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EVOLUTION  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES. 

A  PtEPLY  TO  PKOFESSOE  HUXLEY. 


N  reading  the  criticism  which  Professor  Huxley  has  done  me  the 
honour  to  make  upon  a  little  book  (the  "  Grenesis  of  Species  ")  which 
I  ventured  to  publish  in  the  early  part  of  this  year,  I  felt  that,  as  a 
subaltern  in  science,  I  was  being  severely  reprimanded  by  my 
superior  officer  ;  that  I  might  apprehend  a  sentence  of  degradation  to 
the  ranks,  if  not  actual  expulsion  from  the  service.  I  found  myself 
taxed,  if  not  with  positive  desertion  to  an  enemy  with  whom  no 
truce  is  to  be  allowed,  yet,  at  least,  suspected  of  treasonable  commu- 
nication with  a  hostile  army,  and  treacherous  dalliance  with  ministers 
of  Baal. 

Now,  recognising  as  I  do  that,  in  physical  science,  Professor  Huxley 
is  indeed  my  superior  officer,  having  his  just  claims  to  respect  and 
deference  on  the  part  of  all  men  of  science,  I  also  feel  that  I  am 
under  special  obligations  to  him,  both  many  and  deep,  for  knowledge 
imparted  and  for  ready  assistance  kindly  rendered.  No  wonder  then 
that  the  expression  of  his  vehement  disapproval  is  painful  to  me. 

It  was  not  however  without  surprise  that  I  learned  that  my  one 
unpardonable  sin — the  one  great  offence  disqualifying  me  for  being 
"  a  loyal  soldier  of  science" — was  my  attempt  to  show  that  there  is 
no  real  antagonism  between  the  Christian  revelation  and  evolution  ! 

^ly  "  Genesis  of  Species"  was  written  with  two  main  objects  :— 

My  first  object  was  to  show  that    the  Darwinian  theory  is  un- 


E } rOL  ( rTION  AXD  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.       1 69 

tenable,  and  that  natural  selection  is  not  lie  origin  of  species.  This 
was  ami  is  my  conviction  purely  as  a  man  of  science,  and  I  maintain 
it  upon  scientific  grounds  only. 

My  second  object  was  to  demonstrate  that  nothing-  even  in  Mr. 
Darwin's    theory,   as    then    put    forth,   and    d  fortiori   in    evolution 
rally,  was  necessarily  antagonistic  to  Christianity. 

Professor  Huxley  ignoring  the  arguments  by  which  I  supported 
my  first  point,  fastens  upon  my  second;  and  the  gist  of  his  criticism  is 
an  endeavour  to  show  that  Christianity  and  science  are  necessarily 
and  irreconcilably  divorced,  and  that  the  arguments  I  have  advanced 
to  the  contrary  are  false  and  misleading. 

In-fore  replying  to  Professor  Huxley's  observations  and  miscon- 
ceptions on  this  head,  I  may  be  excused  for  saying  a  few  words 
as  to  my  first  point,  namely,  the  scientific  reasons  which  seem  to 
oppose  themselves  to  the  reception  of  the  Darwinian  theory  as 
originally  propounded  by  its  author  ;  and  here  I  claim  to  be  acting, 
and  to  have  acted,  as  "  a  loyal  soldier  of  science"  in  stating  the 
scientific  facts  which  have  impressed  me  with  certain  scientific 
convictions  (on  purely  scientific  grounds),  in  opposition  to  Mr. 
Darwin's  views. 

Professor  Huxley  does  not  so  much  dispute  the  truth  of  my  con- 
clusions as  deny  their  distinctness  from  those  at  which  Mr.  Darwin 
himself  has  arrived,  or  indeed  originally  put  forth,  asserting  that  my 
book  is  but  "  an  iteration  of  the  fundamental  principle  of  Darwinism." 

I  shall  then  shortly  endeavour  to  show  more  distinctly  wherein  my 
view  radically  differs  from  that  first  propounded  by  Mr.  Darwin,  and 
still  maintained,  or  at  least  not  distinctly  repudiated  by  him  ;  though 
I  believe  that  the  admissions  he  has  of  late  made  amount  to  a  virtual, 
but  certainly  not  to  an  explicit,  abandonment  of  his  theoiy. 

The  Professor  expresses  his  doubt  as  to  the  existence  of  an  "  abso- 
lute and  pure  Darwinian," — a  doubt  which  is  certainly  a  surprise  to 
me,  as  I  had  always  understood  him  as  guarding  himself  carefully 
against  the  identification  of  his  own  views  with  those  of  Mr.  Darwin, 
and  as  allowing  that  it  was  one  thing  to  hold  the  doctrine  of  evo- 
lution and  another  to  accept  the  Darwinian  hypothesis.  In  a 
lecture*  delivered  in  1868  at  the  Royal  Institution,  he  observed,  "  I 
can  testify,  from  personal  experience,  it  is  possible  to  have  a  complete 
faith  in  the  general  doctrine  of  evolution,  and  yet  to  hesitate  in 
accepting  the  Xebular,  or  the  Uniformitarian,  or  the  Darwinian 
hypothoes  in  all  their  integrity  and  fulness." 

It  is  plain  then  that  at  a  recent  period,  Professor  Huxley  distin- 
guished  himself    from   thorough- going   disciples   of    Mr.    Darwin; 
implying  by  this  distinction  a  recognition  of  the  existence  of  such 
*  See  "  Proceedings  of  the  Royal  Institution,"  vol.  v.  p.  279. 


170  THE   CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW. 

disciples,  pure  Darwinians,  like  those  of  whom  he  now  ignores  the 
existence. 

The  very  essence  of  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  as  to  the  "origin  of 
species "  was,  the  paramount  action  of  the  destructive  powers  of 
nature  over  any  direct  tendency  to  vary  in  any  certain  and  definite 
line,  whether  such  direct  tendency  resulted  mainly  from  internal 
predisposing  or  external  exciting  causes. 

The  benefit  of  the  individual  in  the  struggle  for  life  was  announced 
as  the  one  determining  agent,  fixing  slight  beneficial  variations  into 
enduring  characters,  and  the  evolution  of  species  by  such  agency  is 
justly  and  properly  to  be  termed  formation  by  "  natural  selection." 

That  in  this  I  do  not  misrepresent  Mr.  Darwin  is  evident  from 
his  own  words.  He  says  : — 

"If  it  could  be  demonstrated  that  any  complex  organ  existed,  which 
could  not  possibly  have  been  formed  by  numerous,  successive,  slight 
modifications,  my  theory  would  absolutely  break  down."  *  Also  :  "  Every 
detail  of  structure  in  every  living  creature  (making  some  little  allowance 
for  the  direct  action  of  physical  conditions)  may  be  viewed,  either  as  having 
been  of  special  use  to  some  ancestral  form,  or  as  being  now  of  special  use 
to  the  descendants  of  this  form — either  directly,  or  indirectly,  through  the 
complex  laws  of  growth ;  "  and  "if  it  could  be  proved  that  any  part  of  the 
structure  of  any  one  species  had  been  formed  for  the  exclusive  good  of 
another  species,  it  would  annihilate  my  theory,  for  such  could  not  have 
been  produced  by  natural  selection."  f 

Mr.  Darwin  could  hardly  have  employed  words  by  which  more 
thoroughly  to  stake  the  whole  of  his  theory  on  the  non-existence  or 
non- action  of  causes  of  any  moment  other  than  natural  selection. 
For  why  should  such  a  phenomenon  "  annihilate  his  theory  ?  "  Be- 
cause the  very  essence  of  his  theory,  as  originally  put  forth,  is  to 
recognise  only  the  conservation  of  slight  variations  directly  beneficial 
to  the  creature  presenting  them,  by  enabling  it  to  obtain  food,  escape 
enemies,  and  propagate  its  kind. 

Such  being  the  case,  my  first  object,  as  I  have  before  said,  was  to 
show  not  only  that  "  natural  selection"  is  inadequate  to  the  task 
assigned  it,  but  that  there  is  much  positive  evidence  of  the  direct 
action  both  of  external  influences  sufficient  to  dominate  and  over- 
power in  certain  instances  the  ordinary  processes  of  "natural  selection/' 
and  also  of  still  more  influential  internal  powers  ;  moreover,  that  these 
latter  powers  are  so  efficient  as  to  present  themselves  as  probably  the 
main  determining  agent  in  specific  evolution,  although  I  admitted 
that  a  certain  subordinate  action  of  natural  selection  plainly  obtained. 

The  various  arguments  I  advanced  space  does  not  allow  me  here 
to  reproduce,  but  referring  to  my  book,  I  may  point  out  that  therein 
I  endeavoured  to  show  : — 

*  "  Origin  of  Species,"  p.  208.  f  Op.  cit.  p.  220. 


E  VOL UTION  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.       1 7 1 

1.  That  no  mere  survival  of  the  fittest  accidental  variations  can 
account  for  the  incipient  stages  of  structures  useful  enough  when 
once  developed.  Such,  e.g.,  as  the  whalehone  of  the  whale's  mouth, 
the  larynx  of  the  kangaroo,  pedicellaricc  and  bird's  head  processes, 
and  many  other  structures. 

'2.  That  the  sexual  colours  of  apes,  the  beauty  of  shell-fish,  and  the 
complex  mechanisms  by  which  fertilisation  is  effected  in  many  orchids, 
are  quite  beyond  the  power  of  natural  selection  to  develop. 

3.  That  modes  of  formation,  such  as  in  the  human  eye  and  ear,  in 
that  they  spring  from  simultaneous  and  concurrent  modifications  of 
distinct  parts,  have  a  remarkable  significance. 

4.  That  the    independent   origin   of    similar   structures   in   very 
different  animal  forms  should  be  noted,*  and  I  adduced  evidence  to  show 
that  similar  modifications  are  sometimes  directly  induced  by  obscure 
external  conditions,  as  in  the  sudden  acclimatization  of  English  grey- 
hounds in  Mexico,  and  in  the  loss  of  the  tail  in  certain  butterflies  of 
certain  regions,   and  in  the  direct  modification  of  young  English 
oysters  when  transported  to  the  shore  of  the  Mediterranean.  Moreover, 
it  was  shown  that  certain  groups  of  organic  forms  exhibit  a  common 
tendency  to  remarkable  developments  of  particular  kinds,  as  is  the 
case  with  birds  of  paradise. 

5.  That   facts   may   be   cited   to    support   the   theory   of  specific 
stability  (different  in  degree  in  different  species),  and  to  demonstrate 
that  reversion  may  take  place  in  spite  of  the  most  careful  selection  in 
breeding.     The  value  of  the  facts  of  sterility  in  hybrids  was  also 
considered. 

6.  That  data  bearing  on  the  relation  of  species  to  time  may  be 
brought  forward,  apparently  fatal  to  their  origin  by  the  action  of 
natural  selection. 

7.  That  the   significant   and   important  facts  of  the  deep-seated 
resemblances  existing  not  only  between  different  individual  animals, . 
but  between  different  parts  of  one  and  the  same  individual,  should 
be  pondered  over;    these  points   being,   as   was  shown,   capable  of 
reinforcement  by  others  drawn  from  the  abnormalities  of  monstrous 
births,  and  the  symmetrical  character  of  certain  diseases. 

From  all  these  considerations,  a  cumulative  argument  seemed  to 
me  to  arise  conclusive  against  the  theory  that  species  have  had  their 
specific  characters  fixed  solely  by  the  action  of  "natural  selection." 

The  hypothesis  which  I  ventured  to  offer  as  my  view  of  the  evolu- 

*  Professor  Huxley  corrects  me  as  to  "a  slip"  I  have  made  in  laying  too  much 
stress  on  the  amount  of  similarity  existing  between  the  eyes  of  vertebrates  and  cepha- 
lopods.  After  all,  however,  the  resemblance  is  very  great  and  striking.  It  is  grati- 
fying to  me  to  find  no  more  important  error  noted,  even  by  such  a  master  of  the  subject 
as  Professor  Huxley. 


i;2  THE  CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW. 

tionary  process  was  and  is,  that  just  as  all  admit  the  universe  to  Lave 
been  so  ordered — or  to  so  exist — that  on  the  mixing  of  chemical  sub- 
stances under  certain  conditions  new  and  perfectly  definite  species  of 
minerals  are  suddenly  evolved  from  potentiality  to  existence,  and  as 
by  the  juxtaposition  of  inorganic  matters  under  certain  influences* 
a  new  form  of  force — "  vitality  "—appears  upon  the  scene — so  also  in 
animals,  the  concurrence  of  certain  external  exciting  causes  acts  in 
such  a  manner  on  internal  predisposing  tendencies  as  to  determine  by 
a  direct  seminal  modification  the  evolution  of  a  new  specific  form. 
The  action  of  "  natural  selection/'  I  admitted,  and  admit,  to  be  real 
and  necessary,  but  I  ascribe  to  it  an  altogether  subordinate  role. 

This  view  may  be  true  or  false,  but  it  is  a  very  different  one  from 
that  advocated  by  the  author  of  the  "  Origin  of  Species,"  and  I  am 
at  a  loss  to  understand  how  Professor  Huxley  can  consider  it  identical 
with  Mr.  Darwin's,  more  especially  as  (at  p.  237)  I  have  enumerated 
the  points  in  which  my  theory  coincides  with  Professor  Owen's 
''Derivation,"  and  differs  from  that  of  the  author  of  the  "  Origin  of 
Species."  It  seems  to  me  strange  that  Professor  Huxley  should  now 
assert  the  "  very  pith  and  marrow  "  of  Darwinism  to  have  been  the 
affirmation  that  "  species  have  been  evolved  by  variation,  aided  by 
t/ie  subordinate  action  of  natural  selection," — when  he  himself,  in  his 
"  Lay  Sermons  "  (p.  321),  has  enunciated  simply  that  Mr.  Darwin's 
hypothesis  is  the  origin  of  species  "  by  the  process  of  natural  selec- 
tion," without  one  word  of  qualification  ;  and  five  pages  further  on, 
has  considered  the  possibility  of  the  refutation  of  Mr.  Darwin's  view 
by  the  discovery  of  residual  phenomenaf  not  explicable  by  ft  natural 
selection  " — just  such  phenomena  as  I  have  endeavoured  to  call  atten- 
tion to  in  my  book. 

I  question  whether  Mr.  Darwin  even  now  does  admit  that 
"  natural  selection-"  has  only  a  subordinate  action.  I  do  not  recollect 
to  have  met  with  such  a  declaration,  although  I  think  that  it  should 
logically  follow  from  the  various  admissions  he  has  latterly  made. 
If  he  does  admit  it,  then  a  cause  which  is  subordinate  cannot  be  the 
determining  agent.  If  he  does  not  admit  it,  then  there  is  a  radical 
difference  between  my  hypothesis  and  Mr.  Darwin's. 

Professor  Huxley  blames  the  Quarterly  Reviewer's  treatment  of 
Mr.  Darwin  as  "  unjust  and  unbecoming,"  because  he  endeavours  to 
show  how  Mr.  Darwin  has  changed  his  ground  without  (in  spite  of 


*  Though  Professor  Huxley  is  disinclined  as  yet  to  admit  that  such  evolution  of 
living  things  takes  place  now,  he  none  the  less  admits  the  principle,  though  he  relegates 
.such  evolution  to  a  remote  epoch  of  the  world's  history.  See  "Address  to  the  British 
iation,  Liverpool,  1870,"  p.  17. 

f  His  words  are — "What  if  species  should  offer  residual  phenomena,  here  and  there, 
not  explicable  by  natural  selection  ?  " — Lay  Sermons,  p.  326. 


EVOLUTION  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.       173 

his  generally  scrupulous  candour)  disavowing  "  natural  selection  "  as 
the  origin  of  species. 

I  confess  that  it  seems  to  me  that  the  reviewer  was  fully  justified 
in  so  doing  ;  for  Mr.  Darwin's  reputation  as  a  man  of  science  stands 
so  high,  that  it  was  plainly  the  reviewer's  duty  to  endeavour  to  pre- 
vent the  public  attaching,  in  mere  deference  to  Mr.  Darwin's  autho- 
rity, a  greater  weight  to  his  assertions  than  the  evidence  adduced 
warranted.  The  reviewer  sought  to  do  this  by  showing,  by  Mr. 
Darwin's  own  words,  he  had  been  compelled  to  admit  that 
•''abrupt  strongly  marked  changes  "  may  occur  "neither  beneficial 
nor  injurious  "  to  the  creatures  possessing  them,  produced  "  by  un- 
known agencies"  l}Ting  deep  in  "the  nature  of  the  organism."  In 
other  words,  that  Mr.  Darwin  has  in  fact,*  though  not  in  express 
words,  abandoned  his  original  theory  of  the  "  origin  of  species/' 

I  am  grateful,  however,  to  Professor  Huxley  for  having  spoken  of 
"injustice"  in  connection  with  Mr.  Darwin.  I  am  so  because  it 
affords  me  an  opportunity  for  declaring  myself  more  fully  with 
respect  to  the  distinction  between  Darwinism  and  Mr.  Darwin. 

In  common,  I  am  sure,  with  all  those  who  have  been  privileged  to 
know  not  only  Mr.  Darwin's  works,  but  Mr.  Darwin  himself,  I  have 
ever  entertained,  and  shall  continue  to  entertain  for  that  amiable 
gentleman  and  most  accomplished  naturalist  the  warmest  sentiments  of 
esteem  and  regard.  Convinced  as  I  am  that  he  is  actuated  by  a  pure 
love  of  truth,  admiring,  nay,  venerating  him  for  his  acute,  his 
unwearied  and  widely- extended  researches,  it  has  been  to  me  a  most 
painful  task  to  stand  forth  as  his  avowed  and  public  opponent. 

The  struggle  between  my  inclination  to  praise  and  to  acquiesce, 
and  my  sense  of  duty  which  impelled  me  to  dissent,  led  me  to  express 
myself  very  imperfectly,  and  I  thank  Professor  Huxley  for  thus 
giving  me  occasion  to  acknowledge  my  regret  that  these  sentiments 
should  have  led  me  to  give  such  very  inadequate  expression  to  my 
dissent  from,  and  reprobation  of,  Mr.  Darwin's  views,  especially  as 
manifested  in  their  later  developments. 

As  to  the  principles  embodied  in  Mr.  Darwin's  "Origin  of  Species," 
the  further  study  of  them  more  and  more  brings  home  to  me  their 
unsatisfactoriness,  as  pointed  out  by  me  in  my  "  Genesis  of  Species." 

*  Professor  Huxley  now  tolls  us  that  Mr.  Darwin  is  inclined  to  admit  that  varieties 
can  "  he  perpetuated,  or  even  intensified,  when  selective  conditions  are  indifferent,  or 
perhaps  unfavourable"  to  their  "existence."  Surely,  if  species  may  ho  evolved  in  the 
teeth  of  all  the  opposition  "natural  selection"  can  offer,  it  is,  to  say  the  least,  some- 
what paradoxical  to  affirm  that  nevertheless  natural  selection  i  w.  For  all 
this  Mr.  Darwin  has  not,  1  i  \pres.sly  said  that  the  action  of  "natural  selec- 
tion "  is  only  subordinate^  though  he  implies  that  it  is  but  co-ordinate.  So  that  though 
ho  has  virtually  given  up  his  original  theory,  his  view  does  not  yet  coincide  with  mine, 
as  far  as  I  can  gather  from  his  words. 


1 74  THE  CONTEMPORARY  RE  VIE  W. 

Indeed,  "natural  selection,"  as  the  agent  for  the  determination  of 
specific  animal  forms,  is,  I  am  convinced,  utterly  insufficient  to  the 
task  assigned  it ;  while  the  reasoning  employed  in  the  "  Descent  of 
Man  "  to  support  the  hypothesis  of  our  ape  origin*  seems  to  me,  to 
say  the  least,  unworthy  of  Mr.  Darwin's  earlier  productions. 

Professor  Huxley  attributes  to  the  Quarterly  Reviewer  "  peculiar 
notions  of  probability,"  because  he  affirms  that  if  all  animals  below 
man  have  been  evolved  one  from  the  other,  then  a  close  resemblance 
in  man's  body  to  any  particular  animal's  does  not  increase  that  d 
priori  probability  as  to  his  bodily  evolution,  which  springs  from  the 
fact  of  his  being  "  an  animal  at  all."  But  surely  if  it  was  of  the 
essence  of  an  animal  to  be  "  evolved,"  so  that  to  be  an  animal 
implied  being  a  creature  formed  by  evolution,  then  the  fact  of  man 
being  an  animal  would  necessarily  have  a  similar  implication,  and  I 
fail  to  see  what  additional  force  that  probability  would  obtain  through 
any  particular  resemblance.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  is  authority 
for  believing  "that  man's  body  was  miraculously  created,  such  parti- 
cular resemblance  would  not  render  such  a  miracle  one  bit  less 
credible  ;  for  there  is  no  necessity,  on  the  hypothesis  of  such  miraculous 
creation,  for  more  than  even  a  specific  difference  between  his  body  and 
that  of  some  other  animal. 

Professor  Huxley  also  speaks  of  the  Quarterly  Reviewer's  making 
the  admission  as  to  the  similarity  of  man's  body  to  that  of  brutes 
"grudgingly"  With  regard  to  myself,  no  one  is  better  aware  than 
Professor  Huxley  how  I  have  worked  at  the  demonstration  of  the 
close  resemblance  between  the  bodily  structures  of  men  and  apes. 

Another  objection  is  brought  both  against  me  and  the  Quarterly 
Reviewer  by  Professor  Huxley.  We  are  declared  to  make  a  "  con- 
spicuous exhibition  "  of  the  "  absence  of  a  sound  philosophical  basis," 
in  that  we  agree  in  asserting  that  man  differs  more  from  an  ape  than 
does  an  ape  from  inorganic  matter. 

But  surely  this  is  the  position  every  one  must  assume  who  believes 
that  man  is  immortal,  and  has  a  moral  responsibility  to  God.  For  it 
is  manifest  that  such  distinctions  (e.g.  growth,  nutrition,  locomotion, 
&c.)  as  exist  between  apes  and  minerals  are  as  nothing  compared 
with  the  transcendent  distinction  above  referred  to.  If,  then,  in 
saying  this  we  are  in  "  philosophical  error,"  we  share  that  error  with 
all  those  who  assert  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  a  moral  responsi- 
bility of  each  man  to  God  such  as  no  brute  possesses.  We  can  also 
claim  as  more  or  less  on  our  side  even  one  of  the  originators  of  the 
theory  of  "  natural  selection "  itself,  and  his  followers.  For  Mr. 

*  The  much-ridiculed  Lord  Monboddo  has  been  successfully  redeemed  from  very 
unjust  depreciation  in  an  interesting  article  which  has  lately  appeared.  See  the  Month 
for  November,  1871. 


E  VOL  UTIOX  <  I  .\7)  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.       1 75 

TVullace,  if  I  understand  him  rightly,  teaches  us  that  for  the  evolution 
of  man's  body  special  spiritual  agencies  were  required,  which  were  not 
needed  for  the  rest  of  the  organic  world.  So  that,  according  to  this 
view,  man  is  marked  off  from  all  the  rest  of  nature  by  a  very  special 
distinction. 

I  will  turn  now  to  the  main  point  of  Professor  Huxley's  paper — 
namely,  that  in  which  he  applies  himself  to  controverting  the  second 
object  aimed  at  in  my  "  Genesis  of  Species."  As  I  have  before  said, 
my  second  object  was  to  demonstrate  that  there  is  no  necessary  anta- 
gonism between  the  Christian  revelation  and  evolution. 

In  meeting  me  on  this  ground  (to  discuss  what  seems  to  have 
interested  the  Professor  more  than  anything  else  in  my  book),  he 
endeavours  to  create  a  prejudice  against  my  arguments,  and  to 
narrow  my  base,  by  representing  me  as  a  mere  advocate  for  specially 
Catholic  doctrine.  * 

I  altogether  decline  to  allow  the  issue  to  be  thus  limited.  I  decline 
it  because  neither  did  I  intend  such  limitation,  nor  do  any  words  of 
mine  justify  such  a  construction  of  my  purpose.  I  took  up,  and  I 
take  up,  only  the  ground  common  to  me  and  to  all  who  hold  the 
Christian  religion  as  expressed  in  the  Apostles'  Creed,  or  who  main- 
tain the  inspiration  of  Scripture.  The  better  to  make  sure  of  my 
position  I  made  use  of  an  extreme  case,  knowing  that  if  I  could 
maintain  even  that,  then  all  within  that  extreme  term  could  not 
certainly  be  questioned.  Purposely  then  I  set  out  to  show,  and  I 
did  show,  that  even  the  strictest  Ultramontane  Catholics  are  per- 
fectly free  to  hold  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  thereby  making  evident 
that  with  regard  to  Christians  in  general  there  could  not  be  a 
doubt  as  to  their  freedom  in  the  matter.  For  this  end  I  expresslj* 
selected  just  such  persons  as  would  commonly  be  supposed  not  to  be 
those  from  whom  (in  Professor  Huxley's  words)  "modern  science 
was  likely  to  receive  a  warm  welcome,"  and  amongst  others  the 
Spanish  Jesuit,  Father  Suarez,  precisely  because,  as  Professor  Huxley 
says,  "  the  popular  repute  of  that  learned  theologian  and  subtle 
casuist  was  not  such  as  to  make  his  works  a  likely  place  of  refuge  for 
liberality  of  thought." 

My  critic  shows  how  he  misapprehends  my  aim  and  intention 
when  he  speaks  of  "  Mr.  Mivart  citing  Father  Suarez  as  his  chief 
witness  in  favour  of  the  scientific  freedom  enjoyed  by  Catholics." 
Had  he  been  such  a  witness  I  should  not  for  one  moment  have 
thought  of  citing  him ;  it  was  precise^  as  one  of  the  most  rigid 

*  At  p.  454,  Professor  Huxley  gives  the  words  "Catholic,  theology"  with  marks  of 
quotation  as  if  miiie,  though  in  fact  they  were  not  so.  This  typographical  error  does 
not  misrepresent  my  substantial  moaning,  but  it  none  the  less  tends  to  create  a 
prejudice  against  my  statements  in  the  mind  of  the  public. 


i76  TPIE  CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW. 

theologians,  and  of  "unspotted  orthodoxy"  (as  Professor  Huxley 
justly  remarks),  that  I  called  him  into  court  where  he  testifies  so 
completely  to  my  satisfaction. 

The  success  of  my  mode  of  procedure  is,  I  confess,  gratifying  to 
me.  Not  only  was  my  argument  "  most  interesting  "  to  Professor 
Huxley,  but  he  tells  us  his  "  astonishment  reached  its  climax,"  and 
that  he  shall  "look  anxiously"  for  additional  references  "in  the 
third  edition  of  the  '  Genesis  of  Species.'  '  Fortunately  I  have  no 
need  to  keep  the  Professor  waiting,  but  shall  shortly  proceed  to  give 
him  these  additional  references  at  once. 

Let  it  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  view  of  the  popular  conceptions 
current  in  England  on  the  subject,  my  argument  was  that  if  even 
those  who  receive  the  teaching  of  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  and  the 
Jesuits,  and  who  look  to  Rome  for  doctrinal  decisions — if  even  those 
are  free  to  accept  evolution,  then,  d  fortiori,  other  Christians,  sup- 
posed to  be  comparatively  untrammelled,  need  not  hesitate  as  to  the 
harmony  and  compatibility  of  Christianity  and  evolution. 

Of  all  I  said  in  my  book  on  the  subject  I  have  nothing  to  retract ; 
but  I  repeat  yet  more  confidently  than  before  that  "  evolution  is 
without  doubt  consistent  with  the  strictest  Christian  theology;"  that 
"  it  is  notorious  that  many  distinguished  Christian  thinkers  have 
accepted,  and  do  accept,  both  ideas;"  that  "Christian  thinkers  are 
perfectly  free  to  accept  the  general  evolution  theory ;"  and,  finally, 
that  "  it  is  evident  that  ancient,  and  most  venerable  theological 
authorities  distinctly  assert  derivative  creation,  and  thus  their  teach- 
ings harmonize  with  all  that  modern  science  can  possibly  require." 

The  point  I  had  to  prove  was  that  the  assertion  of  the  evolution  of 
new  species  (whether  by  Mr.  Darwin's  "natural  selection  "  or  accord- 
ing to  my  hypothesis)  was  in  no  opposition  to  the  Christian  faith  as 
to  the  creation  of  the  organic  world. 

In  order  to  prove  this  I  had  to  consider  the  meaning  of  the  word 
"  creation,"  and  I  found  that  it  might  be  taken  in  three  senses,. with 
only  two  of  which,  however,  we  had  to  do. 

The  first  of  these  was  direct  creation  out  of  nothing,  of  both  matter 
and  form  conjoined — absolute  creation  such  as  must  have  taken  place 
when  the  earliest  definite  kind  of  matter  appeared. 

The  second  was  derivative  or  potential  creation  :  the  creation  by 
God  of  forms  not  as  existing,  but  in  potentia,  to  be  subsequently 
evolved  into  actual  existence  by  the  due  concurrence  and  agency  of 
the  various  powers  of  nature. 

Searching  for  information  on  the  subject,  I  found  to  my  surprise 
that  the  regular  teaching  of  theology  adopted  this  view,  which  was 
maintained  by  a  complete  consensus  of  authorities.  Of  these  I 
purposely  chose  but  a  few  telling  ones  as  types  ;  and,  amongst  the 


EVOLUTION  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.       177 

rest,   Suarez,  who  without   any  doubt,    and   as  I  shall  proceed   to 
demonstrate  more  at  length,  is  a  thorough-going  supporter  of  it. 

Professor  Huxley  has  quite  misapprehended  *  my  meaning,  hence 
the  disappointment  he  speaks  of.  What  he  did  not  find,  I  never 
.said  was  to  be  found.  What  he  actually  did  find  is  what  everybody 
knew  before,  but  is  a  matter  totally  different  from  and  utterly  irre- 
levant to  the  point  I  maintained. 

^ly  critic  fails  to  distinguish  between  the  question  as  to  the  nature 
of  creation  as  an  act,  and  that  concerning  ike  fact  of  creation. 

Now,  what  my  intention  was  is  plainly  shown  by  the  words  I  used. 
I  said  :  "  Considering  how  extremely  recent  are  these  biological 
speculations,  it  might  hardly  be  expected  d  priori  that  writers  of 
earlier  ages  should  have  given  expression  to  doctrines  harmonising  in 
any  deqree  with  such  very  modern  views ;  nevertheless,  this  is  cer- 
tainly the  case."  And  so  it  is. 

Of  Suarez  I  said,  he  opposes  those  who  maintain  the  absolute 
creation  of  substantial  forms,  and  he  distinctly  asserts  derivative 
(potential)  creation.  And  this  is  true. 

Although  Professor  Huxley  has  conveyed  the  impression  that  I 
adduced  Suarez  as  a  witness  to  evolution,  I  cannot  think  he  intended 
so  to  do.  He  surely  could  not  have  imagined  me  so  absurd  as  to 
maintain  that  ancient  writers  held  that  modern  view ;  to  attribute  to 
them  the  holding  of  such  a  conception  would  be  to  represent  them  as 
nothing  less  than  inspired.  For  certainly  no  notion  of  the  kind 
could  have  been  present,  even  in  a  dream,  to  the  minds  of  such 
thinkers.  In  their  eyes  (as  in  the  eyes  of  most  till  within  the  last 
century)  scientific  facts  must  have  seemed  to  tell  in  the  opposite 
direction. 

All  I  maintained,  and  all  that  I  thought  any  one  could  have 
supposed  me  to  maintain,  was  that  these  writers  asserted  abstract 
principles  such  as  can  perfectly  harmonise  with  the  requirements  of 
modern  science,  and  have,  as  it  were,  provided  for  the  reception  of 
its  most  advanced  speculations. 

My  words  were :  "  The  possibility  of  such  phenomena,  though 
by  no  means  actually  foreseen,  has  yet  been/^/y  provided  for  in  the 
old  philosophy  centuries  before  Darwin."  And  that  this  is  the  case 
can  be  proved  to  demonstration.  The  really  important  matter,  how- 

*  Not  only  this,  but  he  has  even  misrepresented  my  words.  He  says  (p.  445) : 
•'  According  to  Mr.  Mivart,  the  greatest  and  most  orthodox  authorities  upon  matters  of 
( 'atholic  doctrine  agree  in  distinctly  asserting  'derivative  creation  '  or  'evolution'  " — 
as  if  "derivative  creation  "  and  "evolution"  were  the  same  thina.  Having  thus  made 
me  enunciate  what  I  never  thought  of,  consequences  aro  deduced  which,  of  course,  are 
not  of  my  deducing.  Derivative  or  potential  creation  such  authorities  do  assert :  evo- 
lution of  species,  however,  was  no  more  thought  of  in  their  days  than  tho  electri 
telegraph. 

VOL.  XIX.  X 


178  THE   CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW. 

ever,  is  not  what  were  my  expressions,  but  what  is  the  fact  as  to  the 
compatibility  of  evolution  with  the  strictest  orthodoxy  ?  We  shall 
see  how,  by  Professor  Huxley's  very  fortunate  misapprehension  of  my 
meaning,  this  truth  will  be  brought  out  yet  more  clearly  than  before. 
Far  from  maintaining  that  Suarez  was  a.  teacher  of  development 
or  evolution,  what  I  quoted  him  for  was  this : — 

I.  As  an  opponent  of  the  theory  of  a  perpetual,  direct  creation  of 
organisms  (which  many  held,  and  still  hold). 

II.  To  show  that  the  principles  of  scholastic  theology  are  such  as 
not  to  exclude  the  theory  of  development,  but,  on  the  contrary,  to 
favour  it,  even  before  it  was  known  or  broached. 

What  Professor  Huxley  quotes  in  his  article  amply  confirms  my 
position.  For  if  there  are  innumerable  substantial  forms  in  the 
potentia  of  matter,  which  are  evolved  according  to  the  proximate 
capacity  of  matter  to  receive  such  forms,  it  is  evident  that  if  the 
organisation  of  matter,  through  chemical  or  other  causes,  progresses 
by  the  ever-increasiugly  complex  reactions  between  bodies  and  their 
environment,  then  it  necessarily  follows  that  new  and  higher  sub- 
stantial forms  may  be  evolved,  and  consequently  new  and  higher  forms 
of  life. 

Such  a  principle,  firmly  established  against  opponents,  becomes 
applicable  to  the  evolution  of  new  species,  as  soon  as  ever  physical 
science  shows  good  reason  to  regard  the  origin  of  species  not  as 
simultaneous  but  successive. 

It  may  be  objected  that  Suarez,  in  the  passage  referred  to,  only 
adverts  to  new  individuals  of  known  kinds  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
nature.  Professor  Huxley  says  :  "  How  the  substantial  forms  of 
animals  and  plants  primarily  originated,  is  a  question  to  which,  so 
far  as  I  am  able  to  discover,  he  does  not  so  much  as  allude  in  his 
'  Metaphysical  Disputations.' J;  Most  certainly,  in  his  day,  no  one 
entertained  the  modern  notion  as  to  origin,  of  species ;  and  it  was 
hardly  to  be  expected  that  Suarez  should  say  anything  directly  in 
point.  That  he  should  establish  the  needful  principle  was  all  we 
could  reasonably  demand  or  expect. 

Nevertheless,  in  a  remarkable  manner,  even  Father  Suarez  does 
refer  to  the  origination  of  certain  kinds  of  animals,  and  admits  their 
actual  evolution  by  natural  causes.  These  are  partly  exceptional 
forms  such  as  hybrids,  and  partly  such  as  were  believed  to  originate 
by  cosmical  influences  direct  from  the  inorganic  world,  or  through 
the  agency  of  putrefaction. 

In  lib.  ii.,  de  Opere  Sex  Dierum,c.x.,n.  12,  speaking  of  such  animals 
as  the  mule,  leopard,  lynx,  &c.,  after  stating  the  opinion  that  individuals 
of  their  kinds  must  have  been  created  from  the  beginning,  he  says, 
"nihilominus  contrarium  censeo  esse  probabilius;  "  and  he  gives  his 


E  VOL  UTION  A  ND  f  TS  CONSEQ  UENCES.       1 7  9 

reason,  "quia  liujusmodi  species  animalium  sufficienter  contine- 
bantur  potentialiter  in  illis  iudividuis  diversarum  specierum  ex 
quorum  conmixtione  generantur ;  et  ideo  non  fuit  necessarium 
aliqua  eorum  iudividua  ab  auctore  naturae  immediate  produci." 
This  in  principle  is  absolutely  all  that  can  be  required,  for  it  reduces 
the  matter  simply  to  a  question  of  fact.  He  asserts  the  principle  that 
those  kinds  of  animals  which  are  potentially  contained  in  nature  need 
not  be  supposed  to  be  directly  and  immediately  created.  In  deter- 
mining what  kinds  were  or  were  not  so  contained,  he  followed  the 
scientific  notions  of  his  time  as  he  understood  them.  He  would  have 
written  according  to  the  exigences  of  science  now. 

But  this  matter  is  really  unmistakable.  For,  so  far  was  Suarez 
from  teaching  that  all  life  requires  direct  creative  action,  that  he 
speaks  of  certain  creatures,  "  quaa  per  influentiam  ccelorum  ex  putrida 
materia  terras  aut  aqua  generari  solent."  (Ibid.,  n.  10.) 

It  is  also  interesting  to  see  that  (in  n.  11)  he  positively  asserts 
the  improbability  and  incredibility  that  certain  kinds  of  animals  now 
living  were  actually  created  at  first  at  all :  "  Alias  dicendum  esset  in 
omnibus  speciebus  quantumvis  imperfectis  aliqua  individua  in  prin- 
cipio  fuisse  facta  quia  non  est  major  ratio  de  quibusdam  quam  de 
aliis.  Consequens  est  incredibile"  He  then  instances  certain  insects, 
but  as  far  as  the  principle  of  evolution  in  itself  is  concerned  he  might 
as  well  have  selected  crocodiles. 

Moreover,  with  respect  to  certain  vegetable  productions,  he  says 
(ib.  c.  vi.  n.  1),  "  an  vero  hujusmodi  herbse  sint  factse  hoc  die  tantum 
in  potentia  vel  etiam  in  actu  magis  dubitari  potest."  Finally,  even 
with  regard  to  the  production  of  animals  altogether,  he  tells  us  that 
it  was  not  a  real  creation  (c.  x.  n.  3),  "  sed  ex  prrcjacente  materia 
modo  tamen  proprio  auctoris  nature."  It  is  strange  that  Professor 
Huxley  should  have  overlooked  these  passages  which  so  directly  con- 
tradict his  assertions. 

Nevertheless  these  passages  are  not,  let  it  be  recollected,  adduced 
to  show  that  Suarez  held  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  or  that  he  main- 
tained as  a  fact  that  species  were  evolved,  except  in  peculiar  cases,  or 
that  he  took  St.  Augustin's  view  as  to  the  fact  of  creation ;  but  to 
demonstrate  that  he  distinctly  admits  principles  compatible  with 
evolution,  and  that  even  where  he  asserts  direct  and  immediate 
divine  action,  yet  that  even  there  the  exceptions  he  admits  bring 
out  still  more  clearly  how  completely  I  was  justified  in  adducing  him 
as  a  witness  to  the  compatibility  of  evolution  with  the  principles  of 
the  scholastic  philosophy. 

So  much  then  for  the  teaching  of  Suarez  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
creative  act  and  the  admission  of  the  evolution  of  even  certain  new 
organic  forms  by  natural  causes. 

N  2 


i8o  THE   CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW. 

Let  us  turn  now  to  a  much,  more  important  subject. 
Besides  and  in  addition  to  this  view  it  is  a  most  remarkable  cir- 
cumstance that   ideas   should  have  been  expressed  of  a  distinctly- 
evolutionary  character  by  the  highest  theological  authority,  even  as 
regards  the  very  fact  of  creation,  as  an  historical  event. 

Few  things  seem  to  me  more  striking  than  that  such  an  antici- 
pation, as  it  were,  should  have  been  enunciated  by  one  of  the  greatest 
teachers  the  Church  has  ever  known,  a  doctor,  the  authority  of 
whose  writings  is  not  surpassed  by  that  of  any  of  the  Fathers — I 
mean  St.  Augustin.  As  I  said  in  my  book,  "  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  no  one  had  disputed  the  generally  received  belief  as  to  the 
small  age  of  the  world,  or  of  the  kinds  of  animals  and  plants  inha- 
biting it."  Nevertheless,  as  I  have  shown,  the  teaching  of  St.  Augus- 
tin was  distinct  with  respect  to  the  potential  creation  of  animals  and 
plants.  That  great  source  of  western  theology  held  that  the  whole 
creation  spoken  of  in  Genesis  took  place  in  one  instant ;  that  all 
created  things  were  created  at  once,  " potentialiter  atqm  causaliter" 
so*  that  it  accords  with  his  teaching  if  we  believe  in  the  gradual 
development  of  species,  the  slow  evolution,  "per  temporum  moras," 
into  actual  existence  of  what  God  created  potentially  in  the  be- 
ginning. 

Now  the  greatest  representatives  of  Catholic  theology  are  unques- 
tionably St.  Augustin  and  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  and  this  being,  as 
almost  every  one  knows,  the  case,  it  is  inconceivable  how  a  teacher 
like  Professor  Huxley  could  write  as  he  has  done  regarding  the  con- 
sequences of  a  divergence  of  Suarez  from  their  expressed  opinions. 

If,  as  Suarez  suggests,  St.  Thomas  followed  St.  Augustin  rather 
through  deference  than  from  identity  of  opinion,  it  would  only 
bring  out  more  strongly  the  paramount  authority  of  the  latter.  But 
in  fact  Suarez  was  here  mistaken,  for  we  have  St.  Thomas's  own 
words  as  to  the  matter,  where  speaking  of  St.  Augustin's  view,  lie 
tells  us,  "et  hrcc  opinio plus  mihi  placet"  (2  Sent.  dis.  12,  quaest.  1, 
a.  2). 

Here  it  rnay  be  well  to  explain  (as  Professor  Huxley  seems  quite 
to  have  misapprehended  me),  that  when  I  spoke  of  the  "wide 
reception"  of  Suarez  and  of  his  being  "widely  venerated"  and  of 
"unquestioned  orthodoxy"  I  never  thought  of  placing  him  on  a 
level  with  St.  Thomas  and  St.  Augustin.  Moreover,  "  wide  vene- 
ration" and  "  orthodoxy,"  by  no  means  imply  authority  in  the  sense 
of  binding  consciences.  Many  Catholic  teachers  altogether  reject  the 
teaching  of  Suarez  on  certain  points,  though  they  none  the  less  con- 
sider him  an  authority  to  be  respectfully  consulted,  indeed,  but  by 
no  means  to  be  necessarily  followed. 

Multitudes  of  teachers,  all  agreeing  in  matters  of  faith,  yet  belong 


A  /  rOL  UTION  .  1  \D  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.       181 

to  very  different  theological  schools,  and  the  idea  that  any  one  of  them 
can  bind  the  others  is  simply  laughable  to  those  who  know  anything 
of  the  matter. 

Professor  Huxley  seems  to  imagine  in  showing  that  Suarez  (like 
most  teachers  of  his  day,  Catholic  or  not,  e.g.  Tycho  Brahe)  adopts 
an  extreme  literalism  of  scripture  interpretation,  he  has  made  a 
notable  discovery.  But  (as  before  remarked)  I  referred  to  Suarez 
for  principles  of  interpretation  with  regard  to  derivative  creation, 
and  his  views  as  to  the  historical. facts  of  Genesis  are  quite  beside  the 
question.  St.  Thomas  explains  the  diversity  of  opinion  among  theo- 
logians in  a  way  which  exactly  meets  my  purpose :  "  Quoad  mundi 
principium,  aliquid  est  quod  ad  substantiam  fidei  pertinet  scilicet 
mundum  incepisse  creatum  et  hoc  omnes  sancti  concorditer  dicunt. 
Quo  autem  modo  et  ordine  factus  sit  non  pertinet  ad  fidem  nisi  per 
accidens,  in  quantum  in  Scriptura  traditur,  cujus  veritatem  diversa 
expositione  sancti  salvantes  diversa  tradiderunt  (2  Sent.,  dist.  12, 
q.  1.,  a.  2). 

My  critic  also  appears  to  think  that  because  one  side  of  a  question 
is  perfectly  orthodox,  that  its  contradictory  cannot  also  be  so.  If  he 
knew  the  A  B  C  of  Catholic  doctrine,  he  would  know  that  in  open 
questions  it  is  perfectly  allowable  to  maintain  either  side. 

Professor  Huxley  says,  that  Suarez  in  this  question  (as  in  other 
matters)  is  in  opposition  to  St.  Augustin.  He  is  so ;  but  other 
theologians  of  equal  weight  severely  took  him  to  task  for  his  ex- 
pressions on  this  subject,  as  I  shall  proceed  to  show,  and  there  is  not 
the  slightest  difficulty  in  bringing  forward  many  theological  au- 
thorities, both  before  and  since  the  time  of  Suarez,  who  approve  or 
positively  affirm  the  position  which  St.  Augustin  took.  Therefore, 
even  if  I  had  made  the  mistake  which  Professor  Huxley  supposes 
I  had,  it  would  not  be  of  the  slightest  moment,  and  my  thesis  could 
repose  as  securely  on  the  support  of  other  theologians. 

Thus  I  may  mention  St.  Thomas,  St.  Bonaventure,  Albertus 
Magnus,  Denis  the  Carthusian  (1470),  Cardinal  Cajetan  (1530), 
Melchior  Canus(15GO),  Bannes  (1580),  Vincentius  Contenson  (1670), 
Macedo  and  Cardinal  Noris  (1673),  Tonti  (1714),  Serry  (1720), 
Berti  (1740),  and  others  down  to  the  present  day. 

St.  Bonaventure  calls  St.  Augustin's  exposition,  "  Multum  ratio- 
nabilis  et  valdc  subtilis,"  and  speaks  of  his  method  as  a  "via 
philosophica  ;  "  nay,  he  calls  the  contrary  opinion  "  Minus  ratio- 
nabilis  quam  alia  "  (Librum  secund.  Sent.  Dist.  xii.  Quocst.  ii.  art.  1 
conclusio). 

St.  Thomas,  as  I  have  shown,  supports  and  approves  St.  Augustin, 
but  he  even  admits  ("  Sumrn,"  par.  i.  qurcs.  Ixxiii.  art.  1  ad.  3)  the 
possibility  of  new  species  himself.  He  sa}rs  : — "  Species  ctiam  novae 


1 82  THE   CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW. 

si  qusc  apparent,  praeextiterunt  in  quibusdain  activis  virtutibus  sicut 
et  animalia  ex  putrefactione  generata  producuntur  ex  virtutibus  stel- 
larum  et  elementorum  quas  a  principio  acceperunt,  etiam  si  novso 
species  talium  animalium  producuntur." 

Professor  Huxley  will  hardly  dispute  the  weight  and  significance, 
in  this  controversy,  of  the  distinct  adoption  of  St.  Augustin's  view  by 
an  eminent  Roman  Cardinal  of  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth 
century. 

Yet  Cardinal  Noris  ("  Vindicioc  Augus.,"  c.  iv.  §  ix. ;  see  Migne's 
"Patrologia  Cursus  Completus,"  torn,  xlvii.  p.  719)  speaks  in  the 
following  uncompromising  words  : — 

"  Hie  etiam  recentiorum  querelse,  imo  censurse,  quibus  insignem  Sancti 
Doctoris  interpretationem  in  cap.  i.  Geneseos  excipiunt,  refellendoe  sunt.  .  . 
Augustinus,  quod  videbat  sex  priores  dies  queis  Moyses  mundum  a  Deo 
creatum  scribit,  si  litteraliter  accipiantur,  gravissimis  difficultatibus  subjici, 
quas  ipsemet  in  libris  de  Genesi  ad  littcram  proponit,  subtilem  prorsus  ac 
se  difjnam  sententiam  excogitavit,  nempe  dies  illos  intelligendos  esse  mystice,. 
juxta  cognitionem  angelicam  de  rebus  in  Deo,  et  in  proprio  genere,  et  juxta 
ordinem  rerum  simul  a  Deo  creatarum,  dierum  etiam  ordinem  in  angelorum 

mente  designavit Ex  nostris    scriptoribus    Magister  Emmanuel 

Oerda  Lusitanus,  publicus  in  Academia  Conimbriccnsi  theologiae  professor, 
in  suis  Quodlibetis  theologicis,  acerrime  contra  recentiorum  impetum  Magni 
Parentis  sententiam  propugnat,  eorumque  et  in  censurando  audaciam,  et  in 
impugnando  debilitatem  ostendit ;  idem  quoque  praastitit  Carolus  Morcau,, 
noster  Bituricencis  in  vindiciis  pacificis." 

Speaking  of  Cornelius  a  Lapide,  he  adds  : — 

"Verum  Augustino  consentit  Albertus,  qui  ob  multiplicem  ac  niirabilem 
litteraturam  Magni  cognomento  insignitus  fuit,  his  plane  verbis ;  sine 
prasjudicio  sententiao  melioris  videtur  Augustino  consentiendum.  Part  I. 
Summa3  q.  12,  de  quatuor  coaevis.  Addit  Sanctus  Thomas  proxime 
laudatus :  Hsec  opinio  (Augustini)  PLUS  MIHI  PLACET.  Itane  Cornell 
sentcntia  ilia,  quam  Albertus  Magnus  ac  Sanctus  Thomas,  Scholasticoruin 
lamina  ac  columnar,  probant  et  sequuntur,  hac  aetate  erronea  evasit  ? 
Quasnam  illam  Synodi,  qui  Romani  prassules,  quas  doctorum  academic  pro- 

scripserc  ?     An  quia  tibi  tuisquo  displicet  erronea  censenda  est  ? 

Naa  Sanctus  Thomas,  Albertus  Magnus,  Sanctus  Bonaventura,  et  zEgidius 
Romanus  inter  accuratiores  thcologos  minirne  recensendi  sunt  ?  Erunt 
ne  illi  de  ultima  theologorum  plebe,  Senatores  vero  Suarez,  Molina  et 
Martinon  ?  Imo  omnium  nobilissimi  illi  sunt  quibus  et  Suarez  et  Molina 
assurgant,  Martinon  vero  nee  eadem  cum  illis  die  nominetur." 

Berti,  who  was  Assistant- General  of  his  order,  who  published  his 
book  at  Home,  and  belongs  to  a  period  more  than  half  a  century  later 
than  Cardinal  Noris,  proposes  the  following  thesis  ("  DC  Theologicis 
Disciplinis,"  lib.  xi.  c.  ii.)  : — 

"  Propositio  I.  Audacite  potius  et  fidentia3  vitio,  quam  doctrinal  laude 
debent  notari,  qui  maledico  dente  carpunt  Augustianam  de  x&mdbmea 
creationc  sententiam. 

"  Propositio  II.  Augustini  de  sirnultanca  creationo  sententia  non  solum 
ab  omni  animadversione  immunis  est,  i-crum  etiam  probabilis  <:t  pro)>*  cv -rla. " 


E I rOL  UTION  A ND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.       1 83 

And  in  n.  9  he  says  : — 

"  Quare  in  distributione  operum  Dei  omnia  quidem  spectant  ad  illos  dies 
invisibiles  in  quibus  creavit  oninia  simul,  videlicet  ad  diversas  cognitiones 
angelorum ;  sed  plura,  hoc  est,  qua3  primuui  in  rationibus  seminalibus, 
deinde  visibiliter  facta  sunt,  si  accipiantur  secundum  priorem  condi- 
tionem,  pertinent  ad  dies  intelligibiles,  et  unico  moinento  fuerunt  et 
ipsa  producta ;  si  vero  inspiciantur,  ut  in  propria  forma  aspectabili  con- 
stitutse,  istorum  creatio  perficitur  in  tempore,  et  post  sex  illos  dies 
invisibiles  ;  spectatque  ad  dies  naturales  in  quibus  Deus  operatur  quotidic, 
quidquid  ex  illis  tanquani  involucris  prirnordialibus  in  tempore  evolvitur. 
Sed  legite  S.  Patrem  Lit.  v.  de  Gen.  ad  lit." 

But  now,  coming  down  to  our  own  day,  the  same  complete  refuta- 
tion of  Professor  Huxley's  position  is  most  easily  effected. 

Father  Pianciani,  a  Jesuit,  was  president  of  the  College  of  Philo- 
sophy in  the  Roman  University.  His  work,  "  Cosmogonia  Naturale 
Comparata  al  Genes.,"  was  published  at  Rome  in  1862,  at  the  press 
of  the  "Civilta  Catholica."  Professor  Huxley  will  hardly  dispute 
as  to  his  orthodoxy.  This  author,  in  his  "Historia  Creationis 
Mosaicas"  (published  at  Naples  as  long  ago  as  1851),  p.  29,  shows 
that  the  whole  of  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis  must  be  read  as  a  most 
sublime  and  magnificent  poetical  description.  Concerning  St. 
Augustin's  special  view,  he  tells  us  (p.  15),  "  Ejus  doctrina  ad  hasc 
capita  revocatur  :  " — 

"  1°  Omnia  simul  a  Deo  fuisse  producta :  2°  Cuin  ipsa  ita  disponi  queant, 
ut  infimuni  gradum  rnateria  eleinentaris,  supremum  puri  spiritus  occupent, 
interjectos  et  medios  turn  mixta,  seu  chirnica  composita,  turn  corpora  physice 
composita,  ut  saxa,  turn  praecipue  corpora  organica.  Hinc  quoa  ad  infiinum, 
supremumque  gradum  spectant  et  si  qua3  alia  sunt,  quse  naturae  viribus 
neque  nunc  producuntur,  plene  et  perfecte  tune  fuisse  producta ;  qua?  vero 
interjectis  gradibus  continentur  et  nunc  naturae  viribus  producuntur,  virtute 
duntaxat  et  seminaliter  seu  causaliter,  tune  Dei  imperio  extitisse.  Augustini 
opinio,  semper  ab  errore  immunis  habita  pluribus  placuit  theologis  quos  inter 
Alberto  Magno.  St.  Thomas  in  Summa,  p.  1,  q.  74,  a.  2 — earn  reveretur, 
et  nee  ipsi  nee  vulgar!  doctrine  praejudicandum  censet,  p.  15,  16." 

No  liberal-minded  man  can  see  with  anything  but  regret  how 
eagerly  Professor  Huxley  endeavours  to  restrict  within  the  narrowest 
limits  the  faith  of  the  greater  part  of  the  Christian  world,  saying, 
"  I,  for  one,  shall  feel  bound  to  believe  that  the  doctrines  of  Suarez 
arc  the  only  ones  which  are  sanctioned  by  authority,"  &c. 

But  the  attempt  to  represent  that  such  literalism  is  binding  on 
Catholics  is  simply  preposterous.  There  is  no  need  for  the  present 
Archbishop  of  Westminster  to  give  any  such  permission  as  Professor 
Huxley  speaks  of  (as  to  the  six  days),  because  such  freedom  existed 
long  before  His  Grace  occupied  the  see,  and  was  accepted  by  his 
predecessor,  Cardinal  Wiseman.  It  would  be  restriction,  not  freedom, 
which  could  alone  require  him  to  make  any  declaration  on  the  subject. 


i84  THE   CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW. 

We  might  really  suppose  that  at  this  day  it  would  be  superfluous 
to  assert  that  Catholics  are  free  and  unembarrassed  in  their  geology 
and  palaeontology.  But  that  I  may  not  seem  to  shirk  a  point  on 
which  the  Professor  lays  such  stress,  namely,  the  "six  days"  of 
creation,  I  will  say  a  few  words  as  to  the  position  of  Catholics  with 
regard  to  this  matter. 

Now,  authorities  showing  the  freedom  of  Catholics  in  this  respect 
are  so  numerous,  that  it  is  only  difficult  to  choose.  In  the  first 
place  we  have  St.  Augustin  and  his  many  followers,  also  St.  Hilde- 
gard,  Bertier,  Berchetti,  Ghici,  Robebacher,  and  Bossuet.  Cardinal 
Cajetan  says  distinctly  that  the  six  days  were  not  real  days,  but 
meant  to  indicate  order.  And  I  may  cite  also  Cardinal  Gousset, 
"Theol.  Dogmatique,"  t.  i.  p.  103,  seq.  ;  Frayssinous,  "Defense  du 
Christianisme,"  conf.  "  Mo'ise,  historien  des  temps  primitifs;"  Perrone, 
S.  J.,  "Prelect.  Theol.,"  vol.  i.  p.  678  (edit.  Migne,  1842).  But  it 
is  really  needless  to  speak  of  writers  during  the  last  few  years,  for 
books]are  daily  printed  at  Rome  with  the  permission  of  authority  such  as 
Perrone,  just  mentioned,  also  Tongiorgi  and  Pianciani  ("  Cosmogonia 
$"aturale,"  p.  24),  before  referred  to.  In  English  we  have  Cardinal 
Wiseman's  "  Science  and  Revealed  Religion,"  Lectures  v.  and  vi., 
and  only  last  year  a  similar  work  was  published  in  London  by  the 
Rev.  Dr.  Gerald  Molloy. 

So  much  for  the  question  of  the  six  da}^s.  But  before  leaving  the 
subject  of  Christianity  and  evolution,  there  is  yet  one  more  point 
which  it  may  be  well  to  notice.  With  respect  to  the  hypothesis  I 
advanced  that  Adam's  body  might  have  been  formed  by  evolution 
like  those  of  other  animals,  the  soul  being  subsequently  infused,  Pro- 
fessor Huxley  remarks : — 

"If  Suarez  is  any  authority  it  is  not  Catholic  doctrine.  '  Nulla  est  in 
homine  forma  educta  de  potentia  materia3 '  is  a  dictum  which  is  absolutely 
inconsistent  with  the  doctrine  of  the  natural  evolution  of  any  vital  mani- 
festation of  the  human  body.  Moreover,  if  man  existed  as  an  animal  before 
he  was  provided  with  a  rational  soul,  he  must,  in  accordance  with  the 
elementary  requirements  of  the  philosophy  in  which  Mr.  Mivart  delights, 
have  possessed  a  distinct  sensitive  and  vegetative  soul  or  souls.  Hence, 
when  the  '  breath  of  life'  was  breathed  into  the  manlike  animal's  nostrils, 
he  must  have  already  been  a  living  and  feeling  creature.  But  Suarez  par- 
ticularly discusses  this  point,  and  not  only  rejects  Mr.  Mivart's  view,  but 
4  adopts  language  of  very  theological  strength  regarding  it.'  " 

Professor  Huxley  then  quotes  from  Suarez  a  passage  ending  "  ille 
enim  spiritus,  quern  Deus  spiravit,  anima  rationalis  fuit,  et  PER  EAMDEM 

FACTUS    EST    HOMO    V1VENS,    ET    CONSEQUENTER,    KTIAM     SKNTIENS/    and 

a  conciliar  decree  condemning  the  assertion  of  the  existence  of  two 
souls  in  man. 

It  is  surely  not  less  prudent  than  it  is  just  to  refrain  from  speak- 
ing authoritatively  of  that  which  we  have  not  studied  and  do  not 


EVOLUT10X  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.       185 

comprehend.  The  fact  is  that  Professor  Huxley  has  completely  mis- 
apprehended the  significance  of  the  passages  he  quotes.  No  wonder 
if  reasoning  perfectly  lucid  to  those  who  have  the  key  appears  a 
mere  "darkening  of  counsel"  to  those  who  have  not  mastered  the 
elements  of  the  systems  they  criticise. 

To  say  that  Suarez  "  rejects  Mr.  Mivart's  view  "  is  absurd,  because 
no  such  view  could  by  any  possibility  have  been  present  to  the  mind 
of  any  one  of  his  day.  To  say  that  anything  in  the  passage  quoted 
veil  in  the  faintest  degree,  inconsistent  with  that  view,,  is  an 
utter  mistake.  This  is  plain,  from  the  doctrine  as  to  the  infusion 
of  every  soul  into  every  infant,  which  was  generally  received  at  the 
period  when  Suarez  wrote. 

This  doctrine  was  that  the  human,  foetus  is  at  first  animated  by  a 
ative  soul,  then  by  a  sentient  soul,  and  only  afterwards,  at  some 
period  before  birth,  with  a  rational  soul.  Not  that  two  souls  ever 
Coexist,  for  the  appearance  of  one  coincides  with  the  disappearance 
or'  its  predecessor — the  sentient  soul  including  in  it  all  the  powers 
of  the  vegetative  soul,  and  the  rational  soul  all  those  of  the  two 
others.  The  doctrine  of  distinct  souls,  which  Professor  Huxley 
attributes  to  me  as  a  fatal  consequence  of  my  hypothesis,  is  simply 
the  doctrine  of  St.  Thomas  himself.  He  says  (Quacst.  Ixxvi.,  art.  3, 
ad.  3) : — "Dicendum  quod  prius  embryo  habet  anirnam  quae  est 
sensitiva  tantum,  qua  ablata  advenit  perfectior  anima  quaa  est  simul 
M'ii>itiva  et  intellective  ut  infra  plenius  ostendetur."  Also  (Quacst. 
cxviii.,  art.  2,  ad.  2): — "Dicendum  est  quod  anima  praaexistit  in 
embryone,  a  principio  quidem  nutritiva,  postmodum  autem  sensi- 
tiva et  tandem  intellectiva." 

He  then  answers  the  objection  that  we  should  thus  have  three 
souls  superposed,  which  he  says  is  false  because — 

•'Xulla  forma  substantial  accipit  majus  aut  minus,  sod  superadditio 
majoris  perfectionis  facit  aliain  speciem  sicut  additio  unitatis  facit  aliam 
speciem  in  numero.  .  .  .  Ideo  dicendum  quod  cum  generatio  unius  sit 
corruptio  alterius,  necessc  est  dicere  quod  tarn  in  honiine  quam  in  ani- 
malibus  aliis,  quando  perfectior  forma  advenit  fit  corruptio  prioris,  ita 
tamen  quod  sequens  forma  habet  quidquid  habebat  prima  et  adhuc  amplius. 
...  Sic  igitur  dicendum  quod  anima  intellectiva  creatur  a  Deo  in  fine 
k'enerationis  humaiue  qua3  siniul  est  et  sensitiva  et  nutritiva  corruptio 
fornris  pracexistentibus." 

Now  I  am  not  saying  anything  about  the  truth  of  this  doctrine, 
but  only  that  it  perfectly  harmonizes  with  the  hypothesis  thrown  out ; 
while  that  it  was  the  doctrine  generally  held  in  Stiarez's  day  should 
be  known  to  everyone  who  writes  upon  such  a  subject  at  all.  This 
agreement  between  the  doctrine  and  the  hypothesis  will  readily  be 
apprehended,  for  if  Adam  was  formed  in  the  way  of  which  I  suggested 
the  possibility,  he  would,  till  the  infusion  of  the  rational  soul,  be 
only  animal  vivens  et  sentiens,  and  not  "  homo  "  at  all.  But  when 


1 86  THE  CONTEMPORAR  Y  RE  VIE  W. 

the  rational  soul  was   infused,   he  thereby,  as   Suarez  justly  says, 
"  factus  est  homo  vivens,  et  consequenter,  etiam  sentiens." 

The  dictum,  "  Nulla  est  in  nomine  forma  educta  de  potentia 
materise,"  is  nothing  to  the  point,  because  I  never  supposed  that  the 
" forma  rationalis"  was  in  potentia  materise,  but  only  the  "for ma 
sentiens,"  which  would  disappear  and  become  non-existent  as  soon  as 
the  "  animal/'  by  the  infused  rationality,  becomes  "  homo."  Thus, 
so  far  from  being  inconsistent  with  my  hypothesis,  it  supports  it ;  for 
the  dictum  must  have  been  applied  by  Suarez  to  every  child,  the 
"  forma  sentiens  "  of  which  he  must  have  allowed  to  be  "  educta  de 
potentia  materice/'  although  the  "  forma  rationalis  "  in  his  doctrine,  as 
in  my  hypothesis,  is  directly  created  by  God,  and  is  in  no  way  "  educta 
de  potentia  materise."  Professor  Huxley  has  read  Suarez  ad  hoc,  and 
evidently  without  the  guidance  of  any  one  familiar  with  that  author, 
or  with  his  philosophy,  and  the  necessary  consequence  of  writing  on 
such  a  subject  under  such  circumstances  follows  of  course. 

I  think  that  it  must  now  be  plain  to  all  readers,  from  the  passages 
referred  to,  that  there  is  perfect  freedom  for  even  the  very  strictest 
Christians,  not  only  as  regards  the  question  of  the  six  days,  but  also 
with  respect  to  the  full  doctrine  of  Evolution. 

Professor  Huxley,  indeed,  must  know  well  that,  in  addition  to  the 
authority  of  approved  writers  of  ancient  and  modern  times,  there  is  a 
living  authority  in  the  Church.  That  authority,  moreover,  is  ready 
at  any  moment  to  condemn  heresy  in  the  published  expressions  of 
any  of  her  children,  and  certain  to  detect  it ;  the  question  as  to  such 
views  as  evolution  being  tenable  solntur  ambulando.  The  Professor 
congratulates  himself  prematurely  on  the  (i  spontaneous  retreat  of  the 
enemy  from  nine-tenths  of  the  territory  which  he  occupied  ten  years 
ago."  Not  one  step  backwards  has  been  taken  by  the  enemy  Professor 
Huxley  seems  to  detest  above  all.  In  proof  of  this  I  can  refer  to  the 
Rambler  of  March,  1860,  wherein  a  position  was  at  once  taken  up, 
which  is  substantially  identical  with  that  which  I  maintain  now. 

A  word  as  to  what  I  cannot  but  consider  the  very  regretable 
animus  which  Professor  Huxley  displays  in  this  matter.  AVe  have 
been  accustomed  to  hear  again  and  again  the  assertion  that  men  of 
science  differ  from  the  devotees  of  theology,  in  that  they  enter  011 
their  inquiries  cequo  ammo,  free  from  prejudice,  and  desirous  only  of 
truth.  Believers  have  been  warned,  usque  ad  nauseam,  that  a  wish 
to  believe  vitiates  all  their  arguments.  But  what  weight  can  we 
attach  to  Professor  Huxley's  conclusions  when  he  tells  us  with  regard 
to  the  doctrine  of  Evolution  that  "the  position  of  complete  and 
irreconcileable  antagonism  which,  in  his  opinion,  it  occupies  to 
the  Catholic  Church,  is  '  one  of  its  greatest  merits  in  my  eyes' '  A 
similar,  though  less  striking,  theological  prejudice  is  also  exhibited 
by  Mr.  Darwin  himself.  He  tells  us,  in  his  "Descent  of  Man,"  with 


EVOLUTION  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.      187 

characteristic  candour,  that  in  his  "Origin  of  Species "  his  first 
object  )  show  that  species  had  not  been  separately  created/' 

and  he  consoles  himself  for  admitted  error,  by  the  reflection  that  "  I 
have  at  least,  as  /  hope,  done  good  service  in  aiding  to  overthrow  the 
dogma  of  separate  creations*"* 

I  have  already  refused  to  allow  that  I  contend  for  less  than  the 
intellectual  and  religious  interests  of  all  Christians.  But,  in  fact,  I 
may  claim  ::  yet  wider  sympathy  ;  for  in  my  book  I  have  supported 
the  dogma  of  creation  as  against  all  those  wrho  decline  to  assert  the 
existence  of  a  God,  on  the  one  hand,  or  those  who  identify  him  with, 
the  creation  on  the  other;  and  I  have  endeavoured  to  uphold  the 
Theistic  conception  as  opposed  to  Antitheismf  and  Pantheism 
respectively. 

Professor  Huxley  tells  us  that  the  necessity  of  a  belief  in  a  personal 
God,  in  order  to  a  religion  worthy  of  the  name,  "  is  a  matter  of 
opinion  !  "  Of  course  the  word  may  be  employed  in  some  unusual 
sense.  I  recollect  reading  of  a  certain  Emersonian  who,  having 
accompanied  his  wife  to  see  Fanny  Elsler  dance,  and  being  charmed, 
remarked  to  her  during  the  performance — "Margaret,  this  is  poetry." 
To  which,  his  wife  replied — "  JSTo,  Paul,  it  is  religion  !  "  Of  such 
religion  I  willingly  make  a  present  to  Professor  Huxley.  But,  apart 
from  such  bizarre  employments  of  the  word,  I  firmly  adhere  to  my 
proposition.  I  know  that  Buddhism  is  sometimes  asserted  to  be 
atheistic,  but  the  conception  of  a  power  or  principle  apportioning 
after  death  rewards  and  punishments  according  to  a  standard  of 
virtue,  necessarily  involves  the  existence  of  an  entity,  which,  as  being 
most  powerful,  intelligent,  and  good,  is]  virtually/  and  logically,  a 
personal  Gocl,  whatever  be  the  name  habitually  applied  to  it. 

I  do  not  know  what  precise  meaning  Professor  Huxley  would  give 
to  the  word  religion.  He  speaks  of  "  worship,  '  for  the  most  part  of 
the  silent  sort/  at  the  altar  of  the  Unknown  and  the  Unknowable," 
but  he  has  not  (as  far  as  I  recollect)  explained  to  us  as  yet  the  full 
and  exact  nature  and  tenets  of  that  religion  the  ritual  of  which  is 
thus  hinted  at.  Mr.  Darwin's  conception  of  religion  is,  however, 
sufficiently  definite.  He  tells  us  }  that  it  consists  "of  love,  complete 
submission  to  an  exalted  and  mysterious  superior,  a  strong  sense  of 
dependence,  fear,  reverence,  gratitude,  hope  for  the  future,  and 
perhaps  other  elements." 

Let  us  apply  this  to  the  Unknown  and  the  Unknowable.     "  Love  " 

*  I  am  in-leUcil  to  Mr.  Chauncey  Wright  for  calling  my  attention  to  this  remark, 
•which  had  <  scaped  my  notice. 

t  I5y  antilhi 'ism  1  mrui  that  opinion  which  is  oppi  ism,  without  dogmati- 

cally denying  tho  existence  of  God.  Antilhei.sts  deny  that  wo  can  make-  any  assertion, 
whatever  about  that  which  underlies  phenomena,  and  which  they  term  the  "unknow- 
able." 

+  "Descent  of  Man,"  vol.  i.  G8. 


i88  THE  CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW. 

for  that  of  which  we  can  by  no  possibility  know  anything  whatever, 
and  to  which  we  may  as  reasonably  attribute  hidcousness  and  all 
vileness,  as  beauty  and  goodness  !  " Dependence"  on  that  of  which 
treachery  and  mendacity  may  be  as  much  characteristics  as  are  faith- 
fulness and  truth!  "Reverence"  for  an  entity,  whose  qualities,  if 
any,  may  resemble  as  much  all  we  despise  as  all  we  esteem,  and  which, 
for  all  we  know,  may  be  indebted  to  our  faculties  for  any  recognition 
of  its  existence  at  all !  "  Gratitude  "  to  that  which  we  have  not  the 
faintest  reason  to  suppose  ever  willingly  did  anything  for  us,  or  ever 
will !  "  Hope  "  in  what  we  have  no  right  whatever  to  believe  may 
not,  with  equal  justice,  be  a  legitimate  cause  for  despair  as  pitiless, 
inexorable,  and  unfeeling,  if  capable  of  any  sort  of  intelligence 
whatever ! 

This  is  no  exaggeration.  Every  word  here  put  down  is  strictly 
accurate,  for  if  that  which  underlies  all  things  is  to  us  the  unknowable, 
then  there  can  be  no  reason  to  predicate  of  it  any  one  character  rather 
than  its  opposite.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  any  reason  to 
predicate  goodness  rather  than  malice,  nobility  rather  than  vileness, 
then  let  preachers  of  the  unknowable  abandon  their  unmeaning 
jargon,  for  it  is  no  longer  with  the  unknowable  we  have  to  deal,  and 
we  are  plunged  at  once  into  a  whole  world  of  as  distinctly  dogmatic 
theology  as  can  be  conceived — a  theology  the  dogmas  of  which  are 
profoundly  mysterious,  while  they  are  even  more  trying,  and  at  the 
same  time  more  illuminating,  to  the  reason,  than  any  others  of  the 
whole  catena  which  logically  follow. 

Although  I  have  taken  up  this  broad  ground  in  controversy,  and 
only  contended  for  truths  common  to  all  believers  in  revelation, 
nevertheless  I  would  not  have  it  supposed  that  I  in  any  way  shrink 
from  openly  avowing  my  position  as  a  Catholic  Christian,  and  I  can- 
not consider  it  other  than  a  compliment  to  my  creed  that  Professor 
Huxley,  in  his  attack  on  Christianity  generally,  singles  it  out  for  his 
special  hostility.  All  Christians  owe  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  Professor 
Huxle3r,  for  calling  forth  more  clearly  the  certainty  that  their  religion 
has  nothing  to  fear  from  the  doctrine  of  evolution.  It  is,  however, 
Catholic  Christians  who  are  pre-eminently  beholden  to  him  for 
occasioning  a  fresh  demonstration  of  the  wonderful  way  in  which 
their  greatest  teachers  of  bygone  centuries,  though  imbued  with  the 
notions  and  possessing  only  the  rudimentary  physical  knowledge  of 
their  days,  have  yet  been  led  to  emit  fruitful  principles  by  -which  the 
Church  is  prepared  to  assimilate  and  harmonize  even  the  most 
advanced  teachings  of  physical  science. 

Professor  Huxley  indulges  in  rhetorical  declamation  as  to  a  "blind 
acceptance  of  authority/'  but  such  acceptance  is  as  much  repudiated 
by  me  as  by  Professor  Huxley.  The  Church,  in  addressing  unbe- 


ETOL I  'TIOX  AND  ITS  ( 'ONSEQl  r&NCES.        189 

Hovers,  appeals  to  "  reason  "  and  "  conscience  "  alone  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  that  Thcistic  foundation  on  which  she  reposes,  and  no 
acceptance  of  authority  can  be  called  "blind"  which  results  from 
a  clear  perception  both  of  its  rational  foundation  and  of  the  harmony 
of  its  dogmas  and  precepts  with  those  highest  faculties  of  our  nature, 
reason  and  conscience. 

I  confess  myself  weary  of  these  tedious  declamations  as  to  tin* 
incompatibility  of  science  with  Christianity  on  the  one  side,  as  also 
of  timid  deprecations  on  the  other.  The  true  position  of  these  two 
powers  justifies  neither  such  hopes  nor  such  fears;  for,  in  truth,  no 
possible  development  of  physical  science  (and  as  to  Biology  I  claim 
to  speak  with  some  slight  knowledge)  can  conflict  with  Christian 
dogma,  and  therefore  cyery  attempt  to  attack  from  that  basis  is  neces- 
sarily futile. 

On  the  other  hand,  so  far  from  the  Christian  religion  tending  to 
cramp  or  fetter  intellectual  development,  it  is  notorious  that  some 
of  the  profoundest  thinkers  of  recent  as  of  more  ancient  times,  have 
been  believers  in  Christianity,  and  I  am  convinced  that  every  man 
who  rejects  that  belief  is  ip so  facto  necessarily  condemned  not  only 
to  a  moral  but  also,  and  as  inevitably,  to  an  intellectual  inferiority 
as  compared  with  what  he  might  attain  did  he  accept  that  system 
in  its  fulness.  The  Christian  creed  has  long  been  before  the  world. 
I  would  invite  Professor  Huxley  to  formulate  his  system  in  distinct 
propositions,  that  it  also  may  be  tested  by  our  supreme  and  ultimate 
standards — "  reason  "  and  "  conscience." 

\Tith  the  extreme  hatred  of  Catholicity  which  animates  my  critic, 
it  is  easy  to  understand  the  irritation  which  my  demonstration  of 
the  harmony  which  exists  between  the  Church  and  modern  science 
has  caused  him.  He  lets  it  be  seen  that  he  had  supposed  science  to 
have  thoroughly  refuted  some  of  the  Church's  fundamental  dogmas, 
hence  the  vehement  reproaches  I  have  unwittingly  drawn  down  upon 
my  head  by  my  endeavour  to  promote  concord.  I  feel  persuaded, 
however,  that  an  intolerance  which  would  exclude  from  the  band  of 
"  loyal  soldiers  of  science,"  a  Secchi,  a  Van  Beneden,  and  a  Sullivan, 
merely  because  they  happen  to  be  at  the  same  time  "true  sons  of  the 
Church,"  will  not  commend  itself  to  the  great  bulk  of  my  scientific 
fellow-countrymen  any  more  than  the  wish  to  deprive  Catholics  of 
their  common  rights  as  citizens  will  be  approved  of  by  the  English- 
king  races  generally. 

Turning  to  Professor  Huxley's  observations  in  another  branch  of 
philosophy,  I  proceed  now  to  say  a  few  words  as  to  his  strictures  on 
the  psychology  of  the  Quarterly  llcviewer. 

I  apprehend  that  my  critic's  psychological  views  coincide  in  tho 
main  with  thos?  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer.  Now  it  is  not  of  course 


i go  THE   CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW. 

possible  within  the  limits  of  this  article  to  write  a  treatise  on  psycho- 
logy, and  nothing  less  would  be  requisite  to  explain  the  grounds  of 
my  complete  and  fundamental  divergence  from  the  views  referred  to. 
It  must  suffice  to  say  here,  that  Professor  Huxley  has  adduced  no 
argument  and  has  brought  forward  no  kind  of  illustration  which  I 
have  not  maturely  considered  and  deliberately  rejected  as  inadequate 
and  fallacious.  Another  time  I  hope  to  be  able  to  go  at  length 
into  this  question  and  to  endeavour  to  explain,  according  to  the 
system  I  adopt,  the  facts  adduced  *by  the  opposite  school ;  as  also 
to  support  my  views  by  positive  arguments.  In  the  meantime  I 
heartily  re- echo  Professor  Huxley's  tribute  to  the  supreme  import- 
ance of  "  the  philosophical  questions  which  underlie  all  physical 
science,"  and  I  am  confident  that  vast  good  would  result  if  only  men 
could  be  brought  to  undergo  the  labour  and  persevering  application 
necessary  for  their  thorough  investigation. 

I  must  here,  then,  confine  myself  to  the  clearing  up  of  some  mis- 
apprehensions and  misrepresentations. 

In  the  first  place,  Professor  Huxley  objects  to  the  assertion  that 
"  sensation"  is  not  "  thought,"  "  though  sensations  supply  the  con- 
ditions for  the  existence  of  thought."  He  says  : 

"  If  I  recall  the  impression  made  by  a  colour  or  an  odour,  and  distinctly 
remember  blueness  or  muskiness,  I  may  say  with  perfect  propriety  that  I 
'  think  of '  blue  or  musk  ;  and  so  long  as  the  thought  lasts,  it  is  simply  a 
faint  reproduction  of  the  state  of  consciousness  to  which  I  gave  the  name  in 
question,  when  it  first  became  known  to  me  as  a  sensation." 

"  Now,  if  that  faint  reproduction  of  a  sensation  which  we  call  the  memory 
of  it,  is  properly  termed  a  thought,  it  seems  to  me  to  be  a  somewhat  forced 
proceeding  to  draw  a  hard  and  fast  line  of  demarcation  between  thoughts 
and  sensations.  If  sensations  are  not  rudimentary  thoughts,  it  may  be  said 
that  some  thoughts  are  rudimentary  sensations.  No  amount  of  sound  con- 
stitutes an  echo,  but  for  all  that  no  one  would  pretend  that  an  echo  is 
something  of  totally  different  nature  from  sound." 

To  this  I  can  now  only  reply  by  observing  that  according  to  my 
view  a  recalled  thought  is  not  a  "  rudimentary  sensation,"  though 
the  sensible  memory  is  made  use  of  with  regard  to  it.  I  also  deny 
utterly  that  the  faint  recurrence  of  a  sensation  can  ever  be  properly 
termed  a  thought,  and  the  act  of  "  recalling"  such  sensation  is  only 
to  be  so  named  on  account  not  of  the  sensation  recalled,  but  of  the 
intellectual,  voluntary  act  of  recalling. 

The  analogy  of  an  echo  is  false  and  misleading.  An  echo  is 
merely  a  particular  kind  of  sound,  but  a  thought  is  not  merely  a 
particular  kind  of  sensation. 

Again,  Professor  Huxley  objects  to  the  assertion  that  sensations 
supply  the  conditions  for  the  existence  of  thought  or  knowledge — 
saying : 


E  VOL  UTION  A ND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.       i g i 

"  If  this  implies  that  sensations  supply  the  conditions  for  the  existence 
of  our  memory  of  sensations,  or  of  our  thoughts  about  sensations,  it  is  a 
truism  which  it  is  hardly  worth  while  to  state  so  solemnly.  If  it  implies 
that  sensations  supply  anything  else  it  is  obviously  erroneous.  And  if  it 
means,  as  the  context  would  seem  to  show  it  does,  that  sensations  are  the 
subject-matter  of  all  thought  or  knowledge,  then  it  is  no  less  contrary  to 
fact,  inasmuch  as  our  emotions,  which  constitute  a  large  part  of  the  subject- 
matter  of  our  thought  or  of  knowledge,  are  not  sensations." 

It  seems  to  me  that  this  argument  is  quite  unfair,  and  that  it  is 
a  false  dilemma.  The  reviewer's  words  evidently  point  to  "  sensa- 
tions" as  the  condition  of  our  knowledge  of  external  objects,  and 
this,  at  least,  is  no  truism.  For  my  part,  if  I  understand  Professor 
Iluxley  righth',  I  should  assert  that  to  be  "axiomatic"  which  he 
says  is  "  obviously  erroneous." 

The  short  summary  in  the  Quarterly  Review  of  the  psychical 
characters  common  to  man  and  brutes  on  the  one  hand,  and  peculiar 
to  man  as  a  rational  animal  on  the  other,  was  evidently  not  intended 
as  an  exhaustive  catalogue,  but  merely  as  a  concise  statement  of 
certain  leading  and  essential  differences.  Therefore  "  emotion,"  as 
avowedly  common  to  man  and  brute,  and  volition  and  memory,  as 
beside  the  question,  were  reasonably  left  unnoticed. 

A  carping  criticism  as  to  the  word  "  agency "  as  applied  to 
sensation  in  these  reflex  acts  in  which  sensation  intervenes,  is  what, 
I  confess,  I  should  not  have  expected  from  Professor  Huxley.  He 
certainly  would  never  think  of  denying  the  intervention  of  sensation 
in  such  acts. 

As  to  his  assertion  that  the  Quarterly  Reviewer  in  conceding  to 
animals  his  first  four  groups  of  actions,  "  grants  all  that  is  necessary 
for  the  purposes "  of  his  critic,  it  is  an  error  which  arises  from  the 
thorough  misapprehension  by  Professor  Huxley  of  the  Reviewer's 
position,  as  will  be  made  manifest  by  what  I  have  to  say  concerning 
reason  and  predication. 

Professor  Huxley  gives  us,  in  illustration  of  his  views,  a  comparison 
between  a  gamekeeper  and  a  greyhound,  both  engaged  in  coursing, 
the  relevancy  of  which,  I  confess,  escapes  me. 

No  one  denies  that  man  is  an  animal.  No  one  denies  that  the 
sensitive  faculties  of  the  greyhound  are  possessed  by  the  man  just  as 
are  his  digestive  and  locomotive  faculties.  No  anatomist  denies  that 
man's  bodily  structure  closely  resembles  the  brutes',  and  I,  at  least, 
have  been  forward  in  asserting  it.  I  maintain,  however,  that  though 
man  and  dog  agree  in  exhibiting  the  phenomena  of  feeling,  they 
differ  altogether  as  to  the  phenomena  of  thinking,  of  which  man 
alone  gives  any  evidence. 

Professor  Iluxley  asks  a  singular  question.  He  says — "What 
is  the  value  of  the  evidence  which  leads  one  to  believe  that 


1 92  THE   CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW. 

one's  fellow-man  feels  ?  The  only  evidence  in  this  argument  of 
analogy,  is  the  similarity  of  his  structure  and  of  his  actions  to  one's 
own/'  Surely  it  is  not  by  similarity  of  actions,  in  any  ordinary 
sense  of  the  word,  but  by  language  that  men  are  placed  in  communi- 
cation with  one  another,  and  that  the  rational  intellect  of  each 
perceives  the  rationality  and  sensibility  of  his  fellow-man. 

Professor  Huxley  asserts  that  by  "a  combination  of  sensible 
images,"  the  Quarterly  Reviewer  must  mean  more  than  his  words 
imply,  or  otherwise  a  greyhound  would  not  run  after  a  hare. 
Certainly  the  Reviewer  could  hardly  have  suspected  that  any  one 
would  take  him  to  mean  that  brutes  are  destitute  of  appetites  and 
emotions.  The  conjunction,  however,  of  these  appetites  and  emotions 
with  sensible  images  in  complex  associations  is  certainly  amply  suffi- 
cient to  explain  all  that  is  exhibited  by  dogs  in  "  the  noble  art  of 
coursing,"  and  this  Professor  Huxley  must  allow  if,  as  I  suspect,  he 
would  attribute  nothing  essentially  higher  to  the  gamekeeper  himself. 

On  the  question  concerning  morality  I  have,  I  conceive,  some 
reason  to  complain  of  Professor  Huxley's  treatment  of  my  observa- 
tions. From  the  remarks  which  he  has  again  and  again  made,  it 
is  evident  to  whom  he  attributes  the  article  in  the  Quarterly  Review, 
Nevertheless,  he,  in  the  first  place,  misrepresents  my  statement  in 
my  book,  and  attributes  to  me  an  absurdity  which  is  not  in  it,  but 
which  is  distinctly  pointed  out  and  repudiated  in  the  Quarterly 
Review.  In  the  second  place,  he  accuses  me  of  neglecting  a  remark 
made  by  Mr.  Darwin,  which  remark  is  not  only  referred  to,  but 
actually  quoted  in  the  same  review. 

First,  with  regard  to  Mr.  Darwin.  In  this  matter  Professor 
Huxley  accuses  me  of  charging  that  gentleman  "  with  being  ignorant 
of  the  distinction  between  material  and  formal  goodness/'  though 
Mr.  Darwin  himself  "discusses  the  very  question  at  issue  in  a 
passage,  well  worth  reading,  and  also  comes  to  a  conclusion  opposed 
to  Mr.  Mivart's  axiom."  As  I  have  said,  this  passage  is  not  only 
referred  to,  but  actually  quoted  in  the  Quarterly  Review.  In  that 
passage,  however,  Mr.  Darwin,  though  he  notices,  gives  no  evidence 
of  fully  understanding  my  distinction,  nor,  though  he  notices  an 
objection,  does  he  meet  the  difficulty  in  the  least.  Professor  Huxley 
seems  to  think  that  because  Mr.  Darwin  has  referred  to  an  objection, 
that  that  objection  has  thereby  lost  its  force.  The  objection,  how- 
ever, has  not  been  refuted  either  by  Mr.  Darwin  or  Professor  Huxley, 
and  hence  it  becomes  probable  that,  as  I  am  convinced  is  the  case, 
it  cannot  be  refuted. 

We  will  turn  now  to  the  more  serious  misrepresentation  of  which 
I  have  to  complain.  My  critic  exhibits  me  as  committing  the  absurdity 
of  maintaining  that  no  act  can  be  "  good "  unless  it  is  done  with 


E  VOL  UTION  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.       193 

deliberate  and  actual  advertence  in  every  instance — as  if  I  thought 
that  a  man  must  stand  still,  consider  and  reflect  in  each  case  in  order 
to  perform,  a  meritorious  action.  He  also  implies  that  I  am  so 
unreasonable  as  to  deny  "merit"  to  actions  done  unreflectingly  and 
spontaneously  from  the  love  of  God  or  one's  neighbour. 

AVhat  I  assert,  however,  is,  that  for  an  act  to  be  "  good  "  it  must 
be  really  directed  by  the  doer  to  a  good  end,  either  actually  or 
virtually.  The  idea  of  good,  which  he  has  in  the  past  apprehended, 
must  be  influencing  the  man  at  the  time,  whether  he  adverts  to  it 
or  not,  otherwise  the  action  is  not  moral.  The  merit  of  that  virtue 
which  shows  itself  even  in  the  spontaneous,  indeliberate  actions  of 
a  good  man,  results  from  the  fact  of  previous  acts  having  been  con- 
sciously directed  to  goodness,  by  which  a  habit  has  been  formed. 
The  more  thoroughly  a  man  is  possessed  by  the  idea  of  goodness,  the 
more  his  whole  being  is  saturated  with  that  idea,  the  more  will 
goodness  show  itself  in  all  his  even  spontaneous  actions,  which  thus 
will  have  additional  merit  through  their  very  spontaneity.  Now 
this  was  actually  expressed  in  the  Quarterly  Review,  where  of  such 
an  act  it  is  stated  that  "it  is  moral  as  the  continuation  of  those 
preceding  deliberate  acts  through  which  the  good  habit  was  originally 
formed ;  and  the  rapidity  with  which  the  will  is  directed  in  the  case 
supposed  may  indicate  the  number  and  constancy  of  antecedent 
meritorious  actions."" 

Not  only,  however,  does  Professor  Huxley  avoid  notice  of  this 
passage,  but  he  quotes  my  words  as  to  the  unmeritorious  nature  of 
actions  "unaccompanied  by  mental  acts  of  conscious  will  directed 
towards  the  fulfilment  of  duty,"  so  as  to  lead  his  readers  to  believe 
that  I  say  this  absolutely.  He  takes  care  not  to  let  them  know  that 
here  I  am  speaking  *  only  of  the  "  actions  of  brutes,  such  as  those 
of  the  bee,  the  ant,  or  the  beaver,"  which,  of  course,  never  at  any 
period  of  the  lives  of  any  one  of  these  creatures  were  consciously 
directed  to  "  goodness "  or  "  duty "  as  an  end,  so  that  no  later 
spontaneous  actions  could  in  their  case  result  from  an  acquired  habit 
of  virtue,  on  which  account  I  was  fully  justified  in  speaking  of  their 
actions  as  devoid  of  morality. 

Professor  Huxley  speaks  of  "  the  most  beautiful  character  to 
which  humanity  can  attain,  that  of  the  man  who  does  good  without 
thinking  about  it"  (p.  468).  Does  he  mean  that  the  absence  of 
thought  is  the  cause  of  the  beauty  ?  If  so,  then  if  I  do  the  most 
beneficial  acts  in  my  sleep,  I  attain  this  apex  of  moral  beauty.  This, 
of  course,  he  will  not  allow.  Therefore,  it  is  not  by  reason  of  the 
not  thinking  about  it  that  the  action  is  beautiful,  but,  as  Professor 
Huxley  goes  on  to  say,  "  because  he  loves  justice  and  is  repelled  by 
*  See  "  Genesis  of  Species,"  p.  221,  2nd  edition. 

VOL.  XIX.  O 


194  THE   CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW. 

evil."  In  this  last,  then — in  this  habit  of  mind,  the  beauty  consists. 
But  will  the  Professor  say  that  the  man  got  himself  into  this  state 
without  previous  acts  of  conscious  will  ?  Can  a  man  love  justice 
without  being  able  to  distinguish  between  the  just  and  unjust  ?  if 
he  loves  moral  beauty,  must  he  not  know  it  ? 

Professor  Huxley  does  not,  I  believe,  mean  what  he  says  when  he 
asserts  that  acts  may  be  moral  which  are  not  directed  to  a  good  end. 
Were  it  so,  such  words  as  "  virtue  "  and  "  goodness  "  would  have  no 
rational  and  logical  place  in  his  vocabulary. 

Similarly,  I  do  not  believe  him  when  he  says  he  "utterly  rejects"  the 
distinction  between  "  material  "  and  "formal "  morality.  I  do  not, 
because  he  has  elsewhere  asserted  that  "  our  volition  counts  for  some- 
thing as  a  condition  of  the  course  of  events."  If,  however,  he 
rejects  the  distinction  he  says  he  rejects,  he  thereby  absolutely 
denies  every  element  of  freedom  and  spontaneity  to  the  human  will, 
and  reduces  our  volition  to  a  rank  in  the  "  course  of  events,"  which 
counts  for  no  more  than  the  freedom  of  a  match  as  to  ignition,  when 
placed  within  the  flame  of  a  candle.  "With  the  enunciation  of  this 
view,  "  formal  morality  "  most  certainly  falls,  and  together  with  it 
every  word  denoting  "virtue,"  which  thus  becomes  a  superfluous 
synonym  for  pleasure  and  expediency. 

Adverting  now  to  the  question  of  "  reason,"  according  to  Professor 
Huxley  (p.  463),  "  ratiocination  is  resolvable  into  predication,  and 
predication  consists  in  marking,  in  some  way,  the  succession,  the 
likeness  and  unlikeness,  of  things  or  their  ideas.  Whatever  does 
this,  reasons ;  and  if  a  machine  produces  these  effects  of  reason,  I  see 
no  more  ground  for  denying  to  it  the  reasoning  power,  because  it  is 
unconscious,  than  I  see  for  refusing  to  Mr.  Babbage's  engine  the 
title  of  a  calculating  machine  on  the  same  grounds." 

"  Thus  it  seems  to  me  that  a  gamekeeper  reasons,  whether  he  is  con- 
scious or  unconscious,  whether  his  reasoning  is  carried  on  by  neurosis 
alone,  or  whether  it  involves  more  or  less  psychosis." 

According  to  my  idea  of  the  matter,  predication  essentially  consists 
not  in  marking  "  succession,  likeness  and  unlikeness,"  but  in 
recognising  these  relations  as  true. 

To  this  extent  I  may  shelter  myself  under  the  authority  of  Mr. 
John  Stuart  Mill.  Mr.  Mill,  in  criticising  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
definition  of  judgment,  makes  the  following  remarks  ("  Examination 
of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy,"  p.  346)  :— 

"The  first  objection  which,  I  think,  must  occur  to  anyone,  on  the 
contemplation  of  this  definition,  is  that  it  omits  the  main  and  characteristic 
dement  of  a  judgment  and  of  a  proposition.  .  .  .  When  we  judge  or  assert, 
there  is  introduced  a  new  element,  that  of  objective  reality,  and  a  new 
mental  fact,  belief.  Our  judgments,  and  the  assertions  which  express 
them,  do  not  enunciate  our  mere  mode  of  mentally  conceiving  things,  but 


E  VOL  UTIOX  <  i  ffl)  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.       1 95 

our  conviction  or  persuasion  that  the  facts  as  conceived  actually  exist ;  and 
a  theory  of  judgments  and  propositions  which  does  not  take'  account  of 
this,  cmiiiof  /«  d  true  tJit'onj.  In  the  words  of  Reid  'I  give  the  name  of 
judgment  to  every  determination  of  the  mind  concerning  what  is  //•///•  or 
u'lmt  is  fithi'.  This,  I  think,  is  what  logicians,  from  the  days  of  Aristotle, 
called  judgment.'  And  this  is  the  very  element  which  Sir  Win. 
Hamilton's  definition"  [and  I  may  now  add  Professor  Huxley's  also] 
"  omits  from  it." 

Further  on  Mr.  Mill  says  : — 

"  Belief  is  an  essential  rloncnt  in  a  judgment.  .  .  .  The  recognition  of  it 
as  true  is  not  only  an  essential  part,  but  the  essential  element  of  it  as 
a  judgment ;  leave  that  out,  and  jihere  remains  a  mere  piny  of  thought,  in 
which  no  judgment  is  passed.  It  is  impossible  to  separate  the  idea  of 
judgment  from  the  idea  of  the  truth  of  a  judgment ;  for  every  judgment 
consists  in  judging  something  to  be  true.  The  element  belief,  instead  of 
being  an  accident  which  can  be  passed  in  silence,  and  admitted  only  by 
implication,  constitutes  the  very  difference  between  a  judgment  and  any 
other  intellectual  fact,  and  it  is  contrary  to  all  the  laws  of  definition  to 
define  judgment  by  anything  else.  The  very  meaning  of  a  judgment  or  a 
proposition  is  something  which  is  capable  of  being  believed  or  disbelieved ; 
which  can  be  true  or  false  ;  to  which  it  is  possible  to  say  yes  or  no." 

In  addition  to  this,  Mr.  Mill,  in  his  notes  on  his  father's,  Mr. 
James  Mill's,  "  Analysis  of  the  Human  Mind,"  ably  shows,  against 
Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  that  rational  belief  cannot  be  explained  as 
being  identical  with  indissoluble  association  (vol.  i.  p.  402). 

In  denying,  then,  reason  to  brutes — in  denying  that  their  acts  are 
rational,  I  do  not,  of  course,  deny  for  a  moment  that  they  are  rational 
in  the  sense  in  which  Mr  Babbage's  machine  is  calculating,  but 
what  I  do  maintain  is,  that  brutes  have  not  the  power  of  forming 
judgments  in  the  sense  above  explained.  And  I  still  more 
emphatically  deny  that  brutes  have  any,  even  the  very  dimmest,  con- 
sciousness of  such  ideas  as  "  ought "  and  moral  excellence.  And 
because  I  further  believe  that  no  amount  of  sensible  experiences  can 
generate  these  conceptions,  I  deny  that  any  brute  is  even  potentially 
a  moral  agent.  Those  who  credit  brutes  with  "  morality,"  do  so  by 
first  eliminating  from  that  idea  all  its  essential  characteristics. 

One  word  now  of  explanation.      Professor  Huxley  seems  much 

disturbed  at  my  speaking  of  virtue  as,  in  his  view,  a  kind  of  retri 

and  accuses  me  of  imposing  an  "  injurious  nickname,"  and  making  a 

"joke."     Nothing  could  have  been  further  from  my  intention  than 

either  one  or  the  other.     As  it  happens  the  expression  was  not  my 

but  was  picked  up  in  conversation  with  as  thorough  a  Darwinian 

even  as  Professor  Huxley  himself,  who  used  it,  as  I  understood,  not 

nickname,  but  as  a  handy  mode  of  bringing  home  his  conceptions 

to  my  mind.     I  made  use  of  it  in  all  innocence,  and  I  still  think  it 

singularly  apt  and  appropriate,  not  certainly  to  express  the  conception 

o  2 


1 96  THE   CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW. 

of  virtue,  but  to  bring  home  the  utilitarian  notion  of  it.  Professor 
Huxley  says,  "  What  if  it  is  ?  Does  that  make  it  less  virtue  ?  "  I 
answer,  unhesitatingly,  that  it  not  only  makes  it  "less  virtue,"  but 
prevents  its  being  virtue  at  all,  unless  it  springs  as  a  habit  acquired 
from  self-conscious  acts  directed  towards  an  end  recognised  as  good. 

Professor  Huxley  regrets  that  I  should  "eke  out  "  my  arguments 
against  the  views  he  patronises,  by  ascribing  to  them  "  logical 
consequences  which  have  been  over  and  over  again  proved  not  to  flow 
from  them."  But  it  was  to  be  expected  that  a  disciple  of  Mill,*  such 
as  Professor  Huxley,  would  know  that  in  matters  of  this  kind  it  is 
impossible  to  reason  d  posteriori,  011  account  of  the  complexity  of  the 
conditions;  and  that  the  d  priori  argument,  by  deductions  from  in- 
evitable tendencies,  can  be  alone  employed.  If  Professor  Huxley  is 
persuaded  of  the  evil  consequences  of  Christianity,  I  am  equally 
persuaded  of  the  evil  consequences  of  his  system. 

No  one  has  a  greater  esteem  for  Professor  Huxley  than  I  have, 
and  no  one  is  more  convinced  than  I  am  of  the  uprightness  of  his 
intentions  and  his  hearty  sympathy  with  self-denying  virtue. 
Nevertheless,  the  principles  he  unhappily  advocates  cannot  but  tend, 
by  a  fatal  necessity,  in  one  direction,  and  to  produce  results  socially, 
politically,  and  morally,  which  he  would  be  the  first  to  deplore.  They 
tend  in  the  intellectual  order  to  the  degradation  of  the  mind,  by  the 
essential  identification  of  thought  with  sensation,  and  in  the  political 
order  to  the  evolution  of  horrors  worse  than  those  of  the  Parisian 
Commune.  I  refrain  from  characterizing  their  tendency  in  the 
moral  order. 

Before  concluding,  I  must  make  one  observation  with  regard  to 
Mr.  Wallace.  I  emphatically  disclaim  having  had  any  intention  of 
depreciating  obliquely  Mr.  Darwin,  though  I  desired  to  do  justice 
to  Mr.  Wallace.  It  is  an  undoubted  fact  that  there  are  many  men 
who,  if  they  had  thought  out  natural  selection  simultaneously  with 
Mr.  Darwin,  would  have  clamorously  sought  a  recognition  of  the  fact, 

*  In  speaking  of  the  application  of  the  experimental  method  to  social  science,  Mr. 
Mill  remarks  : — "  This  mode  of  thinking  is  not  only  general  with  practitioners  in 
.politics,  and  with  that  very  numerous  class  who  (on  a  subject  which  no  one,  however 
ignorant,  thinks  himself  incompetent  to  discuss)  profess  to  guide  themselves  by  common 
sense  rather  than  by  science ;  but  is  often  countenanced  by  persons  with  greater  pre- 
tensions to  instruction  ....  As,  however,  the  notion  of  applicability  of  experimental 
methods  to  political  philosophy  cannot  co-exist  with  any  just  conception  of  these 
methods  themselves,  the  kind  of  arguments  from  experience  which  the  chemical  theory 
brings  forth  as  its  fruits  (and  which  form  the  staple,  in  this  country  especially,  of  par- 
liamentary and  hustings  oratory),  are  such  as,  at  no  time  since  Bacon,  would  have  been 
admitted  to  be  valid  in  chemistry  itself,  or  in  any  other  branch  of  experimental  science." 
(Mill's  "  Logic,"  vol.  ii.  p.  454.)  "  It  is  evident  that  Sociology,  considered  as  a  system 
of  deductions  d  priori,  cannot  be  a  science  of  positive  predictions,  but  only  of  tendencies.'" 
(Op.  cit.  p.  477.) 


EVOLUTION  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES.       197 

and  have  lost  no  opportunity  of  asserting  simultaneity.  No  one  can 
affirm  that  Mr.  Wallace  has  shown  the  faintest  inclination  of  the  kind, 
while  no  one  can  deny  that  if  he  had  followed  the  clamorous  path, 
his  name  would  have  been  more  widely  known  and  more  popularly 
associated  with  natural  selection  than  has  been,  in  fact,  the  case. 

It  is  a  gratuitous  assertion  on  the  part  of  Professor  Huxley  to  say 
I  hav  -ted  that  Mr.  Darwin's  eminence  is  due  to  Mr.  Wallace's 

modesty,  in  any  other  sense  than  what  I  have  now  explained — 
namely,  that  had  Mr.  Wallace  put  himself  more  prominently  forward, 
he  would  have  been  seen  more  distinctly  by  the  popular  eye,  an 
assertion  no  one  can  question. 

As  a  fact,  I  believe  that  Mr.  Wallace,  in  the  passage  quoted  by 
Professor  Huxley,  allows  his  modesty  to  deceive  him.  From  what 
I  know  of  Mr.  Wallace,  I  venture  to  affirm  he  underrates  his  powers, 
and  I  am  convinced  he  could  have  written  as  good  a  defence  of  natural 
selection  as  even  the  "  Origin  of  Species."  There  are  not  wanting 
those  who,  though  they  have  carefully  studied  Mr.  Darwin's  work, 
only  fully  understood  his  theory  when  presented  to  their  mind  in 
the  clear,  lucid,  and  admirable  writings  of  Mr.  Wallace. 

ST.  GEORGE  MIVART. 


"