ss
,
X-
CAREFUL and STRICT
ENQUIRY
INTO THE
MODERN PREVAILING NOTIONS
OF THAT
FREEDOM of WILL,
WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE ESSENTIAL
T o
MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE and VICE,
REWARD and PUNISHMENT, PRAISE
and BLAME.
By JONATHAN EDWARDS, A.M.
Rom. ix. 1 6. It is not of Mm that willeth —
The FOURTH EDITION.
LONDON,
Printed for J. JOHNSON, No. 72, St. Paul's Church- yard,
M D C C L X X V,
er
E25
651331
x. 7 -3 ^S7
THE
PREFACE.
ANY find much fault with the
caUing profeffing Chriftians, that
differ one from another in fome
,- . . !•/•>•(-»
matters ot opinion, by diitmcc
names > efpecially calling them by the names
of particular men, who have diftinguifhed
themfelves as maintainers and promoters of
thofe opinions : as the calling fome profef
fing Chriftians Arminian^ from Arminius ;
others Arians, horn Arius -, others Socinians,
from Socinus, and the like. They think it
unjuft in itfelf ; as it ieems to fuppofe and
fuggeft, that the perfons marked out by thefe
names, received thofe doctrines which they
entertain, out of regard to, and reliance on
thofe men after whom they are named ; as
though they made them their rule ; in the
fame manner, as the followers of CHRIST
are called Cbriftians ; after his name, whom
they regard and depend upon, as their great
Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjuft
and groundless imputation on thofe that go
under the fore-mentioned denominations.
Thus (fay they) there is not theleaft ground
A 2 to
iv Tbe P R E F A C E.
to fuppofe, that the chief Divines, who em
brace the fcheme of doctrine which is, by
many, called Arminianifm, believe it -the
more, becaufe Arminius believed it : and
that there is no reafon to think any o-
ther, than that they fincerely and impar
tially ftudy the holy Scriptures, and enquire
after the mind of Chrift, with as much
judgment and fincerity, as any of thofe that
calf them by thefe names ; that they feek
after truth, and are not careful whether they
think exactly as Arminius did ; yea, that, in
fome things, they actually differ from him.
This practice is alfo efteemed actually inju
rious on this account, that it is fuppofed na
turally to lead the multitude to imagine the
difference between perfons thus named and
others, to be greater than it is ; yea, as tho'
it were fo great, that they muft be, as it were,
another fpecies of beings. And they object
'againft it as ariiing from an uncharitable,
narrow, contracted fpirit ; which, they fay,
commonly inclines perfons to confine all
that is good to themfelves, and their own
party, and to make a wide diftinction be
tween themfelves and others, and iligma-
tize thofe that differ from them with odious
names. They fay, moreover, that the keep
ing up fuch a diftinction of names has a
direct tendency to uphold diftance' and dif-
affection, and keep alive mutual hatred
among Chriftians, who ought -all to be
united in friendfhip and charity, however
they cannot, in all things, think alike.
I confefsj
The P R E F A C E. v
I confefs, thefe things are very plaufible.
And I will not deny, that there are fome un
happy confequences of this diftin6lion of
names, and that men's infirmities and evil
difpofitions often make an ill improvement
of it. But yet, I humbly conceive, thefe ob-
jeftions are carried far beyond reafon. The
generality of mankind are difpofed enough,
and a great deal too much, to uncharitable-
nefs, and to be cenforious and bitter towards
thofe that differ from them in religious opi
nions : which evil temper of mind will take
occafion to exert itfelf from many things in
themfelves innocent, ufeful and neceffary.
But yet there is no neceffity to fuppofe, that
the thus diftinguifhing perfons of different
opinions by different names, arifes mainly
from an uncharitable fpirit. It may arife
from the difpofition there is in mankind
(whom God has diftinguifhed with an ability
and inclination for fpeech) to improve the
benefit of language, in the proper ufe and
defign of names, given to things which they
have often occafion to fpeak of, or fignify
their minds about ; which is to enable them
to exprefs their ideas with eafe and expedi
tion, without being encumbered with an
obfcure and difficult circumlocution. And
the thus diftinguifhing perfons of different
opinions in religious matters may not imply,
nor infer, any more than that there is a dif
ference, and that the difference is fuch as we
find we have often occafion to take notice
of, and make mention of. That whiph we
A 3 have
vi The P R E F A C E.
have frequent occafion to fpeak of (whatever
it be, that gives the occafion) this wants a
name : and it is always a defeat in language,
in fuch cafes, to be obliged to make ufe of
a defcription, inftead of a name. Thus we
have often occafion to fpeak of thofe who
are the defendants of the ancient inhabi
tants of France, who were fubjefts or heads
of the government of that land, and fpake
the language peculiar to it ; in diftinftion
from the defendants of the inhabitants of
Spain, who belonged to that community, and
fpake the language of that country. And
therefore we find the great need of diftinft
names to fignify thefe different forts of peo
ple, and the great convenience of thofe di-
ftinguiihing words, French and Spaniards -y
by which the fignification of our minds is
quick and eafy, and our fpeech is delivered
from the burden of a continual reiteration
of diffufe defcriptions, with which it muft
otherwife be embarraffed.
That the difference of the opinions of
thofe, who in their general fcheme of divi
nity agree with thefe two noted men, Calvin
and ArminiuS) is a thing there is often oc
cafion to fpeak of, is what the practice of
the latter itfelf confefles ; who are often, in
their difcourfes and writings, taking notice
of the fuppofed abfurd and pernicious opi
nions of the former fort. And therefore the
making ufe of different names in this cafe
cannot reafonably be objected againft, or
condemned, as a thing which muft come
from
P R E F A C E. v'n
from fo bad a caufe as they afllgn. It is eafy
to be accounted for, without fuppoiing it to
arife from any other fource, than the exi
gence and natural tendency of the ftate of
things ; confidering the faculty and difpo-
fition God has given to mankind, to exprefs
things which they have frequent occafion
to mention, by certain diftiriguifhing names.
It is an effeft that is fimilar to what we fee
arife, in innumerable cafes which are parallel,
where the caufe is not at all blame- worthy.
Neverthelefs, at firft, I had thoughts of
carefully avoiding the ufe of the appellation,
Arminian, in thisTreatife. But I foon found
I fhould be put to great difficulty by it ; and
that my Difcourfe would be fo encumbered
with an often repeated circumlocution, in-
itead of a name, which would exprefs the
thing intended, as well and better, that I al
tered my purpofe. And therefore I muft afk
the excufe of fuch as are apt to be offended
with things of this nature, that I have fo
freely ufed the term Armiman in the follow
ing Difcourfe. I profefs it to be without any
defign, to ftigmatize perfons of any fort with
a name of reproach, or at all to make them
appear more odious. If, when I had occa
fion to fpeak of thofe Divines who are com
monly called by this name, I had, inftead of
ftyling them Arminians, called them thefe
men, as Dr. Whitby does Cafainijlic Divines ;
it probably would not have been taken any
better, or thought to fhew a better temper,
or more good manners. I have done as I
A 4 would
viii Me PREFACE.
would be done by, in this matter. However
the term Cafoinijiic is, in thefe days, among
moil, a term of greater reproach than the
term Arminian ; yet I fhould not take it at all
amifs, to be called aCahtnift, for diftinction's
fake : though I utterly difclaim a dependence
on Calvin, or believing the doftrines which
I hold, becaufe he believed and taught them 3
and cannot juftly be charged with believing
in every thing juft as he taught.
But, left I fhould really be an occafion of
injury to fom£ perfons, I would here give
notice, that though I generally fpeak of that
doftrine, concerning Free-will and moral
Agency, which I pppofe, as an Arminian
doctrine -, yet I would not be underftood,
as aflerting, that every Divine or Author,
whom I have occafion to mention as main
taining that doftrine, was properly an Ar-
minian, or one of that fort which is com
monly called by that name. Some of them
went far beyond the Arminians : and I
would by no means charge Arminians in
general with all the corrupt doftrine, which
thefe maintained. Thus, for inftance, it
would be very injurious, if I (hould rank
Arminian Divines, in general, with fuch
Authors as Mr. Chubb. I doubt not, many
of them have fome of his doftrines in
abhorrence 5 though he agrees, for the moft
part, with Arminians, in his notion of the
Freedom of the Will. And, on the other
hand, though I fuppofe this notion to be a
leading article in the Arminian fcherne, that
which,
The P R E F A C E. ix
which, if purfued in its confequences, will
truly infer, or naturally lead to all the reft ;
yet I do not charge all that have held this
do£h ine, with being Arminiam. For what
ever maybe the confequences of the dofhine
really, yet fome that hold this doftrine, may
not own nor fee thefe confequences ; and it
would beunjuft, in many inftances, to charge
every Author with believing and maintain
ing all the real confequences of his avowed
doftrines. And I defire it may be particu
larly noted, that though I have occafion, in
the following Difcourfe, often to mention
the Author of the book, entitled An Effay on
the Freedom of the Will^ in Gcd and the Crea
ture , as holding that notion of Freedom of
Will, which I oppofe ; yet I do not mean
to call him an Arminian : however, in that
doftrine he agrees with Anniniam, and de
parts from the current and general opinion
of Cahinifts. If the Author of that Effay
be the fame as it is commonly afcribed to,
he, doubtlefs, was not one that ought to
bear that name. But however good a Di
vine he was in many refpefts, yet that par
ticular Arminian doctrine which he main
tained, is never the better for being held
by fuch an one : nor is there lefs need of
oppofmg it on that account ; but rather is
there the more need of it ; as it will be likely
to have the more pernicious influence, for
being taught by a Divine of his name and
character; fuppofing the doftrine to be
wrong, and in itlelf to be of an ill ten
dency* I have
x The P R E F A C E.
I have nothing further to fay by way of
preface ; but only to befpeak the Reader's
candor, and calm attention to what I have
written. The fubjeft is of fuch impor
tance, as to demand attention, and the moft
thorough confideration. Of all kinds of
knowledge that we can ever obtain, the
knowledge of God, and the knowledge of
ourfelves, are the moft important. As re
ligion is the great bufinefs, for which we
are created, and on which our happinefs
depends ; and as religion confifts in an in-
tercourfe between ourfelves and our Maker;
and fo has its foundation in God's nature
and ours, and in the relation that God and
we ftand in to each other ; therefore a true
knowledge of both muft be needful, in order
to true religion. But the knowledge of our
felves confifts chiefly in right apprehenfions
concerning thofe two chief faculties of our
nature, the underjlanding and will. Both
are very important : yet the fcience of the
latter muft be confefled to be of greateft
moment ; inafmuch as all virtue and reli
gion have their feat more immediately in
the will, confifting more efpecially in right
acts and habits of this faculty. And the
grand queftion about the Freedom of the
Will, is the main point that belongs to the
fcience of the Will. Therefore, I fay, the
importance of this fubjeft greatly demands
the attention of Chriftians, and efpecially
of Divines. But as to my manner of hand
ling the fubject, I will be far from prefum-
ing
The P R E F A C E. xi
ing to fay, that it is fuch as demands the
attention of the Reader to what I have
written. I am ready to own, that in this
matter I depend on the Reader's courtefy.
But only thus far I may have fome colour
for putting in a claim ; that if the Reader
be difpofed to pafs his cenfure on what I
have written, I may be fully and patiently
heard, and well attended to, before I am
condemned. However, this is what I would
humbly ajk of my Readers ; together with
the prayers of all fincere lovers of truth,
that I may have much of that fpirit which
Chrift promifed his difciples, which guides
into all truth; and that the bleffed and
powerful influences of this fpirit would
make truth victorious in the world.
38
A GENERAL
GENERAL TABLE
OF THE
CONTENTS.
PART I.
Wherein are explained various Terms and Things be
longing to the fubjeft of the enfuing difcourfe.
SECT. I. Concerning the Nature of the
Page i, &c.
SECT. II. Concerning the Determination of the Will. 6
SECT. III. Concerning the meaning of the terms Ne-
ccffityi Impoffibilityy Inability, &c. and of , Gontin-
gence* 18
SECT. IV. Of the diftinction of natural and moral
Neceffity a^d Inability. 28
SECT. V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty^ and of
moral Agency, 38
PART
fbe CONTENTS.
PART II.
Wherein it is confidered, whether there is, or can be
any fuch fort of FREEDOM OF WILL, as that where
in Armlnlans place the Effence of the Liberty of all
moral Agents; and whether any fuch thing ever
was, or can be conceived ot.
SECT. I. Shewing the manifeft in confidence of the
Armlnlan Notion of Liberty of Will, confirming in
the Will's f elf -determining Power. Page 44
SECT. II. Several fuppofed ways of evading the fore
going Reafoning confidered. 50
SECT. 111. Whether any Event whatfoever, and Voli
tion in particular, can come to pafs without a Caufe
of its Exiftence. 57
SECT. IV. Whether Politionc&n arife without a Caufe,
through the Aftivity of the Nature of the Soul. 66
SECT. V. Shewing that if the things aflerted in thefe
Evafions fhould be fuppofed to be true, they are
altogether impertinent, and cannot help the Caufe
of Armlnlan Liberty; and how, this being the ftate
of the cafe, Armlnlan Writers are obliged to talk
inconjiftently. 72
SECT. VI. Concerning the Will's determining in
things which are perfectly indifferent^ in the view
of the mind. 78
SECT. VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of
Will confifting in Indifference. 88
SECT. VIII. Concerning the fuppofed Liberty of the
Will, as oppofite to all NeceJJity. 102
SECT. IX. Of the connection of the Acts of the Will
with the Dictates of the Under/landing. 107
SECT. X. Volition neceffarily connected with the
Influence of Motives. With particular obfervation
of the great Inconfiftence of Mr. Chubb' s AfTertions
and Reafonings; about the Freedom of the Will. 1 1 7
SECT. XL The Evidence of God's certain Foreknoiv-
ledge of the Volitions of moral Agents^ 137
SECT. XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future
Volitions of moral Agents, inconfijtent with fuch a
Continence of thofe Volitions, as is without aP,
IScceilicv. 164"*
And
fbe CONTENTS.
And infers a Neceffity of Volition, as much as an
abfolute Decree. I<71
SECT. XIII. Whether we fuppofe the Volitions of
moral Agents to be connected with any thing ante
cedent, or not, yet they muft be neceffary, in iuch a
fenfe, as to overthrow Arminian Liberty. 183
PART III.
Wherein is enquired, whether any fuch Liberty of
Will as Arminians hold, be neceffary to moral
Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praife and Difpraife, bV.
SECT, I. God's moral Excellency neceffary, yet
'virtuous and praifeworthy • Pa<re 188
SECT. II. The Afts of the Will of the human Soul
of JESUS CHRIST necejfarily holy, yet virtuous, praife-
worthy, rewardable, &c. 104
SECT. III. The Cafe of fuch as are given up of God to
Sin, and of fallen Man in general, proves moral Ne
ceffity and Inability to be confiftent with Blame-wor
th inefs. 2 1 2
SECT. IV. Command, and Obligation to Obedience,
conjiftent with moral Inability to obey. 222
SECT. V. That Sincerity of Deiires and Endeavours,
which is fuppofed to excufe in the Non -performance
of Things in themfelves good, particularly con-
iiderecl. 237
SECT. VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necef-
fary to Virtue, but utterly Inconjijlent with it : and
all, either virtuous or vicious Habits Ql Inclination;,
inconiiftent with Arminian Notions of Liberty, and
moral Agency. 249
SECT, VII. Arminian Notions of moral Agency in-
confiftent with all Influence of Motive and Induce-
went, in either virtuous or vicious Actions. 260
PART IV.
Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reafonings of Armi
nians > in Support and Defence of their Notions of
Liberty, moral Agency, &c. and againft the oppo-
fite Doctrine, are considered.
SECT,
We CONTENTS.
SECT. I. The E/ence of the Virtue and Vice of
the Difpofitions of the Heart, and A£ls of the
Will, lies not in their Caufes> but their Nature. 269
SECT. II. The Falfenefs and Inconflftence of that meta-
phyfical Notion of Aftion and Agency^ which feems
to be generally entertained by the Defenders of the
forementioned Notions of Liberty, moral Agen
cy, fcfc. 278
SECT. III. The Reafons why fome think it contrary
to common Senfe, to fuppofc Things which are ne-
ceffary, to be worthy of either Praife or Blame. 288
SECT. IV. It is agreable to common Senfe, and the na
tural Notions of Mankind) to fuppofe moral Necef-
fity to be confident with Praife and Blame, Re
ward and Punifhment. 297
SECT. V. Concerning thofe ObjeCtions,thzt this fcheme
of Neceffity renders all Means and Endeavours for
the avoiding of Sin or the obtaining Virtue and
Holinefs, vain and to no purpofe ; and that it makes
Men no more than meer Machines, in affairs of
Morality and Religion. 309
SECT. VI. Concerning that Objection againft the Doc
trine which has been maintained, that it agrees
with the Stoical doctrine of Fatey and the Opinion
of Mr. Hobbes. 3 19
SECT. VII. Concerning the NeccJJity of the Divine
Will. 323
SECT. VIII. Some further Objections againft the moral
Neceffity of GOD'S Volition^ considered. 335
SECT. IX. Concerning that Objection againft the Doc
trine which has been maintained, that it makes.
God the Author of Sin. 354
SECT. X. Concerning Sin's firfl Entrance into the
World. 376
SECT. XI. Of a fuppofed Inconjijlence% of thefe Prin
ciples with GOD'S moral Character. 379
SKCT. XII. Of a fuppofed Tendency of thefe Prin
ciples to Atbelfm and Licentioufnefs. 385
SECT. XIII. Concerning that Objection againft the
Reafoning by which the Cahmlftic Doctrine is fup-
ported, that it is metapbyfical and abftruje. 390
We CONTENTS.
The CONCLUSION.
WHAT Treatment this Difcourfe may probably
meet with, from fome perfons. 400
Ccnfequences concerning feveral Galvini/iic Do&rines ;
iuch as an itmverfal9 dccifive Providence. 402
The total Depravity and' Corruption of Man's Na
ture. 403
Efficacious Grace* 404
An univerfal and abfolute Decree ; and abfolute, eter-
, nal, perfonal Election. 406
Particular Redemption. 407
Perfeverance of Saints. 408
Concerning the Treatment which CalvixifticVfritws
and Divines have met with. 410
The Unhappinefs of the Change lately in many Pro-
tefiant Countries. 41 \
The Eoldnefs of forne Writers. 413
The excellent Tpifdom appearing in the holy Scrip
tures. 4 1 3
PART
•mo: :' : PART I. $w
Wherein are explained and ftated va
rious TVmj and Things belonging
to the Subject of the enfuing Dif-
courfe.
SECTION L
Concerning the Nature of the Will.
"
.
" '
I
T may poffibly fre thought, that there
is no great need of going about tode-
fine or defcribe the Will-% this word
being generally as well underftood as
any other words we can ufe to explain
t : and fo perhaps it would be, had not philofo-
phers, metaphyficians and polemic divines brought
the matter into obfcurity by the things they have
faid of it. But fmce it is fo, I think it may be of
fome ufe, and will tend to the greater clearnefs in
the following difcourfe, to fay a few things con
cerning it.
B And
t fhe Nature of the Will. Part L
And therefore I obferve, that the Will (without:
any metaphyfical refining) is plainly, That by
which the mind chufes any thing. The faculty of
the Will is that faculty or power or principle of
mind by which it is capable of cbufing • an act
of the IVill is the fame as an act of chufing or
choice.
If any think 'tis a more perfect definition of the
Will, to fay, that it is that by which the foul
either chufes or refufcs; I am content with it : tho*
I think that 'tis enough to fay, It's that. by which
the foul chufes : for in every act of Will whatfo-
ever, the mind chufes one thing rather than another;
it chufes fomething rather than the contrary, or
rather than the want or non-exiftence of that
thing. So in every act of refufal, the mind chufes
the abfence of the thing refufed j The pofitive
and the negative are fet before the mind for it's
choice, and it chufes the negative ; and the mind's
making it's choice in that cafe is properly the act
of the Will : the Will's determining between the
two is a voluntary determining -, but that is the
fame thing as making a choice. So that what
ever names we call the act of the Will by chufing,
refufing, approving, dif approving, liking, dijliking,
embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, command
ing, forbidding, inclining or being averfe, a being
pleafed or difpleafed with ; all may be reduced to
this of chufing. For the foul to act voluntarily, is
evermore to act eleftively.
Mr. Locke*, fays, " The Will fignifies nothing
*( but a power or ability to prefer or chufe" And
in the foregoing page fays, " The word prefer-
" ring feems bell to exprefs the act of volition ;"
But
f Human Undemanding. Edit. 7. vol. i. p. 197.
Sect. I. ne Nature of the Will. *
But addsi that " it does it not precifely ; For (fays
he) " tho' a man would prefer flying to walking
" yet who can % he ever wills it?'" But the in-
ftance he mentions don't prove that there is any
thing elfe in willing, but meerly preferring: for
it ffipuk! be considered what is the next and im
mediate objecl of the Will, with refpedt to a man's
walking, or any other external adrion ; which is
not being removed from one place to another;
on the earth, or thro' the air ; thefe are remoter
objects ot preference ; but fuch or fuch an imme
diate exertion of himfelf. The thing nextly cho-
fen or prefer'd when a man wills to walk, is nor.
his being removed to fuch a place where he would
be, but inch an exertion and motion of his leo-s
and feet, &c. in order to it. And his willing
inch an alteration in his body in the prefent mo
ment, is nothing elfe but his chufing or prefer
ring fuch an alteration in his body at fuch a mo
ment, or his liking it better than the forbearance
of it. And God has fo made and efbbliuYd the
human nature, the foul being united to a body
in proper ftate, that the foul preferring or chufinc*
Inch an immediate exertion or alteration of the
body, fuch an alteration inftantaneoufiy follows.
There is nothing elfe in the actions of my mind,
L am confcious of while I walk, but only
my preferring or chufing, thro' fucceffive m<£
ments, that there flionld be fuch alterations of my
external fenfations and motions •, together with
a concurring habitual expectation that it will be
to ; having ever found by experience, that on
ch an immediate preference, fuch fenfations and
motions do actually inftantaneoufiy, and conitantly
anfe. But it is not fo in the cafe of flyinp- :
tho a man may be faid remotely to chufe or p?e~
ter flying ; yet he don't chufe or prefer, incline
to or defirci under circumltances in view, any
^ ^ immediate
4 Fbe Nature of the Wilt Part L
immediate exertion of the members of his body
in order to it ; becaufe he has no expe&ation that
he ihould obtain the defired end by any fuch ex
ertion ; and he don't prefer or incline to any bodily
exertion or effort under this apprehended circurn-
ilance, of it's being wholly in vain. So that if we
carefully diftinguiih the proper objects of the fe\ e-
ral ads' of the Will, it will not appear by thi?,
and fnch-like inilances, that there is any difference
between volition and preference ; or that a man's
chufmg, liking bed, or being beft pleafed wTith a
tiling, are not the fame with his willing that
thing ; as they feem to be according to thofe ge
neral and more natural motions of men, according
to which language is formed. Thus an aft of the
Will is commonly expreifed by it's pleafing a man
to do thus or thus ; and a man doing as he wills,
and doing as he pleafes, are the fame thing in com
mon fpeech.
Mr. Locke * fays, " The Will is perfeftly di-
** (tinguifhed from Deiire : which in the very fame
" adtion may have a quite contrary tendency
" from that which our Wills fct us upon. A
" man (fays he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige
" me to ufe perfuafions to another, which, at the
*c fame time I am fpeaking, I may wifh may not
<c prevail on him. In this cafe 'tis plain the Will
" and Defire run counter." I don't fuppofc, that
Will and Defire are words of precifely the fame
fignification : Will feems to be a word of a more
general fignification, extending to things prefent
and abfent. Defire refpeds fomething abfenc. 1
may prefer my prefent fituation and pofture,
fnppofe fitting ftill, or having my eyes open,
and fo may will it. But yet I can't think they
are
* Hum* Und, vol. i. p. 203, 204,
Sed. I. Me Nature of tie Will. §
are fo entirely diftinft, that they can ever be pro*
perly faid to run counter. A man never, in any
inftance, wills any thing contrary to his Defires,
or defires any thing contrary to his Will. The
foremention'd inftance, which Mr. Locke produces,
don't prove that he ever does, He may, on
fome confederation or other, will to utter fpeeches
which have a tendency to perfuade another, and
ftill may defire that they may not perfuade him?
but yet his Will and Defire don't run counter
at all : the thing which he wills, the very fame
he defires; and he don't will a thing, and defire
the contrary in any particular. In this inftance,
it is not carefully obferved, what is the thing
will'd, and what is the thing defired : if it were,
it would be found that Will and Defire don't
clalh in the leaft. The thing will'd on fome con-
fideration, is to utter fuch words ; and certainly,
fame confederation fo influences him, that he
don't defire the contrary ; all things confidered,
he chufes to utter fuch words, and don't defire
not to utter them. And fo as to the thing which
Mr. Locke fpeaks of as defired, viz. That the
words, tho' they tend to perfuade, fhould not be
effectual to that end, his Will is not contrary to
this; he don't will that they fhould be effectual,
but rather wills that they fhould not, as he defires,
In order to prove that the Will and Defire may
run counter, it fnould be mown that they may be
contrary one to the other in the fame thing, or
with refpecl to the very fame object of Will or
Defire : but here the objedls are two; and in each,
taken by thcmfelves, the WTill and Defire agree.
And 'tis no wonder that they fhould not agree in
different things, however little diflinguifhed they
are in their nature. The WTill may not agree with
the WTill, nor Defire agree with Defire, in different;
things. As in this very inftance which Mr. Locke
B men*
6 Of the Determination of the Will. Part I.
mentions, a perfon may, on fome confideration,
clefire to ufe perfuafions, and at the fame time may
defire they may not prevail •, but yet no body will
fay, that Defire runs counter to Defire ; or that this
proves that Defire is perfectly a diftinct thing from
Defire — The like might be obferved of the other
inftance Mr. Locke produces, of a man's defiring
to be eafed of pain, &c.
But not to dwell any longer on this, whether
Defire and Will, and whether Preference and Volition
be precifely the fame things or no; yet, I truft it
\vill be allowed by all, that in every act of Will
there is an ad of choice ; that in every volition
there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination of
the foul, whereby the foul, at that inftant, is out
of a ffote of perfect indifference, with refpect to
the direct object of the volition. So that in every
act, or going forth of the Will, there is fome pre^
pOfldef ation of the mind or inclination, one way
rather than another ; and the foul had rather have
or do one thing than another, or than not to have
or do that thing ; and that there, where there is
ablolutely no preferring or chufing, but a perfect
Continuing equilibrium, there is no volition.
SECTION II.
Concerning the Determination of the Will.
BY determining the Will, if the phrafe be ufed
'with any meaning, mufl be intended* caufing
that the aft of the Will or Choice Jhould be thus, and
not oth'erwifi : and the Will is faid to be deter
mined, when, in cpnfequence of fome action, or
influence, its choice is direded to, and fix'd upon
2 particular object. As when we fpeak of th*
A Deter-
II. What determines the Will. 7
Determination of motion, we mean caufing the
motion of the body to be fuch a way, or in fuch
a direction, rather than another.
To talk of the Determination of the Will, fup-
pofes an effect, which muft have a caufe. If the
Will be determined, there is a Determiner. This
muft be fuppofed to be intended even by them that
lay, the Will determines itfelf. If it be fo, the
Will is both Determiner and determined ; it is a
caufe that acts and produces effects upon itfelf, and
is the objeft of its own influence and action.
With refpect to that grand enquiry, What de*
t ermines the Will, it would be very tedious and un-
neceflary at prefent to enumerate and examine all
the various opinions, which have been advanced
concerning this matter ; nor is it needful that I
fhould enter into a particular difquifition of all
points debated in difputes on that queftion, Whe*
ther the Will akvays follows the laft diftate of the
under ft anding. It is fufficient to my prefent purpofe
to fay, — It is that motive, which, as it Jlands in the
'view of the mind, is the ftrongejl that determines the
Will — But it may be necelfary that I fhould a little
explain my meaning in this.
By motive, I mean the whole of that which
moves, excites or invites the mind to volition,
whether that be one thing iingly, or many things
conjunctly. Many particular things, may concur
and unite their itrength to induce the mind ; and
when it is fo, all together are as it were one com
plex motive. And when I fpeak of the jlrongeft
motive, I have refpect to the ftrength of the whole
that operates to induce to a particular act of voli
tion, whether that be the itrength of one thing
alone, or of many together.
" B a. Whatever
8 Wbat determines tie Will. Part I.
Whatever is a motive, in this fenfe, muft be
fomething that is extant in the view or apprehsnjion of
the undemanding, or perceiving faculty. Nothing
can induce or invite the mind to will or act any
thing, any further than it is perceived, or is fome
way or other in the mind's view ; for what is
wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind's
view, can't affect the mind at all. 'Tis moft evi
dent, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or
takes any hold of it, any otherwife than as it is
perceived or thought of.
And I think it mu ft alfo be allowed by all, that
£very thing that is properly called a motive, ex
citement or inducement to a perceiving willing
agent, has fome fort and degree of tendency, or
advantage to move or excite the Will, previous to
the effect^ or to the act of the Will excited. This
previous tendency of the motive is what I call
the Jirengirb of the motive. That motive which has
a lefs degree of previous advantage or tendency
to move the Will, or that appears lefs inviting, as
it Hands in the view of the mind, is what I call a
weaker motive* On the contrary, that which ap
pears molt inviting, and has, by what appears
concerning it to the understanding or apprphen-
fion, the greateil degree of previous tendency to
excite and induce the choice, is what I call the
jlrongeft motive. And in this ftnfe, I fuppofe the
Will V always determined by the ftrongeft mo
tive.
Things that exiil in the view of the mind have
their ftrength, tendency or advantage to move
or excite its Will, from many things appertain
ing to the nature and circumflances of the thin*
vievfd, the nature and circumftances of the mind
that views i and the degree and manner of its view- ;
whicbj
Seel:. II. What determines the Will ' $
which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect
enumeration of*. But ib much I think may be
determined in general, without room for contro-
verfy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended
by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has
the nature and influence of a motive to volition
or choice, is confkler'd or view'd a,sgood\ nor has
it any tendency to invite or engage the election of
the foul in any further degree than it appears
fuch. For to fay otherwife, would be to fay, that
things that appear have a tendency by the appear
ance they make, .to engage the^mind to elect them,
fome other way than by their appearing eligible
to it ; which is abfurd. And therefore it mult be
true, in fome fenle, that the Will always is as the
greateft apparent good is. But only, for the right
underftanding of this, two things muft be "well an4
diftinctly obferved.
i. It muft be obferved in what fenfc I ufe the
term good ; namely, as of the fame import with
flgreable. To appear good to the mind, as I ufe the
phraie, is the fame as to appear agreabk^ or feem
pleafmg to the mind. Certainly, nothing appears
inviting and eligible to the mind, or tending to
engage its inclination and choice, conlidered as
evil or difagreable ; nor indeed, as indifferent, and
neither agreable nor difagreable. But if it tends
to draw the inclination, and move the Will, it muft
be under the notion of that which fulls the mind.
And therefore that muft have the greateft tendency
to attract and engage it, which, as it ftands in the
mind's view, fuits it beft, and pleafes it molt ; and
In that fenfe, is the greateft apparent good : to fay
otherwife, is little, if any thing, mort of a direct
and plain contradiction.
The word good, in this fenfe, includes in its
fignirication, the removal or avoiding of evil, or
of
*o What determines the Will. Part I.
of that which is difagreable and uneafy. 'Tis
agreable and pleafing, to avoid what is difagreable
and difpleafing, and to have uneafmefs removed.
So that here is included what Mr. Locke fuppofes
determines the Will. For when he fpeaks or un-
eaiinefs as determining the Will, he muft be un-
tlerftood as fuppoiing that the end or aim which
governs in the volition or act of preference, is the
avoiding or removal of that uneafmefs ; and that
is the fame thing as chufing and feeking what is
more eafy and agreable,
2. When I fay, the Will is as the greateft ap
parent good is, or (as I have explained it) that
volition has always for its object the thing which,
appears moft agreable ; it muft be carefully ob-
fervedj to avoid con fufi on and needlefs objection,
that I fpeak of the dire ft and immediate object of
the act of volition ; and not fome object that
the act of Will has not an immediate, but only an
indirect and remote refpect to. Many acts of vo
lition have fome remote relation to an object, that
is different from the thing moft immediately will'd
and choferi. Thus, when a drunkard has his
liquor before him, and he has to chufe whether to
drink it, or no ; the proper and immediate objects,
about which his prefent volition is converiant,
and between which his choice now decides, are
his own acts, in drinking the liquor, or letting it
alone ; and this will certainly be done according
to what, in the prefent view of his mind, taken
in the whole of it, is moft agreable to him. If
he chufcs or wills to drink it, and not, to let it
alone •, then this action, as it ftands in the view
of his mind, with all that belongs to its appear
ance there, is more agreable and pleafing than
letting it alone.
But
Sect. II. Wka! determines the Will. u
But the objects to which this act of volition
may relate more remotely, and between which his
choice may determine more indirectly, are the
prefent pleafure the man expects by drinking, and
the future mifery which he judges will be the con-
fequence of it: he may judge that this future
mifery, when it comes, will be more dilagreable
and unpleafant, than refraining from drinking
now would be. But thefe two things are not the
proper objects that the act of volition fpoken of
js nextly converfant about. For the act of Will
fpoken of is concerning prefent drinking or for
bearing to drink. If he wills to drink, then
drinking is the proper object of the act of his
Will ; and drinking, on fome account or other,
now appears moft agreable to him, and fuits him
bed. If he chufes to refrain, then refraining is
the immediate object of his Will, and is moft
pleafmg to him. If in the choice he makes in
the cafe, he prefers a prefent pleafure to a future
advantage, which he judges will be greater when
it comes; then a leiler prefent pleafure appears
more agreable to him than a greater advantage
at a diltance. If on the contrary a future ad
vantage is prefer'd, then that appears moft aoje-
able, and fuits him beft. And fo dill the prefent
volition is as the greateft apparent good at pre
fent is.
I have rather chofen to exprefs myfelf thus, that
the Will always is as the greatefl apparent good, or
as what appears moft agreable, is, than to fay that
the Will is determinedly the greateft apparent good,
or by what leems moft agreable ; becaufe an ap
pearing moft agreable or pleating to the mind, and
the mind's preferring and chufing, feem hardly to
be properly and perfectly diftinct. If ftrict pro
priety of fpecch be infifted on, it may more pro
perly
12 What determines the Will Parti.
perly be faid, that the voluntary aftion which is the
immediate confequence and fruit of the mind's
volition or choice, is determined by that which ap
pears mod agreable, than the preference or choice
hfelf ; but that the act of volition itielf is always
determin'd by that in or about the mind's view of
the object, which caufes it to appear moil agreable.
J fay, in or about the mind's view of the object,
becaufe what has influence to render an object
in view agreable, is not only what appears in the
object view'd, but alfo the manner of the view,
and the Jlate and cir cumftanc.es of the mind that
views. — Particularly to enumerate all things per
taining to the mind's view of the objects of vo
lition, which have influence in their appearing
agreable to the mind, would be a matter of no
fmall difficulty, and might require a treatife by
itfelf, and is not necefiary to my prefent purpofe.
I fhall therefore only mention ibme things in ge
neral.
I. One thing that makes an object propofed to
choice agreable, is the apparent nature and circum-
fiances of the objeft. And there are various things
of this fort, that have an hand in rendering the
object more or lefs agreable ^ as,
1. That which appears in the object, which,
renders it beautiful and pleafant, or deform* d an4
irkfom to the mind ; viewing it as it is in itfelf.
2. The apparent degree of pleafure or trouble
Attending the object, or the conference of it. Such
concomitants and confequents being viewed as cir-
cumitances of the objedts, are to be considered as
belonging to it, and as it were parts of it ; as it
ftands in the mind's, view, as a propofed object of
choice.
3. The apparent Jlate of the pleafure or trouble
{hat appears, \vith refped to diflance of time ;
being
Sefh II. What determines the Will. \ §
being either nearer or farther off* 'Tis a thing
in itielf agreable to the mind, to have pleafure
fpeedily ; and difagreable, to have it delayed : fo
that if there be two equal degrees of pleafure fet
in the mind's view, and all other things are equal,
but only one is beheld as near, and the other far
off; the nearer will appear mod agreable, and fo
will be chofen. Becaufe, tho' the agreablenefs of
the objects be exactly equal, as view'd in them-
ielves, yet not as view'd in their circumftances ;
one of them having the additional agreablenefs of
the circumftance of nearnefs*
II. Another thing that contributes to the agre
ablenefs of an object of choice, as it ftands in the
mind's view, is the manner of the view. If the ob
ject be fomething which appears connected with
future pleafure, not only will the degree of ap
parent pleafure have influence, but alfo the man
ner of the view, efpecially in two refpects.
1. With refpect to the degree of judgment, or
firmnefs of affent, with which the mind judges
the pleafure to be future. Becaufe it is more
agreable to have a certain happinefs, than an un+
certain one ; and a pleafure view'd as more pro
bable, all other things being equal, is more agre
able to the mind, than that which 13 view'd as lets
probable.
2. With refpect to the degree of the idea of the
future pleafure. With regard to things which
are the fubject of our thoughts, either paft, pre-
fent or future, we have much more of an idea or
apprehenfion of ibme things than others ; that is,
our idea is much more clear, lively and ftrong<
Thus the ideas we have of feniible things by imme
diate fenfation, are ufually much more lively than
thofe we have by meer imagination, or by con
templation of them when abient. My idea 'of the
fun,
f 4 What determines tie H'ilL Part I.
fun, when I look upon it, is more vivid, than when
I only think of it. Our idea of the f\veet relifh of
a delicious fruit is ufually ftronger when we tafte
it, than when we only imagine it. And fometimes^
the idea we have of things by contemplation, are
much ftronger and clearer, than at other times/
Thus, a man at one time has a much ftronger
idea of the pleafure which is to he enjoyed in eating
fome fort of food that he loves^ than' at another.
Now the degree, or ftrength of the idea or fenfe
that men have of future good or evil, is one thing
that has great influence on their minds to excite
choice or volition. When of two kinds of future
pleafure, which the mind confiders of, and are
prefented for choice, both are fuppofed exactly
equal by the judgment, and both equally certain*
and all other things are equal but only one of them
is what the mind has a far more -lively fenfe ofs
than of the other ; this has the greateft advan--
tage by far to affect and attract the mind, and
move the Will* 'Tis now more agreable to the
mind* to take the pleafure it has a ftrong and
lively fenfe of, than that which it has only a faint
idea of. The view of the former is attended with
the ftrongeft appetite, and the greateft uneafmefs..
attends the want of it ; and 'tis agreable to the
mind to have uneafmefs removed, and it's appetite
gratified. And if feveral future enjoyments are
prefented together, as competitors for the choice
of the mind, fome of them judged to be greater^
and others lefs ; the mind alfo having a greater
fenfe and more lively idea of the good of fome
of them, and of others a lefs •, and fome ate view
ed as of greater certainty or probability than
others •, and thofe enjoyments that appear molt
agreable in one of thefe refpects, appear leaft fo
in others : in this cafe, all other things being
equal, the agreablenefs of a propofed object of
choice
Sett. II. What determines the
choice will be in a degree fome way compounded
of the degree of good fuppofed by the judgment,
the degree of apparent probability or certainty of
that good, and the degree of the view or fenfe,
or livelinels of the idea the mind has, of that
good ; becauie all together concur to conftitute
the degree in which the object appears at prelenc
agreable ; and accordingly volition will be de
termined.
I might further obferve, the ftate of the mind
that views a propofed object of choice, is another
thing that contributes to the agreablenefs or dif-
agreablenefs of that object ; the particular temper
which the mind has "by nature, or that has been
introduced and eftabliihed by education, example,
cufbom, or fome other means ; or the trame or
ftate that the mind is in on a particular occafion.
That object which appears agreable to one, does
not fo to another. And the fame objecl: don't
always appear alike agreable to the fame perfon,
at different times. It is molt agreable to fome
men, to follow their reafon ; and to others, to
follow their appetites : to fome men, it is more
agreable to deny a vicious inclination, than to
gratify it : others it fuits belt to gratify the vileft
appetites. 'Tis more difagreable to fome men
than others, to counter-act a former refolution.
In thefe refpedts, and many others which might
be mentioned, different things will be mod agre
able to different perfons ; and not only fo, but to
the fame perfons at different times.
But poffibly 'tis needlefs and improper, to men
tion the frame and ftate of the mind, as a diilin£t
ground of the agreablenefs of objects from the
other two mention'd before -, viz. The apparent
nature and circumftances of the objedts view'd,
and
j6 fa$*l determines He Will. l>art I.
and the manner of the view : perhaps if we ilrictly
confider the matter, the different temper and ftate
of the mind makes no alteration as to the agre-
ablenefs of objects, any other way, than as it
makes the objects themfelves appear differently
beautiful or deformed, having- apparent pleafure
or pain attending them : and as it occasions the
manner of the view to be different, caufes the
idea of beauty or deformity, pleafure or uneafi-
nefs to be more or lefs lively.
However, I think fo much is certain, that vo
lition, in no one inftance that can be mentioned.,
is otherwise than the greatefl apparent good is, in
the manner which has been explain'd. The choice
of the mind never departs from that which, at
that time, and with refpect to the direct and im
mediate objects of that deciiion of the mind, ap
pears moll agreable and pleafmg, all things con-
fidered. If the immediate objects of the will are
a man's own actions, then thole actions which
appear mofh agreable to him he wills. If it be
now moil agreable to him, all things coniukredj
to walk, then he now wiiis to v/alk. If it be now,
upon the whole of what at prefent appears to him,
moft agreable to fpeak, then he chuies to fpeak :
if it fuits him beft to keep filence, then he chuies
to keep iilence. There is fcarcely a plainer and
more univerfal dictate of the fenle and experience
of mankind, than that, when men act voluntarily,
and do what they pleafe, then they do what fuits.
them bed, or what is moil agreable to them. To
lay, that they do what they pleafe, or what pleafes
them, but yet don't do what is agreable to them,
is the fame thing as to fay, they do what they
pleafe, but don't act their pleafure ; and that is to
fay, that they do what they pleafe, and yet don't
do what they pleafe*
Sect. II. What determines ike Will* 1 7
It appears from thefe things, that in fome fenfe*
ike Will always follows the loft dictate of the under*
/landing. But then the underftanding muft be taken
in a large fenfe, as including the whole faculty of
perception or appreheniion, and not meerly what
is called reafon or judgment. If by the diclate of
the underftanding is meant what reafon declares
to be beft or moft for the perfon's happinefs, tak
ing in the whole of its duration, it is not true, that
the Will always follows the laft dictate of the un
derftanding. Such a dictate of reafon is quite a
different matter from things appearing now moil
agredble ; all things being put together which per
tain to the mind's p relent perceptions, apprehen
fion s or ideas,, in any refpedt, Altho* that dictate
of reafon, when it takes place, is one thing that
is put into the fcales, and is to be confidered as
a thing that has concern in the compound influ
ence which moves and induces the Will ; and is
one thing that is to be confidered in eftimatinsj
the degree of that appearance of good which the
Will always follows; either as having its influence
added to other things, or fubdufted from them.
When it concurs with other things, then its weight
is added to them, as put into the fame fcale ; but
when it is againft them, it is as a weight in the
oppofite fcale, where it refills the influence of other
things: yet its refiftance is often overcome by their
•greater weight, and fo the ad: of the Will is de
termined in oppofition to it.
The things which I have1 fald, ffiay, I hope,
ferve, in fome meafure to illuftrate and confirm
the pofition I laid down in the beginning of this
fection, viz. That the Will is always determined ly
the flrongeft motive, or by that view of the mind
•which has the greatefl degree of previous tendency
to excite volition. But whether I have been fo
C happy
i& The Nature of Neceffity. Part L
happy as rightly to explain the thing wherein con-
lifts the ftrength cf motives, or not, yet my fail
ing in this will not overthrow the pofition itfclf *
which carries much of its own evidence with it,
and is the thing of chief importance to the pnr-
poie of the enfuing difcourie : And the truth of it,
I hope, will appear with great clearnefs, before!
have finifhed what I have to fay on the fubjed: of
human liberty.
SECTION III.
Concerning the Meaning of the forms Neceflity, Im*
poflibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence.
THE words necejary^ impoffibk^ &:c. are abun
dantly ufed in controvei fies about Free- Will
and moral agency; and therefore the fenfe in
which they are ufed, fhould be clearly underftood.
Here I might fay, that a, thing is then faid to
be neceffary, when it mud be, and cannot be other*
wife. But this would not properly be a definition
of Neceflity, or an explanation of the word, any
more than if I explained the word mufty by there be
ing a Neceffity. The words ;;/#/?, can, and cannot,
need explication as much as the words necejfary, and
impoffible •, excepting that the former are words that
children commonly ufe, and know fomething of
the meaning of earlier than the latter.
The word neceffary, as ufed in common fpeech,
is a relative term ; and relates to fome fuppofed
oppofition made to the exiflence of the thing
fpoken of, which is overcome, or proves in vain
to hinder or alter it. That is neceifary, in the
original and proper fenfe of the word, which is,
or will be, notwithftanding all fuppofable oppo
fition*
Seel. III. ¥he Nature of Neceffity; 19
iition. To fay, that a thing is neceffary, is the fame
thing as to fay, that it is impoffible, it fhould not
be : But the word impojfible is manifeftly a relative
term, and has reference to fuppofed power exerted
to bring a thing to pafs, which is infufEcient for
the effect ; as the word unable is relative, and has
relation to ability or endeavour which is infuffi-
cient ; and as the word irrcftfiible is relative, and
has always reference to refinance which is made,
or may be made to fome force or power tending to
an effect, and is infufficient to withfland the power,
or hinder the effect. The common notion of Ne-
ceffity and ImpofTibility implies ibmething that
frustrates endeavour or defire.
Here feveral things are to be noted.
i. Things are fkid to be neceflary iri general^
which are or will be notwithftanding any fuppo-
fable oppofition from us or others^ or from whatever
quarter. But things are faid to be neceffary to us,
which are or will be notwithftanding all oppofition
fuppofable in the c^{t from us. The fame may be
obfervcd of the word impoj/jble, and other fuch like
terms.
2. Thefe terms neceffary, impojfibk, irrefiftlble, &c*
do efpecially belong to controverfy about liberty
and moral agency, as ufed in the latter of the two
fenfes now mentioned, viz. as neceflary or impof-
iible to us, and with relation to any fuppofable op
pofition or endeavour of ours.
3. As the word NeceJJity, in its vulgar and
common ufe, is relative, and has always reference
to fome fuppofable infufficient oppofitidn ;- fo wThen
we fpeak of any thing as neceflary to us, it is w-ith
relation to fome fuppofable oppofition of our M^ills^-
C 2 or
20 fhe Nature of Neceffity. Part L
or fome voluntary exertion or effort of ours to the
contrary. For we don't properly make oppofition
to an event, any otherwife than as we voluntarily
oppofe it. Things are faid to be what muft be, or
neceflarily are, as to us, when they are, or will be,
though we defire or endeavour the contrary, or
try to prevent or remove their exiftence : bur inch
oppofition of ours always either conlifts in, or im
plies oppofition of our wills.
5Tis manifeft that all fuch like words and
phrafes, as vulgarly ufed, are tifed and accepted
in this manner. A thing is faid to be neceflary,
when we can't help it, let us do what we will. So
any thing is faid to be impojfible to us, when we
would do it, or would have it brought to pafs,
and endeavour it •, or at lealt may be fuppofed to
defire and feek it ; but all our defires and endea
vours are, or would be vain. And that is faid to
be trrefiftibk) which overcomes all our oppofition,
refiftance, and endeavour to the contrary, And
we are to be faid unable to do a thing, when our
fuppofable defires and endeavours to do it are in-
fufficient.
We are accuftomed, in the common life of lan
guage, to apply and underfland thefe phrafes in
this fenfe : we grow up with fuch a habit ; which
by the daily uie of thefe terms, in iuch a fenfe,
from our childhood, becomes fixed and fettled ;
fo that the idea of a relation to a fuppofed will,
defire and endeavour of ours, is ftrongly con-
ne&ed with thefe terms, and naturally excited
in our minds, whenever we hear the words ufed.
Such ideas, and thefe words, are fo united and
aflbciated, that they unavoidably go together ;
one fuggefts the other, and carries the other with
it, and never can be feparated as long as we
live.
i
Seel. III. The Nature of NeceiTiry. i jr
live. And if we ufe the words, as terms of art,
in another fenfe, yet, unlefs we are exceeding cir-
cumiped and wary, we fhall infenlibly Hide into
the vulgar ufe of them, and fo apply the words
in a very inconfiftent manner : this habitual con
nection of ideas will deceive and confound us in
our reafonings and difcourfes, wherein we pre
tend to ufe thefe terms in that manner, as terms
of art.
4. It follows from what has been obferved, that1
when thefe terms neceffary, impajfiblc, irrefiftibk^ un*'
able, &c. are ufed in cafes wherein no oppofition,
or inefficient will or endeavour, is fuppofed, or
can be fuppofed, but the very nature of the fup^
pofed cafe itfelf excludes, and denies any fuch op
pofition, will or endeavour, thefe terms are then not
ufed in their proper fignification, but quite beiide
their ufe in common fpeech. The reafon is manifefl;
namely, that in fuch cafes we can't ufe the words
with reference to a fuppofable oppofition, will or
endeavour. And therefore if any man ufes thefe
terms in fuch cafes, he either ufes them nonfenfi-
cally, or in fome newfenfe, diverfe from their ori
ginal and proper meaning. As for inftance ; if a
man fhould affirm after this manner, That it is ne-
ceflary for a man, and what nuifl be, that a man
fhould chufe virtue rather than vice, during the
time that he prefers virtue to vice ^ and that it is
a thing impoffible and irrefiilible, that it fhould be
otherwife than that he mould have this choice, fa
long as this choice continues ; fuch a man would
ufe the terms mufty Irre/iftlble^ &c. with perfect in-
iignificance and nonfenfe, or in fome new fenfe,
diverfe from their common ufe ; which is with re
ference, as has been obferved, to fuppofable op
pofition, unwillingnefs and refiftance ; whereas^
here, the very luppofition excludes and denies any
C 3 fuch
22 ¥he Nature of Neceftity. Part I.
fvich thing : for the cafe fuppofed is that of being
willing, and chufing,
5. It appears from what has been faid, that thefe
terms nec'effary* impoffible, &c. are often ufed by
philofophers apd rnetaphyficia'ns in a fenfe quite
diverfe from their common ufe and original figni-
fication : For they apply them to many cafes in
which no oppofition is fuppofed or fuppo.fable.
Thus they ufe them with refpedt to God's exift-
ence before the creation of the world, when there
was no other being but He: fo with regard to ma-,
ny of the difpofitions and acts of the divine Being,
fuch as his loving himfelf, his loving righteoufneis,
hating fin, &c. So they apply theie terms to many
cafes W the inclinations and adtions of created in
telligent beings, angels and men ; wherein all op
pofition of the Will is fhut out and denied, in the
very iuppofition cf the cafe,
Metaptyfical or Pbilofopbicat Neceffity is nothing
different from their certainty, I fpeak not no\v
of the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty
that is in things themfelves, which is the founda
tion of the certainty of the knowledge of them ;
or that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility
of the proportion which affirms them,
What is fometimes given a,s the definition of
philoibphical Neceffity, namely, T'hat ly which &
iking cannot but be, or whereby- it cannot be othcrimfe^
jfjails of being a. proper explanation of it, on two
accounts : Firft, the words can, or cannot * need
explanation as much as the word Necej/ity\ and
the former may as well be explained by the lat
ter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any
one aiked us what v%e mean, when we fay, a thing
wnnotlut.be, \ve might explain ourfclvcs by fay-
Sect. Ill; The Nature of Neceflitjr. 23
ing, we mean, it muft neceffarily be fo ; as well
as explain Neceffity, by faying, it is that by which
a thing cannot but be. And Secondly^ this de
finition is liable to the fore-mentioned great incon
venience : the words cannot, or unable^ are pro
perly relative, and have relation to power exerted,
or that may be exerted, in order to the thing
fpoken of: to which, as I have now obferved, the
word Necejfityi as ufed by philofophers has no re
ference.
Philofophical Neceflity is really nothing elfe than
the full and fixed connection between the things
iignified by the fubject and predicate of a propo-
fition, which affirms fomething to be true. When
there is fuch a connection, then the thing affirmed
in the propofiticn is neceiiary, in a philofophical
fenfe ; whether any oppofition, or contrary effort
be fuppofed, or fnppofable in the cafe, or no,
When the fubjecl: and predicate of the proportion,
which affirms the exiftence of any thing, either
fubftance, quality, act or circumftance, have a
full and certain connection, then the exigence or
being cf that thing is fa id to be neceffary in a
metaphyncal fenfe. And in this fenfe I ufe the
word Neceffity, in the following difcourfe, when I
endeavour to prove that Necejpty is not inconji/lent
with liberty.
The fubject and predicate of a propofiticm,
which affirms exiftence of fomething, may have a
full, fixed, and certain connection feveral ways.
( i .) They may have a full and perfect connection
in and of tbemfelves^ becaufe it may imply a con
tradiction, or grofs abfurdity, to fuppofe them not
connected. Thus many things are necefiary in
their own nature. So the eternal exiitence of
C 4 being
Nature o/Necefilty. Parti.
being generally confidered, is neccifary in itfelf;
becaufe it would be in itfelf the greateft abfurdity,
to deny the exiftence of being in general, or to
fay there was abfolute and nniverfal nothing ; and
is as it were the fum of all contradictions ; as
might be fhev/n, if this were' a proper place for
it. So God's infinity, and other attributes are ne-
cefTary. So it is neceffary in its own nature^ that
two and two mould be four ; and it is neceffary,
that all right lines drawn from the center of a
circle to the circumference Jhould be equal. It
is neceffary, fit and fuitable, that men mould do
to others, as they would that they mould do to
them. So innumerable metaphyfical and mathe
matical truths are neceffary in tbcmfelves : the fub-
jedt and predicate of the propofition which affirms
them, are perfectly connected of themf elves*
(2.) The connection of the fubjeft and predi
cate of a propofition, which affirms the exiftence
of fomething, may be fixed and made certain, be
caufe the exiftence of that thing is already come
to pafs ; and either now is, or has been j and fo
has as it were made fure of exiftence. And there
fore, the propofition which affirms prefcnt and paft
exiftence of it, may by this means be made cer
tain, and neceffarily and unalterably true ; the pall
event has fixed and decided the matter, as to its
exiftence -, and has made it impoffible but that ex
iftence fhould be truly predicated of it. Thus the
exiftence of whatever is already come to pafs, is
now become neceffary ; 'tis become impoffible it
fnould be otherwjfe than true, that fuch a thing
has been,
(3.) The fubject and predicate of a propofi^
tion which affirms fomething to be, may have
g real anci certain connection consequentially ; and
fo
Sect. III. ?be Nature of Neceffity. 25
fo the exigence of the thing may be confequentially
neceflary, as it may be furely and firmly connected
with fomething elfe, that is neceflary in one of the
former refpects. As it is either fully and thoroughly
connected with that which is abfolutely neceflary
in its own nature, or with fomething which has
already received and made fure of exigence. This
Neceflity lies in, or may be explained by the con
nection of two or more proportions one with an
other. Things which are perfectly connected with
other things that are neceflary, are neceflary them-
felves, by a NecefTity of confequence.
And here it may be obferved, that all things
\vhich are future, or which will hereafter begin to
be, which can be faid to be neceflary, are neceflary
only in this laft way. Their exiflence is not necef-
fary in itfelf ; for if fo, they always \vould have
exifted. Nor is their exiftence become neceflary
by being made fure, by being already come topafs.
Therefore, the only way that any thing that is to
come to pafs hereafter, is or can be neceflary, is
by a connection with fomething that is neceflary
in its own nature, or fomething that already is, or
has been ; fo that the one being fuppofed, the other
certainly follows. And this alfo is the only way
that all things paft, excepting thofe which were
from eternity, could be neceflary before tbey came to
fafs, or could come to pafs neceflarily •, and there
fore the only way in which any effect or event, or
any thing whatsoever that ever has had, or will
have a beginning, has come into being neceflarily,
or will hereafter neceflarily exift. A nd therefore
fkis is the Neceflity which efpecially belongs to con-
troverfies about the acts of the will.
It may be of fome ufe in thefe controversies,
further to obferve concerning metapbyfital Neceflity,
that
2 6 tte Nature <?/ Neceffity. Part I,
that (agreable to the diftincHon before obferved of
Neceffity, as vulgarly underftood) things that exift
may be faid to be neceffary, either with a general
or particular Neceffity. The exiftence of a thing
may be faid to be neceffary with a general Ne
ceffity, when all things whatsoever being confi-
dered, there is a foundation for certainty of their
exiftence ; or when in the mod general and uni-
verfal view of things, the fubjedt and predicate of
the propofition, which affirms its exiftence, would
appear with an infallible connection,
An event, or the exiftence of a thing, may be
faid to be neceflary with a particular Neceffity, or
with regard to a particular perfon, thing or time,
when nothing that can be taken into confidera-
tion, in or about that perfon, thing or time, alters
the cafe at all, as to the certainty of that event,
or the exiftence of that thing; or can be of any
account at all, in determining the infallibility of
the connection of the fubjedl and predicate in
the proportion which affirms the exiftence of the.
thing ; fo that it is all one, as to that perfon, or
thing, at leaft, at that time, as if the exiftence
were neceffary with a Neceffity that is moft univer*
fal and abfolute. Thus there are many things that
happen to particular perlbns, which they have no
hand in, and in the exiftence of which no will
of theirs has any concern, at leaft, at that time ;
which, whether they are neceiTary or nor, with
regard to things in general, yet are neceffary to
them, and with regard to any volition of theirs
ae that time; as they prevent all ads of 'the will
about the affair.- 1 fhall have occafion to apply
this obfervation to particular inftances in the fol
lowing difcourfe,- — Whether the fame things that
are neceffary with a particular Neceffity, be not alib
neceffary with a general Ncceffity, may be a matter
of
Seel. III. The Nature of Neceffity. 27
of future confideration. Let that be as it will, it
alters not the cafe, as to the ufe of this diflindion
of the kinds of Necefiity.
Thefe things may be fufficient for the explain
ing of the terms neceffary and NeceJJily9 as terms
of art, and as often ufed by mttaphyficians, and
contrcverfial writers in divinity, in a fenfe diverfe
from, and more extenlive than their original mean
ing, in common language, which was before ex
plained, ijuw
What has been faid to mew the meaning of the
terms mceff&ry and Neceffity 9-m^y -be fufficient for
the explaining of the oppofite terms, impoffible and
impossibility . For there is no difference, but only the
latter are negative, and the former pofitive, Jm-.
fnjfibility is the fame as negative Neceffity y or a Ne-
cdlity that a thing ihould not be. And it is ufed
as a term of art in a like diverfity from the ori
ginal and vulgar meaning, with Neceffity.
The fame may be obferved concerning the
words unable and Inability. It has been obferved,
that thefe terms, in their original and common
ufe, have relation to will and endeavour, as
fuppofable in the cafe, and as inefficient for the
bringing to pafs the thing wilFd and endeavoured.
But as thefe terms are often ufed by philofophers
and divines, efpecially writers on controverfies
about Free-Wili, they are ufed in a quite different,
and far more extenfive fenfe, and are applied to
many cafes wherein no will or endeavour for the
bringing of the thing to pafs, is or can be fup-
pofed, but is actually denied and excluded in the
nature of the cafe,
As ^the words nectflary, impoffible, unable, &c.
are ufed by polemic writers, in a fenfe diverfe
from
28 Of natural and moral Necefiity. Part I.
from their common fignification, the like has hap
pened to the term contingent. Any thing is faid
to be contingent, or to come to pafs by chance or
accident, in the original meaning of fuch words,
when its connection with its caufes or antecedents,
according to the eflablifhed courfe of things, is
not difcerned ; and fo is what we have no means
of the foreiight of. And efpecially is any thing
laid to be contingent or accidental with regard to
us, when any thing comes to pafs that we are con
cerned in, as occafions or fubjedis, without our
foreknowledge, and befide our defign and fcope.
But the word contingent is abundantly ufed in
a very different fenfe ; not for that whofe con-
necYion with the feries of things we can't difcern,
fo as to forefee the event, but for fomething which
has abfolutely no previous ground or reafon, with
which its exiflence has any fixed and certain con
nection.
SECTION IV,
Of the Diftinftion of natural and moral Neceffity,
and Inability.
Til A T Necefilty which has been explained,
confiding in an infallible connection of the
things iignified by the fubject and predicate of a
proportion, as intelligent beings are the fubjecls
of it, is diftinguiilied into moral and natural Ne
cefiity.
I fhall not now ftand to enquire whether this
diftindtion be a proper and perfect diftinc~tion ;
but fli all only explain how thefe two forts of Ne-
ceffity are u.nderftood, as the terms are fometimes
ufed,
Sedt IV. Of natural and moral Neceffity. 2$
ufed, and as they are ufed in the following dif-
courfe.
The phrafe, moral Necejfity, is ufed varioufly *
fometimes it is ufed for a Neceffity of moral obli
gation. So we fay, a man is under Neceffity,
when he is under bonds of duty and confidence,
which he can't be difcharged from. So the word
Necejfity is often ufed for great obligation in point
of interefL Sometimes by moral Nccefilty is meant
that apparent connection of things, which is the
ground of moral evidence ; and fo is diftinguimed
from abfolute Neceffity^ or that fure connection of
things, that is a foundation for infallible certainty.
In this fenfe, moral Neceffity fignifies much the
fame as that high degree of probability, which,
is ordinarily fufHcient to fatisfy, and be relied upon
i>y mankind, in their conduct and behaviour in
the world, as they would confult their own fafety
and intereft, and treat others properly as members
of fociety. And fometimes by moral Neceffity is
meant that Neceffity of connect ion and confequence,
which arifes from luch moral cauj'es, as the ftrength
of inclination, or motives, and the connection
which there is in many cafes between thefe, and
fuch certain volitions and actions. And it is in
this fenfe, that 1 ufe the phraie, moral Neceffity 9 in
the following difcourfe.
By natural NeceJ/ity, as applied to men, I mean
fuch Neceffity as men are under through the force
of natural caufes ; as diftinguifhed from what are
called moral caufes, fuch as habits and difpo-
fitions of the heart, and moral motives and in
ducements. Thus men placed in certain circum-
ftances, are the fubjedts of particular fenfations
by Neceffity : they feel pain when their bodies
are wounded ; they fee the objects prefented before
them
JO Of natural and moral Necefiity. - Part L
them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened :
fo they affent to the truth of certain proportions,
as foon as the terms are underftood ; as that two
and two make four, that black is not white, that
two parallel lines can neves* crofs one another •, io
by a natural Necefllty mens -bodies move down
wards, when there is nothing to fupport them.
But here feveral things may be noted concerning
thefe two kinds of Neceffity.
i. Moral Necefiity may be as abfolnte, as natural
Neceffity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly
connected with its moral caufe, as a natural ne-
ceffary effect is with its natural caufe. Whether
the Will in every cafe is necefTarily determined by
the ftrongeft motive, or whether the Will ever
makes any refinance co fuch a motive, or can ever
oppofe the ftrongeft prefent inclination, or not ; if
that matter fhould be controverted, yet I fuppofe
none will deny, but that, in fome cafes, a previous
bias and inclination, or the motive prefented, may
be fo powerful, that the act of the Will may be
certainly and induTolubly connected therewith.
When motives or previous bias are very ilrong, all
will allow that there is fome difficulty in going
again ft them. And if they were yet ftronger, the
difficulty would be ftill greater. And therefore,
if more were ftill added to their flrength, to a cer
tain degree, it would make the difficulty fo great,
that it would be wholly impoffibjin to furmount it ;
for this plain reafon, becaufe whatever power men
may be fuppofed to have to furmount difficulties,
yet that power is not infinite ; and fo goes, not be
yond certain limits. If a man can furmount ten
degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty de
grees of ftrength, becaufe the degrees of flrength
are beyond the degrees of difficulty; yet if the
difficulty be increafed to thirty, or an hundred,
or
Sect. IV. Of natural and moral Neceflity. 3 1
or a thoufand degrees, and his ftrength not alib
increafed, his flrength will be wholly infufficient
to furmount the difficulty. As therefore it muft
be allowed, that there may be fuch a thing as a
fure and perfect connection between moral caufes
and effects \ fo this only is what I call by the
name of moral Neceffity.
2. When I ufe this difllndlion of moral and na~
turd Neceffity, I would not be underftood to fup-
pofe, that if any thing comes to pafs by the fcr-
mer kind of Neceffity, the nature of things is not
concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I don't
mean to determine, that when a moral habit or
motive is fo ftrong, that the aft of the Will infal
libly follows, this is not owing to the nature of
things. But thefe are the names that thefe two
kinds of Neceffity have ufually been called by ;
and they muft be dhtinguifhed by fome names
or other ; for there is a diftindtion or difference
between them, that is very important in its confe-
quences. Which difference does not lie fo much
in the nature of the connection, as in the two terms
connected. The caufe with which the effect is
connected, is of a particular kind ; viz. that which
is of a moral nature ; either fome previous habi
tual difpofition, or fome motive exhibited to the
undemanding. And the effect is alfo of a parti
cular kind •, being likewife of a moral nature ;
confiding in fome inclination or volition of the
foul or voluntary action.
I fuppofe, that Neceffity which is called natural
in diftinction from tooYal neceffity, is fo called^
becaufe meer nature^ as the word is vulgarly ufed,
is concerned, without any thing of choice. The
word nature is often ufed in oppofition to choice ;
not becaufe nature has indeed never any hand in
our
ji Of natural and moral Necefiity. Part I,
our choice ; but this probably comes to pafs by.
means that we firfl get our notion of nature from
that difcernible and obvious courfe of events,
which we obferve in many things that our choice
has no concern in ; and eipecially in the material
world; which, in very many -parts of it, we eafily
perceive to be in a fettled courfe ; the ilated order
•and manner of fucceilion being very apparent*
But where we don't readily difcern the rule and
connection, (though there be a connection, accord
ing to an eftablifhed law, truly taking place) we
fignify the manner of event by fome other name*
Even in many things which are feen in the ma
terial and inanimate world, which don't difcern-'
ibly and obvioufly come to pafs according to any
fettled courfe, men don't call the manner of the
event by the name of nature, but by filch names
as accident , ckance, contingent, &c. So men make
a diflinction between nature and choice ; as tho'
they were coinpleatly and univerfally diftinct.
"Whereas, I fuppofe none will deny but that choice,
in many cafes, arifes from nature, as truly as other
events. But the dependence and connection be
tween acts of volition or choice, and their caufes,
according to eftabliihed laws, is not fo fenfi-
ble and obvious. And we obferve that choice
is as it were a new principle of motion and action,
different from that eftabliihed law and order of
things which is mod obvious, that is feen efpeci-
ally in corporeal and fenfible things ; and alfo the
choice often interpofes, interrupts and alters the
chain of events in thefe external objects, and caufes
them to proceed other wife than they would do,
if let alone, and left to go on according to the
laws of motion among themfelves. Hence it is
fpoken of as if it were a principle of motion en
tirely diftinct from nature, and properly fet in op-
pofition to it. Names being commonly given to
things
Sect. IV. moral Neceffity. **
things, according to what is moft obvious, and is
fuggefted by what appears to the fenfes without
reflection and refearch.
3. It muft be obferved, that in what has been
explained, as fignified by the name of moral Ne-
ceffity, the word Neceffity is not ufed according to
the original defign and meaning of the word :
for, as was obferved before, fuch terms, nece/ary,
impoffible, irreftftible, &c. in common fpeech, and
their moft proper fenle, are always relative ; hav
ing reference to fome fuppofable voluntary op-
pofition or endeavour, that is inefficient. But no
fuch oppofition, or contrary will and endeavour,
is fuppofable inkhe cafe of moral Neceffity - which
is a certainty of the inclination and will itfelf ;
which does not admit of the fuppofition of a
will to oppofe and refift it. For it is abfurd, to
fuppofe the fame individual will to oppofe itfelf,
in its prefent aft-, or the prefent choice to be
oppofite^ to, and refitting prefent choice : as ab-
furd^as it is to talk of two contrary motions, in
the fame moving body, at the fame time. And
therefore the very cafe fuppofed never admits of
any trial, whether an oppofmg or refilling will
can overcome this Neceffity.
What has been faid of natural and moral Ne
ceffity, may ferve to explain what is intended by
natural and moral Inability. We are faid to be na
turally unable to do a thing, when we can't do ic
if we will, becaufe what is moft commonly called
nature don't allow of it, or becaufe of fome im
peding defed or obftacle that is extrinfic to the
will; either in the faculty of underftanding,
conftitution of body, or external objects. Moral
Inability confifts not in any of thefe things ; but
cither in the want of inclination ; or the ftrength
D
34 Of moral Inability. Part I .
of a contrary inclination ; or the want of fufHcient
motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the
will, or the ftrength of apparent motives to the
contrary. Or both thefe may be refolved into one-,
and it may be faid in one word, that moral Inabi
lity confifts in the oppofition or want of inclination.
For when a peribn is unable to will or chuie iiich
a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence
of contrary motives, it is the fame thing as his be
ing unable through the want of an inclination, or
the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in fuch
circumftances, and under the influence of fuch
views.
To give fome inftances of this moral Inability*—*
A woman of great honour and chaitity may have a
moral Inability to proilitute herfelf to her Have. A
child of great love and duty to his parents, may
be unable to be willing to kill his father. A very
laicivious man, in cafe of certain opportunities and
temptations, and in the abfence of fuch and fuch
reftraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his
luft. A drunkard, under 'fuch ar.d fuch circum-
ftances, may be unable to forbear taking of flrong
drink. A very malicious man may be unable to
exert benevolent ads to an enemy, or to defire his
profperity : yea, fome may be fo under the power
of a vile difpofition, that they may be unable to
love thofe who are mod worthy of their efteem and
affection. A flrong habit of virtue, and great de
gree of holinefs may caule a moral Inability to love
wickednefs in -general, may render a man unable
to take complacence in wicked perfons or things-;
or to chule a wicked life, and prefer it to a virtu
ous life. And on the dther hand, a great degree of
habitual wickednefs may lay a man under an Ina
bility to love and chuie 'holinefs ; and render him
utterly unable to love an infinitely holy Being, or
to chufe and cleave to him as his chief good.
Here
Sed. IV. Of moral Inability. 35
f-Jere it m,ay be of ufe to obferve this, diftino
tioQ of raocal Jnab.ility, viz. of that which is ge
nes a I and habitual, and that which is particular and,
occajioiiaL By a general and, habitual mqral Inabi
lity, I mean, an, inability in the tieatt to all ex-
erciies or acts of will of that nature or kind,
tbro.ugh a fixed and habitual inclination, or an
habitual and dated defedt, pr want o.f a certain
kind of inclination. Thus a very ill-natured man
may be unable to exert fuch acts of benevolence,
as another, who is full of good nature, com
monly exe.rts; and a man, whole Jjeart is habitu
ally voic} of gratitude, may be qnable to exert
fuch and fuch grateful a.<5ts, through tfrat ftated
defect of a grateful inclination. By particular and
o.,c.cajio.nal moral Inability, | mean an Inability of
ihe will or heart to a particular a6t, through the
flrength or defect of prefent motives, or of in
ducements prefented to the yievy of thq under-
Handing, on' tins occafion. • If "it be fo, that the
will is always determined by the ftrongeft mo
tive, then it rnuft always have an Inability, in
this latter fenfe, to aci: otherwife than it doqs ; it
not being poflible, in any c;afe, that the will
ihouki, at prcf^nt, go againil the motive which
ha? now, all things confidcred, the greateft ftrength
and advantage to excite and ipduce it. The
former of thefe kinds of moral Inability, con-
fifting in that which is ftated, habitual and ge
nera), iar moft commonly called by the name -of
Inability -, bec^uff the word Inability, in its moft
proper and original fignification, has refpedt to
fome fated deft ft. And this efpecially obtains the
name of Liability alfo upon another account : — •
I before observed, that the, wor,d Inability in its
original and moft common ufe, is a relative
term ; and has refpeft to will and endeavour,
as fuppofable in the cafe, and as infufficient to
D 2 bring
g 6 Of moral Inability. Part I,
bring to pafs the thing deiired and endeavoured.
Now there may be more of an appearance and
lhadow of this, with refpect to the acts which
arife from a fixed and ftrong habit, than others
that arife only from tranfient occalions and canfes.
Indeed will and endeavour .againft, or diverfe
from prefent acts of the will, are in no cafe fup-
pofable, whether thofe acts be*occafional or ha-
bitual ; for that would be to fuppofe J:he will,
at prefent, to be otherwife than, at prefent, it
is. But yet there may be will and endeavour
againil future acts of the will, or volitions that
are likely to take place, as viewed at a diflance.
'Tis no contradiction, to fuppofe that the acts of
the will at one time, may be againft the acts of
the will at another time ; and there may be de-
fires and endeavours to prevent or excite future
acts of the will ; but fuch defires and endea
vours are, in many cafes, rendered infufficient and
vain, through fixednefs of habit : when the oc-
cafion returns, 'the ftrength of habit overcomes,
and baffles all fuch oppofition. In this refpect, a
man may be in miferable flavery and bondage to
a ftrong habit. But it;may be comparatively eafy
to make an alteration with refpect to fuch future
acts, as are only occafional and traniient ; be-
caufe the occalion or traniient caufe, if forefeen,
may often eaiily be prevented or avoided. On
this account, the moral Inability that attends fixed
habits, efpecially obtains the name of Inability.
And then, as the will may remotely and indirectly
refiil itfelf, and do it in vain, in the cafe of ftrong
habits •, fo reafon may refift prefent acts of the
will, and its refiftance be infufficient ; and this is
more commonly the cafe alfo, when the acts arife
from ftrong habit.
- r - But
Sect. IV. Of moral Inability. 37
• But it mull be obferved concerning moral In
ability, in each kind of it, that the word Inability
is ufed in a fenfe very diverfe from its original
import. The word iignifies only a natural In
ability, in the proper uie of it ; and is applied to
fuch cafes only wherein a prefent will or incli
nation to the thing, with refpect to which a per-
fon is faid to be unable, is fuppofable. It can't
be truly faid, according to the ordinary ufe of
language, that a malicious man, let him be never
fo malicious, can't hold his hand from finking*
or that he is not able to mew his neighbour kind-
nefs ; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never
fo ftrong, can't keep the cup from his mouth.
In the ftrictefl propriety of fpeech, a man has
a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice,
or at his election : and a man can't be truly faid
to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it
if he will. It is improperly faid, that a perfon
can't perform thofe external actions, which are
dependent on the act of the will, and which
would be ealily performed, if the act of the will
were prefent. ,And if it be improperly faid, that
he cannot perform thofe external voluntary actions,
which depend on the will, it is in fome refpect
more improperly faid, that he is unable to exert
the acts of the will themfelves ; becaufe it is more
evidently falfe, with refpect to thefe, that he can't
if he will : for to fay fo, is a down-right contra
diction : it is to fay, he can't will, if he does
will. And in this cafe, not only is it true, that
it is eafy for a man to do the thing if he will,
but the very willing is the doing; when once
he has willed, the thing is performed •, and no
thing elfe remains to be done. Therefore, in thefe
things to afcribe a non-performance to the want
of power or ability, is not juft •, becaule the
thing wanting is not a being able^ but a being
D 3 willing.
38 The Notion 'of Liberty, Part I,
wilting. There are faculties of mind, and capa
city of nature, 'and every thing elfe, fiifficient*
but a diipofition : nothing is wanting but a wiii.
SECTION V,
Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral
Agency.
THE "plain and obvious meaning of the words
Freedom and Liberty, in common fpeech,
is power, 'opportunity, or advantage, that 'any one has,
to do as be:pkafes. Or in other words, his being
free from hinderance or impediment in the way
of doing, or conducting in any refpect, as he
wills. * And the contrary "to Liberty, whatever
name we call that by, is a peribn's being hindered
or unable to conduct: as he will, or being necefii-
tated to do otherwife.
If this which I have mentioned be the meaning
of the word Liberty, in the ordinary ufe of lan
guage ; as I trull that none that has ever learned
to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny ; then it
.will follow, that in propriety of fpeech, neither
•Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be af-
cribed to any being or thing, but that which has
fuch a faculty, power or property, as is called
will. For that which is poffeifed of no fuch
thing as willj can't have any power or opportu
nity of doing according to its will, nor be necefii-
tated to act contrary to its will, nor be retrained
from acting agreably to it. And therefore to' talk
of
* I fay not only doing* but conducing ; becaufe a voluntary
forbearing to do, fitting flill, keeping iilence, &c. are in-
ftances of perfons c'ondud* about which Liberty is exercl&d ;
though they are not fo properly called doing*
. V. and of moral Agency.' 39
of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the
Very ivill ItfelL is not to fpeak good fenfe ; if we
judge of fenie, and nonfenfc, by the original and
proper fignification of words. For the will it-
fetfis not an Agent that has a will: the power
•of chufing, itfelf, has not a power of chufing.
That which has the power of volition or choice
is the man or the foul, and not the power of vo?
lition itfelf, And he that has the Liberty of doing
according to his will, is the Agent or doer who is
poffeffed of the will ; and not the will which be
js pofleiTed of. We fay with propriety, that a
bird Jet loofe has power and Liberty to fly; but not
that the bird's power of flying has a power and
Liberty of flying. To be free is the property of
an Agent, who is pofiefled of powers and faculties,
as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or
zealous. But thefe qualities are the properties
of men or perfons ; and not the properties pf pro,*
perries,
There are two things that are contrary to this
which is called Liberty in common fpeech. One is
conjlramt ; the fame is otherwife called force, coiq-
puljion, and coflfitiw \ which is a perfon's being ne-
ceflitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The
othsr is r-eftrflint ; which is his being hindered, and
not having power to do according to his will. But
that which has no will, can't be the fubjectof thefe
things. — I need fay the leis on this head, Mr. Locke
having fet the fame thing forth, with fo great clear-
nefs, in his Eff&y on the Human IJnfcrjl anting.
But one thing more I would obferve concern
ing what is vulgarly called Liberty •, namely, that
power and opportunity for one to do and conduct
as he will, or according to his choice, is all that
is meant by itj without taking into the meaning
P 4 " $
40 The Notion of Liberty, Part I.
of the word, any thing of the caufe or original of
that choice ; or at all confidering how the perfon
came to have fuch a volition •, whether it was
-caufed by fome external motive, or internal habi-
•tual bias ; whether it was determined by fome in
ternal antecedent volition, or whether it happened
.without a caufe ; whether it was neceflarily con
nected with fomething foregoing, or not connected.
Let the perfon come by his volition or choice how
he will, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in
the way to hinder his purfuing and executing his
will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according
to the primary and common notion of freedom.
What has been faid may be fufficient to ihew
.what is meant by Liberty, according to the com
mon notions of mankind, and in the ufual and
primary acceptation of the word : but the word,
as ufed by Arminians, Pelagians and others, who
oppofe the Cahintfts, has an entirely different fig-
nification. — Thefe feveral things belong to their
notion of Liberty, i. That it confiils in a felf-
deternnning 'power in the will, or a certain fove-
reignty the will has over itfelf, and its own
acts, whereby it determines its own volitions ;
fo as not to be dependent in its determinations,
on any caufe without itfelf, nor determined by
any thing prior to its own acts. 2. Indifference
belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or that
the mind, previous to the act of volition be, in
equilibria. 3. Contingence is another thing that
belongs and is eflential to it ; . not in the common
acceptation of the word, as that has been already
explained, but as oppofed to all rieceffity, or any
fixed and certain connexion with fome previ
ous ground or reafon of its exigence. They fup-
pofe^the effence of Liberty fo much to confift
in thefe things, that unlefs the will of man _ be
free
SecL V. and of moral Agency. 41
free in this fenfe, he has no real freedom, how
much foever he maybe at Liberty to acl: according
to his will.
A moral Agent is a being that is capable of thofe
actions that have a moral quality, and which can
properly be denominated good or evil in a moral
fenfe, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty.
.To moral Agency belongs a moral faculty ', or fenfe
of moral good and evil, or of fuch a thing as de~
;fert or. worthinefs, of praife or blame, reward or
,punifhment; and a capacity which an Agent has
of being influenced in his actions by moral induce
ments or motives, exhibited to the view of under-
Handing and reafon, to engage to a conduct agre-
able to the moral faculty.
The fun is very excellent and beneficial in its
aftion and influence on the earth, in warming
it, and caufing it to bring forth its fruits ; but
it is not a moral Agent : its action, though good,
is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks
out in a city, and confumes great part of it, is
very mifchievous in its operation ; but is not a
moral Agent : what it does is not faulty or finful,
or deferving of any punifhment. The brute crea
tures are not moral Agents: the actions of fome
of them are very profitable and pleafant ; others
are very hurtful : yet, feeing they have no moral
faculty, or fenfe of defert, and don't aft from choice
guided by underflanding, or with a capacity of
reafoning and reflecting, but only from inflind:,
and are not capable of being influenced by moral
inducements, their actions are not properly finful
or virtuous ; nor are they properly the fubjedls of
any fuch moral treatment for what they do, as
moral Agents are for their faults or good deeds. >i
i Here
42 fbe Notion of Liberty, Part I.
Here it may be noted, that there is a circum-
ftantiai difference between the moral Agency of a
ruler and nfubjeft. I call it circumftanttm, becaufe
it lies only in the difference of moral inducements
they are capable of being influenced by, arifing
•from the difference of circum fiances. A ruler act
ing in that capacity only, is not capable of being
influenced by a -moral law, and its fanctions of
threatnings and -prorniles, rewards and punifhments,
-as the fubjeft is ; though both may be influenced
i>y a knowledge of moral good and evil. And
therefore the moral Agency of the Supreme Being,
•\vho acts only -in the capacity of a ruler towards
-his creatures, end never as a fubjeft, differs in that
-refpect from the moral Agency of created intelli
gent beings. God's actions, and particularly thofe
which he exerts as a moral governor, have moral
.-qualifications, are morally good in the higheft de-
;gree. They are rnofl 'perfectly holy and righteous ;
and we muil conceive of -Him as influenced in the
.higheft degree, -by that which,. above all others, is
properly a -moral inducement ; viz. the moral
good "which He fees in fuch and fuch things:
*and 'therefore He is, in the .rnoft proper fenfe,
-a moral Agent, the fource of all moral ability
and Agency, ?the fountain and rule of all virtue
and moral good ; -though -by reafon of his being
Supreme ovrr ail, 'tis not poffible He fhould be
under the influence of law or command, promifes
'.or •.threatnings, rewards .or punifhments, counfels
*or warnings. The eifential qualities of a moral
Agent are in God, in the greateil poffible perfec-
ftk>n ; fuch as underitandkig, to perceive 'the diffe
rence between moral good .and evil ; a capacity of
clifccrning that moral worthiness and demerit, by
which fome things are praafe-worthy, others de-
ferving of blame a^d puniihment ; and alfo a ca
pacity of choice, and choice guided by underffond-
Sect. V. find of moral Agency. 43
ing, and a power of acting according to his choice
or -pleafure> and being capable of doing thole
things which are in the higheft fenfe praife- worthy.
And herein docs very much confifl that image of
God wherein he made man, (which we read of
Gen. I. 26, 2,7. and ' €bap. I-X. 6.) by which God
diftinguiihed man from the beads, viz. in thofe
faculties and principles of nature, whereby He is
capable of 'fnorfcl Agency. 'Herein Very^ -much
confifts the natural image of God ; as his fpintual
and moral image, wherein man was made at firft,
confided Jm that moral exc^kticy, that -he .was
endowed with.
P A R T
( 44 )
PART II. !S>
Wherein it is considered whether there
is or can be any fuch Sort of FREE-
, ,DOM OF WILL, as that wherein Ar~
rninians place the Effence of the
Liberty of all moral Agents ; and
whether any fuch Thing ever was
or can be conceived of.
S E C T I O K I.
Shewing the manifefl In.confrftence of the Arminian
Notion of Liberty of Will, conjtfting in the Will's
felf-determining Power.
H'AVING taken notice of thofe things which
may be neceflary to be obferved, concern
ing the meaning of the principal terms and
phrafes made ufe of in controveriies concerning
human Liberty, and particularly obferved what
Liberty is according to the common language
and general apprehenfion of mankind, and what
it is as underftood and maintained by Arminians ;
I proceed to confider the Arminian notion of the
Freedom of the Will, and the fuppofed neceflity of
it in order to moral agency, or in order to any
Se&. I. ?he Inconfiftence, &c; 4*
one's being capable of virtue or vice, and pro
perly the fubjecl of command or counfel, praife or
blame, promifes or threatnings, rewards or punifh-
ments ; or whether that which has been defcrtbed,
as the thing meant by Liberty in common fpeech,
be not fufficient, and the only Liberty, which
makes, or can make any one a moral agent, and
fo properly the fubjedl of thefe things. In this
Party I mail confider whether any fuch thing be
poilible or conceivable, as that Freedom of Will
which Armenians infift on ; and fhall enquire, whe
ther any fuch fort of Liberty be neceflary to moral
agency, fcfa. in the next Part.
And firft of all, I fhall confider the notion of a
f elf -deter mining Power in the will : wherein, ac
cording to the ArminianSy does mod effentially
confift the Will's Freedom ; and fhall particularly
enquire, whether it be not plainly abfurd, and a
manifeft inconfiftence, to fuppofe that the will itfelf
determines all the free affs of the
Here I ihall not infift on- the great impropriety
of fuch phrafes, and ways of Ipeaking, as the
bill's determining itfelf; becaufe actions are to be
afcribed to agents, and not properly to the pow
ers of agents -, which improper way of fpeaking'
leads to many miftakes, and much confufion,1
as Mr. Locke obferves. But I fhall fuppofe that
the Arminians, \vhen they fpeak of the Will's de
termining itfelf, do by the Will mean the foul
•willing. I fhall take it for granted, that when they
fpeak of the Will, as the determiner, they mean
the foul in the exercife of a power of willing, or
acting voluntarily. I mail fuppofe this to be their
meaning, becaufe nothing elfe can be mtaiit, with
out the groffeft and plaineft abfurdhy. Jn all
cafes when we fpeak of the powers or principles
ni of
4§ ?£<• IncGnfiflence of Part II.
of a6ting, as. doing fuch, things, we mean thae
the agents which hay$ tliefe Powers of a&ing, da
them, in the exerciie of tfcoib powers. So when,
\ve fay, valour %ht.s coufageoufly, we mean, the
man who is under the influence of valour fights
courageously, When we fay, love fpefcs the ob
ject loved, we mean, the per' fon lovi^ leeks that
object. When vve lay, the underfbnt}ing difcerns,
we mean the fouj in the exerciie of that faculty.
So when it is faid, the \\i\\ decides or determine?,
the meaning muft be, that the perfon in the exer-
cife of a Power of willing and chufing, or the foul
acting voluntarily, determines.
Therefore, if the Will determines all 'its own
free ads, the foul determines all the free acts of
the will in the exerciie of a Power of willing
and chufing ; or, \yhich is the fame thing, it
determines them of choice \ it determines its own
acts by chufing its own, acts. If the Will de
termines the Will, then choice orders and deter
mines the choice : and acts of choice are fub-
j£ct to the decifion, and follow the conduct of
other acts of choice. And therefore if the Will
determines all its own free acts, then every free
act of choice is determined by a preceding act
of choice, chufing that act. And if thac pre
ceding act of the Will or choice be alfo a free
act, then by thefe principles, in this act too, the
Will is felf-determined : that is, this, in like
manner, is an act that the foul voluntarily chufes ;
or, which is the fame thing, it is an act deter
mined flill by a preceding act of the Will, chu-
iing that. And the like may again be! obferved
of the lad mentioned act. Which brings us di
rectly to a contradiction : for it fuppofes an act
of the Will preceding th£ fir ft act in die whole
train, directing and de-termining the reft ; or a
free
Sect. I. Self-determining Power. 4?
free act of the Will, before the firft free act of
the Will. Or elfe we muft come at laft to an adt
of the Will, determining the coniequent ads,
wherein the Will is not felf-determined, and fo is
not a free act, in this notion of freedom : but if
the firft act in the train, determining and fixing
the reft, be not free, none of them all can be free;
as is manifeft at firil view, but lhall be demon-
ftrated prefently.
If the Will, which we find governs the mem
bers of the body and determines and commands
their motions and actions, does alfo govern itfclf,
and determine its own motions and actions, it
doubtleis determines them the fame way, even by
antecedent volitions. The Will determines which
way the hands and feet fliall move, by an a&
of volition or choice : and there is no other way
of the Will's determining, dire&ing or command
ing any thing at all. Whatfoever the Will coiu-r
mands, it commands by an act of the Will. And
if it has itfelf under its command, and determines
itfelf in its own actions, it doubtkis does k th.e
fame way that in determines other tilings which
are under its command. So that if the freedom
of the Will con&fts in this, that it has itfelf and
ks own actions under its command aa.d direc
tion, and its own volitions are determined by ij>
felf, it will follow,, -that every free volition arifes
from another antecedent volition, .dire6lm,g and
commanding that : and if that direciitig volition
be alfo free, in that alfo the Will is determined >
that is to -fay, that directing volition is determined
by another going before that ; and fo on, 'till
ive come to the firft volition in the whole ieries :
and if that firft volition be free, and .the Will
ielf-determined in it, then that is determined by
another volition preceding that, \Vluc,h 15 a
con-
48 ¥bc Inconjtftence of Part II.
contradi&ion ; becaufe by the fuppofition, it can
have none before it, to direct or determine it, be
ing the firft in the train. But if that firft voli*
tion is not determined by any preceding act of the
the Will, then that act is not determined by the
Will, and fo is not free in the Armmian notion
of freedom, which confifts in the Will's felf-de-
termination. And if that firft ad: of the Will,
which determines and fixes the fubfequent acts,
be not free, none of the following acts, which
are determined by it, can be free. — If we fuppofe
there are five acts in the train, the fifth and laft
determined by the fourth, and the fourth by the
third, the third by the fecond, and the fecond by
the firft ; if the firft is not determined by the
Will, and fo not free, then none of them are truly
determined by the Will : that is, that each of them
are as they are, and not otherwife, is not firft
owing to the Will, but to the determination of
the firft in the feries, which is not dependent on
the Will, and is that which the Will has no hand
in the determination of. And this being that
which decides what the reft mall be, and deter-
mines their exiftence; therefore the firft deter
mination of their exiftence is not from the Will.
The cafe is juft the fame, if inftead of a chain
of five acts of the Will, we Ihould fuppofe a fuc-
cefiion of ten, or an hundred, or ten thoufand.
If the firft act be not free, being determined by
fomething out of the Will, and this determines
the next to be agreable to itfelf, and that the
next, and fo on ;' they are none of them free, but
all originally depend on, and are determined by
fome caufe out of the Will : and fo all freedom
in the cafe is excluded, and no act of the Will
can be free, according to this notion of freedom.
If we jfhould fuppofe a long chain of ten thou
fand links, fo connected, that if the firft link
moves,
Sect. I. Sdf-det&miabig Power. 49
moves, it will move the next, and that the next ;
and fo the whole chain muft be determined to
motion, and in the direftion of its motion, by
the motion of the firfl link ; and that is moved
by fomething elfe : in this cafe, though all the
links, but one, are moved by other parts of the
fame chain •, yet it appears that the motion of no
one, nor the direction of its motion, is from any
felf- moving or felf- determining Power in the
chain, any more than if every link were imme
diately moved by fomething that did not belong
to the chain. — If the will be not free in the firft
act, which caufcs the next, then neither is it free
in the next, which is caufed by that firft act :
for though indeed the will caufed it, yet it did
not caufe it freely ; becaufe the preceding act, by
which it was caufed, was not free. And again,
if the will be not free in the fecond act, fo neither
can it be in the third, which is caufed by that ;
becaufe in like manner, that third was deter
mined by an a<ft of the will that was not free.
And fo we may go on to the next act, and from
that to the next ; and how long foever the fuc-
cefTion of acts is, it is all one -, if the firfl on which
the wrhole chain depends, and which determines
all the reft, be not a free act, the will is not free
in caufing or determining any one of thofe acts j
becaufe the act by which it determines them all,
is not a free act •, and therefore the will is no more
free in determining them, than if it did not caufc
them at all. — Thus, this Armiman notion of Li
berty of the Will, confifting in the Will's Self-
determination, is repugnant to itfelf, and fhuts itfeff
wholly out of the world.
SECTION
SECTION II.
Several fuppofed Way3 of evading the foregoing
Reafoning, confidered.
IF to evade the force of what has been obferved,
it fhould be faid, that when the Arminians
fpeak of the will's determining its own acts, they
do not mean that the will determines its ads by
any preceding act, or that one act of the will
determines another •, but only that the faculty or
power of will, or the foul in the ufe of that
power* determines its own volitions \ and that it
does it without any act going before the act de
termined ; fuch an evafion would be full of the
moft grofs abfurdity. 1 confefs, it is an Eva-»
fion of my own inventing ; and I do not know
but I fhould wrong the Arminians^ in fuppofing
that any of them would make ufe of it. But it
being as good a one as I can invent, I would ob-
ferve upon it a few things.
Firfti If the faculty or power of the will de
termines an act of volition, or the foul in the
ufe or exercife of that power, determines it, that
is the fame thing as for the foul to determine
volition by an aft of will. For an exercife of the
power of will, and an aft of that power, are the
fame thing. Therefore to fay, that the power of
will, or the foul in the ufe or exercife of that
power, determines volition, without an aR of will
preceding the volition determined, is a contra-
diction.
Secondly, If a power of will determines the act
of the will, then a power of chuling determines
it.
Sect. II. Suppofed Evafions confiderect. gi
it. For, as was before obferved, in every act of
will, there is choice, and a power of willing is
a power of chufing. But if a power of chufing
determines the act of volition, it determines it by
chufing it. For it is mod abfurd to fay, that a
power of chufing determines one thing rather
than another, without chufing any thing. But
if a power of chufing determines volition by chu
fing it, then here is the act of volition deter
mined by an antecedent choice, chufing that vo«
lition.
Thirdly i To fay, the faculty, or the foul, de
termines its own volition, but not by any act, is
a contradiction. Becaufe for the foul to direft,
decide, or determine any thing, is to act ; and this
is fuppofed ; for the foul is here fpoken of as be
ing a caufe in this affair, bringing fomething to
pafs, or doing fomething ; or, which is the fame
thing, exerting itfelf in order to an effect, which
effect is the determination of volition, or the par
ticular kind and manner of an act of will. But
certainly, this exertion or action is not the fame
with the effect, in order to the production of
which it is exerted ; but muft be fomething prior
to it.
Again, The advocates for this notion of the
freedom of the will, fpeak of a certain fovereignty
in the will, whereby it has power to determine its
own volitions. And therefore the determination
of volition muft itfelf be an act of the will ; for
otherwife it can be no exercife of that fuppofed
power and fovereignty.
Again > If the will determines itfelf, then either
the will is aftive in determining its volitions, of
it is not. If it be active in it, then, the determi-
E a nation
5^ Suppofed Evafions considered. Part II.
nation is an aft of the will ; and ib there is one
act of the will determining another. But if the
will is not aftive in the determination, then how
does it exerafe any, liberty in it? Thefe gentle
men fuppofe that the thing wherein the will ex-
ercifes liberty, is in its determining its own acts.
But how can this be, if it be not aftive in deter
mining ? Certainly the will, or the foul, cannot
exercife any liberty in that wherein it doth not aft, or
.wherein it doth not exercife itfelf. So that if either
part of this dilemma be taken, this fcheme of li
berty, confiding in felf-determining power, is over
thrown. If there be an act of the will in deter
mining all its own free acts, then one free act
of the will is determined by another ; and fo we
have the abfurdity of every free act, even the very
fird, determined by a foregoing free act. But if
there be no act or exercife of the will in deter
mining its own acts, then no liberty is exercifed
in determining them. From whence it follows,
that no liberty coniids in the will's power to
determine its own acts : or, which is the fame
thing, that there is no fuch thing as liberty
confiding in a felf - determining power of the
will.
If it mould be faid, That although it be true,
if the foul determines its own volitions, it mud
be active in fo doing, and the determination itfelf
mud be an act: ; yet there is no need of fuppofing
this act to be prior to the volition determined ;
but the will or foul determines the act of che
will in 'willing •, it determines its own volition, in
the very act of volition ; it directs and limits the
act of the will, caufing it to be fo and not other-
wife, in exerting the act, without any preceding
act to exert that. If any ihould fay after this
maflner, they mud mean one of thefe three things :
Either,
Sect. II. Suppofed Evafions confident. 53
Either, (i.) That the determining aft, though it
be before the aft determined in the order of na
ture, yet is not before it in order of time. Or,
(2.) That the determining aft is not before the aft
determined, either in the order of time or nature,
nor is truly diftinft from it ; but that the foul's
determining the aft of volition is the fame thing
with its exerting the aft of volition: the mind's
exerting fuch a particular aft, is its caufing and
determining the aft. Or, (3.) That volition has
no caufe, and is no effect ; but comes into ex-
iilence, with fuch a particular determination, with
out any ground or reafon of its exiftence and deter
mination. — I ihall confider thefe diftinftly.
(i.) If all that is meant, be, that the deter
mining aft is not before the act determined in
order of time, it will not help the cafe at all,
though it mould be allowed. If it be before the
determined aft in the order of nature, being the
caufe or ground of its exiftence, this as much
proves it to be diftinft from it, and independent
on it, as if it were before in the order of time.
As the caufe of the particular motion of a natural
body in a certain direction, may have no diftance
as to time, yet cannot be the fame with the mo
tion effected by it, but muft be as diftinft from
it, as any other caufe, that is before its effect in
the order of time : as the architect is diftinft
from the houfe which he builds, or the father
diftinft from the fon which he begets. And if
the act of the will determining be diftinft from
the aft determined, and before it in the order of
nature, then we can go back from one, to another,
'till we come to the firft in the feries, which has
no aft of tfre will before it in the order of na-
E 3 ture,
£4 Suppofed Evafions conferred. Part II.
ture, determining it •, and confequently is an act
not determined by the will, and fo not a free act,
in this notion of freedom. And this being the
act which determines all the reft, none of them
are free acts. As when there is a chain of many
Jink$, the firft of which only is taken hold of and
drawn by hand •, all the reft may follow and be
moved at the fame inftant, without any diftance
of time •, but yet the motion of one link is before
that of another in the order of nature ; the laft is
moved by the next, and that by the next, and fo
till we come to the firft ; which not being moved
by any other, but by fomething diftinct from the
whole chain, this as much proves that no part is
moved by any ielf-moving power in the chain, as
if the motion of one link followed that of another
in the order of time*
(2.) If any fhould fay, that the determining
act is not before the determined act, either in
the order of time, or of nature, nor is diftinct
from it ; but that the exertion of the acl: is the
determination of the acl: ; that for the foul to
exert a particular volition, is for it to caufe and
determine that ad: of volition : I would on this
obferve, that the thing in qucftion feems to be
forgotten, or kept out of fight, in a darknefs
and unintelligiblenefs of fpeech ^ unlefs fuch an
objeclor would mean to contradict himfelf.—
The very act of volition itfelf is doubtlefs a de
termination of mind ; f. e. it is the mind's draw
ing up a conclufion, or coming to a choice be
tween two things, or more, propoted to it. But
determining among external objeffs of choice, is
not the fame with determining the aft of choice
itfelf, among various poflible acts of choice. —
The queftion is, What influences, directs, or de
termines the mind or will to come to fuch a
con-
Sect, II. Suppofed Evafions confidered.. 55
conclufion or choice as it does ? Or what is th^
caufe, ground or reafon, why it concludes thus,
and not otherwife ? Now it muil be anfwcred, ac
cording to the Armiman notion of freedom, that
the will influences, orders and determines itfelf
thus to a6t. And if it does, I fay, it mufl be
by fome antecedent aft. To fay, it is caufed, in
fluenced and determined by fomcthing, and yet
not determined by any thing antecedent, either in
order of time or nature, is a contradiction. For
that is what is meant by a thing's being prior in
the order of nature, that it is fome way the canfe
or reafon of the thing, with refpect to which it is
fa;d to be prior.
If the particular act or exertion of will, which
Comes into exiftence, be any thing properly de
termined at all, then it has fome caufe of its ex^
ifting, and of its exifting in fuch a particular de^
terminate manner, and not another ; fome caufe,
whofe influence decides the matter : which caufe is
diittnct from the effect, and prior to it. But to
fay, that the will or mind prders, influences and
determines itfelf to exert fuch an aft as it does,
by the very exertion itfelf, is to make the exertion
both caufe and effect ; or the exerting fuch an aft,
to be a caufe of the exertion of fuch an act. For
the queftion is, What is the caufe and reafon, of
the foul's exerting fuch an act ? To which the an*
fwer is, The foul everts fuch an act, and that is
the caufe of it. And fo, by this, the exertioit
muft be prior in the orcler of nature to itfelf, and
diftinct from itfelf.
(3.) If the meaning be, that the foul's exer*
tion of fuch a particular act of will, is a thing
that comes to pafs of itfelf, without any caufe ;
and that there is abfolutely no ground or reafon
£4 .r
t;6 Suppofed Evafions considered. Part II.
of the foul's being; determined to exert fuch a
CD
volition, and make fuch a choice, rather than
another, I fay, if this be the meaning of Armi-
wans, when they contend fo earneftly for the will's
determining its own acts, and for liberty of wilt
confiding in felf-determining power; they do no
thing but confound themfelves and others with
words without a meaning. In the queftion, mat-
determines the will ? and in their aniwer, that iher
will determines itfelf, and in all the difpute about
it, it feerns to be taken for granted, that fome-
thing determines the will •, and the controverfy
on this head is not, whether any thing at all de
termines it, or whether its determination has any
caufe or foundation at all : but where the foun
dation of it is, whether in the will itfelf, or fome-
where elfe. But if the thing intended be what
is above-mentioned, then all comes to this, that
nothing at all determines the will •, volition hav
ing absolutely no caufe or foundation of its ex-
iftence, either within, or without. There is a
great noife made about felf-determining power,
as the fource of all free acts of the will : but
when the matter comes to be explained, the mean
ing is, that no power at all is the fource of thefe
acts, neither felf-determining power, nor any other,
but they arile from nothing ; no caufe, no power,
no influence, being at all concerned in the matter.
However, this very thing, -even that the free
acts of the will are events which come to pals
.without a caufe, is certainly implied in the /fr-
minian notion of liberty of will ; though it be
very inconfiflent with many other things in their
fchcme', and repugnant to fome things implied
in their notion of liberty. Their opinion im
plies, that the particular determination of voli
tion
Sea. III. No Event without a Caufe. 57
tion is without any caufe -, becaufe they hold the
free acts of the will to be contingent events ; and
contingence is effential to freedom in their no^
tion of it. But certainly, thole things which have
a prior ground and reafon of their particular
exiftence, a caufe which antecedently determines
them to be, and determines them to be juft as
they are, do not happen contingently. If fome-
thing foregoing, by a caufal influence and con
nection, determines and fixes precifely their com
ing to pals, and the manner of it, then it does not
remain a contingent thing whether they mall come
to pafs or no.
And becaufe it is a queftion, in many refpecls,
very important in this controverfy about the free
dom of will, whether the free acts of the will are
events which come to pajs without a cauje? I mail
be particular in examining this point in the two
following lections.
SECTION III.
Whether any Event whatfoever, and Volition In
particular^ can come to pafs without a Caufe of
its exiftence.
BEFORE I enter on any argument on this
fubject, I would explain how I would be
imderflood, when I ufe the word Caufe in this
difcourfe : fince, for want of a better word, I
ihall have occafion to ufe it in a fenie which is
itiore extenfive, than that in which it is fometimes
ufed. The word is often ufed in fo retrained a
fenfe as to fignify only that which has a pofitive
efficiency or influence to produce a 'thing, or bring it
to pals. But there are many things which have
no
5 8 No Event without a Caufe. Part II,
no fuch poiitive productive influence j which yet
are Caufes in that refpect, that they have truly
the nature of a ground or reafon why fbme
things are, rather than others •, or why they are
as they are, rather than otherwife. Thus the
abfence of the fun in the night, is not the Caufe
of the falling of the dew at that time, in the
fame manner as its beams are the Caufe of the
afccnding of the vapours in the day-time ; and
its withdrawment in the winter, is not in the
fame manner the Caufe of the freezing of the
waters, as its approach in the fpring is the
caufe of their thawing. But yet the withdraw
ment or abfence of the fun is an antecedent,
v/ith which thefe effects in the night and winter
are connected, and on which they depend-, and
is one thing that belongs to the ground and
reafon why they come to pafs at that time, ra
ther than at other times ; though the abfence of
the fun is nothing poiitive, nor has any pofitive
influence.
It may b$ further obferved, that when I fpeak
of connexion of Caufes and Effeffs^ I have refpe£t
to moral Caufes, as well as thofe that are called
natural in diftin&ion from them. Moral Caufes
may be Caufes in, as proper a fenfe, as any Caufes
whatsoever ; may have as real an influence, and
may as truly be the ground and reafon of an
Event's coming to pafs.
Therefore I fometimes ufe the word Caufe, in
this enquiry, to iignify any antecedent, .either na
tural or moral, pofitive or negative, on which an
Event, either a thing, or the manner and cir-
cumllance of a thing, fo depends, that it is the
ground and reafon, either in whole, or in part,
why it is, rather than not ; or why it is as it is,
rather
Sect. III. No Event without a Caufc. 59
rather than otherwife ; or, in other words, any
antecedent with which a confequent Event is io
connected, that it truly belongs to the reaibn why
the proportion which affirms that Event, is true ;
.whether it has any pofuive influence, or not. And
in an agreablenefs to this, I fometimes ufe the
word effect for the confequence of another thing,
\vhich is perhaps rather an occafion than a Caufe,
moil properly fpeaking.
I am the more careful thus to explain my mean
ing, that I may cut off occafion, from any that
might feek occafion to cavil and object againfl
fome things which I may fay concerning the de
pendence of all things which come to pafs, on
ibme Caufe, and their connection with their Caufe.
Having thus explained what I mean by Caufe*
1 afiert, that nothing ever comes to pafs without
a Caufe. What is felf-exiftent mufl be from
eternity, and mufl be unchangeable : but as to
all things that begin to loc^ they are not felf-ex
iftent, and therefore mull have fome foundation
of their exiflence without themfelves.- That
\vhatfoever begins to be, which before was not,
mufl have a Caufe why it then begins to exift,
feems to be the firft didlate of the common and
natural fenfe which God hath implanted in the
minds of all mankind, and the main foundation
of all our rcafonings about the exiflence of things,
pad, prefent, or to come.
And this dictate of common fenfe equally re-
fpects fubftances and modes, or things and the
manner and circumftances of things. Thus,
if we fee a body which has hitherto been at reft,
ilart out of a ilate of reft, and begin to move,
we do as naturally and necefiarily fuppofe there is
fome
60 No Event without a Caufe. Part II.
fome Caufe or reafon of this new mode of exift-
ence, as of the exigence of a body itfelf which had
hitherto not exifted. And fo if a body, which
had hitherto moved in a certain direction, fhould
fuddenly change the direction of its motion ; or
if it fhould put off its old figure, and take a new
one^ or change its colour : the beginning of thefe
new modes is a new Event, and the mind of man
kind necefTarily fuppofes that there is fame Caufe
or reafon of them.
If this grand principle of common fenfe be
taken away, all arguing from effects to Caufes
ceafeth, and fo all knowledge of any exigence,
befides what we have by the moft direct and im
mediate intuition. Particularly all our proof of
the being of God ceafes : we argue His being
from our own 'being, and the being of other-
things, which we are fenfible once were not, but
have begun to be-, and from the being of the
"world, with all its conflituent parts, and the
manner of their exigence -, all which we fee plain
ly are not neceffary in their own nature, and fo
rot felf-cxiftent, and therefore muft have a Caufe.
But if things, not in themfelves neceflary, may
begin to be withont a Caufe, all this arguing is
vain.
Indeed, I will not affirm, that there is in the
nature of things no foundation for the know
ledge of the Being of God without any evidence
of It from His works. I do fuppofe there is a
great abfurdity, in the nature of things funply
considered, in fuppofing that there fhould be no
God, or in denying Being in general, and fup-
pofing an eternal, abfolute, univerfal nothing :
and therefore that here would be foundation of
intuitive evidence that it cannot be, and that
eternal
Ssct. III. No Event without a Cauft. 61
eternal infinite moft perfect Being miiit be ; if we
had ftrength and comprehenfion of mind fuffi-
cient, to have a clear idea of general and univer-
fal Being, or, which is the fame thing, of the
infinite, eternal, moft perfect Divine Nature and
EfTence. But then we ihould not properly come
to the knowledge of the Being of God by arguing ;
but our evidence would be intuitive : we fhouici
fee it, as we fee other things that are neceifary in
therrifelves, the contraries of which are in their
o\vn nature abfurd and contradictory ; as we fee
that twice two is four ; and as we fee that a circle
has no angles. If we had as clear an idea of
univerfal infinite entity, as we have of thefe other
things, I fuppofe we ihould molt intuitively fee
the abfurdity of fuppofmg fuch Being not to be ;
ihould immediately fee there is no room for the
queition, whether it is poflible that Being, in the
mod general abflraclcd notion of it, ihould not
be. But we have not that fTrength and extent
of mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive
independent manner : but the way that mankind
come to the knowledge of the Being of God, is
that which the apoflle fpcaks of, Rom. L 20..
The inviltble things of Him, from the creation of the
world, are clearly feen ; being under flood by the things.
that are made -9 even bis eternal Power and Godhead.
We firft afcend, and prove a pofteriori* or from
effects, that there mult be an eternal Caufe ; and
then fecondly, prove by argumentation, not in
tuition, that this Being mull be neceifarily exiftent;
and then thirdly, from the proved neccility of his
exiftence, we may defend, and prove many of his.
perfections a priori.
But if once this grand principle of common
fenie be given up, that 'what- is not neceffary in it-
Jelf9 mitft bwe a Caufe -9 and we bcgia to maintain,
that
6z No Event without a Caufe. Part II,
that things may come into exiftence, and begin
to be, which heretofore have not been, of them-
felves, without any caufe ; all our means of af-
cending in our arguing from the creature to the
Creator, and all our evidence of the Being of God,
is cut off at one blow. In this cafe, we cannot
prove that there is a God, either from the Being
of the world, and the creatures in it, or from
the manner of their being, their order, beauty
and life. For if things may eome into exigence
without any Caufe at all, then they doubtlefs may
without any Caufe anfwerable to the effect. Our
minds do alike naturally fuppofe and determine
both thefe things ; namely, that what begins to
be has a Caufe, and alfo that it has a Caufe pro
portionable and agreable to the effect. The fame
principle which leads us to determine, that there
cannot be any thing coming to pafs without a
Caufe, leads us to determine that there cannot be
more in the effect than in the Caufe.
Yea, if once it fliould be allowed, that things
may come to pafs without a Caufe, we mould not
only have no proof of the Being of God, but we
fhould be without evidence of the exiftence of
any thing whatfoever, but our own immediately
prefect ideas and confcioufnefs. For we have no
way to prove any thing elfe, but by arguing
from effects to Caufes : from the ideas now im
mediately in vie\v, we argue other things not
immediately in view : from fenfations now ex
cited in us, we infer the exiftence of things with
out us, as the Caufes of thefe fenfations : and
frcm the exiftence of thefe things, we argue
other things, which they depend on, as effects
on Caufes. We infer the paft exiftence of our-
felves, or any thing elfe, by memory ; only as
v/e argue, that the ideas, which are now m our
minds,
Sect. III. No Event without a Caufe. 6$
minds, are the confequences of pail ideas and
fenfations. We immediately perceive nothing
elfe but the ideas which are this moment extant
in our minds. We perceive or know other things
only by means of thefe, as neceffarily connected
with others, and dependent on them. But if
things may be without Caufes, all this neceirary
connection and dependence is diflblved, and ib
all means of our knowledge is gone. If there be
no abfurdity or difficulty in fuppofing one thing
to ftart out of non-exiftence, into being, of itfelf
without a Caufe ; then there is no abfurdity or
difficulty in fuppofing the fame of millions of mil
lions. For nothing, or no difficulty multiplied,
itill is nothing, or no difficulty : nothing multi
plied by nothing, don't increafe the fum.
And indeed, according to the hypothecs I am
oppoiing, of the acts of the will coming to pals
without a Caufe, it is the cafe in fact, that mil
lions of millions of Events are continually com
ing into exigence contingently^ without any Caufe
or reafon why they do fo, all over the world, every
day and hour, through all ages. So it is in a
conftant fucceflion, in every moral agent. This
contingency, this efficient nothing, this effectual
No-Caufe, is always ready at hand, to produce
this fort of effects, as long as the agent exiils, and
as often as he has occafion.
If it were fo, that things only of one kind,
viz. acts of the will, feemed to come to pafs of
themfelves ; but thofe of this fort in general
came into being thus ; and it were an event that
was continual, and that happened in a courfe,
wherever were capable fubjects of fuch events ;
this very tiling would demonftrate that there was
ibme Caufe of them, which made fuch a difference
be-
64 AT0 Event without a Caufe. Part II.
between this Event and others, and that they did
not really happen contingently. For contingence
is blind, and does not pick and chule for a par
ticular fort of Events. Nothing has no choice.
This No-Caufe, which caufes no exiftence, cannot
caufe the exigence which comes to pafs, to be of
one particular fort only, diftinguifhed from all
others. Thus, that only one fort of matter drops
out of the heavens, even water, and that this
comes fo often, fo conftantly and plentifully, all
over the world, in all ages, Ihows that there is
fome Caufe or Reafon of the falling of water out
of the heavens ; and that fomething befides meer
contingence has a hand in the matter.
If we (honld fuppofe Non-entity to be about to
bring forth ; and things were coming into exig
ence, without any Caui-e or Antecedent, on which
the exiftence, or kind, or manner of exigence
depends ; or which could at all determine whether
the things mould be ; ilones, or flars, or beafts,
or angels, or human bodies, or fouls, or only fome
new motion or figure in natural bodies, or fome
new fenfations in animals, or new ideas in the hu
man underftanding, or new volitions in the will ;
or any thing elfe of all the infinite number of poi-
fibles 3 then certainly it would not be expected,
although many millions of millions of things
arc coming into exiftence in this manner, all over
the face of the earth, that they ihould all be only
of one particular kind, and that it Ihould be
thus in all ages, and that this ibrt of exiftences
Ihould never fail to come to pafs where there is
room for them, or a fubjecl: capable of them, and
that conilantly, whenever there is occafion for
them.
If
Sect. III. No Event without a Caufe. 65
If any fhould imagine, there is fomething in the
fort of Event that renders it poffible for it to
come into exiftence without a Caufe, and fhould
fay, that the free acts of the will are exiftences of
an exceeding different nature from other things;
by reafon of which they may come into exiftence
without any previous ground or reafon of it, tho*
other things cannot} if they make this objection,
in good earneft, it would be an evidence of their
ftrangely forgetting themfelves : for they would
be giving an account of fome ground of the ex
iftence of a thing, when at the fame time they
would maintain there is no ground of its ex
iftence. Therefore I would obferve, that the
particular nature of exiftence, be it never fo
diverfe from others, can lay no foundation for
that thing's coming into exiftence without a
Caufe ; becaufe to fuppofe this, would be to
fuppofe the particular nature of exiftence to be
a thing prior to the exiftence ; and fo a thing
which makes v/ay for exiftence, with fuch a cir-
cumftance, namely, without a caufe or reafon of
exiftence. But that which in any refpect makes
way for a thing's coming into being, or for any
manner or circumftance of its firft exiftence, mull
be prior to the exiftence. The diftinguifhed na
ture of the effect, which is fomething belonging
to the effect, cannot have influence backward^
to act before it is. The peculiar nature of that
thing called volition, can do nothing, can have
no influence, while it is not. And afterwards it
is too late for its influence : for then the thing
has made fure of exiftence already, without its
help.
So that it is indeed as repugnant to reafon, to
fuppofe that an act of the will Ihould come into
exiftence without a caufe, as to fnppofe the hu-
F man
66 Volition not without a Caufe. Part It*
man foul, or an angel, or the globe of the
earth, or the whole univejie, fhould come into
exigence without a caufe. And if once we allow^
that fuch a fort of effect as a Volition may come
to pafs without a Caufe, how do we know but
that many other forts of effects may do fo too ?
It is not the particular kind of effecl: that makes
the abfurdity of fuppofing it has being without
a Caufe, but fomething which is common to all
things that ever begin to be, viz. That they are
not felf-exiftent, or neceiFary in the nature of,
things.
SECTION
Whether Volition tan arife without a Caufe -, through
the Activity of the Nature of the Soul.
TH E author of the Effay on the Freedom of the
Will in God and the Creatures^ in anfwer to
that objection againft his doctrine of a felf-deter-
mining power in the will, (p. 68, 69.) fhat no
thing is, or comes to pafs, without a fujficient reafon
why it is, and why it is in this manner rather than
another, allows that it is thus in corporeal things,
which are, properly and philofophically /peaking, paf-
five leing ; but denies that it is thus in fpirits,
which are leings of an active nature, who have the
fpring of aftion within themfelves, and can determine
thanfelves. By which it is plainly fuppofed, that
fuch an event as an act of the will, may come to
pafs in a fpirir, without a fufficierit reafon why it
comes to pafs, or why it is after this manner,
rather than another -, by reafon of the activity of
the nature of a ipirit.— -— But certainly this au*
thor,
Se&. IV. Volition not without a Caufi. 6?
thor, in this matter, mufl be very unwary and
inadvertent. For,
1. The objection or difficulty propofed by this
author, feems to be forgotten in his anfwer or
iblution. The very difficulty, as he himfelf pro-
pofes it, is this ; How an event can come to pafs
without a fufficient reafon why if i$, or why it is in
this manner rather than another ? Inftead of folv-
ing this difficulty, or anfwering this quefu'on with
regard to Volition, as he propofes, he forgets
himfelf, and anfwers another queilion quite di-
verfe, and wholly inconfiftent with this, viz. What
is a fufFicient reafon why it is, and why it is in
this manner rather than another ? And he affigns
the active being's own determination as the Caufe,
and a Caufe fufficient for the effect ; and leaves
all the difficulty unrefolved, and the queflion un-
anfwered, which yet returns, even, How the
foul's own determination, which he fpeaks of^
came to exift, and to be what it was without a
Caufe ? The activity of the foul may enable it to
be the Caufe of effects ; but it does not at all en
able or help it to be the fubject of effects which
have no Caufe; which is the thing this author
fuppofes concerning acts of the will. Activity of
nature will no more enable a being to produce
effects, and determine the manner of their exi-
itence, within itfelf, without a Caufe, than out of
itfelf, in fome other being. But if an active be
ing fhould, through its activity, produce and de
termine an effect in fome external object, how
abfurd would it be to fay, that the effect was pro
duced without a Caufe !
2. The queftion is not fo much, How a fpirrt
endowed with activity comes to act, as why it
exerts fuch an act, and not another ; or why it
F 2 act*
68 Volition not without a Caufe. Part II.
acts with fuch a particular determination ? If ac
tivity of nature be the Caufe why a fpirit (the foul
of man for inftance) acts, and does not lie Hill ;
yet that alone is not the Caufe why its action is
thus and thus limited, directed and determined.
Adtive nature is a general thing ; it is an ability
or tendency of nature to action, generally taken -,
which may be a Caufe why the foul acts as occa-
fion or reafon is given ; but this alone cannot be
a fufficient Caufe why the foul exerts fuch a par
ticular act, at fuch a time, rather than others.
In order to this, there mud be fomething befides
a general tendency to action ; there mult alfo be
a particular tendency to that individual action.—
If it fliould be afked, why the foul of man ufes
its activity in fuch a manner as it does ; and it
Ihould be anfwered, that the foul ufes its activity
thus, rather than otherwife, becaufe it has acti
vity ; would fuch an anfwer fatisfy a rational
man ? Would it not rather be looked upon as a
very impertinent one ?
3. An active being can bring no effects to pafs
by his activity, but what are confequent upon his
acting : he produces nothing by his activity, any
other way than by the exercife of his activity,
and fo nothing but the fruits of its exercife :
he brings nothing to pafs by a dormant adlivity.
But the exercife of his activity is action ; and
ib his action, or exercife of his activity, muft
be prior to the effects of his activity. If an
active being produces an effect in another being,
about which his activity is converfant, -the effect
being the fruit of his activity, his activity muft
be rirft exercifed or exerted, and the effect of it
muft follow. So it muft be, with equal reafon,
if the aclive being is his own object, and his
activity is converiant about himfelf, to produce
and
Sect. IV. Volition not without a Cattfcl €9
and determine fome effect in himfclf; {till the
cxercife of his activity muft go before the ef
fect, which he brings to pafs and determines by-
it. And therefore his activity cannot be the
Caufe of the determination of the firft action, or
exercife of activity itfelf, whence the effects of
activity arife ; for that would imply a contra
diction ; it would be to fay, the firft exercife of
activity is before the firft exercife of activity, and
is the Caufe of it.
4. That the foul, though an active fubftance,
cannot diverfify its own acts, but by firft acting •
or be a determining Caufe of different acts, or any
different effects, fometimes of one kind, and
fometimes of another, any other way than in
confequence of its own diverfe acts, is manifeft
by this ; that if fo, then the fome Caufe, the fame
caufal Power, Force or Influence, without vari
ation in any refpeft, would produce different effects
at different times. For the fame fubiiance of the
foul before it acts, and the fame active nature of
the foul before it is exerted (i. e. before in the
order of nature) would be the Caufe of different
effects, viz. Different Volitions at different times.
But the fubftance of the foul before it acts, and
its active nature before it is exerted, are the fame
without variation. For it is fome act that makes
the firfl variation in the Caufe, as to any caufal
exertion, force or influence. But if it be fo,
that the foul has no different caufality, or diverfe
caufal force or influence, in producing thefe di
verfe effects ; then it is evident, that the foul has
no influence, no hand in the diverfity of the ef
fect ; and that the difference of the effect cannot
be owing to any thing in the foul ; or which is
the fame thing, the foul does not determine the
diverfity of the effect ; which is contrary to the
F 3 fnp-
*ro Volition not ivitKoyt a Caufe. Part II.
fuppofition. — It is true, the fubftance-of the foul
before it acts, and before there is any difference
in that refpect, may be in a, different ftate and
circumftances : but thcfe whom I oppofe, will
not allow the different circumilances of the foul
to be the determining Caufes of the acts of the
will ; as being contrary to their notion of felf-de-
termination and felf-motion.
5. Let us fnppofe, as thefe divines do, that
there are no acts of the foul, ftrictly fpeaking,
but free Volitions ; then it -will follow, that the
foul is an active being in nothing further than it
is a voluntary or elective being ; and whenever it
produces effects actively, it produces effects vo
luntarily and elect ively. But to produce effects
thus, is the fame thing as to produce effects in
confequence of, and according tQ its own choice.
And if fo, then furely the foul does not by its ac
tivity produce all its own afts of will or choice
themfelves : for this, by the fuppofltion, is to
produce all its free acts of choice voluntarily and
electively, or in confequence of its own free acts
of choice, which brings the matter directly to the
fore - mentioned contradiction, of a free act of
choice before the firft free act of choice. — Ac
cording to thefe gentlemen's own notion of ac
tion, if there arifes in the mind a Volition with
out a free act of the will or choice to determine
and produce it, the mind is not the active volun
tary Caufe of that Volition •, becaufe it does not
arife from, nor is regulated by choice or defign,
And therefore it cannot be, that the mincl fliould
be the active, voluntary, determining Caufe of the
firft and leading Volition that relates to the affair,
• — -The mind's being a defigmng Caufe, only enables
it to produce effects in cqrifequence of its defign ;
it wrill not enable it to be the defigmng Caufe of
all
Sect. IV, Volition not Without a Caufe. 71
all its own defigns. The mind's being an ekftive
Caufe, will only enable it to produce effects in
confequence of its ejections, and according to them;
but cannot enable it to be the elective Caufe of
all its own elections ; becaufe that fuppofes an
election before the firfl election. So' the mind's
being an aftive Caufe enables it to produce effects
in confequence of its own afts, but cannot enable
it to be the determining Caufe of all its own afts ;
for that is Hill in the fame manner a contradic
tion ; as it fuppofes a determining act conver-
fant about the firfl act, and prior to it, having a
caufal influence on its exiftence, and manner of
exifience,
I can conceive of nothing elfe that can be meant
by the foul's having power to caule and determine
its own Volitions, as a being to whom God has
given a power of action, but this ; that God has
given power to the foul, fometimes at leail, to ex
cite Volitions at its pleafure, or according as it
chufes. And this certainly fuppofes, in all fiich,
cafes, a choice preceding all Volitions which are
thus caufed, even the firfl of them. Which runs,
into the fore- mentioned great abfurdity.
Therefore the activity of the nature of the foul
affords no relief from the difficulties which the
notion of a felf-determining power in the will is
attended with, nor will it help, in the lead, its,
abfurdities and inconfiflences,
F 4 SECTION
SECTION V.
S&ewtng, that if the things offer ted in thefe
Jhould be fufpofed to be true^ they are altogether
impertinent y and cannot help the caufe 0/ Arminian
Liberty, and how (this being the ft ale of the
cafe) Arminian Writers are obliged to talk ineon-
Jijlently.
WH AT was laft obferved in the preceding
fection may fliew, not only that the aclive
nature ot the foul cannot be a reafon why an act
of the will is, or why it is in this manner, rather
than another ; but alib that if it could be fo, and
it could be proved that volitions are contingent
events, in that fenfe, that their being and man
ner of being is not fixed or determined by any
caufe, or any thing' antecedent -, it would not at
all ferve the purpofe of Arminians^ to eftablilh the
Freedom of the Will, according to their notion
of its freedom, as conflicting in the will's deter
mination ofitfelf; which fuppofes every free acl
of the will to be determined by fome acl: of the
will going before to determine it ; inafmuch as
for the will to determine a thing, is the fame as
for the foul to determine a thing by 'willing ; and
there is no way that the will can determine an
a£l of the will, than by willing that acl: of the
will, or, which is the fame thing, chufmg it. So
that here muft be two afts of the will in the
cafe, one going before another, one converfant
about the other, and the latter the object of the
former, and chofen by the former. If the will
does not caufe and determine the a6l by choice, it
does not caufe or determine it at all ; for that which
\ is
Seft. V. Tbefe Evafiotts impertinent. 73
is not determined by choice, is not determined
voluntarily or willingly : and to fay, that the will
determines fomething which the foul does not de
termine willingly, is as much as to fay, that
fomething is done by the will, which the foul doth
not with its will.
So that if Arminian liberty of will, confiding
in the will's determining its own ads, be main
tained, the old abfurdity and contradiction mufl
be maintained, that every free act of will is
caufed and determined by a foregoing free act of
will. Which doth not confift with the free acts
arifing without any caufe, and being fo contingent,
as not to be fixed by any thing foregoing. So
that this evafion muft be given up, as not at all
relieving, and as that which, inftead of fupport*
ing this fort of liberty, directly deflroys it.
And if it fhould be fuppofed, that the foul de
termines its own1 acts of will fome other way,
than by a foregoing act of will ; flill it will not
help the caufe of their liberty of will. If it de
termines them by an act of the underftanding,
or fome other power, then the will does not deter
mine itfelf\ and fo the f elf -determining power of
the will is given up. And what liberty is there
exercifed according to their own opinion of 1U
berty, by the foul's being determined by fome
thing beiides its ozvn choice ? The acts of the will,
it is true, may be directed, and effectually deter
mined and fixed ; but it is not done by the foul's
own will and pleafure : there is no exercife at all
of choice or will in producing the effect : and if
tvill and choice are not exercifed in it, how is
the liberty of the will exercifed in it ?
So
74 Thefe Eva/ions impertinent. Part II*
So that let Arminlam turn which way they
pleafe with their notion of liberty, confifting in
the will's determining its own acts, their no
tion deilroys itfelf. If they hold every free aft
of will to be determined by the foul's own free
choice, or foregoing free act of will ; foregoing,
either in the order of time, or nature; it im
plies that grofs contradiction, that the firft free
act belonging to the affair, is determined by a
free act which is before it. Or if they fay that
'the free acts of the will are determined by fome
otbcr aci of the foul, and not an act of will or
choice. This alfo deftroys their notion of li
berty confilting in the acts of the will being
•determined by the will itfelf; or if they hold that
the acts of the will are determined by nothing at
all that is prior to them, but that they are con
tingent, in that fenfe, that they are determined and
fixed by no caufe at all ; this alfo deftroys their
notion of liberty, coniifling in the will's deter
mining its own acts.
This being the true ftate of the Armiman no
tion of liberty, it hence comes to pals, that the
writer^ that clefend it are forced into grofs incon-
fiftences, in what they fay upon this fubject. To
inftance in Dr. Wbltly \ he in his difcourfe on the
freedom of the will, * oppofes the opinion of
the Cahiniftsi who place man's liberty only in a
'power of doing what be will, as that wherein they
plainly agree with Mr. Holies. And yet he him-
lelf mentions the very fame notion of liberty*
as the dictate of ib$ fenfe and common re of on of.
mankind, and a rule laid down by tbe ligfit of na
ture ; viz. that liberty is a power of a&ing from,
curfehes, or DOING WHAT WE WILL, f This
* In his Book on the five Points, S?cpnd Edit. p. 350,
351, 352. f Ibid. p. 325, 326,
Sect. V. Arminians talk inconfiftently. 73
is indeed, as he fays, a thing agreable to the
fenfe and common reafon of mankind ; and therefore
it is not fo much to be wondered at, that he un
awares acknowledges it againft himfelf : for if
liberty does not confiit in this, what elfe can be
devifed that it mould confiil in ? if it be faid, as
Dr. Whitly elfewhere infills, that it does not only
confift in liberty of doing what we will, but alfo
a liberty of willing without neceflity ; flill the
queflion returns, what does that liberty of wil
ling without neceflity confift in, but in a power
of willing as we pkafe, without being impeded
by a contrary neceflity ? or in other words, a li
berty for the foul in its willing to acl: according to
its ozvn choice? Yea, this very thing the fame
author feems to allow, and fuppofe again and
again, in the ufe he makes of fayings of the
Fathers, whom he quotes as his vouchers. Thus
he cites the words of Origen, which he produces
as a teflimony on his fide ; * The foul afts bv
HER OWN CHOICE, and it is free for her to in
cline to whatever fart SHE WILL. And thofe
words of Jujlin Martyr; f the doctrine of the
Cbrijlians is this, that nothing is done jzr fuffered ac
cording to fate, but that every man doth good or evil
ACCORDING TO HIS OWN FREE CHOICE.
And from Eufebius, thefe words ; £ If fate be
ejlablijhed, philofophy and piety are overthrown. —
All thefe things depending upon the necejjity introduced
by the Jlars, and not upon meditation and exercife
PROCEEDING FROM OUR OJVN FREE
CHOICE. And again, the words of Mace anus ;
|| God9 to preferve the liberty of man's will, fuffered
their bodies to die, that it might be IN THEIR
CHOICE to turn to good or evil. 'Tbey who are
afted by the Holy Spirit, are not held under any ne-
* In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 342.
t Ibid. p. 360, J Ibid. p. 363. |J Ibid. 369, 370.
ceffity,
76 Arminians talk inconfiftently. Part II.
ceffityy lut have liberty to turn themfelves^ and DO
WHAT: THEY WILL in MS life.
Thus, the doctor in effect comes into that very
notion of liberty, which the Calvinifts have ;
which he at the fame time condemns, as agree
ing with the opinion of Mr. Hobbes, namely,
the foul's afting by its own choice, men's doing
good or evil according to their own free choice^ their
being in that ex er rife which proceeds from their own
free choice, having it in their choice to turn to good
or evil, and doing what they will. So that if men
exercife this liberty in the acts of the will them-
felves, it muft be in exerting acts of will as they
will, or according to their own free choice ; or ex
erting acts of will that proceed from their choice.
And if it be fo, then let every one judge whether
this does not fuppofe a free choice going before
the free act of will, or whether an act of choice
does not go before that act of the will which pro
ceeds from it. And if it be thus with all free acts
of the will, then let every one judge, whether it
will not follow that there is a free choice or will
going before the Hrft free act of the will exerted
in the cafe. And then let every one judge, whe
ther this be not a contradiction. And finally,
let every one judge whether in the fcheme of thefe
writers there be any pofiibilhy of avoiding thefe
abfurditics.
If liberty confifts, as Dr. IVhitby himfclf fays,
in a man's doing what be will ; and a man exer-
cifes this liberty, not only in external actions,
but in the acts of the will themfelves ; then fo
far as liberty is exercifcd in the latter, it confifts
in willing what h wills : and if any lay fo, one
of thefe two things muft be meant, either, i. That
a man has power to will, as he does will -, becaufe
what-
Sect. V. Arminians talk inconfiftently. 77
what he wills, he wills ; and therefore has power
to will what he has power to will. If this be their
meaning, then all this mighty controverfy about
freedom of the will and felf-determining power,
comes wholly to nothing ; all that is contended
for being no more than this, that the mind of
man does what it does, and is the fubject of what
it is the fubject of, or that what is, is ; wherein
none has any controverfy with them. Or, 2. The
meaning muft be, that a man has power to will
as he pleafes or chufes to will : that is, he has
power by one act of choice, to chufe another ;
by an antecedent act of will to chute a confequenc
act ; and therein to execute his own choice.
And if this be their meaning, it is nothing but
fhuffling with thofe they difpute with, and baffling
their own reafon. For ftill the queftion returns,
wherein lies man's liberty in that antecedent act
of will which chofe the confequent act. The an-
fwer according to the fame principles muft be,
that his liberty in this alio lies in his willing as
he would, or as he chofe, or agreable to another
act of choice preceding that. And fo the queftion
returns in mfinitum^ and the like anfwer muft be
made in infinitum : in order to fupport their opi
nion, there muft be no beginning, but free acts
of will muft have been chofen by foregoing free
afts of will in the foul of every man, without be
ginning ; and fo before he had a being, from all
eternity.
SECTION
SECTION VL
Concerning tbe WiWs determining in Things ivbicb
are perfeftly indifferent, 'in tbe View of tbe
Mind.
A Great argument for felf-deter mining power,
is the luppofed experience we univerfally
have of an ability to determine our Wills, in
cafes wherein no prevailing motive is prefented :
the Will (as is fuppofed) has its choice to make
between two or more things, that are perfectly
equal in the view of the mind ; and the Will is
apparently altogether indifferent ; and yet we find
no difficulty in coming to a choice \ the Will
can inftantly determine itfelf to one, by a fove-
veign power which it has over itfelf* without be
ing moved by any preponderating inducement.
Thus the fore-mentioned author of an Effay on
tbe Freedom of tbe Will, &c. p. 25, 26, 27, fup-
poles, tc That there are many initances, wherein
" the Will is determined neither by prefent un-
" eafinefs, nor by the greateft apparent good, nor
" by the lait dictate of the underftanding, nor
" by any thing clie, but merely by itfelf, as a
" fovereign felf-determining power of the foul ;
" and that the foul does not will this or that
" action, in fome cafes, by any other influence
" but becaufe it will. Thus (fays he) I can turn
" my face to the South, or the North ; I can
" point with my finger upward, or downward. —
" And thus, in fome cafes, the Will determines
" itfelf in a very fovereign manner, becaufe it
" will, without a realbn borrowed from the un-
*' derftanding : and hereby it difcovers its own
" perfecl: power of choice, rifing from within it-
Sect. VI. Ofchifingin Things indifferent: 79
" felf, and free from all influence or re it rain t of
*c any kind/' And in pages 66, 70, and 73, 74,
this author very exprefsly fuppofes the Will in
many cafes to be determined by no motive at all,
and afts altogether without motive, or ground of
preference* — Here I would obferve,
i. The very fnppofition which is here made,
directly contradicts and overthrows itfelf. For
the thing fuppofed, wherein this grand argument
confiils, is, that among feveral things the Will
actually chufes one before another, at the fame
time that it is perfectly indifferent ; which is the
very fame thing as to fay, the mind has a pre
ference, at the fame time that it has no prefe
rence. What is meant cannot be, that the mind
is indifferent before it comes to have a choice, or
until it has a preference •, or, which is the fame
thing, that the mind is indifferent until it comes,
to be not indifferent. For certainly this author
did not fuppofe he had a controverfy with any
perfon in fuppofing this. And then it is nothing
to his purpoie, that the mind which chufes, was
indifferent once -, unlefs it chufes, remaining in
different •, for otherwife, it does not chufe at all
in that cafe of indifference, concerning which is
all the queftion. Befides, it appears in fact, that
the thing which this author fuppofes, is not that
the Will chufes one thing before another, con
cerning which it is indifferent before it chufes ; but
alfo is indifferent when it chufes ; and that its be
ing otherwife than indifferent is not until after
wards, in confequence of its choice ; that the cho-
fen thing's appearing preferable and more agreable
than another, arifes from its choice already made.
His words are (p. 30.) " Where the objects
" which are propofed, appear equally fit or good,
tc the Will is left without a guide or director ;
" and
66
*<
So Of chufing in Things indifferent. Part II.
and therefore muft take its own choice, by its
own determination j it being properly a felf-
determining power. And in fuch cafes the
will does as it were make a good to itfelf by
its own choice, i. e. creates its o\vn pleafure
" or delight in this felf-chofen good. Even as
" a man by feizing upon a fpot of unoccupied
" land, in an uninhabited country, makes it his
" own polfeffion and property, and as fuch re-
" joices in it. Where things wrere indifferent
" before, the will finds nothing to make them
" more agreable, confidered meerly in themfelves ;
" but the pleafure it feels ARISING FROM
« ITS OWN CHOICE, and its perfeverance
" therein. We love many things which we have
« chofen, AND PURELY BECAUSE WE
" CHOSE THEM."
This is as much as to fay, that we firft begin
to prefer many things, now ceafing any longer
to be indifferent with refpedt to them, purely be-
caufe we have preferred and chofen them before.
— Thefe things muft needs be fpoken inconfide-
rately by this author. Choice or preference can
not be before itfelf in the fame inftancc, either
in the order of time or nature : It cannot be the
foundation of itfelf, or the fruit or confequence
of itfelf. The very act of chufing one thing ra-
iherthan another, is preferring that thing, and that
is fetting a higher value on that thing. But that
the mind fcts an higher value on one thing than
another, is nor, in the firft place, the fruit of its
fetting a higher value on that thing.
This author fays, p. 36, " The will may be
" perfectly indifferent, and yet the will may dc-
" termine itfeif to chufe one or the other." And
again in the fame pase, u I a:n entirely in-
" different:
Sea. VI. Of the Will's determining, Sec." 8t
" different to either •, and yet my Will may de-
*€ termine itielf to chufe." And again, <c Which
" I fhall chufe mufl be determined by the meer
" ad of my Will." If the choice is determined
by a meer act of Will, then the choice is deter
mined by a meer act of choice. And concern
ing this matter, viz. That the act of the Will it
felf is determined by an ad of choice, this wri
ter is-exprefs, in page 72. Speaking of the cafe,
where there is no iuperior fitnefs in objects pre-
fented, he has thefe words ; " There it muft act
" by its own CHOICE, and determine itielf as
" it PLEASES/' Where it is fuppofed that the
very determination, which is the ground and fpring
of the Will's act, is an act of choice and pkafure>
wherein one act is more agreable, and the mind
better pleafed in it than another \ and this pre
ference, w\& fitperior pleafednefs is the ground of all
it does in the cafe. And if fo, the mind is not
indifferent when it determines itfelf, but had ra~
tber do one thing than another, had rather deter
mine itfelf one way than another. And therefore
the Will does not act at all in indifference ; not
fo much as in the firlt ftep it takes, or the firft
rife and beginning of its acting. If it be poffi-
bie for the underftanding to act in indifference,
yet to be fure the Will never does •, becaufe the.
Will's beginning to act is the very fame thing as
its beginning to chufe or prefer. And if in the
very firft act of the Will, the mind prefers fome-
thing, then the idea of that thing preferred, does
at that time preponderate, or prevail in the
mind : or, which is the fame thing, the idea of
it has a prevailing influence on the Will. So
that this wholly deitroys the thing fuppofed, viz.
That the mind can by a fovereign power chuic
one of two or mpre things, which in the view
ef the mind are, in every refpect, perfectly
G equal,
82 Of the Will's determining Part II.
equal, one of which does not at all preponderate,
nor has any prevailing influence on the mind above
another.
So that this author, in his grand argument for
the ability of the Will to chufe one of two, or
more things, concerning which it is perfectly in
different, does at the fame time, in effect, deny
the thing he fuppofes, and allows and afferts the
point he endeavours to overthrow 5 even that the
Will, in chufing, is fubject to no prevailing in
fluence of the idea, or view of the thing chofen.
And indeed it is impoffible to offer this argument
without overthrowing it* the thing fuppofed in
it being inconfiftent with itfelf, and that which
denies itfelf. To fuppofe the Will to act at all
in a ftate of perfect indifference, either to deter
mine itfelf, or to do any thing elfe, is to aiTert
that the mind chufes without chufing. To fay
that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleafes,
is to fay that it can follow its pleafure, when it
has no pleafure to follow. And therefore if there
be any difficulty in the inftances of two cakes, or
two eggs, &c. which are exactly alike, one as
good as another •, concerning which this author
fuppofes the mind in fact has a choice, and fo in
effect fuppofes that it has a preference ; it as much
concerned himfeif to folve the difficulty, as it does
ihofe whom he oppofes. For if thefe inftances
prove any thing to his purpofe, they prove that
a man chufes without choice. And yet this is
not to his purpofe j becaufe if this is what he
afferts, his own words are as much againft him,
and do as much contradict him, as the words of
thofe he difputes againft can do.
2. There
SecVVI. in Things indifferent. 83
2. There is no great difficulty in (hewing, in
fuch inftances as are alledged, not only that it
muft needs befo, that the mind muft be influenced
in its choice by fomething that has a preponde
rating influence upon it, but zlfobow it is fo. A
little attention to our own experience, and a di-
ftinct confideration of the ads of our own minds,
in fuch cafes, will be fufrkient to clear up the
matter.
Thus, fuppoiing I have a chefs-board before
me ; and becaufe I am required by a fuperior, or
defired by a friend, or to make fome experiment
concerning my own ability and liberty, or on
fome other confideration, I am determined to
touch fome one of the fpots or fquares on the
board with my finger; not being limited or di
rected in the firft propofal, or my own firft pur-
pofe, which is general, to any one in particular;
and there being nothing in the fquares in them-
ielves conlidered, that recommends any one of all
the nxty-four, more than another : in this cafe,
my mind determines to give itfeif up to what is
vulgarly called accident*, by determining to touch
that fquare which happens to be mod in viewr,
which my eye is efpecially upon at that moment,
or which happens to be then moft in my mind, or
which I mall be directed to by fome other fuch-
like accident. Here are feveral fteps of the
mind's proceeding (though all may be done as it
were in a moment) the firft fbep is its general de
termination that it will touch one of the fquares.
G 2 The
* I have elfewhere obferved what that is which is vulgarly
called accident ; that it is nothing akin to the Ar mini an meta-
physical notion of continence, iomething not conneded with
any thing foregoing ; but that it is fomething that comes to
pals in the courfe of things, in fome affair that men are con
cerned in, unforefeen, and not owing to their defign.
84 Of the Witts determining Part II.
The next ftep is another general determination to
give itfelf up to accident, in fome certain way ;
as to touch that which fhall be mod in the eye
or mind at that time, or to fome other fuch-like
accident. The third and laft ftep is a particular
determination to touch a certain individual .fpot,
even that fquare, which, by that fort of accident
the mind has pitched upon, has actually offered
itfelf beyond others. Now it is apparent that ia
rione of thefe feveral fteps does the mind proceed
in abfolute indifference, but in each of them* is
influenced by a preponderating inducement. So
it is in the frft ftep ; the mind's general deter
mination to touch one of the fixty-four fpots ;
the mind is not abfolutely indifferent whether it
does fo or no : it is induced to it, for the fake of
malting fome experiment, or by the defire of a
friend* or fome other motive that prevails* So
it is in the Jecond ftep> the mind's determining
to give itfelf up to accident, by touching that
which fhall be moil in the eye, or the idea of
which mall be moil prevalent in the mind, &c.
The mind is not abfolutely indifferent whether it
proceeds by this rule or no •, but chufes it be-
caufe it appears at that time a convenient and
requiiite expedient in order to fulfil the general
purpofe aforefaid. And fo it is in the third and
laft ftep, it is determining to touch that indivi
dual fpot which actually does prevail in the mind's
view. The mind is not indifferent concerning
this ; but is influenced by a prevailing induce
ment and reafon ; which is, that this is a profe-
cution of the preceding determination, which ap
peared requifite, and was fixed before in the fecond
ftep.
Accident will ever ferve a man, without hin
dering him a moment, in fuch a cafe. It will al-
2 wavs
Seft. VI. in Things indifferent. 85
ways be fo among a number of objects in view,
one will prevail in the eye, or in idea beyond
others. When we have our eyes open in the clear
fun-fhine, many objects ftri'kc the eye at once,
and innumerable images may be at once painted
in it by the rays of light •, but the attention of
the mind is not equal to feveral of them at once ;
or if it be, it does not continue fo for any time.
And fo it is with refpect to the ideas of the mind
in general : feveral ideas are not in equal ilrength
in the mind's view and notice at once ; or at leaft,
does not remain fo for any fenfible continuance.
There is nothing in the \vorld more conflantly
varying, than the ideas of the mind : they do not
remain precifely in the fame ftate for the leaft per
ceivable fpace of time : as is evident by this.
That all perceivable time is judged and perceived
by the mind only by the fuccelfion or the fuccef-
five changes of its own ideas. Therefore while
the views or perceptions of the mind remain pre
cifely in the fame ftate, there is no perceivable
fpace or length of time, becaufe no fenfible fuc-
ceflion at all.
As trie acts of the Will, in each ftep of th<$
fore-mentioned procedure, does not come to pafs
without a particular caule, every act is owing
to a prevailing inducement : fo the accident, as
J have called it, or that which happens in the
nnlearchable courfe of things, to which the mind
yields itfelf, and by which it is guided, is not any
thing that comes to pafs without a caufe ; and
the mind in derermining to be guidecf by it, is
not determined by fomething that has no caufe ;
any more than if it determined to be guided by a
lot, or the cafting of a die. For though the die's
falling in inch a manner be accidental to him that
cafts it, yet none will fuppofe that there is no
G 3 caufe
86 Of tie Will's, determining, &c. Part II.
caufe why it falls as it does. The involuntary
changes in the fucceffion of our ideas, though the
caufe may not be obferved, have as much a caufe,
as the changeable motions of the motes that float
in the air, or the continual, infinitely various,
fucceffive changes of the uneveneffes on the fur-
face of the water.
There are two things efpecially, which are
probably the occafions of confufion in the minds
of them who infift upon it, that the will ads in a
proper indifference, and without being moved by
any inducement, in its determinations in fuch cafes
as have been mentioned.
i . They feem to miflake the point in queflion,
or at leaft not to keep it diftinctly in view. The
queflion they difpute about, is, Whether the mind
be indifferent about the objefts prefented, one of
which is to be taken, touched, pointed to, &c. as
two eggs, two cakes, which appear equally good.
Whereas the queftion to be coniidered, is, Whe
ther the perfon be indifferent with refpect to his
own a&ions -9 whether he does not, on fome con-
fideration or other, prefer one act with refpect to
thefe objects before another. The mind in its deter
mination and choice, in thefe cafes, is not mod im
mediately and directly converfant about the objefts
frefented-y but tie atts to le done concerning thefe
objects. The objects may appear equal, and the
mind may never properly make any choice between
them : but the next act of the Will being about the
external actions to be performed, taking, touch
ing, &c. thefe may not appear equal, and one ac
tion may properly be chofen before another. In
each ftep of the mind's progrefs, the determination
is not about the objects, unlefs indirectly and im
properly, but about the actions, which it chufes for
other
§ect. VI. Of chufmg in Things indifferent. £7
other reafons than any preference of the objects,
and for reafons not taken at all from the objects.
There is no neceflity of fuppofmg, that the
mind does ever at all properly chufe one of the
objects before another ; either before it has taken,
or afterwards. Indeed the man chufes to take or
touch one rather than another ; but not becauie it
chufes the thing taken, or touched ; but from fo
reign confederations. The cafe may be fo, that
of two things offered, a man may, for certain,
reafons, chufe and prefer the taking of that which
he undervalues, and chufe to neglect to take that
which his mind prefers. In fuch a cafe, chufmg
the thing taken, and chufmg to take, are diverfe :
and fo they are in a cafe where the things pre-
fented are equal in the mind's efteem, and nei
ther of them preferred. All that fad and ex
perience mates evident, is, that the mind chufes
one action rather than another. And therefore
the arguments' which they bring, in order to be
to their purpofe, ought to be to prove that the
mind chufes the action in perfect indifference,,
with refpect to that action -, and not to prove that
the mind chufes the action in perfect indifference
with refpect to the object; which is very poflible,
and yet the will not act at all without prevalent:
inducement, and proper preponderation.
2. Another reafon of confufion and difHculcy
in this matter, feems to be, not diftinguifhing
between a general indifference, or an indifference
with refpect to what is to be done in a more di-
ftant and general view of it, and a particular in
difference, or an indifference with refpect to the
next immediate act, viewed with its particular
and prefent circumitances. A man may be per
fectly indifferent with refpect to his own aftions%
in
88 Of Liberty of Indifference. Part It
in the former refpect ; and yet not in the latter.
Thus, in the foregoing inftance of touching one
of the fqnares of a chefs-board ; when it is firft
propofed that I fliould touch one of them, I may
be perfectly indifferent which I touch \ becaufe as
yet I view the matter remotely and generally, be
ing but in the firft ftep of the mind's progrefs in
the affair. But yet, when I am actually come to
the laft ftep, and the very next thing to be deter
mined is which is to be touched, having already
determined that I will touch that which happens
to be moil in my eye or mind, and my mind be
ing now fixed on a particular one, the act of touch
ing that, confidered thus immediately, and in thefc
particular prefent circumftances, is not what my
mind is abfolutely indifferent about.
SECTION VIL
Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, confifllng
in Indifference.
WHAT has been faid in the foregoing fec-
tiop, has a tendency in fomc meafure to
evince the abfurdity of the opinion of fuch as
place Liberty in Indifference, or in that equili
brium whereby the Will is without all antecedent
determination or bias, and left hitherto free from
any prepofTefling inclination to one fide or the
other ; that the determination of the Will to ei
ther fide may be entirely from itfelf, and that it
may be owing only to its own power, and that
fovereignty which it has over itfclf, thit it goes
this way rather than that*.
But
* Dr. ffkitfy^ and Tome other Armenians* make a diftinc-
tion of different kinds of freedom j one of God, and per-
Sea. VII. Of Liberty of Indifference. 89
But in as much as this has been of fuch long
ftanding, and has been fo generally received, and
fb much infilled on by Pelanans, Semi-Pelagians 9
JeJuilSy Socinians, Arminians, and others, it may
deferve a more full confederation. And therefore
I mall now proceed to a more particular and
thorough enquiry into this notion.
Now left fome mould fuppofe that I do not un-
derftand thofe that place Liberty in Indifference,
or mould charge me with mifreprefenting their
opinion, I would fignify, that I am fenfible, there
are fome, who when they talk of the Liberty of
the Will as confiding in Indifference, exprefs
themfelves as tho* they would not be underftood
of the Indifference of the inclination or tendency
of the will, but of, I know not what, Indifference
of the foul's power of willing ; or that the Will,
with relpect to its power or ability to chufe, is
indifferent, can go either way indifferently, either
to
feft fpirits above ; another of perfons In a ftate of trial.
The former Dr. Whitby allows to confiit with neceifity ; the
latter he holds to be without neceflity : and this latter he
fuppofes to be requifite to our being the fubjedls of praife or
difpraife, rewards or punifhments, precepts and prohibitions,
promifes and threats, exhortations and dehortations, and a
covenant-treaty. And to this freedom he fuppofes Indiffe
rence to be requilite. In his Difcourfe on the five points, p. 299,
300, he fays ; " It is a freedom (fpeaking of a freedom not
*' only from co-a&ion, but from neceflity) requifite, as we
" conceive, to render us capable of trial or probation, and to
" render our actions worthy of praife or difpraife, and our
•' perfons of rewards or punifhments." And in the next page,
fpeaking of the fame matter, he fays, " Excellent to this
" purpofe, are the words of Mr. 1'horndike : We fay not> that
41 Indifference is requijite to all freedom, but to the freedom of
tf man alone in this ft ate of travail and proficience: the ground
'* of which is God's tender of a treaty, and conditions of peace
•' and reconcilement to fallen man, together with thofe precepts
** and prohibitions, thofe promifes and threats , thofe exhortation!
" and dehortations, it is enforced with"
90 Of Liberty confijting Part II.
to the right hand or left, either- act or forbear to
act, one as well as the other. Tho' this feems to
be a refining only of fome particular writers,
and newly invented, and which will by no means
confift with the manner of expreflion ufed by the
defenders of Liberty of Indifference in general.
And I wifh fuch refiners would thoroughly con-
fider, whether they diftinclly know their own
meaning, when they make a diflinftion between
Indifference of the foul as to its power or ability
of willing or chufmg, and the foul's Indifference
as to the preference or choice itfelf ; and whether
they do not deceive themfelves in imagining that
they have any diftincl: meaning at all. The In
difference of the foul as to its ability or power
to will, muft be the fame thing as the Indiffe
rence of the ftate of the power or faculty of the
Will, or the Indifference of the ftate which the
foul itfelf, which has that power or faculty, hi
therto remains in, as to the exercife of that power,
ill the choice it ihall by and by make.
But not to infift any longer on the abftrufenefs
and inexplicablenefs of this diftinction ; let what
will be fuppofed concerning the meaning of them
that make ufe of it, thus much muft at leaft be
intended by Arminians when they talk of Indiffe
rence as effential to Liberty of Will, if they in
tend any thing, in any refpect to their purpofe,
viz. That it is fuch an Indifference as leaves the
Will not determined already; but free from ac
tual pofiefiion, and vacant of predetermination,
fo far, that there may be room for the exprcife of
the Jelf -determining power of the Will ; and that
the Will's freedom confifts in, or depends upon
this vacancy and opportunity that is left for the
Will itfelf to be the determiner of the aft that is
to be the free aft,
And
Sect. VII. in Indifference.' 91
And here I would obferve in the firft place, that
to make out this fcheme of Liberty, the Indiffe
rence muft be perfefl and abfolute ; there muft be
a perfect freedom from all antecedent preponde-
ration or inclination. Becaufe if the Will be al
ready inclined, before it exerts its own fovereign
power on itfelf, then its inclination is not wholly
pwing to itfelf: if when two oppofites are
propofed to the foul for its choice, the propofal
does not find the foul wholly in a date of Indiffe
rence, then it is not found in a (late of Liberty
for meer felf-determination. — The leaft degree of
an antecedent bias muft be inconfiftent with their
notion of Liberty. For fo long as prior inclina
tion pofleffes the Will, and is not removed, it binds
the Will, fo that it is utterly impoffible that the
Will fhould act otherwife than agreably to it.
Surely the Will cannot ad: or chufe contrary to a
remaining prevailing inclination of the Will. To
fuppofe otherwife, would be the fame thing as to
fuppoie, that the Will is inclined contrary to its
prefent prevailing inclination^ or contrary to what
it is inclined to. That which the Will chufes and
prefers, that, all things confidered, it prepon
derates and inclines to. It is equally impoflible
for the Will to chufe contrary to its own remain
ing and prefent preponderating inclination, as it is
to prefer contrary to its own prefent preference, or
chufe contrary to its own prefent choice. The Will,
therefore, fo long as it is under the influence of
an old preponderating inclination, is not at Li
berty for a new free act, or any act that fhall
now be an act of felf-determination. The act
which is a felt-determined free act, muft be an.
act which the will determines in the pofleflion
and ufe of fuch a Liberty, as confifts in a free
dom from every thing, which, if it were there,
would make it impolfible that the Will, at that
i time,
92 Of Liberty of mil . Part II.
time, fhould be otherwife than that way to which
it tends.
If any one fhould fay, there is no need that the
Indifference fhould be perfect •, but although a
former inclination and preference ftill remains, yet,
if it be not very ftrong and violent, poffibly the
itrength of the Will may oppofe and overcome it:
—This is grofly abfurd ; for the flrength of the
Will, let it be never fo great, does not at all en
able it to act one way, and not the contrary way,
both at the fame time. It gives it no fuch fo-
vereignty and command, as to caufe itfelf to pre
fer and not to prefer at the fame time, or to chufe
contrary to its own prefent choice.
Therefore, if there be the leaft degree of ante*
cedent preponderation of che Will, it mufl be per
fectly abolifhed, before the Will can be at liberty
to determine itfelf the contrary way. And if
the Will determines itfelf the fame way, it was
not a free determination^ becaufc the Will is not
wholly at Liberty in fo doing : its determina
tion is not altogether from itfelf \ but it was partly
determined before, in its prior inclination : and
all the Freedom the Will exercifes in the cafe, is
in an increafe of inclination, which it gives itfelf,
over and above what it had by foregoing bias ;
fo much is from itfelf, and fo much is from per
fect Indifference. For though the Will had a
previous tendency that way, yet as to that ad*
ditional degree of inclination, it had no tendency.
Therefore the previous tendency is of no confi-
deration, with refpect to the act wherein the Will
is free- So that it comes to the fame thing which
was faid at firft, that as to the act of the Will,
wherein the Will is free, there muft beptrfeft In-
ftKtt or equilibrium*
To
Sect. VII. conjifting in Indifference. 93
To illuftrate this ; if we fhould fuppofe a fove-
reign felf-moving power in a natural body : but
that the body is in motion already, by an ante
cedent bias : for in (lance, gravitation towards the
center of the earth ; and has one degree of mo
tion already, by virtue of that previous tendency ;
but by its felf-moving power it adds one degree
more to its motion, and moves fo much more
fwiftly towards the center of the earth than it
would do by its gravity only : it is evident, that
all that is owing to a felf-moving power in this
cafe, is the additional degree of motion ; and that
the other degree of motion which it had from
gravity, is of no confideration in the cafe, does not
help the effect of the free felf-moving power in
the leaft ; the effect is juft the fame, as if the body
kad received from itfelf one degree of motion
from a ftate of perfect: reft. So if we fhould
fuppofe a felf-moving power given to the fcale of
a balance, which has a weight of one degree be
yond the oppofite fcale -9 and we afcribe to it an
ability to add to itfelf another degree of force
the fame way, by its felf-moving power; this
is juft the. fame thing as to afcribe to it a power
to give itfelf one degree of preponderation from
a perfect equilibrium ; and fo much power as
the fcale has to give itfelf an over-balance from
a perfect equipoife, fo much felf-moving felf-pre-
ponderating power it has, and no more. So that
its free power this way is always to be meafured
from perfect equilibrium.
I need fay no more to prove, that if Indiffe
rence be eiicntial to Liberty^ it muft be perfect
Indifference ; and that fo far as the Will is defti-
tute of this, fo far it is deilitute of that freedom
by which it is its own mailer, and in a capacity
of breing its own determiner, without being at
all
94 Of Liberty of mil Part II.
all pafiive, or fubject to the power and fway of
fomething elfe, in its motions and determina*
tions.
Having obferved thefe things, let us now try
whether this notion of the Liberty of Will con-
gifting in Indifference and equilibrium, and the
Will's felf-determination in fuch a ilate be not
abfurd and inconfiftent.
And here I would lay down this as an axiom
of undoubted truth ; that every free aft is done in
a Jlate of freedom, and not only after fuch a ft ate.
If an act of the Will be an act wherein the foul
is free, it mult be exerted in a ftate of freedom^
and in the time of freedom. It will not fuffice, that
the act immediately follows a ilate of Liberty ;
but Liberty muft yet continue, and co-exift with
the act -, the foul remaining in poiTeffion of Li
berty. Becaufe that is the notion of a free act
of the foul, even an act wherein the foul ufes or
exercifes Liberty. But if the foul is not, in the
very time of the act, in the poffeffion of Liberty,
it cannot. at that time be in the ufe of it.
Now the queftion is, whether ever the foul of
man puts forth an act of Will, while it yet re
mains in a ftate of Liberty, in that notion of a
ftate of Liberty, viz. as implying a ftate of In
difference ; or whether the foul ever exerts an act
of choice or preference, while at that very time
the Will is in a perfect equilibrium, not inclining
one way more than another. The very putting
of the queftion is fufficient to mew the abfurdity
of the affirmative anfwer : for how ridiculous
would it be for any body to infift, that the foul
chufes one thing before another, when at the
verv fame inftant it is perfectly indifferent with
refped
Sect. VIL confijting in Indifference. 95.
refpect to each ! This is the fame thing as to
lay, the foul prefers one thing to another, at the
very fame time that it has no preference.
Choice and preference can no more be in a ftate
of Indifference, than motion can be in a Hate of
reft, or than the preponderation of the fcale of a
balance can be in a Rate of equilibrium. Motion
may be the next moment after reft ; but cannot
co-exift with it, in any, even the leaft part of it.
So choice may be immediately after a ftate of In
difference, but has no co-exiftence with it : even
the very beginning of it is not in a ftate of In
difference. And therefore if this be Liberty, no
act of the Will, in any degree, is ever performed
in a ftate of Liberty, or in the time of Liberty.
Volition and Liberty are fo far from agreeing
together, and being effential one to another, '
that they are contrary one to another, and one
excludes and deftroys the other, as much as mo
tion and reft, light and darknefs, or life and
death. So that the Will acts not at all, does not
fo much as begin to • act in the time of fuch Li
berty : freedom is perfectly at an end, and has
ceafed to be, at the firft moment of action ; and
therefore Liberty cannot reach the action, to af
fect, or qualify it, or give it a denomination, or
any part of it, any more than if it had ceafed to
be twenty years before the action began. The
moment that Liberty ceafes to be, it ceafes to be a
qualification of any thing. If light and darknefs
lucceed one another inftantaneoully, light quali
fies nothing after it is gone out, to -make any
thing lightfome or bright, any more at the firft
moment of perfect darknefs, than months or
years after. Life denominates nothing vital at
the firft moment of perfect death. So freedom,
if it confifts in, or implies Indifference, can de
nominate nothing free, at the firft moment of
pre-
96 Of Liberty of Will Part II;
preference or preponderation. Therefore it is
manifeft, that no Liberty which the foul is pof-
feffcd of, or ever ufes, in any of its acts of voli
tion, confifts in Indifference ; and that the opinion
of fuch as fuppofe, that Indifference belongs to
the very eflence of Liberty, is to the higheft de
gree abfurd and contradictory.
If any one fhould imagine, that this manner
of arguing is nothing but a trick and delulion ;
arid to evade the reafoning, fliould fay, that the
thing wherein the Will exercifcs its Liberty, is
not in the act of choice or preponderation itfelf,
but in determining itfdf to a certain choice or
preference \ that the act of the Will wherein ic
is free, and ufes its own fovereignty, confifts in
its caufing or determining the change or transition
from a ftate of Indifference to a certain prefe
rence, or determining to give a certain turn to
the balance, which has hitherto been even ; and
that this act the Will exerts in a ftate of Liberty,
or while the Will yet remains in equilibrium, and
perfect mafter of itfclf. — I fay, if any one chufcs
to exprefs his notion of Liberty after this, or fome
fuch manner, let us fee if he can make out his
matters any better than before.
What is aflerted is, that the Will, while it yet
remains in perfect equilibrium, without prefe
rence, determines to change itfelf . from that ftate,
and excite in itfelf a certain choice or preference.
Now let us fee whether this does not come to the
fame ablurdity we had before. If it be fo, that
the Will, while it yet remains perfectly indifferent,
determines to put itfelf out of that ftate, and
give itfelf a certain preponderation -9 then I
would enquire, whether the foul does not deter
mine this of choice ; or whether the Will's coming
to a determination to do fo> be n ot the fame thing
as
3c6t. VII. ' confining in Indifference, 97
as the fouPs coming to a .choice to do fo. If the
ibul does not determine this of choice, or in the
exercifc of choice, then it does not determine it
voluntarily. And if the foul does not determine
it voluntarily, or of its own willy then in what
fenfe does its will determine it ? And if the will
does not determine it, then how is the Liberty of the
Will exercifed in the determination ? What fort
of Liberty is exercifed by the foul in thofe deter
minations, wherein there is no exercife of choice,
which are not voluntary, and wherein the will is
not concerned ? — But if it be allowed, that this
determination is an ad of choice, and it be in-
fifted on, that the foul, while it yet remains in a
ftate of perfect Indifference, chufes to put itfelf
out of that ftate, and to turn itfelf one way ;
then the foul is already come to a choice, and
chufes that way. And fo we have the very fame
abfurdity which we had before. Here is the
foul in a ftate of choice, and in a ftate of equi-
librium, both at the fame time : the foul alrea
dy chufing one way, while it remains in a ftate
of perfect Indifference, and has no choice of one.
way more than the other. — And indeed this
manner of talking, though it may a little hide the
abfurdity, in the obfcurity of exprefiion, is more
nonfenfical, and increafes the inconfiftence. To
fay, the free act of the will, or the act which
the will exerts in a ftate of freedom and Indiffe
rence, does not imply preference in it, but is what
the will does in order to caufing or producing a
preference, is as much as to fay, the foul chufes
(for to will and to chufe are the fame thing)
without choice, and prefers- without preference,
in order to caufe or produce the beginning of a
preference, or the firft choice. And that is, that
the firft choice is exerted without choice, in order
to produce itfelf.
H tf
98 Of Liberty's lying in a Power Part IL
If any, to evade thefe things, ihould own, that
a ftate of Liberty, and a ftate of Indifference are
not the fame, and that the former may be without
the latter ; but fhould fay, that Indifference is ftill
effential to the freedom of an act of will, in fome
fort, namely, as it is neceffary to go immediately
before it ; it being elfential to the freedom of an
act of will that it mould directly and immediately
arife out of a ftate of Indifference : ftill this will
not help the caufe of Arminian Liberty, or make
it confident with itfelf. For if the act fprings
immediately out of a ftate of Indifference, then it
does not arife from antecedent choice or preference.
But if the act arifes directly out of a ftate of In
difference, without any intervening choice to
chufe and determine it, then the act not being
determined by choice, is not determined by the
will-, the mind exercifes no free choice in the
affair, and free choice and free will have no hand
in the determination of the act. Which is en
tirely inconfiftent with their notion of the free
dom of Volition.
If any fhould fuppofe, that thefe difficulties
and abfurdities may be avoided, by faying, that
the Liberty of the mind confifts in a power to
jufptnd the act of the will, and fo to keep it in a
ftate of Indifference, until there has been oppor
tunity for confideration •, and fo ihall fay, that
however Indifference is not effential to Liberty in
fuch a manner, that the mind muft make its
choice in a ftate of Indifference, which is an in-
confiftency, or that the act of will muft fpring
immediately out of Indifference-, yet Indifference
may be effential to the Liberty of acts of the will
in this refpect *, viz. That Liberty confifts in a
J ower of the mind to forbear or fufpend the act
of Volition, and keep the mind in a ftate of In-
differcnc?
Sect. VII. to fufpend Volition. 99
difference for the prefent, until there has been op
portunity for proper deliberation : I fay, if any
one imagines that this helps the matter, it is a
great miitake: it reconciles no inconiiftency, and
relieves no difficulty which the affair is attended
with.— For here the following things muft be
Obferved,
1. That this fufpending of Volition, if there be
properly any fuch thing, is itfelf an act of Vo
lition. If the mind determines to fufpend its
act, it determines it voluntarily, it chufes, on
fome confideration, to fufpend it. And this
choice or determination, is an act of the will :
And indeed it is fuppofed to be fo in the very
hypothefis ; for it. is fuppofed that the Liberty
of the "mil confifts in its Power to do this, and
that its doing it is the very thing wherein the
will exercifes its Liberty. But how can the will
exercife Liberty in it, if it be not an act of the
will ? The Liberty of the will is not exercifed in
any thing but what the will does.
2. This determining to fufpend acting is not
only an act of the will, but it is fuppofed to be
the only free act of the will ; becaufe it is faid,
that this is the thing wherein the Liberty of the will
con/ijls. — Now if this be fo, then this is all the
act of will that we have to coniider in this con-
troverfy, about the Liberty of will, and in our
enquiries, wherein the Liberty of man confifts.
And now the forementioned difficulties remain :
the former queftion returns upon us; viz. Where
in confifts the freedom of the will in thofe afts
wherein it is free ? And if this act of determin
ing a fufpeniion be the only act in which the
will is free, then wherein confifts the will's
freedom with refpect to this act of fufpenfion ?
Hz And
loo Of fufpending Volition. Part H.
And how is Indifference effential to this act ? The
anfwer muft be, according to what is fuppofed in
the evalion under confideration, that the Liberty
of the will in this act of fufpenfion, confifts in a
Power to fufpend even this act, until there has
been opportunity for thorough deliberation. But
this will be to plunge directly into the grolfeft non-
fenfe : for it is the act of fufpenfion itfelf that we
are fpeaking of; and there is no room for a fpace
of deliberation and fufpenfion in order to deter
mine whether we will fufpend or no. For that
fuppofes, that even fufpenfion itfelf may be de
ferred : which is abfurd ; for the very deferring
the determination of fufpenfion, to confider whe
ther we will fufpend or no, will be actually fuf
pending. For during the fpace of fufpenfion,
to confider whether to fufpend, the act is ipfo
fafto fufpended. There is no medium between
fufpending to act, and immediately acting ; and
therefore no poffibilily of avoiding either the one
or the other one moment.
And befides, this is attended with ridiculous
abfufdity another way : for now it is come to that,
that Liberty confifts wholly in the mind's hav
ing Power to fufpend its determination whether
to fufpend or no; that there may be time for
confideration, whether it be beft to fufpend. And
if Liberty confifts in this only, then this is the Li
berty under confideration : we have to enquire
now, how Liberty with refpect to this act of
fufpending a determination of fufpenfion, confifts
in Indifference, or how Indifference is, effential to
it. The anfwer, according to the hypothefis
we are upon, muft be, that it confifts in a Power
of fufpending even this laft-mentioned act^ to
have time to confider whether to fufpend that*
And then the fame difficulties and enquiries
return
Sect. Vll. Of fufpending Volition. 101
return over again with refpect to that •, and fo on
for ever. Which, if it would ihew any thing,
would Ihew only that there is no fuch thing as a
free act. It drives the exercife of freedom back
in infinitum °, and that is to drive it out of the
world.
And befides all this, there is a Delufion, and a
latent grofs contradiction in the affair another
way •, in as much as in explaining how, or in
what refpect the will is free with regard to a
particular act of Volition, it is faid, that its' Li
berty confifts in a Power to determine to fufpend
that aft, which places Liberty not in that aft of
Volition which the enquiry is about, but alto
gether in another antecedent act. Which contra
dicts the thing fuppofed in both the queftion
and anfvver. The queftion. is, wherein confifts
the mind's Liberty in any particular aft of Voli
tion ? And the anfwer, in pretending to Ihew
wherein lies the miners Liberty in that aft, in ef
fect fays, it does not lie in that act at all, but in
another, viz. a Volition to fufpend that aft. And
therefore the anfwer is both contradictory, and al
together impertinent and befide the purpofe. For
it does not ihew wherein the Liberty of the will
confifts in the act in queftion ; inftead of that, it
fuppofes it does not confift in that act at all, but
in another diftinct from it, even a Volition to fnf-
pend that act, and take time to confider of it.
And no account is pretended to be given wherein
the mind is free with refpect to that act, wherein
this anfwer fuppofes the Liberty of the mind in
deed confifts, viz. the act of fufpenfion, or of de
termining the fulpenfion.
On the whole, it is exceeding manifeft, that the
Liberty of the mind does not confift in Indiffe-
H 3 rence,
102 Of Liberty without Neceflity. Part II.
rence, and that Indifference is not eflential or ne-
ceffary to it, or at all belonging to it, as the Ar-
winians fuppofe •, that opinion being full of no
thing but abfurdity and felf-contradidtion.
SECTION VIII.
Concerning tie fuppofed Liberty of the Will, as op-
foftte to all Neceflity.
IT is a thing chiefly inflfted on by Arminmns^
in this controverfy, as a thing moll impor
tant and eficntial in human Liberty, that voli
tions, or the acts of the will, are contingent
events ; underflanding contingence as op polite,
not only to conftraint, but to all Neceflity. There
fore I \Vould particularly confider this matter.
And
1. I would enquire, whether there is, or can
be any fuch thing, as a volition which is contin
gent in fuch a fenfe, as not only to come to pals
without any Neceflity of conflraint or co-a£tion,
but alfo without a Neceffity of confequence^ or an in
fallible connection with any thing foregoing.
2. Whether, if it were fo, this would at all
help the caufe of Liberty.
I. I would confider whether volition is a thing
that ever does, or can come to pafs, in this man
ner, contingently.
And here it mufl be remembered, that it has
been already fhewn, that nothing can ever come
to pafs without a caufe, or reafon why it exiits
in this manner rather than another ; and the evi
dence of this has been particularly applied to the
acts
Sect. VIII. Of tbe fuppofed Libert^ Sec. 103
acts of the will. Now if this be fo, it will de-
monftrably follow, that the acts of the will are
never contingent, or without Neceflity in the
fenfe fpoken of; in as much as tho'fe things
which have a caufe, or reafon of their exiftence,
muft be connected with their caufe. This ap
pears by the following confiderarions.
i. For an event to have a caufe and ground
of its exiftence, and yet not to be connected with
its caufe, is an inconfiftence, For if the event
be not connected with the caufe, it is not depen
dent on the caufe ; its exiftence is as it were1
loofe from its influence, and may attend it, or
may not ; it being a meer contingence, whether
it follows- or attends the influence of the caufe, or
not ; And that is die fame thing as not to be
dependent on it. And to fay, the event is not
dependent on its caufe, is abfurd : It is the fame
thing as to fay, it is not its caufe, nor the event
the effect of it: For dependence on the influ
ence of a caufe is the very notion of an effect.
If there be no fuch relation between one thing
and another, confiding in the connection and de
pendence of one thing on the; influence of ano
ther, then it is certain there is no fuch relation
between them as is fignified by the terms caufe
and ejfoft. So far as an event is dependent on a
caufe and connected with it, fo much caufality
is there in the cafe, and no more. The caufe
does, or brings to pafs no more "in any event,
than is dependent on it. If we fay, the connec
tion and dependence is not total, but partial, and
that the effect, though it has fome connection and
dependence, yet is not entirely dependent on it;
that is the fame thing as to fay, that not all that
is in the event is an effect of that caufe, but that
H 4 only
104 Of the fuppofed Liberty Part II.
only part of it arifes from thence, and part fome
other way.
2. If there are fome events which are not ne-
cefTarily conne&ed with their caufes, then it will
follow, that there are fome things which come
to pafs without any caufe, contrary to the fup-
pofition. For if there be any event which was
not neceflarily connected with the influence of the
caufe under fuch circumftances, then it was con
tingent whether it would attend or follow the in
fluence of the caufe, or no ; it might have fol
lowed, and it might not, when the caufe was the
fame, its influence the fame, and under the fame
circumftanees. And if fo, why did it follow, ra
ther than not follow ? There is no caufe or rea-
fon of this. Therefore here is fomething without
any caufe or reafon why it is, viz. the following
of the effect on the influence of the caufe, with
which it was not neceffarily connected. If there
be a neceflfary connection of the effect on any
thing antecedent, then we may fuppofe that
fometimes the event will follow the caufe, and
fometimes not, when the caufe is the fame, and
in every refpect in the fame ftate and circunv
fiances. And what can be the caufe and reafon
of this flrange phenomenon, even this diverfiry,
that in one inftance, the effect fhould follow, in
another not ? It is evident by the fuppofition,
that this is wholly without any caufe or ground.
Here is fomething in the prefent mariner of the
exiftence of things, and ftate of the world, that
is abfolutely without a caufe. Which is contrary
to the fuppofition, and contrary to what has been
before demonilrated.
3.- To fuppofe there are fome events which
a caufe and ground of their exiftence, that
yet
Sect. VIII. without all Neceflity. 105
yet arc not neceffarily conne&ed with their caufe
is to fuppofe that they have a caufe which is not
their caufe. Thus ; if the effect be not necef-
farily connected with the caufe, v/ith its influ
ence, and influential circumftances •, then, as I
obfcrved before, it is a thing poffible and fup-
pofable, that the caufe may fometimes exert the
fame influence, under the fame circumftances,
and yet the effect not follow. And if this ac
tually happens in any inflance, this inftance is a
proof, in fact, that the influence of the caufe is
not fufficient to produce the effect. For if it had
been fufficient, it would have done it. And yet,
by the fuppofition, in another inftance, the fame
caufe, with perfectly the fame influence, and when
all circumftances which have any influence, are
the fame, it was followed with the effect. By
which it is manifeft, that the effect in this laft
inftance was not owing to the influence of the
caufe, but muft come to pafs fome other way.
For it was proved before, that the influence of
the caufe was not fufHcient to produce the effect.
And if it was not fufficient to produce it, then the
production of it could not be owing to that in
fluence, but muft be owing to fomething elfe, or
owing to nothing. And if the effect be not
owing to the influence of the caufe, then it is
not the caufe. Which brings us to the contra
diction, of a caufe, and no caufe, that which is
the ground and reafon of the exiftence of a
thing, and at the fame time is not the ground
and reafon of its exiftence, nor is fufficient to
be fo.
If the matter be not already fo plain as to ren
der any further reafoning upon it impertinent, I
would fay, that that which feems to be the caufe
in the fuppofed cafe, can be no caufe ; its power
and
7 06 Of tie fuppcfed Liberty i &c. Part II.
and influence having, on a full trial, proved in-
iufncient to produce fuch an effect : and if it be
not fufficient to produce it, then it does not pro
duce it. To fay otherwife, is to fay, there is pow
er to do that which there is not power to do. If
there be in a caufe fufficient power exerted, and
in circumftances fufficient to produce an effect,
and fo the effect be actually produced at one time -y
thefc things all concurring, will produce the
effect at all times. And fo we may turn it the
other way j that which proves not fufficient at
one time, cannot be fufficient at another, with
precifely the fame influential circumftances. And
therefore if the effect follows, it is not owing to
that caufe ; unlefs the different time be a eir^
curnftance which has influence : but that is con
trary to the fuppofition ; for it is fuppofed that all
circumftances that have influence, are the fame.
And bcfides, this would be to fuppofe the time
to be the caufe ; which is contrary to the lup-
pofition of the other thing's being the caufe.
But if meerly diverfity of time. has no influence, .
ihen it is evident that it is as rrm^i of an abiur-
dity to fay, the caufe was fufficient* to produce the
effect at one time, and not at a^bther ; as to lay,
that it is fufficient to produce .the effect at a cer
tain time, and yet not jufficient to produce the
ume effect at the fame time.
On the whole, it is clearly manifeft, that every
effect has a neccffary connection with its caufe,
or with that which is the true ground and rea-
ibn of its exigence. And therefore if there be
no event without a caufe, as was proved before,
then no event whatfoever is contingent in the
manner, that Armenians fuppofe the tree acts of
the will to be contingent.
SECTION
SECTION IX.
Of the Cpnnedion of the Afts of the Will with the
of the Underftanding.
IT is manifeft, that the Adls of the Will are
none of them contingent in fuch a fenfe as to
be without all neceflity, or fo as not to be necef-
fary with a neceflity of confequence and Con-
nee! ion ; becaufe every Adi of the Will is fome
way connected with the Underftanding, and is as
the greateft apparent good is, in the manner
which has already been explained ; namely, that
the foul always wills or chufes that which, in the
prefent view of the mind, coniidered in the whole
of that view, and all that belongs to it, appears
mpft. agreable. Becaufe, as was obferved before,
nothing is more evident than that, when men a6t
voluntarily, and do what they pleafe, then they
do what appeals fnoft agreable to them ; and to
fay otherwife, would be as much as to affirm, that
men do not chufe what appears to fuit them beft,
or what feems moft pleafing to them ; or that
they do not chufe what they prefer. Which
brings the matter to a contradiction.
And it is very evident in itfelf, that the Acts of
the Will have fome Connection with the dictates
or views of the Underftanding, fo this is allowed
by fome of the chief of the Arminian writers :
particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel Clark.
Dr. Tumbull, though a great enemy to the doc
trine of neceflity, allows the fame thing. In his
Chriftlan Pbilofophy, (p. 196.) he with much ap
probation cites another philofopher, as of the fame
mind, in thefe words : " No man, (fays an ex-
" cellent
io8 Of the Connexion of the Will Part II.
" cellcnt philofopher) fets himfelf about any
" thing, but upon fome view or other, which
" ferves him for a rcafon for what he does 5 and
" whatfoever faculties he employs, the Under-
" landing, with fuch light as it has, well or ill
" formed, conftantly leads ; and by that light,
" true or falfe, all her operative powers are di-
" reded. The Will itfelf, how abfolute and in-
•*' controulable foever it may be thought, never
" fails in its obedience to the dictates of the
" Underftanding. Temples have their facred
" images ; and we fee what influence they have
•" always had over a great part of mankind ; but
" in truth, the ideas and images in men's minds
" are the invifible powers that conftantly govern
" them ; and to thefe they all pay univerfally a
<c ready fubmiflion."
But whether this be in a jufl confidence with
themfelves, and their own notions of liberty, I
defire may now be impartially confidered.
Dr. Whhly plainly fuppofes, that the Acts and
Determinations of the Will always follow the Un-
derftanding's apprehenfion or view of the greateft
good to be obtained, or evil to be avoided ;
or, in other words, that the Determinations of
the Will conftantly and infallibly follow thefe two
things in the Underftanding: i. The degree of
good to be obtained, and evil to be avoided, pro-
pofed to the Underftanding, and apprehended,
viewed, and taken notice or by it. 2. The de
gree of the Under/landing's view, notice or appre
henfion of that good or evil ; which is- increafed
by attention and confideration. That this is an
opinion he is exceeding peremptory in (as he is
in every opinion which he maintains in his con-
troverfy Avith the Calvinijls) with difdam of the
contrary opinion, as 'abfurd and fclf-contradictory,
will
Sect. IX. with the Underftanding. 109
will appear by the following words of his, in his
Difconrfe on the Five Points *.
" Now, it is certain, that what naturally makes
" the Underftanding to perceive, is evidence
" propofed, and apprehended, confidered or ad-
" verted to : for nothing elfe can be requifite to
" make us come to the knowledge of the truth.
" Again, what makes the Will chufe, is fome-
" thing approved by the Underftanding ^ and
" confequently appearing to the foul as good.
" And whatfoever it refufe th, is fomething re-
" prefented by the Underftanding, and fo appear-
<c ing to the Will, as evil. Whence all that God
*c requires of us is and can be only this ; to re-
** fufe the evil, and chufe the good. Where-
" fore, to fay that evidence propofed, apprehend-
" ed and confidered, is not fufficient to make the
" Underftanding approve ; or that the greateft
" good propofed, the greateft evil threatened,
" when equally believed and reflected on, is
u not fufficient to engage the Will to chufe the
" good and refufe the evil, is in effect to fay,
" that which alone doth move the IVill to chufe or to
" refufe, is not fufficient to engage it fo to do ;
" which being contradictory to itfelf, muft of
<c neceflity be falfe. Be it then fo, that we na-
" turally have an averfion to the truths pro-
" pofed to us in the Gofpel ; that only can make
" us indifpofed to attend to them, but cannot
<c hinder our conviction, when we do apprehend
" them, and attend to them. — Be it, that there is
" in us alfo a renitency to the good we are to
<c chufe ; that only can indifpofe us to believe it
" is, and to approve it as our chiefeft good. Be
" it, that we are prone to the evil that we fhould
K decline ; that only can render it the more diffi-
* Second Edit. p. 211, 212, 213.
" cult
no Of the Con ne&ion of the Will Part II.
" cult for us to believe it is the worft of evils.
" But yet, what we do really believe to be our chief eft
" good) willjlill be chofen -9 and what we apprehend
" to be the ivorjl of evils, willy whiljl we do continue
" under that conviction, be refufed by us. It there-
" fore can be only requifite, in order to thefe ends,
" that the Good Spirit Ihould fo illuminate our
*' Underilandings, that we attending to, and con-
" fidering what lies before us, fhould apprehend,
" and be convinced of our duty ; and that the
" bleffmgs of the Gofpe) ihould be fo propounded
" to us, as that we may difcern them to be our
" chiefeft good ; and the miferies it threateneth,
" fo as we may be convinced that they are the
<c worft of evils ; that: wre may chufe the one,
" and refufe the other."
Here let it be obferved, how plainly and peremp
torily it is afferted, that the greateft good prcpofed,
and the greateft evil threatened, when equally believed
and reflected on, is fufficient to engage the Will to chufe
the good, and refufe the evil, and is that alone which
doth move the Will to chuf: or to refufe^ and that it
is contradictory to itfelf, to fuppofe otherwife ; and
therefore muft of necejjity be falfe ; and then what ive
do really believe to be our chief eft good willftill be cho-
fen, and what ive apprehend to be the worft of evils,
will, whilft we continue under that conviction, be re
fufed by us. N6thing could have been faid more to
the purpoie, fully to iignify and declare, that the
determinations of the Will muft evermore follow
the illumination, convicYion and notice of the
Underitanding, wirh regard to the greateft good
and evil propofed, reckoning both the 'degree of
good and evil underftood, and the degree of
Underftanding, notice and conviction of that
propoled good and evil •, and that it is thus ne-
ceffarily, and can be otherwife in no inftance :
becaufe
«Sect* IK» with the Underftanding,, m
bccaufe it is afierted, that it implies a contradic
tion, to fuppofe it ever to be otherwife.
I am fenfible, the Doctor's aim in theie after-
tions is againft the Calvinifts', to fhew, in oppo-
fition to them, that there is no need of any phy-
fical operation of the Spirit of God on the Will,
to change and determine that to a good choice,
but that God's operation and alHilance is only
moral, fuggefting ideas to the Underftanding *r
which he (iippofes to be enough, if thofe ideas
are attended to, infallibly to obtain the end, Bui
whatever his defign was, nothing can more di
rectly and fully prove, that every determination
of the Will, in chufing and refufmg, is neceffary ;
directly contrary to his own notion of the liberty
of the Will. For if the determination of the Will,
evermore, in this manner, follows the light,
conviction and view of the Underftanding, con
cerning the greateft good and evil, and this be
that alone which moves the Will, and it be a
contradiction to fuppofe otherwife -, then it is m-
ceflarily fo, the Will neceffarily follows this light
or view of the Underftanding, not only in fome
of its acts, but in every act of chufing and re
fufmg. So that the Will does not determine itleif
in any one of its own acts ; but all its acts,
every act of choice and refufai depends on, and
is neceffarily connected with fome antecedent
caufe ; which caufe is not the Will itfelf, nor
any act of its own, nor any thing pertaining to
that faculty, but fomething belonging to another
faculty, whofe acts go before the Will, in all its
acts, and govern and determine them every one.
Here, if it fhould be replied, that although it
be true, that according to the Doctor, the final
determination of the Will always depends upon,
and is infallibly connected with the Underftand-
ing's
ii2 Of the Connexion of the Will Part II,
ing's conviftion, and notice of the greateft good ;
yet the Acts of the Will are not neceflary ; be-
caufe that conviction and notice of the Underftand-
ing is firft dependent on a preceding Act of the
Will, in determining to attend to, and take notice
of the evidence exhibited ; .by which means the
mind obtains that degree of conviction, which is
fufficient and effectual to determine the confequent
and ultimate choice of the Will ; and that the
Will with regard to that preceding act, whereby
it determines whether to attend or no, is not ne
ceflary ; and that in this, the liberty of the Will
confiits, that when God holds forth fufficient ob
jective light, the Will is at liberty whether to
command the attention of the mind to it.
Nothing can be more weak and inconliderate
than fuch a reply as this. For that preceding
Act of the Will, in determining to attend and
confider, Hill is an Aft of tbe Will (it is fo to be
lure, if the liberty of the Will confifts in it, as is
fuppofed) and if it be an Act of the Will, it is an
act of choice or refufaL And therefore, if what
the Doctor aflerts be true, it is determined by fomc
antecedent light in the Underftanding concern
ing the greateft apparent good or evil. For he
aflerts, it is that light which alone doth move the
Will to cbufe or refufe. And therefore the Will
mult be moved by that in chufing to attend to the
objective light offered, in order to another con
fequent act of choice : ib that this act is no lefs
neceflary than the other. And if we fuppofe ano
ther Act of the Will, flill preceding both thefe
mentioned, to determine both, ftill that alfo muft
be an Act of the Will, and an act of choice ; and
fo muft, by the fame principles, be infallibly de
termined by fome certain degree of light in the
Underftanding concerning the greateft good.
And
Sect. IX. 'with the Underftanding. j j /»
And let us fuppofe as many Acts of the Will, one
preceding another, as we plcafe, yet they are
every one of them neceflarily determined by a
certain degree of light in the Underftanding,
concerning the greateft and moft eligible good in
that cafe ; and fo, not one of them free according
to Dr. Wkitbfs notion of freedom. And if it
be faid, the reafon, why men do not attend to
light held forth, is becaufe of ill habits con
tracted by evil acts committed before, whereby
their minds are indifpofed to attend to, and con-
fider of the truth held forth to them by God, the
difficulty is not at all avoided : ftill the queflion
returns, What determined the Will in thofe pre
ceding evil acts ? It muft, by Dr. Whiitys prin
ciples, ftill be the view of the Underitanding
concerning the greateft good and evil. If this
view of the Underftanding be that alone which doth
move the Will to chufe or refufe, as the Doctor af-
ferts, then every act of choice or refufal, from a
man's firft exigence, is moved and determined
by this view ; and this view of the Underftand
ing exciting and governing the act, muft be be
fore the act : And therefore the Will is necefTa-
rily determined, in every one of its acts, from a
man's firft exiftence, by a caufe befide the Will,
and a caufe that does not proceed from, or depend
on 'any Act of the Will at all. Which at once
utterly aboliihes the Doctor's whole fcheme of Li
berty of Will ; and he, at one ftroke, has cut
the finews of all his arguments from the goodnefs,
righteoufnefs, ftithfulnefs and fmcerity of God,
in his commands, promifes, threatenings, calls^
invitations, expoftulations ; which he makes ufe
of, under the heads of reprobation, election,
univerfal redemption, fufficicnt arid effectual
grace, and the freedom of the Will of man ;
and has enervated and made vain all thofe excla-
I nations
H4 Of the Connexion of the Will Part IK
mations againft the dodtrine of the Calvinifts, as
charging God with manifeft unrighteoufnefs, un-
faithfulnefs, hypocrify, fallacioufnefs, and cru
elty; which he has over, and over, and over
again, numberlefs times in his book.
Dr. Samuel Clark, in his Demonftration of the '
Being and Attributes of God, * to evade the ar
gument to prove the necefiity of volition, from
its neceiTary Connection with the laft dictate of
the Underftanding, fuppofes the latter not to be
diverfe from the Act of the Will itfelf. But if it
be fo, it will not alter the cafe as to the evidence
of the neceffity of the Act: of the Will. If the
dictate of the Underftanding be the very fame
with the determination of the Will or Choice, as
Dr. Clark fuppofes, then this determination is no
fruit or effeft of choice : and if fo, no liberty of
choice has any hand in it: as to volition or
choice, it is neceffary ; that is, choice cannot
prevent it. If the laft dictate of the Underftand
ing be the fame with the determination of voli
tion itfelf, then the exiftence of that determination
muft be neceffary as to volition ; in as much as
volition can have no opportunity to determine
whether it {hall exift or no, it having exiftence
already before volition has opportunity to deter
mine any thing. It is itfelf the very rife and
exiftence of volition. But a thing, after it exiils,
has no opportunity to determine as to its own
exiftence ; it is too late for that.
If liberty confifts in that which Armenians fup-?
pofe, viz. in the Will's determining its own acts,
having free opportunity, and being without all
necefiity 5 this is the fame as to fay, that liber*
* Edit. VI. p. 93.
Sect. IX. with the UnderHanding^ 1 1 ^
ty confifts in the foul's having power and op
portunity to have what determinations of the
Will it pleafes or chnfes. And if the determi
nations of the Will, and the laft didlates of the
Underftanding be the fame thing, then Liberty
Confiils in the mind's having power to have, what
dictates of the Underftanding it pleafes, having
opportunity to chufe its own dictates of Under
ilanding. But this is abfurd ; for it is to make
the determination of choice prior to the didtate of
Underftanding, and the ground of it ; which can
not confift with the dictate of Underftanding's be
ing the determination of choice itfelf.
Here is no wray to do in this cafe, but only to
recur to the old abfurdity of one determination
before another, and the caufe of it ; and another
before that, determining that ; and fo on in infi-
nitum. If the laft dictate of the Underftanding
be the determination of the Will itfelf, and the
foul be free with regard to that dictate, in .the
Armmian notion of freedom ; then the foul, be
fore that dictate of its Underftanding exifls, volun
tarily and according to its own choice determines,
in every cafe, what that dictate of the Under
ilanding Hiall be ; otherwife that dictate, as to
the Will, is neceflary ; and the acts determined
by it mull alib be necerlary. So that here is a
determination of the mind prior to that dictate of
the Underilanding, an act of choice going before
it, chuling and determining what that dictate of
the Underftanding Ihall be : and this preceding
act of choice, being a free act of Will, muft alio
be the fame with another laft di6late of the Un
derftanding : And if the mind alfo be free in that
dictate of Underftanding, that muft be deter
mined ftill by another ; and fo on for ever.]
I 2 Beddes,
1 1 6 Of tie Connexion of the Will Part II.
Befides, if the di&ate of the Underftanding,
and determination of the Will be the fame, this
confounds the Underftanding and Will, and makes
them the fame. Whether they be the fame or
no, I will not now difpute ; but only would ob-
ferve, that if it be fo, and- the Arminian notion
of liberty confifts in a felf-determining power
in the Underftanding, free of all neceflity ; being
independent, undetermined by any thing prior to
its own acts and determinations ; and the more
the Underftanding is thus independent, and fove-
reign over its own determinations, the more free.
By this therefore the freedom of the foul, as a
moral agent, muft confift in the independence
of the Underftanding on any evidence or appear
ance of things, or any thing whatfoever, that
{lands forth to the view of the mind, prior to the
Underftanding's determination. And what a
fort of liberty i's this ! confifting in an ability,
freedom and eafinefs of judging, either accord
ing to evidence, or againft it ; having a fovereign
command over itfelf at all times, to judge, ei
ther agreably or difagreably to what is plainly
exhibited to its own view. Certainly, it is no li
berty that renders perfons the proper fubjedts of
perfuafive reafoning, arguments, expostulations,
and fuch like moral means and inducements.
The ufe of which with mankind is a main ar
gument of the Armimans, to defend their notion
of liberty without all neceflity. For according
to this, the more free men are, the lefs they are
under the government of fuch means, lefs fub-
jecl: to the power of evidence and reafon, and
more independent on their influence, in their c)e-
terminations.
And whether the Underftanding and Will are
the fame or no, as Dr. Clark feems to fuppofe,
yet
Sect. IX. with tie Undemanding. 117
yet in order to maintain the Armmian notion of
liberty without neceflity, the free Will is not
determined by the Underftanding, nor neceflarily
connected with the Underftanding ; and the fur
ther from ftrdi Connection, the greater the free
dom. And when the liberty is full and com-
pleat, the determinations of the Will have no
Connection at all with the dictates of the Under-
Handing. And if fo, in vain are all the appli
cations to the Underftanding, jn order to induce
to any free virtuous act ; and fo in vain are all
inftructions, counfels, invitations, expoftulations,
and all arguments and perfuaiives wliatlbever :
for thefe are but applications to the Underftand-
ing, and a clear and lively exhibition of the ob
jects of choice to the mind's view. But if, after
all, the Will muft be felf-determined, and inde
pendent on the Underllanding, to what purpofe
are things thus reprefented to the Underflanding,
la order to determine the choice ?
SECTION X.
Volition vecejjarily connected with the Influence of
Motives ; with particular Obfcrvations on the
great Inconjifience of Mr. Chubb's Ajjcrtions
and Reasonings •, about the Freedom of the Will.
THAT every act of the will has fome caufe,
and confequently (by what has been al
ready proved) has a neceflary connection with
its caufe, and fo is neceflary by a neceflity of
connection and confequence, is evident by this,
that every act of the will whatfoever is excited
by fome motive : which is manifcft, becaufe, if
1 3 the
n8 'dfls of tie Will ' Part It.
the will or mind, in willing and chufing after the
manner that it does, is excited fo to do by no
motive or inducement, then it has no end which
it propofes to itfelf, or purfues in fo doing ; it
aims at nothing, and feeks nothing. And if in
feeks nothing, then it does not go after any thing,
or exert any inclination or preference towards any
thing. Which brings the rnatter to a contradic
tion ; becaufe for the mind to will fomething,
and for it to go after fomething by an act of pre
ference and inclination, are the fanje thing.
But if every aft of the will is excited by a
Motive, then that Motive is the caufc of the act
of the will. If the acts of the will are excited
by Motives, then Motives are the caufes of their
being excited ; or, which is the fame thing, the
caufe of their being put forth into act and exif-
tence. And if fo, the cxiflence of the acts of the
will is properly the effect of their Motives.,,
Motives do nothing as Motives or inducements,
but by their influence •, and fo much as is done
by their influence is the effect of them. For
that is the notion of an effect, fomething that
is brought to pals by the influence of another
thing.
And if volitions are prqperly the effefts of
their Motives, then they are necefTarily connected
with their Motives. Every effect and event be
ing, a? was proved before, neceflarijy connected
with tha% which is the proper ground and reafon
of its exiiknce. Thus it is manifeft, that volition
is necefiary, and is not from any felf-determin-
ing power in the will : the volition, which is
caufevl by previous Motive and inducement, is
not caufed by the will exercifing a fovereign,
power over itfelf], to determine, caufe and excite
volitions
Se6l. X. connefted with Motives. 119
volitions in itfelf. This is not confident with
the will's acting in a Hate of indifference and
equilibrium, to determine itfelf to a preference ;
for the way in which Motives operate, is by biaf-
fing the will, and giving it a certain inclination
or preponderation one way.
Here it may be proper to obferve, that Mr.
Chubb, in his Collection of Tracts on various
Subjects, has advanced a fcheme of liberty, which
is greatly divided againft itfelf, and thoroughly
fubverfive of itfelf ; and that many ways.
I. He is abundant in aflerting, that the will,
in all its acts, is influenced by Motive and ex
citement ; and that this is At previous ground find
reafon of all its acts, and that it is never other-
wile in any inflance. He fays, (p. 262.) No ac
tion can take place without feme Motive to excite it.
And in p. 263. Volition cannot take place without
fome PREVIOUS reafon or Motive to induce it. And
in p. 310. Action would not take place without fome
reafon or Motive to Induce it ; it being abfurd to fup-
pofe, that the aftwe faculty would be exerted without
fome PREVIOUS reafon to difpofe the mind to ac
tion. So alfo p. 257. And he fpeaks of thefe
things, as what we may be abfolutely certain of,
and which are the foundation, the only founda
tion we have of a certainty of the moral perfec
tions of God. p. 252, 253, 254, 255, 261, 262,
263, 264.
And yet at the fame time, by his fcheme, the
influence of Motives upon us to excite to action,
and to be actually a ground of volition, is confe-
quent on the volition or choice of the mind. For
he very greatly infifts upon it, that in all free ac
tions, before the mind is the fubject of thofe vo-
I litions
1 20 Inccnjlftence of Mr. Chubb's Fart II.
litions, which Motives excite, it chufes to be fo.
It chufes, whether it will comply with the-Motive,
which prefents itfelf in view, or not ; an4 when
various Motives are prefented, it chufes, which it
•will yield to, and which it will reject. So p. 256.
Every man has power to affi, • or to refrain from affi-
ing agreably with, or contrary to, any Motive that
prefents. P. 257. Every man is at liberty to aft, or
refrain from affing agreably with^ or contrary to,
what each of thefe Motives, confidered fmgly^ would
excite him to. — Man has power, and is as much at
liberty to rejeR the Motive^ that does prevail^ as he
has power , and is at liberty to rejett thofe Motives
that do not. And fo p. 310, 311? In order to con-
jiitute a moral agent ', it is neceffary, that he Jhould
have power to aft, or to refrain from afting, upon
fitch moral Motives as he pleafes. A nd to the like
purpofe in many other places. According to thefe
things, the will acts firft, and chufes or refufes to
comply with the Motive, that is prefented^before
it falls under its prevailing influence : and it is
firft determined by the mind's plcafure or choice^
what Motives it will be induced by, before it is
induced by them.
Now, how can thefe things hang togetheV ?
How can the mind firit act, and by its act of
volition and choice determine, what Motives fhall
be the ground and reafon of its volition and
choice? For this fuppofes, the choice is already
made, before the Motive has its effect •, and that
the volition is already exerted, before the Motive
prevails, fo as actually to be the ground of the
volition | and makes the prevailing of the Mo
tive, the confequence of the volition, which yet
it is the ground of. If the mind has already
^hofen to comply with a Motive, and to yield to
Us excitement, it does not need to yield to it after
this;
Sect. X. Scheme of Liberty * Sec. 121
this : for the thing is effected already, that the
Motive would excite to, and the will is before
hand with the excitement-, and the excitement
comes in too late, and is needlefs and in vain af
terwards. If the mind has already chofen to yield
to a Motive which invites to a thing, that implies
and in fact is a chufmg the thing invited to\ and
the very aft of choice is before the influence of
the Motive which induces, and is the ground of
the choice ; the ion is beforehand with the fa
ther that begets him : the choice is fuppofed to
be the ground of that influence of the Motive,
which very influence is fuppofed to be the ground
of the choice. And fo vice 'verfa, the choice is
fuppofed to be the confequence of the influence
of the Motive, which influence of the Motive is
the confequence ot that very choice.
And befides, if the will acts firft towards the
Motive before it falls under its influence, and the
prevailing of the Motive upon it to induce it to
act and chufe, be the fruit and confequence of
its act and choice, then how is the Motive a
PREVIOUS ground and reajon of the aft and choice^
fo that in the nature of the things ', volition cannot
take place without f owe PREVIOUS reafon and Mo
tive to induce it ; and that this act is confequent
upon, and follows the Motive ? Which things
Mr. Chubb often afferts, as of certain and un
doubted truth. So that the very fame Motive is
both previous and consequent, both before and af
ter, both the ground and fruit of the very fame
thing !
II. Agreable to the fore-mentioned inconfiilent
notion of the will's firft acting towards the Mo
tive, chufing whether it will comply with it, in
order to its becoming a ground of the will's
acting^
Inconftftence of Mr. Chubb *s Part IL
ailing, before any act of volition can take place,
Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and excite
ments to the action of the will, the pajfive ground
cr reafon of that affion. Which is a remarkable
phrafc ; than which I prefnme there is none more
unintelligible, and void of diftinct and confident
meaning, in all the writings of Duns Scolus, or
^Thomas Aquinas. When he reprefents the Motive
to action or volition as paflive, he muft mean: —
paffive in that affair, or paffive with refpect to
that action, which he fpeaks of; otherwife it is
nothing to his purpofe, or relating to the defign
of his argument : he muft mean, (if that can be
called a meaning) that the Motive to volition is
firft acted upon or towards by the volition, enuring
to yield to it, making it a ground of action, or
determining to fetch its influence from thence •,
and fo to make it a previous ground of its own
excitation and exiftenCe. Which is the fame
ablurdity, as if one mould fay, that the foul of
man, or any other thing fliould, previous to its
exilting, chufe what caufe it would come into
exiftence by, and fhould a.ct upon its caufe, to
fetch influence from thence, to bring it into be
ing •, and fp its caufe fhould be a paflive ground
of its exiftence !
Mr. Chubb does very plainly fuppofe Motive or*
excitement to be the ground of the being of voli
tion. He fpeaks of it as the ground or reafon
of the EXERTION of an act of the will,
p. 39 1 , and 392, and e^prefsly fays, that volition
cannot TAKE PLACE without fome previous
ground or Motive to induce it, p. 363. And he
i peaks of the ad as FROM the Motive, ancl FROM
THE INFLUENCE of the Motive, p. 352. and
from the influence, that the Motive has on the yian^
for the PRODUCTION of an attion, p, 3 { 7. Cer
tainly
§e&. >£. Scbeme of Liberty, &c.
tainly there is no need of multiplying words
about this ; it is eaiily judged, whether Motive
can be the ground of volition's being exerted and
taking place, fo that the very production of it is
from the influence of the Motive, and yet the
Motive, before it becomes the ground of the VCH
lition, is paffive, or acted upon by the volition.
But this I will fay, that a man, who infills fo
much on clearnefs of meaning in others, and is
fo much in blaming their confufion and incon-
iiftence, ought, if he was able, to have explained
his: meaning in .this phrafe of paffive ground of
attion^ fo as to fhew it not to be confufed and in~
confiftent.
If any fhould fuppofe, that Mr. Chubb , when
he fpeaks of Motive as a paffive ground of action,
does not mean paffive with regard to that volition
which it is the ground of, but fome other ante
cedent volition (though his purpofe and argument,
and whole difcourfe, will by no means allow of
fuch a fuppofition) yet it would not help the
matter in the leaft. For, (i.) If we fuppofe there
to be an act of volition or choice, by which the
foul chufes to yield to the invitation of a Motive
to another volition, by which the foul chufes
fomething elfe ; both thefe fuppofed volitions are
in effect the very fume. A volition, or chufing
to yield to the force of a Motive inviting to chuie
fomething, comes to juft the fame thing as chu-
Jing the thing, which the Motive invites to, as I
obierved before. So that here can be no room
to help the matter, by a distinction of two voli
tions. (2.) If the Motive be pafiive with refpect,
not to the fame volition, that the Motive excites
to, but one truly diftinct and prior ; yet, by Mr.
Cbubb, that prior volition cannot take place, with-
put a Motive or excitement, as a previous ground
Z of
f 24 Inconjifience of Mr. ChubVs Part II.
of its exiftence. For he in lifts, that // is abfurd
to fuppofe any volition foould take place without fome
previous Motive to induce it. So that at laft it
comes to juft the fame abfurdity : for if every vo
lition muft have a previous Motive, then the very
frfl in the whole feries muft be excited by a pre
vious Motive ; and yet the Motive to that firft vo
lition is paflive ; but cannot be paflive with re
gard to another antecedent volition, becaufe, by
the fuppofition, it is the very firft : therefore if it
be paflive with refpect to any volition, it muft be
fo with regard to that very volition that it is the
ground of, and that is excited by it.
III. Though Mr. Chubb afferts, as above, that
every volition has fome Motive, and that in the
nature of the thing* no volition can take place with-
cut fome Motive to induce it ; yet he afferts, that
volition does not always follow the ftrongeft Mo
tive ; or, in other words, is not governed by any
fuperiour ftrength of the Motive that is followed,
beyond Motives to the contrary, previous to the
volition itfelf. His own words, p. 258, are as
follow : " Though with regard to phyfical caufes,
" that which is ftrongeft always prevails, yet it is
" othervvife with regard to moral caufes. Of
" thefe, fometimes the ftronger, fometimes the
" weaker, prevails. And the ground of this
" difference is evident, namely, that what we
" call moral caufes, ftrictly fpeaking, are no
" caufes at all, buc barely pafiive realbns of, or
" excitements to the action, or to the refrain-
" ing from acting : which excitements we have
" power, or are at liberty to comply with or re-
cc ject, as I have fhewed above/' And fo through
out the paragraph, he, in a variety of phrafes,
infifts, that the will is not always determined by
the ftrongeft Motive, unlefs by ihrongeft we pre-
pofte-
Seel:. X. Scheme of Liberty, &c. 125
pofteroufly mean actually prevailing in the event ;
which is not in the Motive, but in the will ; but
that the will is not always determined by the
Motive, which is ftrongeft, by any ftrength previ
ous to the volition iifelf. And he elfe where does
abundantly afiert, that the will is determined by
no fuperiour ftrength or advantage, that Motives
have, from any conftitution or ftate of things,
or any circumftances whatfoever, previous to the
actual determination of the will. And indeed
his whole difcourfe on human liberty implies it,
his whole fcheme is founded upon it.
But thefe things cannot ftand together.
There is fuch a thing as a diverfity of ftrength
in Motives to choice, previous to the choice it-
felf. Mr. Chubb himielf fuppofes, that they do
previoujly invite, induce, excite and difpofe the mind
to attion. This implies, that they have fomething
in themfelves that is inviting, fome tendency to
induce and difpofe to volition, previous to volition
itfelf. And if they have in themfelves this na
ture and tendency, doubtlefs they have it in cer->
tain limited degrees, which are capable of diver
fity ; and fome have it in greater degrees, others
in lefs -, and they that have mod of this ten
dency, coniidered with all their nature and cir
cumftances, previous to volition, they are the
ftrongeft motives ; and thofe that have leaft, are
the weakeft Motives.
Now if volition fometimes does not follow the
Motive which is ftrongeft, or has moft previous
tendency or advantage, all things coniidered, to
induce or excite it, but follows the weakeft, or
that which as it ftands previoufly in the mind's
view, has leaft tendency to induce it ; herein the
will apparently aclts wholly without Motive, withr
i out
126 Tnccnjtftence of Mr. Chubb's Part IL
out any previous reafon to difpofe the mind to it,
contrary to what the fame author fuppofes* The
act, wherein the will mult proceed without a pre
vious motive to induce it, is the act of preferring
the weakeft motive. For how abfurd is it to fay*
the mind fees previous reafon in the Motive, to
prefer that Motive before the other ; and at the
fame time to fuppofe, that there is nothing in the
Motive, in its nature, • ftate or any circumftance
of it whatfoever, as it (lands in the previous
view of the mind, that gives it any preference ;
but on the contrary, the other Motive that Hands
in competition with it, in all thefe refpects, has
moft belonging to it, that is inviting and mov
ing, and has moft of a tendency to choice and
preference. This is certainly as much as to fay,
there is previous ground and reafon in the Mo
tive for the act of preference, and yet no previ
ous reafon for it. By the fnppofition, as to all
that is in the two rival Motives, which tends to
preference, previous to the act of preference, it is
not in that which is preferred, but wholly in the
other: becaufe appearing fuperiour ftrength,
and all appearing preferablenefs is in that ; and
yet Mr. Chubb fuppofes, that the act of prefe
rence is from 'previous ground and reafon in the
Motive which is preferred. But are thefe th ings
confident ? Can there be previous ground in a
thing for an event that takes place, and yet no
previous tendency in it to that event ? If one
thing follows another, without any previous ten
dency to its following, then I mould think it
very plain, that it follows it without ,any man
ner of previous reafon, why it ihould follow.
Yea, in this cafe, Mr. Chubb fuppofes, that
the event follows an antecedent or a previous
thing, as the ground of its exiftence, not only
that
Sect. X. Scheme of Liberty , Src* 127
that has no tendency to it, but a contrary tendency.
The event is the preference, which the mind gives
to that Motive, which is weaker, as it (lands in the
previous view of the mind •, the immediate an
tecedent is the view the mind has of the two ri
val Motives conjunctly ; in which previous view
of the mind, all the preferablenefs, or previous
tendency to preference, is fnppofed to be on the
other iide, or in the contrary Motive -, and all
the unworthinefs of preference, and fo previous
tendency to comparative neglect, rejection or
undervaluing, is on that fide which is preferred :
and yet in this view of the mind is fuppofed to
be the previous ground or reafon of this act of
preference, exciting it, and dlfpojing the mind to it*
Which, I leave the reader to judge, whether it
be abfurd or not. If it be not, then it is not ab-
furd to fay, that the previous tendency of an
antecedent to a confequent, is the ground and
reafon why that confequent does noc follow ;
and the want of a previous tendency to an
event, yea, a tendency to the contrary, is the
true ground and reafon why that event does
follow*
An act of choice or preference is a compa
rative act, wherein the mind acts with reference
to two or more things that are compared, and
{land in competition in the mind's view. If the
mind, in this comparative act, prefers that which
appears inferiour in the cornparifon, then the
mind herein acts abfolutely without Motive, or
inducement, or any temptation whatfoever.
Then, if a hungry man has the offer of two
forts of food, both which he finds an appetite
to, but has a ftronger appetite to one than the
other ; and there be no circumflances or excite
ments whatfoever in the cafe to induce him to
take
128 Incouftjlence of Mr. Chubb's Part II,
take either the one or the other, but meerly his
appetite : if in the choice he makes between
them, he chufes that, which he has leaft appetite
to, and refutes that, to which he has the ftrongeft
appetite, this is a choice made abfolutely with
out previous Motive, Excitement, Reafon, or
Temptation, as much as if he were perfectly
without all appetite to either : becaufe his vo
lition in this cafe is a comparative act, attend
ing and following a comparative view of the food,
which he chufes, viewing it as related to, and
compared with the other fort of food, in which
view his preference has abfolutely no previous
ground, yea, is againft all previous ground and
Motive. And if there be any principle in man,
from whence an act of choice may arife after this
manner, from the fame principle volition may
ariie wholly without Motive on either fide. If
the mind in its volition can go beyond Motive,
then it can go without Motive : for when it is
beyond the Motive, it is out of the reach of the
Motive, out of the limits of its influence, and
fo without Motive. If volition goes beyond the
ftrength and tendency of Motive, and efpecially
if it goes againft its tendency, this demonftrates
the independence of volition or Motive. And
if fo, no reafon can be given for what Mr. Cbubb
fo often aiferts, even that in the nature of things
volition cannot take flace without a Motive to in
duce it*
If the Moft High Ihould endow a balance with
agency or activity of nature, in fuch a manner,
that when unequal weights are put into the fcales,
its agency could enable it to caufe that fcale to
defcend, which has the leaft weight, and fo to
raife the greater weight ; this would clearly de-
that the motion of the balance does
not
Se6l. X. Scheme of Liberty , &c. 129
not depend on weights in the fcales, at leaft as
much as if the balance fhould move itfelf, when
there is no weight in either fcale. And the ac
tivity of the balance which is fufficient to move
itfeli againfl the greater weight, muft certainly
be more than fufficient to move it when there is
no weight at all.
Mr. Chubb fuppofes, that the will cannot ftir at
all without fome Motive ; and alfo fuppoics, that
if there be a Motive to one thing, and none to
the contrary, volition will infallibly follow that
Motive. This is virtually to fuppofe an entire
dependence of the will on Motives : if it were
not wholly dependent on them, it could furely
help itfelf a little without them, or help itfelf a
little againfl: a Motive, without help from the
ftrength and weight of a contrary Motive. And
yet his luppofing that the will, when it has be
fore it various oppofite Motives, can ufe them as
it pleafes, and chufe its own influence from them,
and neglect the ftrongeft, and follow the weakeft,
fuppoics it to be wholly independent on Motives.
It further appears, on Mr. ChuWs fuppofition,
that volition mull be without any previous ground
in any Motive, thus : if it be, as he fuppoles, that
the will is not determined by any previous fupe-
riour ftrength of the Motive, but determines and
chules its own Motive, then, when the rival Mo
tives are exactly equal in (Irength and tendency
to induce, in all refpecls, it may follow either ;
and may in fuch a cafe, fometimes follow one,
fometimes the other. And if fo, this diverfity
which appears between the a6ts of the will, is
plainly without previous ground in either of the
Motives; for all that is previoufly in the Motives,
is fuppofed precifely and perfectly the fame, wirh-
K out
130 Inconfijlence of Mr. Chubb's Part II.
out any diverfity whatfoever. Now perfect iden
tity, as to all that is previous in the antecedent,
cannot be the ground and reafon of diverfity in
the confequent. Perfect identity in the ground
cannot be a reafon why it is not followed with the
fame confequence. And therefore the fource of
this diverfity of confequence muft be fought for
elfewhere.
And laftly, it may be obferved, that however
Mr. Chubb does much infill that no volition can
take place without fome Motive to induce it,
which previoufly difpofes the mind to it; yet, as
he alfo infifls that the mind, without reference to
any fuperiour ftrength of Motives, picks and
chufes for its Motive to follow -, he himfelf herein
plainly fuppofes, that with regard to the mind's
preference of one Motive before another, it is not
the Motive that difpofes the will, but the will
difpofes itfelf to follow the Motive.
IV. Mr. Ckulb fuppofes neceffity to be utterly
inconfiftent with agency ; and that to fuppofe a
being to be an agent in that which is neceffary, is
a plain contradiction. P. 311, and throughout his
difcourfes on the fubject of Liberty, he fuppofes,
that neceflity cannot confifl with agency or free
dom ; and that to fuppofe otherwife, is to make
Liberty and Necefiity, Action and Paffion, the
fame thing. And fo he feems to fuppofe, that
there is no adtion, ftrictly fpeaking, but volition ;
and that as to the effefts of volition in body or
mind; in themfelves confidered, being neceflary,
they are faid to be free, only as they are the ef*
fefts of an act that is not neceflary.
And yet, according to him, volition itfelf is
the effett vf volition ; yea? every act of free vo
lition :
Sect. X.' Scheme of Liberty ^ &c. 131
lition : and therefore every act of free volition
muft, by what has now been obferved from him,
be neceflary. That every act of free volition is
itfelf the effect of volition, is abundantly fup-
pofed by him. In p. 341, he fays, " If a man
" is fuch a creature as I have proved him to be,
" that is, if he has in him a power or Liberty
" of doing either good or evil, and either of
<c thefe is the fubject of his own free choice, fo
« that he might, IF HE HAD PLEASED,
** have CHOSEN and done the contrary."
Here he fuppofes, all that is good or evil in man
is the effect of his choice ; and fo that his good
or evil choice itfelf is the effect of his pleafure
or choice, in thefe words, he might^ if he had
PLEASED, have CHOSEN the contrary. So in
p. 356, " Though it be highly reafonable, that a
" man fhould always chufe the greater good,—
" yet he may, if he PLEASE, CHUSE other-
" wife." Which is the fame thing as if he had
faid, be may, if he chufes, chufe otherwife. And
then he goes on, " — that is, he may, if he pleajes,
" chufe what is good for himfelf, &c." And
again in the fame page, " The will is not con-
" fined by the underflanding, to any particular
" fort of good, whether greater or lefs ; but is at
ci liberty to chufe what kind cf good it pleafes"
— If there be any meaning in the lad words,
the meaning mult be this, that the will is at li
berty to chuje 7vhat kind of good it chufes to chufe ;
fuppofing the act of cnoice itfelf determined
by an antecedent choice. The Liberty Mr. Chubb
fpeaks of, is not only a man's having power to
move his body agreably to an antecedent act of
choice, but to ufe, or exert the faculties of his
foul. Thus, in p. 379, fpeaking of the facul
ties of his mind, he lays, " Man has power, and
4< is at liberty to neglect thefe faculties, to ufe
K 2 " them
132 Inconfiftence of Mr. Chubb's Part II.
'4 them aright, or to abnfe them, as he pleafes"
And that he fuppofes an act of choice, or exer-
cife of pleafure, properly diftindt/r0^, and ante
cedent to, thofe ads thus chofen, directing, com
manding and producing the chofen acts, and even
the acts of choice themfelves, is very plain in
p. 283. " He can command his aftions-, and here-
" in confifts his Liberty •, he can give or deny
" himfelf that pleafure, as he pleafes." And p. 377.
" If the actions of men — are not the produce of a
" free choice, or election, but fpring from a- ne-
".cefTityof nature,- he cannot in reafon be
" the object of reward or puniftiment on their
(i account. Whereas, if action in man, whether
" good or evil, is the produce of will or free
" choice, i fo that a man in either cafe, had it in
" his power, and was at liberty to have CHO-
" SEN the contrary, he is the proper object of
" reward or punifnment, according as he CHU-
" SES to behave himfelf." Here, in thefe laft
words, he fpeaks of Liberty of CHUSING, accord
ing as he ChUSES. So that the behaviour which
he fpeaks of as fubject to his choice, is his cbu/ing
-itfelf, as well as his external conduct confequent
upon it. And therefore it is evident, he means
not only external actions, but the acts of choice
themfelves, when he fpeaks of all free aclions, as
the PRODUCE of free choice. And this is abun
dantly evident in what he fays in p. 372, 373.
Now thefe things imply a twofold great ab-
furdiry and inconGilence,
i. To fnppofe, as Mr. Chulb plainly does, that
'every free act of choice is commanded by, and is
the produce of free choice, is to fuppofe the firft
free act of choice belonging to the cafe, yea, the
free act of choice that ever man exerted, to
tie produce of an antecedent act of choice.
But
Sect. X. Scheme of Liberty, &c. 133
But I hope I need not labour at all to convince
my readers, that it is an abfurdity to fay, the very
frft act is the produce of another ad that went
before it.
2. If it were both poffible and real, as Mr.
Chubb infills, that every free act of choice were
the produce or the effect of a free act of choice ;
yet even then, according to his principles, no one
act of choice would be free, but every one ne-
cefTary ; becaufe, every act of choice being the
effect of a foregoing act, every act would be
neceffarily connected with that foregoing caufe.
For Mr. Chubb himfelf fays, p. 389, " When the
" felf-moving power is exerted, it becomes the
" neceflary caufe of its effects.51 So that his
notion of a free act, that is revvardable or punifh-
able, is a heap of contradictions. It is a free act,
and yet, by his own notion of freedom, is necel-
fary ; and therefore by him it is a contradiction,
to fuppofe it to be free. According to him,
every free act is the produce of a free act ; fo
that there muft be an infinite number of free
acts in fucceflion, without any beginning, in an
agent that has a beginning. And therefore here
is an infinite number of free acts, every one
of them tree ; and yet not any one of them free,
but every act in the whole infinite chain a ne-
ceiTary effect. All the acts are rewardable or
punilhable, and yet the agent cannot, in reafon,
be the object of reward or punifhment, on ac
count of any one of thefe actions. He is active
in them all, and paflive in none ; yet active in
none, but paflive in all, &c.
V. Mr. Chubb does mod ftrenuoufly deny, that
Motives are caufes of the acts of the will ; or
that the moving principle in man is moved, or
caufed to be exerted by Motives. His words, p. 388
K 3 and
1 34 Inconjtftence of Mr. Chubb's Part II.
and 389, arc, <c If the moving principle in man
" is MOVED, or CAUSED TO BE EXERT-
" ED, by fomething external to man, which all
" Motives are, then it would not be a felf-moving
*' principle, feeing it would .be moved by a prin-
" ciple external to itfelf. And to fay, that a
" felt-moving principle is MOVED, or CAU-
*' SED TO BE EXERTED, by a caufe ex-
" ternal to itfelf, is abfurd and a contradiction,
" &c." — And in the next page, it is particu
larly and largely infilled, that Motives are caufes
in no cafe, that they are meerly pa/five in the
production of attion, and have no caufality in the pro-
duttion of it, — no caufality, to be the caufe of tht
exertion of the will.
Now I defire it may be confidered, how this
can poflibly confiil with what he fays in other
places. Let it be noted here,
i . Mr. Chubb abundantly fpeaks of Motives as
excitements of the afts of the will ; and fays, that
Motives do excite volition, and induce it, and that
they are neceffary to this end ; that in the reafon
and nature of things, volition cannot tak: place
'without Motives to excite it. But now, if Motives
excite the will, they move it ; and yet he fays, it
is abfurd to fay, the will is moved by Motives.
And again (if language is of any fignifkancy at
all) if Motives excite volition, then they are the
caufe of its being excited ; and to caufe volition
to be excited, is to caufe it to be put forth or ex
erted. Yea, Mr. Chubb fays himfelf, p. 3 1 7, Mo
tive is neceffary to the exertion of the active fa
culty. To excite, is pofitively to d& fomething ;
and certainly that which does fomething, is the
caufe of the thing done by it. To create, is to
caufe to be created ; to make, is to caufe to be
made \
Sect. X. Scheme of Liberty ', &c. 135
made ; to kill, is to caufe to be killed ; to quicken,
is to caufe to be quickened ; and to excite^ is to
caufe to be excited. To excite, is to be a caufe, in
the moil proper fenfe, not meerly a negative oc-
cafion, but a ground of exiftence by politive in
fluence. The notion of exciting, is exerting in
fluence to caufe the effect to arife or come forth
into exiftence.
2. Mr. Cbulb himfelf, p. 317, fpeaks of Mo
tives as the ground and reafon of adlion BY
INFLUENCE, and BY PREVAILING IN
FLUENCE. Now, what can be meant by a
caufe, but fomething that is the ground and rea
fon of a thing by its influence, an influence that
is prevalent and fo effectual ?
3. This author not only fpeaks of Motives as
the ground and reafon of action, by prevailing
influence ; but exprefsly of their influence as pre
vailing FOR THE PRODUCTION of an ac
tion, in the fame p. 317 : which makes the in-
confirtency flili more palpable and notorious.
The production of an effect is certainly the caufing
of an effect ; and productive influence is caufal in~
fiuence^ if any thing is ; and that which has this
influence pevalently, fo as thereby to become the
ground of another thing, is a caufe of that thing,
if there be any fuch thing as a caufe. This in
fluence, Mr. Chubb fays, Motives have to produce
an action ; and yet, he fays, it is abfurd and a
contradiction, to fay they are caufes.
4. In the fame page, he once and again fpeaks
of Motives as di/pofing the Agent to action, ly
their influence. His words are thefe : "As Mo
" tive, which takes place in the underftanding,
" and is the product of intelligence, is NECES-
K 4 « SARY
-136 Inconfiflence of Mr. Chubb's, Sec. Part II.
" SARY to adion, that is, to the EXERTION
6 of the active faculty, becauie that faculty
" would not be exerted without fome PREVI-
c OUS REASON to DISPOSE the mind to
" a&ion ; fo from hence it plainly appears, that
" when a man is faid to be difpofed to one action
" rather than another, this properly fignifies the
" PREVAILING INFLUENCE that one Mo
c tive has upon a man FOR THE PRODUC-
" TION of an action, or for the being at reft,
" before all other Motives, for the production of
" the contrary. For as Motive is the ground
" and realbn of any action, fo the Motive that
" prevails, DISPOSES the agent to the perform-
" ance of that action."
Now. if Motives difpofc the mind to adlion,
then they caufe the mind to be difpofed : and to
caufe the mind to be difpofed is to caufe it to be
willing; and to caufe it to be willing is to caufe
it to will ; and that is the fame thing as to be the
caufe of an act of the will. And yet this fame
Mr. Chubb holds it to be abfurd, to fuppofe Mo
tive to be a caufe of the act of the will.
And if we compare thefe things together, we
have here again a whole heap of inconfiftences.
Motives are the previous ground and reafon of the
acts of the will ; yea, the neceffary ground and
reafon of their exertion, without which they will not
be exerted, and cannot, in the nature of things, take
place ; and they do excite thefe acts of the will,
and do this by a prevailing influence ; yea, an in
fluence which prevails for the production of the aft of
the will, and for the difpofing of the mind to it •,
and yet it is abfurd, to fuppofe Motive to be a caufe
of an act of the will, or that a principle of will
is moved or caufed to be exerted by it, or that it has
any
Sect XL GOD certainly foreknows, &?c. 137
any caufality in the production of it9 or any caufality
to be the caufe of the exertion of the will.
A due confideration of thefe things which
Mr. Chubb has advanced, the flrange inconfift-
ences which the notion of Liberty, confifting in
the will's power of felf-determination void of all
necefiity, united with that dictate of common
fenfe, that there can be no volition without a
Motive, drove him into, may be fufficient to con
vince us, that it is utterly impofiible ever to make
that notion of Liberty confiftent with the influ
ence of Motives in volition. And as it is in a
manner felf-evident, that there can be no act of
will, choice, or preference of the mind, without
fonie Motive or inducement, ibmething in the
mind's view, which it aims at, feeks, inclines to,
and goes after •, fo it is moil manifeft, there is no
fuch Liberty in the univerfe as Arminians infift on j
nor any fuch thing pofllble, or conceivable.
SECTION XL
<The Evidence of GOD's certain Foreknowledge
of the Volitions of moral Agents.
H AT the acts of the wills of moral Agents
are not contingent events, in that fenie, as
to be without all neceffity, appears by God's cer
tain Foreknowledge of fuch events.
In handling this argument, I would in
place prove, that God has a certain Foreknow
ledge of the voluntary acts of moral Agents ; and
fecondly, Ihew the confequence, or how it follows
from hence, that the Volitions of moral Agents
are
138 GOD certainly foreknows Part IT.
are not contingent, ib as to be without necefllty
of connection and confequence.
FIRST, I am to prove, that God has an abfo-
lute and certain Foreknowledge of the free ac
tions of moral Agents.
One would think, it ihould be wholly needlefs
to enter on fuch an argument with any that pro-
fefs themfelves Chriftians : but fo it is ; God's
certain Foreknowledge of the free acts of moral
Agents, is denied by fome that pretend to believe
the Scriptures to be the Word of God ; and
cfpecially of late. I therefore fhall confider the
evidence of fuch a prefcience in the Mofl High,
as fully as the defigned limits of this eflay will ad .
mit of; fuppofing myfelf herein to have to do
with fuch as own the truth of the Bible.
ARG. I. My /r/? argument fhall be taken from
God's -prediction of fuch events. Here I would,
in the firil place, lay down thefe two things as
axioms.
(i.) If God does not foreknow, He cannot fore
tell fuch events ; that is, He cannot peremptorily
and certainly foretell them. If God has no more
than an uncertain guefs concerning events of this
kind, then He can declare no more than an un
certain guefs. Positively to foretell, is to profefs
to foreknow, or declare pofitive Foreknowlege.
(2.) If God does not certainly foreknow the fu
ture Volitions of moral Agents, then neither can
He certainly foreknow thole events which are con-
fequent and dependent on thefe Volitions. The
cxiftence of the one depending on the exigence of
the other, the knowledge of the exiftence of the
one
Sect. XL the Volitions of moral Agents. 139
one depends on the knowledge of the exiftence
of the other ; and the one cannot be more cer
tain than the other.
Therefore, how many, how great, and how ex-
tenfive foever the confequences of the Volitions
of moral Agents may be j though they mould
extend to an alteration of the flate of things thro*
the univerfe, and fhould be continued in a feries
of fuccefiive events to all eternity, and mould in
the progrefs of things branch forth into an in
finite number of feries, each of them going on
in an endlefs line or chain of events ; God mull
be as ignorant of all thefe confequences, as He is
of the Volition whence they fir ft take their rife :
all thefe events, and the whole ftate of things de
pending on them, how important, extenfive and
vaft foever, mufl be hid from him.
Thefe portions being fuch as, I fuppofe, none
will deny, I now proceed to obferve the follow
ing things.
i. Men's moral conduct and qualities, their
virtues and vices, their wickednefs and good
pra&ice, things rewardable and punifhable, have
often been foretold by God. — Pharaoh's moral
conduct, in refilling to obey God's command, in
letting his people go, was foretold. God fays to
Mofes, Exod. iii. 19. I am fetre, that the King of
Egypt will not let you go. Here God profefles
not only to guefs at, but to know Pharoah's fu
ture difobedience. In chap. vii. 4, God fays, but
Pharaoh Jhatt not hearken unto you ; that 1 may lay
mine hand upon Egypt, &:c. And chap. ix. 30,
Mofes fays to Pharaoh, as for thse^ and thy few ants ^
I KNOW that ye will not fear the Lord. See alfo
chap. xi. 9, — The moral, conduct of Jofiah, by
name.
140 GOD certainly foreknows Part II.
name, in his zealoufly exerting himfelf in oppo-
fition to idolatry, in particular acts of his, was
foretold above three hundred years before he was
born, and the prophecy fealed by a miracle, and
renewed and confirmed by the v/ords of a fecond
prophet, as what lurely would not fail, i Kings xiii.
i 6, 32. This prophecy was alfo in effect
a prediction of the moral conduct of the people,
in upholding their fchifmatical and idolatrous
worfhip until that time, and the idolatry of thofe
priefts of the high places, which it is foretold
jfefiab mould offer upon that altar of BetbeL
Mlcaiah foretold the foolifh and finful conduct of
Abctb, in refufing to hearken to the Word of the
Lord by him, and chufing rather to hearken to the
falfe prophets, in going to Ramotb-Gilead to his
ruin, i Kings xxi. 20,— 22. — The moral con
duct of Hazad was foretold, in that cruelty he
fhould be guilty of; on which Hazael fays, What,
is tby fervant a dog, that he Jbould do this thing !
The prophet fpeaks of the event as what he knew,
and not what he conjectured, 2 Kings viii. 12.
/ know the evil that thou wilt do unto the children of
Ifrael : Tbou wilt dajh their children, and rip up their
women with child — The moral conduct of Cyrus
is foretold, long before he had a being, in his
mercy to God's people, and regard to the true
God, in turning the captivity of the Jews, and
promoting the building of the Temple, Ifai. xliv.
28. and Ixv. 13. Compare 2 Chron. xxxvi 22, 23.
and Ezra i. i, — 4. — How many in fiances of the
moral conduct of the Kings of the North and South,
particular inftances of the wicked behaviour of
the Kings of Syria and Egypt, are foretold in the
xith chapter of Daniel? Their corruption, vio
lence, robbery, treachery, and lies. And par
ticularly, how much is foretold of the horrid
wickednefs of Antiochus Efipbanes9 called there
a vile
Sect. XI. the Volitions of moral Agents. 141
a vile per/on, inflead of Epiphanes, or illuftrious.
In that chapter, and alfo in chap. viii. ver. 9,
14, 23, to the end, are foretold his flattery,
deceit and lies, his having his heart fet to do
mifchief, and let again/I the holy covenant, his de-
ftroying and treading under foot the holy people, in a
marvellous manner, his having indignation againjl
the holy covenant, Jetting his heart againjl it, and
confpiring againjl it, his polluting the J'anftuary of
ftrength, treading it under foot, taking away the
daily facrijice, and placing the abomination that ma-
keth defolate ; his great pride, magnifying himfelf
again/I God, and uttering marvellous blafphemies
againjl Him, until God in indignation Jhould de-
Jlroy him. Withal, the moral conduct of the
Jews, on occafion of his perfecution, is predicted.
It is foretold, that he Jhould corrupt many by flat
teries, chap. xi. 32, — 34. But that others mould
behave with a glorious conftancy and fortitude,
in oppofition to him, ver. 32. And that fome
good men fhould fall and repent, ver. 35. Chrift
foretold Peter's fin, in denying his Lord, with
its circumftances, in a peremptory manner. And
fo, that great fin of Judas, in betraying his maf-
ter, and its dreadful and eternal punimment in
hell, was foretold in the like pofitive manner,
Matt. xxvi. 21, — 25. and parallel places in the
other Evangelifls.
2. Many events have been foretold by God,
which are confequent and dependent on the mo
ral conduct of particular perfons, and were ac-
complilhed, either by their virtuous or vicious
actions. — Thus, the children of Ifrael's going
down into Egypt to dwell there, was foretold to
Abraham, Gen. xv. which was brought about by
the wickednefs of Jofeph's brethren in felling him,
and the wickednefs of Jofeph's miftrefs, and his
own
142 GOD certainly foreknows Part II.
own fignal virtue in refilling her temptation.
The accomplifhment of the thing prefigured in
Jofeptfs dream, depended on the fame moral
conduct. Jotkam's parable and prophecy, Judges
ix. 15, — 20. was accomplifhed by the wicked
conduct of Abimelecb, and the men of Sbecbem.
The prophecies againft the houfe of £//, i Sam.
chap, ii. and iii. were accomplifhed by the wick-
ednefs of Doeg the Edomite, in accufing the pricfls;
and the great impiety, and extreme cruelty of
Saul in deflroying th pr.ih at Nob. i Sam.xxii.
—Nathan's prophecy againfl David, 2 Sam. xii.
n, 12. was fulfilled by the horrible wickednefs
of Abfalom^ in rebelling againft his father, feck-
ing his life, and lying with his concubines in
the fight of the fun. The prophecy againfl Sa
lomon, i Kings xi. n, — 13: was fulfilled by Je
roboam's rebellion and ufurpation, which are fpo-
ken of as his wickednefs, 2 Chron. xiii. 5, 6.
compare ver. 18. The prophecy againft Jero
boam's family, i Kings xiv. was fulfilled by the
confpiracy, trcafon, and cruel murders of Baa-
Jha, 2 Kings xv. 27, &c. The predictions of the
prophet Jehu againft the houfe of Baafha^ i Kings
xvi. at the beginning, were fulfilled by the
treafon and parricide of Zimri, i Kings xvi. 9, —
13, 20.
3. How often has God foretold the future mo
ral conduct of nations and people, of numbers,
bodies, and fucceflions of men : with God's ju
dicial proceedings, and many other events con-
fequent and dependent on their virtues and vices ;
which could not be foreknown, if the Volitions
of men, wherein they acted as moral Agents, had
not been forefeen ? The future cruelty of the
Egyptians in oppreffing Ifrael9 and God's judging
and punifhing them for it, was foretold long be-
i fore
Sect. XL tfo Volitions of moral Agents. 1 43
fore it came to pafs, Gen. xv. 13, 14. The con
tinuance of the iniquity of the Amorites, and the
increafe of it until itjbould be full, and they ripe
for deftruction, was foretold above four hundred
years before -hand, Gen. xv. 16. Afts vii. 6, 7.
The prophecies of the deftruction of Jerufalem,
and the land of Judah, were abfolute ; 2 Kings
xx. 17, — 19. chap. xxii. 15, to the end. It
was foretold in Hezekiah's time, and was abun
dantly infifted on in the book of the prophet Ifaiahf
who wrote nothing after Hezekiab's days. It was
foretold in Jojiah's time, in the beginning of a
great reformation, 2 Kings xxii. And it is manifeil
by innumerable things in the prediction of the
prophets, relating to this event, its time, its
circumftances, its continuance and end ; the re
turn from the captivity, the reiteration of the
temple, city and land, and many circumftances,
and confequences of that ; I fay, thefe Ihew
plainly, that the prophecies of this great event
were abfolute. And yet this event was connected
with, and dependent on two things in men's
moral conduct : firft, the injurious rapine and
violence of the king of Babylon and his people,
as the efficient caufe; which God often fpeaks of
as what he highly refented, and would feverely
punifli; and 2dly, the final obltinacy of the
yews. That great event is often fpoken of as
fufpended on this, Jer. iv. i. and v. i. vii, i, — 7.
xi. i, — 6. xvii. 24, to the end. xxv. i, — 7. xxvi.
i, — 8, 13. and xxxviii. 17, 18. Therefore this
destruction and captivity could not be foreknown,
unlefs fuch a moral conduct of the Chaldeans and
Jews had been foreknown. And then it was fore
told, that the people Jhould be finally obftinate, to
the deitruction and utter defolation of the city
and land. I/at. vi. 9, — n. Jer. i. 18, 19. vii.
27, — 29. Ezek. iii. 7. and xxiv. 13, 14.
The
144 GOD certainly foreknows. Part IT*
The final obftinacy of thofe Jews who were
left in the land of Ifrael^ in their idolatry and re
jection of the true God, was foretold by God, and
the prediction confirmed with an oath, Jer. xliv.
26, 27. And God tells the people, Ifai. xlviii. 3.
4, — 8. that he had predided thofe things which
ihould be confeqnent on their treachery'and ob-
ftinacy, becaufe he knew they would be obfti-
nate ; and that he had declared thefe things be
fore-hand, for their conviction of his being the
only true God, &c.
The deftruction of Babylon^ with many of the
circumilances of it, was foretold, as the judg
ment of God for the exceeding pride and haugh-
tinefs of the heads of that monarchy, Nebuchad
nezzar ', and his fucceflbrs, and their wickedly
deftroying other nations, and particularly for their
exalting themfelves againft the true God and his
people, before any of thefe monarchs had a be
ing ; Ifai. chap, xiii, xiv, xlvii : compare Hab
it ak. ii. 5, to the end, and Jer. chap. 1. and 15.
That Baby lot? s deft ruction was to be a recompence,
according to the works of their own hands^ appears
by Jer. xxv. 14. The immorality with which
the people of Babylon, and particularly her princes
and great men, were guilty of, that very night
that the city was deilroyed, their revelling and
drunken nefs at Balfhazzar's idolatrous feaft, was
foretold, Jer. li. 39, 57.
The return of the Jews from the Balylonljh
captivity is often very particularly foretold, with
many circumitances, and the promifes of it are
very peremptory ; Jer. xxxi. 35, — 40. and xxxii,
6, — 15, 41, — 44. and xxxiii. 24, — 26. And the
very time of their return was prefixed ; Jer.
2 xxv.
Sect. XL the Volitions of moral -dgents.
xxv. ii, 12. and xxix. 10, n. 2 Chron. xxxvi.
21. EzeL'iv. 6. and Dan. ix. 2. And yet the
prophecies reprefent their return as confequent
on their repentance. And their repentance it-
felf is very exprefsly and particularly foretold,
Jer. xxix. 12, 13, 14. xxxi. 8, 9, 18,- — 31. xxxiii.
8. 1. 4, 5. Ezek. vi. 8, 9, 10. vii. 16. xiv. 22, 23.
and xx. 43, 44.
It was foretold under the Old Teftament, that
the Median fhould fuffer greatly through the ma
lice and cruelty of men ; as is largely and fully
-let forth, Pfal. xxii. applied to Chrift in the New
Teftament, Matt, xxvii. 35, 43. Luke xxiii. 34.
John xix. 24. Heb. ii. 12. And likewife in Pfal.
Ixix. which, it is alfo evident by the New Tefta-
jnent, is fpoken of Chrift ; John xv. 25. vii. 5,
&V. and ii. 17. Ram. xv. $.Matt. xxvii. 34, 48.
Mark xv. 23. John xix. 29. The fame thing is
alfo foretold, Ifai. liii. and 1. 6. and Me. v. i.
This cruelty of men was their fin, and what
they acted as moral Agents. It was foretold,
that there fhould be an union of Heathen and
Jewifh rulers againft Chrift, Pfal. ii. i, 2. com
pared with Atts iv. 25,— 28. It was foretold^ that
the Jews fhould generally reject and defpiie the
Meffiah, Ifai. xiix. 5, 6, 7. and liii. i, — 3. Pfal.
xxii. 6, 7. and Ixix. 4, 8, 19, 20. And it was
foretold, that the body of that nation ftiould be
rejected in the Mefliah's days, from being God's
people, for their obftinacy in fin ; Ifai. xlix. 4,
• — 7. and viii. 14, 15, 16. compared with Rom.
x. 19, and Ifai. Ixv. at the beginning, compared
with Rom. x. 20, 21. It was foretold, that Chrift
Ihould be rejected by the chief priefts and rulers
among the Jezvs* Pfalm cxviii. 22. compared with
Matt* xxi. 42. 4&i iv, ii. i Pet. ii. 4, 7.
L Chrift
146 GOD certainly foreknows Part II.
Chritl himfelf foretold his being delivered into
the hands of the elders, chief prieih and fcribes,
and his being cruelly treated by them, and con
demned to death ; and that He by them fhould be
delivered to the Gentiles : and that He fhould be
mocked and fcourged, and crucified, (Matt. xvi. 21.
and xx. 17, — 19. Luke ix. 22. John viii. 28.) and
that the people mould be concerned in and con-
fenting to his death, (Luke xx. 13, — 18.) efpeci-
ally the Inhabitants of'Jeritfalem -9 Luke xiii. 33,
— 35. He foretold, [that the difciples mould all
be offended becaufe of Him that night that he
was betrayed, and mould forfake him ; Matt. xxvi.
31. John xvi. 32. He foretold, that He mould
be rejected of that generation, even the body of
the people, and that they mould continue obfti*
nate, to their ruin-, Matt. xii. 45. xxi. 33, — 42.
and xxii. i, — 7. Luke xiii. 16, 21, 24. xvii. 25.
xix. 14, 27, 41, — 44. xx. 13,— ^-i 8. and xxiiu
34>— 39-
As it was foretold in both Old Teflament and
New, that the Jews mould reject the Mefliah, fo
it was foretold that the Gentiles mould receive
Him, and fo be admitted to the privileges of
God's people ; in places too many to be now par
ticularly mentioned.. It was foretold in the Old
Teftament, that the Jews mould envy the Gentiles
on this account ; Deut. xxxii. 2 1 . compared with
Rom. x. 19. Chrift himfelf often foretold, that
the Gentiles would embrace the true religion, and
become his followers and people-, Matt. viii. 10,
n, 12. xxi. 41, — 43. and xxii. 8,— ip. Lukexii].
28. xiv, 1 6, — 24. and xx. 16. John*. 16. He
alfo foretold the Jews envy of the Gentiles on this
occafion ; Matt. xx. 12, — 16. Luke xv. 26, to
the end. He foretold, that they fhould continue
in this oppofition and envy, and mould mani-
fcft
Sect. XL the Volitions of moral Agents. 147
fefl it in the cruel perfections of his followers^
to their utter deftruction ; Matt. xxi. 33, — 42.
xxii. 6, and xxiii. 34, — 39. Luke xi. 49, — 51.
The Jews obflinacy is alfo foretold, Affs xxii. 18.
Chrifl often foretold the great perfections his
followers fhould meet with, both from Jews and
Gentiles; Matt. x. 16, — 18, 21, 22, 34, — 36, and
xxiv. 9. Mark xiii. 9. Z.«fo x. 3. xii. 1 i, 49, — 53.
and xxi. 12, 16, 17. John xv. 18, — 21. and xvi.
I, — 4. 20, — 22, 23. He foretold the martyr
dom of particular perfons ; Matt. xx. 23. John
xiii. 36. and xxi. 18, 19,22. He foretold the
great fuccefs of the Gofpel in the city of Samaria,
as near approaching ; which afterwards was ful
filled by the preaching of Philip, John iv. 35, —
38. He foretold the rifing of many deceivers
after his departure. Matt. xxiv. 4, 5, 1 1 . and the
apoilacy of many of his profefTed followers ;
Matt. xxiv. 10, — 12.
The perfections, which the apoflle Paul was
to meet with in the world, were foretold •, Atts
ix. 1 6. — xx. 23, and xxi. n. The apoftle fays
to the Chriftian Epbejians, Acts xx. 29, 30. 1 'know ,
that after my departure JJoall grievous wolves enter in
among you, not fparing the flock : alfo of your own
f elves Jhall men arife, freaking perverje things , to draw
away difciples after them. The apoftle fays, He
knew this : but he did not know it, if God did
not know the future actions of moral Agents.
4. Unlefs God foreknows the future acts of
moral Agents, all the prophecies we have in
Scripture concerning the great Antichriftian apo
ilacy : the rife, reign, wicked qualities, and
deeds of the wan of Jin , and his instruments and
adherents ; the extent and long continuance of
L 2 his
148 GOD certainly foreknows Part II.
his dominion, his influence on the minds of
princes and others, to corrupt them, and draw
them away to idolatry, and other foul vices ; his
great and cruel persecutions ; the behaviour of
the faints under thefe great temptations, &cc. &c.
I fay, nnlefs the Volitions' of moral Agents are
forefeen, all thefe prophecies are uttered without
knowing the things foretold. *
The predictions relating to this great apoftacy
are all of a moral nature, relating to men's vir
tues and vices, and their exercifes, fruits and
confequences, and events depending on them ;
and are very particular ; and inofl of them often
repeated, with many precife characteristics, de-
fcriptions, and limitations of qualities, conduct,
Influence, effects, extent, duration, periods, cir-
pjmftances, final hTue, &c. which it \vould be
very long to mention particularly. And to fnp-
pofe, all thefe arc predicted by God without any
certain knowledge of the future moral behaviour
of free Agents, would be to the utmoft degree
abfurd.
5. Unlefs God foreknows the future acts of
men's wills, and their behaviour as irioral Agents,
all thofe great things which are foretold in
both Old Teilamcnt and New concerning the
erection, eftablifhment, and univerfal extent of
the Kingdom of the Meffiah^ were predicted and
promifed while God was in ignorance whether
any of thefe things would come to pafs or no, and
did but guefs at them. For that kingdom is not
of this world, it does not confiil in things exter
nal, but is within men, and confifts in the do
minion of virtue in their hearts, in righteouf-
nefs, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghoft;
and in thefe things made manifeft in practice, to
the
Sect. XL tie Volitions of moral Agents. 149
the praife and glory of God. The Meffiah came
tofave men from their fins, and deliver them from
their fpi ritual enemies ; that they might ferve him in
rightecufnefs and holinefs before him : he gave him-
f elf for «/, that he might redeem us from all iniquity ,
and purify unto himfelf a peculiar people , zealous of
good works. And therefore his fuccefs confifts in
gaining men's hearts to virtue, in their being
made God's willing people in the day of his power.
His conqueft of his enemies confifts in his vic
tory over men's corruptions and vices. And fuch
fuccefs, fuch victory, and fuch a reign and do
minion is often exprefsly foretold: that his king
dom Jhall fill the earth ; that all people, nations
and languages JJjould ferve and obey him : and fo
that all nations Jhould go up to the mountain of the
Houfe of the Lord, that he might teach them his
ways, and that they might walk in his paths : and
that all men Jhould be drawn to Chrift, and the earth
be full of the knowledge of the Lord (by which, in
the ftyle of Scripture, is meant true virtue and
religion) as the waters cover the feas ; that God9 3
law Jlwuld be put into men's inward parts, and writ
ten in their hearts -, and that God's people Jhould be
all righteous-, >&c. &c.
A very great part of the prophecies of the
Old Teftament is taken up in fuch predictions as
thefe. — And here I would obferve, that the pro
phecies of the univerfal prevalence of the king
dom of the Mefliah, and true religion of Jefus
Chrift, are delivered in the moft peremptory man
ner, and confirmed by the oath of God, If at. xlv.
22, to the end, Look to me, and be ye faved, all the
ends of the earth -, for I am God, and there is none
fife. I have SWORN by my Self, the word is gone
out of my mouth in right eoufnefs, and Jhall not re-
that unto Me every knee Jhall bow ; and every
L 3 tongue
150 GOD certainly foreknows Part II.
tongue Jhatt fwear. SURELT, jhall one fay ', in the
Lord have I righteoufnefs and ftrength : even to Him
Jkall men come, &c. But here this peremptory de
claration, and great oath of the Moft High, are
delivered with fuch mighty folemnity, to things
which God did not know, if he did not certainly
forefee the Volitions of moral Agents.
And all the predictions of Chrift and his apof-
tles, to the like purpofe, muft be without know
ledge : as thofe of our Saviour comparing the
kingdom of God to a grain of muftard-feed,
growing exceeding great, from a fmall begin
ning; and to leaven, hid in three meafures of
meal, until the whole was leavened, &c. And
the prophecies in the epiftles concerning the
reftoration of the nation of the Jews to the true
church of God, and the bringing in the fulnefs
of the Gentiles ; and the prophecies in all the Re-
relation concerning the glorious change in the
moral ftate of the world of mankind, attending
the deftru&ion of Antichrift, the kingdoms of the
world becoming the kingdoms of our Lord and of his
Chrift ; and its being granted to the church to le ar
rayed in that fine linen, white and clean, which is the
righteoufnefs of faints, &c.
Corol. i. Hence that great promife,and oath of
God to Abraham, Ifaac and Jacob, fo much cele
brated in Scripture, both in the Old Teftament
q.nd New, namely 5 That in their feed all the na
tions and families of the earth fhould be bleffed, muft
be made on uncertainties, if God does not cer
tainly foreknow the Volitions of moral Agents.
For the fulfilment of this promife confifts in that
fuccefs of Chrift in the work of redemption, and
that fetting up of his fpiritual kingdom over the
pations of the .world, which has been fpoken of.
Men,
.
Sect XL ih'e 'Volitions of moral Agents*. 151
Men are llejfed in Chrift no otherwife than as they
are brought to acknowledge Him, truft in Him,
love and ferve Him, as is' represented and pre-
di&ed in Pfal. Ixxii. n. All Kings Jhall fall down
before Him ; all nations Jhall ferve Him. With
ver. 17. Men flail be bleffed in Him\ all nations
jhall call Him blejjed. This oath to Jacob and
Abraham is fulfilled in fubduing men's iniquities-,
as is implied in that of the prophet Micab, chap,
vii. 19, 20.
Corol 2. Hence alfo it appears, that firft gof-
pel-promife that ever was made to mankind, that
great prediction of the falvation of the Mefiiah,
and his victory over Satan, made to our firlt pa
rents, Gen. iii, 15. if there be no certain prefci-
ence of the Volitions of moral Agents, muft
have no better foundation than conjecture. For
Chrift's victory over Satan confifts in men's be
ing faved from fin, and in the vi&ory of virtue
and holinefs, over that vice and wickednefs,
which Satan, by his temptation has introduced^
and wherein his kingdom confifts.
6. If it be fo, that God has not a prefcience of
the future actions of moral Agents, it will fol
low, that the prophecies of Scripture in general
are without Fore- knowledge. For Scripture-pro
phecies, almoft all of them, it not univerfally
without any exception, are either predictions of
the actings and behaviours of moral Agents, or
of events depending on them, or fome way con
nected with them; judicial difpenfations, judg
ments on men for their wickednefs, or rewards
of virtue and righteoufnefs, remarkable mani-
feflations of favour to the righteous, or mani-
feftations of fovereign mercy to fmners, forgiving
their iniquities, and magnifying the riches of cti-
L 4. yinq
152 GOJ) certainly foreknows Part II.
vine Grace ; or difpenfations of Providence, in
fome refpedl or other, relating to the conduct of
the fubjects of God's moral government, wifely
adapted thereto ^ either providing for what mould
be in a future itate of things, through the Voli
tions and voluntary aftions of moral Agents, or
confequent upon them, and regulated and ordered
according to them. So that all events that are
foretold, are either moral events, or other events
which are connected with, and accommodated
to moral events.
That the predictions of Scripture in general
muft be without knowledge, if God does not fore-
fee the Volitions of men, will further appear, if it
be confidered, that almoft all events belonging
to the future flate of the world of mankind, the
changes and revolutions which come to pafs in
empires,, kingdoms, and nations, and all fq-
fieties, depend innumerable ways on the acts of
men's wills; yea, on an in-numerable multitude
of millions of millions of Volitions of mankind.
Such is the ilate and courfe of things in the world
of mankind, that one fingle event, which appears
in itfelf exceeding inconliderable, may, in the
progrefs and feries of things, occafion a fuccefllon
of the greateft and moft important and extenfive
events ; caufing the ftate of mankind to be vaftly
different from what it would otherwife have been,
for all fucceeding generations.
For inftance, the coming into exigence of thofe
particular men, who have been the great con
querors of the world, which, under God, have
had the main hand in all the confequent flate of
the world, in, all after-ages ; fuch as Nebuchad-
Mzzar, Cyrus, Alexander •, Pompey, Julius C<efary &c.
Undoubtedly depended on many millions of ads
of
Sect. XI. the Volitions of moral Agents. 153
of the will, which followed, and were occafioneot
one by another, in their parents. And perhaps
mod of thefe Volitions depended on millions of
Volitions of hundreds and thonfands of others,
their contemporaries of the fame generation ; and
moft of thefe on millions of millions of Volitions
of others in preceding generations. — As we go
back, ftill the number of Volitions, which were
fome way the occafion of the event, multiply as
the branches of a river, until they come at laft,
as ic were, to an infinite number. This will not
feetn ftrange, to any one who well confiders the
matter ; if we recollect what philofophers tell us
of the innumerable multitudes of thofe things
which are, as it were, the principle or ftamma
•vita * concerned in generation ; the ammalcula in
femen mafculo, and the ova in the womb of the
female ; the impregnation, or animating of one
of thefe in diftinction from all the reft, muft de
pend on things infinitely minute, relating to the
time and circumftances of the act of the pa*
rents, the ftate of their bodies, &c. which muft
depend on innumerable foregoing circumftances
and occurrences ; which muft depend, infinite
ways, on foregoing acts of their wills ; which
are occafioned by innumerable things that happen
in the courfe of their lives, in which their own,
and their neighbour's behaviour, muft have a
hand, an infinite number of ways. And as the
Volitions of others muft be fo many ways con
cerned in the conception and birth of fuch men ;
fo, no lefs, in their prefervation, and circum
ftances of life, their particular determinations
and actions, on which the great revolutions they
were the occafions of, depended. As, for inftance,
when the confpirators in Per/la^ againft the Magi%
were confulting about a fucceflion to the empire,
it came into the mind of one of them, to propofe,
that
ij4 GOD certainly foreknows Part II.
that he whofe horfe neighed firft, when they came
together the next morning, fhould be king. Now
luch a thing's coming into his mind, might de
pend on innumerable incidents, wherein the Voli
tions of mankind had been concerned. But, in
confcquence of this accident, Darius, the fon of
Hiftafpes, was king. And if this had not been,
probably his fucceflbr would not have been the
lame, and all the circumflances of the Perfian
empire might have been far other wife. And then
perhaps Alexander might never have conquered
that empire. And then probably the circum-
liances of the world in all fucceeding ages, might
have been vaflly otherwife. I might further in-
flance in many other occurrences ; fuch as thofe
on w;hich depended Alexander's prefervarion, in
the many critical junctures of his life, wherein
a fmall trifle would have turned the fcale againft
him ; and the prefervation and fuccefs of the Ro
man people, in the infancy of their kingdom and
common-wealth, and afterwards ; which all the
fucceeding changes in their Hate, and the mighty
revolutions that afterwards came to pafs in the
habitable world, depended upon. But thefc
hints may be fufficient for every difcerning confi-
derate perfon, to convince him, that the whole
iiate of the world of mankind, in all ages, and
the very being of every perfon who has ever lived
in it, in every age, fince the times of the an
cient prophets, has depended on more Volitions,
or acts of the wills of men, than there are fands
on the fea-fhore.
And therefore, unlefs God does molt exactly
and perfectly forefee the future acts of men's
v/ills, all the predictions which he ever uttered
concerning David, Hezekiah, Jofiab, Nebuchad
nezzar, Cyrus, Alexander ; concerning the four mo-
narchiesa
Sett. XI. the Volitions of moral Agents. 1 55
narchies, and the revolutions in them ; and con
cerning all the wars, commotions, victories, pro-
fperities and calamities, of any of the kingdoms,
nations or communities of the world, have all
been without knowledge.
So that, according to this notion of God's not
forefeeing the Volitions and free actions of men,
God could forefee nothing appertaining to the flate
of the world of mankind in future ages ; not fo
much as the being of one perfon that mould live
in it ; and could foreknow no events, but only
fuch as He would bring to pals Himfelf by
the extraordinary interpofition of his immediate
power ; or things which fhould come to pafs in
the natural material world, by the laws of mo
tion, and courfe of nature, wherein that is inde
pendent on the actions or works of mankind :
that is, as he might, like a very able mathema
tician and aftronomer, with great exactnefs cal
culate the revolutions of the heavenly bodies,
and the greater wheels of the machine of the ex
ternal creation.
* And if we clofely confider the matter, there
will appear reafon to convince us, that he could
not, with any abfolute certainty forefee even thele.
As to the firftt namely, things done by the im
mediate and extraordinary interpofition of God's
power, thefe cannot be forefeen, unlefs it can be
forefeen when there ihall be occafion for fuch ex
traordinary interpofition. And that cannot be
forefeen, unlefs the ftate of the moral world can
be forefeen. For whenever God thus interpofes,
it is with regard to the ftate of the moral world,
requiring fuch divine interpofition. Thus God
could not certainly forefee the univerfal deluge,
the calling of Abraham, the deftruction of Sodom
and
GOD certainly foreknows Part II.
and Gomorrah, the plagues on Egypt, and IfraeFs
redemption out of it, the expelling the feven
nations of Canaan, and the bringing Jfrael into*
that, land ; for thefe all are reprefented as con
nected with things belonging to the ftate of the
moral world. Nor can God foreknow the moft
proper and convenient time of the day of judg
ment and general conflagration ; for that chiefly
depends on the courfe and ftate of things in the
moral world.
Nor, Secondly, can we on this fuppofition rea-
fonably think, that God can certainly forefee what
things mall come to pafs, in the courfe of things,
in the natural and material world, even thofe
which in an ordinary ftate of things might be
calculated by a good aftronomer. For the mo
ral world is the end of the natural world ; and
the courfe of things in the former, is undoubt
edly fnbordinate to God's defigns with refpect
to the latter. Therefore he has feen caufe, from
regard to the ftate of things in the moral world,
extraordinarily to interpofe, to interrupt and
lay an arreft on the courfe of things in the na
tural world ; and even in the greater wheels of
ks motion ; even fo as to flop the fun in its
courfe. And unlefs he can forefee the Volitions
of men, and fo know fomething of the future
ftate of the moral world, He cannot know but
that he may ftill have as great occaiion to inter
pofe in this manner, as ever he had : nor can He
forefee how, or when, He mail have occafion
thus to interpofe.
CoroL i. It appears from the things which
have been obierved, that unlefs God forefees the
Volitions of moral Agents, that cannot be true
which is obfcrved by the apoftle James 3 Acts xv.
Sect. XI. tie Volitions of moral Agents. 157
1 8. Known unto God are all bis works from the be
ginning of the world.
Corol. 2. It appears from what has been ob-
ferved, that unlefs God foreknows the Volitions
of moral Agents, all the prophecies of Scripture
have no better foundation than meer conjec
ture ; and That, in mod inftances, a conjecture
which muft have the utmoft uncertainty -9 de
pending on an innumerable, and, as k were, in
finite multitude of Volitions, which are all, even
to God, uncertain events : however, thefe pro
phecies are delivered as abfolute predictions, and
very many of them in the moft pofitive manner,
with afleverations ; and fome of them with the
moil folermi oaths.
CoroL 3. It alfo follows, from what has been
obferved, that if this notion of God's ignorance
ot future Volitions be true, in vain did Chriftfay
(after uttering many great and important predic
tions, concerning God's moral kingdom, and
things depending on men's moral actions) Matt.
xx iv. 35. Heaven and earth Jhall pafs away ; but
my wordsfoall not pajs way.
Corol. 4. From the fame notion of God's igno
rance, it would follow, that in vain has God Him-
felf often fpoken of the predictions of his word,
as evidences of Foreknowledge ; and fo as evi
dences of that which is his prerogative as GOD,
and his peculiar glory, greatly diftingurming
Him from all other beings-, as in Ifai. xli. 22. — 26.
xliii. 9, 10. xliv. S.xlv. 21. xlvi. 10. andxlviii. 14.
ARGUM. II. If God does not foreknow the Voli
tions of moral Agents, then he did not foreknow
the fall of man, nor of angels, and fo could not
fore-
GOD certainly foreknows Part IL
foreknow the great things which are confequent on
thefe events ; fuch as his fending his Son into
the world to die for finners, and all things per
taining to the great work of redemption ; all the
things which were done for four thoufand years
before Chrift came, to prepare the way for it ;
and the incarnation, life, death, refurrediion
and afceniion of ChriO:; and the fetting Him at
the head of the univerfe, as King of heaven and
earth, angels and men ; and the fetting up His
church and kingdom in this world, and appoint
ing Him the Judge of the world ; and all that
Satan mould do in the world in oppofition to the
kingdom of Chrift : and the great tranfatftions
of the day of judgment, that men and devils
mail be thefubjedts of, and angels concerned in ;
they are all what God was ignorant of before the
fall. And if fo, the following Scriptures, and
others like them, muft be without any meaning,
or contrary to truth. Eph. i. 4. According as he
hath chofen us in Him before the foundation of the
•world, i Pet. i. 20. Who verily was for e: ordained,
before the foundation of the world. 2 Tim. i. 9.
Who hath fa<ved us, and called us with an holy call- '
ing \ not according to our works, but according to his
own pvrPoft) and grace, winch was given us in Chrift
jFefus be j ore the world began. So, Eph. iii. i r.
{fpeaking of the wifdom of God in the work of
redemption) according to the eternal purpofe which
he purpofid in Chrift Jcfus. Tit, i. 2. In hope of
eternal life, which God that cannot lie, premifed be
fore the world began. Rom. viii. 29. Whom he did
foreknow, them he alfo didpredejtinate, &c. .1 Pet. i.
2. Eleft, according to the Foreknowledge of God the
Father.
If God did not foreknow the fall of man, nor
the redemption by Jefus Chrift, nor the Volitions
of
Sect. XI. the Volitions of moral Agents. 159
of man fince the fall ; then he did not foreknow
the faints in any fenfe ; neither as particular per-
fons, nor as focieties or nations ; either by elec
tion, or meer forefight of their virtue or good
works ; or any forefight of any thing about them
relating to their falvation ; or any benefit they
have by Chrift, or any manner of concern of
their's with a Redeemer.
ARC. III. On the fuppofition of God's igno
rance of the future Volitions of free Agents, it will
follow, that God muft in many cafes truly repent
what He has done, fo as properly to wifh He
had done otherwife : by reafon that the event of
things, in thofe affairs which are moft impor
tant, viz. the affairs of his moral kingdom, be
ing uncertain and contingent, often happens quite
otherwife than he was aware before-hand. And
there would be reafon to underftand, that in the
molt literal fenfe, in Gen. vi. 6. // repented the
Lord, that he had made man on the earth^ and it
grieved him at his heart. And that i Sam. xv. 1 1 .
contrary to that, Numb, xxiii. 19. God is not the
Son of Man, that He Jbould repent. And i Sam. xv.
15, 29. Alfo the ftrength of lirael will not lie, nor
repent ; for He is not a man that He Jbould repent.
Yea, from this notion it would follow, that God
is liable to repent and be grieved at His heart,
in a literal fenfe, continually ; and is always ex-
pofed to an infinite number of real difappoint-
ments in his governing the world ; and to mani
fold, conftant, great perplexity and vexation :
but this is not very confident with his title of
God over #//, blejjed for evermore •, which reprefents
Him as poffeffed of perfect, conftant, and unin
terrupted tranquility and felicity, as God over
the univerfe, and in his rnanagement of the af
fairs of the world, as fupreme and univerial
Ruler.
160 GOD certainly foreknows Part II.
Ruler. See Rom.i. 25. ix. 5. 2 Cor. xi. 31. j Vim*
vi. 15.
ARC. IV. It will alfo follow from this notion,
that as God is liable to be continually repenting
what He has done ; fo He mud be expofed to be
conilantly changing his mind and intentions, as to
his future conduct ; altering his meafures, re-
linquifhing his old defigns, and forming new
fchemes and proje6tions. For his purpcfes, even
as to the main parts of his fcheme, namely, fuch
as belong to the ftate of his moral kingdom,
muft be always liable to be broken, through want
of forefight j and he muft be continually putting
his fyflem to rights, as it gets out of order,
through the contingence of the actions of moral
Agents : He muft be a Being, who, inftead of
being abfolutely immutable, muft necefTarily be
the fubject of infinitely the moft numerous acts
of repentance, and changes of intention, of any
being whatfoever ; for this plain rcafon, that his
vaftly cxtenlive charge comprehends an infinitely
greater number of thofe things which are to
Him contingent and uncertain. In fuch a fixa
tion, He muft have little elfe to do, but to mend
broken links as well as he can, and be rectifying
his disjointed frame and disordered movements,
in the beft manner the cafe will allow. The Su
preme Lord of all things muft needs be under
great and miferable difadvantages, in governing
the world which He has made, and has the care
of, through his being utterly unable to find out
things of chief importance, whkh hereafter fhall
befall his fyftem ; which if He did but know, He
might make feafonable provifion for. In many
cafes, there may be very great necefiity that He
ihould make provifion, in'the manner of his or
dering and difpofing things, for fome great e-
vents
Sect. XI. tie Volitions of moral Agents. 1 6 1
vents which are to happen, of vaft and extenfive
influence, and endlefs confequence to the unU
verfe ; which He may fee afterwards, when it is
too late, and may wifh in vain that He had known
before-hand, that He might have ordered his af
fairs accordingly. And it is in the power of
man, on thefe principles, by his devices, pur-
pofes and actions, thus to difappoint God, break
his meafures, make Him continually to change
his mind, fubject Him to vexation, and bring
Him into confufion.
But how do thefe things confift with reafon,
or with the Word of God ? Which reprefents,
that all God's works, all that He has ever to do,
the whole fcheme and fcries of his operations,
are from the beginning perfectly in his view ; and
declares, that whatever devices and defigns are in
the hearts of men, the counfel of the Lord is that
which Jhall ftand, and the fhmghts of his heart to
all generations, Prov. xix. 21. Pfal. xxxiii. 10, n.
And that which the Lord of Hojls hath purpofed, none
fhall dif annul 9 Ifai. xiv. 27. And that he cannot be
fruftrated In one dejign or thought. Job xlii. 2. And
that which God doth, itjhall be forever, that nothing
can be put to it, or taken from it, Eccl. iii. 14. The
liability and perpetuity of God's counfels are ex-
prefsly fpoken of as connected with the Foreknow
ledge of God, Ifaiabxlvi. 10. Declaring the end
from the beginning, and from ancient times the things
that are not yet done ; faying, My counj'd foall Jland,
and 1 will do all my pleafure. — And how arc thefe
things confident with what the Scripture fays of
God's immutability, which reprefents Him as
without variablenefs, or Jhadtftv cf turning ; and
ipeaks of Him moft particularly as unchangeable
with regard to his purpofes, Mai. iii. 6. / am the
Lord ; I change not ; therefore ye fons <?f Jacob are
M not
1 62 GOD certainly foreknows Part II,
not confumed. Exod. iii. 14. I AM ¥ HAT 1 AM.
Job xxiii. 13, 14. He is in one mind; and who can
turn Him ? Andivkat bis foul defireth, even that he
doth : for he performeth the thing that is appointed
for me.
ARC. V. If this notion of God's ignorance of
future Volitions of moral Agents be thoroughly
confidered in its confequences, it will appear to
follow from it, that God, after he had made the
world, was liable to be wholly fruflrated of his
endm the creation of it •, and fo has been, in like
manner, liable to be fruflrated of his end in all
the gYcat works, He hath wrought. It is mani-
feft, the moral world is the end of the natural :
the reft of the creation is but an houfe which
God hath built, with furniture, for moral Agents :
and the good or bad ftate of the moral world
depends on the improvement they make of their
natural Agency, and fo depends on their Voli
tions. And therefore, if thefe cannot be forefeen
by God, becaufe they are contingent, and fubjed:
to no kind of neceffity, then the affairs of the
moral world are liable to go wrong, to any afiign-
able degree; yea, liable to be utterly ruined.
As on this fcheme, it may well be fuppofed to be
literally faid, when mankind, by the abufe of their
moral Agency, became very corrupt before the
flood, that the Lord repented that he had made man
on the eartb^ and it grieved Him at his heart; fo,
when He made the univerfe, He did not know
but that he might be fo difappointed in it, that it
might grieve Him at his heart that he had m.ade
it. It actually proved, that all mankind became
finful, and a very great part of the angels apof-
tatifed : and how could God know before-hand,
that all of them would not ? And how could God
know but that all mankind, notwithftanding
means
Sc6t. XL tie Volitions of moral Agents. 163
means ufed to reclaim them, being flill left to the
freedom of their own will, would continue in
their apottacy, and grow worfe and worfe, as they
of the old world before the flood did ?
According to the fcheme I am endeavouring to
confute, neither the fall of men nor angels,
could be forefeen, and God mufl be greatly dif-
appointed in thefe events ; and fo the grand
fcheme and contrivance for our redemption,
and deftroying the works of the devil, by the
Mefllah, and all the great things God has done
in the profecution of thefe defigns, mufl be only
the fruits of his own difappointment, and con
trivances of his to mend and patch up, as well
as he could, his fyitem, which originally was all
very good, and perfectly beautiful; but was marr'd,
broken and confounded by the free will of an
gels and men. And flill he mufl be liable to be
totally difappointed a fecond time : He could not:
know, that He fliould have his defired fuccefs,
in the incarnation, life, death, refurreclion and
exaltation of his only begotten Son, and other
great works accompliihed to reflore the flate of
things : he could not know, after all, whether
there would actually be any tolerable meafurc of
refloration •, for this depended on the free will
of man. There has been a general great apof-
tacy of almofl all the Chriflian World, to that
which was worfe than Heathenifm ; which con
tinued for many ages. And how could God,
without forefeeing men's Volitions, know whether
ever Chriflendom would return from this apof-
tacy ? And which way could He tell before
hand how foon it would begin ? The apoflle fays,
it began to work in his time ; and how could it
be known how far it would proceed in that age ?
Yea, how could it be known that the Gofpei
M 2 which
164 Certain Foreknowledge Part II.
which was not effectual for the reformation of
the Jews, would ever be effedhial for the turning
of the heathen nations from their heathen apoi-
tacy, which they had been confirmed in for Ib
many ages ?
It is reprefented often in Scripture, that God,
who made the world for Himfelf, and created it
for his pleafure, would infallibly obtain his end
in the creation, and in all his works ; that as all
things are of Him, fo they would all be to Him ;
and that in the final iffue of things, it would ap
pear that He is tbefirft, and the loft. Rev. xxi. 6.
And be f aid unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and
Omega, the beginning and the end, the frfi and the
loft. But thefe things are not confident with Gcd'3
being fo liable to be difappointed in all his works,
nor indeed with his failing of his end in any thing
that He has undertaken, or done.
SECTION XII.
G 0 D 's certain Foreknowledge of the future vo
litions of moral agents, inconfiftent with fitch a
Contingence of thofe volitions, as is without all
NecefTity.
HAVING proved, that GOD has a certain
and infallible Prefcience of the act of the
will of moral agents, I come now, in t\\s fecond
place, to Ihcw the confequence ; to fhew how it
follows from hence, that thefe events are necejfary,
with a Neceffity of connection or confequence.
The chief Arminian divines, fo far as I have
had opportunity to obferve, deny this conie-
.quence ; and affirm, that if iiich Forknowledge
j be
S*ct. XII. Infers fame Neceffity. 1 6*
be allowed, it is no evidence of any Necefilty of
the event foreknown. Now I defire, that this
matter may be particularly and thoroughly en
quired into. I cannot but think, that on parti
cular and full confideration, it may be perfectly
determined, whether it be indeed fo, or not.
In order to a proper confideration of this mat
ter, I would obferve the following things.
I. It is very evident, with regard to a thing
whofe exiftence is infallibly and indiflblubly con
nected with fomething which already hath, or has
had exiftence, the exiftence of that thing is ne-
cefTary. Here may be noted,
1. I obferved before, in explaining the nature
of Necefiity, that in things which are paft, their
paft exiftence is now neceflary : having already
made fure of exiftence, it is too late for any pof-
fibility of alteration in that refpect : it is now
impofTible that it mould be otherwife than true,
that that thing has exifted.
2. If there be any fuch thing as a divine Fore
knowledge of the volitions of free agents, that
Foreknowledge, by the fuppofition, is a thing
which already to, and long ago had exiftence ;
and fo, now its exiftence is neceflary ; it is now
utterly impoflible to be otherwife, than that this
Foreknowledge fhould be, or fliould have been,
3. It is alfo very manifeft, that thofe things
which are indiflblubly connected with other things
that are neceflary, are themfelves neceflary. As
that proportion whofe truth is neceflarjly con
nected with another propofition, which is necef-
farily true, is itfelf neceflarily true. To fay
M 3 other-
1 66 Certain Foreknowledge Part II,
OtherWifc, would be a contradidtion : it would be
in effect to fay, that the connexion was indiffo-
luble, and yet was not fo, but might be broken.
If That, whofe exiftence is indiffolubly con-r
ne&ed with fomething, whofe exigence is now
neceflary, is itfelf not neceffary, then it may poft
fibly yot exift, notwithstanding that indiffoluble
connection of its exiftence.— Whether the abfurr
dity be not glaring, let the reader judge.
4. It is no lefs evident, that if there be a full,
certain and infallible Foreknowledge of the future
exiftence of the volitions of moral agepts, then
there is 3. certain infallible and indiffoluble con
nection between thofe events and that Fore
knowledge ; and that therefore, by the preceding
obfervations, thofe events are neceffary events i
being infallibly and indiffolubly connected with
that, whofe exiftence already is, and fo is now
neceffary, and cannot but have been.
To fay, the Foreknowledge is certain and in
fallible, and yet the connection of the event with
that Foreknowledge is not indiffoluble, but diffo-
3 able and fallible, is very abfurd. To affirm it,
would be the fame thing as to affirm, that there
is no neceffary connection between a proportion's
being infallibly known to be true, and its being
true indeed. So that it is perfectly demonftrable,
that if there be any infallible knowledge of fu
ture volitions, the event is neceffary ; or, in other
words, that it is impojjible but the event ihould
come to pafs. For it it be not irnpojlible but
that it may be otherwife, then it is not iropof-
iible, but that the propofition which- affirms its
future coming to pafs, may not now be true.
But how abfurd is that, on the fuppofition that
there is now an infallible knowledge (£. e, know
ledge
Sed. XII. infers fome Nccefiity. 16 7
ledge which it is impoflible fhould fail) that it is
true. There is this abfurdity in it, that it is not
impoflible, but that there now fhould be no truth
in that proportion, which is now infallibly known
to be true.
II. That no future event can be certainly fore
known, whofe exiftence is contingent, and with
out all Neceflity, may be proved thus ; It is im
poflible for a thing to be certainly known to any
intellect without evidence. To fuppofe otherwife,
implies a contradiction : becaufe for a thing to
be certainly known to any underftanding, is for
it to be evident to that underftanding : and for a
thing to be evident to any underftanding is the
fame thing, as for that underftanding to fee
evidence of it : but no underftanding, created or
increated, can fee evidence where there is none :
for that is the fame thing, as to fee that to be,
which is not. And therefore, if there be any
truth which is abfolutely without evidence, that
truth is abfolutely unknowable, infomuch that it
implies a contradiction to fuppofe that it is known.
But if there be any future tevent, whofe ex
iftence is contingent, without all NeceflUy, the
future exiftence of the event is abfolutely without
evidence. If there be any evidence of it, it rnuft
be one of thefe two forts, either felf- evidence 9 or
proof; for there can be no other fort of evidence,
but one of thefe two ; an evident thing muft be
either evident in itfelf, or evident in fomething elfe;
that is, evident by connection with fomething
elfe. But a future thing, whofe exiftence is
without all Neceflity, can have neither of thefe
forts of evidence. It cannot be felf -evident : for
if it be, it may be now known, by what is now
to be feen in the thing itfelf , either its prefent
M 4 ex-s
i68 Certain Foreknowledge Part II.
exigence, or the Necefiity of its nature : but
both thefe are contrary to the fuppofition. It is
fuppofed,, both that the thing has no prefent ex-
iftence to be feen ; and alfo that it is not of fuch
a nature as to be neceflarily exiilent for the fu
ture : fo that its future exiflence is not felf-evi-
dent. And, fecondly^ neither is there any fro of \ or
evidence in any thing elfe, or evidence of con
nection with fomething elfe that is evident; for
this is alfo contrary to the fuppofition. It is fup-
pofed, that there is now nothing exiflent, with
which the future exiftence of the contingent event
is connected. For fuch a connection deftroys its
Contingence^ and fuppofes Neceflity. Thus it is
demonftrated, that there is in the nature of things
abfolutely no evidence at all of the future exif
tence of that event, which is contingent, without
all Neceflity (if any fuch event there be) neither
felf-evidence nor proof. And therefore the thing
in reality is not evident •, and fo cannot be feen
to be evident, or, which is the lame thing, can
not be known.
Let us conflder this in an example. Suppofe
that five thoufand feven hundred and fixty years
ago, there was no other being but the Divine
Being •, and then this world, or foine particular
body or fpirit, all at once ftarts out of nothing
into being, and takes on itfelf a particular nature
and form ; all in alfolute Contingency without any
concern of God, or any other caufe, in the mat~
ter ; without any manner of ground or reafon of
its exiflence ; or any dependence upon, or con
nection at all with any thing foregoing : I fay,
that if this be fuppofed, there was no evidence
of that event before-hand. There was no evi
dence of it to be feen in the thing itfelf \ for the
thing itfelf as yet, 'was not. And there was no
evidence
Sect. XII. infers fome Neceflity. 169
evidence of it to be feen in any thing elfe ; for
evidence in fomething elfe, is connexion with fome-
thing elfe : but fuch connection is contrary to the
fuppofition. There was no evidence before, that
this thing would happen ; for by the fuppofition,
there was no reafon why // foould happen^ rather
than fomething elfe, or rather than nothing. And
if fo, then all things before were exadtly equal,
and the fame, with refpecl to that and other pofii-
ble things -, there was no preponderation, no fu-
periour weight or value ; and therefore, nothing
that could be of any weight or value to deter
mine any underflanding. The thing was abfo-
lutely without evidence, and abfolutely unknow
able. An increafe of underftanding, or of the
capacity of difcerning, has no tendency, and
makes no advance, to a difcerning any figns or
evidences of it, let it be increafed never fo much ;
yea, if it be increafed infinitely. The increafe of
the ftrength of fight may have a tendency to
enable to difcern the evidence which is far oft',
and very much hid, and deeply involved in clouds
and darknefs ; but it has no tendency to enable
to difcern evidence where there is none. If the
fight be infinitely Itrong, and the capacity of
difcerning infinitely great, it will enable to fee all
that there is, and to fee it perfectly, and with eafe ;
yet it has no tendency at all to enable a being to
difcern that evidence which is not; but, on the
contrary, it has a tendency to enable to difcern
with great certainty that there is none.
III. To fuppofe the future volitions of moral
agents not to be neceflary events ; or, which is
the fame thing, events which it is not impoflible
but that they may not come to pafs ; and yet to
fuppofe that God certainly foreknows them, and
knows all things ; is to fuppofe God's Knowledge
to
lyo Certain Foreknowledge, &V. Part II,
to be inconfiftent with itfelf. For to fay, that
God certainly, and without all conjecture, knows
that a thing will infallibly be, which at the fame
time he knows to be fo contingent^ that it may
poflibly not be, is to fuppofe his Knowledge in-
confiftent with itfelf; or that one thing, that he
knows, is utterly inconfiftent with another thing,
that he knows. It is the fame thing as to fay,
he now knows a propofition to be of certain
infallible truth, which he knows to be of contin
gent uncertain truth. If a future volition is fo
without all NeceOky, that there is nothing hin
ders but that it may not be, then the propofition,
which afierts its future exiftence, is fo uncertain,
that there is nothing hinders, but that the truth of
it may entirely fail. And if God knows all things,
he knows this propofition to be thus uncertain.
And that is inconfiftent with his knowing that it
is infallibly true •, and fo inconfiftent with his in
fallibly knowing that it is true. If the thing be
indeed contingent, God views it fo, and judges it
to be contingent, if he views things as they are.
If the event be not necefTary, then it is poflible
it may never be : and if it be pofftble it may ne
ver be, God knows it may poflibly never be ; and
that is to know that the propofition, which affirms
its exiftence, may poffibly not be true ; and that
is t;o know that the truth of it is uncertain ; which
furely is inconfiftent with his knowing it as a cer
tain truth. If volitions are in themfelves con
tingent events, without all Neceffity, then it is
no argument of perfection of Knowledge in any
being to determine peremptorily that 'they will
be ; but on the contrary, an argument of igno
rance and miftakc : becaufe it would argue, that
he iuppofes that propofition to be certain, which
in its own nature, and all things confidered, is
uncertain and contingent. To fay, in fuch a cafe,
that
XII. Foreknowledge infers* &c.
that God may have ways of knowing contingent
events which we cannot conceive of, is ridiculous 5
as much fo, as to fay, that God may know con
tradictions to be true,for ought we know, or that
he may know a thing to be certain, and at the
fame time know it not to be certain, though we
cannot conceive how ; becaufe he has ways of
knowing, which we cannot comprehend.
Coral, i. From what has been obferved it is
evident, that the abfolute decrees of God are no
more inconfiftent with human liberty, on ac
count of any Necefiity of the event, which follows
from fuch decrees, than the abfolute Foreknow
ledge of God. Becaufe the connection between
the event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infal
lible and indiflbluble, as between the event and
an abfolute decree. That is, it is no more im-
poffible, that the event and decree Ihould not
agree together, than that the event and abfolute
Knowledge fhould difagree. The connection be
tween the event and Foreknowledge is abfolutely
perfect., by the fuppofition: becaufe it is fup-
pofed, that the certainty and infallibility of the
Knowledge is abfolutely perfect. And it being
fo, the certainty cannot be increafed ; and there
fore the connection, between the Knowledge and
thing known, cannot be increafed ; fo that if a
decree be added to the Foreknowledge, it does
not at all increafe the connection, or make it more
infallible and indiflbluble. If it were not fo, the
certainty of Knowledge might be increafed by the
addition of a decree -9 which is contrary to the
fuppofition, which is, that the Knowledge is ab
folutely perfect:, or perfect to the higheft poflible
degree.
There
172 Foreknowledge infers Ncceffity, Part II.
There is as much of an impoffibtlity but that
the things which are infallibly foreknown, ihould
be, or (which is the fame thing) as great a Ne-
cefiity of their future exiftence, as if the event
were already written down, and was known and
read by all mankind, through all preceding ages,
and there was the moft indiffoluble and perfect
connection pofiible, between the writing, and the
thing written. In fuch a cafe, it would be as
impoflible the event fhould fail of exigence, as
if it had exifted already ; and a decree cannot
make an event furer or more necefTary than this.
And therefore, if there be any fuch Foreknow
ledge, as it has been proved there is, then Necef-
fity of connection and confequence, is not at all
inconfiftent with any liberty which man, or any
other creature enjoys. And from hence it may
be inferred, that abfolute decrees of God, which
does not at all increafe the NecefTity, are not at all
inconfiftent with the liberty which man enjoys,
on any fuch account, as that they make the event
decreed necefiary, and render it utterly impoflible
but that it fhould come to pafs. Therefore, if
abfolute decrees are inconfiftent with man's li
berty as a moral agent^ or his liberty in a ftate of
probation^ or any liberty whatfoever that he en
joys, it is not on account of any Neceflity which
abfolute decrees infer.
Dr. lybrtly fuppofes, there is a great difference
between God's Foreknowledge, and his decrees,
with regard to Neceflity of future events. In
his Difcourfe on the five Points, p. 474, &c. he
fays, " God's Prefcience has no influence at all
" on our actions. Should God (fays he), by
" immediate Revelation, give me the knowledge
** of the event of any man's ftate or actions,
14 would
Sect XII. as much as a Decree. 173
" would my knowledge of them have any in-
u fluence upon his aftions ? Surely none at all. —
" our knowledge doth not affect the things we
" know, to make them more certain, or more
" future, than they would be without it. Now,
" Foreknowledge in God is Knowledge. As
u therefore Knowledge has no influence on things
" that are, fo neither has Foreknowledge on
" things that fhall be. And confequently, the
*' Foreknowledge of any adtion that would be
" otherwife free, cannot alter or diminifh that
" freedom. Whereas God's decree of election
" is powerful and active, and comprehends the
" preparation and exhibition of fuch means, as
" fhall unfruftrably produce the end. Hence
4< God's Prelcience renders no actions necefTary."
And to this purpofe, p. 473. he cites Origen,
where he fays, God's Preference is not the cauje of
things future, but their being future is the caufe of
God's Prefdence that they will be : and Le Blanc*
where he fays, This is the trueft refolution of this
difficulty, that Prefdence is not the caufe that things
are future ; but their being future is the caufe they
are forefeen. In like manner, Dr. Clark, in his
Demonftration of the Being and Attributes of
God, p. 95 — 99. And the Author of the Freedom
of Will, in God and the Creature, fpeaking to the
like purpofe with Dr. Whitby, represents Foreknow
ledge as having no more influence on things known, to
make them necejfary, than After-knowledge, or to
that purpofe.
To all which I would fay ; that what is faid
about Knowledge, its not having influence on the
thing known to make it neceflary, is nothing to
the purpofe, nor does it in the leaft affect the fore
going reafoning. Whether Prefcience be the
thing that makes the event neceflary or no, it al
ters
174 Foreknowledge infers Neceffity, Part II.
ters not the cafe. Infallible Foreknowledge may
'prove the Neceffity of the event foreknown, and
yet not be the thing which caufes the Neceffity.
If the Foreknowledge be abfolute, this proves the
event known to be neceffary, or proves that it is
impoffible but that the event mould be, by fome
means or other, either by a decree, or fome other
way, if there be any other wray : becaufe, as was
faid before, it is abfurd to fay, that a propofition
is known to be certainly and infallibly true, which
yet may poffibly prove not true.
The whole of the feeming force of this evafion
lies in this ; that, in as much as certain Fore
knowledge does not caufe an event to be neceffary,
as a decree does ; therefore it does not prove it to
be neceffary, as a decree does. But there is no
force in this arguing : for it is built wholly on
this fuppofition, that nothing can prove, or be an
evidence of a thing's being neceflary, but that
•which has a caufal influence to make it fo. But
this can never be maintained. If certain Fore
knowledge of the future exiiling of an event, be
not the thing, which firil makes it impoffible that
it mould fail of exjftence ; yet it may, and cer
tainly does demonftrate> that it is impoffible it
Ihould fail of it, however that impoffibility comes.
If Foreknowledge be not the caufe, but the effect
of this impoffibility, it may prove that there is
fuch an impoffibility, as much as if it were the
caufe. It is as ilrong arguing from the effect to
the caufe, as from the caufe to the effect. It is
enough, that an exiflence, which is infallibly fore
known, cannot fail, whether that impoffibility
arifes from the Foreknowledge, or is prior to it. It
Is as evident, as it is poffible any thing mould be,
that it is impoffible a thing, which is infallibly
known to be true, mould prove not to be true :
therefore there is a Necefpty that it Ihould be other-
Si wife :
Se&. XII. as muck as a Decree. 175
wife ; whether the Knowledge be the caufe of
this NecefTity, or the Neceffity the caufe of the
Knowledge.
All certain Knowledge, whether it be Foreknow
ledge or After-knowledge, or concomitant Know
ledge, proves the thing known now to be necefFary,
by ibme means or other; or proves that it is im-
poflible it mould now be otherwife than true. — I
freely allow, that Foreknowledge does not prove
a thing to be neceflary any more than After-know
ledge : but then After-knowledge, which is cer
tain and infallible, proves that it is now become
impoffible but that the proportion known ihould
be true. Certain After-knowledge proves that
it is now, in the time of the Knowledge, by fome
means or other, become impoffible but that the
proportion, which predicates paft exigence on the
event, fhould be true. And fo does certain Fore
knowledge prove, that now, in the time of the
Knowledge, it is by fome means or other, become
impoflible but that the propofition, which predi
cates future exigence on the event, Ihould be true.
The Neceffity of the truth of the propofitions, con-
lifting in the preient impoflibility of the non-exif-
tence of the event affirmed, in both cafes, is the im
mediate ground of the certainty of the Knowledge;
there can be no certainty of Knowledge without it.
There muft be a certainty in things themfelves,
before they are certainly known, or (which is the
fame thing) known to be certain. For certainty
of Knowledge is nothing elfe but knowing or dii-
cerning the certainty there is in the things them
felves, which are known. Therefore there muft be
a certainty in things to be a ground of certainty
of Knowledge, and to render things capable of
being known to be certain. And this is nothing
but the neeefiity of the truth known, or its be
ing
1 7 6 Foreknowledge infers Neceffity, Part II.
ing impoffible but that it fhould be true ; or, in
other words, the firm and infallible connexion
between the fubject and predicate of the propo-
fition that contains that truth. All certainty of
Knowledge confifts in the view of the firmnefs
of that connection. So God's certain Foreknow
ledge of the future exiitence of any event, is his
view of the firm and indifibluble connection of
the fubjecl: and predicate of the propofition that
affirms its future exiftence. The fubjecl is that
poifible event ; the predicate is its future exift-
ing : but if future exiftence be firmly and indif-
folubly connected with that event, then the fu
ture exiftence of that event is necefiary. If God
certainly knows the future exiftence of an event
which is wholly contingent, and may poffibly ne
ver be, then He fees a firm connection between a
fubject and predicate that are not firmly con
nected ; which is a contradiction.
I allow what Dr. Wkitly fays to be true, That
weer Knowledge does not affeEl the thing known , to
make it more certain or more future. But yet, I
fay, \tfuppofes and proves the thing to be already,
both/#/#n?, and certain •, i.e. necefTarily future.
Knowledge o>i futurity, fuppofes/«/Mn/y ; and a cer
tain Knozvledge of futurity, fuppofes certain futurity^
antecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there
is no other certain futurity of a thing, antecedent
to certainty of Knowledge, than a prior impofii-
bility but that the thing fhould prove true ; or
(which is the lame thing) the Neceflity of the
event.
I would obferve one thing further concerning
this Matter, it is this-, that if it be as thole
forementioned writers fuppofe, that God's Fore
knowledge is not the caufe, but the effect of the
exiftence
Sect. XII. as much as a Decreed 177
•exiftence of the event foreknown; this is fo far
from fhewing that this Foreknowledge doth not
infer the Neceflity of the exiftence of that event,
that it rather fliews the contrary the more plainly.
Becaufe it fhews the exiftence of the event to be
fo fettled and firm, that it is as if it had already
been ; in as much as in effett it actually exifts al
ready •, its future exiftence has already had ac
tual influence and efficiency, and has produced an
effefi? viz. Prefcience : the effect exifts already ;
and as the effect fuppofes, the caufe is connected
with the caufe, and depends entirely upon it,
therefore it is as if the future event, which is the
caufe, had exifted already. The effect is firm as
poffible, it having already the pofleffion of ex
iftence, and has made fure of it. But the effect
cannot be more firm and ftable than its caufe,
ground and reafon. The building cannot be
firmer than the foundation.
To illuftrate this matter, let us fuppofe the ap
pearances and images of things in a glafs ; for
inftance, a reflecting telefcope to be the real ef
fects of heavenly bodies (at adiftance, and out of
fight) which they refemble : if it be fo, then, as
thefe images in the telefcope have had a paft ac
tual exiftence, and it is become utterly impoffible
now that it fhould be otherwife than that they
have exifted ; fo they being the true effects of
the heavenly bodies they refemble, this proves the
exifting of thofe heavenly bodies to be as real,
infallible, firm and necefTary, as the exifting of
thefe effects ; the one being connected with, and
wholly depending on the other. — Now let us fup
pofe future exiftences fome way or other to have
influence back, to produce effects before-hand,
and caufe exact and perfect images of themfelves
in a glafs, a thoufand years before they exift,
N yes,
Certain Foreknowledge Part II.
yea, in all preceding ages; but yet that thefc
images are real effects of thefe future exiftences,
perfectly dependent on, and connected with their
caufe •, thefe effects and images, having already
had actual existence, rendering that matter of their
exifting perfectly firm and (table, and utterly im-
poffible to be otherwife ; this proves in like man
ner, as in the other inftance, that the exiftence of
the things, which are their caufes, is alfo equally
fure, firm and neceffary ; and that it is alike im-
poflible but that they fhould be, as if they had
been already, as their effects have. And if in-
itead of images in a glafs, we fuppofe the ante
cedent effects to be perfect ideas of them in the
Divine Mind, which have exiiled there from all
eternity, which are as properly effects, as truly
and properly connected with their caufe, the cafe
is not altered.
Another thing which has been faid by fome
jArminians^ to take off the force of what is urged
from God's Prefcience, againft the Contingence
of the volitions of moral agents, is to this pur-
pofe ; " That when we talk of Foreknowledge in
" God, there is no ftrict propriety in our fo
*c fpeaking \ and that although it be true, that
" there is in God the moft perfect Knowledge of all
" events from eternity to eternity, yet there is no
•" fuch thing as before and after in God, but He
" fees all things by one perfect unchangeable view,
" without any fuccefiion."— To this I anfwer,
i. It has been already fhewn, that all certain
Knowledge proves the Neceffity of the truth
known; whether it be before, after ^ or at the fame
time. — Though it be true, that there is no fuccef-
iion in God's Knowledge, and the manner of his
Knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much.
we
Sect. XII. infers fome Necefiity.
we know concerning it, that there is no event,
pad, prefent, or to come, that God is ever un
certain of; He never is, never was, and never
will be without infallible Knowledge of it ; He
always fees the existence of it to be certain and in
fallible. And as he always fees things juft as they
are in truth ; hence there never is in reality any
thing contingent in fuch a fenfe, as that poffibly
it may happen never to exift. If, ftrictly fpealo
ing, there is no Foreknowledge in God, it is be-
caufe thofe things, which are tuture to us, are as
prefent to God, as if they already had exiftence :
and that is as. much as to fay, that future events
are always in God's view as evident, clear, fure
and neceflary, as if they already were. If there
never is a time wherein the exiftence of the event
is not prefent with God, then there never is a time
wherein it is not as much impoflible for it to fail
of exiftence, as if its exiftence were prefent, and
were already come to pafs.
God's viewing things fo perfectly and un
changeably as that there is no fuccefilon in his
ideas or judgment, do not hinder but that there
is properly now, in the mind of God, a certain and
perfect Knowledge of moral actions of men, which
to us are an hundred years hence: yea the ob
jection fuppofes this ; and therefore it certainly
does not hinder but that, by the foregoing argu
ments, it is now impollible thefe moral actions
Ihould not come to pafs.
We know, that God knows the future volun
tary actions of men in fuch a fenfe before-hand,
as that he is able particularly to declare, and fore
tell them, and write them, or caufe them to be
written down in a book, as He often has done ;
and that therefore the neceflary connection which
Na, there
iSo Certain Foreknowledge Part II.
there is between God's Knowledge and the event
known, does as much prove the event to be ne-
ceffary before-hand, as if the Divine Knowledge
were in the fame fenfe before the event, as the
prediction or writing is. If the Knowledge be
infallible, then the expreflion of it in the written
prediction is infallible -, that is, there is an infal
lible connection between that written prediction
and the event. And if fo, then it is impoffible it
mould ever be otherwife, than that that prediction
and the event mould agree : and this is the fame
thing as to fay, it is impoflible but that the event
mould come to pafs : and this is the fame as to
fay that its coming to pafs is neceflary. — So that
it is mariifeft, that there being no proper fuc-
celTion in God's mind, makes no alteration as to
the Neceflity of the exiftence of the events which
God knows. Yea,
2. This is fo far from weakening the proof,
which has been given of the impoffibility of the
not coming to pafs of future events known, as
that it eftabliihes that, wherein the itrength of the
foregoing arguments confifts, and mews the clear-
nefs of the evidence. For,
( i .) The very reafon, why God's Knowledge is
without fucceflion, is, becaufe it is abfolutely
perfeCt, to the higheft pofiible degree of clearness
and certainty : all things, whether pad, prefent,
or to come, being viewed with equal evidence and
fulnefs ; future things being feen with as much
clearness, as if they were prefent -, the view is
always in abfolute perfection ; and abfolute con-
ftant perfection admits of no alteration, and fo
no fucceffion ^ the aCtual exiftence of the thing
known, does not at all increafe, or add to the clear-
nefs or certainty of the thing known : God calls
the
Sect. XII. infers fome Neceflity.
the things that are not, as though they were ; they
are all one to him as if they had already exifled.
But herein confifts the flrength of the demon-
itration before given, of .the impofiibility of the
not exifting of thofe things, whofe exigence God
knows ; that it is as impoflible they fhould fail
of exigence, as if they exifted already. This
objection, inilead of weakening this argument,
lets it in the cleareit and ftrongeft light •, for it
fuppofes it to be fo indeed, that the exigence of
future events is in God's view fo much as if it
already had been, that when they come actually
to ex-ift, it makes not the leaft alteration or varia
tion in his view or Knowledge of them.
(2.) The objection is founded on the immuta*
lility of God's Knowledge : for it is the immuta
bility of Knowledge makes his Knowledge to be
without fucceflion. But this moft directly and
plainly demonftrates the thing I infift on, viz.
that it- is utterly impofiible the known events
fhould fail of exiftence. For if that were poflible,
then it would be poflible for there to be a change
in God's Knowledge and view of things. For if
the known event mould fail of exigence, and
not come into being, as God expected, then God
would fee it, and fo would change his mind, and
fee his former miftake ; and thus there would be
change and fucceflion in his Knowledge. But as
God is immutable, and fo it is utterly infinitely
impofllble that his view mould be changed ; fo
it is, for the fame reafon, juft fo impoflible that
the fore-known event mould not exift : and that
is to be impofllble in the higheit degree : and
therefore ' the contrary is neceflary. Nothing is
more impofllble than that the immutable God
mould be changed, by ' the fucceflion of time ;
who comprehends all things, from eternity to
N 3 eter-
1 82 Foreknowledge proves Neceffity. PartIL
eternity, in one, moft perfect, and unalterable
view ; fo that his whole eternal duration is wit*
inter minaliliSy tota, Jtmul, & perfefta pojjejfio.
On the whole, I need not fear to fay, that there
is no geometrical theorem or proportion what-
foever, more capable of ftrict demonflration, than
that God's certain Prefcience of the volitions of
moral agents is inconfiflent with fuch a Contin-
~;ence of thefe events, as is without all Necefilcy;
nd fo is in confident with the Armiman notion of
.liberty.
Corol. 2. Hence the doctrine of the Calvinifts,
concerning the abfolute decrees of God, does not
at all infer .any more fatality in things, than will
demonftrably follow from the doctrine of moil
jirminian divines, who acknowledge God's om-
nifcience, and univerfal Prefcience. Therefore
all objections they make sgainft the doctrine of
the Cafoinifts, as implying Hobbes's doctrine of
Necefilty, or the Jloical doctrine of fate, lie no
more agamft the doctrine of Calvmifts, than their
own doctrine : and therefore it doth not become
thofe divines, to raiie fuch an out-cry againft the
Cafainifts, on this account.
Corol. 3. Hence all arguing from NecefTity,
againft the doctrine of the inability of unrege-
nerate men to perform the conditions of falvation,
and the commands of God requiring fpiritual
duties, and againft the Calvimftic doctrine of ef
ficacious grace ; I fay, all arguings of Armenians
(fuch of them as own God's omnifcience) againft
thefe things, on this ground, that thefe doc
trines, though they do not fuppofe men to be un
der any conftraint or coaction, yet fuppofe them
under Neceflity, with refpect to their moral ac
tions,
Sect. XIII. Arminian Liberty inconfiflent. 183
tions, and thofe things which are required of them
in order to their acceptance with God ; and their
arguing againft the Neceflity of men's volitions,
taken from the reafonablenefs of God's com
mands, promifes, and threatenings, and the fm-
ccrity of his counfels and invitations ; and all
objections againft any doctrines of the Cahnnlfls
as being inconfiftent with human liberty, becaufe
they infer Neceflity; I fay, all thefe arguments
and objections muft fall to the ground, and be
juftly efteemed vain and frivolous, as coming
from them ; being maintained in an inconfiftence
with themfelves, and in like manner leveled
againft their own doctrine, as againft the doctrine
of the Cahinifts.
SECTION XIII.
'Whether we fuppofe the volitions of moral agents to
be connected with any thing antecedent^ or not, yet
they muft be neceffary in fuch a fenfe as to over
throw Arminian Liberty.
EVERY act of the will has a caufe, or it
has not. If it has a caufe, then, according
to what has already been demonftrated, it is not
contingent, but necefiary, the effect being ne-
ceflarily dependent and confequent on its caufe 5
and that, let the caufe be what it will. If the
caufe is the will itfelf, by antecedent acts chu-
iing and determining; ftill the determined and
eaufed act muft be a neceffary effect. The act,
that is the determined effect of the foregoing
act which is its caufe, cannot prevent the effici
ency of its caufe ; but muft be wholly fubject
to its determination and command, as much as
N4 the
184 Both Neceffity and Cpntlngence Part II.
the motions of the hands and feet. The con-
fequent commanded acts of the will are as paf-
iive and as necefiary, \vith refpect to the antece~
dent determining acts, as the parts of the body
are to the volitions which determine and command
them. And therefore, if all the free acts of the
will are thus, if they are all determined effects,
determined by the will itfelf, that is, determined
by antecedent choice, then they are all neceflary 3
they are all fubjeot to, and decifively fixed by the
foregoing act, which is their caufe : yea, even
the determining act itfelf; for that muft be de
termined and fixed by another act, preceding
that, if it be a free and voluntary act; and fq
muft be neceflary. So that by this all the free
acts of the will are neceflary, and cannot be free
unlefs they are neceflary : becaufe they cannot be
free, according to the Armmian notion of free
dom, unlefs they are determined by the will ;
which is to be determined by antecedent choice ;
which being their caufe, proves them neceflary.
And yet they fay, Neceflity is utterly inconfiftent
with Liberty. So that,, by their fcheme, the acts
of the will cannot be free, unlefs they are neceflary,
and yet cannot be free if they be not neceflary !
But if the other part of the dilemma be taken,
and it be affirmed that the free acts of the \vill
have no caufe,- and are connected with nothing
whatfqever that goes before them and determines
them, in order to maintain their proper and ab-
folute Contjngence, and this fhould be allowed to
be poflible ; ilill it will not ferve their turn. For
if the volition come to pafs by perfect Contin-.
gence, and without any caufe at all, then it is,
certain, no act of the will, no prior act of the
foul was the caufe, no determination or choice
of the foul, had any ha,nd in it. The will, or
the
Sect. XIII. inconfiji. with Arminian Liberty. 185
the foul, was indeed the fubject of what hap
pened to it accidentally, but was not the caufe.
The will is not active in caufing or determining,
but purely the paflive fubject ; at leaft, according
to their notion ot action and paffion. In this
caie, Contingence does as much prevent the de
termination of the will, as a proper caufe ; and
as to the will, it was neceffary, and could be no
otherwife. For to fuppofc that it could have
been otherwife, if the will or foul had p leafed,
is to fuppofe that the act is dependent on fome
prior act of choice or pleafure ; contrary to what
now is fuppofed : it is to fuppofe that it might
have been, otherwife, if its caufe had-' made it or
ordered it otherwife. But this does not agree to
its having no. caufe or orderer at all. That muft
be neceffary as to the foul, which is dependent
on no free ad: of the foul : but that which is
without a caufe, is dependent on no free act of
the foul : becaufe, by the fuppofition, it is de*
pendent on nothing, and is connected with no
thing. In fnch a cafe, the foul is rieceilarily fub-
jected to what, accident brings to pafs, from time
to time, as much as the earth, that is inactive,
is neceffarily fubjected to what falls upon it. But
this does not confift with the Arminian notion of
liberty, which is the will's power of determining
itfelf in its own acts, and being wholly active in
it, without pafiivenefs, and without being fubject
to Necefiity. — : — Thus, Contingence belongs to
the Arminian notion of Liberty, and yet is incon-
liftent with it.
I would here obferve, that the author of the
Effay on the Freedom of Will, in God and the Crea
ture, page 76, 77, fays as follows : " I he word
" Chance always means fomething done without
" delrgn. Chance and dcfign rtand in direct
" oppo-
i86 Both Neceffity and Contingence Part II.
" oppofition to each other: and Chance can ne-
'* ver be properly applied to acts of the will,
c which is the fpring of all defign, and which
" defigns to chufe whatfoever it doth chufe, whe-
" ther there be any fuperior fitnefs in the thing
" which it chufes, or no ;• and it defigns to de-
" termine itfelf to one thing, where two things,
( perfectly equal, are propofed, meerly becauie
" it will." But herein appears a very great inad
vertence in this author. For if the will be the
fpring of all defign, as he fays, then certainly it is
not always the effect of defign ; and the acts of
the will themfelves mud fometimes come to pafs,
when they do not Jpringfrom defign ; and confe-
quently come to pafe by Chance, according to his
own definition of Chance. And if the will defigns
to chufe whdtfcever it does chufe, and defigns to de
termine itfelf, as he fays, then it defigns to de
termine all its defigns. Which carries us back
from one defign to a foregoing defign determin
ing that, and to another determining that ; and
fo on in infinitum. The very fird defign mud be
the effed of ^ foregoing defign, or elfe°it mud be
by Chance, in his notion of it.
Here another alternative may be propofed, re
lating to the connection of the acts of the will
with fomething foregoing that is their caufe, not
much unlike to the other; which is this : either
human liberty is fuch, that it may well dand with
volitions being neceifarily connected with the
views of the underdanding, and fo is confident
with Necefiity; or it is in confident with., and con
trary to fuch a connection and Neceffity. The
former is directly fubverfive of the Arminian no
tion of liberty, confiding in freedom from all
Necefiity. And if the latter be chofen, and it
be laid, that libei ty is inconfident with any fuch
necefiary
Sect. XIII. inconfifient with Arminian Liberty. 187
necefTary connexion of volition with foregoing
views of the underftanding, it confiding in free
dom from any fuch Neceflity of the will as that
would imply; then the liberty of the foul confifls
(in part at kail) in the freedom from reftrainr,
limitation and government, in its actings, by the
underftanding, and in liberty and liablenefs to
act contrary, to the underftanding's views and
dictates : and confequently the more the foul has
of this difengagednefs, in its acting, the more
liberty. Now let it be confidered what this brings
the noble principle of human liberty to, particu
larly, when it is pofTefled and enjoyed in its per
fection, viz. a full and perfect freedom and liable
nefs to act altogether at random, without the lead
connection with, or reflraint or government by,
any dictate of reafon, or any thing whatfoever ap
prehended, confidered or viewed by the under-
flanding ; as being inconfifient with the full and
perfect fovereignty of the will over its own de
terminations. — The notion mankind have con
ceived of liberty, is fome dignity or privilege,
fomething worth claiming. But what dignity or
privilege is there, in being given up to fuch a
wild Contingence as this, to be perfectly and con-
ftantly liable to act unintelligently and unreafon-
ably, and as much without the guidance of un
derftanding, as if we had none, or were as de-
ftitute of perception, as the fmoke that is driven
by the wind !
PART
P ART
Wherein is enquired, whether any fuck
.liberty of will as Arminians bold,
be neceffary to MORAL AGENCY,
VIRTUE and VICE, PRAISE and
DISPRAISE,
SECTION
GOD's moral Excellency neceffary, yet virtuous
arid praife-worthy.
HAVING confidered the /r/? thing that was
propofed to be enquired into, relating to
that freedom of will which Arminians maintain ;
namely, Whether any fuch thing does, ever did,
or ever can exift, or be conceived of ; I come now
to the fecond thing propofed to be the fubjeft of
enquiry, viz. Whether any fuch kind of liberty
be requifite to moral agency, virtue and vice,
pfaife and blame, reward and punifhment, &c.
I (hall
Sect. L Gofs moral Excellency, &V. 189
I fhall begin with fome conn* deration of the
virtue and agency of the Supreme moral Agent,
and Fountain of all Agency and Virtue.
Dr. Whitby, in his Difcourfe on the five Points,
p. 14, fays, " If all human actions are neceffary,
" virtue and vice muft be empty names ; we
" being capable of nothing that is .blame- wor-
" thy, or deferveth praife ; for who can blame
" a perfon for doing only what he could not help,
" or judge that he deferveth praife only for what
ft he could not avoid ?" To the like purpofe he
fpeaks in places innumerable ; elpecially in his
Difcourfe on the Freedom of the l¥ill\ conftantly
maintaining, that a freedom not only from ccafficn,
but necejjity, is abfolutely requiute, in order to
actions being either wprthy of blame, or deierv-
ing of praife. And to this agrees, as is. well
known, the current doctrine of Armmian writers,
who, in general, hold, that there is no virtue or
vice, reward or puniihment, nothing to be com
mended or blamed, without this freedom. And
yet Dr. WUtby^ p. 300, allows, that God is with
out this freedom ; and Arminians^ fo far as I have
had opportunity to obferve, generally acknow
ledge, that God is neceffarily holy, and his will
necelTarily determined to that whicli is good.
So that, putting thefe things together, the in
finitely holy God, who always ufed to be efleemed
by God's people not only virtuous but a Being
in whom is all poflible virtue, and every virtue
in the moft abfolute purity and perfection, and in
infinitely greater brightness and amiablenefs than
in any creature ; the moil perfect pattern of vir
tue, and the fountain from whom all others vir
tue is but as beams from the fun •, and who has
been luppofed to be, on the account of his vir
tue
* •
God*s moral Excellency neecflary, Part III.
tue and holinefs, infinitely more worthy to be
efteemed, loved, honoured, admired, commended,
extolled and praifed, than any creature : and He,
who is thus every where reprefented in Scripture ;
I fay, this Being, according to this notion of
Dr. Wkitby, and other Arminians, has no virtue
at all ; virtue, when afcribed to Him, is but an
empty name; and he is deferving of no commen
dation or praife ; becaufe he is under necefllty,
He cannot avoid being holy and good as he is ;
therefore no thanks to him for it. It feems, the
holinefs, juftice, faithfulnefs, &c. of the Moil
High, mult not be accounted to be of the na
ture of that which is virtuous and praife-worthy.
They will not deny, that thefe things in God are
good ; but then we rr.uft underftand them, that
they are no more 'virtuous, or of the nature of
any thing commendable, than the good that is
in any other being that is not a moral agent ; as
the brightnefs of the fun, and the fertility of the
earth, are good, but not virtuous, becaufe thefe
properties are neceffary to thefe bodies, and not
the fruit of felf-determining power.
There needs no other confutation of this no
tion of God's not being virtuous or praife-wor
thy, to Chriftians acquainted with the Bible, but
only fiating and particularly reprefenting of it.
To bring texts of Scripture, wherein God is re
prefented as in every refpect, in the highefl: man
ner virtuous, and fupremely praife-worthy, would
be endlefs, and is altogether needlefs to fuch
as have been brought up in the light of the
Gofpel.
It were to be wifhed, that Dr. Wbitly* and other
divines of the fame fort, had explained them-
felves, when they have aflerted, that that which
2 is
Sect. I. yet virtuous and praife-worthy. 191
is necefTary, is not deferring of praife ; at the
fame time that they have owned God's perfec
tion to be neceffary, and fo in effect representing
God as not deferving praife. Certainly, if their
words have any meaning at all, by praife^ they
muft mean the exercife or teftimony of fome
forts of efteem, refpect or honourable regard.
And will they then fay, that men are worthy of
that efteem, refpect and honour for their vir
tue, fmall and imperfect as it is, which yet God
is not worthy of, for his infinite righteoufnefs,
holinefs and goodnefs ? If fo, it mud be, be-
caufe of fome fort of peculiar Excellency in the
virtuous man, which is his prerogative, wherein
he really has the preference -, fome dignity, that
is entirely diftinguilhed from any Excellency,
amiablenefs or honourablenefs in God ; not in
imperfection and dependence, but in pre-emi
nence; which therefore he does not receive from
God, nor is God the fountain or pattern of it;
nor can God, in that refpect, ftand in compe
tition with him, as the object of honour and
regard •, but man may claim a peculiar efteem,
commendation and glory, that God can ha_ve no
preteniion to. Yea, God has no right, by vir
tue of his neceflary holinefs, to intermeddle writh
that grateful refpect and praife, due to the vir
tuous man, who chufes virtue, in the exercife
of a freedom ad utrumqnz \ any more than a pre
cious (lone, which cannot avoid being hard and
beautiful.
And if it be fo, let it be explained what that
peculiar refpect is, that is due to the virtuous man,
which differs in nature and kind, in lome way of
pre-eminence, from all that is due to God. What
is the name or deicription of that peculiar affec
tion ? Is it efteem, love, admiration, honour,
praife,
Concerning G O D 's Virtue. Part III.
praife or gratitude ? The Scripture every where
reprefents God as the higheft object of all thefe :
there we read of the foul's magnifying the Lord, of
loving Him 'with all the heart, with all the foul,
with all the mind, and with all the Jlrength •, ad
miring him, and his righteous affs, or greatly re
garding them, as marvellous and wonderful-, ho
nouring, glorifying, exalting, ex t oiling >> bk fling, thank
ing and pralfing Him ; giving unto Him all the
glory of the good which is done or received, ra
ther than unto men ; that no flefli fliould glory in
Us prefence -, but that He mould be regarded as
the Being to whom all glory is due. What then
is that refpect ? What paffion, affection, or ex-
crcife is it, that Armimans call praife, diverfe from
all thefe things, which men are worthy of for
their virtue, and which God is not worthy of, in
any degree ?
If that neceflity which attends God's moral
perfections and actions, be as inconfiftent with a
Being -worthy of praife, as a neceflity of co-
action ; as is plainly implied in, or inferred from
Dr. Whitby** difcourfe; then why fhould we thank
God for his goodnefs, any more than if He were
forced to be good, or any more than we Ihould
thank one of our fellow-creatures who did us
good, not freely, and of good will, or from any
kindnefs of heart, but from meer compulfion,
or extrinfical Neceflity ? Arminiam fuppoie, that
God is neceflarily a good and gracious Being :
for this they make the ground of fome of their
main arguments againit many doctrines main
tained by Cahinijls ; they fay,' thefe are certainly
falfe, and it is impojjille they fhould be true, be-
caufe they are not confident with the goodnefs of
pod. This fuppofes, that it is impo/ible but that
God fhould be good : for if it be poflible that
He
Sect. I. yet virtuous and praife-worthy.
He ihould be otherwife, then that impoffibility
of the truth of theie doctrines ceafes, according
to their own argument.
That virtue in God is not, in the mofl: proper
lenfe, rewarddble^ is not for want of merit in his
moral perfections and actions, fufficient to de-
ferve rewards from his creatures ; but becaufe
He is infinitely above all capacity of receiving
any reward or benefit from the creature : He is
already infinitely and unchangeably happy, and
we cannot be profitable unto Him. But {till he
is worthy of our fupreme benevolence for his
virtue ; and would be worthy of our beneficence,
•which is the fruit and expreffion of benevolence,
if our goodnefs could extend to Him. If God
deferves to be thanked and praifed for his good
nefs, He would, for the fame reafon, deferve that
we ihould alfo requite his kindnefs, if that were
pofiible. What jhall I render to the Lord for all Ms
benefits ? is the natural language of thankfulnefs :
and fb far as in us lies, it is our duty to recom-
penfe God's goodnefs, and render again according
to benefits received. And that we might have op
portunity for fo natural an expreffion of our gra
titude to God, as beneficence, notwithilanding
his being infinitely above our reach ; He has ap
pointed others to be his receivers, and to ftand
in his ftead, as the objects of our beneficence ;
fuch are efpecially our indigent brethren.
O SECTION
I94 ST& Afa of tie Will of Chrifl:, Part III.
SECTION II.
*fhe ARs cf the Will of tie human foul of JESUS
CHRIST neceifarily holy, yet truly virtuous,
praife-worthy, rewardable, &c.
I HAVE already confidered how Dr. Whitty in-
fifts upon it, that a freedom, not only from
coaftion, but neceflity, is requijite either to virtus
vice, praife or difpraife, reward or puntfhment. He
alfo infifts on the fame freedom as abfolutely re-
quifite to a perfon's being the fubjecl: of a law^
of precepts or prohibitions •, in the book before-
mentioned, (p. SGI, 314, 328, 339, 340, 341,
342, 347, 361, 373, 410.) And of promifes
and threatening^ (p. 298, 301, 305, 311, 339,
340, 363.) And as requifite to a fate of trial^
(p. 297, &c.)
Now therefore, with an eye to thefe things, I
would enquire into the moral condudl and prac
tices of our Lord Jefns Chrift, which he exhibi
ted in his human nature here, in his ftate of humi
liation. And frft, I would fhew, that his holy
behaviour was neceffary ; or that it was impojfibk
it ihould be otherwife, than that He fhould be
have himfelf holily, and that he Ihould be per
fectly holy in each individual adl of his life.
And fecondly, that his holy behaviour was pro
perly the nature of virtue, and was worthy of
praife \ and that he was the fubjecl: of law, pre
cepts or commands, promifes and rewards; and that
he was in a ft ate of trial.
I. It was impojfible* that the Acts of the Will
o£ the human foul of Chrift fhould, in any in-
i fiance,
Sect. II. neceffarily holy.
ftance, degree or circumflance, be othervvife than
holy, and agreable to God's nature and will.
The following things make this evident.
i. God had promifed fo effedtually to preferve
and uphold Him by his Spirit, under all his
temptations, that he could not fail of reaching
the end for which He came into the world; —
which he would have failed of, had he fallen into
fin. We have fuch a promife, Ifai. xliii. 1,2, g, 4.
Behold my Servant , whom I uphold; mine Elefi, in
whom my foul delighteth : I have -put my Spirit upon
him: He Jhall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles:
He Jhall not cryy nor lift up, nor caufe his voice to
be heard in the ftreet. — He Jhall bring forth judg
ment unto truth. He Jhall not fail, nor be difcou-
raged, till He have fet judgment in the earth ; and
the ifle-s Jhall wait his law. This promife of
Chriil's having God's Spirit put upon Him, and
his not crying and lifting up his voice, &c. re
lates to the time of Chrift's appearance on earth ; '
as is manifeft from the nature of the promife,
and alfo the application of it in the New Tei-
tament, Matthew xii. 18. And the words im
ply a promife of his being fo upheld by God's
Spirit, that he fhould be preferved from fin ; par
ticularly from pride and vain-glory, and from
being overcome by any of the temptations, he
Ihould be under to affect the glory of this world,
the pomp of an earthly prince, or the applaufe
and praife of men : and that he fhould be fo up
held, that he fhould by no means fail of obtain
ing the end of his coming into the world, of
bringing forth judgment unto victory, and efta-
blifhing his kingdom of grace in the earth. —
And in the following verfes, this promife is con
firmed, with the ereatefl imaginable folemnity,
Thus faith the LORD, HE that created the heavens,
O 2 and
196 The Ms of the Will of Chrift, Fart III.
and ftretched them out •, He that fpread forth ths
earthy and that which cometh out of it ; He that
giveth breath unto the people upon it, and fpirit to
them that walk therein : 1 the Lord have called Thee
in righteoufnefs , and will hold thine hand ; and will
keep Thee, and give Thee for a Covenant of the peo
ple, for a Light of the Gentiles, to open the blind eyes,
to bring out the prifoners from the prifon, and them
that fit in darknefs out of the prifon-houfe. 1 am
JEHOVAH, that is my name, &c.
Very parallel with thefe promifes is that, If at.
xlix. 7, 8, 9. which ailb has an apparent refpedt
to the time of Chrift's humiliation on earth. —
Thus faith the Lord, the Redeemer of Ifrael, and his
Holy One, to Him whom man defpifeth, to Him whom
the nation abhorreth, to a Servant of the riders •,
kings jhall fee and arife, princes alfo Jhall worflrip -,
lecaufe of the Lord that is faithful, and the Holy One
(/ Ifrael, and he Jhall choofe Thee. Thus faith the
Lord, In an acceptable time have 1 heard Thee ± in a
day of falvation have I helped Thee ; and I will pre-
ferve Thee, and give Thee for a covenant of the peo
ple, to eftabli/h the earth, &c.
And in If at. \. 5 — 6. we have the Mefiiah ex-
prefiing his affurance, that God would help Him,
by ib opening his ear, or inclining his heart to
God's commandments that He ihould not be re
bellious, but ihould per fevere, and not apoftatife,
or turn his back : that through God's help, He
ihould be immovable, in a way of obedience,
under the great trials of reproach -and fuffering
he ihould meet with ; fetting his face like a
flint : fo that He knew, He ftiould not be aiham-
ed, or fruilrated in his defign •, and finally mould
be approved and juftified, as having done his
work faithfully. The Lord hath opened mine ear ;
fo
Sect. II. neceffarily My. 197
fo that 1 was not rebellious, neither turned away my
back : I gave my lack to the [miters* and my cheeks
to them that plucked off the hair; I hid not my face
from Jhame and /pitting, for the Lord God will
help me ; therefore Jhall I not be confounded : there
fore have 1 jet my face as a flint , and I know that I
Jhall not be ajhamed. He is near that jujlifieth me :
who will contend with me ? Let usfland together.
Who is mine adverfary ? Let him come near to me.
Behold the Lord God will help me : who is he that
Jhall condemn me ? Lo, they Jhall all. wax old as a
garment^ the moth Jhall eat them up. /
2. The fame thing is evident from all the
promifes which God made to the Median, of his
future glory, kingdom and fuccefs, in his office
and character of a Mediator : which glory could
not have been obtained, if his holinefs had failed,
and he had been guilty of fin. God's abfolnte
promife of any things makes the things pro-
mifed neceffary, and their failing to take place
abiblutely impojjible: and, in like manner, it makes
thofe things neceflary, on which the thing pro-
mifed depends, and without which it cannot take
effect. Therefore it appears, that it was utterly
impofiible that Ch rift's holinefs fhould fail, from
fuch abfolute promifes as thofe, Pfal. ex. 4, tte
Lord hath fworn, and will not repent, Thou art a
Prie ft forever, after the order o/Melchizedek. And
from every other promife in that pfalm, contained
in each verfe of it. And Pfal. ii. 6, 7. 1 will
declare the decree : The Lord hath faid unto me,
*Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten 'Thee :
dfk of me, and 1 will give Thee the Heathen for
thine inheritance, &c. Pfal. xlv. q, 4, &c. Gird thy
fword on thy thigh, O mojl Mighty, with thy Glory
and thy Majejiy *, and in thy Majejly ride profperoufly.
And fo every thing that is faid from theqce to
03 the
1 98 tte Afts of the Will of Chrift, Part III.
the end of the Pfalm. And thofe promifes, If at.
iii, 13, 14, 15. and liii. 10, IT, 12. And all thofe
prom lies which God makes to the Mefiiah, of
fuccefs, dominion and glory in the charader of
a Redeemer, in If at. chap. xlix.
3. It was often promifed to the Church of God
of old, for their comfort, that God would give
them a righteous, finlefs Saviour. Jer. xxiii. 5, 6.
Behold, the days come, faith the Lord, that 1 will
raife up unto David a righteous, Branch ; and a King
flwll reign and proffer, and Jhall execute judgment
andjujlice in the earth. In. his days Jhall Judah be
Javed, and Ifrael Jhall dwell fajely. And this is the
name whereby He JJjall be called, The Lord our
Righteoufnejs. So, Jer. xxxiii. 15. — 1 will caufe
the Branch of Righteouftiefs to grow up unto David ;
and he foall execute judgment and right eoufncjs in the
land. I fell xi. 6, 7. For unto us a Child is born ; —
upon the throne of David and of his kingdom, to
order it, and to eftabUJh it with judgment and jufiice^
from henceforth, even for ever : the Zeal of the Lord
of Hofts will do this. Chap. ix. at the beginning.
There Jhall come forth a Rod out of the. Stem of Jefie,
and a Branch JJiatl grow out of his Roots ; and the
Spirit of the Lord Jhall reft upon Him, — the Spirit of
Knowledge, and the Fear of the Lord : — with rigb-
teoujnejs Jhall He judge the poor, and reprove with
equity : — rRighteoufnefs JJoall be the girdle of his
loins, and faithfulnefs the girdle of his reins. Chap.
Iii. 13. My Servant JbalL deal prudently. Chap,
liii, 9. Eecaufe He had done no violence, neither
was guile found in his mouth. If it be impoflible,
that thefe promifes fhould fail, and it be eafier for
heaven and earth to pafs away, than for one jot
or tittle of thefe promifes of God to pafs away,
then it was impoflible that God fhould commit
any fin. Chrift himfelf iignified, that it was im-
polTible but that the things which were fpoken
Sect. II. necefiarily My. 199
concerning Him, fhould be fulfilled. Luke xxiv.
44. — That all things muff be fulfilled, which were
written in the law of Mofes, and in theProphets, and
in the Pfalms concerning Me. Matt. xxvi. 53, 54.
But how thenjhdl the Scripture be fulfilled, that thus
it muft be ? Mark xiv. 49. But the Scriptures muft
lefufilled. And fo the Apoftle, Acts i. 16, 17.
— "This Scripture muft needs have been fulfilled.
4. All the promifes, which were made to the
Church of old, of the Mefliah as a future Saviour,
from that made to our firlt parents in P'aradife, to
that* which was delivered by the prophet Malachi,
fhew it to be impoffible that Chrift ftiould not have
perfevered in perfect holinefs. The antient pre-
dictions given to God's Church, of the Meffiah as
a Saviour, were of the nature of promifes \ as is
evident by the predictions themielves, and the
manner of delivering them. But they are ex-
prefsly, and very often called promifes in the New
Teilament; as in Luke i. 54, 55, 72, 73, Afts xiii.
32,33. Rom. i. 1,2, 3. and chap. xv. 8. Heb.\\.
13, &c. Thefe promifes were often made with
great folemnity, and confirmed with an oath ; as
in Gen. xxii. 16, 17. By my f elf have Ifworn, faith
the Lord, that in blejfing, I will blefs thee, and in
multiplying, I will multiply thy feed, as the ftars of
heaven, and as the fand which is upon the fea-
Jhore : And in thy feed Jh all all the nations of the
earth be blejfed. Compare Luke i. 72, 73. and
Gal. iii. 8, 15, 16. The Apoftle in Heb. vi. 17, 18.
fpeaking of this promife to Abraham, fays, Where*
in God willing more abundantly to faew to the heirs of
promife the immutability of his counfel, confirmed it by
an oath ; that by two IMMUTABLE things, 'in
which it was IMPOSSIBLE for God to lie, he might
have fir ong conjolation. — In which words, the ne-
cejjity of the accomplifhment, or (which is the
lame thing) the impoj/ibility of the contrary, is
O 4 fully
zoo The Afts of the Will of Chrift, Part III.
fully declared. So God confirmed the promife
of the great falvation of the Meffiah, made to
Davih by an oath ; Pfal. Ixxxix. 3, 4. I have
made a covenant with my chofen, I have fworn unto
David my fervant ; thy feed will I eft ablijh for ever >
and build up thy throne to all generations. There is
nothing that is fo abundantly fet forth in Scrip
ture, as fure and irrefragable, as this promife and
oath to David. See Pfalm Ixxxix. 34, 35, 36.
2 Sam. xxiii. 5. JjaL Iv. 4. A5ls ii. 29, 30. and
xiii. 34. "The Scripture expreisly fpeaks of it as
utterly impojjible that this promife and oath to
David, concerning the everlafting dominion of
the Meffiah of. his feed, fhould fail. Jer. xxxiii.
15, &c. In thofe days, and at that time, I will
caufe the Branch of Righteoufnefs to grow up unto
David.— for thus faith the Lord, David Jbeti never
want a Man to fit upon the throne of the Boufe of
Ifrael. — Ver. 20, 21. If you can break my covenant
of the day, and my covenant. the of night, and that
there Jhould not be day and night in their feafon ; then
may alfo my covenant be broken with David my fer-
want, .that He Jhould not have a fon to reign upon
his throne. So in ver. 25, 26. — -Thus abundant
is the Scripture in representing how impoj/ible it
was, that .the promiies made of old concerning
the great falvation and kingdom of the Meffiah
fhould fail: which implies, that it was impoffi-
ble that this Meffiah, the fecond Adam* the pro-
mifed feed of Abraham, and of David, fhould fall
from his integrity, as the firft Adam did..
5. All the promifes that were made to the
Church of God under the Old Teftament, of the
great enlargement of the Church, and advance
ment of her glory, in the days of the Gofpel,
after the coining of the Meffiah ; the increafe
pf her irght, liberty, holinefs, joy, triumph
over
Se6t. II. neceflarily My. 201
over her enemies, &c. of which fo great a part
of the Old Teftament confiits ; which are repeat
ed fo often, are fo varioufly exhibited, fo Trequent-
ly introduced with great pomp and folemnity,
and are fo abundantly fealed with typical and
fymbolical reprefentadons ; I fay, all thefe pro-
mifes imply, that the Meffiah ihould perfecl the
work of redemption $ and this implies, that he
ihould perfevere in the work,/ which the Father
had appointed Him, being in all things con
formed to his Will. Thefe promifes were often
confirmed by an oath. (See If at., liv. 9. with the
context; chap. Ixi'i. 18.) And it is reprefented
as utterly impoffible that thefe promifes Ihould
fail. (Ifa. xlix. 15. with the context, cbap.liv. 10.
with the context;- chap. \\. 4—8. cbaf. xl. 8. with
the context.) And therefore it was impoffible, that
the Meffiah ihould fail, or commit fin.
6. It was Impoffible 9 that the Meffiah mould fail
of perfevering in integrity and holinefs, as the
firft Adam did, becaufe this would have been in-
confiflent with the promifes, which God made to
the blefled Virgin, his mother, and to her huf-
band ; implying, that Hejhouldfave his people from
their fins, that God would give Him the throne of his
Father David, that He fiould reign over the houfe of
Jacob for ever ; and that of his kingdom there Jhall
be no end. Thefe promifes were fure, and it was
impoffible they ihould fail. And therefore the Vir
gin 'Mary, in trufting fully to them, acted reafon-
ably, having an immovable foundation of her
faith ; as Elizabeth obferves, ver. 45. And bleffed
isjhe that believeth ; for there Jhall be a performance
ofthofe things, which were told her from the Lord.
7. That it ihould have been poflible that Chrift
ftiould fin, and fo fail in the work of our re
demption,
202 fbe Atts of the Will of Chrift, Part III.
dernption, does not confift with the eternal pur-
pofe and decree of God, revealed in the Scriptures,
that He would provide falvation for fallen man
in and by Jefus Chrift, and that falvation mould
be offered to finners through the preaching of the
Gofpel. Such an abfolute 'decree as this Armi
nians do not deny. Thus much at leaft (out of
all controverfy) is implied in fuch Scriptures, as
I Cor. ii. 7. Eph. i. 4. 5. and chap. iii, 9, 10, n.
I Pet. i. 19, 20. Such an abfolute decree as this,
Arminians allow to be fignified in thefe texts. And
the Arminians election of nations and focieties,
and general election of the Chriftian Church, and
conditional election of particular perfons, imply
this. God could not decree before the founda
tion of the world, to fave all that Ihould believe
in, and obey Chrift, unlefs he had abfoluteiy de
creed, that falvation ihould be provided, and ef
fectually wrought out by Chrift. And fince (as
the Arminians themfelves ftrenuoufly maintain) a
decree of God infers neceffity ; hence it became
xeceffary, that Chrift mould perfevere, and actually
work out falvation for us, and that he Ihould not
fail by the commiilion of fin.
8. That it fhould have been poflible for ChrifVs
Holinefs to fail, is not confiftent with \vhat God
promifed to his Son, before all ages. For, that
falvation fhould be offered to men, through Chrift,
and beftowed on all his faithful followers, is what
is at leaft implied in that certain and infallible
promife fpoken of by the apoftle, Tit. i. 2. In
hope of eternal life ; which God, that cannot lle^ pro-
imjed before the world began. This does not feem
to be controverted by Arminians *.
* See Dr. Whit by on the five Points, p. 48, 49, 50.
9. That
Se&. II. neceffarily holy. 203
9. That it fhould be poflible for Chrift to fail
of doing his Father's Will, is inconfiftent with
the promife made to the Father by the Son, by
the Logos that was with the Father from the be
ginning, before he took the human nature : as
may be feen in PfaL xl, 6, 7, 8, (compared with
the apoftle's interpretation, Heb. x. 5 — 9.) Sa-
crifice and offering tbou didft not dejire : mine ears
baft tloou opened^ (or bored ;) burnt-offering and Jin-
offering Thou baft not required. Then faid 7, Lo, 1
come : in the volume of the book it is written of me^
I delight to do thy Will, 0 my God, and thy law is
within my heart. Where is a manifeft allufion to
the covenant, which the willing fervant, who lo
ved his matter's fervice, made with his mailer,
to be his fervant for ever, on the day wherein
he had his ear bored ; which covenant was pro
bably inferted in the public records, called the
Volume of the Book, by the judges, who were
called to take cognizance of the tranfaction ; Exod.
xxi. If the Logos, who was with the Father, be
fore the world, and who made the world, thus
engaged in covenant to do the Will of the Father
in the human nature, and the promife, was as it
were recorded, that it might be made fure, doubt-
lefs it was impojfible that it mould fail ; and fo it
was impojfible that Chrift Ihould fail of doing the
Will of the Father in the human nature.
10. If it was poffible for Chrift to have failed
of doing the Will of his Father, and fo to have
failed of effectually working out redemption for
finners, then the falvation of all the faints, v/ho
were faved from the beginning of the world, to
the death of Chrift, was not built on a firm
foundation. The Mefliah, and the redemption,
which He was to work out by his obedience
unto death, was the foundation cf the falva
tion
204 W* Acts -of ike Will of Chrift, Part III.
tion of all the pofterity of fallen man, that ever
were faved. Therefore, if when the Old Tefta-
ment faints had the pardon of their fins, and the
favour of God promifed them, and falvation be-
ftowed upon them, ftill it was poffible that the
MefTiah, when he came, might commit fin, then
all this was on a foundation that was not firm
and liable, but liable to fail ; fomething which it
was poffible might never be. God did as it were
trufl to what his Son had engaged and promifed
to do in future time ; and depended fo much upon
it, that He proceeded actually to fave men on the
account of it, as though it had been already done.
But this truft and dependence of God, on the
fuppofition of Chrift's being liable to fail of doing
his Will, was- leaning on a ftafF that was weak,
and might poflibly /break. The faints of old
tr ufied on the promiies of a future redemption
to be wrought out and compleated by the Mcfiiah,
and built their comfort upon it : Abraham faw
Ch rift's Day, and rejoiced ; and he and the other
Patriarchs died in the faith of the promife of it.
(Heb. xi. 13.) But on. this fuppofition, their faith
and their comfort, and their falvation, was
built on a moveable fallible foundation ; Chrift
was not to them a tried ftone, a fure foundation ;
as in Ifai. xxviii. 16. David entirely refted on
the covenant of God with him, concerning the
future glorious dominion and falvation of the
Mefiiah, of his Seed ; fays, it was all his falvation ,
and all his defire\ aLJ comforts himfeif that this
covenant was an everlafling covenant, ordered in all
things and Jure, 2 Sarn. xxiii. 5. But if Chrift's
virtue might fail, he was miftaken : his great
comfort was not built fo fure, as he thought it
was, being founded entirely on the determinations
of the Free- Will of ChriiVs human Soul ; which
was fubjeft to no neceffity. and might be deter*
mined
Se& II. rieceflarily holy. 205
mined either one way or the other. Alfo the
dependence of thofc, who looked for redemption
in Jerufalem, and waited fcr the confolation of
IJrael, '(Luke ii. 25, and 38.) and the confidence
of the difciples of Jefus, who forfook all and fol
lowed Him, that they might enjoy the benefits of
his future kingdom, was built on a fandy foun
dation.
ii. The man Chrift Jefus, before he had
iinifhed his courfe of obedience, and while in the
midft of temptations and trials, was abundant
in pofitively predicting his own future glory in
his kingdom, and the enlargement of his church,
the falvation of the Gentiles through Him, &c.
and in promifes of bleflings he would beftow on
his true difciples in his future kingdom-, on
which promifes he required the full dependence
of his difciples. (Job. xiv.) But the difciples
would have no ground for fuch dependence, if
Chrift had been liable to fail in his work : and
Chrift Himfelf would have been guilty of pre-
fumption, in fo abounding in peremptory pro
mifes of great things, which depended on a meer
contingence ; viz. the determinations ot his Free
Will, confifting in a freedom ad utrumque^ to ei
ther fm or holinefs, ftanding in indifference, and
incident, in thoufands of future inftances, to go
either one way or the other.
Thus it is evident, that it was ImpoJJlbk that the
Adts of the Will of the human foul of Chrift
Ihould be otherwife than holy, and conformed to
the Will of the Father ; or, in other words, they
were necefiarily fo conformed.
I have been the longer in the proof of this
matter, it being a thing denied by fome of the
greateft
2o6 CHRIST'S Righteoufnefs Part III.
greateft drminians, by Epifcopius in particular ;
and becaufe I look upon it as a point clearly and
abfolutely determining the controverfy between
Calvinifts and Arminians^ concerning the neceffity
of fuch a freedom of will as is infifled on by the
latter, in order to moral agency, virtue, com
mand or prohibition, promife or threatening, re
ward or punifhment, praife or difpraife, merit or
demerit. I now therefore proceed,
II. To confider whether CHRIST, in his holy
behaviour on earth, was not thus a moral agentt
fubject to commands* promifes, &c.
Dr. Wkiiby very often fpeaks of what he calls
a freedom ad utrumlibet^ without neceffity, as re-
quifite to law and commands ; and fpeaks of ne
ceffity as entirely inconfiftent with injunctions and
prohibitions. But yet we read of ChrifVs being
the fubjecl: of the commands of his Father, Job x.
1 8. and xv. 10. And Chriil: tells us, that every
thing that He faid, or did, was in compliance
with commandments be Jo ad received of the Father ;
Joh. xii. 49, 50. and xiv 31. And we often read
of Chrift's obedience to his Father's commands,
Rom. v. 19. Phil. ii. 18. Heb. v. 8.
The forementioned writer reprefents promifes
offered as motives to perfons to do their duty, or
a being moved and induced by promifes, as utterly in
confiftent with a ftate wherein perfons hasre not a
liberty ad utrumlibet^ but are necelfarily deter
mined to one. (See particularly, p, 298, and 311.)
But the thing which this writer afTerts, is de-
monftrably falfe, if the Chriftian 'Religion be true.
If there be any truth in Chriftianity or the holy
Scriptures, the man Chrift Jefus had his Will in
fallibly, unalterably and unfruilrably determined
to
Se&. IL. Praife-worthy, rewar dalle, &c. 207
to good, and that alone ; but yet he had pro-
mifes of glorious rewards made to Him, on con
dition of his perfevering in, and perfecting the
work which God had appointed Him ; Ifa. liii.
10, n, 12. Pfal. ii. and ex. If at. xlix. 7, 8, 9. —
In Luke xxii. 28, 29. Chriil fays to his difciples,
Te are they which have continued with me in my
temptations ; and I appoint unto you a kingdom, as
my Father hath appointed unto me. The word moft
properly fignifies to appoint by covenant, or pro-
mife. The plain meaning of Chrift's words is this :
" As you have partook of my temptations and
" trials, and have been fledfaft, and have over-
" come ; I promife to make you partakers of
" my reward, and to give you a kingdom ; as the
" Father has promiled me a kingdom for conti-
<c nuing fledfaft, and overcoming in thofe trials."
And the words are well explained by thofe in
Rev. Hi. 21. To him that o-vercometh, will I grant
to Jit with me on my throne \ even as I alfo overcame,
and am fet down with my Father in his throne. And
Chrift had not only promifes of glorious fuccefs
and rewards made to his obedience and fuffer-
ings, but the Scriptures plainly reprefent Him as
ufing thefe promifes for motives and inducements
to obey and fuffer ; and particularly that promife
of a kingdom which the Father had appointed
Him, or fitting with the Father on his throne ;
as in Heb. xii. 1,2. Let us lay afide every weight,
and the Jin which doth eafily loefet us, and let us run
with patience the race that is fet before its, looking
unto Jefus the Author and Finijher of our faith ; who
for the joy that was fet before Him, endured the crofs,
defpipng the Jhame, and is fet down on the right hand
of the throne of God.
And how ftrange would it be to hear any Chrif-
tian afTerr, that the holy and excellent temper
and
208 CHRIST'S Righteoufnefs Part III;
and behaviour of Jefus Chrift, and that obedi
ence, which he performed under fuch great trials,
was not virtuous or praife-wortby ; becaufe his
Will was not free ad utrumque, to either holinefs
or fin, but was unalterably determined to one ;
that upon this account, there is no virtue at all,
in all ChrirVs humility, meeknefs, patience,
charity, forgivenefs of enemies, contempt of
the world, heavenly-mindednefs, fubmilTion to
the Will of God, perfect obedience to his com
mands, (though He was obedient unto death,
even the death of the crofs) his great companion.
to the afrli&ed, his unparalleled love to mankind,
his faithfulnefs to God and man, under fuch great
trials ; his praying for his enemies, even when
nailing Him to the crofs ; that virtue, when ap
plied to thefe things, is but an empty name-, that
there was no merit in any of thefe things ; that
is, that Chriit was worthy of nothing at all on the
account of them, worthy of no reward, no praife,
no honour or refpect from God or Man ; be
caufe his Will was not indifferent, and free either
to thefe things, or the contrary ; but under fuch
a ftrong inclination or bias to the things that
were excellent, as made it impqffible that he mould
chufe the contrary ; that upon this account (to
ufe Dr. Wkittys language) it would be fenftbly un-
reafonable that the human nature ihould be re
warded for any of thefe things.
According to this doctrine, that creature who
is evidently let-forth in Scripture as the firft-born
of every creature, as having in all things the pre
eminence, and as the higher! of all creatures in vir
tue, honour, and worthinefs of efteem, praife
and glory, on the account of his virtue, is lefs
worthy of rev/ard or praife, than the very leaft
of faints j yea, no more worthy than a clock or
meer
. II* Praife-wortly, rewardable, &:c. 209
meer machine, that is purely paffive, and moved
by natural neceflity.
If we judge by fcriptural reprefentations of
things, we have reafon to fuppofe, that Chrift
took on him our nature, and dwelt with us in this
world, in a fuffering Hate, not only to fatisfy for
our fins ; but that He, being in our nature and
circumftances, and under our trials, might be
our moft fit and proper example, leader and
captain, in the exercife of glorious and victorious
virtue^ and might be a vifible inftance of the
glorious end and reward of it ; that we might
fee in Him the beauty, amiablenefs, and true
honour and glory, and exceeding benefit, of that
Virtue, which it is proper for us human beings to
pradife •, and might thereby learn, and be ani
mated, to feek the like glory and honour, and
to obtain the like glorious reward. See Ileb. ii.
9,-^- 1 4, with v. 8, 9. and xii. 1,2, 3. John xv. 10.
Rom. viii. 17. 2 'Tim. ii. 1 1, 12. i Pet. ii. 19, 20.
and iv.' 13. But if there was nothing of any
virtue or merit, or worthinefs of any reward,
glory, praife or commendation at all, in all that
He did, becaufe it \vas all necdfary, and He
could not help it ; then how is here any thing fo
proper to animate and incite us, free creatures,
by patient continuance in well-doing, to feek for
honour., glory, and virtue ?
God fpeaks of Himfelf as peculiarly well-pleafed
with the righteoufnefs of this fervant of his.
Ifai. xlii. 21. Tbe Lord is well pie afed for kis Rigk-
teoufmfs fake. The facrifices of old are fpoken of
as a fweet favour to God, but the obedience of
Chrift as far more acceptable than they. Pfal. xl.
6, 7. Sacrifice and offering Thou did ft not defire : —
Mine ear haft Tkou opened [as thy fervant per-
P forming
2 TO CHRIST'S Righreoufnefs Part III.
forming willing obedience ;] burnt-offering and
fin-offering haft thou not required : then faid I, Lo,
I come [as a fervant that chearfully anfwers the
calls of his matter :] / delight to do thy will, 0 my
Cod, and thy law is within mine heart. Matthew
xvii. 5. Ihis is my beloved Son, in whom I am well-
f leafed. And Chrift tells us exprefsly, that the
Father loves Him for that wonderful inftance of
his obedience, his voluntary yielding himfelf to
death, in compliance with the Father's command,
John x. 17, 1 8. Therefore doth my Father love
me, becaufe 1 lay down my life : — No man taketh it
from me ; hit I lay it down of myfelfj—This command
ment received I of my Father.
And if there was no merit in Chrift's obedience
unto death, if it was not worthy of praife, and
of the moil glorious rewards, the heavenly hofts
were exceedingly miftaken, by the account that
is given of them, in Rev. v. 8, — 12. — Ihe four
leafts and the four and twenty elders fell down before
tbe Lamb, having every one oj them harps, and gol
den vials full of odours -, — and they fung a new Jong,
faying, Thou art 7/ORTHT to take the book, and to
open the feals thereof-, for 'Thou waftjlain. — And I
beheld, and I heard the voice of many angels round
about the Throne, and the beafts, and the elders, and
the number of them was ten tboufand times ten thou-
fand, and thoufands of thoufands, faying with a loud
voice, WORTHT is the Lamb that was jlain, td
'receive power, and riches, and wifdom, andftrength^
and honour, and glory, and blejjing.
Chrift fpeaks of the eternal life which He was
to receive, as the reward of his obedience to the
Father's commandments. John xii. 49, 50. I
have not ffoken of my f elf ; but the Father which fent
me, He gave me a commandment what IJhouldfay,
and
Sect. II. Praife-worthy and rewardable, &c. 211
and what IJhould fpeak : and I know that his com
mandment is life everlafting : whatfoever I fpeak
therefore^ even as the Father faid unto me^fo I fpeak.
— God promifes to divide him a portion with the
great, &c. for his being his righteous Servant,
for his glorious virtue under fuch great trials and
afflictions, Ifai. liii. n, 12. He foallfre the tra
vel of his foul and be fatisfied : by his knowledge
fhall my righteous Servant jujiify many \ for he jhall
bear their iniquities, therefore will I divide him a
portion with the great , and he ft all divide the fpoil
with the ftrong^ becaufe he hath poured out his foul
unto death. — The Scriptures reprefent God as re-
\varding Him far above all his other fervants,
Phil. ii. 7, 8, 9. He took on Him the form of a
fervant, and was made in the likenefs of men : and
being found in fajhion as a man^ He humbled himfelf^
and became obedient unto death , even the death of the
crofs : wherefore GOD alfo hath highly exalted Him,
and given Him a Name above every Name. Pfal. xlv.
7. Thou loveft right eoufnefs, and hat eft wickednefs -9
therefore God, thy God, hath anointed *Thee with
the oil of gladnefs above thy fellows.
There is no room to pretend, that the glorious
benefits bellowed in confequence of Chrift's obe
dience, are not properly of the nature of a re
ward. What is a reward, in the moft proper
fenfe, but a benefit beftowed in confequence of
fomething morally excellent in quality or beha
viour, in teflimony of wcll-pleafednefs in that
moral excellency, and refpedt and favour on
that account ? If we conlider the nature of a re
ward moft ftrictly, and make the utmoft of tt,
and add to the things contained in this defcrip-
tion, proper merit or worthinefs, and the be-
liowment of the benefit in confequence of a pro-
jnifej fliil it will be found, there is nothing be-
P 2 longing
2i^ CHRIST'S Righteoufnefs, &c. Part III.
longing to it, but that the Scripture is moil ex-
prefs as to its belonging to the glory bellowed on
Chrift, after his fufferings •, as appears from what
has been already obferved : there was a glorious
benefit bellowed in confluence of fomething
morally excellent, being called Righteoufnefs and
Obedience •, there was great favour, love and
well-pleaieclnefs, for this righteoufnefs and obe
dience, in the Beftower ; there was proper me
rit, or worthinefs of the benefit, in the obedi
ence ; it was bellowed in fulfilment of promifes,
made to that obedience ; and was bellowed
therefore, or becaufe he had performed that obe
dience.
I may add to all thefe things, that Jefus Chrifl,
while here in the flefh, was manifeftly in a ilate
of trial. The laft Adam, as Chrifl is called,
i Cor. xv. 45. Rom. v. 14. taking on Him the
human nature, and fo the form of a fervant,
and being under the law, to ftand and aft for us,
was put into a flate of trial, as the firfl Adam
was. — .£)r. Whilty mentions thefe three things as
evidences of peribns being in a flate of trial
(on the five Points, p. 298, 299.) namely, their
afflictions being fpoken of as their trials 6r
temptations, their being the fubjec~ls of promifes,
and their being expofed to Satan's temptations,
But Chrift was apparently the fubjeft of each of
thefe. Concerning promifes made to Him, I
have fpoken already. The difficulties and of-
Jliftions, He met with in the courfe of his obedi
ence, are called his temptations or trials, Luke
xxii. 28. Te are they winch have continued with me
^^temptations, or trials. Heb. ii. 18. For in
that he Himfelf hath fuffsred, being tempted for
tried] He is able to fuccour them that are tempted.
And chap. iv. 1 5, IVe have not an bigb-prieft, which
cannot
Sea. HI. Of tie Inability and Sin, &c. 213
cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities ;
but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet
without fin. And as to his being tempted by
Satan it is what none will difpute*
ECTION III.
ffle Cafe ef jiich as are given up of God to Sin,
and of fallen Man in general^ proves moral Ne-
ceffity and Inability to be confijlent with Blame-
worthiness.
DR. Whiiby afTerts freedom, not only from
co-action, but Neceffity, to be efTential to
any thing deferving the name of fin, and to an
action's being culpable: in thele words ^Difcourfe
on five Points, edit. 3. p. 348.) " If they be
" thus neceffitated, then neither their Sins of
" omiffion or com million could defervc that
" name ; it being erTential to the nature of Sin,
<f according to St. Auftirfs definition, that it be
" an a&ion a quo liber -urn eft abftinere. Three
" things feem plainly neceflary to make an ac-
" tion or omiffion culpable ; i . That it be in
" our power to perform or forbear it : for, as
<( Origen, and all the Fathers fay, no man is blame-
" worthy for not doing what he could not do."
And elfewhere the Doctor infills, that " when any
" do evil of Neceffity, what they do is no vice,
" that they are guilty of no fault, * are worthy
" of no blame, difpraife, -j- or difhonour, | but
" are unblameable." §
* Difcourfeon five Points, p. 347, 360, 361, 377, f 303,
326, 329, and many other places. J 371. § 304, 361.
214 Of the Inability and Sin of fuch Part III.
If thefe things are true, in Dr. Whitly's fenfe
of Necefiity, they will prove all fuch to be blame-
lefs, who are given up of God to Sin, in what
they commit after they are thus given up. — That
there is fuch a thing as men's being judicially
given up to Sin, is certain, it the Scripture rightly
informs us ; fuch a thing being often there fpo*
ken of: as in Pfal. Ixxxi. 11. So I gave them up to
their own' hearts luft^ and they walked in their own
counfeh. Acts vii. 42. Then God turned \ and gave
them up to ivorfbip the hoft of heaven. Rom. \. 24.
Wherefore, God alfo gave them up to unclean nefs^
through the lufts of their own hearts^ to difoonotir
their own lodies between themf elves. Ver. 26. For
this cauje God gave them up to vile affeftions. Ver.
28, And even as they did not like to retain God in
their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate
to do tbofe things that are not convenient.
It is needlefs to (land particularly to inquire,
what God's giving men up. to their own hearts
lufts fignifies : it is fufEcient to obferve, that
hereby is certainly meant God's fo ordering or
difpofing things, in fome refpect or other, either
by doing or forbearing to do, as that the confe-
quence iriould be men's continuing in their Sins.
So much as men are given up to, fo much is the
confequence of their being given up, whether that
be lefs or more. If God does not order things fo,
by action or permiffion, that Sin will be the con
fequence, then the event proves that they are not
given up to that confequence. If good be the
confequence, inftead of evil, then God's mercy
is to be acknowledged in that good ; whiclf mer
cy muft be contrary to God's judgment in giving
up to evil. If the event mud prove, that they
are given up to evil as the confequence, then the
perfons, who are the fubjedts of this judgment,
mull
Sect. III. as are given up to Sin. 215
muft be the fubje&s of fuch an event, and fo the
event is necefTary.
If not only co-aftion, but all Neceffity, will prove
men blameleis, then Judas was blamelefs, after
jChrifl had given him over, and had already de
clared his certain damnation, and that he fhould
verily betray Him. He was guilty of no Sin in be-
traying his Matter, on this fuppofition •, though
his fo doing is fpoken of by Chrift as the moil
aggravated Sin, more heinous than the Sin of
Pilate in crucifying Him. And the Jews in Egypt,
in Jeremiah's time, were guilty of no Sin, in their
pot worfhipping the true God, after God had
fworn by bis great Name, that his Namefoould be no
more named in the mouth of any man of Judah, in
all the land of Egypt. Jer. xliv. 26.
Dr. Whltby (Difc. on five Points, p. 302, 303)
denies, that men, in this world, are ever fo given
up by God to Sin, that their wills fhould be necei-
farily determined to evil ; though He owns, that
hereby it may become exceeding difficult for men to
do good, having a ftrpng bent, and powerful in
clination, to what is evil.— But if we fhould al
low the cafe to be jufl as he reprefents, the judg
ment of giving up to Sin will no better agree
wijth his notions of that liberty, which is eifen-
tial to praife or blame, than if we fhould fup-
pofe it to render the avoiding of Sin impojjible*
For if an impqffihility of avoiding Sin wholly ex-
cufes a man •, then, for the fame reafon, its be
ing difficult to avoid it, excufes him in part ; and
this juft in proportion to the degree of difficulty.
— If the influence of moral impoflibility or In
ability be the fame, to excufe perfons in not do
ing, or not avoiding any thing, as that of na
tural Inability, (^ which is iuppofed) then undoubt-
P 4 edly
2 1 6 Of the Inability and Sin of' fuck Fart III,
edly, in like manner, moral difficulty has the fame
influence to excufe with natural* difficulty. But ail
allow, that natural impofiibility wholly excufes,
and alfo that natural difficulty excufes in part, and
makes the aft or omiflion lefs blameable in pro
portion to the difficulty. 'All natural difficulty,
according to the plaineft dictates of the light of
nature, excufes in fome degree, fo that the neg-
Ifct is not fo blameable, as if there had been no
difficulty in the cafe : and fo the greater the dif
ficulty is, itill the more excufeable, in proportion
to the increafe of the difficulty. And 'as natural
impoflibility wholly excufes and excludes all
blame, fo the nearer the difficulty approaches to
impoffibility, ftill the nearer a perlon is to blame-
leifnefs in proportion to that approach. And if
the cafe of ' moral impoflibility or Neceflity, be
jufl the fame with natural Neceffity or co-action,
as to influence to excufe a neglect, then alfo, fpr
the fame reafon, the cafe of natural difficulty,
does not differ in influence, to excufe a neglect,
from moral difficulty, arifing from a ftrong bias
or bent to evil, fuch as Dr. Wb'itby owns in the
cafe of thofe that are given up to their own hearts
lulls. So that the fault of fuch peribns rmift be
lefTened, in proportion to the difficulty, and ap
proach to impoffibility. If ten degrees of moral
difficulty make the action quite impoffible, and
fo wholly excufe, then if there be nine degrees of
difficulty, the perfon is in great part excufed,
and is nine degrees in ten,, lefs blame-worthy,
than if .there had been no difficulty at all; and
he has but one degree of blame-worthinefs. The
reafon is plain, on Arminlan principles ; viz. be-
caufe as difficulty, by antecedent bent and bias
on the will, is increafed, liberty of indifference,
and felf-determination in the will, is diminilhed :
fo much hindrance and impediment is there, in
i the
Sect. Ill, as are given up to Sin. 217
the way of the will's acting freely, by meer
felf-determination. And if ten degrees of fuch.
hindrance take away all fuch liberty, then nine
degrees take away nine parts in ten, and leave
but one degree of liberty. And therefore there
is but one degree of blameablenefs, cateris pari-
lous, in the neglect ; the man being no further
blameable in what he does, or neglects, than he
has liberty in that affair : for blame or praife (fay
they; arifes wholly from a good ufe or abufe of
liberty.
From all which it follows, that a ftrong bent
and bias one way, and difficulty of going the
contrary, never caufes a perfon to be at all more
expofed to Sin, or any thing blameable : becaufe,
as the difficulty is increafed, fo much the lefs is
required and expected. Though in one refpect,
cxpofednefs to Sin or fault is increafed, viz. by
an increafe of expofednefs to the evil action or
omiffion ; yet it is diminifhed in another refpect,
to balance it; namely, as the iinfulnefs or blame
ablenefs of the action or omiffion is diminifhed
in the fame proportion. So that, on the whole,
the affair, as to expofednefs to guilt or blame, is
Jeft juil as it was.
To illuftrate this, let us fuppofe a fcale of a
balance to be intelligent, and a free agent, and
indued with a felf-moving power, by virtue of
which it could act and produce effects to a cer
tain degree, ex. gr. to move itfelf up or down
with a force equal to a weight of ten pounds ;
and that it might therefore be required of it, in
ordinary circumftances, to move itfelf down with
that force ^ for which it has power and full li
berty, and therefore would be blame-worthy if it
failed of it. But then let us fuppofe a weight of
ten
2 1 8 Of tie Inability and Sin Part III.
ten pounds to be put in the oppofite fcale, which
in force entirely counter-balance its felf-moving
power, and fo renders it impoflible for it to move
down at all ; and therefore wholly excufes it from
any fuch motion. But if we fuppofe there to be
only nine pounds in the oppofite fcale, this ren
ders its motion not impoflible, but yet more dif
ficult ^ fo that it can now only move down with
the force of one pound : but however, this i§
all that is required of it under thefe circum-
Hances ; it is wholly excufed from nine parts of its
motion : and if the fcale, under thefe circum-
flances, negle&s to move, and remains at reft,
all that it will be blamed for, will be its neglecl:
of that one tenth part of its motion ; which it
had as much liberty and advantage for, as in
vifual circumftances, it has for the greater motion,
which in fnch a cafe would be required. So that
this new difficulty, does not at all increafe its ex-
pofednefs to any thing blame-worthy.
And thus the very fuppolition of difficulty in
the way of a man's duty, or proclivity to Sin,
through a being given up to hardnefs of heart,
or indeed by any other means whatfoever, is an
inconfiftence, according to Dr. Wlnttys notions
of liberty, virtue and vice, blame and praife.
The avoiding Sin and blame, and the doing what
is virtuous and praife-worthy, mud be always
equally eafy.
Dr. J'VhltWs notions of liberty, obligation,
virtue, Sin, £$*• led him into another, great in-
confidence. He abundantly infifts, that necef-
fity is inconfiftent with the nature of Sin or
fault. He fays, in the forementioned trearife,
p. 14. Who can blame a ferfonfor doing what he
could not help ? And p. 15. it being fenfibly unjuft,
to.
Sect. III. of fallen Man. 219
to punijh any man for doing that which was never
in his power to avoid. And in p. 341, to confirm
his opinion, he quotes one of the Fathers, fay
ing, Why doth God command, if man hath not free
will and power to obey ? And again, in the fame and
the next page, Who 'will not cry out^ that it is folly
to command him^ that hath not liberty to do what is
commanded ; and that it is unjuft to condemn him*
that has it not in his power to do what is required ?
And in p. 373, he cites another faying, A law
is given to him that can turn to loth parts ; i. e.
obey or tranfgrefs it : but no law can be again/I him
who is bound by nature.
And yet the fame Dr. ^^zV^yafTerts, that fallen
Man is not able to perform perfect obedience. In
p. 165, he has thefe words: " The nature of
" Adam had power to continue innocent, and
<c without Sin ; whereas, it is certain our nature
" never had fo." But if we have not power to
continue innocent and without Sin, then Sin is
inconfiftent with Neceftlty, and we maybe finful
in that which we have not power to avoid ; and
thofe things cannot be true, which he aflerts elfe-
\vhere, namely, " That if we be neceffitated,
" neither Sins of omiilion nor commifllon,
" would deferve that name," (p. 348.) If we have
it not in our power to be innocent, then we have
it not in our power to be blamelefs: and if fo, we
are under a Neceflity of being blame -worthy.
And how does this confiil with v/hat he fo often
afierts, that Necefllty is inconfiftent with blame
or praife ? If we have it not in our power to per
form perfect obedience to all the commands of
God, then we are under a Necefiity of breaking
fome commands, in fome degree-, having no
power to perform fo much as is commanded.
And if fo, why does he cry out of the unreafon -
ablenefs
220 Of the Inability of fallen Man, Part III,
ablenefs and folly of commanding beyond whafc
men have power to do ?
And Armenians in general are very inconfiftent
with themfelves in what they fay of the Inability
of fallen Man in this refpect. They ftrenuoufly
maintain, that it would be unjuft in God, to re
quire any thing of us beyond our prefent power
and ability to perform ; and alfo hold, that we
are now unable to perform perfect obedience, and
that Chrift died to fatisfy for the imperfections of
cur obedience, and has made way, that our imper
fect obedience might be accepted inftead of per
fect : whereiii they feem infenfibly to run them
felves into the groffeft inconfiftence. For, (as I
have obferved elfewhere) " they hold, that God,
*' in mercy to mankind, has abolifhed that rigor-
<c ous conftitution or law, that they were under
w originally •, and inftead of it, has introduced a
" more mild conftitution, and put us under a
*c new law, which requires no more than imper-
" feet fincere obedience, in compliance winh our
*c poor infirm impotent circumflances fmce the
*' fall."
Now, how can thefe things be made con-
fiftent ? I would a/k, what law thefe imperfec
tions of our obedience are a breach of? If they
are a breach of no law, that we were ever under,
then they are not Sins. And if they be not Sins,
what need of Chrift's dying to fatisfy for them ?
But if they are Sins, and the breach of fome
law, what law is it ? They cannot be a breach of
their new law ; for that requires no other than
imperfect obedience, or obedience with imper-
fedions : and therefore to have obedience attend
ed with im perfections, is no breach of it ; for it
is as much as it requires. And they cannot be a
breach
Se6t. ' III. Of tie Inability of fallen Man. 22!
breach of their old law ; for that, they fay, is
entirely abolifhed ; and we never were under it. —
They fay, it would not be juft in God to require
of us perfed: obedience, becanfe it would not be
juft to require more than we can perform, or to
punifh us for failing of it. And, therefore, by
their own fcheme, the imperfections of our obe
dience do not deferve to be punifhed. What need
therefore of Ch rift's dying, to fatisfy for them ?
What need of his fuffering, to fatisfy for that
which is no fault, and in its own nature de-
ferves no fa-fen ng f What need of (Thrift's dying,
to purchafe, that our imperfett obedience fhould
be accepted, when, according to their fcheme, in
would be unjuft in itfelf, that any other obedi
ence than imperfeft fhould be required ? What
need of (Thrift's dying to make way for God's
accepting fuch an obedience, as it would be un-
juft in Him not to accept ? Is there any need of
(Thrift's dying, to prevail with God not to do
unrighteoufly ? — If it be faid, that Chritl died to
fatisfy that old law for us, that fo we might nqt
be under it, but that there might be room for
our being under a more mild la\v ; ftill I would
inquire, what need of (Thrift's dying, that we
might not be under a law, which (by their prin
ciples) it would be in itfelf unjuft that we fhould
be under, whether Chrifi had died or no, be
canfe, in our prefent ftate, we are not able to
keep it ?
So the Armenians are inconfiilent with them-
felves, not only in what they fay of the need of
Chrift's fatisfacYion to atone for thofe imperfec
tions, which we cannot avoid, but alfo in what
they fay of the grace of God, granted to enable
men to perform the fmcere obedience of the new
law.
£22 Of Inability, and Obligation. Part III.
law. " I grant (fays Dr. Sf ebbing *) indeed, that
" by reafon of original Sin, we are utterly dif-
*c abled for the performance of the condition,
*c without new grace from God. But I fay then,
*6 that he gives fuch a grace to all of us, by
" which the performance' of the condition is
" truly poflible : and upon this ground he may,
"• and doth moft righteouily require it." If Dr.
Stebbing intends to fpeak properly, by grace he
mud mean, that afiiitance which is of grace, or
of free favour and kindnefs. But yet in the fame
place he fpeaks of it as very unreafonable, unjuft
and cruel, for God to require that, as the con
dition of pardon, that is become impoflible by
original Sin. If it be fo, what grace is there in
giving afiiitance and ability to perform the con
dition of pardon ? Or why is that called by the
name of grace, that is an'abfolute debt, which
God is bound to beftow, and which it would be
unjuft and cruel in Him to with-hold, feeing he
requires that, as the condition of pardon, which h£
cannot perform without it ?
SECTION IV.
Command and Obligation to Obedience, conjijlent
ivitb moral Inability to obey.
IT being fo much infilled on by Armnian wri
ters, that neceflity is inconfiftent with Law or
Command, and particularly, that it is abfurd to
fuppofe God by his Command ihould require that
of men which they are unable to do ; not allow
ing in this cafe for any difference that there is
between
* Treatife of the Operations of the Spirit,
112, 113.
Stct. IV» Commands confijlent, , &c. 223
between natural and moral Inability -, I would
therefore now particularly coniider this matter.
And, for the greater clearnefs, I would di-
ftinctly lay down the following things.
I. The will itfelf, and not only thofe actions
which are the effects of the will, is the proper
object of Precept or Command. This is, liich
or fuch a ftate or acts of men's wills, is in many
cafes, properly required of them by Commands ;
and not only thofe alterations in the flate of
their bodies ^or minds that are the confequences
of volition. This is mod manifeft; for it is
the foul only that is properly and directly the
fubject of Precepts or Commands ; that only be
ing capable of receiving or perceiving Commands.
The motions or ftate of the body are matter of
Command, only as they are fubject to the foul,
and connected with its acts. But now the foul
has no other faculty whereby it can, in the mod
direct and proper fenfe, confent, yield to, or
comply with any Command, but the faculty of
the will ; and it is by this faculty only, that the
foul can directly difobey, or refufe compliance :
for the very notions of conferring, yielding, ac
cepting^ complying, refujing, rejecting, &c. are, ac
cording to the meaning of the terms, nothing
but certain acts of the will. Obedience, in the
primary nature of it, is the fubmitting and yield
ing of the will of one to the will of another.
Difobedience is the not confenting, not complying
of the will of the commanded to the manifefted
will of the commander. Other acts that are
not the acts of the will, as certain motions of
the body and alterations in the foul, are Obedi
ence or Difobedience only indirectly, as they are
connected with the ftate or actions of the will,
according
224 Commands cdnjiftent Part IIL
according to an eftablifhed law of nature. So
that it is manifeft, the will itfelf may be requir
ed : and the being of a good will is the moft
proper, aired: and immediate fubjed of Com
mand ; and if this cannot be prescribed or re
quired by Command or Precepr, nothing can ; for
other things can be required no otherwiie than as
they depend upon, and are the fruits of a good
will.
CoroL i. If there be feveral acts of the will,
or a feries of ads, one following another, and
one the effect of another, the fir.fi and determining
affi is properly the fubjed of Command, and not
only the consequent ads, which are dependent
upon it. Yea, it is this more efpecially, which
is that, which Command or Precept has a proper
refped to ; becaufe it is this ad that determines
the whole affair: in this ad the Obedience or
Difobedience lies, in a peculiar manner; the con-
fequent ads being all fubjed to it, and governed
and determined by it. This determining govern*
ing ad muft be the proper objed of Precept,
or none.
CoroL 2. It alfo follows, from what has been
obfervcd, that if there be any fort of ad, or
exertion of the foul, prior to all free ads of the
will or ads of choice in the cafe, directing and
determining, what the ads of the will ihall be ;
that ad or exertion of the foul cannot properly
be fubjed to any Command or Precept, in any
refped whatfoever, either diredly or indirectly,
immediately or remotely. Such ads cannot be
fubject to Commands direftly^ becaufe they are
no acts of the will -y being by the fuppoiition prior
to all acts of the will, determining and giving
rife to alj its ads : they not being ads of the
will,
Sect, IV. with moral Inability. 225
will, there can be in them no confent to, or
compliance with any Command. Neither can
they be fubject to Command or Precept indirectly
or remotely ; for they are not fo much as the effefts
Or conferences of the will, being prior to all its
ads. So that if there be any Obedience in that
original act of the foul, determining all voli
tions, it is an ad: of Obedience wherein the will
has no concern at all ; it preceding every act of
will. And therefore, if the foul either obeys or
difobeys in this act, it is wholly involuntarily ;
there is nc willing Obedience or rebellion, no
compliance or oppofition of the will in the af
fair : and what fort of Obedience or rebellion is
this ?
And thus the Arnnman notion of the freedom
of the will confiding in the foul's determining
its own acts of will, inftead of being effemial
to moral agency, and to men's being the fub-
jects of moral government, is utterly inconii-
itent with it. For if the foul determines all its
acts of will, it is therein fubject to no Com
mand or moral government, as has been now
obferved ; becaufe its original determining act is
no act of will or choice, it being prior, by the
fuppofition, to every act of will. And the foul
cannot be the fubjecl: of Command in the act of
the will itfelf, which depends on the foregoing
determining acl, and is determined by it •, in as
much as this is neceffary, being the neceilary
conlequence and effect of that prior determining
act, which is not voluntary. Nor can the man
be the fubjedl of Command or government in
his external actions ; becaufe thefe are all necef-
fary, being the neceffary effects of the acts of
the will themfelves. So that mankind, accord
ing to this fcheme, are fubjects of Command or
moral
226 Commands confident Part IIL
moral government in nothing at all ; and all their
moral agency is entirely excluded, and no room
for virtue or vice in the world.
So that it is the Arminlan fcheme, and not the
fcheme of the C&Ivinifts, that is utterly inconfiftent
with moral government, and with all ufe of
laws, precepts, prohibitions, promifcs or threa-
tenings. Neither is there any way whatfoever to
make their principles confift with thefe things.
For if it be faid, that there is no prior determin
ing act of the foul, preceding the acts of the
will, but that volitions are events that come to
pafs by pure accident, without any determining
caufe, this is moft palpably inconfiftent with all.
ufe of laws and precepts •, for nothing is more
plain than that laws can be of no ufe to direct
and regulate perfect accident : which, by the fup-
pofition of its being pure accident, is in no cafe
regulated by any thing preceding ; but happens,
this way or that, perfectly by chance, without any
caufe or rule. The perfect ufeleffnefs of laws
and precepts alfo follows from the Armiman no
tion of indifference, as eflential to that liberty,
which is requifite to virtue or vice. For the
end of Jaws is to bind to one fide ; and the end
of Commands is to turn the will one way : and
therefore they are of no ufe, unlefs they turn or
bias the will that way. But if liberty confifts
in indifference, then their biafllng the will one
way only, deflroys liberty ; as it puts the will
out of equilibrium. So that the will, having a
bias, through the influence of binding law, laid
upon it, is not wholly left to itfelf, to determine
itfelf which way it will, without influence from
without.
II. Hav-
Seel:. IV. with Moral Inability. 227
II. Having ihewn that the will itfelf, efpe-
daily in thofe acts, which are original, leading
and determining in any cafe, is the proper fub-
je6l of Precept and Command, and not only thofe
alterations in the body, &c. which are the effects
of the will; I now proceed, in the fecond place,
to obferve that the very oppofition or defect of
the will itfelf, in that ad:, which is its original
and determining aft in the cafe ; I fay, the will's
oppofition in this aft to a thing propofed or com
manded, or its failing of compliance, implies a
moral Inability to that thing : or, in other words,
whenever a Command requires a certain ftate or
ad: of the will, and the perfon commanded,
notwithftanding the Command and the circum-
flances under wrhich it is exhibited, fr.il! finds his
will oppofite or wanting, in that, belonging to
its flate or acts, which is original and determining
in the affair, that man is morally unable to obey
that Command.
This is manifefl from what wasobferved in the
firft part, concerning the nature of moral Inabi
lity, as diftinguifhed from natural: where it was
obferved, that a man may then be faid to be
morally unable to do a thing, when he is under
the influence or prevalence of a contrary inclina
tion, or has a want of inclination, under fuch
circumftances and views. It is alfo evident, from
what has been before proved, that the will is al
ways, and in every individual aft, neceflarily de
termined by the ilrongeil motive ; and fo is al
ways unable to go againft the motive, which, all
things confidered, has now the gteatefl ftrength
and advantage to move the will. — But not fur
ther to infift on thefe things, the truth of the
polition now laid down, viz. that when the will
is oppofite /a, or failing of a compliance with a
Qja thing
228 Commands conjijlent Part III.
thing in its original determining inclination or ait,
it is not able to comply, appears by the confi-
deration of thefe two things.
1. The will in the time of that diverfe or op-
pofite leading act or inclination, and when ac
tually under the influence of it, is not able to ex
ert itfelf to the contrary, to make an alteration,
in order to a compliance. The inclination is
unable to change itfelf •, and that for this plain
reafon, that it is unable to incline to change it
felf. Prefent choice cannot at prefent chufe to be
otherwife: for that would be at prefent to chufe
fomething diverfe from what is at prefent chofem
If the will, all things now confidered, inclines
or chufes to go that way, then it cannot chufe,
all things now confidered, to go the other way,
and fo cannot chufe to be made to go the other
\vay. To fuppofe that the mind is now fin-
Cerely inclined to change itfelf to a different in
clination, is to fuppofe the mind is now truly
inclined otherwife than it is now inclined. The
will may oppofe fome future remote act that it is
expofed to, but not its own prefent act.
2. As it is impoflible that the will mould com
ply with the thing commanded, with refpect to its
leading aft, by any act of its own, in the time
of that diverfe or oppolite leading and original
aft, or after it has adually come under the in-
fluence of that determining choice or inclination •, fo>
it is impofiible it fhould be determined to a com
pliance by any foregoing act ; for, by the very
fuppofitibn, there is no foregoing act ; the op-
polite or non-complying act being that act which
is original and determining in the cafe. Therefore
it muft be fo, that if this firjt determining aft be
found
Sect. IV. with moral Inability. 229
found non-complying, on the propofal of the
Command, the mind is morally unable to obey.
For to fuppofe it to be able to obey, is to fuppofe
it to be able to determine and caufe itsfirft deter
mining aft to be otherwife, and that it has power
better to govern and regulate its firft governing and
regulating aff, which is abfurd ; for it is to fup
pofe a prior act of the will, determining its firft
determining act ; that is, an act prior to the firft,
and leading and governing the original and go
verning act of all ; which is a contradiction.
Here if it ihould be faid, that although the
mind has not any ability to will contrary to what
it does will, in the original and leading act of the
will, becaufe there is fuppofed to be no prior act
to determine and order it otherwife, and the will
cannot immediately change itfelf, becaufe it can
not at prefent incline to a change ; yet the mind
has an ability for the prefent to forbear to pro
ceed to action, and taking time for deliberation ;
which may be an occafipn of the change of the
inclination.
I anfwer, (j.) In this objection that feems to
be forgotten which was obferved before, yiz. that
the determining to take the matter into confi-
deration, is itfelf an act of the will : and if
this be all the act wherein the mind exercifes
ability and freedom, then this, by the fnppofi-
tion, muft be all that can be commanded or re-
guired by Precept. And if this act be the com
manding act, then all that has been obferved con
cerning the commanding act of the will remains
true, that the very want of it is a moral Inability
to exert it, t£c. (2.) We are fpeaking concern
ing the firft and leading act of the will in the
cafe, or abpui the' affair •, and if a determining
0.3 to
230 Commands confident Part III.
to deliberate, or, on the contrary, to proceed
immediately without deliberating, be the firfl and
leading act -, or whether it be or no, if there
be another act before it, which determines that ;
or whatever be the original and leading act ; flill
the foregoing proof Hand's good, that the non-
compliance of the leading act implies moral Ina
bility to comply.
If it fhould be objected, that thefe things
make all moral Inability equal, and fuppofe men
morally unable to will otherwife than they ac
tually do will, in all cafes, and equally fo in every
Inflance.
Jn anfwer to this objection, I defire two things
may be obferved. Firfl, That if by being equally
unable be meant as really unable ; then, Ib far as
the Inability is meerly moral, it is true, the will,
in every inilance, acts by moral neceflity, and
is morally unable to act otherwife, as truly and
properly in one cafe as another ; as I humbly
conceive, has been perfectly and abundantly de-
monftrated by what has been faid in the preced
ing part of this Effay. But yet, in fome re-
fpect, the Inability may be laid to be greater in
iome inftances than others : though the man may
be truly unable, (if moral Inability can truly be
called Inability,) yet he may be further from be
ing able to do fome things than others. As it is
in things, which men are naturally unable to do.
A perfon, whofe ftrength is no more than fuffi-
cient to lift the weight of one hundred pounds,
i* as truly and really unable to lift one hundred
and one pounds, as ten thoufand pounds-, but
yet he is further from being able to lift the latter
weight than the former; and fo, according to
common ufe of fpeech, has a greater Inability
lor
Sect. IV. with moral Inability. 231
for it. So it is in moral Inability. A man is
truly morally unable to chufe contrary to a pre-
fent inclination, which in the lead degree pre
vails ; or, contrary to that motive, \vhich, all
things confidered, has ftrength and advantage
now to move the will, in the leaft degree, fu-
perior to all other motives in view : bu£ yet he
is further from ability to refift a very ftrong ha
bit, and a violent and deeply rooted inclination,
or a motive vaftly exceeding all others in flrength.
And again, the Inability may, in fome refpects, be
called greater in fome inftances than others, as it
may be more general and extenfiue to all afls of that
kind. So men may be faid to be unable in a dif
ferent fenfe, and to be further from moral abi
lity, who have that moral Inability which is gene
ral and habitual, than they who have only that
Inability which is occajional and particular*. Thus
in cafes of natural Inability ; he that is born
blind may be faid to be unable to fee, in a diffe
rent manner, and is, in fome refpects, further
from being able to fee, than he whofe fight is
hindered by a tranfient cloud or mifl.
And befides, that which was obferved in the
firft part of this difcourfe, concerning the Inability
which attends zjlrong and fettle d habit ^ ihould be
here remembered •, viz. that fixed habit is attend
ed with this peculiar moral Inability, by which
it is diftinguiihed from occajional volition , namely,
that endeavours to avoid future volitions of that
kind, which are agreable to fuch a habit, much
more frequently and commonly prove vain and
inefficient. For tho? it is impoilible there mould
be any true fincere defjres and endeavours a-
* See this diftinftion of moral Inability explained ia
PART I. Sea.W.
232 Commands conjrftent Part IIL
gainft a prefent volition or choice, yet there may
be againlt volitions of that kind, when viewed at
a diftance. A perfon may defire and ufe means
to prevent future exerciles of a certain inclina
tion ; and, in order to it, may wifh .the habit
might be removed ; but h-is de fires and endea
vours may be ineffectual. The man may be faicl
in fome fenfe to be unable; yea, even as the
word unable is -a relative term^ and has relation to
ineffectual endeavours ; yet not with regard to
prefent, but remote endeavours.
Secondly, It mud be borne in mind, according
to what was obferved before, that indeed no In
ability whatfoever, which is mcerly moral, is pro
perly called by the name of J liability ; and that in
the ftrictefl propriety of fpeech, a man may be
laid to have a thing in his power, if he has it at
his election ; and he cannot be laid to be unable
to do a thing, when he can, if he now pleafes,
or whenever he has a proper, direct and immeT
diate defire for it. As to thofe defires and en
deavours, that may be againft the exercifes of a
ftrong -habit, with regard to which men may be
fold to be unable to avoid thole exercifes, they
are remote Genres and endeavours in two re-
fpects. ttrjt, as to time ; they are never againit
prefent volitions, but only againit volitions of
iuch a kind, when viewed at a diftance. Secondly^
as to their nature ^ thefe oppofite defires are no*
directly and properly againft the habit and incli
nation itfdf, or the volitions in which it is exer-
cifed •, for thefe, in themfelves confidered, are a-
&re.able : but againft fomething elfe, 'that attends
them, or is their confluence ; the oppofition of
the mind is levelled entirely againft this; the in
clination or volitions themfelves are not at all op-
pokd 'directly, and for their own Hike, but only
indirircti'/
Sedt. VI. 'with moral Inability. 233
indireclly and remotely on the account of fome-
•thing alien and foreign.
III. Though the oppofition of the will itfelf,
or the very want of will to a thing commanded,
implies a moral Inability to that thing; yet, if it
be, as has been already fhewn, that the being of a
good flate or acl: of will, is a thing moft pro
perly required by Command -, then, in fome cafes,
iuch a ftatc or act of will may properly be re
quired, which at prefent is not, and which may
aifo be wanting after it is commanded. And
therefore thofe things may properly be com*
manded, which men have a moral Inability for.
Such a ftate, or act of the will, may be re
quired by Command, as does not already exitt.
For if that volition only may be commanded to
be which already is, there could be no ufe of Pre
cept; Commands in all cafes would be perfectly
vain and impertinent. And not only may fuch a
will be required, as is wanting before the Com
mand is given, but alfo fuch as may pofH'oly be
wanting afterwards ; fuch as the exhibition of the
Command may not be effectual to produce or
excite. Otherwife, no iuch thing as difobedience
to a proper and rightful Command is pofilble in
any cafe ; and there is no cafe fuppofablc or pof-
iible, wherein there can be an inexcufable or faul
ty difobedience. Which Arminlans cannot affirm,
confidently with their principles : for this makes
Obedience to juft and proper Commands always
mccffary, and difobedience impofTible. And fo
the Ar mini an would overthrow himfelf, yielding
the very point we are upon, which he fo ftrenu-
oufly denies, viz. that Law and Command are con
fident with neceflity.
If
234 Commands ^ Invitations Part III.
If meerly that Inability will excufe difobe-
dicnce, which is implied in the oppofition or de-
ftct of inclination, remaining after the Command
is exhibited, then wickednefs always carries that
in it which excufes it. It is evermore fo, that by
how much the more wickednefs there is in a man's
heart, by fo much is his inclination to evil the
fbonger, and by fo much the more, therefore, has
he of moral Inability to the good required. His
moral Inability, confiding in the flrength of his
evil inclination, is the very thing wherein his
wickednefs confifls ; and yet, according to Armi-
nlan principles, it muft be a thing inconfiftent
with wickednefs ; and by how much the more he
has of it, by fo much is he the further from wick
ednefs.
Therefore, on the whole, it is manifeft, that
moral Inability alone (which confifts in difmcli-
nation) never renders any thing improperly the
fubject matter of Precept or Command, and never
can excufe any perfon in difobedience, or want
of conformity to a command.
Natural Inability, arifing from the want of na
tural capacity, or external hindrance (which alone
is properly called Inability) without doubt wholly
excuies, or makes a thing improperly the matter
of Command. If men are excufed from doing
or acting any good thing, fnppofed to be com
manded, it muft be through fome defect or ob-
ilacle that is not in the will itfclf, but intrinsic to
it-, either in the capacity of underftanding, cr
body, or outward circumftances.
Here two or three thin-gs may be obferved,
i. As
Sect. IV. confiftent with moral Inability. 235
i. As to fpiritual duties or acts, or any good
thing in the ftate or imminent acts of the will
hfelf, or of the affections (which are only certain
modes of the exercife of the will) if perfons are
juftly excufed, it muft be through want of capa
city in the natural faculty of underftanding. Thus
the fame fpiritual duties, or holy affections and
exercifes of heart, cannot be required of men, as
may be of angels ; the capacity of underftand
ing being fo much inferior. So men cannot be
required to love thofe amiable perfons, whom they
have had no opportunity to fee, or hear of, or
come to the knowledge of, in any way agreable
to the natural ftate and capacity of the human
underftanding. But the infufHciency of motives
will not excufe; unlefs their being infufficient
arifes not from the moral ftate of the will or in
clination itfelf, but from the ftate of the natural
underftanding. The great kindnefs and generality
of another may be a motive infufficient to excite
gratitude in the perfon, that receives the kindnefs,
through his vile and ungrateful temper : in this
cafe, the infufficiency of the motive arifes from
the ftate of the will or inclination of heart, and
does not at all excufe. But if this generofity is not
iiifficientto excite gratitude, being unknown, there
being no means of information adequate to the
ftate and meafure of the perfon's faculties, this
infufficiency is attended with a natural Inability,
which entirely excufes.
2. As to fuch motions of body, or exercifes
and alterations of mind, which does not confift in
the imminent acls or ftate of the will itfelf, but
are fuppofed to be required as effects of the
will ; I fay, in fuch fuppofed effects of the will, in
cafes wherein there is no want of a capacity of
underftanding ; that Inability, and that only ex
cufes,
Commands and Invitations Part III.
cufes, which confilts in want of connection be
tween them and the will. If the will fully com
plies, and the propofed effect does pot prove, ac
cording to the laws of nature, to be connected
with his volition, the man is perfectly excufed ; he
has a natural Inability to the thing required. For
the will, itfelf, as has been obferved, is all that
can be directly and immediately required by Com
mand ; and other things only indirectly, as con
nected with the will. If therefore, there be a full
compliance of will, the perfon has done his duty ;
and if other things do not prove to be con
nected with his volition, that is not owing to him.
3. Both thefe kinds of natural Inability that
have been mentioned, and fo all Inability that ex*
cufes, may be refolved into one thing; namely,
want of natural capacity or flrength -, either
capacity of underftanding, or external ftrength.
For when there are external defects and obftacles,
they would be no obftacles, were it not for the
imperfection and limitations of underftanding and,
ilrength.
Coral If things for which men have a moral
Inability, may properly be the matter of Precept
or Command, then they may alfoof invitation and
counfel. Commands and invitations come very
much to the fame thing \ the difference is only
circumftantial : Commands are as much a mani-
f citation of the will of him that fpeaks, as invi
tations, and as much tefti monies of expectation
of compliance. The difference between them lies
in nothing that touches the affair in hand. The
main difference between Command and invitation
confids in the enforcement of the 'will of him
who commands or invites. In the latter it is his
kiiidiuj's9 the goodnefs- which his will arifcs from :
in
Se6t IV. confident with moral Inability* 237
in the former it is his authority. But whatever be
the ground of the will of him that fpeaks, or the
enforcement of what he fays, yet feeing neither
his will nor expectation is any more te (lifted in
the one cafe than the other ; therefore a performs
being directed by invitation, is no more an evi
dence of infincerity in him that directs, in mani-
fefting either a will, or expectation which he
has not, than his being known to be morally un
able to do what he is directed to by command. —
So that all this grand objection of Ar mint am
againft the Inability of fallen men to exert fakli
in Chrift, or to perform other fpiritual gofpel-
duties, from the fincerity of God's counfds and
invitations, muft be without force.
SECTION V.
that Sincerity of Defires and Endeavours, which
is fuppofed to excnfe in the N on performance
of Things in themfihes gocdy particularly con-
Jidered.
IT is what is much infilled on by manv, that
fome men, though they are not able to per
form fpiritual duties, fuch as repentance of fin,
love to God, a cordial acceptance of Chrift as
exhibited and offered in the gofpel, &c. yet they
may fincerely defire and endeavour thde things ;
and therefore muft be excufed ; it being unreaibn-
able to blame them for the omiffion of thofe things,
which they fincereiy defire and endeavour to do,
but cannot do.
Concerning this matter, the following things
may be obferved.
r. What
238 What Willingnefs and Part III.
i. What is here fuppofed, is a great miftake,
and grofs abfurdity ; even that men may fincerely
chufe and clefire thofe fpiritual duties of love,
acceptance, choice, rejection, &c. confifting in
the exercife of the will itfelf, or in the difpoiition
and inclination of the heart; and yet not be
able to perform or exert them. This is abfurd,
becaufe it is abfurd to fuppofe that a man fhouJd
diredly, properly and fincerely incline to have an
inclination, which at the fame time is contrary
to his inclination: for that is to fuppofe him not
to be inclined to that,, which he is inclined to. If
a man, in the date and acts of his will and in
clination, does properly and directly fall in with
thofe duties, he therein performs them : for the
duties themfelves confift in that very thing ; they
confilt in the itate and acts of the will being fo
formed and directed. If the foul properly Ind
fmccrely falls in with a certain propcfed act of
will or choice, the foul therein makes that choice
its own. Even as when a moving body falls in
with a propofed direction of its motion, thac is
the fame thing as to move in that direction.
2. That which is called a defire and ivillingnefs
for thofe inward duties, in fuch as do not per
form, has refpect to thefe duties only indirectly
and remotely, and is improperly reprefented as a
\villingnefs for them ; not only becaufe (as was
obferved before) it refpects thofe good volitions
only in a diitant view, and with relpect to future
time ; but alfo becaufe evermore, not thefe things
themfelves, but fomething die, that is .alien a$d
foreign, is the object that terminates thefe voli
tions and defires.
A drunkard, who continues in his drunken-
j being under the power of a love, and vio-
lent
Sect. V. Sincerity is no excufe. 239
lent appetite to llrong drink, and without any
love to virtue^ but being alib extremely cove
tous and clofe, and very much exercifed and grie
ved at the diminution of his eflate, and profpect
of poverty, may in a fort defire the virtue of
temperance; and though his prefent will is to
gratify his extravagant appetite, yet he may wifh,
he had a heart to forbear future acts of intempe
rance, and forfake his excefles, through an un-
willingnefs to part with his money : but (till he
goes on with his drunkennefs ; his wifhes and en
deavours are infufficient and ineffectual : iuch a
man has no proper, direct, fmcere willingnefs to
forfake this vice, and the vicious deeds which be
long to it : for he acts voluntarily in continuing
to drink to excels : his defire is very improperly
called a willingnefs to be temperate ; it is no
true defire of that virtue j for it is not that vir
tue, that terminates his wifhes •, nor have they
any direct refpect at ail to it. It is only tbe fac
ing his money, and avoiding poverty, that ter
minates, and exhaufls the whole ftrength of his
defire. The virtue of temperance is regarded
only very indirectly and improperly, even as a
neceffary means of gratifying the vice of covet-
oufnefs.
So, a man of an exceeding corrupt and wicked
heart, who has no love to God and Jefus Chrift,
but, on the contrary, being very profanely and
carnally inclined, has the greater! cliftafte of the
things of religion, and enmity againft them ^
yet being of a family, that from one generation
to another, have moil of them died, in youth, of
an hereditary confumption ; and fo having little
hope of living long ; and having been iniiructed
in the necemty of a fupreme love to Chrift, and
gratitude for his death and fufFerings, in order
to
240 Whit Willingrtefs and Part III.
to his falvation from eternal mifery; if under
thefe circumftances he fhould, through fear of
eternal torments, wilh he had fuch a diipoiition :
but his profane and carnal heart remaining, he
continues {till in his habitual diilafte of, and en
mity to God and religion, and wholly without any
exercife of that love and gratitude, (as doubt-
lefs the very devils themfelves, notwithstanding
all the deviiifhnefs of their temper, would \vifh
for a holy heart, if by that means they could get
out of hell :) in this cafe, there is no fincerc
Willingnefs to love Chrilt and chufe him as his
chief good : thefe holy difpofitions and exer-
cifes are not at all the direct object of the will :
they truly fhare no part of the inclination or de-
fire of the foul ; but all is terminated on delive
rance from torment : and thefe graces and pious
volitions, notwithstanding this forced confent,.
are looked upon undeiirable ; as when a fick
man defires a dofe he greatly abhors, to fave his
life. — From thefe things it appears.
3. That this indirect Willingnefs which has
been fpoken of, is not that exercife of the will
which the command requires ; 'but is entirely a
different one ; being a volition of a different na
ture, and terminated altogether on different ob
jects ; wholly falling fhort of that virtue of will,
which the command has refpect to.
4. This other volition, which has only fome
indirect concern with the duty required, cannot
excufe for the want of that good will itfelf,
which is commanded ; being not the thing which
aniwers and fulfils the command, and being
wholly dcftitute of the virtue which the com
mand feeks.
Further
Sect. V. Sincerity is no Excufe. 241
Further to illuftrate this matter. — If a child
has a moil excellent father, that has ever treated
him with fatherly kindnefs and tenderncfs, and
has every way, in the higheft degree, merited his
love and dutiful regard, being withal very weal
thy ; but the fon is of ib vile a difpofition, that
he inveterately hates his father ; and yet, ap
prehending that his hatred of him is like to
prove his ruin, by bringing him finally to po
verty and abject circumftances, through his father's
difmheriting him,, or otherwife ; which is exceed
ing crofs to his avarice and ambition ; he, there
fore, wifties it were otherwife : but yet remaining
under the invincible power of his vile and malig
nant difpofition, he continues ftill in his fettled
hatred of his father. Now, if fuch a fon's in
direct willingnefs to have love and honour to
wards his father, at all acquits or excufes before
God, for his failing of actually exercifing thefe
difpofitions towards him, which God requires, it
muft be on one of thefe accounts, (i.)* Either
that it anfwers and fulfils the command. But
this it does not, by the fuppofition ; becaufe the
thing commanded is love and honour to his
worthy parent. If the command be proper and
juft, as is fuppofed, then it obliges to the thing
commanded ; and fo nothing elfe but that can an-
fwer the obligation. Or, (2.) It muft be at lea ft,
becaufe there is that virtue or good nets in his
indirect willingnefs, that is equivalent to the
virtue required -y arid fo balances or countervails
it, and makes up for the want of it. But that
alfo is contrary to the fuppofition. The willing
nefs the fon has mecrly from a regard to money
and honour, has no goodnefs in it, to counter-,
vail the want of the pious filial refpect re
quired.
R
Sincerity
242- Wloat Sincerity of Endeavours. Part ILL
Sincerity and reality, in that indirect willing-
nefs, which has been fpoken of, does not make it
the better. That which is real and hearty is often
called fincere, whether it be in virtue or vice.
Some perfons are fincerely lad\ others are fin
cerely gcGd\ and others may be fincere and hearty
in things, which are in their own nature indifferent^
as a man may be fincerely defirous of eating when
he is hungry. But a being fincere, hearty and in
good earneft, is no virtue, unlefs it be in a thing
that is virtuous. A man may be fincere and
hearty in joining a crew of pirates, or a gang of
robbers. When the devils cried out, and be-
iought Chrift not to torment them, it was no
mere pretence ; they were very hearty in their
defires not to be tormented : but this did not
make their will or defires virtuous. And if men
have fincere defires, which are in their kind and
nature no better, it can be no excufe for the want
of any required virtue.
And as a man's being fincere in fuch an indirect
defire or tvillingnefs to do his duty, as has been
mentioned, cannot excufe for the want of per
formance ; fo it is with Endeavours arifing from
fuch a willingnefs. The Endeavours can have no
more goodnefs in them, than the will which they
are the effect and exprefiion of. And, therefore,
however fincere and real, and however great a
performs Endeavours are; yea, though they ihould
be to the utmoft of his ability-, unlefs the will
which they proceed from be truly good and vir
tuous, they can be of no avail, influence qr
weight to any purpofe whatfoever, ih a moral
ienfe or refpect. That which is not truly vir
tuous in God's fight, is looked upon, by Him, as
good for nothing : and fo can be of no value,,
weight or influence in his account, to recom-*
mend,
Se6L V. is no Excufe. 243
mend, fatisfy, excufe or make up for any moral
defed. For nothing can counter-balance evil,
but good. If evil be in one fcale, and we put.
a great deal into the other, iincere and earn eft
D'efiresj and many and great Endeavours ; yet, if
there be no real goodnefs in all, there is no
weight in it ; and fo it does nothing towards ba
lancing the real weight, which is in the oppofitc
fcale. It is only like the fubftrading a thoufand
noughts from before a real number, which leaves
the fum juft as it was.
Indeed fuch Endeavours may have a negatively
good influence. Thofe things, which have no
pofitive virtue, have no pofitive moral influence ;
yet they may be an occaiion of perfons avoiding
fome pofitive evils. As if a man were in the
water with a neighbour, that he had ill-will to,
who could riot fwim, holding him by his hand ;
which neighbour was much in debt to him;
and mould be tempted to let him fink and drown ;
but mould rufufe to comply with the temptation;
not from love to his neighbour, but from the
love of money, and becaufe by his. drowning he
ihould lofe his debt \ that which he does in prc-
ferving his neighbour from drowning, is no
thing good in the fight of God : yet hereby he
avoids the greater guilt that would have been
contracted, if he had defignedly let his neigh
bour fink and perifh. But when Armimans^ in their
difputes with Calvinifts, infill fo much on fmcere
Defires and Endeavours, as what mull excufe men,
mull be accepted of God, &c. it is manifeft they
have refpecl to fome pofitive moral weight or
influence of thofe Defires and Endeavours. Ac
cepting, j unifying or excnfing on the account
of fmcere honeft Endeavours (as they are called;
and men's doing what they can, &c. has relation
R 2 to
244 °f P^omifes Part III
to fomc moral value, fomething that is accepted
as good, and as fuch, countervailing fome d£-
But there is a great and unknown deceit, ari-
fing from the ambiguity of the phrafe, fincere
Endeavours. Indeed there is a vaft indiftindtnefs
and unfixednefs in moft, or at leaft very many of
the terms ufed to exprefs things pertaining to
moral and fpiritual matters. Whence arife innu
merable miftakes, ftrong prejudices, inextricable
confufion, and endlefs controverfy.
The word fincere is moft commonly ufed to
fignify fomething that is good : men are habitua
ted to underfland by it the lame as boneft and up
right ; which terms excite an idea of fomething
good in the ftridteft and high eft fenfe ; good in
the fight of Him, who fees not only the outward
appearance, but the heart. And, therefore, men
think that if a perfon btfincere, he will certainly
be accepted. If it be faid that any one is fincere
in his Endeavours, this fuggefts to men's minds
as much, as that his heart and will is good, that
there is no defect of duty, as to virtuous incli
nation ; he hofteftly and uprightly defires'and endea
vours to do as he is required •, and this leads them
to fuppofe, that it would be very hard and unrea-*
fonable to punifh him, only becaufe he is unfuc-
cefsful in his Endeavours, the thing endeavoured
being beyond his power. — Whereas it ought to
be obferved, that the word fincere has thefe diffe
rent fignifications.
i. Sincerity, as the word is fometimes ufed?
fignifies no more than reality of Will and Endea-
your, with refpedt to any thing that is profefTed
or pretended ; without any confideration of the
nature
Sect. V. to gracclefs Endeavours. 24$
nature of the principle or aim, wjience this real
Will and true Endeavour arifes. If a man has
fome real defire to obtain a thing, either direct
or indirect, or does really endeavour after a thing,
he is faid fincerely to define or endeavour it;
without any confideration of the goodnefs or vir-
tuoufnefs of the principle he acts from, or any
excellency or worthinefs of the end he acts for.
Thus a man, who is kind to his neighbour's wife,
who is fick and languilhing, and very helpful in
her cafe, makes a fhew ot defiring and endea
vouring her refloration to health and vigour;
and not only makes fuch a fhewj but there is a
reality in his pretence, he does heartily and ear-
neftly defire to have her health reftored, and ufes
his true and utmoft Endeavours for it ; he is faid
fincerely to defire and endeavour it, becaufe he
does fo truly or really ; though perhaps the prin
ciple he ads from, is no other than a vile and
fcandalous paffion ; having lived in adultery with
her, he earneflly defires to have her health and vi
gour reftored, that he may return to his criminal
pleafures with her. Or,
2. Ryjincerity is meant, not meerly a reality of
Will and Endeavour of fome fort or other, and
from fome confideration or other, but a virtuous
Jtncerity. That is, that in the performance of
thofe particular acts, that are the matter of vir
tue or duty, there be not only the matter, but the
form and eflence of virtue, confiding in the
aim that governs the act, and the principle ex-
ercifed in it. There is not only the reality of
the act, that is as it were the body of the duty ;
but alib the foul, which ihould properly belong to
fuch a body. In this fenfe, a man is faid to be
fincere, when he acts with a pure intention; not
ffom fmifter views, or bye-ends : he not only
R 3 in
246 Of Promifes Bart III.
in reality defires end feeks the thing to be done,
or qualification to be obtained, for fome end or
other ; but he wills the thing directly and prd-
perly, as neither forced nor bribed -9 the virtue of
the thing is properly the object of the will.
In the former fenfe, a man is faid to be fincere,
in oppofition to a meer pretence, and Jhew of the
f articular thing to be done or exhibit ed? without any
real Defire or Endeavour at all. In the latter
fenfe, a man is faid to be fincere, in oppofition
to that floew of virtue there is in meerly doing the
natter of duty, without the reality of the vir
tue itfelf in the foul, and the eflence of it, which
there is a fhew of. A man may be fincere in the
former fenfe, and yet in the latter be in the fight
of God, who fearches the heart, a vile hypo
crite.
In the latter kind of fincerity, only, is there
any thing truly valuable or acceptable in the
fight of God. ' And this is the thing, which in
Scripture is called Jlncerity^ uprightne/s, integrity,
truth in the inward parts, and a being of a perfeff
'heart. And if there be fuch a fmcerity, and fuch
a degree of it as there ought to be, and there be
any thing further that the man is not able to
perform, 'or which does not prove to be connected
with his fincere Defires and Endeavours, the man
is wholly exculed and acquitted in the fight of
God •, his will fhall furely be accepted for his
deed : and fuch a fincere Will and Endeavour
is all that in' ftrictnefs is required of hi'm, by any
command of God. But as to the other kind of
fincerity of Defires and Endeavours, it having no
•virtue in it, (as was obferved before) can be of
no avail before God, in any cafe, to recommend,
fatisfy,
Se& V. to gracelefs Endeavours. 247
fatisfy, or excufe, and has no politive moral
weight or influence whatfoever.
CoroL i. Hence it may be inferred, that no
thing in the reafon and nature of things ap
pears, from the confideration of any moral weight
of that former kind of fincerity, which has been
fpoken of, at all obliging us to believe, or leading
us to fuppofe, that God has made any pofkive
Fromifes of falvation, or grace, or any faving
afliftance, or any fpiritual benefit whatioever, to
any Defires, Prayers, Endeavours, Striving, or
Obedience of thofe, who hitherto have no true vir
tue or holinefs in their hearts ; though we fhould
fuppofe all the Sincerity, and the utmoft degree of
Endeavour, that is poflible to be in a perfon with
out holinefs.
Some object againft God's requiring, as the con
dition of falvation, thofe holy exerciies, which are
the refult of a fupernatural renovation ; fuch as a
fupreme refpect to Chrift, love to God, loving
holinefs for its own fake, &c. that thefe inward
difpofitions and exercifes are above men's power,
as they are by nature ; and therefore that we may
conclude, that when men are brought to be fin-
cere in their Endeavours, and do as well as they
<can, they are accepted ; and that this mufl be all
that God requires, in order to men's being received
as the objects of his favour, and mult be what
God has appointed as the condition of falvation.
concerning which, I would obferve, that in fuch
a manner of fpeaking of men's being accepted^
becaufe they are fincere^ and do as well as they can,
there is evidently a fuppofition of fome virtue,
fome degree of that which is truly good -, though
it does not go fo far as were to be wimed. For if
R 4 men
248 Of Promifes, &e. Part III.
men do wbat they can, unlefs their fo doing be
from fome good principle, difpofition, or exer-
cife of heart, fome virtuous inclination or act
of the will •, their fo doing what they can, is in
fome refpects not a whit better than if they did
nothing at all. In fuch a cafe, there is no more
pofitive moral goodnefs in a man's doing what
he can, than in a wind-mill's doing what it can ;
becaufe the action does no more proceed from
virtue ; and there is nothing in fuch lincerity
of Endeavour, or doing what we can, that mould
render k any more a proper or fit recommenda
tion to pofitive favour and acceptance, or the
condition of any reward or aftual benefit, than
doing nothing •, for both the one and the other
are alike nothing, as to any true moral weight
or value.
Corol. 2. Hence alfo it follows, there is no
thing that appears in the reafon and nature of
things, which can juftly lead us to determine,
that God will certainly give the neceffary means
of falvatipn, or fome way or other beftow true
holinefs and eternal life on thofe Heathen, who
are fincere, (in the fenfe above explained) in their
Endeavours to find out the will of the Deity,
and to pleafe him, according to their light, that
they may efcape his future difpleafure and wrath,
and' obtain happinefs in the future ftate, through
his favour.
SECTION
249
SECTION VL
Liberty ef Indifference, not only not neceffary to
Virtue, but utterly Inconfiflent 'with it ; and all,
either virtuous or 'vicious Habits or Inclinations,
inconfiftcnt with Arminian Notions of Liberty and
moral Agency.
TO iuppofe fuch a freedom of will, as Armi-
mam talk of, to be requifite to Virtue and
Vice.) is many ways contrary to common fenfe.
If Indifference belongs to Liberty of Will, as
^rminians fuppofe, and it be efTential to a vir
tuous action, that it be performed in a ftate of Li
berty, as they alfo fuppofe ; it will follow, that
it is effential to a virtuous action, that it be per
formed in a ftate of Indifference : and if it be
performed in a Jl 'ate of Indifference, then doubt-
leis it mufl be performed in the time of .Indif
ference. And fo it will follow, that in order to
the virtuoufnefs of an act, the heart mufl be in
different in the time of the performance of that
act, and the more indifferent and cold the heart
is with relation to the act, which is performed,
fo much the better •, becaufe the act is performed
with fo much the greater Liberty. But is this
agreable to the light of nature ? Is it agreable to
the notions, which mankind, in all ages, have
of Virtue, that it Iks in that, which is contrary
to Indifference, even in the 'tendency and Inclina
tion of the heart to virtuous action ;' and that the
itronger the Inclination, and fo the further from
Indifference, the more virtuous the heart, and fo
I much
2$o Indifference mconjiflent Part HI.
much the more praife-worthy the a& which pro
ceeds from it ?
If we fhbuld fuppofe (contrary to what has been
before demonstrated) that there may be an act of
will in a ftate of Indifference; for'inftance, this
act, iz/z. The will's determining to put itfelf
put of a ftate of Indifference, and give itfelf a
preponderation one way, then it would follow,
on Armimah principles, that this act or determi
nation of the will is that alone wherein Virtue
confifts, becaufe this only is performed, while.the
mind remains in a ftate of Indifference, and fb
in a ftate of Liberty: for when once the mind
is put out of its equilibrium, it is no longer in
fuch a ftate ; and therefore all the acts, which
follow afterwards, proceeding from bias, can have
the nature neither of Virtue nor Vice. Or if the
thing, which the will can do, while yet in a ftate
of Indifference, and To of Liberty, be only to fuf-
pend acting, and determine to take the matter
into confideration, then this determination is that
alone wherein Virtue confifts, and not proceeding
to action after the fcale is turned by confidera^
tion. So that it will follow, from thefe principles,
all that is done after the mind, by any means,
is once out of its equilibrium and already polTcf-
fed by an Inclination, and arifing from that In
clination, has nothing of the 'nature of Virtue
or Vice, and is worthy of neither blame nor
praife. But how plainly contrary is this to the
univerfal fenfe of mankind, and to the notion
they have of fincerely virtuous actions ? Which
is, that' they are actions, which proceed from a
heart welt djjpdfed and inclined'-, and the flrcnger^
and the more 'fixed and determined the good dilpo-
fition of the heart, the greater the fmcerity of
'Virtue, and fo'the more of the truth and reality
of
Sect. VI. 'with Virtue. 251
of it. But if there be any acts, which are done
in a ftate of equilibrium, or fpring immediately
from perfect Indifference and coldnefs of heart,
they cannot arife from any good principle or dif-
pofition in the heart ; and, confequently, accord
ing to common fenfe, have no fincere goodnefs
in them, having no Virtue of heart in them. To
have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart that
favours Virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one
perfectly cold and indifferent about it.
And befkles, the actions that are done in a (late
of Indifference, or that arife immediately out of
fuch a ftate, cannot be virtuous, becaufe, by the
fuppoficion, they are not determined by any pre
ceding choice. For if there be preceding choice,
then choice intervenes between the act and the
ftate of Indifference ; which is contrary to the
fuppolition of the act's arifing immediately out
of Indifference. But thofe acts, which are not
determined by preceding choice, cannot be vir
tuous or vicious by Armlnian principles, becaufe
they are not determined by the will.- So that nei
ther one way, nor the other, can any actions be
virtuous or vicious, according to Armlnian princi
ples. If the action be determinedly a preceding act
of choice, it cannot be virtuous ; becaufe the action
is not done in a ftate of Indifference, nor does
immediately arife from fuch a ftate ; and fo is
not done in a ftate of Liberty. If the action be
not determined by a preceding act of choice, then
it cannot be virtuous ; becaufe then the will is
not felf-determined in it. So that it is made cer
tain, that neither Virtue nor Vice can ever find
any place in the univerfe.
Morever, that it is necefiary to a virtuous
action that it be performed in a ftate of Indif
ference,
252 Indifference ineonjijtent Part III,
ference, under a notion of that being a ftate of
Liberty, is contrary to common fenfe ; as it is
a dictate of common fenfe, that Indifference it-
felf, in many cafes, is vicious, and fo to a high
degree. As if when I fee my neighbour or near
friend, and one who has in the higheft degree
merited of me, in extreme diftrefs, and ready to
perifh, 1 find an Indifference in my heart with
refpe£t to any thing propofed to be done, which
1 can eafily do, for his relief. So if it fhould be
propofed to me to blafpheme God, or kill my
father, or do numberlefs other things, which
might be mentioned ; the being indifferent, for
a moment, would be highly vicious and vile.
And it may be further obferved, that to fup-
ppfe this Liberty of Indifference is effential to
Virtue and Vice, deftroys the great difference of
degrees of the guilt of different crimes, and
takes away the heinoufnefs of the moil flagitious
horrid iniquities ; fnch as adultery, beftiality,
murder, perjury, blafphemy, &c. For, according
to theie principles, there is no harm at all in
having the mind in a ftate of perfect Indiffer
ence with re! peel to thefe crimes ; nay, k is ab-
folutely necdlary in order to any Virtue in avoid
ing them, or Vice in doing them. But for the
mind to he in a Hate of Indifference with refpect
to them, is to be next door to doing them : it is
then infinitely near to chufing, and fo committing
the fad: : for equilibrium is the next ftep to a
degree of preponderation ; and one, even the
kaft degree o.t preponderation (all things ponfi-
dered) is choice. Ar.d not only fo, but for the
\\ ill to be in a ftate of perfe6l equilibrium with
refpeCt po fuch crimes, is for the mind to be in
inch a fete, as to be full as likely to chufe them
as to refufe them, to do them as to omit them. And
if
Sect. VI. «?//£ Virtue. 25 3
if our minds muft be in fuch a ftate, wherein it is
as neat to chuiing as refuting, and wherein it
mud of neceffity, according to the nature of
things, be as likely to commit them, as to re
frain from them -, where is the exceeding heinoui-
nefs of chufing and committing them ? If there
be no harm in often being in fuch a ftate, where
in the probability of doing and forbearing are ex
actly equal, there being an equilibrium, and no
more tendency to one than the other •, then, ac
cording to the nature and laws of fuch a con-
tingence, it may be expected, as an inevitable con-
fequence of fuch a difpofition of things, that we
Ihould chufe them as often as reject them : that
it fliould generally fo fall out is neceflary, as e-
quality in the effect is the natural confequence
of the equal tendency of the caufe, or of the
antecedent ilate of things from which the effect
ariies. Why then ihould we be fo exceedingly
to blame, if it does fo fall out ?
It is many ways apparent, that the Armiman
fcheme of Liberty is utterly inconfiftent with the
being of any fuch things as either virtuous or
vicious Habits or Difpofitions. If Liberty of
Indifference be efiential to moral agency, then
there can be no Virtue in any habitual Inclina
tions of the heart \ which are contrary to Indiffe
rence, and imply in their nature the very de-
Itruction and exclufion of it. They fuppofe no
thing can be virtuous, in which no Liberty is ex-
ercifed ; but how abfurd is it to talk of exercifing
indifference under bias and prepomderation !
And if f elf -deter mining power in the will be ne-f
ceflary to moral agency, praife, blame, &c.
then nothing done by the will can be any fur
ther praife or blame- worthy, than fo far as the
will
2 54 Of virtuous Part IIL
will is moved, fwayed and determined by itfelft
and the fcales turned by the fovereign power the
will has over itfelf. And therefore the will muft
not be put out of its balance already, the pre-
ponderation muft not be determined and effected
before-hand ; and fo the felf- determining adt an
ticipated. Thus it appears another way., that
habitual bias is inconfiftent with that Liberty,;
which Arminians fuppofe to be necelfary to Virtue
or Vice ; and fo it follows, that habitual bias it
felf cannot be either virtuous or vicious.
The fame thing follows from their doctrine
concerning the Inconfiitence of Neceffity with Li
berty, _ Praife, Difpraife, &c. None will deny,
that Bias and Inclination may be fo ftrone; as to
be invincible, and leave no poffibility "of the
will's determining contrary to it ; and fo be at
tended with Neceffity. This Dr. Wbiiby allows
concerning the will of God, Angels; and glori
fied Saints, with refpecl to good ; and the will
of Devils, with refpecl to evil. Therefore, if
Neceffity be inconfiftent with Liberty; then* when
fixed Inclination is to fuch a degree of ftrength,
it utterly excludes all Virtue, Vice, Praif<T or
Blame. And, if fo, then the nearer Habits are
to this ftrength, the more do they impede Li
berty, and fo diminiih Praife and Blame. If
very flrong Habits deftroy Liberty, the lefTer
ones proportionably hinder it^ according to their
degree of ftrength. And therefore it will follow,
that then is the ael: moft virtuous or vicious,
when performed without any Inclination or ha-^
bitual Bias at all 5 becaufe it is then performecf
with moft Liberty.
Every prepoffeffing fixed Bias on the mind
brings a degree of moral Inability for the con
trary ;
i
Sect. VI. and vicious Habits. 255
trary ; becaufe fo far as the mind is biafTed and
prepoffeffed, fo much hinderance is there of the
contrary. And therefore if moral Inability be in-
confiftent with moral agency, or the nature of
Virtue and Vice, then, fo far as there is any fuch
thing as evil difpofition of heart, or habitual de
pravity of Inclination ; whether covetoufnefs,
pride, malice, cruelty, or whatever elie : lo
much the more excufeable perfons are ; fo much
the lefs have their evil acts of this kind the na
ture of Vice. And, on the contrary, whatever
excellent Difpofitions and Inclinations they have,
fo much are they the lefs virtuous,
It is evident, that no habitual difpofition of
heart, whether it be to a greater or lefs degree,
can be in any degree virtuous or vicious ; or the
actions which proceed from them at all praife or
blame-worthy. Becaufe, though we mould fup-
pofe the Habit not to be of fuch ftrength, as
wholly to take away all moral ability and felf-
determining power \ or hinder but that, although
the act be partly from Bias, yet it may be in
part from felt- determination •, yet in this cafe, all
that is from antecedent Bias muft be fee afide,
as of no confideration ; and in eilimating the de
gree of Virtue or Vice, no more mufl be confi-
dered than what arifes from felf -determining
power, without any influence of that Bias, be
caufe Liberty is exercifed in no more : fo that
all that is the exercife of habitual Inclination, is
thrown away, as not belonging to the morality
of the action. By which it appears, that no ex
ercife of theie Habits, let them be ftronger or
weaker, can ever have any thing of the nature of
either Virtue or Vice.
Here
ty virtuous Part fit
Here if anyone ihould fay, that notwitb Hand
ing all thefe things, there may be the nature of
Virtue and Vice in the Habits of the mind •, be-
caufe thefe Habits may be the effects of thofe acts^
wherein the mind exercifed Liberty ; that how
ever the forementioned reafons will prove that no
Habits, which are natural, or that are born or
created with us, can be either virtuous or vicious ;
yet they will not prove this of Habits, which
have been acquired and eflabliihed by repeated
free ads.
To fdch an objector I would fay, that this eva-
fion will not at all help the matter. For if
freedom of will be cffential to the very nature of
Virtue and Vice, then there is no Virtue or Vice
'but only in that very thing, wherein this Liberty
is exerciled. If a man in one or more things,
that he does, exercifes Liberty, and then by thole
acts is brought into fuch circumftances, that his
Liberty ceaies, and there follows a long feries of
acts or events that come to pals neceiTarily •, thofe
confequent acts are not virtuous or vicious, re-
wardable or punifhable ; but only the free acts
that eilablifhed this neceffity ; for in them alone
was the man free. The following effects, that
are necefTary, have no more of the nature of Vir
tue or Vice, than health or ficknefs of body
have properly the nature of Virtue or Vice, being
the effects of a courfe of free acts of tempe
rance or intemperance ; or than the good qua
lities of a clock are of the nature of Virtue,
which are the effects of free acts of- the arti
ficer ; or the goodnefs and fweetnefs of the fruits
of a garden are moral Virtues, being the effects
of the free and faithful acts of the gardener. If
Liberty be abfolutely requifite to the morality of
actions, and neceffity wholly inconfiflent with it,
as
Sect. VI. and vicious Habits* 257
as Armimans greatly infill: ; then no neceffary effefts
whatfover, let the caufe be never fo good or bad,
can be virtuous or vicious ; but the virtue or
vice muft be only in the free caufe. Agreably
to this, Dr. Wkitby fuppoies, the neceflity that
attends the good and evil Habits of the faints in
heaven, and damned in hell, which are the con-
iequence of their free acts in their ftate of pro
bation, are not rewardable or punilhable.
On the whole, it appears, that if the notions
of Arminiam concerning liberty and moral agen
cy be true, it will follow, that there is no virtue
in any fuch Habits or qualities as humility,
meeknefs, patience, mercy, gratitude, genero-
fity, heavenly-mindedhefs ; nothing at all praife-
worthy in loving Chrift above father and mother,
wife and children, or our own lives *, or in de
light in holinefs, hungering and thirfting after
righteoufnefs, love to enemies, univerfal bene
volence to makmd : and, on the other hand,
there is nothing at all vicious, or worthy of dif-
praife, in the moft fordid, beaftly, malignant, de-
vilim difpofitions •, in being ungrateful, profane,
habitually hating God, arid things facred and
holy ; or in being moft treacherous, envious and
cruel towards men. For all thefe things are
Difpofitions and Inclinations of the heart. And in
ihort, there is no fuch thing as any virtuous or
vicious quality of mind, no fuch thing as inhe
rent virtue and holinefs, or vice and fin: and
the ftronger thofe Habits or Difpofitions are,
which ufed to be called virtuous and vicious, the
further they are from being fo indeed ; the more
violent men's lufts are, the more fixed their
pride, envy, ingratitude and tnalicioufnefs, Hill
the further are they from being blame- worthy. If
there be a man that by his own repeated ads, or
S by
258 Arminianifm inconjijlent Part III.
by any other means, is come to be of the moft
hellim Difpofition, defperately inclined to treat his
neighbours with injurioufhefs, contempt and ma
lignity -, the further they mould be from any
Difpofition to be angry with him, or in the leaft
to blame him. So, on the other hand, if there
be a perform who is of a mod excellent fpirit,
^rongly inclining him to the moft amiable ac
tions, admirably meek, benevolent, &c. fo much
is he further from any thing rewardable or com
mendable. On which principles, the man Jefus
Chrifl was very far from being praife-worthy for
thofe a&s of holinefs and kindnefs, which He
performed, thefe propenfities being ftrong in
his heart. And above all, the infinitely holy
and gracious God is infinitely remote from any
thing commendable, his good Inclinations being
infinitely ftrong, and He, therefore, at the utmoft
poffible ctiftance from being at liberty. And in
all cafes, the ftronger the Inclinations of any are
to Virtue, and the more they love it, the lefs vir
tuous they are •, and the more they love wicked-
neis, the lefs vicious. Whether thefe things
are agreable to Scripture, let every Chriflian, and
every man who has read the Bible, judge : and
whether they are agreable to common-fenfe, let
every one judge, that has human understanding
in exercife.
And, if we purfue thefe principles, we fliall find
that Virtue and Vice are wholly excluded out of
the world ; and that there never was, nor ever
can be any fuch thing as one or the other ; either
in God, angels or men. No Fropenfity, Dif
pofition or Habit can be virtuous or vicious, as
has been fhewn ; becaufe they, fo far as they take
place, deftroy the freedom of the will, the
foundation of all moral agency, and exclude all
capacity
Sect. VI. with moral Habits and Motives. 259
capacity of either Virtue or Vice. — And if Ha
bits and Difpofitions themfelves be not virtuous
nor vicious, neither can the exercife of thefe
Difpofitions be fo : for the exercife of Bias is not
the exercife of free f elf -deter mining will, and fo
there is no exercife of liberty in it. Confe-
quently, no man is virtuous or vicious, either in
being well or ill-difpofed, nor ,in a&ing from a
good or bad Difpofition. And whether this Bias
or Difpofition, be habitual or not, if it exifls but
a moment before the aft of will, which is the
effect of it, it alters not the cafe, as to the ne-
ceflity of the effect. Or if there be no previous
Difpofition at all, either habitual or occafional,
that determines the act, then it is not choice
that determines it : it is therefore a contingence,
that happens to the man, arifing from nothing
in him ; and is neceflary, as to any Inclination or
Choice of his j and, therefore, cannot make him
either the better or worfe, any more than a tree
is better than other trees, becaufe it oftener hap
pens to be lit upon by a fwan or nightingale:
or a rock more vicious than other rocks, becaufe
rattle-fnakes have happened oftener to crawl over
it. So, that there is no Virtue nor Vice in good
or bad Difpofitions, either fixed or tranfont ; nor
any Virtue or Vice in acting from any good or
bad previous Inclination ; nor yet any virtue or
vice, in acting wholly without any previous In
clination. Where then ihall we find room for
Virtue or Vice ?
S 2, SECTION
200 Motive and Inducement inconjtftent Part III.
SECTION VII.
Arminian Notions of moral Agency incorififtent with
all Influence of Motive and Inducement, in either
virtuous or vicious Actions.
AS Arminian notions of that liberty, which
is efiential to virtue or vice, are incon-
iiftent with common fenfe, in their being incon-
fiftent with all virtuous or vicious habits and dif-
pofitions ; fo they are no lefs fo in their incon-
fiftency with all influence of Motives in moral
adtions.
It is equally againfl thofe notions of liberty of
will, whether there be, previous to the a6t of
choice, a preponderancy of the inclination, or a
preponderancy of thofe circumftances, which
have a tendency to move the inclination. And,
indeed, it comes to juft the fame thing: to fay,
the circumftances of the mind are fuch as tend
to fway and turn its inclination one way, is the
fame thing as to fay, the inclination of the
mind, as under fuch circumftances, tends that
way.
Or if any think it mod proper to fay, that
Motives do alter the inclination, and give a new
bias to the mind, it will not alter the cafe, as
to the prefent argument. For if Motives ope
rate by giving the mind an inclination, then they
operate by deftroying the mind's indifference, and
laying it under a bias. But to do this, is to de-
ftroy the Arminian freedom : it is not to leave the
will to its own felf-de termination, but to bring
it into fubjedtion to the power of fomething ex-
trinfick,
Sect. VII. with Arminian Virtue and Vice. 261
trinfick, which operates upon it, fways and deter
mines it, previous to its own determination. So
that what is done from Motive, cannot be either
virtuous or vicious. — And befides, if the acts of
the will are excited by Motives, thofe Motives
are the c aufes of thofe afts of the will ; which
makes the acts of the will necelfary ; as effects
ncceffarily follow the efficiency of the caufe.
And if the influence and power of the Motive
caufes the volition, then the influence of the Mo
tive determines volition, and volition does not de
termine itfelf ; and fo is not free, in the fenfe
of Armenians (as has been largely fhewn already)
and confequently can be neither virtuous nor vi-
pious.
The fuppofition, which has already been taken
notice of as an infufficient evafion in other cafes,
xvould be, in like manner, impertinently alledged
in this cafe; namely, the fuppoiition that li
berty confifts in a power of fufpending action for
the prefent, in order to deliberation. If it fhould
be faid, Though it be true, that the will is under
a necefiity of finally following the ftrongeft Mo
tive ; yet it may, for the prefent, forbear to act:
upon the Motive prefented, till there has been
opportunity thoroughly to confider it, and com
pare its real weight with the merit of other Mo
tives. I anfwer as follows :
Here'again, it muft be remembered, that if de
termining thus to fufpend and confider, be that
act of the will, wherein alone liberty is exer-
cifed, then in this all virtue and vice muft con-
fiil ; and the acts that follow this confideration,
and are the effects of it, being neceffary, are no
more virtuous or vicious than fome good or bad
events, which happen when they are faft afleep§1
S 3 and
i6x Motive and Inducement iriconjiftent Part III.
and are the confequences of what they did when
they were awake. Therefore, 1 would here ob-
ferve two things :
i. To fuppofe, that all virtue and vice, in
every cafe, confifts in determining, whether to
take time for confideration or not, is not agre-
able to common fenfe. For, according to fuch a
iuppofition, the mod horrid crimes, adultery,
murder, fodomy, blafphemy, &c. do not at all
cofiit in the horrid nature of the things themfelve?,
but only in the neglect of thorough confidera
tion before they were perpetrated, which brings
their vicioufnefs to a fmall matter, and makes all
crimes equal. If it be faid, that neglect of con*
fideration, wrhen fuch heinous evils arc propofed
to choice, is worfe than in other cafes : I anfwer,
this is inconfiflent, as it fuppofes the very thing
to be, which, at the fame time, is fuppofed not to
be ; it fuppofes all moral evil, all vicioufnefs
and heinoufnefs, does not confift meerly in the
want of confideration. It fuppofes fome crimes
in themfelves, in their own nature^ to be more
heinous than others, antecedent to confideration
or inconfideration, which lays the perfon under a
previous obligation to confider in fome cafes more
than others.
2. If it were fo, that all -virtue and vice, in
every cafe, confifted only in the aft of the will,
whereby it determines whether to confider or no,
it would not alter the cafe in the leaft, as to the
prefent argument. For ftill in this act of the
will on this determination, it is induced by fome
Motive, and neceffarily follows the ftrongcft Mo
tive ; and fo is neceffarily, even in that act where
in alone it is either virtuous or vicious.
One
Sect, VII. with Arminian Virtue and Vice. 263
One thing more I would obferve, concerning
the inconfiitence of Arminian notions of moral
agency with the influence of Motives. — I fup-
pofe none will deny, that it is potfible for Mo
tives .to be fet before the mind fo powerful, and
exhibited in fo ftrong a light, and under ib ad
vantageous circumftances, as to be invincible ;
and fuch as the mind cannot but yield to. In
this cafe, Armimans will doubtlefs fay, liberty
is deftroyed. And if 'fo, then if Motives are
exhibited with half fo much power, they hinder
liberty in proportion to their ftrength, and go
half-way towards deflroying it. If a thoufand
degrees of Motive abolifh all liberty, then five
hundred take it half away. If one degree of
the influence of Motive does not at all infringe
or xiiminim liberty then no more do two degrees;
for nothing doubled, is ftill nothing. And if
two degrees do not diminifh the will's liberty,
no more do four, eight, fixteen, or fix thoufand.
For. nothing multiplied never fo much comes to
but nothing. If there be nothing in the nature
of motive or moral fuafion, that is at all oppo-
fite to liberty, then the greateft degree of it can
not hurt liberty. But if there be any thing in the
nature of the thing, that is againft liberty,
then the lead degree of it hurts it in fome de
gree ; and confequently hurts and diminifhes vir
tue. If invincible Motives, to that action which
is good, take away all the freedom of the act,
and fo all the virtue of it ; then the more force-
able the Motives are, fo much the worfe, fo much
the lefs virtue ; and the weaker the Motives are,
the better for the caufe of virtue ; and none is
beft of all.
Now let it be considered, whether thefe things
are agreable to common fenfe. If it Ihould be
$ 4 allowed.
264 Armin. Argument from the Sincerity Part III,
allowed, that there are fome inftances wherein the,
foul chufes without any Motive, what virtue can
there be in fuch a choice ? I am fure, there is no
prudence or wifdom in it. Such a choice is
made for no good end ; for it is for no end at all.
If i£ were for any end, the view of the end
would be the Motive exciting to the act; and if
the act be for no good end, and fo from no good
aim, then there is no good intention in it : and,
therefore, according to all our natural notions of
virtue, no more virtue in it than in the motion
of the fmoke, which is driven to and fro by the
wind, without any aim or end in the thing
moved, and which knows not whither, nor why
and wherefore, it is moved.
Corel, i. By thefe things it appears, that the
argument againft the Calvinifts, taken from the
ufe of counfels, exhortations invitations, ex-
poilulatipns, &c. fo much infifted on by Arming
ans, is truly againft themfelves. For thefe things
can operate no other way to any good effect,
than as in them is exhibited Motive and Induce
ment, tending to excite and determine the acts of
the will. But it follows, on their principles, that
the acts of will excited by luch caufes, cannot be
virtuous; becauie, fo far as they are from thefe,
they are not from the will's felf-determining
power. Hence it will follow, that it is not worth
the while to offer any arguments to perfuade
men to any virtuous volition or voluntary ac
tion ; it is in vain to fet before them the wifdom
and amiablenefs of ways of virtue, or the odi-
oufneis and fully of ways of vice. This no
tion of liberty and moral agency fruitrates all
endeavours to draw men to virtue by inllrqcr
tion or perfuafion, precept or example: for
though thefe things may induce men to what is
materially
Se.VII. of Invitations, &c. againft themfelves. 263
materially virtuous, yet at the fame time they take
away the form of Virtue, becaufe they deftroy
Liberty •, as they, by their own power, put the
will out of its equilibrium, determine and turn
the fcale, and take the work of felf-determimng
power out of its hands. And the clearer the in-
itructions that are given, the more powerful the
arguments that are ufed, and the more moving
the perfuafions or examples, the more likely
they are to fruftrate their own defign ; becaufe
they have fo much the greater tendency to put
the will out of its balance, to hinder its freedom
of felf- determination ; and fo to exclude the very
form of virtue, and the effence of whatsoever i$
praife-worthy.
So it clearly follows, from thefe principles, that
God has no hand in any man's virtue, nor does
at all promote it, either by a phyfical or moral
influence ; that none of the moral methods, He
ufes with men to promote virtue in the world,
have tendency to the attainment of that end;
that all the inductions, which He has given to
men, from the beginning of the world to this
day, by Prophets or Apoflles, or by His Son
Jefus Chrift ; that all his counfels, invitations,
promifes, threatenings, warnings and expoflu-
lations ; that all means, He has ufed with men,
in ordinances, or providences ; yea, all influ
ences of his Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary,
have had no tendency at all to excite anyone
virtuous act of the mind, or to promote any
thing morally good and commendable, in any
refpect. — For there is no way that thefe or any
other means can promote virtue, but one of thefe
three. Either (i.) By a phyfical operation on
the heart. But all effects that are wrought in
rnen in this way, have no virtue in them, by
the
265 Arminianifm excludes all Virtue, Part III.
the concurring voice of all Armintans. Or, (2.)
Morally, by exhibiting Motives . to the under-
Iknciing, to excite good acts in the will. But
it has been demonftrated, that volitions, which
are excited by Motives, are necefiary, and not
excited by a -felt-moving power ; and therefore,
by their principles, there is no Virtue in them.
Or, (3.) By meerly giving the will an opportu
nity to determine itielf concerning the objects
propofed, either to chufe or reject, by its own
uncaufed, unmoved, uninfluenced ieif -determi
nation. And if this be all, then all thofe means
ek> no more to promote virtue than vice : for
they do nothing but give the will opportunity
to determine itielf either way, either to good or
bad, without laying it u'nder any bias to either :
and io there is really as much of an opportunity
given to determine in favour of evil, as of
good.
Thus that horrid blafphemous confequence will
certainly follow from the Arminian doctrine, which
they charge on others ; namely, that God acts an
inconfiftent part in ufing fo many counfels, warn
ings, invitations, intreaties, csV. with iinners,
to induce them to forfake fin, and turn to the
ways of virtue ; and that all are infmcere and
fallacious. It will follow, from their doctrine,
that God does thefe things when He knows, at
the fame time, that they have no manner of
tendency to promote the effect, He feems to aim
at; yea, knows that if they have any influence,
this very influence will be inconiiilent with fuch
an effect, and will prevent it. But what an im
putation of infincerity would this fix on Him,
who is infinitely holy and true ! — So that their's
is the doctrine v/h'ch, if purfued in its confe-
quences, does horribly reflect on the moil Hinh,
and
Sect. VII. and Vice, out of tie WorlL 267
and fix on Hirn the charge of hypocrify ; and
not the do&rine of the Cahinift ; according to
their frequent, and vehement exclamations and
invectives.
Corol. 2. From what has been obferved in this
lection, it again appears, that Arminian principles
and notions, when fairly examined and purfued
in their demottitrablc confequences, do evidently
iliut all virtue out of the world, and make it
impoffible that there ihould ever be any fuch
thing, in any cafe ; or that any fuch thing mould
ever be conceived of. For, by thefe principles,
the very notion of virtue or vice implies ab-
furdity and contradiction. For it is abfurd in
itfelf/and contrary to common fenfe, to fup
pofe a virtuous act of mind without any good
intention or aim \ and, by their principles, it is
abfurd to fuppofe a virtuous act with a good in
tention or aim ; for to act for an end, is to act
from a Motive. So that if we rely on thefe prin-
cipleSj there can be no virtuous act with a good
defign and end-, and it is felf-evideut, there can
be none without : confequently there can be no
virtuous act at all.
Corol. 3. It is manifeft, that Arminian notions
of moral agency, and the leing of a faculty of
will, cannot confiil together •, and that if there
be any fuch thing as either a virtuous or vici
ous act, it cannot be an act of the will ; no will
can be at all concerned in it. For that act which
is performed without inclination, without Motive,
without end, muft be performed without any
concern of the will. To fuppofe an act of the
will without thefe, implies a contradiction. If
the foul in its act has no motive or end ; then,
in that act (as was obferved before) it feeks no
thing,
268 Armin. excludes all Virtue, &c. Part III,
thing, goes after nothing, exerts no inclination to
any thing ; and this implies, that in that act it
defires nothing, and chufes nothing; fo that there
is no act: of choice in the cafe : and that is as
much as to fay, there is no act of will in the cafe.
Which very effectually ihuts all vicious and vir
tuous acts out of the univerfe ; in as much as,
according to this, there can be no vicious or vir
tuous ad wherein the will is concerned ; and ac
cording to the plaineft dictates of reafon, and the
light of nature, and alfo the principles of Armi-
jiians themfelves, there can be no virtuous or
vicious act wherein the will is not concerned.
And therefore there is no room for any virtuous
Or vicious acts at all.
Corol 4. If none of the moral actions of in*
telligent beings are influenced by either previous
Inclination or Motive, another ftrange thing will
follow ; and this is, that God not only cannot
fore-know any of the future moral actions of his
creatures, but he can make no conjecture, can
give no probable guefs concerning them. For,
ill conjecture in things of this nature, muft de
pend on fome difcerning or apprehenfion of thefc
two. \\\mg$, previous Difpojition, and Motive, which,
as has been obferved, Arminian notions of moral
agency, in their real confequence, altogether ex
clude. ~&J i
PART
PART IV. :
Wherein the chief grounds of the
reafonings of Arminians, in fup-
port and defence of the foremen-
tioned notions of Liberty, moral
Agency, Sec. and againft the op-
polite do&rine, are considered.
SECTION I.
The Eflence of the Virtue and Vice of Difpojitions
of the Heart, and ARs of the Will> lies not in
their Caufe, but their Nature.
ONE main foundation of the reafons, which
are brought to eftabliih the forementioned
notions of liberty, virtue, vice, &c. is a fup-
pofition, that the virtuoufnefs of the difpofitions,
or ads of the will, confifts not in the nature of
thefe difpofitions or adts, but wholly in the Origin
or Caufe of them : fo that if the difpofition of the
mind, or a&s of the will, be never fo good, yet if
the Caufe of the difpofition or a6l be not our vir-
i tue,
270 Of the EfTence of Virtue and Vice. Part IV.
tue, there is nothing virtuous or praife- worthy in
it ; and, on the contrary, if the will, in its incli
nation or acts, be. never fo bad, yet, unlefs it arifes
from fomething that is our vice or fault, there is
nothing vicious or blame- wo tth'y in it. Hence
their grand objection and pretended demonftra-
tion, or felf-evidence, againil any virtue and com-
mendablenefs, or vice and blame-worthinefs, of
thofe habits or acts of the will, which are not
from fome virtuous or vicious determination of
the will itfelf.
Now, if this matter be well confidered, it will
appear to be altogether a miftake, yea, a grofs
abfurdity ; and that it is moft certain, that if
there be any fuch things, as a virtuous or vicious
difpofition, or volition of mind, the virtuoufnefs
or vicioufnefs of them confifts not in the Origin
or Caufe of thefe things, but in the Nature of
them.
If the Eflence of virtuoufnefs or commendable-
nefs, and of vicioufnefs or fault, does not lie in
the Nature of the difpoiitions or acts of mind,
which are faid to be our virtue or our fault, but
in their Caufe, then it is certain it lies no where
at all. Thus, for inflance, if the vice of a vicious
act of will, lies not in the Nature of the act, but
the Caufe ; fo that its being of a bad Nature will
not make it at all our fault, unlefs it arifes from
fome faulty determination of our's, as its Caufe,
or fomething in us that is our fault ; then, for
the fame reafon, neither can the vicioufnefs of
that Caufe lie in the Nature of the thing itfelf,
but in its Caufe : that evil determination of our's
is not our fault, meerly becaule it is of a bad
Nature, unlefs it arifes from fome Caufe in us
that is our fault. And when we are come to
this
Sect. I* T& ElTence of Virtus and Vice. 2 7 1
this higher Caufe, Hill the reafon of the thing
holds good ; though this Caufe be of a bad Na
ture, yet we are not at all to blame on that account,
unlefs it arifes from fomething faulty in us. Nor
yet can blame- worthinefs lie in the Nature of this
Caufe, but in the Caufe of that. And thus we
muil drive faultinefs back from ftep to flcp, from
a lower Caufe to a higher, in infinitum: and that
is, thoroughly to banifh it from the world, and to
allow it no poffibility of exiftence any where in the
univerfality of things. On thefe principles, vice,
or moral evil, cannot coniift in any thing that is ail
effeft ; becaufe/^// does not confift in the Nature
of things, but in their Caufe ; as well as becaufe
effects are neceffary, being unavoidably connected
with their Caufe : therefore the Caufe only is to
blame. And fo it follows, that faultinefs can lie
only in that Caufe> which is a Caufe- only > and no
effect of any thing. Nor yet can it lie in this ; for
then it muft lie in the Nature of the thin^ itfelf ;
not in its being from any determination of our's,
nor any thing faulty in us which is the Caufe, nor
indeed from any Caufe at all ; for, by the fiippofi-
tion, it is no effect, and has no Caufe. And thus,
he that will maintain, it is not the Nature of ha
bits or acts of will that makes them virtuous or
faulty, but the Caufe, muft immediately run him-
felf out of his own aiTertion •, and in maintaining
hj will infenfibly contradict and deny it.
This is certain, that if effects are vicious and
faulty, not from their Nature, or from any thing
inherent in them, but becaufe they are from a bad
Caufe, it muil be on account of the badnefi of
the Caufe : a bad effect in the will muft be bad,
becaufe the Caufe is bad, or of an evil Nature, or
has vadnefs as a quality inherent in it : and a goou
eflccr
272 tffe Eflence of Virtue and Vice. Part IV*
effect in the will mud be good, by reafon of the
goodnefs of the Caufe, or its being of a good Kind
and Nature. And if this be what is meant, the very
fuppofition of fault and praife lying not in the Na
ture of the thing, but the Caufe, contradicts itfelf,
and does at leaft refolve the Eflence of virtue and
vice into the Nature of things, and fuppofes it ori
ginally to confift in that.— And if a caviller has a
mind to run from the abfurdity, by faying, " No,
" the fault of the thing, which is the Caufe, lies
" not in this, that the Caufe itfelf is of an evil Na-
" ture, but that the Caufe is evil in that fenfe,
" that it is from another bad Caufe." Still the
abfurdity will follow him ; for, if fo, then the
Caufe before charged is at once acquitted, and all
the blame muft be laid to the higher Caufe, and
muft confift in that's being evil, or of an evil Nature.
So now, we are come again to lay the blame of the
thing blame- worthy, to the Nature of the thing,
and 'not to the Caufe. And if any is fo foolifli as
to go higher {till, and afcend from ftep to ftep,
till he is come to that, which is the firft Caufe con
cerned in the whole affair, and will fay, all the
blame lies in that-, then, at laft, he muft be forced
to own, that the faultinefs of the thing, which he
fuppofes alone blame-worthy, lies wholly in the
Nature of the thing, and not in the Original or
Caufe of it j for the fuppofition is, that it has no
Original, it is determined by no aft of our's, is
cauled by nothing faulty in us, being abfolutely
without any Caufe< And fo the race is at an end,
but the evader is taken in his flight.
It is agreable to the natural notions of man-
kind, that moral evil, with its deiert of diilike
and abhorence, and all its other ill-defervings,
confifts in a certain deformity in the Nature of cer
tain difpofitions of the heart, and acts of the
will*
Sedt I. In the Nature of Volition, &c. 273
will ; and not in the deformity of fomething elfe9
diverfe from the very thing itfelf, which deferves
abhorrence, fuppofed to be the Caufe of it.
Which would be abfurd, becaufe that would be
to'fuppofe a thing, that is innocent and not evil*
is truly evil and faulty, becaufe another thing is
evil. It implies a contradiction ; for it would
be to fuppofe, the very thing, which is morally
evil and blame-worthy, is innocent and not blame
worthy ; but that fomething elfe, which is its
Caufe, is only to blame. To fay, that vice doei
not coniift in the thing which is vicious, but in
its Caufe, is the fame as to fay, that vice does not
coniift in vice, but in that which produces it.
It is true, a Caufe may be to blame, for being
the Caufe of vice : it may be wickednefs in the
Caufe, that it produces wickednefs. But it would
imply a contradiction, to fuppofe that thefe two
are the fame individual wickednefs. The wicked
aft of the Caufe in producing wickednefs, is
one wickednefs ; and the wickednefs produced,
if there be any produced, is another. And there
fore, the wickednefs of the latter does not lie in
the former, but is diftinct from it ; and the wick
ednefs of both lies in the evil Nature of the things,
which are wicked. *
The thing, which makes fin hateful, is that by
which it deferves punifhment ; which is but the
expreffion of hatred. And that, which renders
virtue lovely, is the fame with that, on the ac
count of which, it is fit to receive praife and re
ward ; which are but the exprefiions of efteern
and love. But that which makes vice hateful,
is its hateful Nature; and that which renders
virtue lovely, is its amiable Nature. It is a cer
tain beauty or deformity that are inherent in that
T good
174 ^ Eflence of Virtue and Vice, Part IV,
good or evil will, which is the/0#/ of virtue and
vice (and not in the occafion of it) which is their
worthinefs of efteem or difefteem, praife or dif
praife, according to the common fenfe ot man
kind. If the Caufe or occafion of the rife of an
hateful difpofition or act of will, be alfo hate
ful ; fuppofe another antecedent evil will ; that
is entirely another fin, and deferves punifhment
by itfelf, under a diftinct confideration. There
is worthinefs of difpraife in the Nature of an evil
volition, and not wholly in fome foregoing act,
which is its Caufe ; otherwife the evil volition,
which is the effect, is no moral evil, any more
than ficknefs, or fome other natural calamity,
which arifes from a Caufe morally evil.
Thus, for inftance, ingratitude is hateful and
worthy of difpraife, according to common fenfe ;
not becaufe fomething as bad, or worfe than in
gratitude, was the Caufe that produced it ; but
becaufe it is hateful in itfelf, by its own inherent
deformity. So the love of virtue is amiable,
and worthy of praife, not meerly becaufe fome
thing elfe went before this love of virtue in our
minds, which cauled it to take place there ; for
inftance, our own choice ; we chofe to love vir
tue, and, by fome method or other, wrought our-
felves into the love of it ; but becaufe of the
amiablenefs and condefcency of fuch a difpofi
tion and inclination of heart. If that was the
cafe, that we did chufe to love virtue, and fo
produced that love in ourfelves, this choice it
felf could be no otherwife amiable or praife wor
thy, than as love to virtue, or fome other ami
able inclination, was exercifed and implied in it.
If that choice was amiable at all, it muft be fo
on account of fome amiable quality in the Na
ture of the choice. If we chofe to love virtue,
j not
Sect. I. in tie Nat. ofVolit. not in the Caufe. 275
not in love to virtue, or any thing that was
good, and exercifed no fort of good difpoiition
in the choice, the choice itfelf was not virtu
ous, nor worthy of any praife, according to com
mon fenfe, becaufe the choice was not of a good
Nature.
It may not be improper here to take notice of
fomething faid by an author, that has lately made
a mighty noife in America. " A neceffary holi-
" nefs (fays he *) is no holinefs. — Adam could
" not be originally created in righteoufnefs and
" true holinefs, becaufe he muft cbufe to be
" righteous, before he could be righteous. And
" therefore he muft exift, he muft be created,
<c yea, he muft exercife thought and reflection,
" before he was righteous." There is much
more to the fame effect in that place, and alfo in
p. 437, 438, 439, 440. If thefe things are fo,
it will certainly follow, that the firft chufing to be
righteous is no righteous choice -9 there is no
righteoufnefs or holinefs in it; becaufe no chuf
ing to be righteous goes before it. For he plainly
ipeaks of chufing to be righteous, as what muft go
before rigbteoufnefs : and that which follows the
choice, being the effect of the choice, cannot be
righteoufnefs or holinefs : for an effect is a
thing neceffary, and cannot prevent the influence
or efficacy of its Caufe ; and therefore is una
voidably dependent upon the Caufe : and he
fays, a necejja/y holinefs is no holinefs. So that
neither can a choice of righteoufnefs be righte
oufnefs or holinefs, nor can any thing that is
confequent on that choice, and the eifect of it,
be righteoufnefs or holinefs ; nor can any thing
that is without choice, be righteoufnefs or hpli-
* Scrip. Doc. of Original Sin, p. 180. 3d Edit.
T 2 nefs.
The EfTence of Virtue and Vice, Part IV. •
nefs. So that by his fcheme, ail righteoufnefs
and holinefs is at once fhut out of the world,
and no door left open, by which it can ever pof-
libly enter into the world.
I fuppofe, the way, that men came to entertain
this abfurd inconiiftent notion, with refpect to
internal inclinations- and volitions thtmfelves, (or
notions that imply it,) viz. that the EfTence of
their moral good or evil lies not in their Nature,
but their Caufe : was, that it is indeed a very plain
dictate of common fenfe, that it is fo with reSpect
to all outward aftions, and fenfible motions of the
body ; that the moral good or evil of them does
not lie at all in the motions themfelves j which,
taken by themfelves, are nothing of a moral na
ture •, and the Effence of all the moral good or
evil that concerns them, lies in thofe internal dif-
pofitions and voilitions, which are the Caufe of
them. No\v, being always uled to determine this,
without hefitation or difpute, concerning external
Affions; which are the things, that in the com
mon ufe of language are fignified by fuch
phrafes, as men's aftions, or their doings *, hence^
when they came to fpeak of volitions, and inter
nal exercifes of their inclinations, under the fame
denomination of their aftions, or what they do,
they unwarily determined the cafe muft alfo be
the fame with thefe, as with external aflions -, nor
confidering the vaft difference in the Nature of
the cafe.
If any fliall ftill object and fay, why is it net
neceflary that the Caufe fhould be conlldered, .in
order to determine whether any thing be worthy
of blame or praife ? is it agreable to reafon and
common fenfe, that a man is to be praifed .or
blamed
Sect. I. in /^Nat. of Volition not in Afo Caufe. 277
blamed for that, which he is not the Caufe or au
thor of, and has no hand in ?
I anfwer, fuch phrafes as being the Caufe, being
the author ) kerning a hand^ and the like, are am
biguous. They are moft vulgarly underflood for
being the defigning voluntary Caufe, or Caufe by
antecedent choice : and it is moft certain, that
men are not, in this fenfe, the Caufes or authors
of the firft ad: of their wills, in any cafe ; as
certain as any thing is, or ever can be ; for no
thing can be more certain, than that a thing is
not before it is, nor a thing of the fame kind
before the firft thing of that kind ; and fo no
choice before the firft choice. — As the phrafe,
bang the author , may be under ftood, not of be*
ing the producer by an antecedent act of will ;
but as a perfon may be faid to be the author of
the act of will itfelf, by his being the imme
diate agent, or the being that is afting, or in ex-
ercife in that act ; if the phrafe of being the au
thor, is ufed to fignify this, then doubtlefs com
mon fenfe requires men's being the authors of
their own acts of will, in order to their being
efteemed worthy of praife or difpraife, on account
of them. And common fenfe teaches, that they
muft be the authors of external attions, in the
former fenfe, namely, their being the Caufes of
them by an act of will or choice, in order to
their being juftly blamed or praifed : but it
teaches no fuch thing with refpect to the acts of
the will themfelves. But this may appear
more manifeft by the things, which will be ob-*
ferved in the following fection.
SECTION
278 ?be Arminian Notion of Adion, Part
SECTION II.
The Falfenefs and Inconjiftence of that metaphyji-
cal Notion of A&ion, and Agency, which feems
to be generally entertained by the Defenders of
the Arminian Doftrine concerning Liberty, moral
Agency ^ &c.
ONE thing, that is made very much a ground
of argument and fuppofed demonflration by
ArminianS) in defence of the fore- mentioned prin
ciples, concerning moral Agency, virtue, vice,
£cc. is their metaphyfical notion of Agency and
Action. They fay, unlefs the foul has a felf-de-
termining power, it has no power of Action ; if
its volitions be not caufed by itfelf, but are excited
and determined by fome extrinfic caufe, they can
not be the foul's own qfts -, and that the foul^can-
not be aflive^ but muft be wholly pqffive, in thofe
effects which it is the fubject of neceflarily, and
not from its qwn free 4etermipatlon.
Mr. CJjubb- lays the foundation of his fcheme
of liberty, and of his arguments to fupport it,
very much in this poiition, that man is an Agent 9
and capable of Action. Which doubtlcfs is true :
\2\rt JeLf -determination belongs to his notion of Ac
tion^ and is the very effence of it. Whence he
infers, that it is impoffible for a man(to act and
he acted upon, in the fame thing, at the fame
time •, and that nothing, that is an Action, can
b« the effect of the Action of another : and he
infills, that a neceffary Agent, or an Agent that is
neceflarily determined to act, is a plain contra-
action.
But
Sect. II. falfe and inconjlftent. 279
But thofe are a precarious fort of demonftra-
tions, which men build on the meaning that they
arbitrarily affix to a word ; efpecially when that
meaning is abftrufe, inconfiftent, and entirely di-
verfe from the original fenfe of the word in com
mon fpeech.
That the meaning of the word Aftwn, as Mr.
Chubb and many others ufe it, is utterly unintel
ligible and inconfiftent, is manifeft, becaufe it be
longs to their notion of an Action, that it is fome-
thing wherein is no pafiion or paffivenefs •, that
is ("according to their fenfe of paffivenefs) it is
under the power, influence or Action of no caufe.
And this implies, that Action has no caufe, and
jis no effect ; for to be an effect implies paffive-
nefs, or the being fubjed to the power and Ac
tion of its caufe. And yet they hold, that the
mind's Aftion is the effect of its own determina
tion, yea, the mind's free and voluntary deter
mination; which is the fame with free choice.
So that Action is the effect of fomething preced
ing, even a preceding act of choice : and con-
fequently, in this effect the mind is pafilve, fub-
ject to the power and Action of the preceding
caufe, which is the foregoing choice, and there
fore cannot be active. So that here we have this
contradiction, that Action is always the effect of
foregoing choice ; and therefore cannot be Ac-
ion ; becaufe it is paflive to the power of that pre
ceding caufai choice ; and the mind cannot' be
active and paflive in the fame thing, at the fame
time. Again, they fay, neceflity is utterly incon
fiftent with AcStion, and a necefTary Action is a
contradiction •, and fo their notion of Action im
plies contingence, and excludes all neceffity. And
therefore, their notion of Action implies, that it
has no necefTary dependence or connection with
T 4 any
2,80 fbe Arminian Notion of Action, Part IV.
any thing foregoing ; for fuch a dependence or
connection excludes contingence, and implies
neceffity. And yet their notion of Action im
plies necerTity, and fuppofes that it is neceifary,
and cannot be contingent. For they fuppofe, that
whatever is properly called' Action, mud be de
termined by the will and free choice ; and this
is as much as to fay, that it muft be neceffary,
being dependent upon, and determined by fome-
thing foregoing ; namely, a foregoing act of
choice. Again, it belongs to their notion of
Action, of that which is a proper and meer act,
that it is the beginning of motion, or of exertion
pf power ; but yet it is implied in their notion of
Action, that it is not the beginning of motion or
exertion of power, but is confequent and depen
dent on a preceding exertion of power, viz. the
power of will and choice : for they fay there is
no proper Action but what is freely chofen-, or,
which is the fame thing, determined by a fore
going ad of free choice. But if any of them
Jnal) fee caufe to deny this, and fay they hold no
fuch thing as that every Action is chofen or de
termined by a foregoing choice-, but that the
very firft exertion of will only, undetermined
by any preceding act, is properly called Action ;
then I fay, fuch a man's notion of Action implies
iieceflity; for what the mind is the fubject of,
without the determination of its own previous
choice, it is the fubject of necefTarily, as to any
hand, that free choice has in the affair, and3
without any ability, the mind has to prevent
it, by any will or election of its own } becaufe
by the fuppofition it precludes all previous acts
of the will or choice in the cafe, which might
prevent it. So that it is again, in this other way,
implied in their notion of act, that it is both
neceffary and not neceffary. Again, it belongs to
their
Seft. II. falfe and inconfiftent. ; 281
their notion of an aft, that it is no effeft of a
pre - determining bias or preponderation, but
fprings immediately out of indifference ; and this
implies, that it cannot be from foregoing choice,
which is foregoing preponderation : if it be not
habitual, but occasional, yet if it caufes the aft,
it is truly previous, efficacious and determining.
And yet, at the fame time, it is eflential to their
notion of the aft, that it is what the Agent is the
Author of freely and voluntarily, and that is, by
previous choice and defign.
So that, according to their notion of the aft,
confidered with regard to its confequences, thefe
following things arc all effential to it ; viz. Than
it fhould be neceffary, and not necefiary ; that it
fhould be from a caufe, and no caufe ; that it
fhould be the fruit of choice and defign, and not
the fruit of choice and defign; that it mould be
the beginning of motion or exertion, and yet
confequent on previous exertion ; that it mould
be before it is *, that it mould fpring immediately
out of indifference and equilibrium, and yet be
the effeft of preponderation •, that it fhould be
felf-originated, and alfo have its original from
fomething elfe ; that it is what the mind caufes it-
felf, of its own will, and can produce or prevent,
according to its choice or pleafure, and yet what
the mind has no power to prevent, precluding
all previous choice in the affair.
So that an aft, according to their metaphyfical
notion of it, is fomething of which there is no
idea •, it is nothing but a confufion of the mind,
excited by v/ords without any dillinft meaning,
and is an abfolute non-entity ; and that in two
refpefts: (i.) There is nothing in the \vorld
that ever was, is, or can be, to anftyer the things
which
282 tte Arminian Notion of Action, Part IV.
which mufl belong to its defcription, according
to what they fuppofe to be efTential to it. And
(2.) There neither is, nor ever was, nor can be,
any notion or idea to anfwer the word, as they
life and explain it. For if we fhould fuppofe any
fuch notion, it \vould many ways deftroy itfelf.
But it is impoffible any idea or notion fhould
fubfift in the mind, whofe very nature and ef-
ience, which conftitutes it, deftroys it. — If fome
learned philofopher, who had been abroad, in
giving an account of the curious obfervations he
had made in his travels, fhould fay, " He had
" been in ferra del Fuego, and there had feen an
** animal, which he calls by a certain name,
u that begat and brought forth itfelf, and yet
" had a fire and dam diftind: from itfelf ; that
** it had an appetite, and was hungry before it
" had a being ; that his mafter, who led him,
tc and governed him at his pleafure, was always
<c governed by him, and driven by him where he
" pleafed ; that when he moved, he always took
" a ftep before the firft ftep ; that he went with
" his head firft, and yet always went tail fore-
" mod ; and this, though he had neither head
" nor tail :" it would be no impudence at all, to
tell fuch a traveller, though a learned man, that
he himfelf had no notion or idea of fuch an ani
mal, as he gave an account of, and never had, nor
ever would have.
As the forementioned notion of Adlion is very
inconfiilent, fo it is wholly diverfe from the ori
ginal meaning of the word. The more ufual
iignirication of it, in vulgar fpeech, feems to be
fome motion or exertion of power ^ that is volun
tary, or that is the effett of the will ; and is ufed
in the fame fenfe as doing : and moft commonly
it is ufed to fignify outward Affions. So thinking is
often
Sect. IT. falfe and inconjiftent. 283
often diflinguifhed from a fling; and defiring and
willing^ from doing*
Befides this more ufual and proper fignification
of the word Aftion, there are other ways in which
the word is ufed, that are lefs proper, which yet
have place in common fpeech. Oftentimes it is
ufed to fignify fome motion or alteration in in
animate things, with relation to fome object
and effect. So the fpring of a watch is faid to
aft upon the chain and wheels ; the fun-beams,
to act upon plants and trees ; and the fire, to act
upon wood. Sometimes, the word is ufed to
fignify motions, alterations, and exertions of
power, which are feen in corporeal things, con-
fidered absolutely ; efpecially when thefe motions
feem to arife from fome internal caufe which is
hidden •, fo that they have a greater refemblancc
of thofe motions of our bodies, which are the ef
fects of natural volition, or invifible exertions of
will. So the fermentation of liquor, the opera
tions of the loadilone, and of electrical bodies,
are called the Aftion of thefe things. And fome-
times, the word Aftion is ufed to fignify the ex-
ercife of thought, or of will and inclination : fo
meditating, loving, hating, inclining, difinclin-
ing, chufmg and refuting, may be fometimes
called acting ; though more rarely (unlefs it be
by philofophers and metaphyficians) than in any
of the other fenfes.
But the word is never ufed in vulgar fpeech
in that fenfe, which Arminian divines ufe it in,
namely, for the felf-determinate exercife of the
will, or an exertion of the foul that arifes with
out any neceflary connexion, with any thing fore
going. If a man does fomething voluntarily, or
as the effect of his choice, then in the moft pro-
per
284 fie Arminian Notion 0/ Act ion, Part IV.
per fenfe, and as the word is moft originally and
commonly ufed, he is faid to aft : but whether
that choice or volition be felf- deter mined, or no,
whether it be connected with foregoing habitual
bias, whether it be the certain effect of the ftron-
geft motive, or fome intrinfic caufe, never comes
into coniideration in the meaning of the word.
•And if the word A&ion is arbitrarily ufed by
fome men otherwife, to fuit feme fcheme of me-
taphyfic or morality, no argument can reafon-
ably be founded on fuch a ufe of this term, to
prove any thing but their own pleafure. For
divines and philofophers ftrenuonfly to urge fuch
arguments, as though they were fuificient to fup-
port and demonftrate a whole fcheme of moral
philofophy and divinity, is certainly to erect a
mighty edifice on the fand, or rather on a fhadow.
And though it may now perhaps, through cuitom,
have become natural for them to ufe the word in
this fenfe f if that may be called a fenfe or mean
ing, which is inconfiftent with itfelf ) yet this does
not prove, that it is agreable to the natural notions,
men have of things, or that there can be any
thing in the creation that mould anfwer fuch a
meaning. And though they appeal to experi
ence, yet the truth is, that men are fo far from
experiencing any fuch thing, that it is impoffible
for them to have any conception of it.
If it ihould be objected, that Aftion and PaJJion
are doubtlefs words of a contrary iignification ;
bnt to fuppofe that the Agent, in its Action, is
under the power and influence of fomething in
trinfic, is to confound Action and Pailion, an<i
make them the fame thing,
1 anfwert
Sect. II. falfe and inconfiftent. 285
I anfvver, that A6tion and Pafiion are doubt-
lefs, as they are fometimes ufed, words ot op-
poiite fignificaiion-, but not as fignifying oppofire
exijlences* but only oppofate relations.- The words
caufe and effcft are terms o.f' o(- ofite fi^nifica-
tion ^ but, nevmhelefs, if 1 aflert, that the fame
thing may, at the fame time, in different re-
fpects and relations, be both caufe and effe&9
this will not prove that I confound fhe terms.
The foul may be both aftive' and pajjive in the
fame thing in different refpeds ; active with re
lation to one thing, and pajjlve with relation to
another. The word Pajfiim, when fet in oppo-
fition to Aftion, or rather Adwenefs, is meeriy a
relative : it fignifies no effect or caule, nor 'any-
proper exiftence •, but is the fame with Pajfivenefs,
or a being paffive, or a being acted upon by fome
thing. Which is a meer relation of a thing to
fome power or force exerted by fome cauie, pro
ducing fome effect in it, or upon it. And Action,
when fet properly in oppoiition to PaJJion, or
Pqffivenefs9 is no real exiftence •, it is not the fame
with AN Action, but is a meer relation : it is the
Aftivenefs of fomething on another thing, being
the oppoiite relation to the other, viz. a relation
of power, or force, exerted by fome caufe, to
wards another thing, which is the fubjecl: of the
effect of that power. Indeed, the word Action is
frequently ufed to fignify fomething not meeriy
relative, but more abfolute, and a real exiftence ;
as when we fay an Action ; when the word is not
ufed tranfitively, but abiblutely, for fome motion
or exercife of body or mind, without any rela
tion to any object or effect : and as ufed thus,
it is not properly the oppofite of Pajffion -, which
ordinarily fignifies nothing abfolute, but meeriy
the relation of being atted upon. And therefore if
the word ARion be ufed in the like relative fenfe,,
2 then
286 How Ms Arminian Notion Part IV*
then A6Hon and Pafilon are only two contrary
relations. And it is no abfurdity to fuppofe, that
contrary relations may belong to the fame thing,
at the fame time, with relpect to different things.
So to fuppofe, that there are ads of the foul by
which a man voluntarily moves, and acts upon
objects, and produces effects, which yet them-
felves are effects of fomething elfe, and wherein
the foul itfelf is the object of fomething acting
upon, and influencing that, do not at all con
found Action and Paffion. The words may never-
thelefs be properly of oppofite fignification : there
may be as true and real a difference between aft-
ing and being caufed to aft, though we ihould fup
pofe the foul to be both in the fame volition, as
there is between living and being quickened, or made
to live. It is no more a contradiction, to fuppofe
that Action may be the effect of fome other caufe,
befides the Agent, or Being that acts, than to
fuppofe, that life may be the effect of fome other
caufe, befides the Liver, or the Being that lives,
in whom life is caufed to be.
The thing which has led men into this incon-
fiftent notion of Action, when applied to voli
tion, as though it were efTential to this internal
Action, that the Agent fhould be felt-determined
in it, and that the will mould be the caufe of it,
was probably this ; that according to the fenfe
of mankind, and the common ufe of language, it
is fo, with refpect to men's external Actions ;
which are what originally, and according to the
vulgar ufe and moil proper fenfe of the word,
are called ARions. Men in thefe are felf-direfted,
felf-determined, and their wills are the caufe of
the motions of their bodies, and the external
things that are done ; fo that unlefs men do them
voluntarily, and of choice, and the Action be
deter ;
Sect. II. probably arofe. 287
determined by their antecedent volition, it is no
Action or Doing of theirs. Hence fome meta-
phyficians have been led unwarily, but exceeding
abfurdly, to fuppofe the fame concerning volition
itfclf, that that alfo muft be determined by the
will ; which is to be determined by antecedent
volition, as the motion of the body is ; not con-
fidering the contradiction it implies.
But it is very evident, that in the metaphyfical
diftinction between Action and PafTion (though
long iince become common and the general
vogue) due care has not been taken to conform
language to the nature of things, or to any di-
itinct clear ideas. As it is in innumerable other
philofophical, metaphyfical terms, uled in thefe
difputes ; which has occafioned inexpreflible dif
ficulty, contention, error and confuiion.
And thus probably it came to be thought, that
neceffity was inconfiftent with Action, as thefe
terms are applied to volition. Firft, thefe terms
AEtion and Neceffity are changed from their origi
nal meaning, as fignifying external voluntary Ac
tion and Conftraint, (in which meaning they are
evidently inconfiftent) to iignify quite other
things, viz. volition itfelf, and certainty of ex-
iftence. And when the change of fignification is
made, care is not taken to make proper allow
ances and abatements for the difference of fenfe ;
but ftill the fame things are unwarily attributed
to Action and Neceffity ^ in the new meaning of the
words, which plainly belonged to them in their
firft fenfe ; and on this ground, maxims are efta-
blifhed without any real foundation, as though
they were the moft certain truths, and the molt
evident dictates of reafon.
But
288 Why Calvinifm is fuppofed Part IV.
But however flrenuoufly it is maintained, that
what is neceflary cannot be properly called Action,
and that a neceffary A&ion is a contradiction, yet
it is probable there are few Arminian divines, who,
if thoroughly tried, would ftand to thefe princi
ples. They will allow, that God is, in the higheft
fenfe, an active Being, and the higheft Fountain
of Life and Action ; and they would not proba
bly deny, that thofe, that are called God's acts of
righteoufnefs, holinefs and faithfulnefs, are truly
and properly God's a&s, and God is really a holy
Agent in them ; and yet, I truft, they will not;
deny, that God necerfarily acts juftly and faith
fully, and that it is impoffible for Him to act
unrighteously and unholily.
SECTION III.
T'be Reafons why fome think it contrary to common
Senfe, tofuppofe tboje Things which are neceflary,
to be worthy of either Praile or Blame.
IT is abundantly affirmed and urged by Armi
nian writers, that it is contrary to common
Senfe, and the natural notions and apprehenfions
of mankind, to fuppofe otherwife than that ne-
ceffity (making no diitindtion between natural
and moral necefllty) is inconfiftent with Virtue
and Vice, Praife and Blame, Reward and Punifh-
ment. And their arguments from hence have
been greatly triumphed in; and have-been not a
little perplexing to many, who have been friendly
to the truth, as clearly revealed in the holy Scrip
tures : it has feemed to them indeed difficult, to
reconcile Calvinijlic doctrines with the notions,
men commonly have of juftice and equity. And
the
Se<5h III. contrary to common Scnfe.' 289
the true reafons of it feem to be thefe that fol
low*
I. Tt is indeed a Very plain dictate of common
SenfeA that natural neceffity is wholly inconfi-
ftent with juft Praife or Blame. If men do things
xvhich in themfelves are very good, fit to be
brought to pafs, and very happy effects, pro
perly againft their wills, and cannot help it ; or
do them from a necefilty that is without their
wills, or with which their wills have no concern
or connection *, then it is a plain dictate of com
mon fenfe, that it is none of their virtue, nor any
moral good in them \ and that they are not wor
thy to be rewarded or praifed; or at all efteemed,
honoured or loved on that account. And, on the
other hand, that if> from like neceffity , they do
thofe things which in themfelves are very uri*
happy and pernicious, and do them, becaufe the/
cannot help it-, the necefiity is fuch, that it is all
one whether they will them, or no ; a'nd the rea-
fon why they are done, is from necefiity only,
and not from their wills ; it is a very plain dk>
tate of common Senfe, that they are not at all to
blame ; there is no vice, fault, or moral evil at
all in the effect done ; nor are they, who are thus
neceffitated, in any wife worthy to be punifhed,
hated, or in the leail clifrefpected, on that ac
count.
In like manner, if things, in themfelves good
and delirable, are abfolutely impoffible, with a
natural impoflibility, the univerfal reaibn of man
kind teaches, that this zvbolly andperfeftly excufes
perfons in their not doing them.
And it is alfo a plain dictate of common Senle,
that if the doing things, in themfelves good, or
U avoid-
290 IFky Calvinifm Is fuppofed Part IV,
avoiding things in themfelves evil, is not abfolutely
lmpoJJwTe\ with fuch a natural impofiibility, but
very difficult, with a natural difficulty •, that is, 1J
difficulty prior to, and not at all confifling in will
and inclination itfelf, and which would remain
the fame, let the inclination be what it will ; then
a perfon's neglect or omifTion is excufed inform
meafurei though not wholly ; his fin is lefs ag
gravated, than if the thing to be done were eafy.
And if inftead of difficulty and hinderance, there
be a contrary natural propenfity in the (late of
things, to the thing to be done, or effect to be
brought to pafs, abftracted from any confedera
tion of the inclination of the heart •, though the
propenfity be not fo great as to amount to a na
tural neceflity ; yet being fome approach to it,
fo that the doing the good thing be very much
from this natural tendency in the date of things,
and but little from a good inclination ; then it is
a dictate of common Senfe, that there is fo much
the lefs virtue in what is done ; and fo it is lefs
praife-worthy and rewardable. The reafon is eafy,
viz. becaufe fuch a natural propenfity or ten
dency is an approach to natural neceflity ; and
the greater the propenfity, fti'll fo much the nearer
is the approach to neceflity. And, therefore, as
natural neceflity takes away or Ihuts out all vir
tue, fo this propenfity approaches to an abo
lition of virtue ; that is, it diminifoes it. And,
on the other hand, natural difficulty, in the ftate
of things, is an approach to natural impoflibility.
And as the latter, when it is complete and abfo-
lute, wholly takes away Blame ; fo fuch difficulty
rfakes away fome Blame, or diminifhes Bfame ; and
makes the thing done to be lefs worthy of pu-
nifhment.
II. Men
i
Sect. III. contrary to corhmori Senfe. 291
II. Men, in their firft life of fuch phrafes as
thefe, mitft, can't, can't help it, can't avoid it, ne~
ceffary, unable, impqjfibk, unavoidable, irrejiftible, &c.
wle them to fignify a neceflky of conilraint or
reftraint, a natural necetfity or impoffibility ; or
fome neceflity that the will has nothing to do in ;
which may be, whether men will or no ; and
which may be fuppofed to be juft the fame^ let
men's inclinations and defires be what they will.
Such kind of terms in their original ufe, I fup-
pole, among all nations, are relative ; carrying in
their fignification fas was before obferved) a re-
ierence or refpect to fome contrary will, defire
or . endeavour, which, it is fuppofed, is, or may
be, in the cafe. All men find, and begin to find
.in early childhood, that there are innumerable
things that cannot be done., which they defire to
4o : and innumerable things, which they are averfe
to, that muft be, they cannot avoid them, they
will be^ whether they chufe them or no. It is to
exprefs this necefiity, which men fo foon and fo
often find, and which fo greatly and early affects
them in innumerable cafes, that fuch terms and
phrafes are firft formed ; and it is to fignify fucii
a neceffity, that they are firft ufed, and that they
are molt conftantly ufed, in the common affairs
of life ; and not to fignify any fuch metaphy-
ficalj fpeculative and abftract notion, as that
connection in the nature or courfe of things,
which is between the fubject and predicate of a
proportion, and which is the foundation of the
certain truth of that propofition; to fignify which,
they who employ themfelves in philofophical
inquiries into the firil origin and metaphyfical
relations and dependences of things, have bor
rowed thele terms, for want of others. But
we grow up from our cradles in a ufe of fuch
terms and phrafes entirely different from this,
U 2 and
292 Why Calvinifm Is fuppofed Part IV.
and carrying a fenfe exceeding diverfe from that,
in which they are commonly ufed in the contro-
verfy between Arminiam and Cafoinifts. And it
being, as was faid before, a dictate of the univer-
fal fenfe of mankind, evident to us as foon as we
begin to think, that the neceflity fignified by thefe
terms, in the fenfe in which, we firft learn them,
does excufe perfcns, and free them from all Fault
or Blame ; hence our ideas of excufablenefs or
faultlefihefs is tied to thefe terms and phrafes by
a ftrong habit, which is begun in childhood, as
foon as we begin to fpeak, and grows up with us,
and is ftrengthened by conflant ufe and cuftom,
the connection growing ftronger and ftronger.
The habitual connection, which is in men's
minds between Blameleflhefs and thofe foremen-
tioned terms, muft? cannot? unable, neceffary? im-
pqffibley unavoidable? &c. becomes very ftrong ;
becaufe, as foon as ever men begin to ufe reafon
and fpeech, they have occaiion to excufe them-
felves, from the natural neceflity fignified by thefe
terms, in numerous instances. — / can't do it — /
could not help it. — -And all mankind have conftant
and daily occaiion to ufe fuch phrafes in this fenfe,
to excufe themfelves and others, in almoft all the
concerns of life, with refpect to difappointments,
and things that 'happen, which concern and affect
ourfelves and others, that are hurtful, or difagre*
able to us or them, or things defirable, that we or
others fail of.
That a being accuflomed to an union of diffe
rent ideas, from early childhood, makes the ha-
bituafrconnection exceeding ftrong, as though fuch
connection were owing to nature? is manifeffc in
innumerable inftances. It is altogether by fuch
an habitual connection of ideas, that men judge
of
Sect. III. contrary to common Senfe. 293
of the bignefs or diftancc of the objects of fight,
from their appearance. Thus it is owing to inch
a connexion early eftablilhed, and growing up
with a perfon, that he judges a mountain, which
he fees at ten miles diliance, to be bigger than his
nofe, or further off than the end of it. Having
been ufed fo long to join a confiderable diftance
and magnitude with fuch an appearance, men
imagine it is by a dictate of natural fenfe :
whereas, it would be quite otherwife with one
that had his eyes newly opened, who had been
born blind : he would have the fame vifible ap
pearance, but natural fenfe would dictate no fuch
thing, concerning the magnitude or diflance of
what appeared.
III. When men, after they had been fo habi
tuated to connect ideas of Innocency or BlamelefP
nefs with fuch terms, that the union feems to be
the effect of meer nature, come to hear the lame
terms ufed, and learn to ufe them themfelves in
the forementioned new and metaphyfical fenfe, to
fignify quite another fort of neceflity, which has
no fuch kind of relation to a contrary fuppofable
will and endeavour ; the notion of plain and ma-
nifeft Blameleffnefs,by this means, is, by a ftrong
prejudice, infenfibly and unwarily transferred to
a cafe to wrhich it by no means belongs : the
change of the ufe of the terms, to a iignification
which is very diverfe, not being taken notice of,
or adverted to. And there are feveral reafons,
why it is not,
I, The terms, as ufed by philofophers, are
not very difttnct and clear in their meaning/: few
ufe them in a fixed determined fepfev-' On the
contrary, their meaning is very vague and con-
fufed. Which is what commonly happens to the
U words
294 Why Galvinifm is fuppojed Part IV.
words ufed to fignify things intellectual and
moral, and to exprefs what Mr. Locke calls mixt
modes. If men had a clear and diftindt under-
ftanding of what is intended by thefe metaphy-
fical terms, they would be. able more eafily to
compare them with thejr original and common
Senfe ; and fo would not be fo eafily led into de-
lufion by no fort of terms in the world, as by
words of this fort.
2. The change of the fignification of the terms
is the more infenfible, becaufe the things figni-
fied, though indeed very different, yet do in lome
generals agree. In necejfity, that which is vulgarly
fb called, there is a flrong connection between the
thing faid to be neceflary, and fomething ante
cedent to it, in the order of nature ; fo there is
alfo in philofopbical necejjity. And though in both
kinds of neceflity, the connection cannot be called
by that name, with relation to an oppofite will
or endeavour, to which it is fuperior j which is
the cafe in vulgar neceflity ; yet in both, the
connection is prior to will and endeavour, and
fo, in fome refpect, fuperior. In both kinds of
neceflity, there is a foundation for fome certainty
of the proportion, that affirms the event. — The
terms ufed being the fame, and the things fig-
aiified agreeing in thefe and fome other general
circumstances, and the expreflions as ufed by
philofophers being not well defined, and fo of ob-
fcure and looie fignification •, hence perfons are
not aware of the great difference ; had the no
tions of innocence or faultinefs, which were fo
ftrongly aflbciated with them, and were ftrictly
united in their minds, ever fmce they can rememr
ber, remain- united with them {till, as if the union
altogether Datura! and neceflary -, and they
.that;
Sect. III. contrary to common Senfe. 295
that go about to make a reparation, feem to them
to do great violence even to nature itfelf.
IV. Another reafon why it appears difficult to
reconcile it with reafon, that men Ihould be
blamed for that which is neceflary with a moral
necefluy (which, as was obferved before, is a fpe-
cies of philofophical neceffity) is, that for want of
due confideration, men inwardly entertain that
apprehenfion, that this neceflity may be againft
men's wills and fmcere endeavours. They go away
with that notion, that men may truly will, and
\vifh and flrive that it may be otherwiie ; but
that invincible neceflity Hands in the way. And
many think thus concerning themfelves : fome,
that are wicked men, think they wifh, that they
were good, that they loved God and holinefs : but
yet do not find that their wifhes produce the ef
fect.- — The reafons, why men think, are as follow :
(i.) They find what may be called an IndireS wil-
llngnefs to have a better will, in the manner before
obferved. For it is impoffible, and a contradiction
to fuppofe the will to be directly and properly
againft itfelf. And they do not confider, that this
indirect willingnefs is entirely a different thing
from properly willing the thing that is the duty
and virtue required j and that there is no virtue
in that fort of willingnefs which they have. They
do not confider, that the volitions, which a wicked
man may have that he loved God, are no acts of
the will at all againft the moral evil of not loving
God ; but only fome difagreable confequences.
But the making the requifite diftinction requires
more care of reflection and thought, than moft
men are ufed to. And men, through a prejudice in
their own favour, are difpofed to think well of their
own defires and difpolitions, and to account them
good and virtuous, though their refpect to vir-
U 4 tiu
296 Why Calvinifm Is fuppofed Part IV,
tue be only indirefl and remote, and it is nothing
at all that is virtuous that truly excites or ter
minates their inclinations. (2.) Another thing,
that infenfibly leads and beguiles men into a fup-
pofition that this rnoral necefiity or impofiibility
is, or may be, againfl men's wills and true en
deavours, is the derivation and formation of the
terms themfelves, that are often ufed to exprefs
it, which is fuch as feems directly to point to,
and holds this forth, Such words, for inftance, as
unable, unavoidable, imppj/ible, irrefiftible •, which
carry a plain reference to a fuppoiable power ex
erted, endeavours ufed, refiftance made, in op-
pofuion to the neceffity : and the perfons that
hear them, not confidering nor fufpe&ing, but that
they are ufed in their proper fenfe : that fenfe
being therefore understood, there does naturally,
and as it were neceflarily arife in their minds a
fuppofition, that it may be fo indeed, that true
deiires and endeavours may take place, but that
invincible necefiity itands in the way, and renders
them vain and to no effedt,
V. Another thing, which maizes perfons more
ready to fuppofe it to be contrary to reafon, that
men mould be expofed to the punilhments threa
tened to fin, for doing thofe things which are
morally neceflary, or not doing thofe things mo
rally impoftiblej is, that imagination Strengthens
the argument, and adds greatly to the power and
influence of the feeming reafons againft it, from
the greatnefs of that punimment. To allow that
they may be juftly expofed to a fmall punimment,
would not be fo difficult. Whereas, if there were
any good reafon in the cafe, if it were truly a
di&ate of reafon, that fuch nece/Tity was incon-
fident with faultinefs, or juft punilhment, the
dcmdnftration would be equally certain with re-
fpecl:
Sec"h IV. contrary to common Senfe. 297
fpeft to a fmall punifhment, or any punifhment
at all, as a very great one : but it is not equally
eafy to the imagination. They that argue againft
the juflice of damning men for thofe things that
are thus necefTary, feem to make their argument
the ftronger, by fetting forth the greatnefs of the
punimment in ftrong expreflions : — That a man
jbtftld be caft into eternal burnings, that hejhould be
made to fry in hell to all eternity for thofe things which
he had no power to avoid, and was under a fatal, un-
frujlrable, invincible necejfity of doing,
SECTION IV.
It is agrealle to common Senfe, and the natural
Notions of Mankind, to fuppofe moral Necejjity
to be confident with Praife and Blame^ Reward
and Punifhment.
WHETHER, the reafons, that have been
given, why it appears difficult to fome
perfons, to reconcile with common Senfe the
prailing or blaming, rewarding or punifhing thole
things which are morally necefTary, are thought
fatisfactory, or not-; yet it moil evidently appears,
by the following things, that if this matter be
rightly underftood, fetting alide all delufion arif-
ing from the impropriety and ambiguity of
terms, this is not at all inconfiftent with the na
tural apprehenlions of mankind, and that ienfe
of things which is found every where in the com
mon people; who are furtheft from having their
thoughts perverted from their natural channel,
by metaphyfical and philofophical fubtilties ; but,
on the contrary, altogether agreable to, and the
very
298 Nece/ary Virtue y &c. Part IV.
very voice and dictate of this natural and vulgar
Senfc.
I. This will appear, if we confider what the vul
gar Notion of blame-worthinefs is. The idea, which
the common people,, through all ages and nati
ons, have of -faultinefs, I fuppofe to be plainly
this ; a perfon's being or doing wrong, with bis own
will and pleafure ; containing thefe two things ;
i . His doing wrong, when he does (is he pleafes. 2.
His pleafures "being wrong. Or, in other words,
perhaps more intelligibly exprefling their Notion^
a performs having his heart wrong, and doing wrong
from his heart. And this is the fum total of the
matter.
The common people do not afcend up in their
reflections and abftractions to the metaphyfical
fources, relations and dependencies of things,
in order to form their Notion of faultinefs or
blame-worthinefs. They do not wait till they
have decided by their refinings, what firft deter
mines the will •, whether it be determined by fome-
thing extrinfic, or intrinfic ; whether volition de-»
termines volition, or whether the underfland-
ing determines the will ; whether there be
any fuch thing as metaphyficians mean by contin-
gence (if they have any meaning •„) whether there
be a fort of a itrange unaccountable fovere. ignty in
the will, in the exercife of which, by its own fo-
vereign acts, it brings to pafs all its own fovereign
acts. They do not take any part of their Notion
of fault or blame from the reiolution of any fuch
queilions. If this were the cafe, there are mul
titudes, yea the far greater part of, mankind, nine
hundred and ninety-nine out of a thoufand,
would live and die, without having any fuch No-
tion., as that of fault, ever entering into their
heads,,
Sect. IV. agreable-to common Senfe. 299
heads, or without fo much as one having any con
ception that any body was to be either blamed
or commended for any thing. To be- fare, it
would be a long time before men came to have
fuch Notions. Whereas it is mamfeft, they are
fome of the firft Notions that appear in children ;
who difcover, as loon as they can think, orfpeak,
or act at all as rational creatures, a Senfe of defert.
And, certainly, in forming their Notion of it, they
^make no ufe of metaphyficks. All the ground
they go upon, confifts in thefe two things ; ex
perience > and a natural fenfation of a certain fit-
nefs or agreablenefs, which there is in uniting fuch
moral evil as is above defcribed, viz. a being or
doivg wrong with the will, and refentment in
others, and pain inflifted on the perfon in whom
this moral evil is. Which natural Senfe is what
we call by the name of confdence.
-''& -:b gnbd Iffv/ 3f;it i'^r'n- i: :.o •?•••;• ;>rrnM
It is true, the common people and children,'
in their Notion of any faulty act or deed, of any
perfon, do fuppofe that it is the perfon's own aft
(induced. But this is all that belongs, to what
they underiland by a thing's being a perfon's
own deed or- atlkn \ even that it is fomething done
by him of choice. That fome exerciie or mo
tion ihould begin of itfelf, does not belong to
their Notion of an- aftion, or doing. If ib, it
would belong to their Notion of it, that it is
fomething, which is the caufe of its own begin
ning ; and that is as much as to fay, that it is
before it begins to be. Nor is their Notion of an
aftion fome motion or exercifc, that begins acci
dentally, without any caufe orreafon, for that
is contrary to one of the prime dictates of com*
mon Senfe, namely, that every thing that begins
fp be, has fome caufe or reaibn why it is.
The
300 Nece/ary Virtue^ &c. Part IV.
The common people, in their Notion of a
faulty or praife-worthy deed or work done by
any one, do ftippofe, that the man does it in the
exercife of liberty. But then their Notion of
liberty is only a perfon's having opportunity of
doing as he pleafes. They have no Notion of
liberty confifling in the will's firft ading, and
fo caufing its own ads -9 and determining, and
fo caufing its own determinations ; or chufing,
and fo caufing its own choice. Such a Notion
of liberty is what none have, but thofe that have
darkened their own minds with confuftrd meta-
phyfical fpeculation, and abftrufe and ambigu
ous terms. If a man is not retrained from act
ing as his will determines, or conltrained to aft
otherwife-, then he has liberty, according to com
mon Notions of liberty, without taking into
the idea that grand contradiction of all, the de
terminations of a man's free will being the ef-
feds of the determinations of his free will.—
Nor have men commonly any Notion of freedom
confiding in indifference. For if fo, then it would
be agreable to their Notion, that the greater in
difference men adt with, the more freedom they
ad with ; whereas, the reverfe is true. He that
in ading, proceeds with the fulleft inclination,
docs what he does with the greateft freedom,
according to common Senfe. And fo far is it
from being agreable to common Senfe, that fuch
liberty as confifts in indifference is requifite to
praife or blame, that, on the contrary, the dictate
of every man's natural fenfe through the world
i-S that the further he is from being indifferent in
his ading good or evil, and the more he does
cither with full and ftrong inclination, the more
is he efteemed or abhorred, commended or con*
demned.
II. If
Sect IV, agreallt to common Senfe. 301
II. If it were inconfiftent with the common
Senfe of mankind, that men mould be either to
be blamed or commended in any volitions, they
have, or fail of, in cafe of moral neceflity or im
poflibility ; then it would furely alfo be agreable
to the fame Senfe and reafon of Mankind, that
the nearer the cafe approaches to fuch a moral
neceflity or impoflibility, either through a ftrong
antecedent moral propenfity, on the one hand, *
or a great antecedent oppofition and difficulty, on
the other, the nearer does it approach to a being
neither blameable nor commendable ; fo that acts
exerted with fuch preceding propenfity, would be
worthy of proportionably lefs praife •, and when
omitted, the act being attended with fuch diffi
culty, the omiflion would be worthy of the lefs
blame. It is fo, as was obferved before, with
natural neceflity and impofiibility, propenfity and
difficulty: as it is a plain dictate of the fenfe of
all Mankind, that natural neceflity and impofli-
bility take away all blame and praife; and there
fore, that the nearer the approach is to thefe,
through previous propenfity or difficulty, fo
praife and blame are proportionably diminijhed.
And if it were as much a dictate of common
Senfe, that moral neceflity of doing, or impofii
bility of avoiding, takes away all praife and
blame, as that natural neceflity or impofiibility
does this; then, by a perfect parity of reafon,
it would be as much the dictate of common
Senfe, that an approach to moral neceflity of do
ing, or impoflibility of avoiding, diminffies praife
and blame, as that an approach to natural ne
ceflity and impoflibility does fo. It is equally the
voice of common Senfe, that perfons are excufable
* It is here argued, on fuppofition that not all propenfity
implies moral necefiity, but only feme very high degree ;
which hone will deny.
i in
.302 Nece/ary Virtue, &c. Part IV.
•in part, in neglecting things difficult againft their
wills, as that they are excufable .wholly in negledi-
ing things impofiible againft their wills. And
if it made no difference, whether the impofTibi-
lity were natural and againft the will, or moral,
lying in the will, with regard to excufablenefs *•
ib neither would it make any difference, whether
the difficulty, or approach to neceffity be natural
againft the will, Or moral, lying in the propenfity
<of the will.
But it is apparent, that the reverfe of thefe
.things is true. If there be an approach to a
moral neceffity in a man's exertion of good adts
of will, they being the exercife of a ftrong pro
penfity to good, and a very powerful love to
virtue ; it is ib far from being the dictate of com*
nion Senfe, that he is lefs virtuous, and the lefs
to be efteemed, loved and praifed ; that it is agre*
able to the natural Notions of all mankind, that
•he is fo much the better man, worthy of greater
rcfpect, and higher commendation. And the
jftronger the inclination is, and the nearer it ap*
preaches' , to neceffity in that refpect •, or to im*
poffibility of neglecting the virtuous adt, or of
doing a vicious one ; ftill the more virtuous, and
worthy of higher commendation. And, on the
other hand, if a man exerts evil acts of mind $
as, for inilance, adts of pride or malice from a
rooted and ftrong habit or principle of haughti-
nefs and malicioufnefs, and a violent propenfity
of heart to fnch acts ; according to the natural
Senfe of men, he is ib far from being the lefs
hateful and blameable on that account, that he is
Ib much the more worthy no be detefted and con*
demned, by all that obferve him,.
Mo-re-
Sect. IV. agr cable to common Senfei 303
Moreover, it is manifeft that it is no part of
the Notion, which mankind commonly have of a
blameable or praife-worthy act of the will, that
it is an act which is not determined by an antece
dent bias or motive, but by 'the fovereign power
of the will itfelf ; becaufe, if fo, the greater
hand fuch caufes have in determining any acts of
the will, fo much the lefs virtuous or vicious
would they be accounted •, and the lefs hand, the
more virtuous or vicious. Whereas, the reverie
is true : men do not think a good act to be the
lefs praife:worthy, for the agent's being much
determined in it by a good inclination or a good
motive, but the more. And if good inclination
or motive, has but little influence in determining
the agent, they do not think his act fo much the
more virtuous, but the lefs. And fo concerning
evil acts, 'which are determined by evil motives
or inclinations.
.'iioitojs z nsnt to rnb;j b:is
Yea, if it be fuppofed, that good or evil difpo-
fitions are implanted in the hearts of men, by
nature itfelf (which, it is certain, is vulgarly
fuppofed in innumerable cafes) yet it is not com
monly fuppofed, that men are worthy of no praife
or difpraife for fuch difpofitions ; although what
is natural, is undoubtedly necefTary, nature be
ing prior to all acts of the will whatfoever.
Thus, for inftance, if a man appears to be of a
very haughty or malicious difpoiition, and is fup
pofed to be fo by his natural temper, it is no
vulgar Notion, no dictate of the common Senfe
and apprehenfion of men, that fuch dilpofitions
are no vices or moral evils, or that fuch perfons
are not worthy of difefteem, or odium and dlf-
hono'ur ; or that the proud or malicious acts which
flow from fuch natural difpofitions, are worthy of
no rcfentment. Yea, fuch vile natural difpofitions,
and
304 Neceffary Virtue ^ &c. Part IV.
and the flrength of them, will commonly be men
tioned rather as an aggravation of the wicked
acts, that come from fuch a fountain, than an
extenuation of them. Its being natural for men
to aft thus, is often obferved by men in the
height of their indignation : they will fay, " It
" is his very nature : he is of a vile natural tem-
" per •, it is as natural to him to act fo, as it is
" to breathe ; he cannot help ferving the devil,
" &c" But it is not thus with regard to hurt
ful mifchievous things, that any are the fubjects
or occafions of, by natural neceffity, againil their
inclinations. In fuch a cafe, the neceility, by
the common voice of mankind, will be fpoken
of as a full excufe. Thus it is very plain, that
common Senfc makes a vaft "difference between
thefe two kinds of necefiity, as to the judgment
it makes of their influence on the moral quality
and defert of men's actions.
And thefe dictates of men's minds are fo na
tural and necelTary, that it may be very much
doubted whether the Arminians themfelves have
ever got rid of them ; yea, their greateft doctors,
that have gone furtheft in defence of their meta-
phyfical Notions of liberty, and have brought
their arguments to their greateit ftrength, and,
as they iuppofe, to a demonftration, againfl the
confidence of virtue and vice with any necefli
ty : it is to be queftioned, whether there is fo
much as one of them, but that, if he fuffered
very much from the injurious ads of a man,
under the power of an invincible haughtinefs and
malignancy of temper, would not, from the
forementioned natural fenfe of mind, refent it far
other wife, than if as great fufferings came upon
him from the wind that blows, and fire that
burns by natural necdfity j and othervvife than he
would,
Sec~l. IV. agr table to common Senfe. 305
would, if he fuffered as much from the conduct
of a man perfectly delirious; yea, though he
firft brought his diftradlion upon him ibme way
by his own fault.
Some feem to difdain the diftindtion that we
make between natural and moral neceffity, as though
it were altogether impertinent in this controverfy :
" that which is necefTary (fay they) is necefiary ;
^c it is that which muft be, and cannot be prc-
" vented. And that which is impoffible, is im-
" poflible, and cannot be done : and, therefore,
<c none can be to blame for not doing it." And
fuch comparifons are made ufe of, as the com
manding of a man to walk, who has loft his legs,
and condemning and punifhing him for not obey
ing ; inviting and calling upon a man, who is Ihut
up in a flrong prifon, to come forth, &c. But,
in thefe things, Armlmans are very unreafonable.
Let common Senfe determine whether there be
not a great difference between thofe two cafes ;
the one, that of a man who has offended his
Prince, and is caft into prifon ; and after he has
lain there a while, the King comes to him, calls
him to come forth to him ; and tells him, that if
lie will do fo, and will fall down before him and
humbly beg his pardon, he mail be forgiven, and
fet at liberty, and alfo be greatly enriched, and
advanced to honour: the priibner heartily re
pents of the folly and wickednefs of his offence
againft his Prince, is thoroughly difpofed to abafe
himfelf, and accept of the King's offer; but is
confined by flrong walls, with gates of brafs,
and bars of iron. The other cafe is, that of a
man who is of a very unreafonable fpirit, of a
haughty, ungrateful, wilful difpoiition ; and,
moreover, has been brought up in traiterous prin
ciples ; and has his heart pofleffed with an ex-
X treme
306 Calvinifm confident Part IV.
treme and inveterate enmity to his lawful fove-
reign ; and for his rebellion is cafi into prifon,
and lies long there, loaden with .heavy chains,
and in miferable circumflances. At length the
compafiionate Prince comes to the prifon, orders
his chains to be knocked off, and his prifon-
doors to be fet wide open •, calls to him, and tells
him, if he will come forth to him, and fall
down before him, acknowledge that he has treated
him unworthily, and aik his forgiveneis ; he
fliall be forgiven, fet at liberty, and fet in a
place of great dignity and profit in his court.
But he is flout and ftomachful, and full of
haughty malignity, that he cannot be willing to
accept the offer : his rooted flrong pride and
malice have perfedt power over him, and as it
were bind him, by binding his heart: the oppo-
fition of his heart has the maftery over him,
having an influence on his mind far fuperior to
the King's grace and condefcenfion, and to all
his kind offers and promifes. Now, is it agre-
able to common Senfe, to affert and fland to it,
that there is no difference between thefe two
cafes, as to any worthinefs of blame in the pri-
foners ; becaufe, forfooth, there is a neceffity in
both, and the required ac~l in each cafe is impof-
fible ? It is true, a man's evil difpofitions may
be as flrong and immoveable as the bars of a
caflle. But who cannot fee, that when a man,
in the latter cafe, is laid to be unable to obey the
command, the expreffion is ufed improperly, and
not in the Senfe it has originally and in common
fpeech ? and that it may properly be faid to be
in the rebel's power to come out of prifon, fee
ing he can eafily do it if he pleafes ; though by
reafon of his vile temper of heart, which is fixed
and rooted, it is impofftble that it fhould pleafe
him ?
Upon
Sect. IV. with common Senfe. 307
Upon the whole, I prefume there is no perfon
of good underftanding, who impartially confi-
ders the things which' have been obferved, but
will allow, that it is not evident, from the dictates
of the common Senfe, or natural Notions of man
kind, that moral neceffity is inconfiftent with
Praife and Blame. And, therefore, if the Armi-
mans would prove any fuch inconfiilency, it mud
be by fome philofophical and. metaphyfical argu
ments, and not common Senle.
There is a grand illufion in the pretended de-
mpnllration of Arminiam from common Senfe.
The main ftrength of all thefe demonftrations
lies in that prejudice, that arlfes through the infen-
fible change of the ufe and meaning of fuch terms
as liberty , able^ . unable, neceffary, impqffible, un-
avoidable^ invincible, aftion, &c. from their ori
ginal and vulgar Senfe, to a metaphyfical Senfe,
entirely diyerfe ; and the ftrong connection of the
ideas of BlamelefTnefs, &c. with fome of thefe
terms, by an habit contracted and eftablifhed,
>vhile thefe terms were ufed in their firtf mean
ing. This prejudice and delufion, is the founda
tion of all thofe pofitions, they lay down as max
ims, by which mofl of the Scriptures, which they
alledge in this controverfy, arc interpreted, and
on which all their pompous demonftrations from
Scripture and reafon depend. From this lecret
delufion and prejudice they have almoft all their
advantages : it is the ftrength of their bulwarks,
and the edge of their weapons. And this is the
main ground of all the right they have to treat
their neighbours in fo arTuming a manner, and
to infult others, perhaps as wife and good as
themfelves, as weak bigots, men that dwell in the
dark caves of fuperftition^ perverfely fet, objlinately
Jhutting their eyes againft the noon-day light, ene-
X 2 mm
308 Calvinifm conjiftent, &c. Part IV.
mies to common Senfe, maintaining the frft-lorn of
absurdities, &c. &c. But perhaps an impartial
confideration of the things, which have been ob-
ferved in the preceding parts of this enquiry,
may enable the lovers of truth better to judge,
whofe doctrine is indeed alfurd, abjlrufe, felf-con-
tradiftory> and inconfiftent with common Senfe,
and many ways repugnant to the univerfal dic
tates of the reafon of mankind.
CoroL From things which have been obferved,
it will follow, that it is agreable to common Senfe
to fuppofe, that the glorified faints have not
their freedom at all diminifhed, in any refpect ;
and that God Himfelf has the higheft poflible
freedom, according to the true and proper mean
ing of the term ; and that he is, in the higheft
poflible refpect, an agent, and active in the exer-
cife of his infinite holinefs ; though he acts there
in, in the higheft degree, neceffarily : and his ac
tions of this kind are in the higheft, moft abfo-
lutely perfect manner virtuous and praife- worthy ;
and are fo, for that very reafoq, becaule they are
moft perfectly neceflary.
SECTION
Sect. V. Endeavours not rendered, &c^ 309
SECTION V.
Concerning thofe Obje&ions, that tins Scheme of
Neceffity renders all Means and Endeavours
for the avoiding of Sin, or the obtaining Virtue
and Holinefs, vain, and to no Purpofe; and
that it makes Men no more than meer Machines
in Affairs of Morality and Religion.
RMINIANS fay, if it be fo, that fin and
virtue come to pafs by a neceffity con-
filling in a fure connection of caufes and
effects, antecedents and consequents, it can never
be worth the while to ufe any Means or Endea
vours to obtain the one, and avoid the other 5
feeing no endeavours can alter the futurity of the
event, which is become neceflary by a connec
tion already eftablifhed.
But I defire, that this matter may be fully con-
fidered ; and that it may be examined with a
thorough ftrictnefs, whether it will follow that
Endeavours and Means, in order to avoid or ob*
tain any future thing, muft be more in vain, on
the fuppofition of luch a connection of antece--
dents and confequents, than if the contrary be
fuppofed.
For Endeavours to be in vain, is for them not
to be fuccefsf ul ; that is to fay, for them not even
tually to be the Means of the thing aimed at,
which cannot be, but in one of thefe two ways ;
either fir ft, that although the Means are uled,
yet the event aimed at does not follow : or, fe-
X 3
£iO Endeavours not rendered vain, Part IV.
condly9 If the event does follow, it is not becaufe
of the Means, or from any connection or depen
dence of the event on the Mpans, the event would
have come to pafs, as well without the Means, as
with them. If either of thefe two things are the
cafe, then the Means are not properly fuccefsful,
and are truly in vain. The fuccefsfulnefs or un-
fuccefsfulnefs of Means, in order to an effect, 'or
their being in vain or not in vain, con (ids in
thofe Means being conne&ed, or not connected,
with the effect, in fuch a manner as this, viz.
That the effect is with the Means, and not with
out them ; or, that the being 'of the effect is, on
the one hand, connected with Means, and the
•want of the effect, on the other hand, is con
nected with the want of the Means. If there be
fuch a 'connection as this between Means and
end, the Means are not in vain : the more there
is of fuch 'a connection, the further they are from
being in vain ; and the lefs of fuch a connection,
the more they are in vain,
Now, therefore, the queflion to be anfwered, (in
order to determine, whether it follows from this
doctrine of the neceffary connection between fore
going things, and confequent ones, that Means
ufed in order to any effect, are more in vain than
they would be otherwife) is, whether it follows
from it, that there is lefs of the forementioned
connection between Means and effect ; that is,
whether, on the fuppofition of there being a real
and true connection between antecedent things
and confequent ones, there mufl be lefs of 4
connection between Means and effect, than ori
the fuppofition of there being no fixed connec
tion, between antecedent things and confequent
ones : and the very ftating of this queflion is
fufficient to anfwer it. It muft appear to every
one
Sect. V. ly Calviniftic Principles. 3 1 x
one that will open his eyes, that this queition
cannot be affirmed, without the groffeft abfurdity
and inconfiftence. Means are foregoing things,
and effects are following things : And if there
were no connection between foregoing things and
following ones, there could be no connection be
tween Means and end ; and fo all Means would
be wholly vain and fruitlefs. For it is by virtue
of fome connection only, that they become fuc-
cefsful : It is fome connection obferved, or re
vealed, or otherwife known, between antecedent
things and following ones, that is what directs
in the choice of Means. And if there were no
fuch thing as an eftablifhed connection, there
could be no choice, as to Means ; one thing
would have no more tendency to an effect, than
another 5 there would be no fuch thing as ten
dency in the cafe. All thofe things, which are
fuccefsful Means of other things, do therein
prove connected antecedents of them : and
therefore to affert, that a fixed connection be
tween antecedents and confeqnents makes Means
vain and ufelefs, or (lands in the way to hinder
the connection between Means and end, is jufl
fo ridiculous, as to fay, that a connection between
antecedents and confequents ftands in the way
to hinder a connection between antecedents and
confequents.
Nor can any fnppofed connection of the fuc-
ceflion or train of antecedents and confequents,
from the very beginning of all things, the con
nection being made already fure and neceffary, ei
ther by eftablifhed laws of nature, or by thefe
together with a decree of fovereign immediate
interpofitions of divine power, on fuch and fuch
occafions, or any other way (if any other there
be 5) I fay, no fnch neceflary connection of a fe-
X 4 lies
312 Means and Endeavours made vain, Part IV.
ries of antecedents and confequcnts can in the
leaft tend to hinder, but that the Means we uie
may belong to the feries ^ and fo may be fome of
thofe antecedents which are connected with the
confequents we aim at, in the eftablifhed courfe
of things. Endeavours 'which we ufe, are
things that exifl •, and, therefore, they belong to
the general chain of events ; all the parts of
which chain are fuppofed to be connected : and
fo Endeavours are fuppofed to be connected with
fome effects, or fome confequent things or other.
And certainly this does not hinder but that the
events they are connected with, may be thofe
which we aim at, and which we chufe, becaufe
we judge them moft likely to have a connection
with thofe events, from the eftablifhed order and
courfe of things which we obferve, or from fome-
thing in divine Revelation.
Let us fuppofe a real and fure connection be
tween a man's having his eyes open in the clear
clay-light, with good organs of fight, and fee
ing ^ ib that feeing is connected with his opening
his eyes, and not feeing with his not o'pening
his eyes -, and alfo the like connection between
fuch a man's attempting to open his eyes, and
his actually doing it : the fuppofed eftablifhed
connedlion between thefe antecedents and confe
quents, let the connection be never fo fure and
neceffary, certainly does not prove that it is in
vain, for a man in fuch circumftances, to attempt
to open his eyes, in order to feeing : his aiming at
that event, and the ufe of the Means, being the
effect of his will, does not break the connection^,
or hinder the fuccefs.
So that the objection we are upon does not lie
againft the doctrine of the neceffity of events
by a certainty of connection and confequence ;
On
Se6b. V. fy tie Arminian Scheme. 313
On the contrary, it is truly forcible againft the
Arminian doctrine of contingence and ielf -deter
mination ; which is inconfiilent with fuch a con
nection. If there be no connection between thofe
events, wherein virtue and vice confift, and any
thing antecedent •, then there is no connection
between thefe events and any Means or Endea
vours ufed in order to them : and if fo, then
thofe means muft be in vain. The lefs there is
of connection between foregoing things and fol
lowing ones, fo much the lefs there is between
Means and end, Endeavours and fuccefs ; and in
the fame proportion are Means and Endeavours
ineffectual and in vain.
It will follow7 from Arminian principles, that
there is no degree of connection between virtue
or vice, and any foregoing event or thing : or,
in other words, that the determination of the
exiflence of virtue or vice do not in the lead de
pend on the influence of any thing that comes
to pafs antecedently, from which the determina
tion of its exigence is, as its caufe, Means, or
ground •, becaufe, fo far as it is fo, it is not from
felf-determi nation : and, therefore, fo far there is
nothing of the nature of virtue or vice. And fo
it follows, that virtue and vice are not at all, in
any degree, dependent upon, or connected with,
any foregoing event or exiitence, as its caufe,
ground, or Means. And if fo, then all foregoing
muft be totally in vain,
Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any
confidence with the drminian fcheme, be any
reafonable ground of fo much as a conjecture
concerning the confequcnce of any Means and
Endeavours, in order to efcaping vice or obtain
ing virtue, or any choice or preference of Means,
I as
314 Calvinifm does not encourage Sloth. Part IV,
as having a greater probability of fuccefs by fome
than others ; either from any natural connection
or dependence of the end on the Means, or
through any divine conftitution, or revealed way
of God's beftowing or bringing to pafs thefe
things, in confcqnence of any Means, Endea
vours, Prayers or Deeds. Conjectures, in this
latter cafe, depend on a fuppofition, that God
himfelf is the Giver, or determining Caufe of the
events fought : but if they depend on felf-deter-
mination, then God is not the determining or
difpofing Author of them : and if thefe things
are not of his difpofal, then no conjecture can
be&made, from any revelation he has given, con
cerning any way or method of his difpofal of
them.
Yea, on thefe principles, it will not only fol
low, that men cannot have any reafonable ground
of judgment or conjecture, that their Means and
Endeavours to obtain virtue or avoid vice, will
be fuccefsful, but they may be fure, they will not ;
they may be certain, that they will be in vain ;
and that if ever the thing, which they feek, comes
to pafs, it will not be at all owing to the Means
they ufe. For Means and Endeavours can have
lio effect at all, in order to obtain the end, but
in one of thefe two ways : either, (i.) Through a
natural tendency and influence, to prepare and
difpofe the mind more to virtuous acts, either
by caufing the difpofition of the heart to be more
in favour of fuch aCts, or by bringing the mind
more into the view of powerful motive's and in
ducements : or, (2.) By putting perfons more
in the way of God's beftowment of the benefit.
But neither of thefe can be the cafe* Not the
latter ; for, as has been juit now obferved, it does
pot confift with the Armnian notion of felf-deter-
mination..
Sect. V. Calvinifm does not encourage Sloth. 315
mination, which they fuppofe eflential to virtue,
that God fhould be the Beftower, or (which is
the fame thing) the determining, difpofing Au
thor of Virtue. Not the former , for natural in
fluence and tendency fuppofes caufality and con
nection •, and fuppofes neceffity of event, which
is inconfiftent with' Armiman liberty. A ten
dency of Means, by biailing the heart in favour
of virtue, or by bringing the will under the in-
fiuence and power of motives in its determi
nations, are both inconfiftent with Arminlan li
berty of will, confiding in indifference, and fove-
reign felf-determination, as has been largely de-
monftrated.
But for the more full removal of this prejudice
againft the doctrine of neceffity, which has been
maintained, as though it tended to encourage a
total neglect of all Endeavours as vain ; the fol-
Jowing things may be coniidered.
The queftion is not, Whether men may not
thus improve this doctrine : we know that many
true and wholefome doctrines are abufed : but,
whether the doctrine gives any juft occafion for
fuch an improvement ; or whether, on the fup-
pbfition of the truth of the doctrine, fuch a ufe
of it would not be unreafonable ? If any fhall
affirm, that it wrould not, but that the very na
ture of the doctrine is fuch as gives juft occafion
for it, it muft be on this fuppofition •, namely,
that fuch an invariable neceffity of all things al
ready fettled, muft render the interpofition of
all Means, Endeavours, Conclufions or Actions
of ours, in order to the obtaining any future
end whatfoever, perfectly infignificant ; becaufe
they cannot in the lead alter or vary the courfe
and feries of things, in any event or circumftance;
3 1 6 Calvinifm dees not encourage Sloth. Part IV.
all being already fixed unalterably by necefilty :
and that therefore it is folly, for men to ufe
any Means for any end •, but their wifdom, to fave
themfelves the trouble of Endeavours, and take
their eafe. No perfon can draw fuch an inference
from this do&rine, and come to fuch a conclu-
fion, without contradicting himfelf, and going
counter to the very principles he pretends to act
upon : for he comes to a conclufion, and takes
a courfe, in order to an end^ even his eafe, or the
laving himfelf from trouble ; he feeks fomething
future, and ufes Means in order to a future thing,
even in his drawing up that conclufion, that he
will feek nothing, and ufe no Means in order to
any thing in future •, he feeks his future eafe, and
the benefit and comfort of indolence. If prior
necefiity, that determines all things, makes vain
all actions or conclufions of ours, in order to any
thing future-, then it makes vain all conclufions
and conduct of ours, in order to our future eafe.
The meafure of our eafe, with the time, man
ner and every circumftance of it, is already fixed,
by all-determining necefilty, as much as any
thing elfe. If he fays within himfelf, " What
'< future happinefs or mifery I mall have, is al-
" ready, in effect, determined by the necefiary
^ courfe and connection of things -9 therefore, I
" will fave myfelf the trouble of labour and
ic diligence, which cannot add to my determined
" degree of happinefs, or diminifh my mifery ;
" but will take my eaie, and will enjoy the com-
cc fort of fioth and negligence. " Such a man
contradicts himfelf: he fays, the meafure of his
future happinefs and mifery is already fixed, and
he will not try to diminifh the one, nor add to the
other : but yet, in his very conclufion, he con
tradicts this ; for, he takes up this conclufion, to
add to his future hapfinefs^ by the eafe and com
fort
Seft.V. Calvihifm does not make Men Machines. 317
fort of his negligence •, and to diminiih his future
trouble and mifery, by faving himielf the trouble
of ufmg Means and taking Pains.
Therefore perfons cannot reafonably make this
improvement of the doctrine of neceffity, that
they will go into a voluntary negligence of Means
for their own happinefs. For the principles they
muft go upon, in order to this, are inconfiftent
with their making any improvement at all of the
do&rine : for to make feme improvement of it,
is to be influenced by it, to come to fome volun
tary concluiion, in regard to their own conduct,
with fome view or aim : but this, as has been
ihown, is inconfiftent with the principles they
pretend to act upon. In fhort, the principles are
fuch as cannot be acted upon at all, or, in any
refpect, confiftently. And, therefore, in every
pretence of acting upon them, or making any
improvement at all of them, there is a felf-con-
tradiction.
As to that Objection againft the doctrine, which
I have endeavoured to prove, that it makes men
no more than meer Machines •, I would fay, that
notwithstanding this doctrine, Man is entirely,
perfectly and unfpeakably different from a meer
Machine, in that he has reafon and underitand-
ing, and has a faculty of will, and is fo capable
of volition and choice; and in that, his will is
guided by the dictates or vie\vs of his under-
Handing j and in that his external actions and be
haviour, and, in many reipects, alfo his thoughts,
and the exercifes of his mind, are fubject to his
will ; fo that he has liberty to act according to
his choice, and do what he pleafes •, and by Means
of thefe things, is capable of moral habits and
moral acts, fuch inclinations and actions as, ac
cording
* 1 3 Calvinifm does not make Men Machines. P. IV;
*J
cording to the common fenfe of mankind, are
worthy of praife, efteem, love and reward ; or,
on the contrary, of difefleem> deteflation, indig
nation and punimment.
In thefe things is all the difference from meer
Machines, as to liberty and agency, that would
be any perfection, dignity or privilege, in any
refpect : all the difference that can be defired,
and all that can be conceived of ; and indeed all
that the pretenfions of the Armimans themfelves
come to, as they are forced often to explain them
felves. (Though their explications overthrow
and abolilh the things afferted, and pretended to
be explained) For they are forced to explain a
felf-determining power of will, by a power in
the foul, to determine as it chufes or wills ; which
comes to no more than this, that a man has a
power of chufing, and, in many inftances, can
do as he chufes. Which is quite a different thing
from that contradiction, his having power of ehu-
his firfl act of choice in the cafe.
Or, if their fcheme makes any other difference
than this, between Men and Machines, it is for
the worfe : it is fo far from fuppofing Men to
have a dignity and privilege above Machines^
that it makes the manner of their being deter
mined flill more unhappy. Whereas, Machines
are guided by an underitanding caufe, by the
fkilful hand of the workman or owner ; the will
of Man is left to the guidance of nothing, but
abfolute blind contingence.
SECTION
SECTION VI.
Concerning that Objedtion againft the Doctrine
which has been maintained, that it agrees with
the Stoical Dottrine of Fate, and the Opinions of
Mr. Hobbes.
WHEN Calvini/ls oppofe the Arminian
notion of the freedom of will, and con-
tingence of volition, and infift that there arc no
ads of the will, nor any other events whatfo-
ever, but what are attended with feme kind of
neceflity ; their oppofers cry out of them, as
agreeing with the antient Stoicks in their dodtrine
of Fate, and with Mr. Hobbes in his opinion of
Necejfity.
It would not be worth while to take notice of
fo impertinent an Objection, had it not been urged
by fome of the chief Arminian writers. — There
were many important truths maintained by the
antient Greek and Roman philofophers, and efpeci-
ally the Stoicks, that are never the worfe for being
held by them. The Stoic philofophers, by the ge
neral agreement of Chriftian divines, and even Ar-
minian divines, were the greateft, wifcft, and moll
virtuous of all the heathen philcfophers ; and, in
their doctrine and practice, came the neareft to
Chriilianity of any of their fects. How frequently
are the fayings of thefe philofophers, in many of
the writings and fermons, even t&Armiriian divines,
produced, not as arguments of the falfcnefs of the
doctrines which they delivered, but as a confir
mation of fome of the greateft truths of the
Chriftian Religion, relating to the Unity and Per
fections
320 Qftfa Stoical Fate. Part IV.
fediions of the Godhead, a future ftate, the duty
and happinefs of mankind, &c. as obferving how
the light of nature and reafon, in the wifefb and
bed of the Heathen, harmonized with, and con
firms the Goipel of Jefus Chrift.
And it is very remarkable, concerning Dr.
Whltby, that although he alledges the agreement
of the Stolcks with us, wherein he fuppofes they
maintained the like doctrine with us, as an argu
ment againfl the truth of our doctrine , yet, this
very Dr. Whitby alledges the agreement of the
Stoicks with the Arminians, wherein he fuppofes
they taught the fame doctrine with them, as an
argument for the truth of their doctrine.* So that,
when the Stoicks agree with them, this (it feems)
is a confirmation of their doctrine, and a confu
tation of ours, as fhewing that our opinions arc
contrary to the natural fenfe and common reafon
of mankind : neverthelefs, when the Stoicks agree
with us, it argues no ' fuch thing in our favour ;
but, on the contrary, is a great argument againfl
us, -and mews our doctrine to be heatheniih.
It is obfervcd by fome Calvimflic writers, that
the Arminlans fymbolize with the Stoicks, in fome
of thofe doctrines wherein they are oppofed by
the Cafainlfts ; particularly in their denying an
original, innate, total corruption and depravity
of heart \ and in what they held of man's ability
to make himfelf truly virtuous and conformed to
God ;— and in forne other doctrines.
It may be further obferved, it is certainly no
better Objection againil our doctrine, that it
agrees, in fome refpects, with the doctrine of the
antient
* Wlitly on the five Points, Edit. 3^ p. 325, 326, 327.
Se<5l VI. Of tie Stoical Fate 321
antient Stoic philofophers, than it is againft theirs,
wherein they differ from us, that it agrees, in fome
refpedbs, with the opinion of the very worft of the
heathen philofophers, the followers of Epicurus^
that father of atheifm and licentioufnefs, and with
the doctrine of the Sadducees and Jefuits.
I am not much concerned to know precifely,
what the antient Stoic philofophers held concern
ing Fate^ in order to determine what is truth ; as
though it were a fure way to be in the right, to
take good heed to differ from them. It Teems,
that they differed among themfelves ; and pro
bably the doctrine of Fate^ as maintained by molt
of them, was, in fome refpects, erroneous. But
whatever their doctrine was, if any of them held
fuch a Fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, confiit-
ing in our doing as we pleafe, I utterly deny fuch
fc Fate. If they held any fuch Fate, as is not con-
fiftent with the common and univerfal notions that
mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency,
virtue and vice ; I difclaim any fuch thing, and
think I have demonflrated, that the fcheme I
maintain is no fuch fcheme. If the Stoicksy by
Fate, meant any thing of fuch a nature, as can
be fuppofed to ftand in the way of the advantage
and benefit of the ufe of means and endeavours,
or make it lefs worth the while for men to de-
fire, and feek after any thing wherein their vir
tue and happinefs confifts ; I hold no doctrine
that is clogged with any fuch inconvenience, any
more than any other fcheme whatsoever ; and by
no means fo much as the Armmian fcheme of
contingence ; as has been fhewn. If they held
any fuch doctrine of univerfal fatality, as is in-
confident with any kind of liberty, that is or
can be any perfection, dignity, privilege or be
nefit, or any thing defirable, in any refpect, fcr
Y any
32* Of Hobbiaical Neceffity. Part IV.
any intelligent creature, or indeed with any li
berty that is pofiible or conceivable-, I embrace
no fuch doctrine. If they held any fuch doctrine
of Fate, as is inconfiilent with the world's being
in all things fubject to the difpofal of an intelli
gent wife agent, that prefide's, not as the. foul of
the world, but as the Sovereign Lord of the Uni-
verfe, governing all things by proper will,
choice and deiign, in the exercife of the moil
perfect .liberty conceivable, without fubjedtion
to any conftraint, or being properly under the
powder or influence of any thing before, above or
without himfelf; I wholly renounce any fuch
doctrine.
As to Mr. Hollies' s maintaining the fame doc
trine concerning neceffity •, — I confcfs, it happens
I never read Mr. Ho.bbes. Let his opinion be
what it will, we need not reject all truth which
is demonftrated by clear evidence, meerly. becaufe
it was once held by fome.bad man. This great
truth, that Jefus is the Son of God, was not fpoiled
becaufe it \vas once and again proclaimed with a
loud voice by the devil. If truth is fo defiled,
becaufe it is fpoken by the mouth, or written by
the pen of Ibme ill-minded mifchievous man, that
it muft never be received, we mail never know,
when we hold any of the moil precious and evi
dent truths by a fure tenure.. And if Mr. Hobbes.
has made, a bad ufe of this truth, that is to be
lamented-, but the truth is, not tp be thought
worthy of rejeftion on that account. It is com
mon for the corruptions of the hearts of evil
men to abufe the bed things t,o vile'purpofes. on
I might alfo ta.ke notice of its having been ob-<
ferved, that the Arminians agree with Mr. Hobbes
*in many more things than the Cdvimjls. As,
* Dr. Gi7/,l n his Answer to Dr. Wbitby. Vol. HL
" c.
in
SeA. VII. Concerning tJoe NecefTity, &c. 323
in what he is faid to hold concerning original fin,
in denying the neceffity of fupernatural illumi
nation, in denying- infuled grace, in denying the
doctrine of j unification by faith alone 5 and other
things.
SECTION VII.
Concerning the Neceffity of the Divine Will.
SOME may poffibly, object againfl what has
been fuppofed of the abfurdity and inconfi-
ilence of a felt- determining power in the will, and
the impoffibility of its being otherwife, than that
the will ilionld be determined in every cafe by
feme motive, and by a motive which (as it Hands
in the view of the underftanding" is of fuperior
ftrength to any appearing on the other fide;
that if thefe things are true, it will follow, that
not only the will of created minds, but the will
of God 'Himfelf is neceflary in all its determina
tions. Concerning which, fays the Author of the
Eflay on the Freedom of Will in God and in the Crea
ture (pag. 85, 86.) " What ftrange doctrine is
" this, contrary to all our ideas of the dominion
" of God ? does it not deftroy the glory of his
" liberty of choice, and take away from the
" Creator and Governor and Benefactor of the
" world, that molt free and Sovereign Agent, all
<c the glory of this fort of freedom ? does it
" not feem to make him a kind of mechanical
" medium of fate, and "introduce Mn HMes's
" doctrine cf fatality and NecdTity, into all
" things' that God hath to do with ? Does 'it not
" feem to reprefent ' the" blelfed' God, as a Being
" of Vaft- urrd&rllindimg, as well 'a* power and
tfc effitiency, but Hill to leave him without a
Y 2 " will
324 Concerning tie Necefllty Pat t IV.
" will to chufe among all the objects within his
" view ? In Ihort, it Teems to make the blefTed
*6 God a fort of Almighty Minilter of Fate, un-
" der its univerfal and fupremc influence ; as it
<c was the profeffed fentiment of fbme of the
** antients, that Fate was above the gods."
This is declaiming, rather than arguing ; and
an application to men's imaginations and preju
dices, rather than to meer icafon.— - But I would
calmly endeavour to confider, whether there be
any reafon in this frightful reprefentation. — But,
beifore I enter upon a particular confideration of
the matter, I would obferve this : that it is rea-
fonable to fuppofe, it mould be much more diffi
cult to exprefs or conceive things according to
exact metaphyfical truth, relating to the nature
and manner of the exiftence of things in the Di
vine Underflanding and Will, and the operation
of thefe faculties (if I may fo call them) of the
Divine Mind, than in the human mind j which is
infinitely more within our view, and nearer to a
proportion to the meafure of our comprehenfion,
and more commenfurate to the ufe and import of
human fpeech. Language is indeed very deficient,
in regard of terms to exprefs precife truth con
cerning our own minds, and their faculties and
operations. Words were firft formed to cxprds
external things ; and thole that are applied to
exprefs things internal and fpiritual, are almoii
all borrowed, and ufed in a fort of figurative
fenfe. Whence they are, mod of them, attended
with a great deal of ambiguity and .unfixednefs
in their fignification, occasioning innumerable
doubts, difficulties and confufions, in enquiries
and controverfies, about things of this nature.
But language is much kfs adapted to exprefs
things
Seft. VII. of tie Divine Volition* 325
things in the mind of the incomprehensible Deity,
preciiely as they are.
We find a great deal of difficulty in conceiving
exactly of the nature of our own fouls. And
notwithftanding all the progrefs, which has been
made, in pail and prefent ages, in this kind of
knowledge, whereby our metaphy Ticks, as it re
lates to thefe things, is brought to greater per
fection than once it was •, yet, here is ftill work
enough left for future enquiries and refearches,
and room for progrefs ftill to be made, for many
ages and generations. But we had need to be
infinitely able metaphyficians, to conceive with
clearnefs, according to ftrict, proper and perfect
truth, concerning the nature of the Divine Ef-
fence, and the modes of the action and operation
of the powers of the Divine Mind.
And it may be noted particularly, that though
we are obliged to conceive of fome things in God
as confequent and dependent on others, and of
fome things pertaining to the Divine Nature and
Will as the foundation of others, and fo before
others in the order of nature : as, we muft con
ceive of the knowledge and holinefs of God as
prior, in the order of nature, to his happinefs ;
the perfection of his underflanding, as the foun
dation of his wife purpofes and decrees ; the ho
linefs of his nature, as the caufe and reafon of
his holy determinations. And yet, when we fpeak
of caufe and effect, antecedent and confequent,
fundamental and dependent, determining and de
termined, in the firft Being, who is felf-exiftent,
independent, of perfect and abfolute (implicit/
and immutability, and the firfl caufe of all things;
doubtlefs there mult be lefs propriety in fuch re-
prefentations, than when we fpeak of derived de-
Y 3 pendent
326 Necejfity of aSling mnft wifely, Part IV.
pendent beings, who are compounded, and liable
to perpetual mutation and facceffion.
Having premifed this, I proceed to obferve con
cerning the forementioned Author's exclamation,
about the necejary Determination of God's Will, in
all things, by what he fees to beftteft and be ft.
That all the Teeming force of fuch objections
and exclamations mud arife from an imagination,
that there is fome fort of privilege or dignity in
being without fuch a moral Nfceffity, as will
make it impoflible to do any other, than always
chufe what is wileft and bell ; as though there
were fomedifad vantage, meannefs and tubjedtion,
in fuch a Necefilty ; a thing by which tfoe will
-was confined, kept under, and held in fervitude
by fomething, which, as it were, maintained a
fironor and invincible power and dominion over it,
by boiids that, held him fa ft, and that he could:, by
no means, deliver himfelf from. Whereas, this
mnft be all meer imagination and delufiori. It is
no difadvanta'ge or diihonour to a being, neceifa-
riiy to aft in the moft excellent and happy man
ner, from the necefFary perfection of his own na
ture. This argues no im perfection, inferiority or
dependance, nor any want of dignity, privilege
or afcendency. * It is not inconfiftent with the
abfolute
* ". It might have been objected, with more plaufible-
" nefs, that the Supreme Caufe cannot be free, becaufe he murt
needs do always what is belc in the whole. But this would
not at all ferve Spinoza s purpofe ; for this is a Neceffity,
not of nature and of fate, but of fitnefs and wifdom ; a Ne-
ceiTity confiilent with the greateil freedom, and moft per-
fedi: choice. For the only foundation of this Neceffity is
fuch an unalterable reftitude of will, and perfeftion of
wiidom, as makes it impoiTible for a wife being to aft fool-
ifhly." Clark's Demonltration o( the Being and Attri
butes of God. Edit. 6'. p. 64.
«< Though
Sect. VII. agreablito moft perfeft Liberty. 327
abfolute and moft perfect fovereignry of God-
The fovereignty of God is his ability and au
thority to do whatever -pleafes him ; whereby He
doth according to bis will in the armies of heaven,
and amongft the inhabitants of the eartb> and none
can ft ay his hand, or fay unto him, what doft tkou ? —
The following things belong to the fovereignty of
God; viz. (i.) Supreme, Univerfal, and Infinite
fower ; whereby he is able to do what he pleafes,
without controul, without any confinement of
that power, without any fubjection, in the leaft
meafure, to any other power ; and fo without any
iiinderance or reilraint, that it fhould be either
impoflible, or at all difficult, for him to accom-
plifh his Will ; and without any dependence of
his power on any other power, .from whence it
fhould be derived, or which it ihould Hand in any
need of: fo far from this, that all other power
is derived from him, and. is abfolutely dependent
on him. (2.) That He has fupreme authority ;
Y 4 abfolute
" Though God is a moft perfect free Agent, yet he cannot
rt but. do always' what is bcft and wifeft in the whole. The
" reafon is evident; becaufe perfect wifdom and goodnefs
" are as ftendy and certain principles of aftion, as Necefiity
:«* itfelf ; and an infinitely wife and good Being, indued with
*- the moft perfect liberty, can no more chufe to adl in con-
4« tradition to wifdom and goodnefs, than a neceflary agent
*f can aft contrary to the Neceffity by which it is acted; it
*' :being as great an abfurdity and impoflibility in choice, for
" Infinite Wifdom to chufe to ad unwifely, or Infinite Good-
«' nefs to chufe what is not good, as it would be in nature,
•** for abfoiute Necefiity to fail of producing its necefTary
" efFeft. There was, indeed, no Neceffity in nature, that God
*' fnould at firil create fuch beings as he has created, or indeed
" any being at all ; becaufe he is, in Himfelf, infinitely happy
** and all-fufficient. There was, alfo, no NeceiTity in nature,
" that he fliould preferve and continue things in being, after
** they were created ; becaufe he would be felf-fufficient with-
•*' out their continuance, as he was before their creation,
** But it was fit and wife and good, that Infinite Wifdom fhould
"manifeft
328 Necefflty of afting moft wifely. Part IV.
abiblute and moft perfedl right to do what he
xvills, without fubjedion to any fuperior autho
rity, or any derivation of authority from any
other, or limitation by any diftindt independent
authority, either fuperior, equal, or inferior ;
he being the head of all' dominion, and foun
tain of all authority ; and alfo without reftraint
by any obligation, implying either fubje&ion,
derivation, "or dependence, or proper limitation.
(3.) That his Will is fbpreme, underived, and
independent on any thing without Himfelf ; be
ing in every thing determined by his own coun-
fcl, having no other rule but his own wifdom ;
his will not being fubjeift to, or restrained by the
will of any other, and other wills being perfe&ly
fubje6t to his. (4.) That his Wifdom^ which
determines his will, is fupreme, perfed, unde
rived, felf-fufficient and independent ; fo that it
may be faid, as in Ifai. xl. 14. With whom took He
counfd ? And who inftrufted Him and taught Him in
the
manifeft, and Infinite Goodnefs communicate itfelf ; and
therefore it was neceffary, in the fenfe of Neceffity I am
now fpeaking of, that things mould be made atj'ucb a time,,
and continuedyc long, and indeed with various perfections
in fuch degrees, as Infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs faw it;
wifeft and bell that they mould." Ibid. p. 1 12, 113.
«' 'Tis not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to de-
" fire, will and act, according to the laft refult of a fair ex-
" animation.— This is fo far from being a reftraint or di-
•* minution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and
" benefit of it: 'tis not an abridgment, 'tis the end and
" ufe cf our liberty ; and the further we are removed from
** fuch a determination, the nearer we are to mifery and fla-
** very. A perfect indifference in the mind, not determin-
" able by its laft judgment, of the good or evil that is thought
'* to attend its choice, would be fo far from being an advan-
*' tage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it
'* would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifFe-
" rency to act, or not to act, till determined by the will,
" would be an imperfection on the other fide. 'Tis as
" much
Sect. VII. agreable to moft perfett Liberty. 329
the patio of judgment, and taught Him knowledge^
andjhewed him the way of under/facing ? — There
is no other Divine Sovereignty but this : and this
is properly abfdute fovereignty : no other is deli-
rable ; nor would any other be honourable, or
happy : and indeed, there is no other conceivable
or pofiible. It is the glory and greatnefs of the
Divine Sovereign, that God's Will is determined
by his own infinite all-fufEcient wifdom in every
thing ; and in nothing at all is either directed by
any inferior wifdom, or by no wifdom ; where
by it would become fenfelefs arbitrarinefs, deter
mining and acting without reafon, defign or
end.
If God's Will is fteadily and furely determined
in every thing by fupreme wifdom, then it is in
every thing necerTarily determined to that which
is moft wife. And, certainly, it would be a dif-
ad vantage and indignity, to be othcrwife. For if
the
*' much a perfection, that defire or the power of preferring
** mould be determined by good, as that the power of acting
" mould be determined by the will: and the certainer fuch
** determination is, the greater the perfection. Nay, were
" we determined by any thing but the laft refult of our own
*' minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were
'* not free. This very end of our freedom being, thac we
" might attain the good we chufe ; and, therefore, every man
" is brought under a Neceffity by his conilitution, as an in-
*' telligent being, to be determined in willing by his own
" thought and judgment, what is belt for him to do ; elfe
'* he would be under the determination of fome other than
" himfelf, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a
'* man's will, in every determination, follows his own judg-
" ment, is to fay, that a man wills and ads for an end that
*' he would not have, at the fame time that he wills and ac~t$
4f for it. For if he prefers it in his prefent thoughts, be-
*' fore any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and
" would have it before any other ; unlefs he can have, and
"not have it; will, and not will it, .at the fame time; a
41 con-
'Neceff-ly of aSing mofl wifely. Part IV.
the Divine Will was not neceffarily determined to
that, which in every cafe is wifefl and beft, it
niutf be fubjedb' to fome degree of undefigning
c'ontingence ; and fo in the fame degree liable to
evil. To fuppofe the Divine Will liable to be
carried hither and thither at random, by the un
certain wind of blind contingence,. which is
guided by no wifdom, no motive, no intelli
gent dictate wlvatfover, (if any fuch thing
were poflibte) would certainly argue a great de
gree of imperfection and meannefs, infinitely un
worthy of the Deity. — If it be a difadvantage,
for the Divine Will to be attended with this mo
ral NecefFity, then the more tree from it, and the
more
•J"J»! ! .' ..' I'' '. t?fJ !t?i»J« . .' i \ >
** coTitridiaioirtoo mimifeft to be admitted—If we look up-
** on: thofe fuperior beings above us, who enjoy perfeft hap-
«« pinefs, we fnall have reafon to judge, that they are more
" ileadily determined in their choice cf good than we ; and
*'• yet we have no- reafo'w to think they are iefs happy, or lefs
"• free, than we are. And if it were fit for fuch poor finite
«'• creatures as we are, to pronounce what Infinite Wrfitoni
"• and Goodnefs could do, I think we might (ay, that God
" himfelf cannot chufc-^iit is not good. Thejreedomofthl
•' Almivbty hinders M his bein* determined by Mat *?*W""
tt But to ffive a right view of this miftaken part of hoertyr
& let me aik, Would any one be a changeling, became he is
'f Iefs determined by. wife determination, than a wue man ?
*< Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty to play
" the fool, and draw fhame and mifery upon a man's ielf
-' If to break loofe from the con<I«a of reafon, and to want
« tilat reftraint of examination and judgment, that keeps us
" from doinr* or chufmg the worfe, be liberty, true liberty,
" mad men and fools are the only free men. Yet, I thin*,
« no body would' chufe to be mad, for the fase of fuch h-
»« berty, "but he that is mad already. Lt>ck* Hum. Lnd,
- Vol.' I. Edit. 7. p. 215, 2 r 6. ^1*4- •
" This Bein?, having all things always neceffarily in view,
•i- mull alwavs/and eternally will, according to bis infinite
i« roinprehenfion of things; that is, niuit will all things
- rhat are wifV-il and beiV to be done. There is not getting
f tWs confrquence. Tf it can will at all, it mu- ft will
rce o .
. ^bJr of knowi»», and not capable c
" wjlimg,
Seel. VII. no Meannefs or Difad vantage. 331
mere left at random, the greater dignity and ad
vantage. And, confequently, to be perfectly free
from the direction of understanding, and univer-
fally and entirely left to fenielefs unmeaning con-
tingence, to ac~t abfolutely at random, would be
the -fupreme glory.
It no more argues any dependence of God's
Will, that his fupremely wife volition is necef-
fary, than it argues a dependence of his being,
that his exiftence is neceffary. If it be fomething
too low, far the Supreme Being to have his Will
determined by moral Neceflity, fo as necefiarily,
in every cafe, to will in the higher! degree holily
.and happily •, then why is it not alfo fomething too
low, for him to have his exiilence, and the in
finite
•" willing, is not to be underftood. And to be capable of
"' willing otherwife than what is wifeft and beft, contradicts
<£ that knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge muil
'" direct the will without error. Here then, is the origin of
" moral Necejfity ; and that is really , of freedom — Perhaps it
*•' maybe faid, when the Divine Will is determined, from the
** coniideration of the eternal aptitudes of things, it is as
" neceffarily determined, as if it were phyfically impelled, if
" that were poffible. But it is unfkilfulnefs, to fuppofe this
" an objection. The great principle is once eftabliflied, <viz.
" That the Divine Will is determined by the eternal reafon
" and aptitudes of things, initead of being phyfically im-
*' pelled ; and after that, the more ftrong and neceffary this
" determination is, the more perfect the Deity mufl be al-
" lowed to be : it is this that makes him an amiable and
" adorable Being, whofe Will and Power are conftantly, im-
" mutably determined, by the confideration of what is wifeil
" and bell; inftead of a furd Being, with power, but without
*' difcerning and reafon. If is the beauty of this Necejjityy
'* that it is jircn% as fate itfelf, with all the advantage ofrenjon
" and goodnefs. — It is ftrange, to fee men contend, that the
' ' Deity, is not free, becaufe he is neceffarily rational, im-
" mutably good and wife ; when a man is allowed ftill the
*' pcrfecter being, the more fixedly and conftantly his will is
" determined by reafon and truth.'' Enquiry into the Nature
of the Hum. Sou/. Edit. 3. Vol. II. p, 403, 404.
132 Neceffity of afting mvft wifely, Part IV.
finite perfection of his nature, anc} his infinite
Iiappinds determined by Neceflity ? It is no more
to God's di {honour, to be neceffarily wife, than
to be neceffarily holy. And, if neither of them
be to his diihonour, then it is not to his difho-
nour neceffarily to act holily and wifely. And if
it be not dishonourable to be neceffarily holy
and wife, in the higheft poffible degree, no more
is it mearv and diihonourable, neceffarily to act
holily and wifely in the higheft poffible degree;
or, which is the fame thing, to do that, in every
cafe, which, above all other things, is wifeft and
•belt
The reafon, why it is not difhonourable, to
be neceffarily mojl holy, is, becaufe holinefs im
i-tfelf is an excellent and honourable thing. For
the. fame reafon, it is no diihonour to be necef
farily mojl wife, and, in every cafe, to act moft
wifely, or do the thing which is the wifeft of
alt ; for vvifdom is alfo in itfelf excellent and
honourable.
The forementioned Author of the EJjay on the
Freedom of Will> &c. as has been obferved, repre-
fents that doctrine of the Divine Will's being in
every thing neceffarily determined by fnperior
iitnefs, as making the blciied God a kind of Al
mighty Minifter and mechanical medium of fate :
and he infifts, p. 93, 94. that this moral Ne-
erfTIty and impoffibiiity is, in effect, the fame
thing with phyfical and natural Neceffity and
impoffibiiity: and in p. 54, 55. he fays, u The
** feheme which determines the will always ami
6fc certainly by the unclerfbnding, and the un-
" derftanding by the appearance of things,
u teems to take away the true nature of vice
4t and virtue. For the i'ubiinieft of virtues, ami
" the
Seel, VII. no Meannefs -or Difadvantage
** the vikil of vices, feem rather to be matters
*' of fate and Neceflity, .flowing naturally and
*c neccfTariiy from the exiftence, the circum-
** fiances, and >prefent iituation of perfons and
" things : for this exiftence and fituation ne-
** ceilarily .makes fuch an appearance to the
*< mind.} from this appearance flows a neceffary
" perception and judgment, concerning thefe
*c things ; this judgment., neceiTarily determines
*' the will : and thus, by this chain of necef-
** fary caufes, virtue and vice would lofe ckcir
** nature, and become natural ideas, and necei-
** fary things, inilead of moral and free ac-
tons."
And yet this iame Author allows, p, 30, 31,.
That a perfectly wife being will constantly and
certainly chufe what is moil fit *, and fays, p. 102,
503. u I grant, and always have granted, that
" wherefoever there is fuch antecedent fuperior
" fitnefs of things, God adls according to it,
44 fo as never to contradict k ; and, particularly,
" in all his judicial proceedings as a Governor,
" and Diftribnter of rewards and punifhments."
Yea, he fays exprefsly, p.. 4.2. "That it is .not
*4 poffible for God to a6t other wife, than accord-
*' ing to this fitnefs and goodnefs in tilings/'
So that, according to this Author, putting thefe
feverai pafTages of this Elfay together, there is n&
virtHe, nor any thing of a moral nature, in the
rnoft fublime and glorious acls and exerdfes -of
God's holinefs, juftice,, and faithful nefs-, and he
never does any thing which is in itfdf iupreme-
ly worthy, and, above all other things, fit and
excellent, but only as a kind of mechanical me
dium of fate ; and in -what he does as the Judre^
moral Governor of tbe world, he exerciies no
moral
Neceffity of GOD'S afifrig wifely, &c. P. IV.
moral excellency ; exercifing no freedom in thefe
things, becaufe he ads by moral Neceffity,
which is, in effect, the fame with phyfical or na
tural Neceffity •, and, therefore, he only acts by an
HoWiflical fatality -, as a Being indeed of vaft under-
flandrag, as well as power arid efficiency (as he faid
before j but without a will to chufe ^ being a kind of
Almighty Mmifter of fats^ a fling under its fupr erne
influence. For he allows, that in all thefe things,
God's Will is determined coniLuth and certainly
by a fupcrior funds, and that it is not poflible
for him to act otherwife. Arid if thefe things
are foy what glory or praife belongs to God for
doing holily and juftly, or taking the moll fit,
holy, wile and excellent courfe, in any or.e in-
ftance ? Whereas, according to the Scriptures,
and alfo the common fenfe of mankind, it does
not, in the lead, derogate from the -honour of any
being, that through the moral perfection of his
nature, he neceffarily acts with fupreme wifdom
and holinefs : but, on the contrary, his praife i$
the greater : herein confifls the height of his
glory.
The fame Author, p. 56. fnppofes, that herein
appears the excellent char after of a wife and good
man, that though he can chufe contrary to the jitnefs
of things, yet he does not \ but fuffers himfelf to be
dire fled by jitnefs ; and that, in this conduct,'^
imitates the bieffed God. And yet, he fuppofes it is
contrariwile with the bleifed God -, not that he
fuffers himfelf to be directed by fitncfs, when
"be can chufe ^ contrary to the Jitnefs of things , but
that he cannot chufe contrary' to thefitnefs of things •,
as he fays, p. 42; — *£hat it is not poffible for God to-
att otherwise than ( according to this ftnefs, where
there is any fiinefs or goodnefs in things- : Yea, he
fuppofes, p. 31. That if a matt<wer€-perftftiy i»ijc
and
Sect. VIII. Of God's creating /& J'Forld, &c. 33.5^
tftf*/ £00^ #£ c0zi/^ «0£ */0 otherwife tban be conjlanily
and certainly determined by the fitnefs of things.
One thing more I would obferve, before I COTI-
clude this fe&ion -9 and that is, that if it dero
gates nothing from the glory of God, to be ne-
cefiarily determined by fuperior iitnefs in fome
things, then neither does it to be thus determined
in all things 5 from any thing in the nature of
fuch Necemty, as at all detracting from God73
freedom, independence, abfolute fupremacy, or
any dignity or glory of his nature, tfate or man
ner of acting ; or as implying any infirmity, te-
ftraint, or fubjeclion. And if the thing be fuck
as well confifts with God's glory, and has no
thing tending at all to detracl: from it -, then we
aeed not be afraid of afcribing it to God in too
many things, left thereby we Ihould detracl: from
God's glory too much.
SECTION VIIL
S&ne farther Objections vgainft the moral Neceffity
of GOD'S Volitions cvnfideread
1 1 *HE Author laft cited, as has been oV
X ferved, owns that God, being perfectly
%vife, will conftantly and certainly chule what ap
pears moft fi.t, where there is a , fuperior. fitnefs
and goodnefs in things ; and th$t it is- not poiBbla
for him to do otherwife. So that it is in effect
confeiled, that in thofe things where there is any
real preferablenefs, it is no dilhonour, nothing in
any refpect unworthy of God, for him; to 2&
from Neceflity ; notwithftanding all that can be
objefted from the agreement of fuch a Neceffity,
with
jj6 Of God's creating the World, Part IV.
with the fate of the Stouks, and the Neceffity
maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will
follow, that if it were fo, that in all the different
things, among which God chufes, there were
evermore a iuperior fitnefs or preferablenefs on
one fide, then it would be 'no dilhonour, or any
thing, in any refpedl, unworthy, or unbecoming
of God, for his will to be neceffarily determined
in every thing. And if this be allowed, it is a
giving up entirely the argument, from the un-
fnitablenefs of iiich a Neceffity to the liberty,
fupremacy, independence and glory of the Divine
Being ; and. a retting the whole weight of the
affair on the decifion of another point wholly
divtrfe ; viz* Whether it be fo indeed, that in all
the various poffible things, which are in God's
view, and may be confidered as capable objects
of his choice, there is not evermore a preferable-
nefs in one thing above another. This is de
nied by this Author ; who fuppofes, that in ma
ny inftances, between two or more poffible
things, which come within the view of the Di
vine Mind, there is a perfect indifference and
equality, as to fitnefs or tendency, to attain any
good end which God can have in viexv, or to
anlvver any of his defigns. Now, therefore, I
would confider whether this be evident.
The arguments brought to prove this, are of
two kinds, (i.) It is urged, that, in many in-
ilances, we mud fuppofe there is abfolutely no
difference between various poffible objeds- of
choice, which God has in view: and (2.1 that
the difference between many things is fo incon-
fiderable, or of fuch a nature, that it would be
unreaibnable to iuppofe it to be of any confe-
fjuence i or to iuppofe that any of God's wife de-
figns
Seft. VIII. at fuch a Time and Place. 337
figns would not be anfwered in one way as well
as the other.
Therefore,
I. The fir ft thing to be confidered is, whether
there are any infhances wherein there is a perfect
likenefs, and abfolutely no difference, between
different objects of choice, that are propofed to
the Divine Underftanding ?
And here, in the/r/? place, it may be worthy
to be confidered, whether the contradiction there
is in the terms of the queftion propofed, does not
give reafon to fufpect, that there is an incon-
fiilence in the thing fuppoled. It is inquired^
whether different objects of choice may not be
abfolutely without difference ? If they are abfo
lutely without difference, then how are they different
objects of choice ? If there be abfolutely no diffe
rence, in any refpect, then there is no variety or
diflinttion : for diftinction is only by fome dif
ference. And if there be no variety among pro
pofed objeffs of choice, then there is no opportu
nity for variety of choice, or difference of determi
nation. For that determination of a thing, which
is not different in any refpect, is not a different
determination, but the fame. That this is n<j
quibble, may appear more fully anon.
The arguments, to prove that the MoftHigh, in
fome inftances, chufes to do one thing rather than
another, where the things themfelves are perfectly
without difference, are two.
i. That the various parts of infinite time and
fpace, abfolutely confidered, are perfectly alike,
and do not differ at all one from another : and
that therefore^ when God determined to create
Z the
33$ Of God's creating the world^ &c. Part IV.
the world in fiich a part of infinite duration and
ipacc, rather than others, he determined and pre
ferred, among various objects, between which
there was no preferablenefs, and abfolutely no
difference.
Anfw. This objection fuppofes an infinite
length of time before the world was created,
diftinguiihed by fuccefiive parts, properly and
truly fo ; or a fuccefllpn of limited and unmea-
iurable periods of time, following one another,
in an infinitely long feries : which muft needs be
a groundlefs imagination. The eternal duration
which was before the world, being only the eter
nity of God's exigence •, which is nothing elfe
but his immediate, perfect and invariable poffef-
fion of the whole of his unlimited life, together
and at once ; Vita interminabilis^ tota^ fimul &
perfecta poflejfio. Which is fo generally allowed,
that I need not Hand to demonflrate it. *
* " If all created beings were taken away, all poffibiiity
of any mutation or fucceffion, of one thing to another,
would appear to be alfo removed. Abftraft fucceffion in
eternity is fcarce to be underilood. What is it that fuc-
ceeds? One minute to another, perhaps, velut unda fuper-
venit undam. But when we imagine this, we fancy that
the minutes are things feparately exiiling. This is the
common notion ; and yet it is a manifeft prejudice. Time
is nothing but the exigence of created fuccellive beings,
and eternity the neceiTary exigence of the Deity. Therefore,
if this neceiTary being hath no change or fucceffion in his
nature, his exiflence muft of courfe be unfucc.effive. We
feem to commit a double overiight in this cafe ; foft, we
find fucceffion in the neceflary nature and jexiftence of the
Deity himfelf : which is wrong, if the reafoning above be
conclufive. And then we afcribe this fucceffion to eternity,
confidered abitradledly from the Eternal Being ; and fup-
pofe it, one knows not what, a thing fubiifting by itielf,
and flowing, one minute after another. This is the work
of pure imagination, and contrary to the reality of things.
" Hence
Seft. VIII. at fab a Time and Place. 339
So this objection fuppofes an extent of fpace
beyond the limits of the creation, of an infi
nite length, breadth and depth, truely and pro
perly diftinguifhed into different meafurable parts,
limited at certain ilages, one beyond another, in
an infinite feries. Which notion of abfolute and
infinite fpace is doubtlefs as unreafonable, as that
now mentioned, of abfolute and infinite duration.
It is as improper, to imagine that the imrrienfity
and omniprefence of God is diftinguimed by a
feries of miles and leagues, one beyond another ;
as that the infinite duration of God is diftin
guifhed by months and years, one after another.
A diverfity and order of diftinct parts, limited by
certain periods, is as conceivable, and does as na
turally obtrude itfelf on our imagination, in one
cafe as the other ; and there is equal reafon in
each cafe, to fuppofe that our imagination de
ceives us. It is equally improper, to talk of months
and years of the Divine Exigence, and mile-
fquares of Deity : and we equally deceive our-
" Hence the common metaphorical expreiftons ; Time runs
a-pace, let us lay hold on the prefent minute, and the like. The
philofophers themfelves miflead us by their ill nitration.
They compare eternity to the motion of a point running
on for ever, and making a tracelels infinite line* Here the
point is fuppofed a thing actually fubfifting, reprefenting
the prefent minute ; and then they afcribe motion or fuc-
cefiion to it : that is, they afcribe motion to a meer non
entity, to illuftrate to us a fucceifive eternity, made up of
finite fucceflive parts. If once we allow an all -perfect
mind, which hath an eternal, immutable and infinite com-
prehenfion of all things, always (and allow it we mutt)
the diftinftion of paft and future vanifhes with refped to
fuch a mind, — In a word, if we proceed ilep by ftep, as
above, the eternity or exigence of the Deity will appear
to be Pita interminabilis, fota, JJmul & perfetta pcjjej/tz ;
how much fcever this may have been a paradox hitherto."
Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul. Vol. ii. 409, 410,
41 1. Edit. 3.
Z 2 fclves,
340 Of GOD'S placing differently Part IV,
felves, when we talk of the world's being diffe
rently fix'd, with refpect to either of thefe forts
of meafures. I think, we know not what we
mean, if we fay, the world might have been dif
ferently placed from what it is, in the broad ex-
panfe of infinity ; or, that it might have been dif
ferently fixed in the long line of eternity : and all
arguments and objections, which are built on the
imaginations we are apt to have of infinite exten-
fion or duration, are buildings founded on ma-
clows, or caflles in the air.
2. The fecond argument, to prove that the
Moft High wills one thing rather than another,
without any fuperior fitnefs or preferablenefs in
the thing preferred, is God's actually placing in
different parts of the world, particles, or atoms
of matter, that are perfectly equal and alike. The
ibrementioned Author fays, p. 78, &c. " If one
" would defcend to the minute fpecific particles,,
" of which different bodies are competed, we
" fliould fee abundant reafon to believe, that there
" are thoufands of fuch little particles, or atoms
" of matter, which are perfectly equal and alike,
" and could give no diitinct determination to the
" Will of God, where to place them." He there
inftances in particles of water, of which, there
are fuch immenfe numbers, which cornpofe the
rivers and oceans of this world ; and the infi
nite myriads of the luminous and fiery particles,
which corn po re the body of the Sun; fo many,
that it would be very unreafonable to iuppofe no
two of them fliould be exactly equal and alike.
(i.) To this I anfvver : that as we muft
fuppofe matter to be infinitely divifible, it is vciy
unlikely, that any two, of all thefe particles, are
exactly equal and alike; fo unlikely, that it is a
thoufand
Sect. VIII. fimilar Particles. 34.1'
thoufand to one, yea, an infinite number to one,
but it is otherwife : and that although we fhould
allow a great fimilarity between the different par
ticles of water and fire, as to their general na
ture and figure : and however fmall we fuppofe
thofe particles to be, it is infinitely unlikely, that
any two of them mould be exactly equal in di-
menfions and quantity of matter. — If we mould
fuppofe a great many globes of the fame nature
with the globe of the earth, it would be very
ftrange, if there were any two of them that had
exactly the fame number of particles of duft and
water in them. But infinitely lefs ftrange, than
that two particles of light mould have juft the
fame quantity of matter. For a particle of light,
according to the doctrine of the infinite divifi-
bility of matter, is compofed of infinitely more
aflignable parts, than there are particles of duft
and water in the globe of the earth. And as it
is infinitely unlikely, that any two of thefe parti
cles fhould be equal-, fo it is, that they fliould be
alike in other refpects : to inflance in the confi
guration of their furfaces. If there were very ma
ny globes, of the nature of the earth, it would be
very unlikely that any two fliould have exactly
the fame number of particles of duft, water
and ftone, in their furfaces, and all pofited ex
actly alike, one with refpect to another, without
any difference, in sny part difcernible either by
the naked eye or microfcope ; but infinitely lefs
ftrange, than that two particles of light fliould
be perfectly of the fame figure. For there arc
infinitely more affignable real parts on the furfaqe
of a particle of light, than there are particles of
duft, water and ftone, on the furface of the ter-
f eft rial Globe,
Z 3 4nfw.
342 Of Gop's placing differently Part IV.
Anfw. (2.) But then, fuppofing that there^are
two particles, or atoms of matter, perfectly equal
and alike, which God has placed in different parts
of the creation ; as I will not deny it to be pof-
iible for God to make two bodies perfectly alike,
and put them in different places \ yet it will not
follow, that two different or diftinct acts or ef
fects of the Divine Power have exactly the fame
ritnefs for the fame ends. For thefe two diffe
rent bodies are not different or diftinct, in any
other refpects than thofe wherein they differ :
they are two in no other refpects than thofe
wherein there is a difference. If they are per
fectly equal and alike in tbemfelves, then they can
be diftinguifhed, or be diftinct, only in thofe
tilings which are called circumftances-, as place,
time, reft, motion, or fome other prefent or
paft circumftances or relations. For it is diffe
rence only that conftitutes diftinction. If God
makes two bodies, In themfelves every way equal
and alike, and agreeing perfectly in all other cir
cumftances and relations, but only their place ;
then in this only is there any diftinction or dupli
city. The figure is the fame, the meafure is the
fame., the folidity and refiftance are the fame,
and every thing the fame, but only the place.
Therefore what the W ill of God determines, is
this, namely, that there IJiould be the fame fi-
gn-e, the fame extcnfian, the fame refiftance,
&c. in two different places. And for this deter
mination he has fome reafon. There is fome
end, for which fucli a determination and act
has a peculiar fitnefs, above all other acts. Here
is no one thing determined without an end, and
no one thi.ig without a fitnefs for that ^end, fu-
perior to any thing die. If it be the plcafure of
God to caufc the fame refinance, and the lame
figure, to be in two different places and fituati-
Sect, VIII. fimllar Particles. 343
ons, we can no more juftly argue from it, that
here niu ft be fome determination or act of God's
will, that is wholly without motive or end, then
we can argue, that whenever, in any cafe it is a
man's will to fpeak the fame words, or make
the fame founds at two different times *, there
mull: be fome determination or act of his will,
without any motive or end. The difference of
place, in the former cafe, proves no more than
the difference of time does in the other. If any
one mould fay, with regard to the former cafe,
that there muft be fomething determined without
an end -, viz. that of thofe two fimilar bodies,
this in particular Ihould be made in this place,
and the other in the other, and Ihould enquire,
why the Creator did not make them in a tranf-
pofuion, when both are alike, and each would
equally have fuited either place ? The enquiry
fuppoies fomething that is not true ; namely, that
the two bodies differ and are diftinct in other re-
fpects befides their place. So that with this dif-
tinclion inherent in them, they might, in their firft
creation, have been tranfpoied, and each might
have begun its exillence in the place of the other.
Let us, for clearnefs fake, fuppofe, that God
had, at the beginning, made two globes, each of
an inch diameter, both perfect fpheres, and per
fectly folid, without pores, and perfectly alike in
every refpect, and placed them near one to ano
ther, one towards the right hand, and the other
towards the left, without any difference afs to
time, motion or reft, paft or prefent, or any
circumftance, but only their place ; and the que
ll ion fhould be afked, why God in their creation
placed themfo? Why that which is made on the
right hand, was not made on the left, and vice
verfa ? J^et it be well confidercd, whether there
Z 4 bo
^44 Qf GOD'S chufing among like Wings > P. IV^
be any fenfe in fuch a qnetlion -, and whether the
enquiry does not fuppofe fomething falfe and ab-
furd. Ltt it be considered, what the Creator muft
have done otherwife than he did, what different
act of will or power he muft have exerted, in or
der to the thing propofed. All that could have
been done, would have been to have made two
fphercs, perfectly alike, in the fame places where
he has made them, without any difference of the
things made, either in themfelves or in any circum-
ftance -9 fo that the whole effedl would have been
without any difference, and, therefore, juil the
fame. By the fuppofition, the two fpheres are
different in no other refpect but their place •, and
therefore in other refpe&s they are the fame.
Each has the fame roundnefs •, it is not a diftindt
rotundity, in any other refpecl but its fituation.
There are, alfo, the fame dimenfions, differing in
nothing but their place. And fo of their rcfi-
ftance, and every thing elfe that belongs to them.
Here, if any chnfes to fay, " that there is a dif
ference in another refpec~t, viz. that they are not
NUMERICALLY the fame: that it is thus
\vith all the qualities that belong to them : that it
is confefled, they are, in fomc refpecls, the fame-,
that is, they are both exaclly alike •, 'but yet nume
rically they differ. Thus the roundnefs of one is
not the fame numerical^ individual roundneis with
that of the other." Let this be fuppofed •, then
the queftion about the determination of the Di
vine Will in the affair, is, why did God will,
that this individual roundnefs mould be at the
right hand, and the orher individual ronndnefs at
the left ? why did not he make them in a con
trary pofition ? Let any rational perfon coniider,
whether fuch queftions be not words without a
meaning ; as much as if God ihould fee fit for
fomc
Sect. VIIL and 1'hwgs of trivial Difference. 345
fome ends, to caufe the fame founds to be repeated,
or made at two different times ; the founds being
perfectly the fame in every other refped, but only
one was a minute after the other ; and it Ihould
be alked, upon it, why God caufed thefe founds,
numerically different, to fucceed one the other in
fuch a manner ? Why he did not make that indi
vidual found, which was in the firft minute, to be
in the fecond ? And the individual found of the
lad minute to be in the firft ; which enquiries
would be even ridiculous •, as, I think, every per-
fon muft fee, at once, in the cafe propofed of two
founds, being only the fame repeated, abfolutely
without any difference, but that one circum-
tfance of time. If the Moil High fees it will
anfwer fome good end, that the fame found fhould
be made by lightening at two diftinct times,
and therefore wills that it fhould be fo, muft it
needs therefore be, that herein there is fome act
of God's will without any motive or end ? God
faw fit often, at diftinct times, and on different
occafions, to fay the very fame words to Mofes ;
namely, thofe, lam Jebovah. And would it not
be unreafonable to infer, as a certain confequence,
from this, that here muft be fome act or acts of
the Divine Will, in determining and difpofing
thefe words exactly alike, at different times, wholly
without aim or inducement ? But it would be no
more unreafonable than to fay, that there muft
be an act of God's without any inducement, if
he fees it beft, and, for fome reafons, determines
that there fhall be the fame refiftance, the fame
dimensions, and the fame figure, in feveral di
ftinct places.
If, in the inftance of the two fpheres, perfectly
alike, it be fuppofed poffible that God might have
made them in a contrary pofition ; that which is
made.
346 Of Go D 's chufing among like Things, Part IV.
made at the right hand, being made at the left;
then I afk, Whether it is not evidently equally
poffible, if God had made but one of them, and
that in the place of the right-hand globe, that he
might have made that numerically different from
what it is, and numerically different from what
he did make it; though perfectly alike, and in the
fame place; and at the fame time, and in every
refpect, in the {lime circumftances and relations ?
Namely, Whether he might not have made it
numerically the fame with that which he has now
made at the left hand ; and fo have left that
which is now created at the right hand, in a ftate
of non-exiftence ? And, if fo, whether it would
not have been poffible to have made one in that
place, perfectly like thefe, and yet numerically
differing from both ? And 1-et it be confidered,
whether, from this notion of a numerical diffe
rence in bodies, perfectly equal and alike, which
numerical difference is lomething inherent in the
bodies themfelves, and diverfe from the difference
of place or time, or any circumftance whatfo-
cver ; it will not follow, that there is an infinite
number of numerically different pofiible bodies,
perfectly alike, among which God chufes, by a
felf-deter mining power, when he goes about to
create bodies.
Therefore let us put the cafe thus : Suppofing
that God, in the beginning, had created but one
perfectly folid fphere, in a certain place ; and it
ihonld be enquired, Why God created that indi
vidual fphere, in that place, at that time? And
why he did not create another fphere perfectly
like it, -but numerically different, in the fame
place, at the fame time ? Or why he chofe to
bring into, being there, that very body, rather
than any of the infinite number of other bodies,
perfectly
Sect. VIII. and Things of trivial Difference. 347
perfectly like it-, either of which he could have
made there as well, and would have anfwered his
end as well ? Why he caufed to exift, at that
plac- and time, that individual roundnefs, ra
ther than any other of the infinite number of in
dividual rotundities, juft like it ? Why that in
dividual refinance, rather than any other of the
infinite number of poffible refinances juit like
it ? And it might as reafonably be alked, W'hy,
when God firft caufed it to thunder, he caufed
that individual found then to be made, and not
another juft. like it ? Why did he make choice of
this very found, and reject all the infinite num
ber of other poffible founds juft like it, but nu
merically differing from it, and all differing one
from another ? I think, every body muft be fen-
fible of the abiiirdity and nonfenfe of what is
fuppofed in fuch inquiries. And, if v/e calmly at
tend to the matter, we fhall be convinced, that all
fuch kind of objections as I am anfvvering, are
founded on nothing but the imperfection of our
manner of conceiving things, and the obfcure-
nefs of language, and great want of clearnefs
and precifion in the fignifkation of terms.
If any fhall find fault with this reafoning, that
it is going a great length into metaphyfical ni
ceties and fubtilties ; I anfwer, the objection
which they are in reply to, is a metaphyfical
fubtilty, and muft be treated according to the
irature of it. *
II. Another thing alledged is, that innume
rable things which are determined by the Divine
Will,
* " For men to have recourfe'to fubtilties, hi railing; dif-
" ficulties, and then complain, that they ihould be taken off
** by minutely examining thefe fubtilties, is a ilrange kind
*' Deprocedure." Nature of the Human Soul ^ vol.2, p-35*»
348 0/GoD's clufing among fmall Matters. Pt.IV.
will, and chofen and done by God rather than
others, differ from thofe that are not chofen in fo
inconfiderable a manner, that it would be un-
reafonable to fuppofe the difference to be of any
confequence, or that there. is any fuperior fitnefs
or goodnefs, that God can have refpecl to in the
determination.
To which I anfvver ; it is impofllble for us to
determine, with any certainty or evidence, that
becaufe the difference is very fmall, and appears
to us of no confideration, therefore there is ab-
folutely no fuperior goodnefs, and no valuable
end, which can be propofed by the Creator and
Governor of the world, in ordering fuch a diffe
rence. The forementioned author mentions many
inftances. One is, there being one atom in the
whole univerfe more, or lefs. But, I think, it
would be unreafcnable to fuppofe, that God made
one atom in vain^ or without any end or motive.
He made not one atom, but what was a work of
his Almighty Power, as much as the whole globe
of the earth, and requires as much of a conftant
exertion of Almighty Power to uphold it-, and
was made and is upheld underftandingly, and
on defign, as much as if no other had been made
but that. And it would be as unreafonable to
fuppofe, that he made it without any thing
really aimed at in fo doing, as much as to fup
pofe, that he made the planet Jupiter without
aim or delign.
It is poffible, that the moft minute effecls of
the Creator's power, the fmalleft affignable diffe
rence between the things which God has made,
may be attended, in the whole feries of events,
and the whole compafs and extent of their in
fluence, with very great and important conie-
i quences.
Sect. VIII. Necefiity confiftent with free Grace. 349
quences. If the laws of motion and gravitation,
laid down by Sir Ifaac Newton, hold univerfally,
there is not one atom, nor the leaft affigoable
part of an atom, but what has influence, every
moment, throughout the whole material univerfe,
to caufe every part to be otherwife than it would
be, if it were not for that particular corporeal
exigence. And however the effect is infenfible
for the prefent, yet it may, in length cf time,
become great and important.
To illu (Irate this, let us fuppofe two bodies
moving the fame way, in ftrait lines, perfectly
parallel one to another ; but to be diverted from
this parallel courfe, and drawn one from another,
as much as might be by the attraction of an atom,
at the diftance of one of the fprtheft of the fixed
ftars from the earth ; thefe': bodies- being turned
out of the lines of their parallel motion, will, by
degrees, get further and further diftant, one from
the other; and though the diftance may be inv
perceptible for a long time, yet at length it may
become very great. So the revolution of a planet
round the fun being retarded or accelerated,
and the orbit of its revolution made greater or
lefs, and more or lefs elliptical, and fo its perio
dical time longer or ihorter, no more- than rrmv
be by the influence of the leaft atom, might,
in length of time, perform a whole revolution
fooner or later than otherwife it would have done^
which might make a vaft alteration with regard
to millions of important events. So the influ
ence of the leaft particle may, for ought we
know, have fuch effect on fomething in the con-
ftitution of fome human body, as to caufe another
thought to ariie in the mind at a certain time,
than otherwife would have been; which, in length
of time, (yea, and that not very great) might oc-
caGon
350 Neceffity confident with free Grace. Part IV,.
cafion a vafl alteration through the whole world
of mankind. And fo innumerable other ways
might be mentioned, wherein the leaft affignable
alteration may poffibly be attended with great
confequences.
Another argument, which the fore-mentioned
author brings againft a necefTary determination of
the Divine Will, by a fuperior fitnefs, is, that fuch
doctrine derogates from the freenefs of God's grace
and goodnefs, in chufing the objects of his favour
and bounty, and from the obligation upon men to
tkankfulnefs for fpecial benefits. P. 89,
In anfwer to this objection, I would obferve,
1. That it derogates no more from the good-
nefs of God, to fuppofe the exercife of the bene
volence of his nature to be determined by wif-
dom, than to fuppofe it determined by chance,
and that his favours are bellowed altogether at
random, his will being determined by nothing
but perfect accident, without any end or defign
whatibever; which muft be the cafe, as has been
demonftrated, if Volition be not determined by a
prevailing motive. That which is owing to per
fect contingence, wherein neither previous in
ducement, nor antecedent choice has any hand,
is not owing more to goodnefs or benevolence,
than that which is owing to the influence of a
wife end.
2. It is acknowledged, that if the motive that
determines the Will of God, in the choice of the
objects of his favours, be any moral quality in
the object, recommending that object to his be-r
nevolence above others, his chufing that object is
not Ib great a manifeftation of the freenefs and
fovereignty of his Grace, as if it were otherwife.
But
Se&.VIII. Neceflity ccnjijleni with free Grace. 35 1
But there is noNeceffity of fuppofing this, in order
to our fuppofmg that he has fome wife end in
view, in determining to beftow his favours on
one pcrfon rather than another. We are to diftin-
guifh between the merit of the object of God's Fa
vour, or a moral qualification of the objett attract
ing that favour and recommending to it, and the
natural fitnefs of fuch a determination of the aft of
God's goodnefs, to anfwer fome wife defign of his
own, fome end in the view of God's Omnifci-
ence. — It is God's own act, that is the proper and
immediate object of his Volition.
3. I fuppofe that none will deny, but that, in
fome instances, God acts from wile defign in de
termining the particular fubjects of his favours :
none will fay, I prefume, that when God diitin-
guifhes, by his bounty, particular focieties or per-
fons, He never, in any inftance, cxercifes any
wifdom in fo doing, aiming at fome happy con-
fequence. And, if it be not denied to be fo in fome
inftances, then I would enquire, whether, in thefe
inftances, God's goodnefs is lefs manifefled, than
in thole wherein God has no aim or end at ail ?
And whether the fubjects have lefs caufe of
thaukfulnefs ? And if fo, who (hall be thankful
for the beftowment of diftinguifhing mercy, with
that enhancing circumfhnce of the difti net ion's
being made without an end ? How ihall it be
known when God is influenced bv fome wife aim,
and when not ? It is very manifeil, with refpect
to the apoftle Paul? that God had wife ends in
chufing him to be a Chriftian and an Apoftle,
who had been a perfccutor, ecc. The apoule
himfelf mentions one end. i Tim. i. 15, 16.
Chrijl Je/lis came into the world to fave fmners, ff
ivbom 1 am chief. Howle.lt 9 for this caufc I obtained
m^ that in me frft, Jcfus Chrijl mivbt ihcw forth
Of Ar mini an Fatality. Part IV.
all fong-fuffering, for a pattern to them who Jhould
hereafter believe on Him to life everlafting. But yet
the apoftle never looked on it as a diminution of
the freedom and riches of Divine Grace in his
' election, which he fo often and fo greatly mag
nifies. This brings me to obferve,
4. Our fuppofing fuch a moral Necefllty in the
acts ©f God's will, as has been fpoken of, is fo
far from neceffarily derogating from the riches of
God's grace to fuch as are the chofen objects of
his favour, that, in many inflances, this moral
Necefllty may arife from goodnefs, and from the
great degree of it. God may chufe this object
rather than another, as having a. fuperior fitnefs
to anfwer the ends, clefigns and inclinations of
his goodnefs ; being more finful, and fo more
iniferable and neceflltous than others ; the inclina
tions of Infinite Mercy and Benevolence may be
more gratified, and the gracious defign of God's
fending his Son into the world, may be more
abundantly anfwered, in the exercifes of mercy
towards fuch an object, rather than another.
One thing more I would obferve, before I
finiih what I have to fay on the head of the Ne-
cefiity of the acts of God's will ^ and thac is,
that fomething much more like a fervile fub-
jection of the i)ivine Being to fatal Neceflity, will
follow from Armiman principles, than from the
doctrines which they oppofe. For they (at leaft
moff of them) fuppofe, with refpect to all events
that happen in the moral world, depending on
the Volitions of moral agents, which are'the molt
important events of the eniverfe, to which all
others are fubordinate; I fay, they fuppofe, with
rtfpect to thefe, that God has a certain foreknow
ledge of them, antecedent to any purpofes or
<krrees of his about them, And if fo, they have a
fixed
Sect. VIII. Of Armlnlan Fatality. 353
fixed certain futurity, prior to any defigns or
volitions of his, and independent on them, and
to which his volitions mufl be fubject, as he
would wifely accommodate his affairs to this fixed
futurity of the Hate of things in the moral
world. So that here, inftead of a moral necef-
fity of God's Will, arifingfrom, or confiding in,
the infinite perfection and bleifednefs of the Di
vine Being, we have a fixed unalterable ftate of
things, properly diftincl: from the perfect nature of
the Divine Mind, and the ftate of the Divine
Will and Defign, and entirely independent on
thefe things, and which they have no hand in, be-
caufe they are prior to them ; and which God's
Will is truly fubject to, being obliged to conform
or accommodate himfelf to it, in all his purpofes
and decrees, and in every thing he docs in his
difpofals and government of the world ; the
moral world being the end of the natural ; fo
that all is in vain, that is not accommodated to
that flate of the moral \vorld, which confitls in,
or depends upon, the acts and ftate of the wills
of moral agents, w^hich had a fixed futurition
from eternity. Such a fubjection to neceffity as
this, would truly argue an inferiority and fervi-
tude, that would be unworthy of the Supreme
Being ; and is much more agreable to the notion
\vhich many of the heathen had of Fate, as above
the gods, than that moral neceiTity of fitnefs and
wifdom which has been fpoken of; and is truly
repugnant to the abfolute fovereignty of God,
and inconfiftent with the fupremacy of his will-,
and really fubjects the will of the Molt High, to
the will of his creatures, arid brings him into de
pendence upon them.
A a SECTIOH
354 9f the Objection about Part IV.
SECTION IX.
Concerning that Objection againft the Doftrine which
has been maintained, that it makes GOD the
Author of Sin.
IT is urged by Armiriians^ that the doctrine
of the neceffity of men's volitions, or their
necefiary connection with antecedent events and
circumftances, makes the firft caufe, and fupreme
orderer of all things, the Author of Sin ; in that
he has fo conftituted the ftate and courfe of
things, that fmful volitions become necefiary,
in confequence of his difpofal. Dr. Whiiby^ in
his Difcourfe on the Freedom of the Will, * cites
one of the antients, as on his fide, declaring that
this opinion of the neceffity of the will " ab-
" folves Sinners, as doing nothing of their own
" accord which was evil, and would caft all the
" blame of all the wickednefs committed in the
" world, upon God, and upon his Providence,
" if that were admitted by the afTertors of this
" fate ; whether he himfelf did neceffitate them
" to do theie things, or ordered matters fo, that
" they ftiould be conilrained to do them by fome
" other, caufe." And the doctor fays, in another
place, -f " In the nature of the thing, and in
" the opinion of philoibphers, caufa deficient^ in
<6 rebus neceffariis, ad caujam per fe efficient em re-
*c ducenda eft. In things neceflary, the deficient
" caufe mull be reduced to the efficient. And
" in this cafe the reafon is evident j becaufe the
" not doing what is required, or not avoiding
" what is forbidden, being a defedt, muil follow
* On the five Points, p. 361. f Ibid. p. 486.
" from
Sect. IX. making God the Author of Sin. 355
" from thepofition of the necefTary caufe of that
" deficiency."
Concerning this, I would obferve the following
things.
I. If there be any difficulty in this matter, it is
nothing peculiar to this fcheme -, it is no difficulty
or difadvantage, wherein it is diftinguifhed from
thejcheme of Armlnlans ; and, therefore, not rea-
ibnably objected by them.
Dr. Whitly fuppofes, that if Sin necefTarily
follows from God's withholding affiftance, or if
that affiftance be not given, which is abfolutely
neceflary to the avoiding of Evil ; then, in the na
ture of the thing, God muft be as properly the
Author of that Evil, as if he were the efficient
caufe of it. From whence, according to what he
himfelf fays of the devils and damned fpirits,
God muft be the proper Author of their perfect
unreftrained wickednefs : he muft be the efficient
caufe of the great pride of the devils, and of
their perfect malignity againft God, Chrift, his
faints, and all that is good, and of the infatiable
cruelty of their difpofition. For he allows, that
God has fo forfaken them, and does fo withhold
his affiftance from them, that they are incapaci
tated from doing good, and determined only to
evil. * Our doctrine, in its confequence, makes
God the Author of men's Sin in this world, no
more, and in no other fenfe, than his doctrine,
in its confequence, makes God the Author of the
hellim pride and malice of the devils. And doubt-
lefs the latter is as odious an effect as the former.
Again, if it will follow at #//, that God is
the Author of Sin, from what has been fuppofed
* On the five Points, p. 302. 305.
A a 2 of
356 How GOD is concerned Part IV.
of a fure and infallible connexion between ante
cedents and confequents, it will follow becaufe of
this, viz. that for God to be the Author or Order-
erofthofe things which, he knows before-hand,
will infallibly be attended, with fuch a confe-
quence, is the fame thing, in effect, as for him to
be the Author of that confequence. But, if this
be fo, this is a difficulty which equally attends
the doctrine of Arminians themfelves •, at leaft, of
thofe of them who allow God's certain fore- know
ledge of all events. For, on the fuppofition of
fuch a fore-knowledge, this is the cafe with refpect
to every Sin that is committed : God knew, that
if he ordered and brought to pafs fuch and fuch
events, fuch Sins would infallibly follow. As
for infiance, God certainly foreknew, long before
Judas was born, that if he ordered things fo, that
there fhould be fuch a man born, at fuch a time,
and at fuch a place, and that his life mould be
preferved, and that he fhould, in Divine Provi
dence, be led into acquaintance with Jefus ; and
that his heart mould be fo influenced by God's
Spirit or Providence, as to be inclined to be a
follower of Chrift ; and that he mould be one
of thofe twelve, which mould be chofen conflant-
ly to attend him as his family ; and that his
health fhould be preferved, fo that he mould go
up to Jerufalem, at the laft Paffover in (Thrift's
life; and it fhould be fo ordered, that Judas fhould
fee Chrift's kind treatment of the woman which
anointed him at Bethany, and have that reproof
from Chrift, which he had at that time, and fee
and hear other things, which excited his enmity
againit his Mafter, and other circumftances mould
be ordered, as they were ordered ; it would be
what would moft certainly and infallibly follow,
that Judas would betray his Lord, and would foon
after
Sect. IX. in tbe Exiftence of Sin. 357
after hang himfelf, and die impenitent, and be
fent to hell, for his horrid wickedneis.
Therefore, this fuppofed difficulty ought not
to be brought as an objection againft the fcheme
which has been maintained, as disagreeing with the
Arminian fcheme, feeing it is no difficulty owing
to fuch a difagreement ; but a difficulty wherein
the Armlnians fhare with us. That mufl be un-
reafonably made an objection againft our differ
ing from them, which we mould not efcape or
avoid at all by agreeing with them.
And therefore I would obferve,
II. They who object, that this doctrine makes
God the Author of Sin, ought diftinctly to ex
plain what they mean by that phrafe, The Author
of Sin. I know the phrafe, as it is commonly
ufed, fignifies fomething very ill. If by tbe Au
thor of Sin^ be meant the Sinner, the Agent^ or Ac
tor of Sin, or tbe Doer of a wicked thing \ fo it
would be a reproach and blafphemy, to fuppofe
God to be the Author of Sin. In this fenfc, I
utterly deny God to be the Author of Sin ; re
jecting fuch an imputation on the Moft High, as
what is infinitely to be abhorred; and deny any
fuch thing to be the confequence of what I have
laid down. But if, by the Autbcr of Sin, is meant
the permitter, or not a hinde.rer of Sin •, and, at
the fame time, a difpofer pf the Hate of events,
in fuch a manner, for wife, holy, and moft excel
lent ends and purpofes, that Sin, if it be permit
ted or not hindered, will moft certainly and in
fallibly follow : I fay, if this be all that is meants
by being the Author of Sin, I do not deny that
God is the Author of Sin, (though I diflike and
reject the phrafe, as that which by ufe and cuf-
tom is apt to carry another fenfe) it is no reproach
A'a- for
358 How GOD is concerned Part IV.
for the Moft High to be thus the Author of Sin.
This is not to be the Aftor of Sin, but, on the
contrary, of holinefs. What God doth herein, is
holy ; and a glorious exercife of the infinite ex
cellency of his nature. And, I do not deny, that
God's being thus the Author of Sin, follows from
what I have laid down •, and, I afFert, that it
equally follows from the doctrine which is main
tained by moft of the Arminlan divines.
That it is moft certainly fo, that God is in fuch
a manner the Difpofer and Orderer of Sin, is
evident, if any credit is to be given to the Scrip
ture •, as well as becaufe it is impoflible, in the na
ture of things, to be otherwife. In fuch a manner
God ordered the obilinacy of Pharaoh^ in his re-
fufing to obey God's Commands, to let the peo
ple go. Exod. iv. 21. 1 will harden his heart, and
be Jloall not let the people go. Chap. vii. 2 — 5. Aaron
thy brother fodlfpeak unto Pharaoh, that he fend the
children of Ifrael out of his land. And I will harden
Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my figns and my won
ders in the land of, Egypt. But Pharaoh Jhall not
hearken unto you ; that I may lay mine hand upon
Egypt, ly great judgments^ &c. Chap. ix. 12.
And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he
hearkened not unto them, as the Lord hadfpoken unto
Mofes. Chap. x. i, 2. And the Lord faid unto
Mofes, Go in unto Pharaoh ; for I have hardened
his heart, and the heart of his fervants, that I might
Jhew theft3 my Jigns before him^ and that thou mayft
tell it in the ears of thy fon, and thy fon'sfon, what
things 1 have wrought in Egypt, and my Jigns which
1 have done amon?ft them^ that ye may knew that I
am the Lord, Chap. xiv. 4. And I will harden
Pharaoh's hearty that he Jhall follow after them : and
I will be honoured iipon Pharaoh, and upon all his
Hojl Ver. 8. And the Lord hardened the heart of
Pharaoh
Seft. IX. in the Exiftence of Sin'. 359
Pharaoh King of Egypt, and he purfued after the
Children of Ifracl. And it is certain, that in fuch
a manner God, for wife and good ends, ordered
that event, Jofeph's being fold into Egypt, by his
brethren. Gen. xlv. 5. Now, therefore, be not
grieved, nor angry zvith yourfehes, that ye jold me hi-
ther; for God did fend me before you to preferve life.
Ver. 7, 8. God did fend me before you to prejerve a
pofterliy in the earth, and tofaveyour lives by a great
deliverance: fo that now it was not you, that fent me
hither, but God. Pfal. cvii. 17. He fent a man be
fore them, even Jofeph, who was fold for a fervant.
It is certain, that thus God ordered the Sin and
Folly of Slbon King of the Amorites, in refufmg
to let the people of Ifracl pafs by him peaceably.
Deut. ii. 30. But Sihon King of Hefhbon would
not let us pafs by him ; for the Lord thy God hardened
•hisfpirit, and made his heart objlinate, that he might
deliver him into thine hand. It is certain, that
God thus ordered the Sin and Folly of the Kings
of Canaan, that they attempted not to make peace
with Ifrael^ but, with a ftupid boldnefs and obfti-
nacy, let themfelves violently to oppofe them and
their God. Jom. xi. 20. For it was of the Lord,
to harden their hearts, that they ftould come again/I
Ifrael in battle, that he might deftroy them utterly,
and that they might have no favour ; but that he
might dejlroy them, as the Lord commanded Mofes.
It is evident, that thus God ordered the treach
erous rebellion of Zedekiah againft the King of
•Babylon. Jer. Hi. 3. For through the anger of the
Lord it came to pafs in Jerufalem, and Judah, un
til he had cafl them out from his prejence, that Zede-
kiah rebelled again/} the King of Babylon. So 2 Kings
xxiv. 20. And it is exceeding manifeft, that God
thus ordered the rapine and unrighteous ravages
of Nebuchadnezzar, in fpoiling and ruining the
nations round about. Jer. xxv. 9. Behold, I wi
A a 4
360 How GOD is concerned Part IV.
fend and take all the families of the north, faith the
Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar my fervant, and will
bring them again/I this land, and againft all the na
tions round about ; and will utterly deflroy them, and
make them an aftonifloment, and an hijfing, and per -
fetual defolalions. Chap, xljii. 10, n. I will fend
and take Nebuchadnezzar the king 0/ Babylon, my
fervant: and I will fet his throne upon theje ftones
that I have bid, and he Jhall fpread his royal pavilion
over them. And when he cometh, he Jhall fmite the
land of Egypt, and deliver fuch as are for death to
death, and juch as are for captivity t& captivity,
and fuch as are for the fword to the fword. Thus
God reprefents himfelf as fending for Nebuchadnez
zar, and taking of him and his armies, and bring"
ing him againit the nations, which were to be de-
flroyed by him, to that very end, that he might
utterly deft roy them, and make, them defolate;
arid as appointing the work that he mould do*
fo particularly, that the very perfons were defign-
ed, that he ihould kill with the fword ; and thole
that mould be killed with famine and peftilence,
and thofe that mould be carried into captivity ;
and that in doing all thefe things, he mould a<5t
as his fervant -, by which, lefs cannot be intended,
than that he mould ferve his purpofes and deT
figns. And in Jer. xxvii. 4, 5, 6. God declares,
how he would caufe him thus to ferve his de-
figns, viz. by bringing this to pafs in his fove-
reign difpofals, as the great PofTefTor and Gover
nor of the Univerfe, that difpoies all things juft
as pleafes him. Thus faith the Lord of Hqfts, the
God of Ifrael -, 1 have made the earth, the man and
the- be aft, that are upon the ground, by my great
•pcwzr, -and my Jlretched out arm, and have given it
unto, whom itfeemed. meet unto -me : and now I have
given all ihefc lands into the hands of Nebuchad
nezzar. MY SERVANT, and the beafts of the
field
SeQ:. IX. in the Exiftencc of Sin. 361
field have I given alfo fo.ferve him. And Nebuchad
nezzar is fpoken of as doing thefe things, by
having his arms ftrengthened by God, and having
God's fword put into his hands^ for this end. Ezek.
xxx. 24, 25, 26. Yea, God ipeaks of his terri
bly ravaging and wafting the nations, and cru
elly deflroying all forts, without diftinclion of fex
or age, as the weapon in God's hand, and the in-
(Irument of his indignation, which God makes uic
of to fulfil his own purpofes, and execute his own
vengeance. Jer. li. 20, &c. I'hou art my lattle-axe,
and weapons of war. For with thee will I break in
pieces the nations, and with thee I willdeftroy kingdoms*
and with thee I will break in pieces the horfe and his
rider, and with thee I will break in pieces the chariot
and his rider ; with thee alfo will I break in pieces man
and woman \ and with thee will I break in pieces old
and young ; and with thee will 1 break in pieces the
young man and the maid, &c. It is reprefented, that
the defigns of Nebuchadnezzar, and thofe that de-
flroyed Jerufalem, never could have been accom-
plifhed, had not God determined them, as well as
they; Lam, iii. 37. Who is he that faith, and it
cometh to pafs, and the Lord commandeth it not? And
yet the King of Babylon's thus deftroying the na
tions, and efpecially the Jews^ is fpoken of as his
great wickednefs, for which God finally deftroyed
him. Ifa. xiv. 4, 5, 6, 12. Hob. ii. 5,— 12. and
Jer. chap. 1. and li. It is moft manifeft, that God,
to ferve his own defigns, providentially ordered
Shlmel's curling David. 2 Sam. xvi. 10, i r. The
Lord hath faid unto him, curfe David. — Let him
curfe, for the Lord hath bidden him.
It is certain, that God thus, for excellent, holy,
gracious and glorious ends, ordered the fad;
which they committed, who were concerned in
Chrift's
362 How GOD is concerned Part IV.
(Thrift's death ; and that therein they did but ful
fil God's defigns. As, I truft, no Chriftian will
deny it was the defign of God, that Chrilt Ihould
be crucified, and that for this end, he came into
the world. It is very manifeft, by many Scrip
tures, that the whole affair of Chrift's crucifixion,
with its circumftances, and the treachery of Judas,
that made way for it, was ordered in God's
Providence, in pursuance of his purpofc ; not-
withftanding the violence that is uied with thofe
plain Scriptures, toobfcure and pervert the fenfe
of them. Acts ii. 23. Him being delivered, by the
determinate counfel and foreknowledge of God, *ye
have taken, and with wicked hands, have crucified
andfiain. ^ Luke xxii. 21, 22. \ But behold the
hand of him that letrayeth me, is with me on the
table : and truly the Son of Man goeth, as it was
determined. A6h iv. 27, 28. For of a truth,
agalnft the holy child Jefus, whom thou haft anointed,
both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles,
and the people of Ifrael, were gathered together, for
/a do whatsoever thy hand and thy counfel determined
before to be done. Ads iii. 17, 18. And now, bre
thren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did
'•' Grot his, as well as Btza, obferves, vrpyoto-it muft
here fignify decree ; and Elfner has mewn that it has that
fignification, in approved Greek writers. And it is cer
tain ijt3£r& fignifies one given up into the hands of an
enemy." Dodelridge in Loc.
t " As this paffage is not liable to the ambiguities, which
iome have apprehended in Atls ii. 23. and iv. 28. (which
yet Teem on the whole to be parallel to it, in their molt
natural conftruclion) I look upon it as an evident proof,
that thefe things are, in the language of Scripture, faid
to be determined or decreed (or exaftly bounded and
marked out by God, as the word u^u moil naturally fi<r.
nihes) which he fees in fad will happen, in conlequence
of his volitions, without any neceffitating agency; as well
as thofe events, of which he is properly the Author "
Dodd in LGC.
alfo
Sea. IX. ' ^ tie Exiftence of Sin. 363
alfo your rulers : but thefe things, which God before
had /hewed by the mouth of all Us prophets^ that
Chriftjhouldjuffer^ he hath fo fulfilled. So that what
thefe murderers of Chrift did, is fpoken of as
what God brought to pafs or ordered, and that
by which he fulfilled his own word,
In Rev. xvii. 1 7. Tloe agreeing of the Kings of the
earth to give their kingdom to the beaft, though it
was a very wicked thing in them, is fpoken of as
a fulfilling God's Will^ and what God had put into
their hearts to do. It is mamfeft, that God fome-
times permits Sin to be committed, and at the
fame time orders things fo, that if he permits the
fad, it will come to pafs, becaufe, on fome ac
counts, he fees it needful and of importance, that
it fhould come to pafs. Matt, xviii. 7. // mujt
needs be, that offences come •, but wo to that man by
whom the offence cometh. With i Cor. xi. 19. For
there mujl alfo be henfies among you, that they which
are approved may be made manifejl among you.
Thus it is certain and demonftrable, from the
holy Scriptures, as well as the nature of things,
and the principles of Arminians, that God permits
Sin •, and at the fame time, fo orders things, in
his Providence, that it certainly and infallibly will
come to pafs, in confequence of his permifTion.
I proceed to obferve in the next place,
III. That there is a great difference between
God's being concerned thus, by his permiffion, in
an event and act, which, in the inherent fubject
and agent of it, is Sin, (though the event will
certainly follow on his ptrmifTion) and his being
concerned in it by producing it and exerting the
act of Sin \ or between his being the Orderer of
its certain exiftence, by not hindering it, under
certain
364 &ow GOD is concerned Part IV.
certain circumftances, and his being the proper
Attor or Author of it, by a pojitive Agency or Effi
ciency. And this, notwithftanding what Dr. Wkitby
offers about a laying of philofophers, that caufa
deficient^ in rebus neceffariis, ad catifam per fe ejfici-
entem rcducenda eft. As there is a vaft diiference
between the fun's being the caufe of the light-
fomenefs and warmth of the atmofphere, and
brightnefs of gold and diamonds, by its pre-
fence and pofitive influence ; and its being the
occafion of darknefs and froft, in the night,
by its motion, whereby it defcends below the
horizon. The motion of the fun is the occa
fion of the latter kind of events ; but it is not
the proper caufe, efficient or producer of them ;
though they are neceflarily confequent on that
motion, under fuch circumfrances : no more is
any action of the Divine Being the Caufe of the
Evil of men's wills. If the fun were the proper
caufe of cold and darknefs, it would be the foun
tain -of thefe things, as it is the fountain of light
and heat : and then fomething might be argued
from the nature of cold and darknefs, to a
likenefs of nature in the fun ; and it might be
juftly inferred, that the fun itfelf is dark and
cold, and that his beams are black and frofty.
But from its being the caufe no otherwife than by
its departure, no fuch thing can be inferred, but
the contrary ; it may juftly be argued, that the
fun is a bright and hot body, if cold and dark
nefs are found to be the confcquence of its with-
drawment ; and the more conftantly and necef-
farily thefe effects are connected with, and confined
to its abience, the more ftrongly does it argue
the fun to be the fountain of light and heat.
So, inafmuch as Sin is not the Fruit of any pofi
tive Agency or Influence of the Mod High, but,
on the contrary, arifes from the withholding of his
adtion
Seel. IX. in the Exiftence of Sin. 36$
aftion and energy, and, under certain circum-
ftances, neceflarily follows on the want of his in
fluence; this is no argument that he is finful, or
his operation evil, or has any thing of the nature
of Evil ; but, on the contrary, that He, and his
Agency, are altogether good and holy, and that
He is the Fountain of all Holinefs. It would
be ftrange arguing, indeed, becauie men never
commit Sin, but only when God leaves them to
tbemfehes, and neceflarily fin, when he does ib,
and therefore their Sin is not from tbemfehes^ but
from God ; and fo, that God muft be a finful
Being; as ftrange as it would be to argue, be-
caufe it is always dark when the fun is gone, and
never dark when the fun is prefent, that therefore
all darkneis is from the fun, and that his difk and
beams muft needs be black.
IV. It properly belongs to the Supreme and
Abfolute Governor of the Univerfe, to order all
important events within his dominion, by his
wifdom : but the events in the moral world are
of the moft important kind ; fuch as the moral
actions of intelligent creatures, and their confe-
quences.
Thefe events will be ordered by fomething.
They will either be difpofed by wifdom, or they
will be difpofed by chance; that is, they will be
difpofed by blind and undefigning caufes, it that
were poflible, and could be called adifpofal. Is
it not better, that the good and evil which hap
pens in God's world, mould be ordered, regu
lated, bounded and determined by the good pka-
fure of an infinitely wife Being, who perfectly
comprehends within his understanding and con
front view, the univerfality of things, in all
their excent and duration, and fees all the influ
ence
$66 How GOD is concerned Part IV.
cnce of every event, with refpect to every indi
vidual thing and circumftance, throughout the
grand fyftem, and the whole of the eternal feries
of confequences ; than to leave thefe things to
fall out by chance, and to be determined by thofe
caufes which have no understanding or aim ?.
Doubtlefs, in thefe important events, there is a
better and a worfe, as to the time, f object,
place, manner and circum fiances of their com
ing to pafs, with regard to their influence on the
itate and courfe of things. And if there be, it is
certainly belt that they mould be determined to
that time, place, &c. which is bell. And there
fore it is in its own nature fit, that wifdom, and
not chance, mould order thefe things. So that
it belongs to the Being, who is the PofTefTor of
infinite Wifdom, and is the Creator and Owner
of the whole fyftem of created exigences, and
has the care of all ; I fay, it belongs to him, to
take care of this matter \ and he would not do
what is proper for him, if he fhould neglect it.
And it is fo far from being unholy in him, to un
dertake this affair, that it would rather have been
unholy to neglect it ; as it would have been a
neglecting what fitly appertains to him ; and fo
it wrould have been a very unfit and unfuitablc
neglect.
Therefore the fovereignty of God doubtlcfs ex
tends to this matter: efpecially confidering, that
if it fhould be fuppofed to be otherwife, and God
ihould leave men's volitions, and all moral events,
to the determination and difpolition of blind
unmeaning caufes, or they fhould be left to
happen perfectly without a caufe ; this would
be no more confiftent with liberty, in any no
tion of it, and particularly not in the Armiman
notion of it, than if thefe events were fubject to
the
Sect IX. in tie Exiftence of Sin. 367
the difpofal of Divine Providence, and the will
of man were determined by circumftances which
are ordered and difpofed by Divine Wifdom -, as
appears by what has been already obferved. But
it is evident, that fuch a providential difpoling
and determining men's moral actions, though it
infers a moral neceffity of thofe actions, yet it
does not in the leafl infringe the real liberty of
'mankind ; the only liberty that common ienfe
teaches to be necefiary to moral agency, which,
as has been demonftrated, is not inconfiftent with
fuch necefiity.
On the whole, it is manifeft, that God may be,
in the manner which has been defcribed, the
Orderer and Difpofer of that event, which, in the
inherent fubject and. agent, is moral Evil ; and
yet His fo doing may be no moral Evil. He may.
will the difpofal of fuch an event, and its com
ing to pafs for good ends, and his will not be
an immoral or finful will, but a perfect holy
will. And he may actually, in his Providence,
fo difpofe and permit things, that the event may
be certainly and infallibly connected with fuch
difpofal and permiffion, and his" act therein not
be an immoral or unholy, but a perfectly holy
act. Sin may be an evil thing, and yet that there
ihould be fuch a difpofal and permiffion, as that
it mould come to pafs, may be a good thing. This
is no contradiction, or inconfiflence. Jofepk's
brethren's felling him into Egypt, confider it only
as it was acted by them, and with refpect to their
views and aims which were evil, was a very bad
thing ; but it was a good thing, as it was an
event of God's ordering, and conlidered with re
fpect to his views and aims which were good.
Gen. 1. 20. As for y 011, ye thought Evil againft me-9
but God meant it unto Good, So the crucifixion of
Chrift,
368 D/ GOD's fecret Part IV.
Chrift, if we confider only thofe things which
belong to the event as it proceeded from his
murderers, and are comprehended within the
compafs of the affair confidered as their acl:, their
principles, difpofitions, views and aims-, fo it
was one of the moil heinous things that ever was
done ; in many refpects the moil horrid of all
ac~ls : but confider it, as it was willed and or
dered of God, in the extent of his defigns and
views, it was the mofl admirable and glorious of
all events ; and God's willing the event was the
moil holy volition of God, that ever was made
known to men -, and God's acl; in ordering it, was
a divine adl, which, above all others, manifefts
the moral excellency of the Divine Being.
The confideration of thefe things may help us
to a iufficient aniwer to the cavils of Arminians,
concerning what has been fuppofed by many
Calvinifts, of a diftinction between zfaret and re
vealed Will of God, and their diverfity one from
die other ; fnppofmg that the Cafoinifts herein af-
cribe inconfiitent Wills to the Moft High : which
is without any foundation. God's fecret. and re
vealed Will, or, in other words, his difpofing and
perceptive Will may be diverfe, and exercifed in
diffimilar ac~ls, the one in difapproving and oppo-
fmg, the other in willing and determining, with
out any inconfiftence. Becaufe, although thefe dif-
finiilar exercifes of the Divine Will may, income
refpeds, relate to the fame things, yet, in ft -.ictnefs,
they have different and contrary objefts, the one
evil and the other good. Thus, for inilance, the
crucifixion of Chrift was a thing contrary to the
revealed or perceptive Will of God •, becaufe, as
it was viewed and done by his malignant murder-
ers, it was a thing infinitely contrary to the holy
Nature of God, and fo neceffarily contrary to die
holy
. IX. and revealed mil. 369
holy inclination of his heart revealed in his law.
Yet this does not at all hinder but that the cruci
fixion of Chrift, confidered with all thofe glorious
confequences, which were within the view of the
Divine Ornnifcience, might be indeed, and there
fore might appear to God to be, a glorious event 5
and confequently be agreable to his will, though
this Will may be fecret, i. e, not revealed in God's
law. And thus confidered, the Crucifixion of
Chrift was not evil, but good. If the fecret ex-
crcifes of God's Will were of a kind that is difli*
milar, and contrary to his revealed Will, refpect-
ing the fame, or like objects •, if the objects of
both were good, or both evil ; then, indeed, to
afcribe contrary kinds of volition or inclination
to God, refpecting thefe objects, would be to af
cribe an inconfiftent Will to God : but to afcribe
to Him different and oppofite exerciies of heart,
refpecting different objects, and objects contrary
one to another, is fo far from fuppofing God's
Will to be Inconfijlent with itfelf, that it cannot be
fuppofed confident with itfelf any other way. For
any Being to have a Will of choice refpecting
good, and, at the fame time, a Will of rejection and
refufal refpecting evil, is to be very confident :
but the contrary, viz. to have the fame Will to- .
wards thefe contrary objects, and to chufe and
love both good and evil, at the fame time, is to be
very inconfiftent.
There is no inconfiftence in fuppofing, that
God may hate a thing as it is in itfelf, and con
fidered fimply as evil, and yet that it may be his
Will it Ihould come to pafs, confidering all con
fequences. I believe, there is no perfon of good
underftanding, who will venture to fay, he is
certain that it is impoffible it mould be beft, tak
ing in the whok compafs and extent of exiftence,
B b and
370 Of GOD's fecret Part IV.
and all confequences in the endlefs feries of
events, that there fhould be fuch a thing as moral
evil in the world. * And, if fo, it will certainly
follow,
* Here arc worthy to be obferved fome paffages of a late
noted writer, of our nation, that no body who is acquainted
with him, will fufpect to be very favourable to Cal-vinifm.
" It is difficult (fays he) to handle the uecejjity of evil in fuch
*' a manner, as not to ftumble fuch as, are not above being
*' alarmed at proportions which have an uncommon found.
ft But if philofophers will but reflect calmly on the matter,
*' they will find, that confidently with the unlimited power
*' of the Supreme Caufe, it may be faid, that in the beft or-
" dered fyftem, evils muft have place." — Turnbuir* PRIN
CIPLES of moral Pkilofopby, p. 327, 328. He is there fpeak-
ing of moral evils, as may be feen.
Again the fame Author, in his Second Vol. entitled, Cbri-
fian Philofophy, p. 35. has thefe words : «« If the Author and
" Governor of all things be infinitely per fed, then whatever
" is, is right ; of all poffible fyftems he hath chofen the bejl :
f{ and, confequently, there is no abfolute evil in. the univerfe.—
" This being the cafe, all the feeming impirfe&ions or evils
" in it are fuch only in a partial view; and, with refpect to
" the whole fyftem, they are goods.
Ibid. p. 37. " Whence then comes evil, is the queftion that
** hath, in all ages, been reckoned the Gordian knot in philo-
" fophy. And, indeed, if we own the exiftence of evil in the
" world in an abfolute fenfe, we diametrically contradict what
" hath been juft now proved of God. For if there be any
*' evil in the fyftem, that is not good with refped to the whole,
" then is the nv&o/e not good, but evil : or, at beft, very im-
** perfect : and an Author muft be as his ivorkmanjhip is ; as
** is the effect, fuch is the caufe. But the folution of this
** difficulty is at hand ; That there is no evil in the univerfe.
4f What '. Are there no pains, no imperfections ? Is there no
** mifery, no vice in the world? or arc not thefe evils?
" Evils indeed they are ; that is, thofe of one fort are hurt-
" ful, and thofe of the other fort are equally hurtful, and
" abominable : but they are not evil or mifclnevous with re-
" fpecttotheav/^."
Ibid. p. 42. f( But He is, at the fame time, faid to create
* * evil, darknefs, confufion ; and yet to do no evil, but to be
* * the Author of good only. He is called the Father of L igbts,
** the Author of every perf eft and good gift, <witb<whcm there
** is no variablentfs nor Jhadcw of turning, who tempt eth n»
•' man,,
&ft. IX. and revealed mil. 371
follow, that an infinitely wife Being, who always
chufes what is beft, muft chufe that there fhould
be fuch a thing. And, if fo, then fuch a choice
is not an evil, but a wife and holy choice. And
if fo, then that Providence which is agreable to
fuch a choice, is a wife and holy Providence.
Men do will fin as fin, and fo are the authors
and a<5tors of it : they love it as fin, and for
evil ends and purpofes. God does not will fin as
fin, or for the fake of any thing evil ; though it
be his plealure fo to order things, that, He per
mitting, fin will come to pafs ; for the fake ot the
great good that by his difpofal lhall be the con-
iequence. His willing to order things fo that
evil fhould come to pafs, for the fake of the con
trary good, is no argument that He does not hate
evil, as evil : and if fo, then it is no reafon why
he may not reafonably forbid evil as evil, and pu-
nifh it as fuch.
The Armmians themfelves muft be obliged,
whether they will or no, to allow a diftinction of
God's Will, amounting to juft the fame thing
that Calvintfts intend by their diftinction vi^Jecret
.and reveahd WilL They muft allow a diftinclion
of thofe things which God thinks beft Ihould be,
confidering all circumftances* and confequences,
and fo are agreable to his difpofing Will, and thofe
things which he loves, and are agreable to his
" tnan, butgivetk fo all mtn liberally, and upbraidetb ntt. And
<{ yet, by the prophet Ifaias, He is introduced faying of
' Himfelfj I form light , and create darknefs ; / make peace, and
*' create evil: I the Lord, do all tbefe things. What is the
" meaning, the plain language of all this, but that the Lord
" delighteth in goodnefs, and (as the Scripture fpeaks) evil
'* is bis ftrange work? He intends and purfues the univerfal
<* good of his creation: and the evil which happens, is not
" permitted for its own fake, or through any pleafure in evil,
" but becaufe it is requiiite to the greater good purfued."
B b 2 nature,
37* Of GOD's fecret Part IV.
nature, in themfelves confidered. Who is there
that will dare to fay, that the hellifh pride, malice
and cruelty of devils, are agreable to God, and
what He likes and approves? And yet, I truft,
there is no Chriflian divine but what will allow,
that it is agreable to God's Will fo to order and
difpofe things concerning them, fo to leave them
to themfelves, and give them up to their own
wickednefs, that this perfect wickednefs fhould
be a neceflary confequence. Befure Dr. Whitfrfs
words do plainly fuppofe and allow it. *
Thefe following things may be laid down as
maxims of plain truth, and indifputable evi
dence.
1. That God is a perfeBly happy Being, in the
moft abfolute and higheil fenfe poflible.
2. That it will follow from hence, that God is
free from every thing that is contrary to happinefs ;
and fo, that in ftrict propriety of fpeech, there is
no fuch thing as any pain, grief, or trouble, in
God.
3. When any intelligent being is really crofTcd
and difapp pointed, and things are contrary to what
he truly defires, he is the lefs pkafed, or has lefs
fleafure, his pleafure and happinefs is diminiJJoed^ and
he fuffers what is difagreable to him, or is the
fubject of fomething that is of a nature contrary
to joy and happinefs, even pain and grief, -f
on the live Points, Edit. 2. 300, 305, 309.
f Certainly it is not lefs abfurd and unreasonable, to talk
cf God's Will and Defires being truly and properly crorTed,
without his fuffering any urieafinefs, or any thing grievous or
difagreable, than it is to talk of fomething that may be called
a revealed Will, which may, in fome refpedl, be different
from a. fecret purpofe ; which purpofe may be fulfilled, when
the other is oppofed.
From
8eft IX. and revealed Will. 373
From this laft axiom, it follows, that if no
diftindtion is to be admitted between God's hatred
of fin, and his Will with rcfpect to the event
and the exiftence of Cm, as the ail-wife Determiner
of all events, under the view of all confequences
through the whole compafs and feries of things ;
I fay, then it certainly follows, that the coming
to pafs of every individual act of fin is truly, all
things confidered, contrary to his Will, and that
his Will is really crofted in it; and this in pro
portion as He hates it. And as God's hatred of
fin is infinite, by reafon of the infinite contra
riety of his Holy Nature to fin ; fo his Will is
infinitely crofted, in every act of fin that happens.
Which is as much as to fay, He endures that
which is infinitely difagreable to Him, by means
of every act of fin that He fees committed. And,
therefore, as appears by the preceding pofitions,
He endures truly and really, infinite grief or
pain from every fin. And fo He muft be infi
nitely crofled, and fuffer infinite pain, every day,
in millions of millions of inflances : He muft
continually be the fubject of an immenfe num-
of real, and truly infinitely great crofies and vex
ations. Which would be to make him infinitely
the moil miferable of all Beings.
If any objector ihould fay ; all that thefe
things amount to, is, that God may do evil that
good may come ; which is juftly efteemed immoral
and finful in men ; and therefore may be juftly
efteemed inconfiftent with the moral perfections
of God. I anfwer, that for God to difpofe and
permit evil, in the manner that has been fpoken
of, is not to do evil that good may come ; for it
is not to do evil at alL — In order to a thing's
being morally evil, there mint be one of thefe
things belonging to it : either it muft be a thing
B b 3 unfa
374 Of GOD's fecret Part IV.
unfit and unsuitable in its own nature ; or it muft
have a lad tendency ; or it muft proceed from an
evil diffofition, and be done for an evil end. But
neither of thefe things can be attributed to God's
ordering and permitting fuch events, as the im
moral ads of creatures, for good ends, (i.) It
is not unfit in its own nature , that He fhould do fo.
For it is in its own nature /£, that infinite ivifdom9
and not blind chance, fhould difpofe moral good
and evil in the world. And it is//, that the
Being who has infinite wifdom^ and is the Maker,
Owner, and Supreme Governor of the World,
fhould take care of that matter. And, therefore,
there is no unfitnefs, or unfuitablenefs in his do
ing it. It may be unfit, and fo immoral, for any
other beings to go about to order this affair ; be-
caufe they are not poffeffed of a wifdom, that in
any manner fits them for it -, and, in other refpedls,
they are not fit to be trufted with this affair ; nor
does it belong to them, they not being the owners
and lords of the univerfe.
We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wife
and good man knew with abfolute certainty, it
would be beft, all things confidered, that there
ihould be fuch a thing as moral evil in the
world, it would not be contrary to his wifdom
and goodnefs, for him to chufe that it fhould be
fo. It is no evil defire, to defire good, and to
defire that which, all things confidered, is beft.
Anil it is no unwife choice, to chufe that that
Ihould be, which it is beft fhould be ; and to chufe
the exiftence of that thing concerning which this
is known, viz. that it is beft it fhould be, and fo
is known in the whole to be moft worthy to be
chofen. On the contrary, it would be a plain
defect in wifdom and goodnefs, for him not to
chufe it. And the reafon why he might not or
der
Sect. IX. and revealed 1VIIL 3 75
der it, if he were able, would not be becaufe he
might not defire it, but only the ordering of that
matter does not belong to him. But it is no harm
for Him who is, by right, and in the greateit
propriety, the Supreme Orderer of all things, to
order every thing in fuch a manner, as it would
be a point of wifdom in Him to chufe that they
ihould be ordered. If it would be a plain defect
of wifdom and goodnefs in a Being, not to chufe
that that Ihould be, which He certainly knows
it would, all things confidered, be belt Ihould
be (as was but now obferved) then it muft be im-
poffible for a Being who has no defect of wifdom
and goodnefs, to do otherwife than chufe it ihould
be^ and that, for this very reafon, becaufe He
is perfectly wife and good. And if it be agreable
to perfect wifdom and goodnefs for him to chufe
that it ihould be, and the ordering of all things
fupremely and perfectly belongs to him, it muft
be agreable to infinite wifdom and goodnefs, to
order that it ihould be. If the choice is good,
the ordering and difpofing things according to
that choice muft alfo be good. It can be no harm
in one to whom it belongs tv do his Will in the
armies of heaven, and amonfft the inhabitants of the
earth, to execute a good volition. If this Will
be good, and the object of his Will be, all things
confidered, good and beft, then the chufing or
willing it is not willing evil that good may come.
And if fo, then his ordering, according to that
Will, is not deing evil, that good may come,
2. It is not of a bad tendency, for the Supreme
Being thus to order and permit that moral evil
to be, which it is beft ihould come to pafs. For
that it is of good tendency, is the very thing
fuppofed in the point now in queftion. — Chrift's
Crucifixion, though a moft horrid fact in them that
B b 4 perpe-
376 Of Sin's firft Entrance Part IV.
perpetrated it, was of moft glorious tendency as
permitted and ordered of God.
3. Nor is there any need of fuppofmg, \t pro
ceeds from any evil difpofaion or aim : for by the
fuppofition, what is aimed at is good, and good
is the actual iffue, in the final refult of things.
SECTION X.
Concerning Sin's firft Entrance info tie World.
THE things, which have already been offered,
may ferve to obviate or clear many of the
obje&ions which might be raifed concerning Sin's
firft coming into the world ; as though it would
follow from the doctrine maintained, that God
muft be the Author of the firft Sin, through his fo
difpofing things, that it Ihould necefTarily follow
from his permifTion, that the fmful act fhould be
committed, &c. I need not, therefore, Hand to
repeat what has been faid already, about fuch a
necefiity's not proving God to be the Author of
Sin, in any ill fenfe, or in any fuch fenfe as to
infringe any liberty of man, concerned in his
moral agency, or capacity of blame, guilt and
puniihment.
But, if it fhould neverthelefs be faid, fuppofing
the cafe fo, that God, when he had made man,
might fo order his circum fiances, that from thefe
circumftances, together with his withholding fur
ther afliftance and Divine Influence, his Sin would
infallibly follow, why might not God as well
have firft made man with a fixed prevailing prin
ciple of Sin in his heart ?
I anfwer,
Seel. X. into the World.
I anfwer, i . It was meet, if Sin did come into
cxiftence, and appear in the world, it fhould arife
from the imperfection which properly belongs to
a creature, as fuch, and Ihould appear fo to do,
that it might appear not to be from God as the
efficient or fountain. But this could not have
been, if man had been made at firft with Sin
in his heart ; nor unlefs the abiding principle and
habit of Sin were firit introduced by an evil act
of the creature. If Sin had not arofe from the
imperfection of the creature, it would not have
been fo vifible, that it did not arife from God, as
the pofitive caufe, and real fource of it.- — But it
would require room that cannot be here allowed,
fully to confider all the difficulties which have
been ftarted, concerning the firft Entrance of Sin
into the world.
And therefore,
2. I would obferve, that objections againft the
doctrine that has been laid down, in oppofition
to the Arminlan notion of liberty, from thefe
difficulties, are altogether impertinent ; becaufe
no additional difficulty is incurred, by adhering
to a fcheme in this manner differing from theirs,
and none would be removed or avoided, by agree-
ing with, and maintaining theirs. Nothing that
the Arminians fay, about the contingence, or felf-
determining power of man's will, can ferve to ex
plain, with lefs difficulty, how the firit finful voli
tion of mankind could take place, and man be jult-
ly charged with the blame of it. To fay, the will
was felf-determined, or determined by free choice,
in that finful volition ; which is to lay, that the
firft finful volition was determined by a foregoing
finful volition -, is no folution of the difficulty.
It is an odd way of folving difficulties, to ad
vance greater, in order to it. To fay, two and
two
378 Of Sin's firft Entrance, &c. Part IV;
two makes nine •, or, that a child begat his fa
ther, folves no difficulty : no more does it, to
fay, the firft finful act of choice was before the
firft finful ad of choice, and chofe and deter
mined it, and brought it to pafs. Nor is it any
better folution, to fay, the firft finful volition
chofe, determined and produced itfelf; which is
to fay, it was before it was. Nor will it go any
further towards helping us over the difficulty, to
fay, the firft finful volition arofe accidentally,
without any caufe at all ; any more than it will
folve that difficult queftion, How the world could
be made out of nothing? to fay, it came into being
out of nothing, without any caufe ; as has been
already obferved. And if we mould allow that
that could be, that the firft evil volition mould
arife by perfect accident, without any caufe ; ic
would relieve no difficulty, about God's laying
the blame of it to man. For how was man to
blame for perfect accident, which had no caufe,
and which, therefore, he (to be fure) was not the
caufe of, any more than if it came by fbme ex--
ternal caufe ? — Such kind of folutions are no bet
ter, than if fome perfon, going 'about to folve
fome of the ftrange mathematical paradoxes, about
infinitely great and fmall quantities ; as, that fome
infinitely great quantities are infinitely greater than
fome other infinitely great quantities ; and alfo
that fome infinitely fmall quantities, are infinitely
lefs than others, which yet are infinitely little ; in
order to a folution, mould fay, that mankind have
been under a miftake, in fuppofing a greater quan
tity to exceed a fmaller; and that a hundred, mul
tiplied by ten, makes but a fingle unit.
SECTION
( 379 )
SECTION XL
Of a fuppofed Inconfiftence of thefe Principles with
G 0 D's moral Character.
THE things which have been already ob-
ferved, may be fufficient to anfvver moft of
the objedtions, and filence the great exclamations
of Armenians againll the Cahimjts, from the fup
pofed inconfiftence of Cafoiniftic principles with the
moral perfections of God, as exercifed in his go
vernment of mankind. The confidence of fuch a
doftrine of neceftlty as has been maintained, with
the fitnefs and reafonablenefs of God's commands,
promifes and threatenings, rewards and punim-
ments, has been particularly confidered : the
cavils of our opponents, as though our doctrine
of necefllty made God the author of fin, have
been anfwered •, and alfo their objection againft
thefe principles, as inconfiftent with God's fm-
cerity, in his counfels, invitations and perfua-
fions, has been already obviated, in what has
been obferved, refpecting the confidence of what
Calvinijls fuppofe, concerning the fecret and re
vealed will of God : by that it appears, there is no
repugnance in fuppofing it may be the fecret will
of God, that his ordination and permiflion of
events fhould be fuch, that it ihall be a certain
confequence, that a thing never will come to
pafs ; which yet it is man's duty to do, and fo
God's perceptive will, that he Ihould do ; and
this is the fame thing as to fay, God may fin-
cerely command and require him to do it. And if
he may be fincere in commanding him, he may,
for the fame reafon, be fincere in counfelling, invit
ing and ufing perfuafions with him to do it. Counfels
and
380 Of the Objection Part IV.
and invitations are manifeftations of God's per
ceptive will, or of what God loves, and what is
in itfelf, and as man's act, agreable to his heart ;
and not of his difpofing will, and what he chufes
as a part of his own infinite fcheme of things.
It has been particularly ihewn, Part III. Seel. IV.
that fuch a neceffity as has been maintained, is not
inconfiftent with the propriety and fitnefs of divine
commands •, and for the fame reafon, not incon-
fiflent with the fincerity and invitations and coun
fels, in the Corollary at the end of that Section.
Yea, it hath been Ihewn, Part III. Sect. VII.
Corel, i. that this objection of Armenians, con
cerning the fincerity and ufe of divine exhorta
tions, invitations and counfels, is demonftrably
againft themfelves.
Notwithftanding, I would further obferve, that
the difficulty of reconciling the fincerity of coun
fels, invitations and perfuafiqns with fuch an an
tecedent known fixednefs of all events, as has
been fuppofed, is not peculiar to this fcheme, as
diftinguifhed from that of the generality of Armi-
nians, which acknowledge the abiolute foreknow
ledge of God : and therefore, it would be un-
reafonably brought as an objection againft my
differing from them. The main feeming diffi
culty in the cafe is this : that God, in counfel-
ling, inviting and perfuading, makes a mew of
aiming at, feeking and ufing endeavours for the
thing exhorted and perfuaded to ; whereas, it is
impoflibie for any intelligent being truly to feek,
or ufe endeavours for a thing, which 'he at the
fame time knows, moil perfectly, will not come
to pafs ; and that it is abfurd to fuppofe, he makes
the obtaining of a thing his end, in his calls
and counfels, which he, at the fame time, infal
libly knows will not be obtained by thefe means.
Now,
Se&. XL from God's moral Character. 381
Now, if God knows this, in the utmoft certainty
and perfection, the way by which he comes by
this knowledge makes no difference. If he knows
it is by the neceflity which he fees in things, or
by fome other means; it alters not the cafe. But
it is in effect allowed by Arminians themfelves,
that God's inviting and perfuading men to do
things, which he, at the fame time, certainly
knows will not be done, is no evidence of infin-
cerity ; becaufe they allow, that God has a cer
tain foreknowledge of all men's finful actions
and omifllons. And as this is thus implicitly al
lowed by moil Arminians, fo all that pretend to
own the Scriptures to be the word of God, mud
be conilrained to allow it. — God commanded and
counfelled Pharaoh to let his people go, and ufed
arguments and perfuafions to induce him to it ;
he laid before him arguments taken from his in
finite Greatnefs and almighty Power, (Exod. vii.
1 6.) and forewarned him of the fatal confequen-
ces of his refufal, from time to time : (chap.
viii. i, 2, 20, 21. chap. ix. i, — 5. 13, — 17. and
x, 3, 6.) He commanded Mofes, and the elders
of Jfrael, to go and befeech Pharaoh to let the
people go ; and at the fame time told them, he
knew furely that he would not comply to it.
Exod. iii. 1 8, 19, Andthoufoalt come, thou and the
elders of Ifrael, unto the king of Egypt, and you
Jhall fay unto him ; the Lord €od of the Hebrews
hath met with us ; and now let us go^ we befeech thee>
three days journey into the wlldernefs, that we may
facrifice unto the Lord our God : and, 1 am fure, that
the king of Egypt will not let you go. So our Blefied
Saviour, the evening wherein he was betrayed,
knew that Peter would Ihamefully deny him, be
fore the morning; for he declares it to him with
aiTeverations, to fhew the certainty of it ; and
tells the difciples, that all of them fliould be of
fended
382 Of the Objection Part IV.
fended becaufe of him that night; Matthew
xxvi. 31, — 35. John xiii. $S.Luke xxii. 31, — 34*
John xv\ . 32. And yet it was their duty to avoid
thefe things ; they were very fmful things, which
God had forbidden, and which it was their duty
to watch and pray againft;. and they were obliged
to do fo from the counfels and perfuaftons Chrifl
ufed with them, at that very time, fo to do;
Matthew xxvi. 41. Watch and fray ', that ye enter
not into temptation. So that whatever difficulty
there can be in this matter, it can be no objec
tion againft any principles which have been main
tained in oppofition to the principles of Armi-
nians ; nor does it any more concern me to re
move the difficulty, than it does them, or indeed
all, that call themfelves Chriftians, and acknow
ledge the divine authority of the Scriptures. — Ne-
verthelefs, this matter may poffibly (God allow
ing) be more particularly and largely confidered,
in fome future difcourfe, on the doctrine of pre-
deflination.
But I would here obferve, that however the
defenders of that notion of liberty of will,
which I have oppofed, exclaim againft the doc
trine of CahiniftS) as tending to bring men into
doubts concerning the moral perfections of God;
it is their fcheme, and not the fcheme of Calvi-
ni/lsy that indeed is juflly chargeable with this.
For it is one of the molt fundamental points of
their fcheme of things, that a freedom of will,
confiding in felf-determination, without all ne-
ceceffity, is eiTential to moral agency. This is the
fame thing as to fay, that fuch a determination
of the will, without all neccfiity, muft be in all
intelligent beings, in thofe things, wherein they
are moral agents, or in their moral afts : and from
this it will follow, that God's will is not necef-
farily
. XL from God's moral Character. 383
farily determined, in any thing he does, as a mo
ral agent, or in any of his afts that are of a moral
nature : So that in all things, wherein he acts
holily, juftly and truly ^ he does not aft necefTarily ;
or his will is not neceflarily determined to aft ho-
lily and juftly; becaufe, if it were neceflarily deter-
mined, he would not be a moral agent in thus act-
ing : his will would be attended with neceffity ;
which, they fay, is inconfiftent with moral agency :
" He can aft no otherwife ; He is at no liberty
" in the affair ; He is determined by unavoid-
" able invincible neceflity : therefore fnch agen-
** cy is no moral agency •, yea, no agency at
" all, properly fpeaking : a neceflary agent is
" no agent : He being pafiive, and fubjeft to
" neceflity, what he does is no aft of his, but
" an effect of a neceflity prior to any aft of
" his." This is agreable to their manner of ar
guing. Now then, what is become of all our
proof of the moral perfections of God ? How
can we prove, that God certainly will, in any one
inftance, do that which is jnft and holy •, feeing
his will is determined in the matter by no necef
lity ? We have no other way of proving that any
thing certainly will be, but only by the neceflity
of the event. Where we can fee no neceflity,
but that the thing may be, or may not be, there
we are unavoidably left at a lofs. We have no
other way properly and truly to demonftrate the
moral perfections of God, but the way that Mr.
Chubb proves them, in p. 252, 261, 262, 263. of
his Tracts, ixz. that God mult neceflarily per
fectly know, what is moft worthy and valuable in
itfelf, which, in the nature of things, is bell and
fitteft to be done. And, as this is moft eligible in
itfelf, He, being omnifcient, muft fee it to be fo ;
and being both omnifcient and felf-fufficient, can
not have any temptation to reject it ; and fo muft
neceflarily
384 O/Arminian Arguments, &r. Part IV.
necefTarily will that which is bell. And thus, by
this neceflity of the determination of God's will
to what is good and belt, we demonftrably eita-
blifh God's moral chara&er.
CoroL From things which have been obferved,
it appears, that moft of the arguments from
Scripture, which Arminiam make ufe of to fup-
port their fcheme, are no other than begging the
queftion. For in thefe their arguments, they de
termine in the firft place, that without fuch a
freedom of will as they hold, men cannot be pro
per moral agents, nor the fubjecSh of command,
counfel, perfuafion, invitation, promifes, threaten-
ings, expoftulations, rewards and punifhments ;
and that without fuch freedom it is to no purpofe
for men to take any care, or ufe any diligence,
endeavours or means, in order to their avoiding
fin, or becoming holy, efcaping punilhment or
obtaining happinefs : and having fuppofed thefe
things, which are grand things in queftion in the
debate, then they heap up Scriptures, containing
commands, counfels, calls, warnings, perfuafions,
expoftulations, promifes and threatenings ; (as
doubtlefs they may find enough fuch •, the Bible
is confefledly full of them, from the beginning to
the end) and then they glory, how full the Scrip
ture is on their fide, how many more texts there
are that evidently favour their fcheme, than fuch
as fcem to favour the contrary. But let them firft
make manifeft the things in queilion, which they
fuppofe and take for granted, and fhew them to
be confident with themlelves ; and produce clear
evidence of their truth ; and they have gained
their point, as all will confefs, without bringing
one Scripture. For non£ denies, that there are
commands, counfels, promifes, threatenings, &c.
in the Bible, But unlefs they do thefe things,
their
Sect. XII. JVhetber theft Principles, &c. 385
their multiplying fuch texts of Scripture is infig-
nificant and vain.
It may further be obferved, that fuch Scrip
tures, as they bring, are really againft them, and
not for them. As it has been demonftrated, that
it is their fcheme, and not ours, that is incon-
Merit with the ufe of motives and perfuafives, or
any moral means whatfoever, to induce men to
the practice of virtue, or abftaining from wick-
ednefs : their principles, and not ours, are re
pugnant to moral agency, and inconfiftent with
moral government, with law or precept, with
the nature of virtue or vice, reward or punifh-
ment, and with every thing whatfoever of a mo
ral nature, either on the part of the moral gover
nor, or in the ftate, actions or conduct of the
fubjeft.
SECTION XII.
Of a fuppofed Tendency of thefe Principles to
Atheiim and Licentioufnefs.
IF any object againft what has been maintained,
that it tends to Atbeifm ; I know not on what
grounds fuch an objection can be raifed, unlefs it
be, that fome Atheifts have held a doctrine of
necefilty which they iuppofe to be like this. But
if it be fo, I am perfuaded the Arminians would
not look upon it juft, that their notion- of free
dom and contingence Ihould be charged with a
tendency to all the errors that ever any em
braced, who have held fuch opinions. The Stoic
philofophers, whom the Cdvinifts are charged with
agreeing with, were no Atheifts, but the greateft
Theifts, and nearcft a-kin to Chriftians in their
C c opinions
3 8 6 Wether tbefe Principles Part IV.
opinions concerning the unity and the perfections
of the Godhead, of all the heathen philofophets.
And Epicurus, that chief father of Atheifrn, main
tained no fuch doctrine of neceffity, but was the
greateft maintainer of contingence.
The doctrine of neceffity, which fuppofes a
neceflary connection of all events, on fome ante
cedent ground and reaibn of their exigence, is
the only medium we have to prove the being of
God. And the contrary doctrine of contingence,
even as maintained by Armmlans (which certainly
implies or infers, that events may come into ex-
iflence, or begin to be, without dependence on
any thing foregoing, as their caufe, ground or
reafon) takes away all proof of the being of God;
\vhich proof is fummarily exprefled by the apoitle,
in Rom. i. 20. And this is a tendency to Atbeifm
with a witnefs. So that, indeed, it is the doctrine
of drminians, and not of the Cdvimftsy that is
juftly charged with a tendency tvAtbeifm ; it be
ing built on a foundation that is the utter fub-
verfion of every demonstrative argument for the
proof of a Deity ; as has been mown, Part II.
Sed. III.
And whereas it has often been faid, that the
Cahiniflic doctrine of neceflity faps the founda
tions of all religion and virtue, and tends to the
greateft Licentioufnefs cf practice : this objec
tion is built on the pretence, that our doctrine
renders vain all means and endeavours, in order
to be virtuous and religious. Whkh pretence
has been already particularly confckred in the 51(1
Seffion of this Part \ where it has been c'emon-
ftrated, that this doctrine has no fuch tendency ;
but that fuch a tendency is truly to be charged
on the contrary doctrine : inafmuch as the no
tion
Sed. XII. tend to Atheifm. 387
tion of contingence, which their do&rine implies,
in its certain confequences, overthrows all con-
nedtion in every degree, between endeavour and
event, means and end.
And befides, if many other things, which have
been obferved to belong to the Armmlan dodrine,
or to be plain confequences of it, be confidered,
there will appear juft realbn to fuppofe that, it is
that which mud rather tend to Licentiouihels,
Their doctrine excufes all evil inclinations, which
men find to be natural ; becaule in luch inclina
tions, they are not felf-determined, as fuch incli
nations are not owing to any choice or deter
mination of their own wills. Which leads men
wholly to juftify themfelves in all their wicked
actions, fo far as natural inclination has had a
hand in determining their wills, to the com-
miflion of them. Yea, thele notions, which fup
pofe moral neceflity and inability to be incon-
iiitent with blame or moral obligation, will di
rectly lead men to juftify the vileft acts and prac
tices, from the ftrength of their wicked inclina
tions of all forts ; ftrong inclinations inducing a
moral neceflity *, yea, to excufe every degree of
evil inclination, fo far as this has evidently pre
vailed, and been the thing which has determined
their wills : becauie, fo far as antecedent incli
nation determined the will, fo far the will was
without liberty of indifference and felf-determi^
nation. Which, at laft, will come to this, that
men will juftify themfelves in all the wickedneis
they commit. It has been obferved already, that
this fcheme of things does exceedingly diminilh.
the guilt of fin, and the difference between the
greateft and fmalleft offences; *and if it be
purfued in its real confequences, it leaves room
* Pare III. Seft. VI.
C p 2 for
*S3 WJoethr tlefe Principles Part IV.
for no fuch thing, as either virtue or vice, blame
or praife in the world. * And then again, how
naturally does this notion of the fovereign ielf-
determining power of the will, in all things, vir
tuous or vicious, and whatsoever deferves either
reward or punifhment, tend to encourage men
to put off the work of religion and virtue, and
turning from fin to God ; it being that which
they have a fovereign power to determine them-
felves to, juft when they pleafc •, or if not, they
are wholly excufable in going on in fin, becauie
of their inability to do any other.
If it fhould be faid, that the tendency of this
doctrine of neceflity, to Licentioufnefs, appears
by the improvement many at this day actually
make of it, to juftify themfelves in their diiTolute
couries ; I will not deny that fome men do un-
reafonably abule this doctrine, as they do many
other things, which are true and excellent in their
own nature : but I deny that this proves, the
doctrine itfelf has any tendency to Licentiouf
nefs. I think, the tendency of doctrines, by
what now appears in the world, and in our na
tion in particular, may much more juilly be ar
gued, from the general effect which has been feen,
to attend the prevailing of the principles of Ar-
minianS) and the contrary principles ; as both have
had their turn of general prevalence in our na
tion. If it be indeed, as is pretended, that Cal-
viniftic doctrines undermine the very foundation
or all religion and morality, and enervate and
difannul ail rational motives to holy' and virtu
ous practice ; and that the contrary doctrines
give the inducements to virtue and goodnefs
their proper force, and exhibit religion in a ra-
* Part III. Sc&. VI. Ibid. Sett. VII. Part IV. Sea. I.
Part III. Se£. III. CW, i. after the firit head.
tional
Sect. XII. tend to Licentioufnefs.
tional light, tending to recommend it to the rea-
fon of mankind, and enforce it in a manner that
is agreable to their natural notions of things : I
fay, if it be thus, it is remarkable, that virtue
and religious practice Ihonld prevail moft, when
the former doctrines, ib inconfiftent with it, pre
vailed almofb universally : and that ever fince the
latter doctrines, fo happily agreeing with it, and
of fo proper and excellent a tendency to promote
it, have been gradually prevailing, vice, pro-
phanenefs, luxury and wickednefs of all forts, and
contempt of all religion, and of every kind of
ferioufnefs and ftrictnefs of converfation, mould
proportionably prevail ; and that thefe things
ihould thus accompany one another, and rife and
prevail one with another, now for a whole age
together. It is remarkable, that this happy re
medy (difcovered by the free enquiries, and fu-
perior fenfe and wifdom of this age) againft the
pernicious effects of Calvimfm^ fo inconfiftent with
religion, and tending fo much to banilh all virtue
from the earth, mould, on fo long a trial, be at
tended with no good effect -, but that the confc-
quence ftiould be the reverie of amendment ; that
in proportion as the remedy takes place, and is
thoroughly applied, fo the difeafe mould prevails
and the very fame difmal effect take place, to the
higheft degree, which Cafotnflic doctrines are fup-
pofed to have fo great a tendency to-, even the
banifhingof religion and virtue, and the prevail
ing of unbounded Licentioufnefs of manners. If
thefe things are truly fo, they are very remark-
, and matter of very curious fpeculation.
Ccj SECTION
390 0/Metaphyfical Part IV,
SECTION XIII,
Concerning that Oljsftion again/I the Reafoning, by
which the Calvinitlic doftrine is Jupporteh that-
it is metaphyfical and abftrufe.
IT has often been objected againft the defenders
of Cafoiniftic principles, that in their reafon-
ings, they run into nice fcholaftic diftindtions,
and abftrufe metaphyfical fubtilties, and fet thcfe
in oppolition to common fenfe. And it is pofii-
ble, that, after the former manner, it may be al-
ledged againft the Reaibning by which I have
endeavoured to confute the Armiman fcheme of
liberty and moral agency, that it is very ab,-
ftra&ed and metaphyfical. Concerning this, I
would obferve the following things.
I. If that be made an objc&ion againft the
foregoing Reafoning, that it is metaphysical^ or
may properly be reduced to the fcience of rneta-
fhyficks, it is a very impertinent objection ; whe
ther it be fo or no, is not worthy of any difpute or
controverfy. If the Reafoning be good, it is as
frivolous to enquire what fcience it is properly re
duced to, as what language it is delivered in :
and for a man to go about to confute the argu
ments of his opponent, by telling him, his ar
guments are mttapkyfical, would be as weak as to
tell him, his arguments cculd not be fubftantial,
becaufe they were written in French or Latin. The
queftion is not, whether what is faid be rneta-
phyficks, phyficks, iogick, or mathematicks,
Latin, French, Englifh, or Mohawk? But whe
ther the Reafoning be good, and the arguments
truly conclufive ? The foregoing arguments are
no
. XIII. and abftrufe Reafoning. 391
no more metaphyfical, than thofe which we ufe
againft the Papifts, to difprove their doftrine of
tranfubftantiation; alledging, it is inconfifteht with
the notion of corporeal identity, that it fliould
be in ten thoufand places at the fame time. It
is by metaphvfical arguments only we are able
to prove, that the rational foul is not corporeal ;
that lead or fand cannot think-, that thoughts
are not fquare or round, or do not weigh a
pound. The arguments by which we prove
the being of God, if handled clofely and di-
ftindtly, fo as to mew their clear and demonftra-
tive evidence, muft be metaphy fically treated. It
is by metaphyficks only, that we can demonstrate,
that God is not limited to a place, or is not mu
table : that he is not ignorant, or forgetful ; that
it is impoffible for him to lit, or be unjuft; and
that there is one God only, and not hundreds or
thoufands. And, indeed, we have no.firift.de-
monftration of any thing, excepting mathema
tical truths, but by metaphyficks. We can have
no proof, that is properly demonftrative, of any
one propofition, relating to the being and nature
of God, his creation ot the world, the depen
dence of all things on him, the nature of bodies
or fpirits, the nature of our own fouls, or any of
the great truths of morality and natural religion,
but what is metaphyfical. I am willing, my ar
guments ihould be brought to the tell of the
ilricleft and jnfteft Rcafon, and that a clear, di-
ilincl: and determinate meaning of the terms 1 ufe,
Ihould be infilled on-, but let not the whole be
rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it
the epithet, metaphyfical.
II. If the reafoning, which has been made ufe
of, be in feme fenfe metaphyfical, it will not fol-
C c 4
0/Metaphyfical Part IV.
low, that therefore it mutt needs be abftrufe, un
intelligible, and a-kin to the jargon of the fchools.
I humbly conceive, the foregoing reafoning, at
leaft to thofe things which are moft material be
longing to it, depends on no abflrufe definitions
or diftinctions, or terms without a meaning, or
of very ambiguous and undetermined fignifica-
tion, or any points of fuch abflraction and iub-
tilty, as tends to involve the attentive under-
Handing in clouds and darknefs. There is no
high degree of refinement and abitrufe fpecula-
tion, in determining, that a thing is not before
it is, and fo cannot be the caufe of itfelf •, or that
the firft aft of free choice, has not another act
of free choice going before that, to excite or di
rect it; or in determining, that no choice is made,
while the mind remains "in a flate of abfolute in
difference ; that preference and equilibrium never
co-exift ; and that therefore no choice is made in
a (late of liberty, confiding in indifference : and
that fo far as the will is determined by motives,
exhibited and operating previous to the act of
the will, fo far it is not determined by the act of
the will itfelf; that nothing can begin to be,
which before was not, without a caufe, or
fome antecedent ground or reafon, why it then
begins to be ; that effects depend cm their cauies,
and are connected with them ; that virtue is nor
the worfe, nor fin the better, for the ftrength of
inclination, with which it is practifed, and the
difficulty which thence arifes of doing otherwife ;
that when it is already infallibly known, that the
thing will be, it is not a thing contingent whe
ther it will ever be or no •, or that it can be truly
iaid, notwithftanding, that it is not neceffary it
fhould be, but it either may be, or may not be.
And the like might be obfervcd of many other
thing^
Seel. XIII. and abftrufe Reafoning. 393
things which belong to the foregoing Rea
foning.
If any (hall ftill ftand to it, that the foregoing
Reafoning is nothing but metaphyfical fophiftry ;
and that it muft be fo, that the feeming force of
the arguments all depends on fome fallacy and
wile that is hid in the obfcurity, which always
attends a great degree of metaphyfical abftrac-
tion and refinement-, and fliall be ready to fay,
" Here is indeed fomething that tends to con-
" found the mind, but not to fatisfy it : for who
" can ever be truly fatisfied in it, that men are
" fitly blamed or commended, punifhed or re-
" warded for thofe volitions which are not from
«c themfelves, and of whofe exiftence they are
" not the caufes. Men may refine, as much as
" they pleafe, and advance their abftracl noti-
" ons, and make out a thoufand feeming con-
v traditions, to puzzle our underftandings ; yet
*c there can be no fatisfaction in fuch doctrine as
" this : the natural fenfe of the mind of man
?c will always refill it,"* I humbly conceive, that
fuch
* A certain noted Author of the prefent age fays, the ar
guments for necejjity are nothing but quibbling, or logomachy,
ujing words without a meaning or begging the queftion. — I do
not know what kind of neceffity any authors, he may have re
ference to, are advocates for ; or whether they have managed
their arguments well, or ill. As to the arguments I have
made ufe of, if they are quibbles they may be fhewn fo : fuch
knots are capable of being untied, and the trick and cheat
may be detected and plainly laid open. If this be fairly done,
with refped to the grounds and reafons I have relied upon,
I mall have juft occafion, for the future, to be filent, if not to
be alhamed of my argumentations. I am willing my proofs
fhould be thoroughly examined ; and if there be nothing but
legging the qiieftion, or meer logomachy, or difpute of words,
let it be made manifeft, and fnewn how the feeming ftrength
* of
394 Of Metaphyfical Part IV.
fuch an objeclor, if he has capacity and hu
mility and calmnefs of fpirit, fufficient imparts
ally and thoroughly to examine himfelf, will find
that he knows not really what he would be at ;
and indeed, his difficulty is nothing but a meer
prcjudice, from an inadvertent cuitomary ufc of
words, in a meaning that is not clearly under-
ilood,
of the argument depends on my ufing <aW/ without a mean-
/»?, cr^arifes from the ambiguity of terns, or my making ufc
of words in an indeterminate and unfteady manner; and that
the weight of my reafons .reft mainly on iuch a foundation.:
and then, I mall either be ready to retradl what I have urged,
and thank the man that has done the kind part, or mail be
juilly expofed for my obilinacy.
The fame Author is abundant in appealing, in this affair,
from what he calls logomachy and fopbijlry^ to expedience. __
A perfon can experience only what pafles in his own mind.
But yet, as we may well fuppofe, that all men have the fame
human faculties ; fo a man may well argue from his own ex
perience to that of others, in things that mew the nature of
thofe faculties, and the manner of their operation. But then
one has as good right to alledge his experience, as another.
As to my own experience, I find, that in innumerable things
I can do as I will ; that the motions of my body, in many re-
fpe&s, inftantaneoufly follow the ads of my will concerning
thofe motions ; and that my will has fome command of my
thoughts ; and that the ads of my will are my own, /. e.
that they are ads of my will, the volitions of my own mind ;
or, in other words, that what 1 will, I will. Which, 1 pre-
•fume, is the fum of what others experience in this affair.
But as to finding by experience, that my will is originally
determined by itlelf ; or that, my will firft chufmg what voli
tion there fhall be, the chofen volition accordingly follows ;
and that this is the firft rife of the determination o'f my will
in any affair ; \^r that any volition rifes in my mind contin
gently ; I declare, I know nothing in myfelf, by experience,
of this nature ; and nothing that ever I experienced, carries
the leaft appearance or madow of any fuch thing, or gives
me any more reafon to fuppofe or fufped any fuch thing,
than to fuppofe that my volitions exifted twenty years before
they exifted. It is true, I find rnyielf poffeffed of my voliti
ons, before I can fee the effectual power of any caufe to pro
duce them (for the power and efficacy of the caufe is not feen
but
Se&. XIII. and abftrufe Reafoning, 395
flood, nor carefully refle&ed upon. Let the
objeclor reflecl again, if he has candor and pati
ence enough, and does not fcorn to be at the trou
ble of clofe attention in the affair.— He would
have a man's volition be from himfelf. Let it be
from bimjelf, rnoft primarily and originally of any
way conceivable ; that is, from his own^ choice:
how will that help the matter, as to his being
juftly blamed or praifed, unlefs that choice itfelf
be blame or praife- worthy ? And how is the choice
itfelf (an ill choice, for inflance; blame- worthy,
according to thefe principles, unlefs that be from
himfelf too, in the fame manner ; that is, from
his own choice ? But the original and firft-deter-
mining choice in the affair is not^from his choice:
his choice is not the caufe of it. And if it
be from himfelf fome other way, and not from
his choice, furely that will not help the matter :
If it be not from himfelf of choice, then it is not
from himfelf voluntarily -, and if fo, he is furely
no more to blame, than if it were not from him
felf at all. It is a vanity, to pretend it is a fuf-
ficient anfwer to this, to fay, that it is nothing
but metaphyfical refinement and fubtilty, and fo
attended with obfcurity and uncertainty.
If it be the natural fenfe of our minds, that
what is blame-worthy in a man muft be from
himfelf, then it doubtlefs is allb, that it muft be
from ibmething bad in himfelf, a bad choice, or
but by the effeft) and this, for ought I know, may make fome
imagine, that volition has no caufe, or that it produces it
felf. But I have no more reafon from hence to determine
any fuch thing, than I have to determine that I gave myfelf
my own being, or that I came into being accidentally with
out a caufe, becaufe I firft found myfelf poffefled of being,
before I had knowledge of a caufe of my being.
lad
396 Of Metaphyfical Reafoning. Part IV,
bad difpofition. But then our natural fenfe is, that
this bad choice or difpofition is evil in iifelf, and
the man blame-worthy for it, on its own account,
•without taking into our notion of its blame-
worthinefs, another bad choice, or difpofition
going before this, from whence this arifes : for
that is a ridiculous abfurdity, running us into an
immediate contradiction, which our natural fenfe
of blame- worthinefs has nothing to do with, and
never comes into the mind, nor is fuppofed in the
judgment we naturally make of the affair. As
was demonilrated before, natural fenfe does not
place the moral evil of volitions and difpofitions
in the caule of them, but the nature of them.
An evil thing's being FROM a man, or from
fornething antecedent in him, is not, elfential to
the original notion we have of blame- worthinefs :
but it is its being the choice of the heart ; as
appears by this, that if a thing be from us, and
not from our choice, it has not the nature of
blame- worthinefs or ill-defert, according to our
natural fenfe. When a thing is from a man, in
that fenfe, that it is from his will or choice, he
is to blarne for it, becaufe his will is IN IT : fo
far as the will is in it, blame is in it, and no fur
ther. Neither do we go any further in our no
tion of blame, to enquire whether the bad will
be FROM a bad will : there is no confidera-
tion of the original of that bad will ; becaufe,
acQording to our natural appreheiiiion, blame
vriginally conftjls in it, Therefore a thing's being
from a man, is a fecondary confederation, in the
notion of blame or iil-defert. Becaufe thofq
things, in our external aclions, are moil properly
faid to be from us, which are from our choice ;
and no other external aclions, but thofe that arc
from us in this fenfe, have the nature of blame
Sect. XIII. A Fault of Arminian Writers. 397
and they indeed, not fo properly becaufe they are
from us, as becaufe we are in them, i. e. our wills
'are in them -, not fo much becaufe they are from
fome property of ours, as becaufe they are our
properties.
However, all thefe external actions being truly
from us, as their caufe •, and we being fo nfed, in
ordinary fpeech, and in the common affairs of
life, to fpeak of men's actions and conduct
that we fee, and that affect human fociety, as
deferving ill or well, as worthy of blame or
praife •, hence it is come to pafs, that philofophers
have incautioufly taken all their meafures of
good and evil, praife and blame, from the dic
tates of common ienfe, about thefe overt affs of
men ; to the running of every thing into the molt
lamentable and dreadful confufion. And, there
fore, I obferve,
III. It is fo far from being true (whatever may
be pretended) that the proof of the doctrine
which has been maintained, depends on certain
abilrufe, unintelligible, metaphyfical terms and
notions ^ and that the Armiman fcheme, without
needing fuch clouds and darknefs for its de
fence, is fupported by the plain dictates of com
mon ienfe ; that the very reverfe is moil cer^
tainly true, and that to a great degree. It is fact,
that they, and not we, have confounded things
with metaphyfical, unintelligible notions and
phrafes, and have drawn them from the light of
plain truth, into the grofs darknefs of abiirufe
metaphyfical proportions, and words without a
meaning. Their pretended demonflrations de
pend very much on fuch unintelligible, meta
phyfical phrafes, as f elf- determination, and five-
reignty of the will', and the metaphyfical fenfe
they put on fuch terms, as neceffity, contingency ,
action*
398 Arminians too metaplyJtcaL Part IV.
aftion, agency, &c. quite diverfe from their mean
ing as ufed in common fpeech ; and which, as
they ufe them, are without any cohfiftent mean
ing, or any manner of diftinc~t confident ideas ;
as far from it as any of the abftrufe terms and
perplexed phrafes of the ' peripatetick philofo-
phers, or the moil unintelligible jargon of the
fchools, or the cant of the wildeft fanaticks.
Yea, we may be bold to fay, thefe metaphyfical
terms, on which they build fo much, are what
they ufe without knowing what they mean them-
felvcs ; they are pure metaphyfical founds, with
out any ideas whatsoever in their minds to an-
fwer them ; inafmuch as it has been demonftra-
ted, that there cannot be any notion in the mind
confiftent with thefe expreffions, as they pretend
to explain them -, becaufe their explanations de-
ftroy themfelves. No fuch notions as imply felf-
contradiclion, and felf-abolition, and this a great
many ways, can fubfift in the mind ; as there
can be no idea of a whole which is lefs than
any of its parts, or of lolid extenlion without
dimenfions, or of an effect which is before its
caufe.— — Arminians improve thefe terms, as
terms of art, and in their metaphyfical mean
ing, to advance and eflablifh thoie things which
are contrary to common fenfe, in a high degree.
Thus, initead of the plain vulgar notion of li
berty, which all mankind, in every part of the
face of the earth, and in all ages, have ; con-
filling in opportunity to do as one pleafes ; they
have introduced a new ftrange liberty, con-
fifting in indifference, contingence, and felf de
termination ; by which they involve themfelves
and others in great obfcurity, and manifold grofs
inconfiilence. So, infread of placing virtue and
vice, as common fcnfe places them very much,
in
Sedh XIII. Arminians too metapbyfical. 399
in fixed bias and inclination, and greater virtue
and vice in ftronger and more eftabiifhed inclin-
tion ; thefe, through their refinings and abftrufe
notions, fuppofe a liberty confiiting in indiffe
rence, to be eflential to all virtue and vice.
So they have reafoned themfelves, not by meta-
phyiical diftinctions, but metaphylical confu-
fion, into many principles about moral agency,
blame, praife, reward and puniihment, which
are, as has been ihewn, exceeding contrary to
the common fenfe of mankind -, and perhaps to
their own fenfe, which governs them in common
life.
T J I E
( 4°° )
THE
CONCLUSION.
WHETHER the things which have been
alledged, are liable to any tolerable an-
fwer in the ways of calm, intelligible and ftrict
realbning, I muft leave others to judge : but I
am fenfiblc they are liable to one fort of anfwer.
It is not unlikely, that fome, who value themfelves
on the fuppofed rational and generous principles
of the modern fafhionable divinity, will have their
indignation and difdain railed at the fight of this
dilcourfe, and on perceiving what things are
pretended to be proved in it. And if they think
it worthy of being read, or of io much notice as
to fay much about it, they may probably renew
the ufual exclamations, with additional vehe
mence and contempt, about the fate of the hex*
then, Hobbes's Necejjity^ and making men meer
machines ; accumulating the terrible epithets of
fatal, unfrufirabie, inevitable, Irrefijlible^ &c. and
it may be, with the addition of horrid and blaj-
fhemous ; and perhaps much fkill may be ufed to
fet forth things, which have been faid, in colours
which (hall be mocking to the imaginations, and
moving to the paffions of thole, who have either
too little capacity, or too much confidence of the
opinions
CONCLUSION. 401
opinions they have imbibed, and contempt of
the contrary, to try the matter by any ferious and
circumfped: examination*. Or difficulties may
be ftarted and infilled on, which do not belong to
the controverfy ; becaufe, Jet them be more or
Jefs real, and hard to be refolved, they are not
what are owing to any thing diftinguiihing of
this fcheme from that of the Arminians* and would
not be removed nor diminimed by renouncing the
former, and adhering to the latter. Orfome par
ticular things may be picked out, which they
may think will found harfheft in the ears of the
generality; and thefe may be gloffed and de-
icantecl on, with tart and contemptuous words ;
and from thence, the whole treated with triumph
and infult.
It is eafy to fee, how the deciflon of moft of the
points in controverfy, between Cafoinifts and Ar-
minians, depends on the determination of this grand
article concerning the Freedom of the Will requifite
to moral agency ; and that by clearing and efta-
* A writer, of the prefent age, whom I have feveral times
had occasion to mention, fpeaks once and again of tliofe who
hold the doctrine of Necejjity, as fcarcely worthy of the name
of philofopbers. 1 do not know, whether he has refpecl to
any particular notion of neceiTity, that fome may have main
tained ; and, if fo, what doctrine of neceffity it is that he
means. Whether I am worthy of the name of a philofo-
pher, or not, would be a queftion little to the prefent pur-
pofe. If any, and ever fo many, mould deny it, I fliould
not think it worth the while to enter into a difpute on that
queftion : though at the fame time I might expeft, fome
better ani'wer mould be given to the arguments brought for
the truth of the doctrine I maintain ; and 1 might further rea-
fonably defire, that it might be confidered, whether it does
not become thofe, who are truly worthy of the name of philc-
fopheis, to be fenfible, that there is a difference between ar
gument and contempt i yea, and a difference between the con-
temptiblenefc of the perfon that argues, and the inconclufive-
nefs of the arguments he offers.
D d blifhing
402, Me CONCLUSION.
blifhing the Calvinijlic doctrine in this point, the
chief arguments are obviated, by which Armirium
doctrines in general are fupported, and the con
trary doctrines demonftratively confirmed. Here
by it becomes manifeft, that God's moral govern
ment over mankind, his treating them as moral
agents, making them the objects of his com
mands, counfels, calls, warnings, expoftulations,
promifes, threatenings, rewards and puniihments,
is not inconfiftent with a determining difpofal of
all events, of every kind, throughout the uni-
verfe, in his Providence ; either by politive effici
ency, or permiflion. Indeed, fuch an univerfal
determining Providence, infers fome kind of ne
ceflity of all events, fuch a necefilty as implies
an infallible previous fixednefs of the futurity of
the event : but no other neceflity of moral events,
or volitions of intelligent agents, is needful in
order to this, than moral neceffity ; which does
as much afcertain the futurity of the event, as
any other neceffity. But, as has been demon-
ftrated, fuch a neceflity is not at all repugnant
to moral agency, and a reafonable ufe of com
mands, calls, rewards, punifhments, £cc. Yea,
not only are objections of this kind againft the
doctrine of an univerfal determining Providence, re
moved by what has been laid •, but the truth of
fuch a doctrine is demonftrated. As it has been
demonftrated, that the futurity of all future events
is eftablilhed by previous neceflity, either na
tural or moral •, fo it is manifeil, that the fove-
reign Creator and Difpofer of the world has or
dered this neceflity, by ordering his awn conduct,
either in defignedly acting, or forbearing to act.
For, as the being of the world is from God, fo
the circumflances in which it had its being at
firft, both negative and pofitive, mud be ordered
by him, in one of thefe ways ; and all the necef-
fary
Me CONCLUSION. 403
fary confequences of thefe circumftances, muft
be ordered by him. And God's active and pofi-
tive interpolations, after the world was created,
and the confequences of thefe interpofitions-, alfo
every inilance of his forbearing to interpofe, and
the lure confequences of this forbearance, muft
ail be determined according to his pleafure. And
therefore every event, which is the confequence
of any thing whatfoever, or that is connected
with any foregoing thing or circumftance, either
pofitive or negative, as the ground or reafon of
its exigence, muft be ordered of God ; either by
a defigning efficiency and interpofition, or a de-
figned forbearing to operate or interpofe. But, as
has been proved, all events whatsoever are necel-
iarily connected with fomething foregoing, either
pofitive or negative, which is the ground of its
exiftence. It follows, therefore, that the whole
feries of events is thus connected with fomething
in the ftate of things, either pofitive or negative,
which is original in the feries ; i. e. fomething
which is connected with nothing preceding that,
but God's own immediate conduct, either his act
ing or forbearing to act. From whence it follows,
that as God defignedly orders his own conduct,
and its connected confequences, it mult necefla-
rily be, that he defignedly orders all things.
The things, which have been faid, obviate fomc
of the chief objections of Armenians againft the
Cafoinijlic doctrine of the total depravity and cor
ruption of man's nature, whertby his heart is
•wholly under the power of fin, and he is utterly
unable, without the interpofition of fovereign
grace, favingly to love God, believe in Chrift,
or do any thing that is truly good and acceptable
in God's fight. For the main objection againft
this doctrine is, that it is inconfiftent with the
D d z freedom
404 *fe CONCLUS1O N,
freedom of man's will, confifting in indifference
and fclf-determining power •, becaufe it iuppofes
man to be under a neceffity of finning, and that
God requires things of him, in order to his avoid
ing eternal damnation, which he is unable to do;
and that this doctrine is wholly incontinent with
the fincerity of counfds, invitations, &c. Now,
this doctrine fuppofes no other neceffity of finning,
than a moral necdfity ; which, as has been Ihewn,
does not at all excufe fin ; and fuppofes no other
inability to obey any command, or perform any
duty, even the moft fpiritnal and exalted, but a
moral inability, which, as has been proved, does
not excufe perfons in the non-performance of any
good thing, or make them not to be the proper
objects of commands, couniels and invitations.
And, moreover, it has been fhewn, that there is
not, and never can be, cither in exidence, or fo
much as in idea, any fuch freedom of will, con-
lifting in indifference and felf-determination, for
the fake of which, this doctrine of original fm is
caft out •, and that no fuch freedom is necefTary,
in order to the nature of fin, and a juft defert of
puniflimcnt.
The things, which have been cbferved, do alfo
take off the main objections of Armenians againft
the doctrine of efficacious grace ; and, at the fame
time, prove the grace of God in a finner's con-
verfion (if there be. any grace or divine influence
in the affair) to be efficacious, yea, and irrejtftible
too, if by irreriftible is meant, that which is at
tended with a moral necemty, which -it is impof-
fible iliould ever be violated by any refinance.
The main objection of Anninians againft this doc
trine is, that it is inconfifcnt with their felf-deter-
raining freedom of will ; and that it is repug
nant to the nature of virtue, that it fhould be
wrought
tte CONCLUSION. 405
wrought in the heart by the determining efficacy
and power of another, inftead of its being owing
to a felf-moving power ; that, in that cafe, the
good which is wrought, would not be our virtue,
but rather God's virtue ; becaufe it is not the per-
fon in whom it is wrought, that is the determin
ing author of it, but God that wrought it in him.
But the things, which are the foundation of thefe
objections, have been confidered ; and it has been
demonilrated, that the liberty of moral agents
does not confifl in felf-dete rmining power ; and
that there is no need of any fuch liberty, in order
to the nature of virtue; nor does it at all hinder,
but that the (late or act of the will may be the
virtue of the fubject, though it be not from felf-
determination, but the determination of an in-
trinfic cauie ; even fo as to caufe the event to be
morally necefTary to tire fubject of it. And as
it has been proved, that nothing in the ftate or
acts of the will of man is contingent ; but that,
on the contrary, every event of this kind is ne-
ceffary, by a moral necefllty ; and has alfo been
now demonilrated, that the doctrine of an uni-
verfal determining Providence, follows from that
doctrine of neceflity, which was proved before:
and fo, that God does decilively, in his Provi
dence, order all the volitions of moral agents,
either by pofitive influence or permiffion : and
it being allowed, on all hands, that what God
does in the affair of man's virtuous volitions,
whether it be more or lefs, is by fome pofitive in
fluence, and not by meer permiilion, as in the
affair of a finful volition : if we put thefe things
together, it will follow, that God's afilftance or
influence, mud be , determining and decifive, or
muft be attended with a moral neceflity of the
event -, and fo, that God gives virtue, holinefs
and converfion to finners, by an influence which
D d 3 deter-
4o6 ^CONCLUSION.
jdetermines the effect, in fuch a manner, that the1
effect will infallibly follow by a moral neceflity ;
which is what Oahimfts mean by efficacious and
irrenftible grace.
The things, which have been faid, do likewife
anfwer the chief objections againft the doclrine
of God's univerfal and alfolute decree^ and afford
infallible proof of this doctrine •, and of the doc
trine of abfolute, eternal, perfonal election in par
ticular. The main objections againtl thefe doc
trines are, that they infer a neceffity of the voli
tions of moral agents, and of the future moral
ftate and acts of men ; and fo are not confident
with thofe eternal rewards and punifhments,
which are connected with converfion and impe
nitence ; nor can be made to agree with the rea-
fonablenefs and fincerity of the precepts, calls,
counfels, warnings and expoftulations of the
Word of God ; or with the various methods and
means of grace, which God ufes with linners, to
bring them to repentance ; and the whole of that
moral government, which God exercifes towards
mankind : and that they infer an inconfiftence
between the fecret and revealed Will of God \ and
make God the author of fin. But all thefe things
have been obviated in the preceding difconrie.
And the certain truth of thefe doctrines, con
cerning God's eternal purpofes, will follow from
what was juft now obferved concerning God's uni-
yerfal Providence; how it infallibly follows from
what has been proved, that God orders all events,
and the volitions of moral agents amongft others,
by fuch a decifive difpofal, that the events are
infallibly connected with his difpofal. For if God
difpofes all events, fo that the infallible exigence
of the events is decided by his Providence, then
he, doubtlefs,thus orders and decides things kwnv-
The CONCLUSION. 407
ingly, and on defign. God does not do what- he
does, nor order what he orders, accidentally and
unawares ; either without, or be/id e his intention.
And if there be a foregoing defign of doing and or
dering as he does, this is the fame with n purpofe
or decree. And as it has been fliewn, that nothing
is new to God, in any refpect, but all things arc
perfectly and equally in his view from eternity ;
hence it will follow, that his defigns or purpofes
are not things formed anew, founded on any
new views or appearances, but are all eternal
purpofes. And as it has been now fhewn, how
the doctrine of determining efficacious grace cer
tainly follows from things proved in the forego
ing difcourfe ; hence will necefiarily follow the
doctrine of particular, eternal, abfolute election.
For if men are made true faints, no otherwife
than as God makes them fo, and diftinguifhes
them from others, by an efficacious power and in
fluence of his, that decides and fixes the event ;
and God thus makes fome faints, and not others,
on defign or purpofe, and (as has been now obfer*-
ved) no defigns of God are new •, it follows, that
God thus diitinguifhed from others, all that ever
become true faints, by his eternal defign or decree.
I might alfo mew, how God's certain foreknow
ledge muft fuppole an abfolute decree, and how
fucii a decree can be proved to a demonstration
from it : but that this difcourfe may not be
lengthened out too much, that muft be omitted
for the prefent.
From thefe things it will inevitably follow,
that however Chrift in fome fenfe may be faid to
die for all, and to redeem all vifible Chriftians, yea,
the whole world by his death •, yet there muft be
ibmething particular in the defign of his death,
with refpe<5t to fuch as he intended mould actu-
D d 4 ally
4o8 We CONCLUSION.
ally be faved thereby. As appears by what
been now {hewn, God has the actual falvation or
redemption of a certain number in his proper ab~
folute delign, and of a certain number only •, and
therefore iuch a clefign only can be profecuted
in any thins* God does, in order to the falvation
of men. God purfues a proper defign of the
falvation of the cleft in giving Chrift to die,
and profecutes iuch a defign with refpect to no
other, mod ftrictly fpeaking-, for it is impoffible,
that God ihould profecute any other defign than
only fuch as he has : he certainly does not, in the
higheit propriety and ftrictnefs of fpeech, purfue
a defign that he has riot. — And, indeed, Iuch a
particularity and limitation of redemption will
as infallibly follow, from the doctrine of God's
foreknowledge, as from that of the decree. For
it is as impoflible, in flrictnefs of fpeech, that God
Ihould profecute a defign, or aim at a thing,
which He at the fame time moil perfectly knows
will not be accomplifhed, as that he mould ufe
endeavours for that which is befide his decree.
By the things which have been proved, are
obviated fome of the main objections againft the
doctrine of the infallible and neceffary per/eve-
ranee of. faints, and fome of the main foundations
of this doctrine are eftablifhed. The main pre
judices of Arminlam againft this doctrine feem to
be thefe •, they fuppoie fuch a neceffary, infallible
perfeve ranee to be repugnant to the freedom of
the will ; that it muft be owing to man's own
felf- determining power, that \\Q firft becomes virtu
ous and holy ; and fo, in like manner, it muft be
left a thing contingent, to be determined by the
fame freedom of will, whether he will per lever e
in virtue and holinefs ; and that otherwife his
continuing ftedfaft in faith and obedience would
noc
<tbe CONCLUSION. 409
•not be his virtue, or at all praife-.worthy and re-
wardable •, nor could his perfeverance be properly
the matter of divine commands, counfels arid pro-
-mifes, nor his apoftacy be properly threatened,
and men warned againlt it. Whereas, we find all
.thefe things in Scripture : there we find fledfait-
nefs and perfeverance in true Chriftianity, repre-
fented as the virtue of the faints, fpoken of as
praife- worthy in them, and glorious rewards pro-
mifed to it; and alfo find, that God makes it the
fubject of his, commands, counfels and promifes ;
#nd the contrary, of threatenings and warnings.
But the foundation of thefe objections has been re
moved, in its being Ihewn that moral neceflity and
infallible certainty of events is not inconfiftent
with thefe things -I and that, as to freedom of will
lying in the power of the will to determine itfelf,
there neither is any fuch thing, nor need any of it, in
order to virtue, reward, commands, counfels, &c.
And as the doctrines of efficacious grace and
abfolute election do certainly follow from things,
which have been proved in the preceding ctil-
courfe ; fb fome of the main foundations of the
doctrine of perfeverance, are thereby eftablimed.
If the beginning of true faith and holinefs, and
a man's becoming a true faint at firft, does not
depend on the felt-determining power of the will,
but on the determining efficacious grace of God •,
it may well be argued, that it is aiio with refpect
to men's being continued faints, or perfevering
in faith and hoiinefs. The converfion of a fin-
Tier being not .owing to a man's felf-determina-
tion, but to God's determination, and eternal
election, which is abfolute, and depending on
the fovereign will of God ; and not on the free
.will of man ; as is evident from what has been
faid : and it being very evident from the Scrip
tures,
4io We CONCLUSION.
tures, that the eternal eledtion which there is of
faints to faith and holinefs, is alfo an election of
them to eternal falvation : hence their appoint
ment to falvation muft alfo be abfolute, and not
depending on their contingent, felf-determining
will. From all which it follows, that it is abfo-
lutely fixed in God's decree, that all true faints
fiiall perfevere to adtual eternal falvation.
But I muft leave all thefe things to the con-
fideration of the fair and impartial reader ; and
•when he has maturely weighed them, I would pro-
pofe it to his confideration, whether many of the
iirft reformers, and others that fucceeded them,
whom God in their day made the chief pillars of
bis church, and greatefl inftruments of their de
liverance from error and darknefs, and of the
fupport of the caufe of piety among them, have
not been injured, in the contempt with which
they have been treated by many late writers, for
their teaching and maintaining fuch doclrines as
are commonly called Calvinijlic. Indeed, fome of
thefe new writers, at the fame time that they
have reprefented the doftrines of thefe antient
and eminent divines, as in the higheft degree ri
diculous, and contrary to common fenfe, in an
oftentation of a very generous charity, have al
lowed that they were honeft well-meaning men :
yea, it may be fome of them, as though it were
in great condefccnfion and companion to them,
have allowed, that they did pretty \vell for the
day which they lived in, and coniidering the great
difadvantages they laboured under : when, at the
fame time, their manner of fpeaking has na
turally and plainly fuggefted to the minds of their
readers, that they were perfons, who through
the lownefs of their genius, and greatnefs of the
bigotry, with which their minds were fhackled,
and
tte CONCLUSION. 411
ind thoughts confined, living in the gloomy caves
of fuperftition, fondly embraced, and demurely
and zealouily taught the mod abfurd, filly and
monftrous opinions, worthy of the greateft con*
tempt of gentlemen poiTefTed of that noble and
generous freedom of thought, which happily
prevails in this age of light and enquiry. When,
indeed, fuch is the cafe, that we might, if fo
difpofed, fpeak as big words as they, and on
far better grounds. And really all the Arminians
on earth might be challenged without arrogance
or vanity, to make thefe principles of theirs, where
in they mainly differ from their fathers, whom they
fo much defpife, confident with common fenie ;
yea, and perhaps to produce any doctrine ever
embraced by the blindeit bigot of the Church of
Rome, or the moil ignorant MuJJulman, or ex
travagant enthufiaft, that might be reduced to
more demonstrable inconfiflencies, and repug
nancies to common fenie, and to themfelves ;
though their inconfiftencies indeed may not lie fo
deep, or be fo artfully vailed by a deceitful am
biguity of words, and an indeterminate fignifi-
cation of phrafes. — I will not deny, that thefe
gentlemen, many of them, are men of great
abilities, and have been helped to higher attain
ments in philofophy, than thofe antient divines,
and have done great fervice to the Church of God
in fome refpeds: but I humbly conceive, that their
differing from their fathers, with fuch magifterial
affurance, in thefe points in divinity, muft be ow
ing to fome other cauie than fuperior wifdom.
It may alfo be worthy of confideration, whe
ther the great alteration, which has been made
in the ftate of things in our nation, and fome
other parts of the Proteftant world, in this and
the paft age, by the exploding fo generally Cal-
viniftic
4i2, fbe CONCLUSION.
vimjlic doctrines, that is fo often fpoken of as
worthy to be greatly rejoiced in by the friends of
truth, learning and virtue, as an iuftance of the
great increafe of light in the Chriftian Church ; I
fay, it may be worthy to be confidered, whether
this be indeed a happy change, owing to any fuch
caufe as an increaie of true knowledge and un-
derftanding in things of religion -, or whether
there is not reafon to fear, that it may be owing
to fome worfe caufe.
And I defire it may be confidered, whether the
boklnefs of fome writers may not be worthy to
&e reflected on, who have not ic.ru pled to fay,
that if thefe and thofe things are true (which yet
appear to be the demonftrable dictates of reafon,
.as well as the certain dictates of the mouth of the
MQ& High) then God is unjuft and cruel, and
guilty of manifeit deceit and double dealing, and
the like. Yea, ibrne have gone fo far, as confi
dently to alfert, that if any book which pretends
-to be Scripture, teaches fuch doctrines, that alone
.is fufiicient warrant for mankind to reject it, as
•what cannot be. the -Word of God. Some, who
have not gone fo-far, have faid, that if the Scripture
.feems to teach any fuch doctrines, fo contrary
to : reafon, we are obliged to find out fome other
interpretation of thofe texts, where fuch doc
trines feern to be exhibited. Others exprefs
themfelves yet more modeflly : they exprefs a
-tenderncfs and religious fear, left they fhould re
ceive and teach any thing that mould feem to ie-
fleet on God's moral character, or be a difpa-
ragement to his methods of adminiftration, in
his moral government; and therefore exprefs
themfeives as not daring to eiu brace feme doc
trines, though they feem to be delivered in Scrip-
. ture, according to the more obvious and natural
con-
CONCLUSION. 413.
conftruction of the words. But indeed it would
(hew a truer modefty and humility, if they would
more entirely rely on God's wifdom and difccrn-
ing, who knows infinitely better than we,, what is
agreable to his own perfections, and never in
tended to leave thefe matters to the dccifion of the
wifdom and difcerning of men ; but by his own
unerring inftruction, to determine for us what the
truth is ; knowing how little our judgment is to
be depended on, and extremely prone, vain and
blind men are, to err in fuch matters.
The truth of the cafe is, that if the Scripture
plainly taught the oppofite doctrines, to thofe
that are fo much Humbled at, viz. the Arminian
doctrine of free - will, and others depending
thereon, it would be the greateft of all difficul
ties that attend the Scriptures, incomparably
greater than its containing any, even the mod my-
iterious of thofe doctrines of the firft reformers,
which our late free-thinkers have fo fuperciliouily
exploded. — Indeed, it is a glorious argument of
the divinity of the holy Scriptures, that they teach
fuch doctrines, which in one age and another,
through the blind nefs of men's minds, and flrong
prejudices of their hearts, arc rejected, as moil
abfurd and unreafonable, by the wife and great
men of the world ; which yet, when they are
moil carefully and ftrictly examined, appear to be
exactly agreable to the moft demon finable, certain,
and natural dictates of reafon. By fuch things
it appears, that the foolifhnefs of God is wifer than
men, and God does as is faid in i Cor. i. 19, 20.
For it is written, I will dejlroy the wifdm of the
wife ; I will bring to nothing the under/landing of the
prudent. Where is the wife ! Where is the fcribe !
Where is the difputer of this world r. Hath not God
wade footijlj the wifdom of this world? And as it is
ufed
CONCLUSION.
ufed to be in time paft, fo it is probable it will
be in time to come, as it is there written, in ver.
27, 28, 29. But God hath ckofen the foolijh things
ef the world, to confound the wife: and God hatb
chofen the weak things of the world, to confound the
things that are mighty : and lafe things of the world,
and things which are defpifed, hath God chofen : yea,
and things which are not, to bring to nought things
that are \ that no fofo Jhould glory in his prefence*
Amen.
<$*„&
INDEX.
INDEX.
[N. B. The capital P. fignifies the Part ; Sect.
the Section ; Concl. the Conclufion ; and the
fmall p. the Page •, where the things here fpe-
cified are to be found.]
JBftrafted or abftrufe
Reafoning, whether
juftly objecled againfl
Calvinifts, P. 4. Seel. 13.
p. 390.
4&ion, Inconfiftence
of the Arminian notion
of it, P. 4. Seel. 2. p.
278. and whence this
arofe, ibid. p. 286. whatit
is in the common notion
of it, ibid. p. 282. — and
how diftinguifhed from
Paffion, ibid. p. 284.
Attivity of tbe Nature
of the Soul, whether thro*
this, volition can arife
without a caufe, P. 2.
Seel. 4. p. 66.
Apparent Good, the
greateft, in what fenfe
it determines the will,
P. i. Se<5t. 2. p. 9.
ArminianSy obliged to
talk inconfiflently, P. 2.
Seel. 5. p. 74. Ibid.
Seel. 7. p. 98. Se&. 9.
p. 1 08. where the main
ftrength of their pre
tended demonltrations
lies, P. 4. Seel. 4. p.
307. Their objeclion
from God's moral cha-
racler, confidered and
retorted, ibid. Seel. n.
p. 382,3.
Arminian Dottrine^ its
tendency to fuperfede
all ufe of means, and
make endeavours vaint
P. 4. Seel. 5. p. 312.
and, in effecl, to ex
clude all virtue and
vice out of the world,
P. 3-
INDEX.
P. 3. Seel. 4. p. 226.
234. Ibid. Sect. 6. p.
257, and Seft. 7. p. 266.
P. 4. Seel, i. p. 276.
Ibid. Sett. 12. p. 387.
Aibeifffl) thefuppoicd
tendency of Cahimjlk
principles to it, P. 4.
Seel. 12. p. 385. I~Jow
Armiman principles tend
to it, Ibid. p. 386.
. Attending to Motives^
of liberty's being fup-.
pofed to coniiil in an
ability for it, P. 2. Seel.
5). p. 112.
Atonement. SeeCuRis'T
Author of Sin, whether
it would follow from
the doclrine "here main
tained, that GOD is fo,
P. 4. Scd. 9. p. 354.
B.
A ME - worthinefs,
wherein it confifts,
according to common
lenfe, P. 4. Seel. 4. p.
297.
C.
confident
with common fenfe,
P. 4. Seel. 3. p. 288.
Caufe, how the word
Is ufed in this difcourfe,
P. 2. Seel. 3. p. 58. No
event without one, P. 2.
Seel. 3. p. 59. — >and ef-
feft^ a neceifary conns c^
tion between them, P.
2. Seel. 8. p. 103. This
refpecls moral., as well
as natural caufes, P. 2.
Seel. 3. p. 58.
Chrifty his obedience
necefiary, yet virtuous
and praife- worthy, P. 3.
Seel, 2. p. 194. His a-
tenement excluded in
confequence ot Arml-
nian principles, P. 3.
Seel. 3. p. 220.
Chubb (Mr.) the in-
conMenceof his fcheme
of liberty, &c. P. 2. Seel.
10. p. 119,— 137.
Commands i confident
with moral neceflity and
inability, P. 3. Seel,
4. p. 222. P. 4. Seel.
11. p. 380. Incdnii-
ilent \v\thArmiman prin
ciples, P. 3. Seel 4. p.
225.
Common Senfe, why
the principles maintain?-'
ed in this difcourfe, ap
pear to fome .contrary
to it, P. 4. Seel. 3. p.
288*. Neceflary virtue
and vice agreable to it,
P. 4. Seel. 4. p. 297. —
Arminlan tenets oppo-
fitc
INDEX*
fite to it, P. 3* Sea. 6,
p. 249. Ibid. Seft. 7.
p. 263.
Contingence, P. i.Se6h
3. p. 28. the Inconfif-
tence of the Notion, P.
2. Sea. 3. p. 63. Whe
ther neceflary in order
to Liberty, P. 2. Sea. 8.
p. 1 02. — implied in Ar-
minian Liberty, and yet
inconfiftent with it, P. 2.
Sea. 13. p. 185. Epi
curus the greateft main-
tainerof it, P. 4. Sea. 6.
p. 321. Ibid. Sea. 12.
p. 386.
Corruption of Man's
Nature, CONCL. p. 403.
Creation of the world^
at fuch a particular Time
M& Place, P. 4. Sea. 8.
P- 338-
D,
T\ECREE abfolute, not
inferring Necefiity,
any more than certain
Fore- knowledge does,
P. 2. Sed. 12. p. 171.
How it follows from
things proved in this dif-
courfe. CONCL. p. 406.
Determination. See
Will.
DiRates. See Under-
jl an ding.
E.
>T. See Caufe,
Jt J T*£C • f^
Efficacious (jrace.
CONCL. p. 404.
Election perjonal. See
Decree.
Endeavours^ vs hat it is
for them to be in vain*
P. 4. Sea. 5. p. 309.
Rendered vain by Armi-
nlan Principles, Ibid.
p. 313. But not fo by
Cahinifm, Ibid. p. 316.
See Sincerity.
Entrance of Sin into
the world, P. 4. Sea.
10. p. 376.
Equilibrium. See In
difference.
Exhortation. See In-
vitation*
F,
Man. See
Inability.
6. p. 321.
Fatality, the Princi
ples of Armenians infer
ring that which is moft
fhocking, P, 4. Seel. 8.
P- 352.
Foreknowledge of God,
of Volitions of moral
Agents, proved, P. 2.
E e
INDEX.
Sect, ii. p. 138. — In-
confiftent with Contin-
gence, P. 2. Sedt. 12.
p. 164. Proves Necef
fity, as much as a de
cree, Ibid. p. 171. The
feeming difficulty of re
conciling it with the
fincerity of his precepts,
counfels, &c. not pe
culiar to the CahmJKe
fcheme, P. 4. Sedt. n.
p. 380.
G.
D, his Being how
known, P. 2. Sedt.
3. p. 60. P. 4. Seel:. 12.
p. 386. His moral Ex
cellencies neceffary, yet
virtuous and praife-
worthr, P. 3. Sect, i.
p. 1 88. P. 4. Seel. 4. p.
308. The Neceffity of
his Volitions, P. 4. Sect.
7. p. 323. Whether the
principles maintained in
this difcourfe are incon-
fiftent with his moral
character. P. 4. Sedt. 1 1.
p. 379. How Armini-
anijm deftroys the evi
dence of his moral per
fections, Ibid. p. 383.
Grace of the Spirit , ex
cluded by Arminian prin
ciples, P. 3. Sedt. 3. p
222.
Grace, its Freenefs
confiftent with [the mo
ral Neceffity of God's
Will, P. 4. Sedt. 8. p.
350.
H.
its, virtuous and
vicious, inconfiftent
with Arminian princi
ples, P. 3. Sedt. 6. p.
253-
Heatberr, of their Sal
vation, P. 3. Sedt. 5. p.
248.
Holbes, his Doctrine
of Neceffity, P. 4. Sect.
6. p. 322.
L
JMpoffiblllty y the fame
as negative Neceffity,
P, i. Sedt. 3. p. 27.
Inability^ how the
word is ufed in com
mon fpeech, and how
by Metaphficians and
Arminians, P. i. Sedt.
3. p. 20, 27. P. 4. Sedt.
3. p. 291. Natural and
moral, P. i. Sect. 4. p.
28. Moraly the feveral
kinds of it, P. i. Sedt.
4-
INDEX.
4- P- 35- P. 3- Se6i:- 4-
p, 231. — of fallen man
to perform perfeft obe
dience, P. 3. Sea. 3. p.
219. What does, and
what does not excufe
men, P. 3. Sea. 3. p.
216. Ibid. Sea. 4. p.
234. P. 4. Sea. 3. p.
289.
Inclinations-, fee flj-
Indifference, whether
Liberty confifts in it,
P. 2. Seel. 7. p. 88.—
Not neceffary to virtue,
but inconfiftent with it,
P. 3. 8ed. 6. p. 252.
Indifferent y*£/#ff,
which appear fo, never
the objects of volition,
P. i. Sed. 2. p. 9. P. 2.
Sea. 6. p. 79. Whether
the Will can determine
itfelf in chufing among
fuch things, P. 2. Sea.
6. p. 80.
Invitations > confident
with moral Necefiity
and Inability, P. 3. Sea.
4. p. 236. P. 4. Seel:.
ii. p. 379. But not
confident with Ar mini an
principles. P. 2. Sea. 9.
p. 113. P. 3. Sea. 7.
p. 264. P. 4. Sea. ii.
p. 382.
L.
the end
whereof is to bind
to one fide, rendered
ufelefsby Arminian prin
ciples, P. 3. Sea. 4. p.
226.
Liberty ) the Nature of
it, P. i. Sea. 5. p. 38.
The Arminian Notion of
it, Ibid. p. 40. This
inconfiflent with other
Arminian Notions, P. 2.
Sea. 9. p. 107, &c.
Licentioufnefs, whether
the Calvinijlic doarine
tends to it, P. 4. Sea.
12. p. 386. — See En
deavours.
M.
7l/TAchines, whether
Cahinifm makes
men fuch, P. 4. Sea. 5.
p. 317.
Means, fee Endeavours.
Metaphyfical Reafon-
ing -, fee Abft rafted. —
To be juftly objcaed
againft the Arminian
fcheme, P. 4. Sea. 13.
P- 397-
Mural Agency, its N a-
tnre, P. i. Sea. 5. p. 41.
E e 2 Mo-
I N D
Motives, what they
are, P. i. Se6b. 2. p. 7, 8.
The ftrongeft determin
ing the Will, Ibid. p.
8. P. 2. Sedt. 10. p.
124. Arminian Princi
ples inconiiilent with
their influence and ufe
in moral adHons. P. 3.
Sect. 7. p. 260. P. 4.
Sea. ii. p. 385.
N.
KTAtural Notions; fee
Common Senfe.
Neceffityj how the
term is ufed in com
mon fpeech, and how
by philofophers, P. i.
Sea. 3. p. 1 8. P. 4.
Sea. 3, p. 289.— Phi-
lofophical of various
kinds. Ibid. p. 294.
natural and moral, P.
i. Sect. 4. p. 28. P. 4.
Sea. 4. p. 305.— No
Liberty without moral
Neceflity, P. 2. Sect. 3.
p, 102. Necefiity and
Contingence, both in-
confident with Arminian
Liberty P. 2. Sea. 13.
p. 183. Neceflity of
God's Volition. P. 3,
Sect. i. p. 1 88. P. 4.
Sect. 7, p. 323. This
E X,
confident with the free-
nefs of his grace, Ibid.
Sea. 8. p. 350.— Ne
ceflity of Chrift's Obe
dience, &c. P. 3. Sea.
2. p. 194 — Of the fin
of iuch as are given up
to fin, P. 3. Sea. 3. p.
213. — of fallen man, in
general, P. 3. Sea. 3.
p. 219. What Necef-
fity wholly excufes men,
P. 3. Sea. 4. p. 235.
P. 4. Sea. 3. p. 289.
and Sea. 4. p. 301.
O.
QBedience; fee Cbrijl,
Commands, Necejfity.
P.
Articles perfe&ly alike,
of the Creator's pla
cing fuch differently, P.
4. Sea. 8. p. 340.
Perfeverance of Saints^
CONCLUS. p. 408.
Promijes, whether any
are made to the endea
vours of unregenerate
Tinners, P. 3. Sea. 5.
p. 247.
Providence, univerfal
and decifive, CONCLUS.
p. 402,
R
INDEX.
R.
£> Edemption particular,
CONCLUS. p. 407.
Reformers the firft,
how treated by many
late writers, CONCLUS.
p. 410.
S.
C /lints in Heaven, their
' Liberty, P. 4. Sett.
4. p. 308.
Scripture, or the Ar-
winians arguments from
thence, P. 4, Seel. n.
p. 384.
Self-determining Power
of the Will, its incon-
fiftence, P. 2. Seel. i.
p. 44. Eva/ions of the
arguments againfl it
confidered, P. 2. Seel. 2.
p. 50. Ihewn to be im
pertinent, Ibid. Seel. 5.
p. 72.
Sin ; fee Author, En
trance.
Sincerity ofDefires and
Endeavours, what is no
juft excufe, P. 3. Seel.
5. p. 237, The diffe
rent forts of fincerity,
Ibid. p. 244.
Sloth, not encouraged
by Cahinijm, P. 4. Se<5h
5- P- 3'5-
Stoic Philofophers, great
Theiils, P. 4. Sed 12.
p. 385. See Fate.
Sufpending Fclition, of
the liberty of the Will
fuppofed to confift in
an ability for it, P. 2.
Seel, 7. p. 98 P. 3.
Seel. 4, p. 229. Ibid.
Seel. 7. p. 261.
T.
CT^Endency of the Prin
ciples here main
tained, to Atheifm and
licentioufnefs, the ob-
jeclion confidered and
retorted, P. 4. Seel. 12.
P- 385.
V.
T^lrtue and Vice, the
Being of neither of
them confident with Ar-
minian principles ; See
Arminian Doffrjne. Their
EiTence not lying in
their Caufe, but their
Nature, P. 4. Seel. i.
p. 269.
Under/landing, how it
determines the Will, P.
i. Seel. 2. p. 17. P. 2.
Seel. 9. p. 107. Dic
tates of the Under-
Handing and Will, as
'E'c'3 fup-
INDEX.
fuppofed by fome, the
fame, P. 2. Sect. 9. p.
ii3-
UneaftnefS) as fuppo
fed to determine the
Will, P. i. Seft. 2. p.
10.
Volition, not without
a caufe, P. 2. Sect. 3.
p. 65. P. 2. Se6t. 4. p.
70.
W.
T/T/ILL its Nature,
rr P. i. Sea i. p. i,
&c. Its determination?
P. i. Sed, 2. p. 6, 6fc.
The very being of fuch
a faculty inconfiftent
with Annlnian Princi
ples, P. 3. Seel. 7. p.
267. — '.Of God, fecret
and revealed^ P. 4. Seel.
9. p. 368. Ar mini am
themfelves obliged U)
allow fuch a diftindlion,
Ibid. p. 371.
Willingnefs to Duty,
what is no excufe for
the neglecl of it, Sec
Sincerity*
REMARKS
REMARKS
ON THE
ESSAYS on the PRINCIPLES of MORA
LITY and NATURAL RELIGION,
In a LETTER to a Minifter of the CHURCH of
SCOTLAND :
By the Reverend Mr. JONATHAN ED-
WARDS, Prefident of the College of NEW
JERSEY, and Author of the late INQUIRY into
the MODERN NOTIONS of the FREEDOM of
WILL.
Rev. SIR,
THE intimations you have given me of the
ufe which has, by fome, been made of
what I have written on the Freedom o/ the Will*
&c. to vindicate what is faid on the fubjed of li
berty and neceffity, by the Author of the E/ays on
the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, has
occafioned my reading this Author's Effay on that
fubjed, with particular care and attention. And
I think it muft be evident to every one, that has read
both his Effay and my Inquiry, that our fchemes are
exceeding reverfe from each other. The wide dif
ference appears particularly in thefollowing things.
This Author fuppofes, that fuch a neceJTity takes
place with refpeft to all men's aftions, as is incon-
fiftent with liberty *, and plainly denies that men
have any liberty in ading. Thus in p. 168. after
he had been fpeakingof the neceffity of our deter-
* P. 160, 161, 164, 165, and many other places.
Ee 4 m
minations,
V ( 2 )
minations., as conne&ed with motives, he concludes
-with faying, " In fhort, if motives are not under
our power or direction, which is confeffedly the
faft, we can at bottom have NO LIBERTY."
Whereas, I have abundantly exprefied it as my
mind, that man, in his moral adions, has true li
berty ; and that the moral necefiity, which univer-
fally takes place, is not in the lead inconfiilent
with any thing that is properly called liberty, and
with the utmoft liberty that can be defired, or
that can pofllbly exifl or be conceived of*.
I find that fome are apt to think, that in that
kind of moral neceflity of men's volitions, which
I fuppofe to be univerfal, at leaft fome degree of
liberty is denied ; that though it be true I allow
a fort of liberty, yet thofe who maintain a felf-de-
termining power in the will, and a liberty of con-
tingence and indifference, hold an higher fort of
freedom than I do : but I think this is certainly
a great miftake.
Liberty, as I have explained it, in p. 38. and
other places, is the power, opportunity ^ or advantage
that any one has to do as he pleafes^ or conducing, IN
ANY RESPECT, according to hu pleafure ; without
confidering how his pleafure comes to be as it is.
It is demonilrable, and, I think, has been demon-
ftrated, that no neceflity of men's volitions that I
maintain, is inconfiftent with this liberty : and 1
think it is impoflible for any one to rife higher in
his conceptions of liberty than this : If any ima
gine they defire higher, and that they conceive of
a higher and greater liberty than this, they are de
ceived, and delude themfclves with confufed am
biguous words, in {lead of ideas. If any one fhould
here fay, " Yes, I conceive of a freedom above and
beyond the liberty a man has of conducting in
* Inquiry,?. 38 — 43, 186, 187,278—288,300, 307, 326,
—335-
any
( 3 )
any refpect as he pleafes, viz. a liberty of chufing
as he pleafes." Such an one, if he reflected, would
either blufh or laugh at his own inftance. For,
is not chufing as he pleafes, conducing, IN SOME
RESPECT, according to his pleafure, and {till with
out determining how he came by that pleafure ?
If he fays, " Yes, I came by that pleafure by my
own choice." If he be a man of common fenfe,
by this time he will fee his own abfurdity : for he
muft needs fee that his notion or conception, even
of this liberty, does not contain any judgment or
conception how he comes by that choice, which
firft determines his pleafure, or which 'originally
fixed his own will refpecting the affair. Or if
any lhall fay, " That a man exercifes liberty in
this, even in determining his own choice, but not
as he pleafes, or not in confequence of any choice,
preference, or inclination of his own, but by a
determination arifing contingently out of a flate of
abfolute indifference ;" this is not rifing higher in
his conception of liberty : as fnch a determina
tion of the will would not be a voluntary deter
mination of it. Surely he that places liberty in a
power of doing fomething not according to his
own choice, or from his choice, has not a higher
notion of it, than he that places it in doing as he
pleafes, or acting from his own election. If there
were a power in the mind to determine itfelf, but
not by its choice or according to its pleafure, what
advantage would it give ? and what liberty,
worth contending for, would be exercifed in it ?
Therefore no Arminian^ Pelagian, or Epicurean^
can rife higher in his conceptions of liberty, than
the notion of it which I have explained: wh!ch
notion is apparently, perfectly conliftent with the
whole of that necefiky of men's actions, which I
fuppofe takes place. And I fcruple not to fay, it is
beyond ail th-rlr wits to invent a higher notion, or
form
( 4 )
form a higher imagination of liberty ; let them
talk offovereignty of the will, f elf -determining power +
felf-motion, felf-direttion, arbitrary decifiony liberty
ad utrumvis, power of chufing differently in given
cafes, &c. &c. as long as they will. It is apparent
that thefe men, in their ftrenuous affirmation,,
and difpute about thefe things, aim at they know
not what, fighting for fomething they have no
conception of, fubftituting a number of confufed
unmeaning words, inftead of things, and inftead
of thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to
explain what they would have : they never can
anfwer the challenge.
The Author of the Effhys, through his. whole
ElTay on Liberty and Neceflity, goes on that fup-
pofition, that, in order to the being of real liberty,
a man muft have a freedom that is oppoled to
moral necefiity : and yet he fuppofes, p. 1 75, that
juch a liberty mufl fignify a power in the mind of
afting without and againft motives, a power of afting
without any view, purfofe or defign^ and even of
afting in contradiction to our own defires and aver-
fions, and to all our principles of aftion ; and is an
abfurdity altogether inconjiftent with a rational na
ture. Now, who ever imagined fuch a liberty as
this, a higher fort or degree of freedom, than a
liberty of following one's own views and purpo-
fes, and acting agreable to his own inclinations and
paffions ? Who will ever reafonably fuppofe that
liberty, which is an abfurdity altogether incon-
fiflent with a rational nature, to be a kind of li
berty above that which is confident with the na
ture of a rational, intelligent, deiigning agent.
The Author of the Effays feems to fuppofe fuch
a neceflity to take place, as is inconfiftent with fome
fuppofable POWER OF ARBITRARY CHOICE*;
or that there is fome liberty conceivable, whereby
* P. 169.
men's
( 5 )
men's own actions might be more PROPERLY iw
THEIR POWER *, and by which events might be
more DEPENDENT ON OURSELVES -f- : contrary
to what 1 iuppofe to be evident in my Inquiry J.
What way can be imagined, of our actions being
more in cur poiver, from our f elves, or dependent on
ourfelves, than their being from our power to ful
fil our own choice, to aft from our own inclina
tion, purfue our own views, and execute our own
deiigns ? Certainly, to be able to ad thus, is as
properly having our actions in our power, and de
pendent on ourfelves, as a being liable to be the
fubjects of ads and events, contingently and for-
tuitouily, without defire, view, purpofe or defigny or
any principle of affiion within ourfel ves ; as we muft
be, according to this Author's own declared fenfe,
if our actions are performed with that liberty that
is oppofed to moral necefiity.
This Author feems every where to fuppofe, that
neceffity, mofl properly fo called, attends all men's
actions , and that the terms necejjary, unavoidable,
impcffible, Sec. are equally applicable to the cafe of
moral and natural neceffity. In p. 173, he fays,
The idea of neceffary and unavoidable equally
agrees, loth to moral and phyfical neceffity. And in
p. 184, All things that fall out in the natural and mo
ral world are alike neceffary. P. 174* Th** inclina
tion and choice is unavoidably caufed or occafiomd by
the prevailing motive. In this lies the neceffity of our
actions, that, infuch circumftances, it was impoiTible
we could aft otherwise. He often expreiTes him-
felf in like manner elfewhere, fpeaking in ftrong
terms of men's actions as unavoidable, what they
cannot forbear, having no power over their own
actions, the order of them being unalterably fixed,
and infeparably linked together, &c. §
* P. 191, 19;, 197, 206. f P. 183. t P- 595» 396-
§ P. 180,. 188, 193* i94> J'9$' T97» !98> r99> 205» zo6-
On
( 6 )
On the contrary, I have largely declared, that
the connection between antecedent things and con-
fequent ones, which takes place with regard to the
acts of men's wills, which is called moral neceffity,
is called by the name of Necejfity improperly -, and
that all fuch terms as muft, cannot, impojfible, unable,
irrejijlibk, unavoidable, invincible, &c. when appli
ed here, are not applied in their proper fignifica-
tion, and are either ufed nonfenfically, and with
perfect infignificance, or in a fenfe quite diverfe
From their original and proper meaning, and their
ufe in common fpeech * : and, that fuch a necef-
fity as attends the acts of men's wills, is more pro
perly called certainty, than necejfity -, it being no
other than the certain connection between the
fubject and predicate of the propofition which
affirms their exiftence -f-.
Agreable to what is obferved in my Inquiry J,
I think it is evidently owing to a ftrong prejudice
in perfons minds, arifing from an infenfible habi
tual perverfion and milapplication of fuch-like
terms, as ncceffary, impoj/ible, unable, unavoidable, in
vincible, &c. that they are ready to think, that to
fuppofe a certain connection of men's volitions,
without any foregoing m^ives or inclinations, or
any preceding moral influence whatfcever, is truly
and properly to fuppofe fuch a ftrong irrefragable
chain of caufes and effects., as {lands in the way of,
and makes utterly vain, oppofite defires and en
deavours, like immovable and impenetrable moun
tains of brafs ; and impedes our liberty like walls
of adamant, gates of brafs, and bars of iron :
whereas, all fuch reprefentations fugged ideas as
far from the truth, as the Eaft is from the Weft.
* Inquiry, P. iS— 7-8, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 232, 289—293,
296, 304 308, 397, 398. f Inquiry, P. 22 — 24.
t P, 289—293,
Nothing
( 7 >
Nothing that I maintain, fuppofes that men are at
all hindered by any fatal neceflity, from doing, and
even willing and chufing as they pleafe, with full
freedom ; yea with the higheft degree of liberty
that ever was thought of, or that ever could pol-
fibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive*
I know it is in vain to endeavour to make fomc
perfons believe this, or at leaft fully and fleadily
to believe it : for if it be demonftrated to them,
flill the old prejudice remains, which "has been
long fixed by the ufe of the terms neceffary, muft+
cannot^ impoffibk^ &c. the afTociation with thefe
terms of certain ideas, inconfiftent with liberty, is
not broken; and the judgment is powerfully
warped by it ; as a thing that has been long bent
and grown fliff, if it be flraitened, will return to
its former curvity again and again.
The Author of the EJJays moft manifeftly fup
pofes, that if men had the truth concerning the real
neceflity of all their actions clearly in view, they
would not appear to themfelves, or one another,
as at all praife- worthy or culpable, or under any
moral obligation, or accountable for their actions*:
which fuppofes, that men are not to be blamed or
praifed for any of their actions, and are not under
any obligations, nor are truly accountable for any
thing they do, by reafon of this neceflity •, which
is very contrary to what I have endeavoured to
prove, throughout the third part of my Inquiry. I
humbly conceive it is there fhewn, that this is fo
far from the truth, that the moral neceflity of men's
actions, which truly take place, is requifite to the
being of virtue and vice, or any thing praife- wor
thy or culpable : that the liberty of indifference
and contingence, which is advanced in oppolition
to that neceflity, is inconfiftent with the being of
* P. 207. 209, and ether places.
thefe s
( 8 )
thefe ; as it would fuppoie that men are not deter
mined in what they do, by any virtuous or vicious
principles, nor act from any motives, Intentions of
aims whatfoever •, or have any end, either good or
bad, in a<5ting. And is it not remarkable, that this
Author fhould fnppofe, that, in order to men's ac
tions truly having any defert, they muft be per
formed without any vie>zu, purpofe^ defign, or defire,
or any principle of affion, or any thing agreable to
a rational nature ? As it will appear that he does,
if we compare, p. 206, 207, with p. 175.
The Author of the Effays fuppofes, that God has
deeply implanted in man's nature, a ftrong and in
vincible apprehenfion, or feeling, as he calls it, of
a liberty, and contingence of his own actions, op-
pofite to that necerTity which truly attends them ;
and which in truth does not agree with real fact*,
is not agreable to ftrict philofophic truth -f, is
contradictory to the truth of things '{., and which
truth contradicts ||, not tallying with the real plan § :
and that therefore fuch feelings are deceitful **,
are in reality of the delufive kind ff . He fpeaks of
them as a wife delufion Jt,as nice artificial feelings,
meerly that confcience may have a commanding
power |j|| : meaning plainly, that thefe feelings are
a cunning artifice of the Author of Nature, to
make men believe they are free, when they are
not§§ He fuppofes that, by thefe reelings, the mo
ral world has a difguifed appearance JJJ. And
other things of this kind he fays. He fuppofes
that all fclf-approbation, and all remorfe of con
fcience, all commendation or condemnation of
ourfelves or others, all fenfe of defert, and all that
is connected with th:s way of thinking, all the
ideas, which at prefcnt are fuggefted by the words
* P. 200. f P. 152. t P. 183. ||P. 1 86. §P. 205.
** P. 203, 204, 211. ft P. 183. UP. 209. Jin P. 211.
§§p, i53. ntP. 214.
( 9 )
ought, fiould, arife from this delufion, and would
entirely vanifh without it *.
All which is very contrary to what I have abun
dantly infifted on and endeavoured to demonftrate
in my Inquiry ; where I have largely fhevvn, that it
is agreable to the natural fenfe of mankind, that
the moral necefiity or certainty that attends men's
actions, is confident with praife and blame, re
ward and punifhment -f- ; and that it is agreable
to our natural notions, that moral evil, with its de-
fert of diflike and abhorrence, and all its other ill-
defervings, confifrs in a certain deformity in the
nature of the difpofitions and acts of the heart, and
not in the evil of fomething elfe, diverfe from
thefe, fuppofed to be their caufe or occafion %.
I might well afk here, whether any one is to be
found in the world of mankind, who is confcious
to a fenfe or feeling, naturally and deeply rooted
in his mind, that, in order to a man's performing
any action that is praife or blame- worthy, he muft
exercile a liberty that implies and {ignifies a power
of acting without any motive, view, delign, delire,
or principle of action ? For fuch a liberty, this
Author luppofes, that mud be which is oppofed
to moral neceflity, as I have already obferved once
and again. Suppoiing a man iliould actually do
good, independent of defire, aim, inducement,
principle or end, is it a dictate of invincible natu
ral fenfe, that his act is more meritorious or praife-
worthy, than if he had performed it for fame good
end^ and had been governed in it by good prtnci*
pits and motives ? and fo I might afk, on the con
trary, with refpect to evil actions ||.
* P. 1 60, 194, 199, 205, 206, 207, 209. f Inquiry Part
IV. Se6l. 4. throughout. I Idem, Part IV. Sc&. r. through
out, and P. 391; — 397. || See this Matter illuflrated in my
Inquiry, Part IV. Se£l. 4. especially, P. 302—304.
The
The Author of the .Effays fuppo&s that the liber
ty without neceflity, which we have a natural feel
ing of, implies contingency : and, fpeaking of this
contingence, he fometimes calls it by the name of
Chance. And it is evident, that his notion of it, or
rather what he fays about it, implies things hap.
pening loofely, fortuitoufly^ by accident , and without a
caufe '*. Now I conceive the flighted reflection may
be fufficient to fatisfy any one, that fuch a con
tingence of mens actions, according to our natural
fenfe, is fo far from being eflential to the morality
or merit of thofe actions, that it would deilroy it -,
and that, on the contrary, the dependence of our
actions on fuch caufes, as inward inclinations, in
citements and ends, is eflential to the being of it.
Natural fenfe teaches men, when they fee any thing
done by others of a good or evil tendency, to in
quire what their intention was ; what principles
and views they were moved by, in order to judge
how far they are to be juftified or condemned ;
and not to determine, that, in order to their being
approved or blamed at all> the action muft be
performed altogether fortuitoufly, proceeding
from nothing, ariling from no caufe. Concern
ing this matter, I have fully exprefied my mind
in the Inquiry^.
If the liberty, which we have a natural fenfe of
as neceflary to defert, confifts in the mind's felf-
determination, without being determined by previ
ous inclination or motive, then indifference is eflen
tial to it, yea abfolute indifference; as is obferved
in my Inquiry^. But men naturally have no notion
of any fuch liberty as this, as effential to the mo
rality or demerit of their actions; but, on the con
trary, fuch a liberty, if it were pofllble, would be
* P. 156, 157, 158, 1^9, 177, 178, 181, 183, 184, 185.
f P. 258 — 261, 267, 302, 303, and other Places.
JP. 89—91.
inconfiflent
C » )
inconfiftent with our natural notions of defert, $s
is largely fhown in the Inquiry *. If it be agreable
to natural fenfe, that men muft be indifferent in
determining their own actions; then, according to
the fame, the more they are determined by inclina
tion, either good or bad, the lefs they have of de
fert : the more good actions are performed from
good difpofition, the lefs praife-worthy ; and the
more evil deeds are from evil difpofitions, the lefs
culpable ; and, in general, the more men's actions
are from their hearts, the lefs they are to be com
mended or condemned : which all muft know is
very contrary to natural fenfe.
Moral necefiity is owing to the power and go
vernment of the inclination of the heart, either
habitual or occafional, excited by motive : but,
according to natural and common fenfe, the more
a man does any thing with full inclination of
heart, the more is it to be charged to his account
for his condemnation, if it be an ill action, and
the more to be afcribed to him for his praife, if it
be good.
If the mind were determined to evil actions by
contingence, from a ftate of indifference, then
either there would be no fault in them, or elfe
the fault would be in being fo perfectly indif
ferent, that the mind was equally liable to a bad
or good determination. And, if this indifference
be liberty, then the very effence of the blame or
fault would lie in the liberty itfelf, or the wick-
ednefs would, primarily and fummarily, lie in
being a free agent. If there were no fault in
being indifferent, then there would be no fault
in the determination's being agreable to fuch a
ftate of indifference : that is, there could no
* Efpecially in Part III. Sea. 6, and 7.
F f fault
( 12 )
iault be reafonably found with this, viz. that
oppofite determinations actually happen to take
place indifferently, fometimes good and fometimes
bad, as contingence governs and decides. And
if it be a fault to be indifferent to good and
evil, then fuch indifference is no indifference
to good and evil, but is a determination to
evil, or to a fault ; and fuch an indifferent difpo-
fition would be an evil, faulty difpofition, ten
dency or determination of mind. So inconfiftent
are thefe notions of liberty, as effential to praife
or blame.
The Author of the Eflays fuppofes men's na
tural delufive fenfe of a liberty of contingence,
to be, in truth, the foundation of all the labour,
care and induftry of mankind * ; and that if
men's practical ideas had been formed on the plan
of univerfal necejfity, the ignava ratio, the inac
tive doftrine of the Stoics, would have followed $
and that there would have been no ROOM for fore
thought about futurity, or any fort of induftry and
care f : plainly implying, that, in this cafe, men
would fee and know that all their induftry and
care fignified nothing, was in vain, and to no
purpofe, or of no benefit •, events being fixed in
an irrefragable chain, and not at all DEPENDING
on their care and endeavour •, as he explains him-
ielf, particularly, in the inftance of men's ufe of
means to prolong life J : not only very contrary
to what I largely maintain in my Inquiry §, but
alfo very inconfiftently with his own fcheme, in
what he fuppofes of the ends for which God has
ib deeply implanted this deceitful feeling in man's
nature •, in which he manifeftly fuppofes mens,
* P. 184.. f P- 189. I P- l84> l85- § Efpecially
Part IV. Sed. 5.
care
( 13 )
care and induftry not to be in vain and of no be
nefit, but of great ufe, yea of abfolute neceffity,
in order to the obtaining the moft important
ends and necefTary purpofes of human life, and
to fulfil the ends of a6lion to the BEST ADVAN
TAGE •, as he largely declares *. Now, how mail
thefe things be reconciled ? That, if men had
a clear view of real truth^ they would fee that
there was no ROOM for their care and induftry,
becaufe they would fee it to be in vain, and of no
benefit; and yet that God, by having a clear
view of real truth, fees that their being excited
to care and induftry, will be of excellent ufe to
mankind, and greatly for the benefit of the
world, yea abfolutely neceflary in order to it :
and that therefore the great wifdom and good-
nefs of God to men appears, in artfully contriving
to put them on care and induftry for their good,
which good could not be obtained without them ;
and yet both thefe things are maintained at once,
and in the fame fentences and words by this Au
thor. The very reafon he gives, why God has put
this deceitful feeling into men, contradicts and de-
ftroys itfelf •, that God in his great goodnefs to
men gave them fuch a deceitful feeling, becaule
it was very ufeful and neceflary for them, and
greatly for their benefit, or excites them to care
and induftry for their own good, which care and
induftry is ufeful and necefTary to that end : and
yet the very thing that this great benefit of care
and induftry is given as a reafon for, is God's
deceiving men in this very point, in making them
think their care and induftry to be of great bene
fit to them, when indeed it is of none at all •, and
if they faw the real truth, they would fee all their
* P. 188—192. and in many other Places.
F f 2 endca-
endeavours to be wholly ufelefs, that there was
NO ROOM for them, and that the event does not at
all DEPEND upon them*.
And befides, what this Author fays, plainly im
plies ( as appears by what has been already obfer-
ved), that it is necefTary men mould be deceived,
by being made to believe that future events are
contingent, and their own future actions free,
with fuch a freedom, as fignifies that their ac
tions are not the fruit of their own defires, or
defigns, but altogether contingent, fortuitous and
without a caufe. But how mould a notion of
liberty, confiding in accident or loofe chance,
encourage care and induftry ? I mould think it
would rather entirely difcourage every thing of
this nature. For furely, if our actions do not de
pend on our defires and defigns, then they do not
depend on our endeavours, flowing from our de-
fires and defigns. This Author himfelf feems
to fuppofe, that if men had, indeed, fuch a liberty
of contingence, it would render all endeavours
to determine or move men's future volitions, in
vain : he fays, that, in this cafe, to exhort , to
inftrufl, to promi/e, or to threaten^ would be to no
pnrpole ^. Why ? Becaufe (as he himfelf gives
the reafon), then our will would be capricious and
arbitrary, and we foould be thrown loofe altogether^
and our arbitrary power could do us good or ill only
by accident. But if fuch a loofe fortuitous ftate
would render vain others endeavours upon us, for
the fame reafon would it make ufelefs our endea
vours on ourfelves : for events that are truly
contingent and accidental, and altogether loofe
from, arid independent of, all foregoing caufes, are
* P. iSS, 189, &c. f P. 178, 213, 214.
inde-
( 15 )
independent on every foregoing caufe within our-
felves, as well as in others. - :••'
I fuppofe that it is fb far from being true, that
our minds are naturally pofiefTed with a notion of
fuch liberty as this, fo ftrongly, that it is im-
poffible to root it out, that indeed men have no
fuch notion of liberty at all, and that it is utter
ly impoffible, by any means whatfoever to im
plant or introduce fuch a notion into the mind.
As no fuch notions as imply felf-contradiction and
felf- abolition can fubfift in the mind, as I have
fliewn in my Inquiry * •, I think a mature fenfible
coniideration of the matter, fufficient to fatisfy
any one, that even the greateft and moft learned
advocates themfelves for liberty of indifference
and felf-determination, have no fuch notion ; and
that indeed they mean fomething wholly incon-
fiftent with, and directly fubverfive of, what they
ftrenuoufly affirm, and earneflly contend for. By
a man's having a power of determining his own
will, they plainly mean a power of determining
his will, as he pleafes, or as he chufes ; which
fuppofes that the mind has a choice, prior to its
going about to confirm any action or determina
tion to it. And if they mean that they determine
even the original or prime choice, by their own
pleafure or choice, as the thing that caufes and
directs it ; I fcruple not moft boldly to affirm, that
they fpeak they know not what, and that of which
they have no manner of idea -, becaufe no fuch
contradictory notion can come into, or have a mo
ment's fubfiftence in, the mind of any man liv
ing, as an original or firft choice being caufed, or
brought into being, by choice. After all, they lay,
* P. 257, 258. See alfoP. 49, 56, 57, 73, 74. 79, 183—
187, 281, 282, 298—301.
they
they have no higher or other conception of li
berty, than that vulgar notion of it, which I con
tend for, viz. a man's having power or opportu
nity to do as he chufes : or if they had a notion
that every act of choice was determined by choice,
yet it would deilroy their notion of the contin-
gence of choice •, for then no one act of choice
would arife contingently, or from a Hate of in
difference, but every individual act, in all the
feries, would arife from foregoing bias or prefe
rence, and from a caufe predetermining and fixing
its exiftence, which introduces at once 'fuch a
chain of caufes and effects, each preceding link
decifively fixing the following, as they would by
all means avoid.
And fuch kind of delufion and felf-contradicti-
on as this, does not arife in men's minds by nature :
it is not owing to any natural feeling which God
has ftrongly fixed in the mind and nature of man ;
but to falfe philofophy, and ftrong prejudice, from
a deceitful abufe of words. It is artificial ; not
in the fenfe of the Author of the Effays, fuppofing
it to be a deceitful artifice of God ; but artificial
as oppofed to natural, and as owing to an artificial
deceitful management of terms, to darken and
confound the mind. Men have no fuch thing
when they firil begin to exercife reafon ; but muft
have a great deal of time to blind themfelves, with
metaphyfical confufion, before they can embrace,
and reft in fuch definitions of liberty as are given,
and imagine they underftand them.
On the whole, I humbly conceive, that whofo-
cver will give himfelf the trouble of weighing, what
I have offered to confideration in my Inquiry, muft
be fenfible, that fuch a moral neceffity of men's
actions as I maintain, is not at all inconfiftent with
any liberty that any creature has, or can have, as
a free3
( 17 )
a free, accountable, moral agent, and fubjeft of
moral government ; and that this moral necefilty
is fo far from being inconfiftent with praife and
blame, and the benefit and ufe of men's own care
and labour, that, on the contrary, it implies the
very ground and reafon, why men's aclions are
to be afcribed to them as their own, in that man
ner as to infer defert, praife and blame, appro
bation and remorfe of confcience, reward and
punimment ; and that it eftablifhes the moral fy-
ftem of the univerfe, and God's moral government,
in every refpect, with the proper ufe of motives,
exhortations, commands, counfels, promifes, and
threatenings ; and the ufe and benefit of endea
vours, care and induftry : and that therefore there
is no need that the Uriel: philofophic truth mould
be at all concealed from men ; no danger in con
templation and profound difcovery in thefe things.
So far from this, that the truth in this matter is
of vail importance, and extremely needful to be
known ; and that the more clearly and perfectly
the real fad is known, and the more conitantly it
is in view, the better ; and particularly, that the
clear and full knowledge of that, which is the true
fyftem of the univerfe, in thefe refpects, would
greatly eftablifh the doctrines which teach the true
Chriftian fcheme of Divine Adminiilration in the
city of God, and the Gofpel of Jefus Chrift, in its
moft important articles ; and that thefe things
never can be well eflablifhed, and the oppofite er
rors, fo fubverfive of the whole Gofpel, which at
this day fo greatly and generally prevail, be well
confuted, or the arguments by which they are
maintained, anfwered, till thefe points are fettled :
while this is not done, it is, to rne, beyond doubt,
that the friends of thofe great Gofpel Truths, will
but poorly maintain their controverfy with the
adver-
( i8 )
adverfaries of thofe truths : they will be obliged
often to dodge, fhuffle, hide, and turn their backs ;
and the latter will have a ftrong fort, from whence
they never can be driven, and weapons to ufe,
which thofe whom they oppofe will find no fhield
to fcreen themfelves from •, and they will always
puzzle, confound, and keep under the friends of
found doftrine •, and glory, and vaunt themfelves
in their advantage over them •, and carry their
affairs with an high hand, as they have done al
ready for a long time pad.
I conclude, Sir, with afking your pardon for
troubling you with fo much faid in vindication of
myfelf from the imputation of advancing a fcheme
of neceffity, of a like nature with that of the Au
thor of the Effays on the Principles of Morality and
Natural Religion. Confidering that what I have
faid is not only in vindication of myfelf, but, as I
think, of the moft important articles of moral
philofophy and religion ; I truft in what I know
of your candour, that you will excufe,
Tour obliged friend and brother^
STOCKBRIDGE, J. EDWARDS.
July 25> I757-
FINIS.
BT
810
E25
1775
Edwards, Jonathan
A careful and strict
enquiry 4th ed.
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