soldiers  into  the  ruined  suburbn 
of  Soissons  town.  Meanwhile  he  is  hoping  to  deplete  the 
French  reserve  of  shell. 

Certain  Details. 

The  scandalous  scaremongering  about  the  Fokker 
machine  is  now  dead,  but  the  following  points  may  be  ol 
service. 

The  Fokker  is  simply  a  French  Morane  machine. 
It  existed  as  a  Morane  machine  in  (iermany  long  before 
the  war.  The  German  copy  of  the  Morane  machine  wa? 
not  a  rough  copy  but  an  exact  copy  down  to  the  smallest 
details  and  down  to  measurements  of  a  millimetre  foi 
nearly  all  its  parts.  There  is  some  difference  in  the 
angle  and  cur\ature  of  the  wings.  There  is  the  replace- 
ment everywhere  of  wood  by  metal,  save  in  the  battens 
of  the  wings.  It  is  slightly  more  complicated  in  itv 
apparatus  of  alightiitg  (though  preserving  the  character- 
istic "  M  ")  and  there  is  a  little  difference  in  the  rudder. 

While  upon  this  subject  we  may  note  the  correction 
of  a  false  German  Communique  which  I  think  has  not 
been  noted  in  this  country.  This  communique  appeared 
on  the  28th  of  January  aiid  stated  that  starting  from 
the  1st  of  October,  1913,  the  Germans  had  lost  up  to  that 
date  (the  28th  of  January)  16  aeroplanes  and  the  Allies 
63.  The  statement  is  simply  a  falsehood.  The  true 
figures  for  the  period  were  13  English  losses  and  17 
r>cnch,  making  a  total  of  30.  The  ascertained  German 
losses  in  the  sanie  period  were  11  on  the  English  front 
and  20  cm  the  iMcnch  front,  making  a  total  of  31. 

This  somewhat  belated  information  leads  us  to 
insist   once   more   upon   the   utility — I   should   say   the 


March  9,  lOiG. 


LAND      AND     WATER 


necessity  at  this  stage — of  frequent  official  pronounce- 
ments. The  Government  had  possession  of  these  liguix's. 
\V}iy  on  earth  did  they  allow  the  C.ernian  lie  to  go  un- 
contradicted ? 

A  correspondent  has  sent  me  a  typical  piece  of  enemy 
propaganda  in  the  shape  of  a  piece  of  rubbish  published 
in  a  Swedish  paper,  which  appears  in  Gerrnan  interests. 
This  nonsense  is  curiously  like  the  sort  of  thing  that 
has  been  scattered  broadcast  by  the  same  agency  in 
America,  and  it  confirms  one's  judgment  upon  the  nature 


of  this  propaganda  m  neutral  countries,  which  has  bcttn 
remarked  on  repeatedly  in  L.WD  .■xnd  W.\tek. 

It  gives  the  J^ritish  casualties,  aj)art  from  sickness, 
at  over  a  million  (!)  The  casualties  of  the  other  Allies 
are  given  with  a  little  less  e.vaggeration.  Characteristi- 
cally enough  it  is  more  accurate  about  the  Russian 
casualties  than  about  any  other  because,  presumably, 
it  is  supposed  that  the  Swedish  public  will  have  a  better 
chance  of  judging.  But  the  linglish  figures  are  enough 
to  test  such  stuff. 


GERMAN        LOSSES.— (Continued). 


FINAL    STATEMENT    CALCULATED    TO     THE    END    OF    1915. 
31    MILLIONS    IRREDUCIBLE    MINIMUM. 


IN  pursuance  of  the  analysis  dependent  upon  in- 
formation, the  basis  of  which  my  readers  already 
know,  I  will  continue  and  conclude  in  this  week's 
number  the  calculation  of  German  losses. 

We  must  remember  in  this  calculation  that  we  are 
only  concerned  with  a  minimum.  We  are  estimating 
a  number  below  which  such  losses  cannot  fall. 

The  groundwork  of  the  whole  calcuiati  on  is  the 
number  of  dead. 

We  arrived,  in  the  first  part  of  this  study,  published 
two  weeks  ago,  at  a  clear  and  conclusive  minimum  with 
regard  to  the  number  of  German  dead  \\\>  to  the  last  day 
of  1915.  We  have  conclusive  proof  that  this  number  is 
not  less  than  one  million. 

Our  problem,  therefore,  is  to  establish  the  very  least 
number  of  men  "  off  the  strength  "  of  a  force  in  this  war 
at  a  moment  when  the  deaths  alone  in  that  force  amount 
to  one  million. 

The  readers  of  this  paper  are  familiar  wnth  the  fact 
that  such  an  estimate  involves  two  ciuite  separate  ele- 
ments : 

(i)  We  have  first  of  all  to  establish  the  number  of 
men  who  can  never  return  to  full  active  service  because 
they  are  either  dead  or  prisoners,  or  rendered  by  wounds 
or  by  sickness  permanently  unfit  for  the  firing  line.' 

(2)  When  we  have  established  this  chief  element 
we  have  to  add  to  it  yet  another,  to  wit,  what  has  been 
called  here  "  The  permanent  margin  of  temporary  losses  "; 
That  is,  the  number  of  men  in  hospital  who  will  return 
to  the  army,  but  are  for  the  moment  off  the  strength. 

So  much  being  postulated  let  us  begin  with  the 
estimate  of  permanent  losses  up  to  the  end  of  the  vear 
1915- 

L — Permanent  Losses. 

Permanent  losses  are  made  up  of  four  categories 
which,  between  them,  cover  the  whole  ground  : — 

[a)  The  dead. 

[b)  The  prisoner.^. 

[c)  The  "  disabled  wounded,"  that  is,  the  woun- 

ded who  can  never  return  usefully  to  the 
fighting  line. 
((/)  The  "  disabled  sick,"  that  is,  those  who, 
similarly  disabled  by  sickness  contracted 
in  service,  cannot  retiu'n  usefully  to  the 
fighting  fine. 

[a)   The  Number  of  Dead. 

This  we  already  have,  and  it  is  the  basis  of  our 
calculation.  It  is  a  minimum  of  one  million  up  to 
December  31st,  1015.  We  kno\y  that  even  the  official 
lists  come  within  19  per  cent,  of  that  truth,  and  we  have 
noted  the  conclusi\e  arguments  which  make  the  full 
number  certainly  more  than  19  per  cent,  atiove  the 
official  lists.     We  shall  in  amon^ent  see  how  this  basic 

(i)  As  an  example  of  liow  it  iriay  be  more' and  cannot  be  less,  we 
may  take  the  proportion  of  deaths  from  disease.  The  proportion  of 
such  deaths  admitted  in  the  German  lists  is  less  than  3  p.-r  cent,  of 
the  total  deaths.  Even  allowing,  as  we  have,  for  the  iinpi  irfection  of 
those  lists  to  the  extent  of  one-fifth,  this  would  give  for  the  <leaths  from 
disease  not  so  much  as  6  per  cent,  of  the  total?  Yet,  on  the  analogy 
of  one  large  category  of  troops  fighting  in  Northern  !■' ranee 
under  conditions  less  rigorous  than  some  of  tltose  the  Germans 
have  had  to  suffer  in  the  East,  and  exactly  erihivatent  to  tl  lose  which 
they  have  had  to  siiffor  in  the  VVc.-^t,  the  rea'l  proportion  of  dc  aths  from 
disease  tc  the  total  deaths  turns  out  to  be  not  '.  (lor  cent  but  iu-t 
over  g  per  cent. 


number  of  one  million  should  be  treated  in   our  con- 
sideration of  the  other  categories. 

[h)   The  Ntimbet  oj  German  Prisoners. 

This  is  known  accurately  for  the  Western  front,  and 
has,  I  believe,  been  communicated  for  the  Eastern  front. 

It  is  the  fixed  and  wise  policy  of  the  Allies  not  to 
inform  the  enemy  with  any  detail  w.th  regard  to  the 
prisoners  he  has  lost.  But  I  may,  without  indiscretion, 
give  a  minimum  number  which  will,  when  the  full  official 
statistics  are  available,  be  discovered  to  be  -mthin  the 
truth.  A  quarter  oj  a  million  is  no  exaggeration,  but 
200,000  is  far  too  low  a  figure.  It  is  a  very  small 
number  when  we  consider  the  length  of  time  over 
which  the  operations  of  the  Germany  Army  have  been 
conducted,  and  shows  with  what  skill  the  co-ordination 
of  every  retirement  was  arranged. 

(c)   The  Wounded. 

In  this  category,  we  must  begin  with  a  gross  number 
from  which  deductions  will  be  made  '\u  due  course,  to 
arrive  at  the  nett  estimate. 

Our  basis  of  calculation  is  necessarily  here  an  analogy 
with  the  known  figures  of  corresponding  losses  in  the  other 
forces  engaged,  coupled  with,  and  modified  by,  certain 
considerations  peculiar  to  each  force  engaged. 

Let  me  begin  with  the  figures  most  familiar  to 
readers  in  this  country,  the  Colonial  and  British  figures. 

The  most  carefully  analysed  British  figures  publicly 
available  are  those  of  Jaimary  28th  last,  referring  to  the 
final  date,  January  9th. 

The  total  number  given  for  dead  in  France  and 
Flanders  (which  is  the  only  proper  basis  of  comparison 
because  the  naval  ligures  of  course,  have  no  relation  to 
Land  warfare  and  the  Gallipoli  figures  are  abnormally 
swelled  by  the  e.Kceptional  death  rate  from  disease,  and 
the  cramped  positions .  there  held)  is  87,268  ;  the  total 
number  of  wounded  259,207.  This  gives  to  every  man 
dead  almost  exactly  3  men  wounded. 

But  that  figure  is,  for  proportion  of  the  British 
wounded  to  dead  in  France  and  Flanders,  too  high  ;  for  it 
docs  not  include  as  dead  any  of  the  missing. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  when  we  were  finding  the 
number  of  German  dead,  the  deduction  of  prisoners  from 
the  total  of  missing  gave  us  an  important  additional  item.- 
We  must  try  and  make  a  similar  item  for  the  British 
lists.  Unfortunately,  an  essential  clement  in  the  calcu- 
lation is  lacking.  We  know  to  within  a  very  close  figure 
what  number  of  German  prisoners  are  held  by  the  Allies. 
We  do  not  know  to  within  a  similarly  close  figure,  nor 
within  a  few  thousand,  what  number  of  British  prisoners 
are  held  by  the  Germans.  Some  time  ago  a  rough  official 
estimate  was  made  that  there  were  no  less  than  32,000 
British  prisoners  in  (lermany.  But  that  was  a  minimum 
figure.  The  (Germans  themselves,  not  officially,  but  in 
public  prints  have,  I  believe,  boasted  of  far  more.  At 
any  rate,  neutrals  hav'c  been  told  of  more.  I  believe  we 
are  exaggerating  tlie  niunbiT  of  dead  among  the  missing 
if  we  put  them  at  10,000,  but  let  us  for  the  sake  of  weight- 
ing the  scales  against  ourselves,  put  them  at  12,000.  We 
shall  then  have  for  the  number  of  wounded  to  every  man 
dead  in  these  last  official  British  figures,  just  over  2.6. 
To  be  accurate,  2.61 1 

We  will  scale  this  down  to  2.6  and  start  uoon  that 
basis 


LAND      A  N  D      W  A  T  !•  R  . 


Marcli    0.   IQI^"). 


Tho  Britisli  figures  .qivo  then  about  2.6  men 
wmiudod  to  one  man  killed  or  dead.  (1). 

'    The  separate  (Colonial  statistics  give  us  a  proportion 
not  very  different. 

\Mien  we  turn  to  other  statistics,  portions  of  which 
1  may  aihide  to,  but  the  details  of  which  are  not  public 
property,  we  have  a  rather  hij^her  multiple.  To  one  man 
dead  3.35  wounded  in  one  large  category  ;  in  another 
large, category,  to  one  man  dead,  3.4. 

If  we  ask  ourselves  why  there  is  this  difference 
between  the  lower  British  and  Colonial  multiple  and  tiie 
rather  higher  multiple  in  continental  cases,  the  answer 
is  that  the  maximum,  or  nearly  the  maximum  number  of 
troops  in  the  field  were  being  used  from  shortly  afti-r  the 
beginning  upon  the  Continent,  while  in  the  case  of  the 
British  and  Colonial  contingents  the  army  iii  the  field 
has  immensely  increased  from  the  beginning  of  the  war 
onwards.         / 

What  has  been  the  effect  of  this  ? 

To  answer  that  question  we  must  appreciate  the  fact 
that  the  proportionate  mortality  is  nuich  higher  in 
trench  warfare  than  in  "  open  "  or  "  moving  "  warfare. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  you  had  such  ratios  at 
6.  7  and  even  8  men  wounded  to  one  killed.  It  was  only 
after  the  fixed  trench  warfare  began  that  the  ratio  fell 
to  4  and  3. 

It  is  clear  that  in  a  field  force  fighting,  not  on  immobile 
lines  but  with  movement  throughout  August,  September 
and  much  of  October  1914 — three  full  months — and  after 
that  continuing  uiiincreased  for  fourteen  months  mainly 
occupied  in  trench  warfare,  the  number  of  wounded  to  the 
number  of  dead  will  be  higher  than  it  will  be  in  the  case 
of  a  force  which  was  small  while  open  lighting  with 
movement  was  going  on  and  got  larger  and  larger  after 
the  higher  mortality  of  trench  warfare  had  begun. 

We  should  have,  therefore,  roughly,  for  our  Conti- 
nental average  something  over  3,  although  the  Britisli 
and  Colonial  average  gave  us  something  under  ;. 

In  the  particular  case  of  the  Cierman  Army  we  ha\e 
further  to  note  that  the  whole  of  the  liastern  held  has 
been  characterised  by  a  very  much  larger  proportion 
of  fighting  with  mo\ement  to  trench  fighting  than  has 
been  the  case  with  the  Allies  in  the  Western  field. 

If  it  be  true  of  Continental  troops  in  the  Western 
field  that,  counting  the  open  fighting  and  the  trench 
fighting  together,  the  multiple  is  somewhat  over- 3,  then 
it  will  be  true  of  the  (Icrman  aniiy  as  a  whole  that  the 
multiple  will  be  still  greater,  because,  though  their  lines 
be  largely  immobile  upon  the  Western  field,  yet  upon  the 
ICastcrn  fiekr  (where  first  and  last  more  than  a  third  of 
their  forces  have  been  engaged),  there  has  been  continual 
movement. 

The  general  conclusion  is,  then,  that  the  number  of 
wounded  is  to  the  number  of  dead  in  the  case  of  the 
( Icrman  service  appreciably  more  than  three  to  one. 

The  Cierman  lists  are  here  of  hardly  any  use  to  us. 
They  give  us  the  impossibly  low  multiple  of  1.7  to  1.8 
men  wounded  for  each  man  dead — which  is  nonsense. 

If  we  take  the  number  of  dead,  then,  in  the  Cicrman 
service  and  multiply  it  by  3,  we  ha^•e  a  figure  for  the 
wounded  in  the  same  ser\-ice  which  is  quite  certainly  a 
minimum. 

We  may  write  down  that  minimum,  then,  at  three 
viiUion. 

But  when  we  have  thus  established  a  minimum 
gross  total  of  wounded  our  task  has  only  begun.  For  we 
nave  next  to  decide  what  proportion  of  these  icounded 
have  iiithin  the  eoursc  of  17  moiilhs,  returned  to  the  fii^httw^ 
line. 

\\'e  here  approach  much  the  most  difficult  part  of  the 
subject,  that  upon  which  our  terms  are  least  capable  of 
definition  and  that  upon  which  exact  statistics  are  most 
difficult  to  establish. 

11)  The  proportion  of  wounded  to  killed  is  ol  nurse  int)r}v.<  usly 
liiSher  when  you  take  the  case  of  a  particular  action,  especially  an 
action  in  which  there  is  a  grc.ir  deal  of  nioveiuent,  and  in  wliich  nun 
appear  in  the  open.  I'or  in.stance.  at  Loos  it  was  4.5.  In  the  French 
offensive  in  Champagne  it  was  4.7.  In  such  a  great  offensive  as  that 
which  the  Germans  are  now  undertaking  on  the  Verdun  section  it  is 
])erhaps  as  high  as  4  for  the  moment,  in  spite  of  the  dense  forma- 
tion in  which  the  enemy  atlacks. 

But  this  verv  hijjh  rate  would  be  a  most  mi^Icadin);  one  to  adopt 
at  the  present  moment  and  ns  applied  to  the  whole  year,  because  after 
the  lapse  of  manv  monih.<  yiu  get  a  greater  addition  to  the  dead 
whr  ultiniateh'  die  from  .sick'<?ss  and  wounds  and  also  Ijccause,  as  is 
said  in  the^text,  the  proportion  of  wounded  to  dead  in  the  trench  warfare 
is  luuch  lower  than  in  open  ni  ovcmcnt. 


I'nfortunately  this,  the  least  certain  factor  in  our 
calculation  is,  at  the  same  time,  among  the  most  im- 
portant. Vox  it  is  clear  that  if  we  grossly  overestimate 
or  under-cstimate  the  number  of  wounded  who  ultimately 
return  to  acti\-c  ser\ice,  we  shall  falsify  our  conclusions 
alto(.;ether.  An  .'Vrmv's  iwrmanent  loss  at  any  moment 
tloes  not  consist  in  the  number  of  men  who  have  been  liit 
or  sick  up  to  that  moment.  It  consists  in  the  number  f)f 
men  who  are  at  that  moment  oft  the  strength  from  all 
causes  whatsoever.  And  this  last  figure  is  obviously 
in  a  large  degree  affected  by  th(>  ]>roportion  of  returns, 
^'ou  cannot  bring  the  dead  to  life.  Vou  cannot,  as  a 
rule,  release  your  prisoners.  The  first  two  categories  of 
our  four  categories  are  therefore  absolute. 

But  you  can  so  cure  many  of  your  wounded  men 
as  to  rencler  them  as  useful  as  tliey  were  before. 

What  is  the  proportion  of  men  out  of  all  tho-c 
wounded  who  thus  return  to  full  active  service? 

The  difficulty  of  answering  this  cpiestion  resides  in 
the  fact  that  over  and  above  the  number  who  really 
"  return,"  that  is,  who  are  fit  at  last  for  the  same  strain  as 
they  left  before  they  were  wounded,  there  is  a  certain 
margin  (and  it  is  a  large  one)  wliich  can  conceivably  be 
used  in  capacities  of  \'arying  usefulness,  or  at  the  worst 
can  be  kept  inde'initely  on  the  books  of  an  army  in  the 
hope  that  sooner  or  later  they  may  be  put  to  some  kind 
of  use. . 

Out  of  a  thousand  men  hit,  350,  let  us  say,  will  be 
found,back  again  within  such  a  space  as  a  year  in  exactly 
the  same  capacity  as  they  left  before  they  were  wounderi. 
But  over  and  above  these  there  will  be  a  number  difiicult 
to  establish  (it  may  be  200.  or  e\en  250,  or  it  may  be  as 
low  as  150),  who  are  not  fit  for  the  duties  they  left  and 
will  not  again  be  capable  of  full  active  serxnce.  but  can  be 
put  on  to  less  onerous  duties  (clerical,  sanitary,  prison 
and  frontier  guard,  communication  work  of  certain  kinds) 
thus  releasing  men  fitter  than  themselves  to  take  their 
places  under  the  full  strain  of  active  service. 

A-fter  the  lapse  of  a  very  considerable  period  such 
as  17  months  (and  that  is  the  period  of  war  we  are  con- 
sidering up  to  the  end  of  ic)i5)  very  great  numbers  of  those 
wounded  in  the  earlier  part  of  a  war  will  have  been 
returned  to  the  army  from  the  hospitals  as  "cured." 
But  in  the  same  long  period  there  has  come  in  with  regard 
to  the  use  of  the  imperfectly  cured  and  with  regard  to  the 
use  of  those  who,  though  as  much  cured  as  they  ever  will 
be,  are  permanently  the  worse  for  their  wound,  another 
factor  in  calculation  which  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  seize. 

During  a  certain  short  period  alter  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities,  the  iniperfeelly  cured,  the  men  who  thouoh  still 
capable  of  some  service  will  never  be  the  same  again,  can 
be  absorbed  by  various  forms  of  auxiliary  work.  'J  hey 
can  be  used  for  the  different  services  I  have  mentioned 
la  small  proportion  of  the  lighter  work  upon  communications, 
hospital  work,  clerical  work,  etc.).  and  in  this  capacity  ihev 
replace  filter  men  than  themselves,  but  this  "  ab'iorption  " 
of  inefficicnis  is  soon  exhausted.  After  thai,  if  you  retain 
them  in  your  service  as  fart  of  your  "  paper  army, 
you  either  have  to  create  fobs  for  them  b:hind  Ihc  fight- 
ing line,  which  jobs  are  pcrfecllv  useless  and  merclv 
serve  to  swell  your  force  on  paper,  or  you  7nust  frankly 
admit  them  to  hs  of  no  service  to  you  bx'ause  they  cannot 
go  into  Ihc  firing  line  and  there  is  nothing  for  them 
to  do  elsewhere.  Later,  some  of  them  come  into  use  with 
the  expanding  necessities  of  the  various  auxiliary  branches 
as  the  war  proceeds  (the  medical  for  instance).  But  these  do 
not  check  iiic  decline  of  .the  real  fighting  strength  for  there 
are  no  more  fit  men  for  them  to  replace. 

Now  the  number  •  required  for  medical  help,  for 
guarding  prisoners,  neiJtral  frontier  guards,  policing 
occupied  cities,  etci,  it4  not  very  great.  The  work  of 
communications  i<;.i  in 'a  veiy  large  degree,  work  which 
must  be  conducted  hy  able  bodied  men.  There  is  onl\- 
a  limited  projwrtion  of  work  which  you  can  hand  over 
to  the  less  efiicient. 

In  general,  over  and  above  quite  a  small  fraction  of 
\our  "  returns,"  the  oixly  returns  that  count  arc  the  returns 
'jit  for  full  active  service:''  What  arc  the  gross  returns  in 
such  warfare  as  this,  and  what  the  net  residuum  of  really 
fit  ? 

As  to  the  gross  returnt  ^vc  have  a  good  working  rule  of 


March  9,   191O. 


L  A  X  D      AND      W  A  T  E  R 


tluinib  with  regard  to  them.  On  the  average  60  per  cent.* 
of  the  wounded  are  regarded  as  cured  and  are  again  ])ut 
at  the  disposition  of  the  military  authorities.  Tiuit 
average  is  exceeded  in  many  particular  cases,  especially  on 
the  Western  front  where  there  are  excellent  communica- 
tions, fair  climate  and  elaborate  hospital  facilities  close  at 
hand,  numerous  well  provided  towns,  ample  and  ex- 
cellent water  supply,  ample  medicaments,  a  wealthy  and 
numerous  civilian  population  to  give  help. 

It  was  often  not  nearly  reached  on  the  Eastern  front 
where,  especially  in  winter,  all  these  conditions  were 
reversed.* 

But  that  medical  task  once  accomplished  there 
remains  a  second  task  for  the  authorities  governing  the 
armies  in  the  held,  who  alone  can  decide  what  the  man 
thus  returned  to  them  is  really  capaljle  of  doing. 

It  is  when  they  come  to  making  tliis  last  selection 
that  the  much  smaller  munber  of  those  who  arc  actualh' 
sent  back  to  perform  the  same  duties  as  they  performed 
before  they  were  wounded  or  sick,  begins  to  appear. 

An  exact  calculation  of  that  reduction  is  exceedingly 
dilhcult  to  make,  because  the  stages  between  ser\-ices 
which  even  a  sick  or  maimed  man  can  attempt  to  render 
and  full  active  service  arc  subject  to  innumerable 
gradations. 

The  man  in  the  highest  authority  who  deals  fust  with 
the  returns  as  a  whole  will  give  you  the  highest  hgure. 

As  voii  go  down  to  the  more  local  and  particular 
authorities  the  hgure  rapidly  dwindles. 

When  you  come  to  the  regiment  it  is  surprisingly 
I'jwer  than  it  was  at  the  base. 

When  you  come  to  the  company  officers — who 
nlone  can  really  test  a  man's  capacity  to  undertake  the 
lull  strain  ^\hich  he  was  undertaking  before  he  was  sent 
back  from  the  front — ihcy  would  gi\'e  you  the  lowest 
hgure  of  all. 

Xow  it  is  precisely  that  last  or  lowest  hgure — the 
company  or  battery  figure — which  is  the  only  one  of  real 
value.  How  many  men  sent  back  wounded  from  the  full 
work  .and  strength  of  the  fi.tjhting  line  come  back  to  the 
same  sort  of  ;;ervice  as  they  left  ? 

\\'hen  you  ask  that  question  you  get  indeed  \-ery 
varying  answers,  but  answers  which  show  a  very  large 
diiuinution  of  the  original  60  odd  ])cr  cent,  who  were 
ri'lurned  from  hospital  as  "  ht  for  service." 

No  one  can  profess  to  expert  knowledge  in  the 
matter,  there  are  no  detailed  statistics  beyond  the  first 
rough  ones.  One  can  only  rely  upon  the  experience 
of  the  men  who  have  to  handle  and  detail  for  duty  the 
smaller  units.  But  I  think  I  am  well  within  the  mark  if 
I  say  that  by  the  time  one  is  considering  the  active  work 
in  the  fighting  line  not  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  original 
mnuber  sent  back  from  hospital  find  their  way  to  the  full 
service  which  they  had  left. 

I  may  be  wrong  here.  The  real  number  of  those 
who  actually  return  fit  for  full  service  may  reach  as  high 
a  proportion  as  40  per  cent  of  all  those  originally 
iidmitted  to  hospital  for  wounds.  Let  us  take  it  at  so 
liigh  a  figure  and  call  it  40  per  cent. 

Then  we  have  in  the  category  of  wounded  who  can 
no  longer  return  /o  full  active  service  in  the  German  Army. 
up  to  the  end  of  i<)i5,  and  who  are  therefore  permanently 
off  th2  strength  1,800,000  min. 

It  is  that  figure  less  the  few  who,  at  iirst,  replaced 
fitter  mill  thin  thsmislves  in '  th:;  auxiliary  s.;rvice.-;. 
Scale  the  ligare  do'vn  as  generously  as  you  will  and  you 
will  not  get  it  bjlow  1,600,000. 

(rf)    77j;:   Sick. 

There  remains  the  category  of  the  sick. 

This  category  is  exceedingly  impartant  for  3  reisan-;. 
Fir.3t  that  it  is  never  published  in  any  of  the  lists  available, 
secondly  (and  consequently)  that  public  opinion  ujver 
allows  for  it.  Tiiirdly  that,  in  the  main,  it  a-'c  )aats  for 
the  very  large  difference  between  any  published  list  of 
casualties,  however  accUrati),  and  the  real  number  "  off 
the  strength."  ■  1.    .:., 

We  can  only  take  very  rough  figures  and  remember 
to  weight  the  scales  as  heavily  as  possible  against 
jursilvos— but  rough  figures  wj  have. 

'•'  (".[:.t  un  >\y^z\x\  liaipitals  U  u'c  iu.i;li  lii,:^',i-;r  li^nro-i.      N'  )l  i')ly   in 
.his  comilry. 

•  c.f.  corUvLU  lliiu;4iri,iii  lioipit.vl  rcptirU  wliirli  •^.)L  thi\)ti.!ii  to  Hi 
Miintry  Jtiring  the  winter  lis;htin'.j  in   tUc;  C.up.ilhiaiu  a  ycir   u..;u 
fluJ  appeared  in  tUu  London  press 


We  know  trom  the  experience  of  the  Allies  certain 
main  facts  which,  however  broadly,  help  to  guide  us. 

First  :  Tiie  proportion  of  sick  in  this  campaign  has 
been  far  lower  than  was  expected  or  than  has  commonly 
been  known  in  the  past,  because  there  have  been  no 
epidemics,  save  in  one  or  two  isolated  fields  of  the  war.    ■ 

Secondlv  :  The  number  of  sick  discharged  as  cured' 
is  a  much  larger  percentage  than  the  number  of  wounded 
discharged  as  cured. 

Lastly  we  have  the  fact  that,  from  the  nature  of 
the  war  during  15  months  before  the  end  of  1915, 
the  trench  warfare  produced  sickness  (and  especially 
sickness  of  the  sort  that  disabled  a  man)  largely  in  pro- 
])ortion  to  the  severity  of  humidity  and  cold.  The 
enteric  group  which  was  the  cmse  of  the  older  armies  has 
largely  spared  the  present  war,  but  frostbite,  pulmonary 
disease  and  the  rest  have  been  in  excess  of  the  old  ratio', 
in  proportion  at  least  to  other  ailments. 

Considering  all  these  things,  how  shall  we  arrive  at 
a  fair  minimum  of  the  number  of  men  no  longer  of  full  use 
on  account  of  sickness  ? 

Let  us  first  of  all  make  a  very  large  allowance  indeed 
for  the  complete  cures.  Let  us  call  them  70  per  cent. 
That  is,  of  course,  a  great  deal  too  high  upon  any'of  the. 
evidence  obtainable  among  the  Allies.  But  precisely 
because  this  element  of  the  problem  is  a  vague  one  are 
we  under  the  necessity  of  allowing  for  the  very  largest' 
])ossible  margin  of  error. 

In  the  same  way  we  will  not  take  the  observed  j)ro- 
portion  of  sick  to  wounded  as  being  pretty  well  ccjual 
in  all  the  sanitary  formations  (not,  of  course,  the  hospitals 
at  home)  at  any  one  moment  as  a  whole.  We  will  take  it 
as  only  two-thirds. 

If  we  admit  those  two  elements  we  get  as  low  a 
figure  for  the  whole  war  up  to  the  end  of  1915  as  two 
million  admissions  to  hospital  from  sickness  of  all  kinds 
whatsoever  in  the  German  service.  Of  these  again  let 
us  admit  that  70  per  cent,  arc  complete  cures,  sending 
the  man  back  to  exactly  the  same  duties  as  he  could 
discharge  before  he  entered.  That  again  is  an  admission 
heavily  in  favour  of  the  enemy  and  much  beyond 
the  truth,  but  we  adopt  it  for  the  same  reason,  and 
we  allow  that,  of  two  milhon  cases,  1,400,000  return  as 
strong  as  they  were  before  to  their  old  duties. 

That  leaves  us  600,000  men  lost  from  permanent 
sickness  in  the  period  up  to  the  end  of  1915  off  the  full 
strenyth  to  the  enemv. 


SORTES      SHAKESPEARIAN/E, 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE. 


THE     PRAYER     OF     GERMAN     FINANCE. 

God  save  the  mark! 

ROMEO    AND    JULIET.     UI.,   ii..    5,?.    and 
\.    HENRY    IV.,    I.,    iii,    56. 


THE  RETRENCHMENT  COMMITTEE'S  REPORT. 

Nothing    zvill    come    of   nothing :    s-pea/c 
again. 

KING     LEAR.     I.,     i.,    89. 


GER.MAN-AMERICAN     DIRGE. 

/  shal^    despair;    there    is    no    creature 

loves   me. 
And  if  I  die,    no   sonl  xvil^  pity   me. 

RICHARD     in.,     V.    iii.,    2I0-I. 


L  A  K  D      A  N  I)      \\-  A  T  E  R 


March  9,  njiG. 


So  lar  wc  lia\c  now  cstiiblishcd  all  the  four  categories 
of  absolute  jx-rmanent  loss. 

The  first  category  arrived  ai  b\,  the  call  illation 
already  presented  to  my  readers  gives  us  one  inillioii  dead. 

The  second  category  gi\es  us  about  a  quarter  0/  a 
milliun  prisoners. 

The  third  category,  the  permanently  disabled 
wounded,  gives  us  1,600,000. 

The  fourth  categorj',  the  permanently  disabled  from 
sickness  gives  us  600,000. 

\\e  should  have  altogether  from  these  categories  just 
under  three  million — 2.850,000    men. 

Before  leaving  that  point  of  the  permanent  loss  I 
nuist  emphasise  again  the  deliberately  low  figures  ad- 
mitted. 

To  say  that  for  every  two  men  dead  in  a  prolonged 
war  you  ha\e  barely  three  men  maimed  is  obviously  to 
put  Xhv  maimed  far  too  low.  To  say  that  for  every  three 
men  disabled  by  wounds  >ou  have  little  more  than  one 
man  disabled  by  sickness  is  to  put  the  disabled  from 
sickness  far  too  low.  But  I  am  admittedly  putting  things 
at  their  very  minimum.  /  am  putiini;  them  as  they  n-uuld 
b:  put  by  ait  enemy  who  should  have  to  convince  as  iccll 
IIS  he  could  some  neutral  statesman  that  his  losses  were 
of  the  very  lowest  sort. 

Well  then,  to  this  number  just  short  of  three  million 
(2,830,000)  which  are  the  minimum  permanent  dead  loss, 
what  have  we  to  add  for  the  wounded  and  sick  that  will 
ultimately  return,  but  are  still  in  hospital  or  in  con\ales- 
cence  ? 

There  agam  we  have  the  analogy  of  the  Allied 
statistics  to  guide  us.  The  average  period  in  hospital 
and  convalescence  is  four  months.  The  admis.sions  to 
hospital  per  month  counting  those  only  who  will  ulti- 
mately emerge  cured  and  counting  sick  and  wounded 
together  cannot  jwssibly,  for  an  army  of  the  (ierman 
numbers,  be  less  than  100,000.  W'c  have,  therefore,  to 
add  to  our  total  a  floating  balance  of  400,000,  and  we 
bring  to  the  end  of  the  year  an  irreducible  minimum 
off  the  strength  of  three  and  a  quarter  million. 

****** 
Broad    Checks    on    this    Minimum    Estimate. 

Whenever  in  human  affairs  an  estimate  is  based 
upon  no  more  than  the  careful  addition  of  absolute 
minima,  it  is  necessarily  so  much  below  the  truth  as 
to   pro\oke  ridicule. 

If,  for  instance,  I  were  to  take  the  minimum  con- 
ceivable income,  judging  all  circumstances  most  favour- 
ably for  the  taxed  and  against  the  Treasury,  of  ten 
wealthy  men,  \  should  cheat  the  Exchequer  badly.  The 
tax  gatherers'  estimate  might  double  that  minimum  ; 
it  would  at  any  rate  enormously  exceed  it. 

Have  we  any  other  methods  by  which  to  check  our 
result  and  to  decicle,  not  perhaps  by  how  much  it  is  too 
little — for  it  is  necessarily  that — but  at  least  that  it  is 
too  little  within  a  large  amount  ? 

We  have  several. 

(i). — We  have  the  knowledge  conveyed  by  the  Intelli- 
gence Uepartrtients  that  the  Germans  created  no  new 
formations  after  last  I-'ebruary  ;  that  their  losses  up  to 
that  moment  had  on  the  a\-erage  been  at  the  rate  of  close 
on  a  quarter  of  a  million  a  month,  and  that  their  drafts 
since  that  moment  had  been  on  an  average  about  200,000  a 
month. 

l-'rom  this  external  check  one  arrives  at  losses  a 
great  deal  above  ji  millions. 

(2). — We  have  another  exceedingly  \  aluable  check  of  a 
general  sort.  It  is  the  fact  that  the  total  amount  off  the 
strength  of  a  force  at  any  moment  is  actually  greater  than  the 
casualty  lists  up  to  that  moment,  because  sickness  and  other 
"  causes  more  than  make  up  for  the  return  of  wounded. 
Every  contemporary  army  of  the  Allies  to-day.  and  every 
army  of  the  past  confirms  this  truth. 

(3). — \\'e  have  the  following  invaluable  point  upon 
the  condition  of  the  German  effectives  at  the  present 
moment  : 

The  Erench  Class  '16  after  many  months  of  training, 
is  not  yet  in  the  fighting  line.  Few  ^■olunteers  from  it 
were  admitted.  But  much  of  the  (ierman  Class  16, 
from  which  very  many  volunteers  have  been  admitted  is, 
and  has  been  for  some  time,  in  the  fighting  line  as  we 
know  from  ])risoners.  Only  a  fifth  of  it  or  so  remains 
in  the  depots.     .\nd  that  although  the  average  (ierman 


l)eriod  of  training  in  this  war  is  less  than  half  as  long  as 
the  Erench. 

These  last  two  ])oints  combined  are  conclusive  as  to 
the  relative  exhaustion  of  enemy  numbers. 

As  for  Class  '17,  the  Iwench  ha\c  called  it  up,  the 
Germans  have  "  warned  "  it. 

Neither  process  has  an  effect  upon  the  calculaticjn, 
because,  when  the  (iermans  shall  begin  to  train  their 
Class  '17  they  propose  to  give  it  but  a  few  weeks'  training. 
The  Erench  arc  quite  at  their  leisure  to  begin  the  training 
of  their  Class  '17  (which  they  called  up  on  the  1st  of 
January)  and  they  intend,  as  their  deliberate  policy  is, 
to  give  it  a  training  at  least  as  long  as  that  which  its 
elders  have  already  enjoyed. 

(4). — Lastly  there  is  the  rough  and  general  but 
absolutely  sound  rule  of  thuinb.  The  real  total  wastage 
of  an  army  long  in  the  field,  is  always  more  than  four 
times  its  dead. 

When  the  history  of  the  war  can  be  written  with  all 
documents  available,  no  careful  student  of  the 
situation  will  be  surprised  if  the  total  German  losses 
of  every  kind  up  to  the  end  of  1915  prove  close  on 
four  millions. 

1  he  conclue  ion  would  seem  to  be  as  follows  : — 

A  man  making  out  the  very  best  case  for  German 
losses,  pleading  as  a  German  would  plead  to  some  neutral 
power  to  pro\-e  the  continued  resources  of  his  armies, 
could  not  by  any  form  of  argument  whatever,  get  the 
losses  below  three  and  a  quarter  million  up  to  December 
jist,  1915. 

4>  *  *  *  4c  i|< 

There  is  no  object  in  making  calculations  of  this  sort 
save  the  discovery  of  the  truth. 

Those  who  ridicule  them  as  "  mere  arithmetical 
work  "  are  in  intelligence  and  science  exactly  on  a  par 
with  the  yokel  who  ridicules  the  doctor  for  using  a  ther- 
mometer to  take  the  temperature  in  a  case  of  fever. 
An  estimate  of  numbers  is  the  \-ery  soul  of  judgment  in 
war. 

I  have  been  at  pains  to  put  the  very  lowest 
figures  admissible  by  any  man  who  regards  the  problem 
seriously.  I  know  very  well  that  those  figures  are  below 
the  truth.  But  I  ha\-e  set  such  an  absolute  minimum 
down  fully  and  with  proofs  because  I  think  that  in  a  great 
crisis  of  any  sort,  national  or  personal,  a  grasp  of  reality 
and  not  some  drug  of  illusion  is  the  resource  of  men. 

I  shall  turn  later  to  the  much  vaguer  and  less 
ascertainable  Austro-Hungarian  statistics,  and  see  what 
we  can  make  of  the  losses  in  that  case.       H.   Bei-Loc. 


A\  our  recent  review  of  Major  B.  C.  Lake's  admirable 
liand-hook  Knowledge  for  War  (Harrison  and  Sons,  St. 
Martin's  Lane),  it  was  pointed  out  that  a  book  of  this  nature, 
whicii  will  be  in  constant  use  on  active  service,  ought  to  be 
bound  in  leather,  and  not  in  paper.  Tliis  suggestion  has  now 
been  carried  out. 

Plent\'  of  amusement  and  a  good  deal  of  informitiou  .u  e 
to  be  gathered  from  the  record  of  A  .Merry  Banker  in  the  Far 
East,  by  W.  H.  Young.  (John  Lane.  5s.  net.)  Finding  litth,' 
prospect  of  life  as  it  should  be  in  a  London  office,  tlie  Ijanker 
set  out  for  .Manila,  whence  he  drifted  through  the  fiast  and 
through  much  of  South  America,  gathering  some  moss  in  the 
process,  and  also  gathering  a  very  nice  taste  in  drinks,  and 
some  of  the  moss  tliat,  according  to  the  proverb,  does  not  come 
in  tlie  way  of  most  rolling  stones.  The  book  is  racy  and 
characterised  jjy  keen  observation,  while  its  author  does  not 
mind  telling  a  story  against  himself  on  occasion.  It  is  just  the 
sort  of  volume  one  would  rejoice  to  find  on  the  smoking- 
room  table — a  man's  book  from  first  page  to  last, 

That  useful  book  i)i  reference  "  The  Newspaper  Press 
Directory."  whicli  Mcissrs.  Mitchell  and  Co.  bring  out  annually, 
has  just  appeared  fpr  i,yi6.,|It  is  full  of  information  on 
the  Press  of  the  f-Jritish  Isles,  and  also  includes  a  section  cover- 
ing i)ractically  the  whole  Press  of  the    British  Empire. 

After  an  interval  of  ten  years  or  thereabouts,  a  second 
edition  pf  Stonefoldsi  by  Wilfrid  W.  Gibson,  has  been  issued. 
(Elkin  Mathews.  2S.  6d.  net.)  There  is  a  Hardyesque 
Havour  about  the  dramatic  studies  inverse  of  which  the  book 
is  composed,  but,  save  for  one  instance,  the  fates  refrain  from 
weighting  the  dice  against  these  country  folk  of  wliom  Mr 
Gibson  tells,  and  their  stories  work  out  to  kindly  ends.  There 
is  little  enough  of  genuine  ])oetrv  in  the  mass  of  verse  pub- 
lished now,  which  makes  the  rc-issue  of  this  little  volume  all 
the  more  welcome. 


March  9,  1916, 


LAND      AND      W  A  T  E  R 


xMR.    BALFOUR'S    SPEECH. 


By  Arthur  Pollen. 


I  II AVE  just  returned  from  the  House  of  Commons 
where  I  had  gone  to  hear  Mr.  Balfour's  Naval 
Estimate  speech — and  a  most  powerful,  significant 
speech  it  was.  But  it  was  not  the  event  of  the 
afternoon.  I  do  not  know  whether  reflection  will  alter 
the  first  impression  that  Mr.  Churchill's  speech  must  have 
made  upon  the  bulk  of  his  hearers.  To  me  it  seemed 
a  very  mischievous  utterance.  Of  the  effect  of  the 
speech  there  can  be  no  .possible  doubt.  It  will  be 
quoted  the  world  over  as  showing  that  since  he 
and  Lord  Fisher  left  Whitehall,  Great  Britain's 
shipbuilding  policy  has  been  unequal  to  her  needs. 
Take  all  Mr.  Churchill's  accusations  and  insinua- 
tions as  justified,  and  we  must  be  in  such  naval 
danger  that  his  warning  comes  too  late.  If  there  are 
any  neutrals,  such  as  Roumania  or  (jreece  or  America, 
whose  final  decision  as  to  the  part  they  are  to  take  in 
the  war  hangs  in  the  balance,  if  loss  of  confidence  in  Great 
Britain's  sea  power  can  influence  any  of  these  decisions, 
then  ^Ir.  Churchill  has  done  all  that  was  humanly  possible 
to  turn  such  wavering  neutrals  from  the  Allied  side. 

There  is  but  one  circumstance  that  can  explain — 
for  nothing  can  excuse  —this  malignant  rhodomontade  Mr. 
Churchill  has  been  some  days  in  England.  If  he  went  to 
Mr.  Balfour,  told  him  frankly  his  apprehensions  and 
came  away  without  any  assurance  that  Mr.  Balfour's 
naval  colleagues  were  satisfied  as  to  the  shipbuilding 
position,  then  that  he  should  have  said  what  he  did  is 
intelligible  enough.  But  it  would  not  be  intelligible  in 
the  case  of  anyone  capable  of  remembering  that  the  words 
"  ex-First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  "  still  carry  weight  in 
foreign  countries.  If  he  spoke  without  asking  such 
an  assurance,  what  is  one  to  say  ? 

For  Mr.  Balfour  had  made  it  perfectly  clear  in  his 
speech  that  the  whole  shipbuilding  and  ship  arming 
resources  of  the  country  had  been  de\-otcd  without  inter- 
mission for  the  past  year  to  supplying  the  needs  of  the 
Navy.  He  admitted — without  suspicion  api)arently  that 
the  admission  could  be  misconstrued — that  neither  he 
nor  his  naval  colleagues  were  satisfied  with  the  result, 
and  this  although  the  result  put  the  command  of  the  sea 
and  the  capacity  of  the  British  Pleet  to  maintain  and 
exercise  it  actually  beyond  reasonable  question.  It 
was  obvious  indeed  from  the  whole  tenor  of  Mr.  Balfour's 
account  of  his  duties  and  the  way  in  which  he  and  his 
colleagues  regarded  them  that,-  whatever  the  shipbuilding 
outj)ut  of  the  country  might  be,  the  Admiralty  would  ask 
for  more.  It  is  an  attitude  that  follows  inevitably  from 
the  very  striking  premise  of  his  argument — namely,  that 
the  British  Fleet  is  so  no  longer  ;  it  has  become  an 
international  thing,  the  basis,  the  supporting  and  the 
combining  force  of  the  Alliance  to  which  the  preservation 
of  European  civilisation  is  committed.  Obviously  to 
men  with  so  high  a  sense  of  their  mission,  the  fleet  could 
never  reach  a  strength  to  excuse  them  from  further 
effort.  But  the  fact  that  they  are  striving  for  the  im- 
jjossible  is  not  equivalent  to  pleading  that  their  efforts 
liavc  been  inadecpiate.  They  must  strive  for  it,  because 
although  the  capacity  of  Crermany  to  build — and  what  is 
far  more  important — to  arm  ships,  is  not  likely  to  be 
greater  than  is  estimated,  to  rely  upon  any  estimate 
must  be  unsafe.  To  do  our  utmost  tlien  can  be  the  only 
path  of  safety.  All  this  Mr.  Balfour  made  clear  enough, 
but  he  (jualified  it  somewhat  unfortunately  by  adding 
that  our  production  might  be  still  greater  if  certain 
modifications  of  labour  arrangements  were  in  force. 
Labour,  in  other  words,  was  a  coridition  limiting  the 
amount  of  shipping  that  we  could  receive.  But  then  it 
always  has  been  a  limiting  condition,  and  the  total  weekly 
and  monthly  product  is  not  less  than  it  was  when  Mr. 
Churchill  and  Lord  iMsher  were  struggling  which  should 
rule  at  the  Admiralty.  And  to  say  that  this  limiting 
condition  had  not  been  removed  was  tantamount  to 
saying  that  so  far  the  Board  of  Admiralty  had  seen  110 
necessity  for  its  removal. 

The  regrettable  jjart  of  Mr.  Churchill's  altitude  was 
that  he  failed  to  realise  that  when  Mr.  Balluur  spoke, 


he  spoke  with  an  authority  behind  him  that  no  claptrap 
declamations,  no  parade  of  a  theatrical  reconciliation 
with  Lord  Fisher,  can  shake.  For  Mr.  Balfour  confirmed 
in  terms  of  no  ambiguity  at  all  a  thing  which  I  had 
mentioned  last  week  as  notorious  in  the  Fleet.  He  said 
in  so  many  words  that  the  relations  between  himself, 
his  naval  colleagues  and  the  commanders-in-chief,  and 
indeed  all  the  admirals  at  sea,  were  such,  that  the  most 
intimate  unity  of  plan  and  purpose  animated  and  indeed 
inspired  the  Navy  from  top  to  bottom.  When  the  new 
Board  was  constituted  last  summer  with  Mr.  Balfour 
and  Sir  Henry  Jackson  at  its  head,  those  who  knew  the 
Navy  from  within,  who  knew  also  the  kind  of  men  who 
were  now  to  govern  it,  saw  that  for  the  first  time  for  many 
years  the  one  thing  vital  to  naval  success  was  assured. 
The  Navy  would  be  governed  by  its  own  best  brains,  and 
in  consonance  with  the  cHctates  of  its  highest  professional 
knowledge.  It  knew*  that  for  the  immediate  future  at 
any  rate,  it  need  not  fear  the  arbitrary  impulse  of  amateur 
caprice.  Mr.  Balfour's  speech  established  once  and  for 
all  that  this  expectation  of  the  Navy  has  been  realised. 
Mr.  Churchill  does  not  know  that  the  change  has  taken 
place,  because  he  has  never  understood  that  it  was  neces- 
sary. It  is  the  change  that  makes  his  speech  so  stupefying 
a  performance. 

For  three  months  now  a  determined  effort  has  been 
maintained  to  undermine  and  destroy  this  admirable 
state  of  affairs.  We  have  had  dangled  before  our  eyes 
such  preposterous  things  as  a  squadron  of  German  ships 
armed  with  17-inch  guns.  Last  week  we  had  the  even 
more  childish  assertion  that  (}ermany's  shipbuilding 
facilities  were  so  colossal  that  she  might  have  25  Dread- 
noughts and  battle  cruisers  under  construction  at  this 
minute.  It  is  a  statement  that  is  not  worth  serious 
criticism  because  if  the  writer  meant  shipbuilding 
facilities  and  steel  production  facilities  only,  (jermany 
might  be  building  not  25  but  32,  if  she  were  content  to 
build  them  without  furnishing  guns,  turrets  and  mount- 
ings. These  are  but  two  instances  of  many  of  the  effor-ts 
made  to  shake  public  confidence  in  the  Board  of 
Admiralty.  To  those  who  knew-  the  real  state  of 
affairs  it  has  been  an  ignoble  and'  distressing  business 
from  the  beginning.  And  in  this  business  Mr.  Churchill 
has  now  taken  a  hand.  Will  he  succeed  in  doing  any 
substantial  harm  ?     I  cannot  think  he  will. 

Mr.  Balfour's  speech  was  restrained  to  the  point  of 
dullness.  He  gave  us  the  basic,  but  astounding  facts  of 
fleet's  doings,  but  he  told  them  without  the  least  pretence 
of  rhetoric.  He  paid  a  noble  tribute  to  the  officers  and 
men  of  the  Royal  Navy  and  of  the  merchant  marine.  It 
was  a  tribute  that  was  ten  times  the  more  effective  for 
his  confessed  inability  to  say  what  he  wanted  to  say.  It 
seemed  somehow  the  only  way  a  great  gentleman  should 
speak  of  a  great  aristocracy.  It  stood  in  sharp  contrast 
with  his  predecessor's  three  war  speeches  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  in  which  he  managed  to  praise  himself  and 
Lord  Fisher  and  various  departments  of  the  Admiralty, 
but  had  never  a  word  of  eulogy  for  the  officers  of  the 
fleet.  It  was  another  contrast  too  that  Mr.  Balfour  never 
spoke  of  himself  at  all.  It  was  so  clear  throughout  that 
he  spoke  for  the  Navy  with  which  he  identifies  himself 
so  modestly,  and  unifies  as  only  a  strong  man  can 

The  Return  of  the  "Moevve." 

The  German  Admiralty  has  announced  the  safe 
return  of  the  Mocivc  to  a  home  port,  and  there  seems  to 
be  no  reason  for  supposing  this  account  to  be  unfounded. 
It  w'as  generally  recognised,  when  the  capture  of  the 
Appam  brought  in  the  news  of  the  Mocwc's  breaking 
blockade,  that  the  German  Navy  had  scored  and,  for  once, 
legitimately.  Her  safe  return  is  a  heavier  score  still. 
We  should  be  lacking  in  sportsmanship  if  we  did  not  admit 
that  the  ingenious  Burgrave  who  commands  her  had 
carried  through  an  adventure  of  which  any  seaman  might 
be  proud.  And  in  going  home  the  way  he  came,  this  wily 
rover   has   finished   up   with   a   very   artistic     surprise. 


LAND      A  X  D      WATER 


]\Iarch  (),  KjiG. 


That  lie  would  inaHtvthc  junction  of  the  South  American 
and  West  Indian  trade  routes  off  Pernanibuco  his  luuiting- 
ground  was  fully  anticipated.  It  was  also  anticiimted 
that  the  attentions  of  the  British  cruisers  would  before 
very  long  make  this  hunting-f;round  too  hot  for  him. 
The  next  act,  we  all  thouj^ht,  would  eithei*  be  a  search  for 
a  safe  hiding-place,  or,  at  worst,  internment  under  neutral 
shelter.  But  the  Burgra\-e  having  captured  or  sunk  no 
less  than  fifteen  ships,  and  found  in  them  a  great  deal  of 
\-aluable  booty,  including  (50,000  in  bar  gold,  has,  after 
all,  taken  cash  and  prisoners  in  triumph  home,  where 
flags,  iron  crosses,  and  the  plaudits  of  his  frenzied  country- 
men will,  one  supposes,  recompense  him  for  the  hazards 
he  has  so  skilfully  surmounted. 

The  episode  illustrates  a  great  many  truths  of  sea 
war  which  ought  to  be  more  familiar  to  us  than  they  are. 
It  shows  again,  for  instance,  how  much  more  effecti\e is  a 
ship  than  a  submarine,  so  long  as  it  can  avoid  an  encounter 
with  another  ship  of  superior  force.  But  in  this  case,  it 
shows  also  something  more.  The  advantage  of  the  sub- 
marine over  the  surface  ship  is  its  capacity  to  hide  inconti- 
nently at  the  first  sight  of  danger,  and  to  pass  through 
danger  zones  unseen.  The  cruise  of  the  Mocur  reminds 
us  that  an  effective  disguise  is  only  invisibility  under 
another  name.  There  is  an  incident  in  one  of  Mr.  ("luster- 
ton's  stories  which  bears  directly  on  tliis  point.  A  murder 
was  committed  in  a  block  of  Hats  between  certain  hours. 
The  onlv  entrance  was  under  the  obser\ation  of  se\eral 
persons,  including  the  porter  at  tlie  door.  All  these 
witnesses  swore  that  no  one  had  entered  between  these 
hours.  But  l-'ather  Brown  had  the  perspicacity  to  note 
that  when  these  peojjle  said  "  nobody  "  they  meant  nobody 
who  would  e.xcite  suspicion..  "  Nobody  "  does  not  include 
for  instance,  the  postman,  whose  visit  is  a  matter  of 
routine.  And  it  is  the  postman  who  turns  out  to  be  the 
murderer.  \\'e  ha\'e  then  another  category  of  sea  force 
to  remind  us  that  the  invisibility  of  the  submarine  is 
neither  a  no\el  nor  a  unique  quality.  The  disguised 
ship  must  be  added  to  the  destroyer  at  night  and  the 
mine  by  daw  But,  notwithstanding  the  somewhat 
startling  and  surprising  successes  of  the  Mocivc,  it  still 
remains  true  that  no  very  extensive  preying  on  our  com- 
mercial ships  is  likely  to  be  brought  about  by  disguised 
(ierinan  raiders.  Others,  no"  doubt,  may-  try  to  rival 
these  proceedings,  but  it  is  a  mathematical  certainty  that 
most  of  them  will  fail. 

The  Reply  Blockade. 

The  attack  on  commerce,  whether  by  converted 
merchantmen,  by  fast  cruisers,  by  privateers,  as  was  the 
case  in  our  father's  days,  or  by  submarines  as  in  our  own, 
is  tile  reply  of  a  beU'agured  country  to  its  btsiegirs,  and 
it  has  ne\er  yet  been  a  successful  reply.  Om-  blockade  of 
Germany,  so  far  as  Cerman  shipping  is  concerned,  is  com- 
plete and  absolute.  Our  blockade  of  (lerman  ])orts,  so  far 
as  neutrals  arc  concerned,  is  equally  complete.  Our 
blockade,  at  one  or  more  removes  Ikroiv^h  neutral  ports, 
is  another  matter  altogether.  The  effort  to  cut  off  all 
sujjplies  being  brought  to  (iermany  in  neutral  ships 
through  neutral  ports,  can,  in  the  nature  of  things,  never 
be  complete  unless  we  are  prepared  to  con\ert  into  action 
Sir  Edward  Grey's  dictum  about  the  non-neutrality  of 
neutral  ojjposition  to  the  exercise  of  our  admitted  rights. 
But  though  not  complete,  and  even  though  large  quanti- 
ties of  food  in  fact,  enter  Germany,  it  is  to  be  remembered 
that  Germany's  need  must  ob\iously  be  entirely  incommen- 
surate with  this  form  of  supply.  1  observed,  for  instance, 
some  few  days  ago,  a  statement  that  Holland  was  feeding 
German^^  and  the  allegation  was  based  upon  the  alleged 
fact  that  the  imports  of  food  in  1(^15  were  greater  by  17,000 
tons  than  the  average  of  1914  and  loij.  But  17,000  tons 
is  onh'  eight  or  nine  ounces  ])er  head  of  the  ])oi)ulation 
— say  a  breakfast  of  dubious  adecpiacy  on  one  day  of  the 
year.  If  Germany  got  no  larger  extra  supply  of  food  from 
Holland  than  this,  it  would  not  carry  a  jjopulation. 
accustomed  to  import  one-tenth  of  its  total  support 
from  abroad,  very  far.  The  point  of  her  attack  on  our 
trade,  however,  is  not  to  increase  her  own  supply,  but 
to  diminish  ours.  And  as  was  long  since  pointed  out  by 
Mahaii,  all  these  cruiser  and  priwitt.vr  efforts  in  attacking 
trade,  can  bear  no  comparison  in  effect  with  the  commerce 
ihstruction    that  follows  from  effecti\e  blockade. 

What  the  Germans  are  booing  against  hope  to  effect 


is' "the  'reversal  ojfnheJg^eart  A'merican  writct's  ^ictum. 
Nor  is  it  possible  to  exaggerate  tlie  importance  of  the 
stake  that  they  are  playing  for.  Foreign  trade,  or  as  it 
is  perhaps  more  scientific  to  call  it  during  war— foreign 
supplies — must  always  be  a  matter  of  vital  moment 
to  a  country  whose  economic  life  and  well  being  is  based 
primarily,  or  even  largely  upon  the  give  and  take  of  over- 
seas connnerce.  But  if  this  was  true  in  the  great  wars 
of  100  years  ago,  it  is  a  truth  that  applies  with  enor- 
inously  greater  emphasis  to-day  because  the  ratio  of 
national  resources  devoted  to  war  is  now  so  much  greater 
than   it    was   in    olden    times. 

When  every  Euroi>ean  nation  is  mobiliring  at 
the  present  time  ten  per  cent  of  its  po])ulation  to  light, 
and  oringing  all  these  into  the  field  within  two  years 
instead  of  within  twenty.^  the  intensity  with  which 
economic  forces  aftect  the  situation  must  grow  with  a 
corresponding,  concentration.  The  Germans,  therefore, 
are  gauging  the  situation  quite  correctly  in  supposing 
that  if  they  can  ciit  off  the  overseas  supplies  of  France, 
luigland  and  Russia  they  will  be  doing  more  towards 
determining  tlie  war  in  their  fa\'our  than  by  any  success 
tiiat  the  most  sanguine  Hun  can  think  possible  on  land. 
The  destruction  of  ships,  if  carried  far  enough,  must  be 
vital,  because  it  is  on  ships  that  this  war  is  ])riinarily 
based.  It  is  ob\iou:.,  for  instance,  that  if  the  submarine 
campaign  of  i()i5  Juid  been,  let  us  say,  three  times  as 
destructive  as  in  fact  it  was,  Great  Britain  and  her 
Allies  must  have  been  so  short  of  shipping  as  to  have 
been  gravely  hanchcapped  in  tiie  double  task  of  keeping 
their  civil  populations  well  fed  and  content,  white  at  the 
same  time  maintaining  great  military  forces  in  the  field 
that  must  be  supplied  from  ()\-ersea.  .'\nd  notwith- 
standing the  comparative  failure  of  the  first  submarine 
campaign,  and  even  if  its  sequel  is  no  more  successful,  the 
event  may  still  prove  that  the  supreme  direction  has  been 
gravely  at  fault  in  ignoring  the  danger  from  this  quarter. 
There  has  been  a  neglect  to  continue  the  construction 
of  merchant  shipping,  which  in  war,  is  a  vital  national 
necessity.  Secondly  tliere  has  been  no  adcciuaie  effort 
to  see  that  such  shipping  as  is  available  is  employed 
solely  for  those  supplies  that  are  necessary  for  the  suste- 
nance of  the  people  and  the  successful  carrying  on  of  the 
war.  Everything  else  is  a  check  on  military  efficiency. 
And  to  remedy  both  these  things  very  drastic  measures 
must  be  taken,  and  taken  soon,  h'or  although  there  is  so 
far  no  proof  that  tlie  new  submarine  campaign  is  any 
more  efficient  than  the  old,  it  seems  jjnident  to  ^nppos',' 
that  it  is  likely  to  prove  so. 

Fortunately  it  cannot  prove  seriously  nion-  clte(  ii\e 
without,  as  we  have  fretpiently  seen  in  these  pages, 
bringing  Germany  into  conflict  with  the  United  States. 
And  there  are  many  indications  that  this  certainty 
is  daunting  the  (iennan  critics  of  tiie  \un  Tirjiitz  policy 

Sea    Power  in  the   Black  Sea  and  North  Sea. 

There  is  not  space  this  week  to  do-  more  than  note 
the  significance  of  \arious  items  of  news.  The  Russian 
Black  Sea  Fleet  has  joined  hands  with  the  Russian  .Vrmy  in 
Anatolia.  A  landing  has  been  effected  at  Atina,  and  'i"re- 
bizond  is  not  likely  to  hold  out  nnich  longer.  The  speed  of  a 
military  movement  westward  from  the  Trebizond- 
luv.eroum  line  must  gain  greatly  by  the  supplies  and 
reinforcements  which  will  reach  General  I'ndarich  with 
far  greater  rai)idity,  once  he  can  establish  an  ad\anced 
sea  base.  Neithtr  the  Gocb:n  nor  any  of  the  surviving 
Turkish  battleships  have  shown  any  such  capacity  for 
action  as  would  lead  one  to  suppose  that  the}'  can  redeem 
the  .situation  at  sea.  The  success  of  the  Russians  by 
both  land  and  water  is  so  complete,  the  embarrassment 
into  wlii(-h  Constaiitiiidple  is  thrown  so  great,  that  we  may 
soon  be  wbiuleriiig  whethei'  it  was  altogether  wise  to  have 
left  (iallipoli  when  wv'did. 

The  German  Fleet  in"  Being  and  Buildinj^. 

.\  circumstantial  telegram  from  Holland  asserts  that  , 
a  German  fleet  of  over  zo  units  has  been  seen  off  the  Dutch 
coast.  That  the  'High  Seas  licet  might  come  out  and 
l^arade  in  shallow  water  is  a  contingency  that  was  ])ointet: 
out  last  week  to  be  extremely  i)robable  And  no  com- 
ment on  tiie  news' of  i^ndi  an  e\ent  standing  by  itself  i; 
necessary. 


Marcli  0,  1916. 


LAND      A  X  J)      W^A  T  E  R  . 


THE    AMERICAN    CIVIL    WAR.— IV. 

Some  Lessons  to  be  Learnt  from  it. 
By  John  Buchan. 


[Mr.  John  Buchan  concludes  to-day  the  i:;tcrcstin>j,  scries 
of  articles  in  which  he  has  been  comf^arini;  the  con- 
ditions oi  the  North  in  the  American  Civil  War  with 
Creat  Britain  durini^  the  present  world  stru!:;'^le.  He 
has  demonstrated  how  nearly  the  difficulties  -which  each 
(iovernment  has  had  to'  face  have  coincided,  and  he 
sums  up  the  parallel  most  ably  in  the  final  paragraphs 
of  this  fined  article.] 


G 


RANT  was  the  man  for  the  task.  That  is  to  say. 
ho  could  apply  the  strategic  scheme  which 
ga\-e  the  North  victory.  What  was  that 
scheme  ? 

It  was  in  its  elements  \ery  simple.  It  was  merely 
to  use  the  superior  strength  of  the  North  in  men  and  wealtli 
and  position  to  crush  the  Confederacy.  The  map  will 
showthat  the  Southern  States  were  roughly  a  quadrilateral, 
bounded  by  the  Potomac,  the  Mississippi,  and  the  sea. 
One  great  Confederate  'State,  Texas,  lay  west  of  the 
]\Iississi]5pi,  and  Nortli-Wcst  Virginia  ran  up  in  a  long 
peniu'-uia  towards  Lake  Erie,  so  that  it  left  only  an  isthmus 
a  hundred  miles  wide  between  the  two  partsof  the  North. 
Tlic  fust  business  of  the  N-orth  was  to  occupy  and  hold 
North-West  Virginia,  and  this  was  done  with  little  trouble. 
The  next  was  to  blockade  all  the  sea  coast  and  prevent  any 
oversea  imports  from  reaching  the  South.  The  third  was 
to  control  the  Mississippi  line,  and  so  not  only  cut  off 
Texas  from  the  Confederacy  but  complete  the  in\'estmeiit 
of  tlie  Quadrilateral.  After  that  the  sides  of  the  Quad- 
rilateral could  be  pushed  in,  so  that  the  armies  of  Lee 
were  left  with  less  and  less  ground  to  manoeu\'re  in  and 
draw  their  supjilies  from. 

Tlie  North  was  perfectly  conscious  of  its  strength  and  of 
what  nmst  be  the  main  lines  of  its  strategy.  Strategy 
depends  very  much  upon  geography,  and  geographical 
facts  cannot  be  blinked.  But  in  the  use  of  its  strength  it 
fimiblcd  for  many  long  days.  Strength  in  war,  remember, 
is  not  a  thing  wliich  can  be  said  to  exist  in  the  abstract. 
There  may  be  a  ))otcntiality  of  strcngth.but  till  the  strength 
is  made  actual  it  is  no  better  than  weakness.  A  country 
may  have  an  enormous  population,  but  unless  that  popula- 
tion appears  in  the  shape  of  trained  armies  in  the  right 
place  it  is  not  an  element  of  strength.  It  may  have 
great  wealth,  but  unless  that  wealth  is  used  skilfully 
for  the  p\ir]50ses  of  war  it  is  not  strength.  The  North 
had  tlie  jxitentiaiity  of  strength,  but  it  had  to  find  out  how 
to  apply  it. 

(ine  part  of  the  problem  was  successfully  faced  from 
the  iirst.  The  Navy  was  well  handled,  and  the  whole 
coast-line  of  the  South  was  rigorously  blockaded.  That 
must  be  set  down  to  the  credit  of  the  civilians  at  \^'ashing- 
ton.  LiiKoln  broke  away  from  many  of  the  accepted 
])ractices  of  International  law,  and  he  and  the  Supreme 
Court  created  precedents  which  have  been  of  great  use  to 
us  in  the  present  struggle,  h'or  a  people  so  legally  minded 
and  so  conservative  as  America  that  was  a  remarkable 
performance  and  sets  an  instructi^•e  example  to  other 
nations  in  the  same  position.  The  result  was  that  the 
South  was  pinched  from  the  first  and  very  soon  began 
to  starve.  Prices  went  up  to  a  crazylevel.  Before  the 
end  of  the  war  coffee  was  selling  at  £8  a  pound  and  tea 
at  £b.  A  dinner  in  an  hotel  cost  fs  and  a  newspaper 
cost  4s.  A  pair  of  boots  cost  /40.  Moreover,  practically 
all  the  materials  of  war  came  from  abroad,  and,  if  it  had 
not  been  that  the  arsenals  of  the  South  were  well  supplied 
at  the  start  and  that  great  qpantitics  of  munitions  were 
captured  from  the  North  in  the  first  victories,  the  Con- 
federacy must  very  soon  have  come  to  a  standrtill  through 
sheer  lack  of  material.  That  par,t  of  the  Northern  strength 
was  well  a]>plied.  •  '  '  ' 

But  it  was  not  enough.  The  South  had  to  be  beaten 
in  the  field,  and  it  was  there  that  the  North  fumbled.  The 
main  strategic  objective  was  clear,  but  it  Js  one  thing  to 
have  a  clear  strategical  objective,  ,and  quite  another 
to  have  a  clear  strategical  plan.  The  two  objects  to  be 
gained  were  (i)  the  capture  of  Richmond,  the  Southern 
capital,  and  (2)  the  mastery  of  the  Mississippi  \-alley.   Th<' 


Northern  generals,  ^I'CloUan  and  the  rest,  began  with 
the  most  ingenious  plans  for  the  capture  of  Richmond. 
J5ut  they  were  too  ingenious.  They  dissipattnl  their 
strengtii.  I'"ive  times  great  armies  crossed  the  Potomac, 
and  live  times  they  were  driven  back  by  half  their  numbers. 
In  1862  four  armies  invaded  Virginia  and  converged  on 
Richmond.  In  three  months  Lee  had  routed  them  all. 
On  at  least  two  occasions  the  North  was  very  near  giving 
up  the  war  in  despair.  It  is  true  that  Lee  was  a  man  of 
genius,  and  the  fear  of  his  name  was  worth  an  army  corps, 
but  over-elaborate  tactics,  which  do  not  use  adequate'y 
the  strength  of  a  people,  play  into  the  hands  of  a  man  of 
genius.  The  early  Northern  commanders  all  wanted  to 
be  Napoleons,  and  thought  more  about  their  military  repu- 
tations than  about  beating  the  enemy,  (irant,  when  he 
came  along,  thought  only  of  using  the  gross  strength  of 
the  North  in  a  plain  business-like  way.  The  South  was  so 
situated  that  it  could  terribly  punish  divergence.  It  was 
operating  upon  interior  lines,  and  so  had  the  chance  of 
striking  rapid  blows  at  the  widely  separated  Northern 
armies.  Even  after  Crettysburg,  when  the  bad  days  haci 
begun,  it  could  i^laj*  that  game.  An  instance  is  Long- 
street's  swift  dash  to  the  West, which  gave  him  the  \'ictory 
of   Chickamauga  and   checked  the   Federal   invasion   of 


deorgia. 


The  Method  of  Grant. 


A  great  strategical  plan  is  generally  simple.  As  an 
example  take  Moltkc's  scheme  which  won  the  war  of  1870. 
There  was  no  fumbling  there.  His  two  great  army  groups 
had  no  other  object  but  to  concentrate  all  their  might  as 
soon  as  possible  on  the  main  forces  of  the  enemj-.  The 
North  began  by  flinging  away  its  chances  with  divergent 
operations  and  divided  cormsels.  Then  came  Grant's 
capture  of  Vicksburg,  which  along  with  the  naval  opera- 
tions on  the  lower  waters,  gave  the  North  the  line  of  the 
Mississippi.  It  was  (irant's  greatest  military  trium|")h, 
and  it  will  always  remain  an  admirable  example  of  that 
most  interesting  manfeu\Te  when  a  general  cuts  himself 
loose  from  his  base — a  movement  which  Sherman  made 
later  in  his  great  march  to  the  sea,  and  which  Lord 
Roberts  performed  in  the  South  African  War.  Once  the 
line  of  the  Mississippi  was  won,  and  (irant  was  in  supreme 
command,  the  strategic  plan  of  the  North  was  simplified. 
The  policy  of  pressing  in  the  sides  of  the  quadrilateral 
began.  Sherman  split  the  Confederacy  in  two  by  march- 
ing across  Georgia  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah,  and  the 
war  zone  was  thereby  narrowed  to  Virginia  and  the 
Carolinas.  Grant  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
advanced  against  Richmond.  He  fought  his  way  into  the 
Wilderness,  till  he  was  face  to  face  with  Lee  behind  the 
lines  of  Petersburg. 

Now  mark  the  situation.  The  South  had  been 
blockaded  for  three  years.  Its  soldiers  were  ragged  and 
barefoot,  with  scanty  food,  scanty  munitions,  scanty 
an.esthctics.  But  they  did  not  give  in.  Grant  did  not 
underrate  his  enemy.  He  knew  that  he  could  not  star\'c 
him  into  surrender,  but  nmst  beat  him  in  the  licld.  He 
used  all  his  cards  for  the  purpose,  and  not  merely  a  few. 
For  example,  he  used  the  command  of  the  sea.  With  its 
a.ssistance  in  the  1864  campaign  he  shifted  his  base  and 
the  line  of  communi^-ations  no  less  than  four  times  within 
two  months.  By  the  end  of  March  1863,  he  had  so  weak- 
ened the  enemy's  man-power  that  he  forced  him  to. 
evacuate  the  Petersburg  lines.  Lee  broke  loose,  but  he 
could  not  get  awa\\  The  net  had  closed  round  him,  and  on 
April  f)th,  1865,  the  greatest  soldier  since  Napoleon,  com- 
manding an  army  which  was  reduced  to  little  more  than  a 
corps,  laid  down  his  arms  at  Appomatox.  The  North 
had  ended  the  war  in  the  only  way  by  which  the  I'nion 
could  be  safeguarded  ;  it  had  won  a  complete  and  final 
victor\-. 

The  Parallel. 

Was  the  problem  of  the  North  altogether  unlike  our 
own  ?  In  many  ways  it  was  different.  We  arc  fighting 
along  with  strong  Allies,  We  began  by  possessing  the 
rudiments  of  a  military  system.     \\'e  have  suffered  very 


J.  WD      AND      WATER 


March  9,  1916. 


^ittle  from  the  political  clissonsjons,  t^ic  Press  clamour, 
and  the  pcrsunai  iutrif^ues.  which^for  fco  long  woakcnecl 
the  hand  of  1-incoln.  Again,  \vu  arc  happily  not  lighting 
against  genius  of  the  lirst  order,  for  there  is  no  (lennan 
soldier  who  can  rank  with  Lee  and  Jackson.  \\e  are 
engaged  with  a  far  more  formidable'powcr  than  the  Soutli, 
but  if  we  allow  the  possession  of  the  great  Confederate 
leaders  to  weigh  against  the  lack  of  trained  men  and 
supplies,  we  may  say  that  the  North  was  the  amateur 
and  the  South  the  professional  ;  just  as  to-day  Britain  is 
the  amateur  who  begins  by  having  the  business  to  learn, 
and  (iermanv  is  the  professional  who  has  studied  the 
game  for  a  generation.  Like  the  North,  we  and  our 
Allies  ha\e  the  greater  potential  strength  in  men  and 
wealth,  but  all  Cicrmany's  strength  has  been  at  her  dis- 
posal from  the  outset,  and  we  have  had  to  make  of  ours  a 
practical  reality.  Our  jiroblem  is  the  same — to  beleaguer 
the  enemy  and  then  to  breach  the  walls  of  his  fortress. 
But  we  began,  like  the  North,  by  ha\ing  no  consistent 
strategic  plan,  by  having  no  real  staff  work  at  head- 
quarters, and  by  various  divergent  operations  which 
clissipatcd  our  strength.  JJke  the  North  we  ha\'e  had  to 
mobilise  our  man-power  to  an  undreamed-of  extent,  and 
we  have  had  to  train  it.  We  have  also  had  to  hnd  the  men 
who  could  use  our  strength,  l^'ortunately  they  need  not 
be  geniuses.  Genius  is  like  the  wind  that  bloweth 
where  it  listeth,  and  no  man  knoweth  the  way  of  it.  We 
cannot  connt  on  the  advent  of  a  genius — tholigh  a  Lee 
or  a  Napoleon  would  no  doubt  cliange  the  whole  aspect 
of  the  struggle — but  we  have  the  right  to  look  for  leaders 
who  can  recognise  where  our  assets  lie,  and  use  them  with 
an  undivided  purpose. 

Our  strategic  objective  is  the  same  as  that  of  the 
North,  and  our  strategic  plan  is  the  same.  We  have 
succeeded,  as  the  North  succeeded,  in  blockading  the 
enemv.  But  that  is  not  enough,  (irant  had  to  figlit  liis 
-wav  through  the  enemy's  defences  and  break  him  in  a 
held  battle,  and  that  took  two  stubborn  years.  We  have 
the  same  task.  We  cannot  beat  Germany  by  blockading 
her,  though  all  that  helps  ;  the  finishing  touch  must  come 
from  a  field  victorj'.  \\'e  have  no  use  for  a  complex 
an(^  showy  strategy  any  more  than  (irant  had.  Our 
strategy  must  be  simple,  but  it  must  be  pursued  with  a 
single-hearted  purpose  and  unwavering  resolution.  We 
have  to  mobilise  every  ounce  of  potential  strength  and 
so  concentrate  it  as  to  over\vhelm  the  enemy.  That  was 
what  Grant  did,  and  only  by  doing  that  can  we  win  the 
victory  that  Grant  won. 

Other  Parallels :    Trench  Warfare. 

There  is  another  series  of  lessons  to  be  learned  from 
the  American  Civil  War  —technical  lessons  in  the  handling 
of  troops.  This  is  perhaps  scarcely  the  place  to  enlarge 
on  such  a  subject  ;  but  one  or  two  points  may  be  noted. 

The  first  is  the  use  of  entrenchments.  The  great 
war  of  1870  showed  comparati\ely  little  spade  work, 
at  any  rate  in  the  earlier  stages.  But  if  you  take  such  a 
campaign  as  Grant's  in  the  Wilderness  of  Virginia  in 
May  1864,  vou  will  find  that  it  developed  very  fast  into  a 
war  of  entrenchments.  Both  sides  sheltered  behind 
parapets  of  earth  and  felled  timber,  and  the  result  was  the 
kind  of  stalemate  which  we  have  seen  for  the  past  year. 
Grant,  it  will  be  remembered,  turned  the  first  position  by 
a  very  audacious  flank  march,  and  Lee  took  up  a  second 
line,  the  line  of  Petersburg.  This  line  was  admirably 
chosen,  for  I^ee  has  never  been  surpassed  in  his  eye  for 
country.  There  (irant  wore  him  down  and  ultimately 
drove  him  from  his  position.  If  we  seek  for  parallels  to 
the  kind  of  frontal  attacks  on  entrenchments  which  we 
have  seen  lately  in  the  West  there  are  plenty  in  the  Wilder- 
ness campaign.  The  series  of  encounters  which  we  call 
the  Battle  of  Spottsylvania  was  such  an  attack.  Mark 
what  happened  there.  <  irant  found  out  a  weak  point  in 
the  Confederate  line,  and  on  May  loth  attacked  witii  three 
divisions  after  a  long  artillery  preparation.  The  twelve 
battahons  in  the  centre,  like  the  Highland  Brigade  the 
other  day  at  Loos,  swept  everything  before  them.  They 
carried  the  first  position,  took  20  guns  and  i,aoo  prisoners, 
and  then  swept  on  and  carried  the  second  position.  But 
Lee  deliverecl  his  counter-stroke,  caught  the  Federals 
when  their  impetus  was  exhausted,  and  drove  them  back 
to.  their  original  line. 

Grant's  attack  failed  for  one  reason  only —he  had  no 
reserves  at  hand.     Two  days  later,  early  on  the  morning 


of  May  I2th,  he  made  another  desperate  assault  on  a  salient 
in  Li,'e':i  front,  (^nce  again  the  first  posiition  was  carried  ; 
once  again  the  NortlK-rners  were  brought  up  against  the 
second  position  and  routed  by  Lee's  counter-stroke. 
The  same  thing  happened  in  many  other  battles  of  the 
American  Civil  War— at  (lettysburg,  for  example,  where 
the  superb  charge  of  Pickett's  Virginians  failed  for  lack  of 
supports.  When  a  frontal  attack  succeeded,  as  at 
Chickamauga  and  at  Chattanooga,  it  was  because  behind 
the  spear-head  there  was  a  spear-shaft. 

Have  we  not  seen  the  same  thing  ?  At  Neuve 
Chapelle,  at  Festubcrt,  at  Loos,  we  delivered  frontal 
attacks  which  succeeded  brilliantly  in  the  first  effort. 
But  there  were  no  fresh  troops  behind  them  to  give  the 
finishing  stroke,  and  the  impetus  slackened  just  when  the 
vital  point  was  reached.  The  lesson  of  the  American 
Civil  War  is  that,  when  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  adver- 
sary's ])osition,  no  man(eu\-re  battle  is  possible  and  the 
only  thing  to  do  is  to  attack  in  front,  that  attack  can<mly 
succeed  if  there  are  ample  reserves —fresh  troops  who  can 
carry  on  the  impetus  of  the  first  assault.  It  was  fortunate 
that  the  (iermans  had  ho  Lee  at  their  head  to  deal  his 
deadly  counter-stroke,  for,  if  they  had,  Neuve  Chapelle 
and  Loos  might  have  been  for  us  not  partial  successes, 
but  unrelieved  calamities. 

Cavalry. 

A  second  point  is  the  use  of  cavalry.  The  Civil  War 
will  repay  thi  close  study  of  all  cavalry  officers.  It  pro- 
duced some  really  great  cavalry  loaders,  like  Job  Stuart 
on  the  one  side  and  Sheridan  on  the  other.  In  shock 
tactics  the  American  cavalry  would  probably  have  ranked 
below  the  cavalry  of  a  first-class  European  Power.  But 
they  may  be  said  to  have  discovered  the  mounted  rifleman 
— men  who  could  fight  on  foot  or  on  horseback  as  occasion 
demanded,  men  full  of  initiative  and  self-reliance,  who 
could  lorm  an  impenetrable  screen,  or  raid  enemy  com- 
munications, or  urge  a  pursuit,  or  make  a  reconnaissance, 
or  play  their  part  in  a  set  battle  with  equal  competence. 
Happily  in  Britain  we  have  learned  this  lesson.  I  think 
•we  may  fairly  claim  that  our  cavalry  are  the  handiest 
in  the  world.  In  pure  ca\alry  work  they  showed  great 
brilliance  in  the  retreat  from  Mons,  and  at  the  first  and 
second  battles  of  Ypres  they  were  as  steadfast  in  trench- 
fighting  as  the  best  infantry.  There  is  no  parallel  to 
such  jjerformances  on  the  (icrman  side.  Last  September, 
when  von  Hindenburg  made  his  desperate  effort  to  cut  off 
the  Russian  army  in  the  Vilna  salient,  he  flung  40,000 
troopers  under  von  Lauenstein  round  the  Russian  right 
flank.  They  turned  that  flank  completely,  but  thev 
could  not  hold  their  ground.  They  had  no  infantry  with 
them,  and  the  horsemen  were  routed  by  the  Russian 
counter-attack.  It  was  fortunate  for  Russia  that  the 
(icrman  ca\alry  were  not  true  mounted  infantrymen. 
Had  they  been  trained  on  the  British  ]Aan.  it  is  not  un- 
likely that  \on  Hindcnburg's  bold  stroke  would  luwe 
succeded. 

These  topics  are  suggested  10  an\one  who  cares  to 
pursue  the  parallel.  But  that  parallel  is  most  instructi\  e 
in  connection  with  the  greater  n^atters  on  which  the 
success  of  the  North  depended.  In  almost  all  respects 
their  problem  was  our  own.  (iiven  greater  wealth  and 
more  men,  how  could  these  best  be  used  to  crush  the  enem\'  ? 
Like  us,  the  North  had  to  levy  armies  beyond  its  wildest 
dreams.  It  had  to  simimon  the  whole  of  its  available 
man-power,  and  it  had  to  use  for  this  purpose  the  legal 
imperati\e.  It  had  to  learn  how  to  train  its  le\'ies,  so 
that  the  initiative  of  the  volunteer  should  be  preserved 
under  the  discipline  of  the  corporate  unit.  It  had  to 
use  its  navy  to  hem  in  the  enemy,  and  to  starve  and  cripple 
that  enemy.  It  had  to  find  men  to  lead  its  armies  who 
could  get  the  full  value  out  of  its  greater  man-power 
and  better  equipmept.  It  had  to  find  the  right  strategical 
plan  and  stick  to  it,  discarding  all  divergent  operations 
and  brilliant  side-shows.  And  when  all  this  had  been 
done  it  had  to  fight  hard  for  success  ;  to  deliver  hammer- 
blow  after  hammer-blow  till  the  armed  strength  of  the 
South  crumbled  to  pieces  in  the  field.  Potential  strength 
was  not  enough  ;  it  had  to  be  made  actual.  Actual 
strength  was  not  enough  ;  it  had  to  be  used.  Nothing 
less  than  a  complete  and  whole-hearted  national  effort 
availed. 

But  when  that  effort  was  made,  there  was  victory. 


March  9,  1916. 


LAND      AND     W  A  T  E  R 


THE    BULGARIAN    OBSESSION. 


Bv  Alfred   Stead. 


Bl'LGARIA  lias  betrayed  the  Allies  once,  there 
is  a  danger  that  Bulgaria  will  cause  the  Allies 
to  betray  their  word  again.  To  understand 
the  present  situation  in  the  Balkans,  and  to 
foresee  the  future. course  of  events,  it  is  necessary  to  look 
a  little  closely  into  the  Bulgarian  question.  Here  we 
lind  the  cause  of  much  that  would  otherwise  be  inexplic- 
able. It  is  necessary  that  we  should  understand  this 
question,  because  it  is  far  from  having  finished  its  sinister 
influence.  The  fact  that  the  Bulgarian  Monarch  and 
his  people  are  now  fighting  against  us,  or  that  they  have 
devastated  Serbia  and  shot  down  Enghshmen,  does  not 
preclude  their  endeavouring  to  run  with  the  hare  and  hunt 
with  the  hounds.  It  is  still  necessary  to  warn  against 
the  efforts  of  those  Englishmen,  who,  desirous  of  adver- 
tisement in  Bulgaria  and  at  home,  become  useful  tools 
in  Bulgarian  liands.  The  Bulgarian  seed  has  been  well 
sown,  one  crop  has' been  reaped  in  Gallipoli,  another  in 
Serbia,  the  third  is  ripening  north  of  Salonika. 

The  obsession  of  the  Allies  for  Bulgaria,  the  childlike 
belief  in  Bulgarian  friendship  would  be  touching  were 
it  not  criminal.  It  has  already  brought  the  whole 
Near  Eastern  policy  of  the  Allies  into  chaos.  Serbia  has 
been  sacrificed,  Roumanian  aid  has  been  made  more  diffi- 
cult to  secure,  while  Turkey  has  been  granted  a  new  lease 
of  resisting  power.  The  Bulgarian  obsession  is  also 
responsible  for  the  Dardanelles  campaign.  And  yet  to 
those  on  the  spot,  to  any  honest  man  with  a  knowledge 
of  Bulgaria  and  the  Bulgarian  Monarch  it  was  certain 
that  Bulgaria  must  go  against  the  Allies.  And  the  only 
change  in  the  situation  to-day  is  that  the  Germans  have 
Ferdinand  in  their  hand  as  surely  as  he  had  the  Bulgarians. 

Remarkable  Astuteness. 

The  Bulgarians  have  shown  remarkable  astuteness  in 
])reparing  the  public  opinion  in  this  country  and  in 
France  and  Russia,  making  them  believe  that  they 
knew  Bulgaria,  but  that  was  no  reason  why  English- 
men and  Frenchmen  of  ability  should  have  allowed 
themselves  to  become  Bulgarian  catspaws.  They  may 
be  left  to  their  consciences.  The  future  must,  however, 
be  guarded  against. 

In  Bulgaria  there  was,  from  the  beginning,  and  is 
now  only  one  element  to  be  considered,  and  that  the 
Bulgarian  King,  Ferdinand  of  Coburg,  who  had  gradually 
gathered  into  his  hands  all  the  national  life-cords.  There 
was  nobody  else  who  counted,  no  minister  or  individual. 
He  was  supremely  absolute,  and  his  people  knew  it  well. 
The  successive  Bulgarian  ministers  were  so  many  puppets 
and  had  as  much  fay  in  their  actions  as  the  dolls  in  a 
marionette  show.  It  was  not  only  that  they  were  afraid 
of  their  foreign  ruler,  whose  ability  to  think  quicker  than 
they  earned  an  unloving  respect,  but  Ferdinand  had 
taken  every  precaution  to  ensure  their  obedience. 

It  would  be  difticult  to  find  a  prominent  Bulgarian 
politician  who  could  not  be  forced  to  confess  that 
Ferdinand  possesses  documents  or  proofs  destructive  of 
his  career  and  imperilling  his  life.  And  the  posses- 
sion of  these  proofs  of  unsavoury  transactions,  financial 
))rincipally,  but  occasionally  worse,  made  it  easy  for  the 
King  of  Bulgaria  to  call  his  ministers  to  heel.  Daneff, 
Radoslavoff,  Gueshoff,  Ghenadieff,  none  of  these  had  any 
real  say  in  the  making  of  war  or  the  determining  of  policy. 
Tiiey  were  more  impotent  than  thii  Peace  Party  in  Con- 
stantinople before  Turkey  made  vvar  on  Russia.  They 
could  grow  rich  while  in  office,  to  live  in  uneasy  aiflucnce 
afterwards,  but  they  have  never  been  other  than  political 
eunuchs.  The  Bulgarian  people,  a  Tartar  race,  with  their 
nomadic  instincts  not  yet  Eradicated,  had  inherited 
from  the  Turkish  domination  an  atmosphere  of  petty 
mistrust  of  each  other,  which  riiade  tlie  handling  of 
them  by  Ferdinand  and  his  tools  an  easy  matter. 

Nor  must  it  be  overlooked  that  for  thirty  years 
they  have  acquiesced  in  Ferdinand's  sway — in  a  land 
where  assassination  is  more  easy  of  accomplishment  than 
is  the  mobbing  of  a  minister  here. 

And  as  to  Ferdinand's  views  in  the  present  war  there 
could  never  be  any  doubt.     He  was  inevitably  and  whole- 


heartedly with  the  Central  Powers,  both  by  inclination 
and  calculation.  Nor  is  the  reason  far  to  seek.  Not  only 
was  he  always  more  than  fialf  Austrian  in  his  ideas,  due 
largely  to  his  upbringing  at  Vienna,  but  it  was  evident  that 
he  could  only  realise  his  ambitions  by  alliance  with  Berlin. 

Principle  of  Nationality. 

The  Allies  had  enunciated  the  principle  of  nationali- 
ties as  the  fundamental  basis  of  the  war,  and  the  success 
of  this  principle  meant  ruin  to  all  Ferdinand's  ambitions. 
A  man  of  tremendous  ambiti(ms,  inherited  and  developed, 
he  could  never  be  content  with  a  minor  role.  Vain  and 
arrogant,  his  ambition  has  always  been  to  be  the  greatest 
of  Near  Eastern  sovereigns.  The  principle  of  nationalities 
dooms  him  to  be  the  least  important.  The  inclusion  in 
Serbia  of  the  Serbians  in  the  Dual  Monarchy  and  in 
Roumania  of  the  Roumanians  of  Transylvania  inevitably 
makes  these  two  states  larger  than  Bulgaria,  even  with 
all  Macedonia. 

It  is  impossible,  hurriedly,  to  create  Bulgarians ; 
the  most  that  is  possible  is  to  argue  that  all  Macedonians 
were  Bulgarians.  But  this  still  left  a  Greater  Bulgaria 
overshadowed  by  her  neighbours,  nor  was  there  any  possi- 
bility of  Bulgaria  coming  into  contact  with  Europe.  Often 
and  openly  used  Ferdinand  to  deplore  the  fact  that  he 
had  to  spend  his  life  "a  missionary  of  European  civilisa- 
tion "  amongst  a  barbarous  race  without  any  contact 
with  Europe.  It  was  therefore  hopeless  from  the  start 
for  the  Allies  to  offer  Ferdinand  Macedonia  or  part  of 
Thrace ;  it  could  not  meet  the  needs  of  his  ambition. 

On  the  other  hand  the  Central  Powers  were  able  to 
offer  him  aggrandisement  of  territory  on  the  ruins  of 
Serbia  and  through  the  despoilment  of  Roumania.  They 
were  prodigal  of  promises — so  prodigally  gilded  was  the 
pill  of  future  Bulgarian  vassalage  to  Germany  that 
Ferdinand  was  ready  and  willing  to  swallow  it.  There 
would  be  no  Serbia,  Roumania  also  would  be  much  less 
enlarged — and  promises  were  held  out  that  in  the  later 
future  Roumania  might  also  disappear.  There  was, 
therefore,  every  chance  of  the  greatest  of  his  dreams  being 
realised,  and  on  the  ruins  of  former  Serbia  a  greater 
Bulgarian  Tsardom  march  with  a  Germanised  Austria. 

So  obvious  were  the  advantages  to  Ferdinand  of 
alHance  with  the  Central  Powers  that  he,  never  hesitated. 
He  was  quite  willing  to  risk  his  people  in  the  attempt  to 
realise  his  ambitions — especially  so  since  he  would  far 
rather  have  the  Bulgarian  nation  slaughtered  than  con- 
tinue to  rule  it  as  the  least  important  of  Balkan  rulers. 
But  it  was  necessary  to  gain  time,  to  endeavour  to  obtain 
arms  and  ammunition,  both  lamentably  short  at  the 
commencement  of  the  war.  The  sturdy  resistance  of 
Roumania  to  the  passage  of  war  stores  hindered  greatlv 
the  moment  of  Bulgaria's  action.  The  Austrian  and 
German  forces  were  far  away  and  for  months  Bulgaria  was 
at  the  mercy  of  the  Allies.  An  ultimatum  with  twenty- 
four  hours  for  decision  would  have  settled  the  Bulgarian 
question  any  time  up  to  last  autumn. 

Futile  Negotiations. 

Nothing  was  done.  Negotiations  were  commencea, 
carried  on  and  recommenced.  The  astute  Ferdinand 
was  as  much  in  his  element  as  ever  was  Abdul  Hamid, 
when  maintaining  an  ec]uilibriimi  of  discord  amongst  the 
Great  Powers.  More  than  a  match  for  the  best  diplomats 
and  statesmen,  his  task  with  the  diplomats  at  Sofia  was 
easy,  because  they  were  certainly  not  of  the  first  class. 
Utilising  to  the  full  the  traditionary  belief  in  Bulgarian 
gratitude  to  Russia,  the  King  was  able  to  con\ince  the 
allied  representatives  that  he  was  more  than  desirous 
to  come  in  with  them.  Carefully  coached  by  his  future 
allies  he  tried  on  the  game  of  disgusting  Serbia  by  de- 
manding that  the  Allies  should  take  from  their  small,  but 
victorious  ally,  the  fruits  of  the  two  Balkan  wars.  Serbia, 
violating  her  constitution,  submitted  to  her  own  despoil- 
ment, and  remained  loyal  to  her  Allies. 

Secingto  what  lengths  the  Allied  obsession  would  go, 
and  having  an  additional  proof  in  their  acquiescence  in 
the  Bulgarian  loan  in  Berlin,  the  Bulgarians  began  to 


L  A  .\  T^      A  N  1)      W  A  T  E  R 


March  9,  1916. 


.  ■.        .    ,     ,_         ,  -     .      .  ■  •-._■• 

take  grcartcr'rfsks.  'Of  the' Geihian  loan,  a' Bulgarftin 
tx-Ministor  said  at  the  time  that  it  was  certain  that 
Ciermany  would  never  gnve  Bulgaria  money  during'  a 
war  without  liaving  adequate  guarantees  from  Bulgaria 
as  to  her  decision.  This  would  seem  to  iiave  been  the 
common-sense  view,  but  the  Allied  diplomats  at  Solia  were 
not  disturbed.  When  in  doubt  they  used  to  walk  out 
to  gaze  u]xm  the  huge  monument  of  the  Tsar  Liberator 
and  be  reassured  as  to  Bulgaria's  gratitude  to  Russia. 
They  did  not  realise  the  pregnant  fact  that  when  a  people 
feel  the  need  of  erecting  monuments  to  prove  that  they 
are  grateful,  the  gratitude  is  nuich  less  living.  Tiie  Tsar's 
moinnnent  at  Sotia  is  not  a  sign  of  gratitude,  it  is  it's 
tombstone. 

In  Bucarest  everyone  was  aghast  and  dumbfoundered 
at  the  doings  in  Sofia.  Intercourse  was  free  between 
the  two  countries  for  passengers,  although  the  Bulgarians 
ga\e  as  little  facility  for  the  passage  of  Roumanian  goods 
as  did  Roumania  for  Bulgarian  war  stores.  Roumanians 
returning  from  Solia  reported  the  Bulgarian  capital  as 
"  more  German  than  Berlin."  there  was  open  talk  of  war 
against  Serbia.  Bulgarians  in  Bucarest  talked  naixely 
of  "  taking  Macedonia  by  force  and  remaining  friends 
with  Russia  and  neutral."  The  evidence  that  the  Allies 
were  ready  to  sacrihce  Serbia  con\'inced  the  Bulgarians 
that  there  was  no  real  objection  to  a  Bulgarian  occupation 
of  Macedonia.  German  officers,  easily  recognisable  in 
their  civilian  clothes,  passed  through  every  da\',  German 
under-officers  also.  For  months  before  the  Bulgarian 
mobilisation  German  instructors  were  training  Bulgarian 
troo])s  while  the  general  staff  at  Sotia  was  being  trans- 
formed into  a  German  war  machine,  (ierman  aeroplanes 
alighted  in  Bulgaria  and  were  allowed  to  go  on  their 
way  to  Constantinople,  others  remained  in  Bulgaria. 
It  must  be  said  that  in  Bucarest  the  German  agents  and 
officers  passing  through  were  never  at  any  pains  to  con- 
ceal their  certainty  of  Bulgaria's  entry  on  their  side. 


Active  Preparation. 

During  this  time  of  active  and  almost  open  German 
preparation,  several  Allied  missions,  more  or  less  official, 
visited  Sofia  and  were  charmingly  entertained  by  King 
Ferdinand.  They  all  emerged  from  the  fatal  atmosphere 
of  the  Sofia  diplomatic  circle  saturated  with  a  conviction 
that  Bulgaria  was  surely  pro-Ally — and  they  were  intelli- 
gent persons,  having  some  of  them  pretensions  of  know- 
ledge of  near-eastern  affairs  !  And  so  the  fool's  paradise 
continued  even  up  to  the  end.  It  if  probable  that  even 
after  the  Russian  ultimatum  had  been  delivered,  the 
Allied  diplomats  hoped  for  a  Btdgarian  acceptance. 

The  i^ussian  Minister  in  Bucarest  only  a  few  days 
before  the  outbreak  of  war  asserted  that  Bulgaria's 
mobilisation  was  solely  directed  against  Turkey.  To  the 
lay  mind  of  course  it  seems  curious  that  even  the  fact  of 
(iermany  through  her  ally.  Turkey,  ceding  territory  to 
Bulgaria  during  wartime  should  have  failed  to  convince 
the  Allies  that  Bulgaria  was  "  sealed "  to  the  Central 
Powers.  It  is  perhaps  not  surprising  that  Russia  should 
have  been  reluctant  to  believe  in  Bulgarian  betrayal,  but 
that  was  no  reason  why  the  other  Allies  should  follow 
blindly  in  the  same  way.  Common  prudence  would  have 
suggested  some  sort  of  insurance  against  mistake,  some 
military  preparation  which  would  ha\e  enabled  the  Allies 
to  strengthen  their  position  in  the  Balkans  and  gain 
weight  at  Sofia,  while  avoiding  the  awful  error  of  remain- 
ing at  the  mercy  of  a  belief  in  Bulgaria's  friendship. 
It  is  only  just  to  Bulgaria  to  say  that  it  is  doubtful 
whether  she  ever  made  any  jiromiscs. 

Thus  Bulgaria  was  able  to  mobilise,  to  concentrate 
leisvnely  and  strike  when  her  Central  .Allies  had  made 
good  their  promises  of  crossing  the  Danube.  In  Bucarest 
and  Nish  it  was  well  known  where  the  Bulgarian  troops 
were  concentrating,  but  not  even  jjreventive  measures 
were  allowed  to  Serbia  because  "  we  are  negotiating  at 
Sofia  and  hoi)C  to  arrive  at  fa\>ourable  results."  It  was 
delightful  for  the  Bulgarians,  whose  fear  was  that  the 
Serbian  armj'  would  occupy  Sofia  before  they  could 
concentrate  for  adequate  defence — they  certainly  never 
hoped  to  be  allowed  time  to  concentrate  for  successful 
offence.  Thanks  to  the  Allied  obsession,  however,  even 
this  was  not  denied  them. 

I'hv  Bulgarian  refusal  to  accejit  tlic  Russian  ultima- 
luin  came  as  a    thunderbolt    to  the  diplomats  at   Sofia  '. 


■'  The  visit  of  the  British  and  French  ministers  to  the  Palace, 
the  remaining  of  the  R\issian  minister,  all  after  the  break- 
ing off  of  relations  between  the  Allies  and  Bulgaria,  were 
final  proof  of  the  reluctance  to  believe  the  obvious,  to 
admit  that  Bulgaria  had  played  them  false.  The  Blur 
book  on  the  events  in  Turkey  before  the  war  is  melaucliol) 
reading  with  its  pathetic  reiteration  that  "  the  peace 
party  are  gaining  ground,"  even  while  the  "  Gocbcit  and 
Hrcslau  "  and  the  German  detachments  were  llaimting 
the  victory  of  the  German  triumph  over  the  peace  party. 
It  is  unimaginable  that  there  will  ever  be  a  Blue  book  on 
the  Bulgarian  negotiations— it  would  be  sub-edited  away. 

Removing  Ferdinand. 

And  so  Bulgaria  went  to  war  and  Serbia  was  sacrificed! 
The  simplest  nu'thod  of  proving  the  Russian  contention 
that  the  Bulgarian  ])eople  were  at  heart  with  Russia  and 
that  it  was  only  tlu'  King  who  was  .\ustrian  would  have 
been  to  remove  Ferdinand—  a  sacrifice  of  one  life  to  sa\'e 
thousands.  Then,  and  then  only,  would  it  liave  been 
possible  for  the  Bulgarian  people  to  show  that  their 
sentiments  were  other  than  those  of  their  ruler.  This 
is  no  longer  possible.  The  a^isassination  of  Ferdinand 
would  not  release  the  Bulgarians  from  the  German  swa\'. 
The  argument  of  the  jjro-Ru-sian  inclinations  of  the 
Bulgarians  with  its  corollary  that  the  Bulgarian  troops 
would  not  fight  against  Russians  is  no  sound  one. 
Besides,  the  Bulgarians  are  told  nothing,  know  nothing 
save  that  which  their  rulers  choose  to  tell  them.  A 
Bulgarian  Colonel,  captured  near  Pirot.  did  not  know 
of  tile  Russian  manifesto  nor  that  Russia  had  declared 
war.  He  said  quite  sincerely  :  "  Why  should  Russia 
mind  if  we  take  Macedonia  ?  "  If  a  Colonel  did  not  know 
of  Russia's  action  what  is  to  be  expected  of  the  rank  and 
file  ?  They  are  simply  food  for  cannon  and  will  fight 
against  the  Russians  if  ordered  to. 

That  they  will  surrender  is  also  i>robable  because 
they  will  be  tired  of  the  war  and,  having  Macedonia,  they 
will  think  there  is  nothing  more  to  be  gained.  The 
Bulgarians  have  a  touching  belief  that  in  the  final  settle- 
ment, Russia  will  allow  tliem  to  keep  their  spoils.  To 
honest  men  it  is  a  terrible,  an  unconceivable  idea,  but  it 
exists  in  Bulgaria  and  is  not  unknown  in  Russia.  How 
it  is  to  be  reconciled  with  our  obligations  to  Serbia  and 
our  interests  in  Roumania  it  is  difficult  to  conceive.  In 
the  fairness  of  things  and  for  future  peace  in  the  Balkans, 
Bulgaria  should  disapjicar.  Better  tlie  Turk  than  tin; 
Bulgar.  The  clearer  it  is  made  that  the  Bulgarian 
obsession  no  longer  has  wei.glit  with  the  Allies  the  more 
possible  is  it  to  hope  for  Roumanian  co-operation.  If 
Roumania  were  to  believe  tluit  there  exists  a  policy  of 
resuscitating  Bulgaria  without  or  with  Ferdinand,  of 
taking  the  Bulgarians  again  to  the  Allied  bosom,  it  is 
certain  that  the  six  hundred  thousand  Roumanians  will 
not  participate  in  the  coming  Balkan  campaign. 

Cost  of  Mistakes. 

\\'e  have  surely  paid  dearly  enough  for  our  mistaken 
belief  in  Bulgaria,  we  have  made  Serbia  pay  more  dearly 
and  it  should  be  inconceivable  that  we  should  still  be 
ready  to  be  gulled.  It  is  all  very  well  for  the  Bulgarians 
to  dream  of  being  forgiven — their  German  taskmasters 
will  not  allow  them  to  act  independently  during  hostilities. 
Afterwards  will  come  the  tug-of-war,  but  if  the  true  facts 
of  the  double  dealing  of  Ferdinand  (and  the  Bulgarians  arc 
as  guilty  as  he,  since  for  30  years  they  condoned  his 
doings)  come  to  be  known,  not  even  the  mo:  t  ardent 
devotee  at  the  shrine  of  Bulgaria  as  pictured  by  the 
Balkan  Committee  will  dare  to  ad\ocate  mercv. 

The  allied  ■  pact  guai'anteeing  the  restoration  and 
future  integrity  of  Belgiiim  should  have  its  counteri)art 
in  a  combined  dtH:laration  on  the  part  of  this  country, 
France,  Russia  aiid  Italy,  that  Serbia  will  be  re-created  as 
before  the  war,  wliate\ermay  happen  as  to  the  Serbians 
of  Austria  or  Hungary.  Such  a  declaration  would  clear 
the  Balkan  air  eiiormously. 

The  question'  is  clear  and  vital,  the  Allies  must  choo.sc 
between  a  second-hand  Bulgarian  army  and  a  fresh 
Roumanian  one.  They  cannot  entertain  any  idea  of 
welcoming  l>ulgaria.  into  the  Allied  fold  and  hoix- to  win 
Roumanian  to-o^K'ration.  And  to-ilay  the  decisi\e 
word  in  the  Balkans  is  with  R(jumania. 


lO 


March  0.  iQi(3.  L  A  X  D      AND      \V  A  T  E  R  . 

THE    UNDISCOVERED    COUNTRY. 

By  J.  D.  Symon. 


IN  a  more  earthly  sense  than  Hamlet's,  e\ciyone  has 
his  undiscovered  country,  but  he  has  this  advan- 
tiVfic  o\cr  the  Prince  of  Denmark,  that  this  region, 
altliou;;ii  for  ever  chisixe,  is  to  some  extent 
c'early  delined.  It  belongs  to  no  future,  it  exists  here  and 
now.  We  seem  to  Icnow  where  to  iind  it,  we  are  always 
on  the  point  of  finding  it,  and  lind  it  we  do,  with  that 
inward  eye  which  is  the  bliss  of  solitude,  although  to  the 
eye  of  sense  it  remains  for  ever  unrevealed.  It  is  that 
ideal  place  where  wc  imagine  we  should  be  happy  even  on 
earth.  There  we  would  find  the  perfect  dwelling-j>lacc,  the 
perfect  sky,  the  perfect  air,  at  times  there  are  glimpses  of 
the  perfect  sea,  and  somewhere  in  the  landscape  there 
stands  the  perfect  house. 

This  imdisco\'ered  country  of  ours  is  a  shifting  entity, 
and  were  it  possible  to  captiuT  it  for  a  moment  or  two,  and 
analyse  it,  it  would  be  found  to  be  made  up  of  all  our 
apjiroximations  to  the  earthly  Paradise,  h'or  e\eryone  it 
lies  in  a  different  direction,  but  there  are  some  who  confess 
that  this  sense  of  well-being  is  most  alive  with  them  when 
they  turn  towards  the  southern  outskirts  of  London.  It 
is  true  that  the  northern  heights  can  also  arouse  these 
indefinable  sensations,  but  in  this  northern  hemisphere 
the  sun  draws  our  mental  attitude  southward,  as  it  did 
for  Keats  when  he  cried  aloud  for  a  beaker  full  of  the 
warm  South,  full  of  the  true,  the  blushful  hippocrene. 
It  is  to  the  Undiscovered  Country  that  we  would  retire 
on  that  hajDpy  da>-  when  we  have  made  our  fortune,  when 
we  would  have  all  things  about  us  as  \\-e  would  desire 
them  to  be,  and  enjoy  for  a  moment  such  so\  ereignty  over 
the  world  as  our  means  allow. 

In  poorer  days  we  seek  the  Undiscovered  Coimtry 
during  holiday  rambles,  and  for  some  it  is  inseparably 
connected  with  Saturday  afternoon,  when  they  are  free 
to  leave  the  town  behind  them  and  go  out  into  those 
coimtry  paths,  one  of  which  may  at  some  unexpected 
moment  bring  us  into  the  land  of  Beulah.  It  never  does, 
but  we  are  little  discouraged  by  that  which  may  be  no 
misfortune  after  all,  for  the  intrusion  of  the  concrete  is 
a  consummation  devoutly  not  to  be  desired  in  such 
spiritual  adventures    as    those    we  have  in  hand. 

Prosaic  Reality. 

The  concrete  is  not  to  be  escaped  by  those  who  still 
tread  this  solid  earth,  but  we  may  touch 'prosaic  reahty 
with  our  feet,  we  may  see  the  actual  landscape  around  us, 
and  yet  be  one  remove  away,  for  the  Undisco\-ered  Coun- 
try always  lies  round  the  next  corner.  Now  and  then  wc 
seem  to  catch  actual  glimpses  of  it,  for  there  arc  certain 
accessories  of  the  landscape  which  are  in  an  especial 
degree  stimulating  to  this  fantastic  mood.  Such  stimulus 
lies  more  particularly  in  details  of  the  middle  distance 
and  there  is  nothing  more  wildly  romantic  than  to  see 
across  a  wide  \alley  a  turn  of  road  that  clashes  for  a  moment 
into  view,  and  winding  round  a  spur  of  wood  disappears 
whither  we  may  ne\er  know.  But  e\-ery  day  as  we" look 
with  the  earliest  light  across  that  valley  and  see  our  little 
loop  of  roadway  gleaming  in  the  dawn,  we  vow  that  to- 
day we  shall  find  the  way  there,  stand  at  that  romantic 
corner  for  a  moment  and  learn  what  lies  beyond.  Well 
for  us  if  we  do  not,  for  approach  to  that  enchanted  spot 
would  rob  it  first  of  all  of  that  diminished  perfection  which 
co-ordinates  it  as. a  separate  little  picture  bv  itself,  and 
makes  it  in  the  purest  Greek  scnsc-^idyllic. 

The  Undisco\'ered  Country  shifts  its  ground,  and 
lca\ing  the  open  spaces  flies  townwa.rd  to  those  com- 
fortable regions  where  town  and  country  meet,  and  where 
hpuses  that  ought  by  rights  to  stand  !in  wide  demesnes 
are  content  with  gardens,  ample  perhaps,  as  townward 
gardens  go,  but  all  too  meagije  for  the.  dwellings  which 
they  serve.  Some  of  these  houses:  might  almost  be  stately 
homes  of  England  did  they  stand  amidst. sufficient  acreage, 
but  that  felicity  is  denied  them,  although  they  have  their 
own  felicities.  Some  of  them  make  up  for  their  deficiencv 
of  private  roads  by  their  neighbourhood  to  famous  heaths 
and  commons,  and  rambling  there  as  .Ijhc  twilight  closes 
in,  and  the  lights  twinkle  for  a  moment  from  windows 
soon  to  be  screened  with  warm  curtains,  the  wavfarer 
sees  vet   another  aspect  of  his  Undiscovered  Countrv. 


He  is  beset  with  a  strange  and  perhaps  impertinent 
curiosity  to  view  intimately  his  unknown  neighboiu-'s 
house,  and  it  teases  him  to  reflect  on  the  \-ast  nvnnber  of 
which  he  will  never  see  more  than  the  outside.  Tli  • 
infinite  variety,  the  endless  interest  of  such  an  exhibition 
would  leave  all  museums  tame  by  comparison,  and  the 
spectator  would  be  hugely  advanced  in  the  proper  study 
of  mankind,  were  it  possible  for  him  to  play  the  universal 
Asmodeus.  He  would  desire,  however,  to  approach  in  no 
cynical  mood,  for  the  region  of  the  Undisco\eied  Country 
has  its  root  of  fascination  in  its  bene\-olent  charm. 

The  Twilight  Spell. 

Its  spell  is,  as  wc  have  hinted,  mo.?t  potent  at  twilight, 
particularly  in  the  winter,  just  before  blinds  are  drawn 
and  lamps  are  lighted  and  the  warm  interiors  are  fitfully 
revealed  by  winking  firelight.  Then  it  is  that  the  other 
man's  books  and  pictures,  his  choice  old  furniture  and 
his  cosy  corners  seem  the  right  material  of  romance  and 
the  occasional  figures  that  move  past  the  windows  in  the 
firelight  become  inhabitants  of  a  less  ]-)rosaic  world  than 
our  own.  They  are  dream  children,  they  breathe  a  rarer 
atmosphere,  their  interests  and  ho  lights  must  be  of  finer 
texture  than  ours.  We  know  very  well  that  they  have  to 
face  the  same  grey  days  as  we  ourselves  must  get  through 
somehow,  they  sit  down  to  the  same  sort  of  meals,  they 
read  the  same  papers,  a  similar  world  of  tragedy  and 
comedy  presses  in  upon  them  hour  by  hour,  but  we  refuse 
to  take  it  literally.  The  People  of  the  Undiscovered 
Country  must,  we  think,  be  a  degree  above  the  ordinary, 
for  their  surroundings  are  so  much  more  like  a  story-book 
than  ours. 

"  This  is  all  nonsense,"  saj's  the  practical  man,  "  your 
imagined  felicities  do  not  exist,  and  your  story-book  people 
are  not  to  be  found  out  of  story-books.  You  think 
their  houses  and  their  possessions  are  out  of  the  common. 
To  them,  believe  me,  they  are  commonplace.  They 
do  not  see  what  you  see  in  them  :  pcs.slbly  they  woiild  think 
your  household  gods  the  altogether  desirable,  if  they  were 
afflicted  with  your  lamentable  turn  of  mind.  Go  to,  Mr 
Dreamer,  this  is  a  practical  age.  Give  us  something 
])ractical  and  away  with  your  moonings  aroimd  your 
neighbour's  front  gate.  If  you  hang  about  there  too  long 
the  Special  or  even  the  Ordinary  Constable  will  have  a 
word  to  say  to  you  and  you  will  probably  see  the  inside 
of  a  residence  you  didn't  bargain  for.  Buy  an  e\-ening 
paper,  like  a  good,  sensible  man,  go  home  and,  if  romance 
you  must  have,  read  the  kiiillcton.  For  your  Undis- 
covered Country  and  so  forth  will  only  get  you  into  trouble. 
They  are  not  the  Legitimate  Drama." 

He  is  no  doubt  a  sound  man,  this  counsellor  in  whom 
the  spirit  of  Columbus  does  not  stir,  and  there  is  no 
argument  in  our  armoury  that  would  avail  with  such. 
He  has  forgotten  his  childhood,  otherwise  it  would  be 
very  easy  to  bring  him  to  a  gracious  state  of  unreason 
with  a  single  question.  For  if  any  doubt  the  existence  ol 
the  Undiscovered  Country  and  its  magic,  let. them  gc 
back  for  a  moment  to  that  old  wisful  puzzle  of  childish 
days  :  Why  is  the  room  or  the  \iew  from  the  window  so 
much  more  wonderful  when  you  see  it  in  the  looking- 
glass  ?  It  seems. a  different,  a  nicer  place  somehow,  a 
place  you  want  to  visit  and  enjoy  on  a  long  holidav. 

And  the  answer  is  simply  this  :  It  is  the  Undiscovered 
Country. 


During  the  early  daj-s  of  the  war  the  War  Office  and 
Admiralty  accepted  the  generous  offer  of  the  Bath'  Corpora- 
tion to  give  free  treatment  for  wounded  or  invalided  soldiers. 
The  increased  number  of  visitors  to  Bath,  and  the  manv 
thousands  of  treatments  given  to  officers  and  men,  necessitated 
additional  acconmiodation,  and  the  new  Royal  Baths  were 
opened  recently  by  Field  Marshal  Lord  French,  who  received 
a  warm  welcome  from  tlic  people  of  Bath. 

The  new  establishment  contains  fifty  rooms,  and  accom- 
modation is  provided  for  a  variety  of  treatments,  including 
deep  baths.  Some  of  these  are  fitted  with  chairs  for  lowering 
helpless  patients  into  the  water.  A  large  swinuning  hath  is 
under  the  same  roof.  Many  great  iniprnvemcnts  in  the 
gc'neral  cipiipment  of  the  establisliment  ha\-c  been  introduced. 


I.  A  X  D      AND      W  A  T  !■  R 


March  9.  iQiO. 


THE    SCOTTISH    IMBROGLIO. 


By  Neoimperialist. 


THE  Imnerial  Task  that  is  before  the  free  peoples 
of  (ireater  Britain  is  that  great  task  of  con- 
solidation/jf  the  [Empire  and  the  creation  of  an 
effective  union,  which  shall  conser\'e  all  the 
liberties  and  responsibilities,  by  some  statesmanlike  con- 
trivance that  meets  actual  and  likely  difficulties  of  the 
future.  And  just  as  it  will  be  unsound  to  depend  merely 
on  sentiment,  so  no  arrangements  will  serve  which  are 
fuimd  not  to  be  realities  but  convenient  hctions. 

Tliire  are  always  seeds  of  disunion  as  well  as  of 
fellowship  among  groups  of  men,  even  of  the  same  race, 
es|K'ciali\-  if  they  ha\e  widely-different  environments 
and  many  necessarily  conflicting  economic  interests.  The 
numerically  smaller  groups  naturally  fear  the  tyranny  of 
the  larger  and  are  very  sensitive  to  any  threat  against 
their  comi^lete  autonomy.  There  are.  besides,  in  every 
state  those  intransigeant  minorities  of  ultra-nationalists, 
who  see  with  a  jiassionate  intensity  their  own  beloved 
corner  of  the  world  and  ignore  all  outer,  wider  implica- 
tions. It  is  the  great  privilege  of  our  time  and  of  this 
crisis  of  oiu*  history  that  we  can  set  our  eyes  on  the  larger 
purpose,  and  look  to  tht;  contrivance  of  a  frame-work  of 
indissoluble  union,  the  formation  of  a  greater  British 
Commonwealth  that  shall  be  the  most  potent  influence 
for  peace  and  liberty  that  the  world  has  yet  known. 

A  suggestion  has  been  canvassed  and  has  received 
distinguished  support,  because  it  seems  to  avoid  the 
ditViculties  of  the  situation  which  centre  in  the  sensi- 
tiveness of  the  Dominions  as  to  any  dilution  of  their 
sovereign  rights.  It  is  to  the  effect  that  no  closer  ma- 
chinery of  union  is  advisable  than  the  existence  of  a 
common  King,  thereby  creating  a  common  loyalty, 
strengthened  by  the  bond  of  common  blood  and  common 
ideals.  It  is  a  characteristic  attempt  at  the  solution  of 
difficulties  by  going  round  them  instead  of  overcoming 
them. 

An  interesting  episode  in  our  past  history,  the  quarrel 
between  England  and  Scotland,  that  came  to  a  head  at  the 
beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  provides  a  whole- 
some commentary  on  such  a  suggested  solution. 

Scotland  and  England  were  united  in  i6o;i,  not  by 
deliberate  act,  but  by  the  mere  accident  of  coming 
under  a  common  Crown.  The  whole  of  the  'cventcenth 
century,  the  most  stormy  in  our  history,  which  saw  the 
execution  of  a  King,  the  establishment  of  a  Protectorate, 
the  Restoration  and  the  Revolution,  was  taken  up  with 
the  adjustment  of  .Anglo-Scottish  relations  and  the  sturdy 
struggle  of  the  Scots  not  to  be  absorbed  or  bullied  by  their 
larger  and  none-too-considerate  partner.  Though,  at  this 
period  of  our  development,  the  Crown  was  held  reasonably 
well  in  hand  by  Parliament,  the  despotic  ideas  of  an  earlier 
age  had  by  no  means  disappeared.  There  were  no 
Durhams  in  those  days.  England  undoubtedly  did  treat 
Scotland  dcspitefully  as  a  vassal.  Except  under  the 
brief  and  more  liberal  Cromwellian  settlement,  Scotland 
was  pre\-ented  by  the  Navigation  Laws  from  profitable 
trade  with  America  and  the  Indies.  True  this  was  not 
such  a  naked  piece  of  tyranny  as  the  plain  statenun*  ..f 
it  suggests,  but  it  was  a  serious  disability. 

From  this  cause  and  others  the  northern  kingdom 
became  impoverished,  and  it  was  with  a  view  to  mitigating 
this  widespread  poverty  that  the  foolishly  spacious 
Darien  scheme,  conceived  by  Paterson,  was  fanatically 
patronised  by  Fletcher  of  Saltoun.  Its  ignominious 
failure  created  a  storm  of  bitter  anger  in  Scotland.  The 
enterprise  indeed  was  chiefly  wrecked  by  the  jealousy  of 
the  luiglish  li^ast  India  Company,  who  intrigued  very 
resourcefully  to  put  it  out  of  business,  but  in  itself  it  was 
a  profoundly  futile  project — an  admirable  instance  of  a 
jjolicy  conceived  with  no  corresponding  armaments  to 
give  it  sanction.  The  quarrel  in  its  bitter  course  served 
a  ver}'  useful  purpose  in  exposing  in  the  most  obvious 
way  the  hollowness  of  the  contrivance  on  which  the  alleged 
union  was  based.  Here  was  Scotland,  at  the  back  of  the 
im))ulsivc  h^letcher,  demanding  at  once  the  protection 
of  the  English  fleet  for  Scottish  argosies,  and  at  the  same 
time  working  to  defeat  English  interests,  or  England's 
notions  of  her  interests  ;  and  even  demanding  that  Scot- 
land should  have  her  own  ambassadors  to  conduct  her 


separate  foreign  relations.  That  is  to  say,  English  Heets 
might  have  been  protecting  the  trade  of  Scotland  in 
distant  oceans,  while  the  Scottish  ambassador  in  Paris 
might  be  arranging  an  alliance  with  the  French  king  as  a 
threat    to   her   own    predominant    partner. 

It  was  a  good  example  of  the  attempt  to  combine  the 
membership  of  two  states,  England  and  Scotland,  and  to 
obtain  the  benefits  of  both  without  sharing  the  respon- 
sibilities and  burdens.  There  came  the  inevitable  dis- 
ruption. The  fiction  broke  down  completely.  The 
Scottish  Parliament  was  for  demanding  a  separate  king  and 
set  about  arming  a  militia  for  the  inevitable  war  which 
such  an  extreme  step  involved  according  to  the  idi'as  of 
the  time.  Some  guiding  spirit  of  sanity^  restrained  the 
English  Parliament.  Her  statesmen  saw  that  the  in- 
terests both  of  Scotland  and  of  England  were  for  a  jx-ace- 
ful  arrangement  ;  that,  in  jiarticular,  the  supri'me  issues 
of  national  safety  demanded  such  a  settlement.  Pi'rliai)s 
here  was  the  faint  dawn  of  that  larger  day  of  acconmioda- 
tion  in  place  of  coercion  which  has  guided  the  Empire 
to  her  bloodless  victories,  a  policy  of  which  to-day  in  her 
hour  of  danger  she  is  enjoying  the  reward. 

Common  sense  and  a  sense  of  common  danger  won.  A 
true  union  was  contrived  under  the  Parliament  of  dreat 
Britain.  A  new  state  was  founded  with  Englaml  and 
Scotland  as  joint  partners  and  with  but  one  clear  loyalty 
involved,  a  loyalty  to  the  union,  to  Cireat  Britain,  of 
which  both  were  constituent  elements. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  extract  the  salient  lesson  of  tliese 
events.  But  in  applying  the  moral  of  these  facts  to  the 
problems  of  our  day  considerable  allowances  must  be 
made  for  changes  of  time  and  circumstance,  and  no 
attempt  made  to  press  the  parallel  too  far.  Certainly 
no  causes  of  quarrel  which  might  now  arise  between  the 
Five  Nations  would  be  complicated,  as  in  this  instance 
of  Scotland,  by  dynastic  difficulties.  Again,  and  much 
more  important,  in  these  days  the  idea  of  full  local 
autonomy,  with  centralisation  merely  for  the  supreme 
common  purpose,  had  not  been  born.  Which  is  to  say 
that  the  conditions  of  union  between  England  and  Scot- 
land were  naturally  much  more  rigid  than  any  that  would 
be  contemplated  if  such  a  union  took  place  to-day  ;  when 
undoubtedly  she  would  claim  and  without  questi<in 
obtain  a  full  measure  of  home  rule.  A  lortiori,  a  claim 
to  complete  'independence  for  all  but  the  supreme 
common  issues  would  be  retained  by  the  Dominions  in 
any  union,  however  close,  with  the  Mother  Country  or 
with  each  other.  And  yet,  the  circumstances  being 
even  as  they  were,  who  will  sa}'  that  Scotland  was  op- 
pressed or  has  not  held  her  own  from  that  day  to  this 
in  the  Commonwealth  of  Great  Britain  ? 

An  acute  outside  observer,  the  American  Lowell  in 
his  admirable  treatise  The  Government  of  England,  points 
out  how  completely  the  Scot  was  able  to  assert  himself  in 
the  after  arrangements  of  the  two  countries.  How,  for 
instance,  he  took  part  as  by  right  in  the  chsputes  concern- 
ing English  and  Irish  affairs,  but  contrived  a  custom 
whereby  Scottish  affairs  were  in  the  main  left  to  Scots 
Members.  We  know  too,  that  they  have  their  own  law  ; 
their  own  admirable  system  of  education  ;  and  how  the 
Radical  predispositions  of  a  Scotch  electorate  have 
prevailed  in  the  counsels  of  the  nation. 

The  dominant  idea  of  those  who  put  forward  the 
suggestion  of  the  union  of  the  Dominions  under  a  common 
king  was  the  necessity,  of  safeguarding  the  nationality  of 
the  several  Dominions.  It  was  rightly  held  that  no 
single  diminution  of  their  jirerogatives  or  their  j)ower  of 
inclependcnt  development  would  be  admitted  by  the 
robust  and  politically  self-conscious  nations  of  the 
Dominions.  But  why  this  inference  that  union  can  only 
be  contrived  at  the  expense  of  nationality  ?  It  seems, 
on  the  contrary,  that  it  would  be  all  but  impossible  for 
the  most  perverse  statesmanship  now  to  contrive  a  union 
which  would  in  any  way  threaten  the  supreme  cause  of 
the  unfettered  individualitv  of  each  of  the  four  allied 
nations.  That  cause  is  won  for  good  and  all  and  it  has 
been  recognised  more  and  more  consciously  by  every 
important  Act  that  has  established  the  relations  between 
the  several  units  of  Empire  for  the  last  seventy  years. 


JVIarcli  g,   1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


CHAYA. 

A  Romance  of  the  South   Seas. 
By  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoole. 


Synopsis  :  Macquart,  an  adventurer  who  has  spent 
most  of  his  life  at  sea,  finds  himself  in  Sydney  on  his  beam  ends. 
He  has  a  wonderful  story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in  New 
Guinea  and  a  chance  acquaintance,  Tillman,  a  sporting  ma>< 
about  town,  fond  of  yachting  and  racing,  offers  to  introduce  him 
to  a  wealthy  woolbroker ,  Curlewis,  with  a  view  to  financing  the 
scheme.  Macquart  also  makes  the  acquaintance  of  Houghton, 
u  well-educated  Englishman  out  of  a  job,  who  has  done  a  good 
■deal  of  yachting  in  his  time.  Curlewis  turns  down  the  scheme, 
■though  Macquart  tells  his  story  in  a  most  convincing  manner. 
His  silent  partner  Screed  believes  in  it,  and  unbeknown  to 
■Curleivis,  follows  the  three  men.  asks  them  to  his  home,  and 
■agrees  to  find  the  ship  and  the  money,  on  seeing  that  Macquart' s 
hidden  treasute  map  agrees  wiih  an  Admiralty  chart.  The 
ship  is  the  yawl  "  Barracuda."  Screed,  on  the  morrow,  takes 
the  three  men  over  the  "  Barracuda,"  with  which  they  are  de- 
lighted. Coming  aivay  Macquart  is  overtaken  by  an  old  friend. 
■one  Captain  Hull,  who  hails  him  as  B — y  Joe,  and  accuses 
him  of  many  mean  crimes.  Macquart  gives  Captain  Hull 
the  slip,  but  unbeknown  to  him  Hull  gets  in  touch  with  Screed, 
and  enlightens  him  on  the  real  character  of  Macquart.  Just  as 
the  "  Barracuda  "  is  about  to  sail  Screed  takes  Hull  on  board 
and  unexpectedly  introduces  him  to  Macquart  as  a  member  of 
the  crew.  Before  the  ship  is  a  day  out  Captain  Hull  makes  it 
plain  to  Macquart  he  is  on  the  look-out  for  his  "  monkey  tricks." 

CHAPTER    XI. 

They  Sight  the  River. 

THE  Java  Sea,  the  Banda  Sea,  unci  the  Arafura  Sea, 
all  locked  in  by  the  Sunda  Islands,  North  Australia, 
Borneo,  the    Celebes    and    New  Guinea    form    a 
lake    almost    bluer  than    the    Carribean,    almost 
as  romantic. 

Never  despise  Trade.  The  Romance  of  Adventure  is 
written  on  the  tablets  prepared  by  the  traders  of  the  world, 
and  in  the  go-downs  of  Macassar,  the  trading  houses  of  Batavia, 
and  on  the  wharves  of  Malacca  you  will  find  more  of  the 
spirit  of  the  Real  Thing  Worth  Living  For  than  in  the  wildest 
book  of  Adventures  ever  written,  and  no  spot  in  the  world 
tnore  starred  with  high  doings  in  the  cut  and  thrust  line  than 
just  here. 

Torres  Straits  is  the  highway  between  the  Arafura  Sea 
and  the  Pacific.  In  the  old  sandal-wood  days  and  in  the  early 
times  when  the  Dutch  were  greater  in  the  east  than  they  are 
now  and  the  prahus  of  piratical  dyaks  more  active,  Torres 
Straits  was  the  scene  of  many  a  bloody  fight,  unrecorded, 
•between  the  merchant  adventurers  of  Holland  and  the  Islanders 
•who  did  not  care  a  button  about  monej'  so  loi^g  as  they  got 
licads. 

Through  this  wilderness  of  blue  with  the  long,  low  line 
•of  the  New  Guinea  coast  on  the  horizon  to  starboard  the 
Barracuda  was  steering,  Houghton  at  the  wheel  and  Tillman 
beside  him. 

It  was  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the  wind  was  almost 
due  south  and  they  reckoned  to  strike  the  coast  where  the 
river  disembogued  before  noon  ;  nothing  shewed  but  the 
coast-line  and  an  oil  tank  almost  hull  down  to  windward  and 
a  gull  flickering  dark  against  the  sea  blaze  astern. 

"  Well,"  said  Tillman.  "  We've  done  it  pretty  near. 
To  think  of  us  three  in  the  bar  at  Lamperts  a  few  weeks  ago 
talking  of  the  thing  without  the  seeming  ghost  of  a  chance 
of  pulUng  it  through,  and  now  to  think  of  us  here,  nosing 
through  Torres  Straits  without  having  lost  a  spar,  riglit  on  the 
business  like  a  hawk.  I  tell  you,  Houghton,  if  I  wasn't  a 
modest  man  I'd  be  proud  of  myself." 

"  We've  had  good  luck,"  said  the  man  at  the  wheel, 
"  and  Luck's  a  jolly  good  thing  to  have  with  one  if  it  wasn't 
so  changeable.  We're  here,  but  we  have  all  our  work  cut  out 
before  us." 

Tillman  whistled. 

"  We  have  begun  well,"  went  on  Houghton,  "  but  we 
have  all  the  stuff  on  board  for  an  explosion  between  Macquart 
and  Hull,  even  if  we  have  the  best  of  Luck  and  this  woman 
is  dead  or  doesn't  recognise  Macquart  there's  likely  to  be 
trouble  between  those  two.  The}^  hate  each  other  hke  poison. 
Hull's  a  good  chap,  1  think,  though  he  might  be  better  ; 
an\'how,  he's  a  long,  long  chalk  better  than  the  other,  but  I 
can't  understand  him.  He  doesn't  fight  openly  with  Macquart 
but  he's  all  the  time  jeering  at  him  under  the  pretence  of 
making  fun  and  when  he  has  a  chance,  doesn't  he  work  him— 
ue  can't  afford  that  sort  of  thing  on  an  expedition  like  this." 


"  Well,  there's  no  use  in  worrying,"  said  Tillman.  "  AU 
we've  got  to  do  is  to  keep  our  eye  on  the  moment  and  do  our 
best.     You're  letting  her  off  the  course." 

Houghton  flushed  and  put  the  helm  over  a  few  spokes. 
Tillman  had  a  lot  of  common  sense  though  up  to  this  no  one 
wovdd  have  suspected  it,  and  his  rebuke  was  all  the  more 
severe  because  deserved.  Worrying  about  the  future  becomes 
a  crime  when  it  detracts  from  the  business  of  the  moment  and 
lets  the  ship  off  the  course. 

At  three  bells  the  whole  crew  being  on  deck  and  the  coast 
close  up  to  them,  Hull,  who  had  been  looKing  through  the 
glass,  lianded  it  to  Macquart. 

"  That's  the  rock  you  spoke  of  if  I  ain't  mistaken,"  said 
Hull. 

Macquart  looked  through  the  glass. 

"  That's  the  rock,"  said  he.  ' 

He  kept  the  glass  to  his  eye  for  a  full  half-minute,  then 
he  handed  it  to  Tillman. 

Tillman  took  a  peep  at  the  object  in  question. 

It  was  a  remarkable  feature  on  that  flat  shore,  where 
the  mangrove  trees  crept  down  literally  to  the  edge  of  the 
reef-protected  water. 

The  whole  coast-line  seemed  reef-protected  and  in  the 
sun  blaze  the  foam  breaking  on  the  reefs  showed  like  snow. 

"  Well,"  said  Hull,  "  it's  not  invitin',  but  there's  the 
rock,  anyway,  as  you  said  it  would  be,  and  it's  up  to  you,  Mac, 
to  pilot  us  in." 

"  Keep  her  as  she  goes,"  said  Macquart. 

As  pilot  the  command  of  the  Barracuda  was  now  in  his 
hands  and  Hull  was  his  servant,  but  he  did  not  "  s^well  him- 
self," to  use  Hull's  expression.  He  had  the  appearance  of 
a  man  deeply  absorbed  in  some  fateful  speculation,  and  he 
drew  apart  from  the  others,  his  eyes  fixed  on  the  coast  and 
sometimes  cast  anxiously  to  windward. 

The  wind  held  steady,  almost  due  south,  and  now  with 
the  Pulpit  Rock  coming  abreast  of  them,  Macquart  gave  an 
order,  the  spokes  of  the  wheel  flew  to  starboard  and  the 
Barracuda  with  the  main  boom  svioing  out  and  sailing  dead 
before  the  \vind,  headed  for  the  shore. 

Hull,  shading  his  eyes  with  the  sharp  of  his  hand,  saw  the 
great  black  break  in  the  reefs  they  were  making  for.  It  was 
the  break  where  the  river  disembogued  and  he  pointed  it  out 
to  Tillman. 

"  That's  the  river  anyway,"  said  he,"  and  a  fair  wind  to 
take  us  up.  I  reckon  Mac's  no  fool.  Up  to  this  I've  never 
been  sure  of  him,  but  he's  made  good  so  far." 

"  Yes,  we  haven't  got  on  badly  up  to  now,"  said  Tillman. 

As  they  drew  closer  in,  the  reef  opening  spread  wider 
before  them,  and  the  Barracuda,  going  before  the  vwnd,  took 
the  gentle  swell  with  the  light  and  buoyant  motion  of  a 
balloon  ;  the  foam  bursts  of  the  reefs  shewed  a  long  way  to 
port  and  starboard  as  they  passed  the  reef  ends  and  now, 
the  land  close  up  on  either  hand,  the  river  lay  before  them  like 
a  sheet  of  gold. 

Houghton  stood  speechless  before  the  strangeness  and 
beauty  of  this  place  so  remote  and  so  different  from  any  place 
he  had  seen  before.  Save  for  the  great  rock  standing  like  a 
sentinel  and  swarmed  about  by  gulls,  the  land  shewed  nothing 
buc  loliage,  the  dark  green  of  mangroves  dreaming  upon  their 
water-shadows,  the  emerald  fronds  of  palm,  the  wind-stirred 
masses  of  the  dammar,  cutch  and  camphor,  wildernesses  on 
either  side  the  river  ;  all  these  held  a  charm  mysterious  as 
the  charm  of  the  river  itself  flowing  in  stereoscopic  stillness 
from  the  mysterious  land  beyond. 

It  was  here  that  the  Terschclling  came  in  all  those  years 
ago,  either  under  sail  if  the  wind  was  favourable,  or  towed  or 
warped  up  that  bright  waterway  to  her  last  anchorage,  with 
John  Lant  directing  operations  and  Macquart  no  doubt  assist- 
ing as  deck  hand. 

It  was  away  up  there  in  the  mysterious  country  that 
she  was  sunk  with  all  hands  bottled  in  the  fo'c'sle  after  the 
gold  had  been  safely  cached.  It  was  up  there  that  Macquart 
according  to  all  probability,  had  done  John  Lant  in,  and, 
profiting  nothing  by  his  crime,  had  escaped  with  his  bare  life 
from  the  place  to  which  he  was  now  stealing  back. 

For  a  moment,  as  these  thoughts  occurred  to  Houghton, 
the  whole  brilliant  scene  before  Iiim  became  tinged  with  gloom 
and  tragedy  and  Macquart  a  figure  of  horror  ;  for  a  moment, 
as  they  passed  the  river  moutli  and  took  the  gentle  current  of 
the  half  mile  broad  stream,  a  hand  seemed  thrust  against  his 
breast  and  a  voice  seemed  to  cry  "  Begone — "  And  then, 
flashing  by  him  came  a  thing  like  a  lady's  jewelled  aigrette — 


19 


LAND      AND      WATER 


March  9,  1916. 


it  was  a  hunimin  ;  bird,  and  following  this  vision  came  a  vat;iu- 
trace  of  perfuim-  Irom  the  tree  wilderness  of  the  banks.      Thf 
feeling  passed  from  Houghton's  mind,  the  warning  was    for 
gotten — the  rivor  had  taken  him  in  the  toils  of  its  fascination 

"  The  tide  is  with  us,"   said  Macquart. 

They  had  struck  the  reef  opening'  just  at  the  turn  of  thr 
tide.  And  against  the  slackened  current  they  now  made 
way  almost  as  well  as  in  the   open  sea. 

CH.^FTKK  XII. 

Tnii    L.VGOON. 

TILLMAN  was  at  the  wheel  and  Macquart,  calling  Jacky, 
ordered  him  to  take  Tillman's  place.     Then  he  led 
the  others  a  bit  forward. 
"  Now,"    said   he,   "  here's  the  river.     Have   I   spoken 
rightly  ?     Have    I    judged    rightly  ?     I    have    brought    you 
nearly  to  the  spot  and  it  all  depends  on  the  decision  we  take 
now  whether  we  pull  this  tli  ng  through  or  not. 

"  The  village  hes  on  the  eft  bank,  maybe  si.K  or  more 
miles  up — say  seven,  the  waterway  is  broad  and  we  can  get 
the  Barracuda  up  easy  enough  ;  well,  we  mustn't  take  her 
that  far,  we  mustn't  take  her  more  than  another  mile  or 
two  up.  We've  got  to  tie  her  somewhere  on  the  banks,  some- 
where secure  and  hidden,  and  go  on  to  tlie  village  in  the  boat." 
"  Good  Lord,"  said  Tillman,  "  What  are  you  saying  ? 
Leave  the  Barracuda  and  maybe  have  her  run  away  with  ?  " 

'  i  tell  you,"  said  Maccjuart,  "  It's  not  safe.  You 
haven't  thought  the  thing  out  as  I  have.  If  we  tie  up  by  the 
village  what  will  hai)pen  if  there's  a  row  ?  It  we  have  to 
escape  in  a  hurry  ?  You  can  easily  push  a  boat  off,  but  you 
can't  easily  get  the  yawl  away." 

"  There's  truth  in  what  he  says,"  put  in  Hull.  "  But 
who  can  we  leave  with  her  ?  " 

Macquart  shrugged  his  shoulders. 

'"  Leave  with   her  ?     No  one.     There's  no  one  here  to 
touch  her.     Only  the  monkeys — they  won't  harm  her." 
"  And  what  are  we  to  say  to  the  chaps  at  the  village  ?  " 
"  Say  that  we  have  left  our  ship  down  th  :  river,  that  very 
fact  will  give  us  extra  protection." 

"  One  moment."  said  Tillman.  He  drew  Houghton 
aside  and  tlicy  both  went  into  the  bow. 

"  What  do  you  think  of  this  ?  "  said  Tillman.  "  Is  it 
some  trick  of  Macquart's  or  what  ?  " 

"  No,  "  said  Houghton.  "  The  chap's  frightened  right 
enough  and  he's  thinking  of  his  own  skin.  If  these  people 
in  the  village  are  the  same  as  he  left  there  fifteen  years  ago, 
and  if  that  woman  is  still  alive,  and  if  they  recognise  him,  well, 
you  see,  there'll  be  a  sliindy  right  off —that's  what  it  is.  Bette.- 
do  as  he  says  ;  he's  pla\ing  for  safety,  not  against  us." 
■'  I'm  your  way  of  thinking,"  said  Tillman. 
They  turned  aft. 

"  Well,"   said  Hull.     "  What  have  you  decided  ?  " 
"  Tie  up,"    said  Tillman.     "  It's  the  safest  way,  but  the 
question  is,  where  ?  " 

■'  O  that's  easily  found,"    said  Macquart.      "  You  wait." 

About  two  miles  from  the  mouth  they  opened  what  seemed 

the  mouth  of  another  ri\'er  on  the  left  bank   and  Macquart 

ordered  the  mainsail  to  be  lowered  and  the  boat  got  out   for 

a  tow. 

"  It's  a  lagoon,"  said  he,  "  as  good  as  a  harbour,  nothing 
will  touch  her  in  there.  She'd  lie  to  the  Day  of  Judgment, 
and  they  wouldn't  find  her  then.  Now,  out  with  the  boat, 
sharp,  we  don't  want  to  drift." 

They  lowered  the  boat,  the  tow  rope  was  fixed,  and 
Macquart  was  the  first  man  into  her.  Tillman,  Houghton 
and  Hull  followed  him,  leaving  Jacky  on  board  to  steer. 

Macquart  was  right.  Through  the  opening  in  the  left 
bank  the  river  bayed  out  into  a  la^'oon.  A  still  sheet  of 
water  on  which  the  columns  of  the  NqKih  palms  lining  the 
banks  were  reflected  as  in  a  mirror.  The  tropical  forest 
festooned  with  lianas  and  wild  convolvulus  came  down  to 
the  water's  edge,  .^t  night  and  especially  on  a  night  of  the 
full  moon,  this  place  would  be  filled  with  the  chanting  of 
birds,  the  girding  and  gugghng  and  yooping  of  monkeys. 
and  the  cry  of  prowling  beasts.  Now,  in  the  full  blaze  of 
day,  it  was  silent,  with  the  silence  of  a  room  locked  up  from 
the  world. 

Things  like  red  moths  were  flitting  hither  and  thither 
across  the  water  surface  just  as  you  have  seen  the  mayflies 
dit  across  a  brook,  Houghton  glancing  up  from  the  labour 
of  rowing  saw  that  the  moths  were  birds.  Tiny  red  humming 
birds  with  needle-sharp  bills,  hundreds  and  hundreds  of  them 
dancing  and  flitting  in  the  sunshine. 

When  they  had  brought  the  Barracuda  a  hundred  yards  or 
so  within  the  lagoon  they  boarded  her  and  dropped  the  anchor 
in  two  fathom  water.  Then,  taking  to  the  boat  again  and 
armed  with  a  sounding  lead,  they  started  out  to  hunt  for  a 
berth. 

They  found  an  ideal  one  on  the  left  hand  side  counting 
from  the  point  of  entrance.     Here  for  the  space  of  seventy  feet 


or  so  the  bank  came  down  sheer  to  the  water  without  any 
shelving  and  with  a  depth  yf  three  fathoms,  whilst  the  lower 
branches  of  the  huge  trees  were  sulhcientlv  high  to  clear  the 
main  mast  of  the  Barracuda  if  the  top  mast  were  struck. 

"  We  can  moor  lier  to  them  trees,"  said  Hull.  "  Yes,  it's 
a  Hkely  spot  and  might  'a  been  laid  out  on  purpose  ;  easy  to 
get  her  in  and  easy  to  get  her  out,  and  no  harbour  dues.  Now 
then,  all  aboard  and  let's  get  done  v/ith  it." 

They  struck  the  topmast  of  the  yawl,  lowered  the  main- 
sail and  "miz/,en.  and  havmg  made  everything  snug  towed  her 
to  the  bank.  It  was  after  sundown  when  everything  was 
complete  and,  tired  out,  they  went  down  to  the  cabin  for 
supper. 

Down  below,  it  seemed  to  Houghton  the  strangest  thing 
to  be  sitting  there  at  table,  landlocked  and  moored  up  to 
trees  after  the  long,  long  weeks  of  sea  tossing  and  the  eternal 
noise  of  the  bow  wash  and  the  boosting  of  the  waves.  The 
others  did  not  seem  to  notice  the  change. 

Hull,  who  had  re-taken  charge  of  things,  now  that 
Macquart  had  finished  with  the  piloting,  was  laying  down  tiicir 
future  plans. 

"  We'll  lay  up  here  to-morrer,"  said  he,  "  to  rest  and 
stretch  our  legs,  and  the  day  after  to-morrer,  bright  and  early 
well  man  the  boat  and  start  for  the  village.  Now  it  s  in  my 
mind  when  we've  made  good  with  the  village  people  and 
tapped  the  cache  and  made  sure  the  stuff's  there,  it  will  be 
best  to  bring  the  yawl  right  up.  You  see,  if  we  leave  her 
here,  we'll  have  to  bring  the  stuff  down  by  boat-loads." 

Macquart,  who  had  retired  into  himself  all  through  the 
voyage  as  though  the  presence  of  Hull  had  paralysed  his 
initiative,  rose  from  the  table,  sat  down  on  one  of  the  bunk 
edges  and  nursed  his  knee. 

"  Well,  gentlemen,"  he  said,  as  though  he  were  addressing 
a  meeting,  "'  I  am  not  with  Captain  Hull.  I  believe  I  have 
some  right  to  give  an  opinion,  considering  tjie  fact  that  tlii-- 
expedition  was  originated  by  me  ami  that  I  alone  have  the 
key  to  the  cache." 

Hull  grumbled  something  unintelligible  and  Macquart 
went  on  : 

"  Besides,  I  have  thought  the  matter  out  most  carefully 
and  it  is  for  your  good,  as  well  as  my  own,  that  I  saj'  the 
Barracuda  must  remain  here  right  through  this  business." 

"  O,  she  must,  must  she,"  said  Hull.  "  Seems  to  me 
you're  beginnin'  to  lay  the  law  down.  Mac.  None  of  us  is  to 
say  a  word  but  take  your  leadin'  like  baa  lambs.  D'you 
think  you're  the  only  one  of  the  lot  oi  us  rigged  with  eyes  an' 
understandin'  ?  I  say  that  when  we  touch  this  stuff  we'll 
bring  the  yawl  up  to  load  it  and  if  the  niggers  gi\e  trouble 
we'll  hold  them  down  with  our  guns,  why,  you  blessed  skrim- 
shanker,  it'd  take  a  dozen  journeys  up  and  down  with  a  boat  ; 
we'd  have  to  go  with  the  boat  each  journey,  and  who's  to  be 
left  at  the  cache  to  protect  the  stuff  ?  " 

Houghton  noticed  all  through  this  conversation  thai 
Ivtac({uart's  eyes  were  steadily  fixed  on  Hull  and  that  his  face 
had  been  growing  pale  under  its  bronze.  He  had  guessed 
the  hatred  that  existed  between  the  two  men,  but  he  failed 
to  plumb  the  depth  and  intensity  of  the  passion  surging  in  the 
breast  of  Macquart. 

Leaving  aside  all  old  scores,  Hull  had  got  the  better  of 
him  at  the  start  of  the  expedition.  Macquart,  the  cock 
of  the  walk  and  boss  of  the  business,  with  two  greenhorns  to 
work  for  his  ends  and  a  sound  boat  under  his  feet,  had  suddenl>' 
found  himself  hampered  and  checkmated  by  the  inscrutabK- 
Screed. 

Macquart  was  one  of  those  men  of  whom  we  cm 
say  only  this,  that  their  plans  are  never  more  dark  than  when 
they  seem  most  luminous.  He  had  felt  Tillman  and  Houghton 
to  be  putty  in  his  hands  and  Jacky  a  black  pawn  to  !>(>  played 
with  as  he  chose,  and  though  it  is  impossible  to  define  his 
exact  plan  of  campaign,  already  prepared  no  doubt  on  the 
night  when  he  agreed  to  di\ide  the  treasure  so  generously 
with  Screed,  Houghton  and  Tillman,  one  may  be  sure  of  thi'-. 
that  the  division  of  tlie  treasure  had  no  part  in  it.  Half  a 
million  in  gold  coin  and  bullion  !  Screed  two  thousand  miles 
away  and  only  Tillman  and  Houghton  to  deal  with  and 
bamboozle — or  worse  !  All  the  elements  lay  here  for  a  coup 
for  a  genius  to  pull  off.  and  Macquart  as  will  be  seen — if  not 
a  genius,  was  at  least  a  clever  and  astute  man. 

Screed  had  fancied  that  the  final  disposal  of  the  treasure 
would  prove  such  an  insuperable  obstacle  to  villainy  that 
Macquart  would  be  driven  to  return  to  Sydney  to  "  cash  it.' 
Screed,  the  clever  business  man  with  no  illusions  and  no 
behefs,  had  divined  Macquart  and  his  possibilities  and  had 
not  felt  quile  sure  that  the  latter  would  find  the  disposal  of 
the  treasure  an  impossible  task,  and  so  be  driven  back  to 
Sydney.  Not  being  quite  sure,  he  plaved  his  trump  card 
Hull. 

So  it  came  about  that  Macquart,  on  the  point  of  saihng, 
found  suddenly  dumped  on  him  the  big,  strong  man  he  feared 
and  hated,  the  man  who  knew  exactly  what  sort  of  character 


20 


March  g,  igib. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


#■ 


msm^im. 


^^^ 


Chaya,  a   liomance  •/  tfic  Bouth  Seat  t 


jiitijsaiiai  »■ 


lUliutraUd  by  Jotefh   Simpton,  K.B.A. 


Macquart  sprang  from  the  edge  ot  the  bunk  and  stood  upright  before  the  Captain." 


I.  A  N  I)      A  N  D      W  AT  E  R 


March  g,   191^. 


he  was,  and  the  man  who.  having  been  twice  diddled  by  him, 
was  evidently  determined  never  to  be  so  treated  again. 

Then  Hull  had  taken  virtual  command  of  the  expedition 
and  he  had  worked  Macquart  like  a  dog.  The  explosion  that 
now  followed  was  the  result  of  all  this. 

Macquart  sprang  from  the  edge  of  the  bunk  and  stood 
upright  before  the  Captain. 

"  D n  you,"  he  cried.     "  Who  are  you  to  be  meddling 

and  ordering  and  interfering  in  what  you  don't  understand, 

a wharf  rat  sprung  from  nowhere,  shot  aboard   by   that 

Screed.     You  leave  this  thing   alone    or    I'll   chuck    it, 

one  word  more  from  you  and  you  can    hunt    for    the    stuff 
yourself  you ." 

He  was  shouting  at  the  top  of  his  voice  and  Hull  had 
drawn  back  a  moment  and  was  preparing  to  strike  when 
Tillman  and  Houghton  flung  themselves  between  the  antag- 
onists forcing  Macquart  back  on  the  bunk  and  Hull  to  the 
other  side  the  table. 

"  Don't  be  fools,"  cried  Tillman.  "  Good  Lord,  the 
idea  of  fighting  amongst  ourselves  in  our  position.  Can't 
you  see  there's  no  use  in  arguing  what  we'll  do  till  we've 
touched  the  stuff." 

"  Let  up,"  said  the-  Captain,  who  had  recovered  possession 
of  himself.  "  I'm  not  goin'  to  touch  the  blighter — but  one 
word  more  of  his  lip  and  I'll  break  his  neck.  There,  that's 
said  and  done.  Let  him  sit  there  and  cool."  He  turned  and 
went  on  deck  where  Tillman  and  Houghton  followed  him. 

CHAPTER   -Xlll. 
The  Bl.\ck  Ship. 

NEXT  morning,  at  breakfast,  all  signs  of  the  quarrel 
had-  disappeared.  Macquart  seemed  cheerful  and 
the  Captain  had  got  into  the  old  bantering  way  of 
talking  to  him.  He  did  not  seem  to  resent  it. 
After  breakfast,  they  set  to  work  to  make  everything  snug 
and  secure  on  board.  They  brought  the  top-mast  down  and 
lashed  it  with  the  spare  spars  on  deck,  stowed  away  every- 
thing movable,  even  to  the  collapsible  boat,  and  put  ashore 
extra  mooring  ropes.  Then  they  collected  on  deck  the  stores 
for  the  boat  expedition,  canned  meat  and  vegetables,  blankets, 
a  tent,  matches,  ammunition  and  a  small  parcel  of  trade,  con- 
sisting of  stick  tobacco,  knives,  dollar  watches  and  clay 
pipes. 

The  lazarette  was  carefully  secured  and  every  locker 
fastened,  and  an  hour  or  two  before  sundown  all  the  prepara- 
tions were  finished  for  the  start  on  the  morrow. 

"  Well,  that's  done,"  said  Tillman,  as  he  surveyed  their 
work.  "  Nothing  will  move  her  except,  maybe,  an  earth- 
quake or  a  tornado."  He  filled  his  pipe  and  lit  it.  Hough- 
ton also  produced  a  pipe,  whilst  Hull,  perspiring  from  the  work 
he  had  been  uf)on,  went  below  for  a  drink.  Macquart  had 
taken  his  seat  on  deck  and  was  engaged  in  mending  a  rent  in 
his  trousers.  He  was  often  patching  himself  up  hke  this.  In 
Sydney,  he  could  have  borrowed  tiie  money  from  Screed  for  a 
full  outfit,  or  got  it  on  credit  from  the  outfitter  of  the  expe- 
dition, but  he  had  come  away  with  only  a  few  things,  perhaps 
from  carelessness  or  from  some  strange  twist  of  the  mind 
making  him  utterly  regardless  of  appearances. 

"  Come  out  on  the  water."  said  Tillman  to  Houghton  ; 
it's  cooler  out  there  and  we  can  explore  round  a  bit." 

They  got  into  the  boat  which  was  lying  alongside  and 
pushed  out  into  the  lagoon. 

The  sunlight  was  striking  the  water  across  the  tree  toj)*.. 
and  the  trees  of  the  southern  bank  threw  their  cave-like 
shadow  far  out  on  the  water  ;  against  this  shadow  the  moth- 
like dance  of  the  humming  birds  patterned  itself  with  an 
effect  at  once  gorgeous  and  ghostly. 

This  place  was  the  paradise  of  birds,  the  gorgeous- 
•  oUared  lory  preened  itself  on  the  lower  branches  of  the 
trees  by  the  water,  answering  with  its  beaver-like  noise  the 
ka-ka-toi,  ka-ka-toi  of  the  white  cockatoos  haunting  the 
groves  ;  the  wonderful  crowned  pigeon  flitted  across  from 
bank  to  bank  ;  fork-tailed  water  ch  its  and  blue  fly  catchers 
flew  everywhere,  and,  ;is  the  boat  floated  along,  skirting  the 
shadows,  kingfishers,  hke  i)irds  carved  from  emerald,  showed 
motionless  as  sentries  perched  on  drift  logs  by  the  banks. 

They  had  rowed  towards  the  south  bank,  and  now  they 
sat  smoking  and  letting  the  boat  drift  on  the  edge  of  the  tree 
-'ladows. 

■■'  "I  wish  I  could  put  a  stopper  on  Hull  in  some  way," 
-.lid  Tillman.  "  He's  been  working  Macquart  up  ever  since  we 
started  ;  he  won't  let  the  chap  alone  ;  he  keeps  on  at  him. 
pretending  to  joke  and  sneering  at  him  all  the  time." 

"  He's  got  a  frightful  down  on  him,"  said  Houghton. 
■'  and  I  don't  wonder  ;  from  what  I  can  make  out,  Mac  has 
bested  him  more  than  once.  Hull  told  me  something  of  wliat 
happened  between  them  f<iur  years  ago  in  'Frisco.  Macquart 
got  away  that  time,  and  tlK\v  didn't  meet  again  till  that 
morning,  you  remember,  when  we  were  coming  from  hu-ini; 


our  first  look  at  the  Barracuda.     Seems  hke  fate  that  they 
should    have    met    just    then." 

"  The  world's  a  small  place,"  said  Tillman,  "  and  that's 
the  first  thing  that  a  scamp  finds  out.     Hullo  !  " 

The  boat  floating  with  the  current  th.at  moved  the  lagoon 
water  just  here  bumped  gently  against  something  and  slewed 
round  nose  to  shore. 
Tillman  looked  over. 

"  Why,  it's  all  black  rocks,"  said  he.  "  No— it's  not 
rocks  ;  it  looks  like  an  old  landing-stage  of  some  sort  sunk  by 
the  bank." 

Houghton  leaned  over  the  starboard  gunnel. 
"  Why,  it's  the  bones  of  an  old  ship,"  said  he,  with  a 
catch-back  of  his  breath.     "  She's  been  burnt  at  her  moorings, 
and  we've  hit  one  of  the  mast  stumps." 

He  was  right.  Looking  down  through  the  water,  the 
charred  deck  planking  and  bulwarks  could  be  plainly  made 
out.  The  planking  had  burst  up  here  and  there,  showing 
wide  yawning  holes  through  which  the  flames  and  smoke  had 
once  poured,  before  the  seams  had  opened  letting  in  the 
lagoon  water  to  quench  the  flames  ;  the  buhvarks  were  all 
gone  from  the  knightheads  to  midships  on  the  port  side,  and 
the  upper  planking  also,  so  that  the  ribs  stood  up  like  piles. 
Small  fish  were  darting  in  and  out  of  the  gloomy  cavern 
that  had  once  been  the  main  hold,  and  a  great  eel  waved  its 
way  from  between  the  ribs  and  scuttered  along  the  lagoon 
floor,  as  if  resenting  the  presence  of  the  gazers  above.  Not 
a  sign  of  mast  or  spar  was  visible  with  the  exception  of  the  fore 
mast  stump  with  which  the  boat  had  colUded. 
The  two  men  looked  at  one  another. 
"  That's  funny,  isn't  it  ?  "  said  Tillman..  "  She  must  have 
been  a  fairly  big  ship." 

"  Maybe  brought  in  here  by  pirates,"  said  Houghton. 
"  Looks  as  though  the  masts  had  been  shot  away." 

"  O,  the  fire  would  have  done  that,"  said  Tillman.  "  I've 
seen  a  ship  in  Sydney  Harbour  with  the  masts  clean  gone 
through  fire,  and  not  much  sign  of  damage  to  the  hull." 

"  I  don't  know  what  it  is,"  said  Houghton,  "  but  this 
lagoon  makes  me  feel  that  I  want  to  get  away  from  it  :  funny, 
isn't  it,  but,  from  the  first,  I  felt  there  was  something  crawly 
about  it.  It's  just  the  place  for  river  pirates  to  hide  in,  and  I 
expect  bloody  work  has  gone  on  here  long  ago." 

"  O,  the  lagoon  is  all  right,"  said  Tillman.  "  One  never 
can  tell  :  this  old  hooker  may  have  been  a  peaceful  trader 
set  alight  to  by  some  d — d  fool  messing  round  with  a  light,  the 
same  as  the  Baralong  was  burnt  just  outside  the  Heads." 

"  Maybe  so,"  replied  Houghton  ;  "  all  the  same,  I  don't 
hke   this  place." 

They  rowed  back  to  the  yawl  and  reported  their  find, 
without  raising  any  interest  or  speculation  in  Hull  and 
Macquart. 

"  Some  old  tub  scuttled  for  insurance,  maybe,"  said  Hull. 
"  No,  I  ain't  particular  about  goin'  to  look  at  her.  I  guess 
she'll  keep.  I'm  goin'  to  turn  in  when  I've  had  my  supjjer, 
for  we'll  have  to  be  off  before  sun  up,  so's  to  reach  the  village 
in  the  cool  of  the  day." 

They  had  lit  a  fire  on  the  bank  to  keep  the  mosquitoes 
off,  though  the  mosquitoes  here  were  far  less  troublesome  than 
one  might  have  expected,  owing,  perhaps,  to  the  fact  that  the 
water  was  not  stagnant, 

Tillman  threw  some  more  sticks  on  the  fire  and  then  they 
went  below  to  supper,  after  which  they  turned  in. 
They  were  awakened  by  Jacky. 

It  was  an  hour  before  dawn,  a  slight  wind  had  risen, 
blowing  the  mists  from  the  lagoon,  and  as  they  came  on  deck 
the  mist  wreathes  were  passing  off  like  the  ghosts  of  scarfs, 
wreatiiing  unseen  forms  and  leaving  great  spaces  of  star-shot 
water  frosted  by  the  breeze. 

They  breakfasted  hurriedly,  and  everything  being  stowed 
on  board  the  boat,  they  got  in  and  pushed  off  just  as  the  first 
lilac  of  the  dawn  was  touching  the  sky  beyond  the  tree 
tops. 

When  they  reached  the  ri\er,  the  wind  was  fresher  and 
blowing  with  them,  and  before  they  had  made  half  a  mile  up 
stream,  the  sun  was  blazing  through  the  trees  of  the  left  bank 
and  the  parrots  shouting  at  them  from  the  branches. 

Just  at  this  hour,  the  river  was  lovely,  fresh,  fair  and 
brilhant.  Butterflies  big  as  birds  and  gorgeous  as  flowers 
pursued  them  or  flitted  across  the  boat  ;  azure  butterflies  Uke 
flakes  of  sky,  butterflies  of  bronze  and  gold  in  whose  broad 
wings  were  set  little  clear  spaces  like  panes  of  mica. 

A  mile  and  a  half,  or  perhaps  two  miles,  above  the  lagoon, 
the  river  took  a  bend  westward,  and  the  right  bank  losing  its 
trees  showed  tracts  of  cane  and  tall  grass,  with  here  and  there 
a  great  tree  standing  in  isolation. 

The  left  bank  showed  still  the  edge  of  the  eternal,  un- 
broken forest,  the  forest  just  as  it  was  when  Moses  gave  laws 
to  Israel,  just  as  it  will  be  when  all  present  things  are  for- 
gotten. 

(To    b«  continuetl.) 


Supplement  to  H\v  iso  Waies,  Match   16.    1916 


KENBAR_WEATHERCOAT 

This     exclusive     production~of    BarkeTT^is     the     most 
successful  Weathercoat  produced  by  any  Military  Tai°or 

Afnny  hundred,  have  been  sold  this  'I'r^'-'T.    -     ''°'™"' "';*'=  "''"'-'^  *<'™"«l'ly  porous 


1^.  ;«   ^z-../-;.  <:«5«  giving  the  completest   satisfaction 


Style  F 

The       KENBAR       W'-EATHERCOAT 
With  fly  front,  Infantry  style,  lined    ^  ^  , 
proofed    Check     Wool,     sleeves  A  \/_ 
of     same     material     as    outside  ^^1 
Lined  throughout  with  same  mate-  __ 
rial  as  outside,  making  coat  doubly  7  S  Ifi 
proofed,    with     or     without     belt  '  '^1^ 


Style  W 
DOUBLE    BREASTED     KENBAR 
For  Camp  or  Trench  wear.  A  very  popular 
style.      Lined    Check    Wool,     r\   j   i 
interlined    Oil     Silk.     Collar     5\4/ 
can    be   worn  in   3    positions     ^   ■  /  " 


Style  R 
The      KENBAR      \\EATHERCOAT 

Button  through,  Cavalry   style,  lined  with 
proofed    Check    Wool,  sleeves 

trebly      proofed.        With      the  «7/\  1 

popular        belt      as       sketch,  / 1  l/» 
or    without     belt     if     desired  / 


Telephone :  3520  Kensington 


John  Barker  and   Gompany^ud  ~ 

Kensington    High    St    W  Telegrams:  Barkers  Kensington 


SuBvlemtnt  to  Land  and  Water.  Kerch  ]«,  igiA 


Dunlop :  How  are  the 
tyres  sticking  it  ? 

Tommy :  Like  ourselves, 
sir,  for  the  duration 
of  the  war ! 


Extract  from  a  letter  from  a  Lance-Corporal  in  the  M.T.A.S.C.  at  the  Front: — 
"  My  speedometer  at  the  present  time  shows  a  mileage  of  7,345  miles,  and  forr:the 
first  5,000  of  them  I  had  one  of  your  tyres  on  a  baclc  wheel,  and  it  was  replaced 
by  a  non-skid  and  fixed  on  to  a  front  wheel,  where  I  am  pleased  to  inform 
you  it  still  remains,  and  is  making    me    wonder    if    it    will    last    the   war    out." 


THE  DUNLOP  RUBBER  COMPANY,  LTD., 

Founders  of  the  Pneumatic  Tyre  Industry, 

Asfon  Cross,  Birmingham.     LONDON:  14  Regent 
Street,    S.W.       PARIS :     4   Rue  du  Colonel  Moll. 


XVI 


LAND  &W  ATER 


Vol.  LXVI  No.  2810. 


THTTTJQDAV     ATAT?rPT    rf\     tat*^  rPUULisiiED  ast   price  sixpen^ce 

ixauxs-oum  ,    .vi/\is.v-^ri    10,    1910.  [a  Nr-wsp\PKRj  published  wei:kly 


liy   Louin  Ravmaikcrs, 


Drawn   exclusilely  for  "Land  and    Wutc 


Crown  Prince  :  "We  must  have  a  higher  pile  to  see  Verdun,  father." 


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March  i6,  1916. 


L  A  N  D       A  N  1 )       \V  A  T  E  R 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOU:)u   ."iNGSWAY,   LONDON.  ¥.C. 

Telephone:  HOLBCM^N  2828. 


THURSDAY,  MARCH  16th,  1916. 


CONTENTS 

I'AGIC 

Verdun  War  Cartoon.  By  Louis  Raemaekers  i 
Foret  de  Compiegne  after  the  Pursuit.  By  G.  Spencer 

Pryse  2 

The  Old  Order  Chan-eth  (Leading  Article)  3 

The  Wings  of  Vcrdui..  By  'lilaue  Belloc  4 

Sortes  Shakespeariar  ■.     By  Sir  Sidney  Lee  9 

Revolution  in  W!;iuliali.  By  Arthur  Pollen  11 

An  Anibassadoi-  of  Empire.    By  Neoimperialist  ij 

Freebooters  of  the  Balkans.  By  Jan  Cordon  14 

Why  Peace  is  Impossible.     By  L.  March  Phillipps  15 

Inadetiuacy  of  our  Banks.  By  Arthur  Ritson  17 

Chaya.     By  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoole  nj 

Town  and  Country  24 

The  West  End  26 
Choosing  Rit 


THE  OLD  ORDER  CHANGETH. 

THE  Army  Estimates  introduced  into  the  House 
of  Commons  by  Mr.  Tennant  on  Tuesday  after- 
noon must  have  fallen  like  a  sledge  hammer  on 
the  minds  of  thoughtful  persons,  shattering 
f  lally  and  completely  their  old  ideas  on  the  military 
'.Icfence  and  security  of  these  islands.  After  this  official 
speech  in  which  millions*  were  spoken  of  so  glibly,  it 
needs  a  mental  effort  to  recollect  how  recent  was  the 
time  when  reams  were  written  and  speeches  delivered  in 
shoals  to  prove  that  our  national  commitments  need 
never  contemplate  under  any  circumstance  an  army 
one-quarter  the  size  of  the  one  which  is  enrolled  to-day. 

It  were  foohshness  to  indulge  in  recrimination  even 
against  those  who  carried  their  opinions  on  this  point  to 
excess.  The  nation  accepted  things  as  they  were ; 
neither  platform,  press  nor  pulpit  desired  any  change, 
except  spasmodically.  No  warning  note  ever  issued 
from  the  most  patriotic  ballot-box.  Yet  before  wc  have 
been  at  war  two  years,  an  Act  enforcing  military  service 
is  on  the  Statute  Book,  and  the  British  Army  numbers 
four  millions  of  men. 

Stupendous  as  this  break  with  the  past  has  been,  it 
is  not  yet  complete.  The  Royal  Palace  of  Westminster 
enshrines  traditions  both  glorious  and  mean  ;  among 
the  latter  must  be  reckoned  the  ancient  belief  that  the 
populace  can  be  kept  quiet  with  a  liberal  diet  of  tine 
words  and  specious  promises,  and  that  a  too  nice  regard 
of  the  naked  truth  is,  if  not  indecent,  at  least  inexpedient. 
It  is  an  old  tradition,  based  on  fairly  sound  experience, 
though  it  has  been  rudely  b.'oken  once  or  twice.  But  it 
is  doomed  to-day.  Wc  hope  it  may  disappear  with 
the  wiUing  consent  of  those  who  work  at  Westminster  ; 
otherwise,  the  change  will  come  f:  m  ^vithout,  for  the 
people  weary  of  half-truths  and  oi  pror.     es  half-fulfilled. 

To  give  an  illustration,  we  will  t  .  ;.■  the  question  of 
the'German  losses.  Mr.  Tennant  was  asked  in  the  House 
of  Commons  a  little  time  ago  whether,  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  the  official  German  estimates  of  German  casualties 
were  regarded  by  eminent  mihtary  critics  in  this  and 


otlier  countries  as  wiiolly  unacceptable,  lie  wuukl  consider 
the  desirability  of  accompanying  any  further  statement 
with  a  reasoned  analysis.  He  replied  that  such  an 
analysis  while  gratifying  legitimate  curiosity  in  this 
•country,  would  also  gratify  the  curiosity  of  the  German 
military  authorities.  It  is  not  easy  to  understand  the 
exact  meaning  Mr.  Tennant  intended  to  convey  by  these 
words.  They  sound  mere  Hippancy,  for  the  German 
(ieneral  Staff  of  course  knows  its  own  losses  only  too  well. 
This  answer  in  the  House  appeared  in  the  papers  on  the 
very  date  that  Land  and  Watkk  published  the  first 
part  of  that  most  carefully  reasoned  analysis  of  German 
losses  which  Mr.  Belloc  prepared  when  he  was  in  Paris. 
Had  there  been  any  real  ground  for  the  refusal  of  the 
Under-Secretary  for  War,  obviously  we  should  not  have 
been  permitted  to  publish  this  analysis. 

At  the  end  of  last  week  the  Government  issued 
without  a  word  of  comment  the  official  German  Casualty 
Lists  for  February,  and,  adding  them  to  those  previous- 
ly published,  showed  total  losses  to  the  end  of  February 
of  2,667,372.  Mr.  Belloc  demonstrates  irrefutably  that 
the  irreducible  minimum  of  (ierman  losses  up  to  December 
31st,  1915,  is  just  over  3.V  millions.  He  has  explained 
step  by  step  how  this  sum  total  is  arrived  at  ;  there  is  no 
purpose  in  repeating  his  reasoning  here.  But  the  Govern- 
ment, when  issuing  these  German  Official  figures,  should 
at  least  have  added  a  cautionary  note  warning  readers 
against  placing  i-eliancc  on  them.  The  total  of  killed 
and  died  of  wounds  for  February  is  set  down  at  7,301, 
although  the  Verdun  slaughter  had  been  in  progress  for 
more  than  a  week  !  Still  more  flagrant  is  the  total  of 
prisoners  up  to  the  end  of  February.  Here  there  is  no 
difficulty  in  checking  the  German  figures.  The  Allied 
(Governments  have  positive  and  direct  evidence  showing 
the  exact  number  of  German  prisoners  taken  until  at 
least  the  end  of  January.  This  total  is  more 
than  double  the  number  of  prisoners  (117,045)  men- 
tioned in  this  German  Official  List.  In  issuing  these 
figures  without  explanation,  analysis  or  comment,  the 
Government  undoubtedly  misleads  the  nation. 

Numbers  are  the  supreme  factor  of  the  war.  They 
are  the  balance  on  which  the  issue  hangs.  The  German 
military  authorities  are  quite  alive  to  this  truth  and  edit 
their  lists  accordingly.  The  special  correspondent  of 
certain  London  newspapers,  who  was  present  at  Verdun, 
has  spoken  of  Germany  in  her  present  desperation  "  flash- 
ing falsehoods  round  the  world."  There  is  no  falsehood 
more  vital  to  her  failing  state  than  this  one  of  losses  ; 
yet  wc  find  the  British  Government  in  its  blindness  aiding 
her  in  deceiving  the  Neutral  nations  by  accepting  her 
figures  at  their  face  value.  Why  they  should  act  thus  is 
incomprehensible,  for  we  dismiss  as  unworthy  of  credence 
the  general  rfeport  that  they  do  so  out  of  timidity  lest 
recruiting  be  discouraged,  should  British  manhood 
realise  how  heavy  is  the  toll  of  modern  war.  We  assign 
the  cause  to  that  evil  tradition  of  Westminster  which 
half  despises  and  half  fears  the  people  and  almost  in- 
stinctively prefers  the  half-truth. 

The  presence  of  Mr.  Thomas  Hughes  in  London 
should  act  as  a  salutary  warning  to  the  Government,  that 
the  former  era  when  consideration  first  and  last  could  be 
given  to  local  voters,  has  passed.  The  horizons  widen  and 
those  who  lead  this  nation — chief  of  the  five  nations — have 
to  look  for  judgment  on  their  acts  much  farther  afield 
than  most  of  them  have  been  accustomed  to  do.  Ministers 
must  emerge  from  their  official  "  dug-outs  "  and  face 
realities  on  the  other  side  of  the  parapet,  however  im- 
pleasant  they  may  happen  to  be  at  the  moment,  with 
far  higher  resolution  and  determination  than  they  have 
done  hitherto.  The  day  of  the  shirker  is  done.  Courage 
comes  into  its  own,  not  only  on  the  battlefield  but  in 
the  council  chamber,  though  this  be  the  last  place  to 
respond  to  the  new  spirit  that  is  astir  in  the  air. 


L  A  X  D      A  N  D      W  A  T  K  R 


March  lO,  i<)iG. 


THE    WINGS    OF    VERDUN. 


By  Hilaire  Belloc. 


CORRECTION     OF    TWO    ERRORS. 

BEFORE  turning  to  the  main  subject  of  the  day,  I 
must    apohigise  for  two  errors  which  appeared 
in  my  work  of  last  week  relative  to  the  German 
losses.     Between  them  the  minimum  of  German 
losses  arrived  at  was  far  too  low.  • 

The  first  was  an  obvious  but  stupid  clerical  error, 
the  omission  of  one  item  in  the  addition  I  was  making. 
1  left  out  the  category  of  Sick.  The  first  item  should 
have  been  ',,430,000  instead  of  just  under  three  millions. 
The  second  error  was  an  error  in  method,  and  there- 
fore of  its  nature  more  serious.  It  consisted  in  adding 
the  whole  of  the  "  floating  balance  "  of  sick  and  wounded 
to  the  other  losses. 

To  do  this  is  to  overlook  an  overlap.  For  of  those 
who  have  fallen  sick  or  who  have  been  wounded  and 
who  remain  in  hospital,  on  a  particular  date,  a  certain 
(and  vcrv  large)  jiroportion  reappear  in  the  permanently 
disabled  from  sickness  or  wounds. 

This  error  of  mine  reduces  the  value  of  the  floating 
liospital  balance  by  pretty  well  half.  The  true  figures 
give  one  a  minimum  not  of  three  and  a  quarter  millions, 
but  of  just  over  three  and  a  half  millions  (3,650,000)  up 
to  December  31st,  ic)i5. 

I  owe  this  ajjology  to  my  readers  for  the  first  clerical 
slip  in  a  very  large  number  of  such  additions  carried  on 
for  manv  monthij,  but  I  think  1  ought  to  add  that  the 
combined  result  of  this  clerical  error  and  error  in  a  detail 
of  method  do  not  gravely  affect  a  right  judgment  upon  the 
present  situation,  because  the  minimum  arrived  at  is 
certainly  below  tlie  truth.  Tiie  truth  is  certainly  nearer 
four  millions. 

For  the  benefit  of  those  wlio  may  still  doubt  such 
figures  let  me  give  a  few  simple  illustrations  showing  how 
normal  they  are  for  the  rate  of  wastage  of  the  present 
war. 

(1)  If  the  German  Empire  was  losing  at  a  rate  not 
greater  than  the  average  of  the  British  forces  actually  in 
the  field  since  the  first  ILxpeditionary  Force  left  these 
shores,  its  total  wastage  would  be  somewhat  over  four 
millions. 

(2)  -  Such  a  loss  (4  millions)  means  that  in  the  course 
of  1 7  mcmths  the  Germans  have  lost  about  as  many  men 
as  thev  permanently  keep  in  the  field.  Now  we  know 
that  among  the  Allies  in  the  same  period  the  wastage 
of  each  army  is  very  much  the  same  as  the  average 
total  force  maintained  in  the  field.  We  find  this  to 
be  roughly  true  of  all  the  armies  engaged  in  this 
war,  though  of  course  there  are  certain  not  very  high 
difte;ences,  in  favour  of  the  Italians  for  instance  (for  the 
time  thev  have  been  fighting),  somewhat  in  favour  of 
the  French,  rather  against  the  Austrians  and  the  Russians. 
The  proportion  is  largel\-  affected  by  whether  the  fighting 
has  been  on  lines  or  of  movement  and  the  proportion 
between  the  two. 

(3)  Such  a  rate  of  loss  (4  millions)  for  the  German 
Army  means  a  total  real  wastage  of  less  than  6  per  cent, 
a  month.  Of  course  the  figure  of  15  per  cent,  a  month 
given  in  Parliament  for  the  British  Infantry  is  nonsense. 
But  there  is  nothing  unreasonable  about  6  per  cent,  a 
month,  and  it  is  perfectly  consonant  with  the  experience 
of  every  belligerent  during  this  great  campaign. 

{.\)  No  one  has  recourse  to  abnormal  methods  of 
recruitment  in  a  conscript  country  until  exhaustion  is 
approaching.  Why  should  he  ?  Now  even  the  incor- 
poration of  men  in  their  20th  year  {i.e.,  in  the  year  when 
they  attain  their  20th  birthday)  is  abnormal,  in  the  sense 
that  it  is  unknown  to  peace  training.  But  the  men  in 
their  20th  year  arc  what  is  called  "  the  class  1916."  We 
know  how  heavily  Fraijce  has  sufifered,  and  we  know 
that  she  has  trained  her  Class  1916.  We  know  that 
Germany  also  has  called  out  and  trained  this  same  Class. 
But  tht;  significant  point  is  that  Germany  has  already 
used  0  large  pari  0/  it  in  the  fighling.     France  has  not. 

.Altogether  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the 
German  Empire  is  suffering  wastage  at  much  the  same 


rate  as  the  other  belli.-erents,  rather  less  than  some, 
rather  more  than  others.  If  this  be  so  the  total  dead- 
loss  of  its  armies  cannot,  by  the  end  of  December,  have 
been  far  short  of  four  million.  To  believe  that  it  is  as 
low  as  three  million,  fur  instance,  is  to  believe  that 
Germany  has  cautiously  kept  to  lines,  spared  attack,  in 
attack  used  open  order  as  much  as  possible,  cut  losses 
whenever  an  action  became  doubtful  :  We  know  that  a;,  a 
matter  of  fact  the  exact  opposite  has  been  the  case  in 
each  of  these  points. 

The  only  alternative  is  to  b-iievc  that  the  Germans 
work  miracles,  .'\gainst  the  religious  mood  which  accepts 
such  an  attitude  towards  them  there  is  no  arguin  g. 

THE  BATTLES  ROUND  VERDUN. 

riie  third  week  of  the  great  German  assault  upon  the 
Verdun  lines  was  occupied  in  the  main  with  very  heavy 
attacks  upon  the  two  wings  of  the  shallow  crescent  now- 
formed  by  those  lines.  Upon  the  south-eastern  wing  the 
enemy  made  during  the  whole  of  that  time  the  most 
determined  efforts  to  capture  the  heights  oxerlooking 
the  ravine  of  Vaux  :  upon  the  western  wing  he  made  the 
most  determined  efforts  to  master  the  Goose  Crest  with 
its  culminating  point  of  the  Mort  d'Homme.  both  by 
direct  assault  and  by  a  turning  movement  directed  against 
Bethincourt. 

There  were  also  short  but  very  \igorous  expensixc 
and  futile  efforts  directed  against  the  right  centre  from  in 
front  of  Louvemont  to  Douaumont,  but  the  main  effort 
was  upon  the  two  wings. 

In  either  case  the  attacks  were  distinguished  by  f)nc 
general  feature  :  Very  large  forces  were  launched  at 
intervals  of  about  two  days.  In  other  words,  there  were 
upon  each  wing  three  main  assaults  in  the  course  of  the 
week,  the  intervals  occupied  by  bombardment  and  the 
last  assault  the  most  powerful.  In  each  case  the  attack 
achieved  a  slight  final  progress  after  an  intermediate 
check,  and  in  each  case  up  to  the  Monday  night,  the  13th, 
the  assault  had  failed  in  its  main  object  at  a  cost  quite 
out  of  proportion  to  the  little  belts  of  territory  acquired. 

With  this  cost  I  shall  deal  in  a  moment,  but  I  wuild 
first  set  down  in  detail  the  main  attacks  upon  the  two 
wings,  which  we  may  call  respectively  "  Vaux  "  on  the 
south-east  or  French  righl,  and  the  "  Goos:?  Crest" 
upon  the  west  or  French  lejl. 

(I).     Vaux. 

The  village  of  Vaux  (as  who  should  say  in  English 
"  Dale  ")  before  it  was  ruined  in  this  battle,  iay  on  either 
side  of  one  street  in  the  depth  of  a  ravine  which  has  to 
the  north  of  it  the  plateau  of  Douaumont  and  to  the 
south  of  it  a  plateau  bearing  the  abandoned  fort  called- 
after  the  village  itself,  the  Fort  of  Vaux.  The  edge  of 
the  northern  plateau,  'that  of  Douaumont,  is  rather  the 
higher,  standing  some  300  feet  above  the  village.  The 
southern  one  is  about  20  feet  lower.  Both  are  crowned 
at  the  summit  with  woods.  That  on  the  north,  the  Wood 
oi  Hardaumont  ;  that  on  the  south,  the  Wood  of  Chcnois. 
Just  north  of  the  village  of  Vaux,  upon  the  slopes  of  the 
escarpment,  are  a  couple  of  redoubts,  abandoned  when 
the  permanent  defence  of  Verdun  was  given  up  for  a  field 
defence  in  19x4,  but  still  affording  shelter  for  defence. 

The  reader  should  particularly  notice  these  works 
(which  are  called  "  The  Works  of  Hardaumont  "  from 
the  wood  on  whose  edge  they  lie),  because  some  nns- 
understanding  has  arisen  with  regard  to  them.  Though 
King  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Vaux  they  have  nothing 
to  do  with  the  l-'ort  of  Vaux  which  was,  when  armed, 
a  closed  fort  on  the  edge  of  the  escarpment  to  the  south 
of  the  village  and  formed  an  outwork  of  the  Verdun  ring. 

Upon  Saturday  the  4th  of  March,  and  with  increasing 
violence  throughout  Sunday,  5th,  an  intensi\-e  bombard- 
luent  was  (l(>livered  against  the  edge  of  the  Northern 
plateau  and  Hardaumont  wood.  It  seemed  the  prelude 
to  an  attack,  but  on  the  Monday  no  attack  was  delivered. 
It  was  upon  Tuesday  the  7th  that  the  first  considerable 
effort   in  this  scries  was  made.     The  redoubt  north  ol 


March  i6,  1916. 


LAND       AND    WATER 


the 


;e5 


Bethincourir 


Tfie  Left  U^in^\. 
c  GOOSE  CREST  ^S'^'^  ^ 

j^  ^ — » -s >^Regaeville 


Homme 


I 


••\\  Tfie  Rigid  Witid 


Eix 


^ 


J2 


English  Miles 

Showing  ihe  two  wings  cmmh  of  the  French  Lines, 
where  ihey  cover  Verdun. 


IVlanheulle^**. 

Fresnes'*. 


Vaux  whicli  the  French  had  retaken  a  httle  while  before 
from  the  Ciermans,  was  recaptured  by  the  latter  in  a  strong 
attack,^  the  effect  of  which  was  not  only  to  gain  the  few 
yards  invoh'ed,  but  to  permit  of  an  advance  into  the 
ravine  without  fear  of  a  flanking  lire  from  the  north. 

All  the  following  Wednesday,  the  8th,  the  ravine 
was  bombarded  (and  what  was  left  of  the  village  of  course 
laid  in  ruins)  and  after  nightfall  of  that  day  the  serious 
assault  was  delivered.  At  sometime  in  the  night  an 
clement  of  the  Division  delivering  this  assault,  to  wit, 
the  Infantry  Brigade  consisting  of  the  6th  and  iqth 
Reserve  Regiments  from   Posen   (Polish  units)   got  into 


■.-Ai.imiJiMgji^ 


v«> 


OldFai-tof 
Douaumoiit 


A  * 


w-J 


J-E 


f 


0  woo        3.000    2ooo'^^'ti3s 


Trench  Line* 


Scale. 


'      The  Point  of  Assault  on  the  Right  Wing. 

The  Village,   Ravine  and   Heights  North  and  South  of  Vaux. 

the  ruins  of  the  village  and  were  immediately  thrust  out 
again  by  a  French  counter-attack  delivered  with  the 
bayonet. 

It  was  this  affair  which  gave  rise,  as  we  shall  see  in  a 
moment,  to  the  misconception  at  IBerlin,  which  a  French 
( ommunique  has  since  rectified. 

The  check  thus  administered,  though  expensive  to 
the  enemy,  was  not  heavy  enough  to  prevent  a  massed 
attack  during  the  daylight  horn-s  of  the  next  day,  Thurs- 
day the  (jth,  and  this  attack  (in  larger  force  than  the 


former)  was  directed  not  only  against  the  ruins  of  Vaux 
village,  now  in  French  hands,  but  also  against  the  very 
steep  slopes  of  the  escarpment,  just  to  the  south,  which 
leads  up  to  the  plateau  on  which  the  old  fort  of  Vaux 
stands.  The  attack  was  continued  all  day  and  was  par- 
ticularly violent  against  the  escarpment,  but  it  failed. 

On  last  Friday,  the  >ioth,  (German  reinforcements 
arrived  and  a  further  attack  was  prepared.  Before  it 
was  fully  launched  it  was  checked  and  broken  up  by  the 
French  lire.  But  upon  Saturday  the  nth,  it  was  renewed, 
apparently  in  the  early  morning,  or  at  anj'  rate  with  a 
heavy  mist  upon  the  groimd  such  as  had  three  weeks 
before  covered  the  successful  attack  of  the  enemy  upon 
the  plateau  of  Douaumont.  There  was  very  violent  fighting 
on  the  outskirts  of  the  village,  and  at  some  time  in  the 
morning  the  Germans  carried  the  ruins  of  the  eastern  end. 

Vaux  is  one  long  straggling  street,  the  church  on  the 
north  of  the  road  right  at  the  eastern  end.  Somewhere 
about  noon,  so  far  as  I  can  make  out  from  French 
accounts,  the  ruins  of  the  church  itself  were  entered  by 
the  enemy,  and  this  seems  to  have  marked  the  limit  of 
their  effort.  All  attempts  of  the  (ierman  bodies  to  mo\'e 
by  rushes  beyond  this  central  part  of  the  street  failed. 

But  meanwhile,  and  throughout  a  great  part  of  the 
;ame  day,  a  very  formidable  attack  was  being  delivered 
just  to  the  south  of  the  village  up  the  exceedingly  steep 
grassy  slope  which  takes  you  from  the  clay  of  the 
Woeuvre  up  to  the  plateau  on  which  stands  the  old  fort  of 
Vaux. 

The  hill  is  comparable  in  height  and  general  outline 
to  Boxhill  in  Surrey.  It  is  similarly  crowned  with  wood, 
the  old  fort  standing  upon  its  edge,  and  the  escarpment 
plunging  down  on  to  the  weald.  The  German  attack 
succeeded  in  progressing  some  way  up  this  slope,  but  it  did 
not  reach  the  wire  entanglement  in  front  of  the  fort 
(the  expression  "  fort  "  mjans  of  course  the  dismantled 
works  of  the  old  fort  of  Vaux,  the  guns  from  which 
have  been  taken  away  long  ago). 

The  next  day  Simday,  the  German  infantry  failed 
to  move.     Only  the  guns  were  at  work. 

During  all  these  efforts  to  seize  the  two  edges  of  the 
ravine  of  Vaux  and  to  get  a  footing  upon  the  heights  of 
the  Meuse,  which  form  the  plateau  above  the  escarpment, 
other  minor  work  was  being  done  by  the  enemy  7  or  H 
miles  off  to  the  south,  and  at  points  nearer  to  Vaux  as 
well.  He  carried  Fresnes  in  the  Plain  and  tried  hard  to 
push  beyond  Manheu'Jes  in  the  Plain,  attacking  also 
at  Eix,  and  a  few  other  points.  But  these  efforts, 
undertaken  so  far  with  comparatively  small  forces, 
against  the    compar?  tively    weak   continuations   of    tlie 


LA  N  I)      A  .\  1)       W  A  I   I.  k 


March  16,  1016. 


French  line,  5;hoiild  not  withdraw  our  attention  from  the 
main  point  of  attack  whkh  has  ail  this  week  been  the 
ravine  of  Vaux  and  the  two  heights  conmiahding  it  to 
the  north  and  the  south. 


The  Goose  Crest. 


tnc 


/<•// 


The   other   contemporary   attack    was   du 
wiuf,'.  that  of  "  the  Goose  ("rest." 

Tiie  exact  situation  of  the  spur  known  as  the  (ntc  de 
I'Oie  or  Goose  Crest,  which  is  the  most  advanced  position 
north  of  Verdun  upon  the  west  of  the  Mcuse,  its  military 
value,  and  the  progress  of  the  enemy  again^  it,  merit  a 
detailed  study. 

The  reader  is  acquainted  with  the  general  situation. 
The  successful  retirement  of  the  French  ujwn  tiie  east  of 
the  river  from  the  original  line  of  Brabant  to  the  main 
position  upon  the  crest  of  I.ouvemont  had  left  the  French 
positions  upon  the  west  of  the  Meuse  intact.  The  French 
guns  from  the  west  of  the  Meuse,  th(>refore,  could  play 
upon  the  belt  the  Germans  had  occupied  east  of  the  river 
and  impeded  all  the  German  efforts  to  carry  and  turn  tlie 
left  of  the  French  main  position  ujjou  the  ("oto  du  Poivre. 
On  this  accoimt  it  was  important  for  tlic  enemy  succes- 
sively to  carry  the  series  of  lieights  upon  the  west  f)f  the 
Me\ise,  which  at  once  concealed  the  French  batteries 
there  and  gave  them  posts  of  observation  on  the  summits 
whence  they  could  correct  and  direct  their  fire. 
All  this  we  saw  last  week. 

Of  these  heights  the  first  range  or  ridge  was  the  crest 
of  the  Goose,  the  Cote  de  I'Oie.  with  its  surroundings. 
There  would  be  mithing  decisive  or  hnal  in  the  occupation 
of  this  crest  by  the  enemy.  He  would  have  at  last  to 
deal  with  the  main  position  of  the  Charny  Ridge,  6,000 
to  8,000  yards  behind,  before  he  could  etfect  anything  ; 
but  the  Goose  Crest  in  its  entirety  must  be  seized  as  a  hrst 
preliminary  to  any  advance  upon  the  ridge  of  Charny. 

Let  us  see  at  what  rate  and  with  what  success  the 
enemy  has  effected  this,  his  preliminary  object. 

The  Crest  of  the  Goose  runs  south-west  from  the 
valley  of  the  Meuse  and  is  isolated  from  the  hills  further 
west  (which  are  heavily  wooded  and  reach  to  the  Argonne 
about  7  miles  away)  by  the  upper  part  of  the  brook  of 
Forges.  This  same  brook  of  Forges  taking  its  rise  in  the 
ridge  of  Charny,  Hows  northward  to  Bethincourt,  there 
turns  sharply  to  the  right,  and  thence  Hows  a  little  north 
of  westward,  reaches  the  village  of  Forges  and  imme- 
diately afterwards  flows  into  the  Meuse.  It  is  marshy 
below  Bethincourt  and  all  its  valley  down  as  far  as  Forges 
is  subject  to  .slight  floods.  To  the  north  and  to  the  west  of 
its  course  are  rather  confused  high  lauds  and  to  the 
south,  as  we  have  seen,  this  main  ridge  of  the  Goose. 

The  Goose  Ridge  may  be  compared  in  shape  to  a 
palm  tree,  the  summit  of  the  ridge  itself  forming  the 


trunk,  and  a  series  of  spurs  radiating  out  from  its  south- 
western end,  the  leaves.  The  general  height  of  the 
ridge  is  250  metres  above  the  sea,  which  is  roughly  speak- 
ing, 150  feot  or  rather  more  abov<-  tlie  level  of  the  river 
Meuse  at  this  part  of  its  course.  Lut  there  are  two  dis- 
tinct summits  rising  above  the  g'  neral  level  of  the  ridge. 
Tliat  at  the  north-eastern  end  n<'arcst  the  Meuse  is 
known  from  its  height  in  metres  above  the  sea  as  Hill  265. 
Tlie  other,  just  on  too  feet  highei  (not  sixty  as  I  wrote 
by  error  last  week)  is  at  the  south-western  end  of  the 
ridge  in  the  middle  of  the  "  leaves  "  of  the  palm,  and  is 
called  the  Mort  Homme.  Between  the  two  the  ridge 
narrows  and  sinks  slightly  to  a  central  point  marked 
B  on  Sketch  III.  On  the  Northern  side  the  Cioose  Crest 
slopes  away,  not  very  rapidly,  towards  the  valley  of  the 
brook  of  Forges.  There  are  a  few  steep  bits  hV  re  and 
there,  notably  just  above  Forges  village,  but  in  the  main 
it  is  an  easy  slope  of  one  in  twenty  to  one  in  thirtv  or  so. 

In  the  prolongation  of  the  ridge  towards  the  Meuse 
is  the  hamlet  of  Regneville,  hardly  a  score  of  Jiouses, 
standing  just  on  the  river,  and  in  front  of  Cumieres  is  a 
stone  causeway  laid  on  the  bed  of  the  river,  which  can  be 
used  as  a  ford  in  dry  seasons,  but  which  has  no  value 
at  all  at  the  present  moment.  The  southern  edge  of  the 
Goose  Crest  above  Cumieres  is  everywhere  very  steep. 

Just  at  the  end  of  the  "  trunk  "  of  the  "  palm  tree  " 
on  the  northern  slope,  in  the  shallow  valley  at  C  between 
the  first  "  leaves  "  and  the  trunk,  there  is  a  little  wood 
about  a  mile  long,  and  at  its  broadest  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
across,  which  bears  the  general  name  of  the  Wood  of 
Crows  or  Crow  Wood,  but  of  which  the  eastern  portion 
is  also  called  the  wood  of  Cumieres.  It  does  not  climb 
to  the  top  of  the  ridge,  but  lies  on  the  slope.  The  main 
F'rench  batteries  lay,  of  course,  behind  the  mass  of  this 
height,  sheltered  ;  and  in  order  to  dislodge  them,  as  well 
as  to  carry  the  advanced  position  represented  by  the 
crest,  the  whole  of  the  ridge  must  be  carried,  Mort 
Homme  and  all. 

It  is  clear  from  the  map  that  there  are  three  ways  of 
doing  this.  One  may  turn  the  ridge  by  way  of  the  valley 
of  the  Meuse  ;  but  this  would  ivolve  a  final  assault  up 
its  steep  side  ;  and  there  i^  .  .:  oded  belt  also  just  now 
between  Cumieres  and  Regneville.  One  may  rush  it  up 
the  northern  slopes,  pushing  one's  way  ultimately  to  the 
Mort  Homme  itself,  the  occupation  of  which  culmina- 
ting point  would  involve  the  loss  of  the  whole  position. 
Or  thirdly,  one  may  turn  it  by  an  advance  through 
Bethincourt  and  along  the  upper  valley  of  Forges  Brook 
beyond  at  D  — D. 

The  enemy  has  attempted  the  second  and  the  third 
of  these  methods. 

He  began,  as  we  have  seen  (exactly  a  fortnight  after 
the  opening  of  the  main  battle  for  Verdun)  by  an  intensive 


drabdut 


III 


Loavemoixt 


Homme 


d    MUes     ^ 


The  Contours  of  (lie   Gonse  Crcvt   with   Cerman   Advance  Shaded. 


I\Iarch  16,   1916. 


T.  A  N  D      A  X  D      ^^'  .\  T  K  R 


boiubardmeiit  of  Ihc  ridgc  and  of  tlir  villages  at  its  foot, 
opened  the  afternoon  or  evening  of  Saturday,  tlic  4th  of 
March,  and  continued  tlnougiiout  that  night  and  the 
Sunday  night.  This  bombardment  was  particularly 
severe  along  the  valley  where  the  French  lines  lay,  behind 
the  marshy  brook  from  Bethincourt  to  I'^orges  (both  of 
which  sets  of  ruins  were  occupied  by  the  French)  and  so 
round  the  base  of  the  hill  to  Kegneville. 

On  the  Monday  morning,  the  6th  of  March,  the  enemy 
launched  no  less  than  Iv.o  divisions  against  the  eastern 
portion  of  the  line  he  had  thus  been  bombarding  and, 
probably  in  the  course  of  that  morning,  he  succeeded  in 
rushing  the  village  fif  Forges  ;  he  carried  his  assault  on  to 
the  ruins  of  the  hamlet  of  Regneville,  which  he  also 
occupied.  The  assault  was  continued  against  all  the 
main  slope  up  to  the  "  trunk  "  of  the  "  palm  tree  "  and 
by  the  evening  of  that  Monday,  March  6th,  it  had  had 
the  following  results  : 

One  of  the  two  German  divisions  had  reached  and 
captured  Hill  265  ;  the  other  inclining  to  the  right,  had 
forced  its  way  up  to  the  Crow  Wood  and  right  through 
that  wood  to  its  further  western  extremity.  It  was 
here  not  half  a  mile  from  the  Mort  Homme,  and  it 
looked  as  though  the  Mort  Homme  itself,  and  with  it 
the  whole  ridge,  would  be  in  (jcrman  hands  by  the  Tues- 
day morning. 

At  this  moment,  by  the  nightfall  of  Monday,  March 
6th,  the  French  line  still  held  Bethincourt,  ran  across 
the  shallow  valley  immediately  beyond,  skirted  the  edge 
of  the  Crows'  Wood  and  covered  the  ruins  of  C'umieres. 
(All  these  little  villages  are  places  of  from  300  to  500 
inhabitants  or  less). 

During  the  Monday  night  the  bombardment  was 
continued  with  intensity,  not  only  along  the  whole  ridge, 
but  over  the  ground  beyond  it  to  the  south  in  order  to 
prevent  the  arrival  of  reinforcements.  Reinforcements 
must  nevertheless  have  arrived  to  the  F'rench,  for  on  the 
Tuesday  the  following  day,  the  7th,  the  FVench  counter- 
attacked and  drove  the  (iermans  half  way  back  through 
Crows'  Wood.  The  Cierman  forces,  themselves  reinforced 
during  the  Tuesday  night,  early,  attacked  (presumably 
after  the  early  setting  of  the  moon),  the  portion  of  the 
wood  recovered  by  the  French,  and  at  the  same  time 
launched  another  new,  separate  force,  against  Bethincourt 
from  the  north,  coming  down  the  open  fields  abo^•e  that 
village.  These  attacks  were  continued  on  into  the 
Wednesday  morning  and  were  both  completely  broken. 

During  the  remaining  daylight  hours  of  the  Wednes- 
day the  F'rench  continued  a  slow  progress  through  the 
Crow  Wood  and  recovered  the  whole  of  it  except  the 
eastern  end. 

During  Thursday,  March  gth,  the  enemy  made  no 
new  attack.  He  was  presumably  re-forming  and  bringing 
up  further  troops.  The  lull  was  maintained  through 
the  night.  But  on  Friday,  March  loth,  the  equivalent 
of  a  whole  division  was  launched  against  the  wood  in 
successive  attacks,  .and  before  the  end  of  the  day  the 
wood  was  again  reoccupied  by  the  Germans. 

Upon  Saturday  the  nth,  a  further  attack  was 
launched  against  the  F"rench  trench  running  just  in  front 
of  the  road  from  Bethincourt  village  towards  the  south- 
east, and  marked  upon  the  sketch  A  A.  This  is  the  most 
advanced  of  the  French  trenches  in  this  region.  The 
attack  was  not  successful,  although  at  one  moment  the 
enemy  got  right  past  one  section  of  the  lust  trt'hcli  and 
was  beginning  io  clear  the  main  lomnumication  trench 
k'ading  up  to  it.  He  seems  to  ha\e  been  tvnned  out  of 
this  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon. 

Upon  Sunday,  the  12th,  he  continued  a  heavy  bom- 
bardment along  all  this  sector  from  Bethincourt  to  the 
Mcuse,  but  attempted  no  infantry  attack  upon  that  day. 
And  on  Monday  13th,  he  continued  the  bombardment 
with  increasing  inten.sity,  especially  securing  the  ground 
behind  the  Goose  Crest  to  interfere  with  F'rench  reinforce- 
ment. He  devoted  particular  attention,  at  very  long 
range  and  from' his  heaviest  pieces,  t(3  the  Bororrus  Wood 
in  the  Charny  Ridge,  as  though  preparing  for  a  general 
attack  later  on. 

The  result  by  the  Monday  e\ening  after  a  whole 
week's  infantry  action,  and  nine  days  from  the  beginning 
of  the  artillery  preparation  against  this  sector  of  five 
miles  long  (from  Bethincourt  to  the  river)  was  that  the 
enemy,  having  deployed  over  it  upon  various  occasions, 
at  least  four  di\isions—  from  which  lie  has  lost  exceedingly 


heavily — has  accpiired  the  irregular  triangle  shaded  upon 
the  sketch,  is  still  live  miles  from  Charny  ridge  and  is 
opening  in  this  situation  upon  the  west  of  the  Mcuse 
the  fourth  week  of  the  great  battle. 

Remember  that  the  west  of  the  Meuse  can  be 
made  as  decisive  a  battle  ground  as  the  east,  that  it 
threatens  the  general  French  line  even  more,  and  that 
hitherto  only  four  divisions — only  from  a  6th  to  a  7th 
of  the  force  already  disclosed — ha\e  been  used  against  it. 
To  put  it  another  way,  the  density  of  attack  on  these 
five  miles  has  hitherto  been  but  a  quarter  (or  less)  of 
that  on  the  east  of  the  river. 

Note  on  the  German  False  News. 

The  false  news  spread  in  the  course  of  these  attacks 
by  the  Ciermans  has  been  widely  noted  in  the  Press  of 
this  country,  especially  since  the  detailed  expo.sition  of  a 
part  of  it  in  the  French  wireless  of  last  Friday. 

We  shall  do  well,  however,  to  distinguish  between 
the  different  types  of  falsehood  published  by  the  enemy 
in  this  connection. 

The  exaggeration  of  the  number  of  prisoners  taken 
and  the  counting  of  trench  mortars  as  field  guns  is  a  very 
(jld  trick  with  which  many  months  of  the  war  have 
rendered  us  familiar.  This  sort  of  falsilication  is  not 
without  a  military  object,  and  that  object  has  been 
pointed  out  in  these  cohunns  more  than  imc:'.  In  the 
confusion  of  an  action  where  very  much  smaller  forces 
are  pressed  back  by  very  much  larger  ones,  it  is  not  with- 
out value  to  give  the  commanders  of  the  retiring  force 
an  imjMession,  however  soon  dispelled,  that  they  have 
suffered  more  severely  than  is  really  the  case.  They 
know  that  they  have  been  hard  hit.  It  is  impossible  to 
get  accurate  statistics  in  the  difficult  business  of  the 
retirement,  and  exaggerated  reports  are  bound  to  come 
in.  The  worse  the  situation  is  made  to  appear  to  his 
opponent  the  greater  the  fruits  the  enemy  is  likely  to 
gather  from  his  operation,  since  there  will  not  be  time 
to  establish  the  truth  until  long  after  the  affair  is  con- 
cluded ;  and  if  the  distant  commanders  of  the  retiring 
force  think  it  is  in  a  worse  way  than  it  really  is,  they  may 
hesitate  to  order  it  to  stand  where,  had  they  known  the 
truth,  they  could  easily  have  detained  it. 

But  falsehoods  of  such  a  type  as  that  which  announ- 
ced the  capture  of  the  Fort  of  Vaux  upon  the  morning 
of  Thursday  last,  are  quite  other.  They  cannot  con- 
ceivably affect  the  French  command  even  in  its  regir 
mental  units,  for  everyone  on  the  spot  knows  that  they 
have  no  relation  to  reality.  A  German  wireless,  for 
instance,  announcing  the  occupation  of  the  town  of 
Ypres  on  the  nth  of  November,  1914,  would  have  been 
\alueless  for  such  a  purpose  as  that  described  above, 
because  every  British  soldier  in  Ypres  and  in  front  of  it 
W(juld  have  known  it  was  nonsense. 

Not  only,  therefore,  is  stuff  of  this  kind  valueless 
in  a' military  sense,  but  it  has  not  hitherto  appeared  in 
the  (ierman  accounts.  Falsehoods  equally  grotesque 
have  been  spread  among  neutrals,  but  only  with  regard 
to  general  matters  and  not  with  regard  to  the  occupation 
of  particular  points. 

Why,  then,  has  this  novel  feature  appeared? 

Wfi  can  only  guess  at  the  reason  and  our  guess  must 
Ix'  that  the  news  was  really  believed  in  Berlin,  and 
believed  because  a  certain  feverish  expectation,  the  result 
of  jjrevious  disajipointment,  affected  those  in  charge  of 
the  publicity  bureau  in  the  capital,  it  sliould  be  par- 
ticularly remarked  that  the  mythical  exploit  was  set 
down  to  the  credit  of  two  Pohsh  regiments,  their  brigade 
commander  bearing  (perhaps  by  a  coincidence)  a  Pohsh 
name. 

A  single  point  of  the  sort  nnist  not  be  pressed  too 
far,  but  I  take  it  that  the  thing  was  an  error  rather  than  a 
piece  of  cunning,  and  an  error  due  to  the  state  of  mind  of 
those  who  were  eagerly  waiting  for  news  in  Berlin,  and 
who  particularly  desired  to  control  or  prevent  certain 
forms  of.  disaffection. 

If  one  is  asked  how  such  an  error  should  occur,  it 
would  seem  from  the  nature  of  the  case  natural  enough. 
A  very  large  body  of  men  is  launched  by  night  against 
the  base  of  hills  roughly  corresponding  in  height  and 
steepness  to  the  Surrey  Downs  above  Dorking  and  Rei- 
gate.  There  is  a  most  furious  cannonade  lighting  with 
llashes  all  the  sloDCS  of  the  hills,  and  the  summit  on  which 


LAND      AND      WATER 


March  i6,  1916. 


Ihc  old  abandoned  fort  stands.  The  Kt-doubts  of  Hardaii- 
mont  on  the  slope  of  the  northern  hills  (close  to  Vaux) 
arc  carried,  both  .northern  and  southern  crest  are  hard 
pressed,  and  though  the  attack  can  get  no  further 
and  is  checked,  it  is  easy  to  conceive  how  observers 
behind  the  line  and  overlooking  this  mass  of  lire  in  the 
night  should  accept  a  rumour  that  the  southern  crest 
also  had  been  stormed. 

1  take  it  that  this  rumour  relating  to  the  struggle 
in  the  darkness  between  Mondav  and  Tuesday  was 
received  upon  the  Tuesday  morning  in  Berlin,  and  was 
edited  and  ready  for  sending  out  l>y  noon.  No  contra- 
diction of  it  having  been  received  a'  the  moment  when 
the  officials  depart  for  the  consideable  midday  meal  of 
that  city,  it  was  duly  sent  out.  It  was  received  and 
transcribed,  among  other  places  in  Paris,  by  the  wireless 
and  was  issued  in  France  about  two  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon. 

All  this  is  no  more  than  conjecture,  but  it  seenr^  to 
me  to  explain  what  would  otherwise  be  a  particularly 
lutile  piece  of  nonsense. 

German  Losses  in  the  Great  Attack. 

While  we  must  repeat  the  truth  that  no  estimate  of 
the  enemy's  losses  can  be  accurately  made  until  the 
French  gi\e  us  their  report  of  the  completed  action  yet 
we  should,  if  we  care  for  any  real  basis  in  judgment 
beware  of  an  error  which  is  just  as  fatal  to  such  judgment 
as  the  exaggeration  of  those  losses. 

The  military  value  of  the  whole  thing,  the  German 
success  or  failure,  will  depend  upon  comparative  losses 
at  the  end  of  the  engagement,  and  there  has  been  some 
tendency  in  the  last  few  days  to  undor-estiinate  the  prob- 
able losses  of  the  enemy. 

The  French  estimates  (many  of  them  given  in  private, 
and  all  of  them  as  yet  unofficial,  but  most  of  them  de- 
tailed), put  those  enemy  losses  very  high.  That  they  are 
very  nmch  larger  than  the  French  stands  to  reason,  not 
so  much  because  the  I-'rench  are  standing  on  the  defensive 
(for  there  is  a  great  deal  of  counter-offensive  work)  as  be- 
cause the  French  have  deliberately  u^ed  the  whole  time 
the  tactic  of  covering  with  the  smallest  workable  number  of 
troops*.  In  some  sectors,  on  the  Goose  Crest  for  instance, 
at  Poivre  Hill,  in  the  four  stages  of  the  main  retirement, 
in  all  the  earlier  work  round  Douaiunont,  and  in  the 
assaults  upon  the  escarpment  south  of  Vaux,  position 
alone  must  necessarilj-  mean  that  the  enemy  has  lost  far 
more  than  his  opponent.  In  other  restricted  areas  where 
there  has  been  a  violent  offensive  and  counter-offensive 
alternately,  as  in  the  two  villages  of  Vaux  and  Douau- 
mont,  and  in  the  Crows'  Wood,  the  losses  may  be  more 
nearly  equal.  But  to  repeat,  as  a  whole  the  enemy 
losses  must  be  very  much  the  higher  of  the  two.  While 
their  total  cannot,  of  course,  be  fixed  even  within  a  rough 
approximation,  one  is  able  to  meet  the  principal  argu- 
ment used  by  those  who  doubt  or  would  under-estimate 
the  terrible  price  the  enemy  is  paying  for  what  he  hopes 
to  make  a  decision  before  it  is  o\er. 

That  principal  argument  is  tli  't  the  fronts  concerned 
are  not  sufficient  to  permit  the  dejioyment  of  more  than 
a  certain  number  of  men,  and  therefore  not  sufficient  to 
permit  of  more  than  a  certain  proiwrtionate  loss  in  the 
men  so  deployed. 

The  original  attack  was  upon  a  line  about  8i  miles 
long.  It  has  narrowed  on  the  mam  position  to  about  6.} 
mile  east  of  the  Meuse,  extended  by  the  new  attacks  on 
the  heights  south  of  Vaux  to  quite  7  miles.  West  of  the 
Meuse  it  has  in  the  last  ten  days  developed  upon  a  further 
line  of  5  miles.  There  are  thus  altogether,  if  we  exclude 
the  minor  work  in  the  Woeuvre  Plain,  about  12  miles 
of  front  acted  upon  or,  say  roughly  20,000  odd  yards. 
It  is  perfectly  true  that  upon  such  a  front  you  cannot  use 
more  than  a  certain  number  of  men  in  any  one  attack. 
Moreover,  as  the  attacks  have  been  partial,  now  mainly 
upon  one  sector,  now  mainly  upon  another,  we  are  con- 
cerned in  any  one  day  with  a  great  deal  less  than  this 
total  front. 

But  we  should  do  well  to  note  first  that  attacks  of 
this  sort  in  other  parallel  situations  during  the  present 

•llif  whole  tii-sl  covciiiij;  line  consists  origiiKiUy  ol  bul  4  ilivLsions 
aijainsl  14  or  15, 


war  have,  as  a  fact,  been  exceedingly,  expensive,  and 
secondly  that  the  action  has  not  been  one  gradually 
"  petering  out  "  after  the  first  main  effort,  but  oni: 
renewed  again  and  again  and  again  with  equal  fury  in 
attack  by  the  enemy  o\er  now  more  than  three  week>^. 

The  front  at  the  (irand  Couronue  in  its  ultimate 
development  was  shorter.  It  was  less  than  10  miles  long. 
That  action  lasted  less  than  a  week ;  and  yet  it  certainly 
cost  the  enemy  close  on  100,000  men.  Or,  we  may  take 
for  another  test  the  Allied  efforts  in  Champagne  and  at 
Loos.  The  French  losses  in  Chamjxigne  upon  an  a('ti\o 
front  of  12  to  13  miles,  mainl\'  incurred  in  the  first  few 
days,  are  known  though  not  published.  They  were  much 
less  than  the  enemy's  because  the  Germans  held  their 
front  in  great  strength  under  the  first  bombardment  and 
the  attempt  against  the  second  line  was  checked  in  tinic. 
Rut  they  certainly  do  not  warrant  our  doubting  exceed- 
ingly heavy  losses  for  the  (iermans  in  this  attack  upon 
Verdun,  wJiich  has  included  scores  of  separate  assaults, 
stretched  over  now  25  days. 

We  have  the  cost  of  the  contemporary  Britisli 
attack  known  under  the  name  of  Loos  exactly.  We 
know  liovv  heavy  it  was  ;  between  45,000  and  30,000  men. 
Yet  the  British  were  not  actrively  using  23  divisions  nor 
were  they  attacking  on  a  front  of  such  extent,  still  less 
did  they  prolong  the  action  for  so  considerable  a  time. 

The  conception  that  the  (ierman  losses  must  be 
lighter  than  the  estimate,  because  they  should,  if  as 
heavy  as  the  French  say,  have  already  entailed  exhaustion 
is  not  thought  out.  If  the  enemy  really  thinks  he  can 
get  a  decision  it  is  worth  his  while  to  spend  for  thj 
moment  not  100,000  or  150,000  or  even  200,000  men, 
but  300,000- — or  more.  Because  he  has  only  disclosed 
in  action  about  300,000  does  not  moan  that  he  has 
not  fed  from  reserves  or  has  not  far  niore  men  concen- 
trated in  the  region. 

New  Evidence  of  German  Exhaustion. 

It  will  be  remembered  in  this  connection  that  we 
have  always  insisted  in  this  journal — and  especially  in 
those  moments  of  artifically  produced  depression  wliicli 
affected  this  country  two  or  three  months  ago — that  ^he 
exhaustion  of  the  ( ierman  efficient  reserves  (with  the 
exception  of  classes '16  and  '17)  would  compel  the  enemy 
to  begin  filling  up  gaps  with  inefficients  during  the  whole 
winter  if  he  desired  to  keep  the  two  young  classes  back 
for  an  offensive  in  the  spring  of  this  year. 

We  further  hazarded  the  opinion  — for  it  was  not  like 
the  first  a  matter  of  positive  proof  but  only  of  judgment— 
thai  with  the  best  will  in  the  world  they  would  not  be  able 
to  keep  the  young  classes  back  for  long.  That  the  effect  of 
putting  too  many  inefficients  inlo  the  drafts  ivould  be  so  danger- 
ous and  so  obvious  that  they  would  be  compelled  much  earlier 
than  they  desired  to  bring  the  two  young  classes  into  action. 

■  We  now  have  positive  evidence  that  what  was  then 
only  a  piece  of  judgment  was  right.  The  French  have 
already  taken  many  prisoners  of  the  '16  classes  in  front 
of  Verdun,  and  what  is  worth  noting,  though  too  much 
stress  should  not  be  laid  upon  it,  the  number  of  these  lads 
has  increased  in  the  later  stages  of  the  battle.  What 
is  of  more  significance  is  that  in  soma  cases  these  drafts 
of  the  '16  class  have  been  very  large  indeed.  Three 
whole  companies  in  one  regiment  appear  to  have  been 
formed  of  this  class  alone. 

But  there  is  something  more.  A  certain  number  of 
jjrisoners  (a  few,  it  is  true)  have  been  taken  belonging 
to  the  class  '17,  and  that  is  an  omen  which  no  one  can  over- 
look. The  jirisoncrs  were  not  \oiunteers,  they  were 
regularly  enrolled. 

When  it  was  known  that  the  efficient  reserves  were 
drjing  up  in  the  last  two  months  of  1913  the  general 
suggestion  was  that  with  a  cautious  defensive  policy  the 
first  categories  of  inefficients  would  be  used  in  drafts 
during  the  early  months  of  iqi6,  and  the  classes  '16 
and '17  would  not  appear  until  the  end  of  April  at  the 
earliest.  I  beli\e  this  paper  was  the  only  one  to  suggest 
that  the  strain  could  not.be  endured  throughout  the  winter 
and  that  the  young  classes  would  certainly  be  called  upon 
in  the  exhaustion  of  efficient  reserves  before  the  winter 
was  over.  Now  that,  long  b -fore  the  winter  is  over,  the 
enemy  has  chosen  to  gamble  with  what  remains,  the  last 
classes  have  had  to  be  called. 


8 


March  in,   1916. 


LAND      AND      WA  T  E  R 


:t  in  deliberately 
-.  and  in  continuing 

offensive  ? 
jDiething  personal. 

the    actual    town 


The  German  Object 

What  then,  is  the  enemy's  ohjc 
risking  at  such  a  moment  this  heavy  lu;^ 
it  week  after  week  in  this  great  winter 
The  Press  has  represented  it  as  s 
The  dynasty  hacl  promised  to  enter 
Verdun  and  must  keep  its  word. 

There  may  be  something  of  that  motive  in  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  action,  but  it  is  certainly  not  the  chief 
motive.  The  conception  which  seems  to  underly  the 
enemy's  continued  assault  is  rather  something  like  this  : 

''  The  French  deliberately  cover  with  a  minimum 
number.  It  is  their  known  tactical  method.  They 
showed  it  locally  in  the  beginning  of  this  action.  They 
showed  it  again  in  the  advanced  positions  west  of  the  Meuse, 
on  the  Goose  Crest  the  other  day,  and  even  on  the  main 
])ositions  which  thev  have  been  defending  for  now  more 
than  a  fortnight  ;  they  are  still  using  a  much  smaller 
number  of  men  than  we  should  use  under  similar  circum- 
stances. The  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  this 
method  are  well-known."  When  it  succeeds  you  spare  men 
and  use  them  later  as  a  mass  of  manoeuvre.  But  if  it 
fails  there  is  a  bad  smash.  We  have  failed  so  far  to 
provoke  that  smash,  but  if  we  go  on  perhaps  we  shall 
provoke  it  before  the  end.  We  may  find  a  thin  place  m 
the  crescent,  or  there  mav  be  a  local  break-down  and  the 
effect  of  that  would  be  to  give  us  great  masses  of  prisoners 
and,  if  not  a  decision,  at  least  a  local  triumph  of  the 
utmost  value  to  our  moral  position  at  home  and  abroad. 
There  will  be  a  corresponding  loss  of  that  position  to  the 
enemy." 

this  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  the  enemy  no  longer 
hopes  to  break  the  French  front,  but  that  he  does  still 
liope — at  a  verv  heavy  cost— to  achieve  a  striking  local 
success  upon  a"  large  scale.  He  no  longer  hopes  to  do 
what  he  did  on  the  Dunajetz,  but  he  does  hope  to  do 
what  he  did  in  the  second  advance  to  the  Niemen,  when 
he  defeated  the  Russian  tenth  army— allowing,  of  course, 
for  the  difference  between  an  action  upon  lines  and  action 
of  movement.  Supposing,  for  instance,  he  at  last  drove 
right  through  some  point  of  the  French  quadrant  east 
of  the  Meuse  he  would  at  once;  take  in  reverse  all  its  line 
upon  the  north  of  the  breaking  point.  Or  suppose  he 
mastered  on  the  west  of  the  Meuse  all  the  advanced  lines 
one  after  the  other,  got  to  the  Charny  ridge  and  mastered 
that,  he  would  presumably  destroy,  in  a  military  sense, 
a  great  part  of  the  French  forces  remaining  east  of  the 
Meuse.  .      . 

Such  then,  are  his  main  motives  in  continuing, 
though  the  political  motive  may  have  its  value  for  him. 

The  fact  that  the  chances  against  him  are  very  heavy 
does  not  render  such  motives  less  possible;  places 
might  be  cited  where  the  chances  against  the  Allies 
were  very  heavy  and  were  ultimately  too  much  for  them, 
and  yet  in  which  the  allied  effort  .was  long    continued. 

13ut  there  is  another  motive  which  we  ought  to 
consider. 

Of  all  enemy  statistics  obtainable  by  the  Intelligence 
Department  of  a  General  Staff,  the  most  difficult  to  obtain 
are  the  statistics  of  production.  We  do  not  accurately 
know  the  enemy's  rate  of  production  in  munitionment. 
He  does  not  know  ours.  But  he  does  know  that  the 
three  western  Allies  produce  each  for  its  own  army, 
and  he  knows  that  the  French  were  very  heavily  handi- 
capped by  the  occupation  of  their  principal  industrial 
region.  He  further  knows  that  all  his  own  industrial  area 
including  northern  France,  Belgium  and  the  industrial 
part  of  Poland  can  be  used  as  one  unit,  and  its  surplus 
production  of  shell  concentrated  on  any  one  point. 
Therefore,  he  argues,  he  can  be  sure  of  a  local  superiority 
in  heavy  munitionment  at  least,  wherever  he  chooses  to 
concentrate  for  one  great  offensive  as  he  has  at  Verdun. 
He  may  not  only  hope  that  this  superiority  in  munition- 
ment (as  he  believes  it  is)  will  give  him  a  dominating 
power  in  heavv  guns  to  which,  if  he  continues  his  effort 
the  French  will  no  longer  be  able  to  reply ;  but  he  will 
also  argue  that  bv  thus  depleting  the  French  accumulation 
of  shell,  he  is  rendering  a  later  French  offensive  impossible, 
or  at  any  rate  greatly  postponing  it.  This,  I  believe  to  be 
a  second  motive  inclining  him  to  continue  his  effort. 

There  is  in  aU  this  business  of  Verdun  a  certain 
rather  subtle  point  well  worth  noting.  It  is  the  effect 
of  time  upon  the  operations. 


I  do  not  refer  to  the  effect  time  has  upon  the  losses 
of  men,  for  it  is  evident  that  the  mere  prolongation  of 
an  offensive  is  no  guarantee  of  excessive  loss  upon  the 
attacking  side.  You  may  lose  in  one  type  of  offensive  as 
many  men  in  a  day  as  you  would  lose  in  three  weeks  of 
deliberately  restricted  effort,  True,  the  German  action 
in  front  of  Verdun  is  not  at  all  of  this  latter  kind.  It  is 
not  a  series  of  slight  attacks  carefully  limited  to  a  few 
losses  :  It  is  a  case  of  intermittent  attacks  never  separated 
by  more  than  forty-eight  hours,  delivered  in  extraordin- 
ary numbers  for  the  front  concerned,  and  each  exceedingly 
expensive. 

The  factor  of  time,  therefore,  has  indeed  had  in 
these  Verdun  attacks  a  very  powerful  effect  in  increasing 
their  cost. 

The  EflFect  of  Time. 

But  it  is  not  to  this  effect  which  I  would  draw  atten- 
tion but  to  the  absolute  effect  of  time  in  such  work  as 
this. 

The  enemy  in  attacking  the  Verdun  salient  desired, 
if  possible,  to  break  the  French  front  and  to  pour  through. 

Though  he  should  fail  in  this  he  yet  might  well 
succeed  in  cutting  off  some  very  considerable  body  of  his 
opponents.  And,  as  the  object  of  all  war  is  to  disarm 
your  opponent  in  a  greater  measure  than  yourself,  such  a 
success,  though  partial,  would  have  been  of  great  value. 

A  third  object,  as  we  all  know,  was  the  impression 
of  neutral  and  civilian  opinion  by  the  use  of  the  name 
"  Verdun."  Verdun,  according  to  this  legend  repeated 
over  and  over  again  in  the  German  Press,  and  in  German 
messages  to  neutrals,  was  a  great  "  fortress."  Military 
terminology  for  centuries  past  had  accustomed  men  to 
the  idea  of  a  "  fortress  "  which  you  "  besiege  "  and  which 
at  last  "  capitulates  "  (that  is,  surrenders  on  terms)  or 
is  "  stormed."  In  either  case  the  fortress  "  falls  "  and  an 
artificial  obstacle  hitherto  barring  advance  is  removed 
and  the  advance  can  proceed. 

The  military  value  of  the  area  of  Verdun  to-day 
corresponded  to  such  a  description  about  as  much  as  the 
word  "  Savoy  "  as  applied  to  John  of  Gaunt's  Palace 
applies  to  the  modern  conditions  of  the  Strand.  There 
are  some  things  in  common,  size,  a  numerous  habitation, 
weklth,  etc.  In  the  same  way  it  is  true  to  say  that 
Verdun  was  a  centre  of  communications  because  it  was 
a  great  town,  etc.  Being  the  central  point  of  a  salient, 
it  had  great  stores  of  supplies.     It  had  been  a    fortress 


SORTES      SHAKESPEARIAN.^, 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE. 


Tis 


COL.     CHURCHILL'S     ORATORY 

matter    how    it 
it  make  noise 


tio 


e    in    tune,    so 


enough. 


AS    YOU     LIKE     IT.     IV., 


8-9. 


PORTUGAL     DEFIES     GERMANY. 

Men  shut  their  doors  against  a  settijig  sun. 

TIMON     OF     ATHENS.     I.,     ii.,    139. 


OUR    STRATEGY 

'  Tis  better  that  the 
So  shall  he   waste  his 

soldiers. 
Doing  himself  offence. 


IN     FRANCE. 

enemy  seek  ns : 
means,  weary   his 


JULIUS    C^SAR,     IV.,    iii..     197199. 


I.  A  N  i^      A  N  1^      \y  A  T  E  R 


March  16,  iQif). 


because  the  Uintl  round  it  lent  itself  tofortitication  ;  tlu  re- 
lore  it  would  be  strong  even  when  such  fortihcation 
became  no  more  than  field  works.  For,  of  course.  Verdun 
as  a  "  fortress  "  no  longer  exists.  It  was  no  more  than  a 
jmrticular  i)art  of  the  500  miles  of  French  line  (li^rat  ter- 
ised  by  great  local  strenfith.  a  considerable  accumulation  of 
supply,  and  the  junction  of  communications,  as  also  by 
the  fact  that  it  was  the  nucle\is  of  a  prominent  salient. 

Well,  consider  all  these  points  and  see  how  the  lapse 
of  time  affects  them,  quite  apart  from  its  effect  upon 
(ierman  losses. 

P'or  the  breaking  of  a  front,  rapidity,  the  concen- 
trated value  of  your  blow,  is  everything.  The  Dunajetz 
was  a  proof  of  this,  and  the  partial  success  of  the  Allied 
offensive  in  September.  The  Allied  offensive  in  Septem- 
ber did  not  break  the  German  front,  but  it  smashed  up  the 
first  line  (which  was  held  in  full  strength),  and  all  the 
effective  work  was  done  in  a  few  hours  after  the  close  of 
the  bombardment. 

The  (ierman  attack  upon  Verdun  liar.,  through  the 
effect  of  time,  utterly  lost  this  character.  I  am  trying  to 
break  through  my  enemy's  wall  with  a  battering-ram.  I 
give  a  violent  blow,  open  a  breach  in  it,  but  Imd  a  second 
wall  behind.  Against  this  second  wall  the  impetus  of 
my  battering  ram  is  such  that  it  gives  that  second  wall  a 
bad  dent,  but  cann<it  break  it.  My  battering  ram  is  of 
such  a  nature  that  in  the  act  of  acliieving  its  first  success, 
and  of  striking  against  the  second  wall,  in  every  impact, 
it  loses  a  certain  large  percentage  not  only  of  its  momen- 
tum, but  of  its  actual  stuff. 

That  is  a  metaphor  fairly  describing  what  happened 
in  the  .Mlied  offensive  in  September  so  far  as  a  mere  blow 
was  concerned.  In  the  supreme  factor  of  numerical 
effect,  of  course,  it  was  far  more.  For  the  wall  and 
battering  ram  are  both  made  out  of  armed  men,  and  the 
bricks  thrown  down  were  far  more  numerous  than  the 
material  lost  to  the  ram. 

But  now,  suppose  that  in  attempting  to  break  down 
vty  wall  in  his  turn  the  enemy  believes  me  to  have  built 
it  upon  his  own  plan  of  two  main  curtains  standing  one 
close  behind  the  other,  wherea;.,  as  a  fact,  it  consists  of 
four  or  five  much  thinner  curtains  standing  one  behind 
the  other  and  at  last,  behind  all  these,  the  main  wall. 
My  enemy  delivers  his  blow,  but  finds  that  he  has  to 
deliver  it  four  successive  times,  wasting  his  instrument 
heavily  each  time,  and,  long  before  he  has  reached  my 
main  wall,  destroying  all  the  effect  of  rapidity  in  his  blow. 
That  is  a  fair  metaphor  for  what  happened  between 
February  2 1st  and  February  26th  East  of  the  Meuse,  in 
front  of  Verdun. 

In  this  point,  therefore,  the  effect  of  lime  alone,  quite 
apart  from  losses,  is  apparent,  and  the  fact  that  the  battle 
has  gone  on  for  now  close  upon  three  weeks,  is  a  fact 
heavily  in  favour  of  the  defence. 

Now  for  the  second  point  :  The  desire,  if  one  could  not 
break  a  front,  at  least  to  cut  off  large  bodies  of  one's 
opponents. 

The  essential  of  such  a  plan  is  surprise,  and  surprise 
again  can  only  be  stated  in  terms  of  rapidity.  The 
essence  of  surprise  is  to  catch  your  enemy  before  be  has 
had  time  to  understand  what  you  were  at  or,  if  he  has 
already  done  that,  before  he  has  had  lime  to  take  full 
dispositions  against  it. 

1  believe  that  the  big  attack  up  the  ravine  against  the 
position  of  Douaumont  was  something  in  the  nature  of  a 
surprise,  and  had  it  succeeded  it  is  conceivable  or  even 
probable  that  the  main  body  of  the  defence  lying  between 
Douaumont  and  the  Meuse  would  have  been  wholly  or 
partly  cut  off.  Failing,  as  it  did,  to  do  more  than  reach 
the  edge  of  the  plateau,  this  prime  factor  of  time  in  an 
effort  of  surprise,  rapidly  diminished.  It  was  already 
almost  worthless  when  the  French  counter  offensive  was 
launched  within  three  hours.  It  had  <lisappeared  within 
three  days.  The  passage  of  ten  more  days  has  dissipated 
it  altogether. 

But  it  is  upon  the  thinl  point,  the  moral  or  political 
effect  at  which  the  enemy  aimed,  that  this  effect  of  time 
is  most  noticeable. 

What  may  properly  be  called  the  "  T,egend  of 
Verdun  " — the  theory  of  a  great  "  fortress,"  imperilled 
and  about  to  "  fall  " — was  prettj'  strong  on  February 
iQth,  when  the  first  shots  of  the  bombardment  began. 
It  was  clearly  apparent  in  the  Press  of  neutral  countries, 
and  to  some  extent  our  own  during  the   ne.\t   few   days. 


though  it  waned  rapidly  under  the  vigorous  efforts  of 
those  writers  who  were  concerned  to  emphasise  the  mili- 
tary truth  for  the  public.  It  was  shamelessly  persisted 
in  throughout  the  (ierman  Press,  until  it  became  ludicrous.. 
ICven  as  late  as  last  Tuesday,  March  7th,  German  corres- 
pondents sp:'cially  sent  to  the  F"ront,  were  talking  of  the 
"  groat  French  fortress  "  and  "  last  fortress  of  the  Allies." 
Hut  long  bi'fore  that  date  the  legend,  even  in  remote 
neutral  countries,  antl  even  with  tiie  least  robust  of  Allied 
civilians,  was  dead.  There  is  perhaps  no  one  left  to-day 
outside  (iermany  who  accepts  that  legend,  and  not  many 
in  Germany.  It  is  to  the  honour,  by  the  way,  of  the  prin- 
cipal students  of  the  war  in  that  country  that  they  did 
not  lend  themselves  to  the  oflicial  absurdity  -but  that 
is  by  the  way.  The  point  is  that  the  moral  and  political* 
effect  which  would  certainly  have  been  produced  in  the 
last  days  of  February  had  German  soldiers  reached  the 
ruins  of  the  suburbs  of  Verdun  beyond  the  river,  even  at 
lo.i^es  threefold  th:-ir  opponents,  can  now  never  be 
achieved.  Should  the  area  of  Verdun  be  occupied  after 
a  month's  effort  and  an  enemy  los?;  of  300,000  men,  even 
the  least  instructed  opinion  has  had  time  to  estimate  thai 
result  in  comparative  losses,  which  iire  everything,  and 
not  in  area,  which  is  nothing.  .  H.  B:u.[.oc. 

\Ouin^  to  pressure  on  our  space  Mr.  Bdloc's 
analysis  of  the  A  ustro-Hungarian  losses  is  clef  erred  until 
next  u'eek.\ 


THE    LATE  MR.  JANE. 

Mr.  Fred  T.  Jane,  who  died  quite  suddenly  last  week, 
had  every  student  of  naval  affairs  throughout  the  world 
his  debtor.  His  annual  "Fighting  Ships  "  has  long  since 
been  indispensable  to  all  whosi  interest  in  Navies  was 
more  than  superficial.  Its  compilation  from  year  to 
year  gave  Mr.  Jane  a  knowledge  of  constructional  and 
statistical  detail  altogether  unique.  But  he  was  much 
more  than  a  naval  statistician.  He  was  an  omnivorous 
reader,  and  as  his  published  books  show,  had  a  wide  and 
curious  knowledge  of  ancient  as  well  as  of  modern  s-a 
practice. 

For  many  years  Mr.  Jane  had  lived  near  Portsmouth, 
and  iew  men  can  have  had  a  wider  acquaintance  amongst 
naval  officers.  His  enthusiasm  for  the  Navy  was  im- 
bounded,  and  it  had  been  his  habit  to  put  his  pen  and  his 
speech  at  the  service  of  every  movement  either  for 
strengthening  the  fleet:  or  bettering  the  fortunes  of  its 
personnel.  His  death  leaves  a  gap  no  one  can  fill  ;  he 
will  be  mourned  by  more  than  those  who  could  claim 
the  privilege  of  his  friendship.     And  they  were  many. 


Mr.  Frederic  Coleman,  the  author  of  From  Mons  to  Ypres 
with  French  (Sampson  Low  and  Co.,  6s.  net)  has  seen  certainly 
as  niuch,  and  probably  more,  of  the  actual  fighting  of  the 
British  Army  as  any  civilian,  having  been  on  dutv  with  his 
car  with  the  cavalry  headquarters  staff  for  the  whole  of  the 
period  of  which  his  hook  tells.  The  record  that  he  gives  is 
■'  live  "  throughout  ;  there  are  hosts  of  good  storids  of  the 
indomitable  spirit  of  the  men  on  the  great  retreat,  in  the 
battle  of  the  Marne,  and  in  the  later  days  leading  up  to  the 
great  fighting  about  Yjjres.  Altogether,  this  is  one  of  the 
most  mterosting  books  on  the  war  that  has  yet  been  published. 

There  is  no  evidence  in  the  pages  of  The  Trof>ici.  by 
C.  H.  Ivnock  (Grant  Richards,  i()s.  net),  to  show  that  the 
auth()r  has  visited  all  the  lands  that  he  describes  ;  more 
especially  when  dealing  with  India  and  the  Hast,  the  greater 
part  of  the  work  is  such  as  might  have  been  derived  from 
f^uidc-books  and  geographical  manuals— but  his  book  is 
not  to  be  passed  over  for  that  cause,  for  most  people  have 
neither  the  time  nor  the  inclination  to  amass  such  a  quantity 
of  literature  as  would  be  necessary  for  all  the  information 
contained  in  tliis  single  volume. 

The  Peruvian  tableland,  Chile,  and  the  Andean  plateau 
Renerally.  receive  the  most  detailed  and  intimate  attention 
of  any  localities,  as  if  here  the  author  were  on  ground  with 
which  h;>  is  thoroughly  familiar.  I'or  the  rest,  the  reader 
may  find  descriptions  of  climate,  geographical  peculiarities, 
racial  chara'-teristics,  "if-ommercial  enterprise  and  travel 
facilities,  in  all  the  tropical  regions  of  the  f,'lobe.  For  this 
object,  evitlently  the  book  has  been  compileJ,  nn<l  the  oliiert 
i-i  well  achieved 


10 


Mardi  16,  T916. 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


THE    REVOLUTION    AT    WHITEHALL. 


By  Arthur  Pollen. 


MR.  BALFOUR'S  reply  to  his  predecessor  weis 
something  more  than  a  delightful  addition 
to  our  Hmitcd  literature  of  irony.  And  it 
has  aeliicved  something  more  than  assuring 
Mr.  Churchill  the  immortality  of  preservation  in  the 
amber  of  his  opponent's  wit.  It  is  not  Mr.  Balfour's 
artistry  that  is  to  our  purpose  to-day,  but  the  light  his 
disclosures  throw  on  the  changes  in  naval  administration. 
The  significance  of  these  seems,  on  the  whole,  to  have  been 
very  well  understood,  so  that  the  impression  is  general  that 
while  we  have  assisted  at  tlie  execution  of  the  man  who 
tried  to  shake  our  confidence  in  the  Navy,  we  have  also 
attended  the  public  ob.sequics  of  the  effort — call  it  intrigue 
or  agitation  or  whatever  you  please — for  replacing  the 
present  Board  by  Lord  Fisher  and  his  friends. 

But  to  some  people.  Lord  Fisher's  lonig  ascendancy 
still  makes  it  appt;ar  as  if,  when  we  deny  ourselves  his 
services  in  the  highest  posts,  we  arc  committing  a  kind 
of  naval  /t'/.o  de  sc.  This  conviction  is  passionately  held  and 
eloquently  expres  ed  by  a  few  journals — and  amongst 
them  the  Manchcatcr  (iiiardian  and  the  Observer,  wlio 
are  not  deceived  by  his  being  invited,  with  Sir  Arthur 
Wilson  and  Mr.  Hugh  O'Byrne,  to  assist  at  the  War 
Council  ;  and  to  them  the  refusal  to  put  Lord  Fisher  into 
"  absolute  command  "  of  something  is  a  simple  tragedy. 
As  there  are  some  in  private  life  who  share  these  views, 
and  have  not  yet  reahsed  the  real  moral  of  Mr.  Balfour's 
castigation  of  his  predecessor,  it  is  worth  explaining 
what  the  First  Lord's  revelations  really  reveal. 

Professional  Control. 

It  is  briefly  thus  : — Until  May  last  the  chief  com- 
mand of  the  Navy  had,  for  years,  been  entirely  autocratic, 
and  chiefly  civilian.  It  is  now  as  nearly  self  governed 
as  such  a  service  can  be,  and  its  guidance  is  wholly  pro- 
fessional. We  have  learnt  that  our  Argus-eyed  Fleet  sees 
more  than  the  "  far  sight  and  foresight  and  second  sight  " 
of  even  our  greatest  stay-at-homes,  and  that  an  ad- 
ministration who.se  chief  concern  is  to  focus  the  war 
knowledge  of  the  Fleet  and  turn  it  to  account,  is  not  only 
a  vastly  superior  instrument  of  command  to  any 
autocracy,  but  is  the  only  instrument  that  can  handle  so 
complex  a  weapon  as  the  British  Navy  in  the  imantici- 
pated  and  startling  conditions  of  its  first  war  for  a  hundred 
years.  So  true  is  this,  that  a  root  fact  of  the  situation  is, 
exactly  as  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Sir  Hedworth  Meux  put 
it.  The  Navy  is  ])erfcctly  content  with  the  existing 
regime  and  any  effort  to  return  to  the  old  one  would 
spread  consternation  tluoughout  the  Fleet.  To  many 
it  may  seem  a  hard  saying  that  a  system  which  was  going 
in  full  blast — tearing,  hustling,  pushing  and  driving — 
about  nine  months  ago,  should  already  be  seen  to  be 
obsolete  and  dead  beyond  any  possibility  of  revival. 
But  Mr.  Balfour  liftefl  suiticient  of  the  veil  to  make  it  not 
only  credible,  but  to  those  who  understand  it,  inevitable. 

Mr.  Churchill  left  him  with  no  alternative  but  to 
break  the  brutal  truth  to  us  that  at  the  outbreak  of 
war,  we  had  not  a  single  submarine-proof  harbour  on  the 
East  coast.  Reflect  for  a  minute  what  this  means.  In 
the  eleven  and  a  half  years  which  have  elapsed  since 
Lord  Fisher  came  to  the  Admiralty  as  First  Sea  Lord, 
two  altogether  revolutionary  changes  have  been  made  in 
naval  war.  Until  i()04  the  12-inch  guns  of  our  battle- 
ships were  weapons  that  no  one  would  have  thought  of 
using  beyond  the  range  of  4,000  yards.  The  identical  guns 
have  been  used  in  tliis  war  at  11,000,  12,000  and  13,000 
yards.  The  advance  in  range  owes  nothing  to  improve- 
ments in  the  gun.  It  has  been  brought  about  by  improve- 
ments in  sights,  in  rangelinders,  and  in  the  organisation 
called  fire  control.  Again  in  1904  the  submarine,  or 
submersible  torpedo  carrying  boat,  had  indeed  been 
proved  to  be  a  practical  instrument  for  war,  but  was  still 
in  its  infancy.  By  11)07,  when  Captain  Murray  Sueter 
vvrote  his  well  known  work  on  the  subject,  it  had  become 
obvious  that  the  tactics  of  battle,  no  less  than  tiie  defence 
Df  fleets,  stood  to  be  completelv  changr-d  by  its  actual 
and  probable  developments. 

Now  every  new  mgine  of  war     aiul  as  a  long  rangi' 


weapon  the  modern  gun  is  such — creates  a  double 
problem.  There  is  the  art  of  using  it  in  attack  ;  there 
is  tlie  art  of  countering  it  when  it  is  in  the  enemy'^ 
hands.  With  every  new  develo])ment  then,  the  Navy 
has  to  learn  a  new  offensive  and  a  new  defensive.  In 
the  matter  of  guns,  there  is  but  one  defensive  that  can 
be  perfectly  successful.  It  is  to  develop  a  method  of 
using  them  so  rapid  so  insistent  and  so  accurate  that  the 
enemy's  guns  will  be  out  of  action  before  they  can  be 
employed  against  us.  Failing  this  there  is  a  secondary 
defensive,  viz.,  to  protect  ships  by  armour.  Finally 
you  may  keep  out  of  range  of  the  enemy's  guns  by 
turning  or  running  away.  The  adoption  of  armour  calls 
for  no  perfection  either  of  tactical  organisation  or  technical 
practice.  It  is  a  matter  which  can  be  left  to  the  metal- 
lurgists, engineers  and  constructors.  The  ])urely  naval 
policy  then  should  have  been  to  de\elop  the  use  of  guns 
either  offensively,  which  as  we  liave  seen  will  be  the  best 
defence,  or  to  enjoin  the  tactic  that  will  avoid  risks 
inseparable  from  coming  imder  the  enemy's  fire.  To 
the  country  that  was  completing  nearly  two  battleships 
to  any  other  country's  one,  that  aspired  to  command  the 
sea,  that  hoped  to  be  able  to  blow  any  enemy  fleet  out  of 
the  water  if  it  got  the  chance,  it  would  seem  obvious  that 
there  could  be  only  one  gunnery  policy  ;  to  wit,  piish 
the  offensive  to  the  highest  possible  extent.  This  would 
not  have  been  to  deny  that  there  might  be  occasions  on 
which  defensive  tactics  would  be  justified.  But  they 
would  be  the  exception  and  not  the  rule.  It  certainly 
would  not  be  the  manceuvre  round  which  the  halo  f)f 
ofticial  approbation  would  have  been  particularly  shed. 

Again,  the  distinguishing  feature  of  submarines 
is  their  capacity  to  approach  the  strongest  of  vessels 
rmseen  and  then  to  strike  with  the  most, deadly  of  all 
weapons.  As  they  gained  in  speed  and  radius  of  action, 
it  became  obvious  that  wherever  a  fleet  might  be — whether 
at  sea  or  in  harbour— it  must  be  exposed  to  this  insidious 
and — if  successful — deadly  form  of  attack,  unless  it  u'cre 
protected  by  effective  passive  defences  while  in  harbour, 
and  by  numerous  mobile  guards  when  at  sea.  The  basic 
sup])osition  of  British  naval  policy  has  been  to  maintain 
a  fleet  sufficiently  powerful  to  drive  all  enemy's  craft 
within  his  harbours  and  defences.  The  proposition  has 
only  to  be  stated  for  it  to  be  clear  that  the  Navy  could 
not  have  expected,  except  in  rare  circumstances,  to  havo 
any  targets  for  its  submarines,  whereas  it  was  as  certain 
as  any  future  thing  could  be,  that  every  British  ship  would 
be  a  constant  target  for  the  enemy's  submarines.  British 
policy  in  regard  to  submarine  war  should  then  have  been 
mainly,  if  indeed  not  wholly,  defensive. 

Thus,  if  there  was  one  form  of  offensive  imperatively 
impo;,ed  on  us,  it  was  that  of  naval  artillery  ;  and  if 
there  was  one  form  of  defensive  not  less  imperatively 
incumbent,  it  was  the  pro\'ision  of  adequate  protection 
against  submarines. 

Reversed  Tactics. 

It  is  now  of  course  common  knowledge  that  it  was 
exactly  in  these  two  particulars  that  Admiralty  policy 
from  igo4  to  1914  was  either  discontinuous,  vacillating 
and  self  contradictory,  or  sim])ly  non-existent.  So  far 
as  it  cultivated  anything,  it  was  a  defensive  tactic  for 
the  gun  :  and  offensive  tactics  for  the  submarine !  On 
the  latter  point  let  the  non-provision  of  a  safe  anchorage 
on  the  North-Ea.st  coast  stand  for  the  whole.  If  you 
pick  up  a  Navy  List  for  any  month  in  any  year  prior  to 
August,  1914,  you  will  look  in  vain  for  any  department  of 
Whitehall,  any  establishment  at  a  principal  port,  any 
appointment  of  flag  officer  or  captain,  to  prove  that 
there  was  at  any  time  an  indi\-idual  or  a  committee 
charged  with  the  vital  problem  of  protecting  the  British 
I'leet  against  enemy  submarines  when  war  broke  out. 
The  necessity  had  indeed  been  realised.  It  had  been 
urged  on  the  Board  of  the  Admiralty.  But  no  action 
was  taken. 

This  of  course  was  bad  enough.  The  case  of  gunnery 
was  worse,  for  if  you  comj^are  the  Navy  List  of  August, 
ii)i4,  with  lliat  of  Ihe  ciirrcspondiiig  month  of  the  vear 


ir 


LAND      AND      W  A  T  E R 


March  16,  1916. 


tliat  Mr.  fhiircliill  took  office,  you  will  find  that  it  was  to 
liis  ailministralion  that  we  owe  tlic  abolition  of  the 
onlv  ()lh<"fr  and  diparlmi-nt  in  thr  N'a\y  conipi'tt'nt  to 
acKisc  or  diivct  mt-thods  of  gunnery  adeijuate  for  war. 
From  IQ08  to  k^ij  the  Inspectorship  of  Target 
Practice  had  been  effective  in  giving  shape,  and  to  some 
extent  a  voice  to  the  alarm,  anxiety  and  indignation 
of  the  Navy  at  the  manner  in  which  gunnery  administra- 
tion boxed  the  compass  of  conllicting  policies.  With  the 
suppression  of  the  ofiice  there  came  administrative  jieace 
^and  technical  chaos.  How  complete  that  chaos  was 
is  shown  by  our  inability  to  escape  from  the  hampering 
traditions  of  the  defensive  theory  on  which  the  Dread- 
nought policy  was  built.  The  theory  was  that  ships 
should  be  armed  with  guns  that  outranged  the  enemy, 
and  tUted  with  engines  that  out-ran  hini.  Then  all  risk 
of  coming  under  his  tire  could  be  avoided.  The  effect  caii 
be  seen  in  the  actions  we  have  fought. 

The  Falklands  Action. 

At  the  l-'alkland  Islands  there  was  a  classic  example 
of  defensi\-e  gunnery  tactics.  It  was  one  of  thos-'  quite 
exceptional  cases  in  which  they  were  quite  rightly  em- 
ployed. There  was  a  clear  six  hours  of  daylight  after 
the  enemy  had  been  brought  within  fighting  range  ;  the 
strength  of  the  attacking  squadron  was  o\erwhelming  ; 
there  was  no  safe  harbour  to  which  the  enemj'  could  run  ; 
the  British  .\dmiral  was  many  thousands  of  miles  from  a 
])ort  where  he  could  refit  if  his  ships  were  injured  ;  and 
his  ships  represented  about  6  per  cent,  of  our  total  force 
in  capital  \-essels.  If  then  he  could  destroy  the  enemy 
without  risking  any  injury  to  his  ships,  he  was  clearly 
bound  to  do  so.  The  battle  began  about  i  o'clock,  the 
Scharnhorst  sank  at  a  quarter  past  four,  and  the  Gneisenau 
about  two  hours  afterwards.  For  three  hours  and  a 
quarter  then  each  of  the  (ierman  ships  was  imder  fire 
from  one  battle  cruiser,  for  two  hours  a  single  German 
ship  was  under  fire  from  both.  If  we  assume,  first,  that 
twenty-five  12-inch  shells  would  sufilice  to  destroy  such 
cruisers  as  the  Scharnhorst  and  the  Gneisenau,  and 
secondly,  that  at  no  time  did  our  battle  cruisers  have 
more  than  six  guns  in  action,  it  follows  that  the  rate 
of  hitting  would  be  one  hit  per  gun  every  75  minutes. 

The  mean  range  was  about  12,000  yards. 

Ranging  Problems. 

In  the  second  attack  on  the  Koenigsberg  in  the 
Kufigi  river,  the  t^vo  six-inch  guns  of  Severn  destroyed 
the  Koenigsberg  in  about  15  minutes  after  finding  the 
correct  elevation.  The  range  here  was  just  under  11,000 
yards.  If  we  assume  that  these  guns  could  destroy  the 
Koenigsberg  with  25  hits,  we  have  a  rate  of  hitting  of 
one  hit  per  gun  every  72  seconds.  At  12,000  yards  a 
.Scharnhorst  is  a  far  larger  target  than  a  Koenigsberg  at 
11,000,  and  in  flatness  of  trajectory  a  12-inch  gun  at  the 
greater  range  has  a  vast  advantage  over  a  6-inch  gun  at 
the  lesser.  What  is  it  that  accounts  for  the  gunnery 
efiiciency  at  the  Falkland  Islands  being  one  sixtieth  of 
that  at  the  Kufigi  ?  The  Severn  was  firing  for  all  intents 
and  purposes  from  a  stationary  and  motionless  ship  and 
at  a  stationary  target.  Invincible  and  Inflexible  were 
travelling  from  22  to  25  knots,  were  constantly  under 
helm,  and  were  engaging  fast  and  manoeuvring  targets. 
In  gunlaying  the  difficulties  in  the  latter  case  may  have 
been  slightly  greater.  But  the  sea  was  calm.  It  was 
then  the  unsohed  difficulties  created  by  the  movements 
of  the  firing  ship  and  target  that  explain  the  difference 
in  the  standard  of  efficiencj'  achieved. 

But  unless  these  difficulties  were  solved,  how  was  it 
ever  hoped  that  a  method  of  fire  control  adecjuate  for 
battle  could  be  evolved  ?  Was  it  supposed  that  we 
could  always  engage  on  defensive  terms,  that  we  should 
always  have  time,  always  opponents  of  inferior  speed 
and  armament  to  fight  ?  Should  not  the  elimination  of 
movement  from  the  gunnery  problem  have  been  the  be- 
all  and  end-all  of  gunnery  policy,  if  its  essentially  offen- 
sive character  had  been  understood  ?  The  intensity  of 
hitting  at  the  Falkland  Islands  was  98.4  per  cent,  inferior 
10  that  at  the  Kufigi.  If  ten  per  cent  of  the  errors 
had  been  eliminated,  the  efficiency  would  have  been 
increased  by  six  hundred  per  cent.  ! 

Now.  throughout  the  years  1904  to  1014,  there  were 
many  distinguished  sailors  serving  as  Lords  of  the 
Admiralty  at  Whitehall.    Until  the  end  of  igio  there  was 


virtually  a  naval  autocracy.  There  \\a;  certainly  no 
purely  civil  autocracy  unfil  Mr.  Churchill  took  over  a 
year  later.  How  are  we' to  explain  blindness  so  aston- 
ishing as  this  in  two  such  crucial  matters — the  oniission 
of  a  defensive  for  the  submarine,  and  of  an  offensive 
for  the  gun  ?  The  answer  seems  to  me  to  lie  in  this. 
Wliile  it  was  not  until  Mr.  Churchill  came  to  the  Admir- 
altv  that  technical  decisions  were  habitually  made  by  a 
First  Lord  on  his  own  responsibility,  there  had.  e\('r  since 
jiower  was  transferred  from  the  ISoard  as  a  whole  to  its 
chief,  been  a  complete  civilian  ascendancy  in  naval 
administration.  From  the  moment  the  actual  executive 
power  passed  from  a  body  of  seamen  appointed  by  tlu^ 
Prime  Minister  into  the  hands  of  a  civilian  head  of  a 
department,  naval  policy  had  to  be  reduced  to  such 
provision,  such  measures,  such  preparation  for  war.  as 
lie  would  realise  to  be  essential.  Lay  judgment  thus 
became  the  criterion  of  all  naval  action,  and  this  in  turn 
resulted  in  only  those  naval  officers  attaining  infiuence 
and  power  at  Whitehall  whoso  habit  of  mind  and  character 
ajipealed  to  the  layman.  I  think  it  is  this  that  ex])lains 
how  it  is  that  Lord  Fisher's  reputation  is  so  much  greater 
amongst  politicians,  journalists  and  landsmen  than  it  is 
amongst  sailors.  His  reforms  and  <hanges  were  exactly 
the  things  that  appealed  to  untechnical  minds.  E\'cry- 
body  was  impressed  by  ships  that  were  larger,  costlier 
and  carried  more  powerful  guns  than  previotis  ships.  But 
it  never  occurred  to  any  of  -these  lay  enthusiasts  to  ask 
how  they  were  to  be  used  !  The  critics  of  the  Fisher 
regime  never  made  any  headway,  because  they  had  either 
to  appeal  for  right  doctrine  to  naval  history,  with  which 
neither  the  public  press  nor  the  politicians  were  very  well 
acquainted,  or  to  such  matters  as  the  technique  of  weapons, 
which  no  one  outside  the  Navy  understood  at  all. 

Enemy  Shortcomings. 

It  i>  a  fortunate  circumstance  that  apparently  no 
other  Admiralty  was  in  the  least  degree  in  ailvance  of  ours 
in  the  understanding  of  war,  and  it  is  to  this  that  we  nnist 
attribute  a  state  of  things,  to  this  extent  satisfactory, 
that  whatever  the  defects  in  our  preparations,  in  both 
material  or  methods,  the  shortcomings  of  our  enemy 
seem  in  point  of  fact  to  have  been  greater  yet. 

We  have  now  been  at  war  for  twenty  months,  and 
no  doubt  a  hundred  weaknesses  in  our  arrangements 
have  been  set  right,  and  so  far  as  the  others  can  be  reme- 
died, the /-fgtwie  which  Mr.  Balfour  has  set-up  is  the  best 
guarantee  we  can  have  that  all  that  is  still  possible  will  be 
done.  He  has  at  any  rate  created  machinery  both  for 
finding  out  what  the  fleet  knows  and  wishes,  and  for 
carrying  it  out  where  it  is  feasible.  And  it  is  the  great 
advantage  of  the  Churchill  incursion  that  the  attack  on 
this  regime,  which  if  not  ideal,  is  at  least  the  best  we  can 
get,  will  now  cease. 

Mr.  Balfour,  having  established  a  sane  system,  can 
of  course  strengthen  it.  when  and  as  it  becomes  desirable 
and  convenient  to  make  an  interchange  between  White- 
hall and  the  fleet.  One  new  appointment  of  great  im- 
portance has  recently  been  made.  Admiral  de  Chair  has 
been  taken  from  the  conduct  to  the  direction  of  the 
blockade.  To  those  who  know  more  of  the  fleet  than  of 
the  Foreign  Office,  there  is  something  humorous  in  so 
brilliant  an  officer  being  anybody's  assistant.  It  is  a 
great  thing,  however,  that  a  man  fresh  from  the  practical 
problem  should  bring  a  war-trained  brain  to  the  Govern- 
ment's assistance  in  this  vital  matter.  It  would,  of  course, 
be  easy  to  suggest  other  transferences  from  the  fleet  to 
Whitehall  that  would  strengthen  the  Board  and  other 
departments  there  to  a  very  notable  degree.  But  it  is 
to  be  remembered  that  Mr.  Balfour  has  to  choose  between 
strengthening  his  Board  and  weakening  the  command  at 
sea.  No  change  that  has  yet  been  suggested  would  give  him 
a  better  chief  adviser  than  he  has,  and  his  chief  adviser, 
in  turn,  cannot  be  better  served  by  any  change  in  the 
headship  of  the  War  staff.  And  compared  with  these 
two,  no  other  offices  are  of  very  crucial  moment. 

Arthir  Pollen. 


Aids  to  the  use  of  Mafs  (Jarrold  and  Sons,  is.  net)  is  a 
very  useful  little  handbook  giving  details  of  English,  French, 
and  German  military  maps,  in  a  way  that  will  be  found  ex- 
plicit and  eminently  serviceable  by  junior  officers  and 
n.c.o.'s.  engaged  in  topograpliical-work.  The  comparative 
tables  of  terms  are  especially  to  be  commended,  as  is  the 
chapter  on  conventional  signs. 


12 


March  i6,  1916. 


LAND      AND     WATER 


AN    AMBASSADOR    OF    EMPIRE. 


By  Neoimperialist. 


IT  is  well,  as  notable  occasion  serves,  to  turn  from 
-tudies  to  living  facts,  to  note  how  fast  the  war 
is  doing  the  work  of  those  who,  here  and  in  the 
Dominions,  have  laboured  for  the  creation  of  an 
effectively  organised  Greater  Britain  which  shall  be  a 
Commonwealth  founded  on  free  brotherhood,  rather  than 
an  Empire  based  on  tragically  futile  ideas  of  dominion. 

Progress  was  slow,  studies  and  researches  were 
judged,  and,  even  to  those  engaged  in  them  seemed  to  be, 
largely  academic.  But  now  transparently  clear  implica- 
tions of  the  Etate  of  war  have  tiooded  all  our  world  with  a 
new  vision.  In  normal  times  people  alter  their  con- 
ceptions slowly.  They  continue  to  use  terms  of  which 
the  significance  has  evaporated,  and  this  prevents  con- 
\ersipn  to  necessary  reforms  or  even  the  serious  discussion 
of  them.  In  some  such  way  as  this  on  the  eve  of  war 
many  still  spoke  of  colonies  and  possessions  with  a  half- 
friendly  contempt  or  an  air  of  futile  pride.  The  war  has 
shown  them  as  nations  banded  in  a  free  and  glorious 
alliance  for  a  conception  of  liberty  and  a  theory  of  govern- 
ment on  which  their  national  and  their  personal  lives 
liavt' been  built.  In  truth  the  grandiose  German  plan  was 
inevitably  wrecked  when  Botha  and  Smuts,  Borden  and 
Laurier,  Fisher  and  Hughes,  Massey  and  Ward  declared 
for  England  and  for  Belgium  in  the  nam.es  of  the  peoples 
that  they  represented. 

Never  was  there  such  a  glorious  testimony  in  epitome 
(out  of  enemy  mouths)  to  the  British  as  against  the 
Prussian  Imperial  idea  as  was  involved  in  that  patheticalK' 
eager  question  addressed  to  a  Canadian  prisoner  of  war  by 
his  German  captors:  "What  did  the  English  say  to 
Canada  to  make  her  fight  for  them  ?  " 

Unique  Significance. 

Witiiin  the  last  week  has  happened  an  event  rightly 
hailed  by  the  Press  as  of  unique  significance.  The 
Premier  of  Australia,  after  formal  conference  with  the 
Premiers  of  New  Zealand  and  Canada,  attends  a  meeting 
of  the  Cabinet  in  l^ondon.  It  is  for  the  peoples  of  these 
islands  to  ponder  and  to  understand  the  full  measure  of 
that  significance,  fie  comes  more  definitely  than  has 
ever  been  apparent  in  any  former  visit  of  a  Dominion 
representative,  as  an  ambassador  of  three  of  the  five 
free  nations  to  the  central  executive  ;  as  a  stranger  indeed, 
and  by  concession  rather  than  by  the  right  which  should 
be  his,  but  still  welcomed,  trusted  and  accredited  in  a 
quite  new  sense. 

An  Ambassador  carries  more  than  his  credentials  ; 
or,  rather,  a  salient  part  of  those  credentials  is  his 
capacity,  his  temper,  his  discretion.  Mr.  Hughes  is 
believed  by  his  fellow  countrymen  to  possess  vigour  and 
initiative,  a  forceful  personality  ;  indeed,  the  high  quality 
of  leadership.  An  old  and  loyal  member  of  Mr.  Fisher's 
government,  he  is  judged  to  have  a  wider  outlook  than 
his  former  chief.  Mr.  Fisher  was  primarily  a  Labour 
statesman,  not  indeed  of  so  narrow  a  complexion  as  we 
are  accustomed  to  note  in  our  leaders  of  Labour  at  home 
wlio,  it  is  to  be  said,  light  against  so  much  heavier  odds, 
but  still  necessarily  preoccupied  with  the  task  of  carrying 
what  seemed  to  him  vital  social  and  economic  reforms  in 
the  teeth  of  a  still  powerful  opposition.  Of  that  high 
(juality  of  an  ambassador,  tact,  the  best  testimony  in 
Mr.  Hughes'  favour  is  his  happy  expression,  to  which  Mr. 
Bonar  Law  gave  charming  tribute,  of  the  splendid  for- 
bearance of  Australia  and  New  Zealand  in  regard  to  the 
(iailipoli  failure,  forbearance  hardly  less  magnificent 
than  the  courage  of  the  Anzac  battalions,  ancl  withal 
a  rare  phenomenon  in  political  life  and  of  most  happy 
augury. 

This  ambassador  of  Empire,  then,  sees  further  than 
the  mere  immediate  questions  of  military  co-operation, 
of  the  organisation  of  the  supplies  of  wheat  and  of  metals, 
which  he  has  ostensibly  come  to  discuss.  He  sees  with  a 
clear  eye  the  vision  of  Imperial  unity  ;  but,  a  member 
of  a  powerful  Labour  government,  he' sees  it  from  a  new 
angle.  He  sees  as  a  \vide-eyed  man  cannot  fail  to  see  the 
outstanding  fact  that  the  Empire  is  no  mere  contrivance 
of  tariffs  and  agreements,  no  mere  vast  fanfily  business 
so  to  speak,  but  a  bulwark  of  liberties  won  bv  our  race 


through  centuries  of  persistent  contest  against  arbitrary 
power  and  privilege,  a  barrier  against  the  old,  bad  con- 
ceptions of  the  imposing  of  tyrannical  will  which  are  now 
revived  in  the  later  Prussianism. 

Chamberlain  and  Rhodes. 

You  may  say  that  he  completes  the  visions  of  our 
Chamberlain  and  our  Rhodes,  or  makes  explicit  the 
deductions  implicit  in  their  imaginative  Imperial 
philosophy.  It  is  surely  impossible  that  the  more  per- 
ceptive and  liberal-minded  of  our  Labour  leaders  can  fail 
to  be  deeply  impressed  by  this  Labour  Minister,  whose 
zeal  springs  from  no  suspected  source,  to  {)ut  it  in  hostile 
terms,  of  capitalist  megalomania  or  expansionist  jingoism. 

It  is  almost  impossible  that  even  our  detached 
philosophers  of  pacificism  should  be  able  to  escape  the 
conviction  that  a  Minister  of  such  traditions  is  em- 
phatically not  a  militarist.  The  military  virtues  of  the 
Australians  all  the  world  knows,  but  the  thought  of 
militarism  in  their  connection  would  be  a  rich  joke  to 
those  who  know  their  habits  and  their  temper. 

And  then  there  are  those  honest  men  of  Radical 
mould,  whose  preoccupations  have  been  too  exclusively 
with  domestic  troubles  and  the  real  disabilities  and 
grievances  of  the  unfortunate,  and  who,  after  the  danger- 
ous fashion  of  the  idealist,  believed  what  they  wished  to 
believe,  that  the  great  war  would  never  come  and  was  a 
mere  phantasm  of  the  alarmist  sabre-rattlers  this  side  the 
North  Sea.  These  fundamentally  honest  and  admirable 
folk  have  been  rightly  shocked  into  a  consideration  of 
those  external  issues  of  the  stable  settlement  on  which, 
as  they  now  find,  their  domestic  problems  are  ultimately 
based.  They  have  seen  their  world  in  ruins,  their  careful 
retrenchments  dissipated  in  the  waste  of  a  day's  battle, 
their  reforms  jeopardised  for  a  generation.  They  will 
surely  listen  to  such  a  messenger  and  take  their  new 
conception  of  the  Imperial  Task  from  such  untainted 
lips.  They  will  surely  learn  that  peace  is  not  merely  to 
be  had  by  rationalising — though  rationalism  may  be  the 
slow  ultimate  way  to  the  great  end. 

The  New  Imperialism. 

Mr.  Bonar  La\V,  in  the  recent  gathering  in  the  House 
of  Commons  to  welcome  Mr.  Hughes,  phrased  the  high 
hope  of  the  new  imperialism  in  terms  intelligible  enough 
to  those  who  read  between  the  cautious  lines  of  our 
publicists'   utterances   on  this  matter : 

"  There  is  one  thing  I  hope  and  believe  we  may  gain  from 
the  war  and  that  is  that  as  the  war  has  shown  the  whole 
Empire  is  one  in  spirit  and  in  action,  so  some  means  may 
be  found  for  making  it  one  in  structure  for  all  the  time 
that  is  to  come  "...  adding  the  hope  that  both  here 
and  in  the  Dominions  statesmen  will  realise  "  that  the 
war  has  made  a  great  difference,  that  it  has  made  every- 
thing plastic,  that  things  which  were  impossible  before 
are  perhaps  easy  now,  and  above  all  that  it  may  be  found 
that  perhaps  a  big  step  is  not  more  difficult  to  take  than 
a  small  one." 

One  in  structure  .  .  .  the  big  step  not  more 
difficult  to  take  than  the  small  one— that  is  the  pith  of 
the  utterance.  In  the  big  step  many  prejudices  will 
have  to  be  sacrificed,  many  vague  phrases  re-examined, 
many  conflicting  interests  adjusted.  The  supreme 
passion  for  liberty,  the  supreme  necessity  of  adequate 
defence,  these  will  prevail  to  carry  the  Great  Settlement, 
to  build  the  Five  Nations  into  one  indissoluble  sovereign 
state.  The  details  are  a  matter  of  laborious  enquiry 
and  conference,  but  the  essence  of  the  case  is  made. 
The  Australian  Premier  has  taken  but  another  significant, 
step  along  the  appointed  path.  He  is  a  discreet  and  a 
knowledgeable  ambassador  and  he  should  speak  with  a 
convicticm,  such  as  no  imperialist  of  the  popular  school 
can  command,  to  those  isolationists  among  us  to  whom 
the  word  "  Empire  "  has  been  synonymous  with  a 
challenging  aggression,  and  the  splendid  thing  neither 
studied  nor  believed  in. 

Let  them  listen  to  Mr.  Hughes  and  the  while  turn 
over  in  their  minds  the  salient  cpiestion  '  What  clid  the 
English  say  to  the  nations  t(j  make  them  fight  for  her  ? 


J,  A  \  n      AND       WATKR.  March    16,  kjiO. 

FREEBOOTERS    OF    THE    BALKANS. 


Bv  Jan  Gordon. 


IMr.  Jan  Cutnlini,  lite  a  filer  of  this  diin/e.  acled  us  eir^iiteer 
to  Dr.  Berry's  Serbian  Mission  from  the  Koyal  Free 
Hospital.  He  was  in  the  Balkans  for  six  months 
and  mure,  and  travelled  widely  both  in  Serbia  and 
M onlcne\;,ro ,  taking  part  in  the  great  retreat.  He 
and  his  wife,  aho  uas  also  attached  to  the  Mission. 
have  fust  piihlished,  throuf^h'  Messrs.  Smith  Elder  and 
Co.,  an  account  of  their  wanderings  entitled  "  The 
Luck  of  Thirteen,"  illustrated  bv  fhcmsel.'rs.  bn/li  oi 
them  bein'^  artists. 

IN  niodtTn  armu-s  wc  liavt-  now  discarded  the  frec- 
boottr,  but  in  the  Balkan  States  they  have  not 
yet  learned  that  the  1  ndisciplincd  auxiliary  is  of 
little  use  in  the  warfare  of  to-day,  and  here  the 
(  oniitaji  have  a  reeof^nised  military  position.  Perhaps 
in  a  way  one  is  \\r()nf(  in  su^j^esting  that  we  have  completely 
tliscarded,  for  the  (omitaji  is  after  all  only  a  bold  spy.  a 
spy  who  would  use  force  rather  than  cunning,  who  employs 
a  bomb  instead  of  gold.  Even  in  peace  time  in  the 
Balkans  they  fringe  the  frontiers  like  a  nimbus  round  the 
moon  fortelling  future  storms.  I-'or  them  is  no  middle 
course  between  death  or  honour,  as  a  rule  they  nc.'ver  are 
made  |)risoners,  and  1  have  personal  recollections  of  three 
such  Spartan-. 

Georgcvitch. 

Whin  I  knew  iiim  deorgevitch  was  military  store- 
keejx-r  to  Vrnjatdika  Banja.  No  position  could  have 
become  him  better,  he  was  an  ideal  storekeeper — and, 
was  also  gerant  of  the  hydropathic  hotel  which  we  later 
turned  into  a  hospital.  He  was  young,  plump,  and  genial. 
On  ordinary  cU-ys  clothed  in  Serbian  uniform,  he  was, 
sa\-e  for  his  statinc,.  umioticeable.  But  on  Sunday, 
arrayed  in  his  show  clothes  and  sallying  out  to  attract  the 
frncics  of  the  ladies  who  were  health  resorting,  Georgcvitch 
was  a  sight  for  "  nuts  "  to  weep  at.  To  see  him,  his  plump 
iigure  encased  in  a  very  tight  fitting  black  tail  coat  with 
l)raidcd  edges,  brilliant  waistcoat,  violently  striped 
Irou-ers,  patent  leather  boots  with  cloth  tops,  little 
patterns  worked  in  between  the  leather  and  the  cloth,  was 
to  see  what  the  modern  Serb  can  do  when  he  tries.  His 
hat,  a  bowler  with  a  generous  brim.  Was  always  a  size 
too  small  and  perched  at  the  angle  which  he  thought  the 
most  attractive.  At  any  rate  Georgcvitch  was  never 
deserted,  but  let  us  hope  that  the  rumour  of  his  courage 
attracted  mo'c  than  his  personal  appearance.  One  snowy 
Sunday  some  girls  maliciously  snowballed  him  when  he 
was  dressed  in  his  best  clothes.  He  gave  a  howl  of  elephan- 
tine laughter,  stooped — to  the  grave  danger  of  his  coat — 
])ieked  up  in  his  enormous  hands  a  lump  of  snow  and  with 
it  laid  one  of  his  aggressors  flat. 

One  morning  Georgcvilch  presented  himself  at  our 
hospital  and  demanded  to  see  a  yiatient.  The  two  talked 
violently  for  a  while,  and  when  (ieorgevitch  came  away 
a  tear  was  glistening  at  the  corner  of  his  eye.  He  said 
to  me  :  "  Tliat  man  was  my  comrade.  A  great  big  man 
he  was,  and  now  look  at  him,  all  skin,  and  bones  inside — 
nothing  else.  We  were  Comitaj  together.  Ya  !  "  The 
tear  had  disappeared  and  his  eye  gleamed  with  another 
llame.  "  HeiT  Ciott,  that  is  a  life  "  he  cried,  "  two  loaves 
»f  bread  per  man  and  then — Forwards,  always  For- 
wards." "  Imagine, "  he  clutched  my  arm,  "  adark  night  ; 
\-ou  go  silently,  silently  through  the  trees,  and  there 
before  you  is  an  enemy  outpost.  \'ou  pull  f)ut  J'our 
bombs,  see  !  "  He  swung  round  to  his  hip  pocket  and 
shewed  me  a  smallish  square  cast  iron  bo,\  at  one  end  of 
which  was  a  brass  cap.  He  unscrewed  the  cap,  and 
■  pointed  to  a  pin  which  projected  from  the  case.  "  You 
see  that  pin,  well  you  hit  it — ^count  one,  two,  three,  four, 
and  at  five,  throw  it.  Ah  then.  Bouin  !  Bourn  ! 
Bourn  !  "  he  waved  his  hands  wildly.  "  They  fly,  we  run 
after  them,  always  throwing.     Bourn  !    Bourn  !     That  is 


me 


Eh 


"  We  take  no  prisoners,"  he  went  on,  "  they  take 
no  prisoners,  and  from  two  hundred  of  us  only  twenty- 
three  remain — a  fine  man  that  one.     Ya." 

But  his  comrade  was  not,  in  hospital,  the  wonderful 
hero  that  Georgcvitch  had  pictured  him ;    pcrliaps  the 


jiowcr  (if  bearing  pain  re()uires  <|ualities  other  than  baltle- 
lield  bravery.  At  any  rate  my  wife  had  nicknamed  him 
the  "  Big  child  "  to  tlie  great  joy  of  his  comrades,  because 
he  would  howl  with  agony  before  the  doctor  had  ap- 
proached his  bed.  He  himself  adopted  the  name  and 
would  pathetically  say  to  her,  "  Big  Child  hasn't  got  any 
cigarettes.  Sister." 

Georgcvitch  had  a  beautiful  horse  and  an  English- 
made  saddle  of  which  he  was  inordinately  proud.  One 
day  he  was  appointed  captain  of  cavalry,  and  a  few  days 
later  rode  away.     How  many  maidens  wept  for  his  going  ? 

Another  Comitaj. 

My  secfind  Comitaj  is  nameless.  After  two  nights  in 
a  train  I  stmnbled  out  at  a  wayside  station  seeking  stronK 
Turkish  coffee  with  which  is  banish  sleep  from  my  un- 
satisfied eyelids.  Aft  inn  lay  over  the  way  and  altiiough 
it  was  3  a.m.  I  opened  the  door  and  entered,  but  staggered 
hack  gasping  for  breath.  The  floor  of  the  big  dining  hall 
was  heaped  with  bundles  of  rags.  At  first  sight  it  was  the 
moonlight  flitting  of  a  rag  and  bone  merchant,  then  when 
one  saw  the  faces  there,  and  here  arms  and  legs,  it  was 
more  like  an  Armenian  massacre.  It  smelt  like  a  massacre 
too,  a  massacre  several  days  gone,  for  the  windows 
liad  been  tight  shut  all  night  and  there  must  have  been 
fifty  soldiers  sleeping  there.  1  (ordered  a  table  in  the 
fresh  morning  air  without,  and  presently  as  I  was  sipping 
my  coffee  he  came  out  to  me.  He  was  gorgeously  drunk, 
and  evidently  had  been  so  all  night.  Around  his  coat  he 
had  a  thick  leather  belt  containing  si.x  bombs,  <.m  either 
hip  was  a  revolver,  also  sword,  dagger  and  bayonet,  and 
a  rifle  was  on  liis  back  ;  he  seemed  to  a  military  sense 
akin  to  what  those  old  fashioned  mountebanks  who  used 
to  carry  and  to  play  sinuiltaneously  drum  and  triangle, 
concertina,  bc>lls,  pan-pipes  and  cymbals  are  to  the  musical. 

\\'e  had  little  intercoiuse,  for  alcohol  had  erected  a 
barrier  between  us,  and  I  need  my  Serbian  spoken  slow 
and  distinct.  Still  there  he  is,  a  picture  of  the  apotheosis 
of  warfare  and  by  now  he  must  have  been  satisfied.  In 
opposition  to  these  I  place  the  portrait  of  Nikolo  Pavlo- 
vitch. 

Nikolo  Pavlovitch. 

For  five  days  he  was  our  cicerone,  appointed  by  Marko 
Petrovitch,  governor  of  Ipek  and  brother  to  the  King  of 
Montenegro.  Pavlovitch  was  a  large  spare  man  with 
black  hair  and  moustache,  keen  generous  looking  eyes, 
and  the  most  beautiful  mouth  1  have  ever  seen.  His 
large  frame  was  clothed  in  a  French  fireman's  uniform — 
the  French  sent  all  their  old  imiforms  to  Montenegro — 
and  though  it  was  several  sizes  too  small  for  him  it  could 
not  hide  his  native  dignity.  He  spoke  American.  He 
explained  us  the  Comitaj  as  a  kind  of  vigilance  committee 
instituted  in  order  to  keep  down  the  excesses  of  the 
Turkish  rulers  of  the  Serbian  populace.  In  Macedonia 
especially  there  were  Serbian,  Bulgarian,  and  (ireek 
Comitaji,  and  to  the  joy  of  the  Turk  they  occasionallj' 
would  fall  foul  t)f  each  other. 

"  Ah  !  dis  ere  place,"  he  said  once,  "  'ad  de  Turks 
for  bosses  an  dey  did  jess  wat  dey  like,  ^\'e  kip  'em  in 
order,  you  bet.  Say  one  Turk  feller  he  carry  off  Christian 
gals  inter  is  areem  ;  we  shoot  'im  up — or  one  line  night. 
Mister  Jim,  'e  dissapear.  So  !  "  he  flicked  a  finger 
across  his  throat,  "  dey  know  where  a  goone  to,  and  dat 
kip  em  feared.  Say  !  judge  e  make  too  much  graft.  We 
fix  im  too  sure  !  Wa  judge  'n  jury  'n  execurta  all  in  one, 
dat  make  'm  leave  our  gals  alone.     I'm  tellin  yer  !  " 

There  were  educated  men  amongst  the  Comitaj, 
in  fact  the  greatfcr  proportion,  Nikolo  Pavlovitch  told  us. 
He  was  remarkably  intelligent  and  tho'  f>orn  a  peasant  had 
educated  himself  and  read  English  better  than  he  spoke  it. 
His  favourite  author  was  Jules  Verne,  and  "  Round  the 
World  in  Eighty  Days  "  he  judged  a  masterpiece,  and 
"  Jane  Eyre  "  came  second.  Twice  he  had  been  caught 
by  the  Turks;  the  first  time,  although  they  had  shot  him 
in  fifteen  places,  yet  he  escaped,  was  hidden  by  some 
Serbian  women  and  was  cured.  He  explained  that  in 
Macedonia  a  Comitaj  could  have  anything  he  desired  and 


March  i6,  19 16. 


J.  A  N  D      AND      W  A  T  E  R 


without  payment.  The  second  time  he  was  overpowered 
and  beaten  by  twelve  men  with  fencing  stakes.  They 
thought  he  was  dying,  but  nevertheless  sent  jiiminto Tur- 
key on  a  bullock  cart.  The  agony  of  that  journey  can 
better  be  imagined  than  described.  They  put  him  into 
hospital  and,  he  said,  treated  him  very  kindly  till  he  was 
better,  when  they  flung  him  into  a  hlthy  prison.  His 
friends  had  discovered  where  he  was  and  sent  him  money, 
or  he  would  have  starved  to  death.  He  described  how  the 
dungeon  was  like  night,  becan.se  the  only  windows  were 
blocked  by  the  poorer  prisoners  who  stood  there  all  day  long 
holding  out  arms  through  the  bars  to  beg  alms  from  the 
passers  by.  He  was  rescued  by  his  friends, whobribed the 
(iovernor  and  a  gaoler,  and  he  was  allowed  to  escape. 
But  his  health  ♦as  undermined  by  his  sufferings,  and 
for  six  months  he  lay  a  cripple  in  Montenegro.  He 
cured  himself.  In  the  summer  he  crawled  down  to 
Cattaro,  and  on  the  sweltering  shores  of  the  Adriatic 
he  built  a  primitive  sweat  bath.  In  a  fortnight,  he  said, 
lie  was  better,  and  in  two  months  was  able  to  get  about. 

when  he  was  quite  cured  he  emigrated  to  America, 
where  in  a  few  years  he  saved  £800.  He  returned  to  his 
country,  but  was  so  oppressed  by  the  misery  about  him 
that  in  a  few  months  all  his  money  had  been  given  away 
and  he  went  back  to  America  to  get  more. 

He  was  a  rabid  prospector,  and  when  he  learned  that 
I  had  been  a  mining  engineer,  he  wanted  me  to  join  him, 
after  the  war,  and  make  a  thorough  tour  of  the  mountains 


in  search  of  mineral.  He  was  in  Canada  when  the  war 
started  and  had  organised  the  large  Serbian  contingent 
which  had  left  that  colony  to  aid  Montenegro.  He 
had  strict  notions  and  was  disgusted  because  the  Serbian 
girls  in  Ipek  would  not  discard  Turkish  costume. 

"  I  sez  to  'em  Mister  Jim, — Tisnt  decent.  Dats 
wat  I  sez.  Dese  ere  gals  goin  'bout  in  trousers  an  coverin' 
up  der  faces  .same  as  if  dey  was  Turks.  But  dey  tells  me 
ter  mind  me  business.  Trousers  is  more  comfortable,  they 
sez  ;  an  I  say,tisn't  comfort  youorter  bethinkin'  bout,  but 
nations.  Biit  dey  afraid.  Dey  say  Turk  'e  comeback  an 
what  then  ?  " 

We  took  him  one  day  to  visit  the  Archbishop  of  Ipek. 
Somehow  there  was  no  introduction,  and  the  dignitary 
seemed  a  little  huffed  that  we  should  have  brought  a 
common  soldier  to  see  him.  At  last  he  turned  con- 
descendingly to  Pavolvitch  and  demanded  his  name. 
The  Archbishop's  expression  changed  at  once. 

"  What,"  he  said,  rising  from  his  chair,  "  You  are 
Nikolo  Pavlovitch."  He  shoijk  him  warmly  by  the  hand. 
"  So  I  have  met  you  at  last." 

When  we  left  Ipek,  Nikolo  Pavlovitch,  who  suffered 
at  times  from  bad  facial  neuralgia,  asked  us  to  send  him 
some  camphorated  oil,  also  an  old  sweater  if  we  had 
one.  The  things  were  sent  and  I  expect  he  got  the  oil, 
but  I  doubt  if  a  woollen  sweater  could  travel  from  one  end 
of  Serbia  to  the  other  in  safety.  Serbs  are  so  susceptible  to 
cold. 


WHY    PEACE    IS    IMPOSSIBLE. 


By  L.    March  Philhpps. 


A  LL  wars  imply  the  existence  of  an  inward  antagon- 
/%  ism,  an  antagonism  of  will,  idea,  ambition, 
/  %  preceding  and  leading  up  to  the  outward  an- 
^  A-tagonism  of  act.  But  it  has  hitherto  been  the 
case  that  tlaese  inward  antagonisms,  the  real  sources  of 
wars,  have  rarely  been  vital  or  permanently  important 
to  mankind  in  general. 

Mostly  they  have  been  antagonisms  of  kings  and 
ministers,  and  have  embodied  State  jealousies  and  am- 
bitions more  or  less  irrelevant  to  the  national  welfare. 
Hence  -when  a  certain  amount  of  blood  had  been  spilt 
and  the  available  ready  money  spent  there  was  nothing 
to  prevent  a  peace  being  patched  up.  The  peace  might  not 
mean  a  reconciliation  of  the  interests  involved,  but  those 
interests  being  usually  trivial  it  mattered  not  whether 
they  were  reconciled  or  not.  The  national  life  grew  past 
them,  grew  over  them  ;  the  march  of  humanity  left  them 
far  behind  ;  and  the  historian,  who  by  and  by  reviewed 
t'.iosi  events,  might  imagine  himself  wandering  amid  the 
ashes  of  extinct  volcanobs. 

But  what  if  the  inward  antagonism  does  not  pass, 
what  if  it  is  not  only  profound  and  irreconcileable,  but 
permanent  ?  In  that  case  obviously  there  is  not  much 
use  in  discussing  peace,  for  however  much  we  discussed 
it  we  could  not  realise  it.  Even  if  we  arranged  terms 
and  signed  treaties  and  sheathed  our  swords,  we  should 
not  have  made  peace  so  long  as  the  inward  discord 
remained  operative.  We  might  cover  over  the  fire  but 
the  flame  would  burn  within. 

Evolution  of  Prussianism. 

What  is  it  we  are  dealing  with  ?  I  would  wish  the 
reader  to  tix  his  attention  on  the  orderly,  progressive 
evolution  of  Prussianism  in  its  own  home  and  stronghold, 
from  a  rough  unconscious  law  of  life  dictated  by  harsh 
circumstances  and  grim  necessity,  down  to  its  final 
appearance  as  a  reasoned  theory  of  government  and 
religious  or  ethical  system  ;  and  especially  I  would  have 
him  note  how  all  this  later  political  and  religious  develop- 
ment was  made  to  match  the  primitive  law  of  life,  and 
but  expresses  in  finer  intellectual  or  spiritual  language 
the  impulses  which  guided  that  life's  daily  conduct. 
Just  as  we  see  of  England  that  her  gospel  of  liberty  was 
of  slow  growth,  and  was  built  on  fact  and  experiment, 
so  that  her  creation  of  a  free  empire  has  seemed  un- 
consicous,  as  though  it  were  fashioned  by  convenience 
rather  than  in  accordance  with  any  preconceived  idea  ; 
so  too  the  autocratic  instinct  in  Prussia  may  be  said  to 


have  grown  gradually  out  of  life's  experience  and  to  have 
been  for  centuries  a  matter  of  common  usage  ere  it  was 
raised  to  the  dignity  of  a  philosophy  and  a  faith. 

It  would  almost  seem  that  the  land  of  Prussia  had 
been  created  for  the  express  cultivation  of  the  stern 
spirit  which  came  to  reside  there.  Desolate  and  savage, 
its  mountainous  plains  trending  gradually  to  the  grey 
waters  of  the  Baltic  with  which  the  currents  of  its  rivers, 
the  Vistula,  the  Oder,  the  Spree,  were  often  undistinguish- 
ably  blent  in  vast  expanses  of  marsh  and  reed,  its  heathy 
or  grassy  tracts  interspersed  with  forests  of  fir  and  pine, 
wolf  and  bear  haunted,  it  offered  truly  a  rude  pri:  for 
valour  to  the  Slavs,  Wends,  Danes  and  Germans  by 
whom  it  was  contested.  Not  till  the  Thirteenth  Century 
was  Christianity  introduced  by  the  summary  methods  c)f 
the  crusading  orders,  the  Teutonic  Knights  and  Knights 
of  the  Sword,  missionaries  whose  religious  zeal  was  imper- 
fectly distinguished  from  lust  of  conquest. 

Heterogeneous  Elements. 

Out  of  these  heterogeneous  elements  mingled  i.i 
fierce  confusion  there  formed  by  degrees  an  aristocracy, 
not  distinguished  indeed  by  any  of  the  refinement  or 
grace  of  bearing  which  we  associate  with  the  word,  but 
remarkable  for  the  implacable  resolution  with  which  it 
imposed  its  will  upon  subject  classes  and  peoples.  The 
invaders  were  not  only  the  feudal  lords  but  the  military 
conquerors  of  the  country.  As  rocks  jut  up  out  of  stormy 
waters  so  were  they  surrounded  by  hostile  and  doubtful 
clans  eager  to  submerge  them.  Their  position  could  be 
maintained  and  extended  but  by  the  exercise  of  unfalter- 
ing vigilance  and  resolution.  Self-preservation  meant  for 
every  noble  in  the  land  the  successful  maintenance  of 
the  family  dignity  and  authority  against  all  attack,  and 
the  keeping  his  own  foothold  amid  the  shifting  elements 
of  that  fierce  society'  by  which  he  was  surrounded.  By 
this  endeavour  the  nobles  were  drawn  and  welded  into 
a  solid  body  inspired  by  the  tyrannic  principle  in  all  its 
nakedness  and  power. 

If  the  reader  will  reflect  on  the  nature  of  the  en- 
vironment in  which  the  evolution  of  Junkerdom  took 
place,  he  will  scarcely  wonder  that  it  should  have  given 
to  the  world  the  most  stubbornly  autocratic  society  known 
to  history.  There  are  dyes  so  potent  that  a  single  drop 
will  stain  a  reservoir.  There  are  strains  of  blood  so 
ineradicable  that  the  least  tincture  imprints  itself  on 
generation  after  generation.  In  the  same  way  so  con- 
centrated   was   the   rpiality   of   the    Prussian   autocratic 


LAND      AND     WATER 


March  i6,  1916. 


in^tin**,  nurtured  b\'  rcntmifs  f»f  assiduous  practice  and 
use,  that  it  has  bi-en  able  to  diffuse  itself  like  an  essence 
without  losing  its  own  identity. 

It  is  to  tliat  process  of  diffusion  tliat  I  would  ask  a 
momentary  attention.  Every  practical  rule  of  life  or 
go\-erning  system,  if  it  is  to  prosper  in  the  world,  must 
achieve  some  sort  of  an  intellectual  and  spiritual  expres- 
sion of  itself.  Until  it  does  this  it  has  no  real  existence 
apart  from  the  circumstances  which  called  it  forth,  and 
cannot  hope  to  commend  itself  to  dwellers  outside  those 
circiunstances.  (^ne  of  the  most  remarkable  things  that 
has  occurred  in  luuope  during  the  last  three-quarters  of 
a  centurv  has  been  tiie  investiture  of  the  ])riinitive  Prus- 
sian rule  of  life  with  its  appropriate  body  of  arguments, 
reasons,  and  even  aspirations.  What  was  a  mere  blind 
instinct,  born  of  necessity  and  the  grim  facts  of  life,  has 
found  its  intellectual  and  spiritual  self  and  has  become 
in  consequence  a  proselytising  influence. 

Teuton  State  Philosophy. 

To  attempt  here  a  description  of  the  State-philosophy 
of  Prussia  as  finally  formulated  would  take  us  far  beyond 
our  limits  ;  but  if  we  approach  the  subject  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  practice  and  usage  of  the  Prussian  nation, 
if  we  try  and  imagine  the  philosophy  as  tittiitg  the  life, 
and  the  chief  charateristics  in  the  life  as  de\eloping  into 
the  main  tenets  in  the  ])hilosophy,  we  may  be  able  to 
disengage  the  essential  traits  of  Prussianisni. 

"  To  be  weak  is  miserable  "  ;  the  lesson  of  Prussian 
life  is  summed  up  in  that  short  phrase  of  Milton's.  The 
(piality  on  which  the  very  existence  of  the  invaders 
depended  was  their  capacity  to  dominate,  to  keep  and 
hold  down  by  the  strong  hand  the  insurgent  and  re- 
fractory elements  of  society.  If  we  were  to  figure  the 
Norman  knights  of  England,  not  absorbed  into  the 
l^opnlation  and  reconciled  to  English  ideals,  but  fiercely 
trampling  down  the  conquered  Saxons  into  perpetual 
serfdom  ;  if  we  can  imagine  a  league  of  grey  keeps  and 
castles,  not  falling  to  decay,  but  continuing  to  exercis: 
from  century  to  century  their  subjugating  influence, 
we  should  have  a  true  idea  of  the  processes  by  which  the 
autocratic  spirit  in  Prussia  has  perpetuated  itself. 

The  reader  cannot  fail  to  have  observed  the  extra- 
ordinary sameness  .which  prevails  among  all  the  Prussian 
portraits  belonging  to  the  dim  picture  gallery  of  past 
history.  All  surviving  records,  ballads  and  legends 
deal  in  one  type.  Down  to  the  present  it  never  varies. 
The  heroes  of  the  war  of  liberation,  Gneisenau,  Arndt, 
Eichte,  Scharnhorst,  the  leaders  of  sixty-six  and  seventy, 
Roon,  Bismarck,  Moltke,  Manteuffel,  down  to  the 
Hindenburgs  and  Mackensens  of  the  present,  all  seem  to 
incarnate,  rough  hewn  and  strong  as  they  are, 
the  same  ideal  of  physical  dominance,  physical  might, 
the  might  of  the  bludgeon.  There  is  no  more  eloquent 
testimony  than  this  prevalent  type  to  the  influence  of 
that  long  grim  feudal  history  biting  slowly  into  Prussian 
character.  Let  the  reader  weigh  well  the  lessons  of  that 
historv— that  weakness  is  the  final  misery,  that  might 
and  power  and  valour  and  the  virile  virtues  that  over- 
come and  dominate  are  the  primary  conditions  of  life  — 
and  having  weighed  these  let  him  turn  to  the  State 
doctrine,  as  carefully  and  repeatedly  defined  during  the 
last  fifty  vears  by  a  succession  of  Prussian  historians  ; 
and  ask  himself  whether  its  leading-  axiom —that  "  The 
State  is  Power  "  —is  any  other  than  a  translation  into 
words  of  what  has  been  the  imconscious  rule  of  Prussian 
life  for  centuries  ? 

The  Sense  of  Power. 

For  generations  in  every  typical  Prussian  household 
the  seed  has  been  germinating  which  has  borne  this 
fruit.  The  State  is  the  collective  consciousness,  or  bond 
of  imity  of  the  whole,  and  this  bond  of  unity,  savs  the 
Prussian  doctrine,  cnsisls  in  the  sense  of  power.  I'owcr 
is  the  highest  good.  Power  is  that  which  transcends  all 
moral  law.  As  I  read  the  familiar  phrases  my  thought 
trends  back  over  the  bleak  tracts  of  Prussian  history  and 
I  confess  that  the  modern  doctrine  is  but  the  slowly 
inculcated  lesson  of  ancient  experience. 

But  we  may  go  one  step  further.  Professor  Cramb, 
whom  1  like  to  quote  because  of  his  appreciation  of  what 
is  positive  in  Prussian  ideas,  has  some  fine  pages  on  the 
Spartan  disciuline  and  self  sacrifice  which  the  gospel  of 


miglit  imposes.  But  he  rises  to  a  still  loftier  eloquence 
when  he  goes  on  to  describe  the  spiritual  faith  which 
is  to  be  the  counterpart  of  that  theory.  Ever  since 
Germany's  fatal  mistake  in  adopting,  fourteen  centuries 
ago,  the  religion  of  a  conquered  race,  she  has  "  struggled 
and  wrestled  to  see  with  eyes  that  were  not  her  eyes,  to 
worship  a  god  that  was  not  her  god,  to  live  with  a  world- 
vision  that  was  not  her  vision,  and  to  strive  for  a  heaven 
that  was  not  her  heaven."  And  now  at  last  has  come  the 
great  revolt,  the  revolt  of  "  the  most  earnest  and  pas- 
sionate minds  of  young  (iermany  "  against  th('  thraldom 
of  ("hristianity.  .^Xnd  instead  of  Chvistianity  what  will 
they  set  up  ?  "  The  prevalent  bent  of  mind,  "  ccjmes  the 
answer,  "  at  the  uni\ersities,  in  the  army  amongst  the 
more  cultured  is  towards  what  may  be  described  as  the 
religion  of  Valour." 

\\'ith  that  final  definition  the  Prussian  ideal  reaches 
its  symmetrical  expression.  I  desire  here  only  to  call 
attention  to  its  logical  completeness  and  harmony. 
Every  practical  theory  must  discover,  as  I  said,  its 
intellectual  and  spiritual  self.  The  tyrannic  instinct, 
raw  and  primitive  in  Prussian  history,  finds  its  intellectual 
self  in  the  conception  of  the  State  as  power,  and  its 
spiritual  self  in  a  religion  of  valour.  Thereupon  it  is 
complete.  It  starjds  forth  in  organic  unity,  each  mani- 
festation of  its  nature  in  agreement,  a  complete  philosophy 
of  life. 

Our  Philosophy  of  Life. 

And  what  about  our  philosophy  of  life  ?  What  have 
we  to  set  against  the  Prussian  ideal  ?  It  had  been  my 
intention  to  develop  this  theme  also  ;  to  place  our  answer 
to  life's  problem  alongside  the  Prussian  answer  that  the 
extent  of  the  contrast  might  be  realised.  But  I  have 
already  exceeded  my  space,  nor  perhaps  is  this  further 
analysis  strictly  necessary.  We  can  work  it  out  for . 
ourselves.  What  does  our  past  show  ?  Not  the  dominion 
of  an  all  powerful  class,  but  the  co-operation  of  all  classes 
in  the  act  of  government.  .'Vnd  springing  out  of  this 
difference  of  root  comes  the  equivalent  difference  of  tha 
idea  of  the  State,  not  as  the  embodiment  of  power  but 
the  embodiment  of  liberty.  Further,  just  as  the  Prussian 
religion  of  valour  ir,  as  it  were,  the  moral  guarantee  of 
physical  might  and  tyranny  ;  so  with  us  the  religion 
which  establishes  the  independence  and  ultimate  supre- 
macy of  tlie  individual  spirit  is  the  first  guarantee  of  the 
principle  of  Liberty. 

Whoever  looks  at  the  matter  thus  in  the  light  of 
history,  will  realise  the  depths  of  the  antagonism  on 
which  the  present  war  is  based.  The  roots  of  that 
antagonism  are  buried  in  the  past,  and  embrace  the  life, 
})olitical,  intellectual,  spiritual,  of  nations.  Five  hundred 
years  ago  the  seeds  of  this  war  were  being  sown,  and  yet 
there  exists  a  type  of  politician  among  us  who  glibly  and 
confidently  talk  about  "  making  peace,"  as  though  that 
were  a  simple  matter  easily  within  our  power.  If  they 
would  consider  the  difference  of  which  the  war  is  but  the 
external  expression  they  would  perhaps  alter  that  opinion. 
How  can  we  make  peace  ?  We  might  conceivably  by 
hook  or  crook  stop  the  actual  fighting.  But  would  that 
mean  making  peace  ;  would  that  mean  really  stopping 
the  war  ?     Not  a  bit  of  it. 

The  war,  whatever  we  may  do,  and  whether  we  wish 
it  or  not,  will  go  on.  It  will  go  on,  openly  or  under 
disguises,  until  the  tremendous  question  whether  the 
future  of  Europe  is  to  be  developed  on  a  basis  of  tyranny 
or  on  a  basis  of  liberty,  is  finally  answered. 


The  Italian  Ambassador  will  open  on  Saturday  an 
exhibition  at  the  Suffolk  Street  Galleries  of  the  Koyal  Society 
nf  British  .Artists  of  the  work  of  the  Italian  Society  of 
Etchers  and  Lngravcrs  in  aid  of  the  Italian  Red  Cross. 

Lady  Perley,  wife  of  the  High  Commissioner  for  Canada 
gave  a  reception  for  the  Victoria  League  at  Prince's  Kestau 
rant   last    Friday.     It    was   largely   attended,    especially    by 
Canadian  officers,  and  everything  was  very  well  done. 

Messrs.  Eyre  and  Spottiswoode  have  just  published  the 
Soldiers'  Enolish-Vrencli  Friend,  a  useful  little  manual  o' 
French  words,  phrases,  and  sentences,  with  the  corresponding 
linglish,  which  will  enable  anv  man  to  make  himself  under- 
stood among  Lrench  and  Belgian  troops.  The  book  is  soiil  at 
2d.,  and  all  urofits  an  sales  go  to  the  Red  Cross  Funds. 


March  16,  19 16. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


INADEQUACY    OF    OUR    BANKS. 


By  Arthur   Kitson. 


"^OR  many  years  past  British  manufacturers  and 
merchants  have  complained  of  the  difficulty  of 
obtaining  adeqviate  banking  facilities  and  of  the 
unreasonable  objections  made  by  their  bankers 
to  affording  then  the  accommodation  their  businesses 
required.  These  complaints  have  become  much  more 
frequent  and  general  since  the  London  Joint  Stock  Banks 
invaded  the  Provinces  in  such  force,  and  began  their 
policy  of  absorbing  the  private  country  banks — a  policy 
wliich  has  proceeded  at  an  accelerating  speed  of  late, 
until  to-day  very  few  of  the  old  private  banks  remain. 
WitJiout  doubt,  this  policy  has  been  productive  of  great 
injury  to  the  nation  and  great  hardship  to  hundreds  of 
small  producers  throughout  Great  Britain. 

These  country  banks  were  the  mainstay  of  thousands 
of  industries,  and  they  were  conducted  on  a  far  more 
liberal  and  patriotic  scale  than  the  London  Joint  Stock 
Banks.  The  Country  Banker  knew  all  his  clients  person- 
ally, and  was  usually  familiar  with  their  family  history. 
He  knew  whom  to  trust.  He  could  easily  distinguish  be- 
tween the  thrifty,  industrious,  enterprising  man  and  the  ex- 
travagant, lazy  and  unprogressive  individual.  The  banker 
was  usually  a  leader  in  social  affairs  in  his  own  to-.vn  or 
district,  and  took  a  personal  pride  and  interest  in  assisting 
in  the  development  of  its  industries.  Whilst  he  was,  per- 
haps, as  keen  to  make  large  profits  as  the  London  Bankers, 
his  desire  was  tempered  by  a  sort  of  civic  pride.  It  was 
very  gratifying  to  him  to  feel  he  was  helping  his  neigh- 
bours and  fellow  townsmen,  which  ensured  him  their 
esteem  and  gratitude.  The  demands  of  borrowers  in 
London  or  abroad  were  not  likely  to  induce  him  to  forget 
those  of  his  own  townspeople.  In  short,  he  usually  had  a 
large  amount  of  local  as  well  as  national  patriotism. 

Sympathy  and  Mutual  Help. 

Those  who  have  read  Prince  Krapotkin's  great  woi-k. 
Mutual  Aid.  will  remember  what  an  immense  factor 
symjiathy,  leading  to  mutual  help,  has  been  in  the 
development  of  animal  life.  Sympathy  has  been  a 
similarly  valuable  factor  in  the  development  of  industrial 
and  commercial  affairs.  This  factor  was  present,  in- 
lluencing  the  conduct  of  the  private  banker.  With  the 
advent  of  the  soulless  Joint  Stock  Company  principle, 
this  factor  was  utterly  destroyed. 

The  private  banker  frequently  became  a  shareholder 
in  his  town's  local  enterprises.  All  this  greatly  contri- 
])uted  to  the  upbuilding  and  development  of  Britain's 
industries.  I  have  been  told  by  many  of  the  farmers  and 
country  ti-adesmen,  how  comparatively  easy  it  was  for 
them  to  get  financial  help  from  their  private  bankers 
thirty  or  forty  years  ago.  With  the  advent  of  the  London 
Joint  Stock  Companies'  country  branches,  all  this  is  now 
changed.  In  place  of  the  local  banker  with  his  wealth,' 
power,  local  pride,  knowledge  and  sympathy,  we  have  a 
manager  who  is  usually  a  stranger,  and  who  knows  little 
or  nothing  of  the  townspeople  themselves,  who  is  usually 
without  any  social  or  political  standing,  and  is  powerless 
to  grant  any  considerable  banking  facilities  without  the 
consent  of  his  London  Board  of  Directors.  His  instruc- 
tions are  to  secure  all  the  deposit  accounts  possible  and 
send  as  much  currency  as  he  can  to  London.  If  it  were 
possible  for  a  country  manager  to  acquire  country  deposits 
without  having  to  grant  loans,  the  London  Banks  would 
regard  this  as  an  ideal  condition. 

Just  as  in  the  United  States  the  great  bankers  of  New 
York  and  Chicago  have  always  endeavoured  to  denude 
the  States  of  cash  in  order  to  amass  and  control  it  in  their 
own-  cities,  so  the  London  banks  have  tried  to  keep  the 
stream  of  currency  always  flowing  in  their  direction.  When 
it  is  considered  that  this  policy  of  denuding  the  country 
districts  of  money  is  often  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the 
London  banks  to  grant  loans  to  foreigners  who  are  inter- 
ested in  building  up  industries  abroad  which  successfully 
compete  with  our  own,  the  irony  of  the  situation  becomes 
ajiparent  !  From  the  National  and  Patriotic  standpoint 
what  can  be  more  i.mizing  than  the  knowledge  that  the 
savings  of  tJie  British  public  are  being  employed  dirjctly 
to  cripijle  them  in  their  own  trade  and  industries  ?  In  a 


former  article  I  quoted  from  a  well-known  financial 
writer  a  statement  showing  the  valuable  assistance  the 
London  banks  have  given  to  the  Germans  in  building 
up  their  vast  businesses.  This  policy  has  been  for  this 
country  ruinous  in  the  extreme.  Although  it  has  ])ro- 
bably  helped  to  increase  the  banks'  dividends,  it  has 
blasted  scores  of  British  industries. 

Risk  of  a  Monopoly. 

The  continual  absorption  of  the  smaller  banking 
companies  by  the  laige  ones,  indicates  that  within  a 
comparatively  .short  space  of  time  the  entire  banfcing 
business  of  Great  Britain  will  be  under  the  complete 
control  of  one  board  of  directors.  I'his  is  a  national 
danger  which  should  be  prevented  at  all  hazards.  It 
would  constitute  a  monopoly  as  far  reaching  and  as 
inimical  to  the  public  interests,  as  that  which  was  exposed 
in  the  United  States  by  a  Congressional  Committee  a  few 
years  ago. 

The  monopoly  of  money  is  the  greatest  0/  all  monopolies, 
for  it  controls  all  others  !  It  gives  its  controllers  supreme 
power  over  production,  trade  and  commerce — nay,  over  lite 
itself  J  Under  modern  conditions  money  has  been  made 
indispensable  to  everyone.  Such  a  monopoly  ought  to 
be  permitted  to  no  one  company  or  aggregation  of  com- 
panies. In  the  United  States,  its  effects  have  been  shown 
in  the  corruption  of  political  life,  and  in  the  omnipotence 
it  gives  to  men  like  the  late  Pierpont  Morgan,  who  was 
able  to  possess  himself  of  almost  any  branch  of  industry 
he  desired.  The  career  of  almost  every  one  in  America 
was  at  his  mercy.  He  could  make  and  unmake  whom 
he  chose,  and  woe  to  the  man  who  opposed  him  I  His 
power  far  exceeded  that  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  himself. 

If  such  a  monopoly  must  exist,  let  it  be  owned  by  the 
nation.  Here  is  a  legitimate  field  for  democratic  control. 
For,  even  in  the  hands  of  the  State,  a  bxnking  monopoly 
may  bs  a  source  of  infinite  harm  to  the  public,  unless  it  is 
properly  and  impartially  conducted  for  the  interests  of  all 
classes  alike.  Honestly  and  efficiently  conducted,  it  would 
prove  one  of  the  greatest  institutions  for  the  development  of 
trade,  for  effecting  a  more  equitable  condition  between  capital 
and  labour,  for  improving  social  conditions  and  providing 
an  inexhaustible  revenue  for  the  State. 

The  policy  hitherto  pursued  by  our  Joint  Stock  banks 
has  been  to  give  facilities  to  the  strong  and  deny  it  to  the 
weak.  Evidently  they  believe  in  the  saying  :  "  Unto 
him  that  hath  shall  be  given,  but  unto  him  that  hath 
not  shall  be  taken  away  even  that  which  he  hath.".  The 
object  of  this  policy  is,  to  lend  to  those  only  who  are  able 
to  repay  immediately  on  demand.  Hence  the  speculator, 
the  Stock  Exchange  gambler,  can  get  accommodation 
where  the  producer  would  be  denied. 

The  Policy  Hitherto. 

I  have  known  a  manufacturer,  who,  having  sunk  his 
capital  in  plant,  machinery,  and  tools  for  producing 
necessary  and  useful  articles,  was  unable  to  proceed  for 
lack  of  banking  accommodation  which  was  refused  him  on 
the  ground  that  machinery  and  tools  are  not  considered 
banking  security.  Had  this  man  bought  shares  and  tried 
his  luck  as  a  gambler,  he  might  have  secured  banking 
facilities  to  his  heart's  content.  A  system  which  dis- 
criminates against  the  production  of  wealth  in  favour  of 
gambling  pure  and  simple,  is  neither  morally  nor  econo- 
mically beneficial  to  any  country. 

Let  it  be  admitted  at  once  that  this  feature  is  not 
altogether  the  fault  of  the  bankers  themselves.  It  is 
the  natural  and  combined  results  of  the  Legal  Tender 
Acts  and  the  Deposit  System  under  which  the  banks 
are  compelled  to  agree  to  pay  depositors  their  claims  on 
demand  in  legal  tender.  Consequently  it  would  be 
courting  bankruptcy  for  the  bankers  to  lock  up  all  the 
money  belonging  to  their  depositors  in  investments  they 
are  unable  to  quickly  realise.  Hence,  preference  is  given 
to  short-time  loans  on  gilt-edged  security.  And  this 
class   of   loan    which —although    suitable    to    speculators 


LAND      AND      WATER 


I\rm 


Cll     i(»,     K^il)- 


and  doulcTs — is  unsuitable  to  the  producing  classes. 
The  farmer  who  needs  money  to  buy  liis  seeds  and 
fertilisers  and  agricultural  machinery,  cannot  undertake 
to  repay  the  loan  imlil  he  has  sold  his  crops.  A  period  of 
months  and  even  years  must  sometimes  intervene.  What 
use  is  it  to  offer  him  a  sum  of  money  if  there  is  the  re- 
motest prospect  of  the  loan  bein;^  called  in  a  few  weeks 
or  months  later  ?  This  would  simply  mean  ruin  to  him. 
Tile  banker  would  liave  to  sell  the  farm  iu  order  to  realise 
the  amoimt  of  the  loan. 

A  Well-known  Financial  Game. 

1  his  practice  is,  however,  a  well-know  n  financial 
game  which  is  frequently  played  by  unscrupulous  money- 
lenders and  even  by  many  who  pose  as  capitalists.  How 
many  inventors,  manufacturers  and  merchants  have 
been  swindled  out  of  their  life's  earnings  by  financial 
vampires  who  have  advanced  money  on  debentures, 
mortgages  or  promissory  notes,  and  then  swooped  down 
on  their  luckless  victims  at  a  time  when  they  knew  that 
these  were  rmable  to  repay  the  money  !  Legal  Tender 
Acts  may  possibly  have  been  intended  by  their  framers  to 
facilitate  trade  and  to  ensure  equitable  dealings  between 
man  and  man.  But  they  have  often  been  used  as  instru- 
ments of  the  grossest  frauds  and  the  cruellest  oppression, 
enabling  the  financially  strong  to  rob  and  terrorise  over 
the  financially  weak. 

The  history  of  finance  is  strewn  with  the  wreckage  of 
myriads  who  have  been  broken  by  these  merciless  laws, 
which  prescribe  the  particular  instruments  with  which 
debts  must  be  settled,  without  having  made  an  adequate 
provision  for  a  sufficient  supply  of  these  instruments. 
The  Governments  responsible  for  these  Legal  Tender 
Acts,  do  not  appear  to  have  given  nmch  consideration  to 
this  phase  of  the  subject.  Our  currency  legislators  seem 
to  have  been  haimted  with  the  fear  of  making  money 
cheap.  So  they  made  the  conditions  for  its  creation  as 
difiicult  as  possible,  and  chose  as  the  money-metal  one 
of  the  rarest  and  most  expensive,  leaving  the  public  to 
the  tender  mercies  of  the  few  privileged  persons  who 
]iai)pened  to  control  its  supply. 

For  the  development  of  a  nation's  industries,  deposit 
banking  is  insufficient.  Long-time  loans,  so  essential  to 
those  engaged  in  starting  and  building  up  their  enterprises, 
are  unsuited  to  those  entrusted  with  money  returnable 
on  call.  Further,  the  rigidity  of  the  system  under  which 
legal  tender  could  be  created  prior  to  the  war,  made 
long-time  loans  a  somewhat  dangerous  enterprise  for  the 
banker.  Any  increase  in  the  volume  of  legal  tender 
notes  beyond  the  normal  amount,  had  to  be  accom- 
panied bv  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  gold  reserves — 
often  a  difficult  and  always  an  expensive  proceeding. 

Germany's  More  Elastic  System, 

It  is  in  this  jxxrticular  respect  that  the  German 
svstem  has  proved  itself  far  more  elastic  and  suitable  for 
industrial  growth  than  the  F^nglish  .system.  Notes  is'.ued 
])y  the  German  Reichsbank  required  only  one-third  of 
their  nominal  value  in  gold  and  two  thirds  in  bills,  the 
result  being  that,  as  the  necessities  of  trade  expanded, 
the  means  for  suj)plying  those  necessities  grew  with  them, 
since  the  security  for  the  notes  was  furnished  by  the  in- 
dustries in  the  form  of  bills  of  exchange.  The  increase  of 
the  volume  of  uncovered  notes  is  also  permitted  on 
payment  to  the  Imperial  Government  of  5  per  cent,  on  all 
such  excess  amounts.  The  result  is,  the  Cierman  bankers 
have  always  had  at  their  command  sufficient  credit  to 
back  German  trade  and  commerce  to  the  fullest  extent 
without  running  into  very  great  danger.  An  industry 
that  could  earn  more  than  5  per  cent,  on  any  additional 
capital  rcepiired  could,  other  things  being  satisfactory, 
readilv  secure  fmancial  support. 

With  a  million  marks  of  gold  reserves,  the  German 
Reichsbank  could  issue  three  million  of  legal  tender  notes, 


In  answer  to  numerous  in qinrie^,  tlie  I'lnancuil  writings  o(  .Mr. 
Arthur  Kitson  include  "  The  .Money  Problem,"  (j3.  6d.).  0:1  sale 
at  C.  W.  Daniel,  Ltd.,  Graham  Buildings,  Tudor  .Street,  London. 

"  An  Open  Letter  to  the  lit.  Hon.  D.  Lloyd  George,  Chancellor 
of  the  E.NChcquer  (tgii)"  on  the  "Causes  of  Strikes  and  Bank  Failures." 
Ucnt  and  Sons,  London.     (6d.) 


antl  on  this  the  bank  (ould  issue  twelve  million  marks 
of  Bank  Credit,  whereas  under  our  system  only  one  million 
of  legal  tender  notes  could  be  issued  against  one  million  of 
gold  reserves.  And  with  an  issue  of  four  million  of  bank 
credit  the  position  of  our  banks  would  be  no  safer  than  the 
German  bank  with  its  issue  of  twelve  millions  !  F'or  the 
real  basis  of  credit,  in  times  of  crises  particularly,  is  legal 
tender  based  on  the  national  credit,  and  the  public  is 
satisfied  with  paper  money  pro\'ided  they  know  it  is 
legal  tender  for  all  debts  public  and  private. 

Consider  the  present  position  of  the  small  producer 
who  is  anxious  to  develo])  liis  business.  He  has  no  gilt- 
edged  security  to  offer  his  banker,  and  therefore  cannot  get 
the  accfijnmodation  he  requires.  His  only  alternative  is 
the  private  moneylender  or  promoter,  to  whom  as  security 
he  must  deliver  up  practically  his  soul.  Tlie  money- 
lender points  out  the  great  risk  he  is  running  and  makes 
his  interest  charges  correspondingly  high.  After  a 
few  months  or  perhaps  years,  of  struggle,  during  which 
the  producer  has  been  handicapped  by  the  burdensome 
interest  charges,  the  lender  falls  on  him  and  cleans  him 
out  of  all  he  possesses.  If  it  be  the  promoter  who  helps 
him,  it  generally  ends  the  same  way — i.e.,  in  the  pro- 
moter possessing  himself  of  the  business. 

Now  it  is  this  class  of  producer,  one  of  the  moi.t 
useful  in  the  country,  for  whom  no  financial  provision 
has  yet  been  made.  Our  laws  have  placed  him  between 
the  devil  and  the  deep  sea  !  The  German  Government, 
quicla'r  and  more  intelligent  in  industrial  and  commercial 
matters  than  the  British  Government  (and  although 
autocratic,  far  more  in  touch  witii  the  wants  of  the  pro- 
ducing classes  than  ours)  has  made  j)rovision  for  theirs, 
and  (lermany  has  been  reaping  a  rich  harvest  almost 
entirely  through  such  financial  prevision. 

As  I  said  in  a  previous  article,  the  main  cause  of  the 
inadequacy  of  our  banking  system  for  commercial  and 
industrial  needs,  is  our  stupid  Bank  Charter  Act,  which 
should  be  repealed.  It  has  placed  our  banking  system  in 
a  straight-jacket,  and  it  can  only  expand  in  one  direction  — 
namely,  by  increasing  the  volume  of  bank  credit,  without 
necessarily  increasing  the  base  upon  which  it  rests. 

[In  his  next  article  Mr.  Arthur  Kitson  proposes  to 
point  out  how  this  inadcjuacy  of  the  British  Banking 
System  may  in  his   opinion  bs  best  remedied.^ 


The  war  has  produced  a  fine  crop  of  amateur  journalisin, 
both  in  the  trenches  and  at  home.  For  a  witty  spirit  and 
irresponsiljle  merriment  Wilh  the  Wounded  is  hard  to  beat. 
It  is  the  "official  organ  of  Brondesbury  Park  Military  Hos- 
pital" but  surely  never  before  has  any  "  official  organ  " 
produced  livelier  tunes.  The  Editorial  in  No.  5  is  delightful, 
but  not  quite  so  good  as  the  one  in  No.  4 — an  interview 
witii  a  bright  girl  of  18,  who  wanted  to  be  a  nurse— which 
was  in  its  way  a  ni:isterpi('ce. 

The  Red  trobs  Bur'^c,  by  Mrs.  Belloc  Lowndes  (Smith, 
Elder  and  Co.,  3s.  bd.  net)  is  a  simple  little  story  of  a  h'rench 
Red  Cross  nurse  who  had  the  ill-lortime  to  fall  into  German 
hands  at  the  time  of  the  enemy  advance  through  hrance,  and 
also  the  story  of  a  puzzled  South  German  doctor  who  tried 
hard  to  make  German  war  practices  scpiarc  with  the  ethics  of 
civilisation.  Incidentally,  the  German  doctor  fell  in  love  with 
the  French  nurse,  and — but  the  rest  of  the  story  should  be 
I'ead.  The  atmosphere  of  war  is  well  conveyed,  and  from  such 
a  book  one  may  gain  an  idea  of  the  sufferings  imposed  on 
simpla  country  folk  by  invasion.  The  plot  of  this  book  is 
extremely  simple,  but  the  manner  of  the  telling  is  fine  art. 

The  difference  in  the  upbringing  of  two  sisters,  and  the 
influence  of  their  separate  trainings,  forms  the  theme  of  Love's 
Ili^lrciay  (Cass;ll  and  Co.,  6s.),  the  last  book  from  the  pen  of 
Mr.  Justus  Miles  Forman,  who  was  one  of  the  victims  of  the 
Liisilania  outrage.  That  freedom  of  thought  and  action,  a^ 
allowed  to  the  modern  girl  launched  into  society,  may  develop 
l^readth  of  vision,  and  clarity  of  mind  is  made  abundantly 
clear  in  the  person  of  Diana,  as  honest  and  healthy-minded 
a  girl  as  could  be  found,  despite  her  cult  of  the  tango  and 
turkey-trot.  Her  twin  sister,  on  the  otlicr  hand,  suffered 
from  early  Victorian  methods  of  upbringing,  antl  the  meeting 
of  the  two  sisters  when  fully  K'own,  together  with  the  per- 
plexity and  complications  arising  from  a  variety  of  lovers, " 
makes  material  for  as  good  a  story  as  any  that  Mr.  Forman 
has  written.  Vivid  characterisation  and  plenty  of  incident 
render  this  a  book  to  be  unreservedly  recommended. 


March  i6,   1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


GHAYA. 

A  Romance  of  the  South   Seas. 
By  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoole. 


Synopsis  :  Macguari,  an  adventurer  who  has  spent 
most  of  his  life  at  sea,  finds  himself  in  Sydney  on  his  beam  ends. 
He  has  a  wonderful  story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in  New 
Guinea  and  a  chance  acquaintance,  Tillman,  a  sporting  man, 
about  town,  fond  of  yach'.ing  and  racing,  offers  to  introduce' him 
to  a  wealthy  woolbroker ,  Ctirlewis,  with  a  view  to  financing  the 
scheme.  Macquart  also  makes  the  acquaintance  of  Houghton, 
a  well-educated  Englishman  out  of  a  job,  who  has  done  a  good 
deal  of  yachting  in  his  time.  Curlewis  turns  down  the  scheme, 
ihough  Macquart  tells  his  story  in  a  most  convincing  manner. 
His  silent  partner  Screed  believes  in  it,  and  unbeknown  to 
Curlewis,  follows  the  three  men,  asks  them  to  his  house,  and 
agrees  to  find  the  ship  and  the  money,  on  seeing  that  Macquart's 
hidden  treasure  map  agrees  with  an  Admiralty  chart.  The 
ship  is  the  yawl  "  Barracuda."  Screed,  on  the  morrow,  takes 
Jhe  three  men  over  the  "  Barracuda."  with  which  they  are  de- 
lighted. Coming  away  Macquart  is  overtaken  by  an  old  friend, 
one  Captain  Hull,  who  hails  him  as  B — y  Joe,  and  accuses 
him  of  many  mean  crimes.  Macquart  gives  Captain  Hull 
the  slip,  but  unbeknown  to  him  Hull  gets  in  touch  with  Screed, 
and  enlightens  him  on  the  real  character  of  Macquart.  Just  as 
ihe  "  Barracuda  "  is  about  to  sail  Screed  takes  Hull  on  board 
and  unexpectedly  introduces  him  to  Macquart  as  a  member  of 
the  crew.  The  voyage  passed  with  few  adventures.  Guided  by 
Macquart  the  "  Barracuda  "  arrived  at  New  Guinea,  passes 
the  coral  reefs  successfully  and  anchors  in  the  promised  river 
which  was  in  exact  accordance  with  Macquart's  chart. 

CHAPTER  XIII  {continued). 

Although  it  was  so  early  in  the  morning,  the  heat  of  the 
sun  was  beginning  to  have  its  effect  ;  the  bend  of  the  river  had 
partially  cut  off  the  breeze  from  them,  and  the  river  itself, 
scarcely  stirred  by  the  movement  of  the  air,  lay  mirror  bright 
and  blinding  between  the  emerald  of  the  canes  and  the  gloom 
of  the  forest. 

Four  miles  or  so  up  from  the  lagoon  they  called  a  halt, 
and  tied  the  boat  to  a  tree  root  on  the  forest  bank. 

"  There's  no  use  kilUng  ourselves,"  said  HuU.  "  This 
ain't  no  boat-race,  and  I'm  crool  stiff  from  sittin'  for  a  month 
idle  in  that  blessed  old  bath-tub  of  a  Barracuda.  Well,  Mac, 
how  are  the  indications  goin'  ?  " 

"  The  village  should  be  above  the  next  bend,"  said 
Macquart.  "  It's  on  the  left  bank — that's  this  one,  and  it's 
fi.\ed  in  a  clearing  among  the  trees,  so  that  vou  can't  mistake 
it." 

"  You  seem  to  have  it  all  laid  down  in  your  head,"  said 
Hull.  "  One  might  swear  you'd  been  here  before  and  taken 
the  indications,  and  yet  you  only  had  them  laid  down  for  you 
by  another  chap  ;  blest  if  I'd  be  able  to  hold  aU  that  in  my 
intellects  ;   but   folk   varies. 

They  rested  an  hour,  and  then  took  to  the  oars  again  ; 
keeping  close  to  the  bank,  they  cleared  the  next  vague  bend 
of  the  broad  flowing  river,  and  a  mile  beyond,  Macquart, 
standing  up  in  the  boat  and  shading  his  eyes,  gave  an  ex- 
clamation of  surprise. 

"That's  the  spot,"  said  he,  "by  all  indications;  but 
there's  a  landing-stage — that's  something  new." 

It  was  the  sound  of  the  oars,  perhaps,  that  brought  to 
their  view  the  first  human  figure  sighted  by  them  since  leaving 
Sydney. 

•  A  man  had  come  out  on  the  landing-stage  and  was 
standing  as  if  watching  them,  a  white  man  dressed  in  dingy 
white  drill  and  wearing  a  battered  old  five-dollar  panama  hat. 

Houghton,  as  they  drew  close,  thought  he  had  never  seen 
a  more  villainous-looking  individual. 

CHAPTER   XIV. 

WlART. 

HE  was  unhealthily  stout  and  of  medium  height  ;  he 
wore  black  side-whiskers  of  the  mutton  chop 
variety,  and  his  fat  white  face  had  such  a 
stamp  of  meanness  and  debauchery  that  even 
Hull,  who  was  not  an  impressionable  individual,  felt,  to  use 
ills  own  words,  "  put  off." 

"  Hullo,"    said  the  stranger,  as  they  came  rubbing  up  to 
the  rotten  piles  of  the  stage.     "  Where  have  you  come  from  ?  " 
"  Down  the  river,"   said  Hull,  fastening  the  painter  to  a 
stake  ;    "  and  who  might  you  be  ?  " 

"  Oil,  good  Lord  !  "  said  the  other.  "  Ask  me  something 
else  ;    I've  near  forgotten  my  own  name.     Who  might  I  be  ? 


Why,  I'm  the  trader  here.    Rubber  getting,  that's  my  business 
Wiart's  my  name. — Got  any  lush  in  that  boat  of  yours  ? 

A  faint  odour  of  gin  and  the  manner  and  speech  of  the 
trader  told  their  tale. 

"  Not  a  drop,"  said  Hull,  scraml)ling  on  to  the  stage 
whilst  the  others  followed  liim.  "  We're  a  teetotal  picnic. 
That  your  house  ?  " 

On  the  bank  to  the  right  hand  of  the  stage  stood  a  frame- 
wood  house  Umewashed  as  to  the  walls,  beyond  the  house,  and 
in  a  great  clearing  amongst  the  trees,  lay  a  native  village 
deserted  except  for  a  few  goats  and  a  stray  dog  or  two. 

"  Yes,  that's  my  house,"  said  Wiart.  "  Come  up  and 
have  a  drink  ;  that's  the  village,  people  are  mostly  at  work- 
come  'long." 

He  led  them  to  the  front  of  the  house,  which  was  situated 
away  from  the  river,  and  then  into  the  main  room,  a  place 
barely  furnished  with  native  mats  and  cane  chairs,  and 
wearing  such  a  look  of  neglect  and  sordidness  and  so  littered 
and  dirty  that  the  soul  of  Houghton  turned  against  it. 

An  old  beer  crate,  long  emptied  of  its  contents  and 
filled  with  rubbish,  stood  in  one  corner.  On  the  table  stood 
a  bottle  of  squareface,  a  tumbler  of  thick  glass  and  a  water- 
pitcher  ;  a  rifle  hung  on  the  wall  opposite  the  door  and  in 
another  corner  lay  a  pile  of  old  newspapers  many  months  old. 
There  were  chairs  for  all,  and  they  sat  down  refusing  the 
ofl'er  of  drink  whilst  Wiart,  taking  his  seat  at  the  table, 
poured  himself  out  a  stimulant. 

Then  he  rolled  cigarettes  and  smoked  them  whilst  they 
talked. 

Macquart  did  the  questioning  for  Wiart,  after  the  first 
few  remarks,  seemed  to  have  lost  all  interest  in  the  origin  of 
the  new  comers,  accepting  them  as  though  they  were  old 
acquaintances. 

"  There  used  to  be  a  Dyak  village  just  here,"  said 
Macquart. 

"  There  is  still,"  said  Wiart,  "  but  the  Dyaks  have  nearly 
died  out.  Mostly  Papuans  now  ;  they  do  the  rubber  getting. 
There's  not  more  than  twenty  Dyaks  left  ;  rum  lot  they  are, 
won't  work  ;  there's  an  old  woman,  she's  the  chief  of  them, 
and  her  daughter,  she's  a  peach,  and  ten  or  twelve  chaps 
and  their  wives  and  children.  Their  village  hes  in  the  trees 
there  to  the  left  of  the  Papuan  village — they  fish  mostly 
and  hunt,  and  they're  a  holy  terror  to  the  other  natives— 
Gosh,  yes — they  use  blow  pipes  and  go  about  with  stabbing 
spears.  And  they  take  heads.  You  wouldn't  beUeve  it,  but 
it's  true.  The  young  chaps  before  they  get  married  go  off 
and  make  a  quarrel  with  some  Papuan  village  somewhere 
near,  and  lay  for  one  of  the  niggers,  and  kill  him,  and  take 
his  head.  A  Dyak  girl  won't  look  at  a  man  unless  he  brings 
her  a  head. 

"  How  long  has  this  trading  station  been  here  ?  "  asked 
Macquart. 

"  O,  seven  years  or  so,"   replied  Wiart,  wiping  his  mouth 
with  the  back  of  his  hand.     "  There  was  a  chap  called  John- 
stone here  before  me  ;    he  was  here  four  years  and  died  of 
something  or  another.     He  was  frightfully  thick  with  the 
Dyaks  ;  they  used  to  talk  to  him  in  English  ;  the  old  woman's 
daughter  isn't  a  full  Dyak  either,  mixed  blood  ;   she  can  talk 
a  lot  of  EngHsh  ;    I've  talked  to  her,  told  her  not  to  tie  her 
boat   to  my  steps   and  she  sauced  me  back  ;    that  was  after 
she  refused  to  have  any  truck  with  me.     D— d  montybank 
of  a  nigger  girl  talking  back  at  me  like  that." 
"  What's  her  name  ?  "   put  in  Houghton. 
"  Chaya,  same  as  the  old  woman  ;    she's  the  daughter, 
and  the  Lord  knows  who  was  her  father ;    but  she's  a  peach, 
all  the  same,  there's  no  denying  that." 
Houghton  glanced  at  Tillman. 

"  Do  you  make  much  money  at  this  here  business  ?  " 
asked  Hull. 

"  A  mug's  game,"  repUed  Wiart.  "  There's  no  money 
in  it  e.'ccept  maybe  for  the  Company,  and  they  have  dozens 
of  posts  hke  this  ;  even  then  we're  done  out  by  the  chaps  that 
can  use  niggers  as  they  ought  to  be  used  in  the  other  rubber 
districts  ;  this  is  a  Dutch  company,  a  lot  of  —  fools  !  " 
His  head  began  to  droop,  and  his  lower  lip  to  turn  down, 
his  cigarette  had  gone  out.  Gin  had  him  like  a  nurse  and 
was  lulling  him  to  sleep  ;  he  started  awake  again  and  begged 
pardon  ;  ht  his  cigarette,  talked  a  bit  more  and  then  relapsed 
again,  and  during  that  relapse  the  others  filed  out  softly  into 
the  clean  air  of  the  natural  world. 

"  He's  been  drinking  hard,  that  chap,"  said  Hull,  "  and 
he'll  have  the  jim-jams  if  he's  not  careful.     I  don't  ever  want 


19 


LAND      AND      W  A  T  E  K 


March  lb,   1916. 


Chaya,  a  Romance  el  Hie  South  Seat  , 


[Htittlraled  by  Joyefh   SJm;»on,   H.B.i. 


"Chaya,  a  dream,  njysterious  as  the  forest  that  had  suddenly  given  her  birth. 


March  i6,  1916. 


LAND       AND      WATER 


to  smell  gin  again — Now  then,  Mac,  let's  get  to  business,  the 
boat  and  the  stuff  in  her  will  look  after  themselves.  Is  this 
the  place,  by  your  indications  ? 

"  It  is,"   said  Macquart. 

"  Then,"  said  Hull,  "  lead  us  to  the  spot  where  the 
cache  is." 

"  One  moment,"  said  Macquart.  "  You  surely  don't 
want  to  go  there  in  the  broad  hght  of  day  with  someone  maybe 
spotting  us." 

"  Wiart's  asleep,"  rephed  Hull,  "  and  there's  no  one  to 
look  ;    what  better  do  you  want  ? 

"  I  tell  you,"  replied  the  other,  "  that  wood  may  be  full 
of  eyes  ;  it's  plain  madness  to  go  straight  after  landing  to  a 
spot  that  anyone  can  follow  us  to." 

"  Maybe  he's  right,"  said  Tillman.  "  The. cache  won't 
run  away,  it's  been  there  long  enough." 

"  Then  what  do  you  propose  to  do  ?  "  grumbled  Hull. 

"  Get  the  tent  and  stores  ashore,"  said  Macquart,  "  and 
put  up  the  tent  somewhere  among  the  trees  ;  Jacky  and  one  of 
us  can  sleep  in  Wiart's  house,  and  three  of  us  in  the  tent." 

"  Not  me,"  said  Tillman.  "  I'm  not  going  to  sleep  in 
that  gin  palace." 

"  I'd  sooner  sleep  in  the  boat,"    said  Houghton. 

"  I'm  —  if  I  wouldn't  sooner  sleep  in  the  river  than 
under  the  same  roof  with  that  graven  image  of  d'Urium 
trimmins,"    said  Hull ;    "  not  me."  • 

"  Well,  I'll  sleep  there,  I'm  not  particular,"  said 
Macquart.  "  It's  a  roof,  and  anything  is  better  than  a 
tent." 

Thev  turned  back  to  the  boat. 

Tillman,  who  was  leading  tlie  way,  reached  the  landing- 
stage  first.  He  turned  and  called  to  the  others  to  hurry  up. 
Then  without  a  word,  he  pointed  to  something. 

Moored  to  the  stage  by  the  boat  lay  a  fishing  canoe.  A 
sUm  brown  canoe  with  an  outrigger.  A  paddle  and  a  fish 
spear  lay  in  it,  also  a  spar  with  a  brown  sail. 

Sign  of  the  owner  there  was  none,  and  there  was  some- 
thing fierce  and  savage  in  the  form  and  appearance  of  this 
thing  that  struck  the  four  adventurers  Hke  the  zip  of  an  arrow 
in  a  wood. 

"  You  see,"  said  Macquart,  "  it's  just  as  well  we  were 
careful.  That  canoe  has  been  following  us,  unless  it  has 
come  from  tlie  upper  river,  which  is  unlikely."  He  looked 
into  it  more  attentively,  and  saw  a  fish  lying  on  the  bottom 
board  and  half  hidden  b\'  the  mast  and  sail.  It  was  a  flying 
fish. 

He  pointed  it  out. 

"  I  thought  so.  It  has  come  up  from  the  sea,  and  we 
didn't  even  ghmpse  it,  though  it  must  have  been  not  far 
behind  us." 

"  Well,  it  don't  much  matter."  said  Hull.  "  But  it's 
just  as  well  for  us  to  keep  our  eyes  open.  Come  along  and 
get  the  stuff  up.  Fetch  the  tent  alon";  first  and  let's  prospect 
for  a  place  to  fix  it." 

They  carried  the  tent  to  a  clearing  in  the  trees  to  the 
left  of  the  Papuan  village  and  set  it  up.  Then  the  rest  of 
the  boat's  contents,  including  a  spade  and  small  pick-axe, 
were  stored  by  the  tent  and  covered  with  the  boat's,  sail. 
The  oars  and  the  baling  tin  were  left  in  tlie  boat. 

"  They'll  be  safe  there,"  said  Hull,  "  unless  anyone  runs 
away  with  the  boat,  and  even  if  they  did,  we  can  always  tramp 
back  down  river  to  the  yawl." 

He  ordered  Jacky  to  light  a  fire  and  prepare  a  meal,  and 
whilst  this  was  being  done  they  strolled  round  the  Papuan 
\-illage. 

The  huts  thatched  with  sago  palm  leaves  were  raised  on 
piles  about  six  feet  from  the  ground  ;  not  a  soul  was  visible, 
with  the  exception  of  one  old  woman,  who  was  engaged  in 
watching  som'  goats.  She  seemed  half  idiotic  and  scarcely 
turned  her  head  to  look  at  the  intruders,  and  they  passed 
on,  Hull  leading  the  way. 

As  they  were  turning  to  go  back,  from  the  trees  on  the 
right  suddenly  appeared  a  form.     It  was  the  form  of  a  girl. 

She  paused  in  the  tree  shadows  and  stood  looking  at  them. 
She  was  clad  in  some  hght  white  material,  cast  loosely  and 
gracefully  about  her,  after  the  fashion  of  the  Greek  himalion  ; 
one  brown  arm  was  exposed  to  the  shoulders  and  a  ray  of 
light  piercing  the  leaves  above  struck  the  copper  bangle 
fixed  above  the  elbow. 

Houghton  thought  that  he  had  never  seen  a  more  lovely 
picture. 

She  was  lovely,  a  revelation,  a  dream,  mysterious  as  the 
forest  that  had  suddenly  given  her  birth. 

For  a  moment  she  stood,  and  then  just  as  a  dream,  she 
vanished,  the  leaves  re-took  her,  and  now  for  the  first  time 
they  saw  that  she  had  not  been  alone  ;  the  glimpse  of  a  half- 
naked  figure  shewed  through  the  leaves,  the  figure  of  a  youth 
supple  and  sinuous  and  graceful  as  a  faun,  then  it  vanished 
also  and  nothing  shewed  but  the  trees  and  the  still-moving 
leaves. 


"  That's  the  gal,"  said  Hull,  "that's  the  peach  the 
ginman  was  yarning  about  ;  b'gosh,  he  was  right  ! — she's  an 
a-pricot."  He  spoke  without  enthusiasm,  though  with  con- 
viction. His  temper  had  been  brittle  all  the  morning,  and 
the  feeling  that  the  girl  and  j'oung  man  had  been  spying 
on  them  did  not  improve  it. 

Houghton  said  nothing  ;  the  fact  was  being  borne  in  on 
him  that  he  had  seen  John  Lant's  daughter  ;  Chaya,  the  girl 
half  European,  half  Dyak,  the  child  that  had  been  born  to 
Lant  before  he  had  come  to  his  untimely  end. 

As  they  returned  to  the  tent,  they  did  not  notice  that 
the  old  woman  who  had  been  tending  the  goats  had  risen  and 
was  making  off  among  the  trees. 

CHAPTER  XV. 

Thev  St.4rt  to  Dig. 

WHEN  they  got  back  they  found  that  Jacky  had  laid 
out  some  food  and  was  squatting  on  his  heels  by 
the  fire  he  had  built  close  to  the  tent.      He  was 
boihng  some  water  for  tea.     They  drank  tea    at 
nearly  every  meal  and  they  drank  it  sometimes  between  meals  ; 
it  was  their  main  stand-by,  and  the  sight  of  the  preparations 
for  making  it  restored  Hull's  good  humour. 

The  Captain  fell  to  on  the  food,  as  did  Tillman.  Houghton 
touched  notliing,  waiting  for  the  tea.  He  had  lost  interest 
for  the  moment  in  food,  in  the  expedition,  in  cverytliing  under 
the  sun  except  the  vision  of  the  girl  that  still  jjursued  him. 
It  seemed  to  him  that  he  had  travelled  the  whole  of  his  journey 
through  life  to  arrive  at  ^t his  sight  and  this  end.  Fate  had 
shown  him  an  absolutely  new  thing,  and  in  one  moment  had 
led  him  into  an  absolutely  new  world. 

The  beauty  of  Chaya,  as  disclosed  to  Houghton  in  that 
moment  when  her  ej^es,  gazing  at  the  group,  had  rested  on  him 
in  turn,  was  a  thing  miraculous  as  though  speech  liad  come  to 
the  forest  or  voice  to  the  sky  depths  above  the  trees.  A  whole 
world  in  himself  of  whose  existence  he  had  known  nothing 
awoke  in  troublous  life,  never  to  sleep  again. 

And  he  had  to  sit  now  whilst  the  Captain,  munching 
bully  beef,  expounded  his  ideas  as  to  their  future  proceedings 
to  Macquart  and  Tillman. 

"  I  don't  care  a  dump,"  said  the  Captain,  "  whether  we're 
watched  or  whether  we  ain't  ;  I'm  goin'  for  that  stuff  to-night 
after  sundown.  Ain't  we  armed  ?  Mac,  you've  got  to  bring 
us  to  the  stuff  to-night  ;  I  ain't  goin'  to  be  put  off  wa'tia' — 
what  do  you  say,  Tillman  ?  " 

"  I'm  with  you,"  said  Tillman.  "  We'll  go  and  scratch 
the  cache,  and  once  we're  sure  the  stuff's  there,  we'll  bring  the 
yawl  right  up  ;  four  of  us  can  do  that,  leaving  one  1  eliind 
to  guard  the  boodle." 

"  "Very  well,"  said  Macquart.  "  I'll  lead  you  to  the  spot 
to-night." 

Macquart  had  long  dropped  more  than  the  vaguest  pre- 
tence of  acting  in  this  affair  under  directions  and  plans  given 
him  by  someone  else.  Had  any  of  them  taxed  him  witli  the 
fact  that  he  had  once  belonged  to  Lant's  crew,  and  had 
assisted  in  the  burying  of  the  gold,  I  doubt  if  he  would  have 
bothered  to  refute  the  impeachment.  There  were  no  witnesses, 
fifteen  years  had  passed  and  Lant  was  no  doubt  forgotten, 
even  by  the  natives. 

"  The  TerscheUing  was  sunk  in  the  river  close  to  the 
cache,  you  said  ?  "  spoke  up  Tillman,  who  was  engaged  now 
in  lighting  a  pipe. 

"  Yes,"  said  Macquart,  "  that's  the  story." 

"  They  wouldn't  have  sunk  her  more  than  over  her  decks," 
went  on  Tillman.  "  There  wouldn't  have  been  water  enough 
for  more  than  that — some  of  her  bones  ought  to  be  lying  there 
still." 

"  Maybe  they  are,"  replied  Macquart  ;  "  unless  tlie  wash 
of  the  river  has  swept  them  away." 

"  What  a  devil  that  Lant  must  have  been,"  went  on 
Tillman.  "  You  said  he  waited  till  all  the  crew  but  one  man 
were  in  the  fo'c'sle  and  then  clapped  the  hatches  on  'em  ?  " 

"  That's  the  yarn,"  said  Macquart. 

Tillman  seemed  about  to  pursue  the  subject,  then  he 
seemed  to  think  better  of  it. 

There  was  no  use  in  raking  up  this  old  business.  The 
question  whether  this  one  man,  who  was  not  included  in  the 
general  rnurder  of  the  crew,  had  assisted  in  the  murder  or 
not  was  a  question  for  him  to  settle  with  his  Maker. 

Tillman  was  certain  in  his  own  mind  that  this  man  had 
been  Macquart,  and  he  chose  to  leave  it  at  that. 

Towards  evening,  the  Papuan  rubber  getters  returned 
from  work,  and  almost  at  the  same  time  Dyak  canoes  began 
to  arrive  from  the  sea. 

The  Dyak  fishermen,  as  they  passed  on  to  their  village, 
scarcely  noticed  the  new  encampment,  but  the  Papuans  were 
more  curious.  Women  and  children  came  to  look  at  the  new- 
comers, and  a  few  men,  to  whom  Tillman  presented  tobacco. 


21 


LAND      AND      WATER 


March  i6,  1916. 


"  It's  just  as  well  to  keep  in  with  the  beggars,"  said  he, 
"  and  not  one  of  us  can  speak  their  lingo.  Did  you  ever 
see  such  a  depressed-looking  lot  of  savages — don't  seem  to 
have  any  sense — all  slit  ears  and  wTinkles." 

"  They're  like  that  from  screwin'  up  their  faces  against 
the  sun,"  said  Hull.  "  There,  they're  off ;  look,  Wiart  has 
come  out  ;  ain't  he  a  sleepin'  beauty  ;  he  looks  as  if  he'd  just 
woke  up  after  another  bout  of  dilirium  trimins." 

Wiart  had  come  out  on  his  verandah,  close  to  which  the 
rubber  gatherers  had  placed  their  baskets.  The  Papuans, 
who  at  the  sight  of  him  had  drawn  off  from  the  new  encamp- 
ment, were  now  picking  up  their  baskets  and  following  the 
factor  to  a  godown  among  the  trees, where  the  rubber  would  be 
weighed. 

Hull  and  his  companions  watched  this  proceeding,  and 
they  noticed  how  carefully  Wiart,  at  the  scales,  was  attending 
to  his  work. 

"  Look  at  him,"  cried  Hull.  "  There  you  have  a  trader 
every  time,  nearly  done  in  with  drink  he  is,  yet  he's  alive  to 
his  bizzinesS;  which  is  diddling  the  niggers  out  of  rublier.  Them 
traders  take  the  cake,  they  do  so  ;  you  might  cut  'em  in  pieces 
and  all  they'd  say'd  be  '  bizziness.'     I  ain't  a  particular  man, 

but  I'd  sooner  berth  with  a pirate  than  a  trader  ;  they're 

a  fish-blooded  lot,  sharks  in  britches,  that's  what  they  are." 

When  the  idbber  weighing  was  over  and  the  natives  gone 
back  to  their  village,  Wiart  approached  the  tent. 

He  seemed  very  much  freshened  up,  and  as  he  took  his 
seat  on  the  ground  close  to  Hull  and  proceeded  to  light  a 
cigarette,  he  began  to  talk.  Earlier  in  the  day  he  had  been  so 
dazed  with  drink  that  he  had  accepted  their  statement  of 
having  come  from  down  river  without  question.  Now  he 
threatened  to  show  more  interest  in  their  origin  and  intentions. 

"  It's  good  to  see  white  faces  again,"  said  he,  licking 
the  gum  on  the  cigarette-paper.  "  You're  not  come  up  here 
trading,  are  you  ?  " 

"  No,"  said  Hull  ;  "  we're  prospectors," 

"  Oh,  prospectors — and  what,  might  I  ask,  are  you 
prospecting  for  ?  " 

"  O,  one  thin'  or  nather,"  replied  the  Captain.  "  Metals 
mostly." 

"  Well,  I  don't  know  there's  any  metals  worth  turning 
up  the  ground  for,"  said  Wiart  ;  "  and  if  there  was,  you'd  find 
it  difficult  working  any  mine  ;  you'd  have  to  import  labour, 
for  one  thing — where's  your  ship  ?  " 

"  She's  lyin'  off  and  on,"  replied  Hull,  "  mostly  on. 
We're  a  private-owned  party,  and  we  haven't  come  up  the 
river  to  sell  information,  but  to  look  after  our  own  bizziness, 
same  as  you  are  looking'  after  yours." 

"  O,  I  don't  want  to  put  my  nose  into  your  affairs,"  said 
Wiart.  "  You  can  prospect  as  much  as  you  want,  it's  no 
affair  of  mine.  This  isn't  my  river,  but  I'll  be  glad  to  do  what 
I  can  for  you — where  doyou  propose  to  sleep  ?  " 

It  had  been  suggested  by  Macquart  earlier  in  the  day 
that  he  and  Jacky  should  sleep  in  Wiart's  house,  but  second 
thoughts  had  made  this  impossible. 

They  required  to  be  free  in  their  movements  at  night, 
and  if  Macquart  were  to  sleep  at  Wiart's,  it  would  be  impossible 
for  him  to  come  and  go  without  the  chance  of  rousing  Wiart 
and  making  him  suspicious. 

"  Some  in  the  boat  and  some  in  the  tent,"  said  Hull. 
"  We  have  mosquito  nets  enough  for  both." 

"  Well,  you  can  put  up  at  my  place,  if  you  want  to," 
replied  Wiart. 

They  talked  for  awhile  on  various  things,  and  then  Wiart 
went  off  to  supper. 

The  sun  was  setting  now  across  the  river,  and  just  as  his 
lower  limb  was  cutting  the  tree  tops,  Tillman  went  to  the 
stores  that  lay  under  the  boat  sail  and  fetched  out  the  pick- 
axe and  the  mattock.  Then,  as  the  darkness  took  the  river 
and  the  stars  rushed  out,  led  by  Macquart,  they  set  off. 

Half  a  mile  or  so  above  the  village,  the  bank  projected 
into  the  water,  forming  a  promontory  some  twenty 
yards  from  base  to  apex  ;  the  river  took  a  bend  here,  so  that 
the  apex  of  the  promontory  formed  the  apex  of  the  bend,  and 
as  they  stood  they  could  hear  the  water  gurhng  and  sobbing 
round  it,  a  mournful  sound  in  the  absolute  stillness  of  the  night. 
Stillness,  that  is  to  say,  of  the  river  and  its  bank,  for  the  far 
forest  stretching  away  in  bosky  billows  under  the  now  rising 
moon,  could  be  heard  vibrating  to  the  touch  of  night,  just  as 
a  musical  glass  vibrates  to  a  wet  finger.  Millions,  of  insects 
and  thousands  of  night  birds  were  beginning  their  concert  in 
those  haunted  groves,  where  the  moon  burned  green  through 
the  tropical  foliage  and  the  fathoms  of  liantasse  and  con- 
volvulus cables  sagged  across  paths  untrodden  by  man. 

Macquart  standing  and  looking  around  him,  seemed  at 
fault. 

Tillman  was  the  first  to  speak. 

"  Well,"  said  he,  "  is  this  the  spot  ?  " 

"  It  is  the  spot  right  enough,"  replied  Macquart  ;  "  but 
the  indications  are  gone." 


"  The  which  is  which  ?  "  cried  Hull.  "  What  are  you 
say  in'  ?  " 

"  There  was  a  camphor  tree  there,"  said  Macquart, 
pointing  to  the  apex  of  the  promontory,  "  and  another  there," 
pointing  to  the  base.  "  The  trees  are  gone,  damn  it  !  Maybe 
they've  been  felled,  maybe  a  hurricane  knocked  them  down  ; 
anyhow,  they  are  gone  ;  but  it  doesn't  matter.  The  stuff 
was  buried  between  them  and  digging  will  find  it." 

The  last  words  took  a  load  off  the  minds  of  the  adven- 
turers. 

"  The  cache  was  right  in  the  middle,  between  the  two 
trees,"  said  Macquart,  "  and  we  have  only  to  dig  in  the  middle 
of  this  bit  of  the  bank  to  find  it." 

.  "  Well,  we'd  better  take  a  measurement,  so's  to  get  right 
in  the  middle."  said  Tillman,  producing  a  ball  of  fishing  line 
from  his  pocket.     "  Here,   Houghton,  lend  a  hand." 

Houghton  took  one  end  of  the  line  and  took  it  to  the  apex 
of  the  promontory,  whilst  Tillman  at  the  base  held  the  other  end. 

"  That  would  be  about  the  position  of  the  trees  ?  "  said 
he  to  Macquart. 

"  There,  or  thereabouts,"  replied  the  other. 

Tillman  told  Houghton  to  hold  firm  to  his  end  of  tlie 
hne,  then  he  walked  up  to  him  and  came  back  with  the  doubled 
Une,  which  gave  them  the  half-distance. 

"  This  is  the  spot — or  ought  to  be,"  said  he.  "  Give  us 
the  pick." 

He  drove  the  pick  into  the  soft  earth  again  and  again, 
breaking  up  the  surface  ground  ;  then  he  began  to  dig  with  the 
mattock.     The  others  stood  by,  watching. 

"  What  I  can't  make  out,"  said  Hull,  "  there  ain't  no 
tree  trunks  left.  If  them  trees  were  cur  down  or  broken  by 
a  storm,  where's  them  trunks." 

Macquart  laughed. 

"  A  tree  trunk  in  this  part  of  the  world  doesn't  last 
long,"  he  said.  "  What  between  the  climate  and  the  insects, 
a  year  would  see  it  gone." 

Ten  minutes  later,  Tillman  stopped  work  and  wiped  his 
forehead  ;  he  had  cleared  away  the  earth  from  a  space  some 
yards  square,  leaving  a  hole  about  a  foot  deep.  HuU,  now, 
took  up  the  spade  and  went  on  with  the  digging. 

Not  one  word  was  spoken  by  any  of  the  party  in  this, 
the  supreme  moment  of  their  lives.  All  their  labours,  aU 
their  seafaring,  all  their  dreams,  all  their  future  centred  and 
balanced  on  this  spit  of  river  bank,  on  this  form  digging, 
literally,  for  fortune  under  the  light  of  the  great  calm,  tropical 
moon. 

Macquart,  standing  with  his  arms  folded,  seemed  the 
genius  of  the  scene. 

Then  Hull  flung  down  the  spade,  exhausted,  and  Hough- 
ton took  it  up.     After  him  Macquart. 

Three  hours  of  superhuman  labour  produced  an  enormous 
cavity  wide  and  yawning  to  the  moon,  but  not  a  sign  of  what 
they  sought. 

Macquart  had  stated  that  the  cache  was  covered  by  only 
three  feet  of  earth.  The  hole  was  five  feet  deep  and  more,  yet 
it  showed  nothing. 

They  sat  down  on  the  edge  of  it. 

"  Well,"  said  Hull,  to  Macquart,  "  what  are  we  to  make 
of  this  ? — where's  your  cache  .'  " 

Macquart  said  nothing  for  a  moment,  then  he  spoke  : 

"  It  was  here  ;  it  is  here.  The  trees  being  gone,  I  can't 
get  the  exact  measurements  between  trunk  and  trunk  ;  I've 
figured  it  out  to  the  best  of  my  ability.  All  I  can  say  is,  that 
it  is  here  on  this  spit  of  shore,  and  we  must  go  on  digging  till 
we  find  it." 

■"  I  can't  dig  anj'  more  to-night,"  said  Tillman.  "  I'm 
broke." 

"  So  am  I,"  said  Houghton.  "  It's  beastly,  but  the  only 
thing  for  us  to  do  is  knock  off  and  start  again  to-morrow 
night.  I'm  going  to  dig  the  whole  of  this  spit  up  before  I 
stop."  Then  turning  to  Macquart.  "  Are  you  sure  this  is 
the  place  ;  maybe  you  have  mistaken  ;  there  may  be  another 
spit  like  this  ifith  the  trees  growing  as  you  said." 

"  I  tell  you,  I  am  sure,"  rephed  the  other.  "  The  distance 
frofn  the  village  is  correct.  It  was  here  the  stuff  was  buried, 
and  unless  it  was  taken  away,  it  is  here  still.  And  it  cannot 
have  been  taken  away.     No  one  knew  of  it." 

"  Well,"  said  Hull,  rising  up,  "  there's  no  manner  of  use 
talking,  we've  got  to  dig,  and  if  the  stuff  don't  turn  up,  b'gosh, 
I'll  brain  you,  Mac  !    I  feels  that  way." 

"  There's  no  use  in  talking  like  that,"  said  Tillman, 
gloomily.  "  Macquart  is  in  the  swim  along  with  the  rest  of 
us,  and  if  the  stuff  doesn't  turn  up,  it  hits  him  as  well  as  us. 

He  picked  up  the  mattock,  and  Hull  taking  the  pick, 
they  turned  from  the  spit  and  walked  back  along  the  bank, 

It  was  only  now  that  the  gold  they  were  Imnting  for  began 
to  cry  out  to  them  with  a  full  voice  ;  only  now  that  they  began 
to  perceive  fully  the  awful  difference  between  returning  to 
Sydney  empty-handed  and  returning  with  a  fortune. 

(.To   be  continued.) 


22 


Supplement   III    I.ANIi  AKV   VVatkr,  Mnich  2S.   Ifllti. 


Aquascutum 

FIELDJRENGH  COATS 

Waterproof  yet  Self-  Ventilating. 

The  unprecedented  success  we  have 
experienced  with  these  Coats  is 
largely  due  to  the  recommendation 
of  thousands  of  satisfied  Officers 
who  have  given  them  the  supreme 
test  of  Active  Service,  and  also  to 
our  principle  of  never  supplying  a 
Coat  unless  we  have  full  confidence 
in  its  giving  ENTIRE  SATISFACTION. 

Extracts  from 
Officers'  Letters : 

"  It  stood  the  Winter  in 
the  Trenches  simply  splen- 
didly. I  know  no  better 
coat."  Capt>  p. 

"  I  have  nothing  but 
praise  for  its  wet  and  rain- 
resisting  qualities." 

Col.  N. 

"  I  cannot  speak  too 
highly  of  my  Aquascutum, 
as  it  has  had  many 
severe  tests  and 
has  always  proved 
to  be  absolutely 
waterproof." 

Lieut.  N. 


There  is  only  one  "Aquascutum" 
— do  not  accept  imitations. 


'  Continuous  wear  in 
and  out  of  the  Trenches 
has  naturally  told  on  it  a 
bit,  but  otherwise  it  is 
perfectly  good-  I  can 
never  wish  for  a  better 
coat."  Capt.  B. 

I  wore  it  continuously 
from  ttie  13th  to  the  1 8th 
and  slept  in  it  in  rouddy 
and  damp  Trenches,  and 
for  the  major  part  of  the 
time  it  was  raining.  I  am 
glad  to  say  the  coat  kept 
me  absolutely  dry  the 
whole  time."    Lieut.  O. 

"  I  have  used  one  out 
here  for  6  months,  and 
though  it  is  now  very 
shabby,  it  is  still  quite 
proof  against  any  rain-" 
Lt-Col.  L. 


The  originals  of  the  above 
letters  can  be  seen  by  any- 
one interested. 


AQUASCUTUM  KAPOK  VALISE. 


Waterproof,  warm,  vermin  proof.  Re- 
quires no  blankets.  Specially  con- 
structed for  hard  wear  and  indispensable 
from  the  list  of  Service  requisites. 
Weight  about  9  lbs. 


AQUASCUTUM  Ltd. 


1 


Regent   St.^ 
London,  W. 

BY  APPOINTMENT   TO  H/S  MAJESTY  THE  KING. 


WA^IERPROOF      COAT      SPECIALISTS 
FOR       OVER      50       YEARS.  1=1 


100 


The  Original  Cording  s.    Estd.  1839. 

The**EQUITOR'' 
Waterproof  Coat 

Officers  speak  highly  of  the 
special  provision  for  mounted    wear 

in  the  attached  apron  buttoning  on 
one  side.  This  ab.solutely  shuts  out 
any  rain,  and  when  not  in  use  fastens 
conveniently  (out  of  sight)  on  the 
inside  of  coat,  which  then  serves  just 
as  well  for  ordinary  wear  afoot.  The 
coat  can  be  bad  fitted  with  belt  if 
desired. 

One  of  the  special  materials, 
No.  31,  in  colour  an  approved  mili- 
tary fawn,  is  a  tough  though  finely- 
woven  fabric,  light  in  weight,  yet 
absolutely  reliable  for  hard  wear  and 
tear. 

The  "Equitor"  Coat  is  also  made 
with  warm  fleece  I.ning  to  detach. 

When  ordering  an  "  Equitor "  or 
"Service"  Coat  (the  "Service'"  Coat 
is  made  without  the  attached  apron), 
or  directing  that  one  be  sent  on 
approval,  height  and  chest  measure 
and  reference  should  be  given. 

New  Illastrated  List  of  waterproof  coat;  cape;  boot;  trench  wader,  &c.^t  requett. 

J.  C.  CORDING  &  Ca 

Waterproofers  to  H.M.  the  King 
19  PICCADILLY,  W.  &  "I  sl^tlMESs  st. 


s.w. 


THE 
FASHION 

FOR 
PETTICOATS 


In  view  of  the  fasliion  for 
wide  skirts.  Petticoats  are 
now  in  great  demand.  Our 
stock  contains  an  infinite 
variety  of  dainty  and  prao- 
ticaJ  Petticoats  at  reason- 
able prices. 

PETTICOAT  as  sketch,  in 
rich  quality  taffeta,  cut 
round  and  full,  with  waved 
edge,  finished  with  pinked 
out  ruche.  In  navy,  grey, 
mole.  nigg«r,  saxe,  pink, 
sky,  ajid  purple.  Also 
shot  purple  and  black,  red 
and  black,  and  blue  and 
black. 


Pr, 


ice 


16/9. 


5en/  on  Approval. 

DebenKam 
&Freebo4 


Wigmor*  Street. 

iC»vfnj;sh  Square)  London.W 

Femous  lop  over  a  Century 
forToile  for  QijoMt  lor  VoIu* 


Supplement  to  LlNS  «ND   WiTCK.  March  23.  1916. 


Another  fine  tribute  to  the 
World  s  best  Fountain  Pen 

This   one   is    from    a    Gunner    Subaltern 

B.E.F.,  France.  6.3.16. 
Gentlemen, 

The  enclosed  souvenir  may  interest  you.  It  is  my  faithful 
old  Waterman,  now  alas  laid  low.  This  pen  has  been  in  daily  use 
since  October  21st,  igog,  until  a  week  or  two  ago,  when  it  met  with 
an  untimely  and  sudden  end.  In  addition  to  daily  use,  it  has  been 
on  active  service  with  me  in  France  and  Belgium  for  nearly  eleven 
nionths^in  the  front  Hne  trenches — at  the  Normal  Battery  O.P. 
in  the  Battery  itself,  and  back  at  rest.  Last  December  1  was  sent 
as  adjutant  D.A.C.,  and  I  thought  that  the  pen  and  I  would  end 
our  days  in  peace,  for  normally  the  D.A.C.'s  are  for  tactical  reasons 
placed  well  back.  Unfortunately  I  love  my  horses  even  better 
than  my  pen — and  go  to  see  them  last  thing  every  night.  One 
morning  my  pen  was  missing,  and  later  in  the  day  my  groom 
brought  me  the  enclosed  relic,  trodden  on  by  my  favourite  charger. 

Well,  it  is  all  the  fortune  of  war,  but  I  cannot  do  without  a 
Waterman,  so  please  send  me  another  as  soon  as  possible. 


For  the  ReHular  Type,  10/6  and  up- 
wards. For  the  SAFETY  Type  and 
the  New  Lever  Pocket  Self-Filling 
Tvpc,  12  6  and  upwards.  Safety 
Type  beat  for  Active  Service.  Of 
Stationera  and  Jewellers  all  over  the 
world. 


In  Silver  and  Gold  for  preaentation. 
Fullest  satisfaction  ftuaranteed  Nibs 
exchangeable  if  not  suitable.  Call,  or 
send  to  "  The  Pen  Comer."  Full 
range  of  pens  on  view,  for  inspection 
and  trial.    Booklet  free  from  : — 


L.   G.   Sloan,   Zht&Tfcndorrt&r,  Kingsway,  London. 


\MiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiDiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiimii:= 


I  FOR 

I  MEN 

=  At  the  Front  and 

E  those  about  to  go 

S  strong,     Bturdy     luid     neat 

S  looking  in  wear,  Walthams 

=  are      the      ideal      wristlet 

=  watches  for  men    at    the    Front    and 

=  those  about  to  go.        Thoroughly  de- 

=  pendable  under  the  very  worst  of  conditions. 

S  Scientific  precision  in  watchmaking  and  over           = 

S  sixty  years'  unique  manufacturing  experience            2 

S  have  made  Waltham  watches  world  famous.                 S 

=  As  with  pocket  watches  so  with  wristlet  watches — the              S 

—  best  of  them  all  are  those  bearing  the  name  Waltham.  S 
E  Look  for  the  name  Waltham  on  the  Movement  Plate.                  s 

E  The   best    Watch   money   can    buy.     In    eilvet    case              S 

=  with   ttrap   and  buckle   from    £3     3s.     Od.                      S 

I  WallhamWatches  | 

—  »re  recarded  as  the  most  dependable  of  all  timekeepers.  The  ST 
=  latest  Waltham  achievement  is  the  winuing  of  the  Grand  Prize                — 

—  at  the  8an  Francisco  Panama  Exposition.  This  is  the  hlgheW  — 
=  possible  award  and  the  only  one  of  it*  class.     In  addition   Ave                — 

—  gold  medals  and  one  Bilver  medal  were  also  awarded  to  Waltham  — 
=  Watches.  = 
^  0/  0(1  r«HobIe    Tfolchmoltsri  and  Jeaeller:                               — 

i  Watch      Booklet      FREE.                   | 

E  Walfliam  Watch  Co.  (Dept  63),  125  High  Holbom,  Undon,  W.C.             = 

liiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiMniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiil 


The  THRESHED  Trench  Coat. 

WINDPROOF  AND  WATERPROOF. 

RECOGNISED  by  the  W.C,  and  officially  brought  to  the 
notice  of  Officers  commanding  corps  in  the  B.E.E.  early 
in  the  Winter  of  1914.  the  "Thresher"  has  successfully 
met  the  severest  tests  of  Winter  campaigning,  and  has  estab- 
lished itself  supreme  for  comfort,  warmth  and  service. 

Up  to  February  29th,  1916,  »ix  thousand  BritUh  Military 
Officer*  have  purchased  genuine  "  Thresher  "  Trench  Coats. 

This  fact  alone  makes  it  unnecessary  to  publish  even  a  few  of 
the  many  generous  and  extraordinary  testimonials  that  have 
been  received. 

SPRING  WEAR.  Even  until  the  end  of  April  the  sheepskin 
lining  provides  the  best  protection  against  weather,  and  after 
then  the  lighter  Kamelcott  makes  the  Trench  Coat  the  best 
all-round  garment  for  Summer  wear. 

The  "Thresher"  with  detachable  Sheepskin  Lining    £7     10 


Do.  with  detachable  Kamelcott  Lining 


£5  10  0 


NOTE.— A  coat  with  both  Kamelcott  and  Sheepskin  linings  provides 
a    garment    for    the    coldest   Winter    or    mildest    Spring    weather. 

Kamekoll  lining  (leparole)    .    25/- 

For  Mounted  Officers,  with  Kneeflaps  and  Saddle  Gussets, 
15/6  extra. 

Send  size  of  chest  and  approximate  height, 
and  to  avoid  delay  enclose  cheque  with  order. 

THRESHER    &    GLENNY, 

Military  Vallors  and  Outfilten. 

152  &   153  Strand,   London,  W.C. 

n  The  outstanding  fact  is  that  the  first  coat  produced  in 
October.  1914,  has  been  accepted  without  any  modifica- 
tion as  the  standard  garment  for  modern  warfare. 


i 


XX 


LAND  &W  ATER 


Vol.  LXVI  No.  2811. 


THURSDAY     MARTH    o^     rntfi  published  ast  pr  ice  sixpence 

xn\jxs.oiJn.i ,   mnixy^n.   J,^,    1910.  La  newspaperJ  published  weekly 


iiu  Loui^  Havinaeken, 


Drawn   cxcliisitely  for   -l.und  and    Water' 

AT    THE    GATES    OF    HELL. 

Come  in  :  you  need  not  storm  this  place. 


«•  LAND     AND     WATER  "     WAR     LITHOGRAPHS     No.     9. 


BY    G.    SPENCER    PRYSE. 


INTERIOR    OF    A    COUNTRY    HOUSE    NEAR    EPERNAY. 


March  2j,  1916. 


L  A  M  D      AND      W  A  1  E  K 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE.   KINGSWAY,   LONDON.   W.G. 

Telephone:  HOLBORN  2828. 


THURSDAY,  MARCH  23rd,  1916. 


CONTENTS 

At  the  Gates  of  Hell.     By  Louis  Kaemaekers 
Interior  of  a  Country  House  near  Epernay.     By  G 

Spencer  Pryse 
Let  us  not  Drift.     (Leading  Article) 
The  Mort  Homme.     By  Hilairc  Belloc 
Sortes  Shakcspearianie.     By  Sir  Sidney  Lcc. 
Call  of  von  Tirpitz.     By  Arthur  Pollen 
Neutrals  at  the  Cross  Roads.     By  John  Buchan 
Gaspard  of  Wasdale  Head.     By  William  T.  Palmer 
A  Problem  of  Strategy.     By  Colonel  Feylcr 
Aircraft  Policy.     By  F.  W.  Lanchester 
Chaya.     By   H.    de  Vere   Stacpoole 
Town  and  Country 
J'he  West  End 

Active  Service  E.\hibitiun     Special  Supplement 
Clioosing  Kit 


I 

2 
.:> 

4 

9 

10 

13 
15 
16 

17 
19 
24 
26 
iii. 
.\.\iii. 


LET    US    NOT    DRIFT 

Let  us,  resolutely  putting  audi  all  cuusideratiuns  of  party, 
class  and  doctrine,  without  delay  proceed  to  de\ise  a 
])()licy  for  the  British  Empire,  a  policy  which  shall  cover 
every  phase  of  our  national,  economic,  and  social  life  ; 
which  shall  develop  the  tremendous  resources  and  yet  be 
compatible  with  those  ideals  of  liberty  and  justice  for 
which  our  ancestors  fought  and  died,  and  for  which  the 
men  of  our  race  now,  in  this,  the  greatest  of  all  wars,  are 
lighting  and  dying  in  a  fashion  worthy  of  their  breeding. 
Let  us  no  longer  pursue  a  pohcy  of  drift,  but  set  sail  upon 
a  definite  course  as  becomes  a  mighty  nation  to  whom 
has  been  entrusted  the  destiny  of  one-fourth  of  the  whole 
human  race. 

WHEN  Mr.  Hughes,  Prime  Minister  of  the 
.Commonwealth  of  Australia,  spoke  these 
words  last  week,  he  put  into  language 
the  thoughts  and  aspirations  of  the  very  great 
majority  of  the  citizens  of  the  British  Empire.  It  was 
most  fitting  that  this  speech  should  have  been  delivered 
in  the  mother-city  of  our  race,  and  that  it  should  have 
come  from  the  lips  of  a  Labour  leader,  who  is  also  at  the 
head  of  the  Governriient  of  a  free  Dominion  which  had 
it  so  pleased  could  well  have  stood  outside  and  beyond 
this  world-struggle.  It  must  destroy  the  last  illusions 
of  our  enemies  that  the  British  Empire  is  merely  a 
loose  phrase,  and  not  a  living  truth,  a  concrete  fact. 
Mr.  Hughes'  eloquence  burns  as  brightly  as  a  beacon, 
warning  the  people  of  threatening  danger  and  showing 
to  the  foe  that  at  last  we  are  on  otu*  guard. 

"  Let  us  no  longer  pursue  a  policy  of  drift."  In 
these  words  one  catches  the  echo  of  another  memorable 
speech  delivered  in  this  metropolis  over  fifteen  years 
ago.  Our  present  King,  then  Prince  of  Wales,  had 
returned  from  his  tour  through  the  Empire,  and  at  the 
Guildhall  on  December  5th,  1901,  said  :  "  I  venture  to 
allude  to  the  impression  which  seemed  generally  to 
prevail  among  cnu"  brethern  across  the  seas,  that  the  old 
country  must  wake  up  if  she  intends  to  maintain  her  old 
position  of  pre-eminence  in  Colonial  trade  against  foreign 
competition."  This  "  Wake  up,  England  "  was  hailed 
as  a  battle-cry,  but  how  did  we  act  upon  it  ?  Did  it  not 
in  truth  rather  become  a  lullaby  ?  To  repeat  the  phrase 
often  enough  and  loud  enougli  was  deemed  to  be  sulficient 
pretext  for  doing  nothing  We  w'ere  warned  to  wake 
up.    We  did  not  wake  uo.    We  preferred  to  drift  ;    it 


was  less  trouble.     To-day  uur  eyes  arc  opened. 

But  shall  we  act  more  wisely  in  the  future  ?  The 
whole  national  tendency  for  several  years  before  the 
war  was  to  be  content  with  words,  barren  words. 
A  beautiful  speech  was  ever  applauded  to  the  echo, 
and  never  was  apj)lause  heartier  or  more  sincere  than 
when  it  advocated  either  doing  nothing  or  doing  some- 
thing at  somebody  else's  labour  and  expense.  This  is 
the  very  essence  of  the  pohcy  of  drift.  Many  of  us  have 
been  voluntarily  ruled  by  power  of  attorney,  delegating 
our  personal  responsibihtics  to  others  so  as  to  enable  us 
to  pass  more  easeful  lives.  The  mere  idea  that  we  our- 
selves should  toil  at  the  oar  or  set  the  sails  when  winds 
were  adverse  or  bad  weather  threatened  was  pre- 
posterous. Let  the  ship  drift.  We  desired  nothing 
better.  "  There  is  but  one  way  by  which  a  nation  being 
free  can  remain  so,  and  that  is,  that  every  man  shall  not 
only  be  willing  to  defend  his  country,  but  be  able  to  do 
so."  Five  years  or  two  years  ago  we  should  have  cheered 
these  words  of  Mr  Hughes,  biit  had  he  proceeded  to 
declare  that  by  the  spring  of  1916  Britain  should  have 
four  million  men  trained  to  arms,  he  would  have  been 
either  howled  down,  or  regarded  as  demented. 

Now  he  tells  us  that  the  economic  pohcy  of  a  nation 
and  its  national  welfare  arc  inseparable,  intimate  and 
complex.  "  For  ;  time  the  trade  of  a  nation  that  treats 
trade  as  if  it  had  no  connection  with  national  safety  may 
make  great  strides  as  did  ours,  but  there  comes  a  day  of 
reckoning  to  such  nations  as  it  has  come  to  us."  Nobody 
will  deny  the  truth  underlying  these  words,  but  are  wo 
prepared  to  act  on  this  truth,  and  to  set  to  work  at  once 
to  disentangle  British  trade  from  the  tentacles  of  the 
Teuton  cuttleiish  ?  There  is  no  blinking  the  difficulties 
of  the  task,  or  the  toil  self-sacrifice  and  unflinching 
resolution  which  are  demanded  if  the  end  is  to  be  achieved. 
Evidence  accumulates  that  at  last,  accepting  the  fifteen 
years'  old  advice  of  the  King,  we  are  waking  up.  But 
being  awake  we  must  act  and  act  quickly  and  decisively. 
For  some  weeks  past  there  have  appeared  in  L.\NO  and 
Watkk  articles  from  the  able  pen  of  Mr.  Arthur, Kitson 
dealing  with  the  British  bankmg  system,  and  no  champion 
has  yet  come  forward  to  disprove  his  statement  that  this 
system  is  utterly  inadequate  for  the  development  of  the 
trade  and  industries  of  the  Empire — as  inadequate  as 
was  our  military  system  before  the  war  began.  To 
reorganise  the  system  in  accordance  with  the  larger  need 
of  the  Empire  will  necessarily  conflict  at  many  points 
with  private  or  vested  interests.  But  heroism  must  not 
be  confined  to  the  battlefield.  We  have  to  bring  this 
virtue  into  our  daily  avocations,  for  it  will  not  be  possible 
to  carry  into  effect  a  policy  for  the  scientific  reorganisation 
of  the  British  Empire  and  its  resources  without  scrapping 
many  old  habits,  prejudices  and  customs. 

It  is  not  our  intention  to  dictate  to  the  Government 
how  best  to  begin  this  reorganisation.  All  that  we  ask 
for  is  action,  clearly  defined  action,  so  that  those  most 
nearly  concerned  may  behold  how  they  can  best  help 
forward  the  work  which  lies  nearest  their  heart,  for  not- 
withstanding jeers  to  the  contrary  we  maintain  that  mer- 
chants, as  a  class,  do  not  lack  in  devotion  to  the  highest 
interests  of  their  country.  They  laid  the  foundations  of 
the  Empire,  why  should  they  shirk  to-day  ?  Ruskin 
once  asked  when  is  the  due  occasion  for  a  merchant  to 
sacrifice  his  life.     The  occasion  may  have  arrived. 

Ha\ing  begun  this  article  with  a  citation  from  a 
speech  of  Mr.  Hughes,  we  cannot  do  better  than  end  it 
in  the  same  fashion.  The  present  situation  could  hardly 
be  more  accurately  described  than  in  these  sentences 
spoken  by  him  at  the  City  Carlton  Club  on  Tuesday  : 
"  If  we  are  to  have  a  change  we  must  begin  to  prepare 
for  it  at  once.  .  .  .  Now  is  the  hour  not  only  of  our 
trial  but  of  our  opportunity  which,  if  we  fail  to  avail 
ourselves  of  it,  will  pass  away  for  ever.'' 


LAND      AND     WATER 


March  23,  1916. 


THE    MORT    HOMME 


By  Hilaire  Belloc 


THOUGH  there  has  been"  a  slackening  in  the 
tremendous  fighting  for  the  salient  of  Verdun 
during  the  last  week,  tiie  enemy's  efforts  have 
none  the  less  turned  upon  an  attack  which, 
if  we  examine  it  closely,  helps  us  to  understand  their 
present  aim. 

They  have  tried  hard  to  carry  the  Mort  Homme, 
their  last  effort  this  week  near  Avocourt  on  the  20th  as 
much  as  their  efforts  of  the  14th  and  i6th  on  the  Bethin- 
court  road  has  the  Mort  Homme  for  its  object  ;  and 
we  must  try  and  understand  what  the  advantage  of 
such  a  success,  had  they  attained  it,  would  have  been. 
The  original  plan  of  the  battle  is  now  fairly  clear. 
Suppose  your  enemy  to  hold  what  is  called  a  salient 
— that    is    a   bulge — about    12    miles   across    like    this 


and  to  have  in  that  bulge  a  great  mass  of  material, 
a  great  number  of  men,  both  on  the  line  and  behind  it, 
and  further  within'  it  a  town  which  has  for  centuries 
been  famous  as  a  fortress,  and  which,  up  to  within  18 
months  ago,  was  one  of  the  great  modern  strongholds — ■ 
so  that  its  reputation  as  a  fortress  is  still  very  Strong  in 
the  general  imagination  of  Europe,  although  in  reality 
it  now  forms  a  part  of  the  general  line  and  is  no  longer  a 
special  fortress  in  any  true  sense. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  Verdun  and  its  saUent.     ^ 

Further,  suppose  that  salient  stands  at  a  sort  of 

:orner  or  bend  in     your    general    line     like     this,    so 


that  it  is  obviously  an  advanced  point  menacing 
you  with  a  forward  thrust  from  it  to  the  north  or  to  the 
iiorth-east — which  would  make  yoiir  general  situation  all 
round  the  big  bend  at  S  impossible.  That  was  the 
menace  of  the  Verdun  point  to  the  Germans. 


But  to  go  back  to  Sketch  I.  Your  enemy  is  holding 
this  big  salient  at  Verdun.  Yon  detennine  to  try  your 
luck  with  him  there  and  see  whether  you  can  there 
break  him,  possibly  getting  right  through  his  front  and 
anyhow  damaging  him  so  much  more  seriously  than  you 
hurt  yourself  in  the  process  that  you  will  come  out 
heavily  the  winner.  How  in  such  a  situation  would  you 
act? 

There  are  two  things  you  might  do.  You  might 
try  and  pinch  off  the  neck  of  the  salient.  That  is 
what  you  normally  try  to  do  with  any  large  salient, 
whether  you  have  created  it  by  your  own  pressure,  or 
whether  it  has  just  "  happened,"  or  whether  it  is  due  to 
the  deliberate  forward  policy  of  your  opponent.  To  cut 
off  the  neck  of  such  a  salient  was  the  object  of  all  the 
allied  forces  at  Tourcoing  in  1793.  It  was  the  object 
of  each  of  the  si.x  great  failures  of  the  Austro-Germans 
against  the  l^ussians  during  the  big  advance  last  summer. 
On  each  occasion  they  tried  to  pinch  off  the  neck  of  the 
salient,  hoping  so  to  capture  huge  bodies  of  the  Russians 
within  and  almost  certainly  to  break  the  line  beyond  in 
the  process.  The  last,  and  most  nearly  successful  of  these ' 
attempts  was  the  effort  against  the  great  sahent  of  Vilna. 

According  to  this,  which  1  have  called  the  obvious  and 
normal  plan,  the  Ciermans  would  have  struck  as  hard  as 
they  could  at  the  French  upon  the  points  A  and  B  in 
Sketch  I,  and  particularly  at  A,  because  A  was  better 
and  drier  ground  and  less  easily  defendable. 

But  there  was  another  way  of  going  to  work,  which, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Germans  chose. 

There  runs  through  the  town  of  Verdun  itself  and 
across  the  whole  salient  an  obstacle — the  river  Meuse. 
It  was  an  obstacle  particularly  formidable  six  weeks 
to  a  month  ago  from  the  fact  that  the  river  had  risen  and 
was  flowing  very  rapid!}'  and  had  further  flooded  great 
portions  of  its  valley.  Now  imder  such  circumstances 
the  enemy  might  achieve  a  prodigious  result  and  possibly 
even  get  right  through  the  line  if,  instead  of  getting 
round  behind  the  salient  and  trying  to  pinch  its  neck  oft, 
they  were  simply  to  hammer  as  hard  as  they  could  at 
all  that  part  of  it  which  lay  exposed  beyond  the  obstacle 
M  M,  the  river  Meuse. 

For  an  army  overwhelmed  by  numbers  of  men  and  a 
superior  concentration  of  artillery  will  normally  retire. 
But  with  an  obstacle  behind  it  it  cannot  retire  as  it 
would  retire  upon  open  country.  There  will  be  terrible 
congestion  upon  the  few  roads  (perhaps  a  single  road 
leading  to  a  single  pernianent  bridge  across  the  river), 
and  upon  any  temporary  bridges  it  may  throw  for  its 
retirement  across  the  stream.  Further,  each  of  these 
bridges  and  the  few  roads  leading  to  them  and  the  gates 
leading  out  of  the  town  and  the  narrow  streets  of  the 
town  (since  a  road  system  in  time  of  peace  always  con- 
verges upon  and  passes  through  a  town)  are  exact  marks 
which'  the  air  service  can  discover  and  which  can  be 
shelled  at  fixed  ranges  by  the  heavy  guns  of  the  attack. 
.  A  blow  delivered  with  fair  rapidity,  even  if  it  occupy 
several  days  in  its  full  development,  might  well  give  you 
as  a  prize  nearly  all  the  troops  lying  beyond  the  river 
with  nearly  all  their  material  and  guns,  and  even  so 
disorganise  all  that  lav  on  the  far  side  of  the  stream  as  to 
give  you  a  chance  of  br(>aking  through  altogether. 

That  was  undoubtedlv  the  plan  which  the  Germans 
had  made.  For  they  did  not  strike  at  the  neck  of  the 
salient  by  .\  and  B"(in  Sketch  I.)  in  those  first  days  of 
the  action  which  they  intended  to-be  decisive.  They 
struck  all  round  it  at  "C.  C.  C.  and  did,  as  a  fact,  get  the 
line  back  to  about  the  line  of  crosses  on  diagram  I. 

But  they  did  not  go  anywhere  near  to  pushing  it 
back  on  to  the  river.  Therefore,  their  plan  completely 
failed.  .Xnd  when  this  first  chapter  of  the  story  was 
over  they  had  lost  a  very  much  larger  number  of  men  than 
they   had   caused   the   French   to   lose. 

This  first  assault,  regarded  as  one  action  covering 
about  a  week  (the  bombardment  opened  on  the  T)th 
of  February,  the  'first  infantry  attack  wa:;  on  the  21st, 
and  the  most  violent  blow  of  all,  that  which  got  on  the 


March  23,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


plateau  of  Doiianmont,  was  on  tlie  afitli)  was  strategically 
a  very  bad  defeat  indeed,  if  we  count  defeats  and 
victories  merely  in  terms  of  receding  from  or  approaching 
towards  strategic  success. 

It  was  only  after  this  original  plan  had  failed  that 
what  I  have  called  the  obvious  and  normal  method,  the 
method  that  would  have  been  the  only  one  attempted  if 
that  obstacle  of  the  Meuse  had  not  existed — was  resorted 
to  by  the  Germans.  Their  main  action  in  all  the  second 
phase  of  the  battle  was  hammering  at  the  two  wings — 
that  is,  at  the  neck  of  the  salient  :  Vaux  at  B  and  the 
district  west  of  the  Meuse  at  A. 

Now  of  this  ground  west  of  the  Meuse  the  decisive 
line  is  the  Charny  ridge,  as  we  saw  last  week  and  the  week 
before.  But  to  get  even  to  the  approaches  of  the  Charny 
ridge  you  have  to  carry  the  Goose  Crest  from  five  to  eight 
thousand  yards  in  front  of  it,  and  the  key  of  the  Goose 
Crest  is  obviously  that  culminating  western  point  of  it 
which  is  called  the  Mort  Homme.  Such  a  point  could  be 
carried  either  by  direct  assault  or  by  getting  round  it  and 
rendering  it  untenable.  The  first  method  has  again 
been  tried  this  week,  and  the  second  is  at  the  bottom  of 
the  occasional  attacks  to  the  west,  one  ot  whicli  on  a  small 
scale  was  delivered  as  late  as  last  Monday,  the  20th  of 
March,  in  the  wood  near  Avocourt.  True,  this  last  if 
really  pushed  home  might  carry  height  304  which  domi- 
nates the  Mort  Homme.  But  in  its  first  development 
it  has  had  little  or  no  effect.  It  has  emphasised  a  slight 
local  salient  between  Bethincourt  and  Avocourt  and  it 
has  got  behind  the  easy  slope  leading  up  to  hill  304.  But 
it  has  only  gone  a  very  little  way  so  far  (Tuesday)  to 
turning  the  Mort  Homme  position.  With  the  German 
claim  to  prisoners  I  deal  later. 

It  is  therefore  with  the  main  attack  upon  the  Mort 
Homme,  a  frontal  attack  delivered  directly  against  its 
slopes  a  week  before,  upon  the  Tuesday  and  the  Friday  of 
last  week,  the  14th  and  i6th  March,  that  we  are  par- 
ticularly concerned.  For  these  were  the  biggest  bids  for 
the  Mort  Homme  that  the  enemy  has  made  since  he  began 
his  efforts  upon  the  west  of  the    Meuse. 

Before  we  look  into  that  effort  in  detail,  let  us  re- 
member what  the  Germans,  profiting  by  the  lessons  of 
the  past,  both  upon  their  side  and  upon  ours,  have  deter- 
mined to  be  the  true  way  of  mastering  a  modern  defensive 
position.  They  do  not  propose  to  carry  such  positions 
by  one  initial  blow.  They  have  found,  as  we  have,  that 
the  first  line  can  be  rendered  untenable  at  a  certain  loss 
of  men,  but  that  to  proceed  immediately  against  the 
second  line  behind  it  is  almost  certainly  to  fail.  They 
have  designed,  therefore,  to  proceed  by  steps.  The 
first  line  is  overwhelmed  with  a  vigorous  bombardment, 
attacked  and  occupied  with,  as  it  is  hoped,  not  too  much 


loss.  An  interval  of  two  or  three  days  tlien  passes  during 
which  the  second  line  behind  is  exactly  noted,  the  guns 
brought  up  for  a  new  bombardment,  further  munitions 
brought  forward  and  probably  fresh  troops  as  well.  All 
this  done,  the  second  line  is  attacked— and  so  forth, 
until  the  main  position  is  in  their  hands. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  value  of  this  method  and  its 
comparative  successs  or  failure  must  be  measured  in 
terms  of  expense.  If  you  get  the  first  line  with  an  ex- 
penditure of  munitions  and  of  men  and  your  second  with 
a  further  expenditure  of  munitions  and  of  men— and  so 
forth — such  that  the  final  result  has  not  cost  you  more 
than  the  effect  in  loss  it  will  ultimately  produce  upon  the 
enemy,  then  you  have  succeeded.  But  if.  because  you 
have  under-estimated  the  power  of  the  defensive,  because 
your  bombardments  have  not  overwhelmed  it  as  much  as 
you  thought  they  would,  or  because  your  infantry  did  not 
come  on  as  vigorously  as  you  had  hoped  they  would, 
your  expense  in  men  and  in  material  altogether  exceeded 
your  calculations,  then,  even  if  you  ultimately  get  the 
position,  you  will  have  paid  too  high  a  price  for  it,  and 
you  will  be  in  a  worse  case  after  the  mere  occupation  of 
the  territory  than  j'ou  were  before  you  began  the  attempt. 
To  put  an  extreme  case. 

Supposing  such  a  position  as  the  Goose  Crest,  the 
mere  preliminary  to  an  advance  along  the  west  of  the 
Meuse,  was  only  carried  after  you  had  thrown  away  all 
the  men  whom  you  thought  it  worth  while  to  throw 
away  for  the  capture  of  the  Charny  ridge  itself  beyond. 
It  is  obvious  that  you  would  have  failed.  You  would 
then  be  in  the  position  of  a  man  who  found  that  the  mere 
journey  to  a  place  where  he  intended  to  invest  his  capital 
had  actually  cost  him  all  his  capital  ;  an  unfruitful  venture. 
The  object  of  the  defensive,  then,  against  such  tactics  as 
these,  is  to  make  the  enemy  lose  as  much  as  possible, 
even  in  the  first  preliminaries  of  the  advance.  We  do 
not  yet  know,  for  the  effort  is  not  yet  over,  whether  the 
Germans  will  reach  the  main  ridge  at  all.  We  do  not 
know  whether  they  will  even  carry  the  Goose  Crest  as  a 
whole,  but  we  do  know  that  the  intervals  over  which  they 
act  are  getting  longer  and  longer,  and  that  instead  of 
proceeding  by  successive  sharp  and  decisive  steps,  they 
have  in  the  case  of  the  Mort  Homme,  which  is  the  key 
of  the  Goose  Crest,  gone  back  and  forth  without  even  a 
local  decision  for  now  much  more  than  a  fortnight.  Their 
last  effort  is  an  example  of  the  measure  of  their  failure. 

I  will  now  turn  to  the  detail  of  this.  That  detail  can 
only  be  understood  with  the  aid  of  such  a  sketch  map  as 
Sketch  IV,  showing  the  enlargement  of  the  ground  which 
upon  Sketch  III,  is  enclosed  in  a  little  oblong  frame. 

Sketch  IV  shows  the  contours  of  the  ground  in  front 
of,  and  to  the  north  and  east  of,  the  Mort  Homme,  over 


CrcwlPbod 


braMnt:^    J[J 


V^mcvUlc 


.■^S^^§Sm& 


Avocourt" 


Homme  i 


Sketch  showing  position  of  the  Mort  Homme  and  Salient  of  Bethincourt 

5 


LAND     AND     WATER 


March  23,  1916. 


Details  of  Mort  Homme  Posilion 

which  the  enemy  has  been  operating.  It  is  a  fortnight  ago 
since  he  finally  got  hold  of  the  Crows'  Wood,  which  runs 
up  the  slope  and  reaches  in  most  places  near  to  the  ridge 
of,  and  in  some  places  over  the  Goose  Crest,  and  it  was  in 
the  cover  of  that  wood,  such  as  it  is,  that  the  efforts  wc 
are  about  to  follow  were  made. 

We  note  north-west,  north  and  north-cast  of  the 
summit  of  the  Mort  Homme,  a  country  road  passing  over 
the  hills,  which  is  that  leading  from  the  region  of  Bethin- 
court  to  the  village  of  Cumieres,  and  this  road  we  marked 
on  Sketch  III  with  the  letters  R  R  R.  The  French  trench 
system  at  the  moment  when  the  attacks  began,  exactly 
a  week  ago,  on  March  14th  (these  lines  are  written  on  the 
Tuesday  afternoon,  March  21st)  ran  roughly  parallel  to 
and  in  front  of  this  road.  We  must  further  particularly 
note  on  Sketch  IV  the  subsidiary  height  at  A,  which  is 
called  height  265.  It  is  a  sHght  rise  upon  the  shoulder  of 
the  Mort  Homme.  When  you  look  from  the  back  of  the 
Mort  Homme  northwards  and  eastwards,  in  such  a  direc- 
tion as  the  arrow  on  Sketch  IV,  you  see  this  hump  on  the 
shoulder  of  the  Mort  Homme  itself  peeping  up  to  the  left. 
It  is  called  Hill  265  from  its  height  in  metres  above  the 
sea.  The  summit  proper  (at  B)  of  the  Mort  Homme, 
which  is  1,200  yards  south-east  of  it,  is  called  hill  295, 
being  295  metres  above  the  sea,  and  therefore,  roughly, 
100  English  feet  above  A. 

For  the  Germans  to  attack  and  carry  the  point  A 
and  hold  it  solidly  would  be  a  step  of  importance  in  their 
plan  against  the  Mort  Homme  for  two  reasons.  In  the 
first  place  it  would  make  a  gap  in  the  French  trench  line, 
and  secondly,  it  would  begin  to  turn  the  positions  of  the 
Mort  Homme.  From  A  eastwards  towards  C  the  ground 
falls  away  towards  the  valley  of  the  brook  which  bounds 
these  heights  upon  the  west,  and  is  therefore  open  to  a 
further  advance. 

The  Germans,  therefore,  have  tried  and  perhaps  arc 
still  trying,  to  carry  A  rather  than  to  carry  the  more 
difficult,  higher  and  steeper  approaches  at  B.  They  arc 
also  trying  to  get  round  by  Avocourt  to  the  height  304, 
which  commands  the  Mort  Homme  from  the  east. 

It  was  upon  Tuesday,  March  14th,  that  the 
Germans,  who  had  just  completed  their  second  and  final 
occupation  of  the  Crows'  Wood,  brought  up  reinforcements 
and  left  that  cover  to  carry,  if  they  could,  this  height 
265,  A,  to  the  north-west  of  the  Mort  Homme. 

As  you  come  out  of  the  western  extremity  of  the 
Crows'  Wood  you  see  hill  265  upon  your  right,  standing 
out  somewhat  in  front  of  the  summit  of  the  Mort  Homme 
like  a  flatfish  lump  on  a  shelf :  about  100  ft.  lower  than 
that  summit,  as  I  have  said,  and  rather  more  than  half  a 
mile  from  it. 

The  Germans,  after  a  violent  artillery  preparation  of 
some  thirty-six  hours,  struck  up  as  far  as  the  French 
trenches  in  successive  waves,  the  total  numbers  of  which 
were  equivalent  to  about  a  division,  aiming  all  along  the 


French  line  in  front  of  the  road,  but  particularly  heavily 
towards  their  own  right  and  hill  265,  at  A. 

Their  concentration,  which  had  taken  place  during 
the  Tuesday  night  and  early  morning,  had  not  been  well 
concealed,  and  was  caught  more  than  once  by  the  French 
artillery.  But  tlvc  forces  which  attacked  that  Tuesday 
afternoon  were  sufficiently  strong  to  reach  the  trenches 
just  mentioned. 

The  enemy  for  almost  the  first  time  in  these  Verdun 
attacks,  attenuated  a  reasonably  open  order  with  the  men 
at  inter^•als  of  about  two  metres,  and  the  main  attack  was 
flanked  to  the  right  and  to  the  left  with  the  strength  of 
about  a  brigade  upon  either  side.  It  is  estimated  that 
the  total  numbers  moving  up  the  slopes  from  near 
Bethincourt  on  the  extreme  German  right  to  the  men  upon 
the  height  of  the  Goose  Crest  to  the  extreme  German  left, 
were  some  23,000.  With  what  covering  of  troops  the 
French  met  this  attack  we  are,  of  course,  not  told. 

The  two  flanking  brigades  were  badly  punished,  b\it 
the  main  attack,  as  I  have  said,  consisting  of  five  succes- 
sive waves  of  men,  following  each  other  at  about  100  yards 
interval,  succeeded  in  setting  foot  in  the  French  trench  at 
two  separate  points,  each  of  them  upon  the  slope  of  this 
shelf  called  "  265,"  and  presumably  at  about  E  and  F. 
The  two  points  thus  rushed  were  salients  in  the  line,  and 
their  combined  length  was  about  160  yards.  When  dark- 
ness fell  upon  the  Tuesday  night  the  Germans  remained 
in  possession  of  these  points,  and  were  presumably  con- 
solidating the  ground  between  them  and  the  Crow  Wood. 

Upon  the  Wednesday,  the  day  following,  the  details 
of  this  attack  having  been  communicated  to  Berlin,  the 
publicity  bureau  in  that  capital  described  the  event  as 
"  the  capture  of  the  Mort  Homme."  The  description 
was,  of  course,  quite  false,  and  constitutes  the  second  novel 
procedure  of  this  kind,  the  first  being  the  reported  capture 
of  the  fort  of  Vaiix. 

German  "Errors" 

I  suggested  last  week  the  probable  errors  which  had 
given  rise  to  the  false  communique  about  the  fort  of 
Vaux,  but  I  am  not  sure  after  this  last  piece  of  false  news 
that  this  suggestion  does  not  require  revision.  The  con- 
ditions of  the  attack  of  last  Tuesday  were  quite  different 
from  the  attack  on  Vaux.  The  thing  took  place  in  broad 
daylight,  and  the  German  assault  progressed  only  quite  a 
little  way  and  did  not  come  within  half  a  mile  of  the 
point  falsely  claimed.  Moreover,  the  Mort  Homme  is 
a  position  with  which  thousands  of  the  enemy's  students 
of  the  war  in  private  life  are  now  thoroughly  well  ac- 
quainted, and  it  has  been  minutely  described  in  the 
German  Press.  There  is  no  possibility  of  confusing  it 
with  another  point,  as  there  was  the  possibility  of  confusing 
the  fort  of  Vaux  properly  so  called  with  the  two  Hardau- 
niont  redoubts  just  north  of  Vaux  village.  The  Mort 
Homme  is  an  isolated,  dominating  summit,  separate  from 
everything  around  it,  and  lending  itself  to  no  confusion 
at  all.  It  looks  therefore  as  though  the  false  commu- 
nique were,  in  this  case  at  least,  deliberate,  and  as  though 
the  enemy  had  some  particular  political  reason  for  giving 
out  what  he  believed  would  be  soon  accomplished 
as    something    already  accomplished. 

At  any  rate,  after  another  pause  of  two  days  and 
another  bombardment,  he  made,  on  Thvu-sday,  the  i6th,  a 
very  serious  effort  to  turn  this  false  communique  into 
tiie  truth.  In  the  inter\-al  the  French  had  all  but  clefired 
the  two  small  salients  which  the  Germans  had  occupied, 
and  by  the  Thursday  morning  only  a  few  yards  were  left 
in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

During  the  Wednesday  night,  and  all  the  Thursday 
morning  the  very  violent  bombardment  of  the  whole 
slope  made  it  probable  that  the  enemy  were  going  to 
attack  again  ;  and  a  little  after  three  o'clock  on  the  after- 
noon that  day,  Thursday  the  i6th,  the  second  great' attack 
was  delivered  in  force  at  least  as  strong  as  that  which 
had  failed  forty-eight  hours  before. 

Why  these  efforts  are  made  in  broad  daylight  and 
late  in  the  day  only  those  on  the  spot  can  determine.  At 
any  rate  this  second  attack — which  w^s  an  exact  repeti- 
tion of  that  of  the  Tuesday,  iWe  waves  of  men  charging 
at  miich  the  same  distances  as  before — filled  the  space 
between  the  wood  and  the  French  main  trench. 

Tiiis  second  effort  completely  failed.  It  was  caught 
by  a  very  violent  curtain  fire  from  the  French  field  gims 
and  there  seem  to  have  been  constituted  between  the 


March  23,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER. 


Tuesday  and  the  Thursday  advanced  machine-gun-posts 
l)y  the  French.  Fur  at  least  one  of  the  German  hues  as 
it  charged  was  enfiladed. 

Tin;  great  mass  of  the  attack  broke,  the  whistles 
.sounded,  and  a  retirement  was  ordered  back  again  into 
the  wood,  suffering  heavily  as  it  ran.  On  Friday,  St. 
Patrick's  day,  there  was  nothing  but  an  artillery  duel. 
No  further  German  infantry  upon  the  Mort  Homme 
being  attempted. 

Up  to  the  Friday  right,  then,  the  sum  total  of  the 
German  effort  was  as  follows.  The  Mort  Homme  posi- 
tion, which  is  the  object  of  the  whole  business,  and  the 
loss  of  which  would  mean  the  loss  of  a  French  hrst 
covering  line,  was  intact  and  securely  held.  The  space 
between  the  Crows'  Wood  and  the  French  main  trench 
lying  across  the  shoulder-hummock  called  "  265  "  was 
a  no  man's  land.  But  the  enemy  retained  two  vvvy  small 
advance  points  in  two  separate  sections  projecting  from 
the  French  main  trench  just  under  hill  "  265  "  Tiiese 
by  this  time,  it  is  to  be  presumed,  are  not  isolated,  but 
communicate  with  the  main  German  body  by  one  or  two 
communication  trenches. 

After  nightfall  of  that  same  Thursday  last,  March 
16th,  the  Germans  directed  yet  another  attack  against  the 
extreme  opposite  wing  of  the  defence  twelve  miles  off  at 
Vaux.  It  was  launched  at  about  8  o'clock  in  the  evening, 
and  consisted  in  live  separate  movements. 

Two  of  these  movements  were  successive  assaults 
to  carry  the  ruins  of  the  village  of  Vaux  beyond  the 
church.  Botli  were  completely  broken  up.  It  will  be 
remembered  that  the  Germans  reached  the  church  and 
the  ruins  of  the  three  or  four  houses  east  of  it  ten  days 
ago.  Their  attempt  to  carry  the  rest  of  the  ruins  is  made 
with  the  object  of  following  up  the  ravine  and  taking 
both  the  Douaumont  and  tlic  Vaux  heights  in  reverse, 
l.ong  before  midnight  the  fighting  in  the  ravine  was  over 
without  a  gain  of  a  yard  of  ground  to  the  enemy. 


Domxuniotit 


--■  ■   » 


w-J 


^E 


t 


Trench  Line  ^ 


0  1000         3.000     3000^^''tOS 

Scale 


Meanwhile  during  that  same  darkness  three  separate 
assaults  were  being  made  upon  the  he'ghts  south  of  the 
village  with  the  object  of  reaching  the  crest  on  which  the 
abandoned  fort  of  Vaux  stands.  The  two  first  of  these 
were  broken  up  altogether  imder  the  searchlights  and 
the  star  shells.  A  third  attack  did  not  even  develop 
fully.  The  concentration  was  made  apparently  in  the 
turn  of  the  road  just  east  of  the  cemetery  at  Vaux,  which 
is  here  sunk  below  the  level  of  the  fields  and  forms  a  sort 
of  natural  trench  or  hollow  way.  The  forces  gathered 
there  were  discovered  just  as  they  began  to  dcbijuch 
and  were  broken  uj),  mainly  by  h'rench  lield  gun  lire. 

F^riday,  Saturday  and  Sunday  found  another  lull. 
But  the  Saturday  afternoon  and  Sunday  the  general 
bombardment  grew  more  intense  towards  Avocourt,  well 
west  of  the  Mort  Homme,  and  on  Monday,  the  20th,  the 
Germans — in  what  numbers  or  at  what  <  xpense  we  do  not 
yel  kno  v — seized  tlie  fringe  of  the  Avoronrt  wo<m1,  till  then 
in  French  ha  ids.  As  I  ha\-e  already  pointed  out,  this 
advance  of  their's  slightly  emphasised  the  Bethincourt — 
Avocourt  salient  and  brought  them  a  trifle  nearer  to  the 


back  of  hill  304,  and  so  to  an  ultimate  turning  of  the  Mort 
Homme  by  the  west.  But  the  whole  meaning  of  the 
move  is  only  to  be  estimated  in  comparative  loss  of  men, 
and  of  that  we  know  notliing  yet.  There  the  attack 
stands  at  the  last  advices. 

The  New  German  Tone 

There  is  not  only  a  new  tone  in  the  falsehoods  of 
the  German  communiques,  but  there  is  also  a  new  tone 
observable  in  those  rare  independent  comments  upon  the 
war  to  be  discovered  in  the  German  Press.  That  Press, 
as  a  whole,  has  been  contemutible  in  its  miUtary  conmient 
from  first  to  last  ;  largely  Ixjcausc  the  most  of  it  is  not 
(ierman  at  all  but  owned  and  run  by  cosmopolitan 
financiers— the  worst  example  is  the  Cologne  Gazette* 
But  amongst  the  exceptions  to  this  nonsense  we  have 
continually  noted  the  sober  learning  and  often  accurate 
prediction  of  the  military  critic  of  the  Berhn  daily  journal, 
the  TageUcM.  This  paper  is  also  financial  and  cosmo- 
politan in  ownership  and  direction,  but  that  has  not 
prevented  its  using  the  services  of  a  very  capable  man. 

Now  it  is  significant  that  this  student  of  the  war  for 
the  first  time,  I  think,  in  twenty  months,  has  lashed  out 
like  any  nervous  or  sensational  hack.  He  tells  the 
military  students  of  the  Allies  that  they  are  stuffed 
pigs  (a  fair  translation  of  the  French  slang  "  bouche.") 
He  swears  that  nothing  was  further  from  the  intentions  of 
the  German  commanders  than  a  political  effect,  he  insists 
that  the  whole  object  of  the  great  offensive  against  Verdun 
sector  was  not  the.  occupation  of  certain  areas,  but  the 
defeat  of,  the  breaking  of,  the  F'rench  army,  and  he 
ends  by  prophesying  success  in  that  venture. 

Now  to  prophecy  success  on  the  western  front  as 
though  one  knew  the  future  is  excusable,  though  laugh- 
able, when  it  is  made  in  the  neutral  press  to  order,  whether 
to  influence  credit  or  policy.  Bernhardi,  for  instance, 
said  def'n'tely  in  so  many  words  in  an  American  paper 
some  months  ago  that  the  next  German  move  would  be 
the  breaking  of  the  French  line  and  the  consequent 
"  over-running  of  France."  Serious  students  of  war 
pay  no  attention  to  such  rubbish.  It  is  absolutely  im- 
possible to  foretell  the  future.  It  is  possible  only  to  show 
what  future  alternatives  are  present  and  possible  and 
what  are  not.  Still  the  boasting  has  some  effect  on 
neutrals. 

But  the  fact  that  the  best  and  most  capable  of  the 
German  military  writers  in  the  German  Press  should  be 
now  stung  to  exaggeration  or  folly  is  very  significant 
indeed,  and  the  cause  is  very  simple.  The  cause  is 
"  Verdun."  For  unless  the  French  fine  is  broken  the 
whole  of  Europe  can  see— let  alone  a  conspicuously 
able  writer  upon  military  affairs  like  the  critic  of  the 
Beriin  Tageblatt—that  the  failure  is  a  really  bad  strategic 
defeat.  It  was  a  deliberate  gamble  from  the  beginning, 
it  was  a  gamble  deliberately  continued,  and  it  was  a 
gamble  with  a  very  large  fraction  of  the  remaining  avail- 
able capital.  Gambles  of  that  sort  when  they  fail  have 
a  way  of  becoming  turning  points  in  military  ventures. 

Note 

I  have  been  asked  by  correspondents  what  the  evi- 
dence is  for  the  generally  accepted  figures  that  tiie 
German  army  permanently  maintain  nearer  four  millions 
than  three  and  a  half,  and  further  why  I  have  ridiculed 
the  statement  that  the  wastage  of  an  English  infantry 
battalion  is  15  per  cent,  per  month. 

To  these  queries  I  should  reply,  that  one's  estimate 
of  the  German  army  i)ermanently  maintained  is  based 
upon  the  very  reasonable  supposition  that  the  forces  per 
unit  are  kept  up  to  full  strength,  and  that  auxiliary 
services  cannot  be  less  than  three-quarters  of  a  million  of 
men  and  probably  nearer  the  million.  Though  no  new 
formations  have,  I  belio\'e,  been  voted  for  more  than  a 
year,  the  existing  units  discovered  and  fixed  upon  the  two 
fronts  would  allow  for  German  forces  there  (excluding 
Austro-Hungarian,  of  course)  of  not  less  than  three 
million  men,  distributed,  very  roughly  speaking,  and 
allowing,  of  cou'-se,  for  special  concentration  now  on  the 
east  and  now  on  the  west,  in  the  j^roportion  of  about  two- 

•  I'or  instance,  the  German  edort.s  on  the  Verdun  front  arc  now 
compared  in  the  German  Press  to  "  Sebastopol."  in  order  to  explain 
their  length  and  inordinate  expenditure.  You  might  as  well  compare 
Austerhtz  to  Killiecrankic. 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


March  23,  1916. 


thirds  on  the  west  and  one-third  upon  the  east.  Roughly 
speaking  this  estimate  gives  us  a  minimum  of  three  and 
three-quarter  million  and  possibly  as  many  as  four 
million  men. 

As  to  the  second  point,  whether  the  true  net  wastage 
of  an  average  infantry  battalion  can  be  at  the  rate  of  15 
per  cent,  per  month.  This  would  mean  that  in  a  little 
over  half  a  year  our  full  strength  had  disappeared 
and  that  the  rate  of  loss  of  our  army  in  the  lield  so  far 
as  the  infantry  was  concerned,  was  such  tiiat  the  average 
field  army  would  have  to  be  renewed  three  times  over 
between  the  outbreak  of  the  war  and  the  present  day. 
Such  figures  applied  to  the  Germans,  for  instance,  would 


mean  a  total  dead  loss  of  not  less  than  ten  and  a  half 
millions  and  nearer  twelve,  which  is  obviously  nonsense. 
It  is  quite  possible,  as  I  have  admitted,  that  particular 
battalions,  if  you  count  all  forms  of  wastage  whatsoever, 
however  temporary,  if  you  include  men  being  on  leave 
and  the  rest  of  it,  might  show  as  high  a  wastage  as  15 
per  cent,  in  a  particular  set  of  months.  The  average  rate 
of  dead  loss,  that  is  of  net  total  loss  for  the  whole  army, 
seems  to  be  round  about  6  per  cent,  per  month.  That, 
of  course,  is  including  the  units  which  are  not  for  the 
moment  in  the  fighting  as  well  as  those  which  arc,  and  I 
sliould  imagine  that  the  average  wastage  for  the  units 
actively  used  was  nearer  nine  per  cent. 


THE    AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN    LOSSES 


The  second  most  important  member  of  the  original 
aggressive  Alliance  launched  against  Europe  is  the  Dual 
Monarchy  of  Austria-Hungary. 

We  must  make  some  appreciation  of  its  losses  up 
to  the  31st  of  December,  IQ15,  if  we  are  to  arrive 
at  any  estimate  of  the  detailed  losses.  But  this  esti- 
mate will  be  necessarily  less  general  and  therefore  less 
conclusive  than  was  the  case  with  the  (ierman  Empire. 
There  is  a  much  larger  margin  of  error.  No  one  can 
accept  so  low  a  real  figure  as  3!  millions  for  German  dead 
loss.  Few  would  accept — reasonable  as  it  is — a  figure 
over  4  million.  That  is  a  margin '  of  error  from  the 
average  either  way  of  not  quite  7  per  cent. 

In  the  case  of  Austria-Hungary  the  margin  of  error 
is  much  larger,  it  is  over  i^  per  cent.  There  are  three 
reasons  why  this  should  be  the  case. 

First— and  much  the  most  important  point.- Z//^' 
Dual  Monarchy  publishes  no  regular  lists  of  .killed  and 
uoundcd*  There  are  not  even  private  lists  published  in 
any  useful  number,  such  as  the  (ierman  authorities 
'  foolishly  allowed  to  be  published  for  so  long.  There  have 
reached  this  country  and  other  portions  of  the  alliance 
occasional  calculations  based  upon  particular  hospitals, 
but  they  are  not  sufficiently  widespread  to  give  a  true 
axerage. 

The  second  reason  the  Austro-Hungarian  losses  are 
more  difficult  to  calculate  than  the  German  is  that  the 
number  of  effectives  in  the  field  under  the  .\ustro-Huii- 
garian  Colours,  including  the  au.xiliary  services,  is  more 
difficult  to  calculate.  In  the  earlier  part  of  the  war 
my  estimates  of  Austro-Hungarian  losses  were  exagger- 
ated because  the  only  mode  of  calculation  available  to 
me  was  a  rough  rule  of  thumb  based  upon  the  propor- 
tion between  the  Austro-Hungarian  population  and  the 
German.  But  the  Austrian  army  in  the  field  is  not  of 
so  high  a  proportion  to  the  German  as  is  the  total  popula- 
tion. The  population  is  nearly  80  per  cent  of  the  German. 
But  the  army  maintained  in  the  field,  as  only  became 
clear  when  fairly  full  evidence  was  available,  is  in  :a 
smaller  proportion  than  this  to  the  German  army  main- 
tained in  the  field.  Now  it  is  largely  upon  the  army 
maintained  in  the  field  and  upon  the  rate  of  loss  in 
particular  units  of  it  as  observed  by  its  opponents  that 
total  losses  must  be  gauged  when  lists  (which,  however 
incomplete,  are  an  admirable  basis  of  calculation.*) 
are  unobtainable  ;  the  only  other  tests  being  the  in- 
formation of  spies  as  to  (a)  average  numbers  of  drafts 
per  month  (b)  admissions  to  hospital. 

Under  this  same  heading  we  must  remark  that  not 
only  is  the  Austro-Hungarian  army  in  the  field  smaller 
than  the  total  population  might  seem  to  warrant,  but 
also  it  is  not  quite  certain  that  all  possible  elements  even 
of  that  population  are  available  for  recruitment.  Four 
per  cent,  of  it,  for  instance,  are  in  the  annexed  provinces 
of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  More  than  16  per  cent,  of 
it  is  in  Cialicia.  It  is  probable  that  in  the  former  category, 
and  certain  that  in  the  latter,  very  large  numbers  of  the 
later  recruitment  were  not  available,  .\gain,  there  has 
been   a  verv  heavy  emigration   from   .Austria-Hungary, 

•  The  very  interesting  and  informing  Hungarian  correspondent  of 
the  Morning  Post  mentions  Usts.  I  take  it  they  are  not  pubUc  ones  ? 
I'or  none  such  are  to  my  knowledge  available. 

•  .\s  an  example  of  how  a  falsified  and  incomplete  list  may  bo 
of  the  greatest  value  a<«a  foundation  for  an  exact  estimate.  I  will 
refer  my  readers  to  the  note,  three  weeks  ago,  on  the  German  Prisoners 
in  I'ren'ch  camps.  Specific  instances  gave  an  error  in  tlie  olTicial  lists 
of  70  per  cent.  The  lists,  though  thus  proved  false,  were  the  foundation 
of  an  exact  calculation. 


especially  during  the  last  twenty  years,  the  losses  in 
recruitment  from  which,  though  not  to  be  exactly  esti- 
mated are  appreciable.* 

The  third  reason  which  makes  it  difficult  to  estimate 
the  Austro-Hungarian  losses  is  the  nature  of  the  fighting 
in  which  the  Austro-Hungarian  armies  have  been  engaged. 

Save  in  the  earliest  months  (jf  the  war,  when  the 
Russian  and  Serbian  armies  were  engaged  with  Austro- 
Hungarian  forces  alone,  that  clu'ck  upon  calculation 
which  consists  in  noting  from  prisoners  and  captured 
documents,  from  the  occasional  counting  of  bodies  in 
front  of  the  line,  or,  in  the  ca^e  of  an  advance,  of  men 
left  killed  and  wounded  in  the  territory  occupied,  was  not 
available.  During  the  greater  part  of  the  seventeen  months 
we  are  considering,  German  units  were  mixed  up  with 
AuLitrian  against  the  Russians  or  against  the  Serbians, 
and  there  was  some  confusion  consequent  upon  the  check- 
ing. While  upon  the  Italian  front  Austrian  forces  did 
not  come  into  play  until  more  than  half  the  period  had 
elapsed,  and  no  one  considerable  Austrian  offensive  has 
taken  place  there. 

To  these  three  main  sources  of  difficulty  we  must 
add  the  peculiar  form  of  recruitment  which  makes  it 
more  difticult  in  the  case  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  forces 
to  establish  exactly  the  units  in  front  of  one  than  it  is 
in  the  case  of  the  German.  Separate  units  upon  different 
fronts  often  bear  the  same  number. 

Having  appreciated  the  difficulties  we  may  yet  turn 
to  the  evidence  a\ailable.  such  a^;  it  is,  and  that,  as  in 
the  case  of  all  the  other  armies  consists  in  several  different 
forms  of  estimate  independent  one  of  the  other,  and  check- 
ing one  with  the  other. 

The  first  of  these  forms  is  the  analogy  with  the  known 
losses  of  other  great  groups  in  the  War. 

The  second  is  the  proportionate  losses  noted  in  a 
large  number  of  units  by  our  Allies  who  are  fighting  the 
Austro-Hungarian  troops  and  the  averaging  from  these 
of  total  losses,  together  with  the  known  number  of 
Austrian  prisoners  taken  by  our  Allies. 

The  third  form  of  estimate  is  drawn  from  what  wc 
know  of  the  classes  the  .\ustro-Hungarians  ha\-e  been 
compelled  to  call  up,  which  is  an  index  of  their  exhaustion. 

On  the  analogy  of  the  other  forces  engaged  in  the 
great  War  we  should  arrive  for  the  seventeen  months  at 
something  approaching  the  average  of  the  armies  main- 
tained in  the  field.  Germany  with  a  field  army  (and 
auxiliaries)  of  rather  less  than  four  millions  has  lost  from 
over  three-and-a-half  to  less  than  four  millions  of  men. 
And  the  German  proiwrtion  applies,  as  might  be  expected, 
with  but  slight   differences  to  the  other  armies  at  work. 

The  German  authorities,  in  a  statement  made  to. 
and  used  bv,  their  propagandists  in  neutral  countries 
(particularly  in  Holland)  have  told  us  that  their  Ally's 
effectives  are  little  more  than  half  their  own.  They  have 
put  them  at  56  per  cent. 

Now  it  is  obviously  to  the  advantage  of  the  German 
authorities  when  attempting  to  impress  neutral  opinion 
to  make  themselves  out  particularly  efficient  in  mobilisa- 
tion as  in  everything  else.  Let  us,  however,  accept  this 
minimum  German  estimate  and  say  that  Austria-Hungary 
has  maintained  in  the  field,  counting  all  auxilliary 
services,  an  army  of  no  more  than  2,400,000  men, 
making  that  number  her  standard  and  filling  gaps  as 
best  she  might. 

Tiien,  on  the  analogy  of  the  other  armies,  we  might 

•  (Jne  official  estimate  on  llic  Conlinent  gives  joo.oou  lor  tl;is 
figure. 


8 


March  23,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


expect  Austrian  losses  to  be  somewliat  less  than  or  at 
the  most  equal  to  this  figure.  That  is,  the  total  Austrian 
numbers  on  the  strength  would  not  be  more  than,  say, 
two  and  a  quarter  million  men,  or,  at  the  most  2,400,000. 
We  shall  see  in  a  moment,  that  this  estimate  is  almost 
certainly  insufficient  in  the  case  of  Austria-Hungary 

In  the  second  category  of  evidence  we  have  the 
notes  of  losses  taken  by  those  against  whom  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  forces  have  been  in  conflict. 

The  method,  which  is  a  commonplace  in  every 
service,  is  as  follows  : — 

You  identify  from  prisoners  or  from  wounded  and 
dead  the  units  opposed  to  you  in  a  particular  action. 
You  question  prisoners  with  regard  to  losses  in  the  units 
to  which  they  belong.  Their  evidence  varies,  of  course, 
very  largely,  according  to  their  intelligence,  their  in- . 
formation,  their  rank,  the  length  of  their  service,  their 
willingness  to  give  evidence. 

Method  of  Estimate 

But  when  you  have  been  able  to  sift  a  very  large 
number  of  such  pieces  of  evidence  and  duly  to  weigh 
tbem,  you  arrive  at  a  fairly  close  estimate.  You  cannot, 
of  course,  establish  results  for  cverj'  unit,  you  cannot 
ev.en  identify  e\-ery  effort,  but  after  a  prolonged  period 
of  fighting  you  will  have  covered  so  wide  a  field  as  to 
furnish  you  with  results  which  you  arc  the  more  inclined 
to  accept  if  they  regularly  confirm  each  other,  and  further 
maintain  their  average  as  time  goes  on.  You  are  fre- 
quently able,  though  at  rarer,  intervals  than  in  the  case 
of  prisoners,  to  check  your  results  by  captured  documents. 

You  establish  as  closely  as  possil^le  the  total  of  all 
the  units  actually  engaged  against  you  over  the  time 
concerned,  and  you  apply  your  a^'erage  to  that  total. 

The  Italian  General  Staff  has  made  such  an  estimate 
of  the  proportionate  losses  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
units  opposed  to  them  from  their  entry  into  the  war. 
The  Russian  Higher  Command  has  similarly  obtained  an 
estimate  of  which  the  figures  I  quote  run  up  to  the  end 
of  July,  iqi5.  Both  these  estimates  roughly  tally,  allow- 
ing for  the  difference  between  trench  warfare  and  the 
warfare  upon  the  Eastern  front  up  to  the  autumn.  The 
average  losses  of  a  permanent  character  which  these 
estimates  combined  give  for  the  whole  of  the  Austro-, 
Hungarian   forces  is  as  high  as  180,000  a  month. 

Now  this  is  an  exceedingly  high  figure  for  the  forces 
involved  and  an  impartial  observer,  concerned  only  to 
arrive  at  the  truth  and  suspecting  bias  in  the  opponents 
of  Austria-Hungary,  might  legitimately  question  it.  He 
might  demand,  what  cannot  be  given  here,  and  indeed 
does  not  exist  in  any  complete  form,  documentary  proof. 
Such  an  observer  would  point  out  with  justice  that  the 
field  of  computation  was  far  from  imiversal,  concerned 
only  a  certain  proportion  of  the  forces  engaged,  and  was 
distributed  over  incomplete  periods  of  time. 

This  is  true  ;  and  I  do  not  mean  to  affirm  so  high  a 
figure.  One  certainly  cannot  affirm  it  with  the  same 
certitude  as. one  can  the  minimum  of  German  losses,  for 
the  evidence  is  nothing  like  so  complete. 

But  we  must  recall,  on  the  other  hand,  certain  circum- 
stances peculiar  to  the  case,  which  render  the  figure 
mentioned  less  improbable  than  it  seems  at  first  blush. 
•  .  In  the  first  place,  the  number  of  Austro-Hungarian 
prisoners  taken  by  Serbians,  Italians  and  Russians  com- 
liined  is  at  least  a  million.  A  few  mav  have  escaped 
during  the  over-numing  of  Serbia,  but  their  number 
would  be  insignificant. . 

This  excessive  number  of  prisoners  is  largely  accounted 
for  by  the  nature  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  recruitment- 
including  as  it  does  men  of  Polish ,  Ruthenian,  Roumanian 
and  Serbian  nationality,  and  by  the  continuous  advance  of 
the  Russians  over  Slav  territory  for  the  first  nine  months 
of  the  war,  coupled  with  the  breakdown  of  the  first 
Austrian  armies  in  the  field,  At  any  rate,  this  figure  is 
well  established.  Such  a  figure  for  prisoners— the  only 
solid  bit  of  statistics  we  have — is  quite  abnormal.  It  is, 
in  proportion  to  the  armies  in  the  field,  more  than  three 
times  the  French  and  five  or  six  times  the  German. 
It  leaves,  at  the  rate  of  180,000  a  month  only  about 
120,000  men  a  month  to  be  accounted  for  in  other  ways, 
say  5  per  cent,  a  month  of  the  forces  in  the  field. 

We  must  further  remember  that  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian army  has  had  the  very  worst  climatic  conditions 
and  very  bad  conditions  of  ground  as  well.     The  bulk 


of  the  German  army  has  always  been  on  the  West.  The 
Austro-Hungarian  army  has  had  the  terrible  winter  fighting 
in  Galicia  and  in  the  Carpathians  against  it.  Its  great 
defeat  in  Serbia  took  place  in  the  heart  of  the  winter  and 
in  the  mountains,  and  even  on  the  Italian  front  its  main 
forces  are  massed  upon  a  sector  of  a  few  miles  against 
which  the  whole  weight  of  the  admirable  Italian  heavv 
artillery  is  continuously  directed. 

If  this  second  form  of  estimate — the  Russian  and 
Italian — be  admitted,  we  get  for  the  total  Austro-Hun- 
garian losses  just  over  three  million  men  :  a  much  higher 
proportion  than  the  permanent  losses  of  the  Germans, 
the  French,  or  English,  in  proportion  to  their  respective 
armies  continuously  maintained  in  the  field. 

But  there  is  a  type  of  information  which  seems  more 
conclusive  than  cither  of  these  two,  and  which  inchnes 
one  strongly  towards  accepting  the  highest  figure.  That 
information  is  the  present  condition  of  recruitment  in 
Austria-Hungary.  The  exhaustion  of  available  men  in 
that  country  has  quite  clearly  reached  limits  not  yet 
attained  in  France  or  even  in  Germany.  (In  the  case  of 
Russia,  England,  and  Italy  there  is  no  comparison,  for  the 
proportionate  reserve  of  man-power  in  all  these  three 
countries  is  enormously  greater  than  in  France,  Germany, 
or  Austria-Hungary.) 

Note  these  points  : — France,  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  have  all  of  them  called  up  the  class  1916,  but 
France  has  not  yet,  I  believe,  put  the  men  of  this  class 
imder  fire.  Germany  has  already  done  so  in  a  large 
degree.  Austria-Hitiipary  hzgan  earlier,  and  by  noic  lias 
done  so  in  a  very  large  propoiiion  indeed. 

Again,  France  called  up  (for  lengthy  training)  her 
iqi7  class  on  the  ist  of  January.  Germany  (which 
gives  a  much  shorter  training),  has  warned  her  1917 
class  but  not  yet,  I  believe,  called  them  up,  save  in 
small  numbers.  Austria-Hungary  called  up  her  1917 
class  in  its  entirety  as  early  as  last  October. 

Again,  neither  in  France  nor  in  Germany  has  the 
1918  class  been  affected  at  all.  In  Austria-Hungary  the 
1918  class  has  b:en  already  gone  ihreugh  and  xvarncd 
for  service  this  year.  It  is  true  that  the  warning  is  for 
the  autumn,  but  all  the  organisation  of  this  class  has 
been  already  accomplished,  and  these  lads  are  ready  to 
be  called  out  as  early  as  the  Spring. 

Again,  Austria-Hungary  warned  for  incorporation 
in  January,  the  month  just  passed,  her  Landsturm  up 
to  50  years  of  age. 

In  general,  Austria-Hungary  can  be  proved  to  be 


SORTES      SHAKESPEARIAN^, 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE. 


VERDUN. 

Victory  with  little  loss  doth  play 

Upon  the  dancing  banners  of  the  French. 

KING    JOHN    n..    i.,    307-8. 


RANCOURS    AT    WESTMINSTER, 

Civil  dissension  is  a  viperous  worm 
That  gnaii's  the  bowels  of  the  common- 
wealth. 


I.    HENRY    VI..     III.,    i.i     72J. 


REICHSTAG     HEROICS. 

Now  could  I  drink  hot  blood 
And  do  sJ4ch  bitter  business  as  The  Day 
J I 'out d  quake  to  look  on. 

HAMLET     III.,    ii.,    408-10. 


LAND      A  N  n      ^\'  A  T  E  R 


March  23. 


1916, 


***inmoninf^  classes  older  or  yountjor  than  those  alrcudy 
summoned  in  the  two  other  countries  which  are  fully 
conscript  and  feelinj,'  the  exhaustion  of  m^n,  Germany 
and  France.  She  is  i)roved  to  be  calling  upon  those 
resources  earlier  than  her  Allies  or  opponents.  She  has 
even  made  it  legal,  in  case  of  necessity,  to  call  men  up 
to  the  age  of  55. 

It  is  this  last  group  of  facts,  the  demonstrable  ex- 
haustion of  men  as  proved  by  the  nature  of  the  drafts 
now  required,  which  is  by  far  the  most  signilicant  of  all 
three.  It  is  the  conclusion  of  those  from  whom  I  draw 
these  statistics,  and  the  legitimate  conclusion — since 
she  has  clearly  gone  further  in  abnormal  methods  of 
recruitment  than  any  other  Power — that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  permanent  losses,  added  to  the  floating 
margin  of  temporary  losses  is  more  severe  in  projiortion 
to  the  ultimate  numbers  available  than  is  the  case  even  in 
(iermany,  and,  u  forliori.  more  severe  than  is  the  case  in 
France.  And  that  evidence  inclines  us  much  more 
nearly  to  the  figure  of  three  million  than  to  the  lower 
hgure  of  2,400,000. 

It  is  true  that  the  Au^tro-Hungarian  losses,  if  they 
approach  or  reach  tluee  million,  are  much  larger  in  pro- 
portion to  the  armies  in  the  field  tlian  the  corresponding 
losses  of  the  French  or  the  German  or  the  British.  F-vcn 
if  the  Germans  have  lost  four  millions,  an  Austrian  total 
of  three  millions  would  be  disjiorportionatelv  high.     But 


one's  belief  that  they  have  approximated  to  that  loss  is 
founded  up()n  the  extreme  measures  they  are  already 
taking  to  till  the  gaps  in  their  ranks. 

Befont  leaving  the  matter  there  is  a  way  of  con- 
sidering it  which  should  not  be  neglected  and  which 
confirms  this  conclusion. 

We  must  not  lofe  sight  of  the  fact  that  though 
a  lo.ss  of  three  millions  is  higher  even  than  the  German  loss 
in  i)roportion  to  the  effectives  in  the  field,  it  is  not  hi'^lier 
in  proportion  to  total  population.  The  total  population 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy  is  to  that  of  the  German  limpire 
(by  the  last  statistics)  as  rather  more  than  50  is  to  64, 
and  in  that  proportion  an  Austrian  loss  of  three  millions 
would  only  mean  a  (ierman  loss  of  about  three  millions 
and  seven-eighths. 

To  sum  up  : — There  is  no  very  precise  conclusion 
obtainable  upon  Austro-Hungariaii  losses  from  our  present 
evidence.  We  can  only  arrive  at  a  margin  of  error  as 
wide  as  that  between  2{  millions  and  3  millions,  i.e., 
a  margin  of  over  13  per  cent.  Our  most  reliable 
form  of  evidence  gives  us  no  more  than  the  general 
statements,  that  the  supeiior  exhaustion  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  recruitment  points  to  a  loss  certainly 
superior  (in  proportion)  to  that  of  the  other  belligerents, 
and  that  this  would  mean  a  loss  superior  to  the  lowest 
of  2  j  millions  or  2,400,000,  and  probably  nearer  three 
millions. 


THE    FALL    OF    VON    TIRPITZ 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


IF  the  fall  of  von  Tirpitz  has  mystified  us  in  this 
country,  it  seems  to  have  puzzled  his  country- 
men no  less.  That  the  excuse  of  ill  health  is  a 
mere  excuse,  and  that  in  fact  he  has  been  dis- 
missed, and  dismissed  because  of  differences  with  the 
Chancellor  seem  to  be  admitted  by  the  German  papers. 
The  cry  of  the  Keichstag  Conservatives  for  a  more 
ruthless  submarine  war,  shows  that  his  fall  is  taken  to 
herald  the  abandonment  of  the  sinking-at-sight  policy. 

Inconsistent  Policies 

But  there  are  two  difficulties  in  the  way  of  our  accept- 
ing this  interpretation  of  so  dramatic  a  change.  First, 
there  have  been  official  announcements  that  the  policy 
of  sinking  armed  merchantmen  will  be  pursued  without 
modification,  and  that  between  March  ist  and  March 
18th,  nineteen  enemy  vesssls  have  been  sunk,  of 
an  aggregate  displacement  of  over  40,000  tons.  It 
hardly  seems  consistent  with  any  softening  of  the  cam- 
paign that  boasts  such  as  these  should  be  made.  But 
su:h  statements  must  be  made,  if  only  to  keep  up  the 
country's  spirits — for  we  know  how  frightfulness  cheers 
the  hungry  German.  Secondly,  still  less  consistent  are 
the  two  outrages  perpetrated  on  the  Dutch  liners.  For 
that  matter  the  attacks  on  the  Tubantia  and  Valemhxng 
are  without  precedent — and  inconsistent  with  any  pro- 
fessed German  policy.  The  sailing  of  the  Tubxntia  had 
neen  widely  advertised  in  the  German  papers.  No 
belligerent  liner  of  13,000  tons  displacement  has  been  seen 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Noord  Hinder  Lightship  for 
a  great  many  months.  It  is  true  she  was  sunk  at  night, 
but  then  her  name  was  displayed  upon  her  side  in  letters 
20  feet  high,  each  letter  illuminated  with  electric  lights 
like  a  facade  of  a  picture  palace  before  the  days  of 
Zeppelin  raids.  That  she  was  torjX^docd  cannot  be 
cpiestioned.  But  it  was  not  apparently  seen  whether 
the  torpedo  was  discharged  from  a  submarine  or  from 
a  destroyer.  If  from  a  destroyer,  she  might  ha\(>  fallen 
10  a  long  range  shot.  In  any  event,  illuminated  as  she 
was,  it  must  have  been  obvious  that  there  could  hv  no 
ground  for  supposing  that  it  was  a  belligerent  ship  dis- 
guised as  a  neutral.  It  was  a  million  to  one  against  her 
having  any  cargo  for  Fngland  ;  there  were  heavy  odds 
against  there  Ix'ing  any  English  passengers  on  board- 
for  these  would  travel  by  the  ordinary  Channel  mail 
boats — there  was  a  high  probability  of  the  ship  carrying 
a  considerable  quota  of  Americans.  The  only  taint  of 
belligerency  in  the  case  of  the  'fufxintia  w.is  that  she  did 
intend  to  call  at  Falmouth,  l-'ven  this  was  lacking  in  the 
case  of   the    Palembang.     Here    a  ship    bound    straight 


The  more 
incidents  were 
either  from  the 
T  here  is 
I'    boats 


for  the  Dutch  overseas  possessions,  was  deliberatelv 
attacked,  not  by  one  but  by  three  torpedoes,  the  first  of 
wliich  ajjparently  did  not  explode— at  midday  and  in 
broad  daylight.  The  Tnbantia,  as  a  German  communique 
points  out,  was  not  even  in  the  war  zone,  and  neither  was 
armed.  How  then  can  their  sinking  be  explained  ?  It 
is  possible  that  both  were  sunk  by  submarines  whose 
commanders  had  received  von  Tirpitz's  instructions,  and 
not  those  of  his  successcf.  It  is  also  possible  that  the  \'on 
Tirpitz  instructions  went  far  beyond  any  public  pro- 
fessions. 

probable  explanation  is  that  both 
outside  any  instructions  received 
Grand  Admiral  or  from  von  'Capelle. 
nothing  new  in  the  action  of  the  (ierman 
being  inconsistent  with  Germany's  public 
professions.  \Ve  saw  that  in  the  case  of  the  Arabic, 
the  Hesperian,  and  in  numerous  other  instances.  If,  in 
August  and  September,  their  conduct  showed  that 
the  submarine  commanders  were  too  nervous  and  excited 
to  make  their  acts  square  with  the  orders  of  their  superiors, 
it  is  not  likely  that  their  successors  of  to-tlay  will  be  any 
calmer,  l-or  the  circumstances  of  their  trade  are  not 
favourable  to  balanced  judgment.  We  have  no  precise 
information  as  to  Germany's  submarine  losses.  But  if 
they  were  formidable  in  September,  they  ha\e  certainly 
not  become  less  formidable  in  the  months  that  have 
passed  since  then.  There  can,  in  fact,  be  little  doubt 
that  of  their  original  strength  both  in  boats,  officers 
and  trained  crews,  practically  nothin.j;  now  remains. 

New   Submarines 

The  new  submarines  are  likely  en(?agh  of  a  displace- 
ment 50  or  100  per  cent,  greater  than  the  largest  of  the  old 
ones.  They  must  carry  much  larger  crews.  If,  for  example, 
they  are  armed  with  5-inch  guns,  each  gun  would  mean  an 
addition  of  at  least  25  men  to  the  personnel.  Each  increase 
of  power  needs  mon;  men  also.  A  submarine  displacing 
1,500  or  2,000  tons  armed  with,  say,  two  5.5  guns,  might 
have  to  carry  a  crew  of  at  lea.st  100  if  not  150.  And 
the  value  of  such  boats  would  increase  out  of  proportion 
with  the  increase  in  tonnage.  If  then  this  is  the  type 
of  vessel  on  which  the  Germans  are  now  relying, 
responsibilities  far  heavier  and  more  exacting  than  ever 
arc  now  laid  on  men  who  not  only  are  inexperienced,  but 
starting  on  their  business  knowing  only  too  well  the 
tragic  fate  of  all  their  predecessors.  It  is  said — I  do  not 
know  with  what  truth  -that  for  some  time  the  German 
Admiralty  has  ab.indoned  the  system  of  recruiting  the 
submarine    service    by    volunteers    from    the    fleet.     It 


10 


March  23,  1916. 


LAND      AND     WATER. 


had  to  be  abandoned  because  the  volunteers  were  not 
forthcoming. 

Tile  moral  of  such  a  situation  is  surely  ubvious. 
The  captain,  knowing  that  the  chances  of  bringing  him- 
self, his  boat,  and  his  crew  safely  home  are  slender,  is  not 
hkely  to  feel  himself  very  strongly  bound  by  any  orders 
whatever.  To  him  every  surface  ship  must  be  a  natural 
enemy.  In  the  early  days  of  the  campaign,  the  British 
jiress  rang  with  tales  of  the  prowess  of  merchant  captains 
who  had  run  down  submarines.  He  would  know  that  scores 
of  his  brother  officers  were  at  the  sea's  bottom  with  their 
boats,  and  he  might  easily  suppose  that  the  bulk  of  them 
had  fallen  to  the  ram,  His  own  bigger  vessel  could  not, 
it  is  probable,  be  submerged  or  manceuvred  as  rapidly  as 
the  smaller  boats  Haunted  by  fears,  encompassed  by 
dangers,  his  prospects,  in  any  event,  of  survival  being 
of  the  glocjmiest,  what  more  natural  than  orders  or  no 
orders  he  should  sink  everything  afloat  in  whose  immediate 
neighbourhood  he  fmds  himself  ?  He  might  plead  self- 
defence  for  acts  seemingly  as  senseless  as  the  destruction 
of  these  two  neutral  vessels.  And  at  the  back  of  his 
mind  he  would  have  this  recollection  to  encourage  him, 
that  submarine  war  is  after  all,  an  anonymous  secret 
kinc  of  business,  and  even  if  a  troublesome  diplomatic 
situation  did  arise,  it  would  always  be  open  to  his  em- 
ployer to  suggest  that  the  thing  had  been  done  by  a 
British  mine  or  by  a  British  submarine.  In  any  case, 
then^  should  be  no  proof  that  he  had  done  it.  In  finr, 
the  sinking  of  the  Tnbantia  and  the  Palcmb.mg,  insensate 
and  atrocious  as  they  are,  seem  to  me  to  be  almost 
necessary  incidents  in  the  kind  of  sea  war  that  Germany 
has  embarked  upon,  and  prove  nothing  either  way  as  to 
the  intended  limits  within  which  (iermany  might  wish 
to  keep  it. 

New  Factors 

On  the  whole  then  the  fall  of  Tirpitz  shows  that  the 
von  Tirpitz  policy  is  played  out.  What  has  brought  this 
about  ?  What  new  factors  have  come  into  being  since 
the  new  policy  was  announced  ?  Two,  either  of  which 
might  have  been  decisive  against  persistence.  The  two 
happening  together  had  to  be  decisive.  They  are  the 
failure  of  German  intrigue  at  Washington,  and  the  failure 
of  (ierman  arms  at  Verdun.  Until  the  Senate  and  the 
House  of  Representatives  had  j)assed  their  respective 
votes  of  confidence  in  the  President,  no  one  could  say  that 
Mr.  Wilson  was  free  to  act  as  the  honour  of  his  coimtry 
might  dictate.  It  is  obvious  even  to  the  Germans  that 
he  is  free  now.  Ihe  von  Tirpitz  policy  then  cannot  be 
carried  out  effectively  without  a  breach  with  the  United 
States.  And  once  diplomatic  relations  are  broken  off, 
American  belligerency  might  be  the  matter  of  a  short 
time  only. 

Now,  as  we  have  seen  during  the  last  seven  or  eight 
months,  Germany  has  again  ancl  again  been  willing  to 
risk  hostility  with  the  United  States.  Why  can  she  not 
face  that  risk  again  ?  She  cannot  face  it  because  her 
arms  have  failed  at  Verdun,  and  the  failure  shortens 
time  during  which  slie  can  keep  under  arms  at  all.  It  was 
the  essence  of  the  von  Tirpitz  policy  that  it  should  be 
carried  on  for  an  extended  period.  In  point  of  fact,  it 
would  have  to  be  carried  on  for  at  least  a  year  before  the 
results  it  aimed  at  could  be  achieved.  It  was  no  use  em- 
barking on  this  policy  then,  if  for  other  reasons  the  war 
was  bound  to  end  before  the  results  hoped  from  it  could 
mature.  It  will  make  this  argument  clearer  to  set  out 
what  the  von  Tirpitz  idea  seems  to  have  been. 

Von  Tirpitz  was  wildly  wrong  in  the  kind  of  Navy 
that  he  built,  and,  with  the  other  Cierman  statesmen,  was 
hopelessly  at  sea  in  his  forecast  of  England's  action  in  tlie 
kind  of  war  that  (iermany  intended  to  provoke.  But  it 
is  not  at  all  certain,  after  ihe  first  month  or  two  of  hostili- 
ties had  shown  that  the  war  would  be  a  long  one,  that  he 
was  not  the  fust  European  in  authority  to  foresee  the  role 
that  the  use  of  the  sea  would  play.  The  initial  success 
of  the  Gcrmin  submarines  against  the  British  Fleet  was 
moderate  enough  when  measured  by  the  number  of  vic- 
tims. But  it  probably  opened  the  Grand  Admiral's  eyes 
to  the  immensely  more  promising  iield  that  our  merchant 
shipping  aiforded.  And  in  a  long  war  the  merchant 
shij)ping  of  the  world,  whether  belligerent  or  neutral, 
would  obviously  be  the  only  factor  whereby  the  Allies 
could  cormterbalance  the  vastly  superior  organisation  of 
Germany.     \\'hen  von  Tirpitz,  therefore,  started  in  on 


his  submarine  building  campaign,  he  did  so  with  an 
object  only  announced  in  December.  He  must  have 
seen  from  the  lirst  that  it  could  only  be  a  matter  of  time 
before  Great  Britain  and  her  Allies  awoke  to  the  fact  that 
in  forbearing  from  the  blockade  of  Germany,  they  were 
neglecting  the  strongest  weapon  they  possessed.  He 
must  have  expected  the  blockade  to  have  come  sooner 
than  it  did,  and  to  prove  itself  more  effective  than  for 
many  months  it  was.  In  point  of  fact,  it  was  his  own 
mine  and  submarine  campaign  that  precipitated  us  into 
proclaiming  as  a  reprisal  a  measure  which  should,  in 
fact,  have  been  our  initial  stroke  of  policy.  And  even  von 
Tirpitz  could  hardly  have  counted  upon  the  blockade's 
long  inefficiency,  fiut  blockade  or  no  blockade,  he  kept 
his  eye  upon  the  main  truth  of  the  situation,  which  was 
and  is,  that  Great  Britain's  capacity  to  conduct  military 
ojjerations  over  sea,  and  the  Allies'  capacity  to  carry  on 
military  operations  in  their  own  countries  were,  and  still 
are,  entirely  dependent  upon  sea  supplies  of  food  and  raw 
material,  and  munitions  of  war  coming  to  us  and  them  by 
water. 

Importance  of  Sea  Supplies 

With  the  submarines  at  the  disposal  of  von  Tirpitz 
at  the  beginning  of  things,  little  more  could  be  expected 
than  the  isolation  or  partial  isolation  of  Great  Britain. 
But,  in  fact,  the  range  of  action  of  submarines,  even  of 
those  whose  capacity  should  have  been  well  known,  proved 
to  be  far  greater  than  anyone  anticipated,  so  that  the  first 
boats  built  under  the  new  programme  had  no  difficulty 
in  making  their  way,  not  only  round  the  North  of  Scotland 
to  operate  in  the  Atlantic,  but  even  to  pass  the  Straits  of 
Gibraltar  and  to  get  to  work  in  the  Mediterranean. 

In  taking  a  sanguine  view  then  of  the  submarine's 
capacity  to  do  the  work  he  expected  of  it,  von  Tirpitz  made 
a  far  juster  estimate  of  the  situation  than  anyone  else. 
It  was  not  any  defect  in  the  boats  or  their  commandei|s 
that  prevented  their  success  from  being  as  great  as  he 
expected.  Von  Tirpitz  made  two  capital  mistakes.  Ho 
underestimated  the  courage  both  of  allied  and  neutral 
seamen.  And  he  grossly  underestimated  the  capacity 
of  the  British  Admiralty  to  organise  a  counter-campaign. 

But  notwithstanding  these  mistakes,  it  is  folly  not  to 
recognise  that  his  conception  of  the  importance  of  sea 
supply  to  the  Allies  was  perfectly  correct,  and  that  in 
organising  an  attack  upon  it,  he  was  striking  straight  at 
the  very  lieart  of  our  power  to  carry  on  the. war.  It  is 
equally  folly  not  to  recognise  that  in  spite  of  everything 
he  achieved  a  very  great  success  indeed.  Before  the 
submarine  campaign  290  British,  Allied  and  neutral  ships 
had  been  lost  to  the  world's  shipping,  either  detained  in 
enemy  ports  at  the  beginning  of  war,  or  captured,  or 
sunk.  Since  the  creation  of  the  war  zone  702  more  have 
been  sunk,  captured  or  damaged  by  mines  and  submarines 
and  15  were  captured  by  the  Mneivc.  From  Allied  and 
neutral  shipping  then,  there  has  been  a  reduction  of  at 
least  1,000  vessels  since  the  war  began.  Not  more 
thim  a  third  has  been  replaced  by  enemy  ships. 

Of  enemy  vessels  805  are  in  belligerent  or  neutral 
ports,  or  sunk,  and  destroyed,  and  of  course  many  more  are 
tied  up  in  home  ports.  We  can  probably  assume  that 
the  enemy  vessels  are  no  loss  to  the  world's  shipping, 
because  enemy  trade,  and  therefore  enemy  demands  on 
the  world's  shipping  are  at  an  end  also.  But  the  thous- 
and vessels  which  we,  our  Allies,  and  neutrals  have  lost 
do  not  represent  even  a  third  of  the  vessels  withdrawn 
from  the  transportation  of  goods.  For  the  military 
requirements  of  France,  Great  Britain  and  Italy,  in  the 
Channel  and  the  Mediterranean,  ha\'e  withdrawn  the 
best  part  of  another  3,000  vessels. 

Von  'iirpitz  lealised  that  if  the  attack  on  mer- 
chant shipping  'were  pushed  to  tlii'  highest  iK)int  of 
ruthlessness,  that  the  time  would  come  when  tncat  Jiritain 
would  have  to  choose  between  a  limitation  of  her  military 
activities  over  sea,  or  going  without  either  the  financial 
advantages  of  an  import  and  export  trade,  or  adequate 
supplies  for  her  home  population,  or,  indeed,  both.  We 
have  always  all  of  us  spoken  of  the  submarine  campaign  as 
a  failure,  and  a  failure  of  comse  it  is,  because  the  700  ships 
or  so  that  have  been  sunk  or  put  out  of  action  by  Jt, 
have  not,  in  fact,  sufficed  either  to  stop  our  oversea  cam- 
])aigns,  or  to  prevent  the  Allies  drawing  on  North  and 
South  America  and  the  British  Colonies  for  the  supplies,  . 
munitions  and  raw  materials  needed  for  feeding  their 


II 


LAND      AND     WATER, 


March  23,  igifi. 


population  and  carryine;  on  the  war.  But  the  loss  has 
raised  the  cost  of  freight  enormously.  It  has  conipslled 
us  to  stop  the  imports  of  certain  kinds  of  hixurics.  It 
does  leave  us  with  700  fewer  ships  at  our  disposal,  if  the 
exigencies  of  war  make  it  desirable  to  start  upon  a  new 
and  distant  overseas  campaign  of  great  magnitude. 

Von  Tirpitz  realised  from  the  first  that  great  as  was 
our  margin  in  fighting  ships,  it  yet  could  not  be  considered 
a  margin  adequate  for  the  vast  responsibilities  thrown 
upon  the  British  Fleet.  He  probably  then  counted  on 
the  national  siiipbuilding  effort  being  limited  to  thi? 
requirements  of  the  Navy.  If  he  did,  he  calculated  rightly. 
In  our  long-drawn-out  wars  against  revolutionary  France 
and  Napoleon,  our  annual  loss  of  ships  was  no  doubt 
enormously  heavy,  but  it  was  a  loss  that  was  replaced 
almost  as  fast  as  it  occurred.  Almost  e\ery  coast  town 
with  a  suitable  harbour  had  its  local  ship-builder.  But 
the  increase  in  the  tonnage  of  merchantmen,  and  over  <)o 
per  cent,  of  our  trade  being  carried  in  iron  or  steel  built 
ships  propelled  by  steam,  have  changed  all  that.  And 
we  have,  as  a  fact,  not  attempted  to  replace  the  tonnage 
withdrawn  for  war  purposes  or  destroyed  by  the  enemy. 
All  losses,  then,  are  net  deductions  from  the  carrying- 
power  available. 

Fatal  Weakness 

For  the  Tirpitz  policj'  to  succeed,  it  was  not  necessary 
to  destroy  all  belligerent  shipping.  All  that  was  necessary 
was  to  bring  us  down  to  the  margin  that  would  mean  dis- 
tress. Could  not  larger,  faster  and  wider  ranging  sub- 
marines effect  something  akin  to  the  "  general  strike  " 
that  Continental  syndicalists  used  to  hope  for  to  paralyse 
capital  into  surrender  ?  Could  not  a  general  arrest  of  sea 
carriage  bring  Great  Britain  down  to  the  want  line  in 
another  year  ? 

There  were  two  fatal  weaknesses  in  the  policy.  In 
the  first  place  it  needed  time  before  success  could  be 
achieved.  In  the  second  place  it  could  not  succeed  if 
only  belligerent  ships  were  attacked.  Since  February 
of  last  year,  rather  over  100  neutral  vessels  have  been 
sunk  by  submarines,  and  nearly  an  equal  number  by 
mines.  Von  Tirpitz  probably  thought  the  Swedish, 
Norwegian  and  Danish  and  Dutch  ships  could  be  des- 
troyed with  impunity.  But  here  the  change  in  the 
American  situation  has  changed  the  situation  for  all 
neutrals  who  choose  to  make  common  cause  with  America. 
Indeed,  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  Tuhxntia  and 
Palambzng  incidents  rr.jy  precipitate  the  neutrals  getting 
together  on  this  question.  In  any  event,  whether  it 
implied  the  sinking  of  neutral  ships  or  not,  no  great 
extension  of  the  submarine  attack  on  shipping  could  have 
been  made  without  involving  neutral  interests  and  neutral 
dignity  to  the  danger  point.  If  Germany  had  been 
sure  of  being  able  to  carry  on  say,  for  the  full  three 
years  that  Lord  Kitchener  is  said  to  have  thought 
probable  in  August,  1914,  then  the  hostility  of  America 
would  have  been  worth  risking.  It  certainly  would  have 
been  worth  risking  if  a  real  paralysis  of  the  world's  sea 
service  could,  have  been  achieved.  The  point  of  the 
present  situation  is  that  the  failure  at  Verdun  makes  it 
obvious  that  results  cannot  be  got  in  time. 

We  shall  probably  therefore  see  the  submarine  cam- 
paign continuing  very  much  on  the  Hues  of  the  last  six 
months.  Atlantic  liners  will  probably  be  spared,  and  care 
taken  as  far  as  possible  to  warn  ships  where  warning  can 
safely  be  given.  If  the  new  submarines  really  are  of  the 
dimensions  and  strength  that  nmiour  describes,  then  there 
can  be  no  excuse  for  not  warning  merchantmen  in  the 
majority  of  cases.  For  I  know  of  no  merchantman  so 
armed  as  to  be  capable  of  engaging  an  armament  of  5.5 
guns.  The  encounter  of  the  Clan  Mactavish  with  the 
Mocwe  is  at  any  rate  decisive  on  this  point.  And  there 
is  another  matter  in  regard  to  the  big  submarine  that 
must  be  borne  in  mind.  If  the  big  submarine  has  to 
carry'  a  larger  crew  because  of  its  armament  and  greater 
power,  it  does  not  at  all  follow  that  double,  treble,  or 
even  four  times  the  crew  of  the  old  vessels  would  tax  its 
capacity.  The  weight  of  the  men  and  two  months' 
supplies  for  them  wtiuld  not.  be  a  formidable  addition  to 
the  displacement.  This  capacity  will  enable  submarines 
to  carry  prize  crews,  and  to  that  extent  relieve  the  com- 
mander of  the  responsibility  of  sinking  his  captures. 

Cviriously  enough  there  is  in  Tuesday  morning's 
papers  the  announcement  of  the  first  instance  of  this  being 


done.  A  British  submarine,  it  seems,  has  captured  the 
Norwegian  ship  Kon^  ht^e  on  a  journey  from  Sarpsborg 
to  Liibeck,  i)ut  a  prize  crew  on  board  and  sent  her  home 
to  Leith.  To  get  to  Liibeck  the  Kong  Inge  would  have 
to  pass  through  the  Sound  or  the  Great  or  Little  Belt. 
Tne  papers  do  not  siy  whether  the  capture  took  place  in 
the  Baltic  or  in  the  Kattegat.  .Vnyway  the  Kong  Inge 
had  run  short  of  coal  by  th-^  tim;  she  had  reached 
Frederikshavn,  which  is  ju-;t  opposite  Gothenburg^ 
about  twenty  miles  due  South  from  the  Skaw.  The  British 
subnurines  then  operating  in  these  waters  are  certainly 
carrying  enough  men  for  at  least  one  prize  crew.  If  the 
Germans  play  this  ganv,'  they  will  naturally  have  to  send 
their  prizes  to  .\merica  or  Spain.  It  is  certainly  one  of 
the  possibilities  of  the  situation  that  may  enable  Germany 
to  take  enough  ships  to  please  their  people  at  home — a 
crucial  matter — and  at'  the  same  tim-^  keep  out  of  trouble 
with  America.  .\RTHfR  Poi,i.f.n'. 

RUSSIA,  POLAND  AND   SERBIA 

.Although  he  is  one  of  the  most  eminent  of  Ru.ssian 
novelists,  Alexander  Kuprin's  work  is  little  known  to  Knglisli 
readers,  and  perusal  of  The  Exile  (George  Allen  and  Unwin, 
(«.)  affords  evidence  that  there  is  room  for  translations  of  all 
Kuprin's  works  into  this  language.  Like  Dostoievskv 
and  Goncharov,  Kuprin  gathers  his  materials  from  everyday 
life  :  in  the  manner  of  the  former,  he  draws  largely  from 
personal  experience,  and  this  book  is  concerned  with  life  in  a 
little  garrison  town,  before  the  Russo-Japanese  war  had  come 
to  cleanse  the  Russian  army  and  relieve  its  commissioned 
ranks  of  the  imputation  of  peculation  and  sloth. 

The  book  is  as  terrible  as  Tolstoi's  Resurrection,  as  ruth- 
less as  Hardy's  Jude,  and  as  tragic  as  either  ;  it  is,  at  the 
same  time,  an  analytic  study  of  Romasov,  the  hero,  and 
Shurochka  Nikolaiev,  the  heroine,  and  the  foibles  and  weak- 
nesses of  these  two  are  presented  together  with  their  virtues, 
so  that  they  stand  as  real  people.  The  author's  detachment 
is  such  that  we  are  hard  put  to  it  at  the  end  to  say  whether 
he  justifies  or  condemns  the  duel  as  sanctioned  in  the  Russian 
Army  ;  in  the  true  spirit  of  the  artist,  he  draws  a  picture,  and 
leaves  us  to  form  our  own  conclusions. 

In  the  preface  to  The  Jewa  of  Rissia  and  Poland,  by 
Israel  Friedlander  (G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  6s.  net),  the  author 
states  as  his  opinion  that  the  medLneval  attitude  toward  the 
Jews  was  "  prompted  by  none  other  than  utilitarian 
considerations,  for  which  the  Poles  need  not  perhaps  be 
blamed  but  for  which  they  certainly  deserve  no  credit."  His 
own  attitude  toward  his  subject  is  frankly — and,  to  the 
Gentile  reader,  perhaps  a  little  unduly — optimistic  and 
laudatorv.  At  the  same  time,  the  hostility  of  church  and 
state  toward  the  Jews  in  the  middle  ages — and  even  up  to 
modern  times  —makes  no  pleasant  reading,  for  it  shows  that 
whatever  may  be  one's  feelings  with  regard  to  the  Semitic 
question,  the  Jew  has  no  reason  to  love  those  of  his  neigh- 
bours who  reside  outside  the  Ghetto. 

The  criticism  which  this  work  affords  is  purely  historical, 
and  the  work  itself  stops  short  of  contemporary  events  con- 
cerning the  Jews  of  Poland.  For  the  author  is  more  con- 
cerned with  Poland  than  with  Russia.  Admitting  the  Semitic 
bias  of  tlie  author,  there  is  still  much  valuable  matter  in  his 
work,  which  forms  a  chapter  in  Polish  and  Russian  history, 
and,  being  authoritative,  will  command  the  attention  of 
students  of  Russia  and  of  Judaism. 

iMr.  and  Mrs.  Jan.  Gordon,  wandering  in  Serbia,  have 
perpetuated  an  exceedingly  inconsequent  volume  in  77»j 
Lxick  of  Thirteen  (Smith  Mlder  and  Co.,  7s.  6d.  net),  which 
is  as  scrappy  as  a  feminine  conversation,  and  at  the  same  time 
thoroughly  fascinating.  Here  and  there  the  grimness  of 
war  stands  out  with  startling  realism,  and  the  fate  that  has 
befallen  .Serbia  is  tragically  limned  in  vivid  sentences, 
then  one  is  caught  away  from  horrors  by  the  femininity  of 
"  Jo,"  and  again  interested  in  some  Serbian  Comitaj  or  biilky 
municipal  dignitary.  It  is  all  "  live  "  and  full  of  the  spirit 
of  courage  and  energy  in  a  time  of  utter  tragedy.  Some  fine 
illustrations  and  certain  clever  little  drawings  complete  this 
extremely  interesting  war  book,  which  is  far  more  worthy 
of  more  than  the  great  majority  of  publications  of  its  kind. 


Princess  Christian  will  preside  at  the  meeting  on  Women 
and  Farm  Labour  to  be  held  at  the  Kensington  Town  Hall 
on  Friday  afternoon,  March  31st.  The  chair  will  be  taken 
by  Lady  Wantage,  and  Miss  Gladys  Pott  will  speak  on  lier 
recent  visit  to  the  agricultural  districts  of  France. 


i.7 


March  23,  1916. 


LAND      AND     WATER 


I 


NEUTRALS  AT  THE  CROSS  ROADS 


By  John  Biichan 


SINCE  tlie  beginning  of  the  year,  two  speeches  have 
been  deUvered  in  America  which  will  probably 
rank  as  the  most  important  exercises  in  the 
spoken  word  which  the  world  has  seen  since  the 
outbreak  of  war.  The  speaker  was  Mr.  Elihu  Root,  an 
ex-Senator  of  the  United  States,  formerly  a  Secretary  of 
State,  and  one  of  the  foremost  living  American  jurists. 
One  speech  was  made  in  Washington,  another  to  the 
Republican  Convention  in  New  York  City.  They  dealt 
partly  with  American  domestic  politics  with  which  we 
are  not  concerned  ;  but  their  main  importance  lies  in  the 
fact  that  for  the  lirst  time  a  man  of  great  eminence  has 
stated  the  true  doctrine  of  the  interests  of  neutrals, 
stated  it  so  broadly  and  sanely  that  his  words  mark 
an  epoch  no  less  for  Britain  than  for  America,  for  the  Old 
World  as  well  as  for  the  New.  We  have  drifted  into  a 
legal  controversy  with  Washington  in  which  lawyers' 
arguments  have  been  bandied  across  the  table.  That 
way  there  lies  no  comfort.  It  is  our  business  to  get  back 
to  fundamentals,  and  raise  the  discussion  to  a  different 
plane.  Often  in  a  wordy  litigation  the  common  sense  of 
judge  or  jury  cuts  through  the  knots  of  dialectic  tied 
by  the  counsel  on  both  sides,  and  finds  that  a  very  plain 
((uestion  is  at  issue.  That  is  what  Mr.  Root  has  done. 
To  understand  the  significance  of  his  speech  we  must  go 
nack  a  little. 

German  Peace  Talk 

The  German  attitude  of  mind,  which  believes  in 
organised  Force  as  the  greatest  thing  in  life  and  denies 
any  rights  to  individuals  or  nations  which  they  cannot 
maintain  by  force,  is  by  now  familiar  enough  to  the  world. 
It  is  the  negation  of  the  political  ideals  of  the  Allies,  which 
are  based  on  a  reasonable  liberty,  and  is  indeed  a  denial 
of  what  is  commonly  regarded  aS  civilisation.  Germany 
hoped  to  realise  her  dream  through  her  mighty  armies, 
which  she  thought,  with  some  justice,  would  give  her 
the  land  hegemony  of  Europe.  But  in  recent  months 
she  has  begun  to  have  doubts  about  the  efficacy  of  this 
method.  She  has  made  immense  conquests  of  territory, 
but  to  her  surprise  she  seems  no  nearer  ending  the  war. 
The  Allies  have  shown  in  her  eyes  a  shameless  disregard 
of  the  rules  of  the  game  and  have  refused  to  acknowledge 
defeat. 

About  Christmas  the  Imperial  Chancellor  gave  an 
interview  to  an  American  journalist  and  quoted  "  a  high 
military  authority  "   to  the  following  effect : 

"  Germany  could  take  Paris.  It  would  only  be  a  question 
of  how  many  men  we  were  willing  to  sacrifice.  But 
that  would  not  bring  England  to  terms,  and  therefore 
would  not  end  the  war.  We  could  take  Petrograd.  But 
sujjpose  we  drove  the  Tsar  out  of  his  capital— Britain 
would  not  care.  We  could  drive  the  Italian  army  into 
the  sea — it  would  make  no  dift'erence  to  England.  The 
more  territory  we  occupy  the  thinner  our  lines  and  the 
greater  difficulty  in  supplying  them.  Going  ahead  on 
such  lines  would  help  England  more  than' us." 

Germany  is  tardily  recognising  the  meaning  of  Sea 
Power.  Many  wild  things  were  said  on  this  subject  before 
the  war.  Sea  Power  alone  will  not  give  victory  over  a 
military  Power.  By  itself  it  is  not  even  adequate  for 
defence.  But  now,  as  in  the  time  of  Napoleon,  it  stands 
between  the  land  conqueror  and  his  ambition.  "  Purpose- 
less they  surely  seemed  to  many,"  wrote  Admiral  Mahau 
of  Nelson's  ships  before  Toulon.  "  but  they  saved  Eng- 
land. Those  far-distant,  storm-beaten  ships,  upon  which 
the  Grand  Army  never  looked,  stood  between  it  and  the 
dominion  of  the  world."  It  is  as  true  to-day.  The 
German  High  Command  seem  to  have  become  converts 
to  the  creed  which  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  has  always 
preached.  It  is  Britain's  strength  on  the  sea  which 
bars  the  way  to  Germany's  hegemony  by  land.  But  for 
tha.t  fatal  Navy  an  early  decision  might  have  been  won. 
It  is  that  Navy,  too,  which  theatens  her  economic  endur- 
ance. The  "  freedom  of  the  seas,"  in  Germany's  sense 
of  the  phrase,  nuist  be  the  lirst  of  Germany's  winnings, 


even  if  to  gain  it  she  has  to  sacrifice  for  a  little  some  of 
her  cherished  territorial  dreams.  She  cannot  hope  to 
dictate  to  the  world  on  land  if  Britain  rules  the  water. 

During  the  winter  there  have  been  various  unofficial 
overtures,  emanating  chiefly  from  the  German  circles  of 
higli  finance.  French  and  British  business  men  have 
been  abjured  to  interfere  while  there  was  yet  time.  Is 
Europe,  it  has  been  asked,  to  make  a  present  of  her  com- 
merce to  America  ?  Suggestions  for  peace  have  followed. 
Their  tenor  has  varied,  but  the  terms  have  been  modera- 
tion itself  compared  to  those  which  filled  the  neutral 
press  nine  months  ago.  But  one  condition  has  been 
common  to  all.  Germany  demands  the  "  freedom  of  the 
seas."  In  this  respect  the  views  of  the  financiers  coincide 
with  those  of  the  naval  and  military  chiefs. 

The  Freedom  of  the  Seas 

This  high-sounding  phrase  is  worth  examining.  In 
Germany's  mouth  it  means  that  a  naval  Power  should  be 
compelled  during  a  campaign  to  tie  its  hands,  and  to 
treat  trade  with  neutral  countries  as  wholly  free,  except 
for  enemy  consignments  of  munitions  of  war.  The  land 
Power  will  have  the  free  use  of  its  hmbs,  but  the  naval 
Power  will  be  hobbled.  The  claim  is  a  curious  one  to  be 
made  by  a  people  who  have  sent  every  rule  of  civilised 
warfare  crashing  like  Alnaschar's  basket.  But  two 
blacks  do  not  make  a  white.  The  dictatorial  conduct  of 
the  British  fleet,  a  conscientious  neutral  might  argue, 
is  really  the  complement  on  the  sea  to  the  high-handed- 
ness of  the  German  armies  on  land.  It  is  less  brutal, 
to  be  sure,  but  it  is  no  less  arbitrary.  If  we  decline  to 
contemplate  a  German  hegemony  on  the  Continents  of 
F^urope  and  Asia,  why  should  the  world  tolerate  a  British 
hegemony  on  the  sea  ?  Each  of  them  is  a  form  of 
omnipotence,  and  therefore  has  mankind  at  its  mercy. 

This  argument  seems  to  have  impressed  a  certain 
proportion  of  American  observers.  But  it  is  fundament- 
ally unsound,  for  the  two  hegemonies  differ  in  kind  and 
in  purpose.  In  time  of  peace  the  seas  have  been  free 
for  law-abiding  citizens  of  all  countries  to  go  their  way 
upon.  This  freedom  was  won  by  the  British  fleet  300 
years  ago,  and  it  has  been  maintained  by  the  British 
fleet  ever  since.  Is  this  the  object  of  the  German  land 
hegemony  ?  A  control  exercised  on  behalf  of  hberty 
•  and  peace  is  one  thing,  and  a  conquest  sought  for  pride 
and  aggrandisement  is  another.  The  first  is  a  task  of 
police,  the  second  of  brigandage.  Now  that  all  nations 
are  subtly  hnked  together  the  sea  is  the  great  common 
highway  of  the  world,  and  its  routes  are  the  arteries  of 
every  nation's  commerce.  Let  us  imagine  what  the 
situation  would  be  if  Germany,  holding  her  present  creed, 
dominated  the  ocean  as  she  now  seeks  to  dominate  the 
land.  This  freedom  would  utterly  disappear.  The  sole 
security  for  its  continuance  is  that  Britain  still  rules  the 
water.  In  the  far  future,  when  the  domain  of  law  has 
grown,  this  pohce  work  may  be  internationahsed,  but  for 
the  present  it  must  be  done  by  the  only  Power  that  can 
do  it. 

It  is  true  that  in  the  course  of  the  war  Britain  has 
been,  forced  to  depart  from  some  of  the  practices  of 
International  maritime  law  in  which  she  had  hitherto 
acquiesced.  It  is  easy  to  fasten  on  such  minor  infractions  ; 
the  American  Note  of  November  5,  1915,  laboriously 
enumerated  them.  But  in  a  world  war,  where  con- 
ditions have  suffered  a  chemical  change,  some  such 
departures  were  inevitable.  Rules  framed  under  one 
set  of  circumstances  may  be  sheer  nonsense  under  another, 
and  International  Law,  like  all  human  law,  must  have  a 
certain  elasticity  and  conform  to  facts.  Some  of  the 
British  departures  may  have  borne  hardly  on  neutral 
commerce.  That  was  inevitable,  for  a  great  war  cannot 
be  strictly  delimited.  A  householder,  whose  house  has 
been  shaken  by  an  earthquake,  cannot  sue  on  his  coven- 
ant for  (]uiet  enjoyment.  If  neutral  rights  have  been 
infringed  in  minor  matters,  Britain  is  fighting  to  establisli 
the  greatest  of  all  neutral  rights,  the  right  to  freedom. 


LAND      AND,     W  A  T  E  K  . 


March  23,  igib. 


The  infractions  concx-rn  the  inessentials,  the  struggle  con- 
cerns tlie  fundamentals.  To  quo^te  from  an  admirable 
article  in  tiu:  current  number  of  The  Round  Ttiblc  : 
"  When  one  of  those  fmuhimentals  has  been  challenged 
there  ought  in  principle  to  be  no  neutral  rights  and  no 
neutrals  .  .  .  No  nation  is  entitled  to  say  that 
its  rights  entitle  it  to  obstruct  those  who  arc  endeavour- 
ing to  defend  international  right  and  liberty.  " 

i 
American  Interests 

President  Wilson  has  taken  up  a  very  simple  and 
intelligible  line.  He  is  the  mouthpiece  of  the  American 
people,  and  therefore  can  only  carry  out  the  will  of  the 
majority  of  his  countrymen.  In  this  he  would  seem  to 
have  succeeded.  He  considers  further  that  it  is  his  busi- 
ness to  concern  himself  solely  with  American  interests, 
a  view  in  which  he  is  doubtless  right.  No  statesman  is 
obhged  to  be  a  Paladin,  setting  forth  to  do  battle  against 
wandering  Paynims.  But  the  question  arises  as  to  what 
is  the  true  American  interest,  what  is  the  true  interest  of 
all  neutrals,  and  on  this  point  it  would  appear  that 
President  Wilson  and  the  majority  of  his  countrymen 
have  judged  superficially. 

Let  Mr.  Root  speak  : 

"  The  American  democracy  stands  for  something 
more  than  beef  and  cutton  and  grain  and  manufactures  ; 
it  stands  for  something  tliat  cannot  I)e  measured  by  rates 
o(  e.vchange,  and  does  not  rise  or  fall  with  the  balance  of 
trade. 

The  American  people  achieved  liberty  and  schooled 
themselves  to  the  service  of  justice  before  they  acquired 
wealth,  and  they  \alue  their  country's  liberty  and  justice 
above  all  their  pride  of  possessions.  Beneath  their 
comfortable  optimism  and  apparent  indifference  they  Iiavc 
a  conception  of  their  great  republic  as  brave  and  strong 
and  noble  to  hand  down  to  their  children  the  blessings  of 
freetlom  and  just  and  equal  laws. 

They  have  embodied  tlicir  principles  of  Govern- 
ment in  fixed  rules  of  right  conduct  which  they  jealously 
])reserve,  and,  with  the  instinct  of  individual  freedom, 
they  stand  for  a  Government  of  laws  and  not  of  men. 
They  deem  that  the  moral  laws  which  fornmlate  the 
duties  of  men  toward  each  other  are  binding  upon  nations 
equally  with  individuals. 

Informed  by  their  own  experience,  confirmed  by 
their  observation  of  international  life,  they  have  come  to' 
see  that  the  independence  of  nations,  the  Hberty  of  their 
ix^oples,  justice  and  humanity,  cannot  be  maintained 
upon  the  complaisance,  the  good  nature,  the  kindly  feeling 
of  th«  strong  towards  the  weak  ;  that  real  independence, 
fc-al  liberty,  cannot  rest  upon  sufferance  ;  that  peace  and 
liberty  can  be  preserved  only  by  the  authority  and  observ- 
ance of  rules  of  national  conduct  founded  upon  the 
principles  of  justice  and  humanity  ;  only  by  the  establish- 
ment of  law  among  nations,  responsive  to  the  enlightened 
public  opinion  of  mankind." 

Against  that  Law  was  set  the  German  Force  and  the  Law 
was  broken.  It  was,  says  Mr.  Root,  American  law, 
just  as  much  as  any  domestic  statute. 

"  We  had  bound  ourselves  by  it ;  we  had  regulated  our 
conduct  by  it,  and  we  were  entitled  to  have  other  nations 
observe  it.  That  law  was  the  protection  of  our  peace 
and  security.  It  was  our  safeguard  against  the  necessity 
of  maintaining  great  armaments  and  wasting  our  substance 
in  continual  readiness  for  war.  Our  interest  in  having 
it  maintained  as  the  law  of  nations  was  a  substantial, 
valuable,  permanent  interest,  just  as  real  as  your  interest 
and  mine  in  having  maintained  and  enforced  the  laws 
against  assault  and  robbery  and  arson  which  protect 
our  personal  safety  and  property." 

Where  then  docs  the  true  interest  of  neutrals  lie  ?  In 
a  jjettifogging  insistence  upon  the  details  of  old  inter- 
national practice  in  commercial  affairs,  thereby  hamper- 
ing the  efforts  of  the  Power  which  dares  to  defend  the 
greater  matters  of  the  Law  ?  Or  in  co-operation,  active 
(jr  passive,  with  the  Power  which  stands  for  the  funda- 
m  ntals  ?  Mr.  Root  has  no  doubt.  In  his  speech  at 
Washington  he     said  : 

"  Up  to  this  time  breaches  of  international  law  have 
been  treated  as  we  treat  wrongs  under  civil  jjroredure.  as 
if  they  concerned  nobody  except  the  particular  nation 
upon  which  the  injury  was  inflicted,  and  the  nation  inflict- 
ing it.  There  has  been  no  general  recognition  of  the  right 
of  other  nations  to  object.     .    .     If  the  law  of  nations 


is  to  be  binding  there  must  be  a  change  of  theory.  And 
violations  of  tlie  law  of  such  a  character  as  to  threaten 
the  peace  aiul  order  of  the  conmnmify  of  nations  nm>-t  be 
treated  by  analogy  to  criminal  law.  They  must  he. 
ileemcd  to  be  a  violation  of  the  right  of  every  civilised 
nation  to  liu\e  the  law  maintained." 

The  Cross  Roads 

Hafpi'y  we  may  believe  that  Mr.  Root  does 'fiSt 
stand  aloi  c.  His  speeches  have  cleared  the  air,  and  much 
of  the  best  opinion  in  his  country  is  on  his  side.  America 
to-day  stands  at  the  cross  roads.  She  has  to  decide 
whether  she  will  remain  apart  in  selfish  isolation,  reaping 
where  she  has  not  sown  and  gathering  where  she  has  not 
strewed,  or  whether  she  will  take  a  share  as  a  Great  Power 
in  the  police  work  of  the  world.  It  is  no  question  of 
sacrificing  American  interests.  The  question  is  where 
her  true  interests  lie. 

Each  of  the  Allies  to-day  is  fighting  for  its  own 
special  purpose.  Britain,  for  example,  aims  at  security 
and  at  the  maintenance  of  that  free  Empire,  whose 
ideals  will  be  found  in  those  lines  of  Claudian  which  have 
never  yet  found  an  adequate  translator.  But  all  the 
Allies  are  lighting  for  one  major  cause,  and  that  is  the 
establishment  of  Law  as  against  Force  on  the  world's 
throne.  We  have  to  check  and  punish  the  law-breaker, 
and  for  the  innposc  the  chief  instrument  is  the  British 
fleet.  Can  any  neutral,  small  or  great,  who  sees  in  the 
reign  of  law  his  true  interest,  seriously  desire  to  weaken 
the  power  of  the  constable  against  the  criminal  ?  For, 
remember,  the  criminal  is  self-confessed.  The  case  is 
not  sub  juiikc.  Germany  has  proclaimed  and  gloried 
in  a  creed  which  reposes  the  conduct  of  the  world's  buhine^s 
on  the  ethics  of  the  .Stone  Age.  Does  a  man,  when  the 
house  next  door  to  him  is  burgled,  try  to  trip  up  tiu; 
policeman,  even  though  in  his  haste  that  zealous  officer 
may  have  trodden  on  liis  toes  ? 

To  anyone  who  has  visited  the  Grand  Fleet  there 
must  come  a  sense  of  pride  which  is  something  more  than 
the  traditional  devotion  of  Englishmen  to  the  Navy, 
and  the  remembrance  of  a  famous  past.  The  great  battle- 
ships far  up  in  the  Northern  waters,  the  men  who  for 
twenty  months  of  nerve-racking  strain  have  kept  unim- 
paired their  edge  and  ardour  of  mind,  are  indeed  a  shining 
proof  of  the  might  and  spirit  of  fingland.  I^ut  in  the 
task  before  them  to-day  there  is  a  higii  duty,  which  their 
forefathers  indeed,  shared,  but  which  lies  upon  them  now 
with  a  peculiar  gravity.  They  are  the  modern  crusaders, 
doing  battle  not  only  for  home  and  race  and  fatherland, 
but  for  the  citadel  of  Christendom. 

FRENCH    RED    GROSS 

\'erdun  is  a  name  henceforth  immortal  in  history.  When 
the  full  story  of  the  gallant  defence  by  our  .-\Uies  comes  to 
be  written,  it  will  be  found  to  rank  among  the  most  heroic 
deeds  in  the  long  annals  of  war.  The  French  battalions 
have  withstood  the  onslaught  of  German  forces  often  four 
and  five  times  their  numerical  stcength.  The  tornado  of 
shells  has  been  appalling,  but  nothing  has  been  able. to  break 
the  steadfastness  of  the  defenders  or  to  daunt  their  courageous 
spirit.  The  losses  inflicted  on  the  enemy  liave  been  stupen- 
dous, and  though  compared  with  them  the  French  casualty 
lists  may  appear  light,  nevertheless  a  heav\-  jirice  has  liad  to 
be  paid,  and  at  the  moment  the  resources  of  the  French  Ked 
Cross  Society  are  severely  strained. 

Now  is  the  time  when  we  at  home  mav  testify  to  our 
admiration  of  hrench  bravery  in  a  practical  manner.  Tlie 
London  Conmhttee  of  the  French  Ked  Cross  Society,  of  which 
the  l'"rcnch  Ambassador  in  London  is  President,  will  welcome 
gifts  of  clothing,  food,  comforts,  drugs,  surgical  stores  and, 
above  all,  money.  This  Society  is  admirably  rontrolled  and 
managed.  Money  is  of  course  esjjecially  needed,  for  (he  work 
of  the  Society  is  necessarily  limited  by  the  funds  at  its  dis|)osal. 
We  have  always  to  remember  t'lat  many  of  the  richest  indus- 
trial districts  of  France  arc  in  the  liands  of  the  invader,  where- 
fore our  Allies  are  heavily  handicapped  in  the  voluntary  sup- 
port they  would  naturally  render  to  their  Red  Cross  Society. 
It  is  for  us  to  make  good  this  loss  in  so  far  as  money  can  do  so. 

Send  at  once  a  contribution,  however  humble  it  may  be, 
as  a  token  of  gratitude  and  affection  for  France,  to  the  Corr- 
mittee  of  the  French  Red  Cross,  9,  Knightsbridge,  London,  S.W. 


14 


March  23,  1916. 


LAND     AND     WATER. 


GASPARD    OF    WASDALE    HEAD 

By  William  T.  Palmer 


SOMEWHERE  in  the  Vosges,  where  snow  whitens 
the  ridge  above  the  pine-trees,  is  marching 
or  scouting  or  bivouacking,  with  all  his  accus- 
tomed serenity,  a  sturdy  Danphinois,  a  tigure 
well-known  to  Cumbrian  rock-climbers— (iaspard  of 
Wasdale  Head.  A  man  of  slow,  careful  English,  he  was 
ever  a  friend — now  he  is  an  Ally,  a  dour  lighting  Ally. 
Many  a  climber  at  home,  in  the  Munitions  service,  or 
away  with  the  Colours,  has  kindly  memories  of  Gaspard's 
advice,  patience,  assistance  :  in  quaint  phrases  he  abjured 
one  to  have  patience,  to  use  the  holds,  to  climb  slowly — 
yes,  and  even  in  extreme  cases  to  "  trust  the  rope,"  and 
be  hauled,  a  craven  failure,  out  of  some  fearsome  cave- 
l)itch  or  up  some  sheer  slab. 

The  Climber's  Guide 

For  years  Gaspard  the  Danphinois  has  been  almost 
the  only  professional  climbers'  guide  in  Britain  — now 
he  is  a  private  in  the  Chasseurs  Alpins,,the  most  un- 
relenting enemies  the  Germans  have  yet  found.  Like 
Gaspard,  the  battalions  are  grim,  strenuous,  mobile, 
and  no  difficulty  can  daimt  them.  Gaspard's  letters 
and  postcards  have  told  of  terrible  hardships  withstood 
last  winter  ;  of  frost  and  snow,  raging  gale,  and  the  storm- 
fog  held  of  little  account  in  their  warfare.  Trenches, 
redoubts,  forts  of  snow  built,  attacked,  defended,  and 
the  blood  of  the  bayonetted  stained  crimson  many  a 
ridge  and  summit. 

Winter  after  winter  Gaspard  was  welcomed  at  Was- 
dale Head,  and  the  Christmas  and  Easter  holidays  were 
busy  times  indeed  for  him.  With  June,  howeve.r,  he 
hastened  back  to  the  Dauphiny  and  spent  his  summer 
among  the  eternal  snow  and  ice  of  the  Alps.  He  was  in 
Dauphiny  in  the  August  when  the  summons  to  war  was 
proclaimed,  and  instantly  he  rejoined  the  Colours. 

In  his  Cumbrian  haunt  Gaspard  was  conceded  to  be 
a  fine  guide  and  teacher  of  rock-craft,  and  many  a  good 
climber  owes  to  him  the  introduction  of  his  most  in- 
<li\idual  of  British  outdoor  sports.  So  far  as  records  go, 
he  never  seems  to  have  pioneered  an  ascent,  but  the 
months  during  which  he  was  in  Cumbria  are  not  often 
favourable  to  sustained  and  intricate  exploration.  Often 
his  ice-axe  rang  day  after  day  in  Moss  (ihyll,  climbing 
and  re-climbing  its  icy  staircase.  The  initiation  of  the 
wealthier  class  of  novice  was  Gaspard's  duty  to  the 
Cumbrian  craft,  as  well  as  providing  safe  companionship 
to  solitary  visitors  who  desired  something  more  satisfying 
than  the  ordinary  hill-tracks.  Many  a  man  with  Con- 
tinental experience  discovered  his  way  to  the  British 
rocks  on  (iaspard's  rope. 

His  Pupils 

Gaspard's  pupils  were  not  always  the  handiest  or 
most  courageous.  He  had  to  take  what  "  monsieur  " 
presented.  Surely  the  limit  was  a  character  with 
Tyrolese  hat  and  shepherd's  crook  who  insisted  on  being 
roped  at  the  last  gate  on  the  Sty  Head  path,  and  whose 
]->rogress  up  the  scree-walk  was  accompanied  by  querulous 
plaints  as  to  the  terrible  danger  of  the  way,  punctuated 
with  admirationjof  the  "  shepherd's  "  own  heroism  and 
fortitude.  One  wishes  that  Gaspard's  quaint  words  and 
expressive  grimaces  (the  latter  told  more  of  the  story) 
could  be  reproduced  in  cold  type  :  the  guide  loved  dearly 
to  repeat  the  story  of  that  day's  sufferings,  and  one  has 
seen  him  in  the  yellow  lamplight  of  the  kitchen  posturing, 
ejaculating,  living  again  the  most  amusing  day  in  his 
life.  With  admirable  patience  Gaspard  brought  his 
shepherd  through  the  terrors  of  the  scree-walk,  but  the 
twenty  foot  rock-pile  of  the  Lower  Kern  Knotts  was  too 
much.  The  visitor  bluntly  declined  to  venture  further, 
l^nough  were  the  terrors  he  had  known,  he  would  not 
traverse  into  the  mysterious,  the  unknowable  recesses 
of  the  savage  mountains. 

In  the  presence  of  climbers  Gaspard  was  a  solemn 
man  mdeed,  but  an  adroit  reference  to  the  shepherd's 
crook  was  generally  too  much  for  his  decorum. 

Sometimes  a  postcard  or  a  telegram  would  arrive  at 


the  hotel  :  "  Send  Gaspard  to  meet  me  top  of  Great  End 
Tuesday  eleven  "  (no  signature),  and  away  on  the  stated 
morning  would  tramp  the  guiclo.  Xo  matter  how  thick 
and  foul  the  weatlier  he  would  reacli  the  summit  cairn  — 
sometimes  to  spend  two  hours'  waiting  in  damp  and 
chill  for  a  gentleman  who  did  not  arrive. 

Gaspard  was  ever  in  the  forefront  of  search-parties, 
though  maybe  the  honour  of  his  suggestions  went  else- 
where. He  was  always  ready,  ever  resourceful,  ever 
thoughtful  of  the  last  detail  for  the  comfort  of  both 
searchers  and  lost.  More  than  one  belated  party  has 
waited  in  Walker's  Gully  on  the  Pillar  until  at  the  fust 
streak  of  dawn  (iaspard  came  sliding  over  the  great  cave- 
pitch  on  a  rope.  Endless  coils  of  rope  seemed  to  wreathe 
the  sturdy  man.  There  was  a  rope  to  secure  each  chilled 
and  hungry  climber,  and  then  came  the  unpacking  of 
the  rucksack  with  food  and  drink.  Gaspard  knew  by 
long  experience  that  limbs  and  muscles  exercised  after 
hours  in  cramped  positions  are  apt  to  stumbles,  jerks  and 
tremors. 

All  Night  on  a  Ledge 

On  one  occasion  he  found  a  climber  practically 
comatose  with  fatigue  and  cold.  All  night  the  man  had 
been  standing  on  a  tiny  ledge  of  earth  and  grass,  so  loose 
and  crumbling  that  he  did  not  dare  to  put  full  weight  on 
his  foothold.  In  the  dawnlight  Gaspard  saw  that  the 
climber's  hair  was  white.  Carefully  the  rescue  was 
carried  out,  the  climber  hoisted  to  the  upper  screes  — 
and  the  frosted  poll  was  a  shock  indeed  to  his  friends. 
One  writes  "  frosted  poll  "  advisedly,  for  as  the  climber 
got  back  his  power  of  free  movement,  the  dark  hair  began 
to  show.  The  white  was  but  the  frost-rime  which  had 
clung  to  every  hair.  Gaspard  was  not  accounted  a  great 
rock-climber  in  the  new  or  Cumbrian  school.  He  had 
a  shrewd  taste  for  foot  and  handholds  in  his  work,  and 
rarely  attempted  an  "  exceptionally  severe  "  course. 
His  work  was  with  the  novice  mainly  and  not  with  the 
expert,  his  methods  were  sound  rather  than  enterprising, 
nor  did  he  favour  much  of  the  splendid  gymnastic  work 
which  goes  to  make  up  a  modern  rock-chmb  of  the  first 
class. 

In  addition  to  his  climbing  and  guiding,  Gaspard 
was  "  boots  "  to  the  mountain-lovers  who  resorted  to 
Wasdale  Head  in  winter.  With  a  sticky  green  oil  he 
anointed  the  clinkered  and  nailed  boots  collected  from 
the  hall,  leaving  less  heroic  methods  for  the  daintier 
footgear  deposited  at  bedroom  doors.  From  long  prac- 
tice he  was  an  adept  at  replacing  climbing  nails,  and 
would  cheerfully  undertake  to  give  one's  boots  a  full  new 
-set  of  teeth  between  coming-in  at  sunset  and  the  start 
after  breakfast.  And  the  hobs  —well,  he  had  a  wonderful 
collection  of  nails  brought  from  his  continental  home  and 
rarely  failed  to  issue  a  pattern  which  pleased. 

Here's  to  thee,  Gaspard,  Gaspard  of  Wasdale  Head, 
Gaspard  of  the  Chasseurs  Alpins,  in  camp,  in  biv-ouac, 
wherever  thou  mayest  be  !  Gaspard  on  the  Vosges,  ( i;  s  )ard 
in  the  enemy's  country,  (iaspard  who  is  facing  toward  the 
deep  trench  of  the  Rhine  and  waiting  for  the  whole 
Allied  line  to  advance.  May  we  all  be  spared  to  fore- 
gather, when  War  is  a  muttering  of  the  past,  among  the 
clefts  and  pinnacles  of  rocky  old  Cumbria. 


No  gift  pleases  the  troops  at  the  front  more  than  a 
razor.  On  this  being  made  known  certain  people  decided 
to  interest  their  friends  in  collecting  used  razors  of  all  des- 
criptions, with  a  view  to  putting  them  in  "  working  order," 
and  despatching  them  to  the  front.  No  less  than  160.000 
razors  have  alreadv  been  collected  of  which  135,000  have 
been  distributed.  No  matter  how  old  or  dilapidated  a  razor 
may  be  it  can  be  made  good.  The  scheme  lias  the  warmest 
support  of  Lord  Kitchener,  who  trusts  that  further  supplies 
will  be  forthcoming.  One  of  the  most  active  and  enthusiastic 
workers  in  this  razor  scheme  is  Mr.  Harrj'  Smith,  Managing 
Director  of  the  Rover  Company,  Ltd.,  Meteor  Works,  Coventry 
and  5Q,  New  Oxford  Street,  W.,  wlio  will  be  In^st  grateful 
to  anyone  who  will  assist  him  in  continuing  this  excellent 
work.  No  matter  the  condition  of  a  razor,  it  will  be  gratefully 
received  by  Mr.  Harry  Smith  at  either  of  these  addresses. 


LAND      AND     WA  T  E  R 


March  23,  191:6' 


A    PROBLEM    IN    STRATEGY 


By  Colonel   Feyler 


Colonel  Feyler,  the  -writer  of  this  arresting  article,  is  the 
it'en-knoit'H  military  correspondent  of  the  "  Journal 
Jc  Geneve,"  and  is  Swiss  by  vationalitv.  He  is  the 
most  jamniis  and  the  most  impartial  of  all  Neutral 
critics  of  the  war,  and  his  opinions  carry  great  weight 
in  every  belligerent  country. 

AT  the  moment  of  writihg  the  violence  of  the  battle 
/%  of  Verdun  is  at  its  height.  The  bahince  seems 
I — J^  to  be  incHning  in  favour  of  the  French.  But 
^  JL.  there  is  no  need  to  anticipate  the  event  in  order 
tn  draw  attention  to  one  interesting  problem  in  strategy 
whicli  will,  beyond  all  question,  be  one  of  those  that  will 
be  studied  most  closely  after  the  war,  and  in  the  solution 
of  which  the  battle  of  Wrdun,  whatever  its  issue  may  be, 
"will  certainly  be  a  factor. 

The  problem  may  be  stated  thus  :  Was  the  German 
plan  of  attack  in  August,  1914,  which  decided  upon  a 
march  through  Belgium,  a  wise  one,  or  would  it  have 
been  better  to  have  attacked  France  directly  upon  her 
eastern  fortified  frontier  ? 

1  suppose  no  one  will  deny  that  from  both  political 
and  moral  points  of  view  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  by  the  German  Empire,  which  was  pledged  to 
defend  it,  was  a  very  grave  blunder.  The  political  result 
was  that  Germany  not  only  ])rovoked  the  opposition  of 
the  small  State  she  thus  attacked,  but  also  compelled 
Great  Britain  to  declare  war  upon  her  in  the  interests  of 
moral  Tightness  and  international  loyalty.  And  so, 
instead  of  having  only  France  to  reckon  with  in  the  west, 
the  German  Empire  arrayed  against  itself  France  and 
Belgium  and  the  United  Kingdom. 

The  Moral  View 

From  the  purely  moral  point  of  view  the  fault  was 
equally  grave.  A  Government  cannot  be  forgiven  for 
a  deliberate  breach  of  its  plighted  word  more  easily  than 
an  individual  can.  It  is  even  entitled  to  less  easy  forgive- 
ness, because  the  men  who  constitute  it  are  supposed 
by  those  whom  they  govern  to  have  higher  responsibility. 
Germany  has  suffered  from  the  position  of  inferiority  in 
which  she  thus  placed  herself  ever  since  the  day  when  her 
troops  tirst  set  foot  in  Luxemburg  and  Belgium.  The 
war  immediately  became  a  struggle  between  the  might 
employed  to  make  good  the  broken  word,  and  the  right 
that  is  the  protection  of  treaties  concluded  in  good  faith. 

Lofty  as  these  considerations  may  be,  they  are, 
however,  merely  accessory  to  the  problem  stated  here. 
That  is  essentially  technical,  and  must  be  considered 
simply  and  solely  from' the  point  of  view  of  strategy  and 
of  the  tactics  employed. 

From  the  strategical  point  of  view  the  disadvantages 
of  the  passage  through  Belgium  were  the  greater  length 
of  march  than  by  a  direct  attack,  and  the  addition  to  the 
effective  forces  at  the  disposal  of  the  enemy.  This,  it  is 
true,  might  be  compensated  to  a  certain  extent  by  better 
technical  preparation  and  by  superior  skill  in  the  handling 
of  troops.  The  Germans  had  left  absolutely  nothing 
undone  to  that  end.  The  army  they  had  organised  was 
not  one  designed  for  political  purposes  and  intended  only 
for  the  defence  of  the  Empire,  but  an  army  forged  for 
the  specific  purpose  of  an  offensive  war  against  a  coalition 
of  France,  Russia  and  England.  Fully  realising  that  a 
prolonged  war  would  allow  the  armies  of  those  three 
allied  Powers  to  establish  a  numerical  superiority,  they 
determined  to  anticipate  this  by  hurling  a  more  rapidly 
concentrated  and  more  mobile  force  upon  France.  And 
thanks  to  the  fact  that  she  had  a  higher  birth-rate  than 
that  of  France,  Germany  was  able  to  compose  this  force 
entirely  of  young  and  evenly  trained  elements  that  had 
practically  filled  the  cadres  of  the  active  army  on  its  peace 
footing. 

With  this  powerful  organisation  at  their  disposal 
the  Imperial  Head-Quarter  Staff  thought  it  would  be  an 
easy  matter  to  pass  through  Belgium.  The  Belgian 
army   was   certainlj*   much   less   ready   and  less   highly 


qualified  than  the  German  army.  And  they  feft  no 
apprehension  on  the  score  of  the  effective  force  which 
England  might  throw  into  the  line,  because  for  sevf'ral 
weeks  that  force  would  necessarily  be  a  limited  one. 
From  all  these  considerations  they  concluded  that  the 
numerical  inequality  was  not  of  a  really  serious  character  : 
that  it  could  only  become  manifest  at  a  remote  date 
and  in  the  event,  which  they  did  not  anticipate,  of  their 
plan  not  resulting  in  a  speedily  victorious  campaign. 

Disadvantages  of  the  Detour 

The  disadvantages  of  the  detour  through  Belgium 
could  thus  be  most  fully  obviated  and  free  scope  given 
to  its  advantages.  Among  these  were  the  extension  of 
front,  which  facilitated  bringing  into  action  a  larger 
number  of  guns  and  cannon,  the  obligation  imposed  upon 
the  enemy  of  adapting  himself  to  this  extension  of  front, 
contrary  to  his  original  plans  and  with  inadequate  means, 
and  finally,  the  advantage  of  avoiding  the  strongly 
fortified  country  along  the  line  Belfort-Epinal-Toul- 
Verdun. 

In  point  of  fact  this  last  advantage  has  not  proved 
to  be  quite  what  the  German  Head-Quarter  Staff  supposed. 
They  discovered  that,  although  it  appeared  less  capable 
of  resistance,  the  Belgian  fortified  barrier  of  the  Meuse 
was  strong  enough  to  compel  the  assailant  to  mark  time 
for  days  which  were  worth  weeks.  The  British  Army 
had  time  to  arrive  to  cover  the  French  left  flank,  and  the 
second  Belgian  stand  round  Antwerp  and  afterwards 
on  the  Yser,  having  in  the  course  of  operations  completed 
the  work  of  the  first,  the  advantages  of  the  passage  through 
Belgium  were  eclipsed  by  the  disadvantages. 

How  would  it  have  been  if  the  offensive  had  been 
conducted  by  the  direct  route  in  the  east  ?  That  question 
raises  discussion  of  the  check  which  the  first  heavy  Ger- 
man attack  met  with  before  Verdun  the  other  day.  If 
they  did  not  succeed  in  February,  IQ16,  in  spite  of  the 
colossal  combination  of  methods  employed  and  the 
ferocity  of  fighting,  why  should  they  have  had  any 
better  success  in  August,  1914  ? 

I  do  not  think  the  two  cases  are  parallel.  In  1914 
the  Germans  would  have  benefited  by  the  surprise  caused 
by  their  420  mm.  howitzers.  Instead  of  giving  the  first 
exhibition  of  their  effectiveness  upon  the  forts  of  Liege, 
they  would  have  demonstrated  it  upon  the  French  forts. 
And  even  if  their  success  had  been  less  quickly  achieved, 
the  chances  were  that  the  attack  would  have  succeeded. 

Question  of  Fortifications 

As  it  is  now,  the  forts  on  French  territory  have  been 
adapted  to  meet  the  requirements  which  experience  at 
Li^ge,  Namur  and  Maubeuge  has  proved  to  be  necessary. 
Instead  of  their  defences  being  constricted  within  a  narrow 
limit  of  space,  which  consequently  is  liable  to  destruction 
by  a  very  small  number  of  heavy  shells  accurately  direc- 
ted, they  are  distributed  over  a  larger  area,  which  gives 
them  greater  chances  of  escape  from  the  enemy's  attack. 
The  entrenchments  have  been  developed  in  accordance 
with  the  formulas  of  field  fortifications,  with  the  result 
that  the  defensive  area  is  very  much  vaster.  And 
finally,  the  heavy  artillery  which  the  French  lacked  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  has  been  constructed,  and  is 
now  opposed  to  the  German  heavy  guns  at  Verdun. 

Another  difference  between  1914  and  iqi6  lies  in  the 
quality  of  the  troops  engaged,  and  especially  in  that  of 
the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers.  No  doubt  the 
battle  of  Verdun  has  sent  into  action  troops  that  had  been 
well  prepared  for  the  violent  fighting  required  of  thern. 
They  had  been  rested  after  their  previous  exhausting  fati- 
gues and  carefully  trained.  But  none  the  less  they  had  less 
homogeneity  than  those  that  would  have  been  employed 
in  1914,  and  also  less  quickness  and  skill  in  operation. 
In  August,  1914,  the  men  would  have  been  the  very  best 
that  Germany  could  produce,  and  led  by  the  most  capable 
and  energetic  representatives  of  the  commissioned  and 
non-commissioned    grades.     In    February    and    March, 


lA 


March  23,  1916. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


iqi6,  the  men  belonged  to  any  number  of  annual  classes, 
young  and  old,  and  the  veteran  officers  of  the  active 
army  had  almost  ceased  to  exist.  Thus  the  chances 
had  altered,  and  were  not  nearly  so  many,  and  not 
nearly  so  real,  as  in  August,  1914. 

Is  this  as  much  as  to  say  that,  consequently,  the 
French  would  not  have  retrieved  the  situation,  as  they 
were  able  to  do  at  the  Marne,  with  the  assistance  of  the 
British  Army  ?  It  is  quite  possible.  But  such  an 
enquiry  is  outside  the  scope  of  any  examination  supported 
by  proofs  ;  imagination  takes  too  large  a  part  in  it.  All 
one  can  say  definitely  is  that  the  Belgian  army  would 
not  have  had  to  intervene,  that  England  would  not  have 
had  to  support  Belgium  in  virtue  of  her  guarantee  of 
neutrality,  and  that  with  regard  to  the  moral  support 
wliich  a  belligerent  may  be  desirous  of  finding  among 
neutrals,  Germany  would  not  have  tarnished  her  reputa- 
tion as  she  has  done.  In  short  and  in  conclusion,  she 
would  probably  have  had  greater  chances  of  victory. 


Why,  then,  did  slic  run  tUc  risk  of  reducing  her 
chances  ?  I  do  not  think  it  is  a  hazardous  proposition  tliat 
she  did  so  because  she  wanted  to  get  to  the  sea,  and  that 
when  preparing  her  plan  of  war  her  ambitions  already 
embraced  England  as  well  as  France.  Germany  has 
always  looked  far  ahead  ;  it  is  seldom  that  she  has  sought 
out  one  enemy  without  thinking  about  the  enemy  of 
to-morrow.  When  Prussia  laid  hands  upon  Denmark, 
Austria-Hungary  was  already  a  matter  of  interest  to  her. 
When  she  crushed  Austria-Hungary  at  Sadowa,  slie  was 
not  forgetful  of  France.  Would  there  be  anything 
extraoiclinary  if,  in  I914,  the  German  Empire  perceived 
England  behind  Belgium  and  France  ? 

Investigation  of  the  strategical  problem  offered  by 
her  plan  of  campaign  in  the  west  would  thus  serve  to 
throw  a  light  upon  the  probable  political  aims  and  objects 
of  the  Imperial  government.  The  investigations  will 
be  all  the  more  interesting  when  the  official  records  of  the 
various  Staffs  begin  to  disclose  their  secrets. 


AIRCRAFT    POLICY 

And    the    Zeppelin    Menace    from    the    National    Standpoint 

By  F.  W.  Lanchester 


[In  this  and  the  jolloiving  article  an  endeavour  is  made 
to  put  before  the  public  a  dispassionate  account  of  the 
reasons,  facts  and  circumstances  which  have  led  to  the 
present  day  non-military  employment  of  aircraft  in 
warfare  as  typically  exemplified  by  the  Zeppelin  raids. 
The  writer  has  endeavoured  to  bring  the  question  of 
aircraft  raids  into  their  true  perspective,  both  as  to 
their  relative  material  importance  as  acts  of  war,  and 
to  their  moral  importance,  as  founded  on  the  theories 
of  German  military  writers,  as  a  means  of  causing 
embarrassment  to  an  enemv  Government.  Later  articles 
will  deal  with  the  capabilities  and  development  of  the 
large  airship  and  the  importance  of  its  future  rdle  in 
legitimate  warfare.] 

THERE  have  been  many  complaints  \oiced  in  the 
press  and  at  meetings  of  different  kinds  that 
Britain  has  neglected  to  provide  herself  with 
large  airships  comparable  to,  and  capable  of 
combating,  the  Zeppelin  raider.  Parenthetically  it  may 
be  remarked  that  the  idea  that  airship  can  counter  airship 
has  no  proved  foundation,  and  it  is  certain  that  if  the 
enemy  were  to  adhere  to  its  present  policy  of  attacking 
only  by  night,  any  attempt  at  defence  by  means  of  airships 
of  equal  size  and  speed  would  be  foredoomed  to  failure. 
Thus  if  airship  is  to  counter  airship  in  such  a  matter 
as  giving  protection  against  raids,  it  will  be  b}'  indirect 
means,  namely  by  reprisal  or  by  intercepting  the  enemy 
on  his  return  from  a  raiding  expedition.  Apart  from  the 
question  of  whether  or  no  airship  can  counter  airship  it 
does  appear  on  the  face  of  it  to  require  some  explanation 
why  (ireat  Britain  has  not  kept  a  closer  watch  on  the 
work  done  in  Ciermany,  in  this  the  most  showy  though 
certainly  not  the  most  useful  development  of  service 
aeronautics. 

System   of  Government 

It  is  only  within  roughly  the  past  twelve  months, 
during  which  the  German  raider  has  managed  to  make 
himself  particularly  obnoxious,  that  public  interest  has 
become  focussed  on  this  question  of  aircraft,  and  now  the 
public  attention  is  so  focussed  the  cry  is  that  somebody 
is  to  blame.  The  present  Coalition  (ioxernment  clearly 
cannot  be  blamed,  so  the  blame  has  to  be  thrown  on  the 
late  Government  prior  to  the  war,  and  according  to 
\arious  writers  not  only  is  the  late  Government  to  blame, 
but  the  pigheaded  and  stupid  experts  come  in  also  for 
their  share  !  Let  us  see  to  what  extent  these  allegations 
will  hold  gas. 

During  the  last  few  decades,  one  may  sav  during 
the  last  fifty  years,  it  has  become  more  and  more  the 
settled  system  in  this  country  that  the  Government  elected 
by  popular  vote,  ostensibly  for  the  purpose  of  governing, 
is  controlled,  driven  or  held  back  bv  the  continuous 
application  of  the  pressure  of  public  opinion.     We  do  not 


appoint  a  Government  for  a  period  limited  by  a  maximum 
term  of  office,  and  leave  it  to  govern.  Our  system  appears 
to  be  that  we  appoint  a  (iovernment  as  we  harness  a  horse, 
and  we  never  leave  off  pulling  the  strings  from  the  day  it 
goes  into  office  to  the  day  on  which  it  finishes  its  term  or 
drops  dead.  The  result  of  this  is,  that  if  public  opinion, 
even  in  matters  of  detail,  goes  astray,  it  almost  certainly 
follows  that  the  Government  also  goes  astray,  just  as,  in 
the  analogy  of  the  horse,  if  the  driver  gets  flurried  or  is 
the  worse  for  drink  the  horse  and  coach  will  get  into 
difficulties  or  go  off  the  road. 

There  is  a  strong  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  public 
and  electorate  to  rush  from  one  extreme  to  the  other  ; 
thus  a  few  years  ago  the  Zeppelin  airship  was  looked 
upon  by  the  public  as  a  mere  academic  development  of 
no  particular  interest  to  us  islanders,  and  if  the  Govern- 
ment had  started  spending  a  few  millions  on  a  parallel 
development  in  this  country,  and  had  experienced  half 
the  failures  through  which  Count  Zeppelin  has  fought  his 
way,  there  would  have  been  so  many  questions  asked  in 
Parliament  and  so  much  trouble  created  that  there  can 
be  but  little  doubt  the  whole  aeronautical  movement, 
not  only  in  the  airship  but  also  in  the  aeroplane,  would 
have  received  a  substantial,  possibly  fatal,  set-back. 

Experimental    Expenditure 

Again  and  again  during  recent  years  public  opinion 
has  decHned  to  tolerate  any  expenditure  in  armament 
which  could  not  be  proved  up  to  the  hilt  as  absolutely 
necessary  to  the  country's  safety.  It  is  indeed  probable 
that  the  verdict  of  the  future  historian  will  record  that 
this  standard  of  absolute  necessity  has  been  so  low  as 
at  times  actually  to  have  placed  Great  Britain  and  the 
British  Empire  in  grave  peril.  To  suggest  that  the  British 
Government  would  have  been  allowed  to  carry  out  an 
expensive  experimental  campaign  in  airships  (and  nothing 
but  an  expensive  campaign  would  have  been  of  any 
service)  is  futile,  and  to  blame  a  Government  so  controllcc 
by  public  opinion  for  not  having  done  so  is  a  course  whict 
can  only  lead  serious  thinkers  to  question  the  whoh 
fabric  and  purpose  of  our  modern  democratic  system. 

To-day  we  hear  right  and  left  the  senseless  cry  thai 
the  Government  ought  to  have  done  this,  or  the  Govern- 
ment ought  to  hax'e  done  that  ;  that  the  Government 
ought  to  have  built  large  airships  to  protect  us  from 
Zeppelin  attacks.  What  is  the  meaning  of  this  outcry — 
is  it  that  the  people  and  the  press  are  any  wiser  than 
before  ?  Is  it  that  the  people  and  the  press  have  Icarncc 
something  which  the  Government  have  not  learned  ? 
Is  it  that  the  people  and  the  press  have  known  something 
in  the  past  which  the  Government  did  not  know  ?  My 
answer  is  emphatically  "  No." 

Individuals  amongst  the  people  and  individuals 
amongst  the  press  have  known  and  have  foreseen. 
Members    of    the    Government    have    known    and    have 


LAND      AND     M' A  T  K  R 


March 


1  > 
-J' 


i<)i6. 


lorcstvn.  But  tlic  will  of  the  [)lO])1c  Ims  not  been  of  recent 
years  to  support  a  strouf,'  defensive  pro^^raninie,  Aviiether  it 
be  in  aircraft  or  otherwise.  The  tjuestton  is  thus  a  broad 
one.  Tlie  narrowing'  of  |lhe  question,  and  focussing 
attention  on  aeronautics  generally  and  the  airshii)  in 
particular  is,  so  far  as  the  average  voter  and  the  body 
of  the  electorate  is  concerned,  summed  up  in  a  few  words  : 
Wc  have  bu-n  b:>mb:d  !  ' 

Kven  so  uncompromising  a  democrat,  so  luicom- 
proinising  a  socialist  as  Blatchford  recogniseii  the  truth 
in  this  respect.  In  his  articles,  published  in  the  columns 
of  a  well-known  London  daily  a  few  years  ago,  he  clearly 
recognised  the  real  source  of  weakness,  though  he  did  not 
express  it  precisely  as  the  present  writer  is  doing.  I  will 
quote  two  paragra])hs  from  Mr.  Blatchford's  fifth  article 
(page  17  of  tlie  published  reprint)  : 

Tliere  is  danger  ahead.  Mr.  Asquith  has  told  us  so,  Lord 
l^oberts  lias  told  us  so.  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  told  us  so. 
And  we  arc  not  ready  to  meet  that  danger.  And  we  are 
not  milking  re.idy  to  meet  that  danger.  And  the  gre.it 
nrajority  of  our  people  arc  oblivious  of  that  danger  or 
refuse  to  recognise  its  existence. 
And  a  few  paragraphs  later  : 

It  implies  that  British  Cabinets  are  unworthy  of  the  nation's 
co.nfidencc.     I  am  aiVaid  it  implies  more  than  that.     I 
am  afraid  it  implies  that  British  Cabinet  Ministers,  for 
the  sake  of  remaining  in  power,  have  time  after  time  con- 
cealed a  state  of  affairs  which  in  the  event  of  war    would 
e.vpose  the   Empire   to   serious  rislcs  of  dishonour   and 
defeat. 
It   will   bo   noted   in   the    foregoing    that    Jiaving 
ciumciated  the  fact,  and  stated  that  as  well  as  Lord 
Roberts,  both  Mr.  Asquith  and  Sir  Edward  Grev  have 
warned  us  of  danger,  Mr.  Blatchford  has  said  ;    "  1  am 
afraid  it  implies  more  than  that."     He  says  :   "  It  implies 
that  British  Cabinet  Ministers,  jor  the  sake  of  roir.iiiiiiin 
in  power,"  etc.     Mr.  Blatchford  do;s  not  pros.;  his  argu- 
ment to  its  logical  conclusion.     If  the  British  Cabinet 
.concealed  the  true  state  of  affairs  for  the  sake  of  remaining 
in  power,    then  if  they  had  revealed  the  state  of  affairs 
they  would  presumably  have  been  thrown  out,  and  we 
should  have  had  some  other  Ministry,  who  also  if  they 
had  revealed  the  true  state  of  affairs  would  have  been 
thrown  out,  so  that  Mr.  Blatchford  practically  presents 
to  us  the  apjiaUing  state  of  things  of  a  democracy  electing 
a  Parliament,  and  indirectly  a  tiovernment,  which  will 
bj  thrown  out  if  its  members  dare  to  tell  the  truth. 

Obviously  such  a  state  of  things  carries  as  a  corollary 
that,  whatever  Government  we  may  have,  the  price  and 
condition  of  its  existence  is  that  it  shall  not  tell  th;  truth 
on  a  matter  of  vital  import :  A  more  damning  commentary 
on  the  whole  fabric  of  democratic  control  has  never  been 
])enned.  He  admits  that  both  Sir  PMward  Grey  and  Mr. 
As.iuith  had  warned  the  nation  of  the  danger  ahead,  and 
it  is  common  knowledge  that  the  leaders  of  the  Unionist 
Party  had  not  been  backward  in  thj  same  direction. 

That  I  am  not  misinterpreting  Mr.   Blatchford  is 

clear  when  I  quote  paragraphs  as  follows.     Tl.e  concluding 

paragraph  of  the  third  artitde  (page  13)  thus  reads  : 

I  nmst  confess,  with  sorro^vful   iiisgiving,  that  the  nation 

is  blind  to  its  peril,  and  is  proving  itself  impotent  to  meet 

that  danger  as  it  must  be  met  if  the  Empire  is  not  to  go 

down  in.  complete  and  irretrievable  disaster. 

Or  again,  from  the  first  article  (page  5  of  the  reprint)  : 

That  is  the  Pan-(ierm:mic  dream.     That  is  the  ambition 

which  is  driving  Germany  into  a  war  of  aggression  against 

this  country.     But  the  British  people  do  not  believe  it. 

The  British  people  take  little  interest  in  foreign  affairs, 

and  less  in  military  matters.     The  British  people  do  not 

want  to  bother,  they  do  not  want  to  pay,  they  do  not  want 

to  hght,  and  they  regard  as  cranks  or  nuisances  all  who 

try  to  warn  them  of  tlieir  danger. 

Members  of    the  Cabinet  before   the  war    realised 

the  danger.     I   think  history  will  relate  that  in  some 

respects   they   strained   a   jjoint   beyond   their   mandate 

from  the  people  in  the  direction  of  increasing  our  defences, 

but  as  Mr.   Blatchford  tacitly  agrees,   the  Government 

were  pledged  to  the  electorate  to  economise,  and  if  they 

had  gone  to  the  extent  that    they   would  untrammelled 

have  wished,  they  would  assuredly  have  been  replaced 

by  a  Government  more  complaisant,  which  would  have 

accorded  more  closely,  more  slavishly,  to  the  dictates  of 

popular   clamour.     No    Government    could    have    lived 

during  the  last  decade,  had  it  ventured  to  embark  upon 

an  increased  spending  programme  in  the  direction   of 

araiament ;   given  this  as  a  condition  it  was  clearly  riuht 


that  expenditure  should  have  been  limited  to  those 
directions  in  which  utility  had  been  proved  or  could  be 
detinitely  demonstrated. 

To-day  all  these  facts  are  forgotten.  The  man  who 
wished  for  curtailment  of  exiJcnditure  in  armaments, 
and  a  lavish  expenditure  in  soiaal  reform,  seems  to  have 
vanished.  He  is  there  still,  but  has  changed  his  coat, 
he  will  change  it  back  again  within  a  few  weeks  of  the 
war  being  over,  when  the  fear  of  Zepjiehn  bombs  has 
b.?en  forgotten,  but  for  th-:;  moment  he  shouts  loudly 
about  other  people's  neglect,  and  swallows  his  own  past 
words  without  even  chewing  them. 

An  Effective  Air  Service 

Considering  the  political  atmo.iphere  prior  to  the 
outbreak  of  war,  it  is  wonderful  that  we  were  able  to 
assert,  after  the  first  few  weeks'  lighting,  a  definite  aero- 
nautical ascendency.  This  was  only  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  few  millions  (very  few  millions)  which  had  been 
granted  for  aeronautical  development  had  been  mainly 
concentrated  on  the  perfection  of  the  heavier-than-air 
machine.  If  the  available  resources  had  been  divided 
between  an  airship  policy  and  the  development  of  the 
aeroplane  we  shoukl  have  been  hopelessly  outclassed, 
and  probably  ovcrwholm:'d  by  disaster. 

It  will  only  be  fully  appreciated  when  the  history  of 
the  war  is  written  what  invaluable  assistance  was  rendered 
by  our  airmen  during  the  retreat  from  Mons,  and  that  at  a 
date  before  it  had  been  possible  to  effect  any  mati-'rial 
increase  in  our  force  of  aeroplanes.  If  we  had  not  been 
well  served  by  our  Flying  Corps  at  the  period  in  question 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  most  perfe<:t 
generalship  would  not  have  saved  us  from  irretrievable 
disaster. 

The  cost  of  any  effective  airship  programme  (apart 
from  experimental  or  developmental  expenses)  would 
have  sucked  up  every  available  penny  of  aeronautical 
grant  like  a  mighty  suction  dredger,  and  would  have 
left  nothing  at  all  for  the  humbler  heavier-than-air 
machine. 

It  is  no  UJ2  dwelUng  on  the  past  except  to  glean 
lessons  for  the  future,  but  I  have  reviewed  the  \yji'>i  in  the 
foregoing  paragraphs  to  show  how  senselesss,  and  1  may 
say  ungrateful  and  criminal,  is  the  movement  of  which 
one  hasj-ecently  seen  evidence,  to  blame  the  i)ast  Govern- 
ment for  such  deficiencies  as  may  b3  acknowledged.!  It 
would  be  more  creditable  to  our  national  level-headedness 
if  we  were  to  recognise  that  it  is  our  system  of  Government 
which  is  at  fault,  and  not  the  individual  puppets  who 
happen  nominally  to  be  in  power. 

One  is  tempted  to  exclaim  :  Serve  God  if  you  will, 
serve  Man,  serve  Mammon,  serve  the  n-.vil  himself,  b.it 
never  serve  a  Democracy  ! 

{To  h:  continued). 


WonuHa  War  ]Vork,  edited  by  I-ady  Randolph  Chuichill 
(C.  Arthur  Pearson.  2s.  Od.).  embodies  the  first  sefious  effort 
to  trace  the  war  activities  of  women  in  the  various  belligerent 
countries,  and  to  give  a  scrie.i  of  clear  and  convincing  pictures 
of  wliat  women  liave  accomplished  under  new  jiatriotic  in- 
tbiences  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  l-'rom  this  book  a 
very  clear  view  can  be  obtained  of  women's  war  work  in 
Europe,  America,  and  the  Jiritish  Dominions  overseas  during 
the  past  eighteen  months,  and  scarcely  a  phase  of  these 
activities  has  been  overlooked. 

Degenerate  Germany,  by  Henry  dc  Ilalsalle  (T.  Weiuer 
Laurie.  2s.  6d.  net),  is  a  record  of  the  repellent  decadence 
of  Germany,  the  innate  corruption,  of  the  whole  empire.  It 
is  possible,  of  course,  to  find  parallels  for  a.  number  of  the 
charges  that  the  author  makes  in  almost  any  country  ;  the 
immorality  recorded  of  Cologne  and  other  German  cities  is 
equalled  by  many  centres  outside  (ierinany.  and,  as  far  ai 
statistics  of  this  sort  of  thing  are  concerned,  there  is  nothing 
new  in  the  l)uok.  Hut  in  the  drgeneracy  of  modern  German 
literatiuv.  the  immoral  tendencies  of  Wagnerian  and  certain 
modern  German  music,  and  similar  jioints,  the  author  offers 
some  very  valuable  matter  for  consideration.  He  shows  that  not 
only  are  the  acts  of  the  nation  degenerate,  but  tlie  whole 
tone  of  thought  is  on  the  down  grade— and  obviously  a  long 
way  down  the  grade.  The  work  is  biassed,  beyond  question, 
but  none  the  less  it  makes  a  study  of  sinister  and  at  times 
horrible  interest,  as  showing  to  what  depths  standarcls  of 
conduct  can  sink  under  the  doctrini-  of  "  micht  is  right  " 


March  23,  19 16. 


LAND      AND      WATER. 

CHAYA. 

A  Romance  of  the  South   Seas. 
By  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoole. 


Syxopsis  :  Macqnart,  an  adventurer  who  has  spent 
most  of  his  lije  at  sea,  finds  himself  in  Sydney  on  his  beam  ends. 
He  has  a  wonderful  story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in  New 
Guinea  and  a  chance  acquaintance,  Tillman,  a  sporting  man, 
about  town,  fond  of  yachting  and  racing,  offers  to  introduce  him 
to  a  wealthy  woolbroker,  Curlewis,  with  a  view  to  financing  the 
scheme.  Macqnart  also  m.akes  the  acquaintance  of  Houghton, 
a  well-educated  Englishman  out  of  a  job,  who  has  done  a  good 
deal  of  yachting  in  his  time.  Curlewis  turns  down  the  scheme, 
though  Macquart  tells  his  story  in  a  most  convincing  manner.  ■. 
His  silent  partner  Screed  believes  in  it,  and  unbeknown  to 
Curlewis,  follows  the  three  men,  asks  them  to  his  house,  and 
agrees  to  find  the  ship  and  the  money,  on  seeing  that  Macquart's 
hidden  treasure  map  agrees  with  an  Admiralty  chart.  The 
ship  is  the  yawl  "  Barracuda."  Screed,  on  the  morrow,  takes 
the  three  men  over  the  "  Barracuda."  with  which  they  are  de- 
lighted. Coming  away  Macquart  is  overtaken  by  an  old  friend, 
one  Captain  Hidl,  who  hails  him  as  B — y  Joe,  and  accuses 
Jiim  of  many  mean  crimes.  Macquart  gives  Captain  Hull 
the  slip,  but  unbeknown  to  him  Hull  gets  in  touch  with  Screed, 
and  enlightens  him  on  the  real  character  of  Macquart.  Just  as 
the  "  Barracuda  "  is  about  to  sail  Screed  takes  Hull  on  board 
and  tmexpectedly  introduces  hint  to  Macquart  as  a  member  of 
the  crew.  The  voyage  passed  with  few  adventi^res.  Guided  by 
Macquart  the  "  Barracuda  "  arrived  at  New  Guinea,  and 
anchoied'in  the  lagoon.  Almost  at  once  they  started  for  the 
place  where  Macquart  declared  the  cache  to  be.  They  dug 
ihrough  the  night  but  unearthed  nothing. 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

The  Scorpion  and  the  Centipede. 

THEY  were  a  rather  gloomy  party  at  breakfast 
next  morning.  Not  one  of  them  spoke  of  the 
events  of  the  night  before,  and  even  Hull's 
enormous  appetite  seemed  affected. 
After  the  meal,  Houghton  led  Tillman  off  for  a  stroll. 
.The  morning  sun  was  shining  through  the  trees,  and  the 
village  folk  were  all  off  after  I'ubber  ;  they  passed  the  village 
and  just  beyond,  on  the  dense  border  of  the  forest,  Houghton 
sat  down  on  a  fallen  log,  filled  his  pipe  and  lit  it.  He  seemed 
to  have  something  on  his  mind.  Tillman  sat  down  beside 
him  and  began  to  smoke  also. 

"  Look  here,"  said  Houghton  at  last,  "'  I've  been  think- 
ing." 

'•  Yes  ?  "  • 

■'  Macquart's  not  running  straight." 

■'  How    do    you    mean  ?  " 

"  He's  bamboozling  us." 

"  Over  the  cache  ?  " 

"  Yes.  The  stuff's  not  buried  there  and  never  was.  The 
Terschelling  was  never  fetched  up  as  far  as  this  and  never 
sunk  here.     That  was  her  we  saw  in  the  lagoon." 

"  Which  ?  " 

"  That  old  burnt  ship  we  saw  in  the  lagoon.  Lant  got 
■all  his  men  in  the  fo'c'sle  and  then  set  alight  to  her.  I'm 
positive." 

"  Good  God  !  "  said  Tillman.     "  What  are  you  saying  ?  " 

"  I'm  saying  what  I  think.  Let's  reason  it  out.  Lant 
stole  the  Terschelling  and  her  cargo  of  gold.  He  knew  the 
river,  he  knew  the  people,  he  was  certain  of  a  safe  refuge  here. 
But  he  did  not  want  anyone,  of  course,  to  know  about  the 
treasure,  not  even  the  people  here.  Wh}'  should  he  have 
brought  the  Terschelling  up  this  distance  ?  No,  he  put  her 
into  the  lagoon,  he  made  the  crew  cache  the  treasure  there, 
then  got  on  board  and  did  for  them.  He  had  to  keep  one  man 
to  help  in  the  business  and  to  help  him  to  come  up  here  in  a 
boat.     That  man  was  Macquart." 

"  Go  on,"  said  Tillman,  whose  pipe  had  gone  out. 

"  He  came  up  here  with  Macquart  and  married  a  native 
woman ;  that  gave  him  a  position  and  made  him  one  of  the 
tribe.  Macquart  saw  him  settling  down,  saw  no  chance  of 
profiting  and  did  for  him.  Then  Lant's  wife  suspected,  and 
Macquart  had  to  shin  out." 

"  Wait  a  moment,"  said  Tillman.  '  Macquart  told  us 
that  as  having  happened  to  a  man  named  Smith.  Well 
haven't  you  seen  that  for  the  last  long  time  Ma'^quart  has  not 
been  even  trying  to  keep  up  the  Smith  fiction.  He  has  all 
but  acknowledged  that  he  was  Smith.  Now,  if  he  were  a 
murderer,  would  he  act  like  that  ?  " 

'  To  begin  with,"  said  Houghton,  "  there  was  never  any 
evidence  of  the  crime,  and  it  happened  fifteen  years  ago. 


Macquart  is  absolutely  safe.  Again,  he  is  not  an  ordinary 
man  ;  he  seems  the  most  absolutely  C3'nical  and  cold-blooded 
devil  I  have  ever  met.  I  have  been  watching  him  closely. 
He  doesn't  bother  about  hiding  anything  the  law  can't  catch 
him  for.  He  doesn't  boast  of  his  crimes,  but  he  doesn't 
bother." 

"Wait  a  moment,"  said  Tillman.  '  Now,  see  here.  If 
that  was  the  Terschelling  we  saw  in  the  lagoon,  and  if  the  stuff 
is  cached  near  here,  why  on  earth  did  Macquart  bring  us  up 
here  ?  This  place  is  a  dangerous  place  for  him.  Lant's  wife 
is  still  alive,  and  if  she  recognised  him,  she'd  be  sure  to  try 
and  work  him  mischief." 

"  Did  I  not  say  that  Macquart's  object  was  to  diddle  us 
over  the  cache,"  said  Houghton.  "  He  has  brought  us  up 
here  so  that  he  may  play  us  some  beastly  trick,  of  that  I'm 
certain.  It  may  be  that  he  plans  to  steal  off  some  night,  slip 
down  the  river,  load  up  the  Barracuda  and  make  off.  He's 
very  thick  with  Jacky  ;  he  understands  Jacky's  lingo,  and  I'm 
not  so  sure  of  Jacky's  being  straight  ;  these  black  fellows, 
most  of  them,  from  what  I've  heard,  aren't  to  be  depended 
on  much." 

"  He  might  do  that,"  said  Tillman,  "  but  I  doubt  if  he 
would  be  able  to  get  the  Barracuda  away  with  only  Jacky 
to  help." 

"  Oh,  yes,  he  would.  Two  men  could  do  a  lot  with  a 
boat  of  that  size.  Look  at  Slocum — went  round  the  world  by 
himself.  Macquart  would  make  for  Macassar  or  somewhere 
close." 

"  There  are  two  things  that  knock  your  idea  on  the 
head,"  said  Tillman.  "The  first  is,  Macquart  and  Jacky 
would  never  be  able  to  transport  all  that  gold  from  the  cache 
to  the  Barracuda  before  we  were  on  top  of  them — they  could 
only  get  a  five  or  six  hours'  start  at  the  most ;  the  second 
is,  that  without  Screed's  help,  Macquart  would  never  be  able 
to  dispose  of  it." 

Houghton  laughed.  "  I've  been  thinking  the  whole  of 
this  thing  out,"  said  he,  "  and  I  can  answer  that.  Screed 
was  a  fool ;  we  were  all  fools.  Macquart,  if  he  wanted  to  play  us 
false,  would  not  want  to  take  all  the  stuff  in  the  cache,  a  couple 
of  thousand  would  do.  With  that,  he'd  sail  off  to  Macassar, 
or  somewhere  else,  settle,  make  a  little  position  for  himself 
and  then,  when  he  had  a  house  and  a  banking  account,  he'd 
come  back  for  the  rest  pf  the  stuff — maybe  a  year  from  now, 
it's  quite  simple." 

"  Good  God !  "  said  Tillman,  suddenly. 

"  What  ?  " 

"  Macquart  and  Jacky  slept  in  the  boat  last  night  and  we 
in    the    tent." 

"  Yes,"  said  Houghton,  "  that  was  the  thing  that  started 
me  off  thinking  last  night  just  as  I  lay  down.  I  thought  to 
myself  how  easy  it  would  be  for  those  two  to  slip  off.  You 
will  remember,  it  was  Macquart  who  suggested  that  he  and 
Jacky  should  take  the  boat,  as  the  tent  was  too  small  for  the 
four  of  us." 

Tillman  said  nothing  for  a  moment.  He  seemed  reviewing 
the  whole  matter  carefuUy.     Then  he  spoke. 

"  We've  got  to  consult  at  once  with  Hull,"  said  he,  "over 
this." 

"  For  goodness  sake,  no,"  replied  Houghton.  "  If  you 
put  Hull  on  to  this  business,  you  will  ruin  everything." 

"  How  ?  " 

"  Because  Hull  would  be  in  this  matter  Hke  a  bull  in  a 
china  shop.  He  hates  Macquart,  just  as  Macquart  hates 
him.  I  honestly  believe  that  Macquart  is  tricking  us  in  this 
matter,  not  so  much  that  he  may  collar  all  the  stuff  for  him- 
self, as  that  he  may  get  even  vnth  Hull.  However  that  may 
be,  Hull,  if  he  knew  what  we  are  thinking,  would  go  on  so 
that  Macquart  would  be  on  his  guard.  We  want  to  appear  a 
particularly  soft  lot  of  fools,  so  that  we  may  take  him  off  his 
guard  and  get  to  know  what  his  plans  are.    ^ 

"  He  knows  where  the  stuff  is  cached  and  we  want  to  get 
at  that  knowledge.  He  will  never  tell  us  of  his  own  accord, 
for  that  would  be  to  enrich  Hull ;  besides,  it  would  be  contrary 
to  the  man's  real  nature.  It  would  be  agony  to  Macquart  to 
share  up  and  be  honest  over  a  huge  sum  of  money  like  this. 
He  is  a  fox  man,  or,  rather,  a  wolf  man.  Well,  we  must 
turn  ourselves  into  foxes  or  wolves  if  we  want  to  share  the 
prey." 

One  of  the  properties  of  Adventure  is  the  power  that  it 
possesses  for  the  development  of  character. 

This  expedition  was  already  bringing  forth  the  true  mental 
properties    of    the    adventurers     with    astonishing    results. 


^9 


L  A  N  D      A  N  n      W  A  T  ]{  R 


March  23,  1910 


Chaya,  a  Romance  o/  tAf  South  Seat. 


ililuttraled    by  Joseph  Siaxptom,  J<.B  A. 


••  Houghton  saw  an  object  that  made  his  flesh  crawl  upon  him." 


Tillman,  for  instance,  who  had  always  seemed  a  butterfly  under 
the  false  conditions  of  Sydney  life,  was  exhibiting  qualities  of 
balance  and  energy  that  would  have  astonished  liis  friends  ; 
and  Houghton,  brought  to  the  test,  was  showing  a  clearness  of 
vision  and  a  power  of  reasoning  upon  obvious  facts  that 
he  had  never  exhibited  fully  before. 

The  power  to  reason  clearly  and  justly  on  the  obvious 
facts  before  us  is  a  power  denied  to  very  manv  ;  it  constitutes 
the  soul  of  business  and  success  in  lite.  It  was  the  secret 
of  Napoleon's  greatness,  and  it  has  been  foimd  wanting  in 
many  and  manv  a  philosopher. 

■  Well,"  said  Tillman,  "  perhaps  3'ou  are  right.     Hull's  a 


blundering  sort  of  chap,  and  there's  no  doubt  he  hates 
Macquart  as  much  as  Macquart  hates  him.  We'd  better  lav 
low,  we  two,  and  we've  got  to  watch  this  chap  as  a  cat  watches 
a  mouse.  I'll  watch  the  boat  to-night.  There's  a  lot  of 
bushes  on  the  bank.  I  can  hide  there  with  a  Winchester,  and 
you  can  watch  to-morrow  n'ght  •  we  mustn't  leave  him  a 
second  alone.     I'll  go  off  now  and  see  what  he's  doing." 

He  rose  up  and  went  off,  leaving  Houghton  still  seated 
on  the  fallen  tree. 

So  deep  was  he  in  meditation,  that  he  did  not  hear  a 
light  step  behind  him.     It  was  the  girl  of  yesterday ;    she 

(ContiNued  un  puyt-  22.) 


20 


March  23,  igi6. 


LAND      AND      WATER 


What    Protection     Really     Means 

Magnificently  Exemplified  by  the 


Illustrated 
Military 
or  Naval 
Catalogues 
Post  Free 


TIELOCKEN 
BURBERRY 


PERFECT  SECURITY,  no  words  better 
describe  the  protection  of  The 
Tielocken  Burberry.  Overlapping 
fronts  doubly  safeguard  every  vulner- 
able part  of  the  body,  from  .the  throat 
to  knees,  providing  a  w^arm,  dry  and 
comfortable  shelter  against  driving  rain, 
sleet,  snow  or  cold. 

BURBERRY  WEAVE-PROOF 
CLOTHS  in  combination  with 
Camel  Fleece  or  Felt,  ensure  the  snug 
warmth  and  comfort  essential  for 
prolonged  and  excessive  exposure. 

£ASY     ADJUSTMENT     is     another 

distinctive  feature  of  The  Tielocken. 

No  buttons  to  fasten  or  lose.    The  belt 

fitting  the  coat  to  any  thickness  of  under 

arments,  holds  it  smartly  and  well. 

■pHE  COLLAR  may  be  worn  (1) 
open,  as  depicted ;  (2)  closed  up 
like  a  "  Burberry  "  ;  (3)  stand  with 
fall  points,  as  inset ;  or  (4)  buttoned 
right  up  to  the  neck. 

N.H.— Officers  wishivg  their  Tielocken  Coats  to  he  ABSO. 
LUTELY  WATERPROOF,  regardless  of  hygiene,  may 
have  them  interlined  impervious  material  without  extra  cost. 


NAVAL  OR  MILITARY  WEATHERPROOFS 

Until  further  notice 

BURBERRYS  CLEAN  AND  REPROOF 

Officers'    "  Burberrys,"    Tielocken    Coats,    and    Burberry 
Trench-Warms 

FREE  OF  CHARGE 

N:B. — The  process  entails  lo  clear  days'  possession. 


Everything  the  Officer  Needs 
Burberry  in  2  to  4  Drys  or Ready for  Use 

Garment      ^—^—^^^—^—^^^^-^^^^——^—^^-^——^—^.^^^ 
is  labelled 

"BURBERRYS 

HAYMARKET    LONDON 

Bd.  Malesherbes  PARIS  ;   &  AgenU 


21 


LAND       AND     WATER 


March  23,  1916. 


(Continued  fr<tn   page   20) 

was  coming  along  the  path  that  led  from  the  Dvak  village  to 
the  waterside.  As  she  drew  up  to  the  seated  figure,  she 
paused,  stared,  and  sprang  towards  him. 

The  next  moment,  the  astonished  Houghton  found  him- 
self dragged  by  the  arm  off  the  log,  and  standing  face  to  face 
with  Chaya. 

Without  a  word,  the  girl  pointed  to  the  log  on  which  he 
had  been  seated,  and  Houghton  saw  an  object  that  made  his 
flesh  crawl  upon  him. 

It  was  the  great  scorpion  of  New  (iuinea,  by  far  the  most 
monstrous  creation  of  the  Tropics.  It  was  almost  the  size 
of  a  grown  man  s  hand,  almost  the  colour  of  the  dark  wood 
on  which  it  crawled,  and  as  Houghton  looked  at  it,  he  saw 
the  tail  with  its  terrible  terminal  nippers  curl  up  and  then 
flatten  out  again,  and  the  wholes  body  of  the  reptile  move 
forward  in  its  steady  progress  along  the  path  it  had  chosen 
for  itself. 

Had  he  placed  his  hand  upon  it  or  pressed  his  leg  against 
it,  he  would  have  died  as  surely  as  though  a  pistol  had  been 
fired  at  his  head  point  blank,  for  the  bite  of  the  great  New 
Guinea  scorpion  not  only  kills,  but  kills  in  a  most  horrible 
way,  and  there  is  no  antidote  to  the  poison. 

Houghton  at  once  on  the  sight  of  the  thing  stooped 
down  and  picked  up  a  piece  of  stick  for  the  purpose  of  killing 
it,  but  again  Chaya's  hand  fell  upon  his  arm,  this  time 
restraining  him.  She  was  pointing  at  the  tropical  leaves  that 
half  covered  one  end  of  the  log.  Something  was  coming  from 
among  them.  •  It  was  a  centipede.  A  centipede  fifteen  inches 
in  length,  ash  grey  changing  to  green,  and  orange  where  the 
thousand  tiny  legs  moved  in  hideous  vibration,  and  with  such 
rapidity  that  they  shewed  only  as  a  narrow  band  of  orange- 
coloured  mist. 

Above  and  around  were  the  tropical  leaves  ;  a  bird  like 
a  puff  of  sapphire  dust  flew  from  the  sunUght  through  the 
gloom  of  the  branches,  and  over  the  battle  that  now  ensued 
swung  a  sagging  loop  of  liana,  coloured  like  an  old  rope 
except  at  one  point  where  from  it  blazed  an  orchid. 

The  centipede  attacked.  Making  use  of  the  inequalities 
of  the  bark,  it  covered  the  distance  between  itself  and  the 
enemy  in  three  movements,  and  with  such  cunning  that  the 
scorpion,  who  had  perceived  its  antagonist  from  the  first, 
seemed  undecided  and  not  to  know  from  what  point  the 
attack  was  coming.  There  is  nothing  on  earth  more  skilled 
in  the  art  of  taking  cover  than  the  centipede,  more  astute, 
more  furtive. 

Then  in  a  flash,  the  battle  was  joined  and  the  centipede 
was  running  over  the  back  of  the  scorpion  like  a  narrow  ash- 
grey  river.  The  claws  of  the  scorpion  sought  for  it  and  the 
pincered  tail  was  flung  back  to  seize  it,  but  the  river  changing 
and  shifting  eluded  all  these  attempts  ;  it  seemed  as  though 
the  centipede  possessed  an  eye  to  match  every  foot.  In  the 
fury  of  the  fight  the  combatants  tumbled  off  the  log  and, 
tangled  togetfier,  the  battle  went  on  amidst  the  leaves  on 
the  groimd  with  a  fury  that  made  Houghton  almost  feel 
ill. 

Chaya,  taking  the  piece  of  stick  from  Houghton,  pushed 
the  leaves  aside  and  disclosed  the  end  of  the  fight.  The 
scorpion  was  tearing  the  centipede  to  pieces  with  its  lobster 
claws,  but  its  victory  brought  its  death.  It  had  been  mortally 
stung,  the  claws  flung  themselves  up  once  or  twice,  the  tail 
curved  backwards  for  the  last  time,  fell,  and  even  as  it  fell 
the  body  of  the  thing  was  covered  by  rushing  ants. 

A  great  butterfly,  sea-coloured  and  luminous,  flitted 
across  the  log,  and  Houghton  turned  his  eyes  to  Chaya.  She 
was  half  laughing,  the  pupils  of  her  dark  eyes  were  dilated  as 
if  with  the  excitement  of  the  battle  they  had  just  witnessed. 
She  seemed  the  incarnation  of  the  spirit  of  this  land,  where 
the  flowers  burgeoned  in  a  night,  where  Love  and  Hate  grew 
swift  as  the  convolvulus  that  grows  even  as  oi  e  watches  it, 
wheie  Beauty  and  Terror  walk  hand  in  hand  with  Destruc- 
tion. 

"  Dead,"   said  Chaya. 
"  You  saved  me,"  said  Houghton. 

He  took  both  her  hands  in  his.  She  had  been  in  his 
thoughts  ever  since  their  eyes  had  met  on  the  day  before 
and  she  knew  it. 

Houghton  stood  out  from  his  companions,  not  only  on 
account  of  his  good  looks.  He  possessed  a  refinement  they 
lacked.  He  was  the  only  man  of  his  type  who,  perhaps,  had 
ever  trod  that  soil. 

She  laughed  as  he  held  her  hands,  laughed,  looking  i  ight 
into  his  eyes,  so  that  a  fierce  flame  seemed  to  strike  through 
him,  filling  him  w'th  the  intoxication  of  light  and  fire,  the 
intoxication  that  one  may  fancy  to  seize  the  moth  before  it 
dashes  into  the  lamp. 

Then  he  released  her  hands  and  the  spell  was  taken  off 
him,  but  none  the  less  his  fate  was  sealed.  She  sat  down  on 
th2  log  and  he  sat  beside  her. 

'  You  come  from  far  away  ?  "  said  Chaya,  in  that 
English  which  the  traders  had  taught  her  and  which  she 


spoke  in  a  curious  singing  way,  with  a  rising  inflection  that 
was  the  last  charm  of  language. 

"  Yes,  very  far,"  he  replied  ;  ''  all  the  way  from  Eng- 
land." 

"  All  the  way  from  England,"  said  she,  repeating  the 
words  as  though  they  did  not  interest  her  much,  or  as  though 
they  had  little  meaning  tor  her. 

"  Yes — and  I  know  who  you  are.     You  are  Chaya.  ' 

"  How  know  you  thai  ?  " 

"  Wiart,  the  white  man,  told  me." 

''  Ugh  !  "   said  Chaya. 

Criticism  could  go  no  further  in  conciseness,  and  Houghton 
looking  sideways  at  his  delicious  companion,  saw  that  her 
head  was  tilted  slightly  back,  and  it  came  into  his  mind  for 
the  first  time  that  the  old  expression,  "  turning  up  one's 
nose  "  does  not  refer  to  the  nose  at  all,  but  to  the  position 
of  the  head.  And  whet  a  lovely  head  it  was  that  taught 
him  the  fact,  cut  surely  and  sharply  as  the  head  upon  a  cameo, 
with  night-black  hair  drawn  backwards  and  fixed  in  a  single 
knot,  without  any  adornment  but  its  own  beauty. 

The  arm  close  to  him  was  bare,  and  the  loosely  worn 
robe  exposed  just  a  glimpse  of  her  side  and  the  fact  that  she 
wore  the  brass  corsets  used  by  the  Dyak  women  of  some 
tribes  ;  the  hand  that  still  held  the  stick  shewed  no  sign  of 
hard  work,  small,  yet  capable-looking,  supple  and  subtle, 
with  the  finger-nails  polished  like  agate,  it  fascinated  Hough- 
ton.    He  longed  to  cla.sp  it  and  hold  it. 

Chaya's  colour  was  a  new  form  of  beauty  in  itself,  derived 
from  the  fact  that  it  was  the  blended  colour-beaut\'  of  two 
races,  the  European  and  the  Dyak  ;  but  her  eyes  shewed 
nothing  of  Europe  in  their  depths,  they  were  the  eyes  of  the 
Saribas  woman  and  filled  with  the  mystery  of  the  forests  and 
the  sea. 

"  You  do  not  like  Wiart  ?  " 

Chaya,  instead  of  replying,  sought  amidst  the  leaves  with 
the  point  of  the  stick,  discovered  what  was  left  of  the  centi- 
pede and  held  it  up  on  the  stick  end. 

It  looked  like  a  string  made  of  faded  green  paper. 

Siie  laughed  as  she  held  it  up  in  answer  to  his  question. 

'■  It's  about  as  ugly  as  him  "  said  Houghton.  "  Chaya, 
where  do  you  live  ?  I  know  it's  somewhere  close  here  ;  but 
where  ?  " 

Chaya  waved  her  arm  all  round,  as  if  to  indicate  that  she 
inhabited  the  whole  forest,  a  delicate  and  humorous  evasion 
of  the  question  that  seemed  to  hint,  "We  are  getting  on  very 
well,  but  not  quite  so  fast  as  all  that." 

Houghton  smiled  and  bit  his  lip.  He  wanted  nothing 
more  but  just  to  sit  here  beside  her.  Never  in  his  life  agam 
would  he  feel  just  the  same  thrill  and  intoxication  as  he 
experienced  now,  in  the  first  moments  of  his  new  existence, 
sitting  by  this  half-mute,  half-laughing  companion.  ■ 

She  had  dropped  the  remnants  of  the  centipede  and  she 
was  swinging  the  stick  now,  leaning  forward  as  she  sat  with 
her  elbows  on  her  knees  and  the  stick  between  her  fingers. 

She  seemed  musing  on  something. 

As  she  sat  like  this,  two  butterflies,  desj-erately  in  love 
with  one  another,  passed  flitting  one  above  the  other.  She 
followed  them  with  her  eyes,  and  as  she  turned  her  head  to 
watch  them  vanish  in  the  gloom  of  the  trees,  her  eyes  met 
his  and  the  call  in  them  went  straight  to  his  soul.  Maddened, 
scarcely  knowing  what  he  was  doing,  he  stretched  out  his  arms 
to  seize  her,  but  she  evaded  him  like  a  ghost.  Then  she  was 
gone. 

He  stood  looking  at  the  swaying  leaves  where  she  had 
vanished,  swallowed  up  by  the  same  gloom  that  had  taken  the 
butterflies,  then  his  eyes  fell  to  the  ground  where  the  stick 
she  had  held  was  lying,  and  the  remnants  of  the  scorpion  and 
the  centipede,  whose  battle  to  the  death  was  to  form  the  first 
chapter  in  one  of  the  strangest  love  stories  of  the  tropics. 

(To   be  coni^nued.^ 


Hedgehog  straw  in  spite  of  its  unduly  ugly  name  pro- 
mises to  be  well  liked  this  year.  It  is,  as  can  easily  be  im- 
agined, a  particularly  rough  straw,  and  a  hat  made  of  it  wants 
but  little  additional  trimming,  a  band  and  tie  of  narrow 
ribbon  being  sufficient.  Some  of  the  hats  are  rather  attrac- 
tively trimmed  with  large  flower  motifs  in  a  straw  of  contrast- 
ing colour,  and  are  a  boon  in  our  uncertain  climate.  No 
matter  how  much  it  may  rain  they  come  through  triumphant, 
for  the  colours  are  fast,  and  will  not  run. 


Malted  nuts  is  amongst  the  excellent  preparations  by  the  Inter- 
national Health  Association  Limited,  Watford.  It  is  recommended 
on  medical  grounds  for  very  many  reasons,  especially  to  those  who  are 
too  thin,  suffer  from  neurasthenia  and  find  difficulty  in  digesting 
starchy  food  or  cow's  milk  There  are  no  chemical  properties  in 
Malted  Nuts.  It  is  a  simple  preparation  of  national  products,  pre- 
digested,  and  very  carefully  prepared  for  quick  and  perfect  assimilation. 
There  is  not  the  least  difficulty  in  preparing  it,  for  all  that  is  necessary 
is  to  make  a  paste-like  mixture  with  the  help  of  milk  and  water,  adc^ing 
more  of  either  of  the  latter  till  the  right  consistency  is  obtained.  As 
a  hot  drink  it  is  excellent  before  going  to  bed  and  as  a  nerve  buildin;, 
food  undoubtedly  valuable. 


11 


iviarcn  30,    lyni 


fc_;i.ipL'i'^ii»v--ii.v 


Buyin 


Tabl 


or  me  laoie 

Comestibles  and  Household  Commodities  of  the  First  Quality 

Every  need,  to  the  smallest  item  in  our  household  economy,  is  supplied 
from  this  great  super-Store  by  frequent  daily  motor  van  deliveries  to  the 
residential    districts    of   the  West  -  End   and    the    more    important    Suburbs 

BarkerStore 


EASTER      ORDERS       FOR      THE 
FRONT  SHOULD  BE  GIVEN  NOW 


THOUSANDS  OF   BARKER   HAMPERS 
ARE     DESPATCHED     EVERY     WEEK 


EASTER    HAMPERS    FOR  THE    FRONT 


TWO -GUINEA     BOX 

No.  2. 
FOR     THE      EXPEDITION  ARY 

FORCES 
Contiiining: 


1  tin  Roast 

Turkey  or  Fowl 
1   tin  Pheasant 
Pat^ 

1  tin.. ToHKue 

2  tins  Luncheon 

Pat^s 
2  tins  Steak  and 
Kidney    Puddings 
2   tins  ...Sausages 
1   tin  Fruit 

Pudding 

1  Ginger  Pudding 

2  tins   Herrings 
in  Tomato  Sauce 

1  tin  Sardines 

1  tin  Oval    Di- 
gestive Riscuits 
1   tin  Easter 

Cakes 


1  Cake  Sultana 

Gingerbread 
1  tin  Caf6  au  Lait 
1  tin  Smoked 

Salmon 
1  tin  ...0x0  Cubes 

1  tin  Honey 

2  tins  Potted 

Meat 

3  tins     Jsim 

2  tins  Marmalade 
1  tin Peaches 

1  tin  Pears 

2  cartons  ...Plums 
1  pkt.  Trenoh 

Candles 

1  tin  Matches 

1  bar  Carbolic 

Soap 
1   Tin  Opener 


0NE-6UINEA     BOX     BARKERS    HALF-GUINEA   BOX 


No.  2. 

THE      EXPEDITIONARY 
FORCES 

Containing: 


1  tin  Roast 

Turkey  or  Fowl 
1  tin  Pheasant 

Pat6 

1  tin  Herrings  in 

Tomato  Sauce 

I    tin   ...Sausages 

1    tin Sardines 

(1  ...Soup  Squares 
1  tin  Caf6  au  Lait 
1  tin   Smoked 

Salmon 
1  tin  Bivouac 

Cocoa 
1   tin    Marmalade 


1  tin    Rasp^>6r^y 

Jam 

1   pJtt.   Muscatels 

and   Almonds 

1    Fruit    Pudding 

1  tin    Oxo    Cubes 

2  tinis    Potted 

Meats 

lib    Pluni3 

1  tin  Easter 

Cakes 
1  tablet   Antisep- 
tic Soap 
.   Mat<'he.'» 
Trenth 
Candles. 


1  tin. ..Camp  pie 
1  tin  ...Sausages 
1  tin  ...  Sardines 
1  tin  Caf^  au  Lait 
1... Fruit  Pudding 
I  tin  Potted 
Meat  or  Fish 


No.  3. 

Containing: 


10/6 


1   tin. ..0x0  Cubes 
1  tin  Bivouac 

Cocoa 
1  tin  ...Pineapple 
1  tin    Jam   or 

Marmalade 
3  packets  ...  Soup 


Poslage  paid  to  France. 

BARKERS    "TRENCH"     BOX 


tin   . 
pkt. 


PER 


CASE 


42/. 

Delioered  free  to  M.F.  Officer. 


PER 


BOX 


21/. 

"Delioered  Free  to  M.F.  Officer. 


1  Sultana  Ginger- 
bread 

1  tin  Bivouac 

Cocoa 

1    tin Sardine! 


No.  5. 
Containing : 


5/- 


1    packet  ...Plums 

1  tin  Golden 

Syrup 

2  packets   ...Soup 
1  tablet  Soap 


Postage  paid  to  France. 


BARKERS      "  TUCK  "     BOX 

No.   4. 

Containing: 


1  Calie   Ginger- 
bread 

1  tin  ...  Sardines 

1  tin    Potted 

Meat 

1    paclcet  ...Plums 


7/6 


tin  Marmalade 
1  tin  ...Sausages 
1  ...Fruit  Pudding 
1   tin  Bivouac 

Cocoa 
t  tin. ..Oxo  CubL's 


Postage  paid  to  France. 

Barkers  Prisoners  of  War  Box 


Containing 


1    Cake   Ginger- 
bread 
1  tin  Corned  Beef 
1   tin    ...Sau.sagcs 
r  tin  Jam  or 

Marmalade 


1    tin   Oxo    Cubes 

1    tin Dripping 

1  tin   Herrings   in 
Tomato  Sauce 
1  tabli^'t  Antisep- 
tic Soap 


5/6 


Postage  free  to  Germany 


FULL     LIST     OF    VARIOUS     BARKER     HAMPERS  :      SENT     POST     FREE 

SIMNEL    AND    EASTER    CAKES 

These  are  made  up  to  various  sizes        -        -       from   2/-  to   10/6  each 

A  special  display  of   seasonable    cakes  and   dainties,  suitable    for   sending    to    the  Front   or   as  presents   to    friends 

is    arranged    daily  in    the    Bakery    and    Confectionery    Departments   on    the    Ground    Floor     of    the    Barker  Store 

THIS    DAILY    DISPLAY    IS    THE    LARGEST    AS    IT    IS    THE    MOST    ATTRACTIVE   IN    LONDON 


Telephone :  3520  Kensington 


John   Barker  and  Company  ud 

Kensington    High    St    W  Telegrams: -Barkers  Kensington- 


XIV 


Supplement    to    LAND    &    WATER 


March  30,  1916 


Trade  M»tfc. 

Duniop :  Here  is  an  illustration,  General,  of  my  point  about 
steel  non-skids  for  ambulances  and  staff  cars.  How 
would  rubber  barbed  wire  work  ? 

The  General :  Wouldn't  hold  anything  ! 

Duniop:  Exactly;  and  a  cover  with  rubber  barbs,  so  to 
speak,  won't  hold  your  car  on  grease.  Rubber  doesn't 
bite  through  to  solid  ground  ;  steel  does.  On  the  other 
hand,  rubber  will  hold  on  a  surface  where  steel  would  slip. 

The  General :  So  you  recommend  ? 

Duniop:  Steel-studded  covers  on  the  near-back  and  off- 
front  wheels  and  grooved  rubber  covers  on  the  other 
two.  It  is  the  best  all-round  arrangement  for  varying 
road  surfaces  and  weather  conditions. 


THE    DUNLOP    RUBBER    CO.,    LTD., 

FOUNDERS      OF      THE      PNEUMATIC     TYRE      INDUSTRY. 

Aston  Cross,   Birmingham.  14  Regent    Street,  London,   S.W.  PARIS:     4    Rue  du  Colonel  Moll. 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVI  No.  2812. 


THTTRCiDAV     MARPTT    -in     rnjft  tpublished  ash   pr  i  c  e  sixpencf. 

inuiXouA  1 ,    ivi/\rn^n    ju,    lyio  La  newspaperJ  published  weekly 


r^n'J/t^-' 


By   L(juh  liuiinaekert 


nntwti    exclu^irel'j   'or   "I'tti'I  and    irr*-:/ 


Seems  to   be   neutral ;  send   him   dow-n. 


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LAND  &  WATER 

KMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSWAY,  LONDON,  W.C. 

Telephone:  HOLBORN   2828 

THURSDAY,    MARCH    30th,    1916 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

I 
2 
3 

4 
8 

10 


Sinking  a  Neutral.  By  Louis  Raemaekers 

The  Road  to  Ypres.  By  G.  Spencer  Pryse 

The  Neutral  Choice.  (Leading  Article) 

The  Russian  Movements.  By  Ililaire  Belloc 

Germany  runs  Amok.  By  Arthur  Pollen 

Need  for  a  Balkan  Policy.  By  Alfred  Stead 

A  Famous  Showman.  By  Desmond  MacCarthy  11 

Aircraft  Policy.  By  F.  W.  Lanchester  13 

Sortes  Shakespeariana?.  By  Sir  Sidney  Lee  17 

Towards  a  Better  Banking  System.  By  Arthur  Kitson     17 

Chaya.  By  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoole  19 

Town  and  Country  24 

The  West  l<:nd  26 

Choosing  Kit  xvii 

THE    NEUTRAL    CHOICE 

AT  the  beginning  of  the  war  a  distinguished  foreign 
diplomatist  expressed  the  opinion  that  before  it  was 
over  every  great  civilised  Power  would  have  been 
drawn  into  the  struggle.  We  do  not  know  the  grounds  upon 
which  he  based  his  prophecy,  but  the  inauguration  of  the 
new  campaign  of  German  submarine  frightfulness  brings 
its  realisation  within  the  region  of  practical  poHtics.  For  if 
the  Tubantia  and  the  Palembang,  the  Englishman  and  the 
Sussex,  not  to  mention  other  vessels,  have  been  sunk 
by  German  agency,  and  still  more  if  the  German  Govern- 
ment pursues  to  its  logical  end  the  policy  which  it  has 
thus  begun,  neutrals  can  hardly  fail,  sooner  or  later,  to 
abandon  neutrality  in  self-defence  alone.  Directly  the  neutrals, 
however,  begin  to  consider  the  abandonment  of  neutrality, 
they  are  driven  to  make  up  their  minds  as  to  the  side  which 
they  are  going  to  join,  and  the  question  of  the  defence  of 
their  own  interests  as  neutrals  becomes  swallowed  up  in  the 
larger  question  about  which  the  war  itself  is  being  fought, 
and  it  is,  of  course,  by  no  means  certain  that  neutrals,  if 
forced  to  take  sides,  will  fight  against  the  Power,  or  com- 
bination of  Powers,  which  has  trespassed  upon  their  rights. 

In  view,  therefore,  of  the  events  of  the  last  fortnight  the 
general  trend  of  opinion  in  neutral  countries  as  to  the  main 
issues  at  stake  in  the  war  itself  becomes  of  prime  importance, 
for  it  will  be  their  judgment  about  the  war  itself  which 
will  determine  the  side  they  will  join,  once  neutrality  is 
abandoned.  From  this  point  of  view  an  article  which  appeared 
recently  in  the  New  Republic,  a  well-known  New  York  weekly, 
is  of  much  significance.  The  Nezv  Republic  sees  that  far  more 
is  involved  in  the  submarine  controversy'  than  the  rights  of 
American  citizens.  "  If,"  it  says,  "  the  submarine  survives 
as  a  commerce  destroyer  it  will  do  so  at  the  expense  of  the 
existing  structure  of  marine  law.  If  on  the  contrary,  the 
existing  structure  of  marine  law  is  to  survive,  and  to  be 
enlarged,  the  practice  of  commerce  destroying  by  submarines 
will  have  to  be  ruled  out."  "  Freedom  of  the  seas,  like  civil 
freedom  on  land,  must  eventually  rest  upon  the  orderly 
exercise  of  authoritative  power  and  control."  And  that,  it 
says,  will  be  impossible  if  the  submarine  is  recognised  as  a 
commerce  destroyer.  Owing  to  the  peculiar  combination  of 
invisibility,  vulnerability  and  offensive  power,  possessed  by 
the  submarine,  "  the  seas,  if  submarines  were  recognised  as 
commerce  destroyers  at  all,  would  be  violated  by  a  barbarous 


guerilla  warfare,  which  would  break  down  the  distinction 
between  trading  and  war  vessels,  and  would  endanger  the 
lives  and  boats  of  neutrals  on  the  high  seas,  and  which  would 
make  it  almost  impossible  for  neutrals  not  to  become  in- 
volved in  the  quarrel.  The  exis.ting  marine  law,  which  until 
recently  has  made  travel  on  the  ocean  comparatively  safe  for 
non-combatants  of  all  nations,  would  be  superseded  by  a 
kind  of  anarchy  that,  in  case  many  submarines  could  be  kept 
actively  afloat,  would  become  intolerable."  The  only 
way  out,  in  the  eyes  of  the  Nezo  Republic,  is  for  the  civilised 
world  to  treat  submarines  as  they  have  treated  privateers,  and 
outlaw  them  as  commerce  destroyers. 

The  general  trend  of  this  opinion  is  reinforced  by  American 
comment  on  the  sinking  of  the  Sussex.  The  essence  of  the 
position  was  stated  by  the  World  as  follows  :  "  The  question 
to  be  considered  very  seriously  by  this  country  and  by  all 
other  neutrals  having  self-respect,  is  whether  anything  is  to 
be  gained  by  maintaining  any  longer  the  ghastly  pretence  of 
friendly  diplomatic  correspondence  with  a  Power  notor- 
iously lacking  in  truth  and  honour."  Neutrals,,  in  fact,  are 
beginning  to  realise  what  the  Allies  have  long  known,  that 
the  war  is  really  being  fought  against  a  clique  which,  hiving 
rivetted  its  despotism  on  the  German  and  Austro-Hun- 
garian  peoples,  is  now,  by  the  law  of  its  own  autocratic  being, 
attempting  to  extend  its  paralysing  sway  over  all  F>astcrn 
Europe  as  well.  In  its  passion  for  dominion  it  has  shown  itself 
willing  to  cast  not  only  its  own  word,  but  the  most  elementary 
rights  of  humanity,  to  the  winds.  It  has  proved  to  demon- 
stration that  it  will  stop  at  no  atrocity,  that  it  will  hesitate  to 
employ  no  invention  of  science,  however  devilish  in  the 
misery  it  inflicts,  if  it  can  thereby  subserve  its  military  ends. 

The  significance  of  these  opinions  lies  in  the  fact  tint 
they  know  that  American  opinion  is  hardening,  not  only 
towards  a  truer  perception  of  the  issues  of  the  war  itself,  but 
toward  the  only  conclusion  which  it  is  possible  to  draw  from 
the  facts  revealed  in  this  war.  If  a  great  and  powerful  nation 
sets  out  to  attain  its  own  selfish  ends,  regardless  of  inter- 
national law,  and  regardless  of  the  rights  and  liberties  of 
other  nations,  the  only  answer  is  for  the  civilised  world  to 
band  itself  together  in  active  defence  of  the  principles  upon 
which  civilisation  itself  depends.  The  war  has  sufficiently 
proved  the  futility  of  treaty  declarations  and  paper  inter- 
national law.  Treaty  rights  and  international  law  are  worth- 
less without  the  armed  strength  of  civilisation  behind  them. 
It  was  a  general  perception  of  this  truth  which  took  the  five 
nations  of  the  British  Empire  into  the  war.  It  was  the  violation 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  which  finally  convinced  them 
that  Germany  was  playing  the  part  of  an  outlaw  among 
nations,  and  that  if  liberty,  and  even  civilisation  itself,  were 
to  last,  the  sanctity  of  public  right  must  be  vindicated  at  any 
cost.  If  Germany  is  now  proceeding  to  act  even  more  ob- 
viously than  in  the  past  as  the  outlaw  of  the  seas,  she  is  only 
pursuing  her  own  doctrines  to  their  logical  conclusion  witii 
the  inevitable  result  that  the  eyes  of  neutrals  also  will  be 
opened  to  the  same  conclusion. 

This  war  is  not  a  dog  fight  between  a  number  of  jealous 
rivals.  It  is  a  war  of  principles,  a  renewal  of  the  time  honoured 
struggle  between  tyranny  and  liberty,  might  and  right. 
Ivvery  day  that  passes  convinces  the  Allies  of  the  truth  of 
this  fact.  At  the  outset  they  were  united  mainly  by  a  common 
fear  of  a  common  enemy.  The  meeting  of  the  Concert  of  the 
Allies  this  week  in  Paris  proves  that  they  are  now  united  by 
the  same  spirit  that  animated  the  Quadruple  Alliance  against 
Napoleon  a  century  ago— they  attend  it  as  crusader  nations 
fighting  to  destroy  the  poison  of  Prussianism,  and  to  rebuild 
the  world  on  the  foundation  of  liberty  and  law.  It  is  not 
inappropriate  that  this  should  be  the  moment  chosen  by  the 
inheritors  of  the  Napoleonic  tradition  to  drive  the  neutrals 
to  consider  whether  they  also  should  not  participate  in  the 
great  work  of  permanently  establishing  the  principles  of 
international  justice  and  liberty  as  the  foundation  on  which 
the  civiUsation  of  the  world  shall  rest. 


L  A  N  D 


w  .\  r  E  R 


March  30,   icjiG 


THE    RUSSIAN    MOVEMENTS 


By  Hilaire  Belloc 


THOUGH  the  Russian  movements  of  the  last  fort- 
night have  nothing  decisive  about  them  whatso- 
ever and  can  hardly  be  even  preparatory  to  any 
delinite  plan  at  so  early  a  date  as  this,  we  shall 
better  understand  the  main  effort  later  on  if  we  appreci- 
ate the  situation  North  of  Vilna  as  it  stands  now  before 
the  thaw. 

The  great  line  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Roumanian 
frontier  consists  of  three  separate  sections. 

In  the  centre  are  the  marshes  of  Pinsk  in  which  no 
decisive  movement  can  e\er  take  place.  The  enemy 
there  holds  a  small  number  of  more  or  less  isolated 
positions  which  depend  foi"  their  security  upon  the  nature 
of  the  ground.  One  would  almost  tall  these  jxjsitions 
an  archipelago,  were  it  not  that  the  wliole  region  is  cut 
by  a  certain  number  of  embankments,  by  a  few  causeways 
.and  railway  lines,  and  further  traversed  by  ways  which 
the  inhabitants  know  and  can  use,  and  which  are  pieced 
together  deviously  along  the  harder  stretches  of  ground. 
Our  Allies  hold,  opposite  to  and  watching  these  enemy 
positions,  similarly  discontinuous  posts.  The  main  supply 
of  either  of  the  two  comparatively  small  commands 
watching  each  other  from  north  to  south  of  this  detestable 
triangle  is  the  railway  which  runs  from  cast  to  west 
through '  the  very  centre  of  the  marshes  from  Kobrin 
and  serves  the  town  of  Pinsk.  The  marshes  arc,  I  believe, 
never  so  frozen  as  to  allow  for  the  unimpeded  movement 
of  armies  ;  they  certainly  have  not  been  so  in  the  course 
of  this  campaign. 

This  area  may  therefore  be  regarded  as  a  breach  in 
the  general  continuity  of  the  lines,  such  as  does  not  exist 
upon  any  other  front.  It  compels  both  parties  to  treat 
what  is  north  and  what  is  south  of  the  marshes  separateh', 
and  it  therefore  condemns  each  to  some  considerable 
anxiety  whenever  its  opponent  takes  the  offensive.  If, 
for  instance,   movements  that   look  like  a  big  'Austro- 

'  German    offensive   in    the   south    develop,  the ;  Russians 

,  cannot  rapidly  reinforce  there  from  comparatively  short 
distances.  The  rearrangement  of  forces  does  not  proceed 
as  it  does  in  the  west  along  a  continuous  line,  but  involves 
the  bringing  of  large  bodies  over  very  great  distances 
indeed.  There  are  really  two  separate  theatres  of  war 
on   tlie  eastern  front,   separated    by  the   marshes   and 

.  supporting  each  other  only  in  the  most  distant,  difficult 
and  belated  fashion. 

When  we  contrast  the  ways  in  which  this  disadvan- 
tage weighs  upon  the  enemy  and  upon  our  Ally,  we  dis- 

'  cover  the  following  points  : 

First,  the  Austro-Germans  can  more  easily  and 
(|uickly  move  troops  from  the  one  field  to  the  other 
because,  although  they  do  not  hold  any  good  lateral 
railway  they  ha^■e  behind  theni  a  much  more  comjilete 
system  than  have  the  Russians.  In  other  words,  they 
have  to  bring  their  men  round  in  a  big  bend,  but  along 

.  that  bend  they  have  plenty  of  rolling  stock  and  se\eral 
double  line  railways  Tiie  Russians  have  no  latera'Mne 
tliither.  If  either  side  held  completely  the  Riga, 
Dvinsk,    \'ilna.    Lida,    Luminetz,    Rovko    railway,    that 

•  side  would  ha\e  an  enormous  advantage.  It  was  for 
such  an  advantage  that  the  Austro-Ciermans  fought  so  . 
hard  last  September  ;  but  neither  side  remained  in  such 
a  position.  Each  cuts  across  that  railway  and  holds  only 
a  part  of  it.  and  the  Russians  have  no  great  lateral  line 
for  more  than  a  hundred  miles  behind. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Russian  organisation  has, 
upon  tliat  very  account,  been  arranged  in  perfectly 
separate  groups.  The  Northern  armies  have  their  own 
bases  and  even  their  own  factories  sepai^ate  from  tin- 
Southern,  and  so  far  as  the  mere  reinforcement  in  men  is 
concerned,  a  suHicient  delay  permits  of  drafts  from  the 
interior  which  can  be  directed  either  to  the  north  t)r  to  the 
south.  Rapid  redisposition  of  troops  is  impossible  to  the 
Russians,  but  then  so  is  a  rapid  surprise  movement  of  the 
encmv  against  them  in  such  country. 

1  The  second  thing  we  have  to  note  about  the  Eastern 

front   is  that  as  it   is  divided   into   three  sections  geo- 
graphically so  it  is  divided  into  three  distinct  seasons  for 


operations.  You  have  the  winter,  in  which  decisive  work 
can  hardly  be  atteni])ted,  but  in  which  it  is  possible  to 
move  considerable  bodies  of  men.  \\'e  must  not  conceive 
of  this  season  as  one  long  unbroken  period  of  hard  frost. 
If  it  were  so,  movement  would  be  easier.  There  are  con- 
stant intervals  of  partial  thaw. 

Tnen  comes  a  second  season,  brief,  but  of  a  sort  quite 
imknown  in  the  West  of  luuope,  which  is  the  spring  thaw. 
It  is  hardly  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  during  this  brief 
season  armies  cannot  move  at  all.  Trenches  are  flooded, 
the  low  levels  turned  to  morass  or  shallow  sheets  of  watir, 
and  the  roads  are  merely  deep  masses  of  mud.  It  will  be 
remembered  how,  about  this  time  last  year,  the  operations 
upon  the  Narew  came  to  an  end  abruptly  and  remained 
suspended  until  early  summer.  Tile  cause  of  this  was 
the  thaw. 

The  thaw  once  over  you  get  a  season  of  at  least  six 
months  in  which  operations  upon  a  large  scale  arc  possible. 
It  was  the  period  of  the  great  Austro-Gcrman  offensive 
last  year. 

To  this  note  on  climate  we  nmst  add  the  obvious 
fact  that   the  southern  of  the   three    sections    is    open 


March  30,  19 16 


L  A  N  D      3c     W  A  T  E  R 


for  operations  earlier  than  the  r.ortlieni  althouRli,  the 
climate  beiiiR  more  wliat  is  called  "  Continental,"  the 
depth  of  winter  is  sometimes  more  severe  in  the  south 
than  in  the  north. 

All  this  reasoning  upon  existing  raihvays  and  the 
nature  of  the  soil  and  the  roads  (it  is  the  absence  of  stone 
which  makes  the  country  what  it  is)  is  modihcd  in  some 
degree  by  the  power  of  the  modern  industrial  civilisations, 
of  which  the  Austro-Germans  form  a  part,  to  supplement 
their  commimications  with  rapidly  built  railways  and  to 
trace  new  roads  which  they  can,  within  the  delay  of  so 
many  months,  harden.  They  are  in  a  better  posture  to 
improve  their  front  in  this  fashion  than  are  the  Russians 
with  their  much  smaller  industrial  opportunities  and  their 
absence  of  material  behind  the  lines.  But  wc  must  not 
exaggerate  this  advantage,  ajiprcciable  though  it  is. 
The  Field  Raihvays  which  the  Germans  have  laid  down 
are  not  permanent  ways.  .\nd  the  providing  of  metal- 
ling and  ballast  road-bed  for  any  large  system  of  new 
roads  and  railways  would  be  quite  beyond  the  capacity 
of  the  enemy,  especially  during  the  winter  season 
which  is  all  he  has  had  at  his  disposal.  He  will  here 
and  there  have  hardened  a  few  new  tracks  and  no 
doubt  improved  the  main  causeways.  But  he  is  still 
in  the  main  dependent  upon  the  system  which  he  found 
when  he  entered  the  country,  and  this  is  the  more  ob- 
viously true  from  the  fact  that  the  whole  district  is  a 
tangle  of  marsh,  lake  and  forest.     A  generation  of  ex- 


tensive exploitation  with  a  commercial  civilisation  behind 
it  under  the  best  conditions  of  peace  would  make  a  great 
change  in  the  physical  conditions  of  Eastern  Poland  and 
Courland,  and  the  marshes  between  Poland  and  Russia. 
It  would  especially  improve  communications.  But  a  few 
months,  and  those  months  winter  months  under  con- 
ditions of  war,  will  have  done  very  little.  We  are  right, 
therefore,  in  thinking  of  the  whole  problem  in  terms  of 
main  comnumications  existing  when  the  war  began,  and 
of  conditions  of  ground  and  facilities  of  communication 
not  very  different  from  these  which  existed  in  the  summer 
of  1015.  ■ 

Judged  then  by  general  considerations,  let  us  see 
how  matters  lie  in  the  Northern  sector  which  lias  been  the 
seat  of  the  late  movements  east  of  Vilna  and  south  of 
Dvinsk. 

The  reader  is  familiar  with  the  line  upon  which  the 
enemj''s  effort  of  last  year  was  exhausted  and  balance  at 
last  restored  between  the  invader  and  the  invaded.  It 
ran  along  and  just  missed  the  river  Dvina,  leaving  a  rather 
large  bridgehead  in  Russian  hands  in  front  of  Riga, 
easily  tenable  on  account  of  the  marshes  there.  The  line 
of  the  river  itself  is  everywhere  in  Russian  hands.  It 
covers  Dvinsk  or  Dimaberg,  after  which  the  upper  parts 
of  the  stream  come  from  the  east  and  no  longer  concern 
the  trench  line. 

It  then,  in  the  midst  of  a  perfect  maze  of  lakes,  small 
and  great,   threads  its  way  down  to  the    Vilna-Dvinsk 


Tyfi^S'     i^ 


T.  AN  I)      cS:      W  AT  IC  II 


March   ]o. 


iqiC) 


Kailway,  wliicli  it  nits  south  of  Lako  Drisviaty.     From 
t  liat  point  to  Vilna  the  railway  is  in  (ierman  hands. 

Now  the  reader  will  here  particularly  note  the 
junction  which  lies  immediately  west  of  the  town  of 
Sventsiany.  The  importance  of  that  place  and  the  effect 
of  its  reoccnpation  after  the  thaw  by  our  Ally  is  clear 
from  the  map  alone.  From  tiu'  junction  west  of  Sventsiany 
a  railway  line  leads  to  the  Haltic  at  Libau  and  nourishes 
all  the  action  undertaken  by  the  Germans  between  the 
Vilna-Dvinsk  main  line  and  the  Vilna-Minsk  main  line. 
Tiiat  iwass  of  munitionmont  without  whicii  an  artillery 
attack  a.tjainst  '.nodern  defences  cannot  be  undertaken 
depends  upon  the  possession  of  Sventsiany.  ^lunition- 
ment  can  also  come  round  from  the  Baltic  to  \'ilna  and 
\'ilna  is  the  great  depot  from  the  whole  district.  But  if 
the  junction  near  Sventsiany  was  lost  to  the  enemy,  even 
thoufjh  at  the  moment,  the  Russian  advance  should 
there  form  a  sharp  salient,  the  whole  German  line  would 
have  to  fall  back.  It  would  be  impossibh-  to  supply  the 
districts  east  of  the  Vilna-])\insk  railway  and  north  of 
the  \'iina-Minsk  railway.  Tliis  is  particularly  true  from 
the  lack  of  roads  in  the  Lake  region.  From  Vilna  within 
a  radius  of  about  forty  miles  there  radiate  out  a  con- 
siderable number  of  country  roads,  but  on  striking  the 
lake  region  these  come  to  an  end  for  the  most  part. 

Tiic  junction  near  Sventsiany,  therefore,  will  cer- 
tainly be  the  objective  of  our  Ally  when  the  line  weather 
comi's.  Tiie  present  movements  are  only  designed  to 
make  possible  such  an  advance,  or  the  threat  of  it,  many 
weeks  hence.  They  are  strokes  delivered  by  either  side 
(the  first  infantry  attacks  a  whole  fortnight  ago  were 
German  not  Russian  in  origin)  to  improve  their  positions, 
to  get  hold  of  the  drier  ground,  etc.,  before  the  thaw. 
But  what  each  party  ultimatelj'  has  in  mind  is  the  junction 
near  Sventsiany. 

Next,  let  it  be  appreciated  that  the  Russian  object 
here,  no  matter  what  the  vigour  of  their  offensive  in  the 
future  in  the  region  round  Widzy,  up  northward  to 
lake  Drisviaty,  and  down  southward  to  Lake  Narotch 
(about  70  miles  astraddle  of  the  railway,  and  all  pointing 
at  Sventsiany)  is  strategically  a  defensive  object.  Tiiey  are 
warding  against  and  will  be  trying  to  forestall  a  German 
offensive  in  the  Northern  sector.  They  are  not — they 
cannot  be — planning  a  main  offensive  of  their  own  in 
that  region. 

Indeed,  the  strategical  elements  in  the  larger  sense  of 
that  phrase  upon  the  Eastern  fiont  are  simple  and  clear. 
The  field  for  a  Russian  offensive  is  the  southern  field. 
Tiie  field  for  an  enemy  offensive  is  the  northern  field. 

Why  is  this  ?  Because  the  enemy  has  better  com- 
munications behind  him  for  early  work,  while  the  Russians 
must  take  advantage  of  the  fact  that  their  imperfect 
roads  will  be  useable  in  the  south  before  they  are  useable  in 
the  north.  Because  politically  a  real  Russian  advance 
in  the  south  will  be  of  immediate  effect  upon  the  Rou- 
manian situation  while  a  similar  advance  in  the  north 
would  not  be.  Because  in  the  south  the  forces  opposed  to 
Russia  are  mainly  Austro-Hungarian  and,  as  we  know, 
even  more  exhausted  than  the  (ierman,  and  bocanse  as 
the  now  crying  depletion  of  their  effectives  makes  it  more 
and  more  necessary  for  the  Austro-Germans  to  attempt 
an  early  decision,  the  northern  field  lends  itself  to  their 
]K>wer  of  moving  troops  and  of  accumulating  munitions 
more  than  does  the  southern. 

What  we  are  watching,  then,  for  the  moment,  is  no 
more  than  slight  movements  for  better  positions  in  the 
north  which,  as  they  are  obtained,  will  be  intended  upon 
the  Russian  side  for  defence,  upon  the  German  for  offence  ; 
while  it  is  probable  that  this  offensive  will  be  delivered 
before  the  corresponding  and  counterh;) lancing  Russian 
offensive  in  the  south  develops. 

The  Other  Fields 

In  the  other  fields  of  the-  ;rcat  war  there  is  \ery  little 
to  chronicle  or  to  analyse  between  last  week  and  this. 
On  Monday  last  the  German  salient  at  St.  Eloi  just  in  the 
corner  south  of  the  big  British  salient  round  Ypres  was 
fiattened  out  and  carried.  The  operation  was  per- 
formed by  the  mining  of  certain  points  upon  a  length  of 
()oo  yards  of  (ierman  trench,  the  mines  being  exploded 
early  upon  the  Monday  morning,  whereupon  an  infantry 
attack  was  delivered  by  the  Northumberland  l-"usiliers 
and  the  Royal  Fusiliers,  capturing  the  first  and  the  second 
line  trenches  and  taking  prisoners  two  officers  and  168  men. 


The  situation  upon  the  Tigris  is  stationary.  The 
elements  of  any  judgment  upon  this  situation  are  either 
well  known  or  necessarily  withheld.  There  is  no  margin 
for  conjecture.  What  is  left  of  a  division  is,  and  has  been 
for  these  months  jiast,  contained  by  the  equivalent 
of  at  least  four  Turkish  divisions.  The  relieving  force 
advancing  up  the  river  to  disengage  its  colleagues  has 
not  been  of  sufficient  strength  cither  to  force  or  to  turn 
the  Turkish  line  down  the  river  below  Kut-el-Amara 
which  lies  astraddle  of  the  river  and,  on  account  of  the 
presence  of  marsh  upon  the  north,  is  vulnerable  chietiv 
upon  the  south.  The  capital  element  in  the  situation,  of 
course,  is  the  remaining  supjily  of  the  British  force  con- 
tained by  the  enemy,  and  that  is  a  matter  whi(  h,  ecpially 
obviously,  is  not  for  public  discussion.  What  must  be 
clearly  appreciated,  however,  by  opinion  in  this  country  is 
that  the  small  Russian  force  operating  upon  and  descend- 
ing the  only  road  from  the  Persian  plateau  to  the  Mesopo- 
tamian  Plain  is  neither  in  size  nor  in  proximity  an  appre- 
ciable factor  in  the  problem.  Still  less  will  it  be  affected 
by  the  much  larger  Russian  movements  in  the  Armenian 
mountains — at  any  rate  within  any  useful  time.  It  is  j^ro- 
bable  that  the  Russians  will  ultimately  descend  upon  the 
Plains,  or  at  least  that  their  extreme  left  will  threaten 
and  interrupt  the  railway  at  Ras-l^i-.Ain.  But  such 
action,  whicli  would  have  had  a  very  great  effect  during 
the  concentration  of  the  little  Turkish  army  in  Mesopo- 
tamia and  the  accumulation  of  its  munitions,  would  not 
have  that  effect  to-day.  It  would  threaten  and  perhap;; 
ultin  a'cly  cause  the  destruction  of  any  force  bevf)nd 
Mosul,  but  only  at  long  date. 

Meanwhile  the  Russian  advance  continues  not 
pressed,  but  e\idently  clearing  the  country  melhodicallv 
as  it  goes  and  ijuite  possibly  compelled  to  improxc  the 
tracks,  especially  in  the  south  for  the  passage  of  wheeled 
vehicles  and  guns.  It  has  not  yet  reached  what  ma\'  be 
called  the  second  stage  for  the  main  advance  of  whicli 
Erzeroum  formed  the  first  stage.  Its  second  stage  will  be 
marked  by  the  line  Trebizond  luzinguain  Kliarput  or 
Diarbekjr,  and  until  at  least  that  stage  is  reached  no 
appreciable  effect  upon  the  situation  in  Mesopotamia 
has  even  begun  to  develop  from  the  north.  It  is  cleaiiv 
meeting  with  strong  resistance  in  front  of  Trebizond 
and  has  its  main  concentration  near  the  Black  Sea  and 
not  in  the  south. 

The  Situation  at  Verdun 

Before  Verdun  the  week  has  shown  no  movement 
at  all.  We  only  know  that  the  enemy  has  been  able  to 
keep  on  right  uj)  to  this,  the  37th  day  of  the  main  attack, 
or  the  39th,  counting  from  the  first  opening  of  the  bombard- 
ment, a  well-maintained  bombardment  upon  the  last  of 
the  -sections  which  he  has  chosen  to  threaten,  that  on  the 
extreme  west.  He  is  directing  his  fire  against  all  the 
eastern  slopes  of  Hill  304  and  behind  it  against  the 
western  end  of  the  Charny  Ridge,  which  is  covered  by 
the  wood  of  Bourrus.  It  is  to  be  presumed  that  he  in- 
tends later  a  strong  infantry  attack  against  the  same 
western  sector ;  if  not,  he  has  thrown  away  the  effect  of 
his  bombardment.  This  week  he  has  only  made  one 
infantry  movi^ment,  an  attempt  on  Tuesday  to  debouch 
from  tiie  woods.  It  was  easilj'  thrust  back  and  cannot 
have  been  in  great  force.  But  a  main  infantry  attack 
must  come  unless  he  is  prepared  to  waste  entirely  all  this 
artillery  preparation.  When  he  will  stop  and  confess 
failure,  only  the  future  can  show.  He  cannot  have  had 
less  than  a  quarter  of  a  million  men  so  far  hit  and  caught, 
excluding  all  other  casualties  incidental  to  such  an  effort, 
to  such  weather  and  to  such  ground.  It  may  be  that  he 
desires  to  add  to  this  list.  We  cannot  tell.  It  is  with 
him  at  this  moment  quite  as  much  a  political  as  a  military 
problem.  There  will  be  one  clear  indication  of  the 
moment  in  which  he  admits  defeat  before  Verdun,  and 
that  will  be  the  publication  from  Berlin  of  an  inmiense 
list  of  booty,  prisoners  and  guns.  When  that  is  issued 
we  shall  know  that  the  battle  of  Verdun  is  over  and  that 
the  French  have  won  it. 

The  Rumours  of  a  Raid 

There  have  been  for  now  several  days  rumours 
gathering  in  volume  and  somewhat  supported  by  official 
warnings  that  the  enemy  was  preparing  or  jiretending  to 
prepare,  a  raid  upon  the  Eastern  coast.  Wliat  trutii 
there  may  be  in  such  rumours,  a  private  student  of  the 


March  30,  1916 


LAND      &      W  A  T  E  R 


war  has  no  means  whatsoever  of  determining.  But  it  is 
possible  to  lay  down  certain  principles  with  regard  to 
such  an  adventure  upon  the  enemy's  part.  They  may 
be  of  only  academic  interest.  If  the  thing  is  not  at- 
tempted their  discussion  will  be  worthless.  If  it  is  they 
will  be  still  more  completely  forgotten. 

(i)  The  enemy  will  not  attempt,  and  cannot  attempt, 
a  campaign  in  force.  He  has  not  the  men  for  it,  ancl 
even  if  he  had  the  men,  nothing  done  here  would  save 
liim.  His  life  hangs  upon  the  western  front  between 
Belfort  and  the  North  Sea. 

(2)  Therefore  the  object  of  such  an  adventure  is 
strictly  political. 

That  word  is  ridiculed  by  those  who  do  not  under- 
stand the  part  which  intelligence  plays  in  human  affairs. 
Their  attitude  towards  military  study  is  the  attitude  of 
Sancho  Panza's  wife  towards  the  study  of  literature. 
"  She  would  not  be  pestered  with  all  those  meaningless 
little  black  dots." 

Those  who  take  reasoning  a  little  more  seriously 
know  well  what  the  distinction  is  between  an  operation 
])urely  military  and  an  operation  mainly  political.  The 
former  is  only  concerned  and  directly  concerned  with  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy's  main  force.  The  latter  is 
mainlN'  coticerned  (though  it  is  of  course  military  in 
general  character  and  local  effect)  with  the  affecting  of 
opinion,  and  with  the  disturbance  of  enemy  government  ; 
or  with  the  acquiring  of  Allies,  or  with  the  prevention  of 
neutrals  joining  the  enemy,  etc.,  etc. 

Now  a  raid  upon  the  shores  of  this  country  under- 
taken as  it  would  necessarily  be  by  only  a  small  body  of 
men,'  and  undertaken  with  the  full  knowledge  of  its 
authors  that  no  far  reaching  military  results  could 
possibly  follow  upon  it  diratly,  would  be  almost  entirely 
aimed  at  the  creation' of  political  chaos  here,  and  hence 
at  an  indirect  and  ultimate  effect  on  the  campaign.  It 
will  be  nothing  more  than  the  air  raids  upon  a  larger 
scale.  It  would  necessarily  be  ephemeral.  It  would 
almost  certainly  be  accompanied  by  the  vilest  of  those 
\ile  practices  by  which  the  enemy  has  earned  immor- 
tality. Its  whole  motive  and  direction  would  be  terror. 
When  it  was  over  the  remaining  object  of  the  enemy 
would  be  to  leave  the  threat  of  its  recurrence —but 
nothing  more. 

( ;)  The  very  fact  of  such  an  effort  would  prove  even 
more  conclusively  than  the  piece  of  suicide  under  Verdun 
the  straits  to  which  the  enemy  is  now  reduced. 

The  Last   Card 

It  was  said  in  these  columns  months  ago,  and  it  may 
nsefuUy  be  repeated  now,  that  the  enemy's  using  his  fleet 
and  the  enemy's  attempting  a  raid  would  essentially  be  a 
mark  that  in  his  own  opinion  he  had  come  to  the  end  of 
his  tetlier.  The  thing  is  or  should  be  self-e\'ident.  It  is 
n(jt  the  strongest,  but  it  is  the  last  card  of  the  hand  he  held 
when  he  declared  war  upon  the  older  ci\-ilization  from 
which  he  has  drawn  his  \'ery  incomplete  measure  of 
instruction. 

He  hopes,  when  or  if  he  plays  that  card,  to  add 
suddenly  to  his  failing  margin  of 'strength  by  reducing 
our  weight  in  the  balance  against  him.  He  can  only  do 
this  if  his  action  obscures  the  form  of  government  to  be 
incapable  of  ordering  a  nation  as  a  whole  and.  in  par- 
ticular, incapable  of  controlling  a  few  imscrupulous 
newspapers.  For  we  may  be  perfectly  certain  that  the 
handful  of  wealthy  men  who  raised  a  panic  about  nothing 
last  autunui  will  do  all  they  can  to  raise  one  ten  times 
worse  if  there  is  a  raid. 

Meanwhile,  the  three  points  remain.  The  principal 
men  in  authority  know  them  as  all  educated  men  do, 
and  can,  if  they  choose  act  upon  them,  (i)  The  raid 
could  only  come  in  numbers  small,  relatively,  to  the 
whole  campaign  ;  (2)  Its  whole  object  would  be  panic  ; 
(j)  It  would  bi;  proof  positive  of  the  enemy's  extremity. 

If  these  three  points  are  made  clear  by  official 
IMonounccment,    the    mad    adventure,     should     it     be 


attempted,  will  fail  of  all  effect.  In  proportion,  as  we 
fail  to  bear  them  in  mind,  in  proportion  that  is  as  we 
allow  exaggeration  or  panic  or  lack  of  perspective  in  the 
matter  to  affect  us,  in  that  proportion  we  shall  bring 
the  Germans  nearer  to  victory. 

An  Official  Pronouncement  upon  the  Fall 
of  the  Enemy's  Credit 

Lacking  in  matter  for  analysis  as  this  week  has 
been,  it  is  impossible  to  conclude  these  notes  without 
mentioning  the  appearance  a  day  or  two  ago  of  one  of 
those  very  rare  official  pronouncements  which  illuminate 
and  conftrni  public  opinion. 

The  readers  of  this  journal  know  how  often  the  value 
of  such  government  action  has  been  pointed  out  in  L.and 
.^ND  Wateu  and  how  we  have  pleaded  for  a  succession  of 
official  pronouncements  at  regular  intervals.  They  would 
have  made  all  the  difference  a  few  months  ago  when  the 
wildest  panic  was  being  deliberately  spread  by  a  treason- 
able section  of  the  Press,  and  they  are  almost  as  necessary 
to-day.  But  we  have  at  least  had  this  week  one  example 
which  has  been  of  real  importance.  It  has  taken  the 
form  of  an  authoritative,  lucid  and  highly-informing 
criticism  of  the  value,  sin'ctlv  military,  to  the  Allies  of  the 
fall  of  the  German  mark  and  of  the  Austrian  crown. 
These  two  units  of  exchange  have  fallen,  the  one  by  well 
over  thirty  per  cent.,. the  otlier  by  about  twenty-hve 
in  the  neutral  markets  of  the  world.  There  have  been 
plenty  of  fools  to  tell  us  that  this  meant  the  collapse  of  the 
enemy  from  lack  of  "  money."  As  thougli  a  nation  would 
stop  lighting  because  it  was  hampered  for  the  medium  of 
exchange  while  it  still  had  food,  metal  and  chemicals  and 
men  !  No,  the  fall  of  the  mark  and  of  the  crown  has  only 
one  military  significance,  but  that  is  a  very  fundamental 
one  indeed.  It  signifies  that  the  man  power  of  the  enemy 
is  failin;^  him  in  industry  as  it  is  in  his  effectives. 

A  nation  at  war  is  always  met  by  a  compromise 
between  these  two  factors.  You  cannot  "  run  the 
nation  "  with  too  few  men,  and  there  comes  a  point  when 
you  must  either  starve  your  effectives  or  your  factories. 

As  to  the  enemy's  effectives  we  know  very  well  in 
what  state  thev  are.  Germany  has  put  1916  into  the 
held  and  has  begun  to  put  the  first  elements  of  iQij. 
Austria-Hungary  has  put  1917  partly  into  the  field  and 
has  actually  warned  1918. 

But  the  converse  effect,  the  depletion  of  men  for 
production,  is  equally  important.  And  the  fall  of  the 
exchange  is  the  proof  of  this. 

Germany  is  not  now  importing  as  is  France,  for 
instance,  great  masses  of  food,  munitions,  and  necessaries 
of  war.  She  is  importing  comparatively  little.  That  im- 
port, however,  she  mu^t  pay  for  by  export.  No  more  than 
any  other  belligerent  will  she  let  go  her  stock  of  gold.  In 
the  case  of  the  Allies  it  is  the  industry  of  Great  Britain 
mainly,  in  part  that  of  the  remainder  of  the  Alliance,  which 
]3revents  the  exchanges,  high  as  they  have  gone,  from 
becoming  dangerous.  Germany  and  Austria  could  have 
kept  their  exchanges  down  had  they  been  able  to  maintain 
an  active  export  to  the  neutrals  from  whom  alone  they 
can  buy.  Little  as  they  have  been  buying  during  the  last 
three  months  their  exchange  has  none  the  less  fallen 
during  that  same  period  with  jjecnliar  rapidity.  It  is 
because  they  cannot  maintain  their  old  rate  of  produc- 
tion, and  that  is  a  state  of  affairs  that  must  necessarily 
get  worse. 

H.  Belluc. 


Mililarv  Land  sea  f>e  Sketching  and  Target  Indication, 
by  W.  G.  Nc^vton  (Hugh  Rees),  is  a  little  manual  by  a  member 
of  the  .\rtists'  I'Jiflcs.'by  means  of  which  practically  any  niau 
of  ordinary  intelligence  can  learn  in  a  very  short  tinis  how 
to  make  field  sketches  with  sufficient  clearness  to  convey  all 
the  information  that  can  be  transmitted  by  this  method 
The  instructions  given  here  are  concise  and  completu- , 


Red  Screes,  by  Cecil  Headlam  (Smith,  Elder  and  Co.  6s). 
is  written  by  a  man  who  knows  and  loves  his  English  lake 
scpnery,  and  perusal  of  the  book  is  as  good  as  a  walk  among 
the  fells  of  Westmorland,  while  an  epic  chapter  on  Cumbrian 
wrestling,  and  another  concerning  a  fine  fox  hunt,  are  too  good 
to  be  missed.  The  actual  story  concerns  the  daughter  of  a 
Yankee  millionaire,  a  young  doctor,  and  a  scheming  lawyer 
who  wanted  the  millionaire's  daughter  for  her  inoniy — but  it 
is  the  minor  characters  of  the  book  wlio  count  most.  The 
old  doctor,  who  gave  his  guest  brandy  in  which,  as  an  ardent 
naturalist,  he  "  had  only  pickled  one  bifd,"  is  a  character 
worth  knowing,  and  the  retired  naval  captain  whose  wife 
7i'oidd  wear  pyjamas  is  another  interesting  creation  on  the 
author's  part.  The  book  is  breezily  written,  obviously  with 
intimate  knowledge  of  the  lake  scenery  among  which  its  prin- 
cipal events  transpire,  and  knowledge,  too,  of  the  dalesmen 
and  natives  of  lakeland- 


LAND     &     WATER 


March  30,  lyiG 


RUNNING    AMOK 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


The  Breakdown  of  German  Diciplinc 

WITHIN  the  last  ten  clays  there  has  been  a  dra- 
matic and  smprising  change  in  Germany's 
submarine  policy.  On  the  i6th'  March  von 
Tirpitz's  resignation  on  the  score  of  health  was 
announced,  and  German  papers,  no  less  than  the  resolutions 
proposed  in  the  Reichstag  by  the  Conservatives  and  the 
National  Liberals,  made  it  quite  clear  that  the  Grand 
Admiral  had  not  resigned,  but  liad  been  dismissed.  In  two 
numbers  of  the  Zukuuft,  published  since  the  resignation, 
extracts  of  wliich  are  translated  in  Tuesday's  Times, 
Herr  Maximilian  Harden  sets  out  this  view  of  the  situa- 
tion with  admirable  clearness.  Admiral  Tirpitz,  he  says, 
"  believes  that  only  submarine  war  without  mercy  or 
restraint,  and  without  the  brake  of  pulitieal  coiisiiienilion, 
can  compel  England  to  conclude  peace  within  any 
measurable  period  of  time.  He  who  is  responsible  for 
the  conduct  of  Imperial  affairs  (viz.  the  Chancellor), 
demands  respect  for  political  consideration,  '  In  that 
case,'  the  answer  is  shouted.  '  the  certainty  of  (piick 
results  dwindles,'  The  decision  can  only  come  from  tlie 
Supreme  War  Lord,  He  follows  the  advice  of  his  Chan- 
cellor, and  the  Admiral  departs.  There  is  now  a  hail- 
storm of  leading  articles,  telegrams  of  homage,  and 
resolutions.  Subscriptions  are  collected  by  innkeepers, 
tobacconists  and  waiters.  There  was  not  a  quarter  of 
the  noise  after  the  dismissal  of  Bismarck.  The  Secretary 
of  State  becomes  so  upset  that  he  has  to  walk  for  hours  in 
the  Berlin  air  to  revive  himself.  The  chiefs  of  the 
Admiralty  Sta.fi,  of  the  Battle  Fleet,  and  of  the  Naval 
Cabinet  remain  at  their  posts,  and  Admiral  von  Capelle, 
who  for  years  was  the  most  trusted  colleague  of  Tirpitz, 
is  now  Secretary  of.  State.  These  four  German  admirals 
have  either  contributed  to  the  decision  or  at  least  tind 
it  compatible  with  their  duty  Ought,  then,  68,000,000 
(iermans  to  believe  that  their  heaviest  weapon  has  either 
been  shattered  or  curtailed  ?  " 

All  this  was  written  by  Mr.  Harden  lor  the  Zukiinft 
of  Saturday  last.  He  j)robabIy  wrote  behjrc  hearing 
anything  either  of  the  sinking  of  the  Dutch  Liners  or  of 
subsequent  events.  He  concluded  then  on  the  Tlnu'sday 
of  last  week,  as  I  had  concluded  on  the  Tuesday,  that  the 
von  Tirpitz  policy  had  been  abandoned  out  of  respect  for 
"  pohtical  considerations,"  viz.,  to  prevent  complications 
with  neutrals  and  especially  with  the  United  States,  for 
any  such  must  ultimately  be  disastrous  to  Germany. 
That  is,  or  was,  the  correct  conclusion  borne  out  by  the 
facts.  The  new  submarine  campaign  was  due  to  begin 
on  March  ist,  but  between  March  ist  and  March  2otli 
there  were  but  14  sliips  of  all  nations  attacked  or  sunk 
by  submarines  and  mines  in  home  waters,  this  number 
is  rather  below  than  above  that  of  previous  months. 
But  the  eight  days  March  20th  to  March  27th,  no  less 
than  20  ships  had  been  attacked  or  sunk  in  home 
waters,  a  higher  average  than  for  any  month  since 
February,  1915.  In  other  words,  the  von  Tirpitz 
programme  was  held  in  abeyance  until  the  20th  of 
the  month. 

It  comes  then  to  this.  Between  the  16th,  the  day 
of  von  Tirpitz's  departure,  and  the  iqth,  when  the 
linal  orders  for  the  new  campaign  must  have  been  given, 
something  brought  about  a  very  startling  change.  \\'liat 
was  it  ?  The  answer  can  only  be  that  even  von  Hollweg 
must  have  been  brought  to  realise  that  the  internal  con- 
dition of  Germany  created  by  the  discontent  over  the 
Verdun  losses  in  the  west,  and  anxiety  about  the  new 
Russian  offensive  in  the  cast,  made  it  imperative  to 
pacify  the  people  by  the  promise  of  fresh  British  h(jlo- 
causts.  It  was,  of  course,  extremely  signilicant  that, 
judging  in  the  cool  light  of  reason  "  He,"  as  Herr  Harden 
lias  it,  "  who  is  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  Imperial 
.\lfairs,"  realised  that  at  the  present  juncture  of  the  war, 
to  force  a  quarrel  with  America  and  Holland  would  be 
ruinous.  But  it  is  far  more  signilicant  that  it  is  ])opular 
clamour  and  nothing  less  that  makes  this  respect  "  to 
jwlitical  considerations"  impossible.  For  it  means  that  t  he 
German   people  ha\c  got  out  of  hand.     ,"'lhe  decision 


can  only  come  from  the  supreme  War  Lord,"  sajs  Ger- 
many's acutest  critic.  But,  as  a  fact,  it  has  come  from 
the  "hailstorm  of  leading  articles"  and  the  agitation  led 
by  "  innkeepers,  tobacconists  and  waiters."  My  forecast 
of  last  week  is  wrong,  not  because  I  was  mistaken  in 
crediting  the  German  Government  with  a  foreseeing 
regard  for  the  country's  interest,  but  because  I  was  wrong 
in  supposing  that  it  still  had  the  power  to  follow  any 
policy  of  its  own. 

The  Neutrals  and  the  New  Campaign 

Of  the  new  campaign  itself  there  is  not  very  much 
to  be  said.  It  is  indeed  being  made  "  without  mercy  or 
restraint  and  without  the  brake  of  political  considera- 
tions," Norway,  which  has  lost  nearly  100  ships  through 
German  mines  and  torpedoes,  and  has  been  compensated 
for  only  four,  is  exceedingly  near  an  open  revolt  against 
present  conditions.  The  Dutch  Government,  whose 
situation  is  extraordinarily  difficult,  is  arranging  to  con- 
voy all  national  ships  plying  down  Channel  and  has 
suggested  to  shipowners  that  the  northabout  route  is 
probably  safer.  By  a  miracle  of  good  luck  none  of  the 
Americans  in  the  Sussex  were  killed,  though  some  have 
been  cruelly  injured.  And  the  fate  of  the  .Americans  in 
the  liner  Eiis^lislimaii  does  not  yet  seem  certain.  But  it 
is  clear  from  American  advices  that  the  United  States 
Government  has  become  reconciled  to  its  intervention  in 
the  war  being  now  ine\-itablc.  To  disregard  an  American 
warning  is  a  thing  Germany  has  done  so  often  without 
])enalty,  that  she  might  ha\-e  done  it  again  and  relied 
upon  continued  impunity.  But  the  pledge  which  Count 
Bernstorff  gave  in  September — that  no  unresisting  pas- 
senger ship  should  be  sunk  without  visit  and  search,  and 
proper  provision  of  safety  for  those  on  board — was  an 
undertaking  volunteered  by  Germany  herself.  Since 
September  (jcrmany  has,  it  is  true,  raised  the  point  of 
mercliantmen  being  armed  and  seems  to  ha\-e  included 
the  united  with  the  resisting  ships.  But  no  cross-Channel 
steamer  has  ever  been  armed,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  one 
has  ever  crossed  without  a  considerable  contingent  of 
Americans  on  board.  The  case  of  the  Sussex  then  is 
crucial.  It  is  not  only  a  challenge  to  America,  in  that  it 
ignored  the  American  threat,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Arabic, 
Ancona  and  Persia  incidents  ;  it  is  doubly  a  challenge 
because  it  was  a  breach  of  a  definite  German  promise 
made,  be  it  remembered,  to  prevent  the  summary 
dismissal  of  Bernstorff.  It  is  clear  from  Mr.  Wilson's 
speeches  that  he  must  regard  submission  to  such  treat- 
ment as  inconsistent  with  the  honour  of  the  country. 

The  immediate  result  tlien  of  this  week's  work  is  to 
exasperate  Norway  and  Holland  into  almost  open  enmity 
and  to  leave  the  United  States  with  no  choice  but  to 
break  off  relations  with  Germany.  To  do  otherwise  is 
for  America  to  abandon  any  claim  to  moral  weight-  in 
the  councils  of  Christendom.  The  character  and  high 
culture  of  her  citizens,  her  enormous  wealth,  her  stupen- 
dous productive  capacity,  the  invaluable  services  which 
as  a  commercial  and  manufacturing  community  she  now 
renders  to  the  neutral  world,  these  things— whatever  the 
action  of  the  .\merican  Goxernment  may  be — will  remain 
and  will  si'cure  that  nieasme  of  admiration,  affection  and 
respect  wiiit  h  such  cpialities,  powers  and  possessions  must 
always  command.  But  to  carry  moral  weight  amongst 
other  nations,  a  nation  must  sIkjw  itself  possessed  of 
self-respect  as  a  nation.  And  self  respect  as  we  and 
Belgium,  Serbia  and  France  have  painfully  learned, 
stipulates  being  ready  and  capable  of  taking  national 
action  at  the  cost  of  national  sacritice.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  .America,  after  a  long  and  hmniliating 
schooling,  has  now  learnt  this  lesson  too. 

The  Protection  of  Shipping 

Unfortunately  even  if  all  the  neutrals  victimised  by 
the  new  campaigij  became  belligerents,  it  would  go  luit 
a  little  way  towards  thwarting  ihe  new  campaign's 
object.  I'or  this,  as  has  so  often  been  set  out  in  thc^e 
columns,-  is  not  mereW  to  siaii  iiritiJa  shipping,  but  to 


March  30,  1916 


LAND     &     W  A  T  E  R 


paralyse  the  sea  service  of  the  Allies  by  destroying  all 
shipping. 

It  is  a  case  of  Germany  contra  muiuium,  and  if 
British,  Allied,  and  neutral  shipping  is  to  be  saved,  its 
protection  can  come  from  one  (juarter  only,  namely,  the 
eliorts  that  the  British  Admiralty  is  able  to  put  fortli. 
Should  the  United  States  be  forced  into  war,  the  question 
of  shipping,  viewed  not  as  a  national  but  as  a  world 
problem,  will  be  to  some  extent  solved,  by  putting  into 
service  the  German  ships  now  interned  in  the  United 
States  harbours.  Between  490,000  and  500,000  tons  of 
shipping  would  ease  the  position  materially.  But  it 
would  not  save  it,  if  losses  were  to  continue  for  any  length 
(jf  time  at  the  I'ate  of  the  past  eight  days. 

There  is,  howe\'er,  no  reason  for  supposing  that 
this  rate  can  or  will  be  maintained.  What  apparently 
has  happened  is  that  a  large  number  of  submarines  were 
dispatched  from  the  German  ports  on  the  iqth  of  the 
month.  These  boats  have  been  upon  their  stations  now 
for  periods  varying  from  eight  to  fom-  days.  To  run 
them  down  and  destroy  them  takes  time.  The  situation 
is  not  imlike  that  of  the  last  weeks  of  August  last  year ; 
and  I  shall  be  disappointed  if  history  does  not  repeat 
itself  so  that,  before  April  is  far  advanced,  we  do  not  get  a 
state  of  affairs  comparable  to  that  of  last  September. 
Once  more  the  enemy's  submarines  are  at  their  maximum 
in  numbers  ;  once  more  these  numbers  should  be  effec- 
tively reduced.  Once  more  it  will  take  time  to  replace 
them. 

So  far  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  new  and  larger 
submarines  of  which  we  heard  so  much,  have  taken  part 
in  the  campaign.  Telegrams  from  Denmark  and  Sweden 
indicate  that  such  new  submarines  have  been  seen.  One 
is  said  to  have  taken  the  crew  of  a  captured  ship  on  board 
and  to  have  kept  them  there  for  four  days.  Whether 
these  exist  in  quantities,  and  if  so,  whether  they  can  alter 
the  character  of  the  attack  on  commerce,  so  as  to  make 
its  protection  more  difficult,  are  matters  that  only  ex- 
perience can  decide.  But  the  Admiralty  has  had  the 
necessity  for  preparing  against  these  new  conditions  for  a 
long  time  under  consideration,  and  it  is  not  doubtful 
that  c\Tr3'  preparation  which  forethought  can  suggest 
has  been  made. 

The  " Alcantara- Greif"  Affair 

The  Admiralty  has  at  last  announced  the  fact  that 
the  raider  Greil  was  stopped  bj'  the  patrol  boat 
Alcantara,  Captain  Wardle,  on  February  20th,  and  that 
in  the  ensuing  engagement  the  former  was  sunk  by  gun- 
lire  and  the  latter  by  torpedo.  It  is  unfortunate  that 
we  are  not  given  a  full  and  authentic  account  of  so  in- 
teresting an  incident.  Three  or  four  unofficial  stories  of 
the  fight  have  been  published  and  cacji  is  inconsistent 
with  the  others.  As  an  instance  of  the  kind  of  confusion 
that  arises,  take  the  case  of  the  Grcif  colours.  When 
seen,  she  was  disguised  as  a  Norwegian.  Now-a-days 
this  means  something  more  than  flying  the  Norwegian 
ensign.  For,  as  a  protection  against  German  U  boats 
all  neutrals  carry  their  colours  permanently  displayed 
upon  their  sides  and  they  illuminate  them  by  night. 
the  Moewe,  we  know,  from  time  to  time  used  to  jjaint 
out  the  Swedish  colours  and  substitute  Danish,  and 
generally  to  ring  the  changes  of  apparent  nationality. 
And  as  the  artists  altered  the  ship's  disguise,  so  no  doubt  a 
new  ensign  went  to  the  mast  head.  The  use  of  false 
colours  has  always  been  regarded  as  a  legitimate  ruse 
de  guerre.  But  it  has  been  an  invariable  rule  not  to  light 
except  under  your  own  flag.  "Now  if  no  ship  to-day  can 
pose  as  a  neutral  unless  the  flag  is  painted  on  the  side, 
it  is  clearly  impossible  to  paint  this  out  .when  action  com- 
pels an  acknowledgment  of  nationality.  Tlie  Admiralty 
account  makes  a  point  of  the  fact  tliat  the  Grcif  ioit^ht 
with  these  permanent  Norwegian  colours  upon  her  sides. 
But  these  would  not  have  deceived  Captain  Wardle. 
Since  the  Mocwe's  escape,  the  innocence  of  no  neutral 
ship  attempting  to  pass  the  patrols  could  be  assumed. 
He  would  have  formed  his  judgment  on  the  general  ap- 
ncarance  and  fittings  of  the  ship  and  on  her  conduct. 
The  real  point  is,  did  she  as  the  (ierman  Admiralty 
says,  run  up  the  Germnn  flag  before  she  opened  lire  ?  It 
is  a  matter  on  which  the  Admiralty  account  is  silent,  and 
on  which  the  unofticial  accounts  give  us  no  information. 
The  incident  is  a  curious  comment  on  the  utter  insinceritv 


of  the  German  protest  of  a  little  more  than  a  3-ear   ago 
about  English  shijis  flying  the  American  flag. 

As  to  the  facts  of  the  action  itself  the  details  cannot 
be  disentangled,  but  the  main  incidents  seem  to  have 
been  as  follows.  After  challenge  by  the  Alcantara,  the 
Greif  hove  to,  and  the  Alcantara  stopped  to  lower  a  boat. 
The  range  was  apparently  something  well  under  a  thous- 
and \'ards.  The  Grcij  is  described  as  a  ship  of  between 
4,000  and  5.000  tons,  standing  excejitionally  high  out  of 
the  water.  The  Alcantara,  we  know,  was  a  new  lin^r 
built  for  the  South  American  trade,  displacing  oyer 
15,000  tons.  The  gunners  on  each  side  then  were  faced 
with  the  proverbial  task  of  hitting  a  haystack  at  20  yards. 
As  soon  as  the  boat  was  clear,  the  Alcantara  apparently 
got  under  way.  upon  which  the  Grcif  droppecl  her  gun 
masks,  dispatched  a  torpedo  or  two  and  opened  fire. 
Tiie  Alcantara  is  represented  as  mamxnivring  to  avoid  the 
torpedoes  and  hitting  the  Grcif  repeatedly  until  one  of 
the  enemy  shots  .put  her  steering  gear  out  of  action. 
Until  then  she  was  apparently  hardly  hit  at  all.  This 
no  doubt  brought  her  to,  and  at  a  short  range,  made  her 
an  easy  \ictim  to  the  torpedo.  At  this  stage  the  Andes, 
a  second  auxiliary  patrol  cruiser  came  and  virtually 
completed  the  work  which  Alcantara  had  begun.  Before, 
however  the  Greif  actually  sank,  the  light  cruiser  Comits 
atti^acted  by  the  firing  a])]>eared  upon  the  scene  and,  at  long 
range,  opened  an  extremely  effective  iire  on  the  raider,  and 
finally  blew  her  up.  In  the  meantime,  one  or  more 
destroyers  had  arrived,  and  the  survivors  from  the  two 
foundered  ships  were  picked  up.  The  whole  action  can 
only  have  lasted  a  matter  of  minutes. 

The  conduct  of  the  Grcif  is  all  of  a  piece  with  the 
submarine  camjmign.  I  have  heard  naval  ofticers  discuss 
what  they  would  do  in  such  a  situation.  Obviously,  if 
a  disguised  ship  is  reckless  of  consequences,  it  must  have 
the  patrol  ship  at  its  mercy,  for  the  patrol  is  bound  by 
custom  to  stop  and  send  a  boat  aboard  the  stranger, 
and  when  she  stops,  .she  is  a  sitting  mark  for  the  enemy's 
torpedo.  In  the  earlier  ,';tages  of  the  war,  such  ships  were 
lost  to  the  enemy's  submarines,  who  followed  a  genuine 
neutral — or  one  enemy  ship  disguised  as  a  neutral — and 
caught  the  patrol  ship  when  she  hove  to.  This  danger 
was  got  over  by  removing  the  patrol  line  further  out. 
It  is  not  easy  to  see  how  in  conditions  like  those  of  the 
2Qth  February,  a  patrol  can  make  herself  any  safer  than  is 
a  policeman  who  is  sent  to  arrest  an  armed  desperado.  If 
all  blockading  ships  were  attended  by  a  destroyer,  and 
could  stand  off.-  leaving  the  destroyer  to  go  into  close 
quarters,  the  latter,  which  draws  too  little  water  to  be  in 
danger  from  a  torpedo,  and  presents  a  small  mark  for 
the  enemy's  guns,  and  is  obviously  armed  with  torpedoes 
herself,  would  run  little  risk.  But  then  it  is  quite  certain 
that  there  cannot  be  destroyers  enough  for  work  like  this. 

The  Admiralty  has  no  doubt  made  a  thorough 
investigation  into  the  circumstances.  Indeed,  it  is  to  be 
hoped  that  the  regular  practice  of  holding  a  court  martial 
on  the  surviving  officers  and  men  has  been  revived,  not 
of  course  with  the  idea  that  the  Captain  is  necessainlv 
or  even  probably  to  blame,  but  so  as  to  arrive  at  the  fullest 
and  most  complete  statement  of  the  facts,  and  to  ensure 
a  competent  and  impartial  professional  judgment  on 
them.  The  findings  of  such  a  court  are  the  best  and 
indeed  the  only  safe  guide  to  other  officers  in  similar 
circumstances. 

It  v..  interesting  to  note  that  the  Alcantara  is  onlv  the 
second  ship  to  be  sunk  by  a  torpedo  fired  from  anything 
but  a  submarine.  The  first  ^^•as  the  BUlcher,  which  is 
said  to  have  rccei\ed  the  coup  de  grace  from  the  Arcthusa. 
In  both  cases  the  victim  was  crippled,  stationary  and  at 
short  range,  when  the  shot  was  fired.  Undoubtedly  it 
is  one  of  the  minor  surprises  of  the  war  that  the  torpedo, 
except  when  used  by  the  submarine,  has  been  completely 
ineffective.  Perhaps  if  the  bombarding  ships  had  been 
able  to  get  higher  up  in  the  Dardanelles,  a  different  story 
would  have  been  told,  and  a  new  record  for  work  froiii 
shore  stations  made.  But  even  this  would  not  have 
vitiated  the  general  truth  that  the  difiiculty  of  hitting  a 
manceuvring  ship,  except  at  the  shortest  possible  range, 
seems  to  be  almost  insuperable. 

Air  Raids  and  Naval  War 

Of  the  Air  Raid  on  the  Island  of  Sylt  we  have  very 
few  details.     But  the  loss  of  three  seaplanes  and  their 


10 


T.  A  N  D      \      W"  A  T  !•:  R 


Maivli  ''o,  totG 


pilots  suggests  that  these  raids  are  necessarily  highly 
dangerous  to  those  who  carry  thcni  out  unless  they  can 
operate  at  a  much  greater  height  than  seaplanes  can  reach. 
Since  writing  last  week  a  new  light  has  been  thrown 
on  the  encounter  between  the  British  and  German  des- 
troyers oft  Zeebnigge  last  Monday  week.  When  the 
news  of  this  little  action  was  first  published,  it  sounded  as 
if  it  were  entirelj'  unconnected  with  the  great  air  raid  on 
that  port.  It  subsequently  appeared  tliat  the  (ierman 
d«*stroyers  had  been  dri\en  out  of  Zeebrugg(>  by  the  air- 
craft rmlv  to  fall  under  the  lire  of  "the  British  boats.  Some 
three  months  ago  1  asked  the  question  in  these  columns 
whether  it  was  inconceivable  that  aircraft  could  be  made 


in  modern  conditions  to  do  what  Cochrane's  lire  ships 
achieved  in  the  affair  of  the  Aix  Roads.  It  was  an 
effect  like  that  actually  achieved  at  Zeebnigge  that  I  had 
in  mind.  And  undoubtedly  it  is  one  of  the  j)ossibilities 
of  the  future.  1  say  "  of  the  future,"  because  it  seems  to 
be  pretty  clear  that  no  country  has  at  present  an  air 
service  capable  of  attacking  an  anchored  fleet  with 
sufficient  jirecision  and  effect  to  drive  them  in  confusion 
out  to  sea.  A.gainst  a  fleet  under  way  and  free  to 
man(euvre,  it  looks  as  if  aircraft  neither  had  now,  nor 
was  ever  likely  to  have,  any  such  su|)eriority  as  to  make 
them  a  formidable  menace.  But  if  the  fleet  is  at  anchor 
the   case   is   very   different.  Aktihk    Poi.i.kx. 


The    Need  for  a  Balkan  Policy 


By   Alfred   Stead 


Ei 


X  Oriente  lux  "  ?  The  history  of  the  war  Ikis 
so  far  revealed  nothing  more  striking  than  tlic 
ack  of  comprehension  in  this  <ountry  of  the 
]  *  -^  factors  in  the  Near  East.  Turkey  was  need- 
essly  lost,  Bulgaria  given  the  chance  of  following  her 
inclinations  r;ither  than  ours.  Serbia  and  Montenegro 
were  destroyed,  Albania  overrun,  and  the  decisions  of 
Koumania  and  (ireece  made  much  more  difficult.  So 
much  for  the  past. 

To-day, with  a  great  Allied  Conference  sitting  in  Paris, 
no  question  is  of  more  moment  than  that  of  a  Balkan 
Policy.  In  it  lies  at  once  the  corner-stone  of  the  future 
action  of  the  Allies,  and  from  it  depends  the  more  com- 
plete action  of  Italy  and  the  entry,of  Roumania.  It  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that  Serbia  was  sacrificed  because  of  a 
lack  of  a  definite  policy  in  the  Balkans.  Let  us  therefore 
take  heed  lest  Worse  befall. 

A  Tempting   Objective 

Kven  those  w  ho  do  not  admit  that  the  great  stroke  of 
the  war  will  come  in  the  Balkans  and  the  Hungarian  jilains, 
must  acknowledge  that  the  long-drawn  line  from  Germany 
to  Constantinople  offers  a  tempting  objective.  In 
Germany  so  much  has  been  made  of  Bulgarian  accession 
that  a  Bulgarian  defeat  is  equivalent,  in  moral  effect, 
to  a  German  one.  And  it  is  undoubtedly  easier  to  crush 
Bulgaria  than  to  pierce  the  German  front  in  the  West. 

The  way  to  the  East  and  to  the  Indies  is  always 
bound  to  play  a  great  part  in  the  decision  of  the  war. 
As  long  as  Hungary,  Serbia,  Albania,  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey  remain  in  German  hands  there  can  be  no  real 
settlement.  It  is  idle  to  sa^'  that  a  beaten  Germany  will 
automatically  evacuate  all  these  territories — history 
shows  us  that  treaties  of  peace  by  conference  prove  often 
that  possession  is  nine-tenths  of  the  law.  And  it  is 
obvious  that  we  can  never  accept  the  principle  that 
Germany,  even  a  weakened  Germany,  shall  have  access 
to  Turkey  and  the  East.  But  this  is  only  to  be  prevented 
by  building  a  well  foundationed  dam  across  the  road, 
not  by  throwing  a  loose  brick  into  the  flood. 

Even  if  the  war  be  not  determined  in  the  Balkans, 
at  any  rate  it  is  this  part  of  Europe  which  might  easily 
result  in  discord  amongst  the  Allies  in  the  final  settlement. 
There  is  no  need  that  it  should,  but  there  is  every  danger 
that  it  may,  unless  steps  are  taken  to  set  our  policy  on 
a  firm  basis,  clearly  understood  by  those  immediately 
concerned  and  by  our  Allies. 

There  are  few  fundamental  factors  which  would 
have  to  be  reconciled.  The  principle  of  nationalities  is  a 
difficult  one  to  carry  out  in  its  entirety,  since  it  would 
mean  leaving  the  Turks  at  Constantinople  and  indeed  the 
adding  of  a  considerable  portion  of  Thrace  and  Eastern 
Roumelia  to  Turkey.  It  is  also  a  jirinciple  rather 
weakened  by  the  concessions  made  on  the  Adriatic  coast 
to  Italy  at  the  expense  of  the  Serbs  and  Serbo  Croats. 
But  we  may  take  it  that  in  outward  form  at  least,  an 
attempt  will  be  made  to  stick  to  this  idea.  How  essential 
it  is  to  these  peoples,  filled  as  they  are  with  national 
sentiment,  may  be  judged  by  the  resolution  hrouglit 
forward  by  Croatian  deputies  in  the  Croatian  Diet.    It  ran  : 

"  riu'sontlicm  Sla\' question  can  be  settled  either  upon  the 
ruhis  of  tiie  idea  of  a  (ireater  Serbia  and  in  favour  of  the 
Croatian  State  Idea,  or  on  the  ruins  of  the  idea  of    a 


(ireairr  Croatia,  if  so  he  that  KiiSrsia  and  her  allies  s'.iould 
win  the  war.  But  under  no  cirrumstances  could  the 
South  SIa\-  question  be  settled  on  the  basis  of  a  Greater 
Hungary." 
Then  we  have  the  very  definite  declaration  that 
Serbia  shall  be  recreated,  greater  than  before.  As  the 
greater  includes  the  less,  this  must  be  taken  to  mean 
that  the  status  quo  ante  the  present  war  is  to  be  part  of 
the  peace  demands  of  this  country  There  can  scarcely 
be  any  idea  of  (luibbling  about  tlie  Serbia  of  before  the 
Balkan  wars  ;  it  would  .be  as  reasonable  to  talk  of  the 
Serbia  of  the  Tzar  Dushan.  Thus  we  may  assume  that 
as  far  as  Serbia  is  concerned  our  policy  is  clear.  That  is 
unless  we  are  to  regard  the  words  of  our  responsible 
statesman  as  so  much  mockery  of  the  misery  of  sacrificed 
nations  and  the  adding  of  one  more  geographical  expres- 
sion to  the  list  of  those  to  be  recreated,  as  a  mere  dithy- 
rambic  exercise  to  tickle  the  earsof  members  of  Parliament. 
If  we  can  bank  on  Serbia's  restoration,  a  very  con- 
siderable portion  of  the  Balkan  puzzle  falls  into  place. 
It  is  obviously  impossible  for  us  to  attempt  to  beguile 
Bulgaria  back  into  the  fold  by  offers  of  Serbian  Macedonia. 
Nor  can  Albania  be  regarded  as  anything  else  but  a  separ- 
ate item  to  be  arranged  for  as  may  best  be  considerecl  bv 
those  interested,  'i  his  is  perhaps  just  as  well,  because 
the  Bulgarians  have  made  it  quite  clear  that  it  is  not 
for  Macedonia  that  they  are  fighting  and  will  fight,  but, 
in  order  to  destroy  Serbia  anci  have  a  common  frontit-r 
with  Hungary,  with  direct  access  to  the  Middle  European 
markets  for  her  agricultural  products. 

To   Recreate   Serbia 

"  The  war  will  cease,"  sayr  a  prominent  Bulgarian 
military  authority,  "  only  when  we  convince  the  frii'nds 
of  Serbia  that  their  cause  has  been  definitely  lost,  and 
that  Serbia,  who  is  responsible  for  the  war  is  really  dead." 
We  have  bound  ourselves  to  recreate  Serbia  so  that  it 
would  seem  difficult  to  treat  with  Bulgaria,  since  to  carry 
out  our  promise  must  mean  finally  denying  to  Bulgaria 
Macedonia  and  a  frontier  with  Central  fuirope. 

Nor  is  the  promise  to  Serbia  the  only  factor  bearing 
upon  the  situation.  Nobody  who  has  troubled  to  study 
the  question  can  deny  that  iVec  access  to  the  Black  Sea  is 
essential  to  Russia, "with  all  her  wealth  carried  down 
south  to  the  Black  Sea  by  her  magnificently  navigable 
rivers.  The  time  has  gone  to  discuss  whether  or  not  it 
shall  be  done,  but  we  cannot  disregard  the  results  of  sucii 
a  decision.  Russia  at  Constantinople  is  declared  in 
Bulgaria  to  be  an  untenable  situation,  but  Russia  must  be 
adequately  assured  of  free  egress  from  the  Black  Sea  in 
one  form  or  another.  Thus  we  ha\-e  another  portion  of 
the  puzzle  elucidated. 

Nor  must  we  overlook  that  the  Russians  at  Con- 
stantinople means  that  we  must  ensure  also  the  right  to 
breathe  to  Roumania,  whose  only  coast  is  within  the 
Dardanelles.  An  open  outlet  for  "Roumania  must  mean 
the  cutting  up  of  Bulgaria,  a  resoh-ing  of  the  nomad 
tribes  now  known  as  Bulgarians  into  their  natural  con- 
dition of  subordination.  Such  a  fate  does  not  need  to 
affect  any  of  the  Slav  races  because  there  are  none  more 
insistent  on  their  Tartar  (not  Slav)  origin  than  the 
Bulgarians  to-dav. 

We  are  therefore  faced  by  some  very  definite  factors. 


March  30,  to  16 


L  A  N  0     &     \\  A  T  R  R 


It 


the  principle  of  nationalities,  the  restoration  of  Serbia, 
the  ensuring  to  Russia  of  control  over  the  Dardanelles 
and  Roumania's  right  to  breathe.  All  these  factors 
exist  to  day  and  do  not  in  any  way  depend  upon  develop- 
ments in  the  Roumanian  or  Serbian  jjuimlations  of 
Austria-Hungary.  We  have  ample  mateiial  from  which 
to  construct  a  clear  policy  which  can  then  be  pushed 
forward  without  fear  of  hurting  the  feelings  of  any  of 
our  Allies.  Hut  we  must  have  the  courage  to  make  up 
our  mind.  In  the  Balkans  we  have  never  yet  done  so, 
and  the  results  are  pitiable. 

''  (ireat  Britain,  France  and  Russia  were  great  in 
the  eyes  of  the  small  states  and  everybody  respected 
and  feared  them.  But  this  greatness  was  only  transitory. 
To-day  these  countries  are  getting  small  states  into  their 
power  and  endeavouring  to  persuade  to  carry  on  tlicir 
schemes  of  conquest  with  the  strength  of  the  small  allies." 
So  speaks  a  Balkan  statesman  to-day.  It  is  of  small 
avail  to  point  to  Salonika  as  an  earnest  that  we  are 
seriously  working  nut  a  ])olicy  in  the  Balkans.  TIk^ 
details  of  the  liolding  of  Salonika  reflect  no  credit  on  this 
comilry.  We  had  to  he  driven  to  that  decision — if 
we  are  to  hi'liexe  well-informed  opinion  in  Paris.  And 
so  the  f)nly  jiositive  action  in  the  Balkans,  the  occupation 
of  Salonika  of  which  M.  Radoslavoff  said  recently  that 
"  it  represents  a  serious  political  dan.ger  for  the  Central 
Powers  because  it  could  induce  Roumania  and  (ireece  to 
attack  Bulgaria  at  a  very  unfavourable  moment,"  is  in 
no  way  a  sign  of  a  real  policy.  It  is  an  accidental  happen- 
ing, however  important  it  may  be. 


Let  us  therefore  have  done  with  uncertainty  and 
the  making  of  declarations  one  day  to  deny  them  to- 
morrow. A  declaration  of  policy  bearing  in  itself  the 
evidence  of  reflection  and  decision  will  be  worth  more  than 
many  divisions  in  the  Near  I'-ast."  And  having  decided 
let  words  be  translated  into  deeds.  Pious  wishes  for 
Serbian  future  will  sound  better  if  we  co-operate  ener- 
getically in  the  reorganisation  of  their  army  and  proclaim 
that  we  are  not  thinking  of  giving  Macedonia  to  Bulgaria. 
Roumania  will  believe  us  better  if  we  declare  that  she  has 
a  right  to  breatlu;  and  that  in  restoring  Serb'>  we  are 
removing  a  menace  of  a  (ireater  Bulgaria.  We  have 
all  to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose  by  such  a  policy.  We  have 
so  tied  our  hands  that  we  have  no  real  choice  as  to  the 
form  of  the  policy.  So  let  us  at  least  have  the  credit  of 
])roclaiming  what  we  have  done. 

A  Balkan  statesman  recently  made  a  caustic  summing 
up  of  our  policy  in  the  Near  East.  "  England  asked  the 
neutral  states  to  come  in  with  the  Entente  without 
promising  anything.  Having  failed  she  began  to  promise 
much.  Having  failed  again  she  asked  the  neutral  States  to 
continue  their  neutrality.  She  was  first  ))artitioniiig  other 
peoples  territorits  to  get  intervention  in  her  favour,  then, 
liaving  not  attained  favourable  results  she  partitions 
territories  for  the  continuation  of  the  neutrality.  At 
iirst  she  gives  little,  afterwards  mucli.  When  she  fails 
with  her  large  requests,  she  reduce.;  them  to  a  minimum. 
In  ordinary  commercial  Hfe,  such  a  policy  is  only  that 
of  a  bankrupt.  Have  we  to-day  any  reason  to  hope  that 
things  have  changed  for  the  better  ? 


A    Famous    Showman 


By  Desmond  MacCarthy 


THESE  days,  when  people  arc  more  than  usually 
grateful  for  a  book  which  will  as  they  say,  take 
them  out  of  themselves  (0,  for  a  Leaf  on  a  witch's 
broom  stick  !j  I  do  not  know  that  I  can  do  better 
than  draw  attention  to  such  a  book.  It ''has  been  out  some 
vcars.  It  was  written  by  a  man,  who  at  the  age  of  eighty- 
live  was  murdered  by  a  half-crazy  protege  in  iqii.  His 
name  not  long  ago  was  as  well  known  up  and  down 
lingland  as  Gladstone's  or  Jack  Johnson's.  The  book 
is  called  "  Seventy  Years  a  Showman"  and  it  is  by 
(I  remove  the  conventional  quotation  marks  from  his 
coiutesy  title  with  feelings  of  profound  respect)  Lord 
George  Sanger. 

\Vhen  we  hear  ot  an  odd  adventurous  career,  we 
often  think  to  ourselves,  "  What  a  book  that  man  might 
have  written  if  he  had  merely  put  down  what  he  remem- 
bered !  "  Yet  .such  people  when  they  do  write,  write 
usually  unconvincing,  heavy  books.  It  is  a  melancholy 
fact  that  as  a  rule,  people  to  whom  exciting  things 
happen,  or  who  do  things,  cannot  describe  them  ;  while 
to  those  who  can  describe  anything,  nothing  in  particular 
happens.  His  lordship  is,  liowever,  an  exception.  He 
writes  well.  His  manner  is  as  honest  as  Defoe's,  and  as 
engagingly  bright  and  obvious  as  the  decorations  of  a 
wandering  showman's  van. 

Nothing  is  more  satisfactory  than  to  see  a  thing 
grow,  even  if  it  is  onlv  one's  own  moustache,  Few  stories 
are  more  entertaining  than  the  adventures  of  those  who 
live  precariously,  dangerously,  by  pleasing  men  ;  nothing 
IS  more  romantic  than  the  days  of  our  grandfathers, 
when  our  fathers  were  young.  Such  satisfaction,  en- 
tertainment, and  romance  are  to  be  gathered  from  the 
pages  of  this  autobiography. 

His  lordship's  father  was  a  sailor.  Walking  one  day 
over  London  Bridge  the  Press  Gang  (which  pace  the 
recruiting  authorities  is  not  yet  quite  extinct)  nabbed 
him  and  hustled  him  into  His  Majesty's  Service.  He 
served  on  board  the  Victory  ;  fought  at  Trafalgar,  where 
he  lost  a  few  fingers,  broke  ribs,  got  scalped  and  saw 
Nelson  fall  ;  experiences  which  subsequently,  when,  to 
supplement  a  pension  of  lio  a  year,  he  took  th(>  road, 
helped  him  to  excel  in  jwepshow  patter.  It  was  lucky, 
too,  lie  had  as  a  sailor  been  kind  to  two  pressed  Jews,, 
who  havmg  come  aboard  to  amuse  the  crew,"  had 
strmk  the  captain  as  nature's  seamen  in  disguise,  and 
had  therefore  been  permanently  detained  ;  for  these 
men   had   taught   him   in   return   manv   conjuring   and 


hanky-panky  tricks.  So  from  tlie  little  peepshow  box 
slung  across  father  Sanger's  shoulders,  sprang  the  glories 
of  the  circus  and  menagerie  and  the  glittering,  still  ex- 
tant though  now  dilapidated,  halls  of  Margate. 

It  is  a  fascinating  story  this  ;  it  is  the  story  of  the 
mustard  seed  of  which  we  never  tire.  It  grew,  it  grew. 
From  peepshow  box  it  grew  into  collapsible  merry-go- 
roind,  worked  by  two  boys  ;  from  that  to  a  show  with 
a  giantess  (really  six  foot  high)  and  "two  cannibal  pigmies 
of  the  dark  continent  "  (intelligent  Mulatto  children, 
aged  nine  and  ten)  and  to  a  proper  troop  ;  and  from  that 
it  shot  up  into  the  triumphs  of  his  son,  who  actually 
succeeded  in  1871  in  linking  on  his  own  show  to  the  tail 
to  the  Royal  Thanksgiving  Procession  through  London, 
which  commemorated  the  recovery  of  the  Prince  of 
Wales  from  typhoid  fever  ;  in  which  Mrs.  Sanger  (as 
she  then  was)  represented  on  the  top  of  a  golden  car, 
Britannia,  with  a  living  lion  at  her  feet.  One  can  imagine, 
without  in  the  least  inpugning  the  loyalty  of  the  crowd 
which  lined  the  streets,  how  much  more  imposing  Sanger's 
appendix  to  the  Royal  Progress  must  have  been  to  them. 
And  I  note  as  a  striking  instance  of  the  dramatic  felicity 
of  chance,  that  somehow  on  this  occasion  the  carriage 
in  which,  as  our  author  says,  "  Lord  Beaconslield  was 
con.spicuous,"  got  left  behind  and  inextricably  mingled 
(they  did  not  manage  these  things  so  well  in  the  eighteen- 
seventies)  with  the  circus  itself.  He  "rose  "  our  author 
tells  us,  "  and  acknowledged  the  endeavour  of  youi 
humble  servant  to  enhance  the  circumstance  of  the  great 
occasion."  I  like  to  picture  that  salute,  to  imagine  it 
coinciding  with  the  passing  of  Britannia,  and  to  admire  yet 
again  the  master  of  ironic  presence  of  mind. 

George  begins  as  a  handy  boy,  ready  to  earn,  as  acrobat 
or  conjuror,  a  few  shillings  for  his  parents  ;  to  take  the 
place  of  a  donkey  if  need  be,  in  an  equilibrist's  jx'rfor- 
mance  when  that  docile  beast  is  stolen.  He  then  de- 
velops into  a  strong  young  man  with  a  dashing  paste- 
diamond  quality  air  about  liim  ;  magnificent  in  dress, 
cutting  a  fine  figure,  shouting  his  patter  among  "  the 
flares  "  in  front  of  the  stage.  On  his  first  independent 
venture  as  "  The  Wizard  of  the  West,"  he  adopts  the 
costume  of  Hamlet,  to  which  his  feminine  admirers,  who 
throng  the  bootii,  are  proud  to  contribute  a  ribbon  or 
a  feather.  But  to  them  he  remains  fascinating,  scornful  ; 
proof  against  even  the  charms  of  "  Watercress  Betty." 
'fill,  suddenly  and  irre\ocably,  he  meets  his  fate 
in    the    person    of  Madam  Pauline   de  Vere,  the    Lady 


12 


LAND      i^     W  A  T  E  R 


March  30,  191G 


of  tho  Lions.  Then  many  ups  and  downs ;  hard 
times  ;  no  rasli  somotimcs  to  pay  the  turnpike  dues  ; 
surly  fjatc-keeiM'rs  refusing  even  the  guarantee  of  a  five 
pound  Chinese  (iontj  ;  private  bereavements  ;  prejudiced 
mayors  and  magistrates  :  struggles  for  good  phices  at 
the  fairs  ;  mother  dead,  father  dead  ;  Httle  son  suddenly 
struck  down  in  a  fit,  the  body  washed  and  borne  in  the 
van  along  the  frozen  Yorkshire  roads  among  the  pro- 
perties ;  misfortunes  checkered  by  sudden  fresh  inspirations 
for  coining  money  from  mankind  s  bum])  of  wonder — in 
thoso  lays  of  more  majestic  proportions.  "  The  Tamo 
Oyster,"  which  smoked  a  churchwarden  pipe,  was 
a  glorious  success  ;  so  were  "  the  learned  pigs."  At  last. 
at  last,  he  is  up  and  out  on  to  the  high  level  plateau  of 
solid  success  ;  he  owns  a  circus  ;  he  overshadows  the 
great  Wombwell ;  he  beats  the  Yankees  ;  captures  .\stley's; 
])erforms  in  every  capital  in  lun'ope ;  and  tnially 
lie  reaches  the  acme  of  a  showman's  career  and  performs 
liefore  his  Queen  and  wins  her  smile.  You  see  this 
showman's  story  has  just  the  right  crescendo  in  it,  and 
he  who  tells  it  has  just  the  sterling,  romantic  simple- 
minded  sense  of  values  he  ought  to  liave.  It  is  in  the 
vein  of  Meredith's  Jii^gliui^  Jerry. 

We've  travelled  times  to  tliis  old  common  ; 

Often  we've  hung  our  pots  in  tiic  gorse. 
We've  had  a  stirring  life,  old  woman  '. 

You,  and  I,  and  the  old  grey  horse. 
Races,  and  fairs  and  royal  tjccasions 

i'ound  us  coming  to  their  call  ; 
Now  they'll  miss  us  at  our  stations. 

There's  a  Juggler  out  ;    who  jugtrles  all ! 

Picture   of   Bygone  Times 

But  I  have  still  to  speak  of  the  romance  of  the  picture 
of  bygone  times  which  is  one  of  the  charms  of  the  book. 
He  who  lives  adventurously  in  the  interstices  of  society 
and  picks  up  a  living  by  pleasing  the  crowd,  whatever 
age  he  lives  in,  sees  most  of  such  fragments  as  survive  of 
the  older  order  which  preceded  it.  It  is  what  was  oldest 
in  England  of  coaching  turn-pike  days  that  we  see 
reflected  in  the  early  pages  of  this  book  ;  the  Merrv 
England,  which  was  also  so  miserable  an  England,  but 
could  still  claim  kinship  with  the  days  of  Queen  Elizabeth. 
The  adventures  of  the  Sanger  family  upon  the  road, 
the  dangers  from  Chartists.  small-po.\,  drunken  rioters 
and  magistrates,  to  whom  they  were  "  rogues  and 
vagabonds  "  par  excellence,  make  an  exciting  Odyssey. 
Peel  had  not  invented  Bobbies  then  ;  the  elder  Sanger,  a 
man  evidently  of  great  resource  and  courage  and  natural 
piety,  had  on  occasions  to  take  the  law  into  his  own 
hands.  Once  at  Landsdown  Fair  the  showman's  booths 
and  properties  were  wrecked  by  Bath  roughs. 

The  drink  booths  were  the  fust  to  suffer.  Soma 
of  the  unfortunate  owners  were  half-killed  and  the  mob 
drank  itself  in  a  frenzy  more  acute  than  before.  Then 
they  started  to  wreck  the  booths. 

•'  Canvas  was  torn  to  shreds,  platforms  smashed  up  and 
made  bonfires  of,  wagons  were  battered  and  overturned, 
show  parts  that  had  cost  their  poor  owners  small  fortunes 
battered  to  fragments.  Everywhere  was  riot,  ruin  and 
destruction.  .  .  As  dawn  broke  the  riot  died  down, 
and  the  drunken  mob,  glutted  with  the  wanton  destruc- 
tion of  the  belongings  of  poor  people  who  had  never 
done  them  any  harm,  began  to  straggle,  shouting,  swearing 

and  singing,  back  towards  Hath 

"  Then,  by  ones  and  twos,  the  showncn  came  together, 
pale  with  anger,  some  of  them  bruised  and  bleeding  from 
the  fray,  and  all  resolved  on  vengeance.  They  had 
markedone  or  two  of  the  ringleaders  of  the  riot,  and  meant 
to  give  them  a  taste  of  showmen's  law.  The  scene  is 
before  me  now  as  1  saw  it  when  1  stood  with  my  brother 
William,  still  pale  with  fear,  but  full  of  childish  curiosity, 
on  the  steps  of  our  caravan,  in  the  dawn-light,  and  watched 
•  some  thirtv  stalwart  showmen,  my  father  amongst  tiicm, 
armed  with  stout  cudgels,  mount  the  hastily  collected 
waggon  horses,  and  bare-backed,  ride  after  the  retreating 
mob.  " 
The  showmen's  revenge  was  to  capture  a  dozen,  tie  them 
at  intervals  to  a  rope  and  drag  them  through  a  ])ond. 
••  No  notice  was  taken  of  their  cries,  but  backwards  and 
forwards  through  the  muddy  water  they  were  pulled 
till  no  breath  was  left  in  their  bodies.  One  or  two.  indeed, 
were  so  still  that  some  of  the  showmen  cried  out  in  alarm 
that  they  were  drowned.  "  No  fear,"  shouted  my  father 
in  tf)nes"that  1  can  remember  yet.  "That  sort  do?sn't 
die  from  drowning.  l-Vtch  'cm  out." 
it  was  an  ac'c  when  a  disused  charnel  house  in  Lon- 


don (once  rented  by  Lord  George)  was  used  as  a  dancing 
room,  and  the  proprietor  to  attract  customers  issued  the 
notice :  "  liwdn  Chapel — Dancing  on  the  Dead—. 
Admission  Three-pence.  No  Lady  or  Gentleman  admitted 
unless  wearing  shoes  and  stockings";  when  body- 
snatchers  inspired  a  horror  in  the  poor  greater  than 
murderers  ;  when  grotesque  raggedness  with  cold, 
grimy  nakedness  between  was  a  common  sight  in  the 
streets  ;  when  the  wonder  that  Sanger's  jierfonnances 
roused  in  countr\'  places,  roused  also  suspicions  that  he 
was  a  "  warlock  "  and  better  underground  with  a  stake 
through  his  body.  In  his  story  these  days  live  again. 
There  are  sunny  scenes  as  well  as  lurid  ones,  like  living, 
life-size  Cruikshank  drawings  ht  by  naphtha-Hares. 

Great    Hyde  Park  Fair 

I  like  to  move  about  the  Great  Hyde  Park  Fair,  among 
booths  and  little  theatres  set  uj)  to  celebrate  the  coronation 
of  Queen  \'ictoria  :  to  visit  little  (ieorge's  show  of  per 
forming  mice  or  see  him  balanced  on  a  ladder  on  the  chin 
of  an  equilibrist  ;  to  jam  myself  among  the  crowd, 
thronging  the  booth  of  The  I'ig-jaced  Lady — alas,  sfton 
to  be  repressed  as  a  fraud  by  law.  [,ord  George  lets  us  ifito 
the  secret  of  this  lady.  "  Madam  Stevens  "  was  really  a 
fine  brown  bear,  tht;  paws  and  face  of  which  wore  kept 
closely  shaved,  the  white  skin  imder  the  fur  having  a  close 
resemblance  to  that  of  a  human  being.  Over  the  paws 
were  fitted  white  gloves,  with  well  stuffed  fingers,  so  that 
the  pig-faced  lady  seemed  to  have  nice  plump,  white 
arms  above  them.  The  bear,  dressed  in  a  Leech-bonnet, 
flowing  skirt  and  shawl,  sat  at  a  table,  imderneath  which 
hidden  by  drapery  was  a  boy  with  a  stick  to  make  the 
pig-faced  lady  talk. 

"  I  call  your  attention,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  to  the 
greatest  wonder  of  the  world!  ]?ehold  and  marvel  I -- 
Mmc.  Stevens,  the  pig-faced  lady,  who  is  now  in  her  eigh- 
teenth year.  I  believe  that  is  correct,  miss  ?  (here  the 
hidden  boy  would  prod  the  bear,  who  gave  a  grunt).  As 
you  see,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  young  lady  understands 
what  is  said  perfectly,  though  the  peculiar  formation  of 
the  jaws  has  deprived  her  of  the  power  of  uttering  human 
speech  in  return. 

"  You  were  born  at  Preston  in  Lancashire  ?     (.Another 

prod  and  another  gnint)     Quite  so.     And  you  enjoy  good 

licalth  and  are  very  happy  ?     (.Another  prod  and  gnuit.) 

\o\\  are  iiKlinod,  !  suppose,  as  other  ladies,  to  be  led  by 

some   gentlemui    into    the    holy    bonds   of    matrimony  '■ 

(Here  the  boy  would  give  an  e.xtra  prod,  causing  the  bear 

to    grunt    angrily.)     What,    no !     Well,    well,    don't    l^e 

cross  because  I  asked  you  !  " 

Then,  when   the  hat  had  gone  round  and  the   people 

streamed  out  marvelling,  the  showman  would  rush  to 

the  front,  shouting  to  the  crowd  outside,   "Hear  what 

they  say  !    Hear  what  they  all  say  about  Mme.  Stevens, 

the  wonderful  pig-faced  lady  !  "     But    I    myself    have 

jiattered  enough. 

"  \\alk  up  !  Walk  up  !  Walk  up  1  This  way  for 
a  talc  of  stranger  things,  scenes  and  adventures.  Lord 
George  Sanger  is  on  the  road  again." 


In  a  recent  appreciation  of  Alexander  Kuprin's  novel 
The  Duel,  published  by  Messrs.  George  .\llen  and  Unwin,  the 
title  was  by  a  slip  of  the  pen  given  as  The  Exile.  The  Duel 
is  a  fine  example  of  modern  Kussian  literature,  and  deserves 
a  wide  circulation  in  this  country. 

The  war  has  revealed  a  surprising  wealth  of  lit^^rary 
expression  among  officers  and  men.  Not  much  reaches  the 
very  highest  levels,  hut  the  performance  just  short  of  this  is 
surprising.  .\  delightful  volume  (5s.  net)  published  b\- 
Messrs.  Smith,  Elder,  and  entitled  Colwyn  Philipps,  contains 
poems  and  extracts  from  private  letters  written  by  this 
gallant  officer,  elder  son  of  I^ord  St.  Davids,  who  "fell  at 
Yprcs  last  May,  in  his  2()th  year.  There  is  here  a  pcrfectl\- 
delightful  little  sketch  of  a  morning  in  a  cavalry  school. 
Captain  I'hiliiips  had  a  strong  sense  of  humour,  witness  this 
story  told  in  one  of  his  letters  about  a  Canadian  man  :  "  Our 
chaps  are  all  right,  "  he  said,  "  our  rifle  is  a  good  one,  the  grub 
is  first  rate,  and  our  officers— oh,  well,  we  just  take  tiiCm 
along  as  mascots!  "  The  verses  are  the  least  good  of  the 
good  things  in  tliis  very  charming  volume,  yet  many  of  then- 
are  really  fine.  This  verse  comes  from  a  little  poem  :  "  IV 
Kudyard  Kipling,"  it  voices  the  gratitude  of  thousands: 

What  you've  been  you'll  never  kn<jw, 
What  a  help  upon  my  way. 

In  each  turn  of  weal  and  woe. 
F.vcry  hour  of  everv  day. 


March  30,  1916 


LAND      &    WATER 

Aircraft   Policy 


13 


And    the    Zeppelin    Menace    from    the    National    Standpoint 

By  F.  W.  Lanchester 


In  this  and  the  previous  article,  published  last  week, 
an  endeavour  has  been  made  to  put  be/ore  the  public 
a  dispassionate  account  of  the  reasoiis,  facts  ■  and 
circumstances  which  have  led  to  the  present  day  non- 
military  '  employment  of  aircraft  in  warfare  as 
typically  exemplified  by  the  Zeppelin  raids.  The 
writer  has  endeavoured  to  bring  the  question  of 
aircraft  raids  into  their  true  perspective,  both  as  to 
their  relative  material  importance  as  acts  of  war,  and 
.  to  their  moral  importance,  as  founded  on  the  theories 
of  German  military  writers,  as  a  means  of  causing 
embarrassment  to  an  enemy  Government. 

IN  my  "  Aircraft  in  Warfare  "  I  have  pointed  out 
that  there  are  adequate  reasons  for  regarding  the 
aeroplane,  or  the  flying  machine,  as  being,  from 
a  military  standpoint,  the  mainstay  of  the 
Aeronautical  Arm  ;  the  airship,  even  though  it  may  be 
of  use  as  an  auxiliary',  does  not  require  to  be  taken  into 
consideration  when  we  are  dealing  with  aircraft  in  its 
fighting  capacity.  The  reasons  given  are  to-day  valid  ;  as 
a  lighting  machine  the  aeroplane  is  supreme. 

It  is  possible  that  the  large  rigid  airship  of  the  future 
may,  in  comparison  with  the  aeroplane  (also  of  the  future) 
be  at  a  less  disadvantage  than  it  is  to-day.  Even  if  this 
be  so  the  fact  as  stated  remains  a  truth.  We  have, 
however,  a  new  situation  to  deal  with  :  the  fabric  of 
international  law  has  gone  "  by  the  board  "  and  we 
have  to  consider  facts  relating  to  the  use  of  the  airship 
which  are  not  of  a  military  character,  at  least  according 
to  the  time  honoured  ideas  of  military  duties. 

Hostile  Air  Attacks 

The  popular  clamour  to-day  that  the  civilian 
population  of  a  country  have  a  divine  right  to  be  pro- 
tected from  hostile  air  attack  has  no  more  foundation 
in  fact  than  any  rights  they  may  have  possessed  in  the 
time  of  the  Saxons  against  raiding  by  sea.  It  may  prove 
possible  to  defend  the  whole  country  from  air  attack  in 
future  warfare,  just  as  it  has  been  found  possible  to  pro- 
tect our  shores  by  means  of  our  Navy,  but  this  does  not 
follow  as  a  logical  conclusion.  In  the  warfare  of  the 
future  the  whole  area  of  a  country  is  liable  to  attack, 
and,  with  countries  so  closely  situated  as  in  Europe,  the 
most  carefully  elaborated  defence  may  not  prove  im- 
penetrable. In  other  words  the  civil  population  may  have 
to  accept  the  new  situation  and  get  acclimatised  to  it. 

Naturally  in  the  future  every  reasonable  effort,  every 
possible  effort,  must  be  made  to  avoid  or  to  minimise  a 
risk  of  this  magnitude  ;  I  merely  point  out  that  no  one 
has  offered  any  proof  that,  in  warfare  between  countries 
within  such  short  lange  of  one  another  as  the  leading 
Powers  of  Europe,  there  is  any  real  certaint}^  that  im- 
numity  can  be  secured,  even  though  our  aeronautical 
ascendency  within  our  own  borders  may  be  unquestioned. 

There  is  a  great  deal  of  misapprehension  as  to  the 
real  arguments  underlying  the  question  of  aeronautical 
defence.  For  example,  the  Government  are  blamed,  the 
"  experts  "  are  blamed,  and  everybody  concerned  is 
blamed,  for  not  having  foreseen  that  the  Zeppelin  airship 
could  not  be  attacked  on  a  dark  night  effectively  either 
bv  counter-aircraft  artillery  or  by  aeroplane  "patrols. 
This  is  not. correct.  It  was  beheved  that  by  night  a 
Zep}K'lin  airshiyj  would  be  unable  to  locate. any  objective 
of  military  value,,  and  none  of  the  events  which  have 
taken  place  have  proved  the  contrary. 

what  was  not  foreseen  was  something  far  wider  than 
any  question  of  Zeppehn  behaviour.  It  was  tlie  broad 
fact  that  the  whole  fabric  of  international  law  would  hi- 
jettisoned  by  the  enemy,  and  in  this  respect  the  naval  raid 
on  Scarborough  is  exactly  on  all  fours  with  the  raids 
by  aircraft  on  London  or  the  Eastern  and  Midland  Coun- 
ties. We  relied  on  a  cliea])  jiiece  of  jjaper  to  ])rotect  us 
instead  of  an  expensive  engineering  outfit  and  military 
organisation. 

At  Scarborough,  for  example,  a  few  heavy  naval  guns 
mounted  at  any  suitable  jjoint  a  few  miljs  outside  the 


town  would  have  rendered  the  bombardment  of  the  town 
by  the  enemy  fleet  too  dangerous  to  be  undertaken. 
Nobody  would  lay  any  blame  on  the  Government,  or  on 
any  particular  Government,  for  the  neglect  to  furnish 
such  defences.  We  may  admit  now  that  we  were  mis- 
taken, but  it  must  be  recalled  that  this  fabric  of  interna- 
national  law  (by  ^yhich  99  people  out  of  100  in  this  country 
and  ill  many  other  parts  of  Europe  thought  they  were 
protected)  has  been  growing  up  for  the  last  half  century 
and  more,  and  neither  the  Government  nor  the  military 
or  naval  authorities  can  be  looked  upon  as  to  blame, 
if  reliance  has  been  placed  on  these  accepted  international 
obligations.  Any  man  prior  to  the  War  who  had  sug- 
gested that  there  was  a  need  to  make  provision  in  the 
form  of  guns  and  other  armaments  for  such  breaches 
of  international  decorum  as  we  ha\e  witnessed  would 
have  been  generally  voted  a  madman. 

Where  the  Blame  Lies 

We  must  therefore  endeavour  to  be  sufficiently 
level-headed  in  the  matter  of  air  attack  to  realise  that 
the  failure  of  the  proverbial  "  swarm  of  hornets  "  is  not 
a  matter  for  which  the  experts  are  to  blame,  or  the 
Government  are  to  blame,  it  is  a  matter  for  which  the 
public  and  notably  the  humanitarians  of  the  last  two 
generations  are  jointly  responsible.  The  main  principles 
have  been  accepted  by  all  political  parties  since  the 
middle  of  last  century^backed  by  such  a  force  of  public 
opinion  that  scarcely  a  voice  has  been  raised  to  denounce 
the  danger  to  which  these  international  agreements 
render  our  country  hable.  Unfortunately  the  country 
which  has  been  bombed  fully  justiiies  the  prognostica- 
tions of  the  Bernhardi  school.  The  British  public  goes 
off  its  head  and  blames  experts.  Government  and  every- 
body else  within  reach,  for  that  which  neither  Govern- 
ment nor  experts  are  any  more  to  blame  than  the  man  in 
the  street. 

It  may  be  said  definitely  that  the  change  in  the 
situation  is  not  due  to  any  failing  in  the  prognostications 
of  those  who  have  been  best  qualified  to  judge  on  the 
military  or  technical  merits  of  aircraft  and  aircraft 
defences,  but  wholly  and  solely  on  the  World  Illusion,  I 
would  say  ;:/ic  Great  Illusion  (as  distinct  from  Mr.  AngcU's 
Great  Illusion)  that  international  agreements  on  the 
conduct  of  war  are  worth  the  paper  they  are  written  on. 

The  theory  of  Bernhardi  and  the  German  school  of 
thought  on  the  question  of  attack  on  the  civil  population 
(in  contrast  to  that  which  is  known  as  a  military  objec- 
tive) is  that  although  no  great  material  harm  is  done,  the 
moral  of  the  people  is  so  shaken  as  to  bring  to  bear  an 
adverse  and  demoralising  influence  on  their  own  (Govern- 
ment. In  other  words  the  intention  is  to  shake  the 
nervous  system  of  an  enemy,  just  as  a  boxer  may  in- 
capacitate his  adversary  by  a  blow  in  the  region  of  the 
solar  ple.xus,  and  so  bring  about  a  national  disorganisation 
which  will  be  reflected  in  an  infirmity  of  purpose  on  the 
part  of  this  Government  to  the  detriment  of  the  efficiency 
of  his  military  and  naval  services. 

Zeppehn   Bombing 

Now  it  is  clear  that  if  from  a  national  point  ot  \iew 
the  material  damage  done  by  hostile  air  raids  were  of  a 
substantial  character,  that  is  to  say,  if  twelve  months' 
experience  of  Zeppelin  bombing  amounted  in  the  aggre- 
gate to  a  measurable  percentage  of  the  total  resources  of 
the  country,  it  would  be  quite  reasonable  and  proper  that 
strong  military  measures  should  be  taken  to  avert  the 
danger  or  threat.  If  such  were  the  case,  and  the  damage 
were  great  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  material 
injury,  apart  from  any  question  of  injured  moral  ;  and 
if  the  Government  were  to  neglect  to  take  appropriate 
steps,  and  pressure  were  brought  to  bear  on  tliem  bv 
public  clamour,  this  would  not  constitute  of  necessity  anv 
fnllilnient  or  justification  for  the  theory  propounded  by 
the  German  writers.  If,  however,  the  damage  from  a 
national  point  of  view  be  small  (to  the  extent  of  being 
N-irtually  negligible)  then,  if  any  public  action  results  iu 


14 


LAND      eS:      W  A  T  E  R 


March  30,  njiG 


pressure  being  applied  to  the  Goveriuiieut,  the  thesis  of 
the  psyehological  theorists  is  proven,  and  in  fact  the 
vahie  of  an  attack  on  the  civihan  population  as  a  means 
of  undermining  the  power  of  the  (lovernment  is  estab- 
hshed.  The  question  therefore  turns  defmitcly  upon  the 
extent  of  the  damage  inflicted  as  related  to  what  may  be 
tenned  the  psychological  reaction  produced. 

Relative    Magnitude   of  Peril 

In  order  to  form  an  estimate  of  tlie  relative  magni- 
tude of  the  Zeppehn  peril  in  this  country  as  based  on 
experience,  we  may  take  the  recorded  iigures  over  a 
sufficient  period  of  time.  Thus,  during  the  past  six 
months  the  killed  amount  to  138  and  injured  274,  total 
casualties  412.  If  we  take  the  period  of  twelve  months, 
the  figure  is  roughly  double  this,  so  that  we  may  take 
it  that  the  punishment  inflicted  to  date  is  less  than  1,000 
victims  (killed  and  injured)  per  annum. 

If  this  were  the  only  method  (Germany  had  to  carry 
on  war  it  would  take  considerably  more  than  45,000 
years  to  stamp  out  the  British  nation,  even  if  we  had  no 
rate  of  increase.  Otherwise  expressed,  we  may  say  that 
it  is  not  much  more  than  i/ioooth  of  the  total  annual 
number  of  births,  and  as  a  quantity  which,  if  visited  by 
the  Angel  of  Death  in  a  less  dramatic  manner,  would 
escape  observation  in  the  nation's  statistics.  We  may 
look  at  the  matter  from  the  other  point  of  view,  namely 
the  loss  in  pounds,  shillings  and  pence.  The  total 
damage  (so  far  as  I  know  not  actually  estimated) , 
probably  does  not  exceed  one,  or  at  must  two  days' 
expenses  of  the  British  nation  in  running  the  war,  and 
it  nuist  be  remembered  that  a  great  part  of  the  property 
destroyed  does  not  of  necessity  need  to  be  replaced  during 
the  war,  and  is  property  which  is  in  any  case  not 
available  for  the  carrying  on  of  hostilities.  As  a  matter 
of  economics  there  is  evidently  room  for  argument, 
but  the  main  fact  that  the  real  direct  damage  inflicted  by 
these  raids  is  infmitcsimal  from  the  j)oint  of  view  of  the 
whole  national  wealth,  is  beyond  doubt.  This  broad 
issue  is  usually  sunmiarised  by  saying  the  damage  done. 
by  raids  is  of  no  military  value  to  the  enemy. 

A  certain  writer  on  the  subject  has  taken  exception 
to  the  current  use  of  the  term  "  military  value  "  ;  he 
points  out  (rather  unnecessarily)  that  every  civihan 
killed  does  weaken  the  nation,  especially  if  he  or  she  may 
happen  to  be  a  munition-worker  and  contributing  in  an 
indirect  way  to  the  success  of  our  armies.  It  may  be 
supposed  that  the  writer  in  question  thinks  that  he  has 
made  a  great  discovery,  but  he  may  lest  assured  that 
facts  of  this  kind  are  well  understood. 

National   Injury 

It  scarcely  needs  mention  that  tlic  statistical  method 
of  dealing  with  a  national  injury,  where  life  and  death 
is  concerned,  is  not  a  complete  answer,  but  it  is  the 
crucial  test  as  distinguishing  between  material  and  moral 
damage.  In  a  civihsed  country  imder  peace  conditions 
the  individual  citizen  rightly  expects  the  privilege  of 
the  best  assurance  against  violent  death  which  the  State 
can  offer  him  ;  this  expectation  is  indeed  the  source  from 
which  the  necessity  flrst  for  tribal  and  later  for  national 
organisation  has  sprung,  but  the  conditions  of  war  abro- 
gate this  privilege.  When  many  of  our  citizen  soldiers  are 
called  upon  to  sacrifice  their  lives  in  the  defence  of  their 
cotmtrv,  the  material  or  statistical  measure  of  the 
national  injury  inflicted  by  the  enemy  in  any  of  his  acts 
is,  or  should  be,  the  real  criterion. 

Thus,  if  the  damage  done  in  the  past  twelve  months 
by  Zeppelin  raids  had  represented  an  augmented  result 
of  earthquakes  and  thunderstorms,  England  would  be 
no  more  shunned  as  a  dangerous  country  to  live  in  than  it 
is  to-day  :  the  injury  inflicted  at  the  same  rate  year  after 
year  would  be  such  as  could  be  borne,  both  in  lives  lost 
and  property  destroyed,  without  a  noticeable  or  appreci- 
able tax  on'our  national  resources.  Compared  with  the 
wastage  of  men  and  material  in  the  conduct  of  the  main 
operations  of  the  war  the  figures  are  truly  microscopic. 
Under  these  conditions  it  can  be  asserted  without  hesita- 
tion that  the  outcry  raised  for  protection,  the  outcry 
that  the  (iovernment  and  Services  have  been  neglecting 
their  duties,  the  outcry  that  the  (iovernment  must  be 
"  gingered,"  that  it  requires  waking  up,  and  more  than 
this  in  manv  quarters,  that  it  must  b:  turned  out,  is  in  fact, 
and  in  reality,  the  very  effect  which  military  writers 


and  psychologists  of  the  German  school  had  confidently 
expected.  Thus,  in  shaking  the  popular  nerve  we  have  a 
real  justification  for  air  raids  and  otlier  modes  of  ternjris- 
ing  the  civil  population  of  a  hostile  country,  of  such  potent 
value  that  it  will  always  be  resorted  to  by  a  foe  without 
scruple.  We  must  never  in  future  allow  ourselves  to  be 
lulled  into  a  false  security  in  such  matters  by  the  pseudo- 
legal  sophistry  of  international  agreements. 

We  have  thus  as  a  nation  lost  a  great  opportunity. 
If  we  had  been  prepared  to  take  the  Zeppelin  menace  as 
philosophically  as  we  would  have  taken  an  outbreak  of 
measles,  or  of  volcanic  or  earthquake  activity,  or  as 
philosophically  as  we  would  have  taken  some  meteoro- 
logical cataclysm  involving  previously  unheard  of  injury 
by  lightning,  it  might  have  been  established  that  the 
bombing  of  civilians  was  useless  slaughter  without 
appreciable  military  advantage.  The  fact  that  our 
population  has  been  unequal  to  the  ordeal  means  that 
no  nation  in  considering  its  military  future  will  be  able 
to  remov'e  the  bombing  of  civilians  from  either  its  offen- 
sive or  defensive  programme.  In  other  words,  Bern- 
hardi-isn;  and  the  German  study  of  collective  psychology 
has  triumphed. 

Recent   Unrest 

There  are  those  who  will  say  that  the  unrest  with 
regard  to  the  air  service  which  has  manifested  itself  in  the 
course  of  the  last  few  months  is  nothing  to  do  with  the 
Zeppelin  bombing,  and  that  it  is  due  to  a  general  dis- 
satisfacti(jn  with  a  branch  of  om-  military  and  na\al 
organisation.  The  brief  answer  to  this  is  to  leatl  the 
daily  papers,  either  in  the  matter  contained  in  articles 
or  in  "  letters  to  the  editor,"  or  otherwise  bearing  on 
the"  subject  ;  it  will  be  found  that  an  overwhelming 
majority  of  what  is  said  hinges  on  this  one  question  of  the 
Zeppelin  raid.  .And  it  could  not  be  otherwise,  for  the 
British  Flying  Corps  and  oiu"  Allies  the  French  have,  from 
the  time  the  first  surprise  was  countered,  possessed  and 
maintained  an  aerial  ascendancy. 

The  real  complaint  is  not  against  the  weakness 
or  deficiencies  of  the  aeronautical  branches  of  our 
Services.  Our  preparations  in  this  direction  were 
adequate,  and  we  have  maintained  our  positiijn  since.  It 
is  debatable  whether  we  could  have  done  more.  It 
may  be  debatable  whether  by  making  fewer  shells  or  less 
mechanical  transport  we  might  have  squeezed  out  more 
aeroplanes  from  our  factories.  It  may  be  debatable 
whether  the  aggregate  output  from  our  factories  has  been 
as  big  as  it  might  have  been  if  we  had  had  a  man  of 
Cromwellian  cast  at  the  helm.  It  may  be  debatable 
whether,  while  Cabinet  Ministers  have  been  striking 
bargains  with  miners,  with  labour  leaders,  with  married 
men  versus  bachelors,  and  occupying  themselves  with 
other  domestic  quibbles,  they  could  not  by  speaking 
the  word  have  done  more  than  they  have  doni'.  In 
brief,  it  may  be  argued  that  more  could  have  been  dfic 
by  command  than  by  entreaty  ;  but  these  are  general 
questions  and  must  not  be  exploited  to  the  detriment 
of  our  Air  Service. 

The  truth  is,  in  the  directions  essential  to  the  con- 
duct of  warfare  we  have  an  ascendancy,  it  may  lie 
greater,  it  nun-  be  less,  but  it  exists.  B\-  what  right  do 
the  Press  and  Public  (the  same  Public,  which  is  so  largely 
resi)onsible  for  our  early  widespread  mipreparedness)  - 
bv  what  right  do  they  open  their  niouths  to  blacken  the 
character  (tf  those  to  whom  this  air  service  is  due.  I  say 
emphatically  that  the  whole  of  this  jHcsent  air  agitation, 
sometimes  for  counter-aircraft  artillery,  sometimes  for 
Zeppelins  or  "  super-Zeppelins,"  in  brief  the  whole 
agitation  which  has  been  worked  up  against  the  Govern- 
ment on  the  i)resent  position  of  our  aeronautical  equip- 
ment is  based  on  the  ephemeral  success  of  the  German 
bomb.  It  is  a  public  spasm  of  funk,  resulting  from  a 
calctdated  blow  on  our  national  solar  plexus. 

In  tlefence  of  all  that  is  best  in  our  national  character 
it  may  be  jiointed  out  that  before  districts  had  beconie 
so  depleted  of  their  more  virile  population,  as  in  tht;  earher 
raids  on  London,  the  only  noteworthy  effect  of  a  Zeppelin 
raid  was  a  stiffening  of  the  piiblic  moral  and  a  local  boom 
in  recruiting.  The  opposite  effect  which  we  see  to-day 
and  of  which  we  have  widespread  (>vidence — is  probably 
to  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  the  more  virile  of 
our  manhood  has  gone  voluntarily  to  serve  with  His 
Majesty's    F'orces. 


March  /,o,  toi^> 


L  A  X  D      .*v'      ^^•  A  T  F.  R 


15 


Sport '  Round    Salonika 

By  F.  G.  Aflalo 


IN  view  of  the  absence  of  indecorous  huny  to  attack 
General  Sarrail  displayed  by  the  Austro-German- 
Bulgar  armies,  and  pending  such  offensive  as  he 
may  be  planning  for  the  melting  of  the  snows,  it 
looks  as  if  the  allied  army  of  defence  is  in  for  a  long  spell 
of  waiting,  and  those  with  a  fancy  for  a  little  lishing  or 
shooting  may  be  glad  to  learn  that  their  opportunities 
arc,  so  only  they  know  where  to  look  for  them,  nowise 
inferior  to  their  leisure. 

Ail  along  that  indented  coast  of  Greece,  both  islands 
and  mainland,  is  wonderful  wildfowling  ground,  and  the 
spring  flights  of  swans,  geese  and  ducks  at  the  end  of  a 
liard  March  like  the  present  cover  acres  of  foreshore  on 
the  Gulf  of  Salonika,  the  Gulf  of  Volos  and  Butrinto 
Bay.  The  Katerina  marshes,  in  full  view  Of  Mount 
Olympus,  are  classic  ground  for  the  fowler,  and  wild 
swans,  both  mute  and  hooper,  brent  and  grey  geese, 
widgeon,  teal,  mallard  and  jiochard  are  to  be  shot  by 
anyone  who  has  thi>  enterprise  to  punt  among  tlie 
creeks  in  early  morning  or  on  moonlight  nights. 

Sonii'  sort  of  dog,  a  retrie\'cr  for  choice,  is  neces.sary 
if  any  considerable  proportion  of  the  bag  is  to  be  picked 
up,  as  the  natives  are,  ]>articularly  before  the  air  is 
warmer,  reluctant  to  go  into  the  water  after  birds.  And 
here,  having  advised  a  civilised  dog,  let  me  add  a  word 
of  caution  touching  the  savage  brutes  belonging  to  the 
native  shepherds.  Shooting  them,  even  in  self-defence, 
is  apt  to  lead  to  more  trouble  than  can  be  squared  by  a 
few  lepta  or  piastres,  and  all  over  the  Balkans  these  sheep- 
dogs are  a  dangerous  nuisance,  and  the  only  thing,  if  the 
stranger  cannot  gi\-e  them  a  wide  berth,  is  to  keep  them 
at  bay  till  tiieir  owners  put  in  an  appearance.  This 
counsel  of  perfection  applies  to  ordinary  times.  What 
relaxation  of  normal  etiquette  war  conditions  may  have 
introduced,  I  know  not.  It  may  even  be  allowable  to 
shoot  these  canine  atrocities  without  so  much  as  "  by 
your  leave."  and  without  hearing  any  more  of  the  matter. 
If  so,  shoot  them,  say  I  ;  for  there  are  plenty  more,  and 
they  are  nasty  brutes,  capable  of  giving  a  dirty  and 
poisonous  bite  if  they  get  home. 

Greece's  Game  Laws 

This  possible,  and  e\en  probable,  modification  of 
restrictions  under  existing  conditions  also  applies  to  the 
game  laws  ordinarily  in  force.  When  I  was  last  in  (irecce, 
these  were  strict  (though  systematically  disregarded  by 
the  natives)  and  not  always  intelligible.  Thus  the  Direc- 
tor of  Police  of  Athens  and  the  Piraeus  prescribed  two 
regulations  for  Attica,  according  to  which  partridges 
were  protected  from  February  i6th  to  July  20th,  and 
other  game  (meaning  chiefly  hares)  from  March  15th  to 
the  same  date.  There  was  no  licence  for  either  shooting 
or  fishing,  b>it  in  such  territory  (e.g.,  Epirus,  etc.)  whicli 
was  then  (but  is  not,  nor  ever  again  shall  be)  Turkish,  all 
manner  of  difficulties  were  put  in  the  sportsman's  way, 
and  these  could  be  smoothed  only  by  an  incessant  flow 
of  baksheesh,  the  mainspring  of  the  Turkish  official's 
energy  and  vitality. 

The  sure  finds  for  wildfowl  are  the  smaller  bays  and 
marshes,  particularly  those  at  Port  Surpi,  beyond  Volos, 
and  the  classic  shore  of  Marathon.  There  is  also  a  great 
swamp  near  Na^'arino  and  another  not  far  from  the 
iieadland  of  Papas,  in  both  of  which  wild  duck  and  snipe, 
with  a  sprinkling  of  woodcock,  used  to  be  plentiful. 

Quail  give  an  excellent  shooting  on  the  spring  migra- 
tion, and  several  of  the  headlands  round  Salonika  lie 
in  their  line  of  flight,  while  Port  Lero,  in  Mitylene,  is  the 
best  quail  ground  of  all.  Inrst  come  the  landrails,  the 
avant-coiircurs  of  the  quail  battalions,  and  once  these 
are  seen,  or  more  probably  heard,  the  quail  will  not  be 
long  coming.  It  is  true  that  these  little  birds  are  netted 
in  thousands  on  that  coast,  but  there  are  plenty  for  the 
guns  as  well,  and,  with  a  good  dog  to  work  the  birds, 
a  day's  quail-shooting  early  in  April  is  by  no  means  bad 
fun.  There  may  be  a  few  sand-grouse  also,  and  these 
are  best  sought  in  early  morning  near  the  waterholes  and 
brooks  where  they  drink.  The  sand-grouse  does  not  give 
a  particularly  difficult  shot,  but  where  these  birds  come 


over  singly,  and  not  in  packs,  they  afford  pretty  practice 
and  are  excellent  eating.  For  hares  and  rabbits,  the 
islands  are  better  ground  than  the  mainland,  and  the 
noi'thern  district  of  Andros  is  a  little  better  than  the 
rest. 

Big  Game 

Of  big  game,  little  remains  in  this  much-poached 
land.  There  arc  still,  for  aught  I  know  to  the  contrary, 
a  few  ibex  on  the  rocky  islet  of  Anti-Milos,  but  even  if 
jiermission  be  given  to  shoot  them  they  are  somewhat 
inaccessible,  and  the  visitor  to  the  island  runs  the  risk 
of  being  weather-bound  during  a  spell  of  heavy  seas,  a 
consideration  to  anyone  on  short  leave.  There  are  also  a 
few  wild  boar  near  Panagia,  in  Epirus,  but  they  have 
been  so  persecuted  by  the  natives  that  they  hide  all  day 
in  the  dense  reed-beds  and  have  to  be  "  dug  out  "  on 
moonlight  nights  with  tiie  help  of  native  beaters.  As 
some  of  these  are  sure  to  tinn  out  armed  with  match- 
locks, the  ])erformance  entails  almost  as  much  danger  as 
withstanding  the  much-advertised  frontal  attack  on 
Salonika,  with  none  of  the  glory. 

We  are  at  that  turn  of  the  year  in  which  the  rod 
replaces  the  gun,  and  the  fly-fisherman  at  Salonika  finds 
himself  on  holy  ground,  for  the  first  artificial  fly  ever 
described  was  used  in  a  little  stream  flowing  close  to  that 
city,  the  Thessalonica  of  St.  Paul.  It  is  to  Aelian,  a 
writer  of  the  3rd  century,  that  we  are  indebted  for  this 
almost  prehistoric  account  of  the  fly  "  Hippiuiis,"  which 
was  dressed  with  scarlet  wool  and  cock's  feathers  for 
catching  iish  in  the  river  Astraeus,  midway  between 
Thessalonica  and  Berea.  When  last  at  Salonika,  I  tried 
hard  to  learn  more  of  the  river  and  its  fish,  but  without 
success  ;  and  it  remains  for  some  keen  fisherman,  French 
or  British,  to  seek  it  out  and  throw  a  modern  dry  fly  over 
its  fish,  which  I  strongly  suspect  to  be  sea-trout;  Yet 
there  are  also  trout,  much  poached  but  not  wholly  im- 
responsive,  in  most  of  the  small  streams  of  Epirus ;  and 
in  the  Bay  of  Phalerum  the  sea  angler  with  fine  tackle, 
and  a  bag  of  live  shrimps  (carides)  for  bait,  may  catch 
bass  and  grey  mullet. 

If  the  whole  truth  must  be  told,  Salonika  is  not 
the  best  headquarters  for  either  shooting  or  fishing  in  that 
region,  but,  on  the  assumption  that  a  few  days'  leave 
should,  in  view  of  the  leisurely  enemy  advance,  not  be 
difficult  to  get,  I  add  a  few  concluding  words  on  some 
other  spots  in  the  Balkan  States  in  which,  as  either  friends 
or  enemies,  our  Mediterranean  forces  are  ere  long  likely 
to  find  themselves. 

Quail  and  Woodcock 

Round  Nish  and  Kruschevatx  there  is  wonderful 
spring  quail-shooting,  and  in  parts  of  Montenegro  (where, 
as  Princess  Elena  of  Montenegro,  the  Queen  of  Italv 
enjoyed  famous  sport  in  her  girlhood)  tiiere  is  to  be  founci 
some  of  the  finest  woodcock  groimd  in  Europe.  Close  to 
Sofia  —and  who  can  say  how  soon  the  Anglo-French  army 
of  occupation  may  not  find  itself  in  that  capital  ?  —there 
are  woodcock,  quail,  duck  and  other  game,  and  the  Tuni 
Sviet  marshes,  though  risky  without  a  native  guide, 
would  give  any  sportsman  the  snipe-shooting  of  his  life. 
Capercailzie,  which  arc  shot  with  a  small-bore  rifle  in 
the  spring  tok,  each  bird  being  stalked  and  shot  as  it 
sits  in  the  tree  tops,  are  plentiful  in  the  woods  round 
Samakov  and  Petrokhan,  and  the  big  game  of  Bulgaria 
include  red  deer,  small  bear  and  wild  boar.  Most  of  the 
mountain  streams  of  that  region  are  well  stocked  with 
small  trout,  and  there  are  big  lake-trout  (which  take  only 
spoon  or  a  Devon)  in  Scutari,  Ochrida  and  other  meres! 

Koumania,  a  State  which  a  turn  of  the  wheel  may 
any  day  put  on  our  visiting  list,  affords  immense  stags, 
wolf,  bear,  lynx,  boar,  roedeer,  bustards,  great  and 
lesser,  and  wildfowl,  with  trout,  salmon  and  coarse  fish 
in  the  rivers  of  the  Danubian  system.  There  is  no 
shooting  licence  in  Roumania,  but  private  leave  is  neces- 
sary, and  a  fishing  permit  must  be  obtained  from  the 
Minister  of  Domains. 


i6 


LAND      &      WATER 


March  30,  1916 


The    Old    Western    Seaports 


By     Arthur     L.     Salmon 


CENTURIES  sinoc,  when  tho  call  of  the  country 
came,  the  old  western  ports  heard  it  and  replied 
manfully.  It  was  usually  a  different  foe  then  to 
be  faced— it  was  "that  sweet  enemy,  France,"  a? 
Sir  I'liilip  Sidney  styled  her,  or  it  was  the  pride  and  power 
of  Spain  in  her  Rnatness.  I'rom  the  creeks  of  Devon 
and  Cornwall  the  boats  sailed  forth  Kallantlv,  y)artly 
for  sheer  love  of  lighting,  but  still  more  emphatically  to 
strike  a  blow  for  the  motherland.  The  old  ports  might 
quarrel  among  themselves  as  neighbours  and  rivals  will  -  - 
there  might  be  feud  between  West-countrymen  and  the 
stout  seamen  of  the  Cinque  Ports — Cornishnun  and 
Devonians  might  nurse  their  endless  grievances  and 
jealousies  ;  but  all  were  one  when  there  was  an  enemy 
to  be  faced  and  dauntless  deeds  to  be  done. 

At  times  these  proud  and  high-stomached  townships 
wouUl  even  dare  to  wage  war  on  their  own  accounts, 
independent  of  national  claims.  "I  am  not  at  war 
with  my  brother  of  France,"  said  one  of  the  Edwards  to 
the  men  of  Fowey,  on  an  occasion  when  the  Cornish 
folk  ignored  a  treaty  of  peace  ;  but  "  tvc  are  at  war  with 
F'rance  "  rephed  tlic  daring  Fowey  men.  That  was  the 
spirit  that  fostered  the  British  Navy,  which  has  once  again 
saved  our  land  from  the  most  imminent  of  perils  ;  a 
Navy  born  in  pirac  /,  it  may  be,  born  without  sensitive 
conscience  or  imp.?ding  scruples,  but  born  in  great 
hardihood,  high  resolve,  fearlessness  of  wind  and  wave, 
hungry  for  action  and  adventure.  They  are  like  it  now, 
the  men  of  these  nestling  sea-towns  and  almost  land- 
locked riverways  ;  they  give  their  grit  and  backbone  to 
the  navy,  or  they  fight  heroically  in  the  trenches  side  by 
side  with  the  landlubber  who  is  equally  heroic. 

Dreaming  of  the   Past 

But  the  ships  that  now  keep  the  Seven  Seas  come  no 
longer  from  these  old  western  seaports  ;  in  a  naval  sense 
it  is  only  Plymouth,  in  this  corner  of  England,  that 
counts  for  miich.  The  little  ports  that  were  once  rela- 
tively so  great,  can  now  only  lie  and  dream  ;  their  sons 
have"  heard  the  call,  but  they  themselves  are  in  a  back- 
water. The  elder  men  go  fishing,  the  wives  and  mothers 
stay  with  a  burden  of  fear  at  their  hearts  ;  the  children 
laugh  and  play  on  the  old  quaysides  or  in  the  precipitous 
narrow  streets,  not  realising  that,  far  off,  the  world's 
history  is  being  shaped  by  their  fathers  and  brothers. 

Very  different  from  this  was  it  in  days  when  the 
island's  history  was  shaped  by  the  wooden  vessels  that 
shook  their  wings  like  seabirds  in  flight  from  these 
sheltering  nests.  They  flew  in  flocks  to  the  siege  of 
Calais,  as  they  flew  later  to  confront  the  Armada  ;    and 

,  if  at  times  their  exploits  were  simply  in  the  nature  of 
privateering,  there  were  other  times  when  all  the  spirit 
of  national  enterprise  lay  beneath  their  doings.  It  was 
not  often  that  governments  sought  to  interfere  with  their 
exploits  ;  rulers  knew  too  well  the  value  of  these  gallant 
seamen  and  their  sturdy  ever-ready  ships,  that  would 
seem  scarcely  better  than  Ashing  boats  to-day. 

In  the  early  days  of  Elizabeth,  when  the  country 
was  nominally  at  peace  with  both  France  and  Spain,  we 
read  that  it  suited  the  government  that  the  fangs  of 
British  sea-craft  should  be  felt.  FVoude  tells  us  that 
"  hints  were  given  through  the  western  counties  that 
privateers  who  would  adventure  at  their  own  cost  would 
not  be  closely  enquired  after  ;  and  thirty  piratical  vessels, 
heavily  manned,  were  swiftly  hovering  about  the  Channel." 
There  was  a  belief  in  those  days,  he  adds,  that  the  sea  and 
all  that  was  on  it  was  English  patrimony.  In  such  tone 
and  temper  was  the  naval  genius  of  Britain  fostered  ; 
a  rough  school,  but  it  produced  the  world's  finest  sailors, 
and  it  lead  to  such  heroism  as  that  which  thrills  us  when 
we  read  the  story  of  the  "  Revenge,"   or  of  that  Topsham 

'  man  who,  with  "a  single  boy  to  help  him,  delivered  his 
vessel  from  a  French  prize-crew  of  seven  men,  bringing 
her  back  safely  to  the  little  port,  now  so  somnolescent,  on 
the  eastern  bank  of  the  Exe. 

The  records  of  these  quiet  ports,  now  chiefly  given 
over  to  the  tourist,  are  full  of  such  tales— tales  that  rouse 


us  as  the  old  ballad  roused  Sidney;  they  are  full, of 
roughness,  sometimes  brutality,  yet,  thank  (iod,  not  often 
stained  with  treachery  or  wanton  cruelty,  and  scarcely 
ever  with  cowardice.  It  may  seem  that  the  poetry  of 
sea-lighting  has  gone,  now  that  steam  and  iron  have  stolen 
its  romance  as  they  have  certainly  marred  its  picturesque 
beauty;  yet  we  know  that  the  same  spirit  is  there, 
sobered  and  softened  by  a  fuller  conception  of  right,  a 
more  cultivated  ideal,  a  higher,  purer  morality.  The 
men  are  the  same,  loyal,  bra\e,  fearless  ;.and  so  long  as 
the  men  are  right  there  can  be  little  ultimate  danger  for 
the  nation.  And  to  all  who  love  England,  to  all  who 
re\'ere  the  Navy  which  secures  our  homes,  our  bread,  and 
our  national  honour,  these  old  seaports  must  be  holy 
places,  the  cradles  of  our  liberty  and  our  well-being. 

As  we  linger  about  them  we  see  more  than  the  old 
stone  quays,  we  hear  more  than  the  cry  of  gulls.  We 
would  fain  keep  them  as  they  are,  rugged,  simple,  un- 
pretentious, speaking  of  old  Elizabethan  days  and  earlier  ; 
telling  us  of  a  past  from  which  this  present  has  sprung  — 
a  past  that  has  given  us  power  to-day  to  do  something 
more  than  mere  talking  for  the  ideals  we  cherish  so 
dearly.  Other  ports  may  he  bearing  the  burden  now  — 
there  is  no  room  here  for  the  building  or  launching  of 
huge  Dreadnoughts  or  swift  cruisers  ;  but  these  little 
towns  did  their  part  well  in  the  day  of  smaller  things, 
when  hearts  were  as  big  though  ships  were  tiny. 

We  do  not  now  claim  all  that  is  on  the  water  as  our 
patrimony,  but  we  do  claim  that  all  upon  the  high  se:  s 
should  go  in  safety,  that  the  ocean  highroads  shall  be 
kept  free  from  the  outrages  of  human  wrong-doing,  and 
that  the  days  of  the  pirate  shall  cease  for  ever. 


Three  Good  Novels 

One  must  be  in  the  right  mood  to  appreciate  ^fy  Lady 
of  the  Moor,  Mr.  John  Oxenham's  latest  novel.  (Metlnicn  and 
Co.  6s.).  It  is  the  story  of  an  attempted  murderer,  a  convict, 
who  was  also  a  great  man,  since  he  gained  the  strength  to 
give  the  man  whom  he  hated  most  to  the  woman  who,  for 
him,  was  next  to  divinity,  i  t  is  the  story  of  the  great  sacrifice, 
with  no  chorus  of  minor  characters  to  divert  the  mind  from 
the  main  issue,  no  accompaniment  to  the  melody  but  the  sense 
of  Dartmoor  and  its  strong  influence.  The  book  is  clean  and 
fresh  as  the  moorland  itself,  and  its  utter  sincerity,  redeeming 
it  from  any  suspicion  of  sentimentality,  is  impressive.  It  is 
work  well  in  keeping  with  the  times,  and  given  the  mood — 
one  of  the  best  humanity  knows— it  is  good  to  read. 

Twos  and  Threes,  by  G.  B.  Stern,  (Nisbet  and  Co.  6s.), 
is  the  story  of  Stuart  "Heron,  an  extremely  modern  young 
man  with  a  theory  to  the  effect  that  renunciation  is  the  highest 
good,  and  of  Pepita — commonly  called  Peter — Kyndersley, 
whom,  by  reason  of  his  theory.  Heron  made  suffer.  It  is, 
incidentally,  the  story  of  several  other  people,  including 
Sebastian  Levi,  who  bungled  Heron's  theory  through  lack 
of  the' fineness  with  which  Heron,  for  all  his  selfishness, 
retains  the  reader's  sympathy.  The  book  is  brilliantly 
epigrammatic,  and  is  a  fine  and  forceful  piece  of  work,  in  spite  of 
the  sense  of  unreality  that  characterises  its  earlier  chapters. 
Here  are  no  cant  phrases,  no  liackneyed  scenes,  but  so  much 
of  new  tliought  and  creation  that  the  work  is  challenging 
and  alive,  while  tlie  author's  detachment  is  of  a  quality  that 
rouses  interest.  Both  Stuart  Heron  and  Peter  arc  thoroughlv 
original  characters,  and  this  book  should  place  its  authoi 
among  the  novelists  who  count. 

The  .\merican  reading  public  gave  a  very  high  place  tc 
Sanpriel,  by  Alvilde  Prydz  (George  Allen  and  Unwin,  6s.),  but 
as  far  as  the  English  public  is  concerned  the  book  is  not  likely 
to  fire  tlie  Thames.  It  is  a  delicately-told  story  of  a  woman's 
uniiappiness,  and  in  the  end  her  happiness  ;  it  is  an  open-air 
book,  and  its  chief  characters  are  dominated  by  Flyen,  a 
mountain-bounded  moor  that  is  characteristic  of  Norway 
at  its  best.  Certainly  the  descriptions  of  the  moorland  and 
its  influence,  are  sympathetically  given,  but,  perhaps  by 
.  reason  of  the  inadequacy  of  tlie  translation,  the  book  suffers 
from  an  excess  of  sentimentality.  It  is  a  simple,  pretty 
little  story,  not  lacking  in  quaintly  humorous  passages. 


March  30,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


17 


Towards   a  Better   Banking   System 

By  Arthur  Kitson 


IN  the  course  of  these  articles  on  Finance,  I  have 
endeavoured  to  point  out  the  evils  of  our  present 
Banking  System  and  their  causes.  These  evils 
may  be  briefly  summarised  as  follows  : 
(i)  There  is  an  insufficiency  and  an  uncertainty  of 
credit  facilities,  both  as  to  time  and  amount,  for  the 
proper  and  continuous  development  of  our  industries. 

(2)  Owing  to  its  unnecessarj'  exposure  to  foreign 
influences,  our  credit  market  is  extremely  sensitive  and 
unrehable,  which  results  in  our  being  aiSicted  with  the 
most  variable  bank  rate  in  the  world. 

(3)  Our  bank  credit  is  in  constant  danger  of  a  collapse 
due  to  the  export  of  gold — which  has  been  made  the  legal 
basis  of  credit.  And  the  collapse  of  credit  involves  the 
annihilation  of  trade. 

(4)  British  bank  credit  'has  become  practically  a 
monopoly  of  the  London  Joint  Stock  Banks  due  to  their 
control  of  the  Clearing  House.  This  monopoly  gives 
bank  directors  a  power  and  influence  over  British  in- 
dustries which  they  ought  not  to  possess.  With  the 
constant  amalgamation  of  our  banks,  this  power  is 
falling  into  the  grasp  of  fewer  and  fewer  hands. 

(5)  The  rate  charged  for  loans  is  unnecessarily  high. 

Antiqualed  Banking  Laws 

I  have  shewn  that  these  evils  arc  the  natural  result 
of  our  antiquated  c-urrency  and  banking  laws  which  ha\c 
imposed  unreasonable  restrictions,  compelling  the  banks 
to  base  all  their  transactions  on  gold.  Where  the  bankers 
liave  been  to  blame  is,  first,  in  resisting  every  proposal 
for  altering  and  improving  the  present  system,  and 
secondly,  in  supporting  foreign  loans,  often  in  disregard 
of  the  needs  of  Britisli  traders,  whose  interests  have  been 
frequently  sacrificed  on  behalf  of  the  foreign  trade 
competitor.  No  doubt  they -have  had  good  reasons  for 
pursuing  such  a  policy.  Consequently  when  the  foreigner 
offers  7  per  cent,  or  8  per  cent,  for  money  where  the  British 
trader  can  only  offer  4  per  cent  or  5  per  cent.,  they  are 
apt  to  close  with  the  foreigner.  But  think  of  the  stupidity 
and  shortsightedness  of  British  statesmanship  that  enacts 
laws  making  the  nation's  trade  and  industries  subject  to 
ike  cupidity  or  caprice  of  the  professional  credit  dealers ! 
And  when  at  the  end  of  each  year  the  directors  of  our 
banks  arc  able  to  pay  their  fortunate  shareholders  from 
12  per  cent,  to  22  per  cent  dividends,  they  are  compelled 
to  agree  with  Pippa  that  "  God's  in  his  Heaven,  and  all's 
right  with  the  world.'" 

Now  although  we  have  still  several  obstructions  to 
remove  before  the  ground  is  cleared  for  a  better  system — 
one  remaining  obstruction  being  the  "  gold  standai'd  " 
which  is  the  most  difficult  of  all — it  is  possible  to  give  the 
reader  a  sketch  of  one  or  more  of  sevei-al  better  financial 
systems  than  our  present  one.  Any  proposed  substitutes 
for  the  present  system  must  be  free  from  the  evils 
enumerated. 

An  industrial  banking  system  built  on  sound 
principles  should  (i)  afford  ample  credit  facilities  for 
every  member  of  the  commercial  and  industrial  classes 
for  carrying  on  to  the  extent  of  liis  capital  :  (2)  grant 
loans  for  a  sufficient  time  to  enable  each  one  properly  to 
develop  his  business  under  normal  conditions  and 
repay  the  loan  out  of  his  annual  revenue  :  (3)  furnisli 
loans  on  all  forms  of  productive  capital  without  dis- 
crimination, but  within  a  predetermined  margin  of 
safety  :  (4)  fix  the  charge  for  the  loan  on  the  basis  of 
cost  of  service  plus  insurance  against  bad  debts. 

Just  here  let  me  point  out  that  in  spite  of  all  our 
improvements  in  machinery,  by  which  the  supplies  of 
commodities  of  every  description  have  been  enormously 
increased  and  cheapened,  in  spite  of  the  vast  increase  in 
the  production  of  the  precious  metals  as  well  as  the 
marvellous  economies  in  tlieir  use  for  legal  tender  pur- 
poses through  the  general  introduction  of  the  inexpensive 
cheque  system,  the  price  of  the  loan — the  rate  of  interest 
— has  not  been  permanently  reduced  a  fraction  of  one 
per  cent,  since  the  enactment  of  the  Bank  Charter  Act. 

Now  we  have  already  seen  from  Sir  Edward  Holden's 
illustration  (see  article  March  2nd)  whv  it  is  impossible 


under  our  pi-esent  laws  for  the  banks  to  furnish  loans^to 
all  applicants  owning  capital.  Bank  loans  are  limited  by 
the  amount  of  the  gold  reserves — not  by  the  amount  of 
securities  offered.  And  the  constant  variations  in  -the 
volume  of  these  reserves  due  to  the  imports  and  exports 
of  gold,  create  similar  variations  in  the  amount  of  legal 
tender  with  which  credit  is  made  redeemable. 

Needs  of  Trade 

The  establishment  of  a  banking  system  capable"  of 
supplying  the  needs  of  trade  fully  and  satisfactorily',  as 
outlined,  is  therefore  impossible  tinder  our  present  laivs. 
If  our  trade  could  be  cut  down  to  a  fraction  of  what  it 
now  is,  so  that  the  amount  of  credit  required  was  com- 
mensurable witli  the  gold  and  cash  reserves  held  by  the 
banks,  we  should  then  have  a  condition  which  no  doubt 
would  have  been  regarded  as  ideal — by  Sir  Robert  Peel- 
where  every  pound  of  bank  credit  and  every  legal-tender 
note,  was  redeemable  in  gold  on  demand.  Whilst  this 
would  provide  no  doubt  for  the  quality  of  the  credit,  it 
makes  no  provision  for  the  wece^tSAry  quantity .  In  tliis 
respect  money  and  credit  are  like  food,  clothing  and 
necessities.  It  is  sometimes  necessary  to  sacrifice  quality 
for  quantity.  A  thing  may  be  too  good,  too  expensive 
for  practical  needs.  We  cannot  all  afford  the  luxury  of 
brioche,  nor  can  we  supply  silks  and  sealskins  for  our 
entire  population,  and  yet  we  must  all  eat  and  wear 
clothing. 

On  what  basis  then  should  bank  credit  be  issued  ? 
If  gold  is  so  expensive,  so  unreliable  and  so  inadequate;, 
with  what  must  it  be  replaced  ?  The  answer  is  with  that 
which  has  already  replaced  it  in  a  large  measure  since 
the  War  started,  and  which  invariably  takes  its  place 
in  all  serious  national  crises,  viz.  :  the  Nation'al  Credit. 
To-day  we  are  using  one  pound  and  ten  shilling  currency 
notes,  which  are  legal  tender  for  any  amount.  These 
notes  are  not  based  on  gold,  but  on  the  national  credit. 
Since  they  were  first  issued  they  have  performed  all  tlie 
functions  of  money  with  the  same  facility  as  the  golden 
sovereigns  and  ten  shilUng  pieces  which  disappeared  soon 
after  the  ■«  ar.  They  are  safer  and  more  reliable  than  gold 
coins  since  they  are  not  hkely  to  be  exported.     In  every 


SORTES     SHAKESPEARIAN^, 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE. 


THE    ATTESTED    HUSBAND'S    PLAINT. 

Mosi  accursd  am  I 
To  be  by  oath  enjoined  to  this. 

THE    WINTER'S    TALE,     UL,     iii..    512. 


Mr.    PEMBERTON-BILLING    TO    THE    GERMAN 
AIR-COMMAND. 

And  if  mine  arm  be  heaved  in  the  air 
Thy  gravi  is  digged  already  in  the  earth. 

,2    HENRY    VI.,     IV.,    i.,     54  5. 


AFTER-WAR     POLICY. 

Heat  not  a  furnace  for  your  foe  so  hot 
That  it  do  singe  yourself 

HENRY    VIH.,    I.,     i.,    110-1. 


i8 


L  AND     cS:     W  A  T  E  R 


March  30,  1916 


great  National  crisis  universally,  (lie  Governments  0/  the 
world  Itave  ahtays  fallen  b.ick  on  their  national  credit 
expressed  in  the  form  of  paper  vwney.  Neither  i;vld 
nor  silver  bullets  have  ever  proved  so  effective  as  paper 
bullets.  Surely  if  a  financial  system  is  sirfficiently  strong 
to  weather  a  great  crisis  such  as  the  United  States  went 
through  in  her  Civil  vVar,  it  is  good  enough  in  times  of 
peace. 

The  National  Credit 

Now  the  national  credit  is  based  upon  all  the  wealth 
and  all  the  productive  capacity  of  the  inhabitants  of  these 
islands.  It  includes  the  credit  of  all  the  banks.  It  is 
not  based  upon  one  comparatively  insignificant  metal — • 
gold — but  upon  every  commodity  including  gold,  upon 
all  that  is  comprised  within  the  British  Isles  and  its 
wealth  beyond  the  seas.  Moreover  this  crccht  is  not 
the  property  of  any  one  class  or  section  of  the  community. 
It  exists  because  of  the  enterprise  and  labour  of  all 
British  citizens,  past  and  present.  It  is  as  solid  as  anything 
earthly  can  possibly  be  made.  Why  then  should  our 
statesmen  hesitate  to  employ  it  as  the  basis  for  legal 
tender  and  bank  credit  for  the  bcrctit  of  the  entire  nation, 
instead  of  lending  it  as  a  source  of  profit  to  a  small  and 
privileged  class  ?  Above  all,  why  does  the  Government 
dishonour  the  national  credit  by  pawning  it  for  bank 
credit,  which  is  inferior  in  (piality  ?  But  more  of  this 
later.  The  fact  is  that  the  linancial  (juestion  opens  up 
so  many  others,  such  as  taxation,  foreign  trade,  com- 
merical  union  with  the  Dominions,  etc.,  as  often  to 
tempt  one  to  })ursue  this  immense  subject  in  all  of  its 
different  phases. 

I  suggest  therefore  that  the  basis  for  l)ank  credit 
should  be  the  National  credit.  Legal-tender  notes  slujuld 
be  issued  under  proper  regulations  to  the  limit  of  meeting 
the  demands  of  trade.  I  may  add,  in  passing,  that  the 
root  of  all  our  currency  and  banking  troubles  exists  in 
the  popular  superstitution  surrounding  the  so-called 
gold  standard — the  pons  asinorum  of  Finance — which 
covers  one  of  the  greatest  economic  fallacies  ever 
taught. 

Neither  currency  nor  credit  require  any  metallic 
base.  Values  are  ideal  creations — not  concrete  magni- 
tudes— and  can  hi  expressed  only  in  terms  of  the  ideal. 
Now  the  required  financial  conditions  may  be  obtained 
in  several  ways.  They  may  be  attained  (i)  by  a  system 
of  Mutual  Banking,  (2)  by  Free  Competitive  Banking, 
or  (3)  by  a  system  of  National  Banking.  Our  present 
system  is  neither  National,  Competitive  nor  Mutual. 
Like  many  other  of  our  medieval  institutions — the  legal 
profession,  for  example — banking  is  a  highly  protected 
guild  constituting  a  legalised  monopoly. 

An  Astonishing  Feature 

One  of  the  most  astoJiishing  features  of  our  com- 
mercial history  is  the  failure  of  our  commercial  and 
industrial  classes  to  seize  and  control  the  banking  business 
as  a  necessary  branch  of  trade.  The  entire  business  and 
stock-in-trade  of  the  banks  is  furnished  by  the  trading 
classes,  and  instead  of  forming  a  mutual  banking  system 
under  their  own  control  and  operated  for  industrial  needs, 
they  have  allowed  a  professional  class  to  secure  control 
and  run  it  for  their  own  profit,  until  to-day  the  tail  wags 
the  dog,  and  instead  of  our  industries  controlling  credit, 
credit  dealers  dominate  our  industries. 

Mutual  banking  is  a  system  whereby  banking  facilities 
are  furnished  to  all  the  members  of  the  bank  at  a  rate 
sufficient  to  cover  expenses  and  insurance.  Anyone  can 
become!  a  member  who  owns  capital  and  bears  a  good 
H'putation.  Credit  accounts  arc  opened  and  advances 
mack:  after  careful  investigation  of  the  x'aluc  of  the 
securities  and  the  character  of. the  applicant.  The  bank 
orticers  are  elected  by  the  members  annually  and  the 
bank  is  controlled  by  a  committee  similarly  elected. 
The  object  of  mutual  banking  is  to  furnish  cheaj)  banking 
facilities,  not  to  make  profits.  Its  success  naturally 
depends  Upon  the  number  and  importance  of  its  members. 

In  regard  to  legal  cturency.  This  might  bo  obtained 
at  present  by  the  ])ur(liasc  of  Government  bonds,  which 
the  Government  would  exchange  for  their  face  value  in 
legal-tender  notes.  Now  supposing  all  classes  could  be 
induced  to  patronise  such  a  bank.  It  is  evident  that 
very  little  legal  tender  would  be  ro(|uircd.  Long  ago  it 
was  pointed  out  bv  lohn  Stuart  Mill  that  if  cverv  busi- 


ness man  could  be  induced  to  open  his  account  with  one 
central  London  bank,  all  business  beginnfng  and  ending 
in  London  could  be  transacted  without  the  use  of  cash, 
except  that  required  for  wages,  small  payments  and 
purcliases.  All  payments  could  be  made  by  cheque,  and  ' 
the  settlement  of  accounts  would  consist  merely  of  the 
transfer  of  credit  from  one  person's  account  to  that  of 
another.  If  all  the  banks  of  Great  Britain  were  amalga- 
mated, it  would  effect  the  greatest  economy  in  the  use  of 
money  (that  is.  legal  tender)  ever  achieved.  It  is 
knowledge  of  this  fact  that  is  forcing  the  union  of  so 
many  banking  firms,  because  it  reduces  costs,  economises 
cash,  reduces  the  amount  of  gold  reserves  necessary,  and 
increases  bank  profits. 

If  all  the  business  firms  and  members  of  the  trachng 
classes  in  this  country  agreed  to  organise  a  central  Mutual 
Bank,  with  branches  in  every  town,  on  the  lines  suggested, 
they  would  not  only  be  able  to  j)rovide  a  safe  and  satis- 
factory financial  system  for  supporting  the  trade  and 
enterprises  of  Great  Britain,  but  they  would  effect  a 
saving  of  tens  of  millions  of  pounds  annually  !  It  has 
been  estimated  that  under  such  a  system,  credit  could 
bz  supplied  at  the  rate  of  i  per  cent,  per  annum,  after  al- 
lowing for  all  charges,  expenses,  and  insurance  against  losses. 

Free  Competitive  Banking  has  never  really  existed 
in  this  country.  Most  people  believe  that  the  various 
Joint  Stock  Banks  are  fierce  com]>etitors  \sith  each  other. 
And  within  certain  limits,  this  is  true.  But  the  door  is 
dosed  against  the  addition  of  any  new  banking  company 
by  means  of  their  control  of  the  Clearing  House, 

The  Clearing  House 

The  Clearing  House  is  most  vital  to  the  banking  busi- 
ness. It  is  where  the  daily  balarices  due  by  one  bank  to 
anotherare  ascertained  and  settled.  Refusal  by  the  Clearing 
House  authorities  to  clear  the  cheques  of  any  banking 
company  would  put  it  out  of  business.  If,  however,  the 
Clearing  Houses  were  nationalised  and  free  banking  per- 
mitted with  the  right  of  every  bank  to  use  the  Clearing 
Houses,  such  a  system  of  competition  would  undoubtedly 
tend  to  the  evolution  of  a  better  and  cheaper  service 
than  has  ever  yet  been  discovered. 

Naturally  the  Government  would  have  to  enact 
rules  and  restrictions  under  which  banks  could  be  formed 
and  operated.  In  this  case  also,  the  National  Credit 
could  form  the  basis  of  bank  credit  by  the  purchase  of 
Government  bonds  convertible  on  demand  in  legal- 
tender  notes.  Here,  let  me  say  that  at  present  I  am 
dealing  exclusively  with  a  banking  system  suitable  for 
our  home  trade  and  industries.  I  am  aware  that  a  some- 
what different  arrangement  is  necessary  for  carrying  on 
our  foreign  trade.  At  present  the  popular  opinion  seems 
to  be  in  favour  of  the  creation  of  a  National  Banking 
System,  which  could  be  effected  by  the  purchase  by 
the  nation  of  the  Bank  of  Flngland,  together  with  the 
Joint  Stock  Banking  Companies  of  London,  including 
those  in  the  provinces,  Scotland,  Ireland  and  Wales. 
Such  a  scheme  is  quite  feasible,  and  would  prove  a 
paying  investment  for  the  Nation.  It  would  involve  a  smn 
([uite  moderate  in  comparison  with  the  amounts  we  have  re- 
cently become  accustomed  to  in  connection  with  the  war. 
Naturally  the  credit  of  the  nation  could  be  better 
organised  and  supplied  to  the  peoi)le  through  a  properly 
estahlislied  State  Department  than  by  any  other  means, 
provided,  of  course,  that  such  a  Department  was  officered 
by  the  right  men.  In  this,  as  in  all  other  (iovernmental 
Departments,  the  success  of  an  institution  dejiends  on 
the  ability  and  honesty  of  those  who  administer  it. 


Dameslic  Life  in  Kotniania,  liy  Dorothea  Kirke  (Juhu 
Lane,  5s.  net.)  is  a  ratlier  <omn»oiii)iace  account  of  a  governess's 
life  with  a  Kouniani;in  family,  and  cm  lioliday  in  and  about 
Constantinople.  It  contains  a  good  deal  of  inforinati(»n  of  the 
domestic,  jirosaic  order,  which  is  conveyed  in  a  series  of  letters 
that  tliread  together  tlie  details  of  a  slight  romance  affecting 
the  writer  of  the  letters  and  one  other.  The  result  is  an  ex- 
tremely practical  account  of  Roumanian  life. 

Th.'  Platoon  Commander's  Vade  Mccum,  by  Major  H. 
(i.  ]<.  Wakefield  (Hugh  Kees.  is.  t)d.  net)  emphasises  the 
importance  of  moral  as  the  chief  responsibility  in  the  leading 
of  men,  and  details  the  duties  of  the  platoon  commander  in 
billets,  in  the  trenches,  and  in  the  attack  and  defejice  of  a 
position.  The  booklet  is  iutendc-rl  as  a  handy  guide  to  the 
j)latoun  commander,  and  it   fullils  the  purpose  well. 


March  30,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 

CHAYA 

A  Romance  of  the  South   Seas 
By  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoole 


19 


Synopsis  :  Macquart,  an  advenimer  who  has  spent 
most  of  his  life  at  sea,  finds  himself  in  Sydney  on  his  beam 
ends.  He  has  a  wonderful  story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in 
New  Guinea,  and  makes  the  acquaintance  of  Tillman,  a  sporting 
man  about  town,  fond  of  yachting  and  racing,  and  of  Houghton, 
a  well-educated  Englishman  out  of  a  job.  Through  Tillman's 
influence  he  is  introduced  to  a  wealthy  imolbroker , .  Screed,  who, 
having  heard  Macquart's  story  and  examined  his  plans,  which 
agree  with  an  Admiralty  chart,  agrees  to  finance  the  enterprise. 
Screed  purchases  a  yawl,  the  "  Barracuda."  Just  before  they 
leave  Macquart  encounters  an  old  shipmate,  Captain  Hull, 
who  is  fully  acquainted  with  his  villainies.  Hull  gets  in  touch 
with  Screed,'who  engages  him  and  brings  him  aboard  the  yacht 
just  as  they  are  about  to  sail.  By  degrees  Captain  Hull  prac- 
tically assumes  command  of  the  enterprise  through  force  of 
character.  After  adventures  they  arrive  at  New  Guinea  and 
anchor  in  a  lagoon.  Macquart  guides  him  to  the  place  where 
he  declares  the  cache  to  be.  They  dig  through  the  night  but 
find  nothing  and  begin  to  think  he  is  deceiving  them.  Here 
they  make  the  acquaintance  of  a  drunken  Dutchman,  Wiart. 
who  is  in  charge  of  a  rubber  and  camphor  station.  They  catch 
sight  of  a  beautiful  Dyak  girl,  Chaya.  According  to  Macquart's 
story  a  man  named  Lant,  who  had  seized  this  treasure,  sunk  his 
ship  and  murdered  his  crew  leith  the  exception  of  one  man, 
"  Smith."  Lant  then  settled  here,  burie.i  the  treasure,  and  married 
a  Dyak  woman,  chief  of  her  tribe.  Lant  was  murdered  by 
"  Smith,"  whom  Captain  Hull  and  the  rest  make  little  doubt 
was  no  other  than  Macquart.  Chaya,  with  whom  Houghton 
has  fallen  in  love,  is  Lant's  half-caste  daughter. 

Chapter  XVII. 

Saji 

THE  Dyak  village  situated  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
from  the  Papuan  village,  constituted  only  a  miser- 
able remnant  of  what  it  had  once  been.  There 
were  scarcely  forty  members  of  the  tribe  that  ages 
ago  had  come  here  from  Borneo.  Saribas  Dyaks,  sea 
plunderers  and  fishermen  wlio  had  found  the  river  and  fixed 
themselves  here,  well  sheltered  from  pursut  of  enemies  yet 
within  touching  distance  of  the  sea. 

E\en  in  the  days  when  John  Lant  had  come  here  and 
•settled  down,  marrying  the  mother  of  Chaya,  the  tribe  had 
been  in  decadence. 

When  Lant  died  his  wife  had  been  chief  woman  of  the 
tribe.     She  was  still. 

The  mother  of  Chaya  was  a  full-blooded  Saribas  woman, 
with  all  the  instincts,  all  the  pertinacity,  all  the  ferocity,  all 
the  tenacity  of  her  race 

She  was  not  an  olo  woman  in  years,  but  she  was  old  in 
appearance,  with  a  far-seeing  and  fateful  look  in  her  face 
that  was  daunting. 

Her  husband,  whom  she  had  loved,  had  been  murdered. 
The  murderer  had  done  his  work  so  skilfully  that  in  a  civilised 
community  no  suspicion  would  have  been  attached  to  him 
and  no  process  of  law  could  have  been  put  in  operation 
against  him. 

But  the  mother  of  Chaya  knew  that  the  father  of  her 
child  had  been  murdered,  and  though  the  murderer  had 
escaped  her  and  made  good  his  escape,  she  knew  that  he 
would  come  back. 

Even  civilised  people  have  "  feelings  "  that  amount  to 
sure  knowledge.  Chaya' s  mother,  with  an  inherited  instinct 
for  men  and  events  preternaturally  developed,  had  the  sure 
feeling  that  the  murderer  would  return. 

On  an  every-daj^  basis  that  event  might  have  been  pre- 
dicted, for  he  had  gone  without  the  gold  for  which  the  crime 
had  been  committed.  Chaya's  motlier  did  not  know  where 
the  gold  was  buried,  she  only  knew  that  it  was  somewhere 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  river  ;  the  man  would  come  back  to  the 
river,  and  for  fifteen  years  she  had  waited. 

The  fishing  Dyaks  of  the  tribe — there  were  no  pirates 
now — had  always  been  on  the  watch  to  give  her  news  of 
strangers  arriving.  It  was  part  of  their  business  in  life,  and 
liad  turned  into  a  sort  of  rehgious  observance. 

The  Barracuda  had  been  observed  even  before  she  had 
engaged  tlie  reefs,  and  Saji',  one  of  the  youngest  of  the  fisher- 
m:;n,  had  tracked  her  up  to  the  lagoon.  Hiding  his  canoe  he 
had  observed  everything  to  do  with  her  berthing  in  the 
lagoon,  and  then,  when  Macquart  and  his  companions  had 
taken  the  boat  and  come  up  to  the  village,  Saji  had  followed. 


It  was  his  canoe  that  they  had  found  tied  up  to  the  landing 
stage  when  they  came  out  of  Wiart's  house. 

Saji  had  obeyed  not  only  his  orders  and  his  own  natural 
tracking  instincts,  but  the  desire  to  please  the  chief  woman 
of  the  tribe. 

Saji  was  in  love  with  Chaya. 

The  tribe  had  fallen  into  that  condition  which  scarcely 
allows  for  grades  of  rank  ;  Saji  as  one  of  the  best  fishermen 
though  he  had  no  special  rank  or  standing,  was  as  likely  a 
suitor  for  Chaya  as  any  of  the  others.  He  was  eighteen  years 
of  age,  straight  as  a  dart,  well-formed,  and  even  to  a  European 
eye  not  bad-looking,  but  he  was  a  pure-blooded  Saribas,  his 
dress  was  little  more  than  an  apron,  and  in  the  eyes  of  Chaya 
he  did  not  exist  as  a  man. 

The  white  traders  had  shown  her  the  edge  of  civilisation, 
and  her  instincts  inherited  from  John  Lant  raised  her  above 
the  level  of  the  tribe.  To  complete  the  matter,  Saji  had 
let  her  perceive  the  nature  of  his  feelings  f owards  her.  Besides 
being  a  good  fisherman  he  was  a  skilful  metal  worker,  and  he 
had  only  a  month  ago  constructed  a  bangle  of  copper,  beating 
it  out  from  a  copper  rod  with  infinite  pains  and  care  ;  taking 
his  courage  in  one  hand  and  the  bangle  in  the  other,  he  had 
approached  Chaya  with  the  gift — and  she  had  refused  it. 

"  Give  it  to  Maidan,"  she  had  said. 

Maidan  was  one  of  the  tribe  girls,  and  the  least  good- 
looking  of  them. 

Though  disdaining  him  as  a  lover,  Chaya  did  not  show 
any  dislike  for  him  ;  she  allowed  him  to  accompany  her  in 
the  woods,  and  it  was  his  half-naked  form  they  had  glimpsed 
the  day  before  amidst  the  leaves.  He  had  led  her  to  show 
her  the  strangers,  just  as  an  hour  before  he  had  sought  her 
mother  to  tell  of  the  new  arrivals. 

Last  night  when  the  party  were  digging  on  the  spit  of 
river  bank,  Saji  led  the  old  woman  to  inspect  them.  In  the 
full  moonlight,  she  had  seen  the  face  and  form  that  her  eyes 
had  been  aching  to  see  for  fifteen  years. 

Revenge  was  at  last  in  her  grasp,  and  as  they  returned  to 
the  Dyak  village  after  watching  the  fruitless  work  of  the 
diggers,  she  said  to  Saji  : 

"  You  shall  have  Chaya." 

"  Aie,"  whined  Saji  as  he  trotted  beside  her.  They 
were  going  full  speed  down  the  jungle  path  to  the  village  ; 
"  but  she  cares  nought  for  me." 

"  You  shall  have  Chaya  on  the  word  of  her  mother,  and 
the  gift  you  will  bring  her  will  fetch  her  to  your  feet." 

"  What  gift  ?  "  said  Saji. 

"  That  I  will  tell  you  soon.  You  have  each  stranger 
clear  in  your  mind  so  that  you  would  know  each  even  in  the 
dark  ?  "       • 

"  Ay,  I  could  teU  each  by  his  spoor  or  his  smell." 

"  Then  watch  them  all,  but  more  especially  the  one  I 
pointed  out  last — the  others  do  not  count." 

They  spoke  in  the  Saribas  dialect. 

At  the  village  they  parted,  Saji  returning  to  keep  a  watch 
on  the  newcomers  even  as  they  slept. 

That  watch  was  never  relaxed. 

Fortunately  for  Houghton,  he  was  not  the  man  specially 
pointed  out  to  Saji  as  the  man  never  to  be  lost  sight  of. 
Otherwise  his  meeting  with  Chaya  might  have  been  observed 
with  disastrous  consequences  to  him. 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

Soundings 

When  Houghton  got  back  to  the  tent  he  found  Tillman 
waiting  for  him.  Hull  was  down  by  the  boat  attending  to 
some  matter  or  other. 

"  Macquart  is  in  there  in  the  house  with  Wiart,"  said 
Tillman.  "  They  seem  to  have  chummed  up  very  much.  There 
they  are  smoking  cigarettes  and  drinking  gin  and  water." 

"  I  don't  think  Macquart  is  a  man  to  drink  much,"  said 
Houghton. 

"  No,  he's  not,  but  there  he  is  with  that  soaker.  I  wonder 
what  they're  talking  about.  I  went  to  the  door  and  the 
smell  of  the  place  nearly  knocked  me  down.  Wiart  asked  me 
in  but  I  excused  myself — said  I  had  business  to  attend  to." 

"  O,  I  don't  think  there's  anything  dangerous  in  it," 
replied  the  other.  "  Wiart  has  his  business  here  to  look  after 
and  between  that  and  drink,  his  hands  are  pretty  full." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Houghton's  mind  was  so  filled  by 
Chaya  that  he  did  not  want  for  the  moment  to  think  of  any- 
thing else. 


20 


LAND      &      WATER 


March  30,   1916 


Had  he  frightened  or  offended  her  ?  He  could  not  tell, 
but  lie  cursed  himself  for  his  precipitancy  and  stupidity.  He 
went  down  to  the  landing  stage  and  sat  watching  Hull,  who 
had  baled  some  water  into  the  boat  to  prevent  the  seams 
opening,  and  who  was  now  engaged  in  overhauling  some  of  the 
gear.  But  he  did  not  see  Hull.  He  was  looking  at  the  mental 
image  of  Chaya,  listening  to  her  voice. 

One  of  the  fascinating  things  about  her  was  the  manner 
in  which  she  used  gestures  and  pantomime  to  express  her 
meaning.  He  was  beginning  to  understand  the  great  fact 
that  whereas  l.ove  in  many  cases  is  the  child  of  long  acquaint- 
ance, in  others  it  is  born  instantaneously  and  is  the  child  of 
First  Sight.  There  are  natures  that  fly  together  at  lirst 
approach  just  as  the  elements  of  some  chemical  compounds 
Hy  together. 

It  seemed  to  him  that  he  had  been  wanting  Chaya  all  his 
life,  and  that  she  had  been  waiting  for  him  in  these  mysterious 
forests  of  which  he  had  never  dreamed,  of  whose  e.xistence  he 
had  been  absolutely  ignorant. 

He  was  deeply  disturbed,  not  really  because  of  the  idea 
that  he  might  have  given  her  offence,  for  some  instinct  told 
him  this  was  not  so,  but  because  of  the  general  situation. 

First  there  was  his  own  poverty.  How,  even  if  she  loved 
him,  could  he  ever  take  Chaya  away  from  here  ?  He  liad  no 
trade,  no  resources,  the  expedition  seemed  to  be  turning  out 
the  wildest  of  wild  goose  chases.  How,  evcB  supposing  that 
he  could  get  away  with  her,  could  he  ever  take  her  to  Sydney 
beggared  as  he  was  in  the  goods  of  the  world  ?  To  remain 
here  with  her  was  an  impossible  thought.  To  live  here, 
even  with  Chaya,  would  not  be  to  live  but  to  die  to  the  world 

The  place  lay  heavy  on  his  soul,  filled  him  with  a  vague 
terror ;  the  languorous,  heat-laden  atmosphere,  the  very 
forms  of  the  trees,  the  sluggish,  oily-flowing  river,  the  very 
superabundance  of  life  and  of  life  in  its  most  terrible  forms, 
all  these  had  created  around  him  that  atmcsphere  of  night- 
mare that  the  tropics  can  alone  create. 

Then  even  supposing  that  the  cache  really  existed,  there 
was  Macquart  and  his  threatened  treachery. 

Macquart  was  a  terrible  man.  He  was  beginning  to 
recognise  that  fact  even  more  fully  now.  A  man  who  worked 
always  for  some  hidden  purpose  and  always  underground. 
A  wolf  that  was  yet  a  mole.  It  is  only  given  to  human  nature 
to  incorporate  in  itself  the  properties  of  div  erse  animal  natures, 
and  sometimes  this  gift  produces  most  strange  monstrosities. 
He  remembered  that  morning  of  his  first  meeting  with 
Macquart  in  the  Dam  tin  of  Sydney  ;  even  at  that  first  meet- 
ing something  predatory  in  the  make-up  of  his  new  acquain- 
tance had  struck  him.  Since  then,  and  by  slow  degrees  the 
nature  of  the  man  had  been  half-shewing  itself,  and  the  evi- 
dence against  him  accumulating.  Houghton  had  been  keen 
enough  about  the  object  of  the  expedition  all  through,  but 
now  he  was  doubly  keen  ;  it  was  not  only  the  gold  that  was  at 
Stake,  but  Chaya.  And  he  could  do  nothing  but  wait,  nothing 
could  be  done  to  hurry  matters. 

Houghton's  keen  psychological  sense  had  given  him 
some  glimpse  of  the  extraordinary  mentality  oi  the  man 
upon  whom  everything  depended.  He  guessed  in  Macquart 
some  of  those  qualities  that  go  to  form  the  foundation  of 
madness.  Not  that  Macquart  was  mad  in  the  least,  never 
was  there  a  man  more  coldly  sane,  but  it  seemed  evident 
to  Houghton  that  here  was  a  man  who  would  destroy  every- 
thing, even  his  own  chance  of  success,  rather  than  allow 
success  to  a  man  he  hated. 

And  Macquart  hated  Hull  with  an  ungodly  hatred.  To 
Houghton,  now,  it  seemed  clearly  demonstrated  that  Mac- 
quart's  original  plan  was  to  bring  the  Barracuda  into  the 
lagoon,  where  without  doubt  the  treasure  was  cached,  and  not 
to  come  up  here  to  the  village  at  all.  Macquart  had  meant  to 
run  straight,  at  least,  till  the  gold  was  on  board  the  Barracuda  ; 
after  that,  who  knows  what  he  might  have  done,  but  he  would 
at  least  have  used  his  companions  for  the  purpose  of  shipping 
the  treasure. 

The  advent  of  Hull  changed  all  this,  and  the  way  in 
which  Hull  had  managed  to  arm  himself  and  his  companions 
whilst  disarming  Macquart. 

Finding  his  plans  destroyed  and  his  enemy  on  top  of  him, 
Macquart  had  evolved  new  plans  which  were  now  in  progress. 

What  were  these  plans  ? 

It  was  impossible  as  yet  to  predict.  It  was  only  possible 
to  say  that  to  gain  time  for  some  purpose,  "Macquart  would 
keep  them  digging  every  night  at  the  place  where  there  was 
notiiing  to  be  found. 

The  hopeful  part  of  the  situation  was  embraced  by  the 
fact  that  he  knew  nothing  of  their  suspicions,  and  the  only 
plan  of  campaign  for  the  present  was  to  give  him  a  free  rein. 

Hull  presently  relinquished  his  work  on  the  boat  and 
came  up  and  sat  down  beside  Houghton,  complaining  of  the 
heat. 

"  Where's  Mac  ?  "  said  he. 


"  He's  in  there  in  the  house  smoking  and  talking  to 
Wiart,"  replied  Houghton. 

The  Captain  lit  a  pipe. 

"  I  don't  know  what's  in  me  when  I'm  near  that  swab," 
said  he.  "  I  always  want  to  lay  him  out.  I  do  so.  He 
raises  my  gizzard.  Now  mind  you,  lie  played  me  a  low  down, 
dirty  trick  that  time  fower  years  ago.  but  it's  not  that  makes 
me  want  to  flatten  his  head  in  witii  a  shovel,  it's  himsoif. 
My  Gawd,  sometimes  I  feel  I  could  let  up  on  the  whole  of  this 
show  just  for  the  sake  of  givin'  that  mud  turkle  a  rap  on  the 
shell  that'd  finish  him.     Funny,  ain't  it  ?  " 

"01  don't  know,"  replied  Houghton.  "  I  feel  pretty 
much  as  you  feel,  sometimes,  but  he's  the  goose  that  lays  the 
golden  egg  and  it's  better  not  to  think  of  him." 

"  That's  what  I  can't  help,"  said  the  Captain.  "  I 
believe  the  chap's  bamboozling  us." 

"  Oh,  nonsense,"  said  Houghton,  alarmed  at  the  idea  that 
Hull  was  sniffing  at  the  truth  and  at  the  idea  of  tlic  possible 
consequences.  "  \\'hy  should  he  let  us  down  over  the  busf- 
ness  ?  He  has  just  as  big  a  stake  in  it  as  we  have,  and  he's 
no  use  without  us." 

"  I  don't  know  why  he  should,"  replied  the  other,  "  but 
them's  my  feelings.  We  ought  to  have  struck  the  stuff  last 
night,  we  sure  ought  to  if  it's  there.  If  we  don't  strike  the 
stuff,  well,  all  I've  to  say  is  it's  Mac  that'll  be  struck  and 
struck  hard.     You'll  see." 

"  Look  here,"  said  Houghton,  "  promise  me  one  thing; 
promise  me  to  say  nothing  to  him  ever  that  will  make  him 
think  you  suspect  him  without  first  consulting  with  me  and 
Tillman.  This  is  a  serious  matter.  Captain,  and  supposing 
for  a  moment  he  is  bamboozling  us  —which  doesn't  seem 
probable — we  must  act  accordingly  and  all  together  to  find  out 
his  plans." 

"  O,  I  won't  say  anything,"  replied  the  other,  'or  111 
have  a  talk  with  you  two  before  I  do.  You  tell  me  one  thing. 
If  the  stuff  was  cached  on  that  bit  of  bank,  the  ship  it  was 
took  from,  if  they  sank  her,  would  be  layin'  close  by.  The 
river  is  only  three  fathom  deep  off  the  stage — I've  took 
soundings— I  don't  believe  it's  much  deeper  up  there,  so 
they'd  have  sunk  her  in  only  eighteen  foot  of  water.  Why, 
she'd  draw  most  that." 

"  She  would,"  replied  Houghton. 

"  Let's  "go  and  take  soundings  off  the  bank  up  there," 
said  the  Cajitain.  "  It'll  be  something  to  do."  He  went  to 
the  boat  and  fetched  the  sounding  lead,  and  they  left  the  stage 
and  walked  along  the  river  bank  up  stream  till  they  reached 
the  spot. 

"The  Captain  looked  at  their  excavation  work  of  last  night. 

"  It's  lonesome  enough  to  work  by  day  up  here  without 
nobody  knowing,"  he  said,  "  only  maybe  that  blighter  of  a 
Wiart  might  see  us  goin'  and  suspect.  I  reckon  perliaps 
Mac's  right — unless  he's  foolin'  us." 

He  made  a  cast  with  the  lead  from  the  bank  edge  at  the 
base  of  the  spit ;  it  showed  two  and  a  half  fathoms  or  there- 
abouts, then  he  went  to  the  apex  of  the  spit.  The  depth  here 
was  nothing,  till  one  got  well  away  from  the  bank. 

"  I'd  have  to  bring  the  boat  up  to  get  correct  soundin's," 
said  Hull,  "  but  what  we've  got  will  do.  You  see  for  yourself. 
There  ain't  anywhere  just  here  a  vessel  could  be  moored  to 
and  sunk  at  her  moorin's,  and  that  was  the  way  of  it,  accordin' 
to  Mac." 

"  You're  right,"  said  Houghton.  "  The  only  thing  one 
can  suppose  is  that  the  river  has  altered  in  the  course  of  fifteen 
years." 

"  /  don't  see  what's  to  alter  it,"  said  the  Captain, 
looking  at  the  river.  "  No,  sir,  unless  there's  some  deep 
pool  near  here  we  don't  know  nothing  of,  that  ship  was  never 
moored  to  no  bank  of  this  river." 

It  seemed  astounding  to  Houghton  that  Hull  should 
not  have  thought  of  the  lagoon  and  should  not  have  con- 
nected the  idea  of  the  old  burnt  ship  in  the  lagoon  with  the 
Terschelling,  but  a  moment's  reflection  told  him  that  Hull  had 
not  seen  the  burnt  ship  as  they  saw  it.  and  also  reminded  him 
of  the  fact  that  the  human  intellect  works  in  very  narrow 
circuits.  Hull's  mind  was  held  by  Macquart's  story  to  the 
village  and  this  bit  of  bank  ;  he  was  utterly  lacking  in  imagina- 
tion and  the  lagoon  away  down  the  river  never  once  occurred 
to  him  as  the  "  deep  pool  "  where  the  bones  of  the  Ter- 
schelling might  be  lying. 

They  turned  from  the  spit  and  made  back  through  the 
trees  towards  the  tent,  and  they  had  scarcely  gone  a  hundred 
yards  when  something  white  moving  amidst  the  tree  boles 
drew  Houghton's  attention 

It  was  Chaya. 

She  had  not  been  foUovvmg  them,  evidenfly,  for  she  was 
coming  towards  them,  though  not  in  the  hne  of  their  path. 

"  There's  the  gal  we  saw  yesterday,"  said  Hull. 

Houghton's  heart  sprang  alive  in  him  like  a  struggling 
bird. 

It  was  only  a  couple  of  hours  ago  that  she  had  evaded 


March  30,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


21 


Chaya  a  Romance  o/  the  South   Seat  ] 


{tyiuslraleii  bu  Josei}h   Simpaon,   R.B.A. 


"  When  the  party  were  digging  on  the  spit  of  riverbank  " 


him.     He  would  soon  know  now  if  she  were  angry  or  not. 

She  had  a  basket  in  her  hand  and  was  evidently  going 
about  some  business  or  other,  and  she  had  seen  him,  he  could 
tell  that.  But  she  did  not  alter  her  direction.  She  kept 
straight  on,  and  passing  them  ten  yards  away  she  turned  her 
head,  caught  Houghton's  gaze  full,  and  smiled. 

He  could  only  tell  that  she  was  not  angry,  that  she  was 
in  fact  quite  friendly,  but  it  seemed  to  him  there  was  the 
faintest,  faintest  trace  of  mockery  in  that  smile.  The 
mockery  of  a  child  that  has  just  escaped  its  would-be  captor. 


Then  she  was  gone. 

•"  She  give  you  the  glad  eye,"  said  Hull.  "  She  did 
shore — Funny  things  them  females  are,  she  hadn't  no  eyes 
for  me.  I  never  did  hold  with  wimmen  folk  and  never  took 
up  with  them  much  excep'  maybe  now  and  then  when  I've 
had  more  money  in  my  pocket  than  wits  in  my  head." 

When  they  got  back  to  the  tent  they  found  Tillman 
talking  to  Macquart. 

Tillman  was  seated  on  the  ground  with  his  back  to  a  tree 
and    Macquart    was    seated    near    him.        The    discussion. 


22 


LAND      &      WATER 


March  30,  1916 


whatever  it  was,  between  the  two,  was  being  conducted  with 
vigour  to  judge  by  the  gestures  of  Macquart. 

"  See  here,  you  fellows,"  cried  Tillman  as  they  ap- 
proached.    "  Here's  something  new." 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

The  New  Move 

•■  Well,"  said  Hull,  taking  his  seat  on  the  ground  near 
Tillman,    "  What's  up  now  ?  " 

"  Everything,"  said  Tillman,  "  ask  Macquart." 

"  It's  not  as  bad  as  that,"  said  Macquart,  "  in  fact,  as 
far  as  I  can  see,  things  are  looking  better  than  they  did 
when  we  knocked  off  work  last  night,  but  I'm  beginning  to 
have  more  than  a  suspicion  that  we  have  been  done." 

Houghton  saw  Hull's  big  hand  clench  itself  as  it  lay 
besde  'lim  on  the  grou:id.  Fearing  that  the  Captain  might 
take  up  the  questioning  of  Macquart,  he  moved  close  to  him 
and  1.  ani^ed  to  nudge  him  unseen  by  the  others. 

"  Jt^iovv   do   you  mean  ?  "    he  said.      "  Who   has  done 


us 


Tlic  natives  I    believe,  and  be 


to  them,"   said 


Macquart.  "  It's  this  way.  When  we  struck  nothing  last  night, 
when,  in  fact,  I  saw  that  the  marking  trees  were  gone  I  began  to 
suspect.  I  began  to  say  to  myself,  can  it  be  possible  that  the 
stuff  has  been  removed  ?  I  thrashed  the  thing  out  in  my 
own  mind.  I  said  to  myself,  fifteen  years  is  a  long  while, 
can  white  men  have  been  here  and  taken  tlie  stuff  off  ?  Then 
I  saw  at  once,  arguing  from  common  sense  that — outside 
miracles — the  thing  could  not  be.  No  white  rne.i  in  the 
world  had  track  of  the  position  of  the  thing  but  me." 

•  Steady  on,"  said  Hull,  speaking  despite  the  warning 
nudges  of  Houghton,  "  wasn't  you  goin'  round  the  world 
huntin'  for  a  chap  to  put  up  money  for  this  expedition  ? 
Why,  God  bless  my  soul,  you  told  me  about  the  thing  fower 
years  ago  in  'Frisco.  Well,  if  you  told  it  to  me  you  told  it  to 
loads  besides.  How  do  you  know  that  one  of  them  chaps 
liasn't  been  to  the  money  box  ?  " 

The  enmity  of  Macquart  towards  the  questioner  shot 
out  in  his  glance. 

■  How  do  I  know  ?  I  know  because  I  wasn't  such  a 
complicated  fool  as  to  give  any  man  a  hint  that  would  bring 
liim  within  two  Imndred  miles  of  the  thing.  Have  3'ou  any 
more  questions  to  ask  ?  Well  then.  I  said  to  myself  last 
night,  no  white  man  has  been  here,  but  how  about  natives  ? 
The  Papuans  are  out  of  court,  they  are  too  stupid.  How 
about  the  Dyaks  ?  They're  clever,  'they  may  have  ferreted 
out  the  stuff,  and  if  they  did  they'd  know  it  belonged  to  John 
Lant  and  they'd  maybe  move  it  to  some  other  place  more 
safely  hid  than  the  river  bank.  They're  full  up  of  super- 
stitions, and  if  anv  bad  luck  had  been  happening  to  them  or 
if  they'd  been  miliicky  at  fishing  or  if  one  of  their  wise  women 
had -been  dreaming  things  they  might  have  taken  it  as  an 
indication,  if  they  knew  the  stuff  was  there,  to  move  it. 
Anyhow  those  were  my  thoughts.  Then  to-day  when  I  was 
yarning  with  Wiart  I  managed  to  liit  on  some  news.  Two 
years  ago  there  was  a  big  disturbance  here  and  the  Dyaks 
stopped  fishing  for  a  week.  They  were  desperately  busy 
about  something,  carting  mat  baskets  through  the  woods. 
Wiart  was  very  busy  just  then  with  the  rubber  and  he  didn't 
notice  things  mucli  till  towards  the  end  of  the  pow-wow,  when 
one  day  he  was  out  prospecting  in  the  forest  and  he  came  on 
the  thing  the  Dvaks  had  been  carting  theit  baskets  to.  He 
followed  one  of  "the  basket  carriers  to  it,  in  fact.  It  was  a 
sort.of-temple  hut  and  he  didn't  go  further  for  he  didn't  want 
to  be  seen  prying  into  their  affairs.  He  never  thought  that 
the  stuff  those  chaps  were  carting  might  be  gold,  he  thought 
it  was  earth  from  the  river-side  and  they  had  some  rehgious 
reason  for  bringing  it.  He  thinks  so  still.  I  haven't  said 
anything  to  make  him  think  different.  Well,  I  believe  that's 
where  the  stuff  is.  I  believe  they  cut  the  marking  trees 
down,  though  maybe  the  trees  fell  of  their  own  accord. 
.Anyhow,  that's  the  position  and  Wiart  knows  wiiere  that 
Imt  place  is  in  the  forest,  anyhow,  he  said  he  could  go  there 
'Mijt,.  easy." 

Well,"    said  Hull,  "  if  he  could  we'd  better  yank  him 
(.III  and  make  him  lead  us  there." 

"  I  believe  there's  something  in  this,"  said  Houghton 
with  an  air  of  conviction,  "  but  we  must  go  cautiously." 

"  There  mayn't  be  anything  in  it  at  all,"  said  Macquart. 
••  it  may  be  a  wrong  scent  entirely,  but  it's  worth  enquiring 
into." 

■'  If  it's  true,  our  difficulty  will  be  this,"  said  Tilhiian. 
"  If  the  Dyaks  have  hid  the"  stuff  you  may  be  sure  they'll 
not  let  us  take  it  off  without  a  word  or  two." 

"  And  how  about  our  Winchesters  ?  "  cut  in  Houghton. 
'And   our   six-shooters?     Seems   to   me   the   argument   on 
our  side  will  be  the  strongest." 

"  If  it  comes  to  that,"  said  Macquart,  "  I'll  make  the 
Dyaks  do  the  hefting.  I'll  make  them  carry  that  stuff  right 


down  to  the  Barracuda  and  not  botlier  about  the  boat.  And 
there's  another  point,  you  three  are  armed,  I  've  got  nothing 
but  my  naked  hands,  if  we  are  to  carry  this  thing  through 
we  must  all  be  a:«ned.     I've  got  to  have  a  gun." 

"  That's  perfectly  right,"  said  Houghton,  "  ai  d  you'll 
have  mine  the  moment  we  touch  the  stuff." 

Macquart  said  nothing  but  began  to  fill  a  pipe,  then  he 
lit  it.  He  seemed  satisfied  with  Houghton's  promise,  at 
least,  his  mind  seemed  to  have  travelled  to  some  of  inn- 
subject. 

"We'd  better  go  on  digging  to-night,"  he  said,  "  on 
the  chance  that  some  shock  of  earthquake  may  have  deepened 
the  stuff,  though  I  don't  think  that's  very  probable.  Any: 
how,  we'd  better  make  plumb  sure  the  cache  is  gone.  I 
believe  I'm  right  in  supposing  it  is,  but  we  can  never  be 
quite  sure  in  this  world.  Then  to-morrow  I  can  fix  it  up 
with  Wiart  to  take  us  to  that  place." 

"  Why  not  call  the  chap  out  now  and  let's  talk  it  over  ?  " 
said  Hull. 

"  If  you  like,"  said  Macquart,  "  only  I'd  advise  not. 
He  suspects  nothing  of  what  we're  after,  and  if  you  leave  it  to 
me  he'll  go  on  not  suspecting  tillwere  dabbling  our  hands  in 
the  yellow  boys." 

"  You're  right,"  said  Houghton.  "  Hull,  we'd  better 
leave  this  thing  to  Macquart,  he's  cleverer  than  the  whole 
of  us." 

"  Oh,  I  don't  pretend  to  be  clever,"  said  the  other,  "  I 
struck  on  the  idea  by  chance  and  it  was  the  merest  chance 
that  I  sounded  Wiart  on  the  matter.  That's  all  there  is  to 
it." 

"  Well,  let's  say  nothing  more  till  we've  had  another  try 
to-night,"  replied  Houghton.  "  If  we  draw  a  blank  then  to- 
morrow we  can  make  arrangements  with  Wiart." 

Half  an  hour  later  Tillman,  taking  Houghton  for  a 
stroll  down  to  the  landing  stage,  broke  silence. 

"  Do  you  think  Macquart  is  in  earnest  ?  "  he  asked. 

"  Not  a  bit,"  replied  Houghton,  "  he's  cooking  some 
dog's  trick  to  play  on  us.  I  believe  he  has  roped  that  scani]) 
of  a  Wiart  into  this  scheme,  as  a  cat's  paw,  of  course.  H„' 
intends  to  take  us  into  the  woods  and  do  for  us.  Notice  tli? 
way  he  made  the  bid  for  arms." 

"  Yes,  and  vou  promised  him  your  pistol." 

"  When  we  touched  the  stuff.  The  stuff  is  not  in  the 
woods." 

"  Well,  for  heaven's  sake,  why  should  we  go  with  him  ? 
I'm  not  a  funk,  but  when  we  know  or  suspect  he's  going  to 
do  for  us,  why  not  tackle  him  at  once  ?  " 

"  If  he  was  an  ordinary  scoundrel,  I'd  put  my  pistol 
to  his  head  and  threaten  to  shoot  him  if  he  didn't  show  us  where 
the  cache  was,"  rephed  Houghton.  "  But  he's  not.  The 
threat  wouldn't  have  any  effect  on  him  simply  because  he'd 
rather  be  shot,  I  believe,  than  show  that  stuff  to  Hull.  There's 
the  faint  chance  that  this  yarn  may  be  true,  and  that  his 
plan  is  to  get  us  to  lielp  move  the  stuff  before  doing  us  in, 
and  there's  the  chance  that  he  rnay  lead  us  into  some  trap. 
Now,  if  I  could  once  convict  him  of  that  and  escape  the  trap, 
then  I'd  make  him  show  us  the  place  we  want  even  by  torturing 
him,  then  it  would  be  a  question  of  hot  blood.  Biit  we've 
convicted  him  of  nothing  and  you  can't  torture  a  man  in  cold 
blood — I  can't.  So  we'll  just  have  to  lay  low,  not  care  a 
dump  for  danger  and  be  ready  to  pounce." 

"  I'll  be  ready  to  do  the  pouncing,"  said  Tillman,  "  if  I 
get  tl;e  chance." 

.After  supper  that  night  and  just  before  moon-rise  tiiey 
stole  off  again  up  stream  to  the  spit. 

Four  hours'  digging  showed  no  result  beyond  a  hole  in 
which,  to  use  Hulls  expression,  they  could  have  buried  a 
church.  Then,  depressed  but  not  dispirited,  they  returned  to 
the  tent. 

Hull  and  Houghton  retired  to  rest,  but  Tillman,  according 
to  his  arrangement  with  Houghton,  slipped  oif  armed  with  a 
Winchester  to  keep  watch  on  the  boat. 

{To  be  continued.) 


Once  more  we  arc  threatened  with  a  revival  of  the  waist- 
coat, but  this  seems  likely  to  be  more  general  with  frocks 
than  with  coats  and  skirts.  A  waistcoat  frock  can  be  the 
most  attractive  of  models  and  in  the  newest  form  the  waist- 
coat is  worn  over  the  frock  itself,  after  the  way  Qf  a  little 
sleeveless  coat.  An  unusually  pretty  frock  of  copper  brown 
taffetas  just-  arrived  from  Paris  was  made  after  this  way,  the 
waistcoat  being  of  dark  purple  velvet  embroidered  with  a 
somewhat  scattered  design  of  metallic  autumn  leaves. 
.Acknowledgment  of  the  wintry  weather  which  has  recently 
fallen  to  our  lot  was  given  by  a  narrow  edging  of  fur  round 
neck,  sleeves  and  skirt. 

OKIICEKS'  LE.WE  liKIGIlTENED  BY  BILLIARDS.— As  an 
indoor  sport  Riving  endless  opportunities  for  the  exercise  of  skill, 
nothing  igjn  equal  Billiards — played  on  a  Burroughes  and  Watts' 
Table.     I^^ascination  is  inexhaustible. 


April  6,  1916 


Supplement    to    LAND      &      WATER 


xiu 


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XIV 


Supplement     to     LAND     &     WATER 


April  6,  1916 


TKc  Palmolivc  Secret 


How  Palm  and  Olivo  Oils  are  made  into  tlie  f  nest 
complexion  soap  in  the  world  is  the  Paliolivo 
serrpt.  For  centuries  these  two  wonderful  oils 
have  been  renowned  for  their  beanty-giving  vir- 
tues. The  womenkind  of  ancient  Greeoo,  Rome, 
nnd  Eg_vpt,  adepts,  as  they  were,  in  the  art  of 
Beauty  Culture,  used  nothing  else,  and  to-day, 
in  the  form  of  ^^ 

PALMOLIVE 

there  is  not  iuiything  to 
eoual  them  (or  keeping  the. 
skin  soft,  healthy,  and 
beautiful. 

The  skin  responds  to  PfiJm- 
olive  like  the  flowers  do  to 
a  shower  of  rain — it 
cleanses,  refreshes,  and 
■stimulates  it. 
A  liberal  sample  can  b«  hod 
free,  or  a  large  caJse  of 
1'.\L1I0L1V"E  can  be  pur 
chas«d  at  the  Chomists  (or 
6<I.,  or  will  be  sent  p0.1t  frc*- 
on  receipt  of  si»  penny  stamp- 
with   name   and   addrc&s. 

THF  B.J  JOHNSON  sOflP  CO.. 

'?4  Hilborn.  London,  E.C 


Intellectual  Cravings 
of  Soldiers. 


Now  Ready. 

Part  3  of  the  "  LAND  &  WATER" 
Edition   of 

Raemaekers 
Cartoons. 


^TT  THIS  part  contains  12  Cartoons  in  colours, 
%j\  and  chapters  by  Sir  Herbert  Warren,  W.  L. 
Courtnev.  John  Buchan,  Boyd  Gable,  The 
Dean  of  St.  Paul's,  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoo  e,  Eden 
Phillpotis,  Hilaire  Belloc,  Arthur  Pol. en,  and 
G.  K.  Chesterton. 


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From  a  private  letter  received  lately  from  an  officer  at  the  Front  it 
seems  that  there  are  many  men  who  need  something  better  than  magazincf 
and  novels  to  satisfy  their  intellectual  cravings.  We  niiitst  remember  that 
our  new  Armies  contain  the  flower  of  the  universities  and  of  the  young 
manhood  of  the  nation.  There  are  many  men  like  our  correspondent  who 
are  surfeited  with  "  light  literature,"  and  crave  stronger  meat.  This 
ofiicer  says  : — 

"Could  you  arranije  to  stnd  me  an  'EVERYMAN,'  or  tome  eon 
of  literary  journal,  every  weelcl  I  have  nothing  here  to  read 
except  old  nrngazinea,  etc.,  with  which  I  am  turjeited;  I  never  even 
tee  a  paper  now  for  days  at  a  time.  Therefore,  that  which  it 
literary  in  my  soul  cravet  for  sustenance,  and  it  would  be  a  great 
boon  to  me  if  J  could  rely  each  week  on  a  journal  of  that  tort  to 
keep  me  in  touch  with  those  things  which  are  above  all  travail  of 
the  flesh." 

Is  it  too  much  to  say  that  there  moBt  be  thousands  of  men  with 
similar  tastes  and  cravings  amongst  our  Armies  in  the  various  theatres 
of  war,  to  that  of  the  officer  in  question.  We  think  not.  Agreed  that 
this  is  .so,  it  surely  behoves  everyone  who  has  a  soldier  friend  at  the  Front 
to  .see  that  his  desire  for  literature  of  a  more  serious  character  than  that 
which  reaches  our  Armies  in  large  quantities    does  not  go  unsatisfied. 

But  why  send  EVERYMAN  in  particular!  Why  is  it  that  this  officer 
specially  mentions  EVERYMAN?  Are  there  no  other  journals  equally 
good,  if  not  better,  for  the  purpose?  This  is  quite  an  interesting  point. 
Let  us  see  what  there  is  in  it. 

First  of  all,  what  type  of  journal  is  this  periodical  which  keeps  its 
readers,  in  the  words  of  the  officer,  "  in  touch  with  those  things  that  art 
above  all  travail  of  the  flesh  "? 

Under  what  class  can  such  a  journal  come?  To  be  frank,  it  does 
not  come  under  any  particular  grouping  of  periodicals.  It  is  in  a  class 
by  itself.     There  is  no  periodical  of  precisely  a  similar  character. 

Doubtless  its  distinguished  editor  (Dr.  Sarolea)  counts  for  this 
exclusiveness  and  distinctiveness.  The  Newspaper  Owner  recently 
referring  to  EVERYMAN  said  :— 

"  The  Editor  exhibits  a  marvellous  range  of  vision  and  exact  know- 
ledge in  various  spheres  of  thought  and  activity.  Owing  allegiance 
to  no  sect,  uninfluenced  by  no  consideration  of  partisanship,  we  have 
in  the  Editor  of  EVERYMAN  a  pressman  whost  conclusions  on 
most  questions  possess  an  element  of  finality." 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  Newspaper  Owner  should  speak  in  this  way 
of  Dr.  Sarolea  because  he  is  an  inteniationalist  and  has  studied,  on  the 
spot,  the  social  and  political  problems  of  most  nations ;  he  has  coUected  a 
foreign  library  of  60.000  volumes ;  he  is  Doctor  of  Philosophy  and  Litera- 
ture, and  is  first  Lecturer  and  Head  of  the  French  and  Romance  Dept. 
in  the  University  of  Edinburgh  ;  he  has  made  a  close  study  of  European 
politics,  and  one  of  the  greatest  of  living  German  publicists  has  referred 
to  him  as 

"  A  Cosmopolitan  by  origin  and  by  the  circumttancet  of  hit  career, 
who  shows  a  universality  of  culture  which  will  seldom  meet  its 
equal.  He  it  acquainted  and  familiar  with  almost  all  the  languages 
and  literatures  of  the  world,  and  he  treats  politics  and  history  with 
the  same  virtuosity  as  literature.  Although  a  Cosmopolitan  he  has 
the  keenest  sense  and  appreciation  for  national  patriotism." 

Is  it  to  be  wondered  at  therefore  that  a  journal  controlled  by  such  an 
eminent  internationalist  should  prove  so  remarkably  in.ipiring  to  thought 
ful  men  and  women,  and  should  earn  the  honour  of  special  mention  whicli 
the  officer  correspondent  makes  in  his  appeal. 

Immediately  this  letter  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  proprietor.^ 
of  EVERYMAN  they  offered  to  send  this  particular  officer  a  copy  of 
their  journal  regularly,  at  their  own  cost.  This  has  quite  naturally  led 
to  the  development  of  the  idea  of  getting  EVERYMAN  into  the  hand.-^ 
of  our  thoughtful  soldiers.  Obviou.sly  the  proprietors  cannot  undertake- 
to  send  out  copies  to  the  Front  to  an  unlimited  extent,  but  realising  that 
they  have  an  opportunity  of  assisting  in  satisfying  the  cravings  of  intel- 
lectual soldiers  they  are  prepared  to  share  the  cost  with  those  who  would 
like  to  bring  to  their  friends  the  weekly  pleasure  that  EVERYMAN  so 
evidently  gives.  The  extent  to  which  they  are  willing  to  go  is  to  bear 
one-third  the  cost  by  defraying  the  postage.  In  addition,  they  undertake 
to  address  the  wrapper,  band  up,  and  post.  Thus  for  one  shilling  they 
will  send  out  a  copy  to  any  soldier  weekly  for  three  months. 

A  contemporary  recently  summed  up  the  special  characteristics  of  the 
journal  by  describing  it 

"as  having  filled  a  distinct  requirement  on  the  part  of  the  British 
pulilic  by  the  skilful  presentation  of  subjects  bearing  on  the  domi- 
nant thought  in  men's  minds,  without  the  arguments  and  pleadim/i' 
with  which  readers  of  the  duiliis  are  familiar.  The  j>lan  has  been 
that  of  inducing  judgment  by  deduction,  by  referring  to  men  and 
events  in  an  objective  manner,  not  always  labouring  the  point, 
nrvertlieless,  continually  kept  in  view.  The  policy  could  only 
achieve  its  purpose  by  the  exercise  of  restraint.  That  it  has  is  no 
dnulit  due  to  the  fact  of  Dr.  Sarnlea  possessing  the  double  quati/i- 
cation,  in  addition  to  his  distinguished  capability,  of  being  a  Belgian 
who  thoroughly  understands  Britain  and  the  British." 

We  commend  to  you,  therefore,  the  scheme  of  shilling  subscriptions 
inaugurated  by  EVERYMAN,  in  order  that  you  can  satisfy  the  very 
natural  cravin"  for  good,  wholesome,  intellectual  literature  of  your  soldier 
friends.  Alf  that  von  have  to  do  is  to  se'>d  tn  the  Manager  of 
EVERYMAN,  10,  St.  Mary's  Chambers,  161a,  STR.AND,  London,  W.C.. 
the  sum  of  one  shilling,  together  with  the  name  and  rci;iment  of  the  friend 
at  the  Front  you  wish  to  please  in  this  way.  EVERYMAN  will  do  the 
rest. 


Apii    6,  IQ16 


Supplement    to    LAND      &      WATER 


XV 


Inexpensive 
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18/9 

CATALOGUE  POST  FREE. 

DebemKam 
&  Freebodv 

Wifimorc  Street, 

iCf^.vendisK  Square)  London. W 

Famous  lor  over  a  Century 
(orToste  (op  Quoliiy  f^cValup 


The  Orisinal  Cording  s.    Estd.  1839. 


The  "SERVICE" 
Waterproof     Coat. 

Atrustworthy  waterproof  is  apos- 
itive  necessity  for  campaigning, 

since  getting  wet  is  so  often  followed 
by  ill-health,  and,  at  least,  must 
cause  real  discomfort.  Mounted  or 
afoot,  a  "  Service  "  Coat  ensures 
complete  protection  through  any 
rain.  It  is  a  slip-on  which  gives  to 
every  movement,  and  has  well-con- 
trived fullness  to  make  any  "  stuffi- 
ness "  impossible.  Useful  features 
for  saddle  wear  are  the  leg  straps, 
pommel  strap,  and  fan  piece  within 
deep  slit  at  back. 

Also    made  with    warm 
fleece  detachable  lining. 

A  "  Service  "  Coat,  with  this  snug  woollen 
wrap  or  inner  coat  added,  will  keep  out 
the  bitterest  wind  or  cold,  and  wi^l  moat 
surely  minimise  the  evils  of  enforced  ex- 
posure at  night. 

When  ordering  a  "Service"  Coat,  or  \t  to  tM 
sent  on  approval,  height  and  chest  measure,  and 
reference,  should  be  given. 


New  llluttrated  Li»t  of  waterproof  coati,  eapet,  boott,  trench  wader*  Ac.  at  reouemtm 

J.  C.  CORDING  &  Ca 

Waterproofers  to  H.M.  the  King 

Only     Addresses : 

19  PICCADILLY,  W.  &  35 st.  jamess  st. 

s.w. 


2U£RXHdSSl3i&^ 


Z:f0i^y-'-'^'"'  JEWELLERS      * 


JEWELLERS      ~"««»^rjw'>^»*«»       SILVERSMITHS 
TO  H.M.THE  KING 

TUTE 


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WITH  WHICH  IS  lurnRPORATED  THE  GOLDSMITHS  ALLIANCE  L'?  (A  B.SAVORY  S  SONS)  ..^r''}''-- 

CEstablished  //S/J  ..,,-'ir<i&''^''^ 


'^^^/^'r^j'^v^yi'^ir^i^fT^ITi"', 


rO 

n 


Service    Flasks. 

THESE  Service  Flasks 
are  strictly  hygienic, 
the  inside  beinj*  specially 
treated  to  render  it  proof 
against  corrosion.  Fitted 
with  "  Bayonet "  caps,  and 
made  of  "Regent"  Plate  — 
the  finest  electro-plate  obtain- 
able— they  are  of  practical 
design  and  are  eminently 
suited   to  service  conditions. 

Sold  in  four  sizes:. 
4  ozs.,    11/6;      6  ozs..    12/6; 
8  ozs.,   13/6;     11  ozs.,   14/6 
Tliere  are  20  ozs.   to  a  pint. 

A   calalogue  of  firtsenis'  useful  to  those  on 
sercice  will  he  sent,  pozt  free,  on  application. 


Ontij   One  Addrc. 


\u  Brancfif\ 


12,  Regent  St.,  London,  W. 


VI 


Supplement     to     LAND      &       WATER 


April  6,  1916 


Mr.  Bernard  Partridge, 

the   well-known    "  Punch"   Artist, 
expresses  his  appreciation  of 

Wateraiari's 
FounSa^Pen 


^J?'^^\ 


For  the  above  testimonial  we  are  indebted    to    the    courtesy    of 

Messrs.  C  Roberson  &  Co..   Ltd.,   155    &    156    Piccadilly.  W.. 

to  whom  it  was  addressed. 

For  tl-e  Refular  Type,  10/6  and  up- 
wards. For  the  SAFETY  and  the 
New  L.ever  Pocket  Self-Filling  Types. 
«     iUustr»td,      12/6     and     upwards. 

L.   G.   Sloan,   Chc^cttConter,  Kings  way,  London. 


Safety  Type  best  for  Active  Service. 
Nibs  to  suit  ell  hands.  Of  Stationers  and 
Jewellers.  Booklet  free  from  :— 


r" 


Another   addition." 


"We  Bhall  have  quite  a  magnificent  collection 
of  books  shortly.  They  will  make  a  useful 
library  for  Harold  when  he  grows  up,  espe- 
cially in  this  nice  Globe- Wernicke  Elastic 
Hook  Case." 

"When  the  present  unit  is  filled,  we  can 
easily  add  another."  A  distinguishing  feature 
of  each  unit  is  that  it  is  a  complete  book-case 
in  itself — "always  complete  but  never 
finished." 
Why  not  procure  one  of  these 


Slobc^Vcrtiickc 

••  JLlastic"     Boohcases. 

IPscltiny    Free-     Ordera  of  £2  Carriat;'^   'aid    I 
toitiiy  Gnods  Station  in  tbr  .  nt.sli  Islrs.  I 

Write  To-day  for  lUurraied  Catalogue  lOOB  to:— 

%i  SloW^^rwickc  Co.  Ltd. 

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98  Bi«hop«gat«,  E.G.  _j 


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Marvellously  accur- 
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for  Civilians  who  lik<' 
a  really  good  watch 
for  wristlet  wear. 


In  solid  silver  case 
with  strong  strap 
and  buckle,  complete 
from  £3/3/-.  Lumin- 
ous dials  extra. 


Also  in  dainty  sizes 
tor  Ladies,  in  gold 
or  rolled  gold  cases. 
Of  all  reliable 
Watchmakers  and 
Jewellers. 


Illustrated  Watch  Book  Free. 

Waltham  Watches 

Waltham  Watch  Co.   (Dept.  63),   126,  High  Bolborn,  Loiidon.  W.C. 


The "THRESHER" 

for     Spring     Wenr. 

Rain,      Wind,     and 

Mud  Proof. 


Officers  under  Orders  for  Abroad 

wHI  find  Thresher  and  Glenny's  Guide  useful  for  reference  when  com- 
pleting their  kit  preparalory  to  leaving  for  any  part  of  the  world.  Neat  and 
compact,  it  contains  particulars  of  everythinj  actually  necessary  in  the 
way  of  regular  Field  Kit,  in  addition  to  many  u.seful  hints  on  personal 
comforts. 


For  those  taking  up  a  Commission 

a  glance  through  Thresher's  Guide  will  prove  that  the  purchase  of  a 
Military  Outfit  from  the  leading  Military  Tailors  is  not  costly;  guarantees 
quality,  workmanship,  and  correct  detail.  Lvery  possible  item  of  an 
Officer's  Uniform  and  Equipment  from  a  Trench  Coat  to  a  Marching  Sock 
is  fully  described  and  illustrated  in  thb  book. 

Fresh   editions  are  continually    t>eing    brought    out,  so   this  Guide  is 
always  up  to  dale  with  the  latest  information. 

Write  for  GUIDL  (3)  TO  KIT  AND  LQUIPMLNT. 

THRESHER    &    GLENNY, 

SXCililary   'Cailon  and  Oulfilien 

152  &   153  Strand,   London,  W.C. 

Makers  of  the  THRE-SHE.R  TRENCH  COAT. 


I 


Lined    Detachable 
Kamelcott,  £5  lOs. 

Lined    Detachable 
Sheepskin,  £7  1«. 


I 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVI  No.  2813  [y?!!^] 


TTTrTT?c:DAV      APT?TT     f\     Tr\Tf\  tregistered  ash   price  sixpence 

inuivoi^/A  1  ,    rtirivii^    u,    j.y±u  La  newspaperJ   published  weeklv 


Bi)    Louis   Uaemaekem. 


Drawn   exclusively  for  "Land  and    WaLei. 


On  the  way  to   Verdun — "  We  took  two   houses  in  Malancourt." 


LAND      &      WATER 


April  6,   1 916 


[fhotu    by   Lietitcuaiit    Bvwcn. 


The  South  Pole  ^ Shackleton's  Halfway  House 


U'holu    bU    ilLibill    U.    loii'uiH. 


Mount  Erebus  —  Shackleton's  Goal 


These  photographs  illustrate  Mr.  Herbert  Ponting's  article  on  page  17.  The  tent  in  Lieutenant  Bowers' 
photograph  is  the  one  set  up  by  Amundsen,  who  anticipated  Captain  Scott.  Captain  Scott  is  at  the  extreme 
left  of  the  .picture.    At  the  foot  of  Mount  Erebus   lies  Gape  Evans,   Sir  Ernest  Shackleton's  destination. 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSWAY,  LONDON,  W.C. 

Telephone:  HOLBORN   3828 


THURSDAY,    APRIL   6th,    1916 


CONTENTS 


On  the  Way  to  Verdun.     By  T^ouis  Raemaekers 

South  Pole  and  Mount  Erebus  (Pliotos) 

Tlic  King's  Gift.     (Leading  Article) 

Enemy  Object  at  Verdun.     By  Hilaire  Bclloc 

Cicrmany  and  the  Neutrals.     By  Arthur  Pollen 

Sortes  Shakespeariana; 

Position  of  Holland.     By  John  C.  Van  der  Veer 

The  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer.     By  James  Dougla 

Agony  of  Serbia.     By  Alfred  Stead 

Shackleton's  Expedition.     By  Herbert  G.  Ponting 

Map  of  McMurdo  Sound 

Chaya.     By  H.  de  Vcrc  Stacpoole 

Town  and  Country 

The  West  End 

Choosing  Kit 


P.\GE 

I 

o 

■1 
.1 

-1 
lO 

II 

13 

s     14 

1 6 

17 
19 
20 
26 
xviii. 
xxi. 


THE    KING'S    GH  T 

Privy  Purse  Office, 

Buckingham  Palace,  S.W., 

^ist  March,  1916. 
Sir, — /  have  received  the  King's  commands  to  inform 
you  thai  His   Majesty  has  given   instructions  for  the 
sum   of   One    Hundred   Thousand   Pounds    (£100,000) 
to  be  placed  at  the  disposal  af  the  Treasury. 
It  is  the  King's  wish  that  this  sum,  which  he  gives  in 
consequence  of  the  ivar,  should  be  applied  in  whatever 
manner  is  deemed  best  in  (he  opinion  of  His  Majesty's 
Government. 
I  have  the  honour  to  be,  Sir, 

Your  obedient  Servant, 

F.    E.    G.    PONSONBY, 

Keeper  of  the  Privy  Purse. 
The  Right  Honhlc.  H.  H.  Asquilh,  K.C.,  M. P.,  Prime 
Minister. 

"  ^  ^^""^  deserve  acts,  not  words  in  their  honour." 
/%     This  aphorism  of  the  famous  Greek  orator  was 

/ — %  never  more  applicable  tlian  to  the  King's  gift. 
It  is  easy  to  praise  its  munificence  and  to 
commend  its  spontaneous  generosity,  but  the  true  honour 
of  this  kingly  act,  as  announced  in  the  letter  at  the  head 
of  this  article,  lies  in  the  manner  in  which  the  example 
will  be  followed  by  all  classes  throughout  the  Empire.  In 
placing  of  his  own  free-will  this  large  sum  at  the 
disposal  of  his  Government.  His  Majesty  has  once 
again  testified  to  the  solidarity  of  the  nation  and 
of  the  Empire  in  its  fixed  determination  to  carry  the 
war  through  at  all  costs.  The  willing  spirit  in  which 
the  Buc'get  has  been  received  with  its  Pelion  on  Ossa  in 
the  way  of  new  taxation  must  further  impress  Neutrals 
and  foes  alike  that  Britain  is  not  to  be  daunted  by  any 
demands  upon  her  purse.  The  riches  she  has  often 
boasted  in  the  past  are  a  reality,  and  she  is  willing  to 
jiour  them  out  ungrudgingly  as  the  ,  purchase  price  oi 
liberty  and  freedom. 

Mr.  McKenna  had  his  task  made  easier  for  him  on 
Tuesday  in  that  he  was  able  to  announce  a  reduction 
in  expenditure  and  an  excess  in  revenue  over  his  estimates 
of  last  summer,  and  as  he  has  no  doubt  framed  his  1916-17 
estimates  on  the  same  lines,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to 
expect  tliat  his  anticipations  will  be  more  than  fulfilled. 


There  is  to  be  another  Budget  in  July  primarily  for  the 
purpose  of  continuing  the  additional  duties  on  tea  and 
tobacco  imposed  by  the  Finance  Act  of  last  September, 
duties  which  would  otherwise  expire  on  August  ist. 
The  opportunity  will  then  be  taken  to  review  again  the 
financial  situation  and  also,  so  every  one  hopes,  for  a 
definite  decision  on  the  question  of  fiscal  duties.  In  the 
course  of  his  lucid  speech  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer 
brought  forward  a  very  potent  argument  in  favour  of 
the  earliest  ])ossible  decision  on  this  point.  He  said, 
"  W'c  must  not  overlook  the  fact  that  after  the  war  many 
of  our  traders  will  have  to  compete  with  neutral  rivals 
who  have  been  able  through  war  prices  to  build  up 
immense  reserves  of  capital  which  have  not  been  subject 
to  taxation."  British  traders  have  the  right  to  know 
to  what  extent  they  may  receive  protection  from  their 
own  Government  against  this  new  rivahy,  a  perfectly 
lawful  rivalry  but  which  nevertheless  will  have  been 
created  by  the  very  circumstances  which  will  have 
crippled  their  own  powers  of  resistance. 

Among  the  features  of  the  new  taxation  which  are  to  be 
commended  is  the  tardy  recognition  that  all  fluid  re- 
freshment other  than  spring  water  is  a  luxury,  lemon- 
ade just  as  much  as  champagne,  gingerbeer  as  much  as 
gin  and  cocoa  equally  with  tea.  This  principle  we  trust 
has  now  been  accepted  for  all  time  at  the  Treasury. 
Table  w'aters  are  as  legitimate  a  source  of  revenue  as 
table  wines,  and  it  was  a  scandal  even  before  the  war 
that  the  overflow  of  German  wells  should  be  admitted 
to  this  country  free,  while  the  produce  of  French  vine- 
yards should  be  substantially  taxed.  Another  good  fea- 
ture )s  the  tax  on  amusements.  Surely  there  is  no  form  of 
tribute  that  can  be  rendered  more  gladly  to  the  State 
than  this.  Henceforth  we  may  amuse  ourselves  with  an 
easy  conscience  knowing  that  every  stall  we  buy  at  a 
theatre  is  another  clip  of  cartridges  against  the  Hun. 
Seeing  that  race  meetings  have  now  come  within  the 
purview  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  let  us  hope 
he  may  be  tempted  to  go  a  step  further  into  the  betting 
ring  and  there  set  up  the  public  totalisator.  As  for  the 
tax  on  railway  tickets,  its  results  will  be  watched  with 
considerable  interest  and  some  anxiety.  On  whom 
will  the  extra  burden  fall — on  the  railways  or  on  the 
travelling  public,  which  has  been  considerably  reduced 
already  by  mar^y  causes  connected  with  the  war  ? 

Mr.  McKenna  had  a  word  of  sympathy  for  the  income- 
tax  payer.  He  evidently  knows  how  heavily  the  burden 
already  falls  on  many,  more  particularly  on  the  pro- 
fessional classes,  who  are  not  only  endeavouring  to 
maintain  "  the  standard  of  life  necessary  in  their  circum- 
stances for  efficiency,"  but  also  to  bring  up  and  educate 
children  so  that  they  shall  be  fitted  to  carry  on  to  the 
best  of  their  abilities  their  duty  in  the  state  of  life  to 
which  they  have  been  called.  In  the  delightful  character 
sketch  of  Mr.  McKenna  from  the  pen  of  Mr.  James 
Douglas  which  appears  on  another  page,  stress  is  laid  on 
the  fearlessness  of  his  character,  and  he  touched  the 
right  note  in  the  concluding  sentences  of  his  brief  and 
business-like  Budget  statement  when  he  said  :  "  Civic 
courage  is  as  important  in  its  sphere  as  military  courage 
and  we  may  justly  claim  in  this  time  of  stress  that  we 
have  not  been  found  wanting  in  either  of  those  great 
virtues."  This  being  so  we  appeal  to  Mr.  McKenna  to 
use  his  influence  to  put  an  end  to  those  fatuous  "  Don't  " 
posters  and  other  banal  emanations  that  disfigure  the 
hoardings  to-day.  Their  appearance  brands  us  as  a 
nation  of  either  imbeciles  or  cowards.  We  are  neither. 
The  Government  would  do  well  to  adopt  a  more  restrained 
tone  in  such  advertising  as  is  still  necessary  for  the  busi- 
ness of  the  country.  Much  good  has  no  doubt  been  done 
in  the  past  by  these  methods  but  there  is  a  limit  to  every- 
thing. This  attempt  to  regulate  private  expenditure  by 
public  posters  at  the  present  time  when  everyone  is 
shouldering  tlieir  burden  bravely  is  deeply  resented. 


LAND     &     WATER 


April  6,  itjif 


THE  ENEMY    OBJECT    AT    VERDUN 

By  Hilaire  Belloo 


THE  one  question  wliirh  Wrdnn  is  suijgcsting 
tliroughout  ICuropo  now  is  this  :  W'liat  is  the 
(ierman  object  in  continuing  tin-  attack  ? 
Upon  Saturday,  tiie  Kjtii  February  last,  the 
Germans — after  a  preparation  in  the  way  of  bringing  up 
heavy  pieces  and  accunuilating  heavy  niunitionni<nl, 
resting  tlieir  men,  training  six'cia!  bodies,  etc.,  for  about 
two  months — opened  the  attack  not  upon  the  "  I'ortress 
of  Verdini,"  for  there  is  no  such  thing,  but  upon  tiie 
\'erdun  sector  of  the  western  front.  Tiiey  delivered 
on  that  day  upon  tlie  lines  from  Malancourt  eastward  for 
twenty  miles,  but  especially  on  the  eight  or  nine  miles 
between  the  Mcuse  and  Ornos,  the  first  shells  of  an  inten- 
sive bombardment. 

Upon  ^[onday,  February  21st,  they  launched  their 
infantry  after  the  48  hours'  preparatory  artillery  work 
against  this  eight  to  nine  mile  front  :  the  number  of 
divisions  employed  in  this  shock  being  no  less  than 
fourteen. 

These  lines  are  written  upon  Tuesday,  the  4th  of  April. 
T-"orty-six  days  have  already  elapsed  in  the  pursuit  of  a 
task  which  originally — if  we  may  judge  by  the  attempted 
rate  of  advance  upon  the  one  hand  and  the  reasonable 
calculation  of  delay  to  French  reinforcements  upon  the 
other — was  designed  for  about  four  days. 

We  all  know  the  changes  which  have  passed  over  the 
great  action  and  over  the  conception  of  the  German 
( ieneral  Staff  in  that  period.  There  have  been  two  main 
phases. 

The  first  shock  was  intended  to  crush  back  the  French 
troops  beyond  the  Meuse,  and  in  the  heat  of  that  victory 
possibly,  or  probably,  to  break  the  French  line  imme- 
diately beyond.  This  original  scheme,  for  which  every- 
thing had'  been  designed,  broke  down  altogether,  and 
the  uijoment  of  its  failure  was  the  French  counter-attack 
on  the  plateau  of  Douaumont,  a  little  before  noon  on 
Saturday,  February  26th. 

The  battle  of  Verdun,  as  the  Germans  had  designed  it 
and  as  their  General  Staff  had  conceived  its  objective, 
was  lost  within  the  fust  week. 

On  the  analogy  of  all  the  other  great  offensives  launched 
in  the  course  of  this  war,  since  the  role  of  heavy  artillery 
became  clear  (the  Chaiupagne  offensive  a  year  ago,  the 
Artois  last  May,  Xeuve  Chapelle,  the  two  great  attacks 
upon  the  Warsaw  lines.  Loos,  the  great  offensive  on  the 
Tsonzo  some  w-eeks  ago,  the  French  great  offensive  in 
Champagne,  etc.),  the  German  attack  should  at  this  point 
have  ceased. 

There  is  a  clear  reason  why  it  should  ha\'e  ceased,  a 
reason  familiar  to  every  student  of  the  war,  and  a  common- 
place in  the  descriptions  given  by  the  higher  commands 
of  their  task.  It  is  simply  this  ;  that  these  great  efforts 
are.  against  the  modern  entrenched  defensive,  so  e.\- 
]>ensive  in  material  and  in  men  that  you  gamble  upon  a 
rapid  breaking  of  the  front  (such  as  has  once  been  effected 
in  this  war,  to  wit  on  the  Dunajec  last  year),  and  if 
you  fail  to  do  that  you  must  cut  your  losses  at  once. 

Supposing,  for  instance,  that  (ieneral  de  Castelnau  had 
gone  on  and  oil  through  October  against  the  German  lines 
in  Champagne  in  the  saiue  fashion  as  that  of  his  first  great 
assault  on  September  23th  and  26th.  it  would  have  meant 
perhaps  half  a  million  of  losses  and  tite  jjutting  of  a  very 
large  number  of  guns  out  of  action  for  scjuie  time,  as  well 
as  the  squandering  of  accumulated  anununition.  J'or  no 
Industrial  nation  can  turn  out  shell  at  the  rate  at  which 
it  is  spent  in  these  tremendous  efforts. 

But  the  Germans,  having  lost  their  battle  in  the  first 
week,  continued  the  effort  in  the  shape  of  a  new  and 
different  series  of  actions.  This— that  is,  all  the  iin- 
mensely  e.xpensive  struggle  of  the  last  six  weeks — is  in 
tactical  practice  and  theorv  a  distinct,  novel,  and  second 
affair.  It  has  been  prolonged  up  to  the  present  moment 
—that  is  for  nearly  six  weeks — and  will  probably  be 
prolonged  for  luany  days  more.  This  new  phase  is 
marked   by  the  following  cliaracters  : 

(I)  fhe  front  which  is  being  attacked  is  struck  here 
and  there,  not  in  a  general  assault  but  upon  \t'ry  narrow. 


specially  selected  fronts  :    never  more  than  2,000  yards, 
often  only  500. 

(2)  Facii  of  these  local  actions  is  prepared  with  a 
specially  intense  bombardment,  very  costly  in  munitions. 
Each  involves  the  use?  of  from  one  division  upwards. 
It  is  very  rarely  that  any  of  them  arc  flelivered  with  less. 

(.;)  The  special  sectors  so  selected  have  each  a  fairly 
obvious  tactical  value  (as  will  be  exjilained  in  a  moment). 
There  is  no  element  of  surprise.  There  is  a  contiiuied 
eft'ort  to  dri\e  in  at  one  of  four  or  five  points,  each  of 
which  is  ob\iously  a  jjpint  where  success  would  be  of 
ultimate  \alue  to  the  enemy,  and  eacli  of  which  the 
I'rench  now  know  by  heart. 

'fherefore — as  the  points  are  few,  specially  selected, 
and  of  narrf)w  front — failure  upon  them  does  not  cause 
the  abandonment  of  the  effort.  Tlie  troops  broken  at 
the  first  or  the  second  effort  are  witiidrawn,  new  troops 
sent  up,  and  when  these  are  broken  in  their  turn,  new 
troops  again — and  so  on.  At  Vaux,  for  instance,  where 
there  is  barely  room  to  deploy  a  division  in  full  strength, 
something  like  half-a-dozen  divisions  have  been  identified, 
if  1  am  not  mistaken,  from  first  to  last  ;  and  it  is  the  same 
with  all  the  other  points. 

(3)  Against  this  prolonged  system  of  very  intense,  very 
dense  local  attacks,  conlined  to  particular,  points  upon  a 
general  line  of  30  miles  in  length,  the  French  oppose 
nothing  but  what  has  been  well  called  in  one  of  their 
military  phrases,  "  dynamjc  resistance."  It  is  not  a 
wall — that  metaphor  is  bad.  It  is  a  hot  iron  against 
which  nmch  of  the  attacking  material,  often  all  the 
attacking  material,  melts  away. 

(6)  Therefore  the  whole  effort  has  become  one  quite 
outrageously  more  expensive  in  men  for  the  attacking 
side  than  for  the  defenders  and  this  question  oj  com- 
parative expense  is  the  cctpilal  factor  in  the  whole  matter. 
Modern  war  like  primitive  or  savage  w'ar  thus  con- 
ducted eats  up,  not  the  old,  small,  renewable  armies, 
but  the  available  force  of  whole  nations  :  not  in  a  genera- 
tion but  in  a  score  of  months. 

Having  got  all  this  clear,  let  us  proceed  to  the  mam 
question  which  has  puzzled  all  observers  in  this  war  : 
the  German  conception  lying  behind  this  prolonged 
action.  \\'hat  is  their  object  in  going  on  for  forty  days 
and  more  after  failing  in  their  initial  effort  ? 

I  have  said  that  this  cjuestion  is  the  capital  question  of 
the  moment.  It  is  one  I  cannot  presume  to  answer  : 
no  one  can  enter  the  enemy's  mind.  To  do  so  thoroughh' 
in  any  military  conflict  would  be  to  ensure  victory  : 
conjecture  alone  is  possible.  But  one  thing  is  clear. 
There  is  an  immediate  objective — which  is  self-evidently 
insuflicient — and  there  is  an  ultimate  one.  The  imme- 
diate objective  anyone  can  see.  The  Germans  are 
obviously  trying  to  get  troops  into  the  geographical  area 
marked  by  the  houses  of  Verdun.  To  gi\'e  their  eft'ort 
more  meaning  by  changing  the  phrase,  to  call  it  "  taking 
Verdim,"  for  instance,  would  be  misleading.  There  is 
nothing  to  take.  They  are  not  dealing  with  a  fortress 
'ilicy  ii-e  not  in\esting  a  beleaguered  anuy.  I'hcy  are 
trying  to  compel  the  retireiuent  of  troops  upon  a  par- 
ticular sectiT  of  the  front  from  lines  they  at  present 
occupy  to  lines  some  miles  further  east.  In  the  process 
they  could  put  their  troo])s  into  the  area  of  Verdun — 
and  no  luore.  They  are  continuing  in  such  effort  because 
they  believe  that  it  will  not  cost  them  more  in  armed 
men  than  the  ultimate  result  will  cost  the  French.  For 
\ictory  only  means  the  disarming  of  one's  enemy  in  so 
nuich  greater  proportion  than  one's  own  troops  are 
disarmed  during  the  process,  that  he  will  at  last  fall  intc 
a  hopeless  inferiority  and  give  up  the  struggle. 

What  is  that  ultimate  result  which  the  enemy  sees  af 
the  consequence  of  a  mere  French  retirement  bcyont 
Verdun  ? 

fhat  second  main  question  is  the  undecided  kernel  ol 
the  whole  thing.  Before  approaching  it  let  us  answei 
the  first  and  much  simpler  point  :  the  manner  of  th< 
attack  and  its  cost. 

When  wr  have 'studied  how  the  enemv  is  trving  to  reacf 


April  6,  1916 


LAND      &WATER 


Verdun  and  how  far  he  is  succeeding  and  at  ^vhat  rate, 
we  can  turn  to  thc^  much  more  tundamental  aspect  of 
the  question — why  he  sfiould  desire  to  effect  this  change 
and  at  what  cost  he  seems  prepared  to  pursue  it. 

The  present  method  of  attaining  the 
immediate  object 

Tlie  s'jctor  of  tiie  Western  front  witii  wliich  the  enemy 
is  deahng  is  a  sahent  not  ver\-  prominent  and  of  the 
N  character  expressed  in  the  details  of  Sketch  I. 

If  the  reader  will  look  at  this  Sketch  I  he  will  see  that 
the  line,  starting  at  the  edge  of  the  Argonne  at  Boueillcs 
and  curving  round  to  a  point  within  a  mile  of  St.  Mihicf 
upon  the  Meuse,  stands  forward  at  its  most  extreme  point 
about  14  English  miles  beyond  the  nearest  point  which  the 
line  would  occupy  if  it  were  normally  drawn  instead  of 
forming  a  salient.  In  other  words,  the  extreme  depth  of 
the  salient  is  14  miles.  Its  width  across  what  would  be 
the  neck  of  it,  if  it  were  a  salient  more  defined,  but  to 
which  it  is  rather  ridiculous  to  apply  that  metaphor  in  so 
very  slightly  pronounced  a  bulge,  is  just  over  .50  English 
miles. 


StlVtthid 


If  the  enemy  can  get  the  hne  back  to  the  river  Meuse 
above  Verdun,  and  if  he  can  get  it  back  behind  Verdun 
itself,  he  will  apparently  have  effected  his  immediate 


design 


It  sounds  sillv.  It  seems,  at  first  sight,  to  have  rio 
very  definite  military  meaning,  I  know.  But-  that  is 
quite  clearly  what  he  is  doing,  and  we  must  examine 
later  why  he  is  doing  it. 

Now  tiiis  being  clearly  the  object  in  the  enemy's  mind, 
whether  wise  or  unwise,  what  does  it  suggest  to  the 
French  as  the  object  they  should  aim  at  ?  The  answer 
is  obvious.  The  weak  point  in  the  enemy's  scheme  is 
that  he  is  trying  to  get  something  of  debatable  value 
at  a  price  which  must  be  exceedingly  high,  and  which 
mav  pro\-e  disastrously  too  high.  It  is  the  object  of  the 
French  to  make  him  pay  the  very  highest  price  possible. 
So  long  as  he  ])a\s  that  price  territory — within  reason, 
territory  of  'a  fe\v  miles  breadth— matters  nothing.  If 
the  enemy  captures  at  an  expense  of  20,000  men,  a  few 
acres  which  can  lead  to  nothing  more,  save  a  similar 
small  advance  sc\-c;ral  days  later  at  a  similar  cost,  the 
In-ench  merely  consider  the  difference  between  his  losses 
and  theirs  as  a  price  ]5aid.  And  his  losses  are  normally 
from  four  to  four  and  a  half  times  theirs.  If  the  few 
acres  which  he  captures  would  from  tlieir  position  lead  to 
some  immediate  and  more  important  result — for  instance, 
if  they  include  a  dominating  height  for  observation  or 
make  dangerously  narrow  the  neck  of  a  salient,  or  give 
some  other  advantage  which  might  immediately  procure 
fmllier  and  much  larger  results  -then  it  is  worth  while 
lowering  the  [jruportion  of  loss  ;  in  other  words,  it  is  worth 
while  in  that  particular  instance  to  counter-attack  and  to 
rciover  what  vou  have  lost  even  if  in  so  doing  you  lose 


not  the  usual  quarter  or  fifth,  but  half  as  many  men  as 
your  opponent,  or  even  more.  Such -counter-attacks 
have  been  the  exception  in  the  long  story  of  these  six 
weeks,  e\x'r  since  the  (iermans  reached  upon  the  east  of 
ihe  Meuse  the  main  defences  and  ever  since  they  began 
upon  the  west  of  the  Jleuse  their  long  struggle  for  the 
Mort  Homme. 

We  must  remember  in  all  this  that  the  great  war  is 
novel  in  nothing  so  much  as  in  its  scale  ;  both  of  time  and 
of  ninnbers. 

It  is  within  measurable  distance  of  exhausting;  the 
]K)wers  of  certain  of  the  chief  combatants  ;  it  has  more 
nearly  exhausted  the  powers  of  the  Central  Empires  than 
it  has  those  of  the  Allies — even  of  the  French.  It  permits 
by  its  mere  continuation  and  by  the  mere  further  ex- 
liausting  of  the  (\'ntral  Empires  of  a  reserve  of  man- 
power coming  in  from  this  country,  from  Italy  and  from 
Russia.  Therefori'  in  any  sober  judgment  the  debate 
nmst  be  a  debate  on  numbers,  as  has  been  said  here  a 
hundred  times  ;  and  the  (".crnian  Empire  in  particular, 
whenever  it  gives  us  an  opportunity  to  bleed  it  will,  in 
the  bleeding  of  it,  give  us  ultimate  results  of  exactly  the 
same  character  as  the  more  dramatic  and  vivid  results 
obtained  in  a  local  rapid  and  dccisi\e  action. 

We  have,  then,  the  French  noting  the  enemy's  deter- 
mination to  occupy  a  certain  geographical  area  and  his 
readiness  to  spend  a  very  large  number  of  men  in  the 
process  :  a  very  large  excess  indeed  over  the  correspond- 
ing French  losses  :   an  excess  of,  say,  4  or  4.I  to  one. 

He  is  deliberately  spending  this  capital  for  a  future 
return  :  an  ultimate  purpose  still  to  be  discussed.  We 
have  the  French  therefore  doing  everything  not  to  keep 
the  Germans  out  of  the  geographical  area  called  "  Ver- 
dun," emphatically  not  to  do  anything  so  meaningless  in  a 
military  sense,  but  making  him  pay  just  the  very  maximum 
price  possible  ;  and  the  test  of  the  price  is  the  contrast 
between  his  losses  and  theirs.  \\'e  have  the  enemy,  for 
whatever  reasons,  pounding  steadily  a.way  in  his  desire 
ultimately — apparently  at  a  calculated  but  exceedingly 
high  price — to  occupy  that  area.  Let  lis  ask  first  what 
tactical  method  the  enemy  is  pursuing  to  achieve  that 
result. 

The  method  he  is  pursuing  is  the  one  with  which  his 
former  work  on  the  eastern  front  has  made  us  familiar, 
the  creation  of  salients,  or  the  attacking  of  particular 
salients  already  existing  and  the  attempt  to  flatten  out 
such  salients,  each  such  attempt  when  successful  in- 
volving the  occupation  of  the  area  the  salient  formed. 

Now  it  is  quite  clear  on  a  mere  inspection  of  the  broad- 
est points  on  the  map  that  the  salient  of  Verdun  is  not  of 
a  pronounced  kind.  There  is  no  hope  whatsoever  of 
*' cutting  it  off  at  the  neck."  Indeed,  as  I  have  said,  there  • 
is  no  "  neck,"  properly  speaking,  at  all  ;  there  is,  rather, 
a  very  broad  base  thirty  miles  long,  across  which,  even 
before  the  attack  began,  fairly  good  lines  of  supply  ran. 
and  w'liich  now,  with  innumerable  newly-hardened  and 
even  newly-constructed  roads  and  many  light  railways 
can  feed  any  number  of  men  and  guns  at  the  fighting 
front. 

Upon  Sketch  Map  I  we  see  the  main  double  lines  of 
railway  of  normal  gauge,  the  northern  one  from  Ste. 
Menehould  to  Verdun,  being  the  main  line  from  Paris  to 
Metz  and  Central  Germany,  the  southern  one  through 
Revigny  and  Bar-le-Duc  being  the  main  line  from  Paris  to 
Southern  Germany  and  Vienna  by  way  of  Strasbourg. 
While  the  lateral  line  joining  Revigny  and  St.  Jlenehould, 
connecting  them  to  the  northern  of  thesQ  two  lines,  is 
at  all  points  vulnerable  to  long  range  fire,  the  southern  is 
immune.  There  are  further  light  railways  (one  metre 
gauge)  shown  upon  tlie  Sketch.  There  is  a  whole  net- 
work of  excellent  roads  to  which  others  have  been  added 
in  the  last  few  weeks,  and  many  new  60  centimetre  gauge 
field  railways  serving  the  front  in  every  direction.  The 
three  great  railheads,  as  the  French  have  told  us,  and  as 
is  indeed  obvious,  are  Ste.  Menehould.  Revigny  and  Bar- 
le-Duc,  and  from  them  munitions  and  .stores,  and  even 
reinforcements,  when  the\-  are  needed,  pour  into  the  fight- 
ing front. 

But  while  the  enemy  can  hope  for  nothing  by  attacking 
the  existing  corners  of  the  salient  he  can  effect  something 
by  flattening  out  one  after  the  other  the  smaller  subsidiary 
salients  appearing  upon  the  general  trace  of  the  front  and 
so  getting  nearer  to  and  further  threatening  Verdun 
itself ;  since  wc  continue  to  premise  that  his  immediate 


L  A  N  D    &    ^^•  A  T 1-:  k 


April  6,  1916 


object  is  to  put  liis  troops  into  tlvat  particular  geographical 
area. 

Upon  Sketch  I  the  reader  will  at  once  perceive  two 
subsidiary  small  salients,  the  one  marked  by  an  X,  which 
we  may  call  the  salient  of  Uouaumont,  and  the  one  sur- 
rounding the  point  marked  Z  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Meuse,  which  niav  be  called  the  salient  of  Bethincourt. 
Both  these  salients  he  has  been  trying  to  reduce  for  some 
time  and  has  been  particularly  trying  to  reduce  this  week 
by  attacks  at  their  corners  in  the  direction  of  the  arrows 
upon  the  Sketch. 

Let  us  before  going  further  regard  each  of  these  cffort- 
in  detail,  dealing  first  with  the^westeni  one  X  against  the 
plateau  of  Douaumont  and  the  ravine  of  Vaux,  and  nc.vt 
with  the  salient  of  Bithincourt  Z. 

The  Attack  on  Vaux  and   Douaumont 

The  enemy  has  for  weeks  past  had  the  French  in  front 
of  him  in  about  the  situation  shown  in  Map  II,  where 
the  French  front,  as  it  has  stood  for  all  those  weeks. 
is  marked  by  a  thick  black  line.  He  is  in  the  ruins  of 
the  old  fort  of  Douaumont  and  he  is  in  the  ruins  of  Douau- 


A       I      ^"^'^^        1   , — ,  |1 

/i       O  1000 ,        2000ffaT^i3000  i  I 

Dauuaujnt/X 

Vilk^e  '/l''ti\iT(ivtdi^///, 
^  '  VhmamonfA 


'ortofVcaix 


Tudhsittjerman  advance  AprtlT^'icstApnlJ''^ 
TresentLme  x  k  xx  x  «  ^ 


mont  village.  He  has  attacked  over  and  over  agam  in 
the  general  directions  reprisented  by  the  thin  arrows 
starting  from  A,  and  he  has  attacked  over  and  over 
again  towards  the  ravine  marked  by  the  bold  arrow  C 
•  and  from  the  direction  represented  by  the  sheaf  of  thin 
arrows  starting  from  the  point  B.  In  the  last  week  this 
series  of  efforts  (for  which  combined  he  has  over  the  space 
of  forty  days  brought  into  play  lirst  and  last  at  least  six 
divisions)  have  been  continued  with  much  greater  effect. 
Indeed,  the  attack  on  Vaux,  in  its  entirety  has  formed 
an  excellent  example  of  the  fashion  in  which  the  present 
phase  of  the  great  action  is  developing  ;  for  it  has  shown 
us  a  German  offensive  procuring  some  real  tactical  results, 
and  the  corresponding  necessity  on  the  part  of  the 
French  to  counter-attack,  the  whole  object  being,  to 
repeat  what  was  said  just  above,  that  \yhatcver  be  the 
German  object  the  whole  French  object  in  this  business  is  to 
make  the  enemy  lose  disproportionately  in  men  and  never 
to  run  the  risk  of  considerable  local  loss  to  themselves 
save  in  the  rare  cases  where  the  enemy  at  some  immensf 
sacrifice  of  effectives,  has  managed  to  occuiiy  a  point  of 
real  importance  to  his  further  plans.  With  these  premises 
in  mind,  let  us  see  what  the  details  of  the  affair  of  Vau.\ 
have  been. 

Attack    on   Vaux 

Upon  Tlulr^day  night  he  attacked  in  very  great  force  on 
the  north  side  of  the  ravine  at  C,  that  is  from  tiie  direc- 
tion of  the  short  arrow  at  D,  and  failed.  Later  in  the 
night  he  tried  again,  this  time  up  towards  the  ravine 
from  the  south-east  and  from  Vaux  village  and  carried 
the  ruins  of  the  whok-  village.  On  the  F'riday, 
with  new  troops,  but  not  until  late  in  the  afternoon,  he 
made  a  vigorous  eiYort  to  clinch  the  matter  by  getting 
up  the  ravine  C  from  Vaux  and  right  up  to  Douaumont 
old  fort  uj)  on  the  plateau.  He  jm-ssed  thi>  diniciiit 
adventure  ...with  very  dens'j  forces  indeed  and  lost   pro- 


portionately  heavily,   but    failed.     Upon   the   Saturday 
morning  he  tried  again  and  failed  again. 

Upon  Saturday  afternoon  or  evening,  and  apparently 
over  on  to  the  Sunday,  he  deUvercd  and  pressed  the  last 
and  most  formidable  attack.  To  understand  that  attack 
we  must  look  at  the  Sketch  Map  III  more  detailed  than 
Sketch  11  just  presented,  and  showing  all  the  features  of 
that  neighbourhood. 


SC:S<: 


UI 


'  Original  Line 


by  Oennaas  on  AprUi'^ 


As  you  go  up  the  main  street  of  Vaux  you  come  out 
at  the  end  of  the  houses  on  the  western  end  of  the  village 
upon  a  large  pond.  There  is  a  by-road  or  lane  starting 
from  this  pond  and  running  up  the  ravine,  of  which  1  have' 
just  sjwken.  This  lane  mounts  rather  steeply  through 
woods  and  comes  out  into  the  open  on  the  summit  of  the 
plateau  near  the  old  fort,  faUing  into  the  main  road  which 
serves  the  plateau  and  the  fort  at  a  point  where  the  last 
of  the  redoubts  Hanking  the  old  forts  is  situated.  This 
])oint  I  have  marked  on  the  acconiijanying  Sketch  111 
with  the  letter  R.  The  wood  to  the  right,  or  ncjrth. 
of  the  lane  that  comes  up  from  \'aux  is  called  by  the 
general  name  of  the  wood  of  Haudromont ;  the  wood  on 
the  left,  or  south  side,  of  the  lane,  which  covers  the  fall 
of  the  hill,  is  called  the  wood  of  Caillettes.  The  line  upon 
which  the  two  armies  were  struggling,  the  two  parallel 
lines  of  trenches,  ran,  a  week  ago,  so  that  the  ruins  of 
Douaumont  village,  the  old  fort  and  the  extreme  redoubt 
at  R  were  just  in  (ierman  hands.  The  whole  of  the  lane 
was  held  by  the  French,  and  so  was  all  the  western  part 
of  Vaux  village   beyond  the  church. 

The  (iermans,  as  v\e  have  seen,  carried  upon  the  Friday 
night  the  w*  stern  houses  of  the  village.  They  also 
carried  the  ground  round  the  pond,  and  so  possessed 
themselves  of  the  beginning  of  the  lane.  Their  subse- 
(pient  action  was  this  :  They  struck  not  only  up  the 
lane,  but  also  from  the  north,  from  Haudromont  wood, 
and  swept  through  the  wood  of  Caillettes.  There  was  a 
mopient  when  they  were  thus  masters  of  all  the  Vaux  ravine 
and  had  made  of  Douaumont  village,  or  rather  of  the  ground 
just  south  of  it,  a  very  dangerous  little  salient,  and 
at  the  same  time  had  created,  by  the  same  stroke, 
another  dangerous  salient  in  the  promontory  and  plateau 
upon  which  slan«ls  the  old  fort  of  Vaux.  Had  they 
maintained  their  footing  here,  a  rather  large  slice  of  the 
plateau  of  Douaumont  would  ultimately  have  had  to  be 
evacuated,  and  probably  the  promontory  of  the  plateau 
of  Vaux  fort  as  well.  Had  he  held  Caillettes  Wood 
the  enemy  would  soon  have  had  a  considerably  extended 
line  u})on  the  eastern  and  highest  escarpment  of  the 
heights  of  the  Meusc  instead  of  the  very  narrow  front  he 
now  has  upon  the. same  heights  at  Douaumont  alone. 
On  such  an  extended  line  occupying  the  flat  top  of  the 
hills  he  could  have  deployed  a  formidable  striking  force. 

Tile  area  he  had' just  gained  was  therefore  made  the 
object  of  one  of  those  rare  counter-attacks  of  which  the 
French  are  very  diary,  but  which  they  will  run  to  the 
expense  of  when  the  local  conditions  of  the  defence  seem 
to  make  it  necessary.  Immediately  following  upon  the 
(jernian  occupation  of  the  Caillettes  wood  an  intensive 
bombardment  was  delivered  from  the  French  side  upon 
that  ruined  mass  of  beech,  and  upon  Monday  the  ^rd,  a 
sharp  counter-atta'k  reoccupied  the  Wi':'jle  of  it,  with  the 


April  6,  1916 


I-  A  X  D       .S:      \^'  A  T  E  R 


exception  of  a  tiny  belt  just  near  the  redoubt.  The  lane 
was  recovered  b\'  the  French  and  at  the  same  time  all 
the  western  part  of  \'aux  which  had  been  lost  three  days 
before. 

.•^uch,  so  far  as  I  can  follow  it  in  the  communiques 
and  private  accounts,  including  the  French  semi-othcial 
summary  and  letters  in  the  Paris  press,  has  been  the 
story  of  the  German  efforts  against  this  subsidiarv  salient 
of  Douaumont  during  the  last  week. 

The  Salient  of  Bethincourt 

NMien  we  turn  to  the  other  subsidiary  salient,  the  one 
on  the  west,  that  of  Bethincourt,  we  find  something 
characteristic  enough  of  all  this  duel  upon  the  Verdun 
sector  ;  a  much  more  pronomiced-  enen>y  advance,  and 
vet  no  appreciable  enemy  gain.  \'au.\  for  a  moment 
was  a  real  gain  for  the  enemy,  which  liad  to  be  eliminated 
in  its  last  stages.  The  work  upon  the  Bethincourt  salient 
was  not  an\*thing  of  the  kind. 

Let  me  turn,  then,  to  the  details  of  what  the  enemy 
has  attempted  and  done  against  this  second  salient. 

The  main  defence  of  Verdun  upon  this  western  side  of 
the  Meuse  is  marked  upon  Sketcli  I.  and  is  already 
familiar  to  the  reader  as  the  ridge  of  Charnv.  It  corre- 
sponds to,  and  prolongs  the  main  advance,  beyond  the 
river.  Now,  within  the  salient  of  Bethincourt,  some  four 
or  five  miles  in  front  of  Charny  ridge,  there  is.  as  all  the 
world  knows  now,  a  height  called  the  Mort  Homme,  or 
Hill  293,  which  the  French  hold.  If  the  French  lose  this  hill 
they  would  probably  have  to  retire  to  Chaniv  Ridge, 
for  there  is  no  other  good  position  in  between.  At  anv 
rate  they  would  have  lost  the  whole  of  the  Goose  Crest, 
which  runs  from  Hill  295  to  the  river  and  which,  though 
the  most  of  it  is  in  German  hands,  is  of  no  use  to  them 
until  the  summit  of  the  Hill  205  is  taken.  All  the  German 
work  on  this  side,  therefore,  has  been  concerned  with  the 
effort  to  carry  or  turn — at  any  rate  at  least  to  occupy 
Hill  295.  They  have  tried  to  rush  it  :  to  get  round  it  : 
to  dominate  it  by  selling  the  neighbouring  higher  Hill 
304- 

As  with  the  Vaux  salient  on  the  east  so  with  this 
Western  or  Bethincourt  salient,  and  its  vital  point,  the 
Mort  Homme,  there  has  been  the  continuous  double 
effort  upon  either  side  of  its  base,  and  to  follow  this  we 
must  turn  to  Sketch  V  upon  a  larger  scale. 

Upon  Sketch  Map  V  the  reader  will  re,\  rather  roughly 
and  only  approximately,  I  am  afraid,  the  contours  of  the 
neighbourhood.  The  original  French  line  ran  as  does  the 
full  line  upon  Sketch  Map  \'.  covering  Malancourt  and 
Bethincourt,  the  village  upon  the  brook  in  the  bottom 
of  the  valley.  The  capture  of  positions  upon  the  east 
of  this  line  by  the  Germans  and  in  particular  their  capture 
of  the  Crows'  Wood,  brought  the  hne  on  the  east  back  to 
the  dashes  also  shown  on  Sketch  V  and  close  up  to  the 
,Mort  Homme,  or  Hill  295.  Eflforts  spreading  over  three 
weeks  were  made  to  force  this  commanding  position  from 


the  eastern  side.  Tliey  were,  like  :il\  the  eft'orts  which  we 
have  to  retail  in  the  present  account,  immensely  expen- 
sive :  they  were  begun  o\ct  and  o\er  again  and  they  led 
to  nothing.  The  enemy  tiien  began  attacking  the  further 
side  of  the  salient. 

It  will  be  remembered  how  he  carried  the  projecting 
horn  of  the  woods  at  A  and  the  hill  above  Haucourt  at  H, 
after  which  action  he  had  thrust  into  the  French  hues 
trenches  following  the  line  of  dots  on  Sketch  I\'.  The 
French  recovered  the  outlying  part  of  the  wood  at  A, 
advancing  about  as  far  as  the  double  line  upon  the 
Sketch,  and  in  particular  taking  the  redoubt  which 
the  Germans  had  established  on  the  edge  of  the  wood. 
Why  the  French  here  made  one  of  their  very  rare 
counter-attacks  will  be  explained  a  few  lines  lower 
down.  This  was  upon  Wednesday  last,  the  29th,  in  the 
morning.  Meanwhile  for  24  hours  past  the  enemy  had 
been  charging  again  and  again  down  the  open  slopes  in 
front  of  Malancourt  and  Haucourt,  which  is  a  small 
hamlet  attached  to  Malancourt.  These  villages  down  in 
the  valley  obviously  form  a  very  exposed  projection  and 
the  enemy  attacked  with  the  object  of  reducing  it.  On  the 
afternoon  t)f  the  Wednesday,  after  being  repulsed  all  the 
Tuesday  and  all  the  morning  of  the  Wednesdav,  the 
enemy  got  into  the  first  houses  on  the  extreme  north- 
west of  Malancourt  at  C.  Then  he  waited  more  than  24 
hours  to  bring  up  fresh  men.  He  brought  them  up  in 
^•ery  great  force  and  this  is  what  happened  : 

He  attacked  after  nightfall  on  Thursdav  from  down 
the  hill  which  he  held  on  the  west  at  H  and  from  down 
the  hills  in  the  direction  of  the  arrow  at  D.  He  was 
thrown  back.  This  was  about  9  o'clock."  '  He  attacked 
again  at  about  11.  adding  new  troops  to  those  already 
so  severely  tried.  The  attack  was  broken  up  with 
very  heavy  loss.  He  brought  up  yet  more  troops  and 
attacked  again  at  about  one  in  the  morning  of  Friday 
and  got  into  the  first  houses  on  the  south-west  side  of  the 
village  from  the  direction  of  H. 

From  that  moment  till  about  six  in  the  morning,  that 
is  up  to  dawn,  he  fought  his  way  into  the  ruins,  the 
French,  who  had  been  holding  this  projection — or  such  of 
them  as  survived— gradually  falling  back.  By  Saturday 
morning  last  he  had  established  his  line  where  the  dots 
are  marked  upon  Sketch  V. 

There  now  remained,  as  a  result  of  all  these  efforts,  a 
very  pronounced  little  salient  round  the  village  of  Bethin- 
court, which  the  French  might  have  to  give  up  at  anv 
moment.  But  not,  presumablv,  until  the  enemy  had  led 
up  again  the  effectives  of  at  least  a  division  and  had  had 
another  slaughter. 

Note  what  followed,  because  in  its  own  way  it  illus- 
trates as  clearly  as  the  contemporary  fighting  near 
Douaumont  in  the  Caillettes  \\ood  the  manner  in  which  the 
French  are  conducting  these  opierations.  It  was  certain, 
as  I  have  said,  that  the  enemy  would  attack  and  at  heavj' 
loss  reduce  .the  salient  north'  and  west  of  Bethincourt. 
The  concentration  on  the  enemy  side  for  this  purjwse 


Malatxcourt 


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IV 


Boueilles 


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VERDUN 


*«aMii*  -i;.^!. 


8 


LAND      &      WATER 


April  6,  1 01 6 


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V 


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After  aftack  onAwcoure 

Wood     XXXKXKXX 

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I 


was  noted  during  Saturday.  These  concentrations  have 
not  been  rapidly  effected  by  the  enemy  dining  the 
last  stages  of  the  great  struggle  round  Verdun.  They 
have  got  slower  and  slower  because  the  expenditure  of 
men  has  gone  far  beyond  the  original  calculation,  so  that 
the  filling  up  of  gaps  or  the  use  of  fresh  units  has  become 
in  every  case  a  more  difficult  business  than  it  was. 

In  the  night  between  the  Saturday  and  Sunday,  the 
first  and  the  second  of  April,  the  French  abandoned  all 
the  ground  between  the  northern  slopes  and  the  brook  of 
Forges  in  the  valley,  which  marshy  little  watercourse 
runs  directly  from  Haucourt  to  Bethincourt.  (It  is  the 
northern  fork  or  source  of  the  stream,  the  southern  runs 
into  Bethincourt  from  the  valley  between  Hill  304  and 
the  Mort  Homme.) 

All  day  Sunday  and  all  the  follow  ing  night  the  Germans 
delivered  an  intensi\e  bombardment  over  all  the  aban- 
doned area,  believing  it  to  be  still  occupied,  and  on  the 
Monday  noon  they  threw  a  couple  of  brigades  forward  to 
carry  what  thej'  still  believed  to  be  positions  held  by  the 
Ftench.  They  were  caught  there  by  an  enfilading  fire 
from  their  left  as  well  as  by  the  fire  in  front  of  them  from 
beyond  the  brook,  and  paid  a  very  heavy  toll  indeed. 

Such  are  the  fortunes  of  the  Bethincourt  salient  up  to 
the  last  news  received  at  the  moment  of  writing. 

The  Proportionate  Losses 

Let  us  take  this  particular  set  of  actions  upon  the 
narrow  front  between  Avocourt  and  Bethincourt  and 
study  the  object  of  the  enemy  and  the  price  he  has  been 
made  to  pay  in  this  short  time  not  for  obtaining  but  for 
merely  preparing  to  attain  that  object. 

It  is  perfectly  clear  that  efforts  of  this  sort  involving  a 
loss  of  anything  from  10  to  20  thousand  men  with  a  local 
advance  of  anything  from  a  mile  to  a  quarter  of  a  mile, 
at  a  distance  of  10  miles  from  Verdun  itself  and  a 
mere  scratch  upon  the  surface  of  the  general  salient  of 
Verdun,  are  not  undertaken  with  the  mere  object  of 
occupying  such  little  patches  of  territ(jry.  To  understand 
what  the  enemy  is  doing  here,  we  must  carefully  look  at 
the  contours. 

Over  against  the  Mort  Homme,  at  a  range  of  about  2,500 
yards,  is  a  height  called  Hill  304.  If  the  enemy  can  get 
on  to  this  fiat-topped  hill  Mort  Homme  is  turned  and  is 
untenable.  If  Mort  Homme  is  turned  and  is  untenable 
there  is  no  good  defensive,  as  we  have  seen,  tmtil  the 
main  position  is  reached  four  or  five  miles  behind. 


But  Hill  304  is  very  steep  upon  every  side  except  the 
west.  It  juts  out  like  a  sort  of  ])eninsula  boldly  from 
the  plateau.  Therefore  the  (ierman  effort  is  to  take  it 
from  the  easier  contours  of  the  western  side.  The  wood 
at  A  gives  them  cover  j  ust  as  did  the  Crows'  Wood  against 
the  Mort  Homrne  at  the  other  side.  Hence  their  violent 
effort  to  occupy  the  whole  of  it  some  ten  days  ago,  and 
hence  the  French  counter-attack  last  Wednesday,  which 
recovered  all  that  part  of  the  mood  which  climbs  the  first 
rise  of  the  hill.  That  is  where  the  Germans  had  put  u|i 
their  redoubt  which  the  F"rench  recaptured.  The  attack 
to  carry  Malancourt  and  Haucourt  is  of  exactly  the  same 
nature.  It  is  preparatory  to  pushing  up  the  slopes  along  the 
arrow  E,  getting  the  French  out  of  the  horn  of  the  wood 
that  they  occuj^y  and  going  up  both  from  E  and  from  A 
to  carrv  Hill  304.  The  real  effort,  therefore,  to  turn  the 
^lort  Homme  has  not  yet  begun.  Only  the  foundation 
for  it  has  been  laid. 

Now  the  whole  interest  of  these  various  efforts  lies  for 
us  in  the  proportion  of  loss  sustained  compared  with  the 
result  achieved.  One  might  reiterate  that  truth  fifty  times 
and  not  make  it  too  emphatic.  It  is  the  one  thing  which 
gives  the  fighting  in  front  of  Verdun  all  its  meaning. 
And  to  show  the  reader  what  that  meaning  is  let  me  give 
a  couple  of  examples  in  detail. 

The  French  held  Malancourt  and  Haucourt,  the  hamlet 
next  to  it,  with  one  battalion — to  take  that  particular 
case.  Tiiat  is,  they  were  here  prepared,  not  to  sacrifice 
in  its  entirety,  but  to  suffer  very  heavy  losses  in,  a 
unit  which,  even  at  its  full  establishment  (which  it  certain- 
ly had  not  after  the  first  days  of  fighting)  would  have 
numbered  but  a  thousand  men.  Against  this  defensive, 
within  the  ruins  of  Malancourt  and  Haucourt,  the  enemy 
.  launched  forced  difficult  to  estimate  upon  so  small  a 
front  and  coming  over  such  open  ground,  but  not  less  than 
about  twelve  times  as  numerous  as  the  forces  of  the  defen- 
sive. W'e  know  under  what  conditions  they  attacked— 
their  double  repulse,  their  sending  for  reinforcements, 
their  final  triple  action  through  the  night.  We 
have  recei\'ed  from  authoritative  sources,  and  there 
has  been  printed,  with  full  leave  from  the  commanders  in 
the  l-'rench  press,  detailed  accounts  of  what  happened. 
And  we  are  perfectly  certain  that  before  the  Saturday 
morning  was  reached  more  than  12,000  and  probably 
15,000  men  had  been  flung  into  the  massacre  of  that  attack  : 
an  attack  renewed  over  and  over  again  in  formation  s) 
dense  that  it  was  in  the  nature  of  a  swarm.  The  French  were 
."  firing    into    the    brown  "  all   the   time.     B\-  Saturday 


April  6,  1 916 


LAND      tS:      \V  A  T  E  R 


morniiifj;  the  remnant  of  the  defendini;  battahon  evacuated 
the  rums  and  estabhshed  their  new  trenches  just 
outside,  behind  Haucourt.  _ 

There  is,  of  course,  in  the  description  of  such' tilings, 
ample  room  for  the  noblest  emotion  and  the  most  powerful 
description  for  those  who  liave  the  ability,  or  whose  task 
it  is  to  dwell  upon  such  things.  Mine,  here,  is  only  to 
conjecture  the  driest  elements  of  numbers,  because  by 
thess  alone  shall  we  be  able  to  say  that  there  has  be'eu 
success  or  failure  when  the  whole  thing  is  cast  up. 

Well,  what  proportion  of  men  among  this  great  mass 
launched  against  all  three  sides  of  the  little  Malancourt 
sahent  were  hit  ?  It  is  notoriously  difficult  e\en  for  men 
upon  the  spot  to  gauge  the  losses  of  an  enemy,  especialK" 
in  night  lighting.  Kut'look  at  the  mere  common  sense  of 
the  thing.  You  have  these  dense  masses  of  men,  enormous 
for  the  space  occupied  (think  what  twelve  to  lifteen 
battalions  mean  against  r.ymething  half  the  size  of  St. 
James's  Park)  not  rushing  the  small  area  at  a  charge,  but 
thrown  back  again  and  again,  and  getting  in  at  last  from 
wall  to  wall,  after  ample  reinforcement.  The  Ciermans 
cannot  possibly  have  lost  against  Malancoiut  less  than 
four  men  to  the  French  one.  They  may  have  lost  five, 
or  even  six. 

You  have  exactly  the  same  story  in  one  particular 
incident  out  of  the  thirty  or  forty  attacks,  small  and  great, 
against  the  Ravine  of  Vaux.  Tiie  first,  second  and  third 
battalions  of  the  igth  Reserve  Regiment  of  the  German 
5th  Army  Corps  came  on  upon  March  qth — say  rather 
less  than  3,000  men.  They  tried  to  rush  just  before  night- 
fall the  ruins  of  the  village.  They  formed  the  advance 
body  of  the  whole  division  that  was  attacking.  Certain 
companies  were,  in  the  literal  sense  of  the  phrase,  annihi- 
lated. That  is  quite  certain,  because  every  single  mari 
accounted  for  by  the  Freiich  as  dead,  or  wounded 
upon  the  ground,  or  taker,  an  unwounded  prisoner. 

Next  day  the  iqth  of  Reserve  had  to  be  replaced  not 
only  by  another  regiment,  but  by  another  regiment  of 
another  corps,  the  64th  of  the  Ilird  corps. 

I  only  give  these  special  instances,  which  are  dull  in 
their  minute  detail,  in  order  to  show  the  kind  of  thing 
which  is  going  on  round  Verdun. 

The  French  hardly  ever  counter-attack.  They  do  so 
on  the  rarest  of  rare  occasions,  where  something  vital  is 
concerned,  like  the  horn  of  Avoccnut  wood  the  other  day, 
or  the  little  dent  made  behind  the  fort  of  Douaumont  last 
Sunday.  Nearly  all  their  work  is  simply  a  thin  outer 
defensive  that  kills  and  wounds  day  after  day  a  much 
denser  enemy  defensive  perpetually  renewed,  and  as  per- 
petually destroyed. 

We  have  had  precise  details  of  the  establishment  of 
very  many  enemy  companies.  We  have  found,  over 
and  over  again  that  a  third  of  the  effectives  had  to  be 
formed  of  the  1916  class.  In  many  cases  two-fifths  of 
the  effectives  were  formed  of  the  igi6  class,  sometimes 
the  T917  class  were  present.  We  have  had  similarly 
detailed  proofs  of  companies  recently  reinforced  and 
yet  coming  up  for  the  first  assaults  reduced  to  120  rifles. 
The  losses  have  been  as  enormous  as  they  have  been 
continual.  With  a  sufficient  prolongation  of  them,  there 
is  no  particular  reason  why  the  crests  should  not  be  slowly 
occupied,  and  even  the  Meuse  itself  reached.  But  only  at  a 
price  to  the  enemy  which  will  leave  him  exhausted. 

What  then  is  his  final  object  ? 

A  Conjecture  as  to  the  Ultimate  Object. 

I  still  take  it  that  the  enemy's  object  is  mainly  political. 
I  tiiink  he  adds  to  it  the  belief  that  there  is  about  to 
appear  a  revulsion  in  French  feeling  and  that  continued 
hammering  will  hasten  it.  A  true  strategical  object  now 
it  is  impossible  to  discuss. 

The  enemy  is  perpetually  telling  us  that  his  object  is 
not  political  at  all.  That  he  has  some  far-reaching 
scheme  in  this  mere  rhythmic  repetition  of  losses  four  or 
five  times  his  opponents,  and  that  on  some  distant  day 
the  great  result  will  appear.  What  is  it  ?  A  new  line 
west  of  the  Meuse  is  no  conclusion.  To  talk  of  "  turning 
the  frontier  fortresses"  is  to-day  meaningless.  File 
luistern  defence  of  luance  t(j-day  is  not  a  line  of  fortresses 
but  of  trenches. 

I  cannot  but  conclude  that  the  moral  effect  of  an 
entry  into  Verdun  is  the  main  German  object. 

There  is  also  the  second  point  I  have  mentioned.  It  is 
poss'hic  that  the  enemy  believes,  by  some  judgment  he  is 


forming  upon  tiie  I'rencli  temper,  tliat  mere  luunnieriug, 
no  matter  at  what  cost  to  himself  and  no  matter  how  small 
the  French  losses  compared  with  his  own,  will  cause  the 
French  moral  to  break.  It  is  for  him  to  judge  and  for 
the  result  to  show  whether  so  strange  a  conclusion  is  well 
founded.  .  The  attack  (jn  Verdun  has  not  caused  him 
less  than  270,000  men.  It  has  probably  cost  him  nearer 
300,000.  He  may  expect  to  shake  the  confiden.e 
of  the  world  by  the  entry  into  Verdun  or  to  shake  in  a 
more  restricted  area  the  moral  of  the  I'rench  army  by  the 
same  act — to  disgust  them  with  lighting  by  perpetually 
pounding.  He  may  think  it  worth  while  to  lose  half  a 
million.  His  lines  will  still  be  intact  if  he  loses  three- 
quarters  of  a  million.  But  witii  every  fraction  that  he 
throws  away,  if  his  calculation  of  moral'' e.ffect  is  unwise, 
as  we  believe  it  to  be  tmvvise,  he  is  throwing'tiway  a  calcu- 
lable portion  of  his  remaining  power  to  fight.'  - 

The   German  Accounts. 

If  we  wish  to  sound  the  enenu'fs .  inind  in  the 
matter  we  may  do  so  both  by  tiie  effects  j^eis  anxious  to 
produce  upon  neutrals  and  by>  the  accoi^nts.  jwhich  he 
orders  to  be  printed  in  his  domcstio.  press;  :^j(!)jie  Schiibart 
in  the  Allegenieijic  Kinidschaii,  haf.: put  .l^' name  to.  a 
statement,  certainly  censored  and  probably  ordered,  and 
the  gist  of  it  is  in  this  ;-,entencc.  "  We  shall  certainly 
take  Verdun  ;  but  it  will  take  a  long  time."  He  then 
goes  on  to  say  that  it  may  take  jjretty  well  any  length 
of  time  ;  and  bids  us  not  to  expect  any  final  results  on 
the   western  front  "  till  perhaps  next  year -" 

The  Deutschcs  Tagczcitung  tells  us  that  "even  if  we 
measure  only  by  territory  occupied  the  effort- is  well 
worth  while."  The  Frarikjort  Gazette  in  the  matter  of  the 
Mort  Homme  first  says  that  it  has  been  taken  and  then  a 
few  days  later  says  that  it  has  been  "  practically  "  or 
"  virtually  "  taken,  because  on  the  French  maps  the  word 
"  Mort  Homme  "  occupies  a  space  greater  than  the  actual 
summit  of  the  hill  !  The  Cologne  Gazette  a  whole  niouth 
ago  told  its  readers  that  the  I'rench  paper  Homme 
Echanie  had  been  suppressed  "for  announcing  the  fall  of 
Verdiln,"  which  the  French  desired  to  conceal. 

In  the  matter  of  influencing  neutral  opinion  we  get 
exactly  the  same  note.  The  district  near  Verdun  has 
been  flooded  with  American  correspondents,  one  of  whom 
has  been  told  that  the  losses  are  not  "-particularly  severe," 
and  the  worthy  man  confirms  this  by  telling  us  that  he  did 
not  himself  see  any  great  numbers  of  wounded  passing  the 
position  which  had  been  allotted  to  hirii.  The  losses 
could  anyhow  be  replaced.  So  serious  a  neutral  organ 
as  the  cultured  Xation  of  New  York  informs  its  readers 
that  the  (iermans  can  add  one  million  new  recruits  to 
their  present  forces  from  the  young  men  not  yet  taken 
within  the  course  of  this  year.  They  might  as  well  have 
said  a  million  hippogrilYs. 

Everywhere  it  is  the  same  tune.  Verdun  is  to  be 
"  taken  " — a  phrase  which  means  nothing  now  save  the 
occupation  of  a  piece  of  ground.  The  immense  price 
paid  is  either  denied  or  ignored.  When  the  continuation 
of  the  effort  begins  to  disturb  public  opinion  at  home  the 
most  extraordinary  historical  parallels  are  quoted.  The 
people  are  told  that  Verdun — the  mere  town— is  the 
"  heart  of  France" — the  official  phrase  has  already  appear- 
ed quite  seriously  in  another  Cologne  paper.  I  have 
already  pointed  out  the  ludicrous  parallel  with  the  siege  of 
Sevastopol.  The  word  "  investment  "  is  used,  as  though 
of  a  fortress  of  the  old  fashion  surrounded  by  a  containing 
army.  Another  paper  informs  us  that  there  is  "  still 
one  avenue  of  entry  left  to  the  beleaguered  fortress." 

Now  all  this  surely  means  one  thing.  ,  That  for  some 
reason  not  military,  or  at  least  not  directly  military,  the 
mere  ad\-ance  to  the  Meuse  over  a  few  miles  of  ground,  the 
mere  retirement  by  those  few  miles  of  an  unbroken 
enemy  front,  is  to  be  achieved  at  almost  any  cost — at 
almost  any  risk  of  future  weakness  short  of  a  sheer  local 
collapse,  and  therefore  at  almost  any  risk  of  the  catas- 
trophe that  would  follow  sooner  or  later  if  the  exact 
measure  of  losses  tolerable  were  passed.  It  is  an  un- 
satisfactory solution.  It  leaves  the  question  hardly 
answered  at  all — but  I  can  see  no  other.  H.  Bkli.oc. 

A  military  Rugby  match  has  been  arranged  to  take  place 
on  Saturday,  April  Sth,  between  the  New  Zealanders  and 
South  Africans,  at  tlie  Richmond  Athletic  Ground.  All 
))roceeds  resulting  from  tlie  match  will  be  devoted  to  the 
Sailors'  and  Soldiers'  Tobacco  Fund. 


10 


L  A  N  D      c^      W  A  1  h  R 


April  6,  i'ji6 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NEUTRALS 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


THE  week  has  rovcakHl  no  inavkcd  changi-  of  any 
kind  in  tlu-  naval  situation,  though  that  an  air 
raid  has  reached  Scotland  for  the  rirst  time  may 
not  be  without  sifjniticance  to  the  (irand  Fleet. 
The  submarine  campaign  continues  without  any  new  fea- 
ture beyond  maintaining  the  destnictivcness  with  which 
it  started.  The.  tension  between  (iermaiiy  and  Holland 
which  the  'fulmntiii  and  Palambaiig  outrages  have  created 
is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  extraordinary  military 
measures  arc  being  taken  on  the  Dutch  frontier.  We 
need  not  be  surprised  that  these  measures  are  repre- 
sented by  the  Berlin  Wireless  press  as  being  due  to 
an  ultimatum  from  the  Allies  to  the  Dutch  Government. 
.\merica  has  made  no  overt  move,  but  thert;  are  many 
indications  that  the  decision  of  the  American  Ciovern- 
ment  is  taken.  And  |  not  least  interesting  of  these  is 
the  development  of  ttie  political  situation  in  Germany. 

Armament  of   Merchant  Ships 

It  will  be  remembered  that  a  ruthless,  reckless,  sub- 
marine cani)>aign  against  all  ship])ing  plying  with  Eng- 
land or  with  any  of  the  allied  countries — a  campaign 
that  was  to  be  final  and  decisi\e— was  proclaimed  to 
begin  on  the  first  day  of  last  month.  This  proclamation 
was  issued  when  it  was  supposed  that  America  had 
yielded  on  the  point  that  an  arnied  ship  was  in  a' different 
jwsition  from  an  unarmed  ship,  so  that  not  omy  would 
the  ordinary  canons  of  civilised  war  not  apply  in  such  a 
case,  but  Germany  would  be  released  from  the  specific 
promise  not  to  sink  any  liner  or  indeed  merchant  ship, 
without  visit,  search,  and  provision  for  the  safety  of  the 
people  on  board.  But  between  the  proclamation  of  the 
new  campaign  and  the  date  of  its  promised  beginning, 
it  became  ot)vious  that  the  American  Government  was 
not  going  to  accept  the  German  contention  as  to  the 
defensive  arming  of  ships. 

If  the  new  campaign  were  persisted  in,  it  must 
force  President  Wilson's  hand.  There  ensued  a 
struggle  between  civilians  and  extremists  in  the 
Emperor's  council.  The  civilians,  led  by  Von  HoUweg, 
saw  clearly  enough  that  no  submarine  successes  that 
could  reasonably  be  expected  could  compensate  Germany 
for  the  loss  of  American  friendship.  The  extremists  led 
by  von  Tirpitz  insisted  first  that  only  by  submarine  war 
could  any  success  against  England  be  obtained  at  all 
and,  next,  that  only  by  utter  ruthlessness  in  the  treat- 
ment of  all  ships  neutrals  liners,  and  the  rest,  could  any 
success  worth  having  be  obtained. 

While  this  controversy  was  at  its  highest  the  attack 
on  Verdun  failed,  and  Gennan  capacity  to  keep  war  going 
became  gravely  limited  ;  this  in  turn  made  it  doubtful 
whether  a  large  portion  of  the  world's  shipping 
could  be  destroyed,  and  England  thus  brought  to  her 
knees,  before  Germany's  power  of  resistance  must  come 
to  an  end.  The  diplomatists  and  statesmen  could  not 
fail  to  see  that  should  the  submarine  campaign  fail  of  its 
ultimate  goal,  its  reaction  on  the  German  position,  when 
surrender  became  inevitable,  must  be  utterly  disastrous. 
For  the  United  States  was  not  only  the  sole  great  neutral 
power  that  could  help  Germany  in  peace  negotiations,  that 
was  the  sole  commimity  with  the  wealth  and  good  will 
capable  of  putting  Germany  on  her  feet  again  when  the 
war  was  over.  The  failure  at  Verdun  then  was  the 
decisive  factor  in  the  dismissal  of  \o\\  Tirpitz  and  the 
abandonment  of  his  jjolicy. 

It  was  here  that  tlie  (ierman  Govermuent  paid  the 
penalty  of  the  peculiar  methods  it  had  adopted  to  en- 
slave the  public  opinion  of  its  pecjplc.  For  a  year  or 
more  the  shipowner  paying  demunage  on  his  idle  shij) 
in  American  ports,  the  ruined  merchants  of  Hamburg, 
the  crippled  manufacturers,  and  the  half-starved  jnolc- 
tarians  had  been  told  that  all  their  losses  and  sufferings 
had  been  causc-d  by  F^ngland.  and  that  the  War  Lord's 
vengeance  was  falling  upon  that  country  by  his  destruction 
of  her  ships.  The  first  of  March  was  to  have  seen  this 
campaign  quadrupled  in  violence,  A'on  Tiri^itz,  a  greater 


master  of  political  agitation  and  intrigue  than  (jf  naval 
>cience — it  was  his  famous  League  that  besotted  the 
Germans  into  thinking  that  they  would  become  a  naval 
j)cople,  and  perhaps  the  final  and  determining  factor  in 
persuading  them  that  Great  Britain  could  be  ignored  in 
the  world  conquest  upon  which  Germany  entered  20 
months  ago — \'on  Tirpitz  had  so  organised  things  that, 
if  he  could  not  save  himself,  he  could  at  any  rate  save  his 
policy.  The  protest  against  submission  to  the  neutrals 
was  instantaneous  and  universal.  Within  five  days  of 
the  Grand  Admiral's  disiuissal,  the  Ivmperor  had  to  order 
the  initiation  of  his  programme,  in  spite  of  its  author  being 
no  longer  in  j)owcr.  The  first  and  obvious  moral  of  the 
situation  then  was  that  the  Clovernment  of  Germany  no 
longer  had  Germany  in  hand  and  consequently  was  no 
longer  master  of  its  own  actions. 

During  the  past  week  a  great  effort  has  been  made  to 
re-establish  the  authority  of  the  Chancellor.  A  com- 
mittee of  all  the  Reichstag  parties  has  been  formed,  and 
they  have  heard  trom  the  Chancellor,  from  Dr.  Hellferich 
and  from  the  secretary  of  the  Marine  Amt  a  full  exposition 
of  the  military  and  diplomatic  position.  The  object  of  the 
Government  was  to  obtain  a  resolution  which  should 
pass  the  Reichstag  unanimously  and  give  the  Chancellor 
and  his  august  master  a  free  hand  to  deal  with  the 
situation. 

Two  parties  apparently  stood  out  against  the  course 
which  was  finally  adopted.  The  new  SociaUsts  took  up 
a  line,  the  details  of  which  are  not  given  to  us.  But 
they  are  not  difficult  to  guess,  and  Herr  Ledebourg,  who 
represented  it  on  the  Committee,  was  a  final  dissentient 
from  the  resolution  which  all  the  other  parties  accepted. 
But  the  Radicals  seem  to  have  accepted  it  only  after  a 
struggle  for  a  very  material  alteration.  The  resolution, 
as  agreed  upon,  recites  that  the  submarine  is  an  effective 
weapon  against  England,  that  such  use  must  be  made  of 
it  as  will  guarantee  the  winning  of  a  peace  that  secures 
the  future  of  Germany,  and  that  any  negotiation  with 
neutral  states  must  provide  that  "  while  their  just  interests 
are  to  be  respected,  the  German  Government  is  to 
reser\-e  such  freedom  in  the  use  of  the  submarine  as  is 
necessary  for  the  full  assertion,  of  Germany's  sea  power." 
The  radicals  tried  hard  to  limit  the  resolution  to  saying 
that  the  submarine  must  be  used  against  Germany's 
enemies  only.  But  having  failed  they  accepted  the 
decision  of  the  majority.  It  is  claimed  in  the  semi- 
official press  that  the  resolution  re-estabhshes  the 
authority  of  the  Chancellor.  It  seems  on  the  contrary 
as  if  it  were  the  agitators  that  have  prevailed.  For  there 
is  no  conciliation  to  neutrals  in  a  doctrine  which  says 
that  Germany's  necessity  is  to  be  a  measure  of  Germany's 
freedom  to  use  force  at  sea,  and  is  to  be  the  criterion  of 
(iermany's  judgment  as  to  the  limits  of  right  and  justice 
that  neutral  powers  can  claim. 

A  German  View 

The  significance  of  the  situation  is  perhaps  best  con- 
veyed by  its  effect  on  the  cooler  German  minds.  We 
saw  last  week  how  Maximilian  Harden  welcomed  the  dis- 
missal of  von  Tirpitz  as  a  triumph  of  reasoned  statesma;i- 
ship  over  insane  militarism.  The  failure  of  the  Reichstag 
to  back  up  this  triumph,  and  its  determination  to  commit 
the  German  nation  to  a  crazy  campaign  of  outrage,  has 
evidently,  made  hhn  despair  of  his  countrymen.  "  In 
spite  of  uncountable  \ictories,"  he  says  "  the  war  is  a 
cruel  misfortune.  In  spite  of  Bethmann  Hollweg's  lamen- 
table 'scrap  of  paper '  statement,  Germany  wants 
treaties  to  be  res]x>cted.  Let  us  all  agree  that  .the  war 
was  a  mistake,  made  not  by  one  but  by  all,  though  not 
e(pially  by  all,  and  you  will  find  Germany  ready  to 
organise  the  pea<'e  of  Europe.  The  hour  has  come  foi 
the  Kaiser  and  the  Chancellor  to  state  their  war  ends. 
Our  enemies  are  afraid  that  after  the  war  Germany 
will  continue  to  arm  herself  and  prepare  other  wars. 
This  would  mean  an  attempt  to  world  rule  and  would 
bring  all  those  who  would  sign  peace  with  us  in  deadly 


April  ,6,  1916 


LAN  D      &     WA  TER 


II 


I.  Td 

nniary 

G 

f 

A 
N 
N 

N 

■  ( 

^ 

(A) 

A 

Feb. 

NL 

(ETn 

NA 

.     N 

N 

A 

N 

1  2  3  45^6  7  8  ^\0\XXLVb'l\\SU>\'J\&\<)1£iUl%73Vt25Zi>l7X%Z9 

II.  March , 

A 

N 
A 

N 
N 

N 
N 

A 

A 

c 

N 

Mar 

A 
N 

(A 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

A 

A 

A 

N 

N 

I 

Z 

3  4-  56  7  8  ^  10  U  12 13  H 15 16 17  IS  19  ilO^JIW  23  24  2526  Z72S  25  3031 

1 

2 

3 

ip?z7 


The  above  diagrams  show  ships  attacked  or  sunk  by  mines  and  submarines  in  the  months  of  February  and    March  and   the  first- 
three  days  of  April,   1916 


danger.  This  will  never  be.  Nobody  will  remember 
this  war  with  pleasure.  Let  us  end  it  and  organise  peace. 
To  hush  up  this  desire  for  peace  because  it  would  prove 
our  weakness  is  folly.  Germany  has  learned  the  mysterious 
ivays  of  Providence." 

it  is  hardly  necessary  to  ])(jiut  tlie  moral  of  Hi'rr 
Harden's  words.  The  ominous  arming  of  the  Dutch, 
the  hardly  less  ominous  silence  of  the  American  (Govern- 
ment, these  things  tell  their  own  tale.  The  wholesale 
destruction  of  neutral  ships  has  long  since  made  all 
civilised  people  condemn  the  Germans  in  their  con- 
sciences. These  judgments  cannot  indetinitely  remain 
untranslated  into  action.  In  the  case  of  Holland  and 
Denmark,  their  land  frontiers  are  so  vulnerable  as  to 
make  the  initiation  of  action  against  Germany  as 
quixotic  an  affair  as  was  the  belligerence  of  Belgium. 
Both  probably  would  fight  as  brayely  as  did  Belgium 
if  war  were  forced  upon  them.  But  to  begin  it  them- 
selves is  another  story^  No  such  danger  threatens 
America.  There  the  obstacles  to  defending  the  national 
dignity  and  to  following  the  dictates  of  national  honour 
are  domestic,  not  foreign.  But  those  obstacles  are  being 
slowly  but  surely  removed.  It  is  at  any  rate  as  clear  as 
noonday  now  that  President  Wilson  will  not  abate  his 
insistence  that  the  submarine  cannot  ever  be  a  legitimate 
vessel  in  the  war  on  commerce.  There  is  no  reconcilia- 
tion possible  then  between  American  principle  and  the 
German  practice.  What  the  Americans  are  beginning  to 
see  is  that  there  is  no  reconciliation  possible  between 
American  principle  and  American  practice.  The  folly 
of  the  Tirpitz  programme,  clear  as  the  sun  in  heaven  to 
all  dispassionate  observers,  so  clear  to  Maximilian  Harden 
that  he  sees  no  alternative  between  national  ruin  and 
immediate  peace,  will  perhaps  not  be  made  intelligible 
to  the  Germans  until  its  inevitable  fruit,  the  belligerency 
of  America,  at  last  brings  it  home  to  them.  It  may 
need  this  to  lift  the  veil  from  the  mystery  of  Providential 
ways. 

The  Schleswig  Raid 

At  the  time  of  writing  last  week  we  had  practically 
no  details  of  the  affair  off  the  Island  of  Sylt.  There  was 
little  to  record  then  beyond  the  fact  that  three  seaplanes 
had  been  lost  in  attack  on  the  Zeppelin  bases  at  Toudern, 
and  that  the  aircraft  that  made  the  attack  had  been 
brought  to  the  North  Frisian  archipelago  by  Conunodorc 
Tyrwhitt's  light  cruiser  squadron.  We  have  still  no 
detailed  account  of  the  proceedings,  but  there  is  enough 
to  show  that  brilliant  work  was  done  in  circumstances  of 
quite  extraordinary  difficulty.  According  to  telegrams 
from  Danish  sources,  Commodore  Tyrwhitt's  achance 
was  disputed  by  five  cruisers,  20  destroyers,  5  hydro- 
planes and  the  Zeppelin  L14.  But  they  do  not  seem  to 
have  put  up  much  of  a  fight,  for  no  damage  to  any  British 
ship  is  reported  as  inflicted  by  the  enemy,  there  seems  to 
have  been  no  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  only  loss 
is  three  seaplanes,  all  of  which  were  compelled  to  descend 


but  her  people  were  taken  on  board  a  destroyer,  so  that 
there  was  no  loss  of  life. 

The  Naval   Action 

The  Scotsman  has  published  a  vivid  account  of  what 
took  place,  from  which  it  a])pears  that  the  venture  was 
made  in  a  high  sea  and  a  blinding  snowstorm.  It  nuist 
have  been  Quiberon  ovcp  again,  though  on  a  small  scale. 
Two  armecl  (jerman  trawlers  were  sunk.  A  destroyer 
was  rammed  by  the  Cleopatra,  and  a  battle  hydroplane 
was  brought  down.  At  lirst  it  was  believed  that  a 
submarine  was  dcsti-oyed  also,  but  this  the  (lermans 
deny.  The  German  cruisers  do  not  seem  t'>  have  cut 
much  of  a  figure,  but  it  is  probable  that  Commodore 
Tyrwhitt's  ships  were  better  handled,  and  that  his 
gunnery  was  more  equal  to  the  severe  conditions.  They 
probably  showed  a  wise  •  discretion  in  keeping  away. 
In  the  heavy  weather  the  destroyers  would  have  been 
exceedingly  difficult  to  handle.  The  writer  in  the  Scots- 
man says  that  several  destroyers  retreated  in  flames  and 
badly  hit.  That  one  was  run  down  by  Cleopatra  would 
leave  one  to  suppose   that  it  was  either  unmanageable  or 


SORTES     SHAKESPEARIAN^, 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE. 


THE     KING'S     GIFT. 

/  thank  Ihee,  King, 
For  thy  great  bounty. 

RICHARD  II.,  IV.,  i,,  299-300. 


Mr.    ASQUITH    IN    ROME. 

Set  xve  forward;  let 
A  Roman  and  a  British  ensign  zvave 
Friendly  together. 

CYMBEUNE  V,  v.  4E0-2. 


by  engine  trouble 
enemy's  fire.     One 


-not  as  I  supposed  last  week  by  th-. 
ship.  Medusa,  was  lust  liy  collision, 


PRESIDENT  WILSON'S  NEXT  NOTE  TO  COUNT 
BERNSTORFF:     A  SANGUINE  FORECAST. 

/  ivill  not.  look  upon  your  master  s  lines  • 

I  know  they  are  sltiff  'd  with  protestations 

And  full  of  nctv-found  oaths,  which    he 
will  bi-eak 

As  easily  as  I  do  tear  his  paper. 

TWO  GENTLEMEN  OF  VERON.V,  IV.   iv..  1.35-8 


12 


LAND      cS:      WATER 


April  6,  1916 


was  coinmandid  by  an  otVuir  who  had  more  courage 
than  good  fortune.  It  speaks  well  for  the  seamanship  of 
Commodore  Tyrwhitt's  officers  that  tlie  whole  of  tlu- 
peoplp  in  the  .^hdiisa  should  be  sa\ed,  and  a  large  number 
of  prisoners  picked  »ip  out  of  the  armed  trawlers  that 
were  sunk.  That  such  a  venture  should  have  been  made 
in  such  conditions  is  eloquent  of  the  enterprise  and  pro- 
fcisional  mastery  of  those  that  undertook  it.  It  resulteci 
in  the  enemy  being  driven  -off,  and  the  iield  being  Jeft 
clear  for  the  flyers.  Thc\-  apparently  went  up  on  the 
following  day—  and  in  better  weather. 

Submarine  Losses 

1  gi\e  to-day  graphs  representing  the  submarine  Iossl'S 
reported  at  J-loyd's  for  the  months  of  February.  March 
and  the  lirst  throe  days  in  April.  As  usual,  Mediterranean 
losses  are  distinguished  in  circles,  Allied  and  Neutral 
losses  by  the  initials  "  .\  "  and  "  X."  In  l-'ebniary  it 
will  be  noted  that  there  were  jj  losses  altogether,  of 
which  6 — 2  Neutral,  2  Allied  ancl  >  British — took  place 
in  the  Mediterranean  Tiiere  were  therefore  27  ships 
attacked  in  home  waters  in  _'()  days.  Of  these  10  were 
Neutrals  and  3  Allied,  leaving  a  total  of  British  losses  in 
home  waters  of  12.  The  total  losses  in  March  are  41), 
of  which  .)— -2  British  and  Neutral — were  in  tlie  Mediter- 
ranean, lca\'ing  46  in  home  waters.  Of  these  14  were 
Neutral,  8  Allied  and  24  were  British.  The  losses  in  the 
first  thi-ec  days  of  April  are  11,  of  which  6  are  Neutral 
and  the  rest  British. 

If  we  regard  the  new  campaign  as  having  been  in- 
augurated on  the  20th,  the  losses  in  the  preceding  48 
days,  that  is  from  the  ist  February  to  the  20th  of  March, 
were  43  ships.  In  the  15  days  the  20th  of  March  to  the 
3rd  of  April  inclusive,  we  have  41  ships  gone.  The  new 
campaign  then  has  raised  the  rate  of  destruction  by  joo 
per  cent.  The  actual  loss  is  at  the  rate  of  2.74  ships  per 
day.  The  highest  rate  ever  reached  since  February  of 
last  year,  except  by  the  15  days,  between  August  8th 
and  22nd  inclusive,  when  47  ships  were  attacked.  This 
is  the  only  period  during  which  the  rate  of  loss  exceeded 
3  a  day.  It  is  perhaps  worth  remembering  that  before 
mid- September  the  rate  had  fallen  again  to  what  it  was 
up  to  tne  20th  March.  It  will,  of  course,  fall  again  now. 
But  it  would  be  rash  to  say  how  soon.  Such  losses  arc, 
or  course,  enormously  more  serious  now  than  they  were 
last  August,  simply  because  these  losse.-;  are  cumulative, 
and  the  demands  on  our  shipping  for  the  oversea  forces 
become  greater  as  time  goes  on  and  our  numbers  at  the 
\-arious  fronts  increase.  Anything  the  Government  can 
do  in  the  way  of  restricting  imports,  other  than  of  things 
necessary  to  productive  trade,  to  feeding  the  population, 
an(}  to_the  supply  of  the  armies,  should  be  done  at  once. 
In  this  matter  no  precaution  can  be  taken  too  soon. 

The  Zeppelin  Raids 

The  recent  Zeppelin  raids  have  been  marked  by  two 
interesting  features.  F'or  the  first  time  an  enemy  airshiji 
has  been  brought  down  by  gunfire,  and,  also  for  the  first 
time,  the  Zeppelins  have  reached  Scotland.  Hitting  an 
airship  travelling  at  a  high  speed  and  at  a  great  altitude 
has  been  shown  by  the  experience  of  the  war  to  be  a  matter 
of  so  great  difficulty,  that  while  giving  every  credit  to 
those  who  have  performed  the  task  successfully,  it  is 
idle  to  shut  our  eyes  to  the  fact  that  success  is  quite  im- 
possible without  exceptional  luck.  This  detracts  nothing 
from  the  merits  of  those  who  ha\c  achieved  the  task. 
Theoretically  no  doubt,  stationary  guns  could  be  equipped 
with  fire  control  instruments  that  would  make  success 
almost  a  certainty.  Those  who  have  studied  this  ques- 
tion longest  arc,  it  seems  to  me,  most  confident  that  the 
difficulties  can  all  be  overcome.  But  for  fear  that  people 
should  run  away  with  the  idea  that  there  has  been  any 
gross  neglect  in  this  matter — at  any  rate  since  the  war 
began — it  should  be  made  clear  that  the  number  and 
elaboration  of  the  control  installations  required,  would 
make  such  demands  on  the  instrument  makers  that,  had 
they  been  put  in  hand,  it  would  have  been  quite  im- 
ywssible  to  su])])ly  the  far  more  urgent  needs  both 
of  the  fleet  and  of  the  armies  at  the  front.  To  construct 
a  scientific  gun  barrier  would  need  a  group  of  2  or  4  guns 
on,  say,  ever}'  2  miles  of  front,  and  those  whose  curiosity 
is  equal. to  the  task  of  picking  out  all  the  vulnerable  spots 
in  England,  can  figure  it  out  for  themselves,  the  length  of 
the   lines   required   for   any   reasonably    adequate   pro- 


tection. The\'  can  then  estimate  the  demands  that  the 
fitting  out  of  these  lines  would  make  on  the  gun-making 
and  instrument  making  capacity  of  the  coimtry. 

Aircraft  and  the  Grand  Fleet 

The  fact  that  the  Zeppelins  liave  reached  Scotland 
raises  the  question  whether  the  enemy  is  forming  designs 
on  our  naval  bases  in  the  North.  As  we  have  seen, in 
previous  papers,  the  probability  of  airships  being  able  to 
injure  war  \essels  under  way  is  exceedingly  slender, 
("ommodore  Tyrwhitt's  most  recent  and  most  brilliant 
pcrfornianccs  oft  the  Island  of  Sylt,  where  he  had  3 
battle  bi))lanes  and  a  Zeppelin  opposed  to  his  cruisers 
and  destroyers,  confirmed  the  experiences  of  the  Cux- 
ha\en  raid,  and  srems  to  be  conclusive  as  to  the  capacity 
of  well-handled  ships  to  out-manteu,vre  aircraft  of  all 
kinds  without  dilliculty.  The  situation,  liowe\er,  would 
be  very  different  if  any  considerable  number  of  airships 
could  be  brought  over  a  harbour  in  which  a  battle  fleet 
was  anchored.  Hei-e  again  the  experienccb  of  the  Cu\- 
haven  raid  are  instruc.ive.  The  Von  der  Tann.  which 
was  conspicuous  in  the  raid  on  Scarborough  and  Whitby, 
was  absent  from  \-on  Hipper's  stiuadron  in  the  affair  of 
the  Dogger  Bank.  That  she  was  desperately  injured  in 
the  air  attack  on  Cuxhavcn  has  been  widely  stated  in  the 
American  press.  It  is  not  supposed  that  she  was  actually 
damaged  by  bombs  dropped  on  that  occasion,  but  it 
seems  certain  that  the  raid  threw  all  the-  shipping  into 
confusion,  and  that  hectic  efforts  were  made  to  get  out 
of  the  harbour^as  was  recently  the  case  at  Zeebriigg^.'. 
It  was  in  the  consequent  confusion  that  ^'on  der  Tann 
is  supposed  to  have  run  foul  of  some  other  ship  or  stone 
work,  and  so  to  have  put  herself  out  of  action.  No  doubt 
the  probabilities  of  Zeppelins  catching  any  of  the  Grand 
l""leet  in  similar  conditions  are  small.  But  that  an 
attempt  to  get  at  the  Fleet  from  the  air  seems  more 
probable  now  than  it  ever  has  seemed,  is  indisputable 

Control  of  the   Air  Service 

The  feat  of  Lieutenant  Brandon  seems  to  have  ri\alled 
that  of  the  late  Lieutenant  \\'arneford,  V.C,  and  it  will 
gi\e  a  new  lease  of  life  to  the  theory  that  the  right 
place  to  fight  Zeppelins  is  the  air.  The  evolution  of 
right  doctrines  in  this  very  vital  matter  must  be  left  to 
the  experts — for  it  would  be 'as  grave  a  misfortune  for 
too  many  aeroplanes  to  be  kept  for  home  defence  as  for 
the  ordaiance  and  instrument  makers  to  be  monopolised 
by  providing  anti-aircraft  guns  and  sights. 

I  confess  1  noted  with  the  deepest  regret  Pro- 
fessor Wilkinson's  endorsement  of  Mr.  Pemberton- 
Billing's  complaints  in  Parliament  on  this  subject. 
Professor  Wilkinson  justly  holds  the  very  highest  place 
as  a  lay  critic  of  military  strategy.  Yet  in  his  letter  to 
The  Times  he  seems  to  me  to  have  fallen  into  a  most 
dangerous  error.  This  letter  seemed  to  amount  to  the 
adx'ocacy  of  land  war,  sea  war,  and  air  war  being  treated 
as  three  quite  separate  and  distinct  activities.  But  our 
experience  of  the  last  twenty  months  should  have  opened 
our  eyes  in  this  matter.  It  is  true  that  except  in  purely 
coastal  operations,  naval  fighting  and  land  fighting  are 
so  entirely  dissociated,  and  the  character  of  sea  fighting 
and  land  fighting  are  so  entirely  different  as  to  make 
their  separation,  both  for  strategical  disposition  and 
ministrati\-e  supply,  a  logical  necessity  of  war.  But 
the  amphibious  undertakings,  on  an  unprecedented  scale 
which  the  last  thirteen  months  have  witnessed,  should 
have  taught  us  that  there  are  terrific  dangers  in  the 
principle  oi  separation,  even  in  the  case  of  two  services 
where  joint  work  is  the  exception  rather  tlian  the  rule. 


Aktuik  Pollen 


Professor  Bald^vin.  who  was  on  board  the  Channel  steamer 
Sussex  when  she  was  torpedoed  and  at  one  time  was  thought 
to  have  perished,  has  brought  out,  tiirough  Messrs.' Putnam's 
Sons,  a  \-olunie  on  Amtrican  Xcidralily  :  its  Cause  and  Cure. 
The  Professor's  \-ievv  cannot  be  better  explained  than  in  this 
sentence,  almost  the  last  in  the  l)ook  :  "  This  is  not  a  Furo- 
pean  conflict  :  it  is  not  an  un-.Xmerican  war  ;  it  is  a  human 
conllict,  a  world-war  for  the  preservation  and  extension  of 
what  is  of  eternal  \alue.  the  right  to  self-governnieiit  and  the 
maintenance  of  public  morality."  This  may  be  said  to  be  the 
thesis  of  the  volume  and  most  ably  is  it  argued  out.  The 
Professor's  final  hope  is  that  the  war  will  draw  together  "  tlie 
three  Great  Powers  of  the  .Atlantic  that  love  justice  and  the 
life  of' peace— France,  England  and  tli'.;  I'nitcd  States.  " 


April  6,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


13 


The   Position   in   Holland 

By  John  G.  Van  der  Veer 

(London  Editor  of  the  Amsterdam   "  Telei^raaf.") 


IHA\'E  been  asked  to  throw  some  light  on  the 
present  position  in  Holland,  since  rumours  about 
certain  measures  taken  last  week  by  the  Dutcli 
Government  have  caused  undue  misapprehension. 
\\'e  Dutchmen  here  arc  just 'as  much  in  the  dark  as 
anyone  else  about  the  true  meaninf(  of  those  measures. 
But  to  me  the  greatest  puzzle  is,  how  any  Britons  could 
conclude  from  them  that  Holland  might  throw  in  hvv 
lot  with  the  Central  Powers  and  thereby  commit  suicide. 
For  every  sane  Dutchman  understands  quite  clearly  that 
such  and  nothing  else  would  be  the  result  of  a  small 
neutral  nation  siding  with  the  only  aggressive  Power. 

The  fate  of  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  has  certainly  not  been 
lost  on  level-headed  Dutchmen,  whose  love  of  their  inde- 
p.'rfdence,  so  dearly  bought  and  so  stubbornly  maintained, 
is  historically  ingrained  in  them  and  will  never  be  rooted 
out.  I  am  not  now  saying  that  (icrmany  has  at  the 
present  moment  any  intention  of  threatening  Holland, 
but  I  do  say  that  the  Allies  have,  since  the  beginning  of 
this  war,  never,  either  by  word  or  deed;  threatened  even 
ntho  neutrality  of  Holland,  far  less  her  independence  and 
the  integrity  of  her  rich  Colonies.  What  Germany  might 
have  done,  had  she  been  able  to  win  the  war,  is  a  different 
matter,  and  I  shall  refer  presently  to  what  leading  Ger- 
mans have  at  various  times  openly  stated  about  the 
position  of  Holland. 

The  Rumoured  Ultimatum 

One  further  preliminary  remark  is  necessary  about 
these  rumours.  It  was  reported  that  after  the  recent 
Conference  held  at  Paris,  the  Allies  were  to  have  presented 
to  Holland  an  ultimatum  to  allow  the  landing  of  Allied 
troops  on  Dutch  soil  apparently  for  an  attack  on  Ger- 
many's weakest  spot.  Such  delusions  have  from  time  to 
time  been  spread  in  Holland,  but  they  never  had  anv 
foundation  whatsoever.  W'e  alwa^'s  knew  from  what 
source  these  reports  came.  The  large  mass  of  Dutch 
opinion,  whose  sympathies  in  this  war  are,  or  ought  to  be 
well  known,  never  paid  any  heed  to  them.  Personally,  I 
iind  them  so  ridiculous  that  their  contradiction  is  any- 
thing but  pleasant  to  me.  But  T  am  fully  convinced, 
that  nothing  was  decided  at  Paris  which  could  in  anv 
way  cause  uneasiness  in  Holland.  The  recent  measures 
taken  by  the  Dutch  Government  cannot  therefore  be 
explained  by  the  totally  unfounded  fear  that  the  Allies 
might  be  tempted  to  do  to  Holland  what  Germany  did 
to  Belgium. 

What  then  is  the  true  explanation  ?  To  begin  with, 
we  may  be  quite  sure  that  any  measures  taken  by  our 
Government  at  the  Hague  have  only  one  object,  and  that 
is  :  To  defend  at  all  cost  the  neutrality  of  Holland,  and 
in  case  of  need  her  honour  and  her  full  independence. 
The  Dutch  people  of  to-day  have  not  withdrawn  frpm 
the  position  0/  their  heroic  ancestors,  to  whose  "  coura- 
geous resistance  of  historical  and  chartered  liberty  to 
foreign  despotism  "  John  Lothro  Motley  paid  so  warm 
a  tribute.  We  have  our  small  group  of  pro-Germans, 
whose  sympathies  run  eastward,  and  are  loudly  pro- 
claimed in  the  notorious  pro-German  weeklv  De  Toekomst. 
out  of  all  proportion  to  their  influence.  Most  of  our 
people  have  overwhelming  s^Tiipathy  with  the  cause  of 
the  Allies.  Could  it  be  otherwise  in  a  country  which 
prides  itself  on  having  been  the  birthplace  of  the  illus- 
trious Hugo  Grotius  ?  We  should  betray  his  great 
name  by  siding  with  a  Power  which  in  this  war  violated 
all  those  ma.xims  on  the  conduct  of  war  expounded 
in  his  master  work,  The  Rights  of  War  and  Peace. 

To  revert  to  the  measures  taken  by  the  Dutch  Govern- 
ment, I  find  in  my  paper  of  last  Friday  the  following 
reports  issued  from  the  Correspondence-Bureau  at  The 
Hague  :  "  We  learn  that  for  the  time  being  all  leave  of  the 
(Dutch)  naval  and  army  forces  has  been  stopped,  " 
"  The  highest  military  authorities  of  the  naval  and 
military  forces  were  busy  conferring  together."  "  The 
^linister  for  Home  Affairs  had  conferences  with  the 
Director  of  the  Cabinet  of  the  Oueen  and  with  the  Minister 


for  Foreign  Affairs."  "  It  is  rumoured  that  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  will  hold  a  secret  session."  And  immediately 
underneath  these  reports  I  read  :  "  Dr.  Bos  (the  parlia- 
mentary leader  of  the  Dutch  party  of  Liberal  Democrats) 
writes  (in  the  organ  of  that  party)  :  "  Not  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  has  such  an  emotion  overmastered  the 
Dutch  people,  as  that  caused  bv  the  torpedoing  of  tin- 
Tuhanlid.  The  base  attack  on  a' passenger  boat  of ,  <i 
neutral  power,  without  warning  and  reason,  lias  stirred 
the  cool  blood  of  the  Dutchmen  to  boiling  point.". 

Torpedoed  Dutch  Steamers 

Is  that  statement  the  clue  to  the  foregoing  reports  ? 
I   know   how   deeply    the    torpedoing    of    the    Dutch 
steamers  Tubantia    and  Palambang  has  stirred  and  hurt 
the  feelings  of  our  people.     And  there  is  no  doubt  what- 
soever, in  Holland,  that  both  these  steamers  were  sunk 
by  a  German  submarine.     The  sinister  attempt  to  throw 
the  blame  on  the  English,  failed  altogether.     The  Dut.  h 
say    rightly  :    "  Why    should    the    English    sink    Dutch 
steamers,  which  carried  no  contraband  to  or  from  Cier- 
many."     Even  in  such  a  case,  the  Enghsh  never  sink  a 
neutral  merchant  ship.     In  the  unbiassed  and  influential 
Dutch  monthly  De  Gids  it  was  stated  last  December  : — 
"  Whereas   the  manner   in  which   England,   during  this 
war  acts  at  sea  will  in  future  not  be  considered  as  in 
conflict  with  the  Law  of  Nations — for   that    Law,  which 
.    always  mainly  consisted  of  the  rights  of  war,  has  to  reckon 
with  changed l)circunistancer  and  adapt  itself  to    them  — 
the  way    in  which  Germany   tries   to  rule  over  any  por- 
tion   of    the    open    sea  is    on    a   totally   different   level. 
It  is  certain  that  the  civilised  nations  will  never  justify 
such  a  destruction  of  human  lives  and  goods,  which  is  also 
ineffective  from  a  military  point  of  view.    For  that  method 
goes  completely  against   the  principles  of   International 
Law,  which  are  based  on  humanity  and  military  purpose, 
next  to  the  mutual  interest  of  all  parties.     That  Law  can 
never  adapt  itself  to  German  methods  of  warfare.     To 
excuse  such  action,  which  runs  totally  against  the  customs 
of  International  Law  and  against  every  notion  of  humanit\", 
the  German  Government  said  that  it  is  usually  too  dan- 
gerous for  a  submarine  to  investigate  beforehand  the  ship's 
papers,   and  that  self-preservation  compelled  their  sub- 
marines to  act  as  they  do.     That  may  be  so,  but  then  the 
German  Government  ought  to  have  concluded  from  that 
the  simple  fact,  that  such  warships  are  completely  unfit 
for  the  task    imposed   on    them.    What,    indeed,    would 
any    sane    man    sav     of     a    policeman,     who     without 
any  investigation,  shoots  down  an  apparently  suspicious 
person  because  he  is  afraid  to  talk  to  him  ?  " 

Public  Opinion 

This  was  written  four  months  before  the  sinking,  of 
the  Tubantia  and  the  Palcmham'^.  The  reader  can  judge 
what  the  Dutch  feeling  must  be  after  those  two  tragedies, 
which  followed  each  other  so  closely.  When  last  spring, 
a  German  submarine  sank  the  Dutch  steamer  Medea, 
which  brought  to  England  a  cargo  of  such  dangerous 
contraband  as  oranges,  the  editor  of  De  Gids  wrote  : 
"  If  Dutch  lives  are  again  lost  by  such  acts,  the  cup 
of  injustice  will  overflow."  And  one  Dutch  subject 
happened  to  be  a  Javanese,  but  that  makes  no  difference. 
And  it  is  a  wonder  that  no  more  lives  were  lost  with  that 
steamer,  for  the  captain,  the  first  officer  and  some  other 
members  of  her  crew  had  very  narrow  escapes.  Now  is  it 
not  clear  that  a  neutral  government  cannot  allow  the 
lives  of  her  subjects  to  be  endangered,  while  they  use 
the  open  sea  in  a  legal  and  innocent  manner  ?  The  Allies 
have  never  ruthlessly  sunk  neutral  ships  which  carry  on 
trade  at  sea,  nor  have  they  ever  endangered  the  lives  of 
innocent  neutral  seafarers.  How,  then,  could  the  measures 
taken  bv  the  Dutch  government  be  interpreted  as  directed 
against  the  Allies  ?     The  idea  is  too  ridiculous. 

Neither  does  any  sane  Dutchman  think  that  the  inde- 
pendence of  our  country  has  anything  to  fear  from  Eng- 
land and  her  Allies.  On  the  contrary,  the  maintenance 
of  Dutch  neutrality  happens  to  be  a  vital  interest  for 


M 


LAND     c'v:     W  A  T  E  R 


April  6,  if)i6 


tliis  country,  iwon  it  it  wore  otherwise,  we  would  not 
believe  for  one  moment  that  England  would  liarbour 
dangerous  thoughts  against  our  country.  \\V  an-  tirmly 
convinced  that  England  and  her  Allies  arc  lighting  for  the 
maintenance  of  all  independent  nati<jns.  But  self-interest 
is  for  many  people  a  more  convincing  motive.  Now,  on, 
that  ground,  Hollanci  has  absolutely  nothing  to  fear 
from  the  .Allies.  .And  if  she  had,  she  wcnild  as  in  old  times, 
put  up  a  good  tight  to  repel  any  attack.  It  is  sometimes 
also  said,  that  England  may  desire  Holland's  rich  colonies. 
That  notion  can  also  be  dismissed  as  without  foundation. 
ICngland  cannot  desire  more  colonies.  Besides,  the 
Dutch  Indies  are  a  source  of  strength  for  Holland.  .\nd  a 
strong  Holland  is  in  accordance  with  England's  own 
interests.  We  have  often,  but  in  vain,  challenged  our  few 
pro-Germans  to  point  out  one  instance  when  leading 
linglishmcn  or  Frenchman  have  threatened  Dutch  inde- 
pendence. But  the  German  literature,  written  previous 
to  and  during  the  war,  abounds  with  instances  of  such 
threats  from  Germany. 

Some  time  ago  the  famous  Dutch  jurist.  Professor  Van 
Ifamel,  quoted  in  the  Dutch  weekly,  De  Amskrdammcr, 
numiMous  German  utti-rances,  which  were  afterwards  re- 
]iublislu'd  in  a  book.  In  all  those  utterances  appear  the 
eager  desire  that  Germans'  should  possess  the  mouth  of 
the  Rhine,  which  is  only  possible  by  annexation  of 
Holland.  The  Germans  know,  however,  that  the  Dutch 
character  could  not  easily,  if  ever,  bow  down  under  the 
German  Custom  I'nion,  whereby  Germany  could  by 
"  peaceful  penetration  "  obtain  the  control  over  the 
mouth  of  the  Rhine. 

So  far  back  as  1841  the  learned  German  economist 
Freidrich  I-ist,  wrote  :  "  Holland  is  by  her  geographical 
position,  as  well  as  by  her  commercial  and  industrial 
interest,  by  her  origin  and  language,  an  original  German 
province,  without  whose  reincorporation  Germany  is  a 
house  of  which  the  door  belongs  to  a  stranger.  Holland 
belongs  to  Germany  as  much  as  Brittany  and  Normandy 
to  France,  and  so  long  as  Holland  remains  independent, 
Germany  can  never  develop  to  her  full  strength  any  more 
than  France  could  when  those  two  pro\'inces  belonged  to 
England." 

The  Prussian  historian.  Treitschke,  wrote  in  1870  : 
!'  There  is  no  escape  from  the  duty  of  the  German  policy. 


to  regain  the  mouths  of  the  king  of  rivers,  the  inexhaustible 
resource  for  (iermany,  the  Rhine.  A  pure  political  connec- 
tion with  Holland  is  perhaps  unnecessary,  but  an  economic 
union  is  not.  And  we  are  much  too  modest  if  we  fear  to 
say,  that  Holland's  entrance  into  the  (ierman  Custom 
Union    is  for  us  as  necessary  as  our  daily  bread." 

That  "  modesty  "  later  German  writers  shook  fear- 
lessly off.  Herr  Fritz  Bley  wrote,  in  1897,  '"  the  AU- 
dcutschc  Beii'egunn  und  die  Xicderlande  :  "  We  do  not 
think  of  making  Holland  German,  for  since  the  memory  of 
man  it  is  already  (ierman.  .  .  .  ^\'e  shall  give  Holland 
again  the  life  of  a  realm.  She  needs  our  emigrants  and 
our  power  for  the  development  of  her  colonial  possessions. 
We  need  those  dominions,  drenched  with  German  blood 
(sic)  for  our  economic  expansion.  We  must  have  the 
Rhine  to  the  mouth,  where  Holland's  silent  resistance 
obstructs  us." 

Bernhardi  said  the  same  in  Germany  and  the  next 
War.  Her  Groh  wrote  four  years  ago,  in  his  book, 
Holland  Deutschcr  Bundestaat  (Holland  a  German  League- 
state)  "  Alliance  \vith  Germany  ?  No,  only  uncon- 
ditional connection  can  secure  Holland  quietly  her 
colonial  possessions  If  Germany  is  once  established  in 
Holland,  then  has  she  the  head  of  the  greedy  English 
polyp  in  her  hand." 

Such  ideas  were  uttered  not  infrequently  during  this 
war.  Herr  Alfred  Ruhemann  wrote,  after  the  fall  of 
Antwerp  :  "  Even  if  we  keep  Antwerp  we  have  not  vet 
secured  an  outlet  to  the  sea.  We  need  that  certainty 
which  we  can  only  get  if  Holland  becomes  more  closelv 
connected  with  us."  Even  the  King  of  Bavaria  lent  his 
authority  by  saying,  that  (iermany  "could  at  last  get  a' 
straight  outlet  "of  the  Rhine  to'  the  sea."  Germans 
forgot,  when  talking  about  the  annexation  of  Belgium, 
the  statement  made  by  Herr  jagow,  the  German  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  Foreign  .Affairs,  just  before  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities,  that  (iermany  "  could  not  prolitably  annex 
Belgian  territory  without  making  at  the  same  time  terri- 
torial acquisitions  at  the  expense  of  Holland."  Those 
signilicant  words  are  not,  and  cannot  be,  forgotten  in  our 
country. 

All  this  makes  the  position  of  Holland  quite  clear. 
We  can  dismiss  as  chimerical  any  idea  of  Holland  ever 
siding  with  the  Central  Powers  against  the  Allies. 


The   Chancellor   of  the   Exchequer 

By  James  Douglas 


LATE  in  the  seventies  a  lad  was  lifted  out  of  the 
water  at  the  Lambeth  Swimming  Baths,  after 
having  won  a  hotly  contested  race.  He  had 
taken  the  last  ounce  out  of  himself,  and  as  he 
lay  at  full  length  it  was  apparent  that  he  was  utterly 
exhausted.  Nevertheless,  in  a  few  minutes  he  was  on 
his  legs  again,  ready  for  the  next  race.  The  boy  was 
Reggie  McKenna.  None  of  those  \yho  applauded  his 
pluck  could  have  foreseen  that  he  was  destined  to  become 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  during  the  greatest  war 
in  our  history.  The  boy  was  father  of  the  man.  Ever 
since  he  won  that  race  he  has  been  winning  other  races 
by  sheer  courage  and  greatness  of  heart.  In  1887  he 
was  bow  in  the  winning  Cambridge  University  Eight,  and 
he  rowed  in  the  Trinity  Hall  boat  which  won  the  Grand 
and  the  Stewards'  cups  at  Henley.  These  athletic 
triumphs  provide  a  clue  to  his  success  in  the  Parliamen- 
tary area.  That  success  is  due  to  character  as  well  as 
brains,  to  courage  as  well  as  intellectual  power. 

Throughout  liis  political  career  he  has  been  remarkable 
for  his  iron  fearlessness.  He  has  never  hesitated  to 
face  a  storm  of  unpopularity  after  he  had  made  up  his  * 
mind.  It  is  a  rare  quality  in  a  statesman  and  a  very 
valuable  one.  The  British  people  like  a  man  with  a 
backbone,  and  whatever  fault  may  be  found  with  Mr. 
McKenna,  his  severest  critic  cannot  sa}'  that  he  is 
invertebrate.  There  is  no  living  politician  who  is  more 
impervious  to  the  biting  blasts  of  unpopularity.  He 
seems  to  thrive  on  criticism  and  to  draw  fresh  strength 
from  contumely.  It  is  d-flfi-rult  to  imagine  a  situation  in 
which  his  consummate  n-rvc  would  be  rattled.  The 
Germans  assert  that  this  war  will  be  won  by  the  nation 


with  the  strongest  nerve.  It  is  with  satisfaction  that 
the  British  public  notes  the  strong  nerve  of  the  Chan- 
cellor of  the  E.xchequcr,  for  he  is  the  nerve  centre  of  our 
financial  system.  As  the  business  world  looks  to  the 
banking  world  for  light  and  leading,  so  the  banking 
world  looks  to  the  Treasury,  and  so  the  Treasury  looks 
to  the  Chancellor.  There  is  a  profound  difference  between 
peace  linance  and  war  finance.  In  peace  blunders 
and  aberrations  are  not  irretrievable.  There  is  a  margin 
great  enough  to  cover  a  multitude  of  financial  sins.  But 
in  war — and  especially  in  a  war  utterly  unparalleled  in 
scale — one  false  step  may  bo  irreparable. 

It  is  not  too  nivich  to  say  that  upon  Mr.  McKenna 
depends  the  solvency  of  the  Allied  Powers.  "  Compared 
with  Reginald  McKenna,"  said  a  picturesque  American 
writer,  "  John  D.  Rockefeller  is  a  piper."  No  multi- 
millionaire ever  handled  operations  so  colossal  as  those 
he  has  carried  out  with  an  easj'  mastery  which  astonishes 
the  astutest  financiers  in  the  world.  In  finance  nothing 
succeeds  like  success,  and  the  ignorant  are  too  apt  to 
take  success  for  granted.  The  sense  of  difficulty  over- 
come is  curiously  absent  from  the  Chancellor's  exploits, 
'lo  the  average  man  he  appears  to  be  a  magician  who 
waves  his  fiscal  wand  and  produces  thousands  of  millions 
out  of  nowhere.  But  the  experts  know  that  he  is  a 
supreme  master  of  his  art,  with  a  mind  capable  of  seeing 
the  whole  curve  of  finance  as  well  as  grasping  its  minutest 
details. 

It  is  not  easy  to  persuade  the  general  public  that  his 
great  War  Loan  was  equivalent  to  a  great  victory  for 
the  Allies,  a  victory  as  vital  as  the  Marne  or  Ypres  or 
Verdun.     Yet  such  is  the  truth.     It  is  not  indiscreet  now 


April  6,  1916 


LAND      &    WATER 


15 


tu  admit  that  the  lust  War  Loan  was  a  c.jinpaiativc 
faihire.  It  produced  only  three  huudrcd  millions.  Tiie 
second  War  Loan  produced  six  hundred  millions,  being 
the-  vastest  loan  operation  the  world  has  ever  witnessed, 
combined  with  a  gigantic  scheme  for  converting  and 
liquefying  hundreds  of  millions  of  Consols.  There  w^ere 
many"  gloomy  forebodings  among  the  wise  men  of  the 
city.  They  "thought  his  proposals  were  revolutionary. 
But  they  worked  without  a  hitch. 

A  Great    Business   Man 

The  truth  is  that  he  is  a  great  business  man  as  well  as  a 
great  financier.  He  can  hold  his  own  with  the  highest 
banking  authorities  in  the  City.  His  scheme  for  utilising 
American  securities  was  so  daring  that  it  took  away  the 
breath  of  many  of  our  greatest  financial  experts.  A  story 
is  told  of  a  conference  between  the  Chancellor  and  the 
bankers.  It  may  be  true  or  it  may  not.  It  is  sa.id  that 
the  bankers  came  to  the  conference  in  a  hostile  and 
sceptical  mood.  It  was  a  critical  juncture,  but  Mr. 
McKenna's  nerve  rose  to  the  occasion.  He  convinced 
and  converted  the  conference,  and  came  out  of  the 
duel  triumphant.  It  must  be  admitted  that  no  amateur 
lawyer-politician  could  have  performed  that  dazzling 
fc-it.  The  Chancellor  knew  his  subject.  He  had  sur- 
veyed every  inch  of  the  ground.  He  was  fortiiied  with 
facts  and  with  reasons.  And  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the 
fruits  of  his  audacious  foresight  will  not  all  be  gathered 
in  till  a  later  stage  of  the  war. 

It  is  worth  remembering  that  Mr.  McKenna  was  one  of 
Sir  Charles  Dilke's  yomig  men.  He  won  his  spurs  as 
the  honorary  secretary  of  the  Free  Trade  Union.  His 
first  parliamentary  victory  was  gained  in  a  rather 
meticulous  duel  with  Mr.  Austen  Chamberlain  over  a 
preferential  duty  on  unstripped  tobacco  !  "  C-B  " 
a  shrewed  judge  of  men,  promptly  made  him  Financial 
Secretary  to  the  Treasury,  where  he  evolved  the 
machinery  for  Old  Age  Pensions,  a  faultless  piece  of 
work.  From  the  Treasury  he  went  to  the  Board  of 
Ivducation,  where  he  secured  grants,  for  Secondary 
Schools,  organised  medical  inspection,  and  opened  the 
training  colleges  to  Nonconformists. 

But  these  things  were  but  the  prelude  to  his  titanic 
work  at  the  Admiralty  from  igo8  to  1911.  To  it  we 
owe  our  command  of  the  sea  in  the  present  war.  Public 
memory  is  short,  but  it  is  well  to  realize  that  we  are 
indebted  for  our  naval  security  to  Mr.  McKenna's  far 
seeing  resolution  In  March,  1909,  he  disclosed  to  a 
startled  House  the  facts  which  a  searching  analysis 
of  the  German  naval  estimates  had  revealed.  There 
had  been  a  large  increase  in  the  German  annual  instal- 
ments. He  showed  that  the  increase  could  only  be 
explained  by  one  or  other  of  the  hypotheses  or  by 
both  combined.  Either  the  rate  of  German  construc- 
tion had  been  greatly  accelerated  or  the  size  and 
cost  of  the  German  ships  had  been  largely  increased. 
Both  hypotheses  proved  to  be  true.  The  acceleration, 
at  first  denied  by  the  Germans,  was  ultimately  con- 
fessed. But  the  degree  of  acceleration  was  insuflicient 
to  account  for  the  increased  expenditure,  and  the 
second  hypothesis  was  quickly  verified.  The  new 
German  ships  proved  to  be  of  far  greater  size  and  power. 
They  were  armed  with  12  in.  instead  of  11  in.  guns. 

At  the  Admiralty 

There  were  sharp  differences  in  the  Cabinet  as  to  the 
number  of  Dreadnoughts  to  be  laid  down.  Mr.  McKenna 
clemanded  eight.  Se\eral  powerful  members  of  the 
Cabinet  \-iolently  opposed  him.  But  Mr.  McKenna  carried 
his  programme.  The  Iron  Duke.  Sir  "John  Jellicoe's 
flagship,  was  one  of  the  ships  he  laid  down. 

It  was  expected  that  the  famous  eight  would  be  armed 
with  12  in.  guns;  but  when  the  full  intentions  of  the 
(iermans  became  known  to  the  Admiralty,  and  after  two 
ships  had  been  laid  down,  the  designs  for  the  other  ships 
were  revised,  and  15.5  in.  guns  were  introduced.  For  a 
long  time  the  secret  was  kept,  and  when  the  war  broke 
out  Germany  had  in  being  no  heavier  armament  than  her 
12  in.  guns.  It  was  Mr.  McKenna  who  evolved  the  power- 
ful D  and  E  class.  Mr.  McKenna  was  the  first  to  arm  a 
submarine  with  a  quick-firing  gun. 

It  is  not  generally  known  that  if  he  had  remained 
at   the  Admiralty   wc   should  in    i()i4    liave   had  rcadv 


a  Heel  of  Zejipelius-  So  long  ago  as  ii)ir  he  gave 
an  .order  to  Vickers  to  build  the  first  Britisli  Zeppelin. 
It  was  built,  but  its  back  was  broken  by  an  accident 
when  it  was  launched.  The  true  story  of  that  accident 
has  never  been  told.  Unfortunately,  "Mr.  McKenna  left 
the  Admiralty  in  lyii.  and  nothing  more  was  done  in 
the  matter  of  Zeppelins. 

Mr.  McKenna,  like  Mr.  Asquith,  is  a  master  of  state- 
craft. He  understands  the  art  of  managing  men.  There 
were  no  quarrels  while  he  was  at  the  Admiralty.  No  greater 
proof  of  his  gifts  as  an  administrator  could  be  conceived. 
He  is  not  an  explosive  and  destructive  statesman.  He 
prefers  to  build  upon  the  existing  foundations.  He  once 
said,  after  being  some  months  at  the  Admiralty,  "  I  have 
found  many  customs  and  regulations  which  seemed  ripe 
for  abolition,  and  then  on  closer  examination  I  have  dug 
out  the  reason  for  them.  '  There  is  or  there  has  been  a 
leason  for  every  Departmental  tradition.  The  point  is 
to  find  aut  the  reason  before  you  sweep  it  away.  This 
is  often  very  difficult,  but  it  is  always  worth  while." 
This  explains  the  mixture  of  courage  and  caution 
which  is  found  in  the  McKenna's  rule  at  the  Treasury. 

He  can  put  his  foot  down  firmly  and  keep  it  down,  but 
he  cultivates  an  open  mind.  He  makes  up  his  mind 
very  slowly,  but  once  made  up  it  closes  like  a  vice.  He 
is  broad  in  his  outlook.  Although  he  was  ojiposcd  to 
\\'oman  Suffrage,  he  ne\er  lust  his  lubane  patience  under 
persistent  and  acrimonious  attacks.  No  man  can  stand 
fire  more  serenely.  ■  The  first  illustration  of  this  quality 
was  his  attitude  as  Home  Secretary  towards  the  agitation 
for  interning  enemy  aliens.  He  was  the  target  of  many 
violent  criticisms,  but  he  never  flinched  before  fire  that 
was  in  reality  aimed  at  Lord  Kitchener.  He  never 
revealed  the  fact  that  he  himself  desired  to  intern  all  tho 
enemy  aliens,  and  he  never  defended  himself  at  the 
expense  of  the  War  Office. 

Loyalty   to    Colleagues 

It  is  now  common  knowledge  that  the  War  Office  were 
reluctant  to  undertake  the  burden  of  internment,  for 
the  simple  reason  that  they  had  no  accommodation,  and 
could  not  spare  soldiers  to  guard  the  internment  camp. 
Loyalty  to  his  colleagues  is  Mr.  McKenna's  dominant 
characteristic.  It  is  a  characteristic  which  he  shares 
with  Mr.  Asqvuth.  It  explains  the  close  bond  between 
him  and  the  Prime  Minister.  Without  internal  loyalty 
the  Coalition  Ministry  could  not  stand  the  strain  of  war. 
That  it  should  have  stood  it  so  long  and  so  well  is  a  proof 
of  public  spirit  in  one  statesman  which  matches  the 
publtc  spirit  of  the  nation. 

In  council  Mr.  McKenna  is  irreplaceable,  for  his  supreme 
quality  is  judgment,  calm,  cold,  and  impartial.  Nothing 
else  accounts  for  his  disciplined  rise  from  obscurity  to 
power,  O/ving  nothing  to  a  platform  popularity  or  to  a 
good  Press.  There  is  dramatic  irony  in  the  fact  that  he 
was  placed  in  the  Treasury  by  the  agitation  over  the 
shortage  of  shells,  the  authors  of  which/  builded 
better  .than  they  knew.  Prophets  predicted  that  Mr. 
McKenna  would  resign  over  Conscription.  They  were 
wrong.  They  misjudged  his  jndgniient.  He  does  not 
wage  war  as  a  party  man.  He  is  like  Dilke  in  his  power 
of  looking  ahead.  It  is  with  to-morrow  that  his  spirit 
wrestles.  He  is  no  stickler  for  absolute  security  in  such  a 
struggle  as  this.  He  recognises  that  war  abolishes  the 
canons  of  peace,  and  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  statesman 
to  be  bold  to  the  verge  of  temerity  where  the  stakes  arc 
so  high  and  the  cause  so  sacred.  His  five  hundred  million 
Budget  is  worthy  of  Pitt  in  his  most  daring  mood.  It  is 
a  blow  at  the  heart  of  Germany. 

A  word  about  the  private  character  of  the  Chancellor 
may  not  be  out  of  place.  He  is  the  most  domestic  of 
men,  devoted  to  his  brilliant  wife  and  to  his  charming 
chiklren,  M  chael  and  David,  w'ho  invariably  appear  at 
the  luncheon  table  in  Smith  Square,  and  who  are  humo- 
rously nicknamed,  "  Kultur  "  and  "  The  Hun.''  Mrs. 
McKenna  works  as  hard  as  her  husband,  and  is  his  right 
hand  in  public  life.  Thanks  to  her,  the  Chan:cllor  bears 
the  burden  of  office  lightly  and  almost  gaily.  It  may 
interest  Dr.  Helferich  to"  know  that  his  redoubtable 
antagonist  is  physically  and  mentally  unabashed  and 
miabated  by  (ierman  frightfulness,  and  that  he  faces  the 
coming  vear  of  war  with  smiling  confidence  and  ironic 
assurance,  based  iipon  the  knowledge  that  he  is  rowing 
bow  in  the  winning  boat. 


i6 


t; 


L  A  X  D     AND-  W  A  T  E  R 

The  Agony  of  Serbia 

By   Alfred   Stead 


April  0,  lyiO 


(HUS  do  they  sigh  whu  are  about  to  weep." 
No  more  fitting  description  in  few  words  can  be 
found    for    the    present  pHght    of  the  Serbian 

nation.     The  war  presents  no  more  complete, 

no  more  terrible  traj^'dy  than  that  which  has  befallen 
the  bra\e  peasant  people  who  so  lung  and  su  successfully 
defended  the  pass,  barring  the  road  to  the  Central 
Powers  to  Bulgaria  and  the  East. 

The  welc^ome  \-isit  of  Serbia's  exiled  rulers,  the  Crown 
Prince  and  M.  Pashitch  should  not  only  afford  this  country 
an  occasion  of  paying  tribute  to  brave  men  in  evil  plight, 
but  should  also  bring  to  all  minds  a  fuller  realisation  of 
the  enormity  of  the  catastrophe  which  has  overwhelmed 
oiu-  .\llies.  It  is  difficult  here  to  imagine  the  dramatic 
suddenness,  the  poignant  agony  of  the  tidal  wa\X' 
which  submerged  Serbia  in  a  few  short  weeks. 

The  country  is  not  known  here.  Englishmen  have  few 
friends  in  Serbia  ;  there  were  no  daily  steamers  to  any 
Serbian  Ostend  to  make  realisation  more  easy.  But, 
notwithstanding  the  difficulty  it  is  vitally  necessary  to 
realise.  The  Serbians  will  not  speak  freely  of  their 
calamity".  They  are  a  proud  ))eople,  who  find  in  mis- 
fortune rather  a  reason  for  renewed  effort  than  for  lamen- 
tation on  the  housetops.  While  admiring  them  for  their 
stoical  endurance,  it  must  be  confessed  that  Serbian 
reticence  makes  it  hard  for  this  country  truly  to  compre- 
hend the  real  situation. 

On  broad  lines  it  is  known  that  after  tyvice  repelling  the 
Austrian  invader,  after  suffering  the  scourge  of  typhus 
and  the  sapping  drain  of  starvation,  Serbia,  beset  on  all 
sides  but  one,  fighting  gallantly,  albeit  hopelessly,  against 
tremendous  odds,  .withdrew  her  righting  remnants 
towards  the  west,  leaving  her  country  to  the  tender  mercy 
of  the  savage  Bulgarian,  the  micivilised  Hungarian  or  the 
kultiir-loving  Teuton.  But  what  is  known  of  the  true 
horrors,  the  whole  cloth  upon  which  the  brief  tragic 
story  was  woven  in  relief?  Since  October  of  last  year 
conservative  estimates  place  the  losses  to  the  Serbian 
nation  at  about  one  million  souls — and  this  out  of  a  small 
population  far  less  than  that  of  London.  Killed  and 
wounded  in  battle,  died  of  disease  and  prisoners  form  but 
a  small  portion  of  this  total— the  civilians,  the  women 
and  chiklrcn  have  supplied  the  greatest  the  most  horrible 
proportion.  Manj^  have  been  borne  away  into  captivit}', 
especially  women  with  male  children — the  women  are 
now  working  in  Hungarian  fields,  the  children  are  being 
moulded  to  the  best  ability  of  Jesuit  schools  into  subjects 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  Both  Hungarians  and  Bulgarians 
agree  that  only  by  schools  can  anything  be  done  against 
what  they  are  pleased  to  call  "  Serbian  chauvinism," 
or  what  we  would  recognise  and  applaud  as  patriotism 
and  love  of  national  ideals. 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  inevitably  a  national  catastrophe 
must  follow  a  national  defeat.  Even  after  the  second 
Austrian  invasion,  when  by  a  superb  counter-attack  the 
Serbian  army  drove  the  enemy  north  of  the  Danube  and 
freed  Serbian  soil,  the  conditions  were  terrible.  In 
January,  1915,  the  Serbian  Metropolitan  said  that  there 
were  a  million  destitute  old  mc'n,  women  and  children,  of 
whom  a  large  percentage  must  die  imless  relief  came. 
The  richest  provinces  of  the  country  had  been  de- 
vastated ;  there  was  no  food  ;  there  were  no  medicines. 
A  visit  to  these  provinces  was  the  most  awful  experience 
that  war  has  given.  Thfe  cries  of  untended  wounded  on 
the  stricken  lield  are  terrible  to  the  ears  of  those  who 
unaxailing  hear  and  see,  but  the  unending  moan  of 
children  which  ascended  to  the  skies  from  the  shattered, 
pillaged  villages — what  were  once  Serbia's  fail  est  villages, 
cannot  be  described.  To  imagine  it  is  a  nightmare. 
In  each  house  children  were  lying  and  children  were 
dying  ;  there  was  no  milk  ;  there  was  little  bread  :  the 
water,  like  the  houses,  was  polluted  and  microbe-laden  ;' 
doctors  there  were  none  ;  medicines  were  not  to  be  had. 
.\nd  so  in  ceaseless  moaning  hundreds  and  thousands  of 
little  lives  went  out,  victims  of  the  war. 

If  this  was  the  case  when  the  Serbian  Government 
was  at  Nish,  when  the  railway  to  Salonika  was  open, 
and  when  aid  from  the  .Allies,  if  dilatory  and  insuHicicnt, 
was    available,    who   can    picture    the   condition    today. 


In  place  of  a  Government  anxious  to  help  the  suffered 
there  are  military  forces  whose  fundamental  belief  is 
that  the  fewer  the  Serbians  who  remain  ahve  the  easier 
will  be  their  task.  "  As  long  as  there  are  Serbians  then- 
will  be  Serbia,"  is  the  Bulgarian  view.  Nor  must  it  be 
forgotten 'that  the  recent  offensive  was  prefaced  by  the 
ra\-ages  of  typhus  in  the  whole  country,  the  victims 
munbering  over  a  hundred  thousand,  while  many  who 
recovered  were  wi'akened  and  devitalised,  unable  to  meet 
and  live  through  any  unfa\-ourable  conditions. 

Till'  combined  attack  on  Serbia  in  last  October  brought 
into  sharp  relief  the  sutferings  f)f  a  retreating  nation.  J 
In  under  three  months  the  entire  tragedy  had  been  played  l 
out.  The  sacrifice  of  the  Serbian  army,  although  the 
side  of  the  story  most  in  prominence,  was  but  an  in- 
finitesimal part,  and  after  all  soldiers  go  to  war  expecting 
disaster  and  death.  The  only  unnecessarily  horrrb'e 
part  of  the  army's  retreat  was  that  the  men  felt  that  it 
was  because  of  no  fault  of  their  own,  or  of  their  nation. 
And  yet  thcN'  bear  no  grudge  and  want  to  fight  again. 
The  slow  retreat,  the  awful  hardships,  the  deadly  silence 
of  that  sullen  long-drawn  reluctant  march  from  the 
beloved  soil  of  Serbia  to  alien  lands,  will  never  be  fully 
appreciated — even  the  bards  of  Serbia  will  fail  to  render 
justice  to  it.  To  those  who  shared  in  it,  the  retreat 
remains  as  a  slow-moving  symphony  of  crescendo  despair 
with,  however,  ever  a  leitmotiv  of  hope  and  confidence  in 
the  future. 

The  wounded  and  sick  of  the  army  were  left  hopelessly 
ar.l  helplesslv  intermingled  with  the  star\ing  populace. 
Women  and  children  shared  filthy  straw-strewn  floors 
with  soldiers,  whose  wounds  were  rank  with  septic 
poisoning.  Later,  the  civilians  with  the  army  sickened 
and  died  bv  scores.  How  hard  was  the  way  may  be 
judged  by  the  fact  that  of  the  thousands  of  Austrian 
prisoners ' who  set  out  for  the  coast  only  some  12,000 
reached  Valona.  The  retreating  soldiers  saw  the  civilians 
die  of  hunger  and  exhaustion  and  could  do  nothing 
whatsoever  to  help  them. 

In  the  snowy  mountains  of  Albania,  figures  could  be 
seen,  struggling  to,  their  knees  in  the  snow  in  silent  suppli- 
cation for  food->~but  there  was  none,  agd  silently  the 
sulferers  would  sink  down  soon  to  be  a  quiet  snow- 
mound  by  the  roadside.  As  we  looked  at  those  unfortu- 
nates, the  knowledge  that  the  sufferings  of  those  left 
behind  surpassed  those  we  witnessed,  added  horror  to 
existence.  For,  in  the  grasp  of  the  enemy  there  were  far 
worse  things  than  kindly,  although  long-drawn-out 
death  in  the  snow, or  the  mud.  Families  saw  their  mem- 
bers subject  to  indignities  worthy  of  a  drunken  Roman 
emperor  in  full  Saturnalia.  Mothers  were  divided  from 
children,  and  dragged  out  a  life  of  shame  and  misery, 
knowing  that  their  lost  ones  were  dead  in  unknown 
graves.  I'ood  was  sent  to  Germany,  given  to  the  soldiers, 
there  was  little  enough,  and  none  for  the  inhabitants, 
(iold  and  silver  were  expropriated,  and  rich  and  poor 
alike  were  driven  to  beg  in  the  streets.  Law  and  order 
ceased  to  exist.  The  whim  of  the  common  soldier  had 
replaced  all  codes  of  law.  And  with  all  this  there  was  no 
neutral  eye-witness,  no  Americans  to  keep  the  brute 
instincts  of  the  conquerors  in  check.  In  Nish,  there  were 
a  few  Columbia  l'ni\-ersitv  giaduates  of  a  Red  Cross 
Mission  who  stayed  behind,  but  the  Bulgarians  could 
not  long  tolerate  their  presence. 

The  Serbian  nation  is  condemned  to  suffer  alone,  with- 
out anyone  to  hesu",  much  less  to  help.  While  we  wait  for 
the  fulfilment  of  our  promises  to  make  Serbia  greater  than 
before,  the  nation  is  giving  its  puund  of  flesh  which  cannot 
be  replaced.  .We  can  feed  Belgium,  we  cannot  feed 
Serbia.  Nobody.can  help  them  and  nobody  will  e\er  know 
what  horrors  are  going  on  in  where  once  was  happy  Serbia. 
It  is  noble  that  the  Serbian  army  should  wish  to  begin 
again  the  struggle,  but  we  must  not  forget  the  silent  army 
of  Serbian  civilians,  the  old  men,  women  and  (hildren, 
who  are  stiffc-ring  and  dying  daily  to  make  an  l-Jiiperor's 
holiday.  When,  we  do"  arrive  again  in  Serbia,  let  all 
measures  of  relief  be  ready  with  the  army,  do  not  let  it  be 
necessary  to  make  appeals  at  the  eleventh  hour.  Much 
has  been  asked  of  Serbia  and  nmcli  shall  be  given  her. 


April  6,  1916 


.LAND      &      WATER 


17 


Shackleton's    Expedition 


By  Herbert  G.    Ponting 


In  this  most  ''ntcrcsttng  article  Mr.  Herbert  Ponting. 
member  of  Captain  Scott's  Expedition  and  therefore 
ilwroiighly  familiar  icith  the  conditions  that  are  lil^ely 
to  prevail  during  the  latter  part  of  Sir  Ernest  Shaekleton's 
expedition,  explains  as  nearly  as  can  be  done  from  the 
scanty  information  that  has  so  far  reached  us  the  probable 
position  of  Sir  Ernest's  party  at  the  present  time. 
The  photograph  of  the  South  Pole  appearing  on  page  2 
was  printed  from  a  n^ga'ive  taken  by  Lieutenant  II. 
Bowers.  The  film  was  brought  lack  by  Captain  Scott 
to  his  last  camp,  and  icas  there  found  by  the  Search 
Party  eight  months  after  his  death.  It  was  subsequently 
developed  at  Cape  Evans. 

THE  real  incentive  for  Sir  Ernest  Shaekleton's 
trans-Antarctic  journey  is  to  explore  the  unknown 
region  v^'ch  lies  between  the  \\'eddcll  Sea  and 
the  South  Pole.  That  in  itself  is  a  tremendous 
xuuk  I  taking,  but  merely  to  regard  the  Pole  as  a  "  half- 
way house,"  so  to  speak,  and  to  essay  to  continue  on 
the  journey  to  the  opposite  side  of  the  Polar  continent, 
is  a  colossal  task.  To  accomplish  this  unprecedented 
feat  of  exploration  has  been  Sir  Ernest's  fondest  hope 
ever  since  he  penetrated  within  one  hundred  miles  of 
the  South  Pole  eight  years  ago. 

The  risks  of  all  previous  South  Polar  expeditions  arc 
practically  doubled,  as  Sir  Ernest  is  not  only  relying  on 
his  own  party  getting  safely  through,  but  also  on  another 
party  safely  reaching  the  opposite  side  of  the  continent 
independently,  and  providing  him  with  supplies  for  a 
large  part  of  the  latter  part  of  his  great  journey  as  well 
as  for  emergencies  when  he  reaches  his  journey's  end. 
Had  he  essayed  to  rest  content  with  reaching  the  South 
.Yole  from  a  point  from  which  it  had  not  hitherto  been 
approached,  and  to  turn  back  on  his  tracks,  and  return  to 
the  VVeddell  Sea,  he  would  have  had  the  absolute  certainty 
that  provisions  would  be  cached  along  the  latter  part  of 
his  return  route,  and  he  would  have  known  exactly  what 
arrangements  had  been  made  to  meet  any  emergencies 
which  might  arise.  There  could  be  no  such  certainty  in 
the  tremendous  task  which  he  set  himself,  and,  perhaps, 
anxiety  about  the  expected  food  licpots  and  supplies 
at  the  journey's  end  have  been  among  his  hardships. 

From  the  Pole 

At  the  time  of  writing  these  lines,  March  28th,  we 
know  little  more  than  was  contained  in  the  tirst  wireless 
messages  from  the  Aurora.  These  messages  indicate 
that  Sir  Ernest  intended  to  travel  from  the  Pole,  via  the 
Beardmore  Glacier,  to  Hut  Point  on  McMurdo  Sound, 
which  is  an  arm  of  the  Ross  Sea.  In  the  absence  of  any 
information  from  the  Endurance,  the  ship  by  which  he 
and  his  main  party'sailed  to  the  Weddell  Sea,  we  can  only 
assume  that  he  adhered  to  his  proposed  time  schedule, 
and  started  on  his  trans-Antarctic  journey  from  some 
point  on  the  shore  of  the  Weddell  Sea  between  Graham's 
Land,  which  is  due  south  of  South  America,  and  Coat's 
Land,  as  near  the  date  of  October  ist,  iqi.S,  as  the  weather 
permitted,  and  not  later  than  Novembef  ist. 

Providing  that  he  met  with  no  misfortune,  and  no 
impassable  mountains  or  chasms  impossible  to  cross — 
and  nothing  but  such  physical  barriers  would  daunt  Sir 
Ernest  Shackleton — he  hoped  to  reach  the  South  Pole 
about  Christmas  Day.  Assuming  that  he  did  so,  and 
that  his  dog-teams  were  well  and  going  strong,  and  that 
neither  his  party  nor  the  dogs  were  distressed  for  lack  of 
food,  we  can  best  estimate  the  approximate  date  of  his 
journey's  end  by  referring  to  Amundsen's  time-table. 

Amundsen  left  the  South  Pole  on  December  17th,  iqii. 
rtith  16  dogs,  and  he  reached  his  base  at  the  Bay  of  Whales 
on  the  Great  Ice  Barrier  on  January  a^th,  iqi2,  with 
eleven  dogs,  all  well.  He  therefore  covered  the  700  miles 
in  40  days,  but  he  was  extremely  fortunate  as  regards 
weather,  encountering  little  of  the  sevc'rc'  wind'  which 
distressed  Scott's  party  so  much.  (The  Bay  of  Whales  is 
400  miles  from  Cape  Evans  on  the  Ross  Sea  main  part 
of  the  Barrier  not  shewn  in  the  plan.) 

Shaekleton's    route,    via    the    Beardmore    Glacier,    is 


about  50  miles  longer  than  Amundsen's.  Allowing  say 
ten  days  for  the  extra  distance  and  the  worse  conditions 
of  weather  which  would  seem  to  prevail  on  this  route, 
and  assuming  that  Shackleton  left  the  Pole  on  December 
26th,  and  that  the  Aurora  party  laid  out  depots  of  food 
for  him  for  the  greater  part  of  the  way  to  the  Beardmore 
(ilacier,  we  may  hope  that  he  safely  reached  Hut  Point, 
some  time  about  the  middle  of  Ecbruary  la,st.  On  a 
journey  of  such  magnitude  however  many  delays  might 
be  experienced,  and,  even  if  he  got  through  safely,  it  is 
conceivable  that  he  might  have  been  several  weeks  longer. 

Had  everything  worked  out  as  Sir  Ernest  hoped  and 
planned,  and  had  the  Aurora  not  met  with  the  mis- 
fortune recently  reported,  he  would  have  left  McMurc'o 
Sound  early  in  March,  and  we  should  have  had  news  of 
him  from  some  New  Zealand  port  early  in  April. 

So  much  for  man-made  plans.  But  in  that  storm- 
beaten  end  of  the  world  one  never  knows  what  a  single 
hour  may  bring  forth  as  regards  weather.  The  blizzards 
of  the  Antarctic  are  of  such  severity  that  even  small 
stones  are  blown  about  in  the  wind. 

The  "  Aurora  " 

On  May  6th  the  Aurora  was  blown  from  her  mooring 
•  off  Cape  Evans,  Lat.  77.25  S.,  and  became  fast  in  the  ice- 
pack, in  which  she  appears  to  have  drifted  for  oyer  nine 
months  to  as  far  North  as  Lat.  64.30  S.,  161  E.  With 
this  misfortune  to  his  .ship. ended  all  possible  hope  of  Sir 
Ernest's  relief  this  year  from  the  Ross  Sea  end  of  the 
journey.  It  is  unlikely  that  any  relief  ship  can  reach  him 
before  January  next,  as  until  then,  it  being  now  the 
beginning  of  the  Antarctic  winter,  the  sea  will  be  frozen 
or    blocked  with  ice-pack. 

But  the  fact  of  the  Aurora-  being  blown  out  to  sea,  and 
relief  for  the  pfesent  impossible,  does  not  necessarily 
infer  disaster  to  anyone.  It  means  a  year's  longer  exile 
in  the  Antarctic,  and  a  certain  amount  of  hardship, 
but  if  the  base  has  been  reached  safely  by  Sir  Ernest 
and  his  party,  and  proper  supplies  were  found  theF«, 
not  of  necessity  anything  worse. 

The  drawing  o\'er  leaf  prepared  from  my  photographs 
of  the  south  part  (of  McMurdo  Sound  will  illustrate  the 
points  which  I  wish  to  make  clear,  so  far  as.  I  am  able  to. 
I  do  not  pretend  that  it  is  geographically  correct,  but 
it  gives  a  fairly  accurate  idea  of  the  topography  of  the 
district,  from  an  imaginary  point  above  the  edge  of  the 
Barne  Glacier  at  Cape  Evans.  The  line  of  approach 
to  Hut  Point  across  the  Barrier,  at  the  end  of  the  journey, 
would  vary  according  to  the  ice  conditions.  If  the  sc'a 
were  frozen  it  might  extend  well  out  to  the  south-west, 
or  it  might  lie  towards  the  eminence  called  Castle  Rock, 
if  the  sea  were  open,  and  the  surface  of  the  Barrier  badly 
crevassed  near  the  land  on  the  line  marked.  I  ha,ve 
made  it  a  summer  view,  when  the  sea  would  be  "  open," 
but  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  from  the  end  of  April 
to  January  the  sea  would  probably,  but  not  by  any 
means  certainly,  be  frozen.  The  freezing  of  the  sea 
depends  on  the  roughness  of  the  weather.  If  continual 
storms  are  experienced  during  the  winter  the  sea  may  not 
even  freeze  at  all  over  a  large  part  of  the  Sound. 

Cape  Evans 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  Sound 
might  be  frozen  not  only  during  the  winter,  but,  to  a 
less  extent  during  the  summer  as  well.  In  short,  though 
it  is  more  than  probable  that  the  winter  ice  between 
Hut  Point  and  Cape  Evans  would  break  up  during  the 
summer,  it  is  yet  possible  that  it  might  not. 

The  fact  that  the  Aurora  had  taken  up  moorings  ofl 
Cape  Evans  indicates  that  Captain  Scott's  winter-quarters 
were  being  used  as  the  base  for  operations.  If  Sir  Ernest 
succeeded  in  reaching  this  place  he  would  be  able  to  live 
with  some  pretence  to  comfort,  providing  enough  clothing 
had  been  landed  from  the  Aurora.  Unfortunately  a 
message  has  stated  that  "  the  party  is  short  of  fuel  and 
clothing"  Clothing  would  certainly  present  greater 
difliculties  than  food,  as  nothing  warm  can  be  made  from 


i8 


L  A  X  D      Si      W  A  T  !•:  R 


April  6,  1916 


eal  skins.  The  "  Wcddcll  "  seal  is  not  a  fnr  bearing 
creature,  but  is  covered  with  coarse  hair  which  has  no 
warmth  in  it.  These  animals  are  protected  from  the  cold 
by  a  thick  layer  of  fat,  called  'blubber,"  which  lies  just 
under  the  skin.  Newlv-born  seals  have  soft,  fur  coats, 
but  they  arc  not  calved  imtil  October;  Seal  blubber 
makes  excellent  fuel,  and  if  enough  seals  can  be  secured, 
this  would  solve  the  fuel  difficulty. 

Ready  Stores  Only 

It  apjxjars  that  "  ready  stores  only  "  were  landed  at 
Cape  Evans.  Fortunately  there  are  large  stores  of  food 
left  by  the  Scott  Expedition  here  :  and  at  Cape  Royds, 
Sir  Ernest's  old  winter  quarters  during  his  last  expe- 
dition, about  seven  miles  distant,  there  are  other  large 
supplies  of  tinned  food  and  flour.  This  place  can  be 
reached  from  ('aj)e  I-'vans  whether  the  sea  be  frozen  or  not. 
by  way  of  the  Barne  C.lacier.  It  appears  that  only 
two  months'  stores  were  landed  by  the  Aui-ora  at  Hut 
Point,  but  at  the  Discovery  Hut  at  this  place  there  were 
considerable  supplies  of  biscuits  in  i()i2,  and  these  will 
be  good  for  any  length  of  time. 

It  seems  fairly  certain  that  there  is  not  likely  to  be  any 
distress  from  lack  of  food.  Clothing  is  likely  to  be  the 
difficulty.  Fairly  satisfactory  foot-gear  can  be  made 
from  seal-skins,  but  not  clothes.  Seal-meat  is  excellent 
eating,  tasting  not  unlike  bear  flesh. 

It  would  appear  that  food  depots  had  been  laid  out 
towards  the  Pole,  as  the  message  tells  of  "  six  who  had 
made  the  journey  to  the  South  "  having  returned  s"fely 
on  March  4th  of  last  year.  At  present,  however,  we  do 
not  know  how  far  south  this  party  succeeded  in  placing 
these  depots.  The  message  states,  "On  January  24th  (iQi.s) 
a  party  of  three  men,  with  dogs,  set  out  for  the  Bluff  to 
establish  a  depot,  taking  stores  with  them  for  that 
purpose."  Also,  that  "  the  next  day  Captain  Mackin- 
tosh, accompanied  by  two  other  members  of  the  party, 
left  the  ship  for  a  sledge  trip  with  dogs." 

Later  wc  are  told,  on  May  6th,  the  day  the  Aurora 
was  blown  out  to  sea,  that  "  Captain  Mackintosh  and  his 
two  companions,  as  well  as  the  three  men  who  had  gene 
to  the  Bluff  to  establish  a  depot,  and  four  members  of  the 
Scientific  Staff,  were  ashore."  The  message  continues; 
"  We  saw  no  more  of  them.  "  It  would  appear,  at  first 
sight,  that  there  was  a  grave  note  in  this  last  sentence. 
And  if  the  ship  were  at  Hut  Point  all  the  time,  from 
January  24th  to  May  6th,  and  the  two  references  con- 
cerned the  same  journeys  of  these  two  parties,  the  news 
would  be  grave  enough,  as  it  would  be  clear  that  the 
Bluff  party  (we  are  not  told  where  the  other  party  went) 
at  least,  was  several  weeks  overdue.  They  would  not  be 
likelv  to  be  out  more  than  two  weeks  from  Hut  Point, 
as  the  distance  would  jirobably  be  not  over  80  miles  to 
where  they  would  depot  their  supplies.  As  they  had 
dogs  with  them,  this  should  allow  "ior  reasonable  delays. 

Bvit  on  January  24th  and  23th,  when  these  two  parties 
left,  the  Aurora,  on  accovmt  of  the  ice,  had  probably 
been  unable  to  get  within  many  miles  of  Hut  Point. 
On  referring  to  my  diary  I  fincl  that  in  iqii  Captain 
Scotfs  ship  the  Terra  S'ova  got  within  two  miles  of 
Cape  Evans  as  early  as  January  4th,  yet  the  following 
year  she  was  unable  to  get  nearer  than  two  miles  of 
Cape  Evans  as  late  as  February  6th.  It  is  therefore 
quite  concei\'able  that  the  Aurora  might  have  been  20 
miles  or  more  from  Hut  Point  on  January  24th. 

Hut  Point 

The  Bluff  party,  having  made  one  journey  to  the  place 
where  they  depotcd  their  stores,  perhaps  returned  to 
Hut  Point,  and  after  a  few  days  started  off  again  with 
other  supplies.  In  the  meantime,  the  ice  having  broken . 
up  between  Cape  Evans  and  Hut  Point,  the  ship  proceeded 
there,  and  on  March  4th,  as  we  know,  took  olf  the  i>arty 
of  six  who  had  returned  from  the  journey  on  which  they 
started  on  January  .list. 

Unless  the  Bluff  party  of  three  made,  as  I  think  they 
did,  more  than  one  journey,  they  had  not  returned  -two 
months  after  the  motor-party  got  safely  back,  though 
they  had  started  a  week  earlier  than  the  motor  jjarty. 
The  message  is  not  clear  on  this  ])oint,  but  1  think  that 
wc  may  safely  assume  that  they  made  more  than  one 
journey,  and  that  they  had  not  returned  from  the  last 
one.     In  the  meantime,  since  thc\'  left  on  January  24th, 


the  ship  had  merely  not  be6n  in  touch  with  them,  and 
had  left  Hut  Point"  for  her  winter  berth  on  March  4th. 
\\'e  can  but  hope  that  this  is  what  is  meant,  until  we 
know  more. 

The  motor  party  no  doubt  aimed  for  a  point  much 
farther  south  than  the  Bluff,  but  Capt.  Scott's  experience 
of  motor-sledges  was  not  a  happy  one.  How  far  this 
party  went  is  at  present  a  matter  of  conjecture.  We  can 
only  hope  that  they  had  better  luck  with  their  machine 
than  Scott  did.  As  for  the  scientists,  they  are  probably 
safe  enough  at  Cape  Evans. 

Cape  Evans  cannot  be  reached  from  Hut  Point  except 
by  way  of  the  frozen  sea,  and  if  Sir  Ernest  Shackleton 
arrived  at  Hut  Point  in  February  or  March  of  this  year 
he  would  probably  find  the  way  to  Cape  Evans  barred  bv 
open  water,  as  the  ice  usually  breaks  up  in  January  and 
February.  In  this  event,  he  would  have  to  remain  there 
imtil  the  sea  froze,  which  it  probably  would  do  in  April. 
There  is  no  way  of  reaching  Cape  Evans  from  Hut  Point 
except  over  the  frozen  sea,  the  land  is  completely  blocked 
by  the  impassable  glaciers  of  Mount  Erebus.  He  would 
have  to  subsist  on  such  supplies  as  he  found  there, 
supplemented  by  seal  meat.  There  are  usually  a  good 
many  seals  at  this  place,  and  the  blubber  would  make 
good  fuel.  Here  again  clothing  would  be  a  problem, 
as  very  little  of  anything  seems  to  have  been  left 
by  the  Aurora,  beyond  the  sledging  rations,  the  major 
part  of  which  was  probably  "  depoted  '  by  the  various 
Southern  parties  at  different  points.  In  any  case,  it 
would  not  have  appeared  necessary  to  land  large  supplies 
at  Hut  Point,  seeing  that  the  Base  was  Cape  Evans  and 
that  was  well  provisioned. 

Doubtful  Points 

A  few  more  days  will  j^robably  set  at  rest  all  furthe'" 
conjecture,  as  we  shall  no  doubt  hear  of  the  safe  arrival  o^ 
the  Aurora  at  New  Zealand.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  all 
these  doubtful  points  will  then  be  cleared  up,  and  that  the 
fortunes  of  the  brave  fellows  who  have  risked  so  much 
will  appear  more  favourable  than  the  present  meagre 
infoimation  to  hand  seems  to  indicate.  And  again,  the 
Endurance,  now  due  at  any  time  in  South  America,  may 
arrive  with  Sir  Ernest  and  his  party  safely  aboard.  Though 
he  had  failed  to  carry  out  his  splendid  project  in  full,  the 
whole  nation  would  breathe  a  sigh  of  profound  relief  to 
known  that  at  least  he  and  tho.se  with  him,  are  safe. 

For  the  present  we  must  derive  such  comfort  as  wc  can 
from  the  certain  knowledge  that  the  Empire  does  not 
hold  a  man  more  fitted  for  the  task  he  undertook  than 
Sir  Ernest  Shackleton,  and  that  in  such  men  as  Wild, 
Crean,  Hurley,  and  Marston,  he  has  men  of  as  great 
resource  in  emergency  as  himself. 

***** 

P.S. — I  add  this  on  .\pril  4th  as  the  article  goes  to 
Press.  I  see  from  the  information  contained  in  to-day's 
despatch  to  the  Daily  Chronicle,  concerning  the  missing 
Southern .  parties,  is  still  obscure,  byt  Lieut.  Stenhouse 
who  has  now  reached  New  Zealand  on  the  Aurora 
considers  that  the  bad  weather  would  accoimt  for  their  non- 
return up  to  the  time  the  ship  left  Hut  Point. 

It  now  appears  that  the  party  that  set  out  on  January 
25th  from  the  ship  headed  for  Mount  Hooper,  which  is 
175  miles  from  Hut  Point. 

it  would  seem  that  the  motor-sledge  was  found  to  be 
as  unsatisfactory  as  those  of  the  Scott  expedition,  as  it 
failed  to  reach  Hut  Point.  One  of  Captain  Scott's 
motors,  after  numerous  breakdowns,  pushed  on  some 
fifty  miles  or  more  further. 

Great  difficulty  seems  to  have  been  experienced  by 
the  sledging  parties  off  Cape  .\rmitage,  according  to  the 
latest  despatch.  This  place  has  always  had  a  bad 
reputation  for  dangerous  ice,  owing  to  erosion  by  the 
current  which  flows  under  the  Barrier  here. 


We  would  draw  attention  to  the  charming  shilling  paper- 
covered  booklets  pulilislu'd  for  the  Miedici  .Society  by  Mr. 
Philip  Lee  Warner,  under  the  generic  title  of  Meninrahilia. 
.'\ninng  the  latest  volumes  to  he  issued  are  PnrJraiU  0/  Chris/ 
and  The  Lasl  Suf>pcr  ;  thev  are  erlited  by  Mr.  G.  V.  Hill  of  the 
British  Museum  and  illustrated  with  reproductions  of  famou? 
pictures.  Mr.  A.  \i.  Zimniern's  translation  of  the  iii^toncal 
speech  of  Pericles  forms  another  but  tmillustrated  \olume, 
and  yet  another  contains  Easier  Poems.  These  Memor;diilia 
arc  a  di-tinct  boon  to  lovers  of  literature  and  art.' 


April  6.  xgi6 


LAND      &      WATER 


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LAND       &      WATER 

CHAT  A 

c//  T^omance  of  the  South  Seas 

"By  H.  T>E  FERE  STAC  POOLE 


April  6,   igib 


Synopsis  :  Macquart,  an  adventurer  who  has  spent- 
must  of  his  life  at  sea,  finds  himself  in  Sydney  on  his  beam 
ends.  He  has  a  wonderful  story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in 
New  Guinea,  and  makes  the  acquaintance  of  Tillman,  a  sporting 
man  about  town,  fond  of  yarhting  and  racing,  and  of  Houghton, 
a  well-educated  Englishman  out  of  a  job.  Through  Tillman's 
influence  he  is  introduced  to  a  wealthy  woolbroker.  Screed,  who, 
having  heard  Macquart's  story  and  examined  his  plans,  which 
agree  -with  an  Admiralty  chart,  agrees  to  finance  the  enterprise. 
Screed  purchases  a  yawl,  the  "  Barracuda."  Just  before  they 
leave  Macquart  encounters  an  old  shipmate.  Captain  Hull, 
who  is  fully  acquainted  with  his  villainies.  Hull  gets  in  touch 
with  Screed,  who  engages  him  and  brings  him  aboard  the  yacht 
just  as  they  are  about  to  sail.  By  degrees  Captain  Hull  prac- 
tically assumes  command  of  the  enterprise  through  force  of 
character.  After  adventures  they  arrive  at  New  Guinea  and 
anchor  in  a  lagoon.  They  go  by  boat  up  a  river  where  they 
make  the  acquaintance  of  a  drunken  Dutchman,  Wiart,  who 
is  in  charge  of  a  rubber  and  camphor  station.  They  catch 
sight  of  a  beautiful  Dyak  girl,  Chaya.  According  to  Macquart's 
story  a  man  named  Lant,  wlw  had  seized  this  treausure,  sunk  his 
ship  and  murdered  his  crew  with  the  exception  of  one  man. 
"  Smith."  Lant  then  settled  here,  buried  the  treasure,  and  married 
a  Dyak  woman,  chief  of  her  tribe.  Lant  was  murdered  by 
"  Smith,"  whom  Captain  Hull  and  the  rest  make  little  doubt 
was  no  other  than  Macquart.  Chaya,  with  whom  Houghton 
has  -fallen  in  love,  is  Lant's  half-caste  daughter.  Macquart 
guides  them  to  a  spot  on  the  river-bank  where  he  declares -the 
cache  to  be.  They  dig  through  that  night  and  the  following  but 
find  nothing  ;  they  begin  to  think  he  is  deceiving  them.  Then 
he  starts  the  surmise  that  the  Dyaks  have  moved  the  treasure 
to  a  sacred  grove  in  the  jungle.  Wiart  is  his  authority  for  this, 
and  he  persuades  his  shipmates  to  go  with  him  in  search  of  it. 

CHAPTER  XX 
A  Picture  in  the  Forest 

IT  was  noon  next  day  when  Macquart,  who  had  been  in 
the  house  with  Wiart  having  a  long  talk,  drew  the 
others  together  for  a  consultation. 
He  led  them  among  the  trees  to  a  spot  where  a  clearing 
had  been  made  by  Nature,  a  regular  room  of  the  woods  roofed 
with  blue  sky  and  walled  with  the  liquid  shadow  of  foliage. 
Macquart  took  his  seat  on  the  trunk  of  a  camphor  tree  long 
fallen,  Tillman  sat  down  beside  him,  whilst  Hull  and  Houghton 
remained  standing. 

■'  Well,  I've  fixed  it,"  said  Macquart.  "  He's  open  to 
lead  us  to  the  place,  not  to-day  because  he  has  to  look  after 
the  rubber  chaps,  it's  pay-day,  but  to-morrow." 

"  Will  he  be  sober  ?  think  you  ?  "  asked  Hull. 

"  He's  off  the  drink.  When  we  landed  he  was  just  at  the 
end  of  a  burst.  He'll  be  right  enough  now  for  a  couple  of 
months  and  then  he'll  have  another.     He's  that  sort." 

"  Well,"  said  Hull,  "  I  guess  you  know  more  of  the 
fellow's  clock-works  than  I  do.  I  can't  stomach  the  blighter 
no  how.  Them  whiskers  of  his  sticks  in  my  gizzard.  I 
never  could  abide  whiskers  on  a  man — them  pork  chop  style. 
If  a  man's  a  man,  let  him  grow  a  full  face  of  hair  or  stick  to 
a  moustache.  Them  sort  of  whiskers  is  unholy,  and  I  don't 
mind  a  drinkin'  man  that  takes  his  drink  proper,  but  that 
chap  don't.  He's  a  last  night's  drunk  goin'  about  in  trousers. 
Bv  Jiminy,  boys,  if  we  don't  hit  the  cache,  we'll  export  him 
as  an  objec'  lesson.  Them  temp'rance  guys  would  give  a 
hundred  thousand  dollars  for  him  to  take  round  the  States, 
they  would  so." 

"  Well,  he's  our  last  chance,"  said  Macquart,  "  and  I 
pin  my  faith  to  him,  I  do  so.  You  mayn't  like  him,  but 
don't  say  anything  to  rile  him ;  he's  the  kej^  to  this  pro- 
position." 

"  We  won't  do  anything  to  rile  him,"  said  Tillman. 
Where's  Houghton  going  ?  " 

Houghton  had  walked  off  and  was  away  among  the 
trees. 

"It's  that  gal,"  said  the  Captain,  "  she  was  peekin'  at 
us  from  the  trees  and  he's  gone  after  her.  She's  after  him, 
too,  or  my  name's  not  Hull.  We  only  wanted  a  cage  of 
turkle  doves  to  add  to  our  top  hamper  and  b'  gosh,  1  believe 
we've  got  one." 

Houghton    had    glimpsed    her,    a    white  glint  among  the 


trees.  She  had  been  looking  at  them.  He  knew  quite  well 
that  if  he  had  not  been  of  the  party  she  would  not  have  been 
there.  Forgetting  the  others  and  heedless  of  everything,  he 
made  towards  her.  Seeing  him  coming  she  evaded  him  with- 
out taking  flight,  allowing  herself  to  be  seek  every  now 
and  then  and  every  now  and  then  vanishing  completely  from 
sight. 

This  was  the  edge  of  the  great  and  mysterious  forest  that 
throws  its  cloak  far  and  wide  over  New  Guinea.  The  trees 
just  here  were  not  very  closely  set  but  swinging  lianas  tufted 
with  growths  and  huge  shrubs  with  foot-broad  leaves  gave 
ample  cover  for  anyone  pursued.  Not  wishing  to  call  out, 
half  laughing,  half  vexed,  hit  in  the  face  by  leaves  and 
clutched  at  now  and  then  by  thorns,  he  continued  the  ptirsuit 
till  now  where  the  trees  were  denser  and  the  gloom  more 
profound  he  stood  lost  and  without  sight  of  her,  surrounded 
on  all  sides  by  a  barrier  that  on  all  sides  was  the  same. 

Parrots  were  crying  in  the  tree-tops  and  the  push  of  the 
wind  against  the  foliage  came  as'  a  deep  sigh,  the  voice  of 
leagues  of  trees  sleeping  and  half  disturbed  in  their  sleep. 

"Then  came  a  scuttering  in  the  branches  up  above,  and  a 
nut  hit  him  on  the  shoulder  and  as  he  glanced  up  another 
nut  caught  him  a  sharp  blow  on  the  cheek.  He  was  being 
pelted  by  little  monkeys,  swarms  of  little  monkeys,  skipping 
from  branch  to  branch,  hanging  by  their  tails  or  by  one  hand. 
He  was  wiping  his  cheek  when  a  laugh  sounded  almost  at 
his  elbow,  and,  turning,  he  saw  Chaya.  She  was  pushing 
back  the  leaves  that  hid  her  to  peep  at  him  and  before  she 
could  escape  he  caught  her. 

He  held  her  hands,  and  as  he  drew  her  towards  him  he 
felt  as  though  he  were  drawing  towards  him  the  very 
soul  of  the  mysterious  forests,  the  very  spirit  of  this  tropical 
land,  unknown  and  strange.  She  looked  straight  and  deep 
into  his  eyes,  and  for  a  moment  the  prisoner  and  the  captor 
changed  places  ;  then,  breaking  the  spell,  he  released  her 
hands  to  seize  her  to  him,  and  he  seized  only  air.  She  had 
eluded  him  again  and  he  found  himself  face  to  face  with 
nothing  but  swaying  leaves.  She  had  vanished  as  completely 
and  suddenly  as  though  the  forest  had  snatched  her  from  him. 
The  forest  that  was  her  accomplice  and  of  which  she  was 
the  true  child. 

He  pushed  the  still  swaying  leaves  aside,  thought  that 
he  perceived  a  glimpse  of  her  and  pursued  it  to  find — nothing. 
Then  after  half  an  hour  of  fruitless  wandering,  he  broke  into 
an  open  glade  and  found  himself  close  to  the  Papuan  village. 
There  was  a  great  commotion  in  the  village,  one  of  the  rubber 
gatherers  had  been  brought  in.  He  was  lying  on  the  ground 
turning  from  side  to  side,  crying  out  and,  to  all  appearances, 
delirious. 

As  Houghton  approached,  the  unfortunate  man  ceased 
his  outcries,  raised  himself  with  a  supreme  effort  nearly  to  his 
feet  and  then  fell  back.  He  was  dead.  The  natives,  seeing 
the  white  man,  pointed  to  the  corpse  and  seemed  trj'ing  to 
explain  matters.  Then  one  of  them  shook  something  from 
a  mat  basket,  pointed  to  it  and  to  the  corpse.  The  thing  he 
had  shaken  from  the  basket  was  a  scorpion,  rather  smaller 
than  the  one  from  which  Chaya  had  saved  Houghton.  It  had 
bitten  the  unfortunate  man  only  half  an  hour  ago  and  liere 
lay  the  result. 

Houghton  shivered  at  the  thought  of  what  he  had  escaped. 
It  was  like  an  object-lesson  of  what  tliis  country  held  for  the 
unwary,  a  picture  of  its  dangers  for  all  who  tread  the  paths 
of  life  or  love. 

CHAPTER  XXI 
The  Great  Thorn  Bush 

Saji  knew  nothing  of  the  meetings  between  Houghton  and 
Chaya.  Had  he  done  so,  Houghton's  story  would  have 
come  to  a  very  abrupt  end.  Saji  was  a  being  who  moved 
entirely  in  bhnkers  with  a  more  than  vivid  view  of  his 
immediate  objective,  but  with  great  darkness  on  either  side 
of  him.  So  we  might  fancy  the  tiger  to  move  through  the 
jungle. 

Having  received  his  commission  to  watch  the  strangers 
and  especially  Macquart,  he  fulfilled  it  to  the  letter.  The 
reward  of  his  obedience  would  be  Chaya  ;  that  was  sufficient 
to  blind  him  to  everything  else  but  his  work. 

Hull  and  his  companions  had  found  themselves  unobserved 


April  6,  1 91 6 


LAND      &      WATER 


2L 


Chaya  a  Romance  of  the  South  Seat.] 


Vlluatrated  by  Joseph  Simpion,   R.B.A. 


"  Before   she  could   escape  he  caught  her. 


and  alone.  The  interest  of  the  Papuans  in  them  seemed 
t<j  have  died  out  and  the  Dyaks  showed  no  evidence  of  their 
existence.  In  reahty,  the  newcomers  made  scarcely  a  move- 
ment that  was  not  noted.  Saji,  unseen,  was  always  with  them. 
He  had  followed  them  to  the  second  digging  at  the  spit,  and 
he  had  lurked  behind  Wiart's  house  listening  to  the  con- 
versation between  Wiart  and  ]\Iacquart  througli  a  hole  in  the 
boarding  of  the  wall. 

He  knew  very  httle  English,  but  enough  to  make  out 
that  a  new  move  was  in  progress  and  that  same  night,  coming 
back  through  the  forest  glowing  green  to  the  moon,  he  met 
the  mother  of  Cliaya  and  delivered  his  report. 


"  They  have  done  no  digging  to-night,"  said  Saji.  "They  are 
all  now  asleep,  but  they  start  to-morrow  with  the  rubber  man." 

"  Where  ?  " 

"  I  do  not  know  where,  or  for  what.  The  rubber  man 
and  he  whom  you  told  me  to  watch  have  been  with  their  heads 
together  for  a  long  time  talking  in  one  another's  ears.  They 
mean  no  good  to  the  others." 

"  How  ?  " 

"  I  do  not  know  how,  but  I  smell  death  in  all  their  talk.  I 
see  that  five  will  go  away  into  the  forest  and  only  two  return  — 
the  rubber  man  and  the  other." 

The  old  woman  said  nothing  for  a  moment.     She  seemed 


22 


LAND      &      WATER 


April  6,  1916 


listening  to  the  wind  in  the  trees  and  the  night  soun;ls  of 
the  forest. 

In  thit  vague  green  hght,  sht-  seem?  1  unutterably 
sinister  and  old,  and  Saji,  his  naked  body  glowing  in  the  vague 
light,  seemed  -the  incarnation  of  the  spirit  of  tiie  Punan 
stabbling  spear  he  carried. 

It  was  Hkc  a  conference  between  Age  and  Destru.tion. 
Then  she  said  : 

"  You  must  follow  them,  even  if  they  l"ad  you  to  the 
Black  Waters,  and  you  must  deal  witli  the  one  you  know  at 
the  very  moment  when  you  find  him  alone.  .Should  you  fail 
to  get  him  alone  you  must  deal  with  him  in  the  presence  of  the 
others,  even  though  you  die.  Do  you  promise  ?  " 
"  I  swear." 

Chaya  came  out  from  amidst  the  trees.  She  had  been 
with  the  old  woman  and  had  left  her  before  the  meeting  with 
Saji  ;  then,  looking  back,  she  had  seen  the  meeting  and  had 
returned  to  listen.  Saji  had  been  watching  her  all  the  time 
as  she  listened,  and  the  fer\'our  of  his  words  seemed  derived 
from  her  presence.  The  old  woman  did  not  seem  to  notice 
her,  nor  to  care  whether  she  was  listening  or  not." 

"  At  what  time  do  they  leave  ?  "  she  asked. 

"  I  do  not  know,"  said  Saji.  "But  leave  when  they  may, 
I  will  be  with  them  unseen." 

Without  a  single  word  more  the  old  woman  turned  and 
made  for  the  village. 

Saji  and  Chaya  found  themselves  alone.  These  two. 
•despite  the  fact  that  Chaya  was  indifferent  to  him  as  though  he 
were  a  dog,  had  long  been  companions  in  the  forest.  It  was 
Saji  who  had  taught  her  to  use  a  blow-pipe  so  that  she  could  kill 
a  tree  kangaroo  or  a  bird  at  ten  yards'  distance  ;  he  had  taught 
her  woodcraft  from  the  time  when  they  had  been  children 
together,  and  she  had  once  gone  in  the  fishing  prahu  with  him 
and  had  seen  the  sea  breaking  on  the  reefs,  and  the  trepang 
gatherers  at  their  work,  and  the  great  gnlls  fishing,  the  sailor 
brothers  of  the  forest  birds  and  as  different  from  them  as  the 
foliage  is  from  the  waves. 

She  had  gone  with  him  on  his  hunting  expeditions  in  the 
forest.  Saji  was  a  great  hunter  of  small  game.  He  would 
have  been  equally  great  after  big  game  had  there  been  any  to 
hunt,  but  here  in  these  forests  you  might  travel  days  without 
meeting  anything  more  dangerous  than  the  lizards  and  the 
climbing  kangaroos. 

"  You  are  going  hunting  then  ?  "  said  Chaya  in  the  sing- 
song voice  to  which  the  Saribas'  dialect  inchnes. 

"  To-morrow,"  said  Saji,  without  raising  his  eyes,  which 
he  had  lowered  at  her  approach. 

"  In  the  forest  ?  " 

"  In  the  forest." 

"  You  have  told  me  of  the  big  black  kangaroo  that  hunts 
in  the  thorn,  but  to-morrow  you  follow  the  little  one,  the  one 
with  the  beard." 

"  There  are  two  bearded  ones  in  that  party,"  said  Saji, 
falling  into  her  vein. 

"  But  your  game  is  the  least,"  said  Chaya.  "  I  know. 
He  was  the  slayer  of  the  white  man  who  was  my  father.  He 
must  surely  die." 

"  It  has  been  said." 

"  But  the  others,"  went  on  Chaya,  "  must  not  die." 

"  Who  knows  ?  "  replied  Saji.  "  The  forest  is  very  full 
of  death,  he  will  lead  them  to  it.  His  purpose  is  set  more 
straight  than  a  spear  shaft,  than  the  flight  of  an  arrow." 

"  I  will  go  with  you    and    see    this    thing,"  said  Chaya. 

It  will  be  better  to  see  than  the  kiUing  of  little  birds 
with  the  blow  pipe  or  the  trapping  of  fish  in  the  nets.  I  will 
be  with  you  at  daybreak  and  1  will  bring  my  spear." 

Saji  for  the  first  time  looked  up  at  her.  His  eyes  burned 
in  the  gloaming,  then  he  glanced  swiftly  down. 

"  As  you  will,"  he  said. 

Meanwhile  the  man  in  the  tent  and  the  man  in  the  boat 
by  the  landing  stage  and  the  man  in  the  frame  house  slept. 
The  whole  comj)licated  and  intricate  conspiracy,  now  vaguely 
shadowed  forth,  lay  in  balance,  watched  only  by  Saji  hiding 
near  the  tent  and  Houghton,  who,  to-night,  had  taken  Till- 
man's place  and  was  hiding  near  the  boat. 

Macquart,  whose  able  mind  was  engaged  on  whatever 
plans  he  had  made  against  his  fellow  adventurers,  had  not  the 
slightest  fear  of  the  past  or  suspicion  that  a  hand  was  stretchirg 
out  to  feel  for  him. 

Macquart  was  in  the  position  of  a  man  who  leaves  a 
.  illage,  spends  years  of  adventurous  life  in  distant  countries, 
and  returns  fancying  himself  forgotten,  forgetting  the  fact 
that  nv  ;nory  lives  long  in  quiet  places  and  amongst  small 
<  ommunities.Q 

With  the  exception  of  one  or  two  of  the  fishing  Dyaks,  he 
had  not  seen  a  member  of  the  tribe,  and  he  slept  now  the 
sleep  of  the  unjust,  which  is  often  more  peaceful  and  profound 
than  the  sleep  of  the  just. 

Saji,  hiding  near  the  tent,  had  not  the  slightest  notion 
that  Chaya,  who  was  to  accompany  him  on  the  morrow,  had 


any  interest  in  the  expedition  except  the  interest  of  the  killing 
there  might  be  to  sse.  Saji  judged  Chaya  by  himself,  just  as 
.\lacquart  judged  the  memory  of  the  tiny  Dyak  village  by  the 
memory  of  the  great  civilised  cities. 

Hull,  unconscious  of  everything  and  Tillm  m  suspicious 
but  tired,  slept  so  that  the  sound  of  their  snormg  might  lui\e 
been  heard  by  the  two  watchers,  Saji  by  the  tent  and  Houghton 
by  the  river. 

Then,  as  the  colour  of  the  sky,  the  voice  of  the  forest 
changed  with  the  breaking  dawn,  and  the  river  that  had  held 
the  stars  in  reflection  showed  to  the  increasing  hgiit  ghost 
spirals  of  mist  that  clung  to  the  mangroves  with  wreathy 
fingers. 

Then,  a  golden  glow  came  over  the  forest,  and  the  sky 
above  the  green  of  the  trees  deepened  in  distance  and  where 
the  stars  were  but  a  moment  ago  there  was  now  the  blueness 
unutterable  of  the  tropic  dawn. 

Hull  came  out  of  the  tent  and  stretched  himself.  Hough- 
ton had  released  himself  half  an  hour  ago  from  his  duties  as 
sentry,  and  was  engaged  in  shaving  himself  before  a  mirror 
fastened  to  the  tent  canvas,  and  now  Jacky  and  Macquart 
showed  themselves  coming  up  from  the  river-side. 

Lastly,  Tillman  made  his  appearance. 

"  We'd  better  get  breakfast  and  then  set  to  work  to  pack 
the  provisions,"  said  Hull. 

"  We  won't  want  to  take  too  much,"  put  in  Macquart. 
"  The  expedition  won't  last  long  and  we  can  always  shoot  as 
much  as  we  want  for  food." 

"  Maybe,"  replied  the  other,  "  but  I  ain't  goin'  to  trust 
to  no  roast  lizards  for  my  grub.  Here  comes  the  sleepin' 
beauty." 

It  was  Wiart  who  had  appeared  on  the  verandah  ot  his 
house. 

Wiart  had  improved  very  much  in  appearance  since  they 
first  met  him.  He  had  been  then  at  the  end  of  one  of  his 
periodical  drinking  bouts  and  he  would  be  all  right  now  till 
the  next  attack.  His  face  looked  more  healthy  and  more 
human,  despite  the  whiskers  that  gave  such  great  offence  to 
Hull,  and  he  had  a  rifle  under  his  arm  and  a  bandoUer  of 
cartridges  slung  across  him. 

He  came  towards  the  party  by  the  tent,  for  he  was  to 
breakfast  with  them. 

Hull  stared  at  the  coming  figure  with  a  frown  on  his 
face. 

"  Hi,"  said  he,  "  what's  that  ?  What  are  you  doin'  with 
that  gun  and  them  ca'tridges  ?  " 

"  Doing,"    said    Wiart.     "  Nothing,    carrying    them." 

"  Well,  then,"  said  Hull,  "  you'll  just  oblige  mebycarryin' 
them  back  and  leavin'  them  in  the  house  ;  this  is  a  picnic,  it 
ain't  no  huntin'  party." 

,     "  But  what  are   you   talking   about  ?  "   cried    Wiart.     "  I 
always  go  armed  in  the  woods." 

"  Not  with  me,"  said  Hull.  "  I'm  meanin'  no  offence, 
but  I  don't  go  walkin'  with  armed  strangers  in  no  woods.  I'm 
as  sure  as  certain  you're  an  amiable  man,  but  you're  a  stran- 
ger to  me  as  the  lacly  on  the  'Frisco  tram  said  to  the  gentleman 
whose  foot  was  on  hers.  Now  do  you  take  me  or  do  you  don't 
—my  ultimatum  is  no  armaments." 

"  Then  you  can  go  without  me,"  said  Wiart,  grounding 
the  butt  of  the  rifle  and  half-turning  away. 

"  One  moment,  son,"  said  Hull,  "  I  can  not.  You've 
contracted  to  lead  tliis  party,  and  it's  up  to  you  to  finish  the 
contrac'." 

Whether  he  received  some  sign  from  Macquart  it  is  im- 
possible to  say,  but  the  Rubber  Man  gave  in  suddenly,  and 
unconditionally  on  the  point  of  arms,  put  the  rifle  and  car- 
tridges back  in  the  house  and  sat  down  to  breakfast. 

"  I  don't  blame  you  for  being  cautious,"  said  he, 
"  though  this  seems  caution  run  mad,  if  you'll  excuse  me  for 
saying  so,  'specially  as  the  whole  lot  of  you  are  armed.  How- 
ever, let  it  stand  at  that.     I  don't  mind." 

He  understated  the  case.  Tliis  was  much  more  than 
caution  run  mad  ;  it  was  perhaps  the  most  deadly  insult  that 
one  white  man  could  put  on  another  in  that  place.  Hufl 
did  not  care  in  the  least.  If  Wiart  had  attempted  to  back  out 
of  leading  them  he  would,  as  he  said,  have  taken  him  along 
by  a  halter.  Instinct  had  warned  him  against  Wiart.  He 
knew  absolutely  nothing  of  the  suspicions  that  filled  the  more 
cultivated  and  sensitive  minds  of  his  companions,  but  he  did 
know  that  not  on  any.  account  would  he  trust  himself  in 
lonely  places  with  the  Rubber  Man  if  the  latter  were  armed. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  in  his  sub-conscious  mind  Hull  had 
worked  out  the  sinister  possibilities  of  any  collaboration  be- 
tween Macquart  and  Wiart,  but  he  was  unconscious  of  the 
fact. 

When  breakfast  was  over,  they  began  to  pack  up  the 
provisions,  Hull  supervising. 

"  We  don't  want    no    tent,"    said    he.       "  There  ain't  no 

(Cctrttiuiii-J  on  i-<ige  iM) 


April  6,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


23 


'First  Aid'to  Efficiency  on  Active  Service 


ExeTy 
Genuine 
Burberry 
Oarment 
i$  labelled 
"  Burberry!. ' 


The BURBERRY 


The    Naval    Burberry 

"  My    Burberry    hat    never    let    any    water 
through.     I  have  worn  it  in  a  gale  on  a  de- 
ttroyer,    but    it    kept    me    absolutely    dry." 
— Walter  Burness. 


The  Airman's   Burberry 

"At  an  altitude  of  17,200  feet,  your 
Gabardine  with  Camel  Fleece  lining  re- 
fitted cold  to  a  remarkable  degree.  1 
eonfider  it  an  ideal  outfit." — E.  M. 
Maitland. 


Whenever  the  severity  of 
weather  conditions  to  be  faced, 
in  any  kind  of  Naval  or  Military 
Service,  calls  for  the  highest 
form  of  protection,  it  is  ex- 
pedient and  economical  to  get 
the  best  top-coat  obtainable, 
in  a  word, 

THE  BURBERRY 

Made  in  especially  woven  and 
proofed  Burberry  cloths,  in 
combination  with  linings  of 
Proofed  Wool  or  Camel  Fleece, 
The  Burberry  provides  an 
effective  and  staunch  safeguard 
against  the  worst  weather  of 
any  climate,  and  embodies 
more  advantages  than  have 
ever  been  combined  in  any 
other  top-coat. 

THE  BURBERRY 

— supplies  a  dry  and  comfort- 
able shelter  against  driving 
rain,  sleet  or  snow ; 

— whilst  reliably  weather- 
resisting,  is  healthfully  self- 
ventilating. 

— keeps  out  biting  wind  better 
than  any  other  coat  of  treble 
its  weight. 

— is  luxuriously  warming  in  the 
coldest  weather,  yet  being 

^lightweight  and  air-free,  can 
be  worn  on  mild  days  without 
discomfort. 

— strong  and  durable,  with- 
stands roughest  usage  without 
OSS  of  protective  powers 

But     it     Must     be 
THE  BURBERRY 

That  THE  BURBERRY  is 
universally  accepted  as  the 
most  perfect  coat  for  Active 
Service  available,  is  evidenced 
by  the  fact  that  Burberrys  have 
had  the  honour  of  supplying 


HIS    MAJESTY    THE    KING 

H.R.H  THE  PRINCE  OF  WALES 
H.I.H.  THE  GRAND  DUKE  NICHOLAS 
H  R  H  THE  DUKE  OF  1  HE  ABRUZZI 
EARL  KITCHENER,  VISCOUNT  FRENCH 
and  other  distinguished  Officers  Com- 
manding the   Allied   Armies    and    Navies. 


Illustrated 
Military 
or  Naval 
Catalogues 
Post  Free 


NAV4L  OR  MILITARY   WEATHERPROOFS- 

Unta  further  notice  BURBERRYS  CLEAN  AND 
KE-PROOF  Officera'  "Burberrys,"  Tielockens  and 
Burberry  Trench- Warms  FRt-E    OF    CHARGE. 


BURBERRYS 


Haymarket      S.W.      LONDON 

Bd.  Malesherbes  PARIS;  and  Provincial  Agents 


24 


LAND      &      WATER 


April  6,  1916 


(Coniinuea  from  page   xxll) 

skeeters  in  the  forest  to  speak  of,  and  we  can  light  a  smoke 
fire  to  keep  'em  off  if  there  are.  Jacky  can  carry  tlie  pick  and 
shovel.     Now  then,  if  you're  ready,  histe  your  bundles." 

They  streamed  off,  Wiart  and  Macquart  leading.  Jacky 
and  Hull  coming  ne.vt  and  Tillman  and  Hougliton  following. 
Wiart  had  a  pocket  compass  and  Hull  had  another,  though,  as 
Wiart  said,  his  knowledge  of  the  road  was  so  intimate  that 
compasses  were  unnecessary. 

They  went  down  the  glade  past  the  Papuan  \'illage  and 
struck  into  the  trees  where  the  glade  ended: 

It  was  like  passing  into  a  house  ;  the  damar,  cutch  and 
camphor  trees  round  them  flung  their  branches  to  make  the 
roof,  a  roof  supported  by  a  thousand  thousand  pillars. 

Just  as  the  outline  of  the  Tartar  tents  can  still  be  seen 
in  the  outhne  of  the  roofs  of  the  Chinese  pagodas,  so  in  the 
l)illars  of  the  cathedral  we  can  see  a  vague  sketch  of  the  I'orest, 
that  first  home  of  man,  and  in  the  gloom  of  our  cathedrals 
some  tincture  of  the  gloom  of  the  great  cathedral  that  God 
created  for  the  first  worshippers. 

The  forests  of  the  north  have  a  solemnity  all  their  own, 
and  the  forests  of  the  tropics  a  mystery  incommunicable  to 
those  who  have  not  experienced  it. 

Here  in  the  twilight  that  seems  the  twilight  of  the  birth 
ut  things,  vegetable  hfe  appears  still  clinging  to  its  first  and 
most  extravagant  forms.  It  moves.  Like  that  convolvulus 
in  the  Botanical  Gardens  of  Caracas  that  grows  at  the  rate  of 
nn  inch  an  hour,  here,  in  the  forests  of  New  Guinea,  the  lianas 
K'ngtlun  themselves  almost  perceptibly,  vines  fight  the  trees 
and  kill  them,  trees  fall  and  crush  tlie  vines.  The  orchids  are 
everywhere.  They  seem  the  furious  attempt  of  the  \cgetable 
world  to  enter  the  kingdom  of  the  birds  and  butterflies  and 
insects.  That  bird  chnging  to  that  rope  of  Uantasse  is  a  flower, 
that  butterfly  is  an  illusion,  that  insect  an  orchid. 

That  bursting  crash  is  a  tree  that  has  been  faUing  for  a 
year.  The  forest  kills  itself  and  recreates  itself  eternally  ;  it  is 
a  community  where  the  vegetable  is  king  and  where  the  vege- 
table wars  with  the  animal,  and  the  insects  set  traps  for  flies 
and  thorn  entanglements  for  animals,  and  mazes  to  bewilder 
and  destroy  men. 

Houghton  was  alive  to  these  impressions,  Tillman  less  so. 
"  I've  fi.xed  up  with  Hull,"  said  he,  "  to  keep  those  two 
cliaps  always  in  front  of  us  ;  they  can't  do  any  harm  then." 
•  "I'm  not  afraid  of  them  and  their  tricks,  unless  we  find 
the  cache,"  said  Houghton.  "  You  see,  while  we  are  hke  this 
we  can  always  guard  against  them,  but  should  by  any  chance 
this  lead  of  Macquart's  be  a  real  one  and  we  touch  the  stuff, 
then,  in  the  excitement  of  the  business,  when  we  aren't  think- 
ing, they  may  get  their  blow  in." 

■'  You  needn't  worry  about  that,"  said  Tillman.  "  This 
lead  is  a  spoof.  I'm  dead  sure  of  that.  Mac  has  some  black 
joke  up  his  sleeve.  D'you  know,  I've  got  to  that  condition 
now  that  the  gold  is  less  to  me  than  tiie  chance  of  doing 
Macquart  in  if  we  catch  him  playing  tricks  ;  that  chap  has  got 
on  my  spine.     God  !  how  I'm  beginning  to  hate  him  !  " 

"  I'm  feeling    hke    that,"  replied    the    other.     "  It's  the 
strangest  thing.     At  first  I.  liked  him,  he  seemed  better  than  a 
fairy  tale,  and  slowly  I've  got  to  feel  hke  you.     Yet  he  lias 
never  given  me  offence.     Hull  hated  him  all  along,  you  see  he 
knew  him  better  and.   besides,  he's  a  chap  that  moves  by 
instinct.     Did  you  notice  the  down  he's  taken  on  Wiart  ?  " 
"  You  mean  on    his    whiskers.     Hull's   a    rum    chap,  and 
somehow  he's  hit  the  thing  about  Wiart  that  seems  the  bull's- 
eye.     A  chap  must  be  a  beast  to  grow  a  pair  of  things  like 
that  on  his  face — lost  to  all  sense  of  decency." 
Houghton  laughed  and  they  said  no  more. 
The  work  was   becoming   heavy.     They    were   crossing   a 
boggy  patch  where  tall  nipah  palms  grew — the  nipah  palm 
loves  the  water— and  their  feet    sank  ankle  deep  at  every 
step. 

Beyond  lay  clear  ground  except  for  barrier  lianas  sagging 
so  low  that  sometimes  they  could  be  stepped  over. 

In  cutting  Hull  out  of  their  councils,  Houghton  and  Till- 
man had  made  a  mistake.  They  had  considered  him  too 
volcanic  to  trust  with  their  suspicions,  they  had  forgotten 
that  he  had  a  mind  of  his  own,  and  that  the  working  of  that 
mind  unchecked  by  them  might  be  prejudicial  to  their 
plans. 

Hull  as  hs  ate  now,  was  thinking.  The  working  of  the 
jaws  in  mastication  stimulates  some  brains,  just  as  the  con- 
templation of  the  ideal  stimulates  others.  Hull,  as  he  chewed 
his  bully  beef,  began  to  think  that  he  had  never  made  full 
enquiries  of  Macquart  as  to  the  extent  of  Wiart 's  knowledge  of 
their  real  business  or  his  compensation  if  they  were  success- 
ful. 

"  Look  here,"  said  he  to  Wiart,  "  you  know,  I  s'pose,  that 
you're  not  takin'  us  on  this  traverse  for  the  sake  of  our 
health." 

Wiart  glanced  at  Macquart  \vho  at  once  chipped  in  : 

'  O.   I've  told    Wiart    we're  not  hunting,  for    that   place 


the  niggers  carted  the  baskets  to  tor  nothing.  He's  quite 
ready  to  lend  us  his  assistance  without  prodding  too  deep  into 
our  affairs." 

"  All  the  same,"  said  Hull,  "  I'm  a  man  that  takes 
nothing  from  no  man  for  nothing,  and  if  we  strike  what  we're 
lookin'  for  I'm  not  goin'  to  deny  his  due  to  him  who  brought 
us  to  it." 

"  There's  no  use  in  talking  of  that  yet,"  said  Houghton, 
hurriedly. 

"  O  yes,  there  is,"  said  Hull.  "  It's  better  to  settle 
jobs  hke  these  right  off  at  the  start,  then  there'll  be  no  quarrel- 
hng  at  the  finish,  and  if  we  hit  what  we're  looking'  for  I'm  up 
to  give  Mr.  Wiart  two  hundred  pound  for  his  work  in  directin' 
us,  a  man  can't  say  fairer  than  that." 

Tillman,  who  was  looking  at  Wiart,  thought  tliat  he  saw 
a  momentary  gleam  of  mockery  in  his  eye. 

"  O,  that's  all  right,"  said  he.  "  I'm  not  bothering  alwut 
rewards.  I  can  see  plain  enough  what  you  gentlemen  are 
after,  and  I'll  not  deny  that  I  guessed  it  from  Mr.  Macquart's 
questions  and  what  he  let  fall.  Well,  if  it's  treasure,  then,  and 
you  strike  it  rich,  I'm  not  indisposed  to  take  what  you  offer. 
I  came  on  tliis  expedition  for  the  fun  of  the  thing  and  to  get 
away  from  that  confounded  rubber  plantation  for  a  day  or 
two,  that's  what  riled  me  when  you  objected  to  my  carrying 
a  rifle.  That's  maybe  why  you  objected.  You  thought  in 
your  mind,  this  man  may  make  trouble " 

"  Wait  a  bit,"  put  in  Hull,  "  I  only  put  in  my  word  against 
arms  because  I  didn't  know  you  and  because  you  were  a  bit 
thick  with  Mac  here.  You'll  observe  Mac  doesn't  carry  a 
gun.  Mac  and  me  has  differences  at  times,  don't  we,  Mac  ? 
And  I  objects  to  any  chanst  of  us  quarrellin'.  Now,  if  Mac's 
friend  had  a  gun,  Mac  might  borrow  it,  mightn't  you,  Mac  ?  " 

Houghton  jumped  to  his  feet. 

"  Come  on,"  he  said.  "  There's  no  use  in  sitting  here 
talking.     Let's  be  doing." 

lie  began  to  pack  up  the  things  and  the  others,  rising  to 
their  feet,  helped  him.  Then  they  got  under  way  in  the 
same  order  of  procession. 

At  four  o'clock  they  arrived  at  a  part  of  the  forest  which 
goes  by  the  native  name  of  the  Great  Thorn  Bush. 

(To  be   continued) 


The  new  faille  silks  are  first  favourites  for  spring  frocks  ; 
these,  as  their  name  indicates,  having  more  or  less  of  a  raised 
surface.  There  is  a  considerable  amount  of  substance  about 
them  and  as  a  result  they  cut  exceedingly  well.  Faille  silks 
are  rather  expensive,  the  better  quaUties  mounting  into  quite 
a  large  figure  per  yard.  The  French  designers  were  the  first 
to  leaHze  their  possibiUties,  and  the  French  factories  still 
working  are  responsible  for  quite  a  number  of    them. 

The  new  wrap  coats  for  .warmer  weather  have  made 
their  appearance,  and  in  the  majority  of  cases  call  for  prompt 
admiration.  A  beautiful  Bernard  model  seen  the  other  day 
was  of  Lincoln  Green  suede  cloth  with  facings,  collar  and 
cuffs  of  green  and  white  bird's-eye  spotted  foulard.  To 
the  making  of  this  coat  no  fewer  than  eight  yards  of  material 
had  gone,  and  the  model  hung  in  very  full  folds  of  singular 
gracefulness. 

Some  very  pretty  hats  have  a  narrow  veil  of  lace,  falling 
over  the  brim  and  just  veiling  the  eyes.  It  is  the  same  idea 
as  the  narrow  line  of  tuUe  hanging  from  many  of  the  hats 
last  year,  but  carried  to  a  greater  extreme.  For  these  lace 
frills  are  to  all  intents  and  purposes  eye  veils,  and  should  be 
very  restful  to  the  eyes  when  there  is  a  glare,  or  a  wind,  or 
dust  is  blowing. 

Tiny  shoulder  capes  are  being  seen  here,  there,  and  every- 
where, but  it  is  a  well-known  authority's  opinion  that  they 
will  not  be  worn  in  earnest  till  the  turn  of  the  present  year. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  numbers  of  the  new  suits  and  wrap  coats  are 
decorated  in  this  manner  and  it  is  said  that  cotton  and  linen 
frocks  will  follow  the  example  in  due  course. 

Pockets  have  come  into  their  own,  not  deceptive  bogus 
affairs  into  which  hand  or  handkerchief  could  not  possibly 
be  slipped,  but  the  genuine  article.  They  are  generally  of 
diagonal  shape,  stitched  either  side  of  the  skirt,  and  are  edged 
with  military  braid  or  a  piping  of  satin  or  taffetas.  Quite 
an  attractive  dress  of  serge  had  the  pocket  outhned  with  a 
wide  button-hole  stitching  of  worsted  and  looked  very  well. 

C.A.V.  LAMP  BULBS  for  Car  Lighting,  bein^  specially  cons-tructed 
to  withstand  excessive  vibration,  are  superior  to  the  severe  tests  im- 
posed by  a  long  run  on  a  rough  road.  Motorists  are  invited  to  write 
for  Catalogue  and  full  particulars. — C.  A.  Vandervell  and  Co.,  Ltd., 
Electrical  Engineers.  Acton,  London,  W. — Advt. 


Aprii    13,  1916 


Supplement    to    LAND    &     WATER 


XV 


INEXPENSIVE 

HATS 

for  Easter 

THE  Hat  illustrated 
is  an  excellent  ex- 
ample of  the  value 
to    be    obtained    in    our 
Millinery      Department. 


Our  Book  of  New  Spring 
Millinery  posted  free. 


Attractive  Toque,  de- 
sired and  nude  in  our 
own  workrooms,  in 
buck  panne,  with  high 
tnlle  crown,  tied  round 
with  blue  ribtxm  in  an/ 
sbade  required. 

Prici  29/6 


MARSHALL    & 
SNELGROVE 

LIMITED 

VERB  ST.  and  OXFORD  ST. 

LONDON 


a  Campaign  Boot 

that  will  outlast  the 
Campaign, 

will  wear  like  nails  for  years,  if  need  be,  giving  full  comfort 
from  the  very  first,  fitting  finely,  never  letting  in  the  wet,  and 
looking  as  smart    as  the   most   particular  officer  could   wish. 

That's  the  Norwell  Trench  Boot,  the  very  finest  Campaign  Boot  on 
the  market,  with    100   years'  reputation   for   thoroughness   behind   it. 

D/oriOeJIs 

'F^erih  '^  oots 

"  Direct  from  Scotland." 

The  Norwell  Trench  Boot  (as  illustrated) 
Specifi-  is  hand-built  throughout — light,  but  with 
cation.      every   point    perfectly    finished,    for    wear, 

dryness,  and  com'prt.  See  the  illustration — - 
note  the  welt  all  round  the  Heel,  and  the  full  half-inch 
sole  of  double-wearing,  waterproof  Dri-ped.  Water- 
tight tongues  right  to  the  top,  waterproof  pebble- 
grained  uppers,  black  or  brown  ;  special  leather 
lining.  With  3  buckles  as  shown,  or  with  '7  C  I 
ordinary  laceholes  to  the  top.  Post  Free.  I  iij~ 
Also  the  Cavalry  Officers'  Field  or  Riding  Boot. 
The  uppers  are  cut  from  best  selection  of  water- 
proof brown  calf-skin,  special  flexible  uppers,  leather 
lined,  hand-built  throughout,  with  or  wiihout  toe- 
cap?,  Wellington  high  legs,  to  lace  over  instep  only, 
and  filled  wiih  small  strap  at  top  of  leg  to  keep  this 
in  position.  Fitted  also  with  garter  loops  if 
preferred  to  strap  and  buckle.      Post  Fr 

D.  NORWELL  &  SON, 

PERTH,  SCOTLAND. 

Specialists  in  Riod  wearing  footwear.  (Estab- 
lished over  too  years. 

Foreign  orders  receive   special    aUtntion. 
t^'rite  now  for   New  Footwear  Catalosue. 


The  Original  Cording' s .  Estd.  1839 


High-Grade 
Military  Waterproofs.    J 


The  "EQUITOR"  Coat 

(Regd.) 
Officers  speak  highly  of  the 
special  provision  for  mounted  wear 

in  the  attached  apron  buttoning  on 
one  side.  This  absolutely  shuts  out 
any  rain,  and  when  not  in  use  fastens 
conveniently  (out  of  sight)  on  the 
inside  of  coat,  which  then  serves 
just  as  well  for  ordinary  wear  afoot. 
The  coat  can  be  had  fitted  with  belt 
if  desired. 

One  of  the  recommended  materials, 
No.  31,  in  colour  an  approved  mili- 
tary fawn,  is  a  tough,  though  finely- 
woven  fabric,  light  in  weight,  yet 
absolutely  reliable  for  hard  wear  and 
tear. 

Also     made     with     warm 
fleece    detachable     lining. 

All  "  Equitor  "  Coat  with  this 
snug  woollen  wrap  or  inner  coat 
added,  will  keep  out  the  bitterest 
wind  or  cold,  and  will  most  surely 
minimise  the  evils  of  enforced  ex- 
posure  at   night. 

When  ordering  an  "Equitor"  or  "  Ser. 
vice  "  Coat  (the  "  Service  "  Coat  is  matJe 
without  the  attached  apron),  or  directing 
that  one  be  sent  on  approval,  height  and 
chest  measure,  and  reference,  should  be 
given. 

New  llluttratea  List  of  waterproof  coatt,  cape;  boots/trench  waders  &c.,  at  request. 

J.  C.  CORDING  &  G. 

Waterproofers  to  H.M.  the  King 

Only     Addresses : 

19  PICCADILLY,  W.  &  35 st.  jamess  st. 


Inexpensive 
Crepe  de  Chine 
B  I  o  u 


s  e  s 


In  view  of  the  present 
widespread  feeling  for 
economy  in  dress,  we  have 
designed  a  number  of 
simple  and  dainty,  yet 
t  h  0  r  ou^hly  practical, 
blouses  at  ouite  excep- 
tional prices.  This  is  the 
more  apparent  when  the 
present  remarkable  rise  in 
the  price  of  all  silk  e:oods 
is  taken  into  consideration. 

PRACTICAL  CREPE  DE 
CHINE  BLOUSE,  made 
by  our  own  workers  from 
reliable  quality  Crcpo  de 
Chine,  with  large  collar, 
to  be  worn  outside  coat. 
In  black,  white,  navy, 
s.and,  vellum,  and  hy- 
drangea shades  of  pink, 
blue,  and  raauve. 
SPECIAL  PRICE 

21/9 

In   thick  Japanese  silk, 

18/9 

In  soft  white  spot  muslin, 

15  9 

CATALOCUE  PO'iT  FREE 


DebenKam 
&Freebod[y 

Wigmope  Street. 

iCovendish  Square)  London.VC' 


Fomous  tor  over  a  Century 
(orTosle  (or  QuaMv  for  Value 


XVI 


Supplement     to     LAND     &     WATER 


April  13,  1916 


Mr.  Dunlop  heads  a  deputation. 

" In  conclusion,  I  will  summarise  my  points  : 

(1)  Hiere  is  annually  a  sum  of  more  than 
£3,500,000  going  out  of  this  country  in  the 
purchase  of  foreign-made  tyres. 

(2)  There  is  an  ample  supply  of  British  built 
tyres  to  meet  all  legitimate  demands  without  the 
importation  of  a  single  foreign  tyre. 

(3)  Foreign  tyres,  on  account  of  their  bulk, 
occupy  an  appreciable  amount  of  valuable  space 
and  thus  accentuate  the  existing  shortage  of 
shipping. 

I  submit,  therefore,  that  on  these  three  counts, 
the  free  import  of  foreign  tyres  at  the  present 
juncture  is  economically  unsound  and  contrary 
to  national  interests." 


y  m 


RUBBER   COMPANY,   LIMITED, 

FOUNDERS  OF  THE   PNEUMATIC  TYRE   INDUSTRY. 
Aston    Cross,    Birmingham;  14,    Regent    Street, 

London,  S.W.  PARIS:    4,  Rue  du   Colonel   Moll. 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVII  No.  2814  [v^Tr]  THURSDAY,  APRIL  13,  igi6  [rN^E'S^H^^l^A^]  lS^Si.^U\'irKl^ 


By   Louis  RacmaekcTS. 


Drawn   exclusively  (or  "Land  and    Water," 


A  Zeppelin   Raid:  The   Kaiser  counts   the  bag 


"Land  &  Water"  War  Lithographs,  No.  11 


JJLti^imi. 


Y'i'riae^nisnebiiii^m^tm 


mi^mk 


By  G.  Spencer  Prysc 
A   refugee   ship  from   Ostend    receiving   instructions   from   destroyers 

in   mid-Channel,    October,    1914 


April  13,  iQi*^ 


LAND     &     WATER 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSVVAY,  LONDON,  W.C 

Telephone:  HOLBORN  2828 


THURSDAY.    APRIL    13th,    1916 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

I 


4 

10 

13 


A  Zeppelin  Bag.     By  Louis  Raemaekers 

A  Refugee  Ship.     By  G.  Spencer  Pryse 

German  Character  (Leading  Article) 

The  Right  Perspective.     By  Hilaire  Belloc 

Combined  Arms  in  War.     By  Arthur  Pollen 

Spring  in  Gallipoli.     By  Eden  Phillpotts 

German  Chancellor's  Speech.     By  G.  K.  Chesterton     13 

When  the  Men  Come  Home.     By  Professor  J.  H. 

Morgan  I5 

The  Spirit  of  Russia.     By  L.  B.  Namier  16 

Sortes  Shakespearian;^;.     By  Sir  Sidney  Lee  17 

Germans  on  the  Stock  Exchange  18 

Chaya.     By  H.  de  Vcre  Stacpoolc  19 

Town  and  Country  24 

The  West  End  26 

Choosing  Kit  xix- 


GERMAN     CHARACTER 


Wi 


'E  have  no  time  for  rhetoric.     Stronger  than 
rhetoric  is  the  might  of  facts  and  we  let  them 
speak   for   us."     We  thank  you,  Bethman- 
Hollwcg,  for  teaching  us  these  words.  Strange 
though  it  may  appear  to  many,  they  were  actually  uttered 
by  the  German  Imperial  Chancellor  in  his  speech  to  the 
Reichstag.     It  is  by  the  might  of  facts  that  Germany 
is  indicted  at  the  bar  of  civihsation,  and  we  have  to  see 
to  it  that  rhetoric  has  no  part  either  now  or  hereafter  in 
swaying  our  judgment.     In  the  same  issue  of  the    Times 
which   contained   the  text   of   tl^e   Chancellor's   speech, 
appeared  the  report  of  the  awful  conditions  prevailing 
at  the  camp  for  prisoners  of  war  at  Wittenberg  during  an 
outbreak  of  typhus.     Rhetoric  cafi  never  wipe  away  this 
infamy  ;    it  passes  into  history  among  the  unpardonable 
greater  barbarities  of  war.     Its  horror  is  heightened  by 
the  fact  that  this  crime  against  defenceless  prisoners  was 
committed  with  the  concurrence  of  a  whole  town,  and 
that  the  arch-offender  was  a  doctor — a  man  of  sufficient 
scicntilic  knowledge  to  be  fully  cognisant  of  the  sufferings 
and   death   to   which   he    was   condemning   these   poor 
captives  by  his  cowardly  callousness  and  neglect  of  duty 
— a  neglect  for  which  he  has  been  given  the  Iron  Cross, 
a  decoration  which  might  fittingly  have  been  instituted 
by  Herod  or  Caiaphas  as  a  distinction  for  cruel  men  to 
commemorate  the  part  they  had  taken  in  putting  to  a 
shameful  death  Him  who  showed  to  mankind  divine  pity 
and  compassion. 

Hideous  facts  succeed  one  another  so  quickly  that  by 

the  very  weight  of  their  numbers  they  almost  crush  the 

heart  and  mind  into  a  state  of  apathy.     Words    either 

fail  to  describe  them  or  else  have  lost  their    significance 

by  constant  repetition.     But  we  have  to  keep  steadily 

before  our  eyes  that  those  horrible  facts,  which  we  would 

gladly  lose  sight  of,  are  the  true  German  character — the 

writing  so  to  speak  in  which  the  Teuton  nature  expresses 

itself.     Raemaekers'  cartoons  are  no  exaggeration  ;   they 

arc  only  the  pictorial  representations  of  actual  occurrences 

or  Hving  truths.     Regard  the    Kaiser    gloating    over    a 

^^cppelin  bag  on  the  previous    page.     Its    inhumanity 

ivould  appal,  did  we  not  know  that  it  represents  the  exact 

mental   attitude   which   the    Kaiser   and   his   entourage 

i^issumc  towards  the  results  of  airship  raids.     They  hope 


to  terrify  Great  Britain  into  demanding  an  early  peace , 
wherefore  the  more  British  women  and  children  that  are 
slaughtered,  the  more  they  triumph. 

In  the  Reichstag  last  week,  the  well-known  Socialist 
member,  Dr.  Leibknecht  protested  vigorously  against  the 
Chancellor's  flagrant  perversions  of  truth.    No  doubt  he 
does  not  stand  alone,  but  those  who  are  with  him  form 
such  a  small  minority  of  the  German  people  that  one  is 
reminded  of  Abraham's  unavailing  plea  for  God's  mercy 
on  the  cities  of  the  plain.     Professor  J.  H.  Morgan,  who 
speaks  with  the  authority  of    experience    has    declared 
that  "  the  whole  people  is  infected  with  some  kind  of 
moral  distemper.     To  regard  Germany  as  the  misguided 
pupil  of  a  mihtary  caste  which  alone  stands  in  the  way 
of  her  reformation,  seems  to  me  to  ignore  the  volume  of 
evidence  as  to  the  comphcity  of  oificers  and  men  in  those 
orgies  of  outrage."     The  Wittenberg  infamy  is  yet  further 
evidence  of  the  same  nature,  and  we  doubt  not  that  other 
testimony  will  continue  to  be  forthcoming,  for  we  have 
not  plumbed  to  its  uttermost  depth  German  foulness  in 
war,  which  is  an  integral  part  of  the  German  philosophy  of 
life.     Mr.  Asquith  understands  this,  and  has  expressed 
himself  more  than  once  in  5uch  plain  and  explicit  terms, 
that  those  are  mistaken  who  consider  he  was  whittling 
away  his  previous  determination  when  in  his  speech  at 
Lancaster  House  he  attempted  to  define  what  he  meant 
by  the  destruction  of  the  military  domination  of  Prussia. 
On  the  following  afternoon  in  the  House  of  Lords  Lord 
Crewe   made   this   quite   clear   when   he   rebuked   Lord 
Courtney  of  Penwith  in    this   straightforward   manner ; 
When  Lord  Courtney  tries  to  separate  German  enter- 
prise from  German  militarism  and  the  character  of  the 
German  people  from  the  ambitions  of  the  German  General 
Staff,  he  is  undertaking  an  impossible  task. 
The  best  answer  which  has  been  given  to  the  German 
Chancellor's  speech  is  Mr.  G.   K.  Chesterton's  brilliant 
analysis  of  it  in  Land    &    Water    to-day.     He    turns 
the  big  pronouncement  inside  out,  and  by  placing    in 
juxtaposition     its    ludicrous    contradictions    and    non- 
sensical falsehoods  reveals  in  a  clear  light  its  insincerity 
and  hypocrisy.     He  points  out  that  while  it  is  true  that 
Prussia  is  the  only  country  that  the  AlUes  or  any  other 
people  in  the  civilised  world  have  any  reason  to  put 
under  lock  and  key,  it  does  not  mean  Prussia  is  threatened 
with  destruction  in  the  way  it  has  destroyed  for  its  own 
ends     Belgium    and    Serbia.     No    phrase    could   better 
describe  the  object  we  have  in  view — that  German,y  is 
to  be  put  under  lock  and  key  for  a  term  of  years  until 
it  gives  the  world  indisputable  evidence  that  its  whole 
national  character  is  changed  ;  and  it  must  be  deprived 
of  power    and  organisation  to  do  evil.     We  know  that 
many  of  the  foul  offences  committed  during  the  war 
which  she  endeavours  to  justify  on  the  ground  of  necessity, 
or  on  some  other  equally  heinous  pretext  have  had  their 
counterpart  in  times  of  peace  in  business  transactions. 
That   acute   student   of   modern   Germany,   Dr.   Arthur 
Shadwell,  has  remarked  on  the  low  commercial  morality 
of  German  merchants.    The  main  object  of  the  Paris 
Conference  must  necessarily  be  the  adequate  protection 
of  Allied  countries  against  a  repetition  of  an  unscrupulous 
commercial  offensive  after  the  war  is  over. 

Character  does  not  change  of  an  instant ;  blackest 
turpitude  is  not  a  sudden  occurrence.  We  have  seen 
how  Germany  has  used  the  lawful  occasions  of  commerce 
in  order  to  betray  her  neighbours  and  has  gloried  in  hei 
cunning.  There  is  not  a  capital  or  industrial  city  in 
Europe  which  cannot  tell  a  story  to  match  the  one 
related  in  these  columns  to-day  of  how  the  Germans  have 
over-run  the  London  Stock  Exchange.  The  purpose  of 
the  Paris  Conference  is  to  formulate  a  plan  of  campaign 
which  shall  have  for  its  aim  the  placing  of  Germany 
under  lock  and  key,  that  is  of  depriving  her  of  the  freedom 
she  has  utilised  hitherto  to  exploit  and  undermine  the 
industry  of  other  nations  for  her  own  merciless  ambitions. 


LAND     &     W  A  T  E  R 


April  ij,   1916 


THE    RIGHT   PERSPECTIVE 


By  Hilaire  Belloc 


THOSE  who  read  the  mihtary  history  of  the  past 
al\va\s  remark  one  piizzlin;^  feature  n  that 
history  ;  it  is  the  eontrast  between  the  sinipHeity 
i>f  the  mihtary  problem  and  the  complex,  because 
incomplete,  fashion  in  which  that  problem  is  usually 
attacked. 

The  fundamental  cause  of  that  contrast  is,  of  course, 
what  has  been  called  in  all  these"  articles  the  "  political 
factor.  " 

The  nearer  one  is  in  time  to  a  military  problem,  or  the 
more  concerned  one  is  with  its  result,  the  more  one  under- 
stands why  this  "political  factor"  conies  in  to  disturb 
the  comparatively  simple  military  problems. 

We,  for  instance,  marvel  to-day  at  the  Allies  in  1793 
di\idin{,'  their  forces  for  the  siege  of  Dunkirk.  We  marvel 
that  such  a  blunder  was  possible.  We  regard  the  victory 
of  the  French  at  Wattignies  as  something  given  away  by 
the  folly  of  the  divided  EngHsh  and  Cicrman  commands 
to  their  opponents. 

But  the  reason  we  mar\el  is  that  we  feel  none  of  the 
passions  of  contemporaries  ;  that  we  have  not  before  us 
the  actual  men  with  their  conflicting  wills  and  separate 
interests  ;  and,  most  of  all,  we  know  the  future. 

When  we  exclaim  at  the  folly  of  the  Allies  in  separating 
their  forces 'in  179  5  it  is  because  we  know  that  their  failure 
to  destroy  the  revolutionary  armies  while  there  was  yet 
time  would  breed  the  whole  business  of  the  Napoleonic 
wars. 

The  lesson  of  history  in  all  these  matters  is  surely  clear 
enough.  It  may  be  summed  ujj,  I  think,  in  the  following 
simple  proposition  : — 

The  great  styuggles,  in  ivhich  ullimate  issues  arc  involved, 
always  reach  a  complete  decision  sooner  or  later. 

In  other  words,  to  cry  off  before  you  are  yourself 
disarmed  or  have  disarmed  your  opponent,  because  you 
happen  to  think  some  other  matter  (such  as  your  present 
wealth,  or  physical  or  mental  suffering)  more  important 
than  victory,  is  not  to  achieve  a  compromise  but  simply 
to  sign  a  foolish  truce  in  the  midst  of  what  will  necessarily 
be — taking  history  as  a  whole— a  still  further  prolonged 
war. 

Victory  once  achieved,  the  defeated  party  is  defeated 
usually  for  ever,  always  for  generations.  Short  of  this, 
the  struggle  is  but  briefly  postponed. 

\\ith  historical  events  we  see  this  truth  quite  clearly. 
With  contemporary  events  it  is  confused  by  the  false 
proportions  we  give  to  things  that  are  too  "near  us  or 
with  which  we  are  too  much  concerned,  and  by  the 
multitude  of  objects  disturbing  our  judgment. 

Whether  non-military  considerations  will  or  will  not 
mar  the  effort  of  one  party  or  the  other  in  this  great 
struggle  duly  the  future  can  show.  But  with  regard 
to  the  present  moment  of  it — I  mean  the  situation 
as  it  stands  in  this  particular  Passion  Week  ol  iqi6 — the 
attitude  of  the  future  historian  will  be  very  simple.  The 
\iew  presented  to  the  future  historian  will  be  what  all  the 
soldiers  have  long  seen,  and  what  it  would  be  well  fo  ■  all 
others  to  see  as  clearly  as  the    soldiers  do..    It  is  this  : 

In  a  conflict  the 'ultimate  issue  of  which  was  at  best 
the  new  form  which  European  civilisation  should  take 
on,  and  at  worst,  the  life  or  death  of  that  c.vilisation 
(for  myself  I  believe  it  is  a  struggle  of  the  latter  and  not 
the  former  sort),  the  military  problem  was  clear.  Of  the 
two  groups  of  combatants  one  came  to  enjoy  after  the 
winter  of  1914— through  the  collapse  or  insignificance 
of  all  others  in  its  orbit— a  direct  and  simple  control  : 
Prussia  organised- and  used  with  >m(iuestioned  authority 
much  the  most  of  the  machinery  and  much  the  most 
of  the  metal  production  of  Europe,  and  the  man-power 
of  nearly  160  million  people.  Against  this  enormous 
force  (which,  according  to  one  view,  was  trying  to 
.  niodify  the  future  of  Europe,  in  its  own  image  f  accord- 
ing to  anotiier  could  only  destroy  European  civilisation, 
being  impotent  to  create)  were  chiefly  opposed  three 
western  .-Mlies,  less  in  population,  far  weaker  in  pro- 
ductive power,  but  representing  the  old  and  intense 
civilisation   of  Europe.     Happily   they   had   the   aid   of 


another  body  lunncrically  large — the  I\u:.^ian  Empire. 
But  this  .Ally  was  cut  off  from  them  and  from  Iuiro])<au 
aid,  and  in  resources  and  character  differed  wholly  frcni 
the  western  group  upon  whose  resistance  would  ultimately 
turn  the  fate  of  the  war.  The  western  group  had  railways, 
machinery,  ships,  mines  and  could  call,  in  a  very  great 
extent  for  food,  to  a  much  less  extent  for  metals  and  their 
products,  upon  the  New  World,  which  was  not  yet 
involved.  It  was  superior  to  its  enemies  in  the  factors 
of  intelligence  and  skill.  It  was  immeasurably  their 
superior  in  morals.  But  it  was  not  actually  and 
mechanically  united,  however  strong  its  agreement,  upon 
the  common  end.  Not  one  part}'  within  that  group  was 
even  the  admitted  leader,  let  alone  the  unquestioned 
master  of  the  whole.  Their  very  aims  were  somewhat 
divergent,  for  what  each  desired  from  the  war  differed 
somewhat  from  what  each  of  its  fellows  desired.  Italy 
could  not  but  seek  the  control  of  the  Adriatic  and  the 
security  of  her  Northern  frontier,  France  the  positive 
destruction  of  a  new  and  menacing  barbarism  beyond 
her  frontiers  ;  Britain,  the  continuation  of  an  economic 
position  and  h^mpire  built  up  by  two  centuries  of  magnifi- 
cent adventure. 

The  resources  each  party  could  bring  in  aid  of  the  others 
similarly  differed.  A  reduced  but  very  considerable 
\olume  of  manufacture  for  exchange  remained  to  dreat 
Britain,  who  further  kept  the  sea  open  for  her  Allies. 
The  French  had  been  first  and  best  prepared  with  the 
purely  military  machine.  The  Italians,  from  the  narrow- 
ness of  their  front,  were  using  a  lesser  proportion  of  their 
total  mobilisable  forces  than  the  rest.  The  Eastern 
ally  with  only  one  narrow  gate  of  entrance  for  foreign 
supply  (separated  by  half  the  world  from  the  field  of 
battle)  undeveloped  industrially,  lacking  for  many  months 
anything  like  an  adequate  armament,  represented  in  the 
combination  an  exception  which  further  disturbed  the 
unity  of  the  whole. 

The  victory  of  the  Alliance  against  Prussia  and  her 
dependents  was  none  the  less  certain,  and  had  already 
virtually  been  achieved  in  the  April  of  1916,  if  the  problem 
were  regarded  as  a  purely  military  one. 

But  it  could  not  so  be  regarded.  Not  only  a  certain 
necessary  divergence  -  of  aim  but  the  divergences  of 
national  temperament  and  recent  experience,  affected 
particularly  the  western  Allies.  The  interest  of  the  late 
spring  of  if)i6  (as  this  future  historian  will  say)  lay  in  the 
contrast  between  these  disturbing  political  factors  and 
the  clear  military  problem. 

Prus.sia  could  ultimately  be  disarmed.  There  was  no 
conceivable  accident  to  interfere  with  this  conclusion 
if  the  war  were  pursued  to  its  conclusion  as  a  purely 
military  task.  In  spite  of  her  original  enormous  pre- 
ponderance in  men  and  her  existing  prepc^nderance  in* 
metal  and  machinery,  exhaustion  threatened  her  as  it 
did  not  threaten  her  western  opponents.  Mere  ex- 
haustion did  not  threaten  her  eastern  opponent  at 
all.  This  exhaustion  Prussia  felt  particularly  upon 
the  score  of  men.  And  it  was  clearly  one  of  her  main 
objects  at  the  moment  at  once  to  conceal  this  ex- 
haustion as  much  as  possible  by  misleading  statements, 
and  to  achieve  a  decision  before  it  should  become  fatal. 
Therefore  did  she  perpetually  and  at  vast  expense  con- 
tinue to  attack,  her  attack  being  no  more  than  the  attempt 
to  break  the  lines  of  the  great  siege.  But  she  further 
relied  upon  affecting  non-military  opinion,  especially  in 
the  western  powers  opposed  to  her.  So  much  did  r.he 
rely  upon  this  ,that  two  incidents  at  that  particular 
moment — the  late  spring  f)f  1916 — which  will  be  to  that 
historian  of  the  future  quite  plain  in  character,  wore  as 
a  fact  distorted  by  the  passions  and  the  inevitable  lack 
of  proportion  affecting  the  judgment  of  contemporaries. 

These  two  incidents  were  tlie  enormous  attack  ujjon 
the  sector  of  Verdun  and  the  isolation  of  a  very  smal 
British  force  in  the  remote  h^ast  at  Kut  el  Amara. 

Such  a  historian  would  marvel  at  first  that  any  mi^ 
conception  was  possible  :  that  such  phrases  as  "  the 
taking  of    ^■erdun  "  or  the  "  peril    of    Kut  "  should  be 


April  13,  1 916 


LAND      &      VV  A  T  E  R 


possible  at  nil.  But  if  lie  know  liis  history  well  and  roiikl 
compare  the  situation  with  a  hundred  other  such  in  the 
past,  he  would  kno\y  how  the  niisconce'ptioris  had  arisen. 

It' is  our  whole  business  in  this  critical  ihbment  to-day 
to  see  the  thing  as  he  would  see  it  and  to  correct  those 
misunderstandings  to  which,  if  we  are  not  wise,  that 
historian  may  have  to  ascribe  our  defeat.  For  to  con- 
:lude  the  struggle  before  Prussia  is  disarmed  is  to  suffer 
defeat,  with  all  the  consequences  of  that  disaster  for 
Europe  and  ourselves. 

Let  us  therefore  state  once  more  the  merely  military 
problem  of  the  moment.  The- enemy  is  trying  "  to  take 
Verdun."'  In  ]\Icsopotamia  a  relieving  force  is  trying  to 
disengage  a  single  division  contained  by  the  Turks  upon 
the  Tigris.  What,  apart  from  all  effect  upon  non-com- 
hatants,  is  the  merely  military  meaning  of  these  two 
efforts  ? 

The  isolated  force  contained  upon  the  Tigris  is  not  a 
quarter,  it  is  not  a  sixth,  of  a  single  Allied  force  in 
action  last  Sunday  upon  one  tiny  front  of  nine  miles  out 
of  the  French  front.  It  numbers  in  effectives  not  a  half 
per  cent,  of  the  men  actually  engaged  upon  the  western 
front. 

Upon  the  other  hand,  the  phrase,  "  to  take  Verdun  " 
has,  in  the  purely  military  sense,  no  significance  whatso- 
ever. The  whole  meaning  and  the  only  meaning,  so  far 
as  the  military  problem  is  concerned,  of  the  struggle  round 
Verdun,  is  the  proportion  of  loss  which  either  party  has 
suffered  at  any  stage  during  the  attack.  There  is  no 
question  of  breaking  the  French  line.  Ihere  is  no 
question  of  the  "surrender  of  the  fortress,"  for  there  is 
no  fortress  to  surrender.  No  army  is  surrounded  or 
nearly  surrounded.  No  mass  of  material  and  munitions 
even  is  in  jeopardy.  The  enemy  is  prepared  to  sacrifice 
a  certain  number  of  men  over  and  above  the  number  of 
men  which  he  puts  out  of  action  upon  our  side.  He  is 
prepared  to  exhaust  himself  in  this  degree  in  order  to  be 
able  to  .say  that  his  soldiers  stand  in  the  ruins  of  a  par- 
ticular town — that  is,  upon  a  particular  geographical 
area  upon  the  map — there  is  now  nothing  more  whatso- 
ever to  be  discovered  in  his  efforts. 

Why  is  he  prepared  to  do  this  ? 

Because  he  believes  that  the  effect,  not  military  but 
political,  not  upon  soldiers  studying  the  military  problems 
of  disarming  an  opponent,  but  upon  civilian  opinion — 
outside  France — will  be  such  as  to  determine  an  early 
peace  in  his  favour.  For  the  same  reason  he  may  direct 
his  last  efforts  against  ourselves. 

In  the  first  days  of  the  attack  upon  Verdun  he  had 
another  object.  He  thought  that  he  would  break  the 
French  line.  Now  he  knows  that  this  cannot  be  done. 
And  we  know  it  too.  But  he  is  persuaded  that  by  the 
continual  repetition  of  the  name  "  Verdun,"  by  the  con- 
tinual description  of  it  as  a  fortress,  by  the  concentration  of 
the  world's  attention  upon  those  mere  houses,  his  presence 
among  their  ruins  will  shake  the  confidence  of  his  foes 
and  perhaps  determine  some  accession  of  neutral  aid  for 
himself.  The  whole  thing  may  be  compared  to  the  point 
which  we  ridicule  so  rightly  in  the  later  mediaeval  wars, 
when  the  capture  of  a  single  personage  in  an  action  was 
regarded  by  both  parties  as  decisive.  Because  the  French 
King  John  was  taken  prisoner  at  Poitiers,  a  victory  which 
might  have  ended  in  the  complete  domination  of  France 


1)y  Ihe  Plantagenets  and  came  (o  within  an  ace  of  pro- 
ducing, a  generation  later,  the  union  of  France  and  Eng- 
land under  one  crown,  was  thought  to  have  been  gained. 
M'ho  to-day  pkys  the  least  attention  to  the  death  or  the 
capture  of  a  political  individual  in  an  action  ?  Who 
some  time  hence  will  conceive  it  possible  that  the  mere 
moving  backwards  or  forwards  of  a  small  section  of  an 
unbroken  line  upon  the  western  front  appeared  to  so 
many  contemporaries  an  event  of  capital  importance  ? 

The  French  higher  command  has  for  now  nearly  two 
months  stood  strictly  upon  the  defensive — "  killing 
(iermans."     \\'hy  ? 

It  is  a  tremendous  moral  strain  on  chiefs  and  men 
alike,  in  restraint  of  temper  and  in  endurance  of  evil  and 
pain. 

There  is  a  superabundance  of  men  for  a  counter  offen- 
sive :  Wo  out-number  the  enemy  in  the  West  by  much 
more  than  half  as  much  again  as  the  total  of  his  forces 
there.  Yet  the  French  line  stands  round  Verdun  abso- 
lutely restricted  to  defence  for  weeks  and  weeks,  and, 
at  stated  times,  slowly  withdrawing — killing  and  maiming 
the  enemy  in  heaps.     Is  it  not  ob\  ious  why  ? 

I  repeat,  it  is  our  whole  duty  in  this  moment,  and  the 
duty  of  all  those  whose  opinions  in  sum  make  up  that 
national  judgment  upon  which  governments  repose,  to 
treat  the  struggle  round  Verdun  simply  and  solely  from 
the  point  of  view  of  numbers.  What  sacrifice  can  we 
impose  upon  the  enemy  ?  What  price  can  we  make  him 
pay  for  something  which  has  no  military  value  ?  of  how 
much  blood  will  that  exhausted  body  still  let  itself  be 
bled.     That  is  the  only  thing  that  counts. 

If  at  the  end  of  the  fight  round  Verdun  the  French 
Ime  ran  from  the  Argonne  south-eastward  direct  to  St. 
Mihiel  ;  if  the  enemy  were  present  at  the  close  upon  all 
the  ground  now  held  by  the  French  within  the  salient 
(including  of  course  the  area  of  Verdun  town  itself), 
and  if  in  the  balance  of  loss  and  gain  the  enemy  had  lost 
200,000  men  more  than  the  French,  then  the  action  would 
be  an  asset  of  the  highest  value  to  the  Allied  side.  If  the 
extra  margin  of  loss  was  not  200,000,  but  half  a  million, 
it  would  not  only  be  a  victory,  but  probably  a  decisive 
victory  turning  the  whole  war. 

To  see  that  point  clearly  and  to  retain  it  unshaken 
throughout  all  the  vicissitudes  of  the  battle  is,  so  far  as 
mere  opinion  is  concerned,  to  win  the  war,  and  it  will 
be  doing  exactly  that  which  the  enemy  most  fears  our 
doing. 

To  that  numerical  estimate  of  the  situation  we  must 
add  another  corollary  equally  important.  If  the  Allies 
can  compel  the  enemy  thus  to  exhaust  himself  upon  the 
Aveetern  front  it  will  be  with  the  object  of  destroying  him 
when  the  counter-offensive  shall  be  launched. 

The  troops  concentrated  by  the  Germans  .throughout 
the  pre\'ious  forty-eight  hours  were  launched  in  the  clear 
weather  of  last  Sunday,  April  loth. 

The  comprehension  of  what  followed  will  be  the  easier 
if  we  merely  draw  a  line  without  contours,  marking  with 
crosses  at  i  and  2  the  heights  of  the  Mort  Homme  and  of 
Hill  304. 

One  body,  amounting  to  somewhat  less  than  two 
divisions,  attacked  along  the  arrows  AAA,  its  left  coming 
short  of  Bethincourt  by  some  hundreds  of  yards,  and  its 

Something 


right  being  a  little  to  the  west  of  Avocourt. 


BethinCOUit 


B 


»jiafu-i:n^M  ■»-f^'.JljU'«9'^' 


LAND     &     W  A  T  E  R 


like  half  this  assault,  therefore,  was  delivered  from  the 
mass  of  woodland  called  bv  the  name  of  "  Malancourt  and 
Avocourt  woods."  and  the  whole  of  it  aimed  alonj,'  the 
easier  slopes  which  led  up  to  the  hark  of  Hill  304.  It  is  a 
mile  to  a  mile  and  a  half  of  hard  open  ground,' rising  only 
60  feet  above  the  last  trees  of  the  wood  and  140  feet  above 
the  valleys.  This  attack  along  the  arrows  AAA  appears, 
so  far  as  we  know  at  the  moment  of  writing,  to  have 
been  delivered  somewhere  about  eight  to  nine  in  the 
morning  of  Sunday.  It  came  on  by  colunms  of  com- 
panies- that  is.  in  very  dense  and  deep  formation  -and 
its  first  and  most  vigorous  effort  very  nearly  reached  to 
the  Frencli  trenches,  coming  in  some  points  to  within  a 
hundred  yards  of  them.  This  first  effort,  however,  was 
broken  and  the  large  force  employed  retired  to  reform. 

Just  after  this  first  episode  in  the  battle,  apparently 
about  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  (these  hours  are  con- 
jectural only  until  further  information  shall  be  afforded), 
the  second  attack  was  launched  along  the  line  of 
the  arrows  B  B  B,  this  second  attack  being  somewhat 
stronger  in  number  and  amounting  to  at  least  two  full 
divisions.  In  all,  therefore,  the  equivalent  of  four  divi- 
sions, two  corps,  or  thereabouts,  were  already  engaged. 
This  first  attack  upon  the  east  also  failed  before  it  had 
reached  the  first  French  trenches  ;  unlike  its  western 
fellow  it  went  to  pieces,  and  the  troops  used  fled  for 
cover  suffering  the  particularly  severe  losses  consequent 
on  such  local  breakdowns. 

It  was  already  clear  before  noon  that  the  enemy  was 
not  only  attacking  in  such  a  direction  and  fashion  as 
menaced  the  Mort  Homme  directly  upon  the  one  side 
and  indirectly,  by  Hill  304,  upon  the  other  ;  but  also 
that  his  form  of  attack  was  such  that  if  either  of  these  two 
wings  achieved  its  object  it  would  take  the  remaindey 
ot  the  French  line  in  reverse.  Although  the  salient 
attacked  was  not  pronounced,  success  upon  either  side 
would  mean  not  only  the  retirement  of  the  French  in 
front  of  that  success,  but  also  a  threat  to  the  rear  of  the 
remainder  of  the  French  force  suffering  attack  from  the 
other  section  of  the  Germans. 

It  is  significant  in  this  connection  that  apparently  after 
the  repulse  of  the  first  attack  from  B  there  was  launched 
—as  from  C—  a  very  large  fresh  force— on  the  exact 
strength  of  which  accounts  differ— across  the  now  dry 
fiat  belt  of  meadowland  between  the  hills  and  the  banks 
of  the  Meuse  itself.  This  grass  is  water-meadow  often 
(and  recently)  flooded  between  that  stream  and  the 
(lOose  Crest,  stretching  up  to  the  steep  bank  by  which 
the  crest  overlooks  the  stream.  This  very  heavy  blow 
was  struck  right  at  the  ruins  of  Cumieres  village  and  the 
French  trenches  covering  those  ruins  and  stretching  to  the 
nver  but  the  field  of  fire  was  open,  and  the  German 
check  here  led  to  very  heavy  loss. 

Such  up  to  somewhere  about  noon  or  a  little  later  was 
the  first  phase  of  the  battle. 

The  ne.xt  phase,  which  covered  all  the  afternoon  up  to 
sunset,  consisted  in  no  more  than  the  repetition  of  these 
first  assaults.  How  these  were  directed  upon  the  eastern 
wings  from  B  and  C  we  have  as  yet  no  details.  But  we 
know  ihey  were  repeated,  probably  with  better  troops 
hitherto  held  in  reserve,  and  that,  late  in  the  evening 
a  space  of  about  500  yards  round  about  the  thicker 
line  D  D,  the  German  masses  reached  and  occupied 
the  first  advanced  French  trench  at  the  base  of  the  Mort 
Homme,  and  ultimately  remained  in  possession  of  it 
throughout  the  following  night  and  day— up  to  the  last 
information  received  On  Tuesday  evening,  when  these 
lines  are  written. 

It  was  little  or  nothing  to  get  for  such  an  awful  price 
but  the  western  attack  from  the  direction  A  A  was  even 
Jess  fortunate.     The  renewed  assaults  were  delivered  here 
three  separate  times  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon    and 
all  three  of  these  renewed  attempts  were  thrown  back 
as  had  been  the  first  in  the  morning. 

Upon  this  front,  towards  the  end  of  the  day,  somewhere 
between  five  and  six  o'clock,  an  entirely  fresh  body  of  the 
strength  of  a  brigade  (I  think  it  may  turn  out  to  be 
Bavarian)  appeared  still  further  to  the  German  right  along 
the  arrow  E  and  struck  at  Avocourt  from  the  extreme 
north-west.  Coming  in  thus  at  the  close  of  the  affair  and 
triking  the  French  trenches  when  these  had  supported 
he  whole  weight  of  the  da\-.  this  brigade— or  its  head 
lements—not  onlv  reached    but  entered  the  trenches  at 


April  13,   191(3 


about  the  point  F,  and  were  only  dislodged  just  before 
dusk  by  a  counter-attack. 

This  Sunday  fighting  was  the  main  affair.  Upon 
Monday  all  was  quiet  in  front  of  Avocourt.  A  strong 
enemy  effort  against  the  centre  behind  Bethincourt 
was  thrown  back  ;  a  flank  attack  on  the  right  touched 
a  point  or  two  of  the  adxanced  trenches,  and  no  more. 
^  buch  was  the  situation  at  the  close  of  the  battle  so 
.ar  as  the  description  to  hand  in  London  on  Tuesday 
evening  informs  us.  It  is  clear  that  the  news  leaves  us  iii 
the  middle  of  an  action  not  yet  completed  and  one  upon 
a  scale  comparable  to  the  great  original  attack  of  seven 
weeks  ago  upon  the  other  side  of  the  river  I  say  "  com- 
parabe,''  but  not  equal.  For  the  numbers  engaged, 
though  formidable,  have  hitherto  counted  only  half 
those  which  struck  the  line  between  Ornes  and  Brabant 
on  February  21st. 

While  thfs  main  attack  for  the  carrying  and  seizing  of 
the  Mort  Homme  and  Hill  304  was  proceeding,  another 
attack,  similar  m  volume  and    probably    intended    to 
prevent  reinforcement  by  the  pontoons  across  the  Meuse 
was  being  launched  against  the  Cote  du  Poivre. 

There  had  been  great  artillery  activity  along  this  main 
position  east  of  the  Meuse  the"day  before,  just  as  there 
had  been  artillery  activity  west  of  the  Meuse  seven 
weeks  ago  before  the  main  attack  was  launched  upon  the 
eastern  side,  and  it  was  thought  at  one  moment  that  the 
enemy  was  attempting  to  assault  all  along  the  line  but 
little  came  of  it.  And  if  would  seem  that  the  bombard- 
ment to  which  the  one  side  had  been  subjected  was  (as 
the  converse  bombardment  of  the  western  side  had  been 
se\'en  weeks  before)  designed  only  to  leave  the  French 
command  in  doubt  upon  the  point  of  main  effort. 

The  Evening  Losses 

We  have  as  yet  no  estimate  of  the  proportion  of  enemy 
losses  in  this  affair  up  to  the  ^Monday  evening  where  our 
present  information  ceases.  We  know  that  forces  esti- 
mated at  the  lowest  at  seven  and  at  the  highest  at  nine 
divisions  were  engaged  in  the  attack  from  Avocourt  to 
the  Cote  du  Poivre.  We  can  only  obtain  the  vaguest 
conception  of  their  sacrifice  bv  noting  that  the  attacks 
were  renewed  again  and  again  throughout  the  day  and  by 
a  very  general  statement  (the  basis  for  no  reasoned  con- 
clusion) upon  the  specially  heavy  loss  of  the  enemy 
in  front  of  Cumieres  and  its  wood— points  where  the  enemy 
broke,  whereas  upon  the  rest  of  the  front  he  retired  after 
each  attack  in  some  order  and  reformed  regularly  for  its 
renewal.  What  is  simple  and  satisfactory  in  the  relation 
IS  that  the  enemy  continued  to  bring  up  "fresh  men.  We 
are  particularly  told  that  the  body  which  struck  between 
the  Goose  Crest  and  the  river  was  new  and  so  was  the 
brigade  which  came  down  on  Sunday  evening  from  the 
extreme  north-east  upon  Avocourt.  What  other  new 
elements  were  present  we  have  not  been  told. 

But  the  enemy,  who  would  be  enormously  advantaged 
if  he  could  compel  us  to  take  up  a  foolish  attitude  towards 
the  mere  area  of  Verdun  (which  attitude  he;  believes  we 
are  already  taking),  would  be  almost  equally  advantaged 
if  the  moment,  let  alone  the  place,  of  the  main  counter- 
offensive  were  to  be  determined  by  political  and  not  by 
military  judgment. 

When  or  how  the  counter-stroke  is  to  "be  delivered  is 
a  matter  for  the  allied  command  alone.  No  one,  whatever 
his  personal  vanity  or  power  may  be,  would  openly  dispute 
so  obvious  a  truth.  But  there  "is  a  danger  that  the  mass 
of  uninformed  opinion  may  bring  pressure  to  bear  in 
favour  of  premature  action.  This  danger  is  particularly 
great  in  a  society  the  ultimate  direction  of  which  is  com"- 
mercial  and  civilian.  Every  day  of  delay  is  an-  added 
expense  and  an  added  strain.  That  it  has  the  same  effect 
upon  the  enemy  we  tend  to  forget.  That  the  endurance 
of  such  expense  or  such  strain  is  like  the  sowing  of  a 
harvest  only  to  be  reaped  when  it  is  ripe,  those  un- 
acquainted with  the  military  conditions  of  concentration 
and  supply  equally  tend  to  forget. 

When  we  have  made  the  enemy  pay  the  very  fullest 
price  in  exhaustion  for  a  foolish  purchase  upon  which  he  is 
now  embarked,  not  with  a  true  military,  but  with  a 
political  object,  it  will  be  our  next  duty,  as  negative  and 
therefore  as  difficult  as  the  first,  to  wait  patiently  through 
whatc\-er  space  of  time  will  best  prepare  the  decisive 
character  of  the  counter-stroke,  and  not  to  hasten  or  to 


April  13,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


confuse  by  public  clamour  the  plans  which  will  then  be 
laid  To  do  so  would  be  only  second  in  folly,  if  second,  to 
the  folly  of  attaching  to  the  area  of  Verdun  the  super- 
stitious importance  which  you  already  find  attached 
to  it  in  too  many  quarters  .  . 

I  have  written  at  this  length  upon  the  significance  of 
the  moment  because,  lacking  an  appreciation  of  it. 
the  actual  operations  will  be  without  meaning.  Let 
us  now  turn  to  an  examination  first  of  the  position  m 
Mesopotamia  and  next  of  what  the  last  enemy  effort  in 
this  region  of  Verdun  has  been. 

Position  in  Mesopotamia 

With  regard  to  the  position  in  Mesopotamia  there  is 
little  or  nothing  to  add  to  the  official  summary  which  has 
been  circulated  through  the  Press  with  a  map,  also 
officially  provided,  which  gi\'es  all  the  mam  points  of 
the  situation.  We  do  not  know  the  chances  of  success, 
for  the  very  simple  reason  that  the  numerical  factor,  both 
in  pieces  and  in  men  (which  is  the  essential  of  the  whole 
matter)  is  necessarily  concealed  from  us.  We  know 
from  the  experience  of  Europe  that  with  reasonably 
good  troops  a  line  of  six  miles  long  entrenched  is  held 
at  full  strength  if,  say,  more  than  twenty  and  less  than 
thirty  thousand  men  are  present.  We  know  that  such 
a  line  cannot  be  touched,  no  matter  what  superiority  of 
infantry  attacks  it,  until  it  has  been  pounded  by  very 
numerous  heavy  pieces  for  anything  from  36  to  48  hours. 
But  what  numbers  are  present  of  guns  or  men— the  whole 
basis  of  judgment— is  not  to  be  published. 

With  the  ground  every  one  is  by  this  time  famihar. 


'M^i^ 


•^'uwau'/dt  "dial's  !i 


S€  I 


I 


Oiyoiloh 


The  Turks  have  consolidated  an  extremely  strong  main 
position  running  upon  Sketch  III  from  A  to  B,  some  6 
miles  in  length,  continuous  save  for  a  couple  of  miles 
where  it  is  broken  by  the  Suwada  Marsh,  and  reposing 
upon  its  right  or  southern  extremity  upon  the  Shatt-cl-Hai. 
These  lines  contain  General  Townshcnd's  besieged  British 
force  lying  in  the  bend  of  the  river  at  Kut,  and  are  known 
as  the  EsSinn  position.     Beyond  the  dry,  or  mainly  dry 


watercourse  called  the  Dujailah,  the  flank  of  these 
positions  is  covered  by  a  series  of  six  redoubts.  The  corner 
where  this  flank  joins  the  main  front  is  strengthened  by  a 
strong  work,  the  Dujailah  redoubt  lying  immediately 
behind  the  fosse  formed  by  the  old  watercourse.  Some 
miles  in  front  of  the  main  Es  Sinn  position,  the  ultimate 
breaking  of  which  is  essential  to  the  relief  of  the  small 
force  besieged  at  Kut,  the  Turks  have  put  forward 
advanced  positions  of  less  strength  destined  to  delay  the 
British  relieving  force.  The  first  of  these  at  C,  15  or  16 
miles  in  a  direct  line  down  the  stream  upon  the  Es  Sinn 
position,  was  carried  by  the  relieving  force  some  days  ago. 
The  second  and  more  formidable  one,  known  as  the 
Sann-i-Yat  position,  is  unfortunately  still  intact. 

This  advanced  line  of  the  enemy  reposes  securely  upon 
two  marshes  north  and  south  of  the  Tigris,  the  interval 
between  (nearly  bisected  by  the  river)  being  little  over 
four  miles.  There  was  apparently  no  possibility  whatso- 
ever of  turning  this  comparatively  short  line,  the  marshes 
having  been  recently  flooded,  though  the  river  has  not 

risen. 

These  floods  have  also  restricted  the  front  the  enemy  has 
to  defend  upon  this  advaitced  position  by  encroaching 
somewhat  upon  the  two  extremes  of  it.  All  our  public 
news  with  regard  to  the  effort  to  carry  this  advanced 
position  is  contained  in  a  despatch  of  exactly  seventeen 
words  in  length  :  "  An  attack  was  made  at  dawn  on  the 
qih,  but  failed  to  get  through  Ihe  enemy's  line,"  and  that 
is  all  we  know. 

It  is  impossible  upon  such  information  to  discuss  the 
matter  further.     We  can  only  wait  for  the  result. 

Main  Offensive  against  the  Mort  Homme 

Upon  last  Fridav  and  Saturday,  April  7th  and  8th,  the 
French  command  was  advised  of  a  great  concentration  of 
fresh  forces  (probably  not  less  than  four  divisions  ia 
strength  and  perhaps  more),  upon  the  front  behind  the 
heights  which  run  from  Forges  to  the  woods  of  Malan- 
court.  The  front  line  of  German  trenches  at  that  moment 
ran  as  do  the  crosses  upon  the  accompanying  sketch  Map 
I,  and  the  main  concentration  was  taking  place  roughly 
w'here  the  two  groups  of  thick  black  lines,  A  and  B,  stand 
upon  that  sketch. 

It  was  therefore  clear,  especially  in  connection  with  the 
very  violent  bombardment  which  had  developed  against 
the  French  positions  along  the  whole  of  this  nine  miles 
sector,  that  the  enemy  was  going  to  make  a  strong  bid  for 
the  Mort  Homme. 

That  height,  as  the  reader  knows,  is  the  point  upon 
which  all  this  first  line,  four  or  five  milts  in  front  of  the 
main  Charny  ridge,  depends.  The  enemy  must  hold  the 
Mort  Homme  and  Hill  304  if  he  is  to  have  full  and  secure 
possession  of  the  first  line  :  only  when  he  holds  them  can 
he  even  begin  his  advance  towards  the  main  position 
behind. 

It  is  possible,  as  we  shall  see  later  in  this  article,  that 


LAND     &     W  A  T  E 


April  13,  1916 


Hke  half  this  assault,  therefore,  was  delivered  from  the 
mass  of  woodland  called  by  the  name  of  "  Malancourt  and 
Avocourt  woods,"  and  the  whole  of  it  aimed  along  the 
easier  slopes  which  led  up  to  the  back  of  Hill  304.  It  is  a 
mile  to  a  mile  and  a  half  of  hard  open  ground,  rising  only 
60  feet  above  the  last  tret^s  of  the  wood  and  140  feet  above 
the  valleys.  This  attack  along  the  arrows  AAA  appears, 
so  far  as  we  know  at  the  moment  of  writing,  to  have 
been  delivered  somewhere  about  eight  to  nine  in  the 
morning  of  Sunday.  It  came  on  by  columns  of  com- 
panies— that  is,  in  very  dense  and  deep  formation — and 
its  first  and  most  vigorous  effort  very  nearly  reached  to 
the  French  trenches,  coming  in  some  points  to  within  a 
hundred  yards  of  them.  This  first  effort,  however,  was 
broken  and  the  large  force  employed  retired  to  reform. 

Just  after  this  first  episode  in  the  battle,  apparently 
about  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  (these  hours  are  con- 
jectural only  until  further  information  shall  be  afforded), 
the  second  attack  was  launched  along  the  line  of 
the  arrows  B  B  B,  this  second  attack  being  somewhat 
stronger  in  number  and  amomiting  to  at  least  two  full 
divisions.  In  all,  therefore,  the  ecpuvalent  of  four  divi- 
sions, two  corps,  or  thereabouts,  were  already  engaged. 
This  first  attack  upon  the  east  also  failed  before  it  had 
reached  the  first  French  trenches ;  unlike  its  western 
fellow  it  went  to  pieces,  and  the  troops  used  fled  for 
cover  suffering  the  particularly  severe  losses  consequent 
on  such  local  breakdowns. 

It  was  already  clear  before  noon  that  the  enemy  was 
not  only  attacking  in  such  a  direction  and  fashion  as 
menaced  the  Mort  Homme  directly  upon  the  one  side 
and  indirectly,  by  Hill  304,  upon  the  other  ;  but  also 
that  his  form  of  attack  was  such  that  if  either  of  these  two 
wings  achieved  its  object  it  would  take  the  remainder 
of  the  French  line  in  reverse.  Although  the  salient 
attacked  was  not  pronounced,  success  upon  either  side 
would  mean  not  only  the  retirement  of  the  French  in 
front  of  that  success,  but  also  a  threat  to  the  rear  of  the 
remainder  of  the  French  force  suffering  attack  from  the 
other  section  of  the  Germans. 

It  is  significant  in  this  connection  that  apparently  after 
the  repulse  of  the  first  attack  from  B  there  was  launched 
• — as  from  C —  a  very  large  fresh  force — on  the  exact 
strength  of  which  accounts  differ — across  the  now  dry 
flat  belt  of  meadowland  between  the  hills  and  the  banks 
of  the  Meuse  itself.  This  grass  is  water-meadow  often 
(and  recently)  flooded  between  that  stream  and  the 
Goose  Crest,  stretching  up  to  the  steep  bank  by  which 
the  crest  overlooks  the  stream.  This  very  heavy  blow 
was  struck  right  at  the  ruins  of  Cumieres  village  and  the 
French  trenches  covering  those  ruins  and  stretching  to  the 
river,  but  the  field  of  fire  was  open,  and  the  German 
check  here  led  to  very  heavy  loss. 

Such  up  to  somewhere  about  noon  or  a  little  later,  was 
the  first  phase  of  the  battle. 

The  ne.xt  phase,  which  covered  all  the  afternoon  up  to 
sunset,  consisted  in  no  more  than  the  repetition  of  these 
first  assaults.  How  these  were  directed  upon  the  eastern 
wings  from  B  and  C  we  have  as  yet  no  details.  But  we 
know  ihey  were  repeated,  probably  with  better  troops 
hitherto  held  in  reserve,  and  that,  late  in  the  evening, 
a  space  of  about  500  yards  round  about  the  thicker 
line  D  D,  the  German  masses  reached  and  occupied 
the  first  advanced  French  trench  at  the  base  of  the  Mort 
Homme,  and  ultimately  remained  in  possession  of  it 
throughout  the  following  night  and  day — up  to  the  last 
information  received  On  Tuesday  evening,  when  these 
lines  are  written. 

It  was  little  or  nothing  to  get  for  such  an  awful  price 
but  the  western  attack  from  the  direction  A  A  was  even 
less  fortunate.  The  renewed  assaults  were  delivered  here 
three  separate  times  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon,  and 
all  three  of  these  renewed  attempts  were  thrown  back, 
as  had  been  the  first  in  the  morning. 

Upon  this  front,  towards  the  end  of  the  day,  somewhere 
between  five  and  six  o'clock,  an  entirely  fresh  body  of  the 
strength  of  a  brigade  (I  think  it  may  turn  out  to  be 
Bavarian)  appeared  still  further  to  the  German  right  along 
the  arrow  E  and  struck  at  Avocourt  from  the  extreme 
north-west.  Coming  in  thus  at  the  close  of  the  affair  and 
triking  the  French  trenches  when  these  had  supported 
he  whole  weight  of  the  day,  this  brigade — or  its  head 
leraents— not  onlv  reached    but  entered  the  trenches  at 


about  the  point  F,  and  were  only  dislodged  just  before 
dusk  by  a  counter-attack. 

This  Sunday  fighting  was  the  main  affair.  Upon 
Monday  all  was  quiet  in  front  of  Avocourt.  A  strong 
enemy  effort  against  the  centre  behind  Bethincourt 
was  thrown  back  ;  a  flank  attack  on  the  right  touched 
a  point  or  two  of  the  advanced  trenches,  and  no  more. 

Such  was  the  situation  at  the  close  of  the  battle  so 
far  as  the  description  to  hand  in  London  on  Tuesday 
evening  informs  us.  It  is  clear  that  the  news  leaves  us  in. 
the  middle  of  an  action  not  yet  completed  and  one  upon 
a  scale  comparable  to  the  great  original  attack  of  seven 
weeks  ago  upon  the  other  side  of  the  river.  I  say  "  com- 
parable," but  not  equal.  For  the  numbers  engaged, 
though  formidable,  have  hitherto  counted  only  half 
those  which  struck  the  line  between  Ornes  and  Brabant 
on  February  21st. 

While  this  main  attack  for  the  carrying  and  seizing  of 
the  Mort  Homme  and  Hill  304  was  proceeding,  another 
attack,  similar  in  volume  and  probably  intended  to 
]5rcvent  reinforcement  by  the  pontoons  across  the  Meuse, 
was  being  Jaimched  against  the  ("6te  du  Poivre. 

There  had  been  great  artillery  activity  along  this  main 
position  east  of  the  Meuse  the  day  before,  just  as  there 
had  been  artillery  activity  west  of  the  Meuse  seven 
weeks  ago  before  the  main  attack  was  launched  upon  the 
eastern  side,  and  it  was  thought  at  one  moment  that  the 
enemy  was  attempting  to  assault  all  along  the  line,  but 
little  came  of  it.  And  if  would  seem  that  the  bombard- 
ment to  which  the  one  side  had  been  subjected  was  (as 
the  converse  bombardment  of  the  western  side  had  been 
seven  weeks  before)  designed  only  to  leave  the  French 
command  in  doubt  upon  the  point  of  main  effort. 

The  Evening  Losses 

We  hav  e  as  yet  no  estimate  of  the  proportion  of  enemy 
losses  in  this  affair  up  to  the  Monday  evening  where  our 
present  information  ceases.  We  know  that  forces  esti- 
mated at  the  lowest  at  seven  and  at  the  highest  at  nine, 
divisions  were  engaged  in  the  attack  from  Avocourt  to 
the  Cote  du  Poivre.  We  can  only  obtain  the  vaguest 
conception  of  their  sacrifice  by  noting  that  the  attacks 
were  renewed  again  and  again  throughout  the  day  and  by 
a  very  general  st.atement  (the  basis  for  no  reasoned  con- 
clusion) upon  the  speciallj'  heavy  loss  of  the  enemy 
in  front  of  Cumieres  and  its  wood — points  where  the  enemy 
broke,  whereas  upon  the  rest  of  the  front  he  retired  after 
each  attack  in  some  order  and  reformed  regularly  for  its 
renewal.  What  is  simple  and  satisfactory  in  the  relation 
is  that  the  enemy  continued  to  bring  up  fresh  men.  We 
are  particularly  told  that  the  body  which  struck  between 
the  Goose  Crest  and  the  river  was  new  and  so  was  the 
brigade  which  came  down  on  Sunday  evening  from  the 
extreme  north-east  upon  Avocourt.  What  other  new 
elements  were  present  we  have  not  been  told. 

But  the  enemy,  who  would  be  enormoush*  advantaged 
if  he  could  compel  us  to  take  up  a  foolish  attitude  towards 
the  mere  area  of  Verdun  (which  attitude  he  believes  we 
are  already  taking),  would  be  almost  equally  advantaged 
if  the  moment,  let  alone  the  place,  of  the  main  counter- 
offensive  were  to  be  determined  by  political  and  not  by 
military  judgment. 

When  or  how  the  counter-stroke  is  to  be  delivered  is 
a  matter  for  the  allied  command  alone.  No  one,  whatever 
his  personal  vanity  or  power  may  be,  would  openly  dispute 
so  obvious  a  truth.  But  there  is  a  danger  that  the  mass 
of  uninformed  opinion  may  bring  pressure  to  bear  in 
favour  of  premature  action.  This  danger  is  particularly 
great  in  a  society  the  ultimate  direction  of  which  is  com- 
mercial and  civilian.  Every  day  of  delay  is  an-  added 
expense  and  an  added  strain.  That  it  has  the  same  effect 
upon  the  enemy  we  tend  to  forget.  That  the  endurance 
of  such  expense  or  such  strain  is  like  the  sowing  of  a 
harvest  only  to  be  reaped  when  it  is  ripe,  those  un- 
acquainted with  the  military  conditions  of  concentration 
and  supply  equally  tend  to  forget. 

When  we  have  made  the  enemy  pay  the  very  fullest 
price  in  exhaustion  for  a  foolish  purchase  upon  which  he  is 
now  embarked,  not  ^\^th  a  true  military,  but  with  a 
political  object,  it  will  be  our  next  duty,  as  negative  and 
therefore  as  difficult  as  the  first,  to  wait  patiently  through 
whatever  space  of  time  will  best  prepare  the  decisive 
character  of  the  counter-stroke,  and  not  to  hasten  or  to 


AjM-il  13,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


confuse  by  public  clamour  the  plans  which  will  then  be 
laid.  To  do  so  would  be  only  second  in  folly,  if  second,  to 
the  folly  of  attaching  to  the  area  of  Verdun  the  super- 
stitious importance  which  you  already  find  attached 
to  it  in  too  many  quarters 

I  have  written  at  this  length  upon  the  significance  of 
the  moment  because,  lacking  an  appreciation  of  it, 
the  actual  operations  will  be  without  meaning.  Let 
us  now  turn  to  an  examination  first  of  the  position  in 
Mesopotamia  and  next  of  what  the  last  enemy  effort  in 
this  region  of  Verdun  has  been. 

Position  in  Mesopotamia 

With  regard  to  the  position  in  Mesopotamia  there  is 
little  or  nothing  to  add  to  the  official  summary  which  has 
been  circulated  through  the  Press  with  a  map,  also 
oflicially  provided,  which  gix^es  all  the  main  points  of 
the  situation.  We  do  not  know  the  chances  of  success, 
for  the  very  simple  reason  that  the  numerical  factor,  both 
in  pieces  and  in  men  (which  is  the  essential  of  the  whole 
matter)  is  necessarily  concealed  from  us.  We  know 
from  the  experience  of  Europe  that  with  reasonably 
good  troops  a  line  of  six  miles  long  entrenched  is  held 
at  full  strength  if,  say,  more  than  twenty  and  less  than 
thirty  thousand  men  are  present.  We  know  that  such 
a  line  cannot  be  touched,  no  matter  what  superiority  of 
infantry  attacks  it,  until  it  has  been  pounded  by  very 
numerous  heavy  pieces  for  anything  from  36  to  48  hours. 
But  what  numbers  are  present  of  guns  or  men — the  whole 
basis  of  judgment — is  not  to  be  published. 

With  the  ground  every  one  is  by  this  time  familiar. 


The  Turks  have  consolidated  an  extremely  strong  main 
position  running  upon  Sketch  III  from  A  to  B,  some  6 
miles  in  length,  continuous  save  for  a  couple  of  miles 
where  it  is  broken  by  the  Suwada  Marsh,  and  reposing 
upon  its  right  or  southern  extremity  upon  the  Shatt-el-Hai. 
These  lines  contain  General  Townshend's  besieged  British 
force  lying  in  the  bend  of  the  river  at  Kut,  and  are  known 
as  the  EsSinn  position.     Beyond  the  dry,  or  mainly  dry 


watercourse  called  the  Dujailah,  the  flank  of  these 
positions  is  covered  by  a  series  of  six  redoubts.  The  corner 
where  this  flank  joins  the  main  front  is  strengthened  by  a 
strong  work,  the  Dujailah  redoubt  lying  immediately 
behind  the  fosse  formed  by  the  old  watercourse.  Some 
miles  in  front  of  the  main  Es  Sinn  position,  the  ultimate 
breaking  of  which  is  essential  to  the  relief  of  the  small 
force  besieged  at  Kut,  the  Turks  have  put  forward 
advanced  positions  of  less  strength  destined  to  delay  the 
British  relieving  force.  The  first  of  these  at  C,  15  or  16 
mfles  in  a  direct  fine  down  the  stream  upon  the  Es  Sinn 
position,  was  carried  by  the  relieving  force  some  days  ago. 
The  second  and  more  formidable  one,  known  as  the 
Sann-i-Yat  position,  is  unfortunately  still  intact. 

This  advanced  line  of  the  enemy  reposes  securely  upon 
two  marshes  north  and  south  of  the  Tigris,  the  interval 
between  (nearly  bisected  by  the  river)  being  little  over 
four  miles.  There  was  apparently  no  possibility  whatso- 
ever of  turning  this  comparatively  short  line,  the  marshes 
having  been  recently  flooded,  though  the  river  has  not 
risen. 

These  floods  have  also  restricted  the  front  the  enemy  has 
to  defend  upon  this  advanced  position  by  encroaching 
somewhat  upon  the  two  extremes  of  it.  All  our  public 
news  with  regard  to  the  effort  to  carry  this  advanced 
position  is  contained  in  a  despatch  of  exactly  seventeen 
words  in  length  :  "  An  attac.'i  was  made  at  dawn  on  the 
gth,  but  failed  to  get  through  ihe  enemy's  line,"  and  that 
is  all  we  know. 

It  is  impossible  upon  such  information  to  discuss  the 
matter  further.     We  can  only  wait  for  the  result. 

Main  Offensive  against  the  Mort   Homme 

Upon  last  Friday  and  Saturday,  April  7th  and  8th,  the 
French  command  was  advised  of  a  great  concentration  of 
fresh  forces  (probably  not  less  than  four  divisions  in 
strength  and  perhaps  more),  upon  the  front  behind  the 
heights  which  run  from  Forges  to  the  woods  of  Malan- 
court.  The  front  line  of  German  trenches  at  that  moment 
ran  as  do  the  crosses  upon  the  accompanying  sketch  Map 
I,  and  the  main  concentration  was  taking  place  roughly 
where  the  two  groups  of  thick  black  lines.  A  and  B,  stand 
upon  that  sketch. 

It  was  therefore  clear,  especially  in  connection  with  the 
very  violent  bombardment  which  had  developed  against 
the  French  positions  along  the  whole  of  this  nine  miles 
sector,  that  the  enemy  was  going  to  make  a  strong  bid  for 
the  Mort  Homme. 

That  height,  as  the  reader  knows,  is  the  point  upon 
which  all  this  first  line,  four  or  five  miles  in  front  of  the 
main  Charny  ridge,  depends.  The  enemy  must  hold  the 
Mort  Homme  and  Hill  304  if  he  is  to  have  full  and  secure 
possession  of  the  first  line  :  only  when  he  holds  them  can 
he  even  begin  his  advance  towards  the  main  position 
behind. 

It  is  possible,  as  we  shall  see  later  in  this  article,  that 


lof  Indaitation  eject- 
ed in  Fvtnch  f  rmifc 
titnch  by  Ocniian 
aitac  k  ofr  Su  I  uim£  & . 
Monday  hist. 


I 


■  ■-tiMrjH*  ■  -*■ 


8 


LAND      &      WATER 


April  13,  1916 


his  efforts  here  are  not  intended  to  be  carried  on  as  far 
as  the  Charny  ridge,  but  have  only  for  their  object  the 
clearing  of  all  the  front  between  the  first  positions  and 
the  Charny  ridge  in  order  to  prevent  the  French  from 
firing  across  the  Meuse  upon  the  German  troops  which 
continue  to  front  the  main  position  beyoiul  the  (  6te 
du  Poivre  and  so  round  to  Douaumont  and  Vaux.  But, 
at  any  rate,  whether  he  intends  ultimately  to  make  his 
main  attack  upon  the  Charny  ridge  or  no,  his  immediate 
objc(  t  is  tlie  carrying  of  the  Mort  Honmie,  or  Hill  295 
and  Hill  .;o4  above  and  behind  it. 

The  first  disposition  made  by  the  l-"rench  conunand  for 
meeting  this  massed  attack — intended  probably  for  the 
<onclusion  of  all  this  last  month's  efforts  west  of  the 
^leuse — was  the  evacuation  of  the  salient  of  Bethincourt. 
This  evacuation  was  effected  partly  in  the  night  between 
Friday  and  Saturday,  partly  in  the  night  between  Satur- 
da\-  and  Sunday  last  the  8th  and  qth  of  April.  The  new 
F'rench  litje  ran  on  the  morning  af  the  Simday  tiie  c)th 
as  does  thv^  continued  jjlack  line  from  ('  to  D  upon  Sketch 
1,  the  sharp  salient  shaded  in  the  sketch  being  wholly 
abandoned  by  the  F-rcnch  before  the  Sunday  morning. 

In  the  process  of  this  abandonment  the  (ii>rnians  claim 
that  the  French  left  isolatt^d  certain  small  bodies  which 
they  surrounded  and  captured.  I'nfortunately  the 
(ierman  comnnmitjucs  for  some  time  past  in  what  concerns 
the  fighting  round  Verdun  have  been  quite  untrustworthy. 
I  say  "unfortunately,"  because  an  enemy's  claims  in 
such  statements  are  esstMitial  to  any  jur.t  judgment  of  a 
situation,  and  the  less  reliable  they  are  the  lesr.  accurately 
can  one  piece  together  the  scanty  material  at  one's 
disposal.  Occasionally  the  French  are  at  the  pains  of 
issuing  a  detailed  denial,  though  usually  tlicy  leave  the 
statements  to  pass  for  what  they  are  worth.  It  is  posJblc 
that  a  few  score  men  went  astray  in  the  darkness.  It  is 
almost  certain  on  the  analogy  of  the  puerile  statements 
in  the  past  with  regard  to  F'orges.  Malancourt,  Douau- 
mont. Vaux  and  half  a  dozen  othvr  points,  that  the 
numbers  of  several  hundred  unwounded  prisoners  given 
by  the  enemy  are  false.  What  the  exact  amount  of  the 
exaggeration  may  be  we  cannot  tell.  The  point  is  at  any 
rate  insignificant  in  view  of  the  forces  about  to  be  en- 
gaged. 

The  French  new  line  thus  drawn  up  upon  the  morning 
of  Sunday,  the  loth,  presents,  as  will  be  seen  from 
Sketch  1,  the  form  of  a  slight  salient,. but  the  bend  is  not 
so  accentuated  as  to  present  to  the  enemy  any  advantage, 
and  the  form  which  the  attack  took  was  little  concerned 
with  the  salient  formed  and  much  more  with  the  lie  of  the 
ground. 

If  the  reader  will  glance  at  the  contourr,  of  the  foregoing 
sketch  Map  I,  he  will  .see,  as  lias  been  pointed  out  in 
former  articles,  that  there  are  two  opportunities,  the  one 
direct  and  the  other  indirect,  for  mastering  the  ilort 
Homme. 

The  first  is  by  rushing  the  comparatively  small  distance 
— -about  700  yards — separating  the  Crows'  Wood  and  its 
southern  portion  (called  the  wood  of  Cumieres)  from  the 
summit  of  the  hill.  The  enemy  can  debouch  from  the 
cover,  such  as  it  is,  of  these  shattered  woods  and  has  but  a 
comparatively  short  distance  to  go  before  he  reaches  the 
lowest  slopes  of  the  ;\Iort  Homme.  Looked  at  from  the 
edge  of  the  wood  this  height  is  a  rounded  boss,  the  culmina- 
ting point  of  which  is  about  100  feet  above  one  ;  and  the 
first  French  trenches  coming  up  from  the  fork  of  the  roads 
near  Bethincodrt  touch  the  lower  edge  of  the  bos^  rather 
more  than  half-way  from  its  summit  to  the  wood. 
They  stretch  on  down  the  hill,  covering  the  ruins  of 
Cumieres  village  and  so  to  the  Meuse,  the  floods  in  the 
valley  of  which  have  subsided. 

The  second,  indirect,  method  is.  as  we  have  seen  in 
j)revious  articles,  to  turn  Mort  Homme  by  the  capture  of 
Hill  304,  a  height  which  .slightly  dominates  the  Mort 
Homme  at  a  range  of  rather  over  2.500  yards. 

As  we  have  also  seen  in  previous  attacks,  the  only  enemy 
approach  to  Hill  .',04  available  is  by  the  easy  western 
slope,  which  conies  up  from  the  woods  of  Avocourt  and 
the  south-western  side  of  the  valley  in  which  the  ruins  of 
Haucourt  and  Malancourt  stand. 

We  can  get  a  good  deal  of  light  thrown  upon  the  imme- 
diate tactical  method  and  object  of  the  enemy  and  a  fair 
measure  of  his  success  or  failure  by  quoting  the  main 
])oints  of  a  document  captured  from  him  during  the  fcburse 
of  the  winter. 


In  this  document  the  lessons  taught  by  the  great 
Allied  offensive  of  last  Septemberj^werc  summarised  and 
certain  modifications  of  such  an  offensive  necessary  to 
future  success  are  defined. 

Further  Notes  on  the   Enemy's  Effort  against 
the  Verdun  Sector — An  Enemy  Document 

The  gist  of  the  report  was  that  an  attack  upon  the  first 
line  would. almost  certainly  be  successful  at  a  given 
expense  of  men  and  after  a  gi\en  and  very  expensive 
artillery  preparation.  But  that  to  continue  Injin  this 
immediately  to  attacking  the  second  line  was  an  error. 
The  time  retpiired  for  moving  the  heavy  artillery  forward 
and  still  mcjre  the  time  required  for  establishing  new 
head  supplies  of  heavy  munitionment,  the  exhaustion  of 
the  troops  employed  or,  alternatively,  the  ditticulty  of 
bringing  up  very  large  reserves  at  such  short  notice 
makes  a  continuous  effort  very  doubtful  of  success. 

So  far,  the  conclusions  of  those  German  students  of 
the  war  who  drew  up  the  report  were  at  once  negative  and 
fairly  common  ground.  It  was  the  recognition  of  such 
truths  which  led  the  French  Higher  Command  to  "cut 
their  losses  "  and  preserve  what  might  have  been  wasted 
in  too  prolonged  an  attempt  against  the  second  line. 

But  there  followed  i'^  this  document  something 
more  important,  to  wit  a  positive  prescription.  In 
future  (it  affirmed)  the  advance  must  be  made  by  stages. 
You  must  not  hope  to  break  the  resistance  at  one  blow. 
You  must,  after  "appreciating  the  result  of  your  fin.t  great 
effort,  leave  some  interval  for  the  preparation  of  a  second. 
You  must  follow  that  by  a  third  and  a  fourth,  always 
calculating  your  expenditure  of  men  as  against  a  total 
which  you  are  prepared  to  sacrifice  for  a  final  result. 

These  efforts  stage  by  stage  will  obviously  cost  a  much 
greater  accumulation  of  munitionment  than  the  effort 
tcndu — that  is,  the  attack  without  relaxation —  but  they 
may  hcjpe  within  a  certain  margin  of  time  and  a  certain 
margin  of  expense  in  men  and  munitions  to  pierce  the 
enemy  front  permanently. 

If  the  German  attack  upon  the  sector  of  Verdun  liad 
successfully  followed  these  lines  we  should  only  have  to 
regard  it,  in  spite  of  its  prolongation,  as  the  full  and 
successful  working  out  of  a  pre-arranged  scheme,  and 
certain  students  of  the  war,  notably  in  America,  did  in  an 
earlier  stage  of  the  great  battle  treat  it  so. 

But  if  we  examine  the  thing  as  a  whole,  we  shall  discover 
that  there  is  no  such  exact  correspondence  between  the 
plan  and  the  result.  Far  from  it  :  there  has  been  a  mis- 
carriage. 

In  the  first  place  there  was  an  effort  to  break  through 
all  at  once.  ,In  other  words,  the  enemy  Higher  Com- 
mand only  used  the  doctrines  of  this  report  as  a  "  second 
best  "  after  their  initial  failure  on  February  26th. 

In  the  second  place  the  "  successive  stages  "— wlien 
once  reluctantly  accepted  by  the  enemy — have  worked 
irregularly  and  at  far  too  great  an  expense  of  time,  men 
and  material.  True,  what  succeeded  to  the  first  great 
blow  was  a  series  of  efforts  intended  to  be  spaced  apart 
by  about  the  time  required  to  reorganise  the  attack  and 
especially  to  bring  up  heavy  munitionment.  But  wlicn 
it  came  to  practice  instead  of  theory,  the  intended  regular 
advance  by  successive  and  calculated  steps  failed.  The 
factor  of  time  has  been  quite  disproportionate  to  the  result 
aimed  at,  and  the  factor  of  exhaustion  in  men  has  also 
been  disproportionate.  Further,  after  a  comparatively 
early  stage  in  the  action  it  was  clearly  found  impossible 
to  proceed  by  successive  general  efforts.  That  first 
general  effort  (by  which  1  mean  that  effort  upon  a  broad 
front)  was  succeeded  by  a  great  number  of  particular 
efforts  agaiii-st  narrow  fronts.  Only  upon  very  rare  occa- 
sions spread  out  at  great  distances  of  time  was  there  any- 
thing like  advance  in  line.  One  might  almost  say  that 
sinfe  the  original  great  movement,  which  was  checked 
on  Saturday,  February  26th.  there  has  been  no  similar 
blow  delivered  U])on  a  broad  front  until  the  effort  of  last 
Sunday.  April  ()tli. 

That  part  of  the  plan  which  has  come  nearest  to 
realisation  has  been  the  .succession  of  intensive  bombard- 
ments. The  supply  of  munifionment  has  been  kept  up 
perhaps  beyond  the  expectation  of  the  .\llics,  and  sliows 
so  far.  no  sign  of  failing.  It  is  clear,  as  we  have  pointec 
out  in  these  columns  already,  that  the  expenditure  o 
munitionment  is  at  a  far  greater  rate  than  the  supply  car 
possibly  be  ;   but  still  the  supply  is  coming  in  on  to  thii 


April  13,  1916 


LAND      &      W  A  T  K  R 


particular  sector  at  a  rate  superior  to  that  which  was 
perhaps  calculated  for  it  upon  the  other  side.  With  the 
expenditure  of  men,  however,  it  is  .far  otherwise.  No 
reasonable  calculation  of  the  numbers  at  which  it  was 
worth  while  to  secure  the  result  can  have  allowed  for  the' 
immense  losses  already  suffered,  especially  if  we  remember 
that'  those  losses  have  been  suffered  withrtut  any  corre- 
sponding result. 

\Miat  those  losses  precisely  are  as  a  ma.\imum  to  date 
it  is  manifestly  impossible  to  determine.  The  French 
authorities  have  been  very  careful  to  keep  down  in  their 
ofhcial  or  quasi-official  statement:,  to  ihcjiniiiiinwi  estimate. 
But  even  so,  the  judgment  based  upon  private  reports  and 
descriptions  escapes  this  oflicial  caution  and  justly  tends 
to  regard  the  (ierman  real  los;.  as  much  highei'  than  the 
strict  minimum  occasionally  estimated.  Indeed,  this 
minimiUTi  as  published  from  time  to  time,  quite  apart  from 
private  I'eports,  confirms  such  a  view.  For  instance,  one 
correspondent,  speaking  immediately  after  official  infor- 
mation and  from  all  his  work  manifestly  warning  us  against 
excessive  estimates,  has  told  us  that  the  loss  of  the  firs.t 
four  weeks  was  certainly  more  than  150,000.  Another, 
writing  a  good  deal  earlier,  already  quoted  the  figure 
100,000.  A  more  recent  very  cautious  statement  issued 
in  some  detail  to  the  British  press  discovers,  the  attacking 
troops  actually  identified  to  reach  450,000,  puts  their 
losses  up  to  nearly  a  fortnight  ago  at  about  one-third  of 
this  number  in  the  attacking  line-  plus  about  50,000 
at  least  from  losses  behind  the  attacking  line  through 
artillery  fire  and  sickness,  making  a  total  loss  as  late  as 
that  fortnight  ago  of  200,000.  But  we  must  remember 
with  regard  to  such  a  calculation  two  things,  first,  that 
its  whole  object  is  to  .correct  an  undue  optimism  and 
the  legends  which  stories  from  the.  front  give  rise  to  ; 
r.ocondly  that  the  number  of  units  actually  identified 
iipon  the  immediate  front  attacked  must  always  be  less 
than  the  units  employed.  How  much  less  we  cannot 
tell,  though  v,e  may  guess  it  from  the  nature  of  the 
fighting. 

The  identification  of  units  upon  a  fighting  front  can  only 
be  arrived  at  in  one  of  four  ways. 

1.  Tiie  noting  of  those  imits  from  which  the  dead  and 
wounded  discoxered  upon  the  ground  in  an  advance  are 
drawn. 

2.  Those  units  from  which  prisoners  are  drawn. 

3.  The  statements  of  prisoners  under  examination. 

4.  Documents  taken  from  the  enemy. 

All  these  four  somces,  when  one  is  strictly  on  the  defensive 
;ind  either  immobile  or  occasionally  retiring,  arc  obviously 
more  imperfect  than  when  one  is  advancing. 

Line  of  German  Supply 

We  must  always  remember  that  the  attack  upon  Verdun 
is  conditioned  for  the  enemy  by  a  new  railway  which  is 
built  from  Spincourt  to  Montfaucon  (crossing  the  Meuse 
at  Dun).     The  existing  railway  by  Conflans  and  Etain 


is  directly  imder  observation  and  long  range  fire  from  the 
heights  of  the  Meuse  and  very  diflicuit  for  the  enemy  to 
luo.  •  He  is  really  dependent  ujion  the  new  lini'. 
.  This  means  that  the  main  Cierman  attack  was  con- 
demned to  come  from  the  north  antl  the  north-east  and 
north-west.  It  could  not  have  a  complete  choice  of  all 
points  upon  the  sector  of  Verdun.  The  reason  why  the 
enemy  was  thus  tied  to  ^he  twelve  or  fourteen  miles 
upon  which  all  his  efforts  ha\'e  been  directed,  was  in  some 
measure  liis  dependence  upon  the  305  howitzers,  the 
380  guns  (a  naval  gun,  I  believe)  and  great  320  howitzers. 
It  is  true  that  he  liad  the  same  choice  of  supply  by  road 
as  the  French  had,  and  could  organise  the  movement 
of  munitions  in  lorries  as  the  French  could,  but  his 
special  dependence  upon  very  heavy  pieces  has  here  once 
again,  as  throughout  the  campaign,  affected  his  mobility. 
Those  wlio  may  think  tliis  an  odd  word  to  use  in  con- 
nection with  siege  work  would  do  well  to  note  the  very 
practical  meaning  of  the  word  in  this  case.  The  munition- 
ment  for  the  305  (which  piece  is  capable  of  moving  along 
roads)  is  U^  some  extent  independent  of  the  rail  That  is, 
the  munitionment  can  go  by  rail  and  be  transferred  to  the 
battery,  even  at  some  dii.tance,  by  lorry.  But  when  it 
comes  to  the  big  380  naval  gun  and  the  420  howitzer  it  is 
another  business.  Theoretically,  of  course,  one  could 
move  the  shells  though  not  the  pieces  without  the  aid  of 
the  rail.  But  in  practice  the  handling  of  these  enormous 
masses  ties  one  to  the  railway,  or  to  the  close  proximity 
of  it.    - 

As  a  matter  of  fact  we  ])robably  know  both  the 
number  and  the  situation  of  the  420's  in  this  case.  They 
ha\'e  been  emplaced  for  months  upon  regular  platforms 
in  Hingry  wood,  and  in  other  portions  of  the  big  wooded 
area  between  Orncs  and  frilly. 

There  was  als.o  a  naval  gun  of  380  in  the  wood  of 
Mazeray,  south-west  of  Spincourt. 

Of  the  420's  there  seem  to  be  about  twelve  so  far  cm- 
placed,  and  it  might  seem  that  some  of  these  would  be 
shifted  round  westward  later  to  deal  with  the  front  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Meuse.  But  I  believe  there  is  as  yet  no 
evidence  of  this.  It  is,  at  any  rate,  a  thing  worth  noting 
(though  no  more  definite  than  any  other  information  in 
such  a  matter)  that  the  enemy's  present  efforts  are 
directed  only  to  getting  rid  of  the  French  positions  that 
threaten  him  on  the  other  side  of  the  river.  In  other 
words,  he  wants  to  carry  the  whole  of  the  Goose  Crest, 
including,  of  course,  the  Mort  Homme  and  Hill  304  in  order 
to  be  quite  secure  in  his  position  east  of  the  Meuse,  which 
situation  arrived  at,  he  would  concentrate  again  upon  the 
old  main  front  from  the  river  round  to  Vaux,  and  there, 
after  an  artillery  preparation  entirely  directed  against 
that  sector,  would  launch  his  last  main  attack. 

The  suggestion  is  that  the  enemy,  being  bound  by  his 
line  of  supply  from  Spincourt  to  Montfaucon,  to  attack 
from  the  north  between  Vaux  and-  Avocourt,  means 
his  main  last  attack  to  come  only  upon  the  main  positions 
east  of   the  Meuse  from  A  to  B  on  Sketch  IV.,  where 


T^LUT 


Tvloatfoucoa 

"Mxlon, 

Avocourt, 


'^M-f^ 


IV 


']?iinjjes  m  tlioiisands  ofyards 

O  S  JO  L<  ^o 


pcec-es.  380mm  <P^20iaa..  lilt 


VERTUN 


Okf 'J^hziwa^-s -(III  ).. 


T^^rett 


10 


LAND      &     W  A  T  E  R 


April  13,  1916 


his  first  great  effort  was  made  nearly  two  months  ago  ; 
and  that  his  effoiis  to  capture  the  Goose  Crest,  Hill 
304  and  the  Mort  Homme,  which  are  still  proceeding, 
are  undertaken  with  the  object  of  permitting  this  linal 
attack  to  be  delivered  along  the  whole  line  A  B,  the 
western  portion  of  which  on  the  line  of  the  arrows  E  E 
is  now  hampered  by  the  remaining  French  possession  of 
the  shaded  ground  upon  the  sketch.  It  is  suggested 
that  if  he  captured  the  northernmost  positions  between 
Avocourt  and  the  Meuse  he  would  not  go  on  to  attack 
the  Charny  ridge,  but  having  thus  eliminated  the  threat 
to  the  flank  of  the  arrows  at  E  E  would  attack  all  along 
the  western  position  between  Vaux  and  the  river. 

I  g  ve  the  suggestion  for  what  it  is  worth.  It  has 
been  attentively  listened  to  and  discussed  in  I'-ranre. 
It  is  all  a  question  of  numbers.  If  he  cares  to  lose  enough 
men  he  can,  of  course,  after  carrying  the  Mort  Homme 
and  304,  attack  the  whole  line  of  the  Charny  ridge  as  well 
as  the  position  east  of  the  Meuse  between  that  river  and 
Vaux.  As  a  mere  problem  of  ground  it  is  self-evident 
that  he  would  get  greater  results  by  attacking  the  Charny 
ridge  alone,  because  he  would  thus,  if  he  were  successful, 
automatically  compel  a  retirement  from  A  B.  But  that 
would  mean  a  redisposition  of  his  heavy  artillery,  which 
is  now  in  the  woods  of  Mazeray  and  JHingry,  and  the  new 
emplacement  and  making  of  new  heads  of  munitionment 
for  380's  and  420's  (15  and  17  inches)  is  a  verv  long 
business. 

rSote  on  the  German  Mineral  Supply 

r  believe  that  information  has  been  received  with  regard 
to  the  condition  of  the  iron  ore  supply  in  Lorraine,  which 
is  of  capital  importance  to  the  enemy  at  this  moment. 
The  information  is  of  double  importance  as  showing  us 
how  the  Germans  are  breaking  the  solemn  treaties  to 


which  they  put  their  names  (for  what  that  was  worth)  in 
the  treatment  of  prisoners  and  also  the  straits  for  labour 
into  which  they  have  fallen. 

It  seems  that  the  mines  in  the  Briey  basin,  especially 
those  nearest  Metz,  Hommecourt,  Moutiers,  Landres 
and  others,  are  now  being  worked  by  gangs  of  Russian 
prisoners.  But  some  of  the  mines  have  got  flooded, 
particularly  Pienne,  and  none  of  the  blast  furnaces 
there  are  at  present  working.  In  this  connection  it  is 
further  worth  recalling  the  fact  that  the  whole  of  this  bit  of 
country,  of  which  Verdun  is  one  principal  centre  and 
Metz.  opposite,  the  other,  is  the  one  field  of  supply  for  iron 
ore  upon  which  the  German  Empire  can  securely  depend. 
Just  before  the  war  three-cjuartors  of  the  iron  ore  won 
within  the  Empire  was,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  provided 
by  the  territory  annexed  from  France  in  '71,  in  Lorraine. 
Much  of  the  foreign  supply  was  provided  also  from  French 
Lorraine,  just  over  the  frontier.  A  confidential  memoir 
was  addressed,  according  to  the  French  authorities,  to  the 
German  Chancellor  last  May  by  a  group  of  the  great 
industrial  interests,  pointing  out  that  any  grave  inter- 
ference with  the  supply  of  Lorraine  ore  would  mean  the 
loss  of  the  war.  And  in  this  same  memoir  the  annexation 
of  Verdun  was  urged  as  one  of  the  conditions  of  peace — 
at  that  time,  of  course,  the  basis  of  such  illusions,  though 
flimsy,  was  a  little  less  flimsy  than  it  is  to-day,  the  German 
losses  at  that  moment  being  actually  less  than  half  of 
what  they  are  now,  and  the  effect  of  the  great  success  on 
•  the  Dunajec  recent  and  fresh.  It  may  further  be  remem- 
bered that  the  trace  of  the  new  frontier  in  1871  near 
Metz  was  exactly  calculated  to  convey  to  Germany, 
what  was  then  known  as  the  whole  iron  bearing  area  of 
Lorraine.  It  is  only  since  that  date  that  the  mines  on 
the  French  side  of  the  frontier  have  been  put  into 
exploitation.  H.  Belloc 


COMBINED    ARMS    IN    WAR 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


WHILE  the  submarine  war  remains  the  absorb- 
ing topic  of  the  moment,  there  has  been  news 
of  several  minor  naval  incidents  of  interest, 
and  Sir  Charles  Monro's  j^rotoundly  interesting 
description  of  the  evacuation  of  Gallipoli  has  been  pub- 
lished. Never  have  the  complexities  of  war  been  more 
clearly  laid  before  us,  and  the  dispatch  is  full  of  lessons 
to  those,  and  they  appear  to  be  many,  who  imagine  that 
the  great  campaign  in  which  we  are  engaged  can  be 
simplified  and  made  more  efiicient  by  the  problems  of  air 
war  being  divorced  from  those  on  land  and  sea.  I 
touched  on  this  subject  last  week.  The  situation  has 
developed  markedly  since  then,  and  in  response  to  several 
correspondents,  I  propose  to  discuss  it  at  slightly  greater 
length  to-day.  But  the  purely  naval  events  must  be 
dealt  with  first. 

The  Submarine  Campaign 

Undoubtedly  the  most  serious  fact  of  the  present 
naval  situation  is  that  the  (lerman  submarine  successes 
continue  at  the  high  level  that  prevailed  last  week.  Our 
last  diagram  showed  the  total  reported  up  to  April  3rd, 
but  three  have  to  be  added  to  that  total.  In  the  ensuing 
week  22  ships  have  been  sunk  in  home  waters,  and  four 
in  the  Mediterranean.  The  casualties  then  in  the  last 
three  weeks,  excluding  the  Mediterranean,  have  been 
20,  25  and  22. 

Of  this  total  of  67,  6  are  allied  ships,  26  neutral  and  35 
British.  That  the  rate  has  been  so  high  and  has  been 
sustained  so  long  is  to  be  explained  more  by  there  being  a 
greater  number  of  submarines  engaged,  than  by  these 
submarines  being  of  a  new  type.  But  the  chief  ex- 
planation is  that  all  the  submarines  "seem  to  act  alit'ays 
on  the  principle  of  sinking  at  sight.  It  is  noteworthy 
for  instance  that  in  no  single  instance  in  the  last  three 
weeks  has  it  been  reported  that  a  ship  was  sunk,  or  even 
attacked,  by  gunfire.  It  is  equally  noteworthy  that,  in 
almost  every  case,  those  on  board  the  attacked  ships 
saw  no  submarine.  When  in  September  the  German 
Government  volunteered  a  promise  to  America  that  they 
would  sink  no  more  ships  without  visit,  search  and  pro- 


vision for  the  people  on  board,  it  was  pointed  out  in  these 
columns  that  were  this  promise  carried  out,  the  sub- 
marine campaign  would  be  robbed  of  nine-tenths  of  its 
terrors.  It  was  this  that  made  it  obvious  that  if  both 
Germany  and  the  United  States  were  serious — the  first 
in  her  determination  on  an  effective  blockade,  and  the 
second  in  the  maintenance  of  national  honour — a  conflict 
between  them  must  be  inc\itablc.  The  success  of  the 
last  three  weeks  would  have  been  quite  impossible  had 
the  bargain  with  America  been  kept. 

That  it  has  not  been  kept,  that  Germany  is  in  fact 
carrying  out  the  ruthless  and  relentless  campaign  origin- 
ated by  \on  Tirpitz,  urged  by  Reventlow,  and  forced  upon 
a  vacillating  Chancellor  and  a  shaken  Emperor  by  a 
bloodthirsty  popular  agitation,  creates  an  entirely  new 
problem  for  the  counter-attack.  The  Admiralty  very 
rightly  keeps  its  own  counsel  as  its  form.  But  it  is  clear 
that  if  submarines  avoid  the  surface  altogether,  if  they 
eliminate  all  the  delays — even  the  five  minutes'  delay 
incidental  to  giving  the  crews  of  the  doomed  ships  time 
in  which  to  lower  their  boats — if  ships  are  sunk  every- 
where by  invisible  foes,  whose  pres2nce  in  the  locality 
only  becomes  known  when  the  survivors  in  boats  are 
picked  up,  either  by  other  steamers  or  by  patrol  craft, 
then  the  kind  of  organisation  necessary  for  dealing  with 
such  tactics  must  differ  altogether  from  those  that 
characterised  the  milder  campaign  of  last  summer  and 
autumn.  The  essence  of  the  matter  now  is  pace  in  getting 
to  the  spot  from  which  news  of  the  enemy  is  received. 
And  pace  is  not  so  much  a  matter  of  the  speed  of  the 
ships  engaged  as  of  promptness  in  sending  them  upon  their 
work  at  the  first  intimation  that  there  is  work  for  them  to 
do.  Promptness  of  this  kind  is  quite  imposible  unless  the 
control  of  the  patrolling  and  attacking  craft  is  completely 
decentralised.  It  is  quite  useless  for  information  of  a 
submarine's  presence  to  be  telegraphed  to  the  Admiralty 
and  for  the  initiative  in  the  pursuit  to  originate  from 
Admiralty  instructions.  This  is  the  first  and  the  most 
obvious  lines  of  modification  that  the  counter-campaign 
must  take.  The  second  is  an  alternative  way  of  attaining 
the  main  object,  viz  :  bringing  armed  force  more  swihly 
to   the   infested  swt.     In   preen     conditions  imarmed 


April  13,  191G 


LAND      &     WATER 


II 


drifters,  yachts,  launches,  etc.,  arc  perfectly  useless. 
Any  news  they  may  bring  will  be  too  late.  They  must  act 
instead  of  reporting.  It  may  not  be  possible  to  multiply 
the  craft  engaged  in  the  hunt.  It  should  not  be  impossible 
to  see  that  every  unit  engaged  in  it  is  capable  of  taking 
an  effective  part.  At  any  cost  any  one  of  them  must  be 
armed.  And  if  it  is  necessary  to  despoil  the  old  cruisers 
of  their  3-pounders,  6-pounders  and  3-inch  guns,  their 
loss  of  efficiency  would  be  well  balanced  by  the  greater 
efficiency  of  the  anti-submarine  flotilla.  So  long  as  the 
old  cruisers  can  keep  their  6-inch  guns,  they  can  spare  the 
armament  originally  put  into  tliem  as  defence  against 
torpedo  boats.  It  is  useless  against  the  modern  destroyer 
and  is  far  more  wanted  in  craft  actively  engaged  in 
the  defence  of  commerce  to-day. 

These  remarks  must  not  be  taken  to  suggest  that  the 
Admiralty's  counter-measures  are  inadequate,  that  no 
.changes  of  organisation  are  taking  place,  that  the  pro- 
cess of  multiplying  the  means  of  attacking  submarines  is 
not  in  full  swing.  That  the  Admiralty  measures  have 
not  appreciably  reduced  the  rate  is  no  proof  that  they 
are  not  effective.  The  counter-measures  can  only  have 
a  result  proportionate  to  the  numbers  of  submarines  engaged . 
Without  them  the  rate  might  easily  have  been  twice  as 
high.  What  is  satisfactory  about  the  present  situation  is 
this.  The  course  of  the  campaign  from  September  to  the 
20th  March  seems  to  indicate  that  during  this  period, 
Ihe  German  Marine-Amt  was  making  special  efforts 
to  produce  boats  and  to  tram  crews,  so  that  we  now  have 
upon  the  field  the  total  product  of  five  months'  strenuous 
preparation.  \\'hcn  it  is  remembered  that  we  have  the 
maximum  possible  force  against  us,  and  this  is  employed 
with  a  total  disregard  to  human  rights  or  international 
obligations,  the  wonder  is  not  that  the  victims  are  so 
many,  but  that  the  results  fall  so  far  short  of  achieving 
the  German  purpose. , 

The  Loss  of   Ships 

Admiral  Sir  Cyprian  Bridge  contributed  a  letter  to  the 
Times  last  week,  in  which  it  was  pointed  out  that  the 
total  enemy  attacks  on  merchant  shipping  had  in  20 
months  only  reduced  the  numbers  of  our  merchant  ships 
by  4  per  cent,  and  the  tonnage  by  about  5  per  cent. 
While  this  is  undoubtedly  true,  the  totals  are  a  little 
misleading,  because  that  gallant  and  learned  writer  did 
not  distinguish  between  ships  engaged  in  foreign  trade 
and  the  coasters,  cross-Channel  boats,  etc.  Something 
less  than  four-fiftlis  of  British  steam  vessels  are  usually 
employed  in  foreign  trade  and  it  is  from  these  in  the  main 
tliat  deductions  clue  to  enemy  attacks  must  be  made. 
If  we  take  8,000  as  our  foreign  trading  fleet,  and  assume 
it  to  be  reduced  to  about  5,000  by  the  requirements  of 
the  Navy  and  the  oversea  forces,  then  the  losses  due  to 
the  enemy  attacks  show  a  far  higher  percentage — roughly 
indeed  8  per  cent,  and  10  per  cent,  instead  of  4  per  cent, 
and  5  per  cent.  Not  that  there  is  anything  really  alarm- 
ing in  these  totals.  In  the  revolutionary  and  Napoleonic 
wars  the  percentage  of  ships  lost  often  attained  7  and 
sometimes  exceeded  10  per  cent,  in  a  single  year  Eight  per 
cent,  in  20  months  is  of  course  not  5  per  cent,  per  annum. 
Even  if  the  rate  of  loss  of  British  ships  during  the  last 
three  weeks  were  maintained,  it  would  only  mean  an 
annual  loss  of  just  over  10  per  cent.  It  is  obvious 
then  tliat  while  the  diminution  of  shipping  caused 
by  the  submarine  losses  may  raise  freights,  and 
conseciucntly  prices,  may  make  it  necessary  to  restrict 
imports  more  severely,  and  in  many  respects  embarrass 
supply  and  trade,  there  is  not  the  faintest  ground  for 
anticipating  any  grave  shortage  of  food,  any  serious 
crippling  of  our  economic  life,  above  all,  even  the  slightest 
relaxation  of  our  military  or  naval  activities.  It  is 
important  to  bear  these  facts  in  mind,  because  the  whole 
of  Germany's  case  for  her  sea  savagery  is  based  on  it 
being  necessary  to  inflict  upon  England  the  same  priva- 
tions that  the  English  blockade  has  inflicted  upon  (Ger- 
many. Where  people  throw  over  honour,  decency  and 
humanity,  they  are  left  with  only  one  justification  to 
console  them  for  their  crimes,  and  tliat  is  success.  In 
this  case  it  is  clear  that  even  tliis  miserable  consolation 
will  be  denied  them. 

The  Washington-Berlin  Crisis 

The  Amsterdam  Tclegraaf  published  a  telegram  from 
its  Washington  corresoondent  on  Monday  to  the  clfcct 


that  an  ultimatum  had  been  sent  to  BerHn,  but  this  is 
not  confirmed.  It  is  more  to  the  point  that  there  is  no 
indication  that  American  public  opinion  is  weakening. 
It  still  finds  the  continuance  of  the  present  position 
intolerable.  That  Mr.  Wilson  will  have  to  break  with 
Berlin  appears  then  to  be  certain. 

German  Trade  in  the  North  Sea 

On  Monday  it  was  reported  in  the  Times  and  con- 
firmed from  Copenhagen,  that  Hamburg'  had  sent  two 
ships  to  Aalesund,  taking  fuel  and  returning  with  pro- 
visions and  oil.  It  is  added  that  they  left  and  returned 
under  the  convoy  of  destroyers.  The  story  is  told  as  if 
these  ships  had  put  to  sea  in  the  ordinary  manner, 
confident  in  the  ])rotection  of  their  escort,  and  had 
entered  Aalesund,  and  left  again  exactly  as  if  the  British 
fleet  could  either  be  ignored  or  be  driven  off  by  the  craft 
that  con\oyed  them.  But  an  impartial  view  oi  the  facts 
shows  the  situation  to  have  a  quite  dift'erent  significance. 
That  German  ships  can  leave  Hamburg  and  maintain 
themselves  for  a  time  in  the  North  Sea  is  obviously 
jVjssible.  There  are  the  examples  of  the  Moeur  and  the 
G'm/ to  prove  it.  Any  ship  that  has  sufficient  ingenuity  to 
disguise  herself  as  a  neutral,  and  sufficient  enterprise  to 
take  the  risk,  will  be  reasonably  sure  of  a  certain  number 
of  hours,  if  not  days,  of  rather  exciting  cruising  in  the 
North  Sea.  But  the  journey  from  Hamburg  to  Aalesund 
would  not  even  call  for  many  hours  of  exciting  cruising. 
The  distance  is  about  700  miles,  but  except  for  the 
crossing  of  the  Skagerrack,  the  whole  journey  coTild  be 
done  in  territorial  waters.  Save  then  for  the  passage  of 
the  Skagerrack —and  e\en  this  could  be  avoided  by 
coasting  round  Denmark,  and  then  taking  the  Swedish 
territorial  waters  until  those  of  Norway  were  reached  — 
German  ships  could  embark  upon  this  journey  reasonably 
sure  of  protection  for  the  entire  journey.  But  note  two 
things  in  regard  to  this.  First,  this  journey  could  not  be 
undertaken  regularly,  but  only  occasionally,  for,  as  recent 
news  has  told  us.  Commodore  Tyrwhitt  is  sometimes  to 
be  found  cruising  off  the  Island'of  Sjdt,  and  it  is  after 
all,  less  than  a  month  since  the  Kong  Inge  was  taken  by  a 
British  submarine  in  the  Kattegat,  and  sent  home  in 
charge  of  a  prize  crew.  In  no  sense  then  is  the  journey 
between  Hamburg  and  Norway  one  upon  which  the  Ger- 
mans can  rely.  Note  next  that  it  can  only  be  made  at  all 
because  the  ships  arc  protected  from  the  attentions  of  the 
British  fleet.  But  such  protection  as  exists  is  not  derived 
from  the  High  Seas  Fleet  of  the  German  Admiral  in  the 
Atlantic,  but  from  the  inviolability  of  Danish,  Swedish 
and  Norwegian  waters  !  Thus  the  whole  aifair,  instead  of 
being  an  assertion  of  Germany's  freedom  to  use  the  r.ea, 
is  a  confession  of  German  naval  weakness,  and  is  jx)ssible 
only  because  tlv.'  Germans  can  rely  upon  our  naval  respect 
for  international  law. 

A  Superb  Amphibious  Operation 

Sir  Charles  Monro's  despatch  describing  the  evacuation 
of  Gallipoli,  throws  important  light  on  the  art  of  uying 
naval  and  military  forces  in  combination.  He  pavs  a 
generous  tribute  to  the  Navy's  efficiency,  and  reminds  us 
of  a  truth  insisted  upon  in  these  columns  since  the  first 
landing,  tha-t  throughout  these  operations  the  fleet  has 
taken  the  place  of  all  the  paraphernalia  and  organisation 
summed  up  in  the  expression  "  lines  of  communication 
and  transport "  in  land  operations.  Never  have  the 
two  arms  been  combined  on  so  important  a  scale  before  ; 
never  has  the  combination  been  more  perfectly  and 
successfully  exhibited  than  in  that  final  test  of  efficiency 
— the  successive  evacuations  of  Suvla,  Anzac  and  Holies. 

Air  War — Sea  War— Land  War 

During  the  last  week  Mr.  Billing  has  carried  through 
an  oratorical  campaign  that  has  only  been  very  imperfectly 
reported.  Lord  Montagu  and  Lord  Derby  have  resigned 
from  the  air  committee,  and  according  to  one  journal, 
because  the  need  of  centralising  and  co-ordinating  the  aii 
service  in  a  single  department  is  not  recognised.  Exactlji 
what  these  distinguished  men  mean  by  this  centralisation 
is  not  explained.  It  is  probably  rash  to  attribute  to  them 
the  views  which  Mr.  Billing  has  proclaimed.  But  Pro- 
fessor Wilkinson's  endorsement  of  Mr.  Billing  lends  im- 
portance to  the  rumour  that  the  real  issue  now  is  not 
disagreement  as  to  the  best  way  of  organising  the  supply 


12 


LAND      &      W  A  r  E  R 


April  13,   1916 


of  aircraft,  but  diHorenres  as  to  tl]c  strategic  administra- 
tion and  command  of  the  air  service  as  a  whole. 

The  arf^unient  in  favoiu-  of  a  supreme  and  independent 
air  force,  for  employment  in  a  purely  air  war.  is  put  in 
such  terms  as  this.  "  Command  of  the  Air  "  is  as  essen- 
tial in  this  war  as  "  Command  of  the  Sea."  It  must  be 
sought  and  won  as  an  object  in  its?lf.  It  cannot  be  won 
by  an  air  service  if  that  service  is  under  a  divided  admini- 
stration. The  air  fleet  which  is  at  the  dii.po.al  of  the 
navy  cannot  be  taken  from  the  navy  and  employed  upon 
the  main  jiurpose  for  which  tiie  air  ;.ervice  should  exist. 
Similarly  the  <-raft  belonging  to  the  army  must  be  left 
severely  alone.  So  long  as  the  organii.ation  and.conniiand 
of  the  air  forces  are  in  the  hands  of  a  mixed  commis:;ion, 
military  and  naval  needs  will  be  given  the  first  claim, 
and  the  existence  of  an  independent  air  force  neglected. 
But  this  neglect  is  ruinous,  tor  air  raid:;  on  enemy  vital 
points  may.  and  indeed  must,  be  regarded  no  longer  as 
secondary  operations,  but  as  primary,  and  i)rimary 
because  they  may  easily  be  decisive.  Who.  for  instance. 
can  doubt  that  the  effective  bombardment  of  Essen  would 
isolate  the  (lerman  army  from  its  chief  gun  and  munition 
supply,  and  achieve  at  a  stroke  almo:.t  all  that  an  army 
marching  victoriously  to  the  Rhine  coidd  do  ?  Would 
not  then  such  a  bombardment  be  a  far  heavier  blow  to 
Germany  than  the  loss  of.  say.  Paris  would  be  to  France  ? 
Tiie  capacity  of  aircraft  to  deliver  r.uch  attacks  is  well 
enough  established  for  it  to  be  worth  a  supreme  national 
effort  to  carry  them  out  on  the  desired  scale.  We  must 
then  have  a  force  entirely  free  from  naval  or  military 
control. 

The  Obvious  Weakness 

This  may  be  an  extreme,  but  it  surely  is  not  an  unfair 
repre:.entation  of  what  we  may  call  the  forward  party's 
case.  Its  weakness  is  obvious.  There  can  be  no  such 
thing  as  command  of  the  air  in  the  sense  in  which  there 
is  command  of  the  sea.  \Vhen  Mr.  Billing  tells  us  that 
in  the  future  the  first  will  be  more  important  than  the 
second,  he  seems  to  me  to  be  saying  w-hat  is  absolutely 
meaningless.  This  is  because  except  for  military  pur- 
poses th.ere  is  no  use  made  of  the  air  as  an  clement  at  all. 
It  cannot  be  used  for  the  transport  of  troops,  for  the 
exchange  of  commodities,  or  for  supply.  There  is  not 
s.omewhere  in  the  air,  as  there  is  at  sea,  a  concentration  of 
force  which  commands  it  as  a  means  of  communication. 
Airr.hips  and  aeroplanes  can  rise  from  the  land  into  the 
air,  and  opposing  airships  and  aeioplanes  can  pursue  and 
engage  them,  and  then  for  the  moment,  the  destruction 
of  the  enemy  craft  is  an  object  in  itself.  But  the 
ntltimatc  object  of  attack  and  counter-attack  is  not,  as  at 
sea,  to  seize  or  dispute  the  possession  of  an  element,  but 
to  use  the  element  momentarily  for  some  purpose  imme- 
diately or  indirectly  military  or  naval.  Thu*  the  ultimate 
object  of  every  air  raid  is  to  assist  the  army  or  the  navy 
in  its  task. 

It  may  be  said  that  raids  like  those  of  the  Zeppelins  over 
I^^ngland.  or  the  proposed  raid  on  Essen,  are  so  remotely 
connected  with  naval  or  military  operations  as  to  make  it 
quite  scientific  to  regard  them  as  ends  in  themselvts.  .\ 
case  no  doubt  might  be  established  for  this  philosophy. 
What  is  more  immediately  to  the  point  is,  that  we  have 
no  experience  to  show  that  such  raids  ever  ha\e  or  ever 
can  achieve  so  definite  a  success  a;;  to  justify  a  war 
carried  on  by  air  being  treated  as  a  thing  apart  "from  land 
or  sea  war.  The  ain.hip  raids  on  England  have  in  a 
military  sense  achieved  less,  on  each  occasion,  than  the 
battle  cruisers'  raids  on  the  East  Coast.  They  have 
acliievcd  far  less,  altogether,  than  the  submarines'  raids 
on  shipping.  If  Germany's  fleet  had  been  of  sufficient 
power  to  be  an  active  fleet,  had  it  been  engaged  from  the 
firs.t  in  trying  to  find  opportunities  and  means  of  forcing 
the  British  fleet  to  action — by  having  squadrons  con- 
stantly at  sea.  by  disputing  the  passage  of  our  transports, 
by  sending  their  cruisers  to  interfere  with  our  sea  services 
— would  (iermany.  in  these  circum;;tanccs,  have  devoted 
her  Zeppelins,  whose  scouting  capacity  must  at  times  be 
of  the  highest  naval  strategical  and  tactical  value,  to  such 
indirect  methods  of  obtaining  a  military  result  as  scatter- 
ing boinbs  over  the  country  in  the  hope  that  some  vital 
damage  wbuld  be  done  ?  in  fact,  are  not  the  Zeppelin 
raids  strictly  spreaking,  just  as  much  confessions  of  naval 
weakness,  as  is  the  submarine  camp:\'gn  ?  And  is  it 
not  in  each  case  the  pursuit  of  a  secondary  or  indirect 


military  purpose,  to  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the 
German  navy  is  not  strong  enough  to  use  these  devices  for 
any  direct  na\'al  .object'?: 

The  Purpose  of  Raids 

Now  what  is  the  indirect  objective  which  the 
enemy  has  in  view  in  these  raids  ?  They  are  first  and 
foremost  «to  make  a  demonstration  of  a  frightful  and 
terrifying  use  of  'power  to  cheer  and  console  the 
(lermans,  who  are  the  victims  of  a  real  and  direct 
u;;?  of  naval  power,  and  next  frighten  and  exasj^erate 
the  linglish  who  are  made  the  victims  of  them.  But 
the  moral  effect  sought  by  an  e)iemy  is  not  limited 
to  inspiring  terror  and  anger.  He  seeks  to  create 
a  diversion  of  naval  and  military  force  from  its  true 
])urpose.  The  Admiralty,  after  the  Yarmouth  bom- 
bardment, \ery  properly  announced  that  the  pursuit 
by  the  enemy  of  an  unmilitary  object  would  nut 
lead  the  Admiralty  to  alter  the  distribution  of  the  Fleet. 
But  if  the  air  raids  on  England  result  in  the  diversion 
of  our  air  policy  from  its  true  purpose,  the  enemy  will 
have  achieved  his  end.  For  it  is  useless  to  deny  that  if  air 
war  becomes  an  object  to  be  sought  for  its  own  sake, 
if  Mr.  Billing's  thousand  "  best  aeroi>lanes  in  the  world  " 
are  to  be  produced  by  a  vast  national  effort  for  the 
destruction  of  Essen  and  so  forth,  then  it  is  as  certain  as 
anything  can  be  that  the  air  needs  of  the  army  and  navy 
wiil  take  a  second  place.  There  is  at  least  one  excellent 
reason  why  this  must  appear  as  a  very  serious  threat. 
If  the  accessory  utility  of  aircraft,  always  to  the  army 
and  sometimes  to  the  navy,  is  proved  by  experience  to 
the  point  of  its  being  absolutely  indispensable,  the  utility 
of  aircraft  in  making  raids  of  decisive  military  value  is  still 
to  seek.  All  the  Zeppelin  raids  on  England  put  together 
have  not  yet  achieved  the  casualties  of  the  Lusitania, 
nor  military  damage  that  is  more  than  nominal.  The 
raids  made  by  ourselves  and  our  Allies  over  German 
communications  and  depots  and  the  enemy's  counter 
raids,  are  not,  I  believe,  rated  by  military  authorities  as 
of  one-tenth  of  the  value  of  aircraft  in  more  direct  .services, 
such  as  scouting,  the  correction  of  fire,  and  so  forth. 

The  real  reason  why  raids  are  not  more  efficient  than 
they  are  is,  that  the  aircraft  bomb  has  not  a  destructi\-e 
capacity  sufliciently  great  to  compensate  for  the  lack  of 
])recision  in  its  use.  In  other  words,  if  aircraft  only 
existed  as  a  means  of  attack  no  v'ery  notable  addition  to  the 
implements  of  war  could,  on  our  present  experience,  be 
supposed  to  have  been  made.  Their  real  value  is  as 
accessories  to  naval  and  military  force.  To  get  the  best 
out  of  aircraft  they  must  be  used  in  combination  with  the 
fleet  or  the  army.  If  this  is  so,  it  is  quite  unscientific 
to  treat  this  branch  of  war  as  if  it  were  as  separate  from 
the  other  branches  as  they  are  from  each  other.  Thej'  are 
separate  because  the  units  of  naval  and  military  force  arc 
utterly  different,  are  employed  in  totally  different  ek 
ments.  and  have  a  technique  entirely  separate  and  di>- 
tinct.  It  is  the  exception  for  them  to  be  used  together, 
and  consequently  to  deal  with  land  and  sea  forces  as 
separate  is  strictly  scientific.  But  it  is  the  exception 
for  air  forces  to  be  used  otherwise  than  in  combination 
with  land  or  sea  force. 

If  the  agitation  for  the  reform  and  the  infusion  of 
greater  vigour  of  our  air  policies  is  limited  to  supplying 
more  and  better  machines  and  distributing  them  as  the\ 
are  wanted  to  the  army  and  navy,  reserving  what  is  wis. 
for  the  defence  of  these  islands  against  raids — and;  o' 
course,  for  counter-raids  if  the  force  is  available  for  them- 
then  the  agitation  may  do  nothing  but  good.  But  if  honu 
defence  and  reprisals  are  to  be  regarded  as  ends  in  them- 
selves, and  the  air  force  is  to  be  organised  primarily  witii 
these  objects,  then  the  danger  to  the  army  is  manifest. 

ARTlilR    POI.LK.V 


The  twenty-four  short  stories  which  make  up  Richard 
Dehan's  last  book.  Earth  to  Earth  (Heinemann,  6s.)  seem  tc 
bear  little  relation  to  the  rather  ambiguous  title,  which  is  als; 
the  title  of  the  first--and  in  many  ways  the  best  —of  the  storios 
They  are  all  mere  sketches,  often  commonplace  in  themselves, 
yet  in  each  is  an  underlying  motive  that  makes  it  worth  the 
reader's  while.  Man\-  of  them  concern  the  MacWaugii,  a 
character  very  reminiscent  of  Du  Maurier  and  the  Trilh\ 
trio  of  artists,  but  the  autiior  is  obviously  more  at  home  out- 
side the  studio  than  in,  and  t!ic  first  and  last  are  the  best 
stories  in  the  hook. 


April  13,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 

Spring  in   Gallipoli 


13 


By    Eden    Phillpotts. 

Gcncyal  Sir  Charles  Monro's  despatch  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  Allied  troops  jrom  the  Gallipcli  Peninsula 
ivas  published  on  Tuesday.  It  emphasises  once  again  the  heroic  eharactey  of  this  adventure.  "  'J  he 
position  occupied  by  our  troops  presented  a    military    sitiaition    unique   in  history,"  writes   General  Mo 


nro. 


There  is  a  fold  of  lion-coloured  earth, 
With  stony  feet  in  the  .ligean  blue, 
Whereon  of  old  dwelt  loneliness  and  dearth 
Sun  scorched  and  desolate  ;   and  when  there  flew 
The  winds  of  winter  in  those  dreary  aisles 
Of  crag  and  cliff,  a  whirling  snow-wreath  bound 
The  foreheads  of  the  mountains,  and  their  miles 
Of  frowning  precipice  and  scarp  were  wound 
With  stilly  white,   that  peered  through  brooding 
profound. 

But  now  the  myrtle  and  the  rosemary. 
The  mastic  and  the  rue,  the  scented  thyme 
With  fragrant  iingers  gladdening  the  grey. 
Shall  kindle  on  a  desert  grown  sublime. 
Henceforth  that  haggard  land  doth  guard  and  hold 
The  treasure  of  a  sovereign  nation's  womb — 
Her  fame,  her  w^orth,  her  pride,  her  purest  gold. 
Oh,  call  ye  not  the  sleeping  place  a  tomb 
That  lifts  to  heaven's  light  such  everlasting  blooin. 


They  stretch,  now  high,  now  low,  the  little  scars 
Upon  the  rugged  pelt  of  herb  and  stone  ; 
.\bovc  them  sparkle  bells  and  buds  and  stars 
Young  Spring  hath  from  her  emerald  kirtle  thrown. 
Asphodel,  crocus  and  anemone 
\\'ith  silver,  azure,  crimson  once  again 
Ray  all  that  earth,  and  from  the  murmuring  sea 
Come  winds  to  flash  the  leaves  on  shore  and  plain 
mist      Where  evermore  our  dead — our  radiant  dead  shall  reign. 


Imperishable  as  the  mountain  height 

That  marks  their  place  afar,  their  numbers  shine, 

Who  with  the  first  fruits  of  a  joyful  might 

To  human  liberty  another  shrine 

Here  sanctified  ;    nor  vainly  hav'e  they  sped 

That  made  this  desert  dearer  far  than  home. 

And  left  one  sanctuary  more  to  tread 

For  England,  whose  memorial  pathways  roam 

Beside  her  hero  sons,  beneath  the  field  and  foam. 


The   German   Chancellor's   Speech 

By  G.  K.  Ghesttrton 


^HE  German  Chancellor  has  once  more  delivered 
a  long   speech   on   the   situation,    in   the   course 


T\ 
of  which  he  says  that  the  Allies  are  troubled 
with  a  brutal  lust  of  destruction  and  annihilation, 
that  we  have  the  discomfort  of  having  on  top  of  us  big 
and  broad  mountains  of  bitterness  and  deception  of  the 
people,  that  peace  can  now  only  rise  from  a  flood  of  blood 
and  tears  and  from  the  graves  of  millions,  that  Germany 
is  being  treated  as  a  scape-goat  and  must  answer  with  a 
sword,  because  (it  would  seem)  we  have  tried  to  put  back 
a  clock,  and  might  have  succeeded  had  not  history  since 
advanced  with  an  iron  step  ;  and,  finally,  that  he  has  no 
time  to  use  rhetorical  expressions.  He  considers  with 
some  care  what  it  can  be  that  makes  him  and  his  imme- 
diate neighbours  morally  and  mentally  better  than  other 
people  :  and,  finally,  comes  to  certain  conclusions  about 
what  it  is  "  that  makes  our  hearts  and  our  nerves  so 
strong  "  :  so  that  if  it  only  made  our  heads  a  little 
stronger,  we  should  be  quite  complete. 

For  the  main  element  revealed  by  such  a  Prussian  mono- 
logue is  merely  a  sort  of  weakness  of  mind.    The  Prussian 
will  have  it  all  ways  ;  his  greed  is  full  of  fear ,  like  the 
timidity  of  a  climber  who  will  not  let  go  of  one  foothold 
though  he  has  found  another.     This  gives  some  significance 
even  to  this  first  point  of  form  ;  the  strong  silent  man 
standing  on  his  mountain   of  metaphors.     He  must  be 
talking,  to  draw  attention  to  his  well-known  taciturnity- 
The  political  philosophy    of   the   speech    is    of   the  same 
blend.     .It  is  full   of  precisely  that   kind  of  bumptious 
sliiliy-shallying  which  marks  the  man  in  a  three-act  farce, 
who  cannot  be  off  with  the  old  love  before  he  is  on  with 
the  new.    Mr.  BcUoc  has  often  pointed  out  in  these  columns 
the  impossibility  of  prophecy  in  war,  or  even  in  politics  ; 
and  perhaps  the  nearest  approach  to  a  safe  prophecy  is 
■hat  whatever  happens  the  Prussian  will  go  on  praising  him- 
self.    But   though  consistent   in  praising  himself,   he  is 
not   consistent   even   in   the   nature   of  his   praise.     He 
praises  his  wonderful  heroism  in  enduring  to  the  end  a 
starvation  which  his  wonderful  foresight  has  made  im- 
possible from  the  beginning. 

I  do  not  know  whether  it  is  worth  while  at  this  time  of 
day  to  explain  to  the  Prussian  the  elemcntarv  ethics  of 
such  things  as  the  blockade.  It  is  obvious  that  for 
anyone    remote,    as    Prussia    has    alwavs    been    remote, 


from  tlie  tradition  of  chivalry  (and  therefore  unguided  by 
an  instinct  in  the  matter)  a  sopliist  may  draw  the  line 
anywhere,  on  the  plea  that  all  war  affects  women  and 
children  more  or  less.  Such  a  sophist  will  sec  at  one  end 
of  the  incline  the  breaking  of  a  woman's  heart  by  killing 
her  .lover,  and  at  ^.he  other  end  the  breaking  of  her  ribs 
by  jumping  on  her  with  heavy  boots  ;  and  if  he  has  no 
chivalric  \tradition,  there  is  obviously  only  one  other 
distinction  he  can  employ.  It  is  the  question  which 
party  has  made  innovations  of  ferocity,  and  has  extended 
the  license  of  war  to  cover  things  which  it  did  not  pre- 
viously cover.  In  the  present  case,  to  ask  such  a  question 
is  to  answer  it. 

There  have  been  hunger-sieges  in  war  ever  since  war 
existed  ;  and  the  reduction  of  districts  by  cutting  off 
supplies  has  been  the  special  policy  of  r.ome  of  the  loftiest 
publicists,  like  Lincoln,  and  some  of  the  lowest,  like 
Bismarck.  There  has  never  been  anything  resembling 
the  baby-killing  of  the  Zeppelins  before,  and  it  is  not 
only  desirable  but  jjrobable,  that  there  never  will  be  again. 
But  it  is  idle,  as  I  have  said,  to  urge  even  anything  so 
obvious  as  this  in  order  to  justify  a  shortage  which,  by 
the  enemy's  own  account,  does  not  exist.  The  contra- 
diction is  only  worthy  of  note  as  one  of  the  examples  of 
the  special  weakness  of  mind  which  is  here  in  question  ; 
that  omnivorous  and  indiscriminate  greed  of  vanity  which 
wishes  to  be  admired  at  once  for  its  squareness  and  its 
rotundity,  for  its  bluntness  and  its  sharpness,  for  its 
lightness  and  for  its  weight. 

As  the  Prussian  politician  pays  a  mass  of  contni- 
dictory  compliments  to  himself,  so  he  flings  a  mass  of  con- 
tradictory charges  against  his  opponents.  He  says  that  the 
three  principal  Allies  united  against  Germany  with  the 
aim  of  putting  the  clock  back  to  ancient  times  (whatever 
that  may  mean),  and  proceeds  to  prove  that  their  aim  is 
a  wrong  one,  in  the  following  further  description  of  it. 
"  What  can  the  enemy  coalition  to-day  offer  to  Europe  ? 
Russia  the  fate  of  Poland  and  Finland.  France  the 
preten.sion  to  that  hegemony  which  was  our  bane.  Great 
Britain,  the  state  of  dissension  and  of  continual  irritation 
which  she  called  the  balance  of  power  on  the  Continent 
and  which  is  the  internal  cause  of  the  unspeakable  misery 
which  this  war  has  brought  upon  Europe." 

It  is  tiresome  to  attempt  to  unpick  this  tangle  of  noa- 


14 


LAND     &     WATER 


April  13,  191G 


sense.  But  suiely  it  is  ubvious  llia.t  the  three  Powers 
cannot  have  combined  to  achieve  these  objects,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  thej'  arc  incompatible.  Whatever  a 
French  hej^emony  may  mean,  it  cannot  possibly  mean 
the  balance  of  power.  And  if  Russia  is  offering  Kurope 
the  fate  of  Poland  and  Finland,  that  is  the  fate  of  being 
ruled  by  Russia,  she  is  offering  something  which  cannot 
possibly  be  either  the  balance  of  power  or  a  French 
hegemony.  We  must  therefore  suppose  that  the  three 
conspirators  agreed  in  a  common  plan,  because  each  was 
seeking  something  which  the  other  two  must  of  necessity 
be  the  first  people  in  the  world  to  prevent.  The  alterna- 
tive to  this  incredible  cross-purposes  is,  of  course,  the 
simple  fact  that  the  three  Allies  really  had  a  common 
ground — and  a  good  one.  It  was  resistance  to  the  one 
power  that  really  did  claim  a  hegemony,  and  really 
did  threaten  other  people  with  the  fate  of  Poland — for 
which  she  was  primarily  and  originally  responsible. 

Three  Important  Admissions 

All  that  the  Chancellor  has  here  really  succeeded  in 
doing  is  making  by  implication  three  rather  important 
admissions,  which  he  would  probably  rather  not  make. 
First,  he  admits  that,  in  spite  of  all  the  talk  about  the 
earth-devouring  British  ogre,  Britain  really  desired  all 
powers  to  remain  powerfid  and  on  a  sort  of  equality. 
Second,  he  admits  that,  in  spite  of  the  talk  about  the 
decadence  and  disappearance  of  France,  that  country 
has  still  a  considerable  chance  of  playing  the  first  part  in 
Europe.  And  third,  in  the  case  of  Russia  and  l^oland, 
he  admits  that  the  one  consistent  and  conspicuous  piece 
of  advice  that  Prussia  ever  gave  to  Russia  was  un- 
commonly bad  advice  ;  which  was  indeed  the  case. 
Prussia  first  proposed  and  pressed  the  Partition  of 
Poland.  She  afterwards  prevented  the  emancipation  of 
Poland.  She  has  since  incessantly  bragged  of  the 
natural  inferiority  of  Poland  and  the  complete  subjuga- 
tion of  Poland.  She  now  says,  with  an  unsmiling  visage, 
that  she  will  not  give  poor  Poland  to  shocking  improper 
Russia  ;  though  it  was  only  by  her  own  wish  that  Poland 
was  ever  given  to  anybody.  Much  might  be  said  in  a 
gay  and  pleasurable  spirit  about  this  attitude,  or  antic, 
but  for  practical  purposes  a  simple  and  sober  fact  will 
sultice  ;  and  that  is  the  fact  that  nobody  ever  heard,  or 
dreamed  of  hearing,  a  Prussian  talk  in  such  a  tone  until 
after  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 

Here  I  merely  remark  on  the  advantage  of  hearing  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  publicly  repudiate  the  chief  work  of 
Frederick  the  Great.  It  is  not  the  only  confession  of 
somewhat  the  same  kind.  It  is  worth  while  to  note  one 
other  implied  admission,  which  may  have  been  more 
intentional,  the  contrast  made  between  Germany's 
present  aims  and  her  aims  in  1870.  "  when  Germany 
was  dreaming  of  Alsace  and  Empire."  No  (ierman 
wx)uld  deliberately  dissociate  himself  from  any  imitation  of 
Moltke  and  the  example  of  Alsace,  if  he  were  not  bidding 
cautiously  for  peace.  Truly,  Germany  is  not  now 
thinking  of  Alsace — in  that  sense.  She  has  become 
magnanimous.  She  is  not  troubled  about  getting  her 
neighbour's  goods,  but  only  about  keeping  them. 

The  hrst  stamp  of  this  sort  of  stuff  is  an  illogical  vanity  : 
The  second  is  an  utterly  dead  and  disembodied  pedantry. 
The  best  summary  of  it  is  Rousseau's  "  nier  ce  qui 
est,  cl  cxpliqucr  cc  qui  n'esl  pas."  The  Prussian  is  an  out- 
law and  the  enemy  of  everything  in  existence  ;  but  he 
is  v.ry  careful  in  j)reserving  the  things  which  do  not 
exist.  Thus,  there  was  and  is  a  compact,  unmistakable, 
indepentlent  kingdom  called  Belgium  ;  which  he  and 
everyone  else  not  only  recognised  but  guaranteed.  He 
has  "suddenly  and  savagely  overpowered  it,  and  now 
says  there  must  be  a  new  Belgium,  by  which  he  means,  of 
course,  a  German  Belgium.  That  is,  we  are  to  declare  to 
all  future  ages  that  any  prince  who  chooses  to  invade  a 
weaker  country  shall  be  rewarded  with  that  country 
even  if  he  is  conquered. 

So  far  the  thing,  though  a  joke,  might  be  held  to  be  an 
old  joke.  This  is  not  the  first  though  it  might  well  be 
tlic  worst  case  of  a  kind  of  impudence  which,  bring  also 
impenitence,  may  quite  properly  be  called  damin'd  impu- 
dence. But  what  is  unique  and  German,  what  would 
only  be  conceivable  in  a  (ierman  is  the  fact  that  the 
Chancellor  covers  up  this  moral  tragedy  with  a  sort  of 
scientific  fairv  tale.  He  suddenly  becomes  very  much 
excited  on  behalf  of  something  which  he  calls  "  the  long 


suppressed  Flemish  race,"  which  must  have  something 
which  he' calls  "  a  sound  evolution  "  based  on  its  national 
character.  The  Flemish  race  would  seem  to  ha\c  been  so 
long  and  so  successfully  suppressed  that  the  Flemings 
have  forgotten  all  about  it  ;  and  arc  all  fighting  tooth 
and  nail  for  a  country  which  they  call  Belgium.  No 
doubt  if  the  Germans  were  still  in  a  position  to  do  so, 
they  would  invade  England  to  provide  a  sound  evolution 
for  the  Jutish  race  ;  but  I  will  not  speculate,  for  even  in 
answering  such  words  one  wanders  out  of  the  land  of  the 
living.  It  is  as  if  a  man  who  had  just  cut  my  mother 
into  small  pieces  told  me  he  had  been  very  careful  of 
her  astral  bod}'. 

The  Chancellor  remarks  that  Germany  is  the  only 
state  threatened  with  destruction.  If  we  may  take  this 
as  meaning  that  Prussia  is  the  only  country  that  the 
Allies,  or  any  othei  people  in  the  civilised  world,  have  any 
reason  for  putting  under  lock  and  key,  it  may  be  true. 
If  it  means  that  the  Allies  and  the  civilised  world  will 
probably  be  in  a  position  at  the  end  of  the  war  to  put 
Prussia  under  lock  and  kej',  this  also  we  may  concede  to 
the  eager  intelligence  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor.  But  it 
might  be  noted,  as  a  preliminary  point  of  fact,  that  what- 
ever nation  may  be  threatened  with  destruction  at  the 
end  of  the  war,  at  least  two  nations  were  threatened  with 
destruction  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  were  actually 
visited  with  practical  destruction  in  the  course  of  the 
war.  The  indejjendencc  of  these  two  nations  was 
threatened  by  Germans  alone,  and  was  destroyed  by 
Germans  alone.  The  sovereignty  of  Serbia  and  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  were  abolished  at  a  blow  by  the 
Teutonic  Powers,  not  as  part  of  a  difficult  settlement  of 
Europe,  but  as  part  of  a  perfectly  wanton  unsettlement 
of  it.  Whether  or  no  any  sort  of  annexation  would  be 
Europe's  last  word  to  Germany,  it  was  certainly  Germany's 
first  act  against  Europe. 

The  Chancellor  indicates,  so  far  as  I  can  follow  him, 
that  he  is  too  refined  to  reply  to  Mr.  Asquith  because  this 
would  be  replying  to  "  personal  calumny  "  ;  as  if  Mr. 
Asquith  had  accused  him  of  bigamy  or  stealing  bicycle's. 
So  far  as  I  know,  the  very  simple  substance  of  Mr. 
Asquith's  just  indignation  consisted  in  saying  that  it  was 
wrong  to  invade  Belgium  ;  and  I  cannot  understand  how 
Mr.  Ascpiith  can  indulge  in  calumny  by  saying  of  tint 
Chancellor  what  the  Chancellor  said  of  himself. 

A  Misapprehension 

Touching  the  whole  of  that  matter  there  is  only  one 
thing  which  we  particularly  need  to  say.  Upon  one  point 
the  Chancellor  seems  to  be  under  a  misapprehension. 
He  seems  to  suppose  that  because  he  has  behaved  like 
an  anarchist,  he  has  turned  the  world  into  an  anarchy. 
He  thinks  that  the  mere  fact,  which  we  are  ready  to  con- 
cede to  him,  that  (icrmany  has  broken  the  civilisation  of 
the  world  into  pieces,  means  that  we  ha%'e  entirely  for- 
gotten how  it  was  put  together,  and  shall  be  content 
with  any  patchwork  he  may  pick  and  choose  for  us.  In 
short,  he  thinks  that  his  bravoes  have  not  only  knocked 
us  on  the  head,  but  knocked  us  silly  ;  so  that  we.  has'c 
forgotten  our  father's  name  and  our  baptism  and  even 
tiic  wrong  that  he  has  done  us.  He  is  mistaken.  The 
story  of  the  German  adventure  has  been  dreadful  ;  but 
we  do  not  find  it  in  the  least  dubious.  It  is  the  character 
of  a  crime  to  shock,  but  it  need  not  of  necessity  bewilder  : 
and  in  this  we  do  not  see  any  particular  mystery  cxcepl 
the  mystery  of  iniquity.  At  the  end  of  it  the  Prussian 
will  not  tind  himself  i)icking  up  whatever  he  can  get  in  ;i 
scramble  ;  he  will  tind  himself  more  and  more  separate<l 
from  his  dupes  and  tools,  and  punished  impartially,  aii<' 
])unished  alone.  It  is  only  by  a  misleading  nieta])lior  thai 
we  speak  (jf  a  criminal  as  breaking  the  law.  The  law 
of  Christendom  is  not  broken. 

There  is  one  word  of  truth  in  the  whole  of  the  German 
Chancellor's  speech  ;  and  it  is  a  very  vivid  and  exact 
word.  He  says  that  at  this  moment  the  Germans  are 
"  deep  in  Russia."  They  are.  They  are  deep  in  a  great 
many  things  which  they  do  not  understand.  They  are 
deep  in  a  deep  reaction  against  vulgar  power,  deep  in  an 
ancient  disdain  of  pride,  deep  in  a  most  divine  hatred  of 
cynicism  and  cold  and  unclean  success.  And  to  these 
both  the  name  and  the  metaphor  chosen  are  by  no  means 
inappropriate.  Russia  is  really  something  of  a  human 
sea  ;  there  is  a  thing  known  to  the  sea-bather  as  being  out 
of  one's  depth.    And  to-dav  the  tide  conies  in. 


April  1^,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


13 


When  the  Men   come   Home 


By  Professor  J.  H.  Morgan 


S; 


MITH,  the  sergeant  has  reported  you  to  nic  for 
insubordination.  What  have  you  to  say  ?  " 
j"Beg  pardon,  sir,  but  him  and  1  had  a  dispute 
'about  the  number  of  carbon  copies.  He  said 
he  wanted  three  and  I  said  two'd  be  enough.  And  he 
said  '  Them's  my  orders.'  And  I  said  again  '  Two  will 
be  enough.'  And  he  said  '  Them's  my  orders  '  ■  and  I 
said  '  Two  —  '  "    ' 

"  That'll  do.  Why  didn't  you  obey  the  sergeant's 
orders  ?  " 

"  Well,  sir,  I  told  him  he  was  wrong  and  I  offered  to 
■proj'e  he  was  wrong.     You  see,  sir,—" 

The  Colonel  scribbled  a  note  or  two  on  one  of  those 
fawn-coloured  strips  of  paper  which  a  thrifty  War  Office 
prescribes  for  H.O.  Memoranda,  and  gazed  soarchingly 
at  tin's  forensic  offender.  He  was  young,  pert,  and  ratlicr 
pleased  with  himself,  having  been  specially  enlisted  as  a 
typist,  with  special  rates  of  pay,  and  detailed  to  that 
marvellous  corps  which,  as  regards  its  intellectual  attain- 
ments, is  notlnngless  than  a  profession,  in  respect  of  its 
mechanical  gifts  is  certainly  a  craft,  and  in  point  of  the 
\aricty  and  burden  of  its  tasks  could  give  points  to 
"  casual  labour."  On  his  shoulder  straps  were  the 
letters  "  R.E." 

"  Look  here,  my  lad "  said  the  Colonel.  "  The 
Army's  not  a  debating  society.  No  !  and  it's  not  a 
trade  union.  Or  if  it  is  we've  only  got  one  trade  union 
rule,  which  is  '  Do  as  you  are  told,  and  do  it  quickly.' 
I've  got  to  do  as  I  am  told.  That  surprises  you,  does  it  ? 
Well  if  I  didn't,  home  would  be  the  word,  perhaps  some- 
thing worse.  H  you  don't,  then  field  punishment's  the 
word.  Nasty  thing  field  punishment  "  he  said  pensively. 
"  It  takes  many  forms— all  of  them  more  or  less  unpleas- 
ant, some  of  them  very  distressing  to  the  sense  of  smell. 
Now  we'll  say  no  more  about  this.  Don't  do  it  again. 
You  can  go." 

Casuistries  of  Obedience 

As  the  delinquent  saluted  and  withdrew,  the  Colonel 
turned  to  me.  I  knew  him  well  for  a  wisp  man  and 
discriminating.  What  he  doesn't  know  about  the  labour 
movement  is  hardly  worth  knowing,  for  whenever  there's 
been  "  labour  unrest  "  in  the  last  ten  years  at  home,  and 
the  harassed  authorities  have  had  to  call  in  the  military 
in  aid  of  the  civil  power,  that  unlovely  duty  has  fallen 
to  him  and  a  certain  illustrious  chief  of  "his.  He  has  gone 
in  and  out,  in  mufti,  among  Labour  conventicles,  atten- 
tive, persuasive,  expostulatory,  drinking  bad  beer  in  a 
good  cause  and  almost  persuading  your  Socialist  to  be  a 
citizen.  If  any  officer  has  ever  got  to  the  bottom  of 
that  conundrum  of  the  King's  Regulations  and  the 
common  law  which  presents  an  officer  in  times  of  civil 
"disturbance"  with  the  pleasing  alternative  of  being 
hanged  if  he  obeys  an  order  and  shot  if  he  doesn't,  that 
officer  is  Colonel  X.  He  knew,  if  any  man  did,  that  the 
only  solution  in  dealing  with  the  "  disturbed"  civilian 
is  the  exercise  of  a  stupendous  tact.  Consequently 
liis  opinions  on  the  casuistries  of  obedience  were  worthy 
of  respect. 

They  often  begin  like  that,"  he  explained  to  me. 
"  You  see  they  come  over  here  fresh  from  a  city  office 
where  they've  probablv  wrangled  incessantly  with  the 
senior  clerk  as  to  who  should  do  the  least  work  in  the  longest 
time,  and  they've  hardly  discarded  their  paper  cuffs 
and  put  on  khaki  before  they  begin  to  try  it  on  out  here 
at  G.H.Q.  And  they  can  talk— talk  a  dog's  hind  leg  off. 
'  One  of  the  first  things  that  surprises  'em — and  there  are 
many— is  the  silence  in  this  office.  The  second  is  Work. 
The  third  is  Overtime.  The  fourth  is— What  you've  just 
heard.  I  don't  think  I  shall  have  any  more  trouble  with 
him."  ^ 

This  allocution  has  often  recurred  to  me  since.  For 
..  with  several  millions  of  men  taken  from  civil  life  and 
passed — many  of  them  at  their  most  impressionable 
age— through  the  mint  of  the  British  Army,  ther*?  is 
likely  to  be  an  abiding  impression  left  upon  them  wlien 
they  have  passed  out  of  military  circulation  and  are 
returned  to  civil  life.  What  kind  of  i'lnrM-es^ion  ?      In  those 


memoirs  of  military  life  which  are  a  classic  of  their  kind— 
Souvenirs  de  servitude  et  grandeur  militaires — ^De  Vigny, 
who  came  of  a  dynasty  of  soldiers  and  was  a  soldier 
himself,  speculates  with  extraordinary  insight  as  to  the 
effects  of  military  life  upon  those  who  have  been  sub- 
mitted to  it.  His  early  years  were  passed  under  the  spell 
of  Napoleon,  and  throwing  his  books  at  the  head  of  his 
tutor  he  quited  the  Lycee  for  the  Army,  only  to  find  him- 
self, with  the  fall  of  the  Emperor,  waiting  for  a  war 
which  never  came — kicking  his  heels  in  a  barracks  and 
reilecting  on  the  futility  of  his  career,  and  the  "  isola- 
tion "  of  the  military  life.  The  Army,  he  declared,  was 
a  nation  within  a  nation,  and  though  he  loved  with  a 
passionate  devotion  the  camaraderie  of  regimental  life, 
he  deplored  its  long  divorce  from  civilian  influences. 

Universal  Service 

Few  have  celebrated  more  enthusiastically  than  he 
the  bracing  virtues  of  Army  life—"  c'est  un  hon  livre 
pour  connaitre  I'humanite "  ;  none  have  dwelt  more 
mournfully  on  its  drawbacks.  Superb  in  war,  it  was 
banal  in  peace,  and  the  soldier,  he  complained,  was  in- 
ordinately flattered  and  no  less  inordinately  depreciated 
according  as  the  civilian  found  him  necessary  or  the 
reverse.  De  Vigny's  one  hope  was  in  universal  military 
service — he  wrote  in  the  days  of  standing  armies — where- 
by the  Army  and  the  Nation  should  become  identified. 
Such  a  change,  he  prophesied,  would  be  equally  beneficial 
to  the  soldier  and  to  the  civilian.  The  soldier  would  cease 
to  be  obsequious,  the  civilian  would  become  docile  ;  the 
one  would  acquire  flexibility,  the  other  discipline.  As  it 
was,  the  soldier  had  too  little  confidence  in  himself,  the 
civilian  had  too  much. 

This  catastrophic  war — a  war  which  has  come  to  be 
what  von  der  Goltz  prophesied  it  would  be — a  war  not  of 
armies  but  of  peoples— has  wrought  the  very  change  that 
de  Vigny  looked  for.  We  have  a  nation  in  arms.  Two 
things  will  result  ;  the  Army  will  leaven  the  nation,  the 
nation  will  leaven  the  Army.  Neither  will  ever  be  quite 
tire  same  again.  One  may  predict  with  some  confidence 
that  each  will  have  a  better  opinion  of  the  other.  But 
of  the  two  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  nation  had 
most  to  learn. 

Both  industrially  and  politically  it  was  going  from 
bad  to  worse  ;  Liberal  and  Conservative,  employer  and 
workman,  abused  each  other  as  though  he  were  an  alien 
enemy  instead  of  a  fellow-countryman,  and  never  did 
anarchy  run  so  high.  Oc  the  other  hand,  though  the 
nation  had  never  been  in  a  worse  condition,  the  Army  had 
never  been  in  a  better.  In  the  early  days  of  the  present 
.  conflict  a  certain  ex-Secretary  of  State  for  War,  with 
whom  I  was  discussing  the  retreat  from  Mons  and  the 
superb  rearguard  actions  fought  by  our  men,  said  to  me  : 
"  Yes,  for  its  size  no  better  Army  than  the  British  E.x- 
peditionary  Force  ever  took  the  field." 

The  Army  of  Mons 

Anyone  who  knows  anything  of  the  inner  life  of  the 
Army  during  the  ten  years  from  1904 — 1914  will  endorse 
that  verdict.  Every  officer  from  the  divisional  commands 
down  to  the  youngest  subalterns  had  set  themselves  to 
study  the  men  ;  the  new  recruits  no  longer,  as  in  the  pre- 
historic studies  of  Kipling,  gave  every  reason  for  joining 
the  Army  but  the  true  one,  and  to  say  that  "  there  was 
a  woman  at  the  bottom  of  it  "  ceased  to  be  either  pleasant 
or  true  ;  drunkenness  had  become  merely  foolish  and 
disease  disgraceful ;  the  musketry  of  the  British  infantry- 
man, always  good,  was  now  excellent ;  barracks  were  no 
longer  the  dreary  inhospitable  places  they  once  had  been  ; 
officers  who  took  their  profession  seriously  were  no  longer 
regarded  as  "  mugs,"  and  to  be  indifferent  to  the  recrea- 
tions of  your  men  was  regarded  as  neither  amiable  nor 
wise.  In  a  certain  little  yellow  manual  recently  issued 
confidentially  to  ofticers  on  active  service,  are  words 
to  this  effect  :  "  It  is  important  for  officers  to  remember 
that  their  first  care  should  be  not  for  themselves  but  for 
their  men."  Those  words  might  stand  as  the  motto 
of    the    original    British     Expeditionary     Force.     How 


i6 


LAND      cS:      WATER 


April  13,  19 1 6 


truly  tlio  (idiccrs  tonk  tlioni  to  lioail  may  be  road  in  tlie 
stiuiis  of  tlio  almost  iiKivdiblt;  drvotioii  of  their  im-n. 

What  is  Koinj;  to  be  the  effort  on  the  millions  of  civilians 
who  have  pone  to  school  in  an  Army  such  as  this  ? 

Of  one  thing  we  can  be  quite  s\ire.  The  men  who 
have  been  tlirough  this  gnat  freemasonry  of  arms  will 
he  very  impatient  of  tiie  old  api)eals  to  class-prejudice 
which  have  so  long  distigured  our  politics.  After  the 
reulitie;.  of  war  the  sham-tights  of  politics  will  wear  u 
singularly  inept  vesture,  and  in  nothing  will  thev  appear 
so  inept  as  in  their  attachment  to  words  and  phrases.  The 
men  who  will  come  home  will  have  lived  the  life  of  action 
in  which  men  are  judged  not  by  what  they  sa\'  but  by 
what  tliey  do.  I  doubt  if  any  of  them  are  likely  to  be 
hypnoti  .'.>d  by  the  old  catchwordsof  politics  with  th<' stupe- 
fying rhetoric  of  the  platform.  It  may  be  also  that  they 
will  be  far  less  conscious  of  rights  and  far  more  alive  to 
duties.  They  will  bring  a  highly  critical  mind  to  bear 
upon  these  things.  The  clerk  and  the  artisan  who  has 
been  an  N.C.O.  or  a  subaltern,  and  the  employer  or  pro- 
fessional man — there  are  many  such— who  has  served  as 
a  private  in  the  ranks  will  have  learnt,  the  one  to  rule, 
the  other  to  obey,  and  each  will  have  discovered  the 
peculiar  secret  of  all  Armies  :  that  he  who  aspires  to  give 
commands  nuist  have  learnt  lirst  how  to  execute  them. 
Of  all  the  lessons  that  the  Army  can  teach  that  is  the 
most  enduring  and  the  most  valuable,  and  the  one  whicli 
the  average  linglishman — especially  the  Englishman 
who  ha:,  not  been  to  a  public  school — needs  most  to  learn. 

Another  is  the  habit  of  turning  your  hand  to  anything 
. — on  V  (ififyn'itd  a  mcttrc  la  main  a  tout,  anx  chases  Ifs 
plus  basses  annine  aii\  f>liis  elevees,  as  the  French  soldier 
put  it-- without  inquiring  too  closely  whether  it  is  the 
job  you  contracted  to  do  or  whether  you  are  getting  the 
pay  you  bargained  for.  The  lirst  thing  a  man  in  the 
Army  finds — particularly  the  infantryman— is  that  his 
pay  bears  no  appreciable  relation  to  his  work,  that  he 
may  be  called  upon  at  any  moment  to  do  another  man's 
job,  that  there's  no  such  thing  as  piece-work  rates  and 
"  overtime,"  and  that  it's  a  mere  chance  whether  he 
can  count  on  no  more  than  four  days  in  the  trenches, 
four  in  support,  and,  no  less  than  ten  in  billets 
after  he  has  rung  the  changes  on  the  one  and  the  other. 
Also  that  there  is  no  crime  like  that  of  "  slacking," 
whether  in  a  section  or  a  whole  battalion,  and  that 
liesitation  here  and  slovenliness  there  only  means  that  you 
are  letting  other  fellows  down.  If  a  battalion  gets  a  bad 
name  for  that  kind  of  thing,  other  battalions  will  take 
care  that  they  never  hear  the  end  of  it  ;  1  well  remember 
the  scorn  with  which  my  servant,  a  private  in  the  Sutfolks, 
used  to  speak  of  a  certain  battalion  who  had  left  the 
trenches  taken  over  by  his  regiment  in  such  an  untidy  state 
that  they  had  to  do  a  kind  of  spring-cleaning  after  them. 

Whati'v.r  clsf  a  man  learns  or  does  not  learn  in  the 


The 


Spirit 

By   L.   B. 


FOR  centuries  they  have  been  watching  the  calm 
white  face  of  a  silent  god,  they  have  gazed  at 
the  patient,  mute  eyes  of  a  suffering  i)eople. 
They  have  cursed  it  and  they  have  taught  it  ; 
thc\-  have  feared  it,  and  they  have  bullied  it  ;  they 
tried  to  wring  from  it  and  master  the  \mknown,  they 
tried  to  bring  it  to  the  level  of  their  own  thinking, 
to  conquer  it,  to  transform  it  and  to  destroy  it.  It 
remained.  Then  it  became  a  nightmare  to  them.  Some- 
times (Germans  describe  it  as  the  spirit  of  the  fiussian 
soil,  as  the  spirit  of  the  Russian  people.  The  "  spirit  of 
a  people."  what  is  it  ?  Merely  a  phrase,  a  subterfuge  of 
those  who  in  self-defence  try  to  enclose  life  into  abstract 
words  and  meaningless  descriptions,  so  that  they  may 
master  it,  measure  it  and  juggle  with  it  at  pleasure. 

Cio  into  the  endless  sad  plains  of  Russia,  among 
its  infinitely  patient  peasant  folk.  What  can  you  (ier- 
mans  do  with  them  ?  For  you  always  wish  to  do  some- 
thing. You  and  vour  work  and  your  thoughts  will  pas^ 
over  Russia  as  the  wind  that  straggles  across -the  plains. 
Even  in  that  wind  there  is  more  than  in  your  wisdom  ; 
it  is  part  of  infmite  nature.  It  has  wandered  across  the 
Steppes,  it  has  seen  the  rising  sun,  the  cowfields  have 


.\rmy.  he  at  least  learns  io  regard  liis  work  as  exacting 
as  high  a  standard  as  his  sport.  He  learns  to  "  play  the 
game."  Is  there  any  other  national  institution  that 
teaches  the  ICnglishman  that  ? 

Thesi>  men  are  going  through  a  great  school  of  patriotism 
and  it  would  be  atfi'ctation  to  deny  that  nine  out  of  ten 
ICnglishmen  badly  needed  it  :  TIk;  luiglishman  is  a 
born  individualist — and  never  so  much  so,  paradoxical 
though  it  may  sound,  as  when  he  calls  himself  a  Socialist  ; 
before  the  war  he  had  never  learnt  to  subordinate  his 
own  interests  to  those  of  the  State.  He  was  always 
a  man  with  a  grie\ance  and  as  such  an  easy  prey  for 
exploitation  by  jxiliticians  whose  trade  seems  to  consist 
either  in  discovering  grievances  or  in  inventing  them. 
Hence  the  conscientious  objector — he  is  a  kind  of  survival 
of  our  imregenerate  days  aiid  is  no  doubt  genuinely 
surprised  to  lind  that  he  is  no  longer  popular.  There  was 
a  time  when  he  wt)uld  have  had  all  his  own  way  in  the 
parks  and  on  the  plinth  of  the  Nelson  Column,  but  he  has 
come  to  cut  rather  a  sorry  figure  by  the  side  of  that 
evangelist  of  a  new  gospel — the  man  home  on  leave. 

The  more  "  leave  "  the  authorities  can  hnd  it  possible 
to  give  the  men  at  the  F'ront  the  better  ;  they  will 
leaven  the  whole  nation.  I  well  remember  how  during 
the  old  bad  days  some  months  ago  when  certain  miners 
were  crying  "  down  tools  "  and,  in  almost  so  many  words, 
"  to  hell  "  with  the  Navy  and  its  coal,  a  Staff  Officer  at 
(1.  H.  0.  told  me  that  a  certain  regiment  raised  in  the 
very  district  affected  had  begged  to  be  allowed  to  be  sent 
home  for  a  few  days  to  deal  with  the  malignants.  "  Yes, 
and  if  1  had  my  way,"   added  my  friend,  "  I'd  let  them 

go  and  I'd  make  John  "    (he  mentioned  a  certain 

Labour  M.P.,  who  has  played  the  game  magnificently  at 
home)  "  a  colonel  and  put  him  at  the  head  of  them." 
F'ortunately  nothing  so  drastic  is  now  necessary  ;  tlte 
men  at  home  in  the  workshops  and  the  mines  are  beginning 
to  reflect  something  of  the  devotion  of  the  men  at  the 
front.  All  this,  however,  has  taken  us  a  prodigious  time 
to  learn  and  we  have  paid  an  enormous  j)rice  ff)r  it. 

The  people  at  home  have  still  much  to  learn  ;  they  have 
yet  to  learn  that  the  nation's  extremity  is  not  the  spend- 
thrift's and  the  striker's  opportunity.  I  have  been  in 
I'rance  some  seven  or  eight  months  and  my  official  duties 
took  me  everywhere  north  of  a  line  drawn  from  Rouen 
to  Rheims.  During  the  whole  of  that  time  1  never  once 
saw  a  drunken  person,  whether  man  or  woman,  soldier 
or  civilian.  I  saw  much  thrift,  no  frivolity,  and  little 
pleasure,  an  immense,  almost  religious,  concentration  of 
purpose,  and  everyone  living  on  the  very  margin  of 
subsistence.  When  I  returned  to  England  1  saw — I 
need  not  say  what  I  saw  ;  everyone  has  seen  it.  What 
is  going  to  save  us  ?  There  is  only  one  thing  that  can 
and  will  save  the  British  nation  and  teach  it  a  new  way 
of  life — it  is  the  British  Army. 


of    Russia 


Namier 

bowed  to  it,  and  it  has  talked  to  the  trees  in  the  forests, 
and  it  goes  on  towards  an  endless,  unknown  future  ;  just 
like  the  Russian  people.  Men  have  listened  to  its  songs, 
to  the  songs  which  it  sings  to  lonely  men  in  the  wide,  open 
fields,  and  it  has  listened  to  the  mute  sighs  of  ]>atient, 
suffering  men,  who  work  silently,  waiting  for  the  day 
'whose  coming  none  can  tell.  But  what  are  your  thoughts, 
what  are  those  artiticial,  stillborn  creatures  which  you 
call  ideas  ?  "  Children  of  the  Spirit  ?  "  What  is  the 
spirit  which  is  not  man,  which  neither  suffers  nor  rejoices 
but  merely  prides  itself  on  an  unreal  oxistence  ?  Your 
ideas  will  pasi  away  unheeded. 

You  call  the  liastern  man  aggressive  because  he  is 
not  willing  to  fight  you  on  your  own  level.  Why  should 
he  light  against  you  ?  You  are  the  "  dumb  ones,"* 
the  strangers,  wlio  com?  an»  go.  The  Russian  p?asant 
can  put  up  with  much  that  is  unpleasant,  and  Russia  has 
put  up  with  plenty  of  (iermms.  Why  have  you  so 
suddenly  grown  fierce  ?  What  do  you  fear,  you  clever 
efficient,  victorious  people  ?  You  have  been  insulted, 
Russian  life  itself  is  an  insult   to  you.     You  tried  to 

•.";crmani  ;irc  railed   in   Slav  lansiiayca  by  a  woril  wliicli   sinnilics 
the  dumb  m.an  "  ;    '  Slavs  "  are  the  "  worded  ones." 


April  13,  1916 


L  A  X  IJ      ^      \\  A  T  !•:  R 


^7 


transiorm  it  and  you  failed  ;  you  tried  to  understand  it 
and  you  shuddered  ;  you  tried  to  deny  it  in  a  wild, 
hysterical  cry,  and  the  same  silent,  patient  eyes  still  look 
at  vou  with  amazement.  Poor  amaaing  German  folk  I 
You  do  not  even  know  how  to  suffer.  Your  conceit  i:i 
too  great,  your  achievements  are  too  magnificent,  your 
philosophy  is  too  highly  developed.  You  have  asked 
Russian  life  for  its  philosophische,  erkenntnisslhcoretische 
Errungcnschaflen*  and  you  got  no  answer  ;  so  you  called 
the  Russians  barbarians.  Then  why  do  you  fear  them  '< 
And  by  God,  you  do  fear  them. 

There  was  a  German  poet  who  wrote  many  fine, 
delicate  lyrics,  that  skim  the  lesthetic  surface  of  the  life  of 
the  educated  rich.  He  has  also  written  several  novels 
^vhich  describe  the  unreal  \acc  cf  the  meaningless  German 
yachllebzn  (is  it  not  funny,  your  petty  vice  of  the 
body  and  your  great  spiritual  discovery  that  it  is  not 
vice  ?).  The  writer's  name  was  Otto  Julius  Bierbaum. 
He  was  very  dciUscli  and  in  the  year  1912  set  out  to  study 
iidas  Phnovienon  iJostojeu'ski.  He  has  come  very  near 
being  tragic.  He  escaped  it  by  a  hair-breadth.  He  saw 
a  strange  god,  and  did  not  strive  with  him.  He  shut  his 
eyes  and  did  not  dare  to  keep  them  shut  :  and  he  finished 
by  playing  hide-and-seek  like  a  little  child,  he,  the  great 
spokesman  of  a  Kultur-Sation.  He  did  not  dare  to  keep 
his  eyes  shut,  for  he  suffered  from  an  europdisches 
Kuliurgewissen  (a  European  conscience  for  culture) 
and  he  did  not  dare  to  keep  them  open,  for  he  felt  that  he 
was  shaken  in  his  conceit  as  he  gazed  at  the  calm,  open 
features  of  the  man  who  had  the  courage  to  see,  because 
he  had  neither  the  desire  to  judg^%  nor  the  impulse  to 
change  the  things  which  he  saw. 

The  German  writer  feels  that  "  a  kind  of  perversion 
of  his  natural  feelings  overcomes  him,"  his  pride  on  which 
he  prides  himself  is  in  danger  of  vanishing  before  the 
suffering,  the  understanding  and  the  crushing  humility 
of  that  simple,  human  giant  Dostojewski.  Bierbaum 
wishes  for  a  N'ietzschean  "  transvaluation  of  all  values." 
but  values  must  remain  ;  there  must  be  definite  values, 
other  .vise,  how  could  there  be  pride  of  achievement  ? 

Dostojewski  is  truly  great,  says  Bierbaum,  "  though 
at  bottom  I  don't  Uke  him  ;  he  oppresses  me  more  often 
than  he  uplifts  me.  I  know  it  now,  he  is  not  a  peak,  he 
is  a  mountain-system.  All  our  modem  peaks,  excepting 
only  one.  reach  scarcely  to  half  the  height  of  his  middle- 
chain.  The  one  wfio  excels  his  height  is  Nietzsche  ; 
but  beside  the  enormous  massif  of  live-rock  that  peak 
looks  to  a  terrifying  degree  hke  a  work  of  art,  like  some- 
thing made,  beside  things  elemental."  Nietzsche's 
ideal  expressed  itself  at  its  best  in  one  giant  statue,  in 
his  superman  Zarathustra.  Dostojewski  has  created 
crowds  of  men  ;  none  of  them  takes  thought  to  add  to 
his  own  stature,  they  bow  to  the  ground  in  the  sad, 
humble  consciousness  of  their  human  Uvcs.  And  yet, 
when  looking  from  a  distance  at  his  living  crowd,  one 
perceives  "  a  colossal  figure  resembling  the  images  of 
those  Indian  gods  with  hundreds  of  heads,  with  thousands 
of  arms,  uniting  in  their  bodies  all  the  generations  :  the 
giant  people  of  Russia." 

Moments  come  when  the  German  feels  that  he  can  no 
longer  stand  up  as  judge,  as  a  wise  and  cultured  judge 
against  the  poor,  groat  man  Dostojewski.  He  follows 
him  as  in  the  old  legend  the  children  followed  the  mystic 
piper.  He  look-s  to  him  as  to  a  saint,  he  would  adore  him, 
and  pray  to  him  for  miracles.  "  His  works  are  .  .  - 
self-crucifixion  ;  all  literary  confessions  vanish  before  the 
stations  of  his  Cross,  there  is  no  word  which  could  express 
the  adoration  .  .  .  when  one  sees  that  suffering  man 
rise  up  again  and  again  on  his  path  toward  Calvary  ; 
he  loves  the  pain,  and  with  the  pain  he  loves  humanity. 
.  .  .  But  without  any  pathf>s,  without  any  pose. 
One  might  think  of  the  images  of  the  Byzantine  Christ. 
But  only  for  a  moment.  For  the  magnificence  of  Byzan- 
tium is  lacking.  Dostojewski  is  the  very  opposite  of  a 
schoueSeele  (a  beautiful  soul).  He  was  too  great  for  that." 
Dostojewski  understood  the  heart  of  man  and  knew 
the  name  of  God.  He  loved  that  which  the  world  des- 
pises and  crushes  in  contempt,  says  Bierbaum,  but 
"  which  internally  is  glorious  and  sublime."  And  hi-: 
love  for  it  was  not  that  of  mercy,  not  even  that  of  com- 
passion ;  he  wanted  to  change  nothing,  for  he  knew  the 
secret  glory  which  li% Ci  in  debasement  and  suffering,  and 
rejoiced  in  it.     Before  Dmitri  Fyodorovitch,  the  brazen, 

'  lents  io  the  philosophical  theory  of  knowlerlg' 


animal,  and  yet  so  passionately  human  Karamazoff, 
Father  Zosima  fell  to  the  ground  in  silent,  feeling  rever- 
ence ;  and  he  sent  his  disciple  .\lyosha  into  the  world  to 
live  man's  life,  to  learn  the  mystery  of  good  and  evil, 
and  the  meaning  of  things  which  lie  beyond  the  borders 
of  both.  It  is  beyond  those  borders  that  reveals  itself 
the  true  sense  of  existence,  for  redemption  cannot  be  of 
this  world,  material  achievements  are  froth,  and  freedom 
and  power  are  to  be  found  only  in  feeling  and  under- 
standing. 

Is  that  then  his  Gospel  ?  "If  so,  w(;  have  arrived  at 
a  jxjint  w  here  the  instinct  of  the  man  of  Western  Culture 
refuses  to  follow  any  further  the  sorcerer  Dostojewski." 
He  refu.scs  to  work  miracles  ?  He  is  not  "  a  saint  of 
action  "  ?  He  will  not  use  his  power  to  any  material 
purpose  ?  He  cannot  therefore  crush  us.  Our  simple 
and  sane  German  mind  and  German  wisdom  are 
stronger  than  he  I  The  charm  is  broken  ;  a  broad, 
greasy  grin  spreads  over  the  fat,  angular  face  of 
the  German  writer.  "  \a,  ja,  Verehrleslcr,  at  the  best 
we  may  use  you  as  an  interesting  exhibit  !  "  It  was  only 
w  hen  dazed  by  fear  that  the  eyes  of  the  (ierman  had  seen 
the  glories  of  things  which  lie  beyond  the  reach  of  calcula- 
tion. The  mystic  piper  has  left  the  land  of  dreams,  the 
golden  stars  of  his  magic  robes  have  died  away,  his  power 
has  vanished.  The  German  brings  him  back  as  captive 
into  the  land  of  values  ;  he  is  now  hardly  anything  but 
an  interesting  fool — the  div:iple  has  changed  into  his 
impressario.  He  will  explain  das  Phdnomenon  Dosto- 
jewski and  charge  an  entrance-fee.  The  German  nation  is 
safe.  It  has  no  reason  to  fear  ;  it  will  make  profits  from 
trading  in  Russian  "  spiritual  values  "  as  for  centuries  it 
has  by  trading  with  the  bodies,  prop>erty  and  freedom  of 
the  Russian  nation.  Heroes,  when  it  is  safe,  otherwise 
hucksters. 

"  Sincerely  prepared  to  admire  those  virtuosi  of 
humility  as  extraordinary  men."  says  Bierbaum,  "  and  to 
ascribe  to  them  jxjwers  akin  to  those  of  saints,  we  refuse 
to  accept  them  as  examples  and  models  for  humanity 
at  large  ....  And  we  enjoy  the  confident  hope 
that,jf  the  Russian  spirit  is  really  affected  by  this 
inclination  towards  passi\nty,  which  we  con.sider  sublime, 
but  yet  diseased,  then  there  is  no  danger  of  our  being 
overwhelmed  by  it.  Processions  of  flagellants  do  not 
conquer  the  world     .     .     ." 

"  That  which  has  made  Dostojewski  so  great,  is 
perhaps  just  the  thing  which  will  prevent  the  Russian 
nation  from  becoming  great  as  against  ourselves.  But 
even  assuming  that  this  spirit  answers  the  Russian  heart, 
and  is  therefore  beneficial  for  it,  it  can  hardly  further  our 
own  development.  For  it  seems  that  we  are  not  made  to 
enter  into  it  in  the  way  shown  to  us  by  that,  after  all  for  us 
very  strange,  phenomenon  Dostojewski.  To  follow  his 
spirit  would  mean  to  deny  Goethe  and  to  consider 
Nietzsche  a  disease     .     .     ." 

The  Germans  will  never  do  that  ,  but  Goethe  did  not 
care  for  Germany,  and  Nietzsche  prided  himself  on  his 
foreign  Slav  extraction. 


Sortes  Sbahespcauiana: 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE 

The  Clyde  Strikers  : 


Keep  peace,  upon  )  our  lives  ; 
He  dies  that  strikes  again. 

tjmt  \jtn  \\:  ii .  52-3. 

The  German  Chancellor's   Last  -S^xiech  : 

He  speaks  plain  cannon  fire — and  svwke 
and  bounce. 

K  n<  Joha  II..  •..  ¥£. 


April  r  :  The  Doom  of  the  Zeppelin: 

/  see  thy  glory  like  a  shooting  star 

Fall  to  the  bise  earth  from  the  firTiiaiiient. 

Ridnrdir..  II.,  i..  l»-». 


i8 


LAND      cS:     WA  T  E  R 


April  ij,  lyiO 


Germans  on  the  Stock  Exchange 


Till-  (icrnKuis  have  invaded  almost  every  branch  of 
British  finance,  industry,  and  commerce.  Their  head- 
ijuartcrs  over  here  ivas  naturally  the  City  of  London.  In 
this  article,  written  by  a  gentleman  familiar  with  the  City 
for  over  five  and  twenty  years,  how  Germans  gained  their 
present  strong  position  is  explained,  and  the  difficulties 
that  will  occur  in  disentangling  their  influence  pointed  out. 

WHEN  the  Germans  first  invaded  the  City  they 
were  either  welcomed  or  ignored — chiefly  per- 
haps the  Jattcr.  But  those  who  can  take  back 
their  minds,  say,  twenty  years,  and  think  of 
what  has  happened  since  have  plenty  of  food  for  rellection. 
Wc  have  seen  London  branches  of  German  banks 
established,  which  offered  greater  financial  facilities  for 
trading— be  the  traders  stockbrokers  or  merchants — 
than  our  own  banks  did.  We  have  seen  bill-brokers  and 
discount  houses  not  only  springing  up  but  increasing. 
We  have  seen  the  London  Stock  Exchange  overrun  by 
(Germans  who  became  members  and  were  surrounded  and 
supported  by  a  staff  of  clerks,  half-commission  men  and 
"  runners,"  all  eager  to  seize  any  business  going  and  all 
after  it  at  the  same  time.  English  lirms  of  stockbrokers 
soon  found  that  their  German  competitors  made  consider- 
able headway  and  they  did  not  like  it.  So  many  firms  took 
Germans  into  partnership  in  order  to  secure  their  con- 
nections and  to  minimise  competition. 

How  these  many  Anglo-German  combinations  worked 
together  is  only  known  to  those  directly  interested.  In 
some  cases  dissolutions  of  partnership  took  place,  whilst 
in  others  the  German  partner  became  senior  partner  in  an 
old  English  lirm  and  paid  out  his  British  partners. 

The  Kaffir  Boom 

The  Kaffir  "  boom  "  of  twenty  years  ago  was  respon- 
sible for  introducing  to  the  City  a  host  of  German  un- 
desirables. During  this  period  of  exceptional  activity 
the  Stock  Exchange  was  subjected  to  a  veritable  German 
raid.  Most  of  the  Kaffir  magnates  of  those  days  are  now 
dead.  Many  of  them  were  German  and  they  naturally 
bestowed  their  favours  in  the  way  of  orders  to  German 
firms  and  German  "  runners."  It  was  during  this  boom 
that  most  of  the  German  firms  of  stockbrokers  established 
and  developed  themselves.  They  worked  on  the  "  large 
turnover  and  small  profit  "  system — for  in  those  days 
there  was  no  regulation  scale  of  brokerage — and  by  the 
"  cutting  "  process  they  managed  to  estabhsh  a  large 
clientele  amongst  British  investors  and  speculators  who 
Mere  seduced  by  a  smaller  commission  than  they  were 
accustomed  to  pay  to  their  usual  broker.  But  thougli 
the  commission  was  less  it  did  not  follow  that  the  goods 
were  bought  in  the  cheapest  market,  and  many  true  tales 
could  be  told  in  this  connection. 

To  give  an  illustration  :  When  a  market  m  any  par- 
ticular share  is  active,  the  price  of  such  share  usually 
\aries  considerably  during  Stock  Exchange  hours,  i.e., 
the  opening  price  might  be  4i  and  the  closing  price  5] — 
a  rise  of  13s.  on  the  day.  The  chent  on  scanning  the 
prices  in  his  evening  paper  would  congratulate  himself 
on  the  fact  that  as  his  order  was  sent  by  post  over  night 
he  would  obtain  his  shares  at  the  opening  price.  But 
when  he  received  the  contract  from  his  German  brokers 
hi-i  hopes  were  seldom  realised,  and  he  found  that  although 
he  did  not  pay  the  top  price  of  the  day,  he  nevertheless 
l)aid  much  more  than  the  opening  quotation.  If  he 
complained  there  was  always  a  plausible  reply  that  the 
broker  had  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  early  rise 
would  not  be  sustained,  therefore  lie  thoughtfully  waited 
for  the  shares  to  re-act — which  they  did  not  do.  The 
client  could,  of  course,  challenge  the  price  if  he  so  wished, 
but  how  o  ten  has  this  been  done,  and  what  percentage 
of  disappointed  speculators  would  take  the  trouble  ? 
It  is  no  stretch  of  imagination  to  say  that  there  was  a 
great  deal  of  dishonesty  in  this  direction  during  the 
Kaffir  "  boom,"  and  the  so-called  clever  people  who  per- 
petrated this  fraud  were  in  some  instances  so  elated  with 
their  success  that  they  were  foolish  enough  to  talk  about 
it.  Whether  the  custom  continued  after  the  Kaffir 
"  boom  "  is  not  known,  but  to  the  credit  of  the  British 
members  of   the   London    Stock  Exchange    be    it    said, 


the  many  tricks  indulged  in  by  their  foreign  rivals  never 
appealed  to  them.  Tiie  writer  well  remembers  dis- 
cussing this  ipiestion  with  a  somewhat  cynical  critic 
who  knew  he  had  been  victimised ;  but  he  merely  smiled, 
shrugged  his  shoulders  and  remarked  :  "  The  Germ  ins 
are  so  clever — we  cannot  beat  them." 

How  German  Banks  Help 

With  the  assistance  of  German  banks  in  the  City,  the 
German  broker  could  always  offer  better  "  carrying 
over  "  facilities  than  the  ordinary  British  broker  who 
had  not  unlimited  capital  at  his  back,  and  whose  own 
bank  would  only  lend  on  "  approved  "  securities.  Such 
special  facilities  not  unnaturally  attracted  business  to 
the  German  broker  from  various  quarters.  Knowing 
this,  he  was  shrewd  enough  to  encourage  his  assistants  to 
secure  business.  They  were  supplied  with  an  enter- 
taining allowance,  and  those  with  pleasant  manners 
worked  their  way  into  all  sections  of  society,  keeping 
their  eye  on  business  all  the  time. 

At  one  time  it  looked  as  though  Germany  would 
rule  the  City  of  London,  which  was  doubtless  i)art  of  the 
German  programme,  and  progress  was  only  stopped  when 
hostilities  broke  out.  For  some  reason  or  other  we 
never  seemed  able  or  inclined  to  put  a  brake  on  the 
German  wheel.  On  the  contrary  we  have  encouraged 
German  enterprise  and  loudly  proclaimed  the  marvellous 
ability,  industry,  patience  and  perseverance  of  the 
(iermans  amongst  us,  both  privately  and  in  public, 
little  thinking  what  a  rod  we  were  making  for  our  own 
beuks.  Now  we  see  the  folly  of  our  ways.  The  time 
has  surely  come  to  devise  a  plan  of  campaign  for  the 
future,  but  there  will  be  much  work  to  be  done  in  the 
City  before  we  can  expect  to  succeed.  Although  the 
Germans  may  leave  many  businesses  behind  them,  these 
cannot  be  taken  up  just  where  they  are  left.  Much  as  we 
despise,  and  have  every  reason  to  despise,  our  foes  for 
their  methods  of  warfare,  in  fairness  we  must  admit 
that  they  have  taught  us  much  in  finance,  commerce, 
engineering,  chemistry,  etc.  The  secret  of  the  whole 
position  is  that  they  have  developed  their  resources  to 
the  full  whilst  we,  with  the  same  resources,  energy  and 
brain  power,  have  taken  things  far  too  easily.  From 
Kaiser  to  hawker  the  German  is  a  born  "  pusher  " — 
not  a  "  pusher  "  such  as  the  familiar  American  "hustler," 
but  a  slow,  calculating,  methodical  deep-thinking 
individual  who  has  a  goal  in  view  and  whose  ambition 
is  to  reach  that  goal,  no  matter  by  what  means. 

To  be   Rid  of  the  Hun 

So  far  as  the  Stock  Exchange  is  concerned  it  would  seem 
that  the  best  way  to  be  rid  of  the  German  influence  would 
be,  not  by  attacking  individual  members  of  German 
origin,  but  by  going  further  and  attacking  with  every 
possible  weapon  at  our  command  the  German  issuing 
houses  who  use  the  London  Stock  Exchange  as  a  dump- 
ing ground  for  their  wares.  If  this  could  be  done,  and 
there  seems  no  reason  why  it  should  not,  the  result  would 
be  not  only  a  gradual  weeding  out  of  the  objectionable 
element  on  the  Stock  Exchange,  but  it  might  save  British 
investors  millions  of  pounds.  The  German  financial 
houses  in  the  city  are  mostly  off-shoots  or  subsidiaries  of 
leading  financial  institutions  in  the  United  State;,  Berlin, 
Frankfort,  Vienna,  etc.,  and  the  bonds  sold  to  the  British 
jjublic  are  created  abroad  by  alien  financiers.  We 
should  boycott  every  security,  no  matter  liowever  tempt- 
ing it  might  look,  that  emanates  from  a  German  financial 
house,  whether  its  headquarters  are  in  New  York  or 
on  the  Continent.  The  process  should  not  be  difficult. 
It  is  only  a  question  of  making  up  our  minds.  The 
placing  power  of  such  houses  is  at  the  present  time 
happily  crippled,  and  if  British  investors  determined 
not  to  touch  anything  of  these  issues  in  the  future,  it  is 
safe  I0  say  that  France,  Russia  and  Italy  would  follow 
their  example  and  Canada  and  Australia  would  certainly 
do  the  same.  Therefore,  the  only  markets  left  would  be 
the  United  States,  Austria,  Germany  and  Turkey.  This 
boycott  would  automatically  weed  out  those  members 
of  the  London  Stock  Exchange,  Germans  almost  to  a 
man,  who  speciahse  in  such  securities. 


April  13,   igi6 


LAND      &     WATER 

CHAT  A 

<^  l^mance  of  the  South  Seas 

"By  H.  T>E  FERE  STAC  POOLE 


19 


Synopsis  :  Macquart,  an  adventurer  who  has  spent 
most  of  his  life  at  sea,  finds  himself  in  Sydney  on  his  beam 
ends.  He  has  a  wofiderful  story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in 
New  Guinea,  and  makes  the  acquaintance  of  Tillman,  a  sporting 
man  about  town,  fond  of  ya  Ming  and  racing,  and  of  Houghton, 
a  well-educated  Englishman  out  of  a  job.  Through  Tillman's 
influence  he  is  introduced  to  a  wealthy  woolbroker.  Screed,  wlio, 
having  heard  Macquart's  story,  agrees  to  finance  the  enterprise. 
Screed  purchases  a  yawl,  the  "  Barracuda.''  Just  before  they 
lezve  Macquart  encounters  an  old  shipmate.  Captain  Hull, 
who  is  fully,  acquainted  with  his  villainies.  Hull  gets  in  touch 
with  Screed,  who  engages  him  and  brings  him  aboard  the  yacht 
just  as  they  are  about  to  sail.  They  arrive  at  New  Guinea  and 
anchor  in  a  lagoon.  They  go  by  boat  up  a  river  where  they 
make  the  acquaintance  of  a  drunken  Dutchman,  Wiart,  ivho 
is  in  charge  of  a  rubber  and  camphor  station.  Here  they 
meet  a  beautiful  Dyak  girl,  Chaya.  According  to  Macquart's 
story  a  man  named  Lant,  who  had  seized  this  treausure,  sunk  his 
ship  and  murdered  his  crew  with  the  exception  of  one  man, 
"  Smith.".  Lant  then  settled  here,  buried  the  treasure,  and  married 
a  Dyak  woman,  chief  of  her  tribe.  Lant  was  murdered  by 
"  Smith,"  whom  Captain  Hull  and  the  rest  make  little  doubt 
was  no  other  than  Macquart.  Chaya,  with  ivhom  Houghton 
has  fallen  in  love,  is  Lant's  half-caste  daughter.  Macquart 
guides  them  to  a  spot  on  the  river-bank  where  he  declares  the 
cache  to  be.  They  dig  through  that  night  and  the  following  but 
find  nothing  :  they  begin  to  think  he  is  deceiving  them.  Then 
he  starts  the  surmise  that  the  Dyaks  have  moved  the  treasure 
to  a  sacred  grove  in  the  jungle.  Wiart  is  his  authority.  He 
persuades  his  shipmates  to  go  with  him  in  search  of  it.  Th- 
Tourney  leads  them  through  what  is  called  the  Great  Thorn  Bush. 

CHAPTER  XXII 

Macquart's  Third  Trick 

IT  is  the  chief  wonder  of  this  part  of  the  forests  of  New 
Guinea.  Square  miles  upon  square  miles  of  Wait-a- 
Bit  thorn,  six  feet  in  height,  cut  into  a  thousand 
intersecting  roads  and  presenting  a  maze  all  the  more 
intricate  from  the  fact  that  the  roads  are  sparsely  occupied 
by  trees. 

Where  the  thorn  is  there  grows  nothing  but  thorn, 
forming  a  terrible  wall,  impenetrable  as  a  barbed  wire  en- 
tanglement. 

"  There's  a  bad  bit  of  stuff  in  front  of  us,"  said  Wiart, 
"  but  we  can  get  through  before  sundown  ;  the  way  through 
winds  a  bit,  but  I  know  the  road,  and  if  I  should  rniss  it  the 
compass  will  put  us  right." 

"  Heave  ahead,"  said  Hull. 

Wiart,  Macquart,  and  Jacky  led  the  way,  the  others 
followed.  Hull  had  closed  up  with  his  two  companions  and 
as  they  went  along,  Houghton  proceeded  to  take  him  to  task 
for  his  indiscretions. 

"  It  was  no  good  of  you  opening  that  question  with 
Wiart,"  said  he. 

"  What  question  ?  "  asked  Hull. 

"  Good  Lord  !  About  the  payment  we'd  give  him.  Two 
hundred  pounds — what's  two  hundred  pounds  to  the  amount 
we're  expecting  to  find  ?  " 

"  And  how's  ha  to  know  what  we're  expectin',"  asked 
the  other.  "  My  idea  was,  if  we  nosed  the  stuff,  to  get  rid 
of  Don  Whiskerandos  before  we  carted  it  off,  pay  him  a  lump 
sum  and  get  him  drunk.  He  don't  know  what  we're  ex- 
pectin'." 

"  How  do  you  know  he  doesn't  ?  " 

"  Who'd  tell  him  ?  " 

"  How  do  you  know  Macquart  hasn't  told  him  ?  " 

"  He's  not  such  a  durned  fool  as  that,"  said  the  Captain. 
"  Where'd  be  the  sense  of  lettin'  another  chap  into  the 
know  ?  " 

"  Well,  it's  this  way.  Tillman  and  1  have  been  sus- 
pecting that  Macquart  is  up  to  some  trick  to  do  us  three 
out  and  he's  pulled  Wiart  in.  Of  course  it's  only  suspicion, 
but  if  there  is  any  understanding  between  them  and  if  Wiart 
does  know  wliat  we  expect  to  find,  the  offer  of  two  hundred 
will  only  strengthen  his  determination  to  help  Macquart. 
He'll  say  to  himself  that  with  such  a  measly  offer  it's  worth 
risking  everything  to  go  against  us.     I  think  we'd  better  let 


Wiart  into  the  whole  thing  and  make  him  a  partner  and 
see  if  we  can  get  him  to  peach  on  Macquart,  if  jVIacquart  has 
been  doing  any  plotting.  I  could  take  him  aside  when  we 
camp  to-night  and  sound  him  if  you  fellows  agree." 

"  Let  him  in  1  "  said  HuO.  "  You'd  better  let  the  whole 
of  New  Guinea  in  whiles  you're  about  it,  and  put  up  placards 
when  we  get  back  to  Sydney  statin'  the  job  we've  been  after 
and  the  amount." 

"  I  think  Houghton  is  right,"  said  Tillman.  "  It's 
better  to  lose  a  bit  than  lose  all.  Macquart  is  a  rat  and  he 
hates  you,  Hull,  and  would  be  only  too  glad  to  serve  you 
some  dirty  trick." 

"  Listen,"  said  Houghton. 

They  were  pursuing  their  way  along  a  thorn  alley  in 
sight  of  Macquart  and  the  others  who  were  leading  the  way 
and  now,  seeming  to  come  from  far  away  behind  them,  they 
heard  a  voice  as  though  someone  were  haiUng  them. 

A  girl's  voice  evidently.     Then  it  ceased. 

They  looked  back,  but  they  could  see  nothing  beyond 
the  distance  of  twenty  yards  or  so.  Though  the  trees  were 
so  sparsely  placed  that  walking  between  them  was  easy,  in 
the  aggregate  they  made  an  obstruction  to  the  eye,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  fact  that  the  path  was  irregular  in  its  course. 

"  Come  on,"  said  Hull,  "  or  we'll  lose  sight  of  them  chaps 
in  front.     It's  a  bird,  maybe,  anyhow  it's  no  consarn  of  ours." 

They  resumed  the  way  and  their  argument,  till  at  last 
Hull   gave   in. 

"  Well,  if  you  chaps  are  set  on  it,"  said  he,  "  I'm  not 
goin'  to  stand  against  you,  and  Mac  will  have  to  pay  the 
blighter  out  of  his  share.  He's  fooled  the  bizness  up  to  this 
an'  he'U  have  to  pay  for  his  foohn'." 

They  had  reached  a  part  of  the  great  thorn  bush  now, 
that  was  simply  a  maze  of  alleys.  This  great  maze  extends 
over  many  square  miles,  how  many  no  man  can  say,  for  no 
man  has  ever  mapped  it  or  measured  it.  The  whole  of  this 
district  is  hated  by  the  natives  and  feared  as  the  abode  of 
evil  spirits;  small  wonder,  for  nothing  can  be  more  sinister 
than  this  intricacy  of  paths  hedged  by  the  mournful  thorn. 

Macquart  and  Wiart  and  Jacky,  going  steadily  ahead, 
disappeared  round  an  angle  of  the  way,  and  when  the  others 
reached  the  angle  they  found  bending  paths  leading  from  it  in 
every  direction,  but  of  Macquart  and  Wiart  and  Jacky  not  a 
sign. 

It  was  as  though  the  earth  had  swallowed  them. 

"  Hullo,"     cried     Hull.      "  What's      gone       with      them  ' 
blighters  ?  " 

"  They've  given  us  the  slip,"  said  Tillman.  His  face  had 
suddenly  turned  pale  and  his  Ups  so  dry  that  he  had  to  moisten 
them. 

Houghton,  putting  his  hands  to  his  mouth,  shouted  out. 
Not  a  sound  came  in  reply. 

.    "  Quick,"    said     Hull.      "  Drop     everything     and    after 
them." 

He  cast  his  bundle  down,  as  did  the  others,  and  started 
off  down  the  broadest  of  the  paths  before  them  ;  it  split 
into  three  ways,  and  dividing  they  each  took  a  path,  calling 
all  the  time  to  keep  in  touch. 

They  found  nothing,  and  after  a  while,  fearing  to  lose 
company,  each  began  to  return  along  the  way  he  had  come  by, 
only  to  be  confronted  with  the  fact  that  he  did  not  know  the 
way  ;  all  sorts  of  feeding  ways  and  side-cuts,  passed  without 
thinking,  fonned  now  a  problem  move  dark  than  the  problem 
set  by  the  Sphinx. 

Keeping  in  touch  by  calling,  they  managed  at  last  to 
reunite,  but  they  were  now  utterly  mazed,  without  the  least 
idea  in  which  way  to  go — and  the  precious  bundles  were  lost. 

Dusk  would  soon  be  falling,  suddenly,  like  a  shut  lid, 
and  they  were  without  food. 

"  Oh,  cuss  that  swine!  "  cried  Hull.  "  I  oughter  a'  put 
a  bullet  through  his  carciss.  This  is  the  third  fool  trick  he's 
played  me.     It's  my  fault  ;    I  oughter  a'  known." 

"  That  beast  Jacky  must  have  played  up  to  him,"  said 
Tillrrtan. 

Houghton  said  nothing  for  a  moment.     Then  he  spoke  : 

"  There's  no  use  in  abusing  them,  or  thinking  of  them  till 
we're  able  to  catch  them.  What  we've  got  to  do  is  to  get  out 
of  this  infernal  place  ;  we've  got  a  compass,  and  if  we  strike 
consistently   in   one   direction,    we   will   be   all   right.     That 


20 


LAND      &      WATER 


April  13,  1916 


river  runs  north  and  south  ;   well,  we  must  strike  west,  or  at 
least  take  the  most  westerly  paths  we  can  find." 

"  Well,  I'm  blest  if  I  didn't  forget  the  compass,"  said 
Hull. 

He  opened  the  box  containing  it,  got  it  level  and  found 
the  west. 

The  path  directly  opposite  to  where  he  was  standing 
led  due  west,  and  with  a  load  removed  from  their  minds,  they 
started  down  it.  It  was  only  now,  with  safety  in  sight,  that 
they  began  fully  to  realise  the  horrible  situation  from  which 
they  were  escaping.  The  thorn  tangle  had  a  personality  all 
its  own,  wicked  and  malevolent,  its  intricacy  seemed  the 
intricacy  of  an  evil  mind  set  on  their  destruction. 

The  path  they  were  on  led  them  in  a  straight  hne  for 
some  few  hundred  yards,  and  then  bent  to  the  right  leading 
due  north. 

"  Fitchered,  b'gosh !  "  said  tlie  Captain.  "  We're  done  !  " 
"  Come  on,"  said   Tillman.     "  There's   no   use   stopping, 
and  the  light  won't  last  long." 

They  hurried  ahead  to  a  point  where  the  path  broke  up 
into  three  ways,  one  leading  due  west. 

They  struck  down  the  westerly    path,  and    it    led    them 

bravely  till  a  curve  came  in  it  and  they  found  themselves 

facing  due  south. 

Tillman  felt  the  sweat  standing  out  on  the  palms  of  his  hands. 

The  most  terrible  result  of  a    maze   Uke   this   is  its  de- 

n^-^ralising  effect. 

Hull,  with  a  movement  of  exasperation,  flung  away  the 
compass  ;  it  fell  into  the  thorn  wall  on  the  right  of  them  and 
stuck  there. 
Then  he  folded  his  arms. 

Tillman  and  Houghton  glanced  at  one  another ;  then 
Tillman  recovered  the  compass  and  put  it  in  his  pocket. 

"  I  ain't  used  to  it,"  said  Hull,  as  though  he  were  address- 
ing some  fourth  and  viewless  party.  "  I  ain't  used  to  it. 
It  ain't  fair  on  a  man,  a  lee  shore  ain't  in  it — cuss  the  carciss 
of  that  onholy  blighter  ;  and  to  think  I  had  him  in  reach 
of  the  grip  of  my  fist — an'  let  him  go !  " 
Tillman  took  him  by  the  arm. 

"  €ome  on."  he  said.  "  There's  no  use  in  talking.  Our 
only  chance  is  to  keep  moving.  We'll  get  out  somehow,  and 
then  we'll  deal  with  Macquart." 

This  latter  idea  seemed  to  restore  the  Captain  to  his 
senses,  and  they  started  off. 

But  now,  with  the  suddenness  of  the  tropics,  night  was 
on  them. 

It  seemed  to  rise  up  from  the  earth  like  a  mist,  and  then 
the  stars  were  shining  abo\e. 

They  kept  blindly  on  ;  there  was  sufficient  light  to  let 
them  see  their  way,  but  a  terrible  tiredness  was  coming  on 
them.  Since  morning  they  had  been  travelling,  with  only  a 
break  for  the  midday  meal,  and  the  excitement  which  had 
made  them  fight  their  tiredness  was  now  having  its  own  effect. 
Tillman  stopped  where  a  tree  had  fallen  lengthways  in 
their  path. 

"  We'd  better  stop  and  rest,"  said  he.  "Here's  stuff  for 
a  fire,  it'll  be  company  ;  lend  us  a  hand  to  break  some  of  the 
branches." 

The  tree  had  been  dead  long  enough  to  make  the  branches 
brittle  without  rotting  them,  and  in  a  few  minutes  they  had 
collected  enough  sticks.  Houghton  produced  a  box  of  matches 
from  his  pocket ;  the  flame  of  the  first  match  caught,  and  in  a 
moment  the  fire  was  crackling  and  blazing. 
Then  they  sat  down  round  it. 

It  is  not  till  you  are  in  the  wilderness  that  you  know 
the  value  of  a  fire. 

A  fire  holds  much  more  than  brilliancy  and  warmth  ; 
to  men  and  to  dogs  it  recalls  in  the  subconscious  mind  the 
camp  cooking  and  evening  rests  from  the  million  years  when 
we  were  nomads.  The  dead  Past  lives  in  a  fire,  just  as  it 
Kves  in  music.  It  was  not  round  a  tent  pole,  but  round  a  fire 
that  the  first  home  was  built. 

The  effect  of  the  fire  was  greatest  on  Hull,  who,  producing 
his  pipe,  filled  it  and  lit  it.  Houghton  by  the  firelight  had 
perceiveid  a  prickly  pear  growing  amongst  the  thorn,  and  he 
was  engaged  in  cutting  some  of  the  fruit  ofi  with  hb  knife, 
taking  care  to  avoid  the  prickles. 

"  See  here,"  said  he,  "  we  won't  starve  nor  die  of  thirst  ; 
there's  lots  of  this  stuff  about,  I  saw  several  bushes  as  we  came 
along.  It's  the  only  thing  that  seems  to  grow  here  beside 
this  beastly  bramble  stuff ;  have  some  ?  " 

Tillman  took  one,  and  having  got  rid  of  the  prickles 
ate  it  and  found  it  very  good,  but  Hull  refused  food  just  at 
present  ;  he  was  content  with  tobacco  and  he  was  busy  in  his 
mind  with  Macquart.  His  extraordinary  intellect  seemed 
to  have  eliminated  Tillman  and  Houghton  from  its  purview  ; 
it  was  as  though  all  this  Inisiness  concerned  him  alone,  ard 
he  seemed  to  be  reviling  Fate  as  well  as  Macquart,  though  he 
never  named  the  lady. 

"  It's  cruel  hard,"  said  he,  "  cruel  hard.  No,  I  don't 
want  none  of  that  prickly  stuff ;    if  I  can't  get  man's  food 


I'll  leave  it  be  ;  I'm  not  goin'  to  fill  my  inside  with  sich  gar- 
bige — it's  cruel  hard  to  be  laid  be  the  heels  like  this  with  a 
d — d  bramble  hedge  givin'  one  the  turn  at  every  p'int.  It's 
playin'  it  pretty  low  down  on  a  sailorman  to  set  reefs  before 
him  like  that  a" shore.  And  to  think  I  had  a  good  gun  in  me 
hand  and  didn't  put  a  bullet  through  the  skin  of  that  blighted 
scarecrow  when  I  had  the  chanst.  It's  the  same  trick  he 
served  me  outside  the  'baccy  shop  in  Sydney.  In  I  went  to 
get  a  seegar,  and  out  I  come  to  find  him  gone.  Saw  him 
through  the  winder  as  I  was  lightin'  the  seegar,  and  before 
I'd  blown  the  match  out  he'd  gone.  I  ought  to  a'  known  the 
chap  wasn't  a  man  ;  he's  a  conjurin'  trick  on  legs  worked  by 
the  devil,  that's  what  he  is,  and  I  ought  to  a'  spoiled  him 
when  I  had  the  chanst.  It  was  the  same  fower  years  ago  ; 
left  me  doped  in  a  pub,  he  did,  and  slid  off  with  me  money." 

"  Did  he  take  much  ?  "  asked  Houghton,  more  for  the 
sake  of  saying  something  than  from  any  interest  in  the  question. 

"  It's  not  s'much  what  he  took,"  said  the  Captain, 
evasively,  "  as  the  way  he  took  it ;  left  me  on  a  mud  bank 
stranded,  he  did.  Never  clapped  eyes  on  him  again  till  I 
sighted  him  at  Sydney." 

He  had  let  his  pipe  go  out,  and  he  was  relighting  it  now 
when,  of  a  sudden,  he  dropped  the  match  and  started  to  his 
feet. 

Someone  was  hailing  them. 

The  very  same  voice  that  Houghton  and  Tillman  had 
heard  that  afternoon  came  again  clearer  this  time  and  closer. 

•'  Hi— hi— hi  1  " 

Hull  made  answer. 

"  Hullo  !  "  he  roared.  "  Where  are  you  ? — who  are  vou  ? 
Hullo !  " 

Again  came  the  hail,  closer  now,  and  away  down  the  path 
shown  by  the  stai light  amidst  the  trees,  they  beheld  a 
figure,  white,  like  a  ghost. 

CHAPTER  XXIII 

Chaya 

ALL  through  that  day  Macquart  and  the  party  he  was 
leading   to  their    destruction    had    been   followed   by 
Saji,  intent    on    Macquart    and  his    doings,  and  with 
Saji  had  been  Chaya. 

It  was  nothing  to  them  to  pursue  without  being  seen, 
and  it  was  indicative  of  the  mentality  of  Saji  that  on  a  business 
like  this  Chaya.  his  main  desire  in  Ufe,  although  she  was  at  his 
side,  was  obliterated  for  him  by  the  immediate  objective. 

As  I  have  said  his  mind  wore  blinkers,  when  he  was 
hunting  he  was  a  huntsman  pure  and  simple  and  he  had  no 
view  of  anything  else  but  the  quarry.  Chaya  might  have  been 
a  dog  for  all  the  attention  he  paid  her  on  this  business. 

At  noon,  when  the  expedition  paused  for  the  mid-day 
meal,  Saji  and  Chaya  kept  watch  through  the  trees,  and  when 
the  expedition  started  again  they  followed. 

Saji  had  quite  a  clear  understanding  of  the  fact  that 
Macquart  was  in  partnership  with  the  Rubber  Man  for  th= 
purpose  of  destroying  his  companions.  Had  you  sifted 
Saji's  evidence  before  a  court  of  justice,  or  rather  had  you 
sifted  the  evidence  that  satisfied  Saji  about  the  murderous 
intentions  of  Macquart,  you  would  not  have  obtained  a  con- 
viction. All  the  same  from  what  he  had  observed,  from  what 
he  had  heard,  Saji,  with  his  unerring  dog  instinct,  was  con- 
vinced of  Macquart 's  intentions. 

But  he  did  not  know  how  Macquart  was  going  to  carry 
them  out.  He  thought  at  first  that  Macquart,  relying  on 
Wiart's  knowledge  of  the  forest,  was  going  to  lead  his  com- 
panions into  one  of  the  pit-traps  dug  by  natives  for  wild 
animals,  but  when  they  arrived  at  the  great  thorn  maze 
everything  became  clear  to  him.  Wiart  had  explored  this 
place  and  been  through  it  twice  with  perfect  s'^curitv  owing 
to  the  fact  that  he  had  blazed  his  way.  Wiart,  when  the 
drink  was  not  on  him,  was  an  enthusiastic  forester  and  his 
knowledge  of  the  rubber  plant  and  its  habitats  was  equalled 
by  few.  He  was  also  a  naturalist.  The  thorn  maze  had 
interested  him  as  it  could  not  fail  to  do  and  Saji,  now  faced 
with  it,  perceived  at  once  the  gist  and  meaning  of  this  ex- 
pedition. But  he  would  not  enter  it.  He  had  no  need  to  for 
one  thing.  Instinct  told  him  to  get  back  to  the  river  at  once, 
to  hide  near  Wiart's  house  and  to  await  the  return  of  Wiart 
and  Macquart.  They  would  come  back  alone  —of  that  he  was 
certain.  The  1  he  could  continue  his  tracking  of  them,  for  it 
was  no  part  of  his  scheme,  laid  down  by  the  mother  of  Chaya, 
to  deal  with  Macquart  till  that  person  arrived  at  the  end  of 
his  tether  and  disclosed  the  place  where  John  Lant's  treasure 
was  really  hidden. 

"  I  go  back,"   said  Saji,  when  the   party   had  disappeared 
into  the  thorn  bush.     "  The  Rubber  Man  and  the  other  are 
leading  them  there  to  lose  them,  then  they  will  come  back  ; 
I  go  to  meet  them  quicker  than  you  can  follow." 
"  Go,"   said  Chaya,  "  I  can  return  alone." 
Next  moment  he  was  gone. 
Chaya  knew  all   about   the   thorn   maze,  though  she  had 


April  13,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


21 


Chaya  a  Romance  0/  the  South  Seal.] 


llUtulrated  by  Joeeph  Simpeom,   R.B.A. 


"  Saji  and   Chava   watched  through  the   trees 


never  entered  it  ;  she  knew  that  it  was  a  haunt  of  evil  spirits, 
and  the  Dyak  blood  in  her  veins  and  vague  old  traditions  in 
her  mind  made  the  place  repellent  to  her.  But  Houghton 
had  gone  in  there  to  his  death,  and  without  hesitation  she 
followed,  just  as  the  iron  filing  follows  the  magnet. 

Chaya  knew    nothing    about    love,   she    had    never  even 

considered  the  name  of  the  thing.     When  Saji  had  shown  his 

feelings  towards  her  she  had  repelled   his  advances  as   she 

would  have  repelled  the   fawning  of  a  dog ;    he  had  never 

'ressed  them. 

Once,  and  once  only,  he  had  stroked  her  arm  and  she  had 
flung  his  liand  away  angry  at  his  action,  but  not  knowing  in 
ihe  least  the  real  cause  of  her  anger.  With  Houghton  it  was 
different.     Since  first  seeing  him  he  had  never  been  out  of  lier 


mmd.  He  was  something  quite  new.  A  man  like  Wiart  or 
the  rubber  traders,  who  had  sometimes  come  to  the  village 
but,  somehow,  absolutely  different.  Wiart  had  also  made 
advances  to  her.  Wiart  in  fact  had  once  tried  to  kiss  her  and  she 
had  repelled  him  just  as  she  had  repelled  Saji  and  just  as  uncon- 
sciously and  without  knowledge  of  the  evil  she  was  repelhng 

But   Houghton    seemed    to    her  a  different     being  from 
these,  not  only  on  account  of  his  good  looks,  which  pleased  her 
but  on  account  of  his  personahty  and  his  power  to  call  her  to' 
him  and  hold  her  thoughts. 

The  thought  that  he  was  in  danger  raised  i .:  her  a  leehng 
of  dread  as  though  the  danger  threatened  herself —as  to  what 
became  of  Tillman  or  Hull,  she  did  not  care  in  the  least 

When  she  entered    the    thorn    tangle   the  others  had  trot 


22 


L  A  N  D      &      W  A  T  E  R 


April   13,   igib 


far  ahead.  The  path  sjie  was  on  showed  no  traces  of  them 
and  before  she  had  gone  very  far  slie  was  confronted  with 
the  choice  between  two  paths  so  ahke  that  they  seemed 
twins. 

She  chose  the  WTong  one.  pursued  it  for  a  while,  paused  to 
hsten  and  fancied  she  heard  voices.  The  thorn  bush  is  full  of 
illusion  to  the  person  wha  is  alone  and  listening. 

Then  she  called  out  several  times  but  receivecl  no  answer. 
It  was  her  voice  that  Tillman  and  Houghton  and  Hull  heard. 
Had  they  replied  to  it  things  might  have  been  different,  but 
they  went  on  to  their  fate  and  Chaj'a,  receiving  no  answer, 
went  on  to  hers. 

She  followed  the  path  till  it  divided  into  three  ways,  took 
one  of  them  haphazard,  and  pursued  its  winding  course 
till  she  was  lost  as  surely  as  the  person  whom  she  was  trying 
to   find. 

And  still  she  kept  on,  not  trying  to  escape,  but  endeavour- 
ing to  find. 

She  had  no  thought  at  all  of  her  own  danger,  she  chd  not 
consider  in  the  least  the  fact  that  if  she  found  Houghton  they 
•would  be  both  in  the  same  position — lost. 

She  just  sought  for  him,  tilled  onh'  by  the  tremendous 
passion  that  only  now  was  beginning  to  declare  itself  in  her 
breast. 

Something  great  as  the  sea,  as  reasonless,  as  powerful. 

She  would  find  him  in  this  terrible  place  if  she  kept  on. 
If  she  did  not  find  him  she  might  die — it  would  be  the  same 
thing. 

She  kept  on. 

Then  all  at  once  she  found  a  meeting  of  the  ways  and 
on  the  ground  three  bundles.  They  w&rc  the  bundles  that 
Hull  and  his  companions  had  been  carrying.  She  had  watched 
them  packed  that  morning,  she  had  watched  them  unstrapped 
at  the  midday  meal,  and  there  they  were,  lying  on  the  ground. 

What  did  it  mean  ? 

She  sat  down  beside  them.  What  could  it  mean  ?  Had 
Macquart  and  the  Rubber  Man  slain  the  others  then  ?  There 
■was  no  sign  of  a  struggle,  no  blood.  The  bundles  were  just 
lying  there  where  they  had  been  cast  without  a  sign  to  tell  of 
the  reason  why  they  had  been  abandoned      , 

She  listened  intently  and  now,  sitting  there  alone,  she 
heard  in  the  utter  stillness  the  voice  of  the  thorn  maze,  the 
murmur  and  drone  of  a  million  insects  inhabiting  this  green 
and  treacherous  sphinx. 

For  five  minutes  she  sat  without  moving,  waiting,  watch- 
ing, listening.  Then  she  rose  to  her  feet,  looked  in  every 
direction  and  then,  stooping  and  picking  up  the  bundles,  she 
resumed  her  way,  taking  without  choice  the  path  she  was 
facing. 

The  bundles  were  not  too  heavy  to  carry  but  they  were 
awkward  ;  she  cast  one  over  her  shoulder  by  its  strap,  held 
one  under  her  right  aim  and  the  other  in  her  hand.  She  did 
not  feel  the  weight  nor  did  their  awkwardness  trouble  her,  she 
had  only  one  thought — the  man  she  w.s  looking  for. 

Then  the  darkness  came. 

This  was  a  terrible  moment  for  Chaya,  the  gloom  filled 
her  mind  just  as  it  filled  the  world,  vague  terrors  rose  up 
before  her.  Death,  starvation,  injury,  even  the  terror  that 
lies  in  entanglement  could  not  influence  her  or  make  her 
turn  fron>  her  object,  but  the  terrors  of  darkness  daunted 
her  soul.  Ghosts  of  all  sorts  of  superstitions  and  beliefs 
that  had  once  haunted  the  brains  of  her  ancestors  awoke  in 
her  mind  and  walked  there,  paralysing  her  thought.  She 
wished  to  hide,  but  there  was  no  place  of  refuge.  Then,  as 
though  the  darkness  were  a  heavy  load  bearing  her  down,  she 
crouched  on  the  ground  beneath  the  stars. 

On  this,  as  on  nearly  all  the  paths,  there  were  trees 
sparsely  set,  and  the  branches  above  moving  slightly  to  the 
faint  night  wind  now  obliterated  the  stars  and  now  let  them 
p>eep  through. 

How  long  she  had  been  crouching  thus  she  could  not  tell, 
when  something  reached  her,  rousing  her  from  her  half-dazed 
state  as  a  person  is  roused  from  sleep. 

It  was  the  smell  of  burning  wood. 

One  of  the  results  of  living  in  the  jungle  ;is  Chaya  had 
lived,  is  the  power  to  translate  the  messages  that  sounds, 
sights  and  smells  bring  one,  from  the  language  of  the  jungle 
into  the  language  of  human  thought  or  into  thought  pictures. 

The  smell  of  burning  instantly  produced  in  Chaya' s  mind 
the  picture  of  a  camp  fire. 

She  sprang  erect,  and  then  slowly  turned  with  head  half 
cast  up  testing  the  air  in  every  direction.  You  could  have 
noticed  that  she  did  not  "  sniff  "  the  wind,  she  breathed  quite 
naturally  and  then,  assured  of  the  fact  that  a  fire  was  lighted 
somewhere  about  and  that  the  scent  of  the  burning  wood  was 
coming  on  the  light  breeze,  she  picked  up  her  bundles  and 
came  along  the  path  in  the  direction  she  had  been  going  before 
Terror  and  the  darkness  had  overcome  her. 

Arrived  at  dividing  ways  she  chose  the  one  that  led  most 
nearly  in  the  direction  of  the  ([uarter  the  wind  had  come  from, 
and  then  at  a  point  where  it  split  she  was  rewarded. 


Away  down  the  left  hand  path  she  saw  the  glow  of  the 
fire. 

She  instantly  hailed  it  and  at  once  came  Hull's  answer. 
She  rephed  and  came  along  clutching  the  bundles  tightly, 
walking  swiftly,  scarcely  breathing,  laughing  to  herself  with 

joy- 
Why  its  a  gal,"    said  Hull. 

"  She's  got  our  bundles,"    said  Tillman. 

Chaya  advanced  straight  into  the  firelight,  so  that  the 
red  glow  lit  her  to  the  waist ;  she  did  not  seem  to  see 
Hull  or  Tillman,  she  dropped  the  bundles  one  after  the  other 
Und  still,  without  speaking,  and  with  her  wide  dark  eyes  fixed 
on  Houghton,  held  out  both  hands  to  him. 

"  You !  "  said  Houghton  taking  her  hands  in  his.  He 
could  say  nothing  more  for  a  moment  and  the  others  stood 
by  waiting  whilst  in  the  stillness,  against  the  far  murmur  of 
the  forest,  could  be  heard  the  faint  crackling  and  flickering 
of  the  fire. 

"  I  followed"  said  Chaya,  "  fearing  the  man  would  leave 
you  to  be  lost.     Then  1  lost  myself  looking  for  you." 

She  explained,  pointing  to  the  bundles  as  Houghton 
released  her  hands,  and  then  they  began  to  understand  the 
bitter  truth  that  this  joyful  vision  was  a  prisoner  like  them- 
selves, a  butterfly  that  had  managed  to  get  imprisoned  with 
common  flies  in  this  huge  vegetable  fly  trap. 

But  she  had  brought  the  bundles  and  pushed  starvation 
away  from  them,  they  were  saved  for  the  time  being,  and  as 
for  water,  they  could  never  actually  die  of  thirst  whilst  they 
had  the  succulent  fruit  of  the  prickly  pear,  to  say  nothing  of 
pitcher  plants  which  they  had  noticed  yesterday  attached  to 
some  of  the  lianas  that  hung  between  the  sparsely  set  tree 
boles  of  the  paths. 

They  sat  down,  Chaya  and  Houghton  rather  apart  from 
the  others,  and  Hull,  putting  some  more  sticks  on  the  fire, 
opened  his  bundle  and  produced  some  food.  The  Captain  had 
become  quite  cheerful  again.  It  was  indicative  of  his  mind 
that  he  did  not  seem  in  the  least  interested  in  Chaya  or  the 
problem  of  how  and  why  she  had  followed  them.  The  bundle 
and  its  contents  filled  all  his  thoughts. 

"  Well,"  said  he,  "  I  never  did  think  I'd  have  set  my 
teeth  in  a  piece  of  beef  again.  Thems  as  likes  prickly  pears 
may  eat  'em.  I  can't  get  on  with  garbidge,  no  how.  They 
tell  me  there's  chaps  that  lives  on  green  stuff  like  rab.bits  and 
enjoys  it,  chaps  with  money  enough  to  buy  beefsteaks.  I'm 
not  beyond  likin'  a  good  cabbidge  in  its  place,  but  it  has  to 
be  in  its  place,  and  that's  a  long  way  behind  a  piece  of  steak. 
Lord  love  me !  I'd  give  half  my  share  of  that  there  cache 
for  a  steak  and  taters  and  onions  now  and  a  cup  of  corfee." 

"  Well,  you're  not  Hkely  to  get  it."  said  Tillman,  who 
was  also  engaged  on  the  contents  of  liis  bundle.  "  If  you 
even  smell  a  beefsteak  again  you'll  be  lucky — you're  not  eat- 
ing, Houghton." 

"  I'm  not  hungry,"    said  Houghton. 

He  was  sitting  so  close  to  Chaya  that  their  arms  touched, 
and  he  had  just  captured  her  hand  which  was  Ijdng  on  the 
ground  beside  him  as  if  waiting  to  be  captured. 

He  felt  the  firm  palm  and  then  he  felt  the  fingers  close 
upon  his  thumb,  the  most  delightful  embrace  in  the  whole 
world. 

He  knew  that  she  had  followed  him  all  that  day  and  that 
she  had  risked  her  own  safety  by  entering  the  maze  in  an 
attempt  to  save  him.  He  knew  that  she  was  lost  now  just  as 
he  was,  and  that. Death  was  literally  standing  over  them. 
The  thought  did  not  trouble  him,  or  troubled  him  just  as 
little' as  it  troubled  her.  Love  is  so  tremendous  a  power  that 
Death,  unless  it  means  separation,  has  no  force  of  way  against 
it.  It  becomes  the  httle  thing  that  it  really  is  just  as  that 
inflated  phantom,  the  centipede,  becomes  withered  leaves  under 
a  destructive  blow. 

(To    b€    continued.)  ■ 


Nearly  all  the  new  gowns  are  being  made  with  remarkably 
severe  bodices,  there  being  a'  great  leaning  towards  those 
planned  on  very  tailor-made  lines.  Little  coat-bodices 
fitting  closely  into  the  waist,  with  a  breast  pocket  and  military 
froggings  across  the  front  already  have  a  great  following,  and 
look  specially  well  made  in  silk  faille. 

A  new  idea  is  the  short  full  dress  raised  a  couple  of  inches 
or  so  to  show  an  equally  full  lace  petticoat.  Many  afternoon 
gowns  of  black  taffetas  are  being  made  in  this  way,  the 
petticoat  beneath  being  of  a  rather  fine  meshed  lace  of  the 
Chantilly  persuasion. 

Odd  skirts  for  the  country  are  being  made  in  black  and 
white  checks  of  enormous  dimensions.  There  is  nothing  of 
the  modest  proportions  of  a  Shepherd's  plaid  about  these 
materials,  the  designs  are  as  large  as  they  well  can  be,  and 
it  is  only  the  very  slim  and  well-proportioned  who  can  success 
fullv  wear  them. 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVII  No.  2815  [^]  THURSDAY,  APRIL  20,  1916  [^ifA^s'^P^^?/!]  lS^:!iinii^i^l 


liy    Louis   Raemai;kcrs. 


/  .'" 


Droitn   exc\M»\vt\y  for  "Land  and    Water.' 


Bunkered 


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April  20,  1916 


L  A  >J  D      &      W  A  1  E  K 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSWAY,  LONDON,  W.C 

Telephone:  HOLBORN  2828 

THURSDAY,    APRIL   20.    1916 


CONTENTS 


PACE 

I 


Bunkered.     By  Louis  Raemaekers 

The  Alarm.     By  G.  Spencer  Pryse  2 

Folly  of  a  Truce.     (Leading  Article).  3 

The  Advance  on  Trebizond.        By  Hilaire  Belloc          4 

War  by  Submarine.     By  Arthur  Pollen  *                10 

Air  Defence.     By  F.  W.  Lanchester  12 
The  New  Dominion.     A  Poem.     By  Lord  Montagu  of 

Beaulieu  15 

Shakespeare  To-day.     By  Sir  Sidney  Lee  15 

Chaya.     By  H.  de  Vere  Stacpoole  17 

Town  and  Country  20 

The  West  End  22 

Choosing  Kit  25 


THE   FOLLY   OF  A  TRUCE 

No  sane  man  can  believe  that  the  interpretation 
placed  by  the  German  papers  on  Mr.  Asquith's 
reply  to  the  German  Chancellor,  corresponds 
to  anything  tliat  was  in  the  Prime  Minister's 
mind  wlieU  he  spoke.  Tne  enemy  has  a  very  obvious 
motive  for  Jumping  at  anything  which  could  possibly  be 
twisted  into. an  indication  that  this  country  was  weakened 
In  its  determination  to  prosecute  the  war  unflinchingly 
until  complete  and  final  victory  had  been  obtained  ;  for 
a  truce  which  will  leave  their  power  intact  and  the 
resources  at  their  disposal  still  formidable  and  give  them 
time  to  prepare  for  a  renewed  attack  upon  this  country, 
is  now  the  only  hope  of  the  Prussian  rulers  of  Germany, 
and  constitutes  the  true  end  of  all  their  present  policy, 
whether  mihtary  or  political.  Tne  fact,  however,  that 
some  publicists,  even  in  this  country,  have  shown  a  dis- 
position to  put  upon  Mr.  Asquith's  words  a  gloss,  less 
monstrous  indeed  than  that  of  his  German  interpreters, 
but  none  the  less  unjustifiable  and  very  mischievous, 
makes  it  a  pressing  duty  to  emphasise  once  more  the 
reasons  why  no  peace  will  be  tolerable  which  leaves  the 
military  power  of  Prussia  in  being. 

Tne  great  majority  of  the  people  of  this  country  wel- 
comed the  Prime  Minister's  Guildhall  declarations  be- 
cause, as  tlie  Nation  expresses  it,  "  it  might  be  taken  to 
mean  that  the  military  aim  of  beating  Germany  in  the  field 
nnist  be  pressed  until  either  the  German  army  had  ceased 
to  exist  or  the  German  State  had  been  reconstituted,  and 
the  Prussian  hegemony,  established  in  1870,  annulled.'' 
In  point  of  fact  this  seems  the  least  that  it  possibly  could 
mean  ;  nor  have  we  any  reason  to  doubt  that  it  is  what 
:Mr.  Asquith  mt-ant  and  what  lie  means  still.  At  the 
same  time,  it  is  doubtless  true  that  there  exists  a  minority, 
small  indeed  in  numbers,  but  by  no  means  devoid  of 
political  power,  which  would  not  be  indisposed  to  put  an 
end  to  the  war  so  soon  as  it  could  point  to  what  the  Nation 
(which  may  be  taken  as  more  or  less  representing  the  views 
of  this  section  of  opinion)  calls  "  a  more  or  less  beaten 
Germany."  And  since  this  minority  is  beginning,  how- 
ever unjustly,  to  claim  the  Premier  as  a  sympathiser,  it  is 
nece.ssary  to  explain  once  more  why  their  policy,  howaver 
well  intentioned,  amounts  to  national  suicide. 

First,  let  us  remember  that  a  "  more  or  less  beaten  " 
Germany— that  is  to  say  an  uncrushed,  imhumiliated 
and  undisarmed  Germany— will  remain  a  Prussian  (Ger- 
many.    Tlie  ccjutrary  view  strikes  us  as  one  of  the  most 


curious  miscalculations  into  which  men  otherwise  in- 
telligent have  fallen  in  regard  to  this  war.  They  think 
that  if  Germany  is  "  beaten  "  in  this  very  qualified  sense 
she  will  voluntarily  change  her  aims  and  perhaps  her  rulers. 
Such  a  view  is  based  upon  a  complete  misunderstanding 
of  the  German  attitude,  and  of  the  relations  between  the 
Germans  and  their  Prussian  masters.  We  may  call 
Germany  "  more  or  less  beaten,"  because  her  aggression 
against  the  liberties  of  Europe  has  failed.  But  that  is  not 
how  the  rulers  of  Germany  will  represent  the  matter  to 
the  people  of  Germany.  They  will  claim  that  the  whole 
world  combined  in  arms  to  crush  Germany  ;  and  that, 
thanks  to  Prussia  and  the  Hohenzollerns,  the  whole  world 
failed.  They  will  point  to  the  ravaged  provinces  of  their 
enemies  and  to  a  Germany  almost  e.xempt  from  invasion 
as  a  practical  justification  of  their  "  mihtarism."  Finally, 
they  will  say  that  if  their  enemies  are  still  armed  and  able 
to  renew  the  attack,  that  is  a  reason  for  even  more 
extensive  military  and  naval  preparations,  and  for  even 
more  concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of  the  military 
authorities  in  Berlin. 

It  is  no  good  arguing  that  the  picture  thus  drawn 
would,  from  a  historical  point  of  view,  be  ludicrously 
false^that  the  war  was  deliberately  planned  by  the 
Prussian  authorities  for  two  years,  that  they  started  with 
an  enormous  advantage  over  the  Allies  in  men  and 
materials,  and  that  they  counted  on  immediate  and 
decisive  victory.  All  the  pictures  drawn  by  the  rulers 
of  Germany  for  home  consumption  ai^e  as  false  ;  but  they 
are  believed,  as  this  one  will  certainly  be.  Only  if  Gcr. 
many  suffers  patent  and  ruinous  mihtary  defeat,  if  her 
territory  is  visibly  occupied  by  foreign  armies  and  the 
terms  of  peace  dictated  to  her  involve  open  and  uri- 
disguised  humiliation,  is  there  the  smallest  chance  of  the 
German  people  asking  if  Prussian  rule  is  worth  bearing  at 
such  a  cost  Any  such  peace  as  that  indicated  above 
would  certainly  both  increase  the  prestige  and  confinn 
the  rule  of  the  Prussian  mihtary  caste. 

That  is  the  first  point.  The  second  is  that  tliia 
Prussianised  Germany,  which  would  still  exist  after  such  a 
peace,  and  which  would  still  have  at  its  disposal  the 
enormous  resources  of  the  German  and  Austrian  Empires, 
would  certainly  make  the  first  aim  of  its  future  policy 
the  isolation  and  final  destruction  of  this  country.  On 
the  Continent  Prussia  is  already  defeated  ;  and  though 
she  will  not  admit  it  unless  we  make  her,  it  will  be  long 
before  she  again  ventures  on  a  policy  of  aggression  against 
France  or  Russia.  But  some  compensation  might  be 
found  in  the  establishment  at  our  expense  of  a  great 
Colonial  Empire  and  a  predominance  at  sea.  To  tliis 
achievement  the  new  efforts  of  Prussia  will  be  bent. 

Our  isolation  will  be  the  first  objective.  This  may 
actually  be  made  easier  by  the  fact  that  Prussia's  conti- 
nental schemes  have  miscarried,  that  she  may  have  had 
to  give  up  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France  and  recognise 
Russian  predominance  in  Poland  and  the  Balkans.  It 
will  certainly  be  made  enormously  easier  if  we  have  had 
the  chief  hand  in  making  the  inconclusive  peace  from 
which  we  shall  be  the  chief  sufferers.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, we  could  not  reasonably  expect  our  present 
Allies  to  come  to  our  rescue,  when  our  folly  and  timidity 
were  about  to  receive  their  due  punishment.  We  should 
have  to  fight  our  battle  for  existence  alone  against  the 
energies  and  resources  of  two  great  Empires  devoted 
this  time  to  a  single  end,  and  that  end  the  dismemberment 
of  our  Colonial  possessions  and  the  reduction  of  our  country 
to  a  position  of  permanent  inferiority. 

With  the  question  of  what  terms  should  after  victory 
be  imposed  upon  the  Germanic  powers,  we  do  not  here 
deal.  It  is  too  early  to  think  of  such  things.  What 
is  not  too  early  to  say  is  that  such  terms  must  be  imposed 
and  not  negotiated,  and  that  before  we  even  speak  of 
them  "  the  military  power  o|  Prussia  must  be  utterly 
destroyed." 


LAND     &     WATER 


April  20,  igi6 


THE   ADVANCE   ON   TREBIZOND 


By  Hilaire  Belloc 


WE  know  very  little  of  the  Russian  advance 
through  Armenia,  But  wc  arc  able  to  sum- 
marise at  this  moment  (Tuesday  evening, 
April  i8tli),  from  the  last  news  received,  the 
general  situation,  and  it  may  be  siunmarised  as  follows  : — 
(i)  We  are  fairly  clear  that  the  main  Russian  forces 
are  in  three  groups  whatever  the  liaison  may  be  between 
tiiem.  The  one  group  is  already  well  to  the  west  of 
Bitlis  ;  the  other  is  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Baiburt  on 
the  single  high  road  leading  from  Erzerum  to  Trebizond, 
the  third  is — that  is,  was  last  Saturday  or  Sunday — 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Trebizond  itself. 

(2)  Where  the  most  ad\anced  units  of  the  Russian 
progress  now  stand  we  do  not  exactly  know,  howe\'er, 
save  in  the  case  of  the  northernmost,  which  is  in  the 
immediate  neighbourhood  of  the  Black  Sea  Coast,  re- 
posing, indeed,  with  its  right  wing  upon  the  sea,  and  about 
a  day's  march  eastward  of  Trebizond. 

(3)  The  Russians  are  compelled  to  take  Trebizond 
before  they  can  advance  to  their  ne.\t  step  through  the 
centre  of  Asia  Minor,  and  before  they  can  exercise  a 
])ressure  from  the  north  compelling  the  retirement  or 
imperiUing  the  Turkish  forces  in  Mesopotamia,  ^^'hcn 
they  hold  Trebizond  they  command  ultimately  all  the 
eastern  mountain  country  down  to  the  Mesopotamian 
plain. 

They  are  compelled  to  take  Trebizond  because  that 
Port  is  the  main  avenue  of  supply  for  men  and  materials 
upon  which  the  Turkish  forces  in  this  region  depend.  And 
.though  it  would  seem  that  ingress  to  the  Port  (or  rather 
roadstead)  is  not  unimpeded  (there  is  not  a  regular 
blockade)  it  is  upon  Trebizond  that  the  strength  of  the 
Turkish  forces  in  Armenia  reposes.  Only  when  Trebizond 
has  fallen  will  it  be  possible  for  the  Russian  armies  to  hold 
the  full  line  from  north  to  south,  which  is  marked  by  the 
three  points  Trebizond,  Erzingan,  Diabekir.  When  they 
hold  that  line  they  will  immediately  threaten  the  railway  . 
which  already  reaches  Raz  El  Aim  and  is  being  continued 
to  Nisibin,  and  under  that  threat  the  Turkish  forces  in 
Mesopotamia  will  be  isolated  or  will  withdraw  to  the 
north  and  east. 

This  line  Trebizond,  Erzingan,  Diabekir,  is  by  no  means 
the  end  of  the  business.     It  is  onlv  the  end  of  the  first 


stage.  Against  a  further  advance  the  Turks  can  mass 
troops  based  upon  Angora,  which  is  ser\'ed  by  the  railway. 
But  that  first  stage  completes  the  extreniclv  difficult  work 
in  the  tangle  of  mountains  which  is  the  whole  ground  of 
Eastern  Asia  Minor.  The  second  stage  permits  of  an 
advance  over  the  great  Central  Plateau  which  is  far 
easier  going. 

Upon  Trebizond,  therefore,  must  our  attention  be 
concentrated  in  the  immediate  future  so  far  as  this  field  is 
concerned. 

Let  us  fir^t  ask  ourselves  why  the  main  Russian  advance 
is  being  made  along  the  rather  difficult  seacoast,  and  next 
what  the  chances  of  defending  Trebizond  upon  that 
sector  are. 

The  ad\'ance  is  being  made  along  the  seacoast  because 
the  terrible  tangle  of  mountains  of  the  interior  hampers 
our  Allies  in  two  ways.  It  Icngtliens  the  winter  in- 
ordinately, leaving  many  of  the  higher  tracks  and  passes 
deep  in  snow  for  several  w'eeks  to  come  and,  of  course, 
rendering  the  passage  of  guns  anc^  supply  exceedingly 
difficult.  There  is  only  one  road  through  these  moimtains, 
which  threads  its  way  along  th  j  gorges  of  the  rivers  from 
Erzerum  westward,  coining  round  by  a  great  elbow  to 
Trebizond.  It  is  on  that  road  that  the  central  Russian 
forces  have  advanced  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Baiburt. 
It  can  hardly  cut  across  the  angle  to  Trebizond  in  support 
of  the  force  on  the  seacoast,  because,  though  there  is  a 
track  followed  by  the  telegraph  line  which  leaves  the  main 
road  somewhat  west  of  Baiburt  and  cuts  off  the  angle, 
that  track  is  not,  I  believe,  jmssable  to  artillery.  The 
Russians  are  doubtless  constructing  roads  as  they  go, 
but  that  is  very  slow  work  in  such  a  coimtry. 

Progress  along  the  seacoast  has  the  second  advantage 
that  it  can  be  supported  and  supplied  from  the  sea,  and 
that  it  is  proceeding  imder  good  climatic  conditions.  All 
that  slope  down  to  the  coast  varying  in  height  from  6,000 
feet  to  the  level  of  the  sea  is  now,  in  its  lower  portion, 
under  the  full  influence  of  the  spring. 

The  Russian  force  operating  along  the  seacoast  is, 
on  account  of  what  has  been  said  above,  almost  certainly 
the  largest  of  the  thiee  bodies.  It  is  believed  to  be 
opposed  now  by  about  three  Turkish  divisions,  or  po^sibly 
rather  more  ;   say  60,000  to  70,000  men.      It  has  reached 


llniformly 
Country 


I 


r 


*         '         '  ' 


\ 


April  20,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


the  main  and  perhaps  only  defensive  line  covering 
'Ircbizond  which  is  that  of  the  Kara  Dere,  and  is  about 
15  miles  from  the  town  itself.  The  left,  eastern,  or 
further  bank  of  the  Kara  Dere  had  been  verj'  thoroughly 
strengthened  by  the  Turks  imder  (icrman  guidance. 


BLacL  Sea. 


TREBlZONa 


TarAtsA- 

onSahuuai/  or 
Suiuiay.April:s^s°- 


This  river,  like  all  those  shorter  ones  which  run  from 
the  escarpment  of  the  high  plateau  down  into  the  Black 
Sea,  is  in  most  of  its  course  a  torrent  running  through  a 
deep  and  difficult  gorge.  The  country  becomes  possible 
for  troops  somewhere  about  the  point  A  on  Sketch  II 
above.  Immediately  upon  the  sea  this  rapid  and 
dark  stream  (now  swollen  with  the  snow  melting  upon  its 
higher  sources)  passes  through  a  belt  of  marsh  just  east  of 
Cape  Erekli,  but  between  the  gorge  (flanked  by  summits 
about  6,000  feet  high)  and  the  marsh,  there  is  a  front  of 
quite  ten  miles  and  perhaps  more  upon  which  our  Allies 
can  attack.  To  have  turned  the  line  of  the  Kara  Dere 
by  its  right  or  south  was  not  practicable.  The  moimtains 
were  too  diflicult.  It  had  to  be  forced  by  a  frontal 
attack. 

So  far  as  the  very  brief  message  which  has  reached 
London  informs  us,  the  Russians  have  carried  a  portion 
at  least  of  this  fortified  front.  At  any  rate  some  elements 
of  their  force  seem  to  be  established  upon  the  further 
bank.  So  far  as  can  be  gathered  from  the  message  re- 
ceived this  success  was  scored  last  Saturday  or  Sunday. 
The  remaining  distance  of  the  advance  to  Trebizond  has 
no  obstacle  comparable  to  that  of  the  Kara  Dere.  There 
is  immediately  to  the  west  of  the  Kara  Dere,  coming  out 
by  Cape  Falkos,  a  smaller  but  similar  stream  flowing 
down  from  the  mountains  called  the  Jambolu,  but  its 
shores  are  flatter  and  the  western  bank  does  not  dominate 
the  eastern  as  is  the  case  with  the  Kara  Dere.  Then, 
after  three  small  streams,  one  comes  upon  the  last  true 
defensive  position  covering  Trebizond,  which  is  a  double 
range  of  hills  at  B  with  a  saddle  between,  and  to  the  south 
the  same  high  mountain  lands  as  everywhere  marks  this 
region.  But  it  is  very  near  the  town,  not  continuous, 
and  overlooked  entirely  from  the  south-east.  Only 
those  on  the  spot  can  tell  whether  it  can  be  defended  or 
no.  Beyond  this  position  nothing  could  save  the 
town,  or  at  least  the  use  of  the  roadstead,  because  it  lies 
right  under  observation  and  fire. from. these  hills,  while 
the  considerable  stream  running  immediately  east  of  the 
city  is  too  close  to  it  to  give  a  true  defensive  line. 

OPERATIONS  BEFORE  VERDUN 

After  the  great  attack  of  last  Sunday,  the  9th  (which 
was  comparable  to  the  first  German  blow  of  two  months 
ago  in  intensity  and  not  far  inferior  to  it  in  numbers, 
which  continued  throughout  a  great  part  of  Monday 
and  which  failed  with  exceedingly  heavy  losses),  the 
enemy  remained  a  whole  week  reorganising  his  broken 
units,  probably  bringing  up  new  men  and  certainly 
replenishing  his  stock  of  munitions. 

It  seemed  probable  that  lie  was  preparing  an  advance 
still  further  to  the  west.  The  time  required  for  moving 
big  pieces  a  few  miles  westward  would  account  for  so 
very  long  an  interval  of  inaction.  It  has  always  been 
evident  that  the  heavily-wooded  country  between  Mont- 
faucon   and  tlie  Argonne,  lying  as  it  does  upon  the  very 


edge  of  the  salient  of  Verdun,  offered  him  a  chance  of 
concentration  which  he  has  not  yet  used.  But  at  the 
moment  of  writing  there  is  no  sign  of  this  development 
of  the  battle  westward.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  renewed' 
at  two  in  the  afternoon  of  Monday  last,  the  17th,  upon  one 
of  the  old  fronts  in  the  old  fashion  and  with  the  old 
result.  The  usual  allowance  of  twenty  men  to  the  yard, 
the  front  of  about  2,000  yards,  the  crushing  losses,  the 
retention  of  the  few  yards  of  ad\'anced  trench.  The  pick- 
ing up  by  the  enemy  of  a  certain  number  of  wounded,  and 
less  unwounded,  prisoners  in  the  small  section  of  advanced 
trenches  reached,  the  grotesque  exaggeration  of  their 
numbers  in  an  official  Berlin  communique,  and  all  the 
rest  of  it.  The  thing  has  become  a  sort  of  type  or  model, 
and  the  story  of  one  such  attack  is  the  story  of  half  a 
dozen  others  :  particularly  in  the  reiterated  and  violent 
falsehoods  in  the  enumeration  of  prisoners  which — on 
such  a  scale — is  a  novel  feature  dating  from  last  Feb- 
ruary. 

In  this  particular  case  the  blow  was  struck  in  the 
centre  of  the  segment  from  about  the  middle  of  the  Cote 
du  Poivre  through  the  ruins  of  Louvemont  and  through 
the  little  Chauffour  Wood  to  a  point  slightly  to  the  east 
of  that  wood,  and  the  small  section  of  advanced  trench 
which  the  enemy  entered  was  a  little  salient  just  south  of 
Chauffour  Wood  at  the  point  marked  A  in  sketch  III  here 
appended. 


The  affair  is  of  no  significance,  but  it  affords  an  oppor 
tunity  for  discussing  the  \yhole  French  motive  and  type  of 
tactics  before  Verdun  in  some  detail. 

The  French  Tactic  at  Verdun 

I  said  recently  in  these  columns  that  the  question  every- 
one was  asking,^ll  over  Europe,  about  Verdun  was,  "  Why 
was  the  Germaii  attack  continuing  ?  "  Seeing  that  the 
original  attempt  to  break  the  French  line  at  the  best,  or 
at  the  least  to  put  out  of  action  a  very  much  larger 
number  of  Frenchmen  than  the  operation  should  cost  in 
Germans  had  failed,  the  reason  for  continuing  so  expen- 
sive an  offensive  puzzled  everyone.  It  puzzled  the 
German  critics  just  as  much  as  the  neutrals  and  the  Allies, 
and  the  proof  that  it  puzzled  them  was  that  they  gav« 
all  manner  of  different  answers. 

I  said,  in  connection  with  this  question,  that  I  did  not 
pretend  to  answer  it,  and  that  I  only  suggested  certain 
possible  answers,  two  of  which  seemed  .to  me  the  most 
probably  true  :  two  that  might  both  be  true  at  one  and 
the  same  time. 

The  first  was  that  the  political  importance  of  putting- 
troops  into  the  geographical  area  called  "  Verdun " 
was  considerable  for  the  enemy.  He  had  fixed  attention 
at  home  upon  that  point.  Civilian  attention  abroad 
was  also  fixed  upon  it.  The  attention  of  all  neutrals 
was  fixed  upon  it  ;  and  in  varying  degrees,  the  attention 
of  his  enemies  was  also  fixed  upon  that  mere  geographical 
expression.  However  meaningless  as  a  military  opera- 
tion, the  thing  had  become  what  hundreds  of  other  similar 
operations  have  become  in  the  past,  a  symbol  disturbing 
and  cutting  across  the  purely  military  problem. 

Secondly,  the  enemy  probably  believed — and  still 
believes — that  this  constant  hammering  will  at  last 
produce  a  break-down  upon  the  French  side.  He  may  be 
exaggerating  the  value  of  his  infantry,  but  he  certainly 
puts  that  value  very  high.  He  hopes  that  the  enormous 
expense  in  German  armed  men  which  the  hammering 
process  costs  him  will  be  recouped  by  the  sudden  much 
larger  expense  in  French  armed  men  which  the  collapse  of 
his  opponent  at  the  end  of  the  process  would  involve. 

All  that  ground  we  have  already  gone  over.     But  there 


LAND    &    WATER 


April  20,  i<)i6 


is  another  side  to  the  business  wltich  has  so  far  been 
barely  stated  in  these  columns,  and  which  now  merits 
a  more  thorough  cUscussion.  It  is  the  French  side  of  the 
atfair. 

What  are  the  French  doing  upon  the  sector  of  Verdun  ? 

They  stand  week  after  week.  They  retire  occasionally 
In  their  retirements  they  necessarily  lose  a  certain 
quantity  of  men  and  material.  They  attempt  no  serious 
counter-attack.     What  is  the  meaning  of  this  ? 

The  best  informed  of  the  London  daily  papers  took 
up  this  question  the  other  day,  and  replied  to  it — I  think 
a  little  si-perciliously — by  saying  that  the  whole  thing 
was  quite  clear.  The  (iernians  were  attacking  and  the 
French  were  defending,  and  that  was  the  end  of  it.  We 
were  to  watch  very  anxiously  the  German  attack,  which 
might  succeed.  We  were  to  watch  with  equal  an.xiety 
the  French  defence,  which  might  fail.  We  were  to  regard 
the  whole  struggle  as  an  undecided  balance  between  these 
two  forces,  the  ec^iilibrium  between  which  would  at  last 
fail  to  the  detriment  of  the  one  side  or  the  other. 

Tnis  same  conception,  put  with  less  clarity  and  with 
varying  degrees  of  knowledge,  runs  through  the  most 
of  our  Press.  It  is  apparent  in  all  the  current  comment 
of  the  French  Press,  except  in  the  half-dozen  daily  articles 
which  appear  from  the  pens  of  competent  students  (tlies.- 
by  the  way,  often  helped  in  their  suggestions  by  the 
French  Command).  It  appears  (with  similar  exceptions) 
in  all  the  neutral  Press. 

Now  this  view  is  obvious  and  undeniable.  But  it 
brings  us  no  nearer  to  the  answer  of  the  main  question 
which  is  not  merely  "Wh^it  are  the  French  doing,"  but 
"  Why  are  they  doing  "it  ?  " 

Objects  of  the  Defensive. 

Consider  the  various  objects  which  a  defensive  can 
have  in  view. 

(I)  A  large  body  of  men  and  of  material  is  contained 
within  a  certain  area  from  which  it  cannot  escape.  It 
consists,  let  us  say,  of  a  quarter  of  a  million  men  with 
their  complement  of  guns  and  of  military  stores  of  all 
kinds.  Its  enemy  prevents  its  leaving  that  area  because 
(a)  this  enemy  is  more  numerous  and  can  therefore  every- 
where concentrate  superior  forces  against  its  attempt  at 
retirement,  (b)  He  is  in  positions  or  can  at  will  arrive  in 
positions,  which  block  that  retirement.  This  is,  in  fact,  a 
siege.  The  enemy's  object  in  attacking  in  this  cas3,  if  he 
attacks  at  all,  is  to  crush  back  the  ring  of  the  defence 
upon  a  confined  space  where  it  has  not  elbow  room  to 
manoeuvre,  so  that  the  besieged  force  shall  fall  into  con- 
fusion and  become  his  prey  Or  he  attacks  to  break  the 
ring  which,  once  broken,  is  no  longer  a  defensive  organisa- 
tion and  equally  falls  a  prey  to  him.  If  he  has  reason  to 
think  that  food  or  munitions  will  be  exhausted  in  useful 
time  he  does  not  actively  attack,  he  merely  sits  down 
before  the  besieged  place  and  lets  time  do  its  work. 

The  object  of  the  defensive  is  to  delay  the  enemy  as 
much  as  possible  until  succour  shall  arrive  ;  to  keep  the 
area  within  which  it  can  manoeuvre  large  enough  to 
prevent  confusion,  but  not  too  large  to  be  held 
adequately  upon  every  side. 

If  the  defensive  can  hold  out  until  succour  arrives  and 
the  siege  is  raised,  it  has  won  and  the  offensive  has  lost. 
Ladysmith  in  the  Boer  War  was  an  example ;  Man- 
beuge  in  1793.  The  effect  of  the  delay  has  been  to 
immobilise  numbers  of  the  enemy  over  a  critical  period. 

If  the  defensive  is  either  crushed  or  starved  into 
surrender  it  has  lost.  W^e  have  had  plenty  of  examples 
of  that  in  the  present  war.  Przemysl  surrendered  from 
exhaustion ;  Kovno  was  rushed ;  Maubeuge  saw  its 
ring  of  defences  broken.  In  all  these  cases  the  defensive 
was  standing  a  siege  against  superior  forces,  and  failed. 

There  is  nothing  of  this  sort  at  all  about  Verdun. 

Verdun  is  not  besieged  ;  no  large  force  is  contained 
without  issue  there,  within  a  circle  of  foes.  It  is  simply 
a  town  standing  in  a  shallow  salient,  the  Unes  of  which  are 
lines  of  trenches,  and  behind  these  trenches  artillery 
helping  to  hamper  and  to  break  the  attack  as  does  machine 
gun  and  riHe  fire  from  the  trenches  themselves. 

(II)  A  large  body  of  men  with  their  material  stands  in 
a  salient  with  a  comparatively  narrow  neck.  The  enemy 
does  not  surround  this  body,  but  he  nearly  surrounds  it. 
The  issue  by  which  that  body  can  retire  is  small  for  the 
movements  of  such  numerous  forces.     The  enemy  while 


"  holding  "  his  opponent  along  all  the  bulge  of  the  salient, 
strikes  with  particular  force  against  either  edge  of  the 
"  neck."  If  he  cuts  the  neck  before  the  retirement  has 
begun  he  will  put  out  of  action  all  the  troops  and  the 
material  within  the  salient.  Even  if  he  narrows  the 
salient  so  much  that  the  retirement  gets  congested,  he 
will  reap  a  very  big  harvest  of  men  and  guns  by  crushing 
in  the  bulge  during  that  retirement. 

There  is  nothinj^  of  all  this  in  the  case  of  Verdun. 

The  salient  has  no  neck.  It  is  a  mere  slight  curve  and 
the  main  attacks  are  not  even  delivered  against  the 
extreme  points  where  that  curve  begins  its  projection. 

(III)  .'\  weaker  force  holds  up  a  stronger  one  liy  stand- 
ing on  the  defensive  upon  a  particular  part  of  a  long  line. 
Its  object  in  so  holding  up  the  attack  of  the  stronger 
force  is  either  to  deceiv-e  the  enCmy  upon  the  places  where 
strength  is  concentrated  in  other  parts  of  the  field  or  to 
allow  time  for  developments  in  that  other  part  of  the 
field  or  both. 

We  have  had  what  is  now  a  classical  example  of  this 
kind  of  defensive  in  the  case  of  the  (irand  Couronne  in 
front  of  Nancy  in  the  first  week  of  Saptember,  1914,  which 
made  possible  the  victory  of  the  Marne. 

There  is  nothing  of  that  sort  ahoitt  \'erdun. 

The  enemy  knows  perfectly  w.^ll  what  troops  we  have 
and  where  they  are,  nor  is  there  any  necessity  for  the 
I'Vench  to  m:'et  him,  imless  they  choos?,  with  less-r 
numbers.  There  is  no  tactical  play  to  be  considered  ; 
an  immansely  long  line  of  trenches  over  500  miles  stands 
intact  ;  one  particular  portion  of  it,  about  4  p?r  cnt., 
is  being  \igorously  assaulted ;  upon  the  rest  there  is 
freedom  of  concentration  at  will — within  the  limits 
permitted  by  the  numbers  withdrawn  for  the  defence  f)f 
the  small  sector  attacked.  Troops  can  be  sent  to  aid  in 
that  defence,  withdrawn  shortly  afterwards  and  sent  to 
another  part  of  the  line,  replaced  by  other  troops  taken 
freshly  from  elsewhere,  and  so  on  in  rotation. 

(IV)  Even  where  a  long  line  of  this  sort  exists  intact 
and  only  a  small  section  of  it  is  vigorously  attacked,  a 
prolonged  mere  defensive  may  be  necessary,  and  its  success 
may  be  of  critical  importance,  because  the  lateral  com- 
munications behind  the  whole  line  are  bad  and  because 
the  moving  of  m^n  up  and  down  the  line  is  therefore 
difficult,  very  slow  or  impossible.  The  defence  in  this 
case  must  depend  upon  its  own  resources.  If  it  breaks 
down  the  line  will  be  pierced.  Its  mere  tenacity  is  of 
the  greatest  moment  to  the  caus3  of  the  defenders. 

There  is  nothing  of  this  about  Verdun. 

The  lateral  communications  behind  the  French  line  are 
the  best  in  Europe.  They  are  superior  even  to  the 
corresponding  communications  behind  the  (icrman  line, 
for  they  are  not  interrupted  by  the  n^ccssit}'  for  garrison- 
ing occupied  districts,  or  the  interruption  caused  by  such 
masses  as  the  Vosges  and  the  Ardennes.  It  is  a  very 
small  point.  The  lateral  communications  of  both  oppo- 
nents are  first  rate,  but  at  any  rate  the  French  and  British 
lateral  communications  are  perfectly  clear  and  sufficient 
for  practically  any  movement  of  troops  whatsoever  at 
the  shortest  notice. 

(V)  Lastly,  there  is  the  attack- upon  a  particular  sector 
which  may  have  great  political  or  great  economic  or  great 
strategical  importance,  or  all  three  cfHiibint'd,  and  which 
therefore  must  be  specially  defended.  Antwerp  was 
a  first-rate  example  of  this  kind.  For  the  (Germans  to 
enter  Antwerp  in  the  autumn  of  1914  was  economically 
of  great  importance  to  them.  It  gave  them  building  yard;., 
a  great  town  for  the  repose  of  troops,  huge  titocks  of 
materials,  etc.  Strategically  it  was  of  great  importance 
to  them,  because  it  cleared  their  fianks  of  all  menace, 
and  if  they  had  not  blundered  in  neglecting  to  cross  the 
Scheldt  it  would  have  given  them  a  mass  ot  armed  men  as 
well.  Even  as  it  was,  it  gave  them  the  elimination  of 
very  many  thousands  of  their  opponents  at  insignificant 
experise  to  themselves,  and  a  very  great  (pnntity 
military  stores  and  guns. 

The  defence  of  Antwerp,  had  it  3cen  pos  ;ible  (and  it 
would  have  been  possible  if  the  Allies  had  cared  to  violate 
the  nei.trality  of  Holland  and  had  at  the  same  time  been 
prepared  with  a  large  force  to  throw  into  the  place),  would 
have  been  of  the  utmost  value. 

Politically  the  entry  of  German  troops  into  Antwerp 
was  also  of  very  high  value.  It  decided  the  occupation 
of  Belgium.  It  gave  them  what  was  incomparably  the 
most  important  centre  of  civ-ilian    life  within   the   area 


April  20,   1916 


LAND      &      W  A  T  J:;  K 


^ 


of  their     opeiatiuiis.     It  profoundly  affected  opinion  at 
liome  and  abroad. 

How  does  \'crdun  stand  in  this  fifth  category  ?  What 
economic,  pohtical,  strategic  importance  has  it  ? 

Economically  it  is  worthless. 

Politically  it  is  what  we  ha\e  seen  it  to  be  :  A  place 
with  an  old  reputation  of  being  a  fortress  and  a  place  upon 
which  the  eyes  of  the  world  have  become  fixed.  It  is  a 
place  the  occupation  of  which  would  have  an  immense 
effect  upon  German  opinion  and  a  very  great  one  upon 
neutral  opinion.  I  will  not  deny  that  its  occupation 
would  have  its  effect  upon  instructed  belligerent  opinion 
as  well.  It  is  regrettable  that  this  should  be  the  case, 
but  it  is  true.  You  cannot  have  the  enemy  tr5'ing  to  do 
a  thing  for  weeks,  even  if  the  military  value  of  that  thing 
be  doubtful,  without  his  success  impressing  all  opinion, 
even  that  of  those  whose  business  and  capacity  it  is  to 
isolate  the  purely  military  problem  from  all  others.  The 
phrase,  "  The  Defence  of  Verdun  "  has  become  current 
witli  the  Allies.  It  is  even  occasionally  implied  in  French 
orders  of  the  day. 

What  of  tlie  strategical  value  ?  , 

The  slight  salient  of  Verdun  comes  at  an  importai^t 
point  in  the  general  line.  It  threatens  directly  one  of  the 
main  (ierman  communications,  that  through  Metz,  and  it 
threatens  almoL,t  equally  that  through  Lu.xemburg. 
It  lies  upon  the  Hank  of  that  great  German  salient,  the 
ape.x  of  which  stands  near  Noyon.  A  French  advance  from 
this  point  in  the  future  would  jeopardise  the  German  line 
if  it  could  be  made  before  that  line  were  retired.  The  lines 
before  \'erdun,  the  "  corner  "  which  the  trenches  here 
turn,  is  an  offence  to  the  enemy's  plan.  If  it  were  wholly 
eliminated,  if  the  French  line  had  for  the  future  to  be 
drawn  from  the  Argonne  right  down  to  opposite  St. 
Mihiel,  the  Germans  would  be  in  a  better  posture.  The 
mere  occupation  of  the  town  of  Verdun  would  effect  no- 
thing like  so  much  as  that,  but  it  would  lose  to  the  French 
something  of  the  advantage  hitherto  given  them  by  a 
bridgehead  beyond  the  central  Meuse.  It  would  give 
the  Germans  the  whole  line  of  that  river.  To  that  extent 
there  is  a  purely  military  object  in  the  defence  of  the 
mere  town.  But  it  is  not  a  capital  object,  it  does  not 
seriously  affect  the  campaign.  An  advance  (when  the 
enemy  is  sufiiciently  weakened)  that  should  start  from  a 
few  miles  to  the  west  or  even  to  the  south,  would  not  be 
rendered  impossible  by  the  loss  of  the  point  of  Verdun. 
Indeed,  the  great  offensive  of  last  September  was  at- 
tempt/i  fifty  miles  away  to  the  west.  Still,  the  point  has 
that  amount  of  military  importance,  and  it  must  be 
admitted. 

There  is  then  reason  here  for  the  German  offensive, 
and  there  is  in  some  degree  leason  for  the  French  defen- 
sive too  ;  I  mean  for  its  character  and  for  its  continued 
presence  in  jront  of  the  little  town. 

But  the  whole  thing  still  remains  a  question  of  price. 
And  the  enemy  has  already  paid  a  far  higher  price  than 
the  slight  strategic  advantage  is  worth.  It  is  equally 
true  that  the  French,  by  their  strictly  defensive  tactics,  are 
doing  nuich  more  than  merely  defending  tlie  area  of 
Verdun.  I j  they  thought  the  msrc  holding  of  Verdun  a  great 
essential,  they  could  with  their  superSoiity  of  numbers 
design  a  very  different  fight. 

It  is  not  conceivable"  that  the  mere  tenure  of  lines  a 
few  thousand  yard;;  in  front  of  Verdun  determines  the 
French  plan.  It  has  another  object  and,  so  far  as  I  can 
sec,  that  object  is  to  compel  the  enemy  to  pay  the  very 
highest  price  for  what  the  F"rcnch  conceive  to  have  been 
an  error  upon  the  part  of  his  higher  command. 

Sliort  of  that  the  metiujds  adopted  would  seem  to  lose 
their  military  meaning. 

Consider  wiial  thos'-  methods  have  been  and  then  com- 
l>are  then  with  the  resources  of  the  Allies. 

'I'he  French  through  all  these  eight  weeks  have  either 
retired  very  slowly  or  have  been  content  to  hold  a  pure 
defensive.  Upon  very  rare  occasions  they  have  launched 
a  local  counter-offensive  for  the  temporary  regaining  of 
one  small  point,  which  the  local  command  found  necessary 
to  the  j-ilans  of  the  moment.  They  have  never — with  all 
their  advantage  in  numbers — attcmptf^d  a  permanent 
regaining  of  ground.  In  the  main,  the  whole  thing  has 
been,  since  February  26th,  a  series  of  deliberate  and 
cautious  retirements,  coupled  with  an  equally  deliberate 
and  lengthy  stand  upon  chosen  sections  of  line.  They 
gave  up  all  the  ad\anced  positions  in  the  Woevre  without 


reinforcing  them,  and  before  suffering  serious  pressure. 
They  held  Malancourt  with  one  battalion  against  pretty 
well  any  odds,  sacrificed  the  greater  part  of  that  battalion, 
did  not  reinforce  it,  ordered  its  remnant  to  fall  back. 
Earlier  they  dealt  in  precisely  the  same  way  with  the 
advanced  post  of  Forges.  They  hold  the  eastern  end  of 
the  Goose  Crest  with  a  comparatively  small  force,  and 
allow  it  to  receive  the  ultimately  successful  assault  of  a 
whole  division.  Only  when  an  enemy  advance  threatens 
the  continuity  of  the  forward  lines  which  for  the  moment 
they  oppose  to  that  advance,  do  they  spend  men  in  the 
temporary  recovery  of  the  area  involved.  And  whenever 
they  design  such  a  recovery  they  invariably  effect  it.  It 
was  so  with  that  last  corner  of  the  Avocourt  Wood  which 
laps  up  on  to  the  first  slopes  of  Hill  304.  It  was  so  with  the 
Crows'  Wood,  six  weeks  ago  ;  it  was  so  with  the  ruins  of 
Vaux  and  the  Caillettes  Wood  a  fortnight  ago.  In  the  one 
case  c  f  the  Douamuont  Plateau  when  there  was  a  moment 
of  real  danger,  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  operations, 
there  was  a  really  considerable  expenditure  involved  in  the 
recovery  of  a  critical  point.  But  take  the  thing  in  the 
mass  and  it  is  everywhere  a  strict  defensive  very  slowly 
retiring  before,  for  long  periods  immobile  before,  a  succes- 
sion of  violent  and  repeated  movements.  And  all  this 
is  doneiaith  forces  superior  in  number,  easily  equal  in 
machinery  and  munitionmcnt  to  the  attack. 

That  last  is  the  capital  point  of  the  whole  busines* 
If  the  Allies  in  the  west  were  inferior  in  number,  if 
their  nmnitionment  was  now  inferior  or  the  handling  of 
their  artillerj'  worse  than  the  enemy's,  or  the  quality  of 
their  troops  lower  than  his,  the  thing  would  have  a  very 
different  meaning.  As  things  are  with  our  knowledge  of 
the  numbers  available,  with  our  knowledge  of  the  way  in 
which  the  French  maintain  a  continual  rotation  of  fresh 
troops,  with  our  knowledge  of  their  consistent  exposure  of 
the  very  minimum  number  of  men  in  advanced  posts,  it 
seems  impossible  to  draw  any  other  conclusion  upon  their 
method  than  that  which  is  drawn  here.  This  strange  and 
highl}'  disciplined  anchoring  of  the  Allies  to  a  pure 
defensive  ;  this  refusal  to  create  a  diversion  though  there 
has  been  ample  time  for  that.  This  absolutely  consistent 
"  blocking  "  for  now  eight  weeks  without  so  much  as  the 
sign  of  "  lashing  out  "  can  surely  only  have  one  meaning. 
It  is  designed  to  exhaust.  I  hav^e  seen  no  other  tenable 
hypothesis  put  forward.  There  may  be  one,  but  it  is 
certainly  not  apparent. 

False  Enemy  Figures 

I  know  that  I  ha\'e  had  some  difficulty  in  persuading  a 
small  but  important  minority  of  students  of  the  war  that 
figures  officially  issued  by  the  German  publicity  buteaux 
are  false. 

I  have  had  here  the  same  difficulty  which  one  finds 
right  through  this  campaign  of  combating  a  mood. 
Even  positive  evidence  frequently  repeated  finds  this 
sort  of  obstacle  refractory. 

This  mood  of  patient  confidence  in  the  enemy's  loyal 
accuracy,  in  spite  of  his  most  glaringly  obvious  motives 
for  being  inaccurate  in  order  to  affect  domestic  and  foreign 
opinion ,  is  partly  composed  of  a  long  established  faith  in 
(ierman  pedantry  and  partly  due  to  something  which 
the  enemy  has  very  carefully  thought  out :  the  effect  ol 
apparently  minute  detail  in  convincing  people  of  the  truth 
of  something  false.  The  plaj^wright  Gilbert  noted  tliis 
piece  of  psychology  long  ago  and  spoke  of  such  details  as 
"  adding  \erisimilitude  to  an  otherwise  bald  and  uncon- 
vincing narrati\'e." 

I  have  dealt  with  this  mood  in  the  matter  of  the  Gennan 
casualty  lists  over  and  over  again. 

I  ))ropose  this  week  to  bring  forward  a  piece  of  evidence 
which  is  absolutely  conclusive  in  another  field  if  the  rules 
of  arithmetic  have  any  value. 

I  refer  to  the  German  lists  of  umcounded  French 
prisoners  taken  before  Verdun  upon  certain  dates. 

A  brief  note  has  already  appeared  upon  this  in  the  Press 
but  a  detailed  analysis  will  be  of  more  value. 

When  a  force  retires  there  is,  over  and  above  the  killed 
and  wounded  who  have  been  noted  or  brought  back  with 
the  retirement,  a  much  larger  number  of  "missing"; 
because  the  men  who. have  fallen,  killed  or  wounded,  are 
as  to  a  great  number  of  them  left  where  they  fall,  while 
a  certain  number  will  have  been  taken  unvvoundcd  by 
the  enemy.     The  ground  being  subsequently  occupied  by 


8 


LAND     &     WATER 


April    20,  1916 


the  enemy  it  is  not  possible  to  verify  which  are  dead, 
which  wounded  and  which  unwoundcd  prisoners.  All 
you  can  do  in  establishing  your  numbers  after  such  a 
retirement  is  to  note  that  such  and  such  a  number  of  your 
men  are  "  missing."  ' 

From  all  this  it  is  clear  that  the  number  of  unwounded 
prisoners  must  always  be  much  less  than  the  total  number 
of  "  missing "  in  any  series  of  retirements  within  a 
particular  period. 

Now  though  it  is  impossible  after  a  retirement  to  say 
accurately  what  number  of  your  "  missing  "  are  killed  and 
what  number  have  fallen  into  the  enemy's  hands  wounded, 
and  what  number  are  unwounded  prisoners,  there 
is  one  element  in  the  problem  which  we  can  establish 
in  round  numbers,  especially  after  a  long  experience  of 
some  continued  type  of  fighting  ;  and  that  is  the  pro- 
portion of  dead  out  of  the  total  number  of  missing.  You 
can  tell  within  a  fairly  close  average  what  proportion  of 
the  lost  are  dead,  and  the  remainder  will  represent  within 
a  comparatively  small  margin  of  error  your  wounded  and 
unwounded  who  have  fallen  into  the  enemy's  hands. 

Now  the  French  have  a  complete  record  of  the  "  miss- 
ing "  from  their  various  units  during  the  various  retire- 
ments upon  the  sector  of  Verdun  from  Fresnes  on  the 
south  to  Avocourt  on  the  north,  between  and  including 
the  dates  February  21st,  when  the  first  retirement  began, 
and  April  loth,  up  to  which  last  date  alone  the  present 
note  applies.  The  exact  number  is  not  published.  The 
average  proportion  of  dead  upon  the  analogy  of  any 
number  of  similar  movements  and  of  similar  fighting  dis- 
covered upon  the  enemy's  side  and  upon  our  own,  makes 
one  in  round  figures  certain  of  the  residue  of  wounded 
and  unwounded.  We  know  below  a  certain  maximum 
and  within  a  certain  small  margin  of  error  the  numbers 
who,  though  surviving,  were  abandoned. 

With  that  point  clearly  settled  in  the  reader's  mind, 
I  would  ask  Ifim  to  turn  to  the  following  table  of  figures. 
He  will  find  it  interesting. 

February  21st. — No  German  statement  issued  of 
prisoners  taken  this  day. 

February  22nd. — German  statement  "  About  3,000  to 
this  date." 

February  24th. — German  statement,  "  About  10,000 
to  this  date." 

F'ebruary  25th. — No  Statement. 

February  26th. — German  statement,  "  About  15,000 
unwounded  prisoners  up  to   this  date. 

This  was  the  end  of  the  first  big  advance  and  of  the 
principal  French  retirement  over  a  belt  from  four  to  five 
miles  wide  under  the  first  great  enemy  blow  against  the 
covering  line  of  the  defence. 

After  a  delay  of  forty-eight  hours  (during  which  there 
was  no  French  retirement,  but  in  one  place  a  slight  French 
advance)  the  enemy  issued  a  grand  total  of  the  unwounded 
prisoners,  which  had  fallen  into  his  hands.  I  would  beg 
the  reader  to  remark  its  minute  detail.  It  was  not  given 
in  round  figures  ;  it  was  given  precisely,  and  the  number 
given  was  16,903. 

That  figure  is  our  starting  point.  With  the  end  of 
February,  when  the  first  very  expensive  retirement  of  the 
French  was  over  and  certainly  before  they  had  been  able 
to  estabhsh  complete  lists  of  their  own,  the  enemy  told 
them  that  he  held  i6i903  unwounded  men  of  theirs 
precisely,  besides,  of  course,  a  great  number  (unmentioned) 
of  their  wounded. 

We  all  know  that  since  that  period  the  German  method 
of  fighting  has  changed,  the  progress  against  the  sector 
of  Verdun  has  been  insignificant  and  the  motive  for  false 
statement  greater. 

We  further  know  that  with  each  succeeding  day  of 
disappointment,  or  at  any  rate  at  very  brief  intervals, 
it  has  been  necessary  to  support  the  German  opinion 
at  home  and  abroad  in  favour  of  Germany. 

Now  look  at  the  following  twenty-three  items,  which 
are  the  statements  as  to  French  prisoners  issued  by  the 
German  Publicity  Bureau  under  the  authority  of  the 
German  Government  and  of  the  German  higher  command 
during  the  whole  of  March  and  the  first  ten  days  of  April. 

I.     March  3. — "  Over  1,000."     No  special  mention  of 

unwounded. 
2.  „        4. — Over  1,000.  do. 

(These  two  items  are  quite  distinct  and 
refer  to  two  separate  days  and  two 
separate  local  advances^. 


3-  ,.  5—938  unwounded. 

4-  ..  6.— 152 

5.  Same  day,  but  in  another  place,   "  over  300 

unwounded." 

6.  ,,        I  6. — 711  unwounded  (in  one  place). 

7-  ..  1 7- — 3-337  unwounded.  (This  was  the 
day  of  the  first  big  German  ad- 
vance west  of  the  Meuse.) 

8.  „  g. — 687  (wounded  and  unwounded,  not 

distinguished). 

9.  ,,         14. — 1,025  unwounded. 

10.  „         I5-— 152 

11.  ,,        16. — "A   few"     (number  not  specified) 

unwounded. 

12.  ,,        18. — 41  unwounded. 

13.  „        19.— 281 

14.  „         20.— 2532  (and  a  few  over  not   specified) 

unwounded. 
15-         I,         22. — 440  unwounded. 

16.  ,,         23. — 911 

17.  ,,         28.-498 

18.  „         30.— 328 

19.  „         31—731 

20.  April  2. — 765 

21.  „  5—542 

22.  „  7-— 714 

23.  „        10.-1,267  (The  big  advance  in  Avocourt 

N\"ood). 
. — 222  (in  another  place — unwounded, 
not  specified). 

I  would  beg  the  reader  to  note  that  this  list  of  23  items 
has  all  the  marks  of  a  perfectly  genuine  piece  of  work  ; 
sometimes  the  authors  of  it  confess  their  inability  to  be 
precise  and  give  us  only  round  figures. 

At  other  times  they  are  happy  to  oblige  us  with  very 
exact  details,  even  when  they  have  thousands  of  items  to 
count  in  one  day,  as  for  instance,  item  7.  Usually  they 
tell  us  that  they  are  only  troubling  to  give  us  the  un- 
wounded prisoners — because  these  indicate  a  moral 
weakness  upon  the  part  of  an  enemy  or  bad  arrangements 
upon  his  part.  But  on  other  occasions  they  confess  them- 
selves unable  to  give  us  the  precise  number  of  unwounded 
and  therefore  do  not  mention  whether  the  prisoners 
they  speak  of  are  wholly  unwounded  or  no.  The  whole 
thing  is  convincing  in  the  highest  degree.  It  has  only 
one  drawback,  which  is  that  when  you  come  to  add  it 
up  and  get  the  totals,  the  unwounded  alone  come  to 
more  than  dotihle  the  total  number  of  all  Frenchmen  that 
can  possibly  have  fallen  into  German  hands,  wounded 
and  unwounded  ahke  ! 

In  other  words,  this  enemy  aocument,  or  rather  series 
of  documents,  is  demonstrably  marked  by  the  two  charac- 
ters which  some  have  been  so  slow  to  accept  in  the  matter 
of  the  casualty  lists,  (i)  It  is  very  carefully  detailed 
and  candid.    (2)  It  is  false. 

I  trust  this  piece  of  proof  to  be  sufficient. 

Tiie  enemy  tells  us  that  he  will  prove  his  case  by  "  pul)- 
lishing  the  names."  It  is  no  proof.  He  has  done  that 
before — and  included  among  the  prisoners  taken  at 
Verdun  names  of  men  missing  months  and  months  before 
the  attack  begun. 

Note  on  certain  American  Figures 

Several  correspondents  have  sent  me  some  figures 
published  in  the  London  Press  upon  last  Monday,  April 
17th,  and  cabled  over  from  Washington.  These  figures 
purpose  to  be  the  "  official  estimates  of  the  Ciencral  Staff 
of  the  United  States,"  as  to  the  permanent  losses  of  the 
various  forces  in  the  liuropean  War, up  to  the  end  of 
1915,  There  is  very  little  to  be  said  about  these  figures 
in  so  far  as  they  concern  France,  Austria  and  Germany, 
except  that  they  have  no  relation  to  reality  whatsoever.  It 
is  not  worth  while  refuting  them,  because  they  do  not  give 
their  supposed  sources  of  information,  and  1  think  it 
accurate  to  say  that  they  have  no  proper  sources  of  in- 
formation at  ail.  They  give  the  German  losses  in  killed 
as  less  than  15  per  cent,  of  men  in  the  field  and  put  the 
French  at  32  per  cent.  The  rest  of  the  rubbish  is  on  a 
par  with  this.  I  do  not  see  any  reason  for  wasting  time 
upon  such  nonsense. 

But  its  publication  is  a  symptom  of  what  may  be  a 
grave  piece  of  neglect  upon  our  part. 


April  20,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


The  Opinion  of  America 

We  ought,  I  think,  in  this  country,  to  make  up  our 
minds  defmitely  one  way  or  the  other,  whether  the 
presentation  of  the  Alhed  cause  to  the  American  public 
is  worth  our  while  or  no.  If  the  opinion  of  neutrals — 
which  is,  after  all,  only  a  moral  factor— is  indifferent  to 
us  because  we  conceive  it  to  have  no  real  effect  upon  the 
course  of  the  war,  then  we  may  neglect  that  field  altogether 
and  leave  it  to  the  enemy's  undisturbed  possession. 

If,  upon  the  contrary,  we  think  that  this  moral  factor 
is  of  weight,  then  it  behoves  us  to  put  forward  our  fullest 
strength  to  influence  it.       ' 

Of  all  the  Allies  Britain  alone  is  in  a  position  to  do  this, 
through  the  community  of  language  and  the  very  close 
commercial  and  other  bonds  between  the  two  countries. 
Hitherto,  one  may  say  that  nothing  has  been  done.  That 
is  a  strong  phrase,  but  it  is  not  an  exaggerated  one.  No 
one  who  sees  the  American  Press,  as  I  do,  regularly,  can 
have  any  remaining  doubts  upon  this  matter.  Those  few 
proprietors  of  newspapers  whose  private  inclination  or 
commercial  advantage  is  served  by  supporting  the  Allied 
cause  continue  to  support  it.  But  they  do  not  print 
information  of  the  least  use  to  that  cause,  for  it  is  not 
supplied  to  them. 

Even  the  most  obvious  military  truths  about  the  war 
^not  a  special  plea  in  favour  of  the  Alhes  but  a  mere 
statement  of  facts — is  not  watched  by  us  in  any  way, 
and  even  the  papers  which,  on  the  whole,  support  us, 
leave  their  public,  even  when  that  public  is  favourable 
to  the  Allied  side,  quite  ignorant  of  the  true  situation  ; 
for  they  have  no  one  to  give  it  them.  I  have  myself  in 
the  last  few  weeks  written  letters  to  American  papers 
obviously  well  disposed  towards  us  to  contradict  such 
monstrous  nonsense  published  by  them  as  the  following  : — 

(i)  That  Germany  alone  would  put  in  about  next 
February  one  million  new  effectives. 

(2)  That  no  instructed  English  opinion  now  denies 
the  object  of  Prussia. 

(3)  That  the  German  permanent  losses  from  wounds 
were,  in  20  months,  less  than  79,000  men ! 

Meanwhile,  a  press  of  certainly  much  larger  circulation 
and  of  far  more  vigour  is  acting  quite  openly  against  us, 
and  this  press  is  fed  with  the  utmost  industry  by  German 
propaganda  of  every  kind.  The  German  Government 
really  takes  trouble  here,  and  it  has  succeeded  in  something 
over  a  year  in  producing  with  very  large  bodies  of  American 
opinion  the  state  of  mind  it  desires  to  produce.  It  has 
not  only  pleased  its  own  supporters — that  was  not  its 
main  object.^  It  lias  not  merely  strengthened  the  positions 
of  those  who  would  in  any  case  have  been  opposed  to  the 
Allied  cause.  It  has  done  something  much  more.  It 
has  created  a  view  of  the  war  now  very  largely  accepted 
in  the  United  States  and  accepted  just  as  much  by  those 
who  are  in  our  favour  as  those  who  are  against  us. 

The  best  proof  of  this  is  the  fact  that  the  Germans  can 
now  circulate  in  America  falsehoods  of  a  crudity  and 
enormity  which  they  would  hardly  have  attempted  some 
months  ago,  and  that  these  falsehoods  are  solemnly 
accepted  upon  every  side. 

I  will  give  a  particular  example  which  I  think  very 
striking. 

The  Chicago  Daily  News  published  upon  March  27th 
last  a  cable  from  its  German  correspondent  in  Berlin. 

This  cable  is  marked  "  Via  London."  I  do  not  say 
that  those  words  represent  the  truth,  but  I  note  them. 

The  message  sent  is,  of  course,  a  German  message 
supplied  by  the  German  authorities.  It  is  to  the  effect 
that  the  total  German  permanent  losses  up  to  the  ist 
March,  1916,  were  1,029,620. 

Now  I  would  beg  my  readers  to  dwell  upon  this  amazing 
phenomenon.  Here  is  a  falsehood  apparently  so  crude 
and   stupid   that   it    seems    not    worth   telling.     Every 


Louise  and  Barnavaux,  by  Pierre  Mille  (John  Lane,  3s.  6d. 
net),  forms  a  study  of  the  French  colonial  soldier  in  China — 
and  in  love.  Barnavaux  reappears  here  subjugated  at  last 
by  a  woman,  but  he  is  still  the  old  campaigner  with  a  wealth 
of  stories — and  all  the  stories  are  good,  though  in  one  or  two 
oE  the  earlier  ones  the  susceptibilities  of  some  readers  will  be 
shocked,  for  east  of  the  Straits  the  French  colonial  soldier 
is  apparently  as  lacking  in  morals — as  these  are  understood 
in  the  west — as  any  Ainu.  .'\n  echo  of  Mulvaney,  Barnavaux 
is  ahvavs  entertaining,  morals  notwithstanding. 


authority  in  Europe  has  debated  the  losses  of  the  various 
belligerents  until  the  subject  is  threadbare,  and  though 
there  have  been  considerable  differences  we  know  that  the 
truth  fluctuates  round  about  four  millions  for  the  date 
in  question.  We  know  that  that  is  only  normal  to  the 
rate  of  losses  of  all  other  belligerents  in  this  war,  and  our 
only  debates  turn  upon  whether  we  are  to  put  it  at  a 
quarter  of  a  million  less  or  a  quarter  of  a  milUon  more. 
But  the  German  authorities  feel  perfectly  confident  in 
their  ability  to  publish  and  to  get  accepted  in  America  a 
stupefying  message  cutting  down  the  real  figure  not  by  a 
third  or  a  half,  but  to  a  quarter.  In  other  words,  they 
believe — and  probably  they  have  good  grounds  for  be- 
lieving— that  the  American"  public  will  swallow  the  state- 
ment to  the  effect  that  German  losses  are,  in  proportion 
to  the  numbers  fighting,  four  times  less  than  any  of  their 
rivals  ! 

We  must  not,  in  the  comic  side  of  such  an  incident  as 
this,  forget  its  very  disquieting  lesson.  This  piece  of 
folly  did  not  appear  in  some  obscure  hole  and  corner,  nor 
was  it  put  forward  in  one  of  those  little  fanatical  sheets 
which  from  hatred  of  England  or  love  of  the  enemy  lose 
all  sense  of  proportion.  It  appeared  with  every  credential 
in  one  of  the  very  great  daily  newspapers  of  America, 
something  which  may  be  compared  to  the  Manchester 
Guardian  or  to  the  Scotsman  in  this  country.  It  was 
accepted  as  an  official  and  true  statement  by  millions, 
and  it  has  by  this  time  undoubtedly  become  a  legend  with 
a  whole  body  of  opinion  in  the  middle  West. 

Is  it  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  such  a  state  of  affairs 
would  have  been  impossible  if  we  had,  in  this  country, 
taken  any  steps  to  instruct  American  opinion  ? 

We  have  taken  none,  and  I  think  the  reason  is  a  very 
simple  one.  No  one  has  been  willing  to  take  the  trouble 
required. 

I  do  not  know  whether  it  is  too  late.  I  hope  it  is  not. 
But  there  is  a  great  deal  of  leeway  to  be  made  up,  and  the 
more  I  see  of  the  American  press  in  these  last  few  weeks 
the  more  I  am  impressed  by  the  solidly  rooted  legend  of 
German  greatness  which  is  now  there  implanted. 

We  may  console  ourselves  by  the  knowledge  that  all 
this  will  count  for  nothing  when  the  truth  appears  on  the 
map,  as  it  has  already  appeared  in  the  calculations  of  the 
higher  command.  i 

We  know  that  the  alliance  composed  of  the  German 
Empire  with  its  dependent  peoples,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire,  the  Turks  and  the  Bulgarians,  is  already  beaten. 
But  between  the  present  phase  and  the  last  one  there 
is  still  a  long  distance  to  travel  and  in  that  interval  it 
is  possible  that  American  opinion  will  count.  There 
may  still  be  time  to  effect  something  in  that  field.  So 
far  nothing  serious  has  been  done.  H.  Belloc. 


Sortes  Sbakespeavianae 


By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE 


The  Wittenberg-   Infamy  : 

This  is  the  bloodiest  shame, 
The  ivildest  savagery,  the  vilest  stroke 
That  ever  wall-eyed  wrath  or  staring  rage 
Presented. 

%.\al  Joba  IV.,  ui.,  47-50. 

To  our  Impatient  Pessimists: 

How  poor  are  they  who  have  not  patitiice  ! 
What  wound  did  ever  heal  but  by  degrees  ? 
Thou  know  st  we  work  by  wit  and  not  by 

witchcraft, 
And  wit  depends  on  dilatory  time. 

Othellq  n.,  iii.,  379-82. 

The  German  Dynamitard  in  America : 

And  whatsoever  cunning  fiend  it  was 
That  wrought  upon  thee  so  preposterously 
Hath  got  the  voice  tn  hell  for  excellence. 

Henry  Vn.,   ii.,  Ul-3. 


10. 


LAND      &     WATER 


April  20,  1916 


WAR    BY    SUBMARINES 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


LORD  MONTAGU  has  made  it  quite  clear  that  he  is 
not  askinj,'  for  an  Air  Ministry  to  control  the  use 
of  all  aircraft  in  the  war,  but  only  to  reorganise 
and  concentrate  national  effort  for  producing 
I'loro^  and  better  flying  machines  of  e\ery  kind.  His 
effor;-  to  straighten  this  muddled  state  of  things  should 
have  a  nuich  better  chance  of  success  now  that  its 
ultimate  object  is  defined. 

But  it  is  evident  that  he  has  far  higher  hopes  of  the 
influence  of  aircraft  on  war  than  more  conservative 
thmkers  are  likely  to  endorse.  He  tells  us,  for  instance, 
that  the  mark  of  the  present  condition  of  the  war  is 
(ieadlock.  It  is  so.  he  says,  on  the  Western  front,  at 
Salonika  and  in  the  North  Sea.  It  is  an  inevitable  result 
of  the  power  of  defence  being  so  much  greater  than  the 
power  of  offence.  The  worst  of  it  seems  to  be  that  this 
deadlock  must  continue,  until  determined  by  aircraft  in 
land  warfare,  and  by  submarines  in  sea  warfare  !  Ob- 
itiously,  if  this  theory  is  right,  we  cannot  begin  too 
soon  or  work  too  hard  to  bring  our  aii  equipment  to 
tlie  highest  possible.     But  is  it  right  ? 

If  we  test  it  by  sea  war,  it  hardlv  seems  to  coincide 
with  an  impartial  view  of  the  facts.  There  never  has 
been  and  there  is  not  now  any  deadlock  in  the  naval  war. 
We  took  the  strategic  offensive  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  and 
from   midnight    on  August  4th,  Germany  has  been  im- 


of  any  of  our  trading  ships  practically  impossible.  They 
.speak  as  if  what  had  been  done  during  the  last  month 
might  be  multiplied  by  three  or  four,  and  kept  up  for 
weeks  and  months. 

We  should  then  have  this  extraordinary  state  of  affairs. 
We  should  be  unable  to  use  the  sea  because  of  submarines, 
and  the  Germans,  imable  to  use  it  because  of  the  British 
fleet.  The  advantage  would  be,  of  course,  all  to  the 
( iermans— for  we  are  dependent  upon  the  sea  absolutely 
and  entirely,  and  they  are  not.  Do  facts  or  reason  justify 
such  apprehensions  ?  For  some  months  before  March 
20th — when  the  Tubaniia  and  Palcmhang  were  sunk, 
and  the  new  submarine  compaign  may  be  said  to  have 
begun — the  average  of  merchant  steamers,  British, 
Neutral  and  Allied  attacked  and  lost  in  home  waters 
was  appro.ximately  one  per  diem.  In  the  first  eight  days  of 
the  new  campaign,  the  average  rose  to  2%  ;  in  the  next 
week  to  2J  ;  in  the  third  week  to  2^  ;  and  in  the  past 
week  it  fell  again  to  just  over  ij.  Over  the  whole  period 
then,  the  average  is  nearly  2h  per  day.  This  rate,  if  it 
could  be  kept  tip,  would  destroy  qoo  steamers  a  year. 
Were  they  all  British  we  should  lose  at  this  rate  between 
one-sixth  and  one-fifth  of  our  steamers  engaged  in  foreign 
trade.  Were  we  dependent  on  British  steamers  only 
and  were  we  unable  to  replace  any  of  our  losses,  it  would 
mean  that,  in  the  course  of  the  next  year  of  the  war,  we 


N 

N 

N 

N 

A 

N 

N 

, 

A 

— 

N 
N 

N 

N 

N 
N 

N 

N 

A 

^ 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

1 

-/I 

■ 

N 

1   34  56  T  8   9101111131415-16 
April 


Submar... 
and  Apr! 


"f  iH'.l^  1    Corrected  diagram  of  British,   Neutral  and  Allied  steamers  attacked   by  submarines  cr  mines  between  March  :flh 

)nl  17th;  total  ,2,   .n  29  days,   of  vvh.ch  42  were  British.  27  Neutral  snd  .^  Allied.       In  August   191.S,   66  ships   ivere  attacked    in 
dl  days.      I  he  largest  number  in  any  /  days,  was  between  August  18-24;h,  wh;n  29  victims  w.-re  recorded 


potent  on  the  surface  of  the  sea.  Her  roving—  and 
doomed— cruisers  did  some  slight  damage  to  our  trade,  her 
runaway  capital  ships  did  some  still  more  trifling  damage 
to  a  few  coast  towns.  But  no  (ierman  battleships  or  battle 
cruisers  have  sought  an  action  with  ours.  No  squadrons 
have  attempted  to  dispute  the  passage  of  our  armies  or 
our  transports;  no  effort  has  .been  made  to  convoy 
German  merchantmen  to  sea.  Germany's  confession  of 
sea  impotence  has,  then,  been  absolute.  It  is  possible 
^he  may  still  dispute  our  command.  But  it  does  not  seem 
probable  that  her  equipment  can  so  increase  relatively  to 
ours  as  to  give  her  a  better  chance  in  the  future  than 
she  has  enjoyed  in  the  past.  So  that  the  only  stagnation 
in  this  field  of  war — that  is.  in  the  command  of  the 
surface  of  the  sea — ^has  been  a  continuous  maintenance 
of  British  supremacy,  with  all  that  it  canies  with  it. 

Possibly  Lord  Montagu  believes  that  submarines  may 
turn  this  supremacy  to  defeat.  Ifhe  means  this,  he  can 
hardly  have  intended  to  imply  that  defeat  will  be  brought 
about  by  Sir  John  Jellicoe's  ships  being  destroyed.  How- 
ever badly  equipped  we  were  at  the  outset  to  defend  the 
'  ".rand  Meet  against  these  craft,  the  entire  lack  of  casualties 
by  submarines  in  twenty  months  of  war  seems  proof  positive 
that  there  is  now,  at  any  rate,  no  danger  to  our  fleet  that 
need  cause  us  great  uneasiness.  Lord  Montagu  must 
have  quite  a  different  form  of  submarine  success  in  view. 

lo  some  people  it  is  not  inconceivable  that  Germany 
might  have  so  many  submarines  at  work  and  orgiinise 
them  so  successfully,  as  to  make  the  continuance  at  sea 


should  have  to  reduce  our  imports  by,  say,  one-fifth  ; 
in  the  following  year  by  one-quarter,  aiid  so  on.  In  two 
years  the  situation  would  become  very  critical. 

But  this  prospect,  dismal  enough  1  admit,  need  not 
frighten  us  for  various  excellent  reasons.  In  the  first 
place,  we  are  not  dependent  upon  British  steamers  alone. 
Of  the  72  steamers  attacked  between  the  20th  March  and 
the  17th  April,  27  were  neutral.  If  we  assume  neutral 
shipping  engaged  in  the  service  of  these  islands  to  be  a 
little  under  three-quarters  of  our  own,  it  would  make  the 
total  number  of  steamers  upon  which  we  are  dependent 
8,750  instead  of  5,000.  So  the  present  rate  of  destruc- 
tion, instead  of  being  two-elevenths,  would  only  be  just 
under  one-tenth  ;  which,  though  inconvenient,  would 
not  really  be  very  formidable.  And  in  the  second  year 
of  war,  on  the  same  scale  of  destruction,  there  would 
be  a  reduction  of  one-ninth,  and  so  on.  So  that  we  could 
possibly  carry  on  for  at  least  three  years  without  any 
renewal  of  our  own  or  neutral  shipping,  and  without  being 
brought  to  a  serious  jwint  of  want.  Even  then,  if  the 
rate  of  destruction  of  two  and  a  half  a  day  could  be  kept 
up,  we  should  be  a  long  way  from  stagnation  being 
turned  into  defeat. 

But  it  seems  obvious  that  the  rate  will  not  and  cannot 
be  kept  up.  Note  to  begin  with  that  it  has  not  been 
kept  up.  It  was  2i  a  day  during  the  second,  and 
2jin  the  third  week,  and  it  is  only  just  over  one  and 
a  half  in  the  past  week,  and  this  is  not  so  very  far  from 
normal.     We  must  no*  forget  that  in  July,  .Aiigust,  and 


April  20,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


11 


the  first  week  of  September,  we  had  precisely  the  same 
conditions.  The  rate  then  dropped  suddenly  from  the 
highest  on  record  to  the  lowest.  I  am  far  from  sa^anf^ 
that  we  are  to  infer  that  the  present  drop  from  the  recent 
high  rate  forebodes  a  continuance  of  a  low  rate.  But  it 
was  inconceivable  that  the  high  rate  copld  continue  ; 
equally  almost  inconceivable  that  what  we  have  just  seen 
is  not  the  highest  rate  possible.  The  agencies  which 
reduced  the  rate  last  autumn — though  probably  less 
efficient  than  they  were  because  attacking  at  sight  gives 
to  the  U  boats  opportunities  of  sinking  ships,  and 
lessens  our  opportunities  for  sinking  them — are  still 
formidable  enough,  and  they  have  doubtless  been  in- 
creased in  numbers  and  in  efficiency.  Those  engaged  in 
these  operations  have  a  wider  experience,  and  the  or- 
ganisation for  pooling  these  experiences,  and  making  the 
lessons  of  one  field  available  in  another,  has  been  very 
greatly  improved.  The  directions  which  these  improve- 
ments had  to  take  1  indicated  last  week.  The  process 
of  decentralising  began  going  into  effect  about  last  June. 
And  in  foiu^  months  we  saw  the  value  of  the  new  principles 
cirployed.  It  may  take  a  month  or  two  to  bring  Ger- 
many's present  equipment  of  submarines  once  more  to 
negligible  proportions.  Meantime,  for  the  moment  at 
any  rate,  it  looks  as  if  the  Admiralty  had  the  thing  in 


hand. 


Force   Direct    and   Indirect 


The  curve  of  destruction  will  inevitably  tend  to  return 
to  the  normal  for  reasons  inherent  in  the  character  of 
this  peculiar  kind  of  war.  Where  two  forms  of  force 
arc  engaged  in  opposition,  of  which  one  is  incapable  of  clos- 
ing and  fighting  the  other,  and  relies  upon  chance  strokes 
from  a  distance  to  effect  its  end  and  on  evasion  for  its 
safety-,  while  the  other  is  able  and  willing  to  close  and 
f.ght  it  out — because  in  contact  its  pov.-ers  of  attack 
and   resistance  are  superior,  the  former  evasive   force  is 


^lippift^perda:^                                                               Shippcn^pcrJaif 

%- 

UWetk,   I 

imik. 

irdlVkk 

.--'2k 

-.  ^     _  .. 

z 

z 

\h. 

4thmek 

y   NbrtzuH 

k--    -     . 

> 

0 

ITomal      Istmek.       Znd           3rd.     '    4th. 

Daily  Average  Curve:  The  above  curve  shows  how  the  daily'average 
rose  in  the  fir3t  week  of  the  new  Submarine  Campaign  from  slijihilv  less 
than  one  per  day  during  February  and  the  first  17  days  of  March,  to 
2;  in  the  firs;  week;  2:  in  the  second;  dropped  to  2\  in  the  third,  and 
aga-n  it  l!  in  the  past  week. 

ultimately  doomed  to  failure.  It  is  a  truth  illustrated  in 
many  experiences  of  guerilla  war.  The  South  African 
campaign  and  the  American  wars  with  the  Red  Indians 
are  excellent  instances  in  point.  The  weakness  of  the 
guerilla  is  his  inability  to  combine  and  defeat  the  main 
force  against  him.  The  weakness  of  the  organised  force 
is  to  counteract  the  swiftness  and  secrecy  of  movement 
of  the  guerilla.  In  the  submarine  war  the  case  is  com- 
plicated by  the  submarines  having  objectives  that  cannot 
defend  themselves.  Success  is  measured  bv  the  number 
of  these  that  they  can  waylay.  The  true  analogy  is 
with  bandits  and  highwaymen,  who  have  hills  and  deserts 
to  hide  in,  and  from  them  communications.  But 
until  a  submarine  is  produced  that  can  attack  and  destroy 
its  pursuers  or  is  impenetrable  to  the  weapons  its  pur- 
suers bring  against  it,  the  ultimate  defeat  of  the  submarine 
is  certain,  because  while  their  pursuers  can  combine 
against  them,  the  submarines  cannot  combine  against 
their  pursuers. 

Lord  Montagu,  I  imagine,  called  in  the  submarine  to 
strengthen  his  argument,  which  in  the  main,  of  course, 
vvas  that  we  could  only  decide  the  land  war  in  our  favour 
if  we  strengthened  our  attack  by  aircraft  good  and  numer- 
ous enough  for  the  jiurposc.  But  does  not  the  argument 
of  the  submarine  really  apply  with  even  greater  force 
to  the  aeroplane  ?     \\'hen  used  for  warlike  operations  on 


their  own  account,  all  aircraft  arg  subject  to  a  similar 
disability — They  are  unable  to  close  and  fight  the  enemy. 
They,  too,  have  to  ixly  on  chance  blows,  and  they  areata 
disadvanta;i;e  greater  than  that  of  the  submarine  in  that 
their  objectives  are  many  times  more  difficult  to  lind  and 
fifty  times  more  difficult  to  destroy.  Like  the  submarine 
they  have  no  means  of  engaging  the  fi.xcd  defences  put  up  to 
drive  them  off,  so  that  they  too  must  rely  upon  evasion  for 
safet}'.  Aircraft  are  only  unlike  submarines  in  that  they 
can  fight  each  other,  and  this  is  of  course  a  disadvantage. 

If  the  statement  is  accurate  that  in  a  month's 
time  Germany  will  have  50  Zeppelins,  20  of  which  may 
be  used  for  bombing  the  civil  population  of  this  country, 
it  will  certainly  become  highly  desirable  that  we  should 
have  enough  suitable  aeroplanes — that  are  not  wanted 
for  the  Army  or  the  Navy — to  engage  these  murderers  in 
their  qwn  element.  But  even  if  we  had  aeroplanes  numerous 
and  good  enough  to  bring  down  every  Zeppelin  that 
crossed  the  North  Sea,  we  should  be  making  the  greatest 
mistake  if  v/e  siij:)posed  that  thereby  we  brought  victory 
any  nearer.  It  would  be  a  case  of  the  enemy  compelling 
us,  by  an  unmilitary  use  of  force,  to  devote  part  of  our 
force  to  the  unmTlitary  object  of  thwarting  it.  And  in 
calling  this  object  unmilitary,  I  am  far  from  saying  that 
it  is  not  a  proper  object.  1  am  merely  saying  that  its 
achievement  does  not  carry  us  on  one  inch  towards  ending 
the  war. 

It  is  no  answer  to. say  that  Zeppelins,  coming  often 
enough  and  in  sufficient  numbers,  must  inevitably  destroy 
factories  and  arsenals  vital  to  military  efficiency.  In 
the  first  month  of  the  war  France  lost  j^^  per  cent,  of  her 
coal  supply  and  over  80  per  cent,  of  her  engineering 
resources.  Yet  it  was  not  a  fatal  loss.  Neither  aircraft 
nor  submarines  can  conceivably  do  damage  on  this  scale. 
Their  share  in  war  is  for  practical  purposes  only  indirect. 
They  are  dependent  upon  chance  for  success,  and  they 
must  not  be  confused  with  those  factors  in  the  war  which 
are  decisive. 

Important   News 

As  wc  go  to  Press,  two  important  pieces  of  news  arrive. 
Trebizond  has  fallen  to  the  Russians  in  what  was,  quite 
evidently,  an  operation  in  which  land  and  sea  force 
were  brilliantly  combined.  Some  ten  days  ago,  it  may  be 
remembered,  the  Breslau  made  a  dash  to  the  Anatolian 
coast  to  assist  in  resisting  the  Russian  push  along  the 
coast.  She  was  driven  off,  according  to  the  Turkish 
account,  by  a  squadron  which  included  one  of  the  Black 
Sea  Dreadnoughts.  It  was  the  first  news  we  had  had 
that  any  of  this  class  were  finished.  The  Breslau's  speed 
enabled  her,  naturally  enough,  to  escape.  Whether  the 
Maria  Imperatritza's  big  guns  could  have  been  of  very 
material  assistance  in  the  question  one  cannot  tell  without 
studying  the  contour  map  of  the  field  of  operations.  But 
the  squadron's  intervention  in  landing  artillery  to  cover 
the  final  advance  appears  to  have  been  decisive.  The 
official  account  does  not  say  whether  these  were  naval 
guns  or  not.  They  may,  of  course,  have  been  field  artillery 
landed  from  transports  under  the  protection  of  the  battle- 
ships. The  conquest  of  Trebizond  gives  Russia  a  much- 
needed  advance  base  for  an  Anatolian  campaign,  and  for 
the  first  time,  she  will  begin  now  to  reap  the  full  benefit 
of  her  unquestioned  control  of  the  Black  Sea.  It  is  an 
event  of  the  greatest  importance.  Note  that  once  more 
submarines  have  failed  in  preventing  a  landing. 

Artiu'r  Pollen. 


Mr.  Unwin  published  yesterday  The  Book  of  Italy  issued 
imder  the  auspices  of  Queen  Elena  of  Italy  in  aid  of  the 
Italian  Sailors'  and  Soldiers'  Families  and  the  Italian  Red 
Cross.  For  several  generations  there  has  l)ecn  a  deep  sym- 
pathy between  the  peoples  of  England  and  of  Italy,  a  sort  of 
natural  and  instinctive  understanding  of  one  another.  There 
are  f.w  English  writers  or  artists  who  have  not  felt  the  charm 
of  Italy  and  her  people,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  cultivated 
Italian  is  generally  attracted  towards  England  and  English 
life.  The  Rook  of  Italy  edited  by  an  Italian  scholar.  Dr. 
Rafl'aello  Piccoli,  I'nivcrsity  Teacher  at  Cambridge,  and  with 
an  Introduction  by  Lord  Rryce,  contains  contributions  from 
writers  and  artists  of  both  nations.  The  net  profits  from  the 
sale  will  be  handed  over  by  the  publishers  to  the  Pro  Italia 
Committee  in  aid  of  the  Italian  Sailors'  and  .Soldiers'  Families 
in  the  United  Kingdom  and  of  the  Italian  Red  Cross,  imder  the 
patronage  of  the  Italiau  .Ambassador,  .Marchese  Imporiali, 


12 


LAND      &     WATER 


April  20,  1916 


Air  Defence  Problems  and  Fallacies 

The  Failure  of  the  Derby  Committee 
By  F.  W.  Lanchester 


PERHAPS  the  most  important  announcement 
which  has  been  made  in  relation  to  service 
aeronautics  during  the  last  few  weeks — in  fact, 
since  the  appointment  of  the  Derby  Committee — 
is  the  collapse  of  that  Committee,  notified  by  the  resigna- 
tions of  Lord  Pcrby  and  of  Lord  Montagu,  the  latter  of 
whom  only  joined  the  Committee  in  March.  I  do  not 
know  whether  the  terms  of  reference  of  this  Committee 
were  ever  published,  but  it  is  impossible  from  the 
conditions  that  it  could  have  been  a  Committee  with 
executive  power.  The  responsibility  for  the  efficiency 
of  our  Navy  and  of  our  Army  during  the  European  War 
must  rest  absolutely  in  the  hands  of  the  Admiralty 
and  War  Office  respectively.  It  is  immaterial  whether 
we  are  dealing  with  the  infantry,  with  the  cavalry,  or 
with  the  artillery,  or  whether  we  are  dealing  with  the 
Flying  Corps  ;  they  are  to-day  the  four  arms  of  the 
Service  (if  we  exclude  the  Royal  lingineers  from  Ix-ing 
described  as  an  arm),  the  respensibility  cannot  be  divided. 
Likewise  in  the  Navy  it  is  of  no  consequence  whether  we 
are  considering  our  battle  fleets,  or  bur  cruiser  squadrons, 
or  our  mosquito  flotillas  of  various  denominations,  or 
whether  we  are  considering  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service, 
again  the  responsibility  cannot  be  divided.  In  every 
case  the  inter-relationship  between  the  different  "  Arms," 
be  it  of  our  Army  or  of  our  Fleet,  is  so  close  and  intricate 
and  the  co-ordination  of  their  movements  is  so  necessary 
to  the  successful  performance  of  their  duties  that  no 
division  of  responsibility  is  possible.  Ultimately  as 
concerns  the  conduct  of  operations  in  the  field  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  an  Army  must  be  absolute,  and  the 
Admiral  in  supreme  command  must  have  implicit  power 
over  the  naval  and  air  forces  in  his  control. 

Supply 

From  these  elementary  facts,  which  are  not  disputed  by 
any  competent  mihtary  or  naval  authority,  it  follows 
that  such  a  Committee  as  that  appointed  under  the  pre- 
sidency of  Lord  Derby  must  be  dependent  on  the  agree- 
ment between  the  naval  and  military  representatives 
serving  thereon.  If  such  a  Committee  could  be  dragooned 
by  a  majority  in  which  the  Service  members  were  on 
opposite  sides  there  would  be  an  end  to  responsibility. 
It  may  be  considered  deplorable  that  when  the  machinery 
of  a  Committee  has  been  formed  with  the  object  of  bring- 
Mig  the  responsible  parties  together  to  reach  an  agree- 
ment on.  vital  points  as  they  arise,  that  failure  should 
result,  but  this  is  not  the  point  at  issue ;  deplorable  or 
otherwise,  it  is  perfectly  clear  and  evident  that  the  cure 
must  not  be  sought  in  the  direction  of  destroying  that 
complete  and  plenary  responsibility  which  is  essential 
to  the  well-being  of  the  Services,  and  proper  conduct 
of  naval  or  military  operations. 

It  is  said  that  the  actual  difficulty  or  rock  on  which 
the  Committee  was  wrecked  related  to  the  supply  of 
material.  If  we  take  this  to  be  the  case  it  is  not  a  trouble 
under  present  conditions  which  is  peculiar  to  the  Air 
Service  ;  it  is  a  trouble  which  has  manifested  itself  in 
other  directions  and  in  the  supply  of  material  of  other 
kinds — shells,  artillery,  machine  guns,  small  arms,  etc., 
etc.,  even  within  a  few  weeks  of  the  outbreak  of  war  ; 
it  has  led  to  the  creation  of  a  Ministry  of  Munitions  and 
the  appointment  of  a  Cabinet  Minister  to  organise  and 
regulate  supplies.  It  would  be  indeed  strange  if  the 
supply  of  the  special  material  demanded  by  the  Roj'al 
Flying  Corps,  and  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service,  were 
exempt  from  difficulty  :  aeroplanes,  aeroplane  motors, 
counter-aircraft  artillery,  bombs,  Lewis  guns  and  other 
items  of  etiuipmcnt.  "in  brief,  the  weakness  of  the 
Committee  in  the  matter  of  executive  power,  and  the 
particular  difficulties  in  relation  to  the  supply  of  material 
were  both  such  as  could  have  been  reasonably  anticipated 
and  expected  from  the  outset. 

It  would  have  been  indeed  a  happy  issue  if  under  these 
conditions  the  Committee  had  been  "able,  by  the  exercise 
of  argument  and  persuasive  power,  to  have  accomolished 


successfully  the  duties  assigned  to  it,  but  such  is  more 
than  in  the  conduct  of  human  affairs  could  have  been 
hoped  or  anticipated.  The  Committee  Was  an  experi- 
ment and  it  has  failed.  The  discussion  of  the  fundamental 
difficulty  as  touching  the  supply  of  material  will  be 
res(uned  later.  The  Press  and  public,  of  course,  jirocecd 
to  blame  the  Ciovcrnmcnt  for  having  set  up  a  Committee 
which  has  proved  abortive  in  its  results.  Perhaps  the 
(iovernmcnt  are  to  blame  for  not  having  foreseen  the 
difficulties,  and  for  having  brought  into  being  a  com- 
mittee which  has  after  so  short  a  career  proved  a  failure, 
but  the  question  of  blame  or  otherwise  is  not  what  1  am 
out  to  discuss.  Naturallv  on  the  public  admission  of  the 
failure  we  turn  to  examine  the  alternative  proposals 
which  have  been  made  from  time  to  time  for  the 
strengthening  of  service  aeronuatics,  and  for  the  more 
active  persecution  of  air  warfare,  we  find  ourselves  faced, 
amongst  other  ]irojects  with  a  proposal  for  an  Air  Ministry 
with  full  executive  powers. 

Responsibility. 

This  proposal  requires  to  be  examined  and  studied  from 
the  two  points  of  view  by  which  any  scheme  of  military 
or  naval  reform  is  dominated  :  the  question  of  responsi- 
bility,'and  that  of  the  suppl\-.  The  rjuestion  of  respon- 
sibility is  one  which  is  always  paramount  and  which 
cannot  be  "  jockeyed  with "  without  disaster. ,  The 
question  of  supply  is  one  which  under  normal  conditions 
is  of  comparatively  easy  solution,  but  which  as  ex- 
perience has  shown  in  the  present  great  war,  is  one  of 
grave  and  fundamental  difficulty. 

In  dealing  with  the  question  of  responsibility  I  take 
it  as  an  axiom  that  the  responsibility  of  a  Commander- 
ir'^-Chief  for  the  employment  of  the  forces  allotted  to  him 
for  the  conduct  of  military  operations  must  be  absolute. 
There  may  be  restrictions  and  he  may  have  to  act  within 
the  limits  of  instructions  as  to  the  actual  task  he  is  called 
upon  to  perform;  these  may  be  dictated  by  political 
circumstances,  or  by  reason  of  grand  strategy  ;  but  once 
given  his  job  his  authority  must  be  supreme. 

I  take  it  as  a  further  axiom  that  in  the  supply  of  material 
and  personnel  full  responsibility  must  rest  with  tlic 
Admiralty  and  War  Office  respectively,  and  the  said 
responsibility  being  limited  by  the  resources  of  the 
country  either  as  defined  by  the" Parliamentary %Mauts  on 
supply  which  are  made  available  from  war  to  year,  or  in 
the  case  of  national  danger  by  the  "ultimate  financial 
and  material  resources  of  the"  country,  or  as  judged 
expedient  by  the  Cabinet  or  by  the  section  of  the  Ministry 
on  which  plenary  powers  have  been  conferred. 

When  as  in  the  present  great  war  the  resources  of  the 
country,  both  in  recruiting  for  all  arms,  and  for  industrial 
purposes  in  the  manufacture  of  munitions,  are  utilised 
or  commandeered  to  the  utmost,  it  becomes  one  of  the 
most  anxious  and  diflicult  duties  of  the  Ministry  properly 
to  allocate  these  resources  between  the  authorities 
who  are  responsible  ;  the  conditions  are  without  parallel 
in  our  previous  national  experience.  If  the  question  of 
the  great  war  had  been  studied  closely  by  competent 
authorities  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  to  a 
very  great  extent  the  position  could  have  been  forecast, 
and  on  the  outbreak  of  war  every  man  could  have  had  his 
duties  allotted  to  him,  subject  of  course  to  after  adjust- 
ments based  on  experience,  but  nothing  of  the  kind  was 
done,  and  it  is  scarcely  probable  that  our  Ministry  would 
have  dreamed  of  devoting  the  necessary  time  or  attention 
to  the  consideration  of  any  such  hypothetical  study. 
The  fact,  however,  which  is  "of  importance  is  that  it  was 
not  done.  Hence  we  have  had  industrial  firms  and 
recruiting  officers  competing  for  the  same  man  ;  we  have 
had  the  Army  and  the  Navy  competing  for  the  output  of 
the  .same  factory,  we  have  seen  firms  galore  with  pressure 
applied  from  two  different  authorities,  in  entirely  opposite 
directions,  not  knowing,  for  example,  whether  to  en- 
courage their  men  to  attest  under  the  Derbv  recruiting 
scheme  or  whether  to  toll  th-m  that  thev'were  doing 


April  20,  1916 


LAND       &      WATER 


13 


better  for  their  country  in  sticking  to  their  munition 
work.  We  have  had  at  times  all  the  indications  of  im- 
pending chaos  and  the  Government  has  had  to  improvise 
methods  to  deal  with  the  situation  as  it  has  arisen  ;  we 
ha\'e  thus  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  controlling  our 
munition  factories  and  iirms  engaged  on  Government 
contracts.  The  difficulty  of  fixing  fair  prices  for  muni- 
tions, machines,  etc.,  which  had  never  been  made  before 
was  thus  solved  by  the  simple  method  of  limiting  profits, 
so  that  to-day  it  is  of  little  national  consequence  at  what 
price  orders  are  placed  with  a  firm  under  the  Ministry 
of  JIunitions,  since  if  the  profit  is  excessive  it  comes  back 
to  the  Exchequer.  Though  some  of  the  more  Urgent 
difficulties  have  been  handled  by  these  means,  the  result 
is  far  from  perfect.  There  are  many  rocks  yet  to  be 
negotiated  by  further  improvised  methods  and  regula- 
tions. 

"  Forward  " 

All  these  difficulties  have  affected  and  still  affect  the 
supply  of  aircraft,  and  more  broadl\-  the  air  service 
malcricl.  It  may  be  that  the  air  service  is  more  affected 
than  some  of  the  older  arms  inasmuch  as  the  requirements 
are  far  more  difficult  to  forecast,  either  as  to  type  or 
quantity.  In  the  question  of  personnel  and  training  also 
the  provision  for  the  air  services  is  less  easy  to  deal  with  ; 
new  conditions  have  to  be  met  by  new  methods.  Those 
responsible  for  our  present  position  may  well  be 
proud  of  the  results  so  far  achieved  ;  we  have  in  the 
Royal  Fl3dng  Corps  a  service  which  has  never  failed  to 
hold  its  own  with  that  of  the  enemy,  and  this  under 
meteorological  disabilities  which  favour  the  enemy  one 
might  almost  say  in  the  ratio  of  two  to  one.  Still  the 
motto  must  be  continually  "  Forward." 

.It  is  thus  clear  that  under  the  present  conditions  our 
second  axiom,  the  plenar\-  responsibility  of  the  War  Office 
and  Admiralty  for  their  men  and  material  has  had  "  willy 
nilly  "  to  be  subject  to  external  regulation,  the  regula- 
tion of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  ;  and,  since  it  is  evident 
tiiat  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  is  of  the  nature  of  a  make- 
shift, and  has  not  been  worked  out  as  an  integral  part  of 
our  military  and  .naval  system,  its  powers  and  scope  are 
determined  as  a  matter  of  expediency  rather  than  as  a 
matter  of  logic.  Hence  at  present  firms  which  as  matter 
of  past  habit  and  tradition  have  been  working  exclusively 
or  nearly  exclusively  for  the  Admiralty  continue  to 
deal  with  the  Naval  Contracts  Departments  and  to 
supply  the  Navy  direct.  The  position  with  regard  to 
aircraft  and  much  of  the  aeronautical  material  is 
anomalous  in  this  respect.  It  is,  so  far  as  the  needs  of 
the  Army  are  concerned,  dealt  with  direct  by  the 
Director-General  of  Military  Aeronautics,  and  has  not 
been  brought  into  line  with  army  materiel  of  other 
kinds ;  it  may  be  remarked,  however,  that  the  functions 
and  scope  of  the  Minister  of  Munitions  are  liable  to  be 
extended  if  circumstances  warrant. 

I  will  now  in  the  light  of  the  above  pass  to  examine 
the  suggestions  which  have  been  made  on  the  question  of 
an  independent  Air  Service,  and  will  firstly  deal  with  the 
current  or  popular  cry  that  the  existing  air  branches  of 
the  Army  and  Navy  respectively —namely,  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  and  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  involve 
"  overlapping  "  and  therefore  must  be  amalgamated  into 
a  National  Air  Service,  independently  controlled.  This 
suggestion  I  propose  to  show  is  based  on  fallacious  views. 
If  carried  out  in  Mo  it  infringes  absolutely  the  axioms 
laid  down,  and  can  only  result  in  confusion  and  the 
"  evaporation  "  of  responsibilit3^ 

The  Slogan  :  "  One  Element  One  Service  " 

There  is  no  virtue  in  mere  words,  but  the  general 
public  have  a  tendency  to  accept  an  idea  neatly  ex- 
pressed in  an  epigrammatic  way,  or  to  accept  a  slogan 
of  any  kind  without  enquiring  too  deeply  into  its  intrinsic 
merits.  I  propose  to  deal  with  this  cry  "  One  element 
one  service  "  at  the  outset.  It  sounds  so  very  plausible 
and  might  be  easily  taken  to  express  some  fundamental 
and  necessary  fact.  If  it  means  anything,  it  means 
that  there  is  some  kind  of  symmetrical  relation- 
ship between  land,  air  and  water,  so  far  as  warfare  is 
concerned,  that  entitle  the  three  so-called  "  elements  " 
to  symmetrical  treatment,  but  will  this  view  stand  in- 
vestigation ?     An  army  fighting  on  land  is  fightinji  on 


land  ;  it  can  only  be  directly  supported  from  the  sea,  or 
it  can  only  be  directly  in  relation  to  naval  operations 
when  the  zone  of  hostilities  extends  to  the  littoral.  A 
navy  fighting  at  sea  is  fighting  at  sea  ;  it  can  only  be 
directly  affected,  and  the  two  present  Services  can  only 
directly  participate  in  a  given  operation  when  that 
operation  is  in  a  coastal  region.  Under  these  conditions 
the  employment  of  two  independent  Services  under  their 
respective  Ministerial  heads  is  clearly  appropriate. 
.  The  proportion  of  the  total  world  area  in  which  hos- 
tilities common  to  the  two  Services  can  take  place  is 
small  compared  to  the  total  areas  involved.  Thus  an 
exclusively  naval  action  may  take  place  anywhere  on 
the  broad  ocean,  or  in  our  narrower  seas,  such  as  the 
North  Sea  or  English  Channel.  An  exclusively  military 
operation  may  take  place  anywhere  in  the  length  and 
breadth  of  a  continent.  In  neither  case  will  the  one 
service  be  called  upon  to  co-operate  directly  with  the 
other.  It  is  only  when  the  naval  operations  affect  a 
coast  line  or  the  military  operations  stretch  to  within 
range  of  naval  guns  that  the  two  Services  are  required 
to  act  in  conjunction. 

Is  there  any  analogy  to  this  in  the  air  ?  The  answer 
is  emphatically  no.  There  is  no  place  in  the  field  of 
military  operations  where  aircraft  cannot  co-operate  ; 
the  coast  line  of  the  air  is  the  surface  of  the  earth  and  the 
surface  of  the  sea  ;  there  is  nowhere  on  the  surface  of  our 
seas  or  the  broad  ocean  where  aircraft  cannot  co-operiate 
with  the  Navy  ;  thus  the  conditions  are  totally  dissimilar. 
In  the  future  of  military  operations  the  co-operation  of 
aircraft — aeroplanes — will  be  continuous,  and  the  aero- 
nautical arm  will  be  constantly  acting  in  the  closest 
possible  detailed  relationship  with  the  other  arms  of  the 
Service  ;  it  is  so  acting  to-day.  In  the  Navy  again 
aircraft,  both  large  dirigibles  and  aeroplanes,  and  so- 
called  seaplanes,  will  be  acting  continuously,  undertaking 
reconnaissance,  bombing,  torpedoing,  spotting,  and  per- 
haps other  duties  not  yet  defined.  The  employment  of 
aircraft  as  an  auxiliary  to  the  Navy  is  relatively  back- 
ward, but  every  month  has  its  record  of  progress  and 
every  year  will  show  its  accumulated  advance  ;  it  may 
be  anticipated  the  relation  will  ultirnately  be  as  intimate 
(or  nearly  so)  as  that  in  the  sister  Service. 

Go-operated  Action 

The  situation  is  not  symmetrical,  and  the  slogan 
"  One  Element  one  Service  "  has  no  rational  foundation 
in  fact 

If  naval  and  military  operations  were  interlocked  as 
closely  as  aircraft  and  military  operations  are,  on  the  one 
hand,  or  as  aircraft  and  naval  operations  give  promise  of 
becoming  on  the  other,  it  is  more  than  doubtful  whether 
our  present  system  of  two  independent  Services  would  be 
found  the  best  solution  as  it  is  to-day.  When  it  is 
required  to  conduct  joint  operations,  as  in  Gallipoli 
recently,  and  as  in  many  of  the  great  beUigeient  opera- 
rions  of  history,  the  forces  representing  the  two  Services 
are  under  two  separate  commands  and  the  success  of  the 
operations  in  every  case  largely  depends  upon  the  working 
together  of  the  responsible  Commanders.  Many  ex- 
amples could  be  quoted  from  history  where  a  failure  of 
close  co-operation  has  resulted  in  a  corresponding  failure 
of  the  operation  as  a  whole.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
if  such  operations  were  the  rule  rather  than  the  exception 
the  system  of  controlling  Army  and  Navy  as  two  inde- 
pendent Services  would  be  found  to  possess  glaring 
defects. 

But  the  inter-relation  of  Army  and  Navy  even  under 
conditions  of  co-operation  is  by  no  means  so  close  as  that 
which  experience  has  proved  necessary  and  desirable  be- 
tween the  Army  and  its  Air  Service,  and  the  divorcing  of 
the  one  from  the  other  or  the  division  of  responsibility, 
however  effected  between  the  Flying  f  orps,  by  whate\-er 
name  it  may  be  called,  and  the  other  arms  of  the  military 
service,  must  be  considered  impossible  to  the  extent  of 
absurdity;  hkewise  in  the  R.N.A.S.  I  am  sure  that  in 
saying  this  my  opinion  would  receive  the  support  of 
every  military  officer  of  experience  and  of  every  strategist 
or  tactician  of  repute. 

Almost  as  insidious  a  suggestion  as  that  involved  in 
the  cry  "  One  element  one  service,"  is  contained  in  the 
suggestion  that  the  provision  of  materiel  and  the  training 
of  personnel  should  be  vested  in  a  central  authority. 
The  idea  of  those  who  advocate  this  scheme  appears  to 


14 


LAND     &     WA T  E  R 


April  20,  1 916 


be  that  tlie  training  of  pilots  and  obser\-ers  and  the  supply 
of  aeroplanes,  likewise  the  supply  of  counter-aircraft, 
artillery  and  the  training  of  gunners,  should  be  carried 
out  under  the  authority  of  an  Air  Minister  who  would 
decide  after  discussion  with  the  Services  what  motors, 
machines,  guns,  etc.,  should  be  adopted,  what  quantities 
should  be  provided,  from  what  sources  they  should  be 
obtained,  and  in  addition  to  this,  how  the  personnel 
should  be  recruited,  how  and  where  trained,  etc.,  and  the 
said  Ministry  sliould  be  responsible  for  supplying  to  both 
Army  and  Navy  its  section  or  share  of  .the  national  Air 
Service  "  ready  made." 

Output  and  Demands 

When  considering  a  suggestion  of  this  kind  it  is  not 
possible  to  condemn  the  whole  scheme  out  of  liand  on 
any  broad  or  fundamental  principle.  There  have  been 
and  are  so  many  things  which  are  to  a  certain  extent 
anomalous  both  in  the  recruiting  and  training  of  our 
Annies  and  in  the  control  and  suj)ply  of  material,  and 
such  anomalous  arrangements  have  been  in  the  past 
successful  to  a  greater  or  lesser  degree.  It  is  thus  not 
jwssible  to  condemn  a  new  scheme  out  of  hand  however 
unlikely  or  anomalous  it  may  appear  at  the  outset. 

It  would  be  useless  to  discuss  any  scheme  at  the  present 
time  on  too  broad  a  basis  ;  the  country  is  at  war,  and  the 
war  conditions  which  obtain  are  admittedly  abnormal. 
M'lien  we  talk  of  the  supply  of  material  we  ha\e  innnedi- 
ately  to  visuahsc  the  difticulties  with  which  the  supplies 
of  material  of  all  kinds  are  at  present  surrounded.  The 
conditions  are  detinitely  those  of  a  shortage,  and  when- 
ever augmented  supplies  of  one  kind  are  deemed  necessary 
the  question  immediately  arises  as  to  what  other  kinds  of 
supplies  or  munitions  may  be  curtailed.  Thus  the  supply 
of  counter-aiicraft  guns  could  be  augmented  considerably 
at  very  short  notice  at  the  expense  of  artillery  of  other 
kinds,  or  looking  at  the  matter  from  another  standpoint, 
a  given  increased  demand  for  counter-aircraft  artillery 
could  be  mebil  the  possible  increase  in  the  output  of  other 
kinds  of  artillery  is  moderated.  Under  the  conditions 
of  a  constantly  growing  output  from  our  arms  and  munition 
factories  it  is  rather  a  matter  of  in  which  direction  must 
the  growth  of  output  be  directed  than  a  definite  curtail- 
ment of  one  kind  or  another.  The  ultimate  limit  of  the 
sum  and  total  will  be  the  number  of  men  or  hands  and 
the  output  per  man . 

We  have  already  a  Ministry  of  Munitions  controlling  a 
large  proportion  of  the  output  of  the  country',  in  fact 
with  a  few  exceptions  the  whole  of  the  mihtary  require- 
ments in  the  direction  of  arms  and  munitions  are  imder 
the  control  of  the  said  Ministry.  We  have  the  Navy 
acting  independently  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  mainly 
through  firms  whose  output  has  been  in  the  past  devoted 
}nainly  to  Navy  requirements.  As  already  stated  the 
reason  the  Naval  supplies  have  not  come  under  the  control 
of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  is  rather  a  matter  of  ex- 
pediency than  logic.  In  brief  the  division  of  responsi- 
bility is  the  best  practicable  solution  available  at  the 
moment.  When  at  any  point  the  Admiralty  and  Muni- 
tions requirements  clash,  as  where  firms  are  doing  work 
for  both,  or  where  a  given  article  is  required  by  both, 
the  matter  is  one  of  arrangement,  and  the  most  usual 
solution  is  that  the  output  of  certain  firms  is  allotted 
to  meet  the  naval  needs. 

We  hear  the  outcry  that  often  the  Army  pays 
one  price  for  an  article  and  the  Navy  another  ;  to  the 
layman,  this  soimds  perhaps  absurd  and  as  betokening 
gross  mismanagement.  Sometimes  this  may  be  so.  To 
the  man  who  has  any  experience  of  manufacture,  however, 
it  is  often  (juite  clear  that  so-called  scandals  of  this  kind 
have  no  real  foundation  ;  all  linns  are  not  equally  well  laid 
out  forjthe  same  job,  and  what  in  one  factory  may  cost  £100 
may  cost  in  another  factory  half  as  much  again  without 
any  blame  attaching  to  the  management  of  the  latter. 
Whatever  is !  wanted  by  a  country  [at  war  has  to 
be  made  with  whatever  tools  are  available,  whether  they 
are  specially  suited  to  the  purpose  or  not.  It  is  one  of 
the  main  ftmctions  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  to  adjust 
and  regulate  the  various  demands  to  suit  the  admitted 
relative  importance  of  the  supplies  concerned.  The 
whole  "  Munitions  Machine"  is  an  improvised  makeshift  ; 
it  does  its  best. 

The  proposition  for  the  amalgamation  of  the  Air 
Services,  which  I  am  now  criticisin.c:.  amounts  in  the 


matter  of  material  to  the  substitution  of  a  fourth  party, 
a  Ministry  of  the  Air  who  will  take  the  responsibility 
of  providing  for  both  ArJkiy  and  Navy  so  far  as  aero- 
nautics in  the  Services  is  concerned,  and  in  tliis  respect  the 
proposed  Air  Ministry  would  act  as  a  special  Munitions 
Ministry  as  concerning  aircraft  and  material,  and  would 
compete  in  turn  with  the  three  existing  competitors,  the 
Admiralty,  the  War  Office  and  the  Ministry  of  Munitions 
for  the  nation's  output.  So  far  as  this  aspect  of  the 
question  is  concerned,  1  think  that  for  the  duration  of 
the  war  at  least  it  would  be  preferable  to  end  the 
anomalous  position  of  the  present  supplies  of  aeronautical 
material  by  placing  same  under  the  control  of  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions  as  at  present  instituted,  possibly  as  a  sub- 
department.  This  would  tend  to  reduce  the  present 
competition  rather  than  increase  it.  Further  it  would 
simplify  matters,  inasmuch  as  the  Ministry  of  Munitions 
has  been  set  up  to  keep  the  Army  supplied,  and  the  War 
Office  is  the  only  capable  and  competent  authority  to 
decide  whether  it  is  most  in  want  of  high  explosive 
shells,  or  field  artillery,  or  howitzer  batteries,  counter-air- 
craft artillery,  mechanical  transport,  aeroplanes,  etc..  etc. 

In  my  opinion  to  create  another  authority  to  enter 
into  cornpetition  for  the  supply  of  material  with  those 
which  exist,  to  divide  the  responsibility  of  the  Navy  as 
to  its  supplies  of  aeronautical  material,  and  to  single  out 
and  separate  a  particular  class  of  munition  for  a  kind  of 
parish-pump  treatment  has  nothing  to  commend  it  and 
may  lead  to  serious  deadlock  or  at  least  result  in  confusion. 

Again,  are  we  so  sure  that  the  men  who  to-day  specify 
their  requirements  for  the  Army  or  for  the  Navy  are  so' 
obtuse  or  arc  so  ignorant  as  is  popularly  represented  ? 
They  are  doubtless  human  and  therefore  liable  to  err,  but 
the '  proposed  Air  Ministry  will  also  be  human,  and 
surely  no  less  likely  to  make  mistakes. 

Personnel 

There  is  unquestionably  something  which  might  b 
done  in  the  direction  of  unifying  dedgn  as  between  the 
Services.  There  is  doubtless  much  which  could  be  done 
in  the  direction  of  ensuring  that  the  aeronautical  branches 
of  our  Services  were  making  full  use  of  each  others'  ex- 
perience ;  I  said  all  this  myself  eighteen  months  ago  when 
writing  my  "  Aircraft  in  Warfare,"  but  it  is  by  no  means 
evident  that  an  Air  Ministry  would  achieve  this  end,  or 
if  it  were  to  achieve  this  end  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that 
it  would  not  be  at  the  expense  of  efficiency. 

So  much  from  the  point  of  view  of  materiel.  How 
now  does  the  air  amalgamation  scheme  show  up  when  we 
come  to  the  question  of  personnel.  To  my  mind  here 
again  difticulties  are  certain  to  be  riiet  with;  unfortun- 
ately the  point  is  one  on  which  the  opinion  of  a 
military  man  would  have  infinitely  more  weight  than  my 
own.  I  will  only  say  that  I  am  astounded  to  hear  the 
glib  way  in  which  is  suggested  the  training  of  military  and 
naval  men  and  officers  by  a  third  party,  the  Minister  of 
the  Air,  who  is  neither  military  nor  naval,  and  must  in 
the  first  instance  borrow  his  personnel  from  the  Army 
on  the  one  hand  and  the  Navy  on  the  other,  before  he 
can  begin  operations.  1  cannot  believe  that  unless  what 
I  have  called  the  ''  greater  scheme  ' '  be  adopted,  any  good 
result  could  come  from  taking  the  training  and  disciplin- 
ing of  the  personnel  of  either  the  Army  or  the  Navy  out 
of  the  hands  of  the  proper  authorities,  nariiely  the  Army 
or  Navy ,  themselves,  and  I  am  greatly  surprised  to  see 
such  views  obtaining  any  kind  of  currency.  It  is  not 
my  view  that  it  would  be  definitely  impossible  to  carry 
out  such  a  scheme  ;  1  believe  that  it  would  be  possible, 
but  I  think  it  is  grotesque  to  imagine  that  the  results 
would  be  more  satisfactory,  cither  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  Army,  of  the  Na\y,  or  of  the  nation  as  a 
whole.  I  will  jnit  tlie  matter  in  a  nutshell  by  .-aying  that 
the.\rmy  understands  the  training  of  a  soldier,  whether 
it  be  cavalry,  infantry  or  artillery  ;  the  Navy  understands 
the  training  of  its  personnel  in  all  its  existing  branches  ; 
there  is  more  in  the  training  for  the  Army  or  for  the 
Navy,  qua  Army  and  Navy,  than  there  is  for  the  branch  of 
the  Service  for  which  the  training  is  a  preparation. 

I  have  said  that  this  is  a  point  on  which  there  arc  others 
who  could  speak  with  far  greater  knowledge  and  authority 
than  I  possess.  Doubtless  there  will  be  expressions  of 
opinion  on  the  jjoint  from  competent  Naval  or  Military 
authorities  before  the  question  of  service  aeronautics  is 
finally  settled. 


April  20,  1916 


L  A  N  i)      &      W  A  T  E  R 


15 


The  New  Dominion 

"And  thou  shalt  have  Dominion."— Genesis,  Chap.  I 

These  verses,  written  by  Lord  Montagu  of  Beaulieu  in  1910  for  the  Christmas  number  of  "  The  Car,"  show  a 
remarkable  insight  into  the  possibilities  of  the  aeroplane,  of  which  recent  events  have  afforded  a  striking  demonstration. 

Mai  Qaeitlom  thi  Atroplam  The   Wind  Answers 

BRING  you  War  on  your  widespread  pinions,  or  the  Ask  the  bird  that  wheels    above    yon  if  I  bear  nol  with 
Peace    compelled  by  Fear  ?  tenderest  care, 

Will  j'ou   shatter  armies  in  battle,  or  travellers  Ask  the  oak  I  have  kissed  ten  lifetimes,  though  I  stripped 
onward  bear  ?  his  br.inches  bare, 

There  is  fate  beyond  our  foresight  in  your  planes  and  Ask  the  sea  whom  I  stir  ivith  my  breathings,  how  my  ordered 

your  tight-strung  wires,  cyclones  blow,    ■, 

Will   you  weld   the  hearts   of  nations,    or  kindle  their  Ask  the  seed  wafted  on  to  its  seedbed  to  shelter  under  the 
racial  fires  ?  snow. 


Rising,  soaring,  swooping,  a  speck  in  the  open  sky. 

Through    clouds    and    windstorms    daring   the    thunder      ^^'"'  ''^'''"  Q-'-'t'o"'  ""  Aeroplane 


itself  to  defy. 
Wonderful,  fragile,  unstable,  that  harder  might  be  the 

test. 
You  have  killed  our  sons  without  pity,  taking  the  lives 

of  the  best. 


Ths  Aeroplani  Answers 

I  destroy  not  in  sport  or  error,  but  I  kill  inv  pilots  who 

fail 
For  an  instant  to  gauge  my  temper,  or  I  leave  them  maimed 

by  the  gale. 
In  the  element  last  to  b:  conquered,  shall  my  heart  b2  easy 

to  gain. 
Shall  I  let  fools  guess  my  problems,  or  make  r.iy  meaning 

plain  '' 


Min  Qaestiont  ths   Wind 


Thou   Sphinx   of  the   middle   ;cther   poised  lone  'twixt 

the  clouds  and  the  sun, 
The  falcon  and  swift  are  conquered  by  thy  magic  speed 

outdone, 
Cans't  thou  reach  the  fleecy  cirrus  where  Paradise  opens 

its  gate  ? 
Thou  symbol  of  man  striving  upward,  seeking  ever  his 

freedntn  from  Fate. 


The  Aeroplane  Answers 

The  God  that  sent  you  knowledge,  and  made  your  iyes  to 

see. 
He  ordered  the  timi  of  my  coming,  and  Power  he  gave  to 

I  me  ; 
Ths  youngest  child  of  Motion  in  ths  cave  of  the  winds  was 

I  bjrn. 
The  Spirit  of  Speed  was  my  father,  my  mother  the  Goddess 

of  Dawn. 


\\md  of  the  land,  now  tell  me,  scent  laden  with  clover      Thus  doth  He  send  ms  for  Warfare,  for  Peace,  for  the 

and  rose.  ultimate  good 

Wmd  of  the  sea,  brine  laden,  knowest  thou  how  the  sea-     Of  the  nations  willing  to  woo  me  and  fathom  my  every 


gull  goes  ? 


mood. 


Wmd  oi  the  Day,  in  thy  fullness,  declare  the  charms      That  the  end  may  bs  won  by  courage,  as  it  was  since  the 
that  can  save,  a,o,^;^  5_.^^„_ 

Wmd  of  the  night,  in  thy  softness,  thy  secret  reveal  to      To  give  the  New  Dominion  of  the  wayward  air  to  man. 
the  brave.  Christmas,  1910.  Montagu  of  Beaulieu. 


Shakespeare   To-day 


Si 


By  Sir  Sidney  Lee 


UNDAY  next  is 
the  300th  anni- 
versary of  Shake- 

speare's      death. 

It  is  also  the  day  of 
the  patron  saint  of 
.^  England,  St.  George. 
'  '^  The  obsession  of  the 
war,  and  the  imperative 
need  of  concentrating 
the  national  energy  on 
'1  its  prosecution  to  as- 
sured victory  give  no 
just  ground  for  denying 
to  -Shakespeare's  name 
the  commemorative 
honours  which  are  due 
to  him  on  so  auspicious 
an  occasion  as  the 
tercentenary  of  his  death.  Rather,  the  national  crisis 
enjoins  us  to  dwell  on  Shakespeare's  heroic  achievement, 
even  more  earnestly  than  in  a  season  of  normal  calm. 


A  fit  appreciation  of  a  country's  past  triumphs  stimu- 
lates confidence  in  the  future.  A  slight  acquaintance 
with  the  recent  intellectual  history  of  the  world  makes 
it  clear  that  Shakespeare  constitutes  the  high  water 
mark  of  our  country's  achievement  in  the  sphere  of 
mind.  To  focus  public  attention  on  the  dominion  which 
he  has  exercised  and  is  exercising  over  the  intelligence  of 
his  fellow-countrymen  and  fellow-countrywomen — to  re- 
mind ourselves  at  this  juncture  of  the  sway  which  this 
Englishman  wields  over  the  thought  of  the  civilised 
world — can  only  tend  to  strengthen  our  faith  in  our 
country's  cause,  and  to  confirm  us  in  our  resolve  to  pre- 
serve it  from  every  peril. 

II. 

There  is  no  touch  of  insulaj-ity  about  Shakespeare.  He 
was  accessible  to  all  mannen.-  of  foreign  influences  ;  he 
sought  his  plots  as  often  as  not  in  foreign  fiction,  Itahan, 
French  and  Danish.  He  .gives  his  leading  characters 
foreign  names — Othello,  Prospero,  Miranda,  Polonius, 
Imogen,  Hcnuione,  lago,  Rcmeo,  and  himdreds  of  others 
Much  foreign   sent.'xncnt   lives  in  his  pages.     His  aler 


l6 


LAND     &     WATER 


April  20,  1916 


mental  receptivity  rendered  him  sensitive  to  well-nigli 
every  form  of  thought  and  emotion,  and  he  assimilated 
foreign  forms  of  thouglit  and  emotion,  with  whicii  he  met 
in  foreign  bool<s,  as  readily  and  as  completely  as  the 
thought  and  emotion  which  he  observed  in  the  streets  of 
London  or  the  Warwickshire  lanes.  There  is  no  evidence 
that  he  ever  went  abroad.  But  while  his  largeness  of 
outlook  jnohibited  any  narrow  insular  prejudices,  there 
was  fused  with  his  tolerant  sympathy  for  all  human  hope 
or  suffering,  there  was  welded  with  his  comprehensive 
insight  into  all  human  aspiration,  an  intuitive  faith  in 
the  destinies  of  his  own  country,  an  affectionate  and  an 
enthusiastic  recognition  of  her  virtues,  combined  with 
an  alert  perception  of  her  failings. 

Shake^.jieare  has  left  on  ample  record  proofs  of  his 
interest  in  his  country's  history,  chiefly  in  the  great 
series  of  history  plays.  The  influence  which  that  part 
of  his  work  has  exerted  on  his  fellow  countrymen  in 
rpreading  historical  knowledge  of  and  interest  in  English 
history  is  almost  sufhcicnt  in  itself  to  entitle  him  to 
an  imperial  demonstration  of  honour  at  the  moment. 
Two  of  the  greatest  ligu'res  in  our  history — one  the  greatest 
of  our  past  generals,  the  Duke  of  Marlborough  ;  and  the 
other  the  greatest  of  our  imperial  Statesmen,  the  Earl  of 
Chatham — both  acknowledged  that  all  that  they  knew 
of  Enghsh  history  they  learned  from  Shakespeare's 
jxiges. 

No  morbid  cosmopolitan  tendency  could  live  in  the 
air  of  these  history  plays.  Yet  it  may  not  be  the  in- 
struction they  furnish  in  historic  fact  that  gives  them 
their  main  value.  Their  importance  lies  to-day  at  any 
rate,  in  the  broad  illustration  they  offer  of  the  virtuous 
or  beneficent  working  of  the  patriotic  instinct.  That 
theme  Shakespeare  presents  in  every  light ;  he  does  not 
neglect  the  malevolent  symptoms  incident  either  to  its 
exorbitant  or  its  defective  growth,  nor  is  he  wanting  in 
suggestions  as  to  how  its  healthy  development  may  be 
.     best  secured. 

Although  many  other  passages  call  equally  well  for 
citation,  Shakespeare's  principle  of  patriotism  is  summed 
up  for  his  fellow-countrymen  and  fellow-countrywomen, 
as  clearly  and  as  pointedly  as  anywhere,  in  his  familiar 
warning : 

"  This  England  never  did,   nor  ever  shall. 
Lie  at  tiie  proud  foot  of  a  conqueror. 
But  when  it  first  did  help  to  wound  itself. 
.     .     .     Nought  shall  make  us  rue. 
If  England  to  itself  do  rest  but  true." 

in. 

On  every  phase  of  our  present  situation  Shakespeare 
offers  us  words  of  good  cheer  and  good  counsel.  Here 
is  one  rousing  assurance  of  his  which  may  be  offered  our 
new  married  levies  in  his  name  : 

"If  you  fight  against  God's  enemy, 
God  will  in  justice  ward  you  as  his  soldiers  ; 
If  you  do  swear  to  put  a  tyrant  down. 
You  sleep  in  peace,  the  tyrant  being  slain  ; 
If  you  do  fight  against  your  country's  foes. 
Your  country's  foe  shall  pay  your  pains  the  hire  ; 
If  you  do  fight  in  safeguard  of  your  wives. 
Your  wives  shall  welcome  home  the  conquerors  ; 
If  you  do  free  your  children  from  the  sword. 
Your  children's  children  quit  it  in  your  age." 

»  None  saw  more  clearly  than  Shakespeare  England's 
destiny  to  command  the  seas,  "  which  he  hath  given 
for  fence  impregnable."  In  Shakespeare's  sight  the  sea 
was  lli(!  "  natural  bravery  "    of  this  island  : 

"  Which  stands 
As  Neptune's  park,  ribbed  and  paled  in, 
With  rocks  imscaleable  and  roaring  waters  ; 
With  sands  that  will  not  bear  your  enemies'  boats, 
But  sink  them  up  to  the  topmast." 

Shakespeare  has  much  to  say  of  the  horrors  of  war 
and  the  blessings  of  peace  ;  but  be  insists  with  all  his 
angelic  strength  on  the  prudent  creed  that  the  best 
preventive  of  war  (human  nature  being  what  it  is)  is 
ureparcdness  in  time  of  peace  : 

"  Peace  itself  should  not  so  dull  a  kingdom 

(Tlio'  war  nor  no  known  quarrel  were  in  question) 
]iut  that  defences,  musters,  preparations 
Should  be  maintained,  assembled  and  collected. 
As  were  a  war  in  exoectation." 


In  the  same  vein  the  dramatist  [offers^  such  sage  pieces 
of  advice  as  these  ; 

"  Beware 
Of  entrance  to  a  quarrel,  but  being  in 
Bear't  that  the  opposed  may  beware  of  thee." 

"  In  peace  tiiere's  nothing  so  becomes  a  man 
.■\s  modest  stillness  and  humility. 
But  when  the  blast  of  War  blows  in  his  ears. 
Then  imitate  the  action  of  the  tiger." 

Above  all  is  it  worthy  of  remembrance  that,  highly 
as  Shakespeare  rates  courage,  he  declares  repeatedly  that 
wars  are  won  by  "  wisdom,"  seconded  by  "  valour  " 
and  never  by  "  valour  "  alone. 

"  The  better  part  of  valour  is  discretion." 

"  When  valour  preys  on  reason 
It  eats  the  sword  it  fights  with  " 

are  invaluable  coinages  from  the  Shakespearean  mint. 
Shakespeare  illumines  with  a  piercing  irony  his  denuncia- 
tion of  those  who 

"  Count  wisdom  as  no  member  of  the  war 
.     .     .     .     and  esteem  no  Ect 
But  that  of  hand." 

With  magical  insight  does  the  dramatist  extol 

"  The  still  and  mental  parts 
That  do  contrive  how  many  hands  shall  strike 
When  fitness  calls  them  on,  and  know  by  measure 
Of  their  observ'ant  toil  the  enemy's  weight." 

Military  victory,  according  to  the  Shakespearean 
dispensation,   only  attends 

"  Those. that  with  the  fineness  of  their  souls 
By  reason  guide  the  course  of  war." 

IV. 

Shakespeare's  words  are  accessible  to  all  mankind. 
Our  German  foe  is  making  many  arrogant  and  unvcr- 
acious  claims,  among  which  his  boast  of  identity  with 
Shakespeare's  spirit  is  the  most  ludicrous.  Shakespeare 
is  free  of  the  Prussian  taint,  and  no  Teutonic  quibbling 
can  rob  Britons  of  their  exclusive  racial  affinity  with  him. 
"  Yes,  this  Shakespeare  is  ours  ;  we  produced  him  ;  we 
speak  and  think  by  him  ;  we  are  of  one  blood  and  kind 
with  him."  In  English  ears  Shakespeare's  poetry  of  war 
has,  by  virtue  of  its  animating  vigour  and  ripe  wisdom,  no 
rival.  Englishmen  have  but  to  study  their  Shakespeare 
in  order  to  recognise  that,  if  a  nation's  poetry  can  now, 
as  in  older  times,  lead  armj^  and  navy  to  victory,  this 
country  stands  small  risk  of  faihu-e  in  to-day's  mighty 
conflict.  It  is  well  for  the  English-speaking  peoples  to 
recall  this  week  Carlyle's  moving  words,  now  seventy- 
four  years  old,  and  to  try  to  realise  their  significance. 
"  This  King  Shakespeare,  does  he  not  shine  in  crowned 
sovereignty,  over  us  all,  as  the  noblest,  gentlest,  yet 
strongest  of  rallying  signs  ;  indestructible  ;  really  more 
valuable  in  that  point  of  view  than  any  other  means  or 
appliance    whatsoever  ?  " 

Active  Service  Exhibition 

When  fifty  Grenadier  Guardsmen,  who  have  been  to  the 
front,  are  told  off  to  make  real  trenches  for  all  England  to 
explore,  it  seems  a  pity  that  such  a  permanent  effort  should 
last  but  a  month.  Therefore  one  rejoices  to  know  that  the 
Active  Service  Ivxhibition,  promoted  by  the  Daily  Mail 
in  aid  of  the  Red  Cross  and  St.  John  Societies,  is  to  be  continued 
(luring  the. summer  at  the  Kniglitsbridge  Hall.         ' 

In  addition  to  the  trenches,  the  attractions  include  a 
wonderful  collection  of  war*  relics,  shells,  grenades,  trench 
mortars,  trench  catapults,  and  other  weapons  loaned  by  H.M. 
Board  of  Munitions,  and  a  most  interesting  display  of  inven- 
tions which  have  been  created  as  a  result  of  the  great  war. 

The  complete  gallery  of  signed  artists'  proofs  of  Louis 
Raemaekers'  wonderful  war  cartoons  has  been  retained  and 
added  to.  Then  there  are  the  scenes  of  battlefields  viewed 
through  trench  periscopes,  and  the  very  realistic  sniper's 
post  with  its  machine-gun  in  working-order. 

Eacli  day  all  these  object-lessons  on  the  war  are  to  be  seen 
for  a  shilling  from  ir  a.m.  to  5  p.m.,  and  for  sixpence  from 
5  to  8  p.m.  The  only  extra  charge  is  sixpence  for  viewing  Mr. 
Arthur  CoUins's  vivid  representation  of  the  Bombardment  of 
Ypres.  The  public  not  only  gains  full  value  for  money  in 
\isiting  the  Active  Service  Exhibition,  but  obtains  an  actual 
idea  of  the  conditions  under  which  our  soldiers  live  ind  fight. 


April  20,  191(5 


LAND     &     WATER 

CHAYA 

^  ^^mance  of  the  South  Seas 

"By  H.  'DE  FERE  STAC  POOLE 


17 


Syxopsis  :  MacquaH,  an  adventurer  who  has  spent 
most  of  his  life  at  sea,  finds  himself  in  Sydney  on  his  beam 
ends.  He  has  a  wonderful  story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in 
A'ew  Guinea,  and  makes  the  acquaintance  of  Tillman,  a  sporting 
man  about  town,  fond  of  ya.hUng  and  racing,  and  of  Houghton, 
a  well-educated  Englishman  out  of  a  job.  Through  Tillman's 
influence  he  is  introduced  to  a  wealthy  woolbroker.  Screed,  who, 
having  heard  Macquart's  story,  agrees  to  finance  the  enterprise. 
Screed  purchases  a  yawl,  the  "  Barracuda.  '  Just  before  ihev 
leave  Macquart  encounters  an  old  shipmate.  Captain  Hull, 
who  is  fully  acquainted  with  his  villainies.  Hull  gets  in  touch 
with  Screed,  who  engages  him  and  brings  him  aboard  the  yacht 
just  as  they  are  about  to  sail.  They  arrive  at  New  Guinea  and 
anchor  in  a  lagoon.  They  go  by  boat  up  a  river  where  they 
make  the  acquaintance  of  a  drunken  Dutchman,  Wiart,  who 
is  in  charge  of  a  rubber  and  camphor  station.  Here  they 
me:t  a  beautiful  Dyak  girl.  Chaya.  According  to  Macquart's 
story  a  man  named  Lant,  who  had  seized  this  treausure,  sunk  his 
ship  and  murdered  his  crew  with  the  exception  of  one  man, 
"  Smith."  Lant  then  settled  here,  buried  the  treasure,  and  married 
a  Dvak  woman,  chief  of  her  tribe.  Lant  was  murdered  by 
"  Smith,"  whom  Captain  Hull  and  the  rest  make  little  doubt 
was  no  other  than  Macquart.  Chaya,  with  whom  Houghton 
has  fallen  in  love,  is  Latit's  half-caste  daughter.  Macquart 
guides  them  to  a  spot  on  the  river-bank  where  he  declares  the 
cache  to  be.  They  dig  but  find  nothing.  Then  he  starts  the. 
surmise  that  the  Dyaks  have  moved  the  treasure  to  a  sacred 
grove  in  the  jungle.  Wiart  is  hfs  authority.  He  persuades 
his  shipmates  to  go  in  search  of  if.  The  ■journey  leads  them 
through  the  Great  Thorn  Hush,  which  is  a  vast  maze  from  lehich 
escape  is  impossible  without  a  clue.  Macquart  and  Wiart 
desert  their  companions.  As  night  falls 'a  woman's  voice  is 
heard  calling,  and  Chaya,  Unsweri'ng  their  cries,  finds  them. 

CHAPTER  XXV 

Mitu. 

TILLMAN,  wlio  liad  now  finished  his  supper 
began  to  question  Chaya.  She  described  lier 
wanderings  amongst  the  tliorn.  She  had  never 
been  here  before,  always  avoiding  the  mysterious 
place,  which  had  the  reputation  of  being  haunted. 

The  reason  of  this  reputation  lay  in  the  fact,  perhaps, 
that  some  natives  who  had  come  in  here  had  never  returned. 
One  of  its  names  in  the  Papuan  was  the  Place  of  Confusion. 

"  A  jolly  good  name,  too."  said  Tillman,  "  but  you  say 
the  Rubber  Man  has  been  here  several  times  ;  how  does  he 
know  the  place  so  well  that  he  leads  us  here,  yet  escapes 
himself  ?  " 

"  He  is  perhaps  known  to  the  evil  spirits,"   said  Chaya. 

"  I  shouldn't  wonder,"  said  Tillman.  "  He's  well 
enough  known  to  Gin  anyway.  Oh,  the  skunk  !  li  I  ever  get 
hold  of  him  !" 

"  What  I  want  to  get  hold  of,"  said  Hull,  who  had  lit  his 
pipe,  "  is  them  whiskers.  I  wants  to  sit  comfortable  on  that 
chap's  chest  and  play  with  them  whiskers.  I  wants  a  pair  of 
tweezers  and  no  help  from  no  razor.  I  wants  to  talk  to  him, 
same  as  a  barber  does,  between  the  pulls.  Show  him  each  hair 
as  I  plucks  it  out  ;  anyone  else  may  scalp  him  as  wants  to, 
I  only  walits  his  whiskers." 

"  He  won't  have  much  hair  left  if  we  ever  catch  him," 
said  Tillman.  "  The  thing  that  gets  me  is  that  they  are 
most  Hkely  now  at  the  cache,  digging  it  out  like  rats.  Hull, 
I  didn't  say  anything  about  it  to  you  before,  but  you  remember 
that  old  burnt  ship  Houghton  and  I  told  you  we  saw  in  the 
lagoon  ? 

"  Ay,  ay,"  rephed  Hull,  "  what  about  it  ?  "  . 

"  Well,  I  believe  that  was  the  Terschelling." 

"  The  gold  ship  ?  " 

"  The  same'.' 

"  But  the  gold  ship  weren't  burnt,"  said  Hull,  "  Mac  said 
she  was  sunk  at  her  moorings." 

"  He  lied.  She  was  sunk,  but  she  was  burnt  first,  burnt 
with  all  aboard  her."  1 

Hull  pondered  on  this  for  a  while.     Then  he  burst  out : 

"  But  how  the  mischief  was  the  stuff  cached  bv  the 
river " 


"  It  wasn't,  it  was  cached  by  the  lagoon,  somewhere  on 
the  bank.  Macquart  brought  us  all  up  the  river  for  the  pur- 
pose of  finding  a  chance  to  do  us  in.  He  can  get  the  Barra- 
cuda out  with  Jacky." 

"  Oh,  the  swab  !  "  said  Hull. 

The  mildness  of  his  language  was  indicative  of  the  depth, 
below  oaths,  in  him  that  was  stirred. 

"  There's  one  comfort,"  said  Houghton,  who  was  still 
holding  Chaya's  hand  unobserved  by  the  others,  "  Wiart  is 
sure  to  be  done  in  by  Macquart  if  they  manage  to  get  the 
Barracuda  awa}'.  Tlie  only  live  men  of  those  three  to  be 
left  will  be  Macquart  and  Jacky,  and  Jacky  will  get  his  dose 
after  he  has  been  paid  off  at  Sydney.  I  am  firmly  of  opinion 
that  Macquart  is  not  a  devil,  he  is  the  Devil.  There's  just 
the  chance  left  us  that  we  may  get  out  of  this  before  Mac 
gets  off  with  the  yawl." 

"  Yes,"  said  Tillman,  tapping  the  ashes  out  of  his  pipe, 
"  and  we  won't  be  able  to  da  anything  unless  we're  fresh." 
He  yawned,  stretched  himself  on  the  ground  and  in  a  minute 
his  deep  breathing  told  that  he  was  asleep. 

Hull  in  a  few  minutes  followed  his  example,  lying  face 
down  and  with  his  head  on  the  crook  of  his  arm. 

Houghton  turned  to  Chaya,  her  face  was  close  to  his,  and 
in  the  vague  light  of  the  moon  that  came  across  the  thorn 
bushes  and  tree  branches  her  dark  eyes  gazed  at  him,  thea 
their  lips  met. 

They  had  never  spoken  a  word  of  love  one  to  the  other 
yet  they  had  told  each  other  everything. 

They  awoke  at  dawn.  Chaya  had  fallen  asleep  with  her 
head  resting  on  Houghton's  shoulder.  She  was  the  first 
to  awake.  Houghton  had  not  slept  at  all.  Holding  her 
to  him  with  his  arm  around  her  waist,  feeling  the  warmth 
of  her  body  through  the  warm  girdle  of  brass  beneath  her 
robe,  breathing  the  perfume  of  her  hair,  he  did  not  sleep, 
he  dreamt  the  dream  of  his  life. 

She  awoke  suddenly,  raised  her  head,  saw  Hougliton,  and 
then  raising  her  hands  seized  him  by  the  arm,  as  tliough  to 
push  him  away  from  her — only  for  a  moment.  The  remnants 
of  sleep  still  clinging  to  her  had  vanished  and  her  eyes,  losing 
their  wild  and  bewildered  expression,  grew  soft,  human  and 
filled  with  love.  The  Chaya  who  had  laughed  at  tlie  battle 
between  the  scorpion  and  the  centipede,  the  Chaya  wlio  had 
led  him  that  day  into  the  outskirts  of  the  forest  to  laugh  at 
him  and  elude  him,  the  Chaya  who  had  tracked  them  yester- 
day with  Saji  not  knowing  in  her  own  heart  the  real  reason  of 
her  care  for  Houghton,  had  vanished.  This  was  a  new  being, 
a  rapturous,  warm  living  woman.  The  savage  liad  vanished 
entirely,  the  beauty  of  the  savage  remained,  lending  a  supreme, 
indefinable  fascination  to  the  beauty  of  the  woman. 

"Chaya,"  whispered  Houghton,  holding  her  to  him, 
"  all  my  life  I  have  been  waiting  for  you — hsten,  before  the 
others  wake  up,  you  are  mine  and  never  will  I  let  you  go." 

Chaya  sighed  deeply.  Then  she  put  her  arms  round  his 
neck.  She  did  not  speak  one  word.  She  raised  her  perfect 
lips  to  his,  and  the  eyes  in  whose  darkness  and  depth  lay  the 
mysteries  of  the  forest  and  the  sea. 

Hull  awaking  from  sleep  saw  nothing.  Whilst  he  was 
rubbing  his  eyes  tliey  had  drawn  apart  ;  he  touched  Tillman 
with  his  foot  and  the  latter,  awaking  with  a  start,  sat  up. 

"  Good  Lord  !  "  said  he,  ''  I  dreamt  we  were  out  of  this 
and  back  on  the  Barracuda,  what's  the  time  ?  " 

"  There  ain't  no  time  here,"  said  Hull.  "  It's  after  sun 
up  and  time  to  be  niovin'.     Oh,  cuss  that  swab  !  " 

"  Well,"  said  Tillman,  "  we'd  better  have  breakfast 
before  we  make  a  move.  It's  the  biggest  mistake  to  set  to 
work  on  an  empty  stomach." 

They  set  to  on  the  provisions,  Chaya  cut  some  prickly 
pears  and  picked  some  small  red  fruit  from  a  bush  that  grew 
low  down  among  the  thorns.  She  would  touch  nothing  else. 
She  watched  Hull  eating.  He  seemed  to  fascinate  her 
and  amuse  her  at  the  same  time.  One  of  her  greatest  charms 
was  a  childishnjgss  and  gaiety  which  even  their  desperate 
position  could  not  destroy. 

They  were  discussing  ways  and  means  of  escape  as  futilely 
as  children  discussing  the  meaning  of  an  algebraical  problem, 
when  Tillman,  catching  sight  of  something  away  down  the 
path,     lew  their  attention  to  it. 

A  small  dark   figure   was   disporting  itself  on  the  ground. 


I8 


LAND      cS:      \V  A  T  E  k 


April  20,  1916 


approaching  tlieni  yet  liiding  itself  as  it  came  behind  the  tree 
boles. 

"  It's  a  monkey!  "  cried  Hull. 

Chaya,  who  had  sprung  to  her  feet  and  who  was  standing 
shading  her  eyes,  laughed. 

"  It's  mine,"  said  she,  "  it  is  Mitu."  Saji  a  long  time 
ago  had  killed  a  monkey  on  one  of  his  hunting  expeditions. 
Now  monkeys  are  not  indigenous  to  New  Guinea,  but  as 
Macquart  had  told  them  a  race  of  monkeys  introduced  by 
the  early  Dutch  traders  infested  the  forest  on  the  left  bank 
and  lagoon  edge,  this  tribe  had  never  spread,  nowhere  else 
in  New  Guinea  were  they  to  be  found.  The  monkey  killed 
by  Saji  had  been  carrying  a  baby  in  its  arms,  and  Chaya, 
who  had  been  with  Saji,  rescued  the  baby  and  brought  it 
up.  It  was  her  pet  and  it  followed  her  always  at  a  distance, 
mostly  sj^ringing  along  the  branches  of  the  trees  under 
which  she  walked. 

On  starting  with  Saji  yesterday  morning  she  had  tied  Mitu  up. 
It  must  have  escaped,  and  picking  up  her  traces  pursued  her. 

She  told  her  companions  this  in  a  few  words  and  then 
went  forward  to  meet  her  follower.  But  Mitu  was  shy.  The 
sight  of  the  white  men  evidently  did  not  please  him.  He 
took  to  a  tree,  and  Chaya  standing  beneath  it  began  to  talk 
to  him  in  the  native. 

"  Blest  if  she  ain't  talkin'  to  it  same  s'if  it  was  a  human," 
said  Hull. 

"  Leave  her  alone,"  said  Tillman.  "  It  may  be  that  the 
beast  can  lead  us  out.  It  followed  her  all  the  way  from  the 
village  and  it  has  found  her.  If  it  did  that  it  can  find  its 
way  back." 

They  saw  the  monkey  under  the  blandishments  of  Chaya 
drop  from  branch  to  branch.  Then  it  dropped  on  her  shoulder 
and  sat  with  one  arm  round  her  head  and  its  melancholy 
eyes  fixed  on  Hull  and  his  companions. 

Chaya  continued  talking  to  it  as  if  explaining  things, 
slowh'  approaching  the  others  as  she  did  so. 

"  lie  may  lead  us,"  said  she.  "  I  do  not  know.  It  may 
be.     But  I  have  nothing  to  tie  him  with." 

Mitu  had  on  a  grass  collar  and  he  had  evidently  broken  or 
bitten  through  the  cord  that  had  tethered  him.  Tillman 
understood  her  meaning  at  once,  and  searcliing  in  his  i)ockets 
foimd  six  or  seven  feet  of  lanyard. 

He  produced  it  and  Chaya,  sitting  down  and  taking  Mitu 
in  her  lap,  fastened  one  end.  of  the  lanyard  to  his  collar. 

Then  she  let  him  play  about  for  a  while  to  accustom  him 
^o  the  constraint  of  the  string,  and  then,  standing  up,  spoke 
to  him  again. 

Mitu,  looking  preternaturally  wise,  listened  and  then 
started  off,  taking  the  way  he  had  come  by.  Chaya  followed 
him,  and  the  others,  picking  up  their  bundles,  followed  Chaya. 

"  Well,"  said  Hull.  "  I  never  did  think  I'd  be  condimiied 
to  foUow  a  monkey.  We  only  wants  a  barrel  organ  to  make 
the  show  complete.  Look  at  the  brute.  It's  for  all  the  world 
as  if  it  had  five  legs." 

Mitu's  legs  were  not  unlike  his  tail.  He  w-as  going  on  all 
fours  and  his  progress  was  not  rapid.  He  would  stop  to  sniff 
at  the  leaves  and  every  now  and  then  he  would  whisk  up  a 
tree  bole  as  far  as  the  lead  would  permit. 

Chaya,  recognising  that  he  would  lead  them  more  swiftly 
if  he  were  released  and  allowed  to  take  to  his  own  element — • 
the  air,  untied  tlie  lanyard  from  his  collar  and  let  him  loose. 

Next  moment  lie  was  swaying  from  branch  to  branch ; 
where  the  trees  were  too  sparsely  set  he  would  take  to  the 
ground,  and  though  the  progress  was  slow  it  was  sure. 

On  one  of  the  paths  along  which  he  led  them  they  came 
on  a  strange  thing,  the  skeleton  of  a  man  half  overgrown 
with  ground  vines.  Some  native  trapped  long  ago  in  this 
tangle  and  dying  of  starvation  or  perhaps  simply  from  fright, 
had  left  these  bones. 

"  I  don't  like  mcetin'  that  skillington,"  said  Hull.  "  It 
ain't  lucky." 

"  Nonsense,"  said  Tillman.    "  There's  no  .such  tiling  as  luck." 

"  Ain't  there,"  replied  the  Captain.  "  Well,  if  there 
ain't,  there's  such  a  thing  as  bad  luck  and  it  seems  to  me 
we've  struck  it.  No  .such  thing  as  Luck  !  Why,  I've  seen  it. 
You  take  a  ship  and  alter  her  name  and  you'll  see  it  loo  if 
you  go  for  a  cruise  in  her.  Why,  there's-  notliin'  else  but  luck 
in  this  here  world  and  you'll  know  it,  me  son,  when  you've 
seen  as  much  as  I  have." 

An  hour  later,  after  Mitu  had  led  them  hither  and  thither 
.and  seemingly  in  all  directions,  they  came  on  the  aslics   of 
the  camp  fire.  The  monkey  had  brought  tlieni  liack  to  the 
very  point  they  had  started  from. 

Chaya  sat  down  and  buried  her  face  .in  her  hands,  the 
others  stood  by  speechless,  and  paralysed  for  the  moment. 

It  was  only  now,  really,  that  they  began  to  recognise  the 
appalUng  effect  of  the  maze  upon  the  mind.  The  feeUng  of 
being  held— by  Nothing,  baffled — by  Nothing. 

Here  they  had  air,  light,  liberty  and  speech,  yet  they 
were  tied  and  bound  by  a  viewless  conjurer  as  surely  as 
though  he  had  tied  them  witli  visible  ropes  and  thong.-^. 


Hull,  the  pessimist,  was  the  first  to  break  silence. 
"  Well,  we've  got  to  get  out,"  said  he.  "  I  reckon  that 
skillington  has  spent  itself  now  we've  come  back  to  the 
place  we  started  from.  There's  no  use  in  the  gal  takin'  on, 
she  did  her  best,  but  I'd  like  to  put  a  bullet  into  thatdumed 
monkey.     I  didn't  put  no  store  by  that  monkey." 

"  Yes,"  said  Tillman.  "  There's  no  use  in  complaining. 
Let's  make  a  new  .start  and  trust  to  chance." 

Houghton  was  kneeling  by  Chaya  and  talking  to  her  in  a 
low  tone.  Then  she  rose  uj).  She  had  been  crying,  but  now 
she  dried  her  tears,  put  her  hand  in  Houghton's  and  followed 
the  otliers  on  the  new  start  off. 

They  had  not  been  an  hour  on  the  new  endeavour  when 
they  were  startled  by  a  cry  from  Chaya. 

They  turned  and  found  her  kneeling  by  a  tree.  Houghton 
was  standing  beside  her  and  she  was  pointing  to  something  on 
the  bark. 

On  the  bark,  about  four  feet  up  from  the  roots  was  the 
mark  of  an  axe  blow.  A  j)iece  of  bark  had  been  cut  right 
oht.  It  was  an  old  injury  inflicted  on  the  tree  possibly  months 
ago,  but  it  was  definite  and  purposeful  and  Chaya  knew 
at  once  its  meaning.  She  rose  up  and  hurried  along  to  the 
next  tree  ahead.  It  showed  nothing.  She  examined  tree 
after  tree  and  then  again  she  cried  out. 

.  When  they  reached  her  she  was  pointing  to  another 
mark  similar  to  the  first,  only  shghtly  higher  up.  Tillman  saw 
the  whole  thing  at  a  glance. 

"  She's  struck  the  blaze,"  said  he.  "  Can't  you  see, 
Wiart  or  maj'be  some  native  has  made  it — she's  saved  us." 

They  followed  her  as  she  hurried  along.  Her  keen  eyes 
trained  to  observation  required  only  one  glance  at  a  tree 
to  tell  whether  it  was  blazed  or  not. 

She  had  no  difficulty  at  all  at  cross  roads,  for  here  every 
tree  was  blazed  till  the  right  direction  was  indicated.  On 
straight  paths  the  blaze  was  rare,  it  was  not  really  required, 
yet  it  was  there  sometimes  as  though  the  man  who  had  made 
it  was  so  iini)iessed  by  the  ])ossibilities  of  this  terrible  place 
that  he  determined  to  leave  his  mark  as  often  as  possible. 

The  depression  and  anguish  of  spirit  that  had  ridden 
them  up  to  this  now  completely  vanished,  and  the  renewed 
leeling  of  life  and  elevation  of  spirit  showed  itself  in  each  man 
according  to  his  temperament. 

They  had  not  far  to  go,  less  than  a  mile  the  blaze  led  theni 
and  then  vanished  where  the  path  of  a  sudden  broke  up  and 
delivered  them  to  the  forest. 

To  find  the  thorn  no  longer'  on  either  side  of  one  was  to 
experience  the  feehngs  of  a  man  who  escapes  from  the  clutches 
of  a  male\olent  giant.  The  atmosphere  of  the  forest  was  quite 
different  from  the  atmosphere  of  the  maze,  a  blind  man  could 
have  told  the  difference.  There  the  air  seemed  stagnant  and 
hke  a  prisoner.  The  hfe  of  the  forest  avoided  the  place,  all 
but  the  insect  hfe  that  buzzed  and  droned  amidst  the  thorn. 

Here  the  parrots  were  shrieking  and  chattering  and  the 
cUmbing  kangaroos  astir  in  the  branches  and  the  wind 
moving  the  leaves  and  bringing  with  it  the  perfume  of  the 
camphor  and  cutch  trees,  and  a  faint  fresh  something  that  was 
perhaps  the  breath  of  the  sea. 
"  Thank  God  !  "  said  Houghton. 

Chaya,  with  the  faithful  Mitu  on  her  shoulder,  looked 
around  her.  She  was  now  in  her  own  home,  she  could  find 
her  way  in  the  forest  by  instinct,  possessing  that  unerring 
sense'  of  direction  more  sure  than  the  pointing  of  the  compass. 
She  led  the  way  now,  Houghton  beside  her  and  the 
others  following.  It  was  half  an  hour  after  noon,  and  they 
had  still  almost  a  day's  journey  before  them  ere  they  could 
reach  the  river. 

It  was  now  a  race  for  the  gold  ;  but  just  as  in  the  maze 
they  were  the  prisoners  of  Confusion,  so  here  in  the  forest 
they  were  the  prisoners  of  Distance.  They  could  not  run. 
n<jr  cuuld  they  advance  fast,  the  journey  required  that  they 
should  husband  all  their  energies.  Barrier  lianas  sometimes 
lay  in  their  ])atli  so  thickly  that  they  had  to  be  cut  through, 
aiid  it  was  absolutely  necessary  for  them  to  halt  every  now 
and  then  for  a  short  rest. 

They  flung  away  their  bundles,  retaiaiiig  only  in  their 
pockets  a  few  morsels  of  food,  and  they  would  have  flung 
away  their  guns  and  ammunition  had  it  been  possible. 
Sometimes  when  they  rested  they  talked.  Hull  grumbled. 
"If  them  two  blighters  went  back  to  the  river,"  said  he, 
"  they'll  have  taken  the  boat  sure,  to  reach  the  lagoon,  and 
then  wliere'll  we  be  ? 

"  We'll  have  to  tramp  it,"  said  Tillman.  "  Make  down 
the  river  bank  as  hard  as  we.  can  pelt,  but  the  chances  arc 
they'll  have  struck  for  the  lagoon  through  the  forest.  Wiart 
seems  to  know  the  forest  pretty  well." 

"  How  long  will  it  take  them  to  unload  the  cache,  I 
wonder?"  said  Houghton.  "God!  It  makes  me  boil  to 
think  that  we  may  reach  the  lagoon  only  to  find  the  Barracuda 
gone,  and  we  stranded  here,  and  those  two  and  that  infernal 
Jacky  making  for  Sydney." 

(To   be   cotttiitufi) 


April  20,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


19 


is    labelled  "  Burberrys. 


Greatest    Danger 

The  soldier  has  to  face  on  Active 

Every  Burberry  Garment  Service    is    not     the     poisOD    gaS     and 

liquid  fire  of  the  enemy  but  bad 
weather— the  insidious  foe  that  under- 
mines both  health  and  efficiency. 
As  assurance  against  this  risk  the 

TRENCH-WARM 

BURBERRY 


lljl^  is    absolutely     essential    to 
k  Officer  at  home  or  abroad. 


every 


The  Trench- Warm  Burberry  combines  the 
services  of  THREE  coats  in  ONE,  which 
can  be  worn  separately  or  together,  as 
occasion   requires.      A 

TRENCH-WARM 

of  stout,  densely-woven  Gabardine,  lined 
with  thick,  yet  light.  Camel  Fleece.  A  coat 
that  will  take  the  edge  oflF  the  keenest  wind 
^^Illustrated  and  maintain  a  healthy  glow  of  warmth  on 
the  bleakest  day  ;   a 

WEATHERPROOF 

that  turns  the  heaviest  downpour,  yet  owing 
to  its  perfect  air-freedom,  keeps  the  body  dry 
and  comfortable  in  the  mildest  weather.  It 
is  in  fact  a  perfect  safeguard  without  the 
insufferable  heat  and  discomfort  inseparable 
from  oilskin,  macintosh  or  oiled  silk  ;    and  a 

SHORT-WARM 

of  Camel  Fleece  with  detachable  collar.  A 
smart  and  luxuriously  warm  garment  for 
night  work,  or  when  off  duty. 

W^  The  whole  coat  is  scientifically  de- 
signed to  ensure  maximum  protection 
and  comfort  with  minimum  incon- 
venience from  weight.  There  are 
various  Trench-coats,  but  none  that 
supply  such  comprehensive  security 
or  give  such  faithful  service  as  the 
TRENCH-WARM    BURBERRY. 


Officers'  Complete  Kits  in   2 
to  4  Days  or   Ready  to  Use. 


NAVAL  OR  MIUTARY  WEATHERPROOFS. 

Until  further  notice  BURBERRYS  CLEAN  AND 

RE-PROOF  Officers,"   "Burberry."   Tielockens  and 
Burberry  Trench-Warms  FREE  OF  rHARCR. 


BURBERRYS 


Haymarket      S.W.      LONDON 

Bd.  Malesherbes  PARIS;  and  Provincial  Agents 


ao 


LAND      &      WATER 


April  20,  1916 


<^    Town    and    Country     ^ 


The  King  and  Queen  will  attend  the  memorial  service  at 
Westminster  Abbey  on  Tuesday  for  the  Australian  and  New 
Zealand  soldiers  who  fell  at  Gallipoli.  This  is  as  it  should 
be.  Anzac  Day  will  pass  into  the  greater  anniversaries  of 
the  Empire,  and  its  glory  will  never  be  blotted  out. 

By  the  death  of  Lord  Clanricarde,  the  House  of  Lords  loses 
the  last  of  its  eccentrics.  Few  of  them  have  been  of  a  lovable 
nature,  and  the  late  Marquis  was  no  e.xception.  He  was  no 
doubt  more  than  a  little  mad.  but  not  sufficiently  so  to  be 
kept  under  that  restraint  which  debars  at  least  two  members 
of  the  Upper  House  from  taking  their  seats. 

The  honour  conferred  on  the  Aga  Khan  has  been  well  won. 
His  devotion  to  the  Empire  has  been  sincere  and  unswerving 
from  the  first,  and  he  has  spared  himself  no  labour  to  uphold 
its  interests.  At  times  and  in  places  it  has  demanded  moral 
courage  of  a  high  order.  Sir  Mahomed  Shah,  Aga  Khan,  is 
the  spiritual  head  of  a  large  section  of  Mohammedans  scattered 
throughout  Asia  and  Africa.  Though  a  wealthy  man  he  owns 
no  landed  estates.  The  salute  of  11  guns  now  places  him  on 
the  level  of  a  ruUng  chief,  and  signifies  that  the  King-Em- 
I>eror  recognises  that  other  qualities  apart  from  land  tenure 
may  entitle  a  leader  of  men  to  the  pecuUar  honour  of  a  salute. 

Whether  it  be  due  to  spring  weather  or  to  deeper  causes 
(I  believe  the  latter)  never  have  the  restaurants  of  London 
been  so  crowded  as  during  this  April.  As  an  illustration,  I 
was  at  Prince's  last  Friday,  which  is  considered  an  off  day  in 
the  restaurant  world,  yet  parties  were  waiting  in  the  foyer 
for  tables  until  half  past  two  and  later.  Prince's  of  course  has 
always  been  a  favourite  reeort,  though  in  the  spring-times 
of  peace  the  flood  tide  of  its  prosperity,  so  far  as  luncheon  was 
concerned,  Wcis  when  the  Royal  Academy  opened.  But  this 
year  it  has  not  had  to  wait  for  that  event. 

Before  these  words  are  in  print,  the  result  of  the  Wimbledon 
Election  will  be  known.  Whichever  way  it  goes,  Mr.  Kennedy 
Jones  will  receive  congratulations,  for  the  contest  on  his  part 
was  thoroughly  sporting.  But  K.  J.  has  always  been  a 
sportsman  jind  the  tougher  a   fight  the  more  he   enjoys  it. 


He  was  offered  a  "safe  "  seat  in  the  House  years  ago  but  he 
refused  it.  Those  who  know  him  best  would  like  to  see  him 
there.  He  is  a  hard-headed  business  man  with  a  strong  streak 
of  kindness  in  his  nature,  which  he  does  his  best  to  conceal. 
His  first  experience  of  electioneering  was  at  Portsmouth  over 
twenty  years  ago  when  his  then  partner,  Mr.  Alfred  Harms- 
worth,  now  Lord  Northchffe,  unsuccessfully  fought  an  election. 

Easter  is  the  natural  excuse  for  a  little  extra  indulgence  in 
sweets  and  chocolates  ;  Rumpelmayer  as  usual  gives  every 
encouragement.  He  has  the  true  French  touch.  The  Easter 
eggs  he  despatches,  however  simple  and  inexpensive,  are 
always  works  of  art,  and  it  is  a  pleasure  to  give  as  well  as  to 
receive  them.  Hospitals  are  not  forgotten  and  Rumpelmayer 
has  been  very  busy  in  sending  them  there,  by  his  patrons' 
orders.     His  tea  rooms  are  crowded  of  an  evening. 

The  Canadian  War  Contingent  Association  issued  a  report 
this  month  of  its  work  since  its  inception  in  August,  1914, 
until  December  31st,  1915.  It  would  be  impossible  to  find 
higher  efficiency  ;  it  has  been  thorough  in  its  ways,  straight- 
forward in  its  methods,  and  tlie  support  it  has  received  over 
here  more  particularly  from  Canadians  has  been  most  generous. 
The  initial  difficulties,  especially  in  connection  with  its  mihtary 
hospital  which  is  now  at  Beachborough  Park,  Shorncliffe, 
kindly  lent  by  Sir  Arthur  and  Lady  Markham,  would  have 
disheartened  most  people,  but  they  were  at  last  overcome, 
and  this  hospital,  administered  by  a  committee  under  the  able 
chairmanship  of  Mr.  George  McLaren  Brown,  has  done  and 
continues  to  do  very  splendid  work. 

When  the  Association  first  began  its  duties  of  looking  after 
Canadian  soldiers,  there  were  only  about  33,000  on  this  side 
of  the  Atlantic  ;  now  there  are  120,000,  but  it  can  proudly 
boast  it  has  never  failed  one  of  them.  It  has  not  only  pro- 
vided extra  comforts  but  has  laid  itself  out  to  make  the  life  of 
the  men  both  here  and  at  the  front  healthier  and  happier. 
Its  repKDrt  is  well  worth  a  careful  study.  The  chairman  of  its 
executive  committee  is  Sir  Thomas  Skinner,  and  the  hon. 
secretary,  Mr.  T.  G.  Colmer.  No  man  has  worked  harder  or 
to  better  purpose  than  Mr.  Colmer.  Hekmes. 


AQUASCUTUM 


FIELD    AND 
TRENCH  COATS, 


PERMANENTLY   WATERPROOF  YET  SELF- VENTILATING 


Hare  been  supplied 
to  officers  of  all 
ranks  asd  regi- 
ments in  the 
Britbih  Army,  and 
in  tbeir  opinion 
stand  out  as  the 
ONLYOOATSniHlN 
WHICH  THEY 
CA.N  PLACE  THE 
UTMOST  EELI- 
ANCB. 

We  owe  the  unpre- 
cedented success 
we  have  experi- 
enced with  these 
coats  to  the  recom 
men  dations  of 
thousamla  of  satis- 
fied wearers,  also 
to  our  principle  of 
never  supplying  a 
coat  unless  we  are 
confident  of  iti 
giving 

Entire 
Satisfaction 


BELTED  INFANTRY  COAT.  CAVALRY 

The    Original    of    ihe    above    letter    may    be    seen  with 
where    a    large    stock    of    Military    Waterproofs    in    all 


ANOTHER 

LETTER 

RECEIVED. 

April  6th,  1916. 
Colchester. 

Sirs, — Kindly 
send  me  illus- 
trateil  price  list 
and  self  -  mea- 
surement form 
for  yiiur  Cavalry 
Trench  Coat. 
My  brother  at 
t  e  Front  highly 
recomrae  nds 
your  Trench 
Coat  for  its 
hard  wearing 
qualities  and 
also  as  a 
Perfect  Water- 
proof. 

R.  S.  D. 


COVERALL.  TBEflCH     COAT. 

MANY     OTHERS    at  our   Regent  Street    establishment, 
sizes  are  kept    READY    FOR    IMMEDIATE   WEAR. 


AQUASOUXUM,  Ltd., 

100  REGENT  STREET.  LONDON,  W. 


By  Appointment  to  Hh  vVCajesly  the  King. 
Waterproof  Coal  Specialists  for  over  50  years. 


f 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVII  No.  2816  [vSi]  THURSDAY,   APRIL  27,  1916  [rN^nMYp'^I^E'^l]  ^Sii^Mi^^^i^ 


Bij    Luuh   Iludniu 


Drawn  exclusivdu  hf  "Land  and    Wc  .e/V 


Remember    Wittenberg 


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April  27,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSWAY,  LONDON,  W.C 

Telephone:  HOLBORN  2828 


THURSDAY,    APRIL   27,    1916 


CONTENTS 


PACE 


Remember  Wittenberg.     By  Louis  Ra^maekers  i 

The  Alarm  :   Bevereu.     By  G.  Spencer  Pryse  2 

Dies  Mirabilis.     (Leading  Article)  3 

The  Tigris  Campaign.     By  Hilaire  Belloc  4 

America's  Ultimatum.     By  Arthur  Pollen  9 

Sortes  Shakespearianae.     By  Sir  Sidney  Lee  11 
An     Unhumorous    Pliilosopher.     By    Desmond 

MacCarthy  n 
Air  Problems  and  Fallacies.     By  F.  W.  Lanchester     13 

War  in  Fiction  and  in  Fact.     By  J.  D.   Symon  15 

A  Book  on  ZeppeHns.     (A  Review)  16 

Chaya.     By  H.  de  Vera  Stacpoole  17 

Town  and  Country  20 

The  West  End  22 

Choosing  Kit  ~5 


DIES    MIRABILIS 

WHEN  Britain's  part  comes  to  be  written  in  the 
History  of  the  Great  War,  when  it  is  possible 
for  all  things  to  fall  into  their  right  perspective, 
Tuesday  the  twenty-fifth  day  of  April,  1916, 
will  stand  out  saliently  as  an  historic  date.  For  the  first 
time  in  the  annals  of  Parliament,  that  institution  of 
which  we  Britons  are  so  inordinately  and  perhaps  a  little 
unduly  proud,  the  defence  of  the  realm  demanded 
a  secret  session  which  is  practically  without  precedent. 
Two  secret  sessions  there  have  been  previously,  but  they 
have  been  secret  merely  in  name  and  for  causes  so  trivial 
that  they  scarcely  count.  There  seemed  a  peculiar 
fitness  that  purely  by  chance  this  strong  action  of  the 
leaders  of  Parliament  with  its  inevitable  encroachment  on 
the  ancient  liberties  and  privileges  of  members  of  both 
Houses  should  have  occurred  on  the  birthday  of  Oliver 
Cromwell.  The  Order  in  Council  which  governs  this 
secret  sitting  of  the  representatives  of  the  nation  is 
framed  in  the  spirit  of  the  great  Protector,  who,  where 
the  defence  of  the  realm  was  concerned,  paid  slight  heed 
to  the  susceptibilities  of  members  of  Parliament.  At  the 
same  time  we  may  express  doubt  whether  that  section 
of  this  Order  in  Council  which  has  reference  to  Cabinet 
meetings  has  not  been  framed  in  a  too  drastic  manner, 
and  whether  indeed  it  will  be  found  possible  or  even 
serviceable  in  practice. 

But  Westminster  witnessed  another  sight  on  this 
historic  Tuesday.  The  men  of  Anzac — Australians  and 
New  ;:ealanders — marched  to  the  Abbey  and  there 
"  united  in  .praise  and  thanksgiving  for  those  of  our 
brothers  who  died  at  Gallipoli  for  their  King  and  Empire 
in  the  high  cause  of  freedom  and  honour."  The  King 
and  Queen  were  of  the  congregation  and  their  Majesties 
must  have  thought  of  their  own  coronation  in  the  old 
Abbey,  so  rich  in  the  memorials  of  our  race,  and  com- 
paring the  two  occasions  have  found  reason  for  deep 
gratitude  that  King  and  Empire  should  in  these  hours 
of  trial  stand  so  closely  together  and  be  united  by  one 
common  purpose.  The  Prime  Minister  of  Australia  later 
defined  this  date  as  "  the  natal  day  of  AustraHa's  en- 
trance into  the  world's  politics  and  the  world's  history." 


That  in  itself  constitutes  a  memorable  day  ;  and  the  words 
which  the  Dean  of  Westminster  spoke  from  the  chancel 
steps  of  the  Abbey  :  "  We  are  resolved  that  by  God's 
gracious  favour  ovir  brothers  shall  not  have  laid  down 
their  lives  in  vain,"  were  echoed  by  the  Australian 
Premier  a  little  later  in  the  day  :  "I  feel  that  the  spirit 
of  those  dauntless  ones  whose  bodies  now  lie  on  the  penin- 
sula are  near  to  us  on  this  day  of  Anzac  urging  us  to 
press  on  and  ever  on  to  victory."  There  is  no  faltering  in 
the  pronouncement  of  either  Churchman  or  Statesman. 
These  straightforward  words  are  the  true  expression  of 
the  heart  and  soul  of  the  British  Empire. 

After  a  long  protracted  winter,  summer  came  in  at  a 
single  leap  on  this  Tuesday.  The  sun  shone  out  hotly 
from  a  blue  sky,  as  though  to  grace  the  triumph  of 
the  courageous  soldiers  from  southern  sunnier  lands. 
And  the  people  flocked  into  the  streets  in  their  tens 
of  thousands  to  give  them  welcome,  cheering,  waving 
handkerchiefs  and  flags,  strawing  the  way  with  flowers 
in  a  manner  rarely  seen  in  this  Metropolis.  The  day  of 
Anzac  was  a  day  of  high  holiday  in  London,  which  will 
long  be  held  in  remembrance.  And  the  morning  had  not 
far  advanced  before  rumour  was  busy  with  startling 
episodes  in  the  North  Sea  and  across  the  Irish  Channel. 
There  had  been  a  raid,  some  said  an  attempted  invasion, 
on  the  East  Coast,  but  a  httle  after  mid-day  an  ofiicial 
statement  from  the  Admiralty  made  plain  just  what  had 
happened  at  Lowestoft.  Before  the  afternoon  had 
waned  into  evening,  the  news  of  the  "  rebeUion  "  in 
Dublin  was  in  all  the  papers,  the  Irish  Chief  Secretary's 
statement  in  the  House  being  fully  reported. 
I  Directly  it  was  hinted  abroad  there  was  trouble  in  Ireland, 
all  who  knew. the  country  at  once  attributed  it  to  the 
Sinn  Feiners.  It  is  a  sort  of  "  mad  mullah  outbreak  " 
for  which  rebellion  were  too  big  a  word.  Nor  can  it 
be  fairly  termed  a  conspiracy  seeing  how  open  has  been 
its  propaganda,  and  how  unconcealed  its  preparations. 
It  calls  for  prompt  repression  and  sharp  punishment. 
Nowhere  will  this  uprising  of  a  few  crack-brained 
fanatics,  many  of  them  in  Government  employment,  be 
more  reprobated  than  in  Ireland.  It  has  no  backing 
and  it  is  typical  of  that  overweening  ignorance  which  is 
Germany's  'chief  characteristic  in  all  her  relations  with 
other  nations  either  during  peace  or  in  war  that  she 
should  have  taken  it  seriously.  -  That  there  is  close 
connection  between  Roger  Casement's  mad  descent  on 
the  Irish  coast,  the  Sinn  Fein  ebullition,  the  Lowestoft 
scramble  and  the  ZeppeUn  raids  is  undoubted,  but  we 
only  wish  our  enemies  could  be  truthfully  informed 
through  their  many  secret  channels  of  the  actual  effect 
it  has  had  on  the  peoples  of  these  islands: 

Never  have  the  Easter  holidays  been  celebrated  with 
greater  verve  and  delight.  The  slowly  improving  weather 
that  blossomed  into  the  summer  hours  of  Tuesday 
and  Wednesday,  contributed  to  this.  But  the  great 
working  population  is  enjoying  temporarily  unprecedented 
prosperity,  and  in  London  the  shops  have  been 
crowded  with  busy  buyers  and  the  parks  thronged  with 
happy  holiday  makers,  well  fed,  well  dressed  and  deter- 
mined to  make  the  best  of  their  brief  rest  and  the  sun- 
shine in  a  manner  that  impressed  even  Londoners 
themselves.  The  German  cruisers,  whose  big  guns 
saluted  the  dawn  of  this  dies  mirabilis  so  far  from  frighten- 
ing the  people  only  gave  new  zest  to  their  pleasure  and 
wearied  with  one  excitement  after  another,  they  went 
to  bed  that  evening  wondering  whether  the  Zeppelins 
would  round  off  the  great  day,  but  regretting  that  if  they 
did,  dead-tired  they  would  sleep  too  soundly  to  be 
awakened  unless  a  bomb  fell  on  roof  or  doorstep.  The  Ger- 
man bogey  will  not  work  ;  the  scooped  out  turnip  with 
its  tallow  "candle  on  a  winter's  night  is  more  terrifying 
to  the  British  public  than  anything  the  Hun  has  been 
able  hitherto  to  launch  against  these  islands. 


4 


LAND     cV     W  A  T  E  R 


April    27,  1 9 16 


THE   TIGRIS  CAMPAIGN 

Stragetic   Value  of  British   Operations  in  Asia  Minor 

By  Hilaire  Belloc 


EVERYONE  in  this  country  is  chiefly  concerned 
at  this  moment— ^and  naturally — with  Kut. 
The  chances  of  relieving  (ieneral  Townshend 
seem  the  principal  business  of  the  war,  and  the 
army  on  the  Tigris  is  regarded  in  the  light  of  that  task 
alone. 

But  there  is  another  far  more  important  point  to  be 
considered  in  connection  with  any  allied  arin\'  in 
Mesopotamia  at  this  moment,  and  that  is  the  strategic 
effect  of  its  presence  upon  the  great  war  as  a  whole.) 

That  effect  is  considerable  and  to  ignore  it  in  our 
anxiety  for  Kut  is  to  suffer  a  grave  error  in  judgment. 

Whether  the  small  force  now  contained  at  Kut  el 
Amara  be  compelled  to  surrender  or  not,  the  strategic 
value  of  an  advance  on  Bagdad,  which  was  entrusted  to 
it,  and  the  consequences  that  will  presumably  follow  upon 
that  advance,  in  any  event  remain. 

In  order  to  judge  this  we  must  get  rid  of  the  immediate 
anxiety  for  a  very  small  isolated  force,  we  must. refuse 
to  consider  the  Mesopotamian  campaign  as  an  isolated 
adventure,  and  we  must  consider  the  whole  field  of  the 
war  and  its  development. 

What  Led  up  to  the  Importance  of  the  Turkish 
Empire  in  the  War 

Of  the  Alliance  ranged  against  the  British,  French  and 
Russians,  and  later  the  Italians,  much  the  largest  portion 
of  the  Central  Empires  (which  was  also  the  original  portion) 
is,  in  a  military  sense,  nearly  homogeneous.  The  German 
word  of  command  is  universal  from  the  Danube  to  the 
Bdltic  and  from  the  Vosges  to  the  Vistula.  What  this 
central  body  originally  lacked  in  homogeneity  it  fully 
obtained  upon  the  peril  of  Austria-Hungary  during  the 
first  winter  of  the  war  and  the  consequent  submission  of  all 
her  organisation  to  direct  control  from  Berlin. 

This  formidable  power  outnumbered  for  many  months 
the  available  forces  of  the  Allies  opposed  to  it,  for  a  still 
longer  period  controlled  a  much  greater  industrial  output 
and,  what  was  perhaps  most .  important  of  all,  enjoyed 
a  great  disparity  of  force  between  its  various  opponents. 
It  could  be  confident  that  on  its  eastern  front  industrial 
resources  would  always  be  lacking  to  its  enemy. , 

This  homogeneous  central  body  was  also  fully  mobilised, 
that  is,  it  had  an  organisation  and  means  for  levying  men 
and  material  and  communicating  orders  which  permitted 
it  to  sustain  at  the  very  outset  of  the  campaign  a  maxi- 
mum effort  so  far  as  men  and  their  moNcments  were  con- 
cerned. 

Of  the  opponents  toyirhis  central  body  France  alone  was 
in  a  similar  position,  and  France  counted  in  men  only 
about  a  third  of  the  central  body  ;  in  opportunity  for 
industrial  effort  originally  —after  the  occupation  of  the 
northern  departments  and  before  the  marvellous  develop- 
ment of  production  in  1915  —not  a  tenth. 

The  Central  Powers  thus  attacking  civilisation  with 
such  odds  in  their  favour  suffered  from  two  grievous 
sources  of  weakness  which,  combined,  threatened  them 
with'  an  eventual  loss  of  the  great  war.  These  two 
sources  of  weakness  were  the  inferiority  of  their  land 
strategy  to  the  strategy  of  the  French,  and  the  in- 
feriority of  their  naval  power  to  the  naval  power  of  the 
English.  Before  the  main  operations  of  the  war  had  been 
in  progress  a  month,  the  bad  strategy  of  the  Cierman  staff 
had  destroyed  all  their  advantage  of  initiative  and  dis- 
counted most  of  their  advantage  of  numbers  on  the 
western  front.  Before  they  had  been  in  progress  another 
two  months  the  enemy,  for  all  his  vast  superiority  in  his 
munition  and  manufacture  was  pinned  and  caged  upon 
the  Western  front.  He  has  not  yet  been  able  to  break 
the  bars  of  that  cage. 

He  was  defeated  at  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  which, 
early  as  it  appeared  in  the  operations,  is  the  turning  point 


of  the  whole  war.  After  being  defeated  in  the  Battle  of 
the  Marne  lie  missed  his  opportunity  to  restore  freedom 
of  movement  b\-  his  right  or  northern  wing  and  struck  in 
vain  against  the  sector  of  Ypres  after  the  doors  of  his 
prison  had  been  closed  upon  him.  One  may  say  that  by 
the  nth  of  November,  1914,  he  was  definitely  contained 
on  the  west. 

The  Britisli  supremacy  by  sea,  the  two  factors  wherein 
arc  the  excellence  of  the  British  Navy  and  its  size, 
blocked  the  enemy's  supplies  from  the  outer  world  to  an 
extent  only  limited  by  the  policy  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment towards  neutrals.  It  thus  completed  the  bars  of 
the  cage  which  had  been  forged  by  a  superior  military 
strategv  ujjon  the  western  side  of  the  Continent.  Bnt  it 
did  far  more  than  this,  for  it  left  the  sea  open  for  the  Allies 
to  supply  themselves  ;  and  j)articularly  for  the  P'rench, 
whose  industrial  opportunities  had  been  so  grievously 
curtailed,  to  obtain  munitionment,  arms  and  every 
necessity  from  abroad. 

As  a  counter  to  this  state  of  affairs  the  enemy  had  two 
opportunities,  (i)  He  could  put  Russia  out  of  action 
and  either  obtain  a  separate  peace  from  that  Power  or 
leave  it  by  the  defeat  of  its  armies  and  their  disintegration 
■or  capture  negligible  for  the  rest  of  the  war.  (2)  He  could 
further  endanger  both  France  and  Britain,  but  Britain 
much  more  than  France,  in  their  political  position  through- 
out the  Mahommedan  ivorld.  To  do  this  his  instrument 
was  obviously  the  men,  the  religious  and  political  organisa- 
tion, and  the  territory  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 

Entry  of  the  Turkish   Empire  into  the  War 
and  its  Effect 

Early  in  the  war  he  obtained  the  support  of  that  alh'. 
The  Near  East  promised  to  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  not  only  this  power  of  offence  against  the  British, 
but  also  some  ultimate  chance  of  further  supply  in  cotton 
and  food  and  the  rest  in  spite  of  the  blockade,  should  the 
blockade  become  at  last  really  severe.  Further,  the 
Turkish  alliance  with  (Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
completely  shut  in  Russia  so  far  as  her  main  outlet  to  the 
sea  was  concerned  ;  prevented  the  armament  of  Rou- 
mania  as  a  possibly  ally  of  Russia,  and  heavily  affected 
for  the  worse  Russia's  financial  position  as  well. 

It  behoved  the  French  and  the  British  and  the  Russians, 
but  particularly  the  British,  to  take  measures  against  this 
new  threat. 

Supposing,  to  take  an  extreme  hypothesis,  the  British 
had  done  nothing,  then  the  Turkish  Empire  could  easily 
have  found  men  sufficient  to  cross  the  existing  natural 
defences  of  Egypt  and  to  overwhelm  the  small  garrison 
of  that  dependency.  Apart  from  the  formidable  moral 
effect  upon  the  whole  British  position  in  the  East,  the 
attack  would  have  cut  the  main  communication  between 
Britain  and  India.  It  would  at  the  least  have  enor- 
mously increased  the  expense  and  the  time  of  all  com- 
rnunication  between  India  and  England.  At  the  same 
time,  there  were  men  to  spare  in  the  Turkish  Empire 
(supposing  the  Allies  had  done  nothing)  to  move  into 
Persia  and  interrujit  any  communication  of  men,  news  or 
policy  through  that  avenue.  It  was  even  conceivable 
that  Turkisli  forces  moving  against  the  comparatively 
small  Russian  garrison  south  of  the  Caucasus  miglit 
defeat  them  and  lay  hands  upon  the  Russian  province 
which  was  also  the  main  source  of  petrol  supply  for  the 
Russians.  Nor  should  we  forget  that  an  uninterrupted 
move  against  Persia  would  ultimately  have  cut  off  one  of 
our  own  main  sources  of  oil  supply. 

Of  course,  this  hypothesis  is  purely  imaginary.  What 
really  took  place  was  a  vigorous  initiative  of  attack  by 
the  British  against  the  new  menace.  First,  there  was  the 
attempt  to  force  the  Dardanelles  ;  next  the  rapid  increase 
of  the  forces  in  Egypt  ;   next  the  observation  of  essential 


April  27,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


points  in  southern  Persia,  and  lastly  the  sending  of  a  small 
jorce  up  the  Tigris  to  threaten  Bagdad. 

Meanwhile,  the  Russians  in  December,  1914,  destroyed 
all  danger  of  Turkish  menace  against  Caucasia,  and 
slowly  advanced  into  Turkish  Armenia  itself.  To  the 
opportunity  afforded  the  enemy  by  the  Turkish  Alliance 
there  was  one  grave  lesion,  which  lay  in  the  presence  of 
neutral  territory  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey. 
This  weakness  was  eliminated  last  autumn  [by  the 
adhesion  of  Bulgaria  to  the  Central  Powers,  the  over- 
running of  Serbia  and  the  establishment  of  through  com- 
munications with  Constantinople. 

This  moment,  about  the  beginning  of  November,  1915, 
may  be  regaided  as  the  ma.ximum  point  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  enemy's  strategy  as  a  whole  so  far  as  that 
strategy  concerns  the  Near  East.  He  founded  great 
hopes  upon  the  through  communication  with  the  Bos- 
phorus  and  Asia  thus  provided.  He  rapidly  munitioned 
the  Turkish  armies  and  added  largely  to  the  instructors 
and  leaders  whom  he  had  already  begun  to  provide.  It 
seemed  possible  that  in  the  long  run  a  serious  attack  upon 
Egypt  might  be  made  and  might  be  successful.  It  was 
even  conceivable,  "if  there  were  a  total  collapse  of  the 
Allied  forces  other  than  those  in  the  west,  that  the 
land  route  to  India  itself  might  be  menaced  within  the 
space,  say,  of  the  ne.xt  eighteen  months  or  two  years. 

It  is  at  this  point  that  the  advance  on  Bagdad,  small 
as  K'rts  the  force  with  which  it  was  attempted,  b:gins  to 
take  on  a  strategical  meaning  in  our  eyes. 


Effect   on  Turkey  of  a  Hostile   Force 
the  Tigris 


on 


A  study  of  the  map,  coupled  with  an  appreciation  of 
the  political  importance  of  Bagdad  explains  the  strategical 
situation  therefore  created  by  the  threat  to  that  city.  The 
rule  of  Constantinople  over  the  Turkish  Empire  depends 
mainly  upon  a  complex  of  military,  religious  and  social 
prestige.  Bagdad,  a  distant  but  important  capital  upon 
its  own  account,  fallen  into  the  hands  of  an  enemy  would 
have  shaken  the  whole  of  that  organisation.  Any  threat 
to  Bagdad  must  therefore  be  met  by  the  assembly  of  a 
considerable  force  to  save  the  city. 

But  such  a  force  (the  sea  being  closed  by  the  power  of 
the  British  ilect)  depended  upon  the  line  of  communication 
1,1,  I,  a  hne  interrupted  by  two  ranges  of  mountains  at 


A  A,  losing  the  advantage  of  the  rail  at  B  and  dependent 
between  B  and  the  front  at  F  for  communications,  upon 
a  track  across  Mesopotamia  and  the  waterway  of  the 
Tigris  River.  The  assembly  of  a  considerable  force  thus 
at  F  interfered  with  the  scheme  of  attacking  Egypt  along 
the  second  line  of  communications  branching  from  the 
first,  marked  2',2.  At  this  the  rail  had  been  carried 
as  far  as  D  and  posts  of  water  and  supply  established 
along  nearly  the  whole  of  the  dotted  line  beyond. 

To  undertake  both  operations  at  once  would  have 
involved  a  heavy  strain,  especially  as  a  very  large  garrison 
had  been  accumulated  in  Egypt.  This  force  by  the  s^ca, 
whenever  the  danger  to  Egypt  should  be  past,  would 
form  a  reservoir  for  use  either  in  the  further  East -or 
against  Syria  or  for  the  drafting  of  reserves  to  any  foFcc 
based  upon  the  Balkan  port,  should  such  a  force  be 
engaged  in  active  operations.  Meanwhile,  far  off,  but 
upon  the  flank  of  the  main  line  of  Turkish  communica- 
tions, 1,1, 1,  was  the  threat  of  a  considerable  Russian  army 
which  had  for  its  objective  in  the  first  place  Erzerurh  at  E  ; 
next  the  great  gate  for  supply  to  all  this  region,  the  Pprt 
of  Trebizond  at  T,  and  lastly  through  Bitlis  as  well  as 
through  Er'zerum,  the  road  to  Diar  Bekir.  This  Russian 
force  was  operating  in  the  mountains.  The  communica- 
tions were  atrocious.  The  winter  was  a  most  formidable 
handicap.  But  once  it  was  in  possession  of  all  Armenia 
and  once  its  own  bodies  should  reach  Diar  Bekir,  the 
large  force  which  the  Turks  had  concentrated  in  Meso- 
potamia— the  province  known  in  the  Turkish  scheme  of 
administration  as  Irak — would  be  in  peril,  for  Diar  Bekir 
stands  at  the  edge  of  the  Mesopotamian  plain,  and  any 
large  body  of  men  there  present  would,  in  a  few  days  get 
across  the  only  railway  supplying  the  Mesopotamian 
front. 

Now  let  us  see  how  all  this  fits  in  with  the  position  of 
the  small  British  forces  at  Kut. 

Suppose  the  worst  and  suppose  this  small  force  sur- 
rendered.    What  would  be  the  strategical  consequence  ? 

It  has  brought  down  to  F  and  kept  there  a  considerable 
Turkish  Army.  \\'ill  that  army  retire  after  achieving  this 
success  against  General  Townshend's  small  force  ? 

It  calinot  do  so  because  it  has  in  front  of  it  the  very 
large  force  gathered  for  the  relief  of  Kut.  It  must  remain 
in  front  of  Bagdad  so  long  as  this  very  large  force  im- 
mediatelv  facing  it  stands  on  the  Tigris.  Whether 
General  Townshend's  small  body  is  still  in  existence  or  no 


Allied  (groups 
TurkLsh  Grjup^\ 


T.  A  N  D      i"v-     W  A  T  E  R 


April  27,  1916 


ill  a  military  sense,  does  not  affect  this  truth  in  the  least. 
Bnt  if  the  Turkish  McsoDOtamian  arniv  at  F  remains  thus 
liooked  on  to  its  present  position  by  tlie  large  British 
force  opposed  to  it,  then  with  every  week  that  passes  the 
danger  of  its  coramunications  through  the  Russian  advance 
in  Armenia  gets  greater.  There  is  no  longer  any  question 
of  an  ad\-anre  through  Syria  towards  Egypt.  The  whole 
que^;tion  for  the  Turkish' liighet  cojiiinau'd  will  be  how  to 
hold  Mesopotamia  and  Bagdad.  And  it  will  be  a  question 
that  will  get  more  and  more  diffiiult  to  answer.  There 
must  come  a  time  so  far  as  this  tield  alone  is  concerned, 
and  eliminating  disturbing  facto  ts  elsewhere,  when  the 
Turkish  force  in  front  of  Bagdad  will  have  only  one  of 
three  courses  fipiTii  to  it. 

(i)  To  sumnKWi  to  itself  for  the  luere  work  of  holding 
Irak  and  especially  its  capital.  Bagdad,  all  the  available 
resources  the  GovcTnment  at  Constantinople  can  lend.  In 
that  case  the  Rut*>ian  advance  westward  through  Asia 
Minor,  alrcadv  menacing  though  slow,  would  become 
rapid  and  extremel\- formidable,  for  the  only  thing  check- 
ing it  so  far  has  been  the  concentration  of  very  considerable 
Turkish  forces  in  front  of  it. 

(2)  They  can  fall  back  along  their  line  of  communica- 
tions until  they  are  past  the  danger  point  at  Aleppo 
(the  knot  or  junction  which  is  always  in  peril  of  the  powers 
controlling  the  sea  and  which  many  think  should  have 
been  attacked  long  a,"o.)  To  do  this  is  to  abandon  Irak 
and  to  abandon  Bag-dad,  and  for  that  matter,  within  a 
comparativelv  brief  Qela\-  to  abandon  Syria  too.  This 
's  what  in  any  higluy  organised  country  the  inferior 
Turkish  Forces  would  do  in  the  presence  of  the  Russian 
menace  from  the  north  and  of  the  smaller  but  still  com- 
paratively large  British  force  in  front  of  them.  It  would 
be  elementary  strategy  to  act  thus  in  the  face  of  that 
menace  and  of  this  op_50sing  force,  if  the  Turkish  Empire 
were  one  homogeneous  and  highly  organised  country,  all 
the  members  of  whicli  were  acting  in  accord. 

(3)  There  remains  the  third  course  of  keeping  a  large 
Turkish  force  covering  Bagdad,  but  not  reinforcing  it 
heavily  because  the  Turkish  hi^er  command  thinks  it 
essential  to  block  the  Russian  advance  through  Asia 
Minor.  In  this  last  and  third  case  the  fate  of  tht  Turkish 
force  in  Mesopotamia  is  only  a  question  of  time.  They 
will  have,  their  communications  cut  behind  them  and  they 
will  be  dcstroj'ed. 

A  Choice  of  Sacrifices 

We  must  not  neglect  in  all  this,  by  the  way,  the  presence 
of  a  small  and  advancmg  Russian  force  which  is  moving 
down  to  Bagdad  along  the  Persian  road  3^3. 

The  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter  would  seem  then 
to  be  that  the  threat  to  Bagdad  puts  the  Turkish  higher 
command  into  a  situation  everywhere  menaced.  Of 
the  three  policies  open  to  it  each  leads  to  some  grave  loss, 
and  the  only  choice  they  have  is  to  decide  which  form  of 
loss  is  the  least  ;  whether  to  sacrifice  the  central  plateau 
of  Asia  Minor  until  the  Russians  draw  near  to  the  heart 
of  the  Turkish  power,  or  to  sacrifice  Mesopotamia  and 
Bagdad,  or  to  sacrifice  ultimately  the  army  now  occu- 
pying that  province  and  protecting  that  provincial 
capital. 

If  we  look  at  the  position  in  Mesopotamia  in  this  light, 
that  is,  as  part  of  a  very  large  general  scheme,  it  will  gi\e 
to  the  present  peril  of  the  little  force  at  Kut  a  different 
value  from  that  which  mere  sensationalism,  or 
worse,  will  attempt  to  give  it.  It  is  not  the  re- 
maining military  value  of  this  small  force  which  chiefly 
marks  the  strategical  situation  in  the  East.  It  is  the  com- 
bined positions  of  the  main  force  upon  the  Tigris,  of  the 
advancing  Russian  forces  upon  the  norlli  and  the  east 
and  of  the  Turkish  bod\-  between  them  all,  and  menaced 
by  iJicm  all,  upon  whicli  an  impartial  observer  of  the 
strategical  problem  alone  will  hx  hir  attention.  The 
little  point  of  Kut.  which  produced  the  present  strategical 
situation,  while  it  has  the  importance  of  a  cause  to 
so  much  larger  an  effect,  has  little  other  strategical 
importance  for  the  future.  Discussion  as  to  how  or 
why  that  force  allowed  itself  to  be  surrounded  is  now 
mel-ely  academic.  It  belongs  to  the  past.  But  discussion 
as  to  "how  valuable  the  presence  of  a  considerable  force 
upon  the  Tigris  still  is,  and  of  what  great  effects  it  may 
Kad  to,  is  not  academic  at  all,  but  of  high  practical 

importance.  _       ,  „      . 

As  to  the  moral  or  political  effect  in  the  East  followmg 


upon  the  loss  of  one  division,  that  is  for  others  to 
determine.  It  can  only  be  judged  by  men  who  have  a 
personal  acquaintance  with  a  matter  which  is  not  in  its 
essence  mihtary,  but  purely  political. 

SITUATION  ON  THE  VERDUN  SECTOR 

The  present  lull  in  the  operations  before  Verdun  has 
lasted  longer  than  anj'  similar  interval  since  those  opera- 
tions began. 

The  last  considerable  effort  of  the  enemy  was  made  nine 
days  ago.  Before  that  he  had  allowed  seven  full  days  to 
pass  between  the  very  extensive  assault  of  Sunday,  Ajjril 
()th,  which  was  made  upon  a  front  of  nine  miles,  and  died 
out  in  the  following  two  days.  These  seven  days  were 
the  largest  interval  of  inactivitj'  he  had  yet  allowed  his 
infantry  to  have. 

It  has  been  conjectured  from  this  gradually  extending 
series  of  spaces  between  each  of  his  considerable  expendi- 
tures of  men  that  the  enemy's  attack  upon  this  sector  which 
had  already  proved  so  immensely  costly  and  had  hitherto 
arrived  at  no  military  result  at  all,  was  being  allowed  to 
die  out. 

It  is  impossible  to  decide  upon  the  only  evidence 
publicly  available  in  London,  whether  this  is  the  case  or 
no. 

The  decisive  evidence  in  the  matter  is  the  present  nature 
of  the  bombardment. 

If  he  is  no  longer  delivering  shell  from  the  380's  and 
420's,  then  it  is  reasonable  to  conjecture  that  the  increasing 
intervals  of  inactivity  are  accounted  for  by  his  moving 
of  these  big  pieces,  and  presumably  his  moving  of  them 
westward. 

It  is  true  that  the  Woevre  is  drying  up  and  he  can.  if 
he  likes,  deliver  attacks  with  comparatively  large  bodies 
u])on  the  south-eastern  end  of  the  salient,  between  Fresnes 
and  St.  Miliiel.  But  all  that  is  under  observation  from 
the  heights  of  the  Meuse.  He  would  seem  to  have  a  better 
chance  of  doing  something  effective  if  he  pressed  the  other 
end  of  the  salient,  the  north-western  end  near  the  Argonne; 
and  it  has  already  been  pointed  out  in  these  columns  that 
he  has  there  ample  cover  under  which  to  concentrate,  and 
on  the  whole,  better  results  to  expect  from  an  advance. 

If  he  is  still  delivering  shell  of  the  two  high  calibres 
mentioned,  and  from  the  same  emplacements  west  of  Spin- 
court,  where  he  tied  down  his  big  pieces  (which  he  can 
only  move  by  rail)  early  in  January,  then  the  successively 
increasing  periods  of  inactivity  would  point  to  his  gradual 
abandonment  of  an  enterprise  he  has  found  to  be  fruitless. 
The  other  pieces — up  to  the  305's — he  can  move  in  some 
few  days  and  by  road  ;  but  the  big  pieces  abo\'c  305 — 
the  380's  and  42o's* — are  the  test.  Whether  he  is  wise  to 
tie  himself  up  thus  with  such  masses  of  metal  and  whether 
the  results,  against  field  works,  is  worth  their  immobility, 
is  another  matter.  But  certainly  the  evidence  of  what  the 
biggest  pieces  are  doing,  whether  they  are  still  firing,  and 
if  so,  from  where,  would  be  decisive.  Lacking  evidence 
upon  that  point,  we  can  not  only  come  to  no  conclusion, 
but  we  cannot  even  make  any  reasonable  conjecture  upon 
his  future  movements. 

Meanwhile,  it  may  be  worth  while  to  point  out  the 
errors  underlying  certain  suppositions  which  have  ap- 
])eared  in  the  Press,  and  which  I  have  also  found  in  the 
letter  of  several  correspondents  addressed  to  me  during 
the  last  few  weeks. 

The  first,  and  most  important  error  .would  seem  to  be 
that  connected  with  the  supposed  object  of  the  enemy  to 
exhaust  the  French  by  his  attacks. 

More  than  one  correspondent  has  suggested  to  me  that 
this  enormous  expenditure  of  men  has  been  thought 
worth  while  by  the  enemy  because  it  would  gradually 
wear  down  French  resistance — would  exhaust  Frencli 
numbers. 

As  I  see  the  matter  this  conjecture  is  based  upon  a 
complete  misapprehension  of  the  numerical  standing  of 
the  two  opponents.  It  is  based  upon  a  vague  idea  that 
the  enemy  has  much  larger  reserves  of  men,  and  can 
therefore  better  afford  to  waste  them,  and  it  is  based 
upon  the  conception  that  such  an  offensive  as  the  enemy 
has  maintained  for  two  months  is  no  more  expensive 
to  him  than  to  the  French,     If  we  examine  the  most 

*Thcsc  calibres  are  of  course  in  millimetres,  to  reduce  to  inches 
(roughly)  multiply  by  4  and  shift  the  decimal,  c,g.,  305— I2j  in.., 
42O=l0'S  in.,  etc. 


April  27,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


obvious  pieces  of  evidence  upon  this  matter,  we  cannot 
entertain  that  conjecture  as  to  his  motives. 

The  German  Empire  alone  is  concerned  in  this  war  to 
hold  a  total  front,  eastern  and  western,  of  about  900 
miles — or  rither  more. 

The  eastern  section,  that  is,  the  Hues  north  of  the 
Pinsk  marshes  and  stretching  to  the  Baltic,  can,  during 
the  thaw  and  until  the  drying  up  of  the  soil  after  the 
thaw,  be  held  with  a  much  smaller  number  of  men  to  the 
mile  than  the  western  front.  But  it  cannot  be  held 
with  less  than  thirty-five  divisions,  and  probably  it  is  held 
with  more.  Upon  the  western  front  the  enemy  is  believed 
to  have  over  115  divisions.  He  may  have  more,  but 
I  believe  that  number  has  been  actually  identiiied.  He 
has  put  into  the  attack  on  Verdun,  first  and  last,  over 
thirty  divisions ;  thirty  at  least  have  been  actually 
identified.  He  has  further  to  keep  certain  forces— they 
are  already  grievouslv  attenuated — as  garrisons  to  watch 
his  doubtful  ally  in  the  Balkans.  He  has  to  waste- 
very  grudgingly — some  troops  among  the  Austro-Hun- 
garians.  He  has  to  hold  down  Belgium.  That  last  point  is 
one  we  should  never  lose  sight  of,  for  though  Belgium  is 
now  ruled  normally  as  a  piece  of  occupied  territory,  the 
policing  of  it  is  a  heavy  drain. 

The  available  power  of  the  German  Empire  in  men, 
including  the  youngest  classes  in  training,  is  to  the 
available  power  of  the  French  Republic  in  men,  including 
the  same  classes,  roughly  as  seventeen  is  to  ten.  But  of  the 
western  front  the  French  troops,  thanks  to  the  British 
alliance,  have  only  to  watch  something  over  430  miles — 
say  just  under  half  what  the  Germans  have  to  watch.  The 
French  are  not  hampered  by  having  to  hold  down  any 
conquered  territory  at  all,  or  to  stiffen  any  doubtful 
Allies.  We  know  the  comparative  exhaustion  of  the  two 
bodies,  and  we  know  that  it  is  already  slightly  more  severe 
upon  the  German  side  than  upon  the  French.  The 
enemy  was  already  putting  his  igi6  class  into  the  field  in 
large  numbers  about  a  couple  of  months  before  the  French 
put  any  of  their  1916  class  into  the  field  at  all.  Of  the 
French  430  miles  or  so,  about  80  is  mountainous  and 
densely  forested,  and  can  be  held  with  a  less  number  of 
men  than  the  open  country  north  and  west  of  the 
Vosges.  This,  of  course,  will  relieve  the  enemj^  potentially 
as  much  as  it  now  does  the  French,  when  the  French  pass  to 
the  offensive.  But  since,  by  this  hypothesis  of  the 
enemy's  aiming  at  exhausting  the  French,  we  are  only  at 
the  moment  considering  a  French  defensive,  it  is  a  point 
in  favour  of  the  French. 

Now  these  things  being  so — the  enemy  slightly,  but 
appreciably,  more  exhausted  proportionately  than  the 
French  ;  his  total  man-power  (in  the  German  Empire 
alone),  not  double  the  French,  but  only  70  per  cent, 
greater  ;  the  front  he  has  to  garnish  more  than  double  his 
opponents — an  attack  such  as  that  which  has  been  con- 
ducted upon  the  Verdun  sector,  has  no  chance  of  ex- 
hausting his  numerically  inferior  opponent.  It  has  no 
chance  whatever  of  making  the  French  army  lose  a  ' 
larger  proportion  of  its  men  than  the  German  army 
loses  in  the  same  operation. 

Indeed,  it  is  impossible  to  see  how  such  an  offensive  can 
be  other  than  immensely  more  expensive  to  the  attack 
than  to  the  defensive  opposed  to  it.  As  a  mere  numerical 
calculation  the  thing  is  meaningless.  Individuals  who 
have  seen  this  or  that  restricted  section  of  the  lines, 
especially  where  there  has  been  a  countei -offensive,  will 
report  equal  losses  on  either  side.  Such  tales  are  balanced 
by  others  which,  from  the  observation  of  such  slaughter 
as  that  in  front  of  Vaux  just  a  month  ago,  generahse  the 
German  casualties  at  an  impossibly  high  figure. 

I  know  that  the  Germans  have  been  lavish  with  their 
munitions,  that  the  shelhng  of  the  French  trenches  has 
been  extraordinarily  heavy.  But  I  also  know  that  the 
defence  has  never  broken  and  that  therefore  the  slielter 
has  been  good,  and  I  further  know  that  since  the  first  ten 
days  of  March  the  French  reply  in  shell  has  been  as  heavy. 
The  casualties  from  artillery  fire,  other  than  that  of  field 
guns,  on  the  two  sides  will  not  greatly  differ,  but  will  be 
rather  higher  on  the  enemy's  side  because,  as  he  is  attack- 
ing, there  are  frequently  recurring  moments  when  his 
trenches  are  packed  just  before  an  assault.  There  is  no 
superior  "  convergence  of  fire "  against  the  French. 
The  salient  is  not  sharp  enough  for  that.  While  losses 
from  rifle,  machine  gun  and  field  gun  fire  enormously 
greater  on  the  side  of  a  prolonged  offensive. 


The  general  principle  stands  and  is  in  the  nature  of 
things.  An  offensive  so  directed,  so  prolonged  and  so 
restricted  to  narrow  fronts,  is  enormously  more  expensive 
than  the  corresponding  defensive. 

The  German  higher  command  may,  of  course,  imagine 
that  the  French  are  so  unstable  that  heavy  losses  at  this 
moment  will  incline  them  to  peace,  although  they  know 
that  they  are  inflicting  much  heavier  losses  upon  their 
enemy.  That  is  a  political,  not  a  military  calculation  ; 
and  the  Germans  are  quite  wrong  if  they  are  basing 
themselves  on  that.  But  whether  this  be  their  conception 
or  no,  they  cannot  conceivably  think  that  a  continued 
attack  in  the  present  state  of  the  Allies  with  the  very  large 
English  body  already  in  France,  and  the  enormous 
reserves  behind  that  body,  is  playing  their  game  in  the 
matter  of  attrition.     The  thing  does  not  hold  water. 

Further  note  this  :  we  are  in  the  tenth  week  of  the 
affair,  the  allied  forces  on  the  west  are  at  least  50  per 
cent,  more  numerous  than  the  enemy's.  And  yet  he 
has  not  provoked  us  to  the  least  counter-offensive.  Does 
not  that  decide  the  matter  ? 

It  will  be  of  the  highest  interest  when  these  things  can 
be  studied  in  detail,  and  with  the  ofiicial  evidence  before 
one,  to  discover  with  what  minimum  of  men  the  French 
have  worked  their  astonishing  defensive  along  the  sector 
of  Verdun.  I  do  not  mean  with  what  minimum  of  men 
all  told  ;  on  the  contrary,  the  French  have  used  (in  rota- 
tion) very  great  numbers  of  men.  I  mean  with  what 
minimum  of  men  in  the  front  line,  at  any  moment,  and 
occupied  in  shooting  at  the  enemy  when  he  attacked, 
the  French  staff  has  worked  upon  these  thirty  miles. 

A  Unique  Example 

Upon  the  proportion  of  that  number  to  the  masses  of 
the  attack  will  largely  turn  the  future  science  of  modern 
defence.  For  Verdun  will,  in  the  future,  be  the  classical 
example  in  the  schools.  The  successful  action  of  the 
French  on  the  sector  of  Verdun  is  an  example  of  the 
modern  defensive  upon  a  scale  of  men,  munitionment  and 
time,  which  makes  it  something  unique  even  in  the  history 
of  this  war,  quite  unparalleled  by  any  action  of  the  past ; 
such  lessons  as  it  provides  will  outweigh  all  others. 

The  same  tactics  have  now  been  pursued  by  the  French 
higher  command  for  sixty  days  ;  or,  if  we  count  the  first 
rapid  retirement  for  sixty-five  days  ;  and  during  the  whole 
of  that  time  the  bombardment  has  been  continuous.  The 
total  number  of  separate  attacks  (in  so  far  as  they  can  be 
distinguished  one  from  another,  which  is  not  always  easy) 
would  seem  to  be  over  forty,  and  of  these  no  less  than 
twelve  have  been  attacks  vipon  a  front  of  from  two  to 
nine  miles,  and  with  forces  from  the  equivalent  of  one  to 
perhaps  seven  divisions.  This  last  figure,  ithe  largest 
in  any  attack  upon  one  restricted  front,  was  the  French 
estimate  of  the  forces  engaged  on  April  9th. 

The  enemy  losses  must,  of  course,  be  largely  a  matter  of 
conjecture,  and  this  is  a  pity,  because  the  proportion 
between  the  losses  of  the  offensive  and  the  number  of  the 
enemy  used  at  any  moment  upon  the  defensive  is  the 
essential  point  of  the  whole  matter.  The  curve  of  losses, 
could  we  strike  it,  would  certainly  fall  during  the  last 
few  weeks  because  the  enemy's  attacks  have  been  de- 
livered at  such  much  longer  intervals,  and  in  the  lulls 
between  there  has  been  hardly  any  action  at  all.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  curve  would  rise  rather  sharply  between 
the  beginning  and  the  middle  of  the  affair,  from  the 
development  of  the  Fi^ench  heavy  artillery  fire  against  the 
German  trenches,  which  grew  very  largely  in  volume 
between  the  end  of  February  and  the  middle  of  March, 
since  which  date  it  has  been  maintained  at  about  the 
same  rate. 

It  is  worth  noting  that  the  estimates  of  German  losses 
in  front  of  Verdun  put  about  through  the  Press,  have 
never  had  ofiicial  sanction,  b'at  there  has  evidently  been, a 
very  strong  effort  made  to  keep  the  published  figures 
down  below  the  true  figure,  to  spread  what  business  men 
call  "  a  highly  conservati\'3e "  estimate.  The  reasons 
for  such  a  public  policy  are  obvious  enough.  Meanwhile, 
the  best  evidence  obtainable  has  come  from  the  great 
quantity  of  private  infornaation  which  has  been  fairly 
widely  distributed  behind  tiie  scenes.  Take,  for  instance, 
the  attack  on  the  Mort  d'Komme  of  ten  days  ago.  Those 
who  were  eye-witness  of  that  affair  and  who  are  trained 
by  months  of  warfare  to  the  est  mate  of  losses  will  not 


8 


LAND     &     WATER 


April  27,  1916 


allow  less  than  8.000  of  the  enemy  hit  between  Bethin- 
court  and  Cumitr  s  in  that  one  assault.  It  is  a  perfectly 
clear  open  tield  and  the  chance  of  keeping  an  accurate 
estimate  is  at  its  highest.  Upon  the  basis  of  this  sort  of 
private  evidence  one  can  hardly  doubt  that  the  total  losses 
in  the  si.xtyjodd  days  are  now  well  past  the  .]Oo,ooo.  They 
were  reaching  that  figure  before  the  great  attack  of  April 
yth. 

The  Enemy  Civilian  Attitude 

One  great  factor  in  the  enemy's  military  position 
which  we  are  inclined  to  forget  in  this  country  is  the 
attitude  of  his  civihan  population  ;  and  not  only  of  his 
civilian  population,  but  of  great  masses  of  his  rank  and  file 
in  the  army.  For  it  is  at  once  a  strength  and  weakness  of 
his  upon  the  military  side  that  this  opinion  is  still  quite 
simply  and  unalterably  convinced,  not  so  much  that 
German  victory  is  certain  (as  Hindenberg  was  clamouring 
the  other  day)  as  that  victory  has  already  been 
achieved. 

I  say  that  this  is  at  once  a  strength  and  a  weakness.  It 
is  a  strength  in  two  wajs  :  it  permits  his  liigher  command 
to  work  untrammelled  by  criticism  and  to  command  all  for 
any  effort  with  a  certainty  of  response.  It  is  always  an 
element  of  strength,  though  a  dangerous  and  ephemeral 
one,  to  be  governing  men  who  over  estimate  their 
power.  But  it  is  a  weakness  chiefly  in  this  :  That,  being 
a  falsehood  it  has,  like  all  balances  on  the  wrong  side, 
to  be  kept  up  at  compound  interest. 

Napoleon  with  a  real  foundation  of  decisive  victories 
very  different  indeed  from  that  enjoyed  by  the  German 
higher  command,  suffered  grievously  from  this  weakness 
during  the  later  part  of  the  year  18 12  and  all  the  year 
1813  and  the  first  months  of  1814  up  to  his  abdication. 
What  people  who  rely  upon  the  "  over  capitalisation" 
of  national  confidence  chiefly  have  to  dread  is  exactly 
what  a  debtor  has  to  dread  or,  for  that  matter,  any  one 
who  shirks  reality,  and  that  is,  ultimate  liquidation.  They 
even  usually  exaggerate  in  imagination  the  whole  effect 
which  the  unpleasant  truth  will  have  when  it  comes,  and 
they  are  therefore  led  into  efforts  more  expensive  than 
are  really  needed  to  stave  off  that  moment. 

I  am  not  sure  that  the  continued  waste  of  men  upon 
the  sector  of  Verdun  is  not  largely  concerned  with  this 
point.  The  German  Press  and  the  German  orders  of  the 
day  confirm  one  in  such  a  conception.  For  instance, 
Deimling,  in  command  of  the  15th  Corps  (Strasburg) 
issued  an  Order  of  the  Day  doubtless  similar  to  orders 
issued  by  many  other  commanders  upon  the  German  side 
last  February,  but  peculiar  in  this,  that  it  has  fallen  into 
our  hands.  This  Order  of  the  Day  expressed  to  his  troops 
the  confidence  of  the  higher  command  in  an  immediate 
reduction  of  the  French  forces  west  of  the  Meuse,  and 
the  occupation  of  the  bridges  and  town  of  Verdun  as  part 
of  the  original  attack  now  nine  weeks  past. 

There  was  no  necessity  for  such  bombastic  utterances 
in  the  purely  miUtary  sphere.  There  is  no  military 
necessity  for  any  part  of  that  stream  of  prophecy  which 
pours  out  over  Germany  (and  America  and  England)  from 
the  enemy's  pr.blicity  bureaux.  All  Deimling  had  to  ask 
of  his  soldiers  was  a  special  effort,  and  the  only  language 
necessary  to  such  a  pronouncement  was  the  ordinary 
language  of  glory  and  duty  and  the  rest.  But  hf  felt  it  in- 
cumbent upon  him,  or  rather  he  was  instructed,  to 
promise  specifically  a  highly  definite  result,  which  in 
}K)int  of  fact  was  not  reached. 

You  see  the  same  sort  of  thing  in  the  daily  press  of  the 
enemy,  which  is,  of  course,  written  up,  so  far  as  these 
notices  are  concerned,  directly  by  agents  of  the  German 
VVarOflfice. 

First  an  attack  is  bcinj.^  made  to  capture  the  local 
defences  of  a  mighty  "  for:ress  "  called  Verdun.  It'is 
bound  to  succeed.  For  nearly  every  reader  of  the 
(ierman  daily  press  has  heard  of  the  "  fortress  of  Verdun  " 
since  he  was  a  child.  Not  one  in  a  thousand  studies  the 
war  sufficiently  to  know  that  there  is  no  such  "  fortress  " 
left  under  present  conditions' ;  not  one  in  500,  perhaps, 
even  reads  a  map.  The  Emf 'cror  goes  to  the  front  of  the 
Verdun  sector  and  makes  every  preparation  for  formal 
entry  into  the  town,  much  as  be  did  before  Nancy  nineteen 
months  ago.  Meanwhile  the  papers  are  instructed  to  say 
that  "Verdun  opens  the  ro.id  to  Paris,  "    a  perfectly 


meaningless  phrase.  Next  that  Verdun  is  "  the  heart  of 
France,"  which  is  not  only  empty  but  idiotic.  Next, 
for  some  weeks,  that  progress  "  though  slow,  is  sure," 
next  that  "  Verdun  is  invested  and  besieged  "  (which 
it  isn't),  and  lastly,  that  entry  into  Verdun  is  "  certain  " 
—with  no  fuller  hint  at  what  the  vahie  of  such  an  entry 
might  be. 

Now  there  was  no  necessity  for  all  this  save  the  keep- 
ing up  of  a  legend.  Save  for  that  legend  the  Emperor  was 
perfectly  free  to  go  quietly  to  the  sector  in  which  he  was 
principally  interested  and  to  watch  events  like  a  soldier 
and  not  like  an  actor.  There  was  no  necessity  for  saying 
that  the  reaching  of  the  Meuse  at  Verdun  and  the  accom- 
panying capture  of  great  numbers  of  prisoners  and  guns 
would  "  open  the  way  to  Paris."  The  German  higher 
command  knew  perfectly  well  it  would  do  nothing  of 
the  sort,  and  by  using  that  phrase  they  were  simply 
piling  on  more  to  the  debt  which  would  have  some  day 
or  other  to  be  liquidated. 

German  "  Victories  " 

As  the  affair  goes  on  one  notices  another  development. 
The  attack  is  not  so  often  spoken  of  as  the  "  siege  of 
Verdun  "  it  becomes  "  the  victory  of  Avocourt  Wood," 
"  The  victory  of  Malancourt,"  "  The  victory  of  Hau- 
court."  The  public  in  Germany  is  thus  nourished  with 
unfailing  successes. 

I  ha\e  already  suggested  in  these  columns  what  I  im- 
agine will  be  the  last  development  of  all.  It  is  only  a 
conjecture  but  it  is  worth  watching.  I  conceive  that  the 
moment  when  this  offensive  is  abandoned  will  be  marked 
by  the  sudden  publication  in  the  German  Press  of  im- 
mense (and  false)  totals  of  prisoners  and  material  cap- 
tured, and  probably  some  false  and  heavily  cut-down 
total  of  the  German  losses  incurred. 

One  other  point  seems  likely.  It  is  this.  Some  con- 
tinuation of  the  attack  on  the  Verdun  sector  will  probably 
be  maintained  until  another  big  offensive  has  been 
undertaken,  (iermany  is  bound  to  attack.  She  has  no 
choice.  That  is  why  it  was  perfectly  safe  to  allovv,  as 
was  done  in  these  columns,  for  a  great  enemy  offensive 
on  the  Western  front  before  the  end  of  the  winter  and 
the  drying  up  of  the  Polish  front.  She  must  attack  again 
somewhere  soon.  And  the  political  side  of  this  over- 
lapping of  two  expensive  operations  will  be  inducing 
the  public  to  forget  the  Verdun  failure  in  their  excite- 
ment over  the  next  effort. 

Where  that  effort  may  be  designed  only  those  can  tell 
who  at  Headquarters  are  noting  the  signs  of  concentra- 
tion. For  all  we  know  here  in  England  there  may  as  yet 
be  no  such  signs  apparent.  One  theory,  plausible  enough, 
suggests  that  the  attempt  will  be  made  against  some 
portion  of  the  British  front.  Another,  more  likely, 
against  the  point  of  junction  between  French  and  British 
upon  the  Upper  Somme,  with  the  advantage  if  it  were 
successful  over  a  belt  of  a  few  miles  of  cutting  the  main 
railway  communication  between  Paris  and  the  Straits 
of  Dover. 

Yet  another  theory  is  that  no  further  great  offensive 
upon  the  west  will  be  attempted  by  the  enemy,  but  that 
the  west  will  be  left  to  the  defensive  the  moment  the  soil 
permits  of  an  attack  upon  the  Russian  front.  But  all 
these  things  are  mere  guess  work  except  to  the  men 
who  are  receiving  the  reports  of  (German  movement,  and 
it  is  waste  of  time  to  speculate  upon  them. 

A     Note 

As  I  conclude  the  writing  of  this  article,  news  reaches 
London  of  another  carefully  thoughtout  offensive  plan 
just  launched  by  the  enemy.  It  looks  even  more  futile 
than  the  earlier  ones.  The  great  combination  which  was  to 
have  been  a  powerful  feint  on  the  British  coast  coupled  with 
a  sudden  drain  of  troops  to  Ireland  and  chaos  meanwhile 
through  an  attack  by  air,  has  so  far  resulted  in  a  few 
of  the  Sinn  Fein  in  arms,  the  sinking  of  the  only  munition 
ship  sent,  the  capture  of  one  mad  man,  the  hurried 
appearance  of  a  few  Zeppelins,  immediately  chased 
away,  and  a  few  shells  on  Lowestoft.  If  it  gives  the  men 
who  themselves  feel  panic  and  also  work  on  the  fears  of 
others,  some  measure  of  the  enemy's  lack  of  judgment 
the  silly  thing  will  not  have  been  in  vain.  H.  Bklloc 


April  27,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


THE    AMERICAN   ULTIMATUM 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


THE  past  week  has  been  marked  by  mcmmtous 
events.  The  long  expected  American  uld  natvim 
to  Germany  has  actually  been  dispatched. 
Lowestoft  and  Zecbrugge  have  been  bombarded. 
An  attempt  has  been  made  to  land  arms  in  Ireland. 
This  invasion  was  at  first  treated  as  a  joke — but  subse- 
quent news  shows  that  it  was  a  carefully  considered 
effort.  It  was  made  by  a  disguised  cruiser,  helped  by  a 
submarine.  The  ship  itself  was  sunk  by  our  forces, 
though  the  curious  wording  of  the  Admirahy  announce- 
ment makes  it  quite  impossible  to  guess  the  means. 
Amongst  the  survivors,  all  of  whom  it  must  be  supposed 
were  made  prisoners,  was  the  .rebel  Casement,  and  at  the 
moment  of  writing  h :;  is  in  London  awaiting  trial  by  court 
martial.  On  Tuesday  at  .^(.30  a.m.,  the  German  battle 
cruisers  attempted  a  second  bombardment  of  Lowestoft, 
this  making  the  first  effort  to  cross  the  North  Sea  since 
December,  1914.  The  squadron  was  engaged  by  all  the 
naval  forces  in  the  locality,  but  these,  one  must  presume, 
were  limited  to  destroyers  and  light  cruisers.  The 
Germans  took  to  flight  incontinently,  but  not  before  they 
had  dropped  shell  enough  in  Lowestoft  to  kill  three  adults 
and  a  child.  The  British  light  craft  pursued,  and  kept 
in  touch  with  them,  in  the  hope  no  doubt,  that  our  own 
battle  cruisers  would  cut  off  the  enemy  and  bring  him 
to  action  before  he  had  got  within  the  defences  of  his 
minefields.  Some  of  the  pursuing  squadron  were  hit,  but 
none  were  sunk.  But  as  no  mention  is  made  of  these 
more  powerful  squadrons  being  engaged,  it  must  be 
assumed  that,  as  after  the  1914  attacks  on  Yarmouth 
and  Scarborough,  the  raiders  have  managed  to  get  clean 
away.  Twenty-four  hours  before  this  Admiral  Bacon's 
forces  seemed  to  have  got  into  touch  with  some  German 
destroyers  off  Zeebrugge,  to  have  driven  them  into  that 
harbour,  and  then  to  have  given  that  place  such  a  bom- 
bardment as  it  has  never  had  before.  In  this  case  the 
initiative  was  probably  purely  British.  Two  points  in 
connection  with  the  Lowestoft  and  Irish  raids  are  note- 
worthy. In  the  first  the  safety  of  the  ravaging  cruisers 
was  secured  by  Zeppelin  reconnaissance.  Would  the 
possession  of  similar  craft  by  us  have  made  it  too  dangerous 
a  venture  ?  In  the  Irish  effort  a  submarine  and  cruiser 
worked  in  company.  This  is  a  combination,  the  possi- 
biUty  of  which  our  patrolling  squadrons  will  have  to 
keep  constantly  in  mind  when  they  search  seeming 
neutrals. 

The  Casement  attempt  to  land  arms  in  Ireland  and 
the  raid  on  Lowestoft  must  be  read  together. 

The  Admiralty  announcement  taken .  by  itself,  and 
read  in  absolute  ignorance  of  conditions  in  Ireland, 
suggests  a  touch  of  light  comedy.  But  probably  it  is  a 
mistake  to  look  at  it  in  any  such  light.  Neither  Case- 
ment nor  his  German  employers  would  be  likely  to  start 
on  an  enterprise  of  this  kind  without  hopes  that,  in  the 
unlikely  event  of  the  arms  being  got  through  to  the  Irish 
coast,  there  would  be  somebody  willing  to  use  them. 
If  there  was  any  expectation  of  causing  serious  trouble 
in  Ireland,  then  the  raid  on  Lowestoft  may  well  have  been 
calculated  to  make  the  most  of  the  situation. 

The  Germans  are  great  architects  in  moral  effects,  and 
though  their  assaults  on  British  nerves  have  so  far  not 
been  repaid  by  any  great  perturbation  of  the  popular 
judgment,  there  are  not  wanting  signs,  at  any  rate  in 
London,  that  persons  of  reputed  light  and  leading  ma\- 
yet  be  susceptible  to  terrorism.  And  moral  considera- 
tions apart,  it  is  always  a  good  card  to  play  on  England's 
fear  of  invasion.  If  it  does  nothing  else  it  may  serve  to 
keep  troops  in  these  islands  that  would  be  highly  danger- 
ous elsewhere. 

And  beyond  both  of  these  objects  the  German  go\ern- 
ment  is  face  to  face  with  a  difficulty  with  America  now 
from  which  there  is  no  outlet  that  is  not  disastrous  either 
to  its  home  prestige  or  to  its  mihtary  hopes.  It  has  be- 
come, then,  an  obvious  necessity  of  the  situation 
to  create  some  kind  of  diversional  attack  on  Great 
Britain,  either  by  bombarding  its  coast  or  by  pretending 
to  foster  a  rebellion  in  Ireland,  for  not  otherwise  could 


German  civilian  attention  be  turned  from  the  most 
important  issue  of  the  day. 

Mr.  Wilson's  note  to  Berlin  leaves  Germany  to  choose 
between  the  absolute  abandonment  of  all  the  methods 
that  have  given  success  to  her  submarines,  and  a  final 
rupture  with  the  United  States  of  America.  In  sending 
this  note  Mr.  Wilson  has  done  exactly  what  he  was 
expected  to  do.  It  followed  logically  on  the  discussions 
which  have  taken  place  during  the  last  thirteen  months. 
His  demand  that  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives should  each  pass  resolutions  supporting  the 
Government's  policy  clearly  indicated  that  this  step  was 
imminent. 

It  was  inevitable  that  the  United  States  would  take 
this  line  for  two  reasons.  The  issue  with  Germany  is  on 
a  plain  matter  of  right  and  wrong.  And  it  occurs  in  the 
form  of  war  which,  for  a  great  many  years  now,  has  been 
regulated  by  law  in  a  sense  in  which  land  war  never  has. 
No  cruiser  captain  can  capture  or  sink  an  enemy  ship 
without  his  action  being  liable  to  review  in  a  court  of  law. 
Note,  for  instance,  the  recent  case  of  the  Captain  of  the 
Carmania  having  to  tell  his  story  of  the  sinking  of  the 
Cap  Trafalgar  in  open  court.  A  German  General  can 
capture  and  plunder  a  town  and  abuse  the  inhabitants 
apparently  at  will,  and  do  what  he  likes  with  the  loot. 
Anyone  who  is  interested  in  a  neutral  which  is  captured 
or  sunk  has  his  remedy  in  the  Prize  Courts,  and  all  naval 
action  is  liable  to  be  reviewed  by  a  court  martial.  These 
are  truths  that  should  prove  illuminating  to  those  who 
talk  of  "  navalism  "  and  "  militarism,"  as  names  for  an 
equal  tyrannj'. 

Effects  of  Sea  Action 

It  is,  historically,  strictly  true  to  say  that  the  humanis- 
ing of  war  began  with  sea  war.  Sea  action  is  in  its  essence 
always  simple  and  always  direct.  It  lends  itself  to  strict 
investigation,  to  accurate  and  unmistakable  analysis. 
The  moment,  therefore,  that  Germany  carried  her  con- 
tempt of  the  Christian  and  civilised  code  into  this  field 
her  crimes  were  not  only  open  to  the  detection  and  con- 
demnation of  the  neutral  world,  but  no  excuses  or 
mendacities  could  cloud  the  issue.  The  clearness  of  the 
facts  then,  the  tradition  that  sea  war  was  governed  by 
law,  the  simplicity  with  which  it  was  seen  that  the  issue 
was  one  of  right  and  wrong,  made  the  attitude,  which  the 
United  States  has  now  assumed,  inevitable  from  the  first. 

The  consequences  of  this  ultimatum  will  be  twofold. 
It  has  already  had  an  overwhelming  moral  effect.  It  gives 
a  final  shape  to  the  judgment  of  the  neutral  world,  and 
the  allied  belligerents  would  be  less  than  human  if  they 
were  not  comforted  and  encouraged.  The  judgment  of 
America  on  European  affairs  in  a  way  anticipates  that  of 
posterity.  When  the  New  World  is  called  into  existence 
as  a  critic  of  the  morals  of  the  Old,  it  redresses  the  balance 
which  the  war  has  thrown  out  of  gear.  If,  like  the  judg- 
ment of  posterity,  it  has  taken  some  time  to  become 
effective,  this  fact  only  adds  emphasis  to  the  finality  of 
its  character.  The  event,  then,  is  one  that  has  only  to 
be  defined  for  its  value  to  be  measured.  The  largest 
neutral  state,  the  most  democratic  community  in  the 
world — in  which  opinions  and  judgments  are  canvassed 
and  expressed  with  a  freedom  unknown  elsewhere — has 
spoken  with  due  deliberation  and  in  unmistakable 
words,  and  with  its  protest  has  put  a  term  to  its  neutrality. 
The  thing  is  a  portent,  when  we  remember  that  no  country 
is  less  prepared  for  or  less  desirous  of  war  than  the 
American  States.  That  this  reluctance  is  a  measure  of 
American  sincerity  will  not  be  lost  on  the  German  Govern- 
ment !  Nor  will  it  fail  to  perceive  that  if  the  United 
States  become  belligerent,  fellow  victims  among  the 
neutrals  may  be  encouraged  to  join  as  well. 

Very  few  enemy  expressions  of  opinion  have  reached  us 
and  it  is  not  certain  that  any  of  these  are  of  importance. 
There  has  been  no  general  press  comment — perhaps 
because  none  lias  been  permitted.  This  reticence  is  an 
excellent  proof  that  the  Higher  Command  realises  that  the 


10 


I.  A  N  D     Cv      WA  T  E  R 


April  27,  1916 


final  liioicr  must  now  br  made.  It  is  an  imInc'n^c  result, 
(ierniany  has  to  inako  its  rhuiro  knowing  that  it  stands 
at  the  bar  of  tin-  pubUc  conscit-ncf  convicted  of  crime. 
What  will  the  Highrt"  Command's  choice  be  ?  I'tiose 
who  have  followed  the  de\elopments  of  (jerman  policy 
in  the  months  of  February  and  March  will  see  without 
difficulty  the  choice  it  will  tctsh  to  take.  For  six  months 
previously  von  Tirpitz  had  devoted  the  whole  engineering 
resources  of  (lermany  to  the  preparation  of  a  vast  sub- 
marine campaign  against  the  shipping  that  served  these 
islands.  While  these  jireparations  were  going  on  at 
home.  Count  Bcrnstorft  was  trying  to  keep  American 
opinion  in  check.  Six  weeks  or  so  before  the  grand 
attack  was  due  he  played  his  master  card,  and  for  a  time 
it  looked  as  if,  by  our  arming  of  merchant  ships  in  self- 
defence,  Germany  had  been  supplied  with  exactly  the 
argument  that  would  take  America  out  of  the  contro- 
versy. In  the  first  Hush  of  this  seeming  victory,  March 
1st  was  announced  as  the  date  on  which  the  slaughter  of 
the  merchaJitmen  would  begin.  Then  suddenly  it 
became  clear  that  Bernstorft  had  failed,  that  the  American 
(iovernmcnt  were  too  well  advised,  both  of  law  and 
historv,  to  accept  his  sophistries.  It  became  obvious 
that  the  Tirpitz  campaign,  if  carried  out  as  Tirpitz  meant 
it  to  be,  would  precipitate  the  crisis  which  the  German 


The  Consequences  of  Defiance 

But  if  the  public  opinion  in  Germany  compels  a  deliancc 
of  America,  if  the  true  proportions  of  the  surrender  are 
appreciated  and  are  seen  to  be  intolerable,  something 
much  more  serious  than  the  continuance  of  the  submarine 
campaign  will  follow.  For  ruthless  as  it  has  been  during 
the  past  five  weeks,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  only  liners 
and  passenger  ships  attacked,  have  been  the  victims  of 
misunderstood  or  disobeyed  instructions.  The  cases  of 
the  Palamban^  and  the  Tubantia  I  dealt  with  over  a 
month  ago.  It  is  against  reason  to  suppose  that  the 
German  Higher  Command  could  ever  have  intended  these 
ships  to  be  sunk.  Neither  do  I  beheve  that  the  Sussex 
was  sunk  by  order.  The  official  account  of  this  incident 
as  published  by  the  enemy  is  a  lame  enough  affair,  if  it 
is  interpreted  as  an  effort  to  prove  that  the  Sussex  was 
not  sunk,  but  if  it  is  read  as  an  explanation  or  an  excuse  for 
sinking  her,  it  is  a  different  matter  altogether.  In  no 
conceivable  form  of  naval  operation  can  the  difficulties 
in  identifying  an  opponent  be  so  great  as  in  submarine 
operations.  If,  as  one  supposes,  all  the  more  experienced 
U  boat  commanders  have  perished,  if  all  the  present 
commanders  are  doing  their  work  reluctantly  and,  re- 
membering   their   predecessors'    fate,    in   a    pardonably 


Sliipsperdm/ 
■3. 


' —  + 


ff. 


2—1 -r :- L ] -  ■     2 


/f 


I 

'iJbrmal 


'2^WeeIi 


Shipsperday 


kekt-^^3-^Week, ] Jx.Si 


4^Week\ 


-4 -I------ S^mek^-i 


i 
2 


i__ 


/I 


.- ■ . ^ J 


-!"=■ 


r^ 


2 
-2 


formal  I^Week  2'^hheA  Sr^hM.  ^Week  S^lVeek 


Daily  average  of  Ships  sunk.     Note  that  in  the  past  week  the  losses  have  fallen  below  normal 


CJovernment  knew  at  all  costs  must  be  avoided.     Von 
Tirpitz  was  thereupon  dismissed. 

But  the  Government  had  reckoned  without  the  effect 
of  its  previous  education  of  German  public  opinion.  The 
=reed  that  the  submarine  was  the  only  weapon  against 
England  and  could  be  made  an  effective  weapon,  had 
sunk  deeply  into  the  German  conscience,  and  the  strange 
spectacle  was  seen  of  a  submissive  people  forcing  the 
hands  of  their  autocratic  rulers.  Three  weeks  behind 
time,  then,  the  campaign  began.  A  month  of  it  has 
brought  the  ultimatum  which  the  clearer  heads  had,  from 
the  first  days  of  March,  fully  realised  to  be  inevitable. 
The  first,  and  indeed  the  only  instinct  of  the  German 
Government  in  this  crisis  must  be  to  go  back  to  their 
attitude  before  the  agitation  forced  their  hands.  The 
Kaiser  and  Bethmann  von  Hollweg  will  then  do  their 
best  to  surrender.  The  American  (government  will  do 
its  best  to  make  that  surrender  easy.  So  much  is  clear 
from  Mr.  Willard's  exceedingly  interesting  notes  from 
Washington  in  the  New  York  Evening  Post.  And  Mr. 
Willard  is  credited  by  his  countrymen  with  a  close  and 
singular  knowledge  of  Mr.  Wilson's  wishes  and  intentions. 
But  though  everything  will  be  done  to  make  the  surrender 
ea.sy,  the  surrender  itself  will  have  to  be  absolute.  It 
must  take  the  form  of  a  complete  suspension  of  the  whole 
submarine  campaign  as  we  have  known  it  hitherto.  Only 
time  can  show  whether  the  German  Government  that 
had  to  yield  after  dismissing  von  Tirpitz  is  strong  enougli 
now  to  face  so  abject  a  humiliation.  If  it  is,  there 
follows  from  the  American  note  a  military  result  of  the 
first  importance,  to  wit,  a  virtually  complete  security  for 
the  sea  service  of  the  allied  belligerents. 


shaken  state  of  nerves,  the  wonder  is,  not  that  such  a 
mistake  as  happened  in  the  case  of  the  Sussex  occurred 
but  that  there  are  not  many  more  such  blunders.  At  any 
rate,  Tubantia,  Palambang  and  Sussex  stand  alone,  anil 
it  seems  incredible  that  some  eighty  ships  could  have 
been  sunk  during  these  five  weeks,  and  no  other  liners 
sunk  or  attacked,  except  on  the  supposition  that  liners 
have  been  deliberately  omitted  from  the  proscription. 

If  Germany  refuses  to  yield  to  America,  the  first  result 
must  be  that  the  attack  on  liners  will  become  as  ruthless 
as  has  been  the  attack  on  freighters.  This  is  a  matter 
in  which  the  belligerents'  new  Ally— if ,  indeed,  she  should 
decide  to  become  an  Ally— will  not  be  able  to  help  us. 
The  only  effective  naval  defence  against  submarines  arc 
fast,  well  armed  light  craft,  and  in  this  the  American 
Navy  is  conspicuously  lacking.  The  immediate  result 
then  of  America's  intervention  may  throw  a  far  heavier 
strain  upon  the  Admiralty's  defensive  organisation,  by 
breeding  a  new,  and  in  some  respects,  a  more  formidable 
threat  against  our  shipping.  This  no  doubt  is  a  situation 
which  the  Admiralty  has  anticipated,  and  it  is  difficult 
to  suppose  that  there  is  any  form  of  defensive  that  is  not 
being  pushed  to  development  at  the  maximum  pressure. 

But  other  Departments  of  Government  must  realise 
that  this  new  situation,  if  it  should  arise,  will  retpiire 
special  measures.  The  building  of  new  merchant  shipping 
must  be  made  to  rank  as  equal  in  national  importance 
with  the  making  of  munitions  or  the  supply  of  the  Royal 
Navy.  So  far  Admiralty  restrictions  on  merchant 
shipping  have  been  largely  withdrawn,  but  this  for  two 
excellent  reasons  does  not  sufticc.  First,  shipwrights, 
boilcrmakers,    rivetters,    etc..    while  wiUing  enouirh  to 


April  27,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


II 


tackle  naval  construction,  show  no  patriotic  inclination 
to  throw  the  same  ardour  into  mercantile  work,  for 
.the  reason  that  they  do  not  realise  its  national  importance. 
Secondly,  the  lirms  that  have  contracts  with  shipowners 
ior  the  production  of  steamers,  have  no  inducement  to 
raise  wages  or  push  on  with  this  work,  for  the  reason  that 
any  ships  they  build  must  be  delivered  under  contracts 
made  when  economic  conditions  were  totally  different 
from  those  that  now  prevail.  If  they  complete  the  ships, 
they  do  so  at  a  loss.  And  as  over  half  a  million  tons 
have  been  contracted  for,  the  loss  would  be  formidable. 
It  is  for  these  two  reasons  that  it  is  clear  that  only 
Government  action  can  put  the  renewal  of  our  merchant 
shipping  on  the  footing  which  its  importance  as.  a  national 
interest  now  demands. 

Next,  it  follows  from  the  existing  shortage  and  the 
threatened,  greater  shortage,  that  the  restriction  of 
imports  must  be  made  a  great  deal  more  rigorous  than  it 
is.  The  employment  of  Sir  Guy  Granct  to  supervise  this 
guarantees  that  the  Government's  policy,  whatever  it  is, 
will  be  carried  out  with  the  greatest  possible  ability  and 
firmness.  It  is  more  to  the  purpose  that  this  policy 
should  be  as  strict  as  possible,  and  that  once  principles 
are  laid  down,  no  pressure  to  allow  exceptions  should, 
even  in  a  single  case,  be  permitted. 

The  Case  of  the  Underwriters 

Finally  there  is  the  grave  question  of  insurance,  the 
importance  of  which  seems  in  some  quarters  to  be  very 
little  realised.  In  this  field  the  excess  profit  tax  may 
prove  to  be  of  questionable  wisdom.  The  business  of 
underwriting  has  been  held  to  be  a  trade  and  not  a 
profession,  and  the  individuals  and  firms  engaged  in  it 
have  to  pay  last  year's  and  now  the  enhanced  impost 
on  all  after  war  profits.  Some  of  the  largest  operators 
have  already  withdrawn  from  underwriting  altogether 
and  others  threaten  to  withdraw.  ■  To  them  it  simply 
seems  to  be  a  case  of  "  Heads  you  win  :  tails  I  lose." 
The  Chancellor  has,  of  course,  made  certain  concessions 
to  them.  The  transactions  of  two  years  are  to  be  brought 
into  account,  instead  of  only  one,  and  the  excess  tax 
profits  is  not  to  be  payable  till  the  end  of  the  present 
jinancial  year.  But  is  not  the  application  of  this  tax 
mistaken  in  this  particular  case  ?     At  most  underwriting 


is  half  a  business  and  half  a  profession.  In  no  commercial 
imdertaking  does  individual  experience  and  judgment  so 
affect  a  man's  action.  But  this,  after  all,  is  not  the  point. 
The  point  is  that  we  are  in  a  form  of  sea  war  in  which  the 
uncertainties  are  greater  than  they  have  ever  been,  and 
that  never  was  a  free  underwriting  market  more  needed. 
Anything  which  weakens  the  market  is  bad  policy. 
The  underwriters  have  deserved  well  of  the  nation.  From 
the  first  their  action  has  been  marked  by  public  spirit. 
But  their  position  is  difficult.  It  is  impossible  for  the 
Admiralty  to  give  them  information  which  will  enable 
them  to  judge  the  probabilities  of  any  one  route  being 
safer  than  any  other.  With  an  enemy  with  the  morals  of 
the  German  and  armed  with  a  weapon  like  the  submarine, 
it  is  literally  true  fo  say  that  at  any  moment  anything 
may  happen.  This  is  surely  not  a  situation  in  which, 
however  numerous  the  thousands  that  can  be  drawn 
in  taxation,  the  Exchequer's  receipts  will  compensate 
for  a  diminution  in  the  confidence  of  the  underwriters 
in  their  business.  For  the  possession  of  a  great  reserve 
fund  is  of  the  essence  of  confidence  in  this  affair.  I  cannot 
help  thinking  that  anything  the  Chancellor  might  lose 
by  omitting  this  tax  altogether  would  be  gained fivetimes 
over  by  the  community  in  lower  underwriting  rates,  and 
the  added  buoyancy  and  courage  which  the  prevalence 
of  a  low  underwriting  rate  gives  to  the  shipping  world. 
And  if  the  tax  cannot  be  remitted  altogether  two  changes 
at  least  might  with  advantage  be  made.  Let  the  excess 
profits  tax  for  underwriters  be  halved  on  the  ground  that 
their  business  is  at  least  in  part  professional,  and  let  no 
tax  be  levied  at  all  until  after  the  war  is  over,  so  that  this 
period  of  exceptional — and  to  a  great  extent  incalculable 
— risk  should  be  dealt  with  as  a  whole. 

The  Submarine  War 

I  continue  this  week  the  daily  average  curve  shewn  in 
the  last  number.  It  will  be  seen  that  during  the  past 
seven  days  the  losses  have  dropped  below  one  a  day,  that 
is  below  normal.  The  present  fall  can  hardly  be  ex- 
plained by  the  American  note.  It  is  more  probable  that 
tlip  fall  is  due  to  the  usual  causes,  namely,  the  necessity 
of  all  surviving  boats  to  return  home  for  refit,  and  the 
fact  that  many  boats  have  not  survived. 

Arthur  Pollen. 


An  Unhumorous   Philosopher 


By  Desmond  MacCarthy 


NOTICING  a  look  of  abstraction  on  the  face  of  my 
companion,  I  asked  him  what  he  was  thinking 
about.  "  I  am  thinking,"  he  replied  smiling, 
"  about  Herbert  Spencer."  I  looked  at  him 
in  astonishment.  But  afterwards  when  we  parted  my 
thoughts,  too,  strayed  off  in  that  direction,  and  I  found 
them  amusing. 

Herbert  Spencer's  Autobiography  is  one  of  the  fnost 
transparently  honest  books  ever  written.  Men  have 
often  tried  to  confess  themselves,  but  vanity  or  the 
desire  for  sympathy,  or  the  penitent  instinct  are  the 
strongest  motives  which  prompt  such  attempts,  and  they 
are  distorting  influences  of  the  most  insidious  nature. 
For  really  truthful  self-portraiture  some  complacency 
and  much  detachment  are  necessary  ;  and  these  are  not 
qualities  which  generally  urge  a  man  to  tell  all  he  knows 
about  himself.  By  itself  self-complacency  may  produce 
an  amazingly  fatuous  book  ;  the  hfe  of  Lord  Herbert  of 
Chertbury  and  Benvenuto  CelHni's  autobiography  are 
excellent  reading  ;  but  then  several  pinches  of  salt  must 
be  taken  with  every  page,  for  the  authors  are  out  to 
make  definite  impression.'  Absolute  detachment  again 
prevents  a  man  from  writing  about  himself  at  all.  The 
men  then  who  have  written  about  themselves  most 
truthfully  are  those  who  have  taken  their  work  so  seriously 
that  it  seems  natural  that  the  world  should  want  to  know 
all  about  them,  and  who,  at  the  same  time,  are  so 
satisfied  with  what  they  have  done,  and  so  convinced  of 
its  importance,  that  they  do  not  care  a  rap  what  the  world 
thinks.  This  was  the  case  with  Herbert  Spencer. 
The  perfect  blend  in  him  of  self-complacency  with  the 


absence  of  personal  vanity  has  produced  a  book  of  unri- 
valled honesty  and  tepidity.  It  has  been  said  that  Gibbon 
wrote  about  himself  in  exactly  the  same  tone  as  he  wrote 
about  the  Roman  Empire ;  Herbert  Spencer  wrote 
about  himself  in  exactly  the  same  tone  as  he  wrote  about 


Sovtes  Sbahespeaviana^ 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE 


The   Reunited  Ministry  : 

Men  shall  deal  unadvisedly  sometimes. 
Which  after-hours  give  leisure  to  repent, 

Richard  III.    '\..  iv.,  292-3, 


Parliament  in  Secret  Session  : 

Seal  up   your   lips,    and  give    no    words 

but  mum  ; 
The  business  askcth  silent  secrecy. 

2  Henry  VI„  I.,  ii.,  S9  90. 


President  Wilson's  latest  pronouncements: 

He  is  awake. 
He  tells  thee  so  himself. 

Troiliis  nnd  Crcssida  I.,  iri..  255-6 


12 


LAND    &    WATER 


April  27,  1916 


the  Universe.  He  was  not  in  the  least  afraid  of  making 
the  Universe  dull  ;  he  was  as  perfectly  indifferent  about 
making  himself  out  uninteresting.  His  business  was  in 
both  cases  to  generalise  and  correlate  phenomena.  Many 
men  have  screwed  themselves  up  to  confessing  publicly 
they  were  wicked  or  have  done  mean  things.  But 
as  in  the  case  of  Rousseau,  pride  usually  peeps  out  in  the 
fact  that  they  are  obviously  conscious  that  they  are  own- 
ing up  to  the  things  other  men  conceal.  They  are  proud 
when  they  comi)are  themselves  with  others.  Many  have 
written  themselves  down  as  rascals,  or  as*  asses  of  the 
gay  and  freely  kicking  kind  ;  but  very  few  have  tried  to 
depict  themselves  at  full  length  as  essentially  dull.  Such 
an  achievement  is  beyond  the  reacli  of  humility,  and 
can  only  be  accomplished  by  one  free  Herbert  Spencer 
in  whom  the  passion  for  truth  has  no  other  rival  passions. 

Fascinating  Result 

The  resrdt  is  fascinating.  Perhaps  when  the  Synthetic 
Philosophy,  that  row  of  stout  volumes  bound  in  the 
philosopher's  favourite  colour,  "  an  impure  purple,"  is 
forgotten,  its  author  may  still  be  remembered  as  the  most 
perfect  specimen  of  a  human  type.  There  is  no  name 
for  this  type,  but  we  have  a  name  for  his  op])osite  ;  we 
call  him  a  humorist.  It  was  not  that  Herbert  Spencer 
was  an  antigelast  :  so  far  indeed  from  looking  forward  to 
the  day  of  the  last  joke,  he  was  pathetically  api)reciativc 
of  jokes,  seeking  them  himself  with  care  and  hope.  But 
his  mind  was  exactly  the  kind  of  mind  in  which  humour 
does  not  live.  The  jokes  he  made  himself,  or  appreciated, 
were  little  tiny  jokes  ;  he  never  saw  a  big  one  in  his  life. 
He  tells  us  in  his  autobiography  that  a  sudden  access  of 
moderately  good  health  enabled  him  to  make  one  once 
in  the  Isle  of  Wight  He  was  on  a  holiday  there  with 
G.  H.  Lewes,  and  at  lunch  he  records  that  he  remarked  that 
it  produced  very  big  chops  for  so  small  an  island. 

Herbert  Spencer  had  a  hearty  deep  laugh ;  and 
his  own  chuckles  which  followed  this  remark  must  have 
been  very  funny.  One  can  imagine  his  companion,  after 
gazing  for  a  moment  in  amazement  at  the  delighted 
countenance  of  the  philosopher,  bursting  into  laughter 
himself,  laughter  which  would  be  echoed  by  still  deeper 
guffaws  from  the  only  begetter  of  the  original  joke ;  in 
their  turn  provoking  redoubled  peals  from  the  other,  and 
so  on  till  climax  was  again  reached  memorable  after  forty 
years,  and  the  reaction  set  in,  when  the  philosopher 
suddenly  recovering  his  balance  and  normal  frame  of 
mind,  remarked  on  the  causal  connection  between  humour 
and  health. 

Whisky  on  Top  of  Wine 

Describing  a  walk  on  Ben  Nevis  in  another  passage,  he 
says  :  "I  found  myself  possessed  of  a  quite  unusual 
amount  of  agihty  ;  being  able  to  leap  from  rock  to  rock 
with  rapidity,  ease  and  safety  ;  so  that  I  quite  astonished 
myself.  There  was  evidently  an  exultation  of  the  per- 
ceptive and  motor  powers.  .  .  .  Long  continued 
exertion  having  caused  an  unusually  great  action  of  the 
lungs,  the  exaltation  produced  by  the  stimulation  of  the 
brain  was  not  cancelled  by  the  diminished  oxygenation 
of  the  blood.  The  oxygenation  had  been  so  much  in 
excess,  that  deduction  from  it  did  not  appreciably 
diminish  the  vital  activities."  What  is  all  this  about"? 
He  explains.  The  fact  was  the  philosopher  was  coming 
down  the  hill  side  chariotted  by  Bacchus  and  his  pards, 
having  taken  whisky  on  the  top'of  wine  on  the  summit. 

There  is  another  story  about  him  which  illustrates  this 
habitual  direction  of  his  attention  towards  causes 
to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  aspects.  Numerous 
complaints  about  the  toughness  of  the  meat  having 
occurred  at  the  Atheneum,  the  matter  at  last  came  before 
the  kitchen  committee,  of  which  he  was  a  member.  It 
was  agreed  that  the  butcher  should  be  sent  for  and  inter- 
viewed. But  Herbert  Spencer  would  not  hear  of  his 
being  admitted  until  it  had  been  decided  exactly  what 
was  the  cause  of  the  complaints  :  it  was  unfair  to  the 
man  to  assert  vaguely  that  the  meat  was  tough.  After 
a  longish  session,  in  which  he  took  the  matter  in  hand, 
the  butcher  was  at  last  admitted  and  told  that  his  joints 
"  had  too  much  connective  tissue  in  them." 

Now  this  habit  of  mind,  though  it  may  be  sometimes 
tlic  :;ause  of  humour  in  Oihers,  is  u'lfavourable  to  the 


internal  production  of  it,  and  in  that  amusing  book  Home 
Life  with  Herbert  Spencer,  by  two  of  the  young  ladies 
who  kept  house  fi^r  him  for  eight  years,  the  specimens  of 
his  own  efforts  in  that  direction  prove  this.  For  instance, 
there  arrived  one  day  a  new  photograph  of  him.  The 
ladies  began  to  criticise  it,  no  one  of  them  could  find  any 
points  in  its  favour.  "  Why  it  gives  neither  your  serious 
nor  30ur  frivolous  expression  !  We  don't  like  it  at  all." 
About  ten  minutes  or  a  quarter  of  an  hour  afterwards  we 
were  astounded  to  see  the  philosopher  in  his  sliirt  sleeves! 
standing  at  the  dining-room  door  tying  his  neck-tic. 
The  intensely  amused  expression  on  his  face  shovve  d  he 
was  quite  alive  to  the  surprise  Yii  would  occasion. 

Without  any  apology  for  his  deshabille  he  laughingly 
remarked  :  "I  liave  come  down  to  fire  off  a  joke  before 
1  forget  it  !  Your  criticisms  of  my  photograph — which 
you  expect  to  be  grave  and  gay  at  the  same  time — remind 
me  of  the  farmers,  who  are  never  contented  imless 
simultaneously  it  is  raining  on  the  turnips  while  the  sun 
shines  on  the  corn."  And  with  an  audible  chuckle  he 
hurried  back  to  complete  his  toilet. 

It  is  a  terrible  ordeal  for  any  philosopher  to  be  described 
in  intimacy  by  two  superficially  reverential,  but  un- 
consciously frivolous  young  women.  Herbert  Spencer 
with  his  foibles,  his  ear-stoppers,  his  valetudinism,  his 
habit  of  giving  to  everything — potatoes,  religion,  salt- 
cellars, precisely  the  same  quality  of  attention,  was 
peculiarly  at  the  mercy  of  such  observers.  (It  is  a  very 
funny  book).  He  was  absolutely  defenceless  ;  he  had  no 
humour,  which  is  but  the  defence  of  the  thinker  against 
those  who  take  things  at  their  face  value,  and  the  enor- 
mously wide  sweep  of  his  intellectual  curiosity  was  only 
equalled  by  the  humdrumness  of  his  sympathies. 

Study  of  Trifles 

He  was  a  man  who  could  not  attend  to  anything  lie  did 
not  think  of  the  utmost  importance  and  was  tempera- 
mentally driven  to  attend  more  than  most  men  to  trifles  ; 
who  thought  that  complete  independence  of  the  bias  of 
tradition  was  as  important  in  deciding  how  a  bed  should 
be  made,  or  how  thick  socks  should  be  (he  thought  it 
illogical  to  suppose  that  the  foot  should  be  clad  less  thinly 
than  the  rest  of  the  body)  as  in  scjtting  out  to  investigate 
scientific  problems  ;  who  made  a  heroic  life-long  effort 
to  cram  every  branch  of  experience  into  a  world-formula 
(succeeding  wonderfully  well — with  the  help  of  a 
big  paper  basket  labelled  the  Unknowabl-2  for  things 
which  absolutely  would  not  fit),  and  yet  at  meals  got 
excited  by  a  minute  smut  on  a  potato.  What  a 
victim   for   the  feminine  eye  ! 

The  authoresses  recount  how  on  finding  them  ignorant 
of  some  fact,  he  would  exclaim  :  "  Dear  me,  how  innocent 
you  are  !  "  But  the  reader  is  much  more  inclined  to 
apply  that  adjective  to  him.  Indeed,  it  is  precisely  that 
quality  which  after  all  saves  his  dignity.  When  the 
kdies  suggested  that  the  next  time  a  rather"  over-talkative 
visitor  came,  they  should  all  wear  ear-stoppers,  he 
entered  into  the  idea  without  a  notion  that  it  in  any 
way  reflected  on  his  own  favourite  method  of  guarding 
against  too  much  conversation,  and  he  superintended 
enthusiastically  the  melting  off  of  the  rims  of  old  saucepan 
lids  for  their  manufacture.  (The  ear-stopper  was  a  curved 
spring  which  passed  over  the  head  and  pressed  a  pad 
tightly  over  each  ear.) 

He  could  not  really  believe  that  the  application  of 
reason  to  any  matter "^  could  ever  lead  to  any  ridiculous 
result  ;  that  is  why  he  was  exactly  the  opposite  tyjic 
to  the  humorist,  for  the  humorist  is  always  conscious  of 
the  double  aspects  of  things.  The  contradiction  felt  may 
be  between  feeling  and  thought  or  reason  and  con- 
vention, or  the  contrast  may  be  between  the  seriousness 
with  which  something  is  felt  and  its  trifling  nature,  or 
between  its  importance  and  the  lightness  with  which 
men  take  it.  If  the  unreasonableness  of  convention  strikes  ■ 
one  humorist,  another  laughs  at  the  absurdity  of  results 
reached  by  reason  from  the  point  of  view  of  common 
sense  ;  if  one  finds  jokes  in  the  lightness  with  which 
tragedies  are  born,  another  will  find  them  in  the  serious- 
ness with  which  trifles  are  taken.  Humorists  take  sides  on 
all  sorts  of  questions,  but  they  are  essentially  men  who 
feel  (whatever  they  think)  that  there  arc  tvvo  or  more 
sides  to  them.  They  are  philosophers  who  cannot  make 
ui>  their  minds. 


April  27,  1 916 


LAND     &     WATER 


13 


Air  Defence  Problems  and  Fallacies 

Air  Ministry  or  Board  of  Aeronautics 
By  F.  W.  Lanchester 


THERE  arc,  in  addition  to  the  ordinary  military 
duties,  certain  operations  of  indirect  military 
value  V  hich  experience  has  shown  can  be  under- 
taken by  aircraft  with  advantage.  Such  may 
be  exemplified  "  in  the  bombardment  by  aeroplane 
squadrons  of  the  enemy's  arsenals,  shipbuilding  yards, 
munition  and  explosive  factories,  depots,  warehouses, 
magazines,  etc.,  also  for  destroying  his  transports,  com- 
merce, etc.  Such  duties  may  sometimes  be  said  to  come 
within  the  definition  of  ordinary  military  operations  as 
has  actually  occurred  in  the  present  War.  When  this 
definition  does  not  apply  they  may  be  undertaken  by 
the  Air  Forces  of  either  the  NaVy  or  Army,  that  is  to  say 
in  our  case  by  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  or  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps,  whichever  may  happen  to  be  the  more 
suitable.  :       ._  _ 

So  long  as  we  have  to  deal  with  operations  of  a  decisively 
military  character  or  a  decisively  naval  character,  as 
bearing  directly  and  immediately  on  the  conduct  of 
hostilities,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  settling  to  whom  the 
responsibility  belongs,  or  as  to  which  Service  shall 
undertake  the  work  ;  but  when  we  are  dealing  with 
those  operations  of  indirect  mihtary  value  which  are  under- 
taken in  the  interests  of  both  Army  and  Navy — more 
broadly  in  the  interests  of  the  Nation — there  is  no  natural 
line  of  demarcation,  and  under  existing  conditions  it  is 
necessary  for  an  authority  higher  than  War  Office  or 
Admiralty  to  intervene.  "Hie  Ministry — the  immediate 
advisers  of  the  King — must  decide.  More  generally,  since 
ways  and  means  cannot  be  improvised,  some  standing 
ruling  must  be  laid  down  to  determine  on  which  Service 
the  responsibility  for  any  particular  class  of  operation 
shall  rest.  It  is  probable  that  the  absence  of  an  authorita- 
tive and  sufficiently  early  decision  on  this  point  is  at  the 
root  of  some  of  the  difficulties  which  have  been  met 
with  in  the  administration  of  our  air  services ;  it  is 
likely  to  have  been  one  of  the  difficulties  which  has  con- 
tributed to  the  failure  of  the  Derby  Committee.  What- 
ever may  turn  out  to  be  the  facts  it  is  quite  certain  that 
neither  the  Army  nor  the  Navy  can  be  accused  of  having 
neglected  their  responsibihties  with  regard  to  these 
indirect  aeronautical  operations,  unless  the  Ministry 
has  clearly  laid  down  which  of  the  Services  is  to  be 
responsible  for  the  work  in  question,  and  defined  this 
responsibility  sufficiently  in  advance  to  permit  of  due 
preparation. 

Home   Defence 

In  addition  to  these  operations  of  aggression  there  are 
also  the  duties  connected  with  Home  Defence,  mainly 
concerned  with  the  exclusion  of  enemy  aircraft  from 
British  territorial  air.  This  includes  the  provision  of 
flight  grounds,  or  aerodromes,  of  the  necessary  squadrons 
of  aircraft  with  sheds,  repair  depots,  and  all  the  attend- 
ant paraphernalia.  Also  of  the  counter  aircraft  artillery, 
popularly  known  as  "  Archies  "  in  the  Service,  search- 
hghts,  and  the  whole  of  the  attendant  personnel,  pilots, 
gunners,  etc. 

Now  an  attempt  has  been  made  by  the  Ministry  to 
define  this  latter  responsibility,  namely,  that  of  Home 
Defence,  audit  must  be  agreed  that  the  lack  of  decision 
exhibited  has  been  lamentable.  Thus  the  responsibility 
has  been  given  to  the  Army,  then  to  the  Navy,  and  now 
again  to  the  Army.  It  cannot  be  right,  and  there  can  be 
no  adequate  reason  for  the  responsibility  to  rest  with  the 
Army  in  the  spring  and  summer  and  the  Navy  in  the 
autumn  and  winter.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  in  any 
criticism  launched  against  the  Government  that  in  the 
order  of  military  importance  the  immediate  requirements 
of  the  Army  and  Navy  in  the  direct  conduct  of  hostilities 
takes  first  place  ;  home  defence  and  operations  of  in- 
direct military  value  are  rightly  subordinated.  There  is 
grave  danger,  if  public  clamour  is  allowed  to  rule,  and 
the  Government  is  continually  attacked  by  the  Press 
and  public  (and  more  vitally  by  the  electorate)  that  home 
defence  may  be  given  a  first  place  in  the  aeronautical 


programme,  and  support  may  be  withdrawn  or  diverted 
from  our  Armies  in  the  field.  Already,  owing  to  the 
campaign  which  has  been  carried  on  by  certain  sections 
of  the  Press,  and  the  ill-advised  support  which  has  been 
lent  to  certain  persons  whose  credentials  are  at  least 
doubtful,  it  is  possible  that  this  question  of  home  defence 
may  be  absorbing  the  attention  and  the  resources,  i.e., 
anti-aircraft  guns  and  searchlights,  also  personnel,  which 
should,  "  by  all  rules  of  the  game,"  be  devoted  to  direct 
aggression  and  be  at  the  disposal  of  our  Armies  in  France  or 
elsewhere,  to  be  employed  in  the  major  military  operation 
of  the  smashing  of  the  Huns.  If  one  could  have  a  definite 
statement  from  a  responsible  Minister  that  under  no 
circumstances  will  the  present  agitation  be  allowed  to 
involve  the  withdrawal  or  diversion  of  one  gun  or  one 
aeroplane  from  the  support  of  our  Armies  in  the  field, 
against  the  better  judgment  of  the  military  authority, 
it  would  go  a  long  way  towards  easing  the  minds  of  those 
who  have  the  country's  welfare  at  heart,  and  who  look 
upon  the  present  phase  of  the  Air  Agitation  with  grave 
misgiving. 

Let  it  be  laid  down  as  an  axiom  that  the  corabatant 
services  must  be  accorded  the  first  claim  to  consideration 
and  the  first  call  on  our  resources.  Whatever  part 
aircraft  can  play  in  bringing  the  present  War  to  a  success- 
ful issue  is  primarily  by  its  activity  as  ancillary  to  the 
existing  services.  The  part  played  by  operations  of 
indirect  military  value  may  be  greater  or  less,  but  the 
independent  use  of  aircraft,  whether  it  be  for  long  distant 
raids  on  the  enemy  (unconnected  with  other  military 
operations)  or  in  the  solution  of  the  problems  of  Home 
Defence,  do  not  and  cannot  command  a  decisive  issue. 

Air  Ministry  or  Board  of  Aeronautics 

The  very  existence  of  what  I  have  in  the  preceding 
paragraphs  referred  to  as  operations  of  indirect  militarv 
value  is  in  itself  a  strong  case  for  some  form  of  control, 
such  as  an  Air  Ministry  or  a  Board  of  Aeronautics  apart 
from  the  Army  and  the  Navy.  Such  operations  are  new 
to  warfare.  We  have  neither  experience  nor  tradition  to 
guide  us  ;  they  are  outside  the  ordinary  defined  respon- 
sibilities of  either  Army  or  Navy.  This  latter  assertion 
may  be  combated  by  some,  especially  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  our  Naval  Air  Service  has  executed  raids  which  can 
only  be  defined  as  operations  of  indirect  military  value, 
such  as  the  air  raid  on  Friedrichshaven.  However  I  do 
not  feel  that  I  shall  be  seriously  challenged  when  I  say 
that  the  said  duties  and  operations  are  foreign  to  the 
experience  of  those  who  hitherto  have  had  to  control 
the  preparation  for  and  conduct  of  military  and  tiaval 
warfare. 

It  is  not  currently  as  well  understood  as  should  be  the 
case  that  an  Air  Ministry  as  distinct  from  a  Board  of 
Aeronautics  betokens  as  a  corollary  an  Independent 
'Air  Service.  If,  as  is  probable,  the  operations  of  indirect 
military  value  become  in  course  of  time  of  sufficient  impor- 
tance and  assume  in  fact  an  importance  beyond  anything 
yet  demonstrated,  an  Air  Ministry  with  an  Independent 
Air  Service  may  turn  out  to  be  a  proper  and  necessary 
solution.  It  is  well  to  keep  an  open  mind.  The  case  for 
a  full  blown  Air  Ministry  has  yet  to  be  made  good. 

The  subject  bristles  with  difficulties  which  will  inevit- 
ably take  time  and  patient]consideration  for  their  solution. 
For  example,  if  we  assume  that  an  Independent  Air 
Service  is  to  be  created  to  take  charge  of  Home  Defence 
against  aircraft,  and  also  to  deal  with  long  distance 
raiding  and  generally  duties  of  indirect  military  value 
we  immediately  strike  difficulties  of  fundamental  and 
elementary  difficulty.  Thus  under  what  authority  will 
our  anti-aircraft  artillery  be  required  to  operate  ;  and 
under  whose  commands  are  our  searchlights,  etc.,  to  be 
placed  ?  Searchlights  are  essential  to  the  working  of 
anti-aircraft  guns,  and  are  liable  to  interfere  with  the 
effectiveness  of  the  defensive  aeroplanes  if  not  controlled 
in  close  co-operation.     If,  on  the  one  hand,  these  combined 


14 


LAND     &     WATER 


April  27,  1916 


bined  means  of  defence  are  to  be  put  under  a  command 
which  is  independent  of  our  military  Home  Defence,  we 
have  the  unprecedented  state  of  affairs  of  two  commands 
of  a  miUtary  character  under  two  different  Cabinet 
Ministers  operating  in  the  same  area.  Some  who  have 
no  knowledge  or  experience  of  the  question  of  respon- 
sibility in  connection  with  mihtary  operations  will 
possibly  not  be  aware  of  the  fundamental  nature  of  this 
dif'hcult\-  and  the  clash  of  authority  which  must  inevitably 
result.  Those  who  are  conversant  with  the  military 
aspect  of  the  question  will  not  need  to  be  told. 

Dual  Responsibility 

It  is  useless  of  course  to  suggest  the  Air  Minister  and  the 
Minister  of  War  will  act  in  agreement  and  conjunction 
in  all  matters  relating  to  Home  Defence  for  the  reason, 
if  for  no  other,  that  the  respective  commands  must  each 
be  given  to  an  othcer  in  the  lield  whose  authority  must  be 
imquestioned.     There  will  be  two  such  officers  in  any 
area,  and  the  combined  Home  Defence  will  depend  upon 
the  two  in  some  wav  pooling  their  authority  or  working 
hand  and  glove  together.     This,  to  say  the  least,  would 
be  a  precarious  state  of  affairs.     An.  alternative  would 
appear  to  be  that  the  Minister  of  the  Air  and  the  Minister 
of  War  should  decide  to  put  both  services  in  relation  to 
Home  Defence   under  one  command.     In  case  of  dis- 
agreement as  to  which  sen-ice  the  senior  officer  should 
belong,  it  might  be  laid  down  that  the  air  command  will 
be  subordinate   to   the   military  Commander-in-chief   of 
Home  Defence.     Manifestly  there  is   nothing  absolutely 
unworkable  in  such  a  suggestion,  but  considerable  detail 
would  have  to  be  worked  out.    One  is  tempted  to  ask 
what  benefit  is  to  be  derived  or  expected  from  the  initial 
division.     We  may  presume  that  if  the  said  state  of  things 
is  to  obtain  in  time  of  war  it  would  also  be  the  most 
appropriate  disposition  in  time  of  peace.     It  is  bad  to 
change  a  system  in  its  essential  features  on  or  after  a 
declaration  of  hostilities. 

The  alternative  possibility,  that  the  counter  aircraft 
artillery  and  searchlights  should  be  put  under  military 
control  and  the  flying  defensive  force  be  under  the  control 
of  an  Air  Minister,  is  scarcely  worthy  of  discussion.  We 
should  certainly  have  our  own  aeroplanes  shot  at  and  hit 
more  often  than  those  of  the  enemy,  and  the  enemy 
would  only  need  to  come  plausibly  disguised  to  ensure  his 
own  immunity. 

It  inevitably  occurs  to  one  that  if  it  is  a  military 
necessity  that  the  aeronautical  home  defence  shall  be 
l)laced  under  miUtary  command,  then  half  the  case  for 
•  the  Independent  Air"  Service  (that  is  to  say,  in  relation 
to  Home  Defence)  is  gone.  It  is  only  necessary,  in  the 
first  instance,  that  the  King's  advisers  decide  once  and 
for  all  that  home  defence  against  aircraft,  so  far  as  based 
on  land,  shall  be  definitely  under  military  control  and 
throw  the  responsibility  oh  to  the  Ministry  of  War  to 
provide  for  the  matter  being  adequately  dealt  with. 
The  War  Office  would  then  no  more  neglect  the  problems 
of  home  aeronautical  defence  than  it  would  neglect  the 
other  problems  of  defence  which  are  committed  to  its 
care.  If  there  are  critics  who  would  scoff  at  the  War 
Office  and  hold  the  contrary,  the  reply  is  to  reform  the 
War  Office  and  not  employ  others  to  do  its  work. 

Our  Second  Line  of  Defence 

When  the  above  has  been  said  it  is  to  be  remarked 
that  the  Home  Defence  conducted  from  our  shores  is,  as 
in  the  case  of  Home  Defence  conducted  on  our  territory, 
essentially  our  second  line  of  defence.  The  first  line  of 
defence  will  consist  of  aircraft  acting  in  co-operation  with 
vessels  of  our  Navy,  whether  cruisers  or  destroj'ers  of 
existing  type  or  of  special  type,  is  one  of  the  yet  unsolved 
problems.  Again,  when  we  endeavour  to  visualise  the 
naval  aircraft  acting  under  a  separate  command  from 
the  Navy  proper,  we  are  faced  with  difficulties  analogous 
to  those"  which  concern  our  land  defence.  Is  the  Inde- 
pendent Air  Service  and  the  Minister  at  its  head  to  control 
the  section  of  the  fleet  with  which  the  air  service  (naval) 
machines  will  co-operate,  or  will  the  Independent  Air 
Service  confine  itself  to  the  aircraft  alone,  and  be  working 
in  continual  and  close  co-operation  with  the  Navy  ? 
Will  the  Air  Minister  abrogate  his  control  of  the  aero- 
planes or  other  aircraft  which  have  been  allotted  to  Home 
Defence  and  place  this  branch  of  his  air  service  under 


naval  command,  and  if  this -is  done  in  time  of  war,  will 
it  also  be  done  in  time  of  peace  ?  In  brief,  how  will,  the 
responsibility  be  defined  and  authority  be  allocated  ? 

The  above  may  be  taken  as  the  bare  outlines  of  the 
difficulties   which  must   inevitably   arise  in   relation   to 
Home  Defence.    They  cannot  be  slurred  over,  they  cannot 
be  covered  up  by  eloquence  or  rodomontade  however 
i)lausible.     They  are  difficulties  which  will  have  to  be 
faced  and  dealt' with,  not  only  as  to  broad  principle,  but 
in  every  detail  before  a  Ministry  of  the  Air,  so  far  as  Home 
Defence  is  concerned,  can  become  a  reality.     Do  not  let 
us  attempt  to  hustle  the  Cabinet  and  the  Government  into 
taking  some  precipitate  action  to  satisfy  popular  outcry. 
We  know  that  the  (lovernment  is  not  a  strong   (iovern- 
ment  such  as  we  should  like  to  have  seen  to  conduct  the 
greatest  war  in  history.     I  am  quile  certain  in  my  own 
mind  that  if  at  the  present  juncture  a  Ministry  of  the  Air 
were  appointed  to  carry  out  the  multitude  of  suggestions 
which  are  daily  being  thrown  out  by  irresponsible  Mem- 
bers of  Parliament    and   still    more  irresponsible    Press 
critics,  it  would  be  as  great  a  failure  as  the  late  lamented 
Derby   Committee.     We   do  not   want   an   Air   Minister 
"  in    motley."     The    task    of    surmounting    the    many 
ditficulties  which  will  have  to  be  surmounted  if  a  real 
Ministry  of  the  Air  is  to  be  created  are  such  as  cannot  be 
negotiated  by  mere  hustle,  whether  it  be  described  as 
"  ginger,"  or""  push  and  go,"  or  "  bluff  and  bluster." 

In  the  present  article  I  ha\'e  dealt  with  the  (piestion  of 
an  Air  Ministry  from  the  point  of  view  of  Home  Defence. 
In  the  article  which  follows  the  question  of  aggressive 
action  of  indirect  military  value  will  be  discussed  in  the 
same  relation,  and  some  of  the  more  serious  proposals 
which  have  been  put  forward  in  the  direction  of  air 
reform  will  be  reviewed  ;  as  outlined  in  my  own  "  Aircraft 
in  Warfare,"  and  as  comprised  by  the  scheme  which  has 
been  developed  and  put  for%ard  more  recently  by  Lord 
Montagu  of  Beaulieu. 


The    Agony    of   Serbia 

To  the  Editor  of  Land  &  W.\ter. 

Sir,— Referring  to  Mr.  Alfred  Stead's  article  in  L.\Nn  lv 
Water  of  April  6th  entitled  "  The  Agony  of  Serbia,"  we  beg 
to  inform  you  that  our  Swiss  Committee  for  relief  in  Serbia 
has  made  "arrangements  for  sending  and  distributing  food 
and  clothes  in  Serbia  through  its  Own  Commissioners.  Any 
one  wishing  to  contribute  to  this  work  of  assistance  may  send 
his  donation  through  the  committee. 
1  am.  Truly  yours, 

E.  A.  Naville, 
President  Comit6  de  Secours  aus  Serbe.s, 
Geneva.    April  17th,  1916. 


The  Bristol  branch  of  the  British  Red  Cross  Society  ought 
to  benefit  largely  from  the  profits  accruing  from  the  sales  of 
Tommy's  Red  Cross  A. B.C.,  wliich  is  published  by  that  branch 
of  the  great  national  undertaking  at  one  shiUing.  The  rhymes 
of  "  J.R.G.H.  "  are  well  illustrated  by  "  CT.,"  the  whole" 
forming  a  humorous  recital  of  the  alphabet  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  soldier  in  hospital. 

The  Daughters  of  Germany  (Holdcn  and  Hardingham,  5^' 
net),  is  a  scathing  indictment  of  German  morals,  which  shov  s 
clearly  that,  instead  of  having  borrowed  the  manners  and 
customs  of  the  French  Monarchy  in  the  eighteenth  century, 
Germany  had  nothing  to  learn  in"  the  way  of  immorals  at  any 
period  of  history.  The  book  is  an  ugly  but  unimpeachable 
record  of  German  grossness,  and  a  refutation  to  the  most 
strenuous  German  claim  to  racial  superiority.  It  deals  with 
the  subject  mainly  from  an  historical  standpoint. 

Under  the  ungainly  title  of  Let  Priest  and  People  Weep 
(Gay  and  Hancock,  6s.),  Mr.  Richard  Shanahan  gives  a  viyid 
and  stirring  account  of  German  machinations  on  the  Belgian 
frontier  during  the  three  years  preceding  the  outbreak  of  the 
war.  The  book  begins  at  about  the  time  of  the  Agadir  incident, 
and  ends  with  the  first  German  massacre  of  civiUans  in  Bel- 
gium—that of  Francorchamps,  east  of  Li^ge.  An  e.Kcellent  novel 
and  an  interesting  contribution  to  literature  of  the  war. 

Mr.  Richard  Marsh's  last  book.  The  Great  Temptation  (T 
Fisher  Unwin,  6s.)  opens  just  as  startlingly  as  The  Beetle,  and 
is  in  some  ways  reminiscent  of  that  famous  story,  although 
the  mystery  concerns  "  pills  "  rather  than  horrors.  It  forms 
one  of' the  best  mystery  stories  that  have  appeared  for  a  lon^j 
time,  the  interest  being  well  maintained  througliout. 


April  27,  1 916 


LAND      ifc      WATER 


15 


War  in  Fiction  and  in   Fact 


By  J.  D.  Symon 


IN  the  dim  prehistoric  times  that  He  beyond  August, 
1914,  our  notions  of  war  were  of  two  kinds,  wars 
of  the  past  and  wars  of  the  future.  Past  wars, 
if  we  visuaUsed  them  at  all,  seemed  in  spite  of 
inevitable  horrors,  a  gay  and  gallant  pageant,  wherem 
the  man  in  a  flashing  uniform  rose  superior  to  the  machine. 
Realistic  painters  and  strict  historians  told  us  of  rags 
and  tatters,  of  men  going  barefoot,  of  squalor  unspeakable, 
but  that  did  not  greatly  alter  the  popular  concept.  The 
terrible  pencil  of  Verestchagin  may  have  lifted  the  curtain 
a  little  way  for  the  more  reflective  ;  but  the  pictures  of 
iJetaillc  and  de  Neuville,  of  Vernet,  Meissonier  andWood- 
\ille,  the  splendid  elan  and  onward  sweep  of  Lady 
Butler's  "  Scotland  for  Ever  !  "  gave  the  key-note  to 
the  home-keeping  civilians'  idea  of  the  stricken  field. 
"  Le  Regiment  qui  passe,"  with  its  rhythm  of  parade 
maintained  amid  the  stress  of  active  service,  summed  up 
the  popular  ideal.  The  war  of  fact  seemed  a  romance, 
not  a  business. 

It  was  otherwise  with  the  war  of  the  future,  that 
;trange  portent  in  which  the  late  nineteenth  or  early 
twentieth  century  began  to  interest  itself,  lured  thereto  by 
the  arts  of  one  ingenious  writer.  Others  had  attempted 
the  same  theme,  Ijut  their  imagined  wars  were  all  based 
upon  the  old  conventions.  They  were  mere  Battles  of 
Dorking,  with  a  faint  adumbration  of  modernised 
machinery.  The  late  Captain  Clarke's  lively  novel 
of  a  supposed  Franco-British  conflict  (how  absurd  that 
seems  to-day  !)  was  read  by  the  late  'nineties  as  a  very 
plausible  foreshadowing  of  .what  might  be.  The  Chief 
in  his  motor-car,  passing  rapidly  and  easily  from  point  to 
point,  seemed  quite  wonderful.  That  was  a  touch  of  real 
progress.  Wellington  on  "  Copenhagen  "  had  been 
superseded  by  a  Prince  on  Petrol.  And  magazine-rifle 
fire  received  its  due.  But  the  area  of  operations  was  quite 
small,  and  high  explosives  were  not.  Colossal  concen- 
trations of  Titanic  artillery  found  no  place  in  the  story, 
and  as  for  air-craft,  a  sane  writer  (not,  mind  you,  without 
imagination)  did  not  indulge  in  impossible  flights  of 
fancy.  Verisimilitude  was  carefully  observed,  the  licence 
of  ajules  Verne  would  have  tended  towards  an  uncon- 
vincing narrative. 

Ruthless  Malignity 

But  the  other  fiction  of  future  wars  struck  a  bolder  note. 
The  scale  was  magnified  many  times  and  mighty  engines 
of  destruction  had  full  play.  Further,  the  novelist 
allowed  himself  to  postulate  a  frightful  and  ruthless 
malignity.  In  the  old  forecasts  the  game  was  played  upon 
the  ancient  chivalrous  rules.  In  the  new  war  scruples  of 
humanity  found  no  place.  But  in  order  to  give  that  ele- 
ment its  proper  force  it  was  necessary  to  go  outside  the 
world.  I)id  we  not  live  under  a  Hague  Convention  ? 
Tile  war  of  the  future  on  earth  was  to  be  as  humane  as 
possible.  The  monstrous  engine,  therefore,  and  the 
monstrous  malignity  must  be  assigned  to  a  race  of  super- 
intellectuals  from  another  planet.  It  was  these  hideous 
creatures  who,  using  the  secret  devices  of  science,  blasted 
open  towns  with  a  heat-ray  and  drove  before  them  pitiful 
crowds  of  civiliiins.  The  ultra-loathsome  in  war  was  no 
creation  of  humanity.  A  novelist  who  attributed  such 
methods  to  humankind  would  have  been  voted  an 
outrageous  dreamer. 

It  is  entirely  to  the  author's  credit  and  in  accordance 
with  his  fundamental  optimism  that  he  should  have  found 
it  thus  necessary  to  bring  his  thorough  exponents  of 
frightfiflness  from  beyond  this  present  world,  to  wit,  from 
the  red  planet  of  the  War-God.  How  far  that  neighbour 
orb  has  been  libelled  we  shall  not  know  until  communica- 
tion is  established.  If  the  first  message  be  a  writ  served 
on  the  novelist,  let  us  hope  it  will  come  when  we  are  once 
more  at  peace  to  enjoy  so  piquant  a  cause  celehre.  A 
people  believed  to  be  mighty  civil-engineers  may  have  a 
real  grievance,  for  civil-engineering,  being  in  itself  stupen- 
dous beneficence,  goes  ill  with  stupendous  malignity.  And 
the  novelist,  consistently  enough,  if  cruelly,  portrayed  his 
Apostles  of  Horror  as  themselves  most  horrible  of  aspect. 
His  whole  conception  would  almost  appear  to  be  a  subtle 


satire  on  intellect  sharpened  to  superhuamn  keenness. 
Perhaps  he  did  not  quite  see  how  harshly  his  parable 
reflected  upon  Physical  Science  exalted  to  godhead,  at 
the  expense  of  the' humanities.  Or  perhaps  he  meant  it. 
How-ever  that  may  be,  he  was  careful  to  remove  all  human 
likeness  from  these  mere  brains  raised  to  the  nth  power. 

Aerial  Weapons 

Another  future  war  of  the  noveUst's  was  waged  by  a 
civilised  power  with  aerial  weapons,  and  in  a  manner 
sufficiently  terrible,  but  still,  on  the  face  of  it,  save  for  the 
bombing  of  open  cities,  legitimate.  We  read  and  were  vastly 
entertained,  but  set  it  aside  with  a  smile  at  the  author's 
ingenuity.  Such  things  were  not  going  to  happen.  The 
wars  of  the  future  would  be  astounding,  of  course,  but  tiiey 
would  mean  clean  fighting,  and  even  if  air-navigation 
did  come  into  its  own,  the  old  rules  would  hold  good. 
Air-craft  would  be  used  only  against  military  positions. 
The  imagined  unscrupulousness  conveyed  no  warning. 
We  applauded  the  teller  of  tales  and  asked  for  more. 
No  civilised  power  would  ever  take  a  leaf  out  of  his 
nightmare  goblin  books. 

But  to-day,  what  of  it  ?  We  are  living  in  the  midst  of 
all  that,  and  worse,  and  have  become  so  numbed  by 
horror  on  horror  piled,  that  it  is  doubtful  whether  we 
can  realise  this  present  welter.  The  detached  eye  of  our 
grandson  scanning  the  files  of  our  1916  newspapers  will 
appreciate  this  super-novel  we  live  in  as  we  cannot  hope 
to  do.  'This  morning's  news  sheet,  could  we  but  see  it 
aright,  would  beggar  any  imagining  of  the  futurist  war 
■  novelist  of  yesterday.  He  might  as  well  go  out  of  business 
at  once,  for  his  occupation  is  plainly  gone.  He  conceived 
certainly  the  malignant  power  that  would  seek  conquest 
by'sheer  terror,  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  he  ever  thought 
that  his  hints  would  be  taken  and  improved  upon  in  his 
own  time.  A  Yellow  Power,  in  some  remote  epoch, 
might  thus  assault  civilisation,  but  white  men,  no. 

We  thought  the  Germans  were  whi1,e  men.  That  was  our 
cardinal  blunder.  So  here  we  are,  bombed  o'  nights  from 
the  sky,  torpedoed  at  sea  as  we  voyage  peacefully  on  our 
lawful  occasions,  our  open  cities  shattered  by  a  Brobding- 
nagian  artillery,  whole  nations  driven  into  exile  at  one  fell 
stroke  ;  pain,  misery,  famine  and  sickness  stalking  at  large 
throughout  Europe,  rapine  and  atrocity  rampant,  and  in 
the  legitimate  field  of  battle  such  carnage  as  the  world 
has  never  seen.  Every  other  day  brings  its  Titanic 
disaster  in  a  double  sense,  and  we  have  come  to  take  it 
as  all  in  the  day's  work.  The "  very  newsboys  have 
ceased  to  cry  " 'orrible  disaster."  It  is  no  longer  a 
business  asset.  Therein  lurks  a  parable  for  the  enemy. 
"  'Orrible  disaster  "  has  never  been  a  business  asset  for 
him.  One  day  he  will  find  that  out,  and  at  last  he  will 
know  the  stomach  of  this  people.  He  banked  upon  plunging 
the  world  into  the  actualities  of  a  super-war  novel.  Thus 
his  sentimentality  envisaged  "  Frightfulness."  He  knew 
how  a  taste  of  that  medicine  would  affect  himself.  But  he 
knew  not  the  white  man. 

The  Fat  Boy's  grisly  fictions  translated  into  action 
do  but  touch  a  deeper  futility.  The  super-novel  of  war 
was  effective  only  as  fiction.  As  fact,  it  becomes  a 
brutal  stupidity  which  civilisation,  standing  serene 
above  panic,  has  made  it  her  stern  business  to  suppress. 

The  Bright-  Eyes  of  Danger,  by  John  Foster  (W.  and  R. 
Chambers,  6s.)  is  a  tale  of  the  '45,  and  altliough  the  subject 
of  Bonnie  Charlie  is  one  that  has  inspired  a  vast  mass  of 
reading  matter  of  various  sorts  and  qualities,  tlie  author  of  this 
book  has  caught  the  true  spirit  of  romance  and  steered  well 
away  from  hackneyed  tracks  and  scenes.  The  fortunes  of 
Edmund  I.ayton,  Westmorland  gentleman  and  loyal  to  King 
George,  and  of  Charlotte  Macdonnell,  Jacobite  by  race  and 
instinct,  takes  us  to  Edinburgh  at  the  time  of  the  Pretender's 
occupation  of  the  city,  to  Prestonpans,  to  CuUoden,  and  to 
the  long  hunt  that  ended  the  last  attempt  to  win  back  the 
throne  for  the  Stuarts.  Yet  it  is  not  with  Charlie,  but  with 
the  man  and  woman,  Edmund  and  Cljarlotte,  that  the  interest 
lies,  and  because  of  their  fine  qualities  and  their  love— because, 
too,  all  the  world  loves  a  good  story  of  stirring  incidents  and 
vivid  characterisation  -  this  book  should  make  many  friends. 


i6 


LAND     &     WATER 


April  27,  1916 


A  Book  on  Zeppelins 

Reviewed  by  F.    W.    Lanchester 


MK.  R.  P.  Hcarne's  Zcppdins  and  Super -Zeppelins 
(John  Lane.  2s.  bd.  net.)  may  be  said  to  be  a  book 
with  a  purpose.  Its  purpose  is  to  advocate 
the  big  airship,  to  advocate,  in  fact,  that  this 
countr\-  should  embark  on  a  programme  of  the  building  of 
big  airships.  The  book,  being  of  a  popular  character,  the  big 
airship  is  termed  a  super-Zeppelin,  which  from  the  context 
apj)ears  to  mean  something  that  for  size  and  power  is  greater 
than  the  Zeppelin,  and  presumably,  if  the  Zeppelin  gets 
bigger,  faster,  and  more  powerful,  the  super-Zeppelin  is  to  get 
bigger,  faster,  and  more  powerful  also. 

'liiere  is  no  particular  reason  given  why  great  Britain 
should  have  a  jwtential  monopoly  in  super-Zeppelins,  or  why 
our  technical  skill  should  enable  us  to  fulfil  Mr.  Hearne's 
reejuirements.  For  example,  he  says  "  A  super-Zeppelin  may 
be  defined  as  a  rigid  airship  which  is  better,  faster,  and  more 
reliable  than  the  Zeppelin.  The  vital  essential  is  speed. 
Our  rujjer-ships  must  be  from  ten  to  thirty  miles  an  hour 
faster  than  the  best  (icrman  ship.  At  the  same  time  it  is 
desirable  that  our  ships  should  be  smaller,  lighter,  and  stronger 
than  the  Zeppelins."  This  all  sounds  very  fine,  but  it  does 
not  get  us  any  forwarder.  The  Germans  may  just  as  easily 
postulate  a  supcr-sqiiared-ZeppeUn,  which  is  to  be  from  ten 
to  thirty  miles  an  hour  faster  than  our  best  super -ship,  and 
all  the  rest  of  the  specification.  This  kind  of  talk  is  like  unto 
slaying  the  enemy  with  printers'  ink.  No  one  is  any  the 
l>etter  or  worse  ;  we  slay  each  other  on  paper,  and,  like  the 
characters  is  Bombastes  Furioso,  we  are  ready  to  die  again  to- 
morrow. 

But  I  believe  in  the  plea  that  it  is  time  to  initiate  a  pro- 
granune  of  big  airships.  There  is  no  doubt  the  Navy  wants 
airships,  and  what  the  Navy  wants  it  must  have.  We  must 
not  'leceivc  ourselves  however.  An  airship  fleet  is  required 
—not  an  odd  ship  or  two— the  programme  is  one  which  will 
run  into  millions  sterling.  We  don't  mind  spending  millions 
nowadays  on  anything"  which  is  necessary  from  a  national 
standpoint.  Since  the  War  all  Parties  are  agreed,  and  the 
parish-pump  Radical,  the  great  majority  of  the  Labour 
Party,  the  Irish  Party  and  the  Unionist  Party  are  all  in  the 
same  boat  pulling  more  or  less  in  the  same  direction.  We 
are  going  to  have  big  airships,  Mr.  Hearne  advocates  a  pro- 
gramme of  big  airships.  In  this  respect  it  may  be  said  that  his 
book  preaches  the  right  doctrine. 

Interlarded   with  Politics 

When  this  has  been  said  it  is  very  difficult  to  find  anything 
further  to  praise  in  the  volume,  cither  as  to  views  expressed 
in  the  matter  or  in  the  arrangement.  Thus  the  whole  book, 
from  introduction  to  the  last  chapter  is  interlarded  with  the 
politics  of  the  subject ;  gibes  at  the  want  of  foresight  of  the 
Government,  of  the  stupidity  of  experts,  and  even  at  the 
stupidity  of  the  constructors  of  German  Zeppelins.  Moreover 
it  is  full  of  assumptions  which  are  by  no  means  proven,  in- 
accuracies in  description,  and  general  mis-statements  of  the 
position  which  cannot  be  condoned.  Mr.  Hearne  conjures  up 
people  he  calls  "  anti-airship  experts,"  and  describes  them 
in  many  places  as  foolish  and  prejudiced  people  who  would 
not  listen  to  common  sense.  His  accusations  and  statements 
are  inconsistent  amongst  themselves,  and  are  not  in  accord- 
ance with  facts.  Beyond  this  I  think  that  even  the  advocates 
of  the  large  airship  will  say,  when  they  read  this  book — "  Save 
me  from  my  friend,"  for  again  and  again  we  find  the  matter 
being  urged  as  wanted  for  "  future  Wars,"  or  to  the  "  next 
War.  '  It  is  fervently  to  be  hoped  that  we  are  not  going  to 
wait  till  then. 

Also,  instead  of  confining  himself  to  the  possibilities  which 
are  well  within  sight,  Mr.  Hearne  talks  glibly  of  great  sea- 
going aircraft  capable  of  travelling  at  100  miles  per  hour. 
Doubtless  this  will  come  in  time,  but  such  speeds  are  not 
quite  vet  within  sight. 

As  illustrating  the  above  criticisms  it  is  clearly  stated  in 
more  than  one  place  in  the  book  that  an  air  fleet  such  as 
proposed,  would  constitute  a  definite  assurance  that  "never 
again  will  enemy  airships  bombard  London."  How  the  super- 
Zeppelin  fleet  is  to  effect  this  guarantee  is  not  made  clear. 
There  is  unconscious  humour  in  much  of  the  writing  with 
which  Mr.  Hearne  presents  us.  For  example,  when  he  paints 
the  Zeppelin  as  being  of  small  use,  because  it  is  crude  and 
badly  designed,  and  because  it  has  been  stupidly  employed, 
one  cannot  suppress  a  smiie.  Or  again,  referring  to  Count 
Zeppelin,  he  says  :  "  In  strictly  adhering  to  that  design  in  the 
Ui;lit  of  later  "knowledge  Z''i)pclin  has  shown  stupid    con- 


servatism," atid  there  arc  many  other  passages  to  the  same 
effect.  When  we  turn  the  page  to  see  what  Mr.  Hearne's 
ideas  on  the  subject  arc,  we  find  (page  44)  that  he  advocates 
a  central  tube  along  the  entire  length  of  the  airship.  In  other 
words  a  stiffening  member  along  the  neutral  axis  (neutral 
whether  in  bending  or  torsion).  This  one  suggestion  is  a 
quite  sufficient  commentary  on  Mr.  Hearne's  qualifications 
to  criticise  the  Zeppelin  as  it  exists.  He  repeats  this  sug- 
gestion in  another  form  later  in  the  book. 

From  a  literary  standpoint  this  work  cannot  be  con- 
sidered altogether  an  acquisition  to  one's  library.  The  sloppv 
colloquialism  of  prefacing  adjectives  without  adequate  reason 
by  the  word  "  simple  "  (simply  marvellous  "  page  54)  is  always 
irritating,  but  the  gem  of  the  collection,  if  one  may  so  express 
it,  is  to  be  found  in  the  following  passage — "  The  stock  argu- 
ment against  the  Zeppelin  is  that  it  is  a  fair-weather' instru- 
ment, and  no  use  in  War.  But  the  succession  of  raids  on 
England  in  1915  prove  the  Zeppelin  to  be  a  most  wonderful 
vessel."  As  a  piece  of  inconscquentiality,  this  reminds  one 
of  the  admonition  to  the  prisoner  in  the  dock  bv  the  village 
J. P.,  "  You  have  hard  working  and  industrious  parents,  you 
have  been  blessed  with  good  health,  you  have  been  given  a 
good  education,  instead  of  which  you  go  about  stealing  ducks." 


Some  Novels  of  the  Day 

Readers  of  Mr.  Phillips  Oppenheim's  stories— and  their 
name  is  legion — will  find  in  The  Vanished  Messenger  (Methuen 
and  Co.,  6s.)  a  mystery  of  the  international  politics  order, 
with  an  entirely  new  kind  of  villain,  an  extremely  up-to-date 
hero,  and  a  very  attractive  heroine.  Mr.  John  P.  Dunstcr. 
the  messenger,  brought  over  from  America  disijatches  on 
which  the  peace  of  Europe  depended  ;  the  villain.  Miles 
t'entolin,  intercepted  the  dispatches,  and  the  hero — well, 
the  whole  story  is  told  in  Mr.  Oppenheim's  best  manner, 
and  though  it  seems  rather  strange  to  read  of  the  preserva- 
tion of  peace  now  that  war  has  actually  come  about,  the 
plot  is  so  well  worked  out  that  one  is  lured  to  belief  in  it. 
We  commend  the  book  to  all  iii  search  of  thrills  and  an 
adequate  seasoning  of  sentiment  and  romance. 

Josiah  Chapel,  the  hero  of  Chapel,  by  Miles  Lewis  (Heinc- 
mann,  6s.)  began  life  as  a  failure,  and  stuck  to  that  profession 
up  to  the  time  of  his  wife's  death,  after  which  he  began  to  take 
a  grip  on  things.  Mr.  Lewis,  evidently  a  Welshman  himself, 
has  worked  out  his  Welsh  hero's  ultimate  success  in  a  series 
of  strongly  drawn  sketches  ;  though  the  book  is  one  con- 
tinuous story,  it  is  made  up  of  detached  and  separate  studies 
of  Josiah,  his  son  Griff,  Bess  Hughes — whom  Griff  married— 
and  certain  other  figures  in  the  plot.  The  method  suits  the 
type  of  work,  forceful  stuff,  extremely  material  in  outlook, 
with  a  note  of  reality  and  very  little  sentiment  about  it.  In 
the  best  sense  of  the  phrase,  this  is  a  very  clever  book,  intro- 
ducing an  entirely  new  and  attractive  type  of  Welshman. 

The  Stranger's  Wedding  by  W.  L.  George  (T.  Fisher 
Unwin,  6s.)  concerns  a  certain  Huncote,  fresh  down  from 
Oxford,  who  went  in  for  settlement  work  in  north  London, 
where  he  met,  fell  in  love  with,  and  married  a  washer- 
woman's daughter— rather  a  superior  washerwoman's 
daughter,  possessed  of  aspirates  and  beauty,  but  still  of 
an  entirely  different  class  from  Huncote.  The  story  is  that 
of  their  meeting,  marriage,  and  attempts  to  fit  in  their  lives 
to  each  other.  Huncote  was  moderately  tactful,  and  Sue, 
his  wife,  tried  her  best  to  live  up  to  her  new  status. 

There,  in  essence,  is  the  storv,  but  not  the  book.  l-'or 
the  author  has  brought  to  his  work  such  artistry  as  Wells, 
brings  to  his  studies  of  the  lower  middle  class,  and  has  brought 
too,  a  species  of  ei)igrammatic  wit.  a  I.atinity  of  brilliance, 
that  one  misses  in  Wells.  There  is,  perhaps,  a  trace  too  much 
millinery  in  the  book,  a  shade  too  much  intimacy  with  things 
innately  feminine,  but  both  Huncote  and  Sue  are' masterpieces 
of  creation,  characters  that  will  live  long  in  the  minds  of  those 
who  learn  them  from  these  pages. 

Mr.  George  proves  himself  a  master  of  delicate  shades  of 
emotion,  and  m  this,  undoubtcdlv  the  best  work  he  has  done 
so  far,  he  gives  us  a  book  that  should  rank  very  high  among 
the  novels  of  the  year.  For  the  book  is  not  only  brilliantly 
clever,  in  the  best  sense  of  that  plirase,  but  is  also  a  work  of 
.  unusual  depth  and  power. 


April  27,   1916 


LAND      &     WATER 

CHAT  A 


17 


^  l^mance  of  the  South  Seas 

Xy  H.  T>E  FERE  STAC  POOLE 


Synopsis  :  Macquart,  an  adventurer  who  has  spent  most 
of  his  life  at  sea,  finds  him^ielf  in  Sydney  on  his  beam  ends. 
He  has  a  wonderful  story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in  New 
Cuinea,  and  makes  the  acquaintance  of  Tillman,  a  sporting 
man  about  town,  fond  of  yachting  and  racing,  and  of  Houghton, 
a  well-educated  Englishman  out  of  a  job.  Through  Tillman's 
influence  he  is  introduced  to  a  wealthy  woolbroker ,  Screed,  who, 
having  heard  Macquart's  story,  agrees  to  finance  the  enterprise. 
Screed  purchases  a  yawl,  the  "  Barracuda."  fust  before  they 
leak'e  Macquart  encounters  an  old  shipmate,  Captain  Hull, 
-who  is  fully  acquainted  with  his  villainies.  Hull  gets  in  touch 
'with  Screed,  who  engages  him  and  brings  him  aboard  the  yacht 
just  as  they  are  about  to  sail.  They  arrive  at  New  Guinea  and 
anchor  in  a  lagoon.  They  go  by  boat  up  a  river  -where  they 
make  {he  acquaintance  of  a  drunken  Dutchman,  Wiart,  who 
is  in  charge  of  a  rubber  and  camphor  station.  Here  they 
meet  a  beautiful  Dyak  girl,  Chaya.  According  to  Macquart's 
story  a  man  named  Lant,  who  had  seized  this  treasure,  sunk  his 
ship  and  murdered  his  crew  with  the  exception  of  one  man, 
"  Smith."  Lant  then  settled  here,  buried  the  treasure,  and  married 
a  Dyak  woman,  chief  of  her  tribe.  Lant  was  murdered  by 
"  Smith,"  xehom  Captain  Hull  and,  the  rest  make  little  doubt 
was  no  other  than  Macquart.  Chaya,  with  whom  Houghton 
has  fallen  in  love,  is  .  Lant's  half-caste  daughter.  Macquart 
guides  them  to  a  spot  on  the  river-bank  where  he  declares  the 
cache  to  be.  They  dig  but  find  nothing.  Then  he  starts  the 
surmise  that  the  Dyaks  have  moved  the  treasure  to  a  sacred 
grove  in  the  jungle.  Wiart  is  his  authority.  He  persuades 
his  shipmates  to  go  in  search  of  it.  The  journey  leads  them 
through  the  Great  Thorn  Bush,  which  is  a  vast  maze  from  lohich 
escape  is  impossible  without  a  clue.  Macquart  and  Wiart 
desert  their  companions.  As  night  falJs  a  woman's  voice  is 
heard  calling,  and  Chaya,  ansivering  their  cries,  finds  them, 
and  through  her  help  they  at  last  escape  from  the  maze. 

CHAPTER  XXVI 
The  Treasure 

THE  decision  of  Macquart  to  seize  the  treasure,  if 
possible,  for  himself  and  to  destroy  his  com- 
panions, had  been  taken  on  board  of  the  Barracuda 
long  before  they  reached  the  river. 

]5efore  starting  from  Sydney,  he  had  not  conceived  the 
idea.  His  mind  had  been  taken  up  entirely  with  the 
preparations  for  the  expedition,  but  there  had  always 
been  a  reservation  in  his  mind  due  to  the  terms  which  Screed 
and  the  others  had  exacted  from  Iiim.  Privately,  he  held  him- 
self open  to  swindle  them  if  he  could,  but  without  the  least  idea 
of  how  the  thing  was  to  be  done. 

On  boad  the  Barracuda  his  greed,  his  hatred  of  Hull,  and 
the  possibilities  that  lay  in  Jacky  inspired  the  first  part  of 
the  plot. 

His  original  story,  as  told  to  'Screed  'and  the  others,  made 
no  mention  of  the  real  position  of  the  sunken  Terschelling  or 
the  cache.  Indeed,  he  had  purposely  put  them  on  the  wrong 
scent  by  stating  that  the  cache  was  on  the  river  bank  and  the 
ship  sunk  in  the  river.  He  had  determined  to  keep  the  real 
position  a  secret  till  he  was  on  the  spot,  and  so  be  master  of 
the  situation  till  the  last  possible  minute. 

The  wisdom  of  this  plan  of  action  became  apparent  to 
him  on  board  the  Barracuda.  When  Hull  insulted  him  and 
made  him  work,  he  restrained  his  anger  not  only  by  his 
will,  but  by  the  thought  that  having  the  whip-hand  he  would 
])erhaps  be  able  to  make  the  whip  felt. 

He  determined  to  divulge  nothing,  to  leave  the  Barracuda 
in  the  lagoon  and  to  take  his  companions  right  up  to  the  Dyak 
village.  Once  there,  means  might  be  found  to  get  rid  of  them, 
and  then,  with  Jacky's  help,  all  would  be  plain  saihng.  He 
had  made  a  study  of  Jacky  and  found  him  to  be  a  black 
negation,  a  mechanism  acting  to  the  strongest  will  brought 
to  bear  on  it,  and  Macquart  had  no  doubt  as  to  the  strength 
of  his  own  will. 

The  only  point  against  the  plan  lay  in  the  question  of  the 
safety  of  it.  Was  it  safe  for  him  to  return  to  that  village  from 
which  he  had  fled  fifteen  years  ago  ? 

Now  Macquart  was  a  very  clever  man,  'but  even  very  clever 
men  are  subject  to  delusions.  The  fifteen  years  he  had  spent 
wanderi-.-ir;  hither  and  thither  about  the  world  seomcd  to  bin?- 


fifteen  ages.     He  had  learned  to  forget  so  many  things  tha 
lie  fancied  himself  forgotten,  not  knowing  or  remembering  that 
life  in  a  tiny  community  is  not  the  same  as  life  in  the  great 
cities,  and  that  the  village  has  a  memory  far  longer  and  more 
retentive  than  the  memory  of  a  town. 

Even  so,  he  was  not  without  vague  qualms.  But  the 
strong  desire  to  get  even  .with  Hull,  the  mad  greed  to  possess 
everything  and  an  indefinable  antagonism  that  lay  between 
him  and  Screed,  were  factors  too  powerful  to  be  over-ridden 
by  vague  cjualms  as  to  personal  safety. 

Then  there  was  another  very  curious  factor  ;  the  desire, 
or  instinct,  to  return  to  the  place  that  was  fatal  to  Lant 
and  might  be  fatal  to  himself 

It  was  the  homing  instinct  that  carries  the  murderer  to 
the  place  of  his  crime,  an  attraction  begotten  of  repulsion. 

Having  made  his  plan,  he  stuck  to  it.  Leaving  the 
Barracuda  in  the  lagoon,  he  brought  his  companions  up  the 
river,  and  though  the  first  sight  of  Wiart  upset  his  ideas  and 
made  him  dread  the  presence  of  a  white  witness,  he  had  not 
been  long  in  that  gentleman's  company  before  he  recognised  in 
him  a  helper  and  a  tool  absolutely  as  though  Satan  had  placed 
Wiart  at  his  disposal. 

Then  to  gain  time,  he  prepared  the  faked  treasure-digging 
expedition  to  the  river  spit,  and  then  having  made  sure  that 
Wiart  was  fit  for  the  business  and  ripe  for  it,  all  of  a  sudden, 
he  disclosed  the  whole  thing  to  him. 

Nothing  could  have  appealed  more  to  Wiart.  As  over- 
seer of  the  rubber  business  he  received  two  thousand  dollars 
a  year,  and  the  climate  was  breaking  his  health.  If  the 
villainy  failed,  it  would  only  mesn  three  dead  men  in  the 
jungle  and  a  return  to  the  rubber  business.  If  it  succeeded, 
it  would  mean  unlimited  money,  and  the  delights  of  civilisa- 
tion in  the  form  of  women,  wine,  raiment  and  ease. 

Wiart  was  an  unspeculative  individual,  else  perhaps  he 
would  not  have  endured  his  life  up  to  this  so  well.  He  never 
thought  for  a  moment  that  this  gold  for  which  he  was  prepared 
to  do  anything  might  be  a  thing  more  dangerous  to  touch  than 
a  live  dynamo — when  Macquart  was  the  object  through  which 
he  touched  it. 

Not  a  bit.  With  the  gleeful  acquiescence  of  a  sclioolboy 
enticed  to  rob  apples,  he  helped  to  shoulder  the  infei"nal 
scheme,  and  more,  he  engaged  to  put  it  through. 

He  knew  the  forest  and  its  possibilities,  and  it  was  his 
ingenious  scheme  to  m.ake  the  forest  a  criminal. 

He  would  not  aid  in  killing.  The  forest  would  do  all 
that,  by  the  hands  of  its  child,  the  great  Thorn  Tangle. 

Now  on  its  northern  side  the  Thorn  had  only  one  broad  way 
of  entrance.  Wiart  on  his  first  exploration  of  the  place  had 
blazed  his  way,  and  quite  confident  of  returning  on  his  trail 
had  wandered  far,  coming  out  on  the  western  side  at  last  by 
the  purest  accident.  He  had  made  another  expedition  in 
search  of  beetles  only  a  few  weeks  before  the  arrival  of 
Macquart  and  his  companions,  and  he  knew  that,  whilst  for 
himself  and  whoever  he  might  lead,  the  place  was  safe,  it  was 
death  to  any  unfortunate  led  into  it  without  knowledge  of 
the  blaze. 

Once  he  had  got  far  enough,  and  finding  the  others  some 
way  behind,  he  had  waited  till  a  bend  in  the  path  helped  bv 
the  trees  hid  his  actions.  Then  he  had  given  the  word,  "  Full 
speed."  We  know  the  rest,  as  far  as  it  concerns  Hull  and 
Houghton  and  Tillman. 

As  for  Macquart  and  his  two  companions,  they  did  not  speak, 
till,  led  by  the  rubber  man,  they  were  free  of  the  maze. 

It  had  been  debated  between  them  as  to  whether  Jacky 
was  to  be  taken  into  their  confidence  by  word  of  mouth. 
Wiart  was  for  telling  him  the  whole  thing  and  making  him  an 
accomplice  ;  but  Macquart  refused.  "  If  we  can  get  rid  of 
them  as  easy  as  you  say,  where's  the  use  of  telling  the  nigger." 
said  he.  "  He  won't  know  whether  they've  stayed  b?liind 
from  choice  or  got  left,  and  he  has  no  brains  to  guess  with,  I 
reckon ;  if  any  explaining  is  to  be  done,  we'd  better  leave 
it  till  we  are  at  sea." 

Wiart  had  agreed,  and  now  clear  o '  the  maze  with  Jacky 
following  them,  they  struck  west  kd  by  Wiart.  Wiart  was 
very  much  more  than  a  drunkard,  lialf  English,  half  Dutcli, 
his  father  had  been  a  botanist  employed  by  the  Dutch  govern- 
ment in  forest  work  in  Romeo.  Wiart  had  been  born  with  the 
instinct  of  the  fores';  in  his  blood.     He  could  not  lose  himself. 


i8 


LAND     &     WATER 


April  27,  1916 


especially  in  these  forests  that  he  knew  so  well.  He  was 
following  now  a  line  of  demarcation  between  a  vast  grove  of 
dammar  trees  and  a  mixed  wilderness  of  camphor,  cutch  and 
teak,  and  now  he  was  skirting  a  huge  boggy  patch  where 
rubber  trees  and  nipah  palms  grew  in  profusion. 

"  You  are  certain  we  are  going  right  ?  "  said  Macquart. 

"  Sure,"  replied  Wiart.  "  I  could  tell  my  way  by  the 
smell,  but  don't  waste  time  in  talking,  for  I  want  to  reach  more 
open  ground  before  dark.  Where  were  heading  there  is  a 
big  tract  of  very  open  ground  leading  within  a  mile  of  the 
river,  where  the  trees  close  up  again.  You  remember,  we 
came  through  it  this  morning— but  perhaps  you  did  not  notice. 
Men  cl(«rt  in  forests,  but  to  me  a  thinning  of  the  trees  that 
would  not  be  very  noticeable  to  ordinary  folk  is  as  sure  an 
indication  as  a  street  would  be." 

"  (io  ahead."  said  Mticquart. 

At  sunilown,  they  paused  to  rest  and  partake  of  some  food. 

■'  Well.  '  said  Macquart,  as  he  ate,  "  we  have  got  our 
arms  free  at  last  ;  it's  all  ])lain  before  us  now,  unless  those 
(haps  work  their  way  out  of  that  booby-trap  ;  if  they  do,  and 
if  they  catch  up  with  us,  well— they've  got  the  guns." 

Wiart  said  nothing  for  a  moment  ;  he  was  busy  eating. 
Then  he  said  :    - 

■  \nu  needn't  worry.  Leave  that  to  them.  They'll 
have  enough  of  it  before  Ihey  are  done.  I^sides,  if  they  did 
manage  to  get  out,  what  are  they  to  say  ?  Is  it  out  fault 
that  they  lost  themselves  ?  " 

■■  I  tell  you  this,"  said  Macquart.  "  That  chap.  Hull, 
wouldn't  stop  to  ask  whose  fault  it  was.  There  wouldn't  i)e 
the  least  little  bit  of  good  in  putting  up  a  defence,  lied 
shoot,  and  shoot  on  sight.  I  know  him.  There  wouldn't  hr. 
any  use  saying  to  him,  "  It's  not  our  fault,"  or  trying  to  make 
excuses." 

"Well,"  said  Wiart,  "  when  he  gets  out  of  that  place  he's 
at  liberty  to  do  as  he  chooses,  as  far  as  I'm  concerned.  I'm 
not  afraid." 

They  resumed  their  way,  now  beneath  the  starlight  and 
the  glow  of  the  rising  moon. 

The  forest  glowed  green  to  the  moonlight,  the  green  of 
the  deep  sea  cave  to  which  penetrates  a  few  rays  of  the  sun  ; 
the  loops  of  the  liantasse  and  the  lianas  sagging  from  the 
trw  boles  showed  like  ropes,  and  the  orchids  clinging  to  them 
like  marine  growths.  The  monkeys,  for  they, had  reached 
now  the  region  where  the  monkeys  swarmedil  knowing  by 
some  instinct  that  they  were  unarmed,  pursued  them  per- 
sistently, pelting  them  with  nuts  and  bits  of  stick,  but  they  did 
not  even  look  up. 

A  little  before  [midnight  they  reached  the  river,  and 
skirting  the  village  they  came  down  to  the  landing  stage. 
Here  -Macquart,  having  fetched  the  pick  and  shovel  from  the 
tent,  waited  whilst  Wiart  went  to  the  house  to  collect  what 
money  he  had  there  and  to  fetch  his  rifle. 

Hy  the  stage  was  moored  the  boat,  and  near  the  boat  a 
canoe.     It  was  Saji's. 

"  We're  in  luck,"  said  Macquart.  "  I  was  fearing  that 
the  boat  might  have  been  taken  off  by  someone  or  gone 
adrift.  It's  just  the  sort  of  thing  that  might  happen  to  spoil 
ever\'thing— but  it  hasn't." 

"  if  by  any  chance  they  get  out  of  that  place,"  said  Wiart, 
"  they  might  follow  us  In  that  canoe— there's  just  room  for 
three  in  it." 

"  Leave  that  to  me,"  said  Macquart. 

He  went  to  the  canoe  and  untied  the  grass  rope  painter 
that  held  it  to  the  stage,  then  bringing  the  canoe  up,  he 
followed  his  companions  into  the  boat  and  they  pushed  off. 

Canoe  and  boat  floated  out  into  [the  current,  and  Macquart, 
who  had  shipped  the  stern  oar  whilst  Wiart  took  the  bow,  dicl 
not  perceive  a  dark  form  half  start  from  the  bushes  of  the 
lanchng-stage  and  then  take  cover  again. 

Macquart,  by  his  seizure  of  the  canoe,  had  won  the  second 
move  in  this  game  he  was  playing  against  Fate.  But  he  did 
not  know  it.  He  was  quite  unaware  of  the  fact  that  he  had 
been  recognised  by  the  woman  who  had  been  waiting  fifteen 
years  for  his  return,  or  that  he  had  been  followed  by  Saji.  He 
recognised  nothing  and  cared  for  nothing  now,  but  the  fact 
that  his  object  was  nearly  accomplished. 

Haifa  mile  down  the  river  he  stopped  rowing,  and  order- 
ing Jacky,  who  was  in  the  stern  sheets,  to  haul  the  canoe  up  by 
its  tow  rope,  he  scuttled  it,  capsizing  it  with  the  help  of  the 
out-rigger. 

It  sank  like  a  bottle,  and  the  boat  resumed  its  way. 

The  rivrr,  vaguely  decked  with  mist,  lay  under  the  moon, 
making  a  fairy-like  picture  as  it  flowed  by  the  chanting, 
miion-stricken  forests,  (ireat  bats  passed  them,  fouling  the  air, 
and  the  splash  of  a  jumping  fish  now  and  then  cast  rings 
across  the  water.  Now  and  then  a  great  white  feathery 
moth  circled  around  them  like  a  fragment  of  mist,  and  vanished 
as  though  dissolved. 

With  the  oars  and  the  current,  they  were  making  five 
knots  so  that,  allowing  for  rests  on  the  way,  they  reached  tliu 


lagoon  opening  in  less  than  two  hours.  The  Barracuda  was 
lying  just  as  she  had  been  left,  berthed  by  the  trees  on  the 
banks.  A  horde  of  little  monkeys  were  camped  on  board  her, 
but  they  had  done  no  harm  and  at  the  sight  of  the  approaching 
boat  they  scuttered  away,  taking  to  the  tree  branches  from 
where  they  observed  the  doings  of  the  newcomers. 

Macquart  brought  the  boat  alongside,  and  they  scram- 
bled on  board,  where  on  the  deck  Wiart  collapsed,  declarinjj 
himself  fagged  out. 

"  I  must  turn  in  and  have  a  bit  of  sleep,"  said  he.  "  I've 
been  at  it  now  since  yesterday  morning,  and  I'm  not  as  young 
as  I  used  to  be.  There's  no  use  in  spoiling  the  job  by  over- 
haste.  Those  chaps  are  tixed,  even  if  they  escape  they  have 
no  boat  to  follow  us  with,  so  where's  the  use  in  us  killing  our- 
selves." 

"  All  right,"  said  Macquart.  "  I'll  give  you  four  hours. 
It'll  be  near  sunrise  by  tiien.     As  lor  myself,  I  can't  sleep." 

They  opened  the  hatch  and  went  below,  where  Wiart 
tumbled  into  a  bunk  and  was  soon  snoring. 

Macquart  had  lit  the  swinging  lamp,  and  he  sat  now  under 
it  at  the  cabin  table,  smoking. 

There  was  food  and  drink  in  plenty  to  his  hand,  but  ho 
touched  neither.  He  wanted  no  support  or  stimulant.  Hf 
wanted  notliing  but  just  to  sit  and  smoke  and  dream. 

He  had  succeeded.  He  possessed  the  Barracuda  and 
two  hands  to  hel])  work  her.  Half  a  million  of  money  in  gold 
lay  only  waiting  to  be  shipped,  and  he  had  settled  the  score 
between  himself  and  Hull. 

The  hatred  of  .Macquart  for  Hull  was  a  passion  indicati\'e 
of  the  man's  nature.  Hull  had  never  done  half  as  much 
injury  to  hinv  as  he  had  done  to  Hull.  The  way  Hull  had 
man  handled  him  on  board  the  Barracuda  would,  one  might 
have  thought,  been  sufficient  to  account  for  this  hatred  ;  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  whilst  strengthening  it,  it  had  no  count  ction 
with  its  cause. 

He  hated  Hull  because  the  latter  had  turned  up  in  Sydney 
just  at  the  moment  when  he  had  triumphed  overall  obstacles. 
It  was  the  intrusion  of  his  Past  at  the  psychological  moment 
when  his  new  future  w;us  forming.  Hull  was  the  concrete 
expression  of  all  Macquart's  failures,  wretchedness,  crirrles 
and  general  disabilities.  He  was  also,  of  course,  a  possible 
sharer  of  profits,  but  the  latter  fact  was  less  than  the  former, 
and  the  bad  soul  of  Macquart  rose  against  him  from  its  most 
uttermost  and  powerful  depths. 

This  being  so,  imagine  his  feeling  when  Screed  sprang 
Hull  upon  him  at  the  moment  of  starting.  Hull,  from  whom 
he  fancied  he  had  escaped  ! 

Well,  he  had  paid  Hull  out  ;  he  had  disposed  of  Tillman 
and  Houghton  ;  there  remained  only  Screed,  Screed  waiting 
quietly  at  Sydney  to  gobble  half  the" profits  of  the  expedition. 

He  determined  in  liis  own  mind  that  this  should  not  be. 
Screed  in  his  cleverness  imagined  that  he  had  a  tight  hold  on 
the  expedition  for  the  simple  reason  that  to  dispose  of  the 
findings  without  risk  of  exciting  suspicion  and  enquiry,  a 
"  fence  "  was  needed— a  rich  and  well-to-do  business  man 
with  business  connections  and  a  banking  account.  But  Screed 
had  never  dreamed  of  Wiart.  Wiart,  despite  his  drinking 
habits  and  his  position  as  a  factor,  had  large  connections  in  the 
Dutch  settlements,  and  a  dark  scheme  was  now  evolving  in 
the  mind  of  Ma. quart  by  which  these  connections  might  be 
exploited  without  Wiart  having  a  finger  in  the  pie.  .A  drunkard 
can  never  be  trusted.  Wiart  would  have  to  go  ;  but  he  might 
be  made  very  good  use  of  before  he  was  extinguished. 

Jacky  would  have  to  go  at  the  last  when  he  had  done  his 
work.  The  gold  was  imperative  in  its  terrible  demands.  No 
witness  must  be  left  ol  the  whole  of  this  business. 

So  deep  in  thought  was  Macquart  that  he  did  not  notice 
the  passing  of  time.  It  might  be  said  that  he  slept  a  sleep  that 
was  full  of  dreams. 

Rousing  from  it,  he  stood  up  and  stretched  himself. 
Then  he  turned  and  looked  at  Wiart,  who  was  lying  in  the 
bunk  breathing  heavily,  with  his  mouth  half  open. 

Macquart  smiled  as  he  looked  at  the  helpless  figure  before 
him  ;  then  he  turned  and  lit  the  stove  to  make  some  coffee, 
and  when  that  was  done  he  set  out  some  biscuits  and  canned 
meat.  He  let  Wiart  sleep  till  the  last  mon\ent  possible. 
Then  he  awakened  him. 

<7o   be   conliiiucd) 


The  second  volume  of  Germany  in  Dcjeal,  by  Charles  d^ 
S(mza  (Kegan  Paul  and  Co.,  ()s.  net)  is  just  "as  brilliantly 
written  and  fascinating  as  the  first,  ])resenting  the  strategic 
jiroblems  of  the  war  in  a  style  that  makes  them  equal  to  any 
novel.  We  find  it  rather  diflicult  to  agree  with  all  the  author's 
views,  but  concur  most  heartily  in  his  presentment  of  the 
problem  of  Antwerp,  and  his  opinion  of  the  genius  that  saved 
the  western  campaign,  and  we  lofik  forward  with  interest  to 
the  further  volumes  of  this  brilliant  study  of  the  strategic 
aspect  of  the  war. 


April  27,  1916 


LAND     &    WATEk 


I    o 


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Tee    Cavalry    Burberry 

"  7  found  it  txcellent  f»r 
rain,  snow,  or  extretu 
cold;  tU  imperviousnut 
to  wind  being  most  use- 
ful in  the  latter  case." — 
W.  T.  L. 


Every 
Burberry 
Gannerit 
is  labelled 
"  Burberrys/ 


The  Airman's 
Burberry 


The  Burberry  supplies  a 
dry  and  comfortable  shelter 
against  rain  and  all  damp; 
— whilst  reliably  weather- 
proof, is  self-ventilating. 
— keeps  out  wind  better 
than  leather. 

— is  luxuriously  warming  in 
chilly  weather,  yet 
—lightweight  and  air-free, 
is  worn  on  the  mildest  day 
without  discomfort 
— withstands  roughest 
usage  without  loss  of  its. 
protective  powers. 


Officers' 
Complete 
Kits  in  2 
to  4  days 
or  Ready 
for  Use- 
xumnuiiuiw 


NAVAL  OR  MILITARY  WEATHERPROOFS 

Until  furthfr  notice  BURBERRYS  CLEAN  AND 
RE-PROOF  Officer.' ••Burbfrryi."Titiockens  and 
Burberry  Trench-W«rms  FREE    OF    CHARGE. 


The  Naval  Burberry 

"  My  Burberry  has  never  let  any 
water  tlirougJi.  /  have  worn  it  in  a 
gale  on  a  destroyer,  but  it  kept  me 
absolutely  dry." 

W.  BUENESS. 


I W.  BURNESS. 

BURBERRYSf^S'^To'?! 

8    and    10  Bd.  Malesherbes    PARIS ;    and  Provincial  AgenU 


ae 


LAND      &      WATER 


April  27,  1916 


<f«    Town    and    Country     ^ 


The  Kinp  and  Queen  of  Portugiil  like  going  out  and  about, 
and  they  are  frequently  entertained  by  private  friends. 
Just  before  Easter  they  were  twice  within  three  days  the 
guests  of  honour  at  luncheon  parties  at  the  Ritz,  which  still 
maintains  its  reputation  as  the  favourite  restaurant  of  princes. 

Lord  Erskine,  who  came  of  age  yesterday,  is  the  elder  of 
Lord  and  Lady  Mar  and  Kellie's  two  children,  and  will  in  tlie 
natural  course  of  events  become  one  day  thirteenth  Earl  of 
Mar  and  fifteenth  Earl  of  Kellie,  also  Viscount  Eentoun, 
which  is  the  Premier  Viscounty  of  Scotland.  For  those 
interested  in  the  ramifications  of  pedigrees,  and  not  afraid  of 
headaclies,  tht're  is  no  finer  puzzle  than  the  explanation  of 
why  there  are  two  Earls  of  Mar,  one  the  thirty-third,  the 
other  the  twelfth,  and  why  it  is  that  the  twelfth  Plarl  of  Mar 
and  not  the  thirty-third  Earl  of  Jfar  owns  the  family  property. 

Lady  Hopwood  has  received  many  condolences  on  her 
unfortunate  accident  in  the  Strand.  A  daughter  of  tlie  late 
General  Black,  who  was  well-known  in  the  Punjaub,  she 
married  the  distinguished  civilian  four  and  twenty  years  ago. 
Sir  Francis  Hopwood  must  hold  a  record  for  varied  service. 
He  has  filled  important  posts  in  the  Board  of  Trade,  the 
Colonial  Oftice  and  the  Admiraltv.  And  he  began  life  as  a 
solicitor,  entering  the  Board  of  Trade  thirty  years  ago  as  an 
assistant  law  clerk.  The  Commissions  he  has  served  on 
make  wonderful  reading.  In  addition  to  ability  and  industry, 
he  has  delightful  manners,  and   makes  friends  everywhere. 

This  seems  to  be  the  year  of  Hughes — radiant  Hughes  one 
might  almost  say  While  we  in  this  island  are  applauding 
Mr,  William  Hughes,  Prime  Minister  of  Austraha,  in  the 
United  States  they  are  discussing  whether  Judge  Hughes 
shall  be  their  next  President,  i.e.,  if  a  RepubUcan  be  elected. 

That  most  admirable  institution  the  Metropolitan  Public 
Gardens  Association,  of  which  Lord  Meath  is  chairman  and 
whose  headquarters  are  at  Lord  Meath's  house,  83,  J^ancaster 
Gate,  has  just  i.ssued  its  thirty-third  report.  It  is  mainly 
due  to  this  association  that  London  is  gradually  becoming  a 
garden  city ;    that  its  squares  and  its  disused  churchyards 


have  been  turned  into  gardens  and  its  roads  planted  with 
avenues  of  trees.  This  report  by  the  way  contams  useful 
hints  on  the  planting  and  maintenance  of  trees  in  our 
streets.  Since  1884,  ri8  open  spaces  have  been  laid  out  in 
London  by  the  association  at  a  cost  of  £46,000. 

There  was  if  anything  a  larger  exodus  than  usual  for  Easter 
this  year.  Although  the  festival  has  fallen  late,  everything 
in  the  country  is  extremely  backward  so  that  it  was  difficult 
to  realise  that  we  were  within  ten  days  of  May.  Shall  we 
have  snow  in  May  tliis  year  ?  Ever  since  the  war  began,  it 
seems  as  if  we  have  had  abnormal  weather. 

The  Easter  hoUdays  are  always  a  great  time  for  gardens. 
The  busy  person  has  at  last  a  little  leisure  to  bestow  on  their 
many  claims  and  delights.  The  Royal  Horticultural  Society 
I  hear  is  arranging  a  horticultural  sale  at  the  end  of  June  on 
belialf  of  the  Red  Cross.  It  is  to  comprise  plants,  bulbs,  fruit, 
cut  flowers,  etc!,  as  well  as  books  and  paintings,  which  have 
gardens  for  their  subject.  All  oilers  of  help  should  reach  the 
Secretary  of  the  Society  on  or  before  May  27th.  The  sale 
will  take  place  in  Vincent  Square. 

.\n  unusual  memenfto  of  Verdun  is  possessed  by  Jules. 
His  eldest  son,  CharUe,  who  was  for  many  years  in  the 
restaurant,  but  has  latterly  owned  a  hotel  at  Chateauroux, 
has  been  through  the  fighting.  Jules'  birthday  was  at  the 
beginning  of  this  month,  and  from  the  battlefield  there 
reached  him  from  his  son  two  lovely  birthday  cards,  worked 
in  coloured  silks,  which  had  been  bought  in  Verdun  itself. 
He  has  framed  these  cards.  To  pause  in  the  middle  of  the 
greatest  battle  the  world  has  witnessed  to  send  your  father 
a  birthday  card,  is  a  charming  little  incident  which  strikes 
one  as  thoroughly  typical  of  the  French  spirit. 

Already  have  Messrs.  Jarrold  and  Son  paid  nearly  £1,000 
to  Mr.  Arthur  Pearson's  Fund  for  Blinded  Soldiers  and 
Sailors  at  St.  Dunstans,  this  being  the  first  proceeds  of  "  The 
Bhnded  Soldiers  and  Sailors  Gift  Book,"  which  was  published 
for  this  cause.  They  hope  to  supplement  this  sum  for  copies 
of  this  excellent  book  may  still  be  obtained.  Hermes. 


GONG  SOUPS  for  the  Front. 


Jong    , 

Soups 


Gong  Soups  form  an  ideal  supple- 
ment to  Army  Rations.  Tkey  are 
easy  to  prepare  and    taste    just    like 

delicious  nome-made  soup,  but  cost  much  less. 
The  twelve  different  flavours  provide  plenty  of 
variety. 

Each  packet  of  Gong  Soups  is  complete 
in  itself,  and  is  sufficient  for  three  portions. 
Nothing  need  be  added  but  water,  and  in 
15  minutes  the  meal  is  ready.  (Directions 
on  every  packet.) 


TWELVE  DIFFERENT 
DELICIOUS  VARIETIES. 

ALL  ONE  PRICE 


2 


d. 


Made  by  0X0  Limited, 
Thames  House,  London,  E.C. 


SOUPS 


May  4,    191 6 


Supplement    to    LAND     &     WATER 


xiu 


''THE  ORILUX'' 

THE  ONLY  ELECTRIC  LAMP  WHICH  HAS   STOOD 
THc     TEST    OF    ACTIVE     SERVICE     FOR     YEARS. 

EXTRACTS    FROM   LETTERS    FROM 
THE    FRONT:- 

■■The  most  useful   article   in   my   kit." 

■■I  hear  nothing  but  praise  of  your  lamp 
on  this  side." 

"You  have  made  your  name  famous 
amongst  oflicers." 


THE  ORILUX  LAMP  is  fitted  with  s-witches  for  intermittent 
and  for  constant  light.  The  light  can  be  turned  on  without 
opening  the  case,  which  is  fitted  with  a  hood  to  throw  the  light 
downwards.  The  case  is  provided  with  loops  for  attaching  to  the 
belt,  and  provision  is  made  in  it  fui  carrying  a  spare  bulb. 


PRICE  CI     1     O 


/  Postage  to  the  "v 
^,  Front,  1/-  extra  y 


Extra  Battery  in  sealed  tin.  2/.  (Postage  to  the  Front,  1/-  extra.) 
Extra   Bulb,   1/6,  postage  2d. 


SOLE    MAKERS— 


J.    H.   STEWARD,    Ltd.,    Opticians, 

4b6  Strand,  457  Sti*and,  London. 


The    Original    Cording^s 


Established  in  1839,  77 years  qgo. 


High-Grade  Waterproofs. 


The  "SERVICE"  Coat. 

A  trustworthy  waterproof  is  a  posi- 
tive     necessity     for      campaigning, 

since  getting  -wet  is  so  often  fol- 
lowed by  ill-health,  and,  at  least, 
must  cause  real  discomfort. 
Mounted  or  afoot,  a  "  Service  " 
Coat  ensures  complete  protection 
through  anij  rain.  It  is  a  slip-on 
which  gives  to  every  movemijnt, 
and  has  ■well-contrived  fulness  to 
make  any  "stuffiness"  impossi- 
ble. Useful  features  for  saddle 
wear  are  the  leg  straps,  pommel 
strap,  and  fan  piece  within  deep 
slit  at  back. 

One  of  the  recommended  materials, 
No.  31,  in  colour  an  approved  military 
fawn,  is  a  tough  though  finely-woven 
fabric,  light  in  weight,  yet  absolutely 
reliable  for  hard   wear  and  tear. 

When  ordering  a  "Service"  Coat,  or  if  to  be 
cent  on  approval,  height  and  chest  measure,  and 
reference,  sltouli]  be  given. 


New  illustrated  List  of  waterproof  coats,  capes,  boots,  trencn  waders  &c.,at  request 


J.  C.  CORDING  &  Ca 

Waterproof ers  to  H.M.  the  King 

Only     A  ddressfs «' 

19 PICCADILLY,  W.  &35 st. jamess  st. 


s.w. 


WILKINSONS' 

"SAFETY"  Service  Jacket 

Patent  nn-^'i^'i  for. 


Protects  the  wearer    f  om  traguen  s  of  steel,  spent  bullets, 

&(-.     The  jacket  is    built  up    with   a  lining  of   Wilkinsons' 

bul  et  proof  steel-     Cannot  be   detected,  no  inconvenience 

to  wearer. 


nd 


Military  office's  are  invited  to  inspect  the  SAFETY  SERVICE 
JACKET  now  bemg  made  solely  by 

WILKINSONS,  ""-^J^l^rs: 

53   PALL    MALL,   S.W. 

Outfits  for  any   Regiment    at    Short   Notice.  All   Articles    of 

Equipment   Stocked. 
WILKINSONS'     SWORD     CO,     LTD.  Established  1772. 


=THE "  Submarine"  wrist  watch  ==^ 


INTENSE 

Luminosity. 


WRITE  FOK   PARTICULARS. 

BROOK  &  SON, 


Some  wrist  watches  are 

DUST  PROOF,  others  ARE 
DAMP  PROOF,  BUT  THE 
"SUBMARINE"  IS  THE  FIRST 
ADVERTISED 

WATERPROOF. 

Silver  case,  black  dial, 
intensely  luminous,  non- 
magnetic, the  really 
ideal^  watch  for  navy 
and  army  officers. 

£4-0-0  net. 

By  Appointment  to  H.M,  The  King. 

87  George  Street  West,  Edinburgh. 


Tht  Pioneers  of  Luminous   Watches, 


Health 


in  the 
Lime  Fruit 


The  West  Indian  Lime  contains  more  NATURAL  HEALTH- 
GIVING  SALTS  than  any  other  fruit.     That  is  why 

R  O  S  E'S 
LIME    JUICE 


after  50  years  is  sti 
non-alcoholic  drink. 


unsurpassed  as  a 
Most  Economical. 

DEUCIOUS-WHOLESOME-REFRESHING 

But  be  sure  you  get  ROSE'S. 


XIV 


Supplement    to    LAND     &     WATER 


May  4th,   1916 


ALMOST   any   odd    comer    wffl 
take  one    or    more  units  of 
Giobe-Wemicko     "  Ltastk  " 
Bookcases. 

tach  unit  is  thorou^thly  well 
mode,  tach  has  a  sIkJing  dust- 
proof  ftlass  door.  And  each  one 
IS  a  compact  bookcase  in  Uself— 
reedflv  interkKktng  with  the  other 
iinrK. 


Gk>be- Wernicke  "  EJastic  "  Book- 
cases are  "ahvays  complete  but 
never  finished  *' — you  sunply  add 
more  uniU  as  required. 

What  could  he>  more  appropriate 
for  conserving  the  books  you  prize 
so  much  J 

Why  not  <tet  further  informatk>n 
aow  about  Gk^be  -  Wernicke 
"  Elastic  "  Bookcases  ? 


ie 


Slolv^V^rtncI 

*'E1  attic"      Bookcases 

I    Packing  Frtt.       Orden  of  £j    Carrlaer    raid' lo~[ 

I any  Goods  StaitoH  in    tke  lirtttsk   I$Us. | 

WriU   To-dar    lor    Mluilral<d   Calalogus    lOOB   la:— 

jriier/tote^cmicl(c(?o.  Ltd. 

Ciu.e  BOd  Lit>rary  ruitU'beii, 

SI  Ttetorl*  6U-MV  Loadoa    B  W  ;  M  Holkots  TlUwt.  S.O.; 

n  BUhopaifftU,  E.a 


In    the   Army 

Worn  by  the  Officers  and  men 
in  the  trenches,  in  the  camps, 
on  the  march,  Waltliani  Wristlet 
Watches  are  thoroughly  reliable 
timekeepers. 

There  are  no  better  watches 
lor  wristlet  wear.  Strong,  durable, 
reliable,  they  represent  the  best 
value  at    the    price. 

In  solid  silver  case,  with  strap  and  buckle  com 
plete,  from  iB3  3«,  Luminous  dials  extra 
Sold  by  all  reliable  Watchmakers  and  Jewellers, 


WalthamWatches 


Watch  Booktel  atid  W-btlet  Watch  Pamphlet  Poat  Pne. 

"yyAi^xMABa     IWatchc     Co., 

(Depi.  63).    1U5     High     IIolborn.     London,     'W. C 


e's 


In  Shakespear 
time  men  wrote 
with  the  old 
Goose     Quill. 

Genius  triumphed,  as 
genius  will,  but  how 
much  has  the  world  lost 
by  so  cumbtrsome  a 
method  of  transmitting 
thought  to  paper  ? 
To-day  the  world's 
greatest  writers  use  the 
world's  greatest  writing 
mplement— Waterman's 
Ideal,  the  pen  which 
enables  them  to  write  Ircely  and  uninterruptedly 
without  a  moment's  loss  of  time.  Waterman  s 
Ideal  is  their  "inseparable  companion  and  friend  " 
No  other  pen  writes  so  well,  no  other  lasts  so  long. 

Choose  the  "  Safety"  Type  for  friends  on  Active  Service,  because 
carried   upside  down,  or  in  any  position 


it  Cud    be 

treasure  to  officers  and  men  at  tba  front 


It  it  a  real 


For  the  Rejlular  Type,  10/6  and  up- 
wards- For  the  SAFETY  Type  and 
the  New  Lever  Pocket  Sell-FillinJ 
Type.      12.6       and       upwards  Of 

Stationers  and  Jewe  lers. 
In  Silver  and    Gold  for   presentation. 


Fullest  sotisfaction  Siiarenteed.  Nibs 
exchanjtvable  if  not  suitable.  Call  or 
send  to  'The  Pen  Corner."  Full 
range  of  pens  on  t  ew  for  inspection 
and  trial.     Booklet  free  from  : — 


L.  G.  Sloan,  U:^l(^zxi^xviex ,  Kingsway,  London. 


m 


illllli 


^ 


The  THRESHER  Trench  Coat 

WINDPROOF  AND  WATERPROOF. 

RECOGNI5E.D    by    the    W.O.    and    officially    bought  to 
the  notice    of    Officers    commanding    corps    in    the 
B.L.F.  early  in  the  winter  of    1914,   the   "Thresher" 
has    successfully    met    the    severest    tests    of    winter    cam- 
paigning, and    has   established    itself   supreme    for    comfort, 
warmth,  and  service. 

Up  to  April  15,  I9I6,  seven  tKousaad  Britisi\  Military 
Officers  have  purchased  genuine  "Threiher"  Trench  Coats. 

This  fact  abne  makes  it  unnecessary  to  publish  even  a  few  of  the 
many  generous  and  extraordinary  testimonials  that  have  been  re- 
ceived. 

SUMMER  WEAR.— An  outstanding  fact  is  that  the  orders 
from  the  B.E.F.  were  received  continuously  during  last 
summer,  neither  is  there  yet  any  signs  of  the  demand 
slackening,  which  confirms  our  .statement  that  the  Thresher 
Trench  Coat,  with  detachable  lining,  is  the  best  garment 
for  every  purpose  and  every  season. 

The  "Thresher"  with  detachable  KamelcotI  Lining  JC5  10  0 

Do.  unlined X.4  14  6 

Do.  lined  detachable  Sheep  .  JC.7     I  0 

For  Mounted  Officers,  with  Kneeflaps  and  Saddle  Gussets, 
15/6  extra. 

Send  sfcce  of  chest  and  ai>proxtinate  heiftlit.  and  to  avoid  delay 
enclose  cheque  with  order. 

THRESHER    &    GLENNY, 

Military   'Cailors  and  Outfillers. 

152  &  153  Strand,   London,  W.C. 

n  Note  that  the  first  coat  produced  in  October.  1914,  has  been 
™  accepted  without  any  modiricalion  as  the  standard  i^amient  for 
mcxiern  warfare. 


illlllllilllllllllllllll 


niiis 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVII  No.  2817  [,^1;,]  THURSDAY,  MAY  4.   1916  [^N°E'^Yp\^VR'J  iSrh^^li^iil^ 


liy   Louis  liaofuiekcn 


UiuiLii   exclusivJii  fur   "Laud  uiiJ    Wattr.' 


The  Last  Ride  Together 


L  A  N  D      eS:      W  A  T  E  R 


May  4    ic)i6 


The  Passing  Train — by  Vico  Vigano 


The  Last  Prop— by  Alberto  Artioli 


The  Jew— by  Ettore  di  Giorgio 


These  photographs  are  of  Ttalinn  etchings  and  engravings  which  are  now  on  exhibition 
at  the  galleries  of  the  Royal  Society  of  British  Artists,  Suffolk  Street,  Pall  Mall. 
An  article  dealing   with  this   exhibition    by  Mr.  Marcus  B.  Huish  appears   on   page    18. 


May  4,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSWAY,  LONDON,  W.C 

Telephone:  HOLBORN  2828 


THURSDAY,    MAY   4.    1916 


CONTENTS 

The  Last  Ride  Together.     By  Louis  Raemaekers  i 

ItaHan  Etchings.,    (Photographs.)  2 

The  PoUtical  Situation.     (Leading  Article.)  3 

The  Battle  of  Verdun  is  Won.     By  Hilaire  Belloc  4 

Contrasts  in  Sea  Methods.     By  Arthur  Pollen  8 

The  City  of  Fear.— A  Poem.     By  Gilbert  Frankau  10 

Sortes  ShakespearianiE.     By  Sir  Sidney  Lee  11 
British  Kinship  with  France.     By  Arthur  L.  Salmon    12 

Air  Problems.     By  F.  W.  Lanchester  13 

Waste.     By  Charles  W.  Simpson  15 

German  Trade  Methods.     By  Arthur  Kitson  17 

Italian  Etchings.     By  Marcus  B.  Huish  18 

Chaya.     By  H.  dc  Vere  Stacpoole  19 
Town  and  Country                                                         .  24 

The  West  End  26 


Choosing  Kit 


xvn. 


THE     POLITICAL     SITUATION 

THE  statement  made  by  Mr.  Asquith  in  the  House 
of  Commons  on  Tuesday  has  done  a  great  deal 
to  clear  the  political  situation.  For  the  first 
time  we  have  been  explicitly  and  officially  told, 
what  was  of  course  well  known  to  the  enemy,  that  this 
country  alone  is  maintaining  71  divisions  in  the  field — ■ 
apart  from  12  divisions  contributed  by  our  Dominions, 
and  that  the  total  military  and  naval  effort  of  the  British 
Empire  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  exceeds  the  enor- 
mous total  of  five  million  men. 

It  is  perhaps  a  matter  for  regret  that  the  military 
authorities  did  not  feel  themselves  free  to  make  the  figures 
public  several  months  ago.  Such  a  course  would  have 
differed  from  the  practice  of  our  French  Allies— but  then 
so  does  the  policy  of  publishing  casuality  hsts.  It  would 
have  completely  disposed  of  all  that  calculated  campaign 
of  slander  through  which  certain  people  have  sought  to 
belittle  and  discredit  the  loyalty  of  their  fellow-country- 
men. If  the  Bill,  which  is  now  being  introduced  into 
Parliament,  v\ith  the  apparent  consent  of  all  Parties, 
really  achieves  the  end  which  is  desired  by  the  Prime 
Minister  ;  if  it  settles  once  and  for  all  the  whole  miserable 
controversy,  it  will  be  a  great  step  in  the  direction  of 
national  unity.  The  precise  form  of  the  measure  is 
admittedly  a  question  of  political  expediency,  but  neither 
this  nor  any  other  measure  can  really  secure  the  result 
which  is  described  in  that  high-sounding  phrase  "  equahty 
of  sacrifice."  Indeed;  the  very  word  "  sacrifice  "  reveals 
a  narrow  and  selfish  spirit.  The  country  calls  for  service, 
not  sacrifice,  and  the  Government  has  the  indisputable 
right,  without  recourse  to  legislation,  to  demand  the 
willing  service  of  every  man  and  woman,  whether  single 
or  married,  whether  under  forty  or  over,  in  any  capacity 
for  which  they  are  fitted:  any  arbitrary  fine  of  demarca- 
tion is  bound  to  give  rise  to  individual  grievances  and 
unnecessary  comparisons.  From  the  political  point  of 
view  alone,  apart  from  its  obvious  fairness,  we  might 
have  wished  that  the  principle  of  universal  service  had 
been  adopted  by  the  Government  early  in  the  war, 
when  it  was  urgently  advocated  by  many  pubhc  men. 
It  would  certainly  have  received  the  unqualified  support 
of  tlie  nation. 


It  must  not,  however,  be  forgotten  that  the  problem 
of  recruiting  in  this  country  was  at  once  wholly  different 
from  that  presented  to  any  of  our  Allies,  and  was  solved 
in  an  unexpectedly  successful,  if  not  complete,  manner. 

If  the  violent  controversy  upon  the  method  of  recruiting 
had  not  arisen,  the  attention  of  our  AUies  would  certainly 
be  directed  to  the  astonishing  voluntary  effort  made  by 
this  country.  Certainly  the  attention  of  history  will 
chiefly  be  directed  to  that  effort. 

Let  us  consider  what  it  has  meant.  A  conscript 
nation  prepares  for  war,  not  in  a  year  or  two,  but  over 
a  generation.  All  its  energies  and  activities  are  co- 
ordinated to  fit  in  with  the  conscript  system.  Every 
man  taken  for  service  knows  himself  liable  to  lose  his 
existing  occupation  should  war  break  out,  and  is  at 
fixed  intervals  experienced  in  the  adjustments  necessary 
to  such  a  system,  by  his  regular  and  periodical  summoning 
to  the  colours  for  training.  There  are  a  thousand  details 
which  the  system  of  conscription  secures  and  establishes 
when  it  is  part  of  a  regular  law,  and  these  make  a  con- 
script country  something  different  wholly  in  texture 
from  nations  such  as  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
to  which  such  a  system  has  never  applied. 

This  country,  which  depends  for  its  very  life  upon  a 
vast  overseas  trade,  as  well  as  upon  extensive  manufactures 
at  home,  suddenly  finds  itself  involved  in  a  great  war. 
It  is  possessed  of  a  small  professional  army  of  a  few 
divisions,  mainly  established  for  the  purpose  of  garrisoning 
great  possessions  in  the  East,  and  of  finding  service  for 
that  garrison.  It  has  side  by  side  with  this  a  volunteer 
force,  also  very  small  in  proportion  to  the  population, 
and  composed  of  men  with  comparatively  slight  military 
training  only.  Within  eighteen  months,  that  nation 
produces  an  army  comparable  in  size  with  the  long 
trained  and  conscript  armies  of  its  Allies.  It  feeds, 
clothes,  and  trains  this  enormous  mass  of  new  material 
without  a  hitch,  and  what  is  perhaps  most  remarkable 
of  all,  it  provides  an  adequate  supply  of  officers.  Within 
the  twenty-first  month  of  the  war,  it  can  boast  of  the 
mobilization  of  a  force  superior  to  that  proportion  of 
one-tenth,  which,  before  this  great  war  was  regarded  as 
the  maximum  effort  possible  in  any  country. 

The  truth  is  that  this  voluntary  effort  .has  not  only 
proved  triumphantly  successful,  but  successful  after  a 
fashion  which  no  one  had  dreamed  possible  and— we  may 
say  it  with  pride — which  our  Allies  perhaps  would  have 
thought  even  less  possible  than  we.  What  is  now  in 
progress  is  no  more  than  a  rounding  off  and  completing 
of  a  task  which  had  left  a  comparatively  small  margin 
of  work  undone.  When  the  violence  of  the  present 
controversy  is  forgotten  in  the  great  events  of  the  summer 
which  lies  before  us,  this  truth  will  be  fully  apparent 
to  all. 

There  is  one  thing  more  to  be  said  now  that  the  final 
settlement  of  these  controversies  has  been  reached.  Let 
us  have  no  further  complication  of  the  issues  by  sensa- 
tional "  exposures  "  of  this  or  that  hitch  in  the  extremely 
difficult  work  of  apportioning  military  and  civil  duties  to 
the  small  remaining  margin  of  men  who  will  come  under 
the  new  law.  It  is  perfectly  easy  for  the  leaders  .of  an 
uncensored  press  in  time  of  excitement  and  strain,  to  throw 
out  of  all  proportion  any  details  to  which  they  choose  to 
turn.  If  their  object  be  to  weaken  us  at  the  crucial  moments 
of  this  tremendous  task,  they  could  not  adopt  a  better 
method.  Above  all  it  is  well  to  remember  that  the  con- 
duct of  the  campaign  is  not  in  the  hands  of  the  Press,  but 
of  the  General  Staff ;  and  nothing  could  possibly  be  more 
mischievous  than  complaints,  formulated  in  the  news- 
papers, that  we  are  "everywhere  on  the  defensive."  The 
right  moment  for  the  great  offensive  will  be  chosen  by 
those  who  are  competent  to  decide,  and  it  is  on  their 
decision  that  we  build  our  hopes  of  linal  and  complete 
victory. 


LAND      &     ^^'  A  T  E  R 


May  4,  191C 


THE    BATTLE    OF   VERDUN   IS    WON 

By  Hilaire  Belloc 


IT  is  characteristic  of  this  tremendous  war  that  from 
its  very  scale  we  miss  its  pr(3portions.  Things  near 
to  lis,  either  in  sentiment  or  in  mere  distance, 
become  grotesquely  exaggerated,  and  what  is 
equally  natural  and  equally  a  vice  in  judgment,  things 
limited  in  the  scale  of  time  are  also  distorted.  Something 
which  happens  (piirkly  and  sharply  appears  far  greater 
than  it  is.  Something  long  drawn  out  grows  stale  in  the 
mind  and  is  forgotten. 

The  local  disturbance,  which  you  may  call  at  will  a 
very  serious  riot  or  a  small  local  rebellion,  costs  in  DubHn 
casualties  that  do  not  reach  four  figures.  A  garrison, 
the  British  elements  of  which  were  not  3,000  men — not  a 
mile  of  the  Western  front — surrenders.  The  two  events 
fill  the  public  mind,  and  there  are  even  some  who,  in  the 
midst  of  so  tremendous  a  struggle  for  national  existence 
find  the  occasion  useful  for  the  working  of  personal 
intrigues  and  the  advance  of  petty  individual  ambitions 
in  professional  politics. 

Meanwhile  the  greatest  battle  ever  fought,  an  action 
with  consequences  that  will  affect  the  whole  future  of  man- 
kind almost  as  much  as  the  original  victory  of  the  Marne, 
has  been  won  by  the  French  upon  the  sector  of  Verdun. 

Put  down  the  mere  figures  of  this  past  action^ — by  far 
the  greatest  in  scale,  whether  we  consider  the  numbers  of 
men,  or  the  munitionment,  or  the  time  employed  that 
has  ever  taken  place  in  the  recorded  history  of  the  world 
— and  see  what  they  signify.  Verdun  means  to  the 
enemy  a  loss  over  and  above  the  loss  he  has  inflicted 
upon  his  opponent,  certainly  of  four  army  corps,  pro- 
bably of  five.  It  means  the  sacrifice  of  those  numbers 
at  the  most  critical  moment  of  all,  when  he  has  already 
called  upon  the  whole  of  one  of  his  last  two  classes 
and  is  beginning  to  call  upon  the  last  of  all.  It  means 
that  an  effort  on  which  he  had  concentrated  the  whole 
of  his  available  resources,  for  which  he  had  spent  some 
months  in  preparation,  in  which  he  had  such  confidence 
that  he  risked  open  declarations  of  victory  and  deliberate 
and  definite  prophecies  of  success,  has  resulted  for  him  in 
a  bloody  and  irreparable  defeat. 

Moral  Effect  on  Germany 

It  means  upon  the  moral  side  that  all  his  millions 'at 
home  who  have  read  in  a  thousand  daily  sheets  the  official 
statements  rejjeated  day  after  day  in  a  thousand  forms, 
have  now  to  know  that  those  statements  were  false,  and 
that  the  confidence  based  upon  them  must  be  abandoned. 
No  public,  however  stupid,  or  however  nervously  exalted, 
can  read  day  after  daj*  that  an  obje'tt  is  in  process  of  attain- 
ment and  then  find  it  abandoned,  without  suffering  a  very 
serious  moral  effect  indeed.  No  one  knows  this  better 
than  the  British  public,  which  has  had  to  suffer  such 
things  in  connection  with  subsidiary  expeditions  in 
this  war.  What  would  it  be  if  a  disappointment  of  this 
sort  had  attached,  not  to  a  subsidiary  expedition  but  to 
what  was  rightly  regarded  as  the  main  operation  of  the 
whole  campaign  ? 

There  are,  of  course,  other  reasons,  beside  its  mere 
scale  in  time  and  numbers  which  prevents  the  profound 
significance  of  Verdun  from  receiving  full  recognition  in 
this  countrj'.  The  authorities  here  neglect  to  issue  those 
regular  statements  of  the  general  position  of  which  the 
I'rench  now  give  such  excellent  models.  The  silliest 
(ierman  lie  goes  uncorrected  and  the  enemy  is  naturally 
tempted  to  increase  the  effect  which  he  rightlj'  judges 
attaches  to  falsehoods  about  the  number  of  prisoners  he 
takes  and  grotesquely  belittling  his  own  casualties. 
Further,  you  cannot  expect  lay  opinion  to  be  as  much 
struck  by  the  victory  of  a  successful  defensive  as  it  is 
by  a  forward  movement  upon  the  map. 

If  a  couple  of  (ierman  corps  had  got  themselves  sur- 
rounded in  the  Balkans,  let  us  say,  and  had  had  to  lay 
down  their  arms  after  an  action  costing  the  Allies  an  almost 
equal  number  of  casualties,  we  should  have  had  the  wildest 
excitement  in  the  press  and  a  public  impression  of  victory 
such  as  we  have  not  had  since  the  beginning  of  the  war. 


Verdun,  wliich  is  something  three  times  as  big  as  that, 
three  times  as  large  a  success  for  us,  has  no  such  effect 
upon  the  imagination. 

Yet  one  may  presume  that  with  the  passage  of  a  few 
weeks  the  great  news  will  begin  to  be  digested,  and  if  not 
the  full  meaning  of  Verdim,  yet  at  least  its  colossal  pro- 
portions will  begin  to  receive  their  due.  When  the  time 
comes  for  the  offensive  {and  when  movement  appears 
upon  the  map)  the  very  obvious  fact  that  Verdun  will 
have  laid  the  foundations  for  all  the  concluding  phases 
of  the  war  will  not  escape  the  general  eye. 

One  can  write  thus  strongly  about  this  tremendous 
and  decisi\'e  battle,  because,  although  the  enemy  con- 
tinues the  same  dull  business  of  breaking  his  own  head 
and  has  not  yet  begun  to  mask  the  nature  of  his  failure 
by  the  undertaking  of  another  in  adifferent  field,  military 
judgment  throughout  the  world,  not  only  with  tlie 
French  command,  which  has  full  intelligence  of  the 
enemy's  movements,  but  in  the  matter  written  to  order 
throughout  the  German  press,  confirms  one  in  the  con- 
viction that  the  great  offensive  upon  the  salient  of  Verdun 
has  reached  its  turn  and  has  ended  in  disaster  for  the 
enemy. 

The  Last  Great  Attack 

The  mere  chain  of  dates  leads  one  to  that  conclusion. 
These  words  are  written  upon  the  and  cf  May.  It  was 
upon  the  9th  of  April  that  the  enemy  launched  his  men 
upon  the  last  of  his  general  assaults.  It  was  an  attack 
second  only  in  scale  to  that  of  the  first  four  days,  now 
ten  weeks  gone,  upon  which  he  staked  his  future.  It 
was  utterly  defeated,  and  on  the  evening  of  that  Sunday 
the  General  commanding  the  French  troops  in  the  sector 
of  Verdun  issued  his  Order  of  the  Day,  telling  them  that 
they  could  now  be  confident  that  the  victory  was  won. 
Already  ten  days  earlier,  when  the  decline  in  quality 
of  the  German  attack  had  become  clear,  the  critic  whoso 
judgment  carries  most  weight  in  Europe,  Colonel  Feyler, 
had  risked  the  words,  "  the  French  have  won  the  battle 
of  Verdun."  There  has  followed  since  that  disaster 
of  theirs  upon  the  gth  of  April  no  enemy  effort  com- 
parable to  it.  A  week  later  came  what  was  certainh' 
a  considerable  bid  for  the  Mort  Homme,  defeated  again, 
of  course,  in  what  had  become  a  regular  routine  ;  but  since 
that  date  for  more  than  a  fortnight,  those  who  (including 
the  present  writer)  still  expected  a  further  general  de- 
velopment, have  only  seen  the  enemy's  effort  die  down. 
We  are  upon  the  seventeenth  day  from  that  Monday  when 
he  last  attacked  in  any  strength  and  during  all  that 
interval  we  have  had  no  more  than  purely  local  offensives 
easily  dealt  with  and  delivered  with  apparently  no  hope 
of  success. 

Strategic     Victory 

Even  at  this  date  it  is  not  possible  to  say  that  the  enemy 
will  not  go  on  again.  We  must  pray  that  he  may — ■ 
and  the  longer  the  better.  Prussian  stupidity  and 
Prussian  vanity,  its  colleague,  are  here  our  powerful 
allies — and  they  rarely  fail  us.  There  may  be  domestic 
reasons  too  for  his  continuing  to  bleed  himself  to  death. 
He  may  yet  find  himself  under  some  political  necessity, 
or  suffering  from  the  command  of  some  authority, 
not  wholly  military,  and  thus  be  condemned  to  lose 
another  thirty  thousand  or  so  in  the  continuation  of  his 
blunder.  It  is  unlikely,  because  the  situation  has  become 
quite  obvious  and  glaring,  but  it  is  possible.  It  is  also 
indifferent  to  the  general  result  of  the  campaign.  The 
battle  of  Verdun  is  won.  And  Verdun  can  certainly  go 
down  to  history  as  the  greatest  example  of  woodenness 
in  strategical  judgment  that  any  command  has  evei 
afforded. 

Only  the  future  can  show  what  the  fruits  will  be,  but 
we  know  already  what  they  should  be.  And  when  the 
harvesting  of  them  begins  we  owe  it  to  those  who  died 
between  Vaux  and  Avocourt  to  call  them  more  than  any 
other  men  the  victors  of  the  great  war. 


May  4,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


MESOPOTAMIA 

The  fall  of  Kut  is  the, political  event  of  the  hour.  It 
is  the  loss  of  nearly  3,000  British  troops,  say  one-tenth 
per  cent,  of  the  trained  forces  of  Britain  alone  in  the 
alliance. 

But  the  military  event  of  that  same  hour  is  not  the 
loss  of  this  heroic  little  garrison  but  the  situation  now 
created  for  the  Turks — and  through  them  for  the  enemy 
as  a  whole — b}'  their  committal  to  the  Mesopotamian 
position. 

As  a  purely  militarj'  subject  of  study  the  enemy's 
position  in  the  Near  East  is  one  of  the  clearest  and 
simplest  the"  war  has  afforded,  and  if  it  be  possible  to 
examine  matters  of  such  vital  interest  with  sufficient 
detachment  one  can  almost  take,  in  those  enemy  positions, 
the  same  interest  as  in  a  mathematical  proposition. 

Certain  elements  are  of  course  rmknown.  We  are  m 
doubt  as  to  the  exact  strength  of  the  enemy's  various 
bodies  and  we  have  no  published  account  of  the  strength 
available  against  them  in  the  four  fields  of  Armenia,  the 
Persian  mountains,  the  Tigris  and  Egypt,  but  we  know 
enough  of  the  enemy's  strength  and  of  that  of  the  Allies 
to  determine  the  main  elements,  and  those  main  elements 
lead  us  to  fairly  definite  conclusions. 

The  key  of  the  whole  business  is  the  geographical 
exception,  made  by  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  system, 
to  the  rest  of  the  Turkish  territory,  coupled  with  the 
political  importance  to  the  Turkish  Empire  of  that 
district. 

Supposing  the  enemy's  interests  to  lie  within  Asia 
Minor  and  Syria  alone,  observe  what  would  follow.-  The 
whole  stiTngth  of  the  Turkish  Empire  now  upon  the 
defensive  would  be  occupied  in  delaying,  possibly  in 
permanently  checking,  the  Russian  advance  westward 
through  Armenia.  It  would  have  to  watch  a  compara- 
tively narrow  front  in  Syria  between  the  Mediterranean 
and  the  desert.  It  would  be  anxious,  perhaps,  with 
regard  to  its  communications  with  Syria  where  they  pass  ■ 
close  to  the  sea  near  the  Gulf  of  Alexandretta.  But  the 
position  would  have  for  the  enemy  this  great  advantage 
of  simplicity,  and  a  defensive  against  the  Russians  still 
in  the  Armenian  mountains  would  be  the  only  great 
preoccupation  of  the  Turkish  command. 

The  distant  and  eccentric  Irak,  the  Mesopotamian 
field,  essential  to  the  present  rulers  of  Turkey,  who  fear 
that  with  the  loss  of  it  their  power  of  government  may 
be  destroyed,  transforms  the  whole  character  of  the 
war. 


You  have  as  the  essential  mane  ol  the  whole  situation 
a  dilemma  between  the  defence  of  Asia  Minor,  and  the 
retention  of  Irak  with  forces  certainly  not  sufficient  for 
the  double  task.  You  have  not  only  a  war  upon  two 
fronts  (or,  counting  Syria,  upon  a  possible  three)  but  you 
have  also  one  of  those  fronts  so  far  thrust  out  beyond  the 
Armenian  theatre  of  operations  that  its  communications 
are  in  ever  growing  peril. 

If  the  town  of  Bagdad  and  the  vital  interest  it  has 
for  the  Turkish  power  had  stood  further  north  and 
cast  this  dilemma  would  not  have  arisen.  Standing 
where  that  town  docs  it  will  increase  the  present  anxiety 
of  the  enemy's  higher  comir/and  until  he  shall  be  com- 
pelled to  decide  whether  he  will  retain  Irak  with  some- 
thing like  a  certainty  of  military  disaster,  or  whether  he 
will  abandon  it  with  the  political  consequences  which 
would  follow  such  an  abandonment. 

Consider  what  opportunities  are  open  to  the  Turkish 
forces  in  these  fields.  They  have  in  the  first  place  to 
rely  entirely  upon  their  own  resources.  They  may 
obtain  a  certain  amount  of  munitionment  from  the 
Austro-Gcrman  manufactories.  Of  men  in  any  ap- 
preciable numbers  they  can  get  none  save  through  their 
own  recruitment.  With  forces  now  no  longer  superior 
to  those  converging  against  them,  and  about  to  become 
inferior,  they  have  to  prevent  the  cutting  of  the  com- 
munications behind  their  Mesopotamian  army  or  to 
withdraw  that  army.     There  is  no  alternative. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  a  concentration  in  strength 
in  the  INIesopotamian  field  alone,  compelling  the  retire- 
ment of  the  British  forces  upon  the  Tigris  further  south 
would  be  a  way  out  of  the  present  Turkish  dilemma. 
It  would  be  nothing  of  the  sort.  So  long  as  a  large 
British  force  necessarily  occupying  the  attention,  and 
compelling  the  presence,  of  a  large  enemy  force  facing 
it,  is  present  at  any  point  between  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
the  Armenian  mountains — whether  it  is  present  further 
south  after  a  retirement  or  further  north  after  an  advance 
— so  long  the  Mesopotamian  front  with  all  its  increasing 
dangers  is  the  chief  anxiety  of  the  Turks. 

A  concentration  in  such  numbers  that  the  British 
forces  on  the  Tigris  should  be  overwhelmed  and  should 
cease  to  exist  would  of  course  give  immediate  relief,  but 
a  concentration  in  such  strength  and  with  very  imperfect 
communications  alone  available  is  impossible. 

The  whole  thing,  therefore,  resolves  itself  into  this 
question.  Can  the  enemy  ward  off  the  threat  to  his 
communications  ?  Supposing  him  strong  enough,  as  he 
certainly  still  is  and  will  probably  long  remain,  to  hold 


^*The  (Jiaunumca&nsoffAs'MesDpofamian  Tbras 


«^!»**1*MllWP*« 


1  A  N  D      &      \\^\  T  E  R 


May  4,  1916 


the  Mcsopotaiiiian  field  and  to  cover.  Bagdad  from  the 
Hritisli  on  the  south  and  the  comparativily  small 
Russian  forces  advancing  on  the  ca.>i.  from  the  boundary 
ranges  of  Persia,  ran  he  at  the  sitme  time  defend  the 
lines  whereby  recruitment  in  men  and  necessary  inunition- 
mcnt  reach  him  ? 

In  order  to  answer  that  fundpjiiental  question  those 
who,  like  the  present  writer,  have  no  local  knowledge 
and  depend  upon  the  evidence  of  others  or  upon  the  map, 
work  at  a  disadvantage,  but  it  would  seem  the  opinion 
of  those  -iclto  have  local  kotowlcdge,  and  it  is  certainly 
the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  map,  that  the  Turks 
cannot  efficiently  ward  olif  that  threat  to  their  com- 
munications of  which  I  have  spoken.  If  they  cannot  do 
so  then  we  shall  witness  >vithin  a  comparatively  short 
limit  of  time  a  complete  change  in  the  military  situation 
of  the  Near  East,  and  follo\ifing  upon  it  a  whole  chain  of 
political  lonscquences  ultimately  affecting  the  war  in 
every  part  of  its  3,000  miles  of  front. 

There  are  two  avenues  of  approach  from  Europe,  the 
Bosphorus.  and  Asia  Minor,  to  any  force  keeping  the 
field  near  Bagdad.  The  first  is  the  road,  now  supple- 
mented by  a  railway  across  the  northern  part  of  the 
>Iesopotamian  plain  to  Mosul.,  upon  the  Tigris,  and  thence 
down  the  Tigris  itself.  The  other  that  same  road  as  far 
as  the  Euphrates  only  and  thence  down  the  Euphrates. 
Let  us  see  how  the  matter  stands  in  the  case  of  each 
of  these  communications  severally. 

What  may  be  called  the  "  Tigris  communications " 
arc  those  which  ha\e  so  often  appeared  in  these  columns 
viien  the  Mesopotamian  position  was  discussed.  They 
are  the  railway  from  the  Bosphorus  which,  after  the 
junction  of  Muslimje  (12  iiilcs  north  of  Aleppo)  is  con- 
tinued along  the  edge  of  tire  Mesopotamian  plain  where 
this  meets  the  foothills  of  the  mountains,  and  is  generally 
known  as  the  "  Bagdad  raihvay."  When  I  last  wrote  of 
this  line  it  had  certainly  reached  the  wells  and  springs  of 
RaselAin.  It  had  certainly  not  then  reached  and  lias 
probably  not  yet  reached  the  point  of  Nisii>in  to  which  it 
is  prolonged  upon  certain  (ierman  maps.  But  it  would 
be  a  fair  guess  to  say  that  it  has  at  the  present  moment 
reached  the  point  of  Amude,  where  the  road  or  track  down 
from  Dairbekr  strikes  iL  Thence  a  track  now  certainly  orga- 
nised for  petrol  traffic  leads  to  the  Tigris  at  Mosul,  and 
thence  both  along  the  side  of  the  river  and  down  the 
stream  itself  the  communications  proceed  to  the  rail- 
head of  the  sector  being  built  up  north  from  Bagdad. 
This  railhead  was  some  little  time  ago,  if  I  am  not  mis- 
taken, at  Tekerit.  It  may  have  been  pushed  further, 
though  hardly  beyond  the  point  where  the  Tigris  cuts 
through  a  peculiarly  sharp  and  narrow  range  of  hills  half 
way  between  Mosul  and  Bagdad.  For  it  would  be  bad 
policy  to  waste  lalxjur  upon  that  part  of  the  communica- 
tions which  are  already  fairly  well  ser\'ed  by  water. 

These  communications,  from  the  vital  "  knot  "  near  the 
(iulf  of  Alexandretta,  which  will  be  discussed  in  a  moment, 
are  in  all  their  sinuosities  over  700  miles  in  length.  The 
mere  distance,  therefore,  constitutes  a  formidable  element 
of  difficulty,  for  when  your  communications  are  very  long, 
even  if  they  are  passing  through  friendly  country,  all  the 
delays  due  to  counter  orders,  local  checks,  etc.,  get  multi- 
plied at  a  rate  which  increases  far  more  rapidly  than  the 
mere  mileage,  and  this  is  particularly  the  case  in  un- 
developed country. 

The  second  line  of  comnumications,  which  wc  will  call 
the  Euphrates  line,  is  of  about  the  same  total  length  in 
mileage,  but  is  very  much  less  convenient,  for  serving 
Bagdad  as  a  base  for  a  Mesopotamian  force.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  provides  better  directions  and  oppor- 
tunities for  a  retirement. 

The  Euphrates  comtxiunication  is  not  a  single  line,  but 
a  complex.  Its  main  portion  is  the  river  Euphrates 
between  the  bridge  by  which  the  Bagdad  railway  crosses 
that  river  at  Jerablus,  and  the  point  of  Musseyib  which, 
though  not  the  nearest  upon  the  Euphrates  to  Bagdad! 
is  yet  that  upon  which  the  only  good  road  runs  from  the 
river  to  the  town.  It  will  be  clear  from  the  map  that  this 
use  of  the  Euphrates  as  a  line  of  communication  lea\es  the 
troops  of  the  Turkish  Empire  on  the  Mesopotamian  front 
far  more  dependent  upon  primitive  methods  than  that 
by  the  Tigris.  After  Jerablus  there  is  no  further  rail 
even  for  a  section  of  the  wav. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Euphrates  route  is  supplemented 
by  a  possibility  of  petrol  traction  along  the  two  historic 


ways  that  lead  from  Syria  to  the  Euphrates  itself.  I 
owe  to  the  cf)urtesy  »)f  a  correspondent  who  has  given  mc 
most  valuable  ix-rsonal  evidence  of  the  journey  made  in 
a  petrol-drixen  motor  from  Syria  to  Bagdad,  details  of 
this  opportunity  open  to  the  enemy.  It  seems  that  the 
going  is  good  and  that  the  total  consumption  of  time, 
excluding  the  time  taken  in  the  crossing  of  the  river,  is 
not  more  than  two  days  and  a  half.  Of  these  ways  the 
best  is  that  which  leaves  the  Syrian  railway  at  Homs, 
passes  TadnuH-  and  the  ruins  of  Palmyra  near  Erck, 
strikes  the  Euphrates  at  .\bukeinal  and  makes  for  Ana, 
at  which  point  there  are  ferry  boats  for  the  conveyance 
of  heavy  vehicles. 

The  alternative  route,  further  south  and  nearly  parallel, 
starts  from  Damascus  and  strikes  and  crosses  the 
Euphrates  at  Hit.  It  seems  that  the  open  country  of 
The  Jezinc  beyond  affords  perfectly  good  going  without 
obstacles  to  Bagdad  itself. 

The  continued  provisionment  of  a  large  force — say, 
four  divisions— by  motor  lorries  alone,  however,  over  a 
space  of  nearly  500  miles,  is  a  formidable  task,  and,  as 
wc  shall  see  in  a  moment,  the  crossing  of  such  a  stream  as 
the  Euphrates  upon  the  way,  adds  another  very  serious 
obstacle.  Eurther,  there  is  a  change  of  gauge  between 
the  main  railway  and  the  Syrian  railway  at  Aleppo.  It  is 
probable,  therefore,  that  if  the  enemy  can  be  compelled 
to  rely  upon  the  Euphrates  line  he  will  use  the  river 
mainly  for  the  conveyance  of  munitions,  recruitment, 
and  all  the  necessities  of  his  army. 

Now  what  are  the  ad\antages  and  drawbacks  of  this 
line  ? 

At  the  present  moment  the  Euphrates  would  be 
navigable  for  very  considerable  cargoes  even  from  a 
point  as  high  up  on  its  course  as  Jerablus.  The  same 
cause  which  has  led  to  the  floods  on  the  Tigris  below  Kut, 
which  played  so  great  a  part  in  the  checking  of  the  force 
attempting  to  relieve  (ieneral  Townshend,  swells  the 
w'aters  of  the  sister  riv'er.  It  is  the  melting  of  the  snows 
in  the  Armenian  mountains  which  raises  the  flood  level 
at  this  season  of  the  year.  I  understand  that  these 
conditions  of  navigability  on  the  I'ppcr  Euphrates  continue 
in  normal  seasons  to  a  date  about  two  months  hence  or 
a  little  less  :  at  any  rate,  well  over  the  time  within 
which  the  power  of  the  Turks  to  maintain  themselves  on 
the  Mesopotamian  front  and  on  to  Bagdad  will  be  decided 
one  way  or  the  other.  Because  the  progress  of  the  Russians 
from  the  north  will  either  be  successful  or  will  fail  well 
within  that  limit  of  time. 

But  though  this  rise  of  the  water  at  the  present  season 
presents  such  an  advantage,  the  task  of  bringing  munitions, 
let  alone  further  heavy  pieces  and  their  shell,  down  some 
700  miles  of  winding  water  (the  mere  line  as  the  crow- 
flies  is  450  and  the  river  is  extraordinarily  full  of  loops  and 
bends)  is  hardly  less  serious  than  the  task  of  attempting 
that  munitionment  by  petrol  traffic  from  Syria.  The 
current  is  exceedingly  rapid,  so  much  so  that  a  ferry  at 
this  season  allows  in  rowing  across  the  half  mile  of  the 
stream  something  like  a  mile  drop  between  the  point  of 
departure  and  the  point  of  arrival.  All  the  first  part  of 
the  journey,  and  especially  the  higher  reaches  are  a 
tangle  of  islands  and  there  are  throughout  the  whole 
journey,  I  belie\e,  certainly  throughout  the  greater  part 
of  it,  a  mass  of  perpetually' shifting  banks  of  sand  in  the 
bed  of  the  stream.  This  same  factor  of  the  rapidity  of 
the  current  militates  gravely  against  the  use  of  this 
avenue  of  communication  in  its  reverse  function,  that  is 
for  all  traflic  back  from  Bagdad  towards  the  north-west. 
Slow  and  difficult  towing  is  the  only  means  available, 
and  this  for  a  large  force  is  out  of  the  question.  Should 
a  retirement  be  determined  on  the  only  form  it  could  ' 
possibly  take  would  be  a  retirement  directly  westward 
across  the  desert  and  half  desert  lands  between  the 
Euphrates  and  Syria,  and  beyond  Abu  Venial  (or  Hit  if 
the  two  tracks  were  used)  theEuphrates  would  no  longer 
be  of  scr\-ice. 

From  all  this  consideration  of  both  the  Tigris  and  the 
Euphrates  system  of  communication  with  Bagdad,  it  is 
clear  that  the  nodal  point  upon  which  the  security  of  the 
enemy  army  in  Mesopotamia  turns  is  the  junction  of 
Muslimje  just  north  of  Aleppo  ;  that  is,  in  practice,  the 
Aleppo  town  itself  and  its  neighbourhood.  The 
Tigris  road  would  be  thrown  out  of  action  the  moment 
a  Russian  force  got  astraddle  of  the  railway,  say,  at 
Ras  el  Ain,  the  Euphrates  route  the  moment  an  opponent, 


May  4,  1916 


L  A  N  I)      Sc     W  A  T  E  R 


Russian  or  other,  appeared  at  Jerablus  ;  but  the  whole 
theatre  of  the  enemy's  efforts  in  Mesopotamia  and 
in  Syria,  his  mihtary  existence,  as  it  were,  beyond  Asia 
Jlinor,  is  dependent  upon  his  continued  possession  of 
Aleppo  and  its  neighbouring  junction.  If  he  loses  that 
region  before  retiring  his  armies  in  Syria  and  Mesopotamia 
are  lost  at  the  same  time.  If  he  retires  before  it  be 
seized,  he  abandons  Bagdad  of  course  and  Syria  as  well 
to  the  power  of  the  Allies,  and  with  such  an  abandonment 
the  political  position  of  the  present  government  at  Con- 
stantinoole  could  hardly  be  maintained. 

Now  now  near  are  we  to  the  imperiUing  in  this  fashion 
of  the  enemy's  hold  south  and  east  of  Asia  Minor  ? 

In  order  to  answer  that  question  we  must  set  down 
the  elements  as  here  in  Sketch  II. 


His  forces  before  Bagdad  and  within  that  base  are  held 
in  place  by  the  large  British  army  on  the  Tigris,  and  a 
smaller  Russian  force  coming  down  from  the  Persian 
mountains.  His  ability  either  to  retire  or  munition 
himself  while  he  remains  thus  held  in  the  region  of 
Bagdad  is  threatened  in  three  ways.  One  of  these 
threats  is  'already  in  being,  the  other  two  are  potential 
only  and  open  to  discussion. 

We  can  see  on  this  little  sketch  map,  Map  II,  the 
situation  and  proportion  of  the  Allied  force  surrounding 
the  theatre  of  operations  of  the  Turks  in  Mesopotamia. 
The  main  Turkish  army  being  in  the  region  A,  with  its 
local  base  at  Bagdad  B,  and  its  two  main  communications 
together  with  its  communications  down  the  Syrian  coast 
converging  at  the  nodal  point  X  near  Aleppo,  pressure 
can  be  brought  against  him  either  (i)  by  the  Russian 
force  coming  down  from  Bitlis  marked  (i)  upon  the 
Sketch,  or  (2)  by  a  successful  stroke  against  X  from  the 
sea  at  (2),  or  (3)  by  an  army  marching  as  Napoleon 
marched  along  the  coast  of  the  sea  from  Egypt  at  (3) 
supported  by  the  naval  power  at  our  command  and  strik- 
ing at  Syria.  Of  these  three  methods  of  imperiUing  the 
enemy  one  is  actually  in  being  ;  a  Russian  force  is  present 
between  Bitlis  and  the  Bagdad  railway  and  is  advancing 
south.  The  other  two  are  merely  potential.  No  stroke 
against  the  Aleppo  region  from  the  sea  has  been  attempted 
as  yet,  nor  any  force  gathered  for  delivering  it,  while  the 
very  large  army  in  Egypt  at.  (3)  has  hitherto  lain  almost 
wholly  on  the  defensive,  partly  because  the  threat  of  an 
invasion  to  Egypt  was  at  one  moment  serious,  involving 
the  danger  of  losing  the  canal,  partly  because  the  forces 
at  a  point  so  central  could  be  regarded  as  a  great  reserve 
which  could  be  thrown  towards  any  point  north,  east 
or  south,  including  India,  should  such  a  necessity  have 
arrived . 

Because  2  and  3  are  potential  only,  and  because  the 
reasons  for  delay  in  both  cases  are  necessarily  known  to 
the  authorities  and  the  higher  command  alone  it  is  neither 
profitable  nor  perhaps  wise  to  discuss  them  in  any  detail. 

It  is  enough  to  show  the  more  obvious  of  the  characters 
they  present.  But  the  threat  of  the  Russians  from 
the  north  is  not  only  very  much  more  real  and  imme- 
diate, but  susceptible  of  more  detailed  discussion. 

A  blow  delivered  from  the  sea  against  Aleppo  would 
obviously  settle  the  business  at  once.  To  deliver  it  upon 
the  Gulf  of  Alexan.dretta  has  been  suggested  twenty  times 
from  as  many  quarters  since  Turkey  entered  the  war.  To 
deliver  it  south  of  the  range  of  mountains  covering 
Aleppo  and  a  march  upon  that  district  from  Latakia  to 


Antioch  would  be  equally  decisive.  The  reasons  against 
such  an  undertaking  are,  I  repeat,  not  open  to  debate  at 
this  moment.     But  they  are  not  conclusive. 

An  advance  into  Syria  from  Egypt  has  the  advantage 
that  it  involves  none  of  the  great  losses  and  risks  of  a 
landing,  no  new  base  of  supply,  no  new  transport  of 
troops,  while  the  only  strain  it  would  put  upon  the 
already  heavily  burdened  shipping  of  the  Allies  would  be 
for  the  partial  provision  of  the  force  from  the  side  of  the 
sea.  To  prevent  its  advance  the  enemy  would  be  com- 
pelled to  cover  a  belt  across  Southern  Palestine  of  at 
least  60  miles  and  he  would  not  thus  cover  Syria  with  less 
than  200,000  men.  Were  he  to  attempt  to  hold  an 
entrenched  line  from  the  sea  to  the  desert  with  a  smaller 
number  he  would  be  broken.  Were  he  to  attempt  to  hold 
a  shorter  line  he  would  be  turned. 

The  last  opportunity,  however,  and  the  only  one  which 
is  of  immediate  importance,  because  it  is  the  only  one  in 
being,  is  the  advance  of  the  Russian  force  from  the  district 
of  Lake  Van  on  Bitlis  southward  against  the  com- 
munications of  the  Turkish  army.  \Ve  do  not  know 
exactly  where  the  heads  of  the  Russian  columns  are,  but 
we  may  conjecture  that  they  are  not  yet  arrived  at  the 
edge  of  the  mountain  land,  or  the  point  of  Mejafarkyn,  the 
ancient  Martyropolis,  which  marks  the  beginning  of  the 
open  country.  When  they  have  reached  this  point  they 
will  find  a  fairly  good  road,  I  beheve,  for  the  remaining 
fifty  miles  to  Diarbekr. 

Now  the  news  that  the  Russians  are  at  Diarbekr 
would  be  more  important  perhaps  to  the  great  war  as  a 
whole  even  than  the  preliminary  news  that  they  had  taken 
Erzerum  and  Trebizond.  It  would  mean  that  they  were 
within  striking  distance— within  a  week's  march— of  the 
Bagdad  railway,  and  of  the  main  line  of  communications 
for  the  Mesopotamian  army.  It  is  possible  that  the 
alternative  Euphrates  route  has  already  been  partly 
organised,  but  we  know  with  absolute  certainty  that  not 
more  than  two  months  ago  all  the  work  connecting  the 
Turkish  Mesopotamian  force  with  Asia  Minor,  Constanti- 
nople and  Europe  was  passing  through  Ras  el  Ain, 
Nisibin  and  Mosul.  There  has  hardly  been  time  to 
establish  an  efficiently  working  alternative  line  of  com- 
munications further  west. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  Russians  at  Diarbekr 
are  equivalent  to  the  doom  of  the  Turks  near  Bagdad. 
The  Turkish  army  in  that  region  has  certainly  ample 
provision  for  a  retirement,  it  could  and  would  retire  by 
the  west  to  the  Euphrates  certainly,  and  probably  beyonS, 
the  Euphrates  by  the  tracks  across  the  desert  to  Syria. 
Though  the  Russians  at  Diarbekr  might  be  on  the 
Bagdad  railway  in  a  week  they  would  not  be  within  the 
region  of  Aleppo,  even  by  an  uninterrupted  march,  for 
a  month  (for  the  railway  obviously  would  be  destroyed 
as  the  Turkish  communications  guards  on  it  fell  back). 
In  point  of  fact  a  month  would  be  a  ridiculously  small 
interval  to  allow,  for  the  Russian  advance  would  be  con- 
tested 'and  would  meet,  before  it  could  threaten  the 
Syrian  line  of  communication,  the  serious  obstacle  of  the 
Euphrates.  But  the  Russians  at  Diarbekr  would  be 
equivalent  to  a  Turkish  retirement  from  Mesopotamia, 
with  all  the  political  consequences  following  upon  such  a 
retirement. 

There  is  one  more  element  in  the  problem,  which  has 
nothing  to  do  with  its  topographical  side,  and  is  very 
serious.  And  that  is  the  element  of  climate.  The 
summer,  which  will  render  easy  operations  in  Armenia 
and  the  Anatolian  plateau  to  the  west,  and  the  advance 
down  the  slopes  of  the  mountains  towards  the  Meso- 
potamian plain,  at  the  same  time  renders  military  action 
by  northern  races  such  as  the  Russians  and  the'  Britisl: 
in  southern  Syria  and  upon  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates 
abnormally  diflicult.  The  exact  value  of  that  facto: 
will  only  be  estimated  in  practice,  but  it  must  not  b* 
forgotten.  H.  Beli.oc, 


The  quaintly  precise  English  of  A  Hermit  Tiirnei  Loose, 
by  A.  Kawabata  (East  and  West,  Ltd.,  2s.  6d.  net)  is  reminis- 
cent of  Yoshio  Markino's  studies  of  ^\e5tern  life.  The  author 
of  this  book  set  out  to  enlarge  his  mental  outlook  by  travel, 
and  his  diary  of  experience  in  Egypt,  Greece,  Italy,  and  Eng- 
land is  at  once  interesting  and  amusiiig,  both  by  reason  of  the 
subject  matter  and  the  method  of  e>.pre.ssion. '  It  is  a  capti- 
vating little  book,  and  decidedly  one  to  read,  if  only  fur  tlie 
novel  view-points  (to  Western  minds)  that  it  discloses. 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  4,  1916 


CONTRASTS   IN   SEA   METHODS 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


THE  naval  developments  of  the  last  fortnight 
demonstrate  the  shifts  and  expedients  a  power 
inferior  at  sea  is  seeminfjy  tom;jelled  to  adopt 
when  it  has  neither  the  imagination  nor  .the 
resolution  re<|uired  for  a  direct  effort  to  dispute  an 
adverse  command  of  the  sea.  They  also  illustrate  how 
futile,  in  every  essential  of  military  result,  these  shifts 
and  expedients  must  be.  And  in  this  respect  they  only 
repeat  to  us  to-day  lessons  of  which  history  gives  us  many 
examples.  But  in  one  respect  they  have  produced  what 
is  almost  a  new  phenomenon.  1  mean  the  open  revolt  of 
the  neutral  world  against  the  methods  by  which  a  bellig- 
erent has  aspired  to  the  exercise  of  a  real  sea  power 
without  possessing  the  means  of  doing  so  in  a  manner 
consonant  with  the  dictates  of  justice  and  humanity. 

The  I'nited  States  has,  perhaps  wisely,  limited  its 
protest  to  forbidding  further  offences  by  torpedoing  or 
shelling  trading  ships.  '  The  ground  of  the  quarrel  is 
precisely  that  in  so  doing  Germany  has  been,  and  must 
continue  to  be,  guilty  of  murder.  But  we  should  not 
lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  practically  all  her  actions  at 
sea  are  but  variants  of  the  same  crime.  Take,  for 
instance,  the  fostering  of  revolt  in  Ireland.  It  is  possible 
of  course,  that  those  responsible  for  sending  the  traitor 
Casement  to  the  West  Coast,  and  arming  the  handful  of 
desperadoes  who  have  been  turning  a  few  streets  of  Dublin 
into  a  hell,  may  have  been  foolish  enough  to  have  ex- 
pected their  efforts  to  result  in  an  effective  rebellion 
against  the  British  Crown.  An  effective  rebellion  would 
undoubtedly  have  introduced  a  change  in  the  military 
situation  of  real  value  to  the  enemy.  But  it  is  almost 
inconceivable  that  so  fatuous  a  hope  could  genuinely 
have  been  held.  It  seems  more  probable  that  the  Sinn 
Feiners  were  backed  simply  to  demonstrate  the  power  of 
Germany  to  introduce  fright  fulness  upon  a  scene  hitherto 

,  immune  from  her  murderous  intervention. 

Take  again  the  raid  on  Lowestoft  and  the  unhappy 
accidents  by  which  "  Russell  "  and  two  armed  yachts 
have  run  upon  mines  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  bom- 
bardment of  Lowestoft  and  Yarmouth  had  no  other 
purpose  than  casual  murder ;    and  the  extension  of  the 

.  practice  of  sowing  mines — so  assiduously  cultivated  in 
the  North  Sea — to  the  Mediterranean,  is  indistinguishable 
from  a  deliberate,  though  indiscriminate,  effort  at  murder, 
because  to  one  ship  of  war  that  runs  the  risk  of  fouling 
them,  a  dozen  non-combatant  ships  must  face  this  bar- 
barous and  inhuman  peril  day  after  day.      In  the  North 

.  Sea,  as  we  know,  the  ratio  of  merchant  ships  to  war 
ships  that  have  been  blown  up  by  mines,  is  something 
like  twenty  to  one.  And  it  is  the  merchant  ship  that  is  least 
well  equipped  for  protecting  its  personnel  when  such 
disasters  occur.  Thus,  all  Germany's  naval  action — - 
whether  by  her  most  powerful  warships,  or  by  the  craft 
or  devices  devoted  particularly  to  the  destniction  of 
commerce — is  marked  by  murder  being  its  only  object 
and  its  only  method. 

The  American  Crisis 

Incalculably  the  most  momentous  question  of  the  day 
is  how  Germany  >:^ill  act  in  face  of  the  American  protest 
against  the  continued  indulgence  of  this  homicidal  mania. 
For  a  fortnight  we  have  been  entirely  without  news.  Presi- 
dent Wilson  asked  for  an  immediate  reply,  and  it  would 
seem  as  if  some  sort  of  reply  could  not  be  much  longer 
delayed.  The  enemy's  difficulty  in  sending  one  does  not, 
as  we  all  know,  lie  in  formulating  the  policy  that  is  wisest 
for  himself,  but  in  presenting  that  policy  in  a  manner  that 
will  not  be  destructi\e  of  national  discipline.  Were  there 
no  difficulty  on  this  latter  point,  Berlin  would  surrender 
to  Washington  without  hesitation  or  delay.  The  policy 
of  so  doing  is  obvious,  because  the  \ery  remote  mihtary 
advantages  lost  by  renouncing  the  attack  on  commerce 
are  outweighed  many  times  over  by  the  dangers  that 
must  follow  if  America  is  driven  into  belligerency.  It 
is  surely  no  over  statement  to  speak  of  the  military  effect 
of  commerce  destruction  being  both  indirect  and  unim- 


portant. As  a  sole  method  of  making  naval  war,  cam- 
paign after  campaign  has  shown  its  futility.  In  none  of 
our  wars — neither  tho.se  with  France  in  the  seventeenth 
or  eighteenth  centuries,  nor  in  that  with  America  in 
1812 — have  the  depredations  on  our  commerce  proved 
at  all  serious,  though  in  many  of  these  wars  they  were 
carried  out  on  a  colossal  scale.  The  German  submarine 
campaign  has  so  far  not  approached  the  effectiveness 
either  of  the  French  or  of  the  American  privateers. 

Nor  would  it  be  more  than  a  passing  embarrassment, 
if  it  were  not  for  a  change  in  naval  conditioiis,  that  few 
if  any  realised  before  the  war  broke  out.  In  previous 
wars  the  protection  of  commerce  imposed  extraordinary 
burdens  upon  the  fighting  navy.  To-day  it  is  the  fight- 
ing navy  that  has  imposed  extraordinary  burdens  upon 
commerce.  It  is  the  British  merchant  fleet  that  has  been 
comjielled  to  find  transports  for  our  armies,  and  an  almost 
endless  tale  of  supply  ships,  both  for  the  navy  itself 
and  for  the  maintenance  of  the  forces  employed  in  so 
many  places  overseas.  Compared  with  the  tonnage  that 
naval  and  military  requirements  have  withdrawn  from 
civil  uses,  the  tonnage  lost  by  enemy  action  is  almost 
trivial,  and  it  is  this  fact  that  lends  point  to  what  I 
urged  last  week,  viz.,  that  the  building  of  merchant 
ships  must  be  put  on  the  same  basis  as  naval  ship-build- 
ing or  the  making  of  munitions.  It  is  a  simple  fact  that, 
in  the  general  devotion  of  ail  private  property  to  public 
war  purposes,  the  distinction  between  naval  and  merchant 
shipping  has  vanished.  Apart  from  building  new  ships, 
much  more  can  be  done  to  lessen  the  demand  on  shipping, 
and  to  expedite  the  clearing  of  the  ships  in  use. 

It  is  idle  to  suppose  that  we  have  arrived  anywhere  near 
the  useful  limits  to  which  imports  can  be  restricted,  and 
voluntary  effort  can  supplement  State  action  in  this 
respect  to  a  very  notable  degree.  Nor  can  it  be  doubted 
that  in  a  great  many  ports — if  not  in  all— a  vigorous 
reform  in  the  employment  of  labour,  and  the  wise  intro- 
duction of  fresh  labour,  would  result  in  ships  being 
cleared  and  reloaded  with  far  greater  expedition  than  is 
now  the  rule.  There  are  indeed  many  authorities  who 
go  so  far  as  to  say  that  if  the  labour  devoted  to  building 
new  ships  could  be  turned  to  making  existing  ships  more 
useful  by  shortening  their  periods  of  idleness  in  harbour,  a 
tonnage,  now  useless,  would  be  made  available  far  exceed- 
ing that  which  any  building  effort  could  supply.  Which- 
ever way  then  that  the  problem  is  looked  at,  it  is  cleariy 
obvious  that  no  commerce  destruction  on  any  scale 
hitherto  experienced,  is  likely  to  bring  Germany  that 
weakening  of  British  military  power  which  is  its  pro- 
fessed object. 

MultipHcation  of  Submarines" 

•If  then  Germany  hesitates  as  a  mere  matter  of  policv, 
and  apart  from  internal  questions,  whether  to  yield 
to  America  or  not,  it  must  be  because  she  has  hopes  of 
very  greatly  increasing  the  efficiency  of  her  attack. 
It  ^\as  repeated  from  some  German  source  last  week  that 
the  enemy  had  built  and  equipped  over  200  submarines. 
I  am  not  concerned  at  this  moment  to  dispute  the 
credibility  of  this  statement.  It  is  more  to  the  point 
that  even  if  200  submarines  were  ready  for  the  campaign, 
It  would  not  at  all  follow  that  the  campaign's  efficiency 
would  gain  either  proportionately  or  at  all,  A.nd  the 
reason  is  not  really  very  recondite.  It  is  to  be  found  in 
the  fact  that  a  submarine  cannot  work  with  other  ?ub- 
marincs  in  the  sense  in  which  surface  ships  can  work 
together. 

If  you  add  a  squadron  of  six  battleships  to  a  fleet  of 
twelve,  you  have  manifestly  increased  the  power  of  that 
squadron  by  50  per  cent.  You  have  increased  it  because 
battle  squadrons  are  an  organised  force,  and  all  additions 
to  that  force,  from  the  nature  of  things,  contribute  to  a 
cumulative  result.  But  the  submarine  is  never  part  of 
an  organised  force.  It  is  at  most  a  mobile  danger  point. 
By  multiplying  submarines,  you  multiply  danger  points. 
But  If  the  ships  that  have  "to  oass  the  danger  points 


May  4,  igi6 


LAND      &     WATER 


have  any  internal  or  external  protection,  the  risks  they 
run  are  not  proportionate  to  the  number  of  points  of 
danger  that  they  encounter.  A  man'  who  is  efficiently 
protected  against  wayside  assassination  by  a  body  guard, 
can  pass  a  hidden  threat  of  this  sort  with  impunity,  and 
he  can  pass  it  ten  times  a  day  or  a  hundred  times  a  day 
in  exactly  the  same  safety  as  once.  If  thr,  assassins 
could  all  combine  and  overpower  the  bodyguard,  it  would 
be  a  different  matter.  A  ship  is  no  doubt  in  a  slightly 
different  case  from  a  man  so  guarded.  But  where  ships 
arc  armed,  a  submarine  cannot  come  to  the  surface  to 
pursue  and  bring  it  within  range  without  serious  risk, 
and  where  a  ship  is  in  patrolled  waters,  the  submarine 
cannot  come  to  the  surface  without  risking  instantaneous 
annihilation.  There  are,  moreover,  traps  and  dangers  that 
beset  its  path  in  waters  where  the  intended  victims  are 
numerous,  and  of  these  traps  and  dangers  the  submarine 
commander  can  have  practicall}^  no  knowledge  whatever. 
No  doubt  the  multiplication  of  submarines,  by  multiply- 
ing the  points  of  danger,  would  add  something  to  the  risk 
of  ships.  The  addition,  however  is  not  serious.  But  the 
risk  to  the  submarines  of  multiplying  their  numbers 
in  patrolled  waters  would  be  strictly  in  proportion  to 
their  increase  in  numbers.  And  all  this  the  Germans 
must  know  as  well  as  we  do. 

The  German  Dilemma 

There  seems,  then,  no  ground  for  doubting  that  the 
noisy  professions  of  confidence  in  the  submarine  cam- 
paign as  the  means  by  which  Great  Britain  was  to  be 
brought  to  her  knees,  were  put  out  in  Germany,  not  as  a 
sober  profeision  of  military  expectations,  but  solely  to 
hearten  a  people  stupefied  by  the  spectacle  of  a  country 
apparently"  universally  victorious  on  land,  and  possessing 
the  second  most  powerful  fleet  in  the  world  reduced  to 
a  condition  of  pitiful  sea  impotence.  For  never  in  history 
has  an  impotence  more  complete  been  seen.  When 
historians  discuss  the  value  of  the  destruction  of  com- 
merce in  war,  they  tell  us  how,  for  example,  in  the 
Revolutionary  War,  the  French  took  so  many  British 
ships,  and  how  we  took  so  many  French.  The  matter  is 
always  discussed  in  the  terms  of  relative  loss.  But  in  this 
war  the  loss  of  the  (icrman  marine  has  been  complete. 

Those  that  love  statistics  may  argue  as  to  the  exact 
percentage  losses  by  enemy  action  bear  to  our  total 
shipping.  But  there  is  no  dispute  that  the  loss  of  German 
shipping  is  exactly  lOO  per  cent.  For  such  supplies  as 
reach  Germany  from  overseas  she  is  dependent  entirely 
upon  neutrals,  and  after  many  months  of  irresolute 
vacillation,  we  have  evolved  a  form  of  virtual  blockade 
that  reduces  these  supplies  to  a  minimum,  Opinions  may 
differ  and  do,  as  to  military  hopes  that  can  be  expected 
from  blockade — just  as  they  differ  as  to  the  military  effect 
to  be  got  by  commerce  destruction — but  it  appears  to 
be  beyond  dispute  that  all  (iermany  is  on  the  shortest 
of  short  rations,  and  the  only  thing  which  has  reconciled 
the  people  to  its  privations  has  been  the  government's 
promise  that  their  submarines  would  bring  Great  Britain 
to  the  same  pass.  How  in  circumstances  such  as  these  can 
the  German  Government  unsay  what  it  has  said  and  yield 
to  the  American  protest  ?  It  is  perhaps  the  most  acute 
and  difficult  problem  that  the  much  harassed  Bethmann 
Holwegg  has  yet  had  to  face. 

The  True  Use  of  Sea  Force 

If  the  events  of  the  last  fortnight  have  shown  the 
futility  of  the  German  sea  action,  they  have  included  at 
least  one  example  of  British  sea  action  of  which  there  is  a 
pardonable  curiosity  to  know  more.  I  allude,  of  course, 
to  the  engagement  of  the  German  raiding  ships  by  our 
light  cruisers  and  destroyers.  We  know  no  more  of 
what,  in  fact,  happened  than  that  two  of  our  ships  were 
hit  without  being  sunk.  It  is  not  profitable  to  make 
guesses  as  to  the  character  of  the  engagement.  I  con- 
fine myself  to  the  point  that  there  was  an  engagement. 

The  portentous  thing  is  that  there  was  an  engagement 
between  some  of  the  most  powerful  battle  cruisers  afloat, 
armed  certainly  with  12  and  11  inch  guns — with,  possibly, 
one  unit  carrying  still  heavier  ordnance — and  light 
fragile  craft  carrying  nothing  heavier  than  the  latest 
type  of  6  inch.  It  is  significant  as  showing  the  different 
<>iat  actuates  t4ie  two  navies.     One  makes  sure  by 


the  employment  of  his  Zeppelins  that  the  coast  is  clear, 
and  sends  its  strongest  ships  on  a  mission  of  fugitive 
murder.  The  otheT,  without  a  moment's  hesitation, 
tackles  these  guilty  monsters,  though  defenceless  against 
their  weapons  and  powerless  to  hurt  them.  What  a 
humiliation  that  such  noble  vesssls,  such  noble  guns, 
built  one  cannot  help  hoping  in  the  expectation  of  being 
put  to  a  noble  and  chivalrous  use,  should  be  degraded  to 
the  purpose  of  mere  ravaging  and  slaughter.  Was  it 
shame  that  compelled  them  to  run  from  the  scene  of  their 
crimes,  pursued  by  craft  of  relatively  contemptible  power  ? 

Never  surely  did  material  force  stand  out  in  such  cruel 
contrast  with  moral  greatness.  Who  can  help  asking  the 
question,  since  a  handful  of  mosquito  craft  can  attack 
and  pursue  a  battle  cruiser  squadron,  why  cannot  the 
whole  German  navy,  using  all  its  resources,  attack 
and  bring  to  action  the  British  navy  ?  What  lies 
behind  the  splendid  courage  of  the  one  force,  the 
strange  supineness  and  irresolution  of  the  other  ?  We 
shall  not  be  far  wrong,  I  think,  if  we  see  in  this,  first  and 
foremost,  some  signs  of  demoralisation  must  follow  when 
a  great  navy  is  never  throughout  a  great  war  employed 
on  anything  more  glorious  than  the  slaughter  of  those 
who  are  powerless  to  resist.  The  bloodguiltiness  that 
stains  the  German  naval  flag  must  make  it  a  hideous 
emblem  to  those  that  serve  under  it.  But  there  is  a 
something  else  behind  Germany's  sea  impotence.  Get- 
may  has  no  naval  traditions  and  is  not  the  heir  to  any 
doctrines  of  sea  fighting.  Her  ship  building  policy,  such 
of  her  naval  literature  as  I  have  read,  the  writings  of  her 
general  strategists  like  Bernhardi  and  the  like,  indicate 
that  the  German  navy  has  always  been  regarded  as  a  part 
of  the  German  army,  and  it  is  inspired  by  similar  doctrines 
as  to  the  employment  of  force. 

It  seems  broadly  to  be  ti"ue  that  all  German  military 
policy  is  governed  by  one  fundamental  doctrine.  This 
may  be  called  the  doctrine  of  the  mass  attack.  It  relies 
upon  artillery  of  overwhelming  size,  and  in  overwhelming 
numbers  :  on  machine  guns  in  vast  quantities,  on  the 
employment  of  men  at  the  critical  point  in  solid  forma- 
tions and  in  overpowering  numbers.  The  thing  was 
seen  to  perfection  in  the  famous  phalanx  that  forced 
the  Russians  back  from  Galicia.  But,  if  it  is  not  rash 'for 
one  who  is  no  military  student  to  hazard  a  judgment  in  a 
purely  military  affair,  it  would  seem  as  if  all  the  German 
campaigns,  from  the  advance  on  Paris  to  the  attack  on 
Verdun,  simply  exhibit  variations  of  the  same  method. 
Germany's  naval  position  gives  her  no  opportunity  fbr 
acting  on  this  doctrine  at  sea.  In  the  numbers  of  her 
ships,  in  the  numbers  and  calibres  of  her  guns,  she  is 
inferior  to  the  force  opposed  to  her.  The  essentials  then 
of  the  employment  of  mass  are  lacking. 

What  is  interesting  is,  that  she  seems  entirely  without 
capacity  to  use  those  elements  in  which  she  is  superior 
to  redress  the  balance.  She  has  a  monopoly  of  the  means 
of  aerial  scouting,  she  has  pushed  the  use  of  mines  to  a 
point  undreamed  of  by  any  other  navy,  she  must  have 
incredible  resources  in  submarines.  Surely,  if  her 
sailors  were  resourceful,  resolute,  inspired  by  any 
genius  for  naval  war,  some  combination  of  all  these 
elements  of  scouting,  attack  and  defence  could  be 
worked  out  that  would  give  the  German  fleet  some 
more  noble  aim  than  the  crimes  which  have  brought  the 
condemnation  of  the  neutral  world  upon  her.  But 
then  it  is  perhaps  the  nemesis  of  these  crimes  that  makes 
the  German  navy  so  sterile  of  war  thought.  For  sea  war 
demands  something  more  than  brute  courage  if  it  is  to 
become  an  irt.  It  needs  chivalry,  and  clean  thought, 
and  a  fine  insight  into  the  higher  spiritual  side  in  man. 
And  for  such  qualities  of  the  mind  and  heart  piracy  is 
a  poor  school.  Arthur  Pollen. 


The  concert  in  aid  of  St.  Dunstan's  Hostel  for  Blinded 
Soldiers  and  Sailors  last  Saturday,  at  the  Queen's  HaU,  proved 
a  great  success.  The  Executive  Committee  was  almost 
entirely  composed  of  members  of  the  printing  profession  : 
well-known  artists,  whose  names  alone  guaranteed  a  success, 
offered  their  services  :  the  Lord  Mayor  gave  permission  for 
the  Band  of  the  City  of  London  National  Guard  to  play 
selections  ;  the  paper  for,  and  the  printing  of  the  programmes  : 
the  clever  sketch  on  the  cover  :  the  posters  :  the  chocolates 
sold  in  the  hall :  all,  from  first  to  last,  were  provided  free  by 
generous  and  kind  sympathisers  in  the  splend'd  work  which  is 
being  carried  on  by  Mr.  Arthur  Pearson. 


10 


LAND     cS:     WATER 

The  City  of  Fear 

Bv  Gilbert  Frankau 


May  4,  i(ji6 


THIS  was  a  city  once  :    women  lived  here  ;  , 
Their  voices  were  low  to  their  lovers,  o'nights  by 
the  muanuring  waters  ; 
Their  hands  were  busied  with  home — mothers 
and  daughters,  ._.-- 

Sisters  and  wives  : 
Now  the  shell  dives 
To  scatter  anew  the  shattered  remains  of  the  homes 

that  their  hands  made  dear. 
Fear 

Walks  naked  at  noonday's  clear 
Where  the  shopman  proffcared  his  wares  to  the  loitering 

street, 
\\'here  the  Mass  was  read. 
Above. 

The  war-blades  beat 
And  wliistle  :    and  love 

And  laughter  and  work  and  the  hum  ul  the  city  arc 
utterly  dead. 

Never  a  barge 

Ruffles  the  long  canals  :  the  lock-gates  rot, 

Letting  thin  runnels  spout  : 

Never  the  plash  of  a  rope  in  the  reeds  nor  the  pash  of  a 

hoof  on  the  marge, 
Crack  of  whip,  nor  the  shout 
Of  driver  gladdens  the  quiet  :    the  foul  weeds  knot 
And  strangle  the  sluggish  flow  of  the  waterway ; 
Slime  of  decay 
Clots  on  the  banks  where  the  shell-holes  cut  deep  and 

the  shored  edges  crumble, 
Clots  on  the  piers  of  the  bridges  that  echo  to  transport 

wheels'  rumble 
At  fall  of  the  night 
When  no  Ught 
Is  a-gleara — 
Till  the  sudden  flame  from  a  gun-mu^zlc  crimsons  the 

ebon  glass  of  the  stream. 

Here,  where  the  rails 

Ran  straight   and  gUttcring,   linking   city   to   teeming 

prosperous  plain. 
Mist  and  the  rain 
And  long  disuse  have  rusted  the  glint  of  the  steel  that 

the  wheels  made  shining  ; 
Flame  and  steel  have  twisted  the  steel  from  the  lines  of 

its  fair  designing ; 
Gold  with  grain. 
Shone  the  fields  once,  when  the  harvest    of    peacetime 

was  ripe  to  the  sun  for  the  flails ; 
Green  and  red 
Gleamed  the  hghts  once  when  the  track  was  a-quiver,  a-roar 

with  the  freight  and  the  mail~-- 
But  the  life  of  tlic  farm  and  the  life  of  the  field  and  llie 

traflic  of  peacetime  arc  utterly  dead. 
The  grey  roads  run 
Bare  to  the  sun  ; 
Not  a  cart 

Jingles  in  through  the  gates  that  our  torn  graves  guard 
To  the  mart ; 
Never  a  peasant  girl  passes  and  smiles  with  raised  eyes 

for  a  greeting. 
Never  men  clink  at  the  cottage  the  cup  of  the  wayfarers' 

meeting ; 
(Strown 

Into  heaps  by  the  roadside  the  cottages,  blown 
And  driven  by  shcll-firc,  and  scarred !) 


Only  at  night  when  the  dank  mists  arise  and  the  gaze  of 

our  watchers  is  hidden. 
Comes  tramp  and  muttered  cursing  of  infantry,  rush  of 

horse  ridden 
In  fear  of  the  dark — 
For  wlio  knows  how  the  far  shell  shall  swerve  or  the  blind 

bullet  hiss  to  its  mark  I 

Roadway,  water  or  rail,  the  hfe  has  died  in  the  veins, 

As  life  is  dead  at  the  breast  ; 

Only  remains 

The  hollow  corpse  of  a  city,  slashed  and  gutted  of  war, 

A  grinning  skeleton-city,  mocking  the  eye  from  afar 

With  a  hangman's  jest — 

With    tower   and   chimney   and   gable   \shero   scarcely 

swallows  might  rest. 
Look  well, 

Ye  that  shall  die  as  we  died  ! 
Is  there  roof  of  these  roofs  to  guard  your  heads  from  the 

wind  or  the  rain  or  the  sun  ? 
Is  there  wall  unholed  of  the  gun, 
Or  street  unpitted  of  shell  ? 
Is  there  place  where  Man  might  abide     .... 
Has  the  house  he  built  for  his  scornful  gods  been  proof 

'gainst  the  shafts  of  Hell  ? 

Ruin  is  over  it  all,  hideous,  complete  : 

Street  upon  street ; 

House  upon  house  that  was  gay  with  tlic  patter  of  lest 

children's  feet. 
Whose  windows  were  mirrors  of  lamp  light  to  beckon  its 

worker  returning 
To  welcome  of  arms  and  of  eyes,  to  the  warmth  of  the 

home-fire's  bright  burning ; 
Palace  and  cot — 
Their  charred  beams  rot 
And  their  rent  walls  gape  as  they  totter,  betraying  the 

havoc  within — 
Iron  and  tin, 
Brickwork  and  stone, 
Glasswork  and  tilework  and  woodwork  to  refuse-heaps 

battered  and  spilt  and  o'erthrown. 

Through  the  storied  square — 

Where  aforetime  the  belfry  spired 

In  a  moonbeam- fretted  splendour  of  stone  that  was  pride 
of  a  guild  long  dead. 

Where  the  glory  of  glass 

Was  fired 

By  the  orange  flames  of  a  thousand  candles  .ablaze  on 
altar  and  shrine, 

Till  the  quiet  beauty  of  perfect  things  was  warm  to  the 
soul  as  wine — 

Men  pass 

Hurriedly,  fearfully,  quickening  the  footstep,  barely 
averting  the  head 

To  vision  in  dread 

A  gleaming,  terrible  desert,  pitfallcd  with  shadow- wells 

Blasted  and  bored  by  the  shells, 

Jagged  with  rocks  : — 

For  the  steel  has  stripped 

And  ravished  the  splendours  of  graven  stone,  the  ruby 
glory  of  glass. 

Till  apse  and  gargoyle,  buttress  and  nave, 

Rcredos,  pillar,  and  crypt, 

Lie  tumbled  and  crumbled  to  monstrous  ruins  of  splinter- 
ing granite-blocks     .... 


May  4,  1916 


LAND      &      W  A  T  E  K 


11 


Over  the  grave 

Of  the  work  that  was  spared  fur  the  sake  of  the  work 
by  the  Vandals  of  elder  wars, 

Only  one  tattered  pinnacle  leers  to  the  calm  of  the  out- 
raged stars. 


This  is  the  City  of  Fear  ! 

Death 

Has  ringed  her  walls  with  his  sickle,  has  choked  her 
streets  with  his  breath  ; 

In  her  cellars  the  rat  feeds  red 

On  the  bodies  of  those  whom  their  own  roofbeams  be- 
trayed to  him  as  they  fled — ■ 

For  none  live  here 

Save  you  that  shall  die,  as  we  died,  for  the  city,  and  we, 
your  dead 

Whom  God  for  the  sake  of  our  one  brave  dream  has 
garnered  into  His  hand     .... 

Will  He  give  them  to  understand, 

Tlie  proud  and  the  thankless  cities  we  left  in  a  sheltered 
land  ? 


Our  spirits  fret 

Through   the  troubled  night, 

To  each  sputter  of  rifle  fire. 

To  each  chnk  of  your  transport  w  heels  ; 

Fret 

To  the  roar  and  flash  of  your  sleepless  guns,  to  the  tread 

of  your  feet  in  the  mire. 
To  each  soaring  light 
That  reveals, 
In  a  silver  silhouette, 
House  and  tree  and  the  hump  of  a  crest  and  the  broken 

tooth  of  a  spire  ; 
Fret, 

By  day  when  the  liigh  planes  drone 
And  the  great  shells  throb  through  the  void 
And  the  trench  blur  in  the  gray  ; 
Fret,  and  pray 
That  the  hour  be  near 
When  the  bonds  of  the  foeman  that   hold   us  be  utterly 

broke  and  destroyed, 
And  ours  alone,' 
The  City  of  Fear. 


Should  we  care  at  all  ? 

Sliould  we  not  turn  and  take  rest  from  our  labours  ? 

Here,  wliere  you  buried  us,  sleep  ? 

Forget   the  dream   that  was   cheap   at   Ufe,   forget   the 

wounds  and  the  pain  ? 
Never  again 
Remember  the  call 
That  came  to  our  souls  in  the  sheltered  cities,  drawing  us 

over  the  deep  ?  • 
kemember  in  XAin  ! 


Gladly  we  came — 

From  peaceful  homeland  village ;  from  the  raw  dun 
dusty  town, 

\Vhere  sun  of  the  North  drops  down 

In  purple  behind  the  prairie  ;  from  the  pulsing  plate- 
glass  streets. 

That  are  bright  with  the  girls  of  our  younger  nations  at 
southern  rim  of  the  sea  ; 

From  lazy  tropic  townships,  where  hght  of  day  is  a  flame, 

And  the  night  wave  beats 

In  fire  on  the  scented  foreshores,  and  the  cicad  rings  in 
the    tree  ; 

From  the  gay  gray  mother  of  all  jjur  cities,  at  ease  on 
her  banks  ofiThames — 

Came  and  died, 

Here 

In  the  City  of  Fear. 


Gladly  we  died. 

But  in  death  is  no  peace  for  us, 

Rest  nor  release  for  us. 


Had  you  buried  ns  deep— 

You  whom  we  left  to  fulfill  us  the  task  that  was  stricken 

out  of  our  power — 
Had  you  rolled  the  battle-tide  back  from  our  city,  till 

only  the  growl  of  your  guns 
Fell  faint  on  our  ears  as  the  baying  of  hounds  that  were 

hunting  over  the  hill, 
Perchance  we  might  sleep  : 
But  day  upon  day  that  grows  weary,  and  hour  upon  slow 

footed  hour, 
The  long  year  runs, 
And  ever  the  foeman  beats  at  the  gates  and  batters  at 

rampart  and  tower 
:\.nd  our  souls  are  untpiiet,  for  the  voice  of  our  dreaming 

will  neither  rest  nor  be  still. 


How  can  we  rest, 

Knowing  it  all  unaccomplished,  the  vow  that  was  dear 

to  us  dying  ; 
How  can  we  sleep  or  be  still 
In  our  tombs  that  are  spattered  and  ploughed  by  the 

shell-bursts  and  shaken  by  salvoes  replying, 
Till  dead  bones  thrill  ; 
Till  our  souls  break  forth  from  the  grave — 
Unshriven,  unblest— 
To  flutter  and  shrill 
Down  the  winds  that  murmur  and  moan  in  the  ruins 

our  bodies  were  tortured    to  save. 

Ye  that  remain. 

Have  ye  no  pity 

For'us  that  are  sped  ?     • 

Was  it  then  vain. 

Vain  that  we  bartered  our  youth  for  the  walls  of  the 

desolate  city. 
Bartered  the  red 
Life's  blood,  and  the  hopes  that  were  dearer  than  blood 

and  the  uttermost  faith  that  was  given  us 
Death  hath  not  shriven  us     ...     . 
Shrive  ye  your  dead  ! 

YPRES,  1916. 


Sortcs  Sbakespeariana^ 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE 


The;   Kaiser's  Empty   Brag — Dublin    and 
Lowestoft  at  Easter  : 

Whiles  I  in  Ireland riowis/i  a  mighty  band, 
1  will  stir  up  in  England  some  black  storm 
Shall  bloTO  ten  thousand  souls  to  heaven  or 
hell. 

2  Hcnr/  VI„  UI.,  i..  348-50. 

The  Weakness  of  Mr.  Birrell: 

Fools  do  those  villains  pity  who  are  punish' d 
Ere  they  have  done  their  mischief. 

King  Lear  IV.,  ii.,  54-5. 


The  Sinn  Feiners: 

But  for  you,  rebels,  look  to  taste  the  due 
Meet  for  rebellion  and  such  acts  as  yours. 
Most  shallow  ly  did  you  these  arms  commence. 

2  Henry    IV.,   IV.,    ii..   1I6R 


13 


LAND      5:      W  A  T  E  R 


May  4,  1916 


Britain's  Kinship  with  France 


By  Arthur  L.  Salmon 


IN  tlic  first  great  historic  invasion  of  Britain,  the 
Ivcriiians  and  Celts  were  defeated  by  the  tinest 
civilisation  that  the  Western  world  had  then  to 
ofier,  that  (jf  the  Latins.  But  when  the  Teutonic 
hordes  came  battering  at  our  gates,  it  was  the  lower 
civilisation  that  triumphed,  at  least  for  a  time.  Not  only 
had  the  Celts  their  own  spiritual  culture  and  something 
more  than  a  veneer  of  Christianity  ;  but  it  had  not  been 
for  nothing  that  the  Roman  occupation  had  endured 
for  four  centuries.  But  Celticism  was  hopelessly  dis- 
united, and  it  never  presented  a  single  front  to  the 
enemy  ;  its  resistance  was  always  tribal,  never  national. 
Even  so,  it  was  only  conquered  piecemeal,  and  not  that 
entirely  ;  Wales,  West  \\'alcs.  and  the  North  almost 
wholly  escaped.  France,  at  tliis  moment  our  dear  friend 
and  ally,  had  also  suffered  from  barbaric  invasion,  but 
had  taken  a  hrmer  hold  of  Latin  civilisation,  so  that  her 
influence  was  able  to  convert  herce  Norsemen  into  the 
comparatively  refined  and  art-loving  Normans  who 
were  later  to  convey  their  culture  to  England. 

A  False  Idea 

It  is  especially  interesting  at  this  time  to  draw  atten- 
tion to  Britain's  links  with  France,  and  to  undo  in  part  the 
mischief  wrought  by  the  Teutonising  historians  of  a  past 
generation,  who  tried  to  represent  modern  England  as 
little  more  than  a  German  colony.  That  idea  is  false 
both  in  spirit  and  in  detail.  We  need  not  under-estimate 
the  robust  force  of  the  Teutonic  elements,  or  their  part 
in  fonning  the  typical  British  character  ;  but  the  fact 
remains  that  our  racial  achievement  is  a  blend  of  at 
least  three  main  constituents,  that  of  the  Celt,  the  Latin, 
and  the  Teuton.  Where  England's  gift  to  the  world  is 
probably  greatest,  in  literature,  the  prevailing  elements 
are  without  doubt  the  Celtic  and  the  Latin  ;  in  successful 
colonising  we  derive  from  Rome,  in  commerce  from 
Germany. 

When  it  comes  to  actual  race,  it  is  probable  that  our 
connection  with  France  is  at  least  as  close  as  with 
Teutonism  ;  at  the  present  moment  it  would  seem  that 
our  nearest  European  affinities  are  to  be  found  with 
France  and  with  Scandinavian  Teutonism  rather  than 
that  now  controlled  by  the  pernicious  hegemony  of 
Prussia.  To  cross  from  Cornwall  to  Brittany,  even  now 
is  scarcely  like  a  change  of  country ;  a  few  centuries 
since  it  would  not  have  meant  a  change  of  language. 
Breton  speech  is  the  sole  living  analogue  of  old  Cornish, 
a  Cymric  tongue  akin  to  Welsh,  differing  from  the 
Gaelic  of  Ireland  and  North  Britain. 

In  romance  we  are  linked  to  the  Continent  by  the 
Arthurian  cycle,  purely  British  in  its  inception  if  not  in 
its  development,  and  to  this  day  a  far  more  potent  force 
in  our  literature  than  the  Teutonic  Beowulf  or  Lay  of 
the  Nibelungs.  When  Geoffrey  of  Monmouth  wrote  his 
history  of  the  Britons  he  went  to  Brittany  for  his  details, 
fabulous  as  these  generally  were  ;  they  were  a  common 
heritage,  but,  less  disturbed  by  constant  strife,  the 
Bretons  had  best  preserved  them.  Crossing  to  Brittany, 
we  find  the  familiar  names  of  Domiwnia,  our  Devon, 
Cnnwuaillcs,  our  Cornwall,  and  Leon,  obviously  connected 
with  the  lost,  perhaps  not  wholly  mythic,  land  of  Lyonesse. 

From  very  early  times  there  had  been  a  close  inter- 
colonising  between  south  Britain  and  Armorica  ;  not 
only  so,  but  we  know  that  tiie  British  founded  a  colony 
around  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine,  while  the  tribes  of 
Belga;  in  Britain  obviously  connect  us  with  the  Belgium 
that  has  won  our  admiring  sympathies.  As  early  as 
the  year  316  there  seems  to  have  been  a  colony  of  Welsh- 
men in  Brittany  ;  but  the  exodus  from  British  shores  of 
which  we  know  most  was  that  which  followed  the  Saxon 
encroaclunents,  when  the  British  were  being  j)ushcd 
further  and  further  westward  by  ruthless  Teutons. 

The  coast-region  of  northern  France  afterwards  known 
as  Brittany  or  Little  Britain  had  been  almost  depopu- 
lated bv  furious  incursions  of  Frisian  and  kindred  tribes, 
and  being  an  isolated  deserted  region,  it  offered  naturally 
a  tempting  haven  for  the  distracted  Cymry  who  migrated 


in  large  numbers  during  the  fifth  and  sixth  centuries. 
In  a  life  of  S.  Winwaloe,  whose  name  we  find  not  only  in 
the  Cornish  Landewednac  and  Gunwalloe,  but  in  the 
Breton  Landevenec,  that  "  the  sons  of  the  Britons 
crossing  the  sea  landed  on  these  shores  at  the  period  when 
the  barbarian  Saxons  conquered  the  isle.  These  children 
of  a  loved  race  established  themselves  in  this  country 
happy  to  find  repose  after  so  many  griefs." 

Strong  traces  of  the  community  of  the  races  occupying 
these  opposite  coasts  of  the  Channel  survive  not  only 
in  speech  and  place-name,  in  legend,  superstition,  and 
folk-drama,  but  in  saint-lore  ;  the  saints  of  Wales, 
Cornwall,  Brittany,  are  very  largely  a  common  familw 
The  librarian  of  the  Louvre  once  drew  attention  to  tlie 
fact  that  all  the  saints  of  ancinf  Breton  parishes  were, 
with  a  single  exception,  British  ;  which  of  course  docs 
not  mean  that  they  were  all  born  within  the  British  isles. 
Only  a  few  names  need  be  mentioned.  S.  Budoc.  an 
abbot  in  the  isle  of  Lauret,  left  his  name  to  the  mother- 
parish  of  Falmouth  ;  S.  Non,  mother  of  the  famous 
Welsh  S.  David,  founded  churches  both  in  Cornwall 
and  Devon,  but  retreated  to  Brittany  before  her  death.  S. 
Ronan.  who  did  great  things  in  Brittany,  is  identified 
with  the  Ruan  or  Rumon  of  Cornwall  and  Devon  ;  visitors 
to  F'owey  will  find  his  name  at  Polruan.  There  was  also 
S.  Samson,  a  most  energetic  and  militant  saint,  whose 
traces  are  very  definite  in  Wales,  Cornwall,  Scilly  and 
the  Channel  Islands  ;  he  landed  at  Dol  and  became  a 
notable  man  not  only  throughout  Armorica  but  even  at 
Paris.  S.  Mawes  or  Modez  appears  to  have  been  an 
Irishman  who  first  settled  in  Cornwall  and  then  crossed 
the  Channel,  leaving  his  name  to  one  of  the  Brehat  islands  ; 
S.  Malo  was  apparently  \\'elsh  by  birth. 

Cymric  and  Gaelic  Saints 

While  paying  all  due  respect  to  the  especially  Cymri^ 
saints  who  came  from  South  Britain,  we  have  to  remember 
that  the  Gaelic  saints  of  Ireland  and  North  Britain  did 
their  full  share  in  bringing  Christianity  to  northern  F'rance, 
and  did  even  more  in  taking  it  farther  still  across  the 
('ontinent.  Lovers  of  literature  as  well  as  of  arclueology 
know  how  close  is  the  connection  between  Brittany  and 
all  the  Cymric  parts  of  Britain  ;  while  the  kinship  with 
Ireland  is  not  quite  so  close,  because  the  Irish  belonged  to 
a  different  branch  of  the  Celtic  family.  Renan,  himself  a 
Breton,  paid  special  attention  to  this  kinship — a  kinship 
so  near  that  it  has  been  asserted  that  Breton  onion- 
sellers  can  make  themselves  understood  by  the  Welsh,  as 
they  certainly  could  in  Cornwall  while  Cornish  remained  a 
living  language. 

It  has  been  so  dinned  into  us  that  we  are  a  Teutonic 
people,  that  something  of  the  reverse  side  is  a  welcome 
relief.  It  is  certain  that  our  spiritual  relationships  have 
been  rather  with  the  Celts  and  the  Latin  peoples.  Ob- 
viously none  of  our  great  writers  reveal  this  Teutonic 
ascendancy,  with  the  doubtful  exception  of  Carlyle,  who 
tortured  a  spirit  very  largely  Celtic  into  Teuton  "violence 
of  expression,  to  his  own  loss. 

It  is  impossible  to  unravel  differing  threads  of  race  in 
the  woof  of  national  character  and  national  utterance  ; 
we  must  be  willing  to  give  Teutonism  its  fair  place,  but 
an  unfair  supremacy  has  been  claimed  for  it,  and  against 
this  we  are  brought  to  rebel,  none  too  soon.  Neither 
intellectually  nor  ph\sically  are  the  British  people,  even 
those  most  narrowly  styled  English,  an  insular  colony  of 
Germans.  This  may  be  said  with  all  true  recognition  of 
whatever  has  been  good  in  Germanism,  which  it  would 
be  mere  pettiness  to  disavow. 


Felicity,  having  no  home  ties,  went  out  to  South  .\frica 
and  adopted  journHJisni  as  a  profession,  hence  The  Phases 
of  J-clkilv,  by  Olga  Kacster  and  Jessica  Grove  ((icorgc 
.Mien  aud  Unwin,  Os.),  a  certain  man,  Hromley  to  wit, 
supplies  the  element  of  romance  for  a  rather  diluted  l<ive 
story,  aud  misunderstandings  spin  out  the  romance  to  the  last 
chapter.  The  authors  .know  their  Cape  Town  and  have  also 
definite  acquaintance  with  the  veldt  ;  hence  a  readable  and 
by  no  means  uniittractive  little  storv,  rather  more  concerned 
with  Africa  than  with  Felicity. 


May  4,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


13 


Air  Problems  and  Fallacies 

Air  Ministry  or  Board  of  Aeronautics 
By  F.  W.  Lanchester 


IN  the  preceding  article  it  has  been  pointed  out  that 
the  case  for  an  Air  Minister  or  Air  Ministry,  such 
as  it  is,  depends  mainly  upon  considerations  relating 
to  operations  of  indirect  military  value,  these  opera- 
tions being  broadly  divided  into  home  defence  and  attacks 
and  raids  on  tlie  enemy.  The  difficulties  surrounding 
the  former  of  these  so  far  have  bsen  dealt  with,  and  it  has 
been  shown  to  be  nearly  impossible  to  dissociate  air 
(home)  defence  either  as  to  organisation  or  command 
from  the  existing  services. 

Passing  now  to  the  question  of  attack.  Up  to  the 
present  very  few  raids  have  been  made  by  our  own  air- 
craft or  that  of  the  Allies  which  can  be  considered  as 
lying  outside  the  range  of  legitimate  military  or  naval 
operations.  The  distinction  between  a  raid  or  attack 
from  the  air  of  direct  and  of  indirect  military  value  is  not 
a  matter  of  place  or  distance,  but  rather  of  purpose. 
Certain  writers  and  speakers  have  failed  to  recognise 
the  vital  distinction  which  exists  between  raids  having 
an  immediate  military  object  and  forming  part  of  a  pre- 
concerted scheme,  and  those  of  an  independent  character, 
and  of  indirect  value  only. 

Considered  broadly  it  is  comparatively  rare  that  an 
operation  of  indirect  mihtary  value  is  able  to  serve  a  useful 
purpose  ;  every  such  operation  in  warfare  requires  to  be 
considered  on  its  individual  merits.  Any  act  which  would 
not  in  the  ordinary  way  be  undertaken  by  the  Admiral 
or  Commander-in-Chief  as  part  of  his  strategic  scheme 
is  suspect  at  the  outset,  it  is  prima  facie,  contrary  to  an 
admitted  principle  of  strategy — the  concentration  of  the 
whole  available  resources  on  a  single  object  or  purpose, 
i.e.,  that  object  by  which  the  war  is  to  be  brought  most 
rapidly  to  a  successful  conclusion.  As  in  all  human 
affairs  there  are  exceptions,  and  the  most  common 
operation  constituting  an  exception  known  to  warfare, 
is  blockade. 

The  Case  of  Blockade 

Excepting  where  a  blockade  forms  a  definite  siege 
operation,*  it  is  essentially  of  indirect  military  value  ; 
the  present  blockade  of  Germany,  for  example,  has 
for  its  object  by  the  general  weakening  of  the  Central 
Powers  to  render  their  offensive  less  dangerous  and  their 
power  of  resistance  less  formidable.  But  even  when 
there  is  so  clear  a  case  for  action,  and  so  well  established 
and  time-honoured  a  method  of  exercising  general  pressure 
on  an  enemy,  the  conduct  of  the  operation  reveals  the 
fact  that  the  method  itself  has  inherent  weakness. 

Thus  is  it  not  a  fact  that  every  loaf  of  bread  or  pound 
of  meat  consumed  which  is  unnecessary  for  the  welfare 
of  our  population  is  just  that  much  loss  to  the  country,  as 
assuredly  as  if  it  had  been  destroyed  by  the  enemy  ? 
Are  not  our  statesmen  continually  preaching  economy', 
and  the  avoidance  of  luxury.  Our  Government  cries 
out  for  economy,  begs  for  economy  ;  what  is  the  re- 
sponse ? 

Reports  show  an  increase  of  consumption  of  bread  and 
an  increase  of  consumption  of  meat  per  head  of  population. 
Our  cheap  jewellery  trade  is  experiencing  a  boom,  our 
pianoforte  trade  cannot  procure  supplies  fast  enough, 
picture  palaces  arc  reaping  a  golden  harvest  ! 

The  German  Government  also  know  well  the  import- 
ance of  economy.  The  German  Government  ask  their 
people  to  economise.  The  British  blockade  enforces 
the  order  ! 

When  we  pass  from  a  particular  case  to  consider 
indirect  operations  broadly,  we  bump  at  once  into  the 
real  fundamental  weakness  of  such  operations.  I  do  not 
go  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  there  are  no  circumstances 
under  which  air  operatiqns  of  indirect  value  may  not  be 

•  In  a  siege  in  which  the  high  command  has  decided  to  reduce  a 
fortress  or  position  by  hunger  tlie  e.xclusion  of  supplies  becomes  the 
operation  of  direct  value.  This  is  reflected  in  the  fact  that  the  killing 
off  of  part  of  the  Garrison  by  Artillery  fire  or  other  means(which  now 
befwmes  an  operation  of  indirect  value)  might  actuiUy  enable  the 
defending  force  to  prolong  its  hold. 


justified,  I  merely  point  out  that  in  the  present  state^of 
aircraft  development  opportunities  must  be  rare  and'  of 
unusual  occurrence.  What  conceivable  value  is  it  to  an 
enemy  that  he  bombs  a  few  of  our  farm-yards  and  Tishing 
villages,  if  we  ihially  defeat  him  in  the  main  lield  of 
battle  ?  And  if  we  fail  to  defeat  him  in  the  major 
operations,  what  gain  is  it  to  us  if  we  have  driven  off  or 
destroyed  a  few  airships  or  squadrons  of  his  aeroplanes, 
or  if  we  in  turn  have  bombed  a  few  of  his  cities  or 
factories  ?. 

Air   Supremacy 

I  am  not  writing  against  the  ultimate  necessity  for 
Britain  being  supreme  in  the  air  in  every  field  of  operation, 
I  fully  uphold  it  ;  if  after  this  war  we  neglect  to  place 
ourselves  (and  to  maintain  ourselves)  in  an  unassailable 
position  we  shall  deserve,  man  and  woman,  the  downfall 
which  will  inevitably  be  ours  in  time  to  come.  But  the 
country  is  now  at  war  with  the  greatest  military  power 
that  history  has  known,  and  the  present  problem  is  to 
smash  the  enemy,  and  e\&vy  operation  of  indirect  military 
value  must  be  weighed  on  its  merits  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  the  sum  and  total  of  our  resources  are  limited  and 
our  Navy  on  the  high  seas  and  our  Army  in  the  field 
must  take  precedence  of  everj'thing.  Thus  during  the 
present  war,  the  prospect  of  widespread  air  attack  on 
the  enemy's  country  must  be  regarded  as  remote.  It 
will  take  all  we  can  do  to  produce  the  air  auxiliaries 
necessary  for  our  existing  services.  If  there  should  be 
enough  independent  air  aggression  during  the  present 
war  to  give  us  the  measure  of  its  future  utility  it  is  as 
much  as  we  can  expect. 

But  going  beyond  the  present  war,  a  considerable 
period  must  elapse  before  it  will  be  possible  to  build  up  an 
independent  air  service,  and  when  this  is  done  it  will  need 
to  be  done  stone  by  stone,  brick  by  brick,  if  the  structure 
is  to  stand.  One  has  only  to  reflect  on  the  enormous 
accumulation  of  experience  and  data  which  has  been 
necessary  to  render  possible  the  organisation  of  a  modern 
European  army  or  fleet,  lo  realise  that 'the  task  of  forming 
an  independent  air  service,  if  eventually  it  should  come  to 
achievement,  will  be  an  affair  of  decades  rather  than 
years,  and  can  only  be  considered  as  proven  when  it  has 
emerged  successfully  from  a  first  class  European  war. 
'  It  is  clear  from  the  "foregoing  that  if  an  Air  Ministry 
were  to  be  founded  to-day  to  operate  with  due  regard  to 
existing  needs  and  obligations  it  would  have  to  "  mark 
time  "  so  far  as  its  main  purpose  is  concerned  for  a  long 
while  to  come,  and  indeed  might  eventually  prove  little 
more  than  a  monument  to  shattered  expectations.  Such 
a  Ministry  could  only  begin  its  real  work  when  the  war  • 
is  over.  Its  main  duties  during  the  continuance  of 
hostilities  could  be  carried  out  by  a  Board  having  com- 
paratively limited  executive  power.  That  is  there 
room  for  such  a  Board  few  to-day  question  ;  the  con- 
troversial side  hinges  mainly  on  such  points  as  to  what 
extent  executive  powers  can  be  assigned  to'  it,  and  in 
what  directions  it  can  best  prosecute  its  activities  to  be 
of  real  assistance  to  the  air  branches  of  both  the  Army 
and  the  Navj'  as  at  present  constituted.  A  Board 
of  Aeronautics  would  incidentally  serve  as  a  medium  for 
the  collection  and  co-ordination  of  experience — the 
natural  prelude  to  the  creation  of  a  full  blown  Air 
Ministry  if  at  some  later  date  this  should  be  found 
necessary  or  desirable. 

Two  objections  have  been  raised  to  a  Board  as  against  a 
Ministry.  The  first  of  these  is  that  we  don't  want 
any  more  Boards  and  Committees,  we  want  a  man. 
This  expresses  an  excellent  sentiment,  but  unfortunately, 
that  which  in  this  sense  is  known  as  a  man  is  a  com-» 
bination  of  exceptional  ability  and  "  grit  "  with  experience, 
and  our  whole  system  of  Government  of  late  has  not  lent 
itself  to  the  training  of  the  man  so  much  as  the  team. 
In  a  sense  we  have  already  the  man  or  men — in  the 
Services — in   my  opinion,  exceptionally  able  oflicers  who 


14 


LAND     ec     WW  T  E  R 


May  4,  T016 


could  scarcely  have  been  Ijetter  chosen  ;  all  that  is  needed 
is  the  support  and  help  of  equal  ability  in  those  directions 
in  which  admitted  weakness  lies.  The  second  objection  is 
that  withoiit  an  Air  Minister  there  would  be  nojannual  "  air 
vote,"  and  unless  there  is  a  Cabinet  Minister  directly 
responsible  for  screwing  the  necessary  funds  out  of  the 
Treasury,  the  job  will  be  scamped,  There  are  two 
answers  to  this,  firstly  the  Army  and  the  Navy  might 
draw  their  air  department  requirements  on  a  separate 
vote  so  that  the  public  may  see  what  the  expenditure 
is,  for  what  that  check  may  be  worth  !  Secondly,  as 
suRpestcd  in  my  "  Aircraft  in  \\arfare,"  if  the  require- 
ments of  the  Ser\ices  were  supported  by  the  Boird,  vvhose 
civilian  members  were  pledged  to  resign  if  what  the  Board 
considered  an  adequate  pro\ision  were  denied,  wc  should 
probably  have  a  far  more  powerful  check  on  the  adequacy 
of  our  Air  Service  than  could  be  secured  either  by  the 
jnere  publication  of  ligures  or  by  the  complacence  of  a 
specially  appointed  Minister. 

I-et  it  not  be  understood  that  I  am  individually  hostile 
to  an  Air  Ministry  or  to  an  independent  Air  Service  ;  I 
realise  fully  that  a  time  may  come  when  the  solution  of 
the  problem  of  the  adequate  control  of  our  air  forces  may 
involve  some  such  step.  I  have  myself  drafted  in  great 
detail  a  Echeme  of  control  based  on  an  independent 
Air  Service  and  an  Air  Ministry  with  full  provisions  for 
the  complete  independence  of  the  air  departments  of  the 
existing  Services.*  I^roadly  stated,  I  believe  this  scheme 
to  be  feasible  and  workable  ;  1  have,  however,  failed  to 
satisfy  myself  that  there  is  an  immediate  call  for  anything 
so  comprehensive,  or  that  it  is  possible  to  inaugurate  any 
such  scheme  successfully  during  the  progress  of  hos- 
tilities ;   or  at  least  under  existing  conditions. 

Eyes  on  the  Boat 

When  the  nation  is  occupied  in  the  conduct  of  a  great 
war  the  coxswain's  old  adage  "  Eyes  on  the  Boat  "  is 
singularly  to  the  point.  All  the  talk  we  hear  of  destroying 
Germany  by  bombing  expeditions,  by  a  widespread 
attack  from  the  air,  etc.  ;  all  the  plausible  rubbish 
which  is  spoken — to  the  effect  that  owing  to  the  deadlock 
on  land  and  the  deadlock  of  another  kind  at  sea,  the  war 
will  fave  to  be  settled  from  the  air  ;  that  the  day  of 
the  infantry  on  land  and  the  surface  vessel  at  sea  is  over, 
and  that  the  future  lies  \vith  the  aeroplane  and  the  sub- 
marine ;  all  this  may  be  counted  picturesque,  but  as 
doctrine  it  is  certainly  not  as  picturesque  as  it  is  dangerous. 
Perhaps  I  shall  be  counted  wanting  in  imagination  for 
ridiculing  such  talk  ;  to  me  one  must  veritably  lack 
imagination  to  be  blind  to  its  fallacy.  We  have  heard  the 
same  kind  of  stories  before  ;  we  have  been  told  that  the 
bayonet  cannot  be  of  any  possible  value  in  the  face  of 
the  improvement  in  small  arms.  Nevertheless,  the 
bayonet  is  the  arbiter  of  battles  to-daj'.  We  have  been 
told  before  that  the  submarine  has  rendered  all  other 
vessels  obsolete,  but  submarine  cannot  hunt  submarine, 
and  the  position  of  the  submarine  is  that  of  a  perpetual 
fugitive  from  the  high-speed  surface  craft  of  an  enemy, 
also  the  first  preparatory  step  to  countering  the 
enemy  submarine  is  the  withdrawal  of  one's  own  from 
the  field  of  operations.  When  everything  is  taken  into 
account  these  new  innovations,  whether  they  be  torpedoes, 
submarines,  aeroplanes  or  air  !5hips,  or  small  arms  or 
artillery  of  greater  range  or  speed  of  fire,  result  in  modifica- 
tions only  of  what  has  gone  before,  a  change  perhaps  in 
relative  values,  corresponding  modifications  in  design, 
the  substitution  of  one  type  of  surface  \essel  for  another, 
the  supplementing  of  ordinary  field  artillery  with  guns 
which  command  a  range  of  fire  from  the  zenith  to  the 
horizon,  the  supplementing  of  the  bayonet  with  the  hand 
grenade,  the  substitution  for  the  steel  armour  of  the 
middle  ages,  and  for  the  earth  works  of  yesterdav,  of 
the  deep  trenches  and  protection  of  mother  earth  to-day  : 
in  brief  an  enrichment  of  means  and  a  wider  range  of 
technique,  but  man  remains  an  earth  dweller,  his  home 
and  possessions  are  on  and  in  the  soil,  and  the  underlying 
principles  of  strategy  and  tactical  method  are  eternal. 

•  This  exaggeration  or  exaltation  of  the  importance  of 
operations  of  indirect  military  value  to  the  extent  of 
suggesting  that  such  will  eventually  replace  ordinary 
military  operations  in  the  conduct  of  a  war  can  only  be 
described   as    chimerical.     Such   ideas   are   fit   only   for 

•  Submitted  loriUiscussion  to  the  Committee  of  the  Navy  Leaeiie 


discussion  by  writers  of  fiction  of  the  Jules  Verne  type, 
let  us  say  for  the  destruction  of  "  castles  in  the  air." 
The  real  fact  is  that  the  moment  the  operation  of  aircraft 
is  taken  as  something  apart  from,  and  unconnected  with, 
a  scheme  of  naval  or  militar}'  aggression,  it  is  shorn  of 
more  than  half  its  potential  value.  Even  though  our  air 
forces  were  immeasurably  more  numerous  and  jjowerful 
than  to-day,  and  if  under  the  agis  of  an  Air  Minister  we 
were  to  institute  a  wholesale  campaign  of  bombing  on 
enemy  centres  of  (io\ernment  and  production  without 
any  immediate  relation  to  the  operations  of  our  Army  or 
Navy,  the  result  would  be  incomparably  less  than  were 
similar  forces  to  be  used  in  concerted  oix-rations,  acting  in 
conjunction  with  the  other  arms  of  the  Services. 

Indirect  Operations 

The  value  of  indirect  operations  will  largely  depend 
upon  whether  an  enemy  can  by  such  means  be  reduced 
to  impotence  apart  from  and  independently  of  the  ordinary 
naval  and  military  pressure  which  is  being  applied. 
Clearly  the  effectiveness  of  such  operations  is  a  relati\'e 
question,  one  of  degree;  also,  a  very  important  point, 
it  is  dependent  upon  the  future  relative  power  or  balance 
as  between  air  attack  and  air  defence.  It  may  be  recalled 
that  up  to  the  present  the  air  defences  of  this  coimtry 
ha\e  been  as  successful  as  our  naval  defences,  since,  as 
demonstrated  in  a  previous  article  (March  30th),  the 
German  airship  raids  have  only  been  successful  in  so  far 
that  they  have  outraged  international  convention.  The 
fact  that  no  German  airship  has  violated  British  territory 
during  daylight  or  during  the  period  of  full  moon  is  an 
absolute  reply  to  those  \yho  talk  glibly  of  our  air  muddle 
and  lack  of  preparation.  I  have  before  stated  that  the 
responsibility  for  our  deficiencies  in  this  respect  must 
rest  with  the  humanitarian  as  typified  in  the  frock-coated 
"  Peace  Confercncer,"  and  with  the  World  Illusion  of  the 
last  fifty  years.  In  the  future  it  may  be  laid  down  that 
defensive  organisation  must  meet  hostile  airship  or  aero- 
plane by  night  as  by  day,  and  up  to  a  certain  point  this 
can  undoubtedly  be  done.  The  reason  for  raising  this 
matter  again  here  is  to  point  out  that  in  assuming  the 
case  for  an  Independent  Air  Service  as  based  on  wide- 
spread operations  of  aggression,  we  are  assuming  that 
effective  air  defence  against  such  aggression  is  predestined 
to  failure. 

My  opinion  to-day  is  strongly  that  attack  from  the  air 
is  too  volatile — if  it  may  be  so  expressed— to  be  of  effect 
without  the  immediate  support  of  other  military  and 
naval  measures  of  aggression,  and  that  with  a  ivell  organised 
defence  and  appropriate  precautions  such  independent 
action  is  destined  to  play  a  comparatively  modest  role  in 
the  warfare  of  the  future. 

A  Summary 

In  concluding  the  present  article  I  will  therefore 
summarise  the  position  that  the  "  greater  scheme  "  in 
which  is  contemplated  an  Air.  Minister  and  an  Air  Ministry 
forms  a  better  subject  for  academic  discussion  (a  di.s- 
cussion  which  might  at  any  time  become  of  real  jiractical 
interest)  than  of  immediate  pohtics.  From  the  lattci 
point  of  view  it  fails  on  several  different  counts  : — 

(a)  As  an  organisation  for  defence  it  is  doubtfully  work- 
able in  conjunction  with  the  existing  Services,  and  appears 
to  involve  a  serious  division  of  authority  with  attendant 
"  evaporation  "  of  responsibility. 

(b)  As  an  organisation  for  offence  an  Air  Ministry  is 
open  to  criticism  on  the  ground  that  operations  of  indirect 
military  value  violate  broadly  the  principle  of  strategy 
of  concentration  0/  purpose  ;  it  is  based  on  an  assumed 
future  for  independent  and  direct  air  attack  which  has 
not  been  proved,  and  of  which  we  have  no  clear  assurance 
or  expectation. 

(c)  Its  powers  cannot  be  extended  to  include  operations 
of  direct  military  value  without  clashing  with  the  plenary 
responsibility  of  our  naval  and  military  commands. 

(d)  To  whatever  extent  a  case  may  be  otherwise  sus- 
tained for  an  Independent  Air  Service,  there  remains  the 
condition  that  naval  and  miHtary  demands,  either  for 
material  or  personnel  have  first  claim,  and  thus,  if  the 
case  for  an  Air  Service  be  made  good  on  other  counts, 
no  scheme  can  be  carried  into  execution  during  a  con- 
tinuance of  the  present  condition  of  shortage. 


May  ^,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 

Waste 

By    Charles  W.  Simpson 


15 


A  GLOOMY,  unwashed  man  in  a  dirty  uniform 
sat  on  a  luggage  trolley,  notebook  in  hand.  He 
looked  up  as  the  engine  whistled  and  the  long, 
heavily-freighted  train,  with  its  load  of 
ammunition,  began  to  move  out  of  the  station.  The 
trucks  and  wagons  jerked  noisily  as  the  couplings 
tightened  ;  a  roaring  cloud  of  steam  shot  forth  in  front 
of  the  engine  and  spread,  slowly  fading,  across  the  rails. 

The  gloomy  man  scribbled  something  in  his  note- 
book and  got  up  uneasily  ;  he  was  the  officer  in  command 
of  the  supply  depot.  When  he  raised  his  hand  there 
was  another  whistle  ;  a  fresh  engine  left  the  sidings  and 
was  coupled  to  another  row  of  trucks  on  the  main  line. 
As  each  train  left,  the  officer  stared  after  it  for  a  few 
moments,  until  it  had  partly  disappeared  in  the  dariip, 
heavy  fog  that  lay  thickly  across  the  line  and  necessitated 
the  use  of  the  great  arc-lights  in  the  goods-yard  ;  then 
he  turned  and  looked  towards  the  crowded  sidings. 

Tedious  work,  this  slow  procession  of  trains — each 
one  seeming  to  diminish  by  so  little  the  mass  of  wagons 
awaiting  their  departure  ;  but,  if  it  was  slow,  there  was 
method  in  the  slowness,  and  gradually  the  sidings  became 
less  congested. 

Drivers  and  firemen  w"cnt  about  their  work  apathe- 
tically, in  no  way  disturbed  by  the  confusion  that  un- 
avoidably ensued  in  handling  this  huge  mass  of  rolling 
stock.  Mostly  civilians,  they  were  merely  carrying  out 
their  habitual  duties,  and  were  insusceptible  to  the 
strain  and  stress  of  war. 

There  was  little  rest  for  anyone  at  the  supply  depot, 
from  the  officer  in  command  to  the  platelayers  and  fatigue 
gangs.  All  the  stores  of  food,  forage,  and  ammunition 
were  to  be  rushed  out  of  the  junction,  and  conveyed 
to  a  point — not  expressly  mentioned — somewhere  up  the 
main  line.  Besides  the  rows  of  already  laden  trucks, 
huge  piles  of  flour  sacks  were  stored  imder  shelters  roofed 
with  iron  sheeting  in  the  goods-yard  ;  stacks  of  hay  and 
straw,  covered  with  tarpauling,  bulked  up  in  the  mist  ; 
and  beyond  them  were  ramparts  of  crates  and  cases  of 
every  description — tons  of  frozen  meat  and  tinned 
stuffs  ;  rations  enough  to  keep  an  army  in  the  field  for 
weeks.  It  was  a  giant's  task  to  move  this  mountain 
of  supplies,  and  the  energy  with  which  it  was  being 
attempted  indicated  a  crisis  calling  for  supreme  effort. 

The  O.C.  left  his  seat  on  the  trolley  for  the  fiftieth 
time,  walked  down  the  platform  and  stopped  at  the  door 
of  the  station  master's  office.  In  response  to  his  call  a 
slim  youth  with  a  small  black  moustache  that  grew  very 
close  under  his  nose  and  avoided  his  upper  lip  altogether, 
came  briskly  to  the  doorway — it  was  clear  that  he  was 
not  a  railway  official.  In  shirt  sleeves,  a  pencil  stuck 
behind  one  ear  and  papers  bulging  from  his  pockets,  he 
was  still  an  unmistakable  jimior  sub.,  of  callously  cheerful 
demeanour  in  spite  of  the  dark  rings  under  his  eyes. 

"  Tick  off  the  ammunition  as  done  with,"  said  the 
senior  officer  ;  "  and  now,"  he  added  sa^•agely,  "  we've 
got  to  clear  out  the  grub." 

"Right,  sir!"  answered  the  sub.  brightly.  "The 
swine  won't  find  much  left  here  if  we  go  on  at  this  rate, 
will  they  ?  "  he  chuckled  with  glee.  "  Poor  hungry  devils 
swotting  their  hides  off  to  get  here  in  time,  and  then — 
er  "  casting  about  for  some  felicitous  phrase — "  an  empty 
cage — bird  flown."     He  chuckled  again. 

"  Let  me  sec  the  lists,"  said  the  other,  immo\ed  bv 
the  spirit  of  pleasantry  :  "  we  must  look  sharp.  What 
comes  next  ?  Ah,  yes  ;  thirty  truck-loads  of  barley, 
and  forty  of  wheat,  besides  the  stock  in  the  yard " 

As  the  two  men  stood  in  the  doorway  of  the  office, 
a  third,  who  v.as  pacing  rapidly  up  the  platform,  ap- 
proached them.  He  pulled  up  sharply,  and  taking  a 
quick  glance  round  the  station  shrugged  his  shoulders 
with  an  air,  half  of  indecision  and  half  of  impatience. 
He  turned  to  the  O.C. 

"  Look  here,  old  chap  ;  can  you  finish  the  job  in 
eight  hours  ?   My  men  want  to  get  to  work  on  the  line." 

The  newcomer  was  very  hot  and  very  dusty ;  his 
tunic  and  shirt  were  open,  showing  his  chest  glistening 
wi^h  sweat-drops.     In  one  hand  he  carried  a  larce  ad- 


justable spanner ;    his  face  and  arms  were  smeared  with 
black  train-oil. 

"  y/dl — j'ou  can  see  what  progress  we've  made," 
replied  the  officer  :  "  those  sidings  were  crowded  this 
morning — and  look  at  'em  now.  "  He  waved  his  hand 
towards  the  goods-yard.  1 

"  H'm  yes  ;  but  it's  time  we  ripped  up  those  rails," 
said  the  other,  eyeing  a  maze  of  shining  metals,  cleared  of 
trucks  and  wagons.  "  My  gangs  have  been  at  work 
fourteen  hours  ;  we've  burnt  thousands  of  sleepers,  with 
rails  stacked  on  top — Gad  !  how  they  blazed,  and  thej''re 
still  red-hot." 

"  The  rearguard  struck  camp  this  morning,  and  are 
now  on  the  march  in  the  wake  of  the  army.  I  was  given 
until  midnight  to  clear  all  the  supplies  ;  you  can  smash 
and  burn  the  whole  place  then,  you  devil  of  destruction 
— make  a  bonfire  as  hot  as  hell,  and  then  save  your 
hides."  The  destroyer  smiled,  rubbing  his  chin  thought- 
fully. 

"Ah,  it'll  be  a  fine  sight,"  said  he;  "a  deuce  of  a 
fine  sight." 

"  Fine  sight  !  "  retorted  the  O.C.—"  You've  got  no 
sentiment  man.  Blasted  wrecker ! — Now  then "  he 
shouted  to  a  driver  as  the  next  train  began  to  roll  out 
of  the  junction  ;  "  full  speed  ahead— give  her  as  much 
steam  as  she'll  take." 

Then  he  left  the  office  in  company  with  the  engineer, 
and  the  two  men  watched  the  scene  from  just  outside  the 
station. 

A  dreary  scene — one  of  those  sights  which,  though 
not  actually  concerned  with  human  misery,  give  an  acute 
impression  of  the  horror  and  desolation  of  war,  and  of 
that  ghastly  element  in  war — waste. 

Looking  down  the  fine,  the  country  was  half  oblitera- 
ted by  the  grey  fog.  Groups  of  men  were  moving  among 
what  at  first  sight  appeared  to  be  great  piles  of  rubbish — 
a  closer  inspection  showing  that  they  were  composed  of 
rails  and  sleepers  stacked  together.  Blots  of  dull  red 
here  and  there  showed  that  the  piles  were  still  smoulder- 
ing, and  at  times  the  charred  wood  broke  away  with  a 
faint,  muffled  sound,  or  the  hot  metals  cracked.  A 
scarcely  heard  rumbling  indicated  that  fires  were  yet 
burning  in  the  centre  of  the  piles.  Further  awav,  colunms 
of  smoke,  flecked  by  shooting  flames,  rose  from  other 
bonfires. 

Picks  rang  on  the  broken  railroad,  where  lines  of  men 
were  working  with  rhythmic  strokes.  For  miles  round 
the  earth  was  trodden  by  the  hooves  of  horses  and  the 
feet  of  marching  men,  crimped  by  the  wheels  of  guns  and 
wagons — hedges  and  gateways  demohshed,  and  grass 
borders  stamped  into  mud. 

On  the  far  ridges,  the  clearing  mist  mixed  with  the 
smoke  of  camp  fires  left  by  the  retiring  rearguard. 

"We've  done  pretty  well,  don't  you  think?  Not 
the  j  oiliest  sort  of  place  to  lead  a  starving  army  over  is 
it?  " 

The  speaker  buttoned  his  tunic  and  put  the  spanner 
in  his  pocket. 

"  The  dreariest  spot  I  ever  wish  to  sec  "  replied  the 
other.  "  Come  ;  I  must  get  back  to  my  job — it's  more 
irksome  than  yours.  I  wish  I  could  set  a  match  to  my 
show  and  burn  it  up  "  he  went  on,  in  a  mood  of  partlv 
assumed  exasperation.  "  Better  fun  than  sending  off  all 
these  damned  trains." 

"  Ho,  ho  !  "  said  the  engineer,  "  how  about  sentiment 
now  ?  Well  ;  I'd  burn  it  if  I  had  my  way — but  yours  is 
no  doubt  the  better  method — only  slow,'  devilish  slow. 
And  I  must  say  I  want  to  light  those  straw  stacks.  Some 
reward  for  my  labour  then  ;  and  oh  lord  ! — won't  they 
half  blaze  !  " 

He  laughed  and  cleared  his  throat. 

"  I'll  let  you  and  your  gang  of  incendiaries  in  by 
midnight — not  any  sooner,  mind.     Till  then,  so  long." 

The  O.C.  walked  back  to  his  trolley  on  the  platform. 

The  Northern  Army  was  changing  its  base.  After 
three  days'  severe  fighting,  productive  of  no  definite  result, 
it  had  retired  on  the  junction  during  the  night,  and  its 
leader  had  resolved  on  a  desperate  course,     Se\cn  miles 


10 


LAND 


& 


WATER 


May  4,  1916 


lip  the  line  was  a  broacl  n\cr  in  fiood  ;  across  it  tlic  re- 
mains of  an  iron  girder  bridge  stood  out  of  the  water, 
twisted  and  bent  by  the  force  of  a  great  explosion.  This 
bridge  had  been  destroyed  early  in  the  war,  and  the  junc- 
tion with  its  supply  depot  captured  by  the  very  army 
whose  safety  was  now  threatened.  To  move  the  supplies 
lip  line  by  rail  was  now  impossible,  and  should  the  enemy 
win  back  what  he  had  lost,  his  starving  army  would  gain 
a  new  lease  of  life,  and  would  be  able  to  very  seriously 
harass  the  rearguard  of  the  Northern  Army,  and  possibly 
to  inflict  severe  losses,  or  even  defeat.  At  all  costs  the 
supplies  had  to  be  removed  or  destroyed,  and  the  enemy 
starved  out. 

The  position  of  the  Northern  Array  was  critical, 
because  it  had  only  succeeded  in  holding  its  opponents 
in  check  and  lighting  a  drawn  battle  ;  another  desperate 
onslaught  from  the  enemy,  and  the  junction  might  oc 
lost.  So  the  leader  decided  on  the  destruction  of  the 
su])plies,  and  a  retirement  across  the  river. 

All  through  the  lirst  night,  troops  had  marched  past 
the  depot  on  their  way  to  the  river,  where  the  pontonniers 
were  laying  bridges  for  their  crossing. 

It  was  now  evening;  no  troops  remained  on  the 
junction  side  of  the  river,  except  the  ca\alry,  screening  the 
army's  movements.  The  second  night  of  the  retreat 
was  drawing  on,  and  the  work  of  destruction  at  the 
jimction  was  nearly  complete. 

Just  an  hour  before  midinght,  the  last  train  steamed 
out  of  the  station,  loaded  to  its  utmost  capacity  with 
provisions  and  stores.  The  man  with  the  spanner  was 
given  the  order  to  let  loose  his  hordes  of  wreckers  ;  already 
clouds  of  smoke  rolled  up  thickly  into  the  night  from  the 
lired  buildings  ;  straw  stacks  burst  into  sudden  flame, 
casting  showers  of  sparks  over  the  surrounding  piles — 
sacks  of  flour  that  had  been  abandoned  and  masses  of 
frozen  meat.  Everything  conbustible  was  soon  in  a 
blaze  ;  crash  followed  crash  as  the  buildings  collapsed, 
sending  forth  immense  bursts  of  fire  and  smoke  ;  a  strong 
wind  fanned  the  conflagration  to  fury,  and  blew  wisps 
of  burning  straw  through  the  darkness.  There  was  a 
loud  crackling  now,  a  sound  of  hissing  and  tearing,  as 
the  destroyer  worked  apace. 

The  men  who  had  accomplished  their  task  now 
made  all  haste  to  follow  their  friends  to  safety.  A  light 
engine  followed  by  trucks  moved  up  the  hue  ;  on  the 
trucks  were  swarms  of  grimy  figures  huddled,  together 
some  with  their  legs  dangling  over  the  edge  of  the  trolleys, 
others  lying  asleep  on  the  floor-boards.  Their  hands  were 
sore  and  blistered  ;  .ill  were  parched  with  thirst  and  weak 
from  exertion. 

As  they  glanced  back  they  saw  a  red,  wavering  glow 
m  the  southern  skyline.  Few  among  them  thought  of  the 
thousands  of  exhausted  and  hungry  men  out  in  the  night— 
they  too  might  have  seen  the  glow  in  the  sky  and  have 
guessed  what  it  meant :  the  death  of  their  hopes,  the 
loss  of  that  for  which  they  had  fought  so  desperately  and 
suffered  so  much.  Tnie  ;  the  enemy  was  miles  away, 
busy  with  his  dead  and  wounded  after  the  three  days 
battle  ;  but  hunger  would  not  let  him  wait  long,  and 
even  then  he  might  have  been  advancing  to  wrest,  if 
possible,  some  remnant  of  his  prize  from  the  burning. 
»        *        *        *        *        * 

Through  the  small  hours  of  the  morning,  while  the 
work  of  destruction  was  proceeding  at  the  junction,  a 
steady  stream  of  soldiers,  guns  and  wagons  filed  across  the 
river.  A  mile  below  the  WTecked  girder  bridge  two  others 
had  been  constructed  on  pontoons ;  they  were  placed 
close  together — one  on  canvas  boats  for  the  infantry  ; 
the  other,  a  more  solid  affair  on  wooden  pontoons  for  the 
artillery  and  transport. 

In  the  pale  dawn-light,  seen  through  the  belts  of 
mist  that  rose  from  the  water  and  from  either  bank,  the 
troops  had  an  almost  spectral  appearance  as  they  marched 
over  the  bridges,  with  no  sound  but  their  steady  tread  and 
the  resonant  rumbling  of  wheels  as  the  guns  and  trans- 
])ort  crossed  on  the  pontoons.  Regiments  of  infantry 
filed  in  seemingly  endless  procession  from  bank  to  bank  ; 
many  of  the  men  slightly  wounded,  with  head  or  limbs  in 
bandages.  Some  of  the  gun  shields  were  dinted — 
wounded  men  sat  clinging  together  on  the  limbers.  The 
batteries  were  followed  by  convoys  of  grey  wagons,  motor 
transport,  and  ambulance  cars. 

The  army  had  marched  from  the  scene  of  the  three 
day's  conflict  lest  an  undecided  battle  should  be  turned 


into  defeat  and  disaster  ;  it  had  laid  waste  its  paths  and 
co\-ered  its  tracks^  and  all  that  could  not  be  taken  away 
was'  destroyed. 

By  midday  half  the  army  was  across  the  river. 

And  all  the  while,  behind  them,  train  after  train  had 
rolled  up  from  the  southward,  until  on  both  lines  some- 
thing like  two  miles  of  engines,  trucks,  and  wagons  ex- 
tended along  some  hundreds  of  yards  from  the  ri\-er 
bank. 

Then,  towards  evening,  after  the  last  of  the  troops, 
save  a  few  squadrons  of  cavalry  had  crossed  over  the 
river,  began  an  amazing  work  of  destruction. 

The  girder  bridge  had  spanned  the  ri\cr  at  a  point, 
some  little  distance  below  the  pontoons,  where  the  banks 
were  high  and  steep  and  where  the  drop  into  the  river 
below  was  precipitous.  Towards  the  wrecked  bridge 
two  trains  began  to  move  on  the  two  parallel  lines  of 
rail  ;  at  first  slowly,  then  faster,  imtil  they  leaped  the 
bridge-head  and  crashed  down  through  the  shattered 
ironwork  into  the  swirling  water  below.  There  was  a 
roaring  detonation  as  some  of  the  ammunition  exploded, 
throwing  up  a  bursting  cloud  of  mud,  water  and  splinters. 

Two  more  trains  were  already  coming  on — this  time 
from  a  rather  greater  distance — and  they  too  plunged 
down  thunderously  into  the  flood — now  thick  with 
debris.  Then  two  more — faster  ;  and  so  on,  two  by  two, 
until  the  river  was  choked  and  glutted  with  wreckage. 
The  drivers  stuck  to  their  engines  until  the\'  had  got  the 
trains  moving  steadily,  and  then,  jerking  the  throttle- 
levers  down,  they  sprang  from  the  foot-plates  and  left 
the  trains  to  clatter  forward  to  destruction. 

Gradually  the  piled  wreckage  began  to  show  above 
the  water ;  grim  ;  distorted  shapes  of  bent  iron  that 
seemed  to  gesticulate  forlornly.  Crates  and  boxes  came 
loose,  and  spun  down  on  the  flood  ;  and  the  wreck  and 
waste  continued  until  every  train  had  disappeared  over 
the  brink. 

At  dusk  the  drivers  and  stragglers  crossed  the  light 
bridge,  while  the  pontonniers  hurriedly  dismantled  the 
larger  pontoon  after  a  few  squadrons  of  cavalry  had 
crossed.  A  small  charge  demolished  the  lighter  structure 
and  the  work  was  complete. 

The  retiring  army  had  covered  its  tracks  by  ruthless 
waste^but  waste  that  meant  salvation. 


There  is  much  in  Sussex  Gorse,  by  Sheila  Kayc-Sinith 
(Xisbet  and  Co.,  6s.)  to  render  the  book  comparable  with 
Jitde  the  Obscure,  although  Jude  was  a  failure,  while  Reuben 
Backfield  was  a  success — and  this  work  lacks  the  tremendous 
poignancy  of  the  former  novel,  while  Reuben's  relations  witl 
the  opposite  sex  were  not  lacking  in  conventional  morality. 
Reuben  desired  Boarzeli  Moor,  and,  a  small  farmer  at  the 
time  of  his  father's  death,  he  bought  his  desire  piece  by  piece 
It  cost  him  his  brother,  his  mother,  his  two  wives,  and  al! 
his  children  ;  it  cost  him,  too,  over  seventy  years  of  strenuous 
work  together  with  the  respect  of  his  neighbours  and  all  the 
friends  he  might  have  made.  And  yet  the  man  was  not  S(j  in- 
human that  the  reader  cannot  admire  much  of  his  character. 
He  loved  a  place,  a  thing,  as  others  may  love  sentient  beings, 
and  he  sacrificed  himself  and  all  that  he  had  to  his  one  love— 
Boarzeli  Moor. 

The  book  is  well  above  the  average  length,  yet  not  a  page 
too  long.  It  is  made  up  of  some  of  the  strongest,  most  vivid 
writing  of  the  last  decade  in  spite  of  its  author's  detached 
manner  of  telling  Reuben's  story,  and  not  only  must  it  be 
ranked  as  a  really  outstanding  novel,  but  also  as  a  sincere  and 
notable  addition  to  that  small  part  of  the  output  of  fiction 
which  is  also — in  the  best  sense  of  the  word — literature. 

Paris  Reborn,  by  Herbert  A.  Gibbons  (The  Century  Co.,  New 
York),  is  a  diary  of  life  in  Paris  during  tlie  first  five  months  of 
the  war,  dealing  with  incidents  of  tin-  mobilisation,  the  aero- 
plane attacks,  the  censorship,  and  all  that  made  Paris  memor- 
able during  those  months  of  threat  and  danger.  The  author 
shows,  by  means  of  these  sketches,  how  the  spirit  of  Paris 
rose  to  the  level  of  the  days,  and  how  Paris — which  is  France, 
was  reborn  from  the  negation  of  all  things  to  new  beliefs  and 
greater  national  aspirations — shows,  too,  how  prayer  came 
back  into  French  lives,  and  the  belief  in  things  eternal  and 
intangible  was  born  out  of  the  wreck  of  things  tangible  and 
material.  One  may  gather,  by  reading  such  a  book— whicli 
is  evidence  from  a  neutral  writer,  by  the  way— how  it  is  that 
1' ranee  is  destined  for  victory  in  this  war — how  such  a  nation 
C  )uld  not  be  other  than  victorious.  It  is  an  inspiring  work, 
well  worthy  of  careful  perusal. 


May  4,  1916 


LAND       &     WATER 


^7 


German   Trade   Methods 


By  Arthur  Kitson 


THE  question  has  often  been  asked,  "  By  what 
means  has  Germany  been  able  to  secure  in  so 
short  a  space  of  time  so  large  a  proportion  of  the 
world's  trade  ?  "  Most  writers  who  have  dealt 
with  this  subject  attribute  her  success  to  one  or  more 
of  the  following  factors  :  First,  to  the  intelligence  and 
industry  of  the  (icrman  people  themselves,  secondly,  to 
Iheir  superior  system  of  education,  and  particularly  to 
their  technical  methods  of  training,  thirdly,  to  their 
system  of  trade  protection,  and  fourthly,  to  the  encourage- 
ment and  assistance  that  they  have  always  had  from 
their  rulers. 

The  Germans  themselves  have  often  explained  their 
tolerance  of  so  autocratic  a  Government  as  theirs  by 
claiming  that  the  Kaiser  is  the  best  trade  organiser  and 
sales-agent  in  the  whole  German  Empire. 

There  is  a  fifth  reason  which  is  often  alleged,  namely 
tlieir  financial  system,  under  which  their  bankers  have 
always  been  ready  to  associate  themselves  with  (German 
industries,  and  to  furnish  capital  to  any  extent  for  the 
development  of  such  enterprises  as  promised  success. 
No  doubt,  all  these  reasons  are  valid,  and  German  trade 
is  an  example  of  what  a  nation  can  accomplish  when  it 
is  thoroughly  united  and  organised  for  industrial  purposes. 
There  are,  however,  other  factors  of  quite  a  different 
character.  The  Germans  have  been  taught  from  infancy 
up,  that  the  principal  aim  in  hfe  is  to  achieve  success 
in  whatever  occupation  they  may  be  employed.  They 
have  also  been  taught  that  "  the  end  justifies  the  means." 
No  Jesuit  ever  believed  more  strongly  in  this  doctrine  than 
the  present  inhabitants  of  Germany.  Every  conceivable 
method  of  obtaining  and  developing  trade,  whether 
moral  or  immoral — whether  praiseworthy  or  contemptible 
^is  considered  legitimate.  Methods  which  other  na- 
tions would  regard  as  treacherous  and  infamous  are  per- 
•missible  among  the  modern  Huns.  Many  of  these 
methods  have  already  been  brought  to  light  since  the 
war  started.  Many  others  are  known  only  to  those  who 
have  had  extensive  dealings  with  German  houses  and 
have  not  hitherto  been  published. 

Trade  Spies 

We  now  know  that  the  shoals  of  young  Germans  who 
prior  to  the  war  came  to  this  country,  to  our  Colonies,  to 
France,  to  Italy,  to  Russia  and  other  countries  were  trade 
spies  employed  under  the  direction  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment to  secure  all  the  information  they  could  regarding 
foreign  trade,  which  information  they  placed  from  time  to 
time  at  the  disposal  of  the  German  authorities 

Every  town  was  encouraged  to  send  so  many  of  its- 
most  intelligent  youths  to  foreign  countries  to  seek  em- 
ployment in  any  and  every  kind  of  industry  and  business 
which  they  desired  to  follow.  Being  supported  by  their 
townspeople,  they  were  in  a  position  to  offer  their  services 
free,  their  professed  motives  being  merely  to  learn  the 
language  of  the  country.  They  were  instructed  to  send 
weekly  reports  to  the  German  authorities,  giving  a  full 
description  and  information  of  the  kind  of  business  in 
which  they  were  employed,  with  every  detail  as  to  output, 
methods  and  costs  of  manufacture,  inethods  of  payment, 
prices,  discounts,  with  the  names  of  the  customers  of  each 
firm  with  whom  they  were  employed.  Any  private 
business  letters  that  they  could  secure  they  were  expec- 
ted to  copy,  particularly  letters  from  foreign  cHents, 
with  the  nature  of  the  enquiries,  special  terms  asked  or . 
offered,  and  amount  of  orders,  etc.  In  some  cases,  these 
youths  were  instructed  to  secure  samples  of  the  goods 
made  by  their  employers  and  to  send  them  to  Germany. 
In  this  way,  the  whole  business  arrangements  and  methods 
of  foreign  firms  became  known  to  the  German  manu- 
facturers, with  the  result  that  they  merely  had  to  pro- 
duce articles  of  a  similar  nature,  or  if  possible  with  some 
improvement,  and  offer  them  at  better  terms  to  the  clients 
of  these  foreign  firms  in  order  to  secure  such  foreign 
trade.  Gernvan  firms  were  given  to  understand  by  their 
Government  that  any  financial  assistance  they  might 
require  for  the  purpose  of  ousting  their  foreign  com- 


petitors in  the  markets  of  the  world  would  be  granted 
them.  They  were  instructed  to  undersell  foreigners 
whei-ever  it  was  necessary.  They  were  told  to  give 
longer  credit  and  to  do  everything  in  their  power  to 
convince  the  foreign  purchasers  and  consumers  that 
German  methods  and  German  goods  were  superior  in 
every  way  to  those  of  all  other  nations. 

Secret  Subsidies 

It  has  been  stated  that  at  least  one  school  of  languages 
was  subsidised  by  the  German  Government  in  order 
that  its  employees  should  send  to  Germany  copies 
of  correspondence  given  them  by  foreign  firms  for 
translation.  It  has  been  a  custom  with  many  British 
and  foreign  houses  to  send  their  foreign  letters  to 
such  schools  for  the  purpose  of  translation.  Con- 
sequently, it  was  a  very  simple  matter  for  the  trans- 
lators— if  they  were  unscrupulous  enough — to  make  and 
send  copies  to  Germany.  Such  correspondence,  naturally, 
was  often  of  a  very  private  character,  containing  details  of 
the  foreign  markets  and  of  the  needs  of  various  foreign 
purchasers,  all  of  which  would  be  of  enormous  value  to 
the  Germans. 

Another  method  that  the  Germans  have  practised, 
was  to  send  their  representatives  abroad  to  secure  agencies 
for  British,  French,  Austrian,  Italian,  American  and  other 
goods.  These  representatives  would,  for  example,  locate 
themselves  in  London  or  Manchester,  and  having  secured 
the  agencies  for  various  British  manufacturers  for  British 
speciahties,  they  would  endeavour  to  work  up  a  trade  in 
these  articles  within  Great  Britain  itself.  Having  estab- 
lished themselves  and  become  known  to  the  particular 
.trade  in  which  they  were  engaged,  having  opened  up  a 
business  with  the  British  public,  they  would  send  the 
samples  of  these  British-made  goods  to  Germany  and 
have  them  manufactured  there,  import  them,  and  con- 
tinue to  supply  their  British  customers  with  these  imita- 
tions of  British  goods,  until  finally  the  British  manu- 
facturers would  find  their  trade  practically  destroyed  in 
their  own  country  by  their  own  agents.  That  these 
methods  not  only  received  the  sanction  of  the  German 
Government,  and  the  so-called  "  higher  classes "  in 
Germany,  is  quite  credible  to  those  familiar  with  justice, 
as  understood  and  administered  in  the  Fatherland. 

Some  years  ago,  I  was  represented  in  South  Germany 
by  an  agent  who  had  been  introduced  to  me  as  an  ex- 
tremely able  and  rehable  man.  After  some  months 
experience  with  him,  I  discovered  he  had  been  obtaining 
money  under  false  pretences  and  had  apparently  forged 
my  signature  to  documents  which  he  had  drawn  up, 
giving  himself  the  right  to  negotiate  certain  patents 
which  I  owned.  On  the  strength  of  these  documents, 
he  had  secured  the  payment  of  a  large  sum  of  money. 
The  matter  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  Public 
Prosecutor  of  the  city  in  which  this  man  resided,  and  my 
solicitor  petitioned  for  the  man's  arrest.  The  Public 
Prosecutor  enquired  the  name  of  the  prosecutor,  and  when 
he  discovered  that  I  was  an  Englishman,  he  refused  to 
issue  the  warrant.  When  my  solicitor  expressed  surprise, 
the  prosecutor  suggested  that  I  should  assign  my  claim  to 
a  German  subject. 

"  I  am  not  going  to  arrest  a  German  at  the  instigation 
of  a  foreigner,"  said  he. 

German  Justice 

I  had  an  acquaintance  residing  in  that  city — a  German 
Baron — a  very  well-known  public  man,  and  I  informed 
him  of  the  decision  of  the  Public  Posecutor,  whereupon 
he  offered  to  take  the  claim.  He  informed  me  that  he  also 
had  been  victimised  by  this  same  agent,  and  that  he  had 
hesitated  to  prosecute  him  as  he  had  known  his  father. 
However,  he  forwarded  my  claim,  together  with  his  own, 
and  on  his  complaint  the  agent  was  arrested  and  kept  iii 
prison  without  trial  for  a  week.  At  the  end  of  the  week, 
the  Baron  was  summoned  by  telephone  to  appear  at  the 


i8 


LAN  i)      cS:      WATER 


May  4,  191 6 


Public  Proseuctor's  Office,  where  he  was  brought  face  to 
face  with  the  prisoner.    This  conversation  ensued  : — 

Public  Prosecutor :    "  I  liave  asked  you  to  come  here. 

Baron,  in  order  to  get  the  case  against  tliis  unfortunate 

man  settled.     I  understand  that  your  complaint  is  thit 

you  gave  him  money  at  his  request  for  the  purchase  of 

certain  shares  in  a  Company,  and  he  has  failed  to  either 

return  you  the  money  or  hand  you  the  shares.     If  he 

gives  you  the  shares  you  are  content  ? 

The  Baron :    "  Yes,  I  have  no  wish  to  puni  h  the  man, 

and  if  he  returns  me  the  shares,  1  shall  be  satisfied." 

Public  Prosecutor  to  the  Prisoner:    "  If  I  let  you   go,  are 

yoti  willing  to  give  the  Baron  the  shares  you  owe  him  ?  " 

Prisoner :   "  Yes." 

Public   Prosecutor:    "If  you  do  not   return  the  shares 

within  ;i  week.  I  shall  have  you  re-arrested,  and  then  you 

will  be  punished.     You  can  go." 

The  Baron  to  I'iMic  i'rosecutnr :    "  But  this  case  is  only 

one  (if  two.     What  about  the  forgery  case  ?  " 

Public  Prosecutor  :    "  That  case  has  nothing  to  do  with 

you.  Baron.     I  understand  that  you  have  merely  taken  it 

out  of  friendship  for  a  foreigner,  an  Englishman,  and  I 

am  not  going  to  punish  a  tierman  citizen  on  the  complaint 

of  a  foreigner.    My  advice  to  you  is  to  drop  the  whole 

thing  and  have  nothing  to  do  with  it." 

',!*his  apparently  ended  the  case  so  far  as  the  Baron  was 
concerned,  but  my  turn  was  yet  to  come.  Some  three 
weeks  later,  1  was  <in  my  way  to  Vienna,  and  I  tele- 
{^raphecl  my  solicitor  to  meet  me  en  route.  I  had  come 
direct  from  TMushing  on  one  of  the  througli  trains  that 
ran  from  l-lushing  to  Vienna.  On  my  arrival  in  (iermany 
my  solicitor  boarded  the  train,  and  advised  me  not  to 
leave  the  train  before  crossing  the  Austrian  frontier,  as  a 
warrant  liad  been  issued  for  my  arrest.  I  enquired  what 
crime  I  had  committed.  His  answer  was  :  "  You  liave 
committed  one  of  the  most  serious  crimes  of  which  a 
foreigner  can  possibly  be  guilty  in  Germany.  Y'ou  are 
accused  of  having  conspired  with  another  person  to  cause 
the  arrest  and  imprisonment  of  a  German  citizen,  and  this  is 
punishable  with  a  long  term  of  imprisonment."  I  asked  him 


for  the  details,  and  he  informed  me  that  the  agent  who 
had  forged  my  signature,  after  he  had  made  his  peace 
with  the  Baron  by  returning  liim  liis  shares  and  had 
secured  his  freedom,  applied  to  the  Public  Prosecutor  for 
my  arrest  on  the  ground  that  I  had  conspired  with  the 
Baron  to  deprive  him  of  his  liberty  ! 

I  stated  to  my  solicitor  that  of  course  this  was  non- 
sense, and  that  I  had  merely  acted  on  what  he  himself 
informed  me  was  the  advice  of  the  Public  Prosecutor. 
He  answered  ;  "  This  is  true,  but  it  does  not  lessen  the 
crime  in  the  eyes  of  German  laws.  The  man  who  advised 
your  assigning  your  claim  to  a  German  citizen  is  the  same 
who  has  issued  the  warrant  for  your  arrest  for  having 
taken  his  advice."  He  added  :  "  Now  you  are  beginning 
to  get  some  idea  of '  German  Justice.'  "  He  said  "  I  could 
furnisli  you  with  dozens  of  illustrations  of  a  similar 
character,  of  how  foreigners  have  innocently  fallen  into 
traps  of  this  sort  and  have  had  to  suffer  the  conse- 
quences." For  some  three  or  four  years  afterwards  I  had 
to  exercise  extreme  caution  in  travelling  in  Central 
Europe  in  order  to  escape  the  warrant  that  had  been 
issued  against  me. 

On  another  occasion  when  I  attempted  to  bring  suit 
against  certain  (ierman  firms  for  infringing  my  patents, 
I  was  advised  by  the  very  highest  Patent  Coimsel  in 
Berlin  not  to  attempt  to  bring  the  suit  in  my  own  name. 
Tins  eminent  counsellor  said  ;  "  I  am  sorry  to  have  to 
confess  it,  but  we  have  no  laws  in  this  ccnmtry  for  the 
protection  of  foreigners.  Our  laws  are  made  for  tlio 
benefit  of  (iermans  and  Germans  only."  He  added  : 
"  I  do  not  think  any  of  our  patent  Judges  would  issue. 
an  injunction  to  stop  Germans  from  manufacturing 
goods  in  this  countrj',  even  though  they  infringed  your 
patents,  considering  that  you  are  a  foreigner.  Your 
only  chance  of  success  would  be  by  assigning  3'our  patents 
to  a  German  or  a  German  firm,  and  getting  them  to  bring 
a  suit  in  their  own  name." 

When  the  war  broke  out,  there  were  no  less  than  thirty 
German  Companies  manufacturing  goods  which  infringed 
the  German  patents  which  I  held. 


Italian  Etchings  and   Engravings 


By  Marcus  6.  Huish 


MODERN  Italy  has  done  much  for  British  art. 
At  Koine,  Venice,  Florence,  Turin,  and  other 
cities  a  most  hearty  welcome  has  always  been 
accorded  to  it  and  this  recognition  has  extended 
to  purchases  by  the  Royal  Family,  by  National  and 
Municipal  (ialleries,  and  to  decorations  bestowed  upon 
many  of  our  artists  at  the  hands  of  the  Crown. 

Our  return  for  all  this  has  indeed  been  a  sorry  one. 
Notable  Italians  who  have  laboured  hard  to  bring  about 
these  very  material  benefits  to  English  artists  and  whose 
names  have  been  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  British 
Government  again  and  again  have  not  even  received  a 
word  of  thanks,  much  less  any  special  recognition. 

An  opporttmity  within  the  last  few  weeks  has  pre- 
sented itself  of  reciprcMrating  to  some  extent  the  hospitahty 
accorded  by  Italy  to  our  artists,  but  unfortunately  it 
wotild  seen  as  if  it  would  not  be  availed  of  even  to  a 
limited  extent.  The  Association  of  Italian  Etchers  and 
Engravers  (Associazione  Italiana  Acquafortiste  Incisori) 
wishing  to  hold  in  J-ondon  an  exhibition  of  the  art, 
were  invited  by  Mr.  Brangwyn,  whose  art  lias  been  ap- 
preciated in  Italy  even  more  than  in  his  own  country, 
to  partake  of  the  hospitality  of  the  Society  of  British 
Artists,  an  invitation  which  was  cordially  accepted.  In 
consequence,  at  their  Galleries  in  Suffolk  Street,  under 
the  patronage  of  the  King,  a  considerable  display  of 
etdiings,  lithograj)hs.  and  kindred  matters  now  cover 
the  walls  of  the  principal  Gallery.  But  this  is  practically 
all  the  return  we  are  giving,  for  although  a  substantial 
portion  of  the  proceeds  from  the  sale  of  the  works  will  go 
to  the  Red  Cross  Societies  of  the  two  countries,  the  public 
response  can  hardly  be  called  a  cordial  one,  nor  do  we 
hear  of  anv  National  funds  being  spent,  or  any  public 
spirited  i)erson  presenting,  as  he  well  might,  with  fx-nefit 
to  his  country,  a  selection  of  the  etchings  to  the  Print 
room  of  the  British  Museum. 

The  critical  in  such  matters  will  naturally  compare 
this  work  of  the  Italians  with  that  of  his  own  countrymen. 


exhibited  only  a  month  ago  under  the  regis  of  the  Painter 
Etchers  Society,  within  a  stone's  throw  of  Suffolk  Street, 
and  which  is  supposed  to  convey  a  fair  representation 
of  the  art  as  practised  in  this  country.  Any  such  com- 
parison must  show  that  in  more  than  one  respect  Italy 
can  teach  us  something.  For  instance  her  etchers, 
having  an  ample  fund  of  fine  and  picturesque  material 
to  draw  upon,  people  the  foregrounds  of  their  cathedral 
scenes  with  animated  processions,  as  in  Chiapelli's 
"  Baro(*co  ";  or  Pasqiii's  "Bannered  Crowd,"  entering 
the  Cathedral  of  Siena. 

Again  there  is  less  slavish  copying  of  nature  and  we 
see  such  audacities  as  "  iron  and  stone  "  where  Cesaro 
Fratino  does  not  hesitate  to  introduce  into  the  foreground 
of  San  Giorgio  at  Venice  a  huge  timbered  erection  over 
which  pass  lumbering  engines,  a  combination  of  singular 
power  carried  out  on  a  large  plate  etched  with  fitting 
determination.  Yet  again  an  experimental  spirit  is 
evidently  abroad  attempting  new  methods  of  improving 
on  the  old  ;  this  is  seen  in  a  plate  from  the  hand  of 
Magavacca.  On  the  other  hand  in  a  direction  where 
experiments  in  colour  might  have  been  looked  for,  i.e., 
in  colour  etching,  there  is  a  singular  paucity,  one  of  the 
few  examples  being  Motta's  "  Rheims  Cathedral,"  where 
roseate  angels  weep  over  the  burning  pile  ;  this  is  one  of  a 
singularly  small  number  of  war  subjects,  one  of  the  few 
being  Artioli's  "Last  Prop,"  which  is  reproduced  on  page  2 
of  this  issue  ;  here  the  Austrian  Emperor  is  cleverly 
transposed  into  a  figure  of  death  propped  up  by  gallows. 

Amongst  work  to  be  noted  is  that  of  the  President  of 
the  Society,  Vico  Vigano,  one  of  several  of  his  exhibits 
being  "  The  Passing  Train,"  a  photograph  of  which 
also  appears  in  this  issue  ;  Luigi  Conconi's  "The  Third 
Rome,"  with  Victor  Emanuel  passing  beneath  the  Arch 
of  Trojan  ;  Adolfo  de  Karoli's  coloured  wood  engraving, 
giving  an  architecturally  planned  view  of  the  Roman 
Campagna  ;  and  "  The  Bell  Tower,"  by  Spadolini,  a  work 
remarkable  for  its  clever  draughtsmanshii). 


May  4,  1916 


LAND-     &      WATER 

CHJ  TA 

e//  "T^mance  of  the  South  Seas 

"By  H.  T>E  FERE  STAC  POOLE 


19 


Synopsis  :  Macquart,  an  adventurer  who  has  spent  most 
of  his  life  at  sea,  finds  hiniself  in  Sydney  on  his  beam  ends. 
He  has  a  wonderjid  story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in  New 
Guinea,  and  makes  the  acquaintance  of  Tillman,  a  sporting 
man  about  town,  fond  of  yachting  and  racing,  and  of  Houghton, 
a  ivell-educated  Englishman  out  of  a  job.  Through  Tillman's 
influence  he  is  introduced  to  a  wealthy  woolbroker,  Screed,  who, 
having  heard  Macquart' s  story,  agrees  to  finance  the  enterprise. 
Screed  purchases  a  yawl,  the  "  Barracuda."  Just  before  they 
leave  Macquart  encounters  an  old  shipmate,  Captain  Hull, 
ivho  is  fully  acquainted  with  his  villainies.  Hull  gets  in  touch 
with  Screed,  who  engages  him  and  brings  him  aboard  the  yacht 
just  as  they  are  about  to  sail.  They  arrive  at  New  Guinea  and 
anchor  in  a  lagoon.  They  go  by  boat  up  a  river  where  they 
make  the  acquaintance  of  a  drunken  Dutchman,  Wiart,  who 
is  in  charge  of  a  rubber  and  camphor  station.  Here  they 
meet  a  beautiful  Dyak  girl,  Chaya.  According  to  Macquart's 
story  a  man  named  Lant,  who  had  seized  this  treasure,  sunk  his 
ship  and  murdered  his  crew  with  the  exception  of  one  man, 
"  Smith."  Lant  then  settled  here,  buried  the  treasure,  and  married 
a  Dyak  woman,  chief  of  her  tribe.  Lant  was  murdered  by 
"  Smith,"  whom  Captain  Hull  and  the  rest  make  little  doubt 
was  no  other  than  Macquart.  Chaya,  with  whom  Houghton 
has  fallen  in  love,  is  Lant's  half-caste  daughter.  Macquart 
guides  them  to  a  spot  on  the  river-bank  where  he  declares  the 
cache  to  be.  They  dig  but  find  nothing.  Then  he  starts  the 
surmise  that  the  Dyaks  have  moved  the  treasure  to  a  sacred 
grove  in  the  jungle.  Wiart  is  his  authority.  He  persuades 
his  shipmates  to  go  in  search  of  it.  The  journey  leads  them 
through  the  Great  Thorn  Bush,  which  is  a  vast  maze  from  which 
escape  is  impossible  without  a  clue.  Macquart  and  Wiart 
desert  their  companions.  As  night  falls  a  woman's  voice  is 
heard  calling,  and  Chaya,  answering  their  cries,  discovers 
them  ;  through  her  help  they  at  last  escape  from  the  maze,  to  find 
Ihat  Macquart  and  Wiart  have  returned  to  the  Barracuda 

CHAPTER    XXVI    [continued) 

The   Treasure 

WHEN  Macquart  awakened  Wiart,  he  roused 
himself  up,  yawned  and  looked  about  him.  He 
did  not  recognise  he  was  in  the  Bairacuda  for  a 
moment.  Then  when  he  came  fully  to  his 
senses,  he  put  his  leg  over  the  bunk  edge. 

"  I  was  dreaming  that  I  was  tangled  up  in  that  thorn 
scrub,"  said  he  ;  "  couldn't  get  my  bearings  no  ways."  He 
rubbed  his  eyes,  got  on  to  the  floor  and  came  to  the  table. 

"  Where's  the  black  fellow  ?  "  he  asked. 

"  Jacky  ?  Up  on  deck.  He'll  be  cooking  himself  some 
breakfast  in  the  galley.  I  made  this  coffee  over  the  methy- 
lated stove  so  as  not  to  be  bothered  with  him." 

Wiart  drank  his  coffee. 

"  And  now,"  said  he,  "I  suppose  there's  nothing  to  do  but 
go  for  that  location  of  yours  and  get  the  stuff  on  board." 

"  Nothing.  But  we  must  take  the  yawl  across  the  lagoon 
first." 

"  How's  that  ?  " 

"  Because  the  stuff  is  buried  on  the  other  side." 

"  Oh,  Lord  !  "  said  Wiart.     "  We'll  have  to  tow  her." 

"  That's  about  it." 

"  And  why  in  the  nation  didn't  you  anchor  on  the  other 
side  to  begin  with  ?  " 

"  For  the  very  good  reason  that  the  ship  was  sunk  on 
the  other  side  and  I  didn't  want  those  chaps  to  see  her  bones. 
But  they  did,  all  the  same.  Two  of  them  went  cruising  about 
the  lagoon  in  the  boat  and  spotted  the  burnt  timbers  sunk  by 
the  bank  over  there.  I  thought  for  a  moment  it  was  all  up, 
but  the  fools  never  suspected.  They  came  back  with  the  yarn 
that  they  had  found  a  wreck  under  the  water,  and  they  never 
suspected." 

'■  D asses,"     said     Wiart.      "  She    was    burnt,    you 

said  ?  " 

"  ^^^■" 

"  That  chap  Lant  must  have  been  a  peach." 

"  He  was." 

"  And  to  think  that   girl   Chaya  was  his  daughter — well, 

she's  a  chip  of  the  old  block,  and  I  reckon  if  she  had  any 


idea  this  stuff  we're  after  belonged  to  the  father,  and  if  she 
knew  we  were  on  to  it,  she'd  be  after  us." 

Macquart  moved  uneasily. 

Chaya  was  the  only  hint  of  that  Past  which  he  still 
vaguely  dreaded.  He  had  seen  nothing  of  her  mother,  scarcely 
anything  of  tha  Dyaks.  Brave  enough  to  go  back  to  the 
scene  of  John  Lant's  undoing,  he  had  not  been  brave  enough 
to  make  enquiries  or  go  near  the  Dyak  village. 

"  Anyhow,"  said  he.  "  She  doesn't  know.  No  one  has 
any  idea  of  the  whereabouts  of  that  stuff  but  myself.  Well, 
if  you  have  finished,  let's  set  to  work." 

They  came  on  deck,  where  they  found  Jacky,  v^ho,  as 
Macquart  had  surmised,  was  engaged  on  some  food  he  had 
cooked  for  himself  in  the  galley.  They  waited  until  he  had 
finished,  and  then  they  landed  and  cast  off  the  hawsers. 
Then  they  fixed  the  warp  for  towing.  This  done,  they  rowed 
across  the  lagoon  to  the  opposite  bank  to  find  a  suitable  berth. 

The  day  was  strong  now  in  the  sky,  and  when  they 
reached  the  opposite  bank,  they  could  see  vaguely  outlined 
in  the  water  beneath  the  boat,  the  bones  of  the  Terschelling 
like  the  ghost  of  a  black  skeleton. 

"  She  was  a  big  ship,"  said  Wiart,  who  seemed  fascinated 
by  the  sight  below. 

"  Fairly  big,"  said  Macquart.  "  There's  her  stem.  Well, 
we'll  bring  the  yawl  over  and  moor  her  abaft  the  stern  ;  that 
camphor  tree  marks  the  position." 

They  rowed  back,  took  up  the  warp  and  began  towing. 
The  Barracuda  came  along  easily  enough.  The  difficulty 
was  to  bring  her  to  her  ight  position  beside  the  bank.  In 
doing  this,  they  nearly  got  the  boat  stranded  on  the  stern 
part  of  the  wreck  of  the  Terschelling,  but  they  managed  the 
job  at  last,  and  as  the  rays  of  the  sun  began  to  strike  strongly 
through  the  upper  branches  of  the  trees,  they  had  her  in 
position,  moored  stem  and  stern. 

"  Now,"   said  Macquart,  "  for  the  digging." 

His  cheeks  showed  a  flush  above  the  beard,  and  his  eyes 
were  brilliant  with  excitement.  There  was  a  spare  mattock 
on  board  and  this  was  brought  on  shore,  also  a  compass  and 
three  mat  baskets. 

Jacky  and  Wiart  shouldered  the  pick  and  the  two  mat- 
tocks, Macquart  carried  the  compass.  He  took  a  line  leading 
due  south  from  the  stern  of  the  wreck  and  led  the  way  straight 
into  the  forest.  He  led  them  for  a  hundred  yards  or  so,  and 
then  stopped  for  a  moment,  glancing  about  him  and  seeming 
to  listen.  It  was  as  though  he  were  fearful  of  their  being 
foUowed  or  surprised.  But  there  was  no  sound  other  than  the 
crying  of  the  parrots,  the  wind  in  the  trees,  and  now  and  then 
cutting  through  the  air  the  rasping  call  of  a  cockatoo. 

Macquart  led  on. 

And  now  the  trees  begun  to  thin  out  and  then,  suddenly, 
the  ground  rose  before  them,  forming  a  httle  hill  on  which 
nothing  grew  except  a  few  trees  like  the  pandanus,  but  bearing 
no  fruit. 

The  hill  was  evidently  formed  by  an  uprising  of  the  same 
strata  to  which  the  Pulpit  Rock  at  the  entrance  of  the  river, 
in  some  mysterious  way,  belonged  ;  for,  from  the  hilltop  broke 
two  rocks,  in  structure  exactly  like  the  Pulpit,  though  each 
of  them  was  not  more  than  six  or  seven  feet  in  height. 

They  were  situated  thirty  feet,  or  more,  apart.  When 
Macquart  reached  the  space  between  these  rocks,  he  sat  doWn 
on  the  ground  as  if  exhausted.  Wiart,  standing  beside  him 
and  glancing  round,  noticed  that  the  elevation  of  the  hill  gave 
him  a  view  far  over  the  trees  to  southward,  whilst  the  trees  to 
northward  barred  all  view  of  the  river. 

The  ground  to  the  south  was,  in  fact,  covered  mostly 
by  low-growing  mangroves  feeding  their  roots  in  marshy  land 
and  reaching  to  the  coast  ridge  where  the  foliage  of  other  trees 
barred  the  view  to  the  sea. 

"  Well,"  said  Wiart,  "  how  much  further  have  we  to  go  ?  " 

"  We  are  on  tlie  spot,"  said  Macquart.  He  struck  his 
hand  palm  downward  on  the  ground  as  he  spoke. 

"  Good,"  said  Wiart. 

He  put  his  mattock  down  and  took  his  seat  beside  Mac- 
qu'rt,  whilst  Jacky  stood  by  holding  the  spare  mattock  and 
pick  and  gazing  round  him,  with  eyes  wrinkled  against  the  sun- 
shine, at  the  far  stretches  of  mangrove  forest  over  which  was 
hanging  a  vague  blue  haze. 

Jacky  belonged  to  the  primitive  order  of  things.     Amongst 


20 


LAND      &      WATER 


May    4,  1916 


all  native  races  you  will  find  specimens  of  manhood  that  seem 
itiU  Clung  about  by  the  atmosphere  of  the  Stone  Age.  I  am 
not  so  sure  that  you  will  not  find  these  specimens  of  humanity 
also  in  the  Higlily  Civilised  world,  but  in  the  native  peoples 
the  fact  is  more  striking  because  the  specimens  are  more 
ingenuous    and  unvarnished. 

Jacky,  I  have  left  his  full  description  till  now,  was  a  man 
standing  six  feet  in  height  and  exceedingly  powerful  in  make 
and  build.  Tillman  said  that  he  had  the  strength  of  three 
men.  and  Tillman  scarcely  exaggerated  his  facts  when  he  made 
this  statement.  Yet,  despite  his  strength  and  his  height,  one 
did  not  think  of  this  individual  as  a  man,  one  thought  of  him 
more  as  a  child.  For  one  thing,  his  mind  was  primitive  almost 
to  childishness,  for  another  his  movements  were  lithe  and 
supple  and  rapid  as  the  movements  of  a  boy. 

In  this  superb  animal  dwelt  a  mind  that  seemed  light  and 
shallow  and  restless  as  the  mind  of  a  bird.  A  mind  engaged 
always  with  little  immediate  things.  Not  an  evil  mind,  but 
a  mind  so  un.speculative  and  mobile  that  it  could  be  moved 
towards  evil  or  good  by  any  determined  intelligence  that 
chose  to  grapple  with  it.  ■        ,    j 

Jacky  had  shouted  at  a  Salvation  Army  meetmg,  had 
been  exhibited,  like  a  vegetable,  as  a  fine  specimen  of  what 
earnest  Christian  endeavour  could  do  working  in  primitive 
soil,  had  broken  a  mans  head  in  during  a  row  in  Tallis  Street, 
had  saved  a  boys  life  from  a  shark  in  Lane  Cove,  helped  in  a 
burglary— anything  that  came  along  was  good  enough  for 
Jacky,  and  it  all  depended  on  circumstance  and  external 
pressure  as  to  the  manner  in  which  he  would  act. 

Tillman  had  engaged  him  for  the  expedition  and  was  his 
real  master,  but  he  had  never  paused  to  ask  himself  questions 
as  to  what  had  become  of  Tillman  and  the  others,  or  whether 
they  had  been  betrayed.  He  took  Macquarfs  lead  just  as 
the  Barracuda  took  the  lead  of  the  tow  rope,  and  he  stood  now 
gazing  about  him  with  no  thought  of  anything  except  what- 
ever vague  thoughts  the  scene  around  him  inspired. 

Macquart,  after  a  moment's  rest,  rose  to  his  feet  and  seized 
the  pick. 

There  was  about  the  whole  of  this  business  some  touch 
of  the  enchantment  which  hangs  around  the  story  of  Aladdin 
alone  wi  h  the  Eastern  magician  on  that  desolate  plain  above 
the  treasure  cave. 

Wiart  felt  it  as  he  stood  watching  Macquirt  who,  now 
pale  and  perspiring,  stripped  of  his  coat  and  handling  the  pick, 
seemed  fo'  a  moment  paralysed,  vacillating,  filled  witli  inde- 
cision and,  one  might  almost  have  fancied,  fear. 

It  seemed  impossible  now,'  at  the  supreme  moment,  to 
believe  that  the  treasure  was  really  here.  This  thing  that 
had  haunted  him  for  fifteen  years,  pursued  him  about  the 
world,  held  him  away  from  it  by  fear  and  drawn  him  towards 
it  by  desire,  had  become  for  him  an  obsession,  almost  a 
religion.  It  was  the  embodiment  of  all  his  desires,  the  reverse 
of  the  medal  struck  by  a  Deity  that  had  condemned  him  to  a 
life  of  failure  and  crime.  Here  at  last  was  to  be  glimpsed  all 
that  he  had  missed,  all  that  he  had  failed  to  reach,  all  that 
he  had  seen  from  a  distance,  all  that  he  had  envied. 

Macquart  was  no  little  man.  He  might  have  been  a  great 
man,  but  for  the  fatal  flaws  in  his  character.  He  was  funda- 
mentally defective.  Drunkenness,  vice,  laziness— all  these 
may  be  outgrown,  lived  down,  lived  over,  all  these  may  be 
simply  functioned  diseases  of  the  soul  to  be  cast  aside  as  the 
soul  expands  and  comes  to  its  own.  But  the  disease  of  Mac- 
quart  was  a  crookedness  in  the  grain  and  texture  of  his  mind, 
a  want,  a  blindness  to  the  right  and  wrong  of  things,  a  negative 
ferocity  that  became  positive  when  his  desires  were  checked 
or  excited.  His  fit  of  indecision  and  hesitation  did  not  last 
many  moments  before,  raising  the  pick,  he  set  to  work. 

The  ground  was  hard  on  the  surface,  but  a  few  inches 
below  it  was  soft  sandy  soil  that  promised  easy  work  for  the 
mattocks. 

Working  methodically,  he  broke  the  ground  over  an  area 
of  some  ten  or  fifteen  square  feet.  Then  dropping  the  pick, 
he  called  to  Wiart  to  help,  and  they' set  to  work  at  the  digging. 
The  point  he  had  chosen  was  almost  exactly  midway  between 
the  two  rocks,  and  they  dug  without  a  word,  silently,  furiously, 
making  the  soil  fly  to  right  and  left,  whilst  Jacky  now  and  then 
lent  a  hand,  relieving  the  exhausted  Wiart. 

After  twenty  minutes'  toil,  they  paused  from  pure  ex- 
haustion. Then  they  resumed  work  again,  work  the  most 
terrific  ever  undertaken  by  man.  When  the  shovel  begins  to 
bring  up  despair,  the  treasure  digger  knows  exactly  the  measure 
of  his  task,  and  not  before.  Macquart  labouring,  pale  as  a 
corpse,  hollow-eyed  and  with  his  mouth  gaping,  had  paused  foi 
a  moment  when  Wiart,  who  had  retaken  tiie  mattock  from 
Jacky,  struck  something,  lifted  his  shoved,  and  then,  with  a 
cry  as  though  he  had  unearthed  some  terrible  object,  cast  the 
contents  of  the  shovel  on  the  ground.  He  had  brought  up  a 
spadeful  of  coins,  broken  wood,  like  the  wood  from  which 
cigar-boxes  are  made,  and  earth.  The  golden  coins  were 
scarcely  tarnished. 


Macquart  spoke  not  a  word.  He  was  standing  with  his 
mattock  in  his  hand,  his  eyes  fixed  alternately  on  the  find  and 
on  Wiart,  who  was  now  kneeling  pointing  to  the  gold  and 
looking  up  at  him. 

He  did  not  seem  for  a  moment  to  comprehend  what  had 
happened  and  then,  all  of  a  sudden,  he  was  on  his  knees, 
laughing  like  a  lunatic  and  delving  his  hands  in  the  place 
where  the  mattock  had  struck.  Fistfuls  and  fistfuls  of  gold 
coins  he  brought  up,  holding  them  out  in  his  wide  open  palm 
for  Wiart  to  look  at,  whilst  Wiart,  with  his  arm  round  Mac- 
quart's  neck,  half-demented,  inarticulate,  and  crowing  like  a 
child,  picked  up  coins  and  threw  them  down. 

It  was  a  terrible  picture  of  momentary  mental  over- 
throw. 

A  huge  bird  passing  overhead  trailed  its  shadow  across 
them,  and  Mact[uart  with  a  cry,  cast  his  arm  over  the  stuff  he 
had  been  delving  with  his  naked  hand,  and  glanced  up.  He 
saw  the  bird,  and  as  if  this  incident  had  brought  hiin  back  to 
reason,  he  sat  up,  brushed  the  soil  from  his  hand  and  pushed 
his  hair  back  from  his  forehead. 

"  It's  half  in  English  coin  and  nearly  half  in  French," 
he  said.  "  God  !  to  think  it's  here.  There's  some  Dutch 
coin.  It's  all  packed  in  boxes — so  big."  He  held  his  hands 
a  foot  and  a  half  apart.  "  You  have  broken  one  of  the  boxes  ; 
look,  here's  the  wood.  Pretty  rotten  it  is.  We  must  be  care- 
ful how  we  go.     Why,  d n  it,  we've  already  lost  hundreds 

of  dollars  by  your  carelessness  ;  look  at  the  way  you've  flung 
those  sovereigns  about !  "  He  picked  up  an  Australian 
sovereign,  light  yellow  like  brass ;  he  held  it  between  his 
finger  and  thumb  whilst  he  spoke.  He  seemed  not  to  be  able 
to  let  it  go.  He  could  not  escape  from  the  fascination  of  the 
thing  or  from  the  idea  that  he  was  in  possession  of  a  bank  where 
these  things  lay  in  thousands,  thousands,  thousands.  As  he 
talked,  he  rubbed  it  on  his  left  hand  as  if  wishing  to  feel 
its  existence  with  a  new  set  of  nerves.  Wiart,  with  swollen 
face  and  the  dazed  look  of  a  man  who  has  been  drinking, 
listened  in  a  careless  way  and  laughed  at  the  other's  re- 
proaches. 

"  We'll  pick  'em  up,  "  said  he.  '  Where's  the  use  of 
bothering.  Suppose  we  lose  one  or  two,  will  that  make  us  any 
the  poorer  ?  'What  we've  got  to  do  now  is  to  cart  the  stuff 
down  to  the  boat.     Lucky  we  brought  those  baskets." 

He  rose  and  taking  one  of  the  mat  baskets,  began  to 
collect  the  coins,  sifting  them  from  the  earth  in  which  they 
lay.  Macquart  helped,  whilst  Jacky,  squatting  on  his  hams, 
held  the  basket  wide  open. 

It  took  a  long  time  to  collect  all  the  loose  coins  in  view, 
and  then  Macquart,  with  his  sleeves  rolled  up  and  just  as  a 
person  breaks  up  honeycomb,  delved  with  his  hand  in  the 
remains  of  the  box  they  had  broken  open,  and  extracted  by 
handfuls  the  last  of  its  contents. 

"  There  are  hundreds  more  boxes,  '  said  Macquart,  sitting 
back  and  wiping  his  brow,  "  hundreds  and  hundreds.  We 
brought  them  up  in  sacks,  the  whole  crew  working  double 
shifts.  Tons  and  tons  of  gold.  The  English  stuf?  is  atop, 
the    French    and    Dutch   below." 

"  Let's  go  steady  now,"  said  Wiart.  "  No  more  spade 
work,  we'll  dig  'em  up  with  our  hands  and  so  avoid  breaking 
them.     They're  all  packed  close  together,  I  suppose  ?  " 

"  Side  by  side,  "  replied  Macquart. 

Kneeling  opposite  to  one  another,  the  two  men  began 
carefully  to  remove  the  earth,  till  the  whole  top  of  the  second 
gold  box  was  uncovered.  It  seemed  solid,  though  the  metal 
bindings  at  the  corners  were  black  with  rust.  Working  it 
loose  very  gently,  Macquart  got  one  hand  under  it  for  the 
purpose  of  lifting  it,  when  the  whole  thing  burst  to  pieces  and 
the  coins  came  tumbling  out  in  a  jingling  cataract. 

"  Curse  it,"  said  Wiart  ;  "  this  is  going  to  give  us  trouble.' 

It  was.  Had  the  boxes  not  been  rotten  with  age,  the 
transportation  of  the  gold  to  the  lagoon  oank  would  have  been 
a  difficult  business,  but  feasible.  As  it  was,  the  handling  and 
collecting  of  all  this  loose  stuff  was  an  appalling  task,  the 
significance  of  which  was  just  beginning  to  loom  before  the'm. 
But  it  did  not  daunt  them.  They  set  to  work,  and  in  less 
than  half-an-hour  they  had  collected  every  loose  coin,  and 
the  two  baskets  containing  the  first  of  the  treasure  were 
ready  for  transportation.  "Then  they  found  that  one  basket 
was  more  tiian  one  man  could  carry  if  it  were  to  be  brought  any 
distance — that  is  to  say,  for  a  white  man.  Jacky  made  no 
difficulty  at  all  about  carrying  one,  yet  even  for  him  it  was  a 
maximum  load.  They  settled  the  difficulty  by  carrying  a 
basket  between  them  with  the  help  of  the  pick  shaft  tlirough 
the  handles,  Jacky  following  with  the  other.  They  loft  \\  iart  s 
rifle  and  ammunition,  which  they  had  brought  with  them, 
by  the  cache,  and  started. 

There  was  no  difficulty  in  finding  the  way  ;  before  they 
had  covered  half  the  distance,  the  shimmer  of  the;  lagoon  led 
them  through  the  trees,  but  when  they  readied  the  Barracuda 
they  were  so  exhausted  by  all  they  had  gone  through  and  by 


May  4,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


21 


Chayti  a  Romance  of  the  South    Seas  \ 


[Ifiustrated  bit  Joseph   Simpson,   11. H  A 


He  stood  facing  the  Horror 


the  weitrht  of  their  load,  that  they  sat  down  for  a  moment  to 
rest    tiefore  completing  the  business. 

This  stuff  will  finish  us  before  we've  done  with  it,"  said 
VViart.  "  Good  Lord  !  I  never  did  work  like  this  before. 
Look  at  me  !     I'm  wringing  wet." 

"  Jack\-,"  said  Macquart,  "  hop  on  board  and  fetch  us  a 
jug  of  water  ;  bring  a  bottle  of  gin  and  a  glass  with  you — we've 
earned  a  drink." 

Jacky,  leaving  his  basket  on  the  bank,  climbed  over  the 
rail  of  the  Barracuda,  went  lo  the  saloon-hatch,  paused  for 
a  moment  to  sniff,  as  if  he  smelt  something  for  which  he  could 
not  account.  Then  he  began  to  go  down  the  companion  way. 
He  had  not  taken  four  steps  down  the  ladder,  when  he  suddenly 
vanished  as  thouijh  snatclied  below,  ana  a  scream  heart- 
rending and  appalling  pierced  the  air.     Then  came  a  mufUcd 


cry,  the  sound  of  a  struggle  and  silence.  The  two  men  on 
the  bank  sprang  to  their  feet  and  stared  at  one  another  in 
terror. 

CHAPTER  XXVII 

The  Gold  Fiend 

With  the  sound  of  the  struggle  the  Barracuda  had  rocked 
slightly,  sending  a  ripple  out  over  the  smooth  surface  of  the 
lagoon.     She  now  lay  perfectly  still. 

"  It's  those  chaps  that  have  escaped  and  got  on  bo.ird 
her,"  said  Wiart.  "  They're  hiding  there  and  waiting  for  us." 
"  Not  they,"  said  Macquart.  "  It's  something  else. 
It's  maybe  na'ives."  He  was  white  to  the  lips  and  small 
wonder,  for  nothing  could  be  more  smister  m-  devilisli  than 
the  way  m  which  Jacky  had  vanished,  as  though  the  Barracuda 


2Z 


LAND      &      WATER 


May  4,  1916 


had  snatched  him  into  her  maw.     Then,  suddenly,  Macquart 
turned  to  the  other. 

"  t)R  with  you  back  and  fetch  the  rifle,"  said  he.  "  I'll 
stay  here  and  w.itcli.     Quick,  there's  no  time  to  be  lost." 

Wiart  turned  and  started  off  amidst  the  trees  and 
Macquart,  withdrawing  a  bit,  stood  leaning  against  a  tree 
bole  with  his  eyes  fi.xed  on  the  Barracuda.  As  he  stood  like 
this,  waiting  and  listening,  a  crash  came  from  the  cabin  of 
the  yawl.  It  was  the  crash  of  crockeryware  upset  and  broken, 
and  it  only  wanted  that  and  the  dead  silence  that  followed 
to  put  a  cap  on  the  horror. 

Natives  would  not  carry  on  in  this  way.  If  they  had 
seized  Jacky  and  killed  him  they  would  not  remain  in  dead 
silence. 

Minute  after  minute  pa.ssed  and  then  a  soft  sound  from 
behind  him  made  Macquart  turn.  It  was  Wiart  with  the  rifle. 
"  There's  someone  on  board,"  said  Macquart  in  a  low 
voice.  "  There's  just  been  a  big  upset  in  the  cabin.  One  of 
us  has  got  to  board  her  and  have  a  k)ok  down  the  hatch  whilst 
the  other  stands  by  ready  to  shoot  if  anyone  comes  up.  We've 
got  to  see  this  thing  through,  and  quick." 

"  Well,  I'd  rather  you  went  on  board  than  me,"  said 
Wiart.  "  I'm  no  coward,  but  this  thing  gets  me.  It's  not 
na  ural." 

'■  Natural  or  ui\natural,  we've  got  to  finish  with  it," 
replied  the  other.  "  We  have  no  time  to  waste.  There's  the 
gold  lying  waiting  to  be  taken  aboard,  and  here  are  we  waiting 
like  fools.     It  s  not  a  pleasant  job,  but  we'll  draw  lots.  " 

Ho  plucked   two   blades   of  grass   of  unequal  length,  held 
them  in  his  closed  hand  and  held  his  hand  to  Wiart. 
Whoever  draws  the  longest  goes,"  said  he. 
Wiart   drew    a    blade,    then    they    compared    the  blades. 
Wiarts  was  the  longest. 

He  was  no  coward,  yet  he  held  back  just  for  a  moment. 
Then  picking  up  his  courage  and  handing  the  rifle  to  his  com- 
panion, he  walked  straight  to  the  yawl,  boarded  her,  and 
without  a  moment's  hesitation,  came  to  the  open  saloon  hatch. 
He  peejied  cautiously  down,  then  turned  towards  Mac- 
quart  and  shook  his  head  to  indicate  that  he  saw  nothing. 

Tl'.en,  shading  his  eyes  with  his  hand  he  looked  down 
again. 

He  left  the  saloon  hatchway  and  came  to  the  skylight  ; 
this  was  closed,  however,  and  could  only  be  opened  from 
below,  \vhilst  the  thick  glass  prevented  any  view  being  ob- 
tained of  the  interior. 

He  was  fiddling  with  the  skylight  in  a  stupid  sort  of 
atle  iipt  to  open  it,  when,  suddenly,  from  the  saloon  hatch 
appeared  a  \-ast  hand  that  seemed  covered  by  a  black  woollen 
glove.  It  grasped  the  combing  and  almost  immediately 
squeezing  up  through  the  hatch  opening  came  the  head, 
shoulders  and  chest  of  an  enormous  ape.     ' 

It  seemed  at  first  sight  an  ape  but  Macquart  knew  that 
apart  from  the  little  monkeys  on  the  river  bank  there  are  no 
apes  in  New  Guinea.  He  recognized  this  as  a  creature 
spoken  o'  by  the  native  hunters.  A  creature  larger  than  the 
ape  yet  far  more  terrible. 

He  was  hke  a  great  ruffian  man  gone  to  neglect  in  the 
primeval  woods,  his  humanity  clinging  to  him  like  a  shame. 

Miicquart  was  so  astonished  by  this  apparition  that  he 
did  not  even  call  out  to  Wiart,  and  Wiart  who  was  still  en- 
gaged in  wrestling  with  the  skylight  did  not  see  the  object 
that  had  appeared  on  deck  till  a  faint  sound  made  him  turn. 
'  He  had  picked  up  a  belaying  pin  to  help  him  in  his  work, 
and  now  as  he  stood  facing  the  Horror  that  had  materialised 
itself  at  such  a  short  distance  from  him,  his  hand,  unfor- 
tunately for  himself,  instead  of  releasing  the  iron  pin,  clutched 
it  spasmodically.  It  is  quite  possible  that  the  brute  might 
not  have  touched  him..  Creeping  along  by  the  bank  and 
finding  the  Barracuda,  it  had  boarded  the  yawl  for  the  purpose 
of  exploring  it.  Down  below,  it  had  been  on  the  point  of 
coming  up  when  Jacky  made  his  appearance  on  the  saloon 
ladder.  Then  sure  that  all  this  was  a  trap  and  Jacky  the 
setter  of  it  the  beast  had  seized  the  intruder  by  the  leg, 
hauled  fiim  down,  and  finished  him.  Again  it  had  been 
on  the  point  of  making  its  escape  when  the  sound  of  Wiart 
coming  on  board  had  made  it  pause.  Then,  hearing  the 
fumbling  at  the  skylight  and  seeing  a  fair  way  up  the  com- 
panion ladder,  up  it  came  and  another  moment  might  have 
taken  it  off  over  the  side  had  not  Wiart,  in  a  paroxysm  of 
terror,  Imrled  the  belaying  pin. 

It  struck  the  brute  full  in  the  mouth.  Then  Macquart, 
who  had  raised  his  rifle  to  his  shoulder,  but  who  dared  not 
fire,  so  tremulous  was  his  hand  and  so  close  together  the 
antagonists,  saw  the  creature  seize  the  man  and  hold  him  out 
with  both  hands  as  a  furious  mother  might  >eize  a  naughty 
child.     It   shook   him. 

It  did  not  seem  to  do  anything  more  than  that,  and  then 
it  was  Rone,  and  Wiart  was  lying  on  the  deck  hiccoughing. 

He  h'ccoughed  several  times  and'  put  his  hand  to  his  side 
as  if  it  pained  him      He  did  not  spak  or  take  any  notice  of 


Macquart.  His  mind  seemed  dulled  or  far  away.  Then,  all 
of  a  sudden,  as  Macquart  boarded  the  yawl  Wiart  turned  on 
his  back. 

He  was  dead. 

Macquart  stood  looking  from  the  corpse  at  his  feet  to  the 
spot  where  the  murderer  had  disappeared  into  the  trees. 

He  did  not  seem  to  understand  fully  for  a  moment  what 
had  happened.  In  fact,  he  did  not  realise  fully  that  Wiart 
was  dead  till,  kneeling  down  beside  him  he  raised  his  arm 
and  dropped  it.  Then  all  at  once  the  truth  broke  on  him. 
The  terrible  truth. 

He  did  not  care  a  button  for  the  life  of  Wiart  The  life 
of  Wiart  was  of  no  more  concern  than  the  buttons  on  Wiart's 
coat.  What  concerned  him  greatly  was  the  fact  that  if 
Jacky  was  dead  below  or  seriously  injured  he-  Macquart — 
would  be  helpless.  Even  if  he  could  get  the  Barracuda  out 
single-handed,  how  could  he  tackle  single-handed  the  transport 
of  the  gold  ?  This  thought  occurred  to  him,  but  he  did  not 
appreciate  the  true  significance  of  it  yet. 

He  released  Wiarts  arm,  rose  up  and  approached  the 
saloon  hatchway. 

For  a  moment  he  stood  listening,  then  he  called  down  the 
hatch  to  Jacky,  but  received  no  answer.  Down  below  there 
was  absolute  stillness,  a  sUence  accentuated  by  the  faint 
buzzing  of  flies. 

Then  Macquart  came  down.  The  body  of'  Jacky  was 
lying  right  across  the  table  with  its  head  overhanging  the  t  nd 
opposite  to  the  door.  The  swing  ng  lamp  had  be  n  swept 
away  and  a  tray  of  glasses  and  crockery-ware  lay  smashed  on 
the  floor.  Otherwise  there  was  little  sign  of  confusion  or 
struggle,  but  there  was  in  the  air  a  faint,  vague  odour  of  wild 
beast  that  caught  Macquart  by  the  throat  and  made  the  soul 
in  him  revolt. 

Jacky  was  quite  dead. 

Macquart  opened  the  skylight  by  means  of  the  lever  and 
the  fresh  air  of  day  came  down  so  that  one  could  breathe. 

The  immediate  problem  now  before  Macquart  was  the 
disposal  of  Jacky's  body.  It  could  not  be  left  here.  It  must 
be  got  overboard.  He  proceeded  to  the  task  and  found  after 
ten  minutes  labour  that  it  was  utterly  beyond  him.  With  the 
greatest  difficulty  he  managed  to  pull  and  drag  the  body  to 
the  foot  of  the  companion  way,  but  he  could  not  get  it  up. 
After  all  sorts  of  fruitless  endeavours  he  paused  to  think. 
He  could  think  of  nothing.  The  only  way  to  bring  it  up  was 
with  a  tackle,  but  that  would  require  not  only  a  man  to  haul 
on  the  purchase,  but  a  man  to  guide  the  body.  Besides,  he 
had  not  the  means  nor  the  skill.  He  sat  down  for  a  moment 
on  the  edge  of  a  bunk.  He  was  thinking,  not  of  the  body 
lying  at  his  feet,  but  of  the  gold. 

This  was  the  beginning  of  a  nightmare  business.  Gold  ! 
Gold  !  Gold  !  Tons  of  it  waiting  to  be  lifted  and  deported,  a 
dead  man  lying  on  the  cabin  floor  of  the  yawl,  another  on  the 
deck,  and  one  man  with  only  one  pair  of  hands  left  to  face 
the  task. 

Even  were  he  to  get  the  gold  aboard,  how  could  he  pu;  t(» 
sea  with  that  corpse  in  the  cabin  ?  It  was  very  problemalic.il 
if  he  could  get  the  Barracuda  out  at  all,  single-handed  as  he  was, 
but  even  if  it  were  possible  how  about  this  dreadful  supercargo  'f 
Even  if  he  were  to  store  the  gold  in  the  fo'c'sle  and  tiny 
hold  and  close  up  the  cabin  hermetically,  sealing  hatch  and 
skylight,  how  could  he  steer  for  any  port  .'  There  would  at 
once  be  an  enquiry,  and  an  examination  of  the  boat  ;  even  if 
he  were  to  return  to  Sydney,  the  port  officer  who  boarded  him 
and  who  was  refused  entry  to  the  cabin  would  very  soon  have 
the  rights  of  the  matter. 

The  corpse  of  Jacky  acted  on  him  much  as  the  whale- 
man's drogue  acts  upon  the  harpooned  whale.  He  could  not 
escape  from  it,  and  it  was  bound  to  ruin  hina  in  the  end — even 
if  he  managed  to  get  the  gold  on  board. 

But  Macquart's  brain  just  now  was  not  in  a  condition  to 
recognise  clearly  or  weigh  exactly.  Having  sat  for  a  minute 
or  so  on  the  edge  of  the  bunk  he  rose  up  and  came  on  deck. 

Here  the  first  thing  he  saw  was  the  body  of  Wiart  lying 
just  as  he  had  left  it — but — there  was  a  bird  circHng  in  the  air 
above  it  and  already  one  of  the  eyes  was  gone  I 

In  this  terrible  climate  to  be  dead  and  be  devoured  are 
synonymous  terms. 

(To   be  continued) 


Some  of  the  prettiest  slioe  buckles  are  being  made  of  quilted 
ribbon.  Black  brocade  shoes  look  very  well  finished  with 
magpie  buckles  of  this  kind.  The  white  ribbon  is  inside, 
an  outer  quilting  of  the  black  frames  it,  and  moire  is  the 
best  medium  to  employ. 

Paste  shoe  buckles  are  giving  ground  in  favour  of  those 
set  with  coloured  stones.  Dark  blue,  green,  yellow  and 
brown  stones  are  all  pressed  into  the  service,  and  though  they 
are  of  glass  are  so  well  cut  and  set  that  nobody  would  suspect 
it.  Huge  enamel  buckles  are  another  idea,  and  oxidised  silver 
is  being  much   exploited   by   well-known  shoemakers. 


May   II,   1916 


Supplement  to  LAND     &    WATER 


Xlll 


l-\. 


Gentlemen's  Outfitting 

A  Few  Notable  Examples  of  Value. 


I  officers'  khaki  shirts 

=  Made    from    materials    specially 

=  selected     for      their      toughness 

^  and      non  -  shrinking     qualities. 

=  Medium  Weight   Flannel     ....       9/6 

=  Hest  Quality  Oxford  or  Zephyr    .     .       7/6 

=  Fine    Quality    and    Light    Weight 

=  Khaki  Taffeta 12/6 

=  Khalii  Viyella 9/-,  9/6,  10/6 

=  Best  Quality  Khaki  Oxford  Cotton    .     7/6 

I  PYJAMAS 

~  Special  Value  for  the  Present  Season 

^  "  The  Kingston"  PyjamaSuit  (as  sketch), 

=  made  of  Fine  Twill  Cotton,  with  unui^ually 

S  smart  mercerised  stripe.     The  designs  are 

=  particularly   attractive   and   pleasing — in 

=  fact,  they  are  just  what  a  man  apireciates. 

=  Special  Value,  ti/ll  per  suit.   3  Suits  for  20/- 

W  NOTE.—Harrods    stock    Pyjamas    in   six    sizes^   thus   ensuring 

M  ready-made   Pyjamas   in   any   length   of  sleeve   and  leg  required. 


Richard    Burbidge, 
Managing  Director, 

LONDON 
S.W 


The    Original    Cordials 

Established  in  1839,  77 years  ago 


High-Grade  Waterproofs. 


The   TRENCH   Coat. 

This  good-looking  waterproof  coat,  al- 
though designed  chiefly  for  trencli 
wear,  is  also  of  general  military  useful- 


The  wide  lap-over  front  excludes  both 
wind  and  rain.  The  deep  collar  is  fitted 
with  a  special  tab  and  bucUle,  and  when 
turned  up  closes  comfortably  round  the 
chin.  Openings  to  the  two  large  pouch 
pockets  go  right  through,  and  so  give 
easy  access  to  one's  inner  pockets. 

Officers  who  supplement  this  Trench 
Coat  with  a  pair  of  loose  overall 
leggings  (these  when  not  in  use  can  be 
carried  with  room  to  spare,  in  one  of 
the  pockets),  will  secure  a  completely 
protective  waterproof  outfit,  of  little 
bulk,  light  in  weight,  and  ensuring 
every  possible  freedom  of  movement. 

When  ordering  a  Trench  Coat,  or  if  to  be 
sent  on  approval,  height  and  chest  measure, 
and   reference,  should  be  given. 

New  Illustrated  Litt  of  waterproof  coata,  capes,  boots,  trench  waders,  &c    at  request 

J.  C.  CORDING  &  Ca 

Waterproofers  to  H.M.  the  King 

Only     Addresses: 

19  PICCADILLY,  W.  &35 sx. jamess  st. 


S.W. 


m 


o  ^s* 


w^ 


11 


•ill 


Toilet  Services. 

Mappin's  stock  of  Toilet 
Services  contains  not  only 
many  fine  specimens  of  the 
Silversmiths'  Art,  but  a  com- 
prehensive range  of  unique 
and  registered  patterns. 
.  The  set  illustrated  is  tastefully 
engined  turned,  and  of  that 
high     standard    which     the 

HOUSE    OF    MAPPIN 

has     maintained     for    over    a 
Century. 


^\ 


Ah  inches  li)^> 

£1     15    iS 


3^  Miches  ^IJ;!l 
£1     IS    O 


Size  tlj  y  7Ji>:d«».     S3     IS     O 


~~:::::::i^.«::;i.: 


-^  •*■   ■■■  TTn 

Silversmiths  to  His  Majesty  King  George  V.  SjS.Lf. 

158- 162,  OXFORD  STk*^ET,  W. 
2.    QUEEN    VICTORIA    STREET,    EC. 
172.    REGENT   STREET,    W. 
Manufactory  and  Showrooms  -ROYAL  WORKS.  SHEFFIELD. 


:j.^i 


XIV 


Supplement    to    LAND    &    WATER 


May   II,    igi6 


S-f    ©reams    Came    XLvne, 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVII  No.  2818  [v^I^] 


TMTTT?Qr>AV     MAV    tt     rmfi  tregistered  AST   pr  ic  e  sixpence 

ln>J-l\-oi>'A  I ,    ivi/vi    i-x,    lyiu  La  newspaperJ  published  weekly 


By    Louis  Uatmatken. 


Drutcn   exclusively  lor  "Land  and    Water." 


The  Sinn  Fein  Snake 


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o 
Z 

a 

o 


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u 

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l^Bw^ 


in 


U 
U 

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25 


May  II,  191(3 


LAND      cV      WATER 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSVVAY,  LONDON,  VV.C 

Telephone:  HOLBORN   2828 


THURSDAY,    MAY    11.    1916 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

The  Sinn  Fein  Snake.     By  Louis  Raemaekers  i 

British  Troops  in  Reserve.     By  G.  Spencer  Prysc  2 

Meaning  of  the  German  Note.     (Leading  Article)  5 

The  Last  Attack  at  Verdun.     By  Hilairc  Belloc  4 

Sortes  Shakespearian;e.     By  Sir  Sidney  Lee  7 

The  German  Surrender.     Bv  Arthur  Pollen  8 
Rise  and  Fall  of  the  French  Air  Ministry.     By  F.  W. 

LtinclicstGr 

Before  the  Charge.     By  Patrick  MacGill  13 

World's  Trade  after  the  War.     By  Lewis  R.  Freeman  15 

Some  Mountain  Passes.     By  William  T.  Palmer  17 

Reviews  of  Books  ^" 

Chaya.     By  H.  de  Verc  Stacpoole  19 

Town  and  "Country  24 

The  West  End  2O 

Choosing  Kit ^ 

MEANING  OF  THE   GERMAN  NOTE 

THE  German  reply  to  President  Wilson's  com- 
plaints^in  regard  to  the  enemy's  methods  of 
submarine  warfare  will  for  several  reasons, 
be  of  special  interest  to  readers  of  this 
l)aper.  For  one  thing,  it  will  be  found  on  careful 
examination  to  fullil  exactly  the  prognostications  of 
our  naval  critic.  Essentially  it  is  a  surrender  ;  and 
the  American  rejoinder  makes  the  character  of  this 
surrender  clear  by  refusing  to  take  notice  of  the 
bravado,  the  raising  of  irrelevant  issues,  the  falsifica- 
tion of  notorious  facts  and  the  clumsy  and,  under 
the  circumstances,  exquisitely  ludicrous  appeals  to 
humanitarian  sentiment,  and  directing  attention  to  the 
single  point  really  at  issue.  On  that  point  the  victory 
of  the  United  States  is  for  the  moment  complete.  The 
German  Government  announces  that  it  has  given  orders 
to  its  submarine  commanders  not  to  sink  either  passenger 
or  cargo  ships  without  warning,  whether  within  or  with- 
out the  so-called  "war-zone." 

Whether  the  terms  now  conceded  by  the  German 
(iovernment  will  be  duly  observed  in  the  future  is  neces- 
sarily a  matter  of  speculation.  It  may  well  be,  as  Mr. 
Pollen  suggests  in  another  column,  that  the  hands  of  the 
Kaiser  and  his  Ministers  will  again  be  forced  by  the 
clamour  of  those  dupes  whom  they  have  themselves 
persuaded  to  the  belief  that  Great  Britain  can  be  brought 
to  her  knees  and  her  sea  power  destroyed  by  the  inter- 
mittent murder  of  non-combatants  on  the  high  seas. 
It  may  be  that  the  last  paragraph  reserving  "  complete 
liberty  of  decision  "  in  the  event  of  the  United  States 
not  obtaining  respect  for  "  the  laws  of  humanitv  " 
from  Germany's  enemies,  though  its  main  purpose  was 
undoubtedly  to  make  the  original  concession  look  less  like 
a  surrender  and  more  like  a  bargain  to  German  eyes, 
may  also  have  been  penned  with  a  side  glance  at  this 
possible  eventuality.  If  that  be  so,  the  American 
reply  closes  that  loop  hole  entirely.  President  Wilson 
answers,  as  everyone  must  surely  have  known  that  he 
would,  by  insisting  that  the  (ierman  surrender  must  be 
regarded  as  unconditional,  and  that  he  cannot  make 
any  negotiations  that  may  take  place  between  the  United 
States  and  another  power  a  subject  of  discussion  with 
Germany.  If  Germany  accepts  his  reply  as  final  she  must 
needs  accept  it  on  those  terms. 

We  knou',  however,  that  the  action  of  the  German 
Government  will  be  controlled  much  less  by  any  promises 
it  may  have  given  than  by  the  situation  in  which  it 


linds  itself  ;  and  it  is  in  the  light  thrown  on  that  s^ituation 
and  on  the  view  taken  of  it  by  the  rulers  of  Germany 
that  the  major  interest  of  the  German  Note  consists. 

One  may  dismiss  the  fustian  of  which  at  least  two 
thirds  of  that  Note  is  made  up,  Its  interest  is  mainly 
psychological.  To  those  who  still  accept  the  legend  of  the 
amazing  craft  and  stupendous  knowledge  possessed  b'y 
tlK!  "  efficient  "  Teu,ton  there  should  be  something  en- 
liglitening  about  the  crass  stupidity  which  could  think 
to  make  an  emotional  appeal  to  the  Americans — of  all 
people  in  the  world — by  pointing  to  the  unprecedented 
inhumanity  of  "  starving  "  an  enemy  into  submission. 
As  if  the  Americans,  even  if  they  could  be  supposed  to 
have  forgotten  by  what  means  the  Prussians  themselves 
reduced  Paris,  could  possibly  be  imagined  to  have  for- 
gotten by  what  means  Lincoln  reduced  the  South ! 
There  are  a  dozen  such  touches  of  clumsy  hypocrisy 
and  transparent  absurdity  in  the  document  ;  but  they 
are  not  the  main  thing  worth  noting. 

The  main  point  to  note  is  the  confirmation  afforded 
of  the  truth  we  have  continually  maintained  ;  that  the 
(iermanic  powers  are  already  in  process  of  defeat,  that 
their  rulers  know  it,  and  that  their  present  hopes  are  set 
mainly  upon  an  escape  from  that  defeat,  not  by  way  of 
victory,  but  by  way  of  a  truce.  These  truths  are  the 
key  to  all  or  almost  tdl  that  (jermany  says  and  does  in 
these  latter  days,  to  the  language  of  her  rulers,  whether 
addressed  to  her  own  people  or  to  neutral  nations,  not 
less  than  to  most  of  the  more  recent  developments  of  her 
policy  and  strategy  by  land  and  sea. 

They  are  evident  enough  to  a  discerning  eye  in  the 
document  under  consideration.  In  the  affecting  passage 
to  which  reference  has  already  been  made  we  are  told  of 
"  the  many  millions  of  women  and  children,  who,  accord- 
ing to  the  avowed  intention  of  the  British  Government, 
are  to  be  starved,  and  who,  by  sufferings  are  to  force  the 
victorious  armies  of  the  Central  Powers  into  an  ignominious 
.  capitulation."  When  before  has  the  German  Government 
gone  so  near  to  admitting  the  possibility  of  such  a 
capitulation  ?  When  before  has  she  exhibited  an  appear- 
ance of  anticipating  it  and  of  being  prepared  in  advance 
to  explain  it  away.  Yet  some  of  the  various  and  con- 
flicting daily  "  explanations  "  offered  to  the  German 
people  in  the  matter  of  Verdun  had  already  given  indica' 
tions  of  such  a  mood. 

It  is  not  in  this  paragraph,  however,  that  we  shall  find 
the  kernel  of  the  document.  The  key  passage,  slipped  in 
as  though  by  accident,  runs  as  follows  : — 

The  German  Government  is  conscious  of  Germany's 
strengtli.  Twice  within  the  past  few  months  she  has 
announced  before  the  world  her  readiness  to  make  peace 
on  a  basis  safeguarding  Germany's  vital  interests,  thus 
indicating  that  it  is  not  Germany's  fault  if  peace  is  still 
withheld  from  the  nations  of  Europe.  The  German 
Government  feels  all  the  more  justified  in  declaring  that 
tlie  responsibility  could  not  be  borne  before  the  forum 
of  mankind  and  history  if  after  twenty-one  months' 
duration  of  war  the  submarine  question  under  discussion 
between  'the  German  Government  and  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  were  to  take  a  turn  seriously 
threatening  the  maintenance  of  peace  between  these  two 
nations. 

This,  be  it  obseiA'cd,  is  offered  as  a  reason  for  proceeding 
to  the  utmost  limits  of  concession.  The  hint  is  broad 
enough.  It  is  to  the  effect  that  there  will  be  no  more 
difficulty  about  submarine  warfare  if  President  Wilson 
will  only  offer  his  mediation  and  induce  the  Allies  to  make 
peace  before  defeat  overtakes  the  Germanic  Powers.  It  is 
unlikely  that  President  Wilson  will  do  anything  so  foolish  ; 
and  it  is  certain  that,  if  he  did,  the  Allied  Governments, 
confident  that  the  enemy  is  weakening  every  day  would 
listen  to  no  such  proposition.  But  it  is  equally  certain 
the  proposition  would  never  have  been  made  if  the  Ger- 
man (}o\  ernraent  were  "confident  of  Germanv's  strength.", 


LAND      &     WATER 


May  II,  1916 


IHE   LAST    ATTACK  AT   VERDUN 


By  Hilaire  Belloc 


AT  the  end  of  last  week  and  during  the  week-end, 
the  Germans  acted  upon  the  ^'erdun  sector  in  a 
fashion  which  is  puzzUng  to  anyone  who  studies 
the  war  on  its  purely  military'  side,  which  can  be 
explained,  perhaps,  partly  by  those  who  are  followini,' 
the  political  side  of  the  war,  and  which  in  any  case  leaves 
a  problem  nut  yet  solved. 

Everyone  is  aware  that  the  critical  point  of  \'crdnn  is 
the  Mort  Homme.  My  readers  are  all  familiar  with  the 
fact  that  if  the  enemy  fails  to  take  the  Mort  Homme  he 
may  render  it  untenable  by  taking  Hill  304,  a  Hat- 
topped  eminence,  very  steep  upon  the  south  and  the  east, 
steepish  upon  the  north,  and  gradually  approached  from 
the  west";  it  is  slightly  higher  than  the  Mort  Homme 
(50  ft.  higher)  and  is  at  a  range  of  a  little  over  2,000  yards. 

This  sector,  then,  which  may  roughly  be  called  the 
sector  of  the  Mort  Homme  and  of  Hill  304,  has  been  an 
open  objective  upon  the  west  of  the  Meusc  ever  since 
the  middle  of  March. 

Upon  the  east  of  the  Meuse,  where  the  first  mam 
attack  of  the  enemy  was  delivered,  that  attack  broke 
down  upon  the  chain  of  chief  defensive  positions,  which 
runs  from  the  village  of  Bras  upon  the  Meuse  round  the 
Louyemont  ridge  to  the  ruins  of  the  village  of  Douau- 
mont,  and  so  to  the  ravine  of  Vaux,  beyond  which  it  is 
continued  along  the  crest  of  the  high  steep  hills  crowned 
by  the  old  fort  of  Vaux  and  so  down  to  the  plain  of  the 
\\oevre  near  Fresnes. 

These  positions  east  of  the  Meuse  are  the  main  positions 
of  the  defence.  The  defence  is  not  concerned  with  pre- 
venting the  Germans  from  entering  the  town  or  ruins  of 
Verdun.  It  is  concerned  with  making  the  (iermans  lose 
as  many  men  as  possible  in  a  prolongation  of  their  attempt , 
and  it  is  concerned  with  letting  French  troops  which 
have  been  thus  maintained  almost  entirely  upon  the 
defensive,  lose  as  few  men  as  possible  in  this  task.  The 
French  are  not  defending  Verdun  even  if  (unreasonable  as 
the  phrase  sounds)  the  Germans  are  merely  trying  to 
enter  that  small  town.     The  French  are  using  the  Ger- 


mans' desire  to  enter  it  as  a  means  of  weakening  the 
Germans. 

Now  for  a  statement  of  the  events  as  they  have  de- 
veloped in  the  last  week. 

The  chief  effort  of  the  enemy  has  been  against  the  Mort 
Homme — Hill  304 — sector. 

On  \\ednesday,  May  3rd,  the  enemy  began  a  new 
intensive  bombardment  of  this  particular  narrow  sector 
\ipon  the  \'erdun  front. 

He  carried  on  this  bombardment  two  days  and  appears 
nowhere  to  have  exceeded  something  between  5,000  and 
6,000  yards  in  the  scope  of  this  artillery  preparation  from 
its  extreme  eastern  to  its  extreme  western  point.  All  this 
work  was  directed  against  the  north-western  slopes  which 
fall  gradually  upon  (i)  Avocourt  Wood,  (2)  the  northern 
slopes  of  Hill  304,  and  (3)  the  valley  between  the  Mort 
Homme  and  Hill  304.  Upon  Friday,  after  this  heavy 
artillery  preparation,  he  launched  about  one  division  along 
the  valley  Ijetwecn  the  two  hills  and  made  repeated 
efforts  to  pierce  between  them  and  to  carry  Hill  304. 

Up  to  that  evening — the  evening  of  Friday  the  5th — • 
he  had  completely  failed,  and  that  at  the  expense  of  very 
heavy  losses. 

Upon  the  Friday  night  and  the  Saturday  the  bombard- 
ment was  resumed.  Upon  the  Sunday,  May  7th,  with 
troops  estimated  at  the  equivalent  of  about  two  divisions, 
he  attacked  the  whole  front.  The  bombardment  had 
reduced  all  the  trenches  on  the  north  slope  of  Hill  304  to 
chaos.  ■  Before  nightfall  the  French  had  evacuated  these 
battered  trenches  on  the  northern  slope  of  Hill  304. 
They  had,  with  the  bayonet,  repulsed  all  the  German 
efforts  to  get  out  of  the  wood  on  the  north-west. 

Renewed  action  on  Monday  (the  8th)  led  to  no  further 
result  here.  The  French  held  and  still  hold  (at  the 
moment  of  writing),  the  summit  of  the  hill. 

The  total  result,  therefore,  in  the  small  central  portion 
of  about  four  days'  action  on  the  north  and  north-westerly 
slopes  of  the  flat-topped  height  is  that  the  French  line 


2000 


280 

Homrnz 


Esucs"  cATeaappartntlq  seized 
tni^nam£onSundcui& 
tostanam  on  'Monday. 


May  II  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


which   ran   originally   about   half  way   down   along   the 
northern  slopes  now  runs  along  the  crest. 

The  curious  result  following  upon  this  partial  gain  upon 
the  part  of  the  enemy  has  been  that  the  belt  between  the 
original  French  line  of  advanced  trenches  and  the  present 
line  upon  a  crest  is  a  No  Man's  Land.  If  the  enemy  had 
been  able  to  occupy  it  and  organise  it  after  compelling 
the  French  to  retire,  or  if  he  succeeds  in  doing  this  in  the 
immediate  future,  he  can  claim  a  considerable  advantage. 
He  will  then  lie  to  Hill  304  as  he  has  long  lain  towards 
the  Mort  Homme  ;  that  is,  in  the  immediate  neigh- 
bourhood of  its  summit. 

Such  a  situation  compels  the  defenders  either  to 
evacuate  the  height  or  to  reinforce. 

To  evacuate  the  height  means  probably  a  retirement 
uDon  the  second  line  towards  the  Charny  Ridge,  for  the 
Mort  Homme  and  Hill  304  are  the  two  capital  points 
of  the  first  line  ;  while  to  reinforce  and  to  take  back  the 
lost  ground,  though  a  mere  matter  of  concentration  in 
munitions  and  men,  is  expensive  in  both. 

We  know  what  happened  previously  in  the  case  of  the 
Mort  Homme.  The  French  command  decided  to 
render  it  secure  lea  days  ago  ;  they  delivered  a  bombard- 
ment against  the  German  trenches  immediately  below  its 
summit  ;  reinforced  the  covering  troops  there,  pushed 
the  Germans  down  the  slope  again,  and  got  elbow  room. 
The  last  enemy  assault  upon  Hill  304 — far  more 
expensive  in  men — was  a  reply  to  that  French  effort  on 
the  Mort  Homme  ;  and  we  have  yet  to  see  whether  the 
French  will  send  forward  reinforcements  to  recover  the 
now  abandoned  slopes  of  Hill  304,  or  whether  they  will 
decide  that  the  enemy's  losses  make  it  worth  while  to 
leave  things  as  they  are. 

Judging  by  the  French  policy  in  the  parallel  case  of  the 
Pepper  Hill,  on  the  other  side  of  the  Meuse,  and  its  oppos- 
ing hill  (called  the  Hill  of  Talou)  they  will  not  specially 
reinforce  this  sector,  but  will  be  content  to  leave  it  a 
No  Man's  Land.  It  is  swept  and  observed  from  every 
side,  but  only  the  immediate  future  can  tell  us  which  of 
the  two  policies  will  be  pursued. 

So  far  as  the  northern  slopes  of  Hill  304  are  concerned, 
therefore,  we  have  this  balance  sheet  for  the  week-end. 

The  enemy  has  thrown  away  a  far  greater  number  of 
men  than  it  has  :ost  the  French.  He  has  expended  the  very 
maximum  amount  of  munitions  which  he  can  expend 
upon  so  small  a  sector.  He  has  rendered  untenable  the 
northern  slopes  of  Hill  304,  which  the  French  have 
evacuated.  He  has  compelled  the  French  to  establish  a 
new  defensive  line  upon  the  northern  crest  of  the  hill. 
He  has  been  unable  himself  to  occupy  the  belt  thus 
evacuated  because  it  is  swept  by  fire  from  the  Mort  Homme 
in  flank  as  well  as  from  the  crest  of  Hill  304  in  front. 

But  there  are  two  other  points  in  this  very  small  field 
which  must  be  carefully  watched. 

The  first  is  the  easy  approach  up  to  Hill  304  from  the 
woods  that  climb  this  easy  side,  the  horn  called  the 
"  Wood  of  Avocourt."  This  was  the  approach  by  which 
the  enemy  attempted,  with  at  least  two  divisions,  a 
month  ago,  to  get  to  the  top  of  the  hill.  It  will  be 
remembered  that  he  was  broken  in  that  attempt,  that  his 
occupation  of  the  extremity  of  the  wood  was  easily  thrown 
back  and  that  this  gate,  as  it  were,  of  Hill  304  has  been 
closed  to  him  ever  since.  During  the  recent  main  attack 
upon  Hill  304  of  last  week-end  a  portion  of  his  troops 
tried  again  to  force  this  gate  and  were,  as  we  have  seen, 
defeated.  They  could  not  even  get'  out  of  the  woods 
towards  the  north-west  of  the  hill. 

The  second  point  in  the  field  to  be  carefully  noted  is 
the  ravine  which  lies  between  Mort  Homme  and  Hill  304. 
Here  the  enemy  had  a  very  distinct  success,  the  fruits 
of  which  he  was  able  to  gather  for  something  like  24  hours. 
His  troops  upon  this  left  wing  of  his  assault  carried  the 
French  front  trenches  and  penetrated  into  the  com- 
munication trench  beyond,  and  there  was  a  moment  at 
some  time  on  Sunday  afternoon  or  evening  when  his 
most  advanced  men  must  have  been  placed  somewhere 
between  the  two  hills. 

It  was  of  no  use  occupying  this  ravine  even  if  he  had 
had  time  to  consolidate  it  unless  he  had  proceeded  to 
attack  either  the  one  hill  or  the  other  immediately  from 
its  depths.  For  it  is  overlooked  thoroughly  from  both 
sides,  and  it  is  at  the  mercy  of  observation  from  both. 
But  he  was  not  given  the  time  to  consolidate  himself  in 
this  ravine.     Apparently  about  dusk  upon  the  Sunday 


evening,  at  any  rate  during  the  succeeding  night,  a 
counter-attack  drove  him  out  of  these  communication 
trenches  and  he  was  thrown  back  upon  his  original 
position  at  the  mouth  of  the  gully. 

In  the  course  of  these  attacks  upon  Hill  304  three 
divisions,  or  the  main  part  of  three  divisions,  were  used. 
One  has  been  identified  as  a  new  division  brought  from 
the  north  of  the  line.  It  was  a  Pomeranian  division. 
The  other  two  would  seem  to  be  as  yet  not  identified, 
but  the  enemy  in  his  communique  speaks  of  "Pome- 
ranian troops"  for  the  whole. 

With  the  German  account  of  these  actions  and  with 
their  significance  I  will  deal  later.  Upon  Monday  evening, 
th.e  last  date  with  regard  to  which  news  has  reached 
London,  the  whole  thing  may  be  summed  up  thus  : . 

The  Germans  had  brought  into  play,  first  and  last, 
the  best  part  of  three  divisions  against  Hill  304  in  the 
space  of  five  days. 

Their  attack  concerned  three  points  (i)  The  old  bit  of 
Avocourt  Wood  to  the  north-west  ;  (2)  The  centre  or 
northern  slopes  of  Hill  304  ;  (3)  The  ravine  between  Hill 
304  and  the  Mort  Homme. 

(i)  They  had  (against  what  French  covering  line  we 
know  not)  failed  altogether  at  the  easiest  point  of  ap- 
proach, the  Avocourt  Wood.  (2)  They  had  rendered 
untenable  the  northern  slopes  of  Hill  304  by  artillery 
work,  but  had  not. been  able  to  consolidate  the  evacuated 
belt  nor  to  put  infantry  into  it,  though  they  had  com- 
pelled the  French  to  establish  a  new  line  upon  the  crest. 
(3)  In  the  ravine  between  Hill  304  and  the  Mort  Homme 
they  had  pushed  forward  successfully  at  a  very  heavy 
expense  of  men  in  the  course  of  the  Sunday,  but  on  the 
Monday  lost  all  that  they  had  gained.  This  last  point, 
hovyever,  was  scored  by  the  French,  a  counter-offensive 
which  must  have  cost  a  certain  price  in  men. 

Attacks  East  of  the  Meuse 

Now  let  us  turn  to  their  efforts  east  of  the  Meuse, 
which  were  less  important  than  the  efforts  west  of  the 
Meuse  upon  the  Mort  Homme. 

They  there  launched  an  attack  with  something  between 
12,000  and  15,000  men  on  the  sector  just  west  of  the 
ruins  of  Douaumont  village.  They  occupied  at  an 
expense  in  losses  of  perhaps  3  or  4  thousand  men,  about 
a  third  of  a  mile  of  first  line  trenches  in  the  course  of  the 
same  Sunday.  It  was  thought  worth  while  by  the 
defence  to  send  reinforcements  and  to  drive  the  assailants 
out  of  the  greater  part  of  this  small  gain  in  the 
course  of  the  Monday.  This  being  done  matters  came 
to  a  standstill  for  the  moment  and  the  lines  no  longer 
moved. 

What  enemy  regiments  were  used  upon  this  sector  we 
have  not  been  told,  but  the  F>ench  have  described  them 
in  general  terms  as  "  Prussian  "  :  the  point  is  of  some 
significance,  as  we  shall  see  in  a  moment. 

Now  let  us  analyse  these  very  general  and  imperfect 
statements  with  which  we  have  been  furnished  and  see 
what  we  can  make  of  the  enemy's  intentions. 

We  note  the  following  points  :  — 

(r)  An  attack  in  considerable  strength  has  been  de- 
livered after  a -lull  of  a  whole  fortnight,  during  which 
there  has  been  no  serious  effort  upon  the  part  of  the 
enemy  in  this  sector. 

(2), It  has  been  delivered  a  full  month  after  the  last 
great  effort,  for  there  has  been  no  general  offensive 
upon  his  part  since  April  the  gth. 

(3)  It  has  been  delivered  with  those. troops  which  he 
coiints  the  best,  his  Pomeranian  regiments  and  other 
Prussian  units  not  particularly  specified.  ,   ,  . 

(4)  It  has  achieved  exactly  what  has  been  achieved -in 
the  past  at  almost  exactly  the  same  ratio  of  very  heavy 
expense  to  very  slight  and  tactically  insignificant  ad- 
vances. 

(5)  The  one  point  which  seems  tactically  significant 
to  the  defence,  the  ravine  between  the  two  hills,  was 
recovered  by  the  defence  at  the  expense  of  a-successful, 
though  no  doubt  locally  expensive  counter-offensive. 

(6)  (And  most  important  of  all)  there  is  no  evidence 
of  his  having  moved  his  heavy  artillery  ;  for  the  attack 
has  been  delivered  upon  a  piece  of  ground,  the  prepara- 
tion of  which  by  bombardment  has  already  been  familiar 
to  the  defence  for  more  than  six  weeks.     There  has  been 


L  A  X  D      cS:      W  A  T  E  R 


AFav  IT,  lorr) 


no  development  of  heavj'  artillery  action  against  any 
new  part  of  the  front. 

It  is  perfectly  clear  from  these  six  points  that  the 
enemy  was  doinp  no  more  than  continuing  an  attack 
which  he  knew  to  be,  in  a  military  sense,  already  a  failure. 
It  is  comparable  to  his  last  efforts  against  Ypres  in  the 
second  week  of  November,  1914.  If  he  hoped  at  all  for 
a  miracle  at  the  end  of  his  effort  he  would  at  least  have 
concentrated  the  largest  possible  body  and  made  his  last 
blow  as  strong  as  it  could  be.  Just  as  in  front  of  Ypres, 
at  the  end  of  that  tremf-ndous  effort  he  put  forward  for 
the  close  what  he  believed  to  be  his  best  troops,  on  that 
occasion  the  tiuards,  on  this  occasi(m  jjicked  regiments. 
Just  as  in  front  of  Ypres,  he  admitted  failure  at  the  end  of 
such  a  sacrirtce.  Again,  just  as  at  Ypres.  he  attempted 
nothing  novel  towards  the  end  of  his  last  action.  I'ov 
that  matter  you  have  another  still  more  striking  parallel 
in  the  case  of  the  Grand  Couronne,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  where,  having  laid  his  plan  for  an  attack  in  force 
upon  a  defensive  position,  and  having  tried,  now  here,  now 
there,  along  its  length  to  obtain  a  decision,  1»'  struck  during 
the  last  days  exactly  where  he  had  been  striking  beforr, 
without  any  attempt  at  surprise  or  at  maU'euvrc. 
Apparently  his  calculations  luul  been  too  minute  or  his 
confidence  in  subordinate  command  ton  doubtful  to  j^ht- 
mit  of  change.  Hut  there  is  this  great  difference  between 
Ypres  and  (irand  Couronne  on  the  one  hand  and  Verdmi 
upon  the  other,  that  the  (irand  Couronne  lasted  a  week, 
Ypres  three  weeks.     Verdun  has  lasted  eleven. 

There  were  lulls  before  the  last  Hicker  of  the  failure  at 
Ypres.  There  were  lulls  of  a  day  or  a  day  and  a  half  or 
two  days.  Earlier,  at  the  Grand  Couronne,  there  had 
been  lulls  of  half  a  day,  or  a  few  hours.  Here  at  Verdun 
there  has  been  a  lull  of  something  like  a  month  in  major 
operations  and  of  a  fortnight  even  in  minor  operations. 
What  does  all  that  mean  ? 

It  means  in  the  first  place,  that  Verdun  has  been  upon 
such  a  scale  as  would  seem  to  prove  the  enemy's  deter- 
mination to  stake  all  upon  it. 

Opinion  is  divided  as  to  whether  he  can  find  the  re- 
sources for  one  more  great  offensi\-e  before  he  reluctantly 
determines  upon  a  concentration  of  strength  and  the 
admitted  entry  into  the  last  phase  of  the  war.  Class 
1917  has  not  yet  been  used  on  a  large  scale  by  him,  so 
far  as  (iermany  is  concerned  (it  has  all  been  called  up  in 
Austria).  Class  1016  alone  has  been  absorbed.  He  yet 
has  to  call  upon  class  icjiS,  which  has  been  warned  in 
Austria,  but  which  has  not,  I  believe,  yet  been  warned  in 
North  (iermany.  There  has  been  a  rumour  of  its  being 
warned,  but  no  more.  He  may  have  the  material  left 
in  his  own  judgment  for  one  more  throw.  At  any  rate, 
this  continued  return  to  the  Verdun  sector  without  any 
rearrangement  of  heavy  guns,  and  at  increasingly  long 
inten'als  for  recuperation,  shows  upon  what  a  scale  he 
had  planned  his  attempted  success — and  gives  us  a 
measure  of  his  corresponding  failure. 

The  next  point  the  affair  suggests,  is  this  : 
Was  not  an  effort,  so  futile  in  the  military  sense  (it 
has  been  futile  for  weeks),  connected  with  the  enemy's 
present  political  demand  for  peace  } 

The  Enemy  Demand  for  Peace 

That  the  enemy  does  now  desire  some  spectacular 
fffect  in  connection  with  his  demand  for  peace  cannot  be 
doubted  by  any  careful  observer  of  the  war.  I  do  not 
mean  his  general  demand — that  has  been  in  progress 
ever  since  last  October,  when  hej  knew  that  he  was  at 
the  maximum  of  his  territorial  expansion  in  the  East, 
when  he  had  just  failed  to  obtain  his  decision  against 
the  Russians  at  \'ilna.  and  when  he  threatened  if  the 
advances  he  had  made  were  not  favonrably  received  to 
raise  the  East  against  lis  ;  when,  I  may  add,  he  very 
thoroughly  frightened  a  certain  section  of  our  own  press, 
which,  upon  his  futile  advance  in  the  Bcdkans,  published 
maps  showing  the  imminence  of  a  triinnphant  (German 
march  upon  India  and  Egypt.  That  he  has  thought  an 
inconclusive  peace  necessary  to  him  has  been  clear  from 
at  least  that  date,  even  in  his  open  manoeuvres;  his 
private  advances  when  the  history  of  the  thing  is  written 
will  be  conclusive  evidence. 

But,  1  now  refer  to  the  particular  demand  which  he  is 
certainly  making  at  this  moment. 

We  liave  evidence  of  that  uarticnlar  demand  in  several 


places.  It  is  set  down  in  black  and  white  in  the  Note  to 
America.  It  appears  in  the  rumours  set  afloat  with 
regard  to  the  intervention  of  the  Vatican  ;  but  m  uch 
more  clearly  docs  it  appear  in  the  German  press  which 
is  controlled  and  in  part  written  by  the  political  authori- 
ties of  the  country.  The  whole  tone  of  that  press  may 
be  summed  up  in  the  words  which  one  of  the  so-called 
"  Socialist  deputies  "  (called  by  their  comrades  "  the 
tame  men,"  who  act  as  go-betweens  for  the  Government), 
used  probably  upon  Government  order  "  neither-side  can 
now  win  this  war." 

Exactly  the  same  note  has  been  struck  by  a  man 
who  is  upon  the  whole  the  ablest  of  the  paid  agents  in 
the  service  of  Prussia,  the  Poli.sh  Jew  Witowski,  better 
known  to  the  public  of  this  country  under  the  convenient 
alias  of  "  Maximihen  Harden." 

This  man  is  invaluable  to  the  German  authorities  in 
the  r6le  of  the  "  candid  friend."  He  has  been  theatrically 
"  exiled,"  so  that  men  may  say,  "  he  at  least  is  indepen- 
dent." He  has  returned,  and  the  German  censorship 
prints  his  repeated  declarations  that  the  war  is  really 
getting  very  horrible,  and  that  the  time  has  come  for  it  to 
stop.  Nothing  of  that  sort  passed  the  censor  at  Spandau.  or 
to  be  more  accurate,  nothing  of  that  sort  proceeded  from 
his  office,  when  the  .Allies  were  still  in  doubt  of  victory  ! 

The  German  communiques  themselves  are  illuminating 
in  this  connection,  especially  those  which  concern  the 
last  o{)erations  in  front  of  Verdun.  They  are  directly 
calculated  to  affect  neutral  and  domestic  civilian  opinion 
even  at  the  expense  of  hurting  their  own  side  in  the  eyes 
of  the  soldiers  opposed  to  them.  What  other  possible 
meaning  can  there  be  in  the  use  of  calculatedly  false 
jihrases  like  "  we  hold  the  height."  when  they  do  not 
happen  to  hold  the  summit?  What  is  the  "sense  of 
saying  that  their  troops  are  in  a  particular  position  when 
no  one  knows  better  than  the  Command  opposed  to  them 
that  they  are  not  in  that  position. 

Or  take  again  the  remarks  upon  the  French  rotation  of 
troops  in  front  of  Verdun.  If  there  is  one  thing  of  which 
an  offensive  should  be  proud  and  upon  which  in  a  military 
sense  it  should  insist  if  it  wants  to  show  that  it  is  winning, 
it  is  surely  the  exhaustion  of  the  defence. 

In  such  a  defence  as  that  of  Verdun,  where  there  is  no 
investment  and  where  the  defending  troops  are  known 
to  be  superior  in  number  to  the  attack,  the  power  to 
refresh  those  troops  by  continual  rotation  is  an  essential 
test  of  the  strength  the  defensive  has  at  its  dipsosal. 
Where  on  earth  is  the  point  of  noting  the  case  with  which 
the  French  can  thus  use  fresh  troops  in  rotation  if  it  is 
not  to  impress  uninistructed  opinion  with  the  idea  that 
the  lo.sses  of  such  a  defensive  are  actually  higher  than 
the  losses  of  the  corresponding  offensive  ?  There  may 
be  opinion  so  uninstructed  that  it  is  capable  of 
entertaining  that  idea.  Probably  the  German  Intelli- 
gence Department,  or  at  any  rate  the  German  Publicity 
Bureaux  is  acquainted  with  such  sections  of  opinion, 
or  it  would  not  waste  energy  in  playing  upon  them. 
But  what  a  confession  !  To  be  reduced  to  impressing 
the  kind  of  people  who  think  that  a  defensive  easily 
drawing  upon  50  divisions  for  short  periods  of  strain  is 
weaker  than  an  offensive  using  j2  divisions  subjected  to 
impossible  strains  on  the  offence,  broken,  recruited,  sent 
forward  again,  broken  again  in  nearly  three  months  of  a 
hopeless  effort  ! 

It  is  conceivable  that  the  enemy  in  his  present  effort 
for  peace  is  not  uninfluenced  by  noting  that  sort  of  false 
news,  or  false  emphasis  upon  true  news,  in  the  AUied  press 
which  arises  out  of  domestic  intrigue  or  political  am- 
bition. 

A  curious  example  of  the  way  in  which  opinion  can 
thus  be  misled,  was  afforded  .some"  Httle  time  ago  by  the 
publication  in  the  Times  of  the  General  Staff  Map  estab- 
lishing the  German  units  in  front  of  the  British  line  in 
France. 

The  map  was  accurate,  and  people  concluded  from  it  as 
they  vyere  meant  to  conclude— that  in  spite  of  all  the 
enemy's  efforts  upon  the  Verdun  sector  he  had  been  under 
no  necessity  to  draw  men  from  parts  of  his  line  to  the 
north  of  that  sector.  On  the  other  hand,  the  French 
command  in  front  of  the  Verdun  sector  had  identified 
the  presence  of  divisions  undoubtedly  drawn  from 
northern  portions  of  the  line  and  even  from  in  front  of 
the  British. 
How  is  this  discrepancy  accounted  for  > 


May  II,  191G 


LAND      &     W  A  r  E  R 


In  the  simplest  of  all  possible  fashions.  The  niai) 
published  in  the  Times  was  accurate  for  the  moment  at 
which  it  was  drawn  up,  but  not  for  the  moment  at  which 
it  was  published.  It  referred  to  a  state  of  affairs  already 
a  month  old  when  the  portentous  revelation  was  made. 
•  Sometimes  news  of  this  sort  is  simply  untrue — as,  for 
instance,  the  silly  falsehood  that  the  ample  munitionment 
in  the  f;reat  offensive  of  last  September  was  due  to  the 
establishment  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions.  Not  a  shell 
tired  in  that  great  offensive  was  produced  by  the  special 
activity  of  any  politician.  Every  one  had  been  pro- 
duced by  the  organisation  of  the  soldiers  before  any 
pohtical  and  personal  question  had  been  made  of  the 
matter.  Similarly  the  two  startling  announcements  on 
which  I  commented  some  months  ago,  one  of  which  cut 
down  the  German  losses  by  a  million,  the  other  of  which 
brought  several  thousand  Germans  to  life,  each  in  the 
course  of  seven  or  eight  days. 

But  it  really  does  not  matter  whether  the  information 
thus  permitted  to  appear  is  misleading  in  one  fashion  or 
another.  The  only  thing  that  matters  is  motive.  So 
long  as  it  is  not  the  simple  motive  of  recording  the 
truth  and  thus  enabling  public  judgment  to  be  sound- 
it  is  a  bad  motive  and  adversely  affects  the  moral  power 
of  a  nation  at  war. 

A  Corroboration  of  the  Enemy's    Falsification 
of  His  Casualty  Lists 

I  have  received  from  a  correspondent  whose  prolession 
and  whose  opportunities  and  reputation  give  him  unique 
authority,  remarkable  confirmation  of  the  chscrepancy 
between  the  official  German  lists  of  losses  and  the  truth. 

This  confirmation  attaches  to  only  one  small  portion  of 
the  field,  but  it  is  characteristic  and  fits  in  most  accurately 
with  the  larger  calculations, 

It  applies  to  the  losses  in  the  Medical  Profession  of  the 
German  Empire  alone. 

The  official  casualty  lists  give  of  fuUy'qualified  military 
doctors  killed  or  died  during  the  course  of  the  war  up  to 
the  end  of  1915  466  names.  This  is,  of  course,  allowing 
for  the  delay  in  the  publication  of  names,  and  this  number 
466  represents  (allowing  for  such  delay)  the  total  ad- 
mitted number  in  the  officially  publishecl  lists. 

Now  the  checking  of  this  by  private  lists  yields  almost 
exactly  the  same  result  as  was  yielded  in  the  case  of 
immensely  more  numerous  names  of  the  larger  categories 
dealt  with  in  an  article  published  three  months  ago  in 
these  columns,  to  wit,  a  discrepancy  of  rather  less  than 
20  per  cent. 

Private  lists  were  estabHshed  by  carefully  going  over 
the  names  given  in  three  leading  German  Medical  papers, 
the  Deutsche  Mcdizinischc  weekly  ;  the  Bediner  Klinische 
and  the  Miinchencr  Mcdizinische.  A  great  number  of 
these  names,  of  coiu'se,  overlapped,  and  were  found  in 
all  three  papers.  Many  were  found  in  two ;  a  few 
occurred  in  one  only.     Their  total  gives  565  ! 

The  value  of  these  private  lists  lay,  exactly  as  in  the 
larger  examples  given  last  February,  in  the  fact  that 
they  were  more  detailed  and  presumably  more  exhaustive. 

In  each  case  the  full  name,  address  and  status  of  the 
individual  concerned  was  printed.  Only  the  names  of 
those  who  had  been  killed  or  died  on  active  service  were 
considered,  and  only  the  doctors  of  full  status.  Medical 
students  or  candidates  (that  is,  those  who  had  passed  their 
first  examination)  were  not  included. 

That  the  number  565  is  at  once  accurate  and  a  mini- 
mum, there  can,  seeing  the  detailed  information  gi\'en, 
be  no  doubt  whatsoever,  and  the  discrepancy  between 
it  and  the  number  drawn  from  the  officieil  lists  is  17' 5 J 
per  cent.  In  other  words,  the  official  lists  represent  only 
82-47  t*^  the  truth. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  discrepancy  between 
the  larger  numbers  of  the  Trades  Unions,  the  Athletic 
Societies,  etc.,  gave  a  discrepancy  of  close  on  19  per  cent. 
The  official  lists  in  these  larger  cases  were  a  little  over 
81  per  cent,  of  this  number.  The  coincidence  is  remark- 
able and  instructive.  One  would  imagine  that  the  names 
omitted  in  the  case  of  a  distinguished  profession  would  be 
somewhat  less  than  the  average  of  omissions  for  the  mass 
of  the  army,  and  that  is  precisely  what  we  get  from  this 
calculation.  The  discrepancy  in  the  case  of  the  doctors 
is  not  the  full  19  per  cent.,  but  somewhat  less.  It  is  not 
so  greatly  less,  however,  as  to  disturb  our  general  con- 


clusion. A  little  less  than  K)  per  cent,  for  the  mas3 
and  somewhat  over  17  per  cent,  for  a  specially  distin- 
guished jjrofession  is  a,  divergence  natural  enough,  and 
the  one  figure  confirms  the  other. 

The  imjjortance  of  the  evidence  lies  in  the  fact  that  we 
can  in  the  case  of  tliese  small  numbers  and  of  a  limited 
iield  in  which  every  man  is  known,  establish  the  truth 
without  contention  and  beyond  all  possibility  of  doubt. 
If  there  is  a  discrepancy  of  over  17  per  cent,  between  the 
official  and  the  private  lists  in  the  deaths  of  doctors,  we 
can  be  absolutely  certain  that  at  any  rate  a  larger  dis- 
crepancy in  the  case  of  the  mass  of  the  army  is  to  be 
presumed  ;  and  the  arguments  of  those  critics,  who  wiU 
have  it  that  the  German  Empire  is  too  efficient  and  too 
organised  and  the  rest  of  it,  to  mishandle  its  pfficial 
statistics,  falls  to  the  ground.  It  is  the  case  of  a  par- 
ticular and  indisputable  piece  of  proof  against  a  general 
vague  mood. 

I  must  rejjcat  what  has  so  often  been  said  when  this 
question  has  been  raised,  that  the  chscrepancy  between 
the  official  lists  of  German  casualties  and  the  truth  does 
not  imply  any  elaborate  system  of  false  book-keeping, 
nor  even  in  the  greater  number  of  cases,  perhaps  in  all 
cases,  any  deliberate  individual  mis-statement.  All  it 
means  is  that  the  (Jovcrnment  which  wants  to  keep  down 
returns  sees  that  its  records  are  kept  on  "the  right  side." 
When  there  is  any  row  or  any  confusion,  any  loss  of 
documents  or  any  prolonged  delay  in  furnishing  them, 
those  who  draw  up  the  official  lists  presumably  give  them- 
selves the  benefit  of  all  such  circumstances,  and  the  general 
result  is  a  minimising  of  the  true  losses.  I  have  already 
suggested  in  former  calculations  the  special  ways  in  which 
this  phenomenon  would  appear.  Men  who  die  at  home 
after  being  discharged  from  hospital  can  be  omitted  from 
the  official  lists.  Men  whose  death  is  long  uncertain  can 
be  kept  off  the  official  lists,  and  may  then  in  the  long 
run  never  appear  there.  There  will  also,  it  must  be 
ac*".iitted,  be  a  certain  overlapping  between  those  marked 
as  missing  and  those  who  turn  out  ultimately  to  be 
dead.  In  certain  cases  all  the  documents  of  a  unit  will 
be  lost.  We  know  that  this  has  happened  with  several 
units  during  the  retreat  from  the  Marne  and  upon  the 
Kussian  front.  To  give  but  one  example  :  The  case  of  a 
whole  battalion  of  the  loth  reserve  Corps  in  the  third 
day  of  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  near  Esternay,  and  that 
is  only  one  instance  out  of  many  which  occurs  to  me. 

We  are  under  no  necessity  to  imagine  peculiar  cunning 
or  villainy  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  Things  left  to 
themselves  would  produce  the  result  I  have  shown, 
and  any  government  desiring  to  keep  the  figures  as  low 
as  possible  would  arrive  at  results  below  the  true  total. 

At  any  rate,  whatever  the  cost  may  be,  we  have  in  this 
particularly  small  but  important  example  an  exact  corro- 
boration of  the  conclusions  arrived  at  bv  all  the  best 
observers  in  this  matter.  H.  Belloc 


Sovtes  Sbakeepeatiana^ 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE 


The  German  Note   to  America : 

These  sentences,  to  sugar  or  to  gait. 
Being  sii'ong  on  both  sides,  are  equivocal. 

Othello  I.,  iii,  216-7. 


The   Daylight    Saving  Bill : 

There  is^ome  soul  of  goodness  in  things  evil. 

Would  men  observingly  distil  it  out ; 

For  our   bad   neighbour  makes   us    early 

stirrers. 
Which  is  both  healthful,  and  good  husbandry. 

Henry  V.,   IV..  i..  4-7. 

To  Rtxruiting  Sergeants  under  the  New 

Bill: 

This  is  your  charge :  you  shall  com- 
prehend all  vagrom  jnen  ;  you  are  to  bid 
any  man  stand,  in  the  Prince  s  name. 

Much  Ada  About  Nothing  III.,  iii.,  26-8. 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  II,  1916 


THE    GERMAN    SURRENDER 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


THE  German  reply  to  President  Wilson,  with  its 
characteristic  jumble  of  rodomontade,  prevarica- 
tion and  idle  repetitions  of  things  all  the  world 
knows  to  be  untrue,  will  hardly  have  surprised 
those  who  have  followed  the  discussion  of  the  Washington- 
Berlin  controversy  in  these  columns.  The  dismissal  of 
von  Tirpitz  in  the  early  weeks  of  March  made  it  clear 
what  it  was  that  the  German  higher  conmiand  uishcd 
to  do.  It  defined  the  attitude  that  had  ultimately  to 
be  taken  towards  America.  It  was  the  agitation  of 
the  jingoes  that  deflected  the  Government  from 
its  purpose.  The  reply  published  on  the  eve  of  the 
Lusilania  anniversary  is  the  Emperor's  effort  to  regain 
control  of  the  situation.  He  had  to  deal  with  a  tangled 
and  difficult  situation.  He  had  to  address  the  neutrals 
of  America,  he  had  to  cow  and  bring  into  line  those  of 
his  subjects  who  had  taken  his  previous  boastings  as 
literally  true,  he  had  to  do  this  without  unsaying  too 
much  of  what  he  had  already  said,  and  he  had  to  remember 
that  every  word  that  was  written  would  be  read  by  his 
enemies  as  well  as  by  his  friends.  It  is  no  wonder  that 
there  was  considerable  doubt  as  to  what  it  all  meant. 
The  London  press,  disclaiming  dictation  to  America, 
was  almost  unanimous  in  insisting  that  the  reply  did  not 
meet  the  American  demands.  The  American  press  was 
more  divided.  Some  writers  looked  upon  the  note  as  a 
mere  effort  to  gain  time,  an  obviously  dishonest  con- 
tinuation of  that  inconclusive  word  splitting  of  which 
the  American  public  is  after  twelve  months  excusably 
weary.  Others  took  it  to  be  a  sufficient  concession  to 
America,  though  by  no  means  all  that  was  asked  for. 
Others  again  saw  in  it  as  definite  a  German  surrender 
as  could  possibly  be  expected.  There  is  certainly  much 
in  the  note  that  stands  in  sharp  conflict  with  this  last 
being  even  a  tenable  view,  but  for  all  that  I  cannot  help 
thinking  it  was  the  right  one.  I  read  it  to  say  that 
Germany  had  given  definite  orders  that  submarines  are 
no  longer  to  sink  any  ships  at  sight,  nor  at  all,  without 
ensuring  the  safety'  of  those  on  board.  These  orders 
of  course  may  be  rescinded.  With  superfluous  frankness 
Germany  has  gone  so  far  as  to  say  that  she  reserves 
her  freedom  of  action.  And  those  that  have  followed  the 
story  hitherto  will  have  no  difficulty  in  seeing  that  this 
resers-ation  is  necessary,  not  because  America  is  expected 
to  press  for  a  modification  of  the  British  blockade,  but 
beicause  what  has  happened  in  Germany  before  may  happen 
again.  The  dynasty  having  nourished  its  dupes  in  the 
absurd  belief  that  the  Central  Powers  are  already  vic- 
torious on  land  and  can  be  made  victorious  on  sea  by 
the  submarine  blockade  of  Britain,  may,  in  spite  of  every- 
thing, still  have  to  choose  between  a  final  conviction  at 
the  bar  of  German  public  opinion  and  a  final  effort  to 
make  good  its  promise.  But  for  the  present  it  can 
hardly  be  disputed  that  the  note  complies  in  all  essentials 
with  the  American  demand,  and  that  for  the  moment 
the  trading  ships  of  the  world  are  safe  from  unseen  and 
sudden  attack  and  that  the  crisis  with  America  is  post- 
poned. 

The  American  Terms 

The  indications  at  the  moment  of  writing,  that  is  on 
Tuesday  morning,  are,  that  President  Wilson  will  act 
upon  this  view.  In  doing  so  he  will  not  be  deluded  by 
the  idea  that  it  is  safe  to  accept  German  statements 
at  their  face  value.  I'ltimately  the  relations  between 
the  two  countries  will  be  decided  not  by  words  but  by 
actions.  And  the  question  of  the  moment  is,  not  what 
(ierniany  will  do  but  what  she  has  done.  Is  the  reply 
one  that  would  seem  to  justify  the  President  in  accepting 
it  as  satisfactory  ? 

To  answer  this  we  must  see  exactly  what  it  was  that 
America  asked,  and  so  far  as  it  can  be  disentangled  from 
the  note,  exactly  what  it  is  that  Germany  yields. 

As  to  the  American  demand,  n9  doubt  can  possibly 
exist. 

The  note  of  April  20th  put  the  issue  into  the  plainest 
English-  conceivable.      Before  the  submarine  campaign 


began,  it  said,  America  had  protested  that  the  thrca 
was  incompatible  both  with  law  and  with  the  highe'' 
justice  upon  which  law  is  based  :  the  past  twelve  months 
had  shown  the  reality  to  be  worse  than  the  threat.  The 
hopes  raised  by  German  promises  to  amend  had  been 
blasted.  The  case  of  the  Sussex  had  completed  the 
lessons  of  the  Lusitania  and  Arabic,  and  now  no  possible 
doubt  was  left  that  the  employment  of  the  submarine 
for  the  destruction  of  enemy  trade  was  "completely  irrecon- 
cilable with  the  principles  of  humanity,  the  undisputed 
rights  of  neutrals,  and  the  sacred  privileges  of  non-com- 
batants." "  So  that  if  the  Imperial  Government  should 
not  now,  without  delay,  proclaim  and  make  cffcctivo 
renunciation  of  77s  present  methods  of  submarine  warfare 
against  passenger  and  cargo  ships,  the  United  States  can 
have  no  choice  than  to  break  off  completely  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  German  Government."  Gennany  had 
to  choose  between  submission  and  defiance.  She  has 
made  a  defiant  submission. 

The  German  Dilemma 

The  tone  of  the  reply  is  explained  by  the  circumstances 
in  which  it  was  written.  They  are  familiar  to  the 
reader.  When  the  outbreak  of  popular  frenzy  forced 
the  Government's  hand,  after  von  Tirpitz's  dismissal,  the 
sink-at-sight  campaign  was  begun,  though  its  author  was 
no  longer  behind  it.  It  began  disastrously,  if  it  was 
meant  to  be  consistent  with  remaining  friendly  with 
America.  First,  two  Dutch  passenger  ships  were  sunk. 
Finally,  the  Sussex  was  torpedoed  with  nearly  100 
Americans  on  board.  That  all  these  cases  were  outside 
of  the  commander's  instructions  did  not  alter  Germany's 
actual  guilt.  The  dangerous  folly  of  the  thing  had 
become  manifest,  and,  as  we  have  often  seeo,  the 
problem  that  the  Kaiser  and  his  Chancellor  had  to  settle 
was  not  what  to  do,  but  how  to  do  it. 

If  the  reader  will  put  himself  into  the  position  of 
these  two  harassed  men.  he  will  realise  without  difficulty 
that  the'  Note  had  to  achieve  three  separate,  and 
inconsistent  purposes.  First,  it  must  save  the  face 
of  the  German  higher  command.  For  this  purpose,  it 
must  repeat  the  stale  and  foolish  lies  that  had  done 
duty  so  often  before.  It  must  repeat  them  because 
the  German  jingoes  believe  them  to  be  true.  Incredible 
as  it  may  appear  to  us,  the  German  docs  believe 
that  the  British  blockade,  which  was  proclaimed  in  the 
middle  of  March  of  last  year,  actually  preceded  the  pro- 
clamation of  the  German  war  zone,  which  was  published 
more  than  a  month  before.  He  accepts  without  question 
the  statement  that  the  campaign  was  directed  against 
British  cargo  ships  only — although  in  the  fifteen  months 
of  the  campaign  half  as  many  neutrals  as  British  ships 
have  been  attacked,  while,  two  neutral  and  near  a  dozen 
belligerent  liners  have  been  sent  to  the  bottom  unwarned. 
Although,  after  more  than  a  year  of  this  onslaught  on 
our  trade,  British  imports  and  exports  show  an  increase, 
and  not  a  decrease,  though  there  is  not  a  single  necessity, 
and  lamentably  few  luxuries  that  the  British  people 
m'ust  deny  themselves,  he  still  implicitly  believes  that 
the  campaign  has  only  to  be  continued  for  famine  to 
bring  us  to  our  knees.  In  spite  of  hunger  he  does  not 
yet  'realise  the  fatal  handicap  of  sea  impotence.  He 
thinks  Germany  can  win  despite  British  sea  supremacy. 
He  believes  these  things  because  the  Government  has 
told  him  so  and  the  Government  cannot  unsay  what  it 
has  said,  and  so  it  must  repeat  them  now. 

Having  thus  saved  its  face,  the  higher  command  must 
next  make  a  seeming  virtue  of  necessity  by  making  it 
appear  an  alternative — and  perhaps  a  swifter — means 
of  gaining  the  very  end  the  submarine  campaign  itself 
was  to  achieve.  The  Note  accordingly  states  that  Ger- 
many confidently  expects  America  to  force  Great  Britain 
to  abandon  her  illegalities  and  follow  the  laws  of  humanity. 
Should  America  not  succeed,  Germany,  says  the  Note, 
will  reserve  her  freedom  of  action.  All  this  will  sound 
very  fine  to  the  German  reader.  It  makes  the  surrender 
look  Uke  a  bargain.     But  the  German  Government  knows 


May  II,  1916 


L  A  N  D 


& 


that  America  has  never  questioned  our  blockade  pro- 
ceedings on  the  ground  of  humanity'.  It  knows  that 
there  never  was  and  never  will  be  any  American  effort  to 
stop  our  exercise  of  sea  rights,  or  to  check  the  legal  sale 
of  American  munitions.  Nor  will  the  pathos  of  the 
starving  German  arouse  the  sympathy  of  those  who, 
in  their  civil  war,  compelled  the  rebels  to  surrender  by 
cutting  off  their  sea  supplies.  No  one  knows  better  that 
America  perfectly  understands  the  difference  between  the 
legitimate  and  illegitimate  use  of  sea  force.  But  so  long 
as  the  German  reader  does  not  see  that  this  request  for 
American  help  in  breaking  the  blockade  is  not  a  condition 
of  Germany's  surrender,  but  a  sort  of  bullying  appendage 
to  it,  then'it  does  duty  as  the  only  kind  of  gilding  that 
would  make  a  pill  go  down.      1 

Finally,  the  higher  command  must  silence  the  jingoes 
by  pointing  out  to  them  that  a  quarrel  with  America 
would  be  disastrous.     The  Note,  accordingly,  after  recit- 
ing that  the  Central  Powers  have  been  offering  peace 
right  and  left  just  because  they  are  so  powerful,  says  : — 
'■With  all  the  stronger  justification  can  the  German 
Government  declare  that  it  would  be  an  act  which 
could  never  be  vindicated  in  the  eyes  of  humanity  or 
of  history  to  allow,  after  twenty-one  months  of  war, 
a  controversy  which  has  arisen  out  of  the  submarine 
warfare    to    assume    a    development    which    \\ould 
seriously   menace   peace   between   the   German   and 
American  peoples." 

The  Surrender 

So  far  the  reply  is  purely  for  home  consumption.     What 
is  its  substance  in  face  of  the  American  demand  ?     The 
demand,  as  we  have  seen,  was  for  an  immediate  renuncia- 
tion of  inhuman  practices.  ^  The  reply  is  in  these  words  : — • 
"  The  German  naval  forces  have  received  the  following 
order  :    In  accordance  with  the  general  principles  of 
visit  and  search  and  the  destruction  of  merchantmen 
recognised  by  international  law,   such   vessels,   both 
wtihin   and   without   the   area   declared   a   naval   war 
zone,  shall  not  be  sunk  without  warning  and  without 
the  saving  of  human  lives,  rmless  the  ships  attempt 
to  escape  or  to  offer  resistance." 
There  are  several  things  to  be  noticed  about  this.     It 
is  not  a  renunciation  in  words  but  in  act,  and  of  course 
remains  a  renunciation  only  so  long  as  those  orders  remain 
in  force,  and  are  obeyed.     But  is  not  the  specific  order  of 
more  worth  than  any  explicit  promise  ?    Note  next,  that 
there  is  here  no  discrimination  that  excludes  either  armed 
ships  or  cargo  vessels  from  the  observance  of  civilised 
procedure.     Nor  is  any  distinction  made  between  the 
war  zone  and  the  unproclaimed  sections  of  the  sea.     It 
is  then  an  executive  act  that  abandons  all  the  subterfuges 
that   have   done   previous   duty  in   the  controversy.     I 
cannot  see  how  any  form  of  words  can  be  more  explicit 
or  more  complete. 

Its  Effect 

Its  effect  upon  the  war  must  naturally  be  of  con- 
siderable importance.  If  submarines  can  only  sink  where 
they  visit,  search  and  save,  their  activities  must  be  very 
much  restricted.  And  w:hile  I  am  not  one  of  those  who 
have  ever  believed  that,  however  ruthless  their  attacks 
might  be,  any  serious  national  danger  could  result  from 
them,  it  has  long  been  obvious  that  if  the  rate  of  destruc- 
tion was  higher  than  our  rate  of  new  construction,  a  great 
deal  of  very  serious  inconvenience  must  result,  both  to  us 
and  to  our  Allies.  We  should  be  foolish  if  we  relied  on 
the  reprieve  which  Mr.  Wilson's  diplomacy  has  secured, 
and  excused  ourselves  from  further  effort  either  to 
destroy  German  submarines  or  replace  the  ships  they 
have  sunk.  The  campaign  of  March  and  April  un- 
doubtedly exhibited  the  high  water  mark  of  what  sub- 
marine attack  could  do.  It  is  by  no  means  obvious 
that  we  have  reached  the  high  water  mark  of  what  our 
shipbuilders  can  do.  We  know,  of  course,  from  Lord 
Curzon's  recent  reply  in  the  House  of  Lords,  that  ship- 
building has  been  made  war  work,  and  that  the  Admiralty 
has  removed  all  difficulties  from  the  way  of  building 
merchant  tonnage.  But  it  would  seem  more  logical  ^or 
the  Government  to  undertake  the  construction  of  this 
tonnage  itself.  It  is,  after  all,  our  own  Government,  and 
not  the  Germans,  who  have  brought  our  available  mer- 


W  A  T  E  R  9 

chant  tonnage  low.  And  of  all  forms  of  naval  short- 
sightedness, the  strangest  surely  was  the  abstraction  of 
half  our  merchant  ships  for  naval  and  military  purposes 
without  the  immediate  taking  in  hand  of  building  an 
equal  tonnage  to  replace  what  had  been  abstracted. 
Nor  is  it  too  late  for  this  salutary  change  to  be  made  now. 
For  the  present  there  will  be  a  relief  on  the  heavier  toll 
of  cargo  ships,  but  a  certain  toll  will  still  be  taken,  and  as 
we  have  seen,  the  internal  condition  of  Germany  may,  at 
any  moment,  make  the  position  of  the  Emperor  desperate. 
And  when  this  happens,  no  fear  of  America  will  stand 
in  the  way  of  more  furious  assaults  than  ever. 

Ships  versus  Zeppelins 

During  the  last  few  months  we  have  had  repeated 
evidence  that  light  cruiser  squadrons  ,  are  extremely 
active  in  the  North  Sea.  My  readers  will  remember 
how  first  we  heard  that  Commodore  Tyrwhitt  had  his 
flagship  mined,  then  how  when  he  had  transferred  his 
flag,  he  fought  two  separate  actions  off  Sylt,  how  recently 
when  the  German  battle  cruisers  visited  Lowestoft  some 
light  cruisers  unnamed  had  engaged  them.  But  the  latest 
news  of  the  light  cruisers  is  the  most  astonishing  of 
all.  They  seem  to  have  constituted  themselves  Great 
Britain's  main  defence  against  Zeppelins  !  For  much 
more  than  18  months  some  of  us  have  been  urging  on 
various  government  departments  the  necessity  of  pro- 
viding not  only  an  adequate  defence  of  guns  for  the 
main  centres  of  British  population,  but  what  has  alw'ays 
seemed  to  me  vastly  more  important,  adequate  methods 
for  ensuring  that  those  guns  are  effective  when  the  raiding 
aircraft  appear.  Since  September  last  the  artillerists 
and  the  aeronauts  have  been  screaming  themselves  hoarse, 
one  party  advocating  the  multiplication  of  gun  stations, 
the  other  for  1,000  aeroplanes  of  a  new  and  deadly  type, 
to  tear  the  Zeppelins  down  out  of  the  sky  and  destroy 
them  incontinently.  With  all  our  efforts  only,  one 
Zeppelin  has  been  brought  down,  though  some  scores  of 
them  have  from  time  to  time  been  brought  over  our 
fire,  or  been  pursued  by  bomb-carrying  airmen.  But  all 
this  time  it  would  seem  as  if  the  navy,  personified  by 
the  light  cruisers,  had  been  preparing  to  take  over  these 
onerous  duties  from  the  not  too  successful  folk  on  shore. 
And  it  was  all  of  a  piece  with  the  navy's  methods  that 
while  Phaeton  and  Galatea  winged  their  bird,  it  was  a 
submarine  of  all  things  that  finished  it  off  and  with 
characteristic  chivalry  rescued  the  survivors. 

If  ever  a  list  is  made  of  the  imexpected  things  that 
happened  in  this  war,  chief  amongst  them  certainly  must 
be  the  discovery  that  our  light  cruisers  are  our  best 
defences  against  the  air  raids  of  the  enemy.  Many  ex- 
traordinary things  were  prophecied  about  the  submarine, 
but  that  one  of  these  mysterious  craft  should  finish  off 
and  sm\.  a  Zeppelin  and  rescue  its  crew  is  not  to  be 
found  in  the  most  flamboyant  vaticinations. 

The   Blue  Water  Theory 

It  must  have  been  a  revelation  to  most  people  that 
guns  mounted  aboard  ship  for  this  kind  of  almost  vertica 
firing  can  be  used  with  such  deadly  effect.  Why,  it  may 
be  asked,  have  not  the  shore  guns  which  have  had  ten 
times  as  many  opportunities,  been  more  successful  ? 
I  do  not  think  the  explanation  is  very  far  to  seek.  The 
anti-aircraft  batteries  that  protect  our  towns  are  im- 
mobile. They  can  only  fire  when  the  airship  comes 
within  range,  so  that  in  any  event  the  time  available  for 
finding  and  correcting  the  range  is  exceedingly  short — 
a  grave  disadvantage.  Next  the  airships  only  come  over 
the  land  in  darkness.  However  good  the  searchlights, 
a  Zeppelin  artificially  illumined  at  a  great  height  is  a 
far  more  difficult  mark  than  one  seen  in  the  broad  light 
of  day.  And  then  the  naval  guns  had  the  great  advan- 
tage that  they  are  carried  in  ships  that  can  go  30  knots. 
Supposing  a  Zeppelin  comes  straight  over  a  shore  gun 
and  passes  over  it  at  a  height  of  q.ooo  feet,  and  assume 
the  gun  to  have  an  effective  range  of  4,000  yards,  the 
Zeppelin  could  be  kept  under  fire  while  approaching  and 
departing  for  about  three  minutes  if  its  speed  was 
60  miles  an  hour.  But  if  the  gun  had  a  speed  of  30  miles  an 
hour  the  period  during  which  the  Zeppelin  would  be  under 
fire  would  be  increased  from  three  minutes  to  over  five. 
But  if  a  Zeppelin  instead  of  coming  straight  over  a  fi^ed 


10 


LAS  I)      .\      WATER 


May  II,  1916 


gun,  went  3,000  yards  to  ri^ht  or  left,  tlie  gun  would  not 
be  able  to  reach  it  at  all.  whereas  in  a  similar  case  a  30 
knot  ship  could  bring  it  under  tire.  If  there  is  any  sort 
of  a  breeze  the  Zeppelin  would  have  very  limited  power  of 
manoeuvring  to  avoid  the  lire  of  the  ship.  In  other 
words,  if  the  fire  control  arrangements  and  the  gunnery 
skill  are  equal,  a  ship's  gun  in  broad  daylight  would  have 
many  more  opportunities  and  far  better  opportunities 
of  engaging  a  Zeppelin  than  any  immobile  gun  could 
have. 

We  must  next  remember  that,  as  the  nights  get  shorter 
and  the  days  longer  so  must  the  period  >)f  the  daylight  flight 
of  the  Zeppelin  over  the  North  Sea  increase,  if  we  asMiiue 
that  they  only  desire  to  operate  over  England  during 
darkness.  In  mid-winter  there  are  about  14  hours  of 
darkness,  in  midsummer  less  than  5!.  l-'rom  Heligoland 
to  Edinburgh  is  about  .150  miles.  If  a  60  mile-an-hour 
Zeppelin  left  Heligoland  on  the  21st  December  half  an 
hour  before  darkness,  it  would  go  straight  to  Edinburgh, 
spend  half  an  hour  dropping  bombs,  and  make  its  way 
back  to  Heligoland,  arriving  half  an  hour  after  dawn. 
But  in  midsummer  it  would  ha\e  to  leave  Heligoland 
3}  hours  before  darkness,  and  would  have  to  make  a 
journey  of  270  miles  over  the  North  Sea  in  broad  daylight 
both  in  coming  and  in  rettirning.  Every  British  criiiser 
and  destroyer  cairying  a  gun  for  vertical  lire  and  cruising 
in  the  North  Sea,  is  a  highly  mobile,  and  as  the  (lermans 
now  know,  a  highly  dangerous  obstacle.  The  excite- 
ments of  a  Zeppelin  raid  during  the  summer  months  will 
then  be  impleasantly  magnified. 

Though  no  one  foresaw  this  very  interesting  develop- 
ment, I  think  the  naval  pundits  as  a  bodv  should  be 
heartily  ashamed  of  themselves  that  they  did  not.  For 
Commodore  Alexander  Sinclair's,  Captain  Cameron's  and 
Lieutenant-Commander  I'eilman's  success  is  after  all  only 
a  fresh  illustration  of  the  eternal  truth,  that  mobile  force 
is  of  incalculably  greater  value  than  fixed  force.  Those 
who  have  studied  the  controversies  that  raged  in  the 
last  century  between  those  who  pinned  their  faith  on 
fortifications  and  coast  defence  ships  on  the  one  hand 
and  the  fiery  spirits  of  the  blue  water  school  on  the  other, 
ought  I  think  to  have  foreseen  that  as  the  days  got  longer 
the  chances  of  the  fleets  engaging  the  Zeppelins  must 
grow  greater,  and  that  as  the  chances  increased  so  the 


probabilities  of  success  would  grow. 

The  worst  of  it  is  that  the  fast  ship  with  well-served 
anti-aircraft  guns  is  only  a  summer  time  protection. 
We  obviously  can  no  more  dispense  with  the  fixed  de- 
fences of  searchlights  and  guns,  nor  with  the  other  kind 
of  mobile  defence,  the  counter-fleet  of  airships,  than  we 
can  allow  our  naval  ports  and  depots  and  coaling  stations 
to  remain  incapable  of  protecting  themselves  against 
raiders  by  forts,  destroyers  and  submarines.  In  other 
words,  the  blue  water  theory  of  anti-Zeppelin  defence  is 
subject  to  the  same  limitations  as  the  blue  water  theorj' 
of  national  defence.  And  it  is  subject  to  a  great  many 
more  as  well.  Tiic  fleet  has  to  deal  with  a  force  twice  as 
swift  as  itself,  which  jiossesscs  to  boot  the  enormous 
advantage  of  a  \astly  superior  range  of  \ision.  In  the 
most  favourable  oi  seasons,  then,  it  can  never  be  a  coiii- 
plefe  defence,  though  it  may  be  singularly  effective  when 
it  gets  its  opportunity,  and  in  the  unfavourable  seasons 
it  nuist  of  course  be  no  defence  at  all.  Still  it  is  pleasant 
to  know  that  the  number  of  our  counter  strokes  has  grown, 
and  that  at  any  rate  during  the  next  four  months,  while 
no  doubt  preparations  for  a  better  defence  for  next  winter 
will  be  made,  the  navy  has  added  a  new  terror  to  the 
seas  over  which  the  raiders  must  pass. 

AKTIU'R  ir     POLI.KN. 

Postscript 

Since  writing  the  above,  President  Wilson's  rejoinder 
has  been  published.  It  accepts  the  German  surrender, 
but  only  on  condition  that  it  is  a  surrender  and  not  a 
bargain.  Cicrmany  must  have  expected  the  President 
to  act  on  this  understanding,  though  there  may  be  an 
element  of  unpleasant  surprise  in  his  making  it  so 
brutally  clear.  This  will  not,  in  all  probability  imperil  the 
settlement,  which,  at  this  moment,  Germany  must,  at 
all  costs,  secure.  It  has  for  some  time  been  evident 
that  the  failure  at  Verdun  had  made  peace  overtures 
inevitable  before  the  year  is  out.  So  long  as  anything 
is  expected  from  these,  Germany  cannot  afford  to 
estrange  America.  But  if  they  are  to  be  based  on 
the  theory  of  a  German  land  victory,  they  will  fail, 
and  then — to  quote  the  Kaiser's  note—  "  a  new  situation  " 
will  have  arisen. 


Rise  and  Fall  of  the  French  Air  Ministry 

By  F.  W.  Lanchester 


IN  the  present  article  I  propose  to  make  a  digression 
and  to  leave  the  dispassionate  and  academic 
consideration  of  the  subject,  in  order  to  speak 
of  the  position  as  it  actually  exists,  both  in  this 
country  and  in  I'rance. 

For  several  months  past  there  has  been  widespread 
talk  in  the  Press  of  an  Air  Minister  and  of  an  Air  Ministry. 
Coupled  to  this  there  has  been  an  agitation  centring  on 
the  question  of  the  efficiency,  and  in  some  cases — in 
most  cases — on  the  alleged  deficiencies  of  our  aero- 
nautical forces.  There  have  been  grave  allegations  made 
against  the  naval  authorities,  against  the  (iovemment 
itself,  even  against  the  poor  unoffending  experts,  if  there 
^rc  such  people  as  "  experts." 

Various  parties  have  come  forward  both  inside  Parlia- 
ment and  out  of  Parliament  with  alleged  nostrums  and 
c\ires  for  \-ariousIy  alleged  evils.  I'nfortunately  the 
diagnosis  of  these  self-appointed  physicians  is  not  always 
the  same,  the  latter  in  fact  do  not  agiec  even  as  to  the 
symptoms  of  the  supposed  disease.  Rarely  is  evidence 
offered  of  the  statements  or  allegations  made,  still  more 
rarely  does  the  self-appointed  do<tor  jiresent  his  own 
credentials  as  evidence  of  his  capacity  to  effect  a  cure. 
The  medicine  prescribed  varies  in  its  character  from  a 
veterinary  dose  of  "  ginger  "  to  a  liberal  employment 
both  internally  and  externally  of  industrial  alcohol,  and 
rims  through  the  whole  gannit  of  tonics  and  stimulants. 
Thus  the  suggestions  offered  varj'  widely  both  in  kind 
and  degree  ;  sonu'  have  been  discussed  in  the  preceding 
articles,  others  remain  for  discussion,  others  again  do  not 
pos.sess  sufficient  merit  to  justify  even  a  passing  reference. 
Our  Government  has  made  one  i-ttempt  at  reform— 
the  Derby  Committee —  and  failed.     The  French  Govern- 


ment also  has  made  one  attempt — an  Air  Ministry— and 
has  also  failed.  In  both  cases  the  present  position  is 
"  as  you  were,"  and  in  this  country  the  press  and  ptiblic 
agitation,  backed  by  a  certain  measure  of  political  support, 
continues  as  before. 

Now  the  whole  of  this  agitation  and  debate  has  already 
had  its  counterpart  on  the  other  side  of  the  Channel,  in 
France.  There  a  real  Air  Minister  was  actually  appointed, 
and  five  months  later  the  Air  Ministry  was  disolved  and 
control  restored  to  an  Army  Officer,  and  thus  in  the  course 
of  the  past  twelve  months  the  control  of  Service  Aero- 
nautics in  France  has  twice  been  put  into  the  melting  pot. 
We  have  in  these  experiments  of  administration  of  our 
neighbouring  Ally  a  fund  of  experience  on  which  to  draw, 
which  cannot  be  other  than  of  great  value  to  those 
on  whom  responsibility  rests  to  shape  our  own  air  policy, 
and  to  those  who  are  prepared  to  make  a  serious  study 
of  the  subject.  Although  these  experiments  of  the  French 
Ciovernment  in  the  administration  and  management 
of  service  aeronautics  have  not  been  productive  of  good 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  French  Nation,  they  cast  a 
flood  of  light  on  the  difficulties  which  must  be  encountered 
by  anyone  approaching  the  subject  de  novo. 

There  is  a  very  close  parallel  between  this  French 
history  and  our  own,  we  have  had  the  same  press  and 
jniblic  agitation,  the  same  accusations  of  Service  ineffi- 
ciency. In  F'rance  the  outcry  was  summarised  in  the 
words  "  La  crisc  dc  I'avialion."  Here  the  analogous 
term  coined  by  the  Press  and  the  Parliamentary  mal- 
contents has  been  "the  air  muddle."  But  in  l-'rance 
the  whole  history  developed  earlier  than  it  did  in  this 
country' ;  the  following  is  an  abstract  of  the  bare  events 
as  they  have  taken  place. 


May  II,  1016 


LAND      &     WATER 


It 


Prior  to  the  War,  from  April  ist,  1912,  to  October  ist, 
1913,  Colonel  Hirschauer  (now  General  Hirschauer)  was 
Permanent  Inspector  of  Aeronautics  and  is  looked  upon 
to-day  as  a  most  capable  organiser  and  the  man  who  made 
Service  aeronautics  in  France.  At  the  time  of  the 
outbreak  of  war  General  Bernard  was  in  command  of 
the  French  Flying  Corps,  but  he  resigned  on  October 
loth,  1914,  and  was  replaced  by  General  Hirschauer 
who,  under  the  title  of  Directeur  de  l' Aeronautique  was  at 
tiie  head  of  the  l-Vench  Flying  Corps  until  September 
loth,  1915.  On  this  latter  date  the  French  Government 
created  an  Air  Ministry,  at  the  head  of  which  was  placed 
a  civilian,  M.  Kene  Besnard,  whose  official  title  was  Sous 
Secretaire  dc'  I'Etat  Mililairc  ;  the  actual  date  of  this 
appointment  was  September  12th.  On  February  loth 
of  the  present  year,  M.  Rene  Besnard  resigned,  and  the 
newly  created  Air  Ministry  was  dissolved  after  a  brief 
existence  of  but  live  calendar  months'   duration. 

Parenthetically  it  may  be  stated  as  a  curious  com- 
mentary and  as  a  reflection  on  the  bona  fides  of  those  who 
have  talked  loudest  in  this  country,  that  scarcely  a  word 
has  been  said  as  to  the  history  and  achievements  of  the 
ill-fated  Air  Ministry  of  the  French  Government.  The 
creation  of  the  Air  Ministry  and  the  appointment  of 
M.  Besnard  on  September  I2tli,  1915,  was  duly  announced 
and  trumpeted  in  certain  sections  of  the  English  Press, 
but  the  failure  and  dissolution  of  the  Air  Ministry  fi\e 
months  later  was  received  in  silence.  It  is  difficult  to 
say  ]>ositively  that  the  matter  passed  without  mention, 
but  I  have  searched  in  vain  in  the  papers  which  affect 
to  inform  the  public  on  matters  aeronautical,  and  have 
failed  to  find  even  a  reference  to  so  important  a  fact, 
or  a  word  of  discussion  as  to  the  circumstances  which 
led  to  the  final  downfall  of  the  Air  Ministry  and  the 
restoration  of  the  previous  method  of  administration. 

The  present  Director  of  Military  Aeronautics  in  F"rance 
is  a  soldier,  Colonel  Regnier,  and  his  position  is  the  same 
as  that  formerly  held  by  General  Hirschauer,  hijj  official 
WiXeheing Directeur  dcl'Aeronauti'quc  Militairc  Frattfaise. 

A  Lesson  of  History 

Now  whatever  individual  views  a  man  may  hold  as  to 
the  defects  of  our  existing  aeronautical  organisation,  be  it 
in  the  Army  or  in  the  Navy,  and  whatever  views  he  may 
have  expressed  prior  to  February  of  this  year  as  to  the 
advantages  of  direct  ministerial  control,  that  is  to  say, 
the  advantages  of  the  management  of  Service  Aeronautics 
by  a  civilian  Air  Minister,  he  cannot  (if  acting  in  good 
faith)  ignore  the  teaching  of  history  in  the  French  tenta- 
tive or  experimental  Air  Ministry.     He  may  be  able  to 
show  reasons  why  an  Air  Ministry  in  I'rancc  proved  itself 
a  failure,  he  may  bi'  able  to  point  to  defects  in  its  organisa- 
tion or  in  its  personnel  which  would  account  for  its  failure. 
He  may  be  able  to  show  that  the  conditions  in  Great 
Britain,  with  our  naval  first  line  of  defence,  differ  so 
radically  from  those  which  obtain  in  France,  as  toucliing 
the  Air  Service,  that  what  may  be  wrong  in  France,  what 
may  fail  in  France,  may  yet  be  right  in  Britain.     He 
thus  may  be  able  to  establish    some    plausible  case  for 
an    Air    Ministry    in    England    in    spite    of   its    failure 
in  France,  but  he  cannot  with  honesty  ignore  the  history 
of  the  French  Air  Ministry  without  rendering  himself 
open  to  the  accusation   of  ignorance   or  of  deliberate 
suppressio  veri.     When  we  find  that  one  of  our   leading 
journals  has  taken  up  a  line  of  policy  and  will  stick  at 
nothing — even  suppresrsion  of  the  truth — to  support  its 
own  doctrines,  we  are  inevitably  led  to  the  conclusion 
that  its  aims  and  actions  are  not  wholly  dictated  by 
patriotic  motives. 

We  will  go  into  this  history  of  the  French  Air  Ministry 
in  greater  detail  ;  there  is  not  a  point  or  tmn  in  the" 
experience,  and  I  will  say,  the  ordeal  through  which 
the  French  Air  Service  has  passed  which  has  not  its 
intimate  bearing  on  the  present  agitation  in  this  country. 
The  downfall  of  General  Hirschauer,  who  as  I  have  said 
is  rightly  to  be  regai-ded  as  the  creator,  or  at  least  the 
organiser  of  the  I'Vench  Air  Service,  as  it  existed  prior  to 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  was  due  to  a  systematic 
campaign  of  intrigue.  It  is  to  be  recalled  that  the  first 
term  of  office  of  General  Hirschauer  (then  Colonel 
Hirschauer)  terminated  prior  to  the  War  on  October  1st, 
iqi.;,  from  which  date  the  connnand  was  in  the  hands 
of  (ieneral  Bernard,  and  from  a.  \'arietv  of  causes  during 


the  period  which  intervened  after  Colonel  Hirschauer's 
resignation,  the  organisation  had  so  seriously  deteriorated, 
that  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  was  very  speedily  followed 
by  the  resignation  of  General  Bernard  and  the  recall  of 
(ieneral  Hirschauer  to  office.  It  is  not  possible  to  discuss 
in  full  detail  the  history  of  the  opposition  and  intrigue 
by  which  (jeneral  Hirschauer's  authority  was  under- 
mined. His  thoroughgoing  methods  of  re-organisation 
resulted  in  his  incurring  the  enmity  of  many  of  the  French 
firms  engaged  in  aircraft  contracts,  and  raised  a  corres- 
ponding opposition  amongst  a  certain  clique  of  politicians. 
In  other  respects  the  kind  of  agitation  by  which  General 
Hirschauer  found  himself  opposed  was  very  similar  to 
that  which  has  during  the  last  few  months  been  agitating 
l)olitical   circles   in   this   country. 

General  Hirschauer 

Now  General  Hirschauer's  strength  lay  in  the  fact  that 
he  had  both  the  theoretical  knowledge  and  the  i)ractical 
experience.  His  weakness  lay  in  the  fact  that  he  was  a 
soldier  and  not  a  diplomat.-  Owing  to  the  fact  that  he 
was  a  soldier  he  had  no  means  of  replying  to  the  attacks 
which  were  made  upon  him,  and  these  as  we  know  can 
take  various  forms,  and  are  difficult  enough  to  answer 
and  refute  when  directed  against  a  civilian  who  is  free 
to  use  his  pen  and  speech  in  his  own  defence  :  defence 
is  incomparably  more  difficult  when  a  soldier  is  the 
\-ictim  of  attack.  Eventually  the  inevitable  happened, 
j)olitical  intrigue  succeeded.  General  Hirschauer  resigned, 
and  an  Air  Ministry  was  created  with  the  portfolio  in  the 
hands  of  the  civilian,  M.  Rene  Besnard, 

Now  M.  Rene  Besnard  was  no  clap-trap  orator,  as  with 
certain  agitators  of  whom  we  have  painful  experience 
in  this  country  ;  in  this  respect  France  was  fortunate. 
M.  Besnard  made  no  pretensions  to  being  a  superman 
with  a  mission  to  put  everybody  else  right.  He  was 
and  is  a  capable  and  thoroughly  honourable  man,  and 
one  who  was  frank  to  state  at  the  outset  that  he  had 
neither  the  knowledge  of  the  subject  nor  the  experience 
of  (ieneral  Hirschauer,  whom  in  a  sense  he  succeeded. 

A  consulting  or  advisory  Committee  was  appointed 
shortly  after  the  inauguration  of  the  new  Ministry  to 
co-operate  with  M.  Besnard ;  the  personnel  of "  this 
Committee  was  largely  recruited  from  amongst  prominent 
members  of  the  .aeronautical  industry;  it  included' 
amongst  others,  M.  M.  Esnault,  Pelterie,  Clement  Bayard, 
and  M.  Renault,  also  M.  Eiffel,  the  well  known  French 
engineer.  The  inclusion  of  so  large  a  representation  of 
manufacturers  and  aeronautical  constructors  may  un- 
doubtedly be  regarded  as  an  attempt  to  silence  criticism, 
or  as  a  salve  to  opposition  from  the  powerful  trade  in- 
terests to  which  General  Hirschauer's  downfall  had  been 
so  largely  due. 

As  Air  Minister  he  undoubtedly  had  given  him 
greater  power,  and  was  less  vulnerable  to  attack  from 
the  political  side  ;  in  spite  of  these  advantages,  however, 
his  term  of  office  may  be  summed  up  in  the  one  word 
"  failure,"  and  as  the  failure  of  the  regime  which  lie 
inaugurated  became  more  and  more  apparent  a  new  and 
powerful  press  outcry  arose  until  ultimately  his  resigna- 
tion became  inevitable  ;  it  was  accepted  on  February  joti: 
last.  Beyond  this  the  five  months'  experience  of  ar' 
Air  Ministry  had  convinced  the  French  Government 
that  the  control  was  more  appropriately  to  be  delegated 
to  an  Army  officer  ;  in  other  words  the  work  was  a  soldier's 
work,  and  not  that  of  a  civilian  ;  Colonel  Regnier  was 
appointed  and  remains  in  power  to-day. 

The  failure  of  the  French  Air  Ministry  cannot  be  whoUv 
attributed  to  any  one  cause.  The  probability  is  that 
many  of  the  difficulties  set  forth  in  the  preceding  articles 
became  manifest  at  an  early  period  ;  but  beyond  this 
it  is  known  that  the  work  done  under  tlie  Besnard  regime 
was  from  a  technical  standpoint  unsound.  The  trade 
representation  was  not  found  to  be  as  beneficial  as  its 
advocates  had  hoped,  and  the  new  types  of  aeroplane 
adopted  by  the  Air  Ministry  during  "its  brief  existence 
(in  many  instances  machines  of  large  size)  proved  un- 
satisfactory :  these  machines  are  to-day  recognised  as 
having  failed  to  establish  themselves  as  serviceable  types. 
It  is  a  point  of  considerable  interest,  and  it  is  in  "itself 
eloquent  of  the  character  of  the  agitation  which  resulted 
in  the  futile  upheaval  in  the  Inench  Air  Service  administra- 
tion (and  of  the  agitation  which  is  to-dav   in  iiropress  in 


12 


LA.Nl)      .S:      WATER 


May  II,  1916 


this  country),  that  although  the  complaint  of  the  chief 
would-bf  refornuTS  is  expressed  as  a  general  plea  that 
the  Air  Service  is  thoroughly  mismanaged,  and  that  the 
men  in  charge  do  not  know  their  business,  the  attack  has 
been  almost  invariably  based  on  the  success  of  the  Zeppelin 
raid.  In  other  words,  although  the  very  exponents  of 
reform  liave  been  and  arc  loud  in  their  protestations 
that  they  are  not  endeavouring  to  take  advantage  of  the 
fear  and  the  shattered  ner\es  of  sections  of  the  populace, 
and  repudiate  any  suggestion  that  their  agitation  is 
based  on  the  success  of  the  (ierman  airship  as  a  means  of 
intimidation,  this  is  definitely  the  point  or  pivot  on 
which  the  press  arguments  are  found  time  after  time  to 
liinge,  and  it  is  tlie  Zeppelin  raid  which  has  been  ex- 
ploited more  than  any  other  one  fact  as  an  alleged  proof 
of  the  so-called  "  air  muddle  "  in  this  country  and  of  the 
"  crise  de  I'aviation  "  as  it  has  been  described  in  the 
French  press  and  Chamber  of  Deputies. 

I  give  the  following  examples  both  from  the  press  and 
from  political  speeches  in  I'rance  in  illustration  of  the 
above  statement. 

Effect  of  the  Zeppelins 

The  outcry  against  the  I'ronch  .\ir  Ministry,  more 
particularly  as  touching  the  Zeppelin  raids,  is  wonder- 
ful in  its  singleness  of  purpose.  When  reading  the  dis- 
cussion, either  as  it  took  place  in  the  I'"rench  Chamber  or 
in  the  Press,  one  cannot  escape  from  the  continual  talk 
of  the  Zeppelin. 

The  following  horn  L' Homme  Enchainc  is  an  intcr- 
pellation  of  (ieneral  (iallieni  : 

(i)  What  are  the  mea'-ures  taken  by  M.  Le  Ministre 
de  la  Guerre  against  the  raids  of  Zeppelins  on  Paris  ? 

{z)  How  have  these  instructions  been  followed  on 
the  nights  of  the  aqth  and  joth  Januarv. 

.\nd  on  the  day  following  in  the  same  paper  :  "  The  same 
day  that  we  had  the  visit  of  the  Zeppelins  on  Paris  we 
announced  that  M.  R.  Besnard  had  organised  a  tour  of 
the  bonne  presse  amongst  our  aeroplane  factories  and 
amongst  our  works  for  the  construction  of  dirigibles." 
J.ater  in  the  same  article  they  refer  to  M.  I^.  Besnard  a? 
"  the  disorganiser  [dcsorgauisatcur]  of  our  aeronautics." 
One  day  later,  February  5th,  a  letter  is  published  over 
the  name  of  I-.  Bleriot,  which  begins.  "  I  hav^e  felt  in  a 
manner  particularly  acute  the  affront  of  which  Paris 
has  been  the  victim.  It  is  the  main  motive  of  this  letter." 
Later  in  the  letter  M.  Bleriot  complains  that  everything 
would  be  right  if  a  certain  list  or  panel  of  pioneer  con- 
structors were  embodied  in  a  "  comite  superieur  de  la 
dcjcnse  aerienne  de  la  France."  The  names  he  suggests 
are  Voisin,  Caudron,  Breguet.  Saulnier,  Bechereau, 
Delage  (Nieuport),  Farman,  which  .vith  the  names  already 
cited  would  practically  mean  the  control  of  French 
military  aeronautics  by  a  trade  committee  ! 

On  h'ebruary  9th  the  same  paper  announces  the  resigna- 
tion of  M.  Besnard  and  its  acceptance  by  the  French 
Minister  of  War,  General  Gallieni.  M.  Besnard's  com- 
plaint in  his  letter  of  resignation  is  in  brief  that  the 
French  Chamber  wished  to  saddle  him  with  responsibility 
which  was  quite  bej'ond  the  powers  conferred  upon  his 
ofike. 

Wc  have  in  the  above  a  most  clearly  and  intimately 
related  history  of  cause  and  effect.  But  in  the  same 
paper  of  February  ist  we  lind  the  disclaimer  with  which 
our  press  also  has  made  us  familiar — "  If  the  German 
'  psychologues  '  have  believed  with  their  Zeppelins  and 
their  bombs  to  terrorise  the  Parisian  population  they 
ought  to  be  undccei\cd.  Never  has  Paris  shown  less 
fear,  one  may  say  more  indifference,  to  danger." 

My  comment  on  the  above  is  that  either  the  boasted 
indifference  of  the  Parisian  to  the  German  bomb  is  a 
farce,  or  else  the  wa\e  of  displeasure  previously  expressed 
on  account  of  the  Zeppelin  visit  was  a  pose  assumed  by 
an  industrial  or  political  clique  to  remove  a  Minister 
who  was  distasteful.  What  greater  triumph  could  the 
authors  of  the  Zeppelin  raids  on  Paris  boast  than  of 
■having  been  the  means  through  popular  clamour  of  the 
overthrow  of  the  French  Air  Ministry !  The  alleged 
ineffectiveness  of  the  Zeppelin  bomb  is  curiously  enough 
reflected  in  article  after  article  in  the  same  journal, 
and  yet,  on  the  strength  of  the  failuie  of  the  defence, 
mud  is  continually  thrown  at  the  ill-fated  M.  Besnard. 

The  same  history  will  be  found  in  other  French  journals 


of  the  same  period.  From  the  ist  February  to  the  time 
of  the  Minister's  resignation  we  have  the  same  story, 
indignant  complaints  on  the  subject  of  the  Zeppelin 
raids  and  scornful  attacks  on  the  Air  Minister  up  to 
the  date  of  his  demission. 

In  examining  this  history  of  the  French  Air  Ministry 
I  ha\'e  come  across  a  paragraph  in  La  Liberie  over 
the  pen  of  (ieorges  Berthoulat  which  is  worth  quoting. 
The  following  is  a  rough  translation.  Referring  to  JI. 
Besnard  : 

"  He  will  not  be  replaced  by  a  Sous  Secretaire  d'Etat 
(Minister).  Aviation  is  in  fact  a  department  which 
must  depend  directly  upon  the  Ministry  of  War  which 
this  multiplication  of  under  secretaryships  has  threatened 
with  dismemberment.  General  (iallieni  has  strong  arms. 
He  may  be  trusted  to  use  them  with  energy  to  reorganise 
the  Service  as  he  reorganised  the  entrenched  camp  of 
Paris.  At  the  outset  let  it  be  settlc'd  that  the  technical 
section  of  aeronautics  must  cease  to  be  a  watertight  com- 
partment of  the  Direction.  Banished  to  the  Invalides 
the  technical  section  is  ignored  by  the  office  of  !\I.  Besnard 
in  the  Boulevard  Saint-Germain.  Its  remarks,  its  con- 
clusions, even  the  most  interesting  against  the  Zeppelins, 
have  been  condemned  to  eternal  sleep.  Another  similar 
vicious  system  ;  no  connection  between  the  direction 
of  the  artillery  and  that  of  aeronautics.  But,  firing  from 
below  against  aeroplanes  or  Zeppelins  depends  upon  the 
artillerj',  whilst  fire  from  abo\-e  against  the  same  objec- 
tives belongs  to  aeronautics.  Inconceivable  but  true  ! 
As  for  horizontal  fire  the.  two  departments  dispute, 
amongst  themselves  without  doubt."  ^.■.  ,  ,.  ,  ..    •,.,,',"  '. 

But  as  to  the  main  point— every  French  journal  tells  the 
same  tale — the  sequence  is :—  '  ,      , 

(i)     Zeppelin  raids.  '  ,  ■    •  ,   ■ 

(2)  A  furious  agitation  against  the  Air  Ministry  hiftcf-: 
ing  on  the  Zeppelin  raid.    , 

(3)  Air  Minister  resigns. 

in  the  article  which  follows  I  shall  show  how  closely, 
a  parallel  history  has  been  tlireatened  by  the  present  air 
agitation  (the  so-called  "  air-mud^le  "  )  in  this  country, 
a  history  which  has  kept  French  aeronautics  in  a  state 
of  unsettlement  and  ferment  for  a  period  of  more  tTi.rn 
six  months. 


The  dangers  of  an  inconclqsive. peace,  and; the. possibilities 
of  submarine  merchant  ships,- form  the  main  thesis. -of ; Mr.. 
Ridgwell  CuUum's  latest  book.  The  Men  Who  Wrought. 
(Chapman  and  Hall,  fas.  net.)  There  is  enougli  of  love  story 
in  the  book  to  give  a  personal  interest,  and  there  are  German 
spies,  German  secret  dockyards,  a  genius  of  a  Polish  inventor, 
and  a  Cabinet  Minister.  Mr.  CuUunj  has  adapted,  to  a  certain 
extent,  the  methods  of  \\illiam  le  Oueux  to  his  own  particular 
style  of  writing,  arid  the  result  is  rather  heavy,  Still,  it  is 
a  good  story,  with  enough  of  thrills  to  satisfy  the  most  exact- 
ing reader,  thougli  few  will  agree  with  the  writer's  conclusion 
—the  transport  of  the  centre  of  the  British  Empire  from  these 
islands  to  some  point  of  greater  possible  security.  The 
author  has  evidently  overlooked  what  happens  in  the  case 
of  countries  possessing  land  frontiers,  such  as  Canada  must 
always  possess.  Power  and  the  'possession  of  power  must  al- 
waj's  bring  responsibilities  and  dangers,  and  the  shifting  of  the 
centre  would  not  make  it  less  a  storm  centre. 

The  study  of  Dostoievsky's  life  and  career  embodied  in 
Dostoievsky,  by  Evgenii  Soloviev  (George  Allen  and  Unwin, 
5s.  net,  is  an  appreciation  rather  than  a  criticism  of  the 
man.  "  .•\  return  to  the  people — service  of  the  masses  in 
a  spirit  of  Christian  love  and  truth  "--such  was  Dostoievsky's 
message— that  is  the  keynote  of  the  book.  At  the  same  time, 
much  of  the  matter  that  the  book  contains  will  prove  new, 
even  to  the  majority  of  those  who  are  familiar  with  the  great 
Kussian  through  the  translations  of  his  work  into  English. 

His  sufferings, 'imprisonment,  and  ceaseless  struggle  with 
life  are  outlined,  and  the  persistent  melancholy  of  his  work 
is  more  than  accounted  for  by  the  man  himself.  His  appre- 
ciation of  the  better  qualities  of  the  people  of  Russia — the 
inarticulate  peasantry— is  clearly  shown.  "  Under  the  dingy 
smock  of  the  Russian  peasant,  under  his  inveterate  barbarity 
and  uncouthnessand  'be;ist-like  ignorance,'  Dostoievsky  ever 
sought  and  ever  found  '  great  depths  of  human  sentiment' 
in  the  shape  of  the  peasant's  fine,  almost  maternal  tenderness 
for  whatever  is  weak  or  unhappy  or  in  pain." 

The  book  is  a  stimulating  inquiry  into  causes,  and  perusal 
of  its  pages  will  help  readers  of  Dostoievsky's  own  work  to 
understand  not  only  the  work,  but  the  man  behind  it 


May  II,  1916 


LAND      &     WA  T  E  R 

Before  the  Charge 

By  Patrick  MacGill 


13 


Patrick  MacGill,  whose  first  book.  "  CJiildrcn  of  tlie  Dead 
End,"  caused  him  to  leap  into  fame  as  a  writer  of  the  realist 
school,  is  in  his  twenty-sixth  year.  Born  in  Donegal  of 
Irish  peasants,  hs  started  life  at  nine  years  of  age  as  a 
potato  digger  in  the  North  of  Scotland.  He  then  became  a 
farm  hand,  labourer,  tramp,  drainer,  and  navvy  in  turn, 
and  all  these  phases  of  his  life  are  described  with  great 
power  in  his  autobiography . 

In  his  spare  time  Patrick  MacGill  wrote  poems  and 
studied  to  such  effect  that  he  was  able  to  translate  from  the 
French  and  Ge/man.  A  little  paper-covered  book  (a  collector 
offered  a  guinea  for  a  copy  a  short  time  ago)  entitled  "  Songs 
of  a  Navvy,"  and  published  by  himself,  luas  his  first 
venture  :  an  article,  scribbled  in  pencil  on  a  piece  of  dirty 
paper  in  the  navvy  shack,  found  its  way  to  tlie  editor  of  the 
London  "Daily  Kx press,"  who  immediately  sent  for  the  young 
writer  and  gave  him  a  post  on  the  editorial  staff.  At  the 
beginning  of  September,  1914,  /;:;  enlisted  as  a  private  in 
the  London  Irish  Ki/'Ies,  and  has  been  at  Givenchy,  Guinchy, 
Festubert,  Grenay,  and  many  other  places,  but  was  finally 
wounded  at  Loos  in  September  last.  His  latest  book,  "  The 
Red  Horizon,"  was  -written  entirely  in  the  trenches. 


I 


PATKICK     MACGILL 


POKED  my  head 
through  the  upper 
window  of  our  billet 
.  and  looked  down 
the  street.  An  ominous 
calm  brooded  over  the 
village,  the  trees  which 
lined  the  streets  seemed 
immovable  in  the  dark- 
ness, with  lone  shadows 
clinging  to  their  trunks. 
On  my  right,  across  a 
little  rise,  was  the  firing 
line.  In  the  near  distance 
was  the  village  of  Bully- 
Grenay,  roofless  and 
tenantless,  and  further 
off  was  the  Philosophe 
hamlet  with  its  dark  blue 
slag-head  bulking  large 
.against  the  horizon. 
Souchez  in  the  hills  was 
as  usual  active  ;  a  heavy  artillery  engagement  was  in 
progress.  White  and  lurid  splashes  of  flame  dabbed 
the  sky,  the  smoke  rising  from  the  ground  paled 
in  the  higher  air  ;  but  the  breeze  blowing  away  from  me 
carried  the  tumult  and  thunder  far  from  my  ears.  I 
looked  on  a  conflict  without  a  sound  ;  a  furious  fight  seen 
but  unheard. 

A  coal-heap  near  the  village  stood  colos'sal  and  threaten- 
ing ;  an  engine  shunted  a  long  row  of  waggons  along  the 
railway  line  which  fringed  Les  Brcbis.  In  a  pit  by  the 
mine  a  big  gun  began  to  speak  loudly  and  the  echo  of  its 
voice  palpitated  through  the  room  and  dislodged  a  tile 
from  the  roof.  .  .  .  My  mind  was  suddenly  per- 
meated by  a  feeling  of  proximity  to  the  enemy. 

He  whom  we  were  to  attack  at  dawn  seem.ed  to  be  very 
close  to  me.  I  could  almost  feel  his  presence  in  the  room. 
At  dawn  I  might  deprive  him  of  life  and  he  might  de- 
prive me  of  mine. 

Two  beings  give  life  to  a  man,  but  one  can  deprive 
him  of  it.  Which  is  the  greater  mystery  ?  Birth  or 
death  ?  They  who  are  responsible  for  the  first  may  take 
pleasure,  but  who  can  glory  in  the  second  ?  To  kill  a 
man  .  .  .  to  feel  for  ever  after  the  deed  that  you  have 
deprived  a  fellow  being  of  life  !     .     .     . 

"  We're  beginning  to  strafe  again,"  said  Dudley  Pryor, 
coming  to  my  side  as  a  second  reverberation  shook  the 
house.      "  It    doesn't    matter.      I've    got    a    bottle    of 
champagne  and  a  box  of  cigars." 
"  I've  got  a  bottle  as  well,"  I  said. 
"  There'll  be  a  hell  of  a  do  to-morrow,"  said  Pryor. 
"  I  suppose  there  will,"  I  replied.     "  The  officer  said 
that  our  job  will  be  ciuite  an  easy  one." 
"  H'm,"  said  Pryor. 
I  looked' down  ;it  tlic  street  ;ind  T  snw  Hill  Te;ike. 


"  There's  Bill  down  there,"  I  remarked.'  I!  He's 
smging  a  song.     Listen." 

I  like  your  smile, 
I  like  your  style, 
I  like  your  soft  blue  dreamy  eyes. 

"  There's  passion  in  that  voice,"  I  said.  "  Has  he 
fallen  in  love  again  ? 

A  cork  went  plunk  !  from  a  bottle  behind  me,  and 
Pryor,  from  the  shadows  of  the  room  behind  me,  answered  : 
"  Oh,  yes  !  he's  in  love  again  ;  the  girl  next  door  is  his 
fancy  now." 

"  Oh,  so  it  seems,"  I  said.  "  She's  out  at  the  pump 
now,  and  Bill  is  edging  up  to  her  as  quietly  as  if  he  was 
going  to  loot  a  chicTcen  off  its  perch." 

Bill  is  a  boy  for  the  girls  ;  he  finds  a  fresh  love  at  every 
billet.  His  new  flame  was  a  squat  stump  of  a  Millet 
girl  in  short  petticoats  and  stout  sabots.  Her  eyes  were 
a  deep  black,  her  teeth  very  white.  She  was  a  com- 
fortable, good-natured  girl,  "  a  big  'andful  of  love," 
as  he  says  to  himself,  but  she  was  not  very  good  looking. 

Bill  sidled  up  to  her  side  and  fixed  an  earnest  gaze  on 
the  water  falling  from  the  pump  ;  then  he  nudged  the 
girl  in  the  hip  with  a  playful  hand  and  ran  his  fingers  over 
the  back  of  her  neck. 

"  AUez  vous  en  !  "  she  cried,  but  otherwise  made  no 
attempt  to  resist  Bill's  advances. 

"  Allez  voos  ong  yerself !  "  said  Bill,  and  burst  into 
song  again. 

She's  the  pretty  little  girl  from  Nowhere, 
Nowhere  at  all. 
She's  the: 

He  was  unable  to  resist  the  temptation  any  longer  and 
he  clasped  the  girl  round  the  waist  and  planted  a  kiss  on 
her  cheek.  The  maiden  did  not  relish  this  familiarity. 
Stooping  down,  she  placed  her  hand  in  the  pail,  raised  a 
handful  of  water,  and  flung  it  in  Bill's  face.  The  Cockney 
retired  crestfallen,  spluttering,  and  a  few  minutes  after- 
w-ards  he  entered  the  room. 

"  Yes,  I  think  that  there  are  no  women  on  earth  to 
equal  them,"  said  Pryor  to  me,  deep  in  a  prearranged 
conversation.  "  They  have  a  grace  of  their  own  and  a 
coyness  which  I  admire.  I  don't  think  that  any  womefi 
are  like  the  women  of  France." 

"  'Oo  ?  "  asked  Bill  Teake,  sitting  down  on  the  floor. 

"  Pat  and  I  are  talking  about  the  Frtn"h  girls,"  said 
Pryor. 

"  They're  spleiidid." 

"  H'm  !  "  grunted  Bill,  in  a  colourless  voice. 

"  Not  much  humbug  about  them."  I  remarked. 

"  I  prefer  English  girls,"  said  Bill.  "  They  can  make 
a  joke  and  take  one.     As  for  the  French  girls,  ugh  !  " 

"  But  they're  not  all  ahkc,"  I  said.  "  Some  may 
resent  advances  in  the  street  and  show  temper  when  they're 
kissed  over  a  pimip —  " 

"  The  water  from  the  Les  Brebis  pumps  is  very  cold," 
said  Pryor.  We  could  not  see  Bill's  face  in  the  darkness, 
but  we  could  almost  feel  our  companion  squirm. 

"  'Ave  yer  got  some  champagne,  Pryor  ?  "  he  asked, 
with  studied  indifference.     "  My  froat's  like  sand-paper." 

"  Plenty  of  champagne,  matey,"  said  Pryor  in  a  re- 
pentant voice.  "  We're  all  going  to  get  drunk  to-night. 
Are  you  ?  " 

'•  'Course  I  am !"  said  Bill.  "  It's  very  comfy  to  'ave 
a  drop  of  champagne." 

"  More  comfy  than  a  kiss  even,"  said  Pryor. 

As  he  spoke  the  door  was  shoved  inwards  and  our 
Corporal  entered.  For  a  moment  he  stood  there  without 
speaking,  his  long,  lank  form  darkly  outlined  against  the 
half-light. 

"  Well,  Corporal  ?  "  said  Pryor  interrogatively. 

"  Why  don't  you  light  a  candle  ?  "  asked  the  Corporal, 
"  I  thought  that  we  were  going  to  get  one  another's 
addresses." 

"  So  we  were,"  I  said,  as  if  just  remembering  a  decision 
arrived  at  a  few  hours  previously.  But  I  had  it  in  my 
mind  all  the  time. 


14 


LAND      c^'     \y  A  T  E  R 


May  II.  1916 


Bill  lit  a  candle  and  placed  it  on  the  floor  while  I  co\'crcd 
up  the  window  with  a  gnjund  sheet. 

The  window  looked  out  on  the  iirinf;;  line,  three  kilo- 
metres away,  and  the  li^ht,  if  uncovered,  might  Ix.-  seen 
by  the  enemy.  I  j^lanced  down  the  street  and  saw  boys 
in  khaki  strolling  aimlessly  about,  their  cigarettes  glow- 
ing. .  .  ,  The  starshells  rose  in  the  sky  out  behind 
Bully-Grenay,  and  again  I  had  that  feeling  of  the  enemy's 
presence  wjilch  was  mine  a  few  moments  before. 

Kore  returned  from  a  neighbouring  cafe,  a  thoughtful 
look  in  his  dark  eyes  and  a  certain  irresolution  in  his 
movements.  His  delicate  nostrils  and  pale  lips  quivered 
nervou^l}',  betraying  doubt  and  a  little  fear  of  the  work 
ahead  at  dawn.  Under  his  arm  he  carried  a  bottle  of 
champagne  which  he  placed  on  the  floor  beside  the 
candle.  Sighing  a  little,  he  lay  down  at  full  length  on 
the  floor,  not  before  he  brushed  the  dust  aside  with  a 
newspaper.  Kore  was  very  neat  and  took  a  great  pride 
in  his  uniform,  which  fltted  him  like  an  eyelid. 

Felan  and  M'Crone  came  in  together,  arm  in  arm. 
The  latter  was  in  a  great  state  of  subdued  excitement  ; 
hi^  whole  body  shook  as  if  he  was  in  fever  ;  when  he 
spoke  his  voice  was  highly  pitched  and  unnatural,  a  sign 
that  he  was  under  the  strain  of  great  nervous  tension. 
Felan  looked  very  nnicli  at  ease,  though  now  and  again 
lie  fumbli'd  with  the  pockets  of  his  tunic,  buttoning  and 
imbuttoning  the  flaps  and  digging  his  hands  into  his 
jxxkets  as  if  feeling  for  something  which  was  not  there. 
He  had  no  cause  for  alarm  ;  he  was  the  comjjany  cook 
and,  according  to  regulations,  would  not  cross  in  the 
charge. 

'■  Blimey  !  you're  not  'arf  a  lucky  dawg  !  "  said  Bill, 
glancing  at  Felan.     "  1  wish  I  was  the  cook  to-morrow." 

"  I  almost  wish  I  was  myself.'" 

"  Wot  d'yer  mean  ?  " 

"  Do  you  expect  an  Irishman  is  going  to  cook  bully- 
oeef  when  his  regiment  goes  over  the  top  ?  "  asked 
Felan.     "  For  shame  !  " 

We  rose,  all  of  us,  shook  him  solemnly  by  the  hand, 
and  wished  him  luck. 

"  Now,  what  about  the  addresses  ?  "  asked  Kore. 
"  It's  time  we  wrote  them  down." 

"  It's  as  well  to  get  it  over,"    I  said,  but  no  one  stirred. 

\\'e  viewed  the  job  with  distrust.  By  doing  it  we 
reconciled  ourselves  to  a  dread  inevitable  ;  the  writing 
of  these  addresses  seemed  to  be  the  only  thing  that  stood 
between  us  and  death.  If  we  could  only  put  it  off  for 
another  little  while.     .     .     . 

"  We'll  'ave  a  drink  to  'clp  us,"  said  Bill,  and  a  cork 
went  plonk  !  The  bottle  was  handed  round  and  each 
of  us,  except  the  Corporal,  drank  in  turn  until  the  bottle 
was  emptied.     The  Corporal  was  a  teetotaler. 

"  Now,  we'll  begin,"  I  said.  The  wine  had  given  me 
strength.  "  If  I  am)  killed  write  to — and — .  Tell  them 
that  my  death  was  sudden,  easy." 

"  That's  the  thing  to  tell  them,"  said  the  Corporal. 
"  It's  always  best  to  tell  those  at  home  that  death  was 
sudden  and  painless.  It's  not  much  of  a  consolation, 
but " 

He  paused. 

"  It's  the  only  thing  one  can  do,"  said  Felan. 

"  I've  nobody  to  write  to,"  said  Pryor,  when  his  turn 
came. 

"  There's  a  Miss  .     But  what  the  devil  docs  it 

matter.  I've  nobody  to  write  to,  rtobody  that  cares  a 
damn  what  becomes  of  me,"  he  concluded.  "  At  least, 
I'm  not  like  Bill.  " 

"  And  who  will  I  write  to  for  you.  Bill  ?  "  1  asked. 

Bill  scratched  his  little  white  potato  of  a  nose,  puckered 
his  lips  and  became  thoughtful.  I  suddenly  realised 
that  Bill  was  very  dear  to  me. 

"  Not  afraid,  matey  ?  "  I  asked. 

"  Naw,"  he  answered,  in  a  thoughtful  voice.  "  A 
Bian  has  only  to  die  once,  anyhow,"  said  Felan. 

"  Greedy  !  'Ow  many  times  tl'yer  want  to  die  ?  "  asked 
Bill.  "  But  I  s'pose  if  a  man  'ad  nine  lives  like  a  rat.  he 
wouldn't  mind  dyin'  once." 

"  But  suppose,"  said  Pryor. 

"  S'pose,"  muttered  Bill.  "  Well,  if  it  'as  to  be  it 
can't  be  'elped.  .  .  .  I'm  not  goin'  to  give  any 
address  to  nobody,"  he  said.  "  I'm  goin'  to  'ave  a 
drink." 

We  were  all  seated  on  the  floor  round  the  candle  which 
was  stuck  in  the  neck  of  an  empty  champagne  bottle. 


-The  candle  flickered  faintly,  and  the  light  made  feeble 
light  with  the  shadows  in  the  corners.  The  room  was 
full  of  the  anmatic  flavour  of  Turkish  cigarettes  and 
choice  cigars,  for  money  was  spent  that  evening  with  the 
recklessness  of  men  going  out  to  die. 

I  began  to  feel  drowsy,  but  another  mouthful  of  cham- 
pagne renewed  vitality  in  my  body.  With  tliis  feeling 
came  a  certain  indifference  towards  the  morrow.  I  must 
confess  that  up  to  now  I  had  a  vague  distrust  of  my 
actions  in  tlie  work  ahead.  My  normal  self  revolted  at 
the  thought  of  the  coming  dawn  ;  the  experiences  of  my 
life  had  not  prepared  me  for  one  day  of  savage  and  ruthless 
butchery.  To- morrow  I  had  to  go  forth  prepared  to  do 
much  that  I  disliked.  ...  I  had  another  sip  of  wine  ; 
we  were  at  the  last  bottle  now. 

Pryor  k>oked  out  of  the  window,  raising  the  blind  so 
that  httle  light  shone  out  into  the  darkness.   ' 

"  A  Scottish  division  are  passing  through  the  street 
now,  in  silence,  their  kilts  swinging,"  he  said.  "  My 
God  !   it  docs  look  fine." 

He  arranged  the  blind  again  and  sat  down.  Bill  was 
cutting  a  sultana  cake  in  neat  portions  and  handing  them 
round. 

"  Come  Felan,  and  sing  a  song,"  said  M'Crone. 

"  My  voice  is  no  good  now,"  said  Felan.  but  by  his 
way  of  speaking  we  knew  that  he  would  oblige. 

"  Now,  F'elan,  come  along  !  "  wc  chorused. 

Felan  wiped  his  lips  with  the  back  of  his  hand,  took 
his  cigar  between  finger  and  thumb  and  put  it  out  by 
rubbing  the  lighted  end  against  his  trousers.  Then  he 
placed  the  cigar  behind  hi;;  ear. 

"  Well,  what  will  I  sing  ?  "  he  asked. 

"  Any  damned  thing,"  said  Bifl. 

"  The  '  Trumpeter,'  and  we'll  all  help,"  said  Kore. 

Felan  leant  against  the  wall,  thrust  his  head  back, 
closed  his  eyes,  stuck  the  thumb  of  his  right  hand  into  a 
buttonhole  of  his  timic  and  began  his  song. 

His  voice,  rather  hoarse  but  very  pleasant,  faltered  a 
little  at  first,  but  was  gradually  permeated  by  a  note  of 
deepest  feeling,  and  a  strange  passion  surged  through 
the  mclodj'.     Felan  was  pouring  his  soul  into  the  song. 

•    Trunipi'tcr,  what  are  you  sounding  now  ? 
Is  it  the  call  I'm  seeking  ? 
Lucky  for  you  if  you  hear  it  at  all. 
For  my  trumpet's  but  faintly  speaknig  - 
1  in  calling  'cm  home.     Come  home  !    Come  home  I 
Tread  light  o'er  the  dead  in  the  valley, 
Who  are  l^'ing  around 
Face  down  to  the  ground. 
And  they  can't  hear — ■ 

F'elan  broke  down  suddenly,  and,  conring  across  the 
floor,  he  entered  the  circle  and  sat  down. 

"  'Twas  too  high  for  me,"  he  muttered  huskily.  "  My 
voice  has  gone  to  the  dogs.     ....  One  time " 

Then  he  relapsed  into  silence.  None  of  us  spoke,  but 
we  were  aware  that  Felan  knew  how  much  his  song  had 
moved  us. 

"  Ye're  not  having  a  drop  at  all,  Corporal,"  said 
M'Crone.     "  Have  a  sup  ;   it's  grand  stuff." 

The  Corporal  shook  his  head.  He  sat  on  the  (loot 
with  his  back  against  the  wall,  his  hand  imder  his  thighs. 

"  I  don't  drink,"  he  said.  "  If  I  can't  do  without  it 
now  after  keeping  off  it  so  long,  I'm  not  nnich  good." 

"  Yer  don't  know  wot's  good  for  yer,"  said  Bill,  gazing 
regretfully  at  the  last  half-bottle.  "  There's  nuflink 
Hke  fizz.     My  ole  man's  a  devil  fer  'is  suds  ;   so'm  I." 

Our  platoon  Sergeant  appeared  at  the  top  of  the  stairs, 
his  red  head  lurid  in  the  candle  light. 

"  luijoying  yourselves,  boj's  ?  "  he  asked,  with  paternal 
solicitude. 

The  Sergeant's  heart  was  with  his  platoon. 

"  'Avin'  a  bit  of  a  frisky,"  said  Bill.  "  Will  yer  'ave  a 
drop  ?  " 

"  I  don't  mind,"  said  the  Sergeant.  He  spoke  almost 
in  a  whisper,  and  something  seemed  to  be  gripping  at  his 
throat. 

He  put  the  bottle  to  his  lips  and  paused  for  a  moment. 

"  Good  luck  to  us  all  !  "  he  said,  and  drank.  "  We're 
due  to  leave  here  in  lifteen  minutes,"  he  told  us.  "  Don't 
forget  your  rer^pirators,  boys,  and  be'  ready  when  you 
hear  the  whistle  blown  out  in  the  street.  Have  a  smoke 
now,  for  no  pipes  or  cigarettes  are  to  be  lit  on  the  march." 

He  paused  for  a  moment,  then,  wiping  his  moustache 
with  the  back  of  his  hand,  he  clattered  down  the  stair* 


May  ir,  iqiG 


L  A  N  I)      cS:      W  A  T  K  R 


15 


The  World's  Trade  after  the  War 


By  Lewis  R.   Freeman 


[This  remarkable  forecast  of  the  World's  trade  after 
the  war  and  the  consequent  competition  is  by  Mr  Lewis 
R.  Freeman,  an  American  journalist  of  high  reputation, 
who  for  years  has  given  close  study  to  commercial 
affairs  both  here  and  abroad,  and  has  travelled  widely.] 

IN  America  there  lias  been  a  persistent  tendency — 
not  only  among  professional  pacifists  and  politicians, 
but  also  among  those  bankers,  manufacturers  and 
economists  who  have  not  been  in  personal  touch 
with  the  situation  across  the  Atlantic — to  picture  the 
belligerent  countries  after  the  war  as  depopulated,  dis- 
organised, crushed  with  debt  and  generally  crippled  in 
their  power  to  carry  on  business  at  home  and  abroad. 

The  present  struggle  does  not  promise  to  develop  into 
another  "  Thirty  Years'  War,"  and  the  drawing  in  of  the 
United  States  on  the  side  of  the  Allies  would  tend  to 
shorten  rather  than  to  lengthen  it.  It  is  not  difficult  to 
conceive  of  contingencies  under  which  hostilities  would  be 
brought  to  an  end  by  next  autumn,  and  peace  by  the  middle 
of  i()iy  is  more  than  probable.  The  point  for  American 
bankers,  manufacturers  and  exporters  to  get  well  in  mind 
is  that  their  two  greatest  commercial  rivals,  Great 
Britain  and  Germany,  far  from  being  depopulated,  dis- 
organised cr  industrially  crippled  by  the  middle,  or  even 
the  end  of  iqij,  will,  in  spite  of  their  huge  war  debts 
and  the  killing  of  many  thousands  of  their  be'-.t  men, 
be  in  a  stronger  position  to  wage  aggressive  and  successful 
war  for  the  world's  trade  than  ever  before. 

Organised  Industry 

This  is  especially  true  of  England,  which  as  a  direct 
consequence  of  the  war,  from  being  one  of  the  least 
effectively  organised  and  most  wasteful  of  manual  effort 
among  all  industrial  nations,  has  developed  an  efficiency 
comparable  to  if  not  yet  equal  to,  that  of  the  United 
States  and  Germany,  There  is  no  doubt  whatever  that 
to-day  anywhere  from  seventy  to  eighty  British  factory 
workers  are  doing  as  much  labour  as  were,  one  hundreci 
in  pre-war  times,  and  this  at  the  expenditure  of  very 
little  more  physical  effort.  There  is  still  much  room 
for  improvement  along  the  same  lines,  but  the  fact  that 
so  much  has  been  accomplished  in  so  short  a  time  shows 
the  potency  of  war-time  conditions  in  breaking  down 
what  had  comc^  to  be  regarded  as  the  fixed-for-all-timc 
barriers  of  British  industrial  conservatism,  and  furnishes 
an  illuminative  object-lesson  with  which  to  encourage 
fiu'ther  reforms  after  the  war. 

Besides  a  greatly  improved  industrial  organisation  as 
a  direct  result  of  the  war,  an  enormous  material  increase 
of  British  manufacturing  facilities  will  have  to  be  reckoned 
with.  There  is  scarcely  an  important  manufacturing 
plant  in  the  coimtry  which  has  not  been  greatly  increased 
in  capacity  to  accommodate  the  rush  of  war  orders,  while 
the  jumrher  of  new  factories  built  for  munition  work  of 
one  kind  or  another  is  also  very  large.  Whenever  an 
addition  to  a  factory  has  been  built,  the  fact  has  always 
been  borne  in  mind  so  far  as  possible  that  it  would 
ultimately  be  utilised  for  peace-time  work.  In  many 
instances,  such  as  those  of  shoe,  automobile  and  motor 
truck  factories,  and  ship-building  plants  of  all  descrip- 
tions, the  war-time  extensions  will  be  ready  to  turn  to  on 
regular  peace-time  work  without  any  change  x^hatever. 
and  at  a  moment's  notice.  In  other  cases,  certain 
changes  of  machinery  will  have  to  be  made  to  effect  the 
transition. 

Even  the  huge  new  plants  which  have  been  erected  by 
the  British  Government  for  the  sole  purpose  of  augment- 
hig  its  munition  supply  will  ultimately  figure  as  an 
industrial  asset  rather  than  as  an  economic  loss  to  be 
written  off  as  "  war  cost."  These  are  invariably  located 
at  the  most  convenient  points  as  regards  raw  material 
of  all  kinds,  and  also  as  regards  rail  and  water  transport. 
The  plan  now  is  to  utihsc  as  many  of  these  new  plants  as 
the  (lovernment  ultimately  decides  it  can  dispense  with 
for  the  manufacture  of  products  hitherto  imported  almost 
exclusively   from   Germanv.     l^ritish   chemists   and   en- 


gineers will  have  to  bestir  themselves  to  turn  out  aniline 
dyes,  gas  engines  and  electrical  machinery  as  cheaply  as 
the  Germans  did,  but  with  the  raw  material  supply 
rather  in  their  favour  there  is  no  reason  they  should  not 
prove  equal  to  the  task.  At  any  rate,  whatever  is  done 
with  the  new  war  plants,  England  will  resume  her  light 
for  the  retention  of  her  premier  place  in  the  world's 
trade  with  greatly  augmented  factory  facilities  as  well 
as  an  improved  organisation. 

Increase  of  Manufactures 

In  spite  of  the  five  million  men  in  her  army  and 
navy,  and  the  huge  numbers  employed  in  such  non- 
productive war  effort  as  the  censorship  and  the  clerical 
work  of  the  ,  various  Government  departments,  the 
increase  of  England's  manufactures— ^if  munitions  are 
included — in  the  last  twenty  months  is  enormous.  What 
this  increase  amounts  to,  it  is  impossible — in  the  absence 
of  any  figures  covering  the  output  of  mimitions,  ships, 
etc. — to  make  even  an  approximate  estimate.  Judging 
however,  from  the  fact  that  the  country's  exports  have 
been  fairly  well  maintained — as  compared  with  i(»i3 
as  a  normal  year — and  have  even  been  increased  from 
month  to  month  since  the  first  sharp  drop  following  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  it  must  be  very  great,  possibly 
so  much  as  50  or  75  per  cent. 

Part  of  this  increase,  it  is  true,  is  due  to  causes  which 
will  cease  to  operate  after  the  war — volunteer  workers, 
suspension  of  trade  union  rules  for  the  restriction  of  out- 
put, and  sheer  increase  of  nervous  effort — but  the  much 
greater  part  is  due  to  improved  organisation  and  heightened 
efficiency.  It  seems  reasonable  to  believe,  therefore, 
that  any  losses  of  men  which  England  is  likely  to  suffer 
will  be  more  than  offset  by  the  better  application  of 
national  effort ;  through  not  only  making  four  men 
do  the  work  five  did  before,  but  also  through  increasing 
the  quality  as  well  as  the  quantity  of  their  work — raising 
the  average  of  skill. 

That  England's  loss  of  merchant  ships  from  submarines 
and  other  war  causes  will  greatly  handicap  her  commercial 
efforts  after  peace  is  restored  is  not  probable,  The 
seriousness  of  the  ship  shortage  to-day  is  largely  due  to 
the  fact  that  something  like  forty  per  cent,  of  the  total 
merchant  tonnage  is  in  transport  or  other  war  service, 
so  that  the  sinking  of  one  of  the  remaining  carriers  has 
a  significance  considerably  greater  than  the  fractional 
percentage  it  represents  in  the  total  tonnage  would 
indicate.  But  although  it  may  well  transpire  that  Eng- 
land will  suffer  even  more  severely  before  the  war  is 
over  from  shortage  of  ships  than  she  is  suffering  to-day, 
this  would  not  mean  that  she  would  necessarily  be  greatly 
embarrassed  after  the  war.  The  release  of  the  ships  now 
under  charter  to  the  Government  will  give  her  more 
than  enough  bottoms  to  carry  her  goods  in  any  likely 
event,  so  that,  until  the  lost  ships  are  replaced,  she  will 
merely  have  less  tonnage  than  formerly  with  which  to 
go  after  the  carrying  trade  of  other  countries.  The  loss 
will,  therefore,  have  a  financial  rather  than  a  commercial 
bearing.  The  burden  of  the  high  freights  which  will  rule 
for  an  indefinite  period  following  the  war  will  be,  directlj 
and  indii-ectly,  distributed  pretty  well  over  all  the 
industrial  nations ;  in  the  last  analysis,  indeed,  ovet 
all  the  world. 

Germany,  like  England,  will  be  stronger  industrially 
after  the  war  than  she  was  before,  though  her  gain,  both 
relative  and  actual,  will  be  far  less  pronounced.  Eng- 
land's increased  industrial  effectiveness  will  be  principally 
due,  as  has  been  stated,  to  improved  organisation,  and 
in  this  particular  it  happens  that  Germany  had  gone  just 
about  as  far  before  the  war  as  it  was  possible  to  go. 
There  will,  however,  as  in  England,  doubtless  be  a  con- 
siderable increase  in  the  average  "  quality  "  of  the  work 
performed,  due  to  the  training  of  women  and  hitherto 
unskilled  men.  There  can  be  little  doubt,  also,  thai 
Germany's  increase  of  manufacturing  plants  has  not  been 
nearly  so  great  as  that  of  England.  To  begin  with,  the 
former's   munition   supply    facilities   were   undoubtedly 


i6 


LAND      &     WATER 


May  IT,  191 6 


far  more  neaily  adequate  than  the  latter* j;,  and  when  the 
experience  of  the  war  proved  the  imperative  necessity  of 
speedily  increasing  these,  the  f^reat  number  uf  German 
factories  which  had  been  closed  down  when  that  country's 
export  trade  was  cut  off  stood  ready  for  conversion.  It 
was  this  circumstance,  indeed,  that  made  it  possible  for 
(iermany  to  react  to  the  unexpectedly  gr^^t  demand 
for  shells  more  quickly  than  did  France  and  England, 
both  of  which  countries,  far  from  having  any  idle  factories, 
were  confronted  with  a  greater  export  demand  than  ever, 
(iermany,  has,  it  is  true — especially  in  turning  out  the 
endless  list  of  "  substitutes  "  which  have  been  required  to 
replace  products  cut  off  by  the  blockade  of  the  Allies — 
built  many  new  factories,  but  there  is  no  reason  to  believe 
that  the  increase  has  been  on  an\' where  near  so  consider- 
able a  scale  as  in  England. 

Germany's  Losses 

Germany's  losses  in  man-power  have  been,  and  will 
continue  to  the  end  to  be,  much  heavier  than  those  of 
]i!ngland,  since  the  former  has  been  putting  forth  her 
extreme  efforts  and  lighting  on  over  a  thousand  miles 
of  front  from  the  outset.  Yet  it  is  still  probable  that 
the  war  may  end  without  Germany's  total  losses  being 
great  enough  to  offset  the  better  training  of  the  it  en  and 
vomen  who  have  continued  in,  or  been  pressed  into, 
industrial  work. 

All  in  all,  therefore,  there  seems  every  reason  to  believe 
that  both  England  and  Germany  will  have  gained  rather 
than  lost  industrial  strength  as  a  consequence  of  the  war, 
and  that  of  the  two  England's  position  will  have  improved 
considerably  more  than  that  of  Germany.  Both  will  be 
better  able  to  manufacture  for  export  than  ever  before, 
and  both,  as  a  consequence  of  their  great  need  of  money, 
will  be  forced  to  go  after  overseas  trade  even  more 
aggressively  than  in  the  past.  Just  how  much  their  huge 
war  debts  are  going  to  handicap  them  in  their  renew'ed 
commercial  activities  it  is  difficult  to  forecast  just  yet. 

Germany's  carefully  prepared  financial  scheme  was 
fcased  on  the  expectation  that  her  enemies  would  be 
forced  to  pay  her  war  bill  through  indemnities.  This 
hope  appeared  to  persist  in  Government  circles  during 
most  of  the  first  year  of  the  war,  and  even  down  to  the 
time  of  the  latest  loan  efforts  were  made  to  keep  it  alive 
in  the  hearts  of  the  German  people.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
the  sum  total  of  the  indemnities  Germany  is  likely  to 
receive  is  represented  by  the  "  fines  "  that  were  levied 
upon  occupied  French  and  Belgian  cities  in  the  first 
months  of  the  war.  As  long  ago  as  the  beginning  of  the 
present  year — three  months  before  the  great  drive  at 
Verdun  had  been  definitely  halted — it  was  an  open 
secret  in  Washington  that  Germany  would  be  quick  to 
welcome  a  peace  that  would  involve  not  only  her  with- 
drawal from  Belgium  and  France  without  the  receipt  of 
indemnities,  but  even  the  payment  of  an  indemnity  to 
the  former  under  the  euphemistic  title  of  a  "  reconstruc- 
tion fund." 

Since  it  is  absolutely  certain,  then,  that  Germany  will 
not  be  able  to  pay  her  war  debt  with  indemnities  levied 
upon  Russia  and  France,  and  since  it  is  likely  that 
this  debt  will  be  increased  by  a  payment  to  Belgium, 
and  also  to  Serbia  and  France,  it  is  hard  to  see  how 
she  can  escape  paying  the  penalty  of  a  huge  financial 
crash  for  erecting  those  precarious  "  houses  of  cards," 
her  unbacked  war  loans.  The  dead  weight  of  her  idle 
ships  and  stagnant  export  trade  must  also  be  felt  in 
(iermany  long  after  both  have  begun  to  move  once  more 
as  the  British  Navy  lowers  its  bars. 

With  anything  less  than  the  clean-cut  victory  that 
would  enable  her  to  shift  her  debts  upon  her  enemies' 
slioulders — an  almost  negligible  contingency — Germany's 
after-the-war  financial  problem  will  be  a  staggering  one, 
and  not  the  least  difficult  part  of  it  will  be  to  per- 
suade her  people  to  take  back  in  paper  what  they  gave 
in  gold.  Indeed,  there  is  much  to  support  the  view  of 
those  who  hold  that  the  Kaiser's  greatest  trouble  is 
coming,  not  in  the  settlement  with  his  enemies  at  the 
peace  conference,  but  in  the  settlement  with  his  own 
deluded  people  after  the  peace  conference.  The  (icrman 
people  they  say  have,  under  the  stimulus  of  war  enthusi- 
asm, freely  dribbled  out  their  gold  for  iron  rings  and 
iron  nails,  but  when  they  learn  that  their  life  savings 
have  gone  in  a  lump  to  pay  for  a  war  which  has  most 


signally,  failed  to  accomplish  what  they  had  been  assured 
it  .would,  they  are  likely,  to  develop,  to  say  the  least,  an 
unsuspected  intractability. 

If  we  knew  what  course  the  German  Government 
would  pursue  in  the  way  of  paying  off  its  war  debt,  we 
should  be  in  a  better  position  to  forecast  what  effect 
the  existence  of  this  debt  will  have  upon  Germany  as  a 
competitor  for  the  world's  trade.  In  the  case  of  England, 
which  has  financed  the  war  by  perfectly  legitirnate 
methods  of  remarkable  astuteness,  the  influence  of  her 
new  debt  would  seem  to  be  perfectly  clear.  A  con- 
tinuation for  an  indefinite  length  of  time  of  some  such 
rate  of  taxation  as  the  country  has  shown  itself  so  well 
able  to  bear  during  the  war,  combined  with  continued 
and  perhaps  increased  national  and  ])crsonal  economy, 
should  ultimately  see  England  through  with  a  clean 
slate  and  a  clean  conscience.  The  high  taxes  will,  of 
course,  mean  that  the  cost  of  living  will  remain  high,  and 
this,  in  turn,  will  keep  wages  up,  thereby  increasing  the 
cost  of  production.  Should  ocean  freights  remain  any- 
where near  their  present  level  for  a  number  of  years,  it 
is  possible  that  the  cost  of  living  in  England  might  become 
as  high  as  in  the  United  States,  though  that  is  an  unUkely 
contingency.  Wages,  however,  are  hardly  likely  to 
increase  quite  proportionately  to  food,  and  it  is  probable 
that  the  higher  standard  of  living  of  the  American  work- 
man will  always  keep  his  pay  higher  than  on  the  other 
side  of  the  .Xtlantic. 

Still  paying  lower  wages  than  the  United  States, 
England  has  but  to  bring  her  industrial  organisation  up 
to  that  of  the  former  to  be  able  to  turn  out  goods  more 
cheaply,  and  it  will  be  found  that  a  long  step  has  been 
taken  in  this  direction  during  the  war.  The  advantage 
that  England  will  still  enjoy  as  the  world's  principal 
carrier  will  rather  more  than  offset  the  considerably  in- 
creased expense  she  will  be  under  for  raw  materials 
from  abroad. 

International  Trade  Alliances 

While  it  would  be  idle  to  speculate  before  the  peace 
settlement  concerning  international  trade  alliances  to  be 
entered  into  after  the  war,  it  is  quite  possible  to  observe 
already  the  set  of  certain  significant  currents  in  some 
of  the  individual  nations.  The  British  .  Empire,  for 
instance,  appears  to  be  inclining  strongly  toward  the 
throwing  up  of  a  tariff  wall,  not  only  with  the  object  of 
protecting  new  industries  which  may  have  sprung  up  for 
supplying  goods  hitherto  bought  from  Germany,  but 
also— and  principally — w'ith  the  object  of  curbing  the 
increase  of  German  wealth  and  power.  The  decision 
on  thii  score,  it  is  urged,  is  one  which  cannot  wait  for 
peace-time  deliberation,  for  some  kind  of  protection  must 
be  devised  against  the  seven  thousand  million  marks 
worth  of  German  goods  which  have  been  accumulated 
during  the  war  for  the  purpose  of  "  dumping  "  upon 
foreign  markets  as  soon  as  the  seas  are  open  for  Get  m in 
ships.  The  figure  may  be  an  exaggeration,  but  there  is  no 
doubt  that  Germany's  imperative  need  of  money,  as  well 
as  her  desire  to  regain  lost  markets,  will  induce  her  to 
endeavour  to  kill  two  birds  with  one  stone  by  offering  an 
unprecedented  quantity  of  her  goods  at  very  low  prices. 

Not  only  in  F^ngland,  but  even  more  insistently  from 
Canada,  Australia,  South  Africa  and  India,  there  is  a 
cry  for  adequate  protective  measures  against  German 
"  dumping  "  immediately  after  the  war,  as  well  as  for 
the  initiation  of  some  scheme  calculated  to  restrict  to 
the  minimum  for  an  indefinite  period  German  trading  with 
all  parts- of  the  British  Empire.  There  is  no  mistaking 
the  strength  of  this  feeling.  It  is  evident  not  only  in 
the  growth  of  very  powerful  anti-German  societies  in 
England  and  the  Dominions  and  Dependencies,  but  also 
in  the  utterances  of  some  of  the  most  conservative  mem- 
bers of  their  Governments. 

It  is  just  conceivable  that  Germany  may  be  in  strong 
enough  position  at  the  Peace  Conference  to  insert  pro- 
visions insuring  her  against  the  formation  of  a  customs 
union  among  the  Allies,  but  nothing  less  than  sending  the 
British  Fleet  to  the  bottom  of  the  sea  could  prevent 
England,  once  she  so  desired,  from  throwing  up  such 
tariff  walls  as  she  pleased  about  her  own  Empire.  That 
such  a  wall  against  German  goods — and  it  would  operate 
to  restrict  German  influence  generally  as  well — is  not 
only  desirable  but  imrerafivc,  I  am  thoroughly  convinced. 


May  II,  igiG 


LAND      &     WATER 


17 


Some   Mountain  Passes 


By  William  T.  Palmer 


OMEHOW  our  British  mountain  passes  have 
only  an  "  off-day "  attraction  for  the  cHmber 
kand  mountaineer.  Certainly,  in  his  route  from 
Keswick,  such  a  one  is  compelled  to  tramp 
over  Sty  Head,  or  approaching  from  Langdale  has  to  en- 
dure the  torments  of  steep  and  stony  Rosset  Ghyll  as  a 
prelude  to  his  pleasure.  But  in  this  motoring  generation 
one  may  easily  find  habituees  of  Wasdale  who  know 
nothing  of  either  the  \\'rynose  or  the  Stake  passes,  though 
neither  is  far  away.  And  the  same  circumstance  may  be 
found  both  in  Wales  and  in  Scotland. 

There  seems  to  be  a  strong  prejudice  that  mountain 
passes  must  be  all  alike.  For  my  own  part  I  am  just  in 
from  two  days  in  the  Central  Grampians  where  the 
famous  Glen  Tilt  and  Larig  Ghru  passes  were  taken  on 
successive  days,  and  certainly  cannot  agree  there  is  any 
common  ground  in  the  scenery  there.  A  few  months  ago 
I  renevvecl  acquaintance  with  the  passes  about  Glencoe, 
including  the  Devil's  Staircase  (a  soldier's  nickname 
this  for  a  very  moderate  ascent  ! )  from  Rannoch  Moor 
to  Kinlochleven,  and  some  time  earlier  was  in  the  dark 
depths  of  Glen  Nevis.  The  Cumbrian  passes  are  of  course 
old  familiar  places,  both  as  regards  the  motor  roads,  the 
bridge  paths  (which  serve  as  modern  tourist  routes), 
and  the  nearly  invisible  "  dalesman's  ways." 

A.  slight  consideration  shows  that  mountain  passes 
may  be  divided,  for  accessibility,  into  the  classes  already 
mentioned.  The  motor  roads  represent  the  great  trunk 
lines  (though  they  are  exceptions).  The  drove  road  and 
the  many  "  passes  of  the  calves  "  of  the  Highlands 
indicate  the  routes  by  which  drovers  assembled  their 
live  wares  for  the  fairs  which  in  the  long  ago  were  often 
held  at  points  not  even  represented  on  modern  maps  by 
a  place-name.  Such  roads,  being  disused,  are  in  some 
danger  of  being  forgotten,  and  the  casual  tourist  who 
follows  their  green  lines  knows  nothing  of  either  the 
history  or  associations  around  his  feet. 

Robber  Routes 

Then  there  are  the  robber  routes  so-called — selected 
not  always  as  secret  places,  but  maybe  because  the  way  of 
pursuit,  by  breaking  some  bridge  or  damaging  a  ford 
could  be  hindered  until  the  twenty-four  hours  allowed 
by  the  law  of  "  hot-trod  "  had  expired,  and  the  robbers 
had  the  right  of  defending  with  violence  their  misgotten 
property. 

In  choosing  both  drove  and  robber  routes  a  due  regard 
had  to  be  taken  for  forage  for  the  beasts  :  even  the  wildest 
Highlander  who  ever  lifted  a  Lowland  cow  had  no  desire 
to  present  at  home  a  bag  of  skin  and  bones,  a  fine  animal 
emaciated  by  bad  pasture  and  hard  driving.  How 
often,  in  follow  ing  such  routes,  does  one  find  an  alp  of 
.sweet  gra;>s  starred  in  the  weary  miles  of  heath  and  bog. 
Nor  did  the  ancient  cattle-drovers  particularly  favour  an 
ultra-narrow  passage  between  cliff  and  burn.  If,  and 
because,  the  Pass  of  Killiecrankie  could  not  be  avoided 
then  that  route  was  taken,  but  the  narrow  path  made 
driving  tedious  and  mishaps  almost  certain.  The  thief 
with  his  tiny  knot  of  ill-gotten  cattle  might  lurk  in  crannies 
of  the  rocks,  drive  his  beasts  up  burns  when  other  progress 
was  impossible,  and  cross  the  highest  and  narro\\est  ridges, 
but  not  so  the  honest  man  whose  planning  of  mountain 
roads  was  for  the  public  good,  and  has  mostly  continued. 

One  finds  it  utterly  impossible  tO'  assemble  mountain 
passes  under  specific  banners.  They  are  too  individual. 
There  is  nothing  in  Britain  like  the  Larig  Ghru  which  has 
just  given  me  a  lively  scrimmage  against  wet,  snow  and 
fluffy  drifts,  and  almost  caused  a  night's  bivouac  on  th(; 
lower  boundary  of  the  forest  of  Rothiemurchus.  Rising 
nearly  to  2,800  feet,  it  is  for  the  most  part  of  its  height 
rough  and  stony,  but  still  it  occupies  a  most  emphatic 
trough  through  the  Central  Grampians,  no  lesr  than  four 
distinct  peaks  of  over  four  thousand  feet  peeping  down 
into  its  recesses. 

Compared  with  the  passes  of  Cumbria,  the  Larig  is 
like  an  uncouth,  loose-limbed  hobbledehoy.  Its  great 
length  is  cast  over  miles  of  moor,  ;;tones  and  bog,  with  a 
glorious  unconcern  a':  to  appearances.     Sty  Head,  on  the 


other  hand,  is  a  jewel  among  mountain  passes  (it  is  not, 
and  should  not  be,  perfectly  symmetrical).  It  ladders 
up  the  screes  from  Wasdale  Head,  twists  neatly  round 
the  corner  of  Great  Gable,  and  skis  down  the  cliff  into 
fertile  Borrowdale.  In  half  a  dozen  miles  it  has  passed 
through  the  whole  scenic  gamut,  has  attained  its  little 
sensations,  its  wonderful  quick  changes,  and  is  a  thing 
for  the  memory  to  cherish.  But  the  long  struggle  of  the. 
Larig  gives  one  hours  of  comparative  tedium,  inevitable 
no  doubt  where  Nature  is  shaped  on  the  doubly-large 
scale  of  the  Grampians. 

Motor  Roads 

One  can  scarcely  accept  a  motor-road  over  the  ridges 
as  a  mountain  pass  without  protest,  though  such  as  Kirk- 
stone  and  Glencoe,  Llanberis  and  Drumochter  have  fine 
claims.  Nor  does  the  road  winding  into  the  Trossachs 
or  that  between  Ben  Cruachan  above  and  Loch  Awe 
beside  really  deserve  the  name  of  mountain  pass  unless  we 
also  include  the  way  through  the  gorge  of  Cheddar  in 
Somerset  or  some  of  the  Derbyshire  main  roads.  Some 
of  General  Wade's  roads  achieve  the  height  of  respectable 
passes,  but  that  was  unavoidable,  and  the  beauties  of  the 
Devil's  Staircase  or  of  Corriyarick  (between  Dalhinnie 
and  Fort  Augustus)  are  of  a  poor  order. 

But  after  all  there  is  no  comparison  between  the 
natural  and  the  artificial  in  mountain  passes.  In  the 
former  the  approach  is  usually  by  some  ridge  or  inclined 
strata  which  favours  an  easy  if  lengthy  ascent.  General 
Wade  followed  the  example  of  all  mihtary  engineers  by 
marking  the  point  at  which  it  was  necessary  to  cross  the 
ridge,  and  came  up  to  it  by  ar.eries  of  mere  or  less  steep 
zig-zags — a  horrible  mutilation  of  the  face  of  the  moun- 
tain. Even  in  the  old  Roman  routes  the  same  dis- 
crepancy was  visible,  though  in  less  degree,  probably 
owing  to  the  fact  that  two-wheeled  chariots  and  light 
baggage  carts  were  the  only  conveyances  to  be  provided 
for.  The  Maiden  Way  which  passes  the  Pennine  near  the 
top  of  Cross  Fell  on  its  way  to  Alston  is  a  fair  example 
of  the  Roman  mountain  road.  The  approach  from 
Ambleside  to  High  Street  would,  of  course,  have  been 
steeper,  but  unfortunately  the  line  of  this  road,  pre- 
sumably near  Blue  Ghyll,  cannot  be  definitely  traced  ia 
these  days. 

Concerning  the  mountain  passes  which  were  never 
intended  for  ordinary  cattle  traffic  there  is  little  to  say. 
Dalesmen,  smugglers,  sportsmen,  climbers  have  been 
concerned  in  making  these  short  cuts  from  point  to  point. 
The  Larig  Eilde  from  Glen  Ittive  to  Glen  Coe,  Moses's 
Gate  between  the  two  Gables  in  Cumberland,  the  various 
miner's  paths  in  Snowdonia  are  all  examples  of  this  type. 
These  passes  often  touch  scenes  of  great  beauty,  but  for 
the  most  part  their  object  remains  strictly  utilitarian. 
There  is  a  girdle  round  Snowdon  from  Llanberis  over  the 
neck  between  Crib  Goch,  down  into  Cwm  Dyli  and  over 
to  the  pass  between  Lliwedd  and  the  main  mountain  which 
certainly  introduces  one  to  some  glorious  rock  scenery. 

Other  routes  are  mere  grinds  up  scree  and  boulder  "and 
slippery  grass  without  the  slightest  offset  in  the  way  of 
interest.  No  one,  for  instance,  gets  much  pleasure  out 
of  Sticks  Pass  (to  the  north  of  Helvellyn)  or  from  the 
miner's  track  which  crosses  the  marshy  moor  from 
Pcnygwryd  past  the  Glyders  for  Ogwen  and  Bethesda. 
The  cove  between  the  Glyders  and  Tryfaen  absolutely 
hides  the  beauty  of  those  mountains,  and  another  de- 
pression on  the  Ogwen  side  prevents  anything  good  beiu" 
visible  there.  But  the  track  saves  the  quarryman  at" 
least  an  hour  compared  with  the  circuit  by  main  road  to 
Capel  Curig  and  up  the  disappointing  Nant  Ffrancon. 

There  are  mountain  routes  and  paths  among  the 
Pennines,  but  few  that  arc  interesting  as  passes.  The  walk 
from  the  Tees  to  the  Eden  by  way  of  High  Cup  Nick,  is 
about  the  best  that  comes  to  mind,  for  the  lonely  valley 
of  Birkdale  lies  deep  in  the  moor  and  the  descent  beyond 
the  pass,  through  the  great  whinstone  outcrop,  is  .steep 
and  interesting.  The  other  routes  are  mere  lines  rising 
to  and  over  great  moorish  hummock,  and  certainly  wit- 
ness little  of  Nature's  grandeur. 


i8 


L  A  .N  JJ      t\:      W  A  T  K  R 


May  II,  1916 


Vivid  Scenes  and  Striking  Thoughts 


THE  war  is  chanf,'ing  tlu'  values  of  all  tilings  ^Toat 
and  small ;  among  the  lesser  ones  is  the  significance 
attaching  in  the  public  mind  to  certain  professions 
and  vocations  of  life.  Take  for  instance  the  title, 
Professor.  A  Professor  has  been  always  popularly 
supposed  to  have  an  air  of  antiqueness,  to  use  a  polite 
word,  clinging  to  him  ;  he  has  been  regarded  as  a  being 
(some  would  even  say  a  thing)  entirely  detached  and  remote 
from  the  daily  occurrences  and  ideas  of  life.  Now  we 
fmd  we  owe  to  a  Professor  one  of  the  most  \'ivid  repre- 
sentations of  the  facts  of  war  in  Belgium  and  in  France 
and  to  another  Professor  what  is  certainly  the  most 
acute  description  of  the  state  of  feeling  which  this  war 
has  created  at  home.  Thus  once  again  does  war  destroy 
the  artificialities  of  peace,  and  serve  to  re-establish  reality 
in  our  minds. 

It  is  now  some  little  time  since  Messrs.  Macmillan 
published  Leaves  from  a  Field  Xotc  Book,  by  Professor 
Morgan  (5s.  net).  It  still  shares  with  Hoyd  Cable's 
Between  the  Lines  the  distinction  of  being  the  most  %ivid 
description  of  this  war  as  it  actually  is  across  the 
Channel.  Professor  Morgan  has  the  power  of  making  a 
scene  live  with  a  very  few  words  ;  sometimes  he  is  in- 
clined to  strain  this  power,  which  is  the  only  ad\"erse 
criticism  one  can  make,  the  result  being  a  certain  loss  of 
spontaneity,  .\part  from  that  each  picture  stands  out 
tlirobbing  with  life,  and  alas,  at  times,  with  agony. 
But  there  is  ever  a  fine  reticence  in  the  more  terrible 
jmssages,  which  is  as  effective  and  as  awe-inspiring  as  the 
murders  off  the  stage  in  a  C^reek  tragedy.  "  Bobs 
Bahadur,"  the  opening  story,  is  a  little  bit  of  history  that 
will  li\e  ;  it  tells  of  the  visit  of  Lord  Roberts  to  a  hospital 
for  Indian  troops  on  board  a  ship  in  a  French  harbour 
on  his  last  visit  to  France.  "  Stokes's  Act  "  is  a  fragment 
of  military  history ;  indeed  it  may  be  said  that  all  these 
stories  deserve  to  endure  because  of  the  underlying 
fact,  as  well  for  their  high  literary  achievement.  They 
will  doubtless  in  years  to  come  form  the  basis  of  many 
tales,  and  the  story-writer  will  turn  to  them  for  local 
colour  when  he  writes  about  the  Great  ^Var.  Professor 
Morgan's  book  has  the  quality  of  a  classic. 

My  Brother's  Keeper. 

■  The  other  Professor  to  whom  we  have  referred,  is 
Professor  Jacks.  Messrs.  \\'illiam3  and  Norgate  have 
just  published  a  collection  of  two  and  twenty  essays 
from  his  pen,  entitled  From  the  Human  End,  2s.  6d.  net. 
These  essays  reflect  in. a  wonderful  way  the  perple.vities, 
worries  and  disturbances  which  have  been  caused  in  the 
minds  of  so  many  of  as  by  the  war  and  by  those  changes 
in  our  attitude  towards  life  which  unprecedented  circum- 
stances have  compelled.  Singularly  exquisite  is  the 
chapter  on  "  the  p^acefulness  of  being  at  war.  "  "  I 
believe,"  he  writes,  "  that  the  war  has  brought  to  Eng- 
land a  peace  of  mind  such  as  she  has  not  possessed  for 
generations."  Is  not  this  a  true  belief,  and  realising  it 
is  it  not  as  it  were  balm  for  one's  own  sore  heart  or 
wounded  spirit  ? 

A  finer  study  in  irony  has  surely  never  been  pennel 
than  the  essay  "Organisation  in  Tartarus,"  but  there  is 
one  pa.ssagc  in  the  previous  essay,  "  Am  I  my  brother's 
keeper,"  for  which  Professor  Jacks  will  win  the  gratitude 
of  every  thoughtful  person  in  the  country.  As  we  all 
know  there  is  a  considerable  school  of  sentimentalists 
who  have  constituted  themselves  into  the  keepers  of  their 
brothers  ;  their  ad\'ice  has  filled  columns  upon  columns 
in  the  newspapers,  ever  since  August,  1914  ;  it  has 
latterly  slopped  over  on  to  the  hoardings.  We  ask  these 
good  people  to  inscribe  on  the  tablets  of  the  memory 
this  passage  ;  for  it  is  an  honest  and  true  report  of  the 
evil  which  is  so  often  wrought  in  other  men  s  lives  by 
well  intentioned  but  impertinent  interference  : 

Is  there  anything  in  this  world  wliich  so  rouses  the  indigna- 
tion of  a  self-respecting  man  as  the  discovery  that  another 
man  is  presuming  "  to  do  him  good,"  not  from  love,  not 
from  personal  affection,  but  from  a  cold-blooded  sense 
of  duty  ?  Put  yourself  in  the  position,  not  of  the  keeper, 
but  of  the  brother  who  is  being  kept  on  these  terms. 
Would  you  like  it  ?  Would  you  accept  it  ?  Would 
vou  not  say.  "  The  position  is  'luitc  intolerable  — humihut- 


ing  disgusting  !  Tiiis  fellow  dislikes  inc,  hates  mc  would 
l)e  glad  if  1  were  mit  of  existence,  and  yet  forces  himself 
in  the  name  of  iiis  iluty  to  look  after  my  interests — to  do 
me  good  !  What  does  he  know  of  my  interests  ?  What 
can  he  know,  hating  me  as  he  does  ?  The  prig !  The 
monster  !  Let  him  go  to  the  devil !  "  This  is  wiiat  you 
would  answer.  .\nd,  looking  at  the  matter  from  the 
human  end,  I  cannot  see  that  you  would  be  wrong.  A 
syco])hant,  a  toady,  a  sj^nge,  knowing  on  wliich  side  his 
bread  was  buttered,  would  answer  dillerently. 


Some  Novels  of  the  Day 

Dolores  Fane,  the  last  descendant  of  a  race  of  dissolute 
gentlemen,  forms  tlie  central  figure  in  Oranges  and  Lemons, 
by  D.  C.  F.  Harding  (Cassell  and  Co.,  6s.)  The  book  is,  in 
fact,  her  life  history,  and  it  is  also  a  very  clever  study  in 
feminine  psychftlogy,  though  the  reader  will  find  it  a  little 
difficult  to  understand  Doroles'  uncanny  devotion  to  Amadis, 
the  .Argentine  scoundrel  who  fouled  all  that  he  touched. 
We  begin  by  disliking  Dolores,  but  gradually  the  fineness  of 
her  wayward  character  is  made  manifest,  and  long  before  the 
end  of  the  book  is  reached  we  are  in  full  sympathy  with  her. 
The  novel  is  one  of  unusual  merit,  and,  if  a  first  book,  is  of 
the  highest  promise  and  no  small  measure  of  achievement. 

Xo  Craven  Image,  by  Hilda  P.  Cuiniiigs  (John  Murray,  5s. 
net)  is  a  study  in  renunciation.  Dick  Evcrard,  whu  is  intro- 
duced to  the  reader  at  the  close  of  his  Cambridge  career,  is 
made  by  liis  convictions  to  renounce  first  his  aspirations  as  a 
writer,  and  then  the  woman  he  loves,  and  all  the  time  he  is  so 
self-analytic  and  introspective  that  we  are  not  quite  sure 
whether  the  writer  is  consciously  or  unconsciously  endea- 
vouring to  show  what  a  small  soul  he  jjosseiscs.  He  lives  by 
the  beatitude,  "  Blessed  are  the  meek,"  and  turns  the  other 
cheek  with  the  greatest  pleasure.  To  a  large  extent  the  man 
is  sacrificed  to  the  plot — but  it  makes  a  very  readable  story. 

It  is  always  refreshing  in  a  novel  to  meet  with  a  character 
who  can  command  the  reader's  whole-hearted  admiration,  and 
such  a  one  is  Felicity  in  Felicity  Crofton,  by  Marguerite  Bryant. 
(Hcinemann  Os.  net.)  Fehcity  is  no  young  girl,  but  a  matron 
with  a  gnjwn-up  daughter,  and  her  charm  lies  in  her  perpetual 
youth  and  a  quaUty  that  forms  an  ennobling  influence  on 
those  with  whom  she  comes  in  contact.  She  understood 
and  carried  into  daily  life  the  true  spirit  of  self-sacrifice  under 
circumstances  that  tried  her  to  the  utmost.  An  excellent 
foil  to  Felicity's  strength  is  her  friend  .Stella  Preston,  through 
whose  weakness  the  greater  part  of  Felicity's  troubles  arise. 

Brownie,  by  Agnes  Gordon  Lennox.  (John  I,ane,  6s.),  is 
the  story  of  a  capricious  httle  woman  of  .\ngIo-Italian  parent- 
age, who  married  with  no  more  than  niere  affection  for  her 
husband,  and  came  to  regret  it  when  the  one  man  for  her  came 
into  her  life.  The  story  would  have  been  mucii  more  effective 
without  the  addition  of  a  most  impossible  villain,  Kudolf  de 
Moro  to  wit,  who  says  "  Ha,  ha  !  "  in  the  approved  style 
of  melodrama  and  utterly  fails  to  convince.  He  is  necessary, 
however,  for  the  working  out  of  the  rather  machine-madj 
plot,  in  which  the  really  live  figure  is  Brownie  herself,  a  clever 
study  of  an  unusual  and  attractive  type  of  woman. 

Mr.  Eric  Leadbitter  has  a  way  of  taking  small  lives  ami 
small  happenings  and  miking  them  extremely  interesting,  a 
talent  he  evinces  to  the  full  in  The  Road  to  Nowhere  (George 
.\llen  and  Unwin,  6s.)  Joe  Pcaping.  the  greengrocer's  son, 
determined  to  rise  in  life,  and  the  fortunate  accidents  and 
little  meannesses  by  which  he  achieved  his  aim  debase  rather 
than  refine  the  man  himself,  in  spite  of  his  surface  jwlish. 
(3ne  cannot  ([uiti^  avoid  the  impression  that  the  author  has, 
to  a  certain  extent,  sacrificed  an  excellent  psychological  stuily 
— to  wit,  Joe— to  the  making  of  his  story,  for  Joe's  failure  in 
learning  the  deeper  lessons  of  life  is  carried  almost  too  far  for 
credence.  In  spite  of  this,  the  story  never  fails  in  "  grip," 
but  carries  the  reader  along  to  the  "  Nowhere  "  of  its  end, 
minus  the  proverbial  dull  page. 

There  is  a  good  deal  in  The,  Winds  oj  the  World,  by  Talbot 
Mundy  (Cassell  and  Co.,  6s.)  to  remind  the  reader  of  Kipling's 
Kim.  His  fascinating,  exasperating  Jasmini,  in  spite  of  the 
])ower  with  which  he  endows  her,  will  appeal  to  those 
who  know  the  East,  and  the  German  intrigue,  on  which 
the  whole  story  is  based,  is  real  enough  to  interest  even  a 
captious  critic  of  the  work.      The  story  is  a  good  ono 


May  II,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 

CHAYA 


19 


^  l^mance  of  the  South  Seas 

'By  H.  T>E  VERB  STAC  POOLE 


Synopsis  :  Macquart,  an  adventurer  who  has  spent  most 
of  his  life  at  sea.  finds  himself  in  Sydney  on  his  beam  ends. 
He  has  a  ivonderfut  story  of  gold  hidden  up  a  river  in  New 
Guinea,  and  makes  the  acquaintance  of  Tillman,  a  sporting 
man  about  toien,  fond  of  yachting  and  racing,  and  of  Houghton, 
a  well-educated  Englishman  out  of  a  job.  Through  Tillman's 
influence  he  is  introduced  to  a  wealthy  woolbroker ,  Screed,  who, 
having  heard  Macquart's  story,  agrees  to  finance  the  enterprise. 
Screed  purchases  a  yawl,  the  "  Barracuda."  Just  before  they 
leave  Macquart  encounters  an  old  shipmate.  Captain  Hull, 
who  is  fully  acquainted  with  his  villainies.  Hull  gets  in  touch 
with  Screed,  who  engages  him  and  brings  him  aboard  the  yacht 
fust  as  they  are  about  to  sail.  They  arrive  at  New  Guinea  and 
anchor  in  a  lagoon.  They  go  by  boat  up  a  river  where  they 
make  the  acquaintance  of  a  drunken  Dutchman,  Wiart,  ihho 
is  in  charge  of  a  rubber  and  camphor  station.  Here  they 
meet  a  beautiful  Dyak  girl,  Chaya.  According  to  Macquart's 
story  a  man  named  Lant.  xtiho  had  seized  this  treasure,  sunk  his 
ship  and  murdered  his  crew  with  the  exception  of  one  man, 
"  Smith."  Lant  then  settled  here,  buried  the  treasure,  and  married 
a  Dyak  woman,  chief  of  her  tribe.  Lant  was  murdered  by 
■'  Smith,"  whom  Captain  Hull  and  the  rest' make  little  doubt 
was  no  other  than  Macquart.  Chaya,  with  whom  Houghton 
has  fallen  in  love,  is  Lant's  half-caste  daughter.  Macquart 
guides  them  to  a  spot  on  the  river-bank  where  he  declares  the 
cache  to  be.  They  dig  but  find  nothing.  Then  he  starts  the 
surmise  that  the  Dyaks  have  moved  the  treasure  to  a  sacred 
grove  in  the  jungle.  Wiart  is  his  authority  He  persuades 
his  shipmates  to  go  in  search  of  it.  The  journey  leads  them 
through  the  Great  Thorn  Bush,  which  is  a  vast  maze  from  which 
escape  is  impossible  without  a  clue.  Macquart  and  Wiart 
desert  their  companions.  As  night  falls  a  woman's  voice  is 
heard  calling,  and  Chaya,  ansitering  their  cries,  discovers 
them  :  through  her  help  they  at  last  escape  from  the  maze,  to  find 
that  Macquart  and  Wiart  hare  returned  to  the  Barracuda. 
These  two  find  the  cache  and  unearth  the  gold.  A  huge  kind  of 
man-ape  enters  the  yawl  at  this  junctnre,  and  kills  both  Jacky, 
the  native,  and  Wiart,  leaving  Macquart  alone  with  the  dead 
bodies  and  the  gold. 

CHAPTER   XXVII    {continued) 
The  Gold  Fiend 

MACQUART  stared  at  the  sight  before  him.  Then 
he  tfied  to  get  the  corpse  of  Wiart  overboard. 
It  was  a  most  terribly  difficult  business.  Wiart 
did  not  seem  to  want  to  go  in  the  least,  once 
or  twice  when  he  slipped  back  on  to  the  deck,  just  as  Macquart 
had  almost  got  him  over  the  rail,  his  face  in  the  full  glare  of 
the  sun  showed  a  grin  as  if  he  were  deriding  the  efforts  of 
the  other.  The  injury  to  the  eye  gave  him  the  appearance  of 
having  just  fought  with  someone,  his  clothes  were  in  disorder, 
his  collar  half  off,  and  his  necktie  all  askew.  From  a  distance 
as  Macquart  recommenced  the  business  of  trying  to  get  him 
over,  it  looked  as  though  a  drunken  man  were  being  ejected 
from  the  Barracuda.  This  time  Macquart  was  successful, 
and  the  body  went  over  and  floated  off  on  the  current  that 
flowed  riverwards  past  the  yawl. 

It  was  an  hour  after  noon  now  and  Macquart,  who  had 
not  eaten  since  dawn,  felt  faint  from  his  exertions  and  from 
want  of  food.  Leaving  aside  this  feeling,  he  was  afflicted 
with  a  shght  confusion  of  thought,  or  rather  want  of  power  in 
co-ordinating  his  thoughts. 

He  went  into  the  galley  and  found  the  remains  of  the 
food  left  by  Jacky  that  morning.  In  the  locker  on  the  right 
hand  side  there  was  plenty  more  food.  Biscuit  tins  and 
cans  of  preserved  meat  and  vegetables,  condensed  milk  and 
so  forth. 

Macquart  ate,  and  as  he  ate  his  eyes  roamed  about 
hither  and  thither.  He  read  the  Libby  and  Armour  labels  on 
the  meat  cans,  and  the  measure  of  his  extraordinary  position 
might  ha\e  been  taken  from  the  feeling  of  incongruity  and 
strangeness  with  which  these  commonplace  labels  filled  his 
mind. 

The  place  where  he  was  seemed  remote  from  the  ordinary 
world  as  Sirius. 

He  could  hear  a  faint  chuckle  now  and  then  as  the  lagoon 
water  lapped  the  planks,  and  occasionally  a  faint  groan  from 


the  rudder.  There  were  all  sorts  of  little  facts  about  the 
lagoon  that  spoke  in  all  sorts  of  little  ways  only  to  be  dis- 
tinguished and  interpreted  by  a  person  who  had  nothing  to  do 
but  listen. 

Thus  the  drift  of  the  current  was  unequal  in  rapidity, 
sometimes  a  fairly  strong  swirl  would  lip  the  bow  and  swing 
the  ruddi  r  to  starboard  a  few  inches,  or  a  log  would  come 
along  half-submerged  and  rub  itself  against  the  planking,  or  a 
faint  bubbling  sound  would  tell  of  a  spring  blowing  off  its 
superfluous  water  in  the  lagoon  floor. 

The  Lagoon,  seemingly  so  dead  and  inert,  was,  in  reality, 
always  at  work,  fetching  in  driftwood  from  the  river,  expelling 
it  again,  raising  or  lowering  its  level  in  some  mysterious  way 
independent  of  the  sea  tide  or  river  flow,  stopping  up  old  well 
heads  on  its  floor,  opening  new  ones,  getting  rid  of  all  the 
detritus  that  a  tropical  forest  hands  to  the  water. 

Macquart  sat  for  a  while  after  he  had  finished  eating, 
hstening  to  these  vague  and  indeterminate  voices,  then  though 
the  gold  was  always  in  his  mind,  the  recollection  of  the  two 
baskets  of  treasure  left  on  the  bank  came  to  him  for  the  first 
time. 

He  left  the  galley,  landed,  and  seized  the  basket  that 
Jacky  had  laid  down  before  going  to  his  death.  Then 
struggling  on  board  with  it  he  stood  undecided  as  to  what 
he  should  do. 

It  was  impossible  to  store  an3rthing  in  the  cabin.  He 
could  not  go  down  to  that  place  again.  There  remained  the 
hold  and  the  fo'c'sle.  He  had  never  explor«d  the  httle  hold, 
but  he  knew  the  fo'c'sle  ;  he  came  to  the  fo'c'sle  hatch,  paused 
a  moment,  and  then,  just  as  a  person  shoots  coal  into  a  cellar, 
he  emptied  the  contents  of  the  bag  down  it.  He  had  no  time 
to  waste  stowing  this  cargo  whose  horrible  proportions  in 
relation  to  his  puny  efforts  were  ever  looming  before  him.  It 
was  like  being  in  front  of  a  great  golden  mountain  that  had 
to  be  removed  piece  by  piece  and  in  pocketfuls.  Added 
to  this  fantastic  labour  would  come — on  its  completion — the 
problem  of  escape  from  the  lagoon  in  the  Barracuda  single- 
handed  ;  added  to  this  the  terrible  problem  of  the  disposal  of 
Jacky's  remains. 

No  man  outside  of  Nightmare-land  was  ever  confronted 
with  such  a  position  as  that  which  faced  Macquart  urged  on  by 
gold  lust. 

In  the  grasp  and  under  the  whip  of  the  gold  demon  all 
the  powers  of  his  mind  were  subservient  to  the  main  desire. 

He  turned  now  with  the  empty  basket  in  his  hand,  re- 
gained the  shore  and  came  back  with  the  other  full  basket, 
shot  the  contents  down  the  fo'c'sle  hatch,  listened  till  the 
jingle  of  the  last  rolling  coin  ceased,  and  then  flushed, 
breathing  hard  and  full  of  new  life  and  energy, 
started  off,  with  both  baskets  rolled  up  under  his  arm,  for 
the  cache. 

Here,  with  one  of  the  mattocks,  he  cleared  the  earth 
carefully  away  from  the  next  treasure  box,  and  then  working 
with  his  hands,  began  to  extract  it.  Work  as  carefully  as  he 
might,  the  rotten  wood  of  the  box  sides  broke  to  pieces  and 
the  coins  fell  about  loose  ;  he  had  no  one  to  hold  the  basket 
open  and  he  spent  ten  minutes  in  fruitless  attempts  to  devise 
some  method  to  keep  the  thing  erect  and  yawning. 

Failing  in  this  he  was  condemned  to  hold  it  open  with 
his  left  hand  and  fill  it  as  best  he  could  with  his  right. 

He  succeeded  finely  in  this  way  as  long  as  the  coins  were 
in  mass,  but  when  it  came  to  the  last  few  hundred  scattered 
loose,  ah  !  then  the  real  trouble  began.  Every  coin  had  to  be 
picked  up.  His  task-master  saw  to  that.  To  leave  one  single 
golden  coin  ungathered  was  a  physical  impossibility,  and  it 
was  during  the  picking  up  of  these  that  Haste  kept  crying  to 
^■—    "  speed,"    and    imagination    kept    painting    the    awful 


him 


labours  still  before  him.  Every  last  coin  of  all  that  cache 
had  to  be  removed,  for  each  of  these  terrible  things  had  a 
power  as  great  as  the  mass.  Each  was  a  sovereign  or  a 
Louis. 

Each  represented  four  dollars  or  five  dollars,  and  five 
dollars  to  Macquart,  who  had  always  known  poverty,  five 
dollars  dressed  in  gold  in  the  form  of  a  sovereign,  constituted 
a  power  against  which  there  was  no  appeal. 

He  whimpered  as  he  picked  amongst  the  soil,  whimpered 
like  a  woman  in  distress. 

The  heat  of -the  day  was  great  and  the  sun  struck  heavy 


20 


LAND      &      WATER 


May  II,   igi6 


on  him,  all  the  time  the  sweat  was  pouring  from  him,  and  a 
thirst,  tremendous  as  the  thirst  of  fever,  withered  his  soul. 

Then,  when  the  last  coin  was  salved,  he  took  the  basket 
carefully  oy  both  handles,  rose  to  his  feet  and  lifted  it. 

He  had  intended  to  fill  both  baskets,  but  he  had  com- 
pletely forgotten  this  intention,  and  indeed  the  present  load 
was  as  much  as  he  could  carry — almost  more  than  he  could 
carry. 

He  had  got  halfway  between  the  cache  and  the  lagoon 
bank  when  one  of  the  handles  of  the  basket  broke,  the  basket 
swung  over  and  a  torrent  of  coin  fell  with  a  noise  like  the  rush 
of  rain  amidst  the  leaves  and  grass. 

A  faint  jingle  told  of  coin  striking  coin,  then  nothing 
could  be  heard  but  the  crying  of  the  parrots  in  the  trees  and 
the  wind  stirring  the  branches. 

Macquart  carefully  seized  the  basket  by  the  edge  on  the 
bide  of  the  broken  handle  so  that  no  more  of  the  contents  could 
escape,  then  he  placed  the  basket  by  a  tree  trunk,  then  he 
proceeded  to  hunt  for  the  lost  treasure.  He  seemed  quite 
unmoved  by  this  disaster,  but  in  reahty  he  was  stunned.  It 
is  not  the  weight  that  makes  the  last  straw  figure  as  the  last 
straw,  it  is  the  psychological  moment.  This  accident  that 
would  have  made  Macquart  swear  earlier  in  the  day  now 
made  him  dumb. 

Then,  with  what  seemed  a  terrible  patience,  he  went 
down  on  his  knees  and  began  to  collect  the  coins.  He  stripped 
away  the  long  leaves  as  well  as  he  could  and  the  ground  vines. 
Here  and  there  he  could  see  the  faint  ghnt  of  a  metal  disc  and 
whenever  he  saw  one  he  pounced.  The  light  was  not  very 
strong,  on  account  of  the  foliage  above,  yet  it  was  sufficient 
for  his  purpose. 

And  now  as  he  laboured  on  hands  and  knees,  rooting 
about  like  an  animal,  movements  in  the  branches  above 
became  apparent,  and  twenty  little  faces,  some  upside  down, 
could  be  seen  watching  the  worker  with  an  earnestness 
ludicrous,  yet  somehow  horrible. 

A  monkey  is  a  grin  when  it  is  not  a  grimace,  and  nothing 
can  be  imagined  further  removed  from  honest  mirth  than  these 
incarnations  of  laughter — nothing  certainly  than  these  little 
faces  amidst  the  leaves  looking  down  at  Macquart. 

Then  one  of  them  plucked  a  big,  squashy-looking  fruit 
from  one  of  the  branches  and  flung  it. 

It  hit  Macquart  in  the  small  of  the  back  and  he  sprang 
to  his  feet  with  a  yell.  The  blow  had  been  a  sharp  one,  and 
coming  unexpectedly  there,  where  he  fancied  himself  alone, 
the  shock  had  badly  upset  his  nerves. 

He  glanced  wildly  about  him.  Then  he  saw  his  tor- 
mentors and  shook  his  fist  at  them. 

His  outcry  had  startled  them,  but  they  recognised  at 
once  that  he  was  unarmed  ;  they  knew  that  he  was  ^ngry 
and  that  they  were  the  cause  of  this  anger,  and  they  knevv 
that  he  was  impotent  and  the  knowledge  of  all  this  filled  them 
with  joy. 

They  pehed  him  now  with  Uttk  nuts  whilst,  pretending 
to  ignore  them,  he  went  on  his  hands  and  knees  again.  As  he 
worked  he  placed  the  recovered  coins  in  the  side  pocket  of  his 
coat.  TheH  as  he  worked,  something  that  was  not  a  nut  hit 
liim  on  the  brim  of  the  hat  which  he  had  pushed  back  to  save 
liis  neck — bounced  over  his-  shoulder  and  struck  a  broad  leaf 
in  front  of  him.     It  was  a  gold  coin. 

He  had  made  a  great  mistake  in  placing  the  basket  by 
the  tree  trunk,  for  there  was  an  air  shoot  hanging  by  the  tree, 
and  sliding  down  the  air  shoot  one  of  the  monkey  folk  had 
captured  the  basket  and  its  contents,  spilling  most  of  them 
on  the  way  up. 

But  there  was  enough  left  for  ammunition,  and  Macquart, 
looking  up,  got  a  fistful  of  sovereigns  in  his  face.  He  turned, 
saw  that  the  basket  was  gone  and  then,  forgetting  that  he  was  a 
man,  with  the  howl  of  a  wolf  he  began  to  climb  the  tree  that  was 
nearest  to  him.  As  he  climbed,  he  shouted  and  swore  at  the 
creatures  skipping  above  him,  and  the  higher  he  climbed  the 
liigher  they  went. 

Then  suddenly  the  branch  he  was  climbing  by  broke  and 
he  fell,  the  next  branch  caught  him,  but  only  for  a  moment, 
before  it  snapped  under  his  weight,  dehvering  him  to  the  branch 
immediatdy  below. 

He  clung  to  it  swinging  by  his  hands  twenty  feet  above 
the  ground. 

The  monkeys  above,  enraptured  at  this  fine  game  that 
had  been  suddenly  provided  for  them,  pelted  him,  but  he  did 
not  heed. 

He  did  not  know  how  far  the  ground  was  beneath  him  ; 
he  felt  that  he  was  at  an  enormous  height  in  the  air  and  that 
to  fall  would  be  sure  death.  He  clung.  He  tried  to  work  his 
way  along  the  branch  towards  the  bole,  it  was  impossible  ; 
to  do  so  he  would  have  been  forced  to  hang  by  one  hand  at 
a  time  and  that  was  beyond  his  strength  ;  besides,  the  branch 
had  bowed  beneath  his  weight.  He  knew  that  he  could  not 
go  on  clinging  for  ever,  that  the  fall  must  come  certain  and 
soon,  yet  his  mind  found  room  for  fantastic  thoughts.     It 


seemed  to  him  the  forest  was  in  a  conspiracy  with  John 
Lant  against  him.  Trees,  monkeys,  leaves,'  vines,  hanas  and 
birds,  all  were  "  setting  on  "  him  to  rob  him  of  his  Hfe  ;  he 
saw  himself  swinging  there,  pelted  bv  monkeys,  the  picture 
came  to  him  as  though  it  were  the  picture  of  another  man. 
Then  cramp  seized  him  and  he  fell. 

The  fall,  so  far  from  killing  him.  did  not  even  break  a 
bone,  but  he  was  half  stunned,  and  he  sat  for  a  while  with 
his  hands  to  his  head,  whilst  the  world  rocked  and  reeled 
beneath  him,  and  the  monkeys,  who  had  descended  hmb  by 
limb,  pelted  him  and  jibed  at  him  as  if  to  show  the  boundless 
and  tireless  malignity  that  life  can  tap  through  its  creatures. 

Then,  after  a  while,  Macquart  rose  up.  He  stood  up  a 
moment  as  if  undecided  and  then  made  off  back  towards  the 
cache.  He  went  half  running,  half  stumbHng,  talking  and 
muttering  to  himself  in  a  crazy  sort  of  way,  defeated,  beaten, 
yet  still  led  by  the  gold  that  was  destroying  him.  At  the  edge 
of  the  cache  he  sat  down  and  began  digging  with  his  hands. 

He  had  brought  the  other  basket  up  close  beside  fiim  and 
as  he  burst  another  gold  box  open  he  began  tHling  the  basket, 
but  his  half  crazy  mind  was  now  so  obsessed  by  the  idea  of 
the  basket  breaking  that  he  did  not  load  it  with  more  than 
five  handfuls  of  coin  and  earth,  for  there  was  no  thought  now 
of  sifting  the  coin  from  earth  or  earth  from  coin,  only  the 
overwhelming  and  overmastering  thought  of  speed. 

Then,  with  a  load  that  a  child  could  have  carried,  he 
started  off  at  a  trot  for  the  lagoon  edge,  discharged  his  burden 
into  the  fo'c'sle  of  the  yawl  and  returned. 

So  it  went  on.  and  when  the  sun  sank  and  the  stars  broke 
out  above  he  was  still  running,  whimpering  hke  a  child  who  is 
late  on  an  errand  and  fears  a  beating,  heedless  of  the  rushing 
monkeys  that  flitted  above  him  like  a  breeze  in  the  fohage, 
heedless  of  everytliing  except  the  vast  labour  on  wliich  he  was 
engaged— for  he  was  not  carrying  gold  now  in  his  basket, 
but  earth,  under  the  belief  that  he  had  to  empty  the  whole 
world  into  the  fo'c'sle  of  the  Barracuda. 

CHAPTER   XXVIII 
The  Pursuer 

SAJI,  when  he  parted  from  Chaya  after  having  seen 
Macquart  and  his  party  vanish  in  the  thorn  maze,  made 
.back  for  the  river  at  a  trot. 

It  was  a  nine  or  ten  hours'  journey  from  the  river  to 
the  thorn  for  Europeans  cumbered  with  luggage.  The 
return  journey  took  Saji  slightly  over  four  hours.  The 
runner  who  brought  the  news  from  Marathon  to  Athens  would 
have  had  Httle  chance  in  a  long  distance  race  against  Saji. 

Like  a  centipede,  this  man  seemed  to  have  a  hundred  pair 
of  legs  at  his  service  to  be  used  a  pair  at  a  time,  so  that  he 
might  run  forever,  or  at  least  till  all  were  worn  out  ;  his  lungs 
were  practically  inexhaustible. 

It  was  towards  ten  o'clock   when    he   reached  tlie   Dyak 
village,  and  there  under  the  stars  he  met  the  old  woman  who 
was  waiting  for  news. 
He  told  her  everything. 

"  So."  said  she,  "  he  has  led  them  into  the  thora  city; 
that  means  he  will  come  back,  he  and  the  other  one.  he  will 
lead  him  to  the  hiding-place  or  he  will  destroy  him  before  they 
get  there.  Now  is  your  time  to  strike,  but  not  till  yoH  have 
marked  down  the  hiding-place." 
Saji  nodded. 

"  Where  is  Chaya  ?  "  asked  the  woman. 
"  She  is  following  after,"  said  Saji.  "  I  came  swiftly." 
The  old  woman  went  to  the  hut  where  she  Hved  and  re- 
turned with  something  in  her  hand.  It  was  a  parang,  a 
Dyak  knife  in  a  leather  sheath.  She  held  it  out  to  Saji,  but 
he  showed  her  that  he  was  already  possessed  of  one,  taking 
it  from  his  girdle  and  holding  it  beifore  her  in  the  starKght. 

"  Give  it  to  me  and  take  this,"  said  she.  "  It  belonged  to 
Lant,  it  will  know  what  is  to  be  done  and  lead  you." 

Saji  took  the  parang  and  placed  it  in  his  girdle.  Then  with 
another  word  or  two  to  the  old  woman  he  started  off  through 
the  trees.  By  the  river  bank  he  took  up  his  position  amongst 
the  bushes  at  a  point  that  gave  him  a  good  view  of  Wiart's 
house  and  the  landing  stage,  then  he  squatted  down  to  wait 
and  watch. 

He  was  watching  chiefly  by  means  of  his  ears,  his  eyes  told 
him  little  of  what  was  going  on  around  him  beyond  the  span 
of  river  bank  where  the  house  stood.  His  ears  told  him  much. 
He  could  hear  the  river,  a  sound  made  up  of  a  thousand  httle 
sounds,  from  the  weak  voice  of  the  water  washing  bank  and 
tree  roots  and  landing  stage,  to  the  splash  of  fish  jumping  in 
the  distance.  The  smell  of  the  river  came  with  its  voice,  a 
smell  of  damp  and  decay,  mixed  with  the  musky  perfume  of 
river  mud. 

Then  on  the  other  hand  he  could  hear  the  voices  of  the 
forest,  swept  by  the  night  wind.  Hour  after  hour  passed 
without  lessening  in  the  slightest  the  deadly  vigilance  of  the 
watcher.     He  was  thinking  of  Chaya.     The  success  of  this 


May  II,  igi6 


LAND      &      WATER 


21 


Chaya,  a  R»tMnct  ol  the  South   Seas] 


ItHuttrated  bv  Joiepk  Simpion,   fi.B  .1. 


"  In  the  grasp 


of  the  gold  demon  all  the   powers  of  his  mind   were   subservient 
to  the  main   desire." 


hunt  would  bring  him  Chaya.  When  nc  presented  her  with 
the  gift  of  gifts  she  would  be  his.  The  old  woman  had  said 
so.  Chaya  despised  him  as  a  monkey-slayer,  she  looked  on 
him  as  a  boy.  When  he  proved  himself  a  man  in  her  eyes  all 
would  be  different. 

Then  of  a  sudden  thought  fled  from  him  and  feeling  for  the 
Punan  stabbing  spear  at  his  side  he  bent  forward  and  remained 
rigid  as  a  drawn  bow.  They  were  coming.  He  watched 
them  as  they  parted,  Wiart  going  to  the  house  for  his  gun 
and  Macquart  going  to  the  tent.  Then  they  appeared  again, 
coming  along  down  to  the  landing-stage,  Macquart  leading 
the  way,  Jacky  and  Wiart  following. 

They  were  going  to  take  to  the  boat  and  once  they  were 
off  it  would  be  a  simple  business  to  follow  them  in  the  canoe. 

Ho  watched  them  arranging  the  boat,  then  he  saw  Macauart 


going  towards  the  canoe.  The  boat  pushed  off  and  the  canoe 
followed  it. 

Then  Saji,  with  a  wildly  bounding  heart,  saw  that  he  had 
been  tricked.  These  men  whom  he  despised  in  his  soul  had 
been  cleverer  than  he.  Never  for  a  moment  had  he  dreamed 
that  the  canoe  was  in  danger,  never  for  a  moment  had  he 
fancied  that  their  suspicions  would  have  been  raised  against 
him.  And  now  he  found  himself  checkmated,  rendered  im- 
potent, tricked,  and  put  out  of  the  game. 

He  sprang  up  amongst  the  bushes,  then  he  sank  back  again. 
To  follow  was  impossible,  to  show  himself  or  call  out  misht 
only  lead  to  a  shot  from  that  rifle  Wiart  could  use  so  well. 

He  watched  the  boat  vanish  round  the  river  bend,  then  he 
fell  to  thinking. 

There  was  not  another  canoe  on  the  river,  all  the  fi^hin™ 


LAND      &      WATER 


May  II    1916 


Dyaks  were  at  sea.  The  river  was  no  use,  so  he  dismissed 
it  from  liis  mind  ;  the  only  road  he  could  take  was  the  river 
bank  and  he  did  not  know  the  road  in  the  least. 

He  knew  the  forest,  but  he  had  never  hunted  along  the  river 
bank,  though  his  hunts  had  sometimes  brought  him  out  on 
the  river-side.  However,  want  of  knowledge  of  this  strip  of 
the  forest  did  not  stay  him  in  tlie  least.  The  river  would  be 
his  guide,  and  picking  up  his  spear  he  started. 

He  did  not  know  in  the  least  where  the  boat  was  making 
for,  he  only  knew  that  it  had  gone  down  stream  and  down 
-.tream  he  made  his  way. 

The  road  was  easy  at  first,  but  presently  it  became  bad. 
■-quashy  and  overgrown  with  mangroves.  The  mangrove 
root  seems  made  by  Nature  as  a  trap  for  the  foot,  but  Saji 
seemed  to  have  eyes  in  his  feet  and  he  did  not  trip.  He 
passed  over  this  difficult  ground  as  swiftly  as  though  the  easy 
parts  of  the  forest,  passed  the  belt  of  nipah  palms  that 
bordered  it  and  struck  in  to  the  region  of  cutch  and  camphor 
trees  that  lay  beyond,  always  keeping  in  view  the  river  on 
his  right. 

Beyond  the  camphor  trees  came  very  easy  ground.  In  the 
old  days  when  certain  animals  were  more  frequently  met 
with  in  this  part  of  the  forest,  they  would  come  down  to  drink 
at  the  river  just  here,  and  this  fact  was  to  weave  itself  into  the 
te.xture  of  the  story  of  Macquart  in  a  most  unexpected  manner. 
Saji  had  not  made  twenty  yards  across  this  easy  ground 
when  the  earth  gave  under  his  feet.  He  made  a  wild  effort  to 
save  himself,  failed,  fell  into  the  darkness  and  lay  half  stunned 
for  a  moment  and  half  smothered  by  the  rush  of  earth  and 
rubble  that  had  followed  him. 

He  had  fallen  into  a  pit  trap  dug  in  the  old  days.  A  bottle- 
shaped  cellar  in  the  earth  covered  over  with  laths  and  clay 
and  growing  plants.  The  laths  made  of  split  bamboo  had 
decayed  long  ago,  but  the  fine  roots  of  the  plants  held  the 
clay  together  ;  it  had  consolidated  and  hardened,  making  a 
cellar  top  capable  of  sustaining  the  weight  of  a  small  animal, 
but  not  the  weight  of  a  man. 

In  the  old  days  the  bottom  of  the  pit  had  been  dressed 
with  sharp  bamboo  stakes,  point  upwards.  Fortunately 
for  Saji  time  had  rotted  these  to  dust. 

He  lay  for  a  moment,  then  he  sat  up.  He  knew  at  once 
what  had  happened  to  him,  and  the  knowledge  restored  his 
faculties  hke  a  stimulant.  Looking  up  he  could  see  above 
the  faint  hght  that  indicated  the  ragged  opening  through 
which  he  had  fallen.  Then  he  rose  to  his  feet  and  began 
exploring  his  prison  with  his  hands  held  flat,  palms  against 
the  walls. 

He  was  not  long  in  discovering  the  exact  shape  of  the  trap 
which  was  that  of  an  inverted  funnel.  Having  obtained 
this  fact,  he  explored  the  texture  of  the  walls. 

Rain  had  never  come  in  here,  the  earth  covering  and  more 
especially  the  leaf  covering  of  the  roof,  coupled  with  the  fac  t 
that  the  roof  formed  part  of  the  gentle  shelve  of  the  bank  to 
the  river,  had  kept  the  place  dry,  and  the  walls  were  of  hard 
earth,  but  not  so  hard  as  to  be  proof  against  the  point  of  his 
spear. 

He  had  been  carrying  it  aslant  over  his  shoulder  when  he 
fell,  and  he  had  not  released  his  hold  on  it.  It  was  the  first 
filing  he-touched  when  recovering  his  full  consciousness. 

Having  explored  the  texture  of  the  walls,  he  turned  to  the 
question  of  the  depth  of  the  trap.  By  standing  on  tiptoe  he 
could  just  touch  the  foliage  on  the  borders  of  the  hole  in  the 
roof  with  the  spear-point. 

Having  obtained  all  these  facts,  he  crouched  down  on  the 
floor  of  his  prison  to  grapple  with  them. 

It  was  a  terrible  problem.  No  less  than  the  problem  of 
escape  from  the  interior  of  an  inverted  funnel  whose  walls  were 
of  hard  earth. 

For  a  long  time  he  crouched  wresthng  with  it.  Whoever 
nad  devised  this  trap  must,  in  carrying  out  his  plan,  have 
expended  no  little  time  and  energy.  The  earth  must  have 
been  drawn  up  in  basket  fuls,  the  del  vers  carefully  broadening 
the  base  at  the  risk  of  an  infalling  of  the  walls.  But  the 
labours  of  the  making  of  it  were  nothing  to  the  labours  of  Saji 
wrestling  with  the  result. 

Unable  to  hit  upon  any  means  in  the  least  feasible,  he 
suddenly  rose  to  his  feet  ;  as  he  did  so,  something  touched  him 
on  his  shoulder.  It  was  the  end  of  a  ground  liana  that  had 
been  brought  down  by  the  spear  head  when  he  had  explored 
the  opening  with  it.  The  liana  hung  down  hke  a  rope  ;  it  was 
half  an  inch  thick.     It  was  salvation. 

Inverting  the  spear  and  pushing  the  point  into  the  further 
recess  of  the  pit,  lie  managed  to  seize  the  butt  with  his  teeth, 
so  as  to  bring  it  up  with  him.  Even  in  the  overwhelming 
joy  of  finding  an  easy  and  rapid  means  of  escape,  he  did  not 
forget  for  a  moment  the  necessity  of  taking  the  weapon  with 
him. 

It  was  impossible  to  cUmb  with  it  in  his  hands,  and  even  now, 
holding  the  extreme  end  of  the  butt  in  his  teeth,  he  had  to 
keep  his  head  bent  with  his  chin  on  his  chest  as  he  chmbed. 


This  made  the  process  more  laborious  and  more  lengthy  ;  it 
produced  all  sorts  of  extra  vibrations  in  the  rope  of  liana ;  it 
was  his  undoing.  His  uppermost  hand  had  reached  within 
a  foot  of  tlie  opening,  when  the  hana  broke. 

Instantaneousiy.  he  must  have  —so  to  speak — spat  out 
the  spear  butt,  else  it  would  have  been  driven  through  the 
roof  of  his  mouth.  As  it  was,  he  found  himself  lying  on  the 
floor  of  his  prison  with  the  spear  across  him. 

He  was  shaken,  but  quite  unhurt,  and  the  fall,  instead  of 
demoralising  him,  set  him  to  wrestling  again  with  the  problem 
he  had  so  nearly  solved.  Saji  had  fine  qualities  amongst  his 
many  defects,  and  the  finest  of  them  was  patience  under 
defeat,  and  steadfastness.  The  sea  and  the  forest  had  edu- 
cated these  natural  qualities  inherited  from  those  ancestors 
of  his,  who  had  tracked  and  trapped  and  fished  since  the 
beginning  of  time,  ambushed  their  enemies  after  weeks  of 
patient  watching,  and  secured  their  heads  just  as  Saji  hoped 
to  secure  the  head  of  Macquart. 

That  was  the  gift  which  would  bring  him  Chaya,  and,  much 
as  he  valued  life,  that  was  the  object  for  which  he  was  striving 
now. 

Though  he  had  no  erinfity  against  Macquart,  the  head  of 
Macquart  held  him  to  its  capture  with  a  grasp  stronger  than 
the  kwe  of  life. 

Saji  had  no  enmity  towards  the  animals  he  followed  in  the 
forest  or  the  fish  he  followed  in  the  sea,  yet  in  the  pursuit 
of  fish  or  beast  hfe  was  nothing  compared  to  he  object  of 
the  chase.  His  busy  mind,  working  now  with  the  activity  of 
a  squirrel  in  a  cage,  suddenly  struck  upon  a  new  idea. 

He  began  to  attack  the  walls  of  his  prison.  Going  down 
on  his  knees  and  with  his  spear  point,  he  began  digging  away 
at  the  clay  as  though  endeavouring  to  make  the  beginnings  of 
a  tunnel.  Nothing  was  further  from  his  thoughts  than  a 
tunnel.    He  was  digging  to  bring  down  earth. 

If  he  could  bring  down  sufficient  to  make  a  pile  high  enough 
to  allow  him  to  stand  on  it  and  grasp  the  vegetation  at  the 
opening,  he  fancied  that  he  could  save  himself.  Had  the 
pit  been  flooded  with  the  cold,  practical  light  of  day,  I  doubt 
if  he  would  have  attempted  the  business. 

He  worked  with  the  spear  point,  and  then,  like  a  digging 
animal,  with  his  hands.  He  worked  constantly  and  methodi- 
cally ;  he  worked  through  the  remainder  of  the  night,  through 
the  dawn,  and  on  into  the  day.  Then  he  rested  for  some 
hours,  and  recommenced  working  through  the  evening. 
Before  nightfall,  he  had  brought  enough  clay  out  of  the  pit 
side  to  make  a  mound  three  feet  high  in  the  centre.  A  tremen- 
dous amount,  considering  the  stiffness  of  the  earth,  and  the 
fact  that  the  higher  the  mound  was  built  the  broader  spread 
its  base.  For  every  inch  of  altitude  he  had  to  broaden  and 
thicken  the  base  of  this  infernal  mound.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
to  escape  by  this  way  it  would  be  necessary  to  fill  the  whole 
pit  with  clay.  To  come  up  on  a  rising  tide  of  clay.  The  thing 
was  impossible.  His  labour  had  given  him  employment  which, 
after  hberty,  is  the  best  gift  a  prisoner  can  receive,  but  that 
was  all. 

Now,  with  the  darkness,  he  knew  that  he  was  lost,  that 
all  the  digging  he  could  do  would  not  save  him,  and  knowing 
that  he  sat  down  to  die.  Saji  had  a  terrible  philosophy  of  his 
own.  Whilst  capable  of  endless  elfort,  he  was  a  fatalist 
pure  and  simple,  when  faced  with  the  impossible  or  the  in- 
evitable. 

He  did  not  moan  to  himself  or  curse  his  lot.  He  had  to  die 
— well,  then,  he  had  to  die,  and  there  was  no  more  to  be  said 
on  the  matter.  He  did  not  think,  as  he  sat  there,  of  all 
the  pleasant  days  and  good  times  he  would  never  see  again, 
simply  because  such  things  were  not  for  him.  Blue  skies  to 
Saji  were  no  more  than  blue  skies  to  an  indiarubber  figure  ; 
sunshine  was  good  because  it  warmed  him,  and  for  no  other 
reason.  When  it  warmed  him  too  much,  it  was  bad.  Free- 
dom was  good  because  it  allowed  him  to  move  about  and  kill 
things.  Food  was  good  because  it  filled  his  stomach  and 
satisfied  his  desire  for  food.  He  had  neither  sunshine,  free- 
dom, nor  food  here,  but  presently  he  would  not  need  them. 

His  mind  retired  in  to  itself,  folded  up,  almost  ceased  to 
exercise  its  functions. 

Long  after  dark,  how  long  he  could  not  possibly  tell,  Saji, 
seated  in  the  darkness  of  his  terrible  prison,  suddenly  came 
to  Hfe  and  sprang  erect  with  a  shout. 

The  sound  of  voices  had  come  to  him.  Voices  of  human 
beings  passing  close  to  the  pit  mouth. 

(To  be  concluded.) 


With  each  day  that  passes  the  coat — frock  comes  more 
surely  into  its  own.  At  present  most  of  them  to  be  seen  about 
are  in  serge  or  gaberdine,  but  it  is  likely  that  these  will  be 
replaced  by  linen,  tussore,  or  shantung,  once  summer  is  here. 
There  is  a  thick  weave  of  Hnen  that  lends  itself  uncommonly 
well  to  this  tailored  influence,  and  nothing  could  be  cooler  or 
more  comfortable  during  the  dog  days. 


May   1 8,    191 6 


Supplement    to    LAND     &     WATER 


XI 


The   Supreme 

SUNBEAM 


Great  as  were  Sunbeam  records 
in  pre-war  races  and  trials,  the 
achievements  of  Sunbeam  cars 
in  the  present  war  offer  even 
more  convincing  proof  of  abso- 
lute supremacy.  For  the 
present  the  Government  needs 
all  our  output.  But  you  need 
not  delay  ordering  a  Sunbeam 
for  delivery  after  the  war.  We 
have  a  waiting  list. 


The  SUNBEAM  MOTOR  CAR  CO.,  Ltd. 

WOLVERHAMPTON.    Manchester:  112  Deansgate. 

Agents    for    London    and  District  :  J.   Keele 

Ltd.,    72     New    Bond    St., 

W. 

Dtialop  Tyres  are  fitted  to  Sunbeam  Cars  as  standard. 


The    Original    Cording^s 

Established   77  years  ago 

High-Grade  Waterproofs. 

The    TRENCH  Coat. 

This  good-looking  waterproof  coat,  although 
designed  chiefly  for  trench  wear,  is  also  of 
general  military  usefulness. 

The  wide  lap-over  front  excludes  both  wind 
and  rain.  The  deep  collar  is  fitted  with  a 
special  tab  and  buckle,  and  when  turned  up 
closes  comfortably  round  the  chin.  Openings 
to  the  two  large  pouch  pockets  go  right 
through,  and  so  give  easy  access  to  one's  inner 
pockets. 

Officers  who  supplement  this  Trench  Coat 
with  a  pair  of  loose  overall  leggings  (these 
when  not  in  use  can  be  carried  with  room  to 
spare,  in  one  of  the  pockets),  will  secure  a 
completely  protective  waterproof  outfit,  of 
little  bulk,  light  in  weight,  and  ensuring  every 
possible  freedom  of  movement. 

When  ordering  a  Trench  Coat,  or  if  to  be  sent 
on  approval,  height  and  chest  measure,  and 
reference,   should  be    given. 

NEW     CAMPAIGNING    VMTERPROOF 
PONCHO    AND    SLEEPING    BAG. 

This    new  and    very   practical   ntilitary  poncho  well 
meets  tlie  demands  of  Active  Servi<:e  eitlier  for  wear  -■ 
on  foot  or  for  mounted  use. 

The  head  passes  through  an  opening  covered'  by  a  semd-o'rcular  flap,  which  forms  a 
deep,  neatly-fitting  collar. 

The  poncho  -ser^'es  a  double  pairpose:  as  a  waterproof  garment  readily  put  on  oi 
taken  oflf,  and  prosenting  no  aperture  through  wiiich  driving  rain  can  penetrate ;  as  an 
ample  waterproof  ground  sheet,  which  by  a  simple  buttoning  arrangement  makes  an 
admirable  sleeping  bag. 

New   Illustrated  List    of    waterproofs,    boott,    &c.,    at    rmqueMt 

J.  G.  CORDING  &  GS 

Waterproof ers  to  H.M.  the  King 

Only     AdJresse* : 

19  PICCADILLY,  W.  &35 st. jamess st. 


'5?ioioio^^4o*JR3o***ioioio*jfeioio.:fejfeioiojfeioioio4oioiS***** 


49 
<R 

4? 
4? 
49 

49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
4^ 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 
49 


Foreign  tyres  are 
unessential  im- 
ports, yet  British 
motorists  are  buy- 
ing them  at  the 
rate  of  £3,500,000 
a  year.    Verb.  sap. 


M536 


Now 

while  every  penny  is  needed  in  the  Country,  it  is 
a  duty  to  fit  British-made  tyres,  of  which  there  is  a 
plentiful  supply.    It  will  be  a  pleasure,  too,  if  you  fit 

W®od-Milm 

S*  MOTOR  TYRES 

They  carry  a  Guarantee  of  3,500  miles,  against  all  road 
risks,   which  cannot  be  said  of  any   foreign   tyre      With 
reasonable  care  and  luck  they  are  good  for 
double  and  treble  the  guaranteed  mileage. 


WOOD-MILNE,     LTD.,    PRESTON. 

Wire:   "Comfort,   Preston."  Telephone:  Preston  413. 

London  :    Manchester   Avenue,    E.G. 

Wire:  "Bytuming,  London."  Telephone:  City  4797. 

Bristol,         Birmingham.  Leeds  Manchester. 

Dublin,  Belfast  Glasgow. 


i^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^?^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^'^ 


Xll 


Supplement     to     LAND     &     WATER 


May   1 8,  1916 


The    Call 
to    Arms! 

He  is  leaving  the  coin 
l(jita  of  home,  at  the 
(all  of  King  and  Countrj'. 
Don't  forget  that  there 
is  one  thing  which  is 
essential,  and  that  is  the 
ever  -  ready  means  to 
write  and  tt-ll  you  how 
he  is  faring  in  liarracks, 
imd  <anip,  and  firing 
line.  He  iic«/i  a  Foun- 
tain Pen,  and  he  DE- 
SERVES the  best.  So 
j;i!it  find  ont  the  type  u 
nib  he  uses  and  give  him 
a  Waterman's  Ideal — the 
■SAFETY"  Type  for 
|ireferente,  because  it 
can  be  carried  upside 
down  or  in  any  position. 
There  is  do  other  pen  that  gives  so  inuL-ii  satisiiu-tiun  in  tlujt^e 
on    Active   Service. 

An  Army  Captain  wTilet  : — "  /  cannot  speak  too  hiyhly  of 
f  ificicncy  and  reliabilily.  It  is  all  and  more  than  you  have  daimrd 
lor  it." 

Another  officer  vritet  :— "  /  wouldn't  be  without  it  for  any- 
thing.    It's  the  very  thing  to  <iive  a  fallow  in  the  army." 


Watem^ns 


<E 


For  the  ReluUr  Type.  10/fi  and  up- 
nardH  For  the  SAFETY  Type  and 
the  New  Lever  I'ocket  Self-Fillinit 
Type,      1 2/6       and        upwards.  Of 

Stationers  and  Jeweltem  everywhere. 


FnMeBt  BAttsfaction  g>taranteed.  Nibs 
cxchaniteable  if  not  suitable.  Call  or 
send  to  '  The  Pen  Corner."  Full 
range  of  pens  on  view  for  inspection 
and  trial.     Booklet  free  from  : — 


L.  G.  Sloan,  Chc^ciidcntcr,  Kingsway,  London. 


||M't|nnillllilllMlllllllilM|ir''|['miimmmi||"mtiimnniitiH!g 


This  Waltham  Wristlet 

is    absolutely   the    best  watch 
for  wear  on    Active    Service 


It  is  a  strooin,  senioeable  watoli,  n«at,  and— best  of  aU— 
tliorouRlilj  rcllxihle.  There  never  have  been  wotchc8  to  equal 
Wiilt^ianus  for  accuracy,  and  tliis  Wallliani  "  Wristlet  "  main- 
tains tlie  m.ikers'  great  rejuitation. 

To  have  this  WaltlKim  on  your  wrist  is  to  know  the  eiact 
time  at  n  (ilance.  You  will  not  be  wfuHlerinif  whether  it  is 
fn.st  or.  frlow,  you'll  know  it's  Ti^ht—btcauscit  is  a  WaitMam. 
To  give  this  Walbham  to  your  soHier  friend  is  to  pToseret  him 
wiWi  someUiing  that  will  be  useful,  not  only  now  but  in  tlie 
peace  daya  to  come.  As  a  gift  it  would  be  hanl'  to  fljjd'  ita 
equal. 
In  silver  case,  with  (trap  and  buckle  complete,  front  £3  3s.  9ci 

Luminoas    dials    Extra. 

WalihamWaiches 

0/   all   Reliable    Watchmakers   and   Jeirdlers. 

"  Wristlet  "  Pamphlet  and 
Watch      Booklet      FREE. 

Bend    ><'iir    name   and   oddro-'^s    nnd    we   wiU    forward   thotn. 

WALTHAM   WATCH  CO., 

(Dept.    63)     125    High    Holborn,     London,    W.C. 

Eitablished  over  </)  ijeara. 


^.illllllllllllllllillllimilllllllililllilllllllllllllllllllilllllilLiuiiiiiillir; 


The    THRESHER 
Trench  Coat 

WINDPROOr  AND  WATERPROOF. 

T  TP  to  April  I5fh,  1916,  seven  thousand 
British    Military  Officers    have    pur- 
chased genuine   Thresher   Trench  Coats. 

5UMMLR    WLAR. 

All  last  Sumntier  orders  reached  us 
continuously  from  B.E.F.,  and  at  present 
the  demand  shows  no  signs  of  slacken- 
ing, which  confirms  our  statement  that 
the  Thresher,  lined  detachable  Kamelcott, 
is  the  best  garment  for  every  purpose 
and  every  season. 

Price   -   £5  10  0 

Mounted    pattern     15/6    extra. 

Send  size  of  chest  and  approximate 
hci^tit  when  ordering. 

THRESHER  &GLENNY, 

Strand,    London. 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVII  No.  2819  [v^r^] 


TTTTTT?9DAV     MAY    t8     Tnjfi  tregistered  ast  pr  ic  e  sixpence 

1  xa u xs-OJ-^/^  1 ,    iviAi     xo,    xyxu  LanewspaperJ   published  weekly 


By   Louis  UakiuaiiUnr*. 


brawn   exclusively/  jor   "Land  and    Watei.' 


The  Wolf:  "Is  it  not  time  to  stop  all  further  bloodshed?" 


LAN  D      \      WATER 


May  18,  igi6 


The  King  of  the  Belgians 

Reproduced  from  the  picture  which  is  being  exhibited  by  Mr.  Harold  Speed  in  the  Royal  Academy 


May  18,  1916. 


LAND      &     WATER 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSWAY,  LONDON,  W.C 

Telephone:  HOLBORN  2828 


THURSDAY,    MAY    18,    1916 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Germany's  Cry  for  Peace.     By  Louis  Raemaekers        i 
The  King  of  the  Belgians  2 

Are  We  Winning  the  War  ?     (Leading  Article)  3 

Alternatives  Before  the  Enemy.     By  Hilaire  Belloc  .   4 
Reality  of  Sea  Power.     By  Arthur  Pollen  9 

Sortes  Shakespearian^.     By  Sir  Sidney  Lee  9 

The  Charge.     By  Patrick  MacGill  12 

How  German  Public  Opinion  is  Formed.     By  Colonel 

Feyler  13 

Renascence  or  Decay.     By  Joseph  Thorp  14 

Where  America  Stands.     By  Lewis  R.  Freeman  15 

The  So-Called  "  Air  Muddle."     By  F.  W.  Lanchester     17 
Chaya.     By  H.  do  Verc  Stacpoole  19 

The  West  End  24 

Choosing  Kit  xiii. 


ARE   WE   WINNING   THE   WAR? 

THESE  words  form  the  te.\t  of  a  jeremiad  contri- 
buted by  Dr.  Dillon  to  the  current  number  of 
the  Fortnightly  Review  ;  and  since  this  article 
has  attained  a  wider  publicity  through  the 
columns  of  the  Daily  Mail,  his  arguments  deserve  careful 
examination. 

In  the  first  place  he  deprecates  any  attempt  to  belittle 
the  German  achievements  in  front  of  Verdun  on  the 
curious  ground  that  the  enemy's  losses  "  cannot  have 
exceeded  100,000,  as  there  were  hardly  more  than  300,000 
German  troops  in  action."  Can  Dr.  Dillon  really  be 
ignorant  of  the  standing  fact  that  the  number  of  divisions 
actually  idcntitied  up  to  May  ist  was  31  and  in  addition  is 
it  not  obvious  that  an  enemy  does  not  launch  an  attack  on 
this  scale  without  taking  care  to  provide  adequate 
reserves  ?  Has  the  author  of  this  remarkable  military 
estimate  not  heard  that  the  enemy  was  compelled  over 
and  over  again  to  reconstruct  these  divisions.  His  losses 
during  the  first  month  of  the  Verdun  fighting  were,  on 
the  most  conservative  estimates,  at  least  100,000,  and  at 
the  end  of  April  certainly  exceeded  a  quarter  of  a  million. 
Even  the  ofiicial  German  lists,  though  a  ludicrous  under- 
estimate of  the  truth,  admit  a  monthly  loss  of  over 
150,000  in  the  first  eighteen  months  of  war,  and  are  we 
to  believe  that  in  the  three  months  of  the  most  sanguinary 
fighting  of  all,  their  losses  have  miraculously  reached 
a  minimum  ?  As  for  the  success  or  failure  of  this  costly 
effort,  the  best  way  is  to  compare  the  flamboyant  state- 
ments of  the  German  press  in  the  early  days  of  the  attack 
with  the  insignificant  results  achieved. 

It  is  clear  that  we  must  look  elsewhere  for  evidence 
that  we  are  not  winning  the  war,  and  it  is  scarcely  to  be 
found  in  the  following  statement  that  "  the  enemy  is 
attacking  us  and  attacking  violently.  The  Allies  arc, 
as  usual,  on  the  defensive,  amply  supplied,  one  piously 
hopes;  with  men  and  munitions."  It  is  difficult,  we  may 
say  in  parenthesis,  to  forgive  the  scorn  which  is  barely 
concealed  by  the  piety  of  D:.  Dillon's  hopes,  but  the 
real  answer  to  this  contention  is  that  attacks,  even  violent 
attacks,  are  only  justified  by  success,  and  proceed  quite  as 
often  from  necessity  as  from  strength. 

Dr.  Dillon  apparently  finds  some  consolation,  though 
very  httle,  when  his  eyes  are  turned  towards  the  sea  : 
but  here  again  he  is  full  of  gloomy  foreboding  :  "  We 
must  sing  Britannia  rules  the  waves  in  a  lower  key  : 
for  a  time  has  come,  when  every  nation,  however  in- 


significant in  its  navy,  may,  if  it  possess  a  sufficient 
number  of  submarines,  cripple  or  ruin  the  sea-borne 
commerce  of  its  enemy.  And  that  is  the  task  which  the 
Germans  have  set  themselves  to-day.  .  .  .  How 
thoroughly  and  scientifically  they  have  worked  out  the 
problem  we  know."  Unfortunately  the  above  was 
written  before  the  German  Chancellor's  speech  to  the 
Reichstag,  reported  in  the  Morning  Post  of  May  12th, 
which  contains  the  significant  admission,  "  A  great 
mistake  has  been  committed  in  overstating  the  value  of 
the  submarine  campaign  against  England.  Our  naval 
experts  no  longer  believe  in  the  probability  of  reducing 
England  to  starvation  and  ruin  by  submarines,  even  if 
the  war  lasts  for  another  two  years." 

Perhaps  the  most  extraordinary  argument  of  all  those 
used  by  Dr.  Dillon,  is  his  estimate  or  rather  obsession 
concerning  the  number  of  German  reserves.  He  ridicules 
as  a  puerile  fabrication  the  story  that  they  have  melted 
down  to  700,000,  and  in  a  bewildering  sentence  commits 
himself  to  the  following  opinion  :  "I  venture  to  affirm 
that  the  Germans  still  have  between  7  and  8  million  men 
to  draw  from.  ...  I  go  still  further  and  assert  that 
they  dispose  of  nearly  two  million  of  their  best  troops 
whom  they  have  kept  back  for  the  coup  de  grace."  If 
the  words  "  dispose  of  "  are  meant  to  indicate  that  the 
flower  of  the  German  army  is  kept  in  reserve,  the  con- 
ception is  so  childish  and  so  opposed  to  the  very  elements 
of  probability,  not  to  say  strategy,  that  we  cannot  impose 
it  on  the  German  General  Staff.  Is  it  conceivable  that 
they  would  have  called  up.  their  1916  and  1917  classes 
while  they  had  still  a  large  reserve  of  trained  and  seasoned 
troops  to  draw  upon  ?  They  have  indeed  "  disposed  of 
two  million  of  their  finest  troops,"  and  twice  that  number, 
but  in  a  sense  that  is  irrevocable.  Our  readers  are 
familiar  with  the  detailed  evidence  of  German  losses 
which  has  been  presented  in  these  columns  ;  we  know 
that  their  total  mobilisable  strength  did  not  exceed  nine 
million,  that  the  irreducible  minimum  of  their  permanent 
losses  was  3J  million  at  the  end  of  1915  ;  that  the  fighting 
during  the  last  three  months  has  been  of  the  most  bloodv 
and  desperate  character  ;  and  consequently  the  suggestion 
that  their  available  forces  still  number  from  seven  to  eight 
million  is  a  patent  absurdity. 

What  is  the  panacea  for  all  our  troubles  ?  What  ig 
the  sure  road  to  victory  ?  According  to  Dr.  Dillon,  all 
that  is  needed  is  a  change  of  Government.  Of  our 
statesmen  he  says,  "  If  we  may  judge  by  public  acts,  their 
conception  of  the  problem  is  how  to  worst  the  Teuton 
abroad  without  deranging  our  present  political  and  social 
ordering  at  home,  without  running  counter  to  party 
traditions,  without  hurting  the  susceptibilities  of  neutrals, 
without  compelling  universal  national  service,  and  without 
securing  the  co-operation  of  labour." 

We  regard  this  indictment  as  false  in  every  particular. 
Within  two  years  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the 
British  Empire  have  reached  the  stupendous  total  of  five 
million  men,  which  indicates  that  the  Government  has 
not  only  faced  but  carried  out  the  obligations  imposed 
upon  it  :  the  derangement  of  the  political  and  social  order 
is  witnessed  by  the  willing  sacrifice  of  every  class  in  the 
community  :  party  distinctions,  so  far  as  the  Press  will 
allow,  have  been  swept  aside:  the  blockade  has  been  enforced 
to  a  degree  which  has  sometimes  moved  the  resentment  of 
neutrals,  to  say  nothing  of  the  expostulation  of  the  enemy  ; 
compulsory  service  has  been  adopted,  and  the  Prime 
Minister'  through  the  exercise  of  his  unique  talents,  has 
avoided  that  discord  between  labour  and  capital  which 
would  have  proved  disastrous  to  the  country.  The  true 
answer  to  the  question,  "  Are  we  winning  the  War?  " 
is  to  be  found  in  the  sudden  anxiety  for  peace  which  has 
smitten  the  German  conscience  :  that  is  not  the  herald  of 
victory.  It  is  the  dawning  recognition  that,  in  the 
inevitable  sequel,  the  might  of  Germany  must  be  broken 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  1 8,  1916 


ALTERNATIVES  BEFORE  THE  ENEMY 


By  Hilaire  Belloc 


THE  enemy  has  lost  the  battle  of  Verdun  ;  he 
has — it  should  be  presumed— the  men  left  for 
one  more  great  offensive,  if  not  upon  the  same 
scale,  at  least  in  force.  He  must  make  such  an 
offensive  because  his  rapidly  approaching  limit  in  resources 
of  men,  his  more  distant  limit  of  resources  in  supply, 
condemn  him  to  it. 

Let  us  see  what  alternatives  he  has  in  the  matter. 
\\e  begin  with  the  present — and  very  advanced — stage 
of  his  bloody  defeat  upon  the  Meuse. 

It  is  a  phenomenon  which  you  will  find  in  any  other 
form  of  conflict  when  the  beaten  party  tries  to  go  on 
showing  fight  too  long.  One  might  generalise  further 
and  say  that  it  is  a  phenomenon  you  may  see  in  any  form 
of  energy  expended  beyond  the  moment  of  its  highest 
efficiency.  You  will  see  it  in  the  wobbling  of  a  top  and 
you  will  see  it  in  the  successively  declining  "  spurts  " 
of  the  runner  who  has  misjudged  a  long  course  and  is 
pumped  out  before  the  end  of  it. 

Phases  of  the  Verdum  Action 

In  the  particular  case  of  this  Verdun  sector  we  have 
now  enough  e.xperience  to  establish  something  like  a 
regular  rhythm  governing  the  business.  When  the 
original  "  head  "  of  shell  which  permitted  a  more  or  less 
continuous  bombardment  was  all  shot  away,  the  first 
phase  of  the  action — prepared  for  nearly  two  months — 
ended  :  and  there  came  a  period  which  could  be  prolonged 
for  as  many  weeks,  or  months,  as  the  enemy's  supply  of 
men  would  last — or  at  least  as  long  as  the  French  chose 
to  stand  on  the  defensive.  During  this  second  phase 
each  effort  of  the  Germans  had  to  be  prepared  by  a  pre- 
ceding period  of  accumulation  in  material  and  of  re- 
organisation and  recruitment  in  men.  Very  roughly 
speaking  the  time  that  could  be  devoted  to  intensive 
effort  was  to  the  time  required  to  prepare  that  effort  as 
about  5  to  I.  An  interval  of  ten  days  prepared  and  per- 
mitted an  intensive  effort  of  48  hours  ;  an  interval  of  a 
fortnight  was  followed  by  something  like  three  days  of 
effort.  Such  a  rough  rule  is,  of  course,  modified  in  a 
thousand  ways,  and  by  nothing  more  than  the  difference 
in  the  numbers  of  effectives  with  which  each  effort  was 
made.  But  that  seems  to  have  been  about  the  pro- 
portion. The  enemy's  command  had  to  build  up  men 
and  munitions  during  five  days  for  each  day  of  expense 
in  the  same.  He  may,  if  he  will,  launch  any  number  of 
new  attacks  against  the  critical  points  of  the  present 
deferisive  line — Hills  295  and  304,  Avocourt  Wood, 
Vau.x  ravine  and  hill,  Poivre  hill,  Haudromont  farm. 
He  can  at  an  absurd  expense  in  men  make  slight  advances 
anywhere.  But  in  proportion  to  the  strength  of  each 
such  effort  he  is  thus  condemned  to  a  ruinously  high 
price  in  time. 

The  date  on  which  the  battle  of  Verdun  can  be  regarded 
as  definitely  won  was,  my  readers  will  probably  remember, 
April  9th;  or,  to  be  accurate,  the  close  of  the  great  attack 
on  that  day. 

It  was  then  that  General  Petain  issued  his  Order  of  the 
Day  congratulating  the  soldiers  upon  their  efforts  and 
marking  the  close  of  the  decisive  period.  That  the  battle 
would  be  won  and  that  everything  was  tending  that  way, 
had  been  apparent  very  long  before,  but  that  is  the  day 
on  which  one  can  fix  as  the  terminal  point. 

Since  then  we  have  seen  these  successive  lulls  and  intense 
efforts  beating  a  pulse.  The  last  intensive  bombardment 
began  upon  May  :5rd,  followed  by  the  futile  infantry  action 
of  May  5th.  These  lines  are  written  upon  fucsdnv, 
^lay  i6th.  There  has  been  nothing  of  any  consequence 
in  the  interval.  Tiic  enemy  may  be  accumulating 
further  shell  and  bringing  up  fresh  divisions,  or  recon- 
stituting divisions  already  used  and  broken,  but  if  he  docs 
so  I  think  it  will  be  found  that  the  effort  he  makes  will 
pretty  well  correspond  to  the  rhythmical  proportion  just 
arrived  at.  He  will  use  up  in  time  about  five  days  of 
preparation  to  one  of  action  and  the  price  so  paid  in 
time  is  now  disastrous. 


We  may  take  advantage  of  such  a  lull  in  the  operations 
to  consider  the  war  as  a  whole  and  to  estimate  the  enemy's 
position  for  the  near  future.  Very  many  of  my  corre- 
spondents have  asked  me  to  make  such  an  estimate 
when  an  opportunity  should  be  afforded  by  some  pause 
in  the  main  operations,  and  they  have  lately  added  to  this 
request  frequent  suggestions  that  I  should  reply  in  detail 
to  the  more  ridiculous  statements  put  about  by  those  who 
work  in  this  country  for  the  exaggeration  of  the  enemy's 
power. 

The  two  foundations  of  any  estimate  are,  of  course, 
an  estimate  of  men  and  an  estimate  of  the  power  of 
munitionment  and  supply,  including  in  the  latter 
material  for  industry  and  maintenance  of  population  as 
well  as  material  directly  used  in  war. 

The  general  situation  of  both  those  elements  at  the 
present  moment  is  well  known  and  need  only  be  stated. 

There  are  in  this  war,  from  the  point  of  view  of  man- 
power, two  distinct  groups.  There  is  the  group  of  what 
may  be  called  the  "  fully  mobilised  coOntries,"  and  there 
is  the  group,  the  members  of  which  have,  for  various 
reasons,  not  yet  put  forth  a  maximum  effort  in  man- 
power. 

In  the  first  group  we  put  the  French  Republic,  the 
German  Empire,  the  Austro- Hungarian  Empire,  the 
Bulgarians  and  the  Serbians.  Every  one  of  these  nations, 
irom  the  first  day  it  entered  the  war,  had  the  whole  of  its 
available  man-power  organised,  could  calculate  with 
precision  how  long  "  normal  methods  of  recruitment"  would 
last  it  at  a  given  rate  of  wastage,  and  what  "abnormal 
methods  of  recruitment "  would  yield — particularly 
the  numbers  of  the  "  immature  classes  "  (1916  and  ic)i7) 
which  would  ultimately  be  drawn  upon  should  the  war 
be  prolonged  beyond  the  close  of  the  year  1915. 

Eliminating  for  the  moment  Bulgaria  and  Serbia,  and 
considering  only  the  three  major  members  of  this  group, 
we  know  what  the  condition  of  exhaustion  is,  and  we 
know  it  by  the  very  simple  test  of  remarking  the  neces- 
sities under  which  each  fully  mobilised  power  finds  itself 
of  calling  upon  the  last  drafts  of  recruitment. 

Approaching  End  of  Reserves 

The  position  is  briefly  this. 

All  three  powers  are  approachinj?  the  end  of  their 
reserves  in  men — that  is.  of  the  numbers  over  and  above 
those  necessa!ry  to  keeping  of  their  armies  in  the  field. 
All  three  powers  have  already  fallen  back  u]ion  the 
"  abnormal  methods  of  recruitment,"  and  particularly 
upon  the  calling  up  of  the  youngest  classes  normally 
regarded  as  "  immature  "  and  below  the  military  age. 

But  though  these  three  powers  are  all  near  the 
limits  of  recruitment  as  compared  with  the  other  group  of 
powers  which  still  have  large  reserves,  they  are  by  no 
means  neck  and  neck.  Reduced  as  the  margins  are  in 
each,  there  is  still  a  difference,  giving  an  ampler  margin 
to  one  and  a  lesser  margin  to  another,  though  the  margin 
is  in  all  three  cases  narrow. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Power  is  the  most  exhausted 
of  the  three.  It  owes  this  misfortune  to  a  number  of 
causes. 

The  excellence  and  persistence  of  the  Italian  artillery 
work  upon  the  narrow  but  densely  crowded  Gorizia  front 
is  one  cause ;  the  terrible  cliniatic  conditions  of  the 
Carpathian  fighting  last  year  is  another  ;  the  very  bad 
defeats  suffered  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  are  a  third  ; 
the  disaffection  and  consequent  desertion  or  mishandling 
of  Slav  troops,  especially  in  the  earfier  part  of  the  cam- 
j)aign,  is  a  fourth.  At  an}'  rate,  whatever  weight  we 
allow  lo  each  of  these  causes,  and  to  others  which  may 
have  contributed  to  the  result,  we  know  that  Austro- 
Hungary  is  at  the  present  moment  the  most  heavily  hit 
of  all  the  belligerent  powers  in  the  matter  of  men.  She 
has  put  men  up  to  55  under  contribution  for  military 
work  of  sorts  (though,  of  course,  there  can  be  no  ci\iestion  of 
using  these  older  classes  in  the  field) .  She  has  long  ago  used 
her  I(ji6  class  and  has  now  many  weeks  ago  put  portions 


May  i8,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


of  her  1917  class  into  the  field.  She  is  the  only  Power 
whirli  has  warned  and,  I  believe,  already  examined, 
her  IQ18  class — that  is  the  lads  who  will  be  20  years  of 
age  in  the  course  of  1918,  who  and  are  consequently  either 
just  imder  or  just  over  18  years  of  age  at  the  present 
moment 

The  German  Empire  comes  next  in  its  exhaustion  of 
men.  It  has  called  up  into  the  field  pretty  well  the  whole 
of  its  igi6  class.  It  has  called  up  and  is  training  and  has 
already,  I  believe,  put  into  the  field  portions  of  its  1917 
class.  There  certainly  exists  secret  information  upon  the 
status  of  the  iqi8  class  in  the  derman  Empire  at  this 
moment,  but  I  have  not  seen  that  information.  I  am 
dependent  only  upon  published  telegrams  which  seem  to 
show  that  the  1918  class  has  been  warned,  and  perhaps, 
in  the  case  of  special  services,  examined,  but  at  any  rate, 
the  1918  class  in  Germany  is  not  so  far  advanced  towards 
service  as  is  the  corresponding  class  in  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Empire. 

Lastly,  we  have  the  French  Republic  in  the  following 
situation  : — 

The  1916  class  was  called  up  many  months  ago,  and  has 
been  in  training  ever  since.  The  Germans  even  claim 
that  certain  members  of  it  have  been  discovered  among 
their  prisoners  before  Verdun.  I  was  specially  told, 
upon  the  other  hand  not  many  weeks  ago,  that  none  of 
this  class  (save  a  few  original  volunteers)  had  as  yet 
been  put  under  fire.  But,  no  matter  which  of  these 
versions  be  true,  it  is  of  no  great  consequence.  The 
French  have  certainly  not  yet  put  into  line  many  of 
their  1916  class.  The  Germans  have  put  into  fine  nearly 
all  of  theirs.  They  have  called  up  for  training,  now  four 
months  ago,  their  1917  class.  So  have  the  Germans. 
Neither  party  has  put'j  this  class  into  the  field  yet  in 
any  appreciable  numDcrs.  The  French  have  certainly 
put  none  of  it  at  all.  If  the  Germans  have  begun  to  put 
theirs  in,  it  has  been  only  on  a  very  small  scale  so  far. 

German   Tactics  and   Exhaustion 

VVc  must  of  course  remember  further  in  this  contrast 
that  the  French  period  of  training  is  very  much  longer 
than  the  German.     It  is  more  than  twice  as  long. 

If  it  be  asked  why  the  German  Empire  should  be  some- 
what— though  but  slightly —more  exhausted  than  the 
French  Republic,  the  answer  would  seem  to  be  that 
frequently  given  in  these  columns  :  that  the  German 
Empire  has  been  fighting  upon  two  fronts,  that  it  is  ruled 
by  a  tactical  tradition  of  close  formation  (from  which  it 
sometimes  attempts  to  depart  but  to  which  it  invariably 
returns),  and  thit  it  has  also  since  the  Aisne  been  con- 
demned to  a  perpetual  offensive  against  entrenched 
enemies.  The  two  great  offensive  actions  of  the  French, 
that  in  the  Artois  a  year  ago  and  that  in  the  Champagne 
last  September,  you  can  set  in  the  history  of  the  campaign 
against  at  least  five  such  expensive  German  efforts — 
of  which  Verdun  is  the  last  and  greatest  by  far.  It  is 
only  in  the  natural  order,  and  precisely  what  was  to  be 
expected,  that  the  German  service  should  show  a  slightly 
greater  loss  in  proportion  to  its  numbers  than  the  French. 
But  we  must  be  careful  to  remember  that  this  difference  is ' 
only  slight. 

Such  is  the  general  situation  as  to  numbers  upon  the 
continent,  so  far  as  these  numbers  regard  the  fully 
mobilised  great  nations.  We  can  represent  the  thing 
clearly,  but  exceedingly  roughly,  by  saying  that  where 
Austro-Hungary  has  probably  lost  in  21  months  10  men 
out  of  a  given  unit,  Germany  has  lost,  say,  9,  and  France 
about  8,  while  the  man-power  of  Austro-Hungary  and 
Germany  is  to  that  of  France  alone  as  almost  exactly 
3  to  I. 

It  would  be  mere  waste  of  space  to  refute  once  more  the 
ineptitudes  and  worse  which  have  been  spread  upon  the 
situation  in  the  press  of  this  country,  especially  during  the 
last  few  months. 

Many  of  my  correspondents  again  point  out  to  me  the 
wearisome  iteration  of  the  official  German  lists,  which 
as  we  all  know,  are  about  six  weeks  belated  and  about 
19  per  cent,  below  the  truth  in  dead  alone.  It  is  really 
not  worth  while  going  over  that  well-worn  field  again. 
Germany  does  not  work  miracles.  Her  losses  in  the  war 
are  proportionate  to  the  effort  she  has  made  and  are 
naturally  upon  much  the  same  scale  as  those  of  her  Allies 
and  her  opponents.  The  real  losses  of  the  enemy,  as  of 
any  other  belligerent  power,  are  at  this  time  known  to 


within  so  small  a  margin  of  error  that  there  is  very  little 
room  left  for  discussion.  If  any  new  jact  can  be  produced 
worthy  of  our  consideration  and  slightly  modifying  the 
conclusion  universally  reached  upon  this  matter  by  every 
competent  observer  in  every  bureau  of  every  war  office 
and  of  every  staff,  it  should  receive  due  consideration. 
But  mere  vague  assertion  without  a  shred  of  evidence 
is  not  worth  wasting  powder  and  shot  upon  in  any  serious 
examination  of  our  problems. 

So  much  then  for  the  first  group  or  category  of  "  fully 
mobilised  powers." 

The  second  group  of  powers  includes  Italy,  Great  Britain, 
Russia  and  Turkey.  It  is  the  group  of  those  Powers 
which  have  not  yet,  for  various  reasons,  a\'ailed  themselves 
of  their  fiill  man  power  for  the  purpose  of  this  campaign. 
I  mean,  have  not  put  it  yet  into  action.  Lest  this  phrase 
should  falsify  my  argument  I  will  pause  to  consider  the 
different  ways  in  which  these  Powers,  which  still  have  such 
large  reserves  of  men,  are  affected. 

The  Turkish  Empire  ought  upon  paper  to  produce  very 
much  larger  forces  than  those  it  has  actually  produced. 
Some  have  therefore  argued  that  these  forces  still  stand 
in  reserve.     They  do  not. 

Possible   Reserve3 

The  Turkish  Empire  is  very  loosely  held  together.  It 
contains  a  mass  of  population  that  can  hardly  be  used  for 
war  (for  political  reasons),  and  other  masses  that  are  very 
bad  material  indeed  for  an  army,  and  other  masses  again 
which  simply  cannot  be  enrolled  at  all  for  geographical 
reasons — cannot  be  got  at.  It  has  great  difficulty  in 
providing  itself  with  arms,  and  still  greater  difficulty  in 
providing  itself  with  munitions.  What  maximum  fi\lly 
equipped  force  the  Turkish  Empire  can  keep  in  the  field 
we  do  not  exactly  know — byt  we  know  that  the  forces 
already  mobilised  cannot  be  appreciably  increased.  We 
have  received  the  maximum  effort  of  this  foe,  and  it  is 
already  declining. 

The  causes  that  make  Britain,  Italy  and  Russia  sever- 
ally possessed  of  large  hitherto  unused  reserves  of  men  are 
quite  distinct  in  each  case. 

Great  Britain  has  raised,  so  far  as  the  mere  enrolling  of 
men  is  concerned,  the  training  of  them,  and  their  potential 
use  in  the  war,  a  very  great  number  indeed.  She  has  made 
an  effort  everywhere  comparable  to,  and  in  some  cases 
surpassing,  the  effort  of  the  continental  powers.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  war  the  generally  accepted  rule  among 
soldiers  was  that  the  mobilisation  of  one-tenth  of  one's 
population  represented  a  maximum  effort.  The  strain 
of  the  war  has  slightly  raised  that  standard  and,  though 
the  extra  men  squeezed  in  have  for  the  most  part  been 
absorbed  in  auxiliary  services,  yet  the  10  per  cent,  has  risen 
in  the  case  of  Germany  and  of  France  to  something  more 
like  12  per  cent.,  and  some  say  to  even  a  trifle  over  12  per 
cent.  It  has  been  exactly  the  same  thing  in  this  country, 
with  the  difference  that  this  country  has  produced  virtu- 
ally the  whole  of  its  enormous  effort  by  voluntary  and  not 
by  conscript  means — as  amazing  a  political  success  as  has 
ever  been  achieved  by  a  free  nation  in  the  history  of  the 
world. 

When  one  says,  therefore,  that  Britain  stands  in  the 
category  of  the  not-yet-fully-mobilised  nations,  what  one 
means  is  not  that  she  has  failed  to  reach  her  practical 
maximum*  of  man-power  in  enrolment — for  she  has  reached 
that  maximum,  and  perhaps  even  passed  it.  One  means 
that  the  forces  actually  put  forward  in  the  field  and  the 
losses  hitherto  sustained  are  not  in  proportion  to  that 
man-power.  Roughly  speaking,  the  man-power  of  these 
islands  stands  to  that  of  the  German  Empire  as  more  than 
5  to  7,  but  less  than  5  to  8.  But  the  total  permanent 
losses  in  the  British  forces  from  all  causes  whatsoever  are 
not  5ths  or  gths  of  the  corresponding  German  losses.  They 
are  more  like  a  fourth  or  a  fifth.  And  that  is  why  Great 
Britain  possesses  vast  reserves  of  men  either  behind  her 
front,  or  lying  in  reservoirs,  as  it  were,  such  as  Egypt,  or 
in  camps  and  depots  or  under  training  here  at  home. 

The  position  of  Italy,  again,  is  different. 

Italy  is  fighting  very  intensely  (and  with  a  cumulative 
effect  upon  the  enemy)    upon  a  narrow  front,  or  rather 

•  I  mean  by  a  "  practical  "  niaximuni  the  highest  number  that  can 
be  actually  used  as  soldiers  without  impairing  the  nation  and  the 
army's  necessary  supply:  as  distinguished  from  a  "theoretic" 
maximum,  which  may  of  course,  be  as  high  as  j"ou  liUe — up  to  the 
actual  limits  of  population- 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  i8,  1916 


upon  two  separate  pieces  of  front,  the  most  crowded  one 
ot  which  is  narrow  :  the  open  country  between  the  Black 
Mountain  and  the  Adriatic.  Her  role  there  is  to  hold  the 
dense  Austrian  line  with  artillery  work  wliich  is  as  good 
as  any  in  Europe,  and  we  have  every  evidence  that  the 
Austrian  losses  at  this  point  after  a  year  of  warfare  is 
out  of  proportion  to  the  Austrian  losses  in  any  other 
field  of  the  war.  The  pressure  here  must  be  getting 
severe,  as  exhaustion  in  recruitment  is  beginning  to  tell. 
It  may  soon  provoke  a  diversion. 

But  for  such  a  task  Italy  does  not  need  a  mass  of 
mobilisable  men,  and  there  stands  behind  the  army  in 
action  a  very  large  potential  reserve  of  man-power. 

With  Russia,  again,  there  is  a  separate  and  quite 
different  cause  for  the  reser\'e  of  man-j>ower  which  she 
can  boast.  So  large  are  those  reserves  that  even  if  Russia 
had  the  same  power  of  equipment  and  munitionment 
which  the  industrial  civilisations  of  the  west  and  south 
possess,  she  would  never  have  put  into  the  field  at  any 
one  time,  even  upon  her  vast  front,  all  her  human  resources. 
But  she  is  handicapped  by  great  difficulties  in  munition- 
ment and  equipment.  The  evil  results  of  these  difliculties 
in  the  great  retreat  of  last  year  we  all  know.  But,  on  the 
other  side  of  the  account,  there  is  the  presence  of  masses 
of  men  pouring  through  the  depots,  trained  and  passed 
on  to  the  front  as  equipment  is  obtained  and  munition- 
ment produced  or  purchased. 

The  next  consideration  after  we  have  got  a  clear  view 
of  the  way  in  which  numbers  stand,  is  the  consideration 
of  the  length  of  front  to  be  held. 

There  is  no  exhaustion,  nor  any  approach  to  exhaustion 
of  reser\-e  power  in  Italy,  England  or  Russia.  There  is 
the  approadi  of  such  exhaustion  in  the  three  fully  mobi- 
lised powers  of  France.  Germany  and  Austro-Hungary. 
But  when  we  consider  the  ffonts  to  be  held  by  the  belli- 
gerents in  tliis  war  of  po.sitions,  this  element  gives  the 
problem  a  very  different  significance  from  what  it  would 
have  if  we  were  considering  forces  in  movement. 

Our  enemy  has  to  keep  troops — if  we  exclude  the 
Asiatic  campaigns — upon  fronts,  difficult  to  estimate 
exactly  on  account  of  the  mountainous  character  of  the 
southern  belts,  but  not  less  in  all  their  sinuosities  than 
2,500  miles.  The  two  chief  fronts,  however,  upon  which 
the  campaign  depends  and  which  must  be  held  in  full 
strength,  are  the  eastern  and  the  western  which,  between 
them,  come  to  about  1,500  miles. 

The  German  Empire  alone  {to  take  the  case  which  we 
can  study  most  precisely)  has  almost  exactly  1,000  miles 
of  front  to  hold,  of  which  just  over  half  is  on  the  west  and 
just  under  a  half  on  the  east. 

These  fronts  have  been  arrived  at,  not  by  the  deliberate 
policy  of  the  German  commanders  but  by  the  hazard  of 
war. 

The  German  armies  did  not  stand  where  they  chose  to 
stand  in  the  west.  They  stood  where  they  could.  They 
were  pinned,  in  spite  of  themselves,  to  a  line  only  part 
of  which  was  at  first  organised.  They  have  tried  hard  to 
break  out  since  the  autumn  of  1914  and  they  have  failed. 

Their  considerable  extension  towards  the  east  in 
Poland  is  not  clue  to  any  policy  of  occupying  such  and 
such  districts,  but  to  the  fact  that  they  "reached  their 
present  lines  after  equilibrium  was  restored  between  their 
immense  superiority  in  equipped  men  and  munitions  and 
the  Russian  inferiority  therein.  They  stand  where  they 
stood  seven  months  ago,  halted  after  a  series  of  tremendous 
efforts  {all  of  which  failed)  to  envelop  the  Russian  armies 
during  the  great  retreat. 

Though  the  very  extended  front  which  the  German 
irmies,  to  speak  of  these  alorio,  are  holding,  thus  include 
ilien  territory-  which  they  think  can  be  used  as  an  asset 
.•or  the  obtaining  of  an  inco.aclu?-.;ve  peace,  that  is  of  no 
purely  mHitary  advantage  \ehatsoever.  It  is  indifferent 
so  far  as  the  military  problem  is  concerned,  whether  the 
line  stands  in  Poland  or  Prussia.  It  is  its  length  and 
its  facility  of  supply  that  cotmt.  The  great  extension 
of  these  fronts  and  their  distance  from  supply,  especially 
in  the  case  of  the  eastern  line,  -itand  in  the  balance  against, 
and  not  in  favour  of,  those  'who  hold  them.*     What  has 

•  We  must  not  follow  the  anaVogy  of  past  wars  here.  Distance  with 
\  good  railway  supply  is  not  Ine  same  thing  as  distance  wHth' supply 
t>y  horse  and  waggon.  But  the  Gcrn  lan  eastern  front  dois  suffer  from 
length  and  paucity  of  cor.rmuni<  ations  throughout  the  winter. 
This,  as  definite  collected  evidence  'has  shown,  was  a  cause  of  heavy 
losses  from  sickness.  The  enemy  cca  iccals  this  (of  course)  in  his  iiub- 
Mied  lists. 


been  deliberate  in  the  policy  of  the  German  Government, 
if  not  in  the  strategy  of  the  German  commanders,  has 
been  the  determination  to  stand  on  these  extended  lines 
probably  beyond  the  moment  when  it  would  be  prudent 
to  shorten  them,  and  certainly  up  to  the  very  last  moment 
of  such  prudence. 

If  the  Russian  forces  were  in  precisely  the  same  situa- 
tion of  munitionment  and  equipment  as  the  western 
forces  the  situation,  already  clear  to  most  observers  of 
this  campaign,  would  be  equally  clear  to  the  whole  world, 
instructed  or  uninstructed. 

The  Allies  have  an  overwhelming  superiority  in  re- 
serves of  men  ;  only  one  of  them  is  in  anything  like  the  same 
state  of  exhaustion  as  the  enemy. 

The  enemy  has  come  to  hold  fronts  requiring  all  his 
armies  in  the  field,  save  a  small  margin  stiJl  remaining 
for  offensive  power,  but  rapidly  dwindhng.  The  end  of 
such  a  situation  would  be  almost  mathematically  certain. 

But  Russia  is  not  in  the  same  situation  for  munition- 
ment and  equipment  as  the  western  powers,  and  it  is  this 
distinction  between  the  eastern  and  western  fronts  which 
gives  its  particular  character  to  the  whole  position. 

Lastly,  there  is  an  estimate  to  be  made  of  the  position 
in  munitionment  and  supply. 

We  do  not  know,  of  course,  the  exact  numbers  of 
shell  produced  in  each  belligerent  country  per  day  at 
any  moment.  One  hears  roughly  from  time  to  time 
what  is  being  produced  in  the  various  countries  of  the 
Allies,  and  one  hears  what  the  enemy  claims  to  be  pro- 
ducing. One  can  estimate  the  probable  truth  of  his 
claims,  and  one  can  estimate  by  the  nature  of  the  activity 
shown  and  by  the  rate  at  which  the  effort  has  developed 
in  the  factories  of  the  Allied  countries,  how  far  the  esti- 
mate one  hears  of  their  production  agrees  with  the  truth. 

The  general  conclusion — without  giving  away  even  the 
broadest  statistics — is  roughly  that  the  Allies  in  the  West 
turn  out  munitions  at  a  rather  higher  rate  than  the  Central 
Empires.  The  Central  Empires  are  not  producing  half  a 
million  shells  a  day,  nor  will  they  ever  produce  half  a 
million  shells  a  day.  But  they  may  pass  the  400,000. 
The  actual  production  of  Russia  is  supplemented  by 
purchase  from  abroad  and  by  the  aid  of  her  Allies. 
You  cannot  industrialise  a  great  country  in  a  few  months, 
nor  produce  a  system  of  railways  in  the  same  time  where 
it  was  lacking  before. 

Of  the  two  parties  one  is  far  more  severely  handicapped 
for  general  supply  than  the  other.  The  Allies  are  far 
less  burdened  by  want  than  the  Central  Powers  and 
Turkey.  Thej'  suffer  in  the  west  from  a  restriction  of 
freight,  in  the  east  from  the  great  distances  from  which 
industrial  products  must  be  brought.  But  the  Central 
Powers  are  now  really  hampered,  even  for  food — more 
for  leather,  rubber,  fats  and  oils.  We  cannot  starve 
them,  unfortunately.    But  we  increasingly  strain  them. 

Now  if  you  put  all  these  points  together,  we  can,  I 
think,  see  how  things  stand  in  this  late  spring  or  early 
summer  of  1916.  We  cannot  prophecy,  of  course,  or  say 
that  the  enemy  will  attack  here  or  there.  But  we  can 
estimate  his  necessities  and  opportunities. 

The  Germans  clearly  believe  themselves  to  be  the 
driving  power  of  their  combination.  And  they  are 
right.  They  possess  a  sufficiency  of  men  in  the  younger 
classes  to  release  or  to  recruit  the  human  material  for 
one  more  considerable  effort.  They  will  make  that  effort. 
It  would  have  been  better  perhaps  for  them  if  they  had 
chosen  or  been  able  to  cut  their  losses  in  front  of  Verdun 
in  time.  It  is  possible  that  they  feared  a  counter-action 
had  they  stopped  earlier  in  front  of  Verdim.  It  is  possible 
that  they  continued  to  believe  till  long  after  the  oppor- 
tunity had  passed  that  they  would  succeed  in  breaking 
the  French  line.  It  is  possible  that  they  suffered  some 
admixture  of  purely  domestic,  political  motive.  It  is 
very  probable  that  they  were  misinformed  as  to  the 
political  temper  of  the  French  and  believed  that  heavy 
French  losses  before  Verdun,  even  at  an  expense  to  them- 
selves of  something  like  3  to  i,  were  pohtically 
worth  inflicting.* 

Whatever  the  reasons  for  the  continuance  of  the  action 

•  I  omit  all  reference  to  the  silly  talk  about  "  stopping  the  spring 
offensive  of  the  Allies."  No  such  offensive  was  ever  intended,  nor  did 
the  enemy's  Higher  Command  ever  expect  it.  Thev  began  emplacing 
their  heavy  guns  near  Spincourt  right  in  mid-winter.  l)ecause  they 
thought  they  could  provoke  and  win  a  "  Hattle  of  Verdun.  "  They 
did  provoke  it.  but  thev  lost  it  utterly. 


May  i8,  1916 


LAND     &     WA  T  E  K 


in  front  of  Verdun — and  it  has  been  an  otvious  folly^ 
continued  it  has  been  with  losses  that  will  only  leave  the 
enemy  strong  enough  for  another  and  less  violent  offen- 
sive in  the  immediate  future. 

He  must  deliver  such  an  offensive  because  he  must 
attack.  His  exhaustion  condemns  him  to  it,  and  the 
perpetually  increasing  numbers  of  his  foes.  On  the  day 
when  he  confesses  that  he  can  attack  no  longer  he  is  done. 
On  the  other  hand  it  is  the  obvious  policy  of  the  Allied 
command  to  constrain  him  to  such  an  attack  and  to  re- 
duce him  to  that  position  to  which  the  counter-offensive 
at  last  undertaken  against  him  shall  be  of  certain  effect, 
and  shall  complete  his  ruin. 

He  must  attack.  Where  will  he  attack  ?  The  only 
men  who  can  answer  that  question  even  approximately 
are  the  men  at  the  British,  the  French  and  the  Russian 
headquarters.  But  we  see  at  least  that  one  of  two  obvious 
opportunities  lies  before  the  enemy.  He  may  attack 
elsewhere.  He  may  attack  in  Volhynia,  or  even  waste 
himself  against  Salonika.  He  might  foolishly  strike  on 
the  Italian  front  where  no  decision  is  possible  at  all. 
But  his  obvious  main  opportunities  are  not  there.  His 
obvious  opportunities  are  either  against  the  British  front 
on  the  west  and  where  it  joins  the  French,  or  against  the 
northern  Russian  front  in  the  east.  The  soil  is  drying. 
He  may  have  misjudged  the  political  element  on 
the  eastern  side  as  much  as  he  has  misjudged  it  on 
the  west.  We  may  say  that  there  is  no  decision  to 
be  arrived  at  by  one  last  violent  thrust  in  this  field,  and 
the  argument  is  sound.  But  he  may  believe  that  there 
is  a  better  chance  here  of  some  effect  than  there  would 
be  against  those  Western  Powers  who  have  easily  proved 
his  masters,  who  use  their  railways  better  than  he  does, 
can  n(%v  produce  more  shell  than  he  can,  and  have  just 
tamed  him  thoroughly  after  what  was  most  certainly 
his  most  desperate  effort.  He  is  of  course  carefully 
watching  the  press  of  his  opponents.  He  does  not  under- 
estimate the  advantage  he  has  in  the  unrestricted  liberty 
of  false  and  disheartening  statement  which  our  Allies 
so  curiously  note  in  the  London  press.  He  fully  appre- 
ciates what  kind  of  stuff  may  be  printed  here  should  some 
portion  of  the  British  front  be  subjected  to  a  prolonged 
intensive  bombardment,  should  he  compel  the  retire- 
ment of  troops  upon  any  one  sector  of  it  in  any  con- 
siderable degree. 

THE    PROBLEM  OF     NATIONALITIES 
As  it  Presents  Itself  to  the  Enemy 

When  the  great  war  broke  out  in  Europe,  the  power 
which  suddenly  launched  it — Prussia — was  one  which 
had  in  every  form  of  its  activity,  denied  national  rights. 
The  Universities,  the  Prussian  military  writers,  the  whole 
intellectual  energy  of  the  country  in  its  every  mani- 
festation had  ridiculed  and  denied  the  old  doctrine 
of  national  right  in  Europe.  Austria  Hungary  was  by 
its  very  constitution  as  a  State  a  negation  of  those  rights. 
It  was  a  compromise  whereby  various  irreconcilable 
national  aims  were  united  under  one  head  and  kept,  as 
it  were,  upon  a  sort  of  balance.  The  House  of  Hapsburg, 
because  its  whole  existence  reposed  upon  separate 
nationaUties  kept  from  fighting  under  an  artificial  unity, 
the  House  of  Hohenzollern  because  it  stood  for  the 
negation  of  national  right,  appeared  before  Europe  as 
the  protagonists  of  a  theory  which  some  would  have 
called  revived  from  the  older*  time  before  the  French 
revolution,  which  others  would  have  called  particularly 
modem,  but  which  in  any  case  ignored  the  ideal  of 
nationality  and  put  in  its  place  certain  ideals  of  order 
and  material  comfort. 

It  was  no  contradiction  of  this  truth  that  the  governing 
cliques  in  either  case  were  patriotic.  Obviously  the 
Prussian  landed  classes  patriotically  desired  the  dominion 
of  Prussia,  as  obviously  the  Magyars  in  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  combination  desired  the  continued  oppression 
of  Slav  populations,  Roumanian  and  Serbian,  over  whom 
the  Magyars  ruled,  and  in  so  far  those  Magyar  oppressors 
were  patriots. 

But  the  combination  of  the  Central  Empires  as  a  whole 
stood  for  the  negation  of  national  rights  and  the  affirma- 
tion that  this  political  religion  was  outworn. 

On  this  account  it  was  that  the  Allies,  varying  as  were 
their  motives  of  antagonism  against  Prussia  and  her 
dependents,  could  take  as  a  sort  of  general  common 


ground  the  defence  of  the  old  European  law.  They  could 
affirm  that  nationality  was  a  sacred  thing.  The  Russian 
commander  issued  his  famous  proclamation  with  regard 
to  Poland.  The  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
gave  a  rallying  point  in  the  same  field  of  ideas  to  the 
British.  The  French,  who  alone  of  modern  European 
nations  had  suffered  annexation  of  territory  in  modern 
times,  obviously  could  take  this  doctrine  for  their  battle 
cry;  and  when  later  Italy  came  into  the  war  the  motive 
force  of  their  action  was  the  anomaly  of  Italian  popula- 
tions living  uhder  Hapsburg  rule. 

The  very  trigger  which  started  the  war — the  Serbian 
question — was  from  top  to  bottom  a  national  question, 
and  in  the  first  months  of  the  war  not  a  word  was  heard 
upon  the  enemy's  side  save  of  contempt  for  the  national 
ideal,  while  most  of  the  enthusiasm  ujion  the  Allied  side 
was  in  defence  of  that  ideal. 

i  Complexity  of  Motive 

As  the  great  campaign  developed,  however,  this  simple 
issue,  if  it  was  simple  at  the  very  beginning,  rapidly 
became  obscured  and  distorted.  At  least  five  of  the- 
smaller  neutral  nations  could  complain  that  the  blockade 
of  Germany  and  Austria,  mild  as  that  blockade  was  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  offended  their  traditional 
rights.  It  was  next  apparent  that  sundry  other  neutral 
nations,  also  small,  were  unwilling  to  subscribe  to  the 
doctrines  that  the  allied  cause  was  the  defence  of  national 
right.  After  all  every  one  of  the  Allied  nations  was 
occupied  in  Africa  and  Asia  or  in  Europe  itself  in  governing 
portions  of  territory  against  their  will,  and  the  confusion 
of  the  issue  was  not  to  be  marvelled  at. 

When  the  King  of  Bulgaria,  for  very  base  motives, 
joined  and  became  subject  to  Prussia,  the  issue  was 
further  confused.  The  increasing  rigour  of  the  blockade 
increased  the  irritation  of  certain  smaller  neutral  nations. 
Then  came  the  hesitation  of  Greece  with  the  inevitable 
anomalies  of  the  Allied  occupation  of  a  Greek  port  and 
sundry  other  consequences  following  upon  that  occupa- 
tion, lastly  the  ephemeral  and  local  but  startling  rebellion 
in  Ireland. 

It  might  truly  be  said  that  after  twenty  months  of  war 
the  Central  Empires  no  longer  stood  in  the  general  mind 
for  what  they  had  represented  during  the  space  of  several 
generations.  They  were  no  longer  mere  deniers  and 
oppressors  of  national  rights.  Everyone  seemed  to  be 
in  the  same  boat  so  far  as  these  were  concerned.  It  was 
even  possible  for  the  German  statesmen  to  play  timidly 
with  the,  to  them,  fantastic  and  foreign  doctrine  that  the 
people  of  one  race,  culture  and  territory  had  a  moral 
right  to  govern  themselves  and  that  invasion  of  this 
right  was  a  crime. 

Meanwhile  the  occupation  of  Poland  by  the  Austro- 
German  armies  had  given  an  opportunity  to  the  enemy 
to  suggest  in  his  cries  for  peace  the  autonomy  of  this 
country  which  Prussia  had  been  the  first  to  massacre, 
and  at  whose  rights  the  Kings  of  Prussia  more  than  any 
other  men  had  continuously  jeered. 

Enemy  Stupidity 

One  might  summarise  the  whole  thing  by  saying  that 
the  old  European  tradition  of  national  rights  stood  out 
clearly  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  as  a  main  issue  between 
the  combatants,  but  that  developments  taking  place  in 
the  course  of  the  war  confused  it,  until  it  became,  in  the 
month  of  May,  1916,  entirely  obscured. 

Now  I  would  suggest  that  the  future  of  the  war, 
particularly  as  the  Central  Empires  begin  to  feel  the 
material  and  obvious  effects  upon  the  map,  and  in  their 
pockets,  and  their  resources,  and  their  aumies,  of  that 
defeat  which  they  have  already  potentially  suffered,  will 
revive  this  matter  of  nationality  and  will  perhaps  end 
by  leaving  it  as  clear  as  it  was  in  the  beginning. 

This  accident  we  shall  largely  owe  to  the  stupidity  of 
the  enemy.  Let  us  consider  how  he  has  .dealt  with  the 
matter  to  his  hand. 

Belgium,  he  might  claim,  was  but  a  very  modern  artifi- 
cial state  divided  into  a  Flemish  speaking  and  a  Teutonic- 
speaking  population,  and  further  divided  on  the  question 
of  religion,  and  yet  again  divided  by  the  great  quarrel 
between  the  proletariat  and  the  capitalist.  The  enemy 
has  done  nothing  to  take  advantage  of  any  of  these  pointy 


8 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  i8,  1916 


in  his  favour.  He  has  impartially  destroyed  the  monu- 
ments of  the  one  portion  of  Belgium  as  of  the  other. 
The  violation,  the  tortures  and  the  burnings  have  pro- 
ceeded from  a  general  desire  to  feel  great  at  the  expense 
quite  as  much  of  those  who  speak  Flemish  as  of  the 
Walloons.  He  has  further,  which  is  especially  foolish  of 
him,  shown  an  utter  lack  of  thoroughness  in  this  as  in 
his  other  experiments  in  terror. 

When  he  has  found  that  his  actions  adversely  affected 
neutral  opinion,  especially  American  opinion,  he  has 
apologised  for  them  and  restricted  the  activity  of  his 
agents,  then  foolishly  allowed  their  activity  to  break 
out  again.  The  whole  thing  here  has  been  on  the  same 
model  as  the  incredibly  stupid  bombardment  of  the 
Cathedral  of  Rheims.  There  was  no  conceivable  reason 
for  that  outrage  at  its  beginning  save  to  show  to  the 
French  that  Prussia  was  perfectly  ruthless,  and  lliercfore 
to  be  feared.  To  prove  this  Prussian  gunners  were 
ordered  to  destroy  the  national  monuments  to  which 
the  French  were  chiefly  attached.  They  dropped  shell 
in  conformity  with  their  orders  upon  the  Cathedral  of 
Rheims,  which  was  at  the  moment  being  used  as  a 
hospital,  and  was  flying,  1  believe,  a  huge  Red  Cross  flag. 
When  they  had  ruined  the  glass,  and  burned  the  roof  and 
destroyed  a  certain  number  of  statues  attached  to  the 
building,  they  ceased  their  efforts,  apparently  in  surprise  at 
the  way  in  which  they  had  been  received  by  the  civilised 
world. '  But  the  enemy  did  not  cease  them  altogether. 
From  time  to  time  he  would  launch  a  shell  in  the  direction 
of  the  cathedral  in  order  to  do  a  little  more  damage.  He 
did  himself  the  maximum  of  moral  harm  with  the  mini- 
mum of  effect.  And  he  is  still  at  it.  The  Cathedral  of 
Rheims  is  a  target  at  a  range  of  a  httle  over  6.000  yards 
from  the  foremost  of  his  guns.  It  is  larger  than  West- 
minster Abbey  and  is  not  concealed  by  tall  surrounding 
buildings  of  aiiy  sort.  He  cannot  plead  error.  It  is  sheer 
fatuousness.  It  is  the  alternative  emotion  that  men  pass 
through  when  they  do  not  quite  know  on  what  platform 
they  stand — and  so  it  has  been  in  Belgium  and  in  Eastern 
France.  There  is  no  guarantee  that  the  long  period  of 
repose  through  which  some  districts  have  passed  may 
not  at  any  moment  be  followed  by  another  outburst  of 
violence. 

In  Poland  there  has  been  another  history.  Poland 
was  occupied  in  connection  with  the  great  advance  against 
the  Russian  armies.  The  military  object  of  that  advance 
was  clear  ;  it  was  the  destruction  of  the  Russian  armies 
by  envelopment.  It  failed  altogether.  Its  attempt  was 
only  possible  through  the  lack  of  munitionment  from 
which  the  Russians  suffered,  but  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Austro-Germans  were  correspondingly  tied  by  their  heavy 
artillery,  and  on  six  successive  occasions  six  successive 
plans  for  the  envelopment  of  a  great  portion  of  the  Russian 
forces  failed.  When  the  effort  was  exhausted  Poland,  as 
a  whole,  was  occupied  by  the  enemy's  armies  and 
evacuated  by  the  Russian  Armies.  The  race  and  the 
people  had  suffered  enormously.  They  had  already 
been  divided  between  three  Powers,  the  Prussians,  the 
Russians  and  the  Austrians,  of  whom  they  hated  the 
Prussians  by  far  the  most.  With  the  Russians  they  had 
a  long  hereditary  quarrel  only  somewhat  softened  in 
modern  times.  Their  situation  under  Austrian  rule  was 
by  far  the  best.  One  might  have  thought  that  Austro- 
German  armies  appearing  in  the  country  with  such  an 
historical  foundation  for  their  rule  would  have  taken 
immediate  advantage  of  what  was  but  an  accidental 
result  of  their  failure  to  destroy  the  Russian  forces.  One 
might  have  imagined  that  they  would  have  consolidated 
this  moral  opportunity  by  some  sort  of  statecraft,  how- 
ever clumsy,  as  they  did  the  material  opportunity  by  the 
establishment  of  their  trenches.  Nothing  of  the  sort. 
There  has  been  a  perpetual  change  of  plan  in  their  dealings 
with  the  Polish  and  Jewish  population,  so  far  as  the 
Prussians  were  concerned ;  and  the  Prussians  were  more 
and  more  the  masters.  They  seemed  unable  to  decide 
whether  they  would  consolidate  or  wiiether  they  would 
merely  bully  the  miserable  remains  of  the  population. 
Whatever  be  the  situation  of  the  Pohsh  peasants  now 
subject  to  Austrian  rule  alone,  it  is  certain  by  every 
account  we  receive  that  the  Polish  and  I.ithuanianpopula- 
tion  under  Prussian  rule  has  suffered  from  the  unstable 
policy  of  the  Prussian  commanders  as  no  other  district 
in  Europe  has  suffered.  It  continues  to  suffer  even  in  the 
simple  matter  of  victualling.     Prussia  cannot  make  up 


its  mind  whether  it  is  better  to  leave  memories  of  starva- 
tion among  these  people  or  to  see  them  fed. 

What  is  happening  in  the  Balkans  exactly  we  do  not 
know.  Accounts  are  confused.  But  so  much  is  certain 
that  the  wise  playing  of  the  Serbians  against  the  Bul- 
garians has  not  been  attempted.  There  has  been  nothing 
but  the  crude  overrunning  of  the  Serbian  districts  accom- 
panied with  every  form  of  torture  and  barbarity.  It  has 
been  a  sort  of  revenge  taken  against  a  thing  which  proved 
at  last  much  weaker  than  the  power  which  was  exasp  erated 
by  its  former  resistance.  There  has  been  no  trace  of 
statesmanship  in  the  matter.     Only  of  hatred.  , 

Now  the  sum  total  of  these  blunders  would  seern  to. be 
this.  So  long  as  the  Central  Empires  can  maintain  their 
extended  lines  and  can  govern  by  merely  military  rule  the 
populations  within  those  lines,  the  national  questions 
remain  obscure.  But  the  moment  a  shifting  of  the  lines 
begins,  the  moment  the  military  grasp  ceases  to  be  suffi- 
ciently iirm  to  maintain  so  vast  an  extent  of  territory, 
there  will  be  no  moral  result  left  in  support  of  the  Austro- 
German  cause. 

Bohemia  wished  to  be  Slav,  but  never  wished  to  be 
attached  to  any  Slav  group. 

Catholic  Southern  Slavs  in  Croatia  had  their  difference 
with  the  Orthodox  Serbians  of  the  same  race.  The  Rou- 
manian population  subject  to  Magyar  rule  was  largely 
Uniate  and  garrisoned,  geographically,  as  it  were,  by  Ger- 
man settlers  and  Magyar  colonies. 

Of  all  these  opportunities  no  advantage  has  been 
taken. 

With  the  first  shaking  of  the  line  now  covering  the 
Austro-Hungarian  monarchy  every  one  of  those  national 
riddles  will  again  present  itself  for  solution. 

In  the  case  of  the  Germans  the  matter  is  differently,  but 
much  more  intensely  true.  When  the  Russians  reappear 
in  Lithuania  and  in  Poland  the  age-long  quarrel  between 
them  and  the  Western  Slav  will  exist  no  doubt,  but  it  will 
be  accentuated  in  no  way  by  a  new  feeling  produced  in  the 
course  of  the  war  in  favour  of  the  Germans.  It  will 
almost  certainly  be  the  other  way.  And  there  is  no  con- 
ceivable standing  ground  now— as  there  might  so  well 
have  been  a  few  nronths  ago— for  divided  opinion  in 
Belgium  at  the  moment  of  a  general  retirement.  That 
retirement  will  produce  nothing  at  all  but  a  sensation  of 
relief. 

In  the  mere  mechanics  of  the  war  this  factor  of  national 
feeling  will  have  very  little  effect.  The  nations  arc  too 
highly  mobilised,  their  manhood  too  completely  employed 
for  civilian  opinion  to  count  in  the  field  as  it  counted  in 
the  old  wars  of  professional  armies.  But  it  remains  true 
that  the  settlement  of  Europe  after  the  war  will  be 
adverse  to  the  Central  Powers  in  a  fashion  that  it  might 
not  have  been  if  they  had  used  the  few  months  of  their 
unexpected  territorial  expansion  (as  much  unexpected 
by  them  as  by  us,  and  as  little  connected  with  their  victory 
as  their  defeat)  wisely  and  upon  a  consistent  plan. 

They  were  unable  to  show  such  wisdom.  They  were 
unable  to  follow  a  sustained  plan  because  they  entered 
the  campaign,  and  particularly  Prussia  entered  the  cam- 
paign, with  a  dehberate  scorn  for  the  sanctity  of  a  nation. 
Immorality  on  that  scale  is  stupid,  and  stupidity  is  the 
main  agent  of  defeat  in  war.  H.  Belloc 


There  is  much  food  for  reflection  in  Prisoner  of  War,  by 
Andre  Warnod  (Hcincmann,  3s.  6d.  net.)  The  author  took 
part  in  the  great  battle  of  the  Grand  Couronn  e,  went  up  to 
the  nortliern  frontier,  and  then,  while  tending  woundctl, 
fell  into  German  hands.  This  brief  record  of  his  experiences 
in  the  prison  camp  of  Merseburg  is  terrible  through  its 
simplicity  ;  it  is  a  bald,  soldier's  tale  of  unforgettable  in- 
dignities, at  the  hand  of  a  race  that  knows  no  refinement, 
no  kindness,  no  tact,  and  no  respect  for  a  captured  f»c,  but 
is  sunk  in  a  vast  conceit.  Such  a  book  ought  to  be  in  the 
hands  of  every  person  who  still  thinks  that  Germans  merit 
the  treatment  that  is  accorded  to  ordinary  people  or  that 
they  are  animated  bv  the  decent  motives  that  govern  civilised 
life.  Over  sixty  drawings  amplify  the  text  of  the  book,  draw- 
ings French  in  character,  and  as  illuminative  as  they  arc 
original.     Altogether,  this  is  a  book  not  to  be  missed. 

At  Prince's  restaurant,  Piccadilly,  Mr.  Archibald  Joyce, 
tlic  celebrated  composer  has  been  engaged  to  play  every 
night  with  his  wonderful  orchestra. 


Uay  i8,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


THE   REALITY  OF   SEA  POWER 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


BY  the  time  these  pages  are  in  the  reader's  hands, 
a  fortnight  will  have  elapsed  since  the  German 
reply  to  America  was  written.  A  glance  at  the 
diagram  of  the  ships  lost  since  April  i6th,  that 
is  to  say,  in  the  fifth,  sixth  and  half  of  the  seventh  week 
since  the  new  campaign  against  British,  Allied  and  neutral 
shipping  was  begun,  will  show  how  immediate  has  been 
the  effect  of  the  surrender.  For^  in  the  latter  half  of 
the  seventh  week,  it  will  be  seen  that,  possibly  by  design, 
or  it  may  be  only  by  accident,  only  four  sailing  ships 
were  attacked,  while  in  the  eighth  week  only  three  ships, 
all  of  them  British,  have  gone  under.  These  three  are 
the  Cymric  and  the  Eretria — one  torpedoed  in  the  Atlantic 
the  ■  other  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay — and  the  Dolcoath, 
apparently  sunk  in  the  southern  portion  of  the  North  Sea, 
but  whether  by  mine  or  torpedo  is  not  yet  known.  The 
case  of  the  Cymric  was  cited  as  if  it  qualified  the  sincerity 
of  the  German  submission  to  America.  But  this  criticism 
is  not  called  for  ;  for  it  is  obvious  that  no  U  boat  so  far 
afield  as  those  that  sank  this  ship  and  the  Eretria  could 
possibly  have  been  warned.  And  the  sinking  of  the 
Cymric— iSiV  from  being  a  disquieting  symptom — though 
deplorable  enough  in  itself — is  both  interesting  and  re- 
assuring, because  it  proves  that  this  particular  U  boat 
must  have  been  at  large  in  the  approaches  to  the  Irish 
coast  and  Channel  for  aconsiderable  time  without  being|able 
to  seciu'e  any  other  victim — a  fact  that  is  eloquent  both 
of  the  inefficiency  of  the  present  submarine  captains,  and 
of  the  effective  character  of  the  counter-measures  direc- 
ted from  Queenstown.  If  the  Dolcoath  was  sunk  by  a 
mine,  it  would  seem  as  if,  so  far  at  any  rate,  Germany 
was  abiding  for  once  by  her  written  word. 

Fear   of  America 

There  seems  to  be  excellent  reasons  for  supposing  that 
she    will    continue    to    observe  it.      The   issue   is  not 
Germany's  sincerity,  but  her  fear  of  American  sincerity. 
It  appears  from    the    very    limited    comment    allowed 
to    appeal    in   the    German    press    that    the    surrender 
to  America    has    created    a     profound    arid    most    dis- 
agreeable   impression,    and    is    acquiesced    in    for    the 
same    reason    that    inspired   it,    viz..    sheer    terror    of 
American    intervention   on  the  Allied  side.     The  Chan- 
cellor's   explanation    to    the    Reichstag    took  the    odd 
form  of  saying  that  the  value  of  the  submarine  blockade 
had  been  grossly  exaggerated,  and  that  in  no  case  were 
any  really  important  military  results  to  be  expected  from 
it.     This  throws  a  curious  light  on  the  dismissal  of  von 
Tirpitz  and  the  subsequent  revival  of  his  policy  in  defer- 
ence to  the  public  outcry.     It  is  more  to  the  point  that 
the   Government   has  been  able   to   suppress   a  similar 
•  outcry  now.     Even  the  most  flamboyant  jingoes  seem 
to  have  been  sobered  by  the  continued  failure  at  Verdun, 
the  increasing  stringency  in  the  matter  of  food  supplies,  the 
new  and  formidable  threat  the  Grand  Duke  is  developing 
against  Turkey,  more  than  all  by  the  reaction  of  all  these 
things  on  popular  sentiment  in  Germany,  which   plainly 
shows  that  the  country  is  in  no  mood  for  the  indefinite 
prolongation  of  an  unsuccessful  war.     Thus  the  effort  to 
save  the  face  of  the  higher  command  has  only  met  with 
very  indifferent  success.      Harden  openly  scoffs  at  the 
argument  that  Great  Britain  is  inhuman  in  trying  to 
starve  Germany  into  surrender,  and  all  parties  seem  to 
reahse  the  futility  of  reconciling  the  doctrine  that  the 
blockade  of  England  could  never  be  decisive  with  the. 
previous  boasts  that  it  would  bring  this  country  to  its 
knees.  If  it  was  so  ill  considered  a  course,  why  have  such 
sacrifices  been  made,  why  such  risks  run  with  America  ? 
If   the   Government  "has    failed    to   conceal    from   its 
people  that  it  has  yielded  out  of  weakness,  it  has  been  no 
more  successful  in  disguising  the  character  of  its  sub- 
mission to  those  tp  whom  the  submission  has  been  made. 
As  we  saw  last  week,  the  effort  to  present  this  surrender 
as  a  bargain  failed  dismally.     For  Germany's  repute  for 


observance  of  her  word  is  such  that  the  mere  suggestion 
that  it  was  a  bargain  left  Mr.  Wilson  no  alternative  but  to 
state  publicly  that  th?re  could  in  no  'circumstances  ba 
any  bargain  in  such  a  matter.  By  her  own  clumsiness 
then,  Germany  has  deepened,  not  mitigated  her  own 
humiliation.  But  this  was  not  the  only,  nor  in  some 
ways  perhaps  the  worst,  result  of  her  perverse  and  stupid 
diplomacy.  Something  might  have  been  expected  from 
the  notorious  disagreement  between  the  State  Depart- 
ment and  our  Foreign  Office  as  to  certain  details  of  our 
blockade  methods.  Left  to  itself,  the  situation — or,  at 
least,  one  can  imagine  Germany  so  thinking — might 
have  developed  in  a  way  embarrassing  for  the  Allies. 
But  so  little  do  the  Kaiser  and  the  Chancellor  understand 
the  American  character,  that  in  their  effort  to  use  the 
situation  to  their  home  advantage,  they  have  actually 
made   it   impossible   for   America   to   do   anything. 

The  effort  to  dictate  a  pohcy  to  Washington  has,  it 
is  said,  led  to  the  crushing  retort  that  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  have  a   machinery  defined  by  treaty 


for 


dealing 


with    such     disagreements.       And     with 


the  retort  there  was  a  reminder  that  it  was  exactly  this 
machinery  that  Germany  had  politely  declined.  Not  only 
then  is  there  no  chance  of  the  embargo  being  relieved  by 
any  immediate  or  effective  action  by  America,  but  Ger- 
many is  faced  with  the  uncomfortable  fact,  that  should 
America  think  her  rights  impugned,  she  would  proceed 
to  their  vindication  hy  the  legal  but  leisurely  method 
provided  by  our  arbitration  treaties. 

The  chief  interest  of  the  present  situation  then  con- 
sists in  this.  Germany  has  manifestly  yielded  to  America 
because  it  is  obvious  to  her  Government  that  the  German 
internal  and  military  position  would  make  a  quarrel  with 
America  a  disaster  of  the  first  importance.  The  people 
of  Germany  have  acquiesced  in  this  surrender  because 
they — no  less  than  their  Government — fully  appreciate 
the  dangers  of  the  situation.  They  realise  the  humiliation 
of  their  Government  to  the  full,  because  its  surrender  has 
been  robbed  of  all  its  pretences,  and  shown  to  be  no  bar- 
gain. It  is  the  first  time  since  August,  1914,  that  Ger- 
many has  had  to  submit  to  a  public  reproof,  acknowledge 
herself  wrong,  and  admit  that  her  submission  is  due  to 


Sovtes  Sbakespeadana^ 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE 

A  Redmond-Carson  Pact : 


A  peace  is  of  the  nature  of  a  conquest, 
For  then  both  parties  nobly  are  subdued 
A  nd  neither  party  loser. 

2  Henry  IV.,  IV.,  ii.,  88-90. 

Bluster  and  the  Coalition  : 


For  it  comes  to  pass  oft  that  a  terrible 
oath,  with  a  swaggering  accent  sharply 
twanged  off,  gives  manhood  more  appro- 
bation than  ever  proof  itself  zvould  have 
earned  him. 

Twelfih  Niiht,  III.,  iv.,  199-2(M. 

Disraeli's  Posthumous  Fame  : 

It  so  falls  out 
That  what  we  have  we  prize  not  to  the  zvorth, 
Whiles  we  enjoy  it ;  but,  being  lacMd  and 

lost, 
Why,  then  we  rack  the  value,  then  we  find 
The  virtue  that  possession  would  not  show  us 
Whiles  it  was  ours. 

Much  Ado  About  Nothinj.  IV.,  i.,  219-24. 


10 


LAND      &     WATER 


May  i8,  1916 


the  simple  and  significant  fact  that  she  is  no  longer  in  a 
position  to  assert  the  doctrine  on  which  she  has  acted  for 
forty  years.  That  German  necessity  justifies  anything 
that  Germany  may  do.  is  a  creed  that  has  no  universal 
application  to-day.  She  knows  now  that  British  Sea 
Supremacy  is  a  terrible  reahty,  that  no  make-belief  boast 
can  disguise  from  her  people.  She  knows  that  no 
atrocities  can  relieve  the  people  from  the  consecjuences 
of  its  exercise.  She  also  knows  that  the  neutral  world 
wU  not  tolerate  its  atrocities. 

It  is  the  first  step  in  the  schoohng  of  the  Teutonic 
mind  to  the  truth  which  it  is  the  purpose  of  the 
Allies  to  make  real  and  convincing.  And  the  truth  is 
simple.  The  public  life  of  Europe  is  to  be  governed 
henceforth,  not  by  the  German  will  but  by  the  common 
sense  of  what  is  right  and  just.  What  right  and  justice 
interpreted  into  action  mean.  Germany  will  learn  when 
her  armies  have  surrendered  unconditionally. 

North  Sea  Strategy 

Meanwhile  the  directly  military  employment  of  perhaps 
the  most  potent  instrument  in  ensuring  this  final  surrender, 
to  wit,  the  British  fleet,  has  during  the  last  week  been  made 
the  subject  of  discussion.  Mr.  Balfour  has  written  a 
strange  letter  to  the  Mayors  of  the  East  Coast  towns, 
which  foreshadows  important  developments  ;  an  inspired 
German  apology  for  the  recent  raid  on  Yarmouth  and 
Lowestoft  has  been  published,  and  both  have  aroused 
comment.  Mr.  Balfour's  letter  was  inspired  by  a  desire 
to  reassure  the  battered  victims  of  the  German  bombard- 
ment. He  realised  that  the  usual  commonplace  that  these 
visits  had  little  military  value  no  longer  met  the  case, 
and  proceeded  to  threaten  the  Germans  with  new  and  more 
effective  methods  of  meeting  them  were  these  murderous 
experiments  repeated.  The  new  measures  were  to  take 
two  forms.  The  towns  themselves  would  be  locally 
defended  by  monitors  and  submarines,  and,  without 
disturbing  naval  preponderance  elsewhere,  new  units 
would  be  brought  further  south,  so  that  the  interception 
of  raiders  would  be  made  more  easy.  But  for  one  con- 
sideration the  publication  of  such  a  statement  as  this 
would  be  inexplicable.  If  the  effective  destruction  of 
German  raiders  really  had  been  prepared,  the  last  thing 
the  Admiralty  would  be  expected  to  do  would  be  to 
acquaint  the  enemy  with  the  disconcerting  character  of 
its  future  reception.  Count  Reventlow  indeed  explains 
the  publication  by  the  fact  that  no  such  preparations 
have  indeed  been  made.  But  the  thing  can  be  much 
mt)re  simply  explained  than  that. 

When  Mr.  Churchill,  in  the  high  tide  of  his  optimism, 
addressed  the  House  of  Commons  at  the  beginning  of 
last  year — he  had  the  Falkland  Islands  and  the  Dogger 
Bank  battles,  the  obliteration  of  the  German  Ocean 
cruising  force,  the  extinction  of  the  enemy  merchant 
marine,  the  security  of  English  communications  to  his 
sole  credit — he  explained  the  accumulated  phenomena  of 
our  sea  triumph  by  the  splendid  perfection  of  his  pre- 
war preparedness.  The  submarine  campaign,  the  failure 
of  the  Dardanelles,  the  revelation  of  the  defenceless  state 
of  the  north-eastern  harbours,  these  things  have  somewhat 
modified  the  picture  that  the  e.\-First  Lord  drew. 
And,  not  least  of  our  disillusions,  we  have  all  come  to 
realise  that  in  our  neglect  of  the  airship  we  have  allowed 
the  enemy  to  develop,  for  his  sole  benefit,  a  method  of 
naval  scouting  that  is  entirely  denied  to  us.  That  the 
British  Admiralty  and  the  British  fleet  perfectly  realise 
this  disadvantage  is  tlie  meaning  of  Mr.  Balfour's  letter. 
He  would  not  have  told  the  enemy  of  our  new  North  Sea 
arrangements  had  he  not  known  that  he  could  not  be 
kept  in  ignorance  of  them  for  longer  than  a  week  or  two, 
once  they  were  made.  The  letter  is  in  fact  an  admission 
that  our  sea  power  has  to  a  great  extent  lost  what  was  at 
one  time  its  supreme  prerogative,  Ihe  capacity  of 
strategical  surprise. 

Naval   Development 

But  this  does  not  materially  alter  the  dynamics  of  the 
Nortli  Sea  position,  although  it  greatly  affects  tactics. 
The  (ierman  official  apologist  will  have  it,  however,  that 
another  factor  has  altered  these  dynamics.  Admiral 
Jellicoe,  he  says,  may  be  secure  enough  with  his  vast 
fleet  in  his  "  great  bay  in  the  Orkneys,"  and,  between 
that  and  the  Norwegian  coast,  hold  a  perfectly  effective 


blockade  hne,  but  all  British  calculations  of  North  Sea 
strategy  have  been  upset  by  the  establishment  of  new 
enemy  naval  bases  at  Zeebrugge,  Ostend  and  Antwerp. 
He  speaks  glibly  as  if  the  co-xjperation  of  the  forces  based 
on  the  Bight  with  those  in  the  stolen  Belgian  ports  had 
altered  the  position  fundamentally.  This,  of  course,  is 
the  veriest  rubbish.  So  far  no  captured  Belgian  port  has 
been  made  the  base  for  anything  more  important  than 
submarines  that  can  cross  the  North  Sea  under  water, 
and  the  few  destroyers  that  have  made  a  dash  through 
in  the  darkness.  Such  balderdash  as  this,  and 
that  the  German  battle  cruisers  did  not  take  to  flight, 
but  simply  returned  to  their  bases  without  waiting 
for  the  advent  of  "superior  forces,"  imposes  on  nobody. 
It  remains  of  course,  perfectly  manifest  that  our  con- 
trol of  the  North  Sea  is  as  absolute  as  the  character 
of  modern  weapons  and  the  present  understanding  of  their 
use  makes  possible.  The  principles  behind  our  North 
Sea  strategy  are  simple.  One  hundred  years  ago,  had 
our  main  naval  enemy  been  based  on  Cuxhaven  and  Kiel, 
we  should  have  held  him  there  by  as  close  a  blockade  as 
the  number  of  ships  at  our  disposal,  the  weather  con- 
ditions and  the  seamanship  of  our  captains  made  possible. 
The  development  of  the  steam-driven  ship  modified  the 
theory  of  close  blockade  and,  even  without  the  torpedo, 
would  have  made,  with  the  speed  now  attainable,  any  con- 
tinuation of  the  old  practice  impossible.  The  under-water 
torpedo  has  simply  emphasised  and  added  to  difliculties 
that  would  have  been  insuperable.  But  they  have  un- 
doubtedly extended  the  range  at  which  the  blockading  force 
must  hold  itself  in  readiness.  To  reproduce  then  in  modern 
conditions  the  effect  brought  about  by  close  blockade 
in  our  previous  wars,  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  naval  base 
at  a  suitable  distance  from  the  enemy's  base.  It  must 
be  one  that  is  proof  against  under-water  or  surface 
torpedo  vessel  attack,  and  it  must  be  so  constituted  that 
the  force  that  normally  maintains  itself  there  is  capable 
of  prompt  and  rapid  sortie,  and  of  pouncing  upon  any 
enemy  fleet  that  attempts  to  break  out  of  the  harbour  in 
which  it  is  intended  to  confine  it.. 

Possible   Fleet   Bases 

"  The  great  bay  in  the  Orkneys  "  may,  for  all  I  know 
to  the  contrary,  supply  at  the  present  moment  the  Grand 
Fleet's  main  base  for  this  purpose.  But  there  are  a 
great  many  other  ports,  inlets  and  estuaries  on  the 
East  coast  of  Scotland  and  England,  which  are  hardly 
likely  to  be  entirely  neglected.  Not  all,  nor  many, 
of  these  would  be  suitable  for  fleet  units  of  the  greatest 
size  and  speed,  but  some  undoubtedly  are  suitable, 
and  all  those  that  are  could  be  made  to  satisfy 
the  conditions  of  complete  protection  against  secret 
attack.  Assuming  the  main  battle  fleet  to  be  at  an 
extremely  northerly  point,  any  more  southerly  base 
which  is  kept  either  by  battle  cruisers,  light  cruisers 
or  submarines,  may  be  regarded  as  an  advance  base,  if 
for  no  other  reason  than  that  it  is  so  many  miles 
nearer  to  the  German  base.  The  Orkneys  are  200  miles 
further  from  Lowestoft  than  Lowestoft  is  from  Heligoland. 
An  Orkney  concentration,  while  making  the  escape  of  the 
Germans  to  the  northward  impossible,  would  leave  them 
comparatively  free  to  harry  the  East  coast  of  England. 
If,  approaching  during  the  night,  they  could  arrive  off 
that  coast  before  the  northern  forces  had  news  of  their 
leaving  their  harbours,  they  would  have  many  hours 
start  in  the  race  home.  But  this  freedom  had  to  be  left 
the  enemy — because  no  risk  could  be  taken  in  the  main 
theatre.  It  is  assumed  on  the  one  side  and  ad- 
mitted on  the  other,  that  Germany  could  gain  nothing 
and  would  risk  everything  by  attempting  to  pass  down 
the  Channel.  The  concentration,  then,  in  the  North  of  a 
force  adequate  to  deal  with  the  whole  German  fleet 
• — again  I  have  to  say  in  the  light  of  the  way  in  which  the 
use  of  modern  weapons  is  understood — remains  our 
fundamental  strategical  principle, 

Mr.  Balfour's  letter  has  been  criticised  both  in  the 
Times  and  the  Sunday  Times,  as  if  its  proposals  argued 
an  abandonment  of  these  principles,  and  the  Times 
critic  regrets  the  use  of  monitors  for  coast  defence  as  the 
"  most  disturbing  "  feature  of  the  case,  He  sees  in  it  a 
relapse  into  the  old  heresy  that  was  killed  by  the  blue 
water  school.  But  it  seems  to  me  that  he  has  not  applied 
the  principles  of  this  controversy  correctly.    The  argument 


May  iH,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


II 


SS 

N 

N 

N 

N 

s    $•■        _  _  _ 

A 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

sss^    r 

f                                              Mm/     ^ 

tl'-'tish    steam  ships  blank.     N  means  neutral,   A  allied,  and  S  sailing  ship.   The  arrows  mark  the  dates  of  the  America)  Note 

and  the  German  reply 


__ \p'^e£k\%'^Mek\Sv4m^^^^ 


2i 1 rrrr^m. 


% ----- 


1. ..__-■ f- \ Vii 

VI 


I I 1 


, 1 —  --  - 


i 


1 X ! , . I 


This  diagram  shows  shows  the  rate  of  daily  loss  that  prevailed  before  March  20th,  namely  one  per  day,  and  its  growth  and  decline 
in  the  eight  succeeding  weeks.     The  American  Note  was  sent  in  the  6fth,  and  the  German  Reply  in  the  seventh  week  • 


against    tlic    coast    defence    fleet    was    not    that    such 
a  fleet  could  never  in  any   circumstances  be  of  ayiy  use, 
but  that  to  devote  national  treasure  to  developing  a  fleet 
of  this  character  ivhcn  a  sea  ^oing  fleet  was  wanted,  was  an 
unwarlike  misapplication  of  funds.     But  these  are  not 
the  alternatives  between  which  the  present   Board  of 
Admiralty  has  to  choose.     Their  predecessors,  earlier  in 
the  war,  delayed  the  building  of  battleships  and  cruisers 
to  build  monitors— doubtless  because  they  thought  that 
such    ships    were    capable    of   employment    to    decisive 
military  effect.      Why  the  pre-Dreadnoughts  could  not 
be  used  for  coast  bombardment  instead  of  monitors  need 
not  be  argued  here,  nor  whether  it  was  good  policy  to 
delay  sea  going  capital   ships   to  complete   an   inshore 
squadron.     The  fact  with  which  the  present  Board  of 
Admiralty  has  to  deal  is  that  the  monitors  are  there. 
If  then  certain  of  them  are  sent  to  the  North-East  coast, 
it  can  only  be  because  there  are  more  monitors  available 
than  can  be  employed  in    such    bombardments  as   can 
now    usefully    be    carried    on.      If    this    interpretation 
of  the  Admiralty's  action  is  correct,  there  is  no  diversion 
of  the   monitors  from  the   "  aggressive  purpose  of  their 
designer  "  to  a  passive  and  defensive  purpose.     Monitors 
obviously    cannot    pursue    and    catch    German    battle 
cruisers,  but  they  carry 'formidable  guns  of  long  range 
and  great  destructive  power.      It  may  be  difiicult  for  them 
to  hit  a  26  knot  target  maiiceuvring  at  very  long  range, 
but  it    will  not   be    less    ditticult    for    the    distant    and 
manoeuvring  ships  to  hit  them.     Their  presence  might 
tlien  inflict   serious   damage   on   an   invading    German. 
But  to  use  them  so  does  not  mean  either  that  the  present 
Board  considers  a  coast  defence  fleet  should  be  built  to 
the  neglect  of  more  universally  efficient  forms  of  naval 
force,  or  that  monitors  are  the  best  means  of  engaging 
the  raiding  cruisers. 

If  the  Times  critic  is  right  about  the  redistribution 
his  attack  on  this  part  of  Mr.  Balfour's  policy  is 
vastly  more  damaging.  For  according  to  this  writer 
the  policy  of  defensive  offence,  Great' Britain's  traditional 
sea  strategy,  has  now  been  reversed.  The  East  Coast 
towns  may  e.xpect  comparative  immunity,  but  only 
because  the  strategic  use  of  our  forces  has  "been  altered. 
It  IS  a  modification  imposed  upon  the  Admiralty  by 
the  action  of  the  enemy.  Its  weakness  lies  in  the 
•  substitution  of  squadrons  in  fixed  positions  for  periodical 
sweeps  in  force  through  the  length  and  breadth  of  the 
I^orth  Sea."  Were  this  indeed  the  meaning  of  Mr. 
Kaltour  s  letter  and  the  intention  of  his  policy,  nothing 
more  deplorable  could  be  imagined.  But  what  ground 
IS  there  for  thinking  that  this  is  Mr.  Balfour's  meaning  ? 
He  says  nothing  of  the  kind.  He  makes  it  quite  clear  that 
%"f^5"^"S'^'"^'"t  is  made  possible  by  additional  units 
ot  the  first  importance  now  being  ready  to  use.     The  old 


provision  of  adequate  naval  preponderance  at  the  right 
point  has  not  been  disturbed.  It  is  merely  proposed  to 
establish  new  and  advanced  bases  from  which  the  new 
available  squadrons  can  strike.  It  stands  to  reason  that 
the  nearer  this  base  is  to  the  shortest  line  between  Heligo- 
land and  the  East  coast,  the  greater  the  chance  of 
the  force  within  it  being  able  to  fall  upon  Germany's 
cruising  or  raiding  units  if  they  venture  within  the  radius 
of  its  action.  To  establish  a  new  or  more  southerly 
base  then  is  a  development  of  and  not  a  departure  from 
our  previous  strategy.  If  there  is  nothing  to  show  that 
the  old  distribution  is  changed,  certainly  there  is  no 
suggestion  that  the  squadron  destined  for  the  new  base 
will  be  "  fi.xed  "  there.  If  squadrons  now  based  on  the 
north  are  there  only  to  pounce  upon  the  emerging  German 
ships,  why  should  squadrons  based  further  south  not  be 
employed  for  a  similar  purpose  ?  Arthur  Pollen 


THE    VETERANS'    CLUB 

We  would  draw  special  attention  to  the  Duke  of  Bedford's 
appeal  on  the  subject  of  an  Imperial  Memorial  to  the  heroes 
of  the  Great  War,  which,  as  planned,  is  to  be  constructed 
from  the  nucleus  already  existing  in  the  Veterans'  Club. 

The  original  club  was  opened  five  years  ago  to  fill  the  wants 
of  the  ex-service  man,  where  he  could  meet  old  comrades,  get 
a  bed,  write  his  letters,  and  obtain  help  or  advice,  especially 
with  regard  to  employment.  There  were  no  less  than  7,000 
members  of  it  before  the  war,  most  of  whom  have 
rejoined  the  colours,  but  in  view  of  the  immense  expansion  of 
the  Navy  and  Army  and  the  vast  numbers  of  Veterans  who 
will  leave  the  Services  at  the  expiration  of  the  war  it  is  neces- 
sary that  the  whole  scope  of  this  splendid  Club  should  be 
enlarged  if  it  is  to  be  of  adequate  use.  The  present  club 
building  is  quite  inadequate  for  a  large  membership,  and  it  is 
also  considered  that  branches  should  be  estabHshed  here 
and  in  the  Dominions,  and  centres  constituted  to  which  men 
could  turn  for  help  or  advice  on  emigrating  from  this 
country  to  any  one  of  the  Dominions. 

The  Veterans'  Club  Association  has  been  formed  to  trans- 
late such  a  plan  as  this  into  action,  and  patriotic  individuals 
are  invited  to  join  the  Association  and  subscribe  to  it  accord- 
ing to  their  means.  It  is  desired  to  purchase  and  transfer 
the  Club  to  an  adequate  building  in  London,  now  in  the 
market,  and  permanently  to  endow  it  as  a  great  Imperial 
Memorial  ;  to  endow  a  splendid  country  house  (which  has 
been  offered  to  the  Committee)  as  a  convalescent  home  for 
the  use  of  members,  and  to  carry  on  the  other  activities  of 
the  existing  club  in  Hand  Court,  Holborn. 

For  these  purposes  it  is  estimated  that  a  sum  of  /250  000 
will  be  nt-eded.  Donations  and  subscriptions  should'  be 
sent  to  the  Duke  of  Bedford  or  the  Lord  Mayor  of  London  c/o 
Messrs.Cox  and  Co.,  16,  Charing  Cross,  or  to  Messrs.Drummond 
49,  Charing  Cross.  It  is  much  to  be  desired  that  the  response 
to  this  appeal  will  be  both  prompt  and  generous. 


12 


LAND      &     WATER 


The  Charge 

By  Patrick  MacGill 


May  1 8,  191 9 


Seven  supple  lads  and  clean 

Sat  down  to  drink  one  night, 

Sat  down  to  drink  at  \oiiox-les-Mincs 

Then  went  away  to  tight. 

Seven  supple  lads  and  clean 
Are  finished  witli  the  fight. 
But  only  tliree  at  Nouex-les-Mincs 
Sit  down  to  drink  to-night. 

RIFLEMAN  FELAX,  my  mate,  went  up  the  ladder 
of  the  Assembly  trench  with  a  lighted  cigarette 
in  his  mouth.  Out  on  the  open  his  first  feeling 
was  one  of  disappointment  ;  the  charge  was  as 
dull  as  a  church  parade  to  start  with.  Felan,  although 
orders  were  given  to  the  contrary,  e.xpccted  a  wild, 
whooping  forward  rush,  hut  the  men  stepped  out  soberly 
with  the  pious  decision  of  ancient  ladies  going  to  church. 
In  front  the  bilious  yellow  gas  receded  like  a  curtain, 
but  the  air  stunk  with  it  still,  and  many  of  those  who 
followed  pulled  down  their  respirators  over  their  mouths. 

A  little  \allcy  formed  by  the  caprice  of  the  breeze 
opened  in  the  gas  and  its  far  end  disclosed  the  enemy's 
wire  entanglements.  Felan  walked  through  the  valley 
for  a  distance  of  twelve  yards,  then  he  glanced  to  his 
right  and  fotmd  that  there  was  nobody  in  sight  there. 
Dudley  Prior  had  dir.appeared  in  the  gas. 

"  Here,  Bill,  we've  lost  connection  !  "  he  cried,  turn- 
ing to  his  left.  But  his  words  were  wasted  on  air  ;  he 
was  alone  in  his  little  glen,  and  invisible  birds  flicked  angry 
wings  close  to  his  ears.  His  first  inclination  was  to  turn 
back,  not  through  fear,  but  with  a  desire  to  make  en- 
quiries. 

"  I  can't  take  a  trench  by  myself,"  he  muttered. 
"  Shall  I  go  back  ?  If  I  do,  some  may  call  me  a  coward. 
Oh,  damn  it  !    I'll  go  forward." 

He  felt  afraid  now,  but  his  fear  was  not  that  which 
makes  a  man  run  away  ;  he  was  attracted  towards  that 
which  engendered  the  fear  as  an  urchin  attracted  to- 
wards a  wasps'  nest  longs  to  poke  the  hive  and  annoy  its 
occupants. 

"  Suppose  I  get  killed  now  and  see  nothing,"  he  said 
to  himself. 

"  Where  are  Bill  and  Pryor  and  the  others  ?  " 

He  reached  the  enemy's  wire,  tripped  and  fell  headlong. 

He  got  to  his  feet  again  and  took  stock  of  the  space  in 
front.  There  was  the  German  trench,  sure  enough,  with 
its  rows  of  dirty  sandbags,  a  machine  gun  emplacement 
and  a  maxim  peeping  furtively  through  a  loop  hole. 
A  big,  bearded  German  was  adjusting  the  range  of  the 
weapon.  He  looked  at  Felan,  Felan  looked  at  him  and 
tightened  his  grip  on  his  rifle. 

"  You  —  !  "  said  Felan,  and  just  made  one  step  for- 
ward when  something  "  hit  him  all  over,"  as  he  said 
afterwards.  He  dropped  out  of  the  world  of  conscious 
things. 

A  stretcher-bearer  found  Felan  some  twenty  minutes 
later  and  placed  him  in  a  shell-hole,  after  removing  his 
equipment  which  he  placed  on  the  rim  of  the  crater. 

l-'elan  returned  to  a  conscious  life  that  was  tense  with 
agony.  Pain  gripped  at  the  innermost  parts  of  his 
being. 

"  I  cannot  stand  this,"  he  yeUed.  "  God  Almighty, 
it's  hell !  "  He  felt  as  if  somebody  was  shoving  a  red- 
hot  bar  of  iron  through  his  chest.  Unable  to  move,  he 
lay  still,  feeUng  the  bar  getting  shoved  further  and  further 
in.  For  a  moment  he  had  a  glimpse  of  his  rifle  lying  on 
the  ground  near  him  and  he  tried  to  reach  it.  But  the 
unsuccessful  effort  cost  him  much  and  he  became  un- 
conscious again. 

A  shell  bursting  near  at  hand  shook  him  into  reality 
and  splinters  whizzed  by  his  head.  He  raised  himself 
upwards,  hoping  to  get  killed  outright.  He  was  un- 
successful.    Again  his  eyes  rested  on  the  rifle. 

"  If  God  would  give  me  the  strength  to  get  it  into  mv 
hand,  "  he  muttered.  "  Lying  here  like  a  rat  in  a  trap 
and  I've  seen  nothing.  Not  a  run  for  my  money.  .  .  . 
I  suppose  all  the  boys  are  dead.     Lucky  fellows  if  they 


die  easy.  .  .  .  I've  seen  nothing  only  one  German 
and  he  done  for  me.  I  wish  the  bullt't  had  gone  through 
my  head.  " 

He  looked  at  his  equipment,  at  the  bayonet  scabbard 
lying  limpU'  under  the  haversack.  The  water  bottle 
hung  over  the  rim  of  the  shell  hole.      : 

"  i-'uU  of  rum,  thtj  bottle  is,  and  I'm  so  dry.  I  wi^h  I 
could  get  hold  of  it.  I  was  a  damned  fool  ever  to  join 
the  Army.  .  .  .  My  God  !  I  wish  I  was  dead,"  said 
F>lan. 

The  minutes  passed  by  like  long  grey  thread  unwinding 
itself  slowly  from  some  invisible  ball,  and  the  pain  bit 
deeper  into  the  boy.  Vivid  remembrances  of  long-past 
events  flashed  across  his  mind  and  fled  away  like  tele- 
graph poles  seen  by  passengers  in  an  express  train. 
Then  he  lost  consciousness  again. 

About  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning  I  found  a  stretcher- 
bearer  whose  mate  had  been  wounded  and  he  helped 
me  to  carry  a  wounded  man  into  an  original  front  trench. 
On  our  way  across  I  heard  somebody  calling,  "  Pat ! 
Pat  !  "  J  looked  round  and  saw  a  man  crawling  in  on 
hands  and  knees,  his  head  almost  touching  the  ground. 
He  called  to  me  but  did  not  look  in  my  direction.  But  I 
recognised  the  voice  ;  the  Corporal  of  my  section  was 
calling.     I  went  across  to  him. 

"  Wounded  ?  "   I  asked. 

"  Yes,  Pat,"  he  answered,  and  turning  over,  sat  down. 
His  face  was  very  white. 

"  You  should  not  have  crawled  in,"  I  muttered.  "  It's 
only  wearing  you  out,  and  it's  not  very  healthy  here." 

"  Oh,  I  want  to  get  away  from  this  hell,"    he  said. 

"  It's  very  foolish,"  I  replied.  "  Let  me  see  your 
wound."  I  dressed  the  wound  and  gave  the  Corporal 
two  morphia  tablets  and  put  two  blue  crosses  on  his  face. 
This  would  tell  those  who  might  come  his  way  later,  that 
morphia  had  been  given. 

"  Lie  down,"  I  said.  "  When  the  man  whom  we 
are  carrying  is  safely  in  we'll  come  back  for  you." 

I  left  him.  In  the  trench  were  many  wounded  lying 
on  the  floor  and  on  the  fire  steps.  A  soldier  was  lying 
face  downwards  groaning.  A  muddy  ground  sheet  was 
placed  over  his  shoulders.  I  raised  the  sheet  and  .saw 
that  his  wound  was  not  dressed. 

"  Painful,  matey  ?  "   I  asked. 

"  Oh,  it's  old  Pat,"    muttered  the  man. 

"  Who  are  you  ?  "  I  asked,  for  I  did  not  recognise 
the  voice. 

"  You  don't  know  me  ?  "  said  the  man,  surprise  in  his 
tones.  He  turned  a  queer,  puckered  face  half  round, 
but  I  did  not  recognise  him  even  then  ;  pain  had  so 
distorted  his  countenance. 

"  No,"    I  replied.     "  Who  are  you  ?  " 

"  Felan,"    he  replied. 

".•My  (iod  !  "  I  cried,  then  hurriedly,  "  I'll  dress  your 
wound.  You'll  get  carried  in  to  the  dressing  station 
directly." 

"  It's  about  time,"  said  Felan  wearily.  "  I  have  been 
out  a  couple  of  days.     ...     Is  there  no  R.A.M.C.  ?  " 

I  dressed  Felan's  wound,  returned  and  looked  for  the 
Corporal,  but  I  could  not  tind  him.  Someone  must  have 
carried  him  in,  I  thought. 

Kore  had  got  to  the  German  barbed  wire  entanglement 
when  he  breathed  in  a  mouthful  of  gas  which  almost 
choked  him  at  first  and  afterwards  instilled  him  with  a 
certain  placid  confidence  in  everything.  He  came  to  a 
lesiurely  halt  and  looked  around  him.  In  front  of  him 
a  platoon  of  the  2otli  London  Regiment,  losing  its  objec- 
tive, crossed  parallel  to  the  enemy's  trench.  How  funny 
that  men  should  go  astray,  Kore  thought.  Then  he 
saw  a  youth  who  was  with  him  at  school  and  he  shouted 
to  him.  The  youth  stopped  ;  Kore  came  up  and  the 
boys  shook  hands,  leant  on  their  rifles  and  began  to  talk 
of  old  times  while  a  machine  gun  played  about  their 
ears.     Both  got  hit. 

M'Crone  disappeared  ;  he  was  never  seen  by  any  of  our 
regiment  after  the  25th. 

The  four  men  were  reported  as  killed  in  the  casualty 
list. 


May  i8,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


13 


How  Germap  Public  Opinion  is  Formed 

By  Colonel   Feyler 


SPEAKING  in  the  Reichstag  recently,  the  German 
Minister  of  War  declared  that  the  German  official 
communiques  were  invariably  true,  contrary  to 
those  of  Germany's  enemies.  This  declaration, 
coming  on  the  heels  of  the  fal^e  account  of  the  capture 
of  Fort  Vaux,  near  Verdun,  and  ecjually  false  news  of 
the  storming  of  the  Mort  Homme,  may  have  caused  some  _ 
surprise.  To  those,  however,  who  since  the  commence- 
ment of  the  war  have  made  a  special  study  of  the  methods 
of  the  German  Press  Bureau,  it  caused  no  surprise  whatever. 
I  would  like  to  quote  an  example  of  similar  manipulation, 
dealing  with  operations  in  Flanders  during  Spring,  i()i5, 
which  will  be  of  special  interest  to  the  British  reader. 

The  Hill  known  as  Hill  60  is  situated  south-cast  of 
Ypres  and  south-west  of  Zillebeke.  As  can  be  seen  from 
the  number  "  60,"  which  denotes  metres  above  sea  level, 
this  hill  is  a  mere  mound  of  no  great  altitude,  but  it 
suflices  to  dominate  the  surrounding  plain.  The  British 
took  possession  of  this  position  from  the  17th  to  the  iqth 
of  April  and  on  the  20th  April  published  the  following 
official  statement  : 

The  operations  started  on  the  17th  April  finished  yesterday 
in  the  complete  occupation  of  an  important  position 
known  as  Hill  60,  situated  about  two  miles  south  of 
Zillebeke,  east  of  Ypres  ;  this  eminence  dominates  the 
country  to  the  north  and  north-east.  Operations  com- 
menced by  the  explosion  underneath  the  Hill  of  a  mine 
which  killed  a  number  of  Germans  and  resulted  in  the 
capture  of  15  prisoners,  including  one  officer. 
Oil  the  i8th  April  at  dawn  the  Germans  counter-attacked 
vigorously  in  order  to  re-take  Hill  bo  but  were  repulsed 
with  heavy  loss.  The  enemy  then  advanced  in  serried 
ranks,  exposed  to  the  fire  of  an  EngHsh  machine  gun 
battery  .  .  .  they  were  everywhere  repulsed  with 
heavy  losses. 
German  Headquarters  kept  their  public  informed  as 
regards  these  operations  in  the  following  manner  : 

iSth  April :  After  exploding  several  mines  tlie  British 
penetrated  yesterday  evening  into  one  of  our  positions 
situated  south-east  of  Ypres  on  an  elevation  immediately 
north  of  the  Canal,  but  they  were  immediately  turned 
out  again  by  a  counter-attack.  Fighting  has  ceased, 
except  for  the  possession  of  three  of  the  craters. 
19th  April  :  South-east  of  Ypres  the  British  were  ejected 
from  the  small  portions  of  our  position  which  they  still 
held.  Yesterday  evening  they  made  an  attempt  to  re- 
gain possession  of  the  Hill  by  means  of  a  violent  attack 
along  the  railway  from  Ypres  to  Comincs.  This  attack 
failed  with  heavy  loss. 

The  contradiction  between  the  two  versions  is  thus 
absolute.  In  England  the  public  is  under  the  impression 
that  Hill  60  is  occupied  by  British  soldiers  ;  in  Germany 
everyone  believes  the  contrary.  The  question  will 
without  doubt,  however,  be  solved  by  the  Com- 
muniques of  the  days  immediately  following ;  it 
can  be  taken  for  granted  that  the  Germans,  if  indeed  they 
have  lost  the  hill,  will  not  have  given  up  hope  of  re- 
capturing a  position  of  so  much  importance.  This  is 
proved  indeed  by  their  silence  after  their  despatch  of 
the  19th  April,  as  they  are  no  doubt  waiting  for  a  success- 
ful operation  to  wipe  off  the  failure  exposed  in  the  British 
Communiques  of  the  20th. 

Experience  during  the  present  war  goes  to  show  that 
the  Germans  will  certainly  return  to  the  attack,  whether 
or  not  they  see  fit  to  publish  their  intentions.  The  opera- 
tion of  attacking  and  defending  a  fortified  position  has 
almost  invariably  shown  the  following  three  phases. 

Firstly,  a  reconnaissance  of  the  position  to  be  captured 
and  the  crushing  of  advanced  lines  covering  the  position. 
Secondly,  the  decisive  attack  which,  if  successful, 
does  not  fail  to  provoke  an  immediate  counter-stroke 
by  the  dispossessed  party  who  by  means  of  a  swift 
counter-attack  with  his  nearest  available  reinforcements 
hopes  to  take  advantage  of  the  victor's  exhaustion  and 
to  re-take  the  position  before  the  latter  has  had  time  to 
consolidate  it.  Should  this  counter-attack  be  successful, 
the  original  attacker  has  to  re-commence  his  operations. 
If  the  counter-attack,  however,  fails,  then  the  third 
phase  becomes  evident.  The  defender  does  not  despair 
of  recapturing  his  lost  position,  but  the  enemy  has  already 


consolidated  his  lines  and  the  defender  has,   the  ,'fore, 
to  organise  a  methodical  attack  against  his  old  positions. 

Unless  a  thorough  comparison  of  communiques  and  an 
exhaustive  study  of  earlier  examples  are  at  fault,  the 
Germans  have  now  arrived  at  the  third  phase  of  the 
battle  of  Hill  60.  They  have  pubhshed  on  the  i8th  and 
19th  April  the  probably  quite  correct  news  of  the  success 
of  their  first  counter-attacks,  but  they  have  omitted  to 
publish  their  final  failure.  They  will  now  no  doubt 
pass  to  the  third  phase,  but  they  suffer  from  a  manifest 
inability  to  publish  this  fact,  having  burnt  their  bridges 
by  stating  they  are  still  in  occupation  of  the  position, 
and  they  cannot  publish  news  of  its  recapture  without 
confessing  that  it  had  been  lost.  We  are,  therefore, 
confined  to  statements  from  the  Allied  camp,  and 
these  certainly  have  an  appearance  of  truth ;  as, 
once  Hill  60  had  been  occupied  there  was  no  plausible 
reason  for  composing  fairy  tales  of  more  fighting  for 
it.  Any  fighting  that  takes  place  after  this  point  must 
as  a  logical  certainty  be  fighting  of  the  third  phase,  in 
which  the  Germans  are  attempting  to  regain  their  loss. 

No  time  is  lost  in  informing  us  of  the  situation,  first 
by  the  following  French  Communiques  : 

22nd  April,  7  a.m.  :  In  Belgium  an  attack  has  developed 

against  the  trenches  on  Hill. 60,  which  had  been  captured 

,    by  the  British.     The  attack  was  repulsed. 

23rd  April,  7  a.m.  :    The  British  troops  have  repulsed 

two  attacks  on   Hill   60.     The   German   counter-attacks, 

whose  violence  is  explained  by  the  desire  of  the  Imperial 

General  Staff  to  repair  the  loss  denied  in  their  official 

Communiques,  have  definitely  failed. 

Shortly  afterwards  we  have  General  French's  report : 

22nd  April :     The   Germans  continue   to   make   violent 

counter-attacks  before  Hill  60.     On  Tuesday  afternoon 

between  6  and  9  p.m.  we  repulsed  two  heavy  infantry 

attacks,  inflicting  heavy  loss  on  the  enemy.     Throughout 

the  night  the  Hill  has  been  bombarded  by  the  enemy 

and  we  have  repulsed  several  other  attacks. 

23rd  April  :  The  German  attacks  against  Hill  60  have  been 

several  times  renewed  since  the  last  despatch.     All  these 

attacks  have  failed  and  have  now  momentarily  ceased.     We 

hold  the  whole  ridge,  to  which  the  enemy  attaches  a  great 

,    deal  of  importance.     There  is  not  a  word  of  truth  in  the 

German  official  statement  to  the  effect  that  the  position 

has  been  retaken  by  the  Germans. 

The   position   was,-,  however,   retaken   by  the   Germans 

two  weeks  later,  on  the  5th  May,  by  means  of  the  use  of 

asphyxiating  gases ;    but  of  course  Berlin  was  not  in  a 

position  to  announce  this    recapture  and  it  was  left  to 

General  French  to  make  the  news  public.     This,  of  course, 

was  nof  very  satisfactory  to  German  Headquarters  and 

in  their  telegram  of  the  7th  May  they  described  the  action 

as  follows  :— 

Near  Ypres,  all  the  attempts  of  the  British  to  retake 
Hill  60,  situated  south-east  of  Zillebeke,  which  has  since 
the  17th  April  been  the  centre  of  heavy  fighting,  have 
met  with  failure. 

In  this  manner  the  German  public  is  given  confirma- 
tion of  the  German  despatches  of  the  rSth  and  19th  of 
April,  which  had  concealed  the  capture  of  Hill  60  by 
the  British  ;  in  order  to  meet  the  situation,  the  roles  have 
had  to  be  reversed  and  instead  of  the  Germans  attacking 
and  expelling  the  British  the  British  are  represented  to 
have  attacked  and  been  unsuccessful  in  expelling  the 
Germans.  As  a  matter  of  fact  German  Headquarters,  on 
a  later  occasion  were  careless  enough  to  give  the  lie  to 
this  description,  when  speaking  of  their  recapture  of  the 
position  in  a  despatch  dealing  with  the  uses  of  gases,  thus 
showing  how  difficult  it  is  to  sustain    a  deception. 

The  above  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  examples  of 
the  German  method  of  reporting  nothing  but  victories. 
We  have  seen  how  the  situation  brought  about  by  the 
denial  of  a  British  success  has  eventually  been  solved 
by  a  misrepresentation  of  the  subsequent  German  success 
which  had  nullified  its  effects,  and  how  this  subsequent 
German  success  is  described  to  the  people  as  the  third 
phase  of  the  previous  successfid  attack. 

Many  examples  could  be  given  of  this  process  of  a 
successful  misrepresentation  of  unfortunate  incidents,  but 
the  case  of  Hill  60  is  outstanding  in  its  blatancy. 


»4 


LAND     &     W  A  T  E  R 


May  18,  1916 


Renascence   or   Decay 


By  Joseph  Thorp 


ENASCENCE  or  Decay"  might  very  well 
stand  against  the  Prussian  \Vcltmacht  odcr 
Niedergang  as  the  summary  of  the  choice  of 
.destinies  which  he  before  that  pohtical  system 
known  as  the  British  Empire.  Nor  is  the  reference  to 
defeat  or  victory  in  the  held,  but  to  the  elements  of  decay 
or  of  regeneration  in  the  constitutional  structure  and  the 
temper  and  conditions  of  the  various  racial  and  national 
elements.  The  problem  is  older  and  wider  than  the 
war,  though  that  catastrophe  has  defined  it  and  imported 
a  note  of  urgency  into  it  as  into  so  many  others. 

"  Renascence  or  Decay "  might  also  ser\'e  as  the 
summary  of  the  thesis  argued  in  Tlic  Problem  oj  the 
C ommomvcallh  (Macmillan)  which  is  in  effect  the  result 
of  the  studies  and  deliberations  of  that  group  of  students 
of  political  affairs  which  founded  and  has  conducted  The 
Round  Tab'c  with  such  marked  ability,  detachment  and 
perceptible  effect.  The  book  is  indeed,  for  reasons  duly 
explained,  put  forward  in  the  name  of  but  one  of  their 
number,  Mr.  Lionel  Curtis,  but  it  has  the  breadth  and 
authority  of  its  composite  authorship. 

Readers  of  The  Round  Table  will  have  noted  in  that 
admirable  quarterly,  the  persistent  use  of  the  term 
"  Commonwealth  "  to  replace  the  more  familiar  "  Empire." 
It  is  the  peculiar  service  of  this  school  to  their  generation 
that  they  have  set  forth  their  problem  in  terms  of  free 
citizenship,  resiKinsibility  and  mutual  service  rather 
than  dominion.  The  change  of  terms  reflects  the  change 
of  thought — and  the  changed  thing. 

For  there  is  a  world  of  difference  in  the  two  conceptions. 
The  highest  claim  of  the  association  of  nations  now 
imder  the  British  flag  (for  the  moment  prescinding  from 
the  claims  and  causes  of  our  Allies  and  referring  especially 
to  the  envious  German  challenge  of  the  British  position) 
is  not  the  claim  of  possession.  It  is  the  fact  that  out  of 
the  conception  and  practice  of  liberty  under  that  flag 
there  is  hke  to  spring  a  better  hope  for  mankind  than  out 
of  the  domineering  projects  and  methods  of  Deutschtum. 
That  dear  hope  is  a  greater  thing  for  us  to  fight  for  than 
any  barren  desire  to  keep  by  the  sword  what  was  won 
by  the  sword  of  our  fathers. 

What  then  is  this  Problem  of  the  Commonwealth  ? 
The  admirably  argued  thesis  before  me  confines  itself 
to  a  single,  but  immensely  important,  aspect  of  a  manifold 
problem.  How  can  a  way  be  found  whereby  "  a  British 
citizen  in  the  Dominions  can  acquire  the  sarne  control  of 
foreign  policy  as  one  domiciled  in  the  British  Isles." 
Of  many  utterances  of  Dominion  statesmen  expressing 
dissatisfaction  with  the  present  situation  this*  of  Mr. 
Andrew  Fisher  sets  out  the  matter  in  its  simplest  and 
bluntest  terms.  "  If  I  had  stayed  in  Scotland,  I  should 
have  been  able  to  tackle  any  member  on  questions  of 
Imperial  policy  and  to  vote  for  or  against  him  on  that 
ground.  I  went  to  Australia.  I  have  been  Prime 
Minister.  But  all  the  time  I  have  had  no  say  whatever 
about  Imperial  policy — no  say  whatever.  Now  that  can't 
go  on.     There  must  be  some  change." 

But  what  change  ?  Mr.  Curtis  addresses  himself  to 
the  -answering  of  that  question,  and  it  must  be  admitted 
that  if  his  closely  reasoned  and  lucidly  phrased  argument 
be  followed  step  by  step  it  is  difficult  to  resist  the  con- 
clusion that  nothing  less  than  a  fundamental  constitutional 
change,  the  establishment  of  a  new  Imperial  executive — 
"  one  Cabinet  responsible  to  an  Imperial  Parliament  and 
electorate  and  another  to  a  British  Parliament  and 
electorate  "—rather  than  any  development  of  the 
method  of  Imperial  conference,  will  serve  to  prevent 
disintegration,  to  consolidate,  to  develop  the  greater 
Commonwealth.  This  conclusion  is  approached,  step 
by  careful  step,  via  a  consideration  of  the  growth  of 
self-government  in  England,  in  America,  and  in  the 
British  Colonies — now  the  Dominions.  It  is  shown 
how  the  range  of  authority  covered  by  the  term  self- 
government  has  been  constantly  extended,  but  in  the 
case  of  the  Dominions,  stops  arbitrarily  short  of  the 
highest  function  of  self-government — the  responsibility  for 
national  defence,  the  determination  of  the  high  issues  of 
peace  and  war.    An  open-eyed  discussion  of  the  difficulties 


involved  and  a  very  careful  attention  to  authentic 
definitions  makes  for  tlie  clear  understanding  of  this 
absorbing  problem. 

It  is  well  to. try  and  express  the  problem  for  ourselves 
in  the  concrete.  We  want  such  a  democratically  moulded 
and  acceptable  union  of  nations  in  one  Sovereign  State 
as  will  create  a  greater  loyalty  to  the  Commonwealth — 
over  and  above  the  sectional  loyalties  to  the  separate 
parts  :  so  that  an  Englishman  or  New  Zealander  will  be 
first  a  Commonwealth  man  then  an  Englishman  or  New 
Zealander ;  as  now  both  Enghshman  and  Scot  are 
essentially  British  before  they  are  Scotch  and  English. 
The  statement  wears  the  appearance  of  being  the  very 
reverse  of  the  truth.  But  the  test  lies  not  in  the  apparent 
strength  of  the  affections  which  are  most  often  more 
warmly  engaged  with  the  nearest  entity,  home,  city  or 
native  land,  but  in  the  great  choices  made  in  crisis.  The 
Scot  would  stand  for  Britain  and  the  Empire  as  against 
a  separatist  Scotch  party. 

When  Lee,  the  Virginian,  chose  for  Virginia  as  against 
the  I'nited  States,  he  chose  wrong.  He  had  not  under- 
stood the  terms  of  his  allegiance.  Hyphenation  is 
raising  the  same  problem  again  in  America  to-day.  To 
create  such  a  federation  of  British  States  with  equal 
rights  and  ccpial  share  of  control  as  shall  win  and  retain 
the  loyalty  of  all-  that  is  our  task  as  the  author  sees  it. 
It  cannot  be  done  without  vision,  without  labour,  without 
the  sacrifice  of  many  preconceived  ideas  and  the  abandon- 
ment of  ^  a  dangerous  complacency  as  to  the  sanctity  of 
the  British  constitution.  This  candid,  serious,  lucid, 
and  generous-tempered  piece  of  political  thinking  will 
carry  weight  in  the  discussions  that  must  precede  effective 
movement  towards  the  final  issues  of  self-government, 
and  the  completion  of  the  Commonwealth. 

To  our  author  and  those  for  whom  he  speaks,  "Freedom' 
is  no  vague  shibboleth.  It  is  a  term  with  definite  content 
and  implications.  It  is  wrought  by  constant  human 
andeavour  in  the  light  of  experience  often  bitter  : 

"What  has  been  has  been,  and  God  Himself  cannot  change 
the  past.  But  the  future  is  all  in  human  hands  to  make 
or  to  mar,  so  far  as  with  mortal  eyes  we  are  able  to  discern 
what  time  will  bring  forth.  .  .  .  When  freedom  is  saved 
we  may  fail  to  sec  that  the  world  has  been  changed  in 
the  process,  and  that  the  Commonwealth,  with  which 
the  cause  of  liberty  is  inseparably  linked,  cannot  continue 
to  be  as  it  was.  Changed  it  must  be,  and  woe  betide  us 
if  those  changes  are  not  conceived  in  accordance  with 
the  principle  for  which  the  Commonwealth  stands. 


Of  all  our  Allies,  Japan  is  the  one  of  which  least  is  known. 
There  are  histories  in  existence  familiar  to  historians  and 
students,  but  the  general  reader  is  not  aware  that  Japan  has 
lived  through  heroic  times,  and  maintained  her  freedom  by 
bravery  and  resolution  in  the  "face  of  supreme  dangers.  Lord 
Armstrong  rightly  draws  attention  to  this  in  his  introduction 
to  Mr.  Yamada's  story  of  the  Great  Mongol  Invasion  in  the 
reign  of  Kubla  Khan  at  the  cud  oi  the  thirteenth  century. 
In  Japan  this  invasion  is  called  Ghenko  or  Genko.  and  Mr. 
Yamada  has  called  his  very  able  and  admirable  book  Ghenko, 
(Smith  Elder  and  Co.  7s.  Od.  net.) 

This  invasion  bears  a  curious  similarity  in  many  points  to 
the  Great  Armada,  and  the  author  (who  by  the  way  is  a 
Cambridge  graduate)  tells  the  historic  story  in'a  most  tlirilling 
manner.  If  is  a  chapter  of  history  with  which  we  ought 
all  to  be  familiar,  for  it  casts  a  strong  light  on  the  Japanese 
character  and  makes  clearer  that  division  which  so  often 
bewilders  the  casual  student— the  cleavage  that  exists  behind 
the  peoples  of  China  and  Japan.  A  sidelight  is  also  thrown 
on  Korea,  in  fact  after  a  perusal  of  this  volume  one  is  able  to 
take  a  much  better  view  of  the  Far  East.  The  book  is  written 
in  rather  quaint  F^nglish,  for  the  author,  though  he  has 
mastered  most  of  the  intricacies  of  our  language,  at  times 
goes  astray  over  the  connotation  which  colloquialisms  have 
given  to  certain  phrases  ;  but  this  does  not  detract  from 
the  general  interest  ;  some  may  think  it  even  heightens  it. 
Lord  Armstrong  observes,  "  change  the  names  and  the  seat 
of  war  and  much  of  Mr.  Yamada's  story  might  well  apply  to 
the  great  struggle  now  taking  place  in  Europe."  The  c.vtra- 
ordinary  likeness  'between  German  and  Mongol  sense  of 
honour  arid  frightfulncss  is  especially  remarkable. 


May  i8,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


15 


Where   America   Stands 


By  Lewis  R.  Freeman 


A  COUPLE  of  years  ago — only  a  month  or  two 
previous  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  in  fact — 
I  listened  one  night,  in  San  Francisco,  to  what  I 
thought  was  the  most  eloquent,  the  most  reason- 
able, the  most  convincing  "  peace  "  address  I  had  ever 
heard.  The  speaker  was  a  well-known  American  editor 
and  publicist,  one  of  a  family  distinguished  for  three 
generations  for  its  efforts  to  promote  universal  brother- 
hood, to  make  the  dream  of  world  federation  an  accom- 
plished fact.  He  did  not,  like  Norman  Angell  and  other 
professional  pacifists,  maintain  that  financial  and  other 
material  considerations  would  make  future  wars  im- 
possible, but  only  held  that  man's  increasing  humanity  to 
man,  as  evidenced  on  every  side,  could  bring  the  world 
to  no  other  goal  than  a  scheme  of  living  founded  on  a 
"  live-and-let-live  "  and  "  do-as-you-would-be-done-b}'  " 
basis.  Unlike  the  ante-bellum  harangues  of  the  pro- 
fessional pacifists,  too,  that  speech,  delivered  to-day, 
would  ring  almost  as  true  as  it  did  two  years  ago  ;  this 
because  it  was  based  on  fundamental  truths,  which  the 
war  has  not  altered,  but  only  given  us  the  more  clearly 
to  understand. 

However,  this  particular  peace  address  will  nfit  be  given 
again,  or  at  least  not  for  a  considerable  time.  I  know 
this,  for  the  speaker  himself  told  me  so  on  an  evening 
when  I  sat  next  him  at  supper  at  the  New  York  "  Author's 
Club  "  scarcely  a  month  ago. 

American  Aloofness 

"  You're  just  over  on  a  short  visit  from  the  other  side, 
are  you  not?  "  he  asked.  "  So!  Well,  how  do  things 
look  to  you  here  after  six  months'  absence  ?  Are  you  as 
much  shocked  as  is  everyone  else  who  comes  back  from 
France  or  England  at  the  aloofness,  the  lack  of  respon- 
sibility, not  to  say  callousness,  of  this  country  regarding 
the  war  ?  " 

"  Frankly,  yes,"  I  admitted.  "The  glare  of  the 
'  Great  M'hite  Way  '  is  a  welcome  relief  from  the  dark- 
ness of  London,  but  there  is  no  use  pretending  that  the 
lights  of  Broadway  are  sj'mbolic  of  any  general  enlighten- 
ment existing  in  this  country  in  the  matter  of  the  great 
world  issues  now  being  decided — perhaps  for  the  next 
score  or  so  of  generations — in  Europe." 

"  Several  dozen  other  returning  Americans  have  told 
us  about  the  same  thing,"  he  said  ;  "  only  you  are  rather 
more  moderate  than  the  majority  of  them.  All  of  them 
are  ashamed  ;  most  of  them  indignant,  and  '  mad  clean 
through.'  Do  you  know  what  I  am  afraid  of  ?  It  isn't 
that  we  won't  get  into  war  with  Germany — that  is  in- 
evitable if  Prussianism  is  not  crushed  once  and  for  all 
time  by  the  Allies,  andVe  don't  know  yet  that  it  will 
be — but  that  we  will  not  get  into  this  war  with  Germany. 
1  mean  that  unless  Germany  commits  some  flagrantly 
and  deliberately  overt  act,  such  as  the  sinking  of  an 
American  liner  "with  loss  of  life,  that  will  force  us  in  willy- 
nilly — and  I  think  the  Kaiser  will  take  good  care  not  to 
do  that — \ve  may  not,  as  a  nation,'  come  to  our  senses 
in  time  to  draw  the  sword  before  the  present  struggle  is 
practically  over.     We  shall  have  had  no  part " 

"  Pardon  me,"  I  interrupted.  "  But  I  don't  seem 
quite  able  to  reconcile  your  words  with  those  which  I 
heard  you  speak  in  San  Francisco  two  years  ago." 

"  I  hear  something  like  that  every  day  now,"  he 
answered,  "  and  from  both  '  friend  '  and  *  foe.'  I  found 
1  had  still  much  to  learn  about  many  things,  and  the  war 
has  been  the  means  of  teaching  me  some  of  the  most 
important  of  them.  They  used  to  call  me  a  '  practical 
idealist '  ;  the  war  taught  me  that  I  was  only  an  im- 
practical dreamer.  As  a  matter  of  fact.  I  am  still  an 
idealist,  and  also,  I  trust,  still  practical.  Perhaps  the 
main  thing  that  the  war  has  brought  home  to  me  is  the 
fact  that  while  there  is  such  a  thing  as  Prussianism  still 
alive  in  this  world,  practicality  and  idealism,  so  far  at 
least  as  international  politics  are  concerned,  cannot  go 
hand  in  hand.  Until  or  unless  Prussianism  is  crushed  for 
all  time,  therefore,  I  have  made  up  my  mind  to  keep  my 
idealism  foi  a  domestic  pet,   roaming  only  within  the 


'  three-mile  limit,'  and  emploj'  what  practicality  I  may 
have  to  bring  home  to  my  fellow  countrymen  these 
cumulative  facts  ;  first,  that  there  is  a  great  war  going 
on  ;  second,  that  it  is  a  world  war  rather  than  a  localised 
European  struggle  ;  and  third,  that  for  reasons  both 
moral  and  material — not  only  on  the  score  of  national 
honour,  but  of  national  safety  and  perhaps  national 
existence  as  well — it  is  their  duty,  by  actual  and  active 
participation  in  the  war,  to  do  their  share  in  ridding  the 
world  of  the  menace  of  Pi-ussianism. 

Ahead  of  Congress 

"  So  far  as  the  country  as  a  whole  is  concerned,  one 
cannot  be  sure  that  it  has  much  more  than  grasped  the 
first  two  facts.  That  the  people  fully  realise  that  it  is  a 
world  war  that  is  raging — one  that  may  involve  them 
whether  they  desire  it  or  not — is  shown  by  the  attention 
they  are  giving  to  the  so-called  '  preparedness  '  movement. 
In  this  particular — in  the  determination  to  build  up 
an  adequate  army  and  navy — the  people  are  unquestion- 
ably ahead  of  the  Government,  or  at  least  of  Congress,  now, 
as  many  times  in  the  past,  the  country's  '  Old  Man  of  the 
Sea.'  But  as  for  realising  that  both  honour  and  material 
interest- — the  latter  quite  as  powerfully  as  the  former — 
impel  America  to  align  herself  with  the  Allies  against  ' 
Germany,  I  am  afraid  I  can  hardly  describe  such  a  grasp 
of  the  situation  as  anything  like  universal.  The  most 
encouraging  feature  of  the  situation  is  that  practically 
all  of  our  sound  thinkers — the  men  that  stand  for  the 
best  in  literature,  politics  and  business — have  arrived 
at  this  conclusion,  and  are  speaking  out.  Their  influence 
is  rapidly  moulding  popular  opinion  among  unprejudiced 
Americans  of  all  classes,  but  whether  this  will  become 
strong  enough  to  galvanise  the  country  into  action  before 
it  is  too  late  is  open  to  considerable  doubt.  I  pin  my 
main  hopes  to  Germany's  '  running  amok  '  again  and 
doing  something  that  will  leave  us  no  choice  but  to  turn 
to  and  fight." 

"  What  do  you  mean  by  '  too  late  V  "  I  asked. 

"  Just  this  :  The  ignorance  and  selfishness — not  to  use 
several  stronger  terms  which  I  would  be  perfectly  justified 
in  employing — of  a  very  large  element  in  Congress,  and 
especially  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  makes  it 
absolutely  out  of  the  qiiestion  for  the  nation  properly  to 
meet  the  present  crisis  in  our  foreign  affairs.  Now, 
supposing  the  quickening  conscience  of  the  people  would 
make  it  possible  to  replace  the  worst  of  this  '  rotten 
timber '  with  sound  wood  through  resolute  action  at  the 
polls  in  the  November  election.  The  fact  remains  that, 
even  in  this  happy  contingency,  the  new  Congress  would 
not  be  able  to  make  itself  felt  until  it  convened  next 
March,  and  by  that  time  our  chance  of  being  of  any 
material  use  in  the  war  may  well  have  gone  by.  The 
fight  to  determine  whether  humanity  or  '  frightfulncss ' 
is  to  be  the  dominant  force  of  the  next  cycle  of  history 
may  well  have  been  lost  or  won  without  America's  having 
struclj:  a  blow  for  a  fundamental  cause  of  which  she  has 
trumpeted  herself  the  foremost  champion  since  the  day 
of  her  birth." 

Material  Interest 

"  Just  what  do  you  mean  by  saying  that  materia' 
interest  as  well  as  honour  should  impel  America  to  go  into 
the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Allies  ?  "  I  asked.  "  I  have 
observed  with  much  satisfaction  that  an  increasingly 
large  number  of  right-minded  Americans  are  ready  to 
draw  the  sword  on  the  score  of  honour,  but  it  seems  to  be 
the  pretty  general  opinion  that  honour  would  be  just 
about  all  we  could  hope  to  come  out  of  it  with.  What 
material  interests  would  our  participation  in  the  war 
serve  ?  You  don't  mean  more  '  munition  prosperity,' 
do  you  ?  Wouldn't  that  be  more  than  offset  by. the  fact 
that  we  would  have  to  begin  taking  Europe's 
I.O.U.'s    where  we  are  now  getting  her  gold  ?  " 

"  I  didn't  mean  anything  quite  so  material  as  dollars 
and  cents."  was  the  reply.     "  What  I  did  mean  was  Hiis : 


i6 


LAND     &     W^  A  T  E  R 


May  i8,  1916 


All  but  the  purblind  in  tliis  rountry  know  that  wc  must 
liave  a  strong  army  and  a  stronger  navy.  \\'e  shall  need 
them,  especially  if  we  elect  to  continue  our  traditional 
but  now  obsolete  and  impractical  policy  of  isolation  and 
try  to  stand  alone  ;  but  we  shall  also  need  them  even  if 
(as  so  many  of  us  are  working  and  hoping  for)  we  endea- 
vour to  enter  an  after-the-war  alliance  with  I-'rance  and 
Great  Britain  to  keep  the  world's  peace.  But  only  our 
actual  entry  into  the  war  will  awaken  the  country  to  the 
necessity  of,  and  force  Congress  to  provide  for,  sufficiently 
powerful  fighting  arms.  If  we  continue  to  temporise  with 
the  situation — if  we  just  manage  to  '  save  our  face  ' 
and  keep  out  of  the  war— we  shall  never  get  an  army  ami 
a'  navy  sufficiently  strong  either  to  make  us  unassailable 
standing  alone,  or  to  qualify  us  to  hold  up  our  end  in  an 
alliance  with  I'rance  and  Britain. 

"  Another  incalculable  benefit  incidental  to  our  par- 
ticipation in  the  war  would  be  the  cleaning  up  of  the 
Augean  Stable  in  Congress.  1  feel  rather  too  strongly 
on  that  subject  quite  to  tru.5t  myself  to  words  ;  but  you 
were  in  Washington  during  the  '  armed  ship  warning  ' 
debate  and  vote  and  know  what  a  miserably  misrepre- 
sentative  lot  so  many  of  our  '  professional  jioliticians'  are. 

For  the  Cause  of  Humanity 

•"  Finally,  a  war  fought  for  the  cause  of  humanity  and 
entered  into  only  at  the  end  of  a  year  and  a  half  or  two 
years  of  unparalleled  provocation  would  arrest  the 
denationalisation  that  has  been  eating  deeper  and  deeper 
toward  the  heart  of  this  country  ever  since  the  Civil  War. 
The  size  and  the  diversity  of  the  United  States,  en- 
couraging the  tendency  to  "put  sectional  above  national 
issues,  has  been  an  important  contributing  cause  of  this 
trouble  ;  but  the  main  one  has  been  the  increasingly 
rapid  '  dilution  '  of  our  original  population  with  not 
readily  assimilable  Europeans.  How  deep  this  canker 
liad  eaten  no  one  suspected  until  the  ramifications  of  the 
endless  chain  of  Teutonic  plots  began  to  be  uncovered. 
Our  entry  into  the  war  would  put  an  end  to  this  insidious 
menace  once  and  for  all  ;  it  would  re-nationalise  us  ; 
'  Aniericanism  '  would  begin  to  have  some  meaning 
again." 

I  have  set  down  this  conversation  at  some  length  for 
two  reasons  :  First,  because  of  the  diagnosis  it  furnishes 
of  the  American  situation  by  a  keen  and  impartial  student, 
and  secondly,  because  of  the  insight  it  gives  of  the  view- 
point of  such  leaders  of  American  thought  and  action  as 
Colonel  Roosevelt,  Joseph  Choate,  .Major  Putman,  Dr. 
Elliott,  Lyman  Abbott  and  many  others,  who  have 
discerned  the  fundamental  issues  in  the  European  war 
from  the  outset  and  have  endeavoured  to  awaken  the 
minds  of  their  countrymen  as  to  their  responsibility 
regarding  them. 

It  will  probably  be  difficult  to  make  Englishmen  believe 
that  President  Wilson,  had  he  still  been  the  head  of 
Princeton  University  during  the  present  crisis,  or  any- 
thmg  else  save  an  official  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  would  almost  certainly  have  stood  and  worked 
for  the  same  good  ends.  Yet  there  is  little  doubt  that 
such  would  have  been  the  case.  As  President  he  has 
felt  that  his  action  was  limited  to  putting  the  will  of  the 
peoi>le,  as  he  interptetcd  it,  into  effect.  And  because 
the  American  mind  was  not  a  thing  to  be  pinned  down 
and  charted  with  square  and  compass,  because,  like  all 
national  minds,  it  is  a  variable  and  uncertain  quantity, 
his  course  has  been  a  difficult,  not  to  say  an  impossible 
one. 

A  President  of  the  United  States  has  two  alternatives 
—he  may  lead  the  people,  or  he  may  elect  to  be  led  by 
them.  In  tackling  the  knotty  domestic  problems  which 
confronted  him  previous  to  the  war— Panama  Tolls  Repeal 
and  currency  and  tariff  reform— President  Wilson  led, 
and  led  successfully,  even  brilliantly.  But  with  .Mexico 
his  policy  of  "  watchful  waiting,  "  "corresponding  to  the 
linglish  "  wait  and  see,"  only  piled  Pclion  of  hopes 
deferred  on  Ossa  of  failure.  His  liandling  of  the  sub- 
marine contro\esy  with  Germany  was  foredoomed  to 
partial  if  not  complete  failure  from"  the  moment  he  began 
to  steer  by  the  variable  planet  of  pojjular  opinion  instead 
of  the  fixed  star  of  his  country's  and  of  his  own  higher 
ideals.  He  tried  to  follow  (where  he  might  far  better 
have  led),  and  the  flickering  of  his  guiding  lights  has 
lured  him  into  endless  pitfalls. 


The  President's  lack  of  firmness  in  dealing  with  Mexico 
and  (iermany  has  undoubtedly  seriously  undermined  his 
jiower  to  lead.  Once,  and  only  once  (just  after  the  sinking 
of  the  Lusitania),  he  could  have  taken  the  country  with 
him  in  anything  he  might  have  decided  to  do.  Indeed, 
such  was  the  state  of  popular  feeling  in  May  of  a  year  ago, 
that  Bryan  with  his  peace  dove,  or  a  shepherd  with  his 
crook,  could  have  led  the  country  into  battle.  Since 
then  the  position  of  the  President  in  this  connection;  is 
probably  about  as  I  heard  a  New  York  policeman^ 
epitomise  it  a  few  weeks  ago. 

"If  Wilson  takes  the  country  into  the  war  now,"  he 
said,  "  he  will  have  to  drag  it  by  the  scruff  of  the  neck 
where  old  '  Teddy  R.'  could  lead  it  a  prancing.  And  let 
m:-  tell  you  one  thing  more,"  he  added.  "  If  the  country 
didn't  prance  along  after  Teddy,  he'd  swing  it  around  in  a 
couple  of  circles  iDy  the  tail  and  chuck  it  into  the  war. 
And  then  it  would  pick  itself  up,  thank  him  for  it,  and 
begin  to  fight." 

No  people  in  the  world  more  dearly  love  a  leader  than 
does  the  American,  and  it  is  probably  true,  as  a  trenchant 
French  traveller  once  observed,  that  they  would  rather 
take  the  chance  of  being  misled  than  not  led  at  all. 
President  Wilson,  in  spite  of  his  technical  diplomatic 
victories,  has  steadily  lost  prestige  with  the  very  people 
wliose  wishes  he  has  so  scnipulcnisly  endeavoured  to  follow 
by  his  failure  to  take  advantage  of  this  fact. 

Colonel  Roosevelt 

It  is  impossible  to  overlook  Colonel  Roosevelt  in  any 
survey  of  the  American  situation,  for  "  What  would 
'  Teddy  '  have  done  if  he  had  been  in  Wilson's  place  ?" 
is  a  theme  of  never-ending  interest  froni  Maine  to  Cali- 
fornia. This  is  really  not  a  hard  question  to  answer 
with  a  considerable  degree  of  certainty,  for  we  have  both 
the  spoken  word  and  the  past  record  of  the  unflinchingly 
courageous  ex-President  to  go  by.  He  would  have  pro- 
tested strongly  against  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  but 
would  hardly  have  ventured  to  go  further  if  Ger- 
many— as  would  doubtless  have  been  the  case — 
disregarded  that  protest.  On  the  initiation  of  Germany's 
submarine  war  in  February  of  1915,  there  would  have 
been  another  protest  from  Washington,  this  one  short, 
sharp,  to  the  point,  and  that  controversy  would  have  been 
threshed  out  to  a  finish — a  diplomatic  finish,  I  mean — in 
fewer  days  than  it  was  destined  to  drag  months.  Either 
(iermany  would  have  been  forced  to  a  complete  and  un- 
equivocal surrender,  and  there  would  have  been  no  sink- 
ing of  the  Lusitania,  Arabic,  Ancona  and  the  rest,  or 
Roosevelt  would  have  led  America  "  in."  Vigorously 
led,  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  it  would  not  have 
gone  in  "  a-prancing "  without  forcing  the  doughty 
Colonel  to  resort  to  the  ignominious  alternative  suggested 
by  my  policeman  friend. 

Just  previous  to  my  departure  from  New  York  a 
popular  musical  hall  comedian  was  raising  nightly  laughs 
with  a  joke  which  ran  something  like  this  :  "  If  Roosevelt 
had  been  President  the  war  would  have  been  over  by  this 
time — over  here." 

"  More  truth  than  poetry  in  that,"  I  heard  a  man  next 
me  observe,  and  most  of  the  audience  seemed  to  agree 
with  him.  Personally,  I  feel  certain  that  a  "  Roose- 
veltian  "  handling  of  the  trouble  at  the  outset— a  firm 
grasping  of  the  German  nettle— would  have  at  no  time 
brought  the  United  States  so  near  to  a  break  with  Ger- 
many as  they  are  to-day.  But  if  that  break  had  come, 
a  far  more  united  America  would  have  bfen  thrown 
into  the  struggle  than  President  Wilson — in  spite  of  the 
imi>eccability  of  his  intentions,  and  no  matter  how  much 
he  may  "  stiffen  "  at  the  end — can  possibly  have  with 
him  wlien  or  if  his  earnest  efforts  to  avoid  a  rupture  come 
to  nought. 

This  should  not,  however,  be  taken  to  mean  that. 
With  the  country  once  in  the  war  America  would  not 
"  orientate  "  very  quickly.  Thanks  to  the  work  already 
done  by  such  leaders  as  the  one  whose  words  I  have 
quoted,  public  opinion,  in  spite  of  its  diverse  elements 
and  the  fluid  state  in  which  it  is  at  present,  would  harden 
very  rai)idly.  The  (German-American,  in  spite  of  his 
numbers,  would  be  troublesome  rather  than  dangerous. 
His  bread  is  buttered  on  the  American,  not  the  (ierman 
side,  and  the  very  large  majority  of  him  is  too  canny  to  do 
anythme  to  cause  it  to  fall  with  the  fatty  side  downwards. 


May  18,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


17 


The   So-Called    "Air    Muddle" 


And    Some    of 
By  F.  W. 

IN  the  preceding  article  an  account  was  given  of  the 
history  of  the  ill-fated  French  Air  Ministry,  and 
the  causes  which  led  to  its  creation  and  to  its  down- 
fall were  discussed. 
It  was  pointed  out  that  both  events  followed  as  the 
outcome  of  a  press  and  political  agitation  in  which  the 
dissatisfaction  of  the  "  trade  "  played  a  conspicuous  part, 
and  in  which  the  Zeppelin  menace  was  freely  exploited. 
Beyond  this  the  system  of  control  by  a  civilian  Minister 
was  a  generally  admitted  failure.  I  now  propose  to  show 
tiiat  the  same  influences  have  been  and  are  at  work 
in  this  country,  and  the  same  general  plan  of  campaign 
is  being  followed  in  the  conduct  of  the  onslaught  against 
the  administration  of  both  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  and 
of  the  Naval  Air  Service,  as  in  the  agitation  which  proved 
so  detrimental  to  French  military  aeronautics. 

There  is  every  probability  that  a  case  will  be  made 
out  for  reform  in  the  administration  of  our  Air  t)cpart- 
ments,  but  the  present  agitation,  with  its  picturesque 
title  "  The  Air  Muddle  "  is  not  based  on  solid  grounds, 
or  on  facts  of  which  proper  evidence  can  be  adduced, 
in  brief  it  is  not  founded  on  honest  criticism.  The  actual 
attack,  however,  is  the  matter  of  present  discussion ; 
at  the  outset  it  will  be  demonstrated  that  this  attack — 
launched  by  certain  sections  of  the  press  in  an  indis- 
criminate manner — is  part  of  a  campaign  of  deliberate 
and  cold-blooded  misrepresentation. 

I  will  proceed  at  once  to  give  a  few  instances  and 
evidences  of  the  above  statement  of  the  position."  Firstly, 
as  to  the  trade  origin  of  the  attack.  There  appeared  re- 
cently in  a  trade  organ  published  weekly  an  article 
entitled  :  "The  Dope  Question."  It  may  be  explained 
that  "  dope  "  is  the  under-varnish  applied  to  the  wings  of 
an  aeroplane. 

Here  is  the  accusation  : 

"  Manufacturers  who  are  in  doubt  whether  to  refuse  to 
use  dope  made  by  the  Royal  Aircraft  l-'actory  and  perhaps 
endanger  their  Government  contracts  by  their  refusal, 
are  strongly  advised  to  consider  their  employees'  health 
and  their  own  reputations  first. 

"If  there  is  any  argument  on  the  question,  manufacturers 
need  only  go  direct  to  headquarters  at  the  War  Office  and 
Admiralty  and  state  plainly  that  they  prefer  to  use  dopes 
which  tliey  know  and  in  which  they  have  confidence. 
The  Aeronautical  Inspection  Department  is  entirely 
without  prejudice  in  this  matter  ;  in  fact,  previous  ex- 
jierience  of  tlie  K..^.!-".  does  not  probably  prejudice  the 
A.I.U.  in  favour  of  Raftite  and  other  R.A.F.  chemical 
products. 

"  So  far  as  the  Admiralty  is  concerned,  manufacturers 
will  be  well  advised  to  go  right  over  the  heads  of  minor 
officiousness  to  someone  of  post-captain's  rank  or  higher, 
and  state  plainly  why  they  object  to  being  dictated  to.in 
the  matter  of  material  by  young  men  lacking  in  workshop 
experience." 

Hece  is  the  truth: 

"  Raftite,"  the  name  given  to  the  Royal  Aircraft 
Factory  "  dope,"  is  non-poisonous.  The  formula  of 
raftite  is  due  to  the  Laboratory  of  the  Royal  Aircraft 
I'actory,  where  the  poisonous  character  of  tetrach- 
forethane  vapour  (then  used  in  ordinary  dopes) 
had  been  experienced  at  a  date  when  -not  p\iblicly  or 
generally  known.  Raftite  contains  no  tctrachlorethane. 

Apart  from  the  inaccuracy  as  to  fad,  a  more  un- 
worthy accusation  has  probably  never  been  penned. 
Unfortunately  the  above  scarcely  differs,  either  in  its 
untruth,  or  as  to  its  libellous  character,  from  a  multitude 
of  other  statements  which  have  appeared  over  the  same 
initials  in  the  same  journal.  In  the  current  issue  of 
'Ihc  Observer  over  the  initials  C.W.  there  is  a  new  edition 
of  this  dope  accusation.  It  would  now  appear  that  the 
grievance  against  the  Royal  Aircraft  Factory  is  that  they 
are  alleged  to  have  cornered  the  supplies  of  a  necessary 
ingredient  !  Equally  false.  The  text  of  tlie  paragraph 
IS  as  follows  :  "  Better  dopes  r,-ere  submitted,  but  thev 
had  not  a  chance.     It  was  even  discovered  that  the  R.A.F. 


Its    Exponents 
Lanchester 

had  established  a  corner  in  certain  raw  material,  so  that 
private  dope  makers  were  to  be  squeezed  out  completely." 
Ingenious  but  entirely  without  foundation. 

On  calling  attention  to  this  I  have  been  asked  by 
serious  people  why,  if  the  facts  are  as  stated,  the  (Govern- 
ment have  not'  taken  action — any  private  firm  would 
have  done  so.  I  am  not  speaking  to  defend  the  Govern- 
ment. /  also  ask  ivhy  the  Government  has  taken  no  atdon  ? 
I  now  publicly  ask  the  Government  why  no  action  has 
been  taken.  If  such  unfounded  accusations  had  been 
made  against  a  private  individual  or  firm  prompt  action 
at  law  would  have  resulted  ;  is  it  then  so  m'jan  and 
dastard  a  thing  to  serve  His  Majesty  the  King  that  loss  of 
reputation  and  public  opprobrium  are  to  be  borne  without 
hope  of  prompt  or  effective  redress  ?  Possibly  charges 
of  this  character  may  be  dealt  with  by  the  Committee  of 
Investigation  now  sitting. 

Here  is  another  journahstic  outburst  from  a  London 
daily  in  which  the  source  of  inspiration  is  evident.  In 
this  case  I  give  in  a  footnote  (for  comparison)  the  transla- 
tion of  a  letter  from  the  pen  of  M.  L.  Bleriot*,  showing 
the  identity  that  motive  already  commented  upon  • 

"  Mr.  Tennant  referred  with  great  satisfaction  the  other 
day  to  the  existence  of  a  British  Advisory  Committee 
on  aeronautics.  None  of  the  men  on  that  Committee 
has  ever  been  practically  identified  with  aviation>, 
although  the  Committee  has  weight  in  the  '  theory  ' 
of  flight,  but  the  theory  of  flight  was  pretty  well  under- 
stood eighty  years  ago.  It  took  a  couple  of  brave  prac- 
tical men  like  the  WTight  Brothers,  willing'  to  risk  tlieir 
necks  above  the  hard  earth,  rather  than  conclusions  and 
figures  on  sheets  of  '  theory  '  to  make  a  machine  that  , 
actually  flew.  Why  does  not  the  Government  supersede 
its  Committee  of  Theorists,  and  appoint  instead  a  Com- 
mittee of  experts  from,  the  following  firms  : — Sopwith, 
Martinsyde,  Roe,  Bristol,  and  Vickers." 

In  this  paragraph  we  have  evidently  the  work  of 
an  ignoramus  to  whom  the  word  Iheory  is  so  obnoxious 
that  it  has  to  be  held  up  to  ridicule  in  inverted  commas  ! 
He  little  seems  aware  of  the  fact  that  every  one  of  the 
constructors  he  mentions  depends  largely  up9n  theory 
for  his  product  ;  also  the  Brothers  Wright  have  always 
acknowledged  their  indebtedness  to  the  Smithsonian 
Institution  and  the  work  of  Langley.  Such  articles 
do  not  represent  any  opinion  but  that  of  their  writer, 
but  they  all  serve  as  means  of  publicly  imputing  discredit 
to  the  powers  that  be.  Any  brick  is  good  enough  to  throw. 
On  the  other  hand.  Lord  Montagu,  who  is  now  taking  an 
active  hand  in  advocating  reform  in  service  aeronautics, 
is  fully  alive  to  the  importance  of  scientific  investigation, 
but  he  is — or  was — ^certainly  not  too  well  informed  as  to 
his  facts.  Thus  in  his  speech  on  March  qth  in  the  House 
of  Lords  he  deplores  that  we  are  behindhand  owing 
to  the  fact  that  "  we  had  neglected  science."  It  is 
a  definite  fact  that  so  far  as  the  scientific  side  of  aero- 
nautics is  concerned.  Great  Britain  leads  the  world.  J 

Elsewhere  Lord  Montagu  complains  of  overlapping 
between  the  Services — so  far  as  scientific  research  is 
concerned  there  is  no  "  overlapping."     The  existence  of 

*  "  I  have  felt  in  a  manner  particularly  acute,  the  affront  of'which 
Paris  has  been  the  victim.  It  is  the  main  motive  of  this  letter.  French 
aviation,  which  up  to  the  opening  of  hostilities  was  the  first  in  the 
world,  has  experienced  if  not  a  crisis  at  least  a  retardation  in  its  pro- 
gress. The  reason  is  quite  simple.  They  have  eliminated  from  the 
technical  Committees  of  the  Department  concerned  with  the  study  of 
the  programme  the  men  who  had  created  this  science.  H  they  will 
restore  to  the.se  men,  who  are  at  once  aviators,  engineers  and  con- 
structors, the  real  technical  control  in  collaboration  with  two  or  three 
selected  pilots,  in  four  months  the  time  lost  will  be  nearly  regained. 

"  It  is  already  time.  The  men  to  be  included  are  Voisin,  Caudron, 
Breguet,  Saulnicr,  Bechereau,  Delage  (Nieuport),  Farman.  From 
these  should  be  formed  a  Superior  Committee  for  Aerial  Defence  for 
France.     Their  past  guarantees  the  future. — L.  Bleriot." 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  at  the  time  the  letter  was  penned  by  M.  Bleriot, 
there  was  already  an  Advisory  Committee  acting  in  co-operation  with 
M.  Besnard  (the  .Air  Minister),  including  the  names  of  many  well 
known  pioneer  constructors— MM.  Esnault,  Pelterie,  Clement  Bayard, 
and  Renault,  and  others.  Clearly  M.  Bleriot's  complaint  is  the  time- 
honoured  lamentation  of  the  "  outs  "  who  want  to  be  "  in." 

t  This  is  definitely  untrue. 

t  Compare  I'roc.  Inst.  O.K.,  1914,  cxcviii,  pp.  250  et  seq. 


i8 


L  A  iN  U       &      VV  A  T  E  R 


May  iS,  1916 


the  Advisory  Committee  for  Aeronautics  on  which  both 
Services  are  represented  is  in  itself  a  guarantee  tliat  tiierc 
is  no  unnecessary  duplication  or  "  overlappiuf,'  "  ;  the 
work  is  carried  on  as  decided  by  the  Committee  at  the 
National  Physical  Laboratory  or  elsewhere ,  and  whenever 
the  requirements  of  the  ijcr\'iccs  permit  they  arc  co- 
ordinated. 

Trade  Jealousies 

But  it  is  not  only  the  press,  as  voicing  views  which  may, 
or  may  not  be  inspired  by  members  of  the  trade,  we  have 
more  direct  examples  of  the  pernicious  influence  and 
working  of  trade  rivalries  and  jealousies.  It  is  only  a 
couple  of  days  since  the  Chairman  of  one  of  the  leading 
manufacturing  concerns  in  the  country  was  amazed  to 
find  that  a  well-known  politician  (supposed  to  be  some 
authority  on  the  subject)  had  actually  been  crammed 
"  to  the  muzzle  "  with  the  cock-and-bull  stories  of  a  dis- 
contented aeroplane  motor  designer,  and  had  believed 
every  word  !  When  such  credulity  is  rampant  it  must 
not  be  considered  surprising  that  so  many  of  our  daily 
papers  which  have,  at  least  so  far  as  one  can  tell,  no  axe 
to  grind  at  all,  should  be  printing  and  reprinting  stories 
and  articles  of  a  detrimental  character  which  have  no 
foundation  in  fact  whatever.  That  it  should  be  possible 
for  such  articles  to  be  pubhshed  in  good  faith  I  am 
reluctantly  willing  to  admit. 

When  in  some  instances  I  have  criticised  adversely  the 
part  played  by  the  trade  in  the  i>resent  agitation  it  miist  be 
understood  that  I  am  not  attacking  every  member  of  the 
trade  or  even  a  majority  of  those  in  this  "country  engaged 
in  aeronautical  construction  ;  I  am  attacking  a  certain 
clique,  or  certain  members  of  the  trade,  who  have  made 
themselves  unduly  conspicuous  both  directly  and  in- 
directly in  connection  with  slanders  of  individuals  and 
bodies  connected  with  our  aeronautical  administration 
which  stand  in  the  way  of  their  indi\idual  and  personal 
ambitions.  Admittedly  this  is  a  small  minority,  but  it 
is  a  noisy  minority,  and  as  unscrupulous  as  it  is  noisy. 

The  greater  number  of  our  aircraft  constructors  are 
fully  occupied  in  carrying  out  the  work  which  has  been 
assigned  to  them  by  the  Director  of  Military  Aeronautics 
and  by  the  Naval  Contracts  Department,  and  have  the 
good  sense  not  to  mix  themselves  up  in  politics.  They 
would  be  the  first  to  discountenance  the  unpatriotic 
.  behaviour  of  their  less  enlightened  brethren,  but  they 
may  be'pardoned  for  declining  to  mix  themselves  up  in  a 
controversy  when  their  duties  clearly  lie  in  the  direction 
of  attention  to  business  and  the  efficient  execution  of 
the  work  which  has  been  entrusted  to  their  care.  We 
may  hopie,  now  that  an  association  has  been  formed  of 
aeronautical  constructors,  something  will  be  done  to 
prevent  a  mischief-making  minority  from  behaving  in  a 
manner  which  is  inimical  to  the  national  interest,  and 
liable  to  bring  discredit  on  the  trade  as  a  whole. 

So  far  as  the  attack  centres  on  the  Royal  Aircraft 
Factory  it  is  quite  certain  that  nothing  can  appease  these 
self-appointed  critics.  It  is  not  really  a  question -of 
Mhether  or  no  the  Royal  Aircraft  Factory  manufactures 
a  quantity  of  machines  which  form  an  appreciable 
proportion  of  the  total  output  of  the  country.  It  is  not 
a  question  of  whether  the  Royal  Aircraft  Factory  is 
managed  well  or  badly.  To  these  people  the  existence 
of  the  factory  is  the  offence.  If  they  can  say  that  it  is  badly 
managed  it  is  a  good  enough  basis  for  "attack,  but  it  is 
quite  certain  that  the  better  and  the  more  efficient  the 
management  and  the  bigger  the  output  of  machines,  etc., 
the  more  violent  will  the  opposition  become  ;  for  it  is  not 
the  inefficiency  that  is  really  the  complaint,  it  is  the  very 
efficiency  of  the  factory  which  is  unwelcome.  If  we  go 
deeper  in  search  of  the  fundamental  objection,  it  is  not 
only  that  the  factory  manufactures  aeroplanes,  it  is  that 
it  supplies  the  wherewithal  to  firms  who  have  never 
previously  built  an  aeroplane  to  enter  at  once  into  com- 
petition with  the  old-estabhshed  makers  of  proprietary 
machines.  Again  the  complaint  is  that  this  work  is  not 
done  efficiently,  and  that  the  designs  in  process  of  manu- 
facture are  subjected  to  numerous  and  unnecessary 
alterations  (House  of  Commons  May  nth,  ic)i6). 
The  facts  would  be  no  more  welcome  if  this  ground  of 
complaint  were  removed.  That  which  matters  to  the 
firm  having  a  proprietary  machine  to  push,  and  an 
imaginary  goodwill  to  sustain,  is  that  the  construction  of 


aircraft  has  been  reduced  to  a  matter  of  science  and 
engineering,  instead  of  remaining  in  the  realm  of  priest- 
craft. 

It  is  a  favourite  device  of  those  wishing  to  show  how 
obtuse  the  authorities  are,  to  quote  the  performance  of 
their  latest  (say)  aero  engine,  and  point  out  how  superior 
it  is  to  the  R.A.F.  engine  which  has  been  manufactured 
in  (juantity  for  the  last  eighteen  months.  They  omit 
to  mention  how  long  it  will  be  before  their  own  engine 
can  be  produced  in  quantity  at  all ;  they  omit  the  fact 
that  the  engine  which  they  are  putting  up  for  comparison 
has  all  the  advantage  of  two  years  development,  and  that 
if  it  were  not  better  than  the  R.A.F.  engine  it  would  be  a 
conculsive  proof  of  its  designer's  incompetence  !  Yet 
statements  of  this  character  arc  commonly  swallowed 
by  the  press  and  public  as  if  they  were  proof  of  the  in- 
capacity of  the  men  who  designed  the  R.A.F.  engine 
(with  such  defects  as  it  may  possess)  some  two  years  ago. 

The  Advisory  Committee 

The  plea  that  the  Advisory  Committee  should  include 
a  certain  contingent  of  trade  members  sounds  plausible 
enough.  It  is  to  be  remembered,  however,  that  the 
scientific  work  done  by  the  Advisory  Committee  includes 
many  matters  besides  that  relating  to  aeroplane  or  airship 
construction.  The  Advisory  Committee  is  not  an  engi- 
neering committee,  it  is  a  scientific  committee ;  the 
questions  which  come  before  the  Committee  are  at  times 
closely  concerned  with  engineering  problems,  but  it  is 
almost  invariably  the  scientific  aspect  of  those  pro- 
blems which  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Advisory  Committee  to 
investigate  or  to  report  upon.  But  these  scientific 
questions  concern  many  matters  besides  aeroplane  con- 
struction. They  include  amongst  a  multitude  of  other 
matters  such  questions  as  navigation  of  aircraft,  compass 
deviation  from  various  causes,  bomb  sighting,  meteoro- 
logical questions,  etc.  A  full  realisation  of  the  breadth 
of  the  ground  covered  can  only  be  obtained  from  a  perusal 
of  the  Committee's  published  reports. 

The  Committee  have  the  power,  if  occasion  arises,  of 
taking  the  evidence  of  aeroplane  builders  or  others,  and 
when  it  has  been  thought  desirable  this  power  has  been 
exercised.  There  is  no  more  reason  or  useful  purpose  to 
be  served  by  any  one  trade  being  represented  on  the  com- 
mittee than  by  any  other  of  the  many  trades  affected. 
To  have  members  of  the  aeronautical  industry  perma- 
nently sitting  on  the  Committee  would  result  not  only 
in  a  waste  of  time  for  the  Committee,  but  of  a  great  waste 
of  time  on  the  part  of  aeronautical  constructors  whose  own 
work  would  be  proportionally  neglected.  The  suggestion 
that  the  Advisory  Committee  should  be  largely  recruited 
from  amongst  aeroplane  constructors  arises  from  a  total 
misconception  of  its  functions.  Even  were  members  of 
the  trade  added  to  the  Committee,  the  difficulty  and 
criticism  would  be  in  no  wise  overcome.  The  offence 
against  those  who  were  not  invited  to  sit  on  the  Com- 
mittee would  be  increased  a  hundredfold,  and  we  should 
have  repeated  the  very  difficulty  which  arose  in  con- 
nection with  the  French  Advisory  or  Consulting  Com- 
mittee—namely, that  as  soon  as  certain  members  of  the 
trade  were  appointed,  the  members  who  were  not  ap- 
pointed became  the  most  violent  critics  of  the  French 
Air  Ministry. 


The  Wittenburg  Heroes 

To  the  Editor  of  I-and  &  \V.\ter. 

vSir, — Many  of  us  must  feel  deeply  that  some  mejnorial 
should  be  put  to  tlie  nieniory  of  the  tliree  brave  doctors  who 
died  of  typhus  at  Wittenburg  Camp  while  doing  tiieir  utmost 
to  alleviate  the  terrible  sufferings  and  misery  of  which  we 
have  all  read  with  a  thrill  of  honor  from  the  reports  of  Major 
Priestly  and  Captains  Vidal  and  Lauder. 

The  King  has  voiced  all  our  wishes  by  the  honours  he  has 
graciously  bestowed  on  these  gallant  men  who  mercifully 
survived,  and  we  now  feel  that  the  names  of  those  who  died — 
Major  W.  B.  Fry  and  Captains  A.  A.  SutcHffe  and  S.  Field.— 
should  be  remembered  in  the  years  to  come.  All  will  agree 
that  the  memorial  should  take  the  form  of  helping  to  alleviate 
suffering  and  do  some  permanent  goocf,  but  that  must  neces- 
sarily depend  on  the  amount  received.  I  will  gladly  receive 
and  acknowledge  small  sums  as  well  as  large. 

CoNST.wcE  Parker  of  Waddington, 

Aldworth,  Haslemere,  Surreyr 


I 


May  i8,  1916 


LAND&      WATER 

CHAT  A 

<v/  "T^mance  of  the  South  Seas 

"By  H.  T>E  FERE  STAC  POOLE 


19 


CHAPTER    XXIX. 

The  Treasure. 

WHEN  Hull  and  his  companions  reached  the 
landing  stage  and  found  the  boat — as  they  ex- 
pected— gone,  they  struck  at  once  down  stream 
taking  the  exact  path  taken  by  Saji. 

You  will  observe  that  mechanism  wliich  Fate  often  displays 
in  the  fact  that  Macquart,  in  stealing  the  boat  and  so  making 
liis  own  position  seemingly  more  secure,  had,  in  reality, 
provided  a  release  for  the  death  that  was  pursuing  him  in  the 
form  of  Saji  and  which  was  trapped  and  held  up  in  the  pit. 

The  part\-,  passing  along  the  river  bank  and  hearing  the 
call  for  help,  stopped,  made  a  search,  discovered  the  trap 
mouth  and  soon  had  the  prisoner  out. 

"  Why,  it's  one  of  those  blessed  Dyaks,"  said  Hull,  "  caught 
huntin'  in  his  own  trap." 

Houghton  said  nothing.  He  was  looking  at  Chaya  who 
had  gone  up  to  Saji.  Saji  was  standing  feeling  his  joints 
and  taking  deep  breaths  of  air  and  Chaya  was  talking  to  him. 

"  He  wishes  for  food,"  said  she  to  the  others,  "  and  to 
go  with  us  ;  his  canoe  has  been  taken  from  him.  He  would 
get  it  back." 

Hull  had  some  biscuits  in  his  pocket,  which  he  produced, 
and  Saji,  after  a  rush  to  the  river  bank  for  a  drink,  joined 
in  with  the  others.  His  strength  and  life  had  completely 
returned  to  him,  and  at  the  suggestion  of  Chaya  he  took  the 
lead,  being  a  better  woodsman  than  any  of  the  rest  with  the 
exception,  perhaps,  of  herself.  He  had  saved  his  spear. 
Even  in  the  excitement  of  release  he  had  not  forgotten  that, 
and  he  marched  now  ahead  of  them  with  the  spear  across  his 
shoulder,  leading  the  way,  and  piloting  them  much  more 
quickly  than  if  they  had  gone  without  hirs.  Chaya  and 
Houghton  came  last. 

"  He  is  full  of  danger  and  he  must  not  see  us  together," 
murmured  Chaya,  whose  hand  Houghton  was  holding  for  a 
moment.  "  If  he  were  to  hear  that,  he  would  try  to  kill 
you."  V 

"  Let  him,"  said  Houghton  laughing,  but  she  released  her 
liand.  She  seemed  full  of  fear  of  Saji,  not  for  herself  but  for 
Houghton.  Saji,  however,  had  no  eyes  for  anything  but  the 
road  before  him.  Almost  quicker  than  they  could  follow  him 
he  went  ahead  so  that  dawn  had  little  more  than  touched  the 
skies  above  the  tree-tops  when  they  reached  the  lagoon 
bank. 

Th(  first  thing  they  saw  was  the  Barracuda  moored  to  the 
opposite  bank  with  the  whole  width  of  the  lagoon  between 
themselves  and  it.  The  Barracuda's  boat  was  tied  up  beside 
the  yawl.  Not  a  sign  was  to  be  seen  of  Macquart  or  his 
companions. 

"  \\ill  you  look  at  what  the  swabs  have  done  r  "  cried  Hull. 
"  How  in  the  nation  are  we  to  get  across  ?  " 

"  Thank  God,  tlie  yawl's  not  gone."  said  Houghton. 
•  '  That's  the  main  point.  We'll  get  across  somehow.  Let's 
think." 

Even  as  he  spoke,  in  the  vague  light  that  was  now  filling 
the  world,  they  saw  a  figure  emerging  from  the  trees  on  the 
opposite  bank.  It  was  Macquart.  He  was  carrying  some- 
thing in  his  hand.     They  saw  him  board  the  yawl. 

"  He's  carrying  a  basket,"  said  Tillman.  "  Look  at  him  ! 
He's  emptying  it  down  the  fo'cs'le  hatch.  By  God,  he's 
found  the  cache  and  that's  the  stui^  he's  emptying  into  the 
Barracuda." 

"  Looks  like  it,"  said  HuU,  who  was  standing  now  on  one 
loot  and  now  on  the  other.  "  Oh,  the  swab  !  To  see  him 
and  not  be  able  to  get  me  fingers  in  his  hair.  Come  boys,  it's 
round  the  lagoon  or  nothing.  There  ain't  no  use  in  trying  to 
swim  for  the  place  is  sure  full  of  sharks.  It's  a  fifteen  mile 
tramp  but  we'll  do  it." 

But  Saji,  who  had  been  talking  to  Chaya,  solved  the  diffi- 
culty in  a  quicker  way.  Plunging  into  the  water  and  still 
carrying  liis  spear,  he  struck  out  for  the  opposite  bank.  There 
were  sharks  here  surely,  but  Saji  had  no  fear  of  sharks.  ■  He 
liad  often  swum  amongst  them. 

They  saw  Macquart  make  off  again  among  the  trees  with 
his  basket  ;  he  evidently  had  not  seen  them,  and  then  they 
saw  Saji  unmoor  the  boat.  He  brought  it  back,  sculling  it 
from  the  stern,  and  they  crowded  into  her  and  in  less  than 


five  minutes  they  were  on  the  deck  of  the  yawl.  Hull  made 
a  dart  for  the  fo'cs'le  hatch  and  tumbled  down  it  ;  then  thcv 
heard  him  striking  a  match  and  then  came  his  voice. 

"  Lord  bless  my  soul !  "  The  blighter's  been  fillin'  her  wath 
clay  "  Then  a  wild  yell.  "  Suverins — suverins."  Silence 
and  another  match  being  struck.  "  There's  suverins  all 
scattered  on  the  clay."  He  came  tumbling  up,  his  face 
blazing  in  the  now  strong  dayl'ght,  and  in  one  broad  hand 
which  he  opened  wide  two  sovereigns  and  some  earth. 

"  Did  you  ever  see  the  like  of  that  !  "  he  cried.  "  Haff  a 
ton  of  clay  the  swab  has  shovelled  aboard  her  with  suverins 
all  scattered  on  it.  Where's  the  sense  in  that  ?  What's  he 
been  doin'  ?  Has  he  struck  the  cache  or  has  he  hasn't  ?  Look 
out,  here  he  comes  !  "  | 

Macquart  broke  co\-er  from  the  trees  as  he  spoke,  basket 
in  hand  and  half  running.  He  saw  the  men  on  the  deck  of 
the  yawl  but  did  not  notice  them  in  the  least.  On  board  he 
came,  brushed  them  aside,  rushed  to  the  fo'cs'le  hatch  and 
emptied  his  basket. 

They  stood  horrified.  Macquart  was  no  longer  a  man, 
though  retaining  a  man's  image.  He  seemed  Hke  a  beast  in 
the  last  stages  of  pursuit.  The  saliva  ran  from  the  corners 
of  his  mouth,  his  breath  came  in  sobs  and  sighs,  his  face  was 
grey-brown  as  the  earth  he  was  carrying,  and  it  was  evident, 
now,  that,  although  he  did  not  recognise  them  in  the  least,  he 
saw  them  as  figures,  for  he  avoided  them  as,  i  mpty  basket  in 
hand  he  made  again  for  the  shore. 

Just  as  his  foot  touched  the  bank,  Saji,  who  had  landed, 
seized  him  by  the  arm.  The  effect  was  instantaneous  and 
extraordinary.  Macquart'-  mind,  or  what  was  left  of  it, 
dropped  the  idea  that  was  fixed  in  it  and  seized  upon  the  idea 
that  he  was  being  pursued  and  seized.  With  a  movement 
swift  as  light  he  freed  himself  and  dashed  off  among  the 
trees  with  the  Dyak  in  pursuit. 

"  Now  we're  done  proper !  "  cried  Hull.  "  Cuss  that 
nigger  !  If  he'd  left  that  chap  alone  he  could  have  followed 
him  to  the  cache." 

"  We'll  find  it  without  him,"  said  Tillman.  "  It  can't  be 
far.  Follow  me,  you  chaps.  See,  there's  his  marks.  Why, 
dash  it,  he's  made  a  regular  road." 

They  had  landed,  and  following  Tillman,  they  made  along 
Macquart's  tracks.  Tillman  was  right.  Macquart,  in  those 
endless  journeys  to  and  fro  had  left  a  road.  Trodden  down 
leaves  and  plants;  broken  lianas,  spilt  earth,  gave  indications 
that  required  no  skill  in  tracking  to  follow,  and  when  they 
reached  the  cache  everything  was  plain. 

A  burst  gold-box  lay  exposing  its  contents  to  the  now 
risen  sun.  Macquart  had  not  touched  it.  Earth  and  gold 
were  all  the  same  to  him.  He,  who  had  to  empty  the  world 
into  the  fo'cs'le  of  the  yawl  against  time  had  no  time  to  bother 
with  trifles,  just  as  the  treasure-seekers  now  had  no  time  to 
bother  about  him. 

Hull,  after  the  first  shout  of  discovery,  had  cast  himself 
down  on  his  stomach  and,  now,  laughing  like  a  madman,  was 
playing  with  the  contents  of  the  box,  laying  those  tattooed 
hands  of  his  in  money.  Tillman  absolutely  crazed,  was  danc- 
ing like  a  monkey  in  the  sunlight  before  Hull.  Houghton 
alone  held  himself  together.  Chaya  was  there.  As  full  of 
mad  excitement  and  joy  as  his  companions,  the  check  of  the 
woman,  who  was  looking  wonderingly  on  at  the  antics  of  the 
,  others,  held  him  from  any  demonstration.  He  only  laughed  ; 
then,  turning  to  Chaya,  who  was  laughing  also,  he  seized  her 
to  him.  She  did  not  resist.  They  were  as  much  alone  as 
though  the  frantic  Hull  and  Tillman  were  miles  away.  They 
were  screened  by  the  gold. 

Then  Hull  came  to  his  senses  and  began  to  talk  almost 
rationally,  sitting  up  and  punctuating  his  remarks  with  blows 
of  his  fist  on  the  ground. 

"  Oh  Lord,  Oh  Lord  !  "  cried  Hull.  "  To  think  of  poor  old 
Mac  gone  cracked  and  shovellin'  dirt  and  leavin'  the  yellow 
boys !  " 

It  was  indicative  of  the  Captain's  mentnlity  that  all  anger 
against  Macquart  had  vanished  to  be  replaced  by  furious  mirth 
at  the  tragedy  that  Fate  had  shown  to  them. 

"  Man  and  boy  I've  worked  all  me  life  for  tuppence,  and 
look  at  this.  Look  at  me  now,  and  Mac  tried  to  fitcher  me 
over  the  business,  and  look  at  Mac  !  I  tell  you,  it  had  to  come. 
I  felt  them  «uverins  drawing  me  all  me  life,  and  there  they 


20 


LAND      &      WATER 


May  i8,   1916 


are.  I  wasn't  bom  to  die  pore.  I  was  not.  And  now  I'll 
sit  in  me  kerridge  and  live  as  I  ought.  That's  me.  Me 
sittin'  on  the  top  of  the  keg  and  smokin'  my  pipe  and  Mac 
runnin'  mad  in  the  woods  chased  by  niggers." 
Tillman,  recovering,  was  also  in  a  talkative  mood. 
"  We've  struck  it  in  the  middle  of  the  bull's  eye,"  said  he, 
"  and  no  mistake.  That's  what  pleases  me.  We  aimed  for 
it  and  hit  it.  If  we'd  tumbled  on  this  thing  by  chaiice  there 
wouldn't  have  been  anything  tn  it,  but  we've  got  it  by  going 
for  it.  Well,  it's  champagne  for  all  of  us  for  evermore, 
Amen." 

"  It's  big  luck,"  said  Houghton,  who  was  standing  by 
Chaya.  "  But  there's  one  thing  tliat  bothers  me.  Where  are 
Wiart  and  Jacky  ?  " 

"  That  needn't  worry  you,"  grunted  Hull,  who  was  tossing 
coins  on  his  thumb.  "  Mac's  done  'em  in  as  sure  as  I  haven't. 
Went  mad  and  done  'em  in.  Here  we  come  and  find  him 
mad  and  them  gone — done  'em  in — that's  what  he's  done. 
He'd  a'  spifflicated  his  own  grandmother  for  haff  a  hapeny, 
would  Mac,  and  here  he  was,  alone  with  the  nigger  and  old 
whiskers  and  half  a  million  pounds." 

■  It  looks  like  it,"  said  Tillman.  "  Well,  there's  no  use 
in  talking  about  it.  I'm  longing  to  get  this  stuff  under  cover." 
Tillman  had  picked  up  the  basket  that  Macquart  dro])ped 
in  his  flight  and  they  proceeded  carefully  to  fill  it  with  the 
gold  in  sight,  a  business  that  did  not  take  three  pair  of  hands 
long  in  accomplishing,  whilst  Chaya  held  the  basket  open. 
Then  they  set  to,  and  in  a  moment  located  the  next  gold  box. 
■'  They  are  set  side  by  side,"  said  Houghton.  "  VVe  won't 
have  a  bit  of  trouble  with  them,  only  we  will  want  baskets. 
I  vote  we  get  back  to  the  Barracuda  with  this  lot  and  then  rig 
up  something  to  carrj'  the  stuff  in.  A  piece  of  sailcloth  will 
do  at  a  pinch." 

•The  others  fell  in  with  this  idea.  But,  just  at  the  start,  Hull 
raised  an  objection. 

"  I  don't  like  to  leave  this  .stuff  alone  with  no  one  to  look 
after  it,  and  that's  the  truth,"  said  he.  "  I  ain't  a  narvous 
man,  but  it  gets  me  on  me  spine  when  I  think  of  leavin'  this 
stuff  to  its  lonesome;" 

"  There's  no  one  to  touch  it,"  said  Tillman. 
"  Maybe  not,"  replied  the  Captain,  "but  all  the  same,  I'm 
no  happier  to  leave  it." 

"  I'll  stay  and  look  after  it,"  said  Houghton.  '  Chaya 
and  I  will  sit  tight  here  while  you  two  get  aboard  and  bring 
back  the  canvas." 

■'  I'll  be  easier  that  way,"  said  the  Captain. 
He  started  ofi  with  Tillman  and  they  carried  the  basket 
alternately  till  they  reached  the  deck  of  the  yawl.    • 

We'll  stow  it  in  the  saloon  as  far  as  there's  stowage  room," 
said  Hull,  "  and  the  hold  will  take  the  rest.  Dash  me,  if 
I  like  stowin'  it  anywhere.  I'd  sooner  keep  it  on  deck  under 
me  eye,  but  that's  not  to  be  done."  He  lowered  himself  down 
the  saloon  hatch  and  Tillman  was  preparing  to  follow  with  the 
load  when  a  shout  from  Hull  down  below  made  him  start.  He 
put  the  basket  down  on  deck  and  the  next  moment  he  was  in 
the  cabin.  Hull  was  standing  by  the  body  of  Jacky  stretched 
on  the  floor. 

"  Good  God  '.  "  said  Tillman. 

"  Dead,"  said  Hull,  lifting  an  arm  of  the  corpse  and  letting 
it  drop.  "  Neck  broken  to  all  appearances.  Done  in  by 
Mac.     What  did  I  tell  you  ?  " 

Tillman  was  too  shocked  for  a  moment  to  speak. 
"  How  he  did  it.  Lord  only  knows,"  said  Hull,  who  was  now 
as  cool  as  a  professor  of  anatomy  demonstrating  on  a  "  sub- 
ject." "  There  ain't  no  scratch  that  I  can  see.  There  ain't 
no  blood,  just  the  neck  broke.  He  may  have  tumbled  down 
the  saloon  hatch  and  killed  hisself,  but  that  ain't  probable 
with  Mac  about.  Most  like  he  was  done  in  by  Mac  and  the 
whisker  man  and  then  the  whiskers  got  his  gruel  later  on.  No 
knowin'.  But  he's  got  to  get  out  of  here  and  we've  got  to 
shift  him.  We've  got  to  rig  a  tackle  to  the  main  boom  and 
histe  him.     Let's  get  to  work. 

They  rigged  the  tackle  and  ten  minutes'  gruesome  work  got 
rid  of  the  intruder.  He  went  overboard  with  a  pig  of  iron 
as  a  sinker  and  the  Captain,  quite  unmoved,  assisted  in  the 
removing  of  the  tackle  and  the  rousting  out  of  some  spare 
canvas  to  serve  as  a  sack  for  the  carrying  of  the  gold. 

CHAPTER  XXX. 

Fate. 

Houghton  left  alone  with  Chaya,  took  his  seat  by  the 
cache  whilst  the  girl  sat  beside  him.  If  ever  any  man 
realised  his  ambitions  in  life,  that  man  was  surely  Houghton. 
The  one  woman  in  the  world  that  he  wanted  sat  beside  him, 
all   the  money  he  required  lay  before  him. 

",  Chaya,"  said  he,  pointing  to  the  cache,  "  that  is  what  we 
came  here  for.  We  have  got  it  and  we  must  now  go  away. 
Will  you  come  with  me  ? 

Chaya  laughed  softly  to  herself.     The  woman  they  called 


her  mother  had  no  more  hold  upon  her  affection  than  Mac- 
quart.  She  had  absolutely  never  known  the  thing  called  love 
till  Houghton  came  into  her  life.  She  opened  out  hor  hands 
as  tliough  running  over  in  imagination  the  whole  earth,  turned 
to  him,  laughed  into  his  eyes  and  held  up  her  lips. 

"  That  is  well,"  said  he.  He  held  her  hand  and  they  sat 
shoulder  touching  shoulder,  not  troubling  to  speak. 

All  at  once  Chaya  started  and  turned  her  head,  whilst 
Houghton  rose  to  his  feet.  A  voice  from  far  away  to  the 
right  came  to  them  through  the  almost  windless  air.  It 
seemed  hailing  them. 

"  It  is  Saji,"  said  Chaya,  who  had  often  heard  that  hail 
on  their  hunting  expeditions.  "  He  is  calling  to  me."  Slic 
knew  by  the  sound  of  the  voice  that  Saji  was  either  injured 
or  in  distress.  She  answered  the  call  and  the  reply  came  as 
faithfully  as  an  echo. 

"  Now  he  will  know,"  said  Chaya,  "  and  he  will  come  here 
as  surely  as  the  snake  to  its  rock."  They  listened,  but  no 
sound  came  from  Saji.  That  wily  hunter,  having  obtained 
their  direction,  was  using  his  breath,  no  doubt,  for  a  better 
purpose   than   shouting. 

Then  they  heard  him  moving  among  the  leaves  and  a 
mom<>nt  later  he  appeared  from  among  the  trees.  He  was 
crawling  on  hands  and  knees.  He  held  the  parang  between 
his  teeth,  for  his  girdle  had  been  torn  off  in  some  violent 
struggle.  He  was  mortally  wounded  and  he  was  dragging 
along  the  head  of  Macquart  by  its  hair.  When  he  saw  Chaya 
he  cried  out,  and  supporting  himself  on  his  left  hand  as  she 
approached,  he  held  up  the  head  with  his  right. 

It  was  the  gift  of  gifts,  the  love-offering  of  tlie  Dyak  warrior. 
It  was  more  than  that.  It  was  the  head  of  the  man  who  had 
murdered   Chaya's   father. 

Chaya  did  not  know  this,  nor  did  Houghton,  nor  did  Saji. 
All  these  actors  in  the  drama  were  perfectly  unconscious  of 
the  fact  that  here  Justice  was  dealing  retribution,  that  here, 
above  the  gold  for  which  Macquart  liad  murdered  Lant. 
Macquart 's  head  was  being  offered  as  a  gift  to  Lant's  daughter. 
Houghton  cried  out  in  horror,  but  Chaya,  just  as  on  the 
day  when  she  stood  watching  the  battle  between  tlie  scorpion 
and  the  centipede,  stood  looking  at  Saji  and  his  terrible  trophy 
unmoved.  She  knew  that  it  was  his  offering  to  her,  and  her 
love  for  Houghton  had  told  her  in  some  mysterious  way  the 
secret  of  Saji's  passion  for  her.  It  was  as  though  she  were 
watching  not  only  the  savagery  from  which  she  was  escaping, 
but  the  whole  of  that  mysterious  past  which  lay  on  her 
mother's  side,  stretching  through  unknown  ages  during  wliich 
men,  to  gain  the  love  of  women,  had  brought  them  as  love 
gifts  the  heads  of  men. 

Saji,  with  one  supreme  effort,  tried  to  rise  to  his  feet  ;  then 
he  fell  on  his  knees,  on  his  hands,  on  his  side,  quivered 
as  though  a  breeze  were  astir  amidst  his  muscles  and  lay  dead 
beside  his  trophy.  As  he  turned  on  his  side  they  saw  the 
cause  of  his  death.  The  shaft  of  his  own  spear  broken  off. 
protruded  from  his  side.  Macquart,  in  his  struggle  for  life, 
must  have  gained  possession  of  the  spear  and  used  it  with 
deadly  effect,  only  to  fall  a  victim  to  the  parang. 

Houghton  was  advancing  towards  the  body  of  Saji  when 
Hull  and  Tillman  appeared  from  among  the  trees  carrying 
the  canvas  for  the  conveying  of  the  gold. 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

The  Escape. 

It  was  the  morning  of  the  fifth  day  after  the  death  of 
Saji,  and  Hull  and  his  companions  were  stretched  on 
the  deck  of  the  Barracuda  in  the  shade  of  the  trees, 
smoking  and  talking.  Seldom  have  men  worked  as  those 
three  during  the  last  few  days.  Not  only  had  they  got 
the  last  of  the  coin  on  board,  but  they  had  proved  to  themselves 
the  fact  by  digging  up  the  last  possible  vestiges  of  the  cache. 
They  had  got  a  good  deal  of  the  rubbish  out  of  the  fo'cs'le 
and  flung  it  overboard  after  sifting  it  and  now  the  boat  was 
all  trim  and  ready  for  sea. 

Pig-iron  ballast  had  been  jettisoned  to  be  replaced  by  gold. 
The  gold  was  stored  in  the  cabin,  in  the  hold  and  in  the  fo'cs'le. 
They  had  worked  surrounded  by  an  aura.  The  thing  was 
fabulous  and  the  labour  like  the  labour  in  a  dream.  Nearly 
under  them  lay  the  bones  of  the  Terschellin^.  the  sliip  that 
had  been  taking  all  this  wealth  to  China  ports  more  than 
fifteen  years  ago.  Its  non-arrival  had,  no  doubt,  affected 
underwriters,  caused  talk,  caused  loss  to  the  insurers  of  it 
and  then  had  been  absolutely  forgotten.  Here  it  had  lain 
dead  and  buried  to  all  seeming,  but  its  soul  had  been  actively 
at  work,  weaving,  weaving,  weaving,  drawing  lives  together 
like  threads  to  make  the  texture  of  the  pictures  that  forms  this 
story. 

It  had  drawn  to  itself  Hull  and  Houghton  and  Tillman, 
Macquart  and  Jacky,  Wiart,  Chaya,  Screed,  and  strangest  of  all 
it  had  brought  up  the  past  and  dealt  out  Retribution  to  the 
wicked.     Who  will  say  that  gold  is  a  lifeless  thing,  or  that 


May  i8,  iqi6 


LAND      &     WATER 


21 


Chaya,  i   lluiaanc^  of  the  South   Seat  | 


lIHmtratcd  bn  Joseph   Simpson.    E.B  A 


"  He  dashed  off  among  the  trees  with  the  dyak  in  pursuit 


it  is  not  in  its  way  a  God  ?  Now  stored  and  prisoned,  and 
about  to  be  deported  to  a  land  where  its  activities  could 
begin  anew,  it  showed  nothing  of  its  presence  except  in  the 
weariness  of  its  slaves  who  were  lying  about  on  deck. 

Chaya  was  down  below  in  the  cabin,  arranging  things. 
When  Hull  and  Tillman  got  the  truth  of  the  matter,  they  had 
made  no  trouble  at  all  about  Chaya,  though  her  joining  them 
would  make  things  a  great  deal  more  difficult  on  the  return 
journey.  It  was  arranged  that  she  should  have  the  cabin  for 
herself  to  sleep  in,  and  during  the  day,  except  at  meal-time, 
the  rest  of  the  crew  being  condemned  to  the  fo'cs'le.  Not 
that  this  mattered  much  as  the  crew,  being  so  small,  it  would 
be  required  most  of  the  time  on  deck. 

Tlie  incident  of  Chava  scarcely  gave  Hull  and  Tillman  a 


thought.  Gold  fever  and  heavy  labour  held  their  entire 
minds  and  beings,  and  it  was  perhaps  the  exhaustion  produced 
by  these  two  causes  that  made  Hull,  as  he  lay  on  the  deck 
now,  smoking  and  stretching  himself,  to  forecast  the  difficulties- 
still  before  them. 

"  There's  a  good  many  miles  of  sea  between  here  and  there," 
said  he,  "  but  I  don't  mind  northen  so  long  as  we  get  clear  of 
the  coast.     I  wish  we  was  out  of  this  lagoon." 

"  What's  wrong  with  the  lagoon  ?  "  said  Tillman.  "  It's 
been  a  pretty  good  friend  to  us,  I  think." 

"  I  don't  know  anythin'  that's  wrong  with  it,"  replied 
Hull,  "  but  I  wish  we  was  clear  of  it." 

"  Well,  we'll  be  out  of  it  to-morrow,"  said  Houghton.  "  We 
have  only  to  get  the  water  on  board  and  we  can  do  that  this- 


22 


LAND      .S:      W  A  T  E  R 


May  i8,  lyib 


evening.  We  couldn't  go  sooner  than  to-morrow.  Lord  ! 
every  bone  in  my  body  is  aching.  I  didn't  ever  think  I  could 
have  worked  like  that.  Do  you  know  we  have  been  at  it  for 
five  days  without  a  break  scarcely  ?  " 

■'  Seems  more  like  five  years,"  said  Tillman.  He  had 
risen  up  and  was  leaning  on  the  rail  tapping  the  ashes  from 
liis  pipt-  into  the  lagoon.  Whilst  engaged  in  this  iiis  eye 
caught  sight  of  something.  It  was  the  prow  of  a  fishing 
praliu.  At  this  moment  Chaya  came  on  deck  and  her  quick 
eye  caught  sight  of  the  prahu.  She  called  out  to  Houghton 
and  he  and  Hull  sprang  to  their  feet. 

The  prahu  that  had  come  iip  tlie  lagoon  at  a  rapid  pace 
turned  in  a  hairpin  curve  witfl  the  foam  jwuring  like  crean; 
round  the  blades  of  the  starboard  paddles  and  vanished  as  it 
had  come  almost  in  an  instant. 

"  That  was  smartly  done,"  said  Tillman.  "  Those  chaps 
must  have  come  to  ha\'e  a  'peep  at  us.  I  wonder  how  they 
knew  we  were  here." 

"  I  reckon  they  didn't,"  said  Hull.  "  They  just  struck 
sight  of  us  and  got  skeered."  But  Houghton  who  had  been 
talking  to  Chaya  was  not  of  this  way  of  thinking. 

"  1  don't  hke  the  look  of  those  chaps,"  said  he,  "'neither 
does  Chaya.  She  thinks  they  must  have  got  wind  of  what 
we  are  after  and  they've  seen  her.  That  old  woman  who 
calls  herself  her  mother  is  sure  to  have  raised  the  tribe  when 
Chaya  did  not  go  back.  It's  nearly  a  week  now  since  she 
joined  us  arid  she  thinks  that  the  fishermen  of  the  tribe  have 
come  up  from  the  sea  to  the  village,  got  news  of  what  has 
happened  and  started  out  after  us." 
"  That's  cheerful,"  said  Tillman. 

"  I  said  just  now  I  wished  we  were  out  of  this  lagoon," 
grumbled  Hull. 

"  Chaya  thinks  that  the  fact  of  her  being  with  us  may  have 
caused  the  trouble,"  went  on  Houghton,"  and  she  says,  rather 
than  endanger  you  two  and  the  gold  she  is  ready  to  go  back. 
I  would  go  with  her." 

"  Now,  we  don't  want  any  of  that  sort  of  stuff,"  said  Hull. 
"  We've  contracted  to  lift  the  girl  as  well  as  the  stuff  and 
we're  not  goin'  to  be  done  over  our  contrack  by  those  chaps." 
"  We've  got  our  rifles."  said  Tillman. 
"  Blow  rifles  !  "  said  the  Captain.  "  Sticks  is  good  enough 
to  beat  them  off  with."  He  went  down  below  and  got  an 
axe,  then  with  the  axe  in  his  hand  he  lumbered  over  the  side 
and  disappeared  into  the   forest. 

In  half  an  hour's  time  he  returned.  He  had  cut  down  and 
cut  up  three  small  trees  and  he  carried  the  result  of  his  labours 
xmder  his  arm  in  the  fonn  of  three  cudgels,  each  four  feet 
long.  Down  he  sat  on  the  deck  and  as  he  whittled  at  the 
weapons  with  his  knife  he  laid  down  the  law  of  self-defence 
by  means  of  sticks  to  the  others. 

"  I'll  lam  you  somethin',"  said  the  Captain.  "  Don't 
you  never  try  to  belt  a  chap  over  the  head  with  a  stick  till 
you  have  him  on  the  ground.  The  p'int  of  the  stick  is  the 
able  end  for  fightin'.  Use  it  like  a  bay'net.  There's  not  a 
man  Uvin'  can  stand  up  to  the  poke  of  a  stick  if  the  chap  that's 
usin"  the  stick  knows  his  bizness.  Now  these  sticks  is  short 
enough  to  fend  or  break  a  spear  with  and  long  enough  to  dig 
a  nigger  in  the  stomach  with.     That's  the  p'int  to  aim  at." 

He  spent  nearly  half  the  day  over  these  weapons,  and  at 
sundown  they  started  to  water  the  Barracuda,  Houghton 
and  Tillman  "taking  the  beakers  to  the  well  they  had  found 
just  inside  the  forest  whilst  Hull  and  Chaya  kept  guard. 

They  slept  that  night  on  deck,  keeping  watch  in  turn.  But 
not  a  sign  came  of  any  trouble  from  the  river. 

Then  just  before  dawn  they  unmoored  and  the  Captain 
with  TiUman  got  into  the  boat  and  hauled  the  Barracuda 
out.  They  towed  her  to  the  mouth  of  the  river  where  the 
wind,  setting  from  the  land  fortunately  for  them,  was  ruilling 
up  the  lagoon  water.  Here  they  got  the  boat  on  board  and 
hoisted  the  mainsail  and  jib,  whilst  the  Barracuda,  beginning 
to  walk  and  talk,  nosed  her  way  into  the  river  mists  now- 
breaking  and  making  spirals  to  the  wind. 

The  tide  was  ebbing  and  as  they  drew  along  past  wooded 
cajics  and  deep  dense  masses  of  mangrove  growth,  Hull, 
who  was  on  the  look-out,  saw  on  the  calm  dawn-lit  sea  just 
at  the  river  mouth  vague  forms  like  water  flies  come  to  rest 
on  the  ruffled  water. 

"  That's  them,"  said  he.  "  look,  they're  waitin'  for  us. 
Now,  you  take  my  orders  and  take  'em  sharp.  We're  makin' 
five  knots,  we  must  make  nine  ;  crack  every  stitch  of  canvas 
on  her  and  give  me  the  wheel." 

.  He  took  the  wheel  whilst  the  others  flew  to  obey  his  orders, 
and  the  Barracuda  with  all  sail  set  and  the  main  boom  swun" 
out  to  starboard,  came  along  at  a  spanking  pace  before  the 
wind  that  was  bending  the  palm  tops  and  spreading  before 
them  in  cat's  paws  of  vaguest  silver.  The  rifles,  loaded  and 
ready  were  lying  on  the  deck  to  be  used  as  a  last  resort. 
<"haya  was  kneeling  by  Houghton  ready  to  hand  him  his 
weapon,  and  Tillman,  with  his  foot  on  his  gun  and  his  club  in 
])  i  fist  was  standin:,'  bv  Hull. 


Houghton  could  hear  the  sound  of  the  sea  coming  against 
the  wind.  Never  in  his  life  had  he  gone  through  moments  of 
such  supreme  tension  as  now,  waiting  for  what  might  come 
in  the  vague  light  of  morning,  and  a  silence  unbroken  but  for 
the  wash  of  the  waves  on  the  distant  reefs  and  the  wash  of  tiie 
water  at  the  bow  of  the  yawl. 

Then  suddenly  uprose  a  clamour  hke  the  crying  of  sea-fowl. 
The  six  praluis  that  had  been  lying  like  logs  on  the  heave 
of  the  sea  swarmed  into  a  dark  line  and  tl>e  line  rushed  to  meet 
them.  Houghton  saw  Hull,  as  calm  as  thougii  he  were  on  a 
pleasure  sail,  standing,  quid  bulging  his  cheek  and  great  hands 
playing  gently  with  the  little  wheel.  Then  suddenly  the  wheel 
went  over  to  port  and  the  Barracuda  crashed  into  something 
that  went  grinding  away  under  the  keel.  At  the  same 
moment,  something  struck  the  main  sail. 

It  was  a  light  spear,  venomous  as  the  sting  of  a  wasp,  and 
it  stuck  there  slatting  and  held  from  falling  back  by  its  barb, 
whilst  Hull  put  the  wheel  over  again  to  starboard  and  twenty 
more  spears  fell  "  wop,  wop  "  into  the  water  astern  of  her. 

"  Done  'em,"  said  the  Captain. 

Houghton  looked  back.  He  could  not  beheve  that  it  was 
all  over.  Yet  there  were  the  prahus  all  in  confusion  in  the 
wake  of  the  Barracuda,  the  wrecked  prahu  like  a  broken 
umbrella  on  the  water,  and  the  heads  of  the  swimmers  who 
were  being  rescued  by  their  friends. 

"  They  laid  to  get  us  one  on  each  side,"  said  Hull,  "  and 
if  I  hadn't  shifted  the  helm  and  rammed  that  chap,  they'd 
have  got  their  holts— which  they  didn't.  Well,  there's  no 
blood  spilt  and  that's  all  the  better.  Gad  !  boys,  we've  got 
the  stuff  away  !  " 

The  sun  answered  him,  breaking  up  over  the  sea,  and  all 
the  great  lonely  coast  they  were  leaving  showed  in  its  desola- 
tion across  the  water  rippled  with  gold  and  strewn  with  the 
foam  of  the  reefs. 

Houghton,  holding  Chaya 's  hand,  looked  back.  Then, 
still  hand  in  hand,  they  went  forward  and  stood  looking  far 
ahead  to  where  the  ruffled  blue  of  the  sea  faded  through  the 
morning  haze  into  a  sky  of  azure  fair  with  the  promise  of  the 
future. 

CHAPTER  XXXII. 

Envoi 

ONE  bright  mornmg,  two  months  later,  the  Barracuda, 
having  hung  off  and  on  all  night  in  view  of  Mac- 
quarie,  entered  Sydney  Harbour.  Stole  in  un- 
noticed, storm-beaten,  and  sun-blistered,  and  foul  with 
tropic  weeds,  the  strangest  craft  that  had  ever  made  that 
port  of  call. 

She  and  her  crew,  bronzed  and  tattered,  and  her  cargo, 
invisible  but  there,  might  have  sailed  in  from  some  distant 
Age  when  men  made  the  world  marvellous  with  their  deeds 
and  before  machinery  had  made  man  commonplace  as  itself. 

Chaya  alone,  sunburnt  and  laughing  and  amazed  at  the 
wonders  of  this  new  place,  was  a  whole  romance  in  herself. 

Yet  no  one  noticed  them — or  only  some  early  fishermen 
and  a  few  longshoremen  at  the  little  bay  near  Farm  Cove 
where  they  anchored,  and  one  of  whom  was  sent  hot  foot  with 
a  message  to  Screed— a  pencilled  message  which  ran  :  "  Big 
luck.  Come  at  once,  and  for  God's  sake  bring  some  pro- 
visions with  you." 

It  would  be  impossible  to  describe  that  breakfast  in  the 
musty,  fusty  little  cabin  with  the  sun  blazing  through  the 
port-holes  and  the  skylight.  Wealth  sat  beside  each  of  them, 
and  the  prosaic  Screed,  as  he  hstened  to  scraps  of  the  mar- 
vellous voyage,  forgot  even  the  gold  he  was  sitting  on  in 
contemplation  of  the  greater  gold  that  lay  like  a  halo  around 
the  work  of  these  wanderers. 

Chaya  sat  by  Houghton— the  only  man  among  them  doubly 
blessed  by  wealth. 

The  End. 


Some  of  the  summer  matinee  jackets  are  the  most  fascina- 
ting affairs.  One  model  made  of  three  layers  of  different' 
coloured  ninons,  apple  green,  blush  pink  and  sea  blue  has  a 
border  of  white  swansdown  and  looks  hke  a  summer  cloud. 
'For  those  wanting  an  ine.xpensive  jacket  there  are  charming 
httle  coats  of  printed  French  lawn  trimmed  with  a  kilted 
border  of  white  Valenciennes,  and  an  attractive  turn-down 
collar.  Yet  another  coat  appeals  in  crinkled  silk  crepe 
scalloped  all  round  the  edge  with  a  deep  satin  stitch  padded 
underneath  so  that  it  has  a  raised  appearance. 


C.A.V.  ELECTRIC  STARTERS.-Effective,  Powerful  ;  a  simple 
prrasure  of  the  pedal  and  the  engine  .starts  under  its  own  power.  When 
C.A  V.  equipped  a  girl  can  start  the  heaviest  engine.  Full  particulars 
post  free  to  all  motorists.— C.  A.  Vandervell  and  Co.,  Ltd.,  Electrical 
Encineers,  Acton.  London,  W.— (Advt.) 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  1.XVII  No.  2820  [,"^11] 


THTTRQnAV      MAV     r>C      Tr,rf\  fREGlSTERED  AS")    PRICE    ONE    8HILUNG 

irlUiXDJJ/Vz,    iViAx    ^^,    lyiu  LanewspaperJ   published  wLtKLV 


. 


'3  emarcf  'ParCri^e. 


Draten  gzclusivcty  lor  '*Land  and    Water.' 


To   Victory ! 


LAND 


W  A  T  E  R 


May  25,  1916 


-  1   i      ^  \v» 


•4#P 


iMi^ 


:wrr/-  ::'-■"'., ih\L-*L'^ii 


Uy  <^uart€i   Muster  Sergennt^Instrxtctor   R.    Handley  Read* 


The  Passing  of  Ypres 

At  the  Leicester  Galleries,  Leicester  Square,  there  is  a  wonderful  exhibition  of  witer-colour';,  en'itled 
"The  British  Firing  Line,"  by  Quarter  Ma-iter  Serge int-Instnictor  E  Hindley-ltead  (Machine  Gun 
Corps,  late  Arli^f*  Kifles.)  This  picture  of  Ypres  is  typicil  of  these  s<etches  wnich  so  faithfully 
represeni  the  rum    emptiness  and  heartbreaking  dreariness  of  the    battlefields  of  France   and   Flanders 


May  25,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSWAY,  LONDON,  W.C 

Telephone:  HOLBORN  2828 


THURSDAY,    MAY    25.    1916 

The  Table  of  Contents   appears   on  page   19 

EMPIRE    DAY 

THREE  years  hence  we  shall  celebrate  the  cente- 
nary of  the  birth  of  Queen  Victoria,  that  august 
name  of  good  omen,  and  historians  will  then 
doubtless  tell  us  in  detail  how  in  this  one  hundred 
years  the  British  Empire  has  grown  from  tottering 
infancy  into  sturdy  self-reliant  manhood.  Mistakes 
many  and  great  have  been  made,  but  in  that  we  have 
always  been  loyal  to  our  ideals  of  liberty,  honour, 
humanity  an!  justice,  and  have  not  denied  to  those  in 
subjection  that  freedom  of  individual  action  which  we 
so  hotly  and  at  times  even  foolishly  claim  for  ourselves, 
we  have  outlived  the  errors.  The  truth  of  the  singer  is 
fulfilled  again  in  this  chapter  of  Imperial  history  that 
nations  as  "  men  may  rise  on  stepping  stones  of  their 
dead  selves  to  higher  things." 

On  the  morrow  of  the  first  Empire  Day  to  be  officially 
recognised  in  the  mother  country,  a  Briton,  be  his  birth- 
place betwixt  the  narrow  seas  that  guard  these  old  shores 
or  under  the  skies  of  wider  horizons  in  new  lands,  cannot 
fail  to  feel  a  sense  of  pride  and  satisfaction  in  the  work 
that  has  been  accomplished.  The  unity  of  the  Empire  is 
now  no  more  a  mere  abstract  expression,  but  a  living 
conciete  fact.  In  these  pages  a  record  is  given  of  the 
help  which  every  part  of  the  Empire,  from  the  greatest 
Dominion  to  the  least  remotest  island  over  which  the 
Union  Jack  waves,  has  rendered  to  the  mother  country 
in  hei  day  of  trial,  and  it  is  shown  how  faith  in  the  Empire 
has  been  consecrated  with  blood,  freely  poured  forth  ; 
race,  religion,  custom,  caste  being  subordinated  to  this 
one  central  idea.  The  British  Empire  has  gained  in  this 
war  an  immortal  soul,  through  the  generous  and  lavish 
self-sacrifice  of  her  sons. 

We  have  been  told  that  "  the  world's  altar-stairs 
,lope  through  darkness  up  to  God  "  ;  we  have  learned 
that  they  ascend  also  through  pain.  The  truth,  the  piti- 
ful truth,  appears  to  be  that  the  redemption  of  mankind 
in  small  things  as  in  great  things  can  only  be  won,  even 
in  this  twentieth  century  of  the  Christian  era,  through  the 
torment  of  Calvary.  It  is  almost  as  though  the  lights  of 
heaven  must  be  blotted  out,  earth  swim  in  a  sea  of 
blood  before  man  is  capable  of  comprehending  the 
nobility  of  his  fellow-man.  Yet  surely  it  should  be 
possible  for  humanity  to  make  advance  by  some  less 
sorrowful  way.  Our  children  and  our  children's 
children  may,  we  hope,  learn  wisdom  through  the 
sufferings  and  bitterness  of  spirit  of  our  present 
experiences,  and  will  trust  each  other  with  fuller  con- 
fidence than  we  possessed  before  the  war.  From  this 
richer  sympathy  a  more  vigorous  life  shall  spring  which 
shall  make  the  British  Empire  not  only  the  stronghold  of 
justice  and  freedom,  but,  as  it  were,  a  city  whose  citizens 
enjoy  both  the  power  and  means  to  utilise  their  talents 
and  develop  their  abilities,  each  and  everyone,  to  the 
highest  value  possible,  and  are  capable  of  self-sacrifice 
for  the  good  of  the  community  equally  in  peace  as  in  war. 
It  IS  no  easy  achievement,  but  towards  this  end  we  must 
press  if  all  the  slaughter  and  anguish  of  these  months  is 
not  to  be  in  vain. 

Let  us  escape  from  the  fetters  of  words  and  shibboleths, 
for  life  is  action  not  speech.  This  verity  has  been  taught 
us  by  war,  and  the  lesson  must  never  be  forgotten. 
Before  the  Victorian  centenary  arrives,  in  every  human 


probability  peace  wiU  be  restored  ;  by  peace  we  imply 
the  cessation  of  carnage  and  the  stay  of  devastation. 
But  let  us  not  be  deluded  by  the  word,  and  dream  we 
may  then  sink  back  safely  and  comfortably  into  the  old 
ruts  out  of  which  we  have  been  so  cruelly  flung,  and  soak 
our  souls  with  the  opiates  of  self-complacency.  There  is 
in  truth  no  such  thing  as  peace  on  this  earth  if  life  be 
healthy  and  beneficent  and  the  progress  of  humanity 
maintained.  Even  under  the  most  favourable  circum- 
stances there  must  ever  be  struggle  and  fight.  And  it 
is  an  Empire  well  worth  fighting  for,  _  for  it  is  con- 
fined by  no  narrow  conceptions ;  it  is  too  vast  for 
restricting  influences  of  class,  colour  and  creed.  Though 
tribute  has  to  be  rendered  unto  Caesar,  that  is  unto  the 
State,  to  all  men  is  it  freely  permitted  to  render  unto 
God  the  things  that  are  God's ;  and  where  Christianity 
prevails,  it  is  judged  at  the  last  not  by  doctrines 
or  dogmas  but  by  practical  kindliness — by  giving  meat 
to  the  hungry,  drink  to  the  thirsty,  hospitality  to  the 
stranger,  and  care  to  the  sick.  Those  who  have  mocked 
us  for  ruling  with  so  light  a  hand,  and  deemed  it  to  be 
the  mark  of  indolence  and  decadence,  are  confounded. 

But  we  have  to  take  the  world  as  it  is  if  we  would 
endeavour  to  make  it  a  better  world.  We  must  organise 
the  Empire  in  a  manner  hitherto  undreamed  of ;  we  have 
to  sit  down  and  consider  carefully  every  commercia 
enterprise  and  make  it  impossible  in  the  future  that  the 
channels  of  industry  shall  serve  as  poison-ducts  for  an 
enemy  who  is  not  restrained  by  the  decencies  of  life, 
but  has  exalted  treachery  and  the  betrayal  of  friends 
and  neighbours  into  a  noble  service  to  the  State.  Nor 
can  we  be  deterred  from  this  purpose  by  the  slave-whip  of 
political  sophists  and  rhetoricians,  who  would  herd  us 
back  into  sloth  and  inaction  by  the  flick  of  phrases  which 
have  served  their  purpose  in  the  old  days,  when  eyes  were 
blind  and  hearts  failed  to  understand.  We  show  on 
other  pages  of  this  issue  the  manner  in  which  the  British 
Empire  may  be  all  but  self-supporting.  Can  anyone 
honestly  declare  protection  against  the  products  of  Ger- 
many, raised  in  self-defence,  to  be  a  part  of  Tariff  Reform 
or  an  infringement  of  Free  Trade  if  we  continue  to  our 
gallant  Allies,  as  we  shall  most  certainly  do,  the  com- 
mercial facilities  which  they  have  hitherto  enjoyed.    - 

There  is  hard  work  ahead  for  the  Empire  — work  which 
cannot  be  delayed  and  which  must  be  undertaken  in  a 
thorough  and  methodical  manner.  It  implies  breaking 
with  the  past,  but  does  not  all  life  since  the  guns  first 
roared  at  Liege  imply  this  ?  This  journal  counts  itself 
fortunate  in  that  by  a  happy  inspiration  it  broke  off  in 
August,  1914,  from  its  former  traditions  and  began  a  new 
career  that  synchronises  with  the  world  struggle.  Since 
that  day  it  has  endeavoured  to  give  week  by  week  a  faith- 
ful report  not  merely  of  the  chief  Episodes  of  the  war,  but 
of  their  inner  significance  ;  and  it  has  striven  to  elucidate 
the  influences  which  these  unprecedented  events  are 
exprting  on  life  both  within  the  British  Empire  and  with- 
out. Its  purpose  has  been  to  encourage  the  doubters 
and  to  stimulate  the  fighters,  nor  when  mistakes  have 
been  made  has  it  deemed  it  necessary  to  reprobate  those 
in  authority,  believing  that  to  know  all  would  be  to 
pardon  much  if  not  all.  When  the  last  shot  has  been 
fired  and  a  glad  silence  descends  on  the  troubled  air,  it 
foresees  that  its  work  will  increase  rather  than  lessen. 
The  problems  of  the  future  will  be  at  least  as  difficult  as 
those  of  the  present.  If  peace  has  victories  as  renowned 
as  war,  war  has  prosperities  as  affluent  as  peace,  so  there 
must  needs  be  a  complete  re-settlement  of  the  economic 
and  political  life  of  the  British  Empire,  which  will  make 
heavy  demands  on  publicists.  We  are  no  visionaries, 
thinking  a  new  heaven  and  a  new  earth  are  to  be  created 
by  scraps  of  paper  and  the  pens  of  Plenipotentiaries,  for 
we  remember  the  wise  words  of  a  Chinese  statesman, 
"There  is  but  one  Heaven  ;  it  is  approached  from  Earth 
by  many  ladders.     And  all  the  ladders  are  steep." 


L  A  N  D      &      W  A  T  E  R 


May  2;-,  1916 


The   Right  Hon.    Joseph   Chamberlain 

[BORN     1836  — DIED     1914] 
Secretary    of   State    for    the    Colonies,    1895-1903 


May  25,  1916  LAND      &      WATER 


MESSAGES    FROM    THE    PREMIERS. 


Below  we  print  Empire  Day  messages,  specially  indited 
for  the  "  Five  Nations "  Number  of  Land  &  Water 
by  the  Prime  Ministers  of  the  Overseas  Dominions — 
Canada,      Australia,     New     Zealand      and      South     Africa. 


CANADA  :  The  Right  Hon.    Sir   Robert  Borden  : 

NOTHING  could  be  more  fitting  at  this  time  than  some  special  recognition  of  the  day 
on  which  we  celebrate  a  world-wide  Commonwealth,  single-minded  in  devotion  to  common 
ideals  of  freedom  and  justice  and  determined  to  maintain  a  common  allegiance.  Toward 
that  end  more  than  300,000  Canadians  have  already  offered  their  utmost  service,  and  throughout 
the  Dominion  there  is  no  thought  of  counting  the  cost.  Whatever  further  burdens  are  assumed 
will  be  measured  only  by  what  is  needed  to  secure  a  recognised  victory  for  our  common  cause 
and  the  lasting  integrity  of  our  united  Empire. 

JUS'URJLIJ  :   The  Right   Hon.  William  M.  Hughes  : 

ALTHOUGH  there  have  been  many  occasions  since  the  war  broke  out  upon  which  the 
/\  true  idea  of  the  British  Empire  has  been  more  clearly  revealed  to  us,  to-day,  Empire 
Day,  is  the  special  occasion  when  the  peoples  of  Mother  Country  and  Dominions  join 
to  celebrate  the  unity  and  strength  of  our  wide  flung  race.  Our  enemies,  seeking  to  destroy, 
have  reconstructed.  Such  occasions  as  the  conquest  of  German  South  Africa,  the  landing  of 
the  immortal  29th  Division  at  Helles,  the  entry  of  the  Canadians  into  action  at  Festubert,  and 
the  storming  of  the  Gaba  Tepe  cliffs  by  the  Australians  and  New  Zealanders  have  welded  us. 
Our  own  folly  and  stupidity  may  sunder  some  ties  ;  nothing  else  can,  if  we  are  in  truth  worthy. 

We  in  Australia  are  with  you  heart  and  soul  in  the  war,  because  we  are  free  men  loving 
freedom.  We  shall  fight  for  our  Australian  citizenship  and  our  part  in  the  destinies  of  the 
British  Empire  as  dearer  than  life.  Australia  warmly  appreciates  the  splendid  welcome  and 
generous  hospitality  extended  by  Great  Britain  to  her  fighting  sons,  more  and  more  of  whom 
daily  are  visiting  England.  Thus  are  the  links  of  the  race  being  strengthened  and  when  peace 
comes  we  hope  to  stand  united  and  strong,  a  power  for  good  and  for  the  advancement  of  the 
world. 

^EW  ZEJLAND  :  The  Right  Hon.    William  F.  Massey: 

IN  the  cause  of  Liberty  and  Freedom  for  which  Britain  has  drawn  the  sword  our  Dominion's 
sons  are  taking  their  place  in  the  fighting  line  and  will  continue  to  do  so  until  final  and 
decisive  victory  comes.  Fifty-five  thousand  sturdy  New  Zealanders  have  already  responded 
to  the  call  of  duty.  More  are  coming  and  reinforcements  will  regularly  go  forward.  On  this 
anniversary  of  Empire  Day  the  world  beholds  the  British  Nation  more  firmly  united  than  at 
any  time  in  its  past  history.  Reverses,  when  they  occur,  serve  only  to  strengthen  our  deter- 
mination to  win  this  war  at  all  costs.  New  Zealand,  along  with  the  other  Overseas  Dominions, 
taking  pride  in  her  loyalty  and  devotion  to  King  and  Country,  will  not  relax  her  efforts  now 
or  after  the  war  to  ensure  for  all  time  the  safety  and  integrity  of  the  Empire. 

SOWUH   JFTjICjl  :  The   Right  Hon.   Louis    Botha  : 

4T  no  time  in  the  history  of  the  ^British    Empire    has    there    been    greater    necessity    for 
/-\  co-operation    and    a    united  front.      A    glorious    victory    for    Great    Britain  and    her 
courageous  Allies  must  be  the  sole  aim  and  object  of  all  our  efforts.     South    Africa  will 
continue  to  do  her  duty. 


LAND      &      WATER 


May  25,  1Q16 


Empire   Building 


The     Possibilities     of     Imperial 
By  Harold  Cox 


Union 


THE  conscious  movement  for  Imperial  unity  is 
barely  a  generation  old.  It  had  its  origin  in  a 
book  published  by  the  late  Professor  Seeley, 
entitled  The  Expansion  of  England,  embodying 
a  series  of  lectures  which  had  been  delivered  in  Cam- 
bridge. The  main  thesis  of  this  epoch-making  book 
was  that  England  had  expanded  her  Empire  more  than 
half  unconsciously  ;  .she  had  built  up  vast  dominions 
across  the  seas  without  specially  intending  to  do  so,  and 
frequently  in  opposition  to  prevailing  currents  of  thought 
at  home.  There  is,  at  any  rate,  this  much  of  truth  in  the 
ate     Professor    Seeley 's    thesis  that     at    the  time    he 


both  to  organise  the  dispatch  of  troops  to  the  firing  line, 
and  to  get  rid  of  the  financial  control  which  the  Germans 
had  secured  over  some  of  the  most  important  mineral 
industries  of  Australia. 

At  the  present  moment  it  may  safely  be  said  that 
apart  from  a  few  cranks  who  are  temperamentally  dis- 
posed to  criticising  rather  than  to  helping  their  own 
country,  everyone  throughout  the  Empire  is  eager  for 
closer  Imperial  union.  That  eagerness  arises  from 
two  allied  impulses.  In  the  first  place,  the  loyalty 
which  all  parts  of  the  Empire  have  displayed  in 
rushing  to  the  colours  has  created  a  wide-spread  feeling 


wrote— namely,  in  the  eariy  'eighties, — very  few  English      of  solid.^rity  which  alone   calls  for  defini^te   expression  ; 
people  then  living  had  seriously  and  deliberately  thought      secondly  wl>  all    of  us    now    cleariy  see  the  danger  of 


of     Empire       building 

Barely  twenty  years 
had  elapsed  since  Dis- 
raeli, who  subsequently 
became  a  vigorous  ex- 
ponent of  the  Imperialist 
conception,  had  spoken 
contemptuously  of  the 
Colonies  as  "a  mill- 
stone hanging  round  our 
neck."  Another  English 
statesman,  who,  to  an 
even  greater  extent  than 
Disraeli,  subsequently 
identified  himself  with 
the  Imperialist  move- 
ment, was  in  the  early 
'eighties  an  ultra-Eng- 
lish Radical,  who  pro- 
bably had  never  given 
a  single  thought  to  over- 
sea problems.  So  little 
indeed  was  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain recognised  as  an 
Imperial  statesman  that 
when  in  1895,  on  the 
formation  of  the  Union- 
ist Cabinet,  he  took  the 
office  of  Colonial  Secre- 
tary, there  was  a  mur- 
mur of  puzzled  sur- 
prise throughout  the 
newspaper  press.  Yet 
within  two  years,  at 
the  Jubilee  Conference 
of  1897,  Mr.  Joseph 
Chamberlain  formulated 
ideas  which  lie  at  the 
very  basis  of  the  con- 
ception of  Imperial 
union.  The  events  of  the 
South  African  War  strengthened  Mr.  Chamberlain's  enthu- 
siasm for  Imperial  expansion,  and  at  the  same  time  gave 
to  the  country  at  large  a  more  vivid  conception  of  the 
responsibilities  attached  to  a  great  Empire. 

The  same  events  brought  more  clearly  into  public 
light  and  increased  the  public  influence  of  another  great 
Empire-builder,  Cecil  Rhodes.  To  him  more  than  to 
any  other  Englishman  does  the  Empire  owe  the  con- 
solidation of  South  Africa,  and  his  name  is  rightly  for 
ever  connected  with  a  vast  stretch  of  South  African 
territory. 

Since  then  the  conception  of  Imperial  -union  has 
become  common  property.  It  affects  all  classes  and  all 
parts  of  the  Empire.  In  Mr.  Hughes,  who  comes  from 
tljc    Antipodes,    the    Empire    possesses    a    remarkable 


VHE     RIGHT    HON.     WILLIAM     M. 
PriniL*  Minister  of  Australia 


disunion.  We  have 
learnt  that  Germany 
has  for  years  steadily 
been  planning  to  build 
up  a  great  Empire  of 
her  own,  partly  to  be 
fashioned  out  of  the 
ruins  of  the  British 
Empire.  On  both  ac- 
counts —  for  mutual 
affection  and  for  mutual 
protection  —the  import- 
ance of  Imperial  unity 
is  now  recognised  by 
everyone. 

It  is,  however,  useless 
to  form  a  clear  concep- 
tion of  the  ideal  to  be 
attained  unless  at  the 
same  time  we  take  into 
account  the  obstacles 
which  have  to  be  over- 
come before  the  goal 
can  be  reached.  It  is 
from  this  point  of  view 
that  it  would  be  satis- 
factory if  men  like  Mr. 
Hughes  would  add  to 
their  exposition  of  ideals 
a  precise  statement  of  the 
the  steps  required  to 
attain  them. 

There  is  a  fairly 
general  agreement  that 
one  of  the  most  im- 
portant steps  towards 
closer  Imperial  unity— 
perhaps  the  most  im- 
portant of  all — is  the 
establishment  of  a  fiscal 
system  which  will  pro- 
mote closer  trade  relations  between  different  parts  of 
the  Empire.  On  this  point  the  example  of  the 
German  Empire  is  very  illuminating.  In  effect  the 
German  Empire,  created  in  1871,  was  based  upon  the 
German  Zollverein  established  in  1834.  The  word 
Zollvcrein  means  neither  more  nor  less  than  customs 
union.  Before  the  Zollvcrein  was  established  (and  for 
historical  accuracy  it  should  be  added  that  the  process 
was  gradual,  though  the  year  1834  may  be  taken  as  the 
main  date)  Germany  was  cut  up  into  a  multiplicity  of 
separate  areas  fenced  off  from  one  another  by  innumerable 
independent  customs  houses.  By  establishing  a  customs 
union  these  barriers  to  internal  trade  were  swept  away, 
and  though  the  different  (ierman  States  remained  politi- 
cally independent,  their  peoples  were  brought  into  such 


EXiott  and  fill 


HUGHKS 


exponent  of  this  conception.     His  advocacy  of  Imperialism      cIos3  commercial  union  with  one  another  that  the  ground 


as  the  leader  of  the  Australian  Labour  Party  may  usefully 
be  balanced  against  the  anti-patriotic  attitude  adopted 
by  a  section  of  the  Labour  Party  in  this  country.  Tn.it 
some  of  his  speeches  here  suffer  from  vagueness  may  be 
true,  but  his  action  in  Australia  has  been  full  of  determina- 
tion.    Promptly  on  the  outbreak  of  war  he  took  steps 


WIS  prepared  for  political  union. 

It  will  not,  however,  do  to  press  this  analogy  too  far. 
Tne  arguments  for  removing  an  internal  customs  barrier 
are  obviously  greater  than  thosj  for  removing  a  similar 
barrier  between  countries  separated  by  the  sea.  The 
same  consideration  applies  to  any  question  of  pohtical 


May  25,   1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


union.  It  is  much  easier  to  form  an  Imperial  Reichstag 
sitting  in  Berhn,  in  which  Saxony  and  Wiirtemburg  and 

the  rest  of  the  German  States  arc  represented,  than  to 
form  an  Imperial  Parliament  sitting  in  London  to  which 
Canada,  Australia  and  New  Zealand  would  have  to  send 
representatives  across  the  seas.  For  these  and  similar 
reasons  there  is  little  profit  in  studying  the  German 
analogy  too  closely.  Our  problems  are  peculiar  to  our- 
selves and  they  must  be  studied  in  the  light  of  our  own 
experience  and  the  light  of  our  own  ideals.  When  Mr. 
Chamberlain  addressed  the  representatives  of  the  Colonial 
Conference  in  1902,  he  said  emphatically  that  the  first 
thing  to  consider  was  "  how  far  we  can  extend  the  trade 
between  the  different  parts  of. the  Empire — a  reciprocal 
trade."  He  added  in  words  which  were  as  emphatic 
as  they  were  definite,  "  Our  first  object  then,  as  I  say,  is 
free  trade  within  the  Empire."  To  that  proposal 
the  i)ominions  made  no  response.  They  were  not 
prepared  to  concede  free  trade  to  the  Mother  Country. 
In  none  of  his  speeches  urging  Imperial  union  has  Mr. 
Hughes  indicated  any  willingness  on  the  part  of  Australia  to 
repeal  the  somewhat  heavy  duties  which  are  imposed  upon 
the  manutactures  of  the  Mother  Country.  What  is  true  of 
.'\ustralia  is  apparently 
true  jilso  of  Canada, 
New  Zealand  and  South 
Africa.  The  only  portion 
of  the  Empire  where  free 
trade  with  the  United 
Kingdom  prevails  is  In- 
dia, which  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  India  is  under 
the  direct  political  con- 
trol of  the  Home  Gov-, 
ernment.  Clearly  it  is 
impossible  to  coerce 
the  Dominions  in  this 
matter.  Nobody  would 
dream  of  proposing  to 
undertake  such  a  task, 
and  if  conceivably  it 
were  undertaken  it 
would  certainly  fail. 

These  are  facts  which 
should  be  borne  in  mind 
by  those  newspaper 
writers  who  are  in  the 
habit  of  arguing  that  the 
opposition  to  Imperial 
unity  comes  from  the 
free  traders  of  the  Uni- 
ted Kingdom.  Complete 
fiscal  union  is  impossible 
without  Imperial  free 
trade  and  the  opposition 
to  Imperial  free  trade 
comes  not  from  English 
free  traders  but  from 
Colonial  protectionists. 

Assuming  that  this  pro- 
tectionist opposition  to 
Imperial  unity  cannot  be 
overcome  we  have  to 
consider  whether  any 
steps  can  be  taken  to  secure  a  closer  unity  while  still 
maintaining  the  fiscal  independence  of  the  Dominions 
and  recognising  that  that  independence  will  be  used  for 
the  Sa.ke  of  protecting  colonial  industries  against  the 
competition  of  British  manufactures.  Here  again  it  is 
alleged  by  tariff  reform  writers  that  opposition  comes 
from  English  free  traders.  Again  the  allegation  is  untrue. 
The  only  proposal  which  the  tariff  reformers  in  this 
country  have  made  is  that  a  general  tariff  should  be 
imposed  upon  all  goods  entering  the  United  Kingdom, 
but  that  colonial  goods  should  be  admitted  at  a  lower 
rate  than  foreign  goods.  This  proposal,    so    far    from 

bringing  nearer  the  ideal  of  fiscal  unity  would  drive  that 
ideal  farther  off.  There  is  no  colonial  producer  who 
would  not  prefer  the  present  system  of  free  entry  into  the 
British  market  to  the  proposed  system  of  a  duty  upon  his 
goods  and  a  higher  duty  upon  foreign  goods. 

This  indeed  is  a  crucial  question  both  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  Dominions  and  of  our  Allies,  and  it  is  well 
at  once  to  face  it,  especially  in  view  of  the  growing  demand 
for  protective  duties  at  home  for  the  special  benefit  of 


p 

■ 

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t^H 

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:«^ 

i^l 

^B 

-jif 

^^M 

^K 

'^S^ 

^^H 

m 

^f^^mmM 

m,. . 

■•■  ■■••■<  ■.■■n..  ;»f  "  \,     ■ -- -^j-:  iJBBfe 

fe^^j^^^^^^^^^^^l 

British  agriculture.  The  arguments  for  and  against  that 
proposal  cannot  be  here  considered  in  detail,  but  this 
fact  must  at  once  be  faced,  that  it  is  impossible  to  protect 
British  agricultural  industries  without  imposing  heavy 
duties  upon  agricultural  products  now  supplied  to  us  by 
our  own  colonies  and  by  our  Allies. 

\\c  have  then  to  consider  whether,  leaving  aside  both 
the  proposals  of  the  tariff  reformers  and  the  pre-war 
view  of  the  ultra-free  traders,  we  can  take  any  practical 
steps  which,  while  falling  short  of  Mr.  Chamberlain's 
ideal  of  free  trade  within  the  Empire, ,  may  stiU  make 
Imperial  trade '  relations  closer.  There  is  one  step 
which  we  can  certainly  take,  namely  to  agree  with 
the  Dominions  to  penalise  the  trade  of  our  enemies. 
If  either  by  tariffs,  or  if  necessary  by  absolute  pro- 
hibitions, German  trade  is  handicapped  in  all  countries 
under  the  British  flag,  to  that  extent  those  countries 
will  at  any  rate  have  the  opportunity  of  trading 
more  frequently  and  more  fully  with  one  another. 

On  the  political  side  the  ideal  vaguely  floating  in 
many  minds  is  the  creation  of  some  form  of  truly 
Imperial  Parliament.  But  the  Dominions,  quite  intel- 
ligibly,   look   with   alarm   upon    the    possibility   of   an 

Imperial  Parliament 
which  would  deprive 
them  of  even  a  portion 
of  their  present  com- 
plete legislative  inde- 
pendence. But  it  may, 
however,  be  suggested 
that  there  are  certain 
inter-Imperial  questions 
which  can  reasonably  be 
referred  to  decision  by 
an  Imperial  Council 
\vithout  effectively 
encroaching  upon  the 
privileges  of  the  various 
domestic  legislatures. 
Probably  any  such  Coun- 
cil would  have  to  be 
composed  rather  of  dele- 
gates from  the  existing 
governments  than  of 
representatives  to  be 
chosen  by  direct  popular 
election.  '; 

Without  waiting  for 
the  creation  of  such  an 
Imperial  Council  for 
settling  inter  -  Imperial 
problems,  there  is  one 
definite  step  towards 
closer  Imperial  union 
which  might  be  taken 
at  once.  The  present 
Parliament  of  the  United 
Kingdom  —  frequently 
known  as  the  Imperial 
Parliament,  though  the 
title  is  only  partially 
justified  —  consists  not 
only  of  the  House  of 
Commons,  but  also  of  the 
House  of  Lords.  When  England  and  Scotland  were 
united  by  the  Act  of  Union  in  1707,  it  was  very 
properly  provided  that  the  sovereign  should  no 
longer  create  peers  of  England,  but  that  he  should 
instead  create  peers  of  Great  Britain.  Subsequently 
when  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  were  united  in 
1801,  peerages  of  the  United  Kingdom  were  substituted 
for  peerages  of  Great  Britain.  Cannot  we,  following  these 
analogies,  now  provide  for  the  creation  of  peerages  of  the 
Empire  ?  Such  peerages  must  be  freed  from  the  serious 
objection  attaching  to  existing  Peerages,  namely,  their 
hereditary  character,  and  be  given  for  life  only.  They 
must  clearly  be  limited  in  number,  and  precaution  must 
be  taken  that  the  selecting  authority  is  not  affected  by 
considerations  of  British  party  politics.  Subject  to  these 
conditions,  it  would  be  an  immense  advantage  if  the 
King  were  at  once  authorised  by  Act  of  Parliament  to 
create  Peers  of  the  Empire,  without  regard  to  creed  or 
race  or  colour,  to  hold  office  for  life  and  to  act 
as  spokesmen  in  the  House  of  Lords  for  the  oversea 
portions  and  problems  of  His  Majesty's  Dominions. 


Elliott  and  Ifry 
CECIL    RHODES 

Born   Bishop   Stortford.  July  5,    1853— Died   Cope  Town,   March    26.   19D2 


L  A  X  D      &      W  A  T  E  R 


May  25,  1916 


Story   of  the  Five  Nations 

The  story  of  the  Five  Nations  and  the  part  they  have  played  in  the  Great  War,  when  it  comes  to 
be  written  fully,  will  form  the  noblest  epic  in  the  annals  of  the  world.  That  day  has  yet  to  dai&n. 
But  here  we  give  briefly,  and  as  it  were  in  skeleton  form,  the  outlines  of  this  splendid  story. 
The  following  articles  from  the  pen  of  able  writers,  each  familiar  u'ith  the  events  he 
describes  from  the  hour  when  the  first  bugle  sounded  the  call  to  arms,  set  forth  tersely  the 
glorious  assembly  of  the  fighting  forces  of  the  British  Empire.  Mr.  Hilaire  Belloc  and  Mr. 
Arthur  Pollen  in  other  pages  of  this  issue  tell  of  the  strength  which  the  Mother  Nation  has 
herself  displayed.  We  have  added  to  this  story  an  account  of  what  India  has  done,  leritten 
by  Sir  Francis  Younghusband,  and  also  a  summary,  necessarily  brief,  of  the  extraordinary 
efforts  made  by  the  outlying  parts  of  the  Empire  to  render  the  fullest  assistance  in  their  power  to 
the  cause  of  liberty  and  humanity  for  which  Great  Britain  and  the  Britains  beyond  the  Seas 
are  warring.  Try  to  visualise  the  gathering  together  of  this  mighty  army,  from  almost  all 
the  shores  of  *he  world,  remembering  that  they  have  come  together  of  their  ozmt  free  will,  with- 
out compulsion.     The  dream   of  our  greatest  Imperial  statesmen   has   been  resolved  into  fact. 


Canada  and  Her  Army 

By  an  Officer  of  the  Canadian  Expeditionary   Force 


r 


Gencnl  Service  BaiUe 


"T  is  fortunate  for 
us  that  this  world 
war  was  preceded 
.by  a    period     of 
organising        military 
activity  in  Canada.   In 
summarising  the    tale 
of      the     Dominion's 
participation     in   the 
struggle,    a   few    pre- 
liminary facts  deserve 
to  be  recalled.    At  the 
Colonial  Conference  of 
1907,  the  Chief  of  the 
British  General  Staff, 
Sir  Neville  Lyttelton, 
in  a  paper  on   "  The 
Strategical  Conditions 
of  the    Empire    from 
a    Military    Point    of 
View,"  laid  down  three  fundamental  principles  of  Imperial 
preparation,  of  which  the  first  two  were  : — 

1.  The  obligation  imposed  on  each  self-governing  unit  of 
providing  as  far  as  possible  for  its  own  security. 

2.  The  duty  of  arranging  for  mutual  assistance  upon  some 
definite  lines  in  case  of  need. 

An  Imperial  General  Staff  was  then  proposed,  a  common 
type  of  organisation,  a  common  terminology,  and  a 
common  standard  of  education  for  officers.  It  was  further 
suggested  by  General  Lyttelton  that  whatever  the  size  of  a 
contingent  sent  by  a  colony,  it  should  be  accompanied  bj- 
the  requisite  number  of  administrative  field  units.  The 
suggestions  were  accepted,  and  the  further  Defence 
Conference  of  1909  saw  a  general  concurrence  of  the 
overseas  members  in  the  proposition  "  that  each  part  of 
the  Empire  is  willing  to  make  its  preparation  on  such 
lines  as  will  enable  it,  should  it  so  desire,  to  take  its 
share  in  the  general  defence  of  the  Empire." 

Sir  John  French's  Visit 

When,  in  the  following  year.  Sir  John  French,  as 
Inspector-General  of  the  Overseas  Forces,  paid  a  visit  to 
Canada,  he  criticised,  not  unsympathetically,  the  con- 
ditions then  prevalent,  and  made  further  \'aluable  sug- 
gestions. Two  years  later,  the  Dominions  Section  was 
established  at  the  War  Office.  Danger  was  in  the  air  and 
the  Empire  was  prepared  to  meet  it. 

.•\bout  this  time  the  Liberal  Government,  which  had 
been  fifteen  years  in  power  in  Canada,  was  overthrown. 
and  a  new  War  Minister,  Colonel  (after  Major-Generai 
Sir  Sam)  Hughes,  entered  upon  the  scene.  Popular 
interest  in  miUtary  affairs  became  marvellously  quickened, 
and  the  work  of  organisation  went  forward  by  leaps  and 
bounds.  Now  to  the  question  :  What  was  the  actual 
state  of  Canada's  army  at  the  outbreak  of  war  ?  It  con- 
sisted of  3.500  permanent  troops  and  (on  paper)  60.000 


active  militia.  In  point  of  fact,  the  number  presenting 
themselves  for  annual  drill  was  never  more  than  45,000 
and  was  frequently  below  40,000,  imperfectly  trained, 
equipped  and  officered.  In  addition,  there  were  3,000 
or  4.000  British  Army  reservists,  and  there  were  some 
25,000  members  of  civilian  rifle  clubs,  a  useful  organisa- 
tion dating  from  1901,  whose  members  might  be  expected 
to  fill  up  the  gaps  in  the  MiUtia  ranks. 

This  then,  was  Canada's  military  strength  at  the  out- 
break of  war.  Undeterred  by  the  misgivings  of  experts 
and  by  manifest  technical,  as  well  as  numerical  short- 
comings, the  Prime  Minister  of  Canada,  Sir  Robert 
Borden,  offered  20,000  men  to  the  British  Government 
to  join  the  Imperial  forces  at  the  front,  and  the  offer 
was  accepted.  Promptly  did  Canada  respond  to  the 
call ;  old  Militiamen  as  well  as  untrained  volunteers 
poured  into  the  hastily-improvised  recruiting  stations, 
and  in  less  than  a  month  the  Minister  of  Militia  found 
nearly  40.000  men  under  his  orders. 

Valcartier  Training  Gamp 

A  huge  training  camp,  the  largest  ever  seen  on  Canadian 
soil,  sprang  into  being  at  Valcartier.  in  the  vicinity  of 
Quebec.  The  formation  of  this  camp  was  itself  a  triumph 
of  engineering  and  military  science.  The  making  of  roads, 
drains,  the  establishment  of  a  water  supply,  the  laying 
of  railway  tracks,  electric  lighting,  telephones,  a  sanitary 
system,  bath-houses,  was  accomplished  within  a  single 
fortnight.  The  largest  rifle  range  in  the  world,  with  a  line 
of  targets  3|  miles  long,  was  set  up.  Within  a  week 
25.000  men  had  flocked  thither  from  all  parts  of  the 
Dominion,  drawn  from  every  class  and  phase  of  the 
national  life  ;  from  Canadian  towns,  homesteads,  ranches, 
mines  and  factories. 

It  had  been  decided  to  send  to  England  a  complete 
division,  in  addition  to  a  reserve  brigade  to  be  used  for 
drafting  purposes  to  repair  the  losses  in  the  field.  Not 
only  had  these  troops  to  be  armed  and  trained,  but  the 
material  had  to  be  created  on  the  spot— clothing,  boots, 
puttees,  mess-tins,  belts,  haversacks,  bandoliers,  pouches 
— in  brief,  all  the  accoutrements  of  an  army.  No  detail 
of  administration  was  overlooked.  The  force  received 
careful  medical  attention  and  every  man  was  inoculated 
against  typhoid.  A  fleet  of  transJDorts  was  assembled, 
and  on  one  rainy  day  towards  the  end  of  September,  the 
Duke  of  Connaught,  accompanied  by  the  Duches?-  and 
the  Princess  Patricia,  reviewed  the  first  division  of  the 
Canadian  Expeditionary  Force.  A  few  days  later  a 
fleet  of  transports,  such  a  fleet  as  had  never  before  been 
borne  seaward  on  the  St.  Lawrence,  sailed  away  to  Ply- 
mouth and  the  Old  Land.  They  arrived  in  the  middle 
of  October  and  were  at  once  encamped  on  Sahsbury 
Pla:in,  where,  under  their  new  commander,  Lieut.-General 
Sir  Edwin  Alderson,  they  underwent  further  training 
under  conditions  which  severely  tried  their  spirit  and 
powers  of  endurance,  but  from  which  they  emerged 
triumphant.  Here  they  were  visited  by  that  matchless 
soldier.  Lord  Roberts,  whose  name  alorie  had  a  magical 
power  to  kindle  their  zeal  and  loyalty.  "  The  prompt 
resolve  of  Canada."  he  told  them,  speaking  for  Englishmen. 


May  25,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


"  to  give  us  such  valuable  assistance,  has  touched  us 
deeply.  That  resolve  has  been  quickened  into  action 
in  a  marvellously  short  space  of  time,  under  the  excellent 
organising  and  driving  power  of  your  Minister  of  Militia 
— my  friend,  Major-General  Hughes." 

Early  in  December,  one  Canadian  battalion,  the 
"  Princess  Patricia's  Canadian  Light  Infantry,"  com- 
posed almost  wholly  of  veteran  soldiers,  left  the  camp  to 
join  the  27th  British  Division.  But  it  was  not  until  the 
second  week  in  February  of  last  year  that  the  First 
Canadian  Division  landed  at  St.  Nazaire,  and  thus  found 
itself  at  last  in  France. 

In  this  Division  were  two  thousand  descendants  of  the 
•Frenchmen  who  had  left  France  in  the  17th  century. 
One  company  of  the  14th  Battalion  was-  entirely  com- 
posed of  French  Canadians,  speaking  only  the  tongue  of 
their  ancestors,  and  as  they  marched  through  the  French 
countryside,  on  their  way  to  the  front,  the  air  rang  with 
the  old  chansons,  which,  long  since  forgotten  in  the  land 
of  their  origin,  still  lived  in  the  New  France  overseas, 
from  whence  they  came.  "  The  population,"  wrote  a 
French  Canadian  officer,  "  applauded  us  ;  people  ran 
to  the  doors  of  their  houses  and  offered  us  fruit  and  wine  ; 
at  the  stopping-places,  French  soldiers  brought  us  coffee 
and  rum  ;  joy  and  gaiety  reigned  everywhere,  as  we 
passed."  It  was  an  irresistible  appeal  to  the  historic 
imagination. 

Having  taken  over  French  trenches  at  the  front,  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Ypres,  not  many  weeks  elapsed  before 
the  Canadians  received  their  baptism  of  fire.  The 
"  Princess  Pats  "  was  the  first  of  the  overseas  battalions 
to  be  engaged  in  an  action  of  real  importance.  This  was 
at  St.  Eloi,  and  on  March  20th  their  gallant  commander, 
Colonel  Farquhar,  was  killed.  During  the  ensuing 
month  the  battahon  covered  itself  and  the  name  it  bore 
with  eternal  glory. 

Second  Battle  of  Ypres 

With  the  famous  Second  Battle  of  Ypres,  the  world  is 
now  familiar.  In  those  three  days,  April  22nd,  23rd 
and  24th,  1915,  the  fame  of  the  First  Canadian  Division 
spread  throughout  the  world.  The  French  line  of  trenches 
had  been  emptied  by  a  pestilential  and  irresistible  onrush 
of  poisonous  gas.  The  Canadians  sprang  into  the  breach, 
and  were  left  to  bear  the  brunt.  Enormously  out- 
numbered, they  fought  steadily  two  days  and  nights, 
knowing  that  upon  their  efforts  depended  the  safety 
of  the  whole  line  which  the  enemy  -was  endeavouring  to 
pierce.  "  The  Canadians,"  reported  Sir  John  French, 
"  held  their  ground  with  a  magnificent  display  of  tenacity 
and  courage  ;  and  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the 
bearing  and  conduct  of  these  splendid  troops  averted  a 
disaster  which  might  have  been  attended  with  the  most 
serious  consequences."  "  Canada,"  said  the  Tinies, 
"  saved  Calais." 

Meanwhile  Canada  was  not  slackening  her  efforts. 
Another  call  for  troops  had  gone  forth,  and  another,  and 
another.  In  May,  just  following  the  Second  Battle  of  Ypres, 
which  had  stirred  all  Canada  like  flame,  a  second  division 
set  sail.  In  September,  the  month  which  saw  a  further 
important  action  at  Loos,  a  third  division  left  Canadian 
shores.  At  the  present  moment,  a  fourth  division  is  in 
England,  en  route  for  the  seat  of  war,  and  a  fifth  and 
sixth  are  forming. 

In  March,  1916,  it  was  announced  by  Sir  Robert  Borden 
that  his  Government  was  authorising  the  enrolment  of 
500,000  men  as  Canada's  contribution  to  the  forces  of  the 
Empire.  Of  this  number,  nearly  350,000  are  already 
under  arms. 

Gradually  Canada  has  built  up,  keeping  pace  with  these 
active  military  developments,  a  great  military  organisa- 
tion, not  only  in  the  Dominion,  but  in  this  country.  In 
London  is  Major-General  J.  W.  Carson,  C.B.,  and  an 
administrative  staff,  constantly  in  touch  with  the  War 
Office,  with  the  Army  Council  and  with  the  Imperial 
General  Staff.  Moreover,  on  the  East  Coast  is  a  great 
reserve  division,  under  Brigadier-General  J.  C.  Macdougall, 
C.M.G.,  which  is  constantly  drafting  men  to  the  depleted 
battalions  in  the  firing  line.  The  Representative  of  the 
Dominion  Government  at  the  front  is  Colonel  Sir  Max 
Aitken,  M.P.  There  is  a  thoroughly-equipped  medical 
service  under  General  Carlton-Jones,  and  a  staff  of 
eminent  surgeons,  and  scattered  through  the  country  are 


numerous  Canadian  hospitals  and  convalescent  homes 
which  minister  to  the  needs  of  Canada's  sick  and  wounded. 
The  Canadian  Pay  and  Record  Offices  in  Westminster 
employ  a  thousand  military  clerks.  Altogether  Canada's 
war  expenditure  already  approaches  a  million  dollars  a 
day. 

The  War  Machine 

Gradually  the  war  machine  of  the  Dominion  has  been 
approximated  in  character  and  discipline  to  the  fighting 
forces  of  the  Mother  Country.  The  system  throughout, 
even  to  its  smallest  details,  is  the  same  ;  the  uniform  of 
the  troops  is  the  same  ;  such  laxity  as  was  apparent  on 
the  arrival  of  the  first  division  has  vanished,  and  there 
is  now  nothing  in  the  appearance,  deportment  or  morale  of 
the  men  to  distinguish  them  from  any  of  the  newly-raised 
British  battalions,  save  that  the  physique  of  the  Canadians 
is  rather  superior.  The  very  term  "  battalion  "  is  of 
recent  introduction  in  Canada  ;  the  unit  was  the  regi- 
ment. At  first,  the  Canadian  battalions  wore  any 
distinguishing  badges,  the  maple  leaf  and  the  brass 
shoulder-lettering  being  their  only  mark  of  individuality. 
But  at  an  early  stage  it  was  thought  wise  to  encourage  the 
territorial  system,  and  battalions  came  to  be  associated 
with  the  locaUties  in  which  they  were  raised.  Individual 
badges  were  devised  and  by  degrees  a  battalion  esprit 
de  corps  was  fostered. 

It  is  perhaps  invidious  to  single  out  any  one  of  the 
scores  of  battalions  which  have  seen  active  service,  but 
Canadians  will  not  soon  forget  the  deeds  of  the  gallant 
"  Princess  Pats,"  the  i6th  Battalion  (Canadian  Scottish), 
the  4th  Battalion,  the  ist  (Ontario)  Battalion,  the  3rd 
(Toronto),  Battalion,  the  7th  Battalion  (British  Columbia 
Regiment),  the  13th  Battalion  (Royal  Highlanders  of 
Canada),  the  8th  Battalion  (90th  Winnipeg  Rifles).  Of 
the  gallant  officers  who  have  fallen  the  list  is  large,  but 
the  names  of  Birchall,  Norsworthy,  Merritt,  Boyle, 
McHarg  and  Drummond  are  sure  of  a  niche  in  our 
Temple  of  Fame. 

What  the  war  has  done  in  a  military  sense  for  Canada 
stands  revealed.  The  series  of  scattered  units,  enrolled 
merely  for  local  defence  and  intended  in  time  of  war  to  be 
auxiliary  to  an  army  raised  by  Great  Britain,  has 
vanished  as  such  forever  from  the  scene,  emerging  as  a 
Canadian  Army,  which  already  in  the  crucible  of  war  has 
adjusted  itself  into  the  machinery  of  a  world- v/ide  Im- 
perial military  system. 

Australia's  Part 

By  Arthur  Mason 

(London  Correspondent  of  the  "  Sydney  Morninl  Herald  ") 

IN  days  to  come, 
when  place  and 
share  and  praise 
and  honour  shall 
have  been  measured 
through  the  juster 
perspective  of  his- 
tory, Australia's  en- 
t  husiasm  of  service 
and  sacrifice  in  the 
cause  of  Empire  will 
have  its  due  portion 
of  fame  in  the  common 
fame  of  the  Dominion 
peoples.  That  estimate 
of  a  future  generation, 
the  result  of  a  more 
ilelicatc  balancing  of 
forces  than  is  avail- 
able to  us  who  are  in 
the  very  midst  of  their  clash  and  fire  will,  as  it  always 
does,  consolidate  our  faiths  and  illumine  our  judgments. 
The  material  progress  which  had  lifted  Australia  to 
national  stature  by  gi:ace  merely  of  a  handful  of  population 
and  a  century  of  time,  had  been  the  ideal  progress  of  a 
land  that  was  always  prosperous  and  always  peaceful. 
The  hint  of  war  had  disturbed  that  progress.  No  thought 
of  war  had  checked  it.  The  wars  of  other  lands  and  other 
ages  were,  in  Australia,  not  the  catastrophic  crises  of 
national  fate,  but  part  of  the  picturesque  tradition  of  a 


Cvtriicrtil    Service    Bud^c 


10 


LAND      &     WATER 


May  25.  1916 


storied  past.  She  had  had  a  share  in  the  South  African 
war,  but  long  before  July.  1914.  it  had  come  to  be  recog- 
nised as  a  small  share  in  a  small  campaign.  No  possible 
inspiration  to  thought  of  war  was  to  be  had  by  her  people, 
either  from  the  poUtical  experiments  in  which  they  were 
constantly  engaged,  or  from  the  steady  flow  of  prosperous 
years  in  which  their  wealth  grew  and  multiplied.  Still 
less  was  there  of  such  inspiration  in  the  easy  circum- 
stances of  a  life  swathed  in  .\ustralia's  natural  surrounding 
of  soft  airs  and  abiding  sunshine.  Yet,  and  in  spite  of  all, 
influences  of  sterner  motive  were  undoubtedly  abroad. 

Tliere  was  alwavs,  for  one  thing,  the  incalculable  in- 
fluence of  Australian  loyalty  to  Britain.  For  the  most 
pa-t  dormant,  it  was  easily  awakened  and  obviously 
alive.  No  one  doubted  that  if  ever  a  day  should  demand 
of  it  something  more  than  the  singing  of  national  songs 
and  the  waving  of  national  flags,  that  demand  would  be 
met,  and  met  not  less,  but  more  willingly  by  reason  of 
the  growing  sturdincss  of  a  definitely  Australian  national 
spirit.  Graduallv,  too,  the  leaders  of  Australian  political 
thought  had  begun  to  measure  the  antagonistic  possi- 
bilities of  other  races  of  the  Eastern  seas.  In  the  eves  of  a 
constitutionally  easy-H\dng  people  this  was  little  more 
than  a  far-off  menace,  escape  from  which  seemed,  in 
any  case,  to  be  a  matter  almost  wholly  beyond  the 
capacity  of  their  limited  numbers.  By  reason  of  it, 
nevertheless,  the  seed  of  the  defence  preparation  of 
Australia  was  sown,  and  the  fruit  of  it  became  visible 
when,  in  1909,  the  Royal  Australian  Navy  came  into 
being,  and  when  in  i()io,  the  historic  \-isit  of  Lord 
Kitchener  led  to  the  Defence  Act  of  that  year  and  its 
proN-ision  for  compulsory  training. 

Kitchener's   Scheme 

For  the  most  part,  the  Kitchener  scheme  and  the  Act 
based  upon  it  were  measures  for  a  so  distant  future  that 
their  bearing  upon  the  actual  war  demand  of  1914  is  to  be 
found  not  in  the  region  of  facts,  but  among  those  other 
less  tangible  influences  which  have  played  so  great  a  part 
in  the  arming  of  Austraha.  For  the  Military  College  of 
Duntroon  established  under  the  Act,  had  no  more  than 
begun  its  work  in  1914,  while  the  Citizen  Defence  Force 
was  to  be  built  up  gradually  by  drafts  of  the  cadets  who 
had  been  trained  for  a  specified  term  of  four  years  between 
the  ages  14  to  18.  But  from  its  very  beginning  the  com- 
pulsory training  scheme  had  a  moral  effect  upon  the 
nation.  It  lifted  the  thoughts  of  hundreds  and  thousands 
of  Australians  to  things  beyond  their  accustomed  range.  It 
strengthened  the  fibres  of  Australian  nationality  no  less 
than  it  improved  the  physique  of  Austrahan  boyhood. 
It  reminded  a  people  almost  too  easily  circumstanced 
that  danger  might  lurk  unobserved,  and  that  the  respon- 
sibihties  of  nationhood  could  not  for  ever  be  avoided. 
And  in  every  one  of  those  details  it  was  a  compelling 
influence  upon  the  mind  and  heart  of  Australia  when  the 
])low  fell  and  the  Empire  call  rang  across  the  world. 

Not  the  only  influence,  of  course,  for  there  were  many 
influences,  and  all  the  influences  together  surged  into  a 
common  irresistible  impulse,  so  that  Britain's  entrance 
upon  war,  at  a  stroke  and  from  one  end  to  the  other  of 
the  continent,  transformed  this  peaceful,  peace-loving 
Australia  into  a  land  aflame  with  the  ardour  of  battle. 
Space  will  allow  no  more  than  a  bint  of  that  sudden 
fierce  enthusiasm — how  it  issued  first  m  the  Government's 
immediate  offer  of  an  E.xpeditionary  Force,  and  after- 
■  wards  in  ten  thousand  subsidiary  enthusit^^ms,  how  ac 
the  signal  men  came  hurrying  from  near  and  far  lo  offer 
their  fighting  services,  men  of  the  cities  and  men  of  the 
bush,  men  of  the  silent  mountains,  and  men  of  the  great 
plains,  men  of  cultivated  profession,  and  men  of  the 
humblest  callings,  picturesque  men  of  all  kinds  and  con- 
ditions from  across  the  unrivalled  inner  picturesque  lands 
of  Australia,  men  who  lived  at  touch  with  the  grandeur  of 
its  magnificent  distances,  men  who  sweated  in  the 
dusts  and  heats  of  its  desert  wastes,  lonely  men  from 
west  of  sunset,  and  men  of  the  crowded  highways  of  life — ■ 
left  all  and  came  flooding  in  at  the  word  of  need.  Nor  can 
more  be  said  of  the  Australian  enthusiasm  of  liberality, 
an  enthusiasm  which  set  the  whole  nation  at  work  for 
others  and  for  their  own,  and  which  has  subscribed  nearly 
four  millions  sterling  to  war  funds  and  contributed  many 
miliicms  of  articles  of  fodO.  and  clothing  to  whomsoever 
seemed  to  deserve  or  desire  them.     And  only  a  word,  too, 


of  the  stress  and  strain  of  Governments,  and  of  all  in 
authority  ;  or  of  the  completeness  of  the  offer  which  has 
promised  300.000  Australian  soldiers  to  Bntam  and 
has  despatched  a  great  proportion  of  that  number  fully 
equipped  and  partially  trained,  what  time  the  financial 
burden  of  it  all  upon  the  five  million  people  of  Australia 
calls  for  repeated  War  Loans  and  foreshadows  an  ex- 
penditure for  the  current  year  of  £75,000,000. 

First  Successes 

With  no  more  than  this  in  respect  of  achievements 
and  sacrifices  which  in  themselves  are  of  the  essence  of 
national  revolution,  one  passes  to  a  word  in  remembrance, 
of  achievement  in  actual  war  and  the  supreme  sacrifice 
inseparable  from  it.  The  first  Australian  successes  were 
those  by  which,  in  October,  1914,  Australia  possessed 
herself  of  the  important  German  colonies  of  New  Guinea 
and  New  Britain.  On  November  9th,  -too,  the  wholly 
admirable  activities  of  the  Royal  Australian  Navy  were 
crowned  by  the  ^^ctory  of  the  cruiser  Syd)icy  over  the 
notorious  Emdcn,  a  dramatic  event  which  fully  and 
finally  established  the  infant  Australian  Navy  in  the 
affections  of  the  Australian  people,  who,  besides,  are 
proud  to  think  that  ships  of  their's  are  now  in  battle-line 
in  the  North  Sea  with  the  mighty  fleet  of  Britain. 

The  men  who  had  rushed  by  the  thousand  to  the  first 
enlistments  were  soon  in  training  camps  near  the  capital 
cities,  available  to  them  the  more  conveniently  by  reason 
of  the  Defence  organisation,  of  whose  machinery  they 
and  many  of  the  officers  at  their  service  were  a  part. 
But  the  work  of  the  camps  had  to  be  short  and  sharp. 
For  it  was  no  far  cry  from  those  fateful  days  of  August 
to  the  night  of  December  6th,  when  the  fleet  of  transports 
bearing  the  first  Austrahan  troops  to  fight  on  European 
fields  stole  in  line  through  the  Suez  Canal,  and  no  farther 
cry  to  the  days  that  followed,  when  the  sands  of  the 
desert,  and  the  waters  of  the  Nile,  and  the  stones  of 
immemorial  temples  and  tombs  —the  whole  vast  solemnity 
of  ancient  Egypt— were  the  familiar  surrounding  of  the 
youngest  army  of  the  Empire  come  from  the  newest 
nation  of  the  world. 

Their  work  in  the  sands  and  the  sun  of  the  Egyptian 
training  grounds  was  hard  and  unceasing.  But  it  re-made 
them.  It  built  them  and  those  who  followed  them, 
detachment  after  detachment,  a  steady  stream  of  re- 
inforcements—tens of  thousands  of  Australians  in  arms  — 
into  the  soldiers  they  meant  to  be.  It  gave  them,  more- 
over. General  Birdwood,  now  their  leader  of  leaders.  It 
sent  them,  under  him,  to  the  Dardanelles  and  GallipoH, 
there,  on  April  25th,  1915,  to  make  the  glorious  entrance 
into  battle  which  has  immortalised  them,  there  to  fight 
through  months  of  unflinching  gallantry  in  almost  every 
hour  of  which  was  an  act  of  heroism,  in  some  hours  at  least 
of  which— as  in  those  of  the  unforgettably  bloody  days  01 
last  year's  August— hundreds  of  Australian  lads  fell 
without  a  murmur  and  died  without  a  cry.  Through 
eight  months  of  bitter  fighting,  varied  by  unescapable 
lingering  sickness,  the  (lallipoli  campaign  wore  to  its 
ignominious  end.  Out  of  the  mouth  of  the  hell  of  it  the 
Australian  soldiers  came,  in  Deceml^er  last,  unsullied, 
established  in  a  fighting  fame  as  glorious  as  any. 
They  left  behind  them  thousands  of  their  dead,  the 
graves  of  whom  are  an  abiding  sorrow  of  the  kinsfolk 
and  friends  who,  though  '.hey  sent  them  forth  gladly 
risking  all  were  wholly  without  thought  of  such  a  tragedy 
on  such  u  oodle. 

The  way  of  Australia,  however,  under  this  shock  of  war, 
is  a  great  way.  It  covers  its  strange  new  grief  with 
silence.  The  11,000  Australian  sick  and  wounded  who 
have  been  nursed  back  to  health  in  British  hospitals,  or 
invalided  home,  cover  theirs  with  a  smile.  Such  as  are 
fit  once  more  have  joined  their  fellows  in  the  pleasanter 
fields  of  France,  obviously  happy  in  the  thought  of  a  new 
campaign.  In  Australia  they  will  be  remembered  less 
with  anxiety  than  with  confidence  and  pride.  For 
Australia  was  never  more  proudly  at  war  than  now. 
Still  her  soldiers  come.  Still  she  gathers  and  trains  and 
equips  and  sends  them  forth.  She  makes  munitions  of 
war.  Out  of  her  fertility  she  feeds  the  comrade  peoples 
half  across  the  world.  Her  call  for  men  and  still 
more  men  is  a  matter  of  ordered  campaigning 
by  the  legislatures  of  all  her  States,  and  if  appeals 
should  fail  she  will  not  hesitate  to  compel.     In  all  regards. 


May  25,   1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


II 


indeed,  Australia  has  played  and  is  plajnng  and  will 
continue  to  play,  the  part  of  a  Dominion  of  the  Empire 
whose  people  have  risen  easily  and  fearlessly  to  exalted 
vision  of  a  great  Imperial  cause. 

New  Zealand's  Share 


By  Noel  Ross 


Ol 


General  Service   Badge 


N  April  25th 
Londoners 
ined  the 
streets  and 
cheered  themselves 
hoarse  as  the  Anzacs 
marched  to  the 
memorial  service  in 
Westminster  Abbey. 
What  was  it  they 
were  cheering  ?  Some, 
perhaps,  applauded 
the  good  carriage  and 
the  fine  physique  of 
the  men  from  Over- 
seas. Some  cheered 
because  it  was  the  first 
approach  to  a  military 
pageant,  the  nearest 
to  a  "  Maffick,"  that 
they  had  yet  been  allowed.  How  many  saw  the  real 
significance  of  those  long  columns  ?  How  many  of  those 
enthusiastic  Londoners  realised  that  the  true  lesson  lay 
in  the  fact  that  those  men,  drawn  by  no  tangible  tie, 
had  come  15,000  miles  to  fight  for  Empire. 

We  in  New  Zealand  heard  of  the  declaration  of  war  on 
August  5th,  1914.  Inside  three  weeks  an  expeditionary 
force,  fully  equipped  with  guns,  and  escorted  by  colonial 
war  vessels,  had  captured  German  Samoa,  the  first 
enemy  possession  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  Britain. 
During  the  same  period  the  military  resources  of  our 
small  Dominion  had  been  taxed  to  the  uttermost,  but 
they  had  withstood  the  strain. 

Crowded  Recruiting  Offices 

Camps  sprang  up  in  various  parts,  and  men  were 
drafted  to  central  points.  At  Auckland,  Wellington, 
Christchurch,  and  Dunedin,  the  recruiting  offices  were 
rushed  by  men  anxious  to  enlist.  Many  would-be 
recruits  came  hundreds  of  miles,  only  to  find  that  they 
were  too  late  and  would  have  to  await  the  formation  of 
the  reinforcement  units  before  they  could  get  places. 
At  the  end  of  the  first  month  there  was  in  the  camps 
a  force  of  approximately  10,000  men.  Nor  was  this  all. 
Thanks  to  the  system  of  compulsory  military  training, 
one  man  out  of  three,  and  that  is  an  excellent  leaven' 
knew  how  to  handle  his  rifle  ;  knew  what  was  expected 
of  him  in  the  way  of  discipline  ;  understood  the  elements 
of  camp  sanitation  ;  and  even  had  a  grounding  in  work 
in  the  field.  With  the  mounted  men  these  benefits  were 
even  more  marked.  Those  who  had  them,  brought  their 
own  horses,  many  of  them  valuable  beasts,  and  they  knew 
how  to  look  after  them.  A  colonial  trooper  is  his  own 
veterinary. 

Clothing  and  stores  of  all  sorts  came  quickly  to  hand, 
and  before  the  end  of  September  the  New  Zealand' 
Expeditionary  Force  was  an  accomplished  fact,  fully 
armed,  with  complete  equipment,  and  ready  to  go 
anywhere  the  Mother  Land  commanded.  Big  ocean- 
going merchantmen  and  liners  were  acquired  by  the 
authorities.  Marble  panelled  saloons  were  transformed 
into  rough  deal-boarded  mess  rooms,  and  cabins  were 
removed.  :^unks  were  fitted  up  tier  upon  tier  in  the 
holds,  and  even  in  the  refrigerating  chambers.  Then 
the  men  were  marched  from  the  four  centres  to  the 
transports.  To  the  man  in  the  ranks  things  seemed  to 
go  without  a  hitch,  and  no  better  testimonial  could  be 
given  to  those  responsible  for  the  organising  of  the  force. 
The  fleet  of  grey-painted  troopships  concentrated  at  the 
port  of  the  capital— and  waited,  for  the  German  was 
prowling  in  the  Pacific.  A  month  passed  before  it  was  safe 
to  venture  out.  The  time  was  not  wasted,  for  route 
marches  filled  the  long  spring  days.  At  last  came  our 
escort.  « We  woke  one  morning  to  see  moored  near  us  a 
great  black  hull.     It  was  the  cruiser  Ihuki,   flying  the 


Rising  Sun  of  Japan.  Then  on  a  morning  when  the  sea 
was  so  smooth  that  each  ship  was  reflected  in  perfect 
outhne,  the  twelve  grey  transports  glided  out  of  harbour. 
The  Great  Adventure  had  begun. 

No  need  to  recall  the  long  period  of  training  in  Egj^t, 
or  the  tragic  sequel  at  Gallipoli.  Some  of  us  had  but  a 
few  hours  on  the  Peninsula,  some,  but  very  few,  held  out 
through  the  long  days  until  the  evacuation. 

From  the  original  New  Zealand  contingent  of  10,000, 
has  sprung  a  force  of  50,000  men  !  Of  this  total  38,000 
have  sailed  from  New  Zealand  and  the  remainder  are  in 
camp  in  the  Dominion.  In  addition,  some  hunchreds  have 
joined  in  England  and  Australia.  To  you  people  who 
talk  lightly  of  milHons,  that  seems  perhaps  a  drop  in  the 
ocean.  It  means  more  to  us,  for  that  50,000  has  come 
out  of  a  population  of  a  million  souls — no  more.  To 
keep  up  reinforcements  for  this  force,  we  have  to  supply 
2,500  men  every  month  and  the  men  arc  not  hanging  back. 

Ideal  Camps 

An  Imperial  military  man  of  high  standing  said  recently 
that  the  two  main  camps  in  New  Zealand,  at  Trentham 
and  Featherstone,  were  probably  equal  to  any  in  the 
world.  That  seems  a  sweeping  assertion,  but  it  is  possible. 
Between  the  two  camps  10,000  men  can  be  accommodated. 
All  the  men  are  in  wooden  buildings,  and  there  is  no 
overcrowding.  The  water  supply  and  the  drainage  are 
excellent,  there  is  electric  light,  and  a  railway  runs  into 
the  centre  of  each  camp.  There  are  in  addition  bathing 
arrangements  and  every  device  that  can  be  thought  of 
for  the  comfort  of  the  men.  Horses  are  being  shipped 
continually,  and  there  are  twelve  ocean-going  ships  solely 
occupied  in  carrying  men  and  supphes  from  the  Dominion 
to  the  Force  in  the  field,  for  we  are  maintaining  it. 

As  yet  New  Zealand  has  no  form  of  conscription  for 
service  abroad,  but  here  is  something  that  should  interest 
the  labour  unions,  men  of  the  Clyde,  and  some  of  the 
Welsh  miners.  Quite  recently,  our  Minister  for  Defence 
addressed  a  body  of  railwaymen  on  recruiting.  He 
spoke  at  length,  and  forcefully,  At  the  end  of  his  speech 
he  was  approached  by  a  deputation.  And  what  do  you 
think  he  was  asked  ?  These  working  men  wanted  a 
Conscription  Bill  brought  in  !  The  men  put  their  case 
plainly.  If  they  enlisted  now,  they  said,  their  positions-, 
were  immediately  filled  by  those  who  stayed  behind. 
Under  conscription  they  would  all  have  to  go,  and  the 
slacker  would  gain  no  advantage.  Conscription  has  not 
come  yet,  but  it  may  be  necessary.  If  it  does  come, 
then  it  will  come  easily,  and  the  country  will  accept  if 
with  good  heart  and  understanding. 

One  is  often  asked  by  people  in  England,  and  still 
oftener  told,  the  difference  between  the  New  Zealand  and 
the  British  Tommy.  The  theory  seems  to  be  that  the 
men  are  of  a  different  class.  One  is  told,  "  Your  men 
must  be  different.  They  live  in  the  open  spaces,  not  in 
towns.  They  come  from  the  land,  not  from  offices." 
It  surprises  people  who  hold  that  opinion  when  they  are 
told  that  our  men  are,  for  the  most  part,  recruited  from 
approximately  the  same  class  as  the  men  who  make  up 
an  English  division  This  applies  more  especially  to  our 
infantry.  Out  of  the  four  battalions  in  the  main  body 
there  were  very  few  men  who  had  ever  spent  more  than  a 
fortnight  in  the  country  in  each  year  of  their  lives.  They 
came  from  offices,  shops,  and  warehouses,  and  their 
''  open  life  "  for  the  most  part  was  confined  to  a  stroll 
in  a  small  patch  of  garden  after  their  day's  work.  No, 
the  secret  does  not  he  there.  Rather  is  the  solution  to 
be  found  in  the  entirely  different  social  scheme  of  the 
Dominion.  It  is  a  complex  matter,  too  complex  to  detail 
here,  but,  briefly,  it  is  this. 

In  New  Zealand  a  man  more  fully  recognises  his  own 
worth.  You  may  take  a  man  from  any  class  at  random, 
a  shearer,  a  wharf  labourer,  or  a  cabman,  and  you  may 
talk  to  him  for  half  an  hour.  In  that  time  it  is  more 
than  likely  that  you  will  never  hear  him  call  you  sir,  nor 
will  he  show  you  any  particular  deference,  whatever  your 
own  position  may  be.  The  Prime  Minister  of  the 
Dominion  is  known  familiarly  as  "  Bill."  The  working 
man  has  no  idea  that  you  are  one  bit  higher  up  the  social 
scale  than  he  is.  If  you  are  a  capable  man  in  your  own 
line,  he  admires  you  for  it,  but  that  is  all,  and  in  return 
he  asks  no  more  from  you 

Now  such  a  state  of  affairs  alters  the  whole  outlook 
in  the  matter  of  disciphne.     Times  without  number  our 


12 


LAND      &      WATER 


May  25,  1916 


men  have  been  summed  up  by  people  who  did  not  know 
them,  in  a  phrase  that  is  usually  a  variant  of  this,  "  Yes," 
they  can  fight  like  the  devil,  but  they  have  no  discipline." 
Never  was  there  a  greater  mistake.  At  first  it  is  difficult 
to  see  outward  signs  of  it,  but  all  the  time  it  is  there.  It 
stands  to  reason  that  a  man  whose  outlook  on  his  fellows 
is  as  I  have  tried  to  explain  it,  does  not  take  readily  to 
constant  saluting,  or  to  the  "  Yes,  sir  "  and  "  No  sir  " 
of  the  army.  To  sum  it  up  in  a  sentence,  he  has  sufficient 
brains  to  sift  out  all  the  artificialities  of  discipline  and 
enough  common  sense  to  understand  its  necessities. 

No  Looking  Back 

One  fact  there  is  that  it  would  be  well  to  remember. 
New  Zealand  at  the  outset  said,  "  Here  are  my  sons,  do 
with  them  what  you  will  !  "  and  she  lias  never  taken  back 
that  offer.  Galhpoli  was  a  failure,  and  the  many  crosses 
in  Shrapnel  Gully  and  back  of  Hell  Spit  testify  to  the 
sacrifice  that  New  Zealand  mothers  have  made.  That 
sacrifice  was  made  willingly,  and  without  regret,  and  yet 
in  the  Heart  of  Empire  we  hear  loud  voices  demanding 
satisfaction,  asking  for  enquiries  :  "  Whose  plan  was  this  ?" 
they  shriek  "  Who  sent  these  men  to  their  deaths  ?  " 

We  can  answer  them.  New  Zealand  sent  them,  and 
she  is  well  content,  looking  back,  to  know  that  they  died 
with  their  work  well  done.  To  all  such  clamourers  we 
would  say,  "  Let  our  dead  lie  in  peace.  If  you  want 
enquiries,  if  someone  must  be  pilloried,  then  wait  till  the 
war  is  over.  Only  don't  ask  us  to  go  a-muck-racking 
with  you  !  " 

There  is  another  way  in  which  New  Zealand  has  proved 
her  loyalty  in  this  crisis.  Not  only  has  she  sent  men,  but 
she  has  sent  money  and  produce.  Her  gifts  were  not 
spasmodic,  but  from  the  commencement  of  the  war  with 
generous  hand  she  has  poured  out  her  wealth.  The 
Government  realised  early  in  the  trouble  that  prices  of 
foodstuffs  would  soar  to  an  unprecedented  height.  It 
consequently  took  the  only  course  open  to  it  and  acquired 
the  meat,  wool  and  produce  direct  from  the  fanner  at  a 
reasonable  figure.  The  transport  of  all  this  material  was  a 
matter  of  some  difficulty,  so  again  the  authorities  came 
to  the  rescue  and  provided  the  ships  to  carry  it  to  the 
world's  markets. 

The  generosity  of  institutions  and  private  individuals 
has  been  extraordinary.  In  many  large  business  houses, 
from  the  head  partner  to  the  lift  boy,  each  contributes  his 
regular  weekly  quota.  And  this  will  continue  as  long  as 
the  war  lasts.  We  are  a  small  people,  but  what  we  have 
given,  lives,  money,  produce,  has  been  given  cheerfully 
in  the  cause  of  Empire  and  for  the  freedom  of  the  World. 

South    Africa's    Record 

By  C.  D.  Baynes 

THE  true  measure 
of  South  Africa's 
share  in  the  great 
war  is  not  to  be 
taken  by  men  or  money, 
fhe  50,000  men  who 
were  raised  in  South 
Africa  for  the  campaign 
in  German  South- West 
Africa  ;  the  30,000  men 
who  have  been  raised 
for  the  campaign  in  Ger- 
man East  Africa ;  the 
.  indry  thousands  who 
liave  come  spontaneously 
to  Europe  ;  and  the  15 
J  millions  sterling  repre- 
senting the  actual 
amount  spent  by  South 
Africa  in  the  prosecution 
of  the  war — all  these  make  a  goodly  appearance,  stand 
for  a  signal  achievement  in  arms,  and  are  eloquent  of 
energy  in  the  support  of  Empire,  more  especially  when  one 
has  regard  to  the  small  white  population  of  the  sub- 
continent, which  numbers  not  more  than  1,500,000  souls. 
In  order  to  do  justice  to  South  Africa's  service  to  the 
Empire — and  it  has  been  very  substantial,  even  dazzling, 
and  in  the  heroic  vein — it  is  imperative  to  pay  the 
nicest  attention  to  the  circumstances  of  the  country.     If 


e 


FRICAN    UNFANT 


In  Sf>uth  ATrican  Infmitry 
(Expeditionary  Force) 


that  be  done,  she  emerges  with  an  achievement  to  her 
credit  that  is  destined  to  make  a  bright  page  in  the  World's 
Book  of  History  and  to  be  to  all  nations  for  an  example. 
And  the  achievement  is  threefold — South  Africa  has  been 
saved,  South  Africa's  honour  and  fair  fame  have  been 
preserved,  and,  in  the  process,  the  ethics  upon  which  we 
have  based  our  Imperial  being  have  been  justified,  the 
power  and  prestige  of  the  Empire  enhanced  and  its  very 
foundations  strengthened.     All  this  has  South  Africa  done. 

The  call  that  came  to  South  Africa  came  at  a  delicate 
moment.  When  in  ii)i4  war  in  Europe  broke  out,  the 
Boer  War  was  still  a  thing  of  yesterday,  memories  were 
still  green,  and  not  yet  had  the  sore  places  healed. 
Responsible  Government  was  but  a  dozen  years  old,  the 
Treaty  of  Vereeniging  not  much  older,  and  the  residues 
of  the  war  were  a  lingering  racialism,  which,  cunningly 
nursed  by  mischief-makers,  still  had  much  bitterness  in  it. 
That  is  not  to  say  that  responsible  Government  was  not 
succeeding.  Actually,  it  was  working  wonders,  restoring 
the  sense  of  dignity  and  self-respect,  even  of  in- 
dependence, and  nurturing  a  new  spirit  of  good  faith 
to  the  Mother  Country.  Nothing  less  than  responsible 
Government  would  have  served  in  South  Africa,  where 
the  spirit  of  the  soil  is  so  strong,  the  love  of  land  so  deep- 
rooted,  and  the  gift  of  it  was  far-seeing 

But  a  dozen  or  more  years  are  a  very  brief  period  where 
it  is  a  case  of  conciliating  racial  antagonisms  and  healing 
the  wounds  of  war  ;  and  in  1914  it  was  too  soon  to  look 
for  unanimity.  There  were  still  the  Irreconcilables 
through  whom  enthusiasm  for  Empire  was  retarded. 

Botha  and  Smuts 

Happily,  however.  South  Africa  had  Botha  and  Smuts, 
who  rightly  knew  what  South  Africa  had  received  in  the 
gift  of  responsible  government.  These  two  had  a 
nice  regard  for  pledged  words  and  the  Treaty  of  Vereenig- 
ing, as  for  the  very  real  benefits  and  blessings  it  bestowed  ; 
and  loyally  they  went  about  its  faithful  observance, 
standing  out  for  two  vital  things — conciliation  at  home 
and  closer  co-operation  with  the  Mother  Country. 

It  was  at  this  juncture  in  the  autumn  of  1914,  war 
having  been  declared,  that  the  Imperial  Government, 
through  the  acting  Governor-General  Lord  de  Villiers, 
invited  the  Union  Government  to  "  seize  such  part  of 
German  South-West  Africa  as  would  give  them  command 
of  Swakopmund,  Liideritzbucht,  and  the  wireless  stations 
there  or  in  the  interior."  It  was  a  sensational  invitation, 
containing  a  call  to  duty  which  meant  putting  to  the 
test  the  good  faith  of  land  and  people  in  an  hour  when  it 
was  still  easy  to  expect  too  much  of  both.  Equally  was 
it  a  flattering  invitation,  suggesting  a  very  confident 
feeling  in  London  that  South  Africa  would  not  be 
found  wanting.  But  Downing  Street  must  have 
known  that,  though  the  right  response  would  be  made, 
there  could  hardly  be  unanimity,  though  there  might 
not  be  real  trouble. 

It  was  a  dehcate  moment,  and  a  difficult  one.  The 
opportunity  for  playing  a  great  part,  for  building  up  a 
greater  South  Africa,  and  for  rendering  a  great  Imperial 
service,  was  at  hand  ;  and  the  instinct  of  General  Botha 
was  to  seize  it  instantly.  But  he  also  had  his  country 
to  consider.  Could  he  carry  it  with  him  ?  Would  it 
respond  to  the  summons  to  do  a  splendid  and  unselfish 
act  ?     Would  it  bear  the  cost  ? 

He  would  not  have  hesitated  a  moment  on  any 
one  of  those  heads,  or  as  to  his  cajmcity  to  command 
the  country's  consent  to  the  campaign  and  its  complete 
confidence,  had  he  had  his  people,  pure  and  sim])le,  to 
deal  with.  But  in  the  interim  the}'  had  been  largely 
"  Germanised."  Active  agents  of  Germany,  posing  as 
peaceful  settlers,  had  been  abroad,  tampering  with  men 
of  the  veldt,  undermining  their  loyalty,  engineering 
dissensions  and  producing  political  feuds,  so  that  many 
were  alienated  in  sentiment,  and  already  anti-Bothaism 
was  but  another  name  for  pro-Germanism.  Many  were 
ready  to  seize  any  opportunity  for  pulling  down  General 
Botha  and  his  colleagues  at  the  first  sign  of  Imperial 
confidence.  Plans  had  been  prepared  for  making  the 
first  occasion  an  excuse  "  for  regaining  South  Africa's  in- 
dependence !  " 

The  situation  was  not  simple — not  even  when  the 
Germans  had  actually  invaded  the  Union  at  Groendoorn, 
which  is  called  Nakob,  and  furnished  the  cause  of  war 


May  25,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


13 


There  was  the  native  to  keep  in  view,  and  the  effect  upon 
him  of  more  strife  in  the  land.  Finally,  there  were  the 
industries  and  the  finances  of  the  country  to  consider. 
General  Botha  and  his  friends  were  sorely  beset,  and, 
though  the  path  of  loyalty  was  plain,  the  way  was  not 
easy. 

The  suspense,  however,  did  not  last  long.  In  three 
days  General  Botha  announced  that  he  and  his  colleagues 
"  cordially  agreed'"  to  undertake  the  great  Imperial 
enterprise  in  South-West  Africa,  and  a  month  later  the 
Union  Parhament  confirmed  the  Government's  action  by 
the  significant  majority  of  gi  votes  to  12.  The  country's 
Defence  Force  was  in  being,  and  the  campaign  in  a 
difficult  country,  where  Germany  had  been  fortifying  her- 
self and  making  vast  preparations  for  years,  began  under 
favourable  auspices. 

In  that  minority  of  twelve  lay  the  seed  of  mischief, 
the  capacity  to  create  in  co-operation  with  the  enemy 
in  the  German  South-West  many  difficulties.  Soon  the 
fruit  of  German  intrigue,  the  work  of  a  hundred  German 
agents,  declared  itself  ;  and  the  campaign  in  the  South- 
West  on  which  South  Africa  had  quickly  set  out  was  inter- 
rupted by  a  rebellion  within  the  Union  itself,  by  the 
defection  and  treachery  of  Beyers  and  Maritz,  and  by 
other  treacheries  and  troubles  to  right  and  left. 

Conquest  of  South- West  Africa 

The  difficulties  of  General  Botha  were  increased  an 
hundredfold  ;  but  in  the  process  of  arms  they  were  over- 
come ;  and,  having  overcome  them,  he  himself  marched 
to  the  conquest  of  the  South- West,  swiftly  adding  to  the 
Imperial  assets  a  country  bigger  than  the  German  Empire. 

Then  followed  the  expedition  to  German  East  Africa, 
for  which,  with  the  same  enthusiasm,  in  the  same  spirit 
of  loyal  Imperialism,  and  for  the  sake  of  the  cause  of 
Freedom  and  Civilization  and  the  well-being  of  the 
Empire,  South  Africa  has  sent  forward  thirty  thousand 
men,  who  are  to-day  fighting  bravely  under  General 
Smuts.  But  not  yet  was  the  country  with  the  two 
Generals  to  a  man. 

As  late  as  March  23rd  in  the  House  of  Assembly,  the 
German  East  African  Campaign  being  now  in  full  swing, 
Mr.  Fichardt  protested  against  "  wicked  expenditure  on  a 
wild-goose  chase  round  Kilimanjaro  "  ;  it  was  unfair  to 
ask  them  to  vote  for  "  unknown  schemes  for  an  unknown 
purpose  to  an  unknown  amount."  "  Yesterday  it  was 
German  West ;  to-day  it  is  German  East.  What  would 
it  be  to-morrow  ?  "  "  Moral  support  was  well^enough  ; 
but  they  had  to  consider  the  cost." 

Again  General  Botha  stood  forward  and  carried  the 
day  and  the  country,  administering  a  reproof  in  passing. 
This,  he  finely  declared,  was  no  business  for  bargaining, 
and  the  land  would  be  disgraced  which  said  to  the 
Imperial  Government — "  We  shall  help  you — if  you  pay 
us  back." 

A  troubled  South  Africa  in  troubled  times  !  But, 
it  has  triumphed  over  its  enemies  within  and  without, 
and  has  set  up  a  record  of  achievement  in  the  Imperial 
cause  rich  in  great  deeds,  fragrant  of  good  faith,  and 
abounding  in  the  true  spirit  of  loyalty. 

There  is  gain  of  territory,  and  there  will  be  further 
gains  of  territory  when  German  East  Africa  falls  ;  but 
South  Africa  took  up  arms  not  for  material  ends.  Deeply 
interested  as  she  necessarily  was,  and  is,  in  the  future 
settlement  and  destiny  of  Africa  as  a  whole,  in  the  im- 
mediate and  permanent  elimination  of  the  German 
enemy  from  her  borders,  and  from  all  parts  of  Africa, 
and  in  the  defeat  of  German  designs  upon  it,  her  grand 
concern  when  she  assumed  arms  and  went  forth  to  do 
battle  has  been  throughout  for  the  higher  ideals — the 
ideals  of  liberty  and  the  cause  of  civilisation  ;  and  her 
chief  anxiety  this — that  in  the  hour  of  trial  she  should  not 
be  wanting  ;  but  be  found  faithful  in  all  things,  and 
loyal  ;  and  that  the  trust  reposed  in  her  when  respon- 
sible Government  was  given  should  be  justified. 

It  is  by  the  spirit  of  her  support  of  the  Empire's  cause, 
as  much  as  by  the  strength  of  it,  by  her  successes  in  the 
field  and  her  contributions  of  men  and  material,  that 
South  Africa's  part  in  the  war  can  alone  be  rightly 
measured.  She  who,  only  the  other  day,  was  opposed  to 
us,  has  fought  for  us  from  her  own  free  choice,  from 
conviction  of  the  righteousness  of  our  cause,  because  of  the 
goodness  of  the  thing  we  call  Empire,  and  for  the  sake 


'■iy"vp 


.  JL^r 


J 


L 


Ist  King  George's  Own  Gurkba  Kifies 


of  all  the  treasured  things  it  means,  which  are  treedom, 
security,  emancipation,  enlightenment  and  progress  - 
things  greater  than  many  lands  and  vast  possessions. 

What    India     Has     Done 

By  Sir  Francis  Younghusband 

EFORE      the 

outbreak    of   war 

there    had    been 

much      talk       of 

-edition  in  India.   There 

had    also    been      many 

seditious  acts.      In  191 2 

\n    attempt    was    made 

on  the  life  of  the  Viceroy 

limself.     And,    if    there 

'.\ere      seditious      words 

ind    seditious     acts     in 

time  of  peace  how  much 

more     likely,    it    would 

seem  to  an  outsider,  and 

especially  an  unfriendly 

observer,  would  there  be 

sedition  in   time  of  war. 

Our     enemies     certainly 

counted  on  a  revolt  and 

assumed  that  India  would  be  disloyal :    there  is  ample 

evidence  of  German  designs  to  create  trouble  in  India 

But  we  British  have  always  trusted  India  and  India 
nobly  responded  to  our  trust.  "  I  was  sure  in  my  heart 
of  hearts,"  said  Lord  Hardinge,  "  that  India  was  sound, 
and  I  never  hesitated  to  proclaim  that  assurance  and  act 
upon  it,"  When  the  great  strain  and  test  came  India 
had  the  opportunity  of  displaying  the  loyalty  which  those 
who  knew  her  best  were  convinced  lay  silent  and  latent 
within  her.  The  Chiefs,  the  educated  classes,  and  the 
great  mass  and  bulk  of  the  people  gave  instant,  spontane- 
ous and  convincing  proofs  of  loyalty.  And  through- 
out the  period  of  the  war  the  relations  between  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  people  have  never  been  closer  or  more 
confident. 

As  a  result,  India,  instead  of  being  a  risk,  an  anxiety 
and  a  source  of  danger  to  the  Empire,  has  proved  one  of 
its  props  and  pillars.  Britain  had  no  need  to  send  troops 
to  hold  her.  She  held  to  the  Empire.  She  sent  out  troops 
not  by  brigades  or  divisions,  but  literally  by  the  hundred 
thousand.  And  of  all  the  component  parts  of  the  Empire 
she  was  the  first  to  come  to  the  help  of  the  Mother 
Country  on  the  battlefields  of  France. 

As  far  back  as  the  time  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  India 
had  sent  troops  to  Egypt.  The  dramatic  stroke  of  Lord 
Beaconsfield  in  bringing  Indian  troops  to  Malta  in  1878 
will  be  remembered.  Indian  troops  fought  in  Egypt  in 
1882,  in  East  Africa  and  in  China.  But  the  largest  ex- 
pedition that  ever  left  the  shores  of  India  before  the 
present  war  numbered  only  18,000  men.  And  now, 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  India  has  despatched 
no  less  than  300,000  soldiers  over-seas  and  has  cnotributed 
several  million  pounds  worth  of  war  material  to  the 
Empire.  She  has  sent  troops  to  France  and  to  China  ; 
to  the  Cameroons  on  the  West  Coast  of  Africa  and  to 
Mombasa  on  the  East  ;  to  Egypt  and  Gallipoli ;  to 
Mesopotamia  and  Persia. 

But  the  most  noteworthy  point  is  that  for  the  first  time 
in  history  Indians  and  British  have  fought  side  by  side 
on  the  battlefields  of  Europe.  It  was  a  momentous  step 
to  take.  This  is  a  war  between  Europeans.  We  did  not 
use  our  Indian  troops  in  the  Boer  war.  And  many  may 
have  thought  it  unwise — even  wrong — to  employ  them 
in  Europe.  But  the  enthusiasm  in  India  was  so  strong  ; 
the  eagerness  of  India  to  take  part  with  the  rest  of  the 
Empire  in  this  struggle  so  great,  that  it  was  impossible 
to  leave  them  out.  The  Germans  profess  themselves 
to  be  shocked  and  hurt  at  our  employing  what  they  call 
savages  to  fight  against  them.  But  the  disciplined 
troops  of  the  Indian  Army  have  as  fine  a  chivalry  in 
warfare  and  fight  as  cleanly  as  any  European  army  ;  and 
the  peoples  they  are  enlisted  from,  though  sometimes 
wild,  are  not  barbarian  :  they  at  least  have  their  code 
of  honour. 

On  a  brilliant  day  at  the  end  of  September,  1914,  long 
lines  of  transports  steamed  in  stately  procession  into 
Marseilles   harbour.     It    was    a   significant    event.     The 


12 


LAND      cS:      W  A  T  E  R 


May  25,  1916 


men  have  been  summed  up  by  people  who  did  not  kno\\ 
them,  in  a  phrase  that  is  usually  a  variant  of  this,  "  Yes," 
they  can  light  like  the  devil,  but  they  have  no  discipline." 
Never  was  there  a  greater  mistake.  At  fust  it  is  difficult 
to  see  outward  signs  of  it,  but  all  the  time  it  is  there.  It 
stands  to  reason  that  a  man  whose  outlook  on  his  fellows 
is  as  I  have  tried  to  explain  it,  does  not  take  readily  to 
constant  saluting,  or  to  the  "  Yes,  sir  "  and  "  No  sir  " 
of  the  army.  To  sum  it  up  in  a  sentence,  he  has  sufficient 
brains  to  sift  out  all  the  artificialities  of  discipline  and 
enough  common  sense  to  understand  its  necessities. 

No  Looking  Back 

One  fact  there  is  that  it  would  be  well  to  remember. 
New  Zealand  at  the  outset  said,  "  Here  are  my  sons,  do 
with  them  what  you  will  !  "  and  she  has  never  taken  back 
that  offer,  (ialhpoli  was  a  failure,  and  the  many  crosses 
in  Shrapnel  Gully  and  back  of  Hell  Spit  testify  to  the 
sacrifice  that  New  Zealand  mothers  have  made.  That 
sacrifice  was  made  willingly,  and  without  regret,  and  yet 
in  the  Heart  of  Empire  we  hear  loud  voices  demanding 
satisfaction,  asking  for  enquiries  :  "  Whose  plan  was  this  ?  ' 
they  shriek  "  Who  sent  these  men  to  their  deaths  ?  " 

We  can  answer  them.  New  Zealand  sent  them,  and 
she  is  well  content,  looking  back,  to  know  that  they  died 
with  their  work  well  done.  To  all  such  clamourers  we 
would  say,  "  Let  oiu^  dead  lie  in  peace.  If  you  want 
enquiries,  if  someone  must  be  pilloried,  then  wait  till  the 
war  is  over.  Only  don't  ask  us  to  go  a-muck-racking 
with  you  !  " 

There  is  another  way  in  which  New  Zealand  has  proved 
her  loyalty  in  this  crisis.  Not  only  has  she  sent  men,  but 
she  has  sent  money  and  produce.  Her  gifts  were  not 
spasmodic,  but  from  the  commencement  of  the  war  with 
generous  hand  she  has  poured  out  her  wealth.  The 
Government  realised  early  in  the  trouble  that  prices  of 
foodstuffs  would  soar  to  an  unprecedented  height.  It 
consequently  took  the  only  course  open  to  it  and  acquired 
the  meat,  wool  and  produce  direct  from  the  farmer  at  a 
reasonable  figure.  The  transport  of  all  this  material  was  a 
matter  of  some  difficulty,  so  again  the  authorities  came 
to  the  rescue  and  provided  the  ships  to  carry  it  to  the 
world's  markets. 

The  generosity  of  institutions  and  private  individuals 
has  been  extraordinary.  In  many  large  business  houses, 
from  the  head  partner  to  the  lift  boy,  each  contributes  his 
regiilar  weekly  quota.  And  this  will  continue  as  long  as 
the  war  lasts.  We  are  a  small  people,  but  what  we  have 
given,  lives,  money,  produce,  has  been  given  cheerfully 
in  the  cause  of  Empire  and  for  the  freedom  of  the  World. 

South    Africa's    Record 

By  C.  D.  Baynes 

THE  true  measure 
of  South  Africa's 
share  in  the  great 
war  is  not  to  be 
taken  by  men  or  money. 
The  50,000  men  who 
were  raised  in  South 
Africa  for  the  campaign 
in  German  South-West 
.\frica  ;  the  30,000  men 
who  have  been  raised 
for  the  campaign  in  Ger- 
man East  Africa  ;  the 
:.  mdry  thousands  who 
have  come  spontaneously 
to  Europe  ;  and  the  15 
millions  sterling  repre- 
senting the  actual 
amount  spent  by  South 
Africa  in  the  prosecution 
of  the  war — all  these  make  a  goodly  appearance,  stand 
for  a  signal  achievement  in  arms,  and  are  eloquent  of 
energy  in  the  support  of  Empire,  more  especially  when  one 
has  regard  to  the  small  white  population  of  the  sub- 
continent, which  numbers  not  more  than  1,500,000  souls. 
In  order  to  do  justice  to  South  Africa's  service  to  the 
Empire — and  it  has  been  very  substantial,  even  dazzling, 
and  in  the  heroic  vein — it  is  imperative  to  pay  the 
nicest  attention  to  the  circumstances  of  the  covmtry.     If 


(AFRICANlUNFANTR 


'^ 


Itl  Stiuth   African    Infantry 
(Expeditionary  Force) 


that  be  done,  she  emerges  vrith  an  achievement  to  her 
credit  that  is  destined  to  make  a  bright  page  in  the  \^'orld■s 
Book  of  History  and  to  be  to  all  nations  for  an  example. 
And  the  achievement  is  threefold — South  Africa  has  been 
saved.  South  Africa's  honour  and  fair  fame  have  been 
preserved,  and,  in  the  process,  the  ethics  upon  which  we 
have  based  our  Imperial  being  have  been  justiiied,  the 
power  and  prestige  of  the  Empire  enhanced  and  its  very 
foundations  strengthened.     All  this  has  South  Africa  done. 

The  call  that  came  to  South  Africa  came  at  a  delicate 
moment.  When  in  I()i4  war  in  Europe  broke  out,  the 
Boer  War  was  still  a  thing  of  yesterday,  memories  were 
still  green,  and  not  yet  had  the  sore  places  healed. 
Responsible  Government  was  but  a  dozen  years  old,  the 
Treaty  of  Vcreeniging  not  much  older,  and  the  residues 
of  the  war  were  a  lingering  racialism,  which,  cunningly 
nursed  by  mischief-makers,  still  had  much  bitterness  in  it. 
That  is  not  to  say  that  responsible  Government  was  not 
succeeding.  Actually,  it  was  working  wonders,  restoring 
the  sense  of  dignity  and  self-respect,  even  of  in- 
dependence, and  nurturing  a  new  spirit  of  good  faith 
to  the  Mother  Country.  Nothing  less  than  responsible 
Government  would  ha\-e  served  in  South  Africa,  where 
the  spirit  of  the  soil  is  so  strong,  the  love  of  land  so  deep- 
rooted,  and  the  gift  of  it  was  far-seeing 

But  a  dozen  or  more  years  are  a  very  brief  period  where 
it  is  a  case  of  conciliating  racial  antagonisms  and  healing 
the  wounds  of  war  ;  and  in  1914  it  was  too  soon  to  look 
for  unanimity.  There  were  still  the  Irreconcilables 
through  whom  enthusiasm  for  Empire  was  retarded. 

Botha  and  Smuts 

Happily,  however,  South  Africa  had  Botha  and  Smuts, 
who  rightly  knew  what  South  Africa  had  received  in  the 
gift  of  responsible  government.  These  two  had  a 
nice  regard  for  pledged  words  and  the  Treaty  of  Vcreenig- 
ing, as  for  the  very  real  benefits  and  blessings  it  bestowed  ; 
and  loyally  they  went  about  its  faithful  observance, 
standing  out  for  two  vital  things — conciliation  at  home 
and  closer  co-operation  with  the  Mother  Country. 

It  was  at  this  juncture  in  the  autumn  of  1914,  war 
having  been  declared,  that  the  Imperial  Government, 
through  the  acting  Governor-General  Lord  do  Villiers, 
invited  the  Union  Government  to  "  seize  such  part  of 
German  South-West  Africa  as  would  give  them  command 
of  Swakopmund,  Liideritzbucht,  and  the  wireless  stations 
there  or  in  the  interior."  It  was  a  sensational  invitation, 
containing  a  call  to  duty  which  meant  putting  to  the 
test  the  good  faith  of  land  and  people  in  an  hour  when  it 
was  still  easy  to  expect  too  much  of  both.  Equally  was 
it  a  flattering  invitation,  suggesting  a  very  confident 
feeling  in  London  that  South  Africa  would  not  be 
found  wanting.  But  Downing  Street  must  have 
known  that,  though  the  right  response  \vould  be  made, 
there  could  hardly  be  unanimity,  though  there  might 
not  be  real  trouble. 

It  was  a  deUcate  moment,  and  a  difficult  one.  The 
opportunity  for  plajang  a  great  part,  for  building  up  a 
greater  South  Africa,  and  for  rendering  a  great  Imperial 
service,  was  at  hand ;  and  the  instinct  of  General  Botha 
was  to  seize  it  instantly.  But  he  also  had  his  country 
to  consider.  Could  he  carry  it  with  him  ?  Would  it 
respond  to  the  summons  to  do  a  splendid  and  unselfish 
act  ?     Would  it  bear  the  cost  ? 

He  would  not  have  hesitated  a  moment  on  any 
one  of  those  heads,  or  as  to  his  capacity  to  command 
the  country's  consent  to  the  campaign  and  its  complete 
confidence,  had  he  had  his  people,  pure  and  simple,  to 
deal  with.  But  in  the  interim  they  had  been  largely 
"  Germanised."  Active  agents  of  Germany,  posing  as 
peaceful  settlers,  had  been  abroad,  tampering  with  men 
of  the  veldt,  undermining  their  loyalty,  engineering 
dissensions  and  producing  political  feuds,  so  that  many 
were  alienated  in  sentiment,  and  already  anti-Bothaism 
was  but  another  name  for  pro-Germanism.  Many  were 
ready  to  seize  any  opportunity  for  pulling  down  General 
Botha  and  his  colleagues  at  the  first  sign  of  Imperial 
confidence.  Plans  had  been  prepared  for  making  the 
first  occasion  an  excuse  "  for  regaining  South  Africa's  in- 
dependence 1  " 

The  situation  was  not  simple — not  even  when  the 
Germans  had  actually  invaded  the  Union  at  Groendoorn, 
which  is  called  Nakob,  and  furnished  the  cause  of  war 


May  25,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


13 


There  was  the  native  to  keep  in  view,  and  the  effect  upon 
him  of  more  strife  in  the  land.  Finally,  there  were  the 
industries  and  the  finances  of  the  country  to  consider. 
General  Botha  and  his  friends  were  sorely  beset,  and, 
though  the  path  of  loyalty  was  plain,  the  way  was  not 
easy. 

The  suspense,  however,  did  not  last  long.  In  three 
days  General  Botha  announced  that  he  and  his  colleagues 
"  cordially  agreed'"  to  undertake  the  great  Imperial 
enterprise  in  South-West  Africa,  and  a  month  later  the 
Union  Parliament  confirmed  the  Government's  action  by 
the  significant  majority  of  91  votes  to  12.  The  country's 
Defence  Force  was  in  being,  and  the  campaign  in  a 
difficult  country,  where  Germany  had  been  fortifying  her- 
self and  making  vast  preparations  for  years,  began  under 
favourable  auspices. 

In  that  minority  of  twelve  lay  the  seed  of  mischief, 
the  capacity  to  create  in  co-operation  with  the  enemy 
in  the  German  South-West  many  difficulties.  Soon  the 
fruit  of  German  intrigue,  the  work  of  a  hundred  German 
agents,  declared  itself ;  and  the  campaign  in  the  South- 
West  on  which  South  Africa  had  quickly  set  out  was  inter- 
rupted by  a  rebellion  within  the  Union  itself,  by  the 
defection  and  treachery  of  Beyers  and  Maritz,  and  by 
other  treacheries  and  troubles  to  right  and  left. 

Conquest  of  South- West  Africa 

The  difficulties  of  General  Botha  were  increased  an 
hundredfold  ;  but  in  the  process  of  arms  they  were  over- 
come ;  and,  having  overcome  them,  he  himself  marched 
to  the  conquest  of  the  South- West,  swiftly  adding  to  the 
Imperial  assets  a  country  bigger  than  the  German  Empire. 

Then  followed  the  expedition  to  German  East  Africa, 
for  which,  with  the  same  enthusiasm,  in  the  same  spirit 
of  loyal  Imperialism,  and  for  the  sake  of  the  cause  of 
Freedom  and  Civilization  and  the  well-being  of  the 
Empire,  South  Africa  has  sent  forward  thirty  thousand 
men,  who  are  to-day  fighting  bravely  under  General 
Smuts.  But  not  yet  was  the  country  with  the  two 
Generals  to  a  man. 

As  late  as  March  23rd  in  the  House  of  Assembly,  the 
German  East  African  Campaign  being  now  in  full  swing, 
Mr.  Fichardt  protested  against  "  wicked  expenditure  on  a 
wild-goose  chase  round  Kilimanjaro  "  ;  it  was  unfair  to 
ask  them  to  vote  for  "  unknown  schemes  for  an  unknown 
purpose  to  an  unknown  amount."  "  Yesterday  it  was 
German  West  ;  to-day  it  is  German  East.  What  would 
It  be  to-morrow  ?  "  "  Moral  support  was  welFenough  ; 
but  they  had  to  consider  the  cost." 

Again  General  Botha  stood  forward  and  carried  the 
day  and  the  country,  administering  a  reproof  in  passing. 
This,  he  finely  declared,  was  no  business  for  bargaining, 
and  the  land  woidd  be  disgraced  which  said  to  the 
Imperial  Government—"  We  shall  help  you— if  you  pay 
us  back." 

A  troubled  South  Africa  in  troubled  times  !  But, 
it  has  triumphed  over  its  enemies  within  and  without,' 
and  has  set  up  a  record  of  achievement  in  the  Imperial 
cause  rich  in  great  deeds,  fragrant  of  good  faith,  and 
abounding  in  the  true  spirit  of  loyalty. 

There  is  gain  of  territory,  and  there  will  be  further 
gams  of  territory  when  German  East  Africa  falls  ;  but 
South  Africa  took  up  arms  not  for  material  ends.  Deeply 
interested  as  she  necessarily  was,  and  is,  in  the  future 
settlement  and  destiny  of  Africa  as  a  whole,  in  the  im- 
mediate and  permanent  elimination  of  the  German 
enemy  from  her  borders,  and  from  all  parts  of  Africa, 
and  in  the  defeat  of  German  designs  upon  it,  her  grand 
concern  when  she  assumed  arms  and  went  forth  to  do 
battle  has  been  throughout  for  the  higher  ideals— the 
ideals  of  liberty  and  the  cause  of  civilisation  ;  and  her 
chief  anxiety  this— that  in  the  hour  of  trial  she  should  not 
be  wanting;  but  be  found  faithful  in  all  things,  and 
loyal ;  and  that  the  trust  reposed  in  her  when  respon- 
sible Government  was  given  should  be  justified. 

It  is  by  the  spirit  of  her  support  of  the  Empire's  cause, 
as  much  as  by  the  strength  of  it,  by  her  successes  in  the 
field  and  her  contributions  of  men  and  material,  that 
South  Africa's  part  in  the  war  can  aione  be  rightly 
measured.  She  who,  only  the  other  day,  was  opposed  to 
us,  has  fought  for  us  from  her  own  free  choice,  from 
conviction  of  the  righteousness  of  our  cause,  because  of  the 
goodness  of  the  thing  we  call  Empire,  and  for  the  sake 


of  all  the  treasured  things  it  means,  which  are  freedom, 
security,  emancipation,  enlightenment  and  progress  — 
things  greater  than  many  lands  and  vast  possessions. 

What    India     Has     Done 

By  Sir  Francis  Younghusband 


1st  King  George's  Own  Gurkha  Rifles 


EFORE      the 

outbreak    of   war 

there    had     been 

much      talk       of 

sedition  in  India.    There 

had     also    been      many 

seditious  acts.      In  1912 

\n    attempt    was    made 

on  the  Hfe  of  the  Viceroy 

iiimself.     And,    if    there 

were      seditious     words 

and    seditious    acts    in 

time  of  peace  how  much 

more     hkely,    it    would 

seem  to  an  outsider,  and 

especially  an  unfriendly 

observer,  would  there  be 

sedition  in   time  of  war. 

Our     enemies     certainly 

counted  on  a  revolt  and 

assumed  that  India  would  be  disloyal :    there  is  ample 

evidence  of  German  designs  to  create  trouble  in  India 

But  we  British  have  always  trusted  India  and  India 
nobly  responded  to  our  trust.  "  I  was  sure  in  my  heart 
of  hearts,"  said  Lord  Hardinge,  "  that  India  was  sound, 
and  I  never  hesitated  to  proclaim  that  assurance  and  act 
upon  it,"  When  the  great  strain  and  test  came  India 
had  the  opportunity  of  displaying  the  loyalty  which  those 
who  knew  her  best  were  convinced  lay  silent  and  latent 
within  her.  The  Chiefs,  the  educated  classes,  and  the 
great  mass  and  bulk  of  the  people  gave  instant,  spontane- 
ous and  convincing  proofs  of  loyalty.  And  through- 
out the  period  of  the  war  the  relations  between  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  people  have  never  been  closer  or  more 
confident. 

As  a  result,  India,  instead  of  being  a  risk,  an  anxiety 
and  a  source  of  danger  to  the  Empire,  has  proved  one  of 
its  props  and  pillars.  Britain  had  no  need  to  send  troops 
to  hold  her.  She  held  to  the  Empire.  She  sent  out  troops 
not  by  brigades  or  divisions,  but  literally  by  the  hundred 
thousand.  And  of  all  the  component  parts  of  the  Empire 
she  was  the  first  to  come  to  the  help  of  the  Mother 
Country  on  the  battlefields  of  France. 

As  far  back  as  the  time  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  India 
had  sent  troops  to  Egypt.  The  dramatic  stroke  of  Lord 
Beaconsfield  in  bringing  Indian  troops  to  Malta  in  1878 
will  be  remembered.  Indian  troops  fought  in  Egypt  in 
1882,  in  East  Africa  and  in  China.  But  the  largest  ex- 
pedition that  ever  left  the  shores  of  India  before  the 
present  war  numbered  only  18,000  men.  And  now, 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  India  has  despatched 
no  less  than  300,000  soldiers  over-seas  and  has  cnotributed 
several  million  pounds  worth  of  war  material  to  the 
Empire.  She  has  sent  troops  to  France  and  to  China  ; 
to  the  Cameroons  on  the  West  Coast  of  Africa  and  to 
Mombasa  on  the  East ;  to  Egypt  and  Gallipoli ;  to 
Mesopotamia  and  Persia. 

But  the  most  noteworthy  point  is  that  for  the  first  time 
in  history  Indians  and  Briti.sh  have  fought  side  by  side 
on  the  battlefields  of  Europe.  It  was  a  momentous  step 
to  take.  This  is  a  war  between  Europeans.  We  did  not 
use  our  Indian  troops  in  the  Boer  war.  And  many  may 
have  thought  it  unwise — even  wrong — to  employ  them 
in  Europe.  But  the  enthusiasm  in  India  was  so  strong  ; 
the  eagerness  of  India  to  take  part  with  the  rest  of  the 
Empire  in  this  struggle  so  great,  that  it  was  impossible 
to  leave  them  out.  The  Germans  profess  themselves 
to  be  shocked  and  hurt  at  our  employing  what  they  call 
savages  to  fight  against  them.  But  the  disciplined 
troops  of  the  Indian  Army  have  as  fine  a  chivalry  in 
warfare  and  fight  as  cleanly  as  any  European  army  ;  and 
the  peoples  they  are  enlisted  from,  though  sometimes 
wild,  are  not  barbarian  :  they  at  least  have  their  code 
of  honour. 

On  a  brilliant  day  at  the  end  of  September,  1914,  long 
lines  of  transports  steamed  in  stately  procession  into 
Marseilles   harbour.     It   was    a    significant    event.     The 


14 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  25,  1916 


transports  carried  troops  from  India  to  fight  in  France 
for  the  hberties  of  Europe.  And  that  it  was  possible 
to  carry  them  four  thousand  miles  across  the  ocean  was 
a  fine  tangible  proof  of  the  value  of  sea-power.  The  troops 
were  welcomed  with  enthusiasm  by  the  people  of  France. 
They  were  a  living  symbol  that  France  was  not  standing 
alone  in  the  death  struggle  with  her  implacable  foe. 

In  the  very  Nick  of  Time 

And  the  Indian  contingent  arrived  in  the  very  nick 
of  time.  General  Joffre  had  indeed  thrown  back  the 
Germans  from  the  walls  of  Paris,  and  our  gallant  little 
army  had  taken  a  noble  part  in  this  great  feat.  But  the 
Germans  were  gathering  themselves  in  huge  momentum 
for  another  terrific  push  ;  this  time  to  reach  Calais,  there 
to  prepare  for  an  invasion  of  England. 

Foreseeing  this  movement,  Sir  John  French  had 
skilfully  withdrawn  the  British  forces  from  their  position 
on  the  Aisne  and  extended  them  across  Belgium.  The 
delicate  operation  of  withdrawal  was  completed  by 
October  19th  and  on  the  same  date  the  Lahore  Division 
arrived  in  its  concentration  area  near  the  Belgian  border. 
Already  the  great  battle  for  Ypres  had  commenced.  As 
early  as  October  nth  British  and  German  cavalry  had 
been  engaged.  From  then  onward  there  was  desperate 
fighting  against  the  ever  increasing  numbers  of  the 
enemy.  The  Second  Corps  by  October  24th  was  becom- 
ing exhausted  owing  to  the  constant  reinforcements  of 
the  enemy,  the  length  of  line  it  had  to  defend  and  the 
enormous  losses  which  it  had  suffered.  And  the  Lahore 
Division  was  on  that  date  sent  to  the  neighbourhood  of 
Lacon  to  support  it.  It  is  a  far  cry  from  Lahore  to 
Lacon.  But  these  troops  from  India  arrived  at  the 
moment  of  greatest  stress.  Sir  John  French  knew  that 
to  extend  his  front  across  Belgium  to  the  sea  was  exceed- 
ingly risky.  But  he  resolved  to  take  that  risk  rather 
than  .suffer  the  disastrous  consequences  of  letting  his 
flank  be  turned  and  the  Channel  ports  laid  open.  No 
more  arduous  task  has  ever  been  assigned  to  British 
soldiers.  And  it  was  to  aid  in  frustrating  the  desperate 
attempts  of  our  powerful  enemy  to  break  through  om: 
line  that  the  call  was  now  made  on  the  Indian  Corps. 

On  October  22nd  the  7th  Indian  Brigade  was  fighting 
in  support  of  the  Cavalry  and  the  remainder  of  the  Lahore 
Division  from  the  25th  October  onwards  was  heavily 
engaged  in  assisting  the  Second  Corps  in  the  fighting  round 
Neuve  Chapelle.  On  the  28th  October  especially  the 
47th  Sikhs  and  the  Sappers  and  Miners  distinguished 
themselves  by  their  gallant  conduct  in  the  attack  on 
Neuve  Chapelle.  When  the  Meerut  Division  had  arrived 
the  Indian  Army  Corps  took  over  the  line  previously 
held  by  the  Second  Corps. 

This  hne  was  subjected  to  constant  bombardment  by 
the  enemy's  heavy  artillery,  followed  by  infantry  attacks, 
and  two  of  these  attacks  were  very  severe.  The  8th 
Gurkha  Rifles  were  driven  from  their  trenches  and  on 
November  2nd  west  of  Neuve  Chapelle  the  line  was  to 
some  extent  pierced  and  slightly  bent  back. 

On  December  19th  the  Indian  Corps  attacked  the 
German  position  and  gained  two  lines  of  trenches,  but 
they  were  unable  to  maintain  their  position  and  had  to 
fall  back.  The  following  day  the  enemy  attacked  in 
force,  drove  back  the  Sirhind  Brigade  and  captured  a 
considerable  portion  of  Givenchy. 

The  winter  months  of  trench  warfare  in  wet  and  cold 
and  mud  were  especially  trjdng  to  Indian  troops  and 
they  suffered  much.  But  they  still  retained  their  spirit , 
and  when  Sir  John  French  inspected  them  in  January  hi 
reported  that  their  appearance  fully  confirmed  his  first 
opinion,  that  they  only  required  rest  and  a  little  accHma- 
tising  to  bring  out  all  their  fine  inherent  quahties. 

On  the  loth,  nth  and  12th  March,  1915,  was  fought 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  and  the  success  attained 
was  due,  the  Commander-in-Chief  said,  to  the  magnificent 
bravery  and  indomitable  courage  displayed  by  the  troops 
of  the  4th  and  Indian  Corps.  The  Garhwal  Brigade  and 
the  25th  Brigade  carried  the  enemy  trenches,  and,  sweep- 
ing eastward,  gained  a  footing  in  the  village  itself.  The 
Jullandur  and  Dehra  Dun  Brigades  attacked  the  Bois 
Du  Biez,  but  were  held  up  by  a  river  and  had  to  maintain 
themselves  in  the  position  gained. 

Again  in  April  the  Germans  in  great  force  made  vigor- 
ous and  sustained  attacks  against  the  town  and  district 


of  Ypres  and  again  they  were  repulsed.  And  here  also 
Indian  troops  fought  with  their  British  comrades.  On 
April  22nd  the  Lahore  Division  was  moved  up  to  the 
Ypres  area.  The  Germans  had  for  the  first  time  made 
use  of  poisonous  gas,  the  effect  of  which  was  so  virulent  as 
to  render  the  whole  hne  held  by  the  French  Division 
untenable.  The  left  flank  of  the  Canadian  Division  was 
then  left  dangerously  exposed  and  it  was  only  the  con- 
duct of  these  splendid  troops  that  averted  a  disaster 
which  might  have  had  most  serious  consequences. 

Throughout  the  summer  of  1915  Indian  troops  took 
their  part  in  holding  the  trenches  in  Flanders.  And  in 
another  part  of  Europe  also  were  Indians  fighting  along- 
side the  British  and  French.  From  the  beginning  of  May 
they  were  fighting  in  Gallipoli.  On  the  night  of  the  lOth 
May  the  6th  Gurkhas  distinguished  themselves  by  crawling 
hands  and  knees  up  the  precipitous  face  of  a  cliff  which 
was  always  after  called  the  Gurkha  Bluff.  The  story 
of  the  gallantry  of  the  14th  Sikhs,  whose  officers  both 
British  and  Indian  were  nearly  all  lost,  and  of  those 
Indian  troops  who,  after  the  Suvla  Bay  landing,  did  for 
one  moment  reach  the  summit  of  the  ridge  and  looked 
down  on  to  the  waters  of  the  Dardanelles,  is  interwoven 
with  the  story  of  the  immortal  29th  Division  and  the 
glorious  men  of  Anzac  in  one  of  the  most  tragically  heroic 
pages  in  all  history. 

Kut 

And  in  another  tragic  failure,  made  sublime  by  the 
superb  deeds  of  soldiers,  Indian  troops  also  took  their 
part — in  the  defence  and  in  the  attempted  relief  of  Kut. 
We  do  not  yet  know  the  full  history  of  that  ill-fated 
adventure,  but  we  do  know  tliis  much,  that  the  Indian 
troops,  like  their  British  comrades,  shrank  not  from 
attacking  entrenched  positions  across  perfectly  open 
plains  where  no  shelter  whatever  from  the  most  deadly 
fire  was  to  be  found.  And  we  know  too  that  with  the 
British  they  cheerfully  suffered  all  the  terrible  privations 
of  lack  of  provisions,  lack  of  water,  lack  of  adequate 
medical  aid. 

In  East  Africa  also  ;  in  the  Cameroons,  and  at  Tsingtau 
Indian  troops  have  taken  their  share  of  the  Empire's 
work.  And,  when  we  think  of  these  deeds  of  the  Indian 
Army  and  remember  that  at  the  critical  moment  and 
at  the  critical  point  India  was  able  to  send  all  her  best 
troops — and  what  is  more  significant  still,  nearly  the 
whole  of  her  artillery  and  immense  quantities  of  arms 
and  ammunition,  then  we  may  surely  feel  that  India 
may  in  future  be  regarded  as  a  true  and  trusty  partner  in 
the  Empire. 

The    Crown    Colonies,   etc. 

THE  war  had 
not  been  in  pro- 
gress  many 
weeks  before  the 
truth  was  realised  that 
it  was  a  great  crusade. 
Prom  the  outset  this 
conception  was  manifest 
in  those  outer  parts  of 
the  Empire,  where  fami- 
liarity with  the  German 
;is  he  really  is,  had 
taught  Britons  that  the 
Teuton  philosophy  of 
life  was  in  direct  op- 
position to  their  own. 
They  had  not  to  wait 
for  the  horrors  of  Bel- 
gium in  order  to  realise 
it  was  to  be  a  war 
against  Huns,  a  death  struggle  between  a  higher  and 
a  lower  civilisation.  And  so  Britons  came  instantly 
trooping  to  the  aid  of  the  Mother  Country,  in  little 
companies,  from  all  parts  of  the  Empire.  Presently 
there  was  not  a  Colony  or  Settlement  which  was  not 
organising  assistance  on  an  unprecedented  scale.  It  is 
marvellous  how  resources  have  been  strained  to  the 
uttermost  in  both  men  and  money,  even  in  the  smallest 
of  Britain's  possessions.  But  the  time  has  not  come  when 
it  is  possible  to  obtain  a  complete  or  exact  record. 


Malay    SUUa    Vollmteera 


May  25,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


15 


Take,  for  example,  Singapore  (where  compulsory 
military  service  has  been  in  force  for  weeks)  with  the 
adjacent  Malay  States.  The  Government  has  exercised 
no  particular  control,  and  apparently  no  official  record 
was  kept  of  those  who  came  home,  but  there  were  several 
contingents  and  many  hundreds  of  individuals.  In  fact 
the  first  contingent  of  men  from  Singapore  was  entirely 
financed  by  private  enterprise,  funds  being  raised  locally 
to  send  them  to  England.  Since  then,  the  tea  and 
rubber  plantations  have  been  cleared  of  all  their  best  and 
youngest  blood.  Some  estates  have  carried  on  with 
extreme  difficulty,  while  others  have  been  obliged  to  resort 
to  elderly  men.  Indeed,  one  can  fairly  say  that  unselfish 
patriotism  has  been  at  its  best  in  the  Malay  States  and 
adjacent  islands,  where  men  have  given  up  large  salaries 
on  plantations  to  serve  as  privates  in  the  Army. 

Patriotic  Planters 

But  the  planting  community  in  the  East  has  always 
been  famed  for  its  unselfish  patriotism.  In  the  Boer 
War,  India  and  Ceylon  furnished  regiments  for  South 
Africa,  but  on  this  occasion  the  Indian  planting  com- 
munity was  called  to  serve  locally.  Some,  however, 
found  their  way  to  East  Africa,  where  many  of  them  had 
friends,  and  where  compulsory  military  service  has  been 
in  force  for  months.  Apart  from  individuals  the  Ceylon 
Government  furnished,  at  its  own  expense,  a  contingent 
of  250  men  for  service  at  the  Dardanelles ;  the  majority 
of  the  survivors  of  this  contingent  have  now  received 
commissions. 

In  China,  the  China  Association  and  its  various  branches 
have  pioneered  the  homeward  movement  of  fighting  men. 
They  usually  assembled  in  Shanghai,  but  they  came  from 
all  parts  of  the  Far  East.  In  Shanghai  they  were  grouped 
together  and  sent  home,  and  in  many  cases  commissions 
were  awarded  them  by  the  British  authorities  before  they 
left.  About  450  men  came  to  England  under  the  direct 
auspices  of  the  China  Association  ;  they  included  80  men 
of  the  Imperial  Chinese  Maritime  Customs.  Any  number 
came  home  independently,  and  from  Japan  every  avail- 
able Briton  of  fighting  age  seems  to  have  come  forward. 
One  came  from  Hakodate  in  the  extreme  north  of  Japan, 
and  he  claims  to  have  travelled  farther  to  reach  the  battle- 
fields of  Europe  than  any  other  Briton. 

Conservative  estimates  reckon  that  about  10,000  men 
have  come  in  all  from  South  America,  of  whom  perhaps 
about  4,000  to  5,000  were  from  the  Argentine.  In  many 
cases  the  journey  home  necessitated  the  crossing  of  the 
South  American  Continent  and  took  months  to  accom- 
plish. Hardly  an  Englishman  of  military  age  remains  in 
Mexico,  and  many  of  those  who  returned  to  fight — 
and  there  were  hundreds — had  seen  some  sort  of  military 
experience  in  the  local  revolutions.  The  United  States 
perhaps  have  sent  more  Britons  than  any  other  neutral 
country,  for  the  Britishers  scattered  throughout  the 
various  States  at  once  responded  to  the  Mother  Country's 
call,  and  came  back  whenever  it  was  in  their  power  to  do 
so.  In  many  cases  the  expenses  home  were  paid  by  the 
men  themselves. 

The  West  Indian  Islands  rose  splendidly  to  the  occa; 
sion.  From  Jamaica  and  Trinidad,  from  the  Bermudas  and 
the  Bahamas,  and  from  the  Windward  and  the  Leeward 
Islands  came  men  of  the  Blood  to  offer  their  lives  in 
defence  of  their  ideals.  The  West  Indian  regiments  have 
taken  an  active  part  in  the  war,  some  of  them  are  even 
now  in  Africa.  The  women  who  stayed  behind  devoted 
long  hours  to  preparing  comforts  for  the  fighting  men  and 
for  making  ready  hospitals  for  the  reception  of  the  sick 
and  wounded.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  for  the 
last  two  and  twenty  months  wherever  the  flag  has  waved 
there  British  women  have  devoted  themselves  day  by 
day  to  the  well-being  of  their  fighting  men,  and  have 
bravely  forbidden  private  anxiety  or  sorrow  to  interfere 
with  their  untiring  good  work. 

In  West  Africa,  as  in  East  Africa,  there  has  been  fighting 
to  be  done  at  the  threshold,  and  so  it  has  not  been  possible 
for  troops,  either  fair-skinned  or  dark-skinned  to  be  sent 
to  Europe.  No  one  will  forget  the  generous  offer  made  by 
West  African  chiefs  to  help  in  the  war.  Many  of  them 
were  Mahommedans,  and  prayers  went  up  from  their 
mosques  for  victory  on  British  Arms,  for  they  knew  by 
report  what  would  be  their  fate  were  Germany  to  triumph. 


Never  in  history  has  there  been  more  dramatic  punish- 
ment for  cold-blooded,  heartless  cruelty  than  the  fate 
which  has  overtaken  Germany's  possessions  on  the  Dark 
Continent. 

Take  down  a  map  of  the  British  Empire  and  with  a 
pin-point  designate  a  single  speck  of  red  which  has  not 
contributed  to  the  defence  of  the  Empire  !  It  is  impossible. 
The  Fiji  Islands  have  sent  two  contingents,  from  the 
Seychelles  and  Mauritius  have  come  no  small  part  of  the 
white  population.  The  Falkland  Islands  have  not  only 
heard  the  big  guns  of  the  British  Navy,  but  have  sent 
men  to  the  firing-line  in  France  and  Flanders. 

There  is  nothing  more  pathetic  than  to  read  at  the 
present  time  the  British  papers  all  over  the  world,  and 
notice  the  little  notes  about  former  residents  who  had 
gone  home  to  fight,  and  whose  names  now  appear  in^the 
"  Roll  of  Honour."  Hardly  a  newspaper  appears  in  a 
British  possession  without  them,  and  in  some,  such  as 
those  in  the  Far  East,  where  the  recruiting  has  been 
heavy,  there  is  always  quite  a  long  list  of  their  own.  In 
the  long  annals  of  war  there  is  no  such  thrilling  story 
as  the  rallying  of  the  British  Empire  round  the  standard 
of  the  King-Emperor. 


British  Battlefields 

A  MAP  is  published  overleaf  which  shows  at  a 
glance  the  battlefields  of  the  British  Army. 
It  is  not  in  any  sense  complete,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  it  would  be  impossible,  on  a  chart 
of  this  size,  to  mark  every  actual  scene  of  encounter 
between  Britain's  fighting  men  and  their  foes  for  the 
time  being,  but  it  does  demonstrate  the  world-wide  arena 
over  which  our  little  army — the  "  Old  Contemptibles," 
to  give  it  the  Kaiser's  nickname — has  fought  in  order  to 
estabhsh  the  foundations  of  Empire.  Most  of  these 
campaigns  are,  of  course,  familiar  to  our  readers,  but  this 
synopsis  will  come  somewhat  as  a  surprise  to  many,  for 
Britons  are  apt  to  forget  that  no  nation,  not  even  the 
French,  has  more  feats  of  arms  to  its  credit  outside  the 
cockpits  of  Europe. 

Of  deliberate  purpose  all  reference  to  the  British 
Navy  and  battles  on  the  sea  are  omitted,  for  "  there's 
never  a  wave  of  all  her  waves  but  marks  our  English 
dead."  And  it  would  be  futile  to  attempt  to  chart  the 
deeps  and  the  shallows  which  have  listened  to  the  guns 
of  British  ships  when  they  have  spoken  in  defence  of 
British  rights  and  have  thereby  made  secure  the  freedom' 
of  the  seas. 

These  battlefields  of  Empire  tell  a  different  tale  than 
mere  military  glory.  On  many  of  them  have  been  won 
that  sympathy  which  ever  exists  between  clean  and  brave 
fighters,  be  they  friends  or  foes,  and  from  which  when  the 
decision  has  been  obtained,  mutual  respect  and  under- 
standing spring.  To  give  two  instances,  there  are  the 
campaigns  against  the  Sikhs  and  against  the  Ghurkas, 
neither  of  which,  by  the  way,  are  shown  on  this  map 
owing  to  lack  of  space,  which  has  caused  many  little 
wars  to  be  crowded  out.  None  of  the  fighting  races  of 
In'dia  withstood  our  troops  more  stoutly  than  they,  yet 
almost  before  their  wounds  had  had  time  to  heal,  these, 
our  former  stubborn  foes,  were  fighting  shoulder  to 
shoulder  with  us  before  the  walls  of  Delhi  as  our  staunch 
comrades.  Again  and  on  a  larger  scale  has  this  miracle 
of  a  right  understanding  and  mutual  respect  springing 
to  quick  fruition  from  hard-contested  battlefields  been 
witnessed  in  South  Africa. 

Nor  has  the  Briton  only  risked  his  hfe  where  military 
glory  is  to  be  won.     No  sooner  are  the  dead  buried  and 
the  wounded  cared  for  than  he  turns  to  the  fields  of  peace 
and  risks  his  life  as  gaily  in  the  development  of  new  lands. 
The  British  Roll  of  Honour  in  these  fights  against  Nature, 
these  struggles  of  peace  times,  would  be  a  long  one  where 
it  only  possible  to  compile  it.     That  well-known  verse  of 
Kipling's  describes  in  vivid  phrase  the  work  to  which  so 
many  of  these  battles  have  been  but  the  prelude  : 
Keep  ye  the  Law — be  swift  in  all  obedience — 
Clear  the  land  of  evil,  drive  the  road  and  bridge  the  ford. 
Make  ye  sure  to  each  his  own 
That  he  reap  where  he  hath  sown  ; 
By  the  peace  among  our  peoples  let   men  know  we  serve 
the  Lord  ! 


i6 


LAND      &      WATER 


May  25,  1916 


^^^ 


.„  PQ       PP.,,, 


■mimiinininmiiiiiiuilim 

Vftl^/»l""|».t"l'^"l'l^'■^lw?(F?^^^ 


-ft. 


I*, 


May  25,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


^7 


Britain's  Military  Effort 


By  Hilaire  Belloc 


THE  picture  which  everyone  should  have  before 
him  in  writing  of  a  contemporary  event,  is  the 
aspect  this  event  will  have  for  posterity.  He 
must  attempt  to  see  the  thing  with  that  detach- 
ment and  in  that  proportion  normal  to  a  man  separated 
by  long  spaces  of  time  from  the  affections  and  bias  of  the 
moment. 

If  we  approach  the  military  effort  of  Britain  in  this 
spirit  we  shall  find  that  effort  to  be  a  far  stronger  and 
greater  thing  than  opinion  has  yet  conceived. 

The  war  has  been  in  progress  less  than  two  years. 
We  have  not  yet  ended  its  twenty-second  month.  In 
that  brief  period  of  time  (it  will  be  but  a  flash  in  the  eyes 
of  history)  Great  Britain  has  produced,  upon  the  Military 
side  of  the  State,  an  orgamsalion  almost  entirely  novel, 
and  constructed  under  conditions  which  render  it  unique 
in  all  the  history  of  war. 

Unless  we  recognise  not  only  the  magnitude  but  the 
individuality  of  the  effort,  not  only  its  scale  but  its 
cjuality,  we  shall  miss  (to  our  disadvantage  to-day)  what 
posterity  will  certainly  grasp. 

When  the  war  broke  out  Great  Britain  was  able  to 
put  into  the  field  not  quite  four  divisions. 

The  full  four  divisions  of  what  we  called  "  the  E.\- 
peditionary  Force  "  were  only  constituted  in  the  very 
progress  of  the  fighting.  Their  last  complementary 
units  did  not  exceed  the  losses  already  suffered  in  the 
first  shock,  and  only  reached  the  field  while  the  third 
heavy  day  of  action  was  in  doubt. 

Even  this  original  body,  of  less  than  four  divisions, 
was  not  in  line  until  the  war  had  been  in  progress 
upon  the  Continent  for  more  than  a  fortnight.  It 
.was  a  force  of  professional  regulars.  It  represented 
very  nearly  the  maximum  effort  which  (ireat  Britain 
was  pledged  to  or  had  hitherto  thought  possible  in  case  of  a 
continental  campaign.' 

From  Six  to  Seventy^ 

When,  in  the  counter-offensive  which  began  a  fortnight  , 
to  three  weeks  later,  these  four  divisions  increased  to  a 
nominal  six  ("  nominal,"  because  the  losses  of  the  previous 
fighting  had  so  grievously  depleted  the  units  engaged) 
the  very  maximum  was  reached  of  all  that  had  been 
envisaged  before  this  war. 

So  matters  stood  when  the  British  army  in  France, 
representing  not  a  tenth  at  that  moment — indeed  not 
very  much  more  than  a  twentieth — of  the  total  AlHed 
forces  in  the  west,  came  to  the  Aisne  river  and  entered 
that  second  phase  of  the  campaign  to  which  we  are  still 
condemned  :   the  war  of  trenches. 

In  the  middle  of  May  1916,  exactly  twenty  months 
later,  tho  army  in  the  field  numbers  seventy  divisions, 
so  far  as  the  effort  of  these  islands  alone  is  concerned. 
Not  only  are  those  seventy  divisions  kept  at  full 
strength  during  a  campaign  of  unprecedented  wastage, 
but  they  have  behind  them  such  masses  of  men  already 
trained  and  equipped  as  permit  the  maintenance  of  those 
units — not  indefinitely,  indeed,  for  the  wastage  of  all 
armies  in  this  war  is  more  rapid  than  their  possible 
recruitment,  but,  at  any  rate,  for  quite  as  long  a  time  as 
the  struggle  in  its  present  form  can  possibly  last. 

Not  only  have  the  numbers  thus  increased  by  more 
than  tenfold,  but  the  total  mobilised  man-power  of  the 
nation  has  increased  at  the  same  time  in  a  far  larger 
proportion  ;  and  when  the  third  year  of  the  war  is 
entered  it  will  be  found — for  reasons  which  we  are  about 
to  examine — -that  Great  Britain  will  have  turned  to  the 
purposes  of  war,  direct  or  indirect,  a  larger  proportion 
of  her  population  than  any  belligerent  country,  with  the 
possible  exception  of  France. 

The  statement  when  it  is  thus  first  made  sounds 
extravagant.     It  is  true,  as  will  soon  be  apparent. 

This  State  has  multiplied  its  field  army  by  more  than 
ten  in  the  course  of  less  than  two  years,  and  has  multiplied 
its  total  armed  force  by  a  multiple  nearer  18  and  lo. 


Now  let  us  consider  (without  as  yet  mentioning  the 
peculiar  difficulties  involved)  the  equipment  of  this 
force. 

To  raise  and  train  a  body  of  men  is  one  thing,  to  provide 
it  with  its  necessary  equipment  is  another.  Under 
modern  conditions  it  is  the  second  of  the  two  tasks  that 
is  the  more  serious,  and  the  more  likely  to  involve  delay. 
By  equipment  in  this  sense  we  mean  not  only  the  accoutre- 
ment of  the  soldier  but  the  provision  of  the  armies  with 
all  their  parts  in  due  proportion.  We  mean  the  provision 
of  field  guns,  of  a  new  and  exceptional  number  of  heavy 
pieces  for  the  longest  task.  We  mean  the  provision  of 
everything  needed  for  the  sanitary  formations  and  the 
provision  of  everything  required  for  supply  ;  we  mean 
the  provision  of  all  technical  instruments,  and,  in  general, 
the  organisation  of  an  army  in  its  fullest  development. 
The  immensely  increassed  armed  forces  of  Great  Britain 
are  now  in  that  position.  Nothing  is  lacking,  save  here 
and  there  in  such  things  as  have  been  invented  during, 
or  have  been  suggested  by,  the  course  of  the  war  itself. 
In  these  every  belligerent  is,  according  to  his  situation, 
still  making  good  his  position.  We  have  not  yet,  for 
instance,  the  same  full  output  of  steel  helmets  as  the 
French,  for  the  French  were  here  the  pioneers,  but  we  are 
advanced  beyond  the  Germans  and  Austrians  in  this 
respect.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  certain  forms  of 
trench  weapons  in  which  both  the  armies  of  the  western 
Allies  were  only  lately,  and  may  still  be,  catching  up  with 
the  enemy.  Against  this  again  set  the  fact  that  there  is 
at  least  one  trench  weapon  in  which  we  are  altogether  the 
pioneers,  in  which  our  Allies  are  to  follow  us  when  it 
appears,  and  in  which  our  enemies  will  be  behind  us  so 
heavily  as  hardly  to  be  able  to  catch  up  before  the  end 
of  the  campaign.  With  the  exception,  however,  of  these 
varying  details  of  things  developed  during  the  course  of 
the  war,  the  army  is  fully  equipped,  and  has  not  been 
presented  during  its  rapid  increase  at  any  moment  subject 
to  any  lack  of  equipment.  I  might  add  that  it  is  equipped 
with  a  solidity  and  thoroughness  of  material  in  the  true 
national  tradition. 

This  feat,  the  multiplication  of  one's  army  in  the  field 
by  more  than  ten  in  the  course  of  twenty  months,  and 
the  putting  forward  of  the  new  formations  fully  equipped 
in  every  detail,  is  a  thing  which  has  not  been  known 
before  in  the  history  of  war.  It  has  not  been  known  where 
nations  already  armed  and  already  practised  in  war  were 
concerned. 

It  is  a  feat  the  more  extraordinary  when  one 
considers  that  the  nation  which  has  performed  it  was 
one  of  the  great  Powers.  A  nation  hitherto  ignorant 
of  arms,  or  one  which  from  its  small  size  could 
anticipate  permanent  neutrality  in  European  conflicts, 
might  be  compelled  to  sudden  expansion  from  some  very 
low  original  minimum.  But  England  was  a  nation  of 
the  first  rank,  which  had  calculated  beforehand  the  pro- 
portion of  its  various  efforts  in  case  of  war,  naval,  military 
and  economic,  which  was  suddenly  called  upon  to  throw 
the  whole  of  that  calculation  to  the  winds  and  to  develojj 
one  single  field  of  its  energies  after  a  fashion  utterly  out 
of  scale  with  anything  previously  conceived  or  consonant 
with  the  general  arrangement  of  the  national  life  already 
absorbed  in  the  problem  of.  defence.  The  thing  had  to 
be  done  in  the  midst  of  a  highly  differentiated  industrial 
society,  working  at  full  pressure,  and  it  had  to  be  done 
in  a  society  which  actually  lived — not  merely  thrived — 
by  sea-borne  commerce,  and  which  would  die  if  it  lost 
the  importation  of  raw  materials  and  food. 

These  are  the  considerations  (considerations  attaching 
to  the  nature  of  the  British  polity  before  the  war,  and, 
indeed,  during  all  the  course  of  the  war)  which  gives  to 
the  effort  Britain  has  made  a  quality  far  more  remark- 
able than  its  mere  scale — enormous  as  that  scale  is. 

The  best  way,  perhaj:s,  in  which  to  put  the  thing  is  to 
point  out  a  simple  truth  which  everyone  will  admit  who 
has  the  imagination  to  throw  his  mind  back  to  the  early 
summer  of  19 14.     That  truth  is  this.     No  one  in  the 


i8 


LA  N  D      &-    \V  A  T  E  R 


May  25,  1916 


world — no  foreigner,  still  less  any  Englishman  acquainted 
with  the  nature  of  his  own  country — would  for  a  moment 
have  conceived  the  thing  to  be  possible. 

If  you  had  said  in  June,  1014,  "  Two  years  hence 
Great  Britain  will  have  enrolled  for  the  purpose  of  the 
State  in  a  great  war  five  millions  of  men.  She  will  have 
fighting  in  various  fields  of  that  war,  fully  equipped  and 
at  their  full  strength,  70  di\isions.  She  will  have  trained 
behind  those  divisions  ample  reserves  for  many,  many 
months  to  come.  She  will  be  also  in  process  of  training 
further  reserves  so  large  that  she  can  '  see  her  war  ' 
long  beyond  the  limits  set  by  our  Allies  and  our  rivals," 
you  would  have  been  saying  something  which  would  not 
have  been  condemned  as  exaggerated,  or  foolish,  or  mad, 
but  as  simply  meaningless. 

You  would  have  been  told  in  the  first  place  that  the 
mere  making  of  rifles  for  such  a  force  was  beyond  the 
power  of  Great  Britain  did  she  work  at  nothing  else  for 
many  years.  It  would  have  been  pointed  out  to  you  that 
there  were  not  instructors  neces.sary  for  tlie  training  of 
half,  or  even  a  quarter,  of  such  forces.  You  would  have 
been  given  some  idea  of  the  number  of  guns  an  army 
expects  to  have  to  the  thousand  bayonets,  and  upon 
that   point   alone  you  would  have  been  put  out  of  court. 

We  do  not  yet  see  the  thing  at  alL  That  we  do  not 
see  it  in  its  tnie  proportions  goes  without  saying.  1 
repeat  that  we  do  not  see  the  thing  at  all  any  more  than 
a  man  upon  the  surface  of  a  mountain  sees  a  mountain. 
It  is  a  prodigy. 

Now  there  are  in  connection  with  that  prodigy  two 
things  e.specially  to  be  remarked.  The  first  is  the  social 
medium  in  which  it  took  place  and  against  the  apparent 
character  of  which  it  took  place.  The  second  is  the 
economic  effort  which  accompanied  and  made  possible 
the  militarj'. 

The  society  from  which  this  immense  effort  proceeded 
with  such  immense  rapidity  was  not  a  democratic  society. 
It  was  a  society  such  as  has  often  been  developed  by 
powerful  commercial  and  maritime  states  in  the  past  ;  a 
society  essentially  oligarchic  in  character.  Its  main 
interests  were  the  interests  of  trade.  Its  main  civic 
discussion  was  the  discussion  between  its  increasing  vast 
proletariat  majority  and  a  capitalist  class  decreasing 
in  numbers,  but  adding  to  its  wealth  with  every  decade. 

This  society  had  never  been  asked  to  undertake  within 
Uving  memory'  any  complete  national  effort  against  an 
equal  foe.  That  experience  which  has  moulded  all  the 
national  tradition  of  the  German  Empire  and  of  the  French 
Republic,  of  the  Southern  as  of  the  Northern  States  in 
America,  was  here  quite  lacking. 

It  is  true,  indeed,  that  those  who  cared  to  note  the 
steps  of  a  certain  moral  revolution  through  which  the 
country  was  passing  would  have  marked  as  peculiarly 
significant  the  vohmtary  recruitment  during  the  South 
African  war. 

But  in  the  first  place  it  was  upon  no  such  scale  as  this. 
In  the  second  place,  it  was  accompanied  by  a  very  high 
rate  of  remuneration.  In  the  third  place,  and  most 
important,  it  came  just  after  the  period  when' the  par- 
ticular problems  presented  and  the  particular  passions 
aroused  by  the  South  African  conflict  were  keenly  alive. 

The  more  important  thing  that  has  been  done  in  the 
last  two  years  had  no  such  advantages.  It  arose  from  a 
circumstance  unexpected,  and  in  a  state  of  the  public 
mind  towards  any  potential  enemy  in  Europe  which  can 
iiardly  be  called  a  belligerent  state  of  mind  at  all. 

There  had  been  in  a  comparatively  small  section  of  the 
educated  classes  an  insistence  for  some  years  upon  the 
rivalry  between  the  German  Empire  and  Great  Britain. 
That  a  conflict  upon  this  scale  was  coming  was  not  con- 
templated for  a  moment.  Even  those  few  who  saw  such 
things  in  the  future  saw  them  in  the  shape  of  a  duel 
between  this  country  and  one  great  rival.  It  prepared 
against  the  danger  of  invasion,  and  at  the  most  demanded 
nothing  more  than  a  sort  of  militia,  universal  indeed, 
but  trained  only  for  the  purpose  of  an  island  defence. 

It  is  important  to  emphasise  this  point  at  a  moment 
when  it  is  largely  forgotten.  An  army  for  fighting  abroad 
enormously  greater  than  the  hypothetical  little  "  Ex- 
peditionary Force  "  was  never  in  the  contemplation  of 
the  most  imaginative. 

The  thing  is  entirely  new.  It  has  been  called  into  being 
absolutely  from  the  beginning  and,  as  one  may  say,  almost 


out  of  nothing,  so  far  as  the  moral  forces  creating  it  are 
concerned.     And  that  is  one  part  of  the  miracle. 

Those  who  know  the  history  of  the  coimtry  in  the  past 
will  be  the  most  ready  to  grasp  the  truth  with  regard  to 
the  second  part  of  that  miracle  :  I  mean  the  fact  that 
the  effort  was  voluntary. 

Until  quite  a  few  weeks  ago — until,  indeed,  the  whole 
thing  was  done  and  hardly  anything  remained  to  do — 
the  creation  and  the  recruitment  of  this  enormous  body 
of  men,  to  a  large  extent  its  training  and  organisation 
too,  were  due  to  spontaneous  effort. 

Voluntary   Effort 

Those  who  knew  little  of  their  own  country  and  nothing 
of  the  past,  chose  sometimes  to  point  out  how  much  of 
public  advertisement,  of  persuasion,  and  (in  cases)  of 
individual  pressure  were  necessary  to  produce  enlistment, 
What  these  men  evidently  did  not  know,  or  could  not 
conceive  (from  a  happy  insularity),  was  the  light  in 
which  the  thing  appears  when  we  consider  either  the  past 
of  this  country  or  the  history  of  our  .Mlies  and  rivals. 

The  Germans,  for  instance,  spend  much  of  their  slow 
and  mechanical  research  upon  the  lives  of  their  neigh- 
bours. They  are  nearly  always  lacking  in  judgment,  l3ut 
commonly  well  stocked  with  detail.  They  have,  before 
the  war  broke  out  and  during  its  progress,  grossly 
misunderstood  subtlety,  magnanimity,  human  and 
other  characters  alien  to  their  own.  But  at  least  they 
were  acquainted  with  the  material  circumstances  upon 
which  mere  calculation  could  be  based.  It  was  their 
trade. 

Now  the  Germans  undoubtedly  took  it  for  granted  that 
the  voluntary  effort  in  this  country  would  not  only  fail, 
but  fail  early  and  ignominiously. 

All  their  press,  particularly  their  satire  (if  anything  so 
heavy  can  be  called  satire)  took  for  granted  what  seemed 
to  them — and  not  only  to  them — an  obvious  truth  ; 
that  no  nation,  and  least  of  all  an  industrial  nation  such 
as  ours,  feeling  all  the  strain  between  capitalist  and 
proletariat,  could  produce,  without  legal  enforcement 
of  ser\-ice,  anything  but  a  comparatively  small  pro- 
fessional army.  The  German  mind  has  had  to  suffer  S(3 
many  disillusionments  in  the  last  two  years  that  it  is  now 
frankly  bewildered,  and  it  is  giving  forth  the  chief  mark 
of  bewilderment — which  is  self-contradictory  statement. 
But  in  nothing  has  it  begun  to  be  more  bewildered  than 
in  this  particular  point  of  the  British  voluntary  system. 

The  (ierman  mind  is  so  slow  to  appreciate  anything 
through  the  senses  that  its  jeers  at  the  continuance  of 
such  a  system  and  its  incredulity  of  the  British  power  to 
raise  anything  beyond  the  first  few  divisions,  continued 
past  the  bloody  .  and  complete  defeat  suffered  by 
the  fJerman  army  in  front  of  Ypres.  It  continued  on 
and  on  until  there  were  at  least  twenty  British  divisions 
in  France  alone  opposed  to  the  German  lines.  Then 
and  then  onlj-  did  the  German  popular  mind  at  last — 
whatever  the  (German  higher  command  may  have  thought 
— begin  to  change  in  this  regard. 

To-day— and  for  some  months  past— that  miscon- 
ception of  England  has  so  utterly  disappeared  that  pro- 
bably the  German  mind  has  half-forgotten  it  ever  enter- 
tained it. 

The  economic  effort  which  has  accompanied  this  pro- 
digious transformation  in  the  armament  of  Great  Britain 
has  not  been  as  novel  in  quality,  though  in  scale  it  has 
been  as  remarkable. 

Briefly,  the  wealth  of  England  has  been  "  mobilised  " 
as  thai  of  no  other  belligerent— and  it  is  not  perhaps 
wholly  to  the  advantage  of  this  country  or  its  future 
that-  it  should  have  been  so.  Our  wealth  was,  to  use  a 
continental  metaphor,  more  "  liquid."  It  was  therefore 
more  easily  tapped.  But  whether  it  were  wisely  tapped 
or  no  might  form  a  suitable  matter  for  discussion  in  other 
pages  than  these.  If  a  man  owns  a  ton  of  wheat  in  the 
Argentine  and  a  hundred  bales  of  cotton  in  Egypt,  he  is 
possessed  of  wealth  more  movable  and  more  easily 
exchangeable  than  some  highly  improved  farm  in  Picardy 
or  Lombardy.  The  temptation  to  realise  in  consumption, 
or  to  acquire  for  consumption  by  exchange,  goods  of 
this  kind,  thereby  saving  the  less  mobile  wealth  of 
others  is  considerable,  and  that  temptation  has  been 
yielded  to.  Great  Britain  has  financed  the  Alliance 
very  largely,  herself  entirely  (without  recourse  as  yet  in 
any  marked  degree  to  foreign  or  neutral  aid),  she  has  thus 


May  25,  1916 


LAND      &  *\VATER 


been  freely  "  tapped,"  because  beyond  any  other  of  the 
belligerents  her  wealth  was  mobile.  But  that  is  not  the 
same  thing  as  saying  that  her  wealth  was  greatest,  or 
that  her  expenditure  has  been  in  proportion  to  her  ability 
among  the  belligerents. 

In  another  aspect  of  this  economic  effort  Great  Britain 
has  done  something  novel  and  perhaps  perilous  :  I  mean 
in  the  scale  of  charges.  It  may  be  that  an  industrial 
society  could  not  act  in  any  other  fashion  :  it  is  a  matter 
not  proper  for  discussion  here.  Whether  you  measure  it 
by  the  number  of  men  in  the  field,  or  by  the  number  of 
nien  equipped,  or  by  the  number  of  weapons  used,  or  by 
the  number  of  missiles  discharged  or  accumulated — no 
matter  what  you  make  your  test — you  will  find  that  the 
co-efficient  of  expense  per  unit  is  immensely  higher  here 
than  elsewhere.  It  is  sometimes  nearly  treble.  It  is 
nearly  always  double. 

It  will  be  said  with  justice  that  for  the  most  part  such 
wealth — or  (to  be  accurate)  such  consumable  values — 
remain  within  the  economic  frontiers  of  the  nation. 
That  is  true.  A  portion  of  them,  indeed,  is  lost  for  ever, 
exchanged  with  neutral  foreigners  against  goods  which 
are  immediately  destroyed  in  consumption— such  as 
shell  :  or  which,  if  not  immediately  destroyed  in  con- 
sumption (weapons,  for  instance)  produce  no  further 
'  wealth.  But  still  the  greater  part  of  the  material  passes 
from  the  economic  power  of  one  British  subject  to  the 
economic  power  of  another.  But  that  is  not  the  root  of 
the  matter.  The  root  of  the  matter  is  that  what  was 
formerly  accumulated  wealth  productive  of  further 
wealth  in  the  hands  of  the  first  British  subject,  turns  into 
wealth  which  is  consumed  and  destroyed  without'  the 
production  of  further  wealth  in  the  hands  of  the  second 
British  subject.  The  process  has  been  going  on  with 
an  intensive  progression.  It  was  begun  when  expansion 
of  the  war  and  its  duration  were  less  clear,  and  the 
economic  effect  of  such  a  revolution  has  yet  to  be  seen. 

Yet  here,  also,  the  whole  thing  has  been  voluntary. 
There  has  not  hitherto  been  any  practical  "  conscrip- 
tion "  of  wealth,  though  something  very  like  it  has 
appeared  indirectly  in  the  new  high  taxation — for  it  is 
clear  that  that  taxation  cannot  be  paid  out  of  income, 
and  that  much  of  it  will  be  provided  by  the  seUing  of 
stock  to  the  foreigner.  How  much  will  thus  disappear 
we  shall  know  perhaps  when  the  first  real  pressure  of  that 
new  taxation  begins  to  be  felt  next  year. 

There  should  lastly  be  considered  in  connection  with 
this  great  business  the  specially  difficult  problem  which 
was  presented  by  the  officering  and  the  staffing  of  the  new 
armies.     It  was  perhaps  the  most  serious  of  all. 

The  one  main  thing  discussed  in  every  continental 
country  when  the  conscript  armies  of  the  last  generation 
were  in  process  of  construction,  was  the  officering  and  the 
staff.  It  was  necessary  in  a  conscript  country  to  form 
cadres,  that  is  "  Frameworks  " — moulds,  as  it  were,  of 
existing  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  into 
which  should  be  poured  the  material  of  the  mobilisation. 
Without  such  a  framework  no  army  could  stand. 

The  formation  of  these  cadres,  even  under  conscript 
conditions,  was  always  a  serious  difficulty.  The  supply 
of  professional  officers  was  not  unlimited.  The  obtaining, 
training  and  keeping  of  a  body  of  non-commissioned 
officers  was  still  more  difficult.  The  formation  of  cadres 
for  the  reserves  was  a  continual  anxiety  and,  if  one  may 
use  the  phrase,  abnormal  methods  had  everywhere  to 
be  taken  advantage  of.  Thus  in  Germany  a  reserve  of 
officers  was  created  out  of  the  young  men  who  had  only 
one  year's  service  and  who  had  paid  a  sum  of  money  to 
be  exempt  from  the  ordinary  conditions  of  barrack-room 
life.  In  France  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  enough  non- 
commissioned officers  was  met,  but  only  with  partial 
success,  by  the  offer  of  premiums  for  re-enlistment. 
It  was  always  doubtful  how  far  the  system  had  succeeded. 

Here,  in  England,  this  vast  new  army  had  to  be  pro- 
vided immediately,  and  out  of  nothing,  with  its  cadres. 

It  did  not  find,  as  the  mobilised  forces  of  evfery  other 
nation  found,  cadres  already  in  existence,  far  too  large  for 
the  standing  army  and  designed  for  the  army  mobilised. 
It  found  when  war  broke  out  quite  a  small  body  of  pro- 
fessional officers,  a  correspondingly  small  body  of  non- 
commissioned officers,  a  certain  number  of  commissions 
held  by  men  who  were  not  professional  soldiers,  and 
whose  experience  of  their  profession  was  very  much  less 
than  that  of  professional  soldiers — an  inheritance  of  the 


CONTENTS 


19 


PACE 


I 
2 

3 
4 
5 
6 


To  Victory.     By  Bernard  Partridge 

The  Passing  of  Ypres 

Empire  Day.     (Leading  Article) 

The  Right  Hon.  Joseph  Chamberlain 

Messages  from  the  Dominions'  Premiers 

Empire   Building.     By  Harold  Cox 

Story  of  the  Five  Nations  : — 

"Canada  and  Her  Army.     By  A  Canadian  Officer    8 
Australia's  Part.     By  Arthur  Mason  9 
New  Zealand's  Share.     By  Noel  Ross  .  11 
South  Africa's  Record.     By  C.  D.  Baynes  12 
What  India  has  Done.     By  Sir  Francis  Young- 
husband  13 
The  Crown  Colonies,  etc.  14 
Battlefields  of  the  British  Army  (Map)  16 
Britain's  Military  Effort.     By  Hilaire  Belloc  17 
Dominions'  Naval  Help.     By  Arthur  Pollen  22 
Sortes  Shakespearianse.     By  Sir  Sidney  Lee  ,  23 
Africa  and  the  German  Plan.     By  John  Buchan  25 
Man  and  the  Machine.     By  G.  K.  Chesterton  26 
The  Empire  in  Arms.     By  Prof.  J.  H.  Morgan  28 
War  Colony  of  Oversea  Women.  By  Mary  MacLeod 

Moore  30 

What  Empire  Day  Means.     By  the  Earl  of  Meath  31 

For  King  and  Empire.     By  Louis  Raemaekers.  32-33 

An  Untrue  Tale.     By  Boyd  Cable  34 
British    Empire    Production    and    Trade.     (With 

Tables  and  Diagrams).     By  J.  Holt  Schooling     41 

Motoring   Overseas.     By  H.  Massac  Buist  46 

Half  Hours  with  High  Commissioners.     By  Joseph 

Thorp.— Australia  .50 

New  Zealand      .  32 

South  Africa  56 

Canada  58 

French  Red  Cross.     By  Hilaire  Belloc  61 

The  Overseas  Club  63 

Town  and  Country  xx 

The  West  End  xxii. 

Choosing  Kit  xxvi. 


time  of  the  old  volunteers  continued  through  the  new 
Territorial  army.     Beyond  these  there  was  nothing. 

There  was  a  moment  when  it  seemed  hardly  possible 
that,  in  such  circumstances,  the  officering  of  the  new 
armies  could  be  accomplished.  But  the  marvel  here  has 
been,  as  in  the  case  of  numbers,  not  that  the  difficulty 
should  exist,  not  that  it  should  have  been  unfortunately 
clear,  but  that  it  should  have  been  dealt  with  at  all. 

With  the  formation  of  staffs  the  matter  was  graver 
still.  It  was  long  the  talk  of  every  continental  critic, 
not  only  of  our  new  armies,  but  of  his  own,  that  "  you 
cannot  improvise  a  staff,"  and  the  staff  is  the  brain  of  an 
army.  The  staffing  of  an  army  means  not  only  the  staffing 
of  its  higher  command  but  of  all  the  subsidiary  units 
down  to  the  brigades. 

How  far  that  worst  of  all  difficulties  has  been  sur- 
mounted the  campaign  has  already  in  part  shown.  We 
have  heard  plenty  of  criticism  of  the  imperfection  of 
staff  work.  We  had  ample  evidence  of  that  imperfection 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  and  not  a  little  of  it  last  September. 
But,  I  repeat,  the  conspicuous  fact  about  the  whole 
business  is  here,  as  in  the  case  of  numbers,  as  in  the  case 
of  officering,  not  the  gradually  decreasing  imperfection 
displayed,  but  the  power  of  forming  staSs  at  all  with 
such  rapidity  and  out  of  perfectly  new  material. 

In  conclusion,  we  must  remember  with  regard  to  all 
this  that  this  success  (the  magnitude  of  which  no  one  has 
yet  grasped) .  has  been  accomphshed  under  the  conditions 
of  modern  war. 

The  analogy  of  the  past,  which  is  sometimes  appealed 
to,  will  not  hold.  The  chief  analogy,  of  course,  is  with 
the  armies  of  the  French  Revolution.  These  were  not 
multiplied  by  ten,  but  they  were  multiphed  by  three. 
Their  officering  also  was  a  problem  which  was  but 
gradually  solved. 

Novel  methods  were  used  which  -ultimately  proved 
successful  in  their  case,  as  in  ours.  Bnt  there  lies  between 
the  two  things  this  capital  difference^  that  in  the  case  ol 
the  revolutionary  armies  all  developments  would  be  slow. 
The  conveyance  of  information,  itself  a  matter  of  days 
and  sometimes  of  weeks  ;    mobilisjition  the  affair  even  of 


20 


LAND      &     W  A  T  E  R 


May 


tqtG 


months,  and  the  transport  of  bodies  for  tlie  attack,  soint- 
thing  at  the  best  a  matter  of  15  miles  a  day,  at  the  worst 
seven,  but  half  that  distance. 

What  has  been  done  to-day  has  been  done  in  the  face 
of  an  enemy  intimately  prepared  ;  with  all  his  powers 
for  war  alive  and  ready  from  the  first  day,  with  infor- 
mation conveyed  in  a  few  seconds  over  any  distance  of 
space,  with  mobilisation  a  matter  of  a  few  days,  and  the 
concentration  of  a  million  men  upon  any  small  front  made 
possible  by  invention  in  the  course  of  a  couple  of  weeks. 

It  is  perhaps  the  power  to  improvise  under  !?iich 
circumstances  and  in  the  face  of  such  an  opponent  that 
has  been  the  most  amazing  feature  of  the  whole  story. 

THE    TRENTINO 

These  lines  are  written  twenty-four  hours  earlier  in 
the  week  than  usual  from  the  necessity  of  going  to  press 
a  day  before  the  usual  time. 

I  am  therefore  compelled  to  interrupt  any  examination 
of  the  new  offensive  upon  the  frontier  of  the  Trentino, 
for  that  offensive  is  still  in  progress  at  the  moment  of 
WTiting.  The  critical  point,  the  power  of  the  enemy  to 
force  the  Italian  main  line,  or  their  failure  so  to  do,  re- 
mains undecided. 

Rut  what  has  happened  up  to  the  last  news  received 
upon  writing  this  may  bo  tabulated  as  follows  : 

Beginning  upon  Saturday,  May  13th,  and  throughout 
Sunday,  May  14th,  a  violent  intensive  bombardment  with 
heavy  pieces,  the  characteristic  of  every  great  offensive, 
was  directed  uninterruptedly  along  the  Italian  front 
between  the  Upper  ^alley  of  the  Astico  in  front  of  the 
Folgaria  plateau  and  the  valley  of  the  Adige.  The 
Italian  front  here  ran  everyvvere  in  front  of  the  permanent 
werks,  now  transformed  into  field  works,  which  crown 
the  positions  defending  the  Trentine  ->'alley.  The  two 
main  groups  of  heavy  guns  are  on  either  side  of  the  valley 
on  the  ridge  of  the  Biaena  east  of  J^overeto  and  on  the 
Folgaria  to  west,  and  somewhat  to  north  of  that  town. 

After  the  bombardment  of  Sunday,  May  14th,  the 
Austrian  assault  on  Monday,  May  isth,  attacked  the 
height  of  the  Zugna  Torta,  which  stands  out  rather  in 
front  of  the  most  advanced  Italian  positions ;  with  the 
village  of  Moscheri,  at  its  base. 

The  attack  was  carried  on  all  the  Monday  and  the 
Tuesday  agaiast  the  Italian  advanced  positions,  and  on 
the  latter  day  Moscheri  was  entered. 

Meanwhile  during  the  same  Monday  and  up  to  dawn 
on  Tuesday,  the  second  attack  was  proceeding  upon  the 
advanced  Italian  jjositions  in  the  Val  Sugana,  that  is  in 
the  Upper  Valley  of  the  Brenta,  between  the  summit  of 


the  Collo  and  the  height  of  the  Armenterra,  with  the 
village  of  IJoncegno  between  them  which  marked  the 
e.xtreme  limit  of  the  former  Italian  advance  up  the  valley. 
By  Wednesday  the  Austrians  were  suffering  something 
of  a  check,  especially  in  the  Val  Sugana,  where  they  lost 
a  certain  number  of  prisoners  and  fell  back.  But  on 
Thursday  the  Zugna  Torta,  at  the  base  of  which  the 
Austrians  had  already  entered  Moscheri,  was  evacuated 
by  the  Italians.  On  Friday,  the  iqtli,  the  western  end 
of  the  Armenterra  ridge  was  occupied  by  the  .Austrians 
and  the  village  of  Roncegno  at  its  foot,  while  a  subsidiary 
movement  between  the  two  valleys  was  being  pushed 
against  the  Santo  between  the  Terragnolo  torrent  and  the 
Zugna  Torta  ridge.  By  the  evening  of  that  day  the 
Austrians  claimed  13,000  Italian  prisoners,  107  guns  and 
li  large  howitzers.  We  shall  see  in  a  moment  how 
these  claims  may  be  criticised. 

The  Saturday  and  the  Sunday  gave  no  appreciable 
result,  at  least  in  the  news  reaching  London  by  Monday 
afternoon,  and  it  looked  as  though  the  great  offensive  had 
reached  some  main  line  of  defence  upon  which  our  Ally 
proposes  to  stand  after  ha\'ing  retired  in  some  places 
over  two  miles  of  ground,  in  others  over  a  mile  to  a 
mile  and  a-half. 

The  first  main  general  object  of  these  offensives,  from 
the  great  model  of  Verdun  down  to  the  smallest  efforts 
such  as  the  attack  on  the  Vimy  Kidgc  last  Sunday,  is  to 
postpone  the  counter-offensive  of  an  enemy  growing  in 
power,  and  with  luck  to  render  that  offensive  weak  or  im- 
possible by  the  time  it  comes  (that  is,  supposing  one  has 
compelled  the  enemy  to  lose  more  men  than  a  defending 
force  ought  to  lose)  and  with  greater  luck  still  to  arrive 
at  some  decision. 

Armies  as  they  reach  the  end  of  their  resources  are  - 
always  compelled  to  attack.  To  stand  upon  the  defensive 
means  nothing,  strategically,  except  using  in  one's  own 
favour  the  element  of  time.  It  connotes  increasing 
strength  in  comparison  with  one's  enemy.  The  only 
other  things  it  can  connote  are  despair — which  is  not  a 
strategical  consideration — or  the  political  hope  that  delay 
will  secure  more  favourable  terms.  When  things  are 
the  other  way,  when  one  knows  that  one's  enemy  will 
get  stronger  and  oneself  weaker  as  time  proceeds^  then 
the  defensive  is  useless  and  the  offensive  imposes  itself. 
It  is  clear  that  a  decision  of  any  kind  attained  before  the 
disproportion  of  forces  became  overwhelming  would  be 
the  salvation  of  the  declining  force.  It  is  equally  clear 
that  bad  blundering  on  the  part  of  a  superior  enemy  so 
that  he  should  lose  too  many  men  though  standing  upon 
the  defensive,  might  cripple  his  power  of  greater  action. 
It  is  clear  that  upon  the  very  least  a  vigorous  offensive,  so 


Siae/ia  ~ 


May  25,  1916 


. LAND      &     WATER 
a       10      20     30     40     Siy'pip- 


21 


ii^^^^^^^Si^^ 


II 


GORJZIA 

Mbnfalcone 
TRIESTE' 


Verona. 


II  J-  ^■^■■T^W^W* 


losses,  tlie  thing  would  be  so  clear  that  not  the  stupidest 
panicmonger  could  shirk  the  conclusion.  Unfortunately 
we  Jiave  not  that  statistical  evidence  to  hand,  but  we 
know  roughly  on  the  analogy  of  all  past  experience 
the  proportion  of  losses  between  the  offensive  and  the 
defensive  in  this  trench  warfare.  We  further  know  what 
is  meant  by  the  enemy's  established  rule  for  impressing 
us  with  the  results  of  any  of  his  abortive  offensives.  He 
always  gives  as  the  total  number  of  prisoners  taken  upon 
the  first  blow  as  many  men  as  he  can  possibly  get  any  of 
his  opponents  for  the  moment  to  believe.  Roughly 
speaking  the  figures  given  are  usually  equivalent  to,  or  a 
little  superior  to,  the  total  losses  of  all  kinds  suffered,  and 
the  object  is  to  depress  the  opposed  command  during  the 
period  of  disorder  before  the  line  is  I'eorganised  and  exact 
figures  of  missing,  with  the  presumed  proportion  of  dead, 
wounded  and  unwounded  among  them,  are  obtainable. 
Claims  to  the  capture  of  heavy  guns  are  nearly  always 
accurate,  for  it  is  not  a  matter  upon  which  lying  is  of  any 
use,  the  opposing  command  knows  perfectly  well  that  it 
has  had  to  abandon  such  batteries  or  no.  Claims  to  the 
capture  of  "  guns  "  in  general  include  every  sort  of 
trench  weapon.  Claims  to  the  capture  of  "  field  guns  " 
specially  so  named  cover,  as  a  rule,  the  total  lo.ss  in  such 
weapons  of  the  opponents,  and  include  what  is  destroyed 
with  what  is  still  useful  material. 

Judged  by  this  test  the  Austrian  claims  up  to  last 
Sunday  night  when  the  Italian  belt  of  advanced  posts 
was  taken  and  apparently  a  check  received  by  the  enemy 
upon  the  main  positions  behind,  show  something  of  this 
kind — the  Italians  have  lost  we  may  presume,  in  dead, 
wounded  and  prisoners,  about  the  total  number  of 
prisoners  alone  claimed  by  the  enemy.  One  battery 
and  probably  part  of  another  of  big  howitzers  eraplaced 
far  forward  for  the  reply  to  the  Folgaria  and  other  enemy 
batteries  has  fallen  into  Austrian  hands,  and  a  certain 
unknown  number  of  held  pieces  with  which  French 
weapons  have  been  counted.  All  that  is  insignihcant. 
The  vital  point.-  are  the  expense  at  which  this  shallow 
belt  of  territory  in  the  mountains  has  been  acquired  and 
the  resistance  which  the  enemy  will  meet  with  upon  the 
main  ItaUan  positions.  With  regard  to  the  first  point 
we  have  only  analogy  to  guide  us,  and  may  estimate  losses 
perhaps  two  and  a  half,  perhaps  three  times  more  numerous 
than  those  of  the  defence— for  it  is  clear  from  the  enemy's 
own  figures  that  the  Italians  held  their  first  line  very 
thinly  as  opposed  to  the  German  method  which  cost  the 
enemy  so  heavily  last  September.  As  to  the  second 
point  it  belongs  to  the  future.  H.  Belloc 


long  as  a  declining  force  can  conduct  it,  postpones  the 
dreaded  final  attack  against  it  which  its  relatively  in- 
creasing enemy  designs  ;  and  that  is  why  the  Central 
•Empires  are  condemned  to  unceasing  offensive  action  so 
long  as  they  have  a  margin  left  over  the  numbers  required 
to  hold  their  hues. 

In  each  particular  offensive  there  is  also,  of  course,,  a 
localobject,  which  would,  if  it  were  attained,  effect  some- 
thing like  a  decision.  It  is  clearly  the  intention  of  the 
.\ustrians  to  force  the  two  passages  of  the  Adige  valley 
and  the  Val  Sugana.  They  propose  to  do  this  by  direct 
attack,  and  by  turning  the  defences  of  the  valleys  round 
by  carrying  the  mountain  group  lying  between. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  map  that  the  two  main  passages 
carrying  both  road  and  rail  which  lead  from  Trent  (and 
all  that  lies  behind  Trent)  into  the  Italian  plain,  are  the 
valley  of  the  Adige,  running  north  and  south,  with  its 
great  town  at  the  opening  of  the  plain  at  Verona,  and  the 
Val  Sugana,  that  is,  the  upper  course  of  the  River  Brenta, 
with  its  town  at  the  opening  of  the  plain,  Bassano.  If 
two  Austrian  columns  could  debouch  from  the  hills  by 
these  two  avenues,  they  would  be  right  behind  the  main 
Italian  force  on  the  Isonzo  and  upon  the  main  communica- 
tions of  that  force ;  upon  the  Venetian  plain,  rendering 
the  Italian  position  on  the  Isonzo  impossible  and  destroy- 
ing the  whole  plan  of  campaign  of  the  Italians. 

It  is  exceedingly  late  in  the  day  to  attempt  so  grandiose 
a  scheme,  but  failing  success  in  it  there  yet  remain,  as  we 
have  seen  certain  important  results  attaching  to  the 
movement  if  it  can  proceed  somewhat  further  unchecked. 
It  is  being  conducted  with  all  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy  can  gather  for  the  purpose.  One  Italian  un- 
ofhcial  estimate  puts  it  as  high  as  14  divisions.  It  is  not 
that.  But  it  is  at  any  rate,  we  will  presume,  not  less  than 
10.  It  is  supported  by  long-accumulated  masses  of  heavy 
guns  and  ammunition.  It  will  inevitably  relieve  the 
)>ressuro  upon  tiie  Isonzo  and  bring  a  counter-reinforce- 
ment for  the  Italians  back  upon  the  Trentino  front.  It 
will,  if  it  be  sufficiently  prolonged,  at  sufficient  expense 
Lo  the  Italians,  disturb  the  plans  for  the  offensive  later  on. 
We  have  exactly  the  same  lesson  to  learn  from  the 
renewal  of  the  attack  on  Verdun.  It^  costs  him  a 
tremendous  price  in  men,  but  it  is  better  to  throw 
the  men  away  on  the  chance,  with)  luck,  of  crippling 
the  later  offensive,  than  to  keep  them  merely  for  use  in  a 
slowly  declining  war.  It  is  pretty  clear  by  this  time 
that  even  this  calculation  has  gone  wrong.  The  AlUed 
command  in  the  West  has  evidently  decided  that  the 
losses  suffered  upon  its  side  are  worth  the  expense  en- 
tailed upon  the  enemy,  and  leave  it  perfectly  free  to 
ittack  at  its  own  moment.  The  really  striking  thing 
ibout  the  whole  matter,  is  the  refusal  of  the  Alhed  com- 
mand to  be  provoked  into  a  counter-offensive.  It  is 
the  most  convincing  evidence  of  what  the  situation  is. 

If  we  could  have,  either  in  the  case  of  Verdun,  or  in  the 
case  of  the  Trentino,  an  exact  table  of  the  comparative 


For  the  notable  frontispiece  of  its  "  Five  Nations  "  num- 
ber. Land  &  Water  is  indebtcd.to  Mr.  Bernard  Partridge, 
the  famous  "  Punch  "  cartoonist.  We  are  indebted  to  the 
Proprietors  of  "  Puncli  "  for  permitting  Mr.  Partridge  tfi 
draw  this  cartoon  for  Land  &  Watek. 


22 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  25,  1916 


Dominions'  Naval   Help 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


THE  splendid  work  of  the  Canadian,  Australian 
and  New  Zealand  troops  in  the  stricken  tields 
of  France  and  Flanders,  has  largely  oyer- 
siiadowed  in  the  memory  of  the  public  the  im- 
portance of  Dominion  services  at  sea.  F'or  that  matter, 
there  has  been  little  published  wherefrom  a  connected 
or  detailed  story  can  be  derived.  But  the  broad  facts 
of  the  share  of  the^Dominions  in  the  naval  campaigns  are 
available,  and,  on  an  occasion  such  as  this,  it  is  right 
and  fitting  that  the  more  salient  points  should  be  brought 
to  our  recollection. 

The  first  ship  of  the  British  Xavy  to  be  sunk  in 
action — Good  Hope — was  the  first  ship,  I  believe,  in  the 
Navy  List  that  was,  in  a  sense,  a  gift  from  the  Britons  of 
Overseas.  At  the  Battle  of  Coronel,  Good  Hope  was 
the  gallaint  Cradock's  flagship.  In  the  ships  that  fell  so 
gloriously  in  that  unequal  fight,  there  was  serving  a 
detachment  of  officers  and  men  from  the  Royal  ^Canadian 
Navy — the  youngest  of  the  daughter  services  of  the 
Empire.  It  was  little  more  than  a  matter  of  months 
that  these  men  had  trained  before  they  set  out  on  this 
desperate  and,  in  a  military  sense,  fruitless  errand.  They 
were,  I  believe,  the  first  of  our  Overseas  brothers  to  shed 
their  blood  and  lose  their  lives  at  sea  in  the  cause  of  Empire. 

More  recently,  two  other  Dominions  ga\e  to  the  mother 
country's  Navy,  by  direct  gift,  units  of  the  first  im- 
portance. New  Zealand,  a  battle  cruiser  of  the  Ittde- 
faiigable  type — after  a  maiden  cruise  to  the  Dominion  that 
gave  her  to  the  nation — returned  to  home  waters,  and 
joined  Sir  David  Beatty's  flag.  So  far  as  we  know,  she 
has  been  a  imit  in  the  battle  cruiser  squadron  ever  since, 
and  has  remained  under  the  command  of  the  officer 
who  commissioned  her.  Captain  Lionel  Halsey.  She 
took  part  in  the  sweep  into  the  Bight  of  Heligoland  of 
August,  1914,  and,  in  the  affair  of  the  Dogger  Bank,  flew 
the  flag  of  Rear- Admiral  Sir  Archibald  Moore,  when  he 
succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  squadron  after  Lion 
had  been  disabled.  Malaya,  a  battleship,  was  the  gift 
of  those  of  the  Malay  States  that  are  under  the  dominion 
of  the  British  Crown.  The  value  of  such  gifts  as  these 
needs  neither  argument  nor  emphasis.  Finally,  /1 2<s/>'(»/i«, 
after  invaluable  services  in  the  Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans 
while  von  Spec's  squadron  was  in  being,  has  for  long 
been  in  the  same  squadron  as  New  Zealand. 

Nor  were  the  Canadians,  who  shared  in  the  action 
off  Coronel,  the  only  Dominions  men  serving  in  the  Senior 
Service.  The  uncounted  flotillas  of  sloops  and  special 
craft  designed  for  hunting  submarines,  and  for  finding 
and  sweeping  away  mine  fields,  etc.,  have  been  largely 
manned  and  commanded  by  volunteers  from  Canada  and 
other  Dominions.  From  quite  early  in  the  war,  too,  Canada 
undertook  the  patrol  of  her  own  Eastern  coast,  thus 
releasing  the  North  Atlantic  squadron  for  more  important 
work.  Further  than  this,  both  Australians  and  Canadians 
have  undertaken  and  managed  the  whole  of  the  transport 
of  the  great  armies  they  have  sent  to  Europe — a  purely 
naval  operation  of  the  first  magnitude  and  importance. 
Canada  has  supplied  the  Royal  Navy  with  great  quanti- 
ties of  naval  munitions.  Thus  men,  trained  and  untrained  ; 
material,  raw  and  manufactured^ — everything  which  each 
Dominion  could  give — has  been  willingly  offered  and 
eagerly  accepted. 

Australia,  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  was  the  only  Dominion 
that  had  a  completely  organised  Navy  and  an  Admiralty 
of  its  own.  Of  ships — finished,  commissioned  and  ready 
for  sea — her  force  consisted  of  the  Australia,  a  battle 
cruiser  of  the  Indefatigable  class  ;  two  protected  cruisers 
of  the  Dartmouth  type,  the  Melbourne  and  Sydney; 
the  Encounter,  a  sister  ship  of  Challenger  ;  six  26-knot 
destroyers,  and  the  nucleus  of  a  flotilla  of  submarines  of 
the  E  class.  In  addition  the  fast  light  cruiser  Brisbane  and 
seme  destroyers  are  now  completing  for  her  navy.  It  was 
not  perhaps  a  very  large  force,  but  it  proved  to  be  of 
decisive  value  in  war.  Withoiit  it,  the  coast  towns  of 
Australia  would  have  been  at  the  mercy  of  the  German- 
China  squadron,  her  very  important  trade  routes  opeh 
to  the  ravages  of  von  Spec's  light  cruisers. 


The  strategic  position  in  the  Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans 
was  curiously  complicated  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities 
and  it  may  be  of  some  interest  to  recall  the  main 
circumstances.  In  the  China  Squadron,  Vice-Admiral 
Jerrom  had  under  his  command  Triumph,  Minotaur, 
Hampshire,  Newcastle  and  Yarmouth,  eight  destroyers, 
three  submarines,  four  torpedo  boats,  half  a  dozen  gun 
vessels,  and  some  river  craft.  The  latter  would,  of  course, 
be  useless  for  war  purpose.  Of  this  force.  Triumph 
was  not  commissioned.  She  had  been  sent  to  Hong 
Kong  as  depot  ship,  and  at  the  outbreak  of  war  was  due 
for  a  refit.  Only  a  nucleus  crew  of  officers  and  men  was 
on  board.  She  was  actually  fitted  up  with  men,  officers 
and  stores,  and  sent  out  of  harbour  within  forty-eight 
hours  !  The  East  Indies  Squadron,  under  Rear- 
Admiral  Peirse,  consisted  of  Sunftsure,  a  sister  ship  of 
Triumph  ;  Dartmouth,  a  cruiser  of  the  same  class  as 
Newcastle  ;  the  Fox,  an  old  Astrcca,  and  four  small  craft. 
In  Australian  waters  were  the  Dominion  squadron  I  have 
enumerated  above.  Clearly,  neither  the  East  Indies  nor 
the  China  squadron — without  Triumph — was  any  sort 
of  match  for  the  forces  at  von  Spec's  disposal.  And  had 
Japan  preserved  her  neutrality,  our  chief  reliance  must 
have  been  placed  in  the  force  which  the  loyal  foresight 
of  the   Australians   provided. 

Von  Spec's  Plans 

The  share  an  Overseas  navy  can  take  in  the  strategic 
defence  of  the  Empire,  and  its  influence  upon  the  plans 
and  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  are  very  clearly  indicated 
by  a  brief  review  of  what  in  fact  happened  in  the  only 
waters  where  a  colonial  navy  existed.  The  first  ship 
of  the  German  China  squadron  to  be  sunk,  namely, 
Emden,  fell  as  we  all  know  to  the  Australian  Svdncv 
And  if  we  follow  the  movements  and  can  penetrate  the 
plans  of  von  Spec,  it  becomes  obvious  that  it  was  the 
existence  of  the  Australian  navy  that  determined  his 
movements,  and  materially  assisted  in  hastening  his  end. 

Von  Spec  had  the  choice  of  scattering  his  fleet  or  keep- 
ing it  together,  Scattered,  his  light  cruisers  were  hardly 
equal  individually  to  the  best  of  the  light  cruisers  that 
they  might  encounter.  Sydney,  Melbourne,  Newcastle. 
Yarmouth  and  Dartmouth  were  all  more  heavily  gunned 
than  Number g,  Leipzig  and  Emden  or  than  Dresden, 
which  had  joined  von  Spec  at  Easter  Island  in  the 
middle  of  October.  His  battle  cruisers — though  not 
carrying  such  heavy  metal  as  Swijtsure  or  Triumph — 
were  yet  much  faster.  Each  was  about  equal  in 
speed  and  fighting  power  to  Minotaur,  and,  of  course, 
vastly  superior  to  any  other  British  ship  in  the  Pacific — 
Australia  excepted.  But  he  could  not  count  on  having 
to  meet  British  ships  only — and  the  Japanese  Navy  had 
some  single  ships  that  were  as  fast  and  more  powerful 
than  his.  This  is  an  important  matter  to  remember 
in  discussing  his  choice  of  plans. 

The  first  question  that  he  must  put  to  himself  was — 
should  his  policy  be  to  scatter  his  fleet  and  do  all  the 
damage  he  could  ?  Or  to  keep  it  together,  in  the  hope 
of  ultimately  achieving  some  strategical  object  worth 
having  ?  Scattered,  the  damage  the  armoured  cruisers 
could  have  done  on  the  trade  routes — supposing  they 
could  be  supplied — would  clearly  have  been  enormous, 
although  he  could  hardly  have  expected  to  do  much 
against  the  transports,  for  these  would  surely  be  convoyed 
so  long  as  his  ships  were  at  large.  But  the  necessity  of 
convoying  the  ships  would  have  relieved  him  to  a  great 
extent  of.  the  fe.ar  of  formidable  vessels  being  sent  to 
hunt  him  upon  the  trade  routes.  He  might  have  guessed 
that  the  Japanese  ships  would  probably  be  kept  to  their 
waters.  This  would  leave  all  the  trade  routes  of  the 
Indian  Ocean  open  to  his  attack.  Had  he  used  his 
armoured  cruisers  as  commerce  destroyers  here,  he 
could  reasonably  have  expected  a  staggering  success 
before  they  could  be  brought  to  action  by  superior  force. 
With  such  a  policy,  he  would  no  doubt  have  recognised 
the  ulitmatc  fate  of  his  sliips  to  be  inevitable.    Sooner 


May  25,.  1916 


LAND      &      ^\•  A  T  E  R 


23 


or  later  they  must  have  been  run  down  and  brought 
to  action.  But  the  catching  and  destroying  of  these  ships 
would  have  been  no  simple  matter.  It  would  have  been 
10  use  looking  for  them  with  single  ships  of  greater 
power  but  lower  speed.  Of  ships  of  equal  speed  and 
equal  power,  the  British  Navy  could  only  supply  the 
four  Natals,  Duke  of  Edinburgh,  Black  Prince,  Minotaur 
and  her  two  sister  ships.  And  to  all  of  these,  except  the 
Minotaur,  highly  important  duties  elsewhere  had  been 
assigned.  If  there  were  no  other  difficulty  then,  he 
could  probably  count  on  a  reasonably  long  trip  for  each 
ship,  and  a  considerable  success  while  life  lasted. 

Chilean  Aid 

But  it  probably  was  not  any  definite  weighing  of  the 
chances  of  this  or  that  ship  being  sent  against  him 
that  decided  him  to  keep  his  fleet  together.  East 
of  Australia  and  Singapore  there  are  only  two  trade 
routes  of  supreme  importance — the  Pacific  lines  be- 
tween China  and  Japan  and  America,  and  what 
may  be  called  the  coasting  lines  connecting  Japan 
and  the  Chinese  ports  with  the  Indian  Ocean.  By 
far  the  most  important  both  in  values  of  freights 
and  in  numbers  of  ships  is  the  latter,  and  the  bulk  of 
tills  trade  has  to  pass  across  the  Indian  Ocean  to 
the  Suez  Canal.  In  the  Indian  Ocean  there  comes  not 
only  this  far  Eastern  trade,  to  which  the  Malay,  Borneo 
and  Dutch  and  Java  trade  must  be  added,  but  it  is  swelled 
by  what  comes  from  India,  Ceylon  and  from  Australasia. 
The  mouth  of  the  Red  Sea,  then,  is  the  point  at  which  all 
the  Eastern  trade  concentrates.  What  was  probably 
von  Spec's  final  argument  against  devoting  the  whole  of 
his  force  to  an  attack  on  this  congeries  of  vital  arteries 
was  the  difficulty  of  ensuring  the  supply  of  coal,  provisions, 
etc.,  for  his  ships.  But  if  he  kept  in  the  Pacific  the  in- 
numerable archipelagos  offered  him  two  supreme  ad- 
vantages. He  could  in  the  first  place  hide  amongst  these 
islands  for  almost  as  long  as  he  wished.  He  could  ne.xt 
organise  the  German  traders  scattered  up  and  down 
through  Polynesia  to  collect  and  send  him  supplies, 
provisions,  and  above  all  news,  when  it  was  available. 
Lastly  the  large  amount  of  German  shipping  plying  on 
the  West  coast  of  South  America  could  be  organised  to 
supply  him  with  coal.  In  electing  for  the  Pacific  he  chose 
between  the  chances  of  a  formidable  destruction  of  com- 
merce and  the  best  chance  of  keeping  his  squadron  in  being. 

Immediate  safety  was  probably  not  his  only  object  in 
view.  The  German  community  in  Chile  was  numerous, 
rich,  owned  a  great  many  ships,  and  in  many  districts 
monopolised  Chilean  trade,  so  that  port  after  port 
could  be  relied  on  to  act  almost  as  if  it  were  German 
and  not  neutral.  His  plan  seems  to  have  been,  then, 
to  elude  the  British  and  Japanese  by  concealment 
in  the  islands  and  then  gradually  to  work  a  passage  across 
to  Chile,  and  to  decide  when  he  got  there  what  his  future 
plans  were  to  be.  The  details  of  his  actual  movements, 
so  far  as  I  know,  are  not  available  to  the  public.  It  is 
to  be  presumed  that  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war  the 
China  squadron,  reinforced  by  the  hastily  commissioned 
Triumph,  sought  him  at  his  only  Eastern  base  of 
importance,  Tsing  Tau.  But  he  had  left  this  long 
before  hostilities  were  imminent.  He  appears  to  have 
taken  the  whole  of  his  squadron  with  him  to  some 
rendezvous  in  the  Caroline  Islands.  The  first  news  the 
world  heard  of  his  existence  was  his  appearance  off 
Samoa  towards  the  middle  of  September.  A  fortnight 
later  he  was  off  Tahiti,  and  he  was  not  heard  of  again 
until  he  met  and  destroyed  Cradock's  squadron  on 
November  1st.  It  has  since  become  known  that 
Dresden,  which  before  the  war  represented  German  in- 
terests at  Vera  Cruz,  had  made  her  way  round  Cape  Horn, 
and  joined  him  some  ten  days  before  Cradock  was  en- 
countered. It  is  probable  that  she  brought  the  news  of 
his  arrival  off  the  Chilean  coast.  And  while  Dresden 
was  working  round  the  Horn,  von  Spec  was  pursuing  his 
way  at  low  speed  to  Massafueras  after  a  stop  at  Easter 
Island  en  route.  From  the  end  of  July  then  till  the  ist 
November  he  maintained  his  squadron  in  fuel  and  pro- 
visions without  possessing  any  base  of  any  kind — an 
unprecedented  achievement. 

A  few  days  before  his  appearance  off  Samoa  the  world 
was  startled  by  the  resounding  news  of  Emden's 
devastations  in  the  Indian  Ocean.     She  had  three  series 


of  successes.  The  first  began  on  September  loth  and 
before  the  week  was  out  six  ships  were  captured  and  most 
of  them  sunk.  A  fortnight  later  she  took  five  more  ships 
in  three  successive  days.  Again  for  a  fortnight  nothing 
was  heard  of  her,  and  then  six  more  fell  between  the  loth 
and  19th  of  October.  Emden's  third  disappearance 
lasted  nearly  three  weeks.  She  was  then  brought  to 
action  and  destroyed  by  Sydney  in  the  Cocos  group  of 
Islands.  Simultaneously  with  the  appearance  of  Emden 
in  the  Indian  Ocean  Leipzic  destroyed  a  British  ship  off 
lower  California,  but  she  captured  onlj'  two  more  victims, 
one  on  .September  nth  and  the  other  December  2nd. 

Now  if  all  these  movements  are  examined  it  is  not 
difficult  to  see  a  connected  plan  behind  them,  and  it  is 
equally  clear  that  the  plan  was  of  old  standing.  In 
discussing  what  von  Spee  might  have  done  and  what  he 
did  I  am  not  therefore  supposing  that  he  debated  these 
points  when  war  became  certain.  The  fact  that  Dresden 
was  dispatched  round  the  Horn  off  the  coast  of  Chile, 
seems  to  argue  that  it  was  known  for  certain  that  von 
Spee,  if  all  went  well,  would  reach  there  by  the  end  of 
October.  What  was  the  object  of  these  movements  ? 
First  there  was  the  very  important  strategic  object  of 
keeping  his  enemies  guessing  where  he  might  be  and 
what  he  might  be  up  to.  While  he  was  in  being  con- 
siderable forces  would  have  to  be  mobiHsed,  either  to 
look  for  him  or  to  guard  against  him.  Trade  would  be 
nervous,  the  dispatch  of  troops  would  be  full  of  danger, 
important  units  would  have  to  be  employed  as  convoys. 
There  was  next  always  the  chance  that  he  might  encounter 
and  defeat  some  inferior  force  and  in  this  respect  chance 
served  him  well.  Although  there  was  always  the  possibihty 
of  an  encounter  which  would  raise  the  prestige  of  German 
arms,  still,  he  could  hardly  have  supposed  that  things 
would  so  shape  themselves  that  a  British  Admiral  with 
so  inferior  a  force  as  Good  Hope,  Monmouth,  and  Glasgow 
would  cross  the  Atlantic  with  orders  to  seek  him  out  and 
engage  him.  He  must  then  have  regarded  the  only 
naval  victory  that  fell  to  him  as  the  most  astonishing 
stroke  of  luck  in  history.  There  was  also  the  possibility 
of  his  making  his  way  to  Africa,  where,  if  Great  Britain's 
hands  were  really  full  elsewhere,  his  ships  might  very 
materially  assist  in  -prolonging  a  struggle  for  existence 
by  one  or  more  of  the  German  colonies.  Lastly 
there  was  the  possibility  of  attacking  some  undefended 
British  possession  and,  if  only  for  24  hours,  hoisting  the 
German  flag  over  it.  It  was  as  we  know  his  anxiety 
to  bring  off  this  coup  at  the  Falkland  Islands  that  led 
to  his  undoing. 

These  points  are  worth  rehearsing  now,  because  it  is 
obvious  that,  had  Australia  not  possessed  a  unit  of  the 
power  and  speed  of  her  battle  cruiser,  the  fate  intended  for 


Sovtes  Sbahespeananae 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE 

Empire  Day. 

T/ie  yearly  course  that  brings  this  day  about 
Shall  never  see  it  but  a  holiday. 

Kin<  Joha  III.,  i.,  81-2. 

The  Ruler  of  Imperial  Britain. 

Wherever     the    bright     sun,     of    heaven 

shall  shine. 
His  honour  and  the  greatness  of  his  name 
Shall  be,  and  make  new  nations  ;  he  shall 

flou7'ish 
And,  like  a  mountain   cedar,    reach   his 

branches 
To  all  the  plains  about  him  ;  our  children  s 

children 
Shall  see  this,  and  bless  heaven. 

Henry  VIII.,  V..  iv..  5*5.        ' 

The  Safeguard  of  Enarland. 

Let  us  be  back' d  with  God  and  with  the  seas 
Which  He  hathgiven  for  fence  ivipregnable. 
And  with  their  helps  only  defend  ourselves  : 
In  them  and  in  ourselves  our  safety  lies. 

3  Henry  VI.,  IV..  i.,  43-6. 


24 


J.  A  N  D       cS:      \V  A  T  E  R 


May  25,  T916 


the  ]-"alkland  Islands  would  certainly  have  befallen  the 
chief  seaport  towns  of  the  Commonwealth.  The  pos- 
session by  Australia  then  of  the  navy  that  she  had  was 
a  decisive  factor  in  limiting  von  Spec's  movements  and 
making  him  choose  a  path  across  the  Pacific. 

Discipline  and  the  Dominions 

Tt  is  now  quite  certain  that  the  Dominions  can  produce 
navies  of  the  very  highest  class  and  merit.  This  may 
sound  like  a  commonplace,  but  it  has  not  always  been 
so.  When  it  was  first  decided  that  AustraHa  should 
raise  and  train  a  personnel  of  her  own,  many  of  those 
who  knew  most  about  Australia  and  most  about  the 
navy  were  anything  but  confident  that  the  experiment 
would  succeed.  The  sturdy  sons  of  Australia  and  Canada 
are  born  and  bred  in  surroiuidings  that  produce  men  of 
the  finest  physique,  of  a  high  and  lofty  courage  and  of  an 
admirable  lighting  spirit.  These  are  obviously  as  good 
material  as  there  is  in  the  world  for  an  army.  But  it 
was  questioned  whether  men  and  youths  bred  in 
this  freedom  and  spirit  of  independence  could  accommo- 
date themselves  to  the  highly  rigid  discipline  that  the  naval 
life  requires.  In  British  ships  there  is  a  high  proportion  of 
men  on  board  who  ha\e  been  brought  up  in  naval  schools 
from  childhood,  or  have  come  into  the  navy  as  boys  of 
16  to  18  and  have  been  put  at  once  to  the  discipline  of  a 
barrack  training.  They  ha\e  found  themselves  grouped 
from  the  first  with  long  service  Petty  Officers  and  men 
to  whom  a  reverence  for  naval  discipline  is  so  to  speak 
the  foundation  of  their  being.  A  large  number  of  them 
are  country  bred  ;  they  have  felt  the  feudal  traditions 
of  our  society,  they  have  a  natural  respect  for  those 
above  them  in  the  social  scale.  All  these  things  have 
greatly  simplified  the  task  of  the  British  naval  officer 
on  board  ship.  So  ingrained  in  point  of  fact  is  the 
respect  for  naval  law,  that  it  is  almost  a.xiomatic  to  say- 
that,  if  serious  difficulties  arise,  it  can  be  due  only  to 
bad  will  and  a  rebellious  spirit.  But  the  .whole  problem 
obviously  changes  its  character  in  a  country  where 
there  is  no  feudal  tradition,  no  respect  for  class, 
where  an  independent  spirit  and  a  sense  of  equality 
pervades  the  whole  community.  "Where  young  men 
know  no  other  surroundings  and  no  other  spirit  than  this 
there  seems  good  reason  for  fearing  that  they  would  find 
instinctive  obedience  and  the  formalities  of  discipline 
almost  incompatible  with  habits  which  have  become  a 
principle.  Those  who  feared  these  difficulties  were  not 
completely  reassured  by  remembering  what  admirable 
soldiers  our  Canadian  and  Australian  fellow  subjects 
had  shown  themselves  to  be.  They  thought  the  problem 
of  bringing  them  under  the  influence  of  naval  discipline 
would  be  infinitely  more  difficult,  and  they  feared  both 
the  capacity  of  the  men  to  .submit  and  the  capacity  of 
British  officers  to  bring  them  to  submission. 

Again,  it  was  clearly  perceived  that  the  foundation  of 
a  new  navy  was  a  much  greater  imdertaking  than  the 
mere  expansion  of  an  old  one.  In  this  process  of  making 
seamen  out  of  entirely  new  material- — material  bred  in 
conditions  that  .seemed  inimical  to  their  ever  being  good 
seamen — both  officers  and  men  would  be  put  to  an 
exceedingly  searching  test.  War  has  taught  us  that  both 
have  emerged  from  this  with  flying  colours. 

So  far  as  Canada  goes  naval  developments  had  gone 
little  bej^ond  the  training  of  personnel,  nor  had  this 
been  carried  on  on  a  very  large  scale.  But  as  has  already 
been  remarked  apropos  of  the  heroes  that  fell  at  Coroncl, 
the  training  had  been  perfectly  successful.  In  Australia 
the  thing  had  been  carried  far  further  and  had  indeed  to 
some  extent  been  put  to  the  test  before  war  broke  out. 
It  was  natural  that  the  Canadian  experiment  should 
succeed  under  the  strain  of  imminent  fighting.  It  was  a 
thing,  of  course,  to  pull  men  together  and  make  each  one 
do  his  best.  But  in  Australia  one  capital  ship  «ind  several 
other  smaller  units  had  been  fully  commissioned  and 
engaged  on  regular  naval  work  in  ordinary  |)eace  con- 
ditions. If  there  were  any  difficulties,  and  surely 
thert;  must  have  been  some,  nothing  was  ever  heard 
of  them.  Any  doubts  there  may  have  been  as  to 
how  the  thing  would  work  were  all  dissipated  when 
the  campaign  began. 

In  the  engagement  between  Sydney  and  Emden  it  was 
a  matter  of  justifiable  pride  to  the  officers  of  the  Ati.stralian 
ship,  that  a  crew  with  a  high  proportion  of  comparatively 


inexperienced  boys  went  through  that  action  wdth  a  self- 
possession  and  coolness  that  the  most  experienced 
veterans  might  have  envied.  In  that  action,  as  the 
official  report  pointed  out,  the  opening  salvoes  of  the 
Emden  took  a  heavy  toll  of  the  ship's  company.  It 
seems  certain  that  Emden  scored  first  blood.  She  got  the 
range  at  a  distance  that  was  hardly  to  be  expected  with 
guns  of  the  calibre  that  she  carried,  and  her  salvoes  were 
fired  with  astonishing  rapidity  and  with  still  more 
astonishing  accuracy.  Whether  Sydney  was  making 
as  good  a  pattern  with  her  guns  was  not  a  thing  that 
could  have  been  known  to  the  generality  of  the  crew. 
The  point  is  that  when  the  only  obvious'matter  was  that 
Emden  had  got  Sydney  imder  fire,  there  was  never  a 
moment's  uncertainty  as  to  how  Sydney  took  it. 

Naval   Endurance 

The  Australian  navy's  baptism  of  fire  then  established 
the  character  of  the  new  force  beyond  all  question.  It 
has  had  a  more  testing  time  since.  Australia  has  for  long 
made  one  of  the  battle  cruiser  force  in  the  North,  when; 
the  spells  of  dreary  waiting  for  the  enemy  have  been 
broken  only  by  disappointments  when  there  was  a  hope 
of  getting  him.  The  Colonial  sailors  have,  of  course, 
only  had  to  endure  the  same  tedium  as  our  own  men, 
but  it  is  a  complete  answer  to  those  who  questioned  the 
capacity  of  men  bred  in  the  freedom  and  independence  of 
Colonial  life  to  acquire  the  patient  persistence  of  those 
inured  to  discipline,  that  this  particular  crew  has  done 
so  successfully.  But  while  this  is  so,  it  must  not  be 
forgotten  that  the  problem  will  be  a  standing  one  and 
will  not  solve  itself.  It  will  only  be  solved  if  officers  are 
chosen  for  the  training  of  Colonials,  who  are  conspicuous 
for  tact,  patience  and  good  humour.  The  whole  thing 
will  doubtless  become  easier  as  the  mother  and  daughter 
navies  become  better  and  better  acquainted.  And  the 
best  assurance  of  continued  success, would  undoubtedly 
be  that  whatever  reserves,  either  of  a  purely  voluntary 
or  of  a  paid  character  are  established,  they  should  be 
encouraged  to  take  their  training  as  far  as  possible  in 
Briti.sh  ships  and  in  home  waters.  It  should  be  a  sine 
qua  non  in  the  case  of  all  Colonial  officers,  not  only  for 
their  own  sake,  but  for  the  sake  of  educating  the  ward 
rooms  to  which  they  are  attached.  The  guiding  principle 
should  and  no  doubt  will  be,  that  the  danger  of  mis- 
imderstandings  will  diminish  in  proportion  to  the  intimacy 
of  the  friendship  and  mutual  knowledge  that  is  estab- 
lished between  the  officers  and  men  of  the  home  and 
Colonial  forces. 

There  is  one  other  aspect  of  the  question  of  the  future 
of  the  Dominion  navies  which,  though  it  is  of  a  delicate 
kind,  cannot  be  ignored.  The  proposal  that  Canada  should 
furnish  three  capital  units  of  the  first  importance  to  the 
Imperial  fleet  broke  down  owing,  it  is  supposed,  to 
political  misunderstandings  in  Canada  itself.  Now  it  is 
quite  certain  that  no  Dominion  navy  can  follow  a  healthy 
and  normal  development,  so  as  in  the  end  to  reflect  the 
true  character  of  its  constituent  personnel,  and  the  true 
genius  of  the  people  who  maintain  it,  if  it  is  allowed  to 
become  the  shuttlecock  between  rival  political  parties. 
It  will  be  a  still  greater  danger  if  the  officers'and  men  in 
any  of  these  navies  ever  have  reason  to  suspect  that  the 
actual  administration  of  their  force  is  coloured  by  political 
or  party  designs,  just  as  it  would  be-the  min  of  any  right 
spirit  in  a  navy  if  employment  or  promotion  is  ever 
believed  to  be  procurable  by  party  service  or  interest. 
In  the  long  history  of  the  English  Navy,  we  have  seen 
all  these  things  happen  again  and  again,  to  the  bitter 
loss  of  that  most  gallant  service.  In  our  own  navy,  to 
political  influence,  court  and  social  influence  have  in  the 
past  been  added  too.  Things  are  very  different  to-day, 
but  clearly  there  can  be  no  healthy  spirit  unless  every 
officer  knows  that  promotion  and  employment  will  depend 
upon  professional  merit  and  professional  merit  alone  ; 
and  there  will  be  no  healthy  public  spirit  about  the  navy 
unless  every  voter,  whatever  his  party,  realises  that  the 
interest  of  the  service  i?  a  purely  national  affair,  which  no 
temporary  passage  of  political  interest  or  passion  must 
be  allowed  to  affect.  It  is  probable,  however,  that  after 
so  great  a  war  as  this,  in  whidh  the  direct  naval  services 
of  the  Dominion  have  been  so  remarkable,  there  will 
be  \r?ry  little  danger  of  the  naval  future. 

Aktiu'r  Pou.kn 


Ma}'  25,  jCjiG 


L  A  N  D       cS:      W  A  T  K  R 


25 


AFRICA  AND  THE  GERMAN  PLAN 


By  John  Buchan 


PROFESSOR  ERNST  HAECKEL,  who  describes 
himself  for  the  purpose  as  a  "  free-thinking 
Monist,"  has  been  adding  to  the  gaiety  of 
nations  by  discoursing  in  an  American  magazine 
on  (iermany's  future  plans,  \^'c  have  not  liitherto 
associated  Professor  Haeckcl  with  high  politics,  but  in 
these  hard  times  all  the  gelehrfcn  liave  been  mobilised 
and  the  venerable  author  of  "  Weltrdthsel  "  with  the 
rest.  He  explains  that  (Germany  needs  an  empire,  not 
like  England  for  lust  of  gold,  or  like  France  for  vain 
glory,  or  like  Italy  for  megalomania,  or  like  Russia 
because  of  sheer  barbarous  greed,  but  because  she  is 
o\ercrowded  at  home  and  wants  a  dumping  ground  for 
her  surplus  population.  Africa  is  going  to  he  a  substantial 
part  of  this  empire  ;  the  Congo  especially,  which  is  to 
come  to  (jermany  as  a  consequence  of  the  espousal  of 
Belgium.  The  whole  of  Central  Africa  from  sea  to  sea  will  be 
(ierman,  while  the  Cape  will  be  restored  to  Holland,  and 
ligypt  to  the  Turk,  and  perfidious  Britain  will  depart 
frrmi  the  continent  altogether. 

Professor  Haeckel  is  not  to  be  taken  seriously,  except 
in  so  far  as  he  gives  expression  to  popular  opinion  in  his 
own  land.  At  this  moment  there  is  but  one  German 
colon}'  in  Africa.  Togoland  fell  in  the  first  month  of  the 
war  ;  a  year  ago  (itn^ral  Botha  secured  the  surrender 
of  South- West  Africa  ;  two  months  ago  the  last  (ierman 
resistance  died  in  the  -Cameroons.  Only  German  East 
Africa  still  stands,  ringed  round  with  enemies,  and  General 
Smuts'  mobile  cohnnus  are  already  pressing  the  defence 
southward  upon  tin-  main  railway.  But  the  ultimate 
fate  of  Germany's  o\erseas  possessions  depends  upon 
the  decision  of  the  struggle  in  the  main  theatres,  and 
that  decision  is  not  yet.  It  is  too  soon  for  any  of  the 
combatants  to  count  spoils.  But  it  is  worth  while  to 
remind  ourselves  of  the  purpose  for  which  Clermany  went 
to  Africa  and  the  precise  views  she  entertained  with 
respect  to  that  continent.  In  striking  at  (ierman  Africa 
the  Allies  are  not  attacking  irrelevant  and  half-forgotten 
dependencies,  but  an  integral  part  of  the  German  scheme 
of  world-empire. 

The  Origin  of  German  Africa 

Other  colonial  empires  have  come  about  by  accident 
and  the  slow  process  of  time,  "  growing  as  the  trees  grow 
while  man  sleeps  "  ;  but  Germany's  was  the  outcome  of  a 
sudden  ambition  developing  into  a  methodical  plan.  The 
oldest  of  her  African  possessions  has  a  history  of  less  than 
fifty  years.  After  the  defeat  of  France  in  1870  and  the 
industrial  development  which  followed,  she  aspired  to  all 
the  appurtenances  of  a  great  nation.  She  saw  France 
and  Britain  with  colonies,  and  she  desired  quite  naturally 
to  have  some  of  her  own.  Her  population  was  growing 
and  she  wished  an  outlet  for  emigration  under  her  own 
flag.  She  was  in  the  throes  of  a  new  industrialism,  and 
she  sought  her  own  producing  grounds  for  raw  materials. 
Besides,  national  glory  is  always  measured  to  some  extent 
in  terms  of  territory,  and  she  wished  more  of  the  map 
of  the  world  to  be  the  German  colour.  She  was  of  the 
opinion  of  Captain  John  Smith  that  "  the  greatest  honour 
that  ever  belonged  to  the  greatest  monarchs  was  to 
enlarge  their  dominions  and  erect  commonweals."  Her 
publicists.  List  and  Friedel  and  Treitschke,  pointed  out 
that  trade  followed  the  flag,  and  Bismarck,  playing 
on  Europe  as  on  a  stringed  instrument,  saw  in  oversea 
adventures  a  chance  for  securing  fresh  assets  to  bargain 
with  in  the  European  game.  German  colonisation  was 
a  reasoned  policy,  not  the  haphazard  work  of  individuals 
which  gradually  merges  into  a  national  purpose.  And, 
like  all  reasoned  pohcies,  in  its  first  stages  it  marched  fast. 

The  way  had  been  jnepared  for  her  in  Africa  by  many 
path-finders.  The  history  of  Africa  in  the  last  century 
is  full  of  German  names,  missionaries,  explorers  and 
scientists,  who  must  rank  high  in  the  record  of  explora- 
tion. Such  were  Kolbe  and  Lichtenstein,  Mohr  and 
Mauch  in  South  Africa  ;  in  West  and  Northern  Africa 
Hornemann  and  Barth,  Ziegler  and  Schweinfurth,  Rohlfs 
and  Nachtigal  ;  in  East  and  Central  Africa  von  der  Decken 


and  \'on  Wissmann.  At  first  she  found  her  path  made 
easy,  for  Britain  was  friendly  and  unsuspicious.  The  few 
men  at  home  who  knew  anything  about  the  subject  were 
thinking  only  of  the  slave  trade  and  welcomed  a  European 
collaborator  in  its  suppression.  Mr.  (Gladstone  in  the 
House  of  Commons  publicly  thanked  God  for  the  advent 
of  (jermany  to  assist  "  in  the  execution  of  the  great  pur- 
poses of  Providence  for  the  advantage  of  mankind." 

The  year  1884  saw  the  foundation  of  German  Damara- 
land,  of  (ierman  Togoland,  and  of  German  Cameroons. 
That  same  year  the  Berlin  Conference  regularised  her 
acquisitions,  and  six  years  later  the  Caprivi  Agreement 
settled  the  borders  of  German  East  Africa.  By  1890 
German  Africa  existed  practically  in  its  present 
form,  and  during  the  Moroccan  troubles  of  1911  it  was 
increased  by  a  strip  of  French  Congo.  She  had  obtained 
territory  nearly  five  times  the  size  of  Germany  in  Europe, 
much  of  it  of  great  potential  richness.  And  she  had 
succeeded  in  building  a  fence  across  the  British  road  from 
the  Zambesi  to  the  North. 

Germany's  Colonial  Methods 

Having  got  her  colonies,  Germany  proceeded  to  handle 
them  vigorously  after  her  own  fashion.  She  had  no 
notion  of  live  and  let  live  with  the  native  populations. 
The  hapless  black  was  dragooned  under  the  system 
of  government  which  obtained  on  the  banks  of  the  Spree. 
In  the  words  of  Dr.  ]\Ioritz  Bonn,  who  may  rank  as  one  of 
the  ablest  students  of  (ierman  colonial  aifairs,  she  "solved 
the  nati\'e  problem  by  smashing  tribal  life  and  creating  a 
scarcity  of  laboiir."  She  spent  money  like  water  and  her 
colonial  deficits  grew,  but  she  got  value  for  her  outlay. 
The  roads  and  railways  in  the  Cameroons,  in  Togoland, 
and  in  (ierman  East  Africa  were  models  of  tropical 
engineering. 

Settlers  did  not  appear  in  any  large  numbers,  for  the 
good  reason  that  their  life  was  made  too  d.'fTi^ult  by  an 
ever-present  bureaucracy.  The  colonist  of  whatever 
nationality  must  be  given  a  fair  latitude  or  he  will  never 
get  his  roots  down  into  the  soil.  The  result  was  that 
German  settlers  used  to  trek  across  the  border  into  British 
tcrritor\',  finding  their  country's  hand  too  heavy  under 
an  equatorial  sun.  The  truth  was  that  Germany  did  not 
rpally  want  settlers.  In  spite  of  Professor  Haeckel  she 
had  no  great  surplus  populatioii  to  export,  for  in  late 
years  her  tide  of  emigration  had  slackened.  What  she 
desired  was  producing  grounds  for  raw  material  under 
her  own  flag,  and  she  was  in  a  fair  way  to  get  them.  Her 
most  successful  colony,  German  East  Africa,  was  a 
planter's  country,  with  huge  agricultural  estates,  like 
the  old  Portuguese  pvazos.  Proclucing  grounds,  military 
outposts  and  obser\'ation  stations — tjiis  was  the  future 
she  designed  for  her  oversea  possessions. 

Now,  colonisation  is  something  more  than  a  chain  of 
plantations  and  factories,  and  it  is  much  more  than  a 
string  of  military  garrisons.  It  involves  settlemeni—the 
adoption  by  emigrants  of  the  new  land  as  their  home, 
the  administration  of  that  new  land  with  a  view  to  its 
own  future  and  not  with  regard  only  to  the  ambitions  of 
the  Motherland.  Mere  exploitation  is  not  colonisation, 
as  the  Dutch  and  the  Portuguese  found.  The  inhabitants 
must  get  their  roots  clown,  must  acquire  a  local  patriotism 
as  well  as  a  patriotism  of  origin.  The  duty  to  the  land, 
itself  must  be  recognised,  and  not  less  the  duty  to  the 
older  masters  who  continue  to  live  side  by  side  with  the 
new.  True  colonisation  is  a  slow  business,  an  organic 
growth  rather  than  a  mechanical  construction.  Such 
are  the  British  colonies,  botL  in  the  tropical  and  temper- 
ate zones  ;  such  are  those  of  France,  whose  sons  have 
shown  in  North  Africa  a  very  special  aptitude  for  handling 
native  races  and  a  true  de\-otion  to  their  adopted  land. 
Colonisation  is  a  game  which  has  certain  rules,  and  if  these 
rules  are  broken  it  cannot  succeed.  The  Cierman  posses- 
sions have  never  been  .true  colonies.  Successive  waves 
of  colonial  enthusiasm  have  overflowed  Germany ; 
missionaries  like  Herr  Dernburg  haxe  been  des]>atched 
on  grand  tours  ;    but  the  root  of  the  matter  has  been 


26 


LAND     c\-     WATER 


May  25,  1916 


neglected.  Garrisons  and  plantations  have  been  created, 
but  not  daughter  states  ;  and  garrisons  and  plantations 
are  not  destined  to  endure,  for  they  are  never  deep 
enough  in  the  soil. 

Further,  the  German  colonies,  being  what  they  were, 
were  a  constant  menace  to  their  neighbours.  If  one  man 
is  digging  trenches  to  drain  his  farm,  and  anotlior  digs 
to  make  the  foundations  of  a  fort,  there  is  nothing  in 
common  between  the  two  and  no  possibility  of  harmoni- 
ous neighbourship.  All  Germany's  activities  have  in  late 
years  been  given  a  military  purpose,  and  competition  in 
the  old  fair  sense  was  impossible.  The  State  used  its 
credit  to  build  up  great  industries  and  establish  shipping 
lines,  and  often  money  was  spent  lavishly  from  whicli 
there  could  be  no  purely  economic  return.  All  this  was 
legitimate  enough,  but  it  naturally  gave  other  colonising 
powers  matter  for  thought.  Just  as  in  private  business 
the  British  and  French  merchant  felt  that  the  German 
was  not  competing  with  him  on  fair  terms,  since  he  had 
his  Government  behind  him,  so  in  colonisation  it  was 
perceived  that  Germany  did  not  run  for  the  proper  stakes 
or  play  the  game  by  the  recognised  rules. 

The   Military  Purpose 

The  truth  is  that  the  genuine  colonising  impulse  which 
existed  in  Germany  about  1880  had  utterly  disappeared 
during  the  past  decade.  The  German  colonies  had  become 
part  of  the  Pan-Germanist  propaganda,  like  the  Baghdad 
Railway  or  the  fortress  of  Tsing-Tau.  Tiicy  represented 
one  side  of  the  plan  of  expansion,  as  the  control  of  Meso- 
potamia represented  the  otiicr.  There  was  this  ditfercnce 
between  the  two,  that  while  the  extension  south-eastward 
of  the  Central  European  Powers  might  be  possible  by 
military  strength-only,  the  maintenance  of  armed  colonies 
demanded  a  navy.     Again  and  again  the  enthusiasts  of 


the  Navy  League  used  the  colonial  argument  to  support 
their  pleas  ;  (Jermany  in  her  effort  after  Weltmacht  must 
have  her  oversea  garrisons  and  an  omnipotent  navy  was 
needed  as  a  link  between  them.  Given  that  navy,  their 
strategic  value  would  have  been  great.  German  East 
Africa  was  on  the  southern  flank  of  the  road  to  India  as 
iMesopotamia  was  on  the  northern.  With  German  in- 
fluence on  both  sides  of  the  great  waterway  to  the  East, 
the  most  vital  interests  of  Britain  would  have  been 
menaced.  The  Drang  nach  Osten  was  largely  and  subtly 
conceived. 

Professor  Haeckel  looks  forward  to  the  restoration  ot 
the  German  colonies  in  Africa  and  their  vast  aggrandise- 
ment. His  dream  can  only  come  true  if  the  Allies  are 
beaten  to  the  ground.  If  the  AUies  win  there  can  be 
no  question  of  handing  back  African  territory.  It  is 
not  only  that  our  own  African  colonies  would  strenuously 
oppose  it  ;  the  thing  is  forbidden  by  Imperial  strategy, 
by  our  knowledge  of  what  (iermany  aimed  at,  and  of  the 
purpose  which  she  destined  her  colonics  to  serve. 

She  has  never  shown  the  colonising  spirit.  As  there  is 
an  honourable  camaraderie  among  pioneers  in  wild 
countries,  so  there  is  a  certain  freemasonry  among  those 
Powers  which  have  experimented  in  colonisation.  Their 
object  is  to  make  a  garden  of  the  desert,  to  create  a  new 
laod  which,  while  owing  allegiance  to  the  Motherland, 
shall  yet  be  free  to  follow  its  own  natural  development 
and  shall  be  administered  for  its  own  advantage.  If  a 
tropical  colony,  it  owes  duties  to  the  soil  and  the  former 
inhabitants  ;  if  a  white  man's  land,  it  seeks  settlement 
and  the  advent  of  a  new  nation.  But  a  colony  which 
is  used  as  an  armed  post  and  as  a  point  of  vantage  in  some 
great  strategical  game,  is  outside  this  comity.  It  is 
eternally  a  spy,  an  alien,  and  a  potential  disturber  of  the 
peace.  During  its  life  it  will  be  regarded  with  just 
suspicion,  and  its  end  will  be  unlamented. 


The  Man  and   the  Machine 


By  G.  K.  Chesterton 


IT  is  ob\-ious  that  war  will  probably  punish  the 
particular  neglects  of  peace  ;  and  England  in  this 
war  has  suffered  sharply  from  the  principal  neglect 
in  Englisli  education.  I  mean  the  almost  complete 
neglect  of  history,  even  of  English  history.  But  even 
our  ignorance  of  the  historic  would  have  been  less  disas- 
trous if  it  had  not  been  overweighted  with  two  affectations' 
of  cheap  culture  ;  the  prehistoric  and  what  I  may  call  the 
post-historic. 

Our  philosophers  in  fact  and  fiction  were  almost  entirely 
occupied  with  a  remote  past  and  a  remote  future.  In 
other  words,  they  were  exclusively  concentrated  on 
what  everybody  has  forgotten  or  on  what  nobody  can 
foresee.  For  instance,  the  merest  magazine-writer  could  ' 
tell-  us  that  all  men  were  once  cannibals ;  which  is  ex- 
tremely doubtful.  Or  he  might  very  probably  tell  us 
that  all  men  will  eventually  be  vegetarians  ;  which  is 
even  more  doubtful.  But  if  you  asked  such  a  man  so 
cogent  and  fundamental  a  question  as  whether  the  food 
of  the  English  populace  has  been  really  cheaper  in 
mediaeval  or  modern  times,  you  would  lind  that  he  had 
not  looked  even  for  the  materials  of  a  decision.  Yet  it 
is  hardly  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  this  involves  the 
whole  question  of  whether  the  chief  change  in  our  history 
has  been  for  the  better  or  the  worse.  To  neglect  such  real 
things,  and  live  in  remote  things,  is  to  breathe  tlie  air 
of  falsehood  and  prepare  the  penalties  of  mere  comfort. 
Our  tales  about  the  past  were  told  at  random,  in  the  con- 
Jidence  that  dead  men  tell  no  tales.  And  in  our  tales 
about  the  future  we  wallowed  in  prophecies,  which  we 
knew,>ve  should  not  live  to  see  falsified. 

Among  these  fairy-tales,  at  once  prehistoric  and  pro- 
phetic, is  one  which  we  are  luckily  losing  in  the  deadly 
disillusionment  of  war.  It  may  be  called  the  legend  of 
the  Teutonic  Race  ;  or  the  fairy-tale  of  the  two  golden- 
haired  brothers.  These  two  blonde  and  beautiful  persons, 
the  Englishman  and  the  German,  were  twins  m  some 
prehistoric  perambulator  and  were  destined  to  embrace 
again  at  some  far-off  family  party,  having  only  been 
separated  in  the  interval  bv  the  one  being  occupied  in 


annexing  the  whole  of  the  earth  and  the  other  the  whole 
of  the  sea.  Other  groups  and  institutions,  such  trifles 
as  the  Roman  Empire,  the  French  Revolution,  the  melting- 
pot  of  America  and  what  can  only  be  called  the  continent 
of  Russia— these  things  did  not  exist  at  all,  except  as 
things  to  be  annexed.  It  is  legitimate,  I  think,  to  be 
proud  of  having  really  artistic  dreams  ;  and  it  has  not 
disadvantages,  except  that  in  order  to  dream  we  must 
sleep.  And  we  awoke  when  the  knife  was  at  our  throat. 
\yhen  we  sought  for  our  brother  we  saw  the  face  of  a 
stranger,  and  looked  into  the  eyes  of  a  savage. 

The  truth  is  that  no  two  men,  neither  of  them  literally 
black  or  literally  naked,  could  well  be  more  different  than 
the  two  types  which  have  come  to  stand  for  England  and 
for  Germany.  It  is  the  islander  against  the  inlander,  the 
amateur  against  the  specialist,  the  eulogist  of  a  hberty 
falling  into  laxity  against  the  eulogist  of  a  discipline 
driven  to  terrorism,  the  heir  of  a  ruined  Roman  province 
against  the  chief  of  a  half-baked  and  hardly  baptised 
tribe,  the  wanderer  whose  winnings  have  all  been  at 
the  ends  of  the  earth  against  the  plodder  who  has  laid 
field  to  field,  and  taken  his  provinces  from  his  nearest 
neighbours.  The  perception  of  this  contrast  is  no  mere 
recoil  due  to  the  war  ;  it  has  long  been  apparent  to  those 
who  preferred  European  history  to  Teuton  mythology. 
Its  solidity  can  be  proved  by  the  fact  that  the  contrast 
holds  in  the  weaknesses  as  in  the  merits  of  England. 

No  two  types  are  more  different  than  the  shame- 
faced snob  and  the  entirely  shameless  slave.  It  is  true 
that  too  many  English  citizens  merely  try  to  be  gentle- 
men ;  it  cannot  be  said  that  even  German  aristocrats 
try  to  be  anything  of  the  kind.  We  should  not  now 
put  forward  George  IV.  as  the  flower  of  our  national 
heroes.  But  the  First  Gentleman  of  Europe  was,  in 
this  true  and  traditional  sense,  a  gentleman  ;  that  his 
very  vices  were  obliged  to  be  munificent.  It  may  be  that 
Frederick  the  Great  was  the  first  man  of  Europe,  and 
that  this  is  a  greater  thing  ;  but  it  remains  true  that 
his  very  virtues  were  obliged  to  be  mercenary. 

It  is  tnie  that  the  English  cult  of  commerce  and  private 


Mciy  25,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


27 


liberty  produced  in  the  Manchester  School  an  individual- 
ism shockingly  indifferent  to  the  lives  of  the  labourers. 
It  is  equally  true  that  the  Prussian  disciplinarians  have 
taken  considerable  care  of  the  lives  of  labourers  ;  the  care 
which  nigger-drivers  have  almost  invariably  taken  of 
niggers.  When  we  say  these  things,  it  is  not  a  denuncia- 
tion but  a  description.  As  the  contrast  appears  in  the 
English  vices,  so  it  appears  in  the  Prussian  virtues.  Thus, 
that  the  Prussian  kings  worked  hard  for. Prussia  is  as 
rcrtain  as  that  they  worked  hard  against  humanity.  The 
fact  that  they  saved  money  off  their  pleasures  is  as  certain 
as  that  they  always  spent  it  on  their  power.  The  fact 
that  they  often  kept  the  peace  even  under  provocation  is 
as  certain  as  that  they  always  broke  the  peace  without 
provocation. 

Tradition  of  Freedom 

I  have  deliberately  kept  to  a  strict  under-statement 
of  patriotic  claim  ;  for  the  real  case  for  England  is  best 
seen  when  all  possible  deductions  have  been  made.  And 
when  they  are  all  made,  I  believe  it  is  still  true  that  the 
vague  English  tradition  of  freedom,  with  its  excesses  in 
aristocracy  and  amateurism,  has  been  proved  even  in  the 
])resent  war  to  be  more  practical  than  the  Prussian 
centraHsation  and  rigidity.  No  rational  person  will 
deny  that  we  have  suffered  heavily  from  the  muddles 
and  scandals  which  come  from  being  governed,  as  we  are 
so  largely  governed,  by  a  sort  of  social  club.  We  have 
all  the  disadvantages  that  come  from  such  a  system  ; 
the  shifting  of  responsibility,  the  gossip,  the  network  of 
nepotism.  Certain  newspapers  fan  a  perpetual  fury 
against  ministerial  mismanagement ;  though  I  think  that 
England  has  been  in  more  peril  from  the  organisation  of 
the  newspapers  than  from  the  disorganisation  of  the 
Government.  It  is  always  easy  to  show  that  any  govern- 
ment is  inefficient,  this  sort  of  government  especially. 
But  when  they  proceeded  to  prove  that  the  Prussian  type 
of  government  is  efficient,  they  broke  down. 

That  Prussianised  Germany  is  supremely  efficient  is 
indeed  widely  asserted  and  often  taken  for  granted. 
When  I  remarked  elsewhere  on  the  spiritual  insanity  of 
modern  Germany,  a  critic  ruefully  expressed  the  wish 
that  the  German  rulers  would  bite  some  of  our  own. 
I  am  far  from  saying  that  the  German  rulers  may  not 
bite  somebody  ;  one  never  can  tell  where  true  scientitic 
progress  may  lead.  But  I  am  prepared  to  maintain  that 
in  the  plain  test  of  positive  battle,  their  biting  has  been 
much  less  effective  than  General  Joffre's  nibbling.  And 
I  do  not  think  it  will  be  denied  that,  touching  "  der  Tag  " 
and  the  British  Navy,  their  bark  has  been  much  worse 
than  their  bite. 

Careful  preparation,  of  course,  there  was.  The  German 
is  prepared  for  everything  except  emergencies.  It  may 
even  be  said  that  he  is  always  ready  for  anything,  except 
the  thing  that  happens.  But  the  kind  of  readiness  he 
had  is  much  more  conclusi\-e  in  showing  him  to  be  morally 
wrong  than  in  showing  him  to  be  intellectually  right. 
After  all  the  question,  the  first  and  simplest  of  all  ques- 
tions, is  what  happened  to  his  huge  preparations  when 
they  were  first  poured  out  upon  Paris.  They  were,  in  the 
first  week  or  two,  out-generalled  and  defeated  in  the  open 
by  a  very  much  smaller  force  ;  nothing  they  can  say  or 
do  can  efface  that  fact  of  history.  But  all  they  have 
done  since  illustrates  much  more  widely  the  error  of 
trusting  to  their  particular  theory  and  method.  In  the 
true  and  creative  sense  they  have  done  nothing  at  all 
since  ;  for  they  have  only  done  the  same  thing  over  and 
over  again.  They  not  only  tried  perpetually  to  do  things 
they  did  not  succeed  in  doing,  but  they  tried  to  do  things 
that  could  not  be  done.  Not  only  did  they  in  Russia  con- 
tinually capture  something  the  Russians  evacuated ; 
but  they  are  now  at  Verdun  trying  to  capture  something 
the  French  have  destroyed. 

German  discipline  seems  to  be  the  science  of  repeating 
a  mistake.  It  would  really  seem  as  if  the  concentration 
of  the  mind  on  mechanical  triumphs  made  the  mind  itself 
mechanical.  The  essence  of  all  machinery  is  recurrence. 
But  though  the  engine  must  repeat  itself  to  be  a  success, 
if  the  engineer  always  repeats  himself  he  will  be  a  bore. 
The  wheel  is  always  returning  and  beginning  again  ; 
but  we  do  not  want  the  coach  to  be  always  going  back  and 
starting  again.  Nowadays  it  does  not  seem  so  much  to 
be  the  North  Germans  who  make  a  machine  that  repeats 


itself ;  it  is  rather  the  machmc  that  makes  them  repeat 
themselves.  The  fanciful  might  think  they  had  really 
found  perpetual  motion,  the  impossibility — which  has 
passed  into  a  proverb  ;  and  that  they  had  found  it,  like 
so  many  things  mysteriously  forbidden,  a  disaster  for 
the  sons  of  men. 

Those  who  talk  as  if  the  English  tradition  of  liberty  or 
looseness  were  an  unmixed  weakness  are  perpetually 
reminding  us  of  the  fiasco  of  Gallipoli.  The  English 
a,bandoned  the  effort  against  Gallipoli.  The  Germans 
have  not  abandoned  the  effort  against  Verdun.  To 
them  it  will  probably  appear  a  paradox,  but  it  is  a  very 
solid  truism,  that  the  Germans  have  therefore  suffered  a 
much  more  crushing  defeat  than  the  English.  The 
application  of  the  same  truth  in  other  fields  would  call 
for  a  lengthy  statement,  and  many  of  its  aptest  illustra- 
tions will  not  be  known  in  detail  till  after  the  war.  But 
amateurish  as  I  am,  even  for  an  Englishman,  I  will 
venture  the  strong  suspicion  that  immeasurably  more 
novelties  and  originalities  have  been  added  to  the  naval 
policy  which  we  inherited  than  to  the  military  policy  which 
the  Prussians  inherited. 

A  Living  Thing 

But  there  is  a  much  wider  area  in  which  the  truth  is 
supremely  true  and  supremely  important.  I  mean,  of 
course,  the  English  tradition  of  a  liberal  adaptibility 
in  the  problems  of  colonies  and  dependencies.  Here 
again  a  mere  Jingo  optimism  merely  swamps  the  honest 
objectivity  of  the  claim  we  can  really  make.  England 
has  done  many  things  which  I,  as  an  Englishman, 
deplore  or  detest  ;  she  has  done  some  things  which  all 
Englishmen  deplore  or  detest.  But  what  is  strictly  and 
scientifically  true  about  England  is  this  ;  that  wherever 
the  English  influence  is  present,  men  feel  that  it  has 
something  which  I  can  only  call  the  flexibility  of  a  living 
thing.  The  vital  point  is  not  that  these  things  were  done  ; 
it  is  that  they  were  done  and  undone  ;  that  the  men 
who  made  the  mistake  were  alive  enough  to  see  the  mis- 
take. The  strength  of  the  Prussian,  not  by  our  account, 
but  by  his  own  account,  lies  in  his  inflexibility  ;  and  there 
are  not  wanting  at  this  moment  advocates  of  panic  and 
persecution  to  urge  this  foreign  fad  upon  the  government 
of  England. 

The  truth  is  that  amnesty  and  compromise  have  been 
for  England  a  strength  in  the  very  strongest  sense  ;  that 
most  athletic  type  of  strength  that  goes  with  activity. 
A  wooden  leg  is  not  stronger  than  a  living  leg,  because-  it 
does  not  flinch  and  draw  back  when  it  steps  on  a  thorn. 
The  strength  of  the  English  influence  has  been  that  at  the 
extremest  limits  of  its  sprawling  limbs  it  has  been  at  least 
alive  ;  and  known  the  nature  of  what  it  touched.  People 
complained  of  it,  but  they  also  cornplained  to  it ;  for 
they  knew  it  had  strength  enough  to  move  and  mend. 
But  the  wooden  leg  is  planted  firmly  in  Belgium  to-day  ; 
and  we  shall  not  waste  our  time  in  complaining  to. a 
wooden  leg.  We  shall  do  so  the  less  because  the  wooden 
leg  is  in  truth  adorned  and  completed  by  a  wooden  head  ; 
and  the  whole  is  one  huge  wooden  idol  carved  like 
Hindenburg,  which  the  limbs  of  living  men  shall  lift  and 
cast  into  the  fire. 


Little  has  been  written  about  the  conquest  of  German 
South-West  Africa  and  a  volume  dealing  with  it  is  therefore 
doubly  welcome.  In  With  Botha's.  Army,  by  J.  P.  Kay 
Robinson  (George  Allen  and  Unvvin)  2s.  6d.,  we  have  a  story 
which  has  little  to  do  with  fighting  the  Hun,  but  a  great  dea 
to  say  about  fighting  hostile  forces  of  Nature.  This  cam- 
paign among  the  sand-dunes  between  the  desert  and  the  sea 
was  most  picturesque  (and  most  unpleasant),  and  Mr.  Kay 
Robinson,  who  was  a  trooper  in  the  Imperial  Light  Horse, 
conveys  to  us  the  lighthearted  manner  in  which  the  hardest 
day's  work  and  the  worst  sandstorms  were  faced.  ' 

Coming  of  a  Uterary  family,  "the  author  has  an  exceptional 
power  of  expression,  and  his  descriptions  of  this  weird  kind 
of  dustbin,  out  of  which  they  dig  diamonds,  are  vivid  and 
entertaining.  Before  he  writes  another  book,  he  will  we 
liope,  realise  how  dull  and  wearisome  is  the  repetition  of  ex- 
pletives. There's  not  much  difterence  between  soap-suds 
and  the  froth  of  Niagara  ;  it  is  tlie  force  that  generates  the 
two  that  counts.  So  is  [it  with  "language,"  and,  as  this 
fort*  cannot  be  transferred  to  the  printed  page,  oaths  are 
more  effective  taken  as  read.  But  this  is  a  really  fine  little 
book,  a  N'aluable  addition  to  a  War  Library, 


zo 


LAND      &      \\  A  T  1-:  R 


May  25,  1916 


The  Empire  in   Arms 


By  Professor  J.  H.  Morgan 


ONE  evening  at  the  end  of  April  last  year  two 
or  three  statf  officers  and  myself  were  "sitting  at 
dinner  in  one  of  the  dingy  hotels  at  d.H.O. 
Our  talk  was  scnnbre.  News  was  filtering  in  that 
tlie  position  on  the  Ypres  salient  was  desperate,  and  from 
day  to  day  pt^rplexing  rumours  were  ni  circulation  — 
the  first  tliat  the  French  troops  on  our  left  had  been  on 
the  run.  runnint;  "  from  Dan  even  to  Beersheba,"  as  I 
heard  some  one  put  it.  This  circumstance,  novel  and 
perplexing  in  itself  -for  we  knew  the  indomitaole  temper 
df  our  Ailies— \\'as  not  rendered  the  more  reassuring  by 
the  second  rumour  which  came  on  top  of  the  first  :  That 
they  had  succumbed  to  some  strange  lethal  \'apour  whicii 
had  risen  from  tiie  ground  in  the  twilight  like  a  river  mist 
and  floated  stealthily  over  the  fields  until  e\'ery  trench 
and  sap-head  became  a  pocket  of  poisonous  chlorine.  Also 
tiiat  men,  horses,  cattle  were  lying  all  over  the  place, 
stricken  by  a  kind  of  blight,  and' that  the  happiest  were 
those  who  did  not  survive. 

One  heard  strange  stories  of  a  Brigade  with  its  left 
wing  in  the  air,  of  flanking  movements  which  had  brotight 
the  enemy  into  our  rear,  of  signal  wires  cut  and  whole 
battalions  isolated,  until  the  position  was  a  kind  of  jig- 
saw puzzle.  Also  that  there  was  a  gap  of  four  miles  on 
our  left  through  which  the  enemy  was  pouring  like  a 
flood.  And  other  such  things.  As  we  talked,  a  young 
artillery  officer,  a  Canadian,  with  his  arm  in  splints,  came 
into  the  room  and  shyly  slipped  into  a  place  at  the  long 
table — the  only  table  in  the  room.  (i.H.Q  is  like  a 
\\\»lsh  \-illage — one  knows  everyone  by  sight,  but  the 
newcomer  was  unfamiliar  to  us.  A  stray  remark  about 
the  position  at  St.  JtUien  brought  him  into  the  radius  of 
our  conversation,  and  the  next  moment  we  were  eagerly 
hearing  from  his  lips  the  story  of  the  colossal  struggle  still 
in  progress  and  of  how  his  battery  of  four  eighteen- 
pounders  had  suddenly  foimd  the  enemy  right  in  their 
rear  and  had.  had  to  swing  round  their  guns  to  face  a 
force  not  400  yards  away. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  re-tell  the  immortal 
story  of  those  thirteen  days — ^others  have  done  it  better 
- — but  the  impression  that  stands  out  most  clearly  from 
my  recolle(  tion  of  that  young  gunner's  vivid  narrative 
• — illustrated  by  a  rapid  requisitioning  of  all  the  knives 
and  forks  within  reach  to  reconstruct  the  positions — is 
that  it  was  the  beginning  of  a  new  epoch  in  the  military 
history  of  the  Overseas  Dominions.  For  his  talk  was 
not  so  much  of  battalions  as  of  brigades,  of  brigades  not 
only  of  infantry  but  of  artillery,  and  he  spoke  too  of 
administratiA'e  field  units,  of  ambulance,  supply,  and 
ammunition  columns.  And  all  this  suddenly  brought 
home  to  us  the  fact  that  for  the  first  time  in  the  history 
the  Empire  an  Overseas  Dominion  had  put  a  whole 
Division  into  the  field.  No  man  who  knows  anything  of 
the  problems  of  Imperial  Defence  requires  to  be  told 
what  that  means. 

An    Imperial  Army 

For  years  it  had  been  the  dream  of  our  Imperial 
General  Staff  to  secure  that  there  should  be  a  homogeneous 
Imi)erial  Army  in  which  the  composition  of  units 
should  be  that  of  our  own  War  Establishments — the 
Division  of  three  infantry  brigades  with  its  full  comple- 
ment of  "  divisional  troops.  "  F'or  the  secret  of  sound 
military  organisation  is  a  standardisation  of  parts  and  a 
uniform  composition  of  units.  The  Imperial  army  which 
took  the  field  in  the.  Boer  \\'ar  wis  such  as  to  make  an 
R.T.O.'s  hair  stand  on  end  ;  its  spirit  was  willing  but 
its  "  make-up  "  was  weak  ;  the  Colonial  contingents 
differed  in  weapons,  kit;  organisation,  and  their 
composition  was  as  unorthodox  as  their  ^military 
vocabulary.  The  result  was  delay,  confusion,  and 
vexation  of  spirit. 

In  1907  our  newly-created  General  Staff  took  these 
questions  in  hand.  The  problem  which  exercised  their 
minds  was  primarily  a  political  One — the  jjroblem  of 
^^jcurinj;    a   homogeneous    army   from    a   heterogeneous 


Empire  and  of  persuading  self-governing  Dominions, 
which  are  independent  in  almost  everything  but 
name,  not  only  to  take  the  Army  Annual  Act  as  a  kind 
of  Model  Clatises  Act  for  their  own  Defence  Acts,  but  to 
conform  to  our  own  War  I*:stablishments.  The  (ieneral 
Staff  had  to  work  out  its  own  plans  within  the  rigid  limits 
of  two  constitutional  principles  ;  the  legislative  inde- 
pendence of  the  Overseas  Dominions  and  the  liberty  of 
the  Dominion  citizen  to  volunteer  for  extra-Colonial 
service  or  not  as  he  thought  fit. 

No   Compulsion   for    Foreign   Service 

The  Dominions  were  prepared  to  impose  com- 
pulsion on  their  own  citizens  for  home  defence  ;  they 
were  not  prepared  to  impose  it  on  them  for  foreign  service 
—in  the  former  they  w-ere  ahead  of  us,  in  the  latter  we 
are  now  ahead  of  them.  Whatever  troops  the  Dominions 
choose  to  raise — whether  compulsorily  for  home  service, 
or  voluntarily  for  foreign  service — they  claimed  to  control. 
Legally,  a  Colonial  soldier  is,  of  course,  "  the  King's 
soldier,"  the  Crown  is  one  and  indivisible  throughout 
the  Empire,  and  the  King  is  supposed  by  an  engaging 
legal  fiction  to  be  personally  present  throughout  his 
Dominions— a  legal  fiction  which  sadly  perplexed  a 
certain  Colonial  trooper  when  he  had  his  pay-book 
made  up  in  the  Boer  Wav*  The  King  is  indeed,  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  all  the  Dominion  forces — Dominion 
Defence  Acts  recogni.se  it.  But,  as  leveryone  knows,  the 
prerogatives,  of  the  Crown  in  the  Dominions  are  vested 
in  the  Governor-Cicncral,  or  Governor,  acting  on  the 
advice  of  his  Ministers,  who  in  turn  are  responsible  to  the 
local  legislatures. 

As  regards  the  local  defence  of  the  Dominions  a  great 
advance  had  already  been  made  in  the  early  years  of 
this  centurv.  Manv  causes  contributed  to  it :  the  ex- 
perience of  "the  Boer  \\'ar  started  it,  the  federation  of 
Australia  facilitated  it,  the  emergence  of  a  great  Asiatic 
power  in  the  Pacific  accelerated  it,  but  I  fancy  that  it 
was  the  concentration  of  our  navy  in  home  waters,  in 
response  to  the  challenge  of  the  German  Naval  Bill, 
that  did  most  to  consolidate  it.  Be  that  as  it  may,  there 
was  a  remarkable  sequence  of  Dominion  Defence  Acts 
in  Australia  (iQO^,  1904.  1909,  1910),  Canada  (1906), 
New  Zealand  (1909,  1910),  and  the  new  South  African 
Union  (1912).  All  of  them,  with  some  variation,  adopted 
the  principle  of  compulsory  service  for  home  defence 
though  the  application  of  the  principle  was  more  nominal 
than  real.  Training  in  peace  and  service  in  war  are  alike 
compulsory,  though  in  the  case  of  Canada  the  former  is 
limited  to  a  kind  of  militia  ballot,  to  be  taken  when  the 
Government  think  fit  ;  whereas  in  Australia  and  New 
Zealand  the  compulsory  training  is  tmiversal  for  youths 
from  the  ages  of  16  to  25,  and  the  exercise  of  the  com- 
pulsion is  made  mandatory  upon  the  Government  instead 
of  discretionary.  In  all  these  Dominions  the  liability  to 
service  applies  to  e\-ery  citizen  under  55  or  60  years  of 
age.  Apart  from  this  adoption  of  the  Icvec  en  masse  all 
the  Acts  provide  for  the  raising  of  a  Defence  Force  which 
— the  nomenclature  varies  slightly — is  divided  into  a 
Permanent  F'orce  and  a  Citizen  Force. 

Much  might  be  written  abotit  the  organisation  of  these 
forces  as  a  series  of  experiments  in  compulsory  training, 
but  their  immediate  interest  for  tis  is  the  provision  made 
for  their  use  in  such  great  Imperial  crises  as  the  present. 
The  problem  which  presented  itself  to  the  General  Staff 
was  how  far  could  they  rely  on  the  assistance  of  organised, 
highly  trained,  and  uniformly  composite  forces  in  the 
case  of  a  great  emergency.  As  was  ])ointed  out  in  the 
Imperial  Defence  Conference  of  i90(),  in  none  of  the 
Dominions  was  it  "  legally  possible  for  a  military^  unit  to 
volunteer,  as  such,  for  service  oversea  as  part  of  an 
I  mperial  Army ."  All  the  Defence  Acts  expressly  provided 
that  the  members  of  the  various  Dominion  Forces  were 

•  Sec  the  case  of  Williams  r.  Howarth  lic;ird  oil  appeal  by  tUo 
Jiidiciui  Committee  o(  the  Privy  Council  in  1905. 


May  25,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


^ 


not     bound    to    serve    outside    the    territories  of  each 
Dominion.* 

The  Defence  Acts  contained  no  such  provision  as  that 
in  Section  13  (2)  of  our  own  Territorial  Forces  Act  whereby 
the  members  of  those  Forces  can,  through  the  com- 
manding officer  of  a  unit,  volunteer  to  serve  Overseas. 
An.d  even  as  regards  home  defence  the  application  of  the 
compulsory  principle  was  restricted  in  scope,  and  the 
training  in  virtue  of  it  modest  in  character. 

For   Home   Defence 

Canada  never  got  the  length  oi  applying  compulsion  at 
all ;  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  South  Africa  restricted  it 
to  men  under  the  ages  of  26,  25,  or  21  respectively,  and 
the  training  imposed  on  these  classes  was  limited  to  about 
a  fortnight  annually  in  camp,  although  it  had  a  sound 
basis  in  a  system  of  compulsory  cadet  training 
dyring  school  age.t  The  Permanent  Forces,  as 
distinct  from  their  Citizen  Forces,  were  so  small  as  to 
be  almost  negligible.  I  believe  they  did  not  exceed 
5,000  men  in  any  of  the  Dominions.  The  strength  of 
the  Citizen  Forces  when  the  war  broke  out  was  far  below 
the  War  Establishment  ;  in  Australia  and  Canada  it  was 
barely  one-third.  The  war,  in  fact,  came  upon  the 
Dominions  at  a  time  when  they  were  merely  entering 
on  their  military  novitiate.  This,  of  course,  only  makes 
the  splendour  of  their  achievement  the  more  remarkable  ; 
the  overseas  contingents  they  provided  the  moment  the 
war  broke  out  were  no  part  of  the  Imperial  covenant  ; 
they  were  as  spontaneous  as  they  were  imsolicited. 
Except  for  the  officers,  the  overwhelming  proportion  of 
those  contingents  represents  men  who  had  never  been 
brought  within  the  operation  of  the  Defence  Acts  at  all. 

But  in  one  respect  we  were  more  than  ready.  We 
were  organised.  The  General  Staff  had  expanded, 
under  the  inspiration  of  Lord  Haldane,  into  an  Imperial 
(ieneral  Staff  in  1908,  and  in  1909  the  first  Imperial 
Defence  Conference,  convoked  as  an  extraordinary 
meeting  of  the  Imperial  Conference,  had  laid  down  the 
general  principles  of  an  Imperial  war  organisation  to 
which  each  Dominion  in  turn  conformed.  An  Inspector- 
General  of  the  Overseas  Forces  was  appointed, 
doubling  the  part  of  G.O.C.  Mediterranean,  and  Sir  Ian 
Hamilton  began  his  memorable  tours  of  the  Dominions, 
resulting  in  a  series  of  quite  invaluable  reports  on  their 
military  systems — reports  which  everyone  should  read. 
How  much  has  been  achieved  by  him  and  others  may  be 
realised  by  a  bare  recital  of  the  position  of  affairs  as  it 
was  in  1909,  when  the  Empire  first  began  to  think  about 
putting  its  house  in  order. 

At  that  date  the  number  of  squadrons  to  each  cavalry 
regiment,  of  batteries  to  each  artillery  brigade,  of  com- 
panies to  each  battalion,  varied  throughout  the  Empire  ; 
there  was  no  common  type  of  Field  Service  Regulations 
and  Training  Manuals ;  there  was  little  or  no  uniformity 
in  the  training  of  officers.  There  were  legal  as  well  as 
administrative  difficulties.  The  command  of  Dominion 
Forces  is  vested,  not  in  any  officer  of  the  Home  Regular 
Forces,  but  in  the  Governor,  and  the  King's  commission 
issued  to  officers  in  England  gives  them  no  legal  authority 
over  Dominion  forces.  And  as  regards  discipline  the 
Army  Annual  Act  does  not  per  sc  apply  to  the  Dominion 
Forces,  which  in  this  as  in  other  respects  are  governed  by 
their  own  Defence  Acts — hence  a  real  difficulty  in  the 
case  of  Dominion  Forces  serving  outside  the  Dominion, 
because  it  is  a  rule  of  law  that  Dominion  Parliaments 
cannot  legislate  ex-territorially. 

The  legal  difficulties  were  easily  solved.  Section  177  of 
our  own  Army  Annual  Act  gives  extra-territorial  validity  to 
aiiy  Dominion  code  of  discipline  if  and  when  the  troops 
are  serving  outside  the  Dominion.  The  Dominions 
have,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  largely  adopted  our  own 
Army  Act  and  the  King's  Regulations  as  "  common 
form  "  in  their  Defence  Acts.  Those  Acts  also  empower 
the  Governor-General  in  time  of  war  to  place  the  forces 

•The  exceptions  are  more  apparent  than  real.  T^ie  South  Africa 
Act  e.\ten(ls  the  hability  to  "  outside  the  Union,"  but  conliries  to 
"  any  part  of  South  Africa.  "  The  Canadian  Militia  Act  extends  it  to 
"  anywliere  beyond  Canada."  but  confines  it  to  "  the  defence  thereof." 
The  Australian  Acts  e.\phcitly  contine  it  to  the  Coiunxonwealth.  The 
Xew  Zealand  Act  (No.  28  of  1909),  makes  a  distinction  in  the  case  of 
the  Permanent  Force,  which  is  liable  to  serve  "  throughout  New 
Zealand  or  beyond." 

t  There  are  variations,  but  limits  of  space  forbid  more  particular 
treatment. 


under  the  orders  of  the  comniander  of  any  portion  of  the 
Kipg's  Regular  Forces.  Conferences  with  the  Dominions 
resulted  in  a  scheme  of  interchange  of  officers  for  duty  in 
different  parts  of  the  Empire,  under  which  a  Dominion 
military  officer  on  duty  in  England  was  to  receive  a 
temporary  commission  in  the  Home  Regular  Forces, 
and  an  officer  of  the  latter  on  duty  in  the  Dominions 
was  to  receiv'C  a  temporary  commission  in  the  Dominion 
forces;  The  General  Staff  became  the  Imperial  General 
Staff,  a  body  in  the  creation  of  which  Dominion 
susceptibilities  were  most  carefuhy  studied,  the  chief  of 
the  I.G.S.  being  at  pains  to  disclaim  any  desire  to  give 
orders  to  the  Dominion  sections.  In  return  the  Canadian 
Government  offered  to  confine  its  appointments  to  its 
section  of  the  General  Staff  to  P.S.C.  officers,  except 
where  they  had  qualified  by  service  in  the  field. 

The  military  education  of  officers  throughout  the  Empire 
was  assimilated,  our  own  examinations  for  promotion 
being  adopted,  and  the  British  War  Establishments  were 
accepted  as  the  basis  of. composition  of  units  for  service 
in  the  field.  The  Headquarters  Offices  at  Ottawa,  at 
Melbourne,  and  at  Wellington  were  organised  on  the 
same  basis  as  the  War  Office  in  London.  The  English 
model  was  followed  in  sub-division  of  staff  duties,  the 
local  territorial  organisation,  and  the  system  of  lines  of 
commimication. 

The   Imperial    System 

Such  was  tlie  Imperial  system  which  had  been  worked 
out  by  patient  and  tactful  effort  when  the  mighty  con- 
flict came  upon  us  like  a  thief  in  the  night — a  system 
flexible,  expansi\'e,  voluntary,  forged  by  links  which  are 
truly  light  as  air  but  strong  as  iron.  It  depends  entirely 
on  the  unsolicited  support  of  willing  peoples.  The  war, 
if  it  found  us  unprepared,  did  not  find  us  unintelligent. 
It  is  more  than  probable  that  this  shirt  of  mail,  having 
now  bean  tested  at  every  link,  will  play  a  great  part  in 
the  problem  of  Imperial  organisation  after  the  war. 
Sir  Ian  Hamilton,  in  his  masterly  Canadian  report  in 
191J,  put  forward  the  happy  suggestion  that  there  should 
be  an  Imperial  interchange  of  units — "  the  presence  of  a 
Canadian  regiment  in  London,  Delhi  or  Cairo  would  stir 
the  imagination  not  only  of  the  Five  Nations  themselves, 
but  of  the  whole  outside  world."  Prophetic  words  and  a 
true  inspiration  !  Perhaps  we  shall  perpetuate  in  peace 
what  we  ha\'e  improvised  in  war,  and  the  mother-country 
and  the  Dominions  may  lend  each  other  battalions  for 
nianoeuvres  and  even  for  garrison  duty. 

In  the  same  report  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  visualised 
that  day  in  the  futtne  when  the  protection  of  British 
possessions  on  the  Imperial  lines  of  communication 
would  in  the  natural  order  of  events  be  allotted  to 
each  Dominion  within  whose  sphere  of  influence  they 
lay.  And  indeed  they  were  Dominion  forces  which 
hauled  down  the  German  flag  in  New  Guinea,  Samoa,  and 
South- West  Africa ;  it  may  be^ — indeed  it  is  a 
certainty — that  the  Dominions  which  have  conquered 
them  will  be  empowered  by  letters  patent  to  annex 
them,  and  the  inevitable  result  will  be  an  e.xpansion  of 
their  peace  establishments  to  hold  them.  Salisbury 
Plain  and  Bordon  have  become  vast-  Imperial  training 
grounds  ;  they  may  well  continue  to  serve  in  peace  the 
purpose  they  have  served  in  war.  Certain  it  is  that 
experienced  staff  officers  look  forward  to  the  time  when 
it  will  be  the  normal  thing  for  Dominion  officers  to  com- 
mand Regular  Brigades  at  Aldershot. 

The  Inve  Nations*  have  met  in  camp  and  council  on 
the  soil  of  the  mother- country  ;  such  nieetings  will 
surely  become  part  of  the  natural  order  of  things. 


At  the  request  of  Mr.  Thornton,  the  General  Manager  of 
the  Great  Eastern  Railway,  we  are  asked  to  announce  that 
arrangements  have  been  made  for  one  of  the  Ambulance 
Trains,  constructed  and  just  completed  by  the  Great  Eastern 
Railway  at  their  Stratford  Works  for  the  use  of  the  Army 
in  France,  to  be  on  view  at  Liverpool  Street  Station,  platforrn 
No.  I  from  7.30  a.m.  to  4:15  p.m.  to-day  and  to-morrow, 
and  also  on  Sunday,  from  8  a.m.  to  8  p.m. '  Tickets,  sixpence 
each,  can  be  obtained  at  the  booking  office  on  the  Station. 


•  It  is  i^ot  as  widel\-  known  as  it  might  be  tf-at  at  the  present  moment 
every  Dominion  has  now  a  considerable  coq  .-ingcnt  on  service  in  tUis 
countrv  or  in   France. 


30 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  25,  1916 


A  War  Colony  of  Oversea  Women 


By  Mary  MacLeod  Moore 


WHEN  war  thundered 
forth  a  summons  to  the 
sons  of  the  Empire  to 
quit  them  Hke  men.  and 
to  fight  for  the  lands  their  fathers  left 
them,  the  women  of  Canada,  like  all 
British  women,  far  and  wide,  rose  to  the  occasion.  There 
may  have  been  among  them  those  whose  white  hands  clung 
"  to  the  tightened  rein,  slipping  the  spur  from  the  booted 
heel,"  but  they  were  lost  sight  of  in  the  army  of  brave 
and  patriotic  women  who  sent  off  husbands,  sons — in 
some  cases  both— and  lovers,  with  gay  words  and  smiling 
faces. 

The  idea  that  women  must  weep  while  men  work  is 
exploded.  Instead  of  shedding  tears  the  women  of  the 
Empire  organised  with  great  abihty  and  enthusiasm,  and 
(ledicated  their  brains,  their  hearts  and  their  hands,  to 
the  good  of  the  community.  The  Canadian  women, 
throwing  themselves  into  war  work,  such  as  Red  Cross. 
making  comforts  for  the  troops,  raising  funds  for  afflicted 
Belgians,  and  a  vast  amount  of  similar  labour,  also  went 
in  numbers  to  visit  their  men  at  \'alcarticr  (the  famous 
training  camp,  which  was  laid  out  and  equipped  for 
thirty  thousand  men  in  less  than  three  weeks) ,  and  some 
arranged  promptly  to  follow  them  to  England. 

.At  first  a  few  daring  ones  came.  London,  and  Salis- 
bury, where  the  First  Contingent  spent  a  memorable 
waiting-time,  received  them  into  hotels,  lodgings  and 
houses,  where  they  lived  as  far  as  possible  as  they  did  in 
Canada.  But  by  degrees  more  and  more  women  crossed 
the  Atlantic,  in  many  cases  with  their  families,  until  at 
the  present  time  there  are  roughly  about  two  thousand 
Canadian  women,  exclusive  of  the  Canadian  nurses, 
living  temporarily  in  England.  They  stay  near  their 
soldiers  till  they  go  to  the  Front  ;  they  are  ready  to 
welcome  them  when  leave  brings  them  home,  they  keep 
themselves  cheery  and  busy  until  the  work  of  the  men  is 
done  or  until  a  name  in  the  casualty  list  sends  a  lonely 
woman  back  to  Canada  to  begin  life  afresh. 

The  British  are  the  colonising  people  of  the  world, 
but  it  is  probably  the  first  time  in  history  that  a  body  of 
women,  themselves  the  children  or  other  descendants  of 
men  from  the  British  Isles,  who  helped  to  build  up 
Canada,  should  return  to  the  land  of  their  fathers  and 
take  domestic  root,  living  the  life  of  their  kinsfolk  in 
what  the  overseas  people  call  affectionately  "  the  Old 
Country." 

Folkestone  is  the  chief  colony,  though  there  are  many 
Canadians  elsewhere,  for  at  Bramshott,  for  example, 
there  are  thousands  of  troops.  Canadians  are  in  London 
in  large  numbers,  but  the  old  grey  city  swallows  them  iip 
and  merges  them  into  the  community  so  that  they  form 
no  conspicuous  gathering  as  they  do  in  Folkestone. 

The  lines  of  the  soldiers  fell  in  pleasant  places  when 
Shorncliffe  became  their  temporary  home.  The  sea,  the 
lovely  surrounding  country,  the  Leas,  the  drives  and 
excursions  into  historic  districts  within  easy  reach,  have 
shown  them  England  at  her  sweetest  and  her  best. 

Folkestone,  Hythe.  Sandgate,  and  the  small  places 
close  by,  are  now  the  homes  of  Canadian  women,  often 
closely  linked  together  by  old  ties  ;  always  by  a  common 
birthplace,  and  above  all  by  a  common  anxiety.  They 
talk  of  the  same  places  and  people  ;  they  share  solicitude 
for  Hie  "  boys  "  from  their  own  towns  ;  they  mourn 
together  over  the  lists  of  killed  and  wounded,  and  they 
offer  the  sympathy  and  affection  of  sisters  to  the  bereaved, 
knowing  always  that  they  themselves  may  be  the  next 
to  require  compassion.  There  are  some  who  come  among 
their  countrywomen  as  strangers.  Soon  they  feel  the 
closeness  of  the  tie  that  links  them  together. 

It  is  a  curious  feature  of  this  gathering  of  Canadians 
that  they  are  learning  much  of  each  other  as  well  as  of  the 
people  of  England.  Canada  is  a  country'  of  almost 
incredible  distances.  While  there  arc  many  people  who 
are  familiar  with  East  and  West  alike,  and  have  friends 
all  over  the  Dominion,  there  are  others  who  have  prac- 
tically spent  their  lives  in  a  community  where  everyone 
kaows  everyone  else,  and  the  customs  of  the  town  are  a 


/  am  the  land  of  their  fathers, 
In  me  the  virtue  stays, 
I  Kill  bring  back  my  children 
After  certain  days." 


standard  of  comparison.  At  Folke- 
stone all  have  met  and  shared  the 
same  liopes  and  fears. 

There  have  been  meetings  be- 
tween friends  long  separated,  with 
huge  arrears  of  nev\s  to  make  up. 
There  have  been  glimpses  of  some  charming  women 
whom  "  I  last  saw  on  my  wedding  day."  There  have 
been  enquiries  for  Uttle  So-and-So  of  Toronto,  only  to 
find  her  a  war-bride  soon  to  arrive  in  England. 

The  pleasant  gossip  of  Montreal,  Winnipeg,  Kingston 
and  Calgary  drifts  to  the  passer-by  promenading  the 
Leas  and  watching  the  flowering  shrubs,  climbing  the 
cliffs  against  the  wind,  or  to  the  people  drinking  tea  in 
the  hotels.  Canadian  slang  has  its  place  in  the  com- 
munities where  Canadians  congregate.  Bewildered  Eng- 
lish people  have  discovered  that  the  highest  praise  to 
bestow  upon  a  box  of  good  things  from  home  is  :  "  These 
are  sure  some  eats  I  " 

"  The  Maple  Leaf  Forever,"  "  Alouette.  gentille 
Alouette,"  and  "  O  Canada  1  "  are  now  sung  by  people 
who  wouldn't  know  a  maple  leaf  if  they  saw  one  :  who 
never  heard  the  Canadian  National  song  until  war  brought 
it  across  the  Atlantic. 

The  Canadian  war-weddings  have  been  many  and 
brides  abound.  Just  as  at  home,  an  engagement  or  an 
understanding  is  followed  by  a  hurried  wedding  because 
a  man  is  off  to  England  en  route  for  the  FYont.  In  some 
cases  the  girls  have  remained  at  home  in  Canada.  In 
others  they  have  accompanied  their  young  husbands 
to  England  where  they  stay  putting  a  brave  face  on  their 
loneliness  and  fear,  and  counting  the  days  till  leave  is 
due.  Some  brides  have  dared  submarines  and  have 
crossed  the  Atlantic  alone  to  be  married.  War  romances 
have  blossomed  quickly  on  English  soil,  and  English  as 
well  as  Canadian  girls  have  been  married  at  short  notice 
to  Canadian  fighting  men. 

Canadian  w-omen  have  no  idea  of  sitting  down  with 
idle  hands  to  wait  for  their  men.  While  many  are  in 
hotels  and  lodgings  others  keep  house.  The  solid  comfort 
of  England  is  a  joy.  the  attentions  of  the  servants  and  the 
tradespeople  are  pleasing,  the  cheapness  of  flowers  is  a 
surprise,  the  struggles  with  English  money  are  a  joke, 
but  there  is  a  serpent  in  Eden.  If  you  ask  a  Canadian, 
new  to  English  ways,  what  has  struck  her  most,  nine 
times  out  of  a  dozen  she  will  wail  of  the  iniquities  of  the 
winter  heating  arrangements. 

The  Canadian  woman  finds  her  waiting  time  well 
occupied.  Besides  the  small  social  pleasures  of  which 
wartime  admits,  and  her  everyday  intercourse  with 
friends,  she  docs  an  immense  amount  of  valiiable  service 
in  assisting  at  canteens,  visiting  the  sick  and  wounded 
in  connection  with  that  admirable  organisation,  the 
Canadian  Red  Cross  Society,  to  which  many  Canadian 
women  in  London  devote  their  days,  packing  parcels  for 
soldiers  and  for  prisoners  of  war,  helping  with  soldiers' 
clubs,  giving  entertainments  and  treats  for  soldiers, 
making  and  collecting  comforts,  and  keeping  her  corre- 
spondents at  home  in  touch  with  her  life.  There  is  in 
Folkestone  a  Canadian  Women's  War  Work  Committee, 
which  has  a  large  membership,  and  the  kindness  of  these 
ladies  will  long  be  remembered  gratefully  by  the  soldiers. 

It  may  be  wondered  if  anything  is  done  in  England  to 
make  these  fellow-Britons  feel  at  home  and  welcome. 
Many,  of  course,  have  close  ties  with  England,  and  a  large 
social  connection.  But  numbers  are  over  here  for  the 
first  time,  and  they  are  lonely  and  sad  away  from  their 
old  surroundings.  Hospitable  English  people  would  be 
glad  to  meet  them  and  show  them  some  kindly  attention, 
but  it  is  not  always  easy  to  bring  together  guciis  and 
willing  hostesses.  The  Victoria  League,  however,  of 
which  Dowager  Lady  Jersey  is  President,  has  done  much 
in  this  connection.  There  is  a  Hospitality  Committee, 
through  which  people  at  home  have  had  the  opportunity 
of  meeting  overseas  women  and  cultivating  their  friend- 
ship. Lately  Lady  Perley,  wife  of  the  Acting  High 
Commissioner  for  Canada,  and  a  member  of  the  Com- 
mittee, gave  a  lar^e  reception,  when  many  Canadians 


May  25,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


3? 


met  the  Victoria  League  Committee  and  Council.  Now 
the  Victoria  League  has  organised,  for  the  duration  of  the 
war,  the  Oceana  Club,  at  21,  Hill  Street,  Berkeley  Square, 
primarily  for  convenience  of  women  from  the  Dominions. 

Good  must  come  of  the  mingling  of  the  people  of  the 
British  Isles  with  those  from  Canada.  Want  of  know- 
ledge which  is  conducive  to  want  of  sympathy,  gives  place 
to  a  closer  understanding.  Canadians  have  discovered 
the  charm  of  a  restful,  dignified  England  and  her  people. 
They  have  learned  to  appreciate  that  absence  of  self- 
assertion,  self-praise  and  bustle  which  is  essentially  Eng- 
lish. They  have  admired  the  splendid  ability  and  quiet 
power  of  the  Englishwomen,  who  have  been  working, 
speaking,  organising,  for  the  public  good  for  nearly  two 
years.  When  war  ends  two  thousand  Canadian  women 
will  return  to  Canada  to  tell  what  England  really  is. 


Enghshwomen  are  interested  in  the  enterprise,  the 
courage,  and  the  cheeriness  of  the  Canadians  ;  their 
freshness  and  keenness  ;  even  their  new  ways  of  doing 
things,  if  it  be  only  packing  Christmas  gifts.  They  have 
learned,  too,  some  lessons  in  geography.  People  at 
home  have  discovered  with  shame  and  confusion  of  face 
that  to  call  a  Canadian  an  American  can  only  be  wiped 
out  in  deep  humility. 

And  there  are  Canadians  who  have  been  able  to  make 
the  story  of  the  building  of  Empire  a  real  thing  to  English 
hearers,  for  they  can  speak  of  ancestors  who  were  United 
Empire  Loyalists,  and  suffered  all  but  death  at  the  hands 
of  the  rebellious  Colonists  rather  than  be  false  to  their 
Mother  Country.  In  France  and  in  Flanders  their  male 
descendants  are  lighting,  or  lying  at  rest.  In  England 
and  in  Canada  the  women  watch  and  work  and  wait. 


What  Empire  Day  Means 

By  the  Earl  of  Meath 


jk  FTER  fourteen  years  of  constant  labour  on  the 

/%      part  of  the  promoters  of  this  "Empire  Move- 

Z—m  ment,"  the  British  Government  at  last 
.X  JL.thought  fit  to  reverse  its  policy  of  indifference, 
and  has  so  far  recognised  it  as  to  hoist  the  Union  Jack 
this  year  over  Government  Buildings  on  Empire  Day. 
It  is  difficult  to  understand  why  this  recognition  was  not 
given  years  ago,  especially  as  in  the  Dominions  and  Crown 
Colonies,  the  National  Flag  has  for  years  flown  from 
State  Buildings  on  this  day,  while  in  some  Overseas  States 
the  day  has  been  made  a  statutory  holiday. 

In  1914,  the  last  year  for  which  reliable  figures  can  be 
obtained,  over  19^  millions  of  British  subjects  observed 
"  Empire  Day."  Of  these  some  9 J  million  were  school- 
children. The  object  of  the  Empire  Movement  is 
the  creation  of  good  citizens,  and  especially  the  training 
of  children  in  all  the  virtues  which  tend  towards  this 
ideal.  Its  aims  are  non-party,  non-sectarian,  non- 
aggressive,  and  non-racial. 

Its  watchwords  are  Responsibility,  Duty,  Sympathy, 
and  Self-sacrifice.  It  urges  all  its  supporters  "  to  love 
and  fear  God,  to  honour  the  King,  to  obfey  the  laws, 
to  prepare  to  advance  the  highest  interests  of  the  Empire 
in  peace  and  war,  to  cherish  patriotism,  to  regard  the 
rights  of  other  nations,  to  learn  citizenship,  to  follow 
duty,  to  consider  duties  before  rights,  acquire  knowledge, 
to  think  broadly,  to  practise  discipline,  to  subdue  self,  to 
work  for  others,  to  consider  the  poor  and  the  suffering." 

Its  spirit  may  partially  be  translated  as  the  sub- 
ordination of  selfish  or  class  interests  to  those  of  the 
State  and  of  the  community,  and  the  inculcation  in  the 
minds  of  all  British  subjects  of  the_ honourable  obligation 
which  rests  upon  them  of  preparing  themselves,  each 
in  his  or  her  own  sphere,  for  the  due  fulfilment  of 
the  duties  and  responsibilities  attached  to  the  high 
privilege  of  being  subjects  of  this  mighty  Empire. 

Each  of  the  four  words  represents  an  idea,  and  one  of 
vital  importance  to  the  well-being  of  the  Empire.  How 
overwhelming  do  the  responsibilities  attached  to  British 
citizenship  appear,  if  only  we  consider  what  British 
citizenship  means  !  "  Responsibility,"  not  only  for  the 
proper  self-government  of  some  60  millions  of  white 
people,  but  also  (that  which  is  a  much  more  difficult 
problem)  for  the  just  and  beneficent  government  of  some 
350  millions  of  dependent  coloured  fellow  subjects. 

How  imperative  is  the  call  of  "  Duty  "  sounding  in  the 
ears  of  all  to  whom  is  accorded  the  privilege  of  calling 
themselves  citizens  of  the  British  Empire.  How  iin- 
possible  for  such  to  neglect  that  call  without  exposing 
the  Empire  and  themselves  to  most  serious  dangers  ! 
Is  not  imperial  duty  a  vain  dream  without  "  Sympathy  " 
between  the  different  peoples,  creeds  and  classes  who 
constitute  the  Empire  ?  And  is  true  sympathy  possible 
without  the  presence  in  the  minds  of  the  people  of  a  sub- 
conscious, it  may  be  dormant,  but  still  an  ever-present 
willingness  to  sacrifice  self,  if  need  should  arise,  in  the 
general  interests  of  the  Empire  ? 

These  four  watchwords  express  the  spirit  which  will 
insure  the  defence,  honour  and  well-being  of  the  whole 
Empire,  but  still  more  do  they  express  the  living  spirit 
which  should  preserve  it  from  the  fate  which  has  befallen 
the  empires  of  the  past 


The  love  of  personal  and  political  freedom,  the  religious 
faith  which  exalts  moral  character,  and  a  just  considera- 
tion of  the  interests  and  well-being  of  other  nations^ 
these  principles  have  in  the  main  distinguished  the  British 
Empire,  have  contributed  to  its  growth  and  given  assur- 
ance of  its  permanence.  They  have  also  in  a  special 
manner  won  for  it  the  respect  of  other  nations — more 
than  the  vastness  of  its  territory  and  its  material  power. 
It  is  therefore  by  keeping  the  watchwords  of  the  "  Empire 
Movement  "  in  continual  remembrance  that  not  only  the 
integrity  and  true  welfare  of  the  Empire  will  be  main- 
tained, but  that  the  Empire  will  become  the  leader  of 
international  concord,  and  the  guardian  of  the  best 
interests  of  humanity. 

Is  it  too  much  to  say  that  the  spirit  of  the.  movement 
has  already  influenced  in  some  small  degree  the  united 
peoples  of  the  British  Empire,  and  that  the  marvellous 
loyalty  and  self-sacrifice  displayed  by  all  the  subjects 
of  the  King-Emperor  during  the  present  war  may  not  be 
entirely  unconnected  with  the  Empire  Day  ? 

Loyalty,  patriotism,  obedience  to  lawful  authority, 
moral  thoughtfulness  and  love  of  humanity,  fidelity  to 
duty,  and  readiness  for  sacrifice — these  are  some  of  the 
virtues  which  the  Empire  Movement  desires  to  see  instilled 
into  the  minds  of  the  young,  believing  that  through  these 
and  similar  virtues  good  citizens  are  made. 

It  urges  the  State,  public  education  authorities,  teachers 
and  parents  to  neglect  no  material  aids  to  the  cultivation 
of  the  civic  virtues,  and  advocates  that  every  school  shall 
be  provided  with  a  full-sized  flagstaff  and  Union  Jack, 
with  a  large  wall  map  of  the  Empire,  showing  its 
place^in  the  world,  and  therefore  its  opportunities, 
and  responsibilities  of  service,  and  with  a  portrait  of 
the  King. 

It  regards  these  as  only  outward  aids  to  daily  systematic 
instruction  of  the  young  in  all  matters  that  tend  to  the 
creation  of  good  citizens,  looking  to  parents  and  teachers 
not  to  Leave  this  important  branch  of  education  to  chance, 
but  to  concentrate  on  it  their  best  abilities  and  energies. 
The  "  Empire  Movement  "  has  developed  a  literature  of 
no  small  interest,  which  can  be  obtained  from  the  Secre- 
tary, at  83,  Lancaster  Gate,  London.  It  appeals  to  all 
citizens  of  the  vast  Empire  which  owes  allegiance  to 
King  George  V.  to  unite,  at  all  events  in  thought  and 
feehng,  and  to  think  imperially,  not  with  boastful  arro- 
gance, but  with  the  modesty  that  befits  true  greatness 
(even  though  it  should  be  the  case  that  the  time  has  not 
yet  arrived  to  federate  politically),  and  to  foster  all  those 
noble  virtues  which  may  make  them  worthy  of  the  gi-eat 
responsibilities  and  duties  which  Providence  has  thought 
fit  to  place  on  their  shoulders. 

Finally,  it  advocates  an  annual  popular  celebration 
of  Empire  Day  .on  some  date  not  far  removed  from 
May  24th,  the  anniversary  of  the  birthday  of  oUt  late 
adored  Sovereign  Queen  Victoria,  during  whose  beneficent 
reign  of  63  years  the  Empire  grew  to  its  present  vast 
dimensions,  as  well  as  in  freedom,  wealth,  strength, 
civilisation,  and  happiness.  She  was  herself  a  type  of 
noble  Christian  womanhood,  and  illustrated  in  her 
personal  character  and  in  her  reign  those  elements  which 
made  the  true  glory  of  our  Empire,  and  will  be  the 
stable  foundation  of  its  permanence. 


J.  A  .N  D      c\      N\  A  1  E  Iv 


May  25,  1916 


By  Louit  Haemnektri, 


For    Kin^ 


May  25,  1916 


L  A  X  D     &     WATER 


Drawn  exdusU'ely  for  "  Land  and   Wuler." 


and    Empire 


34 


LAND     &     WATER 

An  Untrue  Tale 

By  Bqyd  Cable 


May  25,    191 6 


THIS  is  not  a  True  Story.  Rather  I  wish  to  state 
that  it  is  utterly  aiidi absolutely  untrue,  that  the 
incident  it  relates  has  not  to  my  knowledge  the 
slightest  foundation  in  fact,  that  the  characters 
in  it  arc  entirely  fictitious,  that  the  nations  to  which 
they  are  supposed  to  belong  are  non-existent,  that  the 
jxTsons,  their  doings,  and  conversations,  everything 
whatsoever  hereinafter  told  or  suggested — except  that 
"  there  is  a  war  on  " — is  the  outcome  of  nothing  but  my 
own  imagination  or  invention.  You  may  find  people 
who  will  say  the  story  is  true  ;  you  may  even  lind  people 
who  will  say  they  told  it  to  me  ;  but  I  deny  it  and  them, 
and  repeat— the  story  is  untrue.  Having  made  this 
comprehensive  and  emphatic  statement,  because  other- 
wise a  great  and  friendly  nation  might  imagine  it  and  its 
citi/.ens  were  being  hinted  at,  and  because  the  Censor 
might  on  that  very  account  be  inclined  to  prohibit  publi- 
cation, I  will  proceed  with  the  untrue  story. 

Once  upon  a  time  the  Government  of  Great  Asterisk, 
believing  that  the  great  and  friendly  United  Hyphens 
might  be  still  more  friendly  to  it  if  they  thought  it  was 
going  to  win  the  war,  invited  a  number  of  United  Hyphen 
newspaper  men  to  make  a  tour  of  the  battle  front  and 
see  just  how  well  affairs  were  going.  The  Asterisk 
Staff  at  the  Front  were  asked  to  show  as  much  hospitality 
and  as  many  dead  enemies  as  possible  to  the  newspaper 
men,  to  take  every  care  of  them,  to  see  they  did  not  get 
their  feet  wet,  and  to  return  them  safely,  carriage  paid, 
This  Side  Up  With  Care,  and  so  on,  as  soon  as  might  be. 

Ttie  Staff,  of  course,  were  delighted.  They  always 
are  delighted,  but  in  this  case  we  are  especially  sure 
they  were,  because  they  themselves  told  the  newspaper 
men  so.  They  dined  and  wined  the  paper  men  well, 
surprisingly  well  remembering  it  was  at  the  Front  ;  they 
toured  them  round  in  motor  cars  ;  they  allowed  them  to 
shap-shot  ruined  churches  and  many  pictures  of  motor 
transport  well  behind  the  lines.  And  at  last  they  sent 
them  to  a  portion  of  the  Front  where  they  were  to  be 
allowed  to  go  right  up  into  the  forward  firing  trenches, 
to  look  out  through  periscopes  on  to  the  Hun  trenches, 
to  risk  their  precious  lives  moderately,  but  sufiiciently 
to  allow  them  to  write  convincingly  thrilling  accounts 
of  shrieking  shells  and  whistling  bullets,  and  perhaps 
even  to  acquire  (at  so  much  per)  Hun  helmets  and  other 
interesting  souvenirs. 

The  portion  of  Front  where  an  introduction  to  the 
shrieking  shells  and  crashing  explosions,  etc.,  was  to  be 
effected  was  on  a  stretch  occupied  by  a  battalion  of 
overseas  troops,  a  battalion  of  the  Princess  Pipactoc's 
Cacnacdonac  Infantry.  The  paper  men  were  motored 
up  in  the  very  early  morning  to  a  village  a  few  thousand 
yards  behind  the  forward  trenches  and  were  first  shown 
a  Cacnacdonian  battery  of  heavy  artillery  in  a  position 
tucked  away  amongst  the  broken  houses  and  a  ruined 
rose  garden. 

The  artillery  were  kind  and  hospitable  to  a  point  of 
precious  rye  whisky,  a  tour  of  the  gun  emplacements, 
dug-outs  and  underground  telephone  exchange,  and  a 
hearty  invitation  to  lunch.  The  correspondents 
accepted  all  these  things  as  by  divine  right  and  apparently 
without  any  inkling  that  the  irruption  of  seven  or  eight 
\isitors  into  a  normal  mess  of  about  five  might  in  any 
way  strain  the  mess  resources.  The  staff  officer  who 
was  doing  Cook's  guide  to  the  party,  however,  had  laid 
in  provision  for  a  lunch,  and  relieved  the  situation  by 
taking  aside  the  subaltern  who,  as  "  Mess  Secretary,  " 
was  responsible  for  catering  arrangements,  and  handing 
over  to  him  the  extra  provisions. 

Lunch  was  eaten  in  an  unusually  commodious  cellar 
which  was  the  Battery's  Mess  Room,  and  during  and 
after  the  meal  rye  whisky  and  thrilling  stories  circulated 
freely.  The.  correspondents  were  out  for  "  stuff  "  and 
"  stories,"  and  a  lead  having  been  very  gravely  given 
by  the  Battery  Commander  in  a  wonderful  talc  of  how 
the  battery,  not  wishing  to  damage  a  certain  building 
behind  the  German  fines,  had  "destroyed- the  rCiermans 
inside  the  house  without  knocking  a,  chip! off ^ the  walls 
by  shooting  shells  at 'about  two  -  miles  range :  carefully 


and  accurately  through  the  windows,  the  other  officers 
played  up  nobly  and  provided  those  correspondents  with 
material  enough  to  fill  -their  editors  with  joy  and  the- 
Front  (if  it  could  have  read  the  talcs)  witli  an  unholy  joy. 

It  was  shortly  after  lunch  was  finished  that  a  ])eculiar 
moaning,  rushing  noise  was  heard.  It  grew  rapidly 
louder,  and  before  the  correspondents,  lifting  their  heads 
and  glancing  about  them  inquiringly  at  each  other,  could 
ask  the  question  each  meant  to  ask,  there  was  an  earth- 
shaking  crash  that  set  the  cellar  walls  shivering.  A 
subaltern  had  slid  from  his  seat  at  the  first,  note  of  the 
rising  sound  and  stepped  to  the  telephone  in  the  passage, 
and  for  the  next  few  minutes  the  correspondents  could 
hear  him  talking  into  the  instrument.  He  was  merely 
kepping.  in 'touch  with  the  dug-out  at  the  Battery  to  be 
sure  that  the  wire  to  it  was  uncut  and  that  the  officer 
in  charge  tliere  had  nothing  unusual  to  '  report,  but 
presently  one  of  the  correspondents  asked  who  was  the 
'phone  through  to.  "It's  only  Pippy  having  a  talk  to 
Divisional  Headquarters,"  he  was  informed  by  the 
subaltern  sitting  next' Mm.  "  He"'s.  asking  what  the 
orders  are  if  any  of  you  people  are  casualtied,  or  what 
we're  to  do  with  the  bodies  if  you're  killed." 

The  correspondent  (whom  I  shall  call  Hesketh  P. 
Tubbs,  because  that  is  utterly  unlike  his  real — or  rather 
vvhat  would  have  been  his  real  name  if  this  had  been  a 
true  story)  a  stoutishman,  with  a  ner\'ous  manner  and  an 
obviously  abnormal  appetite  and  capacity  for  lunch  and 
thrilling  stories,  gazed  at  his  informant  with  an  expression 
of  amazement  that  grew  rapidly  to  one  of  alarm  as  another 
shell  banged  down  uproariously  somewhere  outside. 

"  B-but  can  a  sh-shell  touch  us  in  here  ?  "  he  demanded, 
and  for  the  next  fen  minutes  had  to  endure  a  technical 
description  of  the  effects  of  a  high-explosive  detonating 
on  or  piercing  the  roof  and  exploding  inside  a  room  or 
cellar, , a  yi\id  word  picture  of  some  illustrating  incidents 
the  subaltern  could  recall  from  his  past  experiences,  and 
an  accompaniment  of  the  rising  moan-rush-crash  of 
falling  shells.  Mr.  Tubbs  listened  to  it  all,  holding  his 
breath  and  rounding  his  eyps  during  each  whistling  rush, 
winking:  and  gulping  convulsively  at  each  crash.  His 
note-book  and  pencil  lay  neglected  on  the  table  in  front 
of  him,  although  most  of  the  others  were  very  busily 
engaged  scribbling  in  theirs. 

When  the  shelling  stopped  about  "fifteen  minutes  later, 
the  Major  informed  the  party  that  this  was  merely  a 
normal  and  expected  mid-day  "  straff  "  which  was  now 
in  all  probability  finished.  Allowing  another  five 
minutes  for  safety's  sake,  the  party  emerged  from  the 
cellar  and  inspected  the  fresh  shell-craters  with  immense 
interest,  and  hunted  for  fragments  of  the  shells  as 
souvenirs  with  which  to  aggravate  their  less  fortunate 
fellows  on  their  return  to  Fleet  Street.  Mr.  Tubbs  had 
left  the  cellar  with  considerable  reluctance,  and  was 
closely  accompanied  by  the  subaltern  who.  dining  the 
hunt  for  shell  fragments,  assured  Mr.  Tubbs  that  there 
was  no  need  to  bother  about  that  now. 

"  You're  going  up  to  the  Observing  Station  in  the 
trenches  I  hear,"  he  said.  "  Well,  you'll  get  stacks  of 
shell  splinters  there.  They  have  all  sorts  of  shells  banging 
in  there  most  of  the  time." 

The  information  did  not  appear  to  afford  the  satis- 
faction to  Mr.  Tubbs  which  might  ha\'e  been  expected, 
and  when  the  time  came  for  the  party  to  set  off  on  their 
walk  to  the  trenches,  Mr.  Tubbs  unfortunately  had  de- 
veloped a  painful  recurrence  of  a  rheumaticky  knee  and 
did  not  feel  up  to  the  walk.  He  stuck  to  that  despite 
his  friends'  persuasions,  and  was  at  last  left  behind,  and 
retired  to  the  cellar  and  the  company —at  intervals— of 
the  Major,  and —without  intervals— of  the  rye  whisky. 
He  and  the  Major  went  down  again  to  the  guns  when  a 
call  came  on  the  'phone  and  the  officer  on  duty  said  that 
the  Forward  Observing  Officer  wanted  a  few  rounds 
fired  to  let  the  correspondents  watch  the'  shelling. 

Up  at  the  Observing  Station  the  party  had  to  wait  a 
little  for  the  firing  of  the  rounds,  first  because  the  officer 
at  the  Battery  said  that  Mr.  Tubbs  was  coming  down 
and    he  was    waiting    for  him,   and    later    because    an 


May  25,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


35 


THE  BURBERRY 
TRENCH -WARM 


Illustrated 
Military 
or  Naval 
Catalogues 
Post  Free 


Officers'  Complete 
Kits  in  2  to  4  days 
or    Ready  for     Use 


THE  BURBERRY  TRENCH-WARM 

combines    the   services   of  THREE   coats  in  ONE.  which 
can  be  worn  separately  or  together,  as  occasion  requires.    A 

TRFNrH-WARM    'hat    excludes  the   keenest 
1  IVE-l'IV^n-  VV  /\I\iVl    ^i„d  g^j  maintains  health- 

ful     warmth      during     cold     days     in     the     trenches ;     a 
WE  ATHFRPROOF^'^at  turns  the  heaviestdown 

dom, keeps  the  body  dry  and  comfortable  in  mild  weather;  and  a 

BRITISH- WARM  ii^'^l,^!^  ^'i^ti'S; 

yet  warm,  coat  for  night  work  or  when  off  duty. 

OILED-SILK    CONDENSES    HEAT 

as   quickly  as  rubber— both  are  equally  air-proof. 

The  body  needs  air  as  much  as  the  lungs.    To  ignore  this 

simple   fact  brings    immediate   discomfort,    creates   bodily 

fatigue  and  courts  serious  trouble. 

Then  the  cumbersome  weight  of  an  oil-silk  Interlined  coat ! 

Well,  the  less  said  about  it  the  better  ! 

The  ever-growing  popularity  of  self -ventilating  "Burberrys" 

proves  that  they  give  satisfying  protection  without  need  of 

such  heat-condensing  linings. 


BURBERRYS 

3  &   10  Bd.  Malesherbes    PARIS:  also   Provincial  Agenti 


Haymarket 
LONDON 


IGOODYEA 
k  SERVICE 
WATIOr 


Go  to  the  Garage 
that  I  bears  this  Sign 

As  the  Goodyear  Company  has 
always  aimed  at  being  FIRST  in 
Tyre  Service  to  motorists,  so  are 
they  determined  to  be  FIRST  in  guiding 
motorists  to  the  best  Garages  in  the 
country. 

The  huge  demand  for  Goodyear  Tyres 
— the  colossal  sales  that  grow  ever  greater 
month  by  month,  point  to  the  keen  appre- 
ciation British  Motorists  have  for  the  Tyre 
that  gives  them  such  excellent  service- — 
that  fortifies  them  against  skidding  and 
every  other  tyre  trouble. 

This  demand  for  Goodyear  Tyres  has 
placed  the  Goodyear  Company  in  a  position 
of  friendship  with  the  cream  of  the  Garages 
throughout  Great  Britain. 

Therefore     the  Goodyear     Compan)% 

seeking     the     best  means     of      enabling 

motorists     to    know  these    Garages     have 
designed  a  sign. 

Wherever  you  see  this  Sign  you  will 
get  conscientious  advice  on  car  and 
tyres. 

Everythmg  will  be  done  that  can 
give  you  satisfaction,  and  you  will  be 
certain  of  courteous  treatment  and  reason- 
able charges. 

You  may  ask,  "  What  is  the  motive  of 
the  Goodyear   Company  ?  " 

it  is  because  the  Goodyear  Company 
has  adopted  the  watchword  "PROTECT 
OUR  GOOD  NAME,"  and  it  is  because 
we  want  to  "Protect  our  good  name" 
that  we  recommend  the  best  Garages  under 
the  sign — "  Goodyear  Service  Station." 

The  Goodyear  Tyre  &  Rubber  Co.  (Great  Britain),  Ltd., 

Central   House,   Kin^sway,  .  .  London,   W.C. 

Btanclies  at  Matic/tester,  UtrmirtRhajn, 
Glasgow.  Dublin,   ami  lietfast. 


Canadian    Factory 


Bowmanville,  Ontario. 


36 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  25,  TO  if' 


aeroplane  was  over  and  the  gunsrould  not  fire  without  dis- 
I  losing  their  position.  Previous  to  this  a  "brief  conversa- 
tion liad  ensued  between  the  Forward  Officer  and  the 
subaltern  at  Xhe  guns. 

"  Tell  that  bunch  up  there,"  said  the  guns,  "  that 
we're  going  to  fire  some  of  that  rotten  ammunition  we 
have  been  buying  from  their  people,  just  to  show  them 
how  poorly  it  e.\plodes." 

"  Right-o,"  said  the  Forward  Station.  "  But  rotten 
as  it  is  y'  know  some  of  it  goes  off  all  right.  It  would  be 
just  our  luck  if  the  rounds  we  wanted  to  show  were  bad, 
turned  out  to  be  good." 

A  chuckle  came  over  the  wire  from  the  guns,  "  Leave 
that  to  me,"  said  the  voice  which,  of  course,  was  in- 
audible to  the  rest  of  the  party  at  the  Observing  Station. 
"  I've  had  a  word  with  Sergeant  Dunkley,  and — er, 
he  knows  which  rounds  are  duds.  You  tell  'em  the  first 
three  shells  are  United  Hyphen  make,  and  the  ne.xt 
three  are  our  own." 

The  first  three  rounds  were  "  duds,  "  and,  moreover, 
did  not  land  within  fifty  to  a  hundred  yards  of  the  spot 
pointed  out  as  the  target.  This  poor  shooting,  it  may  be 
mentioned,  was  the  subject  of  some  scathing  comment 
from  the  Forward  Officer  until  the  officer  at  the  guns, 
first  looking  njimd  carefully  to  be  sure  that  Mr.  Tubbs 
was  not  within  hearing,  asked  an  apparently  irrelevant 
question  as  to  whether  if  sand  were  substituted  in  the 
shell  for  high-e.xplosive,  the  ballistics  of  the  shell  would 
not  be  uj>set  and  the  sliooting  spoiled. 

"  You  see,"  said  the  I'orward  Officer  to  the  group 
of  correspondents  crowded  round  the  loophole  of  his 
l(^okout  and  peeping  with  periscopes  through  the  broken 
tiles.  "Your  manufacturers  not  only  stick  in  rotten 
e.\plosi\'e  that  hardly  gives  any  burst,  but  they  never 
seem  to  get  the  balance  of  the  shell  right.  You  can 
imderstand  how  erratic  that  makes  the  shooting;  in 
fact,  3'ou've  just  seen  how  erratic.  \ow  the  next  three 
rounds  will  be  our  own  home-made  goods.  The  guns 
will  be  laid  at  exactly  the  same  angle  and  range  as  for 
those  last  three  rounds  but — well,  keep  your  eye  glued 
on  that  building  I  pointed  out.  ' 

"  Ouph  !  "  the  correspondents  gasped  and  grunted  in 
varying  tones,  but  in  the  same  breath  as  the  first  shell 
hit  the  building  fair  and  square  ;  and  the  exclamations 
continued  as  the  second  and  third  round  followed  and 
sent  the  ruined  walls  whirling  and  dissolving  under  a 
billowing  canopy  of  black  smoke,  red  brick-dust  and  grey- 
plaster. 

"  Bully  .  .  .  great  stuff  .  .  .  some  shoot- 
ing .  .  .  and  some  ginger  in  those  goods,"  said  the 
chorus,  and  "  wouldn't  j-ou  bust  up  another  target  or 
two  ?  " 

"  I  could  so,"  said  the  Forward  Officer,  "  but  if  we 
stir  'em  up  too  much  they're  apt  to  start  shelling  back. 
I  don't  suppose  you  want  a  brisk  bombardment  going  on 
wliile  you  tour  the  forward  trench  ?  " 

"  Not  any,  "  said  one  promptly,  but  another  countered 
as  promptly,  pointing  out  that  it  would  make  "great 
copy  "  ;  and  the  party  took  sides  and  proceeded  to  argue 
as  to  whether  the  risk  was  worth  the  copy  or  the  copy 
worth  the  risk,  until  the  Staff  Officer  settled  the  point 
abruptly. 

"  No  more,"  he  said.  "  If  any  of  you  are  killed,  your 
troubles  are  over,  but  mine  would  only  be  beginning. 
I'm  not  here  to  get  you  shot — to  say  nothing  of  my  own 
objections  to  being  casualtied." 

"  You're  not  stuffing  us,"  said  one  correspondent 
dubiously.  "  I  heard  that  boy  of  yours  back  at  the 
battery  piling  the  horrors  into  poor  old  Tubbs  about  what 
was  to  be  done  with  our  corpses  and  so  on,  but  .  .  . 
'course  it's  Tubbs'  funeral  if  he's  dub  enough  to  fall  for 
such  stuff,  but  you  might  just  skin  the  rest  of  us  as 
gentle  as  you  know  how.  It's  your  lay-out  and  we're 
playing  it  blind,  so  give  us  some  sort  of  a  show." 

He  could  not  have  taken  a  better  line,  and  after  that 
the  party  had  nothing  to  complain  of  in  the  show  they  got. 
But  back  at  the  Battery  Mr.  Hesketh  P.  Tubbs  was  not 
qxnte  so  fortunate. 

•1  the  first  place  he  ruffled  the  lieutenant  considerably 
by  persisting  .in  talking  of  "  us  "  as  if  the  Hyphens  and 
the  Cacnacdonians  wore  the  one  people  (which  they  are 
not)  ;  and  in  the  second  he  offended  still  more  deeply 
by  refusing  to  swallow  the  story  of  an  incident  (after 
swallowing  many  impossible  ones)  which  the  lieutenant 


vouched  for  as  ha\'mg  been  seen  with  his  own  -eyes.  ' 
Lieutenant  "  Pippy  "  had  been  led  to  tell  sojiie  of  the 
nicknames  which  he  had  heard  attached  to  the  Cacnac- 
donians. "  The  Gas-eaters  and  'Un-stoppers  were  1 
tacked  to  us  after  the  Wipers  show  where  we  stuck  out 
the  gas  attafk  and  stopped  the  Hun,  y'  know.  And 
(lethsemane  Gardeners  and  Crossed  Canucks  is  another 
title  from  the  same  scrap." 

"Gethsemane  Gardeners  ?  "  said^Tubbs  inquiringly,  and 
on  an  explanation  of  what  these  names  indicated  he  burst 
into  loud  laughter.  "  You're  surely  not  trying  to  unload 
that  gulf  on  me  about  some  of  your  men  having  been 
crucified  by  the  Germans.  Now  I've  known  a  heap  of  > 
Germans  in  rny  time  and  I'm  not  going  to  believe " 

"I'm  not  asking  you  to  believe,"  said  Pippy  tartly. 
"  Only  I  saw  the  crucified  men  myself.  But  it's  not  a 
thing  we  care  to  talk  about,  or  think  about — except  when 
we're  going  into  action." 

Tubbs  would  have  argued,  but  Pippy  turned  the 
su'jject  abruptly.  They  returned  to  the  cellar  and  there 
Tubbs  had  some  more  Old  Rye,  and  when  the  whisky 
within  him  began  to  talk,  which  it  did  presently  at  length, 
and,  to  Pippy,  rather  offensively,  Pipp\'  at  last  made  some 
excuse  and  left  him. 

"  Of  all  the  Bounce-and-Brags  I  ever  met,"  he  said 
disgustedh'  a  httle  later  to  some  passing  friends  in  the 
Pipactocs.  "  Why  to  hear  him  talk  you'd  think  he 
fair  ached  to  eat  a  Hun  for  breakfast  every  morning. 
And  what  the  United  Hyphens  would  only  do  if  they 
came  into  this  war.  .  .  ."  And  he  went  on  to  give 
details  of  Tubbs'  remarks,  and  of  his  rheumatism  at 
thought  of  the  trenches. 

"  Pity  he  caif  t  have  a  chance  to  show  this  heroism  of 
his,"  said  one  of  the  Pipactoc  officers  thoughtfully. 
"  Now  couldn't  we  fix  .  .  ."  And  the  conversation 
sunk  to  low  tones  and  smothered  laughter. 

When  Tubbs  strolled  out  into  the  shell-smashed  street, 
a  httle  later  lie  ran  across  a  Pipactoc  sergeant  who  most 
obligingly  showed  him  round  the  village,  and  then,  as  if 
he  had  quite  suddenly  remembered  it,  told  Tubbs  he 
ought  to  know  just  who  he  was.  Tubbs  found  him  most 
difficult  to  satisfy.  He  produced  all  the  credentials, 
passports  and  papers  he  had  about  him,  one  after  the 
other,  and  at  last  the  sergeant,  calling  another  man  and 
telling  him  to  wait  there  with  Mr.  Tubbs,  went  off,  as 
he  said,  to  put  the  papers  before  an  officer.  Tubbs  would 
have  protested,  but  protests  were  simply  ignored,  and 
he  had  to  wait  a  good  quarter  of  an  hour  kicking  his  heels 
and  getting  angrier  and  angrier.  At  last  his  guard 
remarked  briefly  that  he  was  sick  of  this  waiting  and — 
"  So  long.  "     He  vanished. 

Tubbs,  thoroughly  angry  by  this  time,  set  off  to  find 
his  late  guide  and  his  papers.  He  took  the  direction 
the  sergeant  had  taken,  but  on  turning  the  first  corner  was 
halted  abruptly  by  a  sentry  with  fixed  bayonet.  A 
demand  for  the  countersign  and  a  brief  parley  ended  in 
the  appearance  of  the  sergeant  of  the  guard  and  an 
abrupt  invitation  to  Tubbs — with  a  bayonet  point 
hovering  about '  six  inches  in  the  ofting— to  enter  the 
guard-room.  An  officer  was  there  and  he  cut  short  Mr. 
Tubbs'  long  explanation  of  who  he  was  by  a  demand  for 
his  credentials.  Tubbs  could  only  commence  a  still 
longer  explanation  about  the  sergeant  who  had  taken  his 
papers.  "  What  regiment  was  he  ?  "  Tubbs  didn't  know. 
"  What  particular  Battery  was  this  where  you  lunched  ?  " 
Again  Tubbs  didn't  know.  "  Where  is  this  battery 
exactly  ?  "  Tubbs  only  knew  it  was  somewhere  around 
the  village. 

The  officer  turned  from  him.  "  Prisoner— close  guard 
— here  sergeant."  Tubbs  found  himself  hustled 
ignominiously  into  an  inner  chamber  without  a  roof, 
his  person  roughly  searched  for  arms,  a  guard  posted 
over  him  with  fixed  bayonet  and  savage  threats  of  the 
penalties  to  follow  any  monkey  tricks. 

He  stayed  there  a  painfully  long  two  hours,  the  first 
part  of  which  were  spent  in  pleadings  with  and  threats 
to  the  guard,  and  the  latter  part  in  dead  silence  after  a 
curt  intimation  that  "  if  he  didn't  shut  his  yap  "... 
a  significant  motion  of  the  bayonet  finishing  the  sentence. 

Up  to'  now  he  had  not  had  the  faintest  doubt  but  that 
he  would  be  released  and  apologised  to  as  soon  as  en- 
quiries had  been  made,  and  he  extracted  what  comfort 
he  could  from  antiri])ations  of  how  hot  he  could  make 
things  for  the  fools  who  had  got  him  in  this  pickle.     But  a 


May  25,   19 16 


LAND     &     W  A  T  E  R 


7,7 


FORTNUM  & 

MASON'S 

Equipment 


BOOTS. 

The  "  Foptmason "    Marching    Boot,    as 

soft   as    a   slipper,    very   strong,    and    three-quarters 

to  one  pound  lighter  than  any  similar  boot,  per  pair   36/- 

bcnd  an  old  cne  as  a  f^iiittc. 

The  "Fortnum"  Trench  Boot,  with  6-inch 

flap  and  buckles   -  -  -  -  per  pair  80/- 

OVERCOATS. 

The   "Zanibrene"   Cavalry,    with    or   without    belt, 
"triple-triple"  proof        -  -  -  .  .    70/- 

The  "Zanibrene  "  Infantry,"  triple-triple'' proof    from   60/- 

WATERPROOFS. 


"  Fortinason  "  Cavalry  Coat 
Waterproof,  lined  fleece 
Oilskin,  brown.  The  "  Beresford  ' 
Pegamoid,   black 

VALISES. 


60/- 
80/ - 

17/6 
30/- 


'  Forlmason  "   improved,    in 


60/> 


from  18/6  to  SS/- 
-  40/-  to  50/- 


•  -12/6 

-  17/6 

17/6 

19/6 


The    "Wolseley" — The 
green  rot-proot  canvas     - 

BLANKETS. 

Good  quality  ... 

Triple         -  -  .  . 

MATTRESSES. 

Light  "Kapok,"  covered  tick    - 

,,  ,,         covered  "  Willesden ' 

Light  cork,  covered  "  Willesden  " 
Hair,  covered  "Willesden" 

BAGS. 

Siiddle  Bags,  brown  canvas,  leather  back         -    each    16/- 
Saddle  Bags,  double, overback,  with  surcingle,  full  size  42/" 

BATHS,  Etc. 

R'lbber  Biiths,  30  inches  ...     each    18/6 

Canvas  Baths,  in  bag,  26  inches  -  -        ,,  7/6 

Buckets,  rubber     -  .  -  -      each  6^-  and  6/3 

Buckets,  canvas,  flagon  shaped  -  -     each       7/- 

Basins,  enamel,  16  inches,  stiff  canvas  cover  -        ,,       10/6 

BELTS. 

"Sam  Browne."  complete,  two  braces,  rcvolverholslcr 

and  cartridge  pouch          -             -             -             .             .  ^g/. 

Sporting  Belt,  selected  pigskin             -            -            -  B/_ 

The  "  Fortniason  "             -             -             -             •             .  5/6 

CANTEEN   BOXES,   Etc. 

Bucket  Canteen,  for  two  persons            -             -             .  27/6 

The  "  Dixie,  "  for  tliree  officers,  W.O,  pattern-             -  42/- 

Cavalry  Canteen,  fitted    -----  18/6 

Cavalry  Canteen,  unfitted             -             -             -             .  ■7/3 
Covers        ......        extra  3/6 

Infantry  Canteen,  aluminium,  fitted  saucepan,  frvpan, 

etc.,  etc.     -                          -             -                          -    '         -  21/6 


CLOTHING. 

Caps,  "  Balaclava"  Waterproof 
Caps,  "  Balaclava  "  Woollen 
Cardigans,  Woollen 
Cardigans,  Orkney,  vcrj'  light   - 

SHIRTS. 


-  B/6  and  7/6 
-      3/6 
10/6lo25  - 
12/- 


Regulation  Khaki  -  -  -        '   -  7/6  to  12/6 

The  "  Tropical."  with  collar  and  spine  pad       -  -    10/6 


GROUND  SHEETS. 

Tweed,  8  ft.  by  5  ft. 
White  Rubber 

WATER    BOTTLES. 

Aluminium 
Britannia  metal    • 
Nickel 


each    1 B/- 

,,       21/- 


-  -  -  from  8/6 

each   1  2/6  and  1  3/9 
each    IS/6,  18/6  and  21  /- 


Complete  Catalogue  of  Ctfuipment  sent  on  application. 

FORTNUM  &  MASON 

LTD. 

182    Piccadilly,    London,   W. 


Be  Dexterproof 

^Vear  a  Dexter  for  >vet, 
■wina — ana  price  resistancei 
Every  thread  in  a  Dexter 
IS  Triplc-proorea — Super- 
proofed  tytteMAKERS. 

POPULAR       STYLES       F  K  O  M 

48/6  to  70  - 

FOR      G  E  N  T  L  E  51  1:  N" 
(;  E  N  T  L  E  W  O  M  E  N 


SUPPLIED    BY   A  GENTS    EVERYWHERE 
JTr^/*    fo-r    Brochurt     anii     Pn.f'ffts    to 
h'mtiace,   Scett    &    Ca.      /M\.     Cathc.xrt.    Glnlim, 


■#^ 


Be    Vigorous !      Get  that  1 

splendid      feeling     of  i 

cheerfulness    and     energy  1 

that     comes      with      a  1 

sense  of  real  fitness.     It's  | 

easy.  i 

Half    a    teaspoonful    of  1 

Kruschen     Salts     on  | 

rising  —  every     morning!  | 

That's  all.    Of  all  Chemists  | 

1/6  per  bottle.  All  British  | 


38 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  25,  19161  I. 


a  low-toned  conversation  between  the  guards  and  two 
men  who  rehcved  them. 

"  What's  the  Cap.  doin'  ?  "  asked  one.  "  Asleep," 
was  the  answer.  "  Same  old  thing — liquored  as  usual." 
"  Isn't  he  chasin'  round  for  evidence  about  this  guy  ?  " 
"  Not  him.  We  asked  round  a  bit  but  nobody  seems  to 
have  heard  of  him.  He's  a  spy,  an'  soon  as  the  Cap. 
wakes  up  or  the  Colonel  comes  round  he'll  be  tried  an' 
shot  right  away  like  that  last  one  we  nailed." 

Tubbs  tried  to  speak,  but  was  silenced  again  savagely, 
and  sat  for  another  half  hour  alternately  cheering  himself 
with  the  thought  that  it  must  come  right  when  he  got  a 
chance  to  sjjeak  at  his  trial,  and  remembering,  with  beads 
of  cold  perspiration  oozing  out  on  his  forehead,  all  the 
horrible  tales  he  had  ever  heard  of  summary  courts 
martial  and  their  abrupt  endings  with  unpleasant  results 
to  the  prisoner. 

Then  he  was  led  back  into  the  outer  room  to  find  there 
three  officers  sitting  at  a  table  and  a  few  men  with  the 
sergeant  who  had  arrested  him.  'J"he  officer  who  had  first 
questioned  him  sat  in  the  centre  of  the  three.  Tubbs 
took  his  place  in  front  of  the  table,  had  his  hat  snatched 
off,  and  was  told  sternly  to  stand  up. 

"  What  ha\e  you  got  to  say  for  yourself,"  asked  the 
centre  officer.  Tubbs,  telling  himself  he  must  keep  cool, 
began  the  same  lon^  explanation  he  had  given  before. 
It  was  cut  short  before  he  finished.  "  Have  you  any 
witnesses  ?  "  "  Crowds,"  he  said  eagerly.  "  There's 
the  rest  of  my  crowd,  and  the  Staff  Officer  with  them, 
and  General  Headquarters  will  vouch  for  me." 

"  Sergeant,  what  is  your  evidence  }  "  The  sergeant 
stated  how  he  had  been  called  by  the  sentry,  and  thinking 
the  prisoner  a  suspicious  cha.racter  had  arrested  him. 

"  Have  any  steps  been  taken  to  verify  or  contradict 
the  prisoner's  story?"  asked  another  of  the  officers 
mildly. 

"  Every  possible  step,"  said  the  centre  officer.  "  But — 
nothin'  doin'.     Nobody  seems  to  have  heard  of  him." 

"  What  was  the  number  of  this  Battery  you  talk 
about  ?  "  Tubbs  had  to  confess  he  hadn't  heard  it. 
"  But  the  Major's  name,"  he  said  with  sudden  inspiration 
"  was — wait  a  minute — I  called  him  Major  mostly,  but 
I  know  I  was  introduced.  It  was — er — oh — what  in 
thunder  was  it  now  ?  " 

"  Yes,  what  was  it  ?  "  said  the  centre  officer  grimly. 
"  Now  look  here  my  son,  you'll  get  off  cheaper  if  you 
confess,  and  if  you've  got  any  useful  information  to  give 
us  about  the  enemy.  If  not  ...  I  really  don't 
think  it's  worth  wasting  more  time  with  him,  is  it  ?  " 
he  concluded,  turning  to  the  other  two.  "  What  do 
you  say  ?     Guilty  ?  " 

One  nodded  and  the  other  hesitated  slightly. 

"  This  is  murder,"  broke  in  Tubbs  wildly.  "  You've 
only  to  send  me  to  Headquarters  or  to  find  the  Battery 
where  I  ate  to-day." 

"  Could  you  find  your  way  there  ?  Here,  can  you  show 
us  where  it  is  on  the  map  ?  "  and  a  large  map  grid-ironed 
with  red  lines  was  flung  on  the  table.  "  Here's  where  you 
are  now,"  said  the  centre  officer,  and  placed  a  finger  on 
the  map.     "  Now,  where's  this  battery  you  talk  about  ?  " 

Tubbs  declined  to  have  anything  to  do  with  the  map. 
He  liadn't  seen  the  place  on  the  map,  he  didn't  know  or 
care  where  he  was  on  the  map  ;  but  if  this  cursed  farce 
didn't  stop  he'd  make  somebody  sweat  for  it  presently  ; 
he'd.     ... 

"  That'll  do,"  said  the  officer  sharply,  and  Tubbs 
stopped  short  at  the  touch  of  a  pricking  point  in  the  small 
of  his  back.  He  gulped  hard  once  or  twice.  "  Send  me 
to  Headquarters,"  was  all  he  said  at  last. 
.  "What  about  it?"  said  the  centre  officer  again. 
'■  Guilty — eh  ?  "  One  of  the  others  wondered  hesita- 
tingly whether  it  would  be  worth  sending  the  man  to 
H.O.,  but  that  suggestion  was  promptly  squashed.  "  Fat 
lot  of  thanks  we'd  get  for  that.  What  would  G.H.Q. 
say  or  'do  if  every  suspected  prisoner  was  shunted  on  to 
them.  Besides,  I'd  object  a  heap  to  G.H.Q.  trying  my 
prisoners.  Don't  see  why  we  shouldn't  have  the  privilege 
of  shooting  our  own  spies.  The  men  like  the  sport  for 
one  thing,  and  it  teaches  these  gentry  to  keep  clear  of 
us." 

"  All  right,"  gave  in  the  objecting  officer  at  last,  and 
Tubbs'  heart  went  down  with  a  bump.  "  But  just  a 
minute.     One  thing  that  he  said  we  might  prove  or  dis- 


:SKaMP>^'4*iTiubbsUieArJ:'leapt'ii^agiiin,  a*uljivjieii.tlie  aaildJ^ « 
mannered  officer  whispered  a  moment  to  the  others  and 
then  turning  to  him  said,  "  Just  step  over  to  the  other 
side  of  the  room  out  of  earshot  a  moment  please." 
Tubbs  stepped  over-with  alacrity.  "  Thank  you.  Now 
back  again.  ...  By  the  way,  what  did  you  say 
was  the  reason  you  didn't  go  with  your  friends  into  tlie 
trenches  ?  " 

In  a  flash  Tubbs  saw  how  he  had  been  caught.  He 
stammered  "  I — I — I — my — er —  " 

"  E.xactly."  said  the  officer.  "  Your  knee  was  very 
bad.  It  has  completely  recovered  since,  I  notice."  He 
turned  to  the  other  two  :  "  I  agree  with  the  finding  of 
Guilty.     The  sentence  I  suppose " 

Tubbs'  face  was  going  grey.  "  See  here,"  he  blurted 
out,  "  You  caught  me  for  fair  and  I'll  admit  there's 
nothing  wrong  with  my.  knee.  I  just  didn't  feel  well 
enough." 

The  officer  looked  at  him  coldly.  "  Was  it  before  or 
after  lunch  you  felt  unwell  ?  " 

"  I've  been — er,  most  of — just  about  lunch  time  I  think 
it  w^as." 

"Then,  of  course,  you  couldn't  eat  much  lunch. 
Suppose  " — and  he  looked  at  the  others,  "  wouldn't  the 
doctor  and  a  stomach-pump  settle  this  point  ?  If  it 
goes  against  the  prisoner  I've  nothing  more  to  say." 

Tubbs  remembered  his  lunch  and  his  knees  shook 
imder  him.  "  I  may  have  eaten  a  fair —  "  he  began, 
buta.cold  glance  from  his  tormentor  stopped  him  flounder- 
ing. He  was  coming  to  hate  and  to  fear  this  man  that  at 
first  he  had  thought  his  best  hope  as  the  worst  of  his 
inquisitors. 

"  I'll  tell  you  the  plain  truth,"  he  blurted  in 
desperation.  "  I  got  cold  feet  when  that  shelling  came 
on.     I  didn't  want  to  get  killed,  so  I  just  plain  quit." 

"That  may  be  the  truth— at  last,"  said  the  mild 
officer.  "  But  you  can  understand  that  all  the  lies  you 
told  don't  help  you.     I  agree — Guilty." 

"iNever  saw  such  a  fuss  over  one  paltry  spy,"  said  the 
centre  officer.  "  Sentence  of  the  Court — prisoner  to  be 
taken  out  and  shot  forthwith."  He  pushed  his  chair 
back  and  stood  up.  "  Go  on  sergeant — usual  place  ; 
and  come  back  and  report' when  he's  turned  off.  Now 
you  fellows,  what  about  a  drink  ?  " 

"  You  pop-eyed  booze-fighter,"  shouted  Tubbs, 
stepping  forward  a  pace  and  glaring.  "  Wait  till  my 
crowd  start  looking  for  me..  Wait  till  you  hear  what 
G.H.Q.  has  to  say  to  you.  Wait  till  you  hear  the  Hyphen 
eagle  squeal.  You'll  pay  for  this,  you  butchers.  Talk 
about  Germans,  you're  worse  than  any  brute  Hun  that 
ever   stepped.     You —you —you. 

The  escort  closed  in  and  seized  him  still  raving  and 
shouting  hysterically;  but  as  they  commenced  to  drag 
him  towards  the  door  his  knees  sagged,  his  feet  trailed  out 
behind  him  and  his  head  drooped. 

They  laid  him  down  hurriedly.  "  I  was  afraid  it  was 
going  a  bit  too  far,"  said  the  mild-mannered  officer. 
"  He'll  raise  Cain  when  he  finds  it  was  a  sell,"  said  the 
centre  one,  pulling  off  his  fierce  moustaches  and  stuffing 
them  in  his  pocket.  "  Not  much,"  said  the  third.  "Don't 
forget,  '  I  got  cold  feet.  I  just  plain  quit.'  That's  a 
tale  he  won't  be  too  anxious  to  advertise.  But  I  think 
we  ought  to  just  naturally  fade  away  and  leave  him  to 
you,  Pippy,"  he  finished  looking  at  the  Artillery  subaltern 
who  had  suddenly  appeared  on  the  scene  immediately 
after  Tubbs  had  collapsed. 

"  Hustle,"  said  Pippy  simply.     "  He's  coming  to." 

Tubbs,  as  he  came  slowly  round,  saw  Pippy's  face 
bending  over  him.     He  stared  vacantly  at  it  a  moment. 

You  just  came  in  time,"  he  gasped  faintly.  "  In  another 
minute  I'd  have  .  .  .  murdered  some  of  those 
guards,  and  then  I  suppose  .  .  .  they'd  have  shot 
me  for  sure." 

"Never  mind  that  now,"  said  Pippy  soothingly. 
"  Here,  drink  this.     Its  Old  Rye." 


Signaller  Ellis  Silas.  i6th  Infantry  Battalion,  .\ustralian 
Contingent,  had  the  honour  of  submitting  his  Sketches  o: 
Gallipoli  for  the  inspection  of  the  King  and  Queen  at  Bucking- 
ham Palace  last  Saturday.  The  King  was  particular!}/ 
interested  in  the  drawing  depicting  the  cliargc  up  the  hill  at 
"  Bloody  .^ngle  "  on  May  ^nd,  1915,  and  also  ''  The  Last 
.Assembly,"  "  when  many  of  us  stood  shoulder  to  shoulder 
for  the  last  time  in  this  world." 


May  25,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


39 


THRESHER 
^GLENNY 


Military  Tailors 

\DftLy  S^cfc&Qss 

152  6s'2J'3'Sh-and 
LONDON 

MAKERS    OF    THE 
THRESHER  11RENCH  COYT 


ESTAB- 


l/SJ 


THE  LAST  18  MONTHS' 
EXPERIENCE 

of  supplying  Military  men  with  the  best 
quality,  material,  cut  and  workmanship 
has  fulh-  justified  our  expectation  that 
increased  business  would  enable  us  to 
keep  prices  on  the  pre-war  basis,  in  spite 
of  increased  cost  in  every  item.  This  will 
be  proved  by  a  glance  through  the 
useful  70-page  booklet  issued  for  the 
convenience  of  those  receiving  a 
Commission  and  of  Officers  under 
orders  for  abroad.  It  contains  even.' 
possible  item  of  an  Officer's  Uniform  and 
Equipment  with  prices.  Fresh  editions 
are  continually  being  brought  out,  so 
this  Guide  is  always  up  to  date  with  the 
latest  information. 


The  custom  of  printing  testimonials  has 
now  become  so  general  that  the  value  of 
them  from  an  advertising  standpoint  is 
apt  to  be  over  estimated.  We  must, 
however,  quote  the  following,  as  the 
implied  suggestion  might  well  be 
taken  as  advice  by  anyone  receiving  a 
commission : — 

"R.A.  Mess, 
Island  of  St.  Helena, 

5th  March,  1916. 
"  I  received  per  the  mail  yesterday  the 
uniform  and  your  account.  I  hare  to 
again  thank  yon  for  the  excellent  fit,-  and 
very  much  regret  I  did  not  come  to  you  u'hen 
first  taking  a  commission.  Your  letter  of 
tlie  4th,  etc.,  etc. 

N.  H.  R. 

{Lt.   R.M.A.)  " 

An  interesting  analysis  for  12  months 
shows  that  by  the  1,417  Officers  who 
have  entrusted  us  with  their  complete 
Uniform  when  receiving  a  Commission, 
every  line  Regiment  in  the  British  Army 
is  represented,  with  the  exception  of  two 
—the  Royal  Irish  and  the  H.Iy.I.  We 
shall  be  glad  if  any  Gentlemen  receiving 
Commissions  in  these  Regiments  will 
allow  us  to  complete  our  record. 


"  A  firm  established  as  Military  Outfitters 
during  the  Crimean  War  and  Indian 
Mutiny,  with  the  outfitting  experience  of 
the  South  African  War  and  the  two  Egyptian 
Campaigns  well  within  the  memory  of  many 
of  its  Staff,  is  entitled  to  deal  with  the  sub- 
ject of  Military  Outfitting  wtih  some  degree 
of  authority." — ("  Land  &  Water,"  March 
23) 

WRITE     FOR     GUIDE     (3) 
TO  KIT  AND   EQUIPMENT 

THRESHER  8  GLENNY 

152  3.   STRAND,  LONDON. 


40 


LAND     &     W  A  T  r,  R 


May  25,  igib 


S.  SMITH  &  SON,  "■''■■ 

(LATE  9  STRAND.  W.C.)       <E»«-  »«8I)- 

W^tcA  and  Chronometer  Makers 
to  the  Admiralty. 


6  Grand  Hotel  Buildings, 

TRAFALGAR    SQUARE,    W.C, 
AND    68    PICCADILLY,    W. 


SMITH'S    <■  ALLIES"      WATCH     WRISTLET 

"Unhreakalile ' 
FRONT. 


REGISTERING    3th    OF    SECONDS. 

bterliiig       Silver         Sterling    Silver  J|ii)  Luminous   figures 

"SCREW  IN"  Screw  in  Case         ^^^^^^^  and  hands,  includ- 

Dust  and  Damp       MedioaJ    Watcli.      /^"f^^^^^"*^      ing  Seconds  Hand. 

Proof  Case.  '^~ 


*o  more  Wotoh  GIom 

Protector* ! 
It  \i  Iniposfiblf  tu  hrcak  tlir 
ifiin' 
WHY?  ?  f 
Beraude  the  front  Is  of  iinlirenkable  mat«ri«l. 
Willi  till!  traiii|i.irriKy  o(   CrrstJil  flUss. 

Exlr«cl  (rom  C*ne  I'rst  mon'al  •monc«»  m«ny  r*ferrln«  l^  rar 

Dear  Sir.     I  .im  greatly  pleased  with  it,  and  since 

checVed  it  by  ilic  Ship's  Onck  Watch  and  it  hai  not 

SMITH'S    FLAT    LEVER 
ALARM    WATCHES 

With  Lamlnout  Dial  thawing 
Tim*      distinctly    at      nieht. 

NO  OTFICER  SHOULD 
BE  WITHOUT  ONE  OF 
THE    WATCHES. 

THEY  ARE  PERFECT 
TIMEKEEPERS. 

THE  ALARM  WILL 

AROUSE  THE  HEAVIEST 
SLEEPER. 

THE  TIME  CAN  BE  SEEN 
AS  WELL  BY  NIGHT  AS 
DAY. 

THE  CASES  ARC  DAMP- 
PROOF  AND  CANNOT  BE 
DENTED. 

EVERY  WATCH  HAS  A 
GUARANTEE. 


linK    Silver,    Lever 
Movemci-.t,      Luminoua 
Guaranteed         Figures 
and      Handt,      Pintkin 
Strap.     Silver     Buckle. 
£3  t  3   :  O 
Black  Dial  same  price. 
C2  :  to  :  o 
Without  Screw  Ca(«, 

"Alliri  ••  U'.tch  2l>'An'-. 

the  date  of  receiving  it  I  Itave 
varied  one  leoond  either  way. 


In  Nickel,  or 
Oxudized  Cases 

£3  3  -  and 
£4  4  - 

In 
Silver 
Cases 

£310/- 
and 

£4  15 

POST    FREE. 


SMITH'S     High    Grade 

i-cver    Movement, 
(iuaranteed         ^^  .  1 1:  .  A 
Timekeeper      **»  •  » J  •  W 


Invaluable   for 
Hospital 
15:0    ^^'»'^''. 


WATCH  WRISTLETS  with  ORDINARY  GLASSES  from  £2  2  OlO  £S  5  0 

CHRONOSCOPE  -  ^r  °S'-' 


SOLE  flIGHTS 


THE     REGULATION     BRITISH-MADE    "SMITH'S   • 

ELECTRIC   READING   LAMP 

rf      .  ^-n       l'ii^t,.:iii.|.|\  Tl.;..     -  ;..rf,      .-1 *!._ 


■a ^.      I'U-ll.pi.lC 


Larger  Siie,   £1 
Regulal 


«' Smith's' 

LAND     AND 

WATKR 
INVISIBLE 

POCKET 

PERISCOPE 

ALL  METAL 

Price 

£1    1  O. 

Full  par- 
ticulars on 
application. 

One  ti-!*timoniiil 
ar»«ng--t  many 
friMii  ail  oniifr 
at  the  I'ront. 

Feb    4th,  1916 
Dear   Sir, 

Kindly        send 
me     another 
)■  Smith's   Land   & 
Water   Periscope. 
f^-w  I  find  i'.  mosi 

"  useful. 

15s  ,  can  be   used  with   the 
ion   Field  Classes. 


riiii  lit*  sliotts  tile  iniportunce  cf 
Ine  Lump  ifor  map  aiid  d^spaUli 
rii.:\iH'j.  The  push-piece  ran  !>,■ 
•  I"  r  ii  il  on  without  opening  the 
■  1-  .  :iiiJ  the  case  can  he  detacheil 
wiIlKHit  iinliiicklini!  the  belt.  Snit 
nt.lo  for  any  climate  and  waterproof. 
Butteries    "UrlUili    Motle." 

DII!WTI!)N.'4.-If  tJie  Jight  is  ne- 
(juircd  for  continuous  nse.  pre.s^  tli*^ 
button  ami  turn  a  little  to  the  riaht 
or  left,  nnj  wlien  llnlshe<l  with  tiini 
the  button  to  orlKinol  pcnitinn.  I)i! 
not  leave  burnini;  as  it  exhau.sts  thu 
Ixittcry. 

Prise       ^f%l     Inland  Pottage, 
Complete    ^^^f       $d.  extra. 

Foreign,  1/-  extra. 
Or  including   one   extra  bulb   in  lid, 
21.'-. 

Tictra  batteri<'«     ...    1/fi  each. 

Hermetically  sealed  In  Tin  box.- 
lAtra   bulb^    1/.  each. 

MOUNTING  CUSTOMERS'  WAR 
TROPHIES  A  SPECIALITY. 


As  usid  by  the  Wsr  Oept 
if 


Instruments. 

Actual  Size 
Chronoscope 

Indispensable    for 

ascertaining   Ranges 

and    timing   of 

Shells,  marking   l/lOO 

of  seconds, 

£10:10:0 

Split   Seconds 
as   Illustrated, 

£16:10:0 

Same  Watch  marking 
1/50  seconds, 

£8:10:0 

Split  seconds, 

£12:10:0 

Full     particulars     and    Tetli. 
nionials    on   application. 


XI-W     IHICNTIFIO.VTIOX      DI.V.  XEW    lUlIXTIFIC.MIOX  mH'  FOR   WRIST 
ill     StiTlinu    Silver    for    Nc.k. 

With  .Silver  fliain  i'l  to  ao  '"  Stcrllns  S^iUer.  14)/U 

IhclK'n  Ions,  l»».'»t  Engraving.  «,« 

on  Space  for  Name  and  Address  on  back  if 


Enurnvins.    ^/H 
Space  for   Nanu*   and  Addrps 


back    if  dcsir  d.    Actual 


•  izo 


desired.     Att;ial    sise. 


LIQUID  NIGHT  MARCHING  i  FIELD  SKETCHING  COMPASS 


(Patent    applied    for>. 


Fuse  Mounted  as 
Letter-Weisrht  on  Ebony 
Stand  with  silver  plate 
for  engravinjr.  Size  Sjin. 
high,  5  in.  diaineter. 

21  :  5  :  0 

SPECIAL  LIST  ON  APPLICATION 


t3    UJ 

The  Li(|uid  Night  Marching  and  Field  Sketching  Compass  is  an  improvement  on 
Priematic   Coi«ip.'c^at!ii      it  rii.,.f   nn,„ts  are:  - 

n)  Tlie  dial  vml  at  one  and  Ihe  fuinie  time. 

ij)  Tlie  dial  .■<rm|..  itlvtag  a  dty^islve  reading. 

CD  ^e»■  licaiij.,     _  ...iik. 

(41  Uack  llnul|.<^  easily   iuund. 

(.Ij  The   di\(di-d  t\t\i  (I?)   gives  "A  fiilVeiMi^'ci  Sivisions.    Having    no  ini<>mip 


(<•)  The.  illiuuiiialioii  is    perniam  nt.   Fiiittier 
complete,   in  bather  Mine  ca«e.  ^3      1  Sm. 


>ftrUeu>urs    on    application.       Price. 


1 


May  25,  1916 


L  A  N  1)      &      \\A  T  \i  R 


41 


British    Empire    Production   and   Trade 

By    John    Holt    Schooling    (Author  of  "  The  BrhUh  Trade  Book"). 


WHICH  is  the  more  valuable  thing  to  a  man,  to 
a  nation,  to  an  Empire  :  the  power  of  pro- 
duction, or  the  opportunity  of  a  cheap  con- 
sumption ?  During  recent  generations,  all 
fiscal  legislation  in  England  has  been  in  the  direction  of 
securing  cheap  consumption,  cheap  for  the  time  being  that 
is  to  say,  without  any  regard  for  efiicient  production. 
But  surely,  and  notably  in  the  long  run,  production  is  of 
far  more  value  than  cheap  consumption.  Our  ignis 
faiuus,  cheap  consumption  at  any  cost,  has  caused  us  not 
only  to  neglect  the  full  development  of  our  power  of  pro- 
duction, and  the  co-ordination  of  the  vast  resources  of  our 
Empire,  but  it  has  also  given  to  our  rival  in  trade  and 
enemy  in  war  a  great  advantage.  Namely,  the  advan- 
tage of  the  Double  Market  for  sales  as  compared  with  our 
Single  Market  for  sales.  To  illustrate  this  point,  look  at 
the  free  or  open  market  for  sales  possessed  before  the  war 
by  the  llnited  Kingdom  and  by  Germany.  Germany 
had  a  free  market  for  sales  of  seventy  millions  of  people  in 
(iermany,  plus  another  free  market  for  sales  of  forty-six 
millions  of  people  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Namely, 
Germany  had  the  Double  Eree  Market  of  116  millions  of 
buyers.  But  the  United  Kingdom  had  only  a  free  or  open 
market  for  sales  among  forty-six  millions  of  people  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  Namely,  the  Single  Market  as  com- 
pared with  (lermany's  Double  Market.  That  fact  has 
been  for  many  years  of  enormous  benefit  to  Germany,  who 
has  constantly  fostered  her  power  of  production,  while 
simultaneously,  we  have  given  to  Germany  great  facilities 
for  the  sale  of  her  production.  When  war  came,  we  dis- 
covered that  in  many  directions  of  our  trade  and  finance 
we  had  allowed  Germany  to  gain  the  control.  Notable 
instances  were  finance  in  London,  the  production  of 
certain  necessary  chemicals  and  dyes,  and  the  control  by 
(iermany  of  the  metal  production  of  Australia. 

We  have  also  discovered  that  the  laisser  jaire  methods  of 
(iur  economic  blind  men  have  been  taken  advantage  of 
by  r.ermany  to  further  her  brutal  national  aims  in  addi- 
tion to  undermining  our  power  of  production.  The  time 
is  ripe,  and  more  than  ripe,  for  us  to  take  action  to  secure 
our  future  in  all  matters  that  concern  British  Empire 
production  and  trade.  With  this  purpose  in  mind,  I 
show  some  facts  relating  to  the  British  Empire  that  may 
be  useful. 

Table  A.  — Production  of  Staple  Articles  witiiin  the  British 
Empire.  Yearly  Average  during  three  periods  of  five 
years  each,  covering  the  fifteen  years  1890-1913. 


.Staplb  Article. 


Averagf-  Y»*aily  Frotluctioii  during  each  period  of  five  years. 


1904-1908. 


19(19-1913. 


Ccial.     Millions  of  Tons 
Coal.     \'alue     Millions  of  £ 
Iron-Ore.     Millions  of  Toii^ 
I'ig-lron.     Millions  of  Tons  (a) 
J>lanion(is.     Value — Millions  of  £ 
iJold.     .Millions  of  Ors. 
fiold.     Value — Millions  of  £ 
Silver.     Value— Millions  of  £  (b) 
('opper.     Value-  Millions  of  £ 
Tin.     Value — Millions  of  £ 
Wheat.     .Millions  of  Bushels  (e) 
Barley.     Millions  of  Bushels  fe) 
*>ats.     Millions  of  Bushels  (e) 
Maize.     .Millions  of  Bushels  (c) 
Wine.     Millions  of  (iailons 
Tea.     Millions  .of  J,iw. 
Coeoa.     Millions  of  Lbs. 
Coftee.     .Aliltions  of  Lbs. 
Raw  Sugar.     Millions  of  Lbs. 
Kubi)er.     .Miliions  of  Li)S. 
('otton.     Millions  of  Lbs, 
.lute.     Millions  of   I.hs.  (d) 


246.0 

28:i.l 

314.2 

10.-1.8 

110.8 

134.2 

1 4 .  .'i 

16.2 

17.0 

0.(1 

10.0 

10..-. 

4.7 

7..<t 

8.9 

U.H 

11.8 

13.4 

28.. 1 

48.4 

&«.4 

1.0 

2.2 

4.5 

:i.2 

!).l 

.'i.li 

0.7 

il.:i 

11.1 

452.4 

.11.^.7 

702.  2 

loa.o 

II.-).  :l 

124.2 

341.  iP 

400.:! 

.-.36.  1 

:i6.:i 

41. « 

44.0 

11.8 

».!» 

8.11 

8SH.7 

410.1 

470.8 

bl.f, 

sft.y 

183.  3 

42.8 

4;).  I 

41.0 

M;i;i.i) 

6091.0 

W40.0 

7.1 

10.  :i 

47.0 

]0«fi.7 

1.V24.2 

17,14.0 

2«,'->«.0 

:!270.O 

3343.0 

EXAlM'l.K  :     The  averagr^  yearly  iiroduetion  of  Coal  during  the  live  years  1009.1B13.  was 
314.2  million  tons     namely,  314,200.000  tons.     Similarly,  the  average  yearly  pro- 
duetion  of  Rubber  during  1909-1913  was  47.9  million  l.h.s.— nanl.-ly,  47,900,000  Lbs. 
ia^  ln<-luding  Pig  Iron  made  from  imported  ores, 
'h)  Kxeludiiig  some  .Australian  silver. 

(e>  The  production  of  cereals  includes  British  India  for  Wheat,  but  not  for  Barlev. 
flats  and  Maize  as  the  latter  returns  are  not  available.     The  above  returns  of 
cereals  produced  in  the  Britisli  Empire  arc  stated  to  be  the  approximate  ligures. 
(d)  Production  in  India  only.     'J'he,  returns  are  not  available  for  some  small  Jut^ 
prf)duction  elsewhere. 
[This  Table  ia  a  condensed  summary  of  the  ofHeial  returns  in  pp.  231-234  of  f.VI.  7827, 
Vear  1915.] 


Although  the  official  records  do  not  enable  proof  to  be 
given  that  the  British  Empire  is  able  to  produce  every- 
thing it  needs  for  its  own  consumption,  there  is  at  the 
least  a  considerable  degree  of  probability  that  if  the  power 
of  production  of  the  British  Empire  were  wisely  fostered 
and    controlled,    there    would    not    remain    many    coni- 


modities  for  which  we  should  have  to  rely  upon  foreign 
countries.  In  Table  A  is  a  summary  of  staple  articles 
produced  in  the  British  Empire  during  the  fifteen  years 
1899-1913.  The  year  1913  is  the  latest  that  can  be  given, 
as  the  war  has  interfered  with  the  records  for  later  years. 

The  grouping  of  the  facts  in  Table  A  in  three  successive 
periods  of  five  years  enables  us  to  see  that  an  increase 
in  production  has  occurred  in  most  of  the  items. 
Wine  and  coffee,  both  minor  articles,  are  the  only'  two 
where  production  declined.  There  are  of  course  many 
articles  produced  in  the  British  Empire  other  than 
those  stated  in  Table  A,  but  this  table  and  Table  B 
summarise  all  the  available  official  facts. 

T.'\BLE  R. — Yearly  Production  of  Staple  Articles  witliin  the 
British  limpire.     Supplementary  to  Tnble  A. 


silver.    Million  o?.s. 
Copper.    Thousand  Tons 
Tin.    Thousand  Tons 
Wool.     .Million  Lbs. 
Horses.     Millions 
Horned  Cattle.     Millions 
Sheep.     Millions 
rigs.    .Millions 


37.0 

1.V2..-. 

71.0 

12.'i7.9 

8.8 

146.0 

205.7 

8.3 


NoTF.  -The  above  results  are  suinninrisc.d  from  pp.  242-274  of  Cd.  7827.  Year  M913 
They,  relate  to  the  year  1913.  or  to  tin*  year  1912.  As  regards  Horses,  Cattle 
Sheep,  and  Pigs,  these  are  the  approximate  numl)er  of  each  in  the  British  Kmpire 
in  the  year  1912  or  1913.  Tlie  tacts  do  not  allow  the  above  items  to  be  stated  Jor 
the  jieriods  shown  in  Table  A. 

In  addition  to  the  above,  the  yearly  production  of  Potatoes  was  8.2  million  tons 
plus  8-».7  million  bushels.  .\nd"  of  Tm-niiis  and  .Mangold-.  41.4  million  toas  jilus 
90.  7  nitllion  bushels. 

As  regards  consumption  of  staple  articles  in  the  British 
Empire,  no  satisfactory  records  exist.  The  quantity  of  a 
few  staple  articles  "  available  for  consumption  "  in  the 
British  Empire  is  stated  in  the  official  records.  But 
these  official  figures  do  not  necessarily  imply  that  the 
quantities  were  consumed.  And  they  do  not  cover 
nearly  the  whole  of  the  British  Empire.  For  these  reasons 
I  am  not  able  to  give  a  table  relating  to  the  consumption 
of  staple  articles  in  the  British  Empire.  In  this  con- 
nection, and  also  as  regards  production,  some  results  ■ 
that  may  be  useful  relate  to  British  Empire  trade. 

T.-iBLE  C. — British  Empire  Trade.  Yearly  Average  during 
three  periods  of  five  years  each,  covering  the  fifteen 
years  1899- rgi  3. 


Descrii'iiox. 


1899-1903 


Yearly  average  d\iring  each  Period. 
1904-1908  1909-1913 


Million  £ 

521 
180 
701 

361 
122 
483 

1184 


Million  £. 

599 
233 

832 

492 

149 

641 

1473 


Million  £. 

754 

291 

1043 

630 

195 

825 

1870 


Imports  into  British  Empire 

From  Foreign  Countries 

From  parts  of  British  Empire 

Total  Imports 

Exports  from  British  Empire. 

To  Foreign  Countries 

To  parts  of  British  Empire 

Tot.al  Exports 

Total  Trapk  or  British  Empire 

British  Empire  Trade  with 

Hermasy. 
Imports  from  Germany  43  69  89 

Exports  to  Germany  52  71  97 

Total  Trade  with  Germany  93  140  186 

Perokntaqk  Proportion-  op  British  Empire  Trade  with  Oerkaxt  to  the  Totak 
Trade  of  the  British  Empire. 

Per  Cent.  Per  Cent  Per  Cent. 

Imports  from  German)  8.1  8.3  8.5 

Exports  to  Germany  10.9  11.0  ■      11.8 

Total  Trade  with  Germany  8.1  9.5  9.9 

This  Table  is  based  upon  Cd.  7827.     Year  1915.     Pages  5—10. 
Example; — During  19<I9-1913.  British  Empire  Imports  from  Germany  were  equal  to 
8.5  per  cent,  of  the  Total  Imports  into  the  British  Empire. 

Table  C  contains  a  much  condensed  summary  of  British 
Empire  trade  during  the  fifteen  years  1899-1913.  This 
trade  is  shown  in  two  distinct  groups.  British  Empire 
trade  with  All  Foreign  Countries,  and  British  Empire 
trade  with  All  Parts  of  the  British  Empire.  The  splitting 
up  of  the  facts  into  three  periods  of  five  years  each 
enables  us  to  see  that  this  trade  has  largely  increased, 
both  as  regards  imports  and  exports.  Looking  at  British 
ICmpire  imports.  Table  C  shows  that  these  entered  the 
British  Empire  predominantly  from  Foreign  Countries. 
During  the  first  of  the  three  periods,  the  facts  in  Table  C 
will  show  that  74  per  cent,  of  these  imports  came  from 
I'oreign  Countries  and  26  per  cent,  came  from  the  British 
Empire.  During  the  latest  period,  72  per  cent,  of  the 
imports  came  from  I'oreign  Countries  and  28  per  cent, 
from  other  parts  of  the  British  Empire. 

As  regards  the  British  Empire  exports  in  Table  C,  a 


42 


L  A  X  0      .S:      \\'  A  T  E  R 


May  25,  1916 


similar  preponderance  of  Foreign  Countries  is  seen. 
During  the  first  period,  75  per  cent,  of  British  Empire 
exports  went  to  Foreign  Countries  and  25  p?r  cent,  to 
other  parts  of  the  Empire.  During  the  latest  period, 
76  per  cent,  of  the  exports  went  to  Foreign  Countries 
and  24  per  cent,  to  British  buyers. 

Another  feature  of  Table  C  is  that  it  shows  British 
Empire  trade  with  Clermany.  Diagram  No.  I  also  illus- 
trates this.  During  the  latest  period,  the  total  trade  with 
(iermany  averaged  186  million  (  per  year.  This  is  equal 
to  just  under  ten  per  cent,  of  <the  total  trade  of  the  British 
F^lmpire.  When  we  bear  in  mind  that  (Iermany  has 
proved  herself  unfit  to  associate  with  any  white 
race  and  to  be  on  a  lower  level  than  any  black  race,  the 
measures  of  reform  to  be  adopted  in  the  British  Empire 
should  include  the  cutting  out  of  this  trade  with  derm^i.ny. 
Its  hulk,  ten  per  cent,  of  the  total  British  Empire  trade, 
is  far  more  important  to  Germany.than  to  the  British 
JCmpire.  Moreover,  (lermany's  mode  of  trade  is  not 
safe  for  the  nations  that  trade  with  her.  F'or  (iermany 
combines  with  her  trading  a  treacherous  and  base  system 
of  spying  and  deceit  for  the  furtherance  of  her  national 
schemes.  Let  the  British  Empire  arrange  its  plans  for 
reform  so  as  to  trade  on  preferential  tariff  terms  with  all 
parts  of  the  Empire  and  with  its  friends  such  as  F'rance, 
Russia,  Italy,  Japan,  and  other  worthy  nations.  But 
let  us  so  penalise  German  production  when  it  seeks  to 
enter  British  Empire  ports  that  entry  becomes  almost  if 
not  wholly  impossible. 

T.\BLn;  D. — Trade  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  Germany 
in  1913  (the  last  complete  year  before  the  War). 


Ous3  or  Tbadi. 


Net  Value  of  Impart*  Proiuc  an!  M  iiii- 
froiii  Cii'rmiiiy  rn-  (acture  oi  111-  Ciiitil 
tainod  in  Ihe  fiilted  Kin?(l')m  i-xparted 
Kingdom.  to  G-Tiumy. 


I. — Vood.  Drink,  and  Tobacco 

U. — Uavv   Makriaia.    or    Articles    tnaialy 

Unmanufactrired 
ni. — ^Artitlf's    wholly   aod   mainly    Mano- 

fartured 
IV. — Miscellaueoiis  and  Unclassified  ,\rticlc3 


Million  £. 
16.3 


6.8 


52.3 

.8 


Million  £. 
4.0 


8.4 


27.0 
1.3 


Total 


41.7 


Thii  Tablf  is  ba.*'don  Cd.  812S.    Year  1913.     Page?  ll»  and  115. 
KOTE. — Bullion  and  Sjwcie  an*  i*X"lii(i'Mi. 

Til"  Total  VaiiiL-  of   Inilod   Kiiudoni   Impirts  from  O.-rmany,  inrluJinj  .Mt- 
cbandisi^  not  retained  in  ih.?  Cnit-d  Kinirdom,  wi*  SO.  4  niillion  £. 

Forpign  and  Colonial  Mcrchandi-^f  t'xport<^d' to  Girminy  fro.ii  1 1'  (*nit>d  Kinj.ljm 
•mounted  to  19.8  million  £.    Ttie  bulli  of  tliia  ws*  Riw  .UilsriaU,  Clwi  II. 

In  this  connection,  look  at  the  facts  in  Table  D  which 
relate  to  the  trade  between  the  United  Kingdom  and 
Germany.  In  1913,  the  last  year  before  the  war,  the  net 
value  of  German  goods  imported  into  the  United  King- 
dom and  there  retained  was  76  million  £.,  But  the 
products  of  the  United  Kingdom  bought  by  Germany 
were  valued  at  only  40  million  /.  We  were  the  best 
customer  of  Germany  for  many  years  before  the  war. 
Entire  cessation  of  trade  between  the  United  Kingdom 
and  Germany  would  be  much  to  Germany's  disadvantage. 
Especially  when  we  note  in  Table  D  the  trade  in  manu- 
factured goods.  We  bought  and  retained  52  million  £ 
of  German  manufactured  goods.  But  Germany  bought 
only  27  million  £  of  our  manufactured  goods. 

Table  E. — British  Empire  Trade  with  Foreign  Countries. 


llrit 

Hh  Knipire 

British  Knipi'"'- 

Ii:i"h  part*  pri 

pirlion.il  .■  shire. 

nil 

Tl-*  fr<irn 

K\pi  ti  1  >all 

pT  £1,011)  of  llritith  Kiinire's 

PiKT  Of  British 
Emi'IKe. 

all 

K.i.-eiliil 
uitri)'^  in 
year  1913. 

I'ore  .in  ('  mn- 
trica  in  tti  ■ 
year  1913. 

Trade  with  !■ 

or'iifn  Countrie*. 

the 

Per  £1,000  of 

iP.!r     £l,00a    of 

Imports  in 

Export!     in 

(») 

(b) 

Col.    (a) 

Col.    (b) 

Million  £ 

Mtliion   £ 

£ 

£ 

I'nited  Kingdom 

601.9 

41)'..  4 

711 

654 

<'an.ada 

101.7 

47.9 

121 

68 

llriti-ih  India,  by  Sea  and 

Land 

50.8 

103.9 

GO 

l.'iS 

Auxfraila 

29.4 

.14.3 

35 

4.S 

Strait.-*  s^'ttlemont.* 

22.9 

2<l.5 

27 

29 

Viiioii  of  South  Africa 

13.9 

4.3 

16 

0 

\V4-»t  India  Lslandi 

i.fl 

6.0 

7 

8 

West  Africa 

4.0 

8.8 

5 

10 

New  Zealand 

3.9 

1.7 

a 

2 

Aden 

2.5 

3.0 

3 

4 

O.vion 

1.9 

e.6 

.> 

9 

.Malta 

1.3 

1.1 

.> 

2 

•Newfoundland 

:.2 

1.7 

•     1 

2 

All    Other    rMfts   of   the 

Britwh  Etnpire 

4.5 

3.5 

5 

.•5 

Total 

815..1 

711.7 

I.IIO) 

1,000 

ThI*  Table   U   hs<u'il  upon     pp.    36  and   38  of  Cd.  7827.      Yctr    I91,'>. 
Ex.^MPi.E:  -C.inada's  Inip  irn  from  all  l',ir'M((n  ''miilries  w.-re  101.7  inilliin  £^nim^ly, 
£ltil,70<l,iK)0.    f'antidas  proportionate  sharo  wn  £121  pT  £1,011.)  of  B.-iti»h  Empire 
IrniKirts  from  all  Foreign  Countries. 

Think  of  what  has  been  going  on  in  the  United  King- 
dom for  many  years  owing  tu  our  foolish  tolerance  of 


hordes  of  German  business  men,  and  German  importer" 
of  German  goods  domiciled  in  England.  Treachery,  base 
ness,  deceit  in  all  directions.  Even  if  the  facts  of  our  trade 
with  Germany  were  reversed,  even  if  this  trade  were 
more  to  our  advantage  than  to  Germany's  advantage, 
could  we  regard  the  continuance  of  this  trade  M'ith  an 
outcast  nation  with  any  feeling  other  than  abhorrence  ? 
It  is  not  safe  to  trade  with  Germany. 

Table  E  enables  iis  to  see,  as  regards  British  Empire 
trad'i  with  all  Foreign  Countries,  the  proportion  of  this 
trade  appertaining  t"o'  'each  part  of  the  Empire.  Of 
course,  the  United  Kingdom  has  the  lion's  share.  Of  all 
British  Empire  trade- with  F'oreign  Countries,  the  United 
Kingdom  buys  ^J^ii^tjisr^r, coo  of  the  imports  from 
Foreign  Countriesy,~?iJKl^sells  £654  per  ;^i,oob  of  the 
e.xports  'sold  to  Foi'cjgii'  Countries  by  the  British  Empire. 
As  regards  the  "future  striking  out  of  G.-rmmy  from  the 
list  of  Foreign  Countries  with  whom  the  British  Empire  will 
trad^  thire  is  ain-olefscop.>  to  su'ostitute  an  increased 
trad;  with  onr  foffe'%[i'?fri'ends  for  our  former  tria.d2  with 
Germany.  '    ■ 


T.xBLE  F. — Imports  of: certain 
Empire,  from  "AU  •E6reiga 


Staple  Articles  into  tha  British 
Countries,  in  the  ye.!*-  1913. 


staple  Arlii-le*, 


.    T.— Food.    Diliik,    aiid-,Tb- 

'  baeco       •    •   -•  •    ■ 
.Meat,  including  Poultry, 

ct  •-  '  '    ,  . 

Snxar  .       . 

Wii-'it  and  Flour       ■    ■ 
Butter 

-Miiz:'  and  Meal 
Tobir-'-.i 

Win--*  and  Spirits 
Milic,  condensed 
Tei 

Cattle,  Sh«ep,  and  Swine 
Beer  and  Alo 

Total.    Class  I 


II.— Raw  Miteriils— 
Riw  Cotton 
Wo  )d  and  Timbar 
Oil 

Coil  and  Cok? 
Hid'.  Siin*,  and  Fats 
R»w  Wo-il 
Fliv  and  Hemp 
Iron  Ore 
Riw  Silli 
Riw  Juto 


40.5 
23,11 
19.5- 

10.9 
12. S 
11.6 


T.)til.    Clm  II. 


';V4lu,i.  8tiph  Article*.                 Value. 

!3lftloB-£  ;,  .               ~           ~                   Million  £* 

,"•  ,  •  -III. —Manufactured  Artielesi — 

'  ■  lion    and    Sti-el    Manii* 
fjletlire*  otll.'r  tlun 

;       *  I.  1  Machinery 

;3,'>,9   '  ,  Cotton    Manufactures 

.  ,  'Jifsi.        .  Silk   Manufactures 

■  19.7     '  Machin^'.ry    other    than 

15.1  Auricultural 
11.6  Woollen       inanuf.'lcturea 

8.4  Pap-^r  and  Stationei  y 

:j,()  Hab'idv-hciy    and  Mil- 

2.:)  linery                                  8.5 

1.8  I,eathr.     tanned     and 

.9  drc.**ed                                    7.8 

Gla«s  and  OUsswire                6.3 

172.6  Ready-mid-  Clothinz              6.0 

Leather     Manufactures, 

BoD^!     and    Shoes, 
Saddlery,  etc.  5.9 

70,9  Linen.  Hemp,  and  Jute 

36.6  Manufactures                        5.0 

2'). 6  Rillw.ii'  i.nl  Tramwav 

12.4  Roliin?   Sto.-k,  etc. 

10.3  (exclinivi!  of  Ixiio- 

10.2  mitivci)  3.7 
8.2  Agricultural    Michinery 

7.6  and  Impl-ni-n'*                 2.8 

2.1  Eirthenw.ire  and  (':iin:i- 

.3  w.ire                                    2.7 

181.2  Total.— Clan    III.         173.0 


Thi*  tabb  i*  bi*-d  o.i  <M.  ~iii;.  Yeir  1915,  p.  4).  T.n  t  .;  il  o;  tin  "  ('Ttiin  Staple 
Artich'S  "  h-re  in^luj-d,  a'ii)-.ri[t  ti  52). 8  milli»:i  £.  T.i-  vilu'  of  oCn '  imparts 
into  til-  Briti*h  Empire,  ff  in  all  K,ir,-i?  i  C  nint.-ie-.,  ail  mi  s.-pl.'lt'ly  sci.rdls, 
315.7  milliin  £,  iu-ladln;  Ballhti  and  SpvMe, 

Ex-IXPLK:— Til'  value  oi  Britnh  E  iipire  Impirti  of  Mit  fr  i  n  a'l  FiriM  Cottntrla  s 
was  44.1  (nlllion  £,— naitaely,  £4-l,10"J,00». 

T.\BLE  G. — Exp.irts  of  certain  St.aple  .\rticle.4  fro.u  th^  Bi-itish 
Empire,  to  All  Foreign  Couutrie.-;,  in  the  year  1913. 


Stiplc  Arti-.-i.-.s.  Value. 


t '  Staple  Article*. 


Value. 


..*...  ~M3Uion  £  • 

-Foad.    D.ini  .  and    To-  .  -  _    , 

b.acco —  ,   ■ 

Wheat  and  Flour           •  .."^^O^S     ' 

Tea                      _ — 5.!8-_ 

M-at,  Includin;;  Poultry, 

etc.  -  .  3.5 

T.ibvco  i.7 

Win-s  and  Spirit*  4.2 

Cittl",  Sheep,  and  Swinei  ivJ^X^  '.  ; 

8ui{.ir  -    i.5    • 

Ber  and  Alo  .9 

Butter  ,8 

Millt,  condensed  .  .8 

Maize  and  Meal  .  4 


Total.    Class  I. 


II.— Riw  Mlt'iiala— 
C- 1  il  a'l-i  C;jlve 
Kiw  Woil 
Riw  C It t )ti 
Hid"*,  Sltin*.  and  Furs 
K  iw  .lui  ■ 
Wood  and  Timbei 

o;i 

Flax  and  Hemp 
Riw  8illc 
Iron  Ore 


Total,    Class  11. 


31.0 


51,7 

3S.3 

-    .35,4 

2,4.7 

W.2, 

«.3 

-,  7.6 

2,5 

.4 

.3 

185.4 


;UI; — Minui.i-!ivred  Article* — 
.Cittnn   M  inufactures 
Iron   and    Ste.el    Mmu- 

iacture.*  other  than 

Michin'ry 
Linen,  Hemp  md  Jute 

.Manufacturi's 

-  "Woollen    ■  Manufactures 

M*chiii'-ry    oth-r    tiian 

Aitrii-uitural 
Leath-r.     tann.'d      and 

dre*sed 
Pap-r  and  Stationery 
.\gricullnral     .Machinery 

and   Imidement* 
R-lilw.iv    and  Tramwav 

llilliii^    Stock,    ctr. 

(exi-lu*iv,e  of   l,,oco- 

miitiv.-*) 
L-eather      .Manufactures, 

Blot*    and    .Shoe*, 

Suldlery.  ete. 
Ready-in  ide  Ciolhinx 
ieilk    Mmufaeture* 
Kirllienware  and  China- 
ware 
Gla**  and   Glassware 
Haberda*liery  and   Mil- 

lin  -ry 

Total.    Class  III. 


Million  £ 
79.1 


31.6 


2-S.  5 

20.8 


22.6 


5.6 

4.8 


4.8 


3.3 


3.0 

3.0 
2.2 

2.1 
.3 

.8 

219.0 


Thi*  Tabl.e  i*  bai'd  on  Cd.  7S27.  Vejr  1915.  p.  42.  The  tutil  of  th-  '•  eertiin  Staple 
Artl.-1-i"  here  included  am  lunti  to  435.4  million  £.  The  vain-  of  oth-r  Exports 
from  the  H''iti*h  Empire,  into  All  Foreign  Countries,  and  not  separately  stated,  ii 
278.3  million  £,  ineludinj  Billiin  and  Specie. 

E.X.1MPI,r :— The  value  of  B'iti*h  Enpire  Export*  of  Wheat  and  Flour  to  .\ll  Foreign 
Countries  was  10.8  million  £,  — namely,  £10,800,000. 

The  official  records  enable  a  useful  summary  to  be 
shown  in  Table  F.  This  Table  sets  out  a  number  of  the 
more  important  articles  imported  into  the  British  Empire 
from  All  Foreign  Countries.  In  class  i,  F'ood,  etc., 
the  leading  articles  are  meat,  sugar,  wheat.  As  regards 
sugar,  wc  have  allowed  our  West  Indian  and  other  British 

(Cotilinucrf  on  pajc  M.) 


LAND    &    WATER 


Souvenirs   ^i 

OF 

Empire 


XOBY"  Jttgs 


Mementoes 


OF    THE 


BY     ••  F.  O.  G." 

Sir  F,  Carruthers  Gould. 


Great  War 


Rt.   Hon.  D.  Lloyd   George. 

The  Serial  of  the   5  Toby  Jugs 
is  made  up  as  follows — 


Sir  John  Jelliooe, 
KC.B.,  C.V.O. 


Earl  Kitchener  of  Khartoum, 
G.C.B.,    Etc. 


General  Joffre. 


GENERAL  JOFFRE,  Iitue  limited  to  350  at  2  Gns.  each. 
ADMIRALJELUCOE 350  .. 


Sir  John  French.  K.C.M.U., 
K.C.B.,  Etc. 

I  VISCOUNT  FRENCH.               luu*  limited  to  350  at  2  Goa.  eac  h 
Ut.  HON.  LLOYD  GEORGE ,,350,. 

EARL,   KITCHENER,     the  first  Toby  Jug  to  be  issued,  is  limiled  to  250,  and  now  almost  completed.  We  have  retained  a  small  number  for 

the  subscribers  of  the  complete  sets  at  £3    3    O  each  Jug.  Early  application  is  advised. 

Either  of  the  other  four  Juge  can  be  ha  J  aeparately* 

Controlled  exclusively  by  The  moulds  will  be  destroyed  on  completion  of  the  series.  Write  for  llluitraled  booklet  No. 


SOANE  &  SMITH,  Ltd., 


Specialists  iti 
China  and  Glass, 


Telegrams — "  Earlhenwesdo.'* 


462  OXFORD  STREET,  LONDON,  W. 


Telephone — Pad.  2634 


MILITARY  TYPE 

20-25  h.p.  AMBULANCES 

AUSTIN  Ambulances  are  built  with 
_/\_  chassis  especially  constructed  for 
that  work,  and  are  not  to  be  confused 
with  converted  Touring  Cars. 

The  Company  can  supply  a  limited  num- 
ber only,  to  be  allocated  in  rotation. 

Accommodation  is  provided  for  four 
lying-down  cases  ;  or,  alternatively,  the 
stretchers  can  be  stowed  away,  and  the 
seats,  fitted  with  cushions,  will  provide 
room  for  eight  "sitting"  patients.  It 
has  a  substantial  waterproof  top,  well 
ventilated  by  a  clerestory  roof ;  the  upper 
panels  being  of  aluminium,  lined  and 
covered  with  canvas,  which  keeps  the 
vehicle  quite  water-tight  under  the  most 
adverse  conditions,  Further,  there  is  no 
possibility  of  the  sagging  of  the  canvas 
to  hold  water  and  to  have  an  unsightly 
appearance. 


THE  AUSTIN  MOTOR  CO.  (1914)  LIMITED 

Longbridge  Works,  Nortiifield,  Birmingham 

London— 479-483.  Oxford  Street,  W.     Depots  at  Paris,  Man- 
(near  Marble  Arch).  chcstcr,  and  Norwich 


44  LAND&     WATER  May  25,  1916 

Table  H.— British  Empire  Trade  with  All  Foreign  Countries  in  the  year   1913.     Distinguishing   Imports  and   Exports  by 
the  various  Classes. 

KrilUh    Kniplro    ImiihuIw    liuin    All    I'oriMgu 

( I'll  111  rii>.  Bfilitli  Empire  Export*  to  All  Foroign  (teuntries. 

I'Uil  oif  BlUTIsa  EjiriM.  I.  rood^H.  lUw    Ul.  Maim-    IV.  MU-    V.  Ballion      Total         I.  Food,      11.  K^w^II.  M»nu-      IV.  Ml*    V.  Bullion     ToUl 

Drink,  A     Muti-riaU,   facturod      wlUucoiu.  4  Specie.     Import!.      Drink,*     Matorlato.  r«cturod      cclUneous.  4  Specie.    Exports. 
Tohacfo.  ArtlclM.  Tobacco.  Art  idea. 

~                                                                Mill.  £  JltU.  £  Hill.  £  Mill.  £  Mill.  £  Mill.  £  Mill.  £  MUl.  £  MIU.  «  MUl.  £  MiU.  £  Mill  £ 

Unllr-d  Kingdom           ..         ..•    ■   ..     214. a  190.3  170. :i  2.4  24.7  flOl.9  32.2  ItS.l  2«8.9  IJ.7  39.5  465.4 

Canada                  15.1  27.4  55.1  '     1.0  3.1  1(11.7  10. H  14.5  14.2  ,8  7.6  47.9 

Blill-li  l!l'1ia(by  S!p»only)        ..          ..        10.1  4.6  21.5  .7  «.«  43.5  17.4  «3.1        •      22.2  .»  .3  103.U 

V                              Il.g  6.0'  20.5  .0  .0  29.4  4.5  26.0  3.5  .0  .3  34.3 

.iicnls 11.1  7.5  3.8  .0  .5  22.11  «.:l  11.5  2.3  .0  .4  »!..'> 

I                     ith  Africa            ..         ..         2.7  2.6  7.1  .7  .8  13.0  .2  3.7  .3  .1  .0  4.3 

>.«    /..uli.n.l 5  .8  2.4  .1  .0  3.0  .2  1.4  .1  .0  .0  1.7 

All  ollur  I'aru :  including  British  India 

by  Und  only        10.1  6.4  9.6  .8  l.t  2S.3  10.5  14.3  T.C  .3  1.6  34.3 

ToUl 267.7  244.6  290.4  5.7  37.1  845.5  82.1  26g.6  300.1  8.2  49.7  711.7 

f  11,1.   ,.11-  w  based  on  rd.  7827.      Year  1015,  pp.  67  to  76  and  pp.  35  to  ,H8. 
Tbc  Exi¥>rta  above  stated  Include  Domeatir  an  !  .luee  exjiorlt-d  frnni  the  Briti^li  Kmplre  to  .\ll  Foreign  t^onntrics.     That  is  to  say.  these    Export.^  are  not.  exclusively 

of  Britiah  Kmpire  prodnetion.     The  Don.  are  not  wpiirately  n'corded.     As  rei^ards  the  t'nlli-d  Kingdom,  the  above  Exports*  to  .411  Foreiifn  Countries  arc  niado 

up  aa   foUowa  : — Merihanduc  of   lluited   l\,,.^^ i'uiductlon  321). 0  milUuu  i;    MercbandUe   not  of  United  Kingdom  Productiun  0(1."    im"!  ""  >:    Bullion  and    ti[Kr.\o 

99.5  niilUon  £.    Total,  465.4  mlUloD  £,  as  above  shown. 


(Continued  Irom  pagt  iZ). 

production  to  fade  in  favour  of  the  inferior  beet  sugar 
we  have  bought  in  huge  quantities  from  (Germany.  We 
have  paid  (iermany  many  millions  sterling  per  year  for 
beet  sugar.  Reform  is  needed  here.  As  regards  wheat, 
Canada,  if  encouraged  jto  do  so,  can  supply  all  the  wheat 
that  is  needed  to  supplement  other  British  Empire 
production  of  wheat. 

In  Class  2  of  Table  F,  Raw  Materials,  the  leading 
articles  of  British  Empire  import  from  All  l-oreign 
Countries  are  raw  cotton,  wood,  oil.  And  in  class  j, 
Manufactured  Articles,  the  chief  items  are  iron  and  steel 
manufactures  other  than  machinery,  cotton  goods,  silk 
gpods. 

Table  G  shows  the  exports  of  certain  staple  articles 
from  the  British  Empire  to  All  Foreign  Countries.  It 
should  be  considered  in  conjunction  with  Table  l-". 

Table  H  gives  a  summary  of  British  Empire  trade  with 
All  Foreign  Countries,  distinguishing  the  most  important 
parts  of  the  Empire  and  also  showing  the  trade  in  each 
Class  of  imports  and  exports.  In  Class  i,  Food,  the 
Empire  imports  268  million  £  and  exports  only  82  milUon  £. 
But  this  large  difference  is  seen  to  be  mainly  due  to  the 


"35^ 


2.90 


0.68 


2.63 


:l^s 


82. 


FOOD 
Etc: 


RAW 

jMATEMALS. 


•MANUFACTOREO 
.ARTICLES. 


Pla'm  Column! — Imports 


Striped  Columns — Exports 


No.    1 — British  Empire   Imports    and    Exports  from  and   to  all   foreiijn 

countries  in  the  year  1913.     Disiinjuiihint  th«  three  classes  of  trade. 

Suted  in  million  £  (see  table  H). 


United  Kingdom's  great  imports  of  food.  One  of  the 
reforms  in  British  trade  and  production  should  be  the 
decrease  of  the  United  Kingdom's  dependence  for  its 
food  upon  sea-borne  supplies  of  food.  The  decay  of 
agriculture  in  the  United  Kingdom  during  recent  genera- 
tions has  been  an  injurious  and  linsafe  accompaniment 
of  our  mistaken  trade  policy.  Foresight  and  prevision 
in  this  matter  are  urgently  needed. 

The  other  parts  of  Table  H,  which  has  been  condensed 
from  a  large  mass  of  official  facts,  are  worth  attention. 
Diagram  No.  2  also  displays  some  of  the  facts  contained 
in  Table  H. 

Some  ten  years  ago,  when  the  advocates  of  Free  Trade 
and   of  Tariff   Reform   were   making   the   air   thick   by 
throwing  carefully  chosen  statistical  bricks  at  each  others' 
heads,  I  set  about  an  investigation  of  the  tendencies  of 
British  and  -Foreign  trade  in  many  directions.     My  pur- 
pose was  to  avoid  the  plan  of  selecting  these  or  those 
facts  which  happen  to  support  a  preconceived  opinion, 
and  to  use  all  the  facts  available  in  a  sound  way  so  as  to 
make  these  facts  disclose  trade  tendencies.     Many  useful 
results  came  to 
light,    and   one 
of  them  is  show 
in  Table  J.    My 
method  of  tak- 
ing the    yearly 
average   during 
a  large  number 
of     continuous 
decades,     illus- 
trated in  Table 
J,    merges    the 
confusing 
fluctuations    of 
single  years 
into     decennial 
averages.     The 
result    is    that 
a  well    defined 
tendency  is  dis- 
closed,      based 
upon  the  whole 
mass    of    facts 
without  any 
biassed      selec- 
tion. The  result 
shown  in  Table 
J,  for  instance, 
is  of  importance 
when     we     are 
c  o  n  s  i  d  e  r  i  ng 
British   Empire 
trade   and  pro- 
ducti'M.  We  see 
that  oaring  the 
long  period  sur- 
veyed, the   United    Kingdom    has    gradually   lost    the 
whole  of  the  predominance    it   possessed   in    1880-1889 
as  a  seller  in  British  oversea  markets.     That  predomin- 
ance  was   finally  lost   in   the  decade    1899-1909.     Two 
foreign    coimtries    that    have    been   largely   responsible 
for   the   displacement   of   the  United  Kingdom  in    the 
markets  of  British  Dominions  and  Colonics  arc  Germany 
and  the  United  States.  It  is  probable  that  after  the  war 

(Conlwucd  on  puf/e  46. J 


• 

y 

Z 

< 

•■ 

r 

>- 

«6 

Ul 

z 
< 

s 

s 

Ul 

ce. 

o 

u. 

f-      ' 

V) 

(/> 

t- 

f- 

c;: 

t£ 

o 

o 

fr. 

b. 

s 

.>< 

Ul 

1 

1 

104-5.  89. 

Q15. 

97 

TOTAL 

TOTAL 

IMPOWS  . 

PIPORTS 

,  —    1 

No.  2 — british  Empire  lotal  Imports  and 
Exports,  distinguishing  British  Empire  Im- 
ports and  Exports  from  and  to  Germany. 
Yearly  average  during  1909-13  stated  in 
million  £  (see  table  C). 


May  25,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


45 


The  BRITISH  DOMINIONS 

GENERAL    INSURANCE    COMPANY  limited 

Managing  Director:  E.M. MOUNTAIN 

AutHorised  Gapitaf:  £1,000.000. 

SmUtrSkU  trT;4$l.       rmU-mp  tlH.TtO.        Jt<fan«a  ucnW  tl.tOO.OtO. 

HEAD  OFFICES:  British  Dominions  Mouse 
Roxja-t  Exchange  Avenue ,  LONDON.  E.  C. 

"ALL-IN- Pol  icy  Ofe'pt.  OCEAN  HOUSE.  3  OLD  BROAD  STE.C. 
Classes  of  Business   Transacted: 


tllfy.  HoD<»-A«W*n' cad  H(mte-M»n«n"*  ALL-IN  "  Pollcici,  FIdcIltj  Gutriatce,  FUtc  GUM. 
LoM  of  Proflta,  Motor  Car,  Public  Liability  (Ocoeval  Rlikt.  Drlvlof  Rlikl  PrOMTty 
'   LUblllty),  PcrioatI  Accldaot.  Secorltlei  lo  TraaaK,  Sprlaklcr  L««kac«,  ^_^^<^^^ 

Employers'  Llabllltjr,    DiMsie  sod  Slckoen,  ConllSfcocy.  ^^^^^^ „ri'jlL  .f   //    //     / 

Government  Aircrift  and  Bombttdairat.  ,     .     ^^MI''^^V>^' 


'^-'J//////,^ 


^/yy/^/,7n.(u.-iL\v^.v^> 


El^ 


WEST  END  - 
LAW  COURTS 
BELFAST 
BIRMINGHAM 
BRIGHTON  - 
BRISTOL 


IIS  PIcodillr.  W. 

latlMZ  Hitb  Holborii.  W.C. 

■     17  WtUiniton  Plxi. 

-       -   63  Tcnpit  Row. 

(  PsTlllu  ttrUt. 

'      •      17/19  Clue  SUMt. 


BRANCHES: 

CARDIFF  ■  '  -   100  St.  Mary  Strwt. 

DUBLIN  •  -  -     III  Craftoa  StrMt. 

DUMFRIES  ■  '  •          ISI  Irish  StrMl. 

EDINBURGH  •  23  Daaaka  Slrnt. 

GLASGOW  •  -  IS7  Wtit  Ceorte  Stritt. 


LEEDS  ■  >  . 
LIVERPOOL  ■  • 
MANCHESTER  ■ 
NEWCASTLtONTYNE 

NOmMCHAM 


21/27  tni  Sirtit. 

I)  Caitlt  Strtet. 

9  Albert  Square. 

4  Raral   Arcade. 

ai  27  Hailey  Street 

14  Low  Pavimcat. 


!l^ffe?g^^|^^i^Mi^^^S^^ 


pl 


46 


LAND     &     WATER 


Mc\v  25,  1916 


(ContinHtd  from  /lage  U) 

British  Oversea  Dominions  and  Colonies  will  to  a   large 
extent  taboo  trade  with  Germany. 

Table  J. — Showing,  for  the  Twelve  Principal  British  Empire 
Dominions  and  Colonies  combined  : — 
1. — Their  Imports  from  the  United  Kingdom. 
II. — Their  Imports  from  All  Countries  other  than  the 

United  Kingdom. 
III. — Their  Imports  from  All  Countries. 
IV. — The  Loss  of  the  United  Kingdom's  Lead  over 
Other  Countries  as  regards  the  supply  of  Imports 
into  the  Twelve  Hri'tisli  Dominions  and  Colonies. 


Yearly  Impotto 

iuto  tbe  Twelve  BrItUb  Domlalons  and 

Colonlea. 

I.— From  Uw 

II.— Vrom  all 

in.— Total  Im- 

IV. 

-The    United 

Unit«d  King- 

Countries other 

ports  from  all 

Ki»l£d(iiii*fl    liead 

DECiDI. 

dom. 

than  the  United 

Countries. 

over  other  Coim- 

1        K  inKdom 

(a-fb) 

ttin.    (a=b).    , 

(») 

(b) 

(e) 

(d) 

Million  £ 

Millian  £ 

Million  £ 

Million  £ 

]B»»-I8d9 

106.2 

66.7 

172.9 

39.5 

18ai-lS90 

110.4 

89.5 

179.9 

40.9 

1 882-1 891 

112.8 

72.2 

185.0 

40.6 

1S«3  1892 

lis. 3 

73.9 

187.2 

39.4 

1884-1893 

113.7 

74.8 

188.5 

38.9 

1885-1894 

114.4 

76.2 

190.6 

38.2 

1888-189.'. 

115.1 

77.5 

192.6 

37.6 

1887-1896 

11«.5 

80.1 

196.8 

36.4 

1888-1897 

118.1 

82.8 

200.9 

35.3 

18J*1>-1898 

118.7 

85.5 

204 . 2 

33.2 

18911-1899 

118.4 

89.2 

207.6 

29.2 

18111-1990 

119.2 

94.0 

213.2 

25.2 

18!I2-19()1 

120.8 

99.4 

220.2 

21!  4 

lSfl:l-19()2 

125.0 

100.11 

231.0 

19.0 

18114    19();! 

128.9 

114. « 

243.5 

14.3 

189.'.  1904 

132.7 

122.9 

255.6 

9.8 

189«-19ll.". 

137.4 

132.2 

209.6 

5.2 

1«»7   19<1« 

143.2 

140.6 

283.8 

2.6 

] 898- 1907 

1.50.3 

149.3 

299.6 

l.U 

18m»-1908 

156.1 

159.2 

317.3 

— 

1900-1909 

163.9 

105.9 

329.8 

-~ 

From  p.  39fi  •'  "■•■  >•■"'■.■  Hkitisii  Trade  Book,  Fourth  Issue.  Based  upon  the 
various  -  -  covcrinn  tiie  p<'rit>d  1880-1909. 

Koto  that  ill  ''-i.  "  <nher'<'.)uiitrif*s  "  .supphiuted  the  I'nited  Kingdom 

at  preduitiiii..>i.  r.^ ..'  >~  ...  ;..o  marki't^  of  British  Dominions  and  Colonies.  Prominent 
among  tiiese  "  Other  countries  "  are  Germany  and  the  Vnited  States. 

The  greater  the  extent  to  which  German  trade  can  be 
killed  by  non-participation  in  trading  with  Germany, 
by  the  British  Empire  and  her  friends,  the  more  difficult 
will  it  be  for  Germany  to  prepare  again  to  attack  us  and 
our  Allies.  Our  aim  should  be  to  keep  this  brutal  nation 
deprived  of  markets  in  which  to  sell  her  production.  If 
Germany  is  allowed  to  raise  her  head  after  she  is  beaten, 
the  death's  head  helmet  will  be  on  that  head  in  a  few 
years  and  once  more  this  nation  of  murderers  will  be  let 
loose  on  civilisation.  And  Mr.  Asquith  promised  our 
merchants  bent  on  the  reform  of  our  trade — a  peace 
book.  My  fellow  citizens,  whose  sons  with  mine  have 
died  for  their  country,  we  must  band  together  to  defend 
our  country  against  the  future  German  menace  and 
against  the  future  apathy  and  shortsightedness  of  those 
in  authority  in  this  country.  An  essential  reform  to 
meet  the  danger  is  the  reconstruction  of  British  Empire 
production  and  trade  without  delay. 


The  Band  of  the  Coldstream  Guards  will  play  at  Royal 
Botanic  Gardens,  on  Saturday  and  Sunday  afternoons  during 
the  summer,  beginning  on  Saturday  week. 

The  Sixth  Edition  of  the  Cambridge  University  War  List 
has  just  been  issued  by  The  Cambridge  Review.  It  contains 
11,834  names  of  past  and  present  Members  of  the  University 
of  Cambridge  on  service.  The  following  Colleges  head  the 
list : — Trinity  2,670,  Pembroke  1,164  ^^d  Gonville  and 
Caius  1,147.  AH  the  colleges  show  an  increase.  The 
casualties  in  killed,  wounded  and  missing  amount  to  2,004, 
and  the  Honours  List  contains  868  names.  At  tlie  end  of  the 
war  the  Syndics  of  the  Cambridge  Univ-ersity  Press  propose 
to  publish,  by  arrangemt.-iit  witli  Tlit'  Cambridge  Review, 
a  complete  official  list  of  members  of  the  l^niversity  who  have 
served  in  the  war,  with  brief  biographical  details  of  those  who 
have  been  killed,  and  a  list  of  distinctions  conferred. 

Considered  from  the  point  of  •'view  of  dramatic  effect,  Miss 
F.  E.  Mills  Young's  novel.  The  Bywonner,  is  hardly  up  to  the 
le%'el  of  its  predecessors,  but  as  a  picture  of  South  African  life 
it  is  the  best  work  she  has  yet  done,  and  compares  favourably 
even  with  Olive  Schreiner's  one  great  book.  The  by- 
wonner's  daughter,  Adela.is  the  central  figure  of  the  book, 
and  her  tragedy  is  vividly  pictured  ;  we  are  not  nearly  so 
much  interested  in  her  brother  and  his  love  story,  and,  in 
fact,  the  life  goes  out  of  the  novel  with  Adela,  some  fifty 
pages  or  more  from  its  end.  In  spite  of  this,  it  is  all 
picturesque  work,  informed  with  thorough  knowledge  of 
veldt  life  and  people,  and  well  above  the  average  in  character- 
isation and  stvle. 


Motoring   Overseas 

By   H.    Massac  Buist 

THE  war  is  exercising  no  less  direct  an  effect  on 
motoring  enterprise  in  the  Empire  overseas  tlian 
is  the  progress  that  has  been  achieved  in  automobile 
design  and  manufacturing  methods  in  the  interval 
of  nearly  two  years  since  the  start  of  the  campaign. 
The  demands  of  it  have  been  so  great  as  to  make  huge  drafts 
on  the  stocks  of  horses  practicallv  throughout  the  world, 
and  particularly  in  Australia  and  Canada.  A  result  has 
been  that  to-day  the  overseas  market  for  utihty  .motor 
machinery  has  reached  proportions  which,  had  there" been  no 
campaign,  would  probably  not  have  been  attained  in  less  than 
five  or  six  years  hence. 

Here  we  may  see  something  of  the  law  of  compensation. 
Had  the  present  demand  arisen  under  peace  conditions,  the 
bulk  of  the  utility  motor  vehicles  that  would  have  been  placed 
on  the  market  to  meet  it  would  have  proved  more  or  less  un- 
satisfactory. The  experience  necessary  to  make  them 
satisfactory  would  have  had  to  be  gained  at  the  expense  of 
users  in  all  parts  of  the  Empire  and  over  a  period  of  years. 

The  average  British  manufacturer  was  content  to  evolve 
vehicles  suitable  for  service  on  developed  British  highways 
and  to  be  worked  under  conditions  neither  of  extreme  heat 
nor  of  extreme  cold.  Generally  his  idea  of  supplving  machines 
of  similar  capacity  for  use  overseas  took  the  forrn  of  gearing 
them  lower,  and  of  providing  them  with  a  greater  ground 
clearance,  stiffer  springs  and  stronger  steering  joints. 

But  because  of  the  war  he  has  been  forced  to  supply  vehicles 
for  service  with  our  armies  in  all  the  several  areas  in  which 
arms  are  engaged.  The  unsuitability  of  the  majority  of  the 
machines  for  working  under  conditions  either  of  extreme 
heat  or  of  extreme  cold,  over  routes  which  we  at  home  would 
scorn  to  recognise  as  roads,  with  continual  exposure  iri  that 
war  vehicles  are  usually  parked  in  the  open,  was  quicklv 
and  abundantly  manifest.  The  old  excuse  "  that  it  is  no't 
reasonable  to  expect  a  man  to  build  motor  vehicles  to  stand 
that  sort  of  abuse"  no  longer  availed.  Stern  necessity 
demanded  that  suitable  machines  should  be  standardised 
and  forthcoming  in  the  necessary  quantities  ;  also  that  that 
work  should  be  done  against  a  strict  time  limit,  our  Russian 
Allies,  no  less  than  ourselves,  ha\-ing  urgent  need  of  ever- 
increasing  motor  services. 

Good  Effect  of  War 

Thus  through  the  war,  in  less  than  two  years  a  degree  of 
motor  development  has  been  attained  which  else  would  have 
taken  many  seasons  to  achieve.  The  fruits  of  this  artificially 
rapid  evolution  are  already  available  to  the  Empire  overseas. 
It  may  be  objected  that,  by  reason  of  war's  heavy  demands 
on  manufacturing  at  home,  at  present  British  motor  makers 
are  not  able  to  supply  the  demands  of  British  users  overseas, 
who  are  therefore  dependent  for  the  most  part  on  the  American 
industry.  Such  a  statement  is  true  as  far  as  it  goes  ;  but  it  is 
incomplete.  As  concerns  their  best  features,  the  larger  sorts 
of  utility  motor  vehicles  which  America  is  supplying  to  the 
Empire  to-day  are  the  result  of  our  work  towards  solving  the 
transport  problems  presented  by  this  war. 

The  reason  is  that  the  demand  was  so  sudden  and  so  great 
that  the  only  way  to  meet  it  was  for  our  military  authorities 
to  place  large  orders  with  the  American  industry,  not  for  such 
vehicles  as  it  was  then  producing  but,  for  machines  embody- 
ing this,  that  and  the  other  features  of  design  which  our  ex- 
perience had   enabled   us  to  evolve. 

The  longer  the  war  lasts  the  greater  will  be  the  demand  as 
w.ell  for  men  as  for  horses,  therefore  alike  in  Canada,  Australia, 
South  Africa,  India  and  other  parts  of  the  Empire  the  need 
for  various  types  of  motor  machinery  to  supersede  horse 
service  and  the  handling  of  which  calls  for  fewer  men  in 
proportion  to  work  done,  must  continue  to  increase. 

Nor  should  we  conclude  erroneously  that  the  coming  of 
peace  will  put  a  period  to  such  demand.  To  do  so  would 
be  utterly  to  fail  to  appreciate  what  the  motor  amounts  to 
as  an  Imperial  factor.  Let  us  have  in  mind  that  the  effects 
of  this  war  on  tire  cost  of  living  are  world-wide.  Even  the 
United  States  which  has  passed  from  the  position  of  a 
borrowing  to  that  of  a  lending  nation,  is  a  country  where  the 
costs  of  living  are  rising  all  the  time.  In  some  districts  the 
retail  price  of  petrol,  for  example,  is  as  high  as  it  is  here, 
allowing  for  the  fact  that  the  English  gallon  is  one  fifth  larger 
than  the  American  one. 

The  only  way  satisfactorily  to  overcome  the  problem  of  the 
increased  and  increasing  cost  of  living,  which  is  manifest  in 
different  wav's  in  different  countries,  is  to  enable  the  individual 

iContinued  on  poe<:  4S.) 


May  25,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


4: 


The  Original  Cording* s.     Estd.  1839. 

High=Grade 

Military  Waterproofs, 


The    "SERVICE"    Coat. 

A  trustworthy  waterproof  is  a 
positive  necessity  tor  cam- 
paigning, sini^e  gettiri';  wet  is  so 
oftt'u  followed  by  ill-health,  and,  at 
least,  must  cause  real  discomfort. 

A  "Service"  Coivt  ensiu-es  com- 
plete protection  throufjh  (inn  rain, 
and  serves  admirably  either  for 
mounted  or  fjeueral  military  wear. 
It  is  a  slip-on  which  gives  to  every 
movement,  and  ihas  well-contrived 
fulness  to  make  any  "stuffiness" 
impassible.  Useful  features  for 
saddle  wear  are  the  leg  straps,  pom- 
mel trap,  and  fan,  piece  within 
deep  slit  at  back. 

One  of  the  recommended  materials, 
Xo.  31,  in  colour  an  approved  mili- 
tary fawn,  is  a  tough  tboujji  finely- 
woven  fabric,  light  in  weight,  yet 
absolutely  reliable  for  hard  wear  and 
tear. 

On    approval. 

When  ordering  a  "Service"  Coat,  or  if  to  be 
sent  on  approval,  height  and  chest  measure 
and  reference,  should  be  given. 


New  Illustrated  List  of    waterproofs,    boot*,    &c„    at    rtqueit. 

«o. 

4Ltd 


J.  C.  CORDING  &  CI 

Waferproofers  to  H.M.  the  King 

Only     Addre*srs: 

19  PICCADILLY,  W.  &35 st. jamess st. 


PRACTICAL 
WRAPPERS  AND 
TEA    FROCKS 


O' 


UR  Stock  of  House  and 

Boudoir   Wraps,    Tea 

Frocks  and  Negliges  is 

particularly  well  assorted.     We 

buy  all  the  most  exclusive  Paris 

Models    and    copy    and    ndapt 

,,       them  in  our  own  workrooms  to 

-''suit    the    present    demand    for 

dainty,  refined,  yet  thoroughly 

practical      garments     at     really 

moderate  prices. 


Tea  Frock,  as  skr'ch, 
in  rich  cbiffon  taffeta, 
with  full  panel  front  and 
\est  of  crepe  chificn, 
sIcKves  also  finii^hed 
chiffon  frlls,  picot 
tdgcd.  Bodice  lined  silk 
;  [,tl  waist  on  elastic. 
In  all  colourings  and 
black, 

P'i"  69:6 

Also  in  rich  shot  satin, 

98/6, 

Or  in  potnpadour  taffeta, 

6J  gns. 


MARSHALL   & 
SNELGROVE 

l-l.MlTEU 

VERE  ST.  and  OXFORD  ST. 

LONDON 

ana  at 
SCARBOROUGH    HARROGATE 
LEEDS  YORK 


Our  Book  of  New  Tea  Frocks  and 
Wrappers  posted  free. 


iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiy^ 


ill 


Feel    depressed     in     the  | 

morning  ?      Get     the  | 

Kruschen  habit,  and  every  ■ 

morning  will  find  you  fit  1 

alert  and  cheerful.     Half  J 

a    teaspoonful  —  i n     hot  I 

water  —  on     rising  —  every  | 

morning !  1 

Of  all  Chemists    1/6    per  1 

bottle.     All   British.  | 


SESSEL  Pearls 
are  the  finest  re- 
productions exist- 
ing. They  are 
made  by  a  secret 
and  scientific 
process  which  im- 
parts to  them  the 
same  sheen,  de- 
licacy of  tone, 
texture  and  dura- 
bility of  genuine 
Oriental       Pearls. 

Brochure  No.V^  on 

request    post  free. 

Old  Gold,  Silver,  Diamonds,   etc. 
SESSEL  (Bourn;  Ltd.),  14  & 
(Directly 


B«autiful  Necklet  of 
SBSSEL  Pearls  in 
fitted  case  with  18-ct. 
yold  clasp. 

Si  4s.  Od. 

Real  Diamond  Clasps 
with  SESSEL  Pearl, 
Emerald,  Sapphire  or 
Rub.v     centre,     from 

£2  2«.  Od. 

SESSEL  Pearl  Ear- 
rings, Studs,  S<iarf 
Pins,  Kinj^s  with 
Solid  Gold  mount- 
ings,   from 

£1   lOt.  Od. 

taken  In  exchange  or   purchased  for  cash. 

14a  New  Bond  Street,  London,  W. 

opposite  Asprey.9.) 


Offctrs  can  it  filled  at  a  minuli's  mlict,  which  Is  a  treat  relief  u  those  en  short  leave, 

ELVERY'S 


STORMPROOFS 

And       TRENCH      WATERPROOFS 

l^i^ELVBRY'S  WATERPROOFS  are  fiiiaranteodto  re- 
sist the  heaviest  possible  raitis  ami  are  strong  and  reliable. 

Ppice  3tfns.     Detachable  Fleece  Linings,  a  gns. 

lA.\n   t^  WATER   says:    "  It  is  a  good  coat  worthy  of  the  careful 
consideration  of  all  otticers  in  nei-d  of  area!  waterproof." 
Short  Trench  Waterproof.      !n  all  wci^;hts  and  made  suitable 
for  riding  if  necessary,  also  (Jiving  thorough  iirot'-ctfon.    Prices  63/-* 
75>,  B4,-.     Also  supplied  with  sheep  sUin  Uniii^s. 
Waterproof  KU.     Leggings  14/6.   Trench 
Trousers  25/.,  Gloves  7/6,  etc..  etc.      Long 
Rubber  Thigh  Boots  with  nailed    leather 
s.iles   45  ■  ■■  Tlie"  Boot  fertile  Trenches. 'J^B'* 
Khaki  Rubber  Knee  Boots.  25,-  (Naitcd 
Leather  Soles..  :*7,ti). 


a 


THE 

[trench 

Waterproof  Specialists.     {"WAHFR' 

1  .        »  BOOT 


\s 


Elephant    House, 
31  CONBUITST.,  LONDON.  W. 

fO}ie  ^ocrfrom  .\c-.i'  Jiona  St.) 

And  at  Elephant  House,  DfitLiN, 
and  CoKK. 


48 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  25.  1916 


SESAUNDERSl 


EAST  COWES 

Contractors     to     the     Admiralty 
and    War    Office. 


The 


British  &  Colonial  Aeroplane 
Co.  Ltd. 


FILTON.   BRISTOL. 


CONSTRVCTOKS  OP 


Cie/w^ila/ive^. 


COSTS ACTOKS    TO 

H.M.  War  Office  &  Admiralty. 


Telegrams:  Ttlfpht^nti :  )    Private  Branch 

"  AVIATION,  BKJSTOL."        3906  BRISTOL,    i    Exchange. 


(.Continued  from   pngc  46.) 

worker  to  produce  greater  results  for  tlie  amount  of  effort  he 
jmts  fortli.  To  expect  each  man  henceforth  to  do  three  men's 
work  would  not  solve  the  problem,  because  that  would  only 
wear  out  men's  lives  untimely. 

This  being  a  scientific  age,  the  obvious  course  is  to  employ 
machinery  to  an  ever-increasing  extent.  It  does  not  tire  as 
rapidly  as  a  man  or  an  animal,  and  it  can  embody  strength  far 
beyond  the  capacity  of  liuman  or  animal  physique.  No  form 
of  machinery  illustrates  this  more  convincingly  than  the 
motor.     Hence  its  growing  importance  as  an  Imperial  factor. 

Before  the  war  the  world's  motor  industry  was  primarily 
devoted  to  the  evolution  and  production  of  passenger  vehicles. 
To-day  tlie  greatest  amount  of  developmental  and  maniifactur- 
ing  enterprise  in  Europe  is  being  concentrated  on  the  utility 
motor  vehicle.  Moreover,  in  tlie  New  World  there  are  al- 
ready over  ninety  utility  motor  vehicle  producers.  These 
facts  alone  illustrate  the  extraordinary  degree  of  progress 
that  has  been  made  in  a  short  time.  Rut  tliey  do  not  give 
the  complete  idea.  Merc  haulage  of  goods  cither  in  bulk  or 
in  retail  quantities  represents  but  one  among  several  classes 
of  demand  for  motors  in  the  Empire  overseas. 

During  the  last  two  years  yet  another  notable  branch  of 
the  industry,  the  ultimate  proportions  of  which  we  cannot  yet 
estimate  with  any  degree  of  accuracy,  has  aiisen  in  coimection 
with  agriculture. 

Agriculture's  Demands 

In  this  connection  it  is  argued  by  some  that  the  British 
agricultural  motor  industry  can  never  attain  great  proportions 
because  in  most  cases  the  machines  it  produces  are  too  ex- 
pensive for  the  small  farmer  at  home  to  buy  and  too  large 
for  the  small  fields  that  provide  one  of  the  most  notable 
characteristics  of  our  scenery.  In  the  latter  connection, 
however,  the  Britisher  overseas  will  discover  a  notable  reason 
why  the  agri-motor  manufacturers  at  home  are  producing 
the  sorts  of  machines  which  will  be  of  the  utmost  use  to  him 
on  the  larger  scale  on  which  he  farms.  Nor  are  those  who 
contend  that  the  need  is  for  much  lighter  agri-motor  machinery 
than  we  produce  wholly  in  the  right,  for  we  make  some  quite 
small  varieties. 

Of  course  the  most  widely  agitated  point  at  present  touches 
the  question  of  price.  Despite  all  the  heralding  of  ])ublicity 
agents,  the  fact  remains  that  no  firm  in  America  has  yet  pro- 
duced the  much-talked-of  half-a-million  agri-motors  in  a 
year.  The  time  may  come  ;  but  it  is  not  yet.  In  any  case, 
however  ^v•e  recognise  the  fact  that  some  agri-motor  manu- 
facturers in  the  United  States  are  already  producing  on  a 
scale  much  larger  than  anything  our  own  motor  industry 
has  yet  attained,  therefore  there  is  no  blinking  the  fact  that 
they  can  cut  prices  accordingly.  But  there  is  no  pretence 
that  the  cheaper  American  agri-motors  arc  intended  to  last 
more  than  a  few  seasons.  As  the  advantages  of  regularly 
acquiring  fresh  types  of  machinery  were  never  less  in  any 
field  of  motor  enterprise  than  in  that  of  agriculture  by  motor, 
and  as  the  more  expensive  types  of  British-made  machines 
are  very  obviously  built  to  last,  I  see  no  reason  why  users 
in  the  Empire  overseas  should  not  find  it  at  least  as  economical 
to  buy  a  higher,  priced,  longer  wearing  article  in  preference 
to  a  lower  priced  one  of  much  less  durability. 

Ear  more  important  in  connection  with  this  matter  is  the 
problem  of  design.  It  will  take  at  least  a  decade  before 
the  average  of  the  workers  on  the  world's  farms  will  have 
become  engineers  of  sorts.  Therefore  agri-motor  manu- 
facturers must  give  more  and  more  thought  to  producing 
machinery  that  can  be  put  into  the  hands  of  the  ordinary 
farm  labourer  of  to-day,  as  distinct  from  instruments  that 
demand  the  services  of  a  mechanic  to  maintain  them.  This 
remark  applies  alike  to  the  agri-motor  productions  of  the 
Old  and  of  the  New  World. 

Admittedly,  inunensc  strides  have  been  made  already  to- 
wards solving  this  problem  ;  also  in  regard  to  the  no  less 
urgent  matter  of  organising  adequate  systems  for  promptly 
supplying  users  with  any  parts  that  may  be  needed  froiir 
time  to  time  either  as  renewals  or  replacements.  America 
leads  the  way  in  this  direction.  In  fine,  we  are  only  Ibeginning 
to  apprehend  and  utilise  the  motor  as  an  Imperial  factor. 
By  its  aid,  in  the  course  of  the  next  few  years  we  shall  both 
open  up  and  bring  jnder  cultivation  vast  tracts  of  virgin 
country  all  over  the  world.  Farming  has  already  entered  on 
a  new  phase  in  Canada. 

Apart  from  the  transport  of  goods  by  road  and  track,  and  of 
ploughing,  sowing  and  reaping  by  motor,  we  have  to  recognise 
that  we  have  onlj'  begun  to  employ  it  on  colonial  railway 
systems,  Most  of  our  overseas  dominions  will  soon  be  produc- 
ing all,  and  more  than  all  the  liquid  fuel  necessary  to  work 
their  motors  of  every  kind,  including  those  to  be  placed 
wholesale  on  their  waterways  for  the  cheapest  of  all  forms 
of  transport. 


May  25,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


49 


M515T3l51H151HlST-5I515lST5T5l5T51SI515T^15151515151Slgl5IS15151Sl5^^ 


m 


,,  ^-Ki""-**, 


JEWELLERS     AND     SILVERSMITHS 


TO    H.M.    THE    KING. 


Regimental  Badges  of  the  Empire. 

THE   Badge  of  any  Regiment  made  in  plain  silver  and  gold  or  set  with  diamonds  and 
other  precious  stones  can  be  obtained  from  the  Goldsmiths  &  Silversmiths  Company, 
who  specialise  in  the  production  of  Regimental  Badge  Jewellery. 

This  Badge  Jewellery  is  of  highest  quality  and  workmanship,  and  represents  the  best 
value  obtainable,  special  care  having  been  taken  to  ensure  correctness  ol  design  and 
excellence  of  finish.     A  Catalogue  will  be  sent  post  free  on  application. 


^yfg  Goldsmiths  &  Silversmiti 
Company  LT?  j&Ssgs^ss^S&SMr 

Only   one  address.  112      Regent      Street,       London,      W.  No   Branches. 


51515l5T^15a5151S15lS15T5l515L51SL^1515I515l5IST5l515l5151515l5l5151515I51S151^^ 


Canada. 


Miiplc    Leaf   Badge 

Silver  

9ct.  Gold    

l;K-t.  Gold    

18ct.  GolJ    


Broooh. 

4  6 
£1  1  0 
£1  IS  0 
£1  17     6 


IJr.\i;oons   Badgs   BrotKli. 

Silver  6    0 

Set.  Gold     £18    8 


Artillery  (new)  Maple  Lenf  Badge 

Brooch. 

Silver  ajid  Enamel  ...        15    0 

9ct.  Gold  and  Enamel  £2    5    0 


letli  Badge  Brooch. 

Silver  

9ct.    Gold  


Sth  Badge  Broocli 

Silver  8    V 

8ct.  Gi.ld    £2  13    a 


Koyal  Naval,  Air  Service 
Badge  Brooch.  ISct.  Gold  with 
Ruby  eye    £2  10    0 


Ist  Life  Guards  B.idge 
Uroo<li.  ISct.  Uolil  and 
Enamel       ...    £3  15    0 


Coldstream  Guards 

Budfe'e  Brooch.  Fine 
quality  Diamonds  and 
Enamel      ..      £11  11    0 


Royal  Navy  Cap  Badge 
Brooch.       ISct.     Gold, 
Palladinin   and  Enamel 
£4  10    0 


Welsh     Guards    Badge 

Brooch.      ISirt.   quality 

Diamonds  and  Enamel, 

£4    0    0 


^^^K^ 


The  Ro.val  Irish  Regi- 
ment     Badge      llrwicli. 

Finest  Brilliants 
uiouiited  in   Palladium, 

18ct.  Gold  and  Enamel 
£17    0    0 


The  36th  Sikhs  Badge 
itruoch.  18<'t.  Gold  and 
Enamel        ...    £S  10    0 


Royal    Artillery   Badge 

Broo<-li. 
ISct.  Gold,  Enamel  and 
Diamonds    ..     £9    5    0 
18<t.  Gold,  Enamel  and 
Rose  Dia.  Wheel 

£5  10  0 
18<'t.  Gold.  Enamel  and 
Gold  Wheel      £3    5    0 


ys 


The  let  King  George's 
Own       Gurkha      Rifles 

Biwlpe    Brooch        ]H<'t. 
Gold  and  Palladium 

£4  10    C 


f^ 


Soots  Guards  B.adgo 
Brooch.  Golil  mid 
Enamel  and  Diamonds, 
with  PItlladium  set- 
ting          £23  10    0 


Army  Serv<c«  Corps  Badge 
Brooch.  Fin*  Gold,  Enamel,  &, 
Dia.,  with  Silver  Star  £7  10  0 
18<'t.  Gold.  Enamel,  with  Gold 
Monogram   £S  10    0 


The  Ride  i;riii:ulc  Badge 
Brooch.  Wet.  Gold,  Palladium 
and  Enamel      £5  io    o 


Australia. 


Commoriwealth      llilitar.v      Forces 

Badge  Broixh. 
Silver  and  Blue  Enamel  10    5 

Oct.  Gold   &  Blue  Enamel  £2    2    0 
loct.  Gold  only    £2  15    0 

South  Africa. 


Heavy     Artillery    Badge    Brooch. 

Silver  6    6 

■let.  Gold      £1  12    6 

13et.    Gold   &    Enamel  £2  15     0 


<>nd  Sonth  African  Infantry  Badge 

Urnnch. 

ijct.    uolu  £2    2    0 


Sonth  Africa  Badge  Brooch. 

Silver  5     6 

9cl.  Gold     £1  17    9 

loct.  Gold £2    3    0 

New  Zealand. 


New    Zealand    Badge    Brooch. 
15tt.  Gold    £2  15    0 


Ml^lgl^l51S151ST^151515i>STS151ST^T^151515I5LSl5TSl5I5l5l5I51^^ 


50 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  25,  1916 


Half  Hours  with    High   Commissioners 

By  Joseph  Thorp 


"  Half  hours  "  is  quite  a  modest  euphemism^  as  the  various 
Secretaries  seemed  to  wish  to  convey  to  mc  when  they  ap- 
peared at  what  seemed  to  them  appropriate  moments  with 
important  looking  documents  for  signature  ;  documents  of 
he  sort  that  capable  secretaries  always  do  keep  by  them  for 
the  purpose  of  ridding  their  chiefs  of  importunate  visitors. 
I  am  gratified  to  think  that  in  each  case  I  survived  the  first 
application  of  the  document  treatment. 

.A  High  Commissioner  is  a  sort  of  Ambassador  with  a 
dash  of  Supcr-consid-General.  The  Office  for  which  the 
Dominions  choose  their  most  distinguished  public  servants 
is  one  of  rapidly  developing  importance  and  is  shaping 
itself  according  to  our  traditional  method  through  e.xperience 
and  practice  rather  than  according  to  a  preconceived  or 
uniform  plan. 

The  High  Commissioner  is  strictly  an  official,  representing 
his  government  not  himself.  Canada's  representative,  Sir 
George  Perky  is  actually  a  Minister  of  the  Canadian 
Cabinet,  a  Minister  without  portfolio.  Mr.  Andrew 
Fisher  and  Sir  Thomas  Mackenzie  have  both  been  Prime 
Ministers.  Mr.  Schreincr  has  had  a  most  distinguished 
political  and  legal  career  in  'South  Africa,  and  has  twice 
been  Attorney  General,  and  was  Prime  Minister  of  the 
Cape  before  the  Union. 

This  official  aspect  of  the  position  inevitably  restricts  the 
candour  of  the  conversations,  especially  in  war  time  when 
every  thorny  question  puts  forth  neiv  spines.  I  can 
make  them  no  better  return  for  their  kindness  than  to  respect 
their  candour  and  put  the  asterisks  where  these  -were  enjoined 
me.  My  best  service  to  readers  of  Land  &  Water  is  to 
attempt  to  give  some  impression  of  these  interesting  person- 
alities and  of  the  substance  of  their ■  excellent  talk. 

I  will  attempt  this  in  the  order  of  my  going. 

THE    COMMONWEALTH    OF 
AUSTRALIA 

MR.  ANDREW  FISHER  is  a  tall  well-made 
man,  without  superfluous  flesh,  a  bearing  almost 
military,  who  has  not  yet  reached  the  middle 
of  the  sixth  decade.     About  his  speech  lingers 

the  flavour  of 
his  native  Scot- 
land, but  no 
trace  you  would 
say  of  the  mine 
which  he  en- 
tered when  he 
was  eleven.  A 
man  certainly 
accustomed  to 
command.  One 
has  to  rub  one's 
eyes  and  re- 
member that  at 
the  age  of  twenty-three  Andrew  Fisher  left  Scotland, 
but  before  that  he  had  expressed  opinions  that  were 
considered  of  the  "agitator"  order.  That  was  in  the 
middle  'eighties.  We  hadn't  begun  even  to  try  to  under- 
stand our  "  agitators "  then.  I  asked  him  how  he 
felt  about  all  that. 

"  I  am  glad  I   went  to  Australia,"    he  said.     "  If  it 
hadn't  been  for  that,  why  I  might  have  been  still  in 
Scotland  thinking  seriously  of  the  fate  of  old  age." 
"  You  must  have  enjoyed  your  strenuous  life  ?  " 
I  caught  a  quickly  passing  expression  of  rather  queer 
dismay. 

"  Yes,  I  have.  But  I  wouldn't  have  another  day  of 
it  over  again.  .  .  .  No,  I  don't  want  to  let  Ufe  go. 
There's  plenty  to  do,  but  it's  an  improving  world, 
despite  the  war.'' 

***** 
Here    then    is  the  hall-mark    of   the  man,  who    has 
really  counted  and  still  counts  in  affairs— he  is  not  so 
much  concerned  to  plume  himself  on  what  he  has  ac- 


complished  against  odds,  but  to  think  chiefly  of  what 
yet  remains  to  be  done. 

I  ventured  to  air  a  hope  that  we  were  nearing 
a  new  day  when  we  shouldn't  be  so  foolishly  afraid  of 
the  power  of  Labour,  but  should  welcome  widespread 
developments  of  that  power,  now  faintly  seen  on  the 
hoVizon  ;  and  that  increased  responsibility  and  fuller 
experience  would  act  as  effective  fly  wheels. 

"  That's  it.  You  have  not  been  fair  to  Labour.  You 
don't  understand  it.  You've  not  trusted  it.  An  animal 
trampled  on  will  bite ;  it  has  to.  Of  course,  when 
the  power  of  two  parties  is  better  balanced  you  will 
get  fairer  negotiations.  You've  been  too  apt  to  try 
dragooning — oh,  yes,  on  both  sides,  of  course  I  admit 
— ^but  in  the  long  run,  in  the  average,  it  is  kindness  that 
tells,  sympathy  and  understanding. 

"  Our  Labour  problem  out  there  is  free  of  some  of 
Labour's  worst  troubles  here  and  it  has  made  us  see 
clearer  and  further  in  [some  ways.  We  saw  an  obvious 
danger  ahead  of  us  and  provided  against  it.  We're  not 
militarist,  but  military  we  had  to  be.  Just  as  the  ex- 
perience of  the  war  here  is  teaching  Labour  things  it 
didn't   realise  before. 

*  *  *  *  *         •      ■ 

"  But  please  don't  talk  of  helping  the  old  country. 
We're  in  this  because  it  is  our  cause  just  as  much  as 
yours." 

"  I  am  afraid  that  was  a  bait  of  mine.  Sir.  I  wanted 
to  hear  you  say  that — just  like  that.  Old  ideas  and 
phrases  die  hard.  We  have,  I  think,  almost  got  rid 
of  talking  about  Colonies  and  the  old  fatuous  air  of 
patronage.  .  .  .  Perhaps  the  patronage  now  is  a 
little  bit  the  other  way  ?  " 

The  High  Commissioner  laughed. 

"  Oh,  I  don't  think  you  need  take  that  too  seriously. 
The  Australian  talks  up  Australia  because  he  believes 
in  his  country.  We're  a  young  country  and  no  doubt 
we've  young  faults. 

"  Well,  as  I  have  said  already,  we're  not  here  to 
criticise  but  to  help  win  the  war." 

"  I  should  like  you  to  tell  me  some  of  the  things 
Australia  has  done  in  the  way  of  help,  so  far  as  official 
discretion  permits." 

"  As  to  our  share  in  the  war.  Well,  we  shouldn't 
have  been  able  to  get  ready  so  soon  to  do  our  bit  if  it 
hadn't  been  for  our  system  of  universal  military  training 
— though  as  you  understand  every  man  who  has  Come 
over  is  a  volunteer  for  foreign  service.  As  to  numbers, 
well  you  appreciate  the  difficulties.  It  worfld  be 
indiscreet  if  I  say  that  over  150,000  troops  of  all  arms 
have  up  to  date  left  Australia  for  Europe.  I  needn't 
tefl  you  that  doesn't  end  our  effort.  We're  all  '  last 
man  and  shilling  '  folk.  There  are  in  training  another 
180,000,  including  cadets. 

***** 

"  Finance  ?  Oh,  that's  a  simple  story.  During  the 
first  six  months  the  Commonwealth  Government  had  to 
finance  not  only  its  own  administration  and  its  Army 
and  Navy,  but  also  the  States,  which  were  affected  by  a 
prevailing  severe  drought.  The  enemy  within  was  much 
worse  than  the  enemy  without.  The  Commonwealth 
borrowed  some  23  millions  from  the  Imperial  Government 
to  finance  its  war  requirements  and  lent  almost  exactly 
the  same  sum  to  the  State  Governments  to  enable 
them  to  carry  on  their  public  works.  When  this 
money  was  exhausted  Australia  realised  that  she  must 
stand  on  her  own  feet.  The  Commonwealth  Govern- 
ment raised  a  war  loan,  applied  for  5  millions  and 
received  13  millions  at  the  first  call.  Within  six 
months  applied  for  a  further  10  millions  and  received 
21.  That  34  milUons  is  not  yet  quite  exhausted,  and 
I  have  every  confidence  that  the  additional  loans 
proposed  in  the  House  of  Representatives  by  the  Treasurer 
wiU  also  be  over-subscribed. 

"  A  great  deal  of  our  abiUty  to  go  on,  naturally,  rests 

iContinued   on   page  52.) 


May  25,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


51 


'        Lr  Solo  and  M^ 


■'•%H^«\>»' 


\I7HETHER  living  in  town  or  country  you 
~  *  will  appreciate  the  usefulness  of  a  B.S.A. 
4^  h.p.  Motor  Bicycle  (for  Solo  and  Sidecar), 
ts  great  reliability  and  economy,  combined 
with  the  special  advantages  of  the  B.S.A. 
Countershaft  Three-Speed  Gear,  have  made 
the  B.S.A.  one  of  the  most  popular 
comb  nations  for  either  long  or  short  journeys. 

1916  B.S.A.  Catalogue  Free. 
THE  BIRMINGHAM  SMALL  ARMS 

Co.,    Ltd., 
78   Small   Heath,  Birmingham. 


t 


B.S.A 


B.S.A 


The  remarkable  pre-war  demand  for  B.S.A.  rifles — for  target  practice  and  game 
shooting — continues,  notwithstanding  that  supplies  have  been  absent  for  some  time.  Fine 
design  and  workmanship  and  marvellous  accuracy  are,  of  course,  at  the  back  of  it  all. 

Manufacture  will  be  resumed  when  machines  are  again  available,  and  those  who  appre- 
ciate the  great  value  of  a  fine  rifle— for  field  or  range  work — will   be  wise  to   wait- 
There  are  still  left  in  stock  a  few  rifles  of  bores  .25,  .300,  and  .310,  specially 
suitable  for  rook  and  small  game  shooting.  Full  particulars  post  free. 


TIME,     FATIGUE     AND     ANXIETY     SAVED     BY 

B.S.A.     "SAFEXIPASXB." 

Merely  coat  the  bore  of  your  rifle,  gun  or  pistol  barrel  with  a  film  of  "  Safetipaste."   Arduous  scrubbing 

and  periodic  re-cleaning  rendered  quite  unnecessary.       "  Safetipaste"  kills  harmful    fouling  immediately. 

It  is  extensively  used  in  army  rifles  at  the  front.        1  /-  per  tube.        Write  for  further  details  free. 

THE     BIRMINGHAM     SMALL     ARMS    Co.,     Ltd.,      BIRMINGHAM. 

Makers  of  rifles  and  machine  guns  for  British,  Colonial,  and  Foreign  Governments. 


52 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  25,  1916 


Colonial&  Continental 

Ci)urcf)  ^ocietp 

(Patron  :    H.M.  THE    KING) 

urgently  needs  funds  for 

I.-ITS  WAR  ZONE  CHAPLAINCIES 

Its    Chaplaioi   ilill   remain   io    Brus»el»,     Lille,    and    Croii.    to 

minister  Io  the  Brilitb  who  are  ilill  to  be  found   there. 

Iti  Chaplains  in    Partt.   Boulogne.  Rouen,  etc..  have    done^  noble 

wcrk  for  our  toldiers  at  well    at   for    Bttttsh    retidcnti.       Several 

of  these  Chaplains  have  been  in  danger  ot  their   live*   from   the 

eaenr. 

II.— ITS  GREAT  WORK  IN  WEST- 
ERN   CANADA 

Western  Canada  ha»  suffered  severely  throuih  the  war:  and  the 

Church  hat  suffered  more  than  any   other  body,  for  a  very   high 

proportion  of  Churchmen  have  left  their  homes  to  go  to  the  help 

ol  the   Mother  Country. 

This  Society  help*  to  maioUin  Clergy  *nd   Lay   Evangelists  in 

13  diocet«s  of  the  West. 

Whole  districli  will  be  'eft   without  any  minister  of  religioo  it 

its  grants  have  to  be  withdrawn. 

III.— ITS  WORKERS  AMONGST 
OUR  SCATTERED  SETTLERS 
EVERYWHERE 

In  the  Buih  d'orrtet  of  Auitratil.  on  the  Eait  African  uplands, 
in  South  Africa,  the  West  Indies,  etc.,  the  Colonial  anil 
Continental  Church  Society  aids  the  poor,  the  tcattered,  the 
strvggliog,  and  the  newly  am/ed  Bnlisk  settler. 

Please  Help   Liberally   NOW 

Tpeasurer :    F.    A.    BEVAN,    Esq. 
Secretary  :    Rev.    J.    D.    MULLINS, 

9  Serjeants'  Inn,  Fleet  Street,  E.O. 


LORD  GLADSTONE,  Ex-Govemor  ot 
South  Africa,  speaking  on  liis  experience 
as  an  Imperial  Administrator  at  the  annual 
meeting  of  tlie  London  Missionary  Society,  on 
May  10,  igifa,  said  :  "  The  most  experienced 
men  in  South  Africa  say  now — facing  in- 
numerable native  problems  in  various  parts 
of  the  African  continent — deliberately  that 
the  best  hope  of  solving  those  problems 
happily  and  rightly  lies  in  a  forward  mission- 
ary movement  of  the  Churches.  I  found  in 
South  Africa  the  splendid  missionary  work 
and  workers  self-evident.  I  have  never 
doubted  the  efficacy  of  missionary  work." 

LORD  BRYCE,  Ambassador  to  the 
U.S.A.,  says  :  "  Because  Christianity 
now  lies  under  the  reproach  of  having  failed  to 
avert  war  between  Christians,  we  ought  to  try 
more  than  ever  not  to  let  missionary  enterprise 
faint  or  dag,  in  the  firm  conviction  that 
nothing  but  Christianity  can  eventually 
secure  the  world's  peace." 

Zi)t  Honbon  itiijifiionarp  ^ocietp 

throughout  the  British  Empire,  in  India, 
Africa,  the  South  Seas,  Papua,  and  Hongkong ; 
and  through  men  like  Livingstone,  Chalmers, 
and  hundreds  of  less  known  men  and  women, 
by  education,  healing  the  sick,  and  by 
preaching,  is  doing  its  part. 

Funds  toward  achieving  the  results  spoken 
of  by  Lord  Bryce  and  Lord  Gladstone  are 
earnestly  solicited. 

Treasurer  :   Mr.  Evan  Spicer,  D.L.,  J. P. 
Home  Secretary  :   Rev.  Nelson  Bitton, 
16  New  Bridge  Street,  E.C. 


(finnUnved  trom  pnge  50) 

in  the  getting  a  prompt  return  for  our  great  primary 
products — that  is,  wool  and  wheat.  That  makes  the 
problem  of  transport,  whicli  is  now  receiving  the  careful 
consideration  of  the  Prime  Minister  in  London,  the 
paramount  problem." 

"  And  what  in  your  view  does  the  future  of  Australia 
chiefly  depend  upon  ?  "  I  said,  asking  the  preposterously 
overwhelming  question  without  which  no  interview  is 
complete. 

But  the  answer  was  not  in  the  vague  terms  that  such 
a  question  usually  invites.     There  was  fire  in  the  reply. 

"  On  our  education,  as  yours  does.  Programme — 
well  but  we  haven't  time  to  talk  of  that.  But,  some 
other  day. 

But  here  the  Seci;etary  came  in  for  the  second  time 
with  a  distinct  air  of  finality  and  laid  some  real  letters 
before  his  Chief. 

When  I  pulled  out  my  watch  with  a  hand  tingling  from 
a  very  cordial  handshake,  I  gasped.  .  .  .  But 
I  carried  with  me  a  much  prized  invitation  to  discuss 
education  and  other  matters  under  conditions  necessitating 
less  official  discretion  on  the  one  sideband  less  abject 
politeness  on  the  other.  And  distinctly,  a  picture  of 
a  real  man. 

NEW    ZEALAND 

SIR  THOMAS  MACKENZIE  received  me  in  the 
beautiful  new  offices  of  the  Dominion  of  New 
Zealand,  just  opposite  the  Tivoli  site  in  the  Strand. 
I  hope  Sir  Thomas  won't  mind  my  saying  that 

he  might  be 
taken  for  a 
Londoner.  He 
doesn't  want  to 
be  one  I  know  ; 
he  is  a  New  Zea- 
lander  through 
and  through 
But  as  he  says 
the  "  youngest 
colony  "  though 
it  is  as  sturdily 
nationalist  and 
independent  in 
the  best  sense 
of  both  words 
as  the  other 
Dominions — well,  time  hasn't  altered  its  characteristics  so 

much New  Zealand  too  has  some  of  the  best 

things  of  our  climate  (omitting  some  of  the  most  beastly 
and  taking  volcanoes  and  geysers  as  a  sort  of  make 
weight).  In  so  far  as  the  country  makes  the  man 
they    have  distinctly  the  advantage  of  us. 

As  all -our  world  has  learnt  with  the  profoundest 
sympathy,  the  High  Commissioner's  gallant  son  lost  his 
sight  from  wounds  in  Gallipoli,  and  that  sorrow  (though 
not  alluded  to)  made  itself  felt  in  the  interview. 

Mindful  of  my  broken  conversation  with  Mr.  Fisher  on 
education,  I  thought  the  subject  might  serve  as  an 
opening  here.  As  it  happens,  no  choice  could  have 
been  more  felicitous.  It  was  obviously  the  High  Com- 
missioner's real  hobby,  though  "  Who's  Who  "  gives 
"  exploration,  natural  history  and  sport." 

Sir  Thomas  has  been  closely  associated  with  the  really 
admirable  educational  system  of  New  Zealand  and 
spoke  of  its  democratic  opportunity  and  its  ingenious 
machinery.  The  system  of  Education  Boards,  chosen 
not  directly  but  by  the  popularly  elected  Committees, 
and  the  delegation  of  real  power  and  responsibility  to 
these  Boards,  draws  an  admirable  type  to  this  Splendid 
opportunity  of  citizenship.  I  listened  to  a  brilliant 
(brilliant  because  so  transparently  sincere)  exposition  of 
the  ideals  and  achievements  of  an  enthusiast.  A  few 
points  stand  out  in  relief. 

"Anyone  capable  of  going  from  the  obligatory  primary 
schools  to  the  secondary  and  out  from  these  on  to  the 
University  can  do  so.  .  ,  .  Wherever  there  are 
twelve  children  in  a  village  a  school  is  pro\ided.  Where- 
ever  there  arc  less  the  dovcrnment  provides  £'6  a  year 
for  each  child  to  the  parents  in  the  lonely  districts  to  help 
pay  the  cost  of  schooling;  at  home.     .     .     .     It  is  arranged 

iContinutd   on    page   54.) 


M? 


i\' 


if)i6 


LAND     &    WATER 


5.3 


presents    many    varied    attractions    for    the    Tourist    and 
Sportsman,  and  provides  an  ideal  Home  for  British  People. 

It  has  a  health}'  and  pleasant  climate.  The  water  is  pure.  There 
are  no  snakes  or  noxious  insects,  nor  any  fevers  peculiar  to  the  country. 

There  are  scores  of  beautiful  lakes  and  hundreds  of  splendid  rivers, 
where  the  finest  trout  fishing  in  the  world  is  obtainable — Rainbow, 
Brown  and  Loch  Leven  being  taken  in  very  large  quantities. 

There  are  hundreds  of  miles  of  majestic  mountains,  ranging  up  to 
13,000  feet.  Comfortable  Alpine  hostels.  Guides  and  all  climbing 
accessories  are  obtainable. 

The  New  Zealand  Fjords  are  admitted  by  travellers  to  be  the 
largest  and  grandest  in  the  World. 

The  Government  Tourist  Department  gives  every  assistance  to  visitors . 

Excellent  Steamship  Services  run  from  London  and  Plymouth  direct 
to  New  Zealand. 

The  Midsummer  months  in  New  Zealand  are  November,  December 
and  Januars'. 

Further    Information    is  obtainable    from 

THE  HIGH  COMMISSIONER  FOR  NEW  ZEALAND. 

413-416    THE     STRAND,     LONDON,     W.C. 


||f 


The  wonderful  natural  resources  of 

QUEBEC  offer  unique  opportunities 

for  the   profitable   investment    of 

British  capital. 

Abundant  Water  power  is  available  and  is  almost 
given  away  to  new  companies  establishing  bona  fide 
industries.  Several  municipalities  are  offering  free 
sites,  exemption  from  taxation,  and  electric  power  at 
very  low  rates  to  manufacturers.  THE  MINING 
INDUSTRY  provides  the  raw  material  of  many  British 
industries,  products  including  Molybdenite,  Feldspar, 
Magnesia,  Graphite,  Copper,  Iron  Ore,  Iron  Sand,  and 
Asbestos.  The  steel  trade  is  booming.  Hardware, 
Enamelware,  and  Woodwarc  offer  excellent  oppor- 
tunities. New  Pa|)er  and  Pulp  Mills  are  urgently 
required.  AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCTS  include 
Wheat,  Oats,  Potatoes,  and  other  Field  Crops.  Dairy 
and  other  product*  include  Butter  and  Cheese,  Apples 
and  other  Fruit,  Tobacco,  Live  Stock,  etc. 

QUEBEC 

(OanadA). 


For  further  particulars  apply    to — 

The  Agcnt-Gcncral  for   Quebec,    36  Kingsway, 
London,  W.C. 


By     AGNES     GORDON 
LENNOX. 


MR.  JOHN  L ANE^S  LATEST  BOOKS 

NEW  NOVE'.S.      6s.  EACH. 

THE  BYWONNER 

By  F.  E.  MILLS  YOUNG.  Author  of  "  The  Great 
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PIERRE  NOZIERE 

By  ANATOLE  FRANCE.  Transatcd  by  J.  LEWIS 
MAY.  Collected  English  Edition  of  the  Works  of 
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BROWNIE 

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HEARTS  &  FACES 

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THE  SHELTERED  SEX 

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54 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  25,  1916 


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'■  '  iiiul  it  murli  riif  imwt  awiinitt  of  ^urh 

•  -nicwlmt  Ijir^it-r  fralr,  and  thniiyh  thi** 

1  om  gliitl  to  h.ive  the  apijordinity 

01  j;t\  111,;  yuii  i]tt>  upiitU'U  Lur  uliuL  ti  ii>  vvucth.      Id  work  surli  a.-*  mino  It  W  an 

opinion  wh'w-U  i*  coustnnUv  piit  to  the  leH, and  Ihave  never  known  tliattcat  to  fall." 

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"  A  "•■■  '   accuracy,  critical  Insight,  and  literary  flnLsh  is 

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^S.1^::^u°LZ^  W,  &  R.  CHAMBERS,  Ltd. 

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c^e  yfAS/^y^/i/^^m^^ 


Prenaier 


hwiM.0LD5corc«Wwl 


Of  many  fine  whiskies,  the  finest. 


Postesses  a  delicate  flavour  and  bouquet  which  will 
give    you    a    new    appreciation    of    Scotch    Whisky. 

Wright  &  Greig,  Ltd., 

distillers  of 

"RODERICK    DHU."  <« 


(Conffnufd  from  page  !>2.) 

that  the  railways,  where  necessary,  take  the  children  to 
school  free  of  charge,  and  springcarts   are  also  hired  for 
that   purpose.      The   teacher's  pay  is   liberal.      He    is 
recognised  as  a  national  asset.      Our  system  of  education 
is  secular,  although  from  time    to  time  colonists  have 
desired  to  introduce  religious  instruction,  and  the  Roman 
Catholics  especially  have  pointed  out  the  hardships  under 
which    they    labour   in     requiring  to  provide  their  own 
schools.     The  system  was   brought  to  us  largely  by  our 
Scottish    colonists.    Otago,    the    pro\ance   to   which    my 
father  went,  was  settled  by  the  Free  Church  of  Scotland, 
and  Canterbury  by  the  Church  of  England.     Large  grants 
of    land    were    set    aside    in    both  .  these  pro\'inccs  for 
religious  purposes,  and  churches  still  receive  considerable 
support  from  these  sources.     Other  provinces  were  settled 
by     people     from     different  counties  in  England.     New 
Plymouth,  for  instance,  was  settled  by  Devonshire  people. 

"A  youth  of  ordinary  ability  will  receive  a  grant  in  aid 
during  the  later  stages  of  his  schooltime  of  £io  a  year  ; 
if  of  extraordinary  ability,  a  grant  of  ^^40  over  and  above 
his  free  education."  ft  sounded  like  the  Millennium  to  me 
and  made  me  wonder  whether  the  hard  days  that  are 
probably  coming  for  the  professional  classes  in  the  matter 
of  education  mightn't  drive  some  of  us  to  apply  for  ad- 
mission into  this  admirably  alert  young  State. 

I  suppose  I  began  apologising  for  something  else,  for 
Sir  Thomas  got  up  and  let  me  have  it  straight  from  the 
shoulder.  It  wasn't  a  piece  thrown  off  for  publication, 
as  I  saw,  if  I  may  tell  it  without  indiscretion,  tears  in 
his  eyes. 

"  Don't  go  on  apologising,"  he  said.  "  Let  me  tell 
you  from  watching  you  pretty  closely  during  the  war, 
you're— you're  a— a  grand  people/  Still  as  sound  as 
ever.  It  is  a  privilege  to  be  here.  Our  fellows  love  your 
men  when  they  come  across  them ;  their  cheeriness, 
their  grit,  their  very  way  of  pretending  there  is  nothing  in 
it.  Your  hospitality  to  us  has  been  astonishing.  It  has 
only  got  to  be  known  that  we  need  anything  and  the  thing's 
done 

"  You  know  all  this  means  a  great  deal  to  me.  I 
suppose  the  old  country  is  less  "  home  "  to  me  than  it 
was  to  my  faiher ;  and  to  my  children  it  is  just  a  little  bit 
farther  away  still.  Old  bonds  were  naturally  weakening 
a  little.  That  couldn't  be  helped  ;  it  is  just  the  passing  of 
time.  But  all  this  coming  together  in  the  war  is  just  the 
big  thing  that  was  wanted  to  pull  us  all  together  again,  and 
for  all  the  dreadfulness  of  it,  absolutely  nothing  could  be 
better  for  the  future  we  all  look  forward  to  ...  . 
Oh,  yes,  of  course  there  are  things  we  don't  like  and  per- 
haps we  shall  have  things  to  say  in  due  time.  But  don't 
you  go  a\\-ay  with  any  impression  that  the  young  people 
have  any  contempt  for  the  old.  England,  or  rather 
Britain,  will  always  be  "  home  "  in  the  old  sense  for 
me  and  for  my  children  and  for  theirs,  if  it  keeps  as 
sound  as  it  is  to-day." 

This  was  good  hearing  indeed.  And  I  ventured, 
catching  at  a  hint,  to  touch  on  the  vexed  question  of 
Land  Settlement." 

The  conditions  of  settlement  which  prevail  in  New 
Zealand  are  very  generous,  and  enormous  assistance  is 
given  by  our  progressive  Government  in  encouraging 
the  workman  to  become  his  own  landlord  and  to  give 
him  a  vested  interest  in  the  Dominion.  However, 
we  want  to  win  this  war,  and  after  that  is  done  I 
think  there  will  be  a  wide  field  for  the  enterprising 
spirits  of  the  Old  Country." 

"  Oh,  of  course  we  have  got  room  for  the  right 
men.  And  women  ?  Oh  j^es.  But  they  ought  to  be 
real  home  makers,  really  trained.  It  does  seem  to 
me  that  here  as  with  us  there  is  an  astonishing  neglect 
of  the  science,  or  the  art  rather  isn't  it,  of  domestic 
economy.     Another  of  my  hobbies,  which  I  musn't  ride 


"  By  the  way,  this  might  interest  you,  though  it  is 
nothing  to  do  with  the  matter  in  hand.  A  Turkish 
officer  forwarded  to  this  office  a  pound  note  which  had 
been  found  by  one  of  his  men  on  the  dead  body  of  one  of 
ours,  together  with  a  memorandum  by  the  poor  fellow 
asking  that  the  pound  should  be  sent  to  his  mother  if 
he  was  killed.     As  you  know  our  fellows  came  back  with 

(Continued  on   page  56.) 


May  25,  1916 


LAND       &     WATER 


55 


Vf^OIMNDS 

HATS 


Unique 
Distinctive 
and  Smart. 


V.  271.— Bangkok 
Panama  Hat,  in  very 
prelly  shape,  trinHned 
tinsel  and  flowers  in 
front,  in  all  lovely 
colourings.     r%  1 

Price    Zfsns- 


E.  103.  — 
Black  Lis^re 
Hat,  lined 
flesh-coloured  pink, 
trimmed  with  black  silk 
bow  at  back  and 
French  rose  at  side. 
In  nigger,  burnt,  navy, 
and  purple^  39^g 


Catalogue  of 

Fashions 

Post  Free  on 

application. 


/ 


E.  92.  —  Charming 

Hat,  straw  brim,  lined 
satin  and  satin  soft  top, 
trimmed  with  ivy 
leaves  round  crown,  in 
every  lovely  ACjq 
colour.  Price   '^*^l  •' 


£.  V_ 


V.    273.  -  Coarse 
Straw    Sailor    Hat, 

trimmed    velvet    band 

and   tie    bow,    in    all 

colours.  «    ^  if\ 

Price     14/9 


WOOLLAND  BROTHERS 


95  to  107  KNIGHTSBRIDGE 
LONDON,  S.W. 


LTD. 

Military  Badge  Broociies. 

Jiny  Regimenlal  Sodge  Perfectly  Modelled. 
I'RICES    ON     APPLICATION. 

Large  Selection  in  Diamonds,  or  Gold 

and  Enamel.  Sketches  sent  tor  al^prora 

"Active  Seroice"  WRISTLET  WATCH 
Fully  Luminous  Figures  and  Hands 

Warranted  Timelceepers 

In    Silver    Cases  with    Screw    Bezel 

and  Back-      l^t   •Ss. 

Or  with     Hunter    cover, 

crt   Ts,    «id. 

Others   in    .Silver   from      C^    lOs, 

Gold  from    tr»   lOs. 


25   OLD  BOND  STREET,  W 

and  62&64  LUDOATE  HILL.   K.C. 


etter  times 


i^ 


TL'ST  asa  bow  in  the  s 

heavens  is  a  sign  = 

that  rain  will  cease  and  = 

the    sun  shine,  so    the  = 

signature  G.  A. V,  bn  an  ^ 

accumulator  denotes  to  s 

the    motorist    that    his  ^ 

lighting    and     starting  = 

troubles  are  at  an  end.  ^ 


^m^  ACCUMULATORS 

fBritish   Made   Tliroti^-liout ) 

are    specially   conitrucled  to  withstand  the  hardest  possible  wear,  and 
the    plates  are  proof  a^rai-si  buckling  even  under  the  severest  strain. 


^  C.A.r.  Brithh-madeBntter- 
=^  ieiforevery  purposf^  if'nte 
^=    Kf     your     requiremente, 


ACTON . LONDON  .W.  ^ 


CORSETS 


Our  Corset  Department 
otfei's  quite  exceptional 
adv,ant;iges  to  customers. 
It  is  under  the  control  of 
a  clever  Corsetiere,  who 
personally  designs  every 
pair  of  Corsets  offered  for 
sale.  The  result  is  that 
ladies  are  able  to  buy 
quite  inexpensive  Corsets 
made  from  thoroughly 
reliable  materials  upon 
the  most  scientific  prin- 
ciples. Ladies  are  cor- 
dially invited  to  inspect 
our  models.  Corsets  sent 
on  approval  are  carefully 
selected  by  our  own  Cor- 
setiere. 

HIP-BELT,  as  sketch, 
especially  woven  to  shape, 
made  of  best  quality 
Tricot,  with  two  pairs  of 
.suspenders. 


^ 


Price 


25/-. 


SOUTIEN  GORGE,  as 
.sketch,  made  of  best  qua- 
lity Silk  Tricot,  trimmed 
Valenciennes  Lace,  ribbon 
over  shoulders. 

p-  18/6. 

Can  be  had  deeper,  25/- 


1 


DebenKam 
&Freebo<Jy 

Wiomore  Street. 

iCovendish  Squore)  London.W 

Famous  lor  over  a  Ccnf  ury 

forTostCi  (or  Qnaliiy  Tor  Value 


56 


LAND      &      WATER 


May  25,  19 16 


tColiUnutd  fiom  patfe  51.) 


a  very  high  feeling  of  affection  for  the  Turk  as  a  clean 
fighting  man.  You  see  he  can  be  a  gentleman  in  other 
ways  also." 

THE    UNION    OF    SOUTH    AFRICA. 


M 


R.  SCHREINER  carries  his  aU  but  three 
score  years  amazingly.  I  hope  it  is  not  out 
of  order  to  note  that  he  is  a  singularly 
handsome  man   and   that    one    of    our    real 

painters  should 
find  it  worth 
his  while  to 
make  a  study  of 
the  clear,  sun- 
warmed  skin, 
the  blue  of  ex- 
ceechngly  keen 
wise  eyes  and 
the  warm  grey 
of  the  beard. 
He  speaks  with 
a  finish  and  a 
fastidious  choice 
of  phrase  which 
1  do  not  attempt  to  reproduce. 

I  found,  if  I  may  be  frank,  his  extreme  official  discretion 
(while  I  could  not  but  admire  it)  a  little  disconcerting.  He 
knew  all  my  gambits  and  no  doubt  some  scores  of  others. 
My  battalions  of  highly  inteihgent  questions  were  withered 
by  what  I  ma\-  call  his  curtain  fire.  On  nothing  approach- 
ing a  controversial  qucstion--and  "  are  not  most  ques- 
tions from  certain  aspects  controversial  ?  " — would  he 
allow  any  comment  to  pass  his  lips. 

Trade  arrangements,  zollvereins,  ah,  those  were  indeed 
very  delicate  questions  to  discuss  in  detail  at  any  time, 
particularly  during  the  war.-  As  General  Botha  had 
said,  let  us  get  on  with  the  war  and  win  it.  Arrange 
after^vards.  That  seemed  to  him  (for  the  purpose  of  this 
interview)  extremely  sound. 

The  general  feeUng  of  the  Dutch  in  South  Africa  ? 
Well,  who  could  answer  for  the  general  feeling  of  any 
body  of  men  ?     The  broad  facts  open  to  all  the  world 


stood  for  themselves.  Clearly  Botha's  commandos  in 
South-West  .\frica  had  their  fair  share  of  Dutchmen. 
As  to  the  troops  going  over  to  England,  of  course  there 
were  less  of  Dutch  than  British  blood.  Sentiment 
counted  a  good  deal.  And  then  farmers  (you  have  an 
analogous  case  in  French  Canada),  were  always  less 
alive  to  questions  outside  their  immediate  ken  than 
townsfolk.  And  it  was  worth  noting  that  South 
Africa  had  had  one  of  its  worst  periods  of  drought,  and 
the  men  after  serving  in  thousands  in  South-Wcst 
Africa,  simply  had  to  return  to  the  farms  to  save  the 
country's  agriculture   from  sheer  ryin. 

And  what  of  tlie  futvuo  ?  Well,  he  could  say  that  the 
change  tiiat  had  taken  place  in  the  fourteen  years  since 
the  war  was  all  but  unbelievable.  To  hive  "heard  and 
seen  the  bitterness  of  some  of  the  defeated  in  those  early 
days  was  to  dread  that  a  future  of  reconciliation  might 
be  impossible.  Yet  the  impossible  had  been  substantially 
achieved.  The  tolerance  and  wisdom  of  the  British 
Government,  the  sanity  and  faith  of  the  men  who 
promised  allegiance  at  Verceniging,  education,  in  which 
great  strides  were  being  made,  intermarriage,  which  was 
becoming  more  and  more  common,  were  doing  this  all- 
important  work. 

****** 

Yes,  the  war  would  in  South  Africa  as  elsewhere, 
strengthen  the  feeling  of  unity. 

****** 

Only  there  were  difficulties  and  dangers  and  no  easy 
solutions.  "  There  never  are  easy  solutions."  Nor  could 
comprehensive  statements  be  made. 

****** 
The  rebellion  was  a  tragedy,  but  it  had  a  happy  ending. 

***** 
Yes,  there  -vill  always  be  nationalist  aspiration  every- 
where. But  in  South  Africa  it  could  be  reconciled  with 
keeping  complete  faith  with  the  fellowship  of  the  Empire. 
Indeed  no  other  serviceable  plan  gives  better  hope  for 
South  African  nationalism. 

***** 
He  would  like  to  say  that  the  War   Office   had   been 
extremely  considerate  towards  South   African  applicants 

iContinxted  on  imge  J8.^ 


rrWE    CAR     SUPEREXCELLENT 


■j(  sIogM  fnm  ihe  Fnni,  uintd  by  a  solditr-Jrivir  m  <harge  of  a  Vauxhall : 

he  finest  car  on  active  service'' 


^ERT.AIN  facts  in  the  matter  of  motor- 
cars and  wnr  service  should  be  kept 
steadily  in  mind  by  prospective  buyers.  One 
is  th;u  His  Majesty's  Government  is  still,  after 
nearly  two  years'  ex|)erictice  of  Vauxhall  cars, 
purdiasing  every  one  that  can  be  produced. 
Another  i^  that  the  Vauxhall  factory  is  kept 
wholly  engaged  on  the  building  of  staft"  cars. 


Apply  these  facts  and  you  arrive  ar  the  justifi- 
cation for  the  above-quoted  slogan.  Take  into 
account'  further  that  these  military  cars  are, 
except  for  details  of  equipment  and  finish,  the 
private  cars  of  peace  time,  and  you  see  that 
there  is  the  strongest  personal  reason  why  you 
should  form  a  cl^||la|||abiding  idea  of  the 
speciar distinction  acfncvcd  by  tlic  Vauxhall. 


You  can  secure  an  option  on  a  Vauxhall  car  for  after-war  delivery,  without  inonrriod  -„     •  i 
obligation,  by   putting    your  name  down   on  our   w^irind    li..       !„ '^:  J"!!!."!;"""'™?4  ""?  J!''"^'"* 

-J «      -•  y    «>  4  .  -        -    . 


after  the  war  of  consumer  and  producer.    Please  send  for  a  copy  to-day. 


-umn^ 


sr  -:^x^ 


A  VAUXHALL   PKIVArE  CAB 


VAUXHALL   MOTORS    LIMITED,  174-182    GREAT    PORTEAND    STREET    W 

ANO   AT    rSTItOGIIAD  *  ' 


May  25,  TQ16 


LAND      &      WATER 


57 


To  the 


"Friends  of  Soldiers 

throughout  the  Empire. 


HELP   THE    Y.M.C.A.    IN   ITS    GREAT 

WORK    FOR    OUR    TROOPS     ON    ALL 

THE  FIGHTING  FRONTS. 


95 


THE  National  Council  of  the 
Y.M.C.A,  appeal  to  all  those  who 
have  the  welfare  of  our  men  at 
heart  ta  help  in  the  great  work,  they  have 
undertaken  for  the  comfort  of  our  Soldiers 
and  Sailors  at  the  Military  and  Naval 
training  centres  throughout  the  Empire 
and  behind  all  the  fighting  fronts. 

The  1,200  buildings  and  tents  which  have 
already  been  erected  are  doing  magnificent 
work  and  are  crowded  daily.  If  it  were  not 
for  these  buildings  thousands  of  our  brave 
soldiers  would  have  nowhere  to  go  for  rest, 
refreshment,  recreation,  and  to  write  letters 
home. 


The  rapid  increase  in  numbers  of  our  men 
on  Service  and  the  growth  of  our  line  in  France 
has  necessitated  a  considerable  extension  of  the 
work.  An  earnest  appeal  is  therefore  made  for 
gifts  of  every  size  to  enable  the  full  service  of 
the  Y.M.C.A.  to  be  extended  to  these  new 
military  centres. 

Will  you  help  ?  A  complete  building, 
several  of  which  are  required  immediately 
behind  the  firing  line  in  France,  costs  ;^450. 
Large  tents  and  marquees,  more  than  one 
hundred  of  which  are  urgently  needed,  cost  £2^0 
each.  Quiet  rest  rooms  are  required  for  addition 
to  existing  buildings — these  cost  ^^  100  each.  A 
number  of  larger  buildings  (costing  from  ^^^o 
to  ;^6oo  each)  are  also  required  for  the  extension 
of  the  work  in  the  Home  Camps. 


Do  not  delay. 

The  need  of  our  brave  men  is  urgent,  and  we  ask 

you  to  send  your  gifts  to-day  so  that  the  great 

work  shall  be  extended  and  maintained. 


Almost  up  to  the  Trenches." 


POST    THIS    TO-DAY. 

.  L.  Barclay,  12,  Russell  Square,  W.C. 

ileasure  in  enclosing  £ 

towards   the   special    work   of    the    Y.M.C.A.    for   the 
troops. 


Name.... 
Address . 


"  Land  and  Water. 


58 


LAND      &      WATER 


May  ^5,  igib 


STANFORD'S  WAR  MAPS 

War  Map  No.  17. 

STANFORD'S  HALF-INCH  MAP  OF  THE 
BRITISH  FRONT  IN  FRANCE  AND 
FLANDERS. 

A  very  clear  and  detailed  Map,  Coloured  on  the  layer  system,  and 
showing  by  a  red  line  the  approximate  Battle  Front,  from  Boesinghe 
on  the  North  to  the  Somme  on  the  South,  on  March  I,  1916. 
One  Sheets  22  in.  by  42  in.i  2  miles  to  1  in.  (1  :  126,720).     Prices! 
Gsloured  Sheet,  3a. ;  mounted  to  (old  in  case,  6a.  6d. 

War  Map  No.  16. 
THE    THEATRE    OF   WAR    IN    THE 
BALKAN    PENINSULA. 

This  Map  extends  to  Temesvar  and  the  Transylvanian  Alps  on  the 
North,  Corfu  and  Brusa  on  the  South,  and  from  Sarajevo  to  the  Black 
Sea  and  Constantinople.  It  is  Coloured  on  the  layer  system,  and  thus 
forms  a  companion  MaptoNos,  11  and  14,  which  are  on  the  same  scale. 
One  Sheet :  42  in.  by  28  in. ;  18  miles  to  I  in.  (1 :  1,140,000).  Prices  : 
Coloured  Sheet,  5a.  ;  mounted  to  fold  in  case,  8s.  6d. 

War  Map  No.  15. 
SKETCH  MAPof  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA 
AND   SURROUNDING  TERRITORIES. 

The  Map  is  Coloured  to  show  the  present  Political  Divisions,  and 
includes  Entebbe  and  Nairobi  on  the  North,  and  Forts  Jameson  and 
Johnston  on  the  South.  The  great  upland  Lakes  of  Victoria,  Tan- 
ganyika, and  Nyasa,  as  well  as  the  smaller  Lakes  Edward,  Kivu, 
Moero,  and  Bangeulu,  are  marked. 

One  Sheet!  22  in.  by  30  in.;  40-83  miles  to  I  in.  (It  2,587,000). 
Prices!  Coloured  Sheet,  3a.;  mounted  to  fold  in  case.  5s. 

War  Map  No.  9. 
THE  SEAT  OF  WAR  IN  TURKEY. 

Including  from  Buda-Pesttothe  Persian  Gulf,and  from  the  Sea  of  Azov 
to  the  Gulf  of  Akaba.  The  Suez  Canal  is  included,  and  Egypt  as  far 
as  Cairo. 

One  Sheet:  42  in.  by  30  in.;  SOJmiles  to  I  in.  (1 !  3,220,177),  Prices: 
Coloured  Sheet,  5s. :  mounted  to  fold  in  case,  8a.  6d. 

War  Map  No.  10. 
THE  SEAT  OF  WAR  IN  ARMENIA. 

Including  Trebizond,  Batum,  and  Tiflis  on  the  North,  Diarbekr. 
Van,  and  T.ibriz  on  the  South. 

One  Sheet:  30  in.  by  22  in.;  15-78  miles  to  1  in.  (1:  1,000,000). 
Prices:  Coloured  Sheet,  2s.  6d.  :  mounted  to  fold  in  case,  5s. 

Central    Europe. 

STANFORD'S  REPRODUCTION  OF  PART 

OF    THE    GERMAN    OFFICIAL    MAP    OF 

CENTRAL  EUROPE 

(1 :  300,000).  Enlarged  to  the  scale  of  4  miles  to  1  in.,  and  issued  in 
sheets  about  25  by  20  in.  The  following  sheets  are  now  issued  : — 
Riga,  Jacobstadt,  Szawle,  Vilkomierz,  Konigsberg,  Kowno,  Wilna, 
Lomza,  Grodno,  Slonim,  Warsaw,  Brest  Litovsk,  Pinsk,  Radom, 
Lublin,  Kowel.  The  Map  (printed  in  black,  blue  and  red)  is  full  of 
detail,  and  embraces  the  area  between  Riga  on  the  North  and  Cholm 
on  ihe  South,  Nowogeorgievsk  on  the  West,  and  the  marshes  of  Pinsk 
on  the  East.  This  is  the  best  map  upon  which  to  study  the  important 
movements  of  the  Armies  on  the  Eastern  battle  front. 
InSlieets:25by20in.;4milesto  I  in.  (1  :  250,000).  Price  per  sheet,  3si 

War  Map,  No.  14. 
THE   SEAT  OF  WAR  ON  THE  AUSTRO- 
ITALIAN   FRONTIER. 

A  detailed  Map  of  parts  of  France,  Switzerland,  Germany,  Austria,  and 
Italy  surrounding  the  Austro-Italian  theatre  of  war ;  including  on  the 
North,  Dijon,  Munich,  and  Vienna,  and  on  the  South,  Marseille, 
Ancona,  and  Spalato.  Coloured  on  the  layer  system  to  show  Eleva' 
tions,  with  the  present  International  Boundaries  clearly  marked. 
One  Sheet :  35  in.  by  22  in. ;  18  miles  to  1  in.  (1 :  1,140,000).  Prices  : 
Sheet,  4s. ;  mounted  to  fold  in  case,  6s.  6d. 

War  Map  No.  5. 
THE    NORTH    SEA    AND    THE    BALTIC. 

Embracing  the  whole  of  the  British  Islands  on  the  West,  and  FarSe 
Islands  and  Aland  Islands  on  the  North,  the  Entrance  to  the  Gulf  of 
Finland  on  the  East,  and  Vienna  and  Paris  on  the  South. 
One  Sheet:  30  in.  by  22  in.;  50i  miles  to  I  in.  (l!  3,220,177).  Prices: 
Coloured  Sheet,  2s.  6d.;  mounted  to  (old  in  case,  5s. ;  mounted  on 
board  to  hang,  5s. 

A  New  Map. 

WORLD  MERC  ATOR.  Stanford's  New 
Library  Chart  of  the  World  on  Mercator's 
Projection. 

Drawn  to  an  Equatorial  Scale  of  350  nautical  miles  to  an  inch. 
Four  Sheets.    Size  complete,  78  by  54  in.     Prices  :  Coloured  Sheets, 
14s.;  mounted  to  fold  in  leather  case,  25s  ;  mounted  on  rollers 
and  varnished,  25s. ;  mounted  on  spring  roller,  £5 

Particulars  of  all  the  best  War  Maps  sold  b^  Edioird  Stanford  Ltd.  post  free. 

London:  EDWARD   STANFORD,  Ltd. 
12,  13.  and   14,  LONG  ACRE,  W.C. 

CARTOGRAPHERS     TO    HIS    MAJESTY    THE     KING. 


T 


(Continued  /rom   page  S6.) 

for  commissions,  and  he  was  proud  of  the  South  Africans 
both  in  the  contingents  and  in  the  vaiious  units  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  who  had  come  over. 

*  4i  *  *  * 

"  With  regard  to  finance,  if  you  look  through  tliis 
report  of  Mr.  Burton's  speech  in  the  House  of  Assembly, 
you'll  get  an  impression  of  the  temper  of  the  House  with 
regard  to  the  war  and  the  satisfactory  state  of  South 
African  finance.  I  don't  suppose  the  details  would 
interest  your  readers,  as  they  won't  generally  understand 
the  controversies  that  lie  behind  them." 

H  it  was  a  strategical  defeat  I  can  at  least  claim  a 
tactical  victory.  I  was  an  hour  and  some  minutes  older 
and  something  wiser  than  when  I  entered.  I  had  had 
a  lesson  in  official  discretion,  and  had  listened  to  comments 
from  the  man  as  distinct  from  the  official,  and  put  by  con- 
sent outside  the  scope  of  this  interview,  of  interesting 
aspects  of  the   Imperial   problem. 

THE    DOMINION    OF    CANADA 

HERE  must  be  something  in  High  Commis- 
sioning wliich  keeps  the  body  young.  You 
would  give  Sir  George  Perley  a  dozen  years 
less   than    his   publicly   recorded  age.     You  find 

here  the  man 
of  b  u  s  i  n  e  f  s  , 
direct,  to  the 
point,  \vith  his 
decisive  speech 
and  quick  de- 
cisions. 

The  question 
of  racial  prob- 
lems cropped  up 
from  my  South 
African  conver- 
sation. 

"Oh.  the 
French  Cana- 
dian ?  Mostlj-  a 
farmer  like  the 
South  African 
Dutchman,  less 
generally  a  lum- 
ber man,  is  not 
much  interested 
in  world  politics.  W  hat  he  is  interested  in  is  farms— his 
farm.  He  is  quite  content  to  live  under  the  British 
flag  and  certainly  wouldn't  like  any  other. 

.  .  .  No,  the  French  alliance  can't  be  said  to  make 
much  difference.  It  is  just  that  the  farming  class 
never  does  see  these  things  in  the  same  way  as  the 
townsman.  And,  of  course,  our  settlers  out  West  are 
newer  to  the  country  and  their  links  with  the  Mother 
Land  are  necessarily  much  stronger.  As  to  the  detach- 
ment of  the  farmer  you  have  surely  something  of  the 
same  sort  here  in  England.  Though  I  suppose  the 
squires  modify  this  a  little. 

"  Oh  yes,  Bourassa  is  an  out  and  out  autonomist. 
He  wants  an  independent  Canada.  Bourassa  is  able 
and  sincere,  but  naturally  we're  not  in  sympathy 
with  his  separatism.  Wbat  we  want,  of  course,  is  a  say  in 
matters  of  life  and  death,  as  we  have  it  in  lesser  matters. 
***** 
.  .  .  Of  course,  Laurier  has  fav(  ured  our  giving 
every  possible  assistance  all  through.  There  is  nothing 
like  a  political  crisis  ;  we're  all  of  us  wth  you  all  the 
time.  When  we  have  seen  this  thing  through  together 
perhaps  we  shall  be  able  to  find  some  common  ground  for 
close  Imperial  relations." 

"  Would  you  mind,   Sir  George,  being  a  Kttle  more 
ex[)licit  ?  " 

"Well,  you  know;  I  rather  would  mind !  " 
"  Oh  yes,  I  know  it's  a  delicate  subject  and  by  this 
time  I  know  something  of  the  appalling  discretion  of  High 
Commissioners,  but  it's  a  really  fundamental  and  interest- 
ing one.  How  do  you  think  we  ought  to  set  about  getting 
this  question  fixed  ?  " 

"  Well,  you  are  asking  rather  a  good  deal  you  know. 
I  think  I  may  say  this  that  I  don't  believe  in  a  set  plan. 

(Continued    on    page    60.) 


May  25j  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


S9 


BARKER  STORE 

The  finest  Household  Store  in  London 

The   Market   Floor 

A  huge  space  devoted  entirely  to  comestibles  for  the  Table 
-and  daily  the  scene  of  the  greatest  animation  and  colour 
Every  need,  to  the  smallest  item  in  table  and  household  economy, 
is  supplied  from  this  great  super-store  by  frequent  daily  motor  van 
deliveries  to  the  residential  districts  of  the  West  End  and  the  suburbs 

For  the   Toilet   Table 

On  the  first  floor,  with  a  five-lift  service,  is  a  series  of 
Salons  of  Continental  charm  and  of  especial  appeal  to  ladies 
Every  need  in  requisites  for  the  Toilet  Table  is  met  in  this  attractive 
shop,  with  numberless  other  interesting-  things  in  the  way  of  leather 
goods  for  personal  and  general  use,  fancy  articles,  stationery,  books,  etc. 

The   Men's   Shop 

The  whole  of  the  second  floor  is  the  man's  domain, 
where  everything  that  interests  him  is  to  be  seen 
There  are  the  tailoring  rooms,  specially  fitted  up  for  his 
comfort  and  convenience  ;  the  room  for  his  shirts,  pyjamas 
and  the  hundred  items  of  personal  wear ;  the  hat  salon 
and   the    department    for    boots — everything    in    the    one    g-reat    shop 

Grand    Restaurant 

This  magnificent  apartment  is  on  the  3rd  floor 
with  the   Man's   Lounge  and  the    Ladies'   Rooms  adjoining 

Shopping    Luncheons    daily  :    West    End    Cuisine 

Popular  rendezvous   for  Afternoon   Tea 

Music  :    3  to  6 


John   Barker  and  Compy.,  Ltd.,   Kensington,  w. 


I.U 


LAND      &      WATER 


May  25,  1916 


(Continued  horn  page  58.) 

I  think  if  any  group  were  to  put  up  a  scheme  all  the  other 
groups  might  fall  upon  it,  more  or  less  on  principle. 

"  I  have  thought  of  the  possibility  of  an  Empir 
Conference  of  not  more  than  twenty-five  members, 
delegates  from  all  parts  of  the  Empire,  sitting  here  in 
London,  hearing  opini.  ns  and  suggestions,  discussing 
everything  fully,  and  eventually  putting  forward  a  draft 
which  had  been  approved  by  them  all. 

*         •         *         *         ♦ 
I  think  you  would  find  that  such  a  draft  would 
be    accepted    by    all    the     Five    Nations.      But  that's 
promature.     Let's    get    back    to    facts.     The  war,   for 
instaiKe. 

"  As  to  Canada's  share  in  the  war,  I  might  remind 
you  that  within  three  weeks  of  the  declaration  of  war 
we  had  33,000  men  fully  armed  and  equipped,  and 
within  six  weeks  they  were  ready  to  cross  for  their  final 
training.     Then  you  know  about  Yprcs  and  the  rest. 

"  As  to  patriotic  gifts  ;  there  is  a  Canadian  Patriotic 
Fund  of  $9,000,000 ;  the  Canadian  Red  Cross,  of 
83,500,000  ;  contributions  to  the  British  Red  Cross  for 
.S2, 000,000  ;  to  the  Belgian  Relief  Fund  for  $2,000,000  ; 
funds  for  $2,000,000  to  the  Special  Machine  Gun  Fund, 
and  for  miscellaneous  purposes  over  another  million  and 
a  half.  And,  of  course,  more,  for  these  are  not  actually 
accounted  to  date. 

"  Then  there  were  the  gifts  in  kind.  Here  is  a  memo- 
randum of  them  :  Canada  sent  as  a  gift  1,000,000  bags 
of  flour,  500,000  bushels  of  oats  were  given  by  the  Alberta 
Government ;  4,000,000  lb.  of  cheese  by  the  Quebec 
Government ;  100,000  tons  of  coal  was  offered  by  Nova 
Scotia  (in  lieu  of  this  Sioo.ooo  was  sent  for  the  relief  of 
distress)  ;  100,000  bushels  of  oats  by  Prince  Edward 
Island  ;  250,000  bags  of  flour  by  Ontario  ;  cheese  and 
hay  by  Prince  Edward  Island  ;  1,500  horses  by  Saskat- 
chewan ;  100,000  bushels  of  potatoes  by  New  Brunswick  ; 
50,000  bags  of  flour  by  Manitoba  ;  25,000  cases  of 
canned  salmon  by  British  Columbia,  etc.,  etc.  A  very 
large  quantity  of  flour  is  now  being  sent  from  Sas- 
katchewan. 


"  With  regard  to  the  wounded,  here  is  a  memorandum 
from  Surgeon-General  G.  Carleton  Jones,  our  Director  of 
medical  services.     I'll  take  out  a  few  salient  facts. 

"  Besides  the  ordinary  Canadian  hospitals  in  England 
there  are  three  special  hospitals  for  after-treatment  — 
Ramsgate,  Folkestone,  Buxton 

"  To  Ramsgate  go  all  cases  of  nervous  shock  ;  bones 
and  joints  that  require  further  treatment  ;  and  here  also 
the  re-education  and  technical  training  of  the  soldier 
goes  on.  The  men  also  make  the  splints,  crutches,  etc., 
for  the  Canadian  hospital  authorities.  At  Folkestone 
diseases  and  injuries  of  the  eye,  ear,  nose  and  throat 
are  dealt  with.  In  such  cases  needing  immediate  and 
continuous  treatment,  the  men  are  treated  here  instead  of 
being   invalided    home. 

"  Among  the  many  acts  of  kindness  we  may  specially 
acknowledge  that  of  His  Majesty  in  putting  Upper 
Lodge,  Bushey  Park,  at  our  disposal  for  the  Canadian 
convalescents  and  of  Mr.  John  Walter  in  devoting  Bear 
Wood  Park  to  the  same  purpose. 

"  Then  as  I  think  you  know,  the  munition  work  over 
with  us  has  been  put  on  a  sound  basis  and  is  very 
much  more  considerable  than  most  people  here  have  any 
realisation  of." 

I  next  led  that  usual  trump.  Emigration.  "  Of 
course  we  want  men,  the  right  kind  of  men.  Sturdy 
fellows  from  the  land.  Fellows  also  vrith  initiative  and, 
at  least,  a  little  capital.  There  are  magnificent  chances, 
especially  in  the  western  provinces,  and  of  course  war 
must  have  its  effect  on  emigration  ;  war  always  does. 
And  I  think  you've  seen  the  kind  of  men  we  turn  out." 

"  You  mean  the   kind   that  looks  you  straight  in  the 

eyes,  and  if  you  annoy  it  teUs  you  to  go  to etc.  ? 

Yes,  we've  all  been  enormously  impressed  with  the  faces 
of  your  men  and  the  Anzacs.  I  remember  two  of  your 
fellows  I  met  from  the  camp  near  Hythe,  and  we  had  a 
day  together  in  London.  One  an  engine  driver  ;  one  a 
bank  clerk.  And  there  wasn't  any  difference  in  manner, 
or  speech  or  equipment  between  them." 

Needless  to  say,  Sir  George  takes  the  view  of  all  big 
Dominion  men  that  Canada  isn't  fighting  just  to  help 
England,  but  to  do  her  share  for  the  Empire. 


Perfect   Tailoring  at  Moderate   Charges. 


WEST  END: 
215,  217,  219  Regent  Street,  W. 


CITY: 
132  Fenchurch  Street,  E.G. 

(Opposite  Mincing  Lane). 


ECONOMY   AND   TAILORING. 

T  T  would  be  false  economy,  even  in  war  time,  to  starve  what  is  essentially  a  home  industry,  such  as 
-■■  Tailoring.  To  be  well  dressed  does  not  of  necessity  mean  extr.ivagance.  A  reasonable  expenditure 
on  clothes  is  necessary.  Moreover,  good  and  well-fitting  clothes  counteracts  depression  and  are  a 
fine  tonic,  especially    in    these  times   of  nerve    strain. 


SERVICE    OUTFITS. 

No  materials  but  those  of  guaranteed  quality  are  used,  the  garments  are  all  perfectly 
tailored  and  regulation  requirements  are  carried  out  in  every  detail.     Price  Utt  od  .ppiK<t>on. 

A  call  invited  or  patterns  sent  on  request. 


Lounge  Suit,  as  bkctcb, 

£3    13    6 
The  fullest  satisfaction  is  guaranteed. 


SEN^D    H.    rrUBE    OF 

"BETULA    ALBA   JELLY" 

To  your  friends  with  the  British  Expeditionary  Force. 

IT  PREVENTS  MOSQUITO,   MIDGE   and  other   INSECT 

BITES,  and  Is  therefore  a  COMFORT  &  NECESSITY  to  them. 

loTaluable  to  Fishermen  and  all  engaged  in  Outdoor  Sports. 

In  metallic  tubes  6d.i  postage  single  tube  2d.,  6  tubes  4d. 

OSBORNE,  BAUER  &  GHEESEMAN. 

19      GOLDEN    SQUARE,    RECENT    ST.,     LONDON. 


DROITWICH 


NATURAL 
BRINE    BATHS. 

For  Rheumatisnri,  Arthritis.  Sciatica,  etc. 

THERE  IS  NO  SUBSTITUTE  FOR  THESE 
WORLD-RENOWNED  BATHS,  WHICH  CAN 
ONLY      BE      OBTAINED     AT     THE     SPA. 

Lovely  Country  and  Holiday  District —  Good  Hotels,  etc. 

Illustrated  Boc<klet  Free  Irom  Baths  Director: 

J.  H.  HOLLYER,  36  Spa  Officu.  Droiiwich  (Worci.). 


J 


Hunt   Servants'   Benefit   Society   and   Hunt   Servants'  Health    Insurance   Friendly    Society. 


The  Forty-Fourth  Annu.il  Geiwral  Meeting  of  the  Hunt  Servants'  Benefit  Society,  and  the  Fourth  Annual  Central  Mectini;  of  the  Hunt  Servants'  Health  Insurance  Friendly 
Society,  will  b«  held  in  the  Subscription   Room   at    Messrs.  Tattersalls',   Knightsbridge,  Lontion,  S.W.,  on  the  morning  of  Thursday,  the  1st  day  of  June,  at   Eleven   o'clocl< 

Nominations  of  candidates  foi  slection  to  the  Conmittee  of  Management  of  the  latter  Society  mu«t  be  given  in  writing  to  the  Secretary,  not  less  than  seven  days  before 
the   Annual  Genera*   M«eli(^.  H.   W.   WRICHT,  Secretary,  40,    Brompton   Road,   London,    8.W. 


May  25,   1910 


LAND      &      WATER 


bx 


The    French    Red   Cross 


By  Hilaire  Belloc 


I  HAVE  been  asked  to  say  a  word  with  regard  to  the 
claims  of  the  French  Red  Cross,  and,  though  I  have  no 
competence  in  such  a  matter,  I  am  particularly  happy 
to  do  so  from  my  knowledge  of  the  work  which  the 
London  Committee  has  accomplished.  This  Committee 
covers  the  work  done  for  the  French  Red  Cross  not  only  in 
the  United  Kingdom,  but  throughout  the  Colonies  and  the 
United  States.  It  was  established  by,  and  under  the  presi- 
dency of,  M.  Paul  Cambon,  the  French  Ambassador,  to  act 
as  a  national  clearing  house  for  the  contributions  of  the 
British  Empire  to  the  Red  Cross  in  France.  From  small 
beginnings  the  Committee  has  grown  until  its  sphere  extends 
over  the  Mrhole  of  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Colonies,  and  the 
United  States.  From  all  parts  of  the  world  contributions 
have  come  in  money  and  in  kind,  no  less  than  in  the  form  of 
personal  services.  To  collect  all  this  material,  to  transmit  it 
to  France,  and  to  distribute  it  there,  where  it  is  most  needed, 
is  the  work  of  the  Committee.' 

Some  25  British  hospitals,  aggregating  over  3,000  beds, 
have  been  founded,  staffed,  and  run  by  Great  Britain  for  the 
French  wounded.  The  Committee  acts  for  all  of  these  and 
contributes  to  their  support  in  a  greater  or  less  degree. 
Direct  contributions  of  money  ;  drugs,  dressings,  clothing, 
food,  and  stores  have  been  sent  to  over  1^200  French  hospitals. 
Should  resources  permit,  the  Committee  will  assist  the  work 
of  4,000  more  hospitals  which  are  working  unceasingly  for 
the  French  wounded. 

The  Committee  has  sent  out  over  250  motor  cars  and  motor 
ambulances  with  British  drivers,  and  these  are  working  in 
convoys  close  to  the  trenches,  and  for  base  hospitals  in  every 
part  of  the  country.  The  Committee  has  supplied  and 
equipped  X-ray  automobiles,  one  for  each  of  the  ten  armies, 
and  these  are  moved  to  where  the  need  is  greatest,  diagnosing 
the  wounds  as  they  come  from  the  field  dressing  stations. 
Fixed  X-ray  installat'ions,  douches,  disinfectors,  sterilizers, 
and  other  necessary  apparatus  have  been  supplied  in  many 
Red  Cross  hospitals  in  regions  where  the  war  has  swept 
away  the  resources  of  the   Red  Cross  Societies.      A  fairly 


full  record  of  all  this  work  of  the  Committee  may  be  found 
in  the  report,  "  The  Work  of  the  French  Red  Cross,"  published 
by  authority  of  the  Committee. 

"The  question  as  to  why  Great  Britain  and  her  Colonies 
should  be  making  a  special  effort  of  this  kind  may  be 
answered  in  two  ways.  In  the  first  place,  the  chief  manu- 
facturing provinces  of  France  are  occupied  by  the  enemy, 
thereby  largely  crippling  French  resources.  Since  the  lirst 
day  of  the  war  every  able-bodied  man  has  been  mobilised, 
and  the  country  is  filled  with  refugees  from  the  invaded 
departments.  Many  a  home  has  not  only  lost  its  bread- 
winner, but  is  also  supporting  these  refugees.  This  is  a  special 
burden  which  France  alone  of  the  western  Allies  has  to  bear. 
No  such  trial  as  this  has  been  imposed  on  Britain,  where, 
save  for  the  transfer  of  men  from  manufacturing  to  military 
activity,  industry  is  practically  unharmed,  and  the  homes  of 
the  people  are  virtually  secure. 

In  the  second  place,  as  this  war  is  testing  the  material 
endurance  of  every  nation,  so  it  is  trying  the  tempers  of  the 
people.  The  North-Eastern  corner  of  France,  from  the 
Channel  to  the  Somme,  has  seen  the  British  Army  and  the 
people  there  know  what  Britain  has  done,  as  dc  those  in 
authority  in  France.  It  has  remained,  however,  for  the 
Red  Cross  to  spread  throughout  the  country  a  special  aad 
generous  message  of  good  will  from  Britain,  which  would 
have  been  impossible  of  communication  through  any  other 
channel.  It  is  not  long  since  that  the  French  Minister  of  War 
pointed  out  how  important  it  was  for  the  French  people  t» 
realise  the  amount  of  good  that  had  been  done  by  tliis  Com- 
mittee in  extending  and  cementing  the  understanding  be- 
tween the  two  nations,  and  he  begged  for  continuance  and 
renewal   of  the   Committee's   efforts. 

The  multiplicity  of  claims  upon  the  public  at  this  moment 
makes  it  a  little  difficult  to  speak  for  one  more  than  for  another, 
but  if  there  is  one  fund  asking  for  subscriptions  which 
thoroughly  deserves  the  support  of  the  public  at  this  time,  it 
is  this,  which  is  perhaps  the  most  directly  useful  of  all  spon- 
taneous actions  undertaken  in  support  of  the  common  cause. 


aI 


I 


Write  for  our 
booklet,  "Science 
and  Tyres."  It 
will  interest  you. 


Every  one  a  "Heavyweight" 


'T^^HERE'S  some  good  stufF 
-^  there  !  "  remarks  the  expert 
as  he  feels  the  vpeight  and  notes  the 
substance  of  the  Henley  Tyre.  He 
is  right.  There  is  good  stuff  there — 
the  best  rubber,  the  best  workman- 
ship, and  an  experience  of  50  years' 
successful  treatment  of  rubber. 

When    Henleys  started  making 
tyres,  their  aim  was  to  make  the  best 


that  could  be  produced.  Now  the 
aim  is  to  maintain  the  high  standard 
of  excellence  reached. 

For  durability,  for  resilience,  for 
all-round  satisfaction,  Henley  Tyres 
cannot  be  beaten.  It  is  much  to  be 
doubted  if  they  can  be  equalled. 
1 '.very  "  Henley  "  Tyre  is  a  "heavy- 
wei  rht"  with  an  extra  stout  casing, 
and  every  Henley  Tyre  is 


Made  in   England  by   British   Labour. 

Manufactured  by 

W.  T.  HENLEY'S  TELEGRAPH  WORKS  CO.,  LTD. 

Tyre    Dept.  :     18    New    Union    Street,    Moorfields,    London,    E.C. 


Telephone  No.  : 
3886   Londoa   Wall. 

Telegrams  : 

"  Hetewocol,      Ave, 

London." 


62 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  25,    1916 


THE   SAMARITAN  S   SERVICE 

MAY   BE   RENDERED   BY   YOU 
TO  THE  BRAVE  DEFENDERS  OF 

VERDUN 

THROUGH      THE      LONDON      COMMITTEE 

of  the 

FRENCH    RED    CROSS 


+ 


'T^HE  Tribute  of  one  Brave  Nation  to  another  is  not  paid  in  Words  but  in 
-^  Sympathy.  The  Valour  of  France  is  immortalised  in  the  name  Verdun, 
and  every  Briton  can  pay  his  Tribute  to  the  Heroes  of  this  great  defence  by 
sending-  a  cheque  to  succour  the  French  Wounded  to  H.E.  THE  FRENCH 
AMBASSADOR,  ALBERT  GATE,  LONDON,  S.W.,  or  to  the  Hon. 
Secretary,  9,  Knightsbridge,  London,  SAV.,  where  gifts  in  kind  will  also  be  most 
gratefully  received.  Cheques  should  be  made  payable  to  the  Hon.  Treasurer, 
French  Red  Cross. 

PLEASE    HELP 
THE     NEED     IS     VERY     URGENT 

"Patrons. 

H.M.   QUEEN  ALEXANDRA. 
H.E.   PAUL  CAMBON, 

French  Ambassador. 

'President. 

VICOMTESSE  DE  LA  PANOUSE. 


I\Uiy  25,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 

The    Overseas    Club 


65 


THE  OVERSEAS  CLUB  is  the  work  of  a  dreamer  of 
dreams  who  at  the  same  time  happens  to  be  a  man 
of  business  and  affairs.  Hence  it  has  succeeded  be- 
yond the  wont  of  dreams.  The  central  idea  was 
to  it-  to  practical  use  some  of  that  fine  spirit  of  fellowship 
wliich  the  scattered  Britishers  feel  for  each  other,  for  the  old 
flag  and  the  old  country.  Here  was  a  great  thing  not  less 
real  because  intangible  and  imponderable.  It  needed  a 
conduit.  And  there  were  difficult  days  coming  for  the 
Empire  not  only  in  war,'  which  was  not  explicitly  in  the 
\  ision,  but  in  peace.  The  Club  was  to.be  a  band  of 
brotliers  that  should  know  and  appreciate  something  of  the 
privileges  and  responsibilities  of  British  Citizenship. 

It  was  inaugurated  in  1910,  on  August  27th,  Trafalgar  Day. 
It  found  a  patron  in  Lord  Northcliffe,  to  whom  the  severest 
critic  would  not  deny  the  faculty  of  imagination.  He  made 
\'cry  generous  donations  wliich  saw  it  through  the  first 
critical  days  of  struggle,  put  the  Overseas  Edition  of  the  Daily 
Mail  at  its  disposal  as  a  velucle  of  propaganda,  and  remains 
a  generous  and  interested  supporter.  It  now  counts  over 
138,000  members.  It  has  formally  won  its  spurs  ;  for  the 
King  has  become  the  Patron-in-Chief — an  honour  only 
accorded,  very  properly,  to  proved  and  stable  institutions 
whose  record  is  absolutely  above  suspicion. 

The  club  has  roomy  and  beautiful  premises  with  all  the 
amenities,  in  that  imperial  centre,  Aldwych-  These  have  been 
constantly  used  by  overseas  visitors,  especially  during  the  war. 
It  has  corresponding  Secretaries  all  over  the  Empire,  or,  as 
wo  are  now  learning  to  caU  it,  with  a  truer  insight,  the  British 
Commonwealth,  and  a  machinery  for  welcoming  and  introduc- 
ing members  in  their  travels. 

The  war  brought  it  the  opportunity  of  provmg  its  practical 
value.  It  has  done  amazingly  good  work.  Its  msmbers  have 
presented  an  Overseas  Club's  Imperial  Aircraft  Flotilla  of  no 
less  than  69  aeroplanes  at  a  cost  of  £103,000,  and  it  is  an  open 
secret  that  others  not  reckoned  in  this  register  were  inspired 
directly  by  its  propaganda.  It  only  needed  such  an  oppor- 
tunity to  prove  the  substantial  value  of  the  organisation  and 
the  capacity  with  which  it  has  been  guided  and  controlled. 
On  its  more  friendly  and  human  side  it  has  raised  the    sum 


of  £125,000  for  tobacco  and  comforts  for  the  troops.  It  has 
distributed  many  thousands  of  pamphlets  in  various  languages 
in  neutral  countries  by  way  of  presenting  the  case  of  the 
Allies  as  a  counterblast  to  the  extremely  active  German  Press 
Bureau.  Its  Members  have  sent  several  hundreds  of  cases 
of  clothing  for  the  Belgian  refugees.  In  a  word,  it  is  "  doing 
things."  Most  notably  its  Central  Committee  has  used  to 
excellent  eftect,  principles  and  methods  of  business  which  are 
so  often  wanting  in  such  idealistic  ventures.  The  Central 
Committee  of  the  Overseas  Club  do  not  think  merely  in  terms 
of  "  flag- waggery,"  though  the  flag  means,  as  it  ought  to 
mean,  a  great  deal  to  them.  They  work  for  "  an  Empire 
without  a  slum,"  for  a  change  in  "  England's  green  and 
pleasant  land  "  quite  Blakeian  in  its  breadth  and  splendour. 
Naturally  as  practical  men  they  have  to  keep  such  visions 
largely  to  themselves  !  But  perhaps  the  war  is  making  an 
atmosphere  about  us  in  which  such  prudences  will  be  no 
longer  necessary.  The  point  for  the  ultra-realists  to  remember 
is  that  the  Overseas  Club  pays  its  way  and  does  what  it  does 
promptly  and  with  gathering  momentum.  T. 


Chambers's  Journal,  one  of  the  oldest  and  still  one  of  the 
best  of  monthly  periodicals,  maintains  its  standard  of  merit  to 
the  full  in  recent  numbers.  A  noteworthy  item  is  a  new  serial 
by  "  Taffrail,"  entitled  "Pincher  Martin,  O.D.,"  a  vivid 
narrative  of  naval  hfe  in  the  present  day — Marrj'at  up-to-date, 
with  the  joj's  of  coaling  ship  added.  Breezily  written,  this 
story  of  Pincher  is  worth  reading— as,  in  fact,"  Chambers's  is 
throughout.  In  addition  to  giving  a  number  of  sidelights  on 
the  war  and  its  various  fronts,  a  notable  feature  of  the 
magazine  is  its  monthly  review  of  science  and  arts. 

Broken  Music,  by  Helen  Key  (Elkin  Mathews,  is.  net)  is  a 
Uttle  collection  of  poems  of  more  than  average  merit,  mainly 
based  on  the  war  and  its  incidents.  Fully  half  of  the  contents 
bear  the  impress  of  Browning  study,  though  there  is  enough 
originality  in  the  matter  to  justify' the  manner  even  of  the 
"  Grammarian's  Funeral."  Here  and  there  banal  sentiment 
is  expressed  in  banal  phrase,  but  for  the  mo,st  part  the  work 
is  distinctly  original,   and  more  than  ordinarily  attractive. 


EDWARDS  &  SONS,161S159  Recent  St..  London,  W. 


(of  Regent  Street),  Ltd. 


By  Appointment 

to 

H.M.  THE  KING 

H  M.  THE  QUEEN. 


Lady'i  Finest  PoHshed  IWorocco  Dressing  Case,  lined  Rich  Watered  Silk,  completely  fitted  Solid  Tortoiseshell,  Inlaiu  Sterling  Silver. 

A  large   selaction  always  In  Stock  rrom  £S  to  £200.    Catajogue  and  Batlmatea  poet  freo  on  application.] 


64 


LAND     &     WATER 


May  25,    1916 


WOODROW,  46  Piccadilly,  London,  W.,  Sportme  Hat  Specialists 


By  Special 
Jipt>ointmmn  t 
•o  H.M.  King 

George    V, 


CATALOGUE 

SENT  ON 
APPUCA  TION 


Special  atten* 
tion  given  to 
Re-modtUing 
and  Rt  •trim- 
ming La  $  t 
Seasons  Hat* 


\ 


441*.  — Damiy    h.it     iM    |iutt/     colour    Chrytanth«mum    ^  438W  yet    drc£«y    n-cornered     hat    in 

■traw,    wittt   oruwn   uiai    folUtxl    baiKl   of    black   chitTon       string    cuiour    oru-yiMnthennjm    straw    wiUi    underlining 


left  side      in- 


MOW.— Pretty  hat  in  tete^le-negre  Chrysanthemum 
plait,  top  of  brim  formed  of  solt  plealeJ  Sevres  blU'  «;iliii 
ril>bon.  nnl59li€<i  with  tcte-de-negre  vplret  riIii>on 
and  sprays  of  clKTries  with  shad«d  metallic  foliage.  J7/6. 
A    SELECTION  OF  HATS   BY   POST   ON    RECEIPT  OF    LONDON   TRADE    REFERENCE    OR   AMOUNT    ON    DEPOSIT. 


Ultet.  trimmed    with    blaclv   and    white  marcuerites  on  ,  ^     trimmed    bunches    of   pink    and    black   satin 

litht  « lie  of    br  m.  and    spray  of  small   pink   roecs  on       "'    """■•'•    '■■"""«™    ,     .    ,        .  ,  ,  ,, , 

l»ft  side      IS/-  Bank5iii   raws   and    .^hiidwl    autumn    foliac«.     3S/- 


SOLE  MAKERS: 


SliAG)ATS 

FASHIONABLE  """^^^i^H^^^^^ 

FOR    ALL    CLIMATES,   WEATHERS    AND    OCCASIONS. 


HARRODS 


The  AdvantagM 
ol  Harrods 
Famous  Yeltra 
Jetton  Coats  are 

undeniable. 
However  doubt- 
ful the  weather 
outlook  maybe, 
sling  one  of  our 
Light  -  Weight 
Yeltra  Coats 
over  your  arm, 
and  you  are 
assured  of 
thorough  pro- 
tection. 


These  coats  are 
made  sclely  by 
Harrods  from 
their  own  Yeltra 
Yarnproof  rub- 
berless  cloths  in 
various  exclu- 
sive shades  of 
Fawn,  Green, 
D  r a  p  and 
Brown.andthey 
are  perfectly  cut 
and  tailored  so 
as  to  combine 
perfect  style 
with  sound  ser- 


THE     KNOCKABOUT     MODEL.— It     has     hlgk 

Amikkr  )ia*t,  tlM  should;  r  aiid  sleeve  aeama 
■  eet.  livinf  a  long  graceful  appearance. 
Po«ImI(  IM  p*tche<l  on  the  inside,  and  finished 
wiM  a  lap.  anil  the  Storm  CulTs  make  ihM 
■•4i(  •  ••■aplaM  serviceable  garment. 

For  spiijf  ami  ■uraroer,  body  unlined,  sleevea 
tm4   imt    M  Aoulders   Uoed    proof         ^S/- 


THE    YELTRA    SPORTS    MODEI Ideal    in    all    weathers. 

Made  itith  Storm  Collar  and  buttoning  to  the  neck;  cut 
with  roomy  Raglan  sleeves,  which  ensure  absolute  freedom; 
vertjoal  pfx-'kets  allow  the  undercoat  pockets  Ixing  easily 
reached  without  unbuttoning.  Sleeves  lined  ^elf  4-Q/ft 
naterial.    Bo<1y  lined  check  wooUine.    Price  from         i^/l/ 

B«ad7  to  wear  in  all  sizes  and  fittings, 
or 
Hade  to  Order. 


THE  INVERCLYDE  MODEL-a  «oat  far  all 
weathers,  with  Raglan  sleeves,  front  hiitt««i>d 
through,  with  hold  lapels.  A  parti<ular  fea 
ture  is  that  the  collar  can  be  adaptenl  to  three 
positions,  affording  protection  in  stormv 
weather. 

As    a    light-weight  coat,   liody  nUiacd,   sloeves 
and     top    of    back     ljn<-<J     with     a         /CC  / 
proofed  silk,  OO/- 


HARRODS    LTD., 


Richard     Burbidge, 

Maaaglag  Director, 


LONDON,    S.W. 


Tavilkner  &  Son 

for  Leggings  with  an  air  of  distinction. 

Pigskin    -    -    35/-  per  pair. 
Brown  Calf-    42/- 
Grey  Canvas  21/-        ,, 


till 

May 
Sl<t. 


Write  for  Illustrated  Booklet  and  Instructions  for  Self-Measurement. 
Urgent  Orders  executed  quickly. 

52  South  Molton  St.,  Bond  St.,  London,  W. 

and  26  Trinity  Street,   Cambridge. 


Advertisement  Rates  in  "Land  &  Water 


Ordinary  Positions,  per  page  and   pro  rata 
Facing   Matter 
l^pecial   Pusitii..D> 


£30 
,£10 
£«) 


The  Country 
of  the  Future 


"^14   Or  all  A  rd 
•I  tk*  Bapire. 


BRITISH     COLUMBIA 

An      Ideal       Climate— Magnificent       Scenery-^Thc   Most    British   of    the    Canndian 

Provinces— A  Land  ol  F.-uit  and  Flowers— Splendid  Inland  Waters— Possesses  Vast 

Natural   Resources  Awaiting  Development. 

Ths  Canadian  Province  lor  MIXED  FARMING,   FRUIT  GROWING,  SHEEP,  HOC, 

AND    POULTRY    RAISING,    DAIRYING  AND  RANCHING. 

CANADA'S   MINERAL   PROVINCE. 

Total   Mineral   pro<luction   from   all   sources    to  date  over  £100,600,000. 
A    WORLD     SUPPLY    OF    TIMBER    FOR     A     WORLD     MARKET. 
British  Columbia  has  Timber  in  enomous  quantities.  In  the  largest  sites,  unsur- 
passed in  quality,  suitable   for  practically  every   use  to  which  wood  can  be  put. 
Full    information   on   application  to  the    Agent  General  lor  B.C.,   British   Columbia 
House,    1    &  3    Regent  Street,  London. 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVII  No.  2821  [v?1r] 


TPTTTPQ'nAV      TTTNF    t     rmf\  rREGiSTEREo  Asi    price  sixpence 

inui\oJJ/\i,    jUiNr!.    X,    lyio  La  newspaperJ  published  weekly 


By  Louit    Racmaehers. 


Drawn  ciciiimf  13  ;ur      Laud  and    Wuli-r.  " 


What   Plentiful   Munitions   Mean 

To-day    there    was    only    artillery    activity    against    our    first    line " 


LAND     &     WATER 


June   I,  1916 


THRESHER 
S^GLENNY 

(Dut/7iirer>s 


Military  Tailors 

yJnlyS^cfcLcQss 

1J2  &jSJ*  Strand 
L0JVn02\r 

MAKERS    OF    THE 
THRESHER  TRENCH  COAI 


WINDPROOF    AND 
WEATHERPROOF 


Recognised  by  the  W.O.  and  officially 
brought  to  the  notice  of  all  Officers  com- 
manding Corps  in  the  B.K.F.  early  in  the 
Winter  of  1914,  the  "  Thresher  "  has 
successfully  met  the  severest  tests  of  two 
Winter  campaigns,  and  has  established 
itself  supreme  for  comfort,  warmth,  and 
service. 

Up  to  April  23rd,  I9I6.  7.400  British  Military 
Officers  have  purchased  genuine  "Thresher" 
Tren<h  Coats.  This  fact  alone  makes  it 
unnecessary  to  publish  even  one  of  the  many 
generous  and  extraordinary  testimonials  that 
have  been   received. 


SUMMER  WEAR, 

The  outstanding  fact  is  that  orders 
from  B.E.F.  were  received  continuously 
during  last  Summer,  neither  is  there  yet 
any  signs  of  the  demand  slackening,  which 
confirms  our  statement  that  the 
"  Thresher  "  with  detachable  Kamelcott 
lining  is  the  best  garment  for  every  pur- 
pose and  every  season.  The  "  Thresher  " 
self-ventilating  system  is  protected.  (Pat. 
No.  14229/15.) 


The  "Thresher"  with- detach- 
able Kamelcott  lining 

Do.  unlined 


£    s. 

5  10 
4  14 


d. 

O 
6 


Do.  lined  Detachable  Sheep  7      10 

For  Mounted  Officers,  with  knee  flaps 
and  saddle  gusset,  15s.  6d.  extra. 

Send  size  of  chest  and  approximate 
height,  and  to  avoid  delay  enclose  cheque 
with  order. 

Note. — That  the  first  coat  produced  in 
October,  1914,  has  been  accepted  without 
anj'  modification  as  the  standard  garment 
for  modem  warfare. 


Extract  (Land  &  Water,  May  25th) 
by  the  "  L.  &  W."  Kit  Expert.  Doubtless 
he  had  the  "  Thresher  "    in  mind. 

"  In  more  than  one  case  objections  have 
been  raised  against  the  oiled-silk  lined 
trench  coat  for  summer  wear  on  the  ground 
that  it  is  too  heavy ;  the  objection  is  a 
needless  one,  for,  when  one  comes  to  consider 
the  build  of  this  pattern  of  coal,  it  will  be 
seen  that  its  weight  is  equivalent  to  that  of  a 
light  raincoat,  plus  the  few  ounces  weight 
of  the  oiled  silk  interlining — when  the  fleece 
or  other  detachable  lining  lias  been  taken  out 
of  the  trench  coat.  Objections  on  the  score 
of  ventilation  are  equally  groundless,  for 
the  trench  coat  as  now  made  is  as  well 
ventilated,  and  as  hygienic  in  wear,  as  any 
other  overcoat  designed  for  military  pur- 
poses." 


For  full  particulars  of  the  Thresher 

"Boimat,"    see    page    26    of    this 

present  issue. 

"  The  ideal  mattress  for  campaign- 
ing work  "('■  Land  &  Water,"  May  18). 


June  I,  I 916 


L  A  N  D      .^-      W  A  r  E  K 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSWAY,  LONDON,  W.C 

Telephone:  HOLBORN  2828 


THURSDAY,   JUNE     1.    1916 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

What  Plentiful  Munitions  Mean.     By  Louis  Raemaekcrs  i 
The  Future  of  Ireland.     (Leading  Article)  3 

Story  of  a  Brandenburg  Army  Corps.     By  Hilaire  Belloc  4 
Sartcs  Shakespeariante.     By  Sir  Sidney  Lee  1^ 

Bluebells  (a  poem).     By  Emilc  Cammaerts  i-i 

The  Navy  at  War.    By  Arthur  Pollen  i.) 

South  America  and  the  M^ar.     By  Lewis  R.  Freeman     15 
A  "  U  "   Boat's  Victim.     By  Georgina  Pennant  17 

The  West  End  '  22 

Town  and  Country  -4 

Choosing  Kit  ^"i- 


THEFUTURE  OF  IRELAND 

A  FORETIMES  if  one  raised  the  cry  "God  save 
/%  Lcland,"  it  was  deemed  seditious,  but  to-day 
/  %  there  is  not  a  man  or  woman  with  a  personal 
•*-  -^-interest  in  the  sister  island  from  whose  heart  this 
prayer  does  not  arise.  It  is  their  fixed  determination 
that  so  far  as  in  them  lies,  a  settlement  shall  be  concluded 
which  shall  render  the  future  of  Ireland  secure  from 
troubles  both  within,  and  without.  When  the  Prime 
Minister  determined  to  go  over  and  examine  the  position 
for  himself,  he  took  a  step  which  won  the  unquahfted  com- 
mendation of  all  save  a  few  bitter  political  enemies  whose 
first  axiom  appears  to  be  that  whatever  Mr.  Asquith 
does  is  wrong.  He  was  able  on  his  return  to  state  with 
the  strong  authority  which  comes  from  experience  that  the 
feeling  in  Ireland  is  universal  for  a  joint  and  combined 
ellort  to  obtain  agreement  as  to  the  way  in  which  the 
Government  of  Ireland  is  for  the  future  to  be  carried 
on,  and  he  has  with  the  full  consent  and  approval  of  the 
Cabinet  devised  a  plan  of  action  which  gives  the  best 
promise  of  success. 

The  occasion  is  more  propitious  than  appears  on  the 
face  of  it.     The  possibility  of  a  recrudescence  of  the 
previous    acute    Irish     differences    and    disagreements 
directly  peace  was  restored  has  hung  like  a  heavy  cloud 
on  the  horizon.     It  has  not  only  presaged  discord  at  a 
moment  when  harmony  should  prevail,  but  latterly  it 
has  been  foreseen  that  it  might  hinder  other  and  greater 
Imperial    developments    and    neutralise    much    of    the 
good  of  that  closer  union  of  the  various  units  of  the 
Empire  which  has  been  effected  through  the  war.     If  the 
solution  of  every  problem,  be  it  political,  social,  economic 
or  financial,  is  to  be  put  aside  until  the  war  is  over, 
it  is  obvious  many  of  them  will  never  be  solved  at  all, 
and  the  nation  will  drift  back  into  its  former  habits  of 
procrastination  and  inaction.     This  is  a  very  real  and 
serious  danger.     But  let  us  find  an  acceptable  settlement 
of  the  Government  of  Ireland  difficulty,  and  it  will  be  new 
encouragement   to   tackle   other   complicated   questions 
which  ought  to  be  faced  boldly  without  delay.     It  is 
needless  to  say   this  settlement  can  only  be   based   on 
compromise,  but  compromise  should  be  all  the  easier  if 
it   be   recognised   that   the   opinion  grows   and   gathers 
strength  among  thinkers  that  one  of  the  first  great  works 
of  peace  will  be  to  retonsider,   and  possibly  reconstruct, 
the   constitution    of    the    British    Parliament   at   West- 
minster so  that  all  subjects  of  the  King-Emperor,  both 
at  home  and  overseas,  shall  be  adequately  represented 
when  Imperial  problems  are  under  discussion.     This  will 


necessarily  imply  the  delegation  of  local  affairs  to  lesser 
Parliaments.  It  would  hs  premature  to  declare  that  we 
are  within  measurable  distance  of  Home  Rule  all  round, 
but  the  omens  point  that  way,  and  we  may  regard  the 
Irish  settlement  as  the  first  experiment  in  constructive 
statesmanship  which  this  world  struggle  has  caused  to 
be  attempted  within  the  British  Empire. 

In  selecting  Mr.  Lloyd  George  as  his  ambassador,  Mr. 
Asquith  has  chosen  wisely,  and  on  the  wisdom  of  his 
choice  the  future  hinges.  These  two— Prime  Minister 
and  Minister  of  Munitions — have  worked  shoulder  to 
shoulder  for  many  years.  They  who  fish  in  troubled 
waters  and  find  pleasure  and  profit  in  the  making  of 
mischief,  have  done  their  best  to  foster  jealousy  and 
intrigue  between  the  two,  but  without  avail.  The  latter 
willingly  continues  the  difticult  task  which  the  former 
has  initiated,  though  it  is  obvious  that  if  the  success  all 
hope  for  be  attained,  the  credit  for  it  will  rest  primarily 
with  the  Prime  Minister.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  through- 
out his  political  career  has  kept  free  from  entanglements 
in  Irish  politics,  and  he  is  both  temperamentally  sym- 
pathetic with  the  Celtic  character  and  happily  endowed 
with  imagination.  Lack  of  imagination  is  a  distinctive 
English  trait  ;  though  this  quality  has  advantages  in 
these  times  of  disturbance,  it  is  not  calculated  to  promote 
concord  where  other  peoples  and  races  are  concerned. 
Yet  in  the  coming  years  we  shall  be  called  upon  to  give 
imagination  a  far  freer  rein  if  we  are  to  place  the  political 
imion  of  the  Empire  on  a  sure  foundation,  so  it  is  as  well 
that  this  truth  should  be  realised  at  once  and  difficult 
tasks  of  this  nature  entrusted  to  imaginative  men. 

It  is  not  our  intention  to  discuss  Ireland's  troubles  here. 
No  good  can  come  of  it.  The  story  cannot  be  told  in  its 
entirety.  Public  inquiries  into  general  causes  and 
particular  episodes  are  being  held  and  the  less  discussion 
there  is  in  the  Press  the  better.  But  we  would  par- 
ticularly invite  attention  to  the  excellent  example  which 
Ireland  is  giving  England  in  certain  social  reforms, 
notably  the,  reconstruction  of  village  industries  and  the 
development  and  extension  of  agricultural  co-operation. 
It  has  been  Ireland's  peculiar  misfortune  that  owing  to  the 
bitterness  of  party  dissensions,  it  has  been  considered 
impossible  that  any  good  thing  can  come  out  of  her, 
and  no  attempt  has  been  spared  by  political  opponents 
to  render  futile  schemes  which  are  intrinsically  sound 
and  wise.  Yet  at  the  present  time  movements  are 
prospering  there  which  despite  the  political  taint 
that  has '  been  so  unfairly  attached  to  them,  ought 
not  only  to  spread  more  rapidly  in  Ireland,  but  to  be 
extended  to  this  country.  England  can  learn  of  Ireland 
and  will  learn,  once  we  are  rid  of  the  dividing  wall  of 
suspicions  and  misunderstandings.  Already  it  is  more 
than  half  broken  down  by  the  gallantry  of  Irishmen  in  the 
field,  and  it  only  remains  for  so  much  of  the  barrier  as 
still  exists  to  be  removed  through  the  temperate  and 
conciliatory  efforts  of  her  leaders  in  the  Council  Chamber. 

We  would  not  have  it  thought  that  we  minimise  the 
difficulties  that  lie  ahead  of  the  Cabinet,  and  its  special 
representative,  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  No  wave  of  a  wand 
will  cause  men  to  change  their  deepest  convictions  of  au 
instant,  and  though  one  speak  with  the  tongues  of  angels, 
persuasion  will  not  remove  every  personal  animosity, 
but  realising  that  the  spirit  of  conciliation  has  never 
been  more  wiUing  than  at  present,  we  entertain  high 
hopes  that  a  plan  of  settlement  is  not  impossible  and  that 
before  the  war  ends,  it  will  be  only  the  bare  truth  to 
assert  that  permanent  peace  has  been  established  in 
Ireland.  There  would  be  singular  satisfaction  in  such  a 
happy  conclusion.  The  Kaiser  thought  to  break  Britain 
through  civil  war  in  Ireland,  and  if  he  makes  Ireland 
whole  through  having  forced  Britain  into  war,  and  thus 
brings  about  a  permanent  reconciliation  between  factions 
and  discordant  elements  which  have  persisted  through 
centuries,  it  will  be  fine,  entirely  fine. 


LAND      &      W  A  i  L R 


June  1,   KjiO 


The   Trentino  Offensive 


By  Hilaire  Belloc 


THE  three  militarv  movements  of  the  week  have 
been  the  crossing  of  the  ("iieck  frontier  by  the 
Bulgars  and  tiernians,  the  big  and  futile  assault 
renewed  upon  the  defensive  line  of  Verdun,  and 
.the  continued  Austrian  offensive  against  the  Italians  in 
the  Trentino. 

The  first"' of  these  movements  is  not  sufficiently  de- 
veloped for  us  to  know  even  whether  it  is  intended  as  aiH 
offensive  movement  at  all.  It, may  be  a  purely  political 
act,  not  even  intended  to  menace,  let  atone  to  lead  up 
to  the  attack  of  the  Salonika  lines.  We  must  wait  for. 
further  developments  before  it  is  possible  to  give  it  any 
commentarv  at  all. 

The  second  movement— the  massed  attack  upon  the 
Verdun  lines,  I  will  deal  with  briefly  at  the  coiu'lusion  of  a 
general  survey  of  the  ("lerman  and  French  theses  which 
I  append  to  the  story  I  print  this  week  of  how  a  certain 
German  Corps  disappeared  in  the  fighting  round  Verdun. 
..  The  Austrian  offensix-e  deserves  more  particular  treat- 
ment, both  from  its  novel  features,  and  also  because, 
although  it  is  still  in  process  of  development  so  that  we 
cannot  yet  define  either  its  full  objects  or  the  measure 
of  success  it  is  attaining,  yet  the  immediate  results  and 
the  peril  thev  involve  are  sufficiently  grave. 
■  The  ground  o\-er  which  the  new  Austrian  offensive  is 
-de\Tloping  is  an  oblong  about  30  miles  By  45.  This 
oblong  is  roughlv  bisected  by  the  old  artificial  frontier 
between  the  Austrian  Trentiiio  and  the  modern  Italian 
state. 

Its  importance  consists  in  this  :  that  the  communica- 
tions between  the  chief  arsenals,  depots,  of  men,  etc.,  of 
the  Italians  and  their  main  I.sonzo  front  pass  right  in 
front  of  the  projection  down  from  the  Alps,  which  the 
.  Trentino  makes.  This  projection,  the  southern  main  point 
of:  which  is  at  Borghctto,  a  few  miles  from  Lake  Garda, 
was  specially  designed  when  the  frontier  was  drawn  to 
weaken  the  new  Italian  state  and  to  strengthen  the 
Austrians.  and  the  modern  importance  of  railways  has 
greatlv  increased  its  advantage. 

There  are  two  lines,  roughly  parallel,  serving  the  front 
upon  the  Isonzo  and  each  connected  with  the  mass  of 
peninsular  Italy  to  the  south  of  the  Po  and  the  industrial 
centres  and  depots  of  Lombardy  and  Piedmont.    The 


first  passes  through  Brescia,  Verona,  Vicenza  and  Treviso. 
The  second  passes  through  Mantua,  Padua,  and  so  to  the 
Isonzo  front. 

The  second,  which  is  marked  (i)  upon  the  accompany- 
ing map.  is  the  principal  line  of  communication. 

The  northern  one,  marked  (2),  has  fewer  sidings,  fewer 
facilities  for  rolling  stock  and,  I  believe,  only  a  single 
line. 

It  is  clear  that  the  enemy  astraddle  of  the  northern 
line  alone  and  in  occupation  of  Verona  or  Vicenza,  or 
both^ — nay,  seriously  menacing  the  northern  line — would 
be  a  very  great  peril  for  the  Italian  main  front  and  would 
almost  certainlv  proxoke  a  retirement  from  it.  The 
enemy's  occupation  of  the  other  main  line,  the  southern 
one,  would  still  more  clearly  be  fatal. 

Now  from  the  southernmost  point  of  the  old  Austro- 
Italian  frontier  at  Borghetto  to  Verona  is,  as  the  crow 
flies,  less  than  20  miles,  and  even  by  road  and  by  rail  not 
30.  Vicenza  is  from  the  nearest  point  of  the  frontier  ex- 
actly 20  miles  as  the  crow  flies,  and  further  east  at  Castel- 
franco  there  is  a  point  almost  equally  near  to  that 
frontier. 

Finally  the  distance  from  the  first,  least  important 
lines  of  communications  to  the  second  absolutely  riial 
one.  is  between  Vicenza  and  Padua  well  under  20  miles 
of  dead  level  ground. 

We  must  also  appreciate  the  fact  that  Verona  and 
Vicenza  lie  on  the  edge  of  the  Venetian  plain,  and  the 
foot-hills  of  the  Alps  touch  that  plain  ujwn  a  line 
corresponding  to  the  line  bounding  the  shaded  area  upon 
the  map. 

It  is  evident  from  all  this  that  a  passage  of  the 
frontier,  upon  even  a  narrow  belt,  by  the  enemy  here 
would  be  of  the  very  gravest  importance,  and  it  was 
to  prevent  it  that  the  Italian  Commander-in-Chief 
pushed  forward  in  the  first  days  of  the  war  in  order  to 
block  the  avenues  whereby  the  enemy  might  attempt 
such  an  advance. 

There  are  two  such  avenues,  as  we  pointed  out  last 
week.  The  Val  Sugana,  or  valley  of  the  Brenta  and  the 
Val  Lagarina,  or  valley  of  the  Adige.  These  valleys 
meet  at  Trent,  and  the  whole  importance  of  Trent  in 
military  as  in  social  history  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  is 


Moimtaixious 
ffHUlCoiuitty 


Theatre  of 
Operations 


I 


To  Piedmont 
and  Lombardy 


'  To  Penuisutaf  t)F  Italy 


June  I,  1916 


LAND      &      VV  A  T  E  R 


I 


■  Critical 

IfAiisSriansnack 
Valstixgrui  alltlie 


ToUccma.  aid',        . 
M'ain  Kailwaiis  inl-l^m 


20  SKiies    .  30 


the  junction  of  the  two  great  roads  whereby  not  only 
armies  but  trade  pass  from  the  Venetian  Plain  up  into 
and  across  the  Alps. 

We  owe  that  position  to  a  peculiar  geographical  con- 
dition, which  is  that  the  lake  from  which  the  Brcnta 
rises,  Lake  Caldonazzio,  instead  of  being  separated 
from  the  valley  of  the  Adige  by  a  high  watershed  is 
only  separated  frjm  it  by  an  insignificant  "  portage," 
open  and  level,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Pergine. 

These  two  avenues,  leading  from  Trent  to  the  Venetian 
plain,  the  valley  of  the  Adige  and  the  valley  of  the 
Brenta,  carry,  as  we  saw  last  week,  the  two  main  roads 
and  the  only  railway's  in  the  district.  //  is  impossible  for 
the  enemy  to  do  anything  serious  against  the  Italians 
iintil  he  is  the  master  of  one  or  other  of  these  avenues,  and 
improbable  that  he  will  do  anything  serious  until  he  is 
the  master  of  one  or  both. 

Upon  this  account  the  main  Italian  resistance  has 
been  massed  in  the  two  valleys,  and  in  these,  so  far,  the 
enemy  has  not  made  good.  When  the  blow  fell  the 
Italian  line  ran  between  Roncegno  and  Novaledo  in  the 
Sugana  and  just  south  of  Rovereto  in  the   Lagarina. 

Upon  the  former  sector,  the  Val  Sugana,  the  retirement, 
though  uncovering  the  town  of  Borgo,  has  not  exceeded 
six  miles.  In  the  latter  and  more  important  avenue  of 
approach,  the  Lagarina,  it  has  not  covered  as  much  as 
four.  At  the  moment  of  writing  the  Italian  line  stands 
firm  across  both  these  essential  avenues  of  approach, 
after  a  fortnight  of  Austrian  effort. 

But  if  the  Italians  thus  successfully  hold  the  Lagarina 
and  the  Sugana  against  direct  attack,  viay  not  those 
valleys  be  turned?  That  is  the  serious  problem  of  the 
moment.  An  Austrian  force  failing  to  break  through 
on  the  upper  Brenta  or  upper  Adige  might  by  getting 
through  the  centre  between  these  divergent  valleys 
appear  on  the  lower  courses  of  either  stream  and  so  be 
masters  of  a  road  into  Venetia,  cutting  off  the  defenders 
of  the  upper  valley.     That  is  the  danger. 

In  the  centre,  the  base  of  the  triangle  of  which  the 
rivers  Brenta  and  Adige  form  the  other  two  sides,  there 
has  been  a  serious  advance. 

Let  us  examine  the  nature  of  that  advance  and  the  ^ 
opportunities  it   may   afford   of   making   the   Austrians 
masters  of  one  or  other  or  both  of  the  great  roads. 

The  frontier'  here  corresponds  to  the  secondary  water- 
shed between  the  upper  and  the  lower    valley    of    the 


Brenta  and  the  upper  and  the  lower  valley  of  the  Adige 
Thus  there  is  a  torrent  rising  upon  the  frontier  ridge  and 
falling  into  the  Upper  Adige  near  Rovereto,  the  valley  of 
which  is  called  the  valley  of  Vallarsa,  which  I  have 
marked  (i)  upon  Map  II.  It  has  a  tributary,  which 
I  have  marked  (2)  called  the  Terragnolo,  while  further 
north  a  number  of  small  streams  fall  into  the  Upper 
Brenta.  South  of  this  ridge,  a  corresponding  system 
of  torrents  runs  down  to  the  Lower  Brenta  and  the 
Lower  Adige.  Those  falling  into  the  Lower  Brenta  are 
the  important  torrents  to  notice.  North  of  the  great 
knot  or  central  mass  of  mount  Pasubio  (not  quite  7,000 
feet  high)  you  have  the  torrent  of  the  Posina,  which  falls 
down  to  the  mountain  town  of  Asiero  and  becomes  a 
tributary  of  the  Astico,  another  torrent  rising  a  little 
beyond  the  frontier.  From  the  other  side  there  falls 
into  the  Astico  the  torrent  of  Val  d'Assa,  and  upon  a  tiny 
tributary  of  this  is  the  town  of  Asiago.  ; 

Now  the  Austrians  have  not  been  able  to  force  the 
Monte  Pasubio,  btit  everywhere  to  the  north  of  it  they 
have  reached  the  last  ridges  overlooking  Asiero  and 
Asiago.  Both  these  towns  are  served  by  light  railways 
commimicating  with  the  main  railway  system  of  the 
plain  immediately  bej'ond.  The  whole  district  has  con- 
siderable industrial  importance  in  the  manufacture  of 
woollen  goods,  and  its  occupation  would  lead  the  enemy 
to  the  very  edge  of  the  plain,  the  line  between  which  and 
the  foothills  is  marked,  in  this  region,  upon  my  sketch 
map  by  a  line  of  crosses,  which  show  the  dangerous 
proximity  of  the  region  to  the  opeai  country  below.  Were 
Asiero  and  Asiago  occupied — and  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
such  occupation  can  be  prevented  now — there  lies 
behind  them  and  between  them  and  the  perfectly  open 
country  only  one  last  ridge,  running  roughly  as  does  the 
line  A  B  upon  the  above  sketch. 

But  there  is  something  much  more  important  in  the 

~  enemy's  reaching  Asigao  than  its  mere  proximity  to  the 

plains,  and  that  is  its  proximity  to  Valstagna  on  the  Brenta. 

In  order  to  see  the  importance  of  Valstagna  let  us 
consider  the  following  argument  : 

Supposing  Asiero  and  Asiago  to  be  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  and  even  supposing  the  last  ridge  A  B  to  be  lost 
to  the  Italians,  but  the  main  jx)sitions  in  the  great  and 
essential  avenues  of  approach,  the  \'alley  of  the  Brenta 
and  the  valley  of  the  Adige,  to  be  still  held  by  the  Italians, 
what  then  would  be  the  position  of  the  enemy  ? 

It  is  clear  that  he  would  be  occupying  a  very  danger© 


LAND      «.\:      W  A  T  F,  R 


June 


1C)-[G 


salient  indeed.     He  has,  to  feed  that  sahent,  only  two 
roads,  and  neither  of  these  is  tirst  class. 

If  he  could  force  .Mount  Pasubio  he  would  have  a  third 
road,  the  road  goinjj;  from  Kovereto  up  the  Vallarsa,  and 
crossing  the  frontier  ridge  at  C.  So  far  he  has  failed  to 
force  the  Pasubio  mountain  ;  his  furthest  advance  up 
the  Terragnolo  valley  (3)  along  the  best  road  is  as  far  as 
Chiesa  at  L).  The  only  two  roads  he  has  as  yet  then  for  a 
continued  advance  (which,  remember,  is  dependent 
entirely  upon  his  preponderanct-  in  heavy  artillery) 
upon  this  sector,  are  tirst  the  road  up  the  valley  of  the 
Astico.  where  he  has  the  advantage  of  holding  the  upper 
land  and  being  already  well  down  upon  the  southern 
slope,  and  secondly  the  road  from  Asiago  up  the  Val 
d'Assa,  where  he  has  a  similar  advantage.  But  these 
two  roads  and  the  mountain  paths  of  all  that  wijd  land 
give  him  no  avenue  of  supply  for  a  large  army.  He  is 
simply  compelled  by  the  nature  of  the  case  to  force  or 
turn  the  two  main  valleys. 

The  Valley  of  the  .\dige  he  cannot  turn  until  he  either 
masters  the  Pasubio  or  forces  his  way  across  the  pass  at 
C,  in  spite  of  the  heights  there  dominating  him.  and  so 
gets  right  down  into  the  lower  country  on  the  southern  side. 

The  Brenta  valley  he  has  imfortunately  a  better  chance 
of  turning.     From   .\siago,  to  th>^  nearest  point  of  the 


firenta  road  and  railway  at  \'alstagna  is  only  eight  miles. 
There  is  no  road  at  all  across  the  tumbled  mountain  land 
there,  but  a  successful  action  fought  from  Asiago  would 
give  him  the  mastery  over  the  Brenta  valley  at  \'al- 
stagna  and  its  neighbourhood  and  even  a  threat  to  this 
would  compel  the  immediate  falling  back  of  the  Italian 
forces  in  -the  Upper  Brenta  Valley. 

The  last  news  received  ui)on  writing  these  lines  shows 
us  the  enemy  on  the  heights  immediately  dominating 
Asiago  and  Asiero  from  the  north.  The  enemy's  posts  of 
observation  look  right  down  upon  both  towns  in  theii 
valleys  at  not  more  than  6,000  yards  from  the  Austrian 
lines.  But  they  show  us  this  advance  with  no  good 
avenues  of  communication  behind  and  dependent  for  any 
success  upon  either  reaching  the  lower  Brenta  valley 
at  the  critical  point  of  Valstagna,  or  forcing  the  Italian 
positions  on  the  Upper  Brenta  valley  just  behind  Borgo. 
Whether  they  will  succeed  in  reaching  Valstagna  or 
whether  the  slowness  of  pace  inseparable  from  their 
dependence  upon  heavy  artillery  will  give  the  Italians 
time  for  a  concentration  sufficient  to  prevent  fult her 
advance  the  next  few  days  will  tell  us.  So  far  (this  is 
written  upon  Tuesday  evening  with  the  matter  (piitc 
\msettled  and  still  in  full  development)  no  judgment  is 
po-isiblo. 


Story  of  a  Brandenburg  Army  Corps 


I  PROPOSE  this  week  to  lay  before  my  readers,  by 
way  of  an  object-lesson  to  guide  our  judgment  with 
regard  to  the  Battle  of  Verdun,  the  story  now 
available  in  some  detail  of  one  single  German 
corps  ;  of  how  it  was  selected  and  trained  for  the  attack  ; 
how  it  suffered  beyond  anything  its  command  had 
thought  possible  ;  how  it  was  incapable  of  further  effort 
after  one  week  of  such  losses  ;  how  it  was  recruited  ; 
how  one  more  attempt  was  made  to  use  it  ;  taken  to  the 
rear,  rested  ,  and  how  in  two  days  that  effort  broke  down, 
.  arid  the  corps  disappeared  for  good. 

I  think  that  the  matter  (which  I  have  not  seen  dealt 
with  at  all  in  any  English  publication)  will  be  illuminating, 
and,  for  many  of  those  watching  the  present  phase  of  the 
campaign,  conclusive. 

The  3rd  .^rmy  Corps  of  the  Prussian  service  is  composed 
of  Metropolitan  and  typically  Prussian  troops.  It  is 
recruited  from  the  Province  of  Brandenburg.  It  has 
reputation  in  that  service  second  only  perhaps,  to  the 
reputation  of  the  Imperial  Guard. 

It  was  present,  under  the  command  of  von  Kluck,  in 
the  attempted  enveloping  movement  by  the  ist  Army, 
which  ended  so  disastrously  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Paris,  and  the  failure  of  which  determined  the  Battle  of 
the  Mame.  It  was  present  in  the  Battle  of  the  Ourcq 
when  the  French  (ieneral  Maunoury  surprised  von  Kluck 
and  was  himself  so  nearly  counter-enveloped. 

It  stood  some  days  later  upon  the  lines  of  the  Aisnc 
when   the   (iermans   dug   themselves   in.     That   was   in 
September.  I')I4.     For  nearly  a  year  the  3rd  Branden- 
burg Corps  remained  there  facing  first  the  British,  later 
the  French,  upon  the  limestone  heights  of  the  Soissonnais. 
The  hurried  concentration  of  German  troops  to  meet 
trie  gre<ii3*  French  offensive  in  Champagne  last  September 
called  dowi.n  to  that  region  certain  elements  of  the  3rd 
Germany  Ai  -my  Corps.     But  later,  with  the  month  of 
October  it  be{,|ins  a  series  of  adventures  which  it  is  of  the 
highest  interest,"^  for  us  to  follow,  because  they  show  how 
thoroughly  and    from  what  long  date  the  attack  on  the 
Verdun  sector  w./vs  planned,  what  that  attack  was  in- 
tended to  do,  and   at  what  a  cost  it  has  failed. 

I-'our  months  bef(\jre  the  lirst  shells  of  the  great  bom- 
bardment were  deliV«^red  against  the  Verdun  lines,  the 
tody  of  infantry  whicvi,  ^ygs;  ^q  deliver  the  shock  was 
already  carefully  selectc*w  ^nd  prepared.  The  method  is 
familiar  from  half  a  dozi^^  great  examples  in  this  war. 
A  hammerhead  of  picked  *ti|-oops  separate  from  the  rest 
are  collected  and  hurled  at  on^oint  to  deliver  the  hammer- 
blow  that  shall  break  the  Vpposing  defensive  cordon. 
The^main  difference  between  ^^  preparation  of  Verdun 
and  the  other  actions  of  the  waiv.jj^  ^j^g  greater  expense  in 
time  and  in  men  which  were  ^ntcmplated.  It  was  as 
though  the  Germans  had  said  y,  themselves  after  the 
attempt    to    envelop    the    Kuss^    armies    had    failed, 


"  We  will  stand  or  fall  by  one  last  great  offensive  against 
the  Western  front."  At  any  rate,  this  picked  corps  of 
typically  Prussian  troops,  tlie  corps  from  Brandenburg, 
was  chosen  with  others  to  form  part  of  this  great  new 
agglomeration  that  was  to  strike  the  decisive  blow.  The 
iirst  part  of  their  preparation  for  this  task  was  to  take 
them  away  from  the  fighting  line,  to  train  and  even  feed 
them  specially  for  a  long  period ;  to  refresh  thent 
physically  and  morally  in  every  way  and  produce  by  a 
l^atient  attention  to  ever}'  detail  and  ample  expense  of 
time  the  very  maximmn  effort  when  they  should  come 
to  be  launched  against  the  French. 

Like  the  rest  of  those  chosen  for  this  great  task  the 
Brandenburgers  of  the  3rd  Corps  were  taken  to  the  interior 
just  when  the  exhaustion  of  the  imperfect  effort  against 
Russia  was  apparent— that  is,  in  the  last  third  of  October 
191.S  (i). 

For  nearly  four  months  the  special  training,  the  repose, 
the  special  feeding  even  of  this  corps  and  its  fellows 
proceeded  far  from  the  lighting. 

At  last,  upon  February  8th.  it  arrived  upon  the  scene 
where  it  was  to  undertake  the  work  to  which  all  this 
preparation  had  been  designed. 

The  3rd  Brandenburg  Corps  stood  on  February  8th 
billeted  in  the  country  behind  the  hills  of  Ornes,  that  is 
in  Gremilly,  Azannes.Ville,  and  to  the  north  of  those 
\-illages.  It  formed  the  extreme  eastern  or  left  wing  of 
the  great  body  which  was  to  be  launched  a  few  days  later 
against  the  French  lines  to  the  North  of  Verdun,  and  on 
the  2 1st  of  February  it  took  the  shock. 

Let  us  review  its  strength  and  situation  upon  that  day, 
Mon4ay  the  21st  of  February,  the  opening  day  of  the 
infantry  work  before  Verdun.  Only  so  can  we  under- 
stand what  followed. 

The  3rd  Corps  had  been  given  the  task  of  driving  the 
French  covering  lines  in  on  a  front  of  not  quite  tw  o  miles. 
Its  strength  in  infantry  actually  present  and  designed 
to  take  part  in  the  shock  itself  was  no  longer  the  full 
complement  of  24,000  bayonets,  but  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  20,000.  These  20,000  consisted  in  two  divisions  of 
about  10,000  each.  These  di\-isions  were  numbered  the 
5th  Division  and  the  6th  Division.  We  know  a  good 
l^art  of  the  composition  of  these  divisions.  They  were 
formed  of  three  regiments  each,  or  the  equivalent  of  three 
regiments,  and  we  arc  acquainted  with  the  numbers  of 
fonr  of  these  and  a  portion  of  the  5th.  The  6th  Division, 
that  on  the  extreme  end  of  the  "line  to  the  east  or  left 
was  composed  of  the  24th  and  64th  regiments,  and  of  a 
body  of  Jaegers,  while  the  5th  Division  contained  ^the 
52nd  regiment  and  the  12th  regiment  with  a  third  element, 

(i)  It  is  possible  that  cert.iin  olomcnts  of  the  3r(l  corps  were  present 
not  in  the  fighting  but  in  rosi-rvc  durinR  the,  Serbian  Kxpnlition  - 
hut  the  point  is  not  certain.  At  am  nitc,  the  grcnl  bulk  »f  the  f  oios 
was  at  rest  at  that  moment. 


June  I,  KjiG 


L  A  iN  D      &      W  A  T  E  R 


the  details  of  which  I  liave  not  seen  published.  These 
divisions  were  not  fully  deployed.  The  elements  of  each 
stood  one  behind  the  other  in  support,  one  regiment 
lieing  destined  to  take  the  first  brunt  of  the  shock  ;  its 
fellows  would  replace  or  reinforce  it  later  according  to 
the  punishment  it  might  have  received. 

In  the  mid-afternoon  of  February  21st,  a  cold  and  misty 
day,  the  advance  portions  of  the"  5th  and  6th  Divisions 
struck  the  French  covering  line  after  that  line  had  been 
turned  upside  down  by  the  previous  intensive  bombard- 
ment. The  main  region  upon  which  the  shock  was  de- 
livered here  on  the  east  or  left  of  the  German  attack  was 
the  wood  of  Herbebois,  a  wood  recently  cut,  and  full, 
therefore,  of  comparatively  large  clearings  \yith  under- 
wood grown  up  during  the"  last  year  or  two.  The  Frencli 
obstacles  here  were  very  thoroughly  organised  and  tho 
attack  of  the  3rd  Army  Corps  was  checked  with  heavy 
initial  loss. 

On  the  next  day,  Tuesday,  February  22nd,  the  attacks 
were  continued  in  a  flurry  of  snow  and  failed  to  secure 
an  advance.  They  were  further  continued  during  the 
morning  of  Wednesday  the  23rd.  But  in  the  afternoon 
the  success  of  German  troops  further  to  the  west  pushing 
in  the  centre  of  the  French  covering  line  compelled  the 
retirement  of  the  French  here  on  the  east,  and  from  4  p.m. 
onwards  the  French  retreated  before  the  advance  of  the 
3rd  Branclenburg  Corps  into  and  beyond  the  wood  of 
'Herbebois,  and  during  the  following  night  fell  back 
once  more. 

During  Thursday  the  24th  and  all  the  succeeding  night 
Ihi;  French  further  retired  upon  Bezonvau.x  village  and 
tlie  wo(k1  of  La  Vauche,  so  that  by  the  dawn  of  day  upon 
tlie  Friday,  the  25th,  the  whole  l-'rench  line  was  only  just 
in  front  of  their  main  position,  the  Ridge  of  Douaumont 
continued  in  a  half  circle  to  the  Hill  of  Poivre,  and  so  to 
the  Meusc  at  Bras.  Upon  the  morning  of  Friday,  the 
25th.  the  3rd  Brandenburg  Corps,  which  had  thus  been 
held  uj)  at  a  considerable  expense  in  men  for  neariy  three 
days  at  the  wood  of  Herbebois,  but  had  in  the  succeeding 
two  days  advanced  over  neariy  two  miles  of  ground, 
delivered  an  attack  violent  in  proportion  to  the  critical 
nature  of  the  moment.  As  they  were  the  best  troops 
the  Prussians  were  employing  for  this  great  shock,  so 
1licy  had  the  chief  task  allotted  to  them. 

The  5th  Division  on  the  west  or  right  was  checked,  but 
I  he  6th  Division  mastered  the  ravine  of  La  Vauche  and 
acquired,  though  with  very  heavy  loss,  the  summit  of  the 
ridge.  The  24th  Regiment  rushed  the  ruins  of  the  old 
fort  of  Douaumont.  and  we  had  the  famous  message 
upon  which  so  much  discussion  has  turned. 

This  Friday  evening  w^as  the  hour  in  which  the  enemy 
believed  that  he  had  achieved  his  purpose  ;  the  decisive 
))oint  was  the  ridge  and  fort  of  Douaumont,  and  he  had 
laid  hands  upon  it.  Heavy  as  had  been  the  price  already 
paid  it  seemed  as  though  the  rest  would  be  the  mere 
jjursuit  of  a  broken  enemy. 

But  the  French  had  been  fighting  with  a  covering  line 
nnly,  and  upon  the  next  day,  Saturday  the  26th,  they 
lavuichcd  a  body  as  large  in  numbers  as  the  whole  German 
3rd  Corps,  to  wit,  the  French  20th  Corps  ;  they  swarmed 
back  over  the  level  of  the  Douaumont  plateau  and  re- 
covered the  ground  on  cither  side  of  the  ruins  of  the  fort, 
though  not  tliose  ruins  themselves.  In  these  the  remnants 
of  the  24th  regiment  remained  entrenched,  and  defied  all 
efforts  to  dislodge  them. 

In  order  to  clear  the  situation  and  to  relieve  the  men 
in  the  fort  from  tiieir  perilous  outlying  position,  as  also  in 
order  U>  push  further  on  to  the  plateau,  and  make  them- 
selves really  masters  of  it,  the  two  divisions  of  the  3rd 
Corps  were  ordered  to  strike  again  to  tiie  west  and  tiie 
east  of  the  Fort.  Upon  the  west  was  the  village  of  Douau- 
mont :  upon  the  east  the  wood  of  La  Caillctte.  It  was 
therefore  the  5th  or  right  Division  \vliicli  attacked  the 
village  ;  the  6th  or  left  Division  which  attacked  the  wood. 
Upon  Sunday  the  27th  of  February,  the  52nd  regiment 
of  the  5th  Division  threw  itself  against  the  French  en- 
ft-enche'd  in  Douaumont  village  and  was  broken.  On 
the  next  day,  the  28th,  its  place  was  taken  by  the  I2th 
regiment  which  met  with  the  same  fate.  Meanwhile 
against  Caillette  Wood  the  64th  regiment  of  the  6th 
Division  and  the  Jaegers  hurled  themselves  six  times  upon 
the  French  lines  in  these  same  two  days  and  were  broken 
back  as  their  comrades  of  the  5th  Division  had  been 
against  the  village. 


On  Tuesday,  February  2Qth,  the  3rd  Army  Corps  was 
exhausted  in  energy  and  broken.  It  was  past  any  further 
effort  and  was  called  back  to  the  rear. 

The  great  mass  designed  for  victorious  shock,  of  which 
it  had  formed  one  portion,  had  failed  in  its  task  and  liad 
suffered  so  heavily  that  it  was  for  the  moment  ruined. 
Its  place  had  to  be  taken  by  reserves.  The  defence 
of  this  sector  of  a  mile  or  so  from  Douaumont  Village 
to  the  Caillette  Wood  was  as  a  fact  taken  over  by 
the  113th  Division.  The  two  divisions  of  the  3rd 
corps,  the  5th,  and  the  6th,  or  what  was  left  of  them, 
were  withdrawn  to  positions  right  back  again  behind 
Ornes,  to  be  reformed  after  their  terrible  experience. 

Actual  Losses 

But  all  these  terms  "  heavy  losses  "  :  "  terrible  ex- 
perience." and  the  rest  are  general.  The  reader  will 
demand,  if  he  is  to  form  a  judgment  upon  even  this  detail 
of  the  war,  the  ])roportion  of  losses. 

From  information  unusually  detailed  which  the  Freni :h 
authorities  obtained  later  on  that  question  can  be 
answered,  and  the  answer  is  startling. 

The  patching  together  again  of  the  3rd  Corps  and  the 
replenishing  of  its  enormous  gaps  with  new  human 
material  showed  a  necessity  of  replacing  the  cadres  (that 
is,  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  oihcerswho  are  the 
framework  of  any  military  body)  to  the  extent  of  two- 
ihirds.  Of  three  regimental  officers  and  sergeants  who 
had  gone  into  action  exactly  a  week  before,  on  the  after- 
noon of  Monday,  the  21st  of  L'ebruary,  two  had  been 
hit  by  the  evening  of  Monday  the  28th.  The  corps  had 
no  reserves  left.  F^verv  one  of  its  elements  had  been 
thrown  in  and  shattered.  The  Jaegers,  who  had  been 
most  spared,  received  their  worst  punishment  in  the 
Caillctte  Wood  in  the  last  days.  The  64th  regiment  of 
the  6th  Division  saw  its  last  units  shattered  in  the  same 
place.  The  24th  regiment  had  spent  itself  in  the  tremen- 
dous attack  which  had  carried  Douaumont  Fort,  while 
of  the  5th  Division,  the  52nd  regiment,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  been  shattered  in  front  of  Douaumont  village  two 
days  before  the  end  ;  the  remnants  of  the  I2th  taking  its 
place  had  been  broken  upon  the  morrow. 

We  have  no  documentary  evidence,  I  believe,  of  the 
exact  losses  in  the  rank  and  file,  and  it  is  wise  to  suppose 
that  these  were  somewhat  inferior  to  the  66  per  cent, 
losses  of  the  cadres.  But  at  any  rate  they  were  certainly 
over  half  the  effectives  employed,  and  it  is  remarkable 
that  in  looking  round  for  material  to  fill  the  gaps  the 
chief  remaining  reservoir  was  only  the  young  class  '16. 
During  the  period  of  recruitment  behind  the  hues  these 
lads  were  povrred  into  this  crack  corps  in  such  numbers 
that  many  of  the  companies  rehed  for  nearly  half  their 
new  strength  upon  the  presence  of  such  recruits. 

On  the  fifth  day  of  this  remodelling,  Saturday  the  4th 
of  March,  a  message  and  an  order  of  the  day  of  the  cus- 
tomary rather  sentimental  sort  (which  perhaps  we  judge 
rather  harshly  from  the  ignorance  everyone  has  of  a 
foreign  tempe-rament)  reached  the  3rd  Corps  from  the 
Commander-in-Chief  of  this  group  of  armies  before  Ver- 
dun, the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia.  He  appealed  to  his 
"  faithful  Brandenburgers,"  condoled  with  them  over 
their  losses,  emphasised  the  pecuHar  value  of  the  Prussians 
among  the  (iermanic  combatants,  and  told  them  how  he 
relied  upon  them  for  further  and  "  decisive  "  efforts. 

This  piece  of  rhetoric  is  not  insignificant,  for  it  tells  us 
something  of  the  effect  produced  by  the  immense  sacrifice 
already  suffered  and  tells  us  even  more  of  the  hopes  that 
were  still  entertained  of  victory. 

The  3rd  Corps  was  not  ready  to  inarch  upon  the  day 
following  this  appeal  as  had  been  hoped. 

It  was  not  until  the  evening  of  March  7th,  Tuesday,  that 
its  commander  reported  everything  ready  for  taking  up 
again  the  dreadful  business  of  a  renewed  attack. 

The  3rd  Army  Corps  was  reconstituted  indeed,  but  it 
was  no  longer  its  old  self.  Less  than  half  of  the  men 
who  had  been  given  that  careful  long  training  of  four 
months  behind  the  lines  remained.  Only  a  third  of  the 
specially  selected  and  instructed  cadres,  which  had  held 
it  together,  marched  out  southward  again  to  take  the 
field.  Not  only  were  most  of  its  men  new,  but  as  we 
have  seen,  a  very  large  portion  of  them  were  of  the 
youngest  tvpe  of  recruit.     Most  significant  of  all,  the 


8 


LAND     .V     WA  T  E  R 


June  I,  1916 


3rd  Corps  even  thus  reconstituted  no  longer  paraded  any- 
thing like  its  old  numbers.  The  companies  had  mustered 
just  before  the  attack  on  Verdun  about  200  strong. 
They  appeared  upon  the  roll  call  of  the  7th  with  an 
average  lessening — in  spite  of  the  new  recruitment — of 
40  per  cent.     They  were  upon  the  average  120  strong. 

The  change  in  tiic  constitution  of  the  corps  and  in  its 
monil  after  the  business  of  the  wiek  before  appeared  at 
once.  A  new  attack  was  launched  upon  Wednesday,  March 
8th  ;  the  jrd  Corps  being  given  its  old  sector  with  a  slight 
extension  towards  the  South.  It  was  thrown  in,  fully 
deployed  from  Vaux  Village  right  round  to  Douaumont 
Village.  It  was  no  longer  of  the  quality  to  do  what  its 
predecessors  of  the  same  name  had  done  only  a  week 
before.  The  attack  of  the  8th  failed.  The  attempt 
to  renew  it  upon  the  qth  was  even  more  disastrous  The 
losses  (as  is  always  the  case  with  inferior  troops  that 
fail  in  an  attack)  were  disastrously  large  and  out  of  scale 
even  with  the  fearful  casualties  of  the  lirst  rtghting  when 
tiic  jrd  Corps  was  still  composed  of  its  original  elements, 
and  still  thought  itself  capable  of  victory  upon  its  sector 
of  the  line. 

These  last  two  days  achieved  the  ruin  of  the  unit. 

In  the  night  of  Thursday,  March  (jth.  the  jrd  Corps  was 
withdrawn  from  the  action  altogether  and  has  never 
reappeared.* 

Here  is  surely  a  most  striking  piece  of  evidence,  con- 
crete and  detailed  with  regard  to  the  nat\ire  of  the 
(ierman  losses  in  front  of  Verdun.  The  nature  of  the 
original  attempt,  its  failure,  its  expense,  are  all  before 
us  in  this  one  example  because  we  happen  to  have  upon 
it  more  complete  evidence  than  upon  any  of  the  other 
German  elements  used  in  the  battle. 

Even  had  we  not  further  knowledge,  such  c\idence 
would  be  conclusive  as  to  the  nature  of  the  (lerman 
wastage  here,  and  the  wisdom  of  the  French  restriction  to 
that  mere  defensive  which  has  astonished  Europe. 

We  know  the  way  in  which  the  first  week  of  the  fight- 
ing ruined  a  body  to  which  the  most  complete  prepara- 
tion possible  had  been  given  at  the  expense  of  four  months 
in  time  and  of  its  absence  during  those  four  months  from 
all  use  in  the  field. 

We  know  that  20,000  bayonets  had  been  massed  against 
never  more  than  3,000  yards  and  at  last  against  less  than 
2,000  yards.  We  know  what  in  that  first  week  it  had  lost 
in  officers  and  sergeants.  We  know  the  necessity  it  was 
under  of  recniiting  from  the  younger  classes.  We  know 
the  changed  temper  in  which  it  re-entered  the  field.  We 
know  that  after  a  bare  two  days' experiment  in  renewed 
fighting  it  was  hopelessly  shattered  and  had  to  be  finally 
withdrawn. 

I  rep)eat,  did  we  only  know  this  we  should  have  an 
instructive  and  indeed  decisive  picture  of  the  failure 
before  Verdun. 

But  the  French  have  obtained  one  last  piece  of  evidence 
which  clinches  all  the  rest  and  which,  read  in  connection 
with  all  the  rest,  is  overwhelming. 

The  French  authorities  arc  possessed  of  evidence  as  to 
the  losses  actually  suffered  by  the  corps  during  those  17 
days  of  which  only  10  were  days  of  action. 

it  will  be  remembered  that  the  jrd  Corps  had  gone 
into  action  on  the  afternoon  of  Sunday  February  21st, 
mustering  about  20,000  bayonets.  When  its  losses  were 
privately  established  after  "the  last  and  bloody  defeat  of 
March  qth,  it  was  discovered  that  the  grand  total,  in- 
cluding of  course  castialties  among  the  new  recniits 
thrown  in,  as  well  as  among  the  original  members  of  ti)e 
force,  ii'as  nctual/v  larf^cr  than  its,  onj^inal  total  strai'^tlt. 
22,000  men  had  been  hit  in  that  brief  space  of  time. 

It  is  no  wonder  that  the  corps  had  ceased,  in  any 
mihtary  sense,  to  exist. 

The  Moral 

What  is  the  lesson  of  that  astonishing  story  ? 

1  must  begin  by  begging  my  readers  to  permit  me  a 
rather  dry  piece  of  introduction  in  which  much  of  what 
has  been  said  before  with  regard  to  the 'nature  of  the 


•  Since  writing  this  I  have  seen  U  suggested  abroad  (but  not  con- 
firmed, and  the  suggestion  not  backed  bv  evidence)  that  the  body  of 
troops  which  appeared  in  the  last  few  days' before  Verdun  and  was  made 
the  subject  of  numerous  executions  after  a  faihire  to  attack,  was  the 
partially  rci onstituled  .^rd  Corps  brought  back  into  the  field  after 
more  than  .;  month-   ■'  <'■  I'pse. 


battle  is  necessarily  repeated.  But  when  I  have  again 
put  forward  those  general  principles  as  clearly  as  I  can 
it  will  be  easier  to  understand  the  immense  significance  of 
what  happened  to  the  Corps  whose  fortunes  I  have  just 
described. 

Roughly  speaking,  the  Battle  of  Verdun  was  won 
upon  the  olh  of  April.  In  other  words  it  was  clear  after 
the  great  attack  of  that  day  that  the  intention  of  the 
offensive  had  failed  and  the  intention  of  the  defensive 
had  succeeded.  For  the  intention  of  the  offensive 
was  to  break  the  Fjench  front  upon  this  centre  ;  while 
the  object  of  the  defensive  was  to  use  that  intention 
as  a  means  of  making  the  enemy  waste  very  many  more 
in  proportion  to  his  remaining  numbers  than  the  French 
lost  in  the  process. 

This  much  being  clearly  settled  nearly  two  months 
ago,  there  succeeded  ji  phase  which  everyone  studying 
the  war  spent  a  good  deal  of  energy  in  discussing,  but 
whicli  no  one  could  pretend  at  first  fully  to  understand. 

This  pliase  has  consisted  in  a  steady  persistence  in 
attack  after  the  I'rench  defensive  had  manifestly  made 
good  and  after  the  only  clear  strategical  purpose  open  to 
the  enemy  had  been  irretricvabh'  lost. 

This  phase  still  continues  and  there  seems  no  particular 
reason  why  it  should  not  continue  indefinitely  :  That  is 
until  the  Allies  make  their  offensive  movement  or  until 
the  enemy  proposes  to  make  a  new  attack  somewhere 
else— with  such  forces  as  may  still  remain  to  him. 

So  long  as  it  continues  the  enemy  loses  far  more  men  in 
proportion  than  the  men  in  the  French  sector  opposed  to 
him.  So  long  as  it  continues  he  allows  the  British  to 
accumulate  their  man  power,  and  so  long  as  it  continues 
he  allows  the  Russians  to  make  the  fullest  use  of  the 
open  water  in  the  North  and  of  the  long  daylight  for 
the  pouring  in  of  arms  and  ammunition. 

Seeing  that  all  the  merely  numerical  calculations  are 
obviousi}-  against  the  enemy  and  tliat  the  military  problem 
regarded  merely  as  a  mechanical  thing  (that  is  a  thing 
upon  the  map  estimated  by  the  number  of  bayonets,  guns, 
power  of  munitionment,"  etc.,  and  presupposing  both 
parties  equal  in  moral  factors)  is  clearly  solved  at  Verdun 
already  against  the  Germans,  it  follows  that  the  (ierman 
General  Staff  is  persisting  in  attack  for  reasons  other 
than  the  strictly  calculable  military  reasons  upcm  which 
one  usually  expects  strategical  action  to  be  conducted. 

I  have  indeed  seen  one  and  only  one  explanation 
modifying  such  a  conclusion.  It  proceeds  from  the  pen 
of  a  man  whom  all  his  readers  have  learnt  to  respect, 
who  writes  as  a  civihan  and  even  as  a  professor,  but  whose 
writing  has,  especially  in  the  last  few  weeks,  deservedly 
attracted  universal  attention  in  Paris.  .'  If  I  read  him 
aright  this  critic  (who  may  be  read  in  the  Dcbals  news- 
paper) conceives  that  the"  enemy  continues  because  the 
French  command  will  not  now  let  him  leave  off.  In 
other  words  he  is  in  the  position  of  which  one  reads  so 
often  tactically  in  the  old  battles,  "  he  is  no  longer  free 
to  break  off  tlie  action."  He  is  "  accroche,"  "  Hooked 
on."  If  he  ceases  to  attack  he  will  be  at  once  counter- 
attacked under  conditions  which  he  cannot  support. 

This,  I  think  it  is  suggested,  explains  the  continued 
waste  of  men  upon  his  side. 

Much  colour  is  lent  to  it  by  the  tactics  the  French  have 
been  pursuing  during  all  the  last  seven  weeks. 

Roughly  what  happens  is  this :  The  enemy  masses  a 
vastl\'  superior  number  of  men  to  rush  some  sector  of  the 
French  covering  line,  usually  he  fails.  Once  in  so  many 
times  he  succeeds.  He  gains  some  acres  ;  picks  uj)  not  a 
few  wounded  men  in  the  trenches  he  has  rushed.  He 
smashes  up  a  certain  number  of  trench  mortars  and 
machine  guns.  But  all  that  at  an  expense  quite  out  of 
proportion  to  the  result.  He  pays  in  these  attacks  say 
four  of  his  men  to  put  one  Frenchman  out  of  action. 
But  the  French.. though  not  fighting  for  ground  but  for 
numbers,  usually  reply  to  such  a  success  by  a  counter- 
attack in  which  they  recover  the  ground  or  a  part  of  it 
at  an  expense  in  their  own  men  superior  to  the  expense 
of  the  enemy. 

On  the  balance  they  are  still  heavily  the  gainers.  But 
they  would  be  much  more  heavily  the  gainers  if  they  never 
counter-attacked  at  all  upon  a 'large  scale.  Why  then 
do  they  deliberately  sacrifice  a  certain  fraction  of  their 
orce  in  thus  counter-attacking  ?  The  critic  whom  I 
have  quoted  would  seem  to  believe  that  this  is  done  in 


June  I,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


order  to  "  hook  on  "  the  enemy  and  make  it  impossible 
for  him  to  stop  his  continued  ruinously  expensive  and 
futile  attack. 

It  may  be  so.  But  I  believe  if  one  could  get  into  the 
mind  of  the  German  General  Staff  one  would  find  that  the 
motives  of  the  enemy's  action  were  mainly  based  upon 
his  own  initiative.  I  believe  that  he  is  attacking  of  his 
own  will  for  the  most  part.  I  believe  from  the  long  lulls 
with  which  he  has  interrupted  the  action  that  he  could 
still  break  it  off  altogether  without  disaster.  And  I 
consider  that  this  motive  of  his  is  made  up  of  certain 
ingredients  the  proportion  between  which  it  is  difficult 
for  us  to  judge,  but  the  presence  of  all  of  which  we  can 
confidently  assume 

It  is  certain  that  among  the  ingredients  of  the  enemy's 
thesis  are  : — - 

(i)  The  conception  that  the  continued  losses  of  the 
French  though  realtively  far  lighter  than  his  own  will  ulti- 
mately shake  French  moral. 

(2)  That  the  moral  of  his  own  army  requires  of  the 
enemy  the  actual  entry  of  German  troops  into  the  geo- 
graphical area  called  Verdun,  or  failing  that  the  con- 
tinued advance  at  no  matter  what  cost  and  no  matter 
how  slowly,  from  one  point  of  territory  to  another  upon 
the  sector  of  Verdun. 

(3)  That  not  only  does  the  German  army  require  such 
moral  stistenance,  but  that  the  German  domestic  opinion 
also  requires  it. 

(4)  That  neutral  opinion  would  be  affected  particu- 
larly in  countries  not  military  but  economically  powerful, 
by  the  "  taking  "  of  Verdun  town  and  is  in  some  degree 
aifected  by  the  fact  that  the  Cicrman  armies  in  this  sector 
advance  from  point  to  point.  For  one  lay  civilian  ob- 
server who  considers  the  nature  of  the  offensive  and  the 
defensive  and  is  acquainted  with  the  now  rapidly  decHning 
man  power  of  Germany,  there  are  a  thousand  whose 
estimate  of  success  or  failure  is  simply  a  movement  upon 
the  map,  however  slight. 

I  say  that  these  ingredients  in  various  proportions  make 
up  the  (ierman  thesis  ;  and  of  these  it  is  clear  thai  the  first 
is  by  far  the  most  important.  The  Germans  must  believe 
that  the  continued  strain,  no  matter  at  what  cost  to 
themselves,  is  likely  to  (?xhaust  French  civilian  endurance 
and  military  vigour.  He  may  be  quite  wrong.  Per- 
sonally I  believe  him  to  be  quite  wrong.  But  my  point  is 
that  he  is  working  for  a  moral  effect  of  which  the  chief 
part  will  be  experienced,  he  imagines,  in  France  itself. 

Upon  the  other  side  the  French  thesis  is  what  we  have 
so  often  described  :  That  so  long  as  the  enemy  continues 
under  this  erroneous  impression  h.e  is  playing  the  game 
of  the  Allies. 

Now  it  is  very  important,  it  we  are  to  judge  the  value 
of  eithci  thesis,  to  discover  what  the  nature  of  the  enemy's 
sacrifice  is.  With  this  object  I  have  given  in  detail  the 
story  of  the  third  Corps,  and  I  think  the  enemy's  immense 
sacrifices  may  further  be  understood  by  considering  the 
thing  as  a  whole 

It  is  clear  upon  general  principles  that  an  offensive 
thus  conducted  win  always  lose  very  many  more  men  than 
the  defensive  opposecT  to  it.  Each  party  suffers  roughly 
the  same  losses  from  artillery  pounding  before  movement 
and  the  moment  movement  takes  place  the  attacking 
party  loses  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  defence. 

\\'hcn  movement  has  ceased  the  attacking  party  suiters 


again  in 'one  of  two  ways.  Either  he  fails  to  enter  any 
portion  of  the  positions  of  the  defence,  in  which  case  his 
swarm  flows  back  suffering  terribly  heavy  punishment 
from  the  opponent's  artillery  ;  or  he  makes  good,  but 
makes  good  upon  a  spot  u'kich  the  heavy  guns  behind  his 
opponent's  line  have  to  a  yard  and  immediately  deluge  with 
ivhat  the  French  call  "  crushing  fire."  The  offensive  has 
not  the  same  advantage  against  the  defenders  because  the 
line  upon  which  the  greater  part  will  retire  is  not  thus 
accurately  known.  It  has  to  be  sought  out  and  marked 
down  later.  Against  these  necessarily  highly  superior 
losses  of  the  offensive  the  only  point  against  the  defensive 
is  that  positions  occupied  by  the  offensive  at  the  end  of 
its  attack  may  be  disorganised  and  suffer  locally  some 
abnormal  loss  through  disorganisation — but  then  it  is 
the  whole  point  of  a  defensive  to  prevent  that.  If  that 
took  place. on  any  large  scale  the  defensive  would  break 
down,  and  the  continued  and  complete  success  of  the 
defensive  policy  for  months  in  front  of  Verdun  proves 
that  it  has  not  broken  down- 

The  Week's  Events 

.What  has  been  happening  this  week  at  Verdun  is  a 
mere  repetition  of  all  that  we  have  been  discussing  here.  It 
has  been  on  rather  a  larger  scale  than  usual,  but  it  ex- 
emplifies every  point  precisely.  You  have  attack  after 
attack  which  does  not  properly  leave  its  trenches  because 
it  is  caught  in  the  first  bound — for  example,  the  two 
divisions  trying  to  get  out  of  the  Crows'  Wood  last  Sunday. 
You  have  the  first  massed  attack  launched  against  the  Mort 
Homme  which  the  French  estimate  at  about  50,000 
bayonets,  repelled — -and  leaving  the  very  large  proportion 
of  15,000  dead.  You  have  the  French  local  counter- 
offensive  at  Douaumont  provoking  another  swarm  attack, 
estimated  at  something  like  two  divisions,  say,  in  practice, 
20,000  bayonets,  or  a  little  less,  and  retaking,  at  terrible 
expense,  the  ruins  of  the  fort  which  are  immediately 
subjected  to  the  "  crushing  "  fire  which  knows  every 
yard  of  the  spot,  ^'ou  have  the  heavy  massing  of  men 
ifor  the  rushing  of  Cumieres,  the  French  local  counter- 
attack recovering  half  Cumieres,  and  you  will  certainly 
have,  before  these  lines  are  in  print,  another  great  massed 
attack  to  rush  Cumieres  again  with  the  usual  quite  dis- 
proportionate expense  in  men  :  the  preliminary  bom- 
bardment was  already  notified  in  telegrams  of  Tuesday. 

I  have  not  seen  evidence  as  to  the  sectors  from  which 
these  fresh  German  divisions  are  drawn,  save  the  pubhc 
announcement  by  the  French  that  they  had  identified 
two  Bavarian  divisions,  which  had  come  from  the 
English  front.  But  if  the  enemy  is  determined  to  play 
the  French  game  here  he  can  still  continue  so  long  as  our 
defensive,  which  is  strictly  ordered  upon  every  part  of 
the  line,  gives  him  rope.  He  may  still  withdraw  divisions 
from  his  ever  weakening  line  (remember  that  his  effectives 
are  now  declining  in  number)  to  melt  them  away  at 
Verdun,  and  he  will  still  tind  that  defence  almost  passive 
and  unpro\-oked  to  any  great  counter-move.  It  is  for 
him  to  decide  the  date  upon  which  such  a  policy  will  de- 
termine his  inability  to  stand  against  the  main"  counter- 
offensive  of  the  Allies.  At  present  he  would  seem  to  desire 
a  hastening  of  that  date,  and  he  is  the  best  judge  of  his 
own  affairs. 


Table    of  German    Recruitment 


IT  is  now  at  last  possible  to  define  with  exactitude 
the  rate  at  which  the  German  man-power  has  been 
drawn  upon  in  the  course  of  the  campaign.  The 
evidence  with  regard  to  the  calling  up  of  each  class 
is  complete,  and  we  can  follow  exactly  the  whole  process 
of  exhaustion  :  The  last  reserves  of  the  active  army 
all  called  up  in  the  first  three  months,  all  normal  recruit- 
ment exhausted  in  the  first  twelve,  the  unfit  men  re- 
examined and  pressed  in  as  far  as  possible  in  the  autumn 
of  last  year,  the  calling  up  of  the  very  youngest  lads  in 
December,  and  the  complete  drying  up  of  recruiting 
power  by  the  end  of  19x5. 

I  propose  to  put  the  whole  thing  this  week  in  tabular 
form  before  my  readers. 
'  The  publication  of  this  all  important  matter  has  bsen 


permitted  in  France.  I  take  it  for  granted,  therefore, 
that  its  publication  \\ill  also  be  permitted  in  England, 
for  1  have  come  to  believe  that  the  failure  to  inform  the 
public  of  vital  things  of  this  sort  is  due  not  to  caution, 
but  merely  to  sloth  and  lack  of  co-ordination  between 
the  various  people  responsible. 

Indeed,  there  is  no  possible  reason  why  such  information 
should  help  the  enemy. 

It  will  be  found,  and  I  shall  comment  upon  the  fact 
in  a  moment,  that  tiie  dates  now  officially  known  agree 
very  exactly  with  the  approximate  estimates  which  have 
appeared  from  time  to  time  in  the  columns  of  Land  & 
Watkr. 

First,  as  to  the  original  German  active  army.  We 
premised  that  the  last  recruits  and  reserves  of  this  were 


10 


J.  A  N  n      \      W  A  T  !•:  R 


JllIU 


aJready  summoned  and  present  in  October,  1914.  ("  Tlie 
last  reser\-es  and  the  last  recruits  "  was  the  phrase  used). 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  that  date  after  which  no  elements  of 
recruiting  from  the  old  active  army  are  discovered  is 
November  i>t.  i<)i4. 

On  that  date — November  ist,  1()I4— all  the  ininio- 
diately  available  men  of  the  (ierman  Empire  had  been 
put  into  the  field.  Theactivearmy  in  a  conscript  country 
means,  of  course,  all  those  men  still  alive  and  of  military 
age  and  able  to  pass  the  doctor  who  have  in  the  past 
received  full  military  training. 

I  need  hardly  point  out  that  the  exhaustion  of  this 
recruiting  ground,  after  only  three  months  of  war,  was 
never  dreamt  of  when  (icrmany  fuolislily  compelled 
Austria  to  join  her  in  an  improvoked  attack  upon  Europe. 
The  wastage  had  been  at  an  enormously  higher  rate 
than  the  (leneral  staff  had  ever  conceived  possible. 

Behind  the  .Active  Corps  was  the  so-called  "  ICrzatz  " 
I?eser\'e.  Germany,  it  is  well  known,  did  not  train  everv 
possible  man  as  France  did,  for  instance,  or  Bulgaria, 
bhe  thoiight  it  sufficient  with  her  preponderant  munbers 
and  rapid  increa.se  in  population  to  train  about  half  of 
them.  The  excess,  that  is  the  young  men  tit  for  service 
but  not  actually  incorporated,  were  given  a  certain  amount 
of  training,  or  at  least  most  of  them  were.  It  was 
calculated  that  the  training  could  be  supplemented  during 
the  course  of  a  war,  and  that  this  body  would  act  as  a  sort 
iii  reserve  for  feeding  tlie  wastage  of  the  army  should  a 
campaign  last  so  long  as  to  begin  to  exhaust  the  active 
army  itself.  These  men  were  summoned  by  classes  from 
almost  the  beginning  of  the  war.  The  man-p)ower  of 
this  body  was  exha\isted  on  or  before  the  ist  of  P^ebruary, 
I()i5.  After  that  date  all  the  "  Erzatz  "  reserve  had 
been  called  up. 

This  is  in  part  ah  explanation  of  the  fact  which  has 
been  pointed  out  more  than  once  in  these  columns,  that 
after  February.  1915.  no  new  German  formations  appeared 
There  remained  the  men  altogether  untrained  between 
20  and  35  ;  the  last  of  these  had  been  called  up  bv  the 
1st  of  April.  1015.  Upon  that  date  all  the  "  normal 
methods  "  (as  the  phrase  goes  in  conscript  coimtries)  of 
recruiting  the  tremendous  wastage  had  been  employed. 
The  ycnmg  classes  '14  and  15  had  been  called  up  by  that 
time — as  we  shall  see  in  a  moment,  and  these  also,  lads 
of  20  or  little  less,  may  be  regarded  as  "  normal  "  material. 
Everyone  who  had  actually  been  trained  as  a  soldier, 
everj'body  who  had  been  partially  trained  and  kept  in 
reserve ;  everybody  who  had  not  been  trained  at 
all,  but  who  was  at  least  physically  capable  had  been 
summoned,  the  untrained  however,  only  up  to  and  in- 
cluding the  age  of  35. 

Technically,  military  age  extends  to  45,  but  in  the 
years  between  35  and  40  (which  are  but  a  small  proportion 
of  any  army)  the  great  mass  of  men  are  better  used  upon 
comnnmications  and  subsidiary  work  than  in  the  field — 
though  this  modification  applies,  of  course,  far  less  to  a 
small  professional  army  in  constant  training  and  with  per- 
petual selecting  and  weeding  out  than  it  does  to  a  con- 
script force  :  a  point  whi(  h  has  been  somewhat  obscured 
therefore  in  the  judgment  of  Englishmen  hitherto  best 
acquainted  with  professional  armi<>s  alone.  The  re- 
maining margin  of  wholly  untrained  men  between  35 
and  40  had  been  all  called  up  by  the  month  of  July,  1915. 
In  exactly  the  first  year  of  the  war,  therefore,  not 
only  had  alj  normal  methods  beim  used,  but  every  man 
who  was  even  technically  of  military  age  and  who  had 
passed  the  doctor,  was  under  arms. 

There  remained  now  only  the  "abnormal"  methods. 
The  word  "  abnormal  "  is  rather  misleading,  though  it 
is  current,  as  I  have  said,  in  all  conscript  countries. 
The  word  "  exceptional  "  would  be  perhaps  a  more 
accurate  one  to  use  in  English.  Part  of  these  methods 
are  indeed  abnormal,  such  as  the  use  of  men  who 
are  not  really  fit.  the  "  inefhcients  "  and  the  use  of 
very  young  lads.  But  other  "  abnormal  "  methods, 
such  as  the  taking  of  a  boy  just  before  his  20th  birth- 
day, or  just  after  it — that  is.  a  year  sooner  than  the 
practice  in  time  of  peace,  are  not  "  abnormal  "  in  the 
ordinary  sense  ;  that  is.  they  do  not  propose  a  strain 
upon  human  nature,  or  the  serious  lowering  of  military 
standards.  At  any  rate.,  the  "  abnormil  '  mrthods  to 
which  all  conscript  countries  have  been  reduced  by  the 
severity  of  the  war,  and  not  Germany  alone,  includ?  the 
calling  up  of  the  younger  classes  imtil  you  g.:t  quite 


young  lads  of  18  and  even  include  the  using,  wherever 
use  can  be  found  for  them,  of  men  physically  inefficient  ; 
the  French  call  it  "  combing  out  of  the  cripples." 

It  will  be  remembered  that  I  suggested  many  months 
ago  in  L.\Nu  cS:  \\'.\Ti:K,and  upon  several  occasions,  that 
this  necessity  for  abnormal  recruitment — the  exhausticm 
of  the  efficient  reserves — might  come  as  early  as  November 
1915,  and  could  not  be  delayed  later  than  the  end  of  the 
year.  The  evidence  now  available  amply  confirms  this 
judgment  and  shows  that  it  was  in  its  tentative  form  too 
"  conservative."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  "combing  out 
of  the  cripples"  (an  exaggerated  and  slang  phrase)  began 
as  early  as  October,  1915.  Men  who  had  failed  to  ])ass 
the  doctor  were  required  to  present  themselves  for  re- 
examination in  that  month  and  the  process  went  on  all 
through  November.     It  was  very  sc\ere. 

Invalids  Called  for  Service 

I  have  received  through  private  correspondents  ex- 
amples of  its  .severity.  Men  have  been  summoned  for 
auxiliary  duties  who  were  really  invalids  :  men  so  much 
invalids  that  they  were  regarded  as  invalids  in  .civilian 
life.  Men  who  have  lost  some  necessary  limb  or  organ, 
an  eye  or  a  hand  or  even  a  leg,  could  be  put  to  certain 
duties  and  were  put  to  them.  Every  possible  man  was 
taken.  For  instance,  in  the  duties  of  serving  the  heavy 
artillery  behind  the  lines  a  maimed  man  can  do  a  certain 
amount  of  work  ;  even  a  man  with  one  arm  can  turn  a 
hand-wheel  and  help  to  traverse  a  gun.  and  even  a  man 
with  one  leg  can  help  to  load  a  wagon  with  shell  or  drive  a 
vehicle  ;  and  it  goes  without  saying  that  the  very  worst 
cases  can  be  used  in  garrison  work,  the  guard  of  neutral 
frontiers  and  prison  camps,  etc.  At  any  rate,  by  the 
end  of  November,  1915,  every  possible  inefficient  who 
could  do  anything  at  all  had  been  drafted  into  the  service. 
As  to  the  calling  up  of  the  yoUnger  classes  it  was  as 
follows  :  The  active  army,  the  army  that  invaded  France 
and  won  at  Tannenberg" included  class  '13,  but  not  class 
'14.  In  other  words,  except  for  the  vohmtccrs  its 
youngest  men  were  men  of  21.  I'or  the  year  attached  to  . 
a  class  in  a' conscript  system  signifies  the  year  within 
which  a  young  man  attains  his  20th  birthday.  The 
youngest  men  who  marched  (except  the  \-ohmt'eers)  in 
July,  1914,  for  the  destruction  of  iM-ance,  were  men  who 
attained  their  21st  birthday  at  some  time  in  the  year 
1914.  and  as  the  armies  did  not  move  until  the  beginning 
of  August,  that  is,  until  more  than  half  the  year  was  over, 
most  of  the  youngest  class  incorporated  in  them  (the  class 
1913),  were  men  who  had  already  passed  their  21st  birth- 
day, while  the  rest  were  over  20'and  approaching  21. 

Class  1914,  that  is,  young  men  born  in  the  course  of 
the  year  1894,  a  year  younger  than  the  youngest  men 
already  m.the  army,  were  called  up  in  November  and 
December,  1914,  after  the  first  3  or  4  months  of  war. 
1  he  ( .erman  system  is  to  train  these  recruits  for  a  com- 
paratively short  time  before  they  are  fed  into  the  lighting 
units.  It  is  a  system  which  the  French  copied,  dis- 
covered to  be  a  weakness,  and  rapidly  abandoned ;  sub- 
stituting for  It  a  much  longer  period  of  training.  On  the 
other  hand,  while  we  mark  its  unwisdom,  we  must 
remember  that  the  German  Empire  had  little  choice. 
In  Its  enormous  wastage  of  men  it  had  to  use  its  new 
recFuits  as  soon  as  possible;  while  the  French  were 
supported  by  powerful  Allies  who  had  not  used  anything 
like  their  available  man-power. 

^  '<f  ^'fiV*"  ^'^^^  ^'^^5  was  not  called  up  until  the 
month  of  May,  1915.  The  process  of  callii^g  them  up 
lasted  into  June.  At  this  point,  the  end  of  the  first  year 
counting  classes  14  and  '15,  all  "  normal  "  methods  vvere, 
as  w.^  have  seen,  exhausted.  But  after  this,  after  the  first 
year  of  war  the  process  of  calling  up  the  young  msn  be- 

!'.^nn»f -■''   a""'-^  [^''"^i     '^'^^  ^^'^^^  ^^»^6  was  actually  sum- 
moned in  August  and  was  all  present  at  the  training 

rnn^^H^  Vf  ?^  ^^Ptember.     I  have  in  these  columns 

.K   ,    T  ^""^^:^'   ^'>    the   average   period   of   training 

mo     h    nn'['"^  "''  ''t'  '"  f^'<=™an.V  as  being  about  4 

nnw^vnl?  Kr'"""""'^"'^  °"  '*'  '^■"^^^tv.     Thc  experience 

imVli,^        '  f  "'"r"-  °^  ^'^^^    ^^^6   c«"'i'-ni'^    the 

con  ecZ        Ti    'T  '''''"  ^  ^"°*^  '*  ^'ttlc  more  than  a 

mu^ ir  nn;  .1.1  r  f'.'""","''  ^'  ^'^  '^^^^^  '''''^  ^^  Verdun, 
put  It    ntothe  held  in  large  numbers  just  four  months 

hst'   lie^'^h'^-     H^^'l'^'  ^^terwards,  in^  DecembJi      9, 
-last    Derember-the  last    class.   1917.  was  called   u," 


June  I,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


II 


It  has  not  yet  appeared  in  the  field  (I  think)  but  it 
must  shortly  do  so. 

From  the  above  it  appears  that  the  man-power  of  the 
German  Empire  had  been  called  upon  in  its  totahty  by 
the  end  of  last  year. 

There  now  remains  nothing  but  the  lads  who  grow  up 
as  the  war  proceeds.  The  class  1918,  more  than  half  of 
whom  at  this  moment  are  not  yet  18  years  of  age,  may 
have  beL^n  already  warned  and  will  at  any  rate  be  warned 
soon.  Behind  them  at  a  year's  interval  come  the  class 
Kjii),  and  so  on.  But  the  wastage  of  this  war  is  many 
times  more  rapid  than  the  recruitment  available  from  the 
younger  classes.  IQ18  may  be  thrown  into  the  fray 
before  the  end  of  this  year  and  allowing  for  the  necessary 
very  numerous  exemptions  among  such  young  boys,  it 
will  not  furnish  more  than  400,000  individuals  and 
probably  less,  and  they  will  be  of  exceedingly  poor 
quality.  The  German  wastage  per  year  is  not  400,000, 
nor  twice  that  figure,  nor  foivr  times  that  figure.  It  is 
more  like  six  or  seven  times  that  figure. 

The  position  may  be  judged  by  the  following  table, 
which  is  both  simple  and  accurate,  and  whiclr  it  would 
be  well  to  retain  in  all  future  judgments  of  the  position, 
for  it  presents  in  the  most  elementary  form  both  the  rate 
of  exhaustion  of  (iermany  and  her  present  situation. 


TABLE  OF  GERMAN  HECflUlTMEKT 


Aug.l?T91+ 


Dcc.l?ti9i4'_ 


"Feb.  1??  1915. 


Aprai!fl915_ 
!Vfcill?^1915. 


Jultil':tl915-. 


Cl<Bs'14cdUediip. 


QmslScaSHup. 


H 
a? 

s  < 

<-'  '^ 
"  '.3 


Jt4y3I-t!'li)J5  ANNIVERSA-RY  of  PECLA'RATION  of  W'AV.. 
EhTD  of  NORMAL  -RICRUITMENT.    BEGINNING  oe 
ABNORMAL  RECRUITMENT 

Augl«tI9I5_-i 


SM>t.31??1915 
Oa.  1S19J5 


>  Cla^  16  caUed  up. 


-1 • ■ T         ^-  '    ^§E^  ^ 

;  Men  prcvuntsUf  classed  as  unfit  »,'tj  •?  t|  ^'  ,jj 

Nny.^l^l<?15  ■•  "ccmhed  out" and  called  up.       \    .g§^Q 


Dec  31!?  1915  ]  Class  ^17  called  t^. 


1  ^?^f^3S 


The  Enemy's   Own  Evidence 

The  most  remarkable  piece  of  evidence  confirmatory 
of  the  above  is  the  pains  at  which  the  German  Staff  have 
been  to  confuse  neutral  opinion  (and  I  daresay  panicky 
opinion  among  the  enemies  of  Germany  as  well)  by  the 
circulating  to  the  neutral  press  of  a  statement  which  I 
can  only  criticise  as  clumsy. 

This  statement  was  issued,  I  believe,  in  the  course  of 
the  present  week,  probably  about  Tuesday  or  Wednes- 
day. It  first  indulges  in  generalities  which  have  no 
particular  value,  and  which  are  only  meant  to  produce  an 
effect,  such  as,  that  Germany  has  plenty  of  men  "  awaiting 
the  call  to  various  fronts."  In  other  words,  that  a  great 
many  of  the  German  men  in  uniform,  like  French, 
Russians  and  alLother  men  in  uniform,  are  not  at  any 
one  moment  in  the  trenches.  It  then  goes  on  to  say  tha't 
Germany  is  so  full  of  men  that  there  is  no  real  necessity  of 
putting  men  of  over  40  into  the  trenches.  As  no  belli- 
gerent ever  puts  any  appreciable  number  of  men  over  40 
into  the  trendies,  the  statement  is  obviously  addressed  to 
those  who  arc  not  seriously  following  the  "war  at  all — to 
what  is  usually  rather  irreverently  called  "genera!  opinion." 

But  after  these  generalities,  which  tell  us  notliing,  there 
is  a  very  remarkable  piece  of  statistics  divulged. 

The  German  autliorities  go  on  to  tell  us  tJiat  they  are 
assured  from  the  younger  classes  "  of  30,000  recruits  a 


month  as  long  as  the  war  lasts."  30,000  recruits  a 
month  is  360,000  a  year.  As  the  reader  has  seen,  I 
should  have  put  it  a  little  higher.  I  should  have  said 
that  the  lads  (little  more  than  bo^'s  who  form  the  lowest 
yearly  class  available — for  example,  1918  this  year, 
191 9  next  year,  and  so  on,  boj's  most  of  whom  when  they 
are  called,  will  be  less  than  18  years  of  age),  might  at  a 
squeeze  have  furnished  400,000.  It  would  have  been 
400,000  of  exceedingly  bad  material,  but  I  think  that 
number  could  be  combed  out.  However,  the  Germans 
tell  us  it  is  less  and  we  must  be  grateful  to  accept  their 
own-  estimate. 

Now  this  is  the  point  where  I  call  this  German  circular, 
like  so  many  of  the  German  circulars,  clums}'.  It  aims 
at  affecting  the  least  instructed  opinion  among  neutrals 
and  for  that  matter  among  belligerents.  No  doubt  that 
method  has  its  value.  But  nothing  is  being  done  mean- 
wliile  to  counteract  the  instructed  comment  which  follows 
on  the,  heels  of  every  such  misleading  German  statement. 
The  German  War  Office  does  not  seem  to  be  here  properly 
co-ordinated.  The  gentleman  who  has  the  task  of 
fabricating  this  sort  of  thing  is  not  checked  by  his 
colleagues  whose  business  it  is  to  read  the  serious  com- 
mentary on  the  war  published  in  such  papers  as  this 
and  proceeding  from  a  v<>ry  great  mnnber  of  competent 
critics  at  the  head  of  whom  I  think  we  must  continue  to 
put  Colonel  Feyler.  This  work  is  not  composed  of  wild 
statement.  It  is  a  mass  of  careful  estimate  and  analysis, 
erring  no  doubt  often  by  some  margin  one  way  or  the 
other,  often  very  uncertain  and  tentative  from  lack  of 
evidence,  and  at  any  rate  always  approximating  to  a 
truth  which  can  be  definitely  proved  and  which  the 
evidence,  when  at  last  available,  thoroughly  supports. 

In  my  opinion  the  German  War  Office  under-estimates 
the  value  of  such  dry  and  detailed  but  continuous  and 
widely  circulated  work.  It  is  fully  present  everywhere 
on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  in  the  Debuts  of  Paris  for  instance, 
the  Manchester  Guardian  and  the  Morning  Post  in  this 
country,  and  in  this  paper.  My  readers  will  do  me  the 
justice  to  note,  for  instance,  the  points  already  made  in 
this  article,  that  the  full  evidence  now  available  with 
regard  to  the  calling  up  of  the  various  elements  of  German 
recruitment  not  only  generally  tallies  with  the  conclusions 
come  to  in  this  particular  paper,  but  as  a  rule  shows  those 
conclusions  to  be  rather  conservative  than  otherwise. 
In  the  same  way  we  saw  only  a  couple  of  weeks  ago  how 
the  private  lists  of  deaths  among  the  German  medical 
service  gave  very  nearly  the  same  percentage  of  error 
between  the  truth  and  the  official  lists,  as  has  been  dis- 
covered upon  more  general  grounds  for  larger  categories  of 
the  German  armed  population. 

Further,  the  enemy's  losses  and  remaining  man  power 
as  worked  out  in  these  numerous  calculations  in  French, 
British  and  neutral  critical  journals  (best  of  all  in  the 
Journal  dc  Geneve)  corresponds  to  what  would  be  normally 
his  position  in  such  a  war  as  this  on  the  analogy  of  all  the 
other  belligerent  Powers,  whereas  hjs  statements  propose 
conditions  so  abnormal  as  to  be  miraculous. 

There  is  in  this  very  circular  to  which  I  am  alluding 
an  example  of  those  assumed  miracles  when  we  are  told 
that  nearly  g/ioths  of  the  German  wounded  are  fit 
shortly  afterwards  "  to  resume  the  most  arduous  miUtary 
duties."  That  is  rubbish,  and  the  man  who  writes  it 
must  know  that  it  is  rubbish.     You  can  keep  the  names 


Sortes  Sbahcspeaviana^ 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE 

• 

To  Mr.  Lloyd  George  on  his  IrLsh  Mission. 

Our  S7iit 
Is  that  yott  reconcile    them. 

Coriolanus,  V.,  iii.,  135-6. 

Munition-workers  who  forego  their  holiday- 

Here  pleasures  court  mine  eyes,  and 
mine  eyes  shun  them. 

Pericles,   I„  ii.,  6. 

Lord  Q\w7.o\\  assumes  his  new  office. 
Noiv  sits  Expectation  in  the  air, 

Henry  V.,  II..  proloiiue,  S, 


12 


L  A  .\  i)      eV-      W  A  T  1-:  R 


Juno   T,   iqiG 


of  men  who  have  been  wounded  on  yonr  lists,  and  a  pro- 
jiortion  between  8  and  Q/  loths  can  be  put  to  some  sort  of 
work,  if  we  include  as  "  work  "  anvihinf^  whatsoever 
connected  with  the  service  of  an  army,  but  the  putting 
in  of  the  word  "arduous"  makes,  the  whole  thing 
ridiculous.'  The  number  of  wounded  men  who  can  go 
back  to  exactly  the  sjime  work  as  they  left  before  they  were 
wounded  and  do  it  as  well  is  not  q/ioths  nor  8  loths. 
nor  7  loths,  nor  even,  if  we  take  the  severest  tests,  tpiite 
6  lOths.  And  (iermany  is  no  better  off  here  than  France 
or  England  or  Italy  or  anybody  else.  We  ail  have  very 
{^ood  hospitals  now  with  thorouglily  efiicient  and  quite 
sufficientlv  niuiierous  staffs  We  are  ail  Europeans,  and 
we  are  all  human  beings.  Tiie  nature  of  our  projectiles 
is  all  much  the  same.  The  character,  effect  and  duration 
f)f  wounds  inflicted  does  not  in  any  miraculous  manner 
increase  in  severity  when  the  body  suffering  them  is 
I'rench  or  English,  nor  as  miraculously  decrease  when 
the  body  suffering  them  is  souie  unfortunate  (ierman. 

Better  Late  than  Never 

My  readers  may  be  interested  to  read  the  following 
seven  passages. 

1.  People  wonder  whal  ix  really  liafipenin-j  al  Vc-diin. 
and  lose  Ihefnselves  in  coniectiires  w!iv  the  German  Command 
persists  in  BUTTING  ITS  HEAD  AC-AINST  A  STONE 
WALL. 

2.  Ilindenbur^  is  said  to  have  observed  that  the  military 
situation  of  Germany  is  brilliant  but  without  prospects. 
It  is  a  close  enoujih  approximation  to  the  truth  and  the 
REAL  TROIHLE  AT  MAIN  HEADOLARTERS  MlSl 
BE  Tt)  FIND  A  WAV  OUT  OF  THE  IMPASSE  INTO 
WHICH  THE  DECISION  TO  ATT.\CK  AT  VERDUN 
HAS  LED  THE  GERMAN  ARMIES. 

3.  We  regard  the  German  persistence  in  error  as  sheer 
obstinacy. 

^.  There  has  been  scarcely  any  change  in  the  situation 
and  none,  certainly,  to  justity  the  immense  sacrifice  of 
German  life  xvhich  has  marked  this  most  tragic  episode 
(•!  the  ivar.  The  Germans  continue  to  exhaust  their  armv 
before  Verdun  to  the  point  of  extermination.  They  bring 
up  divisions  in  reserve  from  every  quarter  where  one  is  to 
be  found,  and  each  fresh  contribution  means  a  fresh  assault 
and  a  fresh  repulse. 

5.  Our  glorious  .^lilies  have  held  the  cnemv  at  arm's  length 
for  the  last  tuv  months,  have  punished  him  .severely  and 
have  prevented  him  from  scoring  a  single  point. 

6.  The  Germans  ....  cheer  up  their  country  by 
declaring  that  they  are  exhausting  the  French  reserves,  and 
there  is  no  wonder  that  they  should  try  to  do  so,  for  opinion 
in  Germany  is  becoming  enervated  and  depressed.  The 
Trench  practice  has  been  to  give  divisions  a  rest  after  .serious 
fighting  in  order  to  prevent  their  quality  from  deteriorating 
and  Ihev  can  afford  to  do- so  because  thev  have  .\MPLE 
RESERVES.  The  GERMANS  ARE  NOT  I\  THIS 
FORTUNATE    POSITION. 

7.  General  Pe'.ain  has  sold  his  ground,  inch  by  inch  and 
•  every  inch  at  the  price  of  German  lives.     He  has  never  been 

unreasonable,  and  when  the  Germans  have  been  willing  to 
pay  the  exorbitant  price  which  he  asks  for  ground. they  have 
been  allowed  to  have  it. 

The  above  extracts  are  not  taken  fro;n  back  numbers 
of  L.\ND  &  Water.  They  are  quotations  from  the  Times 
of  May  23th.  Apart  from  the  use  of  rather  extreme 
adjectives  they  confirm  the  view  that  has  been  repeatedly 
and  consistently  expressed  in  this  paper  in  the  face  of  a 
good  deal  of  criticism.  Its  truth  is  proved  in  a  remark- 
able degree  by  the  events  of  the  past  week  during  which 
the  enemy  has  secured  insignificant  local  advance  without 
as  yet  any  strategical  result,  and  that  at  a  gigantic  cost 
in  men.  H.  Belloc 


It  was  with  regret  that  no  mention  was  made  of  Newfound- 
.  land,  "  our  oldest  Colony  "  in  the  Story  of  the  Nations,  told 
in  the  Five  Nations  number  of  L.\nd  &  W.\tfr  last  week. 
Tlie  contribution  on  which  we  were  relying  failed  to  reach  us. 
Wc  lia%c  now  received  details,  but  too  late  for  this  number, 
riie  omission  will  be  made  good  in  our  next  issue. 

Messrs.  John  Murray  have  just  issued  a  shilling  volume 
entitled  Infantry  Scouting,  by  Lieut.  Cameron,  a  scouts' 
officer  with  service  experience  of  tlie  work  he  details.  The 
book  will  be  found  a  complete  and  concise  exposition  of 
.infantry  scouting,  and  is  one  to  be  recommended,  not  only 
to  officers  specially  interested  in  reconnaissance  work,  but 
also  to  all  infantry  officers,  who  will  find  it  of  great  assistance 
in  preparing  lectures  for  their  men. 


Les  Jacinthes  (Blue-Bells) 

By  Emile  Camm.aerts.    ^ 

Lc  ciel  est  toml^f  par  terre  ! 

II  y  en  a  tant 

Sous  les  bouleaux  blancs, 

Tant  sous  les  frenes  gris, 

Q\x  ou  ne  voit  plus  le  vert  des  tiges. 

II  y  en  a  tant  et  tant  et  tant — 

Frisson  d'amour,  printcmps  flcuri — 

Que  le  vertigo 

\'ous  saisit. 

11  y  en  a  tant  qu'on  nc  pcut  plus 

Marcher  sans  marcher  dessus. 

II  y  en  a  tant  qui  dansent 

Et  qui   rient 

Qu'on  ne  sait  plus 

Ou  le  ciel  commence 

Et  ou  la  terre  fmit. 

Le  ciel  est  tombe  par  terre ! 

II  fait  si  bleu 

Sous  les   frenes  gris, 

U  fait  si  bleu  sous  les  grands  hetres  - 

FVisson  d'amour,  printcmps  fleuri — 

Qu'on  croirait  etre 

En  Paradis. 

II  fait  plus  bleu  cjue  les  crevasses 

De  la  Mer  de  Glace. 

Plus  bleu  que  les  lacs  d' Italic, 

Plus  bleu  cjue  les  yeux 

Des  Bienheureux     ... 

Un  bonne  est  tonibe  par  terre  ! 

Tl  est  couche 

Parmi  les  jacintjics,  les  bras  en  croix  ; 

Son  kepi  a  roule 

A  quelques  pas  de  lit. 

II  a  un  i^ctit  trou  rond 

Au  milieu  du  front. 

II  dort  d'un  profond  sommeil! 

F-t  sa  fete,  sur  la  mousse, 

Dans  son  aureole  rousse, 

Luit  comme  un  soleil.     .     . 


Mai,  19 16. 


[.\i,L  Rights  Rhservkd] 


Garden  lovers  will  find  much  to  awaken  tlieir  interest  in  The 
Well-Considered  Garden,  by  L.  V.  King  (B.  T.  Batsford,  Ltd., 
8s.  6d.  net.).  Mrs.  King  is  American,  and  she  writes  of 
American  flora  and  .American  gardens,  but  the  root  principle 
of  successful  gardening  is  the  same  throughout  all  the  world, 
and  the  chief  charm  in  this  book  lies  in  the  fact  that  its  author 
loves  her  subject,  and  had  lived  with  and  studied  it  in  no 
common  degree.  The  series  of  photographs  with  wliich  the 
work  is  illustrated  adds  greatly  to  its  value,  but  all  devotees 
of  the  garden  will  find  that  the  text  will  keep  them  interested. 


THE    NINETEENTH    CENTURY 

AND     AFTER 

JUXF.. 
"The  Empire   on  th«   Anvil"  Ity  Sir  CH4RL|;s  lcc,«s,   K.C.B..   K.C.M  0. 

Sea  Power  in  its  Dual  Relation.      Uj   Commander   K.   Hamilto.s  Cikrey,  R  X 
Tlie  Iritti   Enigma  AKam: 

<1)  What  is   Wrong  in    Ireland?  nv  .Tosei'H    R,   Msher. 

(2)  An  Appeal  tor  an  Iriili  Entente:  a  Le«ton  from  South  Africa, 

Hy   J,   tlKRC    XIIERIIIAN    u'ommiifioiier  lor   llerfiiiie    tn     the   Vnion 

<•/  s„„l',  Mrirn). 

(J)  The  Sinn    Fein   Retiollion.       By   the    Upv.   Koin.iiT   IT.   Mirr  VY     I,ilt  D. 

Thp    Future   ct   Asiatic   Turkey.  liv  .1     I'mi^ '  lUiiKK't 

Demociacy  and  Diplomacy.  H>   the  Itioht  Hon.  the  Etirl  of  CkomVr'  G  C  II    O  M 

Shakespeare  and  the  French   Mind.    By  Jom;i'H  liEicoiin   (I'roletsor  al  Knnlhh 

nt    Miintitellirr     I  iiirirullf   . 

Some  Caueee  ol   Misconception:    the   Imprenioiw  of    an    Englith   Rtsidenl   In 

,..         .'."■         ..         .,.       ...  ,  "V    CHARI.F..S     !>\WHARN. 

Education   after  the  War.    Ity   Arthur  C.  Bensos,  C.V.O.,   LL  I),  (i/aslcr  or 

Mtnuiiilt'tte    I'ttUfi,'.    <'amhridfle). 
Benedetto  Croce   and   his    Activities,  Bv    Doroi.AS   AixsiIR. 

The^Blble   01   the   Jap..ne88  Soldier.     By   Professor  J.  H.   I-o.wtord   Uormerly 

N»"onal  Railways  after   the  Warr  a  Reply   to  Mr.    HytKlman.       By  Alfred 


By    linHERT   M.ACHRIT. 


Th<   Resurgence  of   Russia. 
Trials  to  Com« : 

O)  Preparation  for  Peace    By  Arthpr  Paterson  iSecrtlary  Social   Wellart 

.\^.<"r}rtl,n,t    I'tr    l.nmloH).    '  ■•' 
(2)  Our  Soldiers  after   the    War:  a   Suggettion.  i 

By  C«pt.ain  OEORCE  S,  C.  SwiXTON. 
I.oikIuh:  .Spottiswoode.    Balbntyne  A    Co..   Ltd..  1,  Xew-.rtrcet  SqiLxre. 


June  I,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


13 


The    Navy    at  War 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


LAST  week  T  was  one  of  a  party  on  a  naval 
tour.  Wc  saw  something  of  the  coast  patrol, 
of  shipbuilding,  of  the  two  main  divisions 
of  the  Grand  Fleet.  At  the  headquarters 
of  one  of  the  sections  of  the, trade  route  defences  we 
saw  a  sample  of  the  new  navy  that  the  submarine 
blockade  has  called  into  existence.  Apart  from  the 
captain  in  command  and  a  staff  of  perhaps  half  a  dozen 
naval  officers,  practically  the  whole  of  this  force  is 
commanded  by  naval  pensioners,  merchant,  trawler 
and  drifter  skippers,  and  mates  promoted  to  command 
on  the  strength  of  an  aptitude  shown  since  this  force 
was  organised.  The  crews  a,re  wholly  taken  from 
the  trading  craft,  the  fisheries,  the  coasters  and  longshore- 
men. Besides  tliis  the  attack  of  hostile  aircraft  is  part 
of  the  commanding  ofhcer's  duty.  He  has,  therefore, 
fixed  and  mobile  guns,  and  great  coveys  of  seaplanes, 
from  the  largest  to  the  smallest,  under  his  orders. 

The  chief  part  of  the  work  lies  in  the  keeping  of  the 
war  route  clear  of  mines  and  the  unceasing  patrol  main- 
tained to  counter  the  submarines.  These  are  grim  and 
glorified  forms  of  fishing  and  pf  deep-sea  hunting.  Tire 
sport  of  kings  has  become  the  sport  of  what,  in  more 
normal  times,  is  one  of  the  least  royal  of  classes.  Only 
those  to  whom  a  sport  is  a  business  could  have  developed 
the  thing  so  rapidly  and  with  such  astonishing  success. 
It  is  fierce  and  merciless,  and  calls  equally  for  courage 
and  for  cunning.  It  has  created  a  new  brotherhood 
between  the  Royal  Navy  and  the  coasting  and  the  fishing 
navies — a  brotherhood  born  of  a  common  danger,  fostered 
by  a  common  aim,  and  crowned  by  an  uncommon  success. 
Mine-sweeping  is  always  a  perilous  business,  for  excellent 
as  is  the  design  of  the  German,  mine,  and,  if  possible, 
still  more  excellent  its  workmanship,  it  does  not  always 
happen  that  these  devilish  contrivances  keep  their  depth. 
Their  cables  do  not  always  hold,  and  the  rule  that  a 
mine,  once  the  cable  is  broken,  is  thrown  out  of  action, 
is  one  too  often  dishonoured,  by  non-observance.  And, 
apart  from  mines,  the  sweepers  are  exposed  to  gun  attacks 
from  submarines.  So  while  those  specially  detailed  for 
the  larger  game  of  submarine  hunting  both  seek  and 
encounter  the  greater  danger,  all,  though  unequallj^  are 
exposed  to  it.  ■  • 

The  keeping  of  the  war  route  for  merchant  ships  is  a 
different  job  entirely  from  sweeping  for  the  safe  passage 
of  the  main  fleets  across  the  North  Sea.  And  the  sub- 
marine patrol  is  again  a  totally  different  thing  from  that 
maintained  for  carrying  on  the  commercial  blockade. 
For  these  again  entirely  new  naval  forces  have  been 
created.  Both  are  hazardous,  and  the  second  incredibly 
exacting,  in  that  it  must  be  carried  on  in  all  weathers. 
To  all  of  tliis  work  the  merchant  navy  has  contributed 
officers  and  men  with  clieerful  generosity,  a  personnel 
which  has  only  taught  us  in  war  how  high  a  character  is 
developed  by  the  sea  service  in  time  of  peace.  If  you 
take  the  merchant,  fisher,  and  coast  trade  men  now 
serving  under  the  white  ensign,  and  add  to  them  those 
who,  in  the  service  of  the  nation's  suppl3^  have  faced  the 
new  perils  of  the  sea,  you  will  find  that  there  is  but  little 
margin  left  for  slackers.  If,  the  Government  has  been 
rutiiless ,  in  commandeering  ships,  the  Admiralty  has 
never  had  to  conscribe  the  men.^  It  was  splendid  to  hear 
the  tributes  of  the  naval  men  to'  tlieir  new  comrades,  not 
less  splendid  to  see  how  perfectly  the  fishermen  and  others 
have  fallen  into  naval  ways  and  learned  the  few  naval 
arts  they  did  not  know  ahead}'.        .     ,«,  „,,..  w.-l 

Next  on  the  Tync  and  Clyde, wf  see  the,  two  main 
centres  of  shipbuilding.  The'  reader  will  have  seen 
elsewhere  picturesque  and  detailed  accounts  of.  these, 
written  by  the  very  able  journalists  who  composed  the 
party.  For  myself  I  find  it  anything  but  a,siipple  busi- 
ness either  to  analyse  my  impressions  of  what  I  saw,  or 
indeed  to  recognise  e.xactly  what  those  impressions  were. 
To  say  that  seeing  is  believing  is  not  so  obviously  true 
as  it  sounds.  You  may  in  point  of  fact  see  so  much  as  to 
become  incredulous.     On  the  Tyne  and  Clj'de  shipyards' 


and  engine  works  are  not  numbered  by  threes  and  fours, 
hut  by  the  dozen.  It  is  not  the  biggest  of  these  that  turns 
out,  and  has  turned  out  for  years,  a  thousand  horse- 
power a  day.  Here  are  battleships  and  battle  cruisers, 
light  cruisers  and  destroyers,  patrol  ships  and  mine 
sweepers,  some  finishing  in  the  tide  way,  others  on  the 
stocks,  some  actually  beginning  to  grow  upon  the  slips ! 
before  another  keel,  on  a  parallel  set  of  blocks,  is  ready 
for  launching — a  bewildering  panorama  of  noisy  activity 

Mammoth   Works 

What,  at  a  single  visit,  are  you  to  make  of  a  firm  that, 
in  its  ordnance  munition  works  and  ship-yards,  employs 
between  60,000  and  70,000  hands  ;  is  turning  out  every 
form  of  vessel  from  the  fastest  and  most  heavily  gunned 
capital  ship  to  the  latest  of  motor-driven  patrol  boats  ; 
which  makes  every  nature  of  naval  gun  from  the  15-inch 
to  the  i2-pounder,  and  every  form  of  land  gun  from  the 
giant  howitzer  to  the  British  equivalent  of  the  75  ;  that, 
on  the  top  of  all  this,  is  grinding  out  shells — from  mon- 
strous things  that  stand  nearly  6  feet  high  and  weigh 
the  greater  part  of  a  ton,  to  i8-pounder  shrapnel  and 
high  explosives— -and  is  completing,  all  told,  nearly 
20,000  of  all  kinds  per  day  ?  The  only  single  impression 
that  is  left  is  that  Sir  Edward  Grey,  so  far  as  these  two 
centres  are  concerned,  was  well  within  the  mark  when 
he  told  our  Russian  visitors  that  Great  Britain  was  all 
out  to  win.  Here  at  least  every  man,  every  machine, 
eveiy  atom  of  our  working  capacity  is  pledged  to  the 
great  cause. 

Then  came  the  visits  to  the  two  bases  between  which 
the  Grand  Fleet  is  chiefly  divided  when  not  at  sea.  On  the 
Tyne  and  Clyde  we  had  seen  ships  in  the  making.  At  these 
two  bases  we  saw  the  fleet  in  being.  The  lines  of  battle 
cruisers,  the  vast  array  of  battleships,  the  attendant 
flotillas  of  cruisers  and  submarines,  even  the  seaplane 
ships  and  the  destroyer  depots,  and  the  main  auxiliaries 
for  engineering,  water  suppl^^  etc. — with  fleets  so  com- 
posed the  great  Spithead  Reviews  had  familiarised  tis. 
What  was  a  revelation  was  to  find  how  in  war  a  fleet,  to 
keep  in  being,  calls  for  the  attendance,  in  addition  not 
only  of  almost  uncounted  colliers  and  oil  ships,  but  for  an 
incredible  array  of  mine  sweepers  and  patrols,  to  clear 
for  it  a  safe  passage  and  to  screen  it  from  submarines. 

Certainly  the  fleet  to-day  is  a  very  different  force  from 
that  with  which  we  began  the  war.  The  odds  against 
the  enemy  to-day  seem,  on  paper,  to  be  hopeless. 

It  is,  indeed,  impossible  to  see  these  vast  Armadas, 
still  less  possible  to  converse  with  the  Admirals,  of 
officers  and  men  who  handle. them„  without  wondering 
what  are  the  enemy's  leal  views  of  his  prospects  at  sea. 
The  famous  Navy  Law  said  it  was  German  policy  to  build 
a  fleet  so  powerful  that  the  strongest  navy  in  the  world 
could  not  attack  it  without  being  so  reduced  in  strength 
as  to  be  a  ready  prey  to  weaker  Powers.  The  German 
fleet  would  have  to  fight,  and  the  neutral  navies  would 
have  to  seize  the  opportunity  which  the  expected^ — but 
Pyrrhic — victorj'  of  the  British  would  afford.  Is  it  the 
coyness  of  the  neutrals  that  explains  German  bashful- 
ness  ?  Failing  this,  so  Bernhardi  has  explained  to  us, 
the  British  fleet  was  to  be  reduced  by  attrition. 

Mines,  submarines,  bomb  dropping  aircraft  were 
to  take  a  steady  toUi  of  our  swollen  numbers.  \\'cll, 
in  20  months  of  war  the  fleet  has  grown  by  nearer  20  than 
10  of  the  largest  capital  units,  so  that  the  triple  attrition 
has  not  beeji  very  effective.  There  were  anxious  months 
no  doubt,  when  inadequate  protection  made  the  sub- 
marine menace  hideously  serious.  Nothing  but  an 
incredible  vigilance,  a  heroic  continuing  effort,  could 
have  brought  the  mine  danger  to  safe  proportions.  Only 
the  cultivation  of  an  excellent  skill  in  gunnery  could  have 
brought  the  aircraft  threat  to  nothing.  But  the  simple 
fact  remains  that  attrition  as  a  policy  has  not  succeeded. 

When  attrition  had  done  its  expected  work,  two  other 
principles    were     to    be    employed     to    complete    our 


34 


I     \  \  ! )      .\      W  A'T  ]•:  K 


juiic  I,  i(ji6 


disiuni  fit  lire.  Shi|)s  wire  to  bo  Jiccrtcd  (torn  our  llitt 
and  su  its  strength  reduced  by  the  sucrilicc  of  sinj^le 
vessels  to  harry  the  trade  routes.  A  battle  cruiser  let 
loose  ujHjn  the  Atlantic  would  attract  two  or  three  to 
catch  her.  Then  another  would  follow  the  lirst,  and  then 
a  tliird,  so  that  three  or  four  (jcrman  ships  would  reduce 
the  British  strength  by  nine  or  12.  Diversion  would 
complete  the  work  of  attrition.  Finally,  the  principle 
of  division  would  make  all  things  ready  for  the  master 
.stroke.  A  couple  of  anny  corps  escorted  by  the  older 
battleships  would  be  sacrificed  in  an  invading  raid.  The 
British  fleet -already  weakened —would  have  to  send 
]X'rhaps  half  its  units  to  avert  the  blow,  then  the  un- 
divided German  fleet  would  fall  upon  the  hapless  re- 
mainder. Skilfully  laid  minefields,  daring  destroyer 
attacks,  cunning  ambushes  of  submarines,  all  these 
devices  would  be  brought  into  play,  and  the  distracted, 
diverted,  divided  British  fleet,  with  its  harassed  and 
impatient  commanders  would  finally  be  crushed. 

It  was  a  lovely  programme,  but  many  things  were 
n«rded  for  its  success.  The  chief  of  these  were  tiiat  the 
(ierman  fleet  should  be  willing  to  risk  everything  for 
\ictory,  and  that  the  British  commanders  should  be 
driven,  by  their  own  disappointed  ambition  and  public 
unpatience,  to  a  frenzy  of  insane  imprudence.     Of  the 


(ierman  wiliingiKss  to  lake  risks  we  know  only  tiiis,  that 
they  liave  taken  mighty  few  so  far.  Of  the  j)rospect  of 
our  Admirals  losing  their  heads,  those  who  visited  tlie 
fleet  can  form  a  fairly  good  opinion.  Sir  David  Beatty 
may  be  what  he  looks,  the  personification  of  the  eager 
fighting  spirit,  but  it  is  an  extraordinarily  calm,  level 
headed,  self-contained  incarnation  at  that.  As  for  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  he  has  long  been  the  very  type  of 
imperturbabilit\'.  Twenty  months  of  the  greatest  respon- 
sibility and  the  greatest  strain  that  any  man  in  any  part 
of  the  fields  of  warhas  undergone,  find  him  to-day  without 
an  added  grey  hair  or  an  added  wrinkle.  Aifd  as  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  so  every  officer  and  man  seemed 
also.  It  really  looked  as  if  continuous  "service,  without 
a  day's  hoHday  or  a  moment's  remission  of  incessant 
duty,  must  certainly  be  the  best  prescription  for  perfect 
health  and  perfect  nerves.  When  one  reflects  upon  what 
all  these  men  have  been  through,  what  sea  cruising  means 
to-day,  the  incredible  standard  of  skill  that  is  being  main- 
tained, and  the  drills,  practices  and  discipline  that  it 
calls  for,  the  thing  is  a  perfect  wonder.  Never  has  the 
fleet  had  less  sickness  ;  never  have  so  few  oflicers  broken 
down  or  become  unfit.  One  thing  is  sure.  Any  German 
hopes  that  are  built  on  the  supposition  that  the  fleet  is 
war  weary  are  doomed  to  disappointment. 


Peace  and  the  President 


.\s  has  Hiot  been  unusual,  the  only  outward  ;mkI 
visible  sign  of  naval  war  has,  for  the  last  fortniuht, 
Ix'en  the  under  water  attacks  on  shijjping.  Lull  details 
are  not  published  of  these,  but  it  would  appear  that 
jiractically  all  the  ships  that  have  suffered  in  home 
waters  have  run  upon  mines,  and  all  those  sunk 
and  damaged  in  the  Mediterranean  have  suffered 
from  submarine  attack.  In  our  issue  of  May  18th 
we  showed  the  home  casualties  between  April  20th 
and  May  I5tli  inclusive.  So  far  as  positive  infor- 
mation goes,  therefore,  there  is  no  evidence  that  the 
( iermans  have  failed  to  keep  the  undertaking  which  they 
have  given  to  the  United  States.  We  have  few  details 
as  to  tlie  circumstances  in  which  these  attacks  were  madi'. 
We  are  simply  not  told  if  ships  were  visited  and  searched 
or  provision  made  for  the  safety  of  the  crews.  But  in 
certain  instances  no  such  provision  could  have  been  made. 
There  is  naturally,  therefore,  some  curiosity  to  know 
whether  Dr.  Wilson  will  repeat  in  the  case  of  Austria 
the  action  he  has  taken  in  the  case  of  Germany.  So  far 
the  Persia  correspondence  has  not  been  followed  up. 

Meanwhile  due  acknowledgment  should  be  made  of 
the  fact  that  for  the  best  part  of  a  month,  British  and 
neutral  ships  in  the  neighbourhood  of  these  islands  have 
been  free  froiu  the  ravages  of  submarines.  The  emanci- 
pation— temporary  though  it  may  be — is  one  of  real 
value,  and  in  finally  insisting  upon  a  doctrine  laid  down  in 
February,  1015.  President  Wilson  has  shown  that  where 
lie  has  the  will  he  possesses  the  power  to  compel  belli- 
gerents to  observe  a  civilised  code  in  war.  There 
seems  no  reason  why  this  same  ix)wer  should  not  enforce 
in  the  Mediterranean  the  standard  of  conduct  which  it 
has  exacted  in  the  t  hannel  and  North  Sea.  Tardy  though 
the  diplomatic  triumph  of  Washington  has  been,  it  is  so 
real  a  triumph  that  we  are  left  wondering  why  a  capacity 
to  enforce  right  action,  which  should  have  been  obvious, 
was  not  exerted  earlier  and  over  a  wider  field.  Even  if 
America  were  to  compel  the  .\ustrian  limpire  to  yield 
as  Germany  has  >aelded,  the  fact  would  still  remain  that 
secret  mine  laying  on  the  trade  routes  is  a  gross  and 
hideous  violation  of  civilised  practise,  whose  criminality 
has  only  been  obscured  by  the  greater  villainy  of  the  sub- 
marine campaign.  There  are  real  difticulties,  no  doubt, 
in  taking  the  same  action  here  as  in  the  latter  case. 
But  it  certainly  seems  odd  that  no  action  should  be  taken 
at  all.  The  first  American  ship  to  suffer  under  the  war, 
the  Evelyn,  perished  by  a  mine.  And  the  practice  of 
using  them  in  this  way  is  not  only  inhuman,  but  unlike 
the  attacks  by  submarine,  forbidden  not  onlj'  in  implica- 
tion, but  specifically  by  international  agreement.  In  this 
matter  Germany  lias  not  only  been  shameless  in  action, 
-,ho  has  been  defiantly  shameless  in  speech.  In  the  first 
of  all  the  Berlin  replies,  America  was  warned  as  cynically 
IS  the  passengers  in  the  Lusitania  were  warned,  that  the 
whole  war  area  would  be  indiscriminately  mined  so  that, 


aj)art  altogether  from  submarines,  no  neutral  shij)  could 
enter  it  in  safety.  This  threat  in  face  of  the  standard  set 
up  both  by  precedent  and  the  Hague  Conventions  might 
surely  have  given  the  American  Government  all  the 
material  necessary  for  taking  a  Ikm  attitude.  The 
weakest  points  in  the  American  position  in  these  matters 
are  first,  the  immense  lengtli  of  time  between  her  first 
protest  and  the  effective  threat  of  action,  secondly,  the; 
limitation  both  of  protest  and  action  to  submarine  attacks 
only,  and  lastly  confining  the  protest  to  attacks  on  ships 
carrying  Americans. 

It  is  of  course  a  larger  weakness  that  the  protest  has 
never  extended  beyond  Germany's  sea  crimes.  And  this 
is  much  emphasised  by  Mr.  Wilson's  somewhat  unfortun- 
ate address  to  "  the  League  for  Enforcing  Peace."  I 
call  it  unfortunate,  because  in  tliis  address  he  encouraged 
Americans  to  think  that  their  Government  would  have 
a  natural  right  to  a  voice  in  the  after  war  settlements, 
on  the  ground  that  whether  they  wished  it  or  not,  the 
States  of  .\merica  were  partners  with  the  rest  of  the  world 
in  the  grand  affair  of  civilisation,  and  that  all  that  affected 
liumanity  affected  them.  He  sketched  out  in  terms  that 
could  hardly  bs  improved,  the  main  outline  of  what  the 
civilised  nations  should  combine  to  maintain — the  free- 
dom of  weak  nations  to  choose  their  allegiance  ;  their 
right  of  immunity  from  unprovoked  a,;^gression  ;  the 
right  of  all  peo])les  to  the  free  and  orderiy  use  of  the  ocean 
highways.  To  have  achieved  such  freedom  of  the  seas 
for  the  whole  worlds  shipping  is  the  justification  and 
boast  of  a  century  of  British  sea  supremacy. 

To  vindicate  the  right  of  small  peoples—like 
Serbia  and  Belgium— to  choose  their  own  allegiance  ;  to 
win  back  for  them  the  lands  of  whicli  they  have  be;'n 
despoiled  ;  to  guarantee  Flurcipe  from  any  renewal  of 
the  present  horror  of  unprovoked  war — these  are  not 
things  that  the  nations  of  the  worid  must  combine,  after 
the  war  is  over  to  secure—  it  is  precisely  to  secure  them  that 
the  war  continues.  Had  President  Wilson  been  defining 
the  object  for  which  the  Allies  are  now  fighting,  he  could 
not  have  put  their  ])urpose  into  happier  terms. 

If  the  American  ideal  of  a  civilised  code  of  inter- 
national life  is  realised,  it  will  be  by  the  heroism  of  the 
Allied  nations,  by  their  financial  sacrifices  and  by  their 
industrial  efforts.  All  thinking  men  would  wish  the 
world  to  .settle  down  to  a  new  life  once  this  war  is  over. 
And  when  it  comes  to  organising  this  new  life,  the 
American  help  will  be  vital.  But  two  things  have  to  be 
done  first.  The  military  power  of  Pmssia  has  to  be 
crushed,  and  those  who  crush  it  must  decide  what  restitu- 
tion IS  due,  what  guarantees  of  future  safety  are  necessary. 
1  he  problem  in  all  its  immediate  aspects  will  be  European, 
and  one  in  which  America  would  hardly  have  a  title  to 
co-operate,  nor  could  co-op(>ratc  usefully.  Mr.  Wilson's 
speech  seems  to  imply  something  different. 

Arthur  Pollen. 


June  T,  1916  LAND      &      WATER 

South  America  and  the  War. 


15 


By  Lewis  R.   Freeman 


[The  very  remarkable  figures  showing  Great  Britain's 
share  of  South  American  trade  on  which  Mr.  Freeman 
bases  his  article  have  only  recently  been  issued  and 
are   noiv  for  the  first  time   published  in   this  country.] 

ONE  of  the  most  remarkable,  as  well  as  one  of  the 
most  encouraging  developments  of  the  war — - 
from  England's  standpoint — has  been  the  manner 
in  which  British  foreign  trade  has  been  main- 
tained. That  this  has  been  done  in  spite  of  an  unpre- 
cedented demand  on  home  industries  and  unparalleled 
ocean  freights,  and  in  the  face  of  the  decreased  buying 
powers  of  practically  all  of  the  overseas  markets,  only 
accentuates  its  importance  on  both  scores.  That  imports 
would  be  greatly  increased  by  the  war,  and  that  exports 
would  be  greatly  restricted,  was,  of  course,  a  foregone 
conclusion.  But,  staggering  as  the  figures  of  the  aug- 
mented imports — principally  represented  by  foodstuffs 
and  munitions — have  been,  the  fact  that  Great  Britain, 
notwithstanding  the  handicaps  mentioned,  has  been 
able  to  bring  back  her  exports  almost  to  pre-war  figures 
is  even  more  remarkable. 

British  exporters,  it  now  appears,  have  been  able  to 
maintain  their  hold  upon  practically  all  of  the  markets 
of  the  world  that  are  open  to  them  from  the  seas,  but  that 
they  have  been  notably  successful  in  this  respect  in  one 
quarter  of  the  globe,  where  it  is  especially  desirable 
that  such  a  hold  should  be  maintained,  was  brought  clearly 
to  the  writer's  attention  during  a  study  he  recently  made 
in  Washington  of  some  late  facts  and  figures  relating 
to  Latin  American  trade  placed  at  his  disposal  through 
the  courtesy  of  the  Pan-American  Union.*  ' 

The  Ideal   Market 

The  South  American  continent,  as  has  long  been  under- 
stood in  England  and  Germany,  and,  more  recently,  the 
United  States,  offers  a  nearer  approach  to  the  theoretical 
ideal  of  a  market  for  an  industrial  nation  than  any  other 
of_  the  great  geographical  regions  of  the  world.  The 
"  ideal  market,"  it  is  generally  agreed,  is  a  country  which 
is  very  rich  in  natural  products,  but  which,  through 
scantiness  or  inadaptability  of  its  population,  is  not 
capable  of  doing  much  in  manufacturing  itself.  This 
allows  an  exporting  nation  to  market  its  manufactures  in 
such  a  country  with  negligible  home  competition,  and 
to  take  its  pay  in  the  raw  products  which  it  must  get 
from  somewhere  in  any  case.  China  is  not  such  a  market 
because,  with  unlimited  coal  and  iron  and  an  enormous 
and  energetic  population,  it  will  become— is  rapidly 
becoming,  indeed— a  great  manufacturing  nation  itself. 
Africa  is  not  an  ideal  market  because  the  producing, 
and  therefore  the  pxnxhasing,  power  of  its  great  savage 
or  semi-savage  populations  is  too  small.  Similar,  or 
equally  potent,  objections  will  be  found  to  apply  to  all 
of  the  other  great  non-industrial  regions  of  the  world. 
Only  the  various  countries  of  South  and  Central  America 
—rich  in  raw  products,  but  lacking  in  iron  and  coal  and 
with  scant  inclination  in  their  peoples  toward  modern 
industry — hold  out  the  promise  of  being  able  to  buy  as 
much  as  they  sell,  of  realising  the  "  commercial  ideal  "  of 
"  fair  exchange  "  on  a  broad  international  basis. 

The  South  American  Republics  have  probably  been 
harder  hit  by  the  war  than  any  other  group  of  countries 
outside  of  Europe.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
commerce  and  finances  of  South  America  were  so  largely 
dependent  upon  Europe  that  any  disturbance  of  con- 
ditions in  the  latter  could  not  but  quickly  be  reflected 
in  the  forn)er.  South  America— being  a  "non-manufac- 
turing region— a  producer  of  raw  materials  rather  than 
elaborated  commodities — has  been  able  to  buy  only 
about  so  much  as  it  could  sell.  This  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  that  continent's 

•  This  organisation,  it  may  be  in  order  to  explain,  is  maintained 
by  the  twenty-one  American  Republics  for  the  development  of  good 
understanding,  friendly  intercourse,  commerce  and  peace  among 
tliem.  It  is  pro-North  and  South  American  rather  than  anti-European, 
and  its  headquarters  in  Washington  is  the  only  place  in  the  world 
\\hcre  one  may  studj-  Latin  .American  problems  free  from  bias,, 


exports  and  imports  very  nearly  balanced  each  other 
at  something  like  two  hundred  million  pounds  each. 
It  followed  naturally,  therefore,  that  as  soon  as  Europe 
became  unable  or  unwilling  to  buy  South  American 
products,  this  acted  automatically  to  restrict  that  con- 
tinent's ability  to  buy  those  of  Europe.  It  was  this 
sudden  contraction  of  South  America's  principal  markets 
as  well  as  the  drying  up  of  what  had  been  its  principal 
financial  sotirces,  that  operated  to  cut  down  the  trade  of 
the  various  republics  from  ten  to  thirty  per  cent,  during 
1914-15,  and  to  make  some  form  or  other  of  moratorium 
necessary  in  every  one  of  them. 

In  the  trade  of  South  America  up  to  the  time  of  the 
war,  as  in  that  of  the  rest  of  the  world,  Great  Britain  had 
a  very  considerable  lead,  with  Germany  second,  and  the 
United  States  a  very  close  third.  Eor  several  years 
the  relative  shares  of  the  two  latter  countries  were  in- 
creasing more  rapidly  than  that  of  the  former,  though 
Britain's  actual  lead  was  fairly  well  maintained.  With 
the  closing  of  the  seas  to  Germany,  the  trade  of  that 
country  quickly  became  an  almost  negligible  quantity, 
and,  especially  in  the  first  months  of  the  war,  that  of 
Great  Britain  was  greatly  cut  down. 

Unfulfilled  Anticipations 

Immediately  after  tlie  outbreak  of  the  war  the  general 
feeling  in  commercial  circles  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic, 
was  that  the  United  States  would  at  once  succeed  to  the 
South  American  trade  of  Germany,  and  to  such  of  that  of 
England,  France  and  the  other  European  nations  as  these 
would  be  compelled  to  relinquish.  That  this  very 
natural  expectation  has  been  fulfilled  only  to  a  small 
degree  is  due  to  a  number  of  causes,  the  most  important 
one  of  which  is  doubtless  the  fact  that  the  huge  war 
demands  of  the  belligerents  have  left  the  American 
factories  little  opportunity  to  turn  their  attention  to 
more  remote  and — for  the  time  being — less  profitable 
markets.  Shortage  of  ships  and  Sovith  America's  decreased 
buying  power  hav.e  operated  to  the  same  end. 

Nor  was  the  United  States,  as  it  transpired,  to  have 
anything  like  the  anticipated  monopoly  in  foreign  markets. 
Englancl's  industrial  vitality  had  not  been  sufficiently 
reckoned  with.  Once  the  sea  lanes  were  cleared  of  Ger- 
man raiders  and  industry  at  home  got  its  second  wind, 
Britain  began  to  make  good  in  commerce  the  "  bull- 
dog's "  dictum  she  has  so  often  made  good  territorially, 
and  "  What  we  have  we'll  hold  "  may  well  have  been  the 
war  motto  of  British  exporters  in  their  plucky  up-hill 
fight  to  keep  their  hard-won  foreign  markets.  How  well 
they  have  succeeded  nothing  could  show  better  than  the 
mounting  figures  of  British  exports  during  the  last 
eighteen  months. 

How  remarkable  is  Britain's  achievement  in  so  nearly 
keeping  its  export  trade  up  to  pre-war  figures  may  be 
best  appreciated  from  the  fact  that,  in  spite  of  the  great 
industrial  mobilisation  in  the  United  States,  the  trade  of 
that  country  with  all  of  the  world  outside  of  Europe  does 
not  show  a  dollar  of  increase  for  the  year  1915  as  com- 
pared with  1914.  Roughly  speaking,  the  total  value  oi 
the  exports  of  the  United  States  for  1915  were,  two 
hundred  milhon  pounds  greater  than  for  1914.  Since 
this  figure  is  almost  exactly  equal  to  the  value  of  the 
increase  of  exports  to  Europe  for  the  same  period,  it  will 
be  seen  that  America's  trade  with  the  rest  of  the  world 
has  no  more  than  held  stationary  in  spite  of  the  elimina- 
tion of  the  competition  of  Germany,  Austria  and  Belgium, 
and  the  unprecedented  war  demands  upon  the  industries 
of  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy. 

The  trade  and  finances  of  the  Latin  American  countries 
have  been  adversely  affected  by  the  war  in  direct  pro- 
portion to  their  previous  dependence  upon  Europe. 
Those  least  affected  have  been  the  ones  having  the  closest 
trade  relations  with  the  United  States. 

Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile  are  the  most  advanced 
commercially,  as  well  as  politically,  of  the  South  American 
repubhcs,  and  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  foreign  trade 
of   that   continent   is   in    their   hands.     Argentina   was 


i6 


I  A  N  D      &      W  A  T  E  R 


jLine  I,  191 J 


extremely  hard  liit  by  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  but  the 
worst  effects  of  the  blow  were  felt  only  until  about  the 
end  of  1014.  Its  recovery  in  exports  during  11)15  has 
been  one  of  the  most  spectacular  commercial  develop- 
ments of  recent  times.  Argentina's  imports  fell  from 
£82,000.000  in  1013  to  but  little  over  £32,000,000  in  1914, 
a  loss  of  £30,000,000.  Exports  decreased  during  the 
same  pieriod  from  nearly  £1)4,000,000  to  less  than 
£68,000.000,  or  over  £26,000,000.  The  total  loss  in 
foreign  trade  was  in  excess  of  £56,000,000,  a  huge  sum 
for  a  country  of  less  than  10,000^000  people. 

Argentina's  Foodstufis 

But  Argentina,  producing  staple  foodstuffs  where  all 
of  the  other  South  American  republics  dejx^nded  almost 
exclusively  upon  luxuries,  was  in  a  strong  position  for  a 
"  come  back,"  and  the  more  than  £80,000,000  worth  of 
the  products  of  her  fertile  lands  which  were  exported  in 
the  first  nine  months  of  1015  is  not  only  greater  than 
for  any  other  similar  period  in  her  history,  but  also 
e.xceeds  by  a  good  margin  the  total  exports  of  any  other 
complete  years  save  only  those  of  1012  and  i')i.^,  Argen- 
tina's foreign  trade  for  the  whole  of  1015.  the  figures 
for  which  are  only  just  to  hand,  are  as  follows  : — Exports, 
£100,000,000  ;  imports,  £44.000,000  ;  total,  £153,000,000. 

The  following  table,  giving  the  percentages  that  the 
imports  of  the  six  leading  countries  bear  to  the  total  of 
Argentine  imports  for  the  last  live  years  is  a  highlv 
interesting  record,  especially  in  the  light  of  the  figures 
for  1914  and  1915.  The  almost  total  elimination  of 
(jermany  in  1915.  and  the  more  than  ten  per  cent,  in- 
crease of  the  imports  from  the  United  States  for  the  same 
year,  are  apparently  its  most  striking  features  ;  but  I 
found  commercial  experts  in  \\'ashington  inclined  to 
rate  the  manner  in  which  Great  Britain,  in  spite  of  the 
turning  of  so  many  of  her  factories  to  munition  works, 
was  shown  still  to  maintain  her  commanding  lead,  as  an 
even  more  significant  circumstance.  There  is  a  salutary 
lesson  for  the  I'nited  States  in  this,  they  say,  for  Eng- 
land's ability  to  hold  her  own  in  the  face  of  great  diffi- 
culties is  very  largely  due  to  the  huge  amount  of  British 
lapital  invested  in  Argentina  railways  and  other  in- 
dustrial enterprises.  No  more  striking  illustration  has 
ever  been  furnished  of  the  persistent  loadstone  money  is 
ioT  trade. 

isn  1912  l»m  1914  1S1'> 

Countrirs.  Per  cent.        PMcent.       Percent.       Percent.      Percent. 

United  Kingdom  .     29.6  30.8  31. i  34.0  32.0 

<icrmany..         ..     18.0  16.6  16.9  14.8  t^.^ 

United  States     ..     14.3  15.4  14.7  13.4  23.6 

Italy        ..         ..       8.0  8.5  8.3  9.2  9.7 

]•"  ranee     ..         ..10.4  98  9.0  8.2  5.9 

liclgium  ..         ..       5.3  5.3  5.2  4.4  b.5 

If  any  Englishman  has  been  inclined  to  harbour  doubts 
regarding  the  industrial  strength  of  his  country,  a  study 
of  this  table — in  the  light  of  all  that  has  happened  in  the 
course  of  the  last  twenty-one  months — should  go  a  long 
way  towards  removing  them.  In  spite  of  all  her  un- 
precedented industrial,  financial  and  military  efforts  for 
herself  and  her  allies.  Great  Britain  supplied  a  larger 
percentage  of  the  goods  bought  by  Argentina  in  the  year 
1915  than  in  any  one  of  the  preceding  years  of  peace.  More- 
over, the  figures,  had  I  the  space  to  set  them  down, 
would  show  more  or  less  the  same  thing  for  nearly  every 
country  in  South  America. 

Business  conditions  in  Brazil,  due  to  a  number  of  causes, 
but  notably  to  unsound  finance  and  the  decline  of  the 
coffee  market,  have  been  going  from  bad  to  worse  for 
some  time,  and  the  war  only  served  to  precipitate  a  crisis 
which  would  have  been  inevitable  eventually  in  any  case. 
Over  a  hundred  million  pounds  of  Brazilian  bonds  of  one 
kind  or  another  are  held  abroad,  and  irregularity  of 
interest  pavmi-nt  has,  in  many  instances,  been  the  rule 
rather  than  the  exception,  for  many  years.  This  state 
of  affairs  was,  of  course,  greatly  aggravated  by  the  war. 

The  decrease  in  Brazil's  foreign  trade  as  a  consequence 
of  the  war  was  rather  staggering.  Imports  fell  away 
from  £66.000.000  in  1913,  to  but  little  over  £33,000,000. 
practically  lifty  per  cent.  Exports  fell  from  £62,000,000 
in  1913  to  £44,000.000  in  1914.  This  startling  decline 
continued  during  a  part  of  1915,  but  an  improvement 
during  the  last  quarter  of  the  year  in  exports  gave  a  slightly 
increased  total  for  the  twelve  months.  Imports  fcil 
away  to  less  than  £30,000,000,   however,  about   forty- 


five  per  cent,  of  the  total  for  1913-     All  countries  suffered 
in  their  trade  with  Brazil  for  1915.  but  England  managed 
~  to  maintain  practically  as  good  a  lead  in  the  percentage 
column  as  in  the  case  of  Argentina. 

The  principal  factor  in  Brazil's  commercial  troubles  is 
colTfee,  always  that  country's  most  important  item  of 
export.  Something  like  half  of  the  world's  coffee  supply 
is  raised  in  the  State  of  Sao  Paulo,  but  owing  to  un- 
scientific growing,  marketiiig  and  financing,  the  industry 
has  been  in  a  bad  way  for  some  years.  With  the  war 
this  condition  was  accentuated  not  only  by  the  shortage 
of  shipping,  but  also  by  the  fart  that  coffee,  being  more 
or  less  of  a  luxurv,  was  one  of  the  things  Europe  began 
to  do  without.  The  same  causes  operated  to  depress  the 
Brazilian  tobacco  industry,  and  the  heightened  demand 
and  increased  jirice  of  rubber  has  not  been  enough  to 
offset  the  loss  in  the  two  other  great  commodities  of 
export.  In  a  general  financial  and  industrial  reorgani- 
sation, the.  first  forerunning  signs  of  which  are  evident 
in  the  increased  activities  of  several  strong  American 
houses  in  the  great  repubUc,  lie  Brazil's  best  hope  of  the 
restored  prosperity  her  incomparable  natural  resources 
so  fully  entitle  her  to. 

Chile's  Nitrates 

Chile,  through  nitrate,  like  Brazil  through  coffee  and 
the  southern  of  the  United  States  through  cotton,  was 
another  region  that  was  the  harder  hit  by  the  war  as  a 
consequence  of  carrying' too  many  eggs  in  one  basket. 
In  1913  the  output  of  Chilean  nitrate  was  approximately 
3,000,000  tons  worth,  at  the  prevailing  price  of  £8  per 
ton,  £24,000,000.  The  shortage  of  shipping  folfowing 
the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  the  cutting  off  entirely  of 
the  German  market,  caused  a  slackening  of  the  demand 
which  forced  the  price  down  to  £5  per  ton,  just  about  the 
cost  of  production.  As  a  consequence,  all  but  36  of  the 
134  nitrate  '*  officinas  "  closed  down  for  a  number  of 
months.  But  by  1915  the  increasing  demand  for  refined 
nitrates  for  use  in  the  manufacture  of  explosives  increased 
the  demand,  and  the  price  went  up  to  over  £9  per  ton, 
with  the  indications  good  that  this  very  satisfactory  figure 
would  be  maintained  through  iqi6.  The  present  "capital 
investment  in  the  nitrate  industry  of  Chile  is  over 
£30,000,000,  about  one-third  of  which  is  British,  and  this 
has  proved  a  very  important  factor  in  enabling  England, 
there  as  in  Argentina  and'Brazil,  to  maintain  her  strong 
commercial  lead.  Chile's  foreign  trade  fell  off  about 
twenty  per  cent,  in  1914  as  compared  with  1913,  but 
much  of  this  was  regained  in  1915,  and  the  present  rate  of 
increase  will  make  iqi6  very  close  to  a  normal  vcar. 

A  study  of  the  trade  figures  for  Peru.  Ecuador,"Bolivia, . 
Uruguay  and  the  other. less  important  South  American 
republics  reveal  conditions  more  or  less  similar  to  tho^ 
prevailing  in  the  three  leading  ones — German  imports 
practically  negligible,  Great  Britain  steadfastly  holding 
its  own,  and  the  I'nited  States  registering  smali  but  con- 
sistent gains.  From  the  American  standpoint  perhaps 
the  most  encouraging  feature  of  the  situation  is  less  in 
the  actual  gains  made  than  in  the  evidence  that  American 
bankers  and  exporters  are  at  last  learning  from  England 
the  important  commercial  axiom,  that  trade  follows  the 
dollar  quite  as  persistently  as  it  does  the  flag.  .American 
loans  to  or  in  a  number  of  South  American  republics,  and 
increased  American  investments  in  mines,  water-power 
projects,  railways,  packing  plants  and  other  industrial 
enterprises,  will  unquestionably  be  more  strongly  reflected 
in  the  American  trade  returns  of  several  years  hence 
than  in  those  of  to-day. 

A  significant  fact,  calculated  to  have  a  very  important 
bearmg  on  the  "  trade  war  "  which  will  be  launched  in 
South  America  immediately  peace  is  declared  in  Europe, 
was  brought  to  my  attention  by  an  official  of  the  Pan- 
American  Union  just  return-d  from  a  swing  around  tho 
southern  continent. 

"  Except  for  the  south  of  Brazil,  with  its  400,00.-) 
Teutons,"  he  said,  "and  th-  Chilean  army,  which  is 
commanded  by  the  ex-revo!utionisla  and"  soldier  of 
fortune.  Gen.  Koiner,  every  part  of  South  America  is  not 
only  actively  pro-Ally,  but  vigorously  anti-German  as 
well.  This  will  be  of  small  moment  one  way  or  the  other 
as  far  as  the  course  of  the  war  itself  is  concerned,  but, 
unless  I  am  greatly  mistaken,  is  bound  to  tell  heavily 
agamst  Germany  in  it6  efforts  to  regain  its  lost  markets 
after  the  war," 


June  I,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


17 


A    "U''  Boat^s  Victim 


By  Georgina  Pennant 


[Miss  Pennant  was  a  passenger  on  board  a  Japanese 
steamer  which  was  sunk  by  an  enemy  submarine  in 
the  Mediterranean  Sea.  She  gives  in  this  article 
a  graphic  description  of   her    exceptional  experiences.'^^ 

TWO  to  three  o'clock  on  a  warm  sunny  afternoon 
is  a  drowsy  hour  on  bioard  ship.  There  is  no 
breeze,  and  a  big  Japanese  hner  shdes  steadily 
through  the  blue  waters  pf  the  Eastern  Medi- 
terranean, on  which  yellow  gleams  of  sunlight  play. 
Most  of  the  passengers  are  dozing,  some  on  deck,  some  in 
their  cabins,  for  the  previous  night  for  the  first  time 
during  the  voyage  there  had  been  a  certain  amount  of 
anxiety  which  had  kept  us  a.wake.  All  day  a  small 
white  steamer  had  hung  about,  not  half  a  mile  away  ;  to 
the  unsuspecting  passengers  she  was  an  object  of  interest, 
the  only  one  in  the  waste  of  waters  ;  but  her  innocence 
was  only  skin-deep — it  began  and  ended  with  her  white 
paint.  She  was  a  Dutch  boat  (so  called),  and  had  been 
sending  off  German  wireless  messages  in  a  code,  which 
aroused  our  Captain's  suspicions,  for  this'is  an  approved 
method  of  communicating  with  submarines. 

On  hearing  this,  most  of  us  had  sat  up  rather  late,  and 
had  slept  uneasily,  for  though  darkness  is  a  close  time 
for  submarines  if  a  ship  shows  no  light,  yet  night  was 
hardly  night  just  then  with  the  full  moon  of  southern 
skies  shining  down  upon  us.  However,  nothing  had 
happened,  and  in  six  hours  we  should  be  at  Port  Said. 
All  an.xiety  was  at  an  end,  as  the  Captain  had  himself 
assured  me  that  morning,  when  bringing  an  Italian 
wireless  message  for  me  to  translate  for  him.  It  referred, 
so  he  said,  to  a  remote  danger  which  did  not  concern  us  at 
all,  being  a  warning  that  there  was  an  enemy  submarine 
in  the  "  Cirelian  Canale  " — there  was  an  interrogation 
mark  after  the  former  of  these  two  words,  and  we  could 
not  make  out  what  it  liieaiTt  ;  but  thought  it  should  have 
been  "  Sicilian  '.'  ;  I  heard  afterwards  that  the  operator 
had  tak  n  it  down  incorrectly. 

A  Tremendous  Explosion 

It  was  getting  on  for  three  o'clock— my  siesta  was  over, 
and  I  was  standing  up  in  my-cabin  finishing  my  packing. 
Suddenly  there  was  the  report  of  a  tremendous  explosion, 
a  sort  of  reverberating,  roaring  boom,  which  shook  the 
ship  from  stem  to  stern  ;  she  stood  still  and  quivered, 
and  I  fell  over  the  berth.  It  made  me  think  of  a  bird  on 
the  wing  being  shot. 

Then  overhead  on  the  deck  I  heard  the  confusion  of 
many  sounds.  The  slap  of  running  feet  on  the  boards 
comes  back  to  me  distinctly,  and  voices  calling  in  different 
languages,  most  noticeable  being  those  of  the  Japanese 
crying  "to-marine,  to-marine."      Or  so  it  sounded. 

My  fur  coat  hung  on  a  peg  near  the  door  ;  quick 
as  thought  I  snatched  it  up  and  raced  down  the  passage 
and  up  the  stairs,  collecting  a  lifebelt  from  an  empty 
cabin  on  my  way.  We  had  had  no  boat  drills  or  warnings 
how  to  act  in  an  emergency,  but  I  knew  which  boat  to 
make  for.  No.  i  starboard,  nearest  the  bridge.  In  rough 
weather  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay  the  boats  had  all  been  swung 
out  and  lowered  to  the  promenade  deck,  but  at  Gibraltar 
they  had  been  hauled  up  to  the  top  deck,  which  was 
reached  by  a  steep  flight  of  steps.  I  heard  a  voice  say 
in  husky,  unnatural  tones,  "  Torpedoed  through  the 
bows." 

Men  were  already  perched  on  the  davits,  swinging  out 
the  boats,  and  passengers  and  crew  were  fast  assembling, 
some  tying  on  ship's  lifebelts,  others  struggling  into 
Gieve  waistcoats,  and  puffing  and  blowing  into  the 
tubes  which  inflated  them  till  they  slowly  assumed  the 
proportions  of  a  motor  tyre  round  their  chests.  There 
was  no  panic,  nothing  like  a  scene — no  one  uttered  a 
shriek  or  a  cry.  One  had  to  correct  one's  estimate  of  one's 
fellow  passengers  in  a  crisis  hkc  this.  A  strong,  deter- 
mined-looking man  going  out  to  take  up  a  post  of  im- 
portance, who  I  had  thought  looked  equal  to  any 
emergency,  was  one  of  the  very  few  who  seemed  abso- 
lutely terrified,  while  a  Spanish  Jew,  who  ate-  and  ate 
till  he  swelled  visibly  and  the  whites  of  his  eyes  turned 


yellow,  was  of  the  greatest  use  in  launching  the  boats, 
even  stopping  an  Englishman  from  stepping  in  by  saying 
"  The  women  must  go  first."  Perliaps  the  most  helpful 
of  all  was  a  young  man,  who  some  people  had  thought 
wa.s  a  German  spy  at  the  outset  of  the  vc^yage.  One 
middle-aged  couple  were  a  marvel  of  calmness,  as  -'icy 
stood  on  the  deck  he  said  to  her,  "  'What  about  a  hat  ?  " 
She  answered,  "  Plenty  of  time  to  run  down  to  the  cabin 
and  fetch  one."  And  off  he  went,  returning  with  a  new 
solar-topee  and  his  dressing-gown,  which  the  lady  was 
very  glad  to  wear  later  on. 

Getting  into  the  Boats 

As  soon  as  the  boat  was  at  the  level  of  the  deck,  we  began 
climbing  in,  which  was  not  very  difficult  though  you  had 
to  get  over  the  oars  as  well  as  the  gunwale.  There  was  no 
confusion,  though  my  boat  being  nearest  the  gangway 
was  very  much  over-crowded,  as  people  came  tearing  up 
the  stairs  and  got  into  the  first  one  thev  saw.  I  begged 
several  of  them  to  go  on  to  the  other  boats  ;  there  were 
four  more  on  this  side,  some  of  which  I  saw  being  lowered 
comparatively  empty.  Even  as  we  were  going  down  half 
a  dozen  or  more  stokers  and  engineers,  who  had  been  busy 
in  the  engine-room  up  to  the  last  moment  came  pelting 
up  on  deck  and  hurled  themselves  over  the  rail  among  us. 

So  far  as  we  could  then  see,  the  ship  looked  as  usual,  and 
I  remember  thinking,  "  It  is  all  very  well  to  get  into  the 
boats,  but  we  shall  be  getting  out  again  directly."  Then 
I  caught  sight  of  the  Captain,  who  stood  near  us  on  the 
bridge  ;  he  was  a  very  brown  Japanese,  not  yellow  at 
all,  but  his  face  was  deathly  w^hite  and  streaming  with 
perspiration,  and  I  knew  tJie  ship  was  doomed.  But 
his  composure  and  presence  of  mind  were  marvellous. 
While  directing  all  the  launching  operations  he  was  also 
dictating  the  log  to  an  officer  who  stood  beside '  him, 
which  was  brought  and  thrown  into  our  boat  before  we 
reached  the  water. 

Being  lowered  in  the  boats  seemed  a  most  dangerous  pro- 
ceeding, though  mercifully  most  of  us  did  not  know  then 
how  dangerous.  Recent  wrecks  where  the  ship  has  listed  or 
could  not  be  stopped  have  shown  this.  We  only  dreaded 
being  stove  in  by  banging  against  the  ship's  side  in  going 
down  or  when  we  reached  the  water,  or  being  upset  by 
the  two  ends  not  being  lowered  evenly.  This  very  nearly 
happened  in  our  case  ;  at  one  of  our  davits  was  the  chief 
steward,  whom  I  had  nicknamed  "  Too  muchee  trouble," 
as  he  always  said  it  when  asked  to  do  anything  special. 
He  lowered  his  end  much  too  fast,  and  at  one  time  we 
were  at  a  very  perilous  angle  but  the  Captain  shouted  out 
directions  and  we  were  promptly  straightened. 

Getting  out  the  oars  was  very  inconvenient  owing  to 
the  crowd,  and  I  had  a  blow  in  the  face  from  the  blade  of 
one,  luckily  only  a  cut  and  a  bruise,  but  it  might  have 
knocked  my  teeth  out. 

Some  Impressions 

It  is  very  difficult  to  be  natural  at  a  moment  like  this. 
You  feel  as  if  you  are  acting  a  subordinate  part  in  some 
great  drama  where  you  can  do  nothing  except  not  hinder 
the  main  actors.  The  actual  lowering  cannot  have  lasted 
more  than  two  minutes,  but  it  seemed  endless.  I  know 
I  had  time  to  count  the  people  in  our  boat — 63 — to  think 
as  we  passed  the  port-holes  of  my  cabin  how  all  my 
possessions  there  would  soon  be  floating  about,  to  notice 
that  all  the  other  boats  from  the  starboard  side  were  afloat, 
and  rowing  hard  and  already  some  little  distance  from 
the  ship  ;  and  worst  of  all  to  be  seized  with  a  fear  that 
we  with  our  big  load  might  not  be  far  enough  aw-ay  to 
avoid  being  sucked  in  when  the  ship  sank.  That  was  the 
time  when  I  felt  most  frightened.  I  never  thought  I 
should  be  drowned.  And  all  the  time  the  Japanese 
talked  without  ceasing,  and  even  laughed  ;  it  was  dis- 
concerting not  to  understand  anything  they  said,  but  I 
am  sure  their  light-hearted  indifference  to  death  and 
danger  created  an  atmosphere  which  made  it  easier  for 
all  of  us. 

Somehow  the  oars  wore  got  out,  and  the  boat  warded 
off  the  ship's  side  at  the  perilous  moment  of  reaching  the 


i8 


T,  A  N  D      &     W  A  T  E  R 


Juu 


<-•  I, 


lyiO 


water.  Ivowiiif;  wa-,  st.utcu  witii  much  vigour,  it  nut  iii 
a  concerted  maiiiur.  1  folt  very  sorry  for  the  two 
Japanese  stewardesses — hitc  arrivals— who  sat  on  the 
floor  of  the  boat  with  their  heads  bent  down  to  be  out  of 
the  way  of  the  oars  ;  they  must  have  been  most  uncom- 
fortable, but  never  uttered  a  word  of  complaint. 

Soon  wc  were  40  yards  or  more  from  the  ship,  going 
round  behind  her,  and  our  hearts  lightened.  She  was  now 
settling  down  evenly  by  the  bowi.  with  no  list  at  all,  a 
wonderful  thing  so  far  as  we  could  judge,  the  torpedo 
must  have  gone  clean  through  her,  and  the  water  must 
have  entered  evenly  from  both  sides.  This  was  one  of 
the  many  things  we  had  to  be  thankful  for,  as  all  the 
boats  on  the  ship  had  been  safely  launched. 

Value  of  Soap 

At  Marseilles  when  watching  the  cargo  coming  on  board, 
I  had  noticed  a  great  deal  oi  soap  (destined  for  Shanghai) 
in  the  forward  part  of  the  hold  ;  if,  as  I  imagine,  it  was 
here  the  torpedo  struck  her,  it  would  be  greased  and 
hastened  on  its  way  by  the  soap  instead  of  making  a  hole 
in  only  one  side. 

The  rowing  improved  after  a  little  while  ;  as  they  pulled 
the  Japantse  kept  time  by  chanting  a  sort  of  sing-song, 
just  two  or  three  words;"  they  sounded  like,  "  Oshima 
Toi,  Oshima  Toi." 

The  stern  of  the  ship  was  now  coming  up  out  of  the 
water  with  the  screws  slowly  revolving.  The  Captain  with 
one  or  two  others  was  still  on  board,  and  we  felt  very  nnich 
afraid  it  might  be  part  of  his  code  to  go  down  with  his 
ship,  and  were  greatly  relieved  and  cheered  heartily  when 
the  last  boat  which  had  left  the  port  side  put  back  and 
took  him  off.  Before  leaving  lie  had  been  into  every 
cabin  on  the  ship  to  make  sure  that  not  one  was  left 
behind.  Just  before  leaving  one  of  the  sailors  ran  up  the 
Japanese  Flag,  so  that  our  poor  ship  should  go  down 
ll>ing  her  colours.  There  seemed  something  so  pathetic 
about  this  that  we  were  all  touched. 

The  arrival  of  the  Captain  inspired  us  all  with  confi- 
dence. Hitherto  we  had  seemed  such  a  forlorn  and  help- 
less little  fleet  adrift  on  the  ocean,  the  over-crowded 
boats  progressing  slowly,  while  the  emptier  ones  were 
already  stme  distance  away.  Our  boat  was  now  about 
one-eighth  of  a  mile  away  from  the  ship.  The  great  red 
stern  was  fast  coming  up  out  of  the  water,  and  towering 
over  us,  while  black  smoke  poured  from  her  funnels,  a 
wonderful  but  awful  sight.  Some  hid  their  eyes  and 
could  not  bear  to  look  at  her,  but  I  could  see  and  think  of 
nothing  else. 

A  ship  has  more  personality  than  any  other  non- 
sentient  thing,  and  to  witness  such  an  end  as  this  must 
fill  the  coldest  heart  with  emotion. 

The  Last  Farewell 

Still  there  was  nothing  hurried  or  undignified  about 
her.  Slowly  she  heaved  forward  in  a  most  deliberate 
manner  till  she  was  literally  standing  on  her  head  nearly 
half  out  of  the  water,  the  screws  pointing  straight  up  to 
heaven.  Then  she  began  steadily  sinking,  but  there 
was  no  rapid  plunge,  she  merely  subsicfcd  in  a  calm 
and  stately  manner.  It  was  a  most  impressive  and 
solemn  moment.  One  minute  she  was  still  there— ^the 
ne.\t  she  was  gone  below  to  join — alas — too  many  of  her 
sisters  in  the  underworld  of  the  Mediterranean  ;  and  what 
a  glorious  death  salute  her  crew  gave  her.  They  all 
stood  up,  cheering,  shouting  and  waving  ;  it  was  more 
like  hailing  a  victory  than  mourning  a  loss.  One  could 
hardly  believe  that  it  was  only  thirty-five  minutes  since 
she  had  received  her  death-blow.  There  was  no  regular 
whirlpool,  only  a  rough  swirl  where  the  sea  had  closed 
over  her  ;  spars,  chairs  and  bits  of  wreck,  all  danced  on 
the  surface  of  the  troubled  waters.  An  explosion,  not  a 
loud  one,  and  a  cloud  of  steam  were  the  only  signs  of  the 
tragedy. 

Calm  settled  down  again  ;  we  pulled  ourselves  to- 
gether and  began  to  think  of  our  own  fate  instead  of  the 
fate  of  the  ship. 

It  was  now  that  I  first  saw  the  submarine,  or  rather,  her 
periscope,  which  from  our  lowly  position  only  looked  like 
i  large  funnel.  She  was  evidently  keeping  near  to  be 
ready  in  case  there  was  any  attempt  to  rescue  us.  She 
.soon  disappeared,  but  subsequently  emerged  three  or 
four  miles  aw;iv  to  have  a  last  look  round. 


Tiie  jjioeiKi!  of  the  Captain  made  all  the  difference 
to  our  well-being.  A  comparatively  empty  boat  came 
up  and  took  off  about  twenty  of  our  load,  while  one  which 
had  a  leak  was  abandoned  altogether.  A  ship's  ofiicer 
was  put  on  each  vessel  to  take  command  ;  ours  was  the 
chief  engineer,  whose  name,  "  Funkiwashi,"  had  always 
amused  me.  Then  the  roll  was  called,  and  to  our  great 
relief  we  were  told  that  no  life  had  been  lost  either  of 
passengers  or  crew,  28^  in  all.  Another  piece  of  good 
news  was  next  circulated.  A  wireless  message  asking  for 
help  had  been  despatched  before  the  ship  sank,  and  an 
answer  had  been  received  from  Port  Said  to  say  that  a 
salvage  boat  would  be  sent  for  us. 

Nine  of  the  ten  boats  were  now  roped  together  in  a  long 
line,  about  30  feet  apart,  while  the  tenth,  which  contained 
some  of  the  crew,  rowed  about  independently.  Sails 
were  hoisted  and  oars  put  away,  for  it  was  our  object  to 
remain  as  near  as  possible  to  the  scene  of  the  disaster. 

Though  very  calm,  there  was  a  slight  swell,  and  the 
motion  as  we  lay  and  flopped  was  very  trying  to  most  c  f  us, 
some  of  the  crew  even  succumbing.  Some  women  and ;  mill 
children  had  begun  being  seasick  almost  as  soon  as  the 
boat  reached  the  water  and  they  managed  to  keep  it  up 
practically  all  the  time. 

Feeling  more  at  ease  as  to  our  prospects,  we  took  stock 
of  our  fellow  flotsam,  and  tried  to  make  the  best  of  our 
position.  I  was  sitting  at  the  side  of  the  stern,  and  had 
the  gunwale  to  lean  against,  but  there  was  only  a  narrow 
bar  to  put  my  feet  on  ;  however,  I  had  my  shoes  on, 
though  no  hat,  so  was  much  better  off  than  the  two  ladies 
next  me,  who  had  come  away  with  only  stockings  on 
their  feet,  and  were  also  bare  headed.  Underneath  the 
bar  lay  several  stokers  and  cooks  who  were  lightly  clad, 
and  found  it  warmer  there.  Later  on  a  mackintosh 
sheet  was  cut  in  pieces  to  cover  up  those  who  felt  cold. 

A  Merry  Purser 

The  purser  and  his  under-study  were  both  in  our  boat. 
The  former  was  a  bald,  elderly  man,  who  chuckled  merrily 
if  spoken  to.  I  did  not  at  first  recognise  him  in  the  boat, 
for  he  had  completely  concealed  his  uniform  with  a  long 
drab  mackintosh  ;  on  his  head  was  a  brown  Homburg 
hat,  and  he  spent  some  time  in  fitting  his  hands  into  a  pair 
of  new  doe-skin  gloves.  Perhaps  he  had  hopes  of  being 
taken  for  an  American  citizen  if  captured. 

We  were  much  exercised  by  seeing  flames  rising  from 
the  Captain's  boat,  and  heard  afterwards  that  he  was 
burning  some  very  important  papers  which  must  on  no 
account  fall  into  enemy  hands. 

The  sunset  that  evening  was  a  glorious  sight.  The  west 
was  afire  with  golden  brown,  when  it  died  down  an  orange 
glow  came  over  the  sky  and  lingered  long,  while  on  the 
other  side  the  full  moon  got  up  out  of  the  sea,  looking 
gigantic  at  first  ;  as  the  darkness  deepened  the  moon- 
beams playing  on  the  water  were  like  drops  of  liquid  silver. 
Our  little  fleet  then  looked  most  picturesque,  iialf  the 
sails  in  brilHant  light  the  other  half  in  black  shadow, 
while  from  time  to  time  a  brilliant  red  flare,  burnt  on  one 
of  the  boats  to  attract  attention,  cast  lurid  reflections 
in  the  water,  the  dark  figures  against  this  glowing  back- 
ground had  quite  a  theatrical  effect.  About  six  o'clock- 
much  too  soon— we  began  thinking  that  the  rescue  boat 
might  turn  up.  Now  and  again  lights  showed  in  the 
distance.  Some  nearer,  some  further,  and  iilled  us 
with  hope  which  quickly  turned  to  despair,  as  one  after 
another  they  made  off.  One  came  so  near  that  the  ropes 
were  undone  and  we  all  rowed  hurriedly  towards  her; 
she  was  a  very  small  vessel,  and  on  hearing  that  help 
had  been  promised  us  she  prom])tly  made  off. 

No  doubt  any  ship  which  stojjped  to  pick  us  up  would 
have  been  exposed  to  the  danger  of  being  torjiedoed,  but 
that  excuse  cannot  be  made  for  the  Dutch  neutral  boats 
which  travel  fully  lit  up  and  are  perfectly  safe  from 
attack.  Two  came  quite  near  and  looked  at  us  ;  then 
these  Priests  and  Levites  of  the  ocean  passed  by  on  the 
other  side.     A  cruel  disappointment. 

Nine  o'clock  came,  ten  o'clock,  still  no  sign  of  help  ;  we 
all  did  our  best  to  be  cheerful,  and  luckily  it  was  very 
still  and  warm.  Biscuits  were  served  out  and  some 
people  were  glad  to  nibble  them,  but  I  never  felt  the 
least  hungry  or  thirsty  though  at  first  I  had  an  odd  parched 
feehng  in  my  mouth.  From  time  to  time  I  slept  fitfully 
for  a  few  minutes,  my  head  on  the  gunwale,  my  feet  on 

(CoiK/nued  en   page  M) 


June   I,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


19 


«^ 


^Si< 


Remarkable  letter 
from  an  Onoto  user 
at  the  Front : — 

«T  HAVE  had  rather 
J.  a  bit  of  luck. 
Yesterday  I  went 
to  the  sheds  here  where 
lost  kits  are  stored,  and 
got  my  valise,  which  was 
lost  on  the  Peninsula, 
with  nearly  all  that  was 
in  still,  including  my 
dear  old  Fountain  pen 
and  writing  case.  I  tried 
the  pen  j  ust  for  luck,  and 
I'm  blowed  if  it  did 
not  start  off  right  away  I  Not 
a  bad  advertisement  for  the 
Onoto — after  nine  months." 


^^ 


The  Onoto  fillsitself  fromany 
ink  supply  —  cannot  leak  —  is 
always  ready  for  use— is  British. 

The      Military      size 
fits  the  soldier's  pocket; 

Prices  from  10/6  to  £5-5-0 

Onoto 

IHE  Pen 

Thomas  De  La  Rue  &  Co., Ltd.,  Bunhill  Row,  London. 


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J  lb.  upwards  post  free. 

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Quantities  of  J  lb.  to  5  lb.  (by  Post),  7/-  per  lb. 

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„  II  „    „  20  „     „       „       6/6      „ 

„  20  (by  Freight) 6/-       „ 

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a  thick,  double-fronted  TRENCH- 
WARM  for  the  severest  weather. 


LYME  REGIS 


PLEASANT  HOLIDAY'S 


A     MORE     pleasant    retreat    than    Lyme    Refsis, 
on    the    western    border  of    Dorset,    with    its 
lovely      bay,      garden      coast      and      glorious 
surrounding  pastoral    scenery,  would    be  diffleult  to 
find.       The  quaint   streets  .ind  diminutive  harbour. 
The  Cobb,    imp.%rt  an  old-world  ohann    appreciated 

hy  those  seeking  a  restful  holiday.  Langmoor  Gardens  situated  at  a  consider 
able  elevation  above  the  Marine  Parade,  provides  a  delightful  alternative  to 
tHe  beaeu.  Prom  the  sheltered  paths  and  seats  among  the  thiek  belt  of  trees 
magntfloent  views  of  th«  bay  can  be  enjoyed,  as  also  from  the  golf  course.  The 
nmneroiis  country  and  cliff  walks  are  very  flni-,  including  the  famous  Landslip, 
CSiarmonth  Fields,  Golden  Cap,  etc.  Safe  Iwating  and  bathing,  ;nd  the  usual 
out-door  pastimes.  Rail  connection  wiith  all  parts.  Corridor  trains  from  London 
(Waterloo)  in  about  4  hours. 

Send  Id.   stamp  to   Secretary,   Advertising  Committee,  for  Illustrated  Guide   and 

information. 


The  Naval  Burb»>rry 

unlike  Rubber  or  Oiled-Silk  interlined 
coats,  provides  an  effective  safeguanJ 
against  rain  or  tempest  or  cold,  yet  i« 
healthful  and  comfortable  to  wear. 
Ever  increasing  sales  of  self-ventilating 
"Burberrys"  prove  that  they  give 
satisfying  protection  without  the  need 
of  heat-condensing  linings. 
Oiled-silk  condenses  heat  as  quickly 
as  Rubber. 

The  body  needs  air  as  much  as  the 
lungs.  To  ionore  this  simple  fact 
brings  immediate  discomfort,  creates 
fatigue  and  counts  serious  trouble. 
Then  the  cumbersome  weight  of  an 
oiled  silk  inlerlined  coal !  Well,  the 
le;s  said  about  it  the  better  ! 


Burberry  Air. Warm 

Designed  by  expert  aviators. 
Keeps  its  wearer  warm  and 
comfortable  in  a  100  miles-an- 
hour  blizzard. 


NNVAL  OR    MILITARY  WEATHERPROOFS 

Until  further  notice  BURBER'YS  CLEAN 
AND  RE-PROOF  ORicers'  "Burberrys,"  Tie- 
locken Coats  and  Burberry  Trench-Warms  FREE 
OF  CHARGE.      The  process  talses  lo  days. 

BURBERRYS 

Hay  market      S.W.      LONDON 
Bd.  Malesherbes  PARIS  &  Agents 


^o 


LAND      &      W  A  T  E  R 


June  I,   1916 


ICentinutt   from   pagt  M) 

the  bar.  The  night  wore  on  ;  eleven  o'clock  found  us 
still  waiting  and  watching,  but  the  moOn  now  shone  down 
on  soma  despairing  faces. 

It  was  after  midnight  when  suddenly  a  small  black 
vessel  bore  rapidly  down  upon  us  showing  no  hght.  She 
stopped  djiJ,  rollin?  hjrribly  ani  challen^ad  us  in 
French.  Quickly  the  Captain  shouted  back,  "Camarade," 
and  a  signal  of  lights  was  sent  .up  to  say  we  might  coma  on 
boird.  Oars  were  got  out  and  a  babel  of  Japanese  voices 
arose  talking  and  shouting.  But  everything  was  per- 
fectly orderly.  There  was  no  fighting  or  stru^^ling  to  be 
first  in  getting  on  board,  which  the  ship's  crew  told  us 
afterwards  they  expected,  for  she  really  looked  too  small 
to  hold  us  all. 

Our  Rescuer. 

She  was  a  French  patrol  boat,  heavily  armed,  an  old 
tug  really,  and  the  oldest  boat  in  the  French  navy, 
but  she  was  the  only  one  at  Port  Said  with  steam 
up.  The  Captain  superintended  the  disembarkation  most 
carefully  ;  it  was  rather  a  difficult  job  as  the  ship  rolled 
tremendously  all  the  time.  I  managed  very  well  with 
a  good  spring,  but  some  people  got  rather  hurt  getting  on 
board.  The  sailors  told  us  they  had  had  their  guns 
trained  to  fire  on  us,  as  they  took  us  for  a  submarine 
decoy  or  screen.  They  had  been  first  to  the  scene  of  the 
wreck,  but  we  had  drifted  five  or  six  miles  away,  and  they 
had  only  found  one  empty  boat  floating  about  there, 
and  had  concluded  that  the  rest  had  gone  down. 

There  was  no  room  to  spare  when  we  were  all  on  board  ; 
guns  and  a  torpedo  took  up  some  of  the  Httle  space  there 
was.  My  place  was  sitting  on  the  very  dirty  deck  with 
my  back  against  the  cabin  window,  but  we  were  packed 
so  tightly  that  I  had  to  settle  with  the  lady  next  me  when 
I  was  going  to  change  from  side  to  side,  as  there  was 
literally  no  room  to  move. 

The  cabins  were  desperate  little  dens  where  the  men 
fed  and  slept.  The  women  and  children  were  taken  down 
to  one,  and  the  lightly  clad  Japanese  took  possession  of 
the  other.  I  could  see  them  through  the  window  I  was 
leaning  against.  Stokers  and  engineers  lay  packed  like 
sardines  on  the  floor.  Down  the  middle  ran  a  narrow 
table,  and  there  the  Japanese  barber  lay  at  full  length. 
On  the  little  benches  on  cither  side  sat  stewards  and 
stewardesses  all  fast  asleep,  with  their  heads  in  two  rows 
on  his  body — really  a  most  comical  sight. 

The  French  sailors  were  most  hospitable  ;  they  fetched 
mattresses  and  rugs  and  distributed  cigarettes  and  hot 
coffee  and  tea.  which  some  people  welcomed,  though  I 
could  not  touch  it. 

We  got  on  very  slowly  with  our  heavy  load,  doing 
barely  seven  knots  an  hour.  Eight  of  our  little  boats 
were  fastened  on  behind,  so  that  there  should  be  something 
for  us  to  take  to  in  case  of  an  accident  (which  was  not  an 
unlikely  contingency)  ;  /they  impeded  our  progress  con- 
siderably, and  four  were  lost  before  Port  Said. 

It  began  getting  light  before  seven,  and  the  passengers 
with  go.)d  sea  legs  made  their  way  about  and  related  their 
experiences.  Everyone  had  fared  very  well  on  the 
whole,  though  a  missionary  who  took  a  gloomy  view  of 
things,  said  even  the  men  in  his  boat  sobbed  and  wept 
whin  no  help  came.  Someone  else  had  had  two  rather 
hysterical  French  girls  as  fellow  passengers  ;  one  had 
bt'en  looking  for  her  gold  purse  and  had  delayed  leaving 
the  ship  so  long  that  she  had  had  to  go  down  a  rope  which 
had  cut  her  hands  badly.  Some  other  late  starters  were 
two  lady  missionaries,  but  they  were  so  neatly  turned  out, 
I  think  they  must  have  been  dressing  for  the  wreck  ; 
they  refused  to  cheer  up  even  on  the  French  boat  ;  they 
were  out  to  be  miserable,  and  miserable  they  would  be. 

One  Iriend  of  ours  had  rather  an  amusing  experience. 
She  and  her  maid  had  both  got  Gieve  waistcoats  which 
the  maid  took  up  on  deck,  but  found  her  mistress  already 
in  a  boat  which  was  being  lowered,  so  gave  one  of  the  waist- 
coats to  a  Swiss  gentleman  who  was  climbing  in.  and  told 
him  to  give  it  to  "  that  lady  in  the  red  cap."  The  Swiss, 
a  man  of  resource,  at  once  put  it  on  himself,  though  he 
had  a  ship's  Ufebelt  in  his  hand,  and  finding  a  flask  of 
brandy  in  the  pocket,  "he  helped  himself,  and  generously 
handed  it  round  to  others.  Meanwhile  the  real  owner, 
having  no  life-saving  appliance  at  all,  asked  the  Swiss 
if  he  would  kindly  let  her  have  the  ship  belt  as  she  saW 
he  had  on  a  patent  one.  and  he  actually  had  the  effrontery 


to  give  it  to  her.  When  the  boat's  crews  were  read- 
justed, the  maid  rejjined  her  mistress,  and  at  once 
spotted  the  Swiss  as  tha  mm  to  whom  she  had  given  the 
Gieve.  The  lady  felt  that  this  was  more  than  she  could 
bear  ahd  requested  the  gentleman  to  return  her  waist- 
coat at  once,  which,  very  shamefacedly  he  proceeded  to 
do,  making  off  to  the  o:her  end  of  the  boat,  where  however, 
he  was  well  chaffed  by  some  girls  who  had  witnessed  the 
whole  scene. 

It  got  very  hot  by  nine  o'clock  ;  the  sun  blazed  down, 
and  I  was  forced  to  tie  a  dirty  pocket  handkerchief  over 
my  head.  The  mole  at  Port  Said  was  a  welcome  sight, 
and  we  were  soon  in  the  mouth  of  the  canal.  Here  an 
unexpected  ovation  awaited  us.  Three  big  French  men- 
of-war  which  lay  there  had  their  decks  manned  with 
cheering  men,  the  admiral  stood  saluting  us,  and  the 
bands  played  the  Japanese  National  Anthem. 

We  next  passed  the  two  Dutch  liners  which  had  glided 
by  us  looking  Uke  fairy  ships  the  night  before,  leaving  w? 
to  our  fate  ;  the  Japanese  gave  them  a  very  different 
reception,  giving  vent  to  yells  of  execration  which  one 
hoped  must  make  them  feel  ashamed  of  themselves. 

We  had  to  go  on  board  a  small  pilot  boat  to  be  landed, 
but  before  leaving  the  French  ship,  the  Captain  shook 
hands  with  all  the  passengers  ;  we  were  proud  to  do  so, 
and  glad  of  the  chance  of  thanking  him  for  all  he  had 
done  for  us.  I  can  only  say  that  if  one  has  got  to  be 
wrecked,  ours  was  a  very  well-behaved  wreck  as  wrecks 
go,  and  the  behaviour  of  both  passengers  and  crew  was 
beyond  all  praise. 


Some   Fashion   Notes 

Heavy  French  crepons  are  being  much  used  for  summer 
coats  and  skirts  and  very  attractive  many  of  them  are.  They 
are  thick  enough  to  hang  and  cut  remarkably  well,  and  the 
crinkled  surface  of  tlie  material  is  in  itself  a  decoration.  For 
tennis  and  country  weir  a  suit  of  this  description  is  unrivalled, 
for  it  is  cool,  comfortable  and  cheap.  Tan  coloured  crepon 
suits  are  amongst  the  best  examples  of  their  kind,  and  have 
an  added  advantage  of  not  showing  the  dust  at  all. 

Many  women  are  wearing  the  new  corded  cape  collars. 
These  are  just  the  same  shape  as  postillions  used  to  wear  in 
the  old  coaching  days,  coming  well  down  over  the  top  of  the 
shoulders.  White  washing  collars  of  this  kind  renovate  a 
last  year's  muslin  gown  surprisingly  well,  bringing  it  up  to  date 
with  a  minimum  of  trouble.  There  are  also  shoulder  capes  of 
taffetas  but  these  are  hot  looking  and  not  particularly  smut 
or  becoming  to  many  women. 

Many  of  the  latest  umbrellas  are  so  short  that  they  pack 
most  conveniently  into  a  week-end  suit  case.  They 
finish  with  a  loop  of  pigskin  or  some  other  leather  and  hang 
over  the  arm,  for  they  are  far  too  short  to  be  a  convenient  aid 
to  walking.  An  en-tout-cas  of  this  kind  may  also  be  seen, 
but  the  notion  has  not  yat  spread  to  sunshades. 

A  boldly  embroidered  djibbah  ol  Egyptian  cotton  is  an 
idea  for  people  wanting  an  inexpensive  evening  wrapper. 
The  chief  charm  of  a  djibbah  is  the  ease  with  which  it  can  be 
shpjx;d  on.  It  goes  readily  over  the  head  and  fastens  on  one 
shoulder  with  a  couple  of  tiny  buttons  and  loops  or  invisible 
fasteners.  Many  people  then  seize  the  opportunity  to  dis- 
pense with  the  daytime  corsets  and  wear  narrow  tea  gown 
belts  to  which  suspenders  are  attached. 

Trains  once  more  are  making  their  appearance,  but  they 
are  by  no  manner  of  means  the  appendages  of  yester  year. 
The  new  trains  are  quite  distinct  from  the  short  skirted  dress 
beneath  and  hang  loose  from  the  waist  downwards.  We 
have  been  accustomed  to  frocks  of  diaphanous  material,  and 
trains  of  satin  or  some  such  weighty  fabric,  but  the  usual 
order  of  things  was  reversed  the  other  day,  with  a  frock  of 
heavy  dull  black  crepe  de  chine  allied  to  a  train  of  gold  em- 
broidered tulle.  The  train  spread  out  like  a  great  fan  along 
the  flofjr,  and  at  the  end  was  a  tliick  border  of  Greek  patterned 
gold  lace  weightingdt  and  keeping  it  in  its  right  position. 

Developments  in  the  wav  ol  liairdressing  liave  resulted  in  a 
large  plait  brought  well  to  the  top  of  the  head  and  twisted 
round  in  a  single  loop  at  the  back.  This  is  a  style  ot  dressing 
which  only  suits  the  possessor  of  very  regular  features  and 
people  with  large  heads  should  undoubtedly  shun  it.  Every 
body  now  is  twisting  their  hair  in  a  loose  knot  and  securing 
it  at  some  special  angle  at  the  back  of  the  head,  particularly 
in  the  evening,  when  no  hat  combats  this  mode  of  dressing. 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVII  No.  2822  [vt^I'R] 


THURSDAY,  JUNE  8,  igi6 


tregistered  ast    price  sixpence 
La  newspaperJ   published  weekly 


'iimmmmimmifm 


mmmmmm^f-K 


.,^5W 


^ 


/■' 


'^afJUl^fjp 


By  Louts  Itaemaekers 


ToutV^y- 


Draii'ii  exclusicely  /or   ■   Land  am;    »  i 


The  Spirit  of  France 


LAND      &      WATER 


June  8,  1916 


THRESHER. 
^GLENNY 

£ry  J^ppoinhneni  i:o 
H-Mt/ieKFnj 


SUZB- 


Miliiary  lauors 

\DnIy  S^cfcLCQSs 

zojvnoj\r 


i^aj 


THE  LAST  18  MONTHS' 
EXPERIENCE 

of  supplying  Military  men  with  the  best 
quality,  material,  cut  and  workmanship 
has  fully  justified  our  expectation  that 
increased  business  would  enable  us  to 
keep  prices  on  the  pre-war  basis,  in  spite 
of  increased  cost  in  every  item.  This  will 
be  proved  by  a  glance  through  the 
useful  70-page  booklet  issued  for  the 
convenience  of  those  receiving:  n 
CommiAsion  and  of  Officers  under 
orders  for  abroad.  It  contains  every 
possible  item  of  an  Officer's  Uniform  and 
Equipment  with  prices.  Fresh  editions 
are  continually  being  brought  out,  so 
this  Guide  is  always  up  to  date  with  the 
latest  information. 


The  custom  of  printing  testimonials  has 
now  become  so  general  that  the  value  of 
them  from  an  advertising  standpoint  is 
apt  to  be  over  estimated.  We  must, 
however,  quote  the  following,  as  the 
implied  suggestion  might  well  be 
taken  as  advice  by  anyone  receiving  a 
commission : — 

"  R.A.  Mess, 
Island  of  St.  Helena, 

5ih  March,  1916. 
"  7  received  per  the  mail  yesterday  the 
uniform  and  your  account.  I  have  to 
again  thank  you  for  the  excellent  fit,  and 
very  much  regret  I  did  not  come  to  you  when 
first  taking  a  commission.  Your  letter  of 
the  /\th,  etc.,  etc. 

An  interesting  analysis  for  12  months 
shows  that  by  the  1.417  Officers  who 
have  entrusted  us  with  their  complete 
Uniform  when  receiving  a  Commission, 
every  line  Regiment  in  the  British  Army 
is  represented,  with  the  exception  of  two 
—the  Royal  Irish  and  the  H.L-I.  We 
shall  be  glad  if  any  Gentlemen  receiving 
Commissions  in  these  Regiments  will 
allow  us  to  complete  our  record. 


"  A  firm  established  as  Military  Outfitters 
during  tlie  Crimean  War  and  Indian 
Mutiny,  with  the  outfitting  experience  of 
the  South  African  War  and  the  two  Egyptian 
Campaigns  well  within  the  memory  of  many 
of  its  Staff,  is  entitled  to  deal  with  the  sub- 
ject of  Military  Outfitting  with  some  degree 
of  aM//»on<y."— ("  Land  &  Water,"  March 
23) 

WRITE     FOR     GUIDE     (3) 
TO  KIT  AND    EQUIPMENT 

THRESHER  U  GLENNY 

152/3,  STRAND,  LONDON. 


MAKEIVS    OF    THE 
THRESHER  TKENCH  COAT 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSWAY,  LONDON,  W.C 

Telephone:  HOLBORN  2828 

THURSDAY.   JUNE     8,    1916 


The  Table  of  Contents  appears  on  page  7 

KITCHENIiR     OF     KHARTOUM  ' 

That  to\wr  of  stnnf,'th 
Which  stood  four  square  to  all  the  wintU  that  blew. 

IN  this  hour  of  grief,  while  the  nation  mourns  the 
death  of  Field-^hirshal  Earl  Kitchener  of  Khartoum, 
these  words  of  Tennyson  on  the  death  of  the  Iron 
Duke,  the  great  Field  Marshal  of  the  Napoleonic 
wars,  inevitabl}'  recur.  For  Ivitchener  was  also  a  tower 
of  strength  which  stood  unmoved  amid  the  fierce  tempests 
of  this  mighty  Continental  war,  and  round  which  the 
miserable  sijualls  of  partisan  jealousy  and  spite  fretted 
in  vain.  His  very  name  ins]>ired  confidence  in  the 
breast  of  our  Allies  for  they  knew  what  he  had  accom- 
yilished  in  otlier  years  under  other  skies  ;  our  enemies 
recognised  in  him  a  modern  Cadmus  from  whose  sowings 
armed  men  spraijg  into  being  by  battalions.  His  hnal 
public  act  in  London  before  lea\ing  for  Petrograd  was 
to  meet  face  to  face,  on  his  own  invitation,  acrid  critics 
of  the  House  of  Commons.  He  spoke  to  them  and  they 
spoke  to  hina  openly,  and  a  new  confidence  in  the  War 
Minister  and  a  clearer  understanding  of  his  policj'  and 
methods  were  engendered. 

Courage,  steadfastness  and  de\otion  to  duty  were  the 
mainspring  of  liis  career.  "  His  hfe  was  work."  He 
was  a  type  of  man  much  better  understood  in  the  outer 
wards  of  the  Empire  where  actual  achieveuK-nt  is 
reckoned  at  liigher  worth  than  it  is  here  at  home  among 
the  haunts  of  politicians!  Never  believing  in  talk,  either 
as  a  preliminary  or  afterwards,  he  left  the  deed  to  speak 
for  itself.  He  was  of  the  same  mould  as  John  Nicholson 
and  the  Lawrences  who  by  sheer  strength  of  character 
maintained  our  rule  in  India  during  those  terrible  days 
close  on  si.xty  years  ago.  Of  all  the  many  and  varied" 
types  which  our  blood  breeds,  there  is  none  to  whom  the 
British  l-jiipire  owes  more  than  to  those  c|uiet  men  of 
action  who  jiever  fear  to  shoulder  a  rcsi)onsibility,  be  it 
ever  so  heavy  or  dangerous  ;  who  center  on  their  work 
determined  at  all  hazards  to  see  it  through  to  a  finish, 
who,  scorning  popularity  and  the  tinsel  of  success,  will  not 
be  moved  from  their  purpose  by  any  attacks  which 
tongue  or  pen  can  frame.  It  is  a  breed,  thank  Heaven, 
which  shows  no  sign  of  failing  in  these  islands,  and 
although  it  is  only  gi\-en  to  the  few  to  rise  to  the  heights 
which  Kitchener  attained,  the  others  recognise  in  him 
a  true  brother  and  a  comrade  and  rejoice  in  his  rewards. 
The  grip  which  this  great  soldier  had  on  national  senti- 
ment arose  from  tliis  one  fact.  >K  lonely  man  lu^  was 
in  the  sense  that  he  did  not  mi.K  freely  and  easily  with 
his  social  equals  ;  his  tastes  were  not  their  tastes  ;  the 
very  conditions  of  his  existence  in  the  early  i)art  of  his 
career  fostered  a  natural  love  of  solitude.  But  with 
all  this  he  must  l)e  written  as  one  who  loved  his 
fellow  men.  Before  Kitchener  entered  the  British  Army, 
he,  then  a  youth,  faced  death  lighting  as  a  volunteer  in 
the  French  ranks  against  Germany  in  1870.  He  met  his 
death  at  the  hands  of  his  first  enemy  while  on  his  way 
to  confer  with  the  Emperor  of  Russia  and  his  Cieneral 
Staff,  thus  at  the  beginning  and  the  ending  of  his  career 
he  forged  new  bonds  between  fireat  Britain  and  her 
greatest  and  most  gallant  Allies. 

Thougli    born    in    Ireland    Lord    Kiichencr    was     an 
L  nglishman  on  both  sides.     The  familv    whose  name  he 


has  lifted  to  a  high  place  in  the  history  of  the  nation 
were  of  old  Hampshire  stock.  Was  it  pure  coincidence 
that  the  Hampshire  should  have  been  the  warship  chosen 
to  bear  him  on  his  last  voyage  ?  His  father,  Lieutcnant- 
("olonel  Horatio  Kitchener  of  the  (jth  Foot,  was 
born  on  October  2Tst,  1805,  the  day  of  the  battle  of 
Trafalgar;  he  himself  dies  at  sea  on  June  5th,  1916, 
almost  before  the  echo  of  the  guns  of  the. battle  of  Jut- 
land has  died  away.  This  connection  of  the  two  greatest 
sea-tights  of  modern  times  by  two  lives  covering  a  period 
of  III  years,  is  in  itself  extraordinary. 

From  that  day,  over  forty  years  ago,  when  he  who 
was  to  become  Britain's  most  famous  Minister  of  War 
took  up  surveying  and  ai"ch,eolog\'  in  Palestine,  he  seems 
never  to  have  varied  his  work.  True,  the  material 
changed — from  stones  to  men,  but  he  has  always  been 
engaged  in  clearing  away  from  the  relics  of  the  past,  the 
debris  and  waste  which  Time  has  heaped  up ;  in  some 
instances  restoring  the  edifices  to  their  ancient  purposes 
and  in  others  rebuilding  on  the  old  foundations.  It 
must  have  been  then  that  he  acipiired  that  wise  appre- 
ciation of  time  which  has  always  marked  his  enterprises 
and  reforms.  Whether  in  the  Soudan  or  in  South  Africa, 
at  Simla  or  in  Whitehall  he  never  allowed  himself  to  be 
hustled.  He  slowly  won  the  Soudan  back  to  civilisation 
and  incidentally  flooded  Darkest  Africa  with  light  ;  he 
restored  peace  to  South  Africa,  and  in  the  process  re- 
established the  jMCstige  of  Great  Britain  for  honourable 
and  straight forvvard  dealing  ;  he  reorganised  the  army 
of  India  and  his  work  has  stood  what  in  those 
daj's  was  con.sidered  the  supreme  test  of  all — a  Eurocean 
conflagration  ;  he  has  gi\'en  Britain  an  army  comparable 
with  the  armies  of  the  great  Continental  Powers.  He  never 
commanded  or  hoped  to  command  in  France  or  else- 
where; the  forces  which  he  had  called  into  being,  but  he 
has  died  on  active  ser\ice  ;  he  has  fallen  doing  his  duty, 
and  at  sea  which  is  the  greatest  and  most  famous  of  all 
Britain's  battlefields,  and  thereby  he. has  entered  into  a 
new  command  of  his  own  men.  Henceforward,  Kitchener's 
Army  is  led  up  the  steep  slopes  of  self-sacrifice  by 
Kitchener  himself. 

When  the  first  news  of  his  death  reached  London, 
people  would  not  believe  it,  they  thought  it  must  be  an 
uncomely  joke  ;  but  as  the  truth  was  borne  in  upon,  them 
they  were  stunned.  It  was  almost  as  if  death  had 
visited  every  home.  It  succeeded  so  quickly  to  the 
sudden  losses  of  the  naval  battle  that  minds  paused 
]XTplcxed  between  time  and  eternity.  Death  ,  takes  on 
a  new  guise  when  men  pass  away  so  rapidly  in  the  middle 
nf  their  work,  in  the  prime  of  life,  or  in  the  first  flush  of 
manhood  before  the  promise  can  be  fuUilled.  E^'eryone 
realised  this  to  the  full  on  Tuesday  ;  you  heard  the  same 
thought  echoed  and  re-echoed.  "  Lord  Kitchener  is 
dead  ;  we  mourn  him  but  we  must  not  grieve  as  men 
without  hope."  And  those  familiar  sentences  from  the 
most  exciuisite  threnody  in  the  English  tongue  were 
recalled:  "  Death  is  swallowed  up  in  victory.  0  death, 
where  is  thy  sting?  O  grave  wlncre  is  thy, victory? 
1^'ornrerly  they  had  sounded  in  our  ears  as  chords  of  solemn 
music,  breathing  ct)nsolation  ;  nowtliat  we  sec  them  clearly 
to  be  triumphant  \'erities,  living  aaid  evea'lasting  truths, 
they  ring  out  like  a  trumpet  call,  simnuoninig  and  inspiring 
the  living  to  stronger  action.  Tlie  work  cf),ntinues  though 
the  hand  that  moulded  it  perishes  ;  the  body  dies,  but  the 
soul  lives  on.  There  is  no  sting  in  the  gruve  when  on 
either  side  men  jiress  forward  to  one  immortal  goal  and 
when  li\ing  and  dead  battle  togrther  for  i n  orniptiblc 
principles.  Whether  individually  avc  li\-e  or  di  •  signifies 
nothing,  if  that  liigh  cause  for  whi:h  we  fight  wins.  Lord 
Kitchener's  death  will  not  interfere  with  the  work  he  had 
undertaken,  nor  shall  his  passing  delay,  birJ;  rather 
shall  it  hasten  the   victory  to  which  he  looked  forward. 


L  A  X  D       &•      W  A  r  !■  R 


Juno  8,  191G 


The  Battle  of  Jutland 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


I.N  the  early  afternoon  of  Wednesday.  May  3i>t,  a 
battle— «hirh,  from  the  number  and  power  of  tlie 
>hi|)s  engaged  on  eaeli  side,  no  less  than  from  the 
important  and  signal  character  of  its  results,  must 
t*'  regarded  as  by  far  the  greatest  event  in  the  history  of 
modern  sea  war — was  begun  between  the  battle  cruisers 
of  the  British  and  tierman  fleets.  The  action  Wiis  fought 
in  niist\-  weather  in  which  contact  between  the  two  fleets 
was  occasionally  lost.  The  fighting,  therefore,  was 
necessarily  of  an  intermittent  character.  More  especially 
was  this  the  case  in  its  later  phases.  From  a  quarter 
to  four  until  a  quarter  to  five  the  engagement  was  between 
the  battle  cruisers  pnly.  By  this  time  von  Hipixr  had 
been  driven  back  on  to  the  High  Seas  Kleet  and  the 
British  fast  squadron,  reinforced  by  four  Queen  Elizabeths 
fought  a  holding  action  for  the  ne.xt  hom^  and  a  quarter, 
drawing  the  (lemian  High  Seas  Meet  towards  the  forces 
that  were  apjiroaching  imder  Admiral  Jellicoe.  During 
this  phase  the  British  squadron  was  greatly  outnumbered, 
of  course,  by  the  (iermans,  but  at  6  they  were  reinforced 
by  Rear-Admiral  Hood  with  three  further  battle  cruisers, 
and  at  6.20  by  I^ear-Admiral  Sir  Robert  Arbuthnot  with 
four  armoured  cruisers  of  tlie  Defence  and  Duke  of  Edin- 
burgh classes. 

Shortly  after  6.30  Sir  John  Jellicoe  brought  the  drand 
Fleet  on  to  the  field  of  battle,  upon  which  von  Sheer 
retreated  incontinently.  From  seven  o'clock  until  dark- 
ness fell,  the  bad  light,  the  thick  weather,  and  the  dis- 
orderly retreat  of  the  German  squadron  made  anything 
Ijke'  an  artillery  duel  between  the  two  fleets  impossible. 
'Oie. ,( ierjuan  destroyers  did  all  in  their  power  to  hamper 
tjlie  jHirsuit  by  the  British  Dreadnoughts,  and  when 
pursuit  'by  the  capital  ships  was  made  impossible  by 
darki«?ss,  the  British  destroyers  were  sent  forward  amongst 
the  rierman. ships. .  There  then  followed  a  night  action, 
the  pursuit  being  carried  on  by  the  British  cruisers  and 
destroyers  until  three  on  the  following  morning,  when 
such  of  the  (ierman  Fleet  as  survived  had  reached  the 
mine  defences  of  their  main  base.  The  Commander-in- 
Chief  then  recalted  his  fleet,  and  at  daylight  made  a 
systematic  search  of  the  scene  of  the  previous  day's 
engagement,  but  without  finding  any  disabled  ships. 
At  noon  the  British  force  returnccl  to  its  bases,  refuelled, 
and  24  hours  later  was  once  more  ready  for  action. 

Thus  the  Germans,  who  had  entered  the  North  Sea, 
according  to  their  own  account  to  engage  and  destroy 
the  British  ships  that  have  been  systematically 
sweeping  the  waters  north  and  east  of  the  Horn  Reef, 
attained  the  first  part  of  their  objective  only.  They 
did  succeed  in  engaging.  But  the  consequences  were 
<lisastrous.  The  plan  of  o\erwhelming  the  British  fast 
cUvision  with  superior  numbers  was  defeated  by  the 
masterly  handling  of  the  British  force,  combined  with 
the  effective  use  that  force  made  of  its  artillery.  So  far 
from  Sir  David  Beatty  having  been  overwhelmed,  he 
succeeded  admirably  in  his  main  object,  which  was  to 
draw  the  German  Fleet  into  a  position  where  Sir  John 
Jellicoe  s  squadrons  could  engage  it. 

The  enemy  was  only  saved  from  total  destruction 
by  mist,  and  by  the  approach  of  night.  Not  only  did 
his  whole  plan  miscarry,  but  he  was  driven  ignomi- 
niously  from  the  field,  and  with  a  very  heavy  loss 
in  ships  and  men.  The  British  Fleet  suffered  far 
less  severely,  and  that  the  losses  were  not  greater  must 
be  attributed  very  largely  to  the  tactical  skill  with  which 
they  were  handled.  The  three  capital  units  that  were 
lost  owed  their  fate  largely  to  bad  luck — a  matter  which 
I  will  touch  on  later.  Thus  the  net  result  of  the  first 
contact  between  the  main  sea  forces  of  the  two  belli- 
gerents is  that  the  field  was  left  in  thfc  jxjssession  of  the 
British:  that  the  (Ierman  Fleet  was  driven  to  seek 
safety  behind  the  defences  of  Heligoland  ;  and  that  it 
lies  there  now,  having  suffered  the  loss  of  many  more 
ships  than  we  have,  so  that  its  relative  strength  is  dis- 
proportionately retluced.  The  Germari  defeat,  there- 
fore, has  ccrtainlv  been  signal  and  has  probably  been 


final.  It  is  diliuult  to  < onceive  a  combination  of  circum- 
stances wliich  can  tempt  or  drive  them  into  action  again, 
nor  au\-  condition^  of  action  likely  to  be  more  favourable 
th.in  were  thosL-  of  .May  3rst. 

The  Story  of  the  Battle. 

The  King,  in  noble  words,  has  thanked  the  victors  and 
paid  royal  homage  to  the  heroic  dead.  A  week  hence  the 
slain  will  hv  commemorated  at  St.  Paul's.  It  is  the  only 
way  in  which  the  nation  can  join  in  the  homage  of  their 
King.  But  need  the  honours  to  the  living  wait  till  the 
tribute  to  the  great  dead  is  paid  ? 

My  readers  will  natiually  wish  to  have  something  like 
a  reasoned  and  consecutive  account  of  this  tremendous 
event.  The  official  conuuunicjues  have  been  exceedingly 
meagre,  but  they  have  been  supplemented  by  certain 
scmi-ofhcial  accounts  of  the  action  and  by  stories  from 
officers  and  men  who  took  part  in  it.  Much  interesting 
information  has  come,  too,  from  British  and  neutral 
fishermen,  who  appear  to  have  carried  on  their  occupations 
regardless  of  the  fact  that  the  fate  of  the  German  Navy 
and  the  command  of  the  sea  were  being  decided  on  their 
fishing  grounds.  The  Germans,  too,  have  issued  both 
an  official  and  semi-official  summary  of  these  events.  I 
have  attempted  in  the  following  pages  to  collate  all  the 
available  information  and  to  elucidate  it  by  a  series  of 
sketch  charts  to  illustrate  the  principal  phases  of  the 
action.  But  I  offer  this  narrative  and  these  sketches 
with  considerable  reserve.  Practically  nothing  is  known 
of  the  movements  of  the  main  fleets  after  contact  was 
made  round  about  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening.  Of  the 
pursuit  from  then  till  darkijess  all  the  accounts  arc 
most  confused.  And  of  the  final  phase — the  night  attack 
by  the  British  light  craft  on  the  flying  German  Fleet — 
nothing  is  known  whatever,  except  that  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  seems  to  have  recalled  all  his  units  at  about 
three  in  the  morning  of  June  ist.  'The  narrative  and 
sketches  then,  are  offered  for  what  they  are  worth,  and 
no  more  can  be  claimed  for  them  than  that  they  contain 
nothing,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  inconsistent  with  reliable 
information  to  hand.  Though  the  positions  of  the  Fleets 
are,  I  beUeve,  generally  correct,  the  sketches  arc  not  to 
scale. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  say  t^iat  they  are  incomplete. 
But  on  one  point  the  reader  must  be  warned.  The 
sketches  indicate  only  the  general  direction  and  character 
of  each  movement.  In  the  phase,  for  instance,  in  which 
Sir  David  Beatty,  weakened  by  the  loss  of  Indefatigable 
and  Queen  Mary  was  reinforced  by  Admiral  Evan 
Thomas's  four  Queen  Elizabeths,  I  have  indicated  the 
courses  of  the  British  Vice-Admiral  and  of  the  German 
Fleet  as  straight  and  continuous.  It  is  most  improbable 
that  this  can  represent  the  events  of  an  hour  and  a 
quarter  of  fighting.  So,  too,  with  the  rest.  At  many 
periods  during  the  afternoon  the  shifting  mists  and  fogs 
made  it  impossible  for  the  British  to  see  their  opposite 
numbers  in  the  German  line,  and  again  and  again  the 
gunlayers  had  no  other  mark  to  aim  at  but  the  flashes 
of  their  opponents'  guns.  These  conditions  not  only 
made  gunnery  extremely  difficult,  they  made  it  quite 
impossible  for  participants  to  keep  any  clear  recollection  of 
the  courses  steered.     With  this  preface,  I  will  proceed. 

(1)    The    Disposition   of  the  Opposing  Fleets. 

Tliis  sketch  indicates  the  approximate  position  at 
2.15  of  the  forces  engaged  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon 
of  Wednesday,  May  31st.  Sir  David  Beatty  was  at 
position  I,  steering  south-east  or  east-south-east.  He 
had  with  him  four  Lions,  I ndef a ligablc  and  New  Zealand. 
There  were  of  course  also  some  flotillas  of  destrovers  ant 
probably  more  than  one  squadron  of  light  cruisers. 
Throughout  these  sketches  the  small  craft  have  not  been 
indicated,  but  they  must  be  assumed  to  accompany  ail 
of  the  main  so.uadrons.     Slightly  asteni  and  a  little  to 


•June  8,  1916 


L  A  N,  D      &     WATER 


'^      JclUcoe 


Hood, 


I    Beatty 
Thomas 


ffom 
TieeF 


Titles     ^ 


rr 


Plan  I. — The  opposing  forces  at  (approximately)  2.30  p.m.  31st  May.— 
1.— BEATTY:  Lion  (flag),  Tiger.  Queen  Mary,  Princess  Royal  (flag), 
Indefatigable,  New  Zealand  (flag)  ;  E.  THOMAS  :  Barham,  Valiant, 
IVarspile,  Malaya.  2.— JELLICOE  :  Iron  Duke  (flag),  a  b  d  Battle 
Squadrons";       HOOD  :      Invincible        (flag),  Inflexible,         Indomitable. 

ARBUTHNOT  :  Defence,    Warrior,   Black  Prince,   Duke    of   Edinburgh  ; 
3.— VON   HIPPER  :    Hindenbmg.    Derflinger.   Lutzow.   Seydlilz.    Molike  ; 
4.— VON    SCHEER  :    With    3     Koenigs,     5    Kaisers,    4    Heligolands, 
4   Westphalens,   and    6    Pre-Dreadnoughts. 

the  southward  of  Sir  David  Beatty,  Rear-Admiral  Evan 
Thomas,  flying  his  flag  in  Barham,  commanded  a  squadron 
of  four  Queen  Elizabeths,  the  name  ship  only  being 
absent.  Some  75  miles  north  by  east  of  Admiral  Beatty 
was  the  Grand  Fleet  under  Sir  John  Jellicoe,  steering  a 
south-easterly  course.  With  Sir  John  Jellicoe  was  a 
squadron  of  three  battle  cruisers  under  Rear-Admiral 
Hood,  Invincible,  Inflexible  and  Indomitable,  and,  in 
addition  to  light  cruisers  and  small  craft,  Sir  Robert 
Arbuthnot's  squadron  of  four  armoured  cruisers  of  the 
Defence  and  Duke  of  Edinburgh  classes.  Ten  miles  to 
the  north-east  of  Sir  David  Beatty,  von  Hipper — who 
commanded  in  the  affair  of  the  Dogger  Bank,  January, 
1915 — was  in  command  of  five  German  battle  cruisers, 
Derflinger,  Lutzoiv,  Moltkc,  Seydlilz,  and  either  Von  der 
Tann  or  Hindenburg,  probably  the  latter.  This  squadron 
was  heading  north  by  west  ;  and  some  60  miles  astern  of 
him  was  the  High  Seas  Fleet  under  Vice-Adnjiral  von 
Scheer,  consisting  of  all  the  German  Dreadnoughts,  six- 
teen in  number.  He  also  had  with  him  half  a  dozen 
pre-Dreadnoughts  of  the  Deutschland  and  Braunschweig 
classes. 

The  Opening   Round. 

It  was  when  the  fleets  were  so  disposed  that  the  ad- 
vanced light  cruisers  of  Sir  David  Beatty  and  von  Hipper's 
squadrons  sighted  each  other  and  Sir  David  thereupon 
closed  the  German  squadron  at  top  speed.  Von  Hipper 
immediately  turned  his  squadron  eight  points  to  star- 
board, and  steered  cither  east  or  east-south-east,  and  a 
stern  chase  followed.  After  about  an  hour  and  a  half 
•  the  battle  cruisers  got  within  18,000  yards  of  the  enemy, 
now  bearing  north-west  from  them,  and  opened  fire.  The 
four  Queen  Ehzabeths  had  necessarily  been  left  behind 
in  this  chase.  The  mist  being  thick  and  visibility  poor. 
Sir  David  Beatty  closed  the  range  fairly  rapidly  and  ten 
minutes  after  the  engagement  had  become  general 
Indefatigable  was  hit,  blew  up  and  sank.  Twenty  minutes 
later  Queen  Mary  shared  the  same  fate.  One  German 
cruiser  was  also  sunk  at  this  stage.  Von  Hipper  had 
meanwhile  been  gradually  changing  course  southward, 
Sir  David  conforming  to  the  same  movement  as  soon  as  he 
had  got  to  a  range  that  it  was  imprudent  further  to 
reduce.  His  squadron,  it  must  be  remembered,  had 
now  been  reduced  from  six  to  four.  Southerly  courses 
\<ere  followed  until,  at  about  a  quarter  to  five,  the  entire 
fleet  of  German  Dreadnoughts  was  seen  comjxig  straight 
up  to  von  Hipper. 


Von  Hipper 
'6eaify    -^^ 


f 


^Voti 

Scheer 


o      Titles     Sb 


Plan  II. — (approximately)  2.20  p.m. 


The  Holding  Action. 

The  latter  then  put  his  helm  over,  turned  16  points  to 
starboard  and  took  station  at  the  head  of  the  German 
line,  where  he  had  three  Koenigs  and  the  five  Kaisers 
immediately  astern  of  him.     The  gradual  turn  south- 


Hood 


-High  Stas 
\  Ftat 

\(VonSdieer 


Horn 
Ree/ 


Plan  III. — 4.45 — (approximately   6.20  p.m. 

wards  had  enabled  Sir  Evan  Thomas  to  bring  up  his 
squadron,  and  when  Sir  David  turned  16  points,  so  as  to 
keep  a  course  approximately  parallel  to  the  enemy's, 
but  a  position  slightly  ahead  of  the  German  line,  Admiral 
Thomas  was  able  to  fall  in  behind  the  battle  cruisers,  and 
.  engage  both  those  of  the  German  battle  cruisers  that  had 
survived  and  the  leading  ships  of  the  German  Dreadnought 
fleet.  At  this  stage  of  tJie  action  the  British  fast  division 
had  manoeuvred  itself  into  a  position  so  much  in  ad- 
vance of  its  opponents  that  the  leading  enemy  ship 
bore  about  40  degrees  abaft  the  beam.  There  ensued 
an  action  lasting  for  about  an  hour  and  a  quarter  between 
these  very  disproportionate  forces.  But  the  English 
ships  had  the  speed  of  the  German,  and  seven  out  of  the 
eight  vessels  had  guns  that  would  have  been  much  more 
effective  at  long  range  had  the  weather  conditions  per- 
mitted of  their  being  used  to  the  full  advantage.  It  is 
vmcertain  how  many  of  the  German  battle  cruisers  were 
still  in  action  at  this  point.  Certainly  not  more  than  four, 
possibly  only  three.  But  even  with  a  lesser  number, 
the  German  force  would  be  19  ships  to  the  British  8, 


I.  A  X  D      \      W  A  I  1-:  k 


June  8,  191 G 


and  obviously  it  was  Sir  David's  duty  to  draw  them 
iiurtinvard.  rutlu-r  tliau  to  seek  dose  aiui  deoisivi-  action. 

The  Heroic  Hood 

At  about  6  odock  the  hrst  reinforccuuiit  hoiii  Ihit 
firand  Fleet  came  upon  the  seene,  and  Sir  David  now 
W'infi  bulliciently  ahead  ol  the  (icnnans  to  execute  tlu- 
)iyl)t  niaiiuuvre.  turned  eic'ht  (mints  to  starboard,  thus 


r+ 


JcUtcoe 

\  Arbiithnot 
ThrmusV     Bcotty 


icitn*':- 


ri.SMS'^i'l— > 


Plan   W.     Approximately   <).^0— T.O  p.m. 

forciuf^  the  (icnn;m'hne  to  tiu'n  also  or  be  enfiladed, 
shortly  after  this  turn,  say  at  about  6.10  or  6.15.  Admiral 
Hood  with  Iininciblc.  Iiiflcxihlc  and  1  udomitahle  swung 
i:allantly  into  line  alnad  of  the  Vice- Admiral,  and  at 
unce  opened  a  very  accurate  lire  on  the  leading  German 
^lups.  Almost  immediately,  however,  Injincih'.c  shared 
the  fate  of  Qitecn  Mary  and  ludcfatigithlc. 

The  Dash  of  the  Cruisers 

Sir  John  Jellicoe's  fleet  was  now  deploying  for  an  im- 
mediate attack  on  the  German  fleet.  To  enable  the 
(,rand  Fleet  to  make  its  attack.  Sir  David  Beatty  forged 
head  as  fast  as  possible  to  the  east,  after  ordering  Rear- 
A  Iminil  Mvan  Thomas  to  take  station  with  the  battleships. 
Tiie  battle  cruisers  had  by  this  time  done  their  task  and 
the  finish  of  the  action  was  to  be  Jianded  over  to  the 
Commander-in-Cli|ef.  The  Germans,  to  whom  the  immin- 
ent participation  of  Sir  John  JcUicoe  in  the  action  was 
ipparent,   promptly  sent   destroyers  and  light  cruisers 


forward  to  hamper  the  British  advance  by  torp>~do 
attacks.  It  was  apparently  to  ward  off  or  thwart  these 
that  Sir  Robert,  Arbiithnot — who  was  some  little  distance 
ahead  of  the  battle  stjuadron  with  his  four  cruisers— made 
a  dash  at  the  advancing  line  of  light  craft.  This  brought 
Inm  under  the  lire  of  tlu'  German  main  fleet,  and  two  of 
his  ships,  one  of  them  Ih-jcncc,  the  flagship,  were  immedi- 
ately sunk,  and  a  tiiird.  Warrior,  was  disabled.  It  w;  s 
at  this  stage  that  Warspite  (("aj^tain  Phillpotts)  dib- 
tingtiished  herself  by  her  brilliant  shielding  of  Warrior. 

The  Grand  Fleet  and  the  German  Flight 

The  next  phase  of  the  action  was  the  short  and  in- 
decisive engagement  between  the  main  fleets.  It  was 
indecisive  largelj'  because  the  fog  had  become  thicker, 
and  short  because  von  Scheer  realisc-d  the  hopelessness 
of  a  regular  artillery  combat  with  the  British  Commander- 
in-Chief's  forces.  But  it  lasted  long  enough  to  show 
von  Scheer  what  would  happen  if  it  continued.  Iron 
Duke  and  the  other  leading  ships  got  in  some  useful 
salvoes,  but  hardly  had  the  leading  squadrons  become 


6: 


JcUicocs  pursuif 


Plan  v.— Grand   Fleet  joina  action,   opproxiniately  7—7.30  p.m. 


Plan  VI.  -May  3!sl.      Appro.ximately  8.0  p.m.   till   mldiiljilit. 

en,gaKed  than  a  disorderly  flight  began,  tiie  dt'tails  of 
which  are  far  too  confused  for  Narration  or  diagrammatic 
reproduction.  So  long  as  daylight  lasted  the  German 
destroyers  and  light  craft  did  all  that  was  possible  to 
protect  their  main  forces.  F"irst  they  sent  up  biragcs 
of  sm.)ke,  which  mixing  with  the  fog  and  mist,  made  a 
barrier  impenetrable  to  sight  ;  secondly,  they  darted 
in  groups  of  four  and  five  out  of  this  barrage  to  launch 
torpedoes  against  the  ad\ancing  British  ships.  In  tin 
result  the  German  F'leet  was  well  off  in  its  flight  before 
Sir  John  Jellicoe  could  either  locate  its  position  or  shake 
off  the  destroyers  for  an  organised  pursuit.  The  pursuit 
was,  however,  carried  on  until  the  gradually,  fading  day- 
light made  gunnery  imi>ossible  and  the  battleships  consc- 
cpientlv  useless. 

Sir  David  Beatty,  in  the  meantime,  in  pushing  forward 
eastward  to  enable  the  battleships  of  the  Grand  Meet  to 
come  into  action,  had  a  .second  objective  in  view  as  well 
In  getting  between  the  German  Fleet  and  the  coast  of 


June  8,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


Jutland,  he  headed  off  the  possibiUty  of  a  (jerinan  retreat 
into  the  Sound  or  any  attempt,  by  cither  single  fast  ships 
or  commerce  raiders,  to  break  past  the  British  fleet  and 
gain  the  Atlantic.  There  seems  some  authority  for 
supposing  that,  almost  as  darkness  fell,  that  is  at  8.30 
or  shortly  afterwards,  he  exchanged  shots  with  the  group 
of  ships  that  had  been  leading  the  German  line  before. 


Plan   VII.     June   1st.      Daylight  till  noon. 

At  this  stage  there  were  seemingly  only  two  German 
battle  cruisers  left,  but  the  Kociiins  and  Kaisers  that 
composed  the  rest  of  the  squadron  could  not  be-usefully 
engaged  in  the  light  that  gave  the  British  13.5  guns  ho 
range  advantage. 

The  General  Chase 

The  final  stage  of  the  battle  was  the  pursuit  of  the 
retreating  German  ships  by  the  British  destroyers  and 
light  craft.  This  continued  for  no  less  than  si.x  hours, 
and  it  was  hot  until  three  in  the  morning  that  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief was  satisfied  that  all  such  German 
ships  as  could  still  steam  had  found  their  way  behind  the 
mine  defences  of  Heligoland  and  the  main  German  bases. 
All  l:)attleships,  cruisers  and  destroyers  were  now  recalled 
■ — the  battle  cruiser  squadron  being  at  this  point  as  far 
south  as  latitude  35.  By  daybreak  on  the  anniversary 
of  the  glorious  lirst  of  June,  "the  victorious  British  fleet 
reformed  and  made  a  systematic  search  of  the  scene  of 
the  pre\'ious  day's  engagements,  it  was  a  vast  area 
that  had  to  be  swept.  The  lighting  and  jjursuit  had 
extended  by  daylight  alone  over  an  ecjuilateral  nearly 
100  miles  by  100.  But  by  noon  no  trace  of  friends  or 
enemy  had  been  found  and  the  fleet  returned  to  its 
bases. 

INTERPRETATIONS  AND  GOMMENTS 

(1)     The  leading  of  the   B.G.F. 

Such,  in  the  briefest  possible  outline,  were  the  chief 
movements  of  the  Fleet  on  this  memorable  day.  Com- 
ment is  Dcrhaps  as  premature  as  criticism  must  be  ill- 


CONTENTS 


PAG! 


The  Spirit  of  France.     By  Louig  Kacmaekers 

Kitchener   of   Khartoum.     (Leading  Article) 

The  Battle  of  Jutland.     By  Arthur  Pollen 

The  Trentino  Front.     By  llilaire  Belloc 

Sortes  Shakes[)earian;e 

The  Prime  .Minister.     A  Character  Sketch 

Raemaekers  and  the  Red  Cross 

Kitchener's  Grave   (Poem).     By  James  Douglas 

( iermany  s  Mistakes  (Strategical) .     By  Colonel  I'-eyler 

Letters  to  a  Lonely  Civilian 

The  Hohenzollern  Ghost.     By  F""rancis  Gribblc 

Tile  West  End 

Our  Oldest  Colony 

Town  and  Country 

Choosing  Kit 


,1 

4 
10 

16 
if) 

17 

IcS 

20 
22 

24 
24 

xiii 


judged  and  out  of  place.  If  then  I  proceed  to  attempt  to 
elucidate  certain  aspects  of  the  tactics  and  strategy 
(•mi)loyed,  or  the  character  of  someof  the  most  striking 
incidents,  it  is  because  on  many  of  these  p(Mnts  judgment 
,  has  ahx-ady  been  ])ronounccd,  and  in  almost  every  case, 
a  judgment,  on  the  face  of  things,  patently  unjust. 
Take,  for  instance,  the  suggestion  that  has  been  made 
many  times  that  the  loss  of  Queen  Mary,  Indefatigable 
and  Invincible  is  to  be  explained  by  their  having  been 
employed  "  in  rash  and  impetuous  "  tactics,  or  sent  to 
engage  a  superior  force  by  the  "  over-confidence  "  of 
the  admiral  resi)onsible  for  their  movements.  One 
<  ritic  has  gone  so  far  as  to  say  that  the,  opportunity 
afforded  the  German  Conunander-in-Chief  to  overwhelm 
an  inferior  British  force  with  greatly  superior  numbers 
was  exactly  what  the  enemy  was  looking  for.  No  im- 
j)artial  examination  of  the  events,  as  I  have  recorded 
them,  affords  the  slightest  justification  for  any  such 
aspersions.  When  Sir  David  Beatty,  with  his  six  battle- 
cruisers  sighted  von  Hipper  with  five,  he  certainly  went 
for  them  at  his  top  speed  and  fought  them  as  hard  as  he 
could.  Von  Hijipcr  ]:)robably  thought  that  he  was 
carrying  out  his  own  j^lan  and  not  Sir  David's,  in  falling 
back  upon  the  German  Higii  Seas  Fleet,  and,  doubtless, 
when  he  effected  a  junction  with  that  force,  at  a  quarter 
to  five,  thought  he  would  get  the  opportunity  which 
the  Times  critic  says  he  was  awaiting.  If  so,  he  must 
have  been  signally  disappointed  by  the  skill  and 
adroitness  with  which  the  British  Admiral  defeated  his 
intentions.  I'or  the  manceuvre  had  enabled  von  Hipper 
to  join  the  main  (kanian  sc]uadron,  also  emibled  Rear- 
Admiral  I''\an  Thomas  to  join  Admiral  Beatt>'''s  sc}uadron, 
and  the  Ikitish  ships  haA'ing  now  a  minimvnu  sj^eed  of 
25  knots,  were  able  to  keep  the  entire  (ierman  Fleet  in 
play,  without  exposing  themselves  unduly,  for  a  period 
of  no  less  than  an  hour  and  a  quarter,  during  which  Sir 
David  acted  the  part  that  in  the  first  hour's  engagement 
fell  to  von  llijjper.  But  the  difference  betwetm  the  two 
exponents  of  the  same  man<cuvre  was  this.  Yon  Hipper 
led  Sir  David  Beatty  into  what  was  no  trap  at  all,  and 
Sir  Da\'id  led  von  Hipper  and  Von  Schecr  into  a  veritable 
trap,  from  which  they  only  escaped  by  incontinent 
retreat  and  the  favour  of  the  weather. 

If  there  were  anything  in  this  criticism,  surely  it  would 
he  sujiported  by  some  facts.  But  Indefatigable  and 
Queen  Mary  were, lost,  not  when  Sir  Davitl  was  engaging 
eight  shi})s  against  nineteen,  but  when  he  was  engaging 
six  shij>s  against  fi\-e.  Again  Sir  David  Beatty's  cruisers 
were  continuously  in  action  from  3.40  till  nearly  seven 
o'clock.  We  do  not  hear  that  Lion,  Pr.inccss  Royal, 
Tiger,  New  Zealand.  Indomitable  or  In/lcxible  were' at  all 
seriously  hurt.  Yet  had  they  been  continuously,  or 
even,  rashly  and  imprudently  exposed  :  if.  at  any  stage', 
they  had  been  trapjied  and  overwheliued,  surely  more 
than  one  of  the  lirst  four  would  haw  been  knocked  to 
pieces  between  a  quarter  to  five  and  si.x,  and  f)ne  at  lea.st 
of  the  others'  before  a  cpiarter  to  se\-en. 

(2)     The  loss  of  the  B  Cruisers 

It  is  time  the  myth  that  the  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet 
is  led  by  a  dare-devil  maniac  should  be  laid  to  rest. 
'i>int    it  needs  the    rarest    kind    of    couraa:e    to   <-xercise 


8 


L  A  N  1)      cN:      W  A  T  E  R 


June  8,  1916 


tactical  skill  ot  the  highest  order  in  the  face  of  great  qdds, 
is  obvious.  But  if  skill  is  useless  without  the  courage, 
so  is  the  couraf;e  dangerous  without  the  skill.  And  it  is 
primarily  to  skill  that  we  owe  last  week's  victory. 

As  to  the  true  explanation  of  the  loss  of  the  three  ships 
that  did  blow  up,  the  Admiralty,  no  doubt,  will  give  this 
to  the  public  if  it  is  thought  wise  to  do  so.  But  there 
can  be  no  harm  in  saying  this.  The  e.vplanation  of  the 
sinking  of  eai  h  of  these  ships  by  a  single  luck\'  shot  — 
lioth  they  and  practically  all  the  other  cruisers  were  hit 
repeatedly  by  shots  that  did  no  harm — is,  in  the  first 
place,  identical.  Next,  it  does  not  lie  in  the  fact  that 
the  ships  were  insufhciently  armoured  to  keep  out  big 
shell.  Nc.\t,  the  fatal  explosion  was  not  caused  by  a 
mine  or  by  a  torpedo.  Lastly,  it  is  in  no  sense  due  to 
any  instability  or  any  other  dangerous  characteristic 
of  the  propellants  or  explosives  carried  on  board.  I  am 
free  to  confess  that  when  I  first  heard  of  these  ships 
going  down  as  rapidly  as  they  did,  one  of  two  conclusions 
seemed  to  be  irresistible — either  a  shell  had  penetrated  the 
lightly  armoured  sides  and  burst  in  the  magazine,  or  a 
mine  or  torpedo  had  exploded  immediately  beneath  it. 
But  neither  explanation  is  right. 

(3)     Sir    Robert   Arbuthnot's  self-sacrifice 

The  manceuvrc  in  this  action  that  is  most  likely  to  be 
criticised  is  that  of  Sir  Robert  .\rbuthnot's  squadron  of 
cruisers.  The  result  seems  to  show  that  the  risk  taken 
was  almost  prohibitive.  I  say  ",  almost  "  because  clearly 
if  by  the  sacrifice  of  these  ships  cither  the  Germans 
were  kept  from  flight  for  a  sufficient  period  to  enable 
the  Grand  Fleet  to  get  up.  or  if  the  manceuvrc  increased 
the  speed  of  the  Grand  Fleet's  advance  by  thwarting 
the  effort  to  check  it,  then  the  improved  prospect  of  the 
battle  squadron's  guns  coming  into  action  was  worth 
a  very  heavf  sacrifice  indeed.  The  success  or  otherwise 
of  the  manotuvre  does  not,  of  course,  in  the  least  affect 
its  tactical  or  strategical  Tightness.  The  admiral  in 
command  has  to  play  the  cards  in  his  hand.  If  there  was 
a  reasonable  chance  of  his  lead  taking  the  trick,  it  was 
manifestly  th^  right  lead.  That  his  sacrifice  was  not 
rewarded  by  such  contact  being  obtained  as  could  finish 
the  business  of  the  enemy  is  therefore  irrelevant  to 
appraising  its  merits.  It  remains  one  of  the  most  glorious 
and  inspiring  memories  of  a  historical  day. 

(4)     Destroyer  Tactics 

The  lay  reader  may  be  puzzled  at  finding  that  the  cliicf 
role  of  the  German  destroyers  was  to  attack  the  British 
ships  by  daylight,  and  that  of  the  British  destroyers  to 
attack  the  Germans  at  night.  The  weapon  of  the  des- 
troyer is  the  torpedo  and  the  range  of  the  torpedo  in 
action  is  not  absolutely  so  many  yards,  as  is  the  range  of 
the  gun,  for  the  reason  that  the  time  of  its  maximum  run 
is  so  long  that  the  target  can  travel  an  immense  distance 
while  the  torpedo  is  on  its  journey.  Thus,  if  a  torpedo 
can  go  10,000  yards  at  a  uniform  speed  of  30  knots,  and 
is  fired  at  a  squadron  advancing  at  20  knots,  clearly 
the  squadron  will  advance  some  6,600  yards  while  the 
torpedo  is  travelling  10,000.  16,600  yards  then  is  the 
effective  range  of  the  torpedo  at  the  oncoming  enemy. 
But  if  a  torpedo  is  fired  at  a  retreating  enemy,  the  dis- 
tance that  the  enemy  goes  while  the  torpedo  is  travelling 
must  now  be  deducted  from  the  torpedo's  range.  The 
;50-knot  torpedo  then  would  not  hit  a  20-knot  battleship 
retreating  along  the  line  of  its  passage,  if  the  initial  range 
were  greater  than  3.300  yards.  The  retreating  force, 
theri,  is  armed  with  a  16,600  yard  weapon  and  the  pursu- 
ing force  only  with  a  3,300  yard  weapon.  But  at  3,300 
yards  in  daylight  the  destroyers  have  very  little  chance 
against  the  battleships's  guns.  In  a  daylight  pursuit, 
therefore,  the  destroyer  is  of  far  less  value  than  in  a  night 
.attack.  But  its  defensive  value  in  a  daylight  retreat  is  at 
its  maximum. 

THE    COST    OF   VICTORY 

The  losses  suffered  in  this  battle  have  naturallv  been 
exceedingly  heavy.  The  British  navy  has  lost.  Queen 
Mary,  Invincible  and  Indefatigable,  battle  cruisers, 
Defence.  Black  Prime  and  Warrior,  armoured  cruisers, 
and  eight  destroyers.     Between  5,000  and  6,000  officers 


and  men  have  perished,  a  loss  that  it  is  difficult  to  face 
with  equanimity.  But  heavy  as  this  loss  is,  the  enemy 
loss  has  been  far  heavier.  They  have  lost  two  Dread- 
nought battleships  of  the  first  class,  and  several  others 
have  been  so  battered  as  clearly  to  be  untit  for  work  for 
many  months  to  come.  Two  of  their  latest  battle  cruisers 
are  gone  also,  and  a  third  is  either  lost  or  disabled.  Since 
the  Iseginning  of  the  war  Germany  has  produced  a  new 
type  of  light  cruiser  armed  with  six-inch  guns.  Two  of 
tiiese  have  been  sunk  and  two  light  cruisers  of  an  earlier 
tj'pe  as  well.  Six  destroyers  and  a  submarine  complete 
what  has  been  officially  announced.  In  the  fleet,  how- 
ever, the  opinion  seems  to  be  universally  held,  that  the 
German  losses  were  far  heavier  than  this.  But  it  neces- 
sarily happens  that  in  an  action  fought  over  10,000 
square  miles  of  sea,  largely  at  night  and  entirely 
in  misty  and  foggy  weather,  there  should  be  wide 
uncertainty  as  to  the  ultimate  fate  of  many  ships 
crippled  and  apparently  disabled.  It  will  be  surprising, 
however,  if  serious  additions  are  not  made  to  the  list  we 
know.  Von  Scheer  did  not  probably  have  under  his 
command  all  the  Dreadnought  ships  completed,  but 
whether  that  total  before  the  battle  was  16  or  20,  a 
reduction  by  two  is  the  loss  of  a  very  serious  percentage. 
The  British  Dreadnought  fieet  remains  in  the  meantime 
what  it  was  before.  Of  battle  cruisers  we  have  fcst  three 
out  of  10,  the  Germans  two  out  of  six,  and  we  have  none 
disabled  and  they  certainly  one.  The  loss  of  Sir  Robert 
Arbuthnot's  armoured  cruisers  is  undoubtedly  a  heavy 
one,  but  their  military  role  is  far  less  obvious  and  im- 
portant than  it  was  when  they  were  first  designed  in  pre- 
Dreadnought  days.  Certainly  the  loss  of  four  light 
cruisers  by  Germany  is  a  greater  handicap  to  the  prospec- 
tive employment  of  the  enemy's  fleet  on  any  future  occa- 
sion. F'or  Germany's  cruiser  losses  have  been  serious 
from  the  beginning,  and  her  margin  now  must  be  an 
extremely  narrow  one.  The  most  difficult  point  to 
determine  is  the  extent  of  Gennany's  destroyer  losses. 
Six  are  claimed  for  certain,  but  the  total  is  likely  to 
exceed  that  very  greatly. 

The  Worth  of  Victory 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  though  the 
actual  losses  of  the  enemy  are  far  heavier  than  ours,  our 
victory  would  have  been  worth  winning  Xvith  the  tale 
of  lasses  reversed.  In  the  first  week  of  war  Gcrmanv 
was  deprived  of  the  whole  of  her  overseas  trade,  and 
before  the  end  of  the  second  week  of  war.  Great  Britain 
was  using  the  sea  as  the  high  road  of  her  military  com- 
munications. In  the  22  months  of  war  the  (rfrman 
navy  has  attempted  no  stroke,  cither  to  restore  her  trade 
or  to  interfere  with  our  reinforcing  and  supplying  the 
army  that  must  pro\'e  decisive  in  the  continental  war. 
Never  before  has  a  Power  possessing  a  great  fleet  waited 
inertly  for  so  long  in  face  of  so  heavy  a  loss  as  our  sea 
blockade  is  causing,  or  in  face  of  so  dreadful  a  military 
menace  as  our  army  in  France  holds  out.  Precisely  what, 
after  so  long  a  patience,  brought  the  German  navy  out  on 
May  31st  is  uncertain.  Its  professed  object,  as  we  ha\-e 
seen,  was  to  attack  the  squadrons  that  had  been  in  the 
habit  of  cruising  off  the  Danish  coasts.  But  would  such 
an  enterprise  have  been  ventured  on  had  there  not  been 
some  impulse  from  witliin  the  country,  some  fading 
confidence  in  the  higher  command,  some  despair  at  the 
stringency  of  the  grip  on  Germany's  food  supply,  that 
made  it  absolutely  necessary  to  restore  the  dynasty's 
prestige  and  put  heart  into  "a  despairing  people  ?  'Fhe 
very  promptitude  with  which  this  great  defeat  has  been 
held  up  as  a  great  victory  seems  to  lend  colour  to  the 
idea  that  the  German  navy  was  to  sacrifice  itself  gallantly, 

After  Quinncy's,  Mr.  Horace  Annesley  Vaclicll's  new  book. 
The  Triumph  of  Tim  (John  Murray,  6s.  net)  is  in  the  nature 
of  a  disappointment,  for  Tim  is  rather  an  ineftectual  person. 
His  varied  adventures- for  the  hook  is  no  less  tlian  his  life 
story— make  good  reading  ;  out  in  California,  on  board  shi]), 
and  in  the  rest  of  the  phases  through  which  Mr.  Vachell 
conducts  him,  he  holds  the  reader,  for  the  adventures  are 
worth  reading,  but  all  the  time  we  feel  that  Tim  himself  is 
not  as  good  as  his  author  tliiuks.  The  vicar,  too,  who  has 
some  share  in  the  making  of  Tim's  life,  is  mildly  exasperating, 
and  the  only  character  who  merits  whole-hearted  admiration 
is  Daffy,  the  heroine.  Mr.  Vachell's  skill  saves. the  bo^k 
from  mediocrity,  but  it  is  not  up  to  his  usual  levcL 


June  b,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


so  long  only  as  the  name  of  the  German  success  could  be 
claimed  afterwards. 

It  is  this  point  which  lends  significance  to.  the  event. 
And  it  is  because  (jermany's  greatest  necessity  now  is 
a  renewal  of  the  national  moral,  that  it  is  the  Allies' 
greatest  necessity  to  strike  at  the  instrument  of  its 
restoration,  regardless  of  what  the  blow  may  cost.  Had 
in  point  of  fact  the  British  attack  on  the  German  fleet 
been  "  over-confident  "  or  "  rashly  impetuous,"  had  our 
success  been  gained  at  a  loss  disproportionate  to  that 
which  the  enemy  had  suffered — but  nevertheless  re- 
mained a  success,  then  the  sacritice  of  ships  and  men 
would  seemingly  have  been  rightly  incurred.  It  was 
the  plain  duty  of  the  British  fleet  to  thwart  the  purpose 
of  the  enemy  at  sea,  whatever  it  might  be,  and  to  drive 
his  fleet  back  into  harbour  at  whatever  cost  in  ships  and 
men. 

The  News  and  Its  Reception 

This  truth,  it  seems  to  me,  was  so  obviously  the  key 
to  the  whole  naval  position,  that  I  must  confess  to  com- 
plete astonishment  at  the  way  in  which  the  news  of  this 
event  was  broken  to  the  people  of  this  country  and  in 
some  quarters  received  by  them.  The  first  announcement 
was  made  on  Friday  evening  at  seven  o'clock,  in  the  form 
of  a  statement  issued  by  the  secretary  of  the  Admiralty. 
Apart  fron>  the  known  losses  of  the  British  fleet  and  the 
supposed  losses  of  the  enemy,  this  statement  told  the 
public  nothing  but  the  following  facts. 

An  engagement  had  taken  place  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
previous  Wednesday  off  the  coast  of  Jutland.  In  its 
first  stage  the  battle  cruiser  fleet,  supported  by  fast 
battleships,  had  engaged  the  German  fleet  till  the  British 
main  forces  appeared.  The  action  between  the  main 
forces  was  brief,  because  the  enemy  took  advantage  of 
a  low  in\'isibiUt3'  to  avoid  action.  Finally,  the  enemy 
had  retreated  to  his  harbours. 

To  anyone  with  the  faintest  understanding  of  things 
naval,  two  things  were  clear.  First,  if  the  enemy  had 
any  object  in  being  at  sea,  he  had  been  thwarted  in  ob- 
taining it.  Ne.xt,  the  day  had  ended  with  Sir  John 
Jellicoe  in  possession  of  the  field  from  which  the  enemy 
had  been  driven.  It  was  evident,  therefore,  that  our 
sea  command  had  been  vindicated  ;  that  the  victory 
was  ours.  The  statement  of  losses  made  it,  it  is  true, 
appear  tliat  the  cost  of  victory  had  been  heavy,  but 
relati\'ely  to  the  size  of  the  two  navies,  the  enemy's  losses 
were  at  least  as  serious.  The.  victory  might  not  be 
decisive  in  the  sense  that  there  was  no  enemy  fleet  left  to 
fight  with  ;  but  it  was  obvious  that  the  enemy's  plans, 
no  less  than  his  hopes  had  been  defeated,  and  that  he 
was  in  certainly  no  better  a  position  than  he  was  before 
to  dispute  Great  Britain's  control  of  the  North  Sea. 

Subsequent  statements,  it  must  be  remembered,  added 
nothing  almost  to  these  5ubstantial  and  eloquent  facts. 
They  did  put  the  GeiTnan  losses  higher,  and  limited  our 
destroyer  casualties  to  eight.  Bvit  the  evidences  of 
victory  were  patent  from  the  first  communique. 

^^'hethcr  the  Admiralty  was  right  or  wrong  to  leave 
the  interpretation  of  this  statement  to  the  intelligence 
of  tlie  newspapers  that  reported  it,  is  a  point  that  is 
difficult  to  decide.  That  we  had  won  was  clear.  It 
may  have  seemed  wiser  to  let  the  absurd  German  state- 
ment have  a  start,  so  that  the  truth,  when  fully  known, 
should  have  a  still  greater  effect.  For  once,  the  facts 
were  allowed  to  speak  for  themselves.  And  the  result 
was  startling.  Mr.  Balfour's  administration  has  ever 
since  last  autumn  been  subjected  to  alternations  of 
sniping  and  curtain  fire  from  a  certain  section  of  the 
press.  If  Mr.  Balfour  had  ordered  the  circulation  of 
Friday's  statement  with- no  other  object  than  to  let  his 
enemies  in,  he  achieved  it  to  admiration. 

A  small  section  of  the  press,  small  in  numbers,  but 
highly  important  from  its  circulation  and  popularity, 
read  in  the  Admiralty's  report  nothing  but  the  list  of  the 
ships  sunk,  and  immediately  lost  its  head.  The  Times 
treated  the  event  as  a  German  "  success  snatched  from 
us  upon  our  own  element."  "  We  have  suffered,"  it 
said,  "  the  heaviest  blow  at  sea  we  have  met  with  dming 
the  war.  .  .  we  engaged,  perhaps  in  over  confidence, 
in  a  long  running  fight  again.st"  ships  more  nuriierous, 
stronger  and  more  heavily  armed.  .  .  and  we  have 
suffered    heavily."     The    Daily    Mail    and     the     Daily 


Chronicle  found  the  result  one  that  could  not  be  "  re- 
garded with  satisfaction."  The  latter  paper  declared 
that  a  feebler  force  had  been  sent  "  far  forward  into 
enemy  waters,  to  be  almost  overwhelmed  by  its  stronger 
adversary."  and  that  this  policy  "  is  directly  traceable 
to  the  influence  upon  naval  strategy  of  civilian  alarm." 
The  Weekly  Dispatch  asked  "  ^^'hat  was  wrong  last 
week?  .  .  .  The  British  navy  was  beaten.  .  . 
Why  did  we  fail  ?  .  .  .  The  fight  itself  was  mis- 
managed. .  .  .  Lord  Fisher  must  be  recalled  to  the 
Admiralty  at  once."  The  Daily  News  mourned  over 
this  "  gravest  disaster  "  and  foresaw  a  serious  danger  of 
diminishing  confidence  in  the  administration  of  the  navy, 
and  called  at  once  for  the  retmn  of  Lord  Fisher  "  in  this 
hour  of  the  country's  urgent  need."  The  Observer  would 
have  it  that  "  we  had  missed  victory."  "  that  our 
strategical  object  had  not  been  obtained,"  that  "  it  was 
a  public  duty  to  be  plain  "  and  "  nothing  could  com- 
pensate for  the  absence  of  Lord  Fisher  from  Whitehall." 
Elsewhere  we  were  told  that  we  could  not  dismiss  from 
our  minds  the  thought  that  soriieone  had  blundered.' 
Of  London  papers  the  Morning  Post  and  the  Westminster 
Gazette  put  the  matter  from  the  first  in  its  true  light, 
but  even  the  Daily  Telegraph,  exceptionally  sane  as 
a  rule  on  naval  subjects,  warned  us  not  to  be  too  gloomy 
or  to  indulge  in  undue  pessimism — as  if  a  measure  of 
gloom   and  pessimism  would   be  wholesome  ! 

It  is  an  odd  way  of  commending  a  new  naval  chief  to 
forces  fresh  from  victory,  to  tell  them  that  he  alone  can 
rescue  them  from  the  disastrous  consequences  of  defeat ! 
And  it  is  as  unfortunate  as  it  must  be  unjust,  that  Lord 
Fisher's  name  should  have  been  coupled  with  views  almost 
too  repugnant  to  professional  intelligence  and  feeling  to 
be  called  ridiculous. 

But  on  Saturday  and  Sunday  last,  it  was  not  the 
ridiculous  side  of  it  that  I  saw.  The  news  that  a  near 
relative  had  been  severely  wovmded  in  the  action  took 
me  to  one  of  the  bases  and  was  the  occasion  of  various 
visits  to  the  naval  hospital.  Here  were  men  who  h^d 
taken  part  in  the  great  action,  had  been  knocked  out  of 
shape,  or  burned  almost  out  of  human  recognition  on 
this  glorious  day,  and  they  had  come  into  hospital 
counting  their  sufferings  as  nothing  weighed  against  the 
greatness  of  their  deeds.  It  was  certainly  pitiful  when 
one  of  them  said  to  me,  "  We  were  a  bit  bucked  with- 
ourselves  when  we  came  in  here,  but  look  at  these  papers. 
They  tell  us  we  have  been  beaten  !  "  The  thing  became 
tragic  when  one  heard  of  widows  and  bereaved  mothers 
having  their  grief  embittered  by  the  thought  that  the 
lives  of  husbands  and  sons  had  been  lost  in  a  failure. 
It  should  not,  one  would  imagine,  need  a  very  robust 
faith  in  the  British  navy,  to  make  one  slow  to  believe  in 
defeat.  It  was  once  supposed  to  be  a  characteristic  of 
the  race  that  we  did  not  knov.-  when  we  were  beaten. 
Now  it  seems  we  do  not  know  when  we  have  won. 

"  The  sailors,  naturally  enough,  are  broken-hearted  that 
they  have  not  sunk  every  German  ship.  The  result,  in 
this  respect,  is  so  contrary  both  to  their  expectations, 
and  to  their  knowledge  of  what  their  guns  could  and 
would  have  done,  had  it  been  possible  to  see,  as  to 
seem  a  much  smaller  thing  than  obviously  it  is.  But 
there  is  no  reason  why  the  nation  should  measure  its 
gratitude  by  their  disappointment." 

But  there  is  another  aspect  of  the  matter  that  must 
be  noted.  It  is  not  necessary,  if  ever  we  are  defeated,  to 
scream  at  once  that  someone  has  blundered.  It  is  con- 
ceivable that  defeats  may  come  without  any  blunder  at 
all.  It  is  certainly  not  very  generous  to  imply  either 
that  the  Admiralty— though  this  department  can  look 
after  itself —or  that  naval  oflicers,  who  cannot  do  so,  have 
brought  disaster  on  us  by  rash  tactics  and  ])rofessional 
incompetence.  Time,  in  this  instance,  will  vindicate  the 
accused.  And  the  time  will  not  be  long.  But  however 
ignorant  and  ill-conceived,  these  hasty  judgments  give 
pain.  They  have  been  persisted  in,  after  the  least 
observant  must  have  realized  that  our  tactics  had 
succeeded,  and  they  are  not  supported  by  any  fact.s 
known  to  us.  They  are  a  poor  return  to  those  who  risk 
not  only  life  and  limb,  but  honour  and  name  in  the 
country's  cause.  Arthur  Pollen. 


Professor^  L.  P.  Jack's  article  "  A  Bad  School  of 
Statesmen."  ojcmg  to  the  sudden  demand  upon  our  space, 
has  regretfully  to  be  held  over  until  next  week. 


LAND      .\      WATLK 


Ulli. 


The  Trentino  Front 


liy  Hilaire  Bclloc 


THK  interest  of  the  war  by  land  this  wcfk  (ix;ndin}; 
furthir  dcvelcnTnient^  upon  tlu*  Nouthcin  Kussiaii 
front)  still  ixmrca  on  the  Trtntino  ;  and.  what  is 
more,  it  is  prubiibly  in  tine  pn-st-nt  week,  certaii^^ly 
in  tin.'  iinmctliati'  fntnn\  tliat  wt-  shall  know  whether  this 
nnjMftant  otUnsivc  u|K)n  llu-  rncmv's  part  has  failed  or 

>uri  ceded. 

file  threat  news  of  the  week,  by  sea,  should  not  obscure 
for  us  the  capital  value  at  this  loonu-nt  of  the  Trentino 
Theatre  ;  nor  slmnld  the  nevis  of  Ihe  Knssian  movement 
of  which  only  the  bepinnin{;s  are  apiwrcnt  at  the  time 
these  lines  are  written. 

Tlie  i)tYen>ive  will  sueroed  if  it  gels  across,  or  even 
imperils,  the  communications  feeding  the  main  Italian 
front  on  the  Isoii/.o.  If  it  is  dclinilely  stopind  short  of 
buch  an  objective  it  will  fail. 


^  fifninsnLar  Italy 


AdriatLC 
Sea. 


The  communications  of  the  main  Italian  army  are  the 
two  railway  lines,  the  northern  one  through  Vicenza  and 
X'erona,  the  southern  one  through  Padua,  both  leading  to 
the  Isonzo  front.  The  southern  is  the  main  one  and  the 
more  important  one  because  it  lias  been  from  the  begin- 
ning the  one  most  remote  from  peril,  and  the  one  by  which 
must  shortly  arrive  the  masses  of  recniitmcnt,  while  it  also 
leads  to  the  industrial  areas  of  the  north. 

But  the  northern  one  is  also  important.  It  is  not  a 
^ingle  line,  as  I  erroneously  suggested  last  week,  but  a 
d(»uble  one.  and  the  enemy  in  possession  of  it  would  not 
only  threaten  within  a  few  miles  all  the  commimications 
of  the  main  Italian  arniv  on  the  Isonzo,  but  would  -.dready 
'  ■  in  possession  of  half  those  communications. 

This  Verona-N'icenza  line  luns  of  comse  on  the  edge 
ol  the  \enetian  plain  just  under  the  mountain  country  ; 
but  the  en<my's  immediate  object  is  not  to  "  reach  the 
l)lain."  but  to  secure  otic  of  the  lito,  or  preferably  both. 
Of  the  great  avenues  of  supply  by  u'hkh  alone  a  large  army 
can  bf  maintained  if  it  is  to  attempt  an  advance  across 
that  plain,  and  meanuhik  to  secure  a  certain  third  inferior 
line  of  sHpplv  uhich,  as  we  shall  see  in  a  moment,  exists 
hd-.c-cn  thr  /„  -. 

(ieiiing  into  the  plain  merely  because  it  is  a  jjlain  ; 
getting  out  of  the  mountains  merely  Ix-causc  they  are 
mountains,  means  under  modern  conditions  hardly  any- 
thing. A  strong  defensive  line  established  across  a  plain 
at  the  mouth  of  a  mountain  valley  is  overlooked  indeed 
from  the  hills,  and  to  that  extent  suffers  a  disadvantage. 
Further,  the  points  at  which  a  line  across  a  plain  i  an  be 
attacked  arc  indelinile  in  ninnber,  whereas  the  points  upon 
which  a  mountain  line  can  be  attacked  are  limited  in 
"imber. 

Ihese  arc  not  the  main  things.  You  will  get  examples 
over  and  over  again  in  this  war  of  a  strong  defensive 
line  well  held  in  Hat  country  and  even  in  flat  cotmtry 
overlooked  by  neighbouring  hills.  What  you  never  get 
in  this  war.  what  you  cannot  get  in  the  nature  of.  things 
is  an  offensive  pursued  upon  a  sector  behind  which  there 
is  no  proper  avenue  of  supply. 


We  all  know  b\'  this  time  that  the  modern  offensive 
consists,  as  against  an  entrenched  line  (not  in  a  war  of 
movement)  of  concentrated  heavy  artillery  hrc  followed 
by  intimtry  attack  for  which  it  is  the  preparation. 

\\\  offensive  under  siege  conditions  has  always  consisted 
of  these  elements  since  artillery  was  invented,  but  the 
l>eculiarlv  novel  character  of  the  ])resent  operations  since' 
the  spring  of  last  year  is  the  weight  of  .shell  which  it  has 
been  found  necessary  to  deliver  over  a  restricted  sector 
and  within  a  restricted  timeifthat  sector  is  1o  h-  itijirkrd 
with  success  e\en  by  great  masses  of  troojis. 

This  great  weight  of  shell  nuist  be  brought  up  some- 
how. Mach  missile  weighs  from  60  lbs.  up  to  several 
hundredweight.  The  mere  handling  of  such  masses 
inx-supposes  artificial  <dnmumieation  of  .some  sort.  The 
nuiving  of  them  in  large  bodies  ])resupposes  railways  for 
general  sujiply  and  good  roads  for  petrol  traflic  between 
railhead  and  the  guns.  Short  of  such  ample  conuimnica- 
tion  modern  concentrated  heavy  artillery  lire  is  physically 
imptissible. 

The  reader  is  actpiainted  with  the  conditions  of  com- 
inimication  upon  the  sector,  about  40  miles  across  as  the 
crow  flies,  which  is  the  scene  of  the  Austrian  offensive^ 

Von  have  two  great  divergent  valleN's,  the  Val  Sugana 
and  the  \'al  Lagarina,  valleys  of  the  Krenta  and' Adigc 
respectively.  Between  them  you  have  only  one  really 
good  road  which  runs  from  Ro\ereto  up  the  \'allarsa 
and  acniss  the  frontier  by  the  l-"uga/.zc  pass  just  behind 
the  block  of  the  Pasubio  ^fountain.  It  runs  doiftn  on 
the  south  side  of  the  Posina  ridge  to  Schio,  and  then  linds 
a  single  line  of  railway  continuing  the  communication 
to  Vicenza. 

North  of  this  good  road  you  only  have  two  interrupted 
roads,  not  so  gootl,  one  leading  to.Asiero  by  the  ravine 
(if  the  Astico,  the  other  leading  to  Asiago.  Neither  could 
supply  a  large  force  advancing  southwards. 

It  the  Austrians  could  have  pushed  down  the 
Adige  valley  or  the  Brcnta  valky,  or  both,  that  would 
have  been  {he  tirst  and  most  obvious  thing  for  them  to 
do.  But  they  failed.  For  it  was  obviously  at  these  two 
points  that  the  Italians  had  to  ])ut  up  their  strongest 
resistance.  In  the  Adige  valley  they  only  managed 
to  carry  the  northern  end  of  the  Zugna  ridge.  They  occu- 
pied the  Zugnatorta  but  they  have  failed,  after  nearly  a 
fortnight's  effort  to  carry  ("onizugna.  On  the  further 
side  of  the  Adige,  between  the  Vul  Lagarina  and  Lake 
(iarda,  they  have  been  held  absolutely  :  the  Hne  still 
passing  just  south  of  Afarco  and  through  Mori. 

In  the  Val  Sngana  it  has  been  the  same  story. 

They  have  got  the  Italiaiis  back  a  few  thousand  yards  ; 
uncovering  the  rather  open  piece  of  valley  at  JBorgo. 
They  have  failed  to  dislodge  the  Italians  from  the  natmal 
position  lying  just   down  streani  east   of  that  town. 

It  has  therefore  been  their  business  to  try  and  get  at 
the  lower  part  of  one  or  both  of  these  two  great  avenues 
of  approach,  the  Adige  Valley  and  the  Brenta  Valley  by 
going  round  through  the  wild  country  between,  since 
they  could  not  get  at  them  by  going  straight  forward. 
And  going  round  meant  attacking  in  all  the  central 
mf)uutain  mass  between  the  two  rivers.  Apart  from 
the  guns  which  they  have  spcciallv  massed  for  their  effort, 
they  were  helped  by  the  fact  "  that  they  had  long 
established  works  on  the  Folgaria  plateau  and  in  the 
La\arone  district.  They  forced  the  frontier  here,  as  we 
know,  up  to  a  salient  in  crescent  formation  (AAA)  the 
most  advanced  points  on  which  are  the  towns  Asierf) 
and  Asiago. 

What  progress  have  they  made  or  are  they  making 
towards  jiroceeding  from  this  saHent  on  to  either  the 
Lower  Brenta  valley  or  the  Lower  .\dige  valley  ? 

It  will  be  remembered  that  I  jKunted  out  last  week  the 
obviously  critical  pciut  .  f  Valstagna,  and  .said  that  if  an 
advance  could  be  made  by  the  Austrians  from  Asiago 
towards  \'alstagna,  so  that  the  latter  point  should  come 
under  effective  fue,  the  Italian  positions  on  the  Upper 
Brenta    near    Borgo    would    be    turned.     Towards  this 


Tunc  8,  1916 


L  A  N  D      &'      \y  A  T  E  R 


It 


VICENZA 


Miles 


20 


objective  the  enemy  has  in  the  interval  made  no  progress 
whatsoever. 

It  is  exceedingly  diflicult  country. 

.\siago  lies  in  tlie  centre  of  a  sort  of  shallow  basin, 
which  itself  is  part  of  the  sm^face  of  a  great  plateau. 
The  plateau  is  called  the  "  seven  villages,"  because  there 
was  here  a  settlement  of  seven  isolated  German-speaking 
villages  which  only  in  modern  times  learned  to  speak 
Italian.  It  was  long  ago  a  sort  of  barbaric  (ierman  island 
cut  off  from  the  ci\ilisation  around  it  by  the  diflicultv  not 
only  of  communication,  but  even  of  water  supply. 

This  plateau  is  cut  by  the  deep  ravine  of  the  Astico, 
but  save  for  the  exception  of  that  valley  is  bovmded  every- 
where along  the  south  by  an  escarpment  (B  B  on  the  map), 
whence  the  land  falls  very  sharply  down  into  tiie  plain. 

It  seems  to  have  been  thought  impossible  hitherto  by 
the  Austrian  Higher  Command  to  force  a  waj-jdown  the  ex- 
ceedingly rugged,  and  in  their  latter  part  exceedingly  steep 
paths  w-hich  lead  from  Asiago  to  Valstagna  lay  the  wild 
Valtrenzela,  with  the  Italians  holding  in  strength  the 
natural  position  formed  by  this  escaipment  of  the  plateau 
B  B.  They  may  attempt  this  easterly  move,  but  time  is 
getting  on  and  they  have  not  yet  attempted  it  ;  and  to 
attempt  it  with  the  Italians  on  the  position  BB  (on 
May  II.)  right  in  front  of  them  untouched  would  be 
extremely  perilous. 

Their  chief  effort  has  been  against  the  other  limb  of  the 
problem  set  them.  They  cannot  here,  indeed,  directly 
approach  the  valley  of  the  Lower  Adige,  as  they  might 
hope  to  approach  on  the  other  side  the  valley  of  the 
Lower  Brenta.  In  this  central  moimtain  push  of  theirs 
they  have  come  to  within  eight  miles  of  Valstagna  u])on 
the  valley  of  the  Lower  Brenta  ;  but  the  valley  of  the 
Adige,  as  the  map  shows,  turns  further  and  furtlier  away 
from  them  as  it  goes  south.  They  are  a  full  thirty  miles 
away  from  its  lower  portion  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Verona. 


What  they  can  hope  to  do  and  what  they  are  attempting 
to  do  is  twofold  : 

1.  They  are  attempting  to  get  hold  of  the  central  part 
of  the  Adige  valley  by  turning  the  positions  the  Italians 
have  so  stubbornly  and  successfully  held  upon  the  Zugna 
ridfie. 

2.  They  are  attempting  to  get  hold  of  the  subsidiary 
line  of  communications,  the  road  from  Rovercto  to  Schio, 
whence  a  single  line  railway  leads  to  Vicenza. 

The  first  of  these  eftorts  has  been  conducted  as  follows : 

The    road    from    Rovereto    to    Schio     runs     up     the 

Vallarsa    to    the    Fugazze    pass.      This    pass    is    rather 


more  than  3,000  feet  above  the  sea,  about  3,000  fee' 
ab,ove  the  plain,  and  about  2,000  feet,  I  believe,  above 
Schio.  They  have  pushed  along  this  line  as  far  a? 
the  point  of  Chiesa,  whence  their  front  tiuns  outward 
a;4ain   slightly  round  Mount  Pasubio,  which   they  have 


J.  A  N  1)      .S:       W  A  1  1'^  K 


Juno  8,  i()i() 


IV 

WalsCaQtia 


ftafum  Tron^ 

s-  "lilies'   10 
1 


failed  to  cany.  Tlicy  cannot  push  down  llu'  Adigo 
valley  much  beyond  .Marco,  and  the  Italians  still 
strongly  hold  the  height  of  the  Conizugna  which  is  about 
5,ooo  feet  abo\'e  the  sea,  though  theyliave  lost  the  lower 
summit  of  the  ridge  to  the  north,  tlie  Zugnatorta.  Just 
south  of  the  Conizugna  and  immediately  above  Chicsa, 
is  a  pass  (without  a  road)  called  the  Buole  pass.  It  is 
only  700  feet  below  the  peak  of  the  Conizugna.  I  have 
marked  it  on  the  above  sketch  Map  III.  with  the  letter  X. 
The  enemy  are  fighting  as  hard  as  they  can  up  from  the 
valley  at  Chiesa  to  force  the  ])ass  of  Buole  and  so  to  come 
down  on  to  the  Adige  valley.  If  they  could  do  that  they 
would  cut  off  the  Italians  to  the  north,  and  would  about 
double  the  present  strength  of  their  hold  upon  the  road  and 
railway  that  follow  the  Adige  valley  south  of  Rovereto. 
Probably  their  main  dihkulty  consists  in  the  fact  that  the 
Italian  batteries  on  Mount  Pasubio  command  the  Buole 
pass.  But  how  far  it  is  thus  overlooked  and  with  what 
effect  only  those  on  the  spot  can  know.  At  any  rate, 
this  attack  upon  the  Buole  pass  with  the  object  of  getting 
into  the  middle  of  the  Adige  valley  is  the  first  part  of  the 
present  Atistrian  effort. 

The  second  i)art  is  an  attempt  to  get  hold  of  something 
second  best  in  the  way  of  communication.  That  is,  the 
excellent  road  of  which  we  have  already  spoken  w-hich 
runs  from  Rovereto  behind  the  mountain  of  Pasubio  to 
railhead  at  Schio.* 

If  they  can  get  this  road  they  would  have  an  avenue 
of  supply  down  towards  the  plain  only  second  in  value  to 
the  two  main  avenues  of  the  Brenta  and  the  Adige. 
rhey  would  lay  a  light  railway,  of  course,  immediately 
along  the  road  and  they  could  feed  with  munitionment  an 
advance  towards  Vicenza.  The  crossing  of  the  northern 
line  at  Vicenza  would  be  a  blow  of  capital  importance, 
and  I  repeat  that  the  excellent  road  from  Rovereto  to 
Schio  with  the  rail  beyond  gives  an  avenue  of  supply  if  it 
were  once  thoroughly  held  by  the  Austrians,  for  an 
advance  on  Vicenza. 

They  have  been  all  this  week  fighting  hard  to  obtain 
full  possession  of  this  road  which  runs  from  Rovereto  to 
Schio  and  the  possession  of  this  road  depends  upon  their 
being  able  to  turn  the  Pasubio  position. 

The  Italians  on  Mount  Pasubio  stand,  and  have  stood, 
for  now  three  weeks,  against  all  attack.  It  is  the  moun- 
tain block  which  dominates  all  that  country.     To  push  up 


•  There  is  .a  tramway  on  to  a  point  a  mile  or  two  higher  up  the 
valley,  but  Scliio  is  the  point  where  the  most  natural  transhipment  would 
take  place  between  road  traffic  and  rail  traffic. 


the  road  behind  the  Pasubio  the  Austrians  found  im- 
possible. Thev  got  as  far  as  Chiesa  and  were  there  held. 
The  Austrians  must  therefore  try  to  get  round,  and  that  is 
what  they  are  now  doing. 

The  Italians  on  Pasubio  can  be  amply  supplied  by  the 
smglc  line  railway  from  Vicenza  to  Schio  and  thci  up 
this  excellent  road  C  C,  which  runs  behind  the  mountain, 
the  road  which  the  Austrians  are  trying  to  seize. 

In.'portance  of  Posina  Ridge 

It  is  obvious  that  if  the  Austrians  from  A  (iii  the  above 
I\Iap  IV,)  were  to  strike  across  the  Posina  Torrent,  through 
to  a  point  between  Schio  and  the  pa.ss  of  Fugazze,  the 
position  on  Pasubio  would  not  only  lose  its  importaftcc, 
but  probably  its  guns  and  its  men  as  well.  The  Itahans 
would  have  to  withdraw  everywhere  from  the  road 
between  Rovereto  and  the  point  W'here  the  Austrians 
had  got  in  behind  them.  And  the  Austrian  ma'in  effort 
at  this  moment  js  being  made  to  effect  this  : — To  get  upon 
some  part  of  the  road  south  of  the  Fugazze  pass  and 
so  turn  the  present  Italian  hold  of  the  Pasubio  momitain. 

Let  us  see  w'hat  the  local  conditions  of  this  effort  are. 

There  runs  from  the  Pasubio  mountain  block  (which 
has  two  i)caks,  one  B  about  7,000  feet  above  the  sea, 
and  the  other  E,  rather  over  6,000)  a  ridge,  steep  and  with 
high  crests,  which  I  have  marked  on  the  accompanying 
Map  IV.  with  tiie  letters  E  E  E.  The  summits  of  this 
ridge  are  from  1,200  to  1,600  feet  lower  than  the  Pasubio, 
and  these  chief  summits,  or  teeth  upon  the  sharp  edge  of 
the  ridge,  which  I  have  numbered  i,  2  and  3,  arc  Mount 
.•\lba,  Mount  Posina  and  Mount  Cogolo  respectively. 
The  ridge  ends  sharply  at  the  gorge  of  the  Astico,  but  is 
continued  beyond  the  .\stico  in  the  ridge  D  U  D,  .which 
stretches  on  to  Valstagna,  and  is  also  held  by  the  Italians. 
The  Austrians  are  engaged  in  an  attempt  from  the  region 
.\in  the  above  Map  IV.  to  carry  the  ridge  E  E  E,  to  cross 
it  and  to  reach  the  main  road  somewhere  about  Valli 
dci  Signori.  They  have  crossed  the  Posina  toiTent 
and  have  got  a  footing  in  the  villages  of  Bettale  and 
Posina,  and  are  now  doing  their  utmost  to  force  their  w*ay 
up  the  steep  slope  to  the  summit  of  the  ridge.  The  peaks 
of  this  summit  are  about  2,000  to  2,500  feet  above  the 
torrent,  and  the  niain  attack  is  against  the  slopes  of 
Mount  Alba  and  of  Mount  Posina,  but  we  may  take  it 
that  the  whole  of  this  stccji  and  high  bank  is  under  attack. 
Up  to  the  moment  of  writing  the  Austrians  have  had  no 
success  here,  and  the  position  covering  the  road  is  still 
solidlv  in  the  hands  of  the  Italians. 


Losses  in  Front  of  Verdun 


WITH  the  continuation  of  the  German  offensive 
rhythmically,  month  after  month,  in  great 
intense  efforts  succeedirig  the  long  intervals  of 
preparation,  opinion  in  this  country  seems  to 
have  wavered  somewhat  upon  the  fundamental  point  pf 


all,   the  fact  that  the  German  tactics,  as  well  as  the 
main  (ierman  strategic  policy  here — which  is  a  continued 
offensive— necessarily  invol\-e  very  much  heavier  losses 
to  the  enemy  than  the  enemy  inflicts  upon  the  French. 
NN'hat  the  enemy  thesis  is  in  its  continued  attack,  how 


June  8,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


13 


far  it  is  political  and  how  far  strategic,  has  been  more 
discussed  than  any  other  matter  in  the  war — and  has 
been  less  decided. 

He  may  be  merely  playing  for  time.  But  whatever 
his  thesis  may  be,  it  is  clear  that  the  whole  French  thesis 
in  this  struggle  reposes  upon  the  apparently  elementary 
truth  that  the  offensive  at  Verdun  is  far  more  expensive 
than  the  defensi\-c. 

As  a  general  truth  this  has  been  affirmed  over  and 
over  again  in  these  columns.  It  is  upon  the  face  of  it 
impossible  to  believe  the  opposite,  if  only  from  the  fact 
that  the  French  have  refused  a^  counter-offensive  of  any 
magnitude  during  the  whole  business,  while  the  nature  of  ■ 
modern  defence  makes  the  losses  of  the  offensive,  ■ 
save  those  of  a  very  rapid  and  successful  offensive  or  of 
one  where  the  losses  are  quickly  cut,  necessarily  higher 
than  the  losses  suffered  by  its  opponent. 

Nevertheless,  the  German  authorities  instruct  their 
press  to  repeat  continually  the  legend  that  the  German 
losses  are  actually  inferior  to  the  French  upon  this  sector. 
One  inspired  writer  said  half  !  And  whatever  Germany 
says  about  her  losses  or  any  other  matter  is  religiously  be- 
lieved by  a  certain  section  of  opinion  here.  It  may  be 
of  service,  therefore,  if  we  go  into  some  detail  on  the 
matter,  though  I  have  already  dealt  with  the  rough  proof 
more  than  once. 

Those  who  are  on  the  offensive  in  such  work  as  that 
which  is  going  on  at  Verdun  act  as  follows  : 

First  they  deliver  a  very  great  number  of  large  calibre 
high  explosive  shell  over  the  advanced  trenches  they  are 
about  to  attack,  delivering  at  the  same  time  a  certain 
proportion  of  shell  upon  points  behind  the  lines  :  Points 
where  they  believe,  or  have  discovered,  a  battery  to  be 
established  :  Points  through  which  men  and  supplies 
must  pass  to  reach  the  advanced  trenches. 

Under  this  intensive  bombardment  the  advanced 
trenches  are  virtually  obliterated  in  a  certain  number  of 
hours.  A  few  machine  gun  shelters  will  remain  and 
possibly  a  few  sections  of  trench  which  men  can  still 
hold.  But  the  design  and  the  effect  of  this  continued 
bombardment  is  to  obliterate  the  defensive  quality  of  the 
first  line. 

Now  it  is  never  possible  to  be  certain  of  the  extent  to 
whiclt  your  initial  bombardment  has  really  destroj'ed 
your  opponent's  defensive  powei-s  in  these  first  lines.- 
You  do  not  know  in  what  strength  he  was  holding  them 
to  begin  with,  nor  exactly  where  his  principal  fire-power 
may  lie  when  you  come  to  advance,  nor  even  what  de- 
fensive elements  may  have  escaped  the  effects  of  the 
bombardment.  But,  at  any  rate,  during  this  preliminary 
stage  the  attacking  party  is  suffering  no  losses  in  direct 
connection  with  attack  ;  the  defending  party  is  certainly 
suffering  some  losses  and  may  be  suffering  heavy  losses. 
Meanwhile,  the  defenders  are  also  at  w'ork  busily  de- 
livering shell  against  places  where  they  believe  the 
attackers'  batteries  to  be  situated,  upon  his  communication 
trenches,  and  other  points  through  which  men  and  supplies 
must  pass  and,  of  course,  upon  the  enemy's  own  advance 
trenches  from  which  the  attack  will  be  launched.  The 
defence  cannot  be  quite  certain  of  the  line  from  which 
the  assault  will  spring.  It  is  further  handicapped  by  the 
fact  that  the  offensive  concentrates  fire  upon  points 
chosen  by  itself,  and  a  counter-concentration  is  not  possible 
at  short  notice  and  in  equal  strength. 

From  all  these  causes  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose,  and 
it  is  in  fact  the  case,  as  many  months  of  experience  have 
taught  all  the  belligerents,  that  during  this  preliminary 
phase  the  losses  of  the  defensive  are  superior  to  the 
losses  on  the  side  which  is  about  to  attack. 

How  much  superior  depends  upon  a  hundred  local 
accidents.  But  the  capital  point  to  seize  in  the  nature 
of  the  losses  suffered  during  this  first  phase  is  that,  short 
of  excessively  bad  management  or  bad  quality  of  troops 
which  cannot  hold  a  line  save  very  densely,  or  the  effect 
of  surprise,  the  main  losses  of  neither  party  are  suffered 
during  this  preliminary  phase. 

It  is  in  the  second  phase  that  the  really  heavy  losses 
appear. 

This  second  phase  opens  in  one  of  two  ways :  Either 
a  whole  large  body  leaps  out  of  the  trenches  to  the  attack 
and  attempts  to  rush  the  battered  trenches  of  the  defence 
immediately  before  it  or — what  is  much  the  commonest 
plan  now  in  front  of  Verdun — comparatively  small  bodies 
arc  sent  out  as  a  sort  of  skirmishers  to  find  out  what 


resisting,  power  remains  to  the  battered  lines.  In  the 
second  case,  if  the  skirmishers  find  that  the  defensive 
power  is  greater  than  was  expected  no  main  attack  is 
launched  ;  while  if  it  is  found,  or  thought  to  be  found  (for, 
of  course,  the  defensive  attempts  to  deceive)  sufficiently 
weakened  by  the  bombardment,  then  the  main  attack 
follows  in  a  great  swarm,  sometimes  as  many  as  five  men 
being  allowed  in  it  (exclusive  of  all  reserves)  to  the  yard 
run. 

Here  enters  a  point  of  considerable  moment  in  this 
discussion.  What  is  the  enemy's  formation  in  attack 
before  Verdun  ?  Some  people  speak  as  though  he  always 
came  on  in  very  close  formation  on  which  the  play  of 
fiel-d-gun,  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire  is  murderous.  Others 
aflirni  that  he  has  abandoned  tliis  old  tradition  of  his 
and  attacks  in  open  order. 

The  discrepancy  in  evidence  is  simply  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  enejny  uses  both  methods ;  one  witness  has 
experienced  the  one,'  another  the  other. 

For  instance,  the  great  attack  on  the  eastern  slope  of 
Mort  Homme  two  months  ago,  the  Silesians  were  disposed 
in  successive  waves  of  assault.  But  in  the  attack  before 
Cumieres  the  other  day,  there  were  dense  columns ; 
columns  as  dense  as  the  old  formations.  Whatever 
the  reason  for  such  a  murderous  plan,  that  was  the  fact 
as  reported  by  actual  witnesses  in  the  French  press. 

The  moment  these  considerable  bodies  appear  they  are 
a  target  not  only  for  the  remaining  advanced  rifle  and 
machine  gun  fire  of  the  defensive  Hne,  but  for  the  field  guns 
of  the  defence,  which  have,  of  course,  studied  every  yard 
of  the  ground  over  which  the  attack  must  pass. 

It  h  in  this  phase  that  the  heavy  casualties  occur.  And 
during  this  phase  one  of  two  things  must  happen.  Either 
the  great  main  effort  of  the  attack,  even  if  it  be  repeated 
over  and  over  again,  fails  to  get  home  or,  at  last,  some  of 
its  elements  do  get  into  the  battered  trenches  of  the 
defence  and  occupy  them.  If  there  is  great  momentum  in 
the  attack  they  even  push  on  well  beyond  towards  the 
second  line.  In  the  first  case,  the  losses  of  the  attack  are 
overwhelmingly  greater  than  those  of  the  defence.  They 
may  be  ten,  twelye  or  twenty  times  greater.  There  is 
no  comparison  between  them. 

In  the  second  case,  the  attack  must  also  normally  lose 
much  more  than  the  defensive,  but  not  so  enormously 
more.  For  there  will  be  a  considerable  amount  of  hand- 
to-hand  fighting  in  which  many  of  the  defenders  will  be 
killed  and  wounded,  and  all  those  over  whom  the  attack 
passes  and  who  survive  will  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
attackers  as  prisoners,  and  will  be  permanently  lost  to 
their  own  side. 

So  far  we  have  the  mathematical  certainty  that  the 
offensive  will  lose  more  than  the  defensive.  It  will  lose 
rather  less  during  the  preliminary  phase,  but  during 
the  second  phase,  which  is  the  only  critical  one  in  the  way 
of  losses,  it  will  lose  enormously  more  if  the  attack  fails, 
and  considerably  more  even  when  it  succeeds.  The  only 
exception  to  such  an  obvious  truth  is  to  be  found  wheia 
the  quality  of  the  defence  is  so  poor  that  it  has  to  be 
densely  packed  to  meet  attack  at  all,  and  breaks  down 


Sovtes  Sbakespeaviattae 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE 

To  the   British  Navy. 

T/ie  grace  of  Heaven 
Before,  behind  ihec,  and  on  every  hand 
Emvheel  thee  round ! 

Otbcllo  n.,  i..  8S-7. 

The   Braggart  Enemy. 

The  man  thai  once  did  sell  the  lions  skin 
While    the    beast    lived,    was   killed  iviih 


hunting  him. 


Henry  V.,  IV.,  iii.,  93-4. 


The  German  Fleet  off  Jutland. 

They   that    of   late    wc^-e    daring    with 

their  scoff's 
Areglad  and  fain  by  flight  to  save  themselves. 

1  Henry  VI.,  III.,  ii.,  113  4. 


T| 


L  A  N  1) 


\\'  A  T  K  R 


June  8,  jqiG 


tlio  moment  the  attack  approaches  :  a  modifuation  of 
thus  kind  does  not  ap])Iy,  ol  cours«\  to  what  iV  f,'oin^'  on 
before  Wrdun  where  tlio  defence  is  skilful  and  stubborn. 

It  will  be  clear  from  the  above  that  a  verv  considerable 
element  in  the  deciding  of  what  extra  losses  the  attack 
snlTers  is  the  ])ro|Mirtion  of  successful  to  nnsuccessfn! 
assaults.  We  can  tabulate  pretty  accurately  this  pnv 
portion  in  front  of  Wnlnn.  Coimtinf,'  only  the  main 
attacks  deli\ered  by  iarne  bodies  of,  say,  at  least  a  brigade. 
i:  soems  to  work  out  rouj,'hly  at  about  hve  to  one.  To 
one  occasion  in  which  ymi  ha^'e  the  successful  rushing  of 
the  advanced  elements,  such  a><  was  accon>plished  by  a 
couple  of  (iennan  Divisions  between  the  Mort  Honuue 
and  Cumieres  the  other  day,  you  have,  I  think,  about 
live  exactly  similar  ixcasions  in  which  a  main  a>sault  rs 
broken.  And  the  exjK'nso  of  these  is  further  added  to 
by  the  fact  that  the  attempt  is  usually  made  up  of  several 
successive  failures  in  the  same  day. 

If  the  fighting  round  Wrdun  consisted  simpl\-  in  re- 
jn-ated  German  attacks  usually  failing  but  siicceeding 
once  in,  siay.  about  five  times,"  and  therefore  f^radually 
eating  into  the  French  lines  without  reactions  against 
such  an  advance,  the  tierman  losses  would  be  immensely 
higher  than  the  French.     They  might  be  fourfold. 

Bui  there  is  another  category  of  fighting  here  as  wc 
all  know.  The  defenders  launch  counter-attacks,  some- 
times recapturing,  sometimes  faihng  to  recapture  certain 
sections  of  their  line  which  they  think  critical. 

Whenever  action  of  this  kind  is  uiideti;ikrii  tiie  roles 
arc  reversed. 

The  force  whicii  i>  upon  the  whole  im  im  defensive 
is  for  the  moment  attacking  and  loses  proportionately. 
If  these  counter-attacks  were  as  numerous,  and  carried 
out  with  as  large  forces  as  the  main  attacks  of  the  offensive 
we  might  expect  the  losses  on  both  sides  (o  be  equal, 
but  we  know  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  these  counter- 
attacks are  nothing  of  the  kind.  They  are  always 
hx-al,  delivered  over  a  comparatively  small  front,  arid, 
what  is  very  important,  <chai  a  point  taken  in  a  counlcr- 
ttltack  is  abandoned  it  is  abandoned  as  a  rule  b.-fore  the 
heaviest  pressure  of  the  reltirninii  enemy,  has  been  jell.  In 
such  cases  the  territory  yieldecl  is  innnediately  subjected 
to  the  fen  d'ccrascment,  wliicii  can  always  be  delivered 
upon  an  enemy  mass,  the  position  of  which  is  exactly 
known.  It  is  a  tactic  which  cannot  be  employed  of  course 
when  territory  is  lost  in  tlie  confusion  of  ari  assault,  but 
it  can  be  employed,  and  is  employed,  when  the  retirement 
is  delibcTate.  "It  wa^  emj^loyed,  for  instance,  at 
Donaumont  fort  on  the  23th  or  26th  of  May,  and  it  was 
employed  two  days  ago  \ipon  the  north  fosse  of  Vaux. 

It  is  a  tactic  possible  only  to  a  defensive  which  intends 
to  remain  a  defensive,  fot  it  is  a  tactic  only  open  to  a 
force  which  is  willing  to  yield  ground  on  condition  of 
making  an  enemy  pay  the  price  for  that  ground. 

1  have  no  more  certain  information  on  the  matter  than 
any  reader  of  this.  I  receive  private -letters  dealing  with 
\'erdun  now  and  then  and  have  heard  information  second- 
lumd,.  I  read  the  accounts  in  the  foreign  press-  often 
by  eye-witnesses — and  I  have  followed,  of  coursi-,  tlie  judg- 
mt'Uts  of  the  chief  writers  upon  the  Continent.  I  do  not 
juetend,  therefore,  to  anything  but  an  estimate  or  a  guess, 
but  1  will  suggest  that  even  in  the  present  stage  of  the 
struggle,  with  the  French  nearly  stationary  and  the  great 
attacks  following  each  other  at  considerable  intervals, 
there  is  a  disproportion  between  the  two  sets  of  losses  of 
more  than  two  to  one. 

The  Southern  Russian  Offensive 

Tt  is  unfortunate  for  the  ]nnposes  of  this  article  that 
the  offensive  which  the  K\issiajis  have  undertaken  against 
the  .\ustrian  lines  south  of  the  Priiiet,  or  rather  the  news 
of  it,  .should  only  be  learned  in  London  just  as  these 
lines  are  written.  No  details  enabling  us  to  analyse  the 
great  movement  or  to  conjecture  its  probable  dexelop- 
ment,  or  even  its  main  objective  are  jet  available. 
We  are  told  (by  the  Austrians)  that  the  heaviest  fighting 
has  taken  place  a  little  south  of  the  centre  of  the  line- 
but  there  is  nothing  sufficiently  definite  to  guide  us  to 
even  the  most  general  statement  at  the  moment  of  writ- 
ing. We  can  only  await  further  developments.  The 
facts  as  contained  in  the  two  communiques,  Austrian 
and  Russian,  are  as  follows  : 

After   a   preliminary    bombardment,    undertaken    ap- 


parently upon  all  sections  of  the  southern  eastern  front 
from  the  I'ripct  to  the  frontiers  of  Roumania,  the  Russian 
infantry  attacked  last  Sunday  upon  sectors  covering  the 
whole  line  and  had  before  reening  made  13,000  prisoners, 
and  had  also  captured  a  certain  (unnamed)  number  of 

The  inteiisixc  bombardment  was  proceeding  as  the 
infantry  advanced.  The  main  weight  of  the  pressiire 
was  u\yim  the  watershed  between  the  Styr  river  and  the 
Pruth,  with  especiallx'  -"^ '"•■  li'-htiiig  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Okna. 

Till-  I'lUssian  local  au\aui  c  wa.-  most  j)ronounced  im- 
mediately to  the  north-west  of  Tarnopol,  and  appears 
to  have  o\erla|)|)ed  upon  cither  side  the  specially- 
strengthened  position  of  I\uzpow,  to  the  west  of  the 
latter.  Strong  attacks  were  also  delivered  in  the  region 
north-west  of  Dubno.  The  whole  affair  is  apparently 
onl\'  beginning,  and  at  the  moment  of  writing  ( fuesday 
evening)  no  details  arc  available  upon  which  to  pass  any- 
considered  judgment. 

The  German  Glass    '17 

Onr  of  tlie  principal  objects  of  speculation  with  tlie 
Allied  command  at  this  moment  is  the  exact  time  when 
tiie  (icrman  class  iqij  (the  last  of  the  contingents  called 
up)  will  be  compellerl  to  appear  in  the  field. 

I  have  recci\ed  not  a  few  accounts  from  private  sources, 
some  of  them  detailed  accounts,  of  the  presence  of  the  1917 
class  already  in  the  field.  But  I  have  seen  no  evidence 
that  give  these  isolated  instances  the  value  of  a  general 
polic\-.  I  have  seen  no  evidence,  official  or  even  private, 
of  any  considerable  numbers  of  the  1917  class  yet  present 
in  the  fighting  units. 

The  date  generally  given  as  the  latest  upon  which  tli. 
Kji;  class  will  appear  in  considerable  force — that  is,  the 
latest  date  to  which  the  Germans  can  ]>ostpone  calling 
upon  these  lads  for  the  maintenance  of  their  effectives- 
would  seem  to  be  the  end  of  the  present  month.  That,  at 
least  is  the  general  opinion  upon  the  Continent,  both 
among  the  Allied  students  of  the  war  and  neutral  students. 
I  presume  that  the  fixing  of  this  date  as  the  last  moment 
of  entry  for  the  class  is  based  upon  intelligence  from 
within  Gerniany.  Common  sense  would  lead  one  to 
belie\e  that  it  could  not  be  postponed  \  ery  nuich  later. 
.Aluch  of  Class  I()i7  has  already  been  kept  back  later  than 
the  other  young  German  contingents.  It  was  first  called 
up  a  little  before  the  corresponding  French  class,  because 
the  German  effectives  arc  .somewhat  more  exhausted  in 
proportion  than  are  the  French.  The  French  began 
calling  up  their  1917  elass  in  January.  The  Germans 
began  calling  their  1(117  ^'l^^s  in  Deceniber.  The  incor- 
poration went  on  through  January,  and  the  tail  end  of 
It  lasted  through  February.  But  "even  though  the  Ger 
mans  c(mtinued  their  incorporation  of  the  i()i7  class  uj) 
to  the  \ery  end  of  February  that  would  still  give  a  full 
four  months  between  the  date  of  the  incorporation  of  the 
last  of  these  and  the  end  of  the  present  month,  and  six 
months  since  the  first  were  called.  Four  months  is  the 
average  length  of  time  after  which  the  (iermans  think  it 
safe  to  put  newly  trained  men  into  the  lield. 

There  is,  by  the  way,  interesting  evidence  also  to  hand 
of  the  use  of  iqi6  before  this  class  was  put  into  the 
furnace  of  \'erdun.  Some  prisoners  taken  from  tlii> 
class  were  found  to  have  already  seen  service  in  Serbia. 
Presumably  onl>-  after  the  occupation  of  Serbia  was  com- 
pleted, and  used  only  for  policing  and  garrison  duties. 

H.  BKii.Oi 


Aulcs  on  Slnvl  l-i-li!u!!^.  a  sixpennv  manual  issued  by 
Messrs.  horsier  (.room  and  Co..  is  tlic  first  book  of  anv  kind 
that  has  appeared  devoted  to  tliis  subject,  and,  in  viewof  tli-.- 
pn.bable  diange  that  will  come  over  the  Flanders  front  with 
the  end  of  the  trench  warfare,  it  is  one  that  recommend^ 
Itself  for  study  by  militarv  men.  Ilinls  for  Flioht  Sub- 
J.ieulcnanis  (is.  net),  publislud  bv  the  same  firm,  is  a  booklet 
of  common-sense  advice  for  the"  Roval  Naval  Air  Service. 
written  by  a  ftiglit  lieutenant,  and  containing  many  useful 
tips.  Other  recent  publications  b\'  this  firni  are  Gunnery 
iormiihe  Simplified  lis.  net),  by  Lieut.  L.  N.  Rawes,  K.A., 
and  Musltetrv  (M.  net),  the  latter  a  verv  -handv  little  intro- 
cfucton-  study  of  the  mechanism  of  the  rifle,  care  of  arms, 
and  the  meanmg  of  "  musketry  "  as  the  term  is  at  present 
applied  to  the  use  of  tl.e  ,in<-  :M,d  irainin"  iturein 


June  y,  i<jiO 


LAND      &      WATER 


15 


The    Prime    Minister 


A  Character  Sketch 


THE  judgments  of  history  di)(in  llie  nu-n  who  con- 
trol events  in  the  great  crises  of  the  world  arc 
often  widely  different  from  contemporary  criticism . 
There  is  no  reputation  more  tmassailable  to- 
diiy  than  that  of  Pitt.  Yet  few  men  suffered  svuli  a 
running  fire  of  attack  as  he  did  from  tlie  critics  of  his 
jiolicy.  And  Lincoln,  whose  name  has  become  a  fixed 
star  in  the  lirinament  of  history,  was  harried,  insulted 
;'nd  traduced  by  Horace  Crreelev  in  the  "  New  ^'ork 
Tribune  "    with  a  \-irulence  that  has  become  historic. 

ft  is  well  to  remind  oinselvcs  of  these  things  to-day. 
When  a  week  or  two  ago  a  well  known  newspaper  invited 
from  the  publip  '"  Ten  shillings  Groans  for  Asquith  " 
as  a  form  of  contribution  to  the  Red  Cross  Fund  I  asked 
myself  what  history  would  be  likely  to  say  about  those 
"groans."  Would  it  endorsL^  them.or  would  it  marvel  at 
the  vulgarity,  the  hysteria,  the  le\ity  that  prcxluced  the 
appeal  ?  \\'ill  its  judgment  be  for  Mr.  Asfjuith,  or  for 
the  critic;  ? 

History's  Verdict 

In  attempting  to  answer  these  questions  we  must 
remember  that  history  will  not  see  this  vast  conflict  as 
we  sec  it,  in  momentary  fragments,  in  flying  day  to  day 
glimpses,  by  half  lights  and  vague  hints,  through  the 
haze  of  rumour  and  the  emotions  of  our  ho})es  and  our 
fears.  It  will  see  it  in  the  large,  by  the  light  of  full 
knowledge  and  by  the  understanding  of  those  great 
currents  and  tendencies  which  we  see  so  dimly,  but  which 
are  fashioning  the  decision  and  upon  which  the  momentary 
incident,  which  seems  so  big  to  us,  floats  like  driftwood 
upon  the  surface  of  the  torrent.  The  historian  will  see 
the  forest.  We  can  only  sec  the  tr:es.  He  will  see 
motives  and  complex  causes  ;   we  can  only  sec  results. 

It  would  be  imjiertinent  to  aijticipate  his  judgment  ; 
but  it  is  not  impertinent,  it  is  even  neccssarj',  to  suggest 
some  considerations  as  to  what  his  judgment  will  be.  And 
this,  not  in  the  interest  of  Mr.  Asciuith.  I  suppose  tliere 
is  no  man  who  has  played  a  great  part  in  the  affairs  of  this 
country  who  has  been  more  indifferent  to  popular  ap- 
plause, less  moved  by  criticism,  more  obstinately  reliant 
upon  the  sanctions  of  his  own  mind.  He  is"  York- 
shire "  to  the  last  iibre — a  sort  of  sublimated  Y"orkshire 
manufacturer,  saturated  with  Oxford  culture,  but  carry- 
ing the  original  grain  of  the  timber  into  every  detail  of 
his  life  ;  a  little  brusque  in  his  manner,  as  the  Yorkshire 
manufacturer  is  ;  very  scornful  of  all  forms  of  flummery  ; 
brief  and  lucid  of  speech  ;  suspicious  of  cant  in  others 
and  avoiding  it  with  a  sort  of  intellectual  horror  himself; 
more  attached  to  principles  and  to  historic  tradition  than 
to  adventurous  empiricism,  but  with  a  healthy  distrust  of 
his  imaginative  limitations  tliat  keeps  his  judgment  open 
to  the  empiricism  of  others ;  a  man  who  bears  opprobrium 
with  a  scornful  shrug  of  the  shoulders  and  a  silent  tongue, 
and  upon  whom  flattery  is  as  much  wasted  as  water 
on  a  duck's  back. 

But  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  country  it  is  extremely 
imiiortant  that  we  should  try  to  understand  what  history 
will  have  to  say  about  Mr.  Asquith.  For  it  is  only  by 
that  detachment  of  vision  that  we  can  range  ourselves 
on  his  side  or  the  side  of  his  critics.  And  we  have  to 
do  one  or  the  other.  We  have  to  trust  someone  in  this 
tremendous  crisis  of  our  history.  Is  he  the  man  to  trust, 
or  can  we  do  better  ?  And  let  us  start  with  the  elemen- 
tary reminder  that  whomsoever  we  trust  it  will  be  a  human 
being,  and,  for  that  reason,  a  fallible  instrument.  The 
choice  is  not  between  a  miracle  and  a  man,  between  per- 
fection and  imperfection  ;  it  is  between  relative  perfection 
and  imperfection.  ^Ir.  y\squith  would  be  the  first  to 
disown  irvfallihility.  He  cultivates  no  fanciful  fictions 
about  himself,  does  not  pose  before  the  mirror,  and  has 
no  dreams  of  personal  triumph.  He  is,  indeed,  singularly 
impersonal  in  his  habit  of  thought.  An  acute  critic  has 
said  of  him  that  he  has  no  jealousy,  no  vanity  and  no 
egotism.  I  think  that  is  the  strict  truth.  The  sugges- 
tion that  he  clings  to  office  for  the  sake  of  power  and  profit 
is  made  either  in  total  ignorance  of  the  man,  or  in  malice. 


F"ew  men  are  more  free  from  the  \ice  of  ambition  or  the 
•])assion  of  j)ersonal  power,  and  in  regard  to  the  baser 
suggestion,  it  is  enough  to  remember  that  he  gave  up 
an  income  at  the  bar  of  £15,000  a  year  when  he  took 
office -at  £5,000.  He  has  no  small  ends  to  serve  and  it  is 
tliis  fact  which  gives  his  actions  that  rare  magnanimity 
that  always  marks  them.  He  wants  no  man"s  place  in 
the  suli,  and  is  content  to  let  anyone  have  the  limelight 
rather  than  himself,  ^\'hat  lie  is  conc<>rned  about  is 
getting  the  thing  done,  and  the  man  who  <"an  do  it  is 
welcome  to  the  rewards.  In  all  his  career  there  has  nc\T'r 
been  a  breath  of  suspicion  in  regard  to  his  jjrobity  or  his 
honour.  He  })reserves  both  with  a'  certain  haughty 
liisdain  of  temptation.  I  should  not  like  to  be  the 
l)crson  who  suggested  a  "  job  "  to  him.  I  think  I  see 
the  glare  of  his  eyes  and  the  swelling  of  the  nostrils  at  the 
hint  that  he  is  that  sort  of  man.  He  has  a  family  of  ^ons 
as  brilliant  as  any  in  the  land,  but  thej'  have  had  to 
make  their  own  fortimes  and  they  have  had  less  chance  of 
public  pickings  than  if  they  were  outside  the  circle  of 
))atronage.  They  have  taken  their  place  in  the  army 
without  ad\'ertisement,  one  of  them  has  been  woundi^d, 
and  none  of  them  has  had  any  sort  of  favour  either  of 
advancement  or  service.  They  are  not  of  the  stuff  that 
asks  for  soft  jobs  and  preferential  treatment. 

Personal  Motive   Power 

What,  then,  is  the  motive  that  hits  kept  this  man  at 
his  post  in  the  face  of  every  form  of  slander  and  abuse  ? 
^^'hat  has  enabled  him  to  survive  a  succession  of  crises 
each  of  which  has  threatened  to  engulf  him  ?  I  think  the 
secret  is  his  austere  devotion  to  the  cause  and  his  clear 
\'ision  of  the  jjart  he  is  called  upon  to  play.  It  is  neither 
vanity  nor  ambition  that  governs  that  vision,  but  the 
plain  understanding  of  the  essentials  of  victory  and  of 
the  bearing  of  his  own  personality  upon  them.  There  are 
many  swifter  a  id  more  supple  minds,  but  there  is  no  mind 
which  sees  the  struggle  with  more  detachment,  with  a 
more  constant  grip  of  fundamentals,  with  a  clearer  dis- 
crimination between  the  momentary  incident  and  the 
permanent  tendency.  He  is  not  the  sla\-e  of  moods, 
but  sticks  with  grim  obstinacy  to  the  vital  things.  It  is 
easy  on  a  superficial  survc}'  of  his  actions  to  convict  him 
of  weakness  here,  of  infirmity  of  purpose  there,  of  slow- 
ness of  vision,  and  of  many  other  deficiencies.  To  this 
critic  he  seems  faithless  to  i)rinciples  ;  to  that  he  seems 
blinded  by  his  traditions  to  the  shattering  impact  of  reali- 
ties. On  this  side  he  surrenders  a  friend  who  is  virulently 
slandered  ;  on  that  he  allows  a  curious  latitude  to  those 
who  are  obviously  pursuing  independent  and  even  un- 
friendly courses. 

All  this  is  puzzling  until  one  grasps  the  underlying 
thought  that  resolves  all  the  seeming  contradictions  into 
one  motive.  That  motive  is  the  steady  consolidation  of 
all  the  forces  of  the  country  and  of  the  Allies  for  the 
struggle.  In  the  midst  of  the  Najiolconic  wars  Pitt  was 
once  asked  what  was  the  most  important  quality  in  a 
statesman  ?  Various  answers  had  bqen  given  by  those 
about  him.  When  the  question  was  put  to  Pitt,  he 
replied  "  Patience."  Some  years  ago  Mr.  Asquith,  in 
a  speech,  recalled  that  famous  reply  and  declared  his 
agreement  with  the  verdict. of  Pilt.  It  is  that  declara- 
tion which  re^•eals  to  us  the  secret  of  his  polic\'  in  tiic 
midst  of  the  stupendous  stornr  that  has  overtaken  the 
world.  What  was  the  chief  peril  with  which  that  storm 
threatened  us  ?  It  was  that  under  the  shock  the  nation 
would  give  way  to  passion  and  panic,  that  internal 
|jolitiral  disagreements  would  break  it  in  pieces,  that  the 
Allies  would  be  beaten  before  they  could  consolidate 
tiieir  power^  that  the  Alliance  would  collapse  before  it 
could  discover  a  solid  basis  of  co-operation  and  under- 
standing— in  a  word,  that  Germany  would  win  before  the 
Allies  had  had  time  to  collect  their  forces,'  marshal  their 
strength  and  learn  how  to  win. 

That  calculation  has  been  defeated.  It  has  been 
defeated  by  the  patient  and  sagacious  statesmanship  of 
Mr.  Asquith.     Through  two  years  of  unprecedented  peril. 


lb 


LAND      cS:      W  A  T  1-:  R 


June  ci,   lijiG 


in  the  midst  of  a  torrent  of  niisrcpri-scntation  and  mis- 
un<>-'rstanding,  in  the  face  of  dirticulties  of  incalculable 
gravity,  enveloped  by  cabals,  tugged  at  oti  this  side  by  the 
fierce  partisans  of  his  own  school,  assailed  on  that  side  by 
the  suspicions  of  the  opposing  school,  he  has  p\irsued  the 
one  dominating  purpose  of  his  policy  with  unHinching 
tenacity.  He  has  turned  a  blind  eye  to  the  cabals,  he 
has  been  patient  with  the  impatient,  he  has  led  this 
body  of  thought  by  persuasive  tolerance  from  one  side 
and  that  body  of  opposed  thought  from  the  other  side, 
he  has  smoothed  away  personal  hostilities  and  softened 
ancient  political  asperities,  and  all  the  time  he  has  been 
collaborating  to  make  the  foundations  of  the  Alliance 
deep  and  enduring.  The  stem  ordinance  of  restraint  that 
he  has  imposed  upon  himself  has  carried  him  through 
crisis  after  crisis.  In  the  eyes  of  his  enemies  he  is  always 
about  to  fall  and  at  the, end  of  every  attack  he  is  seen 
to  be  more  firmly  rooted  than  before. 

Mr.    Asquith's  Influence 

And  the  reason  is  as  creditable  to  his  traditional 
opponents  as  to  his  own  merits.  The  influence  which  he 
exercises  over  the  Conservative  members  of  the  Cabinet 
is  notorious.  It  has  brought  them  under  the  censure  of 
a  certain '  section  of  their  Press  which  openly  charges 
them  w  ith  the  betrayal  of  their  cause.  It  is  a  foolish 
and  unjust  charge.  The  truth  is  that,  Uke  Mr.  Asquith, 
they  are  living  to-day  for  a  cause  more  precious  even  than 
their  party.     They  sec  in  Mr.  Asquith  a  disinterested 


passion,  a  liigh  sense  of  public  duty,  an  entire  forgctful- 
ness  of  self,  r^d  a  masculine  comprehension  of  the  com- 
plex factors  of  the  struggle  that  command  fheir  confidsnce 
and  draw  out  the  best  that  is  in  them,  "  I  went  into  the 
Cabinet  "  said  one  of  them  "  believing  that  Asquith  was 
an  extinct  force  :  to-day  1  know  he  is  the  only  thinkable 
leader  in  this  emergency." 

He  has  made  mistakes,  as  Pitt  made  them,  as  Lincoln 
made  them,  as  everyone  who  has  to  deal  with  the  in- 
tractable elements  of  human  life  and  the  incalculable 
forces  vi  war  must  make  them.  But  in  the  large  estimate 
which  the  future  will  form  of  the  mighty  doings  of  this 
time,  it  is  not  a  very  hazardous  forecast  to  say  that  the 
achievement  of  Mr.  Asquith  will  stand  out  as  the  supreme 
personal  contribution  to  the  victory  that  awaits  us.  He 
has  ke]it  a  cool  head  and  a  iirm  judgment  in  the  midst 
of  a  reeling  world.  He  has  carried  every  element  of  the 
nation  with  him  step  by  step  in  the  task  of  converting 
it  into  one  vast  instrument  of  war.  He.  has  formed  the 
nucleus  around  which  the  various  and  often  conflicting 
forces  of  a  Democratic  society  have  cohered  for  a  common 
purpose,  and  he  has  kept  the  mind  of  the  country  steadily 
lixed  on  the  great  end.  In  a  very  real  sense  he  represents 
that  English  rock  of  dogged  purpose  and  unfaltering 
endurance  upon  which  the  schemes  of  Napoleon  finally 
broke  and  upon  which  those  of  the  Kaiser  are  doomed 
to  break.  They  will  break  all  the  sooner  because,  happier 
than  Pitt,  he  has  been  able  to  keep  the  Alliance,  on  whose 
integrity  victory  depends,  invulnerable  to  the  machina- 
tions of  the  enemy. 


Kitchener's  Grave 

By  James   Douglas 

Nobly  her  warrior  sleeps  with  Drake  and  Hood 

In  the  old  grey  shrine  whose  walls  are  her  green  waves, 

Hero  not  least  of  her  heroic  brood. 
Soldier  of  soldiers  in  her  gra\'e  of  graves. 

Her  tears  are  salt  as  her  own  spindrift  blown. 
Her  heart  is  sad  as  her  own  sea-mew's  cry, 

Over  her  eyes  a  mist  of  grief  is  thrown. 

But  his  voice  whispers  :  "  Britain  shall  not  die  !  " 

Out  of  the  deep  he  calls,  out  of  the  deep 
His  valiant  voice  rings  like  a  clear  sea-bell, 

Out  of  his  sleep  he  calls,  out  of  his  sleep  : 

"  Go  for\varcI,  Britain  !    Forward  !    All  is  well '  " 

While  on  her  head  the  battle-thunders  broke, 
While  round  her  face  the  battle-lightnings  played, 

Her  seas  were  sorrowing  o'er  their  grudging  stroke, 
Her  waves  were  grieving  o'er  the  shroud  they  made- 

Her  billows  knew  the  warp  and  woof  they  wove. 

Have  they  not  woven  it  a  thousand  years  ? 
Bitter  their  guardianship,  and  dark  tlieir  love, 

And  pitilessly  pitiful  th'eir  tears. 

Stand  strong,  thou  smitten  isle  !   Glory  in  death 
More  glorious  tlian  too  much  inglorious  life. 
Stand,  as  he  stood,  like  granite  :  breathe  thy  breath, 
As  he  breathed  his,  in  calm,  unwearying  strife. 

"  Death  in  the  tide  of  duty  full  and  free. 
Death  in  the  wind  of  victory  brave  with  brine. 

Death  in  the  arms  of  my  unconcpiered  sea — 

If  thir,  be  (1(  ath."  quoth  Britain,   "  be  it  mine  !  " 


L'ndcr  Three  i-laf^s,  by  St.  Clair  Livingston  and  Ingeborg 
Steen-Hansen  (Macmillan  and  Co.,  3s.  Od.  net)  is  a  concise 
and  rather  impersonal  record  of  tlu;  work  of  two  nurses  in 
Belgium.  France,  and  Serbia.  The  most  attractive  part  of 
the  i>ook  is  that  wliich  deals  with  work  in  Serbia  before  its 
final  overrunning  liy  tiernians  and  Biilgarians.  The  last 
chapter  of  the  book  curries  the  story  on  to  the  retreat  from 
Monastir,  and  one  feels  ^  the  end  that  even  the  fate  of 
Belgium  is  better  than  tliat  of  Serbia.  As  a  study  of  life 
among  the  human  wreckage  of  war,  this  book  is  one  of  the 
best  that  has  yet  appeared. 


Raemaekers'  Gift. 

With  a  total  of  nearly  four  million  pounds,  the  Times 
Red  Cross  Fund  stands  as  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
charitable  enterprises  of  the  war — and,  in  fact,  as  one  of 
the  greatest  contributions  to  the  relief  of  suffering  ever 
organised  by  a  private  corporation.  A  recent  contribution 
of  note  to  the  fund  is  made  by  Louis  Raemaekers,  who 
has  given  the  first  set  of  signed  proofs  of  his  cartoons  to 
be  sold  in  aid  of  the  Fund  for  the  benefit  of  the  French 
and  British  Red  Cross  Societies. 

The  nominal  value  of  this  set  of. artist's  proofs  of  the 
world  famous  cartoons,  of  which  there  are  150  subjects, 
is  one  guinea  each,  but  this  set,  forming  the  first  im- 
pressions taken  from  the  approved  plates,  would  naturally 
be  of  greater  \-alue  than  even  under  normal  circumstances. 
This  is  still  farther  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  each  plate 
is  stamped  with  a  die  which  records  that  it  was  given  by 
the  artist,  whose  signature  it  also  bears,  in  aid  of  the  work 
of  the  French  and  British  Red  Cross  Societies. 

The  work  of  Louis  Raemaekers  is  well  known  to  readers 
of  L.AND  &  W.\TER,  in  black  and  white  i-eproduction ,  but 
this  set  is  produced  in  "  four-colour  facsimile,"  which 
gives  practically  the  same  delicacy  and  power  as  in  the 
original  drawings — only  an  expert  could  tell  the  difference 
if  reproductions  and  originals  were  placed  side  by  side. 

Such  subjects  as  "  The  Yscr,"  corpses  floating  on 
their  way  to  Calais,  "  The  German  Tango,"  "  Barbed 
Wire,"  and  "  The  Zeppelin  Triumph,"  have  already  won 
world-wide  fame.  The  gift  of  this  set  of  proofs  is  worthy 
of  its  object  ;  Raemaekers  has  given  the  best  that  is  at 
his  command  in  aid  of  the  greatest  humane  enterprise 
that  the  war  has  called  into  being.  The  full  set  of  150 
subjects  has  already  been  purchased  by  Lord  Furncss. 


Sortcs   Sbahespcaviaiux 


B,    SIR    S  UNEV    LEE 


Earl   Kitchener.  ^        ,.      ,      ,     ,,  , 
•        C  wittmely  death  ! 

Kint  Lc«r.  IV..  Ti..  256. 

Thou  ha{d)$l  that  in  thee  indeed^  which 
I  have  greater  reason  to  believe  novo  than 
ever,  I  mean  purpose,  courage  and  valour. 

Oihello.  IV..  ii..  216-8. 

Thou  art  mighty  yet; 
Thy  spirit  walks  abroad. 

Julius  Gtcsar.  V.,  iii..  94-5. 


June  8,  1 916 


LAND      5:     WATER 

Germany's   Mistakes 

1,— Strategical 
By  Colonel   Feyler 


17 


[Colonel  Fcxlcr.  Su'ikci'laiid'x  distinguished  military 
critic  tchose  itritings  arc  follo'iccd  carefully  by  students 
of  the  li'or  throughout  Europe,  contributes  to  Land  & 
Water  three  articles  on  "  Germany's  Mistakes."  The 
first,  which  appears  below,  deals  unth  her  strategical 
blunders.  Next  xveek  Colonel  h'eyler  ivill  write  on  her 
political    and    ajterwards     on     her    moral    mistakes.] 

IT  is  only  when  the  full  consequences  become  mani- 
fest that  one  can  obtain  a  clear  insight  into  the  errors 
committed  by  a  staff  or  by  an  army  at  the  beginning 
of  an  action.  In  the  future,  when  Germany  has  been 
vanquished,  it  will  be  of  absorbing  interest  to  examine  the 
mistakes  which  will  have  led  to  the  downfall  of  so  power- 
ful and  so  formidably  prepared  an  Empire.  From  a 
military  point  of  view,  such  mistakes  can  be  classified 
imder  four  heads,  to  wit,  tactical,  strategical,  political  and 
moral,  each  succeeding  variety  more  grave  than  the 
other. 

Tactical  mistakes  are  those  committed  on  the  actual 
battlefield  by  subordinate  commanders,  or  even  by 
private  soldiers ;  strategical  mistakes  are  those  of  a 
General  Staff  in  the  preparation  of  military  operations 
and  in  the  orders  issued  for  the  purpose  of  ranging  the 
armies  in  order  of  battle  ;  political  mistakes  may  be 
made  by  a  belligerent  Government  in  its  resolutions  re- 
garding the  declaration  and  the  conduct  of  war,  and 
may  have  effect  on  mutual  relations  with  other  States, 
and  lastly,  moral  mistakes  are  such  as,  whether  com- 
mitted by  Government,  General  Staff,  commander  or 
soldier,  outrage  individual  or  national  consciences. 

All  these  mistakes  may  be  repaired,  but  under  very 
unequal  conditions,  for  the  reparation  needs  time  in  pro- 
portion to  the  gravity  of  the  mistake. 

Tactical   Blunders 

Tactical  mistakes  can  usually  be  corrected  immediately 
or  at  no  long  interval  after  their  commission.  On  many 
occasions  a  failure  at  one  point  of  the  held  is  balanced 
by  a  success  at  another.  Such  mistakes  are  so  common  that 
the  victor  of  an  action  is  not  he  who  fails  to  commit  any, 
but  he  who  succee'ds  in  committing  the  least.  Strategical 
mistakes  are  of  deeper  import,  for  a  single  one  may  spoil 
a  whole  battle  or  even  a  whole  campaign.  Woltke  wrote 
that  a  strategical  error  at  the  beginning  of  a  war  might 
compromise  the  whole  course  thereof. 

Still  more  serious  are  political  mistakes,  for  they  may 
put  in  danger  the  very  existence  of  the  State.  For  in- 
stance, Napoleon  III.  foresaw  a  struggle  with  Prussia  ; 
nevertheless  he  allowed  her  to  crush  Austria  alone  at 
Sadowa,  thus  imperilling  the  interests  of  France  and 
necessitating  a  new  war,  at  much  greater  risk,  in  an  effort 
to  counterbalance  the  effects  of  the  first.  Unfortunately, 
this  new  war  merely  aggravated  conditions,  and  forty- 
four  years  were  to  elapse  before  another  attempt  was  made 
to  settle  the  same  question.  And  lastly  again,  moral 
mistakes  may  have  to  be  paid  for  by  the  shame  and 
humiliation  of  countless  generations. 

Which  of  these  faults  can  be  laid  at  Germany's  door  ? 
If  appearances  do  not  mislead,  all  !  This  is  why  Ger- 
many's position  in  the  war  seems  very  grave  to  all  who 
can  see  further,  so  to  speak,  than  the  mouth  of  a  420mm. 
liowitzer.  There  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  Germans 
winning  yet  more  victories,  for  the  last  word  is  not  spoken 
until  the  last  gun  has  ceased  fire.  Napoleon  saved 
himself  in  infinitely  more  critical  situations  ;  but  then 
he  was  Napoleon — and  even  he  eventually  succumbed. 

It  is  too  early  to  discuss  the  tactical  mistakes  ;  these 
are  rarely  decisive,  and  the  Allies  ha\-e  probably  com- 
mitted just  as  many  as  the  Germans.  Such  errors  can 
only  be  of  general  interest  if  their  nature  and  frequency 
betray  a  mistaken  general  method.  Such  a  study  would 
need  an  exhaustive  examination  of  numerous  actions. 

Strategical  errors  make  themselves  more  immediately 
manifest.     We  can  already  ask  ourselves  whether  the  Ger- 


mans did  not  commit  a  first  mistake  in  1914  in  passing 
to  the  left  bank  of  the  Belgian  ^Meuse,  and  a  second,  even 
more  apparent,  in  sweeping  blindly  forward  between 
Paris  and  Verdun.  ,We  may  further  ask  whether  the 
first  mistake  was  not  due  to  too  blind  an  adherence  to 
Moltke's  strategy,  nor  the  second  to  ton  literal  an  applica- 
tion of  the  tactical  theory  of  a  pursuit  which  is  to  make 
the  victory  doubly  complete.  Lastly  we  may  ask  whether 
these  two  errors  do  not  reveal  a  state  of  o\'er-confidence 
reinforced  by  under-estimation  of  the  enemy.  These  can, 
however,  be  but  passing  questions,  for,  in  strategy  as  in 
tactics,  it  is  the  subsequent  facts  -which  lead  to  a  definite 
conclusion,  and  we  may  not  simply  say  "  It  was  a  mistake 
to  act  thus  "  without  seeking  to  laj'  down  the  correct, 
or  at  least  a  less  objectionable,  course  of  action. 

With  this  reservation  then  (for  a  detailed  examination 
is  impossible  until  the  end  of  the  wa*)  we  can  safely  state 
that  the  two  mo\'ements  above  quoted  have  c\;ery  appear- 
ance of  being  strategical  mistakes. 

Crossing  the  Meuse 

The  disadvantages  consequent  upon  the  crossing  to  the 
left  bank  of  the  Meuse  have  shown  themselves  to  be  the 
following  :  A  great  loss  of  time,  whi'ch  postponed  the 
moment  of  the  general  attack  just  when  one  of  the  essen- 
tial conditions  was  that  this  attack  should  be  immediate 
and  overwhelming.  To  keep  in  alignment  with  the  left 
wing  in  Alsace,  the  right  wing  had  to  march  for  several 
days  which  would  have  been  better  employed  had  it 
kept  to  the  right  bank  of  the  river.  This  loss  of  time  was 
aggravated  by  a  resistance  superior  to  the  expectations 
of  the  German  Staff,  who  had  imder-estimated  the 
value  of  the  obstacles  to  be  overcome,  thus  leading  to  a 
further  delay  in  the  general  attack  and  the  loss  of  the 
strategic  element  of  surprise  which  was  the  fundamental 
point  of  the  operation.  A  second  disadvantage  of  this 
movement  between  Meuse  and  Scheldt,  was  the  extension 
of  front  thereby  involved,  necessitating  a  large  increase 
in  the  forces  engaged,  whereas  the  plan. of  a  campaign 
against  France  and  Russia  simultaneously  advised  strict 
economy.  Proportionate  reserves,  too,  had  to  be  con- 
•stituted.  A  third  disadvantage  was  in  the  extension  of 
lines  of  communication  in  an  enemy  country,  which 
immobilised  considerable  forces. 

The  consequences  of  the  second  strategical  mistake, 
namely  the  blind  rush  between  Paris  and  Verdun,  were 
even  more  immediately  conspicuous,  and  the  German 
armies  were  forced  to  beat  a  hasty  retreat  out  of  the  trap 
into  which  they  had  rushed.  Quite  truthfully,  this  was 
described  as  a  "  concentration  to  the  rear  "  and  quite 
inaccurately  as  a  "  voluntary  retirement."  No  one  will 
easily  believe  that  the  German  Staff  led  their  advancing 
columns  forward  till  their  heads  almost  reached  the 
Seine  with  the  intention  of  withdrawing  them  bC3'ond 
the  Marne  only  forty-eight  hours  later.  They  retired 
because  they  were  taken  in  flank,  and  they  were  taken  ill 
flank  because  their  higher  command,  precisely  as  in  Bel- 
gium, failed  to  appreciate  the  true  value  of  the  obstacles 
to  be  overcome. 

Since  that  moment  the  second  strategical  mistake  has 
not  ceased  to  manifest  its  consequences.  The  weaker 
the  German  forces  grow,  the  more  hampering  is  the  effect 
of  the  great  extension  of  their  lines.  Moltke's  saying, 
that  such  a  mistake  may  compromise  the  whole  course 
of  a  war,  threatens  to  find  confirmation. 


Camp  Craft,  by  Warren  H.  Miller,  editor  of  the  American 
journal,  Field  and  Stream  (B.  T.  Batsford,  Ltd.,  7s.  6d.  net.) 
is  a  practical  work  devoted  to  camp  lore,  with  an  introduction 
by  Ernest  Tliompson  Seton.  Cooking,  shooting,  tents,  camp 
comforts  and  organisation,  are'a  few  of  the  subjects  treated, 
and,  though  camping  is  considered  from  the  American  point 
of  view,  lovers  of  the  open  air  in  this  country  will  find  the 
work  a  mine  of  information  on  the  practical  side  of  cnmping 
out,  and  the  nearest  way  to  comfort  and  the  perfect  health 
that  comes  of  life  in  the  open. 


la 


L  A  N  D      c<v      W  A  T  E  R 


June  S,  1916 


Letters   to  a  Lonely   Civilian 


[These  hi/ers.  which  will  appear  weekly,  are  from  the 
pen  of  him  who  wrote  "Aunt  Sarah  and  the  W'lir." 

MY  Di:ak  You,— Every  "  Lonely  OfliciT  "  has 
liis  letter-bag — even  the  \er>'  Lonely  One  who, 
in  some  odd  romantic. moment  is  driven  to 
advertise  for  it  !  And  there  seemed  to  be  just 
ii  tinj,'o  of  envy  in  your  tone  when  you — a  Lonely  Civilian, 
often  far  afield  inthe  service  of  the  State — si)uke  of  tho 
snowing-under  of  a  Soldier-Solitary  who  had  thus  publicly 
appealed  to  a  benevoletice  he  found,  to  his  confusion, 
he  had  underrated.  So  I  made  the  ready  promise  of 
the  rash  ;  an.d  passed  my  word  that  you  should  hear  from 
nie  weekly  in  your  favourite  paper. 

You  told  me  you  had  e\en  more  than  your  usual 
leisure  for  reading  just  now,  being  a  diplomatist  and 
therefore  a  bit  out  of  a  job  NVhereuixm  I  quoted 
('arlyle  pat  :  "  Diplomacy  is  clouds  :  beating  of  your 
enemies  is  land  and  sea."  And  then,  little  fore-knowing, 
I  sat  down  and  wrote  to  you  an  every-day  letter,  with  a 
])un  here,  and  a  parado.x  and  pretty  bit  of  gossip  there-— 
all  in  ink  that  has  a  little  gall  for  an  ingredient- -or  my 
chemistry  has  gone  rusty.  Then,  before  I  could  post  my 
missive,  the  news  came.  The  North  Sea  blotted  out  my 
characters,  as  though  they  were  sins. 

Of  course  I  spare  you  recapitulations.  All  other 
papc^rs  shall  be  taken  as  read  ;  and  for  me  remain  only 
such  domestic  episodes  as  those  that  may  Iwlp  to  bring 
home  the  big  issues— elusive  by  their  very  size  ;  such 
episodes,  too.  as  may  easily  miss  any  other  recorder. 

Ascension  Day  passed,  and  we  did  not  know.  The 
next  daj'  brought  rumours — but  we  had  heard  so  many 
of  their  sort.  On  that  evening,  however,  came  the 
Admiralty  announcement.  1  read  it  o\er  three  times, 
and  I  read  it  \et  again.  So  it  was  really  true  !  Then 
I  passed  fromthe  general,  itself  overwhelming,  to  the 
particular — overwhelming  too.  For  I  had  just  left  a 
friend— the  bearer  of  a  familiar  name — who,  when  the 
war  began,  was  the  devoted  father  of  four  sons.  One, 
when  that  fateful  Fourth  of  August  caihe,  was  already 
in  the  Welsh  Fusiliers  ;  another,  an  Oxford  undergradu- 
ate, loving  life,  loving  poetry,  instantly  transformed  him- 
S'.>lf  into  a  subaltern  in  the  Koyal  Scots.  Quite  early  in 
the  war — within  the  short  space  of  one  week — these  two 
boys  gave  us  their  young  lives.  Now  the  anniversary 
of  their  deaths  had  passed  ;  those  who  lovexl  them,  and 
could  never  cease  to  lament  them,  had  entered  ujion  ■ 
outwardly  normal  ways — even  an  unbroken  night's  slecj) 
had  begun  to  re\-isit  their  pillows.  For  they  had  even 
this  to  reconcile  them  to  life — a  third  son,  sixteen  years 
young,  a  gay  and  guileless  middy  on  the  Iiuicfati'^ablc. 
'•  Your  haj^py  son  "  had  been  the  signature  of  his  last 
letter  home.  How  strange  that  I  should  be  writing 
it  !  He  could  not  have  brooked  so  much  ])ubli(  ity.  His 
fellow  middies  would  never  have  let  him  hear  the  last  of  it 
—and  that  Lieutenant,  whom  he  had  to  wake  for  the 
morning  watch  !  I  have  to  pull  myself  together  to 
realise  that  these  too,  are  gone — they  will  read  no  more 
any  human  writing.  And  what  it  means  for  these  now 
thrice  bereaved  parents— you  will  understand.  I  leax'c 
it  at  that.  It  may  be  I  have  said  too  much  ;  but  private 
griefs  are  now  no  more.  Into  the  larger  family  of  the 
nation  merges  each  one  of  those  five  thousand  households 
to-day  united  in  a  coirimon  loss. 

Politicians,  who  used  to  shake  their  heads  over  the 
arbitrariness  of  our  laws  of  primogeniture,  might  now  feel 
altogether  at  ease.  Prti|)ertv  now  passes  by  right  of  a 
sad  rotation  to  the  younger  born  !  The  lifty  lighting  heirs 
of  peerages  who  have  made  way  for  their  juniors  are  only 
part  of  a  multitude  of  other  elder  sons  of  answering 
renunciations.  1  know  cases  where  two,  and  even  In  the 
instance  already  quoted  where  three,  brothers,  heirs  to  an 
estate,  have  in  turn  laid  down  their  inheritance,  lea\-ing 
the  succession  to  a  boy  not  yet  emerged  from  the  nursery  : 
a  family  tragedy,  but  wliat  a  memory  for  that  young 
heir,  and  for  England  ! 

^'ou  will  have  seen  that  some  other  friends  of  yours 
and  mine  already  advertise  for  sale  their  lovely  house  in 
which  we  were  so  happy  as  fellow-guests — among  its 
beauties  that  \-ision  of  the  sea  from  the  front  windows.* 


Their  son,  their  only  son,  has  passed  away  witli  his 
ship  ;  and  the  sight  of  the  sea  has  become  unendiuable 
to  those  who  li\ed  by  the  lo\-e  of  him.  You  remember 
how  Mrs.  hJrowning,  while  yet  Elizabeth  Barrett,  lost  her 
brother,  Edward,  through  the  foundering  of  his  boat  in 
Babbicombe  Bay  ?  Henceforth  "even  the  sound  of  the 
sea  becauK!  a  horror  to  her."  I  suppose  these  are  things 
that  cannot  in  any  useful  way  be  argued  about.  But  the 
earth  is  still  beloved  of  UK-n  and  women,  though  plotted 
out  in  unforgotten  gra\'es  ;  and  the  sea  may  claim  to  be 
in  some  sort  the  kindest  and  most  decent  place  of  sepul- 
chre. Anyway,  the  Angel  of  the  Resurrection  was  as 
cognizant  of  the  elemental  water  that  shall  gi\e  up  the 
Dead  that  are  in  it,  as  he  was  of  the  closer  clasping  arms 
of  .Mother  Earth  :  and  that's  what  most  matters.  How 
have  the  waves  of  the  sea  been  likened,  by  the  poets  we 
both  li\e  by,  to  a  hundred  things,  from  a  lamb's  fleece 
and  a  horse's  mane  to  human  wrinkles  !  But  to  many 
all  eye  those  billows  will  henceforth  stand  up  as  grave- 
stones. Nameless,  yes  ;  but  the  names  of  those  who 
die  at  sea  for  lingland   are  writ  on  that  water. 

Talking  of  names,  somebody  said  to  me  the  other  day 
an  ob\ious  thing,  which  yet  might  easily  escape  unie- 
marked.  The  Kaiser  does  not  know  the  names  of  our  Dead  : 
but  our  Dead  know  the  name  of  the  Kaiser.  What 
ghosts  will  yet  arraign  him  when  he  reaches  the  shades ! 
Not  his  will  be  "  the  sprightly  port  "  that  makes  the 
ghosts  gaze.  Napoleon  will  need  to  cower  no  more — 
he  will  hold  up  his  head — amid  his  comparati\'ely  in- 
sjgnilicant  cohort  of  accusers. 

I. ike  me,  I'm  sure  you  scanned  with  mixed  feelings  the 
Honours'  List  last  Satmday — that  morning  of  Deathday 
rather  than  of  Birthday  Honours.  1  own  I  saw  all  the 
time  between  the  lines  the  name  of  the  man  who  had  given 
three  sons  to  England,  but  I  knew  it  was  not  on  the 
printed  list,  and  I  knew,  too,  that  no  name  there  could 
rank  with  his  in  equality  of  sacrifice.  A  new  irrelevance 
seemed  to  have  sudclenly  entered  into  all  human 
reckonings  of  distinction.  AH  the  same,  I  didn't  lind 
myself  at  all  among  the  cynics  when  I  saw  that  an 
O.M.  had  gone  to  Mv.  Balfour  in  recognition  of 
his  distinguished  services  to  Literature  and  Philosophy. 
Why  not  ?  An  unlucky  moment,  I  grant,  for  the  an- 
nouncement ;  but  the  time  wasn't  of  his  own  choosing  ; 
it  was  all  in  the  ordintuy  course  ;  and  so  I  couldn't 
waste  that  still  strangely  conjmon  commodity,  a  smile, 
on  the  man  who  surfeited  my  ear  with  the  stale  W'histler 
persiflage  about  Leighton,  the  master  of  so  many  other 
roles,  also  "  a  bit  of  a  painter."  I'm  only  glad  we  have  a 
First  Lord  who  is  also  a  lover  of  Letters  and  of  Philosophy 
-the  things  which  really  do  count  for  Mankind-in-t he- 
making. 

Ordiinuiiu'ss  is  ind(x'd  a  great  need  for  us  all  just  now  ; 
and  in  defence  of  the  exercise  of  it  even  in  the  date  of 
publishing  a  list  of  Birthday  Honours,  battle  or  no  battle, 
just  because  it's  due,.  I  will  tell  you  a  not  tod  outlandisli 
story.  There  was  a  great  Italian  Saint  (at  least  one 
church  in  London  bears  his  name  in  its  English  version) 
who  was  jjlaying  cards  with  his  friends  when  a  question 
arose— how  really  mucli  more  to  the  j)oint  than  any  ever 
asked  in  Parliament  !  "If  you  had  only  a  minute  to 
live,  what  would  you  do  with  it  ?  "  That  was  the  in- 
stant proposition.  One  card-player  said  he  would  hasten 
into  church,  another  he  would  kneel  down  right  there  ;  — 
but  the  Saint  :    "  And  I  would  go  on  with  my  game  !  " 

On  this  same  ])arallel  of  ordinariness.  I  could  not  be 
severe  on  the  ('iramnKuian  of  the  family  who  i)outed  a 
us\ial  jKiut  over  a  little  lapse  of  the  language  he  loves 
e\en  in  an  affecting  Admiralty  notice.  So  and  so,  it 
said.  "  was  not  on  board.  All  the  other  officers  on  board 
were  lost."  Had  Literature's  O.M.  (affectionately  hailed 
"  Old  Man  "  that  day  by  a  friend  never  before  so 
familiar  !)  passed  an  Admiralty  clerk's  superfluous  and 
even  rather  misleading  "  other  "  ? 

How  shall  I  sign  myself  to  you  ?  Y'mi  said,  when  last 
we  talked  far  into  the  night"-(there  are  no  fri«?nds  like 
new  friends)— tliat  I  was  your  double  in  many  of  my 
reflections  !  So  let  me  sign  DovBi.E-Yor,  whicli  is  more 
concisely  written  as  what  hajipens  to  lie  also  mv  own 
Christian  initial—  w 


June  8,   1916. 


LAND     &    WATER 


19 


IN  the  Onoto  you 
really  have  got  a 
Fountain  Pen  which 
you  can  carry  upside 
down  in  the  pocket  with- 
out a  drop  of  ink  leak- 
ing out.  A  turn  of  the 
top  of  an  Onoto  pen 
seals  it  absolutely,  and 
renders  it  safe  to  carry 
in  any  position. 

Further  the  Onoto  fills 
itselfinaflash  from  any 
ink  supply,  liquid  or  pellet,  and 
by  the  same  arrangement  which 
erables  you  to  render  it  leak 
pr-oof  you  can  regulate  the  ink 
supply  to  suit  your  particular 
requirements. 


cs 


^ 


The  Onoto  is  a  British  inven- 
tion, produced  by  a  British 
Company  with  British  Capital. 
It  stands  alone  as  the  one  really 
satisfactory  Self-filling  Safety 
Fountain  Pen. 


The     Military     size 
nts  the  soldier's  pockets 

Prices  from  10/6  to  £5-5-0 

Onoto 

THE   Pen 


Thomas  De  La  Rue  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  Bunkili.  Row,  London. 


QUALITY 


FORTMASON 
BOOT 

SAVES     YOUR     FEET. 


accounts  for  the  extraordinary 
success  of  Burberrys. 

THE  BEST— ALWAYS  THE 
BEST    OF     EVERYTHING. 

Other  factors  contribute  to  this 
success,  but  the  chief  is  QuaHty, 
which  enables  Burberrys  to  reduce 
the  weight  of  their  Weatherproofs 
to  a  minimum. 

Weigh  other  Weatherproofs  against 
a  Burberry.  The  Burberry  is  with- 
out exception  much  the  lighter. 

There  are  two  reasons  for  this — 
both   QuaHty. 

The  inferior  quality  must  be  hidden 
in  bulk. 

Take  a  gun  or  fishing  rod.  Bulk 
and  weight  invariably  denote  the 
cheap  and  common,  whereas  light- 
ness with  strength  denotes  the  good. 

Further,  other  proofings  being 
m.erior,  resort  has  to  be  made 
to  bulkier  textures,  backed  up 
even  then  by  impervious-to-air 
materials,  like  Oiled-Silk,  thereby 
acknowledging  failure. 

Every  item  from  start  to  finish 
in  a  Burberry  bespeaks  Quality, 
because  it  is  Quality  which  has 
made 

BURBERRYS 

and  Quality  maintains  for  them 
their  unparalleled  position. 


Officers' 


This  Marching  Boot 
is  as  soft  as  a  slipper, 
very  strong,  and  f  lb. 
to  1  lb.  lighter  than 
any  similar  boot 
Send  an  old  boot 
for  measurement. 


35/- 

PER    PAIR 

Illustrated  Catalogue  showing  every  type  of  Boot  and  Shoe  worn  at 
the  Front,  also  Catalogue  of  Raincoats,  Valises,  Mattresses, 
Blankets,  Kit  Bags,    Saddlery,   etc.,   etc.,    sent    on    application. 

FORTNUM    &    MASON, 

Piccadilly,       London, 


THE  BURBERRY 

Safeguards    both 
Health  and  Comfort. 

ITNLIKE    RUBBER   or 

^^     Oiled-Silk  interlined  coats, 

THE     BURBERRY    pro- 

vides  an  effective  safeguard 
against  rain  and  tempest,  yet  is 
healthful  and  comfortable  to 
wear.  There  is  no  clammy 
moisture,  no  overheating  or 
fatigue,  because  t  aerates  the 
body  through  millions  of  tiny 
interstices  in  the  cloth  —  too 
small  for  wet  to  percolate. 

ITNLIKE  LEATHER  or 

^^  other  fabrics  depending 
on    weight    for    security,  THE 

BURBERRY  turns  th= 

keenest  wind  and  ensures 
luxurious  warmth  on  cold  days, 
yet  its   weight  is  negligible. 

ITNLIKE  ALL  OTHER 

*^        forms       of        protection 

THE  BURBERRY  is  not 

affected  by  excessive  heat  or 
cold.  It  retains  its  weather- 
resistance  ani  stab  lity  foryears, 
without  deterioration  by  the 
roughest   usage. 


NAVAL    OR    MILITARY 

WEATHERPROOFS. 

Until  further  notice  BURBERRYS 
CLEAN       AND       RE  -  PROOF 

Officers'     "  Burberrys,"      Tielockea 
and  Burberry  Trench- Warms 

FREE    OF     CHARGE. 

The  process  takes  lo  days. 


THE  NAVAL 
BURBERRY 


BURBERRYS 

Haymarket      S.W.      LONDON 
8  &    10   Bd.  Malesherbes    PARIS 


20 


LAND      &     WATER 


June  8,  191J 


The  Hohenzollern  Ghost 


By  Francis  Gribble 


THEY  speAk  of  the  ghost  as  The  White  Lady. 
Her  local  habitation  is  a  certain  tower  of  a 
certain  old  Schloss— old,  for  BerUn,  that  is  to 
say — on  the  banks  of  the  Spree,  built  by  the  first 
King  of  Prussia,  who  was  envious  of  the  glories  of  Ver- 
sailles ;  but  1  had  never  heard  of  her  until  she  cropped  up 
in  the  course  of  a  conversation  during  my  involuntary 
sojourn  in  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  in  wartime. 

It  was  on  the  day  on  which  my  host  gave  a  party  in 
honour  of  a  huge  salmon  trout  which  he  had  caught  that 
morning  in  the  Our.  No  friends  of  Prussia  were  present, 
and  speech  was  consecjuently  free.  We  discussed  the 
fish,  and  then  we  discus.sed  the  war.  Some  one  pro- 
duced an  almanack  containing  the  predictions  of  Madame 
de  Thebes — a  prophetess  whose  reputation,  I  fancy,  no 
longer  stands  exactly  where  it  did  ;  and  then,  superstition 
having  been  approached,  someone  else  said  : 

I  hear,  too,  that  the  White  Lady  has  been  seen.  It's 
a  good  sign.  Something  is  going  to  happen — something 
that  they  won't  like.     Wait  and  see." 

We  waited  and  we  saw.  What  happened  was  the  Battle 
of  the  Marne.  The  Germans  have  never  yet  formally 
admitted  that  they  did  not  like  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  ; 
but  tliey  have  not  challenged  our  credulity  of  boasting 
of  it  as  an  agreeable  experience,  so  that  we  are  entitled  to 
our  own  estimate  of  their  feehngs. 

Luxemburg,  it  may  be,  took  an  exaggerated  view  of 
their  disappointment  ;  for  Luxemburg  claimed  to  have 
heard  from  a  charwoman,  who  claimed  to  have  access  to 
the  waste  paper  basket  of  the  General  Staff,  that  Germany 
had  lost  no  fewer  than  160,000  prisoners  in  that  action  ; 
but  that  is  a  side  issue.  The  main  point  is  that  the 
mention  of  the  White  Lady  and  her  warning  aroused  my 
cariosity,  and  started  me  on  pliant asmological  research. 

"  Who  was  she  ?  "  I  asked  ;  and  it  appeared  that 
no  one  knew  for  certain. 

"  What  does  she  do  ?  "  I  asked ;  and  there  again  I 
came  up  against  conHicting'versions  of  the  Hohenzollern 
ghost  story. 

According  to  some,  the  White  Lady  wandered  nightly 
through  the  passages  of  the  Palace,  and  only  entered  the 
royal  apartments  on  the  eve  of  the  death  of  a  member  of 
the  royal  family.  According  to  others,  the  spot  which 
she  ordinarily  haunted  had  never  been  discovered,  and  no 
one  ever  saw  her  except  a  prince  who  was  about  to  die. 
According  to  all,  however,  her  apparition  was  a  presage 
of  misfortune. 

It  was  agreed,  too,  that  she  was  the  mistress  of  one 
of  the  Electors  or  Margraves  of  Brandenburg  ;  but 
different  authorities  gave  different  Electors  and  Margraves 
the  credit.  There  was  no  evidence  which  could  fairly 
be  called  evidence  ;  but  the  most  convincing  story — 
artistically  convincing,  I  mean,  of  course — identifies  her 
^vith  a  certain  Agnes  von  Orlamundc  of  whom  a  certain 
Margrave  Albert  the  Handsome  was  enamoured. 

"  Willingly  would  I  marry  this  beautiful  widow,"  said 
Albert  the  Handsome,  "  if  it  were  not  for  four  eyes  which 
watch  and  worry  me.  ' 

The  beautiful  widow  thought  that  he  referred  to  the 
four  eyes  of  her  two  children,  and  she  killed  those  children 
by  piercing  their  eyes  with  a  golden  pin.  But  the  Mar- 
grave really  referred  to  the  eyes  of  his  father  and  mother, 
who  objected  to  the  marriage  ;  and  when  Agnes  dis- 
covered her  error,  her  remorse  drove  her  mad,  and  she  is 
still  condemned  to  haunt  the  earth. 

Perhaps  that  story  is  true — it  has  a  truer  ring,  at  all 
events,  than  any  of  the  others  ;  and,  in  any  case,  Berlin's 
belief  in  the  White  Lady  is  firm,  and  as  well  founded  as 
any  such  belief  can  ever  be.  She  not  only  may  be  seen, — 
she  actually  has  been  seen,  not  once  but  often  in  the  course 
of  the  tragic  Hohenzollern  annals.  And  the  apparition 
has  always  been  followed  by  disaster.  She  was  seen  on 
tbe  eve  of  Valmy,  and  again  on  the  eve  of  Jena  ;  and  even 
Princes  for  whom  she  has  remained  invisible  have  lived 
in  dread  of  the  visioui  If  Frederick  the  Great  was  pro- 
tected from  the  terror  by  his  scepticism,  William  I  was 
not.  Attended  by  a  trembhng  aide-de-camp,  he  once 
spent  the  whole  of  a  long  and  anxious  night  searching  for 
the  White  Lady  in  every  one  of  the  six  hundred  apart- 


ments of  the  Palace  ;  but  his  hour  was  not  yet,  and  there- 
fore she  did  not  appear. 

There  have  been  sceptics,  as  there  are  everywhere — 
sceptics  who  have  vowed  that,  if  ever  they  met  the  White 
Lady,  they  would  speak  to  her  aud  solve  the  mystery  ; 
but  the  only  sceptic  who  ever  tried  that  experiment  paid 
for  his  rashness  with  his  life. 

It  hapf>ened  in  the  reign  of  Elector  Sigismund — he 
whoso  daughter  married  the  illustrious  Gustavus  Adoiphus. 
The  sceptic  was  one  of  the  Elector's  pages ;  and  it 
happened  that,  one  night,  he  saw  the  White  Lady  coming 
towards  him  in  a  dim  corridor.  He  made  a  bold  gesture 
of  gallantry,  taking  her  by  the  waist  and  asking  : 
"  Well,  Madam,  where  are  you  going  ?  " 
There  was  no  word  of  anger  or  of  answer.  The  White 
Lady  had  a  key  in  her  hand — the  key,  doubtless,  which 
was  to  have  admitted  her  to  the  royal  apartment  for  which 
she  was  bound  ;  and  she  rapped  the  page  on  the  head 
with  it.  He  lived  long  »!nough  to  tell  the  story,  but  no 
longer  ;  and  Elector  John  Sigismund  himself  died  in  the 
course  of  the  following  day. 

And  then  there  is  the  story  of  the  White  Lady's  appear- 
ance to  Fredenck  I.,  the  first  of  the  Kings  ol  Prussia. 

This  Frederick,  like  so  many  of  the  Hohenzollerns,  was 
a  bad  husband.  His  first  wife,  Leinbitz's  friend,  Sophie- 
Charlotte  of  Hanover,  kept  sedulously  out  of  his  way  ; 
but  his  second  wife  was  of  the  House  of  Mecklenburg, 
whose  members  are  not  distinguished  by  meekness  or  any 
tendency  towards  self-effacement.  She  put  up  with  a 
good  deal ;  but  when  the  King,  envious  as  has  already 
been  said,  of  the  splendours  of  Versailles,  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  a  Montespan  or  a  Pompadour  was  essential 
to  his  dignity,  if  not  to  his  comfort,  and  established  the 
Grafin  von  Wurtemberg,  the  wile  of  his  Prime  Minister, 
as  his  maitresse  en  litre,  the  point  of  her  endurance  was 
passed,  and  she  resolved  to  act. 

"  Throw  that  woman  out,"  she  said  one  day  to  her 
lackeys  ;  and  the  lackeys  threw  her  out — nght  out  into 
the  street. 

One  can  imagine  the  scandal  and  the  royal  wrath.  All 
Berlin  talked  about  it,  and  neither  King  nor  Queen 
forgave  the  other.  Melancholy,  indeed,  preyed  upon  the 
Queen's  mind,  and  unhinged  it  ;  and  the  rest  of  the  narra- 
tive may  be  given  in  the  words  of  one  of  the  most  recent 
historians  of  the  Hohenzollern  House. 

"  The  King,"  we  read,  "  had  fallen  ill,  almost  at  the 
same  time  as  his  wife,  and  had  not  been  informed  of  the 
Queen's  condition.  She,  one  day  when  she  was  more 
excited  than  usual,  escaped  from  the  room  in  which  she 
was  kept  under  observation,  passed  along  a  gallery, 
and  entered  her  husband's  apartments  through  a  glass 
door  which  she  smashed  with  blows  of  her  fist.  The  King 
was  asleep.  Hearing  the  noise,  he  awoke  with  a  start  ; 
but  he  had  neither  the  time  nor  the  strength 'to  rise  from 
his  bed.  The  Queen  had  thrown  herself  upon  him,  cursing 
him  as  she  did  so.  Terror  overcame  him  when  he  saw  her 
half-clothed,  attired  in  white,  her  hands  and  arms  splashed 
with  blood.  Some  officers  who  were  on  duty  in  an  adjoin- 
ing room  heard  his  cries  and  ran  in  and  rescued  him  ; 
but  Frederick  was  so  affected  by  the  experience  that  he 
fell  into  a  fever.  He  moaned,  as  he  got  into  bed  : 
"  I  have  seen  the  White  Lady.  It  is  all  over  with  me.  " 
The  next  day,  he  died. 

Of  all  the  many  stories  told  of  the  apparation  of  the 
White  Lady,  that  assuredly  is  the  most  dramatic,  unless 
we  give  the  palm  to  the  story  that  it  was  for  sudden  fear 
of  her  that  Frederick  William  turned  tail  from  the 
French  at  Verdun,  in  1792.  The  truth  contained  in  them 
cannot,  of  course,  be  exactly  measured  ;  but  one  can,  at 
any  rate,  affirm  with  confidence  that  they  are  believed. 

The  Hohenzollerns  believe  in  the  White  Lady,  and  so 
do  their  Prussian  subjects.  Whenever  there  is  reason  to 
apprehend  disaster,  either  to  the  realm  or  to  the  rulers 
there  are  always  those  who  look  up  to  the  Palace  window, 
by  night,  fearful  lest  they  should  see  a  white  form  gliding 
past  them  in  the  darkness.  We  may  be  quite  sure  that 
there  are  many  watchers  for  the  White  Lady  now  ;  and 
we  may  be  not  less  sure  that  presently  we  shall  hear  that 
the  White  Lady  has  once  more  been  seen. 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVII   No.  2833  r^^™^] 


TRTTPQnAV      TTTNF    tC     roTfi  tregistered  AST     price   sixpence 

itlUKbJJAi,    JUINXL    15,    lyiu  La  newspaperJ   published  weekly 


hy   Lolll:i    ttu:::iue!i^- 


Pr'ni:!!  excluni'-flfi  :or  '   hand  und    W'nUr 


Der    Tag 

Admiral  Wilhelm     "  Thank  God,  the  Day  is  over  " 


LAND      &      W  A  T  1-: 


June   15,  191(1 


MILITARY  OUTFITS. 

"  A  firm  established  as  Military  Outfitters 
during  tJte  Crimean  War  and  Indian 
Mutiny,  with  the  outfitting  experience  oj 
the  South  African  War  and  the  two  Egyptian 
Campaigns  well  within  the  memory  oj  many 
0/  its  staff,  is  entitled  to  deal  with  the  sub- 
ject of  Military  Outfitting  with  some  degree 
of  authority." — ("  Land  &  Water,"  March 
23) 

A  JOINING  KIT. 

The  following  estimate  includes  all  neces- 
sary for  joining  on  receiving  a  first  com- 
mission ;  Serge  F.S.  Jacket,  63s.  ;  Whip- 
cord ditto,  70s.  ;  I  pair  Slacks,  25s.  ; 
I  pair  Whipcord  Knicker  Breeches,  35s.  ; 
Service  Cap,  15s.  6d.  ;  British  Warm,  84s.  ; 
Sam  Browne  Belt,  42s.  ;  Wiiistle  and 
Cord,  Lanyard.  Puttees,  2  Khaki  Flannel 
Shirts  and  Tie,  Stars,  Cap,  and  Collar 
Badges,  and  half  a  dozen  Khaki  Handker- 
chief ;    total,  £20. 


TROPICAL  KIT. 

Khaki  Wcishing  Drills,  Twillettes,  Sun- 
proof and  Tropical  Serges.  Drill-  F.S. 
Jackets,  buttons,  etc.,  detachable,  35s.  ; 
Calvin  Cord  Riding  Breeches,  38s  ;  Drill 
Slacks  and  Shorts,  i6s.  6d.  and  12s.  6d.  ; 
Wolseley  Helmets,  21s.  ;  Sunproof  Tunic 
Shirts,  pockets  and  shoulder  straps,  17s.  6d. 


THE  TRENCH  COAT. 

Wind,  water,  and  weatherproof.  Recog- 
nised by  the  W.O.  and  officially  brought 
to  the  notice  of  all  officers  commanding 
Corps  in  the  B.E.F.,  the  "  Thresher  " 
has  successfully  met  the  severest  tests  and 
IS  regarded  as  the  best  all-round  garment 
for  every  purpose  and  cverj'  season. 

I    s.  d. 

The  Thresher,  unlined        .414  6 

Lined  detachable  Kamelcott    5   10  0 

Lined  detachable  sheep      . .  7     |  0 


W.O.  CAMP  KIT. 

Officers  going  into  camp  will  require  the 
folding  bedstead,  chair,  bath,  basin,  and 
washstand,  etc.,  etc.,  painted  ;  price, 
ij  I  OS.  Also  the  Thresher  Bolmat.  Par- 
ticulars on  page  xv.  of  present  issue. 


WRITE    FOR    GUIDE    (3) 
TO   KIT   &    EQUIPMENT. 


THRESHER  U  GLENNY 

152     &    153     STRAND, 
.    •'    .  LONDON.  I 


SUMMER    WORKING    KIT. 

Solaro  Tunic  Shirt,  Calvin  Cord  Washinf 
Bre«che«,     and     Ventilated     Twill     Cap. 


June  15,  1916 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSWAY,  LONDON,  W.C 

Telephone:  HOLBORN  2828 


THURSDAY,  JUNE     15.    1916 


CONTENTS 

Der  Tag.     By  Louis  Raemaekcrs  i 

The   Economic   Conference.     (Leading   Article)  3 

The  Russian  Offensive.     Bv  Hilaire  Belloc  4 

Battle  of  Jutland  {continued).     By  Arthur  Pollen  ii 

Epitaphe  (A  Poem).     By  Eniile  Cammaerts  13 

Letters  to  a  Lonely  Civihan  ^4 

A  Bad  School  for  Statesmen.     By  L.  P.  Jacks  15 

Sortes  Shakespearianae.     By  Sir  Sidney  Lee  15 

The  Air  Board.     By  F.  W.  Lanchester  17 

Union  Jack  Club  Extension:    Special  Appeal  19 
Choosing  Kit                                                                    ^   -^ 

THE     ECONOMIC     CONFERENCE 

Two  weeks  ago  we  spoke  of  the  endeavour  to 
arrive  at  a  settlement  of  the  Government  of 
Ireland  difficulty,  "as  the  first  experiment  in 
constructive  statesmanship  which  this  world- 
struggle  has  caused  to  be  attempted  within  the  British 
Empire."  The  Economic  Conference  which  began  in 
Paris  vesterday,  is,  if  we  look  at  it  aright,  the  second 
serious  attempt  in  the  same  direction.  Its  importance 
from  the  Imperial  point  of  view  is  emphasised  by  the 
presence  of  the  Prime  Minister  of  the  Australian  Common- 
wealth and  the  Canadian  Minister  of  Trade  and  Com- 
merce. That  Mr.  Hughes  and  Sir  George  Foster  should 
be  taking  part  in  an  international  council  which  has  for 
its  main  object  the  defence  of  the  peaceful  nations  of  the 
v,-orld  against  renewed  treacherous  aggression  after  the 
war  in  almost  the  very  hour  that  the  men  of  Canada 
and  Australia  arc  lighting  heroically  in  the  trenches 
against  the  onslaught  of  Germany,  is  in  itself  an  event  of 
singular  significance.  We  have  pointed  out  that  a 
solution  of  the  Irish  problem  might  possibly  be  the  easier 
at  this  time  in  that  the  constitution  of  the  Imperial 
Parliament  would  be  one  of  the  first  questions  demanding 
revision  when  peace  was  given  back  to  us.  That  this 
is  an  accurate  view  is  established  by  the  proposals  placed 
before  the  Irish  Parties  wherein  it  is  stated  in  distinct 
terms  that  immediately  after  the  war  an  Imperial  Con- 
ference of  representatives  from  all  the  Dominions  of  the 
Empire  will  be  held  to  consider  the  future  Government 
of  the  Empire.  But  at  Paris  the  supreme  right  has 
practically  been  conceded,  and  freely  conceded,  to  the 
Dominions  of  representation  when  questions  affecting 
the  Empire  as  a  whole  are  under  discussion  with  the 
friendly  Great  Powers  of  Europe.  This  is  an  immense 
stride  towards  Imj^erial  union  on  a  sound -and  common- 
sense  basis.  It  will  be  cordially  welcomed  by  all  men 
of  thought  throughout  the  British' Empire. 

We  speak  of  the  Paris  Conference  as  an  economic 
conference  which  is,  of  course,  quite  correct  in  that  it 
deals  with  questions  of  trade  and  commerce.  But 
we  must  be  on  our  guard  against  confusion  of  ideas,  for 
with  Germany  commerce  is  not  peaceful  barter,  but 
preparation  for  world-power  at  a  future  date.  Not  a 
nation  or  state  e.xists  which  is  not  suffering  from  Pots- 
dam's cunning  and  cleverly  organised  trade  campaigns. 
The  number  of  German  firms  which  have  been  conducting 
prosperous  business  in  these  islands  and  which  are  now 
being  closed  down  is  amazing  to  most  people.  There 
does  not  appear  to  be  a  single  industry  which  has  not 
been  eaten  into  by  Teuton  traders  who,  like  the  lesser 
vennin   of   the   tropics,   have    a    curious    instinct    for 


LAJNU(X\VAiI^K  6 

assimilating  themselves  to  their  surroundings  and  counter 
feiting  the  very  substance  on  which  they  work  destruction. 
While  that  is  so  at  home,  it  is  far  more  the  case  in  the 
Dominions  and  Colonies.  We  hope  that  Mr.  Bonar  Law 
may  signalise  his  administration  of  the  Colonial  Office  by 
tabulating  exact  figures  and  facts  from  all  parts  of  the 
Empire  showing  how  Germany  has  eaten  into  British 
trade  during  the  last  two  decades.  We  ought  also  to 
have  details  of  the  way  in  which  British  traders  have 
been  welcomed  in  (jerman  Colonies,  and  how  they  have 
been  allowed  to  carry  on  their  business  without  let  or 
hindrance  (if  such  instances  exist,  which  we  doubt).  We 
know  that  not  only  have  British  firms  received  no  en- 
couragement t(j  plant  themselves  in  Germany,  but  no 
obstacle  or  injustice  has  been  spared  to  prevent  them 
taking  root  there  except  through  German  Agents. 
Not  a  person  in  his  senses  can  believe  that  the  free  trading 
of  the  past  will  be  permitted  to  Germany  in  the  future, 
if  it  can  be  prevented. 

Can  it  be  prevented  ?  We  believe  so,  but  not  easily 
or  without  sacrifice.  All  trade  questions  are  in  them- 
selves complicated  and  intricate,  and  this  question  of  our 
economic  relations  with  Germany  after  the  war  is  still 
further  involved  in  that  we  shall  have  to  deal  with  an  older 
intellect  than  the  Teuton  and  with  a  race  of  world-wide 
ramifications  and  outstanding  ability  and  age-long 
experience  in  trading.  Germany's  peaceful  penetration, 
as  it  is  called,  could  never  have  attained  its  gigantic 
dimensions  in  so  short  a  period  had  not  the  organising 
and  executive  power  been  largely  furnished  by  Jewish 
brains.  It  is  folly  to  blink  that  truth,  for  it  will  be  a 
dominant  factor  in  the  future.  Mr.  Hughes  in  one  of 
his  earliest  speeches  in  London  said  :  ."  We  may  be  sure 
that  the  great  commercial  interests  of  Germany  drank  in 
with  avid  zest  the  teachings  of  Treitschke  and  Bernhardi." 
Evidence  abounds  that  this  was  not  the  case  ;  Ger- 
many's great  commercial  interests  lived  in  terror  of  these 
very  teachings  ;  this  w(jrld-war  atos  a  continuous  night- 
mare to  them,  for  possessing  to  the  full  those  fine  qualities 
of  the  Jewish  blood,  patience,  perseverance  and  far- 
sightedness, they  saw  world-power  within  their  grasp 
provided  nothing  occurred  to  alann  the  rival  nations 
for  another  twenty  or  at  most  another  forty  years.  The 
Declaration  of  War,  or  to  be  more  exact  the  Battle 
of  the  Marne,  when  the  quick  destruction  of  France  was 
seen  to  be  impossible,  was  the  end  of  .their  dreams  for 
the  time  being. 

As  certainly  as  the  sun  will  rise  to-morrow,  thesa 
same  brains,  directly  peace  returns,  will  plan  and  scheiTle 
to  build  up  their  ruined  hopes  on  the  old  foundations. 
Doubtless  already  they  are  hard  at  work^  No  prejudice 
can  obscure  the  truth  that  the  rapid  coniniercial  rise  of 
Germany  throughout  the  world  has  been  a  miracle — 
an  achievement  of  which  any  nation  has  the  right  to  be 
proud.  It  is  the  purpose  to  which  it  has  been  turned 
that  is  the  danger,  and  the  Powers  will  deserve  neither 
pity  nor  mercy  in  the  future  if  they  shut  their  eyes  to  it. 
We  may  be  certain  of  two  things  ;  first,  that  the  enemy's 
commercial  interests  will  do  everything  in  their  power 
to  persuade  the  Allies  that  Germany  after  the  war  will  be 
a  new  (iermany,  and  therefore  safeguarcls  will  be  un- 
necessary ;  secondly,  that  no  attempt  wil'  be  spared  to 
foster  and  develop  confiicting  interests  and  trade  rivalries 
between  the  Allies.  Against  both  these  perils  we  must 
be  on  the  watch.  It  seems  an  elementary  precaution  for 
the  Allied  countries  to  agree  on  withholdiiig  from  Ger- 
many for  a  period  of  at  least  five  yeai'-s,  but  pre- 
ferably longer,  all  most-favoured-nation  clauses  and  on 
miposing  adet[uate  trade  restrictions  to  enable  the 
economic  conditions  of  their  own  people  to  revert  to  the 
normal.  Though  this  involve  sacrifice,  it  were  nothing 
as  compared  with  the  sacrifices  we  have  endured  owing 
to  our  neglect  of  adequate  precautions  in  the  past. 


LAND     &     W  A  TE  R 


June  15,  1916 


The  Russian  Offensive 


By  Hilaire  Belloc 


THE  new  great  Russian  offensive  upon  the  southern 
part  of  thf  Eastern  front  has  now  so  far  developed 
that  we  are  capable  of  understanding  its  nature 
and  appreciating  the  alternatives  before  it. 
It  is,  of  course,  upon  the  same  model  as  the  other  four 
great  offensives  of  the  series  in  which  it  forms  the  fifth, 
the  other  four  being  the  Austro-dennan  offensive  upon 
the  Dunajetz  undertaken  on  the  last  day  of  April,  I()i5  ; 
the  combined  Allied  offensive  in  Champagne  and  Flanders 
undertaken  last  September  :  the  (ierman  offensive  upon 
the  Verdun  sector  imdertaken  upon  the  21st  of  last 
Ecbruary,  and  the  Italian  offensive  in  the  Trentino 
undertaken  on  the  14th  of  May. 

The  lessons  previously  learnt  in  the  course  of  the  war, 
notably  through  the  partial  French  offensives  in  Artois 
during  the  spring  of  1(115  'ind  during  the  (ierman  un- 
successful offensives  against  the  lines  of  NN'arsaw  at  the 
same  time,  have  been  ajjpreciated  by  all  the  belligerents 
and"  may  be  tabulated  as  follows  : 

<""(i)  A  modern  defensive  line  upon  which  sufficient  time 
has  been  spent  for  its  consolidation  and  equipment  with 
defensive  weapons,  for  the  examination  of  the  ground 
in  front  of  it.  and  for  the  perfecting,  if  necessary,  of  com- 
munications leading  to  it  from  the  bases  and  of  lateral 
communications,  can  be  held  with  a  minimum  of  about 
or  a  trifle  less  than  two  men  to  the  yard  run.  That  is, 
rather  more  than  3,000  men  to  the  mile,  which  figure 
tovers,  of  course,  much  more  than  the  mere  defensive 
line,  including  all  local  rescnes  and  also,  of  course,  every 
branch  of  the  ser\-ice  in  the  armies  holding  the  front, 
but  excluding  the  men  upon  main  comnumications. 

When  we  say  that  this  minimum  of  men  will  "  hold  " 
a  modern  defensive  line  we  mean  that  this  is  what  ex- 
perience has  proved  to  be  the  minimum  in  the  present 
war  for  the  withstanding  of  such  shocks  as  have  been 
delivered  when  conditions  of  armament  were  fairly 
fequal  between  the  two  sides. 

(2)  Such  a  line  being  established  and  reposing  upon 
flanks  which  cannot  be  turned,  can,  it  is  presumed  (but 
hardly  yet  proved)  be  broken  by  a  combination  of  two 
offensive  factors  : 

(a)  Prolonged  and  intense  artillery  preparation  :  That 
is,  the  delivery  of  a  \ery  great  weight  of  high  explosive 
lafge  calibre  shell,  far  superior  in  amount  for  the  space 
and  time  in  question  than  had  ever  been  prepared  for 
Yintil  the  later  phases  of  this  great  campaign. 

■  Thus,  the  Allied  artillery  preparation  of  Champagne 
last  September  was  quite  tenfold  or  more  than  tenfold 
the  artillery  preparation  of  nine  months  before. 

To  this  preparation  by  heavy  artillery,  which  flattens 
tout  the  advance  trenches,  interrupts  more  or  less  all 
communication  with  those  trenches,  bewilders,  confuses 
and  throws  into  disarray  the  men  defending  the  line,  is 
added  intense  work  from  the  field  guns  against  the 
obstacles  before  the  trenches,  especially  with  the  object  of 
destroying  the  most  effective  of  these  obstacles,  the 
barbed  wire  entanglements. 

(b)  The  launching,  immediately  after  this  artillery 
preparation  ceases,   of  great   masses   of   infantry  which 

fccupythe  region  devastated  by  the  artillery,  capture 
,  he  sur\'ivors  of  those  who  held  the  advance  lines  and 
push  forward  as  far  as  they  can  towards  the  second  line 
of  defence  beyond. 

Each  of  the  great  offensives  has  been  based  upon  these 
two  main  principles  combined.  They  are  no  more  than 
the  extension,  upon  a  prodigious  scale,  of  similar  princi- 
ples which  have  governed  all  siege  work  since  the  intro- 
duction of  artillery  and  firearms  in  general.  It  is  onlv 
the  vastly  increased  mass  of  shell  that  must  be  delivered 
.  within  a  given  period  and  over  a  given  area  as  well  as  the 
•vastly  increased  effectives  for  the  infantry  work  following 
which  distinguishes  this  attack  upon  the  modern  defensive 
from  the  older  siege  model. 

The  object  of  such  an  offensive  is  immediately  the  break- 
'ing  of  the  enemy's  front  and  ultimately  the  envelopment 


of  so  great  a  portion  of  his  armies  as  shall  leave  the 
remainder  in  a  position  of  manifest  inferiority.  Such 
an  ultimate  result,  were  it  ever  attained,  would  be  a 
true  ."  decision,"  that  is,  the  campaign  would,  in  that 
field  at  least,  be  won  by  the  belligerent  who  should  attain 
that  ultimate  object. 

So  much  being  said  with  regard  to  the  main  principles 
now  discovered  to  be  essential  to  a  great  offensive  against 
modern  entrenched  and  unturnable  lines,  there  remain 
to  be  considered  a  number  of  points  in  which  the  great 
offensives  ha\e  differed  among  themselves,  partly  through 
the  accumulation  of  experience  after  each  attempl  and 
the  consequent  development  of  or  changes  in  the  methods 
of  attack  ;  partly  through  the  different  conceptions  of 
war  held  by  the  various  commands. 

The  Element  of  Surprise 

Thus  it  is  clear  tliat  the  element  of  surprise  is  of  great 
value.  If  a  complete  surprise  could  be  effected  it  would 
be  decisive.  But  it  is  also  dear  that  the  element  of  sur- 
prise has  been  largely  eliminated  from  modern  warfare 
by  the  use  of  aircraft,  while  it  is  further  evident  that  the 
accumulation  of  ^■ery  large  pieces  and  their  munition- 
ment  is  an  affair  so  slow  and  ponderous  that  rapidity, 
a  main  element  in  surprise,  is  largely  eliminated. 

Roughly  speaking,  the  Allies  have  attempted  to  produce 
this  element  of  surprise  by  prefacing  their  o'ffensives  with 
general  bombardments  all  along  the  line,  which  might 
leave  the  enemy  in  doubt  as  to  the  sector  to  be  ultimately 
attacked  in  force,  while  the  Germans  have  regarded 
expenditure  of  ammunition  along  the  whole  line  as  a  waste, 
believing  apparently  that  no  true  surprise  is  possible. 

Their  preparations  against  Verdun  were  not  prefaced 
by  a  general  bombardment  ;  neither  were  their  prepara- 
tions against  the  Dunajetz  nine  months  before.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Austrian  accumulation  of  munition  and 
guns  in  the  mountains  before  their  recent  offensive  in  the 
Trentino  was  certainly  capable  of  concealment  from  the 
Italians  in  some  large  degree,  and  the  element  of  surprise 
entered  considerably  into  the  first  success  of  that  offen- 
sive. Before  \'erdun  and  upon  the  Dunajetz  the  Ger- 
mans made  their  preparations  in  such  fashion  that  whether 
through  their  own  fault  or  from  their  contempt  of  the 
element  of  surprise,  the  Allies  were  well  acquainted  with 
those  preparations  weeks  before  the  offensive  was  de- 
livered. 

Again,  there  has  been  development  in,  and  also  dis- 
cussion upon  the  size  of  the  sector  against  which  the 
offensive  should  be  delivered.  On  the  whole,  the  Allies 
have  depended  upon  the  theory  of  attacking  large  sectors 
and  the  enemy  upon  the  whole  has  believed  in  attacking 
smaller  sectors.  The  .A.llies  in  Champagne  attacked  upon 
a  front  of  nearly  17  miles,  and  at  the  same  time  attacked 
in  the  north  upon  a  front  of  at  least  8,  if  my  memory 
serves  me  right,  making  a  total  of  25  miles.  The  two  main 
thrusts  on  tte  Dunajetz  by  the  Germans  and  Austrians 
were  nothing  like  so  extended,  and  the  thrust  upon  the 
sector  of  Verdun  originally  covered  less  than  eight  miles' 

The  difference  between  the  two  schools  lies  in  this  : 
The  one  maintains  that  if  you  attack  upon  too  narrow 
a  sector  then,  should  you  break  through,  there  is  danger 
of  your  troops  that  have  got  through  being  cut  off  by  the 
re-closing  of  the  enemy's  line.  Thev  point  out  thai  the 
flanks  of  the  gap  being  still  open  to' attack,  if  the  gap  is 
too  narrow  it  may  develop  into  what  the  French  call  a 
"  hernie  "  that  is,  a  sort  of  pocket  or  trap  for  the  attackers. 
The  enemy's  thesis  would  rather  seem  to  be  that  though 
an  attack  on  an  average  sector  has  to  be  of  this  extended 
nature  to  be  safe  after  its  success,  yet  if  you  carefully 
choose  a  particular  sector  where'  circumstances  are 
favourable  to  you,  you  may  safely  attack  on  a  7iarrow 
front  with  the  added  advantage,  of  course,  of  much  greater 
concentration  of  lire,  and  a  greater  weight  of  men  per 
yard.     Thus,  each  of  the  Austrian  attacks  in  the  Trentino 


June  15,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


has  been  upon  a  comparatively  narrow  Iront,  a  thing  made 
possible  by  the  fact  that  the  ItaHan  flanks  in, moun- 
tainous country  could  not  rapidly  .support  the  centre.. 
Similarly,  the  attack  on  the  Verdun  sector  was  made 
over  the  narrow  front  of  less  than  eight  miles,  the  flooded 
Meuse  preventing  the  French  left  flank  from  supporting 
its  centre  easily,  and  the  French  line  turning  a  sharp 
corner  on  its  right — so  that  if  the  short  front  between  the 
flooded  Meuse  and  this  corner  were  broken,  the  whole 
sector  would  go. 

Another  set  of  differences  lay  in  the  different  con- 
ceptions of  various  belligerent  commands  with  regard  to 
the  best  way  of  holding  the  advance  portion  of  the 
defensive  line.  In  general  the  Germans  have  believed 
in  holding  this  densely.  True,  they  have  put  very  few 
men  in  the  very  first  trenches,  but  their  first  line  as  a 
whole  they  have  always  held  strongly,  with  the  result 
that  if  the  offensive  got  in,  the  enemy  lost  a  comparatively 
large  number  of  prisoners  in  the  very  first  phase  of  the 
attack.  The  Allies,  on  the  other  hand  have,  upon  the 
whole,  and  especially  the  French,  pieferred  to  put  forward 
bodies  as  small  as  they  thought  safe  for  what  may  be 
called  "  covering  lines."  Thus,  the  losses  in  prisoners 
during  the  first  shock  of  Verdun  were  only  one-third  of 
the  corresponding  losses  in  the  same  period  of  time  during 
the  first  shock  in  Champagne.  Finally,  the  following 
development  has  occurred  differentiating  the  later 
offensives  from  the  earlier. 

The  first  great  offensive  on  the  Dunajetz  broke  through 
the  Russian  front  completeh^  and  provoked  an  immediate 
retreat.  The  Allies  in  the  West  considering  this  lesson, 
made  a  similar  attack  with  one  blow  in  the  September 
following.  They  failed  to  get  through,  and  their  failure 
was  a  subject  of  an  elaborate  memorandum  upon  the  part 
of  the  German  observers  of  the  action,  which  may  be 
seen  quoted  in  America.  It  was  to  the  effect  that 
these  offensives  in  the  future  had  better  be  conducted 
by  progressive  moves  :  That  there  should  not  be  one 
attempt  with  all  one's  forces  to  break  through  since 
the  second  line  would  almost  certainly  hold  one  ,  up, 
at  least  against  equally  prepared  opponents.  There 
should  be  a  mastering  of  one  advance  belt,  then  the  bring- 
ing up  of  the  guns  and  further  ammunition  for  the  master- 
ing of  a  second  belt,  and  so  forth.  It  was  upon  this 
method  that  the  enemy  acted  in  the  Verdun  sector,  and 
it  is  upon  this  method  that  he  is  acting  in  the  Trentino. 

When  we  compare  the  various  measures  of  success  of 
each  of  these  offensives,  we  find  the  following  table  : 

(i)  The  first  of  these  great  offensives,  that  of  the 
Austro-Germans  against  the  Dunajetz  in  the  last  days  of 
April  and  the  first  days  of  May  1915,  completely  broke 
the  front  opposed  to  it  and  provoked  an  immediate 
retreat  of  the  Russians.  This  retreat  was  precipitate 
until  the  line  of  the  San  was  reached.  There  the  Russians 
rallied  about  twelve  days  after  the  opening  of  the  great 
action  and  from  that  moment,  from  just  before  the 
middle  of  May  1915,  to  the  exhaustion  of  the  enemy's 
effort  at  the  end  of  September,  effort  after  effort  to  en- 
velop any  considerable  portion  of  the  Russian  Army 
failed.  There  were  half  a  dozen  such  efforts,  the  last 
and  greatest  being  that  round  the  saUent  of  Vilna.  We 
may  say,  therefore,  of  this  first  of  the  great  offensives, 
that  it  was  successful  in  its  immediate  object  of  breaking 
the  defensive  front  opposed  to  it,  but  failed  in  its  ultimate 
object  of  enveloping  a  portion  of  the  broken  line  and  thus 
achieving  a  decision. 

(2)  The  second  of  the  great  offensives,  that  of  the  Allies 
in  the  West  was  less  successful.  As  it  was  rapidly  halted 
by  its  commanders,  as  it  "  cut  its  losses,"  to  use  the  verna- 
cular phrase,  the  losses  inflicted  upon  the  enemy  were 
very  high  in  proportion  to  the  expenditure  of  effort  by  the 
Allies,  but  it  did  no  more  than  occupy  the  first  line  of  the 
sector  attacked.  It  failed  to  carry  the  second  line  and 
to  break  through.  The  immediate  object,  therefore,  was 
not  reached  and  the  ultimate  object  was  not  even 
approached. 

(3)  The  third  great  example,  the  offensive  against  the 
sector  of  Verdun,  was  even  less  successful  because  the 
first  line  which  the  Germans  carried,  just  as  the  Allies 
had  carried  the  (ierman  first  line  five  months  before,  was 

hinly  held,  so  that  the  losses  of  the  defence  were  not 
heavy  in  proportion  to  the  expense  of  the  attack,  while 
the  determination  of  the  Germans  to  continue  the  attempt 
right  on  to  the  qth  of  April,  by  which  date  the  defensive 


had  finally  won  the  Battle  of  Verdun,  made  of  this  third 
offensive  a  really  disastrous  failure.  By  that  date  the 
losses  of  the  offensive  were  quite  out  of  proportion  to 
the'  results  originally  obtained  and  were  already  far  more 
than  double  the  Allied  losses  in  the  offensive  of  tive  months 
before.  What  has  gone  on  in  front  of  the  sector  of  Verdun 
since  that  date,  the  repeated  assaults  against  the  French 
lines,  has  no  longer  been  any  idea  on  the  part  of  the  Ger- 
mans of  breaking  the  French  line  (a  thing  they  now  know 
to  be  impossible  in  this  particular  case),  but  only  of  an 
effect  partly  moral,  partly  political  and  partly  of  usury 
in  men  and  munitions,  by  a  combination  of  all  of  which 
they  hope  to  render  the  Allies  more  willing  to  discuss 
peace. 

(4)  The  fourth  of  the  great  offensives,  that  on  the 
Trentino,  is  still  in  progress,  but  so  far  it  would  seem  to 
move  upon  a  model  not  unlike  that  of  Verdun,  and">so  far 
it  has  quite  failed  in  the  first  or  immediate  object  of  break- 
ing a  front  and  has  therefore  not  approached  the  ultimate 
object  of  enveloping  a  portion  of  the  enemy's  forces  and 
thus  attaining  a  decision. 

What  of  the  fifth  ?  \\'hat  of  this  last  great  offensive, 
the  attack  of  the  Russians  upon  the  Austrian  defensive 
line  in  Volhynia  and  Galicia  ?  That  experiment  is  also 
in  progress.  With  regard  to  it  also  we  cannot  yet  affirm 
that  it  has  attained  its  immediate  object^hough  it 
seems  probable  ;  still  less  can  we  affirm  that  it  is  approaich- 
ing  its  ultimate  object.  We  cannot  say  at  the  moment; 
of  writing  that  the  defensive  line  is  broken  so  as  to  bes 
compelled  to  a  general,  immediate  and  precipitate  re- 
treat ;  still  less  can  we  say  the  line  will  be  incapable  of; 
re-forming  as  it  retreats,  that  a  permanent  gap  will  opea 
in  it  through  which  the  Russians  can  advance,  and  thu=i 
envelop  the  southern  portion  of  the  Austrian  line.  If  tho 
Russians  can  do  this  they  will  have  obtained  a  decision. 
But  such  a  result  has  not  yet  been  obtained,  and  we  have 
not  the  elements  before  us  to  judge  as-yet  the  probability 
of  its  attainment. 

What  we  can  do  is  to  examine  in  the  light  of  what  has 
just  been  described  with  regard  to  the  general  character 
of  these  great  offensives,  the  extent  and  the  nature  of  the 
Russian  success  at  the  moment  of  writing. 

The  line  with  which  we  are  concerned  should,  if  we  are 


...iTaksh-e.s  cfpTssic—  1 

KOVEL.„ 

_,.,*/           y^^^^-""^ 

X 

1 

^?^3  Wrovnu.'! 

) 

Cdur>joV  -f-"^  ^ 

J 

> 

< 

•PRZEMYSL        '[^iJSr*'^ 

^ 

Q              STANISI,Au\ 

■ 

X    xrk, 

ICAtrntal..,^^         Y^Suilr^ 

L  A  N  P      ^:     ^V  A  T  E  R 


June  15,  1916 


to  understand  what   is  happt-ninf,'.   be  closely  followed 
upon  the  forcpoing  sketch  map  I. 

The  centre  of  the  Eastern  front  from  the  lakes  of  the 
Dvinsk  ret;ion  rif,'lit  down  throuiih  the  marshes  of  I'insk 
to  the  lower  c(•llrs^•^  of  tlie  Kivcr  St\r  is  a  rt'Kion  of  forest 
and  marsh  quite  improjx'r  to  lar^'e  niiiitary  movemeiUs. 
and  this  is  especially  true  of  the  southern  part  of  tlu> 
central  portion,  the  marshes  of  Finsk  themselves.  Ihev 
is  no  exact  boiuularv  traceable  for  this  region  in  which 
the  numb<MS  required  to  holil  a  line  (or  for  that  matter 
to  attack  it)  ar«-  far  below  the  normal  and  in  which,  more 
properly  speaking,  there  is  no  true  line  at  all.  Hut  when 
we  come  to  the  limit  of  tjlaciation,  that  is,  to  the  southern 
edge  of  the  area  which  was  co\ered  by  ice  in  early  times, 
the  quaternary  formations  of  sand  and  alluvial  nnul 
gradually  ceasi-  and  one  reaches  the  tertiary  cretaceous 
formations  King  to  the  south  in  the  non-glaciated  area. 
The  chariuter  of  the  laiuls.  ape.  as  of  the  ground,  changes. 
From  this  point  southwards  the  movements  of  troops  on  a 
large  scale  is  possible  ,  roads,  railways  and  multitudinous 
human  habitations  appear. 

The  River  Stvr.  which  rises  near  the  town  of  Brody 
and  flows  noithwanl  into  the  Marshes  of  Pinsk.  i)asses 
just  before  it  reaches  the  marshy  region  under  a  group  of 
low  hills  lying  above  its  right  bank  and  marked  upon 
Sketch  Map  i  with  the  letter  "  A."  Just  at  this  point 
stands  also  on  the  fight  bank  the  village  of  Kafalovka. 
which  we  may  regard  as  the  northern  limit  of  the  line 
useful  to  operations.  Hev'ond  this  village  to  the  north 
nothing  effective  can  U-  done.  To  the  south  the  country 
is  ground  for  a  campaign 

Just  south  of  this  little  group  of  low  hills  a  railway, 
which  is  the  arter>'  running  south  of  the  marshes,  crosses 
the  River  Styr  at  Tchartoriisk.  The  station  and  large 
village  of  Tchartoriisk  (now,  of  course,  long  in  ruins),  lie 
.ipon  the  left  bank  of  the  Styr.  a  situation  which  gives 
them  greaJ^  importance.  For  the  Russians  seizing  them 
|X)Ssess  a  bridge-head  across  the  river— here  for  long  the 
chief  defensive  obstacle  in  front  of  the  Austrian  line. 
This  ruin  and  bridge-head  of  Tchartoriisk  were  taken 
bv  the  Russians  some  time  ago,  and  they  have  held  them 
ever  since.  But  inunediately  to  the  south  the  original 
Austrian  line  against  which  the  Russians  have  just  struck 
lav  open  uptoithe  river  and  fcjllowed  it  as  far  as  the  bridge 
of'Kolki.  Here  the  line  crossed  the  stream  and  proceeded 
southward  as  follows  : 

It  ran  jnst  in  front  of  the  villages  of  Silno  and  Kar- 

Eilovka.     At  this  point  it  is  worth  while  noticing  that  a 
nc  of  marshe^  lies  here  immediately  to  the  east.     1  have 
marked  them  B  B  upon  the  sketch.     It  was  this  line  of 
marshes  which  formed  the  true  covering  of  the  Russians 
in   this   district   for  many  months,   and  they   occupied 
Karpilovka  as  a  sort  of   bridge-head   t)eyond  it.     Their 
front  trenches,  then,  reached  just  south  of  Karpilovka 
to  the  second  of  the  railway  communications,  the  im- 
portance of  which  1  will  deal  with  in  a  moment,  the  railway 
between  Rovno  and  Kovel.     South  of  the  railway  there 
comes  a  fairly  dry  region  of  rolling  land,  the  principal 
village  in  which  is  called  Olyka.     This  is  a  region  of  con- 
siderable importance  in  the  line,  the  name  of  which,"  the 
region  of  Olyka,"  will  be  remembered  by  many  of  mv 
readers  as  appearing  in  recent  communi(pies,  and  we  shall 
see  a  little  later  on  why  it  is  so  important.     Thence  the 
hue   continued   southward   until   it   struck,  immediately 
in  front  of  Dubno,  the  third  of  the  main  lines  of  com- 
munication which  it  crosses,  the  railway  through  Brody  to 
Lembcrg.     At  this  point  the  .\ustrians  began  to  rely  as 
a  defensive  line  upon  the  upper  course  of  the  river  Ikwa 
which   flows   past    Dubno.     Roughly   speaking,    the   old 
front  followed  the  line  of  the  Ikwa,  but  the  stream,  which 
is  here  no  formidable  obstacle,  was  in  Austrian  hands, 
and   the  Russian  front  lay  east  of    it,     passing    near 
Kremenietz.     Then  it  crossed  the  old  political   frontier 
between    the    Austrian    and    Russian     Empires,    enter- 
ing    the    Austrian     province    of     Galicia.       The     old 
frontier    here    corresponds    to    the   watershed    between 
tile  basin  of  the  marshes  of  Pinsk.  that  is  of  the  Styr  and 
of  its  tributary  the  Ikwa,  and  the  great  basin  of  the 
Dniester,  which  river  is  the  artery  and  in  some  sense  the 
creator  of  Bukovina  and  of  south-eastern  Galicia.     With 
the  watershed  the  ground  and  landscape  change.     The 
Dniester    basin    is    hard     exposed     sandstone,    a    bare 
plateau  through  which  the  great  Dniester  itself  runs  in  a 


deep  cleft  as  do  its  tributaries,  which  come  in  singulariy 
parallel  lines  straight  from  the  north  to  jom  its  stream  ; 
the  ^trvpa,  for  instance,  along  which  the  old  front  ran 
down  as  Lr  as  the  Dniester.  After  crossing  the  frontier  the 
line  covered  the  town  of  Tarnopol  and  crossed,  not  far  from 
the  station  of  Jezierna,  the  f(uirtli  great  line  of  com- 
munications bv  "road  and  rail,  that  leading  frorn  Tarnopol 
to  1  emberg.  "liefore  reaching  the  Dniester  the  line  crosses 
the  lifth  and  sixth  main  avenues  of  communication  ;  the 
fifth  being  the  railway  just  soulli  of  Tarnopol  and  leading 
to  Strvj  •  and  the  sixth  the  railway  through  Buczacz 
which  "a  little  way  off  to  the  west  joins  the  main  line 
from  Czernowitz  through  Kolomea  and  Stanislav  to 
Strvj  and  l.emberg  ;  Leinberg  we  see  again  is  the  great 
railway  centre,  as  it  is  also  the  great  road  centre  of  the 
whole  "country.  After  reaching  the  Dniester  the  old  line 
left  to  the  Austrians  this  formidable  obstacle  as  far  as 
( )kna  statiiu),  which  is  at  the  end  of  a  little  branch  railway. 
Immediately  after  this  point  the  line  ended  upon  the 
Roumanian  frontier. 

There  was,  therefore,  on  the  extreme  left,  grave  diffi- 
culty presented  to  a  Russian  advance  in  the  deep  valley 
and  broad  stream  of  the  Dniester  covering  the  Bukovina 
and  the  main  Russian  effort  to  effect  a  breach  m  the 
Austrian  line  must  necessarily  be  made,  not  to  the 
I^ussian  left  or  south,  but  to  their  right  or  north. 

Such  was  the  front  along  which  the  general  bombard 
meut  opened  upon  Saturday,  June  3rd.  The  mere  ele- 
ments of  the  map  show  one  at  once  that  a  real  Russian 
advance  to  be  properiy  supported  must  rely  upon  the 
whole  nexus  of  railways  which  con\'erge  ripon  Lembcrg. 
An  observation  equally  elementary  is  that  if  the  Austrian 
front  were  really  broken  then  to  break  it  not  far  south  of 
the  marshes  would  be  to  isolate  the  great  mass  of  it 
lying  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Lutsk  to  the  Roumanian 
frontier. 

The  Russian  effort  then  has  been  for  now  a  week,  and 
still  is,  so  to  destroy  the  Austrian  resistance  in  front  of  the 
right  centre  of  the  Russian  line,  iij  front  that  is  of  the 
region  of  ()l\'ka  marked  1)  upon  Map  I,  as  to  permit 
the  cutting  off  and  turning  of  everything  Austrian  to  the 
south  of  D.  The  immediate  object  is  to  break  the  front 
and  compel  a  retreat  in  front  of  D.  But  attainment  of 
that  immediate  object  will  have  but  an  imperfect 
result  unless  the  ultimate  object  is  also  attained  and 
unless  the  Russian  advance  can  be  so  rapid  and  the 
Austrian  retreat  compelled  to  be  so  precipitate  that  in 
some  such  direction  as  the  large  arrow  marked  E  E  upon 
the  .sketch  map,  an  advancing  Russian  body  can  turn 
all  the  Austrian  positions  to  the  south. 

If  the  Austrians  prevent  this,  and  if  the  main  Russian 
advance  can  only  proceed  northwards  towards  Kovel, 
no  final  result  will  be  achieved. 

\\'hat  the  Russian  forces  attacking  are  we  do  not  know. 
What  we  do  know  is  that  they  have  a  great  advantage 
in  number. 

We  also  know  roughly  what  the  Austrian  divisions  (with 
two  (ierman  divisions  added)  come  to  upon  this  front. 
The  total  of  men  corresponds  to  that  minimum  necessary 
to  hold  a  defensive  line,  which  has  been  everywhere 
apparent  in  the  later  stages  of  the  great  war.  The  line 
as  a  whole — that  part  of  it  which  is  subject  to  attack — 
is  somewhat  over  200  miles  long,  and  the  total  of  the 
Austrian  forces  present  upon  it  at  the  moment,  plus  the 
two  Cicrman  divisions  (one  of  them  the  3rd  division  of 
the  invariably  included  Guards  corps),  is  just  under 
700,000  men. 

Such  then  are  the  conditions  of  the  task.  The  Russians 
started  from  the  line  we  have  described,  evidently  sur- 
prising their  opponents,  who  did  not  believe  they  were 
read\-  to  take  a  general  offensive  yet ;  bombarding  the 
whole  enemy  line  (upon  the  French  model)  in  order  to 
make  him  doubtful  as  to  where  the  main  blow  would  be 
delivered,  they,  were  none  the  less  compelled  to  choose 
some  one  region  where  their  pressure  should  be  far  more 
severe  than  in  any  other.  They  were  compelled  to  such 
a  selection  because  the  concentration  of  heavy  artillery 
and  of  niiinilionment  and  of  men  required  for  a  main 
stroke  is  only  possible  upon  a  front  of  some  few  miles. 
The  region  where  the  concentration  was  effected  was 
that  of  Olyka,  and,  while  the  Austrian  line  as  a  whole 
has  given  way  somewhat  in  many  points,  has  stood 
in  others,  the  main  blow  upon  which  c\-crything  must 


I 


June  15,  1916 


L  A  N  D     &     WATER 


depend  has  been  struck  from  Olyka  westward  against 
Lutsk. 

Let  us  see  how  far  this  plan  has  developed. 

In  order  to  do  tliis  we  must  first  tabulate  the  com- 
muniques sent  us  by  our  Ally,  compared  with  con- 
temporary connnunitiues  sent  us  by  the  enemy.  When 
we  have  them  before  us  in  their  order,  and  only  then, 
can  we  know  how  the  affair  is  progressing. 

The  Story  of  the  Advance 

The  first  notice  of  the  advance  is  telegraphed  from  the 
Russian  War  Ofhce  on  Monday,  June  5th,  and  deals  with 
the  lighting  of  Sunday,  June  4th.  Immediately  after- 
wards there  reaches;  London  a  corresponding  com- 
munique from  the  War  Office  at  Vienna.  Putting  the 
two  communiques  side  by  side  what  we  get  is  this  : 
After  an  artillery  jireparation  developed  along  the  whole 
line  (which  we  learn,  later,  began  on  Saturday  the 
3rd,  late  afternoon)  from  the  marshes  of  the  Pripet 
to  the  Roumanian  frontier,  the  Russian  Infantry  attacked 
upon  so  many  sections  of  that  line  as  to  make  this  lirst 
stage  of  their  offensive  almost  general.  But  the  Austrians 
felt  specially  strong  pressure  in  the  region  north-west  of 
Tarnopol  and  on  the  southernmost  end  of  the  line,  or 
near  the  southernmost  end.  Of  the  e.xtent  and  nature 
of  the  first  advance  that  day,  Sunday,  June  4th,  we  are 
told  nothing,  but  the  Russians  had  counted  by  evening 
13,000  prisoners. 

Next  day,  Monday,  the  extent  of  the  nature  of  advance 
was  also  denied  us,  though  it  was  evidently  progressing. 
The  Austrians  continued  to  note  a  general  pressure  along 
the  whole  fighting  front  of  over  200  miles,  but  the  only 
definite  piece  of  news  is  the  Russian  statement  of  prisoners 
and  guns.  They  tell  us  that  up  to  the  Monday  evening 
they  had  counted  480  oflicers  and  25,000  men,  27  guns 
and  about  30  machine  guns. 

The  third  batch  of  communiques  deals  with  the  great 
action  on  Tuesday,  Jime  6th.  By  the  evening  of  that 
day  the  Russians  count  900  officers,  over  40,000  rank  and 
tile  and  77  guns,  134  machine  guns  and  a  great  number 
of  search  lights,  field  kitchens,  stacks  of  arms,  reserves  of 
ammunition,  and  material  generally.  They  further 
inform  us  that  certain  of  the  enemy's  batteries  were 
captured  intact.  While  from  Vienna  we  learn  that  in  the 
course  of  that  day  a  retirement  was  ordered  of  the 
Austrian  troops  in  front  of  Lutsk.  The  retirement,  the 
Austrians  also  tell  us,  was  undertaken  dehberately  and 
was  not  interfered  with  by  the  enemy's  pursuit.  Mean- 
while, on  the  extreme  north  of  the  line,  just  before  the 
marshes  begin,  on  the  low  hill  of  Rafalovka,  the  Austrians 
tell  us  that  the  Russians  were  held.  We  are  also  told  in  a 
more  general  fashion  that  the  other  Russian  wing  to  the 
south  was  generally  held,  and  the  impression  is  conveyed 
that  at  this  southern  part  of  the  line,  the  Russian  left 
centre,  the  Russians  were  stopped  at  the  Hne  of  the  Strypa. 

The  next  set  of  communiques  refers  to  the  fighting  of 
Wednesday,  June  7th,  the  fourth  day  of  the  great  action. 
On  that  day  the  Russians  tell  us  that  they  reached,  but 
did  not  pass  the  whole  line  of  the  Strypa,  counted  11,000 
of  the  rank  and  iile  as  prisoners,  but  only  56  officers— at 
least  that  is  the  form  in  \vhich  the  telegram  reached  Lon- 
don—and further  large  stores  of  arms,  field  kitchens,  etc., 
and  material  in  general,  while  the  Austrians  tell  us  that 
on  this  same  day  they  established  themselves  on  the 
Stry  as  a  defensive  line  and  on  the  Strypa. 

Meanwhile,  it  is  on  that  same  day,  Wednesday  that 
the  Russian  occupation  of  Lutsk  is  ofiicially  mentioned 
though  the  date  of  it  is  referred  to  as  Tuesday.  The  state- 
ment presumably  signifies  that  the  first  units  of  cavalry 
following  up  the  Austrian  retirement  entered  Lutsk  on 
the  Tuesday  evening,  and  that  the  town  was  occupied  as  a 
whole  during  the  following  day. 

With  regard  to  the  action  "of  the  Thursday  the  news 
becomes  more  detailed,  and  we  arc  beginning  to  see  the 
thing  as  a  whole.  In  the  course  of  that  dav  the  Lower 
Styr  below  Lutsk  was  crossed  by  the  Russians.  They 
appear  to  have  crossed  in  front  of  Rafalovka  in  the 
extreme  north,  and  they  certainly  crossed  at  the  extremely 
important  railway  bridge,  Rojichtche,  a  short  day's 
march  north  of  Lutsk.  The  Russians  report  on  the 
same  day  the  first  captures  of  German  prisoners  and  the 
capture  of  a  certain  though  small  number  of  heavy  guns, 
tanks  of  asphyxiating  gas,  and  balloons  packed  "for  re- 


moval. Nothing  appears  to  have  been  done  on  that  day 
in  the  extreme  soutli  where  the  Russians  were  holding 
the  railhead  of  Okna  north  of  Czernowitz.  A  little 
further  north  on  the  I'^ussian  left  centre  an  important 
development  was  recorded.  Tlu;  Russians  here  crossed 
the  Strypa  line,  which  thenceforward  was  no  longer 
available  as  a  defensive  line  for  the  enemy,  and  certain 
of  their  units,  presumably  cavalry,  reached  the  left  bank 
of  the  next  river  westward,  the  Zlota.  By  the  even- 
ing of  that  day,  Thursday,  the  fifth  day  of  the  battle, 
the  Russians  counted  64,714  of  the  enemy  rank  and  file 
in  their  hands,  and  1.143  ofiicers. 

On  the  Friday  a  large  quantity  of  war  material  was 
captured.  We  are  not  told  upon  what  sector.  The 
number  of  prisoners  returned  for  that  day  was  small. 
The  next  day,  Saturday,  in  common  with  greatly  in- 
creased masses  of  war  material  the  Russians  counted  409 
officers  and  35,100  soldiers  taken  prisoners  as  well  as  30 
more  field  guns,  but  only  13  machine  guns,  and  what  is 
oddest  of  all  at  first  sight,  only  five  trench  mortars.  On 
the  same  day  certain  German  units  appeared  at  the  impor- 
tant bridge-head  of  Rojichtche,  and  helped  the  Austrians 
to  try  and  take  it  back.  The  Germans  also  here  lost 
2,000  prisoners  and  two  guns.  On  the  same  day  the 
Russians  entered  Dubno  and  what  is  apparently  a  cavalry 
force  got  round  to  Demidovka,  seizing  Mlynov  on  the  way 
—-the  importance  of  this  will  be  apparent  in  a   moment. 

On  the  same  day  upon  the  Russian  left  there  was  a 
very  heavy  and  successful  blow  struck  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Czernowitz,  covering  the  whole  country  in  front 
of  Okna  and  permitting  a  rapid  Russian  advance  up  the 
further  southern  bank  of  the  Dniester,  so  that  this 
formidable  obstacle  was  turned  right  up  to  the  Bridge 
of  Zaleszczyki  at  F. 

That  is  exceedingly  important,  for  if  the  Russians  can 
turn  the  Lower  Dniester  line  as  a  whole,  the  Buko\-ina 
is  theirs. 

Lastly,  we  have  the  news,  reachinj,;  London  on  Tuesday 
and  referring  to  the  fighting  of  Sunday.  It  is  very  im- 
perfect because  storms  had  interfered  with  telegraphic 
communication  in  the  night  between  the  southern  front 
and  the  capital,  but  it  informs  us  that  the  number  of 
prisoners  captured  to  date,  or  at  least  the  number  to  date, 
was  114,700,  of  whom  1,700  were  officers.  We  were 
further  told  by  both  sides  that  there  was  sharp  counter- 
attacking by  the   enemy  a  few   miles   north-west    of 


II 


MAKStlES  of  PITfSK.: 


Pezetaysl ' 


<^         ^  r  ■     Sunday  Jcute  If  ^ 


Kolonti 


CKrnowitzT' 


; «« ICWM 


8 


t  A  N  D     eS:     WATER 


June  15,  1916 


Buczacz  upon  the  Lower  Stry*pa,  and  exactly   the   same 
kind  of  action  by  him  north-west  of  Tarnopol. 

The  New  Line 

Putting  all  this  together  in  order  to  draw  our  con- 
chisions  from  it.  the-  first  thing  we  niu>t  ostabUsh  is  the  new 
Russian  hne  as  it  stood  on  tlie  evening  of  Sunday  .last 
(-since  which  no  official  news  has  reached  us  at  the  moment 
of  writing  this),  that  is  after  exactly  eight  days  of  lighting. 
We  have  that  line  now  nmning  as  follows  : 
It  nins  just  west  of  the  Styr  instead  of  just  east  of  it 
from  Rafalovka  down  to  Kolki.  At  Kolki  tliere  is  a  point 
where  it  recrosses  the  Styr  to  its  old  position  on  the  western 
bank,  but  inunediately  above  Kolki  it  passes  to  the 
western  bank  again  and  well  in  front  of  it.  thoroughly 
holding  the  important  bridge-head  at  Rojichtche.  thence 
it  proceeds  west  of  Lutsk  to  Demidovka.  South  of  this 
last  point  it  was  evidently  still  in  rapid  movement  at  the 
moment  the  despatch  was  sent  and  we  have  no  clear  trace 
of  it.  but  we  find  it  again  in  the  hilly  country  about  12 
miles  north  of  Tarnopol,  not  far  from  the  station  of 
je/.ierna  on  the  railway  from  Tarnopol  tf)  Leiiiberg. 
South  of  this  it  f(jllows  the  Strypa,  but  upon  the  west 
side  of  the  river,  and  covers  Huczacz.  As  it  approaches 
the'  point  where  the  Strypa  falls  into  the  Dniester  it  bends 
sharply  round,  keeping  ever\-\vliere  on ,  the  wrong  or 
northern  side  of  that  stream,  which  here  runs  in  a  fairly 
deep  valley  between  sandstone  slopes  and  is  a  formidable 
obstacle.  That  obstacle  is  not  crossed  until  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Okna,  but  thence  the  Russians  have  sent 
bodies  along  the  southern  bank  of  the  Dniester  until  they 
.threatened  the  Austrians  holding  the  bridge  of  Zalescyzyki. 

Significance  of  these  Movements  and  of  the 
Numbers  and  Dates 

The  reader  has  now  before  him  the  measure  of  the  actual 
territorial  ad\ance  made  b\'  our  Ally  in  this  great  week 
of  effort.  We  see  how  much  more  pronounced  it  is  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  I.utsk  than  elsewhere,  how  it  is 
held  for  the  moment  upon  the  two  main  railways  A  and 
B  converging  on  Lemberg  from  Dubno  and  Tarnopol 
respectively  and  how  it  is  pressing  on  the  extreme  left 
in  front  of  Czernowitz,  while  hardly  advancing  at  all  as 
yet  on  the  extreme  right  just  south  of  the  marshes. 

But  we  all  know  by  this  time  that  the  measurement 
of  territorial  advance  or  retirement  is  the  least  significant 
of  all  indices  in  the  present  great  war.  All  that  we  are 
! really  concerned  with  is  how  far  the  Russian  advance, 
its  form,  its  rapidity,  thedamage  is  has  inflicted,  brings 
the  Allies  towards  a  decision. 

The    official    story,    given    in  ,  the  -  communiques    (I 
purposely  neglect  all  nnoflicial-accounts,  tempting  though 
i  they  are)  shows  us  in  the  first  place  that  permanent  des- 
|triiction  by  actual  capture  at  the  hands  of  the  Russians 
I  i.s  between  a  fifth  and  a  sixth  of  the  total  force  opposed 
•to   them.     These   figures   are   certainly   accurate.     The 
;  policy  of  the  Allies,  like  that  of  the  Central  Powers,  in 
the  matter  of  prisoners  is  perfectly  well  known.     The 
Allies  either  say  nothing  of  the  prisoners  they  capture 
or  in  the  case  of  great  offensives  mention  an  exact  tale. 
The  Central  Powers  have  preferred-^and  it  is  well  within 
their   rights — to   begin   with   exaggerations   within    the 
limits  which  their  opponents  may  for  the  moment  be 
•  led  to  believe  ;    for  instance  the  number  of  British  pris- 
oners which  the  (iermans  have  claimed  at  various  times 
is  very  nearly  double  the  number  now  discovered  to  be 
in  (ierman  hands.     Each   party  reaps  the  fruit  of  its 
policy. 

But  while  the  Russian  figures  are  true  we  must  re- 
member that  they  almost  certainly  include  wounded 
and  unwoimded,  and  some  proportion,  though  probably 
a  small  proportion  of  men  who  have  died  since  thev  wen- 
captured.  Only  those  on  the  spot  can  make  even  a 
rough  estimate  of  the  probable  proportion  between  the 
numbers  thus  actually  fallen  into  I^ussian  hands  and  the 
total  Austrian  losses,  temporary  and  permanent,  in  this 
drive.  It  is  not  extravagant,  however,  to  suppose  the 
total  losses  somewhat  more  than  double  the  captured, 
wounded  and  unwoundid.  and  to  set  them  at  least  at  a 
quarter  of  a  million.  They  may  be  less  if  (a  matter  we 
cannot  determine  from  the  news  to  hand)  there  has  been 
rapid  and  orderly  retirement  upon  large  sections  of  the 


line  :  though  even  in  that  case  one  would  imagine  large 
numbers  of  the  wounded  to  be  evacuated  and  saved. 
The  total  losses  are  quite  certainly  not  less  than  200,000. 

The  next  thing  to  note  is  the  comparative  regularity 
of  the  daily  returns.  The  large  number  given  for  Sun- 
day, the  small  number  given  for  Saturday  afe  probably 
due  to  the  imperfection  of  the  returns  upon  the  former 
day  which  swelled  the  return  uj)on  the  latter  day.  At 
any  rate  the  daily  steps  run  thus  in  thousands — 13, 
nearly  15,  over  15,  11,  very  nearly  14,  and  in  the  last 
two  days  between  18  and  19  each. 

Note  further  the  comparative  losses  in  officers  and  men. 
Tt  remains  nonnal  throughout  in  about  one  officer  to 
60  men.  In  a  rajiid  retirement  such  a  proportion  is 
conmion.  If  units  are  captured  whole  it  is,  of  course, 
higher  :    more  like  one  officer  to  35  men. 

As  to  the  guns,  we  notice  a  capture  of  77  guns,  nearly 
all  field  guns,  in  the  first  three  days.  Not  quite  double 
that  niunber  in  the  first  eight,  so  there  has  been  a  fairly 
regularly  progressive  rate  in  this  item  also.  On  the  other 
other  hand,  the  comparatively  small  number  of  machine 
guns  taken  and  the  still  smaller  number  of  trench  mortars 
would  seem  to  mean  that  on-  those  sectors  where  the 
enemy  retired,  the  retirement  was  continuous  without 
any  attempt  to  dig  in  and  resist  from  line  to  line.  In  a 
word,  the  figures  of  prisoners  and  guns  taken  point  in 
general  at  once  to  surprise  and  to  the  rapid  regular 
hillowing  up  of  retirement  where  retirement  has  taken 
place,  but  not  to  a  completely  broken  line. 

But  the  most  important  point  of  all  has  yet  to  be 
decided.  What  is  the  form  of  the  Russian  advance  and 
of  the  enemy's  retirement,  and  how  do  they  seem  to  affect 
the  immediate  future  ? 

It  is  clear  from  a  glance  at  the  foregoing  Sketch  Map  II 
that  only  in  one  region  has  there  been  any  considerable 
retirement  of  the  enemv's  line.  That  region  is  the  region 
where  the  main  blow  fell,  delivered  from  Olyka  towards 
Lutsk.  Now  supposing  such  a  push  to  be  continued 
what  does  it  mean  ? 

A  drive  of  this  sort  can  only  be  sujiplied  bv  the  railways 
and  the  main  roads  which  in  this  undeveloped  and  flat 
country  follow  the  general  lines  of  the  railways. 

To  this  fact  add  another  fact.  Any  turning  movement 
to  cut  off  the  mass  of  the  Austrian  troops  must  aim  at 
Lemberg.  Lemberg  once  occupied  you  have  the  centre  of 
all  the  Galician  railways  in  your  hands.  You  utterly 
paralyse  everything  to  the  south. 

But  for  an  advance  on  Lemberg  you  have  only  the 
two  converging  lines,  apparently,  the  one  from  Dubno 
the  other  from  Tarnopol,  which  I  ha\'e  marked  A  and 
B  upon  the  map.  The  one  from  Tarnopol  (B)  is  being 
fiercely  contested  by  the  enemy,  who  has  here  held  up 
the  Russian  forces  in  the  hilly  country  about  12  miles 
north  of  Tarnopol  for  the  whole  week.  It  is  by  the 
nothern  railway  (A)  that  the  best  chance  of  an  advance 
turning  the  Austrian  positions  to  the  sovlth  lies,  for 
this  railway  can  be  got  hold  of  by  striking  south  from 
the  extreme  point  of  the  advance  beyond  Lutsk.  Already 
a  Russian  body  has  passed  through  Mlyno\-,  occupiecl 
DemidoN-ka  and  so  turned  to  Dubno  and  compelled 
the  Austrians  here  to  fall  bark  upon  the  railway  hne  (A). 
A  continued  advance  westward  from  Lutsk  permits  of 
this  process  being  continued  indefinitely. 

It  is  possible  also  that  the  Russians  have  anothei 
avenue  of  supply.  It  is  said,  I  do  not  know  with  what 
truth,  but  it  is  obviously  probable,  that  the  enemy  in  the 
course  of  his  occupation  of  the  country  has  constructed 
a  railway  to  continue  the  old  railway  (C)  through  the 
intervening  stage  (D)  and  thus  directly  connecting 
Lutsk  to  Lemberg.  If  this  is  the  case  the  meaning  and 
value  of  the  great  stroke  at  Lutsk  are  at  once  apparent 
in  a  new  light.  For  if  tliere  is  a  new  railway  from  Lutsk 
to  Lemberg  direct  it  enormously  increases  the  turning 
value  of  the  Russian  forces  now  in  the  Lutsk  region. 

Meanwhile,  as  I  have  already  said,  a  failure  to  turn 
the  Austrians  round  by  Lutsk  "and  a  mere  shepherding 
of  the  Russian  advance  up  northward  towards  Kovel 
would  effect  nothing  linal.  It  would  compel  a  retirement 
of  the  enemy's  front  in  the  central  marshy  district  ;  it 
would  rearrange  the  line  to  Russia's  advantage  and  would 
gain  territory.     It  would  not  advance  the  war. 

As  to  the  general  chances  of  the  ultimate  Russian 
object  :  the  permanent  division  of  the  Austrian  line, 
the  cutting  off  of  the  southern  portion  and  a  true  decision 


June  15,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


being  thus  achieved,  the  factors  would  seem  to  be  as 
follows  : 

1.  As  an  initial  blow  the  Russian  success  is  miich 
greater  than  the  corresponding  Austro-German  success 
of  last  year.  It  shows  a  very  much  larger  number  of 
prisoners  and  a  very  much  larger  number  of  guns. 

2.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Austro-German  blow  of 
last  year  took  all  the  Russian  Carpathian  positions  in 
flank,  because  the  Russian  lines  were  bent  round  in  the 
shape  of  the  letter  L  and  the  blow  fell  upon  the  corner, 
or  foot  of  the  L,  rolling  up  the  stem.  The  Austrian  line 
■  in  this  case  is  not  so  menaced.  It  presented  no  refused 
flank  for  the  Russians  to  strike  at,  therefore  it  has  a 
much  better  chance  of  reforming  and  making  a  stand. 

3.  The  Russian  retirement  then  provoked  stood  for 
some  time  upon  the  line  of  the  San.  But  it  could  not 
maintain  itself  long  on  one  line,  though  it  stood  time  and 
again  after  its  first  stand  upon  the  San.  It  was  unable  to 
stand  permanently  on  any  line  because  it  lacked  munition- 
ment.     This  will  not  be  the  case  with  the  Austrians. 


They  will  be  amply  munitioned  as  they  fall  back  upon 
their  main  depots.  And  such  a  line  as  that  of  the  Bug 
in  front  of  Lemberg  or  any  other  they  may  have  pre- 
pared further  west  would,  if  they  could  rally  upon  it, 
find  them  at  least  not  short  of  missiles,  which  was  the 
true  cause  of  the  Russian  retirement  last  year. 

4.  On  the  other  hand,  the  great  Russian  retirement 
last  year  gave  the  enemy  no  true  decision  on  account  of 
these  two  things  in  favour  of  Russia  :  An  indefinite  space 
on  which  to  retire  and  indefinitely  large  numbers  from 
which  ultimately  to  recruit.  The  enemy  has  no  such 
adxantage  in  the  present  state  of  the  war.  He  is  ap- 
proaching the  exhaustion  of  his  reserves  in  numbers,  and 
any  retirement  continued  for  say  a  month  uninterruptedly 
would  be  disastrous  for  him  in  the  way  of  space. 

Upon  the  whole  the  chances  are  much  more  in  favour 
of  the  Austro-Germans  reforming  their  line  than  of  the 
great  decision  being  arrived  at  in  this  field  immediately. 
But  only  the  future  can  show  whether  the  event  will 
follow  those  chances  or  no. 


Pressure  upon  the  Trentino  Front 


It  would  be  a  great  error  to  imagine  that  .the  Russian 
offensive  will  immediately  relieve  the  pressure  upon  the 
Trentino  front. 

E.xtraordinary  ideas  of  that  sort  get  about  at  this 
stage  of  the  war,  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  enemy 
have  been  able  to  whisk  vast  masses  of  men  from  place 
to  place  in  a  few  days  by  rail. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  enemy's  handling  of  railways 
had  not  been  superior  to  that  of  the  Western  Allies.  He 
has  never  done  anything  equal  in  rapidity  or  exactitude 
to  the  moving  of  all  the  I3ritish  divisions  right  round 
from  the  Aisne  to  Ypres.  Still  less  anything  that  can 
compare  to  the  swinging  of  the  4th  corps  120  miles  from 
the  extreme  right  to  the  extreme  left  of  the  Allied  line  vuhile 
the  battle  of  the  Manic  was  actually  in  progress  and  just 
behind  the  line  of  that  battle. 

The  truth  is  here,  as  in  almost  every  other  matter,  that 
the  great  modern  industrialised  nations  are  much  of  a 
muchness  in  the  handling  of  machinery,  with  slight  differ- 
ences in  favour  of  the  one  or  the  other  belligerent  in 
particular  categories. 

Now  with  all  the  good  will  in  the  world  and  with  all 
the  exactitude  of  organisation  conceivable  it  would  be 
impossible  for  the  Austrian  Empire  to  despatch  adequate 
reinforcements  from  the  Trentino  to  the  Galician  front 
in  a  less  time  than  several  weeks.  A  single  division 
occupies  80  trains  at  least.  The  special"  concentration 
upon  the  Trentino  front,  over  and  above  the  original 
•garnishing  of  that  line,  is  not  less  than  10  divisions,  pro- 
bably more.  And  it  was  the  winter's  work — a  thing 
long  and  carefully  prepared  against  the  spring  oppor- 
tunity for  advance  in  the  mountains.  But  more  of  a 
factor  in  time  (in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  material 
to  be  moved)  even  than  the  transmission  of  men  and 
field  artillery,  is  the  movement  of  the  big  guns  and  their 
munitionment.  These  have  been  painfully  established 
in  the  mountains  of  the  Upper  Adige  and  Brenta  basins 
after  what  was  certainly  months  of  preparation.  Not  less 
painfully  a  large  head  of  munitionment  was  piled  up 
behind  the  emplacements.  You  cannot  suddenly  transfer 
an  organisation  of  that  kind  for  a  distance  by  rail  equi- 
valent to  the  distance  between  Rome  and  London,  and 
that  with  no  advantage  of  parallel  lines  at  your  service 
such  as  exist  in  the  northern  part  of  the  enemy  territory. 
By  at  least  three  great  arteries  parallel  to  each  other  the 
enemy  in  the  north  can  bring  troops  from  west  to  east  and 
east  to  west,  yet  he  has  only  been  able  to  handle  a  com- 
paratively small  proportion  of  troops  in  this  fashion, 
and  that  at  great  expense  in  time.  For  the  swinging  of 
troops  from  the  Trentino  to  the  Galician  fronts  you  have 
at  the  very  most  two  such  arteries,  one  through  Vienna 
and  the  other  along  the  Drave  valley  and  so  through 
Buda  Pesth,  and  until  the  mouth  of  the  Brenner  Pass 
you  have  one  double  line  of  railway  only  along  which  to 
move  the  whole  of  that  enormous  business.  It  would  be 
simply  impossible  to  get  back  any  large  number  of  guns 
to  the  Russian  front;  still  more  impossible  to  accumulate 
a  large  mass  of  munitionment  for  them  during  the  pro- 
gress of  thi^  great  offensive,  the  checking  of  which  or  the 


gaining  of  a  decision  through  which  will  be  known  in  the 
next  few  days.  It  is  indeed  probable  that  the  effect,  of 
the  Russian  offensive  in  relieving  the  pressure  on  the 
Trentino  will  be  apparent  in  the  course  of  the  month, 
for  it  is  probable  that  men  will  be  transferred.  But  they 
will  not  be  transferred  in  such  numbers  and  they  cannot 
be  transferred  in  such  time  as  to  cause  an  immediate 
relief  upon  the  Trentino  front  in  the  next  few  days.  In- 
deed, the  pressure  upon  the  Trentino  has  been  continued 
during  the  whole  week  which  saw  the  unexpected  Russian 
advance,  900  miles  away.  And  we  shall  do  well  to  notice 
the  fortunes  of  this  continued  Austrian  offensive  against 
the  Italians  because,  as  has  been  apparent  ever  since 
the  first  blow  was  struck,  now  nearly  five  weeks  ago, 
success  in  this  quarter  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  would 
give  a  decision.  It  is  the  only  place  in  Europe 
where  the  Allied  communications  are  in  peril  from-  a 
flank  attack.  Let  us  see,  therefore,  how  things  have 
stood  in  the  past  week. 

My  readers  will  remember  the  general  position  as  it 
was  expressed  in  last  week's  sketch  map,  which  I  repro- 
duce here 


VICENZA, 

JUcbe  deAztded  B  B    B 
iylCaHanf. 

Miles 


The  Austrians  for  their  advance  must  ultimately  control 
the  Brenta  and  the  Adige  valleys,  one  of  them  at  least 
and  better  both.  Otherwise  they  can  never  possibly 
munition  and  feed  and  do  everything  else  necessary  for 
a  large  army. 

Pending  their  possession  of  these  two  avenues  there  is  a 
second  best,  which  would  suffice  for  temporary  needs  if  the 
advance  could  be  rapid,  and  this  second  best  is  the  road 
from  Rovereto  to  Schio  over  the  Fugazze  pass.  The 
Austrians  after  a  month  of  fighting  have  failed  to  get  a 
grasp  even  of  this  second  best  line  of  communications. 
They  have  got  their  line  into  a  big  salient  which  occupies 
the  .\siago  plateau,  the  plateau  of  the  "  Seven  Villages," 
and  from  that  place,  withUheir  heavy  guns  placed  just 
behind  the  northern  crest  of  the  plateau,  they  are 
making  alternate  efforts  to  the  right  and  to  the  left. 


10 


T  AND     Sc     W  A  T  E  R 


Juno  15,  1916 


To  the  right  they  were  trj-ing  to  seize  iho  road  from 
Kovereto  to  Schio  by  forring  the  Posina  ridge,  that  is 
the  steep,  bare  mountain  bank  which  frowns  two  thous- 
and feet  and  more  over  the  bed  of  the  Posina  torrent  to 
the  west.  On  the  left  the\-  were  attempting  what  would 
be  a  ver\'  much  more  important  thing,  if  they  succeeded 
in  reaching  the  Brenta  valK'\-  in  tlu-  neighbourhood  of 
\'alstagna.  This  would  cut  off  the  whole  of  the  I'pper 
Brenta.  and  would  bring  them  very  near  to  the  issue 
from  the  mountains  an<l  the  possession  of  the  whole  of 
this  avenue  of  rommunication. 

Last  week  there  was  a  lull  in  the  effort  towards  the 
Austrian  left,  towards  the  Brenta  valley,  and  a  particular 
intensity  in  the  efforts  towards  the  Austrian  right  on  the 
Posina.  That  effort  to  force  the  Posina  ridge  failed 
altogether. 

This  week  the  effort  has  been  the  other  way.  There 
has  been  a  lull  on  the  Posina  and  the  main  part  of  the 
hea\v  guns  and  tlm^  mass  of  the  infantry  have  been  used 
for  the  effort  upon  the  left  and  centre  and  the  reaching  of 
the  Brenta  \alley  at  Val-^tagua  or  the  point  of  Schio  by 
way  of  Cogollu. 

Now  let  us  sec  what  the  conditions  are  which  govern 
that  effort. 

Imagine  a  rather  thick  book  near  the  edge  of  a  table 
and  up  against  the  side  of  the  book  a  saucer  with  a  rather 
high  rim.  The  book  stands  for  the  row  of  high  mountain 
ridges  and  peaks  bounding  the  plateau  of  Asiago  to  the 
north  and  west.  That  is  from  the  direction  this  Austrian 
offensive  has  come.  The  saucer  stands  for  the  hollow 
upland  plateau  of  the  Sctle  Comuni  or  Seven  Villages, 
of  which  the  little  town  of  Asiago  is  the  chief  centre. 
The  edge  of  the  table  below  the  level  of  the  saucer  is  the 
rocky  crest  of  that  exceedingly  steep  bank  which  falls 
down  three  thousand  feet  into  the  Brenta  valley. 

Another  way  of  e.xpressing  this  condition  of  the  ground 
is  by  way  of  a  section  taken  from  north-west  to  south- 
cast  frorn  the  high  mountains  of  the  frontier  ridge  to  the 
gorge  of  the  Brenta  near  \'alstagna. 


^eaks  StD  6oooPt: 

A 


IV 

Rim  oPBasem.  ^ ' 

Highest  Peaks 
4f00tD4700ft. 

LastCresi  about 
,  3000  ft 


You  have  the  high  ridge  at  A  with  peaks  as  much  as 
6,000  feet  and  5,500  feet.  It  falls  on  to  the  hollow  plain 
of  Asiago  some  3.000  feet  above  the  sea.  The  outer  rim  B 
of  this  hollow  tableland  rises  again  into  peaks  of  as  much 
as  4,500  and  4,700  feet  in  height  and  a  general  crest  about 
a  thousand  feet  above  the  plain  of  Asiago. 

Beyond  this  ridge  or  crest  there  is  another  step  down 
to  the  last  rock\'  crest  C,  and  thence  the  sides  of  the 
Brenta  gorge  fall  very  steeply  indeed  down  a  stance,  in 
some  places,  of  as  much  as  3.000  feet. 

In  order  to  prevent  the  Austrians  getting  out  of  this 
basin  the  Italians  have  seized  the  edge  or  rim  of  it.  and 
if  we  notice  the  points  upon  the  accompanying  sketch 
map  we  shall  see  in  what  fashion  they  hold  this  rim  and 
liow  the  Austrians  arc  trying  to  break  through  their 
line. 

Up  into  the  high  mountains  northward  from  the  Asiago 
plain  run  clefts,  passes  and  torrents.  One  of  these 
valleys  is  that  known  as  the  valley  of  Campo  Mulo  from 
the  huts  and  pasturage  in  its  higher  flats.  And  on  the 
eastern  side  of  this  valley  stand  the  two  peaks  of  the 
lUaletla  and  the  Little  Maletta.  each  about  5,500  feet 
high,  the  latter  having  behind  it  the  highest  peak,  about 
6,000  feet, 'and  the  (Ireater  Maletta. 

The  Italians  hold  all  that  ridge  which  overhangs  the 
valley  of  Campo  Mulo  from  the  east.  Proceeding  further 
to  the  south  one  gets  a  cleft  in  the  rim  of  the  basin,  and 
this  cleft  is  that  profound  ravine  called  ^'al  Frenzena. 


V 


//'  ■!.._  ..\'^  ^msp.  »  -w    I— 


ASIAfiO '  /    sA 

/    % 


VdMaffUi. 


i 


which  leads  down  by  nothing  better  than  a  rough  mule 
track  to  Valstagna. 

Now  the  Austrians  have  certainly  set  foot  in  the  upper 
part  of  this  cleft,  but  there  is  some  discrepancy  in  the 
evidence  as  to  the  exact  amount  by  which  they  have 
been  able  to  proceed  down  it. 

They  cannot  go  down  the  cleft  so  long  as  the  heights 
overlooking  it  are  held  \>\  the  Italians,  They  have  to 
carry  those  heights  progressively  on  the  right  and  on  the 
left  side  of  the  cleft  in  order  to  be  able  to  advance  down 
it  at  all.  In  one  of  their  communiques  they  claim  the 
capture  of  a  Maletta  height  and  they  tell  us  they  are  in  the 
viOage  of  Ronchi,  the  positioA  of  which  will  be  noted 
upon  the  Sketch  Map  V.  The  Italians  have  not  denied,  I 
believe,  the  .\nstrian  occupation  of  Konchi,  but  they 
tell  us  that  their  positions  at  the  head  of  the  valley  of 
Frenzena  have  been  slightly  advanced  in  their  counter- 
offensive  of  the  last  two  or  three  days.  As  we  are  not 
quite  certain  to  within  say  half  a  mile  where  the  line  runs 
at  this  point  I  have  marked  it  upon  Sketch  V  with  notes 
of  interrogation. 

When  we  get  further  on  the  bend  of  the  rim  the  position 
becomes  clearer.  All  along  the  high  ridge  which  runs 
south  of  Asiago  the  Italians  hold  commanding  positions 
and  the  Austrians  are  trying  to  push  them  up  and  over 
those  positions,  just  as  they  were  trying  last  week  to  push 
them  up  and  over  the  corresponding  positions  of  the 
Posina  ridge  away'to  the  west.  That  is  what  is  meant 
by  all  the  matter  of  the  communiques  about  the  fighting 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Cesuna,  a  little  village  south  ol 
Asiago,  and  of  various  mountains  which  are  either  the 
foothills  or  the  main  slopes  of  the  rim.  The  Monte 
(engio,  for  instance,  the  Monte  Marco,  the  Monte 
Busibollo  are  all  main  heights  upon  the  rim  of  the  plateau, 
while  the  hill  which  the  Austrians  claim  to  ha\-e  taken 
is  one  of  the  foothills. 

The  other  central  issue  from  the  upland  plateau  of 
Asiago  which  the  Austrians  are  trying  to  force  is  that 
marked  C  upon  Sketch  V. 

Its  capture  would  not  give  such  great  results  as  the 
issue  of  the  Val  Frenzela  on  to  the  lower  Brenta.  But  it 
would  still  have  the  effect  of  turning  the  whole  of  the 
Schio-Rovereto  secondary  avenue  of  communications, 
and  further  has  the  advantage  of  possessing  a  light  line 
of  railway  and  a  road.  This  is  the  Co.gollo  gap  which 
opens  jvist  beneath  the  Monte  Cengio.  The  disadvantage 
of  this  issue  is  that  the  heights  upon  both  sides  are  very 
nnich  better  supplied  from  the  Italian  bases,  having  good 
roads  and  a  railway  immediately  behind  them,  than  are 
the  heights  in  the  Val  Frenzela.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
it  is  taken  the  Austrians  are  very  near  to  turning  the 
whole  of  the  Rovereto-Schio  road. 

The  last  communiques  up  to  the  time  of  writing, 
Tuesday  afternoon,  leave  the  matter,  thus,  with  the 
.•\ustrians  relaxing  for  a  moment  their  efforts  against  the 
basin  of  the  ridge  and  still  attempting  both  the  Cogollo 
and  the  Frenzela  issues  from  the  upland  hollow  plateau 
of  Asiago.  There  is,  however,  this  much  development  in 
the  situation,  that  the  Italians  are  now  undertaking 
successful  local  counter-offensives  which  seem  so  far  to 
contain  the  enemy, 


June  15,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 

Capture  of  Fort  Vaux 


11 


The  events  of  the  present  week,  in  particular  the  develop- 
ment of  the  great  Russian  offensive,  forbid  me  space  to 
deal  at  any  length  with  the  Verdun  sector.  I  propose  to 
analyse  the  position  more  thoroughly  next  week,  but  it 
may  be  worth  while  pointing  out  briefly  what  is  meant 
by  the  entry  of  the  enemy  into  the  ruins  of  \'aux  Fort. 

As  every  one  knows  the  word  "  fort  "  in  this  con- 
nection has  no  relation  to  the  old  purposes  of  the  forts 
surrounding  \^erdun.  Permanent  restricted  works  shelter- 
ing heavy  artillery  disappeared  in  the  first  days  of  the 
war.  But  these  dismantled  works  are  ready-made 
obstacles  and  ready-made  shelters.  A  comparatively 
small  number  of  men  holding  them  can  do  a  great  deal  (if 
execution  against  an  attack  attempting  to  carry  them, 
even  when  that  attempt  is  brief  as  in  the  counter-attack 
of  the  French  20th  army  corps  in  the  ruins  of  Douaumont 
on  the  26th  of  February — which,  it  will  be  remembered, 
failed  to  carry  the  ruins — or  the  very  brief  and  successful 
recapture  of  the  fort  of  some  weeks  ago,  or  the  equally 
brief  counter-stroke  whereby  it  fell  again  into  German 
hands  two  days  later.  But  if  the  attempt  to  recapture 
such  a  place  is  prolonged,  the  disproportion  between  the 
losses  of  the  assailants  and  those  of  the  defenders  becomes 
prodigious.  A  determination  therefore  upon  the  part 
of  the  enemy  to  acquire  such  a  piece  of  ground  at  no 
matter  what  cost  gives  the  very  fullest  opportunity  for 
the  practice  of  the  French  tactics  upon  the  Verdun  sector, 
Avhich  is,  not  to  preserve  particular  areas  of  ground,  but 
to  inflict  a  maximum  loss  upon  the  enemy  with  the  mini- 
mum loss  to  themselves.  On  the  other  hand,  the  pos- 
session of  the  fort  of  Vaux  was  a  very  valuable  one  for 
the  Germans  and  the  effect  of  its  loss  to  the  French  must 
not  be  minimised,  for  it  was  the  last  good  observation 
post  over  the  Woevre  plain  possessed  by  the  French  to  the 
east  and  north-east  of  Verdun.  The  fort  of  Souville  is 
higher.  It  stands  on  the  top  of  the  down  lying  behind 
the  fort  of  Vaux,  which  latter  is  built  upon  the  shoulder 
of  the  down  just  before  the  bank  plunges  steeply  down  into 
the  plain  of  the  Woevre  below.     But  you  have  no  good 


observation  of  the  Woevre  from  the  distant  back  summit, 
although  it  is  higher.  From  the  fort  of  Vaux  you  had  one 
of  the  best  observation  posts  in  the  whole  district.  I 
believe  at  the  present  moment  there  is  no  French  observa- 
tion post  left  which  directly  commands  the  plain  of 
the  Woevre  in  this  district.  Further,  the  possession  of 
this  spur  upon  the  shoulder  of  the  down  gives  the  enemy 
an  entry  upon  the  Vaux  ravine. 

But  when  we  have  weighed  the  loss  and  the  gain  it 
still  remains  true — and  would  that  every  writer  upon  the 
war  would  steadily  keep  it  in  mind — that  the  main  under- 
lying ideas  before  Verdun  are,  upon  the  German  side  to 
occupy  the  French  by  a  continual  offensive,  to  wear  down 
their  moral  by  losses  which,  if  inferior  to  the  Germans' 
own  losses,  may  yet,  they  hope,  have  an  ultimate  effect ; 
impress  opinion  at  home  and  abroad  by  an  approach 
to  the  geographical  point  of  Verdun,  and  possibly  after  the 
exhaustion  of  their  useful  striking  force  to  enter  the  ruins 
of  the  town  itself.  While,  on  the  other  hand,  the  French 
conception  of  the  fighting  is  the  compelling  of  the  enemy 
(since  he  is  determined,  after  his  loss  of  the  original  battle, 
to  continue  an  offensive  of  usury),  to  lose  the  very  largest 
number  of  men  possible  in  proportion  to  the  numbers  that 
must  be  lost  by  the  French  in  order  to  inflict  that  damage. 
In  general,  the  Germans  believe  that  by  wearing  them- 
selves out  they  are  also  wearing  out  the  French,  and  that 
with  the  wearing  out  of  the  French  the  whole  allianct: 
will  lose  its  moral.  The  French  believe  that  the  Germans 
are  wrong  in  this  calculation,  and  th"at  their  error  will 
cause  them  to  exhaust  their  forces  at  such  a  rate  as  to 
make  the  counter-offensive,  when  it  does  come,  innnediate 
and  crushing.  The  future  will  show  which  of  these  two 
theses  is  right,  but  the  gradual  advance  of  the  enemy 
over  this  sector  at  an  average  rate  of  about  300  yards  a 
month  since  the  first  main  line  was  reached  upon  the  26th 
of  February,  is  not  the  approach  to  a  fortress  and  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  "  taking  "  of  Verdun.  The  more 
we  use  that  meaningless  phrase  the  better  the  enemy  will 
be  pleased.  H.  Blllog 


The   Battle  of  Jutland 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


SINCE  writing  the  general  sketch  of  the  battle  of 
Jutland  which  appeared  in  last  week's  Land 
&  Water,  I  have  seen  no  additional  infomia- 
tion  published  that  seems  to  be  of  material 
\aluc.  In  his  speech  in  the  City,  Mr.  Balfour  dealt  with 
the  position  created  by  our  victory  in  terms  that  were 
just,  statesmanlike  and  moderate,  but  he  gave  no  further 
details  to  assist  us  in  forming  any  clearer  picture  of  the 
event  itself.  The  Commander-in-Chief  has  paid  a  splendid 
tribute  to  the  brilliant  assistance  given  to  him  by  Vice- 
Admiral  Beatty.  "  No  Admiral,"  he  says,  "  could  wish 
to  be  better  served."  And  he  has  thanked  the  Flag 
Officers,  officers  and  men  of  his  fleet  who  are  upholding 
the  glorious  traditions  of  the  Navy.  But  in  speaking  of 
the  victory  he,  like  Mr.  Balfour,  speaks  with  perfect 
modesty  of  the  British  performance.  Sir  David  Beatty, 
in  addressing  his  men,  maintained  that  the  enemy's 
losses  must  be  heavier  than  ours.  Sir  John  Jellicoe 
contents  himself  with  saying  that  they  are  at  least  equal. 
There  is  no  attempt  anywhere  to  pretend  that  the  losses 
are  crushing  or  to  give  official  sanction  to  the  convictions 
held  by  many  reliable  officers  as  to  the  actual  damage 
the  Germans  have  suffered.  And  no  doubt  a  moderation 
in  these  claims  is  right  and  proper. 

The  whole  world  has  paid  its  respect  to  the  candour 
with  which  we  have  admitted  our  own  losses  and 
our  under-statement  of  those  which  we  believe  we 
have  inflicted.  This  candour  was  strikingly  exemplified 
by  the  fact  that  in  the  first  communique,  not  only  was 
every  known  loss  published,  but  all  ships  not  actually 
heard  from  by  the  afternoon  of  June  ist  were  included 
amongst  those  that  might  be  lost.  \\'hen  it  came, 
therefore,   to  giving  a  corrected  list,   the  actual   losses 


turned  out  to  be  smaller  than  might  have  been  anticipated. 
Similarly  too,  little  if  anything  was  made  of  the  damage 
we  had  inflicted.  At  the  beginning  of  last  week  the 
Admiralty  put  the  probable  losses  of  the  Germans  at  four 
capital  ships,  four  cruisers,  nine  destroyers  and  one 
submarine.  Yet  in  his  message  to  the  fleet.  Sir  John 
Jellicoe,  as  I  have  stated,  speaks  of  them  only  as  at  "least 
as  heavy  as  ours.  But  this  message  seems,  though  only 
published  on  Tuesday,  June  13th,  to  have  been  written 
at  least  ten  days  earlier.  After  a  careful  sifting  of  the 
evidence  available  to  me,  I  have  formed  the  opinion 
that  the  Admiralty  statements  of  a  week  ago  must 
be  considerably  below  the  truth.  It  is  highly  probable 
that  two  more  capital  ships  arc  sunk,  that  the  loss 
of  cruisers  is  7  and  not  4,  of  destroyers  15  and  not 
9,  and  instead  of  one  submarine  at  least  three  were 
sunk  by  the  British  and  probably  one  by  the  fler- 
mans  themselves.  But  I  admit  without  any  hesitation 
that  no  estimate  can  be  reliable  until  all  the  evidence  is 
thoroughly  sifted  and  impartially  compared,  and  I  have 
only  suggested  these  figures,  not  as  definitely  established 
German  losses,  but  as  indicating  that  there  is-  evidence 
of  much  higher  losses  than  we  have  claimed. 

The  Enemy  Losses 

The  course  that  the  enemy  has  followed  in  this 
respect  has  been  strikingly  unhke  our  own.  He  began 
by  putting  foi-warda  claim  to  victory  that — in  the  face  of 
his  retreat  and  his  total  inability  to  seize  the  fruits  of 
victory — was  patently  fatuous.  The  only  losses  he 
admitted  were  the  small  cruiser  Wiesbaden,  the 
pre-Dreadnought    Pommerii,    the    Fraucnlob.    and   some 


12 


LAND     &     W'A  T  E  R 


June  15,  1916 


torpcdu  buats.  It  was  perhaps  pardonable  that  he  sliould 
claim  to  have  sunk  many  more  British  ships  than  actually 
went  down.  It  was  as  easy  for  him  to  be  mistaken  in 
such  a  matter  as  for  us.  Ihick  weatiier,  bad  li{,'ht,  the 
fact  of  a  night  action,  all  these  things  would  make  the 
losses  of  one  side  uncertain  to  the  other.  But  the  attempt 
to  conceal  liis  own  losses  must  from  every  point  of  view, 
e.xcept  the  German,  appear  a  fatal  mistake.  A  very 
different  list  has  since  been  admitted.  The  Lutzow 
and  the  Rostok,  the  loss  of  which  till  June  8th  was  denied 
"  for  military  reasons,"  ha\  e  now  to  be  added.  \\'liv, 
one  may  ask,  are  these  losses  admitted  now.  The  in- 
ference is  obvious.  The  liernums  lied  about  their  losses 
in  the  tirst  instance,  for  without  the  lie  the  legend  of  the 
fruitless  victory  could  hardly  have  got  currency  even  in 
(iermany.  They  have  admitted  a  small  part  of  the  truth 
now  in  the  hope  of  concealing  the  larger  part  kept  back. 

The  point  is  not  of  \er\'  great  interest,  for  in  this 
matter  our  opponents  are  only  following  in  naval  matters 
the  course  they  have  pursued  from  the  tirst  with  regard 
to  their  losses  on  land.  It  is  a  courses  that  deceives  no 
one  outside  (Iermany,  but  is,  one  must  suppose,  justified 
if  it  deceives  and  consoles  the  (iermans.  At  this  stage 
of  the  war  it  is  very  doubtful  if  neutral  o])inion  is  of 
much  importance,  but  if  it  is  the  incident  of  the  Lntzow 
has  this  value,  that  all  (icrman  olilicial  statements  about 
their  successes,  their  failures,  their  losses,  their  prisoners 
and  their  booty  will  be  treated  not  merely  as  suspect, 
but  as  deliberate  and  calculated  untruths. 

While  we  have  no  fresh  information  to  alter  our  general 
\\c\\  as  to  the  course  or  the  result  of  the  Battle  of  Jutland, 
careful  reconsideration  of  the  evidence  already  in  our 
j)Ossession  prompts  me  to  no  material  alteration  in  the 
opinions  that  have  already  been  expressed.  There  were 
one  or  two  palpable  errors  in  the  accoiuit  which  I  pub- 
lished last  week,  and  I  have  to  thank  se\eral  corre- 
spondents for  pointing  them  out  to  me.  It  is  also  clear 
from  letters  I  have  received  that  the  preliminary  dis- 
position of  the  forces  and  certain  features  of  the  action 
present  considerable  difiiculties,  and  not  only  to  lay 
readers.  I  cannot  this  week  deal  with  more  than  one 
or  two  of  these. 


T 

^      JclUcoe 

¥ 

\V'\_,Arbuthncrt- 
Hood.^ 

^ 

1   5^    .VcHH^r 

fe\\VonSch«er    1 

TUeT 

0      TtfOes       *" 

E 

Disposition  of  the  Fleet 

First  let  us  make  it  quite  clear  what  their  relative  jx)si- 
iions  were.  And  here  I  have  to  make  a  correction.  In  the 
first  of  the  seven  diagrams  I  gave  last  week,  I  gave  Sir 
John  Jellicoe's,  Beatty's,  von  Hipper's  and  von  Schecr's 
positions  at  approximatch-  2.20.  This  was  an  oversight. 
The  tinii  should  have  been  approximately  j. 45,  when  fire 
was  opened.  I  reprint  the  diagram  this  week.  And  to 
get  the  position  of  the  two  battle-fleets  at  2.20  the  reader 
must  imagine  Sir  John  Jcllicoe  to  be  about  in  the  top  of 
the  left-hand  corner  and  Admiral  Scheer  to  be  somewhere 
just  off  the  Horn  Reefs,  and  both  Sir  David  Beatty  and 


Vice-Admiral  Hii)per  further  to  the  west.  By  3.45, 
when  the  action  began,  they  would  have  closed  to  the 
position  in  the  diagram. 

The  plan  of  the  action  followed  by  the  British  Fleut 
was  undoubtedly  tljat  formulated  by  the  Commander-in- 
Chief.  He  had  not  on  this  occasion  to  consider  any  new 
or  unrehearsed  problem.  The  fleet  was  embarking  on  a 
manoeuvre  which  it  had  performed  on  innumerable 
previous  occasions.  The  task  allotted  to  each  section 
of  the  fleet  was  the  result  of  past  experience  and  a  careful 
consideration  of  all  the  probabilities.  The  objective 
was  to  bring  the  enemy's  fleet  as  a  whole  to  action.  The 
plan,  therefore,  had  to  take  into  consideration  a  thousand 
contingencies  and  obviously  could  not  be  the  best  possible 
plan  for  dealing  with  any  particular  one  of  them.  The 
(|uestion  is  in  point  of  fart  one  that  can  only  be  discussed 
intelligiblv  wliiii  all  the  experience  and  iiiformation 
available  to  the  Conunander-in-Chief  are  known,  and 
conclusions,  as  misleading  as  they  may  be  unjust,  will 
be  put  forward  if  the  disposition  of  the  fleet  is  discussed, 
as  if  tiie  position  and  plans  of  the  enemy  were  known 
before  the  British  Fleets  left  their  ports. 

British  Prisoners  in  German  Hands 

A  fact  which  has  puzzled  a  great  many  people  is  this. 
Indcjati^ablc  was,  as  we  saw  last  week,  sunk  within  ten 
minutes  of  the  battle  cruisers  opening  fire  on  von  Hipper's 
squadron.  The  action  continued  in  a  south-easterly  and 
southerly  direction  for  an  hour  after  this,  and  then  our  fast 
division  led  the  (icrmans  northwards  for  another  hour 
and  twentj'  minutes,  when,  after  the  entry  of  Hood  and 
Arbuthnot  into  the  field,  the  way  was  clear  for  the  (irand 
Fleet,  and  the  action  ended  with  the  disorderly  flight 
of  the  enemy.  How  then  did  it  happen  that  the  (iermans, 
if  driven  off  the  field,  should  be  found  after  the  battle 
with  prisoners  from  Indcjati'^able  ?  The  explanation  is 
really  qiute  simple.  Von  Hipper,  we  must  remember, 
when  the  first  contact  was  made  at  2.20  until  .J.45,  when 
the  action  commenced,  was  always  to  the  north  and 
eastward  of  Admiral  Beatty.  He  had  no  doubt  distri- 
buted his  destroyers  well  ahead  of  him  when  cruising 
northward,  so  that  when  Beatty  made  him  turn  and  fall 
back  on  the  High  Seas  Fleet,  he  would  be  follourd  by 
the  destroyers  that  had  jMeviously  been  his  advance 
guard.  These  destroyers  would,  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  things,  pass  over  the  scene  of  the  engagement  a  quarter 
of  an  hour  or  half  an  hour  after  it  had  taken  place.  Our 
own  destroyers,  in  the  meantime,  which  had  been  ahead 
of  Sir  Da\id  Beatty,  would  probably  ha\c  remained 
ahead  of  the  squadron.  Consequently  our  destroyers 
would  not  pass  over  the  field  of  the  action.  There  is 
nothing  surprising  then,  in  the  (iermans  having  found  a 
few  survivors,  and  it  is  gratifying  to  know  that  they  had 
the  humanity  to  save  them. 

I  have  to  make  two  other  corrections  in  the  account 
of  the  action  which  I  gave  last  week  and  in  the  diagrams. 
First,  it  seems  clear  that  Rear-Admiral  Evan  Thomas's 
battleships  got  into  action  before  4.45  ;  they  seem  to 
have  fallen  into  line  behind  Sir  David's  battle  cruisers 

The  City  of  London  Rose  Society  holds  its  annual  show  at 
the  Cannon  Street  Hotel  on  Tuesday,  the  27th  inst.  Last 
year  the  Society  was  able  to  liand  over  /()5  to  the  British 
Red  Cross  Society  as  the  result  of  this  show,  and  this  year 
it  hopes  to  do  better. 

The  oak-trees  at  Aslistcad  arc  being  devastated  by  cater- 
pillars. Mr.  Comptun  Merryweatlicr  writes  suggesting  that 
the  trees  be  sprayed  with  cluomate  of  lead.  This  was  done 
successfully  in  Richmond  Park  three  years  ago  under  similar 
circumstances  on  the  advice  of  Mr.  Maxwell  Lefroy,  Mr. 
Merrywcather  lending  the  necessary  pumping  apparatus. 

The  Women's  National  I^and  Service  Corps  is,  we  are  in- 
formed, in  urgent  need  of  recruits,  more  especially  among 
educated  women.  This  Corps,  whose  president  is  the  Duke 
of  Marlborough,  is  recognised  by  the  (iovernment  as  th(^  cen- 
tral voluntary  bodj'  for  enrolling  girls  and  Women  of  the  pro- 
fessional and  leisured  classes  for  work  upon  farms.  Short 
trainings  from  four  to  six  weeks  can  be  arranged.  It  is 
found  that  the  presence  of  educated  women  acts  as  an  incen- 
tive to  local  female  labour.  Of  course  not  every  woman,  be 
she  educated  or  not.  is  suitable  for  farm  work,  InU  many  of 
them  ha\e  shown  extraordinary  aptitude^ 


June  15,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


13 


in  the  course  of  the  southorly  pursuit  of  von  Hipper.  I 
was  also  wrong  in  supposing  that  Sir  Robert  Arbuthnot's 
dash  with  the  armoured  cruisers  was  made  after  Sir 
David  Beatty  formed  the  gap  between  himself  and  Evan 
Thomas.  The  incident  took  place  while  the  battle- 
cruisers  and  fast  battleships  were  still  fighting  as  a  single 
squadron. 

Effect  of  Shell  Fire 

Far  too  few  details  as  to  the  effect  of  modern  shell 
fire  on  modern  ships  are  as  yet  available  for  it  to  be  safe 
to  draw  sweeping  deductions.  But  when  it  is  remem- 
bered that  the  bad  light  made  it  necessary  to  engage  at  a 
range  which  this  war  has  taught  us  to  consider  only  moder- 
ate it  seems  astonishing  that  the  battle  cruisers  should  have 
(  ome  through  such  severe  punishment  with  such  insigni- 
ficant injuries.  One  hears  of  a  ship  receiving  over  fifty 
hits  of  II  and  12-inch  shell  without  losing  a  knot  of  speed, 
one-tenth  of  her  complement,  or  having  one-quarter  of 
her  guns  out  of  action — as  an  actual  fact,  needing  no 
essential  repairs  to  make  her  just  as  fit  for  fighting  at  the 
end  as  she  was  at  the  beginning  of  the  action,  and  suffer- 
ing no  damages  that  very  few  weeks  in  dockyard  cannot 
put  right  again. 

This  is  a  thing  that  should  perhaps  make  one  cautious 
in  believing  every  enemy  sliip  that  was  for  any  time 
under  effective  fire  must  be  virtually  destroyed,  or 
shot  to  pieces.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  all 
through  the  action  the  British  were  using  guns  of  far 
heavier  calibre  and,  consequently,  throwing  far  more 
destructive  shells,  than  were  the  Germans.  From  3.45 
till  6  o'clock,  Sir  David  Beatty's  force  was  firing  first 
four,  then  three  broadsides  of  13.5's  and  four  broadsides 
of.  15-inch  guns.  Only  one  of  his  ships  was  armed  with 
12-inch.  We  can  take  it  as  certain  also  that  in  the 
short  tinie  that  the  Grand  Fleet  was  engaged,  it  would  be 
the  15-inch  and  13.5  gun  ships  that  were  principally  in 
action.  Where,  therefore,  there  is  reliable  evidence  of 
these  ships  having  brought  enemy  vessels  under  a  succes- 
sion of  salvoes,  it  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that  he 
must  have  suffered,  hit  for  hit,  far  more  heavily  than  we 
did. 

Spirit  of  the  Fleet 

The  Navy  has  had  to  wait  so  long  for  its  first  big  battle, 
so  many  of  the  officers  and  men  and  ships  had  not  been' 
in  action  before  May  31st,  that  to  the  vast  majority 
this  was  their  baptism  of  fire— the  first  test  to  which 
their  professional  skill,  long  training  and  above  all, 
their  spirit  had  been  put.  Those  who  knew  the  Navy 
best  have  been  least  surprised  at  the  triumphant  egress 
of  all  from  this  ordeal.  Those  deeds  of  daring  that  end 
in  death  naturally  claim  our  first  tribute  and  impress 
themselves  the  more  deeply  upon  our  memories,  so  that 
the  gallantry  of  Hood,  the  splendid  heroism  of  Arbuthnot 
and  his  fellows  on  the  cruisers,  and  the  last  hours  of 
Onslow,  stand  out  pre-eminent.  It  is  much  to  be 
hoped,  however,  that  of  the  innumerable  instances  of 
courage,  intrepidity,  of  light-hearted  facing  of  risks,  and 
of  the  cheerful  bearing  of  suffering,  the  more  picturesque 
and  striking  will  be  recorded  and  preserved  not  only  for 
the  honour  of  their  heroes  but  for  the  encouragement  of 
future  generations.  Many  yarns  are  current  already, 
and  as  a  first  step  towards  the  desired  anthology  I 
note  the  following. 

An  officer  of  one  of  the  light  cruisers  was  reported  in 
the  official  return  as  "severely  wounded."  Whitehall 
immediately  received  a  telegram  respectfully  but  ardently 
protesting  against  so  misleading  and  humiliating  a  des- 
cription. "  I  have  only  got  a  chip  knocked  out  of  my 
shin  and  shall  be  ready  for  duty  in  a  very  few  days  " 
The  P.M.O.  was  promptly  wired  to  for  a  full  description 
of  this  officer's  injuries.  It  turned  out  that  he  had  the 
right  leg  fractured,  and  left  tibia  chipped,  a  large  piece 
of  shell  embedded  in  his  groin,  and  seventeen  other  cuts 
and  wounds. 

In  the  6-inch  battery  of  one  ship  an  enemy  shell  set 
fire  to  a  cordite  charge,  and  there  being  others  in  close 
pro.ximity,  the  officer  of  quarters  at  once  gave  orders  to 
clear  the  battery.  Before  the  order  could  be  obeyed,  two 
boys  were  knocked  over  by  the  ignition  of  a  second  charge 
A  naval  chaplain  went  back,  brushed  the  burning  pro- 
pellant  off  them  and  pulled  them  out,  and  got  badly- 


burned  about  the  face  and  hands  in  doing  so.  With 
every  feature  disfigured  and  almost  blinded,  he  was  led, 
almost  by  force,  below.  The  pain  must  have  been  ex- 
cruciating. But  he  protested  he  was  an  absolute  fraud, 
not  a  bit  hurt  and  that  they  ought  to  be  giving  their 
attention  to  people  who  were  seriously  injured. 

Another  chaplain,  hit  in  the  spine,  was  told  by  the 
doctor  that  he  only  had  a  few  hours  to  live.  He  sat  in 
the  chair,  conversing  cheerily  with  those  around  him 
till  death  came — -by  fat  the  least  concerned  of  all  in 
the  company. 

It  is  said  that  Sparrowhaivk  having  lost  the  whole 
of  her  fore  part  lay  throughout  the  night  of  the  31st 
and  1st  a  helpless  wreck.  Early  in  the  morning  a  cruiser 
was  seen  approaching.  It  soon  became  quite  clear  that 
she  was  an  enemy.  The  men  in  the  Sparrowhawk  had 
no  conceivable  means  either  of  attacking,  or  of  defending 
themselves.  There  seemed  no  alternative  to  death  or 
imprisonment.  They  watched  the  approach  then  of  the 
cruiser  with  none  too  pleasant  anticipations  of  the  result. 
Suddenly,  to  their  amazement,  without  a  gun  being  fired 
or  any  notice  being  taken  of  them,  the  enemy  cruiser 
up-ended  and  sank  in  half  a  minute.  She  had  not  ap- 
peared to  be  badly  damaged  ;  there  was  no  explosion 
or  explanation  whatever.  Arthur  Pollen 


Epitaphe 

By  Emile  Cammaerts 

TO'  the    Memory  of  Sergeant    Jacques    Bouvier, 

aged    23,    killed    at  Dixmudc,    while     relieving 

a   comrade    buried  under   his    dug-out,    in    an 
advance  post. 

II  n'est  pas  mort, 
II  est  parti. 

II  a  force  la  porta  de  sa  vie. 
II  a  franchi, 

D'un  bond,  le  seuil  dc  son  sort. 
II  n'est  pas  mort. 
II  est  sorti 
'       D'un  monde  qui  etait  trop  petit  pour  lui. 

Couvrez  le  tambour  d'un  voile  noir. 

Couvrez  son  corps 

Du  drapeau  de  la  Victoire. 

II  n'a  pas  eu,  comme  d'autres,  la  patience 

D'attendre  jusqu'  au  bout. 

II  n'a  pas  eu,  comme  d'autres,   la  prudejice 

De  boire  k  petits  coups. 

II  n'est  pas  mort. 

II  est  parti. 

II  a  vide  sa  coupe  jusqu'  k  la  lie. 

II  a  franchi, 

D'un  bond,  le  seuil  de  son  sort. 

II  a  fait,  d'un  geste,  tout  ce  qu'il  avait  a  faire, 

II  a  dit,  d'un  mot,  tout  ce  qu'il  avait  at  dire, 

II  a  livre  sa  guerre 

Et  souffert  son  mar  tyre. 

Battez  le  tambour  at  petits  coups  xas, 
Portez  son  corps 
A  petits  pas. 

II  n'est  pas  mort, 

Mais  nous  mourrons 

Chaque  fois  que  nousi  songerons  a  lui 

Et  que  nous  nous  souviendrons 

Que  nous  ne  I'avons  pas  suivi. 

11  n'est  pas  mort, 

Mais   nous   vivrons 

Bien  des  jours  et  bien  des  nuits 

Sans  jamais  voir  la  ]Dorte  d'or 

Qui  s'est  ouverte  de\iant  lui. 

Plantez  une  croix  sur  son  tombeau— 

II  n'est  pas  mort — 

Gravez  son  nom,  son  numero, 

Et  tirez  sur  son  corps 

La  salve  des  heros  1  . 

[All  Uichts  RESERinol 


14 


LAND     &      WATER 


June  15,    1016 


Letters  to  a  Lonely  Civilian 

By  the  Author  of  "Aunt  Sarah  and  the  War" 


MV  DEAR  YOi;.— Kitchener  in  his  death  has 
-ulved,  at  least  for  me.  one  of  the  minor  and 
later  enigmas  of  his  hfe.  Early  in  .March  he 
u;-s>ired  a  Cabinet  Colleague  that  the  War 
\Mnikl  be  over  in  three  months.  That  Cabinet  Colleague 
foiild  not  at  all  tell  what  "  K  "  meant— he  was  even 
^'ainsaying  his  own  famous  forecast  of  a  three  years'  term 
III  fighting.  Again,  dining  with  friends  in  St.  James's 
Square  a  day  or  two  later,  "  K  "  solemnly  assured  a 
fellow-guest  :  "  It  will  all  be  over  in  June."  Everyone 
who  heard  it  wondered  at  a  forecast  which  facts  seemed 
to  falsify  on  the  very  face  of  it.  And  now  we  have  the 
only  conceivable  clue.  For  June  has  come,  and  all  iS 
over — for  liim. 

Kitchener's  most  noticeable  features  were  his  eyelids. 
Eyes  may  dull  or  may  brighten  ;  but  it  is  the  lids  that 
really  lend  e.xpression.by  their  shape  and  bv  their  minute 
muscular  contractions.  In  shape,  his  were  quite  the 
most  soldierly  ever  seen.  The  cut  of  his  lids  proclaimed 
war — they  made  weapons  of  his  eyes.  The  upper  lids 
weighed  thoughtfully  upon  the  iris;  and  the  grave 
eyesight  of  the  man — of  the  miUtary  man — looked  from 
a  kind  of  ambush — not  a  stealthy  ambush,  but  a  coura- 
geous and  strategic.  I  have  heard  people  liken  his  eye 
--must  one  really  say  his  eyelid  ? — to  a  tiger's.  That 
illusion  was  a  little  helped  by  the  colour-scheme  of  cold 
blue  orbs  set  in  a  dark  ruddy  face — the  deepened  palette 
to  which  the  earlier  pink  of  his  complexion  had  given 
place.  His  smile  further  flattered  the  fancy.  Someone 
who  told  a  funny  story  at  a  party  at  whicl:  "  K  "  was 
present,  and  wlio  was  asked  afterwards  if  "  K  "  had 
laughed,  replied  :    "  O  yes,  he  just  showed  a  fang." 

So  laconic  was  his  speech  he  could  not  ha\e  borne  more 
than  a  single  word— ("  Thorough  "  was  the  one  word 
chosen) — for  the  underline  of  his  heraldic  device.  His 
utterances  were  so  simple  as  well  as  so  brief  as  to  be  at 
times  doubly  disconcerting.  "  What  are  they  doing  ?  ' 
he  would  ask,  when  a  crowd  came  out  to  welcome  his 
entry  into  a  town,  or  his  arrival  at  a  port.  "  What  a 
lot  of  people  !  "  became  quite  a  formula  with  him  on 
such  occasions  and  even  at  private  gatherings,  ^^'hcn  a 
Mayor  read  an  address  which  informed  him  of  things 
(things  he  had  done  !)  his  expression  became  that  of  a 
scolded  schoolboy.  It  was  a  frankly  bored  expression 
when,  early  one  May  morning,  he  was  taken  prisoner  to 
the  Academy  by  a  picture-adoring  Duchess.  Con- 
noisseur of  china  though  he  was,  he  brought  to  Burhngton 
House — say  the  soldier's  eyelid,  rather  than  the  artist's 
eye  !  Sometimes  the  sejitiment.  behind  those  bare  sen- 
tences of  his,  was  itself  a  little  bit  of  a  surprise.  Once, 
when  he  had  desired  a  girl  to  continue  dancing  in  his 
presence,  he  explained  :  "  She  is  so  like  a  figure  on  a 
vase  !  " 

"Thorough  "  in  life,  in  death  he  was  a  Man  of  Four 
Mitigations.  Long  since  he  said  to  a  friend,  with  a 
shyness  which  in  him  was  never  unmanly  :  "  A  soldier 
.should  not  marry— he  doesn't  knon-  what  may  happen  to 
him."  And  now  the  comfort  is  that  the  close  company 
of  his  private  mourners  do  not  incLude  a  father,  a  mother, 
a  wife,  or  a  child. 

As  you  may  imagine,  Ostedey  Park  made  altogether 
welcome  the  baby-girl  that  has-,  been  born  to  Lady  Jersey. 
War-time  vastly  changes  ma  nv  an  expecting  motlicrs 
anticipatory  sex-preferences :  sc  iiiic  will  say  it  changes  them 
unpatriotically.  The  coining  event  is  "itself  shadowed 
nowadays  by  the  blackness  of  1  )attlc  ;  and  the  ancient  joy 
of  a  man  child  being  born  into  the  world  gives  place  to  a 
new  delight  in  the  arrival  of  one  of  thcsrt/V/sex.  Is  it  really 
true,  I  wonder,  that  bi)\  s  gai  n  on  giris  in  the  birthrate 
after  a  big  war  ?  Anywa\-,  th'  2  time  is  at  hand  when  that 
popular  superstition  can  be  put  to  a  decisive  test.  In 
so  long  a  war,  we  need  not  ev  en  wait  till  the  end  to  dis- 
cover whether  the  heroism  th:  it  tills  the  air  does  or  docs 
not  fill  the  cradles  with  jwten  tial  heroes.  I  own  to  being 
incredulous  ;  and  the  latest  figures  of  the  Registrar- 
(icncral  do  not  reprove  my  lack  of  faith  in  this  particular 
display  of  Nattire's  obliginglj'-  benign  opportunism. 


Very  old  people  still  recall  that  a  bygone  Lady  Jersey 
was  si'milarh-  pleased,  in  the  middle  of  the  last  century-, 
by  the  dibii't  of  a  baby— that  time  a  boy,  and  not  even 
her  own  !  .\  telegram  from  France  told  her,  one  morning, 
that  her  friend,  the  beautiful  Empress  Eugenie,  was 
"  expecting  "  that  day.  Hour  after  hour  was  passed  in 
eager  anticipation  of  "the  final  bulletin  ;  and  dinner  was 
prolonged  that  night  by  the  Jerseys  into  an  era.  But 
not  till  six  the  next  morning  did  the  message  come  which 
might  mould  history.  Do  you  quite  realise  that  the 
Empress-mother  of  that  morning  is  now  at  Farnborough — 
she,  too.  in  her  turn,  anxiously  waiting  bulletins  from 
France,  but,  alas,  of  death  instead  of  birth  ?  A  woman 
who  kept  her  ninetieth  birthday  a  month  ago  coaching 
herself  in  the  most  alert  methods  of  modern  aviation  ! 
And  can  yoii  imagine  the  Prince  Imperial  the  man  of 
.sixty  he  might  now  be  ? 

r'm  sure  I  can't.  The  Zulu  assegai  gave  him  im- 
mortal youth— in  some  poor  way  the  compensating 
.gift  conferred,  during  these  last  months,  on  so  many  an 
English  mother's  sacrificed  son. 

Stevenson,  you  remember,  knew  a  middle  Lady  Jersey 
— the  grandmother  of  the  four  little  Villiers  children  in 
the  Osterley  nursery  to-day.  In  an  impublished  letter, 
written  by  Stevenson's  wife  from  Samoa  to  a  friend  in 
P-ngland,  she  says  :  "  People  wonder  how  we  can  bear  tlie 
dullness  of  our  life  here.  In  truth  we  live  in  a  whirl  of 
excitement.  To  be  part  of  a  living  Opera  is  not  dull, 
nor  do  I  believe  you  would  find  it  so.  Lady  Jersey  has 
just  been  visiting  Mr.  Haggard,  brother  of  the  novelist. 
I  believe  she  intends  publishing  her  impressions  of 
Samoa- -it  would  be  an  amusing  paper.  She  has  turned 
the  heads  of  all  the  male  population  of  the  Island,  and 
leaves  us,  I  should  think,  well  pleased."  And  as,  in 
the  magazine  article  this  Lady  Jersey  did  afterwards 
publish  about  Samoa,  she  inodestly  omits  all  mention  of 
this  concerted  movement  of  male  heads.  Mrs.  Stevenson's 
letter  adds  a  completing  Footnote  to  History. 

One  of  the  things  which  first  made  me  your  friend  was 
your  saying  that  you  didn't  know  the  woman  with  whom 
you'd  not  been  a  little  in  love.  Women,  you  said,  never 
seem  to  know  how  nice  they  are — how  nice  men  find 
them  ;  and  men,  though  they  feel  the  thrall,  don't  care 
to  talk  of  it.  I  think  that's  true.  If  men  said  all  they 
felt  (and  a  little  more),  they  might  subject  themselves 
to  a  reproof  I  once,  in  youth,  received  at  the  tongue  of 
the  great  Gladstone.  Other  topics  failing,  I  was  remind- 
ing him  of  a  party  at  which  I  had  first  met,  among  others, 
himself,  his  wife,  and  the  Hayters  ;  and  I  said,  "  I  fell 
in  love,  at  sight,  with  Lady  Hayter."  "  I  grant  you 
she's  very  intelligent,"  deprecated  this  great  literaiist, 
whose  voluminous  speeches  you  may  search  in  vain  for 
an  image.  "  But  I  fell  in  love  with  her,"  I  insisted. 
"  O,  well,  she's  a  charming  woman,  and  hey  husband —  " 
but  luckily,  before  the  last  significantly  accentuated 
sentence  was  comf)leted,  soincbody  came  along,  or  a 
Commandment  had  been  quoted  !  Lady  Hayter  later 
became  Lady  Haversham,  but  she  remained  in  dark 
ignorance,  as  women  commonly  will  remain,  of  a  conquest 
made  across  a  dinner-table  I " 

"The  country  has  a  right  to  have  me,  but  not  to  shave 
me,"  remarked  the  least  foppish  of  men  to  me  the  other 
day  in  view  of  his  coming  conscription.  Middle-aged,  he 
has  never  yet  used  a  razor.  Why  should  that  weapon 
be  compulsory  ?  I  think  bearded  Lord  Latymer  might 
reasonably  have  put  shaving  soap  down  oii  his  list  of 
minor  war  economies,  even  for  the  civiUan.  For  the 
soldier,  with  all  the  discomforts  of  camp  and  trench,  the 
razor,  in  novice  hands,  is  an  instnmicnt  of  torture  which 
Parliament  really  should  abolish.  In  different  places 
and  times,  shaving  has  been  variously  considered  a  sign 
of  effeminacy,  of  servitude,  of  liberty,  of  renunciation  of 
the  world.  It  is  as  a  mark  of  servitude  only  that  it  is 
regarded  by  my  bearded  friend.  In  the  Crimea  our  men 
were  liberated  from  the  lather  ;  and,  in  this  war,  the 
French  soldier's  very  name  indii  atcs  his  full  freedom  to 
be  hairy— he  is  now  the  poilu.  W. 


June  15,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


15 


A  Bad  School  for  Statesmen 


By  Professor  h.  P.  Jacks 


MR.  LESLIE  STEPHEN,  in  his  essay  on 
Disraeli's  Novels,  rebukes  the  people  who  extol 
the  man  of  deeds  above  the  man  of  \\  ords.  True 
to  his  profession  as  a  man  of  letters,  Mr.  Stephen 
believes  there  is  nothing  like  literature.  "  I  will  con- 
fess," he  says,  "  to  piTferring  the  men  who  have  sown 
some  new  seed  of  thought  above  the  heroes  whose  names 
mark  epochs  in  history.  I  would  rather  .  .  .  leaven 
a  country  with  new  ideas  than  translate  them  into  facts, 
inevitably  mangling  and  distorting  them  in  the  process. 
.  .  .1  would  rather  have  been  Voltaire  or  (ioethe 
than  Frederick  or  Napoleon  ;  and  I  suspect  that  the 
historian  of  the  nineteenth  century  will  attribute  more 
importance  to  two  or  three  recent  English  writers  than 
to  all  the  English  statesmen  who  have  been  strutting 
and  fretting  their  little  hour  at  Westminster." 

If  the  different  clauses  of  this  statement  are  put 
together  it  will  be  seen  that  Mr.  Stephen's  examples  are 
somewhat  confusing,  and  that  he  is  not  quite  consistent 
with  himself.  He  begins  by  preferring  the  man  of  words 
to  the  man  of  deeds,  and  ends  by  preferring  the  position,  of 
a  writer  to  that  of  a  Member  of  Parliament.  The  latter 
person  Mr.  Stephen,  by  a  perverse  change  in  his  angle 
of  vision,  chooses  to  regard  as  a  man  of  deeds.  This  is 
gravely  open  to  doubt.  To  be  sure,  the  statesmen  who 
strut  and  fret  their  little  hour  at  Westminster  are  engaged 
in  talking  or  making  speeches  about  action  to  be  taken. 
But  talking  about  deeds  is  a  very  different  thing  from 
performing  them.  By  confusing  the  two  things  Mr. 
Stephen  unconsciously  becomes  the  ally  of  the  most 
dangerous  delusion  of  our  times.  The  delusion  is  that 
talk  will  do  the  business,  or  in  the  more  concrete  form, 
that  I  am  a  man  of  action  because  I  spend  my  time  in 
making  speeches,  or  even  in  preaching  sermons,  about 
actions  that  have  to  be  performed  by  other  men. 

Houses  of  Verbiage 

Because  seven  hundred  gentlemen  are  discussing  how- 
children  ought  to  be  educated  or  drunkards  reformed, 
it  does  not  follow  that  any  child  is  being  taught  what  he 
needs  to  know  or  that  any  drunkard  is  being  saved  from 
■  his  doom — nor  indeed  that  they  ever  will  be.  The  con- 
trary is  often  the  truth.  All  the  time  these  gentlemen 
are  making  speeches  the  children  and  the  drunkards  are 
passing  beyond  their  reach  ;  the  children  by  growing 
up  into  men  and  women,  the  drunkards  by  drinking 
themselves  to  death.  When  the  speeches  are  prolonged 
through  several  generations,  as  they  have  been  in  both 
the  instances  given,  the  net  loss  is  very  serious.  It  may 
suit  the  politicians  to  "  wait  and  see  "  and  talk  about 
it  in  the  meantime  ;  but  the  children  and  the  drunkards, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  great  currents  of  history,  neither 
wait  nor  see.  The  result  is  that  the  people  in  whose 
interests  action  was  first  proposed  are  in  their  graves 
before  the  seven  hundred  are  ready  to  act.  Others  no 
doubt  will  have  taken  their  place,  but  if  those  who  have 
been  lost  in  the  intervals  could  be  summoned  from  their 
resting  place  I  doubt  if  they  would  agree  with  Mr.  Stephen 
in  classing  the  seven  hundred  as  men  of  action.  They 
would  rather  support  Carlyle,  who  regarded  the  Houses 
of  Parliament  as  essentially  Houses  of  Verbiage,  and  they 
would  have  told  Mr.  Stephen,  who  preferred  the  man  o'f 
vords  above  the  man  of  deeds,  that  with  such  a  preference 
Parliament  was  undoubtedly  his  proper  place. 

The  truth  is,  of  course,  that  Mr.  Stephen  and  many 
others  who  talk  about  "  ideas  ruling  the  world  "  and 
"  words  being  mightier  than  deeds  "  have  in  mind  a  very 
particular  class  of  ideas  and  a  sort  of  words  which  is  by 
no  means  common.  There  is  a  story  about  the  Shah  of 
Persia  which  illustrates  the  point.  "Somebody  had  pro- 
posed to  this  potentate  that  he  should  go  to  "the  Derb\-. 
The  Shah  refused. 

"  Do  you  suppose,"  he  said,  "  that  I  am  so  ignorant 
as  not  to  know  that  one  horse  can  run  faster  than 
another  ?  " 

The  answer,  though  interesting,  was  irrelevant. '  For 
the  object  of  the  Derby  is  not  to  demonstrate  that  one 


horse  can  run  faster  than  another,  but  to  show  which 
horse  can  run  faster  than  which.  In  the  sajue  way  the 
statement  that  ideas  rule  the  world  is  irrelevant  as  ap 
answer  to  the  man  who  is  inquiring  whether  this  world  is 
well  governed  or  ill.  Little  is  gained  by  knowing  that 
ideas  rule  the  world  until  you  know  further  whether  the 
ideas  in  question  are  good  or  bad.  The  worst  kind  of 
world,  in  my  opinion,  would  be  a  world  ruled  by  an  idea 
— and  that  idea  a  bad  one.  Nor  is  there  any  consolation 
in  learning  that  words  are  mightier  than  deeds.  What 
words  ?  "  The  pen  is  mightier  than  the  sword."  Well, 
what  if  it  is  ?  I  would  rather  live  vmder  the  might  of  a 
sword  that  is  clean  than  under  the  might  of  a  pen  that 
is  dipped  in  lies  and  venom. 

Foolish  Idolatry 

One  may  carry  the  idolatry  of  "  ideas  "  and  "  words  " 
a  httle  too  far.     One  may  carry  it  to  the  length  of  not, 
knowing  a  good  idea  from  a  bad  one,  or  of  taking  every 
windbag  for  a  prophet,  or  of  thinking  ourselves  men  of 
action  because  we  buy  the  Daily  Mail. 

If  our  legislators  spent  their  time  in  legislating  there 
would  be  some  justification  for  classing  them,  with  Mr. 
Leslie  Stephen,  as  men  of  action.  But  a  scrutiny  of  their 
proceedings  soon  reveals  the  fact  that  they  do  nothing 
of  the  kind.  Tlie  legislator,  if  he  happens  to  be  a  promi- 
nent man,  spends  much  of  his  time,  probably  the  greater 
part  of  it,  in  repulsing  the  attacks  of  his  opponents  and 
in  counter-attacking.  This  process  is  dignified  by  the 
name  of  "  debating  "  ;  one  might  almost  sa\'  it  is  canonised 
under  that  name,  for  there  cannot  be  a  doubt  that  "  de- 
bating "  is  regarded  by  most  EngHshmen  as  a  holy 
occupation.  Now,  nobody,  not  even  the  most  abandoned 
heretic,  would  rail  upon  debating,  if  the  object  kept  in 
view  during  the  debate  were  the  merits  of  the  measure 
under  consideration.  But  in  the  ordinary  course  of  our 
Parliamentary  procedure  this  is  not  always  the  case. 
The  debate  becomes  a  war  of  minds,  conducted  for  its 
own  sake  in  the  first  degree  and  for  the  public  good  only 
in  the  second.  The  interests  of  the  debaters,  their  seats 
and  their  reputations,  are  the  interests  primarily  at 
stake,  while  the  public  has  to  content  itself  with  the 
residual  policy  which  is  left  in  being  when  the  various 
warring  factions  have  settled  their  accounts  and  reduced 
each  others  forces,  so  far  as  possible,  to  immobility. 
To  say  that  the  remnant  of  wisdom  thus  left  over  repre- 
sents the  popular  will  is  a  transparent  fiction  which 
deceives  only  those  persons  who  are  bemused  by  phrases. 
Instead  of  being  what  everybody  wants  the  result  is 
often  what  nobody  wants  or  ever  wanted. 

The  truth  is  that  the  people  have  in  Parliament  a 
big  Debating  Society,  not  always  of  the  first  class,  in 
which  debating  has  become  an  end  in  itself,  and  where 


Sovtcs  Sbahcspcaviana: 

By    SIR    SIDNEY    LEE 


To  the  Russians. 

Goal  and  your  arms  be  praised,  victorious 
friends  ! 

Richard  III.,  V.,  v.,  1. 

The  Economic  Conference. 

It  is  like   we  skat  I  have  good  tradiv^r 
that  way. 

1   Henry  IV..   II..  iv.,  «1. 

Kino-  Constantine  and  his  Mini s te rs . 

To  wiljul  men. 
The  injuries  that  they  themselves  procure 
Must  be  their  schoolmasters. 

Kins  Lear,  II.,  iv..  .'iOS-?. 


x6 


L  A  N  D     &     WATER 


June  15,  1916 


the  interests  of  the  conimuiiity  arc;  exposed  to,;  death, 
mutilation,  capture  or  a  precarious  syr/iyal  ^fci^sding  as 
tlie  fortunes  of  parUamentary  warfare  sway  "to  one  side  or 
the  other.  By  means  of  certain  well-estabhshed  fictions 
the  pubUc  has  persuaded  itself  that  this  orgy  of  debating 
is  "  government."  and  even  comes  to  believe  in  course  of 
time  that  this  is  the  only  way  in  which  a  people  can  govern 
itself.  The  fiction  is  maintained  by  the  fact  that,  at  the 
long  last,  something  dehnite  usually  emerges  from  the 
orgy,  which  may  be  either  a  positive  measure  or  the 
destruction  of  one.  This  result,  which  is  held  up  as 
representing  the  will  of  the  people,  does  not  represent 
even  the  will  of  tlie  majoritv  in  power,  but  only  so  much 
of  their  will  as  their  opponents  have  not  succeeded  in 
thwarting.  Home  Rule  is  a  case  in  point.  There  are 
many  others,  and  history  has  nothing  more  pathetic  to 
show  than  the  readiness  of  the  British  public  to  accept 
these  by-products  of  debating,  these  survivals  of  the 
parliamentary  war  of  minds,  as  corresponding  to  the  will 
of  the  people.  They  are  not  what  we  want,  but  what  we 
have  accustomed  ourselves  to  put  up  with. 

Now  and  then,  however,  a  situation  arises  which 
reveals  to  us.  with  a  kind  of  shock,  that  the  issue  of  great 
affairs  cannot  be  left  to  dance  attendance  on  the  fortunes 
of  a  Debating  Society.  How  often  since  the  outbreak  of 
the  present  war  has  the  formula  been  spoken  in  the 
House  of  Commons — "  The  interests  of  the  nation  render 
it  undesirable  to  discuss  the  question  raised  by  the  Honour- 
able Member."  Sometimes  no  doubt  the  motive  of  the 
answer  is  the  need  of  secrecy  ;  but  more  often  it  is  the 
need  of  effectiveness  and  promptitude,  qualities  for  which 
(iovcmment  by  Debating  Society  does  not  provide  the 
favourable  conditions.  To  teach  us  this  is  one  of  the 
beneficent  functions  of  a  great  war.  During  the  last  two 
years  we  have  been  learning  that  a  great  Empire  docs  not 
exist  for  the  purpose  of  providing  seven  hundred  game- 
some debaters  with  subjects  for  a  series  of  lively  evenings. 
It  is  important,  no  doubt,  that  speeches  should  be  made  ; 
but  it  is  more  important  that  the  Empire  should  be 
maintained  ;    and  the  two  are  not  always  compatible. 

Time,  A  Doubtful  Ally 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  recently  informed  us  that  time 
is  a  doubtful  ally.  He  was  thinking  of  the  conditions  a 
government  has  to  face  under  a  state  of  war.  But  is  not 
the  saying  equally  applicable  to  a  state  of  peace  ?  Is 
not  time  a  doubtful  ally,  nay,  often  a  clearly  treacherous 
ally,  when  social  reforms  are  in  question — education, 
public  health,  housing,  poverty,  hunger,  race-suicide. 
These  things  do  not  stand  still,  like  Joshua's  sun  over  the 
Valley  of  Ajalon,  patiently  waiting  without  change  until 
a  factious  assembly  has  made  up  its  qiind  what  to  do 
with  them,  and  submitted  its  proposal  to  the  House  of 
Lords.  They  are  going  from  bad  to  worse  all  the  time ! 
Indeed,  when  the  final  measure  comes  out,  as  "  amended 
in  Committee  and  modified  by  the  House  of  Lords." 
it  is  not  infrequently  found  applicable  only  to  a  state  of 
things  which  has  passed  away,  and  to  be  inadequate  to 
the  new  and  worse  form  whicla  the  problem  had  taken  in 
the  meantime.     Ireland  once  more  ! 

If  you  tell  me  that  these  things  cannot  be  decided  in  a 
moment  and  that  time  is  required  for  their  solution.  I 
assent  :  but  I  assent  on  the  principle  which  dictated  the 
sapient  remark  of  the  Shah  about  the  Derby.  I  know 
that  all  problems  require  time  for  their  solution,  and  that 
some  require  more  than  others.  The  question  is  how 
much  time  do  these  require.  Will  they  tolerate  the  delays 
involved  in  a  whole  epoch  of  speechmaking.  wire-pulling, 
caucus-mongering,  and  parliamentary  antics  ?  Can  they 
be  safely  left  to  wait  until  all  the  secondary  interests  which 
have  gathered  round  the  macliincry  of  "popular  govern- 
ment have  adjusted  their  chaos  of  differences,  until  the 
newspaper  press  has  exhausted  its  controversies  and  its 
venom,  until  every  one  of  the  lighting  factions  has  been 
given  the  time  it  needs  to  accomplish  its  supreme  desire 
— that  of  dishing  its  opponents,  under  the  pretence  of 
promoting  the  popular  will?  Even  if  the  popular  will 
be  allowed  to  have  a  definite  form  of  existence — a  point 
on  which  I  coiifess  to  having  doubts — it  is  to  me  incon- 
ceivable that  it  should  ever  get  itself  expressed  by  a 
process  such  as  this. 

There  is  a  party  at  the  present  moment  which  is 
contending  that  ail  questions  of  foreign  policy  should  be 


frantly  submit ttjl' to  Parliament  and  so  made  the  subjects 
' ;  of  democratii*  contr|l.  I  am  doubtful  in  the  first  instance 
whether  a  "'democracy  "  is  really  competent  to  manage 
,  it  J  relations  with  foreign  states.  It  would  be,  no  doubt, 
if  the  people  always  clearly  knew  what  they  wanted  and 
were  in  one  mind  about  the  matter.  But  there  is  nothing 
about  which  a  people  is  in  so  many  minds  as  about  its 
foreign  policy — a  fatal  state  of  things  for  effective  control 
of  any  great  question  affecting  peace  and  war.  However 
that  may  be,  we  should  not  get  democratic  control  by 
submitting  these  things  to  Parliament.  We  should  get 
control  by  Debating  Society — a  different  thing  alto- 
gether. Were  such  a  course  adopted  wc  might  predict, 
with  confidence,  the  speedy  downfall  of  the  Euipirc. 

New  Order  of  Statesmen 

The  present  war  has  revealed,  both  by  its  inception 
and  its  progress,  that  what  the  government  of  a  great 
empire  needs  most  urgently  is  an  order  of  statesmen  who 
combine  far-seeing  vision  with  an  aptitude  for  prompt, 
decisive,  silent  and  even  masterful  action.  How  to  find 
such  statesmen  is  a  problem  which  can  only  be  solved 
through  great  changes  in  our  whole  national  ethos, 
through  a  reformed  education  and  indeed  through  a 
reformed  morality.  But  the  first  step  to  its  solution  is  to 
realise  that  our  Parliamentary  system  neither  produces 
such  men  nor  trains  them.  Parliament  may  be  a  good 
school  for  politicians  but  it  is  a  bad  one  for  statesmen. 
The  kind  of  political  wisdom  it  fosters  is  the  kind  which  is 
skilful  in  handling  majorities,  in  guiding  debate,  in  counter- 
ing intrigue,  in  dishing  opponents,  and  above  all  in  re- 
ducing a  number  of  factious  interests  to  their  lowest 
common  measure — which  is  seldom  the  measure  of  the 
nation's  needs  or  its  dangers. 

All  this  may  have  its  uses.  It  certainly  requires  enor- 
mous ability  in  the  men  from  whom  it  is  daily  demanded. 
But  the  ability  so  developed  is  not  statesmanship.  Nay 
more  ;  it  is  a  kind  of  ablility  with  which,  for  obvious 
psychological  reasons,  statesmanship  rarely  co-exists.  In 
the  turmoil  of  parliamentary  warfare  "  vision  "  is  lost, 
the  near  usurps  the  place  of  the  distant,  and  the  great 
currents  of  history,  on  which  the  fate  of  empires  depends, 
become  invisible.  Worst  of  all  the  habit  of  liailing 
until  controversy  has  exhausted  itself  and  faction  grown 
tired  unfits  men,  both  temperamentally  and  niorally, 
for  swift  decisions  in  matters  which  admit  not  of  "a 
moment's  delay.  In  Parliament  the  argumentative  habit 
is  developed  at  the  expense  of  insight  and  promptitude, 
which  are  the  statesman's  gifts.  The  consequence  is 
that  our  great  Ministers  become  not  rulers  of  the  nation 
or  its  destinies,  but  riders  of  Parliament— a  very  different 
thing. 

For  Parliament  is  an  institution  with  an  independent 
life  of  its  own — a  life  most  imperfectly  co-ordinated,  some 
might  say  not  co-ordinated  at  all.  with  the  essential  in- 
terests of  the  State.  The  very  perfection  of  the  Parlia- 
mentary machine  largely  defeats  the  purpose  for  which 
Parliaments  were  originally  created.  It  becomes  an 
end  unto  itself.  Its  political  energies,  its  intelligence,  its 
wisdom  are  used  up  in  maintaining  its  own  balance.  The 
interests  on  which  its  vision  arc  concentrated  arc 
primarily  its  own.  Immersed  in  its  atmosphere  states- 
men become,  and  can  hardly  help  becoming,  myopic. 
They  acquire  that  blindness  to  "things  as  they  are  " 
which  suffered  them  two  years  ago,  and  the  nation  which 
blindly  followed  them,  to  drift  unprepared  into  the 
greatest  crisis  of  the  world's  history.  What  else  indeed 
was  to  be  expected  from  men  whose  training  had  been 
in  the  narrow  cockpit  of  British  politics— of  men  wiiosc. 
wits  had  been  kept  at  the  stretch  for  years  in  mastering 
an  endless  series  of  fierce  but  petty  storms — strikes. 
Ireland,  suffragettes,  trades  unions,  tariff  reform  and  all 
that  devil's  dance  of  concessions,  compromises,  sops. 
bribes,  manipulations  and  adjustments,  with  its  wild 
accompaniment  of  speechmaking  in  Parliament  and 
dt  monstrations  outside,  which,  in  normal  times,  does  duty 
as  our  "  political  life."  A  worse  school  for  statesmen 
it  would  be  impossible  to  imagine. 

The  fault  is  not  theirs.  It  lies  with  the  public  which 
creates,  maintains  and  applauds  the  school,  and  then 
complains  because  its  atmosphere  has  failed  to  produce 
the  men  who  foresee  the  hour  of  destiny  and  act  swiftly 
when  it  strikes. 


June  15,  T916 


LAND      &     WATER 

The  Air  Board 

By  F.  W.  Lanchester 


17 


THE  creation  of  the  Air  Board,  under  the  presi- 
dency of  Lord  Curzon,  may  be  regarded  as  in- 
augurating a  new  phase  in  the  development  of 
military  and  naval  aeronautics.  Apart  from 
the  multitude  of  minor  problems  of  greater  or  less  magni- 
tude with  which  the  Air  Board  is,  and  will  be,  faced,  the 
whole  fate  and  future  development  of  the  air  branches  of 
our  Services  may  be  said  to  rest  in  its  hands.  It  is  true 
that  the  Board  has  no  executive  power,  but  it  possesses 
that  which  will  probably  prove  as  effective — the  President 
has  the  power,  in  order  to  avoid  a  deadlock,  of  going  to  the 
War  Committee  of  the  Cabinet  for  authority  to  decide 
any  point  that  may  arise,  or  on  which  disagreement  may 
exist. 

There  are  some  (with  whom  I  am  myself  inclined  to 
agree)  who  regard  the  Air  Board,  or  at  least  an  Air  Board, 
forming  a  link  between  the  Services,  as  the  right  and 
appropriate  solution  to  the  control  of  our  air  forces. 
P'rom  this  point  of  view  the  air  branches  of  the  Services, 
just  as  the  artillery  of  the  Services,  will  remain  under 
separate  control ;  the  War  Office  and  Admiralty  being, 
as  at  present,  respectively  responsible  for  the  air  efficiency 
of  the  Army  and  of  the  Navj^  There  are  others  who  (I 
think  without  sufficient  consideration)  assume  that  an 
ultimate  solution  must  be  sought  in  some  kind  of  amalga- 
mation of  the  two  branches  into  an  Air  Service  under 
an  Air  Minister.  I  have  previously  discussed  this 
cpiestion  to  some  extent  in  these  columns.*  I  now 
return  to  the  subject  to  consider  the  alternatives  with 
greater  analytical  exactness. 

Permanent  or  Temporary 

The  point  of  importance  at  the  present  juncture  is 
broadly  whether  we  are  to  regard  the  present  Air  Board 
as  a  good  and — humanly  speaking — permanent  solution 
to  the  problem  ;  or  whether,  as  strongly  urged  by  Lord 
Montagu,  and  as  actually  foreshadowed  by  Lord  Curzon, 
we  look  to  an  Air  Ministry  and  single  Air  Service  as  the 
probable  outcome.     Lord  Curzon's  actual  words  -f  are  : 

Having  said  so  much,  I  should  like  to  add  for  myself 
that  I  think  such  an  Air  Department  is  destined  to  come. 
I  see  before  myself,  before  many  years  have  passed — it 
may  be  even  sooner — I  paint  to  myself  a  dream  of  a 
single  Service  under  a  single  head,  under  a  single  roof, 
with  a  single  organisation.  Such  a  unification  I  cannot 
believe  to  be  beyond  the  administrative  genius  of  our  race. 
But  if  I  am  right  in  that,  I  would  sooner  see  it  come — 
as  in  the  past  few  months  I  have  seen  military  compulsion 
come — as  the  result  of  a  concordat  between  all  those  who 
are  interested  in  the  matter,  as  the  result  of  a  cordial 
acceptance  of  the  principle  by  both  services  and  both 
Departments,  and  with  the  avowed  support  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  War  and  the  I'lrst  Lord  of  the  Admiralty. 
The  Board  which  has  been  appointed  will  undoubtedly 
hold  this  consummation  in  view.  It  is  one  of  our  duties 
to  explore  the  ground  and  to  examine  the  possibilities 
of  such  a  solution.  One  day  it  will  be  our  business  to 
report  to  His  Majesty's  Government  upon  the  matter. 
But  in  the  meantime  1  tJirnk  I  can  show  the  House  that 
we  have  more  immediate  and  more  pressing  duties  to 
perform.  l'"or  the  reasons  I  liave  stated  I  cannot  accept 
the  Motion  of  my  noble  friend  Lord  Montagu.  His  Motion 
is  really  one,  rather  cleverly  disguised,  for  the  immediate 
creation  of  an  Air  Department  or  an  Air  Ministry. 
This  actually  goes  further  than  Lord  Montagu  desires, 
if  we  take  his  remarks  in  the  House  of  Lords  Debate  as 
a  criterion.  Thus  (following  the  above)  he  says,  "  I 
particularly  disclaimed  any  idea  of  an  Air  Ministry  at 
present."     (The  italics  are  my  own.) 

Whatever  the  future  may" have  in  store,  it  is  I  think 
generally  agreed  by  those  "with  whom  the  decision  lies 
that  no  immediate  action  is  possible  beyond  that  already 
taken  by  the  (iovernment,  namely  the  appointment  of  an 
Air  Board,  and  through  that  luedium  the  more  close 
correlation  of  the  existing  departments  and  the  inde- 
pendent study  of  the  problems  of  air  warfare,  with  a  view 


•  Land  &  \V.\tf.r,  Apiil  aotli,  27tli,  and  May  4tli. 
■f  Oft'ici.-il  Rop.  House  of  Lords.  Vol.  22,  Xo.  3S,  p.  157 


to  tendering  advice  to  the  Services,  and  making  provision 
in  advance  to  meet  such  extensions  in  the  duties  of  air- 
craft as  may  seem  feasible  and  desirable. 

I  will  now  take  the  matter  up  from  the  point  at  which 
it  was  left  in  my  article  of  May  4th  under  the  title  "  Air 
Problems  and  Fallacies." 

Direct  and  Indirect  Military  Value 

It  is  at  the  outset  necessary  to  insist  on  the  funda- 
mental distinction  between  operations  of  direct  and  of 
indirect  military  value  ;  it  is  precisely  on  this  point,  and 
it  is  definitely  on  the  future  of  potential  value  of  opera- 
tions of  indirect  military  value  that  the  case  for  an  Air 
Ministry  will  stand  or  fall.  If  no  such  operations  were 
feasible  or,  from  a  strategic  point  of  view,  desirable,  then 
there  is  no  case  for  an  Air  Ministry.  If  on  the  other  hand 
it  can  be  shown  that  operations  of  indirect  value  are 
destined  to  become  of  importance,  then  there  is  a  case 
for  an  Air  Ministry  and  for  an  independent  Air  Service, 
and  the  more  important  the  operations  of  indirect  military 
value  become,  the  stronger  the  case.  Whether  or  no,  the 
Air  Ministry  and  independent  Air  Service  will  ultimately 
prove  necessary  will  depend  finally  upon  the  strength  of 
the  case  as  above  defined  ;  thus  if  such  operations  are 
found  to  be  in  practice  rare  there  is  no  reason 
why  the  whole  new  apparatus  in  the  sense  of  an  Air 
Ministry  with  its  corollary  Service  should  be  created 
for  its  execution, when  there  are  other  means  available.  If 
on -the  contrary  these  operations  of  indirect  military 
value  become,  or  are  shown  by  experience  to  be,  of  great 
national  importance,  and  require  to  be  initiated  and 
carried  out  on  a  large  scale,  then  we  may  take  it  that  an 
Air  Ministry  and  an  Independent  Air  Service  is  the 
inevitable  solution.     So  far,  experience  is  lacking. 

It  may  be  urged  that  the  preceding  paragraph  is  too 
dogmatic  ;  it  is  not  propounded  as  dogma,  it  is  a  state- 
ment of  the  case  which  it  is  the  object  of  the  present 
articles  to  -make  good. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  the  experience  of  this  War  will 
be  final  on  the  question  of  the  utility  or  otherwise  of 
operations  of  indirect  military  value.  It  has  been 
pointed  out  in  the  previous  article  (to  which  reference 
has  been  made)  that  in  almost  every  case,  whatever  may 
be  the  value  of  operations  of  indirect  value,  they  are, 
more  often  than  not,  weak  in  comparison  with  direct 
operations,  therefore  so  long  as  we  are  building  up  con- 
tinually increasing  armies  with  their  necessary  comple- 
ment of  aircraft,  materiel  and  personnel,  it  is  certain  that, 
whatever  the  future  may  be,  the  present  will  not  leave 
much  scope  for  experimental  development  outside  im- 
mediate military  and  naval  requirements.  The  present 
situation  so  far  as  the  Board  is  concerned  is  clearly  that 
any  operation  of  indirect  military  value,  which,  one  may 
say,  by  definition,  does  not  come  naturally  into  the 
purview  either  of  the  supreme  Admiral  of  the  Navy,  or 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army,  must  be  considered  and 
worked  out  and  defined  by  the  Air  Board,  who  will  also 
decide  which  of  the  present  Services  will  be  expected  to 
undertake  any  particular  kind  of  duty.  Let  the  matter 
be  exemplified  by  a  few  illustrations. 

If  it  were  thought  necessary  to  conduct  bombing  raids 
in  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  lines,  to  destroy  his  magazines 
or  interrupt  his  communications  (as  has  been  done 
repeatedly  in  the  course  of  the  western  campaign)  we 
have  to  deal  with  a  class  of  operation  which  is  decisivclv 
of  direct  military  value,  for  example  the  bombing  of  the 
railway  station  and  junction  at  Lille,  or  the  raid  on  the 
enemy  communications  behind  Verdun.;  such  work  is 
definitely  related  to  military  operations  with  which,  both 
as  to  time  and  place,  it  requires  to  be  co-ordinated. 

It  would  be  useless  for  example,  and  might  even  be 
prejudicial,  if  such  work  bearing  directly  on  other  military 
operations  were  to  be  carried  out  at  the  wrong  instant, 
as  might  easily  happen  were  it  conducted  independently 
of  the  military  command  ;  the  more  closely  such  air  opera- 
tions are  co-ordinated  with  other  work  in  the  field  the 
more  effectively  will  aircraft  be  employed,  hence  it  would 


ig 


L  A  iN  D      c1'     W  A  T  E  R 


June  15,  1916 


be  suicidal  to  place  the  conduct  of  such  operations  in  the 
hands  of  a  separate  Service.  It  would  be  still  more  suici- 
dal to  relegate  to  a  separate  Air  Service  the  still  more 
intimate  duties  of  aircraft,  as  concerned  in  military 
reconnaissance,  "  spotting  "  for  artillery,  etc.  :  it  would 
be  as  foolish  as  placing  the  artillery  or  the  cavalry  under 
the  control  of  a  separate  Minister.  On  the  naval  side 
again  many  e.xamples  might  be  cited  of  the  employment 
of  aircraft  which  are  essentially  so  related  to  otlicr  naval 
operations  as  clearly  to  be  inseparable. 

Direct  Military  Value 

In  all  such  military  and  naval  air  work,  that  is  to  saj', 
in  operations  of  Jitect  military  value,  the  precision  and 
exactitude  of  co-ordination  or  co-operation  with  the  other 
arms  of  the  Service,  or  with  our  Naval  Forces,  is  so  im- 
portant that  it  is  unthinkable  that  any  such  operations 
should  be  placed  under  a  separate  Ministry  or  any 
organisation  other  than  that  of  the  appropriate  Service. 
An  air  operation,  such  as  a  bombardment  from  the  air 
(at  least  as  we  know  it  at  present)  is  as  compared  to  the 
operations  of  the  other  arms  of  tlie  Service  in  itself  but 
of  moderate  effect,  but  by  accurate  co-ordination  such 
air  operations  may  prove  (and  have  proved)  of  signal 
value  and  utility.  It  is  of  little  use  bombing  a  railway, 
for  instance,  a  day  too  soon  because  experience  has  shown 
that  repairs  can  usually  be  effected  in  a  few  hours.  It 
is  useless  conducting  the  same  operations  a  day  too  late, 
it  is  essential  that  it  should  be  done  lo  lime,  at  tlic  psycho- 
logical moment,  in  fact,  when  the  enemy  is  relying  upon 
the  use  of  his  railway  or  comuumication.  and  when  its 
failure  will  be  of  the  greatest  detriment  to  him  ;  thus  an  air 
raid,  such  as  is  under  discussion,  requires  to  be  accelerated 
or  held  back,  or  repeated,  according  to  the  progress  of  . 
other  operations,  and  the  more  intimately  the  command 
of  the  air  force  is  identified  with  that  of  the  Army  on  the 
one  hand  or  the  Navy  on  the  other,  the  more  efficient 
it  will  become. 

A  typical  operation  of  indirect  military  value  was 
the  raid  on  Friedrichshafen  in  the  autumn  of  i()i4.  That 
raid  was  not  connected  with  the  movements  of  any  of  the 
armies  on  the  western  or  other  battle  front  ;  it  was  not 
connected  with  any  naval  operation  in  particular.  It  was 
an  attempt  to  weaken  the  enemy's  industrial  power  and 
in  particular  his  power  of  building  airships.  ■  There  was 
no  special  reason  why  that  should  have  been  undertaken 
at  any  particular  instant  of  time,  there  was  in  fact  no 
clear  reason  why  the  raid  should  have  been  organised 
at  all,  so  far  as  the  Admiralty  is  concerned  ;  it  was,  we 
may  take  it,  initiated  by  certain  adventurous  spirits, 
and  perhaps  we  may  say  justified  by  results.  That  it 
has  not  been  regarded  as  a  cla.ss  of  operation  of  great 
utility  is  well  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  no  serious 
attempt  has  been  made  at  its  repetition. 

Building  Up  a  Flying  Corps 

The  truth  is  that  with  the  limited  numbers  of  aero- 
planes which  have  been  hitherto  at  the  disposal  of  our 
authorities,  and  the  tax  on  our  manufacturing  resources 
by  the  rapid  growth  of  our  armies,  there  are  more  im- 
portant duties  always  at  hand.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that,  with  an  army  Avhich  has  grown  in  less  than  two 
years  to  the  extent  of  three  or  four  millions  of  men,  it 
has  been  a  problem  of  no  mean  magnitude  to  build  up  a 
Flying  Corps,  the  ".cavalry  of  the  air,"  commensurate 
with  the  strength  of  the  other  arms  of  the  Service.  The 
problem  is  still  the  continuous  increase  required,  more 
and  more  pilots,  more  and  more  squadrons,  more  and 
luore  mechanics,  depots,  etc. 

In  suggesting  that  a  raid  such  as  that  on  l-'riedrich- 
shafen  is  not  an  example  of  the  best  possible  employment 
of  our  air  squadrons,  it  is  neces.sary  to  say  under  existing 
conditiotis  ;  it  may  be  fairly  inferred  that"  in  due  course, 
when  adequate  provision  of  materiel  and  personnel  is 
available,  such  operations  will  be  fully  justified  and  will 
have  to  be  carefully  considered  and  organised  in  ad\ance. 
.-\ny  operation  such  as  the  Friedrichshafen  raid  is  rightly 
to  be  regarded  as  one  of  indirect  military  value,  since, 
as  pointed  out,  it  has  no  intimate  relation  to  other 
operations  either  in  the  Army  or  the  Navy,  and,  further, 
there  is  no  definite  indication  from  the  character  of  the 
operation  whether  it  is  part  of  the  responsibility  of  the 


Army  or  the  Navy.  It  may  be  argued  on  the  one  hand 
that  since  the  value  of  the  Zeppelin  airship  is  mainly 
naval  reconnaissance,  the  destruction  of  its  headquarters 
would  fall  naturally  to  the  Navy.  On  the  other  hand  it 
might  equally  be  argued  that  since  the  object  of  attack 
and  the  only  available  base  are  both  far  inland  the  duty 
is  clearly  one  for  the  Army.  In  biief  the  incentive  to 
attack  is  naval,  and  the  undertaking  itself  is  within  the 
military  zone. 

The  raid  on  Friedrichshafen  is  merely  an  example. 
There  are  scores  of  industrial  centres  in  an  enemy  country 
where  munitions  are  manufactured  of  different  kinds,  any 
and  all  of  which  would  be  appropriate  subjects  of  attack 
were  the  appro])riate  air  forces,  i.e.,  machines,  trained 
personnel,  etc.,  available,  and  all  these  duties,  so  far  as 
not  inunediately  connected  with  the  military  or  naval 
strategic  plan,  may  be  classified  as  operations  of  indirect 
military  value.  It  is  these  operations  which  it  will  be 
one  of  the  great  concerns  of  the  Air  Board  to  study  and 
provide  for.  In  the  first  place  (and  under  pre.sent  con- 
ditions) it  is  desirable  that  a  clear  decision  should  be 
reached  at  the  earliest  })ossible  date,  as  to  what  these 
duties  (-omprise  and  which  operations  are  to  be  regarded 
as  coming  within  the  re>ponsibility  of  the  military  authori- 
ties, and  which  (if  any)  the  Navy  will  be  exjjected  to 
undertake.  Clearly  the  Services  can  neither  of  them 
legitimately  be  called  upon  to  carry  out  work  which  does 
not  come  within  their  own  strategic  scheme  or  plans, 
and  for  which  they  have  had  no  opportunity  to  provide 
either  maleriel  or  personnel.  Later,  if  and  when  opera- 
tions of  indirect  military  value  have  been  undertaken, 
it  will  be  a  matter  of  serious  consideration  whether  these 
shall  be  allowed  to  remain  as  collateral  responsibility  of 
the  Army  and  Navy,  or  whether  their  importance  will 
justify  an  Independent  Air  Service  under  an  Air  Minister. 

Test  of  Experience 

Obviously  this  latter  <iuestion  nuist  be  one  of  degree — 
in  brief  it  will  depend  upon  the  relative  magnitude  and 
the  importance  which  will  ultimately  attach  to  the 
operations  in  question.  Should  it  transpire  or  experience 
demonstrate  that  these  operations  have  not  great  or  real 
importance  then  we  may  rest  assured  that  an  Independent 
Air  Service  will  not  be  justified.  If  on  the  other  hand,  as 
is  generally  believed,  attack  on  enemy  centres  of  produc- 
tion, etc.,  should  prove  a  valuable  method  of  breaking  his 
power,  and  capable  of  fast  and  effective  development, 
then  we  may  rest  assured  that  the  Independent  Air 
Service  will  be  found  the  ap})ropriate  solution. 

There  is  fortunately  no  need  to  jump  at  any  conclusion, 
the  future  will  take  care  of  itself.  Thus  the  present  Air 
Board  is  fully  capable  of  considering  the  possibilities  of 
large  scale  air  raids  and  of  taking  the  necessary  initiative 
when  our  resources  permit.  The  War  Office  or  the 
Navy  will  be  advised  that  certain  operations  are  con- 
sidered desirable  from  a  national  point  of  view,  and  be- 
lie\ed  to  be  feasible,  and  either  one  Service  or  the  other 
will  be  informed  that  the  work  of  carrying  out  such  and 
such  operations  has  been  assigned  to  them. 

The  production  of  the  necessary  materiel  and  personnel 
will  then  be  undertaken  with  perhaps  a  special  supple- 
mentary grant  based  on  the  decision  of  the  Air  Board  ; 
in  due  course  the  utility  or  otherwise  of  the  measures 
taken  will  be  proved.  It  is  on  the  test  of  experience  that 
the  future  situation  will  require  to  be  judged.  On  the  one 
hand  we  do  not  want  a  separate  Air  Service  to  conduct 
half  a  dozen  long  distance  raids  per  annum  ;  on  the  other 
hand  if  such  raids  could  be  shown  of  sufficient  value  tc 
become  a  matter  of  daily  occurrence  it  is  more  than 
probable  that  it  may  be  "found  advisable  ultimately  to 
relieve  the  existing  Services  of  these  duties,  and  con- 
centrate all  air  work  of  indirect  military  value  under  an 
orgaiiisation  with  its  own  Minister,  Chief,  and  Staff. 

It  is  of  interest  in  this  regard  to  review  the  history  of 
our  i)iesent  day  systems  of  two  Services  ;  in  other  words 
to  examine  the  manner  and  conditions  in  and  under 
which  the  British  Navy  emerged  as  a  separate  Service 
from  Its  origin  as  a  mere  adjunct  to  the  military  system 
of  feudal  times.  It  is  from  the  reading  of  history  that  we 
may  expect  some  real  guidance  from  the  past,  and  not 
from  the  setting  up  of  false  or  unproven  analogies  such 
as  are  imijlicitly  embodied  in  the  current  slogan  "  One 
Element,  one  Service." 


19 


LAND      &      WATER 


June  15,  1916 


Extension   of  the   Union  Jack   Club 

Our  Special   Appeal  to  Readers  of   Land  &  Water 

By    the   Editor 


THE  Union  Jack  Club  was  presented  by  the 
nation  to  the  Navy  and  Army  as  a  memorial  to 
those  of  the  Services  who  fell  in  the  South  African 
war.  As  everybody  who  lives  in  London  knows, 
it  stands  in  Waterloo  Road,  close  to  Waterloo  Station, 
the  terminus  of  the  London  and  South  Western  Railway, 
which  serves  Aldershot,  Portsmouth,  Southampton,  Ply- 
mouth and  Devonport,  so  it  is  placed  as  it  were,  at  the 
main  gate  of  L(jndon,  from  the  point  of  view  of  its 
momters.  The  Union  Jack  is  a  Club  in  identically  the 
same  sense  as  the  "  Rag  "  in  Pall  Mall,  or  the  Atheufeum 
or  the  Bachelors  in  Hamilton  Place.  The  same 
tacilities  and  advantages  are  offered  to  its  members  by 
it  as  by  them.  It  is  run  on  strict  business  lines  ;  the 
Club  pays  for  itself,  and  has  each  year  a  small  balan  cc 
to  the  good,  but  only  a  small  one,  for  the  right  principle 
is  that  profit  should  not  be  made  out  of  members.  A 
difference,  besides  the 
range  of  prices,  which 
exists  between  the 
U.J.C.  and  those 
Clubs  we  have  men- 
tioned, is  that  it  pro- 
vides much  greater 
sleeping  accommoda-  , 
tion.  During  1915,  the 
actual  number  of 
members  who  passed 
a  night  at  the  Club 
were  211,445  of  whom 
33,921  were  sailors, 
2,948  marines,  and 
174,576  soldiers.  Bet-  : 

ter  testimony  to  the 
appreciation  of  the 
Club  could  not  be 
given.  Where  think 
you,  would  these  men 
haveiv  slept  if  the 
U.J.C.  had  not 
existed  ?  Yet  the 
melancholy  fact  has 
also  to  be  inen- 
tioncd  that  some  hun- ' 
dreds  of  men  had  to 
be  refused,  regretfully 
refused,  sleeping  ac- 
commodation just  because  there  was  no  room  for  them. 
Let  us  try  to  understand  not  only  what  the  U.J.C. 
lias  done  for  Navy  and  Army,  but  the  light  it 
sheds  on  certain  social  problems  of  which  many 
good  people  arc  apt  to  take  the  gloomiest  view. 
Before  it  came  into  existence  the  sailor  and  soldier 
who  found  himself  on  leave  in  London,  usually  with 
a  bit  of  money  in  his  pocket,  had  nowhere  to  go  to 
provided  he  had  neither  home  nor  friends.  Was  it  any 
wonder  that  he  turned  to  the  nearest  public  place  of 
refreshment  that  was  within  his  means  ?  Unfortunately, 
our  Licensing  Laws  have  more  or  less  compelled  public- 
houses  to  be  mere  drinking-dens,  and  the  man  on  leave 
often  only  too  quickly  got  rid  of  his  cash  and  made  of 
himself  in  the  process  cither  a  beast  or'  a  fool.  Then 
society  blamed  the  man.  Which  was  wrong.  It  should 
have  blamed  itself  for  not  providing  its  defenders  on 
their  rare  holidavs  with  a  place  where  they  might  live 
decenth'  and  amuse  themselves  rationally.  A  sensible  and 
healthy  man  never  gets  drunk  from  mere  love  of  getting 
drunk.  The  idea  that  he  does  so  is  a  foolish  and 
wicked  delusion.  Outside  occasional  conviviality,  intoxica- 
tion is  directly  due  to  a  desire  to  escape  from  uncongenial 
environment.  Change  the  environment,  make  it  con- 
genial and  drunkenness  disappears.  The  truth  of  this 
statement  has  been  proved  over  and  over  again,  but  there 
IS  no  stronger  testimony  in  existence  to-day  than  the 
success  and  popularity  of  the  Union  Jack  Club.  There 
are  other  obvious  evils  from  which  the  Club  saves  men 
who  would  otherwise  be  on  a  loose  end  in  the  streets. 


Members  of  the  Union  Jack  Club 


In  this  connection  the  ability  of  the  Club  to  provide  a 
bedroom  to  every  member  who  requires  it  is  urgent.  It 
is  pathetic  to  have  to  send  away  a  self-respecting  man 
to  a  doss-house  or  cheap  lodging-house  for  a  night's 
rest.  That  is  so  at  all  times  either  in  war  or  in  peace,  but 
it  is  doubly  pathetic  at  the  present  when  the  man  perhaps 
has  just  come  in  after  a  spell  of  wild  weather  in  the  North 
Sea,  or  may  be  from  a  hght  with  enemy,  or  if  he  be  a 
soldier  straight  from  the  trenches  and  continuous  pound- 
ing night  and  day  by  big  shell. 

As  we  advance  in  life  the  clearer  do  we  behold  the 
eternal  truth  underlying  the  saying,  God  made  all  men 
equal.  Inequality  between  the  natures  of  different  men 
and  nations  largely  arises  from  the  conditions  which  man, 
through  his  laws,  customs  and  traditions,  has  made  for 
himself.  Men  may  laugh  at  those  who  believe  in  ideals 
and   would   constitute   life   on   idyllic    conditions,    and 

call  them  unpractical. 
But  such  persons  are 
far   wiser  and    more 
sensible    than    those 
others      who     judge 
human  nature  at  its 
lowest  and  treat  man- 
kind accordingly.  We 
stand    in     need  -  of 
golden-tongu  d saints 
to    preach    the   doc- 
trine      of       original 
good,  instead  of  origi- 
nal sin.    It  is  closer  to 
the  truth.     Bear    in 
mind  the  old  parable 
of  the  sower ;  the  good 
ground     that     bears 
fruit    a   hundredfold 
is  there  for  the  tilling 
in  the  heart  of   each 
one  of  us  at  birth  ;  it 
is  human  society  that 
tramples     the     seel 
underfoot  or  denies  it 
the  moisture  it  needs 
or  permits  the  fowls 
of  the  air  to  devour  it. 
If   only  we   moulded 
our  lives  more  closely 
on    this   principle   the   world   would   be   a   happier   and 
better  place  to  live  in.     But, we  can  at  least    make  a 
beginning,  and  when  we  find  institutions,  which  acting  on 
this   principle  have  proved  its  truth  by    their  practical 
success,  give  them  the  fullest  support  within  our    power 
and  the  most  generous  pecuniary  help  within  our  means. 
Such  an  institution  is  the  Union  Jack  Club,  for  the  exten- 
sion of  which  we  make  this  special  appeal.     The  four  mem- 
bers whose  photographs  we  give  here  arc  typical  of  all ; 
their  cheerfulness  is  a  good  suggestion   of   the  pleasure 
all    derive  from  their  Club.     Let  us  briefly  describe  tln' 
Club-house,  a  photograph  of  which  is   overleaf.     It    is  :i 
fine    building,  but  not    big  enough.     Within    there   is    a 
barber's  shop  where  are  sold   tobacco,  match'  s,  cleaning; 
materials,  shirts,    socks,    caps,    etc.,    picture   postcards 
Baths    hot    and    cold    cost    2d.,    including  attendance, 
towels  and  soap  ;    shower-baths  are  free.     Members  are 
given  blacking,  etc.,  to  clean  their  own  boots  or  they  can 
give  the   Club    boot-black   a   penny  to  do  it  for   them. 
There  is  a  large  and  comfortable  smoking-room,  but  no 
standing  bar  ;    members  order  what   they  want  and  are 
attended  by  waitresses.     All  kinds  of  drinks  are  served. 
A  member  can  have  his   glass    ol    beer    or  brandy  and 
soda  if  he  prefers.       In  the    billiard-room   are   six   lull- 
sized  tables.    The  library,  also  the  writing-room,  contains 
two  thousand  volumes  ;  writing  materials  are  free  :    they 
cost  the  Club  last  year  just  £100.     Then   there  is  the 
dining-room,    open   from   7   a.m.    to   10.45   P-m.,   where 
prices  are  most  reasonable.      Last  year  waitresses  weie 
first  mtroduced  :     they  have  proved  so  successful   that 


20 


LAND      &      WATER 


June  15,  1916 


many  members  hope  the  Club  will  never  revert  to  men- 
waiters.     Chief  Petty  Officer  Thompson  voiced  this  wish 
at  the  annual  general  meeting  in  April.     He  said  :    "  In 
the  dining-room   it  is   better  to  have  ladies>  or  girls  as 
we  call  them,  than  it  is  to  have  men.     You  are  waited 
on  nicely.     There  is  no  slackness  whatever,  and  I  have 
seen  here  hundreds  and  thousands  who  have  been  attended 
to  without   any  argument   or  cross  word  by  anyone." 
It  was  at  this  meeting  that    Serjeant-Major  Wood  re- 
marked that  he  had  heard  men  say  so  often  until  it  l;ad 
become  a  jirovcrb  in  the  army  :    "If  you  go  to  London, 
there  is  only  one  place  to  go  to.     If  you  go  to  the  Union 
Jack  Club  you   will  receive  the  proper  treatment  a  man 
should    receive    from    everybody  there."        Could  there 
be  higher  or  truer  apprecia- 
tion ?    Said  a  sailor  the  othcT 
day  to  the   Secretary  :    "I 
have  used  the  Club  since  it 
opened  ;     it    is   my   home." 
A    soldier    who    left     by    a 
very  early  train  on  his  return 
to    active     service,     pinned 
this    note     to     his     pillow  : 
"  This   is    the   best   place    I 
have  ever  been  in.     Thanks 
for  all."     These  one  or  two 
tributes    say   more    for   the 
good  work  the  Club  is  doing 
than      volumes    of    writing 
or  talk.     It   has  proved  in- 
valuable to  the  British  Navy 
and  to  men  of  the  Regular 
Army  and  the  New  Armies, 
the    Naval    Volunteers,    the 
Territorials  while  mobilised, 
and  to  men  of  the  Dominion 
and  Colonial   Forces.         All 
of    them    are    eligible    and 
all  of  them  have  made  free 
use  of  the  Club.      Is  it  any 
wonder  that   the    Clubhouse 
has  proved  too  small  ? 

Land  &  \V.\ter  appeals  to  its  readers  to  help  in  the 
extension  of  the  Club.  That  this  appeal  will  be  liberally 
responded  to  we  are  convinced,  and  not  only  by  individuals 
but  we  trust  also  by  communities  in  a  manner  we  will 
shortly  explain.  How  urgent  is  the  need,  and  how- 
desirable  it  is  that  the  work  should  be  put  in  hand  without 
delay  can  be  judged  from  these  messages  from  Admiral 
Sir  John  Jellicoe  and  General  Sir  Douglas  Haig  : 
From  Admiral  Jellicoe  • 

T/ie  Union  Jack  Club  has  been  of  incslimablc  bzncfit 
'la  the  men  of  the  Fleet  since  its  erection,  and  its  value 
has  been  beyond  words.  During  the  war  the  urgent 
need  for  further  extension  has  bsen  demonstrated  a 
thousand  times,  and  I  trust  that  your  appeal  for  funds 
for  this  extension  will  meet  with  the  wonderful  success 
which  has  so  far  attended  all  your  kindly  efforts. 
From  General  Haig  : 

Please  accept  my  best  wishes  for  the  success  of  your 
appeal.  The  Union  Jack  Club  has  for  the  past  nine 
years  conferred  inestimable  benefits  on  many  thousands 
of  our  sailors  and  soldiers.  Your  proposed  extension 
scheme  comes  at  a  most  suitable  moment,  and  will,  I 
feel  sure,  be  welcomed  by  all  who  wish  to  perpetuate 
the  memory  of  those  gallant  men  who  have  fallen  in  the 
cause  of  freedom. 

Ihe  King,  who  is  patron-in-chief,  laid  the  foundation- 
-stone  of  the  Club,  when  he  was  Prince  of  Wales  on  July 
2ist,  1004,  and  it  is  hoped  that  next  month  may  sec  the 
foundation-stone  of  the  extension  laid,  possibly  by  His 
Majesty,  accompanied  by  the  Queen,  who  is  Patroness- 
in-Chief,  should  their  numerous  engagements  permit. 
King  Edward,  accompanied  by  Queen  Alexandra,  opened 
thj  Club  on  July  ist,  upj.  so  July  is  a  momentous  month 
in  its  annals.  If  readers  of  Land  cS:  Water  were  to 
enable  tlie  coming'  month  to  witness  this  new  function, 
it  w,)uld  indeed  be  a  splendid  achievement.  But  there  is 
no  time  to  be  lost.  It  is  more  bedrooms  that  the  Club 
re^ijjires  most  urgently.  To  have  to  refuse  slee])ing 
accommodation  goes  grcritly  against  the  grain,  but  until 
more  bedrooms  arc  in  existence  this  is  inevitable.  Sir 
Douglas  Haig,  it  will  be  noticed,  speaks  of  the  extension 


The  Club-House  in  Waterloo  Road 


scheme  as  a  means  to  perpetuate  "  the  memory  of  gallant 
men  who  have  fallen  in  the  cause  of  freedom."  This  is 
possible  in  a  simple  fashion.  Each  bedroom  is  calculated 
to  cost  £100,  and  a  donation  of  £iQO  gives  the  privilege 
for  one  room  to  be  dedicated  to  whomsoever  the  donor 
nominates.  A  small  tablet  is  alhxcd  to  the  door,  signify- 
ing in  whose  honour  it  has  been  given,  and  whosoever 
enjoys  a  night's  repose  there  must  of  necessity  feci 
gratitude  to  him  or  those  whose  memory  it  perpetuates. 
Throughout  the  British  Empire  to-day  memorial 
funds  are  being  raised  to  commemorate  the  gallant 
self-sacrifice  of  men  from  this  or  that  village,  township 
or  possibly  commercial  undertaking  "  who  have  fallen 
in    the    cause    of    freedom."     A  bedroom  at   the  Union 

Jack  Club  should  always  be 
at  least  a  part  of  such 
memorial.  It  is  in  this  way 
that  communities  are  able 
to  assist  in  this  good  cause. 
We  should  also  like  to  see 
every  one  of  the  ancient 
Guilds  of  the  City  of  London 
represented  at  the  Club  in 
this  manner.  Their  peculiar 
glory  is  the  freedom  they 
have  tli(^  right  to  bestow  on 
their  fellow  citizens,  a  free- 
dom which  was  only  won 
tlirough  centuries  of  struggle 
and  which  is  now  being 
maintained  and  defended 
by  members  of  the  Union 
Jack  Club. 

As  for  private  individuals, 
many  wc  know  there  to  be 
who  have  only  to  be  made 
acquainted  with  "the  urgent 
need  for  further  extension," 
to  quote  Admiral  Jellicoe's 
words,  to  contribute  gener-- 
ously  and  gladly,  rejoicing 
in  the  opportunity  thus 
afforded  to  pay  a  persona] ,  tribute  to  rank  and  file  of 
Navy  and  Army.  How  often  and  often  during  the  last 
sad  months  have  we  heard  of  officers  who  lived  for  their 
men  and  died  leading  them  into  action.  There  could 
not  be  a  finer  or  fitter  manner  of  commemoration  than 
by  consecrating  a  bedroom  to  their  memory.  Think  what 
It  would  mean  in  practice.  Men  of  the  old  regiment  where 
the  remembrance  of  these  .gallant  gentlemen  shines 
with  lustre,  would  be  glad  to  occupy  the  rooms  and  would 
proudly  relate  to  their  fellow-members  the  deed,  the 
life  and  the  death  of  them  whose  name  it  bore.  Thus 
would  the  Union  Jack  Club  become  as  it  were,  the 
munnnent  tower,  the  record  oftice  of  the  most  unselfish 
heroism  of  this  great  war.  The  dead  would  be  held  in 
remembrance,  their  glory  would  not  be  blotted  out, 
through  the  continuance  of  that  consideration  for  their 
men's  welfare  for  which  they  laid  down  their  lives. 


1          *■ 

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■  ■■'_ 

n^"  ^'                  II 

AH  Contributions  for  iJie  U.J.C.  Extension 
Fund  should  he  forwarded  to  : 


The   Rditor, 
"  LAND  &   WATER," 

Empire  House,  Kingsway, 

London,  W.C^ 

Envelopes  should  be  nunfied  "  U.J.C. 
Fund."  Cheques  should  he  drawn  in  favour 
of  the  U.J.C.  Extension  Fund,  and  Crossed 
"  Coutts  Banfi" 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXVII  No.  2824  [y^™  ] 


TFTTIR^DAY     TTINF   ■?c     Torfi  rREGisxERED  ast    price  sixpence 

in.fji\oLJn.i ,    juiNj:^    ^z,    xyiu  La  newspaperJ  published  weekly 


By  Louis  Raemaekera 


Drawn  exclusively  for  "  Land  and    Water.  ' 

Shall  there  not  be  room  for  all  ? 


This  cartoon  has  been  drawn  by  Mr.  Louis  Raemaekers,  and  is  published  by  the  Proprietors  of  Land 
&  Water  on  behalf  of  the   special  appeal  (see   page  20)   for  the  extension   of  the   Union   Jack   Club 


LAND     &     WATER 


June  22,  igi6 


JOINING  KITS  FOR  EVERY  BRANCH  OF  HIS  MAJESTY'S  SERVICE. 

Thresher     and     Glenny  s     representative     attends      by     appointment     any      camp     in 
England   for    the   convenience   of    Cadets  receiving  commissions. 


MILITARY    OUTFITS. 

"  A  firm  established  as  Military  Outfitters 
during  the  Crimean  War  and  Indian 
Mutiny,  with  the  outfitting  experience  of 
the  South  African  War  and  the  two  Egyptian 
Campaigns  well  within  the  mcmorv  oj  man\ 
of  its  staff,  is  entitled  to  deal  with  the  'sub- 
ject of  Military  Outfitting  with  some  degree 
of  authority, "—{•'  Land  .\  Water."  Matclj 
23) 


A    JOINING    KIT. 

Tlie  following  estimate  includes  all  neces- 
sary (or  joining  on  receiving  a  first  com 
mission  ;  Serge  F.S.  Jacket,  63s.  ;  Whip- 
cord ditto,  70s.  ;  I  pair  Slacks,  25s.  ; 
I  i).iir  Whipcord  Knickcr  Breeches,  35s.  ; 
Service  Cap.  15s.  6d.  ;  British  Warm,  84s.  ; 
Sam  Browne  Belt,  42s.  ;  Whistle  and 
Cord,  Lanyard,  Puttcea.  2  Khaki  Flannel 
Shirts  and  Tie,  Stars,  Cap,  and  Collar 
Badges,  and  half  a  dozen  Khaki  Handker- 
chiefs :    total.  £20. 


TROPICAL    KIT. 

Khaki  W^ashing  Drills.  Twillettas,  Sun- 
proof and  Tropical  Serges.  Drill  F.S. 
Jackets,  buttons,  etc.,  detachable,  35s.  ; 
<  .dvin  Cord  Riding  Breeches,  38s;  Drill 
Macks  and  Shorts,  i6s.  6d.  and  I2s.  Od.  ; 
Wolselcy  Helmets,  21s.  ;  Sunproof  Tunic- 
Shirts,  pockets  and  shoulder  straps,  17s.  6d. 


THE    TRENCH    COAT. 

Wind,  water,  and  weatherproof.  Recog- 
nised by  the  W.O.  and  ofhcially  brought 
to  the  notice  of  all  officers  commanding 
Corps  in  the  B.E.F.,  the  "  Threshhr  " 
has  successfully  met  the  severest  tests  and 
IS  regarded  as  the  best  all-round  garment 
for  every  purpose  and  every  season. 

£     s.    d. 
The  Thresher,  unlined        ..414     6 

Lined  detacjiableKamelcott   s   10    0 
Lined  detachable  sheep      .7     |     3 


W.O.    CAMP    KIT. 

Officers  going  into  camp  will  require  the 
folding  bedstead,  chair,  bath,  basin,  and 
washstand,  etc.,  etc.,  painted  liame 
and    regiment  ;    price,   £7    los. 

Also  the  Thresher  Bolmat.  Par- 
ticulars on  page  xiv  of  present  issue. 


WRITE    FOR    GUIDE    (3) 
TO   KIT   &    EQUIPMENT. 


THRESHER     &     GLENNY, 

152    &    153    STRAND,    LONDON. 


June  22,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


LAND  &  WATER 

EMPIRE  HOUSE,  KINGSWAY,  LONDON,  W.C 

Telephone:  HOLBORN  2828 

THURSDAY,  JUNE     22.    1916 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 


Union    Jack    Club:     Special    Appeal.     By    Louis 

Raemaekers  ^ 

Foundations  of  Peace.     (Leading  Article)    .  3 

Kovel   and   Lemberg.     By  Hilaire  Belloc  4 

"  Your  Splendid  Work."     By  Arthur  Pollen  lo 
Italian  Artists  and  the  War                             I2  and  19 

Germany's  Mistakes  :    Political.     By  Colonel  Feyler  13 

Adventures  of  Richard  Hannay.     By  S.  P.  B.  Mais  14 

Letters  to  a  Lonely  Civilian  15 

New  Steps  to  Economic  Reform.     By  Arthur  Kitson  16 

Roof  of  Armageddon.     By  Will  Irwin  17 

The  Club  with  Five  MiUion  Members  20 

The  West  End  22 

Town  and  Country  24 
Choosing  Kit                                                                 xiii. 


THE    FOUNDATIONS    OF    PEACE. 

THE  recommendations  made  by  the  Economic 
Conference,  held  in  Paris  last  week  are  now 
published,  and  will  be  heartily  approved  by  all 
who  regard  these  questions  of  trade  and  com- 
merce from  the  Imperial  point  of  view.  The  representa- 
tives of  the  Allied  Governments  declare  that  "after  forcing 
upon  them  the  military  contest  in  spite  of  all  their  efforts 
to  avoid  the  conflict,  the  Empires  of  Central  Europe  are 
to-day  preparing  in  corjcert  with  their  Allies  for  a  contest 
on  an  economic  plane  which  will  not  only  survive  the  re- 
establishment  of  peace  but  will  at  that  moment  attain  its 
full  scope  and  intensity."  This  statement,  though  it 
only  confirms  what  was  generally  known  before,  has  a 
double  importance — it  proves  that  the  nations  are  all 
equally  alive  to  the  perils  of  peace,  and  it  makes  clear 
the  reason  why  it  is  necessary  without  delay  to  so  reform 
our  trade  systems  and  methods  as  to  secure  protection 
after  the  war  from  German  aggression. 

This  journal  is  conducted  on  non-party  lines,  but 
since  our  leader  of  last  week  on  the  Economic  Conference, 
we  have  received  a  letter  protesting  that  we  have 
departed  from  this  policy,  as  if  forsooth  economic 
questions  were  the  monopoly  of  partisan  platforms 
because  in  the  past  they  have  been  their  favourite  shuttle- 
cocks. It  is  high  time  we  awoke  out  of  sleep  and  realised 
that  such  questions  have  a  much  deeper  and  more  far- 
reaching  import  than  is  touched  by  academic  arguments 
about  supply  and  demand,  free-trade  and  protection. 
Only  this  week  the  Kaiser  informed  the  world  at  large 
that  the  untiring  activity  of  the  late  von  Moltke  was 
devoted  to  the  "  brilhant  preparation  "  for  this  war  ; 
though  the  deceased  General  confined  his  activity  to 
military  matters,  it  may  be  accepted  without  demur 
that  the  same  "brilliant  preparation"  included  every 
possible  weapon  in  the  armoury  of  economics.  Germany 
has  chuckled  with  evil  glee  over  our  endless  disputations 
about  shibboleths  and  phrases,  while  she  went  on  her 
way  silently  absorbing  every  fraction  of  trade  that  could 
eventually  bo  turned  to  her  direct  benefit. 

In  this  economic  pact  we  may  behold  the  first  founda- 
tions of  peace.  Here  they  are  laid,  and  truly  laid,  but 
we  have  to  build  upon  them.  The  denial  of  "  most- 
favoured-nation "  treatment  to  the  Enemy  Powers  for  a 
period  to  be  fixed  by  agreement,  to  which  we  made  allu- 
sion last  week,  is  one  of  the  main  recommendations  for 
what  is  called  the  reconstruction  period.     And  the  deter- 


mination is  expressed  to  restore  to  those  countries  suffer- 
ing from  destruction  and  spoliation  the  industrial  plant 
and  raw  materials  of  which  they  have  been  despoiled. 
The  systematic  manner  in  which  Germany  at  the  time 
of  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  Northern  France  and  Poland, 
not  only  commandeered  all  raw  materials  but  dismantled 
factories  and  industrial  works,  destro3dng  wiiat  could  not 
be  removed,  is  not  as  generally  realised  as  it  should  be. 
The  idea  was_  to  cripple  instantly  possible  competition 
after  the  war,  and  to  ensure  a  period  of  time  when  certain 
manufactures  could  practically  be  furnished  by  Germany 
alone,  owing  to  her  having  destroyed  for  the  time  being  the 
rivalry  of  France  and  Belgium.  This  is  further  evidence 
how  Germany's  brilliant  preparation  and  conduct  of 
war  embraces  every  branch  and  department  of  national 
life,  both  her  own  and  her  neighbours.  We  must  accept 
this  truth  and  act  accordingly;  wasting  no  more  time 
listening  to  elderly  prophets  who  wrangle  and  abuse  each 
other  in  the  market-place  over  empty  catchwords  and 
worm-eaten  gospels. 

They  who  drafted  this  international  agreement  have 
taken  long  views,  and  have  made  several  excellent 
recommendations  for  permanent  measures  of  mutual 
assistance.  A  common  law  covering  patents,  indications 
of  origin  and  trade  marks  will  go  far  towards  establishing 
a  firm  commercial  alliance,  which  in  the  end  must  prove 
the  surest  defence  against  the  recurrence  of  war.  We 
would  not  suggest  that  this  pact  of  peace  is  the  first 
grey  streak  of  the  dawn  of  the  millennium,  but  it  is 
certainly  a  step  towards  the  federation  of  mankind 
which  is  the  ideal  unto  which  humanity  still  toils 
painfully.  That  there  will  be  trade  jealousies  and  dis- 
putes in  the  future  as  in  the  past  is  obvious,  but  they  will 
not  be  quarrels  out  of  which  armed  conflict  will  arise. 
It  is  to  be  hoped,  so  far  as  this  country  is  concerned, 
there  will  be  a  thorough  overhauling  of  antique  manners 
and  customs.  May  we  not  anticipate  the  aboHtion  of 
our  ancient  system  of  weights  and  measures  and  the 
adoption  of  a  decimal  coinage — on  which  subject  we 
publish  a  special  article  to-day.  The  commercial  harm 
which  British  conservatism  in  this  respect  has  wrought 
is  incalculable.  And  the  change  could  be  made,  if  not  as 
easily  as  we  adopted  paper  currency  or  gained  an  extra 
hour's  daylight  by  putting  on  our  clocks,  certainly  with 
infinitely  less  trouble  and  expense  than  'it  has  cost  us 
to  reclothe  our.  army  in  khaki,  or  refurnish  it  with 
newer  kinds  of  munitions.  This  is  the  age  of  transition ; 
let  us  tread  courageously  the  new  roads  and  be  done 
with  the  easy  contentment  and  "  don't  bother  me " 
ruts  of  the  past.  The  Economic  Conference  has  given 
the  country  the  lead  it  requires ;  we  must  look  to 
our  statesmen  to  build  up  this  new  defence  of  civilisa- 
tion against  commercial  attack  by  scientific  barbarism 
which  prepares  the  paths  of  peace  for  the  wheels  of  its 
big  guns  and  makes  friendly  commerce  the  harbinger 
of  the  foulest  horrors  of  war. 

Attempts  will  doubtless  not  be  lacking  by  a  certain 
school  of  economists  to  prove  that  these  dangers,  once 
the  enemy  is  defeated,  will  be  more  or  less  imaginary,  and 
that  the  sole  salvation  of  the  working-classes  of  the  United 
Kingdom  will  lie  in  the  future  as  in  the  past  in  cheapness 
irrespective  of  consequences.  We  have  suffered  so 
heavily  through  the  blind  worship  of  this  abominable 
fetish  that  it  may  reasonably  be  hoped  that  such  efforts 
will  make  small  headway.  But  we  must  be  ready  for 
them.  Trade  and  commerce  is  now  part  and  parcel  of 
Imperial  defence.  We  know  how  the  enemy  works  and 
who  are  our  friends  and  must  act  accordingly.  Great 
Britain  has  not  hesitated  to  depart  from  old  traditions 
in  defence  of  freedom,  and  now  she  m-ust  display  equal 
courage  and  firmness  in  the  maintenance  of  independence 
when  the  war  is  over.  It  is  for  us  to  set  an  example  in 
putting  into  practice  the  wise  and  well-cdhsidered 
recommendations  of  the  Economic  Conference. 


LAND     t*t     WATER 


June  Jii,  191O 


Kovel  and  Lemberg 


By  Hilaire  Bclloc 


THK  bcsl  iiitnrnu'd  ami  tlii'  umM  na-uiiable  of  the 
(lormiiii  students  who  arc  folluwinn  this  war  and 
pnhlishini,'  their  conuuentaries  upon  it,  is  .Major 
Moraht,  whose  stu(hes  in  tlie  Berhn  Tagcblalt 
liave  ofton  been  aihided  to  in  thise  (ohuims. 

In  the  evcninfi  ot  Monday  tlie  3th  of  Jnne,  when  the  lirst 
news  reached  Berhn  of  the  Russian  blow  upon  the  south- 
eastern front,  this  eminent  authority  committed  himself 
to  the  following  )ud};menl  wln<li  ai)peared  over  his  name 
in  the  issue  of  the  paper  of  the  next  day.  the  (itli  of  June. 

,  .  .  It  uill  need  a  Russian  Annv  of  several 
millions  to  create  anv  serious  menace  a^ainsl  our  seientifieallv 
eonsolidalcd  and  extremely  strong  front.  They  can  luiv: 
no  success  unless  they  conifyel  us  to  brinj;  troops  from 
other  theatres  of  the  war.  Hut  that  will  not  l)e  necessary , 
for  a  e  are  ijuite  strong  cnou-^h  there  to  hold  on  the  defensive, 
and  this  last  adventure  of  the  'I'sar's  armies  remains  an 
error  in  calculation." 

'  We  all  know  what  followed.  The  enemy  writer's  judfi- 
ipent  was  at  fault-  and  the  fault  was  characteristic ! 
hor  the  mark  of  all  Prussian  oj)inion  throughout  this  war 
ftas  been  a  strauf^e  attempt  to  supplement  what  (iermans 
cull  "  objecti\'e  reality  '"  by  somethinn  else  exceedingly 
•'  subjective.  "  In  plain  F.nglish,  to  bolster  up  real  misfor- 
tune by  cr\ing  an  imaginary  \ictory.  This  conce|)tion  that 
thinking  about  external  things  in  one's  own  fashion  will 
change  the  nature  of  those  external  things  is,  luckily  for 
us,  very  deeply  rooted  in  modern  (iermany  ;  it  is  not  im- 
known  elsewhere. 

At  any  rate,  we  all  know  what  really  happened.  Within 
twi'lve  days  of  the  evening  on  which  those  lines  were  written 
the  Austro-dermans  on  the  south-eastern  front  had  lost  at 


1r^» 


' ' ' •  fc-  ^  ♦         /^/r  ^ 


called  the  effort  in  the  region  of    LutsK 


least  a  third  and  pei  \ui\»  nearly  half  of  their  strength  and 
had  seen  an  advance  by  the  Russians  at  a  critiral  point  of 
nearer  fifty  than  forty  miles.  They  had  also  seen  the 
loss  of  the  Hukovina  and  the  complete  transformation  of 
the  whole  situation  between  the  Marshes  and  the  Rou- 
mania^i  border. 

But  if  we  are  to  follow  the  great  operation,  to  measure 
the  amount  of  the  Russian  success,  and  to  estimate  its 
future  chan  cs,  we  must  go  into  some  iletail  and  not  1)C 
content  with  the  general  imjiression  of  the  advance. 
For  the  purposes  of  such  detail  we  shall  do  well  to  regard 
the  whole  oiieration  as  composed  of  three  main  actions, 
which  1  will  separate  on  the  accompanyiug  sketch  map 
and  tabulate  as  follows  : 

(i)  The  elfort  upon  the  north  or  right  Russian  Hank, 
which  may  be 
and  Ko\  el. 

Here  the  Russian  object  is  twofold. 

(a)  To  reach  the  railway  junction  at  Kovel  so  as  to 
])aralyse  or  at  least  gravely  interrui)t  communications 
between  the  northern  and  the  southern  portion  of  the 
enemy's  line  aiul  the  o|)i)ortunities  for  reinforcement  from 
the  north  in  men  and  in  material.  (/))  To  strike  down 
smith-westward  so  as  to  begin  tlu"  eu\elopment  of  the 
central  enemy  body — that  massed  east  of  Lemberg — and 
either  (at  the  best)  capture  it,  or  (at  the  worst)  compel  it, 
under  the  threat  of  en\elopment,  to  fall  back. 

(2)  The  action  upon  the  other  Hank  end  of  the  line, 
the  left  or  southern  wing  :  Here  the  Russians  ]>roj)osed  to 
themselves  the  mastering  of  both  banks  of  the  Dniester 
right  up  to  the  mouth  of  the  Strypa  ;  the  occupation  of  the 
railway  centre,  Czernowit/,  and  thence  of  all  the  Province 
of  Bvikovina :  Operations  which  w'ould  put  them  upon 
the  right  or  southern  (lank  of  the  main  Austro-CIerman 
central  body  abo\e-mentioned,  j\ist  as  the  operations  of 
tlie  Kovel-l.utsk  region  woiild  put  them  upon  the 
northern  or  left  Hank  thereof. 

(3)  The  action  in  the  centre  :  From  tlie  region  of  Br<xly 
to  the  region  of  Bucacz  :  That  is,  the  points  covering 
the  four  railways  and  the  four  main  roads  which  converge 
from  the  east  upon  I.emberg. 

In  this  central  field  the  Russians  have  maintained  them- 
selves with  less  strengtii  than  on  the  two  wings.  They 
are  there,  especially  at  the  chief  point  in  front  of  TarnopoJ, 
subjected  to  the  pressure  of  the  Austro-Germans.  These 
attempt  to  relieve  the  increasing  peril  upon  their  two 
Hanks  by  forcing  the  Russian  centre.  Such  is  the  order 
of  the  great  battle 

I. 

The   Lulsk-Kovcl  Region 

Turning  to  Skt>tch  Map  I  we  see  that  the  main  advance 
of  the  Russians  has  been  in  this  region  of  Lutsk. 

Starting  from  the  region  of  Olyka  last  Sunday  fortnight 
they  have  pushed  on  until  they  have  arrived  just  fourteen 
days  later  to  the  point  marked  by  the  dotted  line  on  Map  I 
which  shows  the  general  limits  of   their  advance  at   the* 
time  of  writing. 

The  Russian  pressure  here  makes  a  great  bulge  into 
the  whole  of  the  old  Austro-Cierman  jwsition,  shifting  the 
line  back  by  an  indentation  now  over  fifty  miles  deep. 

Now  this  indentation  can  be  used  in  two  ways  and  i^ 
undoubtedly  intended  by  the  Russians  to  be  used  in  both 
those  ways.  In  the  lirst  place  along  the  arrow  (a)  it 
threatens  Kovel— the  value  of  which  will  be  explained 
in  a  moment ;  in  the  second  place — and  more  important 
— it  creates  a  new  northern  Hank  whence  the  whole 
Austro-tlerman  centre,  co\ering  Lemberg  and  in  front  ol 
Tarnopol,  is  threatened  along  tlie  arrow  (b). 

Whether  the  Russians  will  be  able  to  use  either  or  both 
of  these  two  opportunities  only  the  future  can  show. 
But  whereas  their  action  down  southward  and  w  estward 
against  the  new  Hank  has  not  yet  developed,  and 
the   line   of   resistance   which   thev  "will   have    to   meet 


June  22,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


is  as  yet  only  ronjcctural,  their  pressure  towards  Kovcl 
is  already  well  developed.  On  that  account,  it  has 
attracted  most  attention  in  Europe 

It  is  rumoured  with  regard  to  the  Russian  attempt  to 
strike  down  in  flank  towards  Lemherg  and  cut  off  the 
Austro-German  central  armies  that  it  will  be  met,  not  upon 
the  line  of  the  Hug,  which  is  the  chief  natural  obstacle  of 
the  district,  but  upon  a  prepared  line  of  trenches  which 
start  from  Vladimir,  pass  tlnough  Sokal  and  so  run  at 
an  angle  to  Sojanow.  Whetlier  this  will  be  so  or  no  we 
cannot  tell  until  the  shock  of  the  rapidly  proceedmg 
advance  in  this  direction  comes  upon  the  main  line  of 
defence,  which  the  enemy  shall  establish  u])on  this 
northern  flank  of  this  central  sector. 

But  a  much  more  obvious  line  is  that  of  the  Luga. 

If  the  enemy  were  to  stand  behind  the  Luga,  small 
as  the  stream  is,  he  would  cover  all  his  railheads  Vladi- 
mir itself,  Sokal,  and  Sojanov,  and  at  the  same  time  he 
would  have  a  continuous  straight  front  in  this  region, 
and  he  would  have  in  front  of  him  to  protect  him  an 
obstacle  not  very  serious  as  the  old  wars  went  but  valu- 
able for  the  increased  jKnver  of  the  modern    defensive. 

At  any  rate  he  must  try  and  stand  somewhere  between 
Vladimir  and  Sojanov  unless  he  wants  his  northern  flank 
broken  in  and  his  central  armies  enveloped. 

This  movement,  I  say,  the  most  important  of  all,  is 
as  yet  only  sketched  out.  But  the  direct  Russian  ad- 
vance upon  Kovel  is  already  very  highly  developed. 

Now  the  value  of  Kovel  is  clearly  apparent  from  the 
simplest  railway  i)lan  of  the  eastern  front.  Take  that 
front  down  from  Dvinsk  to  Czernowitz  and  you  iind  it 
interrupted  by  the  bad  country  of  the  Pripet  Marshes. 
Roughly  speaking,  the  ape.K  of  these  marshes  at  the  end 
of  the  good  land  and  the  beginning  of  the  bad  land  is 
marked  by  the  fortress  of  I-5rest.  Across  the  marshes  runs 
a  railway  that  would  link  up  the  whole  front,  and  the 
Austrians  and  Germans  fought  very  hard  to  get  this 
railway  ;  after  they  had  failed  in  their  attempt  to  destroy 
the  Russian  armies  last  summer,  their  last  object  was  to 
reach  this  lateral  communication  (marked  on  the  accom- 
panying Sketch  II  with  a  thick  black  line  and  the  letters 
(a)  (a) )  and  hold  it.  They  failed.  They  got  the  northern 
])art  of  it  as  far  as  Vilna  and  tliey  got  the  southern 
jiart  of  it  from  Dubno,  but  they  could  not  seize  the 
,  middle  part  of  it.  The  consequence  was,  as  Sketch 
Map  II  plainly  shows,  that  they  could  not  communicate 
between  the  northern  and  the  southern  sections  of  their 
front  save  by  the  railway  communication  marked  with  a 


double  line  and  vitally  dependant  on  the  junction  of 
Kovel.  Their  few  forces  in  the  Pinsk  Marshes  they 
could  supply  by  the  railway  from  Brest  to  Pinsk,  but 
for  general  communication  from  north  to  south  they  had 
to  pass  through  Kovel. 

If  Kovel  wen;  to  fall  into  Russian  hands  the  enemy 
would  be  compelled  to  abandon  all  that  he  holds  east  o^ 
Kovel  and  south  of  the  marshes.  The  whole  southern  Iind 
would  have  to  be  modified.  1 

Note,  such  a  modification  of  the  southern  enemy  front] 
such  a  retirement,  would  not  be  a  decision  in  any  sense  or 
the  word.  It  would  leave  the  enemy  intact.  No  true 
decision  can  be  got  on  this  front  save  by  envelopmentj 


*  I   »■'  <    I  t  I  I  I  ♦ 


.Lokatcfit 


LAND     &     WA  T  E  R 


June  22,  igi6 


But  the  shifting  of  the  line  in  its  soiithorn  portion  right 
back  to  Brest  would  weaken  it  and  would  prepare  the 
way  for  better  tilings  later  on.  Therefore  this  advance 
npon  Kovel.  though  not  decisive,  has  great  value  for  the 
Allies,  and  a  corresponding  disadvantage  for  the  enemy. 

How  is  the  enemy  meeting  the  pressure  of  this  ad- 
vance upon  Kovel  wiiich.  after  the  threat  of  the  direct 
south-westward  advance,  is  the  principal  danger  menac- 
ing them  ? 

In  the  first  place,  by  directly  opposing  the  main 
advance,  secondly  by  bringing  all  the  pressure  lie  possibly 
can  to  bear  upon  the  Russian  right  flank.  The  accompany- 
ing Map  III   will  make  the  position  clear,  I  hope. 

Kovel  Junction  with  its  five  converging  railways  is 
connected  with  Lutsk  by  a  railway  and  by  a  road  which 
will  be  seen  upon  the  sketch  ;  I  have  divided  both  roughly 
into  sections  of  five  English  miles,  starting  from  Kovel. 
Up  this  road  and  railway  the  Russians  are  pushing,  but 
at  a  certain  point  marked  X  upon  the  map,  at  21  miles 
from  Kovel  by  the  railway,  their  advancing  body  has  come 
across  the  obstacle  of  the  River  Stokhod. 

This  river,  like  all  the  watercourses  of  this  region, 
runs  through  soft  black  soil  and  its  banks  are  marshy. 
It  is  of  httlc  depth  at  this  point,  and  perhaps  no  more 
than  50  yards  across,  but  I  behev^e  there  is  no  hard  ford. 

Just  where  the  railway  crosses,  upon  the  further  bank 
(from  the  direction  of  the  Russian  advance),  is  the  village 
of  Svidniki,  the  possession  of  which  by  the  Russians 
obviously  gives  them  a  bridge-head  across  the  obstacle. 
For  three  or  four  days  the  fine  of  the  Stokhod  held  up  the 
Russian  advance  towards  Kovel.  But  upon  Friday 
last  the  passage  was  forced — how  we  are  not  told — and 
the  village  of  Svidniki  securely  held  by  our  Allies. 

So  much  for  the  direct  advance.  It  had  by  Friday 
night,  the  i6t  h  June,  got  to  about  20  miles  from  Kovel 
Junction,  and  there  lay  between  the  head  of  its  column 
and  that  objective  no  formidable  natural  obstacle. 

Now  consider  the  attack  in  flank  by  which  the 
Germans  and  Austrians — but  the  (iermans  in  very  large 
proportion — propose  to  spoil  the  Russian  plan. 


It  is  clear  that  an  enemy  advancing  towards  a  point  O, 
the  reaching  of  which  would  strategically  affect  you  for 
the  worse,  and  making  a  big  bulge  forward  in  his  line  to- 
wards this  objective,  O,  gets  intrt  an  angle  more  and  more 
acute  as  he  advances.  You  will  check  his  advance  and 
put  him  in  peril  in  his  turn,  if  by  striking  upon  either  side 
of  the  bulge,  say  upon  the  right  liand  side  as  by  the 
arrows  at  A-A,  you  can  bend  in  his  line.  F'or  by  so  doing 
you  threaten  his  hnes  of  communication  C-C. 

That  is  exactly  what  the  Austro-Gormans,  but  par- 
ticularly the  German  Higher  Command  (which  we  can  here 
see  at  work)  is  trying  to  do  in  the  Lut.sk-Kovel  region. 

If  the  reader  will  turn  back  to  Map  I  he  will  see  what 
the  enemy  is  about  and  what  advantages  support  him. 

The  Russians  are  holding  the  line  of  the  Styr  from  the 
bridge-head  of  Tchartoriisk  up  the  river  of"  Kolki  and 
beyond.  They  are  holding  it  on  tiie  defensive  and  the 
enemy  are  putting  forth  all  their  energy  in  an  attempt 
to  cross  the  Styr  here  and  to  force  the  Russians  back 
southward  and  eastward  from  the  river  until  the  head 


of  the  bulge  out  by  Svidniki  is  in  peril.  If  the  enemy 
could  get  across  this  part  of  the  Styr  in  the  Kolki  or 
Godomichi  region  ujwn  any  reasonably  broad  front,  they 
would  have  in  front  of  them  two  fairly  good  roads  for 
advancing  down  upon  the  rear  of  the  Rus.sians. 

Note  that  tlie  Austro-Germans  have  for  this  attempt 
the  support  of  an  excellent  lateral  Hue  of  communica- 
tions. Their  troops  lying  along  the  Styr  in  this  region 
are  supplied  by  the  railway  which  runs  from  Kovel  to 
Tchartoriisk,  and  just  up  to  the  neighbourhood  of 
Tchartoriisk  station  itself  this  line  is  in  their  hands. 

F""rom  this  railway  there  runs  the  good  road  marked 
on  Map  III  with  the  numbering  i  i  r  ;  and  the  distance 
across  which  the  fighting  units  have  to  be  munitioned  from 
railhead  at  Manievice  station  is  only  twenty  miles. 

The  actual  situation  of  the  Russians  on  this  imperilled 
flank  is  a  little  obscure  because  the  various  communiques 
do  not  exactly  fit  in  to  each  other.  But  this  much  would 
seem  certain  : 

The  Russians  firmly  hold  the  bridge-head  of  Tchartoriisk 
and  are  on  the  West  bank  of  the  Styr  as  far  as  Kolki. 

Some  days  ago  a  certain  and  unexpected  piece  of 
pressure  from  the  enemy  in  front  of  Kolki  forced  our 
Allies  here  on  to  the  further  bank  of  the  river.  They 
have  recovered  this  point  and  are  again  upon  the  northern 
bank  at  Kolki,  holding  the  bridge-head.  I  find  it  diffi- 
cult to  determine  from  the  very  scarce  evidence  available 
whether  they  hold  the  whole  stream  up  to  Godomichi, 
but  there  upon  the  eastern  bank  ("  the  wrong  side  " 
from  the  Russian  point  of  view),  enemy  pressure  very 
heavily  developed  as  late  as  last  Saturday.  By  the  last 
advices  the  enemy  is  thrust  back  again  on  to  the  western 
bank  at  Godomichi  also. 

Such  is  the  situation  in  this  region  at  the  moment  of 
writing  (Tuesday  afternoon,  June  20th).  The  Russians 
have  advanced  on  the  Kovel  road  as  far  as  Svidniki, 
leaving  a  flank  on  the  north  against  which  the  enemy  is 
hammering  as  hard  as  he  can,  and  with  particular  violence, 
at  the  critical  points  of  Kolki  and  (iodomichi,  where  he  is 
nearest  to  the  main  roads  by  which  the  Russian  advance 
on  Kovel  is  supplied,  as  well  as  by  the  railway. 


Mmieh'Lce  Stii£u>n 


Thorn  Kovel 


'    '    '  ^p''*     / 


Sussuutlaze 
Scmday  last  June /8. 


All  along  the  northern  bank  of  the  Styr  from  Kolki 
to  Rozyszcze  there  is  open  land  above  flood  or  marsh 
level,  immediately  behind  which  begins  the  great  mass 
of  the  woods.  Before  the  Russians  seized  the  bridge-head 
at  Rozyszcze  the  Austro-Germans  had  laid  along  this  high 
open  land  and  along  the  edge  of  the  woods  a  light  railway, 
which  followed  a  rough  road  of  the  neighbourhood  and  had 
its  terminus  just  opposite  Godomichi.  But  when  the 
Russians  had  got  hold  of  the  bridge-head  at  Rozyszcze 
this  railway  was  no  longer  available,  and  the  attack  on 
Godomichi  had  to  be  supplied  from  beyond  Kolki 

To  Kolki  the  enemy  can  bring  comparatively  large 
forces  along  the  road  "which  leads  directly  through  the 
woods  and  the  marshes  to  the  railway  at  Manieovice 
station — a  road  which  now  certainly  has  a  light  railway 
laid  along  it. 

At  (Jodomichi  the  enemy  is  hampered  by  the  absence  of' 
a  good  road.  He  can  only  bring  up  mun'itionment  along 
the  comparatively  open  high  land  north  of  the  ri\er  where 


June  22,  1916 


LAND     &      WATER 


there  is  a  track.  Perhaps  he  can  use  in  this  weather 
certain  rough  tracks  through  the  woods  as  well,  but  at  any 
rate  he  cannot  do  as  much  at  Godomichi  as  at  Kolki. 

It  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  narrow  passage  between 
the  Stokhod  and  the  Styr  is  held  strongly  by  the  Russians. 
At  any  rate,  this  point  would  be  a  difficult  one  for  the 
enemy  to  attack  upon  on  account  of  its  distance  from 
his  railway.  His  success  or  failure  will  still  depend  upon 
his  efforts  at  Kolki  and  Godomichi,  and  it  is  upon  these 
points  that  we  must  fix  our  attention  in  order  to  judge 
the  measure  of  our  Allies'  and  their  opponents'  action  in 
this  region  during  the  next  few  days. 

Meanwhile,  there  is  a  very  important  piece  of  news 
arrived  in  London  just  before  these  hues  are  written. 
It  is  to  the  effect  that  the  Russians  in  some  force  have 
reached  the  neighbourhooa  of  Gorokho\'  upon  the  main 
road  which  leads  from  Lutsk  to  Lemberg. 

The  despatch  which  tells  us  of  this  does  not  mention 
lighting  in  Gorokhov  itself  but,  after  speaking  of  a  violent 
Austrian  effort  (which  captured  3  Russian  guns  and 
against  which  a  strong  local  counter-offensive  had  to  be 
taken  just  east  of  Lokatchi)  goes  on  to  tell  us  of  two 
actions  which  clearly  prove  the  presence  of  considerable 
Russian  bodies  close  to  Gorokhov  upon  the  main  road. 
There  is  mention  of  a  whole  regiment  in  action  with 
horse  artillery — an  advance  body — an  advance  body, 
therefore,  but  a  considerable  one  operating  at  Korytnitzy, 
taking  prisoners  and  machine  guns.  But,  what  is  more 
important,  there  is  also  a  nicntion  of  another  operation 
on  a  rather  larger  scale  at  Bojeff  near  Gorokhov. 


itojanow 


"^ttgltsh  Miles' 


they  only  modify  the  enemy's  front,  but  down  from  the 
north  upon  Lemberg  they  may — improbably — achieve 
a  true  decision. 

II 

Southern  Field  of  Operations  :  Gzernowitz 

The"  next  field  to  which  we  must  turn  our  attention  is 
the  extreme  opposite  end  of  the  line  :  The  Bukovina  and 
its  capital,  the  town  of  Czernowitz. 

The  Russians  are  here  making  another,  southern  dent, 
corresponding — though  much  shallower — to  the  northern 
dent,  and  creating  another  flank  whence  the  central 
positions  covering  Lemberg  and  in  front  of  Tarnopol  may 
be  threatened.  In  a  word,  they  are  making  one  .of  those 
great  salients  the  "pinching  off"  of  which  is  the  obvious 
and  only  strategy  possible  in  a  vast  advance  of  this  Sort. 
They  are  doing  exactly  what  the  Austro-Germans  did 
against  them  last  year— but  with  this  difference,  that 
they  are  taking  more  prisoners  and  are  less  tied  by  heavy 
artillery,  while  their  opponents  have  far  less  space  on 
which  to  fall  back  and  are  more  exhausted  in  men. 

This  southern  indentation.  Ithough  far  less  marked 
than  the  northern  one  of  the  Lutsk-Koyel  region, 
is  yet  of  great  importance,  and  that  on  account  of  the 
nature  of  the  obstacles  here  present  and  of  the  com- 
munications which  man  has  established  in  the  region. 

When  the  Russians  began  their  movement  in  this 
quarter  they  were  planted  just  south  of  the  Dniester  in 
the  region  of  Okna  and  the  distance  separating  their  lines 


Just  outside  Gorokhov  on  the  great  road  between  Lutsk 
and  Lemberg,  and  about  11  miles  from  the  frontier  of 
Galicia,  a  tongue  of  wood  lies  across  that  road,  through 
which  wood  the  advance  column  of  the  Russians  was 
feeling  its  way,  presumably  upon  the  morning  of  Sunday 
last  the  i8th.  This  tongue  of  wood  is  called  the  Wood  of 
Bojeff  from  the  name  of  the  village  standing  somewhat 
off  the  road  at  its  southern  extremity.  It  was  in  this  wood 
that  the  Russians  took  prisoners  a  whole  battalion  with 
four  machine  guns.  They  secured  the  whole  wood  ;  they 
have  debouched  from  it,  and  the  head  of  their  column  is 
quite  probably  at  the  moment  of  writing  in  Gorokhov. 

The  importance  of  this  news  lies  in  the  advance  it 
shows  along  the  main  road  between  Lutsk  and  the  rail- 
head at  Steojnow  and  so  by  road  and  rail  on  to  Lemberg. 

It  means  that  the  south-western  thrust  against  the 
northern  flank  of  the  central  Austro-German  bulge  has 
now  come  very  near  to  its  point  of  trial. 

That  point  of  trial,  as  we  have  seen,  is  rumoured  to  be 
a  defensive  line  recently  organised  and  uniting  the  three 
railheads  of  Vladimir- Volinsky,  Sokal  and  Stojanow. 
It  is  more  probably  a  line  covering  these  three  railheads, 
but  actually  lying  along  the  stream  of  the  Luga  and  carried 
eastward  and  southward  till  it  reaches  the  ( ialician  fron- 
tier. Upon  their  power  to  force  this  hne  and  seriously 
to  meance  the  great  Austro-German  central  salient  from 
its  new  flank  in  the  north  will  largely  depend  the  future 
success  of  the  Russians  in  this  campaign.     For  by  Kovel 


^ 


i^c 


-^■■distriU  ^    ^^  20  MiUs  so 


from  the  Carpathian  mountains  was  not  fifty  miles 
across.  Czernowitz,  the  railway  junction  at  this  point 
(corresponding  in  importance  to  Kovel  in  the  north), 
was  little  more  than  15  miles  away.  Yet  should  they  gain 
possession  of  Czernowitz  they  would  have  done  upon  the 
south  work  corresponding  to,  and  as  valuable  as,  the  work 
in  the  north.  The  occupation  of  the  Bukovina  and 
of  its  railway  centre  Czernowitz  would  place  them  right 
iipon  a  most  vulnerable  flank  of  the  great  salient. 

Southern  fialicia  is  approached  from  the  south  by  one 
main  railway  line,  which  forms  the  lateral  communica- 
tion for  all  armies  defending  it,  and  which  runs  from 
Czernowitz  to  I^eniberg,  from  south-east  to  north-west. 
All  the  other  communications  of  this  district  are  roughly 
parallel  to  this  main  line.  The  other  railway,  and  a 
great  number  of  good  roads,  all  follow  the  same  general 


8 


LAND     &    WATER 


June  22,  1916 


idirection  and  are  all  of  them  so  many  avenues  leading 
straight  up  from  the  south  towards  Lembcrg. 
.  Further,  there  is  no  natural  obstacle  covering  this 
rsouthern  flank  when  once  it  has  been  opened.  Its  true 
'boundary  and  defence  is  the  deep  limestone  cleft  of  the 
Dniester.  Once  you  hold  that,  then  you  hold  the  Bukovina. 
The  occupation  of  Czernowitz  (apart  from  its  political 
•^effect  upon  Roumania,  of  which  1  say  nothing)  gives  one 
j^a  complete  hold  of  this  region  on  account  of  the  way  in 
which  the  railway  has  been  laid  down. 


The  one  railway   connecting  Czernowitz   and  all   its 

•junction  lines  with   Lemberg   and   the  north   was    not 

designed  for  modern  defence.     There  is  here  one  natural 

[obstacle,  not  a  very  formidable  one,  the  upper  waters  of 

fthe  River  Pruth. 

j  So  high  up  in  its  course  this  watercourse  is  fordablc 
tin  many  places,  even  below  Czernowitz.  Still,  even  such 
•as  it  is  for  a  Une  of  defence,  the  railway  vital  to  the  support 
■of  Czernowitz  makes  no  use  of  it  ;  neither  does  the  great 
road.  Both  of  them  cross  the  Pruth  just  in  iront  of  the 
town  and  proceed  on  their  way  to  the  north  (the  vulner- 
able side)  beyond  the  river. 

It  was  thus  an  easy  matter  for  the  Russians  once  they 
found  themselves  in  a  superiority  here,  to  cut  off  Czerno- 
witz before  having  to  force  the  Pruth. 

Once  they  had  occupied  Sada  Gora  and  Sniat\ii, 
Czernowitz  was  at  their  mercy,  although  the  Pruth  was  not 
yet  forced.  For  where  the  road  and  the  main  railway 
and  the  side  line  from  the  Carpathians  all  meet  at  the 
junctioy  of  Nepolokoutz  you  can  cut  the  avenues  of 
supply  upon  which  Czernowitz  depends  ;  and  once  the 
Russians  had  reached  that  level  in  their  process  of  in- 
vasion, even  before  they  forced  the  Pruth  river,  Czerno- 
witz was  at  their  mercy.  The  enemy  rapidly  evacuated 
it,  leaving  at  the  bridge-head  north  of  the  river  at  K  a 
battalion  or  two  by  waj'  of  rearguard  and  a  few  guns. 
-Most  of  this  rearguard  appears  to  have  fallen  prisoners 
to  the  Russians,  and  Czernowitz  was  entered  upon  Satur- 
day last,  the  17th  of  June. 

The  Army  of  Pflanzer  which  was  operating  in  the 
Bukovina,  with  Czernowitz  as  its  principal  base  and  witii 
the  railway  from  Kolomea  as  its  chief  avenue  of  supply, 
was  not  destroyed  by  the  Russian  success.  It  had  the 
following  fate : 

Somewhat  over  20,000  men  and  officers  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  advancng  Russians  as  prisoners  :  a  total  loss 
of  say  a  third  to  a  quarter  of  its  total  effectives.  Of 
the  remamder  some  considerable  fraction  was  got  away 
by  the  main  line  up  through  Kolomea  before  that  line 
was  cut  by  the  Ru.ssians,  who,  before  reaching  Sniatyn, 
had  cut  it  at  Nepolokoutsk.  But  the  greater  part  of  the 
remainder  seems  to  have  been  compelled  to  fall  directly 
back  along  the  line  which  runs  south  from  Czernowitz 
along  the  Roumanian  frontier  to  Dorna  Warta. 

Some  of  the  published  accounts  speak  as  though  a 
retirement  along  this  line  were  perilous  and  its  result 
doubtful.  One  cannot  tell  (without  far  more  details) 
whether  the  Russians  have  any  chance  of  interfering 
with  such  a  retirement,  but  so  far  as  the  mere  com- 
munications are  concerned  this  railway  is  ample  for  the 
Austrian  purjiose.  It  is  true  it  goes  tlirough  a  wild,  broad 
and  sparsely  inhabited  section  of  the  Carpathian  Range. 
It  is  also,  i  believe,  true  that  bcfoi-e  the  war  it  was  not 
linked  up  with  the  Hungarian  railway  on  the  other 
side  of  the  valley  over  the  easy  Borgo  Pass. 

That  defect  in  communications  (a  gap  of  30  odd  miles 
^but  served  by  an  excellent  road)  has  doubtless  been 
made  good  since  the  war.  In  any  case  the  road  and 
railway  between  them  would  be  quite  sufficient  to  keep  a 
rdrcatinc  force  supplied  even  if,  as  is  probable,  it  stands 


upon  the  northern  side  of  the  mountauis.  Still  more  is  it 
suflicient  for  permitting  a  continued  retreat  if  the  Austrian 
Higher  Command  should  find  it  necessary  to  withdraw 
the  whole  of  this  remnant  back  into  Transylvania,  and 
send  it  round  by  rail  to  Galicia. 

Meanwhile  the  test  of  all  this  southern  operation  is 
Kolomea.  If  or  when  the  Russians  occupy  Kolomea  (at 
least,  within  a  reasonable  lapse  of  time  from  the  present 
moment),  they  will  be  really  threatening  in  flank  any 
Austro-German  troops  still  operating  upon  the  central 
sector  west  of  the  Strypa.  For  Kolomea  commands  the 
railway  over  the  jablonitza  Pass,  i.e.,  the  main  avenue 
of  approach  from  Hungary  and  Kolomea  occupied,  all 
(ialicia  north  of  it  is  threatened.  It  is  upon  the  fate  of 
Kolomea  that  we  must  h.x  ourselves  in  order  to  judge 
the  news  in  this  section  during  the  next  few  days. 

Ill 

The  Central  Austro-German  Salient 

The  third  sector  of  the  movement  concerns  .the  centre  : 
Roughly  speaking,  the  positions  from  near  Brody  to  near 
Buczacz  covering  Lemberg. 

Here  we  must  be  careful  not  to  fall  into  an  error  which 
misled  opinion  not  a  little  when  tilings  were  going  against 
us  on  the  eastern  front,  and  which  may  equally  mislead 
it  now  that  things  are  going  in  our  favour. 

The  object  of  the  RussLiin  Higher  Command,  like  that  of 
every  other  Higher  Command  in  this  war,  is  not  to  occujjy 
territory  nor  to  get  "  within  so  many  miles  of  "  places  in 
the  newspapers,  nor  to  parade  through  "  conquered  " 
towns,  but  to  obtain  a  decision  against  the  opponent  : 
that  is,  to  put  as  many  as  possible  of  his  armed  men  oiit  of 
action  with  the  smallest  possible  expenditure  of  armed 
men  upon  their  own  side. 

This  military  object  is  necessarily  common  to  every 
Higher  Command  in  any  war,  but  it  is  peculiarly  true  in 
this  war,  and  above  all  in  the  present  critical  phase  of  Ihis 
war,  that  it  is  the  object  of  the  Allied  Higher  Connuands. 

W'ith  the  Austro-Germans  in  their  present  situation  ; 
with  the  (lerman  temperament  what  it  is  ;  with  the  type 
of  neutral  opinion  the  enemy  hopes  to  affect ;  and  with 
the  chance  offered  him  by  the  baser  Press  even  in  the 
Allied  countries,  the  mere  occupation  of  territory  and  the 
parading  of  troops  through  occupied  towns,  has  got  a 
certain   political  value  for   the  enemy's   commanders. 

■  Strategically  they  were  beaten  long  ago  and  they  know 
it.  Therefore,  their  remaining  chance  is  largely  political. 
But  with  the  Allies  it  is  just  the  other  way.  Strategically, 
if  we  regard  them  as  one  indissoluble  body,  the  game  is 
already  theirs  and  has  long  been  so  ;  and  the  one  thing 
that  could  imperil  their  ultimate  victory  would  be  allowing 
political  considerations— the  mere  retention  of  a  town  or 
the  mere  advance  over  territory — to  interfere  with  their 
strategical  conceptions. 

All  talk,  therefore,  of  the  Russians  "  advancing  on 
Lemberg  "  ;  of  our  hopes  that  they  will  "  take  "  Lem- 
berg, etc.,  of  their  being  "  only  so  many  miles  from  Lem- 
berg," are  as  foolish  and  beside  the  nuirk,  as  the  rubbish 
about  the  Germans  being  "  only  four  miles  from  the  citadal 
of  Verdun."  The  Russians  are  not  out  to  "take" 
Lemberg,  but  to  disarm  the  Austrian  forces  in  as  large  an 
amount  as  possible. 

Now,  as  we  were  saying  last  week,  if  they  could  get 
round  south-westward  from  the  Lutsk  region  towards 
Lemberg.  while  the  Austro-German  central  forces  covering 
Lemberg  were  still  engaged  far  to  the  east,  they  would 
have  a  chance  of  cutting  off  great  bodies  of  the  enemy. 

There  are  two  ways  of  disarming  any  enemy  deployed 
m  front  of  you.  One  is  to  smash  his  organisation  by  a  blow, 
the  other  is  to  envelo))  him  so  that  he  surrenders.  The 
Russians  have  accomplished  a  part,  but  only  a  part  ol 
their  task  in  the  first  method.  Their  great  blow  has  put 
out  of  action  certainly  more  than  one-third  of  the  Austro- 
Germans  between  the  Marshes  and  the  Roumanian 
frontier,  perhaps  nearer  one-half.  But  they  have  not 
destroyed  the  organisation  in  front  of  them  any  more  than 
the  enemy  destroyed  the  Russian  organisation  in  his  great 
advance  last  year.  To  do  that  they  must  somew^ierc  try 
and  envelop.  The  capture  of  the  Bukovina  (and 
Czernowitz  means  that)  puts  them  upon  one  flank  of  the 
mam  Austro-German  forces  in  the  centre.  An  advance 
southward    and    westward    from    the    region    of    Lutsk 


June  22,  1916 


LAND      &     WATER 


would  put  them  upon  the  other  flank.  Were  their  victories 
to  the  north  and  the  south  sufficiently  rapid  and  the 
retirement  of  the  Austro-Gerraans  in  the  centre  suffi- 
ciently tardy,  the  result  would  be  a  great  decision.  The 
Austro-German  forces  of  the  centre  would  be  destroyed. 

The  chances  of  obtaining  such  a  great  decision  in  this 
region  and  at  this  moment,  are  odds  against.  And  that 
for  this  reason  :  That  whereas  the  Austro-German  armies 
of  the  centre  have  a  mass  of  excellent  roads  and  three 
railway  lines  whereby  to  retire  towards  the  region  of 
Lemberg  and  reduce  their  salient,  the  Russians,  though 
well  provided  with  communications  upon  their  southern 
(lank  have  upon  tlieir  northern  flank  in  the  Lutsk  region 
poor    communications. 

But  it  may  be  asked  why  in  any  case  are  the  Austro- 
Germans  thus  fighting  so  hard  in  the  central  section  and 
holding  in  the  hill  country  near  Jezierna,  north-west  of 
Tarnopol  ;  in  the  hill  country  just  west  of  the  Strypa  and 
so  south  to  the  Dniester  ?  Why,  especially,  are  they 
putting  so  great  an  'effort  forward  in  the  region  of 
Jezierna  towards  Tarnopol,  if  this  standing  out  eastward 
in  the  centre,  while  the  Russians  advance  westward 
above  and  behind  them,  puts  them  in  peril  ? 

The  answer  to  that  question  is  the  old  answer.  When 
you  are  pressed  upon  your  flanks,  you  have,  if  j'^ou  are  in 
sufficient  force,  a  chance  of  breaking  the  enemy's  centre. 
If  we  regard  the  Austro-German  effort  in  front  of  Tarnopol 
as  a  "  holding  up  "  of  the  Russian  advance,  we  have  got 
the  situation  absolutely  topsj'^-turv}-.  It  is  the  Austro- 
(lermans  who  are  here  attacking  and  the  Russians, 
deliberately  less  strong  here  than  on  the  two  wings,  that 
are  holding  tip  the  attack. 

The  situation  of  this  central  portion  at  the  moment  of 
writing  would  seem  to  be  as  follows  : 

Beginning  at  Radzivilov  on  the  frontier  and  upon  the 
main  road  and  railway  between  Lemberg  and  Dubno 
(which  was  occupied  by  the  Russians  some  days  ago) ,  this 
front  crosses  the  frontier  somewhere  near  Popovce, 
covers,  I  think  (but  I  am  not  certain)  Zalosce — and  then 
cuts  the  main  Tarnopol-Lemberg  road  and  railway  in  the 
hill  country  just  east  of  Jezierna.  It  crosses  the 
secondary  railway  from  Tarnopol  to  Lemberg  due  south 
of  the  point  where  it  crosses  the  main  railway  ;  then 
runs  along  the  Upper  Strypa  Valley  upon  its  eastern  side, 
I  think  (at  the  moment  of  writing),  crossing  the  stream 
rather  less  than  half-way  down  its  length.  The  line 
runs  up  the  west  side  of  the  Strypa  along  the  watershed 
to  the  east  of  Podhajce  and  so  down  to  the  Dniester, 
which  stream  it  strikes  somewhere  quite  close  to  the 
Strypa  mouth. 

From  this  description  two  points  will  be  apparent. 

First,  that  the  Austro-German  central  advance  sector, 
the  front  of  the  big  salient  which  the  Russians  have  forced 
upon  them,  is  very  straight,  running  almost  exactly  along 
the  23rd  degree  of  eastern  longitude  from  Greenwich. 

Secondly,  that  there  has  been  no  conspicuous  Russian 
advance  here  south  of  the  Jezierna  region.  There  has 
been  a  certain  advance,  especially  in  the  effort  of  Buczacz, 
but  elsewhere,  as  for  instance  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Tarnopol,  there  has  been  hardly  any  movement  at  all. 
But,  as  I  have  said,  the  right  way  to  look  at  the  thing 
is  to  conceive  of  it  as  an  enemy  thrust  against  the 
Russian  centre  which  the  Russians  are  holding  up  while 
they  try  to  get  round  the  flanks.  So  long  as  it  is  held  up 
we  need  not  bother  about  the  strength  of  Bothmer  who 
commands  here.  The  longer  he  stays  so  far  forward 
the  better  for  the  Allied  plan.  But,  unfortunatel3% 
whenever  he  chooses  to  fall  back  he  has  ample  oppor- 
tunities, no  less  than  three  railway  lines  and  a  whole 
network  of  good  roads  upon  a  front  of  only  sixty  miles. 

THE    TRENTINO    FRONT 

There  is  nothing  to  ?.dd  this  week  so  far  as  the  news 
reaching  London  upon  Tuesday  afternoon  advances  us 
with  regard  to  the  position  upon  the  Trentino  front. 
The  rim  of  the  Asiago  plateau  is  held  thoroughly  by  the 
Italians  and  our  Allies  have  begun  local  counter-offensives 
as  well.  Austria  has  not  attained  to  the  possession  of 
any  one  of  the  main  roads  essential  to  ?  further  develop- 
men-t  of  their  plan.  They  are  thoroughly  held  upon  the 
Brenta  and  the  Adige,  which  valleys  would  give  them, 
could  they  force  them,  a  continuous  railway  each  as  well 
as  a  road.     They  ha\-c  not  e\Tn  been  able  to  peach  the 


*^;?^ 
*^^^i^^ 


IX 


XRadzivlloff 
'^Zalosce 


I 


CZERNOWI': 

I 


secondary  avenue  of  communications  which  is  afforded 
by  the  road  from  Rovereto  to  Schio. 

The  Italians  have  now  thoroughly  identified  the  whole 
of  the  Austrian  effectives  acting  between  Arsiero  and 
the  Brenta  :  that  is,  the  units  now  used  in  the  most  active 
fighting,  excluding  those  that  are  held  up  in  the  Brenta 
and  Adige  valley,  and  those  massed  against  the  Posina 
Ridge  and  in  the"  Vallarsa.  These  units  total  15  brigades, 
of  which  six,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  are  mountain  troops. 
■  The  Italian  local  counter-offensi\es  obtained  their  first 
successes  on  the  evening  of  the  5th  of  June,  a  fortnight 
ago,  during  the  storm  which  marked  that  night.  These 
successes  took  the  form  of  pushing  the  Austrians  down 
the  northern  slope  of  the  rim  bounding  the  upland  plateau 
-,in  that  portion  of  the  rim  lying  west  of  the  Astico.  East 
of  the  Astico  the  Austrians  had  the  day  before  mastered 
the  Cengio  mountain,  and  occupied  all  the  Pass  leading 
down  to  Cogollo,  as  we  have  said.  There  must,  therefore, 
ha\e  been  a  very  critical  moment  upon  that  Sunday  and 
for  a  few  days  following,  but  at  the  end  of  the  week  an 
Italian  counter-offensive  recovered  the  ravine  and  all  the 
south-eastern  slopes  of  the  Cengio.  In  other  words,  the 
issue  from  the  plateau  down  to  the  plain  .and  the  railway 
was  blocked  by  the  Italian  counter-offensives  a  week  ago. 
Going  further  eastward  the  Austrians  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Asiago  claimed,  on  the  7th  of  June,  the  foothill 
Lamerle  which  overlooks  the  Plain  of  Asiago  by  about 
700  feet.  This  claim  was  part  of  the  general  policy  of  the 
enemy  dictated  from  Berlin,  whereby,  for  some  reason  best 
known  to  themselves,  the  enemy  announces  the  occupa- 
tion of  a  position  which  he  either  has  not  yet  reached,  or 
will  never  reach.  At  anv  rate,  the  Lamerle  hill  was  not 
carried  upon  that  Wednesday  the  7th  of  June.  They  were 
still  fighting  for  it  three  days  later  upon  the  lotli,  and 
upon  that  da^'  the  Italian  brigade  of  Forli,  which  is  com- 
posed of  the  43rd  and  44th  regiments  of  the  line,  counter- 
attacked and  drove  the  Austrians  with  the  bayonet  down 
such  part  of  the  hill  as  they  had  already  occupied. 
Further  to  the  east  again  the  effort  of  the  Austrians  to 
obtain  the  Brenta  at  Valstanga,  the  most  important 
effort  of  all,  was  also  heavily  pushed  upon  that  same  day, 
Wednesday,  the  7th  of  June.  A  brigade  of  Southern 
Sla\'s  was  thrown  into  the  action  ;  the  2nd  regiment  from 
Bosnia  and  the  22nd  from  Gratz.  They  carried  the 
Meletta  and  the  next  day  the  mountain  called  Castel- 
gomberto,  but  there  the  advance  stopped.  There  has 
been,  if  anything,  a  slight  Italian  readvance  in  this 
neighbourhood  and  particularly  at  the  top  of  the  Val 
Frenzela.  "  H.   Belloc, 


10 


LAND     &     WATER 


June  22,  191G 


"  Your  Splendid  Work" 


By  Arthur  Pollen 


IT  must  be  some  time  before  Sir  John  Jellicoe's  Jut- 
land dispatih  reaches  the  AdmiraUy.  For  the  oper- 
ations involved  a  fleet  five  times  as  numerous  as  that 
which  Nelson  commanded  at  Trafalgar,  and  the 
lighting  extended  over  an  area  more  than  a  hundred 
limes  greater.  As  contact  was  made  with  von  Hipper 
at  2.20  and  the  chase  was  not  abandoned  till  between  three 
and  four  on  the  following  morning,  the  mmiber  and  length 
of  narratives  to  be  written,  examined  and  collated, 
imix)ses  a  long  and  difficult  task  both  on  the  Admirals 
and  Captains  engaged,  and  finally  on  the  Commander-in- 
C  hief  and  his  staff.  And  pending  the  receipt  of  the  dis- 
patch, it  is  natural  enough  that  there  should  have  been 
no  official  statement  made  by  the  Admiralty,  nor  any 
further  information  published  other  than  flat  denials 
of  certain  German  inventions.  The  section  of  the  public, 
therefore,  that  is  anxious  to  form  right  conclusions  about 
naval  events  has  had  to  look  to  contributions  and  corres- 
pondence of  specialists  for  further  light  upon  the  many 
problems  this  great  battle  has  set  for  solution.  An  ex- 
tremely interesting  correspondence  has  been  running  in 
the  columns  of  the  Times,  and  many  professional  judg- 
ments have  reached  us  from  seamen  in  foreign  countries. 
What  is  perhaps  their  most  noticeable  feature  is  the 
contrast  between  the  unhesitating  verdict  of  the  foreign 
experts  and  the  somewhat  diffident  criticisms  of 
native  controversialists.  Is  it  a  becoming  modesty  that 
explains  the  difference  in  the  British  attitude  ?  There 
are,  of  course,  exceptions.  Sir  Cyprian  Bridge,  for  ex- 
ample, does  not  hesitate  to  describe  the  tactics  of  the 
battle-cruiser  fleet  as  perhaps  the  most  brilliant  re- 
corded in  naval  liistory.  He  perceives  that  these  tactics 
were  exactly  designed  to  make  possible  that  which  actu- 
allv  occurred,  namely,  the  intervention  of  the  (irand  Fleet 
in  a  fashion  that  was  as  masterly  as  it  was  decisive. 
There  is  no  closer  student  of  naval  history  or  naval  science 
than  Admiral  Bridge,  and  he  would  not  speak  as  positi\'ely 
as  this  if  he  were  not  e.xceedingly  sure  of  his  ground.  It 
is  a  real  pleasure  to  record  his  concurrence  in  the  \icw 
expressed  in  these  columns  a  fortnight  ago. 

The  more  doubtful  attitude  taken  by  other  writers 
seems  to  me  to  arise  from  two  things.  First,  the  original 
impression  made  by  the  Admiralty  communique  was  that 
the  action  had  been  indecisive.  And  in  spite  of  the  clearer 
\ision  that  should  have  come  with  time,  some  writers, 
more  bv  accident  than  by  intention  I  think,  have  said 
things  that  tend  to  perpetuate  this  illusion.  Admiral 
Henderson,  for  instance,  in  calling  attention  to  what  I 
believe  to  be  the  second  reason  for  confused  judgment — 
namely,  the  fact  that  the  main  forces  on  both  sides  were 
widely  separated — has  likened  the  engagement  to  that  of 
Mathews  off  Toulon  in  1744.  Apart  from  the  bare  fact 
that  the  British  forces  were  divided  on  both  occasions, 
there  is  manifestly  no  parallel  at  all.  But  it  has  misled 
others,  notably  Mr.  Leyland,  who  reminds  us  that  the 
majority  of  naval  actions  have  been  indecisive,  as  if 
the  Battle  of  Jutland  were  a  case  in  point.  Surely 
nothing  more  decisive  than  the  recent  battle  can  well  be 
imagined.  One  of  the  most  distinguished  of  German 
admirals,  the  President  of  the  German  Naval  League,  von 
Koester,  is  clearly  under  no  illu.sions  whatever  on  this 
point.  For  speaking  at  a  meeting  of  that  extremely 
combatant  body  on  Sunday  last  in  Berlin,  he  explained 
that  the  ta.sk  before  the  German  Fleet  was  to  protect 
Germany  against  enemy  attacks,  to  keep  open  the  ocean 
thoroughfares,  to  destroy  the  enemy's  trade,  and  in  the 
highest  degree  damage  the  enemy  in  revenge  for  his 
efforts  to  starve  Germany.  What  more  damning  com- 
ment on  the  Kaiser's  claim  to  a  sea  victory  could  be 
uttered  ?  His  audience  must  have  been  rudely  disil- 
lusioned. For  protecting  Germany  against  hostile  attack 
has  only  one  meaning.  It  is  to  forbid  the  use  of  the  sea 
to  the  enemy  as  a  line  of  communication  for  his  invading 
forces,  and  it  is  immaterial  whether  the  attack  comes 
tlurough  France,  or  directly  through  a  point  seized  on  the 
German  coast.    But  since  the  second  week  in  August,  KJ14, 


the  British  Army  has  been  transported  over  the  sea  for  the 
attack  of  Germany  without,  so  far  as  is  known,  the  loss 
of  a  single  transport,  though  their  numbers  have  been 
incalculable.  This  part,  then,  of  the  German  Fleet's  task 
has  never  been  attempted.  And  the  ocean  thoroughfares 
were  closed  before  the  first  transport  was  sent  !  Not 
since  the  6th  August  has  a  German  ship  from  overseas 
entered  a  German  port.  The  third  division  of  its  duties 
has,  it  is  true,  been  essayed.  I'ifty-six  British  ships  were 
captured  or  sunk  by  surface  craft  in  the  short  five  months 
before  the  last  of  the  fugitive  German  cruisers  was  run 
down  and  sunk  off  Juan  Fernandez.  The  talc  of  sub- 
marine success  was  longer — but  so  discreditable  that  it 
had  to  be  abandoned  in  the  face  of  the  protests  from  the 
civilised  world.  The  last  of  von  Koester 's  catagories 
is  really  the  most  interesting^ — to  do  the  "  utmost  damage 
to  the  enemy."  Apart  from  the  submarine  campaign, 
how  has  the  Germany  Navv  sought  to  discharge  this 
duty  ? 

And  first,  we  must  realise  that  our  Battle  Cruiser 
Fleet  stands  in  a  relation  to  the  Grand  Fleet  that  has  no 
parallel  on  the  German  side.  The  Grand  Fleet  without 
Sir  David  Beatty  was  undoubtedly  superior  in  strength 
to  the  united  German  Fleet.  We  then  could  afford  the 
luxury  of  division  ships  faster  than  the  rest,  because  their 
fitness  to  "lie  in  the  line"  was  sacrificed  to  speed. 
But  the  enemy  was  in  a  different  case.  It  should 
long  since  have  been  recognised  that  as  navies  only 
exist  to  win  or  dispute  the  command  of  the  sea,  and 
that  as  command  follows  the  victory  of  the  main 
force  of  one  side  over  the  main  force  of  the  other, 
Germany  in  setting  up  a  navy  .should  have  concentrated 
her  effort  on  producing  the  greatest  amount  of  lighting 
force  that  her  financial  and  other  sacrifices  would  give 
her.  Up  to  the  completion  of  the  Lutzow  and  the  last 
of  the  Koenigs  the  big  ship  navy  that  Germany  had 
actually  built  for  herself  consisted  of  six  battle  cruisers 
and  17  battleships.     Why  did  she  build  battle-cruisers  ? 

Battleships  v.  Battle-cruisers 

Writing  immediately  after  Sir  David  Bcatty's  pursuit 
of  von  Hipper  in  1915,  I  pointed  out  that  the  most 
serious  of  Germany's  naval  mistakes  was  her  failure  to 
realise  that  no  naval  forces  except  those  capable  of  dis- 
puting command  with  our  main  forces  could  be  of  the 
slightest  use  to  her.  The  armoured  cniiser  Blucchcr 
and  her  six  battle  cruisers  can  hardly  have  cost  her  less 
than  ^^14,000,000  sterling.  This  is  a  sum  that  would  have 
produced  at  least  seven  battleships,  of  which  five  could 
have  been  ready  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  Had  they  been 
ready,  Germany  might  have  had  21  or  22  Dreadnoughts 
in  commission  in  August,  1914,  at  a  time  when  we  had 
only  20  in  the  Grand  Fleet  I  She  seems  to  have  built 
these  battle  cruisers  for  the  curious  reason  given  by  von 
Koester,  namely  as  instruments  of  revenge — engines  of 
f rightfulness,  like  Zeppelins  and  submarines,  that  could 
wound  the  British  even  if  useless  for  conquering  them. 
Their  whole  employment  from  the  beginning  of  the  war 
has  been  consistent  with  tliis  theory,  and  it  was  an  em- 
ployment that  on  every  occasion  risked  their  existence. 
No  doubt  the  extreme  care  with  which  the  several  raids 
on  Yarmouth,  Scarborough  and  then  Lowestoft  were 
arranged,  reduced  those  risks  to  a  minimum.  But  the 
risk  was  there  and  had  it  materialised  should  have  been 
fatal.  But  for  an  accident  to  Lion  the  adventure  of 
January  24th  must  certainly  have  been  fatal. 

The  German  disposition  at  Jutland  risked  them  once 
more,  and  this  time  quite  fatally.  They  were  risked 
because  it  was  the  essence  of  the  German  plan  to  fight  a 
partial  action^ — useless  if  it  succeeded,  ruinous  if 
it  failed.  If  three  are  destroyed,  von  Hipper's  squadron, 
as  a  squadron,  ceases  to  exist,  even  if  the  Hindenbcrg 
is  finally  commissioned  and  got  ready  for  action. 
But.  the  point  to  bear  in  mind  is  this,  was  there 
something  in  the  type   that   made   this  riskHng   of    the 


June  22.  1916 


LAND     8c     W  A  T  E  R 


11 


squadron  inevitable  ?  The  German  could  see  nothing 
in  speed  but  the  capacity  to  strike  a  blow  and  run 
away  before  the  counter -stroke  could  fall.  It  is  a 
fatal  misreading  of  theory.  The  value  of  speed  in  a 
fighting  imit  is  proportioned  not  to  its  actual  pace,  but 
to  the  effectiveness  of  the  lighting  power  that  the  speed 
delivers  at  the  decisive  point.  If  it  dehvcrs  the  striking 
force  at  an  indecisive  point — namely,  to  bombard  bathing 
machines — speed  is  a  deception.  It  only  helps  you  to 
nm  away.  It  is  the  strategy  of  the  gutter  snipe.  It  is 
not  magnificent  ;  neither  is  it  war.  But  I  am  not  at  all 
certain  that  it  is  not  failure  to  appreciate  this  curious 
(ierman  perversion  of  sea  doctrine,  that  explains  much 
of  the  recent  criticism  of  British  strategy  and  tactics. 

The  King's  Verdict 

But  whatever  the  origin  of  our  doubts  the  time  has 
surely  come  now  when  they  can  be  laid  to  rest.  Though 
we  have  not  Sir  John  Jellicoe's  dispatch,  though  the 
Admiralty  is  still  silent,  we  have  yet  in  the  past  week  had 
one  judgment  on  the  battle — namely,  the  King's — 
which  has  a  value  quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  it  is 
expressed  after  the  fullest  information  that  anyone  can 
possess,  and  is  the  judgment  of  one  trained  "to  dis- 
passionate impartiality.  For  in  naval  matters  the  King 
speaks  witli  an  authority  that  is  something  more  than 
Royal.  All  his  early  life  was  spent  under  the  White 
Ensign,  and  since  he  relinquished  active  service  in  the 
ileet  his  interest  in  naval  science  has  been  as  profound 
and  sustained  as  his  training  was  thorough.  When 
then  he  has  visited  both  sections  of  the  British  fleet, 
and  expresses  his  judgment  at  the  end  of  it,  it  is 
something  more  than  phrases  of  ceremony  that  we  hear. 

"  Unfavourable  weather  conditions,"  His  Majesty  says, 
"  and  approaching  darkness,  prevented  that  complete 
result  wliich  you  all  expected.  But  you  did  all  that  was 
possible  in  the  circumstances.  You  drove  the  enemy 
into  his  harbours  and  inflicted  on  him  very  severe  losses 
and  you  added  another  page  to  the  glorious  traditions  of 
the  British  navy. 

You  could  do  no  more,  and  /or  your  splendid  work  I 
thank  you." 

Especially  important  are  these  words  from  the  fact 
that  the  King  himself  adopts  what  those  who  had  any 
belief  in  the  navy  might  have  guessed  for  themselves 
to  be  the  true  reason  why  the  "  major  portion  " — as  the 
secretary  of  the  Marincamt  modestly  said — of  the 
(ierman  forces  regained  their  ports.  His  Majesty  is 
-atisfied  that  it  was  only  the  ill  fortune  of  a  falling  fog 
ihat  saved  the  German  battle  fleet.  Some  critics  have 
urged  us  not  to  excuse  our  ill  success  by  pleading  ill  luck. 
Not  this  way,  they  teh  us,  lies  the  road  to  victory.  But 
the  manly  thing  is,  seeing  things  as  they  are,  totell  the 
truth  about  them.  And  the  truth  of  the  "battle  of  Jutland 
is  simple.  Had  the  mist  not  intervened  ten  minutes  after 
the  Grand  Fleet  came  into  action,  the  German  fleet, 
instead  of  being  only  defeated,  demoralised  and  damaged, 
would  have  been  utterly  destroyed. 

The   Fruit  of  Victory 

There  is  some  disappointment  that  our  victory  has 
not  yet  resulted  in  some  development  palpably 
favourable  to  the  Allied  cause.  As  to  this,  two  things 
may  be  said.  First,  there  is  nothing  we  can  do  now  to 
embarrass  our  enemy  that  we  have  not  always,  since 
the  first  day  of  war,  been  perfectly  free  and  able  to  do. 
Secondly,  our  disappointment  is  nothing  at  all  compared 
with  that  of  the  Germans — who  also,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, have  won  the  same  battle.  And  now  we  should  not 
have  long  to  wait  for  the  fruits  of  victory.  For  no  less  a 
person  than  Mr.  Balfour  has  said  that  it  is  open  to  us  to 
draw  the  lines  of  our  blockade  with  greater  stringency. 
It  is  a  thing  that  certainly  can  be  done  with  advantage. 
And  if  Mr.  Balfour  insists,  it  will  be  done.  But  need  we 
have  waited  till  we  had  beaten  the  German  Fleet  before 
doing  everything  that  was  possible  ?  As  the  American 
Note,  pnblished  last  Monday,  reminds  us,  we  are  not 
pretending  to  blockade  even  now.  If  a  naval  victory 
inspires  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  to  egg  on  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  a  bolder  course  it 
will  advance  the  final  victory  materially.  But  I  must  insist 
that  it  is  not  the  military  results  of  the  Battle  of  Jutland 


that  will  have  made  the  more  effective  policy  possible. 
If  the  more  effective  policy  follows,  it  will  show  that,  for 
us,  the  moral  effects  of  victory  have  been  more  im- 
portant. 

It  has  been  understood  that  we  have  hesitated  to 
use  our  sea  power  to  the  full,  because  it  seemed  better 
that  the  enemy  should  be  rcvictualled  than  the  neutrals 
offended.  If  the  battle  has  sent  down  German  stock 
and  made  ours  soar,  if  it  has  turned  the  Foreign  Office 
and  the  Quai  d'Orsay  into  departments  of  war  instead  of 
conciliation,  then  we  must  expect  great  things  to  happen. 

There  is  nothing  in  Mr.  Lansing's  Note  about  the  mails 
to  make  our  statesmen  pause  if  they  are  really  contem- 
plating drastic  action.  For  Mr.  Lansing — -who  wrote, 
remember,  before  the  decisive  battle  was  fought — in 
admitting  the  belligerent  right  to  verify  the  bonii  fides 
of  all  mail  packets,  as  he  does,  brings  back  the  actual 
discussion  to  what  is  the  main  point  in  all  the  previous 
American  Notes,  namely,  the  loss  and  annoyance  which 
neutrals  suffer,  not  from  our  right,  but  from  our 
actual  methods  of  exercising  it.  America  has  not  yet 
admitted,  and  it  is  supposed  will  not  admit,  that  ships 
with  the  hold-capacity  of  those  of  to-day  simply  cannot 
be  searched  at  sea.  When  I  say  that  they  cannot,  I  do 
not  mean  that  it  is  literally  impossible,  because  if  there  was 
no  other  way  of  doing  it,  the  investigation  would  have  to 
be  made,  and  made  if  necessary,  in  mid  ocean.  But  it 
can  only  be  done  at  an  inconvenience  to  all  concerned,  at 
a  loss  of  time  infinitely  greater  than  is  caused  by  taking 
ships  into  port.  There  is  besides  the  risk  from  sub- 
marines, which  would  be  greater  for  the  neutral  ship 
under  examination  than  for  the  cruiser  ;  for  the  cruiser 
will  be  armed.  The  issue  between  the  Allies  and  the 
United  States  is  not  then  really  the  sanctity  of  the  mails 
any  more  than  the  real  issue  over  the  so-called  blockade 
is  our  right  to  prevent  goods  from  reaching  Germany 
imder  the  admirable  American  doctrine  of  the  "  con- 
tinuous voyage."  The  issue  is  whether  making  neutral 
ships  enter  British  ports  to  be  searched  is  a  justifiable 
application  to  changed  conditions  of  rules  that,  though 
constantly  questioned,  were  firmly  established  under  the 
old  conditions.  No  doubt  this  controversy  presents 
serious  difficulties  and  must  be  conducted  on  the  Allies' 
side  with  skill  and  tact  if  strained  relations  with  America 
are  to  be  avoided.  For  strained  relations — especially 
at  election  times — are  quite  conceivable  even  when  there 
is  no  issue  so  paramount  as  questions  of  life  and  death, 
justice  and  humanity.  On  all  such  matters  the  record 
of  the  Allies  is  absolutely  clean.  So  far  as  we  are  con- 
cerned the  freedom  of  the  seas  from  murder,  torture,  and 
outrage  has  been  absolute.  That  in  hitting  at  our  enemy 
we  have  caused  some  neutrals  severe  damage  to  trade  and 
property,  it  would  be  idle  to  dispute.  But  other  neutrals 
— and  of  the  same  nationality  as  the  sufferers  from  our 
interference — have  done  astonishingly  well  out  of  the  Allies. 
Our  command  of  the  sea  has  created  for  the  United  States 
a  foreign  trade  prodigious  beyond  all  precedent  and 
lucrative  beyond  all  belief.  If  the  total  losses  suffered  by 
America  are  balanced  against  the  total  American  profit, 
the  net  gain — which  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  owe 
to  the  effective  protection  that  the  British  Navy  extends 
over  their  export  trade — will  be  recognised  as  one  of  the 
most  astounding  of  all  the  features  of  a  war,  each  of  whose 
features  is  without  precedent.  The  present  controversy 
is  hardly  one  over  which  the  pubhc  will  have  to  alarm 
itself,  unless  indeed,  it  becomes  the  interest  of  one  of 
the  contesting  parties  in  America  to  make  election  capital 
out-  of  it.  But  as  both  Republicans  and  Democrats  are 
commending  their  candidate  on  a  programme  of  peace  with 
honour,  it  seems  unlikely  that  it  would  be  the  business  of 
either  to  make  a  fighting  issue  of  the  war. 

Submarines  Again  ? 

There  is  far  more  likelihood  that  Germany  will  take 
advantage  of  the  enthusiastic  pacifism  of  the  candidates 
to  revive  the  submarine  attack  on  British  and  neutral 
shipping.  Von  Koester  and  the  Freisinnigc  openly 
urge  it.  Indeed  an  attack  of  sorts  on  neutral  shipping 
has  already  begun.  Two  Norwegian  steamers  were  sunk 
by  submarine  on  June  9th  off  the  coast  of  Holland. 
One  paper  says  six  have  been  sunk  in  June.  The  Orkedal 
was  bound  from  Rosario  to  Aalborg  with  a  cargo  of  maize. 
Nothing  more  neutral  can  well  be  imagined.     She  had 


12 


LAND      &     ^\•  A  T  E  R 


June  22,  1916 


not  apparcntlv  touched  at  a  British  port  and  the  destruc- 
tion oft  the  Dutch  coast  seems  t()  have  been  purely  wanton. 
No  warning  was  given  and  the  crew  were  left  to  shift  for 
themselves.  The  Bure  bound  from  London  to  Christiania, 
was  also  sunk  without  warning  and  one  of  the  crew  was 
killed.  One  British  steamer  the  Elmgrove  was  sub- 
marined earlier  in  the  month,  and  the  Dalcj^arth  on  the 
eve  of  the  battle,  but  we  have  no  infomuition  as  to 
where  these  outrages  took  place. 

On  the  other  hand,  attacks  on  trading  vessels  in  the 
Mediterranean  appear  to  have  slacked  off  the  last 
fortnight.  The  almost  complete  stoppage  of  attacks 
here  and  their  recrudescence  in  the  North  Sea  are  puzzling 
phenomena.  Has  America  intervened,  and  have  the 
Austrian  and  German  submarines  in  the  Mediterranean 
conformed  to  the  conditions  imposed  on  (iermany  in 
May  ?  Or  have  the  measures  we  have  concerted  with 
France  and  Italy,  for  extirpating  the  undersea  pest, 
proved  effective  ?  Are  the  attacks  on  the  Elmgrove, 
Orkedal  and  Bure  in  the  North  Sea  indicative  of  a  Cicrman 
intention  to  revive  the  attack  in  home  waters  ?  For  the 
moment,  we  simply  do  not  know.  But,  as  was  pointed 
out  in  these  columns  when  Berlin  gave  the  undertaking 
on  May  4th,  it  was  one  that  would  only  be  kept  so  long 
as  Germany  is  afraid  of  American  intervention.  Indeed, 
one  of  the  embarrassments  that  the  claim  to  victory 
on  May  31st  has  brought  on  the  German  Government  is 
that  it  is  urged  by  the  Jingoes  to  revive  the  submarine 
war  !  Do  the  Presidential  election  and  the  imminence 
of  trouble  in   Mexico  afford  the  opportunity  ? 

Perhaps  the  only  immediate  result  of  the  Jutland 
battle  has  been  that  the  Allied  Powers  have  at  last  had 
the  courage  to  bring  naval  pressure  to  bear  on  Greece. 
The  position  there  is  no  doubt  obscure.  But  if,  as  seems 
probable,  the  Greek  Government  is  being  bullied  by 
(icrman  agents  into  unfriendly  courses,  the  remedy  is  in 
our  hands!  Greece  depends  on  the  sea  for  a  great  deal 
more  'than  her  food.  Her  shipping  is  at  once  the  most 
important  and  most  lucrative  part  of  her  wealth,  and 
Athens  is  the  only  European  capital  that  can  be  reached 
by  gunfire  from  the  sea.  There  is  not  evidence  enough 
yet  to-  say  whether  the  recent  skirmish  off  the  Swedish 
coast — when  a  few  Russian  destroyers  sank  and  drove 
ashore  some  German  transports  and  scattered  their  armed 
escorts — is  another  by-product.  Nothing  is  more  pro- 
bable than  that  the  Germans  have  been  compelled  to 
call  in  their  light  craft  from  the  Baltic,  for  the  excellent 
reason  that  they  are  no  longer  able  to  support  them. 
There  is  indirect  evidence  that  this  must  be  so,  for  the 
])ress  of  Berlin  has  been  clamourous  as  to  similar  measures 
liaving  been  taken,  by  the  British  Admiralty.  How 
driven  these  gentry  are  for  proofs  of  their  victory  is 
evidenced  by  the  reception  they  have  given  to  one  of 
the  most  interesting  examples  of  public  spirit  that  we 
have  seen  during  this  war.  In  the  course  of  the  last  week 
three  admirals.  Sir  George  ligerton,  Sir  Frederick  Ingle- 
field,  and  Sir  Arthur  Farquhar  have  retired  to  make  room 
for  the  promotion  of  younger  men  to  flag  rank.  Their 
example  has  been  followed  by  no  less  than  three  captains, 
promoted  to  rear-admiral's  rank  in  consequence'  of 
vacancies  so  created.  In  addition,  Rear-Adniirals 
Hood  and  Arbnthnot  and  Captain  Sowerby  have  died 
th^  death  of  heroes — so  that  there  have  been  many 
vacancies  to  fill.  Several  very  distinguished  officers 
thus  reach  the  rear-admiral's  list,  the  most  conspicuous 
amongst  them  being  Commodore  William  (ioodcnough. 
The  German  papers  represent  these  retirements  and 
promotions  as  proof  of  the  drastic  changes  in  the 
"  higher  command  of  the  British  Navy,"  that  the 
Admiralty  has  recognised  as  necessary  in  consequence  of 
the  disasters  that  befell  us  on  the  31st  May.  It  is  a 
statement  on  a  par  with  the  suggestion  that  the  British 
Navy  is  capable  of  picking  up  a  German  torpedo,  adapting 
it  to  a  British  torpedo  tube,  and  of  firing  it — all  in  less 
than  a  week — -from  some  invisible  craft  at  a  stationary 
Dutch  liner,  so  as  to  bring  the  Germans  into  trouble  ! 
Statements  as  foolish  as  these  are  usually  associated 
with  nurseries  and  asylums.  Artiuk  Pollhn 

[Mr.  Pollen's  article  in  our  last  isst4e  'das  submitted  in 
the  oidinarv  course  to  the  Press  Bureau,  but  the  Censor's 
corrections  were  only  received  just  before  we  went  to  press. 
Consequently  Afr.  Pollen  had  no  time  to  revise  the  article 
and  there  was  an  inevitable  interruption  in  the  argu- 
ment.    It  has  happened  to  a  less  extent  again  this  week.] 


Italian   Artists  and  the  War 

GERM.VNV  is  engaged  in  a  war  by  land  and  sea, 
and  the  Allies  are  determined  that  it  shall  end, 
when  it  does  end,  in  her  defeat.  Thereafter,  we 
are  told  a  new  war  of  trade  and  commerce  will 
begin,  wherem  Germany  counts  on  success.  We  merely 
record  this  fact  and  express  no  opinion.  But  there  is  yet 
another  war  in  progress;  the  full  effect  of  which  can  only 
be  guessed  at,  though  Ciermany  has  already  realized  the 
danger.  It  is  war  by  the  cartoonists  of  whom  Rae- 
maekers  is  the  protagonist.  Go  this  week  to  the  Leicester 
(ialleries  in  Leicester  Square  and*  see  the  pitiless  satire 
in  which  Italian  painters  have  depicted  for  all  time  the 
barbarities,  falsehoods,  heartless  cruelty  and  carnage 
of  (iermanv.  How  can  Kultur  withstand  these  attacks  ? 
Will  Gennans  ever  be  able  to  hold  up  their  heads  again 
in  the  face  of  these  pictures  ?     It  seems  impossible. 

In  the  far  galler},'  there  are  some  wonderful  paintings 
of  warfare  on  the  High  Alps.  For  the  first  time  many 
a  Briton  who  gazes  on  these  pictures  will  realise  the 
titanic  difficulties  which  the  Italian  army  have  had  to 
overcome.  Ludovico  Pogliaghi,  a  well-known  Italian 
painter,  was  the  only  artist  permittted  to  visit  the  Army 
that  is  fighting  among  the  Dolomites  ;  he  has  made  good 
use  of  his  opportunity.  The  effect  is  most  impressive, 
and  after  looking  on  his  work  one  comes  away  with  a 
new  sense  of  the  stupendous  efforts  which  our  brave 
Italian  .Ally  is  making  in  the  common  cause.  On  page 
i()  of  this  issue  we  reproduce  two  photographs  of  these 
glorious  paintings,  which  are  executed  entirely  in  grey 
tones  :  this  tends  to  augment  the  grandeur  of  the  scenery 
and  to  emphasise  the  perils  of  the  snowy  mountains. 
In  this  issue  Mr.  Will  Irwin,  the  distinguished  American 
war  correspondent,  describes  the  .•\lpine  fighting,  and 
the.se  pictures  illustrate  and  elucidate  his  article. 

In  reviewing  this  exhibition  we  refrain  purposely  from 
dealing  with  it  merely  from  the  point  of  art.  Splendid 
though  the  art  is,  it  takes  a  secondary  position  to  the 
jjolitical  influence  which  these  pictures  must  exert  for  all 
time.  Horrible  are'many  of  them,  with  a  hauntingV.iorror,  as 
for  instance  the  Lusitania.  The  ship  sinks  on  the  horizon  ; 
the  Kaiser  wades  to  land  pursued  by  a  shoal  of  jelly-fish, 
the  body  of  each  fish,  a  skull,  and  the  soft  tentacles  cling 
round  liis  ankles.  Here  one  recognises  a  vital  present- 
ment of  the  Lusitania  crime  ;  never  until  the  S2a  gives 
up  its  dead  will  the  Kaiser  be  able  to  free  his  name 
from  that  despicable  murder.  There  is  grim  humour  in 
(iolia's  caricature  of  King  Constantine,  who  holding  his 
Queen  in  his  arms  cries  piteously  to  the  Entente  Powers' 
"  You  have  taken  Salonika,  you  have  taken  my  country, 
O.  why  don't  you  take  my  wife  too  ?  "  Golia,  all  of 
whose  cartoons  are  striking,  is  the  editor  of  the  satirical 
journal,  //  Numcro.  published  in  Turin  ;  before  war  was 
declared  he  was  threatened  personally  by  the  German 
Colony  for  his  daring  work.  An  even  more  famous 
journalist  and  cartoonist  is  Galantara,  who  attacked 
the  Middle  Europe  Powers  so  scathingly  in  the  Roman 
journal  L'Asino,  that  he  was  prosecuted  by  the  German 
and  Austrian  Embassies.  The  prosecution,  needless  to 
say,  fell  to  the  ground  when  war  opened.  The  cartoon 
which  led  to  this  diplomatic  attempt  to  suppress  the 
powerful  art  of  Galantara  is  exhibited  here — No.  124.— 
The  Two  Butchers.  It  is  not  a  pretty  picture  ;  it  expresses 
an  awful  truth  in  terrible  fashion. 

This  extraordinary  power  of  expression  is  a  distinctive 
attribute  of  these  Italian  cartoonists.  No  matter  whether 
their  work  is  pathetic  or  humorous,  pitiful  or  brutal,  it 
clutches  the  mind  with  a  new  force  ;  the  deed  it  represents 
is  visualised  henceforth  in  the  form  of  the  '  painting. 
They  enter  into  the  soul  of  things,  and  for  this  reason 
their  work  is  endurable.  Is  it  pure  chance  that  no  great 
cartoonist  has  arisen  to  defend  German  methods  of 
warfare,  but  that  all  have  concurred  in  denouncing  them 
to  the  full  strength  of  their  powers  ?  May  we  not  rather 
see  in  this  the  truth  that  art  is  on  the  side  of  ri.t^hteous- 
ness,  and  that  we  may  ever  rely  on  its  support  in  those 
things  which  make  for  the  right  advance  of  civilisation 
and  the  true  progress  of  mankind.  It  is  impossible  to 
believe  that  thelKaiser  would  ever  have  dared  to  advocate 
"  f rightfulness,"  had  he  the  least  idea  that  the  abomina- 
tion he  let  loose  would  haunt  the  picture  galleries  of 
Europe  for  all  time.  This  is  to  be  his  punishment  on 
earth,  a  hell  of  his  own  making. 


June  22,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


13 


Germany's    Mistakes 


2, — Political 
By  Colonel   Feyler 


[In  the  preceding  article.  Colonel  Feyler,  the  well- 
known  military  critic  of  the  "Journal  dc  Geneve." 
began  an  examination  of  the  mistakes  which,  in  his 
opinion,  will  lead  to  the  defeat  of  Germany.  He 
divided  these  mistakes  into  three  classes — srategical, 
political  and  moral — and  in  his  first  article  published 
two  weeks  ago,  lie  confined,  himself  to  the  strategical. 
He  field  it  ivas  a  serious  blunder  for  Germanv  to  cross 
to  thi  left  bink  of  the  Meuse,  i.e.,  to  im'ade  Belgium. 
It  wasted  valuable  time,  unduly  extended  the  front 
and  increased  the  lines  of  communication  through  an 
enemy  country.  Another  serious  mistake  was  the  blind- 
rush  forward  between  Paris  and  Verdun  that  preceded 
ifie  battle  of  the  Marne.  In  this  article  Colonel 
Feyler   passes   on    to    Germany's    political    mistakes] 

HAVING  in  the  preceding  article  discussed  tlie 
strategical  and  tactical  mistakes  which  have 
seemingly  been  committed  by  the  German 
Armies,  we  may  now  amplify  our  conclusions 
by  a  study  of  the  political  mistakes  committed  by  the 
German  Government. 

Having  to  fight  on  two  diametrically  opposite  fronts, 
Germany,  for  very  good  reasons,  resolved  at  first  to 
stand  on  the  defensive  in  the  East  and  to  put  forward 
all  her  effort  in  the  West.  Military  and  geographical 
conditions,  to  say  notlnng  of  the  help  of  Austria-Hungar3-, 
favoured  such  a  course  ;  whilst  the  latter  looked  after 
the  South,  the  Germans  merely  had  to  consider  the 
northern  part  of  the  R^issian  front,  where  territorial 
conclitions  in  East  Prusna  gave  excellent  defensive 
facilities  to  troops  who  had  been  thoroughly  trained  in 
that  district.  A  very  small  proportion  of  the  active 
forces  sufficed  to  form  the  kernel  of  defence  in  the  East, 
whilst  almost  the  whole  active  army  could  be  hurled  at 
the  French. 

Numerical  Superiority 

Germany  was  thus  in  marked  numerical  superiority  on 
the  Western  front.  Of  the  twenty- two  active  corps  of 
France,  three  at  least  were  immobilised  in  watching  Italy, 
namely  the  14th  and  15th  in  the  Alps  and  the  19th  in 
North  Africa,  for  although  not  directly  participating 
in  the  war,  Germany  could  count  on  Italy's  attitude 
having  a  hampering  effect  on  France.  Some  troops 
also  would  have  to  be  left  for  the  policing  of  Paris  and 
the  army  of  occupation  in  Morocco  could  only  be  with- 
drawn slowly,  if  at  all.  Germany  could  count  on  a 
specially  speedy  advance,  thanks  to  the  faultless  regu- 
larity of  her  railways  and  to  the  minutely  organised 
perfection  of  those  elements  of  her  army  that  worked 
behind  the  actual  firing  line,  both  of  which  are  factors  of 
capital  importance  to  a  speedy  mobilisation  and  con- 
centration. 

Whereas  the  Great  General  Staff  was  under  no  illu- 
sion as  to  the  German  power  in  these  matters,  it  fell  into 
a  complete  error  as  regards  Italy,  where  German  diplo- 
macy showed  an  unexampled  failure.  Italy  was  not 
long  in  realising  that  her  partners  in  the  Triple  Alliance 
had  not  met  their  engagements  towards  her,  and  conse- . 
quently  felt  herself  released  from  her  engagements  towards 
them.  Italian  public  opinion,  too,  showed  in  no  uncertain 
manner,  not  only  its  repugnance  to  fight  on  the  side  of 
Austria,  but  a  distinct  hope  of  the  collapse  of  that  Power, 
thus  enabling  the  French  General  Staff  to  bring  into 
use,  without  much  hesitation,  the  army  of  the  Alps  as 
well  as  the  African  troops.  This  constituted  a  second 
blow  to  Germany's  original  plans. 

The  passage  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse — in  fact,  the 
invasion  of  any  part  of  Belgium — seems  to  have  provided 
yet  another  blow.  Its  effects  were  threefold,  namely,  a 
decrease  in  the  superiority  of  numbers,  a  loss  of  time, 
and  an  indication  to  the  Allies  of  the  enemy's  plan. 

Notwithstanding,  one  is  tempted  to  believe  that  this 
plaii  was  not  too  evident  to  the  French  ;  of  course,  this 
is  mere  hypothesis,  as  we  know  too  little  of  their  initial 


concentration  and  subsequent  movements  to  be  able 
to  form  more  than  a  vague  impression.  The  impression 
remains,  however,  that  the  French  attributed  to  this 
movement  too  little  importance  ;  they  seem  to  have 
anticipated  the  enemy's  main  attack  cast  of  the  Meuse. 
Furthermore,  their  offensives  in  Alsace  and  in  Lorraine 
lead  one  to  believe  that  their  concentration  and  deploy- 
ment were  not  carried  out  against  the  enemy's  principal 
effort.  In  consequence,  the  loss  of  time  on  the  German 
side  was  of  less  advantage  to  the  French  than  might  have 
been  the  case,  although  this  loss  was  immediately 
apparent  in  the  delay  to  the  armies  of  Lorraine  and 
Luxembourg,  which  were  obliged  to  wait  for  the  arrival 
into  line  of  their  marching  wing  ;  whereas  more  weight 
was  given  to  the  French  oftcnsive  in  Lorraine  which 
helped  to  attenuate  the  violence  of  the  enemy's  attack. 

The  Belgian  Army 

The  damage  done  to  the  German  plans  through  the 
upsetting  of  the  balance  of  numbers  was,  on  the  other 
hand,  immediate  and  marked.  The  German  Staff  had 
thrown  the  whole  Belgium  Army  into  the  arms  of  the 
Allies,  thus  giving  the  latter  150,000  unexpected  rein- 
forcements, and  even  incurring  losses  in  that  same  act. 
The  most  signilicant  point  is  the  ignorance  manifested 
by  the  German  Staff  of  the  technical  and  moral  value 
of  its  new  enemy :  notwithstanding  the  undoubted 
superiority  in  military  education  of  the  German  soldier 
as  compared  Mith  the  Belgian,  it  was  necessary  to  detach 
considerable  forces  to  deal  with  the  latter,  who  even  then 
succeeded  finally  in  making  good  his  escape. 

As  a  last  consequence,  and  a  consequence  that  proved 
the -third  and  most  serious  blow  to  the  Austro-German 
plans,  this  act  procured  for  France,  over  and  above 
Italy's  neutrality  and  Belgium's  Army,  the  formidable 
assistance  of  Great  Britain.  The  German  Staff  were 
highly  indignant  and  poured  forth  all  the  vials  of  their 
wrath  against  the  English. 

Surely  this  was  puerile  :  they  had  better  reserved 
their  indignation  for  themselves,  for  all  the  evidence 
.goes  to  prove  that  they  alone  were  responsible  for  throw- 
ing away,  one  after  another,  their  best  trump-cards.  It 
was  not  upon  England's  advice  that  Italy  gave  France 
a  free  hand  in  the  Alps.  I  venture  to  think  'that  this 
result  was  rather  due  to  the  Emperor  William's  pro- 
clamation of  his  intention  to  establish  a  German  world- 
hegemony  ;  and  if  the  German  generals  resolved  to 
violate  Belgian  neutrality  without  regard  to  the  attitude 
of  England,  surely  the  fault  lies  not  at  England's  door. 

Britain's  Intervention 

In  effect,  Great  Britain's  intervention  did  not  at  the 
outset  seriously  disturb  the  numerical  balance,  for  General 
French's  Army  was  not  strong  in  numbers  and  does  not 
seem  to  have  arrived  in  line  until  the  last  moment.  It 
constituted  none  the  less  a  heavy  blow  to  Germany's 
plans. 

It  will  be  observed  that  all  these  circumstances,  which 
disturbed  the  original  German  plan  of  campaign  by 
minimising  their  initial  preponderance  in  numbers,  were 
ultimately  due  to  political  blunders,  that  is  so  say  to 
German  diplomatic  defeats,  and  that  every  political 
trump  thrown  away  by  Germany  was  a  strategical 
trump  gained  by  her  enemies. 

The  results  can  after  all  not  be  totally  surprising. 
Germany's  enemies  blame  her  chiefly  for  hei:  "  militarist  " 
government,  upon  which  they  throw  the  responsibility 
for  the  present  world-conflict.  History  must  be  left 
to  prove  how  much  or  how  little  this  charge  is  founded, 
but  it  can  be  taken  for  granted  that  the  diplomatic 
defeats  as  above  enumerated  were  chiefly  suffered  as  a 
result  of  subordinating  diplomatic  questions  to  the 
strategical  necessities  of  the  General  Staff  rather  than  to 
the  dictates  of  Higher  Policy.  To  this  extent,  therefore. 
Government  was  certainly  under  the  guidance  of  the 
General  Staff,  and  it' was  an  essentially  defective  guidance. 


14 


LAND     &     WATER 


June  22,  1916 


The    Adventures    of   Richard    Hannay 

By  S.    P.    B.    Mais 


"  It's  awful  Jun  :  you  just  indulge-  the  pleasure  of  your 
heart,  that's  all,  no  trouble,  no  strain,  no  writing,  just  drive 
along  as  the  words  come  and  the  pen  ivill  scratch." 

-  -RonKRT  I.oris  Sri- vr:\S()x.  apropos  of  "  Treasure 
Island. 

THERE  is  more  than  a  little  of  the  spirit  of 
Stevenson  in  all  Mr.  Buchan's  novels,  and  \vc 
can  imagine  him  saying,  after  writing  The 
Thirty-Nine  Steps,  just  what  Stevenson  said  on 
completing  Treasure  Island.  We  do  desire  books  of 
adventure,  romances,  but  no  man  will  write  them  for  us. 
It  must  be  "  awful  fun  "  to  sit  down  and  indulge  the 
]ilcasure  of  your  heart  for  once  without  thought  of 
accuracy  and  imagine  yourself  suddenly  caught  up  in  a 
whirlwind  of  adv'entnre,  deciphering  codes  which  will 
disc:lose  diabolic  Teuton  plots  directed  against  the  heart 
of  England,  running  wildly  from  a  relentless  foe  who 
dogs  your  steps  o'er  crag  and  fen,  o'er  moor  and  torrent 
with  aeroplane  and  motor  car,  whose  secret  agents  seek 
to  decoy  you  into  lonesome  places  so  that  they  may  do 
you  to  death,  running  your  head  into  the  craftily  con- 
cealed noose  only  to  escape  by  a  fraction  of  a  second 
with  your  life  and  more  valuable  information. 

What  does  hfe  hold  in  store  more  ecstatic  than  those 
moments  when  you  confront  and  even  converse  amicably 
with  those  who  are  moving  heaven  and  earth  to  find  you 
in  the  guise  of  a  Scots  roadmcnder  ? 

Mr.  Buchan  is  a  wizard  with  his  pen,  and  what  is  more 
a  Scots  wizard.  He  makes  you  scent  again  the  in- 
vigorating winds  of  the  Highlands,  he  takes  you  back  in 
the  spirit  to  those  blue-tinted  mountains  which  even  we 
iminiaginative  Sassenachs  cannot  resist  peopling  with 
Brownies  and  Pixies,  his  word-pictures  make  you  thrill 
just  in  the  same  way  that  the  sound  of  the  pipes  played 
on  the  far  side  of  a  lone  loch  make  you  thrill  ;  in  a  word,  he 
takes  you  right  out  of  yourself  so  that  your  overstrained, 
overtired  body  at  last  begins  to  take  rest  and  your  soul 
is  soothed  as  if  with  the  touch  of  some  cool,  loving,  un- 
seen hand. 

We  shall  not  easily  forget  that  day  when  we  first  lighted 
on  the  initial  instalment  of  The  Thirty-Nine  Steps  in 
"  Blackwood's  "  or  "  Maga,"  as  its  lovers  more  commonly 
call  it.  Who  on  earth  was  "  H.  de  V."  ?  In  three  minutes 
v/e  were  enthralled,  in  five  we  had  forgotten  war,  the  call  of 
dinner,  the  work  that  shrieked  to  be  done,  our  wives  and 
famihes,  our  debts  and  duties,  our  multifarious  troubles 
.  .  all  the  cankers  and  cares  of  a  weary  world  : 
we  had  become  one  with  that  ardent  traveller  Richard 
Hannay,  who  was  so  bored  by  the  monotony  of  London 
that  he  gave  half-a-crown  to  a  beggar  because  he  yawned. 
We  were  back  in  the  golden  clays  of  youth,  the  time 
when  we  lay  flat  on  the  furze-clad  Devon  cliffs,  over- 
looking the  red  loam  and  the  sky-blue  sea  with  our  much 
be-thumbcd  and  battered  but  never-sufliciently-to-be- 
read  copy  of  Treasure  Island  in  front  of  us,  dreaming  of 
pirates  and  Black  Dog,  of  the  Black  Spot  and  John 
Silver,  of  "  pieces  of  eight  "  and  a  derelict  ship  while  the 
waves  lapped  the  golden  sands  far  below  to  the  never- 
ceasing  tune  of  "  Yo-ho-ho  and  a  bottle  of  rum."  Seldom 
indeed  is  it  given  to  us  to  recapture  even  for  a  fleeting 
instant  the  first  fine  careless  rapture  of  childhood's  days  ; 
but  the  more  we  strive  to  attain  this  happiness  the  more 
elusive  it  becomes.  John  Buchan  in  The  Thirty-Nine 
Steps  succeeds  as  no  writer  of  romance  has  ever  succeeded. 
All  too  soon  was  the  deUcious  morsel  finished  :  the 
Editors  of  Ma^a  had  whet  our  appetite  :  we  could 
scarcely  beheve  it  possible  that  we  must  wait  for  31  days 
before  we  could  hope  for  another  taste  of  this  gorgeous 
story.  Wc  thought  seriously  of  writing  to  the  author 
imploring  him  to  have  mercy  upon  us  and  relieve  us  of 
our  anxiety  about  Scudder  and  the  Black  Stone  and  the 
meaning  of  all  those  cryjitic  phrases  which  had  caused 
us  shivers  even  to  the  very  marrow.  But  no  :  that  would 
not  be  playing  the  game  :  we  had  let  ourselves  in  for  this 
agony  of  expectation  and  we  must  wait. 

The  second  and  third  instalments  at  last  came  after  an 
age  of  scarcely  bearable  length,  and  we  could  be  seen 


with  our  ejcs  glued  to  the  printed  page,  turning  over  as 
if  our  own  fate  were  to  be  sealed  on  the  first  line  of  the 
succeeding  one.  How  the  very  titles  of  the  chapters 
roused  us  to  wild  anticipation,  "  The  Man  Who  Died," 
"  The  Adventure  of  the  Literary  Innkeeper,"  "  The 
Adventure  of  the  Radical  Candidate,"  "  The  Adventure 
of  the  Spectacled  Roadman."  "  The  Adventure  of  the 
Bald  Archccologist,"  "  The  Coming  of  the  Black  Stone" 

.  .  .  and  not  one  of  them  but  far  exceeded  our  most 
sanguine  hopes. 

Before  the  war  we  gave  scant  attention  to  any  but 
the  problem  novels.  We  revelled  in  the  artistry  of 
Gilbert  Cannan,  Hugh  Walpole,  Arnold  Bennett,  Compton 
Mackenzie,  D.  H.  Laurence,  and  all  the  host  of  younger 
novelists  who  were  all  out  to  smash  contemporary  tradi- 
tions, iconoclasts  who  sought  to  make  us  see  that  our 
gods  were  mere  tinsel,  our  conception  of  love  senti- 
mentality and  only  a  travesty  of  the  real  thing.  We 
were  content  to  see  ourselves  in  these  feckless  irresolute 
heroes  and  common])lace  rather  ugly  heroines  who 
fought  for  freedom  and  made  a  horrid  mess  of  their  lives 
in  the  doing  of  it.  We  admired  them  as  brave  realists 
who  shunned  nothing  in  their  endeavour  to  depict  us  as 
we  really  were. 

Then  came  the  war  with  its  change  of  values.  What 
was  incredibly  unreal  and  melodramatic  in  1912,  became 
the  ordinary  incident  of  evcry-day  life  in  1915  and  con- 
\'ersely,  what  we  had  looked  upon  as  a  photographic 
representation  of  life  in  1913  looked  simply  silly  in  the 
light  of  what  had  happened  to  each  of  us  during  the  year 
following  it.  The  consequence  of  all  this  was  that  we 
came  to  regard  the  novel  as  a  more  and  more  decadent 
branch  of  letters  ;  something  had  to  conic  in  to  take  its 
place.  It  was  not  that  we  ceased  to  have  a  need  for  litera- 
ture. Rather  did  we  require  the  solace  of  books  more 
than  ever.  The  sales  of  our  ]X)pular  novelists  fell  to 
almost  nothing,  but  poetry,  biography,  history,  and 
philosophy  began  to  boom. 

It  was  at  this  point  that  John  Buchan  stepped  into 
the  breach  with  his  new  romance,  "  where  the  incidents 
defy  the  probabilities  and  march  just  inside  the  borders 
of  the  possible."  But  as  in  these  days  the  wildest  fictions 
are  so  much  less  improbable  than  the  facts  he  "  caught 
on  "  at  once,  and  is  now  not  likely  to  relax  his  hold  on 
the  great  mass  of  readers.  It  was  a  daring  move  on  his 
part. 

Except  for  Mary  Johnston  no  one  could  claim  of  late 
years  to  have  written  a  "romance"  couched  in  even 
respectable  Ii;nghsh.  Yet  John  Buchan  descends  into 
the  lists  with  his  fine  sense  of  style,  his  precise,  logical, 
Swift-like  command  of  language  and  declares  to  the 
world  "  Look  now  :  I  will  write  you  a  romance  that 
shall  hold  children  from  their  play  and  old  men  from 
their  chimney  corner,"  and  beholdit  is  done. 

We  search  in  vain  for  the  secret.  Whence  did  he 
call  forth  his  magic  wand  and  wave  it  over  the  dictionary 
so  that  he  conjured  up  a  novel  that  will  outlast  not  only 
our  own  century,  but  many  more  centuries  to  come? 
There  is  no  answer.  If  you  asked  him  he  would  not  be 
able  to  tell  you.  He  would  with  his  customary  modesty 
reply,  "  Oh  !  all  1  tried  to  do  was  to  enable  an  honest 
man  here  and  there  to  forget  for  an  hour  the  too  urgent 
reahties  with  a  '  dime  '  a  '  shocker,'  a  precipitous  yam, 
call  it  what  you  will."  By  accident  he  has  achieved 
very  much  more  than  this. 

I  am  the  last  person  in  the  world  to  contend  that  the  ob- 
ject of  the  novel  proper  is  "  the  story  for  the  story's  sake." 
I  am  of  those  whose  interest  is  in  psychology,  in  the  un- 
ravelling of  the  tangle  of  human  life,  the  development  and 
unfoldmg  of  character,  but  in  such  books  as  The  'Thirty-Nine 
Steps,  an  entirely  different  side  of  (jur  nature  is  appealed 
to,  a  side  which  in  tlicse  da\'s  will  not  be  denied,  a  healthier 
side,  one  not  obsessed  with  doubts  and  frets,  which 
accentuates  the  never-altogether-dead  sense  of  wanderlust 
and  adventure  which  even  the  most  sedentary  of  us  feel 
at  times  to  be  almost  ingrained  in  our  system,  a  cast  back 
to  our  pirate,  free-booting  ancestors  who  placed  us  in  this 
island  home  of  ours. 


June  22,  1916 


LAND     &     WATER 


1=^ 


Letters  to  a  Lonely  Civilian 

By  the  Author  of  "  Aunt  Sarah  and  the  War  " 


MY  DEAR  YOU, — There  was  a  famous  party 
at  which  we  were  invited  to  cite  the  most 
surprising  saying  of  any  great  modern. 
Somebody  quoted  Gladstone's  declaration, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  American  Civil  War,  that  the 
South  had  made  herself  an  army,  had  made  herself 
a  navy,  had  made  herself  a  nation.  Then  followed 
from  across  the  table  the  great  rival's  fretful  allusion  to 
the  Colonial  millstone  hanging  about  a  bothered  mother's 
neck.  Next,  the  creator  of  Richard  Feverel  and  of 
Lucy  was  summoned  to  the  bar  for  favouring  (in  an 
interview  he  later  foreswore  to  his  friends)  a  term  of  ten 
years'  matrimonial  trial.  Or  was  it  seven  ?  Fancy 
Richard  asking  Lucy  to  mate  him  till  she  was  twenty- 
three  !  Frederick  Myers  (whose  essay  on  Virgil  George 
Wyndham  bracketed  with  Francis  Thompson's  Shelley 
for  the  finest  modern  instances  of  creative  criticism), 
was  quoted  as  declaring  that  the  two  faultless  authors 
in  all  literature  were  both  of  them  women — Sappho  and 
Jane  Austen  !  These,  and  a  score  of  other  such  samples, 
some  of  them  easily  discounted  as  due  to  the  fervour  of 
a  moment  or  the  melancholy  of  a  mood,  seemed  to  make 
easy  records  among  unexpected  issues  of  speech. 

But  now  that  I  think  it  all  over,  I  confidently  put 
Bismarck  into  the  box.  When  Italy  and  Austria  were  at 
war,  in  1859,  the  maker  of  Modern  Germany  (himself,  of 
course,  a  Major  as  well  as  a  Politician)  foresaw  that, 
sooner  or  later,  war  must  be  waged  between  Austria 
and  Prussia,  and  between  France  and  Prussia.  And  he 
had  great  misgivings  for  his  Prussia.  "  The  German 
troops,"  he  says,  "  on  whose  support  we  reckon,  are  for 
the  most  part  quite  wretched  ;  and,  if  things  go  ill  with 
us,  their  leaders  will  fall  away  from  us  like  dry  leaves 
in  the  wind."  O  what  a  welcome  rustle  could  we  hear 
it  this  autumn  !  Then  the  Major  turns  Philosopher,  and 
the  Philosopher,  Ideahst  ;  and  he  writes  calmly  and 
•irnfidentially  to  his  wife  : 

"  As  God  wills  :  It  is,  after  all,  only  a  question  of  time. 
Nations  and  peoples,  folly  and  wisdom,  war  and  peace — 
they  come  and  go  like  waves,  and  the  sea  remains.  What 
are  our  States,  and  their  ])ower  and  honour,  before  God, 
but  ant-hills  and  bee-hives,  which  the  hoof  of  an  ox 
tramples  down,  or  fate,  in  the  form  of  a  honey-gatherer, 
overtakes  ?  .  .  .  Farewell,  my  sweetheart,  and  learn 
to  take  a  melancholy  pleasure  in,  life's  folly;  there  is 
nothing  in  this  world  but  hypocrisy  and  jugglery,  and, 
whether  fever  or  grape-shot  shall  tear  away  this  mask  of 
flesh,  fall  it  must  sooner  or  later,  and  then  such  a  resemb- 
lance will  become  apparent  between  a  Prussian  and  an 
Austrian,  if  tliey  are  of  the  same  size,  that  it  will  be 
difficult  to  distinguish  between  them  ;  the  stupid  and  the 
clever,  too,  properly  reduced  to  the  skeleton  state,  look  a 
good  deal  like  each  other.  Patriotism  for  a  particular 
country  is  destroyed  by  this  reflection,  but  in  any  case 
we  should  hayc  to  despair,  even  now,  if  our  happiness 
were  built  upon  it." 

\nd  that  was  the  word  of  the  greatest  war-maker  but 
Dne  of  the  modern  world — the  world  which  to  him  was 
all  jugglery  and  hypocrisy,  never  a  battlefield  between 
real  right  and  real  wrong.  Slaughter  counted  not.  Leave 
out  that  preliminary  capital  letter,  and  what  is  left  is — 
laughter,  the  laughter  of  a  cynic.  Wars  achieve 
nothing,  but  let  Prussians  at  least  achieve  wars  ! 

Private  Secretaries  of  Ministers  are  just  now  the 
busiest  of  men.  They  do  their  work  behind  the  screen, 
and  are  themselves  perhaps  the  only  people  who  know 
how  important  their  services — and  their  silences — are. 
Lord  Rowton  will  always  remain  the  pink  and  pattern  of  a 
Prime  Minister's  secretary,  so  it  must  needs  be  a  bit  of  a 
disappointment  to  find  but  little  light  'thrown,  in  the 
new  volume  of  the  Disraeli  biography,  on  the  relations 
between  "  Monty  "  and  his  Chief.  "  Of  the  (first) 
meeting  with  Montague  Corry,  Disraeli  has  left  no 
account,"  says  Mr.  Buckle.  But  he  refers  to  a  "  tra- 
dition "  about  that  memorable  coming  together  which  so 
perfectly  illustrates  the  characters  of  the  two  men  that 
I  like  to  tell  it  to  you  as  Lord  Rowton  himself  told  it  to 
an  intimate  friend.     Disraeli  went  visiting  the  Duke  of 


Cleveland  at  Raby   Castle— where,  by   the   way,  some- 
body had  just  written  in  the  Visitors'  Book  ; — 
What  a  pity  at  Raby 
There  isn't  a  baby  ! 

And  at  Raby  there  were  other  pities.  The  girls  of 
the  house-party  thought  it  a  pity,  one  hot  wet  afternoon, 
that  everybody  artd  everything  should  be  so  dull.  They 
really  must  be  amused  ;  and,  accordingly,  they  seized  on 
a  young  man  with  a  reputation  for  wisdom  and  gravity, 
and  insisted  on  his  becoming  a  baby  for  their  sakes. 
So  he  was  commandeered  to  sing  a  comic  song  to  the 
accompaniment  of  the  rattle  of  his  heels.  The  very 
incongruity  between  the  Wise  Youth  and  his  fooling 
gave  licence  to  the  fun.  In  the  midst  of  the  frolic  he 
looked  up  and  saw  the  Sphinx-face  of  Disraeli  in  the 
doorway.  His  first-  meeting  with  the  Minister  the  night 
before  had  been  the  event  of  the  young  man's  life.  "  I 
had  a  great  respect  for  your  father,"  said  the  Minister. 
And  now,  on  this  afternoon  when  he  was  supposed  to 
have  gone  to  his  apartment  to  write  letters  (one  to  his 
devoted  sister  Sarah,  be  sure  !)  he  was  witness  of  this 
farce ;  and  the  willing  yet  unwilling  pei-former  heard  in 
memory  one  sentence  that  choked  his  song  :  "I  had 
a  great  respect  for  your  father."  "  And  what  a  fool  he 
must  think  me  !  "  was  his  reflection  as  he  stopped  short 
in  his  dance  and  shout  with  a  deferential  gesture  towards 
the  onlooker.  The  girls,  bent  with  laughter,  cried  out  to 
him  to  go  on  ;  and  on  he  went.  The  Minister  remained 
for  another  minute  or  two,  his  face-mask  betraying 
neither  amusement  nor  vexation.  Then  he  turned  his 
back  on  the  resumed  revels,  and  took  refuge  in  his  room. 
After  dinner  that  evening,  when  others  passed  on,  Disraeli 
waylaid  the  young  man,  now  grave  even  beyond  his 
custom.  He  expected  to  be  candidly  accepted  as  a 
farceur.  The  Minister's  hand  was  on  his  shoulder,  and 
the  words  came  :  "  I  think  you  must  be  my  Impresario." 
The  Minister  had  seen  in  him  one  who  was  sensitive  yet 
compliant  ;    and  he  knew  his  man. 

My  last  American  mail  is  a  weighty  one,  and  rather 
a  weight ,  too,  on  my  spirits.  What  bothers  me  most  is  that 
people  over  there  are  themselves  badly  bothered  about 
the  Irish  executions.  "  The  military  lynching  of  a  band 
of  melancholy  poets  and  mystics  in  a  part  of  the  world 
many  have  regarded  as  the  source  of  civilisation  makes 
us  greatly  content  to  be  Americans."  What  a  mis- 
understanding !  Perhaps  an  inevitable  one  following  on 
the  English  official  forbearance  and  good  feeling  which 
minimised  and  otherwise  censored  in  the  reporting  of  them, 
the  horrors  and  cruelties  of  the  rebelHon.  This  was 
kindly  and  tactfully  done  lest  England  should  be  further 
incensed  against  Ireland,  and  the  position  of  Redmond 
(your  hat  off  to  him,  please  !)  made  more  difficult 
than  ever. 

Thus  is  England  punished  for  her  reticence.  As  for 
"  lynching  "  the  word  is  surely  too  native  and  too  reminis- 
cent to  have  been  prudently  launched  against  us  from 
overseas.  And  friends  of  W.  D.  Howells  here  have 
written  to  beg  him  to  talk  no  more  of  our  shooting  of 
"  prisoners  of  war."  Unthinkable  !  He  of  all  men  should 
know  it  is  "  A  Foregone  Conclusion  "  (how  I  delighted 
in  his  story  of  the  name  when  it  was  possible  and  even 
easy  to  be  delighted)  that  rebels  who  rise  in  arms  against 
their  fellows,  without  even  the  decency  of  a  declaration 
of  war,  take  their  lives  in  their  hands.  That  is  why 
they  take  also  our  hearts  in  their  hands.  Deprive  the 
rebel  of  his  sacred  right  to  sacrifice  himself,  and  you 
cheapen  his  name  and  his  calling.  Already  the  name 
of  the  pirate,  joy  of  our  youth,  has  been  wasted  by  its 
application  to  the  Kaiser.  What  are  the  nurseries  of  the 
near  future  to  do  when  rebels  and  pirates  are  robbed  of 
the  romance  with  which  their  close  dealings  with  death 
endowed  them  ?  W. 


Mr.  F.  W.  Lanchester's  contribution  on  the  Air  Board,  in 
continuation  of  his  article  of  last  •^•cck,  is  unavoidubly 
postponed  to  our  next  issue. 


i6 


LAND      &     WATER 


June  22,  1916 


New  Steps  in  Economic  Reform 


By  Arthur  Kitson 


0\E  of  llie  many  changes  already  accomplished 
bv  the  war.  is  that  effected  in  the  menta 
altitude  of  the  British  public  regarding  social 
and  e.onomic  reforms.  Two  years  ago  our 
c.n-crvatisni  and  dislike  for  innovations  seemed  to  be 
int-radicable.  We  w.-re  rei^ardi-d  by  our  'Iransatlantic 
luighbours  as  almost  imin-rvious  to  new  ideas  and  U>  all 
radical  reform  measures.  We  were  considered  as  a 
iKXiplc  on  the  down-grade,  living  on  the  memories  of  the 
past,  and  in  most  of  our  methods  and  habits  nearly  3" 
vears  behind  the  times.  To-day  our  conservatism  is 
conspicuous  by  its  absence.  The  British  public  mind 
hitherto  regarded  as  fossilised,  has  been  changed  to  a 
condition  of  remarkable  plasticity.  The  symptoms  of  old 
age  and  decadence,  which  were  apparent  two  years  ago 
are  no  longer  visible,  and  instead  of  this,  we  find  a  mental 
vigour  and  moral  outlook  indicative  of  a  nation  in  the 
young  and  formative  stage. 

A  Period  of  Reform 

We  are  living  at  a  period  when  almost  any  moral,  social 
or  economic  reform  could  be  introduced  and  welcomed 
with  avidity.  Witness  the  ease  witli  which  paper  money 
lias  displaced  gold  coins  for  currency  purposes,  a  svstem 
which  Lord  Goschen  with  all  his  skill  and  influence  failed 
to  introduce.  Witness  also  the  recent  Daylight  Saving 
\.t,  which  two  years  ago  was  regarded  as  altogether 
rtopian.  In  fact,  we  have  arrived  at  a  stage  of  our 
national  history  when  almost  any  reform  is  possible. 
\nd  the  imagination  becomes  confused  when  one  con- 
templates the  innumerable  plans  and  policies  suggested 
and  necessary  in  order  to  carry  Britain  to  heights  of 
progress  hitherto  considered  unattainable. 

Without  rnsliing  too  far  ahead,  let  us  consider  one  or 
two  simple  practical   and   urgent   reforms  which  could 
quickly  and  readily  be  effected,  for  which  the  present 
times  are  propitious.     Neariy  a  century  and  a  quarter 
ago,  the  French  Government  offered  to  the  world  the 
simplest  system  of  physical  measurements— for  weights 
and  measures — ever  proposed  before  or  since.    With  the 
e.xception  of  the  great  English-speaknig  races,  practically 
the  entire  commercial  and  industrial  worid  have  adopted 
the   French   Metric   System.     Only   Great   Britain,    her 
Colonies,  and  the  United  States  still  cling  to  their  archaic 
system.      It   is  perfectly   true   that   we  have    recently 
h-galiscd  the  French  sjstcm,  but  the  time  is  surely  now 
rii)c  for  making  its  use  compulsory.     If  this  were  done, 
to  take  effect  say,  six  months  after  the  passing  of  the  Act. 
its  introduction  could  be  achieved  without  any  serious 
trouble  or  dislocation  of  trade,  and  an  economy  in  time 
and  labour  would  be  achieved  that  would  be  incalculable  ! 
The  saving  which  would  be  effected  in  clerical  labour 
alone  would  furnish  a  small    army  of  clerks  for  much 
needed  service  in  other  fields. 

There  is  another  reason  which  should  induce  us  to  urge 
the  immediate  adoption  of  this  system.  We  are  hoping  to 
form  some  kind  of  Commercial  I'nion  with  our  Dominions, 
and  to  enter  into  certain  friendly  trade-relations  with 
our  Allies  after  the  war.  We  are  preparing  to  capture 
German  trade  in  many  countries.  To  do  this  we  must 
understand  tlie  nature  and  methods  of  trade  in  those 
countries,  and  by  adopting  the  same  standards  and 
methods  of  measurement,  we  shall  make  tlie  task  of  our 
manufacturers  and  merchants  much  easier.  Many  a 
foreign  contract  has  been  lost  by  reason  of  the  inability 
or  refusal  of  British  manufacturers  to  estimate  in  terms 
of  metric  measurements.  The  Germans  have  no  difhculty 
in  this  respect,  since  they  use  the  same  system. 

Accompanying  this  change,  however,  there  should  be 
introduced  a  decimal  coinage  and  currency  system. 
Although  the  United  States  still  join  us  in  retaining  the 
old  unscientific  system  of  weights  and  measures,  they, 
as  well  as  Canada,  long  ago  recognised  the  enormous 
advantages  of  the  decimal  monetary  system,  and  adopted 
the  dollar  and  cent  as  their  monetary  units.  In  fact, 
Great  Britain  is  the  only  important  nation  that  has  not 
yet  adopted  the  decimal  coinage. 
An  American  writer  recently  asserted  that  the  adootion 


by  the  U  S  A.  of  the  English  coinage  systt^i  would  require 
nothing  less  than   a  conscription   of   all   the  American 
youths  to  undertake  the  clerical  labour  uhich  this  extra 
"work  would  entail  !   But  it  is  not  merely  in  the  matter  of 
bookkeeping  where  vast  economy  would  be  effected  by 
such  a  change.     Let  anyone  interested  stand  at  any   ot 
the  booking  oflices  of  a  London  railway  station  or  theatre 
during  holiday  times  and  witness  the  time  taken  by  the 
cashiers  in  receiving  coins  and  notes  and  counting  and 
giving  change.     Then  let  him  do  the  same  at  any  of  the 
New  York,  Boston  or  Chicago  offices  and  note  the  differ- 
ence     I  have  seen  a  Inindred  passengers  pass  through  a 
New  York  Elevated  Railway  turnstile,  each  one  buying 
his  ticket,  and  the  majority  receiving  change,  in  less 
than  six  minutes  !   I  have  been  one  of  a  line  of  20  at  a 
London  booking  office  and  -it  has  taken  the  clerk  over 
ten    minutes    to    perform    the    same    service.     In   other 
words,  it  has  taken  the  London  official  with  our  com- 
pUcated  archaic  coinage  system    ten    times    as    long    to 
attend  to  a  given  number  of  passengers  as  the  American 
with  his  simple  decimal  coinage  !    Nor  is  this  all.     The 
chances  of    errors  and  mistakes  in  giving  change,  are 
enormously  greater  with   the  former.     No  head  work, 
no   mental    arithmetic   is   necessary   with    the   decimal 
system,  whilst  ours  usually  entails  some  very  nimble  and 
careful  calculations. 

This  discussion  is,  of  course,  the  revival  of  an  old 
subject.  But  the  conservatism  which  has  hitherto 
made  such  simple  and  undeniably  essential  reform  im- 
possible, is  to-day  almost  non-existent.  Moreover, 
economy  is  in  the  air,  and  the  public  is  clamouring  for  it 
in  every  shape  and  form. 


Our  Coinage  Systenj 

Many  suggestions  have  already  been  made  for  changing 
our  coinage  system.     That  whicli  would  necessitate  the 
least  inconvenience  is  to  make  the  ten  shilling  piece  the 
standard  coin  in  place  of  the  sovereign.     This  would 
only  occasion  a  change  in  the  division  of  the  shiUing.   By 
dividing  the   shilling  into  ten  pennies,  we  should  arrive 
at   the   decirhal   system   in   practically   one   step.     For 
convenience  we  might  regard  the  penny  as  divided  -into 
ten  parts,  although  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  furnish 
a   coin   of   less   denomination   than   half-a-penny.     The 
standard    coin    (ios>.   might  be    called    the   "George" 
in  honour  of  the  King,  just  as  the  standard  French  coin  is   1 
the  Louis,  formerly  the  Napoleon.  We  should  then  have:       ( 
10  farthings    =  i  penny. 
10  pence  =  i  shilling. 

10  shillings  =  i  George. 
The  transformation  of  "George"  into  pounds  ana 
vice-versa  would  thus  be  simplicity  itself.  No  doubt 
the  monetary  pound — relic  of  a  barbarous  age — would 
gradually  disappear  from  our  vocabulary.  Ever  since 
gold  supplanted  silver  as  the  money  metal,  the  term 
pound,  has  lost  its  original  significance. 

Scientitic  opinion  in  tliis  country  and  in  our  Dominions, 
as  well  as  in  the  United  States,  is  almost  unanimously  in 
favour  of  the  general  adoption  of  the  decimal  system  ir 
all  our  methods  of  physical  measurements,  and  the  present 
time  is  undoubtedly  the  psychological  moment  foi 
beginning  a  new  era  in  this  particular  field. 


Earth  that  has  felt  our  tears  like  rain, 
-    And  shared  our  wounds  of  body  and  soul. 
Gives  of  her  flowers  to  ease  our  pain, 
Gives  of  her  heart  to  make  us  whole. 
This  comes  from  the  little  poem  which  Sir  Owen  Seaman 
has  written  for  the  catalogue  (the  cover  of  which  is  designed 
by  Mr.   Byam  Shaw)  of  the  great  sale  of  flowers  and  fruit 
organised  by  the  Koval  Horticultural  Society  on  behalf  of  the 
British  Red  Cross,  "it  is  to  be  held  at  their  hallin  Vincent 
Square,'  Westminster,  next  Tuesday,  Wednesday  and  Thurs- 
day, mornings  and  afternoons.     It  will  be  a  remarkable  sale. 

The  City  of  London  rose  show  at  the  Cannon  Street  Hotel 
which  was  to  have  been  held  next  Tuesday,  has  been  post- 
Doned  until  Friday,  July  7th,  owing  to  the  cold  weather. 


Juno  22,  1916 


LAND     &     WA  T  E  R 


17 


The  Roof  of  Armageddon 


By   Will    Irwin 


[This  vivid  description  oj  Italian  fighting  in  the  High 
Alps — a  form  0/  fighting  not  at  all  realised  in  this 
country — is  from  the  pen  of  the  famous  American 
xeiar  correspondent,  Mr.  Will  Irwin.  Mr.  Irwin,  it 
ivill  b:  remembered,  made  a  great  reputation  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  for  his  exceedingly  graphic 
accounts  of  the  early  battles  in  France  and  Flanders^ 

*'    )C  ^^   now,"  said   our   Lieutenant,    whose    English 
/^k     is    idiomatic   even    under    excitement,    "  it    is 

/— .%  le.es  !  "  He  jumped  down,  skipping  like  a  boy 
U,  Jm-at  the  touch  of  his  native  mountain  soil.  The 
motor  car  which  had  at  last  struck  an  impasse  on  the 
snowy  road,  whirred  and  coughed  as  the  military 
chauffeur  backed  it  out  to  a  turning-place.  The  Lieuten- 
ant's military  ser\-ant  loaded  himself  like  a  pack  mule 
with  om-  knapsacks  of  Arctic  clothing  and  we  crunched 
on.  The  spring  snow  had  been  wet  and  heavy  all  that 
day  as  we  climbed  by  train  and  by  motor  under  the  pano- 
ramas of  the  Alps.  Our  feet,  in  spite  of  our  five-pound, 
hob-nailed,  grease-soaked  Alpine  boots,  and  our  two 
pairs  of  wool  socks,  were  churning  water  with  every  step. 
Now,  it  had  begun  to  blow  up  a  little  colder,  and  a  wind 
whipped  down  a  lighter  and  more  piercing  quality  of 
snow  from  the  peaks  above. 

We  trudged  on,  trying  to  keep  pace  with  the  loose, 
casj'  swing  of  that  exceptional  mountaineer,  our  Lieuten- 
ant. For  all  that  we  were  going  into  what  might  be 
battle  and  would  surely  be  a  good  deal  of  hardship,  we 
travelled  with  considerable  light-hearted  anticipation. 
For  this  was  the  afternoon  of  Easter  day,  which  is  to 
the  Italian  a  festival  as  important  as  Christmas,  and  there 
were  going  to  be  doings  of  some  kind  in  the  advanced 
Alpine  base  just  ahead. 

\\hat  we  had  been  seeing  all  day  in  the  way  of  scenerj', 
what  we  were  seeing  now  in  the  rifts  of  the  snow-mist,  I 
despair  of  describing.  Mountains  are  mountains  ;  but 
the  Alps  are  more  abrupt,  altogether  more  perilous  in 
every  aspect  than  any  range  we  North  Americans  know. 
To  left  and  right  shot  up  great  ridges  bristling  with 
straight  lirs  now  snow-dusted.  Behind  these  ridges  rose 
white  precipices,  behind  them  pinnacles  of  grey  rock  so 
abrupt  that  the  snow  clung  onlj'  to  the  clefts,  and  further 
up — but  that  was  lost  in  the  whirling  snow  mist.  It  was 
clear,  however,  in  one  direction,  where  the  snow  had 
stopped  momentarily.  And  there,  at  the  very  top  of  the 
landscape  rose  a  sheer  wall  of  white.  It  seemed  impos- 
sible that  anything  which  travelled  on  legs  could  scale 
that  wall  ;  \-et  beyond  its  very  top,  as  we  know,  lay 
important  positions" both  Italian  and  Austrian.  Not  only 
had  men  scaled  it,  but  they  had  dragged  with  them  cannon, 
and  somehow,  every  day,  other  men  were  carrying  to  the 
lighters  above  their  food,  their  ammunition,  all  the  heavy 
and  complicated  apparatus  pf  an  army  in  action. 

The  camp,  wh.en  we  crunched  into  it  at  last,  wore  what 
I  took  for  a  holiday  air  ;  I  being  unaware  just  then  that 
work  was  going  forward  on  this  as  on  every  day  and  that 
this  was  only  the  habitual  gaiety  of  the  Alpini.  Officers 
in'  capes  and  grey  Robin-Hood  hats,  looking  as  Alpinists 
always  do,  like  the  merry  men  of  Sherwood  Forest,  came 
running  down  to  greet  their  old  comrade  the  Lieutenant, 
to  pound  him  on  the  back,  to  wrestle  with  him  in  the 
snow.  Between  two  long  barrack  sheds  were  half 
cylinders  of  black  building-paper  bowed  down  with  laths, 
a  squad  of  men  in  white  w-ere  practising  on  skis.  As  I 
looked,  one  of  them  took  an  awkward,  shambling  run, 
leaped  into  the  air  from  the  top  of  the  slope  before  the 
barracks,  and  brought  up,  a  tangle  of  arms,  legs  and  skis, 
in  the  snowdrift  at  the  bottom.  Another  started,  and  he 
too  spilled  himself  before  the  hrst  man  could  arise.  They 
grappled,  they  wrestled,  with  their  skis  performing 
awkward  evolutions  in  the  air  ;  and  all  the  rest  of  the 
camp  yelled  loud  encouragement. 

As  we,  stood  with  the  officers,  getting  acquainted,  a 
company  jmssed  by  in  single  lile,  lifting  themselves  by 
their  wheel-tipped  alpenstocks.      These  were  not  Alpinists 


as  their  caps  showed,  but  infantry  reservists,  they  wlvb 
help  to  feed  and  supply  the  fighters  on  the  high  cliffs 
above.  The  tall,  lean  fellow  in  command  packed  a 
snowball,  and  shot  it  into  the  midst  of  our  group.  Our 
officers,  laughing,  jjelted  him  unmercifully.  On  a  slope 
above,  a  company  who  had  just  come  into  camp  and 
delivered  themselves  of  their  packs  caught  the  infection 
and  opened  a  snow  "battle.  Most  continental  Europeans 
throw  but  awkwardly  as  compared  to  Americans  and 
Englishmen  who  have  played  baseball  and  cricket  since 
childhood.  These  men  threw  well,  and  they  learned  it, 
I  suppose,  at  snowballing,  the  sport  universal  of  northern 
peoples. 

They  had  been  all  winter  in  this  camp,  and  had  made 
things  comfortable  and  ship-shape.  The  doctor's  cabin, 
where  I  was  quartered  for  the  night,  had  a  stove,  less  for 
warmth  than  for  drying  purposes.  There  was  a  tiny 
bunk  of  canvas,  slung  from  boards,  a  sleeping-bag  and  a 
straw  pillow,  book  shelves,  even  a  little  shelf  for  a  reading 
lamp.  What  gave  it  the  home  touch  to  m.e.  however, 
was' the  finish  of  the  walls.  As  in  the  miners'  cabins  of 
the  Sierra  and  the  Rockies,  they  were  papered  with  news- 
papers and  illustrated  weeklies,  stuck  on  by  flour  paste. 
The  furniture  was  made  on  the  spot  of  pine  boards, 
fashioned  during  the  long  pauses  of  the  winter  storms 
by  soldiers  glad  of  something  to  do. 

All  that  afternoon,  in  fact  all  the  way  from  Head- 
quarters, we  had  been  hearing  details  concerhing  the  life 
and  organisation  of  the  Alpini,  whom  circumstances  have 
made  a  corps  d'elite  of  the  Italian  army ;  and  the 
Lieutenant  told  us  still  more  as  we  strolled  off  to  bed. 
The  men  of  these  mountain  regions,  when  the  time  comes 
to  do  their  military  service,  are  drafted  into  the  Alpine 
Corps.  Already  most  of  them  have  had  practice  since 
childhood  in  mountaineering.  They  have  been  goat- 
herders,  following  their  fiocks  up  and  up,  with  the  rise  of 
the  spring  grass,  to  the  very  edge  of  the  glaciers.  They 
have  been  guides,  making  mountaineering  records  for 
hardy  tourists  who  think  they  made  the  records  them- 
selves. They  have  tracked  and  killed  chamois  along  the 
higher  peaks.  By  the  time  he  comes  to  the  army,  the 
average  Alpine  infantryman  is  learned  in  the  craft  of  the 
mountains  which  recjuires  special  senses  acquired  only  in 
childhood. 

During  his  two  years  of  army  service,  the  Alpinist 
finishes  off  his  education  in  mountaineering.  He  roughs 
it  through  all  weathers,  "  hardening  his  meat  "  as  the 
Indians  say,  and  learning  under  expert  guidance  all  that 
he  had  not  already  learned  concerning  the  conquest  of 
nature  in  her  more  cruel  aspects.  Though  the  Alpini  now 
include  many  men  of  the  lowlands,  such  are  the  backbone 
of  the  Corps.  The  increase  of  forces  to  war  strength  and 
the  inevitable  losses  have  brought  to  this  work  thousands 
of  men  from  Southern  Italy,  who  never  saw  snow  before 
the  war,  yet  they  are  standing  an  Arctic  climate  as  hardily 
as  their  comrades  of  the  North.  There  is  a  wonderful 
vitality  in  all  these  Italians. 

In  the  theory  of  Italian  army  organisation,  each  regi- 
ment defends  or  extends  that  border  lying  nearest  the 
district  from  which  it  is  recruited.  The  men  know  that 
district  with  its  peculiarities  and  tiicks  of  weather; 
and  they  fight  for  their  homes.  In  the  practice  of  this 
war,  the  army  has  been  obliged  to  relax  this  rule  a  little  ; 
but  it  still  holds  measurably  true.  Once  I  stood  on  a 
shoulder  of  the  mountains  talking  in  French  to  an  Alpine 
infantryman. 

"  Where  do  you  live  ?  "    I  asked. 

"Down  there,"  he  said,  and  pointed  far  below,  in  a 
cleft  valley  lay  a  little  village — his  home. 

The  ofiicers  of  the  Alpini.  if  not  all  mountain-born,  are 
usually  at  least  from  Northern  Italy — Milan,  Turin, 
Brescia,  Verona,  Vicenza  and  the  like.  From  the  time 
they  enter  service,  they  follow  with  enthusiasm  what,  I 
dare  say,  is  the  noblest  sport  in  the  world — mountain 
scaling.  As  3'our  cavalryman  plays  polo,  so  do  they  try 
for  impossible  peaks  or  new  ways  of  getting  at  peaks 


i8 


LAND     &     WATER 


June  22,  1916 


alaadv  conquered.  Dining  one  evening  in  a  valley  base 
we  waited  a  few  minutes  for  a  Colonel  who  had  been 
"  up  "  that  day  and  whose  return  to  camp  had  been 
announced  bv  telephone.  He  came  in.  a  compact  round- 
headc-d  little  "lighting  man  of  forty-five  or  so  with  a  fresh 
sunburn  over  his  tan,  and  began  to  talk  in  animated 
Italian. 

•'  It  has  been  a  quiet  day  up  there."  the  Lieutenant 
translated,  "  and  so  he  has  performed  a  feat.  He  has 
climbed,  for  spwrt.  to  a  point  which  no  one  else  has  been 
able  to  reach  this  winter." 

All  their  active  hves,  these  Alpine  r.flicers  practice 
the  sport  as  a  part  of  business.  So  they  learn  the  tricks 
of  the  treacherous  mountains,  such  as  avalanches, 
crevasses  and  hidden  streams,  against  the  time  when  such 
knowledge  mav  mean  life  or  death  for  a  whole  company. 
They  lo\e  the  mountains  and  they  hate  Austria.  It  is 
a  Iwrder-hatred  for  one  thing ;  and  the  memory  of  old 
days  of  Austrian  misrule  remains  a  long  memory  to 
L'.'mbardv  and  Wneto.  At  Brescia  they  still  show  you 
with  hate  in  their  eyes  the  wall  where  the  martyrs  were 
shot  durinK  the  abortive  uprising,  the  false  dawn  of  free- 
dom, in  1840.  All  through  the  \  alleys  they  will  point  out 
this  or  that  village  where  Garibaldi  drove  back  the 
Austrians  in  1866,  and  will  descnbe  to  you  with  much 
lire  and  many  gestures  how  Germany  made  lu/  own 
peace  and  tricked  them  out  of  victory  just  when  the 
Lion  of  Italy  had  Trent  in  his  teeth. 

The  Italian  army  stands  perhaps  next  to  the  French 
for  democracy,  and  in  no  corps  is  the  relationship  between 
men  and  officers  more  tine  and  democratic  than  among 
the  Alpini.  NN'hen.  even  in  manceuvres,  an  Alpine  officer 
goes  on  a  piece  of  far  and  hard  mountain  service  with  his 
.nen,  he  must  Uve  as  one  of  them  for  days  at  a  time, 
wTappcd  in  the  same  blankets,  sheltered  by  the  same 
sliver  of  rock.  Officers  save  the  lives  of  men  and  men  of 
otfici-rs  with  equal  recklessness  and  gratitude  on  both 
sides.  It  is  hard  to  hold  yourself  superior  to  men  with 
whom  you  have  shared  such  primitive  hardships  and 
valour,  and  the  distinction  among  these  mountain  lighters, 
I  think,  is  less  between  men  and  officers  than  between 
Alpini  and  other  people. 

Now  Italy  holds  a  line  of  six  hundred  and  fifty  kilo- 
meters, as  long  as  the  present  French  line  since  the  British 
extended  their  sector.  Perhaps  a  bare  third  of  it  is 
merelv  high-hill  fighting.  All  the  rest  is  Alpine  work. 
The  front  of  that  Alpine  line  belongs  to  these  born 
mountain  fighters.  The  infantry  of  the  plains  supports 
or  reinforces  them  ;  the  reservists  feed  them  ;  the  terri- 
torials dig  and  delve  for  them,  far  back.  The  diagram 
of  the  human  material  in  the  Italian  army  is  a  pyramid, 
and  its  point  is  the  Alpini,  who  have  been  wiggling  for  a 
year  into  Austrian  territory  peak  by  peak. 

When  we  went  to  bed  in  our  sleeping-bags  that  Easter 
nipht,  the  stars  were  out.     On  the  way  to  quarters  we 
asked  the  Commander  if  we  might  go  forward  in  the  morn- 
ing ?    He   reserved   his   decision.     When    I    woke    next 
morning  and  looked  out  it  had  begun  to  thaw  a  little  ; 
and  at  breakfast  the  Commander  put  his  foot  down  on 
our  project.     "  It  is  dangerous,  it  is  most  dangerous," 
he  said.     For  a  sudden  thaw  following  a  heavy  snow, 
brings  the  avalanches  ;   and  that,  in  the  winter  fighting, 
is  the  real  enemy,  taking  toll  from  both  sides.     In  these 
avalanche   days   the    army   transport   service   performs 
only  the  most  necessary  labour,  leaving  the  heavy  work 
for  a  less  dangerous  time.     Just  now,  we  could  not  in 
oj'Jinary  prudence  attack  the  glacier  from  this  point. 
However,  a  party  of  officers  and  men  was  going  forward 
that  n»irning  to  a  place  where  the  most  dangerous  aval- 
anches began.     We  might  accompany  them,  if  we  wished. 
It  was  a  great  place  to  study  the  ways  and  causes  of 
avalanches.     The  rock-walls  were  cleft  to  their  top  with 
gigantic  runways.     A  little  way  from  the  summit  of  these 
creases  the  snow  began  ;    it  had  found  a  slope  just  low 
enough  so  that  it  might  cling.   Thence  it  spread  down 
toward  us  in  great  funnels  and  half-cones.  You  realised 
how,  at  any  time,  it  mi^ht  Iwi^in  to  start  and  slide,  as 
it  slides  from  a  mansard  roof  in  town. 
At  a  certain  point  the  (jffic(>rs  stopped. 
"  We  had  V  '♦er  go  no  further,"    said  the  Chaplain. 
"  There  are  bra\e  men  buried  under  there,"    he  added, 
pointing  to  a  great  domed  drift  in  the  distance,  "and 
we  shar.'t  get  the  bodies  until  spring."    We  turned  back. 
This  trail  had  b<.cn  carefully  laid  to  avoid  avalanches 


as  much  as  possible.  But  no  trail  is  entirely  safe  here 
in  such  weather.  Alpini  from  further  up  passed  us  as 
we  stood  waiting  to  gather  and  go.  When  they  enterccl 
the  sector  of  the  path  below  these  funnels,  they  would 
glance  cautiously  over  their  shoulders  at  the  runways 
above  and  then' scurry  past  the  danger-point.  And  we 
scurried  alter  them.  •   .  j 

Just  before  we  turned  back,  one  of  the  officers  pointed 
upward  to  three  crevasses  widening  out  into  funnels. 

"  W  hen  one  of  them  starts,  they  all  go,"  he  said.  And, 
now,  having  learned  the  signs,  we  saw  that  there  had  beeu 
two  or  three  avalanches  that  morning.  None,  however, 
had  been  great  enough  to  cross  our  path.  You  could 
mark  their  course  jjcrfectly  by  the  break  in  the  even 
white  surface,  by  gigantic  irregular  snowballs,  and  even 
by  rocks  brought  down  from  the  crags. 

"Once  more  in  the  safe  district,  we  took  another  climb. 
This  brought  us.  to  a  natural  platfoim  in  the  mountain, 
and  to  the  foot  of  a  curious  piece  of  military  work,  devised 
since  the  war  and  of  immense  use  to  these  mountain 
fighters.  The  author  of  this  enterprise  is,  I  believe,  a 
young  engineer  ol  Milan. 

The  Italians  call  it  a  "  teleferica,"  and  as  we  have  no 
name  for  the  device,  I  had  better  follow  their  tongue. 
A  teleferica  is  nothing  less  than  a  gigantic  cash-carrier, 
such  as  we  use  in  department  stores.  A  carriage  periiaps 
four  feet  long  by  two  or  two  and  a-half  feet  wide,  depends 
from  two  wheels  on  a  wire  cable.  Another  cable  draws 
it  up,  the  power  being  furnished  by  gangs  of  men  or  by 
motor  engines.  We  stood  on  this  platform  and  looked 
up  to  a  perilous  crag  above.  T"rom  platform  to  crag, 
perhaps  a  third  of  a  mile,  ran  the  double  thread  of  the 
teleferica— one  for  the  upward  journey,  the  other  for  the 
descent.  That  crag,  however,  was  only  the  first  landing- 
place.  From  it  another  double-wire  stretched  upward 
and  lost  itself  in  a  cleft  of  the  mountains.  There  were 
still  other  stages  further  up,  they  told  us,  and  when  the 
supplies  had  shot  the  last  stage,  they  were  within  com- 
fortable reach,  by  man-back  or  sled,  of  the  snow-covered 
advanced  trenches. 

How  useful  the  Italians  make  this  device  only  their 
army  engineers  know.  Later,  and  in  another  place,  I  saw 
a  teleferica  which  makes  the  trip  in  seven  or  eight'  minutes. 
F'rom  its  first  stage  to  its  second  there  is  also  a  mule  trail 
hewed  out  of  the  mountain  side.  The  mules  take  two 
and  a-half  hours  for  the  climb.  In  still  another  place  I 
heard  a  Commander  boast  that  his  series  of  tclefericas 
did  the  work  of  thousands  of  men — and,  what  was  more 
important,  did  it  more  quickly  in  emergency. 

This,  however,  was  a  small  hand  teleferica,  the  motive 
power  the  sturdy  arms  of  three  stout  reservists.  Piled 
in  one  of  the  scmi-cj'lindrical  black  sheds  were  supplies 
such  as  army  never  employed  before  this  war,  devices 
whose  uses  I  did  not  understand  until  the  Chaplain 
explained.  For  example,  there  were  "  trench  boots  " 
for  the  snow-huts  of  the  glacier.  Their  soles  were  of 
thick  wood,  studded  with  sharp  spikes.  Their  uppers 
rose  above  the  knee,  and  they  were  lined  with  the  thickest 
of  rough  wool.  That  tin  bucket,  as  big  as  a  ten-gallon 
oil  can,  was  not  a  fircless  cooker  as  I  supposed,  but  a 
gigantic  thermos  bottle  which  would  keep  dinner  for  a 
squad  warm  all  day.  They  cannot  cook  by  ordinary 
means  up  there  in  the  glacial  trenches  where  the  snow 
drifts  high  over  the  sand-bags,  where  one  lives  like  an 
F2squimaux.     That  would  betray  the  position. 

Not  only  supplies  go  up  that  perilous  cash-carrier,  but 
men.  By  this  means  the  high  officers  save  time,  by  it 
the  surgeons  ascend  in  case  of  emergency  ;  and  by  it 
they  bring  dowrt  the  wounded.  An  army  surgeon,  but 
a  year  ago  a  prosperous  specialist  in  Milan,  remarked  to 
me  one  day  that  he  did  not  bargain,  when  he  enlisted, 
on  being  an  acrobat. 

The  Alpini,  weather  sharps  all  of  them,  squinted  at  the 
heavens  and  prophecied  another  fair  day.  Which  gave 
our  Lieutenant  an  idea.  He  had  learned  by  telephone 
that  a  certain  high  officer  from  a  jjosition  far  down  the 
valley  was  going  up  to  a  \'ery  liigii  mountain  base 
within  easy  touch  of  the  glacier.  Why  not  join  him, 
and  go  along  ?  We  could  make  the  trip  easily  in  a  day 
because  of  the  teleferica. 

Now  I  had  best  stop  here  and  describe,  in  the  general 
and  hazy  way  permitted  «o  war  correspondents,  what 
we   were   about   to  do. 

iTn  be  continued.} 


June  22,  1916 


LAND      &      WATER 


19 


Alpine  troops  and  wagons  going  through  a  pass  in  the  Alps 


Lj  LiiUocico  PonHatihi 


n 


.     i 


L-!/    Lli./..r,c.j    V-Mjl'M'jhi. 


Alpine  troops  with  a  cart  in  an  Alpine  pass 


.     Italian  Artists  and  the  War 

These  remarkable  pictures,  reproduced  here,  are  on  view  at  the  Leicester  Galleries,  Leicester 
Square,  where  a  wonderful  exhibition  of  Italian  Artists  and  the  War  is  now  open.  They  are 
the  work  of  Ludovico  Pogliaghi,  the  only  artist  who  has  been  allowed  to  go  to  the  Italian  front 


20 


L  A  X  I)      &      W  A  T  E  R 


June  22,  1916 


¥¥ 


The   Club  with   Five  Million  Members 

Land  &  Water's  Special   Appeal  for  the  Union  Jack  Club 


THE  extension  of  the  Union  Jack  Club  is  one  of 
thr  most  urgent  practical  needs  of  the  hour. 
Sailors  and  soldiers  should  be  given  a  place  in 
London  where  they  may  be  certain  not  only  of  a 
welcome  home,  but  also  of  a  bed  if  they  require  it. '  This 
Club  has  strained  its  sleeping  accoriimodation  to  the 
extremcst   limit,   and  is  unable  to  meet   the  demands 


Entrance  Hall 

upon  it.  therefore  it  is  endeavouring  to  obtain  the  funds 
without  delay  m  order  to  extend  its  premises.  It  has 
purchased  the  buildings  alongside,  which  as  they  stand 
are  entirely  unsuitable  for  the  requirements  of  a  Club 
I  hey  have  to  be  pulled  down,  and  a  new  edifice  con- 
structed. The  work  can  be  put  in  hand  directly  the 
money  is  available,  and  for  this  money  Land  &  Water 
presses  this  special  appeal. 

It  has  been  contrary  to  this  journal's  policy  to  be 
constantly  makin?  claims  upon  the  purses  of  its  readers 
nor  would  it  do  so  now.  did  it  not  feel  most  strongly  that 
here  IS  a  cause  which  has  special  and  peculiar  claims  and 
which  might  easily  t)e  overlooked  amid  the  other  nume- 
rous and  more  clamant  demands. 

A  fact  that  has  also  had  its  full  influence  is  that  the 
Union  Jack  Club,  from  the  day  when  its  doors  were  first 
open  exactly  nine  years  come  Saturday  week,  has  been 
run  on  thoroughly  sound  and  efficient  business  Drinciplf>s 
Year  after  year  Sir  Edward  Ward.  President  of  its 
Council,  has^  been  able  to  present  at  the  annual  meeting 
a  balance-sheet  showing  a  small  profit  on  the  working 
lit' r  due  provision  had  been  made  for  depreciation 
■ .  unties  written  down  to  their  market  value  and  a 
reasonable  amount  added  to  reserves. 

Ihere  is  not  a  Club  in  the  land  which  is  run  on  better 
principles-  than  this  one  with  its  five  million  members 
It  prides  itself  on  being  independent  of  outside  help 
tor  Its  upkeep,  aird  of  paying  its  way  out  of  its  own  in- 
come. But  naturally  it  has  not  the  "funds  at  its  disposal 
or  .his  new  extension,  the  need  of  which  is  entirely  due 
to  the  war.  Nor  would  it  be  justified  in  utilising  its 
-mall  reserves  m  this  manner.  On  the  other  hand  if 
<ver  there  was  an  institution  that  had  the  right  to  look 
to  the  country  and  ask  for  assistance  it  is  this  Club  with 
Its  clean  financial  record  combined  with  the  splendid  use 
It  is  to  our  fighting  men   on  leave  in  London. 

Mention  was  made  last  week  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  Union  Jack  Club  can 


petuating  the  memory'   of   brave   men  who  have  given 
their  lives  for  their  country. 

Said  Colonel  Clive.  M.P.,  at  the  recent  general  meeting  : 
"  The  sailor  and  soldier  have  shown  themselves  well  able 
to  run  a  good  Club  like  this  for  themselves,  but  the  help 
they  do  require  is  for  its  extension.  Even  in  time  of 
peace  this  Club  was  constantly  over-crowded  in  week- 
ends, and  how  Major  Wilkinson  has  been  able  to  manage 
during  the  war,  not  only  for  the  members  who  used  it 
in  peace  time,  but  for  the  large  number  who  were  made 
honorary  members,  and  also  the  Over-sea  troops  it  is 
difficult  to  understand."  Though  he  has  done  much 
Major  Wilkinson  cannot  achieve  impossibihties. 

The  \Var  Office,  it  should  be  mentioned,  has  been 
applied  to  for  a  grant  from  canteen  funds.  But  it  is  the 
public  that  must  supply  the  most  of  the  money  if  work 
is  to  be  put  in  hand  at  once.  The  Club  Council  displayed 
shrewd  wisdom  in  asking  Mr.  H.  E.  Morgan  to  organise 
and  manage  this  appeal,  for  he  brings  to  his  honorary 
but  by  no  means  light  task  exceptional  energy  and 
experience.  The  appeal  in  the  end  is  bound  to  be 
successful,  and  we  feel  sure  our  readers  will  delight  in 
making  it  so  with  as  little  delay  as  possible.  Bear  in 
mind  that  until  this  extension  is  complete  the  Club  is 
continually  compelled  to  refuse  applications  for  bedrooms 
and  members,  so  stranded,  have  to  fend  for  sleeping 
quarters  the  best  way  they  can. 

Owing  to  mechanical  difficulties  the  section  of  Land 
&  Water,  in  which  this  article  appears,  has  to  go  to  press 
the  day  after  the  publication  of  the  previous  issue  ;  there- 
fore it  is  not  possible  to  pjblish  to-day  a  list  of  contri- 
butions  or  yet    to  comment   on   the  letters  which   had 


render  equal  service  at 
t  he  same  time  to  the  dead 
and  to  the  living.  A  gift 
of  Aoo  enables  a  bed- 
room to  be  built  which 
can  be  dedicated  to  the 
meinor\-  of  any  gallant 
gentleman.  A  'donation 
of  ^1,000  will  construct 
a  corridor  of  ten  bed- 
rooms. To  those  who 
have  the  means  this  must 
appear  a  noble,  simple 
and  sensible   way   of  per- 


Dlning  Room 

begun  to  reach  this  office  as  we  went  to  press  with  this 
part  of  the  paper.  The  subscriptions  will  be  printed 
next  week.  It  is  evident  from  the  tone  of  the  letters 
we  have  already  read,  that  the  appeal  has  won  cordial 
approval  ;  more  than  one  writer  thanking  us  for  drawing 
attention  to  this  need  of  the  Union  Jack  Club.  Its  good 
work  is.  of  course,  widely  known  in  naval  and  military 

circles,    and    officers    and 


All  Conlributtons  for  the  Union  Jack  Club  Exten- 
sion  I'und    should  be  immediately  forwarded  to  : 
The  Editor, 

"LAND     &    WATER," 
Empire  House,  Kingsway, 
London,  W.C. 

Envelopes  should  be  marked  "  U.J.C.  Fuhd." 
Cheques  should  be  drawn  in  favour  of  the  U.J.C. 
Extension   fund,    and  crossed   "  Coutts   and   Co. 


men  concur  in  bestowing 
on  it  the  highest  praise. 
What  the  Club  requires  is 
further  scope  for  its  useful- 
ness, so  that  members. 
when  they  apply  for  rooms 
as  shown  in  the  photo- 
graph at  the  head  of  this 
rurticle.  may  not  be  turned 
away.  The  illustration 
of  the  dining-room  gives 
a  very  good  idea  nf  the 
spaciousness  and  airiness 
of    the    Club     ••enerallv. 


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