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HUMAN DRUG TESTING BY THE CIA, 1977

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC KESEAKCH

or THE

COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION
ON

S. 1893

TO AMEND THE PUBLIC HEALTH SEBVICE ACT TO ESTABLISH
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RE-
SEARCH, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

SEPTEMBER 20 AND 21, 1977

Printed for the o*e of the Committee on HamiA Resource*

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
» WASHINGTON : 19TT

■n

]

CONTENTS

Text of S. 1893. ' 4

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Tuesdat, September 20, 1977

Goldwater, Hon. Barry M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona 38

Geschickter, Charles F., Sr., M.D., Geschickter Fund for Medical Re-
search, professor emeritus of research pathology, Georgetown Univer-
sity Medical Center, commander, U.S. Navy and chief pathologist, U.S.
Navy, accompanied by Plato Chaceris, Esq., Hundley ft Cacheris, P.G.,
Washington, D.C.; and Charles F. Geschickter, Jr., Esq., Brault, Lewis,
Geschickter ft Palmer, Fairfax, Va 44

Rhodes, David, former CIA employee, accompanied by Phillip Goldman,
former CIA employee 100

Lashbrook, Robert, M.D., former CIA employee, accompanied by Charles
Siragusa, former Deputy Commissioner, Federal Bureau of Narcotics;
and George Belk, forme? Bureau of Narcotics agent, a panel 11

Wednesday, September 21, 1977

Turner, Adm. Stansfield, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, accom-
panied by Harry E. Gordon, Office of Research and Development; Ray
Reardon, Office of Security; Frank Laubinger, Office of Technical Serv-
ices; Alan Brody, Office of Inspector General; and Lyle L. Miller, acting
legislative counsel 123

Siemer, Deanne C, General Counsel, Department of Defense 148

Gottlieb, Sidney, M.D„ former CIA agent, accompanied by Terry F.
Lenser, Esq., Wald, Harkraderft Ross, Washington, D.C 169

Bensinger, Peter C, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration,
accompanied by Joseph Kreuger, Acting Chief Inspector, Drug Enforce-
ment Administration 218

STATEMENTS

Bartels, John, R., Jr., previous Acting Administrator of the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration, sworn written statement 41

Bensinger, Peter C, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, ac-
companied by Joseph Kreuger, Acting Chief Inspector, Drug Enforce-
ment Administration fc 218

Geschickter, Charles F., Sr., M.D., Geschickter Fund for Medical Re-
search, professor emeritus of research pathology, Georgetown University
Medical Center, commander, U.S. Navy and chief pathologist, U.S.
Navy, accompanied by Plato Cacheris, Esq., Hundley ft Cacheris, P.G.,
Washington, D.C; and Charles F. Geschickter, Jr., Esq., Brault, Lewis,
Geschickter ft Palmer, Fairfax, Va 44

Goldwater, Hon. Barry M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona 38

Gottlieb, Sidney, M.D., former CIA agent, accompanied by Terry F.

Lenser, Esq., Wald, Harkraderft Ross, Washington, D.C 169

Prepared statement _.. 206

Lashbrook, Robert, M.D., former CIA employee, accompanied by Charles
Siragusa, former Deputy Commissioner, Federal Bureau of Narcotics;
and George Belk, former Bureau of Narcotics agent, a panel 110

Siemer, Deanne C, General Counsel, Department of Defense 148

Rhodes, David, former CIA employee, accompanied by Phillip Goldman,
former CIA employee 100

(HI)

Psge

ilt

Turner, Adm. Stansfield, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, accom-
panied by Harry E. Gordon, Office of Research and Development; Ray
Reardon, Office of Security; Frank Laubinger, Office of Technical Serv-
vices; Alan Brody, Office of Inspector General; and Lyle L. Miller,
acting legislative counsel _„, 123

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Articles, publications, et cetera:

"Hypersensitivity Phenomenon Produced by Stress: The 'Negative
Phase' Reaction," by Charles F. Geschickter, M.D., W. Edward
O'Malley, M.D., Ph. D., and Eugene P. Rubacky, Ph. D., from the
American Journal of Clinical Pathology, vol. 34, vol. 1, July 1969.- 46
"Role of Mucinolysis in Collagen Disease, by Charles F. Geschickter,
M.D„ Panayiota A. Athanasiadou, M.D., and W. Edward O'Malley,
Ph. D., from the American Journal of Clinical Pathology, vol. 30,

No. 2, August 1958.- ----- - — __ — 54

"Use of Amino Acid Antagonists for the Inhibition of Tumor
Growth," by Charles F. Geschickter, M.D., Murray M. Copeland,
M.D., and Jean Scholler, B.S., from the Bulletin, Georgetown Uni-
versity Medical Center, No. 2, August-September 1951. 73

Communications to:

Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Mass-
achusetts, from:
Miller, Lyle L., acting legislative counsel, Central Intelligence

Agency, September 27, 1977 (with enclosure) „ 136

Siemer, Deanne C, General Counsel, Department of Defense,

September 20, 1977 (with enclosure) 156

President of the United States, from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach,
Under Secretary of State; John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare; and Richard Helms, Director of Central
Intelligence Agency, March 24, 1977.. _ 137

HUMAN DRUG TESTING BY THE CIA, 1977

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1977

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research

of the Committee on Human Resources,

Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kennedy and Schweiker.

Opening Statement of Senator Kennedy

Senator Kennedy. We will come to order.

Today the Health and Scientific Research Subcommittee resumes
its inquiry into the biologic and behavioral research activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. The
events we will near about over the next 2 days occurred between 1952
and 1972. They had their origin in a different time which had dif-
ferent values and realities. But it is important for us to fully under-
stand these events today — because they raise fundamental questions
about the kind of society we are and want to become.

We are a free people, living in an open society. But some of our most
cherished freedoms have been threatened by these CIA activities.

The question is not whether a free society can accommodate the
need for covert intelligence activities. The question is how those
activities can be made accountable; how they can be carried out with-
out jeopardizing the very freedoms they are supposed to protect.

In the United States, the ends never have, and never will, justify
the means. Freedom can be eroded by internal excesses as well as by
external threats. The story we will hear in these next 2 days is of well
motivated, patriotic Americans who, by their work, eroded the
freedom of individuals and of institutions in the name of National
security.

As a result, individual Americans from all social levels, high and
low, were made the unwitting subjects of drug tests; scores of uni-
versities were used to further CIA research objectives without their
knowledge, thus threatening in a fundamental way their traditional
independence and integrity; other Government agencies, such as the
Bureau of Narcotics, the National Institutes of Health, and the
Internal Revenue Service, were used to further the programs and
mission of the Central Intelligence Agency.

These projects were not the creation of low-level agency bureau-
crats working against the wishes or without the knowledge of the
Agency's leadership. The collection of activities now known as

(l)

MK-ULTRA were approved, after personal review, including brief-
ings by the Director of the Agency, Mr. Dulles.

It is well known that another CIA Director, Mr. Helms, approved
the destruction of the MK-ULTRA records in 1972. This has made
the task of reconstructing those events very difficult — both for the
CIA and for interested Senate committees. What is clear now, from
the witnesses we have heard and will hear, and from the fox records
that have been found, is the following:

1. When MK-ULTRA was phased out, it was replaced by MK-
SEARCH. MK-SEARCH represented a continuation of a limited
number of the ULTRA projects. It is now clear that the records of
this project have also been destroyed. In fact, the records of all drug
research projects available to the Director of the Technical Services
Division of the CIA were destroyed at the same time.

2. Some operational activities utilizing the fruits of this research
were carried out. *

3. The bulk of the research effort led nowhere.

4. The Bureau of Narcotics was heavily involved in all the drug
projects involving unwitting subjects.

5. The CIA had available certain documents pertaining to these
act : vities in 1975, when this subcommittee's inquiry began, which
they did not make available until 2 weeks ago; and that the Agency
only discovered that some MK-SEARCH materials were available
after the August 3 hearing.

It is my hope that these next 2 days of hearings will close the book
on this chapter of the CIA's life. We have the opportunity to learn
from what has happened. We have the opportunity to build in controls
so these excesses will not occur again If we do not take the oppor-
tunity, if we return to business as usual, then the next erosions of our
freedom and traditions may not be reversible.

Part of the obvious interest of the continuation of these 2 days of
hearings is that we will see that many of the programs that were
started in the early 1950's, many of them continued into the early
part of the 1970's, and during this period of time we see the perver-
sion of many different governmental agencies, and where we found
at least some programs were started, looked like they had a limited
life and then were really phased out, that the continuation of those
activities continued on and on and on.

I think we are concerned about the perversion of those various
agencies of Government. We are concerned most of all about what the
impact of these activities have been on unwitting American subjects
during this whole period of time. Even though we will hear about the
series of different tests that took place, and we wiil track how those
tests began, how they continued and, in some instances, how they
were phased out, we will see a continuation, I think, of activities that
will fail to really protect particularly the unwitting subjects that were
involved in many of these programs, and that is a matter of obvious
serious concern about the activities, particularly when they went on
for such a profound and extensive period of time.

Of course, always we have to ask ourselves what was really gained
from these kinds of programs, particularly in the health field, at a
time when we see scarce resources and we see the expenditures of
hundreds of thousands of dollars, millions of dollars really, in terms
of health function, and we see virtually little if any kind of accounta-

bility in many of these areas. No one doubts that there are serious
kinds of national security issues which are raised in the whole question
of behavioral control. During the course of the hearing tomorrow,
in inquiring of Mr. Turner, we are going to inquire also about what is
essential in terms of providing some degree of protection for the
security of the American people in this area of behavioral research.
[A copy of the bill dealing with the subject follows:]

fch-n CONGRESS £l + r%*\4\

18 x SttU oK S. 1893

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Jclt 10 (legislative day, Mat 18), 1977

Mr. Kennedt (for himself, Mr. Javitr, Mr. Pell, and Mr. Sciiweiker) intro-
duced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Com-
mittee on Human Resources

A BILL

To amend the Public Health Service Act to establish the Presi-
dent's Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, and for other purposes.

j Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That this Act may be cited as the "President's Commission

4 for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and

5 Behavioral Research Act of 1977".

6 AMENDMENT TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT

7 Sec. 2. The Public Health Service Act is amended by

8 adding after title XVII the following new title:

1 "TITLE XVHI— PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION >FOR

2 THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF

3 BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH

4 "ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION

5 "Sec. 1801. (a) (1) There is established a Commission

6 to be known as the President's Commission for the Protec-

7 tion of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Re-

8 search (hereinafter in this part referred to as the 'Commis-

9 sion').

10 "(b) The Commission shall be composed of eleven

11 members appointed by the President by and with the advice

12 and consent of the Senate. The President shall appoint—

13 "(1) five (and not more than five) members of

14 the Commission from individuals —

15 " (A) who are or have been engaged in bio-

16 medical or behavioral research involving human

17 subjects, and

18 "(B) who are especially qualified to serve on

19 the Commission by virtue of their training, experi-

20 ence, or background; and

2i "(2) six members of the Commission from indi-

22 viduals —

23 "(A) who are not and have never been en-

24 gaged in biomedical or behavioral research involv-

25 ing human subjects, and

]

6 - - fa

1 " (B) who are distinguished in the fields of

2 medicine, law, ethics, theology, the biological, phy*-

3 ical, behavioral and social sciences, philosophy, Jni-

4 inanities, health administration, government, and 1

5 public affairs. •

6 " (c) No individoal who is a full-time employee of the

7 United States may be appointed as a member of the Com- *

8 mission. <>

9 "(d) Prior to the appointment of an individual as>a

10 member of the Commission under subsection (b) , each such

11 individual shall receive all agency and department security

12 clearances necessary to assure such individual's access, aa a

13 member of the Commission, to information (as defined -in

14 section 1811).

15 "(e) Until such time as the President acts tor appoint

16 members of the Commission under subsection (b) , those
17' members of the National Commission for the Protection. of

18 Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,

19 who are serving upon the date of enactment of the X Act,

20 are deemed members of the Commission : Provided, That

21 no classified information be made available to such mem-

22 ben through a request of the Commission until appropriate
"23 security clearances be obtained by such, members.

24 " (f ) The term of office of each member of the Com-

25 mission shall be four years; except that—

1 "(1) the terms of office of members first taking

2 office shall begin on the date of appointment and shall

3 expire, as designated by the President at the time of

4 their appointment, four at the end of two years, four

5 at the end of three years, and three at the end of four

6 years;

7 " (2) the term of office of each member appointed

8 to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of

9 the term for which his predecessor was appointed shall

10 be appointed for the remainder of such term; and

11 " (8) a member whose term has expired may serve

12 until his successor has been appointed.

13 "(g) (!) The members of the Commission shall elect

14 a Chairman and one Vice Chairman from among themselves.

15 Either the Chairman or Vice Chairman may be a scientist;
1°* however both shall not be scientists.

17 "(2) Seven members of the Commission shall conati-

18 tute a quorum for business, but a lesser number may conduct

19 hearings.

20 "(3) The Commission shall meet at the call of the

21 Chairman or at the call of a majority of its members.

22 "(4) No individual may be appointed to serve as a

23 member of the Commission, if such individual has served

24 for two terms of four years each.

8 I

5 1

1 " (5) A vac&iicy on the Commission shall not affect the

2 authority or activities of the Commission. J

3 " (h) Members of the Commission shall receive compen- ^

4 sation at a rate to be fixed by the Conimisson, but not ex-

5 ceeding lor any day (including traveltime) the daily equiv- ■ -|

6 alent of the effective rate for GS-18 of the General Sched-

7 ule while engaged in the actual performance of the duties * J
S vested in the Commission, and shall be reimbursed for travel, ,,
9 subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred in the per- *

10- formance of such duties. f

11 " (i) The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,

12 the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelli- |

13 gence, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology

14 Policy (established under the Presidential Science and Tech-
^ nology Advisory Organization' Act of 1976), the Adminis-

16 trator of Veterans' Affairs, and the Director of the National

17 Science Foundation shall each designate an individual to

18 serve as a nonvoting, ex-officio adviser to the Commission.

19 «(j) The Commission may secure directly from any

20 department or agency information necessary to enable it to

21 carry out its duties. Upon the written request of the Chair-

22 man of the Commission, or eight members thereof, each

23 department or agency shall furnish all information requested

1 by the Commission which is necessary to enable the Com-

2' mission to carry out its duties. "°

3 "Duties and Functions of the Commission

4 "general

5 "Sec. 1802. (a) (1) (A) The Commission shall con-

6 duct a comprehensive investigation and study to identify

7 the basic ethical principles which should underlie the con-

8 duct of biomedical and behavioral research involving

9 human subjects.

10 " (B) In carrying out the provisions of subparagraph

11 (A), the Commission shall consider at least the following:

12 "(i) The boundaries between biomedical or be-

13 havioral research involving human subjects and the
34 accepted and routine practice of medicine;

* 5 " (ii) The role of assessment of risk-benefit criteria

36 in the determination of the appropriateness of research

17 involving human subjects;

18 "("*) Appropriate guidelines for the selection of

19 human subjects for participation in biomedical and

20 behavioral research ;

21" " (iv) Appropriate mechanisms to assure the full

22 exercise of the rights and full protection of the interests

23 •'■ of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral

24 research ;

1 "(v) The nature and definition of informed con-*

2 sent in various settings;

3 " (vi) The principles identified and developed by;

4 the National Commission for the Protection of Human

5 Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research; and*

6 " (vii) All relevant work of the National Commis-

7 sion for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedi*
S cal and Behavioral Research.

9 "(2) The Commission shall develop comprehensive and

10 uniform policies, procedures and guidelines which should

11 be followed in biomedical and behavioral research involving

12 human subjects to assure that it is conducted in accordance

13 with principles identified by the Commission under subsec-

14 tion (a) (1) (A) and concerning any other matter pertain^

1 5 ing to the full exercise of the rights and full protection of

16 the interests of human subjects of such research.

17 "(3) The Commission shall advise, consult with, and

18 make recommendations to any department or agency con-

19 cerning such administrative or other action as may be appro-

20 priate or necessary to apply the policies, procedures and

21 guidelines developed under paragraph (2) to biomedical

22 and behavioral research conducted, funded or regulated under:

23 programs administered by such departments or agencies,:

24 and concerning any other matter pertaining to the full exer-

1 cise of the rights and full protection of the interests of human

2 subjects of biomedical and behavioral research.

3 " (4) The Commission shall, from time to time, monitor

4 the implementation of those policies, procedures and guide-

5 lines recommended by the Commission under paragraph (3).

6 "(b) (1) The Commission shall investigate and study

7 biomedical and behavioral research conducted, supported or

8 regulated under programs administered by any department or

9 agency and involving children, prisoners, military person^

10 nel, and the institutionalized mentally infirm to determine —

11 " (A) The nature of the consent obtained from such

12 persons or their legal representatives before such persons

13 were involved in such research ;

14 <; (B) The adequacy of the information given them

15 respecting the nature and purpose of the research, pro-

16 cedures to be used, risks and discomforts, anticipated

17 benefits from the research, and other matters necessary

18 for informed consent; and

19 "(C) The competence and the freedom of the per-

20 sons to make a choice for or against involvement in such

21 research.

22 " (2) The jQonunission shall advise, consult with, and

23 make recommendations to any department or agency to

24 establish special requirements if any for informed consent

25 for participation in biomedical and behavioral research in-

'::i

£.

1 volving children, prisoners, military personnel and the insti-

?. tutionalized mentally infirm.

3 " (3) The Commission shall advise, consult with, and

4 make recommendations to any department or agency con-

5 cerning such -administrative or other action as may be ap-

6 propriate or necessary to assure that biomedical and be-

7 havioral research conducted, funded, or regulated under pro-

8 grams administered by such department or agency meet the

9 special requirements for informed consent, if any, identified

10 by the Commission under paragraph (2) .

11 "(c) (1) The Commission shall conduct an investiga-

12 tion and study of the scope, nature and extent of personal

13 injuries to and deaths of individuals which were proximately

14 caused by participation in or the acts of others involved in

15 biomedical and behavioral research programs. Such study

16 shall include recommendations for a method of compen-

17 sation for such injuries and deaths.

18 "(2) Upon completion of the study, the Commission

19 shall simultaneously submit copies of a report on such study

20 to the appropriate departments or agencies and to the appro- #

21 priate committees of Congress.

22 "(d) (1) (A) The Commission shall develop compre- ;|

23 hensive and uniform policies, procedures, and guidelines con-

24 sistent with this part which should be followed by each , |

25 department or agency in establishing, implementing, certify-

1 ing, and monitoring human investigation review boards in

2 those entities which receive funds from or which are regu-

3 lated by each such department or agency.

4 "(B) In carrying out the provisions of subparagraph

5 (A), the Commission shall include among other matters,

6 comprehensive and uniform policies, procedures, and guide-

7 lines concerning —

8 " (i) the establishment, operation, and functions of

9 the Protocol Review Subcommittee and the Subject Ad-

10 visory Subcommittee required under subsection (c) of

11 section 1805;

12 "(ii) the nature and extent of public participation

13 in the decisionmaking process of the human investiga-

14 tion review boards and subcommittees;

15 "(«i) the inclusion of the public in meetings of
lg such boards and subcommittees;

17 " (iv) The requirement for public hearings by such

lg boards and subcommittees; and

19 "(v) The requirement of public disclosure of

20 decisions of such boards and subcommittees and the
2i nntnre and scope of such disclosure.

22 " (2) Once a department or agency has required the

23 establishment of human investigation review boards in those

24 entities which receive funds from or which are regulated

25 by such department or agency, the Commission shall, from

1 time to time, monitor such department's or agency's policies,

2 procedures, guidelines, and other administrative actions.

3 "(e) The Commission shall continually review the

4 ethical, social, and legal implications of all biomedical and

5 behavioral research involving human subjects conducted,

6 funded, or regulated by any department or agency, and shall

7 make appropriate recommendations to any such department

8 or agency, for the protection of human subjects of such

9 research.

10 "(f) (1) The Commission shall compile a complete

11 list and record of decisions of human investigation review

12 boards and shall annually publish reports of important deci-

13 sions and distribute such reports to the public.

14 "(2) The Commission shall insure communication

15 among human investigation review boards as it determines

16 necessary to permit such boards to be informed about the

17 activi ties, standards, and decisions of such boards.

18 "SPECIAL STUDY

19 "Sec. 1803. (a) The Commission shall undertake a com-

20 prehensive study of the ethical, social, and lagel implications

21 of advances in biomedical and behavioral research tech-

22 nology. Such study shall include —

23 " ( 1 ) an analysis and evaluation of scientific

24 and technological advances in past, present, and pro-

25 jected biomedical and behavioral research and services ;

SyJL ty

1 "(2) an analysis and evaluation of the implications

2 of such advances, both for individuals and for society;

3 " (3) an analysis and evaluation of laws and moral

4 and ethical principles governing the use of technology

5 in medical practice;

6 "(4) an analysis and evaluation of public under-

7 standing of and attitudes toward such implications and

8 laws and principles; and

9 " (5) an analysis and evaluation of implications for

10 public policy of such findings as are made by the

11 Commission with respect to advances in biomedical and

12 behavioral research and technology and public attitudes

13 toward such advances.

14 "(b) (1) The Commission shall simultaneously submit

15 copies of a report on such study to the appropriate depart-

16 m ents or agencies and to the appropriate committees of

17 Congress.

■-• 18 "(2) The Commission may, if it deems it appropriate,

^ 19 include in such report recommendations to such departments

20 or agencies and to Congress.

21 "deLIVEBY OP HEALTH 8EBVICE8

22 "Sec. 1804. (a) (1) The Commission shall identify the

23 basic ethical principles which should underlie the delivery of

24 health services to persons.

1 "(2) In carrying out the provisions of paragraph (1),

2 the Commission shall —

3 " (A) study those basic ethical principles identified

4 in subsection (a) (1) (A) of section 1802 for the pur-

5 pose of determining their application to the delivery of

6 health services to persons ;

7 "(B) conduct a comprehensive investigation and

8 study to identify those basic ethical principles which —
"(i) should underline the delivery of health

10 services to persons; and

11 " (ii) were either not identified under subsec-

12 tion (a) (1) (A) of section 1802 or if identified

13 under such subsection were determined by the Com-

14 mission to be inapplicable to the delivery of health

15 services to persons.

16 "(b) The Commission shall develop comprehensive and

17 uniform policies, procedures, and guidelines which should be

18 followed in the delivery of health services to persons to asr

19 sore that such services are performed in accordance with

20 principles identified by the Commission under subsection

21 (a) and concerning any other matter pertaining to the rail

22 exercise of the rights and full protection of the interests of

23 persons receiving health services.

24 "(c) The Commission shall advise, consult with, and,

1 make recommendations to any department or agency the

2 Commission deems appropriate concerning such administra-

3 tive or other action as may be appropriate or necessary to

4 apply the policies, procedures, and guidelines developed

5 under subsection (b) to the delivery of health services to

6 persons and concerning any other matter pertaining to the

7 full exercise of the rights and full protection of the interests

8 of such persons.

9 "(d) The Commission shall, from time to time, monitor

10 the implementation of those policies, procedures and guide-

11 lines recommended by the Commission under subsection (c)

12 and adopted by departments or agencies.

13 "Iluman Investigation Review Boards

14 "establishment and operation

15 "Sec. 1805. (a) Each department or agency shall, in

16 consultation with the Commission —

17 " ( 1 ) develop policies, procedures and guidelines

18 for the establishment and operation of human investiga-

19 tion review boards in entities which receive funds from

20 or which are regulated by such department or agency.

21 " (2) require the establishment and operation of a

22 human investigation review board by each such entity;

23 "(3) take such administrative or other action as

24 may be necessary or appropriate to require the estab-

1 lishment and effective operation of a human investiga-

2 tion review board by each such entity.

3 "(b) (1) The members of each human investigation

4 review board shall be appointed by the chief executive officer

5 of the entity in accordance with policies, procedures, guide-

6 lines, and regulations established by a department or agency.

7 " (2) No member of a human investigation review

8 board shall be involved in either the initial or continuing

9 review of an activity in which he has a conflict of interest as

10 defined by the Commission, except to provide such informa-

11 f5 on as may be requested by such human investigation review

12 uoards.

13 " (c) Each human investigation review board shall
^ establish two subcommittees as follows :

1° " ( 1 ) a Protocol Review Subcommittee, which shall
be responsible for approving, diasapproving, or offering

17 suggestions and modifications of protocols for experi-

18 mental procedures;

1 ^ " (2) a Subject Advisory Subcommittee, which shall

20 be primarily concerned with the protection of the rights

21 and interests of subjects of biomedical and behavioral

22 research, and shall assure that human subjects are as

23 well informed about the nature of the research as is

24 reasonably possible.

■(

1 t

t
1

(

■ I

16
1 " (d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no

? entity shall be required to establish more than one human

3 investigation review board.

4 " (e) In a case where the policies, procedures, or guide-

5 lines of more than one department or agency conflict and a

6 human investigation review board or an entity cannot resolve

7 the application of such conflicting policies, procedures or

8 guidelines, the Commission shall decide the resolution of such

9 conflict.

10 "certification

11 "Sec. 1806. (a) Each department or -agency which

12 funds or regulates an entity with respect to biomedical and

13 behavioral research involving human subjects shall certify

14 that the Human Investigation Review Board of such entity

15 is in conformity with the requirements of subsection B.

16 "(b) .No human investigation review board shall be

17 certified by a department or agency unless such department

18 or agency is satisfied that —
" (1) the entity has established a human investiga-
tion review board in such manner as is required by this
title and by such department or agency;

"(2) the human investigation review board will
operate in a manner so as to assure the full exercise of
the rights and full protection of the interests of subjects

1 of biomedical and behavioral research consistent with

2 the ethical and moral principles identified by the Com-

3 mission, pursuant to section 1801.

4 "duties of the human investigation beview boards

5 "Sec. 1807. It shall be the duty of each human investi-

6 gation review board, established under section 1805, to—

7 "(a) establish policies for the review of research

8 sponsored in whole or part by Federal funds or required

9 by Federal regulation, consistent with the policies, pro-

10 cedures, and guidelines of appropriate departments or

11 agencies;

12 " (b) assume full responsibility to insure that bio-

13 medical and behavioral research involving human sub-

14 jects is carried out under the safest possible conditions
^ 5 and with the fully informed consent of the subject (or
16 bis family) in a manner fully consistent with the poli-
1? cies, procedures, and guidelines of appropriate depart-

18 ments or agencies ;

19 "(c) seek the consultative services of the Com-

20 mission on any decision, or for the provision of informa-

21 tion needed to arrive at a decision; and

22 "(d) initiate, if appropriate, the referral of par-

23 ticular decisions to the Commission in accordance with

24 regulations promulgated by the Commission,

1 "monitobing and inspection

2 "Sec. 1808. (a) A department or agency which has

3 certified the Human Investigation Review Board of an en-

4 tity shall, from time to time, monitor the operation and

5 activities of—

G "(1) such Board, and

7 "(2). such entity,

S to determine whether the operation and activities of such

9 Board and entity are in compliance with this title, and the
10 policies, procedures, guidelines, and regulations of such de-
ll partment or agency.

12 "(b) (1) A department or agency which has certified

13 the human investigation review board of an entity shall,

14 from time to time, inspect such entity to determine whether

15 it is in compliance with this title, and the policies, pro-

16 cedures, guidelines, and regulations of such department or

17 agency.

18 "(2) In the case of an entity inspected pursuant to this

19 section, the inspection shall extend to all tangible things

20 therein, including records, files, papers, documents, processes,
2i controls, and facilities, which such department or agency

22 finds relevant or material to whether such entity is in com-

23 pliance with this title, and the policies, procedures, guide-

24 lines, and regulations of such department or agency.

25 "( c ) The monitoring and inspection authority of any

1 department or agency, pursuant to this section, shall be

2 limited to those operations, activities, and tangible things

3 which relate to research funded, in whole or in part, by or

4 required pursuant to a regulation of such department or

5 agency.

6 "confidentiality and recordkeeping requirements

7 Sec. 1809. If an entity has established a human investi-

8 gation review board and such board has been certified by a

9 department or agency, such entity shall- —

10 " (a) establish and maintain such records, make

11 such reports, and provide such information as any such

12 department or agency shall by regulation or order re-

13 quire to determine whether such entity is in compliance

14 with this title, and the policies, procedures, guidelines,

15 and regulations of such department or agency;

16 ' "(b) make such records, files, papers, documents,

17 processes, and controls which such department or agency

18 finds material or relevant to whether such entity is in

19 compliance with this title, and the policies, procedures,

20 guidelines, and regulations of such department or agency
2i available to such department or agency, or any of its

22 duly authorized representatives for examination, copy-

23 ing, or mechanical reproduction on or off the premises

24 of such entity upon the reasonable request therefor;

25 " (c) ( 1 ) a department or agency shall not disclose

ill

20 .

1 any information reported to or otherwise obtained by it

2 pursuant to this title which concerns any information

3 which contains or relates to a trade secret or other mat-

4 ter referred to in section 1905 of title 18 of the United

5 States Code ;

6 "(2) the Commission, each department or agency

7 and each entity which is required to establish and main-
S tain records, make reports, and provide information
9 pursuant to this title shall in securing and maintaining

10 any record of individually identifiable personal data

11 (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as 'personal

12 data') for purposes of this title —

13 "(A) inform any individual who is asked to

14 supply personal data whether he is legally required,

15 or may refuse, to supply such data and inform him

16 of any specific consequences, known to the Commis-

17 sion, department or agency, or entity, as the case

18 may be, of providing or not providing such data;

19 "(B) upon request, inform any individual if

20 he is the subject of personal data secured or main-

21 tained by the Commission, department or agency,

22 or entity, as the case may be, and make the data

23 available to him in a form comprehensive to him;

24 "(C) assure that no use is made of personal

25 data which is not within the purposes ot this title

24 ;1 |

.21 :];

1 unless an informed consent has been obtained from

2 the individual who is the subject of such data; I

3 " (D) upon request, inform any individual of *» \
4. the use being made of personal data respecting such

5 individual and of the identity of the individuals and . 1

6 entities which will use the data and their relation-

7 ship to the Commission, department or agency, or * ||

8 entity; -s

9 "(3) any entity which maintains a record of per- --*

10 sonal data and which receives a request from the Com- f

■■■■•*

11 mission or a department or agency for such data for

■ i

12 purposes of this title shall not transfer any such data |

13 to the Commission or a department or agency unless

14 the individual whose personal data is to be so trans- ^

15 ferred gives an informed consent for such transfer. 1

16 " (4) Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

17 personal data collected or maintained by the Com- I

18 mission or a department or agency, pursuant to this

19 title, may not be made available or disclosed by the Com- ^

20 mission or a department or agency to any person or * |

21 entity other than the individual who is the subject of

22 such data. Such personal data may not be required to be ; |

23 disclosed by any Federal, State, or local civil, criminal,

24 administrative, legislative or other proceeding. J

25 "(d) Any person who unlawfully discloses the contents

1 of any record, file, paper, document, process, or control shall

2 upon conviction be fined not more than $500 in the case of a

3 first offense, and not more than $5,000 in the case of each

4 subsequent offense.

5 " (e) The recordkeeping requirements established by

6 any department or agency shall be limited to those operations

7 and activities which relate to research funded by or required

8 pursuant to a regulation of such department or agency.

9 "interim provisions

10 "Sec. 1810. (a) Until such time as a human investiga-

11 tion review board has been certified by a department or

12 agency, each department or agency shall determine with re-

13 spect to biomedical and behavioral research conducted, sup-

14 ported, or required by regulation under programs adminis-

15 tered by each such department or agency that —

16 " (1) the rights of human subjects of such research

17 are fully exercised;

18 " (2) the interests of human subjects of such re-

19 search are fully protected ;

20 " (3) the risks to a human subject of such research

21 are outweighed by the potential benefits to him or by

22 the importance of the knowledge to be gained from such

23 research;

24 "(4) informed consent is given by each human

25 subject in accordance with the provisions of this section.

1 "(b) For purposes of this section onty, the term 'in-

2 formed consent' shall mean the consent of a person, or his

3 legal representative, so situated as to be able to exercise

4 free power of choice without tae intervention of any element

5 of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other form of constraint or

6 coercion. Such consent shall be evidenced by an individual-

7 ized written document signed by such person, or his legal

8 representative. The information to be given to the subject

9 and recorded in such written document shall include the

10 following basic elements:

11 "(1) a fair explanation of the procedures to be

12 followed, including an identification of any which are

13 experimental;

14 " (2) a description of any attendant discomforts and

15 risks reasonably to be expected;

16 "(3) a fair explanation of the likely results should

17 the experimental procedure fail ;

18 "(4) a description of any benefits reasonably to be
29 expected;

20 "(5) a disclosure of any appropriate alternative

2i procedures that might be advantageous for the subject;

22 "(6) an °ff er to answer any inquiries concerning

23 the procedures ; and

(7) any other matter which a department or 1

25 agency deems appropriate for the full exercise of the

1 rights and full protection of the interests of human sub-

2 jects of biomedical and behavioral research.

3 In addition, the written document executed by such

4 person, or his legal representative, shall include no exculpa-

5 tory language through which the subject is made to waive,

6 or to appear to waive, any of his legal rights, or to release
J the institution or its agents from liability for negligence. Any

8 organization which initiates, directs, or engages in programs

9 of research, development, or demonstration which require

10 informed consent shall keep a permanent record of such con-

11 sent and the information provided the subject and develop

12 appropriate documentation and reporting procedures as an

13 essential administrative function.

14 "administrative provisions

15 "Sec. 1811. (a) The Commission may for the purpose
v 16 of carrying out its duties hold such hearings, sit and act at

17 such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such

18 evidence as the Commission deems advisable.

19 "(b) (1) The Commission may appoint and coinpen-

20 sate, at a rate not to exceed the annual rate of basic pay in

21 effect for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule, an execu-

22 tive director, without regard to the provisions of title 5,

23 United States Code, governing appointments in the oompeti-

24 tive service, and the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter

]

1 III of chapter 53 of such title, relating to classification and

2 General Schedule pay rates, who shall administer full-time |
* 3 the daily activities of the Commission.

4 " (2) The Commission may appoint and fix the compen- J

5 sation of such personnel as it deems advisable, without regard * : -,

6 to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing ij "

7 appointments in the competitive service, and the provisions * ||

8 of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title,

9 relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates. J

10 " (3) The Commission may procure, in accordance with . rJJ

11 the provisions of section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, ^

12 the temporary or intermittent services of experts or con- r |

13 sultants. Persons so employed shall receive compensation

14 at a rate to be fixed by the Commission, but not exceeding : : |

15 for any day (including travel time) the daily equivalent of

16 the effective rate for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule. ■# J

17 While away from his home or regular place of business in the if|

18 performance of services for the Commission, any such per-

19 son may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in :|

20 lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 (b) of title

21 5, United States Code, for persons in the Government service H

22 employed intermittently. f|

23 "(c) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the

24 Commission may publish and disseminate to the public such I.J

■V.t

1 reports, information, recommendations, nnd other material

2 relating to its functions, activities, and studies as it deems

3 appropriate.

4 " (2) The Commission shall not disclose any informa-

5 tion reported to or otherwise obtained by it in carrying out

6 its functions which (1) identifies any individual who has

7 been the subject of an activity studied or investigated by

8 the Commission, (2) concerns any information which con-

9 tains or relates to a trade secret or other matter referred to

10 in section 1905 of title 18, United States Code, or (3) is

11 properly classified for any purpose by a Federal agency.

12 "(d) Within sixty days of the receipt of any recommen-

13 dation made by the Commission under this part, the appro-

14 priate department or agency shall publish it in the Federal

15 Register and provide opportunity for interested persons to

16 submit written data, views, and arguments with respect to

17 such recommendation. The appropriate department or

18 agency shall (1) determine whether the administrative or
29 other action proposed by such recommendation is appro-
20 priate to assure the protection of human subjects of bio-
2i medical and behavioral research conducted, supported, or

22 required b)- regulation under programs administered by it,

23 and (2) if it determines that such action is not so appro-

24 priate, publish in the Federal Register such determination

25 together with an adequate statement of the reasons for its

.£

rl i

1 determination. If the appropriate department or agency de-

2 tannines that administrative action recommended by the

3 Commission should be undertaken by it, it shall undertake

4 such ac'ion as expeditiously as is feasible.

5 " (e) The Commission may make grants and enter into

6 contracts for the purpose of undertaking any required in-

7 vestigation or study, for the development of required policies,

8 procedures and guidelines and for monitoring compliance

9 with this title and policies, procedures, guidelines and regu- i

10 lations of a department or agency.

11 " (f ) The Commission shall determine the priority and

12 order of those duties and functions required to be performed

13 under this title.

14 " is) U) Upon a determination by the Commission that

15 sufficient information already exists concerning an area of

16 investigation and study required to be conducted under this

17 title, the Commission may decide that such investigation

18 and study need not be conducted. In such a case, the Com-

19 mission shall utilize already existing information as the if

20 basis for identifying those principles and developing those
2i policies, procedures and guidelines required under this

22 titfe-

23 " (2) Unless the Commission has determined that an

24 investigation and study required under this title need not

25 be conducted pursuant to paragraph (1) , each investigation

•(

1 and study shall be completed within three years from the

2 date of enactment of the President's Commission for the

3 Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral

4 Research Act of 1977.

5 "(h) (1) Pursuant to any activity relating to its duties

6 and functions under this title, the Commission may snbpena

7 witnesses, compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses,

8 and require the production of any records and information,

9 including records, files, papers, documents, processes and

10 controls and other tangible things, which the Commission

11 finds relevant or material to its duties and functions. The

12 attendance of witnesses and the production of records may

13 be required from any place in any State or in any territory or

14 other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States

15 at any designated place of hearing; except that a witness

16 shall not be required to appear at any hearing any more than

17 500 miles distant from the place where he was served with a

18 subpena. Witnesses summoned under this section shall be

19 paid the same fees and mileage that arc paid witnesses in

20 the courts of the United States.

21 " (2) A subpena issued under this section may be served

22 by any person designated in the subpena to serve it. Serv-

23 ice upon a natural person may be made by personal delivery

24 of the subpena to him. Service may be made upon a domestic

25 or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other unin-

1 corporated association which is subject to suit under a comr

2 mon name, by delivering the subpena to an officer, to a

3 managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized

4 by appointment or by law to receive service of process. The

5 affidavit of the person serving: the subpena entered on a

6 true copy thereof by the person serving it shall be proof

7 of service.

8 "(3) In the case of contumacy by or refusal, to obey

9 a subpena issued to any person, the Commission may invoke

10 the aid of any court of the United States within the juris*

11 diction of which the activity is carried on or of which the

12 subpenaed person is an inhabitant, or in which he carries on

13 business or may be found, to compel compliance with the

14 subpena. The court may issue an order requiring the sub-

15 penaed person to appear before the Commission to produce

16 records, if so ordered, or to give testimony touching the mat-

17 ter under consideration. Any failure to obey the order of the

18 court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof.

19 All process in any such case may be served in any judicial
2G district; in which such person may be found.

21 " (i) On November 1 of each year, each department or

22 agency shall each submit a report simultaneously to the 1 [

23 President and to the appropriate committees of Congress. ;

24 Each such report shall include with respect to the previous { \

25 fiscal year—

1 "(1) a complete list and description of all recom-

2 mendations made to such department or agency by the

3 Commission;

4 " (2) a description of what action such department

5 or agency took with respect to each such recommenda-

6 tion;

7 "(3) in those situations where such department or

8 agency accepted a recommendation, a description of the

9 policies, procedures, guidelines, regulations, and other

10 administrative actions were taken by such department

11 or agency to implement such recommendation;

12 "(^) ^ n tnose situations where such department

13 or agency failed to accept, in whole or in part, a recom-

14 mendation, a description of the reasons for such fail-

15 ure; a description of policies, procedures, guidelines,

16 regulations, and other administrative actions were fol-

17 lowed in lieu of such recommendation; and what were

18 the results.

19 " ( j) Section 14 of the Federal Advisory Committee

20 Act shall not apply with respect to the Commission.

21 "penalties

22 "Sec. 1812. (a) No entity may receive any Federal

23 funds from a department or agency, for the conduct of bio-

24 medical or behavioral research unless such entity has es-

1 tablished a human investigation review board which has

2 been certified by such department or agency.

3 " (b) No entity may receive a Federal approval by a

4 department or agency of a program, patent, product or

5 study which requires the conduct of biomedical or behavioral

6 research unless such entity has established a human investi-

7 gation review board which has been certified by such de-

8 partment or agency. ■-■>•■-

9 "definition s ^ .:..":: :

10 "Sec. 1813. (a) As used in this title the term —

11 "(1) 'Commission' means the President's Com-

12 mission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Bio*

13 medical and Behavioral Research.

14 " (2) 'President' means the President of the United

15 States.

16 "(3) 'Department or Agency' means each author-

17 ity of the Government of the United States, whether or

18 not it is within or subject to review by another agency,

19 but does not include —

20 "(A.) the Congress;

2i " (B) the courts of the United States ;

22 " (C) the governments of the territories or pos-

23 sessions of the United States; and

24 "(D) the government of the District of

25 Columbia.

1 "(4) 'entity* includes an individual, partnership,

2 corporation, association, or public or private organization

3 but does not include a department or agency which con-

4 ducts biomedical or behavioral research solely through

5 grants or contracts.

q "(5) 'information' includes any information which

7 is classified or deemed to be classified for any purpose

3 (including national security) by an agency or depart-

9 ment.

10 "(6) Ileal th services' means those health services

11 which are supported or financed by Federal funds.

12 "(7) 'regulated' and 'required pursuant to a regu-

13 lation' means any biomedical or behavioral research in-

14 volving human subjects which is required to be conducted

15 pursuant to a regulation of a department or agency as
K3 a condition precedent to an approval by such department
17 or agency of a program, patent, substance, product, or
lg study.

19 " (b) As used in subsection (b) of section 1802 the

20 term—

2i " ( 1 ) 'children' means individuals who have not

22 attained the legal age of consent to participate in research

23 as determined under the applicable law of the jurisdic-

24 tion in which the research is to be conducted.

25 "(2) 'prisoners' means individuals involuntarily

33
confined in correctional institutions or facilities as defined
in section 601 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (43 U.S.C. 3781) .

" (3) 'institutionalized mentally infirm' includes in-
dividuals who are mentally ill, mentally retarded, emo-
tionally disturbed, psychotic, or senile, or who have
other impairments of a similar nature and who reside
as patients in an institution.

"(4) the term 'military personnel' means individ-
uals who are active and inactive members of the United
States Armed Forces and employees and agents of the
Central Intelligence Agency.".

MISCELLANEOUS

Sec. 3. (a) Part A of title II of the National Research
Act (42 U.S.C. 2891) is repealed.

(b) Sections 211 and 213 of the National Research Act
are repealed.

19 Service Act (42 U.S.C. 218 (f) ) is repealed.

20 EFFECTIVE date

Sec. 4. This Act and the amendments made by this
Act shall take effect on October 1, 1977, except that the

provisions of section 1812 shall not take effect until April 1,
24 1978.

m i

Senator Kennedy. But it seems to me, and I think the other mem-
bers of the committee, that we have to protect our national inter-
ests, but we also have to protect the interest of our American citizens
in a very important way, and develop the kinds of process where
those protections can be made in ways that are not gomg to see the
basic and fundamental integrity of our universities, other agencies
and individuals compromised.

What we have seen over the issue of behavioral health research,
which is the area of interest of this committee, during this period of
time is that the agency worked effectively without accountability
and, in so many instances, really basically without basic regard for
the protection of the human subjects.

Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Having served on the original Senate Intelligence Committee,
I find it rather disturbing to be here at all today. During the Intel-
ligence Committee's IS months of investigation, we were continually
given information by the intelligence agencies with the very specific
implication that the information was either complete or it was the
best we knew. We were told that we had the whole story then, just
as this subcommittee was told we had the whole story during our
1975 hearings. Time after time after time, that has proven not to be
the case.

The series of hearings we are now conducting began because we
found yet another black box that we opened up to find information
that throws just a little bit more light on the whole picture. It is rather
tragic to me that Senate committees have to operate this way. We
are limited by our knowledge and in our ability to make new laws
and to oversee present laws when we are given information piece-
meal — and seemingly with great reluctance by the agencies. It's
like opening a series of small boxes, and then finding that after we
open the last box, which we are assured has everything in it, there
appears yeL another box that has to be opened and the whole matter
examined again.

That's certainly the description I would give of the way that the
intelligence agencies have disclosed material on their past actions to
Senate committees which are charged with legislative and oversight
responsibilities.

I do commend Admiral Turner for his candor, for his straightfor-
wardness in revealing the discovery of this latest group of documents
containing more information relating to CIA human experimentation.

I do have to say I wonder who was responsible for supplying the
information to us in the past and where tins material was at the time
our committee initially looked into the use of human subjects by the
CIA. We were told 2 years ago lhat we had all of the information that
was available, and that it was the most the officials knew. Of course
the people who knew differently were either silent or not available.

So I am very troubled that this process goes on and on.

Also, while this point is not particularly relevant to this morning's
hearing, in reading the newspapers this week we see the same sort of
situation in the matter of the intelligence community's use of jour-
nalists. We see almost an exact parallel of the pattern of information
disclosure on that issue as the subcommittee faces on the human
subjects issue — being told something, but not being told the whole

story, and then finding out later that, in fact, we were told just a
small part of the story, and now a new story has come out with a lot
more detail and much broader implications than what we were orig-
inally told.

So it is not surprising to me that we are here today, but it is rather
disappointing.

I am here to learn, and I have learned enough by now about how
these things operate to know that there may well be more chapters
in this continuing story.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Kennedy. The final point I want to make, I suppose the
matter which is of greatest concern for Americans, is that we have
seen over the period of these 14 years when these programs were
being undertaken a perversion again of the freedom of both individuals
., as well as agencies, and I suppose it is only fair to ask what was really
achieved and what was accomplished from that?

I think that that certainly has been my conclusion reviewing both
the details of the material and the documents. I think we would be
hard pressed to find it.

Senator Schweiker. Mr. Chairman, I do have a request. Senator
Goldwater, who is ranking Republican member of the Senate Intel-
ligence Committee, cannot be here because of the scheduling conflict.
He has asked me to include a statement of his in the record at the
start of these proceedings. *

Senator Kennedy. We will include that in the record as though
read.

STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY M. GOLDWATER, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA

Senator Goldwater. Mr. Chairman: Information on drug testing
of human beings by the CIA and other intelligence agencies became
known to the public during the Rockefeller Commission and Church
committee investigations. These events happened over 12 and as far
back as 25 years ago and are now completely stopped. Yet, we con-
tinue to hear and read about these events in a manner that causes
enough confusion and which lead some people to believe that these
events are being revealed for the first time when in fact that is not
the case. The current emphasis is a rehash of previous revelations and
really adds nothing worthwhile except to cause a new rash of publicity
and more confusion. None of the things that you are bringing up
before this committee and transmitting on television across this
country and spreading across the pages of the press of this country
is new or, in fact, even news. We went through this, I guess, 2 years
ago before the first Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
everything that you are hearing has been heard before.

Now as to why the orders were issued, you may recall that during
the Korean conflict, for the first time, American prisoners were
subjected to the use of drugs by the enemy in an effort to either make
them talk or to punish them or to use them as propaganda agents.
This business got started at a time when it was considered to be es-
sential. I can recall how bewildered a lot of us were just following the
Korean war when many of our soldiers who had been prisoners of war
did not want to return home and it led us to believe that they had

been brainwashed. The Church committee's report explains it this
way:

The late 1940's and early 1950's were marked by concern over the threat posed
by the activities of the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China and other
Communist bloc countries. United States concern over the use of chemical and
biological agents by these powers was acute. The belief that hostile powers had
used chemical and biological agents in interrogation*, brainwashing, and in
g~- attacks designed to harass, disable, or kill Allied personnel created considerable

pressure for a "defensive" program to investigate chemical and biological agents
so that the intelligence community could understand the mechanisms by which
these substances worked and how their effects could be defeated.

The Church committee report further explains that the rationale

* for testing programs was a follows:

Fears that countries hostile to the United States would use chemical and bio-
logical agents against American? or America's allies led to the development of a
defensive program designed to discover techniques for American intelligence

• agencies to detect and counteract chemical and biological agents.

I think it was a very natural reaction of our leaders, in this particu-
lar instance, to run tests to find out what the effect of drugs, or at
least certain drugs, would be on individuals so tha* we might provide
protection for our own forces in the future. Certainly there were some
unfortunate results, particularly in regard to the unwitting partic-
ipants and even to those who volunteered for the program. But,
war itself is an unfortunate thing.

That's behind us now. After \){ years of investigation by the Church
committee and now followed by more than a year of oversight by the
new Senate Intelligence Committee we are now assured that the
intelligence agencies are under congressional control with effective
oversight and accountability. To arrive at that point the select
committee has set up six subcommittees whose combined responsi-
bi ities involve them m all aspects of the intelligence gathering activ-
ities of the Federal Government. Each executive branch organization
engaged in intelligence operations, all the way from the White House
on down, must ask for funds, justify the programs for which those
funds are requested, advise the committee of special undertakings,
and, above all, account for what they do.

The ntelligence business has been through some tough times and
the public's view has been soured. That is Dehind us now. I believe
it is time to look ahead. I am convinced that our agencies are staffed
« by competent and concerned public servants who will continue to pro-

vide the Nation with an effective intelligence program dedicated to
; the national interest. I believe they have earned and now deserve our

support.
* In my humble opinion, I think the time has come for someone to

rise to the defense of the Central Intelligence Agency in this whole
matter of the administration of certain types of drugs to individuals
in this country, either on a voluntary or an involuntary basis. Now
these individuals that you are bringing before this committee were
members of the Intelligence Agency, and they were acting under
orders. These are good, patriotic, dedicated American citizens who
were told to do something and, in turn, those people who issued *he
instructions were given orders from on high, and if you want to trace
the source right on up, you'll probably find that the source was prob-
ably at the White House level. People working in agencies like the
ClA are pretty much like the people in uniform. They do not disobey

orders unless they feel so strongly about the subject that they would |

be willing to resign their posts or their commissions. |

I would hope that the hearings before this committee would cease
and that all the good work being done in rehabilitating and rebuilding ~

the Central Intelligence Agency will not be hindered by spreading |

these matters, which will leave an erroneous impression, across the *

news of this country. I believe that it would be more useful at this
time to focus our attention on finding and helping those individuals
or institutions that may have been harmed by any improper or illegal
activities.

I offer this with all respect to you, Mr. Chairman, and to your com- ,

mittee and with the full knowledge that you have every right in the
world to hold these hearings.

Senator Kennedy. We had joint hearings previously and we have
worked very closely with the Intelligence Committee. „

Our interest in these hearings is obviously limited to health aspects
and this spins over, obviously, into other provisions.

Our first witness this morning is Dr. Charles Geschickter, Geschick- |

ter Fund for Medical Research. |

Dr. Geschickter, we welcome you here. If you will be kind enough
to come up, we will ask you to stand and be sworn in.

Do you swear that the testimony you will give is the truth, the |

whole truth, so help you, God? ■■ i

Dr. Geschickter. I do.

Senator Kennedy. Just before we get started, one of the obvious f

aspects of our inquiry has been how the Agency in the development of |

this program of testing involved other agencies. We are going to hear
from Mr. Bensinger tomorrow about the Bureau of Narcotics. I have ,

here just a sworn statement by John Bartels, and I will just read it I

into the record. ■ •*

It is a brief statement, but it is related to our first witness, and I
think we ought to have this in the record, and I will insert it into the 1

record at this time. J

[The material referred to follows:]

::.i

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER )

ss.

JOHN R. BARTELS, JR., being a member of the Bar of the
State of New York, affirms under penalty of perjury the
following :
1. On July 1, 1973, I was appointed Acting Administrator

of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration by Attorney
General Elliot Richardson. During the first few weeks
of that term, I learned from Patrick Fuller, Chief
Inspector, that there were between 13 and 17 agents of
D.E.A. assigned to various field offices as anonymous
inspectors. These men had prior C.I. A. training, and I
believe some may have had prior C.I. A. experience. Mr.
Fuller explained that he had promised to keep their
names anonymous, and accordingly could not tell even me
who they were. Their function was to report to him
alone anonymously, questionable instances or allegations
concerning the character or integrity of other agents .
Thus an agent could be transferred or removed from his
position on Fuller's say-so alone without ever being
confronted with a charge.

2. After consulting with Jonathan Moore , Mr. Richardson's
executive assistant, I decided to encourage Mr. Fuller
to retire or resign. He continued to refuse to disclose
the names, but agreed that the program be disbanded,
and it was. During this time period I received a letter

from William Colby, head of the C.I. A., withdrawing all
support for this program.

Many months later I learned from my executive assistant,

Daniel Casey, that the old Federal Bureau of Narcotics

had maintained joint "safe houses" with the C.I. A. He

told me that the Bureau had used these apartments in

California for debriefing informants while he supposed

the Agency had used them for meeting sources and perhaps

compromising situations as they contained two-way mirrors. ,

It is my belief that whatever Mr. Casey learned was from

other agents or reports.

At about the same time I asked Mr. Colby for a representa-
tion from the C.I. A. that there were no employees on the
D.E.A. payroll who were also performing services in any
manner for the Agency. It is my recollection that I
received an oral representation to that effect from Mr.
Colby, and I believe a written letter, either from Kim
or one of his deputies. In addition, the Office of Personnel
informed me that there were approximately 53 employees at
D.E.A. with past C.I. A. experience who had been absorbed
into the Agency in the merger between B.N.D.D. and the
Bureau of Customs. We obtained affidavits from each one ij |

of those employees to the effect that he was not performing

* ft
any services for, or acting at the' request of, any employee J

of the Agency. I believe we got affidavits from every

employee with any past history of working with the Agency. *

-&■

To my knowledge, there was no formal program of
cooperation between D.E.A. and the C.I. A. after July
of 1973 apart from the formal exchange of information
between our office of intelligence and liaison for the
Agency, initially Seymour Bolton and subsequently John
Kennedy.

Sworn to before me this
19th day of September 1977.

faA

Q ; -'.!=-* - v. r . ..

ftfe

Senator Kennedy. We will refer back to that during the course of
our hearing.

Dr. Geschickter, would you tell us a little bit about the Geschickter
Fund for Medical Research?

Did you arrange with the CIA to have the CIA money funneled
through the funds for medical research in order to carry out various
research projects?

STATEMENT OF CHARLES F, GESCHICKTER, SB., M.D., GESCHICKTER
FUND FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH, PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF RE-
SEARCH PATHOLOGY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CEN-
TER, COMMANDER, U.S. NAVY AND CHIEF PATHOLOGIST, U.S.
NAVY, ACCOMPANIED BY PLATO CACHERIS, ESQ., HUNDLEY &
CACHERIS, P.O., WASHINGTON, D.C.; AND CHARLES F. GESCHICK-
TER, JR., ESQ., BRAULT, LEWIS, GESCHICKTER & PALMER,
FAIRFAX, VA.

Dr. Geschickter. The Geschickter Fund had already been in
being since 1939 and was doing research in cancer and in chronic
diseases. The original contract with the fund, given us by the CIA,
was for a group of anticancer compounds that had already been
published in 1951. I have reprints of these compounds and their use
on cancer patients.

Subsequent to this, the CIA enlarged their grants to my laboratory
at Georgetown which was being supported by the Geschickter Fund
and by the NCI grants and ultimately from grants from the Army's
Institute of Walter Reed Research, and they agreed to supply funds
to continue the research as we had done previously because of our
capabilities in synthetic chemistry and in their reading of their use-
fulness in physiology by a unique procedure, that was giving of
material to rats and subsequently analyzing their effects through
microscojpic preparations of virus organs. This is not usual in pharma-
cology. Our laboratory represented practically the only one in the
world that was assaying new chemicals by this lustologic method. We
did not furnish monies knowingly to other universities for separate
projects until 1955. The Agency came in with moneys for other
universities who submitted proposals for ongoing research, and none
of this research, neither in Geschickter Fund Laboratory nor in the
universities supported through the Geschickter Fund by the CIA,
ever had any research instituted by the CIA.

These were ongoing projects in reputable universities and hospital
centers, and never did they depart from their usual practices because
of the CIA grant.

Senator Kennedy. Why was the CIA in it? Were they interested
in cancer research?

Dr. Geschickter. If you read their reports, you will find one of the
byproducts of this will be cancer research advancement and they were
initnenleil in picking up whatever ideas

Senator Kennedy. Do you believe that this is what they were
interested in, or is that just a statement that they were interested?

Why would the CIA be interested?

■-#

Dr. Gxschicktsb. I can only give you the report that came to me
from Allen Dulles, and I will quote it: "Thank God there is something
decent coming out of our bag of dirty tricks. We are delighted."

Senator Kennedy. We will get into some of those other ones. Can
you tell us why you got involved with the GIA funding?

Dr. Geschickter. I would like for Senator Schweiker and y<u>
self to have copies of these reports.

Senator Kennedy. They will be made a part of the record.

[The infoimation referred to follows:]

Amiucam JeoiMu. or Cumcai. Patmouoot

Vol. M. So. I. July. IMO, pp. I-S

MmlM in U.S.A.

A HYPERSENSITIVITY PHENOMENON PRODUCED BY STRESS:
THE "NEGATIVE PHASE" REACTION

CHARLES F. GESCHICKTER, M.D., W. EDWARD O'MALLEY, M.D., Ph.D., and
EUGENE P. RUBACKY, Ph. D.

Georgetown Univeriity School of Medicine, Washington, D. C.

The role of stress in disease has been a
source of controversy and interest since
Selyc'- * first published his unprecedented
observations on the general adaptation
syndrome. Since that time, an extensive
literature has accumulated on the effects of
prolonged stress on the pituitary-adrenal
axis; however, the effects of a single brief
episode of stress has received little attention.
The stresses of life are most commonly
short and intermittent. It therefore seemed
of great interest to assess the effects of a
single brief stress episode on adrenal-
cortical function. These studies were stimu-
lated by a surprising finding during the
course of investigations on Alarmine, a
substance discovered by Geschickter and
associates' to produce lesions simulating
those of the collagen diseases.

gelygio. n demonstrated that chronic daily
administration of ACTH and Cortisol
prevented the anaphylactoid reaction to the
intraperitoneal injection of fresh egg albumin
in the rat. It was noted that in Alarmine-
treated rats the injection of egg white
caused no reaction. This was unexpected
and occurred even after a single injection of
Alarmine. Thus, rats that were treated
with 1 dose of Alarmine responded in a
manner identical with that of rats con-
ditioned for a long period of time by re-
peated therapy with ACTH or Cortisol. The
anaphylactoid reaction in the white male
rat following the intraperitoneal injection of
2.0 ml. of fresh egg white obtained from the
hen's egg consists of conspicuous edematous
swelling around the paws, tongue, nose, and
scrotum. This response appears regularly

Received, November 21, 1959; accepted for
publication February 29, I960.

Dr. Geschickter is Professor of Pathology, and
Dr. O'Malley in Research Assistant, Department
of Pathology.

This work was supported by a grant from the
Geschickter Fund for Medical Research.

within 60 to 90 min. following the injection,
and it occurs in the absence of a preceding
sensitizing dose of egg white. All rats are
susceptible, and the edematous response is
relatively uniform and can be observed

Several other stressor substances were
tested for antianaphylactoid activity. They
included formalin, nitrogen mustard, and
epinephrine hydrochloride. All of these
substances in a single dose prevented the
anaphylactoid reaction, apparently by pro-
voking the general adaptation syndrome
(GAS), which involved the pituitary-
adrenal axis. Epinephrine was selected for
further study. Its use permits the adminis-
tration of a quantitated degree of stress for
a very short time interval. The effects of
this brief stress can be studied for many
hours thereafter.

The studies herein reported were designed
to elucidate the immediate and long-term
effects of a single stress episode produced by
the injection of epinephrine. Less extensive
parallel studies were conducted using
formalin, Alarmine, and nitrogen mustard.
The egg white anaphylactoid reaction was
used as an indicator system in studying
these reactions.

These experiments demonstrate that
whereas a mild acute bout of stress in
animals protects against immediate sensi-
tivity reaction, it subsequently but tran-
siently weakens the organism's resistance to
further stress. These findings are in marked
contrast to the currently held concept that
in intermittent chronic stress conditions
the organism becomes resistant to future
stresses.

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES

Experiment No. I. Epinephrine hydro-
chloride, 0.1 ml. of 1:1000 solution, was
administered subcutaneously to 170 white
male Wistar rats that weighed 100 to 120

■i

>->

GESCHICXTER XT At.

Vol.84

€

Gm. each. Following this, 2 ml. of fresh hen
egg white were administered intraperi-
toneally at each of the following time in-
tervals to groups of 10 of the epinephrine-
treated rats: 1 hr. and >£ hr. before the
administration of epinephrine; simultane-
ously with the administration of epinephrine ;
H hr-i 1 hr., and l>£ hr. after the ad-
ministration of epinephrine; and every
hour thereafter for 6 hr., and then every
3 hr. thereafter for 12 hr. A single group of

16 rats not treated with epinephrine served
as a control, and they received only 2 ml.
of egg white intraperitoneally. Responses to
egg white I hr. after injection were recorded
as to 4 plus, according to the severity of
the reaction (Table 1). It will be seen that
the stress invoked by epinephrine protected
against the anaphylactoid reaction to egg
white for approximately 2 hr. after a post-
epinephrine period has elapsed.

Experiment No. S. Forty-five hypophy-

TABLE 1
Experiment No. 1— Response or Rats to Intraperitoneal Injection or Ego Write a iter

Treatment with Epinephrine

1-Hr. Rapoatt to Em Whit*

Number of Group

Number of

Rati

■M

+«

I. Control group (no epinephrine)

11. Egg white* 1 hr. before epi-

nephrine!

III. Egg white }■$ hr. before epi-

nephrine

IV. Egg white at time of epineph-

rine

V. Egg white H hr. after epineph-

rine

VI. Egg white 1 hr. after epineph-

rine
VII. Egg white 1*4 hr. after epineph-

°[pro-

■tor tori

rine

VIII. Egg white 2 hr. after epineph-

rine

IX. Egg white 3 br. after epineph-

rine

X. Egg white 4 hr. after epineph-

rine

XI. Egg white 5 hr. after epineph-

rine

XII. Egg white 6 hr. after epineph-

rine

XIII. Egg white 7 hr. after epineph-

rine

XIV. Egg white 8 hr. after epineph-

rine

XV. Egg white 11 hr. after epineph-

rine

XVI. Egg white 14 hr. after epineph-

rine

XVII. Egg white 17 hr. after epineph-

rine

XVIII. Egg white 20 hr. after epineph-

rine

* Egg white— 2 ml. per rat intraperitpneally.

t Epinephrine H CI —0.1 ml. of 1: 1000 solution aubcutaneously.

July I960

STRESS HYPERSENSITIVITY PHENOMENON

sectomized male Wistar rats, weighing 200
to 250 Gm. each, were divided into 9 groups
of 5 rats each. Ten days postoperatively
they all were injected subcutaneously with
0.1 ml. of a 1 rlOOO epinephrine hydro-
chloride solution. Egg white was adminis-
tered intraperitoneally at each of the
following time intervals to groups of 5 rats:
1 hr. before the- administration of epi-
nephrine; simultaneously with the adminis-
tration of epinephrine; and 1, 2, 4, 6, 9,
and 18 hr. after the administration of
epinephrine. Another group of 5 hypophy-
sectomized rats received egg white but no

injection of epinephrine. They served as
controls. Anaphylactoid reactions were
observed and graded to 4 plus 1 hr.
following administration of egg white
(Table 2). It will be seen that no adequate
protection resulted from injection of epi-
nephrine in the absence of the hypophysis.

Experiment No. 3. Experiment No. 2 was
duplicated, substituting 45 adrenalectomized
rats injected 2 days postoperatively (Table
3). Again, no adequate protection was
achieved in the absence of the adrenal
gland.

Experiment No. 4- One hundred and

TABLE 2
Experiment No. 2— Responbe of Htfophysectomized Rats to Injection of Eoo White after

Prior Treatment with Epinephrine

Number ol Group

! Number of
Kit.

1-Hr. RnpoaM to En While

I. Control group (no epinephrine)
II. Egg white* 1 hr. before epineph-
rine!

III. Egg white at time of epinephrine

IV. Egg white 1 hr. after epinephrine
V. Egg white 2 hr. after epinephrine

VI. Egg white 4 hr. after epinephrine
VII. Egg white 6 hr. after epinephrine
VIII. Egg white 9 hr. after epinephrine
IX. Egg white 18 hr. after epinephrine

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

2 '

* Egg white — 2 ml. per rat intraperitoneally.

t Epinephrine HC1 — 0.1 ml. of 1:1000 solution aubcutaneously.

TABLE 3
Response or Adrenalectomized Rath to Injection of Eaa White after Prior Treatment with

Epinephrine

Nmmbcr of Croup

I. Control group (no epinephrine)
II. Egg white* 1 hr. before epineph-
rine!

III. Egg white at time of epinephrine

IV. Egg white 1 hr. after epinephrine
V. Egg white 2 hr. after epinephrine

VI. Egg white 4 hr. after epinephrine

VII. Egg white ft hr. after epinephrine

VIII. Egg white 9 hr. after epinephrine

IX. Egg white 18 hr. after epinephrine

1-Hr. RetpouM lo Egg While

-»

* Egg white— 2 ml. per rat intraperitoneally.

t Epinephrine HC1 — 0.1 ml. of 1:1000 solution aubcutaneously.

+«

2
1
1
2

GESCHICKTER ET At.

Vol. 34

twenty male Wistar rats, weighing between
100 and 120 Gm. each, were divided into
12 groups of 10 rats each. Groups I to IV
were administered 1.0 mg. per kg. of
hydrocortisone solution intraperitoneally.
Groups V to VIII were administered 10
mg. per kg. of hydrocortisone solution
intraperitoneally. Groups IX' to XII were
administered 100 mg. per kg. of hydro-
cortisone solution intraperitoneally. Groups
I, V, and IX were administered 2 ml. of
egg white intraperitoneally Vi hr. following
the administration of hydrocortisone.
Groups II, VI, and X received 2 ml. of egg
white intraperitoneally \ l /2 hr- after the
administration of hydrocortisone. Groups

III, VII, and XI received 2 ml. of egg
white intraperitoneally 5 hr. after the
administration of hydrocortisone. Groups

IV, VIII, and XII received 2 ml. of egg
white intraperitoneally 14 'hr. after the
administration of hydrocortisone. Reactions
to injections of egg white were noted and
graded in the manner previously described
(Table 4). It will be seen that in contrast to
epinephrine, varying doses of hydrocor-
tisone administered as a single dose gave
no protection when the animals were
challenged at varying time intervals.

Experiment No. 5. Sixty male Wistar
rats, weighing 100 to 120 Gm. each, were
divided into 3 equal groups of 20 each.
Group I received hydrocortisone, 20 mg.
per kg. subcutaneously twice daily for 2
weeks. Group II received 0.1 ml. of 0.9
per cent solution of sodium chloride twice
daily for 2 weeks. Group III received 10
units per kg. of ACTH intramuscularly
twice daily for 2 weeks. Following the lust
injection, all 60 rats were administered 2
ml. of egg white intraperitoneally. Reactions
were observed and recorded as stated above
(Table 5). It will be seen that chronic doses
of hydrocortisone and ACTH failed to
protect.

Experiment No. 6. Twenty hypophy-
sectomized and udrcualectomized mule Wis-
tar rats, weighing approximately 200 Gm.
each, were divided into 4 groups of 5 rats
each, 10 days postoperatively. Group I
received 2 ml. of egg white per rat intra-
peritoneally. Group II received 0.1 ml. of
1:1000 epinephrine hydrochloride solution

TABLE 4
Experiment No. 4— Effect or Acute Adminis-
tration op HroRocoRTisoKE on Reaction
to Eoo White

Number of Croup*

■

Dow of Hydro-
cortisone

i Tim* of
1 Adminu-
* tralion of
; Em Whiter

Averu*
1-Hr.Re-

IfXMIK to

En White

W5. ftr if.

1.0

1'*

1.0

' '*

I'i

' +4

VII

VIII

! 14

100

l'i

XI .

too

XII

100

* Ten male rata to each group.
t Hours after hydrocortisone.

TABLE 5
Experiment No. 5— Effect of Chronic Admin-
istration OF HrDROCORTISONE ON RESPONSE

to Injected Egg White

dum-
ber of

. Treatment

1-Hr. Resnonie to
Em White

Group

o !+ii+i!+j|+*

! 1 !

Treated with hydrocor-
tisone* for 14 days; '■
20 rats

1 i 3 ' 12j 5

Treated wit h saline *o- ■.
lution for 14 days; 20
rata

8: 8' 4

! !

Treated with ACTHt

3:10 8; 2

for 14 days; 20 rats

• Hydrocortisone— 20 mg. p«r kg. subcutane-
ously twice daily.

t ACTH — 10 units per kg. intramuscularly
twice daily.

subcutaneously; >2 hr. later 2 ml. of egg
white per rat was administered intraperi-
toneally. Group III received 20 mg. per kg.
of hydrocortisone solution intraperitoneally;
}-2 hr. later 2 ml. of egg white per rot was
administered intraperitoneally. Group IV
received both 0.1 ml. of 1:1000 epinephrine
hydrochloride solution subcutaneously and

July 1960

STRESS HYPERSENSITIVITY PHENOMENON

TABLE e
Experiment No. 6 — Effect of Acute Admin-
istration or Epinephrine and Hydrocortisone
on Hypophtsectomiied-Adrenalectomued
Rats

Nmbef

Num-
ber oi

RmU

Drufi

1-Hr. Rctpenw (e
Egg WMte

Group

III

5
5
5
5

None

Epinepbrine*
Hydrocortiaonet
Epinephrine and
Hydrocortiaone

* Epinephrine — 0.1 ml. of 1:1000 solution aub-
cutaneously.

t Hydrocortiaone solution— 20 rag. per kg. in-
traperitoneally.

20 mg. per kg. of hydrocortisone intra-
peritoneally; J4 hr. later 2 ml. of egg white
per rat was administered intraperitoneally.
Reactions were observed and results re-
corded as above (Table 6). It will be seen
that in hypophysectomized-adrenalectom-
ized rats, a combination of adrenalin and
hydrocortisone offered protection.

RESULTS

Experiment No. 1. The responses of the
normal male rat to injection of 2.0 ml. of
egg white intraperitoneally include severe

swelling of the paws, snout, tongue, scrotum,
and ears. This response usually is mani-
fested in approximately 1 hr. It is predicated
upon a natural or inborn hypersensitivity
of the rat to egg albumin and needs no
previous conditioning. Reference to Table 1
reveals that this reaction was blocked during
the period of approximately 1^ to 2\£ hr.
after administration of epinephrine, that is,
when egg white was administered % to
1^ hr. after administration of epinephrine.
A lesser degree of blockage by epinephrine
was noted before and after this period of
time, but it will be noted that rats were
more sensitive to injection of egg white
4 to 7 hr. after injection of epinephrine.
Not only were responses accentuated, but
also the reaction occurred within 30 min.
after injection of egg white instead of 1 hr.
Figure 1 illustrates this "negative phase" of
hyperreactivity.

Experiments No. 8 and 3. Hypophy-
sectomized and adrenalectomized rats
treated with epinephrine responded in a
manner identical with that of control
hypophysectomized and adrenalectomized
rats, with the exception of 1 group. This
group received injections of epinephrine
and egg white simultaneously, and was
afforded some slight degree of protection
against the anaphylactoid response (Tables
2 and 3), apparently because of transient
peripheral vasoconstriction. The adrenal-

EG6 WHITE
RESPONSE

HYPO- REACTIVE
1+ PHASE)

—

HYPER- REACTIVE

(-PHASE)

MEASURED

RESPONS

PRESUMED NATURAL

RESPONSE

V
\
\
\
\

\
\

TIME Of AOMINISTIUTlON

Or EMNCPHIIINC HCL
(>CC '/MOO *0k MOI

*
*

TIME IN HOURS
Flo. 1. Curve indicating the responses to injections of egg white administered 1 hr. prior to observations

GESCHICKTER XT AL.

Vol. 34

ectomized animals responded to injections of
egg white more vigorously and, at times,
with convulsions. This was more conspicuous
than in the hypophysectomized animals.

Experiment No. 4- It will be noted that
acute therapy with single doses of hydro-
cortisone failed to modify the reaction to
egg white (Table. 4).

Experiment No. 5. Chronic therapy with
bidaily doses of hydrocortisone and ACTH
likewise failed to modify the reaction J&
egg white (Table 5). ^g?-'

Experiment No. 6. Epinephrine and hy-
drocortisone, when administered simul-
taneously, prevented the anaphylactoid
reaction in the hypophysectomized-adrenal-
ectomized rats (Table 6). Either compound
alone was ineffective.

DISCUSSION

Selye" first demonstrated that the degree
of reaction suffered by the rat upon injection
of egg white was a measure of the prophlogis-
tic status of the animal. Reference to
Table 1 establishes that intact rats remain
in an antiphlogistic state, failing to react to
injection of egg white for 1% to 2^ hr.
after the administration of a single dose of
0.1 ml. of 1:1000 epinephrine subcutane-
ously. These findings are in accord with
those of Clark and MacKay,* who also
demonstrated blockade of the anaphylactoid
reaction by epinephrine. Furthermore, it will
be noted that the animals then suffer a
"rebound" effect, becoming hyperreactive
for 4 to 7 hr. following administration of
epinephrine. A more rapid onset and in-
creased edema resulted in reaction to egg
white. This prophlogistic hyperreactive
state is, on occasion, severe enough to cause
convulsions.

We have referred to the hypersensitivity
rebound effect as the "negative phase."
During the negative phase rats previously
treated with epinephrine are more sensitive
to the anaphylactoid reaction than normal,
untreated rats. This illustrates a temporary
period of weakening of the organism's
defenses resulting from prior stress.

It seems that these short, intermittent
periods of stress cause hypersusceptibility
to a noxious agent, egg white. One is tempted
to compare these findings with the delayed

hypersensitivity response of rheumatic fever
and glomerulonephritis to streptococcal
infections, or to the increased incidence of
pneumonitis and upper respiratory in-
fection following sudden changes in seasonal
temperature. It also may be compared to
the postpuerperal exacerbations of rheuma-
toid arthritis.

Recently, Kitay and his co-workers*
have demonstrated that a single dose of
epinephrine tends to deplete the amount c
ACTH available for immediate release from
the pituitary gland in acute distress. The
pituitary gland thereby becomes less re-
sponsive to successive stresses. Our studies
are consistent with these findings.

Although the "negative phase" is similar
to Selye's* exhaustion stage of the general
adaptation syndrome, it differs by being a
more acute, frequent, and repetitive occur-
rence, and of a lesser degree of severity
than that observed with exhaustion (Fig. 1).
It bears no relation to delayed shock and is
reversible. The organism's expenditure for
protection by means of the general adapta-
tion syndrome apparently can detract from
its ability to provide protection in the
immediate future, as illustrated. Within
18 hr. the organism has returned to the
normal pretreatment reactive status. These
results are indicative of a pharmacologic
action of epinephrine persisting up to 18
hr., an agent usually regarded as having a
duration of action of only a few minutes.
In this respect, our results parallel those of
Kaplan and Gant,* who have demonstrated
a delayed hyperlipemic action of epi-
nephrine.

References to Tables 2 and 3 support the
contention that acute effects of adminis-
tration of epinephrine on the egg white
reaction are mediated, at least in part, via
the pituitary-adrenal axis. It will be noted
that epinephrine itself produces no pro-
tective effect in the hypophysectomized or
adrenalectomized rat. There are no "nega-
tive phase" results. It was, therefore, of
additional interest to determine if the
effects of administration of epinephrine
were mediated through a final common
pathway of increased production of cor-
tisone. Even large, single doses of cortisone
(as recorded in Table 4) failed to elicit a

July I960

STRESS HYPERSENSITIVITY PHENOMENON

protective antiphlogistic effect. The usual
4 to 7 hr. prophlogistic effects (negative
phase) were similarly absent. It was noted
at this time that rats injected with large
doses of cortisone by an inexperienced
technician were protected against the
anaphylactoid reaction. It was postulated
that the increased manipulation of these
rats resulted in liberation of endogenous
epinephrine, thereby explaining the anti-
phlogistic protective effects.

The foregoing observations posed an
interesting question. A single dose of cor-
tisone, carefully administered in a gentle
manner (in order to avoid frightening the
rat, with concomitant liberation of endog-
enous epinephrine) fails to be antiphlogis-
tic. Selye 10 reported that chronic ad-
ministration of ACTH and Cortisol is
antiphlogistic. It seemed possible that the
stress of daily injections, liberating epine-
phrine, rather than Cortisol, or administra-
tion of ACTH might be the basis for the
antiphlogistic state so produced. For this
reason, the chronic effects of ACTH and
Cortisol were again studied.

The questionable factor of epinephrine
liberated by the daily pain and fright of
injection, feeding, noise, and caging was
minimized. The animals were isolated in a
quiet room and .handled by skilled workers.
Reference to Table a reveals that under
these conditions no difference exists in the
egg white reactivity of cortisone- and saline-
treated controls. These results are in
agreement with those cf Morrison and his
co-workers 7 and of Swingle, 1 * who, also
failed to prevent the anaphylactoid reaction
by injection of cortisone. Thcss results are
in opposition to those of Swingle, 1 * in that
epinephrine in our hands prevented the
anaphylactoid reaction in the intact rat.
Cannon, 1 in his original demonstrations of
the "flight or fight" response, measured the
ability of the organism to resist noxious
attack largely in terms of sympathetic
nervous system effects and epinephrine.
Selye,* in turn, has demonstrated cortisone
to be of vital importance in similar situ-
ations. It now seems that neither, alone,
suffices for maximal defense by endogenous
agents. Both, together, must be present in
increased quantities to be of value. One is

tempted to conclude that the proximity of
the adrenal cortex and adrenal medulla is
more than accidental.

The data presented seem to illustrate
the necessity of the liberation of both
Cortisol and epinephrine, in order to bring
about protection against the anaphylactoid
reaction (Table 6, Group IV).

It is of interest to note that Halpern and
associates 4 observed that treatment with
cortisone may enable adrenalectomized mice
to tolerate 5 otherwise lethal doses of
histamine. Epinephrine alone enabled adren-
alectomized mice to tolerate 5 to 10 lethal
doses of histamine. Together, epinephrine
and cortisone enabled the adrenalectomized
animal to tolerate 50 to 100 lethal doses of
histamine, thereby restoring histamine toler-
ance to normal levels.

It seems that the protection expended in
warding off the noxious anaphylactoid
reaction imposes the hazard of future
hypersusceptibility. The latter has been
termed by us a "negative phase." Its role
in human disease remains to be elucidated.
These studies, however, suggest that the
ability of the human body to withstand the
onslaught of disease following short bouts of
stress, whether psychic or physical, shou.'d
receive more study.

It is known from clinical and subjective
experience that stress provoked by psychic
mediation-' evolves within seconds, rather
than in the 30 or more minutes required for
epinephrine to mediate the protective
action of the general adaptation syndrome.
It therefore seems possible that -psychic
stimulation, operating by neural pathways,
can act directly on end-organs, including
the adrenal medulla and perhaps the cortex,
without involving the hypophysis. This is
suggested in our experiments by the fact that
the injection of both adrenalin- and cortisone
afford some protection in the absence of the
hypophysis and the adrenal gland. The
immediate effects of stress will be the
subject of a subsequent paper.

SUMMARY

1. The effects of acute episodes of stress
were measured, using the egg white anaphy-
lactoid reaction.

2. A "negative phase" period of hy-

GESCHICKTEH ST AL.

VoL.SU

persensitivity was elucidated. It occurs
shortly after the initial protection afforded
by stress to the organism. The significance
of the "negative phase" response was
discussed.

3. A co-relationship of epinephrine and
cortisone in stress reactions was demon-
strated. Neither singularly suffices to evoke
the degree of protection elicited by the
combination of the 2 substances.

SUMMARIO IN INTERLINOUA

1. Le effectos de episodios de stress acute
esseva mesurate per medio del reaction ana-
phylactoide a clara de ovo.

2. Un periodo de "phase negative" del
hypersensibilitate esseva constatate. Illo
occurre brevemente post le protection initial
que es providite al organismo per le stress.
Le signification del responsa de "phase nega-
tive" es discutite.

3. Un co-relation de epinephrina e de cor-
tisona in reactiones de stress esseva demons-
trate. Ni le un ni le altere sol suffice a evocar
le grado de protection que es evocate per le
2 substantias in combination.

REFERENCES

1. Cannon, W. B.: Bodily Changes in Pain,
Hunger, Fear and Rage, Ed. 2. New York:
D. Appleton A Company, 1934, p. 404.

2. Clark, W. G.. and MacKat, E. M.: Effect

of (-epinephrine and /-arterenol on egg white
edema in the rat. Proc. Soc. Exper. Biol.
& Med., 71: 86-87, 1949.

3. Gescricxtei, C F., Athanasiadoc, P. A.,

and O'Mallet, W. E.: The role of mucino-
lysis in collagen disease. Am. J. Clin.
Path., 30: 93-111. 1968.

4. Halpern, B. N\, Benacerraf, B., and

Briot, M.: Potentiation by adrenaline of
protective effect of cortisone on histamine
toxicity in adrenalectomiied mice. Proc.
Soc. Exper. Biol. * Med., 79: 37-39, 1952.

5. Kaplan, A., and G a NT, M.: Epinephrine and

blood lipids. Paper presented at American
Physiological Society, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, 1955.

6. Kit at, J. I., Holvb, D. A., and Jailer, J. W.:

"Inhibition" of pituitary ACTH release
after administration of reserpine or epineph-
rine. Endocrinology, 66: 548-554, 1959.

7. Morrison, J. L., Richardson, A. P., and

Bloom, W. L.: Effects of antihistaminic
agents on reaction of rat to dextran. Arch,
internat. pharmacodyn., 88: 98-105. 1951.

8. Selte, H.: The alarm reaction (abstract).

Canad. M. A. J.. 34: 706, 1936.

9. Selte, H.: A syndrome produced by diverse

nocuous agents. Nature, 138: 32, 1936.

10. Selte, H.: Studies on adaptation. En-

docrinology, 21: 169-188, 1937.

11. Selte, H., and Jasmin, G.: Screening of

possible therapeutic agents by means of
experimental replicas of connective-tissue
diseases. Ann. New York Acad. Sc., 64:
481-193, 1956-1957.

12. Swingle, W. W.: Unpublished observations.

Quoted by Cohen, H., Graff, M., and
Kleinbkro, W;: Inhibition of dextran
edema by proteolytic enzvmes. Proc. Soc.
Exper. Biol. * Med., 88: 517-519, 1955.

■aawur Joobbaii or Cwjwim. Paoommt
VoL M. No. 1. Aajo*. Ml*, pp. H-Ul
PrbHitn VJS.A.

€

THE ROLE OF MUCIN0LYSI3 IN COLLAGEN DISEASE

CHARLES F. GESCHICKTER, M.D.. PANAYIOTA A. ATHANASIADOU, MD., ax»
W. EDWARD CMALLEY, Ph.D.

Department of Pathology, Georgetown Univertity School of Medicine and Dentil try, Washington, D. C.

The term collagen disease, according to
lUemperer* refers to "generalised alteration
of the connective tissue, particularly to
abnormalities of its extracellular compo-
nent, . . ." and "includes rheumatic fever,
rheumatoid arthritis, polyarteritis, acute
lupus erythematosus, generalized sclero-
derma and dennatomyositis." Hinge* first
proposed that this group of rheumatoid
diseases represents pathologically a systemic
involvement of the entire connective tissue
of the human body; and he postulated that
the intercellular components are the primary
site of damage..

The histopathologic features common to
this group of diseases are:

1. Mucinous or myxoid degeneration of
the ground substance of connective tissue.

2. fibrinoid degeneration involving both
the matrix and collagenous fibers.

3. Vasculitis of medium-sized and small
blood vessels, varying from thrombonecrosis
to perivascular edema and "cuffing" with
plasma cells and monocytes.

4. Focal histologic changes peculiar to
the individual collagen disease, such as the
Aschoff body in acute rheumatic fever,
rheumatoid nodules in rheumatoid arthritis,
"wire looping" in the glomeruli of dis-
seminated lupus erythematosus, and capil-
lary platelet thrombosis in thrombocytopenic
purpura.

Among the histochemical reactions ob-
served are:

1. The formation of L.E. cells, which
contain depolymerized desoxyribose nucleic
acid.

2. Elevation of hexosamine in the blood
serum (from split glycoproteins).

Received, February 3, 1958; revision received,
March 13; accepted for publication March 17.

Dr. Geschickter is Professor of Pathology, and
Dra. Athanasiadou and O'Malley are Research
Assistants.

This work was supported by a grant from The
Geschickter Fund for Medical Research.

3. Elevation of serum globulin (alpha 2
Or gamma).

4. Amelioration of clinical manifestations
by administration of adrenocorticotrophic'
(ACTH) or adrenal cortical hormones.

Whether the collagen diseases represent
examples of the hypersensitivity state or
belong to the category of endocrine im-
balance resulting from the general adapta-
tion syndrome is still disputed- Ignorance of
the etiology of these conditions makes it
impossible to state whether all of the
diseases proposed for this category actually
belong there. The problem of etiology would
be advanced at least 1 step forward, if it
could be demonstrated that the pathologic
and histochemical features referred to above
could be reproduced experimentally by a
single agent of injury. The present report
indicates that a simple chemical compound
can be used to reproduce the main features
of all the collagen diseases in experimental
animals.

An anticollagen chemical substance. Sev-
eral compounds of the phenylenediamine
class have been utilized in biologic work as
dye indicators. McLeod 4 used both dimethyl-
or tetramethyl-p-phenylenediamine hydro-
chloride to study the oxidation reactions of
gonococcic organisms. More recently, Aker-
feldt 1 used the dimethylamino derivative of
this compound to study the reaction of the
serum in the major psychoses. We chose an
isomer of this compound, N,N'-dimethyl-p-
phenyienediamine, which will be referred to
as DT,P. It has the formula shown in
Figure 1.

The preparation of diamine compound
used in these experiments was the crystalline
base prepared in 2 per cent oily solution. This
was applied by repeated daily brushings to
the shaved skin of rats. The aqueous solution
of the dihydrochloride salt, however, also was
used for intramuscular and intravenous injec-
tions in other animals. Except for some acute
experiments, Wistar rats weighing approxi-

GEBCHICKTER MT AL.

Vol. SO

^C^

Fio. 1. Formula of DT,P

mately 120 Gin. each were used. The main
features of the results obtained are shown in
the accompanying illustrations. The various
focal lesions of the collagen diseases were
reproduced histologically, including Aschoff-
like bodies, the rheumatoid nodules, capil-
lary platelet- thrombi, glomeruli "wire
looping," and focal fibrinoid degeneration.
In addition, animals on chronic treatment
showed a 2-fold enlargement of the adrenal
cortex, and (apparently as a result of such
adrenal changes) there was focal destruction
of lymphoid tissue and splenomegaly. Be-
cause the chemical used appeared to produce
its effects through its mucinolytic action on
the connective tissue matrix, particular
attention was given to changes in the mucosa
of the gastrointestinal tract, which included
multiple peptic ulcers with a characteristic
punched-out appearance.

The results obtained do not enable us to
state what role, if any, this particular
chemical compound playB in the histo-
genesis and etiology of the corresponding
natural disease states in man.

Experimental procedure*. In the initial
experiment, 24 Wistar male rats, weighing
100 Gm. each, were painted twice daily
with a 5 per cent solution of N,N'-dimethyl-
p-phenyleDediamine. The pure base was
dissolved in 80 per cent diethylhexyl-
hexahydrophthalate and 20 per cent benzyl
alcohol, and applied to a shaved area of skin
on the thigh approximately 2 by 3 cm. in
site. The rodents died witJhin 36 to 72 hr.
Vesicles or ulcerations of the skin appeared
in all rats living more than 48 hr. In some of
these rats at autopsy the adrenals were

enlarged and hemorrhagic. Histologic studies
were performed only on the skin.

In a second series of experiments, 3 groups
of Wistar male rats, weighing 120 Gm.
each, were painted daily (except Sunday),
on the surface of the shaved skin of the
thigh over an area of approximately 2 by 3
cm. The diamine compound in the form of
the pure base was dissolved in the diethyl-
hexyl-hexahydrophthalate-benxyl alcohol so-
lution referred to above.

Group I, consisting of 8 rats and 4 con-
trols, was painted with a 2 per cent solution.

Group II, consisting of 8 rats and 4
controls, was painted with a 1 per cent
solution.

Group III, consisting of 8 rats and 4
controls, was painted with a 0.5 per cent
solution.

The solution used for painting is a non-
volatile oily solution prepared from the base.
Inhalation is not a complication but the
animals bite and lick the irritated surface
and ingestion and aspiration of the material
probably explains the tendency for the
pulmonary vessels to show the most striking
changes. It also .probably accounts for the
appearance of peptic ulcers in some of the
animals, although it does not occur in all of
them. The animals were not kept in indi-
vidual cages.

Group I, high dotage. The rats failed to
gain in weight and died between 10 and 15
days, living on the average 12 days. The
skin showed ulceration and vesicles, but the
manifestations were not as extensive as with
the 5 per cent solution. At necropsy, the
adrenals did not appear to be enlarged. The
spleen and lymphoid tissues showed Blight
atrophy. There was increased secretion in
the bronchi, pulmonary edema, and con-
gestion, and the right heart was dilated.
Microscopically, exudation of plasma (so-
called lymphorrhagia) about the smaller
pulmonary vessels was conspicuous (Fig. 2).

Fio. 2 (upper). Change* in the Teasels of the lung. There is a perivascular collar of edema and the
endothelial cells project into the lumen of the vessels. The rat was brushed 7 times with a 2 per cent
solution of DT,P and died on the 8th day. Hematoxylin and eosin. X 50.

Fio. 3 (lower). Aschoff-like cellular aggregates and capillary dilatation in the myocardium. The
cellular aggregates, which are adjacent to small vessels, are at the left and right portion of the band
of muscle fibers which runs diagonally across the photograph. The long, slit-like spaces are dilated capil-
laries. This rat was brushed 6 times with a 2 per cent solution of DT,P and died on the 7th day. Hema-
toxylin and eosin. X 100.

GEBCHICKTER XT AL.

Vol. SO

]

Fio. 4. Higher magnification of the cellular aggregates in Figure 3. In tbe upper
left corner (about 11 o'clock) is a typical Anitschkow cell, and in the lower right
corner (about 5 o'clock) is an Aachon cell. Note the spilling of the erythrocytes from
ruptured capillaries illustrated in the upper portion of the photomicrograph. Hema-
toxylin and eosin. X 220.

The basement membrane of these small
vessels showed smudging and dissolution,
and the endothelial lining cells, some of
which were detached, projected into the
lumen. In tbe heart there were foci of endo-
thelial cells (apparently liberated by dis-
solution of adjacent capillaries) lying

between the myocardial fibers. Some of the
sections showed Aschoff-like cellular ag-
gregates (Figs. 3 and 4). There were
uuuierous Jilatr* vascular spaces lined by a
single layer of endothelium surrounded by
extravasated erythrocytes, wlrieh were
interpreted as capillary aneurysms. In su:r»e

Fig. 5 (upper). Section through the cortex of the adrenal revealing hyperplasia and cytoplasmic
vacuoles. The adrenals were grossly enlarged to 4 times their site. This rat was brushed with a 1 per
cent solution of D'P.P. The animal died utter 2 months. Hematoxylin and eosin. X 130-

Fic. 6 (lower). Low-power photomicrograph of the stomach illustrating I of several peptic ulcers
which were present in this animal. There is a sharp crater overlaid by desquamated remnants of the
glandular mucosa. Peptic ulcers can be produced more consistently by oral administration of D'P.P
than by application to the shaved skin. Although this animal was brushed with a 1 pen cent solution,
it is possible the material was swallowed by licking the wounds. Hematoxylin and eosin. X 30.

OESCHICKTER ST AL.

Vol.30

of the small arteries in the myocardium,
changes in the basement membrane and
intima stained positively with periodic acid-
Schiff stain, indicating the liberation of
mucopolysaccharide material.

In the synovial membranes of the knee
joint the capillaries were congested and
dilated, some of them undergoing lysis.
There was smudging of the ground sub-
stance immediately beneath the mesothelial
lining layer of the synovial surface. In the
bone marrow the capillaries were dilated, and
there were areas of coagulated extravasated
fluid. The bone marrow elements appeared
normal. The spleen showed complete disap-
pearance of its lymphoid pulp, and the
surviving germinal centers showed focal
necrosis. The thymus and lymph nodes were
similarly affected. The other organs were
negative. No significant changes were found
in the animate of the control group.

Group It, middle dotage. These rats lived a
maximum period of 2 months and died
usually between the thirtieth and sixtieth
day. They failed to gain weight. At autopsy,
the lungs were congested and edematous;
There was some thickening of the walls of
small arteries in the lungs but not of the
veins. Histologically, there was some "onion
peeling" of the small arteries and arterioles,
but similar changes were found in some of
the animals in the control group. The heart
was dilated and the adrenals were markedly
enlarged. Microscopically, the adrenals
showed cortical hypertrophy and vacuoliza-
tion of cells in the zona fasciculate (Fig. 5).
The spleen and lymphoid tissues were
similar to Group I. Microscopically, the
spleen showed reduction of lymphoid tissue
and necrosis of germinal centers, with
increased number of macrophages, many of
which were binucleated. The heart showed
focal fibrosis and aggregates of histiocytes
but no typical Aschoff bodies. The joint
changes in animals that died early were
similar to Group I. In the gastric mucosa,
the mucus in the superficial glandular

crypts was reduced and peptic ulcers were
present (Fig. 6). No such changes were
found in the ahirnab of the control group.

Group III , low dotage. Some of the rats in
this group died 6 weeks after the beginning
of the experiments, but some were still
living 3 months later. The animals showed
progressive gain in weight. At autopsy, the
outstanding finding was endothelial pro-
liferation of the lining of small pulmonary
vessels. In some of the vessels the lumen was
practically occluded. These vessels looked as
if they were being recanalized in places and
some vessels looked almost like glomeruli.
The endothelial proliferation in places ex-
tended into the adjacent septums of the lung.
This was found in only 2 rats, who may have
aspirated the compound while licking their
wounds (Fig. 7). Ingestion of the compound
in this manner may also have something to
do with the formation of peptic ulcers, since
animals who are fed D'P, P die of perforated
peptic ulcers. These oral experiments were
performed by Dr. A. I. Miller, Emory
University, Atlanta, Georgia.

The spleen was practically devoid of
lymphoid tissue and usually twice its normal
weight. The pulp contained many macro-
phages with numerous foam cells, and there
were some granulocytes but practically no
lymphocytes. A few germinal centers were
intact (Fig. 8). The heart showed areas of
fibrinoid degeneration and aggregates of
Anitschkow's cells, similar to those shown in
Figure 9. In the coronary circulation, the
walls of the capillaries were disintegrating,
and the liberated endothelial cells accumu-
lated about the adjacent arterioles. The
adjacent myofibrils were necrotic and
hyalinized. These changes were not as
widespread as in the rats on higher dosage.
The knee joints showed the microscopic
features of rheumatoid arthritis with the
formation of rheumatoid nodules in the
synovial membrane (Fig. 10)? The bone
marrow was not remarkable. The brains and
kidneys were normal in appearance. Id the

Fio. 7 (upper). Endothelial proliferation plugging a small vessel in the lung. This animal was painted
with an 0.5 per cent solution of D'P,P daily andlived 6 weeks. Hematoxylin and eosin. X 228.

Fio. 8 (lower). Low-power photomicrograph of spleen. The pulp is entirely replaced by red blood
cells and a few scattered macrophages. The focal areas of lymphocytes are remnants of the germinal
centers. This animal was painted daily except Sunday for a 5-week period with a 0.5 per cent solution.
Hematoxylin and eosin. X 30.

100

OESCHICKTER BT At,.

Vol.30

Flo. 9. High-power photomicrograph of an Aaehoff body illustrating typical Anitschkow's
cells. Two capillaries am Men, 1 in longitudinal and the other in cross-section. The Anitschkow
eel!a seem to be developing in the wall of the capillary. Note the mitotic figure in the upper
portion of the photograph. This animal was brushed with a 2 per cent solution of D'P,P daily
and 'lived 7 days. Hematoxylin and eoain. X 400.

region of the kidneys and pancreas, small to
medium-sued vessels showed thrombone-
crosis or marked endothelial proliferation
similar to that found in the lungs (Fig. 11).
The skin showed epidermal hyperplasia
rather than necrosis in the painted areas. In
the subcutaneous tissue of these regions
there was marked edema and fibrosis with
loss of collagen fibrils, simulating sclero-
derma (Fig. 12). At times this involved the
derma and was accompanied by atrophy of

the hair follicles. In the voluntary muscles
beneath the painted areas, there were
collections of plasma cells and lymphocytes
about damaged blood vessels, simulating
the lesions of dermatomyositis. In other
places the degeneration of muscle fibers
resembled muscular dystrophy. In the liver
there were increased numbers of cells with
acidophilic cytoplasm and binucleated forms
but no focal necrosis. Some of the liver cells
were vacuolated; others showed hyaline

Fio. 10 (upper). Rheumatoid nodule developing in the synovial membrane of a knee
joint. The lesion extends almost to the mesothelial lining. The line passing through the center of
the photograph is an artifact. This animal was brushed with an 0.5 per cent solution of
DT.P daily and was sacrificed after 3 months. Hematoxylin and eosin. X 128.

Fio. 11 (lower). Artery manifesting thromboneerosia and perivascular infiltrate. The
vessel is in the perirenal fat. Prom the same animal illustrated in Figure 10. Hematoxylin
and eosin. X 50.

102

GESCHICKTEH XT AL.

Vol. SO

droplet degeneration, and the nuclei were of
varying site and density. Some of the small
hepatic vessels showed endothelial pro-
liferation as in the lungs. The adrenals were
enlarged as a result of cortical hypertrophy.
All zones of the adrenal showed increased
vascularity. The control rats showed no
significant changes.

Acute experiments. In the animals surviv-
ing 10 or more days, no membranous
glomerulitis was found and the "wire
looping" of disseminated lupus erythema-
tosus was not reproduced. Theoretically, the
lapse of time before sacrifice was sufficient
to allow the chemical compound to act as a
hapten* and combine with serum albumin
and produce an antigenic effect. In order to
resolve this question of a possible hyper-
sensitivity reaction and to produce more
acute lesions that might involve the kidney,
smaller rats were chosen in preference to
raising the dosage of the compound. The
experimental procedure was repeated with
24 rats, this time using males weighing 60 to
80 Gm. each. The animals were pair. ted daily
with a 2 per cent solution of the diamine
compound prepared by 2 separate chemical
laboratories in order to insure that the
experiments would be reproducible (this
compound undergoes darkening through
oxidation). These animals were sacrificed at
intervals of 2 to 4 days. The characteristic
changes in the myocardium were produced,
as well as membranous glomerulitis in the
kidneys, with typical "wire looping," char-
acteristic of disseminated lupus erythema-
tosus (Fig. 13). Some of these rats also
showed perivascular lesions of the brain in

'Another line of evidence indicating that the
diamine compound does not act as hapten was
obtained by injecting a group of 12 guinea pigs
with the material in 0.5 per cent solution intra-
muscularly daily foe 6 weeks. These animals failed
to develop anaphylaxis and all survived the
treatment.

the form of small focal accumulations of
mononuclear cells resembling typhus nodules
(Fig. 14 and Table 1).

D'P,P on kypophyaedomued rats. Since
D'P.P produces enlargement of the adrenals
and atrophy of lymphoid tissues, its mech-
anism of action is possibly that of a stressor
or alarming substance (as noted above, its
role as a hapten could not be demonstrated).
In order to test this interpretation, 2 groups
of 10 each of male hypophysectomized rats,
weighing 120 Gm. each, were painted with a
2 per cent solution of D'P,P as described in
the previous experiments. If this substance
is adrenalin-like in action, hypophysectomy
should block its untoward effect upon the
collagen matrix of connective tissue. The
results obtained partially support this
interpretation. In the animals surviving 2 to
4 weeks, characteristic changes were ob-
served about the smaller pulmonary vessels.
Both arteries and veins were surrounded by a
collar of edema and monocytes, and their
endothelial lining was destroyed in patches
or reduplicated. Some of the vessels con-
tained small mural thrombi. A number of the
animals showed. peptic ulcers. However, no
characteristic rheumatoid nodules were
found in the synovial membrane of the knee
joint, although in places the synovial lining
cells were reduplicated to 4 to 6 layers and
stained deeply with hematoxylin and eosin.
In some animals the synovial membrane
showed highly vascular papillary protrusions
in which the connective tissue cells had
proliferated about dilated capillaries. The
myocardium showed capillary dilatation but
no Aschoff bodies or proliferation of endo-
thelial cells were found. Adrenal cortical
hypertrophy was absent, and the lymphoid
tissue of the spleen, thymus and lymph
nodes was unaltered. In general, the changes
were not striking outside of the lungs and
gastrointestinal tract. The skin changes
were not suggestive of scleroderma. It

Fio. 12 (upper). Dense, Sbrotic scarring involving the subcutaneous region in the, area painted with
D'P.P in a 2 per cent notation daily for 6 days and sacrificed on the seventh day.' Remnants <of hair
follicles show in the upper portion of the photograph. Note the small thrombosed vessel. The under-
lying musculature is shown in the lower left-hand corner. Similar changes were found in the skin of
animals painted with 0.5 per rent solution, who survived for longer than 2 months. Hematoxylin
and eosin. X 28.

Fio. 13 (lower). Hyalin thrombi in enrly membranous glomerulitis in an 80-Gm. rat that wa* brushed
with a 2 per cent solution of D'P.P for 3 days. Hematoxylin and eosin. X 323.

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Occasional
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ulcer

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nodules in synovial
membrane.

Skin: Epidermal hy-
perplasia; fibrosis of
derma simulating
scleroderma

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trophy and hy-
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cortex with in-
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GE8CHICKTBR ET At.

Vol.30

appeared, therefore, that D'P.P has V.
direct mucinolytic effect in the tissues which
it reaches in high concentration, but wide-
spread collagen disease is not produced
unless the. general adaptation syndrome is
provoked - in .an intact animal. The im-
portance of the tissue concentration of
D'P.P in producing collagen disease by
direct action is further indicated by vascular
and 'glomerular damage, which we have
produced in the dog's kidney by retrograde
intravenous injection in the renal vein,
which will be reported in a subsequent
communication.

The hypophysectomies were apparently
adequate since all of the animals showed
absence of spermatogenesis and varying
degrees of testicular atrophy. In these
hypophysectomized animals painted with
DT,P, regressive changes were found in
the adrenal medulla. The medullary cells
showed shrinkage and vacuolization of their
cytoplasm with persistence of sparse num-
bers of large eosinophilic cells, which re-
sembled ganglion cells.

Adrenalectomy similar to hypophy-
sectomy abolishes most of. the changes
observed' with DT,P. The animals do not
tolerate the skin applications and die early.
The effect of the adrenalectomy and ad-
ministration of cortisone will be discussed
in a subsequent communication.

DISCUSSION'

The effect of D'P,P on the cement and
ground substance*. Apparently the primary
effect of DT,P is to produce hydration of
the mucopolysaccharide structure, of base-
ment membranes and ground substance in
mesenchymal tissues. The mucin in the
glands of the gastrointestinal tract is also
affected. Apparently the most sensitive
tissue component is the cement substance in
the endothelial wall of capillaries, perhaps
because this is the site of the initial contact

in the tissue. The earliest stage is "soften-
ing," which allows the capillary, wall to
stretch and form aneurysmal dilatations
(Fig. 15). In the basement membrane
behind the endothelium in precapillary
arteries and in arterioles this hydration can
be seen histologically as a chain of small
bubbles, which we have termed "beading"
(Figs. 16 and 17). In the next stage, the
capillary wall disintegrates and the viable
endothelial cells and intact erythrocytes spill
into the tissue spaces at the point of rupture.
Behind the rupture the free ends of the
capillary at times retract into the adjacent
precapillary artery So form a thrombus
encircled by a double row of endothelial
cells. In the heart, the liberated endothelial
cells from injured capillaries proliferate and
migrate toward damaged arterioles and form
Aschoff-Iike cellular aggregates (Fig. 18).
In subsequent stages, there is more wide-
spread damage, which results in fusion of
erythrocytes, condensation of ground sub-
stance to form fibrinoid degeneration and
liquefaction of other portions of the matrix,
probably aided by plasma leaking from
ruptured capillaries. This is followed by
shredding of the collagen fibers with subse-
quent necrosis of these structures and
adjacent muscle cells. Fibroblasts are mo-
bilized as histiocytes and show frequent
mitotic figures. Myocardial cells are liberated
also. Depolymerization and hydrolysis seems
to affect the nonviable cement and ground
substances and later the collagen fibers. The
primary effect is mucinolysis that results in
angjblysis and stromatolysis. This deduction,
we believe, is justified by the corresponding
changes observed in the mucous glands and
lining celts of the gastrointestinal tracts
(Figs. 6 and 19). However, the foregoing
interpretations will require additional ex-
perimental verification.

According to the latest chemical studies
6l collagen, fibrinoid degeneration does not

Fio. 16 (upper). Capillary thrombosis and hydropic change in the basement membrane
of precapillary artery in a 43-year-old patient with rheumatic fever, dying following valvu-
lotomy. The vessel was in •>>» Rcsisges. The thrombosed capillary is invaginated in the
precapillary artery. Hematoxylin and eostn. X 420.

Fio. 17 (lower). So-called platelet thrombi of the small vessels; in the perirenal fat of an
80-Gm. rat brushed with a 2 per cent solution of I)' P,P daily for 3 days. Note the double endo-
thelial wall indicating invagination in the precapillary artery. Note the hydropic changes! in
the endothelial cytoplasm of the outer wall. Compare with Figure 16. Hematoxylin and eosin.
X 323.

108

GESCHICKTER XT Al.

Vol.30

initially involve the collagen bundles of
well-formed connective tissue fibers. In
order to emphasize the sequence of events,
it is important to review the composition of
connective tissue. Robb-Smith* has denned
connective tissue as a continuous matrix
varying in consistency from the limpidness of
Wharton's jelly of the umbilical cord to the
hardness of bone, in which lies an interlacing
fabric of fibers of different sorts and which
is bathing isolated or closely set cells. This
continuous matrix pervades the spaces
between the organs and major vessels and
supplies the capsule, as well as their sup-
porting stroma, for these major structures.
Within this matrix the fibroblasts show
various stages of development from reticu-
lum cells to adult fibrocytes and also a
parallel line of development (usually under
pathologic conditions) from reticulum cells
to histiocytes (Fig. 20). There is an addi-
tional specialized component of connective
tissue, the basement membrane. The matrix
of connective tissue contains a variety of
mucopolysaccharides, such as hyaluronic
acid and chondroitin sulfate in combination
with proteins. In this matrix ore embedded
fibers of collagen, reticulin and elastica,
which are defined as precipitated sclero-
proteins. The elastica does not concern us
here, but the reticulin and collagen fibers do.
The collagen fibers are polymerized poly-
peptides, which are oriented in linear fashion
and contain a small amount of muco-
polysaccharide. The reticulin fibrils are
similar, but their polypeptide linkages are
non-oriented. They may be termed pro-
collagen fibrils because of their less
differentiated structure. Both fibers are
precipitated or formed from the matrix,
influenced by the fibroblast in a manner yet
to be determined. The third noncellular
structure, the basement membrane, is
formed from reticulin fibers and condensed
matrix, which stains more intensively for
mucopolysaccharides than- the ground sub-
stance. This condensed matrix at the base-
ment membrane is usually termed cementin

and also forms the binding substance
between the endothelial cells in the capillary
wall.

HutogenetiM of the Aschoff body. The
damage to the cementin of capillaries is the
earliest demonstrable change in the experi-
mental production of collagen disease de-
scribed here. Because this is best seen in the
myocardium, the probable histogenesis of
the Aschoff body can be traced from this
initial change. Following the formation of
capillary aneurysms, which is the first
change observed, there is leakage of plasma
and hydration of the ground substance with
subsequent damage to collagen fibrils.
Capillary aneurysms and hydration of the
ground substance are found within 36 to 48
hr. after the initial painting with DT,P.
Within 48 to 96 hr., there is dissolution
of capillaries, liberation of the viable endo-
thelial cells and proliferation of fibroblasts
in the edematous matrix. Within this period
these mobilized endothelial cells and fibro-
blasts clump together around damaged
arterioles to form the earliest cellular
aggregates, which may be looked- upon as
asceptic granulomas formed in part by the
sacrificial dissolution of adjacent capillaries.
Within 5 to 7 days, the granulomas continue
to enlarge and are accompanied by changes
of early dissolution of collagen fibers and
the deposition of fibrinoid material. From 8
days to 2 weeks, there is a progressive ac-
cumulation of Anitschkow's cells from the
damaged myocardial fibers and further
fibrinoid degeneration and continued fibro-
blastic proliferation. Thus, both endothelial
cell proliferation and migrating and pro-
liferating fibroblasts contribute to the
formation of Aschoff-like bodies, which form
after these fixed cells are free from the
capillary cementin and the connective tissue
matrix, respectively (Table 2).

CONCLUSIONS

A simple irritant amine, which is a strong
reducing agent and which apparently lyses
the matrix of connective tissue, is capable of

Fio. 18 (upper). Asehoff-like cellular aggregate* in process of formation in • rat receiving 7 brush-
ing* of • 2 per cent solution of D'P.P. The animal died on the eighth day. The cellular aggregates
are endothelial cells migrating from ruptured capillaries, seen to the left. Hematoxylin and eosin. X 230.

Fig. 19 (lower). Mucinolysis in the mucous glands of the larynx manifesting complete dissolution
of acinar content. This is taken from the rat with the peptic ulcer illustrated in Figure 6. Hematoxylin
and eosin. X 220.

GE3CHICKTKR XT AL.

Vol. 30

ENDOTHELIUM

CAPILLARY

CEMENT SUBSTANCE
RETICULAR FIBERS

ELASTIC FIBERS

MUCOPOLYSACCHARIDE
••.OROONO SUBSTANCE

COLLAGEN FIBERS

Fio. 20. Diagram illustrating the components of stromal connective tissue and their relation
to the capillary wall.

TABLE 2

Evolution or Expkumental Aschoff Bodies in Rats Tkbated with

N.N'-Diubthtl-p-Phbntlknediami.se

Tine

36 to 48 hr.

2 to 4 days

6 to 7 days

8 to 14 days

Hbtckck Change*

Capillaries

Softening with beginning mucinolysis of
capillary cementin with formation of
capillary aneurysms

Dissolution of capillary wall, liberation of
viable endothelial cells

Migration of altered capillary endothelial
cells (endothelioid cells) to adjacent
damaged arterioles to take part in as-
ceptic granuloma

Stroma

Hydration of adjacent ground substance

Freeing of fibroblasts in hydrated matrix,
separation of reticulin and collagen
fibrils; early proliferation of fibroblasts

Migration of altered fibroblasts (histio-
cytes) to damaged arterioles to take
part in aseeptie granuloma

Endothelioid cells and stroma) histiocytes form Aschoff-like aggregates accompanied
by altered myocytes (Anitschkow's cells)

Focal disappearance of capillaries I Precipitation of matrix as fibrinoid de-

generation

reproducing the histopathology of all the
more common collagen diseases, as well as
inducing peptic ulcers in rats. Its relation to
naturally occurring substances in the human
disease states is unknown, but it represents a
valuable tool for studying the histogenesis
of the lesions, as well as the wterrelation-

ships between the adrenal cortex and the
collagen .diseases. Adrenal cortical hyper-
trophy and atrophy of lymphoid tissues
accompany these changes. Aschoff-like
bodies in the myocardium, rheumatoid nod-
ules in the joints, and "wire loop" changes
in renal glomeruli are found.

August 1968

MUCINOLYSIB IN COLLAGEN DISEASE

111

The action of this irritant amine is ap-
parently partially direct and partially
indirect, since hypophysectomy inhibits
many of the characteristic lesions of collagen
diseases which were found in the intact
unimals.

Cardiac lesions simulating Aschoff bodies
were not seen consistently except in animals
painted with a 2 per cent solution of N,N'-
dimethyl-p-phenylenediamine (D'P.P).
Some of them weighed 120 Gm. and some 80
Gm.; in other words, they were only in
Group I and Group IV (Table 1)— the high
dosage and the acute experiments, respec-
tively. Scleroderma-like lesions in the skin
were seen only with high doses or on the very
prolonged treatment (with 2 per cent and
0.5 per cent solutions)— Groups I and III.
The adrenal changes were seen in Groups II
and III only if the animals lived for 5 or
more weeks. The same applies to the marked
changes in the spleen and lymph nodes.
Endothelial plugging of capillaries in the
lung and peptic ulcers probably occurred
only in animals that aspirated or swallowed
the material by licking their wounds, and
the mucinolytic lesions in the mucous glands
of the larynx were probably dependent upon
the same factor. Renal and cerebral lesions
occurred only in the acute experiments, in
80-Gm. rats painted with a- 2 per cent
solution of D'P.P.

8UMKABIO IN I.NTEBLINGCA

Un simple amina irritante, que es un forte
agente reductori e que apparentemente ef-
fectua le lyse del matrice de histo conjunc-
tive, es capace a reproducer le histopatho-
logia de omne le plus conunun morbos de
collageno e a inducer ulceres peptic in rattos.
Su relation con substantias de occurrentia
natural in states pathologic in humanos non
cs cognoscite, sed illo representa un im-
portante odjuta in le studio del histogenese
del lesiones e etiam del interrelation del
cortice adrenal con le morbos de collageno.
Hypertrophia adreno-cortical e atrophia de
histos lymphoide accompania iste altera-
tiones. Corpores "oschoffoide," nodulos
rheumatoide, e alterationes a "ansa de filo
metallic" in le glomerulos renal es incontrate.

II pare que le action de iste amina irri-

tante es in parte directe e in parte indirecte,
proque hypophysectomia inhibi multes del
characteristic lesiones de morbos de col-
lageno le qualeaseva incontrate in animales
intacte.

Lesiones cardiac que simula corpora de
Aschoff non esseva trovate uniformemente,
except* in animales pingite con un solution
de 2 pro cento de N,N'-dimethyl-j>-phenyl-
enediamina (D'P.P). Alicunes de illos pe-
sava 120 Gm. e alicunes 80 Gm. In altere
parolas, illos esseva solmente in Gruppo I e
Gruppo IV (Tabula 1), i.e., le gruppos a alte
dosage e a experimentation acute. Lesiones
cutanee simile a scleroderma esseva vidite
solmente post alte doses o post un tracta-
mento multo prolongate (con solutiones a 2
e a 0.5 pro cento), i.e., in Gruppo I e Gruppo
III. Le alterationes adrenal esseva vidite in
Gruppo II e in Gruppo III solmente si le
animales superviveva 5 septimanas o plus.
Le mesmo vale pro le marcate alterationes
in le splen e in le nodos lymphatic. Obstruc-
tion endothelial del capiUares in le pulmones
e ulceres peptic occurreva probabilemente
solmente in animates que aspirava o ingereva
le material per lamber lor vulneres. Le
lesiones mucinolytic in le glandulas mucose
del larynge resultava probabilemente del
mesme factor. Lesiones renal e cerebral
occurreva solmente in le experimentos acute,
in rattos de 80 Gm. pingite con un solution
de 2 pro cento de D'P.P.

REFERENCES

1. Akmfbldt, 8.: Oxidation of N,N-diroethyl-p-

phenylenediamine by serum from patients
with menUl disease. Science, US: 117, 1957.

2. KLBiirBBM, P.: The concept of collagen dis-

eases. Am. J. Path.. M: 505-519, 1950.

3. Kunob, F.: Der "Rheumatismus," patho-

logiscn-anatomiache und experimentell-
patnologtsehe Tatsachen und ihre auswertung
for das irstliche Rheumaproblem. Ergebn.
d. allg. Path. u. path. Anat., IT: 1-351, 1933.

4. McLeod, J. W,, Coatcs, J. C, Hjlvtold, F. C,

Pkibstlt, D. P. and Whbatlbt, B.: Culti-
ration of gonocoecus as method of diagnosis
of gonorrhea with special reference to oxydase
reaction and to value of air reinforced in its
carbon dioxide content. J. Path, & Bact.,
3»: 221-231, 1934.

5. Robs-Smith, A. H. T.: The Functioning Sig-

nificance of Connective Tissue. Lectures on
the Scientific Basis of Medicine. II. Univer-
sity or London, 1952-1953, The Athione
Press, 1954.

THE USE OF AMINO ACID ANTAGONISTS
FOR THE INHIBITION OF TUMOR GROWTH

CHARLES F. GESCHICKTER, M.D.

MURRAY M. COPELAND, M.D.

JEAN SCHOLLER, B.S.

■| Roprintad from

:i THE BULLETIN, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER

. 1951, V. No. 2. Au9Mt-S«pt*mb*r

:'r- *

& ; - si

I Dr. Geschickter. I was using anticancer drugs at Georgetown, r l

%i/\ and we had published on this in 1951, the CIA had come to this reprint |
;> through other means that I know not of.

; v?T One of the compounds, which is benzoether, was listed in the anti- m

malarial programs undertaken during the wan One of these was very j

similar to our product, and in the antimalarial report, three volumes,. **
£ tLis particular group of compounds had some, should I say, disturbing

effects on the nervous system of the patients, that was submitted to ft
this antimalarial drug under the antimalarial program, and this is J
so reported in those three volumes. This is how they came to be in-
terested in this group of compounds. j*

Senator Kennedy. How many years were you involved with the 1

CIA? J

Dr. Geschzcktbr. They say 13 years. The number of years that

we were giving money to other universities was about 9 or 10; 13 1

years is the major part. It tailed off so that a number of the years ^
were added to that subsequent to handling this money that went to

other universities. "|

Senator Kennedy. Your personal involvement was over what y
period of time? "^

Dr. Geschickter. It was from late 1953 until 1972. I

Senator Kennedy. And were all the resources that were coming I

through your medical foundation at that time for cancer research? ^

Dr. Geschickter. No. As I pointed out, the Geschickter Fund is

not for cancer research. The Geschickter Fund reads Geschickter ^

Fund for Medical Research, and it is, applied to chronic diseases. .-I

Senator Kennedy. So the funding of some of these programs was

not solely for cancer, is that correct? m

Dr. Geschickter. Correct. ;|

Senator Kennedy. Could any of the work that you supported,
have been done by NIH if they wanted to?

Dr. Geschickter. The NIH has a billion dollar budget ji

Senator Kennedy. More than that now. $

Dr. Geschickter. And what they do with it is unpredictable.

When y>u get a grant from there, they want a report within 3 months f|

before you can get the next one. So it is not a feasible way of doing ||
this sort of research.

Senator Kennedy. But the point is the research that you were ^

doing could have been done or supported by the National Institutes i |

of Health, is that correct? . ;J

Dr. Geschickter. Certainly they have the facilities and the money

to have done it. j

Senator Kennedy. So none of the work you were doing or support- m
ingon that kind of thing was secret or covert in that sense?

Or. Geschickter. All has been published. v|

Senator Kennedy. Now, if we could get into a specific project, the 1
MK-ULTRA Subproject 23.

As I understand the purpose of this project, it was to synthesize .,

new drugs and modify old ones to determine their effectiveness in I

modifying behavior and function of the central nervous system. This '
included animal tests and tests on terminally ill cancer patients.

In an August 25, 1955, memorandum for the record, an authoriza- J

tion was given for the contractor, ostensibly you, to pay the hospital a
expenses of certain persons suffering from incurable cancer for the

privilege of studying the effects of these chemicals during their
terminal illness.

Is that corect?

Dr. Geschickter. No, sir. Absolutely incorrect.

Senator Kennedy. Well, are you familiar with this document
[indicating]?

Dr. Geschickter. I have it in my, hand.

I want to show you something peculiar about it if you will look at
it. You will see that they pull out $658.05 out of expenditures that
were made in 1954. That $658.05 went into the Georgetown Hospital
pharmacy for drugs used by my assistants : n the animal house. Now,
watch the peculiarity. They come along on the 25th day of August
1955, and issue a specific directive for $658.05. Now, we are using
hundreds of thousands of dollars which they imply are going to patient
research, and the only thing they can come up with is a separate and
new voucher for $658.05 a year later, after the project has been com-
pleted and paid for.

Senator Kennedy. Why are they doing this? Are there other
records that are simply mistaken?

Dr. Geschickter. Absolutely.

Senator Kennedy. Tell us a little bit about that.

Dr. Geschickter. I have a record, which was a very foolish record,
the way they put it down

Senator Kennedy. Who is they?

Dr. Geschickter. They?

Senator Kennedy. Yes.

Dr. Geschickter. You are talking about MK-ULTRA project.
I do not know who "they" are.

Senator Kennedy. All right.

Do you know who th« people are?

Dr. Geschickter. I do not know all of them.

Senator Kennedy. Well, Mr. Bortner, do you know him?

Dr. Geschickter. I knew Mr. Bortner. That was the man I saw
most frequently.

Senator Kennedy. As I understand it, he was the one who signed
these documents.

Dr. Geschickter. He signed this one.

Senator Kennedy. Certainly you are familiar with Mr. Bortner
who signed these. Let us go back to the other question about whether
you have other records which are inadequate as well.

Dr. Geschickter. I have a record of $1,000 charged to patient
care at Georgetown under the MK-ULTRA project. This is at the
date of March 1957, there is a copy of a check on our private funds
for $1,000.

Do you have that record there?

Senator Kennedy. Yes.

Dr. Geschickter. In September there is $250 charged to surgeon's
fee.

Senator Kennedy. I believe we have those records here. We have
all the records because the staff went over those with you

I think we want to make a particular comment on that. I think
we have that one and we also nave another one dated Ocvober 8,
1954 that said:

Due to a considerable increase in the scope of the work under Dr. Gcschickter
at the direction of the SSCD, which is CIA, under Subproject 23, Project MK-
ULTRA, the $42,700 sum originally obligated for this work is insufficient. It is
«? therefore proposed $15,000 to that already obligated under this subproject.

You are familiar with that?

Dr. Geschickteb. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. Is that accurate?
, Dr. Geschickteb. That is accurate. We do not account for that

$1,250 on that.

Senator Kennedy. Did you do the work?

Did you do that work described in that project.
# Dr. Geschickteb. Yes. But, Senator, we were talking about

patients in the hospital. I want to make that clear. Now, we are
jumping to this general laboratory work on animals.

Senator Kennedy. I think the point that we are interested in, or
at least one of the points we are interested in is not so much the book-
keeping aspects, although we do want to examine those to the extent
that they are important, but the

Dr. Geschickteb. They are crucial, Senator.

Senator Kennedy. OK.

But, as I understand, they are inaccurate.

Dr. Geschickteb. Not accurate, sir.

Senator Kennedy. You tel. us about it.

Dr. Geschickteb. The inaccuracy applies to patients.

Senator Kennedy. Tell us about it.

Dr Geschickteb. Well, I will. We are concerned here with labora-
tory studies done exclusively on animals. We are then going over to
$1,250 ascribed to hospitalization, of an advanced cancer patient, and
so icited in your report, and this patient that we contributed $1 ,000 —
well, it was a case of abdominal aneurysm, he was not seen by me as a
patent, I referred him to the surgeon — I never administered to
him — he was operated on, and if they want to sneak that patient in
as advanced cancer case, they should never put the $250 on top of it
because I could recognize the surgeon from it. His low fee was a
courtesy to me. ™

* Senator Kennedy. It is basically inaccurate? Is it inaccurate or ;|

accurate?
r Dr. Geschickteb. It is inaccurate. ,-»

, Senator Kennedy. Now, do you have any idea why they did that? !l

Dr. Geschickteb. I do not know what they were thinking of. ^

Senator Kennedy. Why would they put that kind of information
in? n

Dr. Geschickteb. They were trying to make sure in their own y

records that they had some breakthrough on clinical grounds so they
put in anything clinical they could lay their hands on. They put the r i

money on the wrong patient that time. j

Senator Kennedy. Even with regard to the particular case you
have described, it is not accurate?

Dr. QncmcxTBR. It is not accurate at all.

Senator Kennedy. Now, turn to subproject 35. This involves the
intention of the Agency to construct a new research wing at the
Georgetown University Hospital using the Oeschickter Foundation
as a cutout for channeling CIA. money for the project.

Georgetown University was to be unwitting of CIA interest, and
CIA's interest was to provide the Agency with the equivalent of a
hospital safehouse for doing research. The plans for this project were
approved by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

in this approval document of November 15, 1954, the memo says
that Agency-sponsored research projects in sensitive fields would be
carried out— r suppose it is important to note that it says "would be
carried but"— in thenew wing of the hospital.

The Agency's contribution to the hospital would be a nonrecurring
grant of $125,000. And the Agency was to encourage the Atomic
Energy Commission to make a similar contribution.

The document describes the background of the relationship of the
Geschickter Fund for medical research and the CIA, and it describes
the background of Dr. Geschickter and the contributions to be made
by the CIA and by the Geschickter Fund.

Their plans included integrating at least three Chemical Division
employees into the new hospital wing to work on the Agency's re-
search projects. It talks about three Chemical Division employees
and how they are going to put those employees into the new wing
of the hospital. It was anticipated that one-sixth of the total space in
the new research wing would be available to Dr. Geschickter and, in
turn, would be available to the CIA. Indeed, the CIA referred to this
as the equivalent of a hospital safehouse.

Then, on April 6, 1955, it became clear that the Atomic Energy
Commission would not participate in giving money, and so the
Agency proposed to double its contribution. In the latter document
of April 6, 1955, the CIA states that they will no longer have to wait
until the new wing is built in order to take advantage of the research
facility. This was Because you, Dr. Geschickter, were to be allowed to
use existing space in the present hospital in order to build up an
organization that would later occupy the new wing, and the CIA
claims, and I quote, "This means that we will be able to begin to
take advantage of this cover situation within a matter of months
instead of waiting for a year and a half."

So, did you give CIA money to Georgetown University Hospital
for construction of a new research wing?

Dr. Geschickteb. In 1957, I gave some money to the building
fund of Georgetown University Medical Center. I never gave them
a penny for any particular building.

Senator Kennedy. So you did not have the money for that?

Dr. Geschickter. No, sir, I did not.

The Geschickter Fund was giving it anyhow. I never had the money.

Senator Kennedy. Well, you have this document in front of you
about the memorandum of January 10, 1956, that talks about Sub-
project 35 was finally completed on December 9. 1957. Total funds
made available $515,000. So they spent a half a million dollars they
said they would spend to build the wing.

Now, did the Geschickter Fund pass the money?

85 ' ■' li I

Dr. Geschickteb, No; we never passed that sum of money, ™ \

Senator. >| \

Senator Kennedy. Well; did you pass any money? :i M

Dr. Gesceicktir. $375,000, not $515,000.

Senator Kennedy. So what was the Agency's contribution? fl )

Dr. GEScmcKTi^ It could be anything because I do not know what J)

their records showed.

Senator Kennedy. But through the Gescbickter Fund, was it the .?* I

$375,000— ;} i

Dr. Geschickteb. $375,000 given in 1957. ■ ;

Senator Kennedy. And can you tell us whether that was the CIA
funds or how much of that was CIA funds? 1 :

Dr. Geschicktbb. That was CIA money, as it turned out later. J, i

At the time in 1955 we did not know whether the AEC was involved
or not, or whether some other foundation was there. m\

Senator Kennedy. But that was CIA money? y

Dr. Geschickteb. It turned out to be $375,000 CIA money.

Senator Kennedy. Why would they invest this money? Do you . ; ,

have any idea why they wanted to invest it? '!

Dr. Geschickteb. I have not the slightest idea because I never '■*

saw any of that memo or that so-called Project 35 until about Satur-
day. It was the first time I had ever laid eyes on it. That is about 80 : : |
hours ago. if

Senator Kennedy. Did you ever get in return one-sixth of the
hospital wing? n

Dr. Geschickteb. Not at all. i|

Seuator Kennedy. Did you conduct research

Dr. Geschicktbb. Not a bit in this building. I was still in the
animal house in the Department of Pathology where I had been 1

since 1946. i*

Senator Kennedy. So you never got any — at least yon never did
any research, and none of the research that was done under your ■]

guise, and you have no idea as to what the followup was? J

Dr. Geschickteb. I have no idea what their plan was for giving
the money. .=?»

Senator Kennedy. And even though the documents all relate to ||

you and indicate what you are going to do in terms of the researc h -

Dr. Geschickteb. As in "The Man From La Mancha," as far as
T am concerned, I know not of what they were thinking. |

Senator Kennedy. They are not accurate then either in their por- it

trayal of what they said you were going to do?

Dr. Geschickteb. Senator, if you go to that building, the top floor m

that they say they would occupy is 50 percent mechanical equipment ||

for air-conditioners.

Senator Kennedy. You did not know what the agency got out from
all that money that they put in? You have no idea?
Dr. Geschickteb. No idea.

Senator Kennedy. Did you perform any other research for testing
drugs, gadgets, or any research at all on human subjects?

Dr. Geschickteb. Are you referring to research in that particular
building?
Senator Kennedy. No. Any other.

Dr. Geschickteb. I did my usual research every year, discovering
the cause of cancer, a new treatment for cancer, a new treatment for
asthma, a new treatment for hypertension, and new insights info
arthritis.

Senator Kennedy. Did the CIA sponsor that research?

Dr. Geschickteb. They sponsored it along with the other con-
£ tributors.

Senator Kennedy. Why were they interested in all of these?

Dr. Geschickteb. They had money but they did not have ideas.

Senator Kennedy. What did they speak to you about in terms of
cancer? What were the other diseases, arthritis?

Dr. Geschickteb. High blood pressure, arthritis, asthma, and
cancer.

Senator Kennedy. Could you see any connection between that and
the national security-covert intelligence?

Dr. Geschickteb. All I can say is any understanding of the way
the body works and how chemicals work or pharmaceuticals or drugs
work is important for any agency in the Government to know.

I have a reprint here that will be made available.

Senator Kennedy. What do you have?

Dr. Geschickteb. I have a reprint here on the hypersensitivity
phenomenon produced by stress by Charles Geschickter and Edward
n'Malley, published and submitted for publication in 1959.

Senator Kennedy. Is this Subproject 45?

Dr. Geschickteb. This is 45.

Senator Kennedy. If I could make a brief comment about that.

According to the CIA, during the period of 1955 to 1963, you were
trying to identify and evaluate substances which might have appli-
cations in the field of the psychochemical and knockout drops. This
was also supposed to involve, first, the testing of drugs on advanced
cancer patients, and then on appropriate patients.

This is the project that involved into a study of stress. The CIA
was supposed to have contributed approximately $600,000 over that
period of time in support of this project. Apparently, in order to
cover the CIA's purpose of being involved in this project, on January

rA 30, 1956, a CIA memo says

'y : - Dr. Geschickteb. The project of stress that they referred to was

' done entirely on rats and so reported.

Senator Kennedy. Now, in the memo it says:

In order to continue the established cover activities in the Fund and to make

«» available a pool of subjects for testing purposes, the cardiovascular and anti-

carcinogenic effects of compounds resulting from the above program will be
evaluated.

Now, it would seem to me in the health area that what you are
basically talking about in this situation is where you are completely
mixing what would be legitimate kinds of research — 'that is, testing
cardiovascular and an ti carcinogenic effects of compounds — in order
to cover the real purposes.

Dr. Geschickteb. I was not covering anything.

Senator Kennedy. No, no. This is what I am quoting in the
memorandum— I am not saying that you were. I am quoting the
CIA memo that indicates that that is what their understanding of
the nature was.

What do you say about that? Is that an accurate description?

Dr. Geschickter. No. They were looking on anybody's work in
my laboratory or any other of 86 universities for anything they could
find in that field. But I did not know what they were4ooking tor.

Senator Kennedy. What field is this now?

In what field is this? You are talking about stress now?

Dr. Geschickteb. Stress. We are tauring about stress.
£ Senator Kennedy. That is subproject 45, is that correct?

Dr. Geschickter. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. There were a series of annual renewals of this
project?
i Dr. Geschickter. Correct.

Senator Kennedy. In each one of them there were summaries of
what was accomplished and what was hoped to be accomplished.

On the January 17, 1957, draft, they talk about synthesizing and

4 the clinical evaluation of compounds known to have application in the

psychochemical and K-fields. In addition, natural toxic psychoses

were to be studied. These included compounds lowering blood glucose,

compounds to be administered by all routes. |

Do you remember this research? J

Dr. Geschickter. I have a list of the compounds and that research
applies to thiogycolic acid submitted to the NCI, and I will give you >

their number for it. I remember the research very well, Senator. I

Cancer code number is 59-2-79, it is an anticancer compound and not ^

a psychotic knockout drug.

Senator Kennedy. Now, in January 1959, in the next renewal of ']

this project, the following goals are enumerated by the CIA. And it J

talks about development of materials and techniques for the production
of maximum levels of physical and emotional stress in human beings. I

And then it continues, development of material and techniques which - J

E reduce a maximum attenuation of stress in human beings once it *

as been produced. It continues along. It indicates you are going to
do it. I

Dr. Geschickter. This refers to continuation of rat studies of J

stress and these other chemicals that produce stress and phenomena
in rats, and they have been published. Hj

Senator Kennedy. Were any of these tests done on human subjects? H

Dr. Geschickter. No, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Well, it indicates that that is what they made r ,

♦ the grant in order |

Dr. Geschickter. Can I correct you on that, Senator? i J

I The cancer compounds were given to patients under that NCI

# number, and they have Jbeen reported to the Tumor Board at George- ; I
town. They are looking for its effects on blood sugar and on stress, m
but the compounds that we used were modified to cure cancer, and
they were so modified that they would show up as anticancer drug at
the NCI, and that is what they did.

But we were not giving our patients stress drugs.

Senator Kennedy. All right.

Now^ in the continuation of this project, the funding for this par-
ticular project, on the 29th of December, 1959, the memo will ob-
viously De part of the record, but let me read you the relevant part:

"As in indicated in the attached proposal, which is the proposal for : J

the next year, work of the past year has progressed to the point where y

more definitive experiments on stress reaction can be carried out.

Primarily this is brought about by the characterization of several
new materials which produce reactions in humans and the application
of some new clinical methods of measuring the extent of disturbance
produced."

Now, as I understand, this is the internal document that would
justify the expenditures for the next year. But you say that that is not
g. accurate, that that aspect is not accurate?

Dr. Geschickter. Those materials, Senator, have to be cortisone
and adrenalin, and we had discovered that tney work uniquely in
combination. Now, those materials, Senator, are standard— cortisone
is standard treatment for lymphosarcoma and for Hodgkin's disease,
and our studies in that field would define the side effects in cancer
patients who were getting cortisone as approved treatment, and
adrenalin at times.

Senator Kennedy. Well, that is not terribly dramatic then, is it?
It is important but not dramatic.

Why do you think the agency is attempting to vdramatize this?

Dr. Geschickter. I could not answer that, except they were
tremendously dogged in maintaining connections with Georgetown
and, remember, aU through this period we were distributing hundreds
of thousands of dollars to other universities, and they did not want to
lose that either.

Senator Kknnkdt. Why is this all sort of kept in the black box, so
to speak? If this is legitimate, valuable, useful, and worthwhile, why
is it all couched in

Dr. Geschickter. Senators, the amazing thing to me is what is in
that black box. Some of what was in that black box was available on
open market, and they were trying to synthesize it secretly.

Senator Kennedy. They paid $600,000 for this type of research.
Why, if it is available in the open market — why are they channeling it
through the agency?

Dr. Geschickter. I have not the slightest idea. I can just quote
you a $32,000 grant to another institution to synthesize a drug that
was in French pharmacopea, and I bought it for $220 a pound.

Senator Kennedy. How much went to the Geschickter Fund over
these years totally, approximately?

Dr. Geschickter. Project 45 — I can tell you exactly, $535,000.

Senator Kennedy. For all projects?

Dr. Geschickter. For all projects that went to us for research,
the expense, the total amount was $655,500. Total building program
* expense was $375,000, and that b total amount.

Senator Kennedy. For the 13 years, what would be the total of it
approximately?

Dr. Geschickter. That is approximately the total for those years.

Senator Kennedy. All the years, all projects.

Dr. Geschickter. All projects?

Senator Kennedy. If you totaled all the projects that were funded
through the Geschickter Foundation for the universities in those 13
years, what is the total?

Dr. Geschickter. This figure is the $1 million that went to
Georgetown, a little over that.
__ Senator Kennedy. Total amount, a little over $1 million is all?
7 Dr: Geschickter. Yes, $1,030,000

Senator Kennedy. Is that not just Georgetown?

80 si

Dr. Geschickter. That was spent at Georgetown. ?T

Senator Kennedy. I want the total amount for the 13 years, all J

CIA money for any purpose that went through the foundation.

Dr. Ge8chicktbr. That went through the foundation? 'ft

Senator Kennedy. Yes, approximately. |

Dr. Geschickter. I will give it to you exactly.

Senator Kennedy. Give it to us exactly.

Dr. Geschickter. $2,088,600, to other institutions.

Senator Schweiker, Does that figure represent operating or capital
or construction funds?

Dr. Geschickter. These are all operational funds distributed to *i

the universities and all other projects I have listed by the Geschickter J

Fund independently of the Georgetown University Medical Center.

Senator Kennedy. What would you say they got f:omtiiat? ^

Dr. Geschickter. What did they get from it? I

Senator Kennedy. Yes. d

Dr. Geschickter. I would like to read you what they got from it.
I would like to clear this up. 1

In the first place, they did soil research, and they spent $300,000 J

for soil research at three universities. That soil research aas been used
and is still being tried out to convert shale to oil by bacterial action. rj

They found 57 substances would increase the growth of those bacterias 1

to attack shale. That is one thing that might-

Senator Kennedy. Does it seem peculiar to you that the Central
Intelligence Agency is funding that kind of research, whether these 1

things are valuable or useful or not: U

Dr. Geschickter. Senator, this is what came out of the black box.

Senator Kennedy. Now, just in a general kind of comment, would fj

you say that there may have been some useful and important research? J

Dr. Geschickter. More good than evil.

Senator Kennedy. As I understand it, there was nothing or at ,,

least from what you indicated here, there was nothing that was done J

or channeled through your foundation that could not have been sup- -*

ported by other instruments of government, am I correct?

Dr. Geschickter. Money wherever you put it, and that is what j|

they were doing, spending their money, is well spent on research. II

Senator Schweiker. We struck oil in the black box, is that what you
are trying to tell us? ?a

Dr Geschickter. We struck oil. That is one thing that came out i

of It.

Senator Kennedy. Yet, even in the explanations, and even in the
interna] documents that describe the work, in some instances, as it : |

related to personal records, those were inaccurate, am I correct in ^

that?

Dr. Geschickter. They were inaccurate. ;|

Senator Kennedy. Do you have any understanding of why they i}

would be so inaccurate?

Dr. Geschickter. No, except that I know the amounts were n

inaccurate. ..»■'.. j

Senator Kennedy. Did it occur to you they might be using funds
that had been described in those expenditures for perhaps other ,

purposes? ; |

Dr. Geschickter. I do not know. ^

Senator Kennedy. You do not know.

Second, in terms of the characterization of the work, you are
aware of really the dramatization of a number of the research pro-
jects that you were involved in. You have no insight or understand-
ing of why they might have been either over-dram atized or over-
stated?
^ Dr. Geschickter. I do not know why they were overd^amatized.

v Mr. Cacherib. I will speak for the record.

Dr. Geschickter first learned of these documents through the
courtesy of your staff Friday afternoon and Saturday morning. It *
was the first time he had seen them, the characterizations of them.

Senator Kennedy. He has been very cooperative. All of you have
in helping the committee. It is not easy to follow all the lines, where
they nave been leading. But you have been very helpful to us.

Now, the records of MK-ACTION indicate that although the use
of the Geschickter Foundation for Medical Research would no longer
be used as conduit, you were still to be used as conduit to handle

? rants to other researchers through separate commercial accounts,
t also says that in the past you have been used as a grantee for specific
research activity and as a channel for funding other medical re-
searchers, and as the provider of cover for one staff member of the
CIA.

Is all of that accurate?

Dr. Geschickter. That is accurate.

Senator Kennedy. Who was the staff member? You do not have
to give us the name, but where did he work? Can you tell us?
.- Dr. Geschickter. I do not know where these people work at the
present time. This was long ago. Where they worked then?

Senator Kennedy. Yes.

Dr. Geschickter. I would like to hear the question. I do not
know what people you are referring to.

Senator Kennedy. Was the NIH involved in any of the research
projects?

Dr. Geschickter. There was NIJI involvement.

Senator Kennedy. Could you tell us the nature of that involve-
ment?

Dr. Geschickter. I can tell you the nature of it accurately. One
was on studies on concussion m which they rocked the heads of
animals back and forth to try to cause them amnesia by concussion
of the brain. And that was for $1 10,000.
* The other, which war funded through this later business was the

use of radar to put monkeys to sleep, to see if they could be, should
I say, instead of Mickey Finn, they could put them under with radar
directed toward the monkey brain.

Senator Schweiker. Could they?

Dr. Geschickter. Did they go to sleep?

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

Dr. Geschickter. Yes, sir. But, Senator, it showed if you got into
too deep a sleep, you injured the heat center of the brain the way you
cook meat, and there was a borderline there that made it dangerous.

Senator Kennedy. Now, there is a discussion also in the memoranda
as to how to hide contributions so that no additional taxes would be
paid by you. There is no indication of any wrongdoing obviously on
your part. I think all of us understand that in terms of the protection

of various kinds of agents that there may have to be some procedures
which are established to protect their cover.

But, in this memorandum, it mentioned examinations of Dr.
Geschickter's — saying if this were the case, the nature of this trans-
action would arouse suspicion under cursory IRS examination. Then
it continues, talking about the Foundation:

|£ Such an investigation could undoubtedly be handled by intercession with the

IRS. The need for such intercession should, however, be avoided.

It would certainly indicate that it appears that the ability to inter-
cede with regard to the IRS was certainly a working tool of the
« agency itself.

Can you tell us about what MK-ACTION, what was MK-
ACTION?

Dr. Geschickter. I first heard about it on Saturday. But the
4 answer is they were looking for a new way to hide things, and that

is all I can ten you about it.

Senator Kennedy. Were you involved in any research under that
project?

Dr. Geschickter. I was involved in research, no matter how it
came, it went to the Geschickter Fund and to the same laboratories.

Senator Kennedy. Was that research covert?

Dr. Geschicktsr. No, sir, it might be, it might not. It depends
on how you look at it.

At the same time, it was covert.

Senator Kennedy. Well, do you want to, just briefly, tell us about
that?

Dr. Geschickter. Among other things I tested all the rocket fuels
that were in use* for toxicity, and they were all of a certain type of
halogen derivatives related to chlorine we drink in water ana the
fluorides that we use in toothpaste to strengthen teeth. I found out
that these fluorides and these chlorines ana these rocket fuels were
all excreted through the lungs and were damaging to the lungs, so it
is possible that one of the agents of cancer of the lung is not just
tobacco, it may be the chlorination of our water.

Senator Schweiker. Does that come from the formation of chloro-
form after chlorine is put into the water and ingested?

Dr. Geschickter. It is metabolized and all of these halogens are

# excreted through the lungs, this is what I proved, whether

Senator Schweiker. Are you saying you do not agree with EPA's
, finding that the amounts of chlorine in water today are safe? You are

« saying they are not safe?

* Jpr. Geschickter. We do not know over a long period of time.
This is a terrible thing about cancer, Senator. It is like a national
policy. You think it is good todaxr and, 20 years later, you might be
wrong. -W

Senator Kennedy. Just finally, the Agency funneled money to
many universities through the Geschickter Fund, did it not?

Dr. Geschickter. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Do you have the list of all of those universities?

Dr. Geschickter. All of them.

Senator Kennedy. In genera], did the universities know that the
money was coming from the CIA?

■'■':)

Dr. Geschickteb. Some of them had previously gotten CIA
money, and they just switched this method of giving it to them. In
general, they did not know.
Senator Kennedy. Did or did not know?

Dr. Geschickteb. In general, did not know. Some of the universi-
ties undoubtedly knew it, in my opinion.

Senator Kennedy! As a researcher, what is your own reaction to
the covert funding of university research in terms of the universities?
Dr. Geschickteb. I do not believe in it.
Senator Kennedy. Pardon?

Dr. Geschickteb. I do not believe in covert funding. I think that
the country has got enough brains and money to use it intelligently,
I hope when they give it to research. But it has been a ragged record.
Senator, I had a comment. If public use of money for research was
so wonderful in their administration, the Geschickter Fund would
not be in existence today.

Senator Kennedy. But the point about it is that while there is,
obviously, a lot of research that is being done, and obviously it is a
very important part of our whole health effort, we already have a way
and means of trying to do that, which is the National Institutes of
Health for the most part, as well as private groups.

What we have seen here, just in your own example, is that for about
20 years the CIA channeled more than $2 million through the Founda-
tion on work which, by your own admission, could have been done
through open research. We found that within that kind of context,
there are records which are inaccurate, which misrepresent the situa-
tion, which distort the situation. We have all of that particular package
laid out before us.

Within that you have the compromising of the universities. We
have failure for the protection of individuals who are being tested
and we have failure of a follow-up in terms of adequate kinds of health
protections for those people who have been subject to a good deal
of the testing. You have as well the perversion of many of the different
agencies of Government and in a very unnecessary way. You can
say there may have been some benefits which spin off from all of that
money that has been channeled or funneled through, but we certainly
have no evidence of any of that in terms of the Agency. Maybe it
has been written about by you or by others, but we certainly do not
have accountability.

I think this is part of the troublesome aspects of this.
Dick, do you have anything?

Senator Schweiker. Dr. Geschickter, you have described projects
such as the oil shale and bacteria project, the use of radar waves
on animals, and the study of animal brains and concussions. Is that
all or are there some other projects, too, that you are familiar with?
Dr. Geschickteb. I am going to give you a very important one
that I would like to publish, and I could not at the time. We had
trouble with the Vietnamese switching from our side to the other
side at night, and the Army had to have a way of labeling switch-
coats or turncoats, so we helped them to develop a suspension of
material related to pheno-phthalms, when we would give them their
health shots or anticholerat vaccine, they could inject this fluorescent
material. It is invisible except under ultraviolet light. I have it in

it'

my arm. Some males of his staff have it in their arms, my nurse |

and others. -*

Now, this material stays visible year after year.

Now, here is the important spinoff of that. We have a lot of patients fl

with bad hearts, and we do not know whether to operate on them or J

not. If it is a degenerative thing, thev will not stand the operation,
which is a long 4-hour operation. But if it is congenital heart valve— a m

murmur has been picked up in childhood— we can operate. If they (|

have on their back carried their own recording or computerized ^

symbol of what their congenital deformities were, then the doctor'
can put a light on the patient's back and get the history of all important
things just by reading a few tatooed marks. That is what I want to
publish.

Senator Kennedy. You have been describing good projects.

What about some of the bad projects?

Dr. Geschickter. I can give you one that I cannot understand.
I think it will amuse everybody. -

They spent $247,000 on mushrooms. Twenty thousand went to an
agent whose— well, I had to. decipher this, going back and forth to
Philadelphia, and I picked up the Philadelphia ticket stamps— well,
it was not punched out on his train record, and he had Atlantic City
on the other side of one of them, and they were spending $107,667
buying mushrooms from Africa. And these things were then shipped
down — —

Senator Schweiker. We grow mushrooms in Pennsylvania. Why
did we have to bring them in from Africa?

Dr. Geschickter. These are poison mushrooms. Let me tell you
something about it.

The name is in the report but, by God, it is not in any dictionary.
It is an African name of an African mushroom.

Now, they also spent $120,000 analyzing these mushrooms at a
university laboratory, reputable State university, so here they are
smuggling in mushrooms back and forth. I have a thousand pages of
memos, mostly bus tickets, purchasing orders for natural drugs, but
they all turned out to be mushrooms, and the total of that, Senator, is
$247,000, so you will not eat a poison mushroom.

Senator Schweiker. What did they do with the poison mushrooms
once they had them?

Dr. Geschickter. They sent down to — I will not name the uni-
versity — to analyze them for toxic substances, but they apparently
would poison somebody. I do not know what they did with them. I
have not gotten the followup on that one.

Senator Schweiker. Any others like that?

Dr. Geschickter. And the other ones, I told you about, they were
very interested in hashish cannabionol, and that original synthesis
by the way was done by Roger Adams at the University of Illinois in
1932. I worked with him. So they went back to Illinois to do a lot of
this work. They spent some money at another university, $36,500, to
purify the allergens in ragweed that make you sneeze or give you hay
fever.

Well, this may be very important, because with that as a test, they
discovered a new antibody in the body called Gamma E, that is on
surface cells only. It does not circulate in the blood as a rule. This led

ns_s?.n — 77-

to discovery that the mast cell liberates the chemicals that give 3 r ou
the hay fever and asthma. That was not a complete waste.

I mentioned the bacterial work, the concussion experiments for
amnesia, and they did $177,000 worth of work trying to cure chronic
alcoholism with various additives. I do not know how successful that
is.

Senator Schweiker. I was going to say I hope you are going to
**" publish a paper on that.

Is there something you can tell us about a cure for chronic alco-
holism?

Dr. Geschickter. I will let you know.

Senator Schweiker. Dr. Geschickter, in suhproject 35* one-sixth
of the space of the university hospital wing which the CIA contrib-
uted to, supposedly through your fund, was going to bs available for
the agency's research.

Who occupied that space?

Dr. Geschickter. All of the space that is referred to in that par-
ticular memo, which I just saw last Saturday, was used by ordinary
hospital laboratories and outpatient clinic for dentistry, outpatient
clinic for ordinary hospital psychiatry, and they used it for a baby
clinic on the first floor.

On the top floor is the only place I was interested in. They had
$375,000 worth of isotope labs, and radio isotopic equipment, while
now that type of equipment that is there amounts to over $2 million.
I bought the first equipment myself for $7,500. This is why AEG was
interested. That is why I started this money-raising effort through
Admiral Strauss, a friend of mine.

Senator Schweiker. According to the CIA documents, part of this
agreement says there will be available the equivalent of hospital
safehouse.

Dr. Geschickter. Senator, I do not need to tell you if you go to
a marriage ceremony, there has to be at least two parties at the altar.
Here there is only one party behind closed doors making the agree-
ment. I knew nothing of this. Neither did Georgetown.

Senator Schweiker. Are you saying that no agreement existed or
that you were not aware of any?

Dr. Geschickter. There was no atrreement that I know of and
none that you can make with only one party, keeping it in a black box.

Senator Schweiker. There wa<* no safehouse, or you did not know
of any safehouse?
j Dr. Geschickter. We have never found it.

Senator Schweiker. I,t refers ii; here to a written memorandum.
i Let me get my notes on it.

Were you aware of, or did you sign, a memorandum with anyone
i who represented or who might have been from the CIA, a merao-

j randum of understanding which might have specified the reasons for

the CIA's donation and what the Agency hoped to get in return for
its money?
i Dr. Geschickter. Never signed anything. I never heard of this

1 until Saturday. I have heard of comments in the press, but what has

gone on in that memorandum would scare anybody.
j Senator Schweiker. Were there any hospital staff assistants or

a people in this bu Iding who were doing work that might have been

construed to be connected with the CIA?

■■a

Dr. Geschickter. None.

Senator Schweiker. And you have-

Dr. Geschickter. Not that I know of. It turned out there was
none at that time.

Senator Schweiker. The building we are talking about in sub-'
project 35 was to have sheltered some pretty gruesome experiments
that the CIA was interested in. They were worried about responsi-
bility for this work. In a CIA document describing subproject 35,
it says:

The proposed facility offers a unique opportunity for the secure handling of
such clinical testing in addition to the many advantages outlined in the project
proposal. The security problems mentioned above are eliminated by the fact that
responsibility for testing will rest completely upon the physician and the hospital.

What are they talking about there?

Dr. Geschickter. I do not know because you cannot do that in a.
university hospital.

Senator Schweiker. You signed no memorandum of agreement on
this project?

Dr. Geschickter. Absolutely not, or I would not be here today. I
would be running out of the country.

Senator Schweiker. Do you know of anybody on your staff who
did sign such a memorandum?

Dr. Geschickter. No, no one would have the authority to.

Senator Schweiker. I am a little bit confused, Dr. Geschickter,
about what the Government got out of this. In other words, for all
this investment, and in light of all the cover and facilities for all the
sensitive experiments that they expected to gain and referred to here
in these documents, it does not seem like the CIA got its money's
worth.

Dr. Geschickter. I do not know what they had in mind.

Senator Schweiker. Well, they certainly would rely upon you.
I have to believe that you were one of the people they relied upon.
To work through you as the conduit for this much money, they
certainly must have relied on you in some way to produce

Dr. Geschickter. Senator, I was over 55 when most of this was
dreamed up, and it takes 4 or 5 years to build a building, and I could
drop dead in the meantime. I do not see how you can make a promise
on one side and expect me to live forever.

Senator Schweiker. How was the building financed again? Where
did the $3 million total come from?

Dr. Geschickter. All of that is inaccurate, because what actually
happened is different. Georgetown built three things at once. They built
the Kober-Kobian building, they built a nurses school, and they
built the Gorman building, no one of which comes up to anything
like the mentioned amount.

Senator Schweikur. How was the Gorman building financed? Just
give a brief breakdown.

Dr. Geschickter. I have not the slightest idea on that.
Senator Schweiker. What was the Geschickter Fund role in that
building then?

Dr. Geschickter. None. I was not given a square inch.
Senator Schweiker. What was your relationship with the building
for the hospital?

i 96

Dr. Geschickter. My relationship was to help with the building
fund., It specified no building whatsoever. I gave them money with no
strings attached.

Senator Schweiker. How much was that again?

Dr. Geschickter. $375,000.

Senator Schweiker. Where did the $500,000 come from? |

*• Dr. Geschickter. I have not the slightest idea.

** Senator Schweiker. Did you combine the $375,000 with some- I

body else's money to equal $500,000?

Dr. Geschickter. Never. I do not know where those figures came
from.

Senator Schweiker. And how much did the Gorman Building ij

■cost? . I

Dr. Geschickter* I have not the slightest idea. It depends on |

who the contractor was and whether he put in extras. ■ I

Senator Schweiker. Well, your role was, I thought, connected
with the building fund? I

Dr. Geschickter. My role was simply to build up Georgetown to f

"where it could hold its head up in any medical school in the country,
and that is just what happened.

Senator Kennedy. Finally, Dr. Geschickter, using the example of
the Agency's description about Georgetown University, it talks
about the objectives and the details. This is in justifying the commit-
ment of the Agency. f

Dr. Geschickter. Is this 35? i

Senator Kennedy. This is on 35. |

It talks about objectives and details of the work to further technical
services, it talks about chemical and biological requirements, and it
goes on to talk about the Geschickter Foundation Fund for Medical
Research used as a cutout, whereby arrangements would permit
Agency sponsored research projects using Agency personnel to be
carried out in the new wing without Georgetown University being
aware of CIA interests. Arrangements would also provide the Agency
with the equivalent of a hospital safehouse and so forth. All Agency

funds for Geschickter for Georgetown would be met by matching * |

U.S. grants. f

Now, the fact is, that is a great deal different from what actually !

happened in terms of what you have described here toda3\ It would |

appear to me that either the Agency did that without you knowing it, * I

to make it sound so appealing that whenever the Director of the Agency
**■ went to the President or the ultimate authority for approval of it,

they were going to approve that, and yet that is a good deal different
from what the actual facts were in terms of your understanding.

Either the memo is clearly a misrepresentation, and then we have |

to ask ourselves why did the Agency do it? Or did you not know I

what they were doing with the money even though you were a witting

subject on that, you did not know what they were doing. Either \

way this does not make any sense.

Dr. Geschickter. It makes no sense, Senator. I agree with you. f

Senator Kennedy. If they were overselling what they were doing, \

and were not doing it the way you described, you were the principal f

agent of that kind of factor, it then leaves the question about who was |

getting the resources, who was getting the money, and what were \

the real purposes, and maybe we do not know the answer to that f

97 a

one. Or if it is that they were fully interested in doing the kind of
things you were doing in terms of research, then there were other 1

agencies of Government that could have done it, provided protection 1

for individuals, and done it very satisfactorily.

Now, it seems to me that that is the dichotomy that we find our- *i

selves in at this time. In either way, it just does not make any sense ;l|

at all.

Dr. Geschickter. I agree with you. I agree with you. I cannot ~

make any sense out of it. 1

Senator Schweiker. I think one thing that does make sense from *

my past experience on the Intelligence Committee, is that one of the
key justifications for subproject 35 of MK-ULTRA as specified in
this memorandum, one of the key statements in the outline of the
project that has become available to us is that "agency sponsorship
of sensitive research projects will be completely deniable." It appears
to me that the agency was overwhelmingly successful in achieving
that objective.

Here we are fumbling and stumbling around trying to ascertain
what went on and who's responsible. One of the key aims of the sub-
project was complete deniability.

Dr. Geschickter, you seem to have it, we seem to have it, and the
project seems to have been handled so that it was a complete success
in terms of complete deniability.

I would like to come back once again, to the memorandum of
agreement for this project, which seems to be so very elusive.

I would like to read from article IX in the CIA document that was
made available to us.

Memorandum of Agreement: A memorandum of agreement will be signed with
(blank), outlining to greatest extent possible the arrangements under which the
hospital space under his control will be made available to chemical division per-
sonnel and the manner in which cover will be provided and other benefits attained.
No contract will be signed since (blank) would be unable to reflect any of the
Agency's contractual terms in his arrangements with the university when (blank)
makes the donation in question. The memorandum of agreement will be retained
inTSS.

Now, I am really confused. This could not be more specific about
obtaining a written memorandum of agreement. It talks about the
donation to the university, the reasons why a contract can't be
drawn up, and the need for a memorandum of agreement specifying
certain things about cover, and all of that. Elsewhere, the documents
explicitly say that you are aware of the terms of the agreement and
will cooperate.

You are telling me that you absolutely know nothing at all about
any^ memorandum of agreement?

Dr. Geschickter. Absolutely nothing. Even if there was such agree-
ment, it would not be worth the paper it was written on. You cannot
do that in a university hospital.

Senator Schweiker. Why not?

Dr. Geschickter. Because you have got a nursing staff and every
man of caliber on the hospital staff has to have appointment that comes
through the faculty, he has to get — he gets tenure, he has to be ap-
proved by a 20-man faculty, and you cannot do it that way.

Senator Schweiker. I have got to believe the CIA got something
for the $375,000, minimum, they put up.

Dr. Geschickter. I cannot answ-er that.

Senator Schweiker. Did they ever ask you to sign such an agree-
ment, and you refused?

Dr. Geschickter. Never discussed any of this with me. Imagine
■what I thought of it when I read it.

Senator Kennedy. What did you think?
Dr. Geschickter. I was in Alice in "Wonderland's domain.
Senator Kennedy. Why would they do it? Do you think you were
being set up?

Dr. Geschickter. I do not know the purpose. I cannot answer
any of your questions. There were plenty of hospital facilities all over
the country* they did not have to build one.

Senator Kennedy. Do you think it is possible that you were being
either misled or kept in the dark about all of this?

Dr. Geschickter. I was certainly in the dark. I never heard of this.
It was deliberately kept from me, or intentionally or unintentionally, I
do not know how to answer it.

Senator Kennedy. Even though you were working with the Agency
in terms of conducting——

Dr. Geschickter. T?hey kept all of this from me. I never saw it,
never heard of it, it was never discussed.
Senator Kennedy. You were still the conduit of the money, though?
Dr. Geschickter. The purpose was just research, not the building.
Senator Schweikek. What was the reason they told you they wanted

to make this charitable contribution to the cost of Georgetown's

Dr. Geschickter. They never told me anything until years later
they told me they got into'a fight with Aimiral Strauss of the AEC,
and when they would not put up the money, they were going to put it
up themselves.

Senator Schweiker. What was the rationale when the money
mysteriously appeared for you to give to Georgetown?

Dr. Geschickter. It was supposedly for radioisotope laboratories,
which are still there, and that is the only thing tangible that was ever
obtained.

Senator Schweiker. Well, there was more than that, because the
ensuing research projects that you described — you described a series
vof six or seven projects.

Dr. Geschickter. Which projects are you referring to Senator?
Senator Schweiker. Oil shale, effects of radar waves and brain con-
cussion in animals, poison mushrooms* halogen derivatives excreted
through the lungs.

Dr. Geschickter. They were nearly all farmed out in other places.
We did not have to even supply a test tube in most of them.

Senator Schweiker. Right, but the funding for those projects
went through you?

Dr. Geschickter. Yes; but none of that money stuck to our hands.
We got 4 percent. But that went right back in research. So all these
things you are talking about occurred at other universities, had
nothing to do with Washington, D.C.

Senator Schweiker. Yon do not draw any connection between the
money they put in the building and the ensuing research program?
Dr. Geschickter. None at all.

Senator Schweiker. Who approached you with the money for the
building?

99 . §J

Dr. Geschickter. The original idea, and the money that they would fj

contribute came from a man who is dead, who said he represented a |

Philadelphia foundation, and he was interested in support, because
there was a mental retardee, and they wanted to keep contributions ^

anonymous, and he said he thought he could get some matching money. I

But he never said he would give us that amount. *

Senator Schweiker. That was the conduit?

Dr. Geschickter. That was the conduit. That was the original fj

conduit. |j

Senator Schweiker. Did that man have any dealings with you or
any connection with the subsequent research projects you just de- f»

scribed as funded through you? j

Dr. Geschickter. No; he died pretty soon, thereafter.
Senator Schweiker. Who did direct, or oversee-^ —

Dr. Geschickter. I knew nothing about anything, because the y|

money, the final accounting of the money, and where it came from, ij

we never knew exactly. The only person who might know it was our
financial director, and he is also dead. ~|

Senator Schweiker. Why did they do it through you? |

Dr. Geschickter. They did not do it through me personally.
Senator Schweiker. Well, it was your fund. How were you made
aware of the availability of money? I am not clear on what relationship 1

existed between you and the CIA, with respect to funds for these J

projects.

Dr. Geschickter. Are you referring to the projects of building the fl

hospital, or these other projects? ij

Senator Schweiker. These other projects.

Dr. Geschickter. Through the other universities -,

Senator Schweiker. I am not clear on how that worked. In other \ 1

words, operationally, how did those projects proceed, and how were '>■*

you used *

Dr. Geschickter. How was I used? These universities submitted |

research proposals to the Geschickter Fund. These research proposals J

were on university stationery. They outlined ongoing research, and
gave their publications. They asked for a certain sum of money. This m

money requested for these projects were then shown to me as research y[

proposals and the money was then made available through pur bank
account. We then passed that money on to these particular universities ,.

on the basis of their research proposals, all of which are indexed through \ \

the work of your committee, that made the documents available to me. * J

Senator Schweiker. It was the Philadelphia Foundation that acted
as the conduit for money on the building projects? fl

Dr. Geschickter. Yes. We only got, Senator Schweiker, we only |J.

got about $75,000 anonymously in our books that I can trace to CIA.
All this money that we are talking about, the big volume of money, ?j

came through the Philadelphia Foundation. ||

Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. _"

Our next witnesses are Mr. David Rhodes, a former Central In-
telligence Agency employee; and Phillip Goldman, also a former CIA y|
employee. lj
Gentleman, would you stand?

Do you swear the testimony you give will be the truth, the whole J

truth, so help you God? ||

Mr. Rhodes. Yes.

::\

100

Mr. Goldman. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. Mr. Rhodes, did you work with the CIA?

STATEMENTS OP DAVID RHODES AHD PHILLIP GOLDMAN, FORMER

CIA EMPLOYEES

Mr. Rhodes. I did.

Senator Kennedy. What was your job with the Agency?

Mr. Rhodes. I worked as a psychologist on the stan of Technical
Services Division.

Senator Kennedy. From what period?

Mr. Rhodes. Approximately 1957 or 1958, until about 1961.

Senator Kennedy. Now, did you know Mr. Pasternak?

Mr. Rhodes. I did.

Senator Kennedy. We had invited Mr. Pasternak, subpenaed Mr.
Pasternak. He was scheduled the last time, and then at the final hour
he decided not to show, and we attempted to get ahold of him. We
have not found him since.

Did you and Mr. Pasternak travel to California together?

Mr. Rhodes. We did.

Senator Kennedy. Did you know there was a CIA safe house in
California?

Mr. Rhodes. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. And the first trip you made to California with
Mr. Pasternak was to understand the different ways of delivering
LSD to unsuspecting citizens, is that correct?

Mr. Rhodes. That is correct.

Senator Kennedy. Do you want to tell us the story in your own
words?

Mr. Rhodes. Well, very simply, Mr. Pasternak and I went to
California. We went there with a reasonable supply of money, and
proceeded for about a week, simply to go around to a number of
oars, and drink and meet people.

During that time we just were trying to establish some sort of
relationship with people so that we could subsequently invite them
to a party on some basis that would be acceptable to them for that
purpose.

Senator Kennedy. Then what happened after the period of a week?

Mr. Rhodes. Well, after that week was completed

Senator Kennedy. The purpose, as I understand it, was to find
ways of delivering LSD to unsuspecting citizens?

Mr. Rhodes. That is correct. We were testing a particular device,
to determine if LSD could be given in small quantities via an aerosol
delivery.

Senator Kennedy. Aerosol delivery?

Mr. Rhodes. Yes; just spray it in the air, that is correct.

Senator Kennedy. Did you line the people up for a party?

Mr. Rhodes. Yes. We lined up people that we thought we could
invite to such a party.

Senatoi Kennedy. And that resulted from your visit to the bars?

Mr. Rhodes. Various bars.

Senator Kennedy. What was supposed to happen at the party?

Mr. Rhodes. At the party the intent was that we would be able to
spray the aerosol, which as I understood it, had a sufficiently small

101

quantity, or the amount that could be ingested would be sufficiently
small, so that you would need practiced people to observe any differ-
ences in behavior of people, but just to see if it could be delivered
in that fashion.

Senator Kennedy. Was aerosol LSD brought out to the west coast?

Mr. Rhodes. It was brought out; yes. ,

Senator Kennedy. Who brought it out?

Mr. Rhodes. John Gittinger, as I recall.

Senator Kennedy. What happened after Mr. Gittinger arrived out
there in California?

Mr. Rhodes. We had a singular problem. The particular house was
not air-conditioned, and it was hot, and we had the problem of whether
or not we could arrange to keep windows and doors closed long enough
for this type of delivery, and the weather defeated us.

It was as simple as that.

Senator Kennedy. You could not postpone the party?

Mr. Rhodes. We were there for a period of tune. Actually, Mr.
Gittinger, as I recall, tried it out on himself in the bathroom. He felt
the system was not working adequately to continue the exercise.

Senator Kennedy. What did Mr. Gittinger do?

Mr. Rhodes. The only room in the house that could be completely
closed off easily, and it would not havjfe circulation, was the bathroom,
so he sprayed the aerosol in the bathroom, to see if he could detect
whether he was ingesting any of it.

Senator Kennedy. What happened to him?

Mr. Rhodes. Apparently he aid not get enough, in his terms, that
he felt it would be useful to try to continue it for a group of people.

Senator Kennedy. Did he spray it all in the bathroom?

Mr. Rhodes. Yes; to the best of my knowledge. I did not see him
do it. He reported this after he had done it.

Senator Kennedy. So then what happened? He came out of the
bathroom, and what happened?

Mr.. Rhodes. Frankly, Senator, we decided to scratch it at this
point. We were grateful we had not invited a bunch of people to a
party.

Senator Kennedy. So, as I understand it, three grown men flew
from the east coast to the west coast to spend a week in the bars out
there, to gather people for a party, and Mr. Gittinger— he was the
only one that went in the bathroom?

Mr. Rhodes. And only two of us were in the bars.

Senator Kennedy. Then what happened? Then you all went back
to the airport?

Mr. Rhodes. Simply closed up shop.

Senator Kennedy. Closed up shop?

Mr. Rhodes. Got on the airplane and came home.

Senator Kennedy. Can you make any determination of what the
value of that particular experience was to the Agency at all? ■

Mr. Rhodes. Well, you know, implied in what I said was that you
cannot deliver it by aerosol under those conditions.

Senator Kennedy. Did you and Mr. Pasternak take any other
trips to San Francisco? Was this the only one?

Mr. Rhodes. Yes, sir, we did. ■ " .

Senator Kennedy. You did?

Mr. Rhodes. Yes.

102

Senator Kennedy. What was the purpose of the other trip?
Mr. Rhodes. Totally unrelated to anything related to drugs. We
attended the First National Convention of Lesbians in this country.
Senator Schweiker. Can you report on the value of that trip?
Senator Kennedy. What is the connection?

Mr. Rhodes. The major connection was that the primary work
iBf , that we were doing, of a psychological nature, was to test a particular
^ theory developed by Mr. Gittinger, in terms of nature of per-
sonality

Senator Schweiker. This is after he has been in the bathroom?
Mr. Rhodes. That has been developed over years. The theory
was very useful in that unlike most of what was being done at the
time, you could work from testing materials — that is, psychological
testing to behavior, and then with training observe behavior, and
work back to how people would perform on tests. And to do this
there were a number of different kinds of groups visited by one person
or another, to try to get test results, observe behavior, and build
normal backgrounds of personality materials related to this particular
testing operation.

Senator Kennedy. Did you know Morgan Hall?
Mr. Rhodes. Yes, I met him.

Senator Kennedy. Did you know anything about the details of
the safe house he ran in San Francisco?

Mr. Rhodes. This is the safe house that we stayed at, Pasternak
and I stayed at. That is where the party would have been held. I am
talking about the one in the Marin County.
Senator Kennedy. There were others?
Mr. Rhodes. Apparently there were others.

Senator Kennedy. Before leaving this, just in terms of the testing
of the LSD aerosol, do you have any sense at all about the fact that
these people would have been unwitting subjects, subject to this kind
of drug, that it has had some extremely important negative impacts
on individuals, some absolutely tragic results?

I think we have seen those perhaps more in recent times than
that, but I am sure in terms of those that understood vhe drug, even
during that period of time, were fully aware of it, and I do not know
whether you have any reaction.

Obviously it is easier to look back in terms of the atmosphere, the
moral atmosphere of the times was different, but I do not know
whether there is anything you would like to say on that, or whether
you would do it again.

Mr. Rhodes. That is really hard for me to say, Senator. I was
aware that this was an unwitting administration. That was the
intent. It did not come off. That still was the intent.

The purpose of this sort of testing was simply that a person who
takes an LSD trip and can attribute it to the LSD was one kind of
behavioral reaction. And there was some reasonableness to believe
that a person who had some of these internal reactions and did not
know what to attribute them to would behave in a different way. We
felt we needed to do this in connection with some of the brainwashing
work, and some of the other things, as to whether there was an
unwitting thing, and the only way we could discover to do it was to
do it in this fashion.

103

We did take precautions to try to make it smallest possible do9ev
that could be delivered that would be detectable. But what you are
implying is perfectly true. - '

Senator Kennedy. Mr. Goldman, how long did you work for the
CIA?

Mr. Goldman. From March of 1958 until January, I think, around
1968, January.

Senator Kennedy. Were you not involved in laboratory develop-
ment, gadgets and devices of different kinds?
Mr. Goldman. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. Could you describe what you know about the
operation of the New York safe house?

Mr. Goldman. The New York safe house was set up at the request
of, I believe, it was Dr. Bortner, that it would be a facility that would
be available for use by the Agency in the event they wanted to use it."
In connection with that it was also made available to the Bureau of
Narcotics, for whatever use they wished to make of it. It was also at
that time suggested to me that we put in a two-way mirror, so that
any interviews and that sort of thing, which would be going on in one
room could be observed from the other room. And a tape recorder was
also installed.

To the best of my knowledge, Senator, this particular place was
used by the Bureau of Narcotics in their drug work, and as far as the
Agency was concerned, I was not made aware of any use that it would
be put to during the time.

It was understood that it would possibly, or could be used by other
parts of the Agency, or other parts of the groups that we were working
with.

Senator Kennedy. Well, of course, you have seen the document
made in 1963 which bears your name on it, and then the request for .
future funds for the continuation of the subproject 42, It says that in
the past year a number of covert and realistic field trials have been
successfully carried out.
- So you must have some knowledge or awareness?

Mr. Goldman. Senator, there was, to the best of my knowledge,
nothing carried out in that safe house, to the best of my knowledge.
We did, however, we did do some — through the^ Bureau of Nar-
cotics — we did get a camera, worked with a photograph, to determine
the presence of marijuana and the presence of opium poppies. We also
worked through them to get a device— we had a material with ivy,
Virginia ivy, English ivy, which when put on it would stunt it, and
prevent it from growing any further, would stop its growth at that
point.

We used the Agency, Bureau of Narcotics, at that point, to get for
us a sprayer which would spray this particular material in a very
definitive band, and a certain width.

We also, through the Agency — not through the Bureau — through
the project we also had developed a means for applying the tsar gas
CS that could be fitted into a billy club, or a riot stick.

We had at the same time given to the people there at the safe house,
and who it was now, I cannot recall, samples of tear gas dispensers
which could be used for self-protection.

Now, the wording— I might point out that the wording-of a lot of
these projects is deliberately misleading.

fe*

104

Senator Kennedy. The what?

Mr. Goldman. The wording.

Senator Kennedy. The wording on what?

Mr. Goldman. The wording on a project, the reason for a project.

Senator Kennedy. You mean the justification for the project?

Mr. Goldman. Justification, no, hold on.

Senator Kennedy. The ones that were bumped upstairs, so

that-

Mr. Goldman. The original-

Senator Kennedy. Those having responsibility in making the
decisions were getting information that was deliberately misleading?

Mr. Goldman. I was told, whether it was Dr. Bortner.

Senator Kennedy. Speak up a little.

Mr. Goldman. I was told, 1 do not know whether it was Dr. Bortner,
•or who it was at the time, that we were to continue the safe house and
justify its use.

Senator Kennedy. You were just told by your supervisors to
continue the safe house, and work out a justification for it?

Mr. Goldman. Right.

Senator Kennedy. Why would he do that?

Mr. Goldman. To provide the justification, so that he could extend
it more.

Senator Kennedy. You were not supposed to justify from what
you knew about it, even though you had some responsibility

Mr. Goldman. From what I knew, yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. You were told from your supervisor to go
ahead and justify it?

Mr. Goldman. As far as I know, there was nothing done in that
safe house.

Senator Kennedy. But why would a superior ask you to just work
out a justification — did that happen in any other program that
you were involved in in the agency?

Mr. Goldman. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. In other programs?

Mr. Goldman. In another area, where the wordage of the project
was such that it showed over or surreptitious, or whatever it was.

Senator Kennedy. Where would the real facts be in terms of what
was going on? If the agent who was going to justify it is told by the
superior now to word the explanation, it was not only in this project,
but in another project as well?

Mr. Goldman. It must have been used by other people, that is
my only solution.

Senator Kennedy. Did you know what went on in the San Francisco
safe house?

Mr. Goldman. The San Francisco safe house, I never knew as a
safe house, until the time that the episode that Dr. Rhodes mentioned
to you. I had no idea at that time that — I am quite sure that this
was a temporary establishment. I was aware that it was going to be
going

Senator Kennedy. Excuse me?

Mr. Goldman [continuing]. I was aware of what was going to be
going on there, because I was the person that put together the aerosol
device and the tripping device to set it off.

Senator Kennedy. You were aware of that project?

105 1}

Mr. Goldman. That it was ™

Senator Kennedy. Experimental? :|

Mr. Goldman. On an experimental basis. ^

Senator Kennedy. Were you aware of other research going on?

Mr. Goldman. Not at that safe house. fl

Senator Kennedy. At any other safe house? yi

Mr. Goldman. No; as far as I know, there was no other safe house.

Occasionally, when I would go out I would meet with Morgan Hall at «*

a downtown place, which was simply nothing more than a motel 1

room. '*-*

Senator Kennedy. You carried the money to the people running
the safe houses? fl

Mr. Goldman. Generally sent it to them, or carried it to them. Once si

in awhile I carried it to them. I generally sent it to them.

Senator Kennedy. You had the responsibility of getting the money *|

to them? t|

Mr. Goldman. I got it to Morgan Hall, sent it to him.
Senator Kennedy. Morgan Hall is George White?

Mr. Goldman. That is my understanding. I

Senator Kennedy. We have in the record that since 1963 you ^

approved some $2,000— that is, 22 checks, undercover agents for

operations, and you approved all !1

Mr. Goldman. Yes. j |

Senator Kennedy. And since 1964, some $4,800, and these things
go on year after year. Yet you do not know what this money was for? p*

Mr. Goldman. You did not ask me that until this moment. ' 1

Senator Kennedy. OK, I will ask you. ^

Mr. Goldman. You did not ask me. You are putting words in my
mouth. ' H

Senator Kennedy. Did you know what the money was for? I

Mr. Goldman. Thanks to your excellent staff, and the careful
review of some documents yesterday, after I had been out of the fi

United States for over, practically a month. I came back voluntarily y

so I could testify, and cut short the business trip, and thanks to your
excellent staff, I was shown some documents, and asked if that would .-^

refresh my memory, because in the — because the last time when we ||

sat up across from each other, I couk} not remember, and I frankly £*

could not.

They did show me these, and this, to the best of my knowledge — I f|

can tell you what was involved. When I took over that project, and jj

it was simply passed onto me as another person to monitor the project,
they already had, apparently from the records I had seen, done some rj

work that involved a drug of one sort like tetrahydro cannabinal, ||

some of these things, and I sat down with White at that time and ^

asked him, in his opinion was there any justification for any contin-
uation, and what was the result of what he had seen. I|

He thought that he had milked that information dry, as far as any i$

information would be concerned.

My interest in, has been all the time I was with the Agency, has
been more directed toward the devices and gadget area, and harass-
ment type of things. For that purpose I had developed for us dif-
ferent kinds of materials, and different things which he evaluated for
me.

106

I took them out there, turned them over to him, and asked him if
he would take a look and let us know whether or not it was suitable
for this purpose.

Now, among these things was a launching device to launch a glass
ampule that would break, that would even have in it tear gas CS —
gp at that time we had CS available to us, a very fine powder, which air

would blow around, or a very odoriferous material which could be
used, referred to by lot as stink bombs, used for breaking up demon-
strations.

Both of these things were for the purpose of disrupting or breaking
up demonstrations.

Senator ScHWEiKER.-What was the Agency's interest in tear gas?

Mr. Goldman. The purpose there was to break up demonstrations,
overseas countries, where they had people crowded into a plaza,
and it could be launched, and launched in such a way that the person
launching it would not be seen, and would not have the problem that
has happened in one case, where they had a hotel overlooking the
plaza and the person drew back with the odoriferous material and
threw it out the window, and it hit the side of the window, and bounced
back in the room.

So we developed a very silent launching device, which you could
throw it about 100 yards.

Senator Kennedy. Could we ask how these were tested, how
were they evaluated?

Mr. Goldman. They were evaluated, to be very frank with you,
participated in some of the evaluation of these, because I was in-
terested in doing it, seeing it myself, and we used the beach house
from San Francisco, and threw the stuff at a very isolated spot, so
we would not be observed, and measured the drift of the thing to
find out if it is effective, how far it would be effective and noticeable..

One thing this particular powder material had which Ave worked
up the devices, in which I turned over the devices to him, that is,
to Morgan Hall, to evaluate for him which I did not participate in,
taking the material, and put it in very fine glass, thin glass ampules,
which could be dropped on the floor and stepped on covertly, and
a very little bit of the powder would come out.

This particular material is so potent if you want to use that word,

in irritating the nose, it is perfectly harmless, that it causes sneezing

if it is in a closed room. If it is in a room that is in an exhibition room,

^ if it is in a small meeting room, or something of that sort, even a

large meeting room, it will cause very, very violent sneezing and

. continued sneezing, and the only way to get rid of it is to get out.^

The purpose again here was to get the people out of it, for example,

in trade fairs, and I was told the thought was it could be used in

| trade fairs overseas, in unfriendly country exhibit areas, where it

' would be used, and it would not be attributed, because it would not

be detected.
j Senator Kennedy. Do you know if it ever was?

| Mr. Goldman. As far as I know, I really do not know whether that

particular material was. I do know that the other material was, but
I was telling about the launcher.
j The other thing that we did, the other thing that we had him

evaluate, we had a material that was very potent on dogs, for quiet-
ing guard dogs.

107

I remember I gave him some of the material, gave him the right
combination of the material to put in hamburger, ground meat, to try Fl

on some dogs, which he knew were guard dogs, and which would bark, ;J

in whose yard, I do not know, where these dogs were, but he did eval-
uate this for me, and he said it did work. ^

He said the next morning the dogs were back up, but at the time I

they were completely silenced. "*

Senator Kennedy. What about the swizzle stick?

Mr. Goldman. The swizzle stick, this particular material — well, ft

the idea was that we would develop, or make a swizzle stick for a cock- I

tail, which would have the coating on it, which would be soluble in
water, soluble in the cocktail itself, but which when you use it, would ti

be undetectable. In other words, it wculd not look unnatural when you j|

use it, lay it on the table alongside of it, nor did it create any adverse
taste at all.

We used, for that purpose, material which had a very bitter, a very | J

bitter effect, very, very tiny little bit, which when put on the swizzle &

stick first, coated it, and I gave these to Mr. White to try cut to see if
the material came off in actual use the way we hoped it would come "|

off. He reported back to me again on this, that it did work, that it J

worked quite well.

Senator Kennedy. Who did he test that on, do you know? , ,

Mr. Goldman. I have no idea. He told me that it worked, that it I

passed, in other words, surreptiticusly. *

Senator Kennedy. You must have assumed this was being tested
in the safe house? |

Mr. Goldman. No ; I would think not. I think it would have been J

tested in the bar, because to the best of my knowledge, this safe house
you keep talking about, I think was set up for this particular operation • i

that they are talking about, and I do not believe it existed after that. J

Senator Kennedy. We will hear from Dr. Gottlieb tomorrow about
that.

Mr. Goodman. As far as I know, I do know that one other thing l|

that we worked on, and in this particular case this was something that ^

was administered, or used to be administered to individuals, it was an
amino type of acid, which was supposed to be perfectly innocuous when ff

used, but was supposed — I even recall the name — gamma hydroxybu- H

tyric acid, which was reputed in the literature to cause sleepiness.

Senator Kennedy. Sleeplessiness? »■*

Mr, Goldman, Sleepiness. To make one more lethargic. Not put J

you to sleep, not knock out drops, but make you sleepy.

I gave him several samples of it, and asked him if he would evaluate
it. I thought there was a slight amino, I would say like glutamic acid, ||

with due respect to Senator Schweiker, it tastes like a mushroom, and Mi

has that mushroomy flavor of this particular one.

Senator Kennedy, What about the syringe, the hypodermic needle f|

to deliver drugs in wine bottles? |J

Mr. Goldman. Which one is this now?

Senator Kennedy. The hypodermic needle to deliver drugs in wine ;.-»

bottles. Did they test that out there, too? j

Mr. Goldman. Yes; they tested that out there. The purpose of i

testing this, Senator, was to find out if the bartender, in handling the
bottles, or if a person subsequent to that would see that the cork j ]

had been penetrated, and we found out by using a very fine hypodermic ii

108

syringe of sufficient length, and putting it at the proper place, over
the cap, so that the hole would be undetected, and you could smear
over a little bit with something to cover it over, I was told tha* it
worked perfectly for the purpose.

Senator Kennedy. This was tested by Morgan Hall, too?

Mr. Goldman. Only to the extent that he tested it to find out if
it could be used. I showed him how to use it, where it should be put
C in different kinds of bottles.

Senator Kennedy. This was putting drugs in wine bottles?

Mr. Goldman. He did not pu' drugs in wine bottles. If he did, I
did not know about it.

Senator Kennedy. Was that not the intent of the test?

Mr. Goldman. The purpose of the test was to find out if it would
be noticed.

Senator Kennedy. How would you do that? You would do it to a
wine bottle in a bar, I imagine?

Mr. Goldman. That is right.

Senator Kennedy. Do you presume that he did do it to a wine
bottle in a bar?

Mr. Goldman. I presume he did it someplace. He may have done
it and asked people to take a look at the bottles, to see if they saw it.

Senator Kennedy. What do you assume?

Mr. Goldman. I would assume the latter.

Senator Kennedy. What about passing of pills surreptitiously?

Mr. Goldman. Oh, in this particular case, we had, or thought we
had, indeed in the case of a meeting of some sort, where they would
want to put a pill in a person's glass, or at a bar, and the purpose
here was to find out if it could be passed on, and could be introduced
into the glass without attracting the attention of the individuals, and
he again reported to me that in this particular case that you better
go back to the drawing board, because when it hits the water it
fizzles up, and made fuzz on top of the water.

Now, we had another particular thing that we did, in which he
evaluated, and did it so it could not be observed and checked out in
any way, was to take thin glass fibers, polyglas fibers, and put an
odoriferous material in them. These were sealed at the end and
cleaned off, and these particular fibers could then be introduced
underneath the edge of a rug, and by stepping on the rug i-. would
break it and release the odoriferous material and create a bad odor
in a meeting room. .

Senator Kennedy. Also, there were some kinds of drugs which
gave a person diarrhea, as I understand it?
j Mr. Goldman. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. All of these were tested, and being evaluated
by Morgan Hall?
i Mr. Goldman. Yes, sir.

! Senator Kennedy. They were all basically on unwitting subjects?
Mr. Goldman. I would assume that this was so. I never par-
| ticipated in any of them, but the idea being that they would not be
attributed, and that the person, for example, would feel all right.
Another test which was made

Kit

109

Senator Kennedy. We have, got 'a long list of different things,
different examples, of what was being tested. We have the background
of all the other facts on unwitting subjects and a whole wide range of
activities.

It was quite clear that, in terms of the west coast, and to some
extent, as well, the east coast — *—

Mr. Goldman. To the best of my knowledge, the east coast did
not

Senator Kennedy. There were east coast- — —

Mr. Goldman. This I did not know.

Senator Kennedy. Well, we will not get into tha£ now.

Just finally, in the documents that you are familiar with here, is
this what you are referring to when you say in the past year a num-
ber of covert and realistic field trials have been successfully carried
out?

Mr. Goldman. I would say so; yes. There were a number which I
could go into.

Senator Kennedy. I do not think so. I think that is all right.

Senator Schweikeb. I wouldjust like to ask Mr. Rhodes a question
related to the point Senator Kennedy brought up earlier about the
ethics of unwitting testing.

Was your answer directed to the time you were operating in, then,
or now? I was not quite clear about your view of unwitting tests.

Mr. Rhodes. Yes, Senator, it was to that time frame.

That was a peculiar period in our history. I really cannot answer
the question, ii another new, strange hallucinogen or something like
that came on the scene, as whether I would participate in such an
activity or not. At the time I thought it was worthwhile to do.
There would be no reason to do any such thing today that I know of.

Senator Schweikeb. Let us bring it up to today. This committee
is confronted with the task of writing a new law for the protection of
human subjects. One pertinent question I would like to ask is if
the American Psychological Association, or the body that performs
accrediting or licensing functions for clinical psychologists, prescribes
any kind of ethical standards on this issue today?

In other words, is there an ethical standard in the profession,
developed by the American Psychological Association or some other
group, relating to unwitting tests on human subjects today?

Mr. Rhodes. Senator, I am not absolutely sure. But having read
those ethics, I would strongly suspect there is a very strong state-
ment.

Senator Schweikeb. What do you feel the needs and responsibilities
in terms of new legislation and within the profession are today in this
regard? Forget the past and the time frame of the past. What about
today? What is your judgment on what is needed?

Mr. Rhodes. My personal feeling is that administering of drugs
to people unwittingly, it is something that we — this is the time to
stop tills sort of thing. I would suggest we not have any unwitting
administration in the future. That is a personal opinion.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.

Our last panel of witnesses include Mr. Charles Siragusa, former
Deputy Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics ; Mr. George

9S-S39— 77-

110

Belk, former District Supervisor for the New York Office of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics; Mr. Ira Feldman, former agent for the Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics; and Dr. Robert Lashbrook, former CIA
employee.

Gentlemen, please rise and raise your right hands.

Do you swear the testimony you give will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth?

[Messrs. Feldman, Belk, Lashbrook, and Siragusa answered in the
affirmative.]

Senator Kennedy. We will be having Dr. Gottlieb with us tomor-
row, who will respond to a number of related areas of inquiry here.

I think it is important that we understand that he will be testifying.
He is working closely with the committee. These matters have been
related obviously to the areas of inquiry here.

He has been granted immunity, so he has been very responsive.

Now, we might start off with Dr. Lashbrook.

According to the CIA response to our September 25, 1975, letter,
Dr. Lashbrook entered on duty on August 9, 1951, and. transferred,
to TSS on November 24, 1951. He was a research chemist on Project
Engineer.

From 1952 to 1956 he was Deputy Chief of the Chemistiy Division
of TSS under Dr. Gottlieb. He continued in this area until he resigned
in 1963. Is that correct?

STATEMENT OP ROBERT LASHBROOK, M.D., FORMER CIA EMPLOYEE;
ACCOMPANIED BY CHARLES SIRAGUSA, FORMER DEPUTY COM-
MISSIONER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS; AND GEORGE
BELK, FORMER BUREAU OF NARCOTICS SUPERVISOR, A PANEL

Dr. Lashbrook. Essentially so, yes.

Senator Kennedy. Would you like to correct it in any way?

Dr. Lashbrook. I was not necessarily Deputy Chief that long.

Senator Kennedy. How long were you?

Dr. Lashbrook. I do not recall.

Senator Kennedy. Did you work with Dr. Gottlieb?

Dr. Lashbrook. Yes; I did.

Senator Kennedy. Can you tell us what your relationship with
Gottlieb was in terms of the hierarchy?

Dr. Lashbrook. Well, I was his Deputy, which basically meant
that when he was out of town I would act for him largely in an admin-
istrative capacity, or to answer questions, or anything that would
come up.

Senator Kennedy. Were you involved with the projects that have
come to be known as MK ULTRA?

Dr. Lashbrook. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. You are listed as project monitor on the MK
ULTRA subproject No. 3, which involved realistic field testing of
R. & D. items of interest to the CIA.

Do you remember that project?

Dr. Lashbrook. Which one was that?

Senator Kennedy. That is New York safe house.

Dr. Lashbrook. Morgan Hall?

Senator Kennedy. New York safe house, Morgan Hall ; yes.

Ill

]

Dr. Lashbrook. Well, I may have been listed as the monitor, or
-what not for that project, but in fact I never did. My personal knowl-
edge of that particular operation was strictly secondhand.

Senator Kennedy. You were listed, but you say you had no knowl-
edge, or >ou did not have anything to do with it? ^

Dr. Lashbrook. The fact that I might have been listed now I do fi

not know— yesterday I guess, I was shown a piece of paper on which I
was listed, and this I believe was the authorization for that particular
project.

Now, my signature was on there, along with many other signatures
in the piece of paper that I saw. The fact that my signature on there
does not necessarily mean th«t I was actually the one who signed for ?i

that project, y

I could have signed off on it administratively for Dr. Gottlieb. At
the time that went through, I could have been listed as the project
officer for that project, but that could be subsequently changed. v]

Senator Kennedy. What can we gather from the fact that it says, &•

this project will involve realistic field testing of R. & D. items of
interest to the CH/TSS. During the course of research it is sometimes |

found that certain field test experiments, or tests are not suited to j

ordinary laboratory conditions. At the same time it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to conduct them with operational field tests. This ,-,

project is designed to provide facilities to fill these intermediate I

requirements, it will be conducted by Morgan Hall, and we will have ^

certain support activities.

You have signed it twice. It has your signature on it twice. |

What should we gather? J

Dr. Lashbrook. Is that the authorizing document?

Senator Kennedy. That is right. You saw this, it has those items 71

typed, and it has Robert Lashbrook, Chemical Division, approved, I

Robert Lashbrook for Sidney Gottlieb. You have two signatures on
there.

Dr. Lashbrook. Does it have other signatures? I

Senator Kennedy. Yes; it has Mr. Gibbons. '-*

Dr. Lashbrook. AH right.

As I think I was intimating a little bit before, I cannot make much ?|

sense out of what you have read. It was intimated before, I think, a y

large part of the-. documents that you have of this nature, are what we
called boilerplate j

Senator Kennedy. Excuse me? I

Dr. Lashbrook. Boilerplate. What was actually signed off on was
not the same as the actual proposal, or actual detailed project.

Senator Kennedy. How frequently do you use boilerplate? Do you \

sign off on things that are not relevant to what is really happening? m

Dr. Lashbrook. You have both. You have what you sign on, and
the actual project, side by side. Ji

Senator Kennedy. Who has got the real file? y

Dr. Lashbrook. TSS.

Senator Kennedy. Pardon?

Dr. Lashbrook. TSS.

Senator Kennedy. You mean this is not the real file. It is stamped
top secret.

Dr. Lashbrook. It is a real file. It is the one which goes through,
receives the signatures, and is then filed.

112

Senator Kennedy: It is what?

Dr. Lashbrook. It is then filed.

Senator Kennedy. It is a real file, but does not mean anything, is
that about what you are saying?

Dr. Lashbrook. It has administrative value.

Senator Kennedy. It is not telling what the story is?

Dr. Lashbrook. That is right. Not necessarily.

Senator Kennedy. Not necessarily?

Senator Schweiker. What is this, a cover file? Do we have cover
files? Is that what we are dealing with?

Dr. Lashbrook. In a sense, and in a sense it was done for security.

In other words, the files that went through the system ended up
when the Financial Section— obviously TSS lost control of those files.

Senator Schweiker. So the FBI had a "do not file" procedure de-
signed to handle this sort of thing, and the CIA has a cover file sys-
tem to handle it. In this case, though, some of the cover files contain
pretty damaging information that doesn't seem to reflect well on the
Agency's use of human subjects — I wonder what the real file contains.

Senator Kennedy. The Agency has already admitted that the
testing is going on.

Dr. Lashbrook. Correct.

Senator Kennedy. So this is accurate, they have indicated tests
are going on, and this does say the tests will be going on, and it is
approved. What is the extent of those boilerplate approvals or dis-
approvals that you make reference to? How routine is that?

Dr. Lashbrook. They are summaries. It is a summary. Maybe
that would be better.

Senator Kennedy. But is the information accurate or inaccurate?

Dr. Lashbrook. Probably it is reasonably accurate. I could not
say, you know, at this point in time. We are talking about a genera-
tion ago, so I could not say.

Senator Kennedy. Now, there is another authorized document I
think you saw yesterday, for October 1953, same project, where you
signed off on it. Is that boilerplate, too?

Dr. Lashbrook. I do not recall which one you are talking about.

Senator Kennedy. You are talking about boilerplate files that are
not revealing in terms of their substance.

Dr. Geschickter indicated that a number of the files that repre-
sented his charges and reimbursements were completely inaccurate
and distorted.

Another agent, Mr. Goldman, indicated that this was a procedure
in the Agency itself, and we have heard it again, for the third time
this morning.

It is our understanding from examination of these various files
that this is the case in terms of boilerplate continuation of various
projects, and reviewing many of these, you find almost the exact
same language 10 years in a row. Maybe one word, or a second word
is altered or changed.

Would you be surprised if that process was followed, and that
procedure was followed?
Dr. Lashbrook. Would I be surprised?
Senator Kennedy. Yes.
Dr. Lashbrook. No.

113

Senator Kennedy. Why do you say that? You have been in the m

Agency, and evidently you have seen the way they write the reports. J

Dr. Lashbrook. Well, accurate records were kept, accurate files
were maintained, yes. Now, such a thing as summaries were made, ~

they are summaries, then if you are dealing with a summary, it is 1

just that. But the paper that was just shown to me would be ^

nothing less than a summary.

I could look at that, and I could say I do not really know what fl

that paper is talking about. It does not say enough. It does not say J

much.

Senator Kennedy. It does not say much. Does not a summary sum %,

up information? What you are saying is, even though it might be ;j

labeled a summary, it is done in such a way that you do not know **

what it is really summarizing?

Dr. Lashbrook. It might be a very brief summary.

Senator Kennedy. But in terms of what you are saying here is
that you are at least familiar with the process by which information is
prepared in such a way as to not be either accurate or meaningful— — i

Dr. Lashbrook. Not to be too revealing. J

Senator Kennedy. Where does that leave us? Do we assume that
all the information related to these projects were actually destroyed,
and that what we have hero are documents with inaccurate, or J

unrevealing information? J

Dr. Lashbrook. I would not know. I am not sure what you do have.

Senator Kennedy. Did you know the substance of the field test, [|

about the testing of drugs, gadgets, on unwitting subjects in any y

safe house

Dr. Lashbrook. With Morgan Hall? ^

Senator Kennedy. Yes. |

Dr. Lashbrook. No.

Senator Kennedy. Or anyone else?

Dr. Lashbrook. Not with any detail. |

Senator Kennedy. Do you know in a summary way, in a general U

way?

Dr. Lashbrook. Secondhand, it would have to be very secondhand. pi

Senator Kennedy. Secondhand from whom? jj

Dr. Lashbrook. Various people who were involved.

Senator Kennedy. From Mr. Gottlieb? „

Dr. Lashbrook. Possibly. At this point in time I could not pin |

down who. In fact, it is very difficult for me to identify exactly what ^

I did know, or what I did not know, except that in detail I did not
know. ;|

Senator Kennedy. You were the Deputy Director of the project? |J

Dr. Lashbrook. Right.

Senator Kennedy. Did you know what was going on in the projects?

Dr. Lashbrook. Only on the broadest of details. I was not only
Deputy Chief of the Division, but my primary duty was actually as a
sort of project officer, in which I would have anywhere from 12 to, say.
20 projects of my own, which I personally was responsible for, and
almost all of these were completely outside the area that you are
interested in.

So, my own personal involvement, my own personal detailed knowl-
edge of projects with Morgan Hall was quite minimal. There might be
& time when I was

114

Senator Kennedy. What did you know. Why do you not tell us
what you knew, in general terms, from whatever sources?
^ Dr. Lashbrook. I knew that Morgan Hall set up a safe house in
New York. That the purpose was somehow or other to utilize the safe
house.

Senator Ken nedy. For what?

Dr. Lashbrook. Interrogating, or talking to his informants. He
was interested in using drugs of some type in this process. And I think
that is all I really could say specifically on what Morgan Hall had in
mind. It was mostly Morgan Hall proposing to the Agency that he do
this.

Of course, his having a safe house, getting the most information he
could from his informants

Senator Kennedy. These safe houses went on for a period of 14
years, did they not?

Dr. Lashbrook. I would not know how long.

Senator Kennedy. Well, they were in your division, you were the
Deputy Director?

Dr. Lashbrook. But I was not there 14 years.

Senator Kennedy. But, you were Deputy Chief for a period of 4
years.

Dr. Lashbrook. Perhaps. I was aware of the safe house in New
York. In fact, I visited the place oh two occasions. I was aware that
it was going to San Francisco, but the details of actually what was
being done, that I was not aware of, that I recall. I do not recall.

Senator Kennedy. You wrote the memorandum that talked about
a doorway constructed in a wall, a monitor testing surveillance equip-
ment, a window constructed in the bedroom to permit visual surveil-
lance techniques.

Dr. Lashbrook. Right.

Senator Kennedy. You wrote that memorandum. You approved
accounts for microphones, recording equipment, listening aids, and a
number of other materials in that. You wrote this other document.

Dr. Lashbrook. Right.

Senator Kennedy. You signed off on these particular reimburse-
ment justifications?

Dr. Lashbrook. Right.

Senator Kennedy. But you do not remember anything?

Dr. Lashbrook. Well, that was a generation ago, and if you had
asked me— I saw those yesterday — if you had asked me without
showing me any of those documents, I would say no, I do not remember,
because I do not recall things in that detail a generation ago.

However, the first one you referred to, I was shown this yesterday,
I read it over, and quite obviously to me it was a document prepared,
because the auditor had disallowed some of the claims that Morgan
Hall had made at the time he moved from New York. The title of it,
well, I had contacted Morgan Hall io ask him to provide further
justification for the items he disallowed.

One item Morgan Hall has been disallowed was a tip to the landlord.
I reported that Morgan Hall said that that tip to the landlord was
because he had knocked a hole in the wall, and so on.

In other words, that particular memorandum was strictly an adminis-
trative memorandum to justify, to ** tempt to help Morgan Hall
justify Ids expenditures.

115

Senator Kennedy. You were no stranger to the whole drug testing
program? fl

Dr. Lashbrook. No, sir. ;[J

Senator Kennedy. Were you not aware of the program that actually
involved Mr. Olson? ^

Dr. Lashrrook Yes. 1

Senator Kennedy. You have an awareness of drug testing in any ^

event over a period of time?

Dr. Lashbrook. Yes. *l

Senator Kennedy. Particularly in the early days? ||

Dr. Lashbrook. All I am saying is this particular operation of
Morgan Hall is one that I really — I was not very familiar with at ^

that time. What I did know at the time, 1 am sure I have forgotten ill

much of it — there were some other things that I am personally more
familiar with.

Senator Kennedy. Do you have knowledge, or has anyone ever fl

told you that prostitutes were involved in the safe-house operation ii

run by Morgan Hall?

Dr. Lashbrook. I think I recall having been told that, yes. I never fj

quite figured how they entered in this, but yes. y

Senator Kennedy. I think there arc others who have.

Dr. Lashbrook. Yes; we have heard some testimony this morning.

Senator Schweiker. Dr. Lashbrook, did experiments relating to 1

hypnosis come under your direction? ■»*

Dr. Lashbrook. 1 was familiar with some of the work that was done
on hypnosis, yes. f 1

Senator Schweiker. In a nutshell, what was the general thrust of j

those experiments? I realize drugs and hypnosis were used together
in some of them. What was the objective or purpose of that series of *■,

eight subprojects? 1

Dr. Lashbrook. There were, of course, claims, or thoughts that iiS

maybe great things could be done with hypnosis. There was very little
that could be pinned down as to what could or could not be done by 1

this technique. So the only project that I recall on this was a very i J

small project, one small project, in which we had a hynotist do some
experiments primarily to see what the limitations of hypnosis might m

be, what could or could not be done with hypnosis. ||

We are trying -to get some kind of answer as to — well, can you make
a person do something under hypnosis that he would not ordinarily rr

do against his will. i]

Senator Schweiker. Can you? ~*

Dr. Lashbrook. 1 think our conclusion was that this capability
is very limited. fl

Senator Schweiker. What about projects relating to motivational y

studies? In his August 3 testimony, CIA Director Turner listed «s
category 7, "motivation studies, studies of defectors, assessment ami p-a

training techniques". What would these 23 projects entail? ||

Dr. Lashbrook. Assessment would come mostly under psychology, '

I think you probablv covered that — it is an area that I would not
have any great familiarity with.

In other words, I could not give, in detail

Senator Schweiker. What were we looking for in studies on
defectors?

Dr. Lashbrook. I do not reallv know. I do not recall.

]

% ' ' ' 116

Senator Schweiker. You do not recall any of those projects. Did

i not any of them come under your-

1 Dr. Lashbrook. Not that I recall.

Senator Schweiker. How about training techniques?
Dr. Lashbrook. Training for what?
| Senator Schweiker. I do not know. Admiral Turner just simply

listed motivational studies, studies of defectors, assessment, and train-
,., * ing techniques — 23 subprojects in all — as part of MK- ULTRA.

Dr. Lashbrook. That sounds like something that would come more
under the category of psychology.

Senator Schweiker. Training for what?

Dr. Lashbrook. That is what I wonder. I do not know. I do not
know of any good answer to that question.
Senator Schweiker. Was Executive action in this category at all?
Dr. Lashbrook. Executive action?

That term, I think, would perhaps have been covered pretty well
in the previous testimony — —

Senator Schweiker. I know it was covered rather thoroughly when
our former Intelligence Committee looked into it, but my question

here is, did any training for

Dr. Lashbrook. Training?
I Senator Schweiker. Training for Executive action, was that

included in any of these motivational studies?

Dr. Lashbrook. Not that I am aware of. Not that I can recall, no.

Senator Schweiker. So that the Executive action concept, political

assassination, was not in any way involved in motivational training

studies under any of these categories in MK- ULTRA, is that what

you are saying? That is a pretty categorical statement.

Dr. Lashbrook. OK. Repeat the question.

Senator Schweiker. We know what our Intelligence Cornmittee
found that Executive action was, assassination of foreign political
leaders.

Dr. Lashbrook. Maybe I should have asked you to define the

meaning of that term.

Senator Schweiker. Now, some studies under MK-ULTRA were

K'l motivational studies, including assessment and training techniques.

ig| My question to you is, did any of the 23 subprojects Bsted in that

category by the Director involve anything related to motivation

, for Executive action?

Dr. Lashbrook. By Executive action, you mean assassination

Senator Schweiker. Assassination, plots against political leaders.
Dr. Lashbrook. OK. No, none that I am aware of.
j Senator Schweiker. None that you are aware of?

'M Dr. Lashbrook. I am not aware of any.

Senator Schweiker. Are you aware of all the 23 subprojects cate-
gorized in Admiral Turner's statement?
] Dr. Lashbrook. I doubt it. I have not run through all 23 of them.

Senator Schweiker. So you are not excluding the possibility?
You are just saying that, as far as you are aware, none of the sub-
projects related to this?
^ Dr. Lashbrook. Right.

Senator Schweiker. All right. That is all.

Senator Kennedy. Mr. Siragusa, what agency of the Federal
Government do you work for and what position did you hold?

117

Mr. Siragusa. I was with Immigration and Naturalization Service ™

for 4 years as a clerk-stenographer, with the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics I

from 1935 to 1963. J

Senator Kennedy. Then you retired in 1963?

Mr. Siragusa. 1963, I retired.

Senator Kennedy. You were Assistant Deputy Commissioner of
the Bureau of Narcotics?

Mr. Siragusa. Later I was Deputy Commissioner.

Senator Kennedy. Deputy Commissioner.

Could you tell us who Cal Salerno was?

Mr. Siragusa. That was my cover name.

Senator Kennedy. Salerno was an alias for you, and you became
an agent for CIA, did you not?

Mr. Siragupa. I was not an agent for CIA. I was liaison with
CIA. I never worked for them.

Senator Kennedy. You were liaison?

Mr. Siragusa. Liaison, in my capacity with the Bureau of
Narcotics.

Senator Kennedy. Who gave you Cal Salerno?

Mr. Siragusa. I had used the name Cal Salerno years before, from
1950 to 1958 when I worked overseas for the Bureau of Narcotics. I
pioneered their foreign operations. At that time I did undercover work,
and I used the name of Cal Salerno. I just carried on with that name
later on.

Senator Kennedy. OK.

Could you tell us what you had to do with the safe house in New
York?

Mr. Siragusa. Along about 1959, which was a year after I returned
to Washington from Europe, among my many other duties in the
Bureau, I was appointed unofficially as liaison with CIA. I was also
liaison with the Hill in various other capacities.

Mr. An&linger one day introduced me to Dr. Ray Treichler of the
CIA, a very brief introduction, a very brief conversation. I was asked
by Mr. Anslinger to take Dr. Treichler back to my own office. Dr.
Treichler gave us the idea of setting up the operational apartment.

Senator Kennedy. The CIA gave you the idea, is that right?

Mr. Siragusa. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. What happened?

Mr. Siragusa. We set up this apartment on 13th Street off of
Sixth Avenue, and the understanding was that we were to use this
apartment for our own purposes. That is, my office in New York
City would use the apartment to interview informants, to debrief
informants, to work undercover operations.

Then whenever the CIA wished to use the apartment itself, they
would notify us to stay away from the apartment. Dr. Treichler was
my contact man. He also furnished me with the money. We had an
unfurnished apartment. He gave us the money with which to buy
the furniture.

Senator Kennedy. Did you ever have any idea of what was going
on in the safe houses?

Mr. Siragusa. No; I know it was being used for some intelligence
purposes. One of my first guesses was perhaps it was being used to
uncover defectors in their own organization.

118

If you are asking me if I ever knew or suspected it was being used
for drug testing purposes, my answer would-be no, I never knew that.
In fact, had I known that, had I even suspected that, t would have
disassociated myself with that operation.
Senator Kennedy. Why would you have?

Mr. Siragtjsa. I was surprised to learn from news account about
2 years ago that the CIA was testing drugs on unsuspecting witnesses;
that is contrary to my personal beliefs.

Senator Kennedy. Did they ask you to set up a safe house in
Chicago?

Mr. Siragtjsa. No, sir, I do not recall that. I was asked that by one
of your investigators. I do not recall they ever asked me.

In 1963, when I retired from the Bureau of Narcotics, I did so for
the purpose of assuming a position of Executive Director of the
Illinois Crime Investigating Commission in Chicago, which later
became known as the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission.
I do not recall that Dr. Treichler or anyone else ever suggested that
we set up an apartment in Chicago. Had the suggestion been made to
me, I would have automatically turned it down because I had all I
could do to handle my new duties in Chicago.
Senator Kennedy. They never contacted you in Chicago?
Mr. Sikagtjsa. Dr. Treichler visited Chicago. In fact, after he left
the CIA, he took a position with a chemical manufacturing company
in Chicago, and several times he contacted me in Chicago. They
were social visits.

Senator Kennedy. Nothing to do with the agency?
Mr. Sikagtjsa. No, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Why would a high ranking official of the Bureau
of Narcotics be willing to play the role of administrative agent, paying
rent and keeping the Facility, and having no substantive contact what-
ever with the idea of the project and knowledge of how that project
was carried out?

Mr. Siragtjsa. My contact with the CIA was rather remote. The
operation of the apartment was under the control of the District
Supervisor in New York City. He handled all of that. I remained in
Washington. I had very little to do with the day-to-day function of
that apartment.

Senator Kennedy. In the record of the MK-ULTRA Subproject
132, this is March 1964, it states the following:

This project is conducted by Mr. Cal Salerno. Mr. Salerno, a public relations
consultant, has recently moved his offices from New York City to Chicago, 111.
Air. Salerno holds a top secret agency clearance and is completely witting of the
aims and goals of the project. He possesses unique facilities and personal abilities
which have made him invaluable to this kind of operation.

Mr. Siragtjsa. There has been some poetic license taken with the
truth. I left the Bureau of Narcotics in November 1963. I only just
learned that the name of Cal Salerno was adopted by others that
succeeded me. I had nothing to do with CIA during the period of time
that I was in Chicago.

Senator Kennedy. Well, the description of you then is completely
inaccurate as being-

Mr. Siragusa. Yes. I was not a consultant for the CIA. I never
had any official capacity with CIA in any way whatsoever.

119

' ' I

Senator Kennedy, lou were not, would you say, completely
witting from the aims and goals of the project? fi

Mr. Siragusa. I knew nothing about the project. j

Senator Kennedy. Then this report is inaccurate?

Mr. Siragusa. It is. .

Senator Kennedy. We have heard from others — as a matter of
fact, from each witness here, how the memoranda have been in-
accurate. I am j ust trying to find out what the situation is.

Do you have any idea why they were trying to put the monkey %

on your back? ||

Mr. Siragusa. I do not know that they particularly put the monkey
on my back. Because in Washington in my era from 1958 to 1963, the ^

entire bureaucracy of the Bureau of Narcotics, consisted of folir fj

men. I was one of them, and which bureaucracy has how been re- *"

placed by some 200 men. This is by way of explaining the fact that I
had many duties that I had to assume without benefit of any official %

appointments. I was liaison with the media, with CIA, with con- m

gressional committees, with individual Congressmen. I had all to do
just to keep my sanity. f|

Senator Kennedy. But in the CIA files they have, the memoranda ;i|
that you were completely witting, knowledgeable about these pro-
grams, the aims and goals

Mr. Siragusa. That is not so. That is entirely inaccurate. It is Jl

untrue. &J

Senator Kennedy. Mr. Belk, what agency of the Government were
you with? Where were you stationed? "I

Mr. Belk. I was with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics started ij

Avith that agency in 1948. I assumed the position of Supervisor in
New York City office in April 1963. Prior to going to New York, <~«

in the early part of April 1963, I had a meeting with Commissioner J

Giradono at that time, and he informed me I was going to New ^

York as Supervisor in Charge. And during that conversation he alluded
to the fact that the agency, that is the Bureau, had an apartment
they were responsible for in New York. It was national security
endeavor in collaboration with the CIA, and that he would wish me
to continue that project. And that there was an agent in the New
York office at that time, a man by the name of John Tagley, who was ||

familiar with it and could give me much of the detail.

When I arrived in New York City, I took over the office from Mr.
John Enright, who I believe was aware of the fact that the apartment tl

existed. *i

I certainly got a briefing from Mr. Tagley on where the place was
and what it did look like. I was told we can use the apartment for fl

operations, and that when the CIA was going to use the place, that we y|

would be notified in advance that they were, and that we would stay
off the premises. F »

Senator Kennedy. What knowledge did you have about what was ||

going on inside the safehouse?

Mr. Belk. In terms of the CIA using the safehouse?

Senator Kennedy. Yes. f\

Mr. Belk. I had no knowledge at all of what they were doing there. d

I know we used it on a couple of small operations. In fact, as I recall,
in 1964 I recommended to the Commissioner that we close the place { I

3sita

120

and get out because I did not think the cost of it was justified, what
we, that is the Bureau, was getting out of it.

Senator Kennedy. Did you have any qualms about paying all the
bills for a project you knew nothing about?

Mr. Belk. No. It was an assignment. It was a national security
thing. We were helping another agency and paying bills.

But in terms of the Bureau's use of that place, I did not think it
was justified. I did not know what they were doing there and how
frequently they used it, and I wanted to get out from under it.

Senator Kennedy. Your original work for the agency, Mr. Belk,
was part of MK-ULTRA, is that right?

Mr. Belk. I did not even know what that was. Never heard of it
before until the last couple of days.

Senator Kennedy. We have documents, memoranda from the
agency itself that have references to your involvement, not dissimilar
to the kind of characterization of Mr. Siragusa's involvement. But I
understand from what you said here that you would deny that cate-
gorically, is that correct?

Mr. Belk. I would do stronger than that. It is a lie.

Senator Kennedy. OK.

Mr. Feldman, we are going to recess the hearing until tomorrow
and hear your testimony. We are going to have to start at 8 o'clock
tomorrow morning to accommodate Admiral Turner.

I want to thank all of you — Mr. Belk and Mr. Siragusa particularly.
I think we are very mindful of the very extraordinary work that you
have been involved in for the Bureau. I just want you to have a very
clear understanding that my interest in this is how the Agency has
used different agencies and, in many instances without the knowledge
of those people being used. We have seen it in the National Institutes
of Health, and we saw reference to it in terms of IRS, and it has
absolutely no reflection, of what I understand from my reading of
your records in the Bureau of Narcotics, on your very commendable
careers.

I want you to understand that, and what the purpose of this partic-
ular area of inquiry is, because this involves your career people, and
I know that your career means a lot and that your service means a jot,
and there should not be anything that reflects on that contribution.

So, thank you very much.

We will resume at 8 o'clock with Admiral Turner in room 2228.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to recon-
vene at 8 a.m., Wednesday, September 21, 1977.]

HUMAN DRUG TESTING BY THE CIA, 1977 |

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1977 fj

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research ||

of the Committee on Human Resources, fj

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:05 a.m., in room n

2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy jj

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kennedy, Schweiker, and Chafee.

Senator Kennedy. We will come to order. We welcome as our first !|

witness this morning Admiral Turner, who is the Director of the **

Central Intelligence Agency, and his associates. We appreciate his
presence here today to respond to the committee's areas of concern, fg

and I might just, at the outset, mention the particular areas that we ||

are concerned with.

We have received additional materials from the Agency since our ^

last hearing, and we want to know what the process was for finding ff

those. It seems that it is a never-ending process of finding new material . & *

We heard a great deal yesterday from a number of the former agents
of the Agency that questioned the accuracy of documents and !|

memoranda within the Agency. They talked about two sets of files. (I

They talked about boilerplate language; summaries that were not
revealing, except with those that had some very special insight. We t|

want to hear from the Director about that observation that was ;|

made by a number of the former agents. "

We want to hear about the appropriateness of the relationship
between the Central Intelligence Agency and the other agencies of If

Government, as well as private institutions; what does the Director SI

believe is the appropriate relationship between the Agency and uni-
versities, and what is the appropriate relationship between the fl
Agency and other agencies — the Bureau of Narcotics, the NIH, the |j
IRS, and others — and how will that be developed, how it is viewed at
the present time, and what comment the Director might say about ™
that, in terms of the past. ;|

I am absolutely convinced that if we had those materials, that were ^

in existence in 1975, which were referred to within the Agency in
this whole area of experimentation, this committee, as far as our
interest, would have wound up its area of inquiry a long time ago.

And I suppose the most important area that we are interested in
hearing from the Director, is the disparity of responsibility between
the Agency and the Department of Defense; the areas of MKSEARCH
and MKULTRA, and MKCHICKWIT. We know that aspects of
the behavioral research started in the early 1950's and continued,
to one extent or another, through 1973.

(121)

Vr\

122

The various projects were turned on and turned off in a never-,
ending web, at least for that 20-year period of time, especially the
most recent ones from the late 1960's to the early 1970's, the follow-
ups, in MKSEARCH, in MKULTRA, and in MKCHICKWIT.

In the course of our hearing, we asked the Director, specifically —
and I am reading from the record — in a question by myself: "In the
followups, in the Mksearch, and the Mkultra, and Mkchickwit, could
you give us, also, a report on those particular programs?" Admiral/
Turner said, "Yes, sir."

"Did they involve experimentation?" The Admiral indicated, "No,
sir." Senator Kennedy: "None of them?" And then, Admiral Turner
said. "Let me say this: That these programs are code names for the
CIA participation in what was basically a Department of Defense
program."

So, we inquired from the Department of Defense about their
knowledge and understanting of these programs, and for a complete
report. Last evening, we received the correspondence from the General
Counsel's Office from the Department of Defense, and we will make
the letter a part of the record.

[The information refered to may be found on p. 157.]

Senator Kennedy. In the letter — and I will read just the relevant
parts:

I have enclosed a copy of memoranda and copies of the documents retrieved by
the DOD. It appears from the available documents that the projects Mksearch,
Mkorphan, and Mkchickwit were directed, controlled, funded by the Central
Intelligence Agency, and much of the participation of the military departments
was solely as a conduit of funds from the Central Intelligence Agency to outside
contractors.

And then, in the operative memoranda for the Secretary of Defense,
prepared within DOD, on page 2, it continues:

It appears from the document that these three code word projects of the Central
Intelligence Agency, identified by the Director in his testimony as basically
Department of Defense projects, were, in fact, planned, directed, and controlled
by the Central intelligence Agency,

and then it continues:

Each of the projects are described below.

So, what we have is, in the followup programs that took place over
the period of years that brought us into the more recent period, from
1973, we have the real questions of accountability, and who is direct-
ing, who has control, who has review responsibility, and what kind of
oversight is being exercised on this particular program. Then, we
have both the apparent and direct conflict from the two agencies that
were involved in this program as to the responsible agency. We are
looking forward to clearing that particular issue up this morning.

And to do that, having the testimony of the Director on these areas
will obviously be extremely important and will be extremely helpful.
We hope that we can resolve those particular questions with a degree
of finality today, so that we may go back to our other legislative
responsibilities.

Finally, I would just like to say, after we hear from Admiral Turner,
our next witness, Dr. Gottlieb, who, at the request of Dr. Gottlieb and
his attorney, for medical reasons, has requested that he be permitted
to testify in a less crowded room. His testimony will obviously be made
public and will be piped live into this room. He has a medical condition

123

which we have verified, independently, and we will follow that
procedure. It is an unusual request, but obviously we are interested in
getting his testimony, and we are also interested in his well-being and
his health. So, we will have the meeting in the next room with him,
and it will be piped live in here after Admiral Turner.

Senator Chafee. I would just like to say, Mr. Chairman, that I,
personally, want to extend our thanks, and I believe I speak for the
committee, to Admiral Turner for all he has done in digging out this
material. I am on another committee where Admiral Turner often
appears before us, and I think it is marvelous the way Admiral Turner
is able to appear at different committees. I hope some time is left over
for him to run the Agency, because the demands of the Congress upon
his time are certainly strenuous.

And, of course, as you all know, the matters we are investigating
happened long before his watch. We are digging up material about
activities that took place many years ago and, Mr. Chairman, I think
you agree with me that we have to get on with it and get these hearings
completed so Admiral Turner can devote his time to matters of
pressing importance to this country at this point.

Senator Kennedy. Fine. Well, as the Senator from Rhode Island
understands, the last human testing that took place was in 1973. So,
it was over a 21-year period, and I do not know how many times we
have been told that the variour- programs were turned off, just to
spring up again. We are told that in the most recent tests by the
Agency, itself, that they were conducted by DOD; and DOD, in their
testimony here today, spy that the tests were conducted by the
Agency.

I am very hopeful that we can resolve these questions. I think that
the extraordinary fact is that these matters have come to light. In no
other country would they have come to light. And I do not question
that there are many other things that have been done in other nations
that never would be known, but we do know, and we are interested
in the protection of human subjects. We have every intention, to the
extent that we can from a legislative point of view, to support what
is the statement of Admiral Turner, and that is that he is committed
to the protection of these human subjects. He has commented, on and
testified to that in the past.

Admiral Turner, we would be glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF ADM. STANSFEELD TURNER, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY HARRY E. GORDON,
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; RAY REARDON, OF-
FICE OF SECURITY; FRANK LAUBLNGER, OFFICE OF TECHNICAL
SERVICES; ALAN BRODY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL; AND
LYLE L. MILLER, ACTING LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Admiral Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Chafee, for your remarks I appreciate the fact that both the chairman
and Senator Chafee have reminded us that the activities about which
we are talking today are part of the history, not the current activities,
of the CIA.

124

And if I might make one point, while there may have been drug
testing as late as 1973, we have no evidence of unwitting testing of
drugs on human beings past the period of about 1964. So, this is a
historical matter, and as I have said to you before, Mr. Chairman, we
are not doing this kind of thing, in terms of unwitting testing on
human beings with drugs, at this time, and I will get into that in more
detail in a moment.

I would like to preface my remarks, also, by saying that I feel it is
very unfortunate that some of the media and other sources have drawn
the inference from the testimony in the recent days that there may
have been deliberate withholding of material by the CIA, either in
1975 or as recently as July and August of this year, and I categorically
deny that for this year, because I was here and I know that it did not
happen. I have no reason to believe that it happened in 1975, and T
would point out that we volunteered the information in July of 1977.
If it had been deliberately withheld, I suppose it would have continued
to have been withheld.

We did discover more material in August, after our initial voluntary
revelations in July and, clearly, we did that voluntarily, also, not
because we were withholding it in July and suddenly decided to release
it in August. I pledge to you that I have made every effort, and my
staff has, too, to be as forthcoming with you and your staff as possible
here in providing information.

Rather than read a prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, let me just
address your four points of concern and move on with them as quickly
as I can. How have we come to this process of finding the additional
materials? Well, we came because on the 3d of August, you asked me,
and I promised, to find and furnish any materials we had on
MKSEARCH and on OFTEN /CHICK WIT, as well as providing vou
some additional details on safehouses in San Francisco and New York
that were engaged in MKULTRA, which was the subject of our pre-
vious testimony on the 3d of August.

We provided the information on the 1st of September about
MKULTRA. Immediately upon returning from the previous testi-
mony, we started reviewing what limited material we had on MK
SEARCH, and trying to see where there might be more. If you will
recall, the ULTRA documents were found in our archives, located
outside of Washington, D.C. However, we had checked previously
and found that there were no MKSEARCH materials in those archives
under the financial filings, which is there we found the MKULTRA
material.

The gentleman on my left, who had found the MKULTRA mate-
rials, then did a very diligent job of Sherlock Holmesing and said to
himself:

If they were found under financial filings in the archives, perhaps T should
check all the financial holdings of that area of the Agency in our Langley head-
quarters.

He did so. and on August 15, came up with additional materials
on MKSEARCH, as well as 12 extra files on research grants, which
are not technically part of MKSEARCH, but related to it.

Mr. Chairman, the process of finding materials that are ferretted
away in these files at the headquarters, in these files at the archives;,
is not easy, and there is no way I can look you in the eye today ami
say there will not be some more turn up this afternoon. I can only

125 fj

assure you we have nothing more on these subjects known to us at
this time, and I am pleased at the diligence of our people in looking ;p»

and I am pleased that each time something does turn up, it immedi- j

ately comes fonvard and we make it known to you.

Next, you asked about the accuracy in some of the allegations

Senator Kennedy. Maybe I could just refer to this in greater f|

detail. Our committee began its inquiry in 1975. It is apparent from jj

some of the documents released to us last week, that documents were
available that could have been helpful to us in 1975. One of the |»

documents was made available to the Church committee at that J

time, but not to our committee until recently, and I am referring to
the memoranda for the IG on Subproject 3 of MKULTRA, dated
February 10, 1954, which describes the project involving the testing
of drugs on unwitting persons, the use of electronic and photographic
equipment, the liaison .with a narcotics agent by the name of Morgan
Hall; the names of the drugs he administered. The last list of four
drugs would have been useful in 1975.

In the material provided several weeks ago, we noticed a buck
slip that was found in 1975, and it was handwritten in 1975, and it says,

The attached package should be of interest to vou in connection with the
relations with BNDD regarding arrangements on East and West Coasts; see,
particularly, the January 30, 1967, Gottlieb memo.

So, this was obviously obtained in preparation for our hearing in
1975. There was a Gottlieb memorandum which still was not included
in the package given to us. We certainly did not have it back in 1975, •
and there were other memos from August 25, 1975, indicating that
there had been inquiries concerning possible employment of Ira
Feldman, and these documents were not provided prior to the
August 3 hearing, when we were trying to put the maximum light
on these subjects.

So, I want to be very specific. We have mentioned these to your
staff in preparation for these hearings, so that you would be aware
of the program. But, those were the references. I am convinced that
with regards to the memorandum from Gottlieb, that with that
information, we could have had all of this really behind us and we
would not have to be back here, in terms of our particular interest;
With what we are interested in, I am satisfied, but those were the
documents that we referred to in my opening.

I think the areas in which we would be most interested, Admiral—
and we will include your statement, obviously, entirely into the rec-
ord — I think is this basic kind of conflict. I wonder if you could
address it. You indicated from your testimony here, that the follow-
on programs — I mean, we are talking about the early history, which
was on unwitting; the later history, was on witting subject. We are
obviously concerned about that, as well, in terms of the kind of infor-
mation that is available to agents in order to make an informed judg-
ment and decision about various kinds of testing.

That is, obviously, of great concern. We have seen in the past
where even witting subjects were not given the full kind of informa-
tion needed in order to make an informed judgment.

Now, that particular document— I am sure you are familiar with
it now — where you indicated that those studies, or those tests, or
those projects were being done by DOD, and DOD's response, was
that they were being done by the Intelligence Agency — and this was

126

as of last evening. I mean, this is your Agency and DOD reviewing
the same kinds of material, and each saying that the other had respon-
sibility on it, and what we are trying to do is to put it to rest, so we
know who had the responsibility, who had the authority, and I am
wondering if you can help us on that.

Admiral Turner. My agency has full responsibility for MK-
SEARCH, OFTEN, and CHICKWIT, and I do not believe there is
a conflict between us and the Department of Defense, and I do not
even believe there is between my statement on the 3rd of August, but
on the 3rd of August, I was here to testify on MKULTRA. I knew
very little about MKSEARCH, and the Department of Defense,
I think, at that time knew less, because these documents are incom-
plete and none of us had been reviewing them at that point.

I find myself in no conflict with them at this time. MESEARCH
and OFTEN/CH1CKWIT were CIA projects. They were part of a
larger envelope which included a Department of Defense program,
but not Department of Defense responsibility for those particular
subcomponents. A part of the activities of some of those components
was funded through Department of Defense agencies, and, most
specifically, the Edge wood Arsenal.

I take full responsibility for anything done in SEARCH, OFTEN/
CHICKWIT.

Senator Kennedy. Was experimentation on human subjects part
of that program?

In your testimony, just earlier, there was, obviously, the CIA
participation in what was basically a DOD program, and the DOD
indicated that it was your program and you are taking responsibility
for that this morning. The other question is, did they involve experi-
mentation in human experimentation, and your response to that was,
"No, sir," and they did. They did involve human experimentation.

Admiral Turner. I have two experts on my left; one on OFTEN/
CHICKWIT, one on SEARCH. Ed Gordon, would you talk about
human

Senator Kennedy. Would you just identify yourself, please?

Mr. Gordon. I am Ed Gordon. I will address the OFTEN/CHICK-
WIT. CHICKWIT was, as stated in some of the material you have,
a program to get foreign drugs, information on foreign pharmaceu-
ticals, developments in Europe and the Far East. There was no testing
scheduled, and our records indicate that there never was any testing
of any kind under project CHICKWIT.

I would like to point out that CHICKWIT does not have the "MK."
There has been a misunderstanding. So, it is just plain CHICKWIT.

Senator Kennedy. It does not surprise me, because when we
tried to find out about MKULTRA, it was very clear what our
interests were; it was and is on human experimentation, and, obviously,
on unwitting experimentation. These are our interests. We made all
the requests on MKULTRA and got a response that this was the end
of project MKULTRA. Then we found that theprojects have changed,
in names, to either MKSEARCH or MKOFTEN, or that the code
name has been dropped on it. We had difficulty in getting information,
because we did not make the exact kinds of requests for the infor-
mation on these projects since then- code names were changed. So
you see our difficulty.

127

The Director responded that there was no human experimentation
in those programs. Now, I understand that there was human experi-
mentation in MKOFTEN.

Mr. Gobdon. In project OFTEN, Senator, there was human test-
ing involved. To the best of our knowledge, that was part of an on-
going DOD program. We identified a single compound which We were
interested in as a defensive mechanism, because we knew that foreign
intelligence people were using it.

We believe, from the evidence We have, that though the testing
was fully intended on that compound, that the project was stopped
in January of 1973, before any human testing for Agency was con-
ducted.

Senator Kennedy. I see. So, your point is that they intended to
test it on humans, but actually they ceased it before it was tested?

Mr. Gordon. Yes, sir. ™

Senator Kennedy. Well, the log of the tests here have June 1973, ||

a period of four tests; two tests, two people each. Are you familiar
with those?

Mr. Gordon. Senator, I am familiar, in that the Defense Depart- J

ment, in telling us the things that they had found out, said that there li

were two tests in June of 1973 on two military volunteers, and in the
draft that I received on that, it said that it was wholly sponsored =j

and funded by Army research and development. We have no results. :]

Senator Kennedy. Yes, but you just said there was not human
testing, before, as I understood the ^

Mr. Gordon. Sir, I said under Agency sponsorship. I

Senator Kennedy. Oh, under Agency. Tne thing I am confused *

about is that we have the records of testing of those four; two tests
of two individuals each. You say that there was not any testing, as f|

far as the Agency is concerned. The Admiral assumed complete J

responsibility for the totality of these programs, just 4 minutes ago.

And, now, we have the DOD statement— their comments — saying ?»

that these matters were directed, controlled, and funded by the j

Intelligence Agency, and that they were the conduit of funds. Now,
I am just trying to piece it together here. m

Mr. Gordon. Sir, I can understand the confusion. I can only ]

again say that I was aware of only one of those tests in June of 1973
that I was given to understand were two, and that they were done
by the Department of Defense under Army's research and develop-
ment. As such, they would not have been part of the Agency's pro-
ject OFTEN.

Senator Kennedy. Now, in one of the CIA documents on drug -»

research you indicate Agency support for the clinical testing and 1

collection of information on, and samples of, foreign drug develop-
ments, which terminated in January. Because of prolonged after-
effects, additional charges to the contract were made after this date 1
for the necessary post-test follow-up observation and examinations IJ
of the volunteer.
Mr. Gordon. Yes, sir. r l
Senator Kennedy. There is a volunteer. [J
Mr. Gordon. I acknowledge there is conflict, but I cannot explain
that. We have nothing in our records that indicates that there was ; ,
the kind of testing that we were interested in, or CIA-sponsored |J

128

testing. We do know that there had been testing on this particular
compound prior to Agency's saving, "Can you test it for us in this
fashion?" We asked for a specific kind of application.

Senator Kennedy. Well, this is your document, not DOD's docu-
ment.

Mr. Gordon. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. It talks about a follow-up on the volunteer,
and your testimony is that there was no human testing?

Mr. Gordon. We have nothing beyond that information.

Senator Kennedy. And, yet, the documents that were provided
for us, against some background yesterday, where we heard from other
agents who talked about the value of the files that are kept by the
Agency, seems to indicate otherwise. I mean, if you are confused,
you can imagine how we are on this.

Mr. Gordon. Yes, sir, I certainly can.

Admiral Turner. May I interrupt, sir?

Senator Kennedy. Yes.

Admirel Turner. I want to make it perfectly clear, Senator Ken-
nedy, we are not professing to tell you the complete story of these
activities. We are professing to tell you the complete story that we
know. These records that we have uncovered are financial records.
They do not tell the story; they tell pieces of it.

Senator Kennedy. The thing, though, Admiral Turner, having
tracked this the best that we could from the origins of the program,
we are now up to 1973. There are people around who were involved
in that program. In dealing with the early part of the 1950's, it is a
little more difficult because the people who were involved in those
programs are deceased, and we can understand that.

But, now, we are talking about the people who were involved in it
in 1973 and we have direct conflicting testimony on the nature of this
program, both from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Depart-
ment of Defense. Now, is that not the case in terms of the material
that we showed you in preparation for this hearing? The Department
of Defense is in basic conflict with what you are telling us, in terms
of the nature of the program? And we have just seen an example of
that, in terms of my questions here.

Now, do you understand that; that there is a dilemma that we are
confronted with at the present time?

Admiral Turner. I do not sense a great sense of conflict between
us and the Department of Defense.

Senator Kennedy. Well, will you explain for me, then, why, in
your testimony, you tell us that you have full responsibility for that,
and Mr. Gordon says that there was no human testing, and then in
the file here, it shows that there were four testings, and we will give
you the dates on those programs?

Admiral Turner. It is my understanding that is done under the
Army program, not under the CIA program.

Senator Kennedy. And the Army says, specifically, "The projects
the Director defines in his testimony as basically Department of
Defense projects, were, in fact, planned, directed, and controlled by
the Central Intelligence Agency." Now, that is from the DOD; we
got it last night; directed control, and that the military departments
were solely a conduit of funds from the CIA to outside contractors.

129 3

Now, that is 1973. That is just a few years ago, and that is why we fl

have difficulty on it, and I imagine you have difficulty, too. ,j

Admiral Turner. I have great difficulty. I am happy to ask the

General Counsel of the Department of Defense, who is in the room, ft

to come up and help us clarify this thing. I am not trying to hide j

anything. If there is confusion here — I do not understand it that way. •=•■
I do not understand this statement; I have never seen it or heard it

before you read it. f|

So, if she would like to come up, we will try to straighten it out y[
between the two of us.

Senator Kennedy. Well, I do hot want to take away from your f»

time. Does the Counsel just want to make a reference to that at this J
time, or if you want to be more elaborate on this, we will give you a
chance.

Ms. Siemer. Well, we will appear before you later on this morning, f|

Senator. We do not know any more about it than the admiral does. si
We have the same records, and we come to a different conclusion.

Our conclusion is that the testing that was done was part of a project "Fi

that was tested by the Agency. We have no additional documents and ||
no additional records, other than those that are available.

Senator Kennedy. Then, we will wait. As I understand, you have ™

the same documents as the Agency has and you both reached different 1

conclusions, in terms of responsibility. ' " % ^

Ms. Siemer. We have provided our documents to Admiral Turner*

I apologize over the fact that they were not provided to him until 2 ||

days ago, and he has not had an opportunity to look at those and ;j
try to analyze them. That is my fault, because it took us a long time

to get them out of our files. rs

Senator Kennedy. Well, we will hear from you later on. But, the 1
problem, as we see it, is in this follow-on testing, and over the course
of our investigations, we see the various kinds of drug testing assuming

different names; it is the MKULTRA, MKSEARCH, MKCHICK- fl

WIT, MKOFTEN. Whether they have "MK" before them or not, £1
there is a continuing program for a period of some 21 years, up to

1973, with unwitting and, then, witting subjects. fl

The matter that we are obviously concerned with is the issue of ||
accountability; people wonder how these programs go on and con-
tinue. You are not going to be able to halt a program, or review it, 5 -
or protect the people who are involved in it unless we know who is^in 1
charge. We have direct, conflicting testimony from the two agencies ^
of Government that have responsibility in this area, that is the Agency
and the Department of Defense, and that is where we are at. ||

Admiral Turner. Well, we are happy to try to sort it out. I have H
just been handed what I am told is the DOD document that you are

referring to, and in tab G, last page, there is a statement which— ?*

and this is a DOD document, not mine— it says: |

In June, 1973, two military volunteer? were tested at Earle — that is an army
depot — with EA-3167, but these tests were funded by army RDCE funds, and
they are not connected in any way with the CIA project. j

I do believe I am responsible for OFTEN/CHICKWIT. I do believe J

that we funded some things through the Army under OFTEN/
CHICKWIT, and that the Army did other projects which were not
part of OFTEN/CHICKWIT, but were in the same area and related

130

to it, and that this testing of human volunteers was in that latter
category of an Army project closely related to OFTEN/CHICKWIT.

Senator Kennedy. Well, we will move on from this. I will yield to
Senator Schweiker on it, but we will try and get the staffs of your
department and DOD with the same material, since we all agree that
we have got the same documents, so that we can at least get a reso-
lution about it. I think that is going to be important. §

We have the remaining areas, which we are going to review with
Admiral Turner, but Senator Schweiker has an area now. j

Senator Schweiker. Well, I have another example the same exact
sort of conflict between your CIA testimony at the last hearing and *

the information we now have, Admiral. I want to preface my remarks
by saying I commend you f c? releasing the initial documents. I know
it was not an easy thing to do; and I know from having served on the

former Intelligence Committee, that that committee could not even * |

get the information at all. So, I think you have to be given credit for I

providing us with the documents.

But, I want to bring up another instance of the same type of conflict
that Senator Kennedy just brought up with regard to other projects.
When I questioned you last time you were here, I asked you about
subproject 54 on brain concussion. One of your aides gave a brief reply,
and you promised to find out what you could about it and supply it
to us. |

We have not had too much success in getting any additional infor-
mation, except, I think, at the last minute, we were told the CIA
really did not have control of this project: It was handled by the
Office of Naval Research; it was basically their project. The CIA
phased it out.

Well, here we have, again, in the Defense Department's, testimony,
dated September 20th, what appears to be a contradiction. Here is
what DOD says about it:

This project began in October, 1954 and was terminated, at least with respect
to the Navy, in December, 1955. It was performed by a contractor located in

California. The involvement of the Navy was primarily as a conduit of funds |

from the Central Intelligence Agency to the contractor. A small amount of Navy f

funds may also have been used for this contract. In December, 1955, this project ■

was terminated as far as the Navy involvement was concerned, and it thereafter, j-

apparently became subproject 54 in the MKULTRA project. |

We are faced with a real dilemma in pinpointing responsibility and
authority as to what happened. Here is another classic example where,
initially, you folks said, no; it was funded and run by the Office of
Naval Research; it was their project. That was the only information

you could supply to us about the project. Now, the Defense Depart- " j

mentis saying just the opposite. ;

How do we pinpoint accountability and responsibility? How can
we tell who was in charge?

Mr. Laubinger. Senator, I would like to make a few comments to
that, since I answered your question before on 54. We furnished the
committee with all the project folders on MKULTRA, including 54,
complete.

Senator Schweiker. I want to compliment 3 r ou for that. I think
it was critical to our attempts to sort out what went on in the
MKULTRA projects, I think we should compliment you for doing
that.

131

Senator Kennedy. Would you identify yourself , please?

Mr. Laubinger. I beg your pardon, Senator. I am Frank Laubinger
with the Office of Technical Service, which was formally TSD, Tech-
nical Services Division. I testified before with the Admiral on
MKULTRA.

On project 54, it has got a rather sensational proposal in there, in
terms of the work that they propose to do, and you asked about the
proposal and I said, in fact, it was never funded under MKULTRA.
Now, I overlooked — at least, my memory did not serve me correctly
when I went through that file folder to see one memorandum dated
January 10, 1956, which makes it quite clear, as a matter of fact, that
that proposal was based on prior work that was funded by the Agency.

Senator Schweiker. By whom?

Mr. Laubinger. By the CIA. So, that information was in their file ™ \

folder. It did not happen to be in my head when I testified. |

Senator Schweiker. I think I might have read part of that memo ^ \

to you at the last hearing. That is why I argued with you at the time,
because I think I had documents in front of me, as I recall, which I

clearly indicated CIA involvement. I did read that to you. You did J

supply the documents to us. There is no argument about that in-
formation, but you seemed to be denying what appeared clear from -j
the documents and persisted in denying it until this morning. J

Mr. Laubinger. Perhaps I am sort of headstrong, myself, and in
my own view, I am reading under the ULTRA project/that if it had
been funded under ULTRA, it would have had a project number and I

identified as such. The thing that threw me was that it was J

funded, apparently, outside of any MKULTRA activity and it
was under the normal contracting process, so that it was not included -i

in MKULTRA as any work done under that funding umbrella. ; ]

The file folder that you have and I have, right here, makes it quite
clear, however, that 1 year's work was done through Navy funding — T ~

a Navy funding mechanism— on which the proposal was based that j

ultimately came into the MKULTRA program. That second pro- ^

posal was never funded. So, there was conflict and I, personally, I
think, introduced a little bit of confusion in that in my testimony. 1

Senator Schweiker. Well, do you agree or not agree with DOD's iJ

statement here that even though the initial funding went through
Navy, the Navy was really acting just as a conduit for the CIA? a

Mr. Laubinger. I think that is correct. J

Admiral Turner. Would you like me to address your other basic
points, Senator? i

Senator Kennedy. Yes; if we could go to the quality of the nature J

of the files of the Agency, and the kind of information that is geUmg *a

up through the system. Maybe you would want to make a general
comment about those allegations and charges which we heard from J

the four witnesses to the effect that many of the descriptions of y

ULTRA projects contained in the files, for which they were responsi-
ble, were not accurate. The witnesses referred to these descriptions as
boilerplate descriptions. One went so far as to say that some of the
records were intended to be misleading. Mr. Lashbrook even im-
plied that there would be two sets of files; one with a complete,
accurate description; one without that.

132

Would you comment on the recordkeeping activities of the Agency,
and do you have requirements that project approval be based on
accurate memoranda which actually reflect what has been done and
what is intended to be done? Do you have double bookkeeping?
And why do so many witnesses take issue with the substance of the
documentation?

Admiral Turner. There is lots of confusion about the files at the
CIA. I have no indication that anyone has kept deliberately inac-
curate files. I think when people refer to inaccuracies in this particu-
lar context, they really should be using the word "incomplete". We
mentioned from the beginning that what we are telling you is incom-
plete, through no fault of our own at the moment.

There are systems at the agency, quite proper, where we have what
we call working files and official files, and there are lots of good reasons
for having working files. And, sometimes, people who do not under-
stand the system try to portray that as a duplicate— perhaps, false,
incomplete, or otherwise— distorting file.

The working file generally is an incomplete file, and one of the main
reasons for that is that we are dealing in a world of necessary security
and secrecy. And if the man on my right is working on a part of a
project, whether it is one of these or anything else, he will develop a
working file from which he operates, and we do not want it to have the
things that belong to my man on the left, if he is working on a different
part of that project and the two of them do not need to know each
other's part.

In order to keep the secrecy as tight as we can, the working files will
be different and each will be incomplete, for good reason. In addition,
we keep working files as a matter of convenience and as a matter of
insuring that the official file does not get torn apart, separated, lost, or
destroyed in any way.

So, the fellow that has got to have it in his hands and maybe take
it with him to meetings, he takes a copy, which is called a working
file. I think that is what the witnesses yesterday, if they were not being
self-serving, were referring to when they suggested we had duplicate
files. But, again, I have no way of guaranteeing, Senator, what people
put in the files in the 1950's and 1960's.

I only say that I have looked into the system as it exists today in the
agency, and I do not find any evidence of people keeping files for the
purpose of distorting the facts to people who have the right to get into
them.

Senator Schweiker. Do I understand— and I realize this was before
your watch — that a file, whether official or working, would not be

Erepared with the purpose of distorting the project or obscuring or
idmg the facts?
Admiral Turner. I have no evidence of that, Senator. As I say, I

cannot tell you

Senator Schweiker. We came across the Dr. Geschickter case
yesterday. He pretty well denied the essence of what was in the files.
For example, the files said there was to be a memorandum of agreement
between the Agency and Dr. Geschickter on subproject 35, and that
he was completely writing off the terms of the agreement yesterday,
he denied ever knowing of such an agreement at all, denied ever seeing
a memorandum of agreement, and denied signing a memorandum of
agreement.

133

Admiral Turner. Well, I Have not read Dr. Geschickter's testi-
mony. I have been told a little bit about it. It is my understanding he
said that we gave $335,000 to Georgetown University, or to his founda-
tion for the Georgetown University; that we neither got nor asked for
any services in return for that, and I just find that an utterly incredible ■?■»

allegation for anybody to make. ]

I cannot imagine any official of this government giving away $335,-

000 and not asking for something in return.

Senator Kennedy. Well, did you get anything in return? ^f
Admiral Turner. We do not know what we got. ' il
Senator Kennedy. Well, that is the point. If you had other kinds

of documents or information on it, you might have some idea, but i

you really do not know. It is incredible to us that they gave it away. ||
Admiral Turner. I did not say he was incorrect.

Senator Kennedy. Right. *_

Admiral Turner. I said it was incredible that it could happen. 3

1 cannot believe it. I think he was mistaken. ^
Senator Kennedy. I dare say that it was somewhat more severe,

in terms of the criticisms of the recordkeeping. Mr. Goldman indi- |

cated that he was ordered by his superiors to justify the continuation J

of a program and to file a statement that would justify it, which was
not based upon the merits of that particular program. g

They talked about boilerplate language that was used for the i

continuation of the program. In one memorandum for the record of
Mkultra, it says:

This project was conducted by Cal Salerno, who hold? top secret agency jl

clearance and is completely witting of the aims and goals of the project. ^

Mr. Salerno swore in his sworn testimony that he was shocked to
hear that. He testified he never knew the aims or the goals of the 1

project. ii

More recently, in the Mkabate, which is another program — a
subdivision of one of the other MK's— in January of 1972 the notation 71

of it says, "authorizing Mkabate dated 1964, I think we should J

update, since new DCI" — new Director of Central Intelligence
Agency — then signed by the person. ?»

Right underneath it— this is obviously the superior^-"No action }*

by TSB/BF, per telecon with"— another agent. Then, the agent, m

evidently, is not satisfied and, later, on January 18, 1972, it says:
"Call, reference need for an update of Mkabate activity approval."
And then, he continues, "DCI approval 1964, why update due to
change in DCI's?" And then, under the bottom from the superior,
"No action required."

Now, how would you even know that these things were going on?
This is in the one area, in terms of human experimentation, that the
new Director was going to get any kind of information. How do you
know, really, what is going on, if you have got people as recently as
that, and that is in 1972? I imagine some of these people are still
there.

Admiral Turner. Senator, I have no comment. If Mr. Horowitz
had included that on the list of material he wanted me to prepare for,
I would have. I have never heard of Mkabate until this time.

Senator Kennedy. We just received that this morning, and it is
just relevant to this particular area.

Could we go to the relationship with the other agencies?

134

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. We have very clear rules on these. You
asked about universities. We have an internal regulation issued in
February of 1976 that we will have no contractual relationship with a
university that is unwitting to the university.

We do not have any relationships with other agencies of the U.S.
Government which are unwitting to the appropriate people in those
%*. agencies, and in your area of health care, any remotely related health

item that we get involved in today — psychology, and things like this—
we have to get a serially numbered approval from the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, and they are, therefore, fully witting.
And we do not get into this kind of area without it being approved by
the proper health authorities in the Government.

Senator Kennedy. You do not believe, nor is it the policy now,
that the agency work covertly with any other agencies of Government?

Admiral Turner. Well, we work covertly with other agencies of
Government.

Senator Kennedy. Within the other agencies?

Admiral Turner. We do not work covertly against those people.
Somebody in those agencies knows what we are domg.

Senator Kennedy. Well, does the Director of each of the agenc'-s
always know what the activities of the CIA are?

Admiral Turner. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. You are saying it is done wittingly?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Senator Schweiker. That is the question, whether the other
agencies are witting or unwitting of the CIA's activities.

Admiral Turner. I do not say, Senator Schweiker, that everybody
in those agencies knows.

Senator Schweiker. But, you are saying the top official knows?

Admiral Turner. That is correct. I have had personal conversa-
tions with a number of Cabinet officers who have relationships with us,
where we work them out in detail. But, I am sure there is a certain
secrecy within their agencies, just as there is within ours.

Senator Schweiker. What about CIA use of foundations? Founda-
tions came up with relation to Dr. Geschickter's testimony. I believe
the CIA established a policy some years back of not using foundations.
Am I correct in that or not?

Admiral Turner. That, I do not

Senator Schweiker. A foundation was apparently used to fund the
^ Geschickter fund as a conduit, I believe the policy on the CIA's use of

'- foundations is known as the Katzenbach guidelines. I am just wonder-

ing if the Katzenbach guidelines are still in effect.

Admiral Turner. Yes, they are.

Senator Schweiker. And what, in essence, do they provide?

Admiral Turner. Well, I am not positive of those with respect to
foundations. I would be happy to get that for you.

Senator Schweiker. Could one of your assistants maybe answer
that?

Mr. Laubinoer. I am sorry. I did not hear your question. Would
you ask it again?

Senator Schweiker. I believe the Katzenbach guidelines were
promulgated back in 1967, when some information about CIA founda-
tion funding came to light. My question really is, are the guidelines
still in effect, and what are they?

135

Admiral Turner. We will have to furnish that for the record, sir.
Senator Schweikbr. Fine. We'd appreciate that.
[The information referred to follows:]

136

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON. D. C. 20W3

Hi Offica of Legislative Counsel

j C 27 September 1977

Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman
Subcommittee on Health and Scientific

Research
Committee on Human Resources
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to Senator Richard Schweiker's question
as to whether the Agency is following the guidelines of
the Katzenbach Report, I have contacted, appropriate
offices in the Agency and I can assure you that. we are
complying with the guidelines recommended by the Report
and endorsed by the President.

Enclosed is a copy of the Katzenbach Report for
your information.

Le L. Miller
Acting Legislative Counsel i;

■ ' |

Enclosure |

137

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON " '

March 24, 1967

Dear He President:

The consult tee which you appointed on February' 15, 1967
has sought, pursuant to your request:

--To review relationships between government agencies,
notably the Central Intelligence Agency, and educational
and private voluntary organizations which operate abroad;

and " ' ■■•■.-■

—To recommend means to help assure that such organ!- .
zations can play their proper and vital role abroad.

The committee has held a number of meetings , interviewed
dozens of individuals " in and out of government, and reviewed
thousands of pages of reports. We have surveyed the rele-
vant activities of a number of federal agencies. And we have
reviewed in particular and specific detail the relationship '
between CIA and each relevant organization. :|

Our report, supplemented with supporting classified
documents, follows.

•In summary, the committee offers two basic recommendations ;

1. It should be the policy of* the United States Govern-
ment that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial

The President

The White House;

Ij
i

a I

138

-2-

ass
nation

istance or supports direct or Indirect, to any of the
Ion ' 3 educational or private voluntary organizations .

2. the Government should promptly develop and establish
• public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly
for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged
deserving, in the national interest, of public support .

1: A MEW POLICY

The years immediately after World War II saw a surge,
of communist activity in organizations throughout the world.
Students, scientists,- veterans, women and professional groups
were organized Into international bodies which spoke In the
cadences, advocated the policies, and furthered the Interests
of the communist bloc. Much of this activity was organized,
directed, and financed covertly by communist governments.

'American organizations reacted "from the first. The
young men and women who founded the United States National
Student Association, for example, did so precisely to give
American youth the capacity to hold their own In the inter-
national arena. But the importance of students as a force
in international events had yet to become widely understood •
find NSA found it difficult to attract private support for
its international activities. Accordingly, the United States
Government, acting through the Central Intelligence Agency,
provided support for this overseas work.

We have* taken NSA as an example. While no useful pur-
pose would be served by detailing any other CIA programs
of assistance to private American voluntary organizations,
one fundamental point should be clearly stated: such
assistance was given pursuant to National Security Council
policies beginning in 'October, 1951 and with the subsequent,
concurrence of high-level senior interdepartmental review
committees in the last four Administrations. In December,
1960, in a classified report submitted after a year of study,
a public-private Presidential Committee on Information
Activities Abroad specifically endorsed both overt and covert
programs, including those assisted by CIA. •

139

-3-

Our study, undertaken at a later -time, discloses new
developments which suggest -that ve should now re-examine '
these policies. The American public, for example, has be--
** come increasingly aware of the importance of the complex

forms of international competition between free •societies
and communist states. -As this awareness has grown, so have
potential sources of support for the overseas work of pri-

* ■ vate organizations.

There is no precise index to. these sources, but their
increase is suggested by the growth in the' number of private.

• foundations from 2., 220 in 1955 to 18*000 in 1967. Hence it
is increasingly possible for organizations like KSA to seek -'

"support for overseas activities 'from open sources.

* • - . *

Just -as sources of support have increased, so has the
number of American groups engaged in overseas work. Accord-
ing to the Agency for International Developsaent, there has •
been a nine-fold increase just among voluntary organizations
which participate in technical assistance abroad, rising*
from 24 in 1951 to 220 in 1965. The total of all private
American voluntary groups now working overseas may well ex-
ceed a thousand. .

The number of such organizations which has been assisted
covertly is a small fraction of the total. The vast pre-
.pOnderance have had'no relationship with the government or
hxve accepted only open government funds— which greatly exceed
funds supplied covertly.

• The work of private American organizations, in * host
^ of fields, has been of great benefit to scores of countries.
* Hat benefit must not be impaired by foreign doubts about
the independence of these organizations. - The coaaaittee be-
lieves it is .essential for the United States to underscore . .
that independence immediately and decisively .
■ - . " "

_ For these reasons, the cotaaittee recommends the following:

140 I

-4-

•STATEMENT OF POLICY

No federal agency shall provide any covert
financial assistance or support, direct or in-
direct, to any of the nation's educational or
private voluntary organizations. This policy
specifically applies to all foreign activities
of such organizations and it reaffirms present
policy with respect to their domestic activities;.

Where such support has been given, it will
be terminated as quickly as possible without de-
stroying valuable private organisations before
they can seek new means of support.*

We believe that, particularly in the light of recent
publicity, establishment of a clear policy of this kind is
the only way for the government to carry out two important .
responsibilities. One is to avoid any implication that
governmental assistance, because it is given covertly, is
used to affect the policies of private voluntary groups.
The second responsibility is to make it plain, in all foreign -
countries that the activities of private American groups
abroad ere, in fact, private.

The cozaittee has sought carefully to assess the impact
of this Statement of Policy on CIA. We have reviewed each
relevant program of assistance carried out by the* Agency in
case-by-case detail. As a result of this scrutiny, the
committee is satisfied that application of the Statement of
Policy will -not unduly handicap the Agency in the exercise
qf its national security responsibilities. Indeed, it
should be noted that, starting well before the appearance
of recent publicity, CIA had initiated and pursued efforts
to disengage from certain of these activities.

The committee also recommends that- the implementation
of this policy be supervised by the senior interdepartmental

*0n the basis of our case-by-case review, we expect that
the process of termination can be largely— perhaps entirely-
completed by December 31, 1967.

141

- 5 -

review committee which already passes on proposed CIA acti-
vities and which would review and assist in the process of
disengagement.*

2: NEW METHODS OF SUPPORT

While our first recoracendation seeks to insure the in-
dependence of private voluntary organizations, it does not
deal with an underlying probletn--how to support the national
need for, and the intrinsic worth of , their efforts abroad.

* If the Statement of Policy is "to be effective, it must
be rigorously enforced. In the judgment of this coran.it tee,
no programs currently would justify any exception to this
policy. At the same time, where the security of the nation
may be at stake, it is impossible for 'this committee to state
categorically now that there will 'never be a contingency in
which' overriding'*, national security interests may require an
exception— nor 'would it be credible to enunciate a policy
which purported to do so.

We therefore recommend that, in "the event of such un-
usual contingencies, the interdepartmental review committee
be per mitted to make exceptions to the Statement of Policy,
but only where overriding national security interests so re-
quire; only on a case-by-case basis; only where open sources
oi s upport are shown to be unavailable; and only when such
exceptions re ceive the speci tic approval of the Secretaries
of State and U elcnsc. In no event should any future exception
be approved -.-■•h ici involves any educational, philanthropic, or
cultural oraanizacion .

Anyone who has jfche slightest familiarity with intellec- ft

tual or youth groups abroad knows Chat free institutions ||
continue to be under bitter, continuous attack, some of it

carefully organized and well-financed, all of it potentially ■**

dangerous to this nation. j]

It is of the greatest importance to our future and to

the future of free institutions everywhere that other nations, - f|

especially their young people, know. and understand- American. J
viewpoints. There is no better way- to meet this need than

through the activity of private American organizations. ,~

I:
- I

142 I

X I

-6- J

■ ■ ■ ■ • ' - ' 1

The time has surely cone for the government to nelp |

support such activity in a nature* open manner. |

I ■■ ' 1

Some progress toward that aim already has been made.

In recent years, a number of federal agencies have developed

contracts, grants, and other forms of open assistance to -

private organizations for overseas activities. This z ,«

assistance, however, does not deal with a major aspedt of »

the problem. A number of organizations cannot, without I

hampering their effectiveness, as independent bodies, accept

funds directly from government agencies. |

The committee therefore recommends that the Government |

should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism
to 'provide public funds openly for overseas activities of
organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national
Interest, of public support. •.•'._ f

- Such' a mechanism could' take various, forms. One promls- f

ing proposal, advanced by Mr. Eugene- Black, calls for a
publicly funded but privately administered body patterned |

on the British Council. . I

--■■' .. - |

The' British Council established, in 1934, operates in 80 - f

countries, administering approximately $30,000,000 annually
for reference libraries, exhibitions, scholarships,, inter-
national conferences, and cultural; -exchanges. Because 21
of its 30 members are drawn from private life, the Council
has maintained a reputation for independence, even though .
90 percent of its funds are governmental. . f

According to the UNESCO Directory of Cultural Relations |

Services, other nations have developed* somewhat similar j

.institutions. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations-,
for example, is 'entirely government-financed but operates

autonomously. The governing body of the Swedish Institute j

for Cultural Relations consists of both government and
private members. This institute receives 75 percent of its
funds from the government and the remainder from private
contributions.

iii

143
-7-

The experience of these and other countries
helps to demonstrate the desirability Of a similar
body in the United States, Wholly or largely funded
by the federal government. Another approach might:
be the establishment of a governmental foundation,
perhaps with links to the existing Federal Inter-
Agency Council on International Education and
Cultural Affairs.

Such a public-private body would not be new to
the United States. Congress established the Smith- -
sonian Institution, for example, "more than a century
ago as a private corporation, under the guardianship
of Congress, but governed by a mixed public-private
Board of Regents.

The committee began a preliminary study of what
.might be the best method of meeting the present need.
It is evident, however, that, because of the great
range both of existing government and private philan-
thropic programs, the refinement of alternative! and
selection among them is a task of considerable com-
plexity. Accordingly, we do not believe that this
exclusively governmental committee is an appr o p riate
forum for the task "and we recommend, instead, the
appointment of a larger group, including individuals
in private life with extensive experience in this
field.

The basic principle, in any event, is clear.
Such a new institution would involve government funds.
It might well involve government officials. But a.
premium must be placed on the involvement of private
'citizens and the exercise of private judgments, for .
to be effective, it would have to have— and be
recognized to have— a high degree of independence.

144

-8-

The prompt creation of such an institution, based
on this principle, would fill an important— and never .
more apparent— national need.

Respectfully,

Secretary of

Health, Education and Welfare

• • •

Richard Helms

Director of

Central Intelligence

$JtiU k.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Under Secretary of State,
Chairman

■a»

145

Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions. It «

seems to me that this matter, as you know, is going to come up with j

the general guidelines that will be set forth by the Intelligence Com- ^

mittee, and it seems to me we have cleared the air to some extent.

And I think, as has been said too often here, it is well to bear in ?f

mind that all this took place many years ago, before these gentlemen — ||

and, certainly, Admiral Turner — was involved in any way, or the
current regime in the Defense Department. p.

Senator Schweiker. I have another question. 1

Admiral Turner, last time we were here, I think the chairman and k *

other members of the committee discussed your plans for notification
of the institutions and investigators involved in MKULTRA. Could |1

you bring us up to date on whether that notification has taken place? H

Have all the institutions been told of their former involvement?

Admiral Tubneb. Is General Counsel here? m

Senator Kennedy. Would you identify yourself, please? ||

Mr. Julien. Emile Julien; I am with the agency's Office of General
Counsel. We are still in the process of working out notifying individ-
uals, where we can find individuals, with the Department of Justice. ;|

Admiral Turner. All the institutions have been notified, have they -■*

not?

Mr. Julien. All the institutions, yes. ! !$

Admiral Tubneb. All the institutions have, and in each case, we J

have offered, if they want, to provide them all the back-up material
that is unclassified that we can. We just sent them a letter and de- ,,

scribed the fact that we were involved. Some of them have come back f|

and ask for those details. Some of them have sent representatives here ^

to our offices to review the materials. Others have not responded at all.
But, we are available to give them everything that we have given you f 1

on an unclassified basis that they want. |]

Senator Schweiker. What about efforts to locate subjects of previ-
ous research projects for medical check-ups or follow-ups, or informing pt
unwitting subjects that something might have happened to them dur- :|
ing the testing program? What is the policy of the agency, and where
are we in that regard?

Admiral Tubneb. We are doing everything we can there. But, of I

course, I am being very careful to keep the agency out of investigating
and searching for American citizens inside the United States. We have
turned that over to the Attorney General who has turned it over to the
FBI. I asked him just yesterday how they were going, and he said they
are working on it, but they have not yet actually located anybody.
But, we are giving them all of the information we have.

There are only a few cases where we think it is likely they would
even be able to find people, and that is like in an institution. A penal
institution might have kept some records. They have some problems
checking with legalities here, and they have not actually, to my
knowledge, found any people yet, but they are checking.

Senator Schweiker. This is all going to be handled by the Justice
Department, you say?

Admiral Turner. Yes, is there a legal check here? I thought it was
a matter of informing people and doing medical followup, or am I
missing the point?

146

The Attorney General tells me he had some concerns about the
legality of the way we go about finding these people and prying into
the records of these institutions, and so on. I do not have the details
or specifics on that, Senator, but he has taken responsibility for the
governmental effort to locate the individuals, and we are providing
support in any way we can.
_,.. There is one more supplementary point of information.

**• Mr. Brody. I might add one thing, Senator, and that is that we are

getting occassional letters in from people who say they have been, or
recall Deing subjects of experiments. We are doing whatever we can
to check out those names of people to see if we have anything in our
own records to indicate that, indeed, that was the case, and we" will be
cooperating with those people to try to give them whatever we have.

Admiral Turner. We have had 77 letters, 49 of which we have an-
swered that we do not have any help for them, and the rest, we are
still researching.

Senator Kennedy. What records would you check for the unwitting
subjects? As in all the records, you have checked them all, have you
not?

Admiral Turner. Oh, yes. We have no names of individuals, but
they tell us, "My son was in this place at this time ; was that anywhere
connected with your activities," and so on. Lots of people in the
country have written us that are totally unrelated, we are sure.

Senator Kennedy. In an earlier question in August, we asked about
the other tests involving current active tests studying human be-
havior and what research was taking place. Now, you indicated you
would make that available to us. Could you? We have not received that
yet. I would be interested in it, if you could provide it for us in the next
2 or 3 weeks ; page 32 of the transcript.

Admiral Turner. All right. We will check it out and get it to you,
sir.

Senator Kennedy. Fine. I know you have got a time problem, and I
will just hold you a few more minutes. Can you tell us, from a defense
intelligence position, now, what should be being done now, in terms
of national security reasons, in this area?

I mean are we faced with adversaries that are continuing to be
involved in this? Obviously, we take that responsibility extremely
seriously, and we want to work closely with the agency along the
guidelines which we have suggested and which you have indicated
strong personal support for.
* But, is there anything that you want to mention in this area to us

today?

Admiral Turner. I have nothing specific, Senator, but we must
keep abreast of what other nations may be doing in these areas that
could be used against us or our people. That, of course, need not
involve experimentation on humans and, certainly, would not involve
unwitting experimentation on humans. But, through our normal intel-
ligence operations, we target against the research activities or the
operational use of drugs or mind controlling experimentation in other
countries.

I have no evidence at this point that there is any serious threat or
activity in that area at this moment, but I think we must constantly
monitor that, and if we come to any necessity of a response to it or
preparation for it

147 I

Senator Kennedy. How prevalent is it now, in terms of the Agency's
agents overseas, and the rest of them? ' pi

Admiral Turner. Not prevalent. It is not a problem. j

Senator Kennedy. But, your information is that there is that capac-
ity for this activity by adversaries, is that correct? „

Admiral Turner. Yes; there is. f|

Senator Kennedy. Let me just make a final comment, Admiral J

Turner. I think one of the things that is so perplexing, as we are trying
to bring the curtain down on this phase of intelligence, is to gain an m

understanding in tenns of the value and in terms of the national ]

security that was obtained through these 21 years of experimentation
on unwitting, as well as witting subjects. What was the value in terms ,.

of our national security? , J

I am completely convinced that what was done and what was tested ^

could have been done through the other agencies, and done in the
open. I know that there are those that feel, "Well, we wanted to keep fl

away from our adversaries the progress that was being made." But, |J

..the fact of the matter is, most of the results of the studies that were
being done were actually printed and reported in documents which .*»

would have been available to our adversaries. 1

But, besides that, as we try to come to a conclusion on this we see, '

really, in what we hope to be our final day, a direct conflict between
two agencies of Government working under one administration; the -J

agency and the Department of Defense. It seems there is a conflict in J

terms of the responsibility for the testing in the latter years, which
brings us up to 1973 ; which was not that long ago. f|

We are going to make every effort to try and resolve this, given the yj

fact that it is similar material, but we have the two different agencies
of Government drawing completely .different conclusions. I firmly ™,

believe that unless you can get accountability in a program with '1

dimensions such as this, or in any program, for that matter, that we ^

are just not meeting our responsibilities for the protection of Americans.

What we are talking about, I believe, is an extraordinary burden
which exists for the Intelligence Agency in the United States. We put
more of a burden on our Intelligence Agency than any other country
puts on theirs', because we expect you to carry through with the
intelligence gathering of information, and yet to do it in ways which
are not going to violate the basic and fundamental principles which
this country was built upon, and that is a tough challenge. And I
think the Agency, at different times in its history, has met it, and at
other times, it has not.

But, the fact of the matter is, when we do not have that kind of
accountability, we are not going to have the responsibility in an area
which has affected individuals in the most extraordinary ways. That
is, altering their human behavior, the various kinds of testings, the
electronics eavesdropping, and recording, all of which is so alien to
the protection of human liberties, and then we see the perversion,
in the past, in terms of universities and other agencies of Govern-
ment. All of this leaves the question of accountability, here in this area,
suspect.

We are reaching the real bedrock, in terms of what this society is
to be about. I think it really challenges our whole kind of system to
see how we can. bring an end to those kinds of violations of individual
liberties, to-pj»tect our institutions, and still provide for our national
security.

148

We continue to be troubled by the nature of the recordkeeping.
We have direct conflicts by sworn testimony by different agents.
Obviously, your explanation has been of some help, but we had dif-
ferent conflicts about just whether the recordkeeping was in this file
or that file; agents, under sworn testimony, who told that they were
told by superiors to work up a justification, and others that said that
they signed matters as a matter of routine that had no relevancy
•%. to the substance which they were interested in.

We cannot come away from the conclusion that at least somewhere —
I do not think it is with you, personally, but I think within the
Agency, that they felt that this was all part of the past and it was not
really necessary to really come forward with the kind of information
that close this chapter.

We find, just in our staff people interviewing agents and people
that have information, that they have never been contacted by the
CIA, even in recent times; recent weeks, recent days. And this is
disturbing.

But, we want to look to the future, both toward the charter of
the Agency that will be directed toward the protection of the human
subjects and we want to look to our legislation. We have extended
the life of the panel on protection of human subjects, now. We passed
it in the Senate last week. It did not have a particular phrase, in terms
of the Agency and DOD on it, but it is absolutely essential that we
do, when we come to grips with that, hopefully at the end of this year
or the early part of next. The Secretary of HEW has some ideas
relating to that whole panel which we have to clarify.

But, we will want your support in the charter which, I am sure,
from your own personal testimony, you would see achieved, and we
would want your support in terms of the legislation in the future. We
thank you for your presence here today.

Admiral Turner. Thank you very much.

Senator Kennedy. We will hear from Deanne Siemer from the
Department of Defense, who also has got a conflict in terms of time,
her testimony will be, as I understand it, relatively brief arid then we
will recess.

Ms. Deanne Siemer, we are glad to have you here. We welcome you
here. You have a lot of empty seats on both sides of you; You look
like a lonely figure out there, but I can tell from our past communica-
tions with you on other matters, that you handle these responsibilities
extremely well and capably for the Department.
* J*? we ^ come your testimony here, we would like you, if you would,

to*a?rect yourself to those inconsistencies that I mentioned earlier
with Mr. Turner, giving you an opportunity to address those. I will
ask you to do whatever you want to do, in terms of your presentation,
but I hope you will come to grips with that particular problem;
whatever way you want to proceed.

STATEMENT OF DEANNE C. SIEMEB, GENEBAL COUNSEL,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. Siemer. Senator, let me address first the question of the testing
at Edgewood with respect to this compound, which has been designated
3167.

Senator Kennedy. What was that one? Can you tell us?

149 m

Ms* Siemer. That appears on page 5 of my report to the Secretary, fl

and it is a project that began in 1971, was terminated in 1973, and 1

was part of Often, or Mkof ten. Apparently, what happened here is
that the Edge wood Arsenal research laboratories were testing a ^i

number of compounds prior to the time that the Central Intelligence |

Agency had any interest in these compounds.

They tested the compounds both on animals and in human testing,
and the human testing has been reported to you previously. In 1971, fj

the Central Intelligence Agency apparently reviewed Edgewood's il

work in connection with their Project Often to identify any part of
Edgewood's work that might be useful for that project, or useful for ft

the purposes that they had in mind, which were apparently different ^j

than the purposes for which Edgewood had initially done the testing.

In 1971, the Agency transferred some $37,000 to Edgewood to ^

pursue testing of this compound, which was designated EA-^3167, |I

which had previously been tested by Edgewood. The Agency was ^

interested in some different kinds of testing.

Specifically, they wanted to know from Edgewood whether this 1

compound could be put on an adhesive substance and transferred to ; J

humans through skin contact. Edgewood's previous experiments with
this compound had apparently been done in different forms of admin- ? j

istering it by intermuscular injection, and other means of testing it, |

for different purposes.

The Agency wanted to know, could this compound be placed on an
adhesive substance and transferred to skin for absorption through the M

skin. Again, the documentation is very sketchy and it is difficult to ij

tell exactly what was done, Edgewood took the Agency's money, did
the testing, and was successful in formulating a way to apply this n

compound to an adhesive. |J

They tested it primarily on animals and, indeed, the indications are
that all of the results that were reported to the Agency were testing ^

on animals; primarily, I think, on mice. The funding for this was ||

planned to be terminated in January of 1973. The funding apparently ^

was not terminated until June of 1973.

The testing about which you asked Admiral Turner occurred some-
time in June of 1973. It is our conclusion from the documents available
to us, and from the people available to us, that the testing on that
particular compound, in June of 1973, was a part of the Agency's
project.

Now, as I say, I have no other documents to support that conclusion
than the Agency has to support their conclusion that it was not. The
reason I reach that conclusion is that Edgewood had completed its
testing of this compound and had no further interest in it at the time
that the Agency asked Edgewood to take it up again in 1971. When
the Agency asked Edgewood to take it up again, they didj they did
a certain amount of testing and that testing was completed in June* . -.,,
of 1973, when the funding from the/Agency was completed.

There are, I think, five documents relevant to this, which your staff
has been provided by the Agency. First, is a CIA document dated
May 29, 1973, which is a memorandum for the director of research
and development. The second is an undated CIA document entitled,
"Influencing Human Behavior." The third is a CIA document dated
February 12, 1975, which is a memorandum for the record and a trip
report to Edgewood to interview people with respect to what that

• 11 ml # ■ i • A* t » i • ¥ . l t» . 1. _. . ••»»

150

1971, which, again^is a memorandum for the director of research and
development.

Those are the documents that we have; those are the documents
that the Agency has; and that is what we know about that program.

Senator Kennedy. Well, that is very helpful. I gather from what
^ you say that the interest of the Department— DOD had terminated

C prior to the actual testing that was done.

Ms. Siemer. That appears to be the case. This compound was one
of a large number of compounds that were surveyed by Edgewood for
various purposes. The Agency came and looked at Edgewood' s survey,
identified this compound as of particular interest to their purpose,
and asked that further work be done.

Senator Schweiker. There was a destruction of CIA documents in
January 1973. Is there any indication that signficant documents
relating to this project might have been destroyed with the files that
the CIA. destroyed around that period of time?

Ms. Siemer. I do not know that, Senator. I have no way of knowing
how the Agency kept their records with respect to this, or what records
one would expect to find.

Senator Kennedy. I think Dr. Gottlieb did that prior to the time
he left. We are going to hear about that in a short time.

Were there any occasions that you know of where the CIA decided
that they did not want to share the results of some of these experiments
with the Department of Defense, and where they took the projects
out from under the Defense Department's surveillance?

Ms. Siemer. Yes, Senator, and that is the experiment that Senator
Schweiker referred to with respect to blast concussion. The Navy
had some interest in that project because they have an ongoing study
of headgear and protective headgear.

The project began in October 1954, and it was a theoretical, physical
study intended to use fluid-filled flasks and dynamite to see what
happened to the fluid in the flask when the impact from the blast hit
them. That work was funded by the Agency, and when the contractor
came in with a follow-on proposal, the Agency's documents indicate
that they decided to terminate the Navy's involvement in that pro-
gram because they doubted the Navy's capability to maintain the
security of the program.

Senator Schweiker. Do the documents show how long after the
Navy's involvement terminated that the CIA carried on with the
t project?

Ms. Siemer. They do not, and they do not show that the CIA did
carry it on. They do show that the CIA terminated the Navy involve-
ment and, specifically, they were concerned with the possibility of
operating a program securely under the previous cover, which was the
Office of Naval Research.

Senator Kennedy. That means, basically, they did not trust them?

Ms. Siemer. I would hope that they would trust the Navy, but
apparently what it involved was— the CIA's document says that this
work would involve human experiments of a type not easily justifiable
on medical or therapeutic grounds. They also noted that they would
have to clear a number of Navy personnel ; a number of Navy personnel
would have to know that this work was going on. They did not want
'" "'"""■ ,.,.to,do^that.

Senator Kennedy. What year was that?

151

Ms. Siemer. That was in 1956.

Senator Kennedy. I see.

Ms ; Siemer. So, they decided against clearing the Navy personnel,
and since they could not run the program without clearing the Navy
personnel, using the Navy as a conduit, they terminated the Navy
involvement in the program. Now, you have heard testimony this,
morning that they also terminated the program. We have no way of
knowing that that is the case.

Senator Kennedy. We have been over, in 1975, the Department
of Defense's programs in very considerable detail. Could you briefly
describe the kinds of research projects that were of interest to the
DOD over the recent periods of time, and the significant results of
any that the Department of Defense derived from any of these
programs?

Ms. Siemer. Yes, Senator. The program that I described at
Edgewood, which terminated in 1973, is really the only significant
recent program that was conducted, using military faculties. And as
I said, that program was successful in the sense that the Army devel-
oped what the Agency asked them to develop, and they were success-
ful in doing what the Agency asked them to do. Whether that con-
stitutes a product or constitutes a contribution, I do not know.

The remaining programs, as you can see — four of them weie ter-
minated in the early 1950's or 1960's, and those are four Navy pro-
grams, and those programs are primarily where the Navy acted as a
conduit for Central Intelligence Agency funds. Let me just review
those briefly for you.

There were four programs in which our records indicate that the
Navy operated solely as a channel for funds to outside contractors.
Those are the programs described in my memorandum, the first of
which is a synthesis of analogs of certain kinds of stimulants. The
second is the identification of a nonaddictive substitute for codeine.
The third is the blast concussion project which I have just discussed,
and the fourth is the administration of LSD to human subjects,
again, back in the early 1950's.

Those four projects, the documents indicate, the Navy operated
solely as a conduit of funds. Two of the remaining programs were
Army programs, and there was no human testing. Those programs—
the first is described on page 4 of my memorandum, and that was
the effort to identify drugs with behavioral effects. This is the Chick-
wit, or Mkchickwit, program, which was looking to identify devel-
opments in Europe or the Far East.

The second was a project to develop a data base for computer use
to easily access the large amount of information about various drugs,
and Edgewood contributed to the data base that was used by the
Agency for its Project Often.

Senator Kennedy. I guess they had a division between the Agency
and the DOD, a matter which we referred to earlier. Also, during the
late 1950's, there was a decision by DOD to split off its testing, in
terms of LSD, from the CIA, and those are referred to in the Church
committee report.

So, I think the significance is that we have seen in the past a division
of responsibility and the separations of responsibility, and the absence
of coordination. And at least in terms of the most recent times, we
have seen a continued division, in terms of responsibility; as late as

I ■ 152

this morning, at least in terms of interpretation about who had the
responsibility in these particular areas of Mkchickwit, Search, and
,1 Ultra.

What benefits were derived from these programs?

Ms. Siemer. The blast concussion program that was conducted by

the Navy for a year resulted in a 17-page research report, which I am

informed was a valuable contribution. That researcher has continued

^ to work in that field, and that is a field that is of substantial use to the

1 military, because it involves the development of protective headgear.

! The project to develop data bases for computer access also has a

substantial amount of use. As you know, there is a vast amount of

i data about drugs, and their side effects and direct effects, available,

I and being able to access that information and retrieve it quickly and

efficiently is a useful contribution.
-_,, The only other program that was conducted by the services is the

program at Edgewood with respect to applying this compound to
^ adhesive substances, and whether that was useful or not would have

to come from the Agency. We were successful in doing what they asked
us to do, which is developing a way of applying it to the adhesive
substance, but whether the use of an adhesive substance is useful,
we do not know.
> * Senator Chafee. It seems to me that in some of these experiments,

the fact that they are not useful, itself, is helpful. A negative answer
can sometimes be of assistance.

The thing that has bothered me a little is, for example, the testing

of this EA-3167 that was being done at Edgewood Arsenal, under

the Army's direction and without the CIA involvement, at the

beginning, anyway, and it seems to me that recordkeeping in this

! whole business seems to have been haphazard, at best.

| Suppose somebody comes along 5 years from now and thinks that

there might be something to EA-3167? Are they going to start all

...... over again, or does somebody have a record that shows this was a

J failure?

Ms. Siemer. The records available show what the compound is,

chemically; show what the results were on dogs, guinea pigs, monkeys,

^ and so on, and so all of the results of that research are available. As

sj to the application — what the Central Intelligence Agency made of

whatever was done for this particular application at Edgewood, I do

I not know what records are available of that.

I But, the actual results of dog and monkey and mouse experiments —

1 .0 that is, that the mouse died, or the monkey had particular effects —

I believe are available.
I Senator Chafee. Well, it seems to me fairly important to have

ii this information— -you mentioned a retrieval system. It is fairly

important, like we just said, that you do not go through this all over
■;';:] again when some bright fellow comes up with the suggestion.

^1 Also, with reference to those two military volunteers that were

discussed — now, was that under CIA, or was that under — I was
, going to say "you," but I will say the Army I am not sure.

| Ms. Siemer. Well, that is the subject of the current discussion, as

to whose problem it was. It is my conclusion from the documents that
that was a part of the ClA program. I cannot say it any more defini-
j tively than Admiral Turner can say it is his conclusion it was a part of

a DOD program.

153

Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.

Senator Schweiker. Based on your survey of the different projects
that were done through the Department of Defense, I wonder if you
could give us a rough estimate of how many human subjects were used
by the Department of Defense in these kinds of experiments over this
period.

Now, I am not talking about situations in which the Department of
Defense was merely a conduit for the CIA. Obviously, as you point out
in your statement to us, DOD served as a conduit in a number of
instances. On the other hand, there were some experiments that the
Defense Department was responsible for, not as a conduit. Could you
give the committee any kind of a rough estimate of the number of
human beings that were involved in these kinds of experiments during
this period, m experiments that the Department of Defense or one of
its branches or subintelligence groups was running? *&

Ms. Siemer. Yes; I think, Senator, I could give you some sketchy j

understanding that I have from the documents. Of these eight pro-
grams in which there was some military participation, there are four
in which there was human testing, and one in which there was a pos- fl

sibility of human testing. If

The first is the Edgewood Arsenal program that we have been
talking about, and that is this compound EA-3167- Prior to the ^

Agency's involvement in 1 97 1 , there was testing of that compound in fj

a different form and for different purposes at the Holmesburg State
Prison in Pennsylvania. The documents indicate that that may have
involved from 5 to 12 prisoners; one document says 5, another one 11

says 12. &

There was subsequent testing of that compound at the Edgewood
laboratories involving military volunteers, and that phase of it may f|

have involved as many as 15 persons. yj

Senator Schweiker. They were witting?

Ms. Siemer. Yes; they were, Senator, and that was prior to the f.

Agency's involvement. J

The Navy project with respect to synthesis of analogs of certain
stimulants— the documents do not indicate that that involved human
testing, but it is possible that it did. I am unable to determine whether 1

it did or did not. The relative CIA document indicates that the merits iJ

were going to be determined on tests on mice.

The second program conducted by the Navy, which was the identi- n

fication of a nonaddictive substitute for codeine, was carried out at a J

Government agency in Kentucky. We do not have any indication of
how many persons that was conducted on, but that was a very sub- *-

stantial project. The Central Intelligence Agency spent over $280,000 ||

on that project, and that was an average of between $34,000 and ^

$45,000 a year. So, there may have been a substantial number of
people involved in that. |j

Senator Schweiker. Again, were they witting or unwitting sub- y

jects?

Ms. Siemer. I have no way of telling that. Those records would m

be available only from the Agency. This is a program in which we — |j

that, the Navy— was only a conduit for the funds.

Senator Schweiker. Is that Dr. IsbelPs work that you are talking ,

about? ||

Ms. Siemer. Yes; it is. a

154

The third is the administration of LSD to human subjects. That
was begun in 1952 and completed in 1956. Our records indicate that
there were six knowing subjects who were a part of the researchers'
own staff who were involved in that, and that later on, there were
eight subjects who were Soviet defectors who were tested in Europe —
I am sorry. That is part of project 5.

On project 4, this was done by CIA, and those are the only facts
that we have in our documents.

On the 5th, the Navy project which was development of speech-
inducing drugs, there was a test of those drugs on eight Soviet defec-
tors in Europe in 1952, I think — in August or September of 1952—
and the test was apparently a failure, because they could not formu-
late the substance in a way that the defectors could not taste it and,
therefore, they could not be kept unwitting of the test.

Senator Kennedy. Sometimes I think that might have leaked out
from over m the Senate, that speech-inducing drug.

Ms. Siemer. That is it. That is what we know from the documents
we have available.

Senator Schweiker. Now, is this work that you have described
pretty well confined to programs conducted in connection with the
CIA? In other words, my question also directed itself — and I am
not sure if I have made it clear — to non-CIA sponsored work. Are
you including that in your answer?

Ms. Siemer. No, I am not, Senator. The non-CIA sponsored
work was previously reported £o you in 1975, and you have our
Inspector General's report on that and that is, so far as we know, a
complete report.

Senator Schweiker. OE. Now, in connection with that, a couple
of years ago, we were told by the Defense Department that they
would make every effort to contact people who had been used as
subjects of DOD research. I think there were several thousands of
people involved, as I recall, at least well over a 1,000, though I cannot
be precise, without checking. The Department was going to make
every effort to contact the people who were tested in the program. I
realize that you are new on board and were not involved with this
initially, so my question may be something you have to report back
to us on a little bit later.

Could you update this committee on whether DOD has been
successful in contacting former subjects of research? How effective
have the Department's efforts to follow up and inform the subjects
of those tests been? The witnesses at our previous hearings did, I
believe, make that commitment to us.

Ms. Siemer. I do have a report on that for you, Senator. This
report is as of August 22, 1977, which is the date of your original
hearings on this subject. As of that date, we had completed medical
examinations on 127 of the known participants; 176 had been con-
tacted and had agreed to an examination, but the examination had
not yet been scheduled; 146 had been located, but they had not
made a decision as yet as to whether to be examined; 22 were de-
ceased, and we were able to find death certificates for 12 of those,
but have other information that 22 of them were deceased ; 39 refused
examination, and 177 we are still working on locating.

156

Senator Schweiker. I want to compliment you on your testimony. 1

You certainly have been very direct, specific, and candid with us. It 'J

is obvious that you have done your homework and certainly tried to
comply with the intent of the committee's request for testimony in
areas of our responsibility, and we thank you for that.

Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman, just one other question. About
those two military volunteers that were involved in 1973, was there
any followup on them, regardless of who was responsible for the
experimentation, either DOD or CIA?

Ms. Siemeb. It is my understanding, Senator, that they are included
in the followup statistics that I have just given you. ~

Senator Chafee. Now, I just wonder, out of curiosity, would the j

results of that examination go back into the file at Edgewood, so that iJ

the experimentation is then wrapped up and the documentation on
the experimentation completed? fl

Ms. Siemeb. The followup study is being done as a separate study, jjj

but the information developed from it can be accessed through
computers and other records by researchers. We have privacy prob- <m

lems, and that is, you have to be able to generalize the data, and I

cannot transmit data about a specific person.

Senator Chafee. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add my
congratulations on the testimony today. You certainly had all the r |

facts. IJ

Senator Kennedy. Well, all of us are impressed. You obviously
have personally taken this — and the Department has — as a matter of jj

very considerable priority and importance, and it is shown by your fj

familiarity with the material and the responsiveness to the questions.

Ms. Siemer. Thank you, Senator. ' ™

[The following material was submitted for the record :] |

156

Septerr.ber 20, 1977

Honorable Edward M. Kennedy

United States Senate >

Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on
^ Health ,& Scientific Research

£■ Washington , D.C. 20510

Dear Mr.. Chairsan:

Your letter to the Secretary of Defense of August 10,
1977 requested all classified and unclassified documents
relating in any way to hunan experimentation in connection
with Central Intelligence Agency projects designated bv the
code Words MKSEARCH, MKOTTEN and MIxCHICKWIS.

Pursuant to that request, the Office of General Counsel
coordinated a search of the files maintained by the Amy,
tlavy and Air Force frost -1950 to the present. ?hat search
vas completed on September 15, 1977 and a memorandum was
prepared for the Secretary summarizing the results.

I have enclosed a ccpy of that -.enorandun and copies of
each of the documents retrieved from Department of Defense
fil-rss. It appears front the available documents that pro-
jects MXSEA3CH, MKOFTEH and MXCHICICWIT were directed, con-
trolled and funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. Much
of the participation of the military departments was solely
as a conduit of fund3 from the Central Intelligence Agency
to outside contractors. A substantial amount of thi3
participation was terru.nated in the 1950's and 19€0*3. The
remaining activity was terminated no later than 1973.

All of the military department documents identified in
Appendices A and 3 have been declassified. The aenorandura
refers to and appends certain Central Intelligence Agency
docunents that have not been declassified. If the Agency
declassifies those documents, the memorandum should also be
declassified.

If the Subcommittee requires further information or
assistance in this natter, please let me knew.

Sincerely,
Enclosures Deanne C. Sieraer

157

GcNcRAl COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, 0. C. 70301

September 20, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Experimentation Programs Conducted by the

Department of Defense That Had CIA Sponsor-
ship or Participation and That Involved the
Administration to Human Subjects of Drugs
Intended for Mind-control or Behavior-
modification Purposes

On August 8, 1977 you requested that the Office of
General Counsel coordinate a search of Department of Defense
records to determine the extent of Department of Defense
participation in three projects identified by the Director
of Central Intelligence on August 3, 1977 as including the
administration of drugs to human subjects for mind-control
or behavior-modification purposes. In addition, you
requested that the search attempt to identify any other
project conducted or participated in by the Department of
Defense in which there was any Central Intelligence Agency
involvement and which included the administration of drugs
to human subjects for mind-control or behavior-modification
purposes. That search was conducted during the period
August 15, 1977 through September 15, 1977 and covered the
records of the Military Departments from 1950 to the
present.

The results of the search indicate that there were three
such programs in which the Army participated over the period
1969 to 1973; five such programs in which the Navy partici-
pated over the period 1947 to 1973; and no such programs in
which the Air Force participated. In four of these eight
programs the Department of Defense* participation was limited
to channeling funds to outside contractors in order that the
sponsorship of the Central intelligence Agency be covered.
In two of the remaining- four programs there was no testing
on human subjects. Four of the programs were terminated in
the 1950's, or early 1960's and the remainder were terminated
in 1973.

158

It appears from the documents that the three codeword
projects of the Central Intelligence Agency identified by
the Director in his testimony as basically Department of
Defense projects were, in fact, planned, directed and
controlled by the Central Intelligence Agency. Each of
these projects and the participation of the military
services is described below.

I. Codeword Projects Identified by the Central Intelligence
Agency

In testimony on August 3, 1977, before a joint session
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate
Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, the Director
of Central Intelligence reported that the Central Intelligence
Agency had located a number of boxes of documents, consisting
largely of financial records, relating to experiments using
human subjects in which drugs were tested for mind-control and
behavior-modification purposes. The Director testified that
it appeared that three of the projects described by these
documents — projects designated MKSEARCH, MKOFTEN and
MKCHICKWIT — were Department of Defense programs with which
the Central Intelligence Agency had had some contact. The
Director also described three other projects — designated
MKULTRA, MKDELTA and MKNAOMI — which were primarily Central
Intelligence Agency projects but which might have had some
Department of Defense involvement.

It appears from the available documents that these
projects cover subject matters as follows:

MKDELTA: This was apparently the first project
established by CIA in October, 1952, for the
use of biochemicals in clandestine operations.
It may never have been implemented operationally.

MKULTRA: This was a successor project to MKDELTA
established in April, 1953, and terminating some
time in the late 1960's, probably after 1966.
This program considered various means of control-
ling human behavior. Drugs were only one aspect
of this activity.

MKNAOMI: This project began in the 1950* s and was
terminated, at least with respect to biological
projects, in 1969. This may have been a successor

159

project to MKDELTA. Its purpose was to
stockpile severely incapacitating and
lethal materials, and to develop gad ge try
for the dissemination of these materials.

g" MKSEARCH: This was apparently a successor

project to MKULTRA, which began in 1965
and was terminated in 1973. The objective
of the project was to develop a capability
to manipulate human behavior in a predict-

» able manner through the use of drugs.

MKCHICKWIT or CHICKWIT: This was apparently
a part of the MKSEARCH program. Its
objective was to identify new drug
r developments in Europe and Asia and to

obtain information and samples.

MKOFTEN or OFTEN: This was also apparently
a part of the MKSEARCH project. Its
objective was to test the behavioral and
toxicological effects of certain drugs
on animals and humans.

Beginning on August 4, 1977, Army and Navy investigators
undertook a search of the boxes of Central Intelligence
Agency records identified by the CIA code words OFTEN and
CHICKWIT in order to locate documents relevant to possible
Department of Defense involvement in these projects. On
September 7, 1977, the Agency permitted DoD representatives
to search additional boxes containing MKULTRA records. Both
sets of materials consisted of approvals of advances of funds,
vouchers and accounting records relating to these projects.

II. Army ?roqrams

It appears from the available documents that the Army was
involved in one aspect of the Central Intelligence Agency
project designated as MKCHICKHIT and two aspects of a counter-
part project designated as MKOFTEN. The document search is
described in section A below, and each of the Army programs
is described in section B below.

A. Records searched

> The search of Army records was coordinated by the Director

of the Staff. The search included the files or the Edgewood

160

Arsenal Research Laboratories, the Dugway Proving Grounds,
the Department of Defense Investigative Service (with respect
to the Special Operations Division at Fort Detrick) , the
Department of the Army Inspector General, the Army activity

x,, in the U.S. Biological Warfare Program, and the Army

*"• Intelligence Agency.

B. Programs identified

(1) Identification of new drugs with behavioral
effects

This project began in 1967 and was terminated in 1973.
It was carried out primarily by a contractor in California.
The project was apparently funded jointly by the Army,
through Edgewood Arsenal Research Laboratories, and the
Central Intelligence Agency. The funds contributed by the
Agency were used by Edgewood for payments to a private
contractor. This project was a part of the project
designated as MKCHICKWIT.

This project was involved solely with the collection
of information. No testing on human subjects was conducted.
The Central Intelligence Agency apparently provided $12,084
in 1967 and $5,000 in 1969 for this project. The extent of
the Army's financial contribution to this project is unknown.

(2) Data bases on evaluation of pharmacological
products

This project apparently began in 1968 and was completed
by 1971. It was carried out by the Edgewood Arsenal Research
Laboratories. The Central Intelligence Agency transferred
funds to the Army for this purpose in 1968, 1970 and 1971.
This project was a part of the project designated as MKOFTEN.

Edgewood created data bases for computer use with respect
to information on pharmacological products. These included
human clinical data obtained from volunteer subjects in other
Edgewood projects, not connected with the Central Intelligence
Agency. These data bases were acquired by the Agency in an
effort to enhance its computer capability to detect and
nullify manipulation of U.S. personnel by means of these
materials. The two data bases provided by Edgewood, arising

161

out of its work, were supplemented by three other data bases
created by other contractors or the Agency. ^J

This project involved only the transfer of information
to computer usable form. No testing on human subjects was
conducted. The amount of funding is not known.

(3) Determination of clinical effects of a
glycolate class chemical

This project began in 1971 and was terminated in 1973.
It was carried out by the Edgewood Arsenal Research Labora-
tories and was funded by the Central Intelligence Agency.
This project was a part of the project designated as MKOFTEN.

It appears from the available documents that Edgewood
had been testing a number of incapacitating agents in its
own programs without Central Intelligence Agency participation.
Edgewood identified a compound designated as EA#3167 as
particularly effective and tested it on animals. Edgewood
also engaged in clinical testing on human volunteers at the
Holmesburg State Prison in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, using
prisoners as test subjects and at the Edgewood laboratories
using military personnel as test subjects. It appears that
all of the test subjects were volunteers and that stringent
medical safeguards and followup procedures were used.

In 1971, the Central Intelligence Agency reviewed prior
Edgewood work and identified EA# 3167 as relevant to the
MKOFTEN program. The Agency set up a joint effort with
Edgewood to pursue further testing of this compound. In
1971, the Agency transferred to Edgewood $37,000 for this
purpose. Most of the testing under CIA sponsorship was with
animals. The primary effort was to determine- whether EA23167
could be used effectively if applied to the skin through some
type of adhesive tape. There was only one experiment that
involved human subjects. In June, 1973, two military volunteers
were apparently tested using EA#3167. The documents do not
give any details with respect to these tests.

V The Navy contributed a similar data base to the MKOFTEN
project but it appears from the available documents that the
work to create the data base was undertaken as an independent
Navy project not designed for any CIA use, and that there was
no transfer of CIA funds to the Navy for this purpose.

1
1

I
I

162

C. Documents released

The Army has identified nine documents related to the jjj
programs described in Section B. A list identifying those

«* documents is set out in Appendix A. ti

ta. ' . ■ %

III. Navy Programs ' §

■ |

It appears from the available. documents that the Navy was |

not involved in any aspect of the Central Intelligence Agency f

projects designated MKSEARCH and MKCHICKWIT. It appears that 1

| the Navy did act as a financial intermediary through which the |

I Central Intelligence Agency dealt with an outside contractor |

that conducted one research effort that was a part of the |

MKOFTEN project. It also appears that the Navy conducted, i I

J directly or through contractors, five programs in which there |

i was Central Intelligence Agency sponsorship or participation |

! and which included the administration of drugs to human sub- |

jects for mind-control or behavior-modification purposes. The |

j records that were searched are described in section A below. f
| Each of the projects discovered is described in section B

' below. |

! A. Records Searched |

-*"

j The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy f

coordinated the search of Navy records. The search covered |

archival material with respect to the activities of the |

1 Office of Naval Intelligence, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, I

j and the Office of Naval Research. f

B. Programs identified

(1) Synthesis of analogs of certain central v
nervous system stimulants

This project began in 1971 and was terminated in January, |
1973. It was performed by a contractor located in Massachusetts.
The involvement of the Navy was only as a conduit for funds

between the contractor and the Central Intelligence Agency. |

, Some of the funding documents identify this project as a part |

I of project OFTEN. f;

! I

In December, 1970, the contractor contacted the Central |

Intelligence Agency project officer directly and suggested §

j research work on two types of drugs: analogs of DOPA and |

j .; dopamine and analogs of picrotoxin. After the work was f

£ undertaken, the contractor added a third aspect, the study of fi

163

analogs of the hallucinogen ibogaine. In March, 1972, the
contractor suggested enlarging the scope of the work to include
narcotic antagonists or blocking agents. One document indi-
cates that "The overall objective of these studies is to
synthesize new classes of phanhocdlogically active drugs
affecting the central nervous system so as to evaluate their
modification of man's behavior." (Doc. No. CIA-1.) The
purpose of creating analogs, rather than using the parent
compounds, was to find drugs "which will be more specific ir.
action as well as more reliable." (Doc. No. CIA-2.)

The Central Intelligence Agency may have transmitted as
much as $117,938 for this project to the Office of Naval
Research during the period February 26, 1971 through June 23,
1372. The Central Intelligence Agency authorization document
stated: "This project is funded through the Office of Naval
Research. This arrangement protects the Agency's association
with this area of research and provides the contractor with
credible sponsorship. The work will be unclassified, but
Agency association will be confidential." (Doc. No. CIA-1, 3.)

There is no indication in the documents available to
the Navy that human testing was performed by the researchers.
One of the documents reports: "The relative merits of the
synthetic compounds will be determined in mice, and informa-
tion as to the underlying biochemical basis for the observed
pharmacological activities will be deduced from the compara-
tive effects of the various compounds." (Doc. No. CIA-8.)

One of the researcher's progress reports indicates an
intention to publish the results of the first phase of this
work, on analogs of DOPA and dopamine, at a professional
meeting in the fall of 1972 but there is no indication that
publication was accomplished. (Doc. No. N-2.)

(2) Identification of nonaddictive substitute for
codeine

This project began in 1954 and was continued at least
until 1964. It was performed at the facilities of another
government agency located in Kentucky. The involvement of
the Navy was only as a conduit for funds between the Central
Intelligence Agenqy and a researcher who was associated with
a federal government agency. One of the funding documents
identifies this as part of project HKPILOT.

164

According to the information available to the Navy, the
purpose of the project was to find a nonaddictive substitute
for codeine. The work was done at the Addictive Research
.*> Center, U.S. Public Health Service Hospital, in Lexington,

** Kentucky. It is unclear from the information available

to the Navy whether the researcher was an independent scien-
tist using government facilities or a government employee.

It appears that the researcher tested some 800 compounds
on addicted patients. There is no indication in the documents
as to the number of persons involved or the compounds tested.
Three compounds were retained and all are now common drugs:
darvon which is used as a pain killer; dextromethorphan which
is used in cough syrup; and lomotil which is used as an
antidiarrhea drug.

The Central Intelligence Agency transferred at least
$282,215 to the Office of Naval Research for this program
with instructions to make the funds available to the researcher
at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital. The project costs
appear to have been between $34,000 and $45,000 per year.
These documents specify that "the interest of CIA in this
project is classified Secret and is not to.be revealed ... ."
( e.g .. Doc . No. N-18.)

(3) Identification of effects of blast concussion

This project began in October, 1954 and was terminated,
at least with respect to the Navy, in December, 1955. It was
performed by a contractor located in California. The involve-
ment of the Navy was primarily as a conduit of funds from the
Central Intelligence Agency to the contractor. A small amount
of Navy funds may also have been used for this contract. In
December, 1955 this project was terminated as far as the Navy
involvement was concerned and it thereafter apparently became
subproject 54 of the MXULTRA project.

While the Navy was involved with this project it did not
include any drug testing and apparently did not include any
testing on humans. The contractor wa3 investigating a new
theory of the dynamics of brain concussion. Fluid-filled
flasks were used to measure the effect of blast impacts from
a 2 1/2 lb. charge of dynamite 10 feet away. The results
of this work were published in 1957 in a 17-page report
entitled "On the Impact Thresholds of Brain Concussion."
(Doc. N-19.)
f

165

The Central Intelligence Agency transferred $20,000 to
the Office of Naval Research for use on this project. The
Office of Naval Research nay have contributed as much as
$5,000 of its own funds to this project.

In December, 1955, the contractor submitted a proposal
for a continuation of the research for 1956. In that
proposal the contractor pointed out that brain concussion "is
always followed by amnesia for the actual moment of the
accident" and suggested that "if a technique were devised to
induce brain concussion without giving either advance warning
or causing external physical trauma, the person upon recovery
would be unable to recall what had happened to him. Under
these conditions the same technique of producing the
concussion could be re-used many times without disclosure of
its nature." (Doc. No. CIA-4.) In discussing the techniques
envisioned, the contractor described non-drug means for
inducing concussion, but went on to describe a technique for
providing immunity to concussion that "involves the introduction
of a small quantity of gas, approximately 1 cc, into the spinal
cord." (Doc. No. CIA-4.)

When this project proposal was received, CIA decided to
convert it to the MKULTRA project rather than using the Navy
as a conduit for funds. A memorandum dated January 10, 1956
explained:

The first year's work on this program
was financed through the Navy for several
reasons ... .

When [the contractor) was cleared and
informed of our true interests in this
research, the whole scfpe of the project
changed, and it became apparent that
developments might be expected in the
second year which would make it impossi-
ble to operate the program securely under
the previous cover. Specifically/ human
experiments of a type not easily justifiable
on medical-therapeutic grounds would be
involved. ...

For the reasons given above and because
this project in a general way will begin to
become involved in the subjects of interro-
gation and some aspects of brain-washing,

166

TSS/CD has decided that it should be funded
through project KKULTRA rather than by less
secure rr.ethods.

(Doc. No. CIA-5.) The project thereafter became subprojec=
^ 54 of the MKULTRA project and there is no indication of furtner

A» involvement by the Navy.

(4) Administration of LSD to human subjects

This project began in 1952 and was apparently completed
by 1956. It was performed by a researcher located in New York.
Navy is listed as a sponsor in only one CIA document prepared
at a later date, and not otherwise corroborated. If Navy was
involved, it was solely as a conduit for funds between the
Central Intelligence Agency and the researcher. This project
has been identified as subprojects 7, 27 and 40 of the
MKULTRA project.

(5) Development and administration of speech -
inducing drugs

This project apparently began in 1947 and ended in 1953.
It was performed primarily by a contractor located in New
York and, in one aspect, by the Navy at a location in Europe.
The involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency was appar-
ently only as an interested observer. The project was funded
by the Navy through the Naval Medical Research Institute.
The Central Intelligence Agency records of this project are
apparently in the BLUEBIRD and ARTICHOKE project files.

The Navy arranged in 1950 to obtain marijuana and heroin
from the FBI for use in experiments and entered a contract
with a researcher in Ne** York to develop drugs and instrumen-
tation for use in interrogation of prisoners of war, defectors
and similar persons. The security cover for the project was
a study of motion sickness. The study began with six of the
researcher's staff as knowing volunteers. The project was
expanded to cover barbituates and benzedrine . Other sub-
stances were evaluated.

In August, 1952 the Office of Naval Intelligence informed
the Central Intelligence Agency that it had developed drugs
that might have the desired characteristics and was about to
test them on human subjects who would be unaware of the test.
The drugs were administered to about eight subjects, each of
whom was a Soviet defector, and each test was done in Europe

167

in September, 1952. The tests were apparently not satisfac-
tory because the drugs used had such a bitter taste that it was
not possible to keep the human subjects from knowing about
the test.

By September, 1952 it was apparent that this project was
not producing useful results and the Navy began to consider
ending it. By 1953 most work had apparently been phased out.

C. Documents released

The Navy has identified 42 documents which are related
to the programs described in section B. A list identifying
those documents is set out in Appendix B.

IV. Air Force Programs

It appears from the available documents that the Air
Force was not involved in any aspect of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency projects designated MKSEARCH, MKOFTEN and
MKCHICKWIT. It also appears that the Air Force was not
involved in any program in which there was Central Intelligence
Agency sponsorship or participation and which included the
administration of drugs to human subjects for mind-control
or behavior-modification purposes.

A. Records searched

The search was conducted by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Research, Development and •
Logistics. The Air Staff offices in which records were
searched are: The Surgeon General, the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Research and Development, the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations, and the Air Force Intelligence Service.

B. Programs identified

There were no records or information found relating to
projects designated MKSEARCH, MKOFTEN or MKCHICKWIT or
corresponding to the description of the subject matter of
those projects available through Central Intelligence Agency
files.

168

There were no documents or information found indicating
any CIA involvement in any experimentation program conducted
by the Air Force that included administration of drugs to
human subjects.

C. Documents released

None.

VI. Current Programs

There are no programs currently maintained by any
Department of Defense component or contractor involving
drug testing on human subjects in which the Central Intelli-
gence Agency is in any way involved.

All current Department of Defense programs involving the
use of investigational drugs on humans, including its contrac-
tor programs, have been approved by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration.

A^<L**U V.

*Au>;tuA,

Editor's Note: Due to the voluminous content of the appendixes
mentioned ir this memorandum, and in the interest of ecqhomy,
the material vas retained in the files of the subcommittee.

169 1

Senator Kennedy. We appreciate your testimony. We will try and
work, without taking a lot more of your time — I am sure you have very fl

many important things — just to try and resolve the basic kinds of J

conflicts, so that in our report, we are able, to the extent that we can,
to put some of these matters to rest. ■ a

You have been very, very responsive and very helpful to the com- |j

mittee, and we appreciate your presence here.

Senator Chafee. Maintaining the high standards of the Department _

of Defense. jj

Senator Kennedy. We will recess and gather in the anteroom in I

order to hear from Dr. Gottlieb.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.] m

[The hearing was reconvened in the anteroom.] J

Senator Kennedy. We will come to order.

I would ask if you would be kind enough to rise. ™

Do you swear the testimony you will give is the truth, the whole fl

truth, so help you, God? ^

Dr. Gottlieb. I do.

Mr. Lenzner. I wanted to say, on behalf of Dr. Gottlieb, how much fl

we appreciate the courtesies that the committee has extended in J

responding to his health and cardiac problems. I also want to express
our appreciation to the committee staff, to Dr. Horowitz, Walter ^

Sheridan, and Jim Mitchie for the assistance they have provided in I

reviewing the materials that the committee asked us to review prior to
Dr. Gottlieb's testimony.

The doctor has got a brief statement he would like to read with the fl

committee's permission because I think it help^ place in perspective li

some of the issues we believe the committee is interested in pursuing.

Senator Kennedy. The record will show that Dr. Gottlieb has been rj

sworn, and the attorney, Mr. Lenzner, has indicated that Dr. Gottlieb J

would like to read his statement. Then we will get into the question
period.

Dr. Gottlieb.

STATEMENT OF SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, M.D., FORMER CIA AGENT, AC-
COMPANIED BY TERRY F. LENZEB, ESQ., WALD, HABKBADEB &
BOSS, WASHINGTON, B.C.

• Dr. Gottlieb. M[y name is Sidney Gottlieb and I reside in Cali-

fornia. I am appearing at this hearing as I have appeared in others in
J ? the past, voluntarily and prepared to offer whatever constructive

^ testimony made possible by my background and remembrance of

things past.
I would like to first comment on project MKULTRA.
To the best of my recollection, several research inquiries — which
much later came to be organized under the cryptonym MKULTRA. —
were begun in about 1952. Their purpose was to investigate whether
and how it was possible to modify an individual's behavior by convert
means. The context in which this investigation was started was that of
the height of the cold war with the Korean war just winding down;
with the CIA organizing its resources to liberate Eastern Europe by
paramilitary means; and with the threat of Soviet aggression very
real and tangible, as exemplified by the recent Berlin airlift.

170

In the judgment of the CIA, there was tangible evidence that both
the Soviets and the Red Chinese might be using techniques of altering
human behavior which w»:re not understood by the United States
and which would have implications of national survival in the context
of national security concerns at that time. It was felt to be mandatory
and of the utmost urgency for our intelligence organization to estab-
^ lish what was possible in this field on a high priority basis.

To mention just a few examples, there was a concern about the
apparent manipulated conversions of Americans interned in Red
China for a very short time; there was also a concern about apparently
irrational remarks made by a senior American diplomat returning
from the Soviet Union; perhaps most immediate and urgent in our
minds was the apparent buying up of the world supply of, at that
time, little-known new psychogenic material LSD; lastly, there was
a growing library of documented instances of routine use by the
Soviet Security Services of covertly administered drugs. This list,
by the way, has grown and been added to up to the time lief t the CIA.

I accept full responsibility for my own role in these activities, in
relation to what my position in the CIA implied, as to my level of
responsibility as it changed over the years. At the outset, in the period
1951-57, 1 was head of a branch of a division charged with the respon-
sibility of looking into the matters which I described above. I set up
and handled soiue projects myself, and supervised and administered
other CIA employees monitoring other projects. As the years went
on and I assumed broader responsibilities, my personal involvement in
the projects lessened. Thus, my involvement was most direct in the
period 1951-57.

From 1957 to the end of 1960, I was not directly involved at all,
being assigned to other matters. I was stationed overseas 1957-59,
and was assigned to another unit in headquarters in the period 1959
to the end of 1960. Late in 1960, 1 returned to TSD to become Chief
of the Research and Development component; in 1962, I became
Deputy Chief of TSD; and from 1966 to 1973, 1 -vas Chief of TSD. I
retired from the CIA on June 30, 1973. 1 want to stress, however, that
a policy review of project MKULTRA and all of the projects I was
connected with took place at least once a year during MKULTRA
active period, which I remember as 1952-H55. In addition, as each
project was funded, approval in writing at least two levels above mine
were required in all research and development activities.

Project names, like Artichoke and Bluebird, have been mentioned
% in the press, associated with my name. My remembrance is that

Project Artichoke was managed by the Office of Security and that I
had no direct or indirect responsibility for it, although I became
aware of its existence and general nature over the years. Project
Bluebird, as I remember it, was also an Office of Security concept,
possibly never actually realized, which later evolved into a TSD-
sponsored activity looking into brainwashing, and ultimately included
the Society for Investigation of Humlan Ecology.

One unusual project started in 1952 and continued until about 1965
was an arrangement originally set up by me with the Bureau of
Narcotics. In this regard, I have previously furnished my recollections
of this matter during my 40-odd hours of testimony to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence — I did not mean to say that the
testimony was odd — but I am glad to discuss these matters again with
this committee.

lLJ

171

The origin of this Bureau of Narcotics activity rested in my becom-
ing aware, through reading OSS research files of an investigation
into the behavior-alternating possibilities of Tetrahydrocannabinol, a
synthetic material related to the naturally active constituent of mari-
huana, I was able to contact an officer of the Bureau of Narcotics who
had participated firsthand in the OSS investigations. With him, I made
"k an arrangement, funded by the CIA, whereby he would covertly ad-

minister chemical materials to unwitting people. The Bureau of
Narcotics, through this individual, had their own interest in deter-
mining whether chemical materials could be used to elicit or validate
information obtained from drug informants. The arrangement would
benefit the CIA's program in that information would be obtained,
unobtainable in any other way, on the effects of these materials used in
situations closely resembling those in actual operations.

* I have no personal awareness of specific individuals to whom these
materials were administered. To the best of my knowledge and remem-
brance, the materials administered in the great majority of cases under
the Bureau of Narcotics project were LSD and Meretran. I do not
have detailed information on the exact number of individuals in- m
volved, but the impression I have is that the number involved was J
between 20 and 50 individuals over the years of the project.

If I might interject here, that impression remains after studying
carefully the files that your staff made available to me. I

I would like to add that the Bureau of Narcotics project was the i

only one of its kind in the sense of trying to gain urgently needed in-
formation in the administration of materials in an operational context. |
Although it has drawn considerable attention in the news media, be- J
cause of its unusual nature, it was actually a very small part of an
overall program which took place in more conventional project, in the ™
more normal setting of universities and laboratories, as borne out by 1
the records shown to me by the committee staff. iJ

This committee might be interested to know that the total amount
of money spent on everything related to MKULTRA was limited to
10 percent of the total research done by TSD. To my remembrance,
at the height of the spending on MKULTRA-related activities, it
never even reached this percentage.

The great bulk of the research done under the general umbrella of
the Project MKULTRA took place in academic and other research
settings. These projects almost always represented work that the

* individual investigators would have been doing in any case. The
agency's role was to provide the funds and, in many cases, provide
access to the investigator if specific interpretation of his results in
terms of our interests were needed. To my recollection, in every case,
the results of the related research were published. I should add "where
appropriate." I cannot testify that everybody published everything
they did.

The degree of wittJngness of the principal investigators on these
projects varied depending on whether we judged his knowledge of
our specific interests to be necessary in providing useful results to us.
Thus, many projects were established in which the principal investi-
gator was fully knowledgeable of who we were and exactly what our
interests in the research were. Others were simply provided funds
through a covert organization and had no idea of ultimate CIA
sponsorship.

3*,

172

The degree to which individuals others than the principal investi-
gator needed to be witting of the agency's connection to the research
varied. It was generally left to the principal investigator to advise us
as to whether anyone else in either bis research tern or in the admin-
istrative part of the university or research organization needed to be
made witting to the agency's relationship. To the best of my remem-
brance, although for general security reasons we were eager to keep
this kind of information to a minimum, we went along with the

Erincipal investigator's desires and cleared and briefed whomever
e felt was necessary.

The general subject of why we felt it is necessary to user funding
mechanisms like the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology
or the Geschickter Fund for Medical Research needs some comment.
This involves the more general question of why we felt all of this re-
search needed to be kept secret insofar as Agency sponsorship was
concerned. The reason, however, it may seem with the benefit of
hindsight, was that we felt any potential enemies of this country
would be greatly benefited in their own possible future aggressive acts
against the United States if they were forewarned as to what the
nature and progress of our research in this field was.

The largest overall picture that can be given of th ; s group of aca-
demic and other formal research undertaking is that they were an
attempt to harness the academic and research community of the
United States to provide badly needed answers to some pressing
national security problems, in the shortest possible time, without
alerting potential enemies to the U.S. Government's interest in these
matters.

In all cases, research results were published through the normal
overt channels for publication of medical and physiological research.
I would like to remind the members of the committee that at this
point in history the amount of available reliable data on LSD and
similar materials was essentially nil.

I understand from reading newspaper accounts that one of the
principal interests of this committee in this kind of research is the
degree of protection that was afforded to the subjects used in those
experiments where human subjects were used. As far as the Bureau of
Narcotics project is concerned, my impression was there was no ad-
vance knowledge or protection of the individuals concerned. The
only comment I would like to make on this is that, harsh as it may
seem in retrospect, it was felt that in an issue where national survival
might be concerned, such a procedure, and such a risk was a reason-
able one to take. I would like to remind the committee again that,
as far as those of us who participated in this work were concerned,
this country was involved in a real covert war in the sense that the
cold war spilled over into intelligence activities.

Insofar as protection of individuals in the bulk of this work, as
represented by formal research projects, is concerned, the matter
of informed consent and protection to the volunteers participating
was left to each investigator according to the standards that either
he or his institution felt were appropriate to the situtation. Our
general feeling was that if we chose reputable and responsible investi-
gators, appropriate standards in this area would be used. I think,
in general, the procedures actually used in these experiments were

a* 1

173

representative of what was considered to be adequate safeguards
at the time.

I might add I fu'ly realize those standards have changed since then.

A comment should be made on the land of interest that the agency
had in these matters and how it may have changed over the years.
The original impetus for the work, as mentioned above, was the con-
cern that aggressive use of behavior-altering techniques against this
country by its enemies. Although this remained a continuing and
probably primary focus in the history of these projects, the agency
did become interested in the potential use of behavior modification
techniques in unforeseen circumstances that might occur in the future.

It is undoubtedly true that some of these research activities were
continued into the middle or late 1960's when, in looking backward
now, the real possibility of their successful and effective use either
against us or by us was very low. In fact, I remember writing a report
'when I was on detached assignment with another unit in the clandes-
tine services in about 1961 which concluded that the potential ef-
fectiveness of these techniques and the inclination of American in-
telligence officers to use them was limited. The only reasons I can
provide now for the continuance of a small number of these activ-
ities was that we felt we needed to be more certain than we were
of these negative results and also that we felt a need to maintain
contact with individuals knowledgeable in these fields to keep our-
selves abreast of what was happening.

I might add that I left out here, and I will freely admit to a certain
amount of bureaucratic inertia that always takes place in the shutting
off an ongoing activity. That certainly was a factor.

In conclusion, I would like to comment on three things which trouble
me very much about the situation I find myself in.

First, there have been many references in the press to attempts by
me to avoid testifying. These allegations are without any basis in fact,
either in terms of "hiding" or making myself unavailable to congres-
sional committees.

In the case of my testimony before the Church committee in 1975,
I voluntarily and immediately returned from India as soon as I was %.

made aware at the missionary hospital, where I was performing vol- fj

untary services, that I might be needed. I have been available for all a

legitimate inquiries at all times through my counsel.

Second, I feel victimized and I am appalled at the CIA's policy, f|

wherein someone or some group selectively pinpoints my name by m

failing to delete it from documents released under the Freedom of
Information Act without any permission from me. That is, my name i

is selectively left on released documents where all or most others are y

deleted. I have a great concern for past, present, and future employees
of the CIA involved in sensitive, difficult, and potentially misunder-
stood work, as this policy of selective disclosure of individuals' names ||

gets applied to them. I am sincerely concerned that the CIA's ability ^

to recruit clandestine assets in the future would be severely impaired.

Third, my concern is for the reputations of the many individuals
not employees of the agency, in academic and professional life who,
for the most patriotic and constructive of reasons, and guaranteed
both by myself and the Agency of confidentiality and nondisclosure, i

chose to assist the Agency in its research efforts over the past years. ||

By now, in today's climate, the association in the news media of any

174

name in the academic or professional world with CIA brings immediate
and automatic negative connotations and irreparably damages their
reputations. With regard to my testimony, I hope this committee will
understand my reluctance, except when absolutely essential, to men-
tion other names. I am desirous and willing to share my knowledge of
matters of interest to the committee that I have in my memory but,
**■ whatever the CIA's policies may be on this matter, I feel it is a point

of personal responsibility to honor the commitment of confidentiality
that I feel toward these individuals and not to be a party to further
damage their reputations.

In summary, I would like this committee to know that I considered
all this work — at the tune it was done and in the context of circum-
stances that were extant in that period — to be extremely unpleasant,
extremely difficult, extremely sensitive but, above all, to be extremely
urgent and important. I realize that it is difficult to reconstruct those
times and that atmosphere today in this room.

Another thought that I would like to leave you with is that should
the course of recent history have been slightly different from what
it was, I can easily imagine a congressional committee being extremely
critical of the agency for not having done investigations of this nature.

At this point, with, your permission, I would like to interject two or
three incidents very briefly to illustrate this point if you will permit
that.

Senator Kennedy. Fine.

Dr. Gottlieb. I did not write them here because they were not
recalled. One is on at least two occasions in the past, I and an associate
of mine briefed the physician of the then President of the United
States on the inherent dangers and alerted them as to what to look
for should a covert attack against the President of this nature be
made.

The second point involves an incident that happened not too
long ago where, m connection with a Presidential visit to a potentially
hostile country, is the best way I can say it, the physician along on
this visit, when he came back, reported some— I do not quite know
how to describe it — some unusual feelings he and several other
members of the party had, and an associate of mine, someone who
worked for me, with knowledge of this whole research, was able to
counsel with him as to what this kind of behavior might mean.

I just use this to illustrate but the bottom line on this whole busi-
er, ness has not been written as far as I am concerned.

In any case, it is my simple wish to be as helpful as possible to this
committee in obtaining its appropriate legislative goals, and I am
prepared to be as helpful and forthcoming as possible in the areas in
which you are interested.

Senator Kennedy. We will indicate at the outset that Dr. Gottlieb
is testifying pursuant to a grant of immunity. I think it is important
that the record reflect that.

Mr. Lenzneb. Thank you, sir.

Senator Kennedy. We will be glad to include it.

One point in terms of the availability, Dr. Gottlieb, you made
reference to that in your formal statement. The fact is, just in terms
of our inquiry, we were unable to get any conversation or any infor-
mation from you until we had the grant of immunity. We had other
agents who we had requested to come and who came. Others, we had
to subpena to come. But really you were the only one that — well,

175

others talked with us and would come back with a grant of immunity,
but you are tho only one who insisted on the grant of immunity to
come and talk. 1 do" not, want to make more of that than that state-
ment or comment, but I think, since you really brought this up in
terms of availability, I think probably the record ought to at least
indicate what our understanding of the availability would be.

Mr. Lenzneb. Senator, if I could comment on that.

Dr. Gottlieb, following our advice and counsel, strict advice and
counsel, has been available to congressional committees and other
sources pursuant to a grant of immunity. But he is relying on our
advice and counsel, not to discuss or waive any legal rights that he
might have prior to this formal legal process taking place. But he
did come in a day earlier at your staffs request to review these ma-
terials, and we have tried to be cooperative to the extent of 6 days of
testimony before the Senate Select Committee, and now his testi-
mony today.

Do you want to add anything to that?

Dr. Gottlieb. No.

Senator Kennedy. Before I get into the flow of the questions,
let me see if I understand one of the add-ons that you made in terms
of a Presidential visit to a foreign country. Upon his return, the
President and his party sought and counseled with you about the-

Dr. Gottlieb. Excuse me, it was not me personally. It was some-
one who worked for me.

Senator Kennedy. Associated with you. But they told you of this.

Are you suggesting that at least these people, the Presidential
party, were drugged by a foreign country?

Dr. Gottlieb. I am suggesting that they wanted to help them
review and determine whether that might have happened.

Senator Kennedy. Did they look into that? Did your associate
look into it?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. Did they make any judgment? ,

Dr. Gottlieb. I cannot give you a precise answer on that, nor am j

I sure it is appropriate for me to, but the fact is that I cannot. ^

Senator Kennedy. You could tell us if the

Dr. Gottlieb, I am going to try to be as responsive as I can. My fl

remembrance is that they decided it was an indeterminate thing ||

that long after the incident they could not, at least unequivocably,
conclude that this behavior was due to some covert drug. m

Senator Kennedy. Can you tell us what year this happened? |j

Dr. Gottlieb. 1 am not precisely fixed in the year. I would say
it was approximately 1971, approximately. ™

Senator Kennedy. So I gather the results were inconclusive. 1

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, that is my remembrance. I do not have a &*

sharp detailed remembrance.

Senator Kennedy. Would the other agency know that? fl

Dr. Gottlieb. I just do not know. I bring it up only in the context §§

of illustrating that we are walking in a margin here, on a border
where, you know, the relevance of work like this and the urgency of
where, you know, it, that the final answer possibly has not been
written.

Senator Kennedy. Well since you raised it. I am interested in the
specific circumstances which you raised here.

176

I think there are extraordinarily great implications on it about a
Presidential party. I think that that is something that is worth knowing
about.

Is the Intelligence Committee familiar with those

Dr. Gottlieb. I really do not know.

Senator Kennedy. Senator Chafee is on the Intelligence Committee.
I do not know whether or not you want to pursue this, Senator Chafee.
*£ We want to get back into our other areas, but I think it is worth at

least finding out more about this incident.

Just 'finally on this, is there any way you can describe to us the type
of behavior that was of concern to the Presidential party?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

My best recollection is that it was disoriented, unusual in terms of
the person's normal behavior. I can only give you a general description

of it;

Senator Kennedy. Is this just the Presidential party or did it
include the President?

Dr. Gottlieb. My recollection is that it certainly did not include
the President.

Senator Kennedy. The Presidential party?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. And specifically it included the physician
himself and some of his associates. You know, inappropriate tears
and crying, I remember was part of this manifested behavior.

Senator Kennedy. If we may go back a little bit, just in following
through your experience, Dr. Gottlieb. I think you tried to put this
program in some perspective, the program of drug testing on unwitting
subjects.

What was there about the times that caused you or your colleagues
in the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake that project, the
overall MKULTRA research project?

Dr. Gottlieb. The feeling that we had was that there was a real
possibility that potential enemies, those enemies that were showing
specific aggressive intentions at that time, possessed capabilities in
this field that we knew nothing about, and the possession of those
capabilities, possible possession, combined with our own ignorance
about it, seemed to us to pose a threat of the magnitude of national
survival — as I said, hard as it may be to imagine that in this room
at these times.

Senator Kennedy. You mentioned sort of concrete examples up to
the time you left the agency. Those concrete examples go right up
^ through 1972, 1973.

Dr. Gottlieb. My best recollection is that a unit in the agency,
the Counterintelligence Unit, who keeps track specifically of activities
of other intelligence services, keeps a running account of those in-
. stances, and the degree of reality to them. In other words, how well
they can be documented. I have looked at this file several times for
obvious reasons during my various responsibilities in the CIA, and
that is why I know it is both growing and real, and as far as I know,
up to the time I left the agency, current. In other words, what I am
trying to say is there are well-documented instances of this country's
potential enemies' specific use of covert drug administrations against
Americans and others.

Senator Kennedy. Your information is that it is continuing at the
present time?

177 1

Dr. Gottlieb. I cannot talk about anything after 1973.

Senator Kennedy. Up through 1973 though, covert drug admin- j

istrations were being used? _ J

Dr. Gottlieb. Tnat is my impression.

Senator Kennedy. That is your impression and your information? m

Dr. Gottlieb. I am afraid I might Ibe giving you a misimpression, J

Senator, and that is I am not saying they used LSD or psychogenic
material. I am saying that the general method of operation of covert ™

administration of drugs is well documented. fl

Senator Kennedy. Do you want to just tell us the type of things, ^

the most recent times that you were- — —

Dr. Gottlieb. I cannot remember them. The list is long. As I say, |J

it is impressive that way. The ones I remember, the specific remem- ||

brance 1 have are drugs which totally incapacitate individuals in a
manner so that documents can be stolen. In other words, basically m

insensate, and this would be, as I remember it, because it has been in 1

the press several times, American and other couriers and military
attaches have had this sort of thing happen to them.

Senator Kennedy. Are we talking about a handful of cases or are 1

we talking about hundreds, thousands? J

Dr. Gottlieb. We seem to have trouble with precise figures
because I do not have that in my head. In this particular one, I rs

realize this is a sensitive and important issue, and I do not want to y

make misstatements, so I would rather not use a number and be
imprecise.

Senator Schweiker, Could I ask, are you talking about a handful 1

or more than a handful? ^

I think we ought to have some

Dr. Gottlieb. If you mean by handful, five, it is a lot more than
that.

Senator Kennedy. You listed a long list in your earlier testimony.

Dr. Gottlieb. By long, I mean more than 20. I do not remember
how much longer.

Senator Kennedy. Can you tell us how and why the first safe-
houses were set up?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

To repeat briefly what I said in the statement, that after becoming
acquainted with the Bureau of Narcotics agent with an interest and
background in this, he and I worked out an administrative arrange-
ment, and I might straighten one thing out here that has appeared in
several places, "Both in the press and elsewhere, and that was that this
narcotics agent worked for CIA. As far as 1 am concerned, in my
remembrance of all of these matters, that is a total distortion of what
happened. He remained a very active and, I understand, effective
Bureau of Narcotics agent and administrator; that he felt that his
interest and ours could be successfully intermingled. And the nature
of the things that he did for us were indeed not things that he would
say, well, now, I am doing this for CIA. They were meant to be useful
in his own work, to the extent that he felt that way. I just want to
straighten that out. He never worked for CIA.

He was & member of another Government agency who was coop-
erating with us in using facilities that this agency did not feel they
could affpiv? or were relevant.

178

Senator Kennedy. But the fact is, is it not, that you really started
the program in terms of this— —

Dr. Gottlieb. Oh, yes, that is a fact.

Senator Kennedy. They were really started by you and George
White, Morgan Hall?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. v .

Senator Schweikeb. Were any of these agents paid by the CIA, or
:£ were all their salaries paid by the

Dr. Gottlieb. By agents — —

Senator Schweikeb. I mean any of the people involved in the drug
experiments, who administered drugs or ran the safehouSes, people
from the Bureau of Narcotics. Were any of them paid by the CIA
while they did this work?

Dr. Gottlieb. There was orve unusual period that I would be happy
to go into of no longer than 3 to 6 months that, due to special circum-
stances, I will relate to you as best I understand them, we did pay Mr.
White's salary.

As I say, just for a period of 3 to 6 months.

Senator Schweikeb. Any others, or is that the only one?

Dr. Gottlieb. No. That is the only incidence. I will be glad to
recoUect to you what I remember about that.

Sanator Kennedy. Well, as I understand it, Morgan Hall did work
for and was being directly paid by the agency for a period of approx-
imately 3 months?

Dr. Gottlieb. The main point I want to make is that he was paid by
the Bureau of Narcotics legitimately for all the other times. That is the
point I want to leave.

Senator Kennedy. But by the agency

Dr. Gottlieb. For this short period.

Senator Kennedy. When he was not being paid by the CIA, but
was involved in this program in terms of the safehouses, he was
effectively working for and with the understanding for the agency
itself?

Dr. Gottlieb. No; no — —

Senator Kennedy. As well as the Bureau of Narcotics?

Dr. Gottlieb. No; I do not think that is, in my formulation, the
way I would describe it at all, Senator.

Senator Kennedy. Well, you describe it then.

Dr. Gottlieb. He was a working active Bureau of Narcotics officer

going about his business and altering them insofar as he felt he could
elp us and still arrange his own affairs.
* Senator Kennedy. But he was running the program, the safehouse

in San Francisco, was he not?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. But the activities in the safehouse, whatever
information we were getting out of them, they all involved the Bureau
of Narcotics' interests.

Senator Kennedy. That is right. But they also involved CIA
interests.

Dr. Gottlieb. Oh, yes.

Senator Kennedy. Effectively, I would describe it, and this is a
matter of semantics, you would effectively describe it that Morgan
Hall was the operational arm of the agency in terms of the safehouse
in San Francisco — that is my description.

Dr. Gottlieb. I have to accept the way you describe it

5* 1 '

179

Senator Kennedy. I do not waat to put words- — si

Dr. Gottlieb [continuing]. To me, and I have no axe to grind now
in this area, there is no reason that I would want to make it appear fl

that he was not working for CIA, if he was. But the fact is and the ll

circumstances are, and I am fairly familiar with this corner of things,
that that just was not the case. m

Senator Kennedy. What was, his association with the saf ehouse in 1

San Francisco for that period of 10 years? ■■ il

Dr. Gottlieb. There is no question that he was the principal and
practically the only person that, through whom, CIA became aware f|

of those results from all of this that they felt they would be useful. I ' §j

am not trying to dilute or mitigate or alter the fact that Mr. White
was it as far as this program goes. The point I want to make though is ^

that these were always activities that the Bureau of Narcotics— — - ||

Senator Kennedy. Had some interest in?

Dr. Gottlieb. Had some interest in.

Serator Kennedy. He was still the conduit of very sizable amounts %

of money during all this period, was he not? ii

Dr. Gottlieb. No question about it.

Senator Kennedy. From the agency? m

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. U

Senator Kennedy. OK. :

In terms of your knowledge, did the leadership of the Intelligence
Agency understand this program, the MKULTRA, and did they
approve it?

Dr. Gottlieb. My answer to that, before you made available to
me the documents you have, would have been absolutely. Having |1

read the documents, you have documented evidence of that, I think U

you have the Director's signature on enabling incuments that got
this started, and as I mentioned in my statement, my remembrance i ^

is that there was a policy review of this project, at least once a year, ||

and more frequently than that later, and that people with responsi-
bilities broader than mine always approved specific projects and
specific expenditures of funds. As I say, my remembrance of this was fl

very much reinforced by all the signatures on the memoranda that I il

saw.

Senator Scmv iJiKER. In your testimony you said written approval ||

from persons at least two levels above you was required for each |f

project. What positions are you referring to when you speak of two
levels above you? ^

Dr. Gottlieb. The reason I put it that way, Senator Schweiker, is fl

that my own job changed. What two levels would be at any one time ^

above me would change. For instance, when I was a branch chief,
there would be more than two levels. The division chief would sign it, ||

and the chief of then called TSS would sign it, and I do not remember U

now but for certain levels of funds there woul4 have to be one or two
.signatures above bis, depending on what the size of the expenditure
was.

Also I specifically remember briefing the Director of CIA repeatedly
on these matters.

Senator Kennedy. Who were they? What was it and who were
they?

180

Dr. Gottlieb. I have to be careful that my remembrance was
accurate. It was certainly Mr. Dulles, Mr. McCone and Mr. Helms.

Senator Kennedy. Did you ever brief a President?

Dr. Gottlieb. No.

Senator Kennedy. Do you know if anyone briefed a President?

Dr. Gottlieb. I have no knowledge of that, Senator.

Senator Kennedy. Could we go on to the focus on the safehouse
operation.
g; What were the purposes of the safehouses — ^— ■■■

Senator Schweiker. First, may I interpose one question?

How about briefing Congress during this period? Would you have
briefed Congress or would you know that Congress had been briefed
on these projects?

Dr. Gottlieb. I really have no knowledge on that. As I under-
stand it, the congressional briefing procedures were run, that was done
by officers of the agency much higher than me, and we provided them
with information. I remember forwarding information of this kind.
They would decide what to use and what not. But I have no direct
knowledge that Congress was or was not briefed.

Senator Chafee. Could I ask one question?

It is my understanding that this whole operation was so sensitive
that the Inspector General himself did not know about it, is that
correct?

Dr. Gottlieb. The only light I can throw on that, Senator Chafee,
is that there was an inspection and, as I remember it, the year might
have been 1957, but if you will remember from my testimony that
was a period that I was disassociating myself with TBS. I was going
overseas. But there was one, and I really do not know what he was
shown. Certainly in the one I do remember, which was about 1961
or 1962, when I was back in TSD, the Inspector General had total
access to this program. What I am saying is before 1961 there was
an inspection in TSD about that time. These took place about every
7 years. Before that time I really am hazy on this point. I just do not
remember.

After that time, and including that inspection, I specifically remem-
ber the Inspector General being made privy to this whole program.

Senator Kennedy. As I understand, the Inspector General recom-
mended a termination of this in 1963 on the unwitting part of-

Dr. Gottlieb. That was not what he recommended, Senator.
What he recommended, Senator, was that the Director make a new
determination as to whether he wanted it to continue or not.

Senator Kennedy. He questioned, as I understand, in 1963, the
•?. testing of certain drugs on unwitting U.S. citizens, is that correct?

Dr. Gottlieb. As I say, his specific recommendation was that the
Director of the CIA be given an opportunity to again determine
whether this program should continue. So it certainly raises the
question.

Senator Schweiker. And did the program continue after that? Was
a new determination made by the Director?

Senator Kennedy. May I just finish on this?

What was your recommendation at that time, as to whether or not
it should be continued?

181

Dr. Gottlieb. This needs to be put carefully because, in the first
place, the precision with which I remember this does not allow for an
answer here. As I remember, I specifically remember meeting with
Mr. McCone at which I was present with a whole history of this
project, the pros and cons of continuing or not continuing it were
presented to nim for decision. The instructions that I received after
this meeting was that the Director was considering this problem, had
not made a decision, and specifically keep the facilities, but stand
down on the unwitting testing.

Senator Kennedy. What did you recommend? I understand that
to be the end result, at least in the documents that were made avail-
able. Principally, in a standby situation, what did you recommend?

Dr. Gottlieb. I do not think I can accurately testify on that
standpoint, Senator. My remembrance is that the pros and cons for
continuing it and discontinuing it were presented by us.

Senator Kennedy. You are familiar with the document for— — -

Dr. Gottlieb. Is that one we saw the other day? Because those
documents were very helpful to me.

Senator Kennedy. It is Intelligence Agency document, second
paragraph

Dr. Gottlieb. Senator^ I had not seen this.

Mr. Lenzner. We did not see that the other day.

Dr. Gottlieb. May we take 1 minute to read it?

Senator Kennedy. Sure.

Dr. Gottlieb. Senator, I have no problem with admitting that we
argued for the program.

Beading this document, I have no reason to dispute it was not m

written by me. ||

One point I want to make clear is that this was a meeting, as you
will see— not there for the purpose of deciding anything — it was a _

discussion of the whole project. |]

Senator Schweiker. Is it true Mr. Helms recommended the pro- ^

gram be continued, including the testing of unwitting subjects?

Dr. Gottlieb. Again, Senator, I want to be careful where people ||

other than me are involved because my remembrance is not that J

clear. I would honestly have to be shown a document like I was just
shown to refresh my memory sharply on the matter. m

And right now, I cannot testify precisely as to whether he as an y

individual said or felt or recommended it. m

Senator Schweiker. Was he your boss at the time?

Dr. Gottlieb. At the time these discussions took place? fi

Senator Schweiker. He was your boss as I remember it, and you II

said that at least two levels above yours were involved in decision-
making on this program.-,. , . m

Senator Kennedy. The documents show that both Dr. Gottlieb yj

and Mr. Helms recommended a continuation of the project.

Now, can we get to the purpose of the safe houses. ? ,

Were unwitting drug tests conducted there and how many were fj

conducted? ^

Let's talk about New York City.

Dr. Gottlieb. My answer to your question is, Senator, is that yes, IJ

unwitting administration of drugs took place there, and I say that iJ

because I never personally witnessed any but I received reports on it
happening.

i
I

1".

' I

1 ■ ■ " j

182

I am confident that it did. . $

That is what the project was set up for.

In response to your second question of how many, I testified after
carefuly looking over all the files, that were shown tome, by best guess
would be 25 to 50.

Senator Kennedy. Including New York's safe house and San Fran-
cisco's safe house.

Dr. Gottlieb. My figure refers to total over all the years.

Senator Kennedy. Over how many years?

Dr. Gottlieb. Well, as I say, it appeared that I feel this thing
was active, was 1952 to 1965.

Senator Kennedy. For 13 years you are suggesting that there were
only from 20 to 40 individuals or groups of tests?

Dr. Gottlieb. That is what I am saying my best remembrance is. -

Senator Kennedy. Individuals or groups of tests?

Dr. Gottlieb. Senator, my impression of what went on in the safe
houses was that there was a good deal of Bureau of Narcotics activity*
not related to drug testing mat went on and this, again, I want to
emphasize, is only an impression from talking to Mr. White mostly,
in that lots of potential informants -and other people related to the
Bureau of Narcotics activities were brought in and out of these safe
houses for operational reasons, and some of these individuals were
unwittingly administered these drugs.

So, I am not for a moment saying that as far as what you might
call operational encounters jsith drug enforcement and people related
to the Bureau of Narcotics operations, I cannot say now many of
those. I am talking about the ones that I have any reason to think
were administered drugs.

Senator Kennedy. But it was basically pretty much a joint oper-
ation, was it not, in terms of these safe houses?

Dr. Gottlieb. When you say, we need to be— for me to give pre-
cise answers to that — — .:

Senator Kennedy. Just in terms of the numbers.

As you are well familiar, having examined the checks during that
period of time, there were for the undercover operations for the two
safe houses, as I understand during this period of time, there were
more than 200 payments that were made*

This is just San Francisco — for more than $20,000— and the New
York one had considerably less. The bookkeeping, as I understand
from the records that were made available, Were much inferior.

How do you explain from where your name appears on a number of
those checks, on the authorization for the expenditures of these
matters, what does this mean to you in terms of these types of ex-
penditures?

It would certainly seem that these places were much more active
just with regard to payments than you would suggest.

Dr. Gottlieb. Senator, I understand your asking me for my
impressions and my best understanding on interpretation of the data
that these checks represent.

I am not disputing in any way that these checks were made, pay-
ments were made, some of them are hard to understand, that all of
them — all of these 200-plus seem to have generic title of — what were
they— not STORMY.

You said 29 or 39 or what?

183

Let's be careful here with the figures, 200-plus, and it referred to
amounts like $50 and $100 that have titles besides STORMY, like 1

operational purposes or something. I have no way or no reason to J

dispute that; in fact, they were used for operational purposes.

I do have a lot of confusion in my own mind that all of these so- ™

called operational purposes involved unwitting administrations. j

Let me make it clear, they may have. I have no reason to think
that. You asked me what my impression was ; my impression is derived
from all the information that I can remember about this. !|

Senator Kennedy. Well, could you tell us a little bit about li

STORMY?

Dr. Gottlieb. My remembrance is that STORMY was a method f%

of referringto LSD that Mr. White used. ||

Senator Kennedy. Would you tell us how extensive that was?

Dr; Gottlieb. Well, I think your staff can tell you that better than
I can because I know it only from the documents I read which they II

gave me, but I believe they said there were 32 STORMY connotations. H

I would agree that they probably represented at least attempts at
drug administrations. 11

Senator Kennedy. Many of the $100 checks, some of which are J

specifically marked for payment of undercover agents while admin-
istering STORMY and others, are not marked at au, were presumably ™
used for the same purpose because they were for the same amount, l\
cashed by the same people. ^

Dr. Gottlieb. What is the question, Senator?

Senator Kennedy. You are aware that many of the checks say fl

STORMY and those were LSD checks. Then we have some of those |j

200 checks that were to the same people, same amount, same period
of time from the CIA. ' ^

I am just wondering if you can add anything to what you think ;||

Dr. Gottlieb. My processing of that information. Senator, as I
said, is that they could be drug administrations, but you are asking
me what my impression of the total number is, and I think that fj

there is a difference between the $100 items that were handed out

and the actual cases in which drugs were administered.

Mr. Lenzner. Excuse me one second, Senator. H

Senator Kennedy. Go ahead. U

g'ause.]
r. Gottlieb. There is a point, Senator, that might have gotten a
little confused as we talked about this matter. That- is, that these
checks to which you refer, not written by CIA, they were certainly
using CIA funds. But they were actually written by Morgan Hall.

Senator Kennedy. Right. But as you just mentioned, they could
have been for drug testing, could they not?

Dr. Gottlieb. I certainly cannot say they were not. *

I have no way of saving that.

Senator Kennedy. That were kept up in the same accounting
process in the CIA, in the same series of files, made out to the same
people for the same amount during the same period of time, and there
are the 32 that referred to STORMY specifically— and we have
others that have MIDNIGHT and CLIMAX written on it. We are
trying to find out the extent of the amount

Dr. Gottlieb. I am not sitting here trying to minimize anything.
That is not my effort. I am trying to be responsive to your question
of what the total number of drug administrations were, and I think

184

•ye-

the key point here is a matter of interpreting that which is not precise,
namely, just what were those items used for.

I am persuaded, for instance, that every one of those $100 or $50
disbursements could have been situations where they thought they
might have used drugs.

I am persuaded of that, but I am not at all persuaded that they
were administered in every one of these cases.

There is no recollection I have nor have I seen tny concrete evidence.

Senator Kennedy. But the checks were cashed?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. These are returned checks.

Senator Kennedy. In your opinion, were prostitutes used by
George White for bis activities in the San Francisco safe house?

Dr. Gottlieb. May I put this question, Senator, also in a context?

Senator Kennedy. Sure.

Dr. Gottlieb. I notice only from things which Mr. White told me
and things which I picked up in association with him in his activities
over many years.

That is, that the general field of drug enforcement and narcotics
use prostitutes and addicts and in the method of operation of an
outfit like the Bureau of Narcotics, the element of prostitution is
interwoven in the whole matter.

So I am certainly persuaded that as far as safe houses are concerned,
there were prostitutes in them.

Senator Kennedy. And involved in the testing?

Dr. Gottlieb. I have no specific knowledge of that, I would say.

Senator Kennedy. What is your impression?

Dr. Gottlieb. My impression is yes.

Senator Kennedy. You are aware that photographic surveillance
and sound recordings were maintained?

Dr. Gottlieb. That is another matter which I think needs to be
talked about in something more than a yes or no answer.

When these safe houses were set up, I do remember the attempt
was made to equip them and the original intention was to have a
documented sound movie, you might say, so we would know some-
thing about the behavior of people when they were administered
these drugs.

To my remembrance, the movie part of it, although there was
equipment put in and tried, to my remembrance I never saw nor am
I aware of a movie made?

That does not mean there was not a movie made, but I find myself
having an objection to an element of pornography being put into
here, that is as far as I am concerned, was never there, namely some
aspect of collecting pictures of prostitutes for the fun of it.

To my knowledge that never happened.

Senator Kennedy. Well, they had authorization for the purchase
of two-way mirrors, for photographic equipment and sound record-
ingequipment. Was this paid for by the CIA?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. There was no question in your mind that there
was an intention of using it?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. And you do not know from your own direct
knowledge whether it actually was or was not used, is that correct?

185

Dr. Gottlieb. My impression was that as far as the movies are
concerned, that was not used.

Senator Kennedy. Well, anything else? Stills? Recording 1

information? si

Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my knowledge.

My remembrance is that the Bureau of Narcotics in their standard fl

method of operations, either with us or independent of us, used audio J

recordings of meetings with informants.

Senator Kennedy. Did the Bureau of Narcotics pay for this? ■„

I think the answer to that is no. 1

Dr. Gottlieb. You mean audio equipment used in safe houses? '-*

Senator Kennedy. That is right.

Dr. Gottlieb. No. I think the CIA paid for that. fl

Senator Kennedy. They paid for all of it? H

Dr. Gottlieb. That was considered a part of the CIA contribu-
tion. I have no argument with that. ?■

Senator Kennedy. They paid for it on the west coast as well as \

on the east coast? ' •■

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. Did you administer the drugs to any of your
colleagues or did your colleagues try out most of these drugs
themselves?

Dr. Gottlieb. There was a period that we have not talked about,
Senator, that preceded the establishment of these safe houses, and that
could have, you know, overlapped in that period when there was an
extensive amount of self-experimentation for the reason that we felt
that a first-hand knowledge of the subjective effects of these drugs
were important to those of us who were involved in the program.

Senator Kennedy. This is about the time of the Olson case — —

Dr. Gottlieb. It preceded that and probably continued for awhile
afterwards.

Senator Kennedy. Did that Olson case give you any cause to re-
think the testing program on unwitting subjects?

Dr. Gottlieb. It certainly did.

Senator Kennedy. If it did, what were the results of it?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think you can understand, Senator, that that was
a traumatic period as far as I am concerned. It was a great tragedy
and it did cause us to consult with the people that we felt were knowl-
edgeable in helping us make a judgment as to whether to go ahead or
not. .

It caused me a lot of personal anguish. I considered resigning from
the CIA and going into other work because it affected me that way.

Our final conclusion was to go ahead with the work on the basis of
the best advice we could get medically was that the casual connection
between LSD and the actual suicide was not absolute at all, that the
two were separated by a week or so. That it was a reasonable risk to
take, and certainly Mr. White was told about the incident.

Senator Kennedy. Now, just to get back to the numbers agai n

Senator Schweiker. May I follow this point up?

• After that Olson incident, why didn't you consider bringing in some

medical experts to exercise some sort of supervision of drug testing?

After all, there were two-way mirrors in the safe house, so it could have

easily been done. Medical personnel could have come to observe what

7 •

fil

186

was happening so if there were any suspicious that another Olson
incident was in the making, there would be someone on the scene to
provide medical help or assistance. It seems to me that some steps
should have been taken to prevent a future Olson case, and since you
had two-way mirrors, it seems to me that one simple feasible thing that
could have been done was to bring in a medical observer.
^ Dr. Gottlieb. My remembrance, Senator Schweiker, is that that

£* may well have happened. There was a physician, in both cases there

were physicians, to whom Mr. White was accredited to go, whenever
he felt he needed help or consultation or advice.

I cannot recount to you now how often and how much he sought this
advice.

Senator Schweikeb. Of course, it was not a matter of his needing
help and advice; the subjects of the experiments were the ones who
might have needed help. If you went through Mr. White, I am at a loss
to understand how a doctor could make a judgment once removed on
whether or not something ought to be done.

Dr. Gottlieb. That is not what I mean, Senator.

I mean that there may have been these physicians who were accred-
ited looking at it through the mirror. I just do not know. I don't
recollect.

Senator Chafee. I would like to ask a question if I might here.

You mentioned that in connection with the death of Mr. Olson,
you personally were very disturbed, and on the basis of medical advice,
as I understood what you said, the decision was made to continue
with these experiments.

Who got the medical advice?

Dr. Gottlieb. That is not quite what I meant.

I did not mean that someone told us to go ahead with them. That
would have been shirking responsibility.

Senator Chafee. What medical advice was received?

Dr. Gottlieb. As I say, I beg your indulgence as far as revealing
names here, for the reason I mentioned in my opening statement.

If I can say this without revealing names, there were two physicians
who knew more about LSD than anyone else at this time as far as we
are concerned, on the east coast, that there were several meetings
held with them, and in the decision that was made, their input into
this was that the relationship between LfT) and Olson's df-ith was
not necessarily causal.

Then a decision had to be made, was it important enough to take
* whatever risks remained after that?

K - Senator Chafee. Do I understand from your conclusions here that

when all is said and done, you did not get much out of this program?

Dr. Gottlieb. That is hindsight, Senator Chafee, that at the time
you were talking about we did not have

Senator Chafee. That is right, but the part that I find interesting- -
and you did not know it, obviously, until you finished the program —
but when you finished the program, you came to the conclusion you
did not get much out of.it.

Yet, in your statement you mentioned there is a growing library qf
documented instances of routine use by the Soviet Security Services
of covertly administered drugs.

Have they succeeded where we have not?

Dr. Gottlieb. That is hard to say.

187

That is why I made the statement that the bottom line has not
been written on this.

My estimate and please remember that I am at least 5 years out of
date in following this field, and having access to classified information
and so on, but at the time I left the CIA, my conclusion would have
been that the probability of them using psychogenic materials in a
finely tuned way to alter behavior was very low on the basis that we
found it was very hard to do.

What I really— what really happened to people when they were
under the influence of these mind-altering or psychogenic drugs was
very variable, very unpredictable. The statement about the growing
list has to do with the general method of operation where you unwit-
tingly administer drugs.

The drugs that I remember mostly used in these documented cases
were more in the knockout— —

Senator Chafes. Sort of macelike?

Dr. Gottlieb. Not mace.

Senator Chafes. I do not mean mace specifically.

Dr. Gottlieb. Much more subtle than mace in the sense of render-
ingthe individual unconscious so you can manipulate him.

That is a form of manipulation, so you can take his papers.

Senator Chafes. There is nothing subtle about this. %*

Dr. Gottlieb. It is subtle to do this successfully, covertly, materials ||

have to be in small enough quantities, tasteless, and in fact, I remem- ^

ber— this is a vague remembrance, so don't hold my toes t« the fire on
the details of it— but there was some mention in these files I referred ! ]

to about a system, a potential enemy use, where they put a sort of J

pipe under the door of a sleeping target and ran gas in, which would
essentially anesthesize them, but had no odor so he would not be ^

alerted to it. J

And during this anesthesia, they would come into bis room and
search it and take his documents and so on.

But what I want to say, Senator, that is the sort of administration 1

I mean. That is the sort of administration I mean. ^

Senator Schweiker. After the Olson case, Dr. Gottlieb, were you
given any warning from anyone about what had happened here and fl

what should be done in the future, to your recollection? H

Dr. Gottlieb. I have not seen papers relating to that in quite
awhile, Senator, but my recollection is that there were certainly dis- ™

cussions, certainly, about terminating the program or going slow. I

I do not want to make any inferences from your question, but my "**

direct answer to your question is that I remember discussions like that.
I certainly do not remember anybody telling us to stop the program f|

and knock everything off. U

Senator Schweiker. Well, in documents provided to us for the
hearing in August which we conducted jointly with the Intelligence m

Committee, we learned, and I quote, ||

On February 12, 1954, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency wrote
Technical Services Staff officials criticizing them for "poor judgment" in admin-
istering LSD on "an unwitting basis and without proximate safeguards" to Drt
Olson and for the lack of "proper consideration of the rights of the individual" to
whom the drug was administered. On the same day that these individuals received
critical letters from the DCI, the Inspector General reviewed a report on Sub-
project 3 of MK-ULTRA. In that report, the same CIA officers who were criti-*
cixed were quoted as to the purposes of Subproject 3— the observation of unwitting
persons who had been questioned after having been given a drug.

1 188 *

Based on that information, it would seem to me that the whole top
level of the Agency was critical of what happened in terms of un-
witting testing and pretty much said, "Do something differently,
' tak e safeguards, and proceed with caution— if you proceed at all. 1 '

I am not clear on what really happened after that message from

I the DCI, because it appears that the testing went on in just about

: the sameVay as it had before, without safeguards. Nothing changed.

^ Dr. Gottlieb. I do not know that I can help with the specifics,

C wh at really took place and what happened. I will only repeat what I

J do remember very clearly, Senator, but this program was reviewed

once a year and my own remembrance, and as responsive as I can

be to your query, we are talking about something that happened 23

years ago — —

Senator Schweiker. I think you will surely agree that, expecially

after the Olson incident, it was something that was indelibly etched

I in your memory during that period of time. You must recall what

happened.
1 Dr. Gottlisb. Yes; that the upper echelons of the agency were

thoroughly aware that the program was continued.
I I cannot rationalize for you what happened specifically after the

] memorandums you are referring to. .■»—*

Senator Chafee. Could I ask one question related to that, Dick?
I Along with these critical reviews by the Inspector General, and the

| death of Mr. Olson, do you remember any additional safeguards

. being- taken to protect the subjects as a result of these actions, or
didn't you believe that additional safeguards should be taken?
1 Did these just go along in the same manner as they had before?

1 Dr. Gottlieb. Aside from, as I say, pondering on the whole ques-

tion, and alerting people who were involved about what had hap-
pened, I cannot respond to your question any more specifically than
j that. '

Senator Chafee. By alerting, you do not mean alerting the sub-
jects, though?
j Dr. Gottlieb. No.

Senator Chafee. You still had unwitting subjects, so as best you

can recall, despite the concern that was shown over the death of Mr.

I Olson and the fact that you got medical testimony in which the

j whole subject of the tie-in between LSD and Mr. Olson's death

was discussed — despite all of that, things went on just as in the

I past as far as unwitting subjects were concerned?

j Dr. Gottlieb. Well, if you add to that statement, Senator, that

^ there was a lot of serious discussion about whether to go on or not,

~ my answer would be yes.

Senator Chafee. The decision was, don't change anything?
I Dr. Gottlieb. Well, the best I can respond to that, that seems to

be the case.
j Senator Kennedy. Just in this area, again, to get back to the

j numbers of people that were actually tested, you were out of the

country for a period of 5 years

I Dr. Gottlieb. Actually 2 years.

j Senator Kennedy. Two years.

1 Do you know what was going on in the safe houses then?

Dr. Gottlieb. I have no recollection of that at all.
j ' Senator Kennedy. Would you assume, that there was testing

i during this 2-year period?

as-

189

Dr. Gottlieb. I assume that. ^

I think some of the checks— well, there is no question about that.

Senator Kennedy. The thing that I find troublesome is that with 11

the sense of urgency that you placed on the program from tie begin- H

ning, the priority that it had in terms of the directors, die brief-
ings that had taken place, the reviews of the various programs, the m
indications that you were for continuation of the program and the I
urgency that you placed even in terms of your testimony here today, " J
why you believe that there were only 30 individuals who were actually
impacted or affected over a period of 14 years.

There is difficulty, I find, in taking both of those, juxtaposing
both of those kinds of statements or comments, particularly against
a background where we have scores of checks to. the same people,
kept in the same file, with a strong possibility for same services.
And you have reservations about the breadth of the program.

I mean, 25 is just 2 a year, 2 individuals, 1 on the east coast and 1
on the west. I just think that that is difficult to accept.

Dr. Gottlieb. I am just trying to respond, Senator, appropriately
to you, to your question.

Senator Kennedy. Fine.

Dr. Gottlieb. In the first place, as far as the general concept of
where this fitting into the overall program, it was conceived of sort
of the last thing that might be done to get useful information.

It was not a numbers game. It was not a question of doing this
hundreds of times.

As far as rationalizing the number of checks with certain amounts
of money with them against estimates I told you about, I think I
am mostly basing my impressions on those times that I was aware
by Mr. White telling me that one of these had taken place.

Again, I want to reiterate I cannot testify that it was not admin-
istered 200 times. There was this point about the east and west coast.
Please remember, actually the tunes that 2 safe houses existed at
once were over a fairly short period.

Senator Kennedy. We will just put in the record the numbers
of cashed checks and numbers of payments during that period of time.

Let me move on.

Mr. Lsnzneb. Will the record reflect that there were 32 checks
that were designated as Stormy checks, because the witness has
testified — —

Senator Kennedy. We will print all the checks in the record, and
the numbers for each period of time, and the numbers which indicate
Stormy during those years as well.

Mr. Lenzneb. Thank you.

Senator Kennedy. Was the FBI involved in any of these programs?

Dr. Gottlieb. I am hesitating, Senator, to be sure I give you, a
considered answer. —

My off-the-hat answer would be not to my remembrance.

Senator Schweikeb. To your knowledge, did any of the unwitting
victims require hospitalization?

Dr. Gottlieb. You are talking about domestic activities, now?

Senator Schweikeb. In the safe houses.

Dr. Gottlieb. I have a remembrance, I have onlv a hazy remem-
brance of that having happened once in New York City.

Senator Schweikeb. Did you have other details about any such : I

incidents? Can you tell us anything more about that case? u

190

Dr. Gottlieb. No, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Can you tell us what was learned from the years
of the operation of the safe house?

Was it useful?

What can you tell us?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think what we learned from the safe houses was
more about what you could not do than what you could do. That was
as relevant as positive information.

I think the conclusion from all the activities, was that it was very
difficult to predictably manipulate human behavior in this way, and
that would be a summary statement I would make.

Senator Kennedy. Obviously, you believed that the Soviets or
other adversaries were doing it, as I understand it?

Dr. Gottlieb. We believed they might be doing it, Senator. I have
tried to be very careful in explaining to you why we felt that.

Senator Kennedy. Just with regard to the usefulness of the infor-
mation, did the lessons that were learned in these houses have any
operational use?

Dr. Gottlieb. I would have to say yes.

I think we would have been in a far worse position in terms of being
able to brief "j the President's physicians before these trips, to field
inquiries about this area, without it.

Senator Kennedy. Do you know whether it led to the covert use
of drugs by the Intelligence Agency?

Dr. Gottlieb. I was advised by your staff that the area of the
overseas use of these drugs was not one of your primary interests.

Is that accurate?

Senator Kennedy. Well, the details of it.

But I think if you could answer whether you know if information
that was developed in these safe houses was used for covert operations
overseas without getting into countries or without getting-

Dr. Gottlieb. My answer would be yes.

Senator Kennedy. Can you tell us the extent of it?

Dr. Gottlieb* Well, the best response I can give to that, because
we are in an area here that I do worry about being precise about, but
I would like-

Senator Kennedy. If you do nofr — —

Dr. Gottlieb. Suggesting — I suggest you ask CIA which has that
information.

Senator Kennedy. Well, could we turn then

Dr. Gottlieb: May I add one thing?

Senator Kennedy. Sure.

Dr. Gottlieb. This area was gone over in extensive detail by the
Church committee.

Senator Kennedy. Fine. That is fine.

Dr. Gottlieb. I testified fully on it.

Senator Kennedy. Can we turn to some of the other MK-ULTRA
projects.

I)id you know Dr. Geschickter?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. What did he do for the CIA?

Dr. Gottlieb. I would divide the things which Dr. Geschickter did
for the CIA in three parts.

-**

191

I want to say right now that from my remembrance of our relations ||

over a good number of years, Dr. Geschickter is exactly one of these
individuals I was referring to who, out of the most patriotic and ^

constructive motives chose to help us, and I' have a deep concern for |

what may have happened to his reputation as a result of the dis- ^

closures that have been made.

But I would divide this in three parts: ft

In the first place, the Geschickter medical fund was a conduit for j

funding other projects, and was very useful in that way, some of which
the purposes— some of which as far as we are concerned, the reasons m

why we wanted to do it, Were made aware to him and some were not. %

The second use we made of Dr. Geschickter was he had his own **

medical interests that were based on his interest as a pathologist in
cancer and arthritis and hypertension and several other things. %

We were interested in materials which he himself was experimenting ||

with in terms of some of the effects, side effects sometimes, that had
to do with what we called material like the kind I mentioned, we had m

evidence others were using, knock out material and psychogenic |i

materials, and so that was the second .purpose.

The third purpose was to use Dr. Geschickter who was close to us
here in Washington as general consultant. I and other individuals that i|

worked with me would often go down and discuss a problem that we i*

had and get his help in thinking through what the correct and appro-
priate approach would be. f|

Senator Kennedy. But he was a witting participant in the activities } J

of the agency.

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. ™

Senator Kennedy. We went over in the course of pur hearings if

yesterday, the development of the Agency's relationship with George- : *

town University.

Can you tefl us what were the Agency's intentions in getting |I

into that project to build the wing? II

Dr. Gottlieb. Most of what I can say that I feel were the — give
you useful background rest on what I read the other day. m

This happened a long time ago. But my remembrance was that we j

considered our relationship with Dr. Geschickter a very valuable
one for the reasons that I mentioned, and that the contribution to
the wing was generally considered a way in winch we could insure a f|

connection with him over the years, to have these kinds of services <*»

available to us.

Senator Kennedy. Were you doing it to make Dr. Geschickter ?|

happy? i

Did you have a purposeful kind of project in mind?

Dr. Gottlieb. As I remember, having my memory refreshed by
what I read, we had in mind a local facility, a local facility at which
work could go on, and I want specifically to exclude unwitting testing
from this because that was our intention here, with the kind of work
that went on in other more formal MK-ULTRA projects could go
on close at hand, that we could visit and see and talk to.

That was the general concept.

Senator Scbweikeb. Did it, in fact, happen that way?

Dr. Gottlieb. It did not.

192 ""■•■ f

Looking back at it in retrospect, and reading these files in retro- I

spect may seem— in fact, the plans that were made to actually have §

a facility at which formal and institutional research would go on, in |

areas of interest to us, was just never realized. |

Senator Kennedy. You gave the money, though? I

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. 1

Senator Kennedy. They did, in fact, contribute $375,000. |

What benefits were derived to the Agency from that? |

Dr. Gottlieb. I would have to say m retrospect, the only benefits |
that the Agency derived was maintaining productive relationship
with Dr. Geschickter, himself. *

Senator Kennedy. There was not any research done at the hospital?

Dr. Gottlieb. To my knowledge as a result of building that wing, I

no. " |

Sent cor Kennedy. Well, the Director says he thought that was ^ f

absolutely incredible that the Agency would 1>e involvea in that. I

Dr. Gottlieb. My response to that is, I do not know how to re- |

spond to that. I

I guess the Director is entitled to his reactions.

Senator Kennedy. He thought, as I would gather from his testi-
mony, that it was incredible that they would have put up the money
and then not at least have derived some degree of benefit from this
amount of money in it.

Dr. Gottlieb. I can give you a philosophical answer to that, |

Senator, but I do not kno w how helpful it would be. f

Senator Kennedy. Why do we not, if we could, go to the questions

of files. |

We had a lot of testimony yesterday about the way records were f

kept in the CIA. !

Senator Schweiker. Have you finished your questions on the
Geschickter relationship?

Senator Kennedy. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. I have a couple of questions on that. ■ \

Along the same line that Senator Kennedy was pursuing with re- |

gard to the hospital wing, Subproject 35 of MK-tJLTRA, we have |

ere a memorandum from the CIA files. |

It says that in the event of Dr. Geschickter's death, the projects I

will continue: "any activities under this project will be continued 1

through the Geschickter Fund and will be unaffected by his death." * \

■ ; The memorandum also gets very specific about what the CIA will |

V get in return for its contribution to the building fund. I have trouble jj

reconciling statements like these, cited by the CIA in their files, with ^ ^ \
what you just said about the relationship between CIA and Dr.

Geschickter. ■'■'■..'.■ 1

Dr. Gottlieb. My response to that is to focus— the main point I j

was trying to make is that there were* plans made and expectations j

made when this money was transferred that simply did not happen. j
I thinks those were our intentions when the project was made, and

they just were not realized. j

Senator Schweiker; Well, also, in the same document, it says: j

A memorandum of agreement will be signed with Dr. Geschickter outlining to
the greatest extent possible the arrangements under which the hospital space
under his control will be made available to Chemical Division personnel and the
manner in which cover will be provided and other benefits obtained. The memo-
randum of agreement will be returned in TSS.

u.';)

■ ■ . . m ■ 1

What is your response to that?
- Dr. Gottlieb. I read that memo the other day. fi

My response to that, as best as I can recollect, the intentions were ;J

to do just what you read, to get such a memorandum of agreement.

I am not aware that that was ever actually done, Senator. ' «*

Senator Schweiker. You do not have any recollection of such a i

memorandum of agreement? , sJ

Dr. Gottlieb; I have &good recollection of the memorandum you
read, Senator. fl

Senator Schweiker. What about the memo referred to in the ||

document I just read from?

Dr. Gottlieb. The memo of agreement that Dr. Geschickter actually ^

signed or any implementation of the series of events that you read I

from that memo **

Senator Schweiker. Did you ever discuss such a memorandum of
agreement with Dr. Geschickter? ft

Dr. Gottlieb. I was not dealing with Dr. Geschickter at the time. fj

Senator Schweiker. You were not?

Dr. Gottlieb. I personally was not. ^

Senator Schweiker. This project was under your direction? i|

Dr. Gottlieb. It was. The man that worked for me dealt with it. **

Senator Schweiker. The project descriptions said three CIA
biochemists or scientists would be provided cover as one of the benefits 1 1

the Agency would get in return for its contribution. H

Were they, in fact, provided cover by this project?

Dr. Gottlieb. I would have to answer that the way I did before, %*

these things were never implemented. ||

Senator Schweiker. That was not implemented either?

Dr. Gottlieb. No, sir, to the best of my recollection. ^

Senator Schweiker. How was the funding for this wing handled? :j

In other words, how was the $375,000 payment made? '-"..' *»

Dr. Gottlieb. I do not remember the fiscal details.

My remembrance was helped by reading these files the other day —
was the question of whether the CIA could legally do this certainly
came up, and extensive legal opinion and approval right up to the
Director was received for it.

But as far as the details of how the money was transferred to the
university, aside from the fact that it was put in the Geschickter Fund
as an intermediate step or there may have been other intermediate
steps depending on what techniques they used, I am not specifically
awareofthat.

Senator Schweiker. Dr. Geschickter said yesterday that funding
was provided by either "a" Philadelphia Foundation, or "the"
Philadelphia Foundation.

I wonder if you could shed some light on that?

Dr. Gottlieb. I have no recollection on that.

I want to make it clear, I am not disputing Dr. Geschickter 's
statement.

But I remember no details about a Philadelphia Foundation.

Senator Schweiker. Why did not these plans come off?

We have a very elaborate project description, with pretty detailed
planning. It was approved at the highest levels of the Agency. A lot of
money was spent. By all indications, the project seemed to nave very
high priority, as an important integral part of your program.

3 ■" ■ ■ 194

Here is a very detailed, specific memorandum containing the justifi-
cations for it. Why did not the plans come off ?

Dr. Gottlieb. May I have my memory refreshed on the date of
that memorandum?
i Senator Schweiker. Yes.

{ Dr. Gottlieb. Because I think that is relevant to my giving a

^ responsive answer.

- ; Senator Schweikek. It looks like the dates have been sanitized. §

! Dr. Gottlieb. My suspicion is that the period after the event I

■■■' you talk about may have happened When I left. |

Short of being reminded of the date, my response to you, Senator - •» ■ |

j Schweiker, would be that I would have to say probably here expecta- |

| tions of either finding people to do this, qualified people who were I

trained medically and technically to do this work, could have turned |

l out to be very hard to do, or it could have been, also, that the whole ^ |

. thing, faced with the reality of implementing it, could have seemed |

" : " like an infeasible thing to do. |

I also want to add that efforts to implement research, particularly
I with the complexities, the extra complexities of this kind of cover and

j so on, I mean with research efforts they often are expensive and do

not yield results.

Senator Schweiker. That would have been perceived before the |

j project was designed approved, wouldn't it? You do not have to be an |

expert in spying to figure out that doing these kinds of things at |

Georgetown University would present some horrendous problems, |

j particularly if you were going to try to do it on an unwitting basis. jj

i I have to believe those problems were known before the project

was OK'd and that they certainly were taken into account before |
it was approved. Still, notwithstanding all of these things that you
are pointing out now, the files indicate that the plan was to go full
speed ahead with this project.

, Dr. Gottlieb. I really do not know how to respond to your query. f

Senator Schweiker. We have the date on the document you asked f

' about — I believe it's 1955. - |

Dr. Gottlieb. I did not think that would change my response. I

'-' Senator Kennedy. The Senator has been good enough to yield. |

I I just have a couple remaining areas, Dr. Gottlieb. |

One is on the area of files. |

sj We had a lot of testimony yesterday about the way the files were » |

j kept in the CIA. |

* Some people talked about two sets of files, one detailed summary of I

the project, and another boilerplate. . # I

f The boilerplate had various meanings. It was unclear whether it |

d represented an accurate summary or a misleading summary. 1

Gould you help clarify the recordkeeping system at the Agency? f

; Dr. Gottlieb. As far as I am concerned, based on the files that I |

] looked at Sunday, those files in the sense of a fiscal interest, with |

justifications that were involved in the Agency's regulations at the |

, time were reasonably accurate. |

I Your reference to boilerplate could be interpreted in several ways 1

' I will do it in my own way. I

I am not aware from reading those that there was, either a purpose-
uj "«■■ ful misrepresentation in what you are calling boilerplate, nor was

[A there an inference that this was one of two sets of files.

195 I

The two sets of files that I understand would be, one, the files that
you now have; and two, substantive set of files which contain a lot 1

more technical detail. ||

Senator Kennedy. Do you feel the summary documents, the ones
with your name on them, always represented the core or essence of |»

truth of what was going on in the particular project? \

Dr. Gottlieb. I looked at a lot of files, Senator.

I would say in a general statement, the answer is yes.

Senator Kennedy. Can you tell us about why you destroyed the fl

files, and which ones you destroyed? y[

Dr. Gottlieb. May I read a statement that I made?

I think it will be the shortest way to answer that. ft

I made this before to the Church committee, and there has not been !|

anything changed in respect to this.

There were three reasons. _

One, as with the other files which were destroyed in a continuing i

and important CIA program of files destruction to handle a burgeon- »

ing paper problem there was constant pressure to retire files and to
destroy those files which had no further use. H

Two, with my retirement and that of others connected with this ||

work, and with the drug work over and inactive for several years,
these files were of no constructive use to the Agency. They were the
kind of sensitive files that were capable of being misunderstood by
anyone not thoroughly familiar with their background.

Three, the files contained the names of prominent scientists,
researchers, and physicians who had collaborated with us and who fl

had been assured that their relationship with CIA would be kept ||

forever confidential. I felt that the careers and reputations of these
people would be severely damaged or ruined, for instance, in today's $*

climate of investigations, if their names and CIA connection were J

made public. I felt a special deep personal obligation to respect this
assurance of confidentiality and to make as certain as I could that
these particular CIA sources would never be revealed. f|

I am sorry, I left out the preamble. *J

In late 1972 and early 1973, I began to systematically clean out
and destroy files and papers which we felt were superfluous and not |i

useful, relevant, or meaningful to my successors. U

In the case of the drug files, I specifically checked with my supe-
riors to obtain authorizations and concurrence to destroy these files.

My reasons for feeling that they should be destroyed were essen-
tially threefold and had absolutely nothing to do with covering up
illegal activities.

Senator Kennedy. I would imagine if these were just paperwork
you would not have to check with a superior, would you? This was
something more involved than just eliminating paperwork, was it not?

Dr. Gottlieb. I tried to make clear I was aware there was more
involved, that is why I checked

Senator Kennedy. Who did you check with?

Dr. Gottlieb. I checked with Mr. Helms, who was then Director.

Senator Kennedy. Did he order the destruction?

Dr. Gottlieb. Certainly did not order them, he concurred.

Senator Kennedy. You requested they be destroyed-

Dr. Gottlieb. No, no.

186

I requested, I was really asking his authorization to destroy them.

One needs to make a decision always as to what you need to go to
your superiors for.

Senator Kennedy* You felt you should on this one?

Dr. Gottlieb. -Yes.

Senator Kennedy. So, certainly, the paperwor aspect was not
*» really the overriding concern that you had. It was these other reasons?

** Dr. Gottlieb. No, I would have to add that that was the motive

behind my-going through all my files.

Senator Kennedy. You are not trying to leave the impression that
that was either & principal justification or reason to destroy the files,
are you?

Dr. Gottlieb. I am simply saying it was one of them.

Senator Kennedy. The thing that I suppose we would have to
understand, having been given the kind of priority that you stated
this program would have, your own strong commitment to it over the
record of the exchanges we have had this morning and the other
record, and your belief in the importance of this in terms of security
reasons, that you felt that this kind of program was continuing all
the way from 1973 when you left the Agency. I would have to ask
why you felt that the national security reasons justified their
destruction?

Dr. Gottlieb. Senator Kennedy, I think a careful search of the
records would show that it was me that terminated this project and
that I many times gave the reasons why.

The fact that at one period in history I felt strongly this was a
relevant and urgent program, and that in another time later, I specif-
ically not only recommended but implemented its termination, to me
are not inconsistent.

Senator Kennedy. Well, you indicated to us that at the time you
left in 1973, that the use of the hebavioral kinds of drugs was at least
still being continued by adversaries.

I mean, you gave that certain impression to us.

And you spelled out very clearly in your formal statement and others
that you felt this program was of a great kind of importance.

I am just wondering, when you suddenly went along on justification,
you urged its continuation in 1963, why at some point you suddenly
decided that the. national security interests were not served by at
least keeping the information and material that had been gathered
from all these expenditures and from all the work that was done.
f Dr. Gottlieb. One response to your question, Senator, would be

that the substantive technical work done on 99 percent of these
projects was published in open literature and available. There was
nothing useful in the files that could add to that.

The second point is, I must come back to what period of time we
are talking about.

As I tried to say, there became a growing realization that whatever
the foreign threat might be by 1973 or even earlier than that, that
that was not a justification to do any more than keeping in touch
with several individuals in this program to be able to answer questions
that might come up, that a program of this kind was no longer justified.

It was not that the threat may have lessened, it was what we could
usefully do about it.

Senator Kennedy. You made that decision in 1973?

Dr. Gottlieb. No, no.

-PS"

197

I would have to examine the files. The decision was a growing one.
I think your own examination of the files was showing that although
this may have been a formal official determination of it then, tne
thing tapered off to almost nothing by 1967 or 1968.

Senator Kennedy. But the destruction, the decision to destroy— —

Senator Schweiker. Is it not true that your Deputy objected to
the destruction of files for the reasons that we are getting at here?

Dr. Gottlieb. I have only heard that as a rumor.

I have never seen a memo on that subject and never discussed it
with the person who was my Deputy at the time.

I do not know whether you are saying he told you he objected to it
or whether he told you he. told me. He might well have. A person can
have different feelings about it.

Senator Schweiker. When you discussed it with your Deputy, do
you recall his having objected to destroying the records?

1 have got to believe he would have expressed his reasons for obj ect-
ing_to it to you, that he would give you his opinion.

Dr. Gottlieb. I do not recall that discussion with the person who
was my Deputy. I have no recollection of it.

I am not saying it did not happen. He says it did.

Senator Kennedy. Dr. Gottlieb, Senator Schweiker is just going to
continue the questions.

I have asked him to ask a brief one for me at the conclusion.

I have to excuse myself. I appreciate your presence here.

Senator Schweiker. Dr. Gottlieb, going back to the role played by
Dr. Geschickter and the Geschickter fund, did Dr. Geschickter in
essence oversee expenditures of several million dollars worth of
projects or channeled through his fund, acting as a conduit?

Dr. Gottlieb. I would say I would have to disagree with the first
part of your statement and agree with the second one.

Senator Schweiker. You state your understanding of the relation-
ship.

Dr. Gottlieb. He provided the conduit for sums of money in the
amount you are talking about. He certainly was not asked to super-
vise

Senator Schweiker. You did say earlier he was used by you in some
consulting capacity occasionally?

Dr. .Gottlieb. But not necessarily on the project.

Senator Schweiker. Not on these particular projects?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. He cited the figure of about $2.3 million, as I
recall, as the amount of money that his fund handled for the CIA.

Does that ring a bell with you?

Dr. Gottlieb. I would have to say that seems reasonable.

Senator Schweiker. In listening to your description of the functions
that Dr. Geschickter performed and in reading the CIA files about the
relationship, there is obviously a wide, unaccounted for discrepancy
between wnat the files say and what, in fact, according to both you
and Dr. Geschickter happened — particularly in terms of the agreement
which was supposed to be worked out for use of the facility at George-
town, the Gorman Building, the planned experiments which you say
were not conducted there, the use of patients as subjects, et cetera.
Might we view this building fund contribution as the CIA's donation
to Dr. Geschickter's favorite charity in order to keep him as an
ongoing consultant to the CIA?

198 |

Is that really what we are seeing here?

Dr. Gottlieb. Are you asking me, Senator, whether that is my
perspective?

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

Dr. Gottlieb. No, it is not my perspective.

Senator Schweiker. Here is agreement that nobody lived up to,
which did not mean a thing. It almost looks like it was written down
as a sort of charade. Nobody knows about the facility providing any
cover, nobody knows about having one-sixth of the space available
for clause, nobody tested anything there no people went in and out
on any specific research projects. Nobody knows about anything that
was to be included in the agreement ever happening.

I do_ not know what other conclusion I could draw except that it
looks like a goodwill offering to Dr. Geschickter.

Dr. Gottlieb. The only Tight I could throw on that is to repeat
what I said before.

My perspective is these were plans that there were intentions to
carry out, that just were not.

Senator Schweiker. It seems like the CIA went to an awful lot of
fuss and bother, and it seems also that the problems that you men-
tioned a few moments ago— ^security problems, and so forth — all of those
problems were known before this agreement was worked out. To do
the sort of things described in the proposed agreement, at Georgetown-
even if only willing subjects were used— would surely have raised
red flags. Yet the project was approved.

I come back to the fact that it looks to me as if it was an artificial
device for keeping Dr. Geschickter happy because he was useful to
the CIA in some sort of consultant role.

Dr. Gottlieb. You said something there that I need to understand
better. Did you say witting or unwitting?

Senator Schweiker. Witting, even if the intention was only to use
witting subjects. Maybe I did not say that.

Dr. Gottlieb. It is helpful, Senator, my perspective on this was
that of an expensive project that just never took place.

If you are saying, was it wasteful, my answer would have to be
yes in terms of CIA's interest.

Senator Schweiker. The project may not have taken place, you
say, but every one agrees that the project was paid for — the money
was spent. You are saymg in your opinion it was not a matter of
donating to Dr. Geschickter's favorite charity to keep up a good
relationship there for consulting purposes?

Dr. Gottlieb. I mentioned before when this subject first came up
that an element in trying to implement this was to insure the con-
tinuation of all three services that I mentioned we were getting from
Dr. Geschickter, that that was an element.

But i certainly would have to say, no, the perspective you mentioned
was not mine.

Senator Schweiker. You mentioned it in your statement that a
number of the projects in MK-ULTRA, I guess all of those conducted
at the universities, were ultimately published, ami correct?

Dr. Gottlieb. Most of them.

Senator Schweiker. Most of them.

199

Dr. Gottlieb. To the extent that information was published that
was publishable. What I really mean is, that they were not the kind
of things that were developing data that was considered secret.
* Senator Schweikeb. If that was true, why did we feel that "potential
enemies of this country would be greatly benefited," as you also say
in your statement, if they knew about the nature and progress of our
research. I am confused by your apparent concern about our enemies'
learing about our work, when at the same time you make the obser-
vation that most of this work was published in the open literature
anyway.

Can you clarify that?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think I understand the reason you are confused.

What I was trying to make clear there was that if you turn the
situation around, this country's intelligence organs would find it very
valuable if they could establish that another country's intelligence
oigans are sponsoring a coherent group of projects and would draw
some pretty accurate conclusions as to specifically what their interest
might be.

Senator Schweiker. Let's look at some examples here from the
CIA files about the kind of research that the Agency had in mind,
areas of research which the research and development program of the
TSS Chemical Division was supporting.

In a document relating to subproject 35, which of course was con-
nected with Dr. Geschickter and his fund, we find a list of materials
and methods the Agency was interested in. I'll read a few items:

1. Substances which will promote illogical thinking and impulsiveness to the
point where the recipient would be discredited in public.

2. Substances which increase the efficiency of mentation and perception.

3. Materials which will prevent or counteract the intoxicating effect of alcohol. <m

4. Materials which will promote the intoxicating effect of alcohol. r J

5. Materials which will produce the signs and symptoms of recognized diseases 41
in a reversible way so that they may be used. for malingering, etc.

6. Materials which will render the induction of hypnosis easier or otherwise ?*
enhance its usefulness. iyi

7. Substances which will enhance the ability of individuals to withstand priva- ii
tion, torture and coercion during interrogation and so-called "brain-washing".

8. Materials and physical methods which will produce amnesia for events pre-

ceding and during their use. ||

And the list goes on. "*

Surely, these would not be normal kinds of university projects that

we are discussing? ft

Dr. Gottlieb. I think data which was developed on all but a small U
amount of the work that was done in normal university settings

indeed was done to get basic data that we felt did not exist that were g|

relevant to these questions. ||

Senator Schweiker. The list also includes research into physical
methods of producing shock and confusion over extended periods of

time and capable of surreptitious use; and substances which produce |

physical disablement such as paralysis of the legs, acute anemia, etc. ^*

These certainly would not be published?

Dr. Gottlieb. They would not be published under the headings ||

that you are talking about, but a researcher doing the actual work ||
that needed to be done, first, on animals, to get this kind of data,

would certainly have a lot of data that was perfectly publishable, and j i

did not necessarily mention these ends. |g

•r '" ■

Sil

300

A potential enemy analysis o/ a whole group of projects could very
readily lead him to those conclusions.

I do not know if I make that clear.

Senator Schweiker. I guess so. I think it's important to point out
that in the same document where this list appears, explicit reference is
made to human testing, which raises problems that "cannot be
g handled by the ordinary contractor."

I had earlier asked the Director on two occasions about brain
concussion studies.

One of the project descriptions refers to testing fluid-filled flasks and
using other means in an attempt to find out how the brain is shocked
by concussion or blast effects. At one point I was told that it was an
Office of Naval Research project and the CIA was only indirectly
interested.

Then, DOD came back today and said just the opposite, that this,
in fact, was a CIA project, and the Office of Naval Research was just
a conduit for CIA funding. '■[■

Can you tell us more specifically about the brain concussion studies?
Was that one of your projects?

Dr. Gottlieb. I do not have that— I want to be Very careful. I am
not saying it was not, Senator, but it happened a long time ago, and
I did not see any data on it.

And if I was going to be as responsive as I would like to be to your
question, I would like to have my memory refreshed.

Senator Schweiker. We will get that for you in a moment.

Did you work closely with Dr. Robert Lashbrook?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. During the course of your association, did you
discuss the details of safe house projects as well as other MK- ULTRA
projects with him?

Dr. Gottlieb. My impression would be that I certainly did, but
if you ask me to name instances when I did, or afternoons that I did,
I would be very hard pressed.

Senator Schweiker. What capacity was he in at the time that
you worked closely with him?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think, as I remember, he was my deputy.

Senator Schweiker. Would it not be fairly natural that almost
all operational material and information would be available to him,
with few exceptions?

Dr. Gottlieb. Pardon me?
£- t I am consulting with my attorney because there is another individual

involved here and I do not want to unknowingly harm him.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

[Short pause.]

Senator Schweiker. Do you have a response?

Dr. Gottlieb. I need to be reminded of the question because I
thought the question was: Do I remember or should he have had
knowledge of everything going on

Senator Schweiker. Because he was your deputy.

Dr. Gottlieb. My impression is "Yes."

Senator Schweiker. Here is the documentation relating to the
brain concussion project.

You are specifically listed as an accredited CIA technical liaison
representative for the project, along with another person.

201

Dr. Gottlieb. Bemember, Senator, I did not deny knowledge of
this.

Senator Schweikeb. I am trying to help you remember.

I am showing you the documents. I mow you did not deny in-
volvement in thfe project. I would like to establish whether or not
this was your project, a CIA project— DOD said it was a CIA project.

This is a memo dated November 1954.

Dr. Gottlieb. Beading this, I still do not have a specific recol-
lection of this project but L would not dispute that it was.

In answer to your question about what we were doing and why,
the best answer I can give you is that it had something to do with a
series of ultimate ends of the nature that you read before.

It sounds like a highly theoretical study of the kind that could be
published, by the way, that would backstop and lead perhaps to other
investigations. It sounds that way from reading the paper.

Senator Schweikeb. As I recall from reading more detailed docu-
ments that I have not put before you today, the project description
also discusses what it takes to induce concussion and how to sneak
up on a person and induce a concussion, and how to have that occur
without the persons being witting of it. The purpose was to produce
a concussion with maximum amnesia and no visible injury.

There were a lot of ramifications to that sort of research.

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

Senator Schweikeb. In the memorandum it lists people from CIA
who, have knowledge of it, and, interestingly enough, it does not list
any technical people from the Office of Naval Research.

Would that not be a pretty clear indication that prime technical
responsibility would have rested with you folks?

Dr. Gottlieb. Senator, I did not say it was an ONR project, I do
not want to be held to that. I believe someone else said that.

Senator Schweikeb. Reading the memo, can you not make a
judgment, seeing how this was structured-

Dr. Gottlieb. I thought I said from what I was reading there, it
probably was a CIA project.

Senator Schweikeb. Dr. Gottlieb, what do you know about the
knowledge of Mr. Anslinger, of the Bureau of Narcotics, or other
Bureau of Narcotics' officials, regarding Morgan Halls safehouse
activities.

In other words, how far up the Bureau of Narcotics' chain of
command did awareness of Mr. Hall's operations go?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think the only thing I can say that might really
help you on this in the sense that I am talking about my own knowl-
edge, and not assumptions or inferences or impressions, Was that Mr.
Anslinger was knowledgeable of the safe houses that we set up and
why.

Senator Schweikeb. Any other Bureau of Narcotics' officials that
come to mind?

Dr. Gottlieb. No.

Senator Schweikeb. Why did the CIA take over Mr. Hall's salary
for a time? !

We discussed that earlier and you said this only' went on for a few.
months. What was the rationale for this departure from the rule?

202

Dr. Gottlieb. I prefaced this by saying there is no record that has
been kept of this, that what I am going to try to relate to you, and it
is perhaps a little fuzzy in my mind, and I beg your indulgence there
for what might seem like some discrepancies.

There was a period, and the period is exactly mentioned in some
of the files that were made available to me on Sunday, where for
reasons I am not entirely sure of, it had something to do with some
of his past activities about some people in high places who were very
angry with him, and it was useful for Mr. Anslinger to not have him
specifically on the Bureau of Narcotics' payroll for a period of time.

He approached me and said, since we are in this collaborative effort, ^

would you people be kind enough to formally take his salary for a f

period through me so that I could honestly say that he is working for I

another agency for this period. That was the background of it. g

Senator Schweiker. Some of the projects under MK-ULTRA in- ^ f

volved hypnosis, is that correct? |

Dr. Gottlieb. Yjes. §

Senator Schweikeh. Did any of these projects involve something |

called radio-hypnotic-intra-cerebral control, which is a combination, I

as I understand it, in layman's terms, radio transmissions and |

hypnosis? 1

Dr. Gottlieb. My answer is "No." |

Senator Schweiker. None whatsoever? I

Dr. Gottlieb. Well, I am trying to be responsive to the terms |

that you used. |

As I remember it, there was a current interest, running interest, all |

the time in what affects people's standing in the field of radio energy |

have, and it could easily have been that somewhere in many projects, f

someone was trying to see if you could hypnotize somebody easier if I

he was standing in a radio beam. I

That would seem like a reasonable piece of research to do. f

What I am saying, I do not see that being the focus of a large jj

interest or successful result come out of this. |

Senator Schweiker. We did have some testimony yesterday that S

radar waves were used to wipe out memory in animal experiments.

Dr. Gottlieb. I can believe that, Senator.

I would remind you that the problem of radio waves and what it
does to people is extremely current interest in connection with events
in an important embassy overseas now. There is a great concern about »

that.

Senator Schweiker. Subproject 39 involved research on 142
criminally insane individuals. Research techniques included straight
interrogation, hypnosis, hypnosis in conjunction with LSD, and LSD
with interrogation.

Can you'shed any light on this experiment or what the purpose for
getting into this area was? How successful or effective was the project?

Dr. Gottlieb. I have to again ask for a date on that if I can get it.

The reason I was asking for a date, there was a rather large period
of time that I was not involved in this at all.

Senator Schweiker. We have one. It is April 7, 1958.

Dr. Gottlieb. I was not in the country, not connected with LSD,
had no knowledge of it.

4 »

203

Senator Schweiker. Did you ever in your work under MK-ULTRA
or other work in your division, buy "reject" drugs from pharmaceutical
concerns?

I use "reject" in the trade sense, drugs would not be available on

the commercial market because they could not meet the standards for

some reaso- or another, such as having too many adverse side effects.

& Dr. Gottlieb. Can I speculate on a misunderstanding of that term,

*• Senator?

Senator Schwbiker. Certainly. Because it may be helpful.

Dr. Gottlieb. You may be talking about a term used for drugs
^ which drug companies test and find have side effects which mitigate

commercial exploitation, because the military had a continuing pro-
gram, a very aggressive one, to pinpoint those in a sense that they nad
effects of interest to the military, and we did have liaison with the
military and were interested. But that is what I think we are talking
* about "reject."

Senator Schweiker. I accept your definition.

Now, were there any of these kinds of drugs used as part of your
ongoing MK-ULTRA or other testing programs* and if so, for what
purpose?

Dr. Gottlieb. An interest in them there surely was. The purpose
was, in our continuing search for drugs that might have any of the
effects on that list that you started to read before.

Senator Schweiker. Was any of this work fruitful, to your
knowledge?

Dr. Gottlieb. In a way, I guess that is the way LSD came to our
knowledge. LSD was one of these compounds made by Sandos Phar-
maceutical Co.
, Because of these bizarre side effects it had, they had no commercial

\ use for it.

Senator Schweiker. Where did you get your LSD for your tests?

Dr. Gottlieb. I am a little hazy on exactly where. But~I have got
a pretty good idea. It was from one of the major U.S. pharmaceutical
houses who were making drugs of a similar structure iand who we
interested in manufactunng LSD for us.

Senator Schweiker. I want to make a clarification regarding the
time period of subproject 39.

The record shows that subproject 39, dealing with criminally
insane individuals and using such techniques, as hypnosis, hypnosis
with LSD, and LSD interrogations, actually began in 1954 and lasted
through 1959, a 5-year period. The memo I referred to earlier was
dated n 1958, while you were out of the country, but the project
covered a much longer time frame.

And the cost was estimated at $30,000.

Dr. Gottlieb. I have been given a piece of paper that will give me a
little bit more information about this. I will read it and try to respond.

I will just read you what we wrote :

It is thought that these persons have the same kind of motivation for with-
holding certain information that is comparable to operational interrogations in
the field.

That would be a clear remembrance of mine, and having been
stimulated by reading this as to why we were in it.

1
!

I 204

Senator Schweikeb. Dr. Gottlieb, besides the safe houses that we
I have discussed in some depth here, where else were drugs tested on

{ unwitting subjects? We know these tests went on in certain safe

houses. -

> What about other places and locations, to your knowledge?
) Dr. Gottlieb. Are you talking about with the United States?

■ :] , r Senator Schweikeb. Yes.

•**■ Dr. Gottlieb. I do not remember now the places where that was

) done, unwitting tests. We certainly, as I indicated before, did a lot

] of testing on ourselves.

Senator Schweikeb. Well, now, we had some information indicating ^

\ that drugs were slipped to unwitting subjects in bars in New York

:■{ City,

Dr. Gottlieb. I am sorry, I was in my mind putting those under
the umbrella of the safe house.

] ' I did not realize you meant specifically, physically outside-

v! Senator Schweikeb. How did you relate them to safe houses, so '%

I understand- — ^ I

i Dr. Gottlieb. They were unwitting administrations that were f

I made by Morgan Hall or through Morgan Hall. 1

I would like to say, to give the most precise answer to that that I |

can is that. I am not specifically aware in the sense that I can remember, |

! look, this was done in a bar. a |

> But I have no reason to think that that was not done. I

Senator Schweikeb. What did you do with the quantities of material |

i that ultimately came into your possession — drugs, poisons, toxic |

( substances — which either were produced for you or were studied by

you? I

_ For example, we heard yesterday from Dr. Geschickter that we f

i imported a lot of poison mushrooms from Africa. What did we do with

1 them?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think to answer the question precisely I did hear |

| about the mushroom discussion, and my best remembrance of that, |

j and I want to underline this, to answer it most accurately, would jj

have to relate it to a particular project from where it was done, but |

^1 my general remembrance of it, that was a project that was discussing \

% some of the very basic aspects of relating a chemical and a structure |

to an activity. It took place in the university somewhere, I cannot 1

remember where, and that this material was procured in connection 4 \

j with getting this investigation or material for him to work on. \

I ^ It was not a secret or unwitting— —

k ~ Senator Schweikeb. As a normal thing, what would you do with

} this kind of toxic material? *

: :l Dr. Gottlieb. Material like the one you are talking about would

revert entirely to the investigator doing the work. He works with
, materials like that all the time, and different institutions do different

things.
] Some have a storage room, I guess they accumulate; some destroy

them afterward.
I Senator Schweikeb. As you will recall very vividly, our own In-

,[ telligence Committee looked into a case where the CIA had maintained

and stored poison toxins that were supposed to have been destroyed.

205

I guess the responsibility for that fell somewhere between CIA and
Fort Detrick, but we had good evidence that deadly shellfish toxin
was not destroyed even after a Presidential order. Some of the ma-
terials from projects like MKULTRA must have come into the
Agency's hands. What happened to them? Do we know they were
destroyed? $1

e Dr. Gottlieb. My experience is most specifically roverted to our i*

•£■ hands; mother words, it was not appropriate to leave them with the

investigator because it wasn't normal for him to have them, and also H

had to do his work and were kept in the laboratory for storage in the J

~ CIA. .

I guess that laboratory, as I remember, this happened after I left, was m

inventoried and reviewed and my understanding from the testimony .fj

that came up in those hearings that you mentioned were all destroyed ^

and that did not happen while I was there.
* Senator Schweikeb. One point that came to light in our review of ft

the financial records was that Morgan Hall had considered subleasing m

the safe house, or at least he had placed an ad to sublease the safe
house. ■ fl

Can you enlighten us as to what was happening here? J

Dr. Gottlieb. I do not remember anything about that.

Senator Schweikeb. That was February 8, 1955. Morgan Hall
wrote a check to pay for an ad he placed to sublease the safe house. fl

Dr. Gottlieb. 1 am sorry, Senator, I do not remember that incident =J

and cannot throw any light on it.

Senator Schweikeb. I know you have a'plane to make, so I'll try
to conclude this.

I have only one other area of questioning today.

EA3167, the compound we discussed in our open session with the
Defense Department, was tested by DOD for CIA by putting it on the
skin, what does this EA3167 do to people? Can you tell us in layman's
terms what effect you were looking for?

Dr. Gottlieb. I am repeating something I heard the other day
because I have no recollection of my own, but as it was explained to
me in my work with the staff here on Sunday, it is a material which,
when added with other materials, makes it possible to administer
something to the skin rather than orally or through the air.

That is my understanding of it.
j Senator Schweikeb. It is more or less an administering agent,

then? You are saying you would mix some other drug with it, some
r hallucinogen or other drug, but EA3167 itself has no particular effect?

Dr. Gottlieb. I want to be careful, Senator,
t I do not have independent knowledge of this. I am trying to inter-

pret that from what someone on your staff told me. That is my
interpretation of it.

Senator Schweikeb. I guess that concludes our line of questions
foryou, Dr. Gottlieb.

We appreciate your being here. Thank you for coming.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gottlieb follows:!

206

j -STATEMENT OF DR. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB

) My name is Sidney Gottlieb and I reside in California.

I am appearing at this hearing as I have appeared in others in

**■ the past, voluntarily and prepared to offer whatever constructive

testimony made possible by my background and remembrance of

) things past.

^ I would like to first comment on project MKULTRA.

To the best of my recollection, several research

:i inquiries ~ which much later came to be organized under the

Cryptonym MKULTRA — were begun in about 1952. Their purpose was

i to investigate whether and how it was possible to modify an

individual's behavior by covert, means. The context, in which
f ' ■

I this investigation was started was that of the height of the

Cold War with the Korean War just winding down; with the CIA

1 organizing its resources to liberate Eastern Europe by para-

i *

military means; and with the threat of Soviet aggression very

\ real and tangible, as exemplified by the recent Berlin air-

! lift.

| In the judgment of the CIA, there was tangible

I evidence that both the Soviets and the Red Chinese might be

.,-, using techniques of altering human behavior which were not

i ''■■'.'■' '""'''

.J understood by the USA and which would have implications of

national survival in the context of national security con-

{ cerns at that time. It was felt to be mandatory and of the

z-- utmost urgency for our intelligence organization ro establish

what was possible in this field on a Mgh priority basis.

207

To mention just, a few examples, there was a concern about the
apparent manipulated conversions of Americans interned in Red
China for a very short time; there was also a concern about
apparently irrational remarks made by a senior American diplomat
returning from the Soviet Union; perhaps most immediate and
urgent in our minds was the apparent buying up of the world
supply of at-that-time-little-known new phychogenic material
LSD; lastly, there was a growing library of documented instances
of routine use by the Soviet Security Services of covertly-
adminstered drugs. This last, by the way, has grown and been
added to, up to the time I left the Agency (CIA).

I accept, full responsibility for my own role
in these activities, in relation to what my position in the
CIA implied, as to my level of responsibility as it changed
over the years. At the outset in the period 1951-1957, I
was head of a branch of a division charged with the responsibility
of looking into the matters which I described above. I set
up and handled some projects myself, and supervised and
administered other CIA employees monitoring other projects.
As the years went on and I assumed broader responsibilities,
my personal involvement in the projects lessened. Thus, my
involvement, was most direct in the period 1951-1957. Prom
1957 to the end of 1960, I was not directly involved at all,
being assigned to other matters. I was stationed overseas
1957-1959 and was assigned to another unit in headquarters
in the period 1959 to the end of 1960. Late in 1960,

virJ'

208

- 3 -

I returned to TSD to become Chief of the Research and Develop-
ment component; in 1962, I became Deputy Chief of TSD; and
from 1966 to 1973, I was Chief of TSD. I retired from the CIA
on June 30, 1973. I want to stress, however, that a policy
review of project MKULTRA and all of the projects I was con-
nected with took place at least once a year during MKULTRA
active period, which I remember as 1952-1965. In addition,
.as each project was funded, approval in writing at least two
levels above mine were required in all research and develop-
ment activities.

Project names like Artichoke and Bluebird have been
mentioned in the press, associated with my name. My remembrance
is that project Artichoke was managed by the Office of Security
and that I had no direct or indirect resonsibility for it,
although I became aware of its existence and general nature
over the years. Project Bluebird, as I remember it, was also
an Office of Security concept, possibly never actually realized,
*»hich later evolved into a TSD-sponsored activity looking
into brainwashing, and ultimately included the Society for
the Investigation of Human Ecology.

One unusual project started in 1952 and continued
until about 1965 was an arrangement originally set up by se
with the Bureau of Narcotics. In this regard, I have pre-
viously furnished my recollections of this matter during my

209

- 4 -

40 odd hours of testimony to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, but I am glad to discuss these matters again
** with this Committee. The origin of this Bureau of Narcotics

activity rested in my becoming aware through reading OSS
research files of an investigation into the behavior-alterating
possibilities of Tetrohydrocanniabinol, a synthetic material
related to the naturally active constituent of marijuana.
§■ I was able to contact an officer of the Bureau of Narcotics

who had participated first-hand in the OSS investigations.
With him, I made an arrangement, funded by the CIA, whereby
he would covertly administer chemical materials to unwitting
people. The Bureau of Narcotics, through this individual,
had their own interest in determining whether chemical materials
could be used to elicit or validate information obtained from
drug informants. The arrangement would benefit the CIA's
program in that information would be obtained, unobtainable
in any other way, on the effects of these materials used in
situations closely resembling those in. actual operations.
I have no personal awareness of specific individuals to whom
these materials were administered. To the best of my knowledge
and remembrance, the materials administered in the great majority
of cases under the* Bureau of Narcotics project were LSD and
2 Meretran. I do not have detailed information on the exact

number of individuals involved, but the impression I have is
that the number involved was between 20 and SO individuals
over the years of the project. I would like to add that the

£»

210

- 5 -

Bureau of Narcotics project was the only one of its kind in
the sense of trying to gain urgently needed information in
the administration of materials in an operational context.
Although it has drawn considerable attention in the news
media, because of its unusual nature, it was a very small
part of an overall program which took place in more conventional
project, in the more normal setting of unversities and labor-
atories, as born out by the records shown to me by the
Committee staff. This Committee might be interested to know
that the total amount of money spent on everything related
to MKULTRA was limited to 10% of the total research done by
T5D. To my remembrance, at the height of the spending on MKULTRA
related activities, it never even reached this percentage.

The great bulk of the research done under the general
umbrella of Project MKULTRA took place in academic and other
research settings. These projects almost always represented
work that the individual investigators would have been doing
in any case. The Agency's role was to provide the funds and,
in many cases, provide access to the investigator if specific
interpretation of his results in terms of our interests were
needed. To my recollection, in every case, the results of
the related research were published.

The degree of wittingness of the principal investi-
gators on these projects varied depending on whether we judged
his knowledge of our specific interests to be necessary in
providing useful results to us. Thus, many projects were

211

established in which the principal investigator was fully
knowledgeable of who we were and exactly what our interests
in the research were. Others were simply provided funds
through a covert organization and had no idea of ultimate
CIA sponsorship.

The degree to which individuals others than the
principal investigator needed to be witting of the Agency's
connection to the research varied. It was generally left to
the principal investigator to advise us as to whether anyone
else in either his research team or in the administrative part
of the university or research organization needed to be made
witting to the Agency's relationship. To the best of my
remembrance, although for general security reasons we were
eager to keep this kind of information to a minimum, we went
along with the principal investigator's desires and cleared
and briefed whomever he felt was necessary.

The general subject of why we felt it necessary to
use funding mechanisms like the Society for the Investigation
of Human Ecology or the Geschickter Fund for Medical Research
needs some comment. This involves the more general question
of why we felt all of this research needed to be kept secret
insofar as Agency sponsorship was concerned. The reason, however
it may seem with the benefit of hindsight, was that we felt any
potential enemies of this country would be greatly benefitted

"212 I

■ - 7 - |

in their own possible future aggressive acts against the USA <v

if they were forwarned as to what the nature and progress of :?

■f '%

fc& our research in this field was. ft

The largest overall picture that can be given of this |

group of academic and other formal research undertakings is that |

they were an attempt to harness the academic and research community f

of the United States to provide badly-needed answers to some |

pressing national security problems, in the shortest possible $• §

time, without alerting potential enemies to the United States I

Government's interest, in these matters. '}

In all cases, research results were published through

the normal overt channels for publication of medical and j

physiological research. I would like to remind the members f
of the Committee that at. this point in history the amount, of

available reliable data on LSD and similar materials was |

essentially nil. |

I understand from reading newspaper accounts that, one 1
of the principal interests of this Committee in this kind of

research is the. degree of protection that was affordsd to the |

subjects used in those experiments where human subjects were I

' 1

used. As far as the Bureau of Narcotics project is concerned, my |

impression was there was no advance knowledge or protection of the 1

individuals concerned. The only comment I would like to make V |

^ on this is that, harsh as it. may seem in retrospect, it was I

felt that in an issue where national survival might be concerned, * '\

such a procedure and such a risk was a reasonable one to take. 1

213

- 8 -

I would like again to remind the Committee that, as far as

those of us who participated in this work were concerned,

to. this country was involved in a real covert war in the sense

that the cold war spilled over into intelligence activities.

Insofar as protection of individuals in the bulk
•J

of this work, as representated by formal research projects,

is concerned, the matter of informed consent and protection

% . . to the volunteers participating was left to each investigator

according to the standards that either- he or his institution

felt were appropriate to the situation. Our general feeling

was that if we chose reputable and responsible investigators,

appropriate standards in this area would be used. I think,

in general, the procedures actually used in these experiments

were representative of what was considered to be adequate

safeguards at the time.

A comment should be made on the kind of interest

that the Agency had in these matters and how it may have

changed over the years. The original impetus for this work

as mentioned above was the concern about aggressive use of

behavior-altering techniques against this country by its

enemies. Although this remained a continuing and probably

primary focus in the history of these projects, the Agency

214

- 9 -

did become interested in the potential use of behavior
modification techniques in unforeseen circumstances that
might occur in the future.

It. is undoubtedly true that some of these research
activities were continued into the middle or late 1960's
when in looking backward now the real possibility of their
successful and effective use either against us or by us was
very low. in fact, I remember writing a report when I was
on detached assignment with another unit in the clandestine
services in about 1961 which concluded that the potential
effectiveness of these techniques and the inclination of
American intelligence officers to use them was limited. The
only reasons I can provide now for the continuance of a small
number of these activities was that we felt we needed to be
more certain than we were of these negative results and also
that we felt a need to maintain contact with individuals
knowledgeable in these fields to keep ourselves abreast of
what was happening.

In conclusion, I would like to comment on three
things which trouble me very much about the situation I find
myself in.

First, there have been many references in the
press to attempts by me to avoid testifying. These allega-
tions are without any basis in fact, either in terms of

215

- 10 -

"hiding" or making myself unavailable to congressional committees.

In the case of my testimony before the Church Committee in

1975, I voluntarily and immediately returned from India as

soon as I was made aware at the Missionary Hospital, where

I was performing voluntary services, that I might be needed.

I have been available for all legitimate inquiries at all

times through my counsel.

Second, I feel victimized and I am appalled at the
CIA's policy, wherein someone or some group selectively pin-
points my name by failing to delete it from documents re-
leased under the Freedom of Information Act without
any permission from me. That is, my name is selectively left
on released documents where all or most others are deleted.
I have a great concern for past , present and future employees
of the Agency involved in sensitive, difficult, and potentially
misunderstood work, as this policy of selective disclosure
of individuals names gets applied to them. I am sincerely
concerned that the CIA's ability to recruit clandestine assets
in the future could be severely impaired.

Thirdly, my concern is for the reputations of the many
individuals not employees of the Agency, in academic and pro-
fessional life who, for the most partiotic and constructive

'■'■■)

M
^

216

- n -

of reasons, and guaranteed both by myself and the Agency of
confidentiality and non-disclosure, chose to assist the Agency
in its research efforts over the past years. By now, the
association in the news media of any name in the academic
or professional work with CIA brings immediate and automatic
negative connatations, and irreparably damages their reputa-
tions. With regard to my testimony, I hope this Committee will
understand my reluctance, except when absolutely essential,
to mention other names. I am desirous and willing to share any
knowledge of matters of interest to the Committee that I have
in my memory but, whatever the CIA's policies may be on this
matter, I feel it is a point of personal responsibility to
honor the commitment of confidentiality that I feel towards
these individuals and not to be a party to further damage
their reputations.

In summary, I would like this Committee to know that
I considered all this work — at the time it was done and in
the context of circumstances that were extant in that period —
to be extremely unpleasant, extremely difficult, extremely
sensitive, but above all, to be extremely urgent, and important.
I realize that it. is difficult to reconstruct those times
and that atmosphere today in this room.

Another thought that I would like to leave you with
is that should the course of recent history have been slightly
different from what it was, I can easily imagine a congressional

217

- 12 -

committee being extremely critical of the Agency for not having
done investigations of this nature.

In any event, it is my simple wise to be as helpful
as possible to this Committee in obtaining its appropriate
legislative goals, and I am prepared to be as helpful and forth-
coming as possible in the areas in which you are interested.

218

Senator Schweiker. We will continue with another witness, but we
will recess first and go back into the full committee hearing room for
an open session.

Thank you very much.

[Short recess.]

[The meeting reconvened in the full committee hearing room.]

Senator Schweiker. At this time we will call as the health sub-
& committee's next witness Mr. Peter C. Bensinger, the Administrator
of the i Drug Enforcement Administration.

Mr. Bensinger, would you like to make a few general remarks first?
Do you have a prepared statement to present before I ask you a few
questions?

STATEMENT OF PETEB C. BENSnTCffiB, ADMOTSTBATOR, DBTJG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTEATION, ACCOMT ANTED BY JOSEPH
XREUGER, ACTING CHIEF INSPECTOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Bensinger. Thank you, Senator Schweiker.

I would like to, if I might, also introduce Joe Krueger, Acting Chief
Inspector for Drug Enforcement Administration.

Ihave been Administrator for DEA since January 23, 1976. I
might add there was no indication at the time I arrived at the Drug
Enforcement Administration that any former narcotics agent of a
former predecessor agency of which there have been many, had been
engaged in cooperation with the CIA or anyone else in experim elation
with drugs or unwilling subjects.

Needless to say, I was shocked and appalled that such activity did
take place, and I can conceive of no circumstances under which such
activity could be justified.

Upon determining that a former official was involved from the Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics in this activity, I did direct DEA's Office of
Internal Security to conduct with highest priority a thorough inves-
tigation to determine the nature and scope of drug testing activities,
cooperative relationships between predecessor agencies and individuals
and the CIA.

The Office of Internal Security of DEA has determined with sworn
and written statements from every national and regional program
manager that we are not providing facilities, drugs, or funds, for
un willing testing on humans to the CIA or anyone else.
K We have worked closely with the staff of this committee.

I would be happy to answer any questions, Senator.

Senator Schweiker. I think you are certainly correct.

You have exhibited a very positive approach and worked very
cooperatively and very closely with the subcommittee.

So I understand your answer to my basic question, which I didn't
even have to ask, is you were not only surprised but shocked to
learn about your agency's former involvement with CIA drug testing,
and you are already taking steps to remedy it and prevent future
abuses by instituting your own investigation. Is that essentially
correct?

Mr. Bensinger. That is correct, Senator Schweiker, except that the
details that we have, both from committee staff and whatever records
are availble to us from the CIA indicate that this type of cooperative

relationship in which facilities, safe houses, were operated in conjunc-
tion between FBN and CIA did terminate in June 1965.

Senator Schweiker. The relationship apparently terminated in
June 1965, and you were apprised of its existence when, roughly?

Mr. Bensinger. I was apprised of it in September of this year
that this previous 12 years ago activity did take place.

Senator Schweiker. September of this year?

Mr. Bensinger. 1977.

Senator Schweiker. And it terminated in 1965, about 12 years ago.
You view the sort of cooperative relationship laid out in these hearings
as going against the basic drug enforcement purposes of your agency?

Mr. Bensinger. That is correct.

Senator Schweiker. I gather you are taking every precaution
and safeguard to assure that relationships like this or programs like
this do not happen while you are Administrator?

Mr. Bensinger; Absolutely^

Senator Schweiker.- We appreciate your coming as a witness
today, and we thar_k you for your patience in waiting until we com-
pleted our questioning of the other witnesses.

It is refreshing to see a positive, constructive attitude on the part
of a Federal agency that wants to help and cooperate with us and
shares the same objectives as we do on this committee with regard
to human experimentation.

Thank you very much for coining here today.

Mr. Bensinger. Thank you.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you. The subcommittee will now
stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned,
subject to the call of the Chair.]

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