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Full text of "The 9/11 Commission report [electronic resource] : final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States"

FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



NOTES 



For simplicity, we have adopted the following citation conventions in 
these endnotes. 

Dozens of government agencies and other entities provided the Commis- 
sion with more than 2.5 million pages of documents and other materials, 
including more than 1,000 hours of audiotapes. In general, we cite docu- 
ments and other materials by providing the agency or entity of origin, the 
type of document (e.g., memo, email, report, or record), the author and recip- 
ient, the title (in quotes) or a description of the subject, and the date. We use 
the following abbreviations for the agencies and entities that produced the 
bulk of these documents: AAL — American Airlines; CIA — Central Intelli- 
gence Agency; DCI — Director of Central Intelligence; DHS — Department 
of Homeland Security; DOD — Department of Defense; DOJ — Department 
of Justice; DOS — Department of State; DOT — Department of Transporta- 
tion; EPA — Environmental Protection Agency; FAA — Federal Aviation 
Administration; FBI — Federal Bureau of Investigation; FDNY — Fire 
Department of New York; GAO — General Accounting Office; INS — Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Service; NEADS — Northeast Air Defense Sec- 
tor; NSA — National Security Agency; NSC — National Security Council; 
NTSB — National Transportation Safety Board; NYPD — New York Police 
Department; OEM — Office of Emergency Management, City of New York; 
PANYNJ or Port Authority — Port Authority of New York and New Jersey; 
PAPD — Port Authority Police Department; SEC — Securities and Exchange 
Commission; Treasury — Department of Treasury; TSA — Transportation 
Security Administration; UAL — United Air Lines; USSS — United States 
Secret Service. 

Interviews, meetings, briefings, and site visits conducted by Commission- 
ers or by members of the Commission staff are cited, for example, as "George 
Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004)." Testimony by witnesses at one of the Com- 

449 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



450 NOTES 

mission's 12 public hearings is cited as "Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 
2004."Written statements for the record provided by witnesses at one of our 
public hearings are cited as "Thomas Ridge prepared statement, May 19, 
2004." 

At the request of intelligence community agencies (including the FBI), 
we use the first name and last initial, only the first name, or in a few instances 
an alias or title when referring to working-level employees in those agencies. 
At the request of several intelligence agencies, we cite most reports from the 
CIA and other intelligence agencies generically as "Intelligence report," fol- 
lowed by a description of the subject and date. In a few instances in which 
we were given access to highly sensitive documents or information, we cite 
generically to documents or information provided to the Commission. 

Our investigation built on the work of many others, including the Joint 
Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Per- 
manent Select Committee on Intelligence into Intelligence Community 
Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, which 
we refer to as the "Joint Inquiry." We cite as "Joint Inquiry report, Dec. 2002" 
the Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Rep. No. 107-351, 
H.R. Rep. No. 107-792, 107th Cong., 2d sess. (2002), indicating "classified 
version" where appropriate. Testimony presented during hearings conducted 
by the Joint Inquiry is cited as "Joint Inquiry testimony of George Tenet, Oct. 
17, 2002," indicating "closed hearing" where appropriate. We cite interviews 
conducted by the Joint Inquiry staff as "Joint Inquiry interview of Cofer 
Black," with the date of the interview. 

Another major source for our investigation were the thousands of inter- 
views conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation during its investiga- 
tion of the 9/11 attacks, which it refers to as "Penttbom." FBI agents write 
up their interviews on forms called 302s, which we cite as "FBI report of 
investigation, interview of John Smith, Oct. 4, 2001," using the date of the 
interview. We cite interviews conducted by other agencies by agency name 
and date of the interview; for example, an interview conducted by the 
Department of Justice Office of Inspector General is cited as "DOJ Inspec- 
tor General interview of Mary Jones, July 9, 2002." 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 451 

1 "We Have Some Planes" 

1. No physical, documentary, or analytical evidence provides a convincing explanation of why Atta and Omari 
drove to Portland, Maine, from Boston on the morning of September 10, only to return to Logan on Flight 5930 
on the morning of September 1 1. However, Atta reacted negatively when informed in Portland that he would have 
to check in again m Boston. Michael Touhey interview (May 27, 2004). Whatever their reason, the Portland Jet- 
port was the nearest airport to Boston with a 9/11 flight that would have arrived at Logan in time for the passen- 
gers to transfer to American Airlines Flight 1 1, which had a scheduled departure time of 7:45 A.M. See Tom Kinton 
interview (Nov. 6, 2003); Portland International Jetport site visit (Aug. 18, 2003). 

Like the other two airports used by the 9/11 hijackers (Newark Liberty International Airport and Washing- 
ton Dulles International Airport), Boston's Logan International Airport was a "Category X" airport: i.e., among the 
largest facilities liable to highest threat, and generally subject to greater security requirements. See FA A report, "Civil 
Aviation Security Reference Handbook," May 1999, pp. 1 17—1 18. Though Logan was selected for two of the hijack- 
ings (as were both American and United Airlines}, we found no evidence that the terrorists targeted particular air- 
ports or airlines. Nothing stands out about any of them with respect to the only security layer that "was relevant to 
the actual hijackings: checkpoint screening. See FAA briefing materials, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, 
EWR, and IAD," Oct. 24, 2001. Despite security problems at Logan (see, e.g., two local Fox 25 television inves- 
tigative reports in February and April 2001 , and an email in August 2001 from a former FAA special agent to the 
agency's leadership regarding his concerns about lax security at the airport), no evidence suggests that such issues 
entered into the terrorists' targeting: they simply booked heavily fueled east-to-west transcontinental flights of the 
large Boeing aircraft they trained to fly that were scheduled to take off at nearly the same time. See Matt Carroll, 
"Fighting Terror Sense of Alarm; Airlines Foiled Police Logan Probe," Boston Globe, Oct. 17, 2001, p. Bl. 

2. CAPPS was an FAA-approved automated system run by the airlines that scored each passenger's profile to 
identify those who might pose a threat to civil aviation.The system also chose passengers at random to receive addi- 
tional security scrutiny. Ten out of the 19 hijackers (including 9 out of 10 on the two American Airlines flights) 
were identified via the CAPPS system. According to the procedures in place on 9/1 1, in addition to those flagged 
by the CAPPS algorithm, American's ticket agents were to mark as "selectees" those passengers who did not pro- 
vide correct responses to the required security questions, filled to show proper identification, or met other crite- 
ria. See FAA report, "Air Carrier Standard Security Program," May 2001, pp. 75—76; FAA record of interview, Donna 
Thompson, Sept. 23, 2001; Chuck Severance interview (Apr. 15,2004);Jim Dillon interview (Apr. 15, 2004); Diane 
Graney interview {Apr. 16, 2004). It appears that Atta was selected at random. See Al Hickson briefing (June 8, 
2004). 

3. The call was placed from a pay phone inTerminal C (between the screening checkpoint and United 175's 
boarding gate). We presume Shehhi made the call, but we cannot be sure. Logan International Airport site visit 
(Aug. 15, 2003); see also FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11). 

4. Flight 1 1 pushed back from Gate 32 inTerminal B at 7:40. See AAL response to the Commission's Febru- 
ary 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004. 

5. See UAL letter, "Flight 175— USepOl Passenger ACI Check-in History," July 11, 2002. Customer service 
representative Gail Jawahir recalled that her encounter with the Ghamdis occurred at "shortly before 7 A.M.," and 
when shown photos of the hijackers, she indicated that Mohand al Shehri resembled one of the two she checked 
in (suggesting they were Banihammad and Shehri). However, she also recalled that the men had the same last name 
and had assigned seats on row 9 (i.e., the Ghamdis), and that account has been adopted here. In either case, she 
almost certainly was dealing with one set of the Flight 175 hijackers. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews 
of Gail Jawahir. Sept. 21, 2i )< ) 1 : Sept. 28, 201 ) I . Even had the hijackers been unable to understand and answer the 
two standard security questions, the only consequence would have been the screening of their carry-on and checked 
bags for explosives. See FAA report, "Air Carrier Standard Security Program," May 2001, p. 76. 

6. For Flight 11, two checkpoints provided access to the gate. The second was opened at 7:15 A.M. The FAA 
conducted many screener evaluations between September 11, 1999, and September 1 1, 2001. At the primary check- 
points, m aggregate, screeners met or exceeded the average for overall, physical search, and X-ray detection, while 
falling below the norm for metal detection. No FAA Special Assessments (by "red teams") were done at Logan 
security checkpoints during the two years prior to September 11, 2001. See FAA briefing materials, "Assessment 
and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD," Oct. 24, 2001 . 

7. See AirTransport Association/Regional Airlines Association (ATA/RAA) report, "Air Carriers Checkpoint 
Operations Guide,"Aug. 1999; FAA report,"Air Carrier Standard Security Program "May 2001, appendix VI. 

8. Mary Carol Turano interview (Mar. 1 1, 2004); FBI reports of investigation, interview of Nilda Cora, Oct. 4, 
2001; interview of William Thomas, Sept. 14, 2001; interview ofjennifer Gore, Sept. 12, 2001; interview of Clau- 
dia Richey, Sept. 15, 2001; interview of Rosarito Rivera, Sept. 25, 2001. 

9. SeeTSA report, "Selectee Status of September 1 1th Hijackers," undated. For boarding and seating informa- 
tion, see AAL record, SABRE information on Flight 1 1, Sept. 1 1, 2001. These boarding times from the American 
system are approximate only; for Flight 11, they indicated that some passengers "boarded" after the aircraft had 
pushed back from the gate. See AAL response to the Commission's February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004. 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



452 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 

10. SeeTSA report, "Selectee Status of September 1 lth Hijackers," undated; see also UAL letter, "Flight 175 — 
11 SepOl PassengerACI Check-in History," July 11, 2002. 

1 l.The Hazmis checked in at 7:29; the airline has not yet been able to confirm the tune of Hanjour's check- 
in. However, it had to have taken place by 7:35, when he appears on the checkpoint videotape. See AAL record, 
SABRE information for Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL response to the Commission's February 3, 2004, requests, 
Mar. 15, 2004; Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 1 1, 
2001. 

12. SeeTSA report, "Selectee Status of September 1 lth Hijackers," undated; see also FAA report, "Selectee List 
AALA #77," undated; FBI report of investigation, interview of Vaughn Allex, Sept. 12, 2001;Vaughn Allex inter- 
view (July 13,2004). 

13. The FAA conducted many screener evaluations at Dulles between September 11, 1999, and September 1 1, 
2001. While the test results for physical search exceeded the national average, both the metal detector and X-ray 
results were below average. See FAA briefing materials, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD," 
Oct. 24, 2001. 

14. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 1 1, 2001; 
see also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004). 

15. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 1 1, 2001; 
see also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004). 

16. For investigation findings, see FAA report, "American Airlines Flight #77: Hijacking and Crash into the 
Pentagon, Sept. 1 1, 2001," undated. For screener evaluations, see Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004). 

17. See AAL record, SABRE information for Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL response to the Commission's Feb- 
ruary 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004. 

18. UAL record, Flight 93 EWR bag loading status, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 EWRACI passen- 
ger history, Sept. 1 1, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 EWR full bag history, Sept. 11, 2001 ;TSA report, "Selectee Sta- 
tus of September 11th Hijackers," undated; FBI report, "The Final 24 Hours," Dec. 8, 2003. 

19. The FAA conducted many screener evaluations at Newark between September 11, 1999, and September 
1 1, 2001. Detection rates for metal detection, physical searches, and X-rays all met or exceeded the national aver- 
ages. See FAA briefing materials, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD," Oct. 24, 2001; see also 
FAA report, "United Airlines Flight 93, September 11, 2001, Executive Report," Jan. 30, 2002. 

20. UAL record, Flight 93 EWR ACI passenger history, Sept. 11, 2001; see also FBI report, "The Final 24 
Hours," Dec. 8, 2003. 

21 .While Flights 1 1 and 77 were at or slighdy above the average number of passengers for the respective flights 
that summer, Flights 175 and 93 were "well below their averages. We found no evidence to indicate that the hijack- 
ers manipulated the passenger loads on the aircraft they hijacked. Financial records did not reveal the purchase of 
any tickets beyond those the hijackers used for themselves. See FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 
6, undated (topic 8);AAL report,"Average Load Factor by Day-of-Week," undated (for Flights 1 1 and 77 from June 
11,2001, to Sept. 9, 2001); AAL response to the Commission's supplemental document requests, Jan. 20, 2004; UAL 
report, Flight 175 BOS-LAX Load Factors, undated (from June 1,2001, to Sept. 1 1, 2001); UAL report, "Explana- 
tion of Load Factors," undated. 

22. See AAL response to the Commission's February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004; AAL record, Dispatch 
Environmental Control/ Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 1 1, Sept. 1 1, 2001; AAL report, "Flight Attendant Jump 
Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service," 
undated; AAL report, "Passenger Name List, Flight 1 1 /September 1 1," undated. 

23. Commission analysis of NTSB and FAA air traffic control and radar data. See AAL record, Dispatch Envi- 
ronmental Control/ Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001; NTSB report, "Flight Path Study — Amer- 
ican Airlines Flight 1 1," Feb. 19, 2002; Bill Halleck and Peggy Houck interview (Jan. 8, 2004). The initial service 
assignments for flight attendants on American 11 would have placed Karen Martin and Bobbi Arestegui in first 
class; Sara Low and Jean Roger in business class; Dianne Snyder in the midcabin galley; Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney 
in coach; and Karen Nicosia in the aft galley. Jeffrey Collman "would have been assigned to work in coach, but to 
assist in first class if needed. See AAL report, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight 
Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service," undated; Bob Jordan briefing (Nov. 20, 2003). 

24. NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording— American Airlines Flight 1 1, Dec. 21, 2001; NTSB report, 
AirTraffic Control Recording — United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001. Given that the cockpit crew ofAmeri- 
can 11 had been acknowledging all previous instructions from air traffic control that morning "within a matter of 
seconds, and that when the first reporting of the hijacking was received a short time later (the 8:19 call from Betty 
Ong) a number of actions had already been taken by the hijackers, it is most likely that the hijacking occurred at 
8:14 A.M. 

25. An early draft of an executive summary prepared by FAA security staff for the agency's leadership referred 
to an alleged report of a shooting aboard Flight 1 l.We believe this report was erroneous for a number of reasons — 
there is no evidence that the hijackers purchased firearms, use of a gun would be inconsistent with the otherwise 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 453 

common tactics employed by the hijackers, the alleged shooting victim was seated where witness accounts place 
the stabbing victim (9B), and, most important, neither Betty Ong nor Amy Sweeney, the only two people who 
communicated to the ground from aboard the aircraft, reported the presence of a gun or a shooting. Both reported 
knives and stabbings. AAL transcript, telephone call from Betty Ong to Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 1 1, 2001; AAL tran- 
script, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL transcript, telephone call from 
Nancy Wyatt to Ray Howland, Sept. 1 1, 2001; Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004). The General Account- 
ing Office looked into the gun story and was unable to corroborate it. GAO report, summary of briefing re inves- 
tigation,Aug. 30, 2002. 

26. Craig Marquis interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004);Jim Dillon inter- 
view (Apr. 15, 2004). See also AAL transcript, telephone call from Betty Ong to Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 11, 2001. 
At the time of the hijacking, American Airlines flight attendants all carried cockpit keys on their person. See Craig 
Marquis, Craig Parfitt,Joe Bertapelle, and Mike Mulcahy interview (Nov. 19, 2003). 

27. AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 1 1, 2001; Obituary, "Daniel 
Lewin," Washington Post, Sept. 22, 2001, p. B7. 

28. AAL transcript, telephone call from Betty Ong to Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL transcript, tele- 
phone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001. Regarding the claim of a bomb, see Michael 
Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004). 

29. Calls to American's reservations office are routed to the first open line at one of several facilities, among 
them the center in Cary, N.C. See Nydia Gonzalez interview (Nov. 19, 2003). On standard emergency training, 
see FA A report, "Air Carrier Standard Security Program," May 2001, pp. 139j— 139o; Don Dillman briefing (Nov. 
18, 2003); Bob Jordan briefing (Nov. 20, 2003). The call from Ong was received initially by Vanessa Minter and then 
taken over by Winston Sadler; realizing the urgency of the situation, he pushed an emergency button that simul- 
taneously initiated a tape recording of the call and sent an alarm notifying Nydia Gonzalez, a supervisor, to pick 
up on the line. Gonzalez was paged to respond to the alarm and joined the call a short time later. Only the first 
four minutes of the phone call between Ong and the reservations center (Minter, Sadler, and Gonzalez) was recorded 
because of the time limit on the recently installed system. See Nydia Gonzalez interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Nydia 
Gonzalez testimony, Jan. 27, 2004. 

30. AAL transcript, telephone call from Betty Ong to Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 

31. See Nydia Gonzalez interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Craig Marquis interviews (Nov. 19, 2003; Apr. 26, 2004); 
AAL record, Dispatch Environmental Control /Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL tran- 
script, telephone call from Bill Halleck to BOS ATC, Sept. 1 1, 2001. The Air Carrier Standard Security Program 
required airlines to immediately notify the FAA and FBI upon receiving information that an act or suspected act 
of airplane piracy was being committed. 

32. See FAA recording, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, position 46R, at 8:25 A.M.; Air Traffic Con- 
trol Recording — American Airlines Flight 1 l,Dec. 21, 2001. Starting at 8: 22, Amy Sweeney attempted by airphone 
to contact the American Airlines flight services office at Logan, which managed the scheduling and operation of 
flight attendants. Sweeney's first attempt failed, as did a second at 8:24. When she got through to Nunez, the latter 
thought she had reported her flight number as 12. Michael Woodward, supervisor at the Boston office, hearing that 
a problem had been reported aboard an American airplane, went to American's gate area at Logan with his col- 
league Beth Williams. Woodward noted that the morning bank of flights had all departed Boston and the gate area 
was quiet. He further realized that Flight 12 had not even departed yet, so he and Williams returned to the office 
to try to clarify the situation. See FBI report, "American Airlines Airphone Usage," Sept. 20, 2001; MichaelWood- 
ward interview (Jan. 25, 2004).The phone call between Sweeney andWoodward lasted about 12 minutes (8:32—8:44) 
and was not taped. See AAL email, Wood ward to Schmidt, "Flight 1 1 Account of events," Sept. 19, 2001; AAL notes, 
Michael Woodward handwritten notes, Sept. 1 1, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Michael Wood- 
ward, Sept. 13, 2001;AAL report, interview of Michael Woodward, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL transcript, telephone call 
from Nancy Wyatt to Ray Howland, Sept. 11,2001. 

33. See AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 1 1, 2001; NTSB report, 
"Flight Path Study — American Airlines Flight 11," Feb. 19, 2002. AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gon- 
zalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL transcript, telephone call from Nancy Wyatt to Ray Howland, Sept. 
11,2001. 

34. Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004). 

35. AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 1 1, 2001; Michael Woodward 
interview (Jan. 25, 2004); AAL, Michael Woodward notes, Sept. 1 1, 2001. Also at this time American Airlines com- 
pleted its "lockout" procedure for Flight 1 1, which restricted access to information about a hijacked flight in accor- 
dance with the Air Carrier Standard Security program. See FAA report, "Air Carrier Standard Security Program," 
May 2001, p. 110. 

36. AAL transcript, telephone call from Nancy Wyatt to Ray Howland, Sept. 1 1 , 2001 ; Michael Woodward inter- 
view (Jan. 25, 2004). 

37. AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 



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454 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 

38. Ibid.; Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004). 

39.NTSB report, "Flight Path Study— American Airlines Flight 11," Feb. 19,2002. 

40. The 56 passengers represented a load factor of 33.33 percent of the airplane's seating capacity of 168, below 
the 49.22 percent for Flight 175 on Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11, 2001. See UAL 
report, Flight 175 BOS-LAX Load Factors, undated (from June 1, 2001, to Sept. 11, 2001). Nine passengers hold- 
ing reservations for Flight 175 did not show for the fhght.They were interviewed and cleared by the FBI.FAA report, 
"Executive Summary," Sept. 12, 2001; FAA report, "Executive Summary, Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Cri- 
sis, September 1 1, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; UAL record, Flight 175 ACARS report, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 
175 Flight Data Recap, Sept. 11,2001. 

41. FAA report, "Executive Summary," Sept. 12,2001;FAA report, "Executive Summary, Chronology of a Mul- 
tiple Hijacking Crisis, September 1 1, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report,"Hight Path Study— United Airlines 175," 
Feb. 19, 2002; NTSB report,Air Traffic Control Recording— United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001. At or around 
this time, flight attendants Kathryn Laborie and Alfred Marchand would have begun cabin service in first class; with 
Amy King and Robert Fangman in business class; and with Michael Tarrou, Amy Jarret, and Alicia Titus in econ- 
omy class. See UAL report, "Flight 175 Flight Attendant Positions/Jumpseats," undated. United flight attendants, 
unlike those at American, did not carry cockpit keys. Instead, such keys were stowed in the cabin — on Flight 175, 
in the overhead bin above seats 1A and IB in first class. See Don Dillman briefing (Nov. 18, 2003); Bob Jordan 
briefing (Nov. 20, 2003). 

42. Asked by air traffic controllers at 8:37 to look for an American Airlines 767 (Flight 11), United 175 reported 
spotting the aircraft at 8:38. At 8:41, the flight crew reported having "heard a suspicious transmission" from another 
aircraft shortly after takeoff,"like someone keyed the mike and said everyone stay in your seats." See NTSB report, 
Air Traffic Control Recording— United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001. 

43. See Marc Policastro interview (Nov. 21, 2003); FBI reports of investigation, interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 
11, 2001; interview of Marc Policastro, Sept. 11, 2001; interview of Louise Sweeney, Sept. 28, 2001; interview of 
Ronald May, Sept. 1 1, 2001. On both American 1 1 and United 175, Boeing 767 double-aisled aircraft, the hijack- 
ers arrayed themselves similarly: two seated in first class close to the cockpit door, the pilot hijacker seated close 
behind them, and at least one other hijacker seated close behind the pilot hijacker. Hijackers were seated next to 
both the left and right aisles. On American 77 and United 93, Boeing 757 single-aisle aircraft, the pilot hijacker sat 
in the first row, closest to the cockpit door. See FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2(104, 
pp. 67-69; AAL schematics for Flight 11 and Flight 77; UAL schematics for Hight 175 and Hight 93. 

44. NTSB report, "Hight Path Study — United Airlines 175," Feb. 19, 2002; NTSB report, Air Traffic Control 
Recording— United Airlines Hight 175, Dec. 2 1 , 200 1 . 

45. See FBI report of investigation, interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11, 2001. 

46. Flight crew on board UAL aircraft could contact the United office in San Francisco (SAMC) simply by 
dialing *349 on an airphone. See FBI report of investigation, interview of David Price, Jan. 24, 2002. At some point 
before 9:00, SAMC notified United's headquarters of the emergency call from the flight attendant. See Marc Poli- 
castro interview (Nov. 21, 2003); FBI report of investigation, interview of Marc Policastro, Sept. 1 1, 2001; Rich Miles 
interiew (Nov. 21, 2003). 

47. NTSB report, "Flight Path Study— United Airlines 175," Feb. 19,2002. 

48. See FBI reports of investigation, interview of Julie Sweeney, Oct. 2, 2001; interview of Louise Sweeney, 
Sept. 28,2001. 

49. See FBI report of investigation, interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11, 2001. 

50. See ibid.; interview of Louise Sweeney, Sept. 28, 2001. 

51. NTSB report, "Flight Path Study— United Airlines 175," Feb. 19,2002. 

52. AAL report, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin 
Positions During Start of Cabin Service," undated; AAL email, Young to Clark, "Flight Crews," Sept. 12, 2001; AAL 
record, Dispatch Environmental Control /Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 1 1, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 

53. AAL record, System Operations Command Center (SOCC) log, Sept. 11, 2001, p. 2; NTSB report, "Flight 
Path Study — American Airlines Flight 77," Feb. 1 9, 2002. Flight attendant Renee May would likely have started 
working in the first-class galley; Michele Heidenberger would have been in the aft galley: Jennifer Lewis would 
have been in first class; and Kenneth Lewis would have been in the main cabin. On cabin service, see AAL report, 
"Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start 
of Cabin Service," undated. For cruising altitude, see NTSB report, "Flight Path Study — American Airlines Flight 
77," Feb. 19, 2002. On events in the cabin, see FAA recording, Indianapolis AirTraffic Control Center, position 
HNN R, Sept. 11,2001; FBI report of investigation, interview ofTheodore Olson, Sept. 11,2001; FBI report of 
investigation, interview of Ronald and Nancy May, Sept. 12, 2001; AAL record, Dispatch Environmental 
Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001. 

54. Air traffic control notified American's headquarters of the problem, and the airline began attempts to con- 
tact the flight by 8:59 via ACARS. See NTSB report, "Flight Path Study — American Airlines Flight 77," Feb. 19, 
2002. On American 1 1, the transponder signal was turned off at 8:21; on United 175, the code was changed at 8:47; 
on American 77, the signal was turned off at 8:56; and on United 93, the signal was turned off at 9:41. See FAA 
report,"Summary ofAirTraffic Hijack Events: September 1 1, 2001,"Sept. 17, 2001; Richard Byard interview (Sept. 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 455 

24, 2003); Linda Povinelli interview (Sept. 24, 2003); see also NTSB report, AirTrafEc Control Recording — Amer- 
ican Airlines Flight 77, Dec. 21, 2001; AAL record, Dispatch Environmental Control/ Weekly Flight Summary for 
Flight 11, Sept. 11,2001. 

55. Gerard Arpey interview (Jan. 8, 2004); Larry Wansley interview (Jan. 8, 2004); AAL record, System Opera- 
tions Command Center (SOCC) log, Sept. 11,2001. 

56. FBI report, "American Airlines Airphone Usage," Sept. 20, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of 
Ronald and Nancy May, Sept. 12, 2001. 

57. The records available for the phone calls from American 77 do not allow for a determination of which of 
four "connected calls to unknown numbers" represent the two between Barbara and Ted Olson, although the FBI 
and DOJ believe that all four represent communications between Barbara Olson and her husband's office (all fam- 
ily members of the Flight 77 passengers and crew were canvassed to see if they had received any phone calls from 
the hijacked flight, and only Renee May's parents and Ted Olson indicated that they had received such calls). The 
four calls were at 9:15:34 for 1 minute, 42 seconds; 9:20:15 for 4 minutes, 34 seconds; 9:25:48 for 2 minutes, 34 
seconds; and 9:30:56 for 4 minutes, 20 seconds. FBI report, "American Airlines Airphone Usage," Sept. 20, 2001; 
FBI report of investigation, interview ofTheodore Olson, Sept. 1 1, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of 
Helen Voss, Sept. 14, 2001; AAL response to the Commission's supplemental document request, Jan. 20, 2004. 

58. FBI report, "American Airlines Airphone Usage," Sept. 20, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of 
Theodore Olson, Sept. 1 1 , 2001 . 

59. See FAA report,"Report of Aircraft Accident," Nov. 13, 2001;John Hendershot interview (Dec. 22, 2003); 
FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 1 1, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report, "Flight 
Path Study — American Airlines Flight 77," Feb. 19, 2002; Commission analysis of radar data. 

60. See FAA report, "Summary of AirTrafEc Hijack Events: September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report, 
"Flight Path Study — American Airlines Flight 77," Feb. 19,2002; FAA report, "Report of Aircraft Accident," Nov. 
13,2001. 

61. See NTSB report, "Flight Path Study— American Airlines Flight 77," Feb. 19,2002;TSA report, "Crimi- 
nal Acts Against Civil Aviation for 2001," Aug. 20, 2002, p. 41. 

62. The flight attendant assignments and seating included Chief Flight Attendant Deborah Welsh (first class, 
seat Jl at takeoff); Sandra Bradshaw (coach, seat J5);Wanda Green (first class, seat J4); Lorraine Bay (coach, seat J3); 
and CeeCee Lyles (coach, seat J6). See UAL response to Commission questions for the record, Apr. 5, 2004; FAA 
report, "Chronology of the September 11 Attacks and Subsequent Events Through October 24, 2001," undated; 
UAL records, copies of electronic boarding passes for Flight 93, Sept. 1 1, 2001; BobVarcadipane interview (May 4, 
2004); Newark Tower briefing (May 4, 2004). 

63. Although the flight schedule indicates an 8:00 A.M. "departure," this was the time the plane left the gate 
area. Taxiing from the gate to the runway normally took about 15 minutes. BobVarcadipane interview (May 4, 
2004); Newark Tower briefing (May 4, 2004). 

64. Commission analysis of FAA air traffic control data. On the FAA's awareness of multiple hijackings, see 
AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; Craig Marquis interview 
(Nov. 19, 2003);AAL record, System Operations Command Center (SOCC) log, Sept. 1 1, 2001 ; UAL System Oper- 
ations Control briefing (Nov. 20, 2003); Rich Miles interview (Nov. 21, 2003); UAL report, "Timeline: 
Dispatch/SMFDO Activities — Terrorist Crisis," undated. 

65. FAA audio file, Boston Center, position 46R, 8:24:38 and 8:24:56; Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003). 

66. On September 6, 1970, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked a Pan Amer- 
ican Boeing 747, aTWA Boeing 707, and a Swissair DC-8. On September 9, a British airliner was hijacked as well. 
An attempt to hijack an Israeli airliner was thwarted. The Pan American plane landed in Cairo and was blown up 
after its passengers were released. The other three aircraft were flown to Dawson Field, near Amman, Jordan; the 
passengers were held captive, and the planes were destroyed. The international hijacking crisis turned into a civil 
war, as the Jordanian government used force to restore its control of the country. See FAA report, Civil Aviation 
Reference Handbook, May 1999, appendix D. 

The FAA knew or strongly suspected that Flight 1 1 was a hijacking 1 1 minutes after it was taken over; Flight 
175, 9 minutes after it was taken over. There is no evidence to indicate that the FAA recognized Flight 77 as a 
hijacking until it crashed into the Pentagon. 

67. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, line 5114, 9:07:13; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Cen- 
ter, position 15, 9:19. At 9:07, Boston Air Traffic Control Center recommended to the FAA Command Center that 
a cockpit warning be sent to the pilots of all commercial aircraft to secure their cockpits. While Boston Center sent 
out such warnings to the commercial flights in its sector, we could find no evidence that a nationwide warning 
was issued by the ATC system. 

68. Ellen King interview (Apr. 5, 2004). FAA air traffic control tapes indicate that at 9:19 the FAA AirTraffic 
Control System Command Center in Herndon ordered controllers to send a cockpit warning to Delta 1989 
because, like American 1 1 and United 175, it was a transcontinental flight departing Boston's Logan Airport. 

69. For American Airlines' response, see AAL briefing (Apr. 26, 2004). For Ballmger s warnings, see Ed Ballinger 
interview (Apr. 14, 2004). A companywide order for dispatchers to warn cockpits was not issued until 9:21. See 
UAL report, "Timeline: Dispatch/SMFDO Activities — Terrorist Crisis," undated. While one of Ballinger's col- 



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456 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 

leagues assisted him,Ballinger remained responsible for multiple flights. See Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004). 
AmencanAirlines'policy called for the flight dispatcher to manage only the hijacked flight, relieving him of respon- 
sibilities for all other flights. On American Airlines' policy, see Craig Marquis, Craig Parfitt, Joe Bertapelle, and Mike 
Mulcahy interview (Nov. 19, 2003). United Airlines had no such "isolation" policy. UAL System Operations Con- 
trol briefing (Nov. 20, 2003). 

70. On FDR, see NTSB report, "Specialist's Factual Report of Investigation — Digital Flight Data Recorder" 
for United Airlines Flight 93, Feb. 15, 2002; on CVR, see FBI report, "CVR from UA Flight #93," Dec. 4, 2003; 
Commission review of Aircraft Communication and Reporting System (ACARS) messages sent to and from Flight 
93 (which indicate time of message transmission and receipt); see UAL record, Ed Ballmger ACARS log, Sept. 1 1, 
2001. At 9:22, after learning of the events at the World Trade Center, Melody Homer, the wife of co-pilot Leroy 
Homer, had an ACARS message sent to her husband in the cockpit asking if he was okay. See UAL record, ACARS 
message, Sept. 11,2001. 

71. On FDR, see NTSB report, "Specialist's Factual Report of Investigation — Digital Flight Data Recorder" 
for United Airlines Flight 93, Feb. 15, 2002; on CVR, see FBI report, "CVR from UA Flight #93," Dec. 4, 2003; 
FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report, Air Traf- 
fic Control Recording — United Airlines Flight 93, Dec. 21, 2001. 

72. The 37 passengers represented a load factor of 20. 33 percent of the plane's seating capacity of 182, consid- 
erably below the 52.09 percent for Flight 93 on Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11 (June 
1 1— September 4, 2001). See UAL report, Flight 93 EWR-SFO load factors, undated. Five passengers holding reser- 
vations for Flight 93 did not show for the flight. All five were interviewed and cleared by the FBI. FBI report,"Flight 
#93 'No Show' Passengers from 9/1 1/01," Sept. 18, 2001. 

73. INS record, Withdrawal of Application for Admission for Mohamed al Kahtani, Aug. 4, 2001. 

74. See FAA regulations,Admission to flight deck, 14 C.F.R. § 121.547 (2001); UAL records, copies ofboard- 
ing passes for United 93, Sept. 1 1,2001. One passenger reported that ten first-class passengers were aboard the flight. 
If that number is accurate, it would include the four hijackers. FBI report of investigation, interview of Lisa Jeffer- 
son, Sept. 1 1, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 passenger manifest, Sept. 1 1, 2001. All but one of the six passengers seated 
in the first-class cabin communicated with the ground during the flight, and none mentioned anyone from their 
cabin having gone into the cockpit before the hijacking. Moreover, it is unlikely that the highly regarded and expe- 
rienced pilot and co-pilot of Flight 93 would have allowed an observer into the cockpit before or after takeoff who 
had not obtained the proper permission. See UAL records, personnel files of Flight 93 pilots. For jumpseat infor- 
mation, see UAL record, Weight and Balance Information for Flight 93 and Flight 175, Sept. 1 1, 2001 ;AAL records, 
Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11 and Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001. 

75. Like Atta on Flight 1 l,Jarrah apparently did not know how to operate the communication radios; thus his 
attempts to communicate 'with the passengers were broadcast on the ATC channel. See FBI report, "CVR from 
UA Flight #93," Dec. 4, 2003. Also, by 9:32 FAA notified United's headquarters that the flight was not responding 
to radio calls. According to United, the flight's nonresponse and its turn to the east led the airline to believe by 9:36 
that the plane was hijacked. See Rich Miles interview (Nov. 21, 2003); UAL report, "United dispatch SMFDO 
activities — terrorist crisis," Sept. 11, 2001. 

76. In accordance with FAA regulations, United 93's cockpit voice recorder recorded the last 31 minutes of 
sounds from the cockpit via microphones in the pilots' headsets, as well as in the overhead panel of the flight deck. 
This is the only recorder from the four hijacked airplanes to survive the impact and ensuing fire. The CVRs and 
FDRs from American 1 1 and United 175 were not found, and the CVR from American Flight 77 "was badly burned 
and not recoverable. See FBI report, "CVR from UA Flight #93," Dec. 4, 2003; see also FAA regulations, 14 C.F.R. 
§§ 25.1457,91.609,91.1045, 121.359; Flight 93 CVR data. A transcript of the CVR recording was prepared by 
the NTSB and the FBI. 

77. All calls placed on airphones were from the rear of the aircraft. There was one airphone installed in each 
row of seats on both sides of the aisle.The airphone system was capable of transmitting only eight calls at any one 
time. See FBI report of investigation, airphone records for flights UAL 93 and UAL 175 on Sept. 11, 2001, Sept. 
18,2001. 

78. FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, position Lorain Radar; Flight 93 CVR data; FBI report, "CVR from UA 
Hight#93,"Dec. 4, 2003. 

79. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls fromTodd Beamer, Sept. 11, 2001, through 
June 1 1, 2002; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Sandy Bradshaw, Sept. 1 1, 2001, 
through Oct. 4, 2001. Text messages warning the cockpit of Hight 93 were sent to the aircraft by Ed Ballinger at 
9:24. See UAL record, Ed Balhnger's ACARS log, Sept. 11,2001. 

80. We have relied mainly on the record of FBI interviews with the people who received calls. The FBI inter- 
views were conducted while memories were still fresh and "were less likely to have been affected by reading the 
accounts of others or hearing stories in the media. In some cases we have conducted our own interviews to sup- 
plement or verify the record. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls fromTodd Beamer, 
Mark Bingham, Sandy Bradshaw, Marion Bntton,ThomasBurnett,Joseph DeLuca, Edward Felt, Jeremy Glick, Lau- 
ren Grandcolas, Linda Gronlund, CeeCee Lyles, Honor Wainio. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 457 

81. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Thomas Burnett, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI 
reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Marion Britton, Sept. 14, 2001, through Nov. 8, 2001; 
Lisa Jefferson interview (May 11, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Lisa Jefferson, Sept. 11, 2001; 
Richard Belme interview (Nov. 21, 2003). 

82. See Jere Longman, Among the Heroes — United Flight 93 and the Passengers and Crew Who Fought Back (Harper- 
Collins, 2002), p. 107; Deem Burnett interview (Apr. 26, 2004); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipi- 
ents of calls from Jeremy Glick, Sept. 11, 2001, through Sept. 12, 2001; Lyzbeth Glick interview (Apr. 22, 2004). 
Experts told us that a gunshot would definitely be audible on the CVR. The FBI found no evidence of a firearm 
at the crash site of Flight 93. See FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11). The FBI 
collected 14 knives or portions of knives at the Flight 93 crash site. FBI report, "Knives Found at the UA Flight 93 
Crash Site," undated. 

83. FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11); FBI reports of investigation, inter- 
views of recipients of calls from Jeremy Glick, Sept. 11, 2001, through Sept. 12, 2001. 

84. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from United 93. 

85. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from United 93. For quote, see FBI report of 
investigation, interview of Philip Bradshaw, Sept. 11, 2001; Philip Bradshaw interview (June 15, 2004); Flight 93 
FDR and CVR data. At 9:55:11 Jarrah dialed in theVHF Omni-directional Range (VOR) frequency for theVOR 
navigational aid at Washington Reagan National Airport, further indicating that the attack was planned for the 
nation's capital. 

86. Flight 93 FDR and CVR data. 

87. Ibid. 

88. Ibid. 

89. Ibid. The CVR clearly captured the words of the hijackers, including words in Arabic from the microphone 
in the pilot headset up to the end of the flight.The hijackers' statements, the clarity of the recording, the position 
of the microphone in the pilot headset, and the corresponding manipulations of flight controls provide the evi- 
dence. The quotes are taken from our listening to the CVR, aided by an Arabic speaker. 

90. In 1993, a Lufthansa aircraft was hijacked from its Frankfurt to Cairo route and diverted to JFK Airport in 
New York. The event lasted for 1 1 hours and was resolved without incident. Tamara Jones and John J. Goldman, 
"11-Hour Hijack Ends Without Injury in N.Y.," Los Angeles Times, Feb. 12, 1993, p. Al. 

91. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a tremendous growth of the air transport industry, and 
the FAA's corresponding responsibilities grew enormously from the 1960s through 2001. Throughout that time, 
the FAA focused on setting and maintaining safety and efficiency standards. Since no plane had been hijacked inside 
the United States since 1991, sabotage was perceived as the most significant threat to civil aviation. For a broader 
discussion of the perception of the threat, see section 3.3. 

92. FAA report, "Administrator's Fact Book," July 2001; Benedict Sliney interview (May 21, 2004); John 
McCartney interview (Dec. 17, 2003). 

93. FAA re gulatio ns, Air Traffic Control transponder and altitude reporting equipment and use, 14 CFR § 91.215 
(2001). 

94. DOD radar files, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, "9/1 1 Autoplay," undated; Charles Thomas interview 
(May 4, 2004);JohnThomas interview (May 4, 2004);Joseph Cooper interview (Sept. 22, 2003);Tim Spence inter- 
view (Sept. 30, 2003). For general information on approaching terminals, see FAA report, "Aeronautical Informa- 
tion Manual," Feb. 19, 2004. Times assigned to audio transmissions were derived by the Commission from files 
provided by the FAA and the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) based on audio time stamps contained within 
the files provided by the sender. FAA tapes are certified accurate to Universal Coordinated Time by quality assur- 
ance specialists at FAA air traffic facilities. NEADS files are time- stamped as accurate to the Naval Observatory 
clock. We also compared audio times to certified transcripts when available. 

95. FAA Boston Center site visit (Sept. 22-24, 2003). 

96. NORAD's mission is set forth in a series of renewable agreements between the United States and Canada. 
According to the agreement in effect on 9/11, the "primary missions" of NORAD were "aerospace warning" and 
"aerospace control" for North America. Aerospace warning was defined as "the monitoring of man-made objects in 
space and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or 
space vehicles." Aerospace control was defined as "providing surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and 
the United States." See DOS memo, Exchange of Notes Between Canada and the United States Regarding Exten- 
sion of the NORAD Agreement, Mar. 28, 1996; see also DOS press release, "Extension of NORAD Agreement," 
June 16, 2000 (regarding the extension of the 1996 Agreement unchanged). For NORAD's defining its job as 
defending against external attacks, see Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004). 

97. DOD report, "NORAD Strategy Review: Final Report,"July 1992, p. 55. 

98. For assumptions of exercise planners, see Paul Goddard and Ken Merchant interview (Mar. 4, 2004). For 
the authority to shoot down a commercial aircraft prior to 9/11, granted to NORAD but not used against Payne 
Stewart's plane in 1999 after the pilot and passengers lost consciousness, see Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 
2004). A 1998 White House tabletop exercise chaired by Richard Clarke included a scenario in which a terrorist 



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458 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 

group loaded a Learjet with explosives and took off for a suicide mission to Washington. Military officials said they 
could scramble fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base to chase the aircraft, but they would need "executive" orders 
to shoot it down. Chuck Green interview (Apr. 21, 2004). For no recognition of this threat, see Ralph Eberhart 
interview (Mar. 1, 2004). 

99. Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004). 

100. Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Langley Air Force Base 1 19th Fighter Wing briefing (Oct. 
6-7, 2003). 

101. Collin Scoggins interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; fan. 8, 2004); FAA report, "Crisis Management Handbook for 
Significant Events," Feb. 15, 2000; DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of 
Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 2001. 

102. See FAA regulations, Hijacked Aircraft, Order 7110.65M, para. 10-2-6 (2001); David Bottiglia interview 
(Oct. 1, 2003); FAA report, "Crisis Management Handbook for Significant Events," Feb. 15, 2000. From interviews 
of controllers at various FAA centers, we learned that an air traffic controller's first response to an aircraft incident 
is to notify a supervisor, who then notifies the traffic management unit and the operations manager in charge. The 
FAA center next notifies the appropriate regional operations center (ROC), which in turn contacts FAA head- 
quarters. Biggio stated that for American 11, the combination of three factors — loss of radio contact, loss of 
transponder signal, and course deviation — was serious enough for him to contact the ROC in Burlington, Mass. 
However, without hearing the threatening communication from the cockpit, he doubts Boston Center would have 
recognized or labeled American 11 "a hijack." Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); see also Shirley Miller inter- 
view (Mar. 30, 2004); Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004). 

103. FAA regulations, Special Military Operations, Requests for Service, Order 7610. 4J, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2 
(2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne 
Objects," June 1,2001. 

104. Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004); Alan Scott interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Robert Marr interview (Jan. 
23, 2004); FAA regulations, Position Reports within NORAD Radar Coverage, Order 7610.4J, para. 7-4-2 (2001); 
DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 
1,2001. 

105. FAA regulations, Air/Ground Communications Security, Order 7610. 4J, para. 7-1-6 (2001); FAA regula- 
tions,Vectors, Order 7610.4J, para. 7-2-3 (2001). 

106. Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003);Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); Collm 
Scoggms interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2003). For evidence of the numerous 
attempts by air traffic control to raise American 1 l,see FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; AAL1 l;New 
York, NY; September 1 1, 2001," Feb. 15, 2002, p. 7. 

107. DOD radar files, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, "9/1 1 Autoplay," undated; Peter Zalewski interview 
(Sept. 22, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22, 2003). 

108. Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003);John Schippani interview (Sept. 22, 2003). 

1 09 . FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident;AAL 1 1 ; New York, NY; September 1 1 , 2001," Feb. 1 5, 2002, 
p. 1 1 ; Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003). 

1 10. Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22, 2003);Terry Biggio inter- 
views (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); Robert Jones interview (Sept. 22, 2003). 

111. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; AAL 1 1 ; New York, NY; September 1 1 , 2001 "Apr. 1 9, 2002, 
p. 2; FAA record, Boston Center daily record of facility operation, Sept. 11, 2001;Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 
22, 2003;Jan. 8, 2004);Damel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2004). See also FAA memo, "Transcription of 9/1 1 Tapes," 
Oct. 2, 2003, p. 2; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, line 4525, 8:32-8:33. 

112. See FAA memo, "Transcription of 9/11 Tapes," Oct. 2, 2003, pp. 2—3; FAA record, New England Region 
Daily Log, Sept. 1 1, 2001; Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 
2004). 

1 13. FAA memo,"FullTranscript;Aircraft Accident; AAL11; New York, NY; September 11, 2001, "Feb. 15,2002, 
p. 12. 

114. FAA memo,"Full Transcript; Aire raft Accident; AAL11; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,"Jan. 28, 2002, 
p.5. 

115. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; AAL1 1 ; New York, NY; September 1 1 , 2001 ,"Apr. 19, 2002, 
p. 5;Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Collin Scoggins interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; [an. 8, 2004); Daniel Bueno 
interview (Sept. 22, 2003). 

1 16. On 9/11, NORAD was scheduled to conduct a military exercise, Vigilant Guardian, "which postulated a 
bomber attack from the former Soviet Union. We investigated whether military preparations for the large-scale 
exercise compromised the military's response to the real-world terrorist attack on 9/1 1. According to General Eber- 
hart,"it took about 30 seconds" to make the adjustment to the real-world situation. Ralph Eberhart testimony, June 
17, 2004. We found that the response was, if anything, expedited by the increased number of staff at the sectors and 
at NORAD because of the scheduled exercise. See Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004). 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 459 

117. For the distance between Otis Air Force Base and New York City, see William Scott testimony, May 23, 
2003. For the order from NEADS to Otis to place F-15s at battle stations, see NEADS audio file, Weapons Direc- 
tor Technician position, channel 14, 8:37:15. See also interviews with Otis and NEADS personnel: Jeremy Powell 
interview (Oct. 27, 2003); Michael Kelly interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004), 
and interviews with Otis fighter pilots: Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 
2004). According to Joseph Cooper from Boston Center, "I coordinated with Huntress ["Huntress" is the call sign 
for NEADS]. I advised Huntress we had a hijacked aircraft. I requested some assistance. Huntress requested and I 
supplied pertinent information. I was advised aircraft might be sent from Otis." FAA record, Personnel Statement of 
Joseph Cooper, Oct. 30, 2001 . 

118. Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004); Leslie Filson, Air War Over America (First Air Force, 2003), p. 56; 
Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 3, 2004). 

119. NEADS audio file,Weapons Director Technician position, channel 14; 8:45:54; Daniel Nash interview 
(Oct. 14, 2003); Michael Kelly interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004);Timothy 
Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004); NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 8:44:58; NEADS 
audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5,8:51:13. 

120. FAA audio file, Boston Center, position 31R; NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, 
channel 2, 8:58:00; NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 8:54:55. Because of a tech- 
nical issue, there are no NEADS recordings available of the NEADS senior weapons director and weapons direc- 
tor technician position responsible for controlling the Otis scramble.We found a single communication from the 
weapons director or his technician on the Guard frequency at approximately 9:11, cautioning the Otis fighters: 
"remain at current position [holding pattern] until FAA requests assistance." See NEADS audio file, channel 24. 
That corresponds to the time after the Otis fighters entered the holding pattern and before they headed for New 
York. NEADS controllers were simultaneously working with a tanker to relocate close to the Otis fighters. At 9:10, 
the senior director on the NEADS floor told the weapons director,"I want those fighters closer in." NEADS audio 
file, IdentificationTechnician position, channel 5. At 9:10:22, the Otis fighters were told by Boston Center that the 
second tower had been struck. At 9:12:54, the Otis fighters told their Boston Center controller that they needed 
to establish a combat air patrol over NewYork, and they immediately headed for NewYork City. See FAA audio 
files, Boston Center, position 31R. This series of communications explains why the Otis fighters briefly entered 
and then soon departed the holding pattern, as the radar reconstruction of their flight shows. DOD radar files, 84th 
Radar Evaluation Squadron, "9/1 1 Autoplay," undated. 

121. In response to allegations that NORAD responded more quickly to the October 25, 1999, plane crash 
that killed Payne Stewart than it did to the hijacking of American 1 1 , we compared NORAD's response time for 
each incident. The last normal transmission from the Stewart flight was at 9:27:10 A.M. Eastern DaylightTime.The 
Southeast Air Defense Sector was notified of the event at 9:55, 28 minutes later. In the case of American 11, the 
last normal communication from the plane was at 8:13 A.M. EDT NEADS was notified at 8:38, 25 minutes later. 
We have concluded there is no significant difference in NORAD's reaction to the two incidents. See NTSB memo, 
Aircraft Accident Brief for Payne Stewart incident, Oct. 25, 1999; FAA email, Gahris to Myers, "ZJX Timeline for 
N47BA accident," Feb. 17, 2004. 

122. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; NewYork, NY; September 11, 2001," May 8, 
2002, pp. 5-6. 

123. FAA audio file, NewYork Center, position R42, 8:42-8:45; FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Acci- 
dent; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001," May 8, 2002, pp. 6-8; DOD radar files, 84th Radar Evalua- 
tion Squadron, "9/1 1 Autoplay," undated. The FAA-produced timeline notes, "Based on coordination received from 
[Boston Center] indicating a possible hijack, most of the controller's attention is focused on AAL 1 1." See FAA 
report, "Summary of AirTraffic Hijack Events September 1 1, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; see also David Bottiglia inter- 
view (Oct. 1, 2003); FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL 175; NewYork, NY; September 1 1, 2001," 
May 8, 2002, p. 9. 

124. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, NewYork Center position, line 5114, 8:48. 

125. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; NewYork, NY; September 11, 2001," May 8, 
2002, pp. 12, 14. 

126. Ibid., p. 15. At 8:57, the following exchange between controllers occurred: "I got some handoffs for you. 
We got some incidents going over here. Is Delta 2433 going to be okay at thirty-three? I had to climb him for traf- 
fic. I let you United 175 just took off out of think we might have a hijack over here.Two of them." See FAA memo, 
"Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; NewYork, NY; September 11, 2001," May 8, 2002. 

127. See FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001, "Sept. 17,2001;Evanna Dowis 
interview/ (Sept. 30, 2004); Michael McCormick interview (Dec. 15, 2003); FAA record, Personnel Statement of 
Michael McCormick, Oct. 17, 2001. See also FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; NewYork, 
NY; September 11, 2001," May 8, 2002, p. 17. 

128. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Command Center; NOM Operational Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 
14,2003, pp. 15-17. 



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460 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 

129. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001 "Jan. 17, 
2002, p. 3. 

130. "N90 [New YorkTerminal Radar Approach] controller stated 'at approximately 9:00 a.m., I observed an 
unknown aircraft south of the Newark, New Jersey Airport, northeast bound and descending out of twelve thou- 
sand nine hundred feet in a rapid rate of descent, the radar target terminated at the World Trade Center.'" FAA 
report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001. Former NORAD official Alan 
Scott testified that the time of impact of United 175 was 9:02. William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003. We have 
determined that the impact time was 9:03:11 based on our analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control soft- 
ware logic. 

131. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center position, line 5114, 9:02:34. 

132. Ibid., 9:03; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, Cleveland/Boston position, line 5115, 9:05; 
Michael McCormick interview (Oct. 1, 2003); David LaCates interview (Oct. 2, 2003). 

133. FAA Audio File, Herndon Command Center, Boston Center position, line 5115, 9:05—9:07. 

134. Joseph McCain interview (Oct. 28, 2003); Robert Marr (Jan. 23, 2004); James Fox interview (Oct. 29, 
2003); Dawne Deskins interview (Oct. 30, 2003). 

135. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 9:07:32. 

136. Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003);Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004). 

137. Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military airspace and then to 
New York, the battle commanders "were concerned about refueling. As NEADS personnel looked for refueling 
tankers in the vicinity of New York, the mission crew commander considered scrambling the Langley fighters to 
New York to provide backup for the Otis fighters until the NEADS Battle Cab (the command area that overlooks 
the operations floor) ordered "battle stations only at Langley." The alert fighters at Langley Air Force Base "were 
ordered to battle stations at 9:09. Colonel Marr, the battle commander at NEADS, and General Arnold, the CONR 
commander, both recall that the planes were held on battle stations, as opposed to scrambling, because they might 
be called on to relieve the Otis fighters over New York City if a refueling tanker "was not located, and also because 
of the general uncertainty of the situation in the sky. According to William Scott at the Commission's May 23,2003, 
hearing, "At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations,just based on the general situation and the breaking 
news, and the general developing feeling about what's going on." See NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Comman- 
der, channel 2, 9:08:36; Robert Marr interview (Oct. 27, 2003); Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 3, 2004). See also 
Colonel Marr's statement that "[t]he plan was to protect New York City." Filson, Air War Over America, p. 60. 

138. Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control transmissions. 

139. The Indianapolis Center controller advised other Indianapolis Center personnel of the developing situa- 
tion.They agreed to "sterilize" the airspace along the flight's westerly route so the safety of other planes would not 
be affected. John Thomas interview (May 4,2004). 

140. John Thomas interview (Sept. 24, 2003). According to the FAA-produced timeline, at 9:09 Indianapolis 
Center "notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center a possible aircraft accident of AMERICAN 77 due to 
the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification." FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack 
Events September 1 1, 2001," Sept. 17,2001. 

141. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Operations Manager position, line 4525; FAA audio 
file, Herndon Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer east position, line 4530; FAA memo, "Full 
Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; 
September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, p. 13. 

142. Primary radar contact for Flight 77 "was lost because the "preferred" radar in this geographic area had no 
primary radar system, the "supplemental" radar had poor primary coverage, and the FAA ATC software did not 
allow the display of primary radar data from the "tertiary" and "quadrary" radars. 

143. David Boone interview (May 4, 2004); CharlesThomas interview (May 4, 2004);JohnThomas interview 
(May 4, 2004); Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control software logic. 

144. John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); CharlesThomas interview (May 4, 2004). We have reviewed all 
FAA documents, transcripts, and tape recordings related to American 77 and have found no evidence that FAA 
headquarters issued a directive to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. Review of the same mate- 
rials also indicates that no one within FAA located American 77 until the aircraft "was identified by Dulles con- 
trollers at 9:32. For much of that time, American 77 was traveling through Washington Center's airspace. The 
Washington Center's controllers were looking for the flight, but they were not told to look for primary radar returns. 

145. John White interview (May 7, 2004); Ellen King interview (Apr. 5, 2004); Linda Schuessler interview (Apr. 
6, 2004); Benedict Sliney interview (May 21, 2004); FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System 
Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 
14,27. 

146. John Hendershot interview (Dec. 22, 2003). 

147. FAA memo, "Partial Transcript; Aircraft Accident; AAL77; Washington, DC; September 11, 2001," Sept. 
20,2001, p.7. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 461 



148. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7, 9:21:10. 

149. NE ADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:21:50; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22—23, 
2004). 

150. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, Channel 2, 9:22:34. The mission commander thought to 
put the Langley scramble over Baltimore and place a "barrier cap" between the hijack and Washington, D.C. Kevin 
Nasypany interview (Jan. 22—23, 2004). 

151. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:32:10; ibid., 9:33:58. 

152. For first quote, see NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:35:50. For second 
quote, see NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7, 9:36:34; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 
22-23, 2004). For the third quote, see NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:39; 9:39:37; 
Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22—23, 2004). 

153. Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1,2003); FAA memo, "Partial Transcript; Scramble Aircraft; QUIT25; Sep- 
tember 1 1, 2001," Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 2—4 (Peninsular Radar position); FAA memo, "Partial Transcript; Scramble Air- 
craft; QUIT25; September 11, 2001," Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 2-5 (East Feeder Radar position). 

154. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:38:02; Dawne Deskins interview (Oct. 30, 
2003). The estimated time of impact of Flight 77 into the Pentagon is based on Commission analysis of FDR, air 
traffic control, radar, and Pentagon elevation and impact site data. 

15 5. Joseph Cooper interview (Sept. 22, 2003); NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, recorder 
1, channel 7, 9:41. 

156. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 9:42:08. 

157. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11,2001," 
May 10, 2002, p. 10. 

15 8. The United 93 timeline in FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 1 1, 2001," Sept. 
17, 2001, states that at 9:28:17 "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from 
an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB [Cleveland Center] radio." See FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft 
Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 1 1. 

15 9. The United 93 timeline in FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 1 1, 2001," Sept. 
17, 2001, states that at 9:28:54 a "second radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, again with sounds of possible 
screaming or a struggle and a statement, 'get out of here, get out of here' from an unknown origin was heard over 
the ZOB [Cleveland Center] radio." FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Lorain Radar position; FAA memo, "Full 
Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 11. At 
9:31:48, Execjet 56 also called in, reporting that "we're just answering your call. We did hear that, uh, yelling too." 
The FAA responded at 9:31:51, "Okay, thanks. We 're just trying to figure out what's going on." FAA memo, "Full 
Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 15. 

160. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11,2001," 
May 10, 2002, p. 15. 

161. FAA memo, "Full Transcription; AirTraffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Manage- 
ment Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 10, 13; FAA audio file, Herndon Command 
Center, New York Center position, line 5154. 

162. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11,2001," 
May 10, 2002, p. 19. 

163. Ibid., p. 23. 

164. FAA memo, "Full Transcription; AirTraffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Manage- 
ment Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001, "Oct. 2 1,2003, pp. 16— 17; FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Lorain 
Radar position; FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 
2001," May 10, 2002, pp. 26-32. 

165. FAA memo, "Full Transcription; AirTraffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Manage- 
ment Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 17-19. 

166. For 9:46 quotation, see ibid., pp. 19—20. For 9:49 discussion about military assistance, see ibid., p. 21. 

167. For 9:53 discussion about scrambling aircraft, see ibid., p. 23. Neither Monte Belger nor the deputy direc- 
tor for air traffic services could recall this discussion in their interviews with us. Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 
2004); Peter Challan interview (Mar. 26, 2004). Subsequently Belger told us he does not believe the conversation 
occurred. Monte Belger, email to the Commission, July 12, 2004. However, tapes from the morning reveal that at 
9:53 a staff person from headquarters told the Command Center "Peter's talking to Monte now about scrambling." 
FAA memo,"FullTranscription;AirTraffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Offi- 
cer, East Position; September 1 1, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, p. 23. For discussions about the status of United 93, see ibid., 
pp. 24-27. 

168. Ibid., pp. 23— 27. We also reviewed a report regarding seismic observations on September 1 1, 2001, whose 
authors conclude that the impact time of United 93 was "10:06:05 + 5 (EDT)."Won- Young Kim and G. R. Baum, 
"Seismic Observations during September 1 1, 2001, Terrorist Attack," spring 2002 (report to the Maryland Depart- 



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462 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 

merit of Natural Resources). But the seismic data on which they based this estimate are far too weak in signal-to- 
noise ratio and far too speculative in terms of signal source to be used as a means of contradicting the impact time 
established by the very accurate combination of FDR, CVR, ATC, radar, and impact site data sets. These data sets 
constrain United 93's impact time to within 1 second, are airplane- and crash-site specific, and are based on time 
codes automatically recorded in the ATC audiotapes for the FAA centers and correlated with each data set in a 
process internationally accepted within the aviation accident investigation community. Furthermore, one of the 
study's principal authors now concedes that "seismic data is not definitive for the impact of UA 93." Email from 
Won- Young Kim to the Commission, "Re: UA Flight 93," July 7, 2004; see also Won- Young Kim, "Seismic Obser- 
vations for UA Flight 93 Crash near Shanksville, Pennsylvania during September 1 1, 2001," July 5, 2004. 

169. FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Manage- 
ment Officer, East Position; September 1 1 , 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, p. 31 . 

170. For 10:17 discussion, see ibid., p. 34. For communication regarding "black smoke," see FAA memo, "Full 
Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93) Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, pp. 16-18 
(Cleveland Center, Imperial Radar position). This report from the C-130H was recorded on ATC audio about 1 
minute and 37 seconds after the impact time of United 93 as established by NTSB and Commission analysis of 
FDR, CVR, radar, and impact data sets — more than a minute before the earliest impact time originally posited by 
the authors of the seismic data report. 

171.NEADS audio file, Identification Technician, channel 5, 10:07. 

172. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 10:10. 

173. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician, channel 4, 10:14. 

174. DOD record, NEADS MCC/T Log Book, Sept. 11,2001. 
175. William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003. 

176. Larry Arnold testimony, May 23, 2003. 

177. See DOD record, NEADS MCC/T Log Book, Sept. 11, 2001. The entry in this NEADS log records the 
tail number not of American 77 but of American 1 1: "American Airlines #N334AA hijacked." See also DOD record, 
Surveillance Log Book, Sept. 1 1 , 2001 . 

178. William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003; DOD briefing materials, "Noble Eagle; 9-11 Timeline," undated. 

179. For lack of knowledge about the hijacking, see, e.g., White House transcript, Card interview with Ron 
Fournier of the Associated Press, Aug. 7, 2002. For information on the hijacking within the FAA, see the discus- 
sion of American 11 in section 1.2. 

180. SeeWhite House record, Situation Room Log, Sept. 11, 2001; White House record, Presidential Emer- 
gency Operations Center (PEOC) Watch Log, Sept. 1 1, 2001 ; DOD record, Senior Operations Officer log, Sept. 
11,2001. 

181. Jane Garvey interview (Jun. 30, 2004); Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004). 

182. For notifications, see DOD record, Assistant Deputy Director Operations Passdown Log, Sept. 11, 2001. 
For the call to the FAA, see DOD record, Senior Operations Officer log, Sept. 1 1 , 200 1 ("9 :00 NMCC called FAA, 
briefed of explosion at WTC possibly from aircraft crash. Also, hijacking of American Flight 1 1 from Boston to LA, 
now enroute to Kennedy"). For the scrambling ofjets not being discussed, see Ryan Gonsalves interview (May 14, 
2004). 

183. Secret Service records show the motorcade arriving between 8:50 and 8:55. USSS record, shift log, Sept. 
11, 2001 (8:55); USSS record, Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (8:50). For Andrew Card's recollec- 
tion, see Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). For the President's reaction, see Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 
2004);White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Schieffer of CBS News, Apr. 17, 2002. 

184. White House transcript, Rice interview with Evan Thomas of Newsiveek, Nov. 1, 2001, p. 2; see also White 
House record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 

185. White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview "with Nctvsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 1. 

186. For Rice's meeting, see White House transcript, Rice interview with Bob Woodward of the Washington 
Post, Oct. 24, 2001, pp. 360—361. For White House staff monitoring the news, see, e.g., White House transcript, 
Rice interview with Evan Thomas, Nov. 1 1, 2001, p. 388. 

187. On White House staff reaction, see White House transcript, Rice interview "with Bob Woodward, Oct. 
24, 2001, p. 361; Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). On security enhancements, see USSS memo, interview 
with CarlTruscott, Oct. 1, 2001, p. 1. On security measures being precautionary, see CarlTruscott interview (Apr. 
15,2004). 

188. For the time of the teleconference, see FAA record, Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11, 2001. For recollec- 
tions of the NMCC officer, see Charles Chambers interview (Apr. 23, 2004). For recollections of the FAA man- 
ager, see Michael Weikert interview (May 7, 2004). For Belger's reaction, see Monte Belger testimony, June 17, 
2004. 

189. For the times of the video teleconference, see White House record, Situation Room Communications Log, 
Sept. 1 1, 2001 (9:25 start); CIA notes, Cofer Black timeline, Sept. 11,2001 (CIA representativesjoining at 9:40); FAA 
record, Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11,2001 (FAA representatives joining at 9:40). 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 463 

190. Patrick Gardner interview (May 12, 2004). For participants, see Jane Garvey interview {Oct. 21, 2003); 
Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Jeff Griffith interview (Mar. 31, 2004). On the absence of Defense offi- 
cials, see John Brunderman interview {May 17, 2004). The White House video teleconference was not connected 
into the area of the NMCC where the crisis was being managed. Thus the director of the operations team — who 
was on the phone with NORAD — did not have the benefit of information being shared on the video teleconfer- 
ence. See, e.g., Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004): MontagueWmfield interview (Apr. 26, 2004); Patrick Gard- 
ner interview (May 12, 2004). Moreover, when the Secretary andVice Chairman later participated in the White 
House video teleconference, they were necessarily absent from the NMCC and unable to provide guidance to the 
operations team. See DOD report, OT-2 Analysis of NMCC Response to Terrorist Attack on 11 SEP 01, Oct. 4, 
2001;John Brunderman interview (May 17, 2004). 

191. NSC notes, Paul Kurtz notes, Sept. 1 1, 2001; Paul Kurtz meeting (Dec. 22, 2003). For shootdown author- 
ity having already been conveyed, see DOD transcript, AirThreat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. 

192. Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004). For the job of the NMCC in an emergency, see NMCC brief- 
ing (July 21, 2003). 

193. For the Secretary's activities, see DOD memo, interview of Donald Rumsfeld, Dec. 23, 2002; Stephen 
Cambone interview (July 8, 2004). 

194. Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004). Secure teleconferences are the NMCC's primary means of coor- 
dinating emergencies, and they fall into two categories: "event" and "threat." Event conferences seek to gather infor- 
mation. If the situation escalates, a threat conference may be convened. On 9/11, there was no preset teleconference 
for a domestic terrorist attack. NMCC and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) briefing (July 21, 
2003). For the content of the conferences on 9/11, see DOD transcript, AirThreat Conference Call, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 

195. See DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001; see also White House notes,Thomas 
Gould notes, Sept. 11,2001. 

196. On difficulties in including the FAA, see NMCC and NMJIC briefing {July 21, 2003);John Brunderman 
interview (May 17, 2004). On NORAD and the time of the FAA's joining, see DOD transcript, AirThreat Con- 
ference Call, Sept. 1 1, 2001. For the FAA representative, see Rayford Brooks interview (Apr. 15, 2004). 

197. Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004); Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004). 

198. DOD transcript, AirThreat Conference Call, Sept. 11,2001. 

199. On the briefing, see ibid. The Vice Chairman was on Capitol Hill when the Pentagon was struck, and he 
saw smoke as his car made its way back to the building. Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004). For the Chair- 
man being out of the country, see DOD record, Deputy Director for Operations Passdown Log, Sept. 11, 2001. 

200. DOD transcript, AirThreat Conference Call, Sept. 11,2001. 

201. Ibid. 

202. Ibid. 

203. For the President being informed at 9:05, see White House record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 
For Card's statement, see White House transcript, Card interview with Ron Fournier, Aug. 7, 2002. For the Pres- 
ident's reaction, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). 

204. For the President's activities, see Education Channel videotape, "Raw Footage of President Bush at Emma 
E. Booker Elementary School," Sept. 1 1, 2001 (remaining in classroom); Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004) 
(in the holding room). For his calls, see White House record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001 (9:15 call to 
Vice President); Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004) (call to Rice); President Bush and Vice President Cheney 
meeting (Apr. 29, 2004) (call to Pataki); White House record, Secure Switchboard Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (call to 
Mueller). For the decision to make a statement, see An Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For the Secret Service's 
perspective, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004). 

205. On the return to Washington, see Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004); Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 
31, 2004). On consulting with senior advisers, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). On information about 
additional aircraft, see, e.g., Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). On decisions and the focus on the President's 
speech, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 
2004);Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). 

206. On the motorcade, see USSS record, shift log, Sept. 1 1, 2001 (departing 9:35, arriving 9:45); USSS record, 
Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 1 1, 2001 (departing 9:36, arriving 9:42). Fleischer deduced from his notes that 
the President learned about the Pentagon while in the motorcade. An Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For the 
President's actions and statements to the Vice President, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004);White House 
notes, Ari Fleischer notes, Sept. 11, 2001. 

207. On not returning to Washington, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004); USSS memo, interview 
of Edward Marinzel, Oct. 3, 2001; Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). For additional sources on the President's 
desire to return, see White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Neivsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5. 
For the Vice President's recollection, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For 
time of departure, see USSS record, Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 1 1, 2001 . On Air Force One's objectives 
on takeoff, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004). 



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464 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 

208. USSS memo, interview of Gregory LaDow, Oct. 1,2001, p. 1. Shortly after the second attack in New York, 
a senior Secret Service agent charged "with coordinating the President's movements established an open line with 
his counterpart at the FAA, who soon told him that there were more planes unaccounted for — possibly hijacked — 
in addition to the two that had already crashed. Though the senior agent told someone to convey this information 
to the Secret Service's operations center, it either was not passed on or was passed on but not disseminated; it failed 
to reach agents assigned to the Vice President, and the Vice President was not evacuated at that time. See Nelson 
Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); USSS memo, interview of Nelson Garabito, Oct. 1, 2001; see also Terry Van 
Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004). 

209. American 77's route has been determined through Commission analysis of FAA and military radar data. 
For the evacuation of the Vice President, see White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with 
Neivsiveek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 2; USSS memo, interview of Rocco Delmonico, Oct. 1, 2001 (evacuation of the White 
House); see also White House notes, Mary Matalin notes, Sept. 1 1, 2001. On the time of entering the tunnel, see 
USSS report, "Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, September 1 1— October 3, 2001," Oct. 
3, 2001, p. 2. Secret Service personnel told us that the 9:37 entry time in their timeline was based on alarm data, 
which is no longer retrievable. USSS briefing (Jan. 29, 2004). 

210. White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 4; President 
Bush andVice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). 

211. On Mrs. Cheney, see USSS report, "Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, Sep- 
tember 11— October 3, 2001," Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2 (time of arrival); White House transcript, Lynne Cheney inter- 
view with Newsweek, Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2 (joining theVice President). For the contemporaneous notes, see White 
House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On the content of the Vice President's call, see White House 
transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5. According to the Vice President, 
there was "one phone call from the tunnel. And basically I called to let him know that we were a target and I 
strongly urged him not to return to Washington right away, that he delay his return until we could find out what 
the hell was going on." For their subsequent movements, see White House transcnpt,Vice President Cheney inter- 
view with Neivsiveek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5;White House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview "with Newsweek, Nov. 
9, 2001, p. 2. 

212. On communications problems, see, e.g., President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 
2004). On lack of an open line, see, e.g., Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004). 

213. On the Vice President's call, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For 
the Vice President's time of arrival in the shelter conference room, see White House record, PEOC Shelter Log, 
Sept. 11, 2001 (9:58); USSS memo, OVP 9/1 1 Timeline, Nov. 17, 2001 (9:52; Mrs. Cheney arrived White House 
and joined him in tunnel); White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes (9:55; he is on phone with President);White 
House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2 ("And "when I got there, he was on 
the phone with the President . . . But from that first place where I ran into him, I moved with him into what they 
call the PEOC"); White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 4 
(9:35 or 9:36 arrival; he estimated a 15-minute stay); Carl Truscott interview (Apr. 15, 2004) (arrived with Pace 
and the Vice President in conference room: called headquarters immediately: call logged at 1 0:00); President Bush 
and Vice President Cheney meeting, Apr. 29, 2004 (Vice President viewed television footage of Pentagon ablaze in 
tunnel); White House transcript, Rice interview "with Evan Thomas, Nov. 1, 2001, p. 388 (Rice viewed television 
footage of Pentagon ablaze in Situation Room). For the Vice President's recollection about the combat air patrol, 
see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); White House transcript, President Bush 
interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 17, 2001, p. 16. 

214. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); see also White House transcript, Vice 
President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, pp. 7—8. 

215. Douglas Cochrane meeting (Apr. 16, 2004); Condeleeza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). For Rice entering 
after the Vice President, see USSS report, "Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, September 
1 1-October 3, 2001," Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2; Carl Truscott interview (Apr. 15, 2004). 

216. In reconstructing events that occurred in the PEOC on the morning of 9/1 1, we relied on (1) phone logs 
of the White House switchboard; (2) notes of Lewis Libby, Mrs. Cheney, and Ari Fleischer; (3) the tape (and then 
transcript) of the air threat conference call; and (4) Secret Service and White House Situation Room logs, as well 
as four separate White House Military Office logs (the PEOC Watch Log, the PEOC Shelter Log, the Communi- 
cations Log, and the 9/11 Log). 

217. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 1 1, 2001. For one open line between the Secret Ser- 
vice and the FAA, see note 208. At Secret Service headquarters, personnel from the intelligence division were also 
on a phone conference with FAA headquarters. Chuck Green interview (Mar. 10, 2004). For notification of an 
inbound aircraft at 10:02, see USSS record, Intelligence Division timeline, Sept. 1 1, 2001; USSS record, Crisis Cen- 
ter Incident Monitor, Sept. 1 1, 2001. For the FAA's projection, see Tim Grovack interview (Apr. 8, 2004). For Secret 
Service updates, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 

218. White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001;White House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 
11,2001. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 465 

219. For Libby's characterization, see White House transcript, Scooter Libby interview with Netvstveek, Nov. 
2001. For the Vice President's statement, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). 
For the second authorization, see White House notes, Lyime Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001; White House notes, 
Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001. 

220. Joshua Bolten meeting (Mar. 18, 2004); see also White House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001 
("10:15— 18: Aircraft 60 miles out, confirmed as hijack — engage? VP:Yes.JB [Joshua Bolten]: Get President and con- 
firm engage order"). 

221. For the Vice President's call, see White House record, Secure Switchboard Log, Sept. 1 1, 2001; White House 
record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001; White House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001. Fleischer's 
10:20 note is the first mention of shootdown authority. See White House notes,Ari Fleischer notes, Sept. 1 1, 2001; 
see also An Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). 

222. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11,2001. 

223. On reports of another plane, see White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 1 1, 2001; White House 
notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 1 1, 2001. On the Vice President's authorization, see ibid.; DOD transcript, Air Threat 
Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. For Hadley's statement, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 
11,2001. 

224. For the quotation, see White House transcript, Libby interview with Ncivswcck, Nov. 2001. On the air- 
craft's identity, see White House record, White House Military Office Log, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 

225. On the NMCC, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. On the Secret Service's 
contacts with the FAA, see notes 208, 217. On the Secret Service conveying information to the White House, see 
DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 1 1, 2001; Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11,2004). 

226. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11,2001. 

227. Ibid. 

228. Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004). On the morning of 9/1 1, General Eberhart was in his office at 
headquarters — roughly 30 minutes away from Cheyenne Mountain, where the operations center is located. 

229. DOD record, Continental Region chat log, Sept. 11,2001. 

230. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 10:32:12. For the text of the chat log 
message, see DOD record, Continental Region chat log, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 

231. For the statements of NEADS personnel, see Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004) (NEADS com- 
mander); Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22, 2004) (mission commander); James Fox interview (Oct. 29, 2004) 
(senior weapons director). On the understanding of leaders in Washington, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Con- 
ference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. For the orders to Langley pilots, see NEADS audio file,Weapons Director position, 
recorder 1, channel 2, 10:10—1 1. 

232. For evidence of the President speaking to Rumsfeld, see White House notes,Ari Fleischer notes, Sept. 1 1, 
2001. On inability to recall this conversation, see Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004). 

233. DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. 

234. Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004). At 11:15, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke to the President and told 
him DOD was working on refining the rules of engagement so pilots would have a better understanding of the 
circumstances under which an aircraft could be shot down. See, e.g., DOD notes, Stephen Cambone notes, Sept. 
11, 2001. DOD did not circulate written rules of engagement until sometime after 1:00 P.M. See DOD memo, 
rules of engagement, Sept. 1 1, 2001 (faxed to Andrews Air Force Base at 1:45 P.M.). 

235. David Wherley interview (Feb. 27, 2004). 

236. The 1 13th Wing first learned from the FAA tower at Andrews that the Secret Service wanted fighters air- 
borne. The FAA tower had been contacted by personnel at FAA headquarters, who were on an open line with sen- 
ior agents from the President's detail. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); Terry Van Steenbergen 
interview (Mar. 30, 2004). On the Secret Service agent relaying instructions, see USSS memo, Beauchamp to AD- 
Inspection, September 1 1 experience, Feb. 23, 2004. On the order to fly weapons free, see David Wherley inter- 
view (Feb. 27, 2004); DOD memo, interview of David Wherley, Oct. 3, 2001, p. 12. 

237. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). 

238. These estimates are based on analysis of Boeing 757 maximum operating speed data, FAA and military 
radar data, and assumptions regarding how the airplane would be operated en route to the Washington, D.C., area. 
The shortest time frame assumes maximum speed without regard to overspeed warnings, a straight-line path, and 
no time allowed for maneuvering or slowing to aim and crash the airplane into its target. The probable time frame 
allows for speeds consistent with the observed operation of the airplane prior to its final maneuvers and crash, as 
well as for maneuvers and slowing in the D.C. area to take aim. According to radar data, the fighters from Langley 
Air Force Base arrived over Washington at about 10:00 A.M. Two of the three Langley fighters were fully armed 
(i.e., with missiles and guns); the third fighter carried only guns. Craig Borgstrom interview (Dec. 1, 2003). 

239. For the pilots' awareness, see Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1, 2003); Bradley Derrig interview (Dec. 1, 
2003); Craig Borgstrom interview (Dec. 1, 2003). For the quotation, see Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1, 2003). 

240. For no authority at 10:10, see NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2. For shootdown 



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466 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 

authority at 10:31, see DOD record, Continental Region chat log, Sept. 1 1, 2001. For possibility of ordering a shoot- 
down, see Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 2, 2004). 

241. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, recorder 1, channel 4, 10:1.12:22. 

2 The Foundation of the New Terrorism 

l."Text ofWorld Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,"/!/ Quds al Arabi, Feb. 
23, 1998 (trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service), which was published for a large Arab world audience and 
signed by Usama Bin Ladm, Ayman al Zawahiri (emir of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad), Abu Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha 
(leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group), Mir Hamzah (secretary of the Jamiat ul Ulenia e Pakistan), and Fazlul Rah- 
man (head of the Jihad Movement m Bangladesh). 

2. "Hunting Bin Ladm," PBS Frontline broadcast, May 1998 (online at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/ 
shows/binladen/who/i nterview.html). 

3. Usama Bin Ladin, "Declaration ofWar Against the Americans Occupying the Land of theTwo Holy Places," 
Aug. 23, 1996 (trans., online at www.terrorisnifiles.org/individuals/declaration_ofjihadl.html}. 

4. "Hunting Bin Ladin," PBS Frontline broadcast, May 1998. 

5. Ibid. 

6. For a classic passage conveying the nostalgic view of Islam's spread, see Henri Pirenne, A History of Europe, 
trans. Bernard Miall (University Books, 1956), pp. 25—26. 

7. See Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalism Observed, vol. 1 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1994). 

8. See Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, enlarged ed. (Yale Univ. Press, 1990). 

9. From the perspective of Islamic, not Arab, history, the Baghdad Caliphates destruction by the Mongols in 
1292 marks the end not of Islamic greatness but of Arab dominance of the Muslim world. Moghul India, Safavid 
Persia, and, above all, the Ottoman Empire were great Islamic powers that arose long after the Baghdad Caliphate 
fell. 

10. Bin Ladin, "Declaration ofWar,"Aug. 23, 1996. 

1 l.The Muslim Brotherhood, which arose in Egypt in 1928 as a Sunni religious/nationalist opposition to the 
British-backed Egyptian monarchy, spread throughout the Arab world in the mid— twentieth century. In some coun- 
tries, its oppositional role is nonviolent; in others, especially Egypt, it has alternated between violent and nonvio- 
lent struggle with the regime. 

12.Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (American Trust Publications, 1990). Qutb found sin everywhere, even in rural mid- 
western churches. Qutb's views "were best set out in Sayyid Qutb, "The America I Have Seen" (1949), reprinted in 
Kamal Abdel-Malek, ed., America in an Arab Mirror: Images of America in ArabicTravei Literature: An Anthology (Palgrave, 
2000). 

13. For a good introduction to Qutb, see National Public Radio broadcast, "Sayyid Qutb's America," May 6, 
2003 (online at www.npr.org/display_pages/features/feature_1253796.html). 

14. "Bin Laden's 'Letter to America,'" Observer Wortdvieif, Nov. 24, 2002 (trans., online at 
http://observer.guardiLin.co.uk/worldview/storv/(t, I 1 58 1 ,845725, 00. html). The al Qaeda letter was released in 
conjunction with the release of an audio message from Bin Ladm himself. 

15. Ibid. 

16. See Arab Human Development Report 2003 (United Nations, 2003), a report prepared by Arabs that exam- 
ines not only standard statistical data but also more sensitive social indicators recently identified by the Nobel 
Prize— winning economist Amartya Sen. It says little, however, about the political dimensions of economic and social 
trends. See Mark LeVine, "The UN Arab Human Development Report: A Critique," Middle East Report, July 26, 
2002 (online at www.merip.org/mero/mer0072602.html). 

17. President Bush, remarks at roundtable with Arab- and Muslim-American leaders, Sept. 10, 2002 (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020910-7.html). 

18. See, e.g.. Intelligence report, interrogation of Zubaydah. Oct. 29, 2002; CIA analytic report, "Bin Ladins 
Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable," CTC 00-40017CSH, Nov. 2, 2000. 

19. "Open resistance flared so quickly that only two months after the invasion . . . almost the entire population 
of Kabul climbed on their rooftops and chanted with one voice,'God is great.'This open defiance of the Russian 
generals who could physically destroy their city was matched throughout the countryside." General (Ret.) 
Mohammed Yahya Nawwroz and Lester W. Grau,"The Soviet War in Afghanistan; History and Harbinger of Future 
War?" Military Review (Fort Leavenworth Foreign Military Studies Office), Sept. /Oct. 1995, p. 2. 

20. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 16— 23. Regard- 
ing UBL's access to his family's fortune, see Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004); William Wechsler interview 
(Jan. 7,2004). 

21. Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States 
v. Enaam Amaout, No. 02-CR-892 (N.D. 111. filed Jan. 6, 2003). 

22. Intelligence report, Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin's Historical Links to 'Abdallah Azzam, Apr. 18, 1997. By 



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£3 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 467 

most accounts, Bin Ladin initially viewed Azzam as a mentor, and became in effect his partner by providing finan- 
cial backing for the MAK. 

23. In his memoir,Ayman al Zawahiri contemptuously rejects the claim that the Arab mujahideen were financed 
(even "one penny") or trained by the United States. See Zawahiri, "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner,"/!/ Sharq 
alAwsat, Dec. 2, 2001. CIA officials involved in aiding the Afghan resistance regard Bin Ladin and his "Arab Afghans" 
as having been militarily insignificant in the war and recall having little to do with him. Gary Schroen interview 
(Mar. 3,2003). 

24. See Abdullah Azzam, "Al Qaeda al SulbalT (The solid foundation), Al Jihad, Apr. 1988, p. 46. 

25. A wealth of information on al Qaeda's evolution and history has been obtained from materials seized in 
recent years, including files labeled "Tareekh Usama" (Usama's history) and "Tareekh al Musadat" (History of the 
Services Bureau). For descriptions of and substantial excerpts from these files, see Government's Evidentiary Prof- 
fer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States I'.Arnaont, Jan. 6, 20(13. See also Intel- 
ligence report, Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to 
Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; DOD document, "Al-Qaeda," AFGP-2002-000080 (translated). For a particularly useful 
insight into the evolution of al Qaeda — written by an early Bin Ladin associate, Adel Batterjee, under a pseudo- 
nym — see Basil Muhammad, Al Ansar at Arab fi Afghanistan (The Arab volunteers in Afghanistan) (Benevolence Inter- 
national Foundation (BIF) and World Association of MuslimYouth, 1991). 

26. Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States 
v.Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2(103. 

27. See FBI report of investigation, interview ofjamal al Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Gunaratna, Inside At Qaeda, p. 23. 

28. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 6—7, 57—63, 83—85; 
United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104-105, 123-124 (2d Cir.Aug. 16, 1996). 

29. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 25—27; DOD document, "Union Agreement between Jama 'at Qaedat Ansar 
Allah (The Base Group of Allah Supporters) and Jama'at Al-Jihad (Jihad Group)," AFGP-2002-000081, undated; 
Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, p. 103. 

30. Trial testimony ofjamal al Fadl, United States v. Usama bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), Feb. 6, 
2001 (transcript pp. 218-219, 233); Feb. 13, 2001 (transcript pp. 514-516); Feb. 20, 2001 (transcript p. 890). Fadl 
says this invitation was delivered by a Sudanese delegation that visited Bin Ladin in Afghanistan. See also CIA ana- 
lytic report, "Al-Qaida in Sudan, 1992-1996: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths," CTC 2003- 
40028CHX, Mar. 10, 2003. 

31. See Intelligence report, Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from 
Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996. 

32. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 220-224). 

33. For Bin Ladin's confrontation with the Saudi regime, see, e.g., Peter L.Bergen, Holy War Inc. : Inside the Secret 
World of Osama bin Ladin (Touchstone, 2001), pp. 80—82. On aid provided by a dissident member of the royal fam- 
ily, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 
26, 2003. See also FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996. 

34. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 34. 

35. Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's business activities in 1992, Mar. 31, 1994; Intelligence report, Terrorism: 
Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; CIA 
analytic report, "Old School Ties," Mar. 10,2003. 

36. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 301-302, 305-306, 315-317, 
367—368); Intelligence report, Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from 
Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; CIA analytic report, "Old School Ties," Mar. 10,2003. 

37. See Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's business activities in 1992, Mar. 31, 1994; Intelligence report, Shipment 
of Arms and Boats toYemen for Use by an Islamic Extremist, Aug. 9, 1996; Intelligence report, Terrorism: Respon- 
sibilities and Background of Islamic Army Shura Council, Dec. 19, 1996; CIA analytic report, "Old School Ties," 
Mar. 10, 2003; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Nov. 12, 1996; CIA analytic report, 
"Usama Bin Ladin: Al-Qa'ida's Business and Financial Links in Southeast Asia," CTC 2(J02-40066CH,June 6, 2 (.102. 
For Bin Ladin's involvement in the Bosnian conflicts, see Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida'sjiliad in Europe :The Afghan - 
Bosnian Network (Berg, 2004). 

38. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript p. 354); FBI reports of investiga- 
tion, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Dec. 21, 1998; "RP Cops Aware of Long-Term Rightwing Muslim Con- 
nection," Manila Times, Apr. 26, 2002. 

39. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States u bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp. 354—355); FBI report of inves- 
tigation, interview of Fadl, Feb. 4, 1998. See also Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Home Affairs, Report to Par- 
liament, "The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat ofTerrorism," Jan. 7, 2003. 

40. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Tenor, pp. 10(1, 235. 

41. See CIA analytic report, "Arizona: Long-Term Nexus For Islamic Extremists," CTC 2(l02-30(.l37H, May 
15, 2002; Steven Emerson, American Jihad (Free Press, 2002), pp. 129-137. 



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468 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 

42. Intelligence report, Fatwa to attack U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia and movement of explosives to Saudi Ara- 
bia,Jan. 8 1997; trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 265—266); trial testi- 
mony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript p. 1163); FBI reports of 
investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Nov. 12, 1996; FBI report of investigation, interview of confiden- 
tial source, Sept. 16, 1999. 

43. On Wali Khan's relationship with Bin Ladin, see Intelligence report, Usama Bin Ladin's Historical Links to 
'Abdallah Azzam,Apr. 18, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Muhammad, AlAnsar 
ul Arab fi Afghanistan. On the Blind Sheikh. Bin Ladin eventually spoke publicly oi his admiration. See ABC News 
interview, "To Terror's Source," May 28, 1998. In late 1992, Abu Zubaydah confided to his diary that he was get- 
ting ready to go to one of al Qaeda's military camps: "Perhaps later I will tell you about the Qa 'ida and Bin Ladin 
group." Intelligence report, translation of Abu Zubaydah 's diary, June 9, 2002. Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed masterminded the 1995 Manila airplot,and KSM helped fundYousef's attempt to blow up the World 
Trade Center m 1993. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. The Blind Sheikh was linked to Yousef 
and the 1993 World Trade Center attack, while Wali Khan was convicted together with Yousef for the Manila air 
conspiracy. 

44. Intelligence report, Usama Bin Ladin Links to a Southern Yemeni Group, Mar. 5, 1997; FBI report of inves- 
tigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; CIA analytic report, "Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003, p. 4. 

45. U.S. intelligence did not learn ofal Qaeda's role in Somalia until 1996. Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's Activ- 
ities in Somalia and Sudanese NIF Support, Apr. 30, 1997. 

46. Intelligence report, Bin Ladm's Activities in Eritrea, Mar. 10, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview 
of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; FBI report of investigation, interview of Essam Mohamed al Ridi, Dec. 7, 
1999; trial testimony of Essam Mohamed al Ridi, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 14, 2001 (transcript pp. 578—593); 
trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 279—285). In June 1998, Bin Ladin was 
indicted on charges arising out of the Somalia attack in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York. 

47. For background about the attack on the training facility, see, e.g., Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 
pp. 132, 242. On the proposed attack in Saudi Arabia, see Intelligence report, Fatwa to attack U.S. interests in Saudi 
Arabia and movement of explosives to Saudi Arabia, Jan. 8, 1997; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, 
Nov. 12, 1996; Feb. 13, 1998. On associates taking credit, see Intelligence report made available to the Commission. 

48. CIA analytic report, "Khobar Bombing: Saudi Shia, Iran, and Usama Bin Ladin All Suspects," CTC 96- 
300 15, July 5, 1996; DIA analytic report, Defense Intelligence Threat Review 96-007, July 1996; Intelligence report 
made available to the Commission. See also Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 224—225, 300—302. 

49. Intelligence report, Usama Bin Ladin's Attempts to Acquire Uranium, Mar. 18, 1997; CIA analytic report, 
"Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?" CTC 97-30002, Jan. 6, 1997; trial testimony of Fadl, 
United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp. 357-366); Feb. 13, 2001 (transcript pp. 528-529); Feb. 20, 2001 
(transcript pp. 982-985). 

50. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 13, 2001 (transcript p. 528). 

51. CIA analytic report, "Old School Ties," Mar. 10,2003. 

52. Intelligence report, Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF, 
Jan. 31, 1997; Intelligence report, Cooperation Among Usama Bin Ladin's Islamic Army, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31 

1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, 
Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 290—293); FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999. 

53. CIA analytic report, "Ansar al-Islam: Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC 2003-4001 1CX, Feb. 1, 
2003. 

54. Ibid.; Intelligence report, al Qaeda and Iraq, Aug. 1, 1997. 

55. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 22, 2003; May 24, 2003. At least one of these reports 
dates the meeting to 1994, but other evidence indicates the meeting may have occurred in February 1995. Greg 
interview (June 25, 2004). 

Two CIA memoranda of information from a foreign government report that the chief of Iraq's intelligence 
service and a military expert in bomb making met with Bin Ladin at his farm outside Khartoum on July 30, 1996. 
The source claimed that Bin Ladin asked for and received assistance from the bomb-making expert, who remained 
there giving training until September 1996, which is when the information was passed to the United States. See 
Intelligence reports made available to the Commission. The information is puzzling, since Bin Ladin left Sudan for 
Afghanistan in May 1996, and there is no evidence he ventured back there (or anywhere else) for a visit. In exam- 
ining the source material, the reports note that the information was received "third hand," passed from the foreign 
government service that "does not meet direcdy with the ultimate source of the information, but obtains the infor- 
mation from him through two unidentified intermediaries, one of whom merely delivers the information to the 
Service." The same source claims that the bomb-making expert had been seen in the area of Bin Ladin's Sudan 
farm in December 1995. 

56. Intelligence report, Possible Islamic Army Foreknowledge of an "Egyptian Operation" and Logistical and 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 469 

Security Assistance Provided for the Attackers, Feb. 13, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 4, 
1997. 

57. Tim Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003). 

58. Trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 
1280-1282). 

59. On the Sudanese economy, see, e.g., Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 1 14—1 15, 132—133. For 
details about Saudi pressure on the Bin Ladin family, see, e.g., Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). Regarding man- 
agement of Bin Ladin's finances, see CIA analytic report,"Usama Bin Ladin:Al-Qa'ida's Financial Facilitators," OTI 
IA2001-134-HXC,Oct. 18, 2001; CIA analytic report,"Shaykh Sa'id:Al-Qa'ida's Loyal Senior Accountant," CTC 
2003-30072H,July 2, 2003; Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Sept. 17, 1998; Aug. 4, 1999. On the 
financial crisis in al Qaeda at this time, see trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. inn Laden, Feb. 
21,2001 (transcript pp. 1282-1284). 

60. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 165-174, 190-205, 255-258); 
Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp. 382—391); trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 
2001 (transcript pp. 1282-1284). 

61. Because the U.S. embassy in Khartoum had been closed in response to terrorist threats, the U.S. Ambas- 
sador to Sudan was working out of the embassy in Nairobi. The Sudanese regime notified him there by fax. See 
Tim Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003); Donald Petterson interview (Sept. 30, 2003); DOS cable, Nairobi 7020, 
"'Sudan: Foreign Minister on Developments re Terrorism and Peace," May 21, 1996. On the attempted assassina- 
tion of Bin Ladin, see FBI report of investigation, interview of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, Oct. 15, 2000; FBI report 
of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999. 

62. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 23, 2003. 

63. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale Univ. Press, 2000), p. 
133; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars.The Secret History of the CIA , Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to Sep- 
tember 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p. 9; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Sept. 27, 2003; 
Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 27, 2003. The current Afghan Foreign Minister told us that one 
of Bin Ladin's planes landed in Islamabad for refueling. See Abdullah Abdullah interview (Oct. 23, 2003). 

64. Rashid, Taliban, pp. 88-90. 

65. See Owen Bennet Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (Yale Univ. Press, 2002); Raffat Pasha interview (Oct. 
25, 2003); Rashid, Taliban;Waleed Ziad,"How the Holy Warriors Learned to Hate," NeivYork Times, June 18, 2004, 
p.A31. 

66. See, e.g., Marvin Weinbaum interview (Aug. 12, 2003); William Milam interview (Dec. 29, 2003). Milam 
described "strategic depth" as Pakistan's need tor a friendly, pliable neighbor on the west due to its hostile relation- 
ship with India on the east. 

67. On Pakistan's consent, see Ahmed Rashid interview (Oct. 27, 2003); see also Rashid, Taliban, p. 139; Intel- 
ligence report, Terrorism: Activities of Bin Ladin's in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India, July 14, 1997; FBI investiga- 
tion, interview of former al Qaeda associate, Mar. 19, 2001, p. 26. On the Afghanistan-Pakistan- centered network 
of guesthouses and training camps, see CIA analytic report, "Sketch of a South Asia— Based Terrorist Training and 
Logistic Network," DITR 95-12, Dec. 1995; CIA analytic report, "The Rise ofUBL and Al-Qa'ida and the Intel- 
ligence Community Response," Mar. 19, 2004 (draft), p. 1 1. 

68. On Bm Ladin's money problems, see trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States u bin Laden, 
Feb. 21, 2003 (transcript pp. 1282-1286); Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); DOS cable, Nairobi 1 1468, 
"Sudan: Major Usama Bin Ladin Asset Deregistered,"Aug. 6, 1996; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 
30, 2003. See also Robert Block, "In War on Terrorism, Sudan Struck a Blow by Fleecing Bin Laden," Wall Street 

Journal, Dec. 3, 2001 , p. Al . 

69. FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; trial testimony of Ashifjuma, 
United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 15, 2001 (transcript pp. 626—627); trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United 
States v. bin Laden, Feb. 22, 2001 (transcript pp. 1264—1267); FBI report of investigation, interview of L'Houssaine 
Kherchtou, Aug. 28, 2000. See also Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 27, 2003. 

70. See trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 22, 2001 (transcript pp. 
1282-1286). 

71. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 41; Rashid, Taliban, 
pp. 19-21, 133. 

72. For Bin Ladin's 1996 fatwa, see Bin Ladin, "Declaration ofWar," Aug. 23, 1996. On constraints from the 
Sudanese, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. On warnings from the Saudi monarchy, see 
Intelligence report,Timeline of events from 1993 bombing ofWo rid Trade Center through 9/11 (citing cables from 
Apr. 1997). 

73. On Bin Ladin's promise to Taliban leaders, see government exhibit no. 1559-T, United States v. bin Laden. 
For the Bin Ladin interview, see CNN broadcast, interview of Bin Ladin by Peter Arnett on Mar. 20, 1997, May 
9, 1997 (available online at http://ne~ws.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/binladen/binladenintvw-cnn.pdi). According to 



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470 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 

KSM, Bin Ladin moved to Kandahar "by order of Emir Al-Moummin," that is, Mullah Omar. See Intelligence 
report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. On the Taliban's invitation to UBL, see Mike briefing (Dec. 12,2003); 
Rashid, Taliban, p. 129. Rashid has also described the move as part of Bin Ladm's plan to solidify his relationship 
with, and eventually gain control over, the Taliban. Ahmed Rashid interview (Oct. 27, 2003). 

74. Intelligence report, unsuccessful Bin Ladin probes for contact with Iraq, July 24, 1998; Intelligence report, 
Saddam Hussein's efforts to repair relations with Saudi government, 2001. 

75. Intelligence report, Iraq approach to Bin Ladin, Mar. 16, 1999. 

76. CIA analytic report, "Ansar al-Islam: Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC 2003-4001 1CX, Feb. 1, 
2003. See also DIA analytic report, "Special Analysis: Iraq's Inconclusive Ties to Al-Qaida,"July 31, 2002; CIA ana- 
lytic report, "Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003. We have seen other intelligence reports at the CIA about 1999 con- 
tacts. They are consistent with the conclusions we provide in the text, and their reliability is uncertain. Although 
there have been suggestions of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda regarding chemical weapons and explosives 
training, the most detailed information alleging such ties came from an al Qaeda operative who recanted much of 
his original information. Intelligence report, interrogation ofal Qaeda operative, Feb. 14, 2004. Two senior Bin Ladin 
associates have adamantly denied that any such ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. Intelligence reports, inter- 
rogations of KSM and Zubaydah, 2003 (cited in CIA letter, response to Douglas Feith memorandum, "Requested 
Modifications to 'Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq— al Qaida Contacts (1990— 2003),"' Dec. 10, 
2003, p. 5). 

77. On Gulf-based donors to Bin Ladin, see Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); CIA analytic report, 
"Saudi-Based Financial Support forTerrorist Organizations," CTC 2002-401 17CH, Nov. 14, 2002. On the rela- 
tionship between Bin Ladin and Omar, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 20, 2002. On rela- 
tions between the Arabs in Afghanistan and the Taliban, see ibid. On financial relations, see CIA analytic report, 
"Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and Activities," OTI IR 1999-170CX,July 29, 1999; CIA, NID,"Near East: UAE: 
Imposition of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin's Finances," June 9, 1999. 

78. CIA analytic report, "Afghanistan: An Incubator for International Terrorism," CTC 01-40004, Mar. 27, 
2001; CIA analytic report, "Al-Qa'ida Still Well Positioned to Recruit Terrorists," July 1, 2002, p. 1. 

79. The number of actual al Qaeda members seems to have been relatively small during the period before 9/11, 
although estimates vary considerably, from the low hundreds to as many as 5,000. For the low hundreds, see Intel- 
ligence report, interrogation of KSM, Dec. 3, 2003. For 5,000, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, 
Nov. 26, 2003. Khallad added that because pledging bayat was secret, the number ofal Qaeda members can only 
be speculative. On al Qaeda's training and indoctrination, see minutes from the August 1988 meeting leading to 
the official formation ofal Qaeda, cited in Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co- 
conspirator Statements, United States v.Arnaont,]:\n. 6, 2003, p. 36. 

80. By 1996, al Qaeda apparently had established cooperative relationships with at least 20 Sunni Islamic extrem- 
ist groups in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and East Asia, as well as with elements of the Saudi opposition. 
See CIA analytic report, "Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003, p. 3. On ties with Southeast Asia and the Malaysian- 
Indonesian JI, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 5, 2003. On Pakistani militant ties to Bin 
Ladin, see CIA analytic report, "Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakistan," Nov. 29, 
2001, p. 1 and appendix B; see also Gunaratna, Inside A! Qaeda, pp. 169—171, 199; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred 
Terror, pp. 286—287. On Europe, see, e.g., trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript 
pp. 301, 315—316), Feb. 7,2001 (transcript p. 368). On London, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, 
Sept. 17, 1997. On Balkans, see Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspira- 
tor Statements, United States v. Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003; Kohlmaim, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe. 

81. See, e.g., "Tareekh Usama" and "Tareekh al Musadat" (described in note 25}. See also FBI report of inves- 
tigation, interviews of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al 'Owhali, Aug. 22—25, 1998; FBI report of investigation, inter- 
view of Nasser Ahmad Nasser al Bahri, Oct. 3, 2001, p. 8. 

82. The merger was de facto complete by February 1998, although the formal "contract" would not be signed 
until June 2001. See Intelligence report, Incorporation of Zawahiri's Organization into Bin Ladin's Al-Qa'ida, and 
Recent [1998] Activities of Egyptian Associates of Al-Qa'ida, Sept. 22, 1998; see also Intelligence report, interro- 
gation of detainee, Feb. 8, 2002. 

83. FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; FBI report of investigation, 
interview of L'Houssame Kherchtou, Aug. 28, 21.100; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 123—124. 

84. On the group's surveillance and photography activities, see trial testimony of L'Houssame Kherchtou, United 
States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 1499—1500); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of L'Houssaine 
Kherchtou, Aug. 18, 2000; Oct. 18, 2000; see also FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 
16, 1999. On Bin Ladm's use of technical equipment to promote his intelligence/security capabilities, see Intelli- 
gence report, Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin's Intelligence Capabilities and Techniques, Dec. 5, 1996. 

85. On the surveillance reports and the Hezbollah training camps, see FBI report of investigation, interview of 
confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; see also Intelligence report, Al Qaeda Targeting Study of U.S. Embassy Nairobi, 
prepared 23 December 1993, Apr. 5, 1999; Intelligence report, Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among 



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^ 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 471 

Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31, 1997; Intelligence report, Cooperation Among Usama Bin Ladin's 
Islamic Army, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996. Bin 
Ladin told his operatives he wanted them to study Hezbollah's 1983 truck bombing of U.S. marines in Lebanon 
that killed 241 and led to the American pullout from Lebanon. See, e.g., statement of All Mohamed in support of 
change of plea, United States v. AH Mohamed, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), Oct. 20, 2000 (transcript p. 30); trial 
testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 292—293); FBI report of investigation, inter- 
view of Fadl, Mar. 10, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999. 

86. Hugh Davies, "Saudis Detain Member of Anti-American Terror Group," Daily Telegraph (London), Aug. 2, 
1997. 

87. For general information on Hage, see Oriana Gill, "Hunting Bin Laden: A Portrait ofWadih El Hage, 
Accused Terrorist," PBS Frontline broadcast, Sept. 12, 2001. On returning to the United States, Hage was met at the 
airport by FBI agents, interrogated, and called the next day before the federal grand jury then investigating Bin 
Ladin. Because he lied to the grand jury about his association with Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, he was arrested imme- 
diately after the embassy bombings a year later. Testimony of Patrick Fitzgerald before the Senate Judiciary Com- 
mittee, Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 3—4. On Hage's phone taps, see introduction of stipulation (government exhibit no. 36), 
United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 27, 2001 (transcript pp. 1575—1576). For Harun's fax, see government exhibit no. 
300A-T, United States v. bin Laden. 

88. "World Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad," Al Quds al Arabi, Feb. 23, 1998; closing statement by Asst. 
U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 1, 2001 (transcript pp. 5369, 5376-5377). On related activ- 
ities in Kenya and Tanzania, see FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohamed Sadeeq Odeh, Aug. 15—28, 
1998. 

89. FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohamed Sadeeq Odeh, Aug. 15—28, 1998; closing statement by 
Asst. U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 1, 2001 (transcript pp. 5239, 5408, 5417). 

90. For the Atef fax, see government exhibit no. 1636-T, United States v. bin Laden. For the fatwa, see govern- 
ment exhibit no. 1602-T, United States v. bin Laden (translation of "Clergymen in Afghanistan Issue a Fatwa calling 
for the Removal of American Forces from the Gulf," Al Quds al Arabi, May 14, 1998). For the interview, see ABC 
News interview, "To Terror's Source," May 28, 1998. 

91. See closing statement by Asst. U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 2, 2001 (transcript 
pp. 5426—5439); see also FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al 'Owhali, Aug. 
22—25, 1998, p. 9. Copies of the declarations issued by "The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places" 
taking credit for the operation were recovered from a raid m Baku, Azerbaijan, after the bombings in September 
1998. See also government exhibit no. 1557C-T, United States v. bin Laden ("The formation of the Islamic Army 
for the Liberation of the Holy Places"); government exhibit no. 1557D-T, United States t>. bin Laden ("Al-Aqsa 
Mosque operation"); government exhibit no. 1557E-T, United States v. bin Laden ("The Holy Ka'ba operation"). 

92. Closing statement by Asst. U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 2, 2001 (transcript p. 
5445). 

93. ABC News interview, "Terror Suspect: An Interview with Osama Bin Laden," Dec. 22, 1998 (conducted 
in Afghanistan by ABC News producer Rahimullah Yousafsai). 

3 Counterterrorism Evolves 

1. Brief of the United States, United States v. RamziAhmedYousef, Lead No. 98-1041 (2d Cir. filed Aug. 25,2000), 
pp. 42-43;John Miller and Michael Stone, with Chris Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/1 1 Plot, and Why the FBI and 
CIA Failed to Stop It (Hyperion, 2002), pp. 95, 99. 

2. On President Clinton's tasking the NSC, see Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003). On the role of dif- 
ferent U.S. government agencies, see Steve Coll, Ghost War:The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, 
from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p. 251. 

3. Trial testimony ofBnan Parr, United States v.Yousef, No. S12 93 CR 180 (KTD) (S.D. N.Y.), Oct. 22, 1997 
(transcript p. 4694). 

4. On the process of identification, see Joseph Malone interview (May 25, 2004). 

5. United States v. Salameh, 152 F3d 88, 107-108 (2d Cir. 1998); Miller and Stone, The Cell, pp. 104-105, 107, 
109. Abouhalima had fled to the Middle East after the bombing, and 'was picked up by Egyptian authorities and 
returned to the United States in late March 1993. Brief of the United States, United States v. Mohammed A. Salameh, 
Lead No. 94-1312 (2d Cir. filed Jan. 17, 1997), p. 64 and n. ***. 

6. United States v. Salameh, 152 F3d at 107-108, n. 2; United States v.Yousef, 327 F3d 56, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Miller and Stone, The Cell, p. 119; Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 
2002), p. 12. 

7. On Rahmans ties to the Farouq mosque, see Miller and Stone, The Cell, pp. 54—55. On Rahmans message, 
see United States v. Rahman, 189 F3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1999);Bnef for the United States, United States v. Siddig Ibrahim 
SiddigAli, Lead No. 96-1044 (2d Cir. filed July 3, 1997),pp. 10, 15. See also DOS Inspector General report, "Review 



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472 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 



of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance ofVisas to Sheikh Omar All Ahmed 
Abdel Rahman," Mar. 1994, pp. 6, 8, 36. On the informant's reports, see United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 106-107. 
On the landmarks plot, see United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 108-111, 123-127; Miller and Stone, The Ceil, p. 
116. 

8. These prosecutions also had the unintended consequence of alerting some al Qaeda members to the U.S. 
government's interest in them. In February 1995, the government filed a confidential court document listing Usania 
Bm Ladin and scores of other people as possible co-conspirators in the New York City landmarks plot. Ali 
Mohamed, who was on the list, obtained a copy and faxed it to a close Bin Ladin aide for distribution. Statement 
of Ali Mohamed in support of change ofplea, United States v. Ali Mohamed, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), Oct. 
20,2000 (transcript p. 29); Statements of Prosecutor and Judge, United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. 
N.Y.), Mar. 26, 2001 (transcript pp. 3338-3339); Patrick Fitzgerald interview (Jan. 28, 2004). 

9. On Ajaj's travels to Khaldan and interactions with KSM, see United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 107—108. 
Ajaj had entered the United States on a B-2 tourist visa at NewYork City on September 9, 1991. INS alien file, 
No. A72215823, Sept. 9, 1991. 

10. OnYousef's capture and the Manila air plot, see United States v.Yousef, 327 F.3d at 79—82. On KSM, see Joint 
Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 324—328; CIA analytical report, "WTC 1993:The Solid Case for al-Qa'ida 
Involvement," CTC 2002-40084H,July 11, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 27, 2003;James 
Risen and David Johnston, "Threats and Reponses: Counterterrorism; Qaeda Aide Slipped Away Long Before Sept. 
1 1 Attack," NewYork Times, Mar. 8, 2003, p. A12. 

11. For a general history of the FBI, supporting the subsequent text (unless otherwise noted), see Athan G. 
Theoharis, et al., The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide (Onyx Press, 1999); the FBI's authorized history, FBI 
report, "History of the FBI" (online at www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/historymain.htm); the FBI's history as 
told by the Federation of American Scientists, "History of the FBI," updated June 18, 2003 (online at 
www. fiis.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/ fbi_hist.htm). For discussion of field office autonomy, see FBI letter, Kalish to Wolf, 
responses to questions posed by the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary of the House Appro- 
priations Committee, May 24, 2004, pp. 47-48. 

12. See, e.g., Dan C. interview (Aug. 27, 2003); Ruben Garcia interview (Apr. 29, 2004); DOJ Inspector Gen- 
eral interview ofWilliam Gore, Oct. 24, 2002. 

13. The Washington Field Office was originally assigned the East Africa bombings case because it generally has 
responsibility for investigating crimes overseas. When the attack was determined to be al Qaeda— related, responsi- 
bility shifted to the NewYork Field Office. See generally Kevin C. interview (Aug. 25, 2003). This created signifi- 
cant friction between agents in the respective offices. Edward Curran and Sidney Caspersen interview (Jan. 20, 
2004). On the concept of the office of origin, see FBI memo, Kalish to Wolf, responses to questions from the Sub- 
committee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary of the House Appropriations Committee, pp. 47—48; testi- 
mony of Robert S. Mueller III before the Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the 
Judiciary and Related Agencies of the House Appropriations Committee, June 18, 2003; FBI report, "Counterter- 
rorism Program Since September 2001," Apr. 14, 2004, p. 20. 

14. On the impact ofWatergate, see generally Kathryn Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post- 
Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1996). 

15. David M.Alpern with Anthony Marro and Stephan Lesher,"This Is Your New FBI," Neivsiveek,Jan. 5, 1976, 
p. 14. 

16. On the Levi guidelines and the Smith modifications, see John T Elliff, "Symposium: National Security and 
Civil Liberties:The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Investigations," Cornell Lair Review, vol. 69 (Apr. 1984), 
p. 785. On the line between church and state, see Floyd Abrams, "The First Amendment and the War against Ter- 
rorism," University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 5 (Oct. 2002). 

17. On Pan Am bombing investigation, see Commission analysis of U.S. counterterrorism strategy from 1968 
to 1993; FBI report, "History of the FBI." 

18. Louis Freeh interview (Jan. 6, 2004); Federation of American Scientists, "History of the FBI;" DOJ Inspec- 
tor General report, "Federal Bureau of Investigation Casework and Human Resource Allocation," Sept. 2003, pp. 
iv, vi, viii, x, xiii. 

19. For quote, see FBI report, "Congressional Budget Justification Book FiscalYear 1995," undated, p. 6. On 
Freeh's efforts, see Howard M. Shapiro, "The FBI in the 21st Century," Cornell International Law journal, vol. 28 
(1995), pp. 219—228; Louis Freeh interview (Jan. 6, 2004). On Freeh's budget request, see FBI report, "Congres- 
sional Budget Justification Book FiscalYear 1995," undated. 

20. Janet Reno interview (Dec. 16, 2003); Dale Watson interview (Feb. 5, 2004); Stephen Colgate interview 
(May 19, 2004); OMB budget examiner interview (Apr. 27, 2004). 

21. On the plan, see FBI report, "Strategic Plan: 1998-2003, 'Keeping Tomorrow Safe,'" May 8, 1998. For Wat- 
son's recollections, see Dale Watson interview (Jan. 6, 2004). 

22. For the mid-1990s numbers, see FBI memo, Freeh to Reno, "Reorganization of FBI Headquarters — Estab- 
lishment of Counterterrorism Division and Investigative Services Division," Apr. 22, 1999. For the 1998—2001 num- 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 473 

bers, see DOJ Inspector General report, "Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Counterterroristn Pro- 
gram:Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management," Sept. 2002, p. 67. For the failure to shift 
resources, see DOJ Inspector General report, "FBI Casework and Human Resource Allocation," Sept. 2003, pp. iv, 
vi, viii,x, xiii. For the comparison to drug agents, see testimony of DickThornburgh before the Subcommittee on 
Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Appropriations Committee, June 18, 
2003, p. 20. 

23. Dale Watson interview (Feb. 5, 2004); Virginia Bollinger interview (Feb. 2, 2004); Robert Bryant interview 
(Dec. 18,2003). 

24. On the state of information technology at FBI, seeVirginia Bollinger interview (Jan. 28, 2004); Mark Miller 
interview (Dec. 23, 2003). On the lack of an overall assessment, see DOJ Inspector General report, "Review of the 
FBI's Counterterrorism Program," Sept. 2002, pp. ii— iii. 

25. For training statistics, see DOJ Inspector General report,"Review of the FBI's Counterterrorism Program," 
Sept. 2002, p. 74. For translation resources, see FBI report, "FY 2002 Counterterrorism Division Program Plan Sum- 
mary," undated, p. 4. Since 9/11, the FBI has recruited and processed more than 30,000 translator applicants. This 
has resulted in the addition of nearly 700 new translators. FBI report,"The FBI's Counterterrorism Program Since 
September 2001,"Apr. 14, 2004. The FBI's hiring process includes language testing, a personnel security interview, 
polygraph, and a full background investigation. The FBI must maintain rigorous security and proficiency standards 
with respect to its permanent and contract employees. Even as the FBI has increased its language services cadre, 
the demand for translation services has also greatly increased. Thus, the FBI must not only continue to bring on 
board more linguists, it must also continue to take advantage of technology and best practices to prioritize its work- 
flow, enhance its capabilities, and ensure compliance with its quality control program. FBI linguists interviews (July 
31,2003-May 10, 2004); Margaret Gulotta interview (May 10, 2004). See DOJ Inspector General report, "A Review 
of the FBI's Actions in Connection with Allegations Raised by Contract Linguist Sibel Edmonds," July 1, 2004; 
Sibel Edmonds interview (Feb. 11, 2004). 

26. Wilson Lowery interview (Jan. 28, 2004); Janet Reno testimony, Apr. 13, 2004; Helen S. interview (Dec. 29, 
2003); Stephen Colgate interview (May 19, 2004); Robert Dies interview (Feb. 4, 2004). 

27. FBI report, "Director's Report on Counterterrorism," Sept. 1, 2001, pp. 1-1— 1-14. On FBI reorganization, 
see FBI memo, Freeh to Reno, "Reorganization of FBI Headquarters — Establishment of Counterterrorism Divi- 
sion and Investigative Services Division,"Apr. 22, 1999. OnWatson's observation, see Dale Watson interview (Feb. 
4, 2004). On MAXCAP 05, see FBI memo, description of MAXCAP 05, undated (draft likely prepared after Aug. 
31, 2001, for incoming Director Mueller). On field executives' views, see FBI report, Counterterrorism Division, 
International Terrorism Program, "Strategic Program Plan, FY 2001—06," undated, p. 30. 

28. International terrorism intelligence cases were designated as 199 matters: international terrorism criminal 
cases were designated as 265 matters. In 2003, these designations were eliminated; all international terrorism mat- 
ters now receive the same designation, 315. 

29. For historical information on FISA, see Americo R. Cinquegrana, "The Walls (and Wires) have Ears:The 
Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978," University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, vol. 137 (1989), pp. 793, 802-805. For the statute, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. As enacted in 1978, FISA 
permitted orders authorizing electronic surveillance. It did not refer to physical searches. In 1994, the statute was 
amended to permit orders authorizing physical searches. See Pub. L. No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3423, 3443 (Oct. 14, 
1994); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829. See generally, William C. Banks and M. E. Bowman, "Executive Authority for 
National Security Surveillance," American University Law Review, vol. 50 (2000), pp. 1—130. 

30. On the history of courts applying the primary purpose standard, see In re Sealed Case, 310 F. 3d 717, 725—726 
(FISC Ct. Rev. 2002), m which the FISC Court of Review concluded that these courts had ruled in error. See also 
DOJ report, "Final Report of the Attorney General's Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory Investigation" (hereinafter "Bellows Report"), May 2000, appendix D. On DOJ interpretation of FISA, 
see DOJ memo, Dellinger to Vatis, "Standards for Searchers Under Foreign Intelligence Act," Feb. 14, 1995; Royce 
Lamberth interview (Mar. 26, 2004); Bellows Report, pp. 711—712; DOJ Inspector General interview of Marion 
Bowman, May 28, 2003. 

31. Bellows Report, pp. 71 1—712; DOJ Inspector General interview of Marion Bowman, May 28, 2003. 

32. Bellows Report, pp. 712—714, n. 947, appendix D tabs 2, 3; Richard Scruggs interview (May 26, 2004); 
Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004). Because OIPR had ultimate authority to decide what "was presented to 
the FISA Court, it wielded extraordinary power in the FISA process. 

33. The group included representatives from the FBI, OIPR, and the Criminal Division. In addition, the U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of NewYork was given an opportunity to comment on the procedures. The 
procedures that were eventually issued were agreed to by all involved in the drafting process. As a member of the 
Commission, Gorelick has recused herself from participation in this aspect of our work. 

34. On Reno's July 1995 memo, see DOJ Inspector General report,"A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intel- 
ligence Information Related to the September 1 1 Attacks," July 2004, pp. 27—34; Bellows Report, p. 709, appen- 



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474 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 

dix D tab 23. Some barriers were proposed by OIPR in the FISA applications and subsequently adopted by the 
FISC; others, less formally recorded, were believed by the FBI to be equally applicable. 

35. On the misapplication of the procedures and the role of OIPR, see Bellows Report, pp. 721—722; Marion 
Bowman interview (Mar. 6, 2004); Fran Fragos Townsend meeting (Feb. 13, 2004). On the OIPR as gatekeeper, 
see Michael Vatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004); Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004). On OIPR's stated defense, 
see David Kris interview (May 19, 2004); Richard Scruggs interview (May 26, 2004). On OIPR's threat, see Larry 
Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004); Thomas A. interview (Mar. 16, 2004). On the lack of information flow, see 
Bellows Report, pp. 722, 724-725, 729-731. 

36. For Bryant's comment, see David Kris interview (Jan. 15, 2004); Bellows Report, p. 714. On barriers between 
agents on same squads, see Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004); Michael Vatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004); DOJ 
Inspector General interview of Thomas A., May 28, 2003. On incorrect interpretation by field agents, see Joint 
Inquiry report, pp. 363, 367— 368; Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004); Michael Vatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004); 
DOJ Inspector General interview of Thomas A., May 28, 2003; DOJ Inspector General interview ofjane, Nov. 4, 
2002. 

37. For an example of the barriers between agents, see DOJ emails, Jane to Steve B., interpreting the wall to 
apply to no n-FIS A information, Aug. 29, 2001; David Kris interview (Jan. 15,2004). On the NSA barriers, see DOJ 
Inspector General interview ofjane, Nov. 4, 2002. These barriers were reinforced by caveats NSA began placing 
on all of its Bin Ladin— related reports and later on all of its counterterrorism-related reports — whether or not the 
information was subject to the attorney general's order — "which required approval before the report's contents could 
be shared with criminal investigators. Ibid. On the several reviews of the process, see Bellows Report, pp. 709, 722; 
DOJ Inspector General report,"The Handling of FBI Intelligence Information Related to the Justice Department's 
Campaign Finance Investigation," July 1999, pp. 15-16, 255, 256, 328-330, 340, 344; GAO report, "FBI Intelli- 
gence Investigations: Coordination Within Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters Is Limited," July 2001, 
pp. 3—5. 

38. In December 1999, NSA began placing caveats on all of its Bin Ladin reports that precluded sharing of any 
of the reports' contents with criminal prosecutors or FBI agents investigating criminal matters without first obtain- 
ing OIPR's permission. These caveats were initially created at the direction of Attorney General Reno and applied 
solely to reports ofinformation gathered from three specific surveillances she had authorized. Because NSA decided 
it was administratively too difficult to determine 'whether particular reports derived from the specific surveillances 
authorized by the attorney general, NSA decided to place this caveat on all its terrorism-related reports. In Novem- 
ber 2000, in response to direction from the FISA Court, NSA modified these caveats to require that consent for 
sharing the information with prosecutors or criminal agents be obtained from NSA's Customer Needs and Deliv- 
ery Services group. See DOJ memo, Reno to Freeh, E.O. 12333 authorized surveillance of a suspected al Qaeda 
operative, Dec. 24, 1999; NSA email, William L. to Brian O, "dissemination of terrorism reporting," Dec. 29, 1999; 
NSA memo, Ann D. to others, "Reporting Guidance," Dec. 30. 1999; Intelligence report, Nov. 6, 2000. See also dis- 
cussion of the history of the NSA caveats in the notes to Chapter 8. 

39. See DEA report, "DEA Staffing & Budget" (figures for 1972 to 2003) (online at www.usdoj.gov/dea/ 
agency/staffing.htm). For USMS staffing, see DOJ information provided to the Commission. 

40. On the number of agents, see INS newsletter, "INS Commissioner Meissner Announces Departure," Jan. 
2001; INS news release,"INS to Hire More than 800 Immigration Inspectors Nationwide," Jan. 12, 2001; Gregory 
Bednarz prepared statement, Oct. 9, 2003, p. 5. On the INS's main challenges, see, e.g., Eric Holder interview (Jan. 
28, 2004);Jamie Gorelick interview (Jan. 13, 2004); Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). On the White House 
views, see, e.g., White House press release, "Fact Sheet on Immigration Enforcement Act," May 3, 1995. On DOJ's 
concerns, see INS newsletter, Remarks of Attorney General Reno on Oct. 24, 2 (100, Jan. 2001, pp. 16, 2 6. To assess 
congressional views, we reviewed all conference and committee reports relating to congressional action on INS 
budget requests for fiscal years 1995 through 2001 and all Senate and House immigration hearings from 1993 to 
2001. On outdated technology, see Gus de laVina interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 
2003). 

41. On Meissner's response, see Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). On the lookout unit, see Tim G. 
interview (Oct. 1, 2002). On the number of denials of entry, see Majority Staff Report, Hearing on "Foreign Ter- 
rorists in America: FiveYears after the World Trade Center" before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, 
and Government Information of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Feb. 24, 1998, p. 145. 

42. Majority Staff Report, Hearing on "Foreign Terrorists in America: FiveYears after the World Trade Cen- 
ter," Feb. 24, 1998, p. 152; 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(A). On the low level of removals, see Daniel Cadman interview 
(Oct. 9, 2003); Rocky Concepcion interview (June 15, 2004). 

43. On the 1986 plan, see INS report, Investigations Division, "Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contin- 
gency Plan," May 1986; Daniel Cadman interview (Oct. 17, 2003). On the 1995 plan, see INS memo, Bramhall to 
Bednarz and Hurst, "Draft Counter- Terrorism Strategy Outline," Aug. 11, 1995. On the 1997 plan, see INS email, 
Cadman to others, "EAC briefing document," Dec. 5, 1997 (attachment tided "Counterterronsm/National Secu- 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 475 

rity Strategy and Casework Oversight"). On the work of the National Security Unit and the Intelligence Unit, see 
Daniel Cadman interview (Oct. 17, 2003); Cliff L and esman interview (Oct. 27, 2003). 

44. For number of agents on Canadian border, the Canadian situation generally, and the inspector general's rec- 
ommendations, see INS report, "Northern Border Strategy," Jan. 9, 2001; DOJ Inspector General report, "Follow- 
up Review of the Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border," Apr. 2000 (inspection plan). On terrorists 
entering the United States via Canada, see, e.g., INS record, Record of Deportable Alien, Abu Mezer,June 24, 1996. 
Mezer was able to stay in the United States despite apprehensions for his illegal entries along the northern border. 

45. The inspectors' views are drawn from our interviews with 26 border inspectors who had contact with the 
9/11 hijackers. On the incomplete INS projects, see Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1 10 Stat. 3009 (1996), §§ 1 10, 641 . 

46. For the 1996 law, see 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1996). On unauthorized immigration, see Migration Policy Insti- 
tute report, "Immigration Facts: Unauthorized Immigration to the United States," Oct. 2003 (online at 
www.mignUionpolicy.org/piibs/two_unauthorized_immigration__us.pdi). On the initiation of city noncoopera- 
tion, see New York Mayor Ed Koch's 1987 order prohibiting city line workers, but not police or the Department 
of Corrections, from transmitting information respecting any alien to federal immigration authorities. On back- 
logs, see testimony of Dr. Demetrios G. Papademetnou before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Secu- 
rity and Claims of the House Judiciary Committee, Mar. 11, 2004. On the overwhelmed INS, see James Ziglar 
testimony, Jan. 26, 2004. 

47. On the relationship between the FBI and state and local police forces, see William Bratton et al. interview 
(Nov. 20, 2003); David Cohen interview (Feb. 4, 2004). On the New York JTTF, see Mary Jo White, "Prosecuting 
Terrorism in New York," Middle East Quarterly, spring 2001 (online at "www.meforum.org/article/25). On the pre- 
9/11 number ofJTTFs, see Louis Freeh prepared statement for the Joint Inquiry, Oct. 8, 2002, p. 18. On the effec- 
tiveness of JTTFs, see Washington Field Office agent interview (Aug.4, 2003); Phoenix JTTF member interview 
(Oct. 20, 2003); Phoenix Field Office agent interview (Oct. 21, 2003); Art C. interview (Dec. 4, 2003). 

48. Treasury report, "1995 Highlights ofThe Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms," undated (online at 
www.atf.gov/pub/gen_pub/annualrpt/1995/index.htm); ATF report, "ATF Snapshot," Jan. 30, 1998 (online at 
www.atf.gov/about/snapl998.htm). 

49. Dale Watson interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Frank P. interview (Aug. 26, 2003); Dan C. interview (Aug. 27, 2003); 
Louis Freeh interview (Jan. 8. 2004). 

50. See Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213 (1996), codified at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 40101; Federal Aviation AuthonzationAct,H.R. Rep. No. 104-848, 104th Cong., 2d sess. (1996) (notes on con- 
ference substitute for § 401). On responsibility for protection, see 49 U.S.C. § 44903(b). On sabotage, see FAA 
report, Aviation Security Advisory Committee, "Domestic Security Baseline Final Report," Dec. 12, 1996; FAA 
report, "Civil Aviation Security: Objectives and Priorities," Mar. 18, 1999 (staff working paper). See also Jane Gar- 
vey prepared statement, May 22, 2003; Report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (Pan 
Am/Lockerbie Commission), May 15, 1990, pp. 1 13—1 14; Final Report of the White House Commission on Aviation 
Safety and Security (Gore Commission), Feb. 12, 1997. While the sabotage of commercial aircraft, including Pan Am 
103 in 1998, had claimed many lives, hijackings had also been deadly, including the 1985 hijacking of an Egypt Air 
flight in which 60 people were killed and 35 injured; the 1986 hijacking of Pan Am 73 in which 22 people were 
killed and 125 injured; and the 1996 hijacking of an Ethiopian Airlines flight in which 123 people were killed. See 
FAA report, "Civil Aviation Security Reference Handbook," May 1999. Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Gorelick, and 
Thompson have recused themselves from our work on aviation security matters. 

51. See GAO report, "Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Chal- 
lenges," Jan. 27, 1994; GAO report, "Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed," Sept. 11, 1996; GAO 
report, "Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener Performance Problems," Mar. 16, 
2000; GAO report,"Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners' Performance," June 28, 
2000; testimony of Kenneth M. Mead, DOT Inspector General, Joint Hearing on Actions Needed to Improve Avi- 
ation Security before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the Dis- 
trict of Columbia of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Sept. 25, 2001. On rules regulating access to 
security sensitive areas of commercial airports, see FAA regulations, "Airport Security," 14 C.F.R. § 107; FAA report, 
"Air Carrier Standard Security Program," May 2001. 

52. The FAA maintained formal agreements with the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, 
and NSA to receive data of interest as outlined in the agreement. In addition, the FAA posted liaisons with the CIA, 
FBI, and Department of State to facilitate the flow of intelligence and threat information. See Claudio Manno inter- 
view (Oct. 1, 2003); Matt K. interview (Feb. 13, 2004). FAA civil aviation security officials reported that the agency's 
intelligence watch received about 200 pieces of intelligence per day. See Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003). 
The analysis regarding the passage of FBI information was based on a review of the FAA's Intelligence Case Files.The 
FBI analyst "who worked on the 1998 tasking indicated that the information was shared with the FAA liaison to the 
Bureau, but the liaison did not recall having seen it. Cathal Hynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Matt K. interview (Feb. 
13,2004). 



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476 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 

53. Regarding intelligence reports, the Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS) prepared by the FAA's Office of Civil 
Aviation Intelligence was reviewed first by an assistant to Acting Deputy Administrator Belger, who would inform 
him of any information that she felt merited his attention. Belger in turn would determine whether the informa- 
tion needed to be raised with Administrator Garvey. Garvey told us that she maintained an open door policy and 
counted on her security staff to keep her informed on any pressing issues. Jane Garvey interview (Oct. 21, 2003); 
Monte Belger interview (Nov. 24, 2003); Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Shirley Miller interview (Mar. 30, 
2004); Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003). Regarding the intelligence unit, see Nicholas Grant interview 
(May 26, 2004); Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003); Mike Canavan interview (Nov. 4, 2003); Alexander T. 
Wells, Commercial Aviation Safety (McGraw-Hill, 2001), p. 308. 

54. On the threat to civil aviation, see Lee Longmire interview (Oct. 28, 2003). On CAPPS, also known as 
("APS (Computer Asm steel Profiling System), see FA A security directive, "Threat to Air Carriers," SD 97-01, Oct. 
27, 1997. The profile was derived from information on the Passenger Name Record and did not include factors 
such as race, creed, color, or national origin. In addition to those chosen by the algorithm, a number of other pas- 
sengers were selected at random, both to address concerns about discrimination and to deter terrorists from figur- 
ing out the algorithm and gaming the system. On no-fly lists, see FAA security directive, "Threat to U.S. Air 
Carriers," SD 95, Apr. 24, 2000. Some of the individuals on the no-fly list were in U.S. custody as of 9/11. See 
Kevin G. Hall, Alfonso Chardy, and Juan O.Tamayo, "Mix-Up Almost Permitted Deportation of Men Suspected of 
Terrorist Activities," Miami Herald, Sept. 19, 2001; FAA security directive, "Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators," SD 
108-1, Aug. 28, 2001. On the Gore Commission, see Final Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety 
and Security, Feb. 12, 1997, p. 28. On theTIPOFF database (used to screen visa applicants and persons seeking per- 
mission to enter the United States against the names of known or suspected terrorists), see DOS cable, State 182167, 
"Fighting Terrorism:Visas Viper Procedures," Oct. 19, 2001 . Finally, on the watchlist, officials told us that large lists 
were difficult to implement, particularly when they "weren't accompanied by numeric data such as date of birth that 
would enable an air carrier to distinguish the terrorist from others around the world who had his or her name. In 
addition, the U.S. intelligence community "was required to approve the "no-fly" listing of an individual in order to 
protect sources and methods. Matt Kormann interview (Feb. 13, 2004). 

55. On selectees, see James Padgett interview (Oct. 7, 2003). Their bags "were either screened for explosives or 
held off their flight until they were confirmed to be aboard. See FAA security directive, "Threat to Air Carriers," 
SD 97-01 Oct. 27, 1997. Under the previous noncomputerized profiling system, selectees were subject to second- 
ary screening of their carry-on belongings, and checked baggage. See FAA security directive, "Threat to Air Car- 
riers," SD 96-05, Aug. 19, 1996. 

56. FAA report, "Air Carrier Standard Security Program," May 2001; FAA regulations, "Screening of Passen- 
gers and Property," 14 C.F.R. § 108.9 (1999); Leo Boivin interview (Sept. 17, 2003). 

57. "Knives with blades under 4 inches, such as Swiss Army Knives, scout knives, pocket utility knives, etc. may 
be allowed to enter the sterile area. However, some knives with blades under 4 inches could be considered by a 
reasonable person to be a 'menacing knife' and/or may be illegal under local law and should not be allowed to enter 
the sterile area." See FAA regulations,Air Carriers Checkpoint Operations Guide,Aug. 1999; see also AirTransport 
Association Regional Airlines Association report, "Checkpoint Operations Guide," Aug. 1999; Cathal Flynn inter- 
view (Sept. 9, 2003); Lee Longmire interview (Oct. 28, 2003); Leo Boivin interview (Sept. 17, 2003). A 1994 FAA 
assessment of the threat to civil aviation in the United States stated that "system vulnerabilities also exist with respect 
to hijackings . . . aircraft can be hijacked with either fake "weapons or hoax explosive devices. Cabin crew or pas- 
sengers can also be threatened with objects such as short blade knives, which are allowable on board aircraft." See 
FAA report, "The Threat to U.S. Civil Aviation in the United States," Sept. 1994. 

58. On random and continuous screening, see Janet Riffe interview (Feb. 26, 2004); FAA report, "Air Carrier 
Standard Security Program," May 2001. On the 9/11 hijackers, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi 
Bmalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; FAA records, Intelligence Case File 98-96. 

59. CourtneyTucker interview (June 3, 2004); Kenneth Mead prepared statement, May 22, 2003. Some air car- 
rier officials, however, enjoyed a strong reputation for leadership in aviation security, including United Airlines' Ed 
Soliday. Bruce Butterworth interview (Sept. 29, 2003); Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Steven Jenkins inter- 
view (Feb. 24, 2004). 

60. Mike Morse interview (Sept. 15, 2003). Regarding training, see FAA report, "Air Carrier Standard Secu- 
rity Program," May 2001 . 

61. On a hardened cockpit door making little difference, see Tim Ahem interview (Oct. 8, 2004). For regula- 
tions governing the doors, see FAA regulations, "Miscellaneous Equipment" (emergency exit), 14 C.F.R. § 121.313 
(2001); FAA regulations, "Closing and locking of flight crew compartment door," 14 C.F.R. § 121.587 (2001). Also 
compromising cockpit security was the use of common locks (one key fit the cockpits of all Boeing aircraft) and 
the absence of procedures to properly manage and safeguard cockpit keys. Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 
2004). For the quote on reinforced cockpit doors, see Byron Okada, "Air Rage Prompts Call for Safety Measures: 
The FAA Is Expected to Release a Report Today," Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Jan. 10, 2001, p. 1. 

62. James Underwood interview (Sept. 17, 2004); Mike Canavan interview (Nov. 4, 2003). 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 477 

63. [.me Garvey interview (Oct. 21, 2003). 

64. As defined by statute, covert action "means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influ- 
ence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Gov- 
ernment will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include — (1) activities the primary purpose 
of which is to acquire intelligence [.]" 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). Executive Order 12333, titled "United States Intelli- 
gence Activities," terms covert action "special activities," defined as "activities conducted in support of national for- 
eign policy objectives abroad "which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is 
not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities[.]" E.O. 12333 § 3.4(h). Pur- 
suant to that order, the CIA has primary responsibility for covert action; another nonmilitary agency may conduct 
covert action only if the president determines that it "is more likely to achieve a particular objective." Ibid. § 1.8(e). 

65. See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4). 

66.DCI report, "National Foreign Intelligence Program Historical Data FY 1985 to FY 2003," Feb. 11,2004. 

67. For quote, see Joint Inquiry testimony of Michael Hayden, [une 18, 2002; see also Michael Hayden inter- 
view (Dec. 10,2003). 

68. Michael Hayden interview (Dec. 10, 2003). 

69. For the CIA's early years, see John Ranelagh, The Agency .The Rise and Decline of the CIA (Simon & Schus- 
ter, 1986). For the Agency's more recent history, see Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows.The Ultimate Insider's Story 
oj Five Presidents and HowThey Won the Cold War (Simon & Schuster, 1996). 

70. Regarding the dissolution of the OSS and creation of the CIG, see Michael Warner, Centra! Intelligence: Ori- 
gin and Evolution (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001); Executive Order 9621, "Termination of the Office 
of Strategic Services and Disposition of its Functions," Sept. 20, 1945; "Presidential Directive on Coordination of 
Foreign Intelligence Activities," Jan. 22, 1946 (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339). 

71. Regarding fears of creating a US. Gestapo, see Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design; The Evolution of the CIA,JCS 
and NSC (Stanford Univ. Press, 1999), p. 268, n. 6. 

72. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(3), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(l). 

73. On plausible deniability, see, e.g., Ranelagh, The Agency, pp. 341—345; Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four 
Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 230-235. 

74. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). 

75. Steve Kappes interview (May 7, 2004); James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). 

76.Jami Miscik interview (Aug. 29, 2003). 

77. Mary McCarthy, Fritz Ermarth, and Charles Allen briefing (Aug. 14, 2003). 

78. See Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton, the CIA's Master Spy Hunter (Simon & Schuster, 1991). 

79. Ruth David interview (June 10, 2003). 

80. "According to the 2002 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System statistics, American colleges 
granted only six degrees in Arabic in the survey year." Joint Inquiry report (unclassified version), p. 344. 

81. Leo Hazelwood interview (Aug. 25, 2003); Duane Clarndge interview (Sept. 16, 2003). 

82. Charles Allen interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Duane Clarndge interview (Sept. 16, 2003); David Carey inter- 
view (Oct. 31, 2003); Leo Hazelwood interview (Aug. 25, 2003); John Helgerson interview (Sept. 5, 2003); Robert 
Vickers interview (Sept. 17, 2003); CIA Inspector General report, "The Agency's Counterterrorism Effort," Oct. 
1994. 

83. Cofer Black testimony, Apr. 13, 2004. 
84. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). 

85. George Tenet testimony, Mar. 24, 2004; George Tenet testimony, Apr. 14, 2004. 

86. Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004). 

87. See Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military (W.W. Norton, 2003). 

88. Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003). 

89. See DOS report, Bureau of Consular Affairs, "1990 Report oftheVisa Office," Oct. 1991;DOS Inspector 
General report, "Review of the Visa-Issuing Process; Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance ofVisas to 
Sheik Omar Ahmed Ali Abdel Rahman," Mar. 1994; Mary Ryan interviews (Sept. 29, 2003; Oct. 9, 2003); DOS 
briefing materials, presentation on consular systems delivered to the Information Resources Management Program 
Board, Apr. 26, 1995; DOS report, "History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency 
(1993—2001)," undated (online at wwwstate.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/c6059. htm); Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-236 (1994), § 140(a). 

90. See Gordon N. Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwatcr-Nichols Act of 1986 (Green- 
wood, 1999). 

91. William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004);John Hamre interview (Dec. 9, 2003); Hugh Shelton interview 
(Dec. 5, 2004); Cohen Group meeting (Dec. 12, 2003). 

92. See Monterey Institute of International Studies report, "Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness 
and WMD Civil Support Teams," Oct. 2001 (online at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/120city.htm); National 
Defense Authorization Act for FiscalYear 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, 110 Stat. 2422 (1996); DOD report, "Domes- 



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478 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 

tic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction," May 1, 1997 (online at 
www. defenseliiik.mil/pubs/doniestic/toc.html). 

93. John Hamre interview (Dec. 9, 2003); Henry Allen Holmes interview (Nov. 10, 2003); Brian Sheridan inter- 
view (Feb. 25, 2004). 

94. Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004). 

95. Commission analysis of U.S. counterterrorism strategy from 1968 to 1993. 

96. President Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association," July 8, 1985 
(online at www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1985/70885a.htiii). 

97. See Report of the President's Special Review Board (Tower Commission) (GPO, 1987);Theodore Draper, A 
Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs (Simon & Schuster, 1991). 

98. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). 

99. President Clinton, "Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters,"June 26, 1993. 

100. President Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," Jan. 24, 
1995; President Clinton, "Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed LegislationTo CombatTerrorism," Feb. 
9, 1995; President Clinton, "Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation To Combat Terrorism," 
May 3, 1995. 

101. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39, "U.S. Policy on Counterterronsm,"June 21, 1995. 

102. President Clinton, "Remarks by the President in a Congressional Meeting," July 29, 1996. 

103. President Clinton, "Remarks Announcing the Second Term National Security Team and an Exchange 
With Reporters," Dec. 5, 1996. 

104. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland 
and Americans Overseas," May 22, 1998; Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63, "Critical Infrastructure Protec- 
tion," May 22, 1998. 

105. President Clinton, "Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Mary- 
land," May 22, 1998. 

106. See Ernest R. May, "Intelligence: Backing into the Future," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992. 

107. For Congress's domestic orientation, see Lee H. Hamilton, How Congress Works and Why You Should Care 
(Indiana Univ. Press, 2004), pp.18— 19. For presidential focus prior to 9/11, see President Clinton, "Commence- 
ment Address at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland," May 22, 1998; President Clinton, "Keep- 
ing America Secure for the 21st Century," Jan. 22, 1999. 

108. Hamilton, How Congress Works, p. 17. Our review of the classified schedules of authorization from 1995 
to 2001 found that Congress generally supported the top line requests made by the administration for intelligence, 
never reducing it by more than 2 or 3 percent; however, the congressional oversight committees did reallocate the 
administration s requests significantly, sometimes increasing programs like counterterrorism that they believed were 
being underfunded. On the intelligence budget, see George Tenet prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004, pp. 23—26. 
The DCI added that frustrations with getting additional funding requests arose mainly from the administration. 
See ibid. 

109. Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Final Report, Dec. 1993; "Contract with America," 
1994; Statement of Rep. Saxby Chambliss, Hearing on Intelligence Gaps in Counterterrorism before the Special 
Oversight Panel on Terrorism of the House Armed Services Committee, Sept. 5, 2002. 

1 10. Hamilton, How Congress Works, p. 106; Richard Durbin interview (Apr. 27, 2004); Dianne Feinstein inter- 
view (June 1, 2004); Peter Hoekstra interview (June 2, 2004); Chris Shays interview (June 2, 2004); Dana Priest, 
"Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized," Washington Post, Apr. 27, 2004, p. Al. For Tenet quote, see 
George Tenet testimony, Mar. 24, 2004. 

111. For neglect of airline security, see Commission analysis of the Congressional Daily Digest and the Congres- 
sional Record using the search term "aviation security." See also FAA briefing materials, "FAA Hearing/Briefing 
Activity Prior to September 11, 2001," undated. For the focus on the Southwest border, see Commission analysis 
of the hearing records of the subcommittees on immigration of the House and Senate Judiciary committees from 
1993 through 2001 .On restricting the FBI's appropriations, see Robert Dies interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Stephen Col- 
gate interview (May 19, 2004). On sanctions on Pakistan, see Strobe Talbott interview (Jan. 15, 2004); Karl Inder- 
furth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Christina Rocca interview (Jan. 29, 2004). On the lack of time for oversight, see 
Hamilton, How Congress I Vorks, p. 1 12; see also Center for Strategic and International Studies meeting (July 23, 2003); 
Jay Rockefeller meeting (Oct. 16, 2003). On the Senate Appropriations Committee, the long-serving Chair (Ted 
Stevens) and Ranking Minority Member (Daniel Inouye) of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee conduct 
at least weekly oversight sessions of the intelligence community, always behind closed doors, the effectiveness or 
which we cannotjudge. 

112. Although some members of the House sought the creation of a Select Committee onTerrorism in the 
beginning of 2001, the Speaker asked the intelligence ceo mini ttee to set up a terrorism working group instead. 
Under Rep. Saxby Chambliss and Rep. Jane Harman, it held several briefings before 9/11 and became a subcom- 
mittee of the Intelligence Committee immediately afterward. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 479 

113. Rep. Christopher Shays of Connecticut, chairman of the National Security Subcommittee of the Gov- 
ernment Reform Committee, held 12 wide-ranging hearings on terrorism between 1999 and July 2001, with spe- 
cial attention on domestic preparedness and response to terrorist attack. Though the intelligence oversight panels' 
work was largely secret, the intelligence community's annual worldwide threat testimony before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence was public testimony (typically followed by a closed session). From 1997 through 2001, 
the threat of terrorism rose on the priority list from third (1997-1998) to second (1999-2000) to first in 2001. See 
Commission analysis of congressional hearings on terrorism. 

1 14. Congress created three commissions in 1998. One, chaired jointly by former senators Gary Hart and War- 
ren Rudman, examined national security challenges for the twenty-first century.This commission included stark 
warnings about possible domestic terrorist attacks and recommended a new institution devoted to identifying and 
defending vulnerabilities in homeland security. See Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Secu- 
rity/21st Century,"Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change," Feb. 15, 2001. A second, chaired by 
former governor James G. Gilmore ofVirgmia, studied domestic preparedness to cope with attacks using weapons 
of mass destruction and presented five reports. See, e.g., Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of 
the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities forTerrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruc- 
tion, "Forging America's New Normalcy: Securing our Homeland, Preserving our Liberty," Dec. 15, 2003. The third, 
chaired by L. Paul Bremer, the former State Department counterterrorism coordinator, with vice chair Maurice 
Sonnenberg, a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, focused specifically on terrorist 
threats and what could be done to prepare for them. See Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, "Coun- 
tering theThreat of International Terrorism," June 2000. 

4 Responses to Al Qaeda's Initial Assaults 

1. On financing of Egyptian terrorists, see Intelligence report, Sudanese links to Egypt's Gama'at al-Islamiya 
and training of Egyptians, July 14, 1993; Intelligence report, funding by Bin Ladin of Gama'at al-Islamiya by Bin 
Ladin and composition of its Sudanese wing, July 22, 1993. On aid to Yemeni terrorists, see DOS memo, attached 
to Bm Ladin "Viper" file, Aug. 28, 1993. CTC documents describing Bin Ladin as an "extremist financier" include 
Intelligence report, Bin Ladin links to materials related to WMD, Mar. 20, 1997; Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's 
financial support to Egyptian, Algerian, and Libyan extremists, June 17, 1997. 

2. Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18. 2003). Of the 200 people at the Center, the new Bin Ladin unit had 
about 12. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003). Staffing of the UBL unit had risen to 40—50 employees by Sept. 11, 
2001, out of about 390 CTC employees. Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003); CIA response to Commission ques- 
tions for the record, Jan. 21, 2004. 

3. On Fadl, see, e.g., Intelligence reports on historical background of Bin Ladm's army (Nov. 26, 1996;Apr. 18, 
1997); on the structure of al Qaeda and leadership composition (Dec. 18, 1996; Dec. 19, 1996; Dec. 19, 1996); on 
roles and responsibilities of the organizational component (Dec. 19, 1996); on objectives and direction (Jan. 8, 1997; 
Jan. 27, 1997); on the financial infrastructure and networks (Dec. 30, 1996; Jan. 3, 1997); on connections and col- 
laboration with other terrorist groups and supporters (Jan 8, 1997;Jan. 31, 1997;Jan 31, 1997; Feb. 7, 1997); on 
activities in Somalia (Apr. 30, 1997); on Bin Ladin's efforts to acquire WMD materials (Mar. 18, 1997). On the other 
walk-in source, see CIA cable, Jan. 3, 1997. Material from the Nairobi cell was introduced into evidence during the 
testimony of FBI Special Agent Daniel Coleman, United States v. Usama Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), 
Feb. 21,2001 (transcript pp. 1078-1088, 1096-1102). 

4. Mike interview (Dec. 11,2003). 

5. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 269— 270; Mike inter- 
view (Dec. 11, 2003); Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003); George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004). 

6. On Sudanese discussions with Saudi officials, see Frank interview (Mar. 18, 2004); Ron interview (Mar. 18, 
2004). Timothy Carney believed the Saudis told Sudan that they did not want Bin Ladin. Timothy Carney inter- 
view (Dec. 4, 2003). 

7. The CIA official who held one-on-one discussions with Erwa said that Erwa never offered to expel Bin 
Ladin to the United States or render him to another country. Mark interview (May 12, 2004). For Carney's instruc- 
tions and the lack of a U.S. indictment, see Timothy Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003). On the indictment issue and 
the supposed Sudanese offer to give up Bin Ladm, see Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 

In early May 1996, the CIA received intelligence that Bin Ladm might be leaving Sudan. Though this report- 
ing was described as "very spotty," it would have been passed along to the DCI's office because of high concern 
about Bin Ladin at the time. But it did not lead to plans for a U.S. operation to snatch Bin Ladm, because there 
was no indictment against him. Ron interview (Mar. 18, 2004); Frank interview (Mar. 18, 2004). It appears, how- 
ever, that if another country had been willing to imprison Bin Ladin, the CIA might have tried to work out a sce- 
nario for apprehending him. CIA cable, May 8, 1996. The Sudanese government did not notify the United States 
that Bin Ladin had left the country until about two days after his departure. DOS cable, Nairobi 07020, "Sudan: 
Foreign Minister on Developments," May 21, 1996. 



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480 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 

President Clinton, in a February 2002 speech to the Long Island Association, said that the United States did 
not accept a Sudanese offer and take Bin Ladin because there was no indictment. President Clinton speech to the 
Long Island Association, Feb. 15, 2002 (videotape of speech). But the President told us that he had "misspoken" 
and was, wrongly, recounting a number of press stories he had read. After reviewing this matter in preparation for 
his Commission meeting, President Clinton told us that Sudan never offered to turn Bin Ladin over to the United 
States. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004).Berger told us that he saw no chance that Sudan would have handed 
Bin Ladin over and also noted that in 1996, the U.S. government still did not know of any al Qaeda attacks on U.S. 
citizens. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 

Alleged Sudanese offers to cooperate on counterterrorism have been the subject of much recent controversy. 
After repeatedly demanding that Sudan stop supporting terrorist groups, in 1993 the U.S. government designated 
the country a state sponsor of terrorism. Diplomatic discussions continued but had little impact on Sudanese sup- 
port for terrorism or on other issues, such as human rights. In the fall of 1995, the United States conducted a Sudan 
policy review and, supported by a vocal segment of Congress, the White House sought to pressure and isolate the 
Sudanese. Susan Rice interview (Jan. 9, 2004). 

After Bin Ladin left Sudan in May 1996, some State 1 )epamnent officials, including Ambassador Carney, crit- 
icized the NSC's hard-line policy, which he felt provided no "carrots" for Sudanese moderates to cooperate on 
counterterrorism. He also faulted the NSC for not reopening the U.S. embassy in Khartoum (closed in early 1996) 
when security concerns there were reevaluated. State's Sudan desk officer agreed, noting that the embassy was an 
excellent vehicle for gathering information on terrorists. According to one State official, NSC policymakers' views 
were too firmly set to engage and test the Sudanese on counterterrorism. Timothy Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003); 
David Shinn interview (Aug. 29, 2003); Stephen Schwartz interview (Dec. 30, 2003). 

But supporters of the tough line, such as the NSC's Susan Rice, argued that any conciliatory statements from 
Khartoum belied its unhelpful actions. For example, she noted, though Sudan did eventually expel Bin Ladin, his 
al Qaeda network retained a presence in the country. Susan Rice interview (Jan. 9, 2004). In addition, the CIA's 
Africa Division, whose operatives had engaged the Sudanese on counterterrorism in early 1996, would conclude 
that "there is no indication that Sudanese involvement with terrorism has decreased in the past year."They saw the 
Sudanese gestures toward cooperating as "tactical retreats" aimed at deceiving Washington in hopes of having sanc- 
tions removed. CIA memo, Walter to Acting DCI, "Africa Division's Recommendations Regarding Sudan," Dec. 
17, 1996. The CIA official who ran the Sudanese portfolio and met with the Sudanese on numerous occasions told 
us the Sudanese were not going to deliver, and the perceived moderates "were just flat-out lying." Mark interview 
(May 12,2004). 

In February 1997, the Sudanese sent letters to President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright, extending an 
invitation for a U.S. counterterrorism inspection mission to visit Sudan. The Sudanese also used private U.S. citi- 
zens to pass along offers to cooperate. Mansoor Ijaz interview (May 7, 2004); Janet McElligot interview (Oct. 20, 
2003). But these offers were dismissed because the NSC viewed Sudan as all talk and little action. U.S. officials also 
feared that the Sudanese would exploit any positive American responses, including trips to the region by U.S. offi- 
cials, for their own political purposes. See Joint Inquiry interview of David Williams, June 26, 2002. Today, Sudan 
is still listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. 

8. Mike interview (Dec. 1 1, 2003). On local contacts, see Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004). On "Jeff's" 
views, see CIA memo, "DCI Talking Points Regarding Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin," Aug. 25, 1997. 

9. See Joint Inquiry briefing by Mike, Sept. 12, 2002. For briefings to the NSC, see NSC email, Clarke to Berger, 
"Threat Warning: Usama bin Ladin," Mar. 7, 1998; Mary McCarthy interview (Dec. 8, 2003); CIA memos, sum- 
mary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, May 1, 1998. 

10. CIA memos, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, May 1, 1998. 

11. Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18,2004). 

12. Peter Tomsen interview (Oct. 8, 2003). 

13. For State Department officials' views, see Strobe Talbott interview (Jan. 15, 2004); Karl Inderfurth inter- 
view (Feb. 18,2004). 

14. On the civil war and UNOCAL, see Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Robin Raphel interview 
(Dec. 8, 2003). The former UNOCAL chief for the pipeline project, Marty Miller, denied working exclusively with 
the Taliban and told us that his company sought to work with all Afghan factions to bring about the necessary sta- 
bility to proceed with the project. Marty Miller interview (Nov. 7, 2003). UNOCAL hired, among others, Robert 
Oakley, the former ambassador to Pakistan. Oakley told us that he counseled the company about the internal 
dynamics of Afghanistan and Pakistan but never lobbied the State Department on UNOCAL'S behalf. Robert Oak- 
ley interview (Sept. 7, 2003); see also "Advisory Consulting Agreement" between UNOCAL and Oakley, Oct. 1996. 
On giving the Taliban a chance, see Marvin Weinbaum interview (Aug. 12, 2003). 

15. See Madeleine Albright, speech at Nashir Bagh refugee camp in western Pakistan, Nov. 18, 1997. For a 
description of the Richardson mission, see Bill Richardson interview (Dec. 15, 2003); Karl Inderfurth interview 
(Feb. 18,2004). 

16. Marvin Weinbaum interview (Aug. 12, 2003). See also Strobe Talbott interview (Jan. 15, 2004). For Zirmi's 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 481 

view, see Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29, 2004). 

17. Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004). For more details, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars:Tlie Secret History of the 
CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p. 379. 

18. Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 343,391; Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004); Joint Inquiry briefing by Mike, Sept. 
12,2002. 

19. For a description of the plan, the content of briefing papers, and the Berger- Tenet meeting, see CIA memo, 
Jeff to Tenet, "Information Paper on Usama Bin Ladin," Feb. 12, 1998 (with attached paper for Tenet's meeting "with 
Berger on Feb. 13, 1998, "Next Steps Against Usama Bin Ladin"). The paper also briefly noted other options the 
CIA could be pursuing against Bm Ladin: paramilitary or sabotage attacks — possibly lethal — against Bin Ladins 
facilities in Kandahar and Sudan, or even intelligence support for U.S. military strikes. On the Kansi operation, see 
Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 373. 

20. NSC note, Simon to Berger, update on Feb. 24 meeting, Feb. 27, 1998. 

21. Joint Inquiry briefing by Mike, Sept. 12, 2002; NSC email, Clarke to Berger, "Threat Warning: Usama Bin 
Ladin," Mar. 7, 1998. 

22. Mike interview (Jan. 6, 2004); CIA email, Schroen to Mike, "Capture Op," May 5, 1998; CIA cable, "Com- 
ments on [Tribals'] Planning for UBL Rendition," May 6, 1998. For the modification of the plan, see CIA memo, 
"Tentative Timeline for the Bin Ladin Capture Operation," May 19, 1998. For details on some CIA officers' con- 
cerns, see Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 393—394. 

23. CIA cable," 19 May 98 Briefing forJSOC," May 27, 1998; CIA cable, "Developments in the [Tribals'] Oper- 
ation at the HQs End," May 26, 1998;Joint Inquiry interview of Michael Canavan, Sept. 3, 2002. 

24. CIA memos, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, May 1, 1998. 

25. CIA memo, summary of Covert Action Planning Group meeting, May 18, 1998; CIA memo, "Tentative 
Timeline for the Bin Ladin Capture Operation," May 19, 1998. The summary of the meeting notes that the ini- 
tiative was not an assassination, despite the inaccurate comments of some in the NSC. 

26. Mike interviews (Dec. 1 1 , 2003;Jan. 6, 2 004) Jeff interview (Dec. 17, 2003); Mary Jo White interview (May 
17,2004). 

27. CIA cable, "20-24 May 98 Full Mission Profile of the U.S. Side of the Bm Ladin Capture Operation," 
May 27, 1998; CIA cable, "Developments in the [Tribals'] Operation at the HQs End," May 26, 1998. 

28. CIA memo, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, May 20, 1998. It is unclear if a decision had been 
made at this point on where to bring Bin Ladin. 

29. Mike interview (Dec. 1 1, 2003); CIA cable, "The [Tribals] Operations," May 29, 1998. 

30. Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003), in which he also noted that Tenet did not approve of the plan. 
For Clarke's comments to the NSC, see CIA cable, "Info from State on Status of Political Approvals for [Tribals]," 
May 29, 1998. See Jeff interview (Dec. 17, 2003);James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004); GeorgeTenet interview (Jan. 
22, 2004), m "which he also said he did not tell the Principals Committee his reasons for canceling the operation 
because there was no reason for the principals to hear details of an unsound plan. See also Samuel Berger inter- 
view (Jan. 14,2004). 

31. CIA memo, DDO to Berger, "Timing of the UBL Rendition Operation," June 15, 1998; for Schroen, see 
CIA cable, "Comments on [Tribals'] Planning for UBL Rendition," May 6, 1998. 

32. See, e.g., Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 

33. On Saudi disruptions generally, see CIA report, "Additional Background on the Saudi discovery of an UBL 
Network in Saudi Arabia," undated (appears to be May 1998). On the DCI's visits to Saudi Arabia, see Intelligence 
reports made available to the Commission. 

34. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission. 

35. Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 400-402. 

36. CIA note, Pillar to Wentworth/Ramanujam, summary of Aug. 5, 1998, CSG meeting on Bin Ladin, Aug. 
6, 1998. 

37. See, e.g., CIA briefing materials, "Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam — An Update,"Aug. 14, 1998. 
38.DOD memo, "Chronology of Planning," Dec. 14, 1998. 

39. Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003). 

40. NSC email, Clarke to Berger,Aug. 8, 1998; Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); CIA memo, "Khowst 
and the Meeting of Islamic Extremist Leaders on 20 Aug.," Aug. 17, 1998. 

41. NSC notes, checklist re military strikes, Aug. 14, 1998 (author appears to be Clarke). On the military plans, 
see DOD memo, "Chronology of Planning," Dec. 14, 1998. 

42. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 

43. NSC emails, Simon to Kerrick, Aug. 5, 1998. For the report of Bin Ladin's comment, see, e.g., NSC email, 
Clarke to Berger,July 15, 1998. EMPTA stands for O-ethyl methylphosphonothioic acid. 

44. NSC memo, McCarthy to Berger, re Shifa,Aug. 11, 1998; Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14,2004). 

45. For a timeline of the decisionmaking events, see NSC memo to Steinberg et al., Aug. 17, 1999. The list of 
concurrences is drawn from talking points prepared for Berger s use with the main four leaders of the House and 



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482 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 

Senate; the list explicitly mentions the Attorney General. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Aug. 19, 1998. Reno told 
us she did not mention her concerns to the President but discussed them with Berger, Tenet,White House Coun- 
sel Charles Ruff, and DO) staff. Janet Reno interview (Dec. 16, 21.103). 

46. NSC email, Clarke to Kerrick, "Timeline "Aug. 19, 1998; Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). We did 
not find documentation on the after-action review mentioned by Berger. OnVice Chairman Joseph Ralston s mis- 
sion in Pakistan, see William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For speculation on tipping off the Taliban, see, e.g., 
Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003). 

47. NSC email, Clarke to Kerrick, "Timeline," Aug. 19, 1998. 

48. For initial support by Gingrich and Lott, see, e.g., Steven Thomma and Richard Parker, "U.S. Strikes Afghan, 
Sudan Sites, Retaliating for Embassy Attacks," Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 21, 1998, p. Al. For a reaction to the later 
criticism by Gingrich's office, see NSC email, Simon to Berger, Sept. 10, 1998. 

49. Editorial, "Punish and Be Damned," Economist, Aug. 29, 1998, p. 16. For a summary of skeptical public reac- 
tion, see Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 354—363. 

50. See NSC memo, McCarthy and Clarke to Berger, Apr. 17, 2000, reporting that on balance, they think the 
CIA claim was valid. See also President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004);Vice President Gore meeting (Apr. 9, 2004); 
Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004); Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 
19,2003). 

51. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 22, 2004). President Clinton told us that he had directed his national secu- 
rity team to focus exclusively on responding to the embassy bombings. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004). 
See also William Cohen testimony, Mar. 23, 2004. When "wag the dog" allegations were again raised during the 
December 1998 Desert Fox campaign over Iraq, Defense Secretary Cohen, formerly a Republican senator, told 
members of Congress that he would have resigned if he believed the President was using the military for any pur- 
pose other than national security. William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004). 

52. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 22, 2004). 

53. CIA analytic report, "Foreign Terrorist Threat in the U.S.: Revisiting our 1995 Estimate," Apr. 1997. 

54. Daniel Benjamin interview (Dec. 4, 2003). 

55. On the Balkan crises, see Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction ofYugoslavia (Yale Univ. 
Press, 2000). 

56. On Clarke's obsession with terrorism and Bin Ladin, see Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004); Richard 
A. Clarke, Against AH Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free Press, 2004), p. 234. On the CSG and the Small 
Group, see Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 11,2004). 

57. NSC memo, "Political Military Plan DELENDA," Sept. 1998 (attached to NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, 
Jan. 25, 2001). 

58. Ibid. See also NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 7, 1998. 

59. Handwritten note from Steinberg on NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Apr. 14, 2000. For the views of Small 
Group members, see William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004); Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004); President 
Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Madeleine Albright interview (Jan. 7, 
2004);James Steinberg interview (Dec. 5, 2003). 

60. Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004); DOD memo, Slocombe to Cohen, Aug. 27, 1998. 

61. DOD memo, "Towards a More Aggressive Counterterrorism Posture," undated, pp. 1, 7. The principal 
author of this paper wasThomas Kuster, a career civil servant and former special forces officer. He told us that this 
paper was drafted in September 1998. On this episode, seeThomas Kuster interviews (Dec. 9, 2003; Mar. 5, 2004); 
Allen Holmes interview (Mar. 10, 2004);Jan Lodal interview (Mar. 5, 2004). 

62. DOS cable, Islamabad 06863, "Afghanistan: Demarche to Taliban on New Bin LadinThreat," Sept. 14, 1998. 
See also NSC memo, Clarke to principals, "Possible New Attacks on US by UBL Network," Sept. 12, 1998, which 
suggested language lor the demarche, including a warning that future attacks would bring "severe consequences." 
NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 19, 1998, indicates that the State Department used both its embassy in Islam- 
abad and a direct call to Mullah Omar's office to deliver the warning. 

63. DOS memo, "Mullah Omar's 8/22 Contact with State Department," Aug. 22, 1998. 

64. DOS cable, Islamabad 007665, "High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line on Bin Ladin with a 
Couple of Nuances," Oct. 12, 1998. 

65. NSC memo, Sept. 24, 1998; Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 414. 

66. The CIA in particular pressed the Saudis hard on intelligence sharing. DCI Tenet met with Crown Prince 
Abdullah, Ambassador Bandar, the minister of defense and aviation, and other senior officials repeatedly and pressed 
them on counterterrorism. See, e.g., CIA memo, Tenet to Berger, Tenet's meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah in 
Jeddah,June 7, 1998. As late as July 3, 2001, the DCI was pressing Bandar, conveying the urgent need for informa- 
tion. CIA cable, DCI meeting with Bandar, July 3, 2001. 

67. See, e.g., Mike interview (Dec. 1 1, 2003). The Saudis, however, were reluctant to provide details of incom- 
plete investigations and highly sensitive to any information related to Saudi nationals, particularly those in the King- 
dom. See CIA memo, Saudi CT Cooperation, June 18, 1998. 

68. CIA talking points, Vice President's meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah, Sept. 24, 1998; NSC memo, 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 483 



Simon to Berger, "Talking Points for Lott- Gingrich Meeting," Sept. 24, 1998. 

69. NSC memo, Wechsler, summary of conclusions of Nov. 16, 1998, meeting ofWorking Group on UBL's 
Finances. 

70. Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004);Treasury memo, Office of Foreign Asset Control to DOS, "Draft 
Cable on Meeting with Two of UBL's Brothers," May 19, 2000; DOS cable, State 035243, "January 2000 Meeting 
Regarding UBL Finances," Feb. 27, 2000; Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). The U.S. government team learned 
that the Bin Ladin family sold UBL's share of the inheritance and, at the direction of the Saudi government, placed 
the money into a specified account then frozen by the Saudi government in 1994. 

71. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998. According to Clarke, Tenet's deputyjohn Gordon, 
agreed that there was no senior CIA manager to answer these questions and promised to fix that. 

72. DOS memo, McKune to Albright, "State Sponsorship of Terrorism: Pakistan," Feb. 1998. For the rejection 
of the proposed designation, see handwritten notes on the McKune memo. 

73. Madeleine Albright interview (Jan. 7, 2004). 

74. NSC memo, Simon to NSC officials, Oct. 6, 1998. Links between Pakistan's military intelligence service 
and Harakat ul Ansar trainees at Bin Ladin camps near Khowst were also discussed in DOS memo, Inderfurth to 
Talbott, "Pakistani Links to Kashmiri Militants," Aug. 23, 1998. 

75. William Milam interview (Dec. 29, 2003). 

76. By the fall of 1999, the Glenn, Pressler, and Symington amendments prohibited most economic and mili- 
tary assistance to Pakistan. Clinton administration officials told us that these sanctions made it impossible to offer 
"carrots" to Pakistan, and that before 9/11, waiving sanctions was not feasible because of the Musharraf coup, non- 
proliferation concerns, and Congress's pro-India orientation. Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Strobe Tal- 
bott interview (Feb. 8, 2004). 

77. Strobe Talbott interview (Feb. 8, 2004). Berger agreed with Talbott that using other sticks, such as block- 
ing loans from international financial institutions, would have risked a collapse of the Pakistani government and 
the rise of Islamists to power in a nuclear-armed country. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 

78. DOS memo, Pickering to Albright, "Berger meeting on UBL," Nov. 3, 1998. 

79. White House reports made available to the Commission. President Clinton met with Prime Minister Sharif 
on December 2, 1999, and called him on December 18, 1999. 

80. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 9, 1998. The event described in the intelligence report was said to have 
occurred on November 17, 1998. Intelligence officials now tell us that there are some doubts about the accuracy 
of the report. 

81. Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003). For Sheehan's background, see Madeleine Albright, with Bill 
Woodward, Madam Secretary (Miramax, 2003), pp. 369—370. For one of Sheehan's warnings, see DOS cable, Abu 
Dhabi 002212, "Messages for the Taliban," Apr. 9, 1999. 

82. Michael Sheehan interviews (Dec. 16, 2003; March 2004). For Albright's views, see Madeleine Albright 
interview (Jan. 7, 2004). NSC memo, Principals' Decision Paper, Mar. 8, 1999. In May 1999, Albright approved a 
State Department diplomatic strategy calling for increased high-level pressure on the Taliban and the three coun- 
tries that recognized it — and for unilateral sanctions if this failed. DOS memo, Inderfurth, Indyk, and Sheehan to 
Albright, "A New Bin Ladin Strategy," May 15, 1999. 

83. NSC email, Riedel to Berger and Clarke, June 8, 1999. 

84. See Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); DOS memo, Inderfurth to Albright, May 6, 1999; Michael 
Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003). Although Sheehan told us he was initially skeptical about supporting the North- 
ern Alliance, he eventually came around in the fall of 2000. 

85. For aid to the exile groups, see Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); PeterTomsen interview (July 14, 
2004). The aid was later cut because of alleged accounting deficiencies. For the diplomat's views, see Christina Rocca 
interview (Jan. 29, 2004). But PeterTomsen, the State Department's special envoy to the Afghan resistance in the 
late 1980s, believed that neither administration did enough to assemble an anti-Taliban ruling coalition inside and 
outside Afghanistan. PeterTomsen interview (Oct. 8, 2003); see also letter from PeterTomsen to the Commission, 
June 30, 2004. 

86. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, May 18, 1999. 

87. DOS memo, Inderfurth to Albright, May 6, 1999; DOS memo, Oakley to Pickering, "Designating the Tal- 
iban a FTO," Apr. 22, 1999; Executive Order 13129, July 4, 1999. Since 1979, the secretary of state has had the 
authority to name "state sponsors of terrorism," subjecting such countries to significant economic sanctions. Being 
designated a "foreign terrorist organization" also brings sanctions and stigmatizes a regime. While the U.S. govern- 
ment did not use either designation against theTaliban, the sanctions under this executive order mimicked the sanc- 
tions that would have been implemented under them. 

88. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267, Oct. 15, 1999.UNSCR 1267 demanded that theTal- 
iban render Bin Ladin to justice within 30 days; upon noncompliance, UN member states 'were called on to restrict 
takeoff and landing rights of Taliban-owned aircraft. The sanctions also required member states to freeze Taliban 
funds and financial resources. But Taliban "charter flights" continued to fly between Afghanistan and the UAE. 
Judy Pasternak and Stephen Braun, "Emirates Looked Other Way While Al Qaeda Funds Flowed," Los Angeles 



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484 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 

Times, Jan. 20, 2002, p. Al. Enforcing the financial restrictions also proved a challenge — especially in the Middle 
East. Anthony Wayne interview (Jan. 14,2004); Frank G. interview {Mar. 2, 2004); DOS report, "Usama Bin Ladin 
Intelligence Update," Nov. 19, 1999. 

89. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Oct. 30, 1999. 

90. Ibid.; NSC memo, Benjamin to CSG, Nov. 12, 1999. Earlier, Clarke had worried that the expulsion of Bin 
Ladin might mean he would move to Somalia or Libya, where he might be even harder to target. NSC email, Clarke 
to Berger, Oct. 8, 1998. 

91. See Intelligence report, relations between al Qaeda and theTaliban, Feb. 20, 2002. 

92. Intelligence report, March 2000. 

93. UNSCR 1333, Dec. 19, 2000. 

94. Edmund Hull interview (Oct. 18, 2003). 

95. Ambassador Milam characterized UNSCR 1267 and UNSCR 1333 as "punchless." DOS cable, Islamabad 
000656, "Options for dealing with Afghan terrorism problem," Feb. 6, 2001. But Ambassador Sheehan indicated 
that even if UNSCR 1333 failed to stop the arms flow from Pakistan to theTaliban, it had enormous symbolic 
importance. He also noted that UNSCR 1333 must have stigmatized theTaliban because they "went ballistic over 
the sanctions." Sheehan added that UNSCR 1333 made Saudi Arabia and the UAE "very nervous" about their 
relationships with theTaliban. Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003). 

96.White House cable to U.S. Embassy, Islamabad, message to Prime Minister Shanf,June 16, 1999; Madeleine 
Albright prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004. 

97. White House cable to U.S. Embassy, Islamabad, message to Prime Minister Sharif, June 16, 1999; Samuel 
Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); NSC memo, Clarke and McCarthy to 
Berger, Aug. 2, 1999. 

98. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); DOS memo, Sheehan to Albright, "S/CT Update on Critical 
Issues," July 9, 1999. 

99. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004). 
100. Thomas Pickering interview (Dec. 22, 2003). 

101. See Executive Order 13099, Aug. 20, 1998. 

102. CIA talking points, information on Bin Ladin for the DCI's Sept. 2, 1998, briefing to the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Sept. 2, 1998. 

103. For the Tirana raid and resulting operations, see Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacral Terror, pp. 261, 264; 
Clarke, Against AH Enemies, p. 183; CIA talking points, "CIA Operation Results in Capture ofTwo Bin Ladin Oper- 
atives," July 7, 1998; CIA memo, Jeff to Tenet, "Biweekly Developments in CT Policy," July 15, 1998. For other 
operations, see NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger, Oct. 9, 1998. For the arrest of Abu Hajer, see CIA report, "Appre- 
hension of Senior UBL Lieutenant in Germany," Sept. 22, 1998; NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger, Oct. 9, 1998; 
NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 17, 1998. For an overview of the CIA's efforts to disrupt al Qaeda, see Joint 
Inquiry testimony of George Tenet, Oct. 17, 2002. For Clarke's comment to Berger, see NSC email, Clarke to 
Berger, Sept. 25, 1998. 

104. For ambush attempts, see Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 312—313; CIA memo, "Status of the 
Bin Ladin Capture Operation," Sept. 30, 1998 (part of materials for Small Group meeting). For CIA officials' doubts, 
see James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004);Jeff interview (Dec. 17, 2003). On the quality of the tribals' reporting, see 
Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004). The tribals' extensive reporting on Bin Ladm's location is reflected in near 
daily UBL Situation Reports prepared for the DCI from December 1998 to January 2001. 

105. See Martin Sieff, "Terrorist Is Driven by Hatred for U.S., Israel," Washington Times, Aug. 21, 1998, p. 1. 
Regarding the leak, see Mary C. interview (Oct. 25, 2003); Richard Taylor interview (Dec. 10, 2003); Don Kerr 
interview (Sept. 9, 2003). 

106. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998; NSC talking points, Nov. 3, 1998.The quoted 
sentence is in boldface. 

107. NSC memo, summary of conclusions of Oct. 26, 1998, CSG Meeting, Oct. 28, 1998; NSC notes, CSG 
Agenda:"Bin Ladm Penetration of the United States," Oct. 26, 1998. For the threat against Washington, see NSC 
memo, Clarke to Berger, Weekly Report, July 3, 1998; NSC email, Clarke to various NSC staff", Sept. 7, 1998; NSC 
memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998. 

108. NSC memo, summary of conclusions of Oct. 26, 1998, CSG meeting, Oct. 28, 1998. 

109. Indictment, United States v. Usama Bin Laden, No. 98 Cr. (S.D. N.Y. unsealed Nov. 4, 1998), p. 3. For the 
reports concerning Derunta, see NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998. 

1 10. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Nov. 4, 1998. Evidence on Iraqi ties to al Qaeda is summarized in chapter 2. 
111. Patrick Fitzgerald testimony, June 16,2004. 

1 12. The PDB was a summary of Intelligence report, planning by UBL to hijack U.S. airplane, Dec. 4, 1998. 
For the immediate responses, see NSC memo, summary of conclusions of Dec. 4, 1998, CSG meeting; FAA secu- 
rity directive, "Threat to Air Carriers," SD 108-98, Dec. 8, 1998. We requested declassification of this document; 
the declassified document "was delivered on July 13, 2004. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 485 

113. On further information, see Intelligence report, possible arrest of persons involved in hijacking plan, Dec. 
18, 1998; Intelligence report, timeframe for completion of hijacking operation, Dec. 24, 1998; Intelligence report, 
claim that Bin Ladin postponed hijacking, Jan. 8, 1999; CIA analytic report, "Reporting onAl-Qaida plans to Use 
Aircraft as Terrorist Weapons," Aug. 26, 2002. After 9/11, the U.S. government checked again with the foreign gov- 
ernment to determine if there could be any connection between the attacks and these 1998—1999 reports.The for- 
eign government had no intelligence of such links, but judged that the 1998 plan could have influenced planning 
for the 9/11 operation. Ibid. 

On the FBI followup in 1998-1999, see FBI memo, Jack S. to FAA ACI, "FBI Investigative Efforts," Jan. 27, 
1999; FAA records, information in FAA Intelligence Case File 98-0199B.A Saudi who had just completed pilot 
training, boarding a flight to return to Saudi Arabia, had been arrested at JFK Airport in late November 1998. He 
had been carrying an inert hand grenade, which 'was detected by a checkpoint screener.The terminal was evacu- 
ated, and police found miscellaneous gun parts, pistol ammunition, and military paraphernalia in the man's checked 
bags. FAA record, "Security Summary NY-99-007," undated. The man was released after a few days in jail and, 
assisted by the local Saudi consulate, had returned to Saudi Arabia. The new threat information caused the FBI and 
the CIA to look again at this case. FBI agents found that the man's statements about his flight training were true 
and that his firearms were legally registered. The Saudi investigators reported that the Saudi had enjoyed shooting 
at a gun club in Texas, where he had completed his flight training for a commercial pilot's license. The Saudis fur- 
ther indicated that the man had no apparent political motive, and the results of a security investigation in the King- 
dom were negative. FAA memo, Matthew K. to Jack S. and Tom K., Saudi national, Jan. 17, 1999; FBI memo, Jack 
S. to FAA ACI, "FBI Investigative Efforts," Jan. 27, 1999; Intelligence report (to FAA), Saudi information, Apr. 13, 
1999. For the expiration of the FAA security directive, see FAA security directive, SD 108-95; FAA record, "SD/EA 
Status: 108 Security Directives," May 20, 2002. 

1 14. NSC notes, Clarke briefing notes for Berger for Small Group, Dec. 17, 1998; CIA memo, "Bin Ladin Ready 
to Attack," Dec. 18, 1998. 

115. NSC notes, Clarke briefing notes for Berger for Small Group, Dec. 17, 1998; NSC memo, Benjamin to 
Berger, Dec. 18, 1998; DOD memo, "UBL Campaign: Talking Points for Qandahar Attack," Jan. 11, 1999; Hugh 
Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). 

116. NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger, Dec. 18, 1998; DOD order, Execute Order (EXORD), Dec. 18,1998. 

117. NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger, Dec. 18, 1998; Mike interview (Jan. 6, 2004); CIA emails, Mike to 
Schroen, "Urgent re UBL," and Schroen's response, Dec. 20, 1998. 

1 18. John Maher III interview (Apr. 4, 2004). Maher said he found General Zinni's figures to be "shockingly 
high ."On the principals' decision against recommending an attack, see NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Jan. 12, 1999. 
See also George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004); Mike interview (Feb. 6, 2004). 

119. CIA email, Mike to Schroen, "Your Note," Dec. 21, 1998; CIA email, Schroen to Mike, "Re Urgent re 
UBL," Dec. 20, 1998. 

120. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004). 

121. CIA report, "Further Options Available Against UBL," Nov. 18, 1998; CIA talking points, "Options for 
Attacking the Usama Bin Ladin Problem," Nov. 24, 1998. On the MON, see Randy Moss interview (Feb. 6, 2004); 
James Baker interview (Feb. 4, 2004). 

122. NSC note, Dec. 20, 1998. There is no indication as to who wrote this note or to whom it was directed. 
It was cleared "with Berger, Reno, Assistant Attorney General Randy Moss, and CTC's "Jeff," and briefed in sub- 
stance to Leon Fuerth, national security adviser to Vice President Gore, and to Deputy DCI Gordon. See also 
attached CIA memo, Gordon to Berger, Dec. 21, 1998; NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, Dec. 24, 1998. 

123. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, Dec. 24, 1998; Randy Moss interview (Feb. 6, 2004); James Baker 
interview (Feb. 4, 2004). Both Moss and Baker told us they concluded that killing Bin Ladin did not violate the 
assassination ban contained in Executive Order 12333. 

124. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, Dec. 24, 1998; Janet Reno interview (Dec. 16, 2003). See also 
Randy Moss interview (Feb. 6, 2004).Tenent told us he does not recall this episode. 

125. CIA cable, message from the DCI, Dec. 26, 1998. 

126. CIA cable, instructions passed to tribals and response, Dec. 27, 1998. 

127. CIA cable, comments on tribals' response, Dec. 27, 1998. "Mike" noted that the tribals' reaction had 
"attracted a good deal of attention" back at CIA headquarters. CIA cable, comments from Schroen, Dec. 28, 1998. 
Schroen commented that the tribals' response was an effort to appear statesmanlike and take the moral high ground. 

128. See President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 1, 2004); Richard Clarke 
interview (Jan. 12, 2004). For a CIA senior intelligence manager, operator, and lawyer's view, see George Tenet inter- 
view (Jan. 22, 2004); Gary Schroen interview (Jan. 6, 2004); Doug B. interview (Nov. 17, 2003); Mike interview 
(Jan. 6,2004). 

129. James Baker interview (Feb. 4, 2004); President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004). 

130. NSC memo, McCarthy to CIA, Dec. 1999. 

131. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Jan. 12, 1999. 



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486 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 

132. NSC email, Ward to Clarke and others, Jan. 5, 1999. 

133. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Jan. 12, 1999. 

134. NSC email, Clarke to Kernck, Feb. 10, 1999; Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004). 

135. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Feb. 1 1, 1999. The email in fact misspells "boogie" as "boggie." 

136. NSC email, Riedel to NSC front office, Feb. 16, 1999. The email does not provide Riedel's source. For 
Berger's authorization, see NSC notes,TNT note, Feb. 12, 1999. 

137. DOD memo, "Chronology of Planning," Dec. 14, 1998. 

138. DOS cable,Washington 157093, "Aug. 21 telephone conversation between POTUS and Prime Minister 
Sharif," Aug. 26, 1998. Sharif was cordial but disagreed with the U.S. decision to strike. 

139. Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29, 2004). 

140. Ibid. 

141. DOD memo, Headquarters SOC, "Planning Directive for Infinite Resolve," Dec. 23, 1998. On basing 
options, see DOD memo, "Summary of Conclusions: AC-130 Deployment Decision Paper,"Jan. 12, 1999. 

142. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger and Steinberg, Roadmap for Feb. 2, 1999, Small Group meeting, undated; 
John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29, 2004); Peter Schoomaker interview 
(Feb. 19,2004). 

143. Peter Schoomaker interview (Feb. 19, 2004); William Boykin interview (Nov. 7, 2003). 

144. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). 

145. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004};William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004). 

146. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004);William Boykin interview (Nov. 7, 2003). 

147. General Zinni reminded us that in addition to severing military-to-military relations with Pakistan after 
the 1998 nuclear test, the United States had not shipped to Pakistan the F-16s Pakistan had bought prior to the 
test. Instead, the United States kept the money Pakistan paid for the F-16s to fluid storage of the aircraft. Mean- 
while, Pakistani pilots were crashing and dying. "Guess how they [felt] about the United States of America," Zinni 
said. Nevertheless, Zinni told us that Musharraf "was someone who would actually work with the United States if 
he was given the chance to do so. Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29, 2004). 

148. William Boykm interview (Nov. 7, 2003). 

149. Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12,2004). 
150. William Cohen testimony (Mar. 23, 2004). 

1 51. CIA report, "UBL Situation Report," Feb. 2, 1999. Public sources include Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 447-449; 
Benj amin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, p. 28 1 . 

152. CIA cable, "Update on Location of an Activity at Sheikh Ali's Camps," Feb. 7, 1999. 

153. DOD order, MOD 001 to CJCS warning order, Feb. 8, 1999. 

154. CIA reports, "UBL Situation Report," Feb. 6-10, 1999. 

155. CIA cable, "Support for Military Contingency Planning," Feb. 10, 1999. 

156. NSC email, Clarke to Kernck, Feb. 10, 1999. 

157. CIA talking points, "CIA Operations Against UBL," Feb. 10, 1999. 

158. CIA reports, "UBL Situation Reports," Feb. 11-12, 1999. 

159. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Gary Schroen inter- 
view (Mar. 3, 2004); Mike interview (Jan. 6, 2004). 

160. Mike briefing (Mar. 11, 2004); John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004). 

161. NSC memo, Clarke, secure teleconference between UAE Chief of Staff Muhammad bin Zayid and Clarke, 
Mar. 7, 1999. 

162. Mike interview (Jan. 6, 2004). Maher told us he thinks it "almost impossible" that the CIA cleared Clarke's 
call. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004). 

163. Days before overhead imagery confirmed the location of the hunting camp, Clarke had returned from a visit 
to the UAE, where he had been working on counterterronsm cooperation and following up on a May 1998 UAE 
agreement to buy F-16 aircraft from the United States. His visit included one-on-one meetings with Army Chief of 
Staff bin Zayid, as well as talks with Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid, the ruler of Dubai. Both agreed to try to work 
with the United States in their efforts against Bin Ladin. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Trip Report, Feb. 8, 1999; 
Theodore Kattouf interview (Apr. 21, 2004). On February 10, as the United States considered striking the camp, Clarke 
reported that during his visit bin Zayid had vehemently denied rumors that high-level UAE officials were in 
Afghanistan. NSC email, Clarke to Kerrick, UBL update, Feb. 10, 1999. Subsequent reporting, however, suggested that 
high-level UAE officials had indeed been at the desert camp. CIA memo, "Recent High Level UAE Visits to 
Afghanistan," Feb. 19, 1999. General Shelton also told us that his UAE counterpart said he had been hunting at a desert 
camp in Afghanistan at about this time. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). 

164. Mike briefing (Mar. 3, 2004). Talking points tor the DCI to use at a late March Small Group meeting 
note that concurrently with the UAE being"tipped off" to the CIA's knowledge of the camp, one of the tribal 
network's major subsources (within Bin Ladin's Taliban security detail) was dispatched to the north, further hand- 
icapping reporting efforts. CIA talking points, "Locating Bin Ladin," Mar. 29, 1999. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 487 

165. Theodore Kattouf interview (Apr. 21, 2004). Kattouf was the U.S. ambassador to the UAE from 1999 to 
2001. He indicated that high-level UAE officials would agree to restrict Afghan flights but told him that the gov- 
ernment had a difficult time enforcing this. For communications with the UAE, see White House letter, President 
Clinton to bin Zayid, July 23, 1999; DOS memo, Sheehan to Albright, "Signs of Progress on our UBL strategy," 
Sept. 12, 1999. 

166. DOS memo, Indyk and Sheehan to Albright, "UAE Gives Ultimatum to Taliban on Bin Laden," July 16, 
1999, and attached transcript of conversation between Hamdan bin Zayid and Mullah Mutawakkil, "Informal Trans- 
lation of UAE Note," July 14, 1999; DOS cable, Abu Dhabi 04644, "Taliban Refuse to Expel Bin Ladin Despite 
UAEG Ultimatum: Need to Stiffen UAE Resolve to Take the Necessary Next Steps," July 19, 1999. 

167. DOS memo, Indyk and Sheehan to Albright, "UAE Gives Ultimatum to Taliban on Bin Laden," July 16, 
1999. 

168. Jeff interview (Dec. 17, 2003). Schroen, however, told us that the tribals' reporting was 50—60 percent accu- 
rate. Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004). 

169. For discussion of theTaliban generally, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism 
in Central Asia (Yale Univ. Press, 2000). 

170. Ibid.; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 338—399; George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004). 

171. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004). 

172. Richard interview (Dec. 12, 2003); Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004). 

173. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For an account of the reporting from this period written by 
Mike, see CIA memo, Jeff to Tenet, "Tracking Usama Bin Ladin, 14-20 May 1999," May 21, 1999. Mike's account 
was also used to prepare the DCI for a May 25, 1999, Principals Committee meeting. CIA briefing materials, "Back- 
ground Information: Evaluating the Quality of Intelligence on Bin Ladin (UBL) in Qandahar, 13—20 May, 1999," 
undated (probably May 25, 1999). 

174. CIA email, Mike to Schroen, "Re:Your Note," May 17, 1999. 
175. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004). 

176. GeorgeTenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004);John Gordon interview (May 13, 2004). 

177. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 

178. The May 1999 intelligence on Bin Ladin's location in Kandahar came as criticism of the CIA over the 
recent bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was at its peak. The DCI later testified that this bombing was 
the result of a CIA mistake. Testimony of George Tenet before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intel- 
ligence, July 22, 1999. On Bin Ladin's whereabouts during the December 1998 episode, see John Maher III inter- 
view (Apr. 22, 2004). 

179. Cruise missiles were readied for another possible strike in early July 1999. But none of the officials we 
have interviewed recalled that an opportunity arose at that time justifying the consideration of a strike. See, e.g., 
John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004). 

180. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004); DOD briefing materials, UBL JCS Focused Campaign, undated. 

181. NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger and Steinberg, Apr. 29, 1999; NSC email, Clarke to Berger, May 26, 
1999. 

182. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger,June 24, 1999. For Clarke's request to Berger to convene the Small Group, 
see NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Analysis/ Options re UBL,Jun. 13, 1999. See also NSC email, Storey to Berger 
and Clarke, June 24, 1999. 

183. Berger notes on NSC memo, Clarke to Berger,June 24, 1999. 

184. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, June 24, 1999. 

185. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, UBL review for Dec. 3, 1999, Small Group meeting, Dec. 2, 1999. 

186. NSC memo, CSG agenda, Sept. 24, 1999. 

187. According to CTC talking points for the CSG in June 1999, more than 40 members of al Qaeda had 
been imprisoned over the past year. CIA talking points, C/CTC TPs/Backgrounder for CSG, June 7, 1999. Fig- 
ures cited m the DCI's letter to President Clinton in October, however, are slightly different: CTC had helped ren- 
der 32 terrorists to justice since July 1998, more than half ofwhom were al Qaeda. CIA letter, Tenet to President 
Clinton, "CIA's Counterterrorism Efforts," Oct. 16, 1999. 

188. See CIA cable, "Usama Bin Ladin: The Way Ahead," Aug. 25, 1999, soliciting comments from various sta- 
tions on "possible new approaches to capturing UBL and disrupting operations."The evolution of some of this 
thinking can be seen throughout the summer of 1999. See, e.g., CIA briefing materials, CTC UBL Update: "Must 
Do Some Fundamental Rethinking," July 20, 1999 (Afghan assets are not capable of mounting a UBL capture oper- 
ation or ambush); CIA briefing materials, CTC UBL Update:"Problems with Capturing UBL," Aug. 3, 1999 (trib- 
als are good reporters but are unlikely to capture Bin Ladin because of the risks involved, so there is a need to 
identify a new group to undertake a capture operation). 

189. July 1999 Memorandum of Notification. 

190. See James Baker interview (Feb. 4, 2004);Janet Reno interview (Dec. 16, 2003); Randy Moss interview 
(Jan. 22, 2004); GeorgeTenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004). On the Pakistani and Uzbek capture teams, see CIA memo, 



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488 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 

"'Outline of Program to Build Pakistan Team to Seek the Capture and Rendition of Usama Bin Ladin and his Lieu- 
tenants," July 27, 1999; CIA memo, CIA Outline of Program to Build Uzbek and other teams to Seek the Cap- 
ture and Rendition of Usama Bin Ladin and his Lieutenants, July 27, 1999; CIA briefing materials, talking points 
for the DCI for the Aug. 3 Small Group meeting, Aug. 3, 1999 (Other Pakistani Involvement in Efforts to Capture 
UBL; Uzbek and other programs). On the Uzbeks' readiness, see CIA briefing materials, "Executive Summary for 
UBL Conference," Sept. 16, 1999. 

191. CIA briefing materials, "Executive Summary for UBL Conference," Sept. 16, 1999. For its preface, the 
Plan quoted a memo Tenet had sent to the CIA's senior management in December 1998: "We are at war with 
Usama bin Ladin." 

192. Ibid. See also the following briefings of the Plan: CIA briefing materials, CTC/NSC Briefing on the Plan, 
Sept. 29, 1999; CIA briefing materials, Executive Summary: UBL Conference, prepared for Berger, Nov. 30, 1999; 
CIA briefing materials, CTC briefing for the NSC Small Group, Dec. 2/3, 1999. 

193. This figure increased through the fall of 1999, from less than 5 percent on September 16 to less than 10 
percent by November 30, and finally to less than 15 percent by early December. CIA briefing materials, "Execu- 
tive Summary for UBL Conference," Sept. 16, 1999; CIA briefing materials, Executive Summary: UBL Confer- 
ence, prepared for Berger, Nov. 30, 1999; CIA briefing materials, CTC briefing for the NSC Small Group, Dec. 
2/3, 1999. On Massoud, see also CIA briefing materials, "DDCI UBL Update," Oct. 29, 1999; CIA briefing mate- 
rials, "DCI UBL Update," Nov. 12, 1999. 

194. CIA briefing materials, "Executive Summary for UBL Conference," Sept. 16, 1999. For the JSOC esti- 
mate, see CIA briefing materials, Executive Summary: UBL Conference, prepared for Berger, Nov. 30, 1999. 

5 Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland 

1. Though KSM and Bin Ladin knew each other from the anti-Soviet campaign of the 1980s, KSM apparently 
did not begin working with al Qaeda until after the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings. Intelligence reports, inter- 
rogations of KSM, Nov. 21, 2003;Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 19, 2004. 

2. Those detainees are Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Riduan Isamuddin (also known as fiam- 
bali),Abd al Rahim al Nashiri,Tawfiq bin Attash (also known as Khallad), Ramzi Binalshibh, Mohamed al Kah- 
tani, Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, AH Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi (also known as Abu Bakr al Azdi), 
and Hassan Ghul. 

3. On KSM's relationship to Yousef and his ethnicity, see CIA analytic report, Khalid Sheik Muhammad's 
Nephews, CTC 2003-300013, Jan. 31, 2003. On KSM's biography, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, 
July 12, 2003; FBI electronic communication, requests for information on KSM colleges/ universities, June 10,2002. 

4. In an uncorroborated post-capture claim that may be mere bravado, KSM has stated that he considered assas- 
sinating Rabbi Meir Kahane when Kahane lectured in Greensboro at some point between 1984 and 1986. Intel- 
ligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. On KSM's connection to Sayyaf, see Intelligence reports, 
interrogations of KSM, July 3, 2003;July 12, 2003; FBI electronic communication, "Summary of Information . . . 
with regard to . . .KSM," July 8, 1999. On KSM's battle experience and his electronics work, see Intelligence reports, 
interrogations of KSM, July 3, 2003; July 12, 2003. On KSM's anti-Soviet activities, see Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of KSM, Feb. 17, 2004 (in which KSM says he apparently met Bin Ladin for the first time when the Sayyaf 
group and Bin Ladm's Arab mujahideen group were next to each other along the front line). 

5. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003 (in which KSM also notes that his group contin- 
ued fighting m the Jalalabad area, and his brother Abid was killed there). KSM claims that RamziYousef visited the 
NGO's establishment injalalabad while Yousef was undergoing training. KSM adds that between 1993 and 1996, 
he traveled to China, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bosnia (a second time), Brazil, Sudan, and Malaysia. Most, if not all, 
of this travel appears to have been related to his abiding interest in carrying out terrorist operations. Although KSM 
claims that Sheikh Abdallah was not a member, financier, or supporter of al Qaeda, he admits that Abdallah under- 
wrote a 1995 trip KSM took to join the Bosnia jihad. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 23, 2003. 

6. On KSM's learning ofYousef s plans, see Intelligence report, interrogation or KSM, Jan. 9, 2004 (in which 
KSM also contends that Yousef never divulged to him the intended target of the attack). On KSM/Yousef phone 
conversations, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 17, 2004 (in which KSM also says that most of 
his phone conversations "with Yousef were social in nature, but that Yousef did discuss mixing explosives ingredients 
once or twice and that on one occasion, Yousef asked him to send the passport Yousef had in his true name,Abdul 
Basit). On KSM's money transfer, see FBI report, Tradebom investigation, Mar. 20, 1993. 

7. Evidence gathered at the time ofYousef's February 1995 arrest included dolls wearing clothes containing 
nitrocellulose. FBI evidence, Manila air investigation. On KSM's rationale for attacking the United States, see Intel- 
ligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 5, 2003 (in this regard, KSM's statements echo those ofYousef, who 
delivered an extensive polemic against U.S. foreign policy at his January 1998 sentencing). On the Manila air plot, 
see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Apr. 17, 2003; July 12, 2003 (in which KSM also says bojinka is not 
Serbo-Croatian for "big bang," as has been widely reported, but rather a nonsense word he adopted after hearing 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 489 

it on the front lines in Afghanistan). According to KSM, the plot "was to receive financing from a variety of sources, 
including associates of co-conspiratorWali Khan and KSM's own funds. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, 
Nov. 26, 2(J03;Jan. 9, 21.104; Feb. 1 9, 201.14. On activities during the summer of 1 994, see Intelligence reports, inter- 
rogations of KSM, May 3, 2003;July 12, 2003; Nov. 10, 2003; Feb. 21, 2004; Feb. 24, 2004. 

8. On recruiting Wali Khan m Karachi, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Abdul Hakim Murad, Apr. 
13, 1995; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003 (in which KSM recounts how he knew Wali 
Khan from Afghanistan). On the testing of the timer, see Brief for the United States of America, United States v. 
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, No. 98-1041(L) (2d Cir. filed Aug. 25, 2000), pp. 85-86, 88-91. The latter explosion caused 
the death of a passenger and extensive damage to the aircraft, which was forced to make an emergency landing in 
Okinawa. In 1996, Yousef was convicted on charges arising out of the Bojmka plot, including the bombing of the 
Philippine Airlines flight. See ibid., p. 8. On KSM's travels, see generally Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, 
July 12, 2003.Yousef managed to escape to Pakistan, but his accomplice, Murad — whom KSM claims to have sent 
to Yousef with S3, 000 to help fund the operation — was arrested and disclosed details of the plot while under inter- 
rogation. Contrary to Murad's confession, in which he described his intended role as one of the five operatives who 
would plant bombs on board the targeted aircraft, KSM has said that Murad's role was limited to carrying the $3,000 
from Dubai to Manila. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004; (two reports); Feb. 24, 2004; Apr. 
2, 2004. This aspect of KSM's account is not credible, as it conflicts not just with Murad's confession but also with 
physical evidence tying Murad to the very core of the plot, and with KSM's own statements elsewhere that Murad 
was involved in planning and executing the operation. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; 
Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 24, 2004 (in which KSM also claims that while he was in Qatar in February 1995, he and Yousef 
consulted by telephone regarding the cargo carrier plan, and Yousef proceeded with the operation despite KSM's 
advice that he hide instead). We have uncovered no evidence that KSM was present at the guesthouse m Islamabad 
where Yousef's arrest took place, as has been suggested in the press. 

9. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. KSM's presence in Bosnia coincided with a police 
station bombing in Zagreb where the timing device of the bomb (a modified Casio "watch) resembled those man- 
ufactured by KSM and Yousef in the Philippines for the Manila air operation. FBI report, Manila air investigation, 
May 23, 1999. On the Sudanese trip and Afghanistan, see Intelligence report, interrogation of SM, July 12, 2003 
(in "which KSM also claims to have encountered Sayf al Adl while in Yemen; apparently KSM has not divulged the 
substance of this meeting). 

10. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. In another interrogation report, however, KSM 
downplays the significance of his relationship to Yousef in enabling him to meet "with Bin Ladin. Specifically, KSM 
notes that Yousef was not a member of al Qaeda and that Yousef never met Bin Ladin. Intelligence report, interro- 
gation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004. 

1 1 . Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM July 12, 2003 Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 19, 2004.With respect to KSM's 
additional proposal to bomb cargo planes by shipping jackets containing nitrocellulose, KSM states that Bin Ladin 
expressed interest in changing the operation so that it would involve a suicide operative. Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of KSM, Nov. 10, 2003. 

12. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004. 

13. Probably inflating his own role, KSM says he and a small group of colleagues, including Yousef and Wali 
Khan, "were among the earliest advocates of attacking the United States. KSM asserts that Bin Ladin and some of 
the other jihadist leaders concentrated on overthrowing Arab regimes and argued for limiting confrontation "with 
the United States to places like Somalia. On KSM's description of Bin Ladin's agenda, see Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003. As discussed in chapter 2, we do not agree "with this assessment. On Bin Ladin's 
reactions to KSM's proposal, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 19, 
2004. On KSM's intent to target the United States and Bin Ladin's interest in Somalia, see Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of KSM, Nov. 13,2003. 

14. On KSM's independence, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. Even after he began 
working with Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, KSM concealed from them his ongoing relationship with Sayyaf. Intelli- 
gence report, interrogation of KSM, July 30, 2003. Although KSM says he would have accepted the support of 
another organization to stage a 9/11-type operation, there is no evidence he ever peddled this idea to any other 
group. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004. On his travels after meeting Bin Ladin, see Intel- 
ligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. Hambali also was one of the founders ofKonsojaya,a Malaysian 
company run by a close associate ofWali Khan. FBI report, Manila air investigation, May 23, 1999. Hambali claims 
he was asked to serve on the company's board of directors as a formality and insists that he did not recognize the 
"Arabs" who were to run the company or play any role in its operations. Intelligence report, interrogation of Ham- 
bali, Nov. 19,2003. 

15. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Feb. 19, 2004 (two reports). KSM maintains that 
he provided similar services for other mujahideen groups at this time, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group 
and a group headed by Abu Zubaydah. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004. 

16. On KSM's understanding of Bin Ladin's commitment, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 



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490 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 

19, 2004. On KSM's assistance to al Qaeda, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003 (two 
reports). On Bin Ladin's decision to approve 9/11 operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 
2004. KSM has observed that the East Africa bombings and the subsequent bombing of the USS Cole yielded a 
recruiting bonanza for al Qaeda, as increasing numbers of Arab youth became enamored of the idea of waging jihad 
against the United States. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 5, 2003. 

17. On KSM's decision to move to Kandahar, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. On 
the media committee, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003 (in which KSM also says that as 
head of the media committee, he would take charge of producing the propaganda video al Qaeda issued follow- 
ing the bombing of the USS Cole). On the oath, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003 (in 
which KSM also claims his reluctance stemmed from a concern that he would lose the ability to persevere with 
the 9/1 1 operation should Bin Ladin subsequently decide to cancel it). 

18. On a possible Southeast Asian operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 4, 2003. 
On a possible U.S. operation, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 27, 2003; July 14, 2003. On a 
possible Israeli operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 30, 2003. On other possible targets 
discussed with Atef, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 4, 2003 (Thailand); Intelligence report, 
interrogation of KSM, Apr. 4, 2004 (Singapore, Indonesia, Maldives). 

19. For an example of KSM's popularity, see Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda facilitator, Oct. 11, 

2002. See also Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Nov. 7, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation 
ofNashin, Feb. 10,2003. 

20. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Hambali, Jan. 14, 2003; Mar. 5, 2004. 

21. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network ofTerror (Columbia Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 187, 199. 

22. On the trip to Karachi, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 12, 2003. On Hambali's rela- 
tionship with Atef and receipt of al Qaeda funds, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Mar. 5, 2004. 
Al Qaeda began providing funds to JI for terrorist operations as early as 1999. Intelligence report, interrogation of 
detainee, Mar. 3,2004. 

23. On Hambali's role as coordinator, see Intelligence report, interrogation at detainee. Mar. 4. 2' )(>4. On Sufaat, 
see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 12, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 30, 

2003. In 1987, Sufaat received a bachelor's degree in biological sciences, with a minor in chemistry, from Califor- 
nia State University, Sacramento. Sufaat did not start on the al Qaeda biological weapons program until after JI's 
December 2000 church bombings in Indonesia, in which he was involved. Intelligence report, interrogation of 
Hambali, Sept. 8, 2003. On Sufaat's schooling, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Dec. 14, 2001. 

24. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 9, 2003. KSM also maintains that he persuaded Hambali 
to focus on "soft" targets in Singapore, such as oil tankers, the U.S. and Israeli embassies, and Western airlines. Intel- 
ligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 24, 2003. 

25. As discussed in greater detail in section 5.2, Khallad was sent by Bin Ladin to Kuala Lumpur to case U.S. 
airline flights in the Far East for possible future attacks there, whereas Hazmi and Mihdhar "were on the first leg of 
their travel from Karachi to Los Angeles, where they would arrive on January 15, 2000. Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of KSM, July 31, 2003. On Hambali's assistance at KSM's request, see Intelligence report, interrogation of 
KSM, July 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 8, 2003. On assistance to Moussaoui, see 
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24,2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 9,2002. 
According to statements attributed to Hambali and Sufaat, in each of these instances the al Qaeda guests were lodged 
at Sufaat's condominium, an apartment on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. Intelligence report, interrogation of 
detainee, Jan. 22, 2002; Intelligence reports, interrogations of Hambali, Sept. 8, 2003; Sept. 12, 2003. 

26. On Hambali's relationship "with Bin Ladin, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Hambali, Aug. 29,2003; 
Sept. 5, 2003 (in which Hambali also explains his relationship with al Qaeda as follows: he received his marching 
orders from JI, but al Qaeda "would lead anyjoint operation involving members of both organizations). On Ham- 
bali's objections, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 8, 2003. On KSM's coordination with Ham- 
bali, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 17, 2003. On KSM's recognition of Hambali's domain, see 
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. According to KSM, his close relationship with Hambali 
prompted criticism from Bashir, the JI leader, who thought Hambali should focus more directly on Indonesia and 
Malaysia instead of involving himself in al Qaeda's broader terrorist program. Indeed, KSM describes Hambali as 
an al Qaeda member working in Malaysia. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. Nashiri observes 
that al Qaeda's standard security practice dictated that no senior member could manage terrorist activities in a loca- 
tion where another senior member was operating. Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Jan. 14, 2003. Yet 
al Qaeda's deference to Hambali's turf apparently had limits. Khallad says he and Hambali never discussed the 
intended Southeast Asia portion of the original 9/11 plan. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 27, 
2004. 

27. On Nashin's recruitment, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Nasser Ahmad Naser al Bahri, a.k.a. 
Abu Jandal, Sept. 17— Oct. 2, 2001. On Nashiri s refusal to swear allegiance, see Intelligence report, interrogation of 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 491 

KSM, Nov. 21, 2003. On Nashiri's idea for his first terrorist operation and his travels, see Intelligence reports, inter- 
rogations of Nashiri, Nov. 21, 2002; Dec. 26, 2002. 

28. Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Dec. 26, 2002. Although Nashiri's account of this episode dates 
his return to Afghanistan in 1996, the 1997 date is likely more accurate. On Nashiri's involvement in the missile- 
smuggling and embassy-bombmg plots, see Intelligence report, seizure of antitank missiles in Saudi Arabia, June 14, 
1998; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al Owahli, Sept. 9, 1998, p. 6. 

29. For Nashiri's version, which may not be true, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Dec. 26, 
2002. On communication between Nashiri and Bin Ladin about attacking U.S. vessels, see Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of Nashiri, Nov. 21, 2002. The reporting of Nashiri's statements on this subject is somewhat inconsistent, 
especially as to the exact timing of the original proposal. Some corroboration does exist, however, for Nashiri's 
claim that the original proposal was his. A detainee says that 9/11 hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar told him about the 
maritime operation sometime in late 1999 and credited Nashiri as its originator. Intelligence report, interrogation 
of detainee, Dec. 2, 2001. 

30. Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Jan. 27, 2003. Nashiri claims not to have had any telephone 
or email contact with Bin Ladin while planning the Cole operation; rather, whenever Bin Ladin wanted to meet, 
he would have an al Qaeda member travel to Pakistan to summon Nashiri by telephone. Ibid. 

31. As an example of Nashiri's status, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Abu Jandal, Sept. 17— Oct. 2, 
2001 (in which Nashiri is described as "widely known to be one of al Qaeda's most committed terrorists and, accord- 
ing to one of his mujahideen colleagues, so extreme in his ferocity in wagingjihad that he "would commit a ter- 
rorist act 'in Mecca inside the Ka'aba itself [the holiest site in Islam] if he believed there was a need to do so"). On 
Nashiri's role on the Arabian Peninsula, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Jan. 14, 2004. Nashiri also 
enjoyed a reputation as a productive recruiter for al Qaeda. See Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubay- 
dah, Aug. 29, 2002. On Nashiri's discretion, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Nov. 20, 2002. 
On Nashiri seeking Bin Ladm's approval, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 14, 2004. On the Lim- 
burg operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, May 21, 2003. On Nashiri's security concerns, see 
Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 20, 2003. 

32. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 1, 2003; Sept. 5, 2003. 

33. For KSM's learning from the first World Trade Center bombing and his interest m a more novel form of 
attack, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 1, 2003. For KSM's interest in aircraft as weapons and 
speculation about striking the World Trade Center and CIA, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 
2004. KSM has stated that he and Yousef at this time never advanced the notion of using aircraft as "weapons past 
the idea stage. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. 

After 9/11, some Philippine government officials claimed that "while in Philippine custody in February 1995, 
KSM's Manila air plot co-conspirator Abdul Hakim Murad had confessed having discussed withYousef the idea of 
attacking targets, including the World Trade Center, with hijacked commercial airliners flown by U.S. -trained Mid- 
dle Eastern pilots. See Peter Lance, 1 000 Years for Revenge; International Terrorism and the FBI — the Untold Story 
(HarperCollins, 2003), pp. 278—280. In Murad's initial taped confession, he referred to an idea of crashing a plane 
into CIA headquarters. Lance gave us his copy of an apparent 1995 Philippine National Police document on an 
interrogation of Murad. That document reports Murad describing his idea of crashing a plane into CIA headquar- 
ters, but in this report Murad claims he "was thinking of hijacking a commercial aircraft to do it, saying the idea had 
come up in a casual conversation with Yousef with no specific plan for its execution. We have seen no pre-9/11 
evidence that Murad referred in interrogations to the training of other pilots, or referred in this casual conversa- 
tion to targets other than the CIA. According to Lance, the Philippine police officer, "who after 9/11 offered the 
much more elaborate account of Murad's statements reported in Lance's book, claims to have passed this added 
information to U.S. officials. But Lance states the Philippine officer declined to identify these officials. Peter Lance 
interview (Mar. 15, 2004). If such information "was provided to a U.S. official, we have seen no indication that it 
was written down or disseminated "within the U.S. government. Incidentally, KSM says he never discussed his idea 
for the planes operation with Murad, a person KSM regarded as a minor figure. Intelligence report, interrogation 
ofKSM,Apr.2,2004. 

34. Intelligence report, 1996 Atef study on airplane hijacking operations, Sept. 26, 2001. 

35. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Nov. 6, 2003. Abu Zubaydah, who worked closely 
with the al Qaeda leadership, has stated that KSM originally presented Bin Ladm with a scaled-down version of 
the 9/11 plan, and that Bin Ladin urged KSM to expand the operation with the comment, "Why do you use an 
axe when you can use a bulldozer?" Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 16, 2003. The only 
possible corroboration we have found for Abu Zubaydah's statement is Khallad s suggestion that Bin Ladin may 
have expanded KSM's original idea for an attack using planes. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 22, 
2004. Neither Abu Zubaydah nor Khallad claims to have been present "when KSM says he first pitched his proposal 
to Bin Ladin in 1996. 

36. For the scheme's lukewarm reception, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 6, 2003. For Bin 
Ladin s response, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Feb. 19, 2004. 



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492 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 



37. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004. 

38. For KSM's joining al Qaeda, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003. KSM has pro- 
vided inconsistent information about whether Bin Ladin first approved his proposal for what became the 9/11 
attacks in late 1998 or in early 1999. Compare Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Jan. 9, 
2004; Feb. 19, 2004; Apr. 3, 2004. For KSM's antipathy to the United States, see Intelligence report, interrogation 
of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004. For Atef's role, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. ForAtefs death, 
see DOS report, "Comprehensive List ofTerrorists and Groups Identified Under Executive Order 13224,"Dec. 31, 
2001. 

39. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18,2003. 

40. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Apr. 30, 2004. An earlier KSM 
interrogation report, however, states that Bin Ladin preferred the Capitol over the White House as a target. Intel- 
ligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 17, 2003. KSM has admitted that his statement in a post-9/1 1 interview 
with Aljazeera reporterYosri Fouda — that an al Qaeda "reconnaissance committee" had identified 30 potential tar- 
gets in the United States during the late 1990s — was a lie designed to inflate the perceived scale of the 9/11 oper- 
ation. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 23, 2004. For the specific targets, see Intelligence report, 
selection of 9/1 1 targets, Aug. 13, 2003 (citing KSM interrogation). 

41. For the four individuals, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. Abu Bara alYemeni 
is also known by the names Abu al Bara alTaizi, Suhail Shurabi, and Barakat. Ibid. KSM has also stated that he did 
not learn of the selection of Hazmi and Mihdhar for the planes operation until November 1999. Intelligence report, 
interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. For Mihdhar's and Hazmi s eagerness, see Intelligence reports, interrogations 
of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 20,2004 .For Bin Ladin's instruction, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 
20, 2004. Hazmi obtained a B-l/B-2 multiple-entry visa issued at Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, on April 3, 1999; Mihdhar 
obtained the same type of visa at the same location on April 7, 1999. DOS records, NIV applicant details for Hazmi 
and Mihdhar, Nov. 8, 2001. Hazmi and Mihdhar both obtained new passports shortly before they applied for visas. 
FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Jan. 31, 2003, p. 9. 

42. For Hazmi and Mihdhar's city of birth, see CIA analytic report, "1 1 September: The Plot and the Plotters," 
CTC 2003-40044HC,June 1, 2003, pp. 49—50. For their travel to Bosnia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of 
Saudi al Qaeda member, Oct. 3, 2001. For their visits to Afghanistan, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of 
detainee, Feb. 5, 2002; Feb. 11, 2002; Intelligence reports, interrogations of Saudi al Qaeda member, Oct. 2, 2001; 
Oct. 18,2001. 

43. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad,June 25, 2003; Sept. 5, 2003. 

44. For Khallad's visa application under a false name and its rejection, see DOS record, visa application of Salah 
Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf (alias for Khallad), Apr. 3, 1999; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 
20, 2003. Khallad's visa denial was based not on terrorism concerns but apparently on his failure to submit suffi- 
cient documentation in support of his application. See DOS record, NIV applicant detail, Mar. 31, 2004. For Khal- 
lad's 1999 mission to Yemen, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 20, 2003. For the U.S. point of 
contact, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 22, 2003. Khallad claims he cannot remember his 
U.S. contact's full name but says it sounded like "Barzan." According to the CIA, "Barzan" is possibly identifiable 
with Sarbarz Mohammed, the person who resided at the address in Bothell, Washington, that Khallad listed on his 
visa application as his final destination. Ibid. For his contacts with "Barzan" and his arrest, see ibid.; Intelligence 
report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 20, 2003. Nashiri has confirmed that Khallad had been assigned to help pro- 
cure explosives for the ship-bombing plot, and that his arrest caused work on the operation to stop temporarily. 
Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 21, 2004. 

45. For the interventions, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 20, 2003. Khallad has provided 
inconsistent information as to his release date. Ibid. (June 1999); Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 
6, 2004 (August 1999). Khallad's brother reportedly has confirmed that Khallad was released from custody only 
after negotiations with the Yemeni director for political security in which a deal was struck prohibiting Khallad and 
his associates from conducting operations in Yemen. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 1, 2002. For 
his giving up on a visa and his return to Afghanistan, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, July 31, 
2003; Aug. 22,2003. 

46. For KSM's realization of visa complications, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. 
According to both KSM and Khallad, Abu Bara never applied for a U.S. visa. Intelligence report, interrogation of 
KSM, Feb. 20, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004. KSM has noted that Ramzi Binal- 
shibh, another Yemeni slated early on to participate in the 9/11 attacks, likewise would prove unable to acquire a 
U.S. visa the following year. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 7, 2004. For KSM's desire to keep Khal- 
lad and Abu Bara involved, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For Saudis being chosen 
for the planes operation, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Jan. 7, 2004; Jan. 23, 2004. For KSM's split- 
ting the operation into two parts, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Intelligence report, 
interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 27, 2004. 

47. For the second part of the operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18. 2003. For the 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 493 

alternate scenario, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 30, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation 
of Khallad,Apr. 21, 2004.Khallad has provided contradictory statements about the number of planes to be destroyed 
in East Asia. Intelligence reports, interrogations ot K ha 11, id. Aug. 1 3, 21 >! '3; Apr. 5, 2' )04. According to K h alia d, Thai- 
land, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Malaysia "were likely origins of the flights because Yemenis did not need visas 
to enter them. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 13, 2003. For the importance of simultaneity, see 
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 20113. 

48. For the four operatives' training, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For the elite 
nature of the course and Nibras's participation, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Sept. 8, 2003; 
Sept. 11, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 15, 2003. For KSM's view, see ibid.; Intelligence 
report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For KSM's visit, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 
20, 2004. 

49. For a description of the camp and the commando course, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, 
July 15, 2003. For Bin Ladin's interest and the decision on the number of trainees, see Intelligence report, interro- 
gation of Khallad, Sept. 8, 2003. 

50. For the nature of the commando course, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 8, 2003. 
KSM claims that the course proved so rigorous that Mihdhar quit after a week and returned to his family inYemen. 
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18,2003. However, two ofMihdhar's al Qaeda colleagues who were 
present during the training have provided different accounts. Khallad apparently has stated both that Bin Ladin 
pulled Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi out of the course early and that Mihdhar actually completed the course. See 
Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Sept. 1, 2003; May 21, 2004. See also FBI report of investigation, 
interview of Abu Jandal, Oct. 2, 2001 (indicating that Mihdhar completed the course). 

51. For instruction on Western culture and travel, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Mar. 24,2003; 
June 15, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 21, 2003. For KSM's mid-1999 activity and Bin 
Ladin's payment, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. According to KSM, he received a 
total of $10,000 from Bin Ladin for 9/1 1-related expenses. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 5, 2004. 

52. For Khallad, Abu Bara, and Hazmi's travels, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 30, 2003. 
Khallad has provided a second version, namely that all three traveled together to Karachi. Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. For Hazmi and Atta's simultaneous presence in Quetta, see Intelligence reports, 
interrogations of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004; Mar. 31, 2004. KSM maintains it was a coincidence. Ibid. 

53. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 31, 2004. In his initial post-capture statements, KSM claimed 
that Mihdhar did not have to attend the training because he had previously received similar training from KSM. 
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003. KSM subsequently expressed uncertainty about why Bin 
Ladin and Atef excused Mihdhar from the training. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. 

54. For the varying accounts of the course's length, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 
2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003;July 31, 2003. For KSM's descrip- 
tion, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003; Aug. 18, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004. For Khallad's 
description, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 5, 2004. KSM says that he permitted the trainees 
to view Hollywood films about hijackings only after he edited the films to cover the female characters. Intelligence 
report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 10, 2003. For the use of game software and discussions of casing flights, see 
Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003. For KSM's instructions regarding casing, see Intelligence 
report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. For visits to travel agencies, see Intelligence report, interrogation of 
Khallad, Aug. 13,2003. 

55. For the travels of Khallad, Abu Bara, and Hazmi via Karachi, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, 
Aug. 18, 2003. For Mihdhar's travel fromYemen, see FBI report,"HijackersTimeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A- 
NY-280350, serial 24808). 

56. For the operatives' knowledge, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For Hazmi and 
Mihdhar being sent to Malaysia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 29, 2003. For passport doctor- 
ing, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For casing, see Intelligence report, interrogation 
of KSM, July 29, 2003. For Khallad and Abu Bara's departure, as well as Hazmi's travel, see Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of KSM, July 31, 2003. Khallad maintains that Abu Bara did not participate m the casing operation and 
simply traveled to Kuala Lumpur as Khallad's companion. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 30, 
2003. 

57. For the trip's original purpose and Bin Ladin's suggestion, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khal- 
lad, July 31, 2003. On Malaysia, Endolite, and the financing of Khallad's trip, see Intelligence report, interrogation 
of Khallad, Aug. 22,2003. 

58. On informing Hambali, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For Hambali's assis- 
tance, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, 
Sept. 4, 2003. For the colleague who spoke Arabic, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 30, 2003. 

59. For the dates of Khallad's travel, his mistake in seating, and his other efforts to case flights, see Intelligence 
reports, interrogations of Khallad, July 31, 2003; Aug. 21, 2003. Khallad says he put the box cutter alongside tubes 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



494 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 

of toothpaste and shaving cream with metallic exteriors, so that if the metal detector at the airport was triggered, 
the inspector would attribute the alarm to the other items. He also carried art supplies, which he hoped would 
explain the presence of a box cutter if anyone asked. Ibid. 

60. For Khallad's return to Kuala Lumpur, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 30, 2003. For 
Hazmi's arrival and stay at the clinic, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. For Mihdhar's 
arrival, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 24808). For their stay 
at Sufaat's apartment, see CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the PI otters," June 1, 2003, p. 1 1; Intelligence report, 
interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 22, 2003. For Khallad's discussions with Hazmi and Khallad's knowledge of the oper- 
ation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. 

61. For the Bangkok meeting, see CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, pp. 49—50. 
For relocation of the meeting to Bangkok, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Aug. 18, 2003;Jan. 7, 
2004. Fahd al Quso, a close friend of Khallad's, accompanied Nibras on the trip to Bangkok to take money to Khal- 
lad. Quso claims that the amount was $36,000. FBI report of investigation, interview of Quso, Jan. 31, 2001. Khal- 
lad claims that it was only $10,000 to $12,000. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, May 30, 2003; Aug. 
18, 2003. Khallad has identified contradictory purposes for the money: a donation to charities benefiting amputees, 
see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 8,2003; and to advance the ship-bombing operation, see Intel- 
ligence report, interrogation ot Khallad, [an. 7, 2<)()4. Khallad luis explicitly denied giving jiiv ot the money he 
received from Nibras and Quso to Hazmi and Mihdhar. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Aug. 8, 2003; 
Jan. 7, 2004. Given the separate reporting from KSM that he gave Hazmi and Mihdhar $8,000 each before they 
traveled to the United States, we have insufficient evidence to conclude that the Nibras/Quso money helped finance 
the planes operation. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 15, 2004. For Hazmi and Mihdhar's interest 
in traveling to Bangkok, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 7, 2004. For Hambali's assistance, see 
Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 8, 2003. For Abu Bara's return to Yemen, see Intelligence report, 
interrogation of Khallad, May 30, 2003. 

62. For the hotel arrangements, see Intelligence report, interrogation ofKhallad,Jan.7, 2004. For the two groups 
not meeting with each other, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 18, 2003. For Khallad's subse- 
quent actions, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. 

63. For Bin Ladm's cancellation of the East Asian operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 
18, 2003. For Hazmi and Mihdhar's departure, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 8, 2003. For 
their arrival in Los Angeles, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-CG, 
serial 4062; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134). 

64. On Atta's family background, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (citing FBI electronic 
communication from Cairo dated Sept. 13, 2001); CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, 
p. 23. For details on his study in Germany, see German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) report, investigative summary 
re Atta,June 24, 2002; Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp. 
3— 4. Atta's host family in Hamburg soon asked him to move out. Between 1993 and 1998, Atta shared a one- 
bedroom apartment in Hamburg with a fellow student, who moved out after having problems with Atta and was 
succeeded by another roommate. See German BKA report, investigative summary re Atta, June 24, 2002. On Atta's 
character, see German BKA investigation of Said Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Shahid Nickels on Oct. 30, 
2001. 

65. On the Muslim student association in Hamburg, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, 
Oct. 2, 2002. On the Muslim-Christian working group and Atta, see German BKA investigation of Bahaji, sum- 
mary of inter rogation of Michael Krause on Oct. 1 1, 2001; German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of inter- 
rogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001. Much of the information about Atta and his friends in Hamburg comes from 
Nickels, a German national who converted to Islam while in high school and spent considerable time with Atta's 
circle between 1997 and 1999. Nickels testified at the trials in Germany of Mounir el Motassadeq and Abdelghani 
Mzoudi on 9/11-related charges. 

66. German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001, pp. 8, 15; fed- 
eral prosecutor's closing argument, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 5,2003. On Atta's fundamentalism, see FBI electronic com- 
munication, "Khaled A. Shoukry,"June 17, 2002. 

67. German BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002; Federal Prosecutor General (Ger- 
many), response to Commission letter,June 25, 2004, pp. 3—4; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fuad Omar 
Bazarah, Apr. 9,2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002. Binalshibh used various names, 
such as Ramzi Omar and Ramzi al Sheiba. In May 1998, months before he was expelled from school, German 
authorities had issued a warrant to arrest and deport "Ramzi Omar." German BKA report, investigative summary 
re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002. But Binalshibh was no longer using this alias, so the German authorities did not dis- 
cover that he and Ramzi Omar were the same person until after the attacks of September 1 1. Ibid. 

68. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002; German BKA investigation of Bahaji, sum- 
mary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001; German BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 
4, 2002. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 495 

69. German BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh,July 4, 2002. 

70. CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 23; German BKA report, investigative 
summary re Shehhi,July 9, 2002. 

71. German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002; Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), 
response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp. 3—4; FBI electronic communication, summary of testimony of 
MohamedAbdullaMohamedAwady on Oct. 24, 2003, at the Mzoudi trial, Dec. 5, 2003. 

72. German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi,July 9, 2002. 
73. Ibid. 

74. FBI electronic communication, summary of testimony of Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady on Oct. 
24, 2003, at the Mzoudi trial, Dec. 5, 2003. 

75. Federal prosecutor's closing argument, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 5, 2003. 

76. German BKA report, investigative summary re Jar rah, July 18,2002; Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), 
response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp. 3—4. In 19 99, Jar rah and Senguen allegedly married in an Islamic 
ceremony not recognized under German law. Senguen has only acknowledged that she and Jarrah were engaged. 
German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002. 

77. German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002. 
78. Ibid. 

79. Ibid. 

80. Onjarrah's accommodations in Hamburg and his meeting with Binalshibh, see ibid. On Jarrah and Zam- 
mar, see German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001; see gener- 
ally Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 6, 2003; Intelligence report, "Terrorism: Background 
Information on Usama Bin Ladin Associate Muhammad Haydar Zammar,"Jan. 14, 2002. For Zammar encourag- 
ingjihad, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 14, 2002. 

81. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 6, 2003; German BKA investigation of Bahaji, sum- 
mary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001. On one occasion, German authorities intercepted a call in which 
such a gathering was mentioned. An individual phoning Zammar's house on February 17, 1999, was told that he 
was away on a trip to a distant, "bad" region, but that "people" at 54 Manenstrasse knew where he was. The same 
conversation revealed that these "people" included "Said, Mohamed Amir, [and] Omar," likely a reference to the 
apartment's original occupants, Said Bahaji, Atta, and Binalshibh. Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response 
to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, p. 9. Shehhi also appears to have lived there briefly, in November 1998 and 
again in the summer of 1999. German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002. The Marien- 
strasse apartment remained an important location for the group even after Binalshibh, Atta, and Shehhi all moved 
out, as some of their closest associates, including Zakanya Essabar and Abdelghani Mzoudi, moved in. See German 
BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002. 

82. German BKA report, investigative summary re Bahaji, Mar. 6, 2002. A document containing a biography 
of Bin Ladin — seized from the residence of Said Bahaji, a member of Atta 's circle — also contains the phrase "Dar 
el Ansar," "which refers to the name of a guesthouse Bin Ladm established in Afghanistan for mujahideen recruits. 
Ibid. 

83. German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Nov. 7, 2001; German BKA 
report, investigative summary re Bahaji, Mar. 6, 2< )02; federal prosecutor's closing argument, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 
5, 2003. The diskettes seized from Bahaji's residence also contained bomb-making instructions. Federal Prosecutor 
General (Germany), response to Commission letter,June 25, 2004, p. 10. A videotape of Bahaji's October 9, 1999, 
wedding at the Quds mosque, recovered by German authorities after the September 1 1 attacks, depicts Binalshibh 
giving a speech denouncing Jews as a problem for all Muslims. On the videotape, Binalshibh also reads a Palestin- 
ian war poem, and Shehhi and Mzoudi sing a jihad song. Also shown attending the wedding are Jarrah and Zam- 
mar. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14,2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-BN-41 5). 

84. German BKA report, investigative summary re Essabar; CIA report, interrogation of Binalshibh, May 27, 
2003; federal prosecutor's closing argument, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 5, 2003. After arriving in Afghanistan in 2001, 
he became a member of al Qaeda's media committee. Intelligence report, interrogations of KSM and Binalshibh, 
May 27,2003. 

85. German BKA report, investigative summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001 . 

86. German BKA report, investigative summary re Mzoudi, Jan. 13, 2003; German BKA report, investigative 
summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001. Mzoudi and Motassadeq were both tried in Germany on charges related 
to the 9/11 attacks. Mzoudi was acquitted in February 2004, in part because Binalshibh was not produced as a wit- 
ness. Motassadeq was convicted in 2003 for being an accessory to the attacks and received a 15-year prison sen- 
tence, but his conviction was reversed. See Richard Bernstein, "Germans Free Moroccan Convicted of a 9/11 Role," 
NewYork Times, Apr. 8, 2004, p. A18. 

87. Summary of Judgment and Sentencing Order by Hanseatic Regional High Court, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 
19, 2003; German BKA investigation ofBahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001. According 
to Nickels, who was distancing himself from the group by this time, "Atta was just too strange." Ibid. 



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496 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 

88. Shehhi and other members of the group used to frequent a library in Hamburg to use the Internet. Accord- 
ing to one of the librarians, in 1999 Shehhi, unprompted, inveighed against America, and boasted that "something 
was going to happen" and that "there would be thousands of dead people." FBI electronic communication, sum- 
mary of testimony of Angela Duile on Aug. 28, 2003, at Mzoudi trial, Oct. 27, 2003. Another "witness who lived in 
the same dormitory as Motassadeq testified that in late 1998 or early 1999, he overheard a conversation in which 
Motassadeq told someone that "we will do something bad again" and that "we "will dance on their graves." The 
conversation also contained a reference to the "burning of people." FBI electronic communication, summary of 
testimony of Holger Liszkowski on Sept. 9, 2003, at Mzoudi trial, Nov. 17, 2003. On another occasion, according 
to the same "witness, Motassadeq apparently identified Atta as "our pilot." Another witness recalled Atta ominously 
observing in 1999 that the United States was not omnipotent and that "something can be done." German BKA 
investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Nov. 20, 2001. 

89. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 7, 2002; May 20, 2003. 

90. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, May 20, 2003. A detainee has confirmed Binalshibh s 
account about being advised to go to Afghanistan rather than trying to travel directly to Chechnya.The detainee 
dates the Slahi meeting to October 1999. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 17, 2003. The detainee, 
however, also suggests that Slahi and Binalshibh may have met earlier in 1999 in Frankfurt, through a mutual 
acquaintance. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 27, 2003. The acquaintance apparently tells a dif- 
ferent story, claiming that Slahi introduced him to Binalshibh and Jarrah at Slahi's home in 1997 or 1998, and that 
he later lived with them in Hamburg. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, July 2, 2003. 

91. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 8; Intelligence reports, interrogations 
of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Mar. 4, 2003; May 20, 2003. 

92. On meetings with Atef and Bin Tadin, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 10, 2002; 
Mar. 4, 2003; Mar. 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. Atta reportedly had between 
two and five meetings with Bin Ladin before leaving Kandahar and was the only 9/11 hijacker who knew the 
entire scope of the operation from the outset. Intelligence report, comments of Binalshibh on Atta, Apr. 21, 2003. 

93. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 10, 2002. According to KSM, Bin Ladin designated 
Hazmi to be Atta's second in command. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. 

94. In addition,Atta obtained a new passport in June 1998, even though his current one was still valid for nearly 
a year, a sign that he may have been following the al Qaeda practice of concealing travel to Pakistan. Federal Pros- 
ecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, p. 1 1. 

95. German BKA report, investigative summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001; Summary of Judgment and Sen- 
tencing Order by Hanseatic Regional High Court, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 19, 2003. Motassadeq continued to han- 
dle some of Shehhi s affairs even after Shehhi returned to Hamburg. Most importantly, in March 2000, Motassadeq 
paid Shehhis semester fees at the university, to ensure Shehhi's continued receipt of scholarship payments from the 
UAE. Ibid. 

96. German BKA report, investigative summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001. After 9/11, Motassadeq admit- 
ted to German authorities that Shehhi had asked him to handle matters in a way that would conceal Shehhi's 
absence. Motassadeq also would claim later that he did not know "why his friends had gone to Afghanistan, saying 
he thought they were planning to go fight in Chechnya. For assistance provided by both Motassadeq and Bahaji, 
see Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter,June 25, 2004, pp. 13—14. 

97. Jarrah encountered a minor problem during his return trip to Hamburg. On January 30, 2000, while tran- 
siting Dubai on his way from Karachi to Germany, Jarrah drew questioning from UAE authorities about an over- 
lay of the Qu'ran that appeared on one page of his passport. The officials also noticed the religious tapes and books 
Jarrah had in his possession, but released him after he pointed out that he had lived in Hamburg for a number of 
years and was studying aircraft construction there. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, 
p. 13. 

98. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sep. 24, 2002; FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Inves- 
tigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 1 1, 13. According to a KSM interrogation report, Shehhi may have been present for at 
least some of the training that Atta and Binalshibh received in Karachi. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, 
Mar. 31,2004. 

99. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 6, 2003. Binalshibh and the others kept their distance 
from Zammar even before visiting Afghanistan and getting their instructions from Bin Ladin and Atef. Ibid. 

100. On Atta, see FBI analytic report, "The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model," Feb. 2003, p. 28. On Jarrah, 
see German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002. Note that although Jarrah s attitude was 
now much more congenial, he told Senguen nothing about being in Afghanistan. On Shehhis wedding celebra- 
tion, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi,July 9, 2002; on his changed appearance and behav- 
ior, see FBI electronic communication, summary of testimony of Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady on Oct. 24, 
2003, at the Mzoudi trial, Dec. 5, 2003. 

101. German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002. 

102. On Ali Abdul Aziz All, also known as Ammar al Baluchi, see FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investi- 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 497 

gation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 78. Ali, in turn, would ship these materials to his uncle, KSM, in Karachi. Intelligence 
report, interrogation of Ali Abdul Aziz All, Feb. 1 1, 2004. On Jarrah, see German BKA report, investigative sum- 
mary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002. Following his sudden decision to study aircraft engineering in Hamburg, Jarrah had 
expressed interest in becoming a pilot around the end of 1998, well before he traveled to Afghanistan. According 
to Senguen, Jarrah told her about friends of his who had interrupted their studies to join the Germany army so 
that they could become pilots. Jar rah 's pre -Afghanistan interest in aviation also is confirmed by a January 22, 1999, 
email recovered after the September 1 1, 2001, attacks, in which Jarrah told a friend from Beirut that he might "come 
next year and . . . have something to tell about airplanes." Ibid. On Binalshibh, see Intelligence report, interroga- 
tion of Bmalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002. 

103. Summary ofjudgment and Sentencing Order by Hanseatic Regional High Court, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 
19, 2003, pp. 10—1 1. Zacarias Moussaoui later would benefit from the results of all this research. Following his August 
2001 arrest, the FBI discovered among his possessions a fax copy of an advertisement for U.S. flight schools. Accord- 
ing to Binalshibh, notes in the margin of the advertisement were written by Atta. Intelligence report, interrogation 
of Binalshibh, Dec. 19, 2002. 

104. DOS record, NIV applicant detail, Marwan al Shehhi, Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, Nov. 8, 2001. The visa 
applications were destroyed by the State Department according to routine document handling practices before their 
significance was known. 

105. DOS records, visa applications ofRamzi Binalshibh, May 17, 2000;June 15, 2000; Oct. 25 2000. CIA ana- 
lytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, pp. 9—10; German BKA report, investigative summary re 
Binalshibh, July 4, 2002. Atta had twice explored the possibility of obtaining a U.S. green card shortly before his 
November 1999 trip to Afghanistan. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 8. Both 
Binalshibh and Jarrah listed the same person as a point of contact in the United States, an Indonesian national who 
had previously lived in Hamburg. Although this individual knew some members of the Hamburg cell, including 
Mohamed Atta and Razmi Binalshibh, there is no indication that any of the hijackers actually contacted him while 
they were in the United States. See German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002. Binalshibh 
had applied for a visa years earlier along with Fuad Bazarah, a co-worker inYemen whose father contacted the U.S. 
embassy on Binalshibh's behalf. Bazarah obtained a visa application and moved to Los Angeles, but Binalshibh's 
application was denied. Bazarah would later live in Los Angeles with Ramez Noaman, an individual who knew 
Nawaf al Hazmi in San Diego. FBI electronic communication, "Penttbom," Oct. 23, 2001. 

106. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 9, 2003; CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda travel issues,Jan. 
2004, p. 1. On the role of KSM, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 1 1, 2002. On the role 
of Abu Zubaydah, see, e.g., Intelligence report, biographical information on Abu Zubayda, Feb. 25, 2002. Al Qaeda 
also relied on outside travel facilitators, including fraudulent document vendors, corrupt officials, travel agencies, 
and smugglers, to help move operatives around the world by obtaining fraudulent documents, arranging visas (real 
or fake), making airline reservations, etc. See CIA analytic report, "Clandestine Travel Facilitators: Key Enablers of 
Terrorism," Dec. 31, 2002; CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda travel issues, Jan. 2004. 

107. On passport collection schemes, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 9, 2003. On recycled 
passports, see Intelligence report, Collection of passports June 7, 2002. 

108. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Nov. 12, 2003; May 25, 2004; CIA analytic report, Al 
Qaeda travel issues, Jan. 2004, pp. 1,3, 19. A detainee has admitted attending several security and specialized courses, 
including ones in counterfeiting and seal removal. Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda associates, Apr. 1 1, 
2002. Atta reportedly learned alteration techniques in Afghanistan, cleaning Ramzi Binalshibh's passport of its Pak- 
istani visa and travel cachets. CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda travel issues, Jan. 2004, p. 1. 

109. Intelligence report, Information on Mujahideen Travel, Mar. 13, 2002. 

1 10. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 25, 2003. A small amount of the plot's backing came from 
Shehhi's own funds. He received a salary from the UAE military, which was sponsoring his studies in Germany, 
through December 23, 2000. Binalshibh apparently used some of this money to 'wire just over $10,000 to Shehhi 
in the United States and pay some of his own plot-related expenses. Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); FBI 
Report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 20—22. 

111. CIA analytic report, "Terrorism: Amount of Money It Takes to Keep al-Qa'ida Functioning," Aug. 7, 2002; 
CIA analytic report, "Terrorism: Al-Qa'ida Operating on a Shoestring," undated (post-9/1 1); Frank G. interview 
(Mar. 2, 2004). 

1 12. In the wake of the East Africa embassy bombings, the NSC led trips to Saudi Arabia in 1999 and 2000 to 
meet with Saudi officials on terrorist financing. These meetings, and subsequent interviews of Bin Ladin family 
members in the United States, helped the U.S. government revise its understanding of Bin Ladm's wealth. Rick 
Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004); William Wechsler interview (Jan. 7, 2004). 

113. See William Wechsler interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Frank G. inter- 
view (Mar. 2, 2004); Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003). See also DOS cable, State 035243, "January 2000 
Meeting Regarding UBL Finances," Feb. 27, 2000; DOS cable, Riyadh 000475, "The Saudi Binladin Group: 
Builders to the King," Feb. 16, 1999;Treasury memo, Office of Foreign Asset Control to DOS, Draft Cable on Meet- 



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498 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 

ing with Two of UBL's Brothers, May 19, 2000;Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Saudis Strip Citizenship from Backers of Mil- 
itants," NeivYork Times, Apr. 10, 1994, p. 15; "Saudi Family Disassociates Itself from 'Terrorist' Member," Associated 
Press, Feb. 19, 1994. 

1 14. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of KSM,July 30, 2003; Robert Block, "In War on Terrorism, Sudan Struck a Blow by Fleecing Bin Laden," 
Willi Street Journal, Dec. 3, 2001, p. Al. Despite substantial evidence to the contrary and his own assertion that Bin 
Ladin arrived in Afghanistan with no money, KSM has told his interrogators that he believes the bulk of the money 
(85—95 percent) for the planes operation came from Bin Ladm's personal fortune. Intelligence reports, interroga- 
tions of KSM, July 30, 2003; Apr. 5, 2004;June 15, 2004. 

1 15. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2,2004); CIA analytic report, Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations, CTC 
2002-401 17CH, Nov. 14, 2002. The United States was not a primary source of al Qaeda funding, although some 
funds raised in the United States may have made their way to al Qaeda or its affiliated groups. Frank G. and Mary 
S. briefing (July 15,2003). 

116. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); CIA analytic report, "Identifying al-Qa 'lda's Donors and Fundraisers: 
A Status Report," CTC 2002-40029CH, Feb. 27, 2002. 

1 17. CIA analytic report, "Identifying al-Qa 'lda's Donors and Fundraisers: A Status Report," Feb. 27, 2002; CIA 
analytic report, spectrum of al Qaeda donors, CTC 2003-30199HC, Oct. 30, 2003; Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 
2004). 

118. CIA analytic report, "How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network," CTC 99-40003, Jan. 27, 
1999; CIA analytic report, "Gauging the War against al-Qa'ida's Finances," CTC 2002-30078CH, Aug. 8, 2002; 
CIA analytic report, paper on Al-Haramain, CTC 2002-30014C, Mar. 22, 2002. 

119. CIA analytic report, "Al Qa'ida's Financial Ties to Islamic Youth Programs," CTC 2002-40 132HCX, Jan. 
17, 2003; CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda Financial Network, CTC 2002-40094H, Aug. 7, 2002. 

120. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); CIA analytic report, Financial Links ofAl Qaeda Operative, CTC 2002- 
30060CH,June 27, 2002. 

121. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003). The Taliban's support was limited to the period immedi- 
ately following Bin Ladin's arrival in Afghanistan, before he reinvigorated fund-raising efforts. By 9/11, al Qaeda 
was returning the favor, providing substantial financial support to the Taliban. 

122. David Aufhauser interview (Feb. 12, 2004). We have found no evidence that Saudi Princess Haifa al Faisal 
provided any funds to the conspiracy, either directly or indirectly. See Adam Drucker interview (May 19, 2004). 

123. On limited Saudi oversight, see Bob Jordan interview (Jan. 14, 2004). In Saudi Arabia, zakat. is broader and 
more pervasive than Western ideas of charity, in that it functions not only as charity but also as social welfare, edu- 
cational assistance, foreign aid, a form of income tax, and a source of political influence. 

124. A luiwiiiii, at least in the "pure" form, transfers value without the use of a negotiable instrument or other 
commonly recognized method for the exchange of money. For example, a U.S. resident who wanted to send money 
to a person in another country, such as Pakistan, would give her money, in dollars, to a U.S. -based hawaladar.The 
U.S. hawaladar would then contact his counterpart in Pakistan, giving the Pakistani hawaladar the particulars of the 
transaction, such as the amount of money, the code, and perhaps the identity of the recipient. The ultimate recipi- 
ent in Pakistan would then go to the Pakistani hawaladar and receive his money, in rupees, from whatever money 
the Pakistani hawaladar has on hand. As far as the sender and ultimate recipient are concerned, the transaction is 
then complete. The two hawaladars would have a variety of mechanisms to settle their debt, either through offset- 
ting transactions (e.g., someone in Pakistan sending money to the United States using the same two hawaladars), a 
periodic settling wire transfer from the U.S. hawaladar's bank to the Pakistani hawaladars bank, or a commercial 
transaction, such as the U.S. hawaladar paying a debt or an invoice, in dollars, that the Pakistani hawaladar owes in 
the United States. Hawalas typically do not have a large central control office for settling transactions, maintaining 
instead a loose association with other hawaladars to transfer value, generally without any formal or legally binding 
agreements. See Treasury report, "A Report to Congress in Accordance with Section 359 of the [USA PATRIOT 
Act] "Nov. 2002;Treasury report, "Hawala:The Hawala Alternate Remittance System and its Role in Money Laun- 
dering," undated (prepared by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in cooperation with INTERPOL, prob- 
ably in 1996). 

125. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); CIA analytic report Al-Qa'ida Financiers, CTC 2002- 
30138H,Jan. 3, 2003. Moreover, because al Qaeda initially was living hand to mouth, there was no need to store 
funds. 

126. CIA analytic report, "Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target," CTC 01-40003HCS, Apr. 12, 2001; CIA 
analytic report, "Couriers, Hawaladars Key to Moving Al-Qa'ida Money," CTC 2003-40063CH, May 16,2003. 

127. For al Qaeda spending, see Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003}. The 1998 U.S. embassy bomb- 
ings m East Africa cost approximately $10,000. CIA analytic report, "Gauging the War on Terrorism: Most 1 1 Sep- 
tember Practices Still Viable," Jan. 30, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 3, 2003. Although there 
is evidence that al Qaeda experienced funding shortfalls as part of the cyclical fund-raising process (with more 
money coming during the holy month of Ramadan), we are not aware of any intelligence indicating that terror- 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 499 

ist acts were interrupted as a result. For al Qaeda expenditures, see, e.g., CIA analytic report, "Usama Bin Ladin's 
Finances: Some Estimates ofWealth, Income, and Expenditures," CTC IR 98-40006, Nov. 17, 1998. For payments 
to the Taliban, see Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003}; CIA analytic report, "Terrorism: Amount of Money 
ItTakes to Keep al-Qa 'ida Functioning," PWR080702-05, Aug. 7, 2002. On start-up funds, see Frank G. interview 
(Mar. 2, 2004). 

128. DougWankel interview (Mar. 15, 2004); Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003). Although some 
reporting alleges that Bin Ladin may have been an investor, or even had an operational role, in drug trafficking 
before 9/11, this intelligence cannot be substantiated. Ibid. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). No evidence indi- 
cates any such involvement in drug trafficking, and none of the detained al Qaeda operatives has indicated that this 
was a method of fund-raising. 

129. "Conflict diamonds" refers to rough diamonds that finance armed conflict in Africa. The international 
community has tried to restrict trade in such gems. FBI report, "Allegations of Al Qaeda Trafficking in Conflict 
Diamonds," July 18, 2003; CIA analytic report, "Terrorism: Assessing al-Qa 'ida and HizballahTies to Conflict Dia- 
monds," CTC 2002-401 2 1CH, Jan. 13, 2003; CIA analytic report, "Couriers, Hawaladars Key to Moving Al-Qa'ida 
Money," CTC 2003-40063CH, May 16, 2003; DOS cable, Brussels 05994, "WP Reporter Claims More Witnesses 
to 2001 Al-Qai da/ Conflict Diamonds Link," Dec. 12, 2002; DOS cable, Brussels 001054, terrorism and conflict 
diamonds, Mar. 1, 2002. Greg R. interviews (Oct. 3, 2003; July 6, 2004); Alan White interview (June 23, 2004); FBI 
situation reports and supporting documents from the Sierra Leone trip, Feb. 2004. 

130. Highly publicized allegations of insider trading in advance of 9/11 generally rest on reports of unusual 
pre-9/1 1 trading activity in companies whose stock plummeted after the attacks. Some unusual trading did in fact 
occur, but each such trade proved to have an innocuous explanation. For example, the volume of put options — 
investments that pay off only when a stock drops in price — surged in the parent companies of United Airlines on 
September 6 and American Airlines on September 10 — highly suspicious trading on its face.Yet, further investiga- 
tion has revealed that the trading had no connection with 9/1 1 .A single U.S. -based institutional investor with no 
conceivable ties to al Qaeda purchased 95 percent of the UAL puts on September 6 as part of a trading strategy 
that also included buying 1 15,000 shares of American on September 10. Similarly, much of the seemingly suspicious 
trading in American on September 10 was traced to a specific U.S. -based options trading newsletter, faxed to its 
subscribers on Sunday, September 9, "which recommended these trades. These examples typify the evidence exam- 
ined by the investigation. The SEC and the FBI, aided by other agencies and the securities industry, devoted enor- 
mous resources to investigating this issue, including securing the cooperation of many foreign governments. These 
investigators have found that the apparently suspicious consistently proved innocuous. Joseph Cella interview (Sept. 
16, 2003; May 7, 2004; May 10-1 1, 2004); FBI briefing (Aug. 15, 2003); SEC memo, Division of Enforcement to 
SEC Chair and Commissioners, "P re-September 11, 2001 Trading Review," May 15, 2002; Ken Breen interview 
(Apr. 23, 2004); Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004). 

131. The hijackers spent more than $270,000 in the United States, and the costs associated with Moussaoui 
were at least $50,000. The additional expenses included travel to obtain passports and visas, travel to the United 
States, expenses incurred by the plot leaders and facilitators, and the expenses incurred by the people selected to 
be hijackers who ultimately did not participate. For many of these expenses, we have only fragmentary evidence 
and/or unconfirmed detainee reports, and can make only a rough estimate of costs. The $400,000 to $500,000 esti- 
mate does not include the cost of running training camps in Afghanistan, where the hijackers were recruited and 
trained, or the marginal cost of the training itself. Finally, the architect of the plot, KSM, put the total cost at approx- 
imately S4l ll )J )( 10, apparently excluding Moussaoui s expenses. Intelligence reports, interrogations ai KSM. lime 3, 
2003; Apr. 5, 2004. Our investigation has uncovered no evidence that the 9/11 conspirators employed hawala as a 
means to move the money that funded the operation. Indeed, the surviving plot participants have either not men- 
tioned hawala or have explicitly denied using it to send money to the United States. Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 
12, 2004); Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, April 5, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, 
Apr. 2, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, Apr. 7, 2004. On domestic U.S. and foreign 
government funding, see, e.g., Adam Drucker interviews (Jan. 12, 2004; May 19, 2004); Dennis Lormel interview 
(Jan. 16, 2004); FBI response to Commission question for the record, July 13, 2004. As discussed in chapter 7, we 
have examined three transactions involving individuals in San Diego. Based on all of the evidence, we have con- 
cluded that none of these transactions involved a net transfer of funds to the hijackers. 

132. Shehhi received a salary from the UAE military, which was sponsoring his studies in Germany. Adam 
Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004). For funds received by facilitators, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, 
Apr. 5, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Apr. 9, 2004. Notwithstanding persistent press reports 
to the contrary, there is no convincing evidence that the Spanish al Qaeda cell, led by Imad Barkat Yarkas and al 
Qaeda European financier Mohammed Galeb Kalaje Zouaydi, provided any funding to support the 9/11 attacks 
or the Hamburg participants. Zouaydi may have provided fluids to Hamburg associate Mamoun Darkazanli — see, 
e.g., FBI letterhead memorandum, Yarkas and Spanish Cell investigation, Jan. 8, 2003 — but there is no evidence that 
Zouaydi provided money to the plot participants or that any of his funds were used to support the plot. Adam 
Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004). 



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500 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 

6 From Threat to Threat 

1. President Clinton was a voracious reader of intelligence. He received the President's Daily Brief (PDB), Senior 
Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB), and the State Department's intelligence updates daily, as well as other products 
episodically. Berger, Clarke, and Chief of Staffjohn Podesta received daily Bm Ladin "Situation Reports" from the 
CIA detailing Bin Ladin's reported location and movements. Berger told us he would tell President Clinton if there 
was anything in these reports that he needed to know. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). Information on 
distribution of Bin Ladin Situation Reports provided to the Commission by CIA. 

2. President Clinton spoke of terrorism in numerous public statements. In his August 5, 1996, remarks at George 
Washington University, he called terrorism "the enemy of our generation." He usually spoke of terrorism in two 
related contexts: new technologies and the greater openness engendered by post— Cold War globalization; and 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially — and increasingly over time — the threat from biological and chem- 
ical weapons. President Clinton repeatedly linked terrorist groups and WMD as transnational threats for the new 
global era. See, e.g., President Clinton remarks, "On Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century," Jan. 22, 1999 
(at the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.), in which he spoke directly to these topics. 

3. President Clinton spoke of theY2K computer problem in his January 19, 1999, State of the Union address. 
OnY2K concerns, see John Podesta interview (Jan. 15, 2004). On concerns about extremist groups exploiting mil- 
lennial opportunities, see, e.g., CIA briefing materials, CTC for the DCI, "Millennium Threat," Dec. 16, 1999. 

4. Judith Miller, "Holy Warriors: Dissecting a Terror Plot from Boston to Amman," NewYorkT hues, Jan. 15,2001, 
p.Al;CIA analytic report, "Bin Ladin's Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable," CTC 00-4001 17, Nov. 2, 
2000 (appendix B:"Bin Ladin's Role in the Anti-US. 'Millennial' Plots"). 

5. Ibid. On Hoshar and Hijazi, see Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow ofTtrror (I. B.Tauns, 2003), p. 188. 
Khaldan and Derunta were terrorist training camps in Afghanistan controlled by Abu Zubaydah. While the camps 
were not al Qaeda facilities, Abu Zubaydah had an agreement with Bin Ladin to conduct reciprocal recruiting efforts 
whereby promising trainees at the camps could be invited to join al Qaeda. See Intelligence report, interrogation 
of Abu Zubaydah, July 10, 2002. 

6. Miller, "Holy Warriors," Jan. 15, 2001; CIA analytic report, "Bin Ladin's Terrorist Operations," Nov. 2, 2000 
(appendix B). 

7. CIA analytic report, "Bin Ladm's Terrorist Operations," Nov. 2, 2000 (appendix B). 

8. FBI electronic communication, "Ahmed Ressam; Usama bin Ladin; Sbih Benyamin; Lucia Garofalo; Boua- 
bide Chamchi,"Dec. 29, 1999; Miller,"Holy Warriors," Jan. 15, 2001. The Encyclopedia is a multivolume instruction 
manual containing lessons on weapons handling, tactics, covert operations, bomb making, and other topics. The 
manual was originally created in the late 1980s by Afghanistan-based extremists, who considered it essential for 
waging terrorist operations and guerrilla warfare in the jihad against the Soviets. For more on the origins of the 
Encyclopedia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, June 24, 2003. Although Deek's precise role 
within the extremist community is unknown, his name appears variously as a staff member, instructor, and techni- 
cal guru for the Khaldan and Derunta terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Intelligence has revealed no extant 
links to the al Qaeda inner circle. For more on Deek, see FBI electronic communication,"Usama Bin Laden; Pentt- 
bomb;Taliban,"May 25, 2002. 

9. Testimony of Dale Watson before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 9, 2000, p. 4; Miller, 
"Holy Warriors," Jan. 15, 2001. 

10. Testimony of Dale Watson before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 9, 2000, pp. 3—4; FBI 
electronic communication, "Ahmed Ressam; Usama bin Ladin; Sbih Benyamin; Lucia Garofalo; Bouabide Ghain- 
chi,"Dec. 29, 1999; Miller, "Holy Warriors," Jan. 15,2001. On the fate of Hoshar and Hijazi s accomplices, see DOS 
cable, Amman 05 158, "Security Court Convicts UBL Suspects of Plotting," Sept. 18, 2000. 

1 1. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 4, 1999; Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004). In the margin next to 
Clarke's suggestion to attack al Qaeda facilities in the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote "no." 

12. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, Dec. 9, 1999. 

13. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 14, 1999. The State Department, through the U.S. embassy in Riyadh, 
also asked the Saudis to relay the same threat to the Taliban. The diplomat said the United States was delivering "a 
strong and unmistakable message to the Taliban that should such attacks occur, they and Bin Ladin will be subject 
to swift and serious response." See DOS cable, Riyadh 003900, "Saudis on USG Warning to Taliban Concerning 
UBL Threats," Dec. 14, 1999. Berger wrote President Clinton that the State Department's warning seemed to barely 
register with the Taliban. See NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, terrorist threat at the millennium, Dec. 18, 
1999. 

14. See NSC memo, talking points for Zinni, Dec. 20, 1999; Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 19, 2004); NSC 
email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 22, 1999 (in which Clarke writes that "the Milam mission has largely failed"); NSC 
memo, Riedel re Milam call (attached to the Clarke email). 

15. GeorgeTenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004); GeorgeTenet prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004, p. 22. 

16. Randy Moss interview (Feb. 6, 2004). In sending the draft MON to the CIA, the NSC s senior director 
for intelligence programs, Mary McCarthy, cited only the August 1998 and July 1999 MONs as relevant prece- 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 501 

dents — indicating that these new authorities were limited to using the capture and rendition approach. There was 
no indication that this MON authorized kill authority, although lethal force could be used in self-defense. See NSC 
memo, McCarthy to CIA, Dec. 1999. 

17. CIA cable, "DCI message and update on Millennium threat," Dec. 20, 1999; NSC email, Cressey to Berger's 
office and others, Dec. 23, 1999. 

18. Trial testimony of Ahmed Ressam, United States v. Mokhtar Haouari, No. S4 00 Cr. 15 (S.D. N.Y.), July 3, 
2001 (transcript pp. 536-569); July 5, 2001 (transcript p. 624); FBI report of investigation, interviews of Ahmed 
Ressam, May 10, 2001; May 24, 2001. Ressam s recruitment by Abderraouf Hannachi (a Khaldan alumnus) is noted 
in Deposition of Ahmed Ressam, In re: Letters Rogatory, August 1, 2001 (S.D. N.Y.),Jan. 23, 2002 (transcript pp. 
32—33). See also PBS Frontline broadcast, "Trail of a Terrorist," Oct. 25, 2001 (online at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/shows/ trail). 

19. Trial testimony of Ressam, United States v. Haouari, July 3, 2001 (transcript pp. 570— 584); FBI report of inves- 
tigation, interview of Ressam, Aug. 7, 2001. 

20. FBI report of investigation, interview of Ressam, May 10, 2001; Hal Bernton, Mike Carter, David Heath, 
and James Neff, "The Terrorist Within: The Story Behind One Man's Holy War Against America," Seattle Times, 
June 23-July 7,2002 (part 1 1, "The Ticking Bomb"). 

21. Trial testimony of Ressam, United States v. Haouari, July 5, 2001 (transcript p. 605); Deposition of Ressam, 
In re: Letters Rogatory (S.D. N.Y.),Jan. 23, 2002 (transcript p. 23). 

22. Trial testimony of Ressam, United States v. Haouari, July 3, 2001; Bernton, Carter, Heath, and Neff, "The 
Terrorist Within," June 23^July 7, 2002 (part 6, "It Takes a Thief"). A friend of Ressam s, Fateh Kamel, would pay 
Ressam for stolen passports, credit cards and other identity documents. Kamel is now serving eight years in prison 
in France for activities related to association with terrorist enterprises. Bruce Crumley, "Fighting Terrorism: Lessons 
from France," Time, Sept. 24, 2001 (online at www. time. com/time/ nation/article/0, 8 599, 176 13 9, 00. html). 
Ressam testified that he also sold stolen documents to Mohktar Haouari. See trial testimony of Ressam, United 
States v. Haouari, July 5, 2001 (transcript pp. 631—632). 

23. PBS Frontline broadcast, "Trail of a Terrorist." Leo Nkounga was the document broker and an illegal alien 
in Canada from Cameroon "who failed to surrender himself for deportation in 1993. Canadian deportation order, 
Adjudication file no. AOT 93-0077, Sept. 15, 1993. He said he obtained two genuine Canadian passports for Ressam 
by submitting fake baptismal certificates to Canadian authorities. CBC News broadcast, Disclosure, "Target Terror- 
ism," Mar. 26,2002 (online at www.cbc.ca/disclosure/archives/020326_leo/resources.html). Ressam told border offi- 
cials that he did not have a visa for Pakistan because he was only transiting on his way to India. FBI report of 
investigation, interview of Ressam, May 15, 2001, p. 7. 

24. FBI case profile (part of materials provided to Dale Watson), "Abdelghani Meskini ," Feb. 8, 2000. Meskini, 
who spoke English, was to drive Ressam and to give him money, but Ressam never showed since he was arrested 
at the border. Meskini was arrested on Dec. 30, 1999, and charged with material support and interstate fraud. See 
Testimony of Dale Watson before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 9, 2000, pp. 1 1—12. On pass- 
ports and visas provided by Haouari, see United States v. Haouari, 319 F. 3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2002). 

25. INS alien file, No. A7 36031 19,Abdel Hakim Tizegha. There is no record ofTizegha's entry into the United 
States. 

26. Trial testimony of Ressam, United States v. Haouari, July 5, 2001 (transcript pp. 605—607, 613); FBI report of 
investigation, interview of Ressam, May 10, 2001; Opening Statement, United States v. Ahmed Ressam, No. CR99- 
666C JCC (WD. Wash.), Mar. 13, 2001 (transcript p. 33). 

27. Trial testimony of Diana Dean and Mark Johnson, United States v. Ressam, Mar. 13, 2001 (transcript pp. 116, 
165). On the unraveling of the Ressam case, see Bernton, Carter, Heath and Neff, "The Terrorist Within," June 
23-July 7, 2002 (part 15, "Puzzle Pieces"). 

28. Trial testimony of Mark Johnson, United States v. Ressam, Mar. 13, 2001 (transcript p. 124). 

29. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, terrorism threat at the millennium, Dec. 9, 1999. 

30. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 1 1, 1999. 

31. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); GeorgeTenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004). 

32. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, terrorist threat at the millennium, Dec. 18, 1999. 

33. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, roadmap for Small Group, Dec. 22, 1999; NSC email, Cressey to Berger and 
others, Dec. 23, 1999. 

34. NSC memo, "The Millennium Terrorist Alert — Next Steps," undated (attached to NSC draft memo, 
"Review ofTerrorism Alert and Lessons Learned," Jan. 3, 2000). In the original document, the quotation is under- 
lined, not italicized. See also NSC memo,"Principals Meeting: MillenniumTerrorism," undated (likely Dec. 1999); 
NSC email, Clarke to Berger, roadmap for Small Group, Dec. 22, 1999. 

35. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, roadmap for Small Group, Dec. 22, 1999. 

36. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). See also Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Roger Cressey 
interview (Dec. 15,2003). 

37. Trial testimony of Diana Dean, United States v. Ressam, Mar. 13, 2001 (transcript p. 124). 



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502 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 

38.Vanderbilt University, Television News Archive, Dec. 22, 1999-Jan. 4, 2000. 

39. On the FBI's standard operating procedure, see Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); John Podesta inter- 
view (Jan. 15, 2004);James Steinberg interview (Dec. 4, 2003); Richard Clarke interviews (Dec. 18, 2004;Jan. 12, 
2004); Paul Kurtz interview (Dec. 16, 2003). 

40. See James Steinberg interview (Dec. 4, 2003). According to Steinberg, the millennium crisis was the only 
time that the FBI effectively shared information with the NSC. Before that,White House officials complained, they 
got nothing from the FBI — and were told that they were being deliberately kept out of the loop on grounds of 
propriety. See also Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Roger Cressey 
interview (Dec. 15, 2003). In fact, it was completely appropriate for the NSC to be briefed by the FBI on its national 
security investigations. Moreover, the legal bar to sharing information was often exaggerated. Only information 
actually presented to the grand jury could not be disclosed. See Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro- 
cedure, which establishes rules for grand jury secrecy. 

41. Intelligence report, Activities of Bin Ladin associates, Dec. 29, 1999; Intelligence report, review of 9/11 
hijackers' activities, Sept. 23, 2002; CIA cable, "Activities of Bin Ladin Associate Khalid Revealed, "Jan. 4, 2000. 

42. Intelligence report, meetings between Khallad and perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, May 30, 2003. 

43. Intelligence report,Activities ofBin Ladin associates, Jan. 2, 2000; CIA cable, "Activities of Bin Ladin Asso- 
ciate Khalid Revealed," Jan. 4, 2000; CIA email, CTC to NSA, Another UBL related report, Jan. 3, 2000. 

44. CIA cable, "Activities of Bin Ladin Associate Khalid Revealed," Jan. 4, 2000. His Saudi passport — which 
contained a visa for travel to the United States — was photocopied and forwarded to CIA headquarters. This infor- 
mation was not shared with FBI headquarters until August 2001. An FBI agent detailed to the Bin Ladin unit at 
CIA attempted to share this information with colleagues at FBI headquarters. A CIA desk officer instructed him 
not to send the cable with this information. Several hours later, this same desk officer drafted a cable distributed 
solely within CIA alleging that the visa documents had been shared with the FBI. She admitted she did not per- 
sonally share the information and cannot identify who told her they had been shared. We were unable to locate 
anyone "who claimed to have shared the information. Contemporaneous documents contradict the claim that they 
were shared. DOJ Inspector General interview of Doug M., Feb. 12, 2004; DOJ Inspector General interview of 
Michael, Oct. 31, 2002; CIA cable, Jan. 5, 2000; DOJ Inspector General report, "A Review of the FBI's Handling 
of Intelligence Information Related to the 9/11 Attacks," July 2, 2004, p. 282. 

45. CIA cables, "Identification of UBL Associate Khalid Transiting Dubai "Jan. 4, 2000; "UBL Associate Travel 
to Malaysia — Khalid Bin Muhammad bin 'Abdallah al-Mihdhar," Jan. 5, 2000; "Arrival of UBL Associate Khalid 
Bin Muhammad bin 'Abdallah al-Mihdhar," Jan. 6, 2000. 

46. CIA cable, "UBL Associates Travel to Malaysia and Beyond — Khalid Bin Muhammad bin 'Abdallah al- 
Midhar,"Jan.6, 2000. 

47. CIA cable, "UBL Associates Depart Malaysia," Jan. 8, 2000. 

48. CIA cable, "UBL Associates: Flight Manifest," Jan. 9, 2000. None of the CIA personnel at CIA headquar- 
ters or in the field had checked NSA databases or asked NSA to do so. If this had been done, on the basis of other 
unreported intelligence associated with the same sources, analysts would have been able to quickly learn "Nawaf" 
was likely Nawaf al Hazmi. Such analysis "was not conducted until after 9/11. After 9/11 it also was determined 
that Salahsae was part of a name being used byTawfiq bin Attash, also known as Khallad. One reason he was trav- 
eling around East Asia at this time is that he was helping to plan possible hijackings on aircraft in connection "with 
an early idea for "what would become the 9/11 plot. 

49. CIA cable, "Efforts to Locate al-Midhar,"Jan. 13, 2000. We now know that two other al Qaeda operatives 
flew to Bangkok to meet Khallad to pass him money. See chapter 8. That was not known at the time. Mihdhar was 
met at the Kuala Lumpur airport by Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national. Reports that he was a lieutenant 
colonel in the Iraqi Fedayeen have turned out to be incorrect. They were based on a confusion of Shakir's identity 
with that of an Iraqi Fedayeen colonel "with a similar name, who "was later (in September 2001) in Iraq at the same 
time Shakir was in police custody in Qatar. See CIA briefing by CTC specialists (June 22, 2004); Walter Pincus and 
Dan Eggen, "Al Qaeda Link to Iraq May Be Confusion over Names," Washington Post, June 22, 2004, p. A13. 

50. Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003); CIA briefing materials, UBL unit briefing slides, Jan. 3-Jan. 14, 2000; 
Intelligence reports, "UBL Situation Report," Jan. 5, 10, 12, 2000; CIA email, Rob to John and others, "Malaysia — 
for the record," Jan. 6, 21100. 

51. CIA cable, "Efforts to Locate al-Midhar," Jan. 13,2000. 

52. CIA cable, "UBL Associates: Identification of Possible UBL Associates," Feb. 1 1 , 2000. 

53. CIA cable, "UBL Associates: Identification of Possible UBL Associates," Mar. 5, 2000. Presumably the depar- 
ture information was obtained back in January, on the days that these individuals made their departures. Because 
these names "were watchlisted with the Thai authorities, we cannot yet explain the delay in reporting the news. But 
since nothing was done with this information even in March, we do not attribute much significance to this failure 
alone. 

54. See, e.g., Joint Inquiry testimony of George Tenet, Oct. 17, 2002, pp. 1 10—1 12; DOJ Inspector General inter- 
view ofjohn, Nov. 1, 2002. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 503 

55. CIA briefing, CTC Update, "Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat," Jan. 5, 7, 2000; George Tenet interview 
(Jan. 22, 2004). Tenet described the millennium alert as probably the most difficult operational environment the 
CIA had ever faced. 

56. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, "Post- Millennium Soul Searching," Jan. 1 1, 2000. 

57. NSC memo, "Review of Terrorism Alert and Lessons Learned," Jan. 3, 2000 (draft). This paper is part of a 
packet Clarke sent to Deputy Attorney General Thompson, copying White House officials, on Sept. 17, 2001. 

58. NSC memo, McCarthy to Berger, need for new strategy, Jan. 5, 2000. 

59. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, roadmap for March 10 PC meeting, Mar. 8, 2000. 

60. NSC memo, Cressey to Berger, Summary of Conclusions for March 10, 2000, PC on Millennium After- 
Action Review,Apr. 3, 2000; Samuel Berger letter to the Commission, "Comments on Staff Statements 5—8," May 
13, 2004, p. 9. 

61. NSC memo, "The Millennium Terrorist Alert — Next Steps," undated. 

62. DOS memo, Sheehan and Inderfurth to Albright, "Pakistan Trip Report — A Counterterrorism Perspec- 
tive," Jan. 26, 2000; DOS cable, Islamabad 00396, "Inderfurth Delegation Meeting with General Musharraf," Jan. 
24, 2000. 

63. In February 2000, the CIA began receiving information about a possible Bin Ladin— associated plot to attack 
Air Force One with Stinger missiles if President Clinton visited Pakistan; this information was deemed credible by 
early March. The CIA also reviewed reported threats to the President in Bangladesh and India. CIA briefing, 
"Reported Plan To Attack U.S. Presidential Plane If HeVisits Pakistan," Feb. 18, 2000; NSC email, Clarke to Berger, 
terrorism update, Feb. 29, 2000; CIA briefing, chief of CTC for the President, "Threats to the President's Visit to 
Asia," Mar. 2, 2000; NSC memo, Kurtz, "Summary of Conclusions of March 14, 2000 Meeting on Clinton Trip to 
South Asia;" NSC email, Kurtz to Berger, two new threats to assassinate the President in Bangladesh, Mar. 16, 2000. 
Berger told us that the Secret Service was vehemently opposed to a presidential visit to Islamabad; it took the 
extraordinary step of meeting twice with the President and offering very serious warnings. Samuel Berger inter- 
view (Jan. 14,2004). 

64. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004). President Clinton told us he offered Musharraf aid and help in 
improving US. -Pakistani relations. A conversation that day between the two leaders in the presence of several close 
advisers is described in DOS cable, State 073803, "Memorandum of the President's Conversation with Pervez 
Musharraf on March 25, 2000," Apr. 19, 2000. A third meeting was apparently held in front of additional aides. 
Berger told that President Clinton did not want to press the Bin Ladin issue too heavily at the main meeting because 
ISID (Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate) members were present. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 

65. NSC email, Camp for Berger, "Musharraf's Proposed Afghanistan Trip," May 8, 2000. Clarke wrote Berger 
that Musharraf seemed to have "said the right things to Omar." NSC email, Clarke to Berger, May 1 1, 2000. 

66. DOS cable, Islamabad 002902, ''Summary of May 26, 2000 Meeting Between Pickering and Musharraf," 
May 29,2000. 

67. DOS cable, Islamabad 79983, "DCI Meets with Chief Executive General Musharraf," June 21, 2000. 
Musharraf agreed to create a counterterrorism working group to coordinate efforts between Pakistani agencies and 
the CIA. Tenet noted that he was not asking the Pakistanis to deliver Bin Ladin nextTuesday; the DCI said he was 
"ambitious, but not crazy." 

68. DOS cable, State 185645, "Concern that Pakistan is Stepping up Support to Taliban's Military Campaign 
in Afghanistan," Sept. 26, 2000. 

69. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1333, Dec. 19, 2000. UNSCR 1333 also called for countries 
to withdraw their officials and agents from the Taliban-held part of Afghanistan. Sheehan said that the new UN 
sanctions were aimed at the Taliban's primary supporters: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003). 

70. Madeleine Albright prepared statement, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 1 1 ; Madeleine Albright interview (Jan. 7, 2004). 

71. Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003). 

72. The CIA appears to have briefed President Clinton on its "Next Steps and New Initiatives" in February 
2000, noting the need to hire and train the right officers "with the necessary skills and deploy them to the right 
places, as "well as to work with foreign liaison. The CIA noted in its briefing that the President should press foreign 
leaders to maintain pressure on terrorists. See CIA briefing matenals,"Targeting theTerrorists: Next Steps and New 
Initiatives," Feb. 1, 2000 (for the President); NSC email, Cressey to Berger, "CT Briefing for Clinton," Feb. 8, 2000. 

73. For the CTC's perspective, see CIA briefing materials, "Talking Points for the DCI for the Principals Com- 
mittee meeting onTerrorism:The Millennium Alert — After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000. Deputy Chief of CTC 
Ben Bonk noted in the talking points that the CTC had obligated 50 percent of its fiscal year 2000 budget by Jan. 
31, 2000, spending about 15 percent of its budget directly on the millennium surge. He stated that without a sup- 
plemental, it "would be impossible for the CTC to continue at its current pace, let alone increase the operational 
tempo. On Tenet meeting with Berger, see George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004). 

74. Joan Dempsey interview (Nov. 12, 2003); George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004). Tenet called the supple- 



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504 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 

mental appropriation "a lifesaver." See, for example, the request for supplemental appropriations in CIA briefing 
materials, "Targeting the Terrorists: Next Steps and New Initiatives," Feb. 1, 2000 (for the President). 

75. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004). 

76. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). 

77. Richard Clarke interviews (Dec. 18, 2003; Feb. 3, 2004). 

78. CIA memos, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, Apr. 5, 12, 2000; NSC memo, "April 19, 2000 
Agenda for Deputies Committee Meeting on CT:Tlie Millennium Threat FY00 and FY01 Budget Review;" NSC 
memo, "Summary of Conclusions of April 18,2000 CSG Meeting," Apr. 26, 2000. On May 2, 2000, Berger was 
updated on budget issues relating to the CIA and other agencies; there was agreement on the most critical items 
to be funded, but not on the source of that funding. In CIA's case, it had already reprogrammed over $90 million, 
but Tenet wanted to use most of this money on non-counterterrorism programs. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, 
"Budget Issues," May 2, 2000. On June 29, 2000, the President authorized raising the CIA's covert action funding 
ceiling. NSC memo, McCarthy to CSG, "DO Wants to Raise Funding Ceiling," May 8, 2000; NSC memo, 
McCarthy to others July 7, 2000 (appendix on authorities). But funding issues in other agencies remained unre- 
solved. Clarke complained that neitherTreasury nor Justice would identify offsets. Clarke encouraged OMB to tell 
both departments that if they would not identify offsets then OMB would. NSC email, Clarke to Rudman and 
Mitchell, May 9, 2000. On August 1, 2000, Clarke wrote Berger that one of five goals by the end of the Clinton 
administration was to secure appropriations for cybersecurity and millennium after-action review projects. NSC 
memo, Clarke to Berger, "Goals and Wildcards," Aug. 1, 2000. As late as September 2000, Clarke was advising Berger 
that unfunded counterterrorism requests continued to be his number one priority. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, 
Sept. 9, 2000. 

79. Executive Order 13099 (Aug. 20, 1998); Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Robert McBnde inter- 
view (Nov. 19—20, 2003); NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000. OFAC did freeze accounts belonging to 
Salah Idris, the owner of the al Shifa facility bombed in response to the East Africa embassy bombings. Idris filed 
suit against his bank and OFAC. OFAC subsequently authorized the unfreezing of those accounts. James Risen, 
"To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: AYear Later, Debates Rankle," NewYork Times, Oct. 27, 1999, p.Al.The inability 
to freeze funds is attributed in part to a lack of intelligence on the location of Bin Ladin's money, OFAC's reluc- 
tance or inability to rely on what classified information there may have been, and Bin Ladin's transfer of assets into 
the hands of trusted third parties or out of the formal financial system by 1998. Even if OFAC had received bet- 
ter intelligence from the intelligence community, it would have been powerless to stop the bulk of the problem. Al 
Qaeda money flows depended on an informal network of hawalas and Islamic institutions moving money from 
Gulf supporters to Afghanistan. These funds would not therefore have touched the U.S. formal financial system. 
OFAC's authorities are only against U.S. persons, financial institutions, and businesses. Frank G. and Mary S. brief- 
ing (July 15, 2003); Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2003). 

80. Executive Order 13129;Treasury memo, Newcomb to Johnson, "Blocking ofTaliban-Controlled Assets," 
undated (probably Oct. 18, 1999). 

81. DOS cable, State 184471, Sept. 30, 1999; 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 

82. The Financial Action Task Force, a multilateral government organization dedicated to standard setting, 
focused on money laundering, particularly as it related to crimes such as drug trafficking and large-scale fraud that 
involved vast amounts of illegally procured money. Although the UN General Assembly adopted the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terror ism in December 1999, the convention did not enter into force 
until April 2002. 

83. Doug M. interview (Dec. 16,2003); Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). See also Mike interview (Dec. 11, 
2003), setting forth the goals of the UBL station; none relate specifically to terrorist financing. Another witness 
recalled that the UBL station made some effort to gather intelligence on al Qaeda financing, but it proved to be 
too hard a target, the CIA had too few sources and, as a result, little quality intelligence was produced. Ed G. inter- 
view (Feb. 3, 2004). Some attributed the problem to the CIA's separation of terrorist-financing analysis from other 
counterterrorism activities. Within the Directorate of Intelligence, a group was devoted to the analysis of all finan- 
cial issues, including terrorist financing. Called the Office ofTransnational Issues (OTI), Illicit Transaction Groups 
(ITG), it dealt with an array of issues besides terrorist financing, including drug trafficking, drug money launder- 
ing, alien smuggling, sanctions, and corruption. ITG was not part of the CTC, although it rotated a single analyst 
to CTC. Moreover, OTI analysts were separated from the operational side of terrorist financing at CTC, which 
planned operations against banks and financial facilitators. William Wechsler interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Frank G. and 
Mary S. briefing (July 15,2003). 

84. CIA analytic report, "Funding Islamic Extremist Movements: The Role of Islamic Financial Institutions," 
OTI 97-10035CX, Dec. 1997. 

85. Mike interview (Dec. 1 1, 2003). 

86. CIA analytic reports, "Usama Bm Ladin: Some Saudi Financial Ties Probably Intact," OTI IR 99-005CX, 
Jan. 11, 1999; "How Bin Ladm Commands a Global Terrorist Network," CTC 99-40003, Jan. 27, 1999; "Islamic 
Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively," CTC 99-40007, Apr. 9, 1999. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 505 

87. See NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000; NSC document,TNT to Berger, Nov. 3, 1998, roadmap 
for Small Group, undated. The problem continued until 9/11. Intelligence reporting was so limited that one CIA 
intelligence analyst told us that, unassisted, he could read and digest the universe of intelligence reporting on al 
Qaeda financial issues in the three years prior to the 9/11 attacks. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003). 

88. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004); see, e.g., NSC memo, Clarke to CSG,"Concept of Operations for 
Task Force Test of the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center," Nov. 1, 2000; Treasury memo, Rotney to Sloan, 
"FTAT SCIF," May 17, 2001; Treasury memo, Newcomb to Sloan, "Response to Romey Memo," May 23, 2001. 
Despite post-9/11 declarations to the contrary, on the eve of 9/11 FTAT had funds appropriated, but no people 
hired, no security clearances, and no space to work. Treasury memo, Newcomb to Dam, "Establishing the Foreign 
Asset Tracking Center," Aug. 3, 2001. One Treasury official described CIA's posture as "benign neglect" toward the 
Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTATC), and characterized the CIA as believing that financial tracking 
had limited utility. Treasury memo, Mat Burrows to O'Neill, "Your PC on Counterterrorism on 4 September," 
Sept. 4, 2001. National Security Advisor Rice told us she and her staff had determined by spring 2001 that terror- 
ist financing proposals were a good option, so Treasury continued to plan to establish an office for 24 financing ana- 
lysts. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). In fact, as noted above, Treasury failed to follow through on the 
establishment of the FTATC until after 9/11. 

89. This assessment is based on an extensive review of FBI files and interviews with agents and supervisors at 
FBI Headquarters and various field offices. 

90. Although there was an increased focus on money laundering, several significant legislative and regulatory 
initiatives designed to close vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial system failed to gain traction. Some of these, such 
as a move to control foreign banks with accounts in the United States, died as a result of banking industry pres- 
sure. Others, such as the regulation of money remitters within the United States, were mired in bureaucratic iner- 
tia and a general antiregulatory environment. In any event, it is an open question whether such legislative or 
regulatory initiatives would have significantly harmed al Qaeda, which generally made litde use of the U.S. finan- 
cial system to move or store its money. 

91. Treasury report,"The 2001 National Money Laundering Strategy," Sept. 2001. 

92. NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000. 

93. PDD-62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas," May 
22, 1998, pp. 8—9; NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After Action Review," 
Mar. 9, 2000. 

94. PDD-62, May 22, 1998; PDD-39, "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism," June 21, 1995, p. 2. 

95. NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000. 

96. PDD-62, May 22, 1998, p. 9. Congress had authorized the Alien Terrorist Removal Court at the request 
of the Justice Department in 1996, and it was established in 1997. Clarke noted the court had not been "highly 
useful." NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000. 
Indeed, it had not been used at all. 

97. PDD-62, May 22, 1998, p. 8; NSC memo, Clarke, "Summary of Conclusions for March 31, 2000 Millen- 
nium Alert Immigration Review Meeting,"Apr. 13, 2000. One provision from PDD-62 not. updated and reiterated 
in 2000 was a directive to CIA to ensure that names (and aliases) of terrorists were collected and disseminated to 
State, INS, and the FBI in a timely way, so that the border agencies could place them on a watchlist and the FBI 
could identify them in the United States. 

98. NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000. 

99. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3,2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Scott Fry interview (Dec. 
29, 2003); Scott Gration interview (March 3, 2004); NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Mar. 2, 2000. Clarke apparendy 
took the comment as a presidential instruction to take another look at what additional actions could be taken against 
Bm Ladin. Given diplomatic failures to directly pressure the Taliban through Pakistan, the NSC staff saw increased 
support to the Northern Alliance and Uzbeks as alternative options. NSC memo,"The MillenniumTerrorist Alert — 
Next Steps," undated. 

100. A good account of the episode is found in Steve Coll, Ghost lVars:The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, 
and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), pp. 487— 491; see also ibid., pp. 495— 496, 
502—503, 517—519; Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003). "Richard" told us the attack had already occurred when 
CIA headquarters heard about it; "within this building, they were breathless," he remarked. The CIA concern was 
apparently over possible casualties and whether, by sharing intelligence with Massoud on Bin Ladin s possible loca- 
tion, the CIA might have violated the assassination ban. Tenet did not recall the incident, saying it was no doubt 
just "a blip" on his screen within the context of the millennium alerts. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004). The 
incident 'was, however, noticed by the NSC counterterrorism staff, which pointedly asked to be kept in the loop 
in the future. NSC memo, "Review ofTerrorism Alert and Lessons Learned," Jan. 3, 2000 (draft). 

101. See, e.g., CIA officers' visits to Tashkent noted in CIA briefing materials, DCI Update, "Islamic Extrem- 
ist Terrorist Threat," Feb. 18, 2000; CIA briefing materials, EXDIR Update, Visit to Tashkent, Apr. 5, 2000. CTC 
teams were deployed to Afghanistan to meet "with Massoud on March 1 3—2 1 , 2000, and possibly on April 24—28, 



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506 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 

2000. CIA briefing materials, EXDIR Update,"Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat," Mar. 6, 2000; CIA briefing mate- 
rials, "CTC PowerPoint," Apr. 3, 2000. Massoud's representatives also met "with Clarke, the State Department's 
Michael Sheehan, and CIA senior managers in Washington. CIA briefing materials, "DDO Update," May 22, 2000. 

102. On Black and Clarke's positions, see Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003); Roger Cressey interview (Dec. 
15, 2003). On reasons for caution, see, e.g., Strobe Talbott interview (Jan. 15, 2004). 

103. See, e.g., CIA briefing materials, CTC Update for the DDCI, July 7, 2000 ("Direct engagement "with 
Massoud will enhance our ability to report on UBL and increase retaliation options if. . . we are attacked by UBL"). 

104. The deputy chief for operations of CTC, "Henry," told us that going into the Afghanistan sanctuary was 
essential. He and Black proposed direct engagement with Massoud to the CIA's senior management, but the idea 
was rejected because of what "Henry" called "a question of resources" — the CIA did not have effective means to 
get personnel in or out of Afghanistan. When he proposed sending a CIA team into northern Afghanistan to meet 
with Massoud in August 2000, the idea was turned down; local helicopters were not deemed airworthy, and land 
access was too risky. Henry interview (Nov. 18, 2003); Henry briefing (Apr. 22, 2004). 

105. The alleged attempt was reported on August 10, 2000; see CIA memo, Bonk to McCarthy and Clarke, 
"Attempted Interdiction ofSuspect Bin Ladin's Convoy,"Aug. 11, 2000. For doubts as to "whether the tribals made 
this attempt, see Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003); Richard interview (Dec. 1 1, 2003). 

106. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Warning Order of July 6, 1999, was still in effect. See DOD memo, "Military 
Response Options," Oct. 23, 2000. 

107. The 13 options included B-2 bombers, missiles, AC- 130 gunships, the armed UAV, and raids to capture 
and destroy al Qaeda leaders and targets. DOD briefing materials, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Operation Infinite Resolve 
Brief," June 2000. 

108. Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004). See also Scott Fry interview (Dec. 29, 2003). 

109. This quotation is taken from Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 
2002), p. 318. President Clinton confirmed that he made this statement. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004). 

110. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004); William Cohen inter- 
view (Feb. 5, 2004). 

111. Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004); Scott Fry interview (Dec. 29, 2003). 

112. NSC memo, Clarke to CSG members, "Follow-Up to bin Ladin Review," Apr. 25, 2000. See also CIA 
briefing materials, "DDCI Update," Apr. 21, 2000 Q— 39 "has decided to do everything possible to support CIAs 
UBL efforts"). This reportedly included J-39's belief that it would be able to pay for all costs — though, as it turned 
out, that "would not be the case. CIA managers were reluctant to go ahead with either the telescope or the Preda- 
tor options. Executive Director David Carey told us they saw the projects as a "distraction" that "would pull per- 
sonnel and resources away from other, high-priority activities, such as worldwide disruptions. The telescope 
program, for instance, was considered too challenging and risky for the CIA's Afghan assets; development contin- 
ued through the summer, but the idea was eventually dropped. David Carey interview (Oct. 31, 2003); Scott Fry 
interview (Dec. 29, 2003); Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004). 

1 13. According to Charles Allen, the CIA's senior management, especially within the Directorate of Opera- 
tions, was originally averse to the Predator program mostly because of the expense — approximately S3 million, 
which the directorate claimed it did not have. Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004). The argument between CIA 
and DOD over who would pay for proposed operations continued for months. On the CIA side see, for example, 
CIA briefing materials, "DDO Update," May 22, 26, 2000 (at which the DC I was told that unless funding was iden- 
tified within the next 10 days, the military advised that the Predator could not be deployed that fiscal year; the mil- 
itary was waiting for an NSC request that it fund the projects). See also NSC memo, Clarke to Tenet, June 25, 2000 
("The other CSG agencies are unanimous that the Predator project is our highest near-term priority and that fund- 
ing should be shifted to it"). Clarke noted that the CSG plan "was to use DOD money to jump-start the program. 
On the cost-sharing agreement, see NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000; NSC memo, "Small Group 
agenda," June 29, 2000. Eventually, "after some pushing," the CIA found $2 million from its funds to pay for two 
months of trial flights. DOD agreed to fund $2.4 million. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger,June 28, 2000. 

114. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000. On UAV tests, see CIA briefing materials, "DCI Update," 
July 14, 2000. On modifications, see NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, update, July 18, 2000. 

115. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, "Predator," Aug. 11,2000. 

116. NSC memo, Cressey to Berger, Aug. 18, 2000 (underlining in the original); NSC memo, Cressey to Berger, 
Aug. 21, 2000 (attaching informational memo to President Clinton). 

1 17. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 9, 2000. 

1 18. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004). The CIA's Ben Bonk told us he could not guarantee from analy- 
sis of the video feed that the man in the "white robe was in fact Bm Ladm, but he thinks Bin Ladin is the "highest 
probability person." (Bin Ladin is unusually tall.) Ben Bonk briefing (Mar. 1 1, 2004). Intelligence analysts seem to 
have determined this might have been Bin Ladm very soon after the September 28 sighting; two days later, Clarke 
wrote to Berger that there was a "very high probability" Bin Ladin had been located. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, 
"Procedures for Protecting Predator," Sept. 30, 2000. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 507 

119. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, "Procedures for Protecting Predator," Sept. 30, 2000. Clarke pointed to a sil- 
ver lining: "The fact that its existence has become at least partially known, may for a while change the al Qida 
movement patterns," he wrote, but "it may also serve as a healthy reminder to al Qida and the Taliban that they are 
not out of our thoughts or sight." Ibid. 

120. Clarke wrote to Berger that "it might be a little gloomy sitting around the fire with the al Qida leader- 
ship these days." NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 9, 2000. 

121. For the number of dead and wounded, see Indictment, United States v. Jamal Ahmed Mohammed AH al- 
Badawi, No. S12 98 Cr. 1023 (KTD) (S.D. NY. filed May 15, 2003), p. 16. 

122. See Intelligence report, interrogation of Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, Feb. 21, 2004. For Khallad, see Intelli- 
gence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 20, 2003. For Khamri and Nibras's full names, Quso's responsibility to 
film the attack, and Nibras and Quso delivering money, see Indictment, United States v. al-Badaun, May 15, 2003, 
pp. 13—14. Badawi was supposed to film the attack but had to travel, so he instructed Quso to do it instead. FBI 
notes, notes of Nov. 11 and 13 executive conference call, Nov. 13, 2000, p. 2. For Quso's admission of delivering 
money, see Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003). 

123. For Bin Ladin's decision, Nashiri s trip to protest, and Nashin's instructions, see Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of Nashiri, Feb. 21, 2004. For a report that Nashiri did not instruct the operatives to attack, see Intelli- 
gence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Nov. 21, 2002. 

124. For the attack, see Indictment, United States v. al-Badawi, May 15, 2003, p. 16. For Quso not filming the 
attack, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Fahd Mohammed Ahmad al-Quso, Feb. 3, 2001, p. 8. Quso 
apparently fell asleep and missed the attack. See FBI notes, notes of Nov. 1 1 and 13 executive conference call, Nov. 
13, 2000, p. 2. 

125. For Bin Ladin's order to evacuate and subsequent actions, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu 
Zubaydah, Dec. 13, 2003. For Bin Ladin's, Atef's, and Zawahin's movements, see Intelligence report, interrogation 
of Khallad, Sept. 27,2003. 

126. Intelligence report, Terrorism Activities, Oct. 1, 2001. 

127. For the media committee, the video, and its effect, see Intelligence report, autobiography of KSM, July 
12, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 4, 2003. On the bombing of the Cole sparking jihadist 
recruitment, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 5, 2003. 

128. See Barbara Bodine interview (Oct. 21, 2003); Al S. interviews {Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003). On the 
problems with having Americans bring firearms into the country, see also NSC email, Clarke to Berger, USS Cole — 
situation report for PC meeting, Oct. 13, 2000. U.S. officials cannot travel to a country without the clearance of 
the U.S. ambassador to that country. 

129. For suspicion of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, see NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, update on Cole 
attack, Oct. 12, 2000. For McLaughlin's statement, see John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). In this vein, the 
State Department advised the investigation not to rush to judgment that al Qaeda was responsible. Barbara Bod- 
ine interview (Oct. 21, 2003). 

130. ForYemen barring the FBI, see Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003). For the CIA's character- 
ization, see CIA report, threat to U.S. personnel in Yemen, Oct. 18, 2000. For the high-level interventions, see Samuel 
Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Kenneth Pollack interview (Sept. 24, 2003); CIA cable, CIA talking points for 
Tenet's call to chief ofYemen intelligence, Oct. 26, 2000. On secondhand information, see John McLaughlin inter- 
view (Jan. 21,2004). 

131. FBI notes, notes of Nov. 1 1 and 13 executive conference call, Nov. 13, 2000; FBI electronic communica- 
tion, "Summary of information fromYemen intelligence," Jan. 10, 2001. 

132. For the FBI agent's role, see Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003: Sept. 1 5, 2003). ForYemen providing the pho- 
tograph, see FBI electronic communication, "Summary of information fromYemen intelligence," Jan. 10, 2001. For 
the source identifying the photograph, see FBI electronic communication, "Source reporting on al Qaeda," Jan. 16, 
2001. 

133. For Khallad s involvement in the embassy bombings, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Mo ham- 
mad Rashed Daoud al Owhali, Sept. 9, 1998. ForYemen identifying Nashiri, see FBI electronic communication, 
"Information provided by Yemen intelligence," Dec. 17, 2000. 

134. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004). Richard Miniter offers an account of the Clinton administra- 
tion's deliberations about the Cole in Richard Miniter, Losing Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global 
Terror (Regnery, 2' >' )3),pp. 222— 227. Berger told us the account is "a crock." Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 
Clarke was less critical. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004). 

135. For the additional covert action authorities, see NSC memo, McCarthy to Berger, new covert action 
authorities, Oct. 31, 2000. For Tenet developing options, see NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, update on 
Cole investigation, Nov. 25, 2000. 

136. For Berger's authorization, see NSC memo,TNT to Berger, responding to Taliban's September overture, 
Oct. 20, 2000. For Berger's statement, see NSC memo, Berger to TNT, reply to Oct. 20, 200(1, memo. For the admin- 



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508 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 



istration working with Russia, see NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, update on Cole investigation, Nov. 25, 
2000. 

137. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004). 

138. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 

139. In the first ten days after the bombing, between October 13 and 23, at least three high-level briefing items 
discussed responsibility for the attack. The next such briefing item we can find summarized the evidence for the 
new Bush administration on January 25, 2001. On the guidance, and the presumed reasons for it, see Barbara Bod- 
ine interview (Oct. 21, 2003); Pattie Kindsvater interview (Mar. 29, 2004); Ben Bonk statement during John 
McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004); see also John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004); Richard interview (Dec. 
11,2003). 

140. For Clarke's statement, see NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Nov. 7, 2000. For the November 10 briefing, see 
CIA briefing materials, preliminary findings regarding the Cole attack for the Nov. 10, 2000, Small Group meet- 
ing, undated (appears to be Nov. 10, 2000). For Berger and Clarke's communication with the President, see NSC 
memo, Berger to President Clinton, USS Cole investigation update, Nov. 25, 2000. 

141. See Gregory Newbold interview (Sept. 29, 2003); William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For Shelton 
tasking Franks, see DOD memo, Joint Chiefs of Staff tasking, Mod 005 to Joint Planning Directive to U.S. Central 
Command, Nov. 30, 2000. For Shelton briefing Berger, see NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, USS Cole 
investigation update, Nov. 25, 2000. For the 13 options, see also DOD briefing materials, Operation Infinite Resolve 
Contingency Plan Brief, undated. For the briefing to Kerrick, see DOD briefing materials, briefing to Lt. Gen. 
Kerrick, Dec. 20, 2000. For the briefing of other DOD officials, see DOD briefing materials, "Evolution of Infi- 
nite Resolve Planning, Summary ofTLAM Availability (1998—2001), Evolution of the Armed Predator Program," 
Mar. 19, 2004, p. 5. 

142. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, USS Cole investigation update, Nov. 25, 2000. 

143. Ibid. For Clarke's ideas, see NSC memo, Clarke to Sheehan and Hull, "Ultimatum Strategy with theTal- 
iban," Nov. 25, 2000. 

144. CIA briefing materials, "Intelligence Assessment: The Attack on the USS Cole," Dec. 21, 2000. 

145. Ibid. 

146. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 

147. For Albright's advisers, see DOS memo, Inderfuth to Albright, Dec. 19, 2000; DOS memo, Hull and East- 
ham to Albright, preparation for Principals Committee meeting, Dec. 21, 2000. See also DOS briefing materials, 
talking points for Principals Committee meeting, Dec. 21, 2000; William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004); Hugh 
Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). 

148. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004) 

149. Richard Clarke, Against Ail Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free Press, 2004), p. 224. Sheehan has 
not disavowed Clarke's quote. 

150. George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004). 

151. Pattie Kindsvater interview (Mar. 29, 2004). For Clarke's awareness, see NSC email, Clarke to Cressey, 
"Considerations," Oct. 25, 2000. 

152. For the lack of meaningful targets, see Scott Fry interview (Dec. 29, 2003); Walter Slocombe interview 
(Dec. 19,2003). 

153. CIA memo, Black to Clarke, "NSC Requests on Approaches for Dealing with Problems in Afghanistan," 
Dec. 29, 2000. 

154. See Samuel Berger letter to the Commission, "Comments on Staff Statements 5—8," May 13, 2004. For 
the Blue Sky memorandum's proposals being rolled into proposals considered by the new administration, see George 
Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004);John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). On the internal CIA draft of the Blue 
Sky memorandum, Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt added a handwritten note that he posed no objec- 
tion if the memorandum was for transition discussion purposes, but "I do not believe a proposal of this magnitude 
should be on the table for implementation" so late in the Clinton administration. He also questioned the proposal 
for support to Massoud. CIA memo, "Options to Undermine Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida," Dec. 18, 2000. 

155. NSC memo, "Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and 
Prospects," undated (appears to be Dec. 29, 2001), attached to NSC memo, Clarke to Rice,Jan. 25, 2001. 

156. Ben Bonk interview (Jan. 21, 2004); John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). 

157. Robert McNamaraJr., interview (Apr. 19,2004). 

158. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 
2004) James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). Pavitt also recalls telling the President-elect that killing Bin Ladin would 
not end the threat. Vice President— elect Cheney, Rice, Hadley, and White House Chief of Staff^designate Andrew 
Card also attended the briefing, which took place about a week before the inauguration. The President noted that 
Tenet did not say he did not have authority to kill Bin Ladin. Tenet told us he recalled the meeting with Bush but 
not what he said to the President-elect. George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004). He told us, however, that if cir- 
cumstances changed and he needed more authority, he would have come back to either President Clinton or Pres- 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 509 

ident Bush and asked for the additional authority. See GeorgeTenet testimony, Mar. 24, 21.104. The Blair House CIA 
briefing is recounted in some detail in Bob Woodward, Bush at War (Simon & Schuster, 2002), pp. 34—35. 

159. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004). 

160. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). 

161. NSC briefing materials, "CT Briefing for Bush-Cheney Transition Team, APNSA-Designate Rice, "Pol- 
icy, Organization, Priorities," undated. Powell was briefed by the full CSG, at his request. 

162. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14,2004); Condoleezza Rice meet- 
ing (Feb. 7, 2004); Roger Cressey interview (Dec. 15, 2003); Paul Kurtz interviews (Dec. 16, 2003; Dec. 22, 2003). 

163. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004); Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). Hadley told us that 
he was able to do less policy development than in a normal two-month transition. 

164. Public references by candidate and then President Bush about terrorism before 9/11 tended to reflect 
these priorities, focusing on state-sponsored terrorism and WMD as a reason to mount a missile defense. See, e.g., 
President Bush remarks, Warsaw University, June 15, 2001. 

165. Rice and Zelikow had been colleagues on the NSC staff during the first Bush administration and were 
coauthors of a book concerning German unification. See Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified 
and Europe Transformed; A Study in Statecraft (Harvard Univ. Press, 1995). As the Executive Director of the Commis- 
sion, Zelikow has recused himself from our work on the Clinton-Bush transition at the National Security Council. 

166. Philip Zelikow interview (Oct. 8, 2003). 

167. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). 

168. Ibid. 

169. Richard Clarke interviews (Dec. 18, 2003; Feb. 3, 2004); Roger Cressey interview (Dec. 15, 2003). As 
Clarke put it, "There goes our ability to get quick decisions." Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004). However, 
Paul Kurtz told the Commission that even though Clarke complained about losing his seat on the Principals Com- 
mittee on terrorism issues, Kurtz saw no functional change in Clarke's status. Paul Kurtz interviews (Dec. 16, 2003; 
Dec. 22, 2003). 

170. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); GeorgeTenet interview (Jan. 28,2004). 

171. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). 

172. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review,Jan. 25, 2001 (italics and underlining of the word urgently 
in original). Clarke's staff called on other occasions for early Principals Committee decisions, including in a "100 
Day Plan" that called for cabinet-level decisions on the Northern Alliance, Uzbekistan, Predator, and the Cole. See 
NSC memo, Fenzel to Rice, Feb. 16, 2001. Other requests for early PCs are found in NSC email, Fenzel to Hadley, 
"Early PC Meeting Priorities," Feb. 2, 2001; NSC email, Cressey to NSC Front Office, "TNT Meeting Priorities," 
Feb. 7, 2001 ; NSC email, Cressey to Moran,"Aid to NA," Feb. 1 2, 2001 ; NSC memo, Cressey to Rice, Mar. 2, 2001. 

173. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001. 

174. The Bush administration held 32 Principals Committee meetings on subjects other than al Qaeda before 
9/11. Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004;White House information provided to the Commission. Rice told 
us the Administration did not need a principals meeting on al Qaeda because it knew that al Qaeda was a major 
threat. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004) Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8. 2004. 

175. CNN broadcast, "CNN Ahead of the Curve," Oct. 13,2000.Vice presidential candidate Dick Cheney also 
urged swift retaliation against those responsible for bombing the destroyer, saying: "Any would-be terrorist out there 
needs to know that if you're going to attack, you'll be hit very hard and very quick. It's not time for diplomacy and 
debate. It's time for action." Associated Press, "Cheney: Swift Retaliation Needed," Oct. 13, 2000. 

176. GeorgeTenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004). 

177. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001. 

178. NSC memo, Clarke to Vice President Cheney, Feb. 15, 2001. 

179. CIA briefing materials, "UBL Strategic Overview and USS COLE Attack Update," Mar. 27, 2001. These 
briefing slides appear to have been recycled from slides prepared on Jan. 10, 2001. 

180. In early March, Cressey wrote Rice and Hadley that at a belated wedding reception atTarnak Farms for 
one of Bin Ladin's sons, the al Qaeda leader had read a new poem gloating about the attack on the Cole. NSC 
email, Cressey to Rice and Hadley, "BIN LADIN on the USS COLE," Mar. 2, 2001. A few weeks later, Cressey 
wrote Hadley that while the law enforcement investigation went on, "we know all we need to about "who did the 
attack to make a policy decision." NSC email, Cressey to Hadley,"Need forTerrorism DC Next Week," Mar. 22, 
2001. Around this time, Clarke wrote Rice and Hadley that theYemeni prime minister had told State Department 
counterterrorism chief Hull that while Yemen "was not saying so publicly, Yemen was 99 percent certain that Bin 
Ladin was responsible for the Cole. NSC email, Clarke to NSC Front Office, "Yemen's View on the USS Cole," 
Mar. 24, 2001. In June, Clarke wrote Rice and Hadley that a new al Qaeda video claimed responsibility for the 
Cole. NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, "Al Qida Video Claims Responsibility for Cole Attack," June 21, 
2001. Later that month, two Saudi jihadists arrested by Bahraini authorities during the threat spike told their cap- 
tors that their al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan had held celebratory parties over the Cole attack. NSC email, 



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510 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 

Clarke to NSC Front Office and others, "Captured Al Qida Terrorist Met UBLThenWere to Attack US in Saudi 
Arabia," June 29,2001. 

181. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). 

182.Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004); Donald Rumsfeld meeting (Jan. 30, 2004); Paul Wolfowitz inter- 
view (Jan. 20, 2004); Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). 

183. See CIA memo, "History of Funding for CIA Counterterrorism," Aug. 12, 2002. One of Clarke's con- 
cerns had been the level of funding for counterterrorism in the new administration's first budget. See, e.g., NSC 
memo, Clarke to Vice President Cheney, Feb. 15, 2001. 

184. NSC note to Hadley, undated (attached to NSC memo, Cressey to Rice, aid to Northern Alliance and 
Uzbekistan, Mar. 2, 2001). 

185. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). Rice remembered President Bush using this phrase in May 

2001, when warnings of terrorist threats began to multiply. However, speaking on background to the press in August 

2002, Richard Clarke described a directive from the President in March 2001 to "stop swatting at flies" and "just 
solve this problem."A reporter then said to Clarke that he understood Bush to have given that direction in May, 
and Clarke said: "No, it was March." Fox News transcript, "Clarke Praises Bush Team in '02," Mar. 24, 2004 (online 
at www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0, 3566,1 15085, 00. html). 

186. Barton Gellman,"A Strategy's Cautious Evolution: Before Sept. 1 1, the Bush Anti-Terror Effort Was Mosdy 
Ambition," Washington Postman. 20, 2001, p.Al. 

187. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). 

188. NSC notes, John Bellinger notes from March 7, 2001, meeting; NSC email, Cressey to Rice and Hadley, 
"BIN LADIN on the USS COLE," Mar. 2, 2001; CIA briefing materials, Deputies Committee Briefing, "Coun- 
tering the Threat from al-Qa'ida," Mar. 7, 2001. 

189. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). On the Iraq PC, see Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (Simon & 
Schuster, 2004), p. 13. On the Sudan PC, see NSC memo, "Summary of Conclusions for March 27, 2001 Princi- 
pals Committee Meeting on Sudan," Apr. 10, 2001; CIA notes, Houdek's notes on March 27, 2001, Principals Com- 
mittee meeting. On others, see NSC document, list of meetings, Jan. 20 to Sept. 1 1 , 2001 , undated. 

190. CIA briefing materials, "U.S. Policy Against Al Qa'ida" (for the Apr. 30, 2001, Deputies Committee meet- 
ing). On the DC meeting, see also NSC email, Clarke to NSC Front Office, "Request for DC on al QidaTerror- 
ism,"Apr. 16, 2001. DCI Tenet had already talked with Rice and Hadley about Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, the Taliban, 
and the Predator program. See, e.g., CIA memos, summary of weekly Rice/Tenet meeting, Jan. 24, 2001; Feb. 7, 
2001; Mar. 8, 2001 (when Rice received CIA assessments on the possible impact ofTaliban actions against al Qaeda 
and on the likely regional impact of increased aid to anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan). Both Secretary Powell 
and Secretary Rumsfeld appear to have already been briefed on these topics by the DCI as well. See, e.g., CIA 
briefing materials, talking points on the Predator for DCI meeting with Rumsfeld, Feb. 9, 2001; CIA briefing mate- 
rials, talking points on Bin Ladin, the Taliban and Afghanistan for DCI meetings with Powell, Feb. 13, 2001; Mar. 
13,2001. 

191. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions for Apr. 30, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting. 

192. Ibid. 

193. NSC memo, Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) Chairman's Summary Paper, "Key Issues forAl-Qida 
Deputies Meeting," Apr. 19, 2001. 

194. For threats considered by the CSG, see NSC memo, agenda for March 19 CSG videoconference, Mar. 
19, 2001 (agenda item about UBL interest in targeting a passenger plane at Chicago airport); NSC memo, agenda 
for CSG threat videoconference, May 17, 2001 (agenda item, "UBL: Operation Planned in US"). For Clarke's con- 
cern about an al Qaeda presence in the United States, see NSC briefing materials, TNT to Rice, counterterrorism 
briefing for Bush/Cheney transition team, undated, which noted that al Qaeda had "sleeper cells" in more than 40 
countries, including the United States; NSC memo, "Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Net- 
works of al Qida: Status and Prospects," undated (appears to be Dec. 29, 2000), attached to NSC memo, Clarke to 
Rice, Jan. 25, 2001, discussing al Qaeda's presence in the United States. For Clarke's concerns about an attack on 
the White House, see NSC email, Clarke to Rice, briefing on Pennsylvania Ave, Mar. 23, 2001. 

195. For the President's announcement, see White House press release, "Statement by the President, Domestic 
Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction," May 8, 2001 (online at www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2001/05/prmt/02010508.html). 

196. CIA memo, summary of "weekly Rice/Tenet meeting, May 29, 2001. 

197. Ibid. 

198. Richard interview (Dec. 11,2003). 

199. CIA memo, summary of "weekly Rice/Tenet meeting, May 29, 2001. 

200. NSC memo, Hadley to Armitage, Wolfowitz, McLaughlin, and O'Keefe, "Next Steps on al- Qida," June 7, 
2001. 

201. NSC memo, draft National Security Presidential Directive, undated; Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 
2004. 



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^ 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 511 

202. See, e.g., Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004). 

203. Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004). 

204. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). 

205. DOS cable, State 111711, "Demarche on Threat by Afghan-based Terrorists," June 27, 2001. Under Sec- 
retary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman knew of Sheehan's severe demands and instructed Ambassador 
Milam to reiterate them to the Taliban. Marc Grossman interview (Jan. 20, 2004). 

206. In early July 2001, shortly before retiring, Ambassador Milam met one last time with Taliban Deputy For- 
eign Minister Jalil in Islamabad. Milam tried to dispel any confusion about "where Bin Ladin fit into U.S. -Taliban 
relations — the Saudi terrorist was the issue, and he had to be expelled. DOS cable, Islamabad 3628, "Taliban's Mul- 
lah Jam's July 2 Meeting With The Ambassador," July 3, 2001. The State Department's South Asia bureau called for 
a less confrontational stance toward the Taliban. It opposed a policy to overthrow the Taliban and "was cautious about 
aiding the Northern Alliance. DOS memo, Rocca to Grossman, "Your Participation in Deputies Committee Meet- 
ing, Friday, June 29, 2001 "June 28,2001; see DOS memo, "Pakistan/ Afghanistan DC-Covert Action Issue," undated 
(appears to be mid-June 2001); Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004). 

207. For the Deputies Committee meeting, see NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of June 29, 2001, 
Deputies Committee meeting, undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 6, 2001). For 
officials "who were impatient with the pace of the Deputies' Committee review, see, e.g., Richard Armitage inter- 
view (Jan. 12, 2004); John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). For Clarke's arguments, see NSC memo, PCC 
Chairman's Summary Paper, "Key Issues for Al-Qida Deputies Meeting," Apr. 19, 2001. See also Richard Armitage 
testimony, Mar. 24, 2004; Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). 

208. For Clarke and Black renewing their push, see, e.g., Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003). For Clarke's sug- 
gestion, see NSC email, Cressey to Moran, various matters concerning al Qaeda, Feb. 12, 2001. 

209. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004); Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31,2004); Zalmay Khalilzad inter- 
view (Nov. 21, 2003). For Clarke's view, see NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001. 

210. For the draft authorities, see CIA briefing materials, talking points for DCI meeting with Rice on the 
draft Afghanistan counterterrorism finding and the draft UBL Memorandum of Notification, Mar. 28, 2001. For 
the draft explicitly stating that the goal was not to overthrow the Taliban, see Jonathan F. interview (Jan. 19, 2004). 

211. See NSC email, Clarke to Khalilzad, Crawford, and Cressey, "Option for integrated al Qida-Afghan- 
Pakistan paper," June 30, 2001. For State's view, see DOS memo, "U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama Bin 
Laden," undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 16,2001). 

212. For an outline of the policy, see NSC memo, "Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Strategy," undated (attached 
to NSC memo, Biegun memo to executive secretaries, Sept. 7, 2001). For the September 10 meeting, see NSC 
memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, Summary of Conclusions for Sept. 10, 2001, Deputies Committee meet- 
ing on Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, Sept. 26, 2001. 

213. For the September 10 meeting, see NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, Summary of Conclu- 
sions for Sept. 10, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting on Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, Sept. 26, 2001. For 
Armitage s view, see Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004). 

214. Colin Powell prepared statement, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 5. 

215. For reviewing the possibility of more carrots, see DOS memo, Hull and Usrey to Grossman, "Deputies 
Committee Meeting onTerrorism and al Qaida," Apr. 20, 2001. For the possibility oflifting sanctions, see Colin 
Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004); Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004); DOS memo, "Engagement "with Pak- 
istan: From Negative to Positive," undated (appears to be May 29, 2001). 

216. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). 

217. For Rice's view on Sattar, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). For Sattar urging the United 
States to engage theTaliban, see DOS cable, State 109130, "The Secretary's LunchWith Pakistani Foreign Minis- 
ter Abdul Sattar," June 22, 2001. For the deputies agreeing to review objectives, see NSC memo, Summary of Con- 
clusions ofjune 29, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting, undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun to executive 
secretaries, July 6, 2001). For Clarke urging Hadley, see NSC memo, Clarke to Hadley,"DC on Pakistan," June 27, 
2001. 

218. See White House letter, President Bush to Musharraf, Aug. 4, 2001. For Rocca's view, see DOS memo, 
"Engagement with Pakistan: From Negative to Positive," undated (possibly May 29, 2001); Christina Rocca inter- 
view (Jan. 29, 2004). For Armitage 's comment, see Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004). 

219. For the Vice President's call, see CIA briefing materials, "Efforts to Counter the Bin Ladin Threat," Sept. 
12, 2001. For Powell's meetings, see DOS cable. State 04 1824, "Secretary's 26 February Meeting With Saudi Crown 
Prince Abdullah," Mar. 8, 2001; DOS cable, State 117132, "The Secretary's June 29 Meeting With Saudi Crown 
Prince Abdullah," July 5, 2001. 

220. Paul Wolfowitz interview (Jan. 20, 2004); Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004). 

221. For Shelton's recollection, see Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For Sheridan's departure, see Austin 
Yamada interview (Dec. 23, 2003); Brian Sheridan interview (Feb. 24, 2004). 



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512 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 

222. Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004). Rumsfeld had been a member of the Bremer-Sonnenberg 
Commission on Terrorism, created by Congress in 1998. 
223. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004). 

224. For Annex B, see NSC memo, draft National Security Presidential Directive, undated (attached to NSC 
email, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 13, 2001). The annex said that Pentagon planning was also to include 
options to eliminate "weapons of mass destruction that the al Qaeda network might acquire or make. 

225. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). 

226. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). 

227. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). 

228. Ibid. 

229. John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003). 

230. NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, "Courtesy call on AG," Feb. 22, 2001. 

231. On the FBI strategy, see FBI report, Counterterrorism Division, International Terrorism Program, "Strate- 
gic Program Plan FY 2001—2006," undated (appears to be from summer 2000). On Watsons recollections, see Dale 
Watson interview (Jan. 6, 2004). On the FBI budget proposal, see statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
Hearing on U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat Terrorism before the Subcommittee on Commerce,Justice, and State, 
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 9, 2001. See DOJ memo, Com- 
ments on Staff Statement 12, Apr. 7, 2004. 

232. Testimony of John Ashcroft, Hearing on U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat Terrorism before the Subcom- 
mittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Com- 
mittee, May 9, 2001. On DOJ's priorities, see DOJ memo, Ashcroft to Heads of Department Components, 
"Guidance for Preparing FY 2003 Budgets," May 10, 2001 . On Watson's reaction, see Dale Watson interview (Jan. 
6, 2004). 

233. DOJ letter, Ashcroft to Daniels, transmitting the Department of Justice FY 2003 budget request, Sept. 
10, 2001; Thomas Pickard interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Pickard told us that he approached Ashcroft and asked him 
to reconsider DOJ's denial of the FBI's original counterterrorism budget request in light of the continuing threat. 
It was not uncommon for FBI budget requests to be reduced by the attorney general or by OMB before being 
submitted to Congress; this had occurred during the previous administration. 

234. In chapter 3, we discuss how this problem arose. By 2001, it had become worse. During 2000, the FBI 
had erred in preparing some of its applications for FISA surveillance, misstating how much information had been 
shared with criminal prosecutors and the nature of the walls between the intelligence and law enforcement func- 
tions within the FBI. In March 2001, Judge Royce Lamberth, chief judge of the FISA Court, chastised the FBI, 
sending a letter to Ashcroft announcing he was banning an offending supervisory agent from appearing before the 
court. Judge Lamberth also met personally with Ashcroft and his acting deputy, Robert Mueller, to complain about 
the performance of the FBI and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR). Judge Lamberth letter to 
Ashcroft, Mar. 9, 2001; John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003). In May 2001, Ashcroft altered the FISA applica- 
tion process to ensure greater accuracy See DOJ memo, Ashcroft to Freeh, "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) Process," May 18,2001. 

In July 2001, the General Accounting Office criticized the way the 1995 procedures "were being applied and 
criticized OIPR and FBI for not complying with the information-sharing requirements of the 1995 procedures. 
This was the third report in as many years by a government agency indicating that the procedures were not work- 
ing as planned. In October 20! )(), December 2' )< H), and March 2' )( ) I , proposals for reform to the I 995 procedures 
were put forth by senior DOJ officials. None resulted in reform. One impediment "was that the respective DOJ 
components could not agree on all the proposed reforms. A second impediment was a concern that such reforms 
would require a challenge to the FISA Court's position on the matter.This was considered risky because the FISA 
Court of Review had never convened, and one of the judges had previously voiced skepticism regarding the con- 
stitutionality of the FISA statute. Deputy Attorney General LarryThompson did ask the court to accept the mod- 
ifications described in the text, which were distributed as part of his August 2001 memorandum reaffirming the 
1995 procedures. See DOJ memo, Thompson to the Criminal Division, the Office of Intelligence Policy and 
Review, and the FBI, "Intelligence Sharing," Aug. 6, 2001. 

23 5. This tasking may have occurred before Rice's March 15, 2001, meeting with Tenet. See CIA memo, "Talk- 
ing Points for DCI Meeting with Rice," Mar. 15, 2001. For Rice's recollections, see Condoleezza Rice meeting 
(Feb. 7, 2004). Attorney General John Ashcroft told us he told Rice on March 7, 2001, that his lawyers had deter- 
mined that the existing legal authorities for covert action against Bin Ladin "were unclear and insufficient, and that 
he suggested new, explicit kill authorities be developed. John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004. On the CIA draft 
documents, see CIA memo, "Talking Points for the DCI on the Draft Afghanistan Counterterrorism Finding and 
the Draft UBL MON," Mar. 27, 2001. For the description of the meeting, see CIA memo, Moseman to Tenet, Mar. 
28,2001. 

236. NSC memo, Sturtevant to Griffin, Levin, Krongard, Watson, and others, July 12, 2001. 

237. See, e.g., NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 23, 2000; Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004). 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 513 

238. CIA memo, Black to Clarke, Jan. 25, 2001. For a Joint Staff view, see, e.g., Scott Gration interview (Mar. 
3, 2004). The mission commander for the Predator flights, Air Force Major Mark A. Cooter, had registered his oppo- 
sition to redeploying the aircraft back in December 2000: "given the cost/benefit from these continued missions 
it seems senseless." DOD letter, Cooter to Alec B., "Continued Flight Operations," Nov. 14, 2000 (attached to CIA 
memo, Black to DCI and others, Predator Operation, Nov. 17, 2000). 

239. See NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee meeting, Apr. 30, 2001. This docu- 
ment noted a consensus in favor of reconnaissance missions commencing in July. But DDCI McLaughlin told us 
that he and Black believed that no such decision had been made at the meeting. Hadley told us he believed that a 
decision had been made at the meeting to fly such missions. See John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 2, 2004). See also 
CIA briefing materials, "Summary of April 30, 2001 Deputies Committee meeting," May 3, 2001 ; Stephen Hadley 
meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). For Rice's perspective, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). 

240. Allen described the "quibbling" over financing the Predator program as "ridiculous." Charles Allen inter- 
view (Jan. 27, 2004). For a CIA senior management perspective, see, e.g. John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). 
The Defense Department's view is suggested in CIA briefing materials, "Summary ofApril 30, 2001 Deputies Com- 
mittee meeting," May 3, 2001. 

241. GeorgeTenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004); Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004). 

242. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004);John Jumper interview 
(Mar. 3,2004). 

243. On Hadley 's efforts and directions, see NSC memo, Hadley to McLaughlin, Wolfowitz, and Myers, "Re: 
Predator," July 1 1, 2001. On Rice's intervention, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). 

244. On the Deputies Committee meeting, see NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 31, 2001; 
CIA memo, Campbell to McLaughlin, Pavitt, and others, Aug. 2, 2001. The White House told us that it cannot find 
a formal Summary of Conclusions for this meeting. 

245. NSC memo, Hadley to Armitage, Wolfowitz, Myers, and McLaughlin, resolving Predator issues, Aug. 3, 
2001 (including McLaughlin's handwritten comment); NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, "Need to place a 
call to Tenet," Aug. 8, 2001. 

246. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); John Jumper interview (Mar. 3, 2004); see also Scott Gration 
interview (Mar. 3, 2004). 

247. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, "Observations at the Principals Meeting on Al Qida," Sept. 4, 2001 (text ital- 
icized here is underlined in the original). 

248. Ibid. 

249. Ibid. 

250. Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004. 

251. CIA memo, Black to Tenet, Sept. 4, 200 1 . 

252.Various interviews with participants, as "well as the Maher memo (see note 255 below), make it clear that 
the meeting focused on Predator, not the presidential directive. 

253. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). 

254. Ibid.; NSC memo, Cressey to Rice, September 4 PC on counterterrorism, Sept. 3, 2001. 

255. CIA memo, Maher to limited group, "Principals Committee meeting, Sept. 4, 2001," Sept. 4, 2001. We 
have not found a formal summary of conclusions, which would usually be prepared after a Principals Committee 
meeting. 

256. Ibid. 

257. Ibid. 

258. Ibid. 

259. NSC memo, Clarke to CSG members, Sept. 7, 2001. 

260. On Massoud's assassination, see Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 574—575. On the Sept. 10 meeting, see NSC memo, 
Biegun to executive secretaries, "Summary of Conclusions for Sept. 10, 2001 Deputies Committee meeting on 
Afghanistan, India and Pakistan," Sept. 26, 2001. Note that the agenda for this meeting, distributed on September 
7, 2001, listed its topics as "Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan"; the Summary of Conclusions, written after 9/1 1, flipped 
the order of the topics. 

261. NSC memo, Hadley to Tenet, Sept. 10,2001. 



7 The Attack Looms 

1. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 16. 

2. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003. Although KSM's stated reasons for sending Hazmi 
and Mihdhar to California do not seem especially compelling, we have uncovered no evidence tending to estab- 
lish any more plausible explanation for the California destination. The possibility that the two hijackers were pur- 
suing another al Qaeda mission on the West Coast, "while certainly conceivable — see, e.g., CIA analytic report, 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



514 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 

"Alternate View: Two 1 1 September Hijackers Possibly Involved in Previous US Plot," CTC 2(102-301.164, July 5, 
2002 — conflicts with the organizations preference for having its 9/11 operatives concentrate on that mission exclu- 
sively. 

3. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 19, 2003; Aug. 14, 2003. 

4. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. According to Hambali, in late 1999 or early 2000 
KSM sent an al Qaeda operative named Issa al Britain to visit Hambali in Malaysia. At the end of the visit, Issa pro- 
vided Hambali with two addresses — one in the United States ("possibly in California") and one in South Africa — 
and told Hambali he could contact "people in those locations" if he "needed help." Hambali claims he never 
contacted anyone at either address or passed either address to anyone else, and claims not to remember the addresses. 
Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 12, 2003. In an assessment of KSM's reporting, the CIA con- 
cluded that protecting operatives in the United States appeared to be a "major part" of KSM's resistance efforts. For 
example, in response to questions about U.S. zip codes found in his notebooks, KSM provided the less than satis- 
factory explanation that he was planning to use the zip codes to open new email accounts. CIA report, Intelligence 
Community Terrorist Threat Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammeds Threat Reporting — Precious Truths, Sur- 
rounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," Apr. 3, 2003, pp. 4—5. 

5. Notably, as discussed in chapter 5, precisely such arrangements — in the form of lodging and travel assistance 
provided by Hambali 's minions — were in place when the first contingent of operatives {including Hazmi and Mih- 
dhar) journeyed to Kuala Lumpur in late 1999 and early 2000. 

6. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003. 

7. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 19, 2003; Aug. 14, 2003. KSM also has stated that in addi- 
tion to providing Hazmi and Mihdhar with a San Diego telephone book, he gave them another directory "pos- 
sibly covering Long Beach, California." Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 15, 2004. 

8. Although Hazmi and Mihdhar told immigration authorities on January 15, 2000, that they would be stay- 
ing at the Sheraton Hotel in Los Angeles, their names do not appear in the hotel's registration records for the sec- 
ond half ofjanuary. FBI searches of the records of other hotels near the airport and smaller establishments in Culver 
City failed to locate the hijackers, as did our own investigation. See FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 
(Apr. 3, 1999, entry, citing 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 4062; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134); Commission 
investigation in Culver City;Vicki G. interview (Sept. 30, 2003). 

9. For the FBI source's claims, see FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom investigation, Oct. 8, 2002. For 
Abdullah's recollections, see FBI report of investigation, interview of MohdarAbdullahJan. 15, 2002. Other report- 
ing indicates that Hazmi and Mihdhar spent time at the King Fahd mosque. A scholar lecturing at the mosque was 
reportedly approached by either Hazmi or Mihdhar about performing a wedding ceremony. Khalil A. Khalil inter- 
view (Feb. 24, 2004). On "Khallam," see FBI electronic communication, "Fahad Althumairy," Sept. 4, 2002; FBI 
electronic communication, "Ziyat Kharfan,"Jan. 8, 2002 (giving description of visitor with whom Hazmi and Mih- 
dhar met at mosque). The Khallam story has never been corroborated. The FBI considered the possibility that Khal- 
lam might be Khallad,the al Qaeda member whose role in the 9/11 plot and the Cole attack we discussed in chapter 
5. This speculation was based on reporting that Khallad was in the United States injune 2000 and was seen in the 
company of Fahad alThumairy, an imam at the mosque. FBI electronic communication, investigation of Cole bomb- 
ing, interview of witness, Mar. 19, 2003; CIA cable, source reporting, Mar. 18, 2003. Neither we nor the FBI have 
found any travel documentation establishing Khallad's presence in the United States at any time. We doubt that the 
person allegedly seen withThumairy actually was Khallad. 

10. Patrick J. McDonnell, "Saudi Envoy in L.A. Is Deported," Los Angeles Times, May 10, 2003, p. Bl; Michael 
Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, with Jamie Reno,"Failure to Communicate,' Newsweek, Aug. 4, 2003, p. 34. As ofjan- 
uary 2000,Thumairy was employed by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and 
Religious Guidance, to act as the consulate's liaison to the mosque. FBI electronic communication, "Fahad AlThu- 
mairy," Sept. 4, 2002. Before 9/1 1, Saudi imams employed by the ministry often were dispatched to help serve Mus- 
lim communities around the world, sometimes — as inThumairy's case — with diplomatic status in the host country. 
On Thumairy's leadership, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bin Suleiman al 
Muharma,July 9, 2003; FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohamed Ibrahim Aliter, Dec. 2, 2002. 

1 1. FBI electronic communication, "Abdulaziz Alroomi," Apr. 2, 2003. 

I 2. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of K haled Chant, I)ec. 4, 20! P. After 9/1 1 , arguments arose 
within the Saudi government over whether to allow reputedly radical imams, includingThumairy, to work for the 
Saudi government in the United States. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bin Suleiman 
al Muhanna,July 9, 2003. In May 2003, the U.S. government settled the matter, at least inThumairy's case, by refus- 
ing to let him back into the country. DOS memo, Karl Hoffman to the Commission,June 8, 2004, and the attached 
materials. 

13. On Thumairy's religious views, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohamed Aliter, Dec. 
2, 2002; Fahad alThumairy interviews (Feb. 23— 25, 2004). However, two witnesses we interviewed who knewThu- 
mairy and used to hear him preach at the King Fahd mosque deny that he promoted extremism. Sami A. Mekhe- 
mar interview (Apr. 21, 2004); Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Despite the disparate views as to whether Thumairy 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 515 

qualified as an extremist while he was in Los Angeles, it does appear that both the Saudi Arabian government and 
the leadership of the mosque attempted to discipline him in the summer of 2002 and early 2003 for espousing 
extremist views. Thumairy denies incurring any such disciplinary measures. Fahad al Thumairy interviews (Feb. 
23—25, 2004); FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bm Suleiman al Muhanna,July 9, 2003. 
OnBayoumi, see Khalil A. Khalil interview (Feb. 24,2004). Bayoumi andThumairy had numerous telephonic con- 
tacts between December 1998 and December 2000. Specifically, Bayoumi called Thumairy 's home telephone 10 
times during this period, andThumairy called Bayoumi 's cellular and home phones 11 times between December 
3 and December 20, 2000. FBI electronic communication, "Fahad Al-Thumairy," Nov. 20, 2002. Bayoumi recalls 
consulting with Thumairy, solely on religious matters, both by telephone and in person at the mosque. Omar al 
Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16—17, 2003). As to Thumairy s contact 'with M ohd a r Abdullah, see FBI electronic com- 
munication, "Fahad Althumairy," Oct. 25, 2002; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 
2002. According to one individual, Abdullah visited the mosque frequently and was "very close" to radical follow- 
ers ofThumairy. FBI electronic communication, "Fahad Althumairy," Oct. 25, 2002. 

14. We have checked, for example, the records for apartments whereThumairy is known to have placed Saudi 
visitors during 2001. The most intriguing lead concerns an Arabic-speaking taxicab driver, Qualid Benomrane, who 
was arrested on immigration charges in early 2002. When asked to look at a series of photographs that included 
the 19 hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks, Benomrane responded ambiguously, seeming first to pick out the 
photographs of Hazmi and Mihdhar but then denying that he recognized them. Later in the interview, Benom- 
rane told the FBI about driving"two Saudis" around Los Angeles and to San Diego's SeaWorld after being intro- 
duced to them by Thumairy at the King Fahd mosque before 9/1 1. According to Benomrane, someone at the 
consulate had asked Thumairy to assist the two Saudis, "who had recently arrived in Los Angeles and had moved to 
an apartment near the mosque. FBI electronic communication,"Fahad Althumairy," Sept. 4, 2002;Ashour E. inter- 
view (May 20, 2004); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Qualid Moncef Benomrane, Mar. 7, 2002; Mar. 13, 
2002; May 23, 2002. Working with agencies of the U.S. government, we have attempted to locate and interview 
Benomrane overseas, since he was deported in 2002. After checking many possible avenues of corroboration for 
this story, our investigation has not substantiated the hypothesis that Benomrane's "two Saudis" were Hazmi and 
Mihdhar. In fact, we have established that Benomrane did not obtain a taxi license, or even a driver's license, until 
months after he could be supposed to have chauffeured Hazmi and Mihdhar. Moreover, before his deportation, 
Benomrane described the two Saudis as sons of a sick father who was seeking medical treatment in Los Angeles. 
Ibid. We have found evidence corroborating this account. 

15. FBI document made available to the Commission; Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Omar al 
Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16—17, 2003); Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). In Bin Don's presence, Bayoumi met with a still- 
unidentified consular employee whom Bayoumi already knew and whom Bin Don says he saw in Anaheim as 
recently as November 2003. The employee provided Bayoumi with Qur'ans and other religious materials during 
the February 1, 2000, meeting. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16—17, 2003). At the time of the February 1, 

2000, restaurant encounter, Bin Don, a U.S. citizen, went by the name Isamu Dyson. 

16. Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Isamu Dyson, Oct. 8, 
2001. 

17. See Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Isamu Dyson, Oct. 
8, 2001. Bin Don himself has been inconsistent about visiting the mosque. In his initial interviews, he recalled pray- 
ing with Bayoumi at the consulate before lunch and visiting the mosque only once, after the meal; when we inter- 
viewed him recently, however, he stated that both prayer sessions took place at the mosque. For Bayoumi's visits to 
Los Angeles, see FBI report of investigation, recovery of hotel records, Jan. 15, 2002. Although Bayoumi might deny 
visiting the mosque on February 1 to conceal some contact he may have made there that day, we have seen no evi- 
dence of such contact. 

18. Saudi Civil Aviation Authority employment records for Bayoumi, Mar. 2000— Jan. 2002 (provided by the 
FBI); FBI report ofinvestigation, "Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi 
Arabia," undated; FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Bayoumi, Apr. 15, 2002. While m San Diego, Bay- 
oumi was officially employed by Ercan, a subsidiary of a contractor for the Saudi Civil Aviation Administration, 
although a fellow employee described Bayoumi as a "ghost employee," noting that he was one of many Saudis on 
the payroll who was not required to work. In April 2000, Bayoumi received a promotion and his status "was also 
adjusted from "single" to "married" (despite the fact that he was already married). As a result, his salary was raised 
and his "other allowances" stipend increased significantly, from approximately $465 to $3,925 a month, remaining 
at that level until December 2000. In January 2001, the stipend "was reduced to $3,427. It stayed constant until August 

2001, when Bayoumi left the United States. Saudi Civil Aviation Authority employment records for Bayoumi, Mar. 
2000— Jan. 2002 (provided by the FBI); Richard L. Lambert prepared statement, June 26, 2003, pp. 7—9; FBI reports 
ofinvestigation, interviews of Samuel George Coombs, Apr. 8, 2002;July 24, 2002;Aug. 26, 2002. 

19. On Bayoumi's activities, see FBI electronic communication, interview of Bayoumi, Sept. 17, 2003. Although 
Bayoumi admits knowingThumairy, no telephone records document any contact between the two just before Bay- 
oumi's lunch with Hazmi and Mihdhar in Los Angeles. Nor do individuals who regard Thumairy as an extremist 



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5 1 6 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 

place Bayoumi inThumairy's circle of associates. KSM has denied knowing Bayou mi. Intelligence report, interro- 
gation ofKSM,Aug. 18,2003. 

Bayoumi was once the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation, prompted by allegations about him 
that appear to have been groundless. On the closing of the investigation, see FBI electronic communication, "Omar 
Ahmed Al Bayoumi," June 7, 1999. Another possible source of suspicion is his passport, which contains a cachet 
that intelligence investigators associate with possible adherence to al Qaeda. It is a marking that can be obtained 
by especially devout Muslims. Although we believe the marking suggests the need for further inquiry, it is not the 
kind of fraudulent manipulation that would conclusively link the document with a terrorist organization. INS 
records, copy of Bayoumi passport; CIA analytic report, Al-Qa'idaTravel Issues, CTC 2004-40002H, Nov. 14,2003, 
pp.ii, 18. 

20. On Abdullah's assistance to the hijackers, see FBI electronic communication, Abdullah investigation, May 
19, 2004. In a post-9/11 interview with law enforcement, Abdullah claimed that Bayoumi specifically asked him 
"to be the individual to acclimate the hijackers to the United States, particularly San Diego, California." FBI report 
of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002. Bayoumi, however, denies even introducing Hazmi 
and Mihdhar to Abdullah, much less asking him to assist them. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16—17, 2003). 

21. FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002; FBI electronic communication, 
"Osama Bassnan," Oct. 17, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2001; FBI 
electronic communication, "Shareef Abdulmuttaleb el Arbi," Feb. 4, 2003. For the possibility of the notebook 
belonging to someone else, see FBI report, Behavioral Analysis Activity, Oct. 4, 2001. 

22. FBI electronic communication, interview of Charles SabahToma, May 18, 21104. 

23. On Abdullah's claims of advance knowledge, see FBI electronic communication, interview, May 17, 2004. 
On Abdullah's telephone use after August 25, 2001, and acting strangely, see FBI report of investigation, interview, 
Sept. 24, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002; Danny G. interviews (Nov. 
18, 2003; May 24, 2004). 

24. The hijackers' mode of transportation and the exact date of their arrival in San Diego are not known. On 
their locating Bayoumi on February 4 and his assistance, see Richard L. Lambert prepared statement,June 26,2003, 
pp. 6—7; Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16—17, 2003); FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar al Bay- 
oumi, Aug. 4—5, 2003. The rental application states that Hazmi and Mihdhar resided in Bayou mi's apartment from 
January 15 to February 2, 2000, but Bayoumi denies it, and we have found no reason to dispute his denial. Accord- 
ing to Bayoumi, he was in such a hurry to complete the rental transaction that he signed the application form with- 
out reading it. Bayoumi also denies receiving any money from Hazmi or Mihdhar for helping them with the 
apartment. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16—17, 2003). On opening an account, see FBI report, "Summary of 
Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 12. 

Contrary to highly publicized allegations, we have found no evidence that Hazmi or Mihdhar received money 
from another Saudi citizen, Osama Bassnan. 

25. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16—17, 2003). According to Bayoumi, he originally intended to hold the 
party at his own apartment, but moved it to the hijackers' apartment when one of the guests created an awkward 
social circumstance by bringing his wife; Bayoumi solved the problem by having the friend's 'wife stay with his own 
wife in Bayoumi 's apartment and moving the party to the hijackers' residence. Bayoumi maintains that a visiting 
sheikh was the party's principal honoree. Ibid. Although Bin Don has recalled that the party was intended to wel- 
come Hazmi and Mihdhar to the community, this is belied by the hijackers' apparent decision to sequester them- 
selves in the back room, and by the account of another party attendee. Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); 
Khalid Abdulrab al Yafai interview (Feb. 24, 2004). Of the two operatives, only Mihdhar appears briefly on the 
video shot by Bin Don. Bayoumi videotape of party (provided by the FBI). 

26. On the hijackers' efforts to relocate, see Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16—17, 2003); Interview (Apr. 
23, 2004); FBI report, "San Diego Brief to 9/11 Commissi on," June 26, 2003, p. 17. Telephone records indicate that 
on February 9 and February 14, 2000, Bayoumi 's cell phone was used to call the landlord of the operatives' acquain- 
tance, Hashim al Attas, who had decided to vacate his apartment. On February 15, 2000, when the landlord returned 
a page from Bayoumi 's cell phone, Hazmi answered the phone. Steve O. interview (Nov. 17, 2003); FBI report of 
investigation, interview of George Harb, Oct. 30, 2001. Hazmi and Mihdhar appear to have used Bayoumi s cell 
phone until telephone service (subscribed in Hazmi s name) was installed in their apartment. 

27. FBI report of investigation, interview of George Harb, Sept. 16, 2001 .The hijackers may actually have lived 
in Attas's apartment for a short while. Bayoumi has stated that he recalls hearing that Hazmi and Mihdhar moved 
into the apartment for two weeks but then returned to their original apartment while Bayoumi was in Washing- 
ton, D.C. FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar al Bayoumi, Aug. 4—6, 2003. This account is confirmed by 
Attas's girlfriend, who recalls that Attas met Mihdhar and Hazmi either through friends or at the mosque, and that 
the pair moved into Attas's apartment for approximately two "weeks before moving out and taking Attas's furnish- 
ings with them. FBI report, "San Diego Brief to 9/11 Commission," June 26, 2003, p. 18. 

28. Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Hazmi and Mihdhar did not officially vacate their first apartment until May 31, 
2000. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline" Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-SD, serial 1445). The exact details 



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^ 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 517 

of the hijackers' move to their final San Diego address are not altogether clear, as their landlord — who has been 
interviewed many times by the FBI and once by us — has provided various accounts of how he first met them. See 
also FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Oct. 3, 2001. On Mihdhar s travels, see Interview (Apr. 
23, 2004); FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 46. On Hazmi's 
departure, see FBI report, "San Diego Brief to 9/11 Commission,"June 26, 2003, p. 18. 

29. On the purchase of the car, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (citing Bank of America 
records). Law enforcement officials recovered the blue 1988 Toyota from the parking lot at Dulles International 
Airport on September 1 1. On the wire transfer, see FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 17, 2001. After 9/11, 
the mosque administrator came forward because he feared he had unwittingly aided the hijackers. He recalled Hazmi 
and Mihdhar arriving at the mosque on their own and describing themselves as clerks employed by the Saudi Ara- 
bian government. The two said they needed help finding a school 'where they could study English, which neither 
spoke well enough, in the administrator's opinion, to permit them to become pilots. The administrator also sus- 
pected that Mihdhar might have been an intelligence agent of the Saudi government. After first declining Hazmi's 
request for a loan, the administrator agreed to permit him to use the administrator's bank account to receive the 
$5,000 wire transfer. Claiming to have been suspicious of the entire transaction, the administrator distanced him- 
self from Hazmi and Mihdhar, but not before they had received the assistance they needed. Ibid. We have no evi- 
dence contradicting the administrator's account. 

30. On visits to other mosques, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Ali Ahmad Mesdaq,Jan. 28, 
20(12; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Samir Abdoun, Oct. 28, 2001; May 15, 2002. On Bayoumi's assis- 
tance, see Richard L. Lambert prepared statement, June 26, 2003, p. 7; FBI electronic communication, "Jay Steven 
Barlow," Sept. 24, 2002. On April 12, 2000, Hazmi registered for a one-month class in conversational English. FBI 
report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (Apr. 12, 2000, entry, citing Bank of America records). 

31. Even before learning of Abdullah's alleged jailhouse conversations, we attempted to interview him in 
November 2003, while he was incarcerated and awaiting deportation. Through counsel, Abdullah refused to be 
interviewed unless he was released from custody.The U.S. Department ofjustice declined to obtain an order of use 
immunity so that Abdullah's testimony could be compelled. See Commission letter to Daniel Levin, DOJ, Dec. 31, 
2003; DOJ letter, Daniel Levin to the Commission, Jan. 5, 2004. On Abdullah's deportation, see FBI electronic com- 
munication, Abdullah investigation, July 1, 2004. Abdullah appears to be at liberty in Yemen, although he claims 
Yemeni authorities are watching him. H. G. Reza, "Deported Friend of Terrorists in Report," Los Angeles Times, 
June 17, 2004, p. A3 1. 

32. On Awadallah, see FBI electronic communication, interview of Osama Awadallah,June 6, 2002; FBI elec- 
tronic communication, interview of Osama Awadallah, Feb. 4, 2003. On Bakarbashat, see FBI report of investiga- 
tion, interview of Omar Bakarbashat, Sept. 17, 2001; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Apr. 
11, 2002. Another associate of Hazmi and Mihdhar allegedly referred to them after the September 11 attacks as 
"more than heroes." FBI letterhead memorandum, "Diah Thabet," Oct. 25, 2002. 

33. On Anwar Aulaqi, see Wade A. interview (Oct. 16, 2003). The FBI investigated Aulaqi in 1999 and 2000 
after learning that he may have been contacted by a possible procurement agent for Bin Ladin. During this inves- 
tigation, the FBI learned that Aulaqi knew individuals from the Holy Land Foundation and others involved in rais- 
ing money for the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas. Sources alleged that Aulaqi had other extremist connections. 
FBI electronic communication, background searches, Feb. 3, 21.100; FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 
2001; FBI electronic communication, interview, Oct. 8, 2002. None of this information was considered strong 
enough to support a criminal prosecution. For evidence of possible early contacts between Hazmi/Mihdhar and 
Aulaqi, see Steve O. interview (Nov. 17, 2003), noting that four calls took place between Aulaqi 's phone and Bay- 
oumi's phone on February 4, 2000, the day Bayoumi helped Hazmi and Mihdhar find an apartment and perhaps 
lent them his phone. 

One witness remembered meeting Hazmi through Aulaqi and Mohdar Abdullah, and later meeting Mihdhar 
at Aulaqi's mosque. This same witness recalled seeing Hazmi and Mihdhar in the guest room on the second floor 
of the mosque and, on one occasion, leaving the room just after Aulaqi, at the conclusion of a meeting. FBI reports 
of investigation, interviews of Samir Abdoun, Oct. 28, 2001; May 15, 2002; FBI report of investigation, interview 
of Anwar Aulaqi, Sept. 25, 2001; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 15, 2002. 

34. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Anwar Aulaqi, Sept. 17, 2001; Sept. 19, 2001. 

35. Aulaqi took a position at the Dar al Hijra mosque in early 2001. By the time we sought to interview him 
in 2003, he had left the United States, reportedly returning to Yemen.We attempted to locate and interview him 
inYemen, "working with U.S. agencies and the Yemeni government, as well as other governments that might have 
knowledge of his whereabouts.Those attempts were unsuccessful. 

36. Whereas Hazmi managed to speak broken English, Mihdhar did not even have this much command of the 
language, which he appeared uninterested in learning. Interview (Apr. 23, 2004); FBI report of investigation, inter- 
view of Omar Bakarbashat, Sept. 17, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ramez Noaman, Oct. 1, 2001. 
On April 4, 2000, Hazmi took his first flying lesson, a one-hour introductory session at the National Air College 
in San Diego. Exactly one month later, Hazmi and Mihdhar purchased flight equipment from an instructor at the 



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5 1 8 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 

Sorbi Flying Club in San Diego. On May 5, both of them took a lesson at Sorbi, followed by a second lesson at the 
same school five days later. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 18. 

37. On the Sorbi Flying Club, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Khaled al Kayed, Sept. 15, 2001. 
For other instructors' views, see FBI electronic communication, Penttbomb investigation, Apr. 11,2002. 

38. On Mihdhar's phone calls, see, e.g., FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (Mar. 20, 2000, entry, 
citing 265A-NY-280350-19426). On Mihdhar's travels, see FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 
29, 21.104 (classified version), p. 17. On KSM's views, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003. 
On Mihdhar's status, see INS record, NIIS record of Mihdharjune 10, 2000. 

39. On KSM's communication methods, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 15, 2003. Even 
here, the West Coast operatives' language limitation posed a problem, as KSM had to send emails in Arabic using 
the English alphabet. Ibid. In addition to having his nephew Ali Abdul Aziz Ali transmit funds to the operatives in 
the United States, KSM used Ali as an intermediary for telephone messages. Intelligence report, interrogation of 
detainee, Jan. 7, 2004. On Khallad's role, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct. 15, 2003; Aug. 18, 
2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004. On KSM's annoyance with and views on Mih- 
dhar, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 15, 2004; May 19, 2003. 

40. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004; FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 
2001; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 15, 2001; FBI electronic communication, inter- 
view, July 26, 2002; Interview (Apr. 23, 2004); FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 15, 
2001. Both KSM and Khallad were aware of Hazmi's interest in finding a bride, and KSM reportedly went so far 
as to promise Hazmi a monthly stipend of $700 in the event he succeeded in marrying. Intelligence reports, inter- 
rogations of KSM, Aug. 6, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004. Although Hazmi did not use his housemate's telephone to make calls, 
he apparently received calls on it, including calls from an individual named Ashraf Suboh, who called the house 16 
times between July 20 and November 18, 2000. Suboh's name and address appear in a printed email recovered dur- 
ing searches at an al Qaeda site in Pakistan in May 2002. The document was dated Jan. 9, 2001, and included his 
name and a mailing address. FBI letterhead memorandum, San Diego investigation, July 2, 2002. 

41. Salmi arrived in San Diego on August 7, 2000, and three days later moved into the house where Hazmi 
resided. Omar al Bayoumi — who reported (at least nominally) to Salmi's uncle at the Saudi Civil Aviation min- 
istry — found this accommodation for Salmi, although Salmi claims not to have known Bayoumi before coming to 
San Diego. FBI report of investigation, interview/ ofYazeed al Salmi, Oct. 8, 2001. On Salmi's move to Abdullah's 
house in La Mesa, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Salmi, Sept. 21, 2001. On possible financial links, 
see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 59279); FBI electronic 
communication, Information and questions re Salmi interview,June 9, 2004; FBI report of investigation, interview 
of Salmi, June 17, 2004. For Salmi's possible link to Hanjour, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Abdul- 
lah, July 23, 2002. We made efforts with the assistance of the FBI to interview Salmi, but without success.The FBI 
interviewed Salmi on its own in June 2004 but failed to ask about his reported childhood ties to Hanjour. FBI 
report of investigation interview ofYazeed al Salmi, June 14, 2004. 

42. At KSM's direction, Khallad notified Hazmi that another operative, who turned out to be Hanjour, 'would 
bejoining Hazmi soon. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004. On Hazmi's work at the gas 
station and his statement about becoming famous, see FBI report of investigation, interview, May 21, 2002. The 
owner of the gas station, Osama Mustafa, and the manager of the station, Iyad Kreiwesh, have both been the sub- 
ject of FBI counterterrorism investigations. The investigations did not yield evidence of criminal conduct. Thu- 
mairy, the Saudi imam in Los Angeles, allegedly presided over Kreiwesh 's wedding at the King Fahd mosque, 
witnessed by Abdullah and Benomrane, likely around September 2000. FBI report of investigation, interview of 
Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002; 4377 Parks Avenue, San Diego record, "Application to Rent and Rental Deposit," 
Sept. 21,2000. 

43. On Hanjour's travel to San Diego, see INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Dec. 8, 2000. Hazmi's house- 
mate remembers him taking an unexplained trip to the San Diego airport around this time. FBI report of investi- 
gation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001. On Hanjour and Hazmi leaving San Diego and the visit to the gas station, see FBI 
report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Sept. 19, 2001. On Hazmi's comment to his housemate, see 
Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Although Hazmi's housemate claims that the "Hani" 'whom Hazmi introduced him to 
is not the same person pictured in Hanjour's photograph, we have little doubt that the housemate did in fact see 
Hanjour on the day he and Hazmi left San Diego. Ibid.; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, 
Sept. 15,2001. 

44. On Hazmi's contact with Abdullah, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Sept. 
19, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ramez Noaman, Oct. 1, 2001. On Hazmi's contact with his 
housemate, see FBI reports ofinvestigation, interviews, Sept. 24, 2001; July 26,2002. On Hazmi's contact to acquain- 
tances in San Diego, see Danny G. interviews (Nov. 18, 2003: May 24, 2004). 

45. For Shehhi's arrival, see INS record, NIIS record of Shehhi, May 29, 2000; Customs record, secondary 
inspection record of Shehhi, May 29, 2000. For Shehhi going to New York City, see FBI report, "Hijackers Time- 
line," Dec. 5, 2003 (May 30, 2000, entry citing Dresdner bank records). For Atta's travel to the Czech Republic, 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 519 

see ibid. (June 2, 2000, entry citing Teletype, Sept. 21, 2001, 280350-PR, serial 111). Upon entry, Atta received 
the customary authorization to stay six months as a tourist. For Atta's arrival in Newark on June 3, 2000, see INS 
record, non-NIIS record of Atta, June 3, 2000. For Atta's apparent motivation, see CIA analytic report,"l 1 Sep- 
tember:The Plot and the Plotters," CTC 2003-40044HCJune 1 , 2003, p. 13; Intelligence reports, interrogations 
of Binalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002; Mar. 3, 2004. 

46. Demonstrating Atta and Shehhi's uncertainty regarding flight schools, Atta emailed a New Hampshire school 
on June 5, 2000, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 3975); and 
inquired with a New Jersey school on June 22, 2000, see ibid, (citing 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 15965). As they 
looked at flight schools on the East Coast, Atta and Shehhi stayed in a series of short-term rentals in New York 
City. Ibid. (June 19, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serials 80926, 86069; June 25, 2000, entry citing 
265A-NY-280350-302, serial 74902). For Jarrah's travel and training, see INS record, NIIS record of Jarrah, June 
27, 2000; FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. For Jarrah living with instructors, see ibid. 
For Jar rah purchasing a vehicle, see FBI briefing materials, Penttbom, Dec. 10—1 1, 2003, p. 150 (citing 265A-NY- 
280350-302, serials 21113, 66098). 

47. For Atta and Shehhi visiting the Oklahoma school, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (July 
2, 2000, entry citing FBI electronic communication, Sept. 13, 2001). For Moussaoui's enrollment, see Superseding 
Indictment, United States v. Moussaoui, Crim. No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. filed July 16, 2002), para. 44. For Atta's initial 
training in Florida, see FBI report,"HijackersTimeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (July 7, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350- 
TP-5382). Atta and Shehhi did not take their return flight to New York, and there are no travel records indicating 
how they traveled from Oklahoma to Florida. Ibid. (July 7, 2000, entry citing FBI electronic communication, Sept. 

19, 2001). For Atta and Shehhi's enrollment in the advanced course, see ibid. (July 17, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY- 
280350, serial 4234; 265A-NY-280350-CE, serial 632). The two also soon rented an apartment and opened a joint 
bank account. Ibid. (July 13, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-TP-5679; July 7, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY- 
280350-302-16752). Atta bought a car. FBI briefing materials, Penttbom, Dec. 10-11, 2003, p. 150. For their solo 
flights, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (July 30, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-CE-624, 
632). For passing the test, see ibid. (Aug. 14, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serials 9715, 26590). For 
Atta and Shehhi continuing training, see ibid. (Sept. 1 , 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-2435). For Jarrah's train- 
ing, see ibid. (June 27, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-TP (FD-302), serial 1442). 

48. All reportedly received the money sent to the United States from KSM in Pakistan and via courier. Intel- 
ligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Feb. 1 1, 2004 (two reports). Ramzi Binalshibh wired some funds 'with- 
drawn from Shehhi's bank account in Germany, a total of more than SI 0,00(1 in four transfers between June 13 and 
September 27, 2000. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 16—17; German BKA 
(Bundeskriminalamt) report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002, pp. 39—41. 

49. Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); wire transfer documents (provided by the FBI), pp. 6— 37. Ali did 
provide identification for his initial wire transfer to Hazmi in April that, along with some contact information he 
provided when he made subsequent transfers, helped the FBI unravel his aliases after 9/11. Intelligence reports, 
interrogations of detainee, Feb. 11, 2004 (two reports). 

50. The applications of Atta and Shehhi for student status include the same supporting financial documenta- 
tion. See INS record, Atta application to change status, Sept. 19, 2000; INS record, Shehhi application to change 
status, Sept. 15, 2000. For Atta and Shehhi's enrolling at Jones Aviation, see FBI report, "HijackersTimeline," Dec. 
5, 2003 (Sept. 23, 2000, entry citing SunTrust Financial Records). For Atta and Shehhi's behavior, see FBI report 
of investigation, interview of Ivan Chirivella, Sept. 15, 2001. For their failure, haste, and return to Huffman, see FBI 
report,"Hij'ackersTimeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Oct. 4, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-TP, serial 1474; 265A-NY- 
280350-302, serial 1361). 

51. For Jarrah's certificate, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile ofjarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. Forjarrah's leav- 
ing the United States, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Oct. 7, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY- 
280350-302-7134). Forjarrah and Senguen's travel to Paris, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile ofjarrah, Mar. 

20, 2002. Forjarrah's return to the United States, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Oct. 29, 2000, 
entry citing INS NIIS Report; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134). For their telephone contact, see FBI letterhead 
memorandum, profile ofjarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. For their email contact, see FBI electronic communication, Pentt- 
bom investigation, Sept. 18, 2001, p. 5. 

52. For Bmalshibh's deposit, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (June 27, 2000, entry citing 
265A-NY-280350-TP (FD-302), serial 1442; 265A-NY-280350-TP, serial 9500). For his May and June visa appli- 
cations, see DOS records, Binalshibh visa applications, May 31, 2000;July 18, 2000; FBI briefing materials, Pentt- 
bom, Dec. 10-11, 2003, pp. 136-137; CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1,2003, pp. 10, 12. For 
his September application in Yemen, see DOS record, Binalshibh visa application, Sept. 16, 2000. For his October 
application in Berlin, see DOS record, Binalshibh visa application, Nov. 1, 2000. Even after the last application was 
rejected, Binalshibh sought ways to get a visa, such as by marrying a U.S. citizen. He corresponded by email with 
a woman in California, but Atta told him to discontinue this effort. Intelligence report, interrogation ofBinalshibh, 
Sept. 24,2002. 



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520 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 

Essabar may have been intended to replace Binalshibh. Like Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah, Essabar obtained a new 
passport even though his old one was nearly a year from expiration, evidently to conceal his prior travel to 
Afghanistan during the first half of 2000. On December 12, 2000, and January 28, 2001— after Binalshibh s four 
U.S. visa applications had been denied — Essabar made two unsuccessful U.S. visa applications, stating that he wished 
to visit the United States during the week of February 15, 2001. DOS records, Essabar visa applications, Dec. 12, 
2000; Jan. 8, 2001. See Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, p. 14. 
Neither Binalshibh nor Essabar were denied visas based on terrorism concerns. 

53. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 82. 

54. For KSM sending Moussaoui to Malaysia, see Intelligence Report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003. 
For Moussaoui not finding a flight school, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 22, 2002. For the 
ammonium nitrate purchase, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 9, 2002; Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of detainee, Apr. 12, 2004. For the cargo planes operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, 
Apr. 12, 2004. For KSM's reaction, see Intelligence Report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003. For Moussaoui's 
and Binalshibh's trips and Moussaoui's emails, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 
(classified version), p. 85. There are no witnesses who report that Moussaoui and Binalshibh actually met in Lon- 
don, but Moussaoui's subsequent travel to Afghanistan implies that he received instructions from Binalshibh. See 
ibid., p. 86. Somewhere in his travels, Moussaoui obtained the funds he would bring to the United States. He 
declared $35,000 upon arrival on February 23, 2001, and he deposited $32,000 into a Norman, Oklahoma, bank 
account on February 26. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 78. 

55. For Hanjour's entry, see INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Oct. 3, 1991. For his university studies, see 
FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5,2003 (Oct. 14, 1991, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-PX, serial 3792). For 
Hanjour being religious, see FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom investigation, Jan. 4, 2004, p. 10. One witness 
interviewed by the FBI after 9/11 remembers Hanjour and Nawaf al Hazmi becoming so entranced during a prayer 
that both men began to cry. FBI report of investigation, interview of Mourad Jdami, Sept. 22, 2001. For Hanjour's 
trip to Afghanistan, his initial studies in the United States, his rejection by the Saudi flight school, and his desire for 
flight training in the United States, see Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; 
FBI report of investigation, interview of Adnan Khalil, Sept. 29, 2001. 

56. For Hanjour's 1996 trip to the United States, see, e.g., FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 
1, 1996, entry citing 265A-NT-280350, serial 2746; 265A-NT-280350-302, serial 9130). For his interest in flight 
training in Florida and his training in California, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Adnan Khalil, Sep. 
14, 2001; FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Sept. 3, 1996, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-SF, serial 
1847). For his 1996 flight instruction in Arizona and return to Saudi Arabia, see ibid. (Sept. 29, 1996, entry citing 
265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 953; Nov. 26, 1996, entry citing INS: 265A-NY-280350-NK). For his return to 
Florida, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Bandar al Hazmi, Jan. 15, 2002. For his 1998 flight train- 
ing in Arizona, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5,2003 (Feb. 2, 1998, entry citing 265A-NY-280350- 
IN, serial 4468). For his flight training in Arizona with his two friends, see ibid. (Feb. 24, 2000, entry citing 
265A-NY-280530-IN, serial 4468). Hanjour initially was nervous if not fearful in flight training. FBI letterhead 
memorandum, investigation of Lotfi Raissi,Jan. 4, 2004, p. 1 1. His instructor described him as a terrible pilot. FBI 
letterhead memorandum, interview of James McRae, Sept. 17, 2001. 

We have seen no evidence of a familial relationship between Bandar al Hazmi and hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi 
and Salem al Hazmi. Tim T. interview (Jan. 5, 2004); Ken Williams interview (May 1 1, 2004). Bandar al Hazmi claims 
he met Hanjour in Florida, as they "were both studying at the same English -language institute. FBI letterhead mem- 
orandum, investigation of Bandar al Hazmi, Jan. 15, 2002. Rayed Abdullah, who knew Bandar al Hazmi from high 
school, says he moved to Florida to become a commercial pilot after speaking with Bandar al Hazmi, and claims 
he met Hanjour upon arriving in Florida. FBI report of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 15, 2001; 
FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Abdullah Rayed Abdullah, Nov. 16, 2001, p. 8. This account is not 
credible, because Abdullah arrived in the United States on November 15, 1997, the day before Hanjour arrived. Ken 
Williams interview (May 11, 2004); FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-NK, 
serial 1379). The three of them did attend language school together but not until after all three had arrived in the 
United States. FBI report of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 15, 2001. The Phoenix FBI office 
remains suspicious of Abdullah and Hazmi and their association with Hanjour. Ken Williams interview (May 11, 
2004). (Williams is the FBI agent who authored what is referred to as the "Phoenix memo," discussed in chapter 8.) 

For Hanjour obtaining his pilot's license in three months, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Amro 
Hassan, Sept. 17, 2001, p. 2. For Hanjour receiving his commercial pilot's license, see FBI report, "Hijackers Time- 
line," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 15, 1999, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-PX, serial 334). For Hanjour's apparent return to 
Saudi Arabia, see ibid. (Apr. 28, 1999, entry citing INS 1-94, 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 1 379). Bandar al Hazmi 
continued his training at Arizona Aviation with intermittent trips home to Saudi Arabia, before departing the United 
States for the last time in January 2000. Tim T interview (Jan. 5, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of 
Amro Hassan, Sept. 19, 2001. Rayed Abdullah trained at Arizona Aviation and obtained a private pilot's license in 
December 1998. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Rayed Abdullah, May 5, 2001, p. 9. Abdullah then 



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S 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 521 

worked as a computer programmer in Arizona before resuming flight training during the summer of 2001. FBI 
report of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 16, 2001, p. 5. 

57. Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001. 

58. Al Qaeda figures at the university or in Tucson included Mubarak al Duri, reportedly Bm Ladin's princi- 
pal procurement agent for weapons of mass destruction; Muhammad Bayazid, an al Qaeda arms procurer and trainer; 
Wadi al Hage, an operative convicted for the East Africa bombings; and Wail Julaidan, a Saudi extremist with ties 
to al Qaeda. CIA and FBI joint analytic report, "Arizona: Long Term Nexus for Islamic Extremists," May 15, 
2002, p. 3. 

59. Rayed Abdullah, who lived and trained with Hanjour,was a leader at the Islamic Cultural Center in Phoenix 
and reportedly gave extremist speeches at the mosque. Ken Williams interview (Jan. 7, 2004); FBI electronic com- 
munication, Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2003. Another Hanjour associate, Faisal al Salmi, took flight training with 
Rayed Abdullah but wanted to keep his training secret. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Rayed Abdul- 
lah, May 5, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview ofMalek Seif, Oct. 25, 2001. When polygraphed on whether 
he had taken flight training at the behest of an organization, al Salmi's negative response was deemed deceptive. 
FBI electronic communication, investigation of Zakaria Soubra,June 5, 2002, p. 8. 

60. For al Qaeda activity m Arizona, see KenWilliams interview (Jan. 7, 2004). On al Qaeda directing individ- 
uals in the Phoenix area to enroll in flight training without telling them why, see FBI electronic communication, 
investigation of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2003. Ghassan al Sharbi, who was captured in March 2002 in Pakistan 
along with Abu Zubaydah, studied at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, Arizona. Greg Krikorian, 
"Detainee Facing Deportation Summoned to Probe," Los Angeles Times, Jan. 24, 2003; KenWilliams interview (Jan. 

7, 2004). Although Sharbi has not been tied to the 9/11 attacks, he reportedly attended the training camps in 
Afghanistan and swore bayat to Bin Ladin during the summer of 2001. FBI memorandum, investigation of Hamed 
al Sularm, Aug. 1 , 2002, p. 6. 

After he left the camps, Sharbi looked for his friend Harridan al Shalawi, another student in Arizona, for a secret 
project. Shalawi reportedly trained in the camps in November 2000, learning how to conduct "Khobar 
Towers"— type attacks that he and a colleague planned to execute in Saudi Arabia. FBI electronic communication, 
investigation of Hamdan al Shalawi, Oct. 16, 2003, p. 2; Intelligence report, trace request on Shalawi, Nov. 27, 2000. 
Shalawi, however, denies this, claiming to have been studying in Arizona at the time, which neither the FBI nor 
we have been able to confirm. Shalawi was involved in a widely publicized incident in November 1999, when he 
and his friend Muhammed al Qudhaieen were detained because the crew of a cross-country America West flight 
reported that Qudhaieen had attempted to open the cockpit door on two occasions. FBI letterhead memorandum, 
Hamed al Sulami, July 25, 2002, p. 7. After the 9/11 attacks, FBI agents in Phoenix considered whether the inci- 
dent was a "dry run" for the attacks. See, e.g., FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Fa had al Wahedi, Nov. 

8, 2002, p. 4. In our interviews of Shalawi and Qudhaieen, they both claimed that Qudhaieen was only looking for 
the lavatory on the plane. Mohammad al Qudhaieen interview (Oct. 25, 2003); Hamdan al Shalawi interview (Oct. 
22, 2003). Shalawi admits having gone to Afghanistan, but only once in the late 1980s after the war with the Soviet 
Union. Shalawi interview (Oct. 22, 2003). 

Finally, another admitted associate of Hani Hanjour in Arizona, Hamed al Sulami, has had telephone contact 
with Sulayman al Alwan, a radical Saudi cleric from Qassim Province who was reported to be Abu Zubaydah 's spir- 
itual advisor and, as discussed later in this chapter, may have had a role in recruiting one or more of the muscle 
hijackers. FBI memorandum, investigation of Hamed al Sulami, Aug. 1, 2002, p. 2; FBI memorandum, investigation 
ofFahad al Wahedi, Nov. 8, 2002, p. 4; CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1,2003, p. 27. 

61. For Hanjour's meeting KSM, experience in the camp, and incorporation into the 9/11 operation, see Intel- 
ligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. It is unknown how Hanjour got to the camps or who may 
have directed him to go there. For new arrivals' procedures, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15, 
2003. 

62. For Hanjour returning home and obtaining a visa, see DOS records, visa applications for Hanjour, Sept. 
10, 2000; Sept. 25, 2000. For Hanjour's statement to his family, see Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijack- 
ers' families, Dec. 22, 2001. For the meeting, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 7, 2004. 

63. All initially gave Hanjour $3,000 to open the account and later deposited another $5,000 into the account. 
See FBI report, financial timeline of 9/11 hijackers, Dec. 9, 2004, p. 36 (Dec. 5, 2000, and Jan. 28, 2001, entries). 
Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 1 1, 2004. Hanjour also maintained another account, into which 
more than $9,600 was deposited. While in the United States, he accessed both accounts via ATM. FBI Report, 
"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 9, 11, 13, 17—18, 19. For Hanjour's travel and supposed 
destination, see INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Dec. 8, 2000; DOS record, Hanjour visa application, Sept. 25, 
2000. For his enrollment but failure to attend, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Nov. 6, 2000, 
entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 11165; 265A-NY-280350-SF, serial 160). 

64. For Hanjour's refresher training, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Dec. 13, 2000, entry 
citing 265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 29652). For his desire to train on multi-engine planes, his language difficulties, 
the instructor's advice, and his reaction, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Rodney McAlear, Apr. 10, 



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522 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 

2002. For his training at Pan Am International Flight Academy and completion by March 2001, see FBI report, 
"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Feb. 8, 2001 , entries citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 2870; 265A-NY-280350- 
PX, serials 334, 1 033). For the Academy's instructor's reaction, see FBI report of investigation, interview of James 
Milton, Apr. 12, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 16, 2001, pp. 2—3. For his per- 
severance, see ibid., p. 3. For vacating their apartment, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Mar. 31, 
2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-PX, serial 762). During the cross-country drive, Hazmi received a speeding 
ticket in Oklahoma on April 1, 2001 . Ibid, (citing 265A-NY-280350-W, serial 693, items k2453, k2454; 265A-NY- 
280350-OC, serial 1 541 ; 265A-NY-280350-302, serials 58753, 58757). For arrival in Virginia, see ibid, (citing 265A- 
NY-280350-NH, serial 1859). 

65. ForAtta's training at Huffman, see, e.g., FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Nov. 19, 2000, entry 
citing 265A-280350-TP-5382). ForAtta's certificate, see ibid. (Nov. 20, 2000, entry citing FAA records). For She- 
hhi's training at Huffman, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Erik Seiberlich, Sept. 12, 2001. For Shehhis 
certificate, see FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 20. For Atta and Shehhi taking 
the commercial pilot test, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Dec. 19, 2000, entry citing 265A- 
NY-280350-302-971 5, serial 26590). For Atta and Shehhi's commercial pilot licenses, see ibid. (Dec. 21 , 2000, entries 
citing FAA records; 265A-NY-280350-302-2340). For Atta and Shehhi's simulator training, see ibid. (Dec. 30, 2000, 
entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 1 177). For Jarrah's training, see ibid. (Dec. 15, 2000, entries citing 265D- 
NY-280350-1399, serial 8048). 

66. For Jarrah's trip to Beirut and return trip 'with Senguen, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile ofjar- 
rah, Mar. 20, 2002. For Senguen accompanying Jar rah to flight training, see German BKA report, investigative sum- 
mary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002, p. 60. According to Binalshibh, Senguen visited Jarrah in order to verify that he actually 
was studying to become a pilot. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, June 9, 2004. For Jarrah's second 
trip to Beirut and visiting Senguen, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002; FBI elec- 
tronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 18, 2001, p. 5. 

67. ForAtta's trip to Germany and meeting with Binalshibh, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binal- 
shibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Dec. 10, 2002; FBI Penttbom timeline briefing (Dec. 10-11, 2003). For Atta giving money 
to Binalshibh, see ibid. For Atta returning to Florida, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Jan. 10, 
2001, entry citing INS NIIS report; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134). For Binalshibh's trip to Afghanistan, see 
FBI Penttbom timeline briefing (Dec. 10-11,2003). 

68. For Shehhi's trip, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Jan. 1 1 and 12, 2001, entries citing 
265A-NY-280350-TP, serials 11182, 11183; 265A-NY-280350-OUT, serials 2248, 2256, Intelligence report). We 
do not have information on what Shehhi did in Morocco. Atta 's cell phone was used on January 2 to call the Moroc- 
can embassy in Washington, D.C. before Shehhi left. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing cellular 
telephone records). Shehhis trip occurred at a time when Abdelghani Mzoudi, one of the Hamburg cell associates, 
was also in Morocco. Mzoudi claims he went home to Morocco to get married but could not because he was injured 
in a car accident there. German BKA report, investigative summary re Mzoudi, Jan. 13, 2003, p. 43. He denies hav- 
ing met with Shehhi, and neither German nor U.S. investigators have uncovered evidence of a meeting. See Fed- 
eral Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004. For Shehhi's family contacting 
the UAE embassy, which contacted Hamburg police, and the UAE official's search, see German BKA report, inves- 
tigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002, p. 23. For Shehhi's call home, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 
5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-BN-98). For the search being called off, see German BKA report, investigative 
summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002, p. 24. 

69. Reports that Atta was in the Prague airport on May 30—31, 2000, and that he was turned back because 
he lacked a visa appear to be a case of mistaken identity: a Pakistani traveler with a name similar to Atta's attempted 
to enter the Czech Republic from Saudi Arabia via Germany but was forced to return to Germany because he 
lacked a valid Czech visa. CIA cable, report re traveler to Prague, Dec. 8, 2001. 

70. For Czech source reporting and credibility assessment, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); EliskaT. interview 
(May 20, 2004). For the information being reported to CIA, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004). For the leak and the 
ministers' statements, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). On April 4, 2001, Atta 
cashed an $8,000 check at a bank in Virginia Beach; he appears on a bank surveillance tape. For FBI evidence of 
Atta being m Virginia Beach, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 4, 2001, entry citing 265 A- 
NY-280350-302-615, 688, 896, 898). For FBI evidence of Atta being in Coral Springs, see ibid. (Apr. 11, 2001, 
entries citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 381; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serials 3817, 5214). For Czech govern- 
ment finding no evidence of Atta's presence and having evidence that Ani was not in Prague, see CIA briefing (Jan. 
28, 2004). Aside from scrutinizing various official records, the Czech government also reviewed surveillance pho- 
tos taken outside the Iraqi embassy CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). None of the 
people photographed that day resembled Atta, although the surveillance only operated from 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. 
CIA cable, review of surveillance photos, Feb. 27, 2002. For Ani's denials of any meetings and request to superiors, 
see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Intelligence report, interrogation of Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, Oct. 1, 

2003. For KSM's denial of the meeting, see Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). Binalshibh has stated that Atta and 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 523 

he were so close that Atta probably would have told him of a meeting with an Iraqi official. Intelligence report, 
interrogation of Bmalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002. Binalshibh also stated that Bin Ladin was upset with Iraqi leader Saddam 
Hussein for committing atrocities against Iraqi Muslims, and that Bin Ladin would never have approved such a meet- 
ing. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 4, 2002. For Atta not using an alias during his July 2001 
trip, see FBI memo, Penttbom investigation, Jan. 14, 2002. 

71. Atta was admitted as a tourist for an eight-month stay, even though the legal limit for tourists is six months. 
Shehhi was admitted for a four-month "business" stay.The Atta and Shehhi applications to change status were ulti- 
mately adjudicated on July 17 and August 9, 2001. Each received until October 1, 2001, to complete his studies. 
ForAtta's INS inspection, see INS records, NIIS record of Atta, Jan. 10, 2001; copy of Atta s Egyptian passport; Atta's 
inspection results; student/school form presented by Atta; primary and secondary inspectors interviews (Mar. 25, 
2004). For Shehhi's INS inspection, see INS records, NIIS record of Shehhi, Jan. 18,2001; Shehhi 's inspection results; 
primary inspector interview (Mar. 26, 2004); secondary inspector interview (Mar. 22, 2004). 

72. For Atta and Shehhi staying in Norcross and Decatur, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 
(Jan. 25, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-3631; 265A-NY-280350-AT-141). For the plane rental in 
Lawrenceville, see ibid. (Jan. 31, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 13850). These locations are all near 
Atlanta. For return to Virginia, see ibid, (citing 265A-NY-280350-NF-48). For mailbox rental, see ibid. (Feb. 20, 
2001, entry citing 265 A-NY-280350-NF-48, 51). For check cashing, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Inves- 
tigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 26. For return to Georgia, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Feb. 21, 
2001, entry citing 65A-NY-280350-302, serial 49563). Forjarrah staying in Decatur, see FBI report, "Hijackers 
Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Mar. 15, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 15661). For Atta-Jarrah call, see FBI 
letterhead memorandum, profile ofjarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. Forjarrah's apparent visit with Senguen, see INS records, 
NIIS record forjarrah, Feb. 25, 2001 (with departure date of Mar. 30, 2001); NIIS record for Jarrah, Apr. 13, 2001. 
For Atta and Shehhi returning to Virginia Beach, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 3, 2001, 
entry citing FBI electronic communication, Sept. 17, 2001). For Atta closing the mailbox, see ibid. (Apr. 4, 2001, 
entry citing FBI electronic communication, Sept. 18, 2001). 

73. For Atta and Shehhi arriving in Virginia, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 3, 2001, 
entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302-61 5, 688, 896, 898). For Hazmi and Hanjour arriving inVirginia, see ibid. (Apr. 
4, 2001 , entry citing 265A-NY-280350-NH, serial 1859). For their attendance at the Dar al Hijra mosque, see FBI 
electronic communication, request for interviews, Aug. 6, 2002. 

74. For Aulaqi moving to Virginia, see FBI electronic communication, analysis related to Penttbom investiga- 
tion, Oct. 23, 2001. For his denial of contacts with Hazmi and Hanjour, see FBI report of investigation, interview 
of Anwar Aulaqi, Sept. 17, 2001. 

75. The apartment was already occupied by two other individuals. The al Qaeda operatives spent little time 
with their roommates, but did mention at one point that they had considered going to Afghanistan for jihad. FBI 
report of investigation, interview of Ahmad Ahmad, Oct. 4, 2002. For Hazmi and Hanjour meeting Rababah, see 
FBI electronic communication, request for interviews of certain individuals, Aug. 6, 2002. For Rababah seeking 
work at the mosque, his meeting them, and his assistance in finding them an apartment, see FBI report of investi- 
gation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002. For Hazmi and Hanjour renting the apartment, see FBI report 
of investigation, interview of Derar Mohammed Saleh, Jan. 16, 2003. 

76. For FBI agents' suspicions, see Jim B. interview (Nov. 6, 2003). Rababah was reluctant to admit meeting 
the hijackers at the mosque and initially told a story about meeting them for the first time at a store. Rababah attrib- 
uted his initial prevarication to wanting to protect the mosque from anti-Arab sentiment following September 1 1 . 
FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002; Robert B. interview (Nov. 6, 2003). For 
Rababah's deportation, see Peter A. interview (Oct. 10, 2003). 

77. FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah. [une I 0, 2< )()2. 

78. For Rababah going to the apartment and finding new roommates, see FBI report of investigation, inter- 
view of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002. For the trips to Connecticut and Newjersey, see FBI report, "Hijackers 
Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (May 8, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-NH, serial 1859); FBI electronic commu- 
nication, summary of Penttbom investigation, June 3, 2002. For the telephone calls, see FBI report,"Hijackers Time- 
line," Dec. 5, 2003 (May 8, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-NH, serial 1859). For return to Connecticut and 
Rababah not seeing the hijackers again, see ibid. (May 10, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-NH, serial 1859); 
FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10,2002. 

79. For the apartment rental in Newjersey, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 
10, 2002; FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (May 21, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, seri- 
als 25453, 25445). For the landlord finding six people, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Jimi Nouri, 
Sept. 19, 2001. Although no specific evidence places Omari in the apartment, the muscle hijackers based in New 
Jersey likely lived together, as they apparently conducted other activities joindy, such as obtaining identification 
cards. See, e.g., FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (July 1, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-FD- 
302, serials 4718, 11815,20900,21529). 

80. For Atta's renting the apartment, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY- 



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524 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 

280350-302, serial 381; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serial 3817). For Shehhi's presence in Florida, see, e.g., ibid. (Apr. 
13, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 17575). 

81. For Shehhi's ticket purchase, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 13, 2001, entry cit- 
ing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 17575; Apr. 18,2001 entry citing 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 1928; 265A-NY- 
280350-302, serial 16379;Apr. 19, 2001, entry citing CIA report; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 17575). For Shehhi's 
visit with Atta's father, see ibid. (Apr. 20, 2001, entry citing CIA report). For Atta having license during April 26, 
2001, traffic stop and Shehhi spending two weeks abroad, see ibid, (citing 265A-NY-280350-MM, serial 2746; May 
2,2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 16379; 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 1928); FBI Pentfbom time- 
line briefing (Dec. 10-11, 2003). 

82. For Shehhi's return, see INS record, NIIS record of Shehhi, May 2, 2001. For Atta and Jar rah obtaining 
driver's licenses, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5,2003 (May 2, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350- 
MM, serial 59). Also on May 2, Atta and two unidentified companions appeared at the Miami District Immigra- 
tion Office, where an inspector reduced Atta's authorized length of stay by two months, correcting the mistake 
made back in January. Interview of inspector (Mar. 25, 2004). 

83. For a description of the muscle hijackers, see CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, 
pp. 34-52. 

84. On Banihammad, see CIA analytic report, "Facilitating Disaster: An Overview of 1 1 September Finance," 
CTC 2002-40093H, Aug. 22, 2002, p. 4 

85. Intelligence reports, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July 17, 2002; Saudi Arabian 
Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003) (disclosing that two of the muscle hijackers had married shortly before joining 
the plot and only one,Wail al Shehn, was employed, as a physical education teacher). 

86. CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 25. 
87. Ibid. 

88. Ibid., p. 26. 

89. Ibid., p. 25. On Nawaf's efforts on behalf of his brother, see CIA analytic report, "Afghanistan Camps Cen- 
tral to 11 September Plot: Can al-Qa'ida Train on the Run?" CTC 2003-40071CH, June 20, 2003, p. 1; Intelli- 
gence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 18, 2001. 

90. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogations of KSM 
and another detainee, Feb. IS. 2<)04; Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Feb. 19, 2004; Intelli- 
gence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 18, 2004. 

91. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan 7, 2004. Khallad agrees about the recruit pool, but also argues 
that operatives' ethnicity was important for symbolic reasons, citing the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy bomb- 
ings and the planes operation as examples. In the planes operation, Khallad notes, Bin Ladin selected operatives 
from Mecca (Mihdhar and the Hazmi brothers) and would have used more had they been available. Moreover, with 
respect to the remaining Saudi muscle hijackers, Khallad claims Bin Ladin chose them because he wanted the 9/11 
attacks to resound across Saudi Arabia, especially among the southern tribes and those of the hijackers themselves. 
According to Khallad, Bin Ladin wanted operatives from strong tribal areas of Saudi Arabia and chose two Saudi 
brothers from the al Shehn tribe, of which their father was a leader. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, 
Feb. 18, 2004. 

92. CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, pp. 24, 26. According to Saudi authorities, 
none of the hijackers had any record of extremist activity, but Satam al Suqami and Salem al Hazmi both had minor 
criminal offense records. Saudi Arabian Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003). 

93. CIA analytic report, "Afghanistan Camps Central to 1 1 September Plot," June 20, 2003, pp. 1—2. 

94. For trainer's comments, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 8, 2002. For Omari's, 
Ghamdi's, and Shehn 's backgrounds, see CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the PI otters," June 1, 2003, p. 27; Intel- 
ligence reports, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001;July 17, 2002. 

95. CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 26; Intelligence reports, interviews of Saudi 
hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July 17, 2002. According to Saudi authorities, a substantial number of the hijack- 
ers isolated themselves and became religious only "within a few months of leaving the Kingdom. All but Ahmad 
al Haznawi, who called his aunt to inquire about his sick mother, ceased contact with their families about six months 
before the attacks. Saudi Arabian Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003). 

96. CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 26; Intelligence reports, interviews of Saudi 
hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July, 17, 2002. 

97. On Khattab, see CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 26, n. 2. For KSM's claim, 
see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15, 2003. For difficulties traveling to Chechnya, see also Saudi 
Arabian Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003). 

98. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Sept. 5, 2003; Mar. 26, 2004;Jan. 8, 2004; Jan. 7, 2004. Khal- 
lad claims he also encouraged Salem al Hazmi to participate in a suicide operation. Intelligence report, interroga- 
tion of Khallad, Apr. 13,2004. 

99. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 15, 2003;Jan. 9, 2004; Oct. 21, 2003. KSM does acknowl- 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 525 

edge that the commander of al Faruq training camp was known to urge trainees to swear bayat. Moreover, peer 
pressure certainly appears to have been a factor in swaying recruits to choose "martyrdom." Intelligence report, 
interrogation of KSM,Apr. 30, 2004. 

100. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Jan. 
8, 2004. 

101. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 1 8, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 
7, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 8, 2003. 

102. CIA analytic report, "Afghanistan Camps Central to 1 1 September Plot," June 20, 2003, pp. 2—3. 

103. Ibid., p. 8; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15,2003. 

104. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 15, 2003;Jan. 9, 2004;Apr. 2, 2004; Intelligence report, 
interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 13, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 14, 2004. For descrip- 
tion of martyrdom video filming, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 21, 2004. 

105. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 13, 2004; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, 
Aug. 20, 2003; Apr. 13, 2004; Apr. 5, 2004; Apr. 3, 2004. 

Dates of U.S. visas obtained in 2000: Ahmed al Ghamdi (September 3), Saeed al Ghamdi (September 4), Hamza 
al Ghamdi (October 17), Mohand al Shehri (October 23),Wail andWaleed al Shehri (October 24), Ahmed al Nami 
(October 28), Ahmad al Haznawi (November 12), Majed Moqed (November 20), and Satam al Suqami (Novem- 
ber 21). Five Saudi muscle hijackers obtained visas in 2001: Ahmed al Nami (April 23), Saeed al Ghamdi (June 
12),Khalid al Mihdhar (June 13), Abdul Aziz Omari (June 18) and Salem al Hazmi (June 20). For Nami, Ghamdi, 
and Mihdhar, this was their second visa, and each applied using a new passport. Banihammad, the only non-Saudi 
muscle hijacker, also obtained his visa much later than most of the Saudi muscle hijackers, on June 18, 2001. See 
Commission analysis of DOS records; CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters "June 1, 2003, p. 5 5. Accord- 
ing to KSM, the three hijackers who obtained their first visas much later than the others were not replacements 
for unsuccessful candidates. KSM simply wanted to get as many hijackers into the United States as possible to 
enhance the odds for success, even if each flight ended up with as many as six or seven. Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. 

106. Only the passports of Satam al Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari were recovered after 9/1 l.Both had been 
doctored. According to KSM, two hijacker passports were damaged in the doctoring process. These may have 
belonged to Saeed al Ghamdi and Ahmed al Nami, as both acquired new passports and new U.S. visas, although 
the old visas were still valid. Of the hijacker visa applications we were able to review, all were incomplete. Tourist 
visas were granted anyway. On obtaining "clean" passports and the two damaged passports, see Intelligence reports, 
interrogations of KSM, July 3, 2003; Sept. 9, 2003. Wail and Waleed al Shehri had a family member in the Saudi 
passport office who provided them with new passports for their trip to the United States. See CIA analytic report, 
Al Qaeda Travel Issues, CTC 2004-40002H,Jan. 2004, p. 12. 

107. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khali, id. Apr. 5, 2< )(>4; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 
20, 2004. The candidate operatives were 

1. Muhammad Mani Ahmad al Kahtani. Currently in custody, he is the last known Saudi mus- 
cle candidate to be sent to the United States, in early August 2001, to round out the number of hijackers. 
As discussed later in this chapter, he was refused entry. Secretary of Defense interview "with David Frost 
(BBC), June 27, 2004, available at www.defenserink.mil. CIA analytic report, "Threat Threads: Recent 
Advances in Understanding 11 September," CTC 2002-30086CH, Sept. 16, 2002, p. 4; Intelligence report, 
interrogation of KSM, July 3, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 3, 2003. 

2. Khalid Saeed Ahmad al Zahrani. He traveled to Afghanistan illegally after being prohibited by 
Saudi authorities from leaving Saudi Arabia. After being assigned to a mission in the U.S., he secretly reen- 
tered the Kingdom but failed in an attempt to have his name removed from the list of prohibited travel- 
ers so that he could obtain a U.S. visa. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Apr. 20, 2002; 
Oct. 4, 2002; Apr. 3, 2003. 

3. Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi. (aka Abu Bakr al Azdi) He reportedly was to have 
been part of the planes operation but was held in reserve by Bin Ladin for a later, even larger operation. 
Like other muscle hijackers, he reportedly set out for Chechnya but diverted to Afghanistan. See Intelli- 
gence reports, interrogations of Abu Bakr al Azdi, July 23, 2003; Sept. 25, 2003; Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003. 

4 and 5. Saeed al Baluchi and Qutaybah al Najdi. Both were sent to Saudi Arabia via Bahrain, 
where Najdi was stopped and briefly questioned by airport security officials. Both were so frightened by 
the experience that they withdrew from the operation. KSM urged Baluchi to obtain a U.S. visa, but 
Baluchi refused, fearing that he might be watchlisted at the U.S. embassy. See Intelligence report, interro- 
gation of Khallad, July 9, 2003; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Mar. 27, 2003;July 3, 2003; 
Feb. 20, 2004. 

6. Zuhair al Thubaiti: He has reportedly admitted membership in al Qaeda, stating "proudly" that 



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526 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 



he "was among a select number of operatives "who had the personal endorsement of Bin Ladin. He was not 
ultimately selected for the 9/11 attacks because the al Qaeda leadership considered him too high-strung 
and lacking the necessary temperament. CIA analytic report, "Threat Threads," Sept. 16, 2002, p. 3; Intel- 
ligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 21 , 2002 June 1 7, 21.102 June 20, 2002; Intelligence reports, 
interrogations of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004 (two reports). 

7. Saeed Abdullah Saeed ("Jihad") al Ghamdi. He arranged to travel to Afghanistan in March 
2000, swore allegiance to Bin Ladin (agreeing to serve as a suicide operative), and was sent to Saudi Ara- 
bia by KSM with 9/11 hijacker Ahmad al Haznawi to obtain a U.S. visa, but his visa application was denied 
because he appeared to be intending to immigrate. DOS record, Ghamdi visa application, Nov. 13, 2000. 
CIA analytic report, "Threat Threads," Sept. 16, 2002, p. 4; Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, 
Apr. 11, 2002; Sept. 1 1, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. 

8. Saud al Rashid. Describing him as headstrong and immature, KSM says he disappeared after being 
sent to Saudi Arabia for a U.S. visa, either because he had second thoughts or because his family interceded 
and confiscated his passport. Passport photos of Rashid and three 9/11 hijackers — Nawaf al Hazmi, Mih- 
dhar, and Oman — were found together during a May 2002 raid in Karachi. After discovery of the photos 
in 2002, Rashid turned himself in to the Saudi authorities, but he has since been released from custody. 
In a Commission interview, he has admitted training in Afghanistan but denies hearing of al Qaeda before 
returning from Afghanistan or meeting Bin Ladin, KSM, or any 9/11 hijacker other than Ahmad al Haz- 
nawi, whom he claims seeing only once or twice at a guesthouse. He has no credible explanation why 
photos of him were found with those of three other hijackers, or why others identified him as a candidate 
hijacker. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 27, 2003;June 1 1, 2003 July 3, 2003; Feb. 20, 
2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khalladjuly 9, 2003; Saud al Rashid interview (Feb. 24, 2004). 

9. Mushabib al Hanilan. Sent to Saudi Arabia to acquire a U.S. visa, he and his travel companion, 
9/11 hijacker Ahmed al Nami, both applied for and received visas on October 28, 2000. Hanilan never 
returned to Afghanistan, probably dropping out either because he changed his mind or because his fam- 
ily intervened. 

In December 1999, while still in high school in Saudi Arabia, Hanilan became involved with a group 
that gathered periodically to watch jihad propaganda tapes, and was encouraged by a mentor named Ban- 
dar Marui to pursue jihad, especially as practiced in the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Russian-Afghan wars 
and a book titled Gladiator of Passion. As instructed, Hanilan acquired a passport, on February 15, 2000, and 
agreed to go to Afghanistan after the hajj in mid-March 2000. He and two travel companions obtained 
Pakistani visas in Sharjah, UAE, and traveled to Islamabad, where al Qaeda facilitator Hassan Ghul took 
them to a guesthouse managed by Abu Zubaydah. Days later, two men helped Hanilan cross the Pakistan- 
Afghanistan border. 

At the Khaldan camp, Hanilan received military training courses. Upon hearing that the camp was to 
be closed, he and others traveled to al Faruq camp near Kandahar, where they received more training. He 
also met and proclaimed allegiance to Bin Ladin at this time. Injured during a further training session, 
Hanilan was assigned to guard the airport, where he met future hijacker Ahmed al Nami (whose recent 
laser eye surgery had interrupted his training). An individual named Abu Basir al Yemeni indoctrinated the 
two in Bm Ladin s anti-US. position and extolled the virtues of martyrdom. Hanilan and Nami eventu- 
ally agreed to approach Abu Hafs al Mauritani about participating m a suicide operation.The day after vis- 
iting Abu Hafs, Hanilan and Nami heard from Abu Basir that Bin Ladin was planning an attack against the 
United States. After taking their passports, Abu Basir arranged for Hanilan and Nami to meet Bin Ladin 
and instructed them to use the following phrase to express their desire to become martyrs: "I want to be 
one of this religions bricks and glorify this religion."The al Qaeda leader accepted both applicants. 

In October 2000, Abu Basir took Hanilan and Nami to Kandahar to meet KSM, who impressed on 
them the high expectations for martyrs and instructed them on using coded telephone numbers. He 
returned their passports, which had been altered and now contained forged tourism stamps for Singapore, 
iVLihiysia, Turkey, and Egypt. KSM told them to meet with Atef before returning to Saudi Arabia, where 
they should contact hijacker future 9/11 hijacker Waleed al Shehri for additional documentation. 

After meeting with Atef, Hamlan and Nami traveled by car and by air to an address KSM had given 
them inTehran, "where arrangements were made for them to fly to Qatar. From Qatar they traveled onward 
to the UAE and then to Mecca. Nami contacted KSM and received coded instructions to go to Jeddah, 
call Waleed al Shehri, and obtain visas at the U.S. consulate. In Jeddah, they briefly shared an apartment 
with Shehri, who provided them with directions to the consulate and showed them how to fill out the 
visa application. After acquiring visas, Hamlan and Nami presented their passports to Shehri for inspec- 
tion and returned to Mecca. Nami called KSM, who told them to return to Afghanistan the next day. 

Despite instructions to the contrary, Hamlan insisted on calling his family before leaving Saudi Ara- 
bia because he had begun to have second thoughts after acquiring the visa. Told by his brother that their 
mother had fallen ill. Hamlan decided not to return to Afghanistan even after Nami reminded him of his 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 527 

allegiance to Bin Ladin and commitment to complete the suicide mission. In Riyadh, he told his broth- 
ers that he had been on jihad in Chechnya. Fearing that they might ask for his passport, he removed the 
U.S. visa — as later confirmed by forensic analysis performed by Saudi authorities. Hamlan returned to col- 
lege and resumed living with his parents, who confiscated his passport. 

Thereafter, Hamlan received a visit at the college from a former associate at al Faruq camp, Khalid 
al Zahrani, who asked why he had not returned to Afghanistan. Zahrani admitted having been sent by 
KSM to convince Hamlan to return to Afghanistan. Hamlan never did. Intelligence report, interrogation 
of detainee, Mar. 16, 2003. 

10. Abderraouf Jdey, a.k.a. Faruq al Tunisi. A Canadian passport holder, he may have trained in 
Afghanistan with Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi and received instruction from KSM with Atta 
and Binalshibh. A letter recovered from a safehouse in Pakistan, apparently written by Sayf al Adl, also sug- 
gests that Jdey was initially part of the 9/11 operation at the same time as the Hamburg group.A video- 
tape of Jdey's martyrdom statement was found in the rubble of Atef's house near Kabul following a 
November 2001 airstrike, together with a martyrdom video of Binalshibh. While both Binalshibh and 
Khallad confirm Jdey's status as an al Qaeda recruit, KSM saysjdey was slated for a "second wave" of attacks 
but had dropped out by the summer of 2001 while in Canada. FBI briefing (June 24, 2004}; Intelligence 
report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 21, 
2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 1, 2003. 

108. On the few operatives fully aware of the plot and Abu Turab's training, see Intelligence report, interroga- 
tion of KSM, Feb. 23, 2004. Abu Turab was the son-in-law of Ayman al Zawahiri. Intelligence report, interrogation 
of Zubaydah, Feb. 18, 2004. KSM also taught the muscle hijackers English and provided lessons about airplanes. 
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. Binalshibh also has discussed this training in post-capture 
statements, describing it as hand-to-hand combat training. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Jan. 8, 
2004. According to Binalshibh, after returning to Afghanistan, muscle hijacker recruits fought on the front lines 
alongside the Taliban and participated in the March 2001 destruction of the giant Buddha statues in Bamian 
Province, Afghanistan. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Mar. 31, 2004. 

109. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 23, 2004. According to KSM, the muscle hijackers learned 
about the specific targets and the Atta's completed operational plan only in late August. Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. 

1 10. On the facilitator's comments, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Sept. 14, 2002; Oct. 3, 
2002; May 5, 2003 (two reports), in which he claims also to have assisted the Hamburg pilots and Binalshibh. On 
KSM's funding of the hijackers, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 15, 2004;July 25, 2003. 

111. On Ali's role and the transit of the hijackers, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 12, 
2004. According to the detainee, the operatives arrived with their own money to buy plane tickets and anything 
else they needed. Ali referred them to places where they could obtain travelers checks. He also helped Ahmed al 
Ghamdi, one of the earliest operatives to transit Dubai, acquire a mobile phone account so that the operatives could 
use that number as a travel agency point of contact. Ibid. 

1 12. In May 2001, however, All asked KSM to participate in a suicide mission and offered to travel to the United 
States and assist the operatives there. As discussed in a set ofAtta-Binalshibh exchanges inAugust 2001, Ali (referred 
to by the nickname "Losh") appears to have contacted Atta and expressed the desire to join the operation. Ali actu- 
ally applied for a U.S. visa on August 27, 2001, listing his intended arrival date as September 4 for a one-week stay. 
His application was denied because he appeared to be an economic immigrant. DOS record, visa application of Ali 
Abdul Aziz Ali, Aug. 27, 2001 . Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Nov. 1 7, 2003; Intelligence report, doc- 
uments captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003; CIA notes, "DRG Research Notes," Jan. 17, 2004; FBI report, "Sum- 
mary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 72. 

113. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 6, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004. See also Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. Hawsawi's role as financial facilitator appears to have begun when he and 
hijacker Banihammad opened bank accounts at the same UAE bank while Banihammad was his way to the United 
States. Banihammad, who "was from the UAE, was familiar with the country's procedures and helped Hawsawi com- 
plete his account application. Banihammad gave Hawsawi roughly $3,000 and granted him power of attorney over 
his account so that Hawsawi could forward the bank card to him in the United States. After Banihammad arrived 
in the United States, Hawsawi deposited $4,900 into the account. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investiga- 
tion," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 29. 

114. All but 2 of the 15 muscle hijackers were admitted as tourists, affording a six-month stay in the United 
States (except in the case of Mihdhar, who received four months). The first pair to arrive were Waleed al Shehri 
(Flight 11) and Satam al Suqami (Flight 11), "who flew from the UAE to London and arrived in Orlando on April 
23, 2001, where Atta most likely met them. Suqami "was admitted as a business visitor, allowing him only a one- 
month stay and thus making him an illegal overstay by May 21, 2001. INS records, NIIS records ofWaleed al Shehri 
and Satam al Suqami, Apr. 23, 2001. Suqami was the only hijacker not to obtain a U.S. identification document. 



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528 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 

Shehri and another individual (presumably Suqami) settled in Hollywood, Florida, moving into a motel on April 
30. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing London EC, serial 2236; 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 
7134; 315N-NY-280350, serial 8082). 

The next set,Ahmed al Ghamdi (Flight 175) and Moqed (Flight 77), arrived at Dulles Airport on May 2, 2001, 
on a flight from London originating in Dubai. INS records, NIIS records of Ghamdi and Moqed, May 2, 2001. 
Although Customs declarations of the two indicate that Moqed claimed to be carrying more than $10,000, the 
Customs Service generated no report of this event. Both Ghamdi and Moqed gave the Hyatt Hotel in Washing- 
ton as their intended destination, but instead moved into the apartment in Alexandria, Virginia, that Nawaf al Hazmi 
and Hani Hanjour had rented. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing flight manifest and Customs 
records, referenced in 265A-NY-280350, serial 2746; 265A-NY-280359-RY, serial 5; 265A-NY-280350-302, New 
Hampshire ECs dated Sept. 28, 2001, Sept. 29, 2001; 265A-NY-280350, serial 9776; 265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 
5151; 265A-NY-280350-302). 

Hamza al Ghamdi (Flight 175), Mohand al Shehri (Flight 175), and Ahmed al Nami (Flight 93) arrived in 
Miami on May 28, 2001. INS records, NIIS records of Hamza al Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami, 
May 28, 2001. The three had taken a flight from London after starting out in Dubai. Atta probably picked up the 
group at the airport, having rented a Ford Explorer for the day. Shehri and Nami gave the Sheraton in Miami as 
their intended destination, but do not appear to have stayed there. Marwan al Shehhi helped them settle in Florida. 
Within a few days, Shehhi found the group an apartment in Delray Beach, Florida. FBI report, "Hijackers Time- 
line," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 2851; 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 1928; 265A-NY- 
280350-NK, serial 2851; 265A-NY-280350-DL, serial 1778; 265A-NY-280350-DL, 838; 265D-NY-280350-A, 
serial 16; 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 2851; 265A-NY-280350-MM-302, serial 11703). 

Haznawi (Flight 93) and Wail al Shehri (Flight 1 1) arrived m Miami from London on June 8, 2001 using the 
same route as the previous three. INS records, NIIS records of Haznawi and Wail al Shehri (June 8,2001). FBI report, 
"HijackersTimehne," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-RY, serial 5). 

Saeed al Ghamdi (Flight 93) and Banihammad (Flight 175) arrived in Orlando from London on June 27, 2001. 
INS records, NIIS records of Saeed al Ghamdi and Banihammad, June 27, 2001. Saeed al Ghamdi was questioned 
by immigration authorities as a possible intending immigrant, as he spoke little English, had no return ticket, and 
listed no address on his arrival record. INS record, inspection results for Ghamdi, June 27, 2001; primary inspector 
interview (Mar. 17, 2004); secondary inspector interview (Apr. 19, 2004). Ghamdi and Banihammad presumably 
stayed with the hijackers who preceded them or with Atta and Shehhi in the Hollywood, Florida, apartment. Post- 
9/1 1 investigation revealed that during this time period Atta and Shehhi also checked into hotels or rented apart- 
ments with unidentified males, probably the newly arrived muscle hijackers. FBI report, "HijackersTimehne," Dec. 
5,2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-302-19615; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serial 3255; 265A-NY-280350-MM-302, 
serial 34927; 265A-NY-280350-MM-Sub, serial 3255; 265A-NY-280350-RY, serial 5; 265A-NY-280350-MM- 
302, serial 34927; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serials 48418, 2374, 4449, 4696; 265A-NY-280350, serials 925, 449, 
18695). 

The remaining hijackers entered the United States through New York. Salem al Hazmi (Flight 77) and Omari 
(Flight 11) arrived at JFK on June 29, 2001, from Dubai with a connection in Zurich. INS records, arrival records 
of Salem al Hazmi and Omari, June 29, 2001. They likely were picked up by Salem's older brother Nawaf- — who 
was then living in Paterson, New Jersey, with Hani Hanjour — the following day, for on June 30, Nawaf had a minor 
car accident traveling eastbound on the George Washington Bridge, toward JFK. FBI report, "HijackersTimehne," 
Dec. 5, 2003 (citing Bern EC Sept. 15, 2001; INS NIIS report; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134; 265A-NY- 
280350-HQ, serial 11297; Bern EC (Oman PNR, Swiss Air); 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 60839). On Salem al 
Hazmi in the Paterson apartment, see FBI report of investigation, interview ofjimi Nouri, Oct. 6, 2001, p. 5. 

115. FBI report, "Summary ofPenttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 29— 41; Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 
12,2004). 

116. In some cases, bank employees completed the Social Security number fields on the new account appli- 
cation with a hijacker's date of birth or visa control number, but did so on their own to complete the form. Adam 
Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004). Contrary to persistent media reports, no financial institution filed a Suspicious 
Activity Report (SAR) — which U.S. law requires banks to file within 30 days of a suspicious transaction — with 
respect to any transaction of any of 19 hijackers before 9/11. A number ofbanks did file SARs after 9/11, "when 
the hijackers' names became public. Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004) James Sloan interview (Nov. 14, 2003). 
Nor should SARs have been filed. The hijackers' transactions themselves were not extraordinary or remarkable. See 
Commission analysis of financial transactions; Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Dennis Lormel interview 
(Jan. 16,2004). 

117. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Mar. 26, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, 
May 19,2003. 

118. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Nov. 27, 2001; Feb. 5, 2002. 

119. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-DL, serial 2812; 315N-NY- 
280350-302, serial 21529; 315N-NY-280350-NK, serials 21529, 11815, 4718). 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 529 

120. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Oct. 18, 2001; Mar. 13, 2002; Intelligence report, interro- 
gation of detainee, Mar. 7, 2002; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 20, 2003; Sept. 12, 2003, July 16, 
2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 12, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, 
Sept. 30, 2003; CIA analytic report, "Iran and al-Qa'ida: Ties Forged in Islamic Extremism," CTC 2004- 
40009HCX, March 2004, pp. i, 6-12. 

121. Intelligence report, analysis of Hezbollah, Iran, and 9/11, Dec. 20, 2001; Intelligence report, interrogation 
of Binalshibh, July 16,2004. 

122. Ibid.; Intelligence report, Hezbollah activities, Oct. 1 1, 2001; Intelligence report, operative's travel to Saudi 
Arabia, Aug. 9,2002. 

123. Intelligence reports, hijacker activities, Oct. 11, 2001; Oct. 29, 2001; Nov. 14, 2001; Intelligence report, 
operative's claimed identification ofphotos of two Sept. 11 hijackers, Aug. 9, 2002. 

124. Intelligence reports, hijacker activities, Nov. 14, 2001; Oct. 2, 2001; Oct. 31, 2001. 

125. Intelligence reports, hijacker activities, Oct. 19, 2001; Dec. 7, 2001. 

126. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 16, 2004; Intelligence report; interrogation of Binalshibh, 
July 16,2004. 

127. Intelligence report, analysis of Hezbollah, Iran, and 9/1 1, Dec. 20, 2001. 

128. Intelligence report, Hezbollah and Sunni terrorist activities, Sept. 21, 2001; Intelligence report, Hezbol- 
lah denies involvement in 9/11, Sept. 22, 2001. 

129. For Atta and Shehhi's efforts, see FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 
25-37. 

130. Ibid., pp. 29-41. 

131. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5,2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 12436, 7134); see 
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 15, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, June 9, 
2004. Another example of unusual travel was a trip by Suqami on July 10 from Fort Lauderdale to Orlando; he 
stayed at a hotel in Lake BuenaVista with an unidentified male through July 12. FBI report, "Summary of Pent- 
tbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 31. 

132. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 27063; 315N-NY- 
280350-DL, serial 2245); Commission investigation in Las Vegas. 

133. FBI report, "Summary ofPenttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2001, pp. 41— 44. 

134. FBI letterhead memorandum, profile ofjarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. 

135. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 7228; 315N-NY- 
280350-F, serial 99; 315N-NY-280350-NK, serial 263). Documents from Sawyer Aviation in Phoenix, Arizona, 
show Hanjour joining the flight simulator club on June 23, 2001, with Faisal al Salmi, Rayed Abdullah, and Lotfi 
Raissi. FBI report of investigation, interview ofjennifer Stangel, Sept. 14, 2001. But the documents are inconclu- 
sive, as there are no invoices or payment records for Hanjour, while such documents do exist for the other three. 
FBI memo, Penttbom investigation, Oct. 7, 2001; FBI memo, Penttbom investigation, summary of dispatch sheets, 
Oct. 12, 2001; Don W. and Steve B. interview (Jan. 6, 2004). One Sawyer employee identified Hanjour as being 
there during the time period, though she was less than 100 percent sure. FBI report of investigation, interview of 
Tina Arnold, Oct. 17, 2001. Another "witness identified Hanjour as being "with Salmi in the Phoenix area during 
the summer of 2001. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Lotfi Raissi, Jan. 4, 2004, p. 18. Documentary 
evidence for Hanjour, however, shows that he was in New Jersey for most ofjune, and no travel records have been 
recovered showing that he returned to Arizona after leaving with Hazmi in March. Nevertheless, the FBI's Phoenix 
office believes it plausible that Hanjour returned to Arizona for additional training. FBI electronic communication, 
Penttbom investigation, Feb. 19, 2002. 

136. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002. 

137. CIA cable, communications analysis, Sept. 1 1, 2003. 

138. On Hazmi, see FBI report, "Summary ofPenttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 46. On obtaining photo 
identification, see ibid.; FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 3 1 5N-NY-280350-NK, serial 1243; 
315N-NY-280350-BS, serial 352; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 33059, 64343). 

139. FBI report, "Summary ofPenttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 47. 

140. For Binalshibh moving the muscle hijackers, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, June 9, 
2004. According to Binalshibh, he took each of the muscle hijackers shopping for clothes and set them up "with 
email accounts during their time in Karachi. Ibid. For meeting with Atta and Bin Ladin, see Intelligence reports, 
interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Feb. 18, 2004. Binalshibh has provided inconsistent information about 
who else was present during his meeting with Bin Ladin. In one interview, Binalshibh claimed he attended two 
different meetings, one of "which was attended by Bin Ladin, Atef, KSM, and Abu Turab al Jordani, and the second 
of "which was attended just by Bin Ladin, Atef, and KSM. More recently, however, Binalshibh has mentioned only 
one meeting and has claimed he alone met with Bin Ladin because Atef and KSM "were busy with other matters. 
Compare Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 1 1, 2002, with Intelligence report, interrogation of 
Binalshibh, Feb. 18,2004. 



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530 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 

141. On Binalshibh s meeting with Bin Ladin, Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh,Dec. 1 1, 2002; 
Sept. 24, 2002; Feb. 18, 2004; Apr. 7, 2004. KSM claims that the White House and the Capitol were both accept- 
able targets and had been on the list since the spring of 1999. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 
2004. On Binalshibh's receipt of money, Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 23, 2002; Dec. 1 1, 

2002. In one report, Binalshibh says that Atef provided him with S3, 000; in another he claims it was $5,000. 

142. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Oct. 23, 2002; Dec. 11, 2002. 

143. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Dec. 11, 2002. 

144. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Apr. 8, 2004. 

145. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 48. Intelligence reports, interrogations 
of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Dec. 21 , 2002. Atta had a stopover in Zurich, where he bought two Swiss 
Army knives and withdrew 1,700 Swiss francs from his SunTrust bank account. He may have intended to use the 
knives during the attacks. It is unknown why he withdrew the money. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Inves- 
tigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 47. 

Although U.S. authorities have not uncovered evidence that anyone met 'with Atta or Binalshibh in Spain in 
July 2001, Spanish investigators contend that members of the Spanish al Qaeda cell were involved in the July meet- 
ing and were connected to the 9/11 attacks. In an indictment of the Spanish cell members dated September 17, 

2003, the Spanish government relies on three main points. First is a 1997 trip to the United States by Ghasoub al 
Abrash Ghalyoun, a Syrian living in Spain. During the trip, Ghalyoun videotaped a number of U.S. landmarks, 
including the WorldTrade Center.The Spanish indictment alleges that an al Qaeda courier was in Ghalyoun's town 
in Spain shordy after the trip and that the courier probably delivered the tape to al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan. 
Second, the Spanish government contends that during the relevant time period, an individual named Muhammed 
Belfatmi "was near the town where the Atta-Bmalshibh meeting took place, and that Belfatmi traveled to Karachi 
shortly before September 1 1 on the same flight as Said Bahaji, one of Atta's Hamburg associates, and even stayed at 
the same hotel. Finally, Spanish authorities rely on an intercepted telephone conversation between cell leader Imad 
Eddin Barakat Yarkas and an individual named "Shakur" in August 2001, in which "Shakur" describes himself as 
entering "the field of aviation" and "slitting the throat of the bird." "Shakur" has been identified by Spanish author- 
ities as Farid Hilali. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that other facts will come to light as the Spanish 
case progresses to trial, we have not found evidence that individuals in Spain participated in the July meeting or in 
the 9/11 plot. See Baltasar Garzon interview (Feb. 13, 2004); Indictment, Central Investigating Court No. 5, Madrid, 
Sept. 17, 2003, pp. 151—200, 315—366; Superseding Indictment, Central Investigating Court No. 5, Madrid, April 
28, 2004. 

146. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Apr. 17, 2003. 

147. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Sept. 1 1, 2003; Oct. 1 1, 2003; 
Feb. 18, 2004; Apr. 7, 2004. KSM claims to have assigned the Pentagon specifically to Hanjour, the operation's most 
experienced pilot. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. 

148. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Mar. 7, 2003; Oct. 1 1, 2003. Binalshibh since has denied 
that the term electrical engineering was used to refer to a potential nuclear target despite having said so earlier. Intel- 
ligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 1 1, 2003. KSM has admitted that he considered targeting a nuclear 
power plant as part of his initial proposal for the planes operation. See chapter 5.2. He has also stated that Atta 
included a nuclear plant in his preliminary target list, but that Bin Ladm decided to drop that idea. Intelligence 
report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 12, 2002. 

149. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Feb. 18, 2004. 

1 50. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Apr. 17, 2003. 

151. On Binalshibh's new phones, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 21, 2002. On Binal- 
shibh's call to KSM, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 31, 2003. CIA cable, 
Sept. 10, 2003; CIA report, Directors Review Group, Oct. 2003. 

I 52. Intelligence report, interrogation ot KSM, Oct. 31 , 20( )j; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, 
Nov. 1, 2003. KSM may also have intended to include these documents as part of the historical file he maintained 
about the 9/11 operation. He says the file included letters and email communications among those involved with 
the attacks, but was lost in Afghanistan when he fled after September 1 1. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, 
Oct. 15,2003. 

I 53. intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh. Nov. 1 , 2('( )j; Oct. I 1 , 2(H >3; Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of KSM, Oct. 31, 2002. 

154. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 31, 2002; Dec. 19, 2002; Apr. 17, 2003; Oct. 11, 
2003; Nov. 1, 2003; Intelligence report interrogation of KSM, Sept. 1 1, 2003. 

155. FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom investigation, Mar. 20, 2002, p. 60; FBI report, "Hijackers Time- 
line," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 3 15N-NY-280350-302, serial 20874); Jarrah travel documents (provided by the FBI). 

156. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 11, 2002; Apr. 8, 2004. 

157. According to Binalshibh, Jarrah was not aware of Moussaoui or the wire transfers. Intelligence reports, 



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S 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 531 

interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 1 1, 2002; Apr. 17, 2003. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 
29, 2004 (classified version), pp. 89-90. 

158. FBI report, Moussaoui, Zacarias, a. k.a. Shaqil, Aug. 18, 2001, pp. 7, 11; FBI briefing materials, Penttbom, 
Dec. 10-11, 2003, p. 148 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 98252). 

159. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 90; DOJ Inspector 
General interview ofJohnWeess, Oct. 22, 2002; FBI letterhead memorandum, "Moussaoui, Zacarias," Aug. 31, 2001. 

160. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 2, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 
11,2003. 

161. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 1, 2003;July 8, 2003. In addition to Moussaoui, the two 
al Qaeda operatives identified by KSM as candidates for the second wave of attacks 'were Abderraouf Jdey, a. k.a. 
Faruq alTunisi (a Canadian passport holder, discussed earlier as a candidate hijacker) and Zaini Zakaria, a. k.a. Mussa 
(ajemaah Islamiah member who worked in Hambali's Malaysia stronghold and was directed byAtefto enroll in 
flight training sometime m 2000, according to KSM). Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 8, 2003; Intel- 
ligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Mar. 4, 2004. 

162. Intelligence report, interrogation ofBinalshibh,Apr. 17, 2003. According to Binalshibh, KSM said that the 
operative had been raised and educated in Europe and that his arrest resulted, at least in part, from his having been 
insufficiently discreet. KSM identified this operative as an exception in Bin Ladm's overall record of selecting the 
right people for the 9/11 attacks. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 18,2002. Subsequently, how- 
ever, Binalshibh has sought, somewhat incredibly, to exculpate a host of individuals, including Moussaoui, from com- 
plicity in the 9/11 plot. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh. Apr. 2, 2 Hi )4. 

163. For Binalshibh's claims, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Nov. 7, 2002; Feb. 13, 2003; 
Feb. 27, 2003. On KSM, see intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 2, 2003. 

164. Jar rah returned to the United States on August 5, 2001 . INS record, arrival record ofjarrah, Aug. 5, 2001. 

165. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 14139; Boston elec- 
tronic communication). The communications were recovered from materials seized during the March 2003 cap- 
ture of KSM. For background, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 13, 2002 (two cables); 
Intelligence report, documents captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003. 

166. Intelligence reports, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 12, 2003. Binalshibh, however, has denied that law and 
politics referred to two separate targets; he claims that both terms referred to the U.S. Capitol, even though in the 
context of the exchange it seems clear that two different targets were contemplated. Intelligence report, interroga- 
tions of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003 (two reports). 

167. CIA notes,"DRG Research Notes," Jan. 17, 2004. In another exchange between Atta and Binalshibh on 
September 9 — two days before the attacks — it still appears as though the White House would be the primary tar- 
get for the fourth plane and the U.S. Capitol the alternate. See CIA report, Documents captured with KSM, Sept. 
24,2003. 

168. On the Atta-Binalshibh communication, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 1 1, 2003. 
On Kahtanis attempt to enter the U.S., see INS record, withdrawal of application for admission of Kahtani, Aug. 
4, 2001. For Hawsawi, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 3, 2003. 

169. On Atta's trip to Newark, see FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 50. On 
arrivals in Florida, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2004 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serials 388, 5860; 
315N-NY-280350-BS, serial 294; 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 66933}. On travel to Las Vegas, see ibid, (citing 
315N-NY-280350-LV, send 53299; 315N-NY-280350-302, serial HOJ.Atta's flight from Washmgton,DC, arrived 
in Las Vegas within an hour of Hazmi and Hanjour's arrival. Ibid. The three hijackers stayed in Las Vegas only one 
night, departing on August 14. Ibid, (citing 315N-NY-280350-DL, serial 829; 315N-NY-280350-SD, serial 569; 
315N-NY-280350-302, serial 165970). Detainee interviews have not explained the Las Vegas meeting site. See, 
e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 5, 2003. 

170. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 52—57. Hanjour successfully con- 
ducted a challenging certification flight supervised by an instructor at Congressional Air Charters of Gaithersburg, 
Maryland, landing at a small airport with a difficult approach. The instructor thought Hanjour may have had train- 
ing from a military pilot because he used a terrain recognition system for navigation. Eddie Shalev interview (Apr. 
9, 2004). 

171. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 57— 60. According to Binalshibh, Atta 
deliberately selected morning flights because he anticipated that the most people would be at work then. Intelli- 
gence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, June 3, 2004. 

172. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Dec. 17, 2002; Dec. 21, 2002. 

173. On KSM's receipt of date of attacks, see Intelligence report, interrogations of KSM and Binalshibh, May 
27, 2003. Although Binalshibh also has claimed that he called KSM with the date after receiving the information 
from Atta, KSM insists that he learned of the date m a letter delivered by Essabar, and that it would have been a 
serious breach of communications security to communicate the date over the phone. Intelligence reports, interro- 
gations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Dec. 17, 2002. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. Most 



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532 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 

recently, Binalshibh has claimed that he neither called nor sent a letter to KSM, but rather passed a verbal message 
via Essabar. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Apr. 8, 2004. On Binalshibh's communication to Ess- 
abar, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 17, 2002; Nov. 6, 2003; Apr. 8, 2004. 

174. On Binalshibh's travel, see FBI report,"Summary ofPenttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified ver- 
sion), p. 84. On Binalshibh's communication with Atta, see Intelligence report, Documents captured with KSM, 
Sept. 24, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 1 1, 2003. On Atta 's call to his father, see Intel- 
ligence report, re Atta, Sept. 13, 2001. On Jarrah's letter, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, 
July 18, 2002, p. 67. 

175. Shortly after 9/1 1, Abdullah told at least one witness that the FBI was asking questions about his having 
received a phone a call from Hazmi in August. FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001. In ajuly 2002 
FBI interview, Abdullah asked whether the FBI had taped the call. FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar 
Abdullah, July 23, 2002. Also on possibility of Hazmi-Abdullah contact shortly before 9/11, see Danny G. inter- 
views (Nov. 18, 2003; May 24, 2004). On the change inAbdullah's mood, see FBI report of investigation, interview 
of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2001. On the sudden interest ofAbdullah and Salmi in proceeding with marriage 
plans, see FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Samir 
Abdoun, Oct. 21, 2001. On anticipated law enforcement interest in gas station employees and September 10, 2001, 
meeting, see FBI report of investigation, interview, May 21, 2002. 

176. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 5, 2002. 

177. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 14, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004. 

178. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 3, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Apr. 3, 2004. 

179. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Nov. 27, 2001; Feb. 5, 2002. Intelligence report, interroga- 
tion of detainee, May 30, 2002. 

180. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, June 
27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 5, 2002. KSM also says that he and Atef were so con- 
cerned about this lack of discretion that they urged Bin Ladm not to make any additional remarks about the plot. 
According to KSM, only Bin Ladm, Atef, Abu Turab al Jordani, Binalshibh, and a few of the senior hijackers knew 
the specific targets, timing, operatives, and methods of attack. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct. 27, 
20(13; Feb. 23, 2004. Indeed, it was not until midsummer that Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman al Zawahiri 
learned of the operation, and only after his group had cemented its alliance with al Qaeda and Zawahiri had become 
Bin Ladm's deputy. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. 

181. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 24, 2003. 

182. On Omar's opposition, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, May 30, 2002, in which the 
detainee says that when Bin Ladm returned after the general alert during July, he spoke to his confidants about 
Omar's unwillingness to allow an attack against the United States to originate from Afghanistan. See also Intelli- 
gence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 27, 2003. There is some discrepancy about the position of Zawahiri. 
According to KSM, Zawahiri believed in following the injunction of Mullah Omar not to attack the United States; 
other detainees, however, have said that Zawahiri was squarely behind Bin Ladm. Intelligence report, interrogation 
of detainee, fune 2( I, 20! i2; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, [line 27, 20! i3: Intelligence report, interro- 
gation of KSM, Sept. 26, 2003. 

183. Intelligence report, interrogation ot KSM, Jan. 9, 2004; Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, 
June 27, 2003; Dec. 26, 2003. On Abu Hafs's views, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 7, 2003. 

184. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct. 27, 2003; Sept. 27, 2003, in which KSM also says Bin 
Ladin had sworn bayat to Omar upon first moving to Afghanistan, following the Shura Council's advice. KSM claims 
he would have disobeyed even had the council ordered Bin Ladin to cancel the operation. Intelligence report, inter- 
rogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. 

185. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 24, 2003. 

186. Abdul Faheem Khan interview (Oct. 23, 2003); see also Arif Sarwari interview (Oct. 23, 2003). 

187. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 8, 2003; July 24, 2003. 

188. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serial 31 12; Western Union 
records; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 28398, 37864). In addition, Nawaf al Hazmi attempted to send Hawsawi 
the debit card for Mihdhar's bank account, which still contained approximately SI 0,000. The package containing 
the card was intercepted after the FBI found the Express Mail receipt for it in Hazmi's car at Dulles Airport on 
9/11. FBI report, "Summary ofPenttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 61. 

189. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-WF; serial 64; 315N-NY- 
280350-BA, serials 273, 931, 628; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 10092, 17495). 

190. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serials 6307, 9739). In the early 
morning hours of September 1 1, Jarrah made one final call to Senguen from his hotel. FBI report,"Hijackers Time- 
line," Dec. 5, 2003. The conversation was brief and, according to Senguen, not unusual. FBI electronic communi- 
cation, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 18, 2001, pp. 5—6. 

191. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-FD-302; 315N-NY-280350- 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 533 

SD, serial 1522; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 16597, 5029, 6072, 1 1098, 1 1 1 14, 1 1 133, 41 19; 315N-NY-280350- 
BS, serials 349, 19106, 16624; 315N-NY-280350-CD, serial 373; 315N-NY-280350, serials 7441, 21340; 315N- 
NY-280350-AT, serial 135). There have been many speculations about "why Atta scheduled the Portland flight. 
Although he may have believed that security was more relaxed at the smaller airport, he and Omari had to pass 
through security again at Logan. Ibid, (citing 315N-NY-280350-BS, serial 2909). Interrogation of detainees has 
produced no solid explanation for the trip. See, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Mar. 3, 2004. 
192. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serial 2268; 315N-NY-280350- 
302, serials 32036, 9873; 315N-NY-280350-LO, serial 2). 

8 "The System Was Blinking Red" 

I. Beginning in December 1999, these briefings were conducted based on slides created by the CIA's Bin Ladin 
unit. See Richard interview (Dec. 1 1, 2003). We were able to review the slides to identify the subjects of the respec- 
tive briefings. 

2. The exact number of persons who receive the PDB varies by administration. In the Clinton administration, 
up to 25 people received the PDB. In the Bush administration, distribution in the pre-9/11 time period was lim- 
ited to six people. The Commission received access to about four years of articles from the PDB related to Bin 
Ladin, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and key countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, including all the 
Commission requested. The White House declined to permit all commissioners to review these sensitive docu- 
ments.The Commission selected four representatives — the Chair, the Vice Chair, Commissioner Gorelick, and the 
Executive Director — as its review team. All four reviewed all of the more than 300 relevant articles. Commissioner 
Gorelick and the Executive Director prepared a detailed summary, reviewed by the White House for constitutional 
and especially sensitive classification concerns, that was then made available to all Commissioners and designated 
staff. Except for the August 6, 2001, PDB article, the summary could not include verbatim quotations, for exam- 
ple the titles of the articles, but could paraphrase the substance. Two of the articles — the December 4, 1998, hijack- 
ing article (in chapter 4) and the August 6, 2001, article discussing Bin Ladin s plans to attack in the United States 
(in this chapter) — were eventually declassified. 

3. The CIA produced to the Commission all SEIB articles relating to al Qaeda, Bin Ladin, and other subjects 
identified by the Commission as being relevant to its mission from January 1998 through September 20, 2001. 

4. See CIA, SEIB, "Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing," Feb. 6, 2001; CIA cable, "Intelligence Community Ter- 
rorist Threat Advisory," Mar. 30, 2001. 

5. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice, Briefing on Pennsylvania Avenue, Mar. 23, 2001. 

6. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Terrorism Update, Mar. 30, 2001; NSC email, Clarke to Rice, 
Terrorist Threat Warning, Apr. 10, 2001. 

7. See FBI electronic communication, heightened threat advisory, Apr. 13, 2001. 

8. See NSC email, Cressey to Rice and HadleyThreat Update, Apr. 19, 2001; CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Planning 
Multiple Operations," Apr. 20, 2001; NSC memo, Clarke for Hadley, "Briefing Notes for al Qida Meeting," undated 
(appears to be from April 2001). 

9. For threats, see CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attack," May 3, 2001; CIA, SEIB, "Bin 
Ladin Network's Plans Advancing," May 26, 2001; FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update, 
ITOS Threat Update Webpage, May 7, 2001 (the walk-in's claim was later discredited). For Attorney General brief- 
ing, see CIA briefing materials, "Briefing for the Attorney General, 15 May 2001, Al-Qa'ida," undated. For more 
threats and CSG discussion, see Intelligence report,Threat Report, May 16, 2001; NSC memo, CSG agenda, May 
17,2001. 

10. See CIA, SEIB, "Terrorist Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plot," May 23, 2001; FAA informa- 
tion circular,"PossibleTerroristThreat Against American Citizens," IC-2001-08,June 22, 2001 (this IC expired on 
August 22, 2001); CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Network's Plans Advancing," May 26, 2001; NSC email, Clarke to Rice 
and Hadley, "A day in the life of Terrorism intelligence," May 24, 2001. 

II. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Stopping Abu Zubaydah's attacks, May 29, 2001. For threat 
level, see White House document, "Selected Summer 2001 Threat Response Activities," undated, pp. 1—2 (provided 
to the Commission by President Bush on Apr. 29, 2004). 

12. The information regarding KSM was not captioned as a threat. It "was part of a longer cable whose subject 
line was "Terrorism: Biographical Information on Bin Ladm Associates in Afghanistan. "The cable reported further 
that KSM himself was regularly traveling to the United States. See Intelligence report, June 12, 2001. This was 
doubted by the CIA's Renditions Branch, which had been looking for KSM since 1997. It noted, however, that if 
the source was talking about the "real" KSM, the CIA had both "a significant threat and opportunity to pick him 
up." See CIA cable, request additional information on KSM, June 26, 2001. A month later, a report from the source 
indicated that the information regarding KSM's travel to the United States was current as of the summer of 1998. 
It noted further, however, that KSM continued his old activities but not specifically the travel to the United States. 
Significantly, it confirmed that the source "was talking about the "real" KSM. See CIA cable, follow-up source on 



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534 NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 

KSM,July 1 1, 2001. As noted in chapter 7, KSM has said that it was generally well known by the summer of 2001 
that he "was planning an operation in the United States. Roger Cressey told us he did not recall seeing this report- 
ing, although he would have had access to it. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004). 

For the summer threat reporting and actions taken in response, see NSC memo, Clarke/Cressey agenda for 
June 22 CSG meeting, June 20, 2001; CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near- Term Threats," June 25, 
2001 ; CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Planning High-Pro file Attacks,"June 30, 2001 ; CIA cable,"Threat UBL Attack Against 
US Interests Next 24-48 Hours," June 22, 2001; FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update, 
ITOS Threat Update Webpage, June 22, 2001. 

13. DOS cable, Riyadh 02326, "U.S. Visa Express Program Transforms NIV Scene in Saudi Arabia," Aug. 19, 
2001; NSC memo, Current US Terrorism Alert, July 3, 2001. 

14. See CIA cable, "Possible Threat of Imminent Attack from Sunni Extremists," June 23, 2001; CIA, SEIB, 
"Bin Ladin Attacks May be Imminent," June 23, 2001; CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near- Term 
Threats,"June25,2001. 

15. See NSC memo, Clarke to CSG regarding that day's CSG meeting, June 22, 2001; NSC memo, Current 
U.S. Terrorism Alert, July 3, 2001. For the readiness of FESTs, see NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Terror- 
ism Threat Update, June 25, 2001. 

16. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Possibility of an al Qaeda Attack,June 25, 2001; CIA report, 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "MBC TV Carries Video Report on Bin Ladin, Followers in Training," 
June 24, 2001 ; CIA, SEIB, "Bin LadmThreats Are Real," June 30, 2001 John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004); 
CIA cable, "Continued Threat/Potential Attack by UBL," June 29, 2001. 

17. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Possibility of an al Qaeda Attack, June 28, 2001; NSC email, 
Clarke for Rice and others, Terrorist Alert, June 30, 2001. 

18. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and others, Terrorist Alert, June 30, 2001; CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Planning 
High-Pro file Attacks," June 30, 2001 ; CIA, SEIB, "Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delays," July 
2,2001. 

19. FBI report, National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) message, "National Threat 
Warning System — Potential Anti-U.S. Terrorist Attacks," July 2, 2001. 

20. By July 3, DCI Tenet had asked about 20 of his counterparts in friendly foreign intelligence services to 
detain specific al Qaeda members and to generally harass al Qaeda— affiliated cells. NSC memo, Current U.S. Ter- 
rorism Alert, July 3, 2001 . For specific disruption activities and maintaining alert, see NSC email, Clarke to Rice 
and Hadley,Threat Updates, July 6, 2001; Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004). 

21. For the Cheney call see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For the Hadley 
call see NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Edelman, Terrorism Alert, July 2, 2001. For the G-8 summit see Associated 
Press Online, "Bush Faced Threat at G-8 Summit," Sept. 26, 2001. 

22. Veronica C. interview (May 25, 2004); INS memo, Veronica C. to Cadman, "Briefing at the NSC," July 9, 
2001; Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004). The Customs representative, Ricardo O, did send out a general 
advisory that was based solely on historical facts, such as the Ressam case, to suggest there was a threat. Ricardo C. 
interview (June 12,2004). 

23. See CIA memo, "CTC Briefing for the Attorney General on the Usama Bin Ladin Terrorist Threat," July 
5, 2001, and the accompanying CIA briefing materials, "DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review," July 3, 2001 . 

24. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and HadleyThreat Updates, July 6, 2001. 

25. Ibid.; see also FBI memo, Kevin G. to Watson, "Protective Services Working Group (PSWG) Meeting Held 
at FBIHQ 7/9/01," July 16, 2001, and accompanying attendance sheets. 

26. FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update, ITOS Threat Update Webpage, July 20, 
2001. 

27. Thomas Pickard interview (Apr. 8, 2004). 

28. See CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned," July 13, 2001; CIA, SEIB, "One Bin Ladin 
Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing," July 25, 2001; NSC memo, Cressey to CSG,Threat SVTS,July 23, 2001. 

29. FAA information circular, "Continued Middle Eastern Threats to Civil Aviation," IC-2001-04A, July 31, 
2001. 

30. GeorgeTenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004). 

31. See CIA, SEIB, "Bin Ladin Threats Are Real," June 30, 2001. For Tenet's response to DOD's concerns about 
possible deception, see CIA memo, weekly meeting between Rice and Tenet, July 17, 2001 John McLaughlin inter- 
view (Jan. 21, 2004); Richard interview (Dec. 11,2003). 

32. NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley,Threats Update, July 27, 2001. 

33. FBI report, NLETS message, "Third Anniversary of the 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombings in East Africa 
Approaches;Threats to U.S. Interests Continue," Aug. 1, 2001. 

34. CIA cable, "Threat of Impending al Qaeda Attack to Continue Indefinitely," Aug. 3, 2001. 

35. CIA letter, Tenet to the Commission, Mar. 26, 2004; Barbara S. interview (July 13, 2004); Dwayne D. inter- 
view (July 13,2004). 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 535 

36. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For Rice's reaction to the August 6 
PDB article, see Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004. 

37. The CTC analyst "who drafted the briefing drew on reports over the previous four years. She also spoke 
with an FBI analyst to obtain additional information. The FBI material was "written up by the CIA analyst and 
included in the PDB. A draft of the report was sent to the FTil analyst to review.The FBI analyst did not, however, 
see the final version, which added the reference to the 70 investigations. Barbara S. interviews (Apr. 12, 2004); joint 
Inquiry interview ofjen M., Nov. 20, 2002. Because of the attention that has been given to the PDB, we have inves- 
tigated each of the assertions mentioned in it. 

The only information that actually referred to a hijacking in this period was a walk-in at an FBI office in the 
United States who mentioned hijackings among other possible attacks. The source was judged to be a fabricator. 
FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update, ITOS Threat Update Webpage, Aug. 1, 2001. 

The FBI conducted an extensive investigation of the two individuals who were stopped after being observed 
taking photographs of two adjacent buildings that contained FBI offices. The person taking the photographs told 
the FBI that he was taking them for a co-worker in Indiana who had never been to New York and wanted to see 
what it looked like. The picture taker was in New York to obtain further information regarding his pending citi- 
zenship application. He had an appointment at 26 Federal Plaza, where the relevant INS offices "were located. This 
same building houses portions of the FBI's New York Field Office. Before going into the building the individual 
pulled out the camera and took four photographs.When the FBI attempted to contact the co-worker (and room- 
mate) "who had requested some photographs, it was determined that he had fled without receiving his last paycheck 
after learning that the FBI had asked his employer some questions about him. Further investigation determined 
that he was an illegal alien using forged identity documents. Despite two years of investigation, the FBI was unable 
to find the co-worker or determine his true identity. The FBI closed the investigation on June 9, 2003, "when it 
concluded that it "was unable to connect the men's activities to terrorism. Matthew interview (June 18, 2004); FBI 
case file, no. 266A-NY-279198. 

The 70 full-field investigations number "was a generous calculation that included fund-raising investigations. It 
also counted each individual connected to an investigation as a separate full-field investigation. Many of these inves- 
tigations should not have been included, such as the one that related to a dead person, four that concerned people 
who had been in long-term custody, and eight that had been closed well before August 6, 2001. Joint Inquiry inter- 
view ot Elizabeth and Laura, Nov. 20, 2002; FBI report,"70 UBL Cases," undated (produced to thejoint Inquiry 
on Aug. 12,2002). 

The call to the UAE was originally reported by the CIA on May 16. It came from an anonymous caller. Nei- 
ther the CIA nor the FBI was able to corroborate the information m the call. FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical Fun- 
damentalist Threat Update, ITOS Threat Update Webpage, May 16, 2001. 

38. See CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladm Determined to Strike in US,"Aug. 7, 2001; see also Roger Cressey interview 
(June 23, 2004). The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence testified that the FBI information in the PDB was 
omitted from the SEIB because of concerns about protecting ongoing investigations, because the information had 
been received from the FBI only orally, and because there were no clear, established ground rules regarding SEIB 
contents. John McLaughlin testimony, Apr. 14,2004. 

39. Intelligence report, Consideration by Abu Zubaydah to AttackTargets in the United States,Aug. 24, 2001. 

40. GeorgeTenet interview (July 2, 2004). 

41. Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). 

42. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). 

43. It is also notable that virtually all the information regarding possible domestic threats came from human 
sources. The information on overseas threats came mainly from signals intelligence. Officials believed that signals 
intelligence was more reliable than human intelligence. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004). 

44. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001 (attaching NSC memo, "Strategy for Eliminat- 
ing the Threat from the Jihadists Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects," Dec. 2000). Clarke had also mentioned 
domestic terrorist cells in connection with the possibility of reopening Pennsylvania Avenue. See NSC email, Clarke 
to Rice, Briefing on Pennsylvania Avenue, Mar. 23, 2001. 

45. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004). 

46. This approach was consistent with how this same issue was addressed almost exactly a year earlier, despite 
the fact that by 2001 the threat level "was higher than it had ever been previously. On June 30, 2000, NSC coun- 
terterrorism staffers met with INS, Customs, and FBI officials to review border and port security measures. The 
NSC staff's Paul Kurtz wrote to then national security adviser Samuel Berger,"We noted while there was no infor- 
mation regarding potential attacks in the U.S. they should inform their officers to remain vigilant." NSC email, 
Kurtz to Berger, Steinberg, and Rudman, warning re: UBL threat reporting, June 30, 2000. 

47. FAA briefing materials, Office of Civil Aviation Security, "The Transnational Threat to Civil Aviation," 
undated (slide 24). The presentation did indicate, however, that if a hijacker "was intending to commit suicide in a 
spectacular explosion, the terrorist would be likely to prefer a domestic hijacking. Between July 27 and September 
1 1, 2001, the FAA did issue five new Security Directives to air carriers requiring them to take some specific secu- 



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536 NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 

rity measures. Two continued certain measures that had been in place for at least a year. Others related only to car- 
rying specific passengers. See FAA security directives, SD 1 08-98, July 27, 200 1 ; SD 1 08-00, July 27, 200 1 ; SD 108- 

00, July 27, 2001; SD 108-01, Aug. 21, 2001; SD 108-01, Aug. 31, 2001. In order to issue more general warnings 
without directing carriers to take specific action, the FAA issued Information Circulars. Of the eight such circu- 
lars issued between July 2 and September 1 1, 2001, five highlighted possible threats overseas. See FAA information 
circulars, "Possible Terrorist Threat — Arabian Peninsula," IC-2001-1 1, July 18, 2001 ; "Recent Terrorist Activity in 
the Middle East," IC-2001-03B, July 26, 2001; "Continued Middle Eastern Threats to Civil Aviation," IC-2001- 
04A,July 31, 2001; "Violence Increases in Israel," IC-2001-07A, Aug. 28, 2001; "ETA Bombs Airports in Spam," 
IC-2001-1 3, Aug. 29, 2001 . One, issued on August 16, warned about the potential use of disguised weapons. FAA 
information circular, "Disguised Weapons," IC-2001-1 2, Aug. 16, 2001. 

48. FAA report, "Record of Air Carrier Briefings— 4/18/01 to 9/10/01," undated. 

49. See Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; NSC memo, U.S. Terrorism Alert, July 3, 2001; FBI elec- 
tronic communication, Heightened Threat Advisory, Apr. 13, 2001. For the lack of NSC direction, see Roger Cressey 
interview (June 23, 2004). 

50. Thomas Pickard interview (Apr. 8, 2004). For example, an international terrorism squad supervisor in the 
Washington Field Office told us he was not aware of an increased threat in the summer of 2001, and his squad did 
not take any special actions to respond to it. The special agent in charge of the Miami Field Office told us he did 
not learn of the high level of threat until after September 11. See Washington Field Office agent interview (Apr. 

1, 2004); Hector Pesquera interview (Oct. 3, 2003). 

51. Dale Watson interview (Jan. 6, 2004). 

52. See Thomas Pickard interviews (Jan. 21, 2004; Apr. 8, 2004); Thomas Pickard testimony, Apr. 13, 2004; 
Thomas Pickard letter to the Commission, June 24, 2004; John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004 .We cannot resolve 
this dispute. Pickard recalls the alleged statement being made at a briefing on July 12. The Department of Justice 
has informed us that the only people present at that briefing were Pickard, Ash croft, Deputy Attorney General Larry 
Thompson, and Ashcroft 's chief of staff, David Ay res. There are no records of the discussions at these briefings. 
Thompson and Ayres deny Ashcroft made any such statement. Dale Watson, who did not attend any of the brief- 
ings, told us that Pickard complained after one of the briefings that Ashcroft did not want to be briefed on the 
threats because "nothing ever happened." Ruben Garcia, head of the FBI's Criminal Division, who attended some 
of Pickard 's briefings of the Attorney General but not the one at which Pickard alleges Ashcroft made the state- 
ment, recalls that Ashcroft was "not enthusiastic" about the classified portions of the briefings that related to coun- 
terterrorism.We have been told that Pickard and Ashcroft did not have a good relationship.This may have influenced 
their views on the facts surrounding their meetings. Larry Thompson interview (Jan. 29, 2004); Dale Watson inter- 
view (June 3, 2004); Ruben Garcia interview (Apr. 29, 2004);Thompson and Ayres letter to the Commission, July 
12,2004. 

53. See Thomas Pickard interviews (Jan. 21, 2004;Apr. 8, 2004); John Ashcroft meeting (Dec. 17, 2003);John 
Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13,2004. 

54. Indeed, the number of FISA warrants in effect in the summer of 2001 may well have been less than it was 
at the beginning of the year. Because of problems with inaccuracies in the applications, FISAs "were allowed to lapse 
rather than be renewed with continuing inaccuracies. Michael Rolince interview (Apr. 12, 2004); Marion Bow- 
man interview (Mar. 6, 21.104). 

55. See CIA cable, Base/FBI comments on draft cable, Nov. 27, 2000; FBI electronic communication, USS 
Cole investigation, Nov. 21, 2000; FBI electronic communication, USS Cole investigation, Jan. 10, 2001 (draft). 

56. For the recollection of the FBI agent, see Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003). See also FBI 
report of investigation, interview of source,July 18, 2000; attachment to FBI electronic communication, USS Cole 
investigation, Jan. 10, 2001 (draft); FBI electronic communication, UBL investigation, Jan. 16, 2001. 

57. For speculation regarding identities, see CIA cable, "Photo of UBL Associate," Dec. 27, 2000. Retrospec- 
tive analysis of available information would have answered that question, but that analysis was not done until after 
9/1 1. For analysis, see Intelligence report, Retrospective review of 1 1 September 2001 hijackers' activities, Sept. 23, 
2002. 

58. CIA cable, "Request for January 2000 Malaysian Surveillance Photos," Dec. 12, 2000; CIA cable, "Photo 
of UBL Associate," Dec. 27, 2000; CIA cable, "Review of Malaysia 'Khaled' Photos," Jan. 5, 2001. 

59. The CIA knew that Mihdhar and Khallad had both been to Bangkok in January 2000. They had not yet 
discovered that Khallad, traveling under an alias, had actually flown to Bangkok with Mihdhar. Still, as Director 
Tenet conceded in his testimony before the Joint Inquiry, the Kuala Lumpur meeting took on additional signifi- 
cance once Khallad was identified as having attended the meeting. See Joint Inquiry report, p. 149. 

60. ForTenet and Black testimony, see Joint Inquiry testimony of George Tenet, Oct. 17, 2002;Joint Inquiry 
testimony of Cofer Black, Sept. 26, 2002. For documents not available to CIA personnel who drafted the testi- 
mony, see, e.g., FBI electronic communication, UBL investigation, Jan. 16, 2001; FBI emails between Al S. and 
Michael D., re: source,Jan. 9-11, 2001; FBI electronic communication, USS Cole investigation, Jan. 4, 2001; DOJ 
Inspector General interview of Jennifer M., Dec. 9, 2002. For the views of the FBI investigators, see DOJ Inspec- 



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S 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 537 

tor General interviews of Steve B., Sept. 16, 2002; Nov. 14, 2002; Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003). 
The DOJ Inspector General came to the same conclusion. See DOJ Inspector General report, "A Review of the 
FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks" (hereinafter "DOJ IG 9/11 
Report"), July 2, 2004, pp. 308-310. 

61. DOJ Inspector General interview of Michael D, Nov. 6, 2002; Michael D. interview (May 4, 2004); DOJ 
Inspector General interview of Chris, Nov. 27, 2002. 

62. For the internal CIA reports to which the FBI did not have access, see CIA cable, "UBL Operative Khal- 
lad,"Jan. 3, 2001; CIA cable, source debriefing, Jan. 5, 2001. The FBI agent informed us that he was unaware how 
such internal CIA communications worked, or that the operational cables even existed, and so did not know to ask 
for them. Such messages are routinely not shared m order to protect intelligence sources and methods. In this case, 
application of the routine procedure did not serve that purpose because the FBI agent was aware of the source's 
identity as well as the methods used to obtain the information. Moreover, the FBI agent also may have been absent 
from the room when the identification was made. The source had brought a sheaf of documents with him that the 
FBI agent left the room to copy while the interview of the witness continued. Because of the circumstances of the 
interview site, the agent would have been absent for a significant period of time. In addition, the case officer was 
frequently given photographs from a broad range of CIA stations to show to this particular witness. He did not 
focus on the purpose of showing the photographs; he was only concerned with whether the source recognized the 
individuals. DOJ Inspector General interview of Michael D., Nov. 6, 2002; Michael D interview (May 4, 2004); 
DOJ Inspector General interview of Chris, Nov. 27, 2002. 

63. John interview (Apr. 2, 2004). See also CIA email, Dave to John, "Re: Liaison Response," May 18, 2001. 
The old reporting from early 2000 that was reexamined included CIA cable, "Transit of UBL Associate Khalid 
Through Dubai," Jan. 4, 2000; CIA cable, "Recent Influx of Suspected UBL Associates to Malaysia," Jan. 5, 2000; 
CIA cable, "UBL Associates: Flight Manifest for MH072," Jan. 9, 2000; CIA cable, "UBL Associates: Identification 
of Possible UBL Associates," Mar. 5, 2000. For cable information, see CIA records, audit of cable databases. 

64. For a record of the exchange between John and Dave, see CIA emails, Dave to John, May 17, 18, 24, 2001; 
CIA email, Richard to Alan, identification of Khallad,July 13, 2001. For the account of John's FBI counterpart, see 
Michael Rolmce interview (Apr. 12, 2004). For John's focus on Malaysia, see DOJ Inspector General interview of 
John, Nov. 1,2002. 

65. DOJ Inspector General interview ofjohn, Nov. 1, 2002. 

66. For the account of the desk officer, see DOJ Inspector General interview of Michael D., Oct. 31, 2002. For 
cable information, see CIA records, audit of cable databases. 

67. DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002; July 16, 2003. 

68. DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Dave, Oct. 
31,2002. 

69. DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002; July 16, 2003. 

70. DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Dave, Oct. 
31, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Russ F, Sept. 17, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Steve 
B.,Sept. 16,2002. 

71. "Jane" did not seek OIPR's permission to share this information at the meeting. "Jane" also apparently did 
not realize that one of the agents in attendance was a designated intelligence agent, so she could have shared all of 
the information with that agent regardless of the caveats. No one who was at the meeting suggested that option, 
however. DOJ Inspector General interview of Steve B., Sept. 16, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, 
July 16, 2003. These caveats "were different from the legal limits we discussed in section 3. 2. The Attorney General's 
July 1995 procedures concerned FISA information developed in an FBI intelligence investigation. This, however, 
was NSA information. These particular caveats were the result of the Justice Department's and NSA's overabun- 
dance of caution in December 1999. During the millennium crisis, Attorney General Reno authorized electronic 
surveillance of three U.S. persons overseas. Because the searches were not within the United States, no FISA war- 
rant was needed. Reno approved the surveillances pursuant to section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333 with the pro- 
viso that the results of these particular surveillances not be shared with criminal investigators or prosecutors without 
the approval of the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. Because of the complexity of determining whether 
particular reporting "was the fruit of particular surveillances, NSA decided to place these caveats on all its Bin 
Ladin— related reporting, not just reporting on the surveillances authorized by Reno. As a result, these caveats were 
placed on the reports relating to Mihdhar even though they were not covered by Reno's December 1999 order. 
See DOJ memo, Reno to Freeh, FISA surveillance of a suspected al Qaeda operative, Dec. 24, 1999; NSA email, 
William L. to Karen O, "distribution restrictions," Dec. 10, 1999; NSA email, William L. to Anthony L.,"doj restric- 
tions," Dec. 20, 1999; NSA email, William L. to Brian O, "dissemination of terrorism reporting," Dec. 29, 1999. See 
also NSA memo, Ann D. to others, "Reporting Guidance," Dec. 30, 1999. 

In May 2000, it was brought to the Attorney General's attention that these caveats prevented certain attorneys 
in theTerrorism and Violent Crime Section (TVCS) from reading the reporting. After discussions with NSA, the 
caveats were changed to specifically permit dissemination of these reports to designated attorneys in theTVCS and 



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538 NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 

two attorneys in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. See NSA memo, Joan R. to 
Townsend and Reynolds, "Resumed Delivery of Classified Intelligence toTVCS,"June 9, 2000; NSA memo, Hay- 
den to Asst. Attorney General, "Proposal to Provide UBL-related Product to U.S. Attorney's Office/Southern Dis- 
trict of New York," Aug. 30, 2000. 

72. For the facts known by Dave at this time, see CIA records, audit of cable databases; see also CIA email, Dave 
to John, timeline entries, May 15, 2001. For CIA analyst's role, see DOJ Inspector General interview of Dave, Oct. 
31, 2002. For Jane's account, see DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, July 16, 2003. 

73. DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, Oct. 29, 2002. 

74. For Mary's account, see DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, Oct. 29, 2002. For the reporting regard- 
ing Mihdhar and Hazmi, see CIA cable, Khalid's passport, Jan. 4, 2000; CIA cable, Mihdhar's visa application, Jan. 
5, 2000; CIA cable, Hazmi entered U.S., Mar. 6, 2000. For Mary's cable access information, see CIA records, audit 
of cable databases. 

75. DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, Oct. 29, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview ofjane, Nov. 
4,2002. 

76. DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, Oct. 29, 2002; Intelligence report, Watchlisting of Bin 
Ladin— related individuals, Aug. 23, 2001 ; Joint Inquiry testimony of Christopher Kojm, Sept. 19, 2002. The watch- 
list request included Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf (they did not yet realize this 
was an alias for Tawfiq bin Attash, a.k.a. Khallad), and Ahmad Hikmat Shakir (who assisted Mihdhar in Kuala 
Lumpur). 

77. Jane told investigators that she viewed this matter asjust another lead and so assigned no particular urgency 
to the matter. DOJ Inspector General interviews ofjane, July 16, 2003; Nov. 4, 2002. For the draft lead, see attach- 
ment to FBI email, Jane to Craig D., "Re: FFI Request," Aug. 28, 2001. For the final version, see FBI electronic 
communication, "Request to Open a Full Field Investigation," Aug. 28, 2001. 

78. FBI email, Craig D. to John L., "Fwd: Re: FFI Request," Aug. 28, 2001; FBI email, John L. to Steve and 
others, "Fwd: Re: FFI Request," Aug. 28, 2001. For an introduction to these legal limits and "the wall," see section 
3.2. In December 2000, pursuant to concerns of the FISA Court, the New York Field Office began designating 
certain agents as either intelligence or criminal agents. Intelligence agents could see FISA materials and any other 
information that bore cautions about sharing without obtaining the FISA Court's permission or permission from 
the Justice Department's OIPR. FBI electronic communication, "Instructions re FBI FISA Policy," Dec. 7, 2000. 

79. While one witness recalls a discussion with a senior FBI official, that official denies that such a discussion 
took place. The other alleged participant does not recall such a meeting. John interview (Apr. 2, 2004); Michael 
Rolmce interview (Apr. 12, 2004); Jane interview (July 13, 2004); DOJ Inspector General interview/ of Rodney 
M., Nov. 5, 2002. For investigation's goal, see FBI electronic communication, "Request to Open a Full Field Inves- 
tigation," Aug. 28, 2001. 

80. DOJ Inspector General interviews ofjane, July 16, 2003; Nov. 4, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interviews 
of Steve B., Sept. 16, 2002; Nov. 14, 2002; Jane interview (July 13, 2004). FBI email, Jane to John L.,"Fwd: Re: FFI 
Request," Aug. 29, 2001. 

The analyst's email, however, reflects that she was confusing a broad array of caveats and legal barriers to infor- 
mation sharing and rules governing criminal agents' use of information gathered through intelligence channels. 
There "was no broad prohibition against sharing information gathered through intelligence channels with criminal 
agents. This type of sharing occurred on a regular basis in the field. The court's procedures did not apply to all intel- 
ligence gathered regardless of collection method or source. Moreover, once information was properly shared, the 
criminal agent could use it for further investigation. 

81. FBI email, Jane to Steve, NSLU Response, Aug. 29, 2001. "Jane" says she only asked whether there was suf- 
ficient probable cause to open the matter as a criminal case and "whether the criminal agent could attend any inter- 
view if Mihdhar was found. She said the answer she received to both questions was no. She did not ask whether 
the underlying information could have been shared. Jane interview (July 13, 2004). The NSLU attorney denies 
advising that the agent could not participate in an interview and notes that she would not have given such inac- 
curate advice.The attorney told investigators that the NSA caveats would not have precluded criminal agents from 
joining in any search for Mihdhar or from participating in any interview. Moreover, she said that she could have 
gone to the NSA and obtained a waiver of any such caveat because there was no FISA information involved in this 
case. There are no records of the conversation between "Jane" and the attorney. "Jane" did not copy the attorney 
on her email to the agent, so the attorney did not have an opportunity to confirm or reject the advice "Jane" was 
giving to the agent. DOJ Inspector General interview of Sherry S., Nov. 7, 2002. 

"Jane" asked the New York agent assigned to the Mihdhar search to sign a FISA acknowledgment form indi- 
cating the agent understood how he had to treat FISA information. Because no FISA information was involved, 
she should not have required him to sign such a form. To the extent she believed, incorrectly, that the Attorney 
General's 1995 procedures applied to this situation, there was in fact an exception in place for NewYork. DOJ 
Inspector General interview ot Sherry S., Nov. 7, 2< )02. Moie fundamentally, "fane ' apparently understood the wel- 
ter of restrictions to mean, in workday shorthand, that any information gathered by intelligence agencies should 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 539 

not be shared with criminal agents. This 'was incorrect. DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, July 16, 21.103; 
Nov. 4, 2002. 

82. FBI emails between Steve B. and Jane, re: NSLU Response, Aug. 29, 2001. While the agent expressed his 
frustration with the situation to "Jane," he made no effort to press the matter further by discussing his concerns 
with either his supervisor or the chief division counsel in New York. 

83. Attorney General Ashcro ft testified to us that this and similar information-sharing issues arose from Attor- 
ney General Reno's 1995 guidelines, discussed in chapter 3, and specifically from a March 1995 memorandum of 
then Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick. John Ashcro ft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004; DOJ memo, Gorelick to 
White, "Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations," Mar. 4, 
1995. 

We believe the Attorney Generals testimony does not fairly or accurately reflect the significance of the 1995 
documents and their relevance to the 2001 discussions. Whatever the merits of the March 1995 Gorelick memo- 
randum and the subsequent July 1995 Attorney General procedures on information sharing, they did not apply to 
the information the analyst decided she could not share with the criminal agent. As discussed earlier, the reason 
"Jane" decided she could not share information was because the initial information on Mihdhar had been analyzed 
by the NSA.This reason was unrelated to either of the 1995 documents. The Gorelick memorandum applied to 
two particular criminal cases, neither of which was involved in the summer 2001 information-sharing discussions. 
As the FBI agent observed in his email, Part A of the 1995 procedures applied only to information obtained pur- 
suant to a FISA warrant. None of the Mihdhar material was FISA information. There was an exemption for the 
Southern District of New York from Part B of the 1995 procedures, so they did not apply. Also, the 1995 proce- 
dures did not govern whether information could be shared between intelligence and criminal agents within the 
FBI, a separation that the Bureau did not begin making formally until long after the procedures were in place. The 
1995 procedures governed only the sharing of information with criminal prosecutors. Even in that situation, the 
restriction obliged running the information through the OIPR screen. 

What had happened, as we discussed in chapter 3, was a growing battle within the Justice Department during 
the 1990s, and between parts ofjustice and the FISA Court, over the scope of OIPR's screening function and the 
propriety of using FISA-derived information in criminal matters. The FISA Court's concern with FBI sloppiness 
in its FISA applications also began to take a toll: the court began designating itself as the gatekeeper for the shar- 
ing of intelligence information; the FBI was required to separately designate criminal and intelligence agents; and 
the court banned one supervisory FBI agent from appearing before it. By late 2000, these factors had culminated 
in a set of complex rules and a widening set of beliefs — a bureaucratic culture — that discouraged FBI agents from 
even seeking to share intelligence information. Neither Attorney General acted to resolve the conflicting views 
within the Justice Department. Nor did they challenge the strict interpretation of the FISA statute set forth by the 
FISA Court and OIPR. Indeed, this strict interpretation remained in effect until the USA PATRIOT Act was passed 
after 9/11. 

Simply put, there was no legal reason why the information the analyst possessed could not have been shared 
with the criminal agent. On August 27, "Jane" requested the NSA's permission to share the information with the 
criminal agents, but she intended for the information only to help the criminal agents in their ongoing Cole inves- 
tigation. She still did not believe they could be involved in the intelligence investigation even if the NSA permit- 
ted the information to be shared. DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, p. 339. The next day the NSA notified its 
representative at FBI headquarters that it had approved the passage of the information to the criminal agents. NSC 
email, Carlene C. to Richard K., "Response to FBI Sanitization Request,"Aug. 28, 2001. Thus, "Jane" had permis- 
sion to share the information with the criminal agent prior to their August 29 emails. 

84. DOJ Inspector General interview/ of Robert F, Dec. 18, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Los Ange- 
les lead, Sept. 10, 2001. 

85. Hazmi and Mihdhar used their true names to obtain California driver's licenses and open Newjersey bank 
accounts. Hazmi also had a car registered and had been listed in the San Diego telephone book. Searches of read- 
ily available databases could have unearthed the driver's licenses, the car registration, and the telephone listing. A 
search on the car registration "would have unearthed a license check by the South Hackensack Police Department 
that would have led to information placing Hazmi in the area and placing Mihdhar at a local hotel for a week in 
early July 2001. The hijackers actively used the New Jersey bank accounts, through ATM, debit card, and cash trans- 
actions, until September 10. Among other things, they used their debit cards to pay for hotel rooms; and Hazmi 
used his card on August 27 to purchase tickets on Flight 77 for himself and his brother (and fellow hijacker), Salem 
al Hazmi. These transactions could have helped locate them if the FBI had obtained the bank records in time. There 
would have been no easy means, however, to determine the existence of these accounts, and obtaining bank coop- 
eration pre-9/1 1 might have been problematic. The most likely means of successfully finding the men in the short 
time available was one not often used pre-9/1 1 for suspected terrorists: an FBI BOLO (be on the lookout) com- 
bined with a media campaign. This alone might have delayed or disrupted the plot, even if the men had not been 
physically located before September 11. But this would have been considered only if the FBI believed that they 
were about to carry out an imminent attack. No one at the FBI — or any other agency — believed that at the time. 



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540 NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 

See FBI report, financial spreadsheet re: 9/11 hijackers, undated; South Hackensack, N.J. , Police Department report, 
Detective Bureau Report, Oct. 17, 2001 (case no. 20018437). According to Ramzi Binalshibh, had KSM known 
that Moussaoui had been arrested, he would have canceled the 9/11 attacks. Intelligence report, interrogation of 
Ramzi Binalshibh, Feb. 14, 2003. The publicity regarding Mihdhar and Haznii might have had a similar effect 
because they could have been identified by the airlines and might have jeopardized the operation. 

86. Joint Inquiry report, pp. xm, 325-335; DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, pp. 59-106. 

87. FBI electronic communication, Phoenix memo, July 10,2001. 

88. Ibid.jjoint Inquiry report, pp. 325-335; DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, pp. 59-106. 

89. DOJ Inspector General interview of Kenneth Williams, July 22, 2003. 

90. Unlike Moussaoui, the typical student at Pan Am Flight Academy holds an FA A Airline Transport Pilot rat- 
ing or the foreign equivalent, is employed by an airline, and has several thousand flight hours. Moussaoui also stood 
out for several other reasons. He had paid nearly $9,000 in cash for the training, yet had no explanation for the 
source of these funds; he had asked to fly a simulated flight from London's Heathrow Airport to New York's John 
F Kennedy Airport; and he was also particularly interested in the operation of the aircraft doors. FBI electronic 
communication, Request OIPR permission to contact U.S. Attorney's Office regarding Zacanas Moussaoui, Aug. 
18, 2001. For a detailed, step-by-step chronology of activities taken regarding Moussaoui prior to September 11, 
see DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, pp. 109-197. 

91. FBI electronic communication, Request OIPR permission to contact U.S. Attorney's Office regarding 
Zacanas Moussaoui, Aug. 18, 2001 . 

92. DOJ Inspector General interview of Harry S.,June 6, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of GregJ., 
July 9, 2002; FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui, Aug. 19, 2001. 

93. DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, p. 128. 

94. Criminal search warrants must be approved by Department of Justice attorneys before submission to the 
court. Therefore, approval from the Minneapolis U.S. Attorney's Office was required before a criminal search war- 
rant could be obtained. DOJ Inspector General interview of Coleen Rowley, July 16, 2002. Another agent, how- 
ever, said that he spoke to an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Minneapolis office and received advice that the facts 
were almost sufficient to obtain a criminal warrant. DOJ Inspector General interview of GregJ., July 9, 2002. The 
Assistant United States Attorney said that if the FBI had asked for a criminal warrant that first night, he "would have 
sought it. He believed that there was sufficient probable cause for a criminal warrant at that time. DOJ Inspector 
General interview of William K., May 29, 2003. Mary Jo White, the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern Dis- 
trict of New York, told us that based on her review of the evidence known pre-9/11, she would have approved a 
criminal search warrant. Mary Jo White interview (May 17, 2004). Because the agents never presented the infor- 
mation to the Minneapolis U.S. Attorney's Office before 9/11, we cannot know for sure what its judgment would 
have been or whether a judge would have signed the warrant. In any event, the Minneapolis agents were concerned 
that if they tried to first obtain a criminal "warrant but the U.S. Attorney's Office or the judge refused, the FISA 
Court might reject an application for a FISA warrant on the grounds that the agents were attempting to make an 
end run around the criminal process. Therefore, it wasjudged too risky to seek a criminal warrant unless it was cer- 
tain that it would be approved. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002. In addition, FBI head- 
quarters specifically instructed Minneapolis that it could not open a criminal investigation. DOJ IG 9/11 Report, 
July 2, 2004, p. 138. Finally, the Minneapolis Field Office mistakenly believed that the 1995 Attorney General pro- 
cedures required OIPR's approval before it could contact the U.S. Attorney's Office about obtaining a criminal 
"warrant. 

95. The FISA definition of "foreign power" includes "a group engaged in international terrorism or activities 
in preparation therefor." 

96. FBI electronic communication, Request to contact U.S. Attorney's Office regarding Zacarias Moussaoui, 
Aug. 18, 2001 . For CTC contact, see FBI email, Harry S. to Chuck F, "Please Pass To [desk officer]," Aug. 24, 2001 ; 
FBI email, Harry S. to Chuck F,"Re: Fwd: 199M-MP-60130 (Zacarias Moussaoui)," Aug. 24, 2001. 

97. DOJ Inspector General interview of GregJ., July 9, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Moussaoui inves- 
tigation, Aug. 22, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Moussaoui investigation, Aug. 30, 2002. 

98. FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui, Aug. 21, 2001; CIA cable, subjects involved in suspi- 
cious 747 flight training, Aug. 24, 2001; CIA cable, "Zacarias Moussaoui and Husayn 'Ali Hasan Ali-Attas," Aug. 28, 
2001;Joseph H., interview (May 4, 2004); FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui, Sept. 5, 2001. 

99. FBI teletype, "Zacarias Moussaoui — Inter national Terrorism," Sept. 4, 2001. 

100. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002. 

101. Minneapolis may have been more concerned about Moussaoui's intentions because the case agent and 
the supervisory agent were both pilots. They "were, therefore, more highly sensitized to the odd nature of Mous- 
saoui's actions and comments regarding flying. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002; DOJ 
Inspector General interview of Harry S.,June 20,2002. 

102. DOJ Inspector General interview of Michael Rolince, May 5, 2004; Michael Rolmce interview (Apr. 12, 
2004); DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, pp. 168-170, 188. 



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Q 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 541 

103. CIA briefing materials, DCI Update, "Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly," Aug. 23, 2001 . Deputy Director 
of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin testified that he was told about Moussaoui several days before Tenet was 
briefed, although he did not recall the specific date of the briefing. John McLaughlin testimony, Apr. 14, 2004. 

104. George Tenet interviews (Jan. 28, 2004;July 2, 2004). 

105. For the renewed request, see FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui, Sept. 11, 2001. For the 
initial British response, see British Security Service memo, re: Zacarias Moussaoui, Sept. 12, 2001; information pro- 
vided to the Commission by the British government; British liaison telex, "Zacarias Moussaoui — Background Infor- 
mation," Sept. 13, 2001. See also Joseph H. interview (May 4,2004). 

106. Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 340—341. Notably, the FBI analyst "Mary" who was looking 
at the Mihdhar information suggested that the U.S. government talk to Ressam to see if he knew anything about 
Mihdhar. See CIA email, Mary to John, seeking identification by Ressam, Aug. 21, 2001. There is no evidence that 
Ressam was asked about Moussaoui or Mihdhar prior to 9/11. 

107. According to Ramzi Binalshibh, had KSM known that Moussaoui had been arrested, he would have can- 
celled the 9/11 attacks. Intelligence report, interrogation ofRamzi Binalshibh, Feb. 14,2003. 

108. Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 329— 331; Joint Inquiry interview of Mike, Alice, Larry,John, 
Terry,Aug. 12,2002. 

109. CIA cable, Key UBL personalities, Sept. 25, 2000. 

1 10. CIA cable, Mukhtar information, May 23, 2002. 

111. CIA cable, Biographical Information on Key UBL Associates in Afghanistan, June 1 1, 2001; Intelligence 
report, biographical information on Bin Ladin associates in Afghanistan, June 12, 2001. For the subsequent identi- 
fication, see CIA cable, follow-up source on KSM, July 1 1, 2001. 

1 12. For the reporting identifying Mukhtar as KSM, see CIA cable, source information re: KSM, Aug. 28,2001. 

113. John interview (Apr. 2, 2004). 

9 Heroism and Horror 

1. For the WTC's layout, see Port Authority diagrams, "World Trade Center Concourse Level," "Concourse 
Level," and "Plaza Level," undated. For the number of square feet of office space, see Federal Emergency Manage- 
ment Agency (FEMA) report, "World Trade Center Building Performance Study," undated. For the number of 
workers and passersby, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004). 

For the dimensions, see FEMA report, "World Trade Center Building Performance Study," undated. In addi- 
tion, the outside of each tower was covered by a frame of 14-inch-wide steel columns; the centers of the steel 
columns were 40 inches apart. These exterior walls bore most of the weight of the building.The interior core of 
the buildings was a hollow steel shaft, in which elevators and stairwells were grouped. Ibid. For stairwells and ele- 
vators, see Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. 

2. See Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. 

3. Ibid. These deviations were necessary because of the placement of heavy elevators and machine rooms, and 
were located between the 42nd and 48th floors and the 76th and 82nd floors in both towers. For the doors being 
closed but unlocked, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004). 

4. For rooftop access and evacuations, see Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. 
For the helipad not conforming, see PANYNJ interview 14 (July 8, 2004). In the interests of promoting candor 
and protecting privacy, we agreed not to identify most individuals we interviewed. Individuals are identified by a 
code, and individuals' ranks or units are disclosed only in a broad manner. 

5. For the 1993 attack's effect, see Alan Reiss testimony, May 18, 2004. For the attack's testing the city's response 
capability, see FDNY report, "Report from the Chief of Department, Anthony L. Fusco," in William Manning, ed., 
The World Trade Center Bombing: Report and Analysis (FEMA, undated), p. 11. 

6. For the towers' loss of power and the other effects, see New York City report, "Report of the World Trade 
Center Review Committee," 1995, p. 4. For generators' shutting down, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004). 
For the rescue efforts, see FDNY report, "Report from the Chief of Department, Anthony L. Fusco," in Manning, 
ed., The World Trade Center Bombing, p. 1 1 . For the evacuation time, see PANYNJ interview 5 (May 15, 2004). 

7. For information on rooftop evacuations, see Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 
2004; NYPD interview 25, Aviation (June 21, 2004). For the rappel rescue, see Port Authority response to Com- 
mission interrogatory, May 2004. For figure of 1 5 hours, see "World Trade Center Bombing," NY Cop Online Mag- 
azine, Dec. 12, 2000 (online at www.nycop.com). For the general false impression, see Civilian interview 3 (May 
4, 2004); Commission analysis of letters written to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
concerning the September 11 attacks. For the WTC fire safety plan, see Port Authority response to Commission 
interrogatory, May 2004. 

8. For the upgrades, see Port Authority memorandum to the Commission for Nov. 3, 2003, meeting; Port 
Authority briefing (May 13, 2004). 

9. For the upgrades, see Port Authority memorandum to the Commission for Nov. 3, 2003, meeting; Port 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



542 NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 

Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. For the fire alarm, see PANYNJ interview 10 (June 
16, 2004); PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004). 

10. Port Authority memorandum to Commission for Nov. 3, 2003 meeting; WTC interview 6 (May 25, 2004). 

1 1. For fire safety teams, see PANYNJ Interview 7 (Jun. 2, 2004). For fire drill procedures, see Civilian inter- 
view 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). For aids to the September 11 evacuation, see, e.g., 
Civilian interview 14 (Apr. 7, 2004); Civilian interview 20 (May 4, 2004); Civilian interview 21 (May 4, 2004); 
Civilian Interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004). 

12. For instructions to civilians, see, e.g., Civilian interview 20 (May 4, 2004); Civilian interview 21 (May 4, 
2004); Civilian interview 12 (May 4, 2004); Stanley Praimnath testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped). For civilians' 
participation, see Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004); Civilian interview 15 (Apr. 21, 2004); Commission analy- 
sis of letters written to OSHA concerning the September 1 1 attacks. For civilians not being instructed not to evac- 
uate up, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004). For the standard fire drill announcement, see Port Authority 
response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. For civilians' recollection, see Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); 
Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). For Port Authority acknowledgment 
of lack of a protocol, see PANYNJ interview 2 (Apr. 14, 2004). 

1 3. For SPI transition, see PANYNJ Interview 1 1 (Jun. 23, 2004);Alan Reiss prepared statement, May 18, 2004, 
p. 8. For fire safety plan, see PANYNJ Interview 8 (June 6, 2004). 

14. See Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) report, "Port Authority of New York and New Jersey," 
undated (online at www.panynj.gov). 

15. PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10, 2004). 

16. For 40,000 officers, see NYPD information provided to the Commission, July 9, 2004. For standard oper- 
ating procedures, see NYPD regulations, "Patrol Guide: Rapid Mobilization," and "Patrol Guide: Mobilization 
Readiness Levels," Jan. 1, 2000. 

17. For the 35 radio zones, see NYPD report, "Radio Zones," undated. For other citywide radio channels, see, 
e.g., NYPD report, "Transit PatrolVHF" undated; NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). 

18. For the NYPD supervising the emergency call system and employing more than 1,200 people, see NYPD 
report, "Communications Section," undated (online at www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/otsd/ commsec.html). For 
fire emergencies being transferred to the FDNY dispatch, see FDNY interview 28, Dispatch (Jan. 29, 2004). 

19. See FDNY email to the Commission, July 9, 2004;ThomasVon Essen interview (Apr. 7, 2004). For oper- 
ations being headed by the sole five-star chief, see FDNY regulations, "Regulations" chapter of "Operational Pro- 
cedures and Policies," July 1999. 

20. For department organization, see FDNY report, "Unit Location Chart," Sept. 1 1, 2001; FDNY regulations, 
"Firefighting Procedures," "Engine Company," and "Ladder Company Operations" chapters of "Operational Pro- 
cedures and Policies," July 1999. 

21. FDNY interview 48, SOC (Mar. 11,2004). 

22. FDNY interview 28, Dispatch (Jan. 29, 2004). Each center was staffed at all times "with a supervisor and 
seven dispatchers who worked in 12-hour tours. Positions included a decision dispatcher, responsible for directing 
the appropriate fire apparatus to the scene; a voice alarm or notification dispatcher, responsible for intra- and inter- 
agency communications; a radio in and radio out dispatcher who tracked the movement of fire apparatuses; and 
three alarm dispatchers, responsible for sending the appropriate number of units to a fire scene to correspond "with 
the designated alarm level. Ibid. 

23. FDNY regulations, "Communications" chapter of "Ope rational Procedures and Policies," July 1999; FDNY 
interview 60, HQ (May 1 1, 2004); FDNY interview 64, HQ (June 30, 2004). 

24. FDNY report, "Report from the Chief of Department, Anthony L. Fusco,"in Manning, ed., The World Trade 
Center Bombing, p. 1 1 . 

25. PANYNJ interview 1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10, 2004). In early 2001, New York pro- 
vided its firefighters "with new digital radios. The procurement process for these radios remains controversial, and 
they proved unpopular with the rank and file, "who believed that adequate training in their use had not been pro- 
vided. The new radios were withdrawn shortly after they had been introduced into the field. While the new radios 
briefly were m service, the WTC repeater channel could be left on at all times, because the new radios operated 
on entirely different frequencies and thus were not vulnerable to interference from the repeater system. Thomas 
Von Essen interview (Apr. 7, 2004). For the new radios permitting the repeater to stay on, see PANYNJ interview 
1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10, 2004). 

26. For civilian fatalities, see New York City press release, Office of the Mayor Press Release No. 042-01, Feb. 
8, 2001. For firefighter fatalities, see Terry Golway So Others Might Live (Basic Books, 2002), p. 304. 

27. For the creation of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), see Rudolph Giuliani interview (Apr. 
20, 2004). For OEM's purposes, see Richard Sheirer interview (Apr. 7, 2004). For OEM's sending field responder, 
see ibid.; OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004). Other data monitored by OEM's Watch Command included Emer- 
gency Medical Service data regarding patterns of illness (to spot a potential epidemic in its early stages), live video 
feeds from New York Harbor and city streets, and television news channels. Richard Sheirer interview (Apr. 7, 2004); 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 543 

OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004). The Watch Command's monitoring of EMS data proved instrumental in an 
extremely early identification and then highly effective containment of the 1999 West Nile outbreak, which likely 
would have resulted in many more fatalities but for OEM. Richard Sheirer interview (Apr. 7, 2004). 

28. Richard Sheirer testimony (May 18, 2004); OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004). 

29. New York City memo, "Direction and Control of Emergencies in the City of NewYork,"July 2001 (signed 
by Mayor Giuliani}. 

30. For the exact time of impact, see FAA analysis of American 11 radar returns and Commission analysis of 
FAA radar data and air traffic control software logic. For the zone of impact, see National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) report, "Interim Report on the Federal Building Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade 
Center," June 28, 2004. On people alive on the 92nd floor and above after the impact, see Commission analysis of 
conditions on tower floors and advice received by civilians in the towers based on (1) calls to NYPD 911 from or 
concerning people in the towers on September 1 1, 2001, and (2) transcripts of recorded calls to the Port Author- 
ity police desk from people in the towers on September 11, 2001 (hereafter "Commission analysis of 911/PAPD 
calls"). Everyone alive on the 91st floor was able to evacuate. Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian inter- 
view 6 (Mar. 22, 2004). For civilians being alive but trapped, see Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls; Civilian 
interview 17 (May 11, 2004); Civilian interview 2 (Mar. 19, 2004). 

31. For fire in the 77th floor elevator and damage to the 22nd floor, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD 
calls; Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 1 1, 2001, vol. II, channel 
8, p. 4 (22nd floor). For a fireball in the lobby, see PAPD interview 1, WTC Command (Oct. 14, 2003); Civilian 
interview 14 (Apr. 7, 2004). Burning jet fuel descended at least one elevator bank. FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 
8, 2004). For the roofs being engulfed and the winds, see, e.g., NYPD interview 16, Aviation (Apr. 1, 2004). 

32. Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. 
33. Ibid. 

34. For the on-duty fire safety director's perspective, see WTC interview 6 (May 25, 2004). For the chiefs being 
told by the Port Authority fire safety director that the evacuation order was given earlier, see PANYNJ interview 
13 (Nov. 20, 2003). For him no longer being the designated fire safety director, see PANYNJ interview 11 (June 
23, 2004). 

35. For public announcements not being heard, see, e.g., Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian inter- 
view 7 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian interview 9 (Mar. 23, 2004); Civilian interview 14 (Apr. 7, 2004); Commission 
analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls.The evacuation tone was heard in some locations below the impact. Civilian interview 
7 (Mar. 22, 2004); Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. For some emergency intercoms being unusable, see 
WTC interview 9 (June 8, 2004); Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, 
Sept. 11, 2001. For evidence that some were usable, see WTC interview 6 (May 25, 2004). 

36. For callers being disconnected, see Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. For the standard operating pro- 
cedure and only a few people being available, causing calls to be transferred, see FDNY interview 28, Dispatch (Jan. 
29, 2004). For delays and terminations, see Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. 

37. For operators' and dispatchers' situational awareness and instructions to callers, see Commission analysis of 
91 1/PAPD calls. For standard operating procedures for a high-rise fire, see FDNY interview 28, Dispatch (Jan. 29, 
2004). For the fire chiefs' view, see FDNY interview 61, Chief (May 12, 2004); FDNY interview 62, Chief (May 
12, 2004). For many injuries occurring during the evacuation, see Zachary Goldfarb and Steven Kuhr, "EMS 
Response to the Explosion," in Manning, ed., The World Trade Center Bombing, p. 94. 

38. FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004): FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004). 

39. For operators' and dispatchers' lack of knowledge, see Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. For oper- 
ators departing from protocol, see ibid. 

40. Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls; Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and 
radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001, vol. II, channel 9, pp. 1—2, 23—24; channel 10, pp. 2, 6, 23. 

41. See Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian interview 14 (Apr. 
7, 2004); Civilian interview 9 (Mar. 23, 2004). For Port Authority employees remaining, see Civilian interview 6 
(Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004), Port Authority report, September 1 1 Special Aivards Ceremony, 
vol. 1, undated (recognitions 2, 3, 4, and 5). 

42. For trouble reaching exits, see, e.g., Civilian interview 9 (Mar. 23, 2004). For "locked" doors, see, e.g., Civil- 
ian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian Interview 14 (Apr. 7, 2004); WTC interview 9 (June 8, 2004); Civilian 
interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004). 

43. For smoke rising and its effect, see Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. For people jumping, see Civil- 
ian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls; Port Authority transcripts of recorded 
Port Authority calls and radio channels, vol. II, WTC channel 26 (channel W), Sept. 11, 2001, pp. 4—6. 

44. There is no evidence of a dispute between Morgan Stanley and the Port Authority over the Port Author- 
ity's "defend m place" evacuation policy before September 1 1. For occupants who were unaware of "what happened, 
see, e.g., Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004). For civilians concluding that the incident had occurred in the other 
building, see Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004). For others being aware that 



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544 NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 

a major incident had occurred, see, e.g., Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). 
Some of them could actually feel the heat from the explosion in the NorthTower. See, e.g., Civilian interview 10 
(Mar. 24, 2004); Civilian interview 15 (Apr. 21, 2004). For people deciding to leave or being advised to do so by 
fire wardens, see, e.g., Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004); Civilian statement 

1, undated. For Morgan Stanley occupying 20 floors and ordering its employees to leave, see Civilian interview 19 
(June 6, 2004). 

45. Port Authority, transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 1 1, 2001, vol. II, chan- 
nel 17, p. 1; PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004). Fire command stations were equipped with manuals containing 
prescripted announcements corresponding to a number of specified emergencies. Once the FDNY arrived on the 
scene, however, all decisions relating to evacuation or other emergency procedures were left to its discretion. 

46. When a notable event occurred, it was standard procedure for the on-duty deputy fire safety director to 
make an "advisory" announcement to tenants who were affected by or might be aware of the incident, in order to 
acknowledge the incident and to direct tenants to stand by for further instructions. The purpose of advisory 
announcements, as opposed to "emergency" announcements (such as to evacuate), was to reduce panic. PANYNJ 
interview 7 (June 2, 2004); Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. For the content of 
the announcement, see, e.g., Brian Clark testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped); Civilian interview 3 (May 4, 2004); 
Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian statement 1, undated. For the protocol and prescripted announce- 
ments and the death of the director of fire safety and the deputy fire safety director, see PANYNJ interview 7 (June 

2, 2004); PANYNJ interview 1 2 (July 7, 2004). For people not thinking a second plane would hit, see, e.g., PANYNJ 
interview 7 (June 2, 2004). For the quotation, see FDNY interview 63, Chief (May 16, 2004). For civilians remain- 
ing, see Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 
2004); Civilian interview 16 (Apr. 27, 2004); Commission analysis of letters written to OSHA concerning the Sep- 
tember 11 attacks. For civilians returning after evacuating, see Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian inter- 
view 11 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Commission analysis of letters written to OSHA 
concerning the September 11 attacks. 

47. For advice on the ground floor, see Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16,2004). Nineteen of them returned upstairs, 
where 18 died; the 20th was told by her supervisor, who was in the group, to leave rather than return upstairs. The 
supervisor also survived. Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004). For advice in the sky lobbies, see, e.g., Civilian inter- 
view 15 (Apr. 21, 2004). For security officials not being part of the fire safety staff, see PANYNJ interview 7 (June 
2, 2004). 

48. For people told to stand by, see Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio chan- 
nels, Sept. 1 1, 2001, vol. II, channel 8, pp. 7—8. For people advised to leave, see ibid., vol. II, channel 9, pp. 2, 4, 9. 

49. It is also not known if the deputy fire safety director received the order by the PAPD to evacuate the com- 
plex; however, the Port Authority has told us that deputy fire safety directors did not generally take direct orders 
from the PAPD under the regular chain of command. PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004). For the announce- 
ment, see Civilian interview 16 (Apr. 27, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004). For the announcement's 
deviating from protocol, see PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004). 

50. For senior leaders' response by 9:00 A.M., see FDNY interview 18, Chief (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 
54, Chief (Apr. 15, 2004); FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003); FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004); 
FDNY interview 27, HQ (Jan. 28, 2004). For the Chief of Department s and Chief of Operations actions, see FDNY 
interview 18, Chief (Jan. 22, 2004). For senior leaders' response by 9:59, see FDNY report, McKinsey & Company, 
"FDNY Report," Aug. 19, 2002, p. 32 . 

51. FDNY interview 60, HQ (May 11, 2004); see FDNY record, computer-aided dispatch report, Sept. 11, 
2001,08:47:20-9:00:00. 

52. For the chief's and companies' arrival, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 1 1, 2001; 
FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004). For burned civilians, see FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004). 
For the building's physical conditions, see FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004). For conditions in the 
lobby, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 

53. For the initial incident commander and command post location, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, 
video footage, Sept. 1 1, 2001; FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004). For the transfer of incident command, see 
FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004). For ascertaining building systems' status from building personnel, see 
FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); PANYNJ interview 13 (Nov. 20, 2003); FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 
14, 2004). For speaking with OEM and PAPD officials, see FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004);Jules Naudet 
and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11,2001. 

54. For the ladder and engine companies' climb, see FDNY interview 59, Battalion 2 (Apr. 22, 2004); Jules 
Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 1 1, 2001. For tactical 1, see FDNY interview 59, Battalion 2 (Apr. 
22, 2004). For other units lining up in the lobby, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 
2001. 

55. For FDNY instructing building personnel and PAPD to evacuate the South Tower, see FDNY interview 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 545 

4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); PANYNJ interview 13 (Nov. 20, 2003). For lack 
of concern about a second plane, see FDNY interview 63, Chief (May 16, 2004). 

56. FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004). 

57. For their situational awareness, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 15, Chief 
(Jan. 14,2004) (quotation). 

58. Peter Hayden testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped). 

59. On the lack of information, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 
14,2004). 

60. On the staging areas, see FDNY interview 47, Chief (Mar. 11, 2004); FDNY interview 44, Chief (Mar. 8, 
2004); FDNY interview 33, EMS (Feb. 9, 2004). For EMS's response, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video 
footage, Sept. 11, 2001. For private ambulances responding, see FDNY interview 35, EMS (Feb. 10, 2004). 

61.NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations Division, and Divisions 1,2, and 3 radio channels, Sept. 
11,2001. 

62. For the Chief of Department's actions, see NYPD interview 8, HQ {Feb. 24, 2004). For the number of offi- 
cers, see NYPD regulations, "Patrol Guide: Rapid Mobilization," Jan. 1, 2000; NYPD recordings, City Wide 1 and 
Divisions 1, 2, and 3 radio channels, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 

63. For shifting the mobilization point, see NYPD interview 17, 1st Precinct (Apr. 1, 2004). For stationing offi- 
cers around the perimeter, see NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations Division, and Divisions 1, 2, and 
3 radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001. For officers being diverted, see, e.g., NYPD interview 21, 6th Precinct (May 4, 
2004). 

64. For the helicopters' dispatch, see NYPD records, "Aviation Unit Flight Data Sheets," Sept. 1 1 , 2001 . For 
communications with air traffic controllers and their situational awareness, see NYPD interview 12, Aviation (Mar. 
10, 2004); NYPD interview 14,Aviation (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 13, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD 
interview 16, Aviation (Apr. 1, 2004). 

65. NYPD recording, Special Operations Division radio channel, Sept. 11, 2001. 

66. For the third helicopter, see NYPD records, "Aviation Unit Flight Data Sheets," Sept. 1 1, 2001. For the hel- 
icopters' subsequent actions and protocol, see NYPD interview 12, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD interview 14, 
Aviation (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 13, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD interview 16, Aviation (Apr. 1, 
2004); NYPD interview 15,ESU (Mar. 1 1, 2004). 

67. Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls; NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations, and Division 
1, 2, and 3 radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001. 

68. NYPD memo, requests for departmental recognition 4 and 6,Jun. 26, 2002. For those on the 22nd floor 
apparently not being located, see PANYNJ recognition 1, undated. 

69. NYPD interview 15,ESU(Mar. 1 1, 2004); NYPD interview 18,ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). 

70. For other officers' positioning, see NYPD interview 20, Manhattan South Task Force (May 4, 2004); NYPD 
interview 21, 6th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 19, 13th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 4, 
Housing (Feb. 17, 2004); PAPD interview 4, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command (Nov. 20, 2003). For officers 
assisting in the North Tower evacuation, see NYPD memo, request for departmental recognition 1 and 2, June 26, 
2002. 

71. NYPD recording, Transit Division 1 radio channel, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 

72. NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations Division, and Divisions 1,2, and 3 radio channels, Sept. 
11,2001. 

73. For the on-site commanding officer's actions, see PAPD interview 1,WTC command (Oct. 14, 2003). For 
the on-duty sergeant's initial instructions, see PAPD statement 3,WTC Command (Nov. 12, 2001). For his instruc- 
tions to meet at the desk, see PAPD statement 3, WTC Command (Nov. 12, 2001); PAPD statement 12, WTC 
Command (Mar. 28, 2002). On the scarcity of radios, see PAPD statement 9, PATH Command (Jan. 28, 2002); 
PAPD statement 8, WTC Command (Jan. 12, 2002). 

74. PAPD interview 7, WTC Command (Nov. 25, 2003). 

75. For the response, see PAPD statement 2, WTC Command (Nov. 10, 2001). For the lack of such written 
standard operating procedures, see PAPD interview 3, LaGuardia Airport Command (Nov. 20, 2003); PAPD reg- 
ulations, "Manual of Police Division Instructions," undated (in existence before 9/11). Instead, the PAPD relied on 
tradition to dictate its response procedures. On the lack of interoperable frequencies, see PANYNJ interview 4 (May 
10, 2004); PAPD statement 9, PATH Command (Jan. 28, 2002). 

76. For the evacuation order, see PAPD statement 3, WTC Command (Nov. 12, 2001); PAPD interview 1, 
WTC Command (Oct. 14, 2003). For its transmission, see Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority 
calls and radio channels, Sept. 1 1, 2001, vol. II, channel W, p. 7. 

77. PAPD statement 1, Administrative Command, Nov. 2, 2001 ; PAPD statement 4, Administrative Command, 
Nov. 24, 2001. 

78. For the Emergency Operations Center's activation, see OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004); OEM interview 
2 (Mar. 4, 2004). For the request for search teams, see OEM interview 5 (Mar. 19, 2004). For the senior OEM offi- 



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546 NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 

cial's arrival, see OEM interview 4 (Mar. 18, 2004). For other OEM officials' arrival, see Richard Sheirer interview 
(Apr. 7, 2004); OEM interview 6 (Mar. 24, 2004). 

79. For the time of impact, see FAA analysis of United Airlines Flight 175 radar returns and Commission analy- 
sis of FAA radar data and air traffic control software logic. For the impact zone, see NIST report, "Interim Report 
on the Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center,"June 18, 2004, appendix H-41. 
For portions undamaged, see Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). For stairwell A remaining passable, see Civil- 
ian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civil- 
ian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004). 

80. For the sky lobby, see Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). For the condition of people on the impact 
floors, see Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004); Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Commission analysis of 
91 1/PAPD calls. For events in the sky lobby after impact, see Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). 

81. For conditions in the impact zone above the 78th floor, see Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Civilian 
interview 3 (May 4, 2004); Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. For conditions on the 81st floor, see Civilian 
interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Civilian interview 3 (May 4, 2004). 

82. For the four people, see Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004}; Civil- 
ian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004). For the first person to descend stairwell A, 
see Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004). 

83. For civilians ascending the stairs, see Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004); Civilian interview 16 (Apr. 27, 
2004); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Commission analysis of letters written to OSHA concerning the Sep- 
tember 1 1 attacks. For the intention of the group ascending the stairwell and the conditions, see Civilian interview 

8 (Mar. 23, 2004). 

84. On civilians finding locked doors, see, e.g., Civilian interview 16 (Apr. 27, 2004); Commission analysis of 
letters written to OSHA concerning the September 1 1 attacks. On the lock release order, see Port Authority tran- 
scripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 1 1,2001, vol. II, channel X,pp. 25— 31; Port Author- 
ity response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. The Security Command Center did not control access areas 
in the Observation Deck and other private tenant spaces. It is unknown whether there were any prior or subse- 
quent orders or attempts to release the building's locks. 

85. For trouble descending, see Brian Clark testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped); Richard Fern testimony, 
May 18, 2004 (videotaped); Commission analysis of letters written to OSHA concerning the September 1 1 attacks. 
The conditions of stairwell C are unknown. For conditions in stairwells, see, e.g., Civilian Interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); 
Civilian Interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004). 

86. For some civilians remaining, see Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). For some civilians ascending, see, 
e.g., Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 11 (Mar. 25, 2004). 

87. For conditions in the 90s and 100s, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. For the 105th floor and 
the condition of the less affected area, see Civilian interview 16 (Apr. 27, 2004). For the other areas of the 105th, 
88th, and 89th floors, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. 

88. For the callers, see Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. There are many variables to consider in deter- 
mining whether, and to what extent, stairwell A "was actually a viable exit. Knowing that the stairway was initially 
passable from at least the 91st floor down, we can conclude that it was likely open from top to bottom, on floors 
farther removed from the impact. However, in areas near the impact zone some doors leading to the stairwell may 
have jammed. We know that access to stairway A "was possible from at least the 81st and 84th floors, and from sev- 
eral other floors between the 84th and 91st floor. It is likely that access was possible from floors higher up as "well. 
It is not known, however, whether 911 callers had a clear path to the stairwell entrance from their locations. Dam- 
age caused by the impact of the plane, and the resulting smoke and heat, may have prevented some from being able 
to reach the entrance to the staircase; but the stated locations of at least some callers indicate that they were near 
stairwell A on their floor. Based on conditions described by civilians who descended stairwell A from at or above 
the impact zone, we conclude that stairwell A may have become effectively impassable as the morning progressed. 

89. Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. 

90. Brian Clark testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Commission analy- 
sis of 91 1/PAPD calls. 

91. Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. 

92. Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 
2004); Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. 

93. OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004); PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 
2004); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004). 

94. Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 
2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); NYPD interview 15,ESU (Mar. 11,2004). 

95. Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004) (quotation); Civilian interview 

9 (Mar. 3, 2004); Civilian interview 14 (Apr. 7, 2004). 

96. Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. It is not clear whether callers from below the impact were trapped 



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S 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 547 

in offices or otherwise obstructed from proceeding, or were simply calling to seek advice. In any case, the 911 oper- 
ators and FDNY dispatchers who advised them did not appear to be basing their advice on these or other factual 
considerations. 

97. Port Authority transcripts ofrecorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 11,2001. 

98. For the evacuation route for civilians, see Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004}; Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 
22, 2004); Civilian interview 14 (Apr. 7, 2004); Civilian interview 9 (Mar. 23, 2004); PANYNJ interview 7 (Jun. 2, 
2004). 

99. FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004); FDNY 
interview 24, Battalion 6 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); NYPD interview 6, ESU 
(Feb. 19, 2004); NYPD interview 10, ESU (Mar. 1, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 10, Battalion 2, Dec. 6, 2001. 

100. Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004);PAPD interview 4, Port Author- 
ity Bus Terminal Command (Nov. 20, 2003); NYPD interview 10, ESU (Mar. 1 , 2004). For people killed by debris, 
see, e.g.,WTC interview 9 (June 8, 2004). 

101. FDNY records, computer-aided dispatch report, alarm box 8087, Sept. 1 1, 2001, 09:10:02; FDNY inter- 
view 45, HQ (Mar. 8, 2004). 

102. For the 23 engines and 13 ladders dispatched, see FDNY records, computer-aided dispatch report, Sept. 
11, 2001, 09:08:28-09:15:00. For units that self-dispatched, see FDNY interview 60, HQ (May 11, 2004); FDNY 
report, McKinsey & Company, "FDNY Report," Aug. 19, 2002, p. 35. For units riding heavy, see ibid., p. 131; FDNY 
interview 25, Battalion 1 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 21, Battalion 1 (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 7, Bat- 
talion 4 (Jan. 9, 2004); FDNY interview 9, Battalion 8 (Jan. 9, 2004); FDNY interview 50, Battalion 1 1 (Mar. 17, 
2004); FDNY interview 31, Battalion 1 (Jan. 30, 2004); FDNY interview 34, Battalion 1 (Feb. 9, 2004). For extra 
personnel being a particular issue for SOC companies, see FDNY report, 9/1 1 fatalities list. For firefighters respond- 
ing when told not to, see FDNY interview 46, Battalion 10 (Mar. 9, 2004). For firefighters responding from fire- 
houses separately from the on-duty unit, see FDNY interview 46, Battalion 10 (Mar. 9, 2004); FDNY interview, 
transcript 26, Battalion 2, Jan. 16, 2002; FDNY interview, transcript 14, Battalion 32, Dec. 12, 2001; FDNY inter- 
view, transcript 19, Battalion 2, Jan. 8, 2002. For firefighters responding from home, see FDNY interview 14, Bat- 
talion 1 (Jan. 13, 2004); FDNY interview 17, Battalion 6 (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 19, Battalion 4 (Jan. 22, 
2004); FDNY interview, transcript 6, Battalion 6 (Oct. 12, 2001); FDNY interview 1 1, Battalion 1 (Jan. 13, 2004); 
FDNY interview, transcript 2, Battalion 2, Oct. 9, 2001. For numerous additional FDNY personnel reporting, see 
FDNY interview 3, Chief (Jan. 7, 2004); FDNY interview 8, Fire Marshall (Jan. 9, 2004). 

103. FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004);Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 
2001. 

104. For FDNY personnel requesting the repeater's activation, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004). 
For one button on the repeater channel being activated, see PANYNJ interview 1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ inter- 
view 4 (May 10, 2004); Port Authority records, measurements of repeater activation tones on Sept. 1 1, 2001, undated. 
For it being unclear who triggered activation, see WTC interview 6 (May 25, 2004). For the mechanics of activat- 
ing the repeater, see PANYNJ interview 1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10, 2004). 

105. For the testing of the repeater system, see Port Authority recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), 
Sept. 1 1 , 2001 . For the master handset not being able to transmit, see PANYNJ interview 1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ 
interview 4 (May 10, 2004); Port Authority records, measurements of repeater activation tones on Sept. 11, 2001, 
undated. For the chief on the handset not being able to hear, see Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 
(repeater channel), Sept. 1 1 , 2001 . On why he could not hear, see PANYNJ interview 1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ 
interview 4 (May 10, 2004). For the repeater channel being m use in the South Tower, see Port Authority record- 
ing,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001. 

106. FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 5, 
Chief (Dec. 16, 2003). For the quotation, see Joseph Pfeifer testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped). 

107. Peter Hayden testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped). 

108. FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 5, 
Chief (Dec. 16,2003). 

109. On units ascending to the impact zone, see, e.g., FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004); FDNY 
interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004). On tasks below the impact zone, see FDNY interview 9, Battalion 8 (Jan. 
9, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 16, Battalion 31, Dec. 20, 2001. For rescuing civilians on the 22nd floor, see 
PANYNJ recognition 1, undated. 

110. See FDNY interview 58, Division 3 (Apr. 22, 2004). For units using tactical 1, see FDNY interview 15, 
Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004). 

1 1 1 . See FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004);Jules 
Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001. For equipment being carried, see ibid. 

1 12. FDNY interview 38 .Battalion 4 (Feb. 1 1, 2004). For the working elevator, see FDNY interview 23, Chief 
(Jan. 23, 2004). 

113. FDNY interview 38, Battalion 4 (Feb. 1 1, 2004); FDNY interview 25, Battalion 1 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY 



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548 NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 

interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 24, Battalion 6 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 10, 
Battalion 1 (Jan. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 20, Battalion 6 (Jan. 22, 2004). 

1 14. FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 30, Battalion 4 (Jan. 30, 2004); FDNY inter- 
view 13, Battalion 1 (Jan. 13, 2004); FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 26, Battal- 
ion 8 (Jan. 28, 2004). 

115. FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 20, Battalion 6 (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY 
interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004); FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 13, 
Battalion 1 (Jan. 13, 2004); NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004); 
FDNY interview 25, Battalion 1 (Jan. 23, 2004). 

116. For the instruction to return to the lobby, see FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003);Jules Naudet 
and Gedeon Naudet video footage, Sept. 1 1, 2001. For the rumor being debunked, the other chief continuing oper- 
ations, and no evidence of units returning, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001; 
FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004). For the chief m lobby asked about helicopters, see FDNY interview, 
transcript 7, Chief, Oct. 23, 2001. For the rejection of helicopters, see Rudolph Giuliani interview (Apr. 20, 2004). 

117. For the diminished communications, see FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY inter- 
view, transcript 5, Battalion 6 (Oct. 12, 2001); FDNY interview 42, Field Comm (Feb. 13, 2004);Jules Naudet and 
Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 5, 
Chief (Dec. 16, 2003). For lobby chiefs hearing nothing in response, see FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); 
FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16,2003). 

118. For firefighters on the 54th floor, see NYPD interview 23, Intelligence (June 10, 2004). For firefighters 
on the 44th floor, see PAPD interview 7,WTC Command (Nov. 25, 2004}. For firefighters between the 5th and 
37th floors, see, e.g., FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 
2004). 

1 19. For their commencing operations, see Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 
1 1, 2001. For OEM field respond er joining, see OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004). For units not rerouting to South 
Tower, see OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004); Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 
1 1 , 2001 ; FDNY interview, transcript 4, Battalion 4, Oct. 9, 2001 ; FDNY interview, transcript 20, Battalion 1 (Jan. 
10,2001). 

120. For the ladder company in stairwell B, see Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), 
Sept. 1 1, 2001. For the other ladder company, see OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004). For the senior chief's perspec- 
tive, see Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001. 

121. Port Authority recordmg,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11,2001. 

122. For the chiefs' situational awareness, see Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), 
Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY 15, Chief flan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 43, 
Chief (Mar. 3, 2004). For the senior chief's perspective, see Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater 
channel), Sept. 11,2001. 

123. Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 1 1, 2001. It is unknown whether the 
lobby chief ceased to communicate on the repeater channel because of technical problems or because he simply 
switched channels in order to be able to communicate with chiefs outside the South Tower.The FDNY strongly 
maintains that there must have been a technical problem resulting from the impact of one of the planes, because 
they do not believe this chief would have switched channels "without first so advising on the repeater channel. FDNY 
letter to the Commission, July, 2, 2004. However, the repeater channel subsequently worked very well for FDNY 
personnel on the 78th floor and in an elevator on the 40th floor. Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 
(repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001. 

124. FDNY interview 37, Battalion 35 (Feb. 10, 2004); FDNY interview 2,Battalion 48 (Dec. 15, 2003); FDNY 
interview, transcript 1 1, Battalion 32, Dec. 12, 2001. 

125. On the need for more companies, see FDNY interview 6, HQ (Jan. 8, 2004). For only two units being 
dispatched, see OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004); Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), 
Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 4, Battalion 4, Oct. 9, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 20, Battalion 

10, Jan. 10, 2001. For the delayed dispatch, see FDNY records, computer-aided dispatch report, alarm box 8087, 
Sept. 1 1 , 2001, 09:03:00-09:10:02. For units staged at the Brooklyn-Battery tunnel, see ibid., alarm box 1377, Sept. 

11, 2001, 08:52:59-09:47:05. On units who parked and walked, see FDNY interview 46, Battalion 10 (Mar. 9, 
2004); FDNY interview, transcript 24, Battalion 35, Jan. 25, 2002; FDNY interview, transcript 22, Battalion 7, Jan. 
16, 2002. For confusion about the towers, see FDNY interview, transcript 8, Chief, Oct. 23, 2001; Port Authority 
recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 1 1, 2001. On the inability to find the staging area, see FDNY 
interview 2, Battalion 48 (Dec. 15, 2003); FDNY interview, transcript 17, Battalion 12, Dec. 20, 2001. On jumpers 
and debris, see FDNY interview 2, Battalion 48 (Dec. 15, 2003); FDNY interview 22, Battalion 28 (Jan. 22, 2004); 
FDNY interview 39, Battalion 35 (Feb. 11, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 11, Battalion 32, Dec. 12, 2001; 
FDNY interview, transcript 15, Battalion 48, Dec. 13, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 17, Battalion 12, Dec. 20, 
2001. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 549 

126. For the chief's perspective, see FDNY interview 43, Chief {Mar. 3, 2004). For the four companies, see 
FDNY interview, transcript 13,Battalion 11, Dec. 12,2001. 

127. FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004). For finding working elevator in North Tower, see FDNY inter- 
view 53, Battalion 1 1 (Apr. 14, 2004). 

128. For the second alarm, see FDNY interview 6, HQ (fan. 8, 2004). For the other units, see FDNY records, 
computer-aided dispatch report, alarm box 1377, Sept. 1 1, 2001, 09:42:45—09:47:05. For some having gone through 
the tunnel and responded to the Marriott, see FDNY interview transcript 15, Battalion 48, Dec. 13, 2001 . 

129. Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001. 

130. FDNY interview 42, Field Comm (Feb. 13, 2004); FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar. 8, 2004); FDNY inter- 
view 46, Battalion 10 (Mar. 9, 2004); FDNY interview 18, Chief (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 27, HQ (Jan. 
28, 2004); FDNY interview 47, Chief (Mar. 1 1 , 2004); OEM interview 6 (Mar. 24, 2004). 

131. FDNY interview 42, Field Comm (Feb. 13, 2004). 
132. Ibid. 

133. FDNY interview 27, HQ (Jan. 28, 2004). 

134. For no chief fearing a total collapse, see FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar. 8, 2004);ThomasVon Essen inter- 
view (Apr. 7, 2004); FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004); FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY 
interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003). For one chief's perspective, see FDNY 
interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5,2004). For the opinion not being conveyed, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); 
FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003). 

135. FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003). 

136. For the fifth alarm, see FDNY records, computer-aided dispatch report, alarm box 2033, Sept. 1 1 , 2001 , 
09:54:29. On numbers dispatched, see ibid., Sept. 1 1 , 2001 , 08:47:20-09:54:29. For the paramedic, see FDNY inter- 
view 32, Chief (Feb. 9, 2004). 

137. NYPD interview 8, HQ (Feb. 24, 2004). Each Level 4 mobilization fields about 1,000 officers. 

138. NYPD interview 8, HQ (Feb. 24, 2004). 

139. NYPD interview 15.ESU (Mar. 1 1, 2004); NYPD interview 18.ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). 

140. For the ESU team's arrival in the North Tower and attempt to talk with the FDNY chiefs without OEM 
intervention, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 1 1 . 20! > 1 : \ YP1 ) interview 5, ESU (Feb. 
19, 2004); NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004). For the decision to have the ESU team ascend, see NYPD 
interview 1 5, ESU (Mar. 1 1, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). For the first ESU team m the South 
Tower checking in with the FDNY command post there, see OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004). 

141. For the ESU teams' preparations and one team entering the South Tower, see NYPD interview 15, ESU 
(Mar. 1 1 , 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). For the fifth team's status at 9:59, see NYPD interview 
15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004); NYPD interview 7, ESU (Feb. 20, 2004). For 
the team at the North Tower, see NYPD interview 11, ESU (Mar. 9, 2004); NYPD interview 10, ESU (Mar. 1, 
2004). 

142. NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004). 

143. New York City Police Museum interview of Kenneth Winkler,Apr. 17, 2003 (videotaped); NYPD inter- 
view 15, ESU (Mar. 11,2004). 

144. NYPD interview 22, Intelligence (June 10, 2004); NYPD interview 23, Intelligence (June 10, 2004); 
NYPD interview 24, Intelligence (June 15, 2004). 

145. NYPD interview 20, Manhattan South Task Force (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 21, 6th Precinct (May 
4, 2004); NYPD interview 19, 13th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 4, Housing (Feb. 17, 2004); PAPD 
interview 4, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command (Nov. 20, 2003). 

146. NYPD interview 19, 13th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 2, Transit (Jan. 2, 2004). 

147. For the instructions to civilians, see NYPD interview 3, HQ (Jan. 15, 2004). For the officers at 5 WTC 
and the concourse, see NYPD memo, requests for departmental recognition 3 and 5, June 26, 2002; NYPD memo, 
request for departmental recognition 3, June 26, 2002. For officers m the South Tower, see NYPD memo, request 
for departmental recognition 6,June 26, 2002; NYPD memo, request for departmental recognition 4, June 26, 2002. 

148. For the Chief of Department's instructions, see NYPD interview 8, HQ (Feb. 24, 2004). For the heli- 
copter's perspective, see NYPD recordings, City Wide 1 and Special Operations Division radio channels, Sept. 1 1 , 
2001. For pilot's belief and the helicopter not hovering, see NYPD interview 12, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004). For the 
other helicopter, see NYPD interview 16, Aviation (Apr. 1, 2004); NYPD interview 1, Aviation (Sept. 26, 2003). 

149. For the warning, see NYPD recording, Special Operations Division radio channel, Sept. 1 1, 2001. For no 
pilot predicting a collapse, see, e.g., NYPD interview 12, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD interview 14, Aviation 
(Mar. 11,2004). 

150. For the 911 call, see Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. For the inaccurate conveyance, see NYPD 
report, McKinsey & Company, "NYPD Call-routing and Message Dispatch: Draft Summary Report,"July 23,2002. 

151. For the initial responders and the assignments, see PAPD statement 3, WTC Command, Nov. 12, 2001; 
PAPD statement 12, WTC Command, Mar. 28, 2002. For officers assigned to rescue, see Port Authority transcripts 



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550 NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 

of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 1 1, 2001, vol. II, channel W, p. 26. For others climbing 
toward the impact zone, see PAPD statement 4, Administration Command, Nov. 24, 2001. 

152. For the PAPD Superintendent and inspector's ascent, see PAPD statement 3,WTC Command, Nov. 12, 
2001. For the PAPD Chief's and officers' ascent, see PANYNJ statement 1, Feb. 1, 2002. For the calls to the PAPD 
desk, see Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 1 1, 2001, vol. II, chan- 
nel 10, pp. 16-17. 

153. For officers responding on their own initiative, see PAPD interview 8, JFK Command (Mar. 31, 2004); 
PAPD statement 11,WTC Command, Mar. 28, 2002. For the desk's instructions, see PAPD statement 10, Port 
Authority Bus Terminal Command, Mar. 20, 2002; PAPD interview 3, LaGuardia Command (Nov. 20, 2003). For 
formulating an ad hoc plan, see PAPD interview 3, LaGuardia Command (Nov. 20, 2003); PAPD statement 6, Port 
Authority Bus Terminal Command, Jan. 4, 2002. For poor situational awareness, see PAPD statement 7, Adminis- 
trative Command, Jan. 6, 2002; PAPD interview 8, JFK Command (Mar. 31, 2004). For the lack of equipment, see 
PAPD interview 9, LaGuardia Command (Apr. 1, 2004); PAPD statement 13, Port Newark Command, Mar. 5, 
2002. 

154. On the PAPD officer reaching the 44th floor, see PAPD interview 7,WTC Command (Nov. 25, 2003). 
For the PAPD teams, see PAPD, statement 4, Administrative Command, Nov. 24, 2001; PAPD interview l.WTC 
Command (Oct. 14, 2003). For the officers climbing, see PAPD statement 3,WTC Command, Nov. 12, 2001. For 
officers on the ground floors, see PAPD interview 4, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command (Nov. 20, 2003); PAPD 
interview 2, Holland Tunnel Command (Oct. 27, 2003); PAPD statement 2,WTC Command, Nov. 10, 2001. 

155. On remaining in the bunker, see OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004). For the evacuation order, see OEM 
interview 4 (Mar. 18, 2004). On liaisons and OEM, see OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004). For field responders' 
placement, see OEM interview 6 (Mar. 24, 2004); OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004); Richard Sheirer interview 
(Apr. 7, 2004); OEM interview 7 (Mar. 31, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 25, OEM, Oct. 17, 2001. 

156. NIST report, "Progress Report on the Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the WTC," June 
18, 2004, appendix H, p. 40. 

157. For information about 911 calls, see Commission analysis of 91 1/PAPD calls. For people alive on the 92nd 
and 79th floors, see ibid.; Civilian interview 5 (May 26, 2004). For civilians being assisted, see PAPD interview 4, 
Port Authority Bus Terminal Command (Nov. 6, 2004); NYPD interview 10, ESU (Mar. 1, 2004); FDNY inter- 
view, transcript 10, Battalion 2, Dec. 6, 2001. For injured civilians being assisted, see FDNY interview, transcript 
10, Battalion 2, Dec. 6, 2001; FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); PAPD interview 6, Lincoln Tunnel 
Command (Nov. 24, 2003). 

158. For the overall command post, see FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5,2004). For the North Tower lobby, 
see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004). For South Tower staging, see FDNY interview 6, HQ (Jan. 8, 2004). 
For EMS staging areas, see FDNY interview 32, Chief (Feb. 9, 2004); FDNY interview 35, EMS (Feb. 10, 2004). 

159. For situational awareness in North Tower lobby, see FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004). For over- 
all command post, see FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004). 

160. For the collapse's effect on the firefighters, see FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY 
interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 25, Battalion 1 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 24, 
Battalion 6 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 
2004). For the reaction of firefighters not facing the south, see FDNY interview 7, Battalion 4 (Jan. 9, 2004); FDNY 
interview 10, Battalion 1 (Jan. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 12, Battalion 4 (Jan. 13, 2004); FDNY interview 26, 
Battalion 8 (Jan. 28, 2004); FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 
20, 2004). 

161. It is possible that the repeater channel satellite on the roof of 5 WTC was damaged or destroyed when 
the South Tower collapsed. That the repeater channel stopped recording transmissions at 9:59 does not mean trans- 
missions no longer could be made on it. 

162. For the FDNY boat radioing of the collapse, see FDNY recording, FDNY Manhattan Dispatch Chan- 
nel, Sept. 11, 2001. For the van being abandoned, see FDNY interview 42, Field Comm (Feb. 13, 2004). For the 
order one minute after the collapse, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004);Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, 
video footage, Sept. 11, 2001. For the subsequent order, see FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004). 

163. For evacuation instructions, our analysis is based on more than 100 interviews we conducted and our 
review of 500 internal FDNY interview transcripts. For three firefighters hearing "imminent collapse," see FDNY 
interview, transcript 20, Battalion 1 OJan. 1 0, 2002; FDNY interview, transcript 23, Battalion 7,Jan. 21 , 2002; FDNY 
interview/, transcript 21, Battalion 8, Jan. 9, 2002. 

164. For firefighters hearing orders over tactical 1, see, e.g., FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); 
FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004). For one chief giving the instruction, see FDNY interview 23, 
Chief (Jan. 23,2004). 

165. For the chief on the 35th floor and the first instruction, see FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004). 
For the chief on the 23rd floor, see FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battal- 
ion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004). For the chief on the 35th floor hearing of the SouthTower collapse and taking subsequent 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 551 

action, see FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004). For firefighters beginning to evacuate because of these chiefs, 
see, e.g., FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 9, Battalion 6, Dec. 5, 2001. 

166. For radios not working in high-rise environments, see FDNY interview 9, Battalion 8 (fan. 9, 2' )< )4); FDNY 
interview 13, Battalion 1 (Jan. 13, 2004). For tactical 1 being overburdened, see FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 
(Jan. 20, 2004). For the quotation, see FDNY interview, transcript 9, Battalion 6, Dec. 5, 2001. 

167. For off-duty firefighters in the North Tower, see NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); FDNY inter- 
view 24, Battalion 6 (Jan. 23, 2004). For firefighters dispatched to the South Tower, see FDNY interview 53, Bat- 
talion 11 (Apr. 14, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 20, Battalion 10, Jan. 10, 2001. 

168. For units stopping or delaying evacuation to help, see FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); 
FDNY interview 59, Battalion 2 (Apr. 22, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 3, Battalion 2, Oct. 9, 2001; FDNY 
interview, transcript 5, Battalion 6, Oct. 12, 2001. For companies first trying to regroup, see FDNY interview, tran- 
script 3, Battalion 2, Oct. 9, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 4, Battalion 4, Oct. 9, 2001. For the lack of urgency, 
see FDNY interview 57, SOC (Apr. 15, 2004); FDNY interview 25, Battalion 1 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 
16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 9, Battalion 6, Dec. 5, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 

4, Battalion 4, Oct. 9, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 3, Battalion 2, Oct. 9, 2001. For the belief that urgency 
would have increased on learning of the South Tower's collapse, see FDNY interview, transcript 9, Battalion 6, Dec. 

5, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 5, Battalion 6, Oct. 12, 2001. For firefighters sitting and not evacuating, see 
FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004); NY State Court interview 1 (June 22, 2004). For firefighters not 
leaving while others remained and convincing others to stay with them, see FDNY interview, transcript 4, Battal- 
ion 4, Oct. 9, 2001; FDNY interview 57, SOC (Apr. 15, 2004). 

169. FDNY interview 57, SOC (Apr. 15, 2004); FDNY interview 55, Battalion 8 (Apr. 15, 2004); FDNY inter- 
view, transcript 9, Battalion 6, Dec. 5, 2001 ; FDNY interview 59, Battalion 2 (Apr. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 10, 
Battalion 1 (Jan. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 7, Battalion 4 (Jan. 9, 2004); FDNY interview 13, Battalion 1 (Jan. 13, 
2004); FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 26, Battalion 8 (Jan. 28, 2004); FDNY inter- 
view 12, Battalion 4 (Jan. 13, 2004). 

170. FDNY interview 59, Battalion 2 (Apr. 22, 2004). 

171. For hotel's damage, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 1 1, 2001. For individuals 
in the lobby, see FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004); FDNY interview 36, Chief (Feb. 10, 2004); FDNY 
interview 1, Chief (Mar. 26, 2004). On assisting the civilians, see FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004). For 
the line of 20 men and the 4 survivors, see FDNY interview, transcript 13, Battalion 1 1, Dec. 12, 2001. 

172. For the two companies and their actions, see FDNY interview 22, Battalion 28 (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY 
interview 37, Battalion 35 (Feb. 10, 2004); FDNY interview 39, Battalion 35 (Feb. 11, 2004); FDNY interview 41 , 
Battalion 35 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 12, Battalion 35, Dec. 12, 2001. For the PAPD having 
cleared the area, see PAPD statement 3,WTC command, Nov. 12, 2001. For FDNY personnel checking the area 
afterward, see FDNY interview, transcript 12, Battalion 35, Dec. 12, 2001. 

173. For the senior leaders confirming the collapse, and the Chief of Department issuing a radio order, see 
FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004). For his ordering the post's relocation and two companies to respond, 
see FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar. 8, 2004). 

174. For the chiefs' delay in learning of the collapse, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY inter- 
view 56, Chief (Apr. 23, 2004). On one chief's view of the North Tower, see FDNY interview 51 (Apr. 2, 2004); 
FDNY interview 36, Chief (Feb. 10, 2004). 

175. For firefighters' actions after the collapse, see FDNY interview 49, Chief (Mar. 17, 2004); FDNY inter- 
view 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004); FDNY interview 36, Chief (Feb. 10, 2004); FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar. 8, 2004); 
FDNY interview 51 (Apr. 2, 2004); FDNY interview 22, Battalion 28 (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 1, Chief 
(Mar. 26, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 1, Battalion 7, Jan. 28, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 12, Battalion 
35, Dec. 12, 2001. For some not knowing about the collapse but others knowing and remaining to help, see FDNY 
interview 49, Chief (Mar. 17, 2004); FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004); FDNY interview 36, Chief (Feb. 
10, 2004); FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar. 8, 2004). For the quotation, see FDNY interview 49, Chief (Mar. 17, 
2004). For the firefighter directing those exiting, see FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY inter- 
view 24, Battalion 6 (Jan. 23, 2004). For the using a bullhorn, see FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004). For 
the three senior members' actions, see FDNY interview 51 (Apr. 2, 2004). 

176. NYPD recordings, City Wide 1 and Special Operations Division radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001; see also 
NYPD interview 12,Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD interview 14,Aviation (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 
13, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD interview 16,Aviation (Apr. 1, 2004). 

177. NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations Division, and Divisions 1, 2, and 3 radio channels, 
Sept. 11,2001; NPYD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 1 1, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). 

178. For the ESU teams' situational awareness, see, e.g., NYPD interview 5, ESU (Feb. 19,2004); NYPD inter- 
view 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004). For the evacuation order, see NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 1 1,2004); NYPD inter- 
view 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). 

179. For the message being clearly heard, see, e.g., NYPD interview 5, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); NYPD interview 



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552 NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 

6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004). For the subsequent exchange, see NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); NYPD inter- 
view 5,ESU (Feb. 19,2004); NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 1 1, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). 

180. For the ESU team's perspective, see NYPD interview 5, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); NYPD interview 6, ESU 
(Feb. 19, 2004). For a firefighter stating he would not take instructions from the NYPD, see FDNY interview 38, 
Battalion 4 (Feb. 1 1, 2<)(>4). For a firefighter alleging that ESU officers passed him without sharing evacuation 
instruction, see FDNY interview 57, SOC (Apr. 15, 2004). A member of the only ESU team that this firefighter 
could have encountered above the 1 1th floor states that his team did share its evacuation instruction with firefight- 
ers it encountered. NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004). 

181. NYPD interview 11, ESU (Mar. 9, 2004); NYPD interview 10, ESU (Mar. 1,2004). 

182. NYPD interview 7, ESU (Feb. 20, 2004); NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 
18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). 

183. NYPD interview 22, Intelligence (June 10, 2004); NYPD interview 23, Intelligence (June 10, 2004); 
NYPD interview 24, Intelligence (June 15, 2004). 

184. NYPD interview 20, Manhattan South Task Force (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 21,6th Precinct (May 
4, 2004); NYPD interview 4, Housing (Feb. 17, 2004); PAPD interview 4, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command 
(Nov. 20, 2003). 

185. For officers being in the concourse, see NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations Division, and 
Divisions 1,2, and 3 radio channels, Sept. 1 1, 2001. For the survivors' actions, see NYPD memo, requests for depart- 
mental recognition 3, 4, 5 and 6, June 26, 2002; NYPD interview 19, 13th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD inter- 
view 2,Transit (Jan. 2, 2004). 

186. For the collapse's effect, see PAPD interview 3, LaGuardia Command (Nov. 20, 2003). For officers not 
receiving the evacuation order, see PAPD interview 7,WTC Command (Nov. 25, 2003); PAPD interview 5, Lin- 
coln Tunnel Command (Nov. 24, 2003). For officers deciding to evacuate, see PAPD interview 10, GW Bridge 
Command (Sept. 25, 2003); PAPD statement 5, Lincoln Tunnel Command (Dec. 10, 2001). For officers slowing 
their descent, see PAPD interview 10, GW Bridge Command (Sept. 25, 2003). 

187. For the North Tower collapsing at 10:28:25, see NIST report, "Progress Report on the Federal Building 
and Fire Safety Investigation of the WTC," June 18, 2004, appendix H, p. 40. For those in stairwell B "who survived 
the North Towers collapse, see FDNY report, Division 3 report on operations on Sept. 1 1, 2001, undated; Dennis 
Cauchon and Martha Moore, "Miracles Emerge from Debris," USA Today, Sept. 6, 2002, p.Al. 

188. According to the number of death certificates issued by the New York City Medical Examiner's Office, 
the WTC attacks killed 2,749 nonterrorists, including nonterrorist occupants of the hijacked aircraft. New York 
City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner report, "WTC Victim List," undated (as of July 9, 2004). The Pentagon 
attack killed 184 nonterrorists, including the occupants of the hijacked aircraft. FBI report, list of Pentagon victims, 
undated (as ofjuly 9, 2004). Forty nonterrorists died in the crash of United Airlines Flight 93 in Pennsylvania. FBI 
report, list of Flight 93 victims, undated (as ofjuly 9, 2004). Our conclusion that these first responder death totals 
were the largest in U.S. history is based on our inability to find contrary evidence. For FDNY fatalities, see FDNY 
report, September 11 tribute, undated (online at www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/fdny/ media/tribute/ tribute.html). For 
PAPD fatalities, see PAPD report, "In Memonam," undated (online at www.pairynj.gov/AboutthePortAuthority 
/PortAuthorityPolice/InMemoriam/). For NYPD fatalities, see NYPD report,"NYPD Memorial: 2001 Heroes," 
undated (online at www.ci.iwc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/memorial_01.html). 

189. Rudolph Giuliani interview (Apr. 20, 2004); OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004); Richard Sheirer inter- 
view (Apr. 7, 2004);ThomasVon Essen interview (Apr. 7, 2004); Bernard Kerik interview (Apr. 6, 2004). 

190. The Incident Command System (ICS) is a formalized management structure for command, control, and 
coordination during an emergency response. ICS provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual agencies 
as they work toward the three main priorities of most emergencies — life safety, incident stability, and 
property/environment conservation.Within ICS, incident command is organized into five major components: the 
command function, the planning section, the operations section, the logistics section, and the finance/administra- 
tion section. When multiple agencies or jurisdictions are involved in a response, ICS provides for and can evolve 
into a unified command, with a decisionmaker from each key agency represented at the incident command level. 
For the system being used on 9/11, see, e.g., Arlington County, Virginia, report, Titan Systems Corp., "Arlington 
County: After-Action Report on the Response to the September 1 1 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon," 2002, pp. 
ll,A-20-A-21. 

191. Grant C. Peterson, "Introduction: Arlington County and the After-Action Report," July 28, 2003 (pre- 
sented at conference m Arlington, Va., "Local Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the 
Pentagon"). 

192. For the death toll, see FBI report, list of Pentagon victims, undated. For patient care and victim disposi- 
tion, see Arlington County, "After- Action Report," pp. B-l, B-12— B-15. 

193. For reasons the response was mainly a success, see Arlington County, "After- Action Report," pp. 11—12; 
Edward Plaugher interview (Oct. 16, 2003). For preparations for the International Monetary Fund and the World 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 553 

Bank meetings, see "Washington Is Seeking Support to Handle Protests at 2 Meetings," NeivYork Times, Aug. 18, 
200 1 , p. A8; Arlington County, "After-Action Report," pp. 1 2, A-4, C-26. 

194. For a list of the response agencies, see James Schwartz and Christopher Combs,"Incident Command,Joint 
Operations Center and Incident Communications," July 28, 2003 (presented at conference in Arlington,Va., "Local 
Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon"). When the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms moved from the Department of theTreasury to the Department ofjustice after 9/11 in con- 
nection 'with the creation of DHS, it was renamed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (still 
abbreviated ATF); see ATF press release, "ATF Moves to the Department of Justice," Jan. 24, 2003. 

195. For the establishment of incident command on September 11, see Arlington County, "After-Action 
Report," appendix 1, p. 1-1; Schwartz and Combs, "Incident Command." 

196. Arlington County, "After-Action Report," appendix 1, p. 1-1. Other sources put the time of the partial 
collapse as late as 10:14. See Edward P. Plaugher, "Fire & EMS," July 28, 2003 (presented at conference in Arling- 
ton,Va., "Local Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon"). 

197. Ibid., pp.A-30-A-31. 

198. Edward A. Flynn, "Law Enforcement," July 28, 2003 (presented at conference in Arlington,Va., on "Local 
Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon"). 

199. Arlington County, "After- Action Report," pp. 12-13. 

200. For the estimate, see NIST report, "WTC Investigation Progress," June 22—23, 2004. For the updated 
death certificate information, see NewYork City report, "WTC Victim List," June 21, 2004. The analysis m this 
paragraph is based upon the following sources: CNN, "September 11: A Memorial," updated 2004 (online at 
www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/memorial/index.html); company contacts, June 29, 2004 (online at 
http://worldtradeaftermath.com/wta/ contacts/companies_list.asp?letter=a); CNN,WTC tenants, 2001 (online 
at www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/ tenantsl.html); September 11 personal tributes, June 19,2004 
(online at www.legacy.com/LegacyTribute/Septl l.asp); September 1 1 personal profiles, Oct. 1 1, 2003 (online at 
www.septemberl lvictims.com/septemberl 1 Victims); NeivYork Times, Portraits: 9/1 1 /01 .The Collected "Portraits of 
Grief (Times Books, 2002). It is possible that a person who worked above the impact zone had not yet reached 
his or her office and was killed below the impact zone, either by falling debris, by the fireballs that exploded into 
the lobby, or by being trapped in an elevator. Individuals below the impact zone may have been killed for the 
same reasons. Individuals may also have been killed while in the process of evacuating. 

201. Ironically, had the towers remained up longer, scores more first responders "would have died. Twenty-six 
additional FDNY companies — more than 150 firefighters — were en route at the time of the South Tower's col- 
lapse, and scores more PAPD officers on Church and Vesey were preparing to enter the towers. 

202. The "advisory" announcement directed by protocol (without the expanded instruction for occupants to 
return to their floors) would have given greater leeway to those who judged, based on a firsthand awareness of con- 
ditions on their floors (e.g., some could feel heat from North Tower explosion), that evacuation "was "warranted. In 
retrospect, occupants would only have had to reach a point below the 77th floor to be safe. 

203. Appended to the directive "was a list of different types of emergencies with designated Incident Comman- 
ders. Terrorist incidents were subdivided according to the types of attack. Conventional weapons and bomb threats 
were assigned to the NYPD, while chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks designated "NYPD or FDNY" as the 
Incident Commander.The directive noted:"The handling of a threat of a chemical or biological release or the use 
of conventional "weapons falls to the NYPD. Dealing with the consequences of the explosion or release is the respon- 
sibility of the FDNYThe investigation that follows, once the consequences of the event have been mitigated, is the 
responsibility of the NYPD. Any conflicts regarding the issue of Command at these incidents will be resolved by 
OEM." NewYork City memo, Office of the Mayor, "Direction and Control of Emergencies in the City of New 
York," July 2001. 

204. For the NYPD clearing lanes, see, e.g., FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004). 

205. For the Mayor and Police Commissioner's consultation with the FDNY Chief of Department, see 
Rudolph Giuliani interview (Apr. 20, 2004). 

206. The FDNY's lack of command and control had some unintended positive consequences. One battalion 
chief was dispatched to the South Tower but instead responded to the North Tower, where he was instrumental in 
saving many lives after the South Tower collapsed. Some FDNY units dispatched to the South Tower — "where they 
would have perished — instead were mistakenly sent to the North Tower and in many cases survived. 

207. For the FDNY addressing these issues, see generally FDNY report, McKmsey & Company, "FDNY 
Report," Aug. 19, 2002; Peter Hayden interview (Jan. 14, 2004). For the PAPD not changing standard operating 
procedures or training, see PAPD regulations,"Manual of Police Division Instructions," undated (in existence before 
and after 9/11); Barry Pickard interview (Nov. 24, 2003). 

208. One instance in which the FDNY/NYPD rivalry may have had an impact on the total fatalities was the 
alleged failure of ESU officers descending past at least two firefighters after 9:59 in the North Tower to share their 
evacuation instructions.lt should be noted, however, that at least one firefighter has conceded that he, too, descended 
past other stationary firefighters without telling them to evacuate. In addition, according to one of the ESU offi- 



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554 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 9-10 

cers and one of the firefighters in the North Tower, at least some FDNY personnel were unwilling to take evacu- 
ation orders from police that morning. 

209. Based on more than 100 interviews we conducted and our review of 500 internal FDNY interview tran- 
scripts, we conclude that out of these 32 companies, all on-duty members of 19 companies are likely to have known 
to evacuate (Engine Companies 1,4, 7, 9, 15, 16,21, 24,28, 33, 39, and 65; Ladder Companies 1, 5, 6,8,9, 110; and 
Rescue l).We also conclude that at least some members of each of five companies knew to evacuate (two firefight- 
ers from Ladder Company 10; the officer of Ladder Company 20; all but the officer of Engine Company 10; at 
least two firefighters from Squad 18; and at least three firefighters from Engine 6). We do not know whether mem- 
bers of the eight other companies knew to evacuate (Engine Companies 55, 207, and 226; Rescue 2, 3, and 4; Haz- 
mat 1; and Squad 1) because they all died, and we have come across no on-point eyewitness accounts related to 
their operations. It is very possible that at least some of these firefighters did hear the evacuation order but never- 
theless failed to evacuate in the only 29-minute period between the collapse of the two towers. In addition, it is 
possible that several of the eight companies for which we have no record of their receiving evacuation instructions 
were in the South Tower and thus died in its earlier collapse. 

210. Eric Lipton, "A New Weapon for Firefighters," NewYork Times, May 30, 2004, p. 27. 

10 Wartime 

1. All times are Eastern Daylight Time. Sometime around 10:30, after the decision had already been made not 
to return to Washington, a reported threat to "Angel" — the code word for Air Force One — was widely dissemi- 
nated in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) and aboard Air Force One. Notes from the morn- 
ing indicate that Vice President Cheney informed President Bush in a phone conversation shortly after 10:30 that 
an anonymous threat had been phoned into the White House that was viewed as credible. At about the same time, 
news of the threat was conveyed on the air threat conference call. 

The Secret Service's Intelligence Division tracked down the origin of this threat and, during the day, deter- 
mined that it had originated in a misunderstanding by a watch officer in the White House Situation Room. The 
director of the White House Situation Room that day disputes this account. But the Intelligence Division had the 
primary job of running down the story, and we found their witnesses on this point to be credible. During the after- 
noon of September 11 the leadership of the Secret Service was satisfied that the reported threat to "Angel" was 
unfounded. 

At the White House press briefing on September 12, spokesperson Ari Fleischer described the threat to Air 
Force One as "real and credible."White House transcript, Press Briefing by An Fleischer, Sept. 12, 2001 (online at 
www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/ 2001 091 2-8.html). Fleischer told us he cited the information 
in good faith. Indeed, Fleischer had conferred "with Vice President Cheney and Karen Hughes before the briefing, 
and they had decided to let people know about the threat, all of them believing it was true. According to Fleischer, 
only weeks later did he learn — from press reports — that the threat was unfounded. We have not found any evi- 
dence that contradicts his account. Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Chuck Green interview (Mar. 10, 2004); 
Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004); Ralph Sigler meeting (May 10, 2004); Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 
2004); Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004); Secret Service briefing (Jan. 29, 2004). 

2. Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004); USSS memo, interview with Edward Marinzel, Oct. 3, 2001; 
President Bush andVice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Deb- 
orah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004);White House record, PEOC Watch Log, Sept. 1 1 , 2001 . 

3. Commission analysis ofAir Force One radar data; Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004); USSS memo, 
interview with Edward Marinzel, Oct. 3, 2001; Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004). 

4. White House record, Situation Room Communications Log, Sept. 1 1, 2001. 

5. White House transcript, Rice interview with Bob Woodward of the Washington Post, Oct. 24, 2001, p. 367. 
In the interview, Rice also said the President characterized the war as "global in nature." Ibid. 

6. See White House transcript, Rice interview with Scott Pelley of CBS, Aug. 2, 2002, p. 408; but see Rices 
statement to Bob Woodward: "In the first video conference, the assumption that everybody kind of shared was that 
it was global terrorists. ... I don't believe anybody said this is likely al Qaeda. I don't think so." White House tran- 
script, Rice interview with Bob Woodward, Oct. 24, 2001, p. 367. 

7. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting (held by secure teleconference), 
Sept. 11,2001. 

8. The Secretary's decision was broadcast on the air threat conference call at 10:43. A minute later, Secretary 
Rumsfeld spoke to the Vice President, and he asked Rumsfeld to run the issue by the President. At 10:45 confer- 
ees were told to "hold off" on Defcon 3, but a minute later the order "was reinstated. Rumsfeld believed the mat- 
ter was urgent and, having consulted DOD directives, concluded he had the authority to issue the order and "would 
brief the President. Rumsfeld briefed the President on the decision at 11:15. See DOD transcript, Air Threat Con- 
ference Call, Sept. 1 1 , 2001 ; Stephen Cambone interviews (July 8, 2004;July 12, 2004); DOD notes, Stephen Cam- 
bone notes, Sept. 11,2001. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 555 

9. The 9/11 crisis tested the U.S. government's plans and capabilities to ensure the continuity of constitutional 
government and the continuity of government operations. We did not investigate this topic, except as needed in 
order to understand the activities and communications of key officials on 9/11. The Chair,Vice Chair, and senior 
staff were briefed on the general nature and implementation of these continuity plans. 

1 O.White House transcript, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, Sept. 1 1, 2001 (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200 1 09 1 1 - 1 6.html) . 

1 1. White House transcript, Rice interview with Bob Woodward, Oct. 24, 2001, p. 371. 

12. Joshua Bolten meeting (Mar. 18, 2004); see also Steven Brill, After: How America Confronted the September 12 
Era (Simon & Schuster, 2003), pp. 50—51. 

13. The collapse of the World Trade Center towers on the morning of September 1 1 coated Lower Manhat- 
tan with a thick layer of dust from the debris and fire. For days a plume of smoke rose from the site. Between Sep- 
tember 1 1 and September 2 1,2001, EPA issued five press releases regarding air quality in Lower Manhattan. A release 
on September 16 quoted the claim of the assistant secretary for labor at OSHA that tests show "it is safe for New 
Yorkers to go back to "work in New York's financial district." (OSHA's responsibility extends only to indoor air 
quality for "workers, however.) The most controversial press release, on September 18, quoted EPA Administrator 
Christine Whitman as saying that the air was "safe" to breathe. This statement was issued the day after the financial 
markets reopened. The EPA Office of Inspector General investigated the issuance of these press releases and con- 
cluded that the agency did not have enough data about the range of possible pollutants other than asbestos to make 
a judgment, lacked public health benchmarks for appropriate levels of asbestos and other pollutants, and had impre- 
cise methods for sampling asbestos in the air; it also noted that more than 25 percent of the bulk dust samples col- 
lected before September 18 showed the presence of asbestos above the agency's 1 percent benchmark. EPA Inspector 
General report, "EPA 's Response to the Wo rid Trade Center Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improve- 
ment," Aug. 21, 2003. 

We do not have the expertise to examine the scientific accuracy of the pronouncements in the press releases. 
The issue is the subject of pending civil litigation. 

We did examine whether the White House improperly influenced the content of the press releases so that they 
would intentionally mislead the public. The EPA press releases were coordinated with Samuel Thernstrom, associ- 
ate director for communications at the White House Council on Environmental Quality. Oral reports, interviews 
with EPA officials, and materials on the EPA'sWeb site were not coordinated through the White House. Although 
the White House review process resulted in some editorial changes to the press releases, these changes were con- 
sistent with what the EPA had already been saying without White House clearance. See, e.g., David France and 
Erika Check, "Asbestos Alert; How much of the chemical does the World Trade Center "wreckage contain?" 
Neivsitwek Web Exclusive, Sept. 14, 2001 (quoting EPA Administrator Whitman as saying the air quality is not a health 
problem); Andrew C. Revkin, "After the Attacks: The Chemicals; Monitors Say Health Risk From Smoke Is Very 
Small," NeivYork Times, Sept. 14, 2001, p. A6 (EPA says levels of airborne asbestos below threshold of concern); Hugo 
Kugiya, "Terrorist Attacks; Asbestos Targeted in Cleanup Effort; EPA s Whitman: 'No reason for concern,'" Mews- 
day, Sept. 16, 2001, p.W31 (Whitman says there is no reason for concern given EPA tests for asbestos). There were 
disputes between the EPA's communications person and the White House coordinator regarding the press releases. 
The EPA communications person said she felt extreme pressure from the White House coordinator, and felt that 
they were no longer her press releases. EPA Inspector General interview ofTina Kreisher, Aug. 28, 2002. The White 
House coordinator, however, told us that these disputes were solely concerned with process, not the actual sub- 
stance of the releases. Samuel Thernstrom interview (Mar. 31, 2004). Former EPA administrator Christine Whit- 
man agreed with the White House coordinator. Christine Whitman interview (June 28, 2004) The documentary 
evidence supports this claim. Although Whitman told us she spoke with White House senior economic adviser 
Lawrence Lindsey regarding the need to get the financial markets open quickly, she denied he pressured her to 
declare the air was safe due to economic expediency. We found no evidence of pressure on EPA to say the air was 
safe in order to permit the markets to reopen. Moreover, the most controversial release that specifically declared 
the air safe to breathe was released after the markets had already reopened. 

The EPA did not have the health-based benchmarks needed to assess the extraordinary air quality conditions 
in Lower Manhattan after 9/1 l.The EPA and the White House therefore improvised and applied standards devel- 
oped for other circumstances in order to make pronouncements regarding air safety, advising workers at Ground 
Zero to use protective gear and advising the general population that the air "was safe. Whether those improvisations 
were appropriate is still a subject for medical and scientific debate. See EPA Inspector General report, "EPA's 
Response to the World Trade Center Collapse," Aug. 21, 2003, pp. 9—19. 

14. Brill, After, pp. 47-50. 

15. We studied this episode and interviewed many of the participants.The NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq have devel- 
oped plans for coordination and cooperation in the event of a disaster affecting one or all of them, but these plans 
do not include other exchanges or international components. The White House efforts during the crisis were coor- 
dinated by the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, a group created in the 1980s. 

16. Brill, After, pp. 53—55, 89—91. Following interim reports in 1999 and 2000, a congressional commission 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



556 NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 

chaired by former senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, and directed by retired general Charles Boyd, had, in 
January 2001, recommended the creation of a cabinet department dedicated to "homeland security." In May 2001, 
President Bush namedVice President Cheney to head a task force on problems of national preparedness. His recently 
hired coordinator, Admiral Steven Abbot, had started workjust before the 9/11 attack. 

17. Ashcroft told us that he established a "hold until cleared" policy because of the high rate of flight from 
deportation proceedings. John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004. For closure of hearings and secrecy of the detainee 
names, see DOJ email, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy to all immigration judges, "Cases requiring spe- 
cial procedures," Sept. 21, 2001. This policy has been challenged in two U.S. courts of appeals.The Sixth Circuit 
held that there is a constitutional right of public access to these hearings; the Third Circuit reached the opposite 
result.The Supreme Court has not yet decided to resolve this "circuit split." See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 
E3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert, denied, 123 S.Ct. 
2215 (2003). For the length of the clearance process, see DOJ Inspector General report, "The September 11 
Detainees:A Review of the Treatment ofAliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investiga- 
tion of the September 11 Attacks," Apr. 2003, p. 51. 

18. DOJ Inspector General report, "The September 11 Detainees," Apr. 2003, pp. 142-150, 195-197. 

19. John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004; DOJ record, "Special Interest Cases," Sept. 16, 2003. These num- 
bers do not add up to 768 because we have not included all categories. Some of those remanded to the Marshals 
Service were held as material witnesses, and individuals were released "on bond" only after they were "cleared" by 
the FBI of any connection to 9/11. For the response to our questions about the 9/11 detainee program, see DOJ 
emails, Daniel Levin to the Commission, July 9, 2004;July 13, 2004. There is one exception to the statement in the 
text that the detainees were lawfully held on immigration charges; one detainee was held for a short time "despite 
the fact that there was no valid immigration charge."DOJ Inspector General report,"The September 1 1 Detainees," 
Apr. 2003, p. 15, n. 22. See also Khaled Medhat Abou El Fadl testimony, Dec. 8, 2003. 

20. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 10, 2003. 

21. The complete title of the Act is Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
273 (signed into law Oct. 26, 2001). 

22. John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003}. 

23. On the early development of the Patriot Act, see, e.g., Brill, After, pp. 73-76, 120-125. 

24. During the morning of September 11, the FAA suspended all nonemergency air activity in the national 
airspace. While the national airspace was closed, decisions to allow aircraft to fly were made by the FAA 'working 
with the Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Secret Service, and the FBI. The Department ofTrans- 
portation reopened the national airspace to U.S. carriers effective 1 1:00 A.M. on September 13, 2001, for flights out 
of or into airports that had implemented the FAA's new security requirements. See FAA response to Commission 
questions for the record,June 8, 2004. 

25. After the airspace reopened, nine chartered flights with 160 people, mostly Saudi nationals, departed from 
the United States between September 14 and 24. In addition, one Saudi government flight, containing the Saudi 
deputy defense minister and other members of an official Saudi delegation, departed Newark Airport on Septem- 
ber 14. Every airport involved in these Saudi flights was open when the flight departed, and no inappropriate actions 
were taken to allow those flights to depart. See City of St. Louis Airport Authority, Lambert— St. Louis International 
Airport response to Commission questions for the record, May 27, 2004; Los Angeles International Airport response 
to Commission questions for the record, June 2, 2004; Greater Orlando Aviation Authority, Orlando International 
Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 8, 2004; Metropolitan Washington Airports Author- 
ity, Washington Dulles International Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 8, 2004; Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, JFK Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 4, 
2004; Massachusetts Port Authority, Logan International Airport, and Hanscom Airfield response to Commission 
questions for the record, June 17, 2004; Las Vegas— McCarran International Airport response to Commission ques- 
tions for the record, June 22, 2004; Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Newark Airport response to sup- 
plemental question for the record, July 9, 2004. 

Another particular allegation is that a flight carrying Saudi nationals from Tampa, Florida, to Lexington, Ken- 
tucky, was allowed to fly while airspace was closed, with special approval by senior U.S. government officials. On 
September 13, Tampa police brought three young Saudis they were protecting on an off-duty security detail to the 
airport so they could get on a plane to Lexington. Tampa police arranged for two private investigators to provide 
security on the flight. They boarded a chartered Learjet. Dan Grossi interview (May 24, 2004); Manuel Perez inter- 
view (May 27, 2004);John Solomon interview (June 4, 2004); Michael Fendle interview (June 4, 2004). The plane 
took off at 4:37 P.M., after national airspace was open, more than five hours after the Tampa airport had reopened, 
and after other flights had arrived at and departed from that airport. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, Tampa 
International Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 7, 2004. The plane's pilot told us there 
was "nothing unusual whatsoever" about the flight other than there were few airplanes in the sky. The company's 
owner and director of operations agreed, saying that "it was just a routine little trip for us" and that he would have 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 557 

heard if there had been anything unusual about it.The pilot said he followed standard procedures and filed his flight 
plan with the FAA prior to the flight, adding, "I was never questioned about it." Christopher Steele interview (June 
14, 2004}; Barry Ellis interview (June 14, 2004). FAA records confirm this account. FAA supplemental response to 
Commission questions for the record, June 8, 2004. When the plane arrived at Lexington Blue Grass Airport, that 
airport had also been open for more than five hours. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Board, Blue Grass 
Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 8, 2004. The three Saudi nationals debarked from 
the plane and were met by local police. Their private security guards were paid, and the police then escorted the 
three Saudi passengers to a hotel where they joined relatives already in Lexington. Mark Barnard interview (June 
7, 2004). The FBI is alleged to have had no record of the flight and denied that it occurred, hence contributing to 
the story of a "phantom flight."This is another misunderstanding. The FBI was initially misinformed about how 
the Saudis got to Lexington by a local police officer in Lexington who did not have firsthand knowledge of the 
matter. The Bureau subsequently learned about the flight. James M. interview (June 18, 2004). 

26. Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004). 

27. Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004); President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); 
Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004); Prince Bandar interview (May 5, 2004); Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 
12, 2004); Richard Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004 ("I would love to be able to tell you who did it, who brought 
this proposal to me, but I don't know"). Instead, the matter was handled as follows. Within days of September 1 1, 
fearing reprisals against Saudi nationals, Rihab Massoud, the deputy chief of mission at the Saudi embassy in Wash- 
ington, D.C., called Dale Watson, the FBI's assistant director for counterterrorism, and asked for help in getting 
some of its citizens out of the country. Rihab Massoud interview (May 1 1, 2004). At about the same time, Michael 
Rolmce, chief of the FBI's international terrorism operations section, also heard from an FBI official in Newark 
about a proposed flight of Saudis out of the country. Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004). We believe this was 
the Saudi deputy defense minister's flight. Rolince says he told the Newark official that the Saudis should not be 
allowed to leave without having the names on their passports matched to their faces, and their names run through 
FBI case records to see whether they had surfaced before. Rolince and Watson briefed Robert Mueller, the direc- 
tor of the FBI, about the issue and how they were handling it.The State Department played a role as well in flights 
involving government officials or members of the royal family. State coordinated with the FBI and FAA to allow 
screening by the FBI of flights with Saudi nationals on board. There is no evidence that State tried to limit the 
screening. DOS record, Log of USA 9-11 Terrorist Attack Task Force, Sept. 13, 2001; Jack S. interview (June 14, 
2004). The FBI effectively approved the Saudi flights at the level of a section chief. Having an opportunity to check 
the Saudis was useful to the FBI. This "was because the U.S. government did not, and does not, routinely run checks 
on foreigners who are having the United States.This procedure was convenient to the FBI, as the Saudis who wished 
to leave in this way would gather and present themselves for record checks and interviews, an opportunity that 
would not be available if they simply left on regularly scheduled commercial flights. 

28. These flights were screened by law enforcement officials, primarily the FBI. For example, one flight, the 
so-called Bin Ladin flight, departed the United States on September 20 with 26 passengers, most of them relatives 
of Usama Bin Ladin. Screening of this flight was directed by an FBI agent in the Baltimore Field Office who was 
also a pilot. This agent, coordinating with FBI headquarters, sent an electronic communication to each of the field 
offices through which the Bin Ladin flight "was scheduled to pass, including the proposed flight manifest and direct- 
ing what screening should occur. He also monitored the flight as it moved around the country — from St. Louis to 
Los Angeles to Orlando to Washington Dulles, and to Boston Logan — correcting for any changes in itinerary to 
make sure there was no lapse in FBI screening at these locations. Again, each of the airports through which the Bin 
Ladin flight passed was open, and no special restrictions were lifted to accommodate its passage. James C. interview 
(June 3, 2004). 

The Bin Ladin flight and other flights we examined were screened in accordance with policies set by FBI head- 
quarters and coordinated through working-level interagency processes. Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004). 
Although most of the passengers were not interviewed, 22 of the 26 people on the Bin Ladin flight were inter- 
viewed by the FBI. Many were asked detailed questions. None of the passengers stated that they had any recent 
contact with Usama Bin Ladin or knew anything about terrorist activity. See, e.g., FBI report of investigation, inter- 
view of Mohammed Saleh Bin Laden, Sept. 21, 2001. As Richard Clarke noted, long before 9/11 the FBI was fol- 
lowing members of the Bin Ladin family in the United States closely. Richard Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004. 
Two of the passengers on this flight had been the subjects of preliminary investigations by the FBI, but both their 
cases had been closed, m 1999 and March 2001, respectively, because the FBI had uncovered no derogatory infor- 
mation on either person linking them to terrorist activity.Their cases remained closed as of 9/1 1, were not reopened 
before they departed the country on this flight, and have not been reopened since. FBI electronic communication, 
Summary of Information Regarding Flights taken by Saudi Citizens Out of the U.S. Shortly After September 11, 
2001, Oct. 29, 2003, pp. 9-10. 

29. Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004). Massoud corroborates this account. He said the FBI required 
the names and personal information of all departing passengers sponsored for departure by the Saudi Embassy. Rihab 
Massoud interview (May 11, 2004). 



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558 NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 

30. Jack S. interview (June 14, 2004). 

31. The FBI checked a variety of databases for information on the Bin Ladin flight passengers and searched the 
aircraft. Because it was not clear to us whether theTIPOFF terrorist watchlist was checked by the FBI, the Terror- 
ist Screening Center checked the names of individuals on the flight manifests of six Saudi flights against the cur- 
rent TIPOFF watchlist at our request prior to our hearing in April 2004. There were no matches. At our request, 
based on additional information, theTerrorist Screening Center in June and July 2004 rechecked the names of indi- 
viduals believed to be on these six flights, the names of individuals on three more charter flights, the names of indi- 
viduals on the flight containing the Saudi Deputy Defense Minister, and the names of Saudi nationals on commercial 
flights that journalists have alleged are suspect. There were no matches. Tim D. interviews (Apr. 12, 2004;June 30, 
2004; July 9, 2004); FBI memo, Terrorist Screening Center to Director's Office, "Request by 9/11 Commission 
Task Force to screen the airline passenger lists through theTDSB and TIPOFF databases," Mar. 30, 2004. 

32. White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Charlie Gibson of ABC, Sept. 4, 2002, p. 11. 

33. "The only . . . true advice I receive is from our war council." White House transcript, President Bush inter- 
view with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz of the Washington Post, Dec. 20, 2001. 

34. On Secretary Rumsfeld's remarks, see White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Wood- 
ward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001. The President's adviser, Karen Hughes, who was in the interview, listed the points 
Rumsfeld made at the smaller NSC meeting. Ibid. 

35. On the President's tasking in the earlier meeting held that day, see NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions 
for NSC Meeting Held on September 12, 2001, Dec. 17, 2001. On the paper that went beyond al Qaeda, see NSC 
memo, Deputies Draft Paper (attached to Agenda for NSC Meeting Scheduled for Sept. 12, 2001). The Summary 
of Conclusions for the afternoon meeting indicates that the paper was discussed. 

On giving priority to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, see White House tran- 
script, Hadley interview with Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, Jan. 1 1, 2002, p. 535. 

36. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee Meeting Held on September 13, 2001. 
In addition to the usual members of President Bush's war cabinet, Secretary of Transportation Mineta and FAA 
security chief Canavan also attended. 

37. DOS cable, State 15871 1, "Deputy Secretary Armitage's Meeting with General Mahmud: Actions and Sup- 
port Expected of Pakistan in Fight Against Terrorism," Sept. 14, 2001. On September 14, 2001, the U.S. Embassy 
in Islamabad sent Musharraf's answer to the State Department by cable. 

38. DOS cable, Islamabad 5123, "Musharraf Accepts the Seven Points," Sept. 14, 2001. 

39. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of NSC Meeting Held on September 13, 2001. According to the 
Summary of Conclusions, this meeting of the President and his advisers took place in the White House Situation 
Room; however, the agenda alerting agencies to the meeting specified that it would be conducted via the secure 
video teleconference system (SVTS).Thus, it is unclear whether the attendees met face-to-face at the White House 
or held their meeting remotely via SVTS. 

40. State Department memo, "Gameplan for Polmil Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan," Sept. 14, 2001 
(tasked by President Bush). The paper was sent to theWhite House on September 14, 2001. The demand to free 
all imprisoned foreigners reflected the U.S. government's concern about the welfare of several foreign aid workers 
in Afghanistan "who had been imprisoned by the Taliban in August 2001 .Two young American women, Heather 
Mercer and Dayna Curry of the organization "Shelter Now International," were among those arrested and charged 
with promoting Christianity.The Taliban and other Islamists found their activities an affront to Islam and in viola- 
tion of Afghanistan's laws and the regime's tenets. Wendy Chamberlin interview (Oct. 28, 2003). Powell stated that 
the President "wanted to get the hostages out but that desire would not restrain American action. White House tran- 
script, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001. 

41. State Department memo, "Gameplan for Polmil Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan," Sept. 14, 2001. 

42. White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001. 

43. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). Hadley told us that the White House "was not satisfied with the 
Defense Department's plans to use force in Afghanistan after 9/11. Ibid.; see also White House transcript, Rice inter- 
view with John King of CNN, Aug. 2, 2002, p. 42 1 . 

44. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004). 

45. NSC memo, Hadley to recipients, "Discussion Paper for NSC meeting at Camp David on 14 September," 
Sept. 14,2001. 

46.CIAmemo,"GomgtoWar,"Sept. 15,2001. 

47. White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001. 

48. DOD briefing materials, "Evolution of Infinite Resolve Planning (AQ, UBL)," undated (provided to the 
Commission on Mar. 19, 2004). According to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, the President 
responded to Shelton by saying that the boots-on-the-ground option was an interesting idea. He wanted to know 
what the CIA would do when ground forces were in Afghanistan. White House transcript, Hadley interview with 
Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, Jan. 11, 2002, p. 545. 

49. NSC memo, "Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting," Sept. 17, 2001; White House transcript, 
President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001 . 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 559 

50. NSC memo, "Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting," Sept. 17, 2001. 

51. See NSC memo, Rice to Cheney, Powell, O'Neill, Rumsfeld, Ashcro ft, Gonzales, Card, Tenet, and Shelton, 
Sept. 16,2001. 

52. NSC memo, "Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting," Sept. 17, 2001. 

53. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions ofTerronst Fund-raising Meeting Held on September 18, 2001. 

54. DOS briefing materials, "Fact Sheet on Response to Terrorist Attacks in US," Sept. 17, 2001. 

55. DOS cable, State 161279, "Deputy Secretary Armitage-Mamoud Phone Call," Sept. 18,2001. 

56. White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, Jan. 18,2002, 
pp. 7-8. 

57. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). 

58. See National Security Presidential Directive 9, Oct. 25, 2001. 

59. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). On Iran, see Condoleezza Rice testi- 
mony, Apr. 8, 2004. 

60. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free Press, 2004), p. 32. According to 
Clarke, he responded that "al Qaeda did this."When the President pressed Clarke to check if Saddam was involved 
and said that he wanted to learn of any shred of evidence, Clarke promised to look at the question again, but added 
that the NSC and the intelligence community had looked in the past for linkages between al Qaeda and Iraq and 
never found any real linkages. Ibid. 

61. President Bush told us that Clarke had mischaracterized this exchange. On the evening of September 12, 
the President was at the Pentagon and then went to the White House residence. He dismissed the idea that he had 
been wandering around the Situation Room alone, saying, "I don't do that." He said that he did not think that any 
president "would roam around looking for something to do. While Clarke said he had found the President's tone 
"very intimidating,' ("Clarke's Take onTerror," CBSnews.com, Mar. 21, 2004, online at www.cbsnews.com/stories 
/2004/03/19/60minutes/printable6( i7356.shtml),President Bush doubted that anyone would have found his man- 
ner intimidating. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). Roger Cressey, Clarke's deputy, 
recalls this exchange with the President and Clarke concerning Iraq shortly after 9/1 l,but did not believe the Pres- 
ident's manner was intimidating. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004). 

62. NSC memo, Kurtz to Rice, Survey of Intelligence Information on any Iraq Involvement in the Septem- 
ber 11 Attacks, Sept. 18, 2001. On 60 Minutes (CBS, Mar. 21, 2004), Clarke said that the first draft of this memo 
was returned by the NSC Front Office because it did not find a tie between Iraq and al Qaeda; Rice and Hadley 
deny that they asked to have the memo redone for this reason. 

63 . See DOD notes,Victoria Clarke notes, Sept. 1 1 , 2001 ; DOD notes, Stephen Cambone notes, Sept. 1 1 , 2001 . 
Cambone's notes indicate this exchange took place at 2:40 P.M. on September 11, 2001. Steven Cambone inter- 
view (July 15,2004). 

64. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). For an account of Rumsfeld's and Wolfowitz's position on Iraq, 
see Bob Woodward, Bush at War (Simon & Schuster, 2002), pp. 83—84. Rice told us that the Bush at War account of 
the Camp David discussions on Iraq accorded with her memory. 

65. DOD memo, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "War on Terrorism: Strategic Concept," 
Sept. 14,2001. 

66. Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Rumsfeld told Bob Woodward that he had no recollection of 
Wolfowitz's remarks at Camp David. DOD transcript, "Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with the Washington Post," 
Jan. 9, 2002 (online at www.defenselmk.mil/transcripts/2002/t02052002_t0109wp.html). 

67. Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Powell raised concerns that a focus on Iraq might negate progress 
made with the international coalition the administration "was putting together for Afghanistan. Taking on Iraq at 
this time could destroy the international coalition. Ibid. 

68. Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004). 

69. White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001 . 

70. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). 

71. NSC memo, "Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting," Sept. 17, 2001. 

72. Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; see also Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (Simon & Schuster, 2004), 
P-22. 

73. DOD memo, Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld, "Preventing More Events," Sept. 17, 2001. We review contacts 
between Iraq and al Qaeda in chapter 2. We have found no credible evidence to support theories of Iraqi govern- 
ment involvement m the 1993 WTC bombing.Wolfowitz added in his memo that he had attempted injune to get 
the CIA to explore these theories. 

74. DOD memo, Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld, "Were We Asleep?" Sept. 18,2001. 

75. DOD memo, Rumsfeld to Shelton, "Some Thoughts for CINCs as They Prepare Plans," Sept. 19, 2001. In 
a memo that appears to be from Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith to Rumsfeld, dated September 20, the 
author expressed disappointment at the limited options immediately available in Afghanistan and the lack of ground 
options.The author suggested instead hitting terrorists outside the Middle East in the initial offensive, perhaps delib- 



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560 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 10-11 

erately selecting a non— al Qaeda target like Iraq. Since U.S. attacks "were expected in Afghanistan, an American attack 
in South America or Southeast Asia might be a surprise to the terrorists. The memo may have been a draft never 
sent to Rumsfeld, or may be a draft of points being suggested for Rumsfeld to deliver in a briefing to the Presi- 
dent. DOD memo, Feith to Rumsfeld, "Briefing Draft," Sept. 20, 2001. 

76. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). 

77. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004). 

78. NSC memo, memorandum of conversation from meeting of President Bush with Prime Minister Blair, 
Sept. 20,2001. 

79. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004). 

80. White House transcript, President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 
Sept. 20, 2001. British Prime MinisterTony Blair attended the session. 

81. Ibid. Several NSC officials, including Clarke and Cressey, told us that the mention of the Cole in the speech 
to Congress marked the first public U.S. declaration that al Qaeda had been behind the October 2000 attack. Clarke 
said he added the language on this point to the speech. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004); Roger Cressey 
interview (Dec. 15,2003). 

82. White House transcript, President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 
Sept. 20, 2001. President Bush told the Washington Post that he considered having Powell deliver the ultimatum to 
the Taliban, but determined it would have more impact coming directly from the president. White House tran- 
script, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001. 

83. White House transcript, President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 
Sept. 20,2001. 

84. Ibid. 

85. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004). Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers and 
Major General Del Dailey, commander of Joint Special Operations Command, also attended the September 21 
meeting.The meeting was in direct response to the President's September 17 instruction to Rumsfeld to develop 
a military campaign plan for Afghanistan. The original "Infinite Justice" name was a continuation of a series of names 
begun in August 1998 with Operation Infinite Reach, the air strikes against Bin Ladin's facilities in Afghanistan 
and Sudan after the embassy bombings. The series also included Operation Infinite Resolve, a variety of proposed 
follow-on strikes on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan. 

86. DOD Special Operations Command and Central Command briefings (Sept. 15—16, 2003; Apr. 8—9, 2004; 
Apr. 28, 2004); Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004). On death of Atef, see Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, 
Age of Sacred Terror, p. 349; Henry, "The CIA in Afghanistan, 2001—2002," Studies in Intelligence (classified version), 
vol. 47, no. 2 (2003), pp. 1, 11. See Donald Rumsfeld testimony, Mar. 23, 2004 (nearly two-thirds of the known 
leaders of al Qaeda had been killed or captured). 

11 Foresight — and Hindsight 

1 . Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford Univ. Press, 1962), p. 387. 

2. Intelligence Community analytic report, "The Foreign Terrorist Threat in the United States," NIE 95-13, 
July 1995,pp.v,vii-vm, 10-11, 13, 18. 

3. Intelligence Community analytic report,"The Foreign TerroristThreat in the US: Revisiting Our 1995 Esti- 
mate," I CB 97-8, Apr. 1997, p. 1. 

4. For Bin Ladm being mentioned in only two other sentences, see ibid. 

5. Titles are drawn from articles in the National Intelligence Daily and the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. 

6. John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). 

7. Ibid.; Pattie Kindsvater interview (Sept. 12, 2003). 

8.TimWemer,"U.S. Hard Put to Find Proof Bin Laden Directed Attacks," NewYorkTimes, Apr. 13, 1999, p. Al. 

9. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 23; see also ibid., pp. 5, 
21-22. 

10. For a concise statement of the role of the national estimate process, see Task force sponsored by the Coun- 
cil on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future oj U.S. Intelligence (Council on Foreign Relations, 
1996), pp. 34-35 (additional views of Richard Betts). 

1 1 .Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1988), p. 215. 

12. For the response being routine, see Gordon Prange, /If Dme/i We Slept :The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (McGraw- 
Hill, 1981), pp. 732—733. For a brief summary of these routines and the reasons why the intercepts were not properly 
digested, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 2d ed. (Longman, 1999), p. 194, n. 72. 

13. PDBs were not routinely briefed to congressional leaders, though this item could have been m some other 
intelligence briefing. It was not circulated in the NID or SEIB. For the September 1998 report, see Intelligence 
report, "Terrorism: Possible Attack on a U.S. City," Sept. 8, 1998. 



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Q 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 11 561 

14. For the August report, see Intelligence report, "Terrorism: Alleged Threat by Arab Terrorists to Attack the 
World Trade Center in New York," Aug. 12, 1998. An FAA civil aviation security official believed the plan was 
improbable because Libyan planes were required to operate within airspace limitations and the Libyans did not pos- 
sess aircraft with the necessary range to make good on the threat. Jack S. interview (June 13, 2004). On September 
30, 1999, the FAA closed the file on the August report after investigation could not corroborate the report, and the 
source's credibility was deemed suspect. FAA report, Transportation Security Intelligence ICF Report 980162, 
undated; but see FAA/TSA rebuttal to the Joint Inquiry's Sept. 18, 2002, staff statement, undated, p. 1 (stating that 
the FAA did not formally analyze this threat). The Algerian hijackers had placed explosives in key areas of the cabin. 
However, there was some speculation in the media based on reports from a passenger aboard the plane that the 
hijackers had discussed crashing it into the Eiffel Tower. FAA report, FAA Intelligence Case File 94-jDS, undated. 

15. For Murad's idea, see chapter 5, note 33. 

16. For Clarke's involvement in the 1996 Olympics, see Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003). For the 
1998 exercise, see Chuck Green interview (Apr. 21, 2004); NSC briefing paper, Nov. 10, 1998. 

17. For the report of the National Transportation Safety Board, see NTSB report, "Aircraft Accident Brief," 
Mar. 13, 2002 (online at www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/aab0201 .htm). For the early 2000 CSG discussion, see NSC 
note, CSG SVTS agenda, Jan. 31, 2000. 

18. Richard Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004. 

19. FAA memo, Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence, "Usama Bin Ladin/World Islamic Front Hijack- 
ingThreat," Intelligence Note 99-06, Aug. 4, 1999, pp. 5-6. 

20. Ibid. 

21. As part of his 34-page analysis, the attorney explained why he thought that a fueled Boeing 747, used as a 
weapon, "must be considered capable of destroying virtually any building located anywhere in the world." DOJ 
memo, Robert D. to Cathleen C, "Aerial Intercepts and Shoot-downs: Ambiguities of Law and Practical Consid- 
erations," Mar. 30, 2000, p. 10. Also, in February 1974, a man named Samuel Byck attempted to commandeer a 
plane at Baltimore Washington International Airport with the intention of forcing the pilots to fly into Washing- 
ton and crash into the White House to kill the president. The man was shot by police and then killed himself on 
the aircraft "while it was still on the ground at the airport. 

22. For NORAD's hypothesis of aircraft as weapons, see, e.g., Ralph Eberhardt interview (Mar. 1, 2004). For 
the 2001 Positive Force 01 exercise, see DOD briefing (Apr. 29, 2004);Tom Cecil and Mark Postgate interview 
(June 7, 2004). 

23. For the Gates report's recommendations, see DCI task force report,"Improvmg Intelligence Warning," May 

29, 1992. For strengthening of the warning official, see DCI memo, "Warning," July 17, 1992. For the recommen- 
dations languishing, see Charles Allen interview (Sept. 22, 2003). For CTC having responsibility for warning, see 
Robert Vickers interview (Sept. 17, 2003). For the Board's warnings, see, e.g., Community Counterterrorism Board 
report, "Intelligence CommunityTerroristThreat Advisory: Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks," June 

30, 2000. 

24. CIA briefing materials, "DCI Update," Aug. 23, 2001. 

25. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). For more on this meeting, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 
2004); George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004). 

26. For the briefing to the President-elect, see James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). The CIA's formal analysis 
of what 'would happen if Bin Ladin alone was removed as compared with the importance of shutting down the 
sanctuary was offered in several places. See, e.g., CIA analytic report, "Likely Impact ofTaliban Actions Against Al 
Qaeda," Feb. 21, 2001 (provided as background forTenet meetings with Rice on Feb. 23 and Mar. 7, 2001). 

27. Richard Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004. 

28. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003) (reading from CIA email, Mike to Winston Wiley, Aug. 27, 1997). 

29. For President Bush's statement of al Qaeda's responsibility for the Cole attack, see White House transcript, 
"Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," Sept. 20, 2001 (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html). 

30. For Pavitt s view, see James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). 

31. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). Zinni was concerned about excessive collateral damage caused by 
Tomahawk strikes. See Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29, 2004). 

32. For Shelton's view, see Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For Cohen's view, see William Cohen inter- 
view (Feb. 5, 2004). 

33. Russell Honore interview (Oct. 29, 2003). 

34. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). 
35. Ibid. 

36. Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003). 

37. Rich interview (Dec. 11,2003). 

38. CIA memo, Tenet to Gordon and others, "Usama Bin Ladin," Dec. 4, 1998, p. 2. 

39. See, e.g., Joan Dempsey interview (Nov. 12, 20()3);Jeft B. interview (Dec. 1 1, 2003); Louis Andre interview 



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562 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1 

(Nov. 10, 2003); Mary C. interview (Oct. 25, 2003); Maureen Bagmski interview (Nov. 15, 2003);Thomas Wilson 
interview (Dec. 4, 2003). Assistant DCI Charles Allen did redouble his efforts to coordinate and improve collec- 
tion at the tactical level, but this was not a plan to address larger weaknesses in the fundamental capabilities of the 
intelligence community. See Charles Allen interview (Sept. 22, 2003). 

40. For Dempsey's action, see Joan Dempsey interview (Nov. 12, 2003). For Minihan's view, see Joint Inquiry 
interview of Kenneth Minihan, Sept. 12, 2002. For the CIA viewing the memorandum as intended for non-CIA 
intelligence agencies, see Dave Carey interview (Oct. 31, 2003). 

41. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004); James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). 

42. For the New York Times article about the Jordanian arrests, see Reuters, "Jordan Seizes 13 and Links Them 
to Afghan Explosives Training," NeivYork Times, Dec. 16, 1999, p. A 13. For the Ressam story being on the front page, 
see, e.g., Sam HoweVerhovek with Tim Werner, "Man Seized with Bomb Parts at Border Spurs U.S. Inquiry," New 
York Times, Dec. 18, 1999, p. A 1. For television coverage, see Vanderbilt University Television News Archive, Dec. 
13,22-31,1999. 

12 What to Do? A Global Strategy 

1. For spending totals, see David Baumann, "Accounting for the Deficit," National Journal, June 12, 2004, p. 
1852 (combining categories for defense discretionary, homeland security, and international affairs). 

2. White House press release, "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," Feb. 2003 (online at www.white- 
house.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html). 

3. "Islamist terrorism is an immediate derivative of hiamism.Th.is term distinguishes itself from Islamic hy the 
fact that the latter refers to a religion and culture in existence over a millennium, whereas the first is a political/reli- 
gious phenomenon linked to the great events of the 20th century. Furthermore Islamists define themselves as 
'Islamiyyoun/Islamists' precisely to differentiate themselves from'Muslimun/Muslims.' . . . Islamism is defined as 'an 
Islamic militant, anti-democratic movement, bearing a holistic vision of Islam "whose final aim is the restoration of 
the caliphate.'" Mehdi Mozaffari, "Bin Laden and Islamist Terrorism," Militaert Tidsskrift, vol. 131 (Mar. 2002), p. 1 
(online at www.mirkflem.pup.blueyonder.co.uk/pdf/islamistterrorism.pdf). The Islamist movement, born about 
1940, is a product of the modern world, influenced by Marxist-Leninist concepts about revolutionary organiza- 
tion. "Islamists consider Islam to be as much a religion as an 'ideology,' a neologism which they introduced and 
which remains anathema to the ulamas (the clerical scholars)." Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol 
Volk (Harvard Univ. Press, 1994), p. 3. Facing political limits by the end of the 1990s, the extremist wing of the 
Islamist movement "rejected the democratic references invoked by the moderates; and as a result, raw terrorism in 
its most spectacular and destructive form became its main option for reviving armed struggle in the new millen- 
nium." Gilles ~Kepel, Jihad :Tlie Trail of Political Islam, trans. Anthony Roberts (Harvard Univ. Press, 2002), p. 14. 

4. Opening the Islamic Conference of Muslim leaders from around the world on October 16, 2003, then 
Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad said: "Today we, the whole Muslim ummah [community of believ- 
ers] are treated "with contempt and dishonour. Our religion is denigrated. Our holy places desecrated. Our coun- 
tries are occupied. Our people are starved and killed. None of our countries are truly independent. We are under 
pressure to conform to our oppressors' wishes about how we should behave, how we should govern our lands, how 
we should think even." He added: "There is a feeling of hopelessness among the Muslim countries and their peo- 
ple. They feel that they can do nothing right. They believe that things can only get worse. The Muslims "will for- 
ever be oppressed and dominated by the Europeans and Jews."The prime minister's argument was that the Muslims 
should gather their assets, not striking back blindly, but instead planning a thoughtful, long-term strategy to defeat 
their worldwide enemies, which he argued were controlled by the Jews. "But today the Jews rule the world by 
proxy.They get others to fight and die for them." Speech at the Opening of the Tenth Session of the Islamic Sum- 
mit Conference, Oct. 16, 2003 (online at www.oicsummit2003.0rg.my/speech_03.php). 

5. CIA map, "Possible Remote Havens forTerrorist and Other Illicit Activity," May 2003. 

6. For the numbers, seeTariq interview (Oct. 20, 2003). 

7. For Pakistan playing a key role in apprehending 500 terrorists, see Richard Armitage testimony, Mar. 23, 
2004. 

8. For Pakistan's unpoliced areas, seeTasneem Noorani interview (Oct. 27, 2003). 

9. Pakistanis and Afghanis interviews (Oct. 2003); DOD Special Operations Command and Central Command 
briefings (Sept. 15-16, 2004); U.S. intelligence official interview (July 9, 2004). 

lO.Pervez Musharraf, "A Plea for Enlightened Moderation: Muslims Must Raise Themselves Up Through Indi- 
vidual Achievement and Socioeconomic Emancipation," Washington Post, June 1, 2004, p. A23. 

11. For a review of ISAF's role, see NATO report, "NATO in Afghanistan," updated July 9, 2004 (online at 
www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan). 

12. United States Institute of Peace report, "Establishing the Rule of Law m Afghanistan," Mar. 2004, pp. 1—3 
(online at www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl 17.html). 

13. For the change, see Lakhdar Brahimi interview (Oct. 24, 2003); U.S. officials in Afghanistan interview (Oct. 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 12 563 

2003). For the request that the United States remain, see Kandahar province local leaders interview (Oct. 21, 2003). 
For the effect of the United States leaving, see Karim Khalili interview (Oct. 23, 2003). 

14. Some have criticized the Bush administration for neglecting Afghanistan because of Iraq. Others, includ- 
ing General Franks, say that the size of the U.S. military commitment in Afghanistan has not been compromised 
by the commitments in Iraq. We have not investigated the issue and cannot offer a judgment on it. 

15. Even if the U.S. forces, stretched thin, are reluctant to take on this role, "a limited, but extremely useful, 
change in the military mandate would involve intelligence sharing with civilian law enforcement and a willingness 
to take action against drug 'warehouses and heroin laboratories." United States Institute of Peace report,"Establish- 
ing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan," Mar. 2004, p. 17. 

16. For barriers to Saudi monitoring of charities, see, e.g., Robert Jordan interview (Jan. 14, 2004); David 
Aufhauser interview (Feb. 12, 2004). 

17. For the Saudi reformer's view, see Members of majles at-sliura interview (Oct. 14, 2003). 

18. Neil MacFarquhar, "Saudis Support a Jihad in Iraq, Not Back Home," New York Times, Apr. 23, 2004, p. Al. 

19. Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, "A Diplomat's Call for War," Washington Post, June 6, 2004, p. B4 (translation of 
original in Al-Watan, June 2, 2004). 

20. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004). 

21. For Jordan's initiatives, see testimony of William Burns before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and 
Central Asia of the House International Relations Committee, Mar. 19, 2003 (online at www.house.gov 
/inter national_relations/108/burn03 19. htm). For the report, see United Nations Development Programme 
report, Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society (United Nations, 2003) (online at 
www. mi ftah.org/Doc/Reports/Englishcomplete2003.pdf). 

22. DOD memo, Rumsfeld to Myers, Wolfowitz, Pace, and Feith, "Global War on Terrorism," Oct. 16, 2003 
(online at www. usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo. htm). 

23. For the statistics, see James Zogby, What Arabs Thin k : Values, Beliefs, and Concerns (Zogby International, 2002). 
For fear of a U.S. attack, see Pew Global Attitudes Project report, Views of a Changing! Vorld: June 2003 (Pew Research 
Center for the People and the Press, 2003), p. 2. In our interviews, current and former US. officials dealing with 
the Middle East corroborated these findings. 

24. For polling soon after 9/11, see Pew Research Center for the People and the Press report, "America 
Admired, Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen as Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders; Little Support for Expanding War 
onTerrorism" (online at http://people-press.org/reports/prmt.php3?ReportID=145). For the quotation, see Pew 
Global Attitudes Project report, "War With Iraq Further Divides Global Publics But World Embraces Democratic 
Values and Free Markets," June 3, 2003 (online at www.pewtrusts.com/ideas/ideas_item.cfmPcontent_ 
item_id=1645&content_type_id=7). 

25. For the Occidentalist "creed of Islamist revolutionaries," see, e.g., Avishai Margalit and Ian Buruma, Occi- 
dentalism :Tlie West in the Eyes of Its Enemies (Penguin Press, 2004). 

26. We draw these statistics, significantly, from the U.S. government's working paper circulated in April 2004 
to G-8 "sherpas" in preparation for the 2004 G-8 summit. The paper was leaked and published m At-Hayat. "U.S. 
Working Paper for G-8 Sherpas," Al-Hayat, Feb. 13, 2004 (online at http://english.daralhayat.com/Spec/02- 
2004/Article-20040213-ac40bdaf-c0a8-01ed-004e-5e7ac897d678/story.html). 

27. Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," Washington Post, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7; Richard Armitage inter- 
view (Jan. 12,2004). 

28. Testimony of George Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context," 
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 24, 2004. 

29. U.S. Department of Energy Advisory Board report,"A Report Card on the Department ofEnergy's Non- 
proliferation Programs with Russia," Jan. 10, 2001, p. vi. 

30. For terrorists being self-funding, see United Nations report, "Second Report of the [UN] Monitoring 
Group, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1390," Sept. 19, 2002, p. 13. 

31. For legal entry, see White House report, Office of Homeland Security, "The National Strategy for Home- 
land Security," July 2002, p. 20 (online at www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html). For illegal entry, see 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations task force report, Keeping the Promise: Immigration Proposals from the Heart- 
land (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), p. 28. 

32. The names of at least three of the hijackers (Nawaf al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, and Khalid al Mihdhar) were 
in information systems of the intelligence community and thus potentially could have been watchlisted. Had they 
been watchlisted, the connections to terrorism could have been exposed at the time they applied for a visa or at 
the port of entry.The names of at least three of the hijackers (Nawaf al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, and Khalid al Mih- 
dhar), were in information systems of the intelligence community and thus potentially could have been watch- 
listed. Had they been watchlisted, their terrorist affiliations could have been exposed either at the time they applied 
for a visa or at the port of entry. Two of the hijackers (Satam al Suqanii and Abdul Aziz al Oman) presented pass- 
ports manipulated in a fraudulent manner that has subsequently been associated with al Qaeda. Based on our review 
of their visa and travel histories, we believe it possible that as many as eleven additional hijackers (Wail al Shehri, 



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564 NOTES TO CHAPTER 12 

Waleed al Shehri, Mohand al Shehri, Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Nawaf al Hazini, Haniza al Ghamdi, Ahmed al 
Ghamdi, Saeed al Ghanidi, Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmad al Haznawi) held passports containing these same fraud- 
ulent features, but their passports have not been found so we cannot be sure.Khalid al Mihdhar and Salem al Hazmi 
presented passports with a suspicious indicator of Islamic extremism. There is reason to believe that the passports 
of three other hijackers (Nawaf al Hazmi, Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmad al Haznawi) issued in the same Saudi pass- 
port office may have contained this same indicator; however, their passports have not been found, so we cannot be 
sure. 

33. Khallad Bin Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, Zakanya Essabar, All Abdul Aziz Ali, and Saeed al Ghamdi (not the 
individual by the same name "who became a hijacker) tried to get visas and failed. Kahtani was unable to prove his 
admissibility and withdrew his application for admission after an immigration inspector remained unpersuaded that 
he was a tourist. All the hijackers whose visa applications we reviewed arguably could have been denied visas because 
their applications were not filled out completely. Had State visa officials routinely had a practice of acquiring more 
information in such cases, they likely would have found more grounds for denial. For example, three hijackers made 
statements on their visa applications that could have been proved false by U.S. government records (Hani Hanjour, 
Saeed al Ghamdi, and Khalid al Mihdhar), and many lied about their employment or educational status. Two hijack- 
ers could have been denied admission at the port of entry based on violations of immigration rules governing terms 
of admission — Mohamed Atta overstayed his tourist visa and then failed to present a proper vocational school visa 
when he entered in January 2001; Ziadjarrah attended school in June 2000 without properly adjusting his immi- 
gration status, an action that violated his immigration status and rendered him inadmissible on each of his six sub- 
sequent reentries into the United States between June 2000 and August 5, 2001. There were possible grounds to 
deny entry to a third hijacker (Marwan al Shehhi). One hijacker violated his immigration status by failing to enroll 
as a student after entry (Hani Hanjour); two hijackers overstayed their terms of admission by four and eight months 
respectively (Satam al Suqami and Nawaf al Hazmi). Atta and Shehhi attended a flight school (Huffman Aviation) 
that the Justice Department's Inspector General concluded should not have been certified to accept foreign stu- 
dents, see DOJ Inspector General's report, "The INS' Contacts with Two September 1 1 Terrorists: A Review of the 
INS's Admissions of Atta and Shehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and its Efforts to Track 
Foreign Students in the United States," May 20, 2002. 

34. John Gordon interview (May 13, 2004). 

35. For a description of a layering approach, see Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How the U.S. Has Failed 
to Secure the Homeland and Protect Its People from Terrorism (HarperCollins, 2004), p. 69. 

36. The logical and timely rollout of such a program is hampered by an astonishingly long list of congressional 
mandates. The system originated in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
and applied to all non-US. citizens who enter or exit the United States at any port of entry. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009 (1996), § 110. The Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 altered this mandate by incorpo- 
rating a requirement for a searchable centralized database, limiting the government's ability to require new data 
from certain travelers and setting a series of implementation deadlines. Pub. L. No. 106-215, 114 Stat. 337 (2000), 
§ 2(a). The USA PATRIOT Act mandated that the Attorney General and Secretary of State "particularly focus" on 
having the entry-exit system include biometrics and tamper-resistant travel documents readable at all ports of entry. 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), § 1008(a). In the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, 
Congress directed that, not later than October 26, 2004, the attorney general and the secretary of state issue to all 
non-US. citizens only machine-readable, tamper- resistant visas and other travel and entry documents that use bio- 
metric identifiers and install equipment at all U.S. ports of entry to allow biometric authentication of such docu- 
ments. Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002), § 303(b).The Act also required that increased security still facilitate 
the free flow of commerce and travel. Ibid. § 102(a)(1)(C). The administration has requested a delay of two years 
for the requirement of tamper-proof passports. Testimony ofThomas Ridge before the House Judiciary Commit- 
tee, Apr. 21, 2004 (online at www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=45&'content=3498&print=true). Program 
planners have set a goal of collecting information, confirming identity, providing information about foreign nation- 
als throughout the entire immigration system, and ultimately enabling each point in the system to assess the law- 
fulness of travel and any security risks. 

37. There are at least three registered traveler programs underway, at different points in the system, designed 
and run by two different agencies in the Department of Homeland Security (outside the U.S.VISIT system), which 
must ultimately be the basis for access to the United States. 

38. For the statistics, see DOS report,"Workload Statistics by Post Regions for AUVisa Classes"June 18, 2004. 
One post-9/1 1 screening process, known as Condor, has conducted over 130,000 extra name-checks. DOS letter, 
Karl Hofmann to the Commission, Apr. 5, 2004. The checks have caused significant delays in some cases but have 
never resulted in visas being denied on terrorism grounds. For a discussion of visa delays, see General Accounting 
Office report, "Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Stu- 
dents and Scholars," Feb. 2004. We do not know all the reasons why visa applications have dropped so significantly. 
Several factors beyond the visa process itself include the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, which 
requires additional screening processes for certain groups from Arab and Muslim countries; the Iraq war; and per- 



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NOTES TO CHAPTER 12 565 

haps cyclical economic factors. For the cost to the United States of visa backlogs, see National Foreign Trade Coun- 
cil report, "Visa Backlog Costs U.S. Exporters More Than $30 Billion Since 2002, New Study Finds," June 2, 2004 
(online at www. nftc.org/ newsflash /newsflash. asp?Mode=Vie\v&articleid=1686&Category= All). 

39. These issues are on the G-8 agenda. White House press release, "G-8 Secure and Facilitated Travel Initia- 
tive (SAFTI),"June 9, 2004 (online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040609-51 .html). Lax pass- 
port issuance standards are among the vulnerabilities exploited by terrorists, possibly including two of the 9/11 
hijackers. Three models exist for strengthened prescreening: (1) better screening by airlines, such as the use of 
improved document authentication technology; (2) posting of border agents or inspectors in foreign airports to 
work cooperatively with foreign counterparts; and (3) establishing a full preinspection regime, such as now exists 
for travel to the United States from Canada and Ireland. All three models should be pursued, in addition to elec- 
tronic prescreening . 

40. Among the more important problems to address is that of varying transliterations of the same name. For 
example, the current lack of a single convention for transliterating Arabic names enabled the 19 hijackers to vary 
the spelling of their names to defeat name-based watchlist systems and confuse any potential efforts to locate them. 
While the gradual introduction of biometric identifiers will help, that process will take years, and a name match 
"will always be useful. The ICAO should discuss the adoption of a standard requiring a digital code for all names 
that need to be translated into the Roman alphabet, ensuring one common spelling for all countries. 

41. On achieving more reliable identification, see Markle Foundation task force report, Creating a Trusted Infor- 
mation Network for Homeland Security (Markle Foundation, 2003), p. 72 (online at www.markle.org). 

42. General Accounting Office report, Mass Trans it: Federal Action Could HelpTransit Agencies Address Security Chal- 
lenges, GAO-03-263, Dec. 2002 (online at www.gao.gov/new.items/d03263.pdf). 

13 How to Do It? A Different Way of Organizing the Government 

l.The Bush administration clarified the respective missions of the different intelligence analysis centers in a let- 
ter sent by Secretary Ridge, DC I Tenet, FBI Director Mueller, and TTIC Director Brennan to Senators Susan Collins 
and Carl Levin on April 13, 2004. The letter did not mention any element of the Department ofDefense. It stated 
that the DCI would define what analytical resources he would transfer from the CTC to TTIC no later than June 
1, 2004. DCI Tenet subsequently told us that he decided that TTIC' would have primary responsibility tor terrorism 
analysis but that the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency would grow their own analysts. TTIC will have task- 
ing authority over terrorism analysts in other intelligence agencies, although there will need to be a board to super- 
vise deconfliction. George Tenet interview (July 2, 2004). We have not received any details regarding this plan. 

2. "TTIC has no operational authority. However,TTIC has the authority to task collection and analysis from 
Intelligence Community agencies, the FBI, and DHS through tasking mechanisms we will create. The analytic work 
conducted at TTIC creates products that inform each ofTTIC's partner elements, as well as other Federal depart- 
ments and agencies as appropriate." Letter from Ridge and others to Collins and Levin, Apr. 13, 2004. 

3. Donald Rumsfeld prepared statement, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 20. 

4. In this conception, the NCTC should plan actions, assigning responsibilities for operational direction and 
execution to other agencies. It would be built on TTIC and would be supported by the intelligence community 
asTTIC is now. Whichever route is chosen, the scarce analytical resources now dispersed amongTTIC, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency's Joint Interagency Task Force — Combatting Terrorism (JITF-CT), and the DCI's Countert- 
erronst Center (CTC) should be concentrated more effectively than they are now. 

• The DCI's Counterterrorist Center would become a CIA unit, to handle the direction and execution of tasks 
assigned to the CIA. It could have detailees from other agencies, as it does now, to perform this operational 
mission. It would yield much of the broader, strategic analytic duties and personnel to the NCTC. The CTC 
would rely on the restructured CIA (discussed in section 13.2) to organize, train, and equip its personnel. 

• Similarly, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division would remain, as now, the operational arm of the Bureau to 
combat terrorism. As it does now, it 'would work with other agencies in carrying out these missions, retain- 
ing the JTTF structure now in place. The Counterterrorism Division would rely on the FBI's Office of Intel- 
ligence to train and equip its personnel, helping to process and report the information gathered m the field. 

•The Defense Department's unified commands— SOCOM, NORTHCOM, and CENTCOM— would be 
the joint operational centers taking on DOD tasks. Much of the excellent analytical talent that has been assem- 
bled in the Defense Intelligence Agency's JITF-CT should merge into the planned NCTC. 

• The Department of Homeland Security's Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
should retain its core duties, but the NCTC should have the ultimate responsibility for producing net assess- 
ments that utilize Homeland Security's analysis of domestic vulnerabilities and integrate all-source analysis 
of foreign intelligence about the terrorist enemy. 

• The State Department's counterterrorism office would be a critical participant in the NCTC's work, taking 
the lead in directing the execution of the counterterrorism foreign policy mission. 



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566 NOTES TO CHAPTER 13 

The proposed National Counterterrorism Center should offer one-stop shopping to agencies with counterterror- 
isin and homeland security responsibilities.That is, it should be an authoritative reference base on the transnational 
terrorist organizations: their people, goals, strategies, capabilities, networks of contacts and support, the context in 
which they operate, and their characteristic habits across the life cycle of operations — recruitment, reconnaissance, 
target selection, logistics, and travel. For example, this Center would offer an integrated depiction of groups like al 
Qaeda or Hezbollah worldwide, overseas, and in the United States. 

The NCTC will not eliminate the need for the executive departments to have their own analytic units. But 
it would enable agency-based analytic units to become smaller and more efficient. In particular, it "would make it 
possible for these agency-based analytic units to concentrate on analysis that is tailored to their agency's specific 
responsibilities. 

A useful analogy is in military intelligence.There, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the service production 
agencies (like the Army's National Ground Intelligence Center) are the institutional memory and reference source 
for enemy order of battle, enemy organization, and enemy equipment. Yet the Joint Staff and all the theater com- 
mands still have their own J-2s. They draw on the information they need, tailoring and applying it to their opera- 
tional needs. As they learn more from their tactical operations, they pass intelligence of enduring value back up to 
the Defense Intelligence Agency and the services so it can be evaluated, form part of the institutional memory, and 
help guide future collection. 

In our proposal, that reservoir of institutional memory about terrorist organizations would function for the 
government as a whole, and would be in the NCTC. 

5. The head of the NCTC would thus help coordinate the operational side of these agencies, like the FBI's 
Counterterrorism Division. The intelligence side of these agencies, such as the FBI's Office of Intelligence, would 
be overseen by the National Intelligence Director we recommend later in this chapter. 

6. The quotation goes on: "It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too 
precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the 
alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert "watchman, but also the one who 
knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that 
occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward 
procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of indi- 
vidual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion — which is usually too late. . . . 
Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and 
some sheer bad luck." Thomas Sell el ling, foreword ro Roberta Wohlsterter. Pearl Harbor: 1 1 urn i tig and Decision (Stan- 
ford Univ. Press, 1962), p. viii. 

7. For the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986). For a general discussion of the 
act, see Gordon Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff; The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1 986 (Greenwood, 1999); 
James Locher, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2003). 

8. For a history of the DCI's authority over the intelligence community, see CIA report, Michael Warner ed., 
Central Intelligence; Origin and Evolution (CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001). For the Director's view 
of his community authorities, see DC I directive, "Director of Central Intelligence Directive l/l:The Authorities 
and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of the U.S. Intelligence Community," Nov. 19, 
1998. 

9. As Norman Augustine, former chairman of Lockheed Martin Corporation, writes regarding power in the 
government, "As in business, cash is king. If you are not in charge of your budget, you are not king." Nor man Augus- 
tine, Managing to Survive in Washington: A Beginner's Guide to High-Level Management in Government (Center for Strate- 
gic and International Studies, 2000), p. 20. 

10. For the DCI and the secretary of defense, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-6(a). If the director does not concur with 
the secretary's choice, then the secretary is required to notify the president of the director's nonconcurrence. Ibid. 
For the DCI and the attorney general, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-6(b)(3). 

11. The new program would replace the existing National Foreign Intelligence Program. 

12. Some smaller parts of the current intelligence community, such as the State Department's intelligence bureau 
and the Energy Department's intelligence entity, should not be funded out of the national intelligence program 
and should be the responsibility of their home departments. 

13. The head of the NCTC should have the rank of a deputy national intelligence director, e.g., Executive 
Level II, but "would have a different title. 

14. If the organization of defense intelligence remains as it is now, the appropriate official would be the under 
secretary of defense for intelligence. If defense intelligence is reorganized to elevate the responsibilities of the direc- 
tor of the DIA, then that person might be the appropriate official. 

15. For the information technology architecture, see Ruth David interview (June 10, 2003). For the necessity 
of moving from need-to-know to need-to-share, see James Steinberg testimony, Oct. 14, 2003. The Director still 
has no strategy for removing information-sharing barriers and — more than two years since 9/11 — has only 
appointed a working group on the subject. George Tenet prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004, p. 37. 



FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 



NOTES TO CHAPTER 13 567 

16. The intelligence community currently makes information shareable by creating "tearline" reports, 'with the 
nonshareable information at the top and then, below the "tearline," the portion that recipients are told they can 
share. This proposal reverses that concept. All reports are created as tearline data, with the shareable information at 
the top and with added details accessible on a system that requires permissions or authentication. 

17. See Markle Foundation Task Force report, Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security (Markle 
Foundation, 2003); Markle FoundationTask Force report, Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age (Markle 
Foundation, 2002) (both online at 'www.markle.org). 

18. Markle FoundationTask Force report, Creating a Trusted Information Network, p. 12. The pressing need for 
such guidelines was also spotlighted by the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee appointed by Secretary 
Rumsfeld to advise the Department of Defense on the privacy implications of its Terrorism Information Aware- 
ness Program. Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee report, Safeguarding Privacy in the Figiit Against Terror- 
ism (2004) (online at www.sainc.com/tapac/TAPAC_Report_Final_5-10-04.pdf). We take no position on the 
particular recommendations offered in that report, but it raises issues that pertain to the government as a whole — 
not just to the Department of Defense. 

19. This change should eliminate the need in the Senate for the current procedure of sequential referral of the 
annual authorization bill for the national foreign intelligence program. In that process, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee reviews the bill passed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence before the bill is brought before 
the full Senate for consideration. 

20. This recommendation, and measures to assist the Bureau in developing its intelligence cadre, are included 
in the report accompanying the Commerce, Justice and State Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005, passed by the 
House of Representatives on July 7, 2004. H.R. Rep. No. 108-576, 108th Cong., 2d sess. (2004), p. 22. 

21. Letter from Ridge and others to Collins and Levin, Apr. 13, 2004. 

22. For the directorate's current capability see Patrick Hughes interview (Apr. 2, 2004).