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BACON 


ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 


WRIGHT 


Oxford University Press 
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annette FE aye 


BACON 


The 


Advancement of Learning 


EDITED BY 


WILLIAM ALDIS WRIGHT, M.A. 


HON. D.C.L. AND LL.D. 


FELLOW AND VICE-MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 


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: Printed in England 
At the OxrorD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
By John Johnson 
Printer to the University 


Impression of 1926 
First edition, 1868 


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PRET ret, B 


FRANCIS BACON was born on the 22nd of January, 1560-1, 
at York House in the Strand, the residence of his father 
Sir Nicholas Bacon, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal. Sixty 
years later, Ben Jonson sang of him as 

‘England’s high Chancellor; the destined heir, 
In his soft cradle, to his father’s chair.’ 
His mother, Anne Cooke, whose eldest sister was married to 
Lord Burleigh, was his father’s second wife, and had borne 
him two children. Anthony, the friend and correspondent of 
Essex, was two years older than Francis. Of their childhood 
nothing is known. In April, 1573, when Francis was little 
more than twelve years old, the two brothers were entered 
as fellow-commoners at Trinity College, Cambridge, and ma- 
triculated between the roth and 13th of June in the same year. 
They were placed under the care of Dr. Whitgift, Master of the 
College, who found this distinguished position not inconsistent 
with holding the Deanery of Lincoln, a Canonry at Ely, and the 
Rectory of Teversham; having, however, previously resigned 
the Regius Professorship of Divinity. From an account-book 
which he kept, and which was published by the late Dr. Mait- 
land in the British Magazine (vols. xxxii. xxxiii), we glean 
the meagre facts of Francis Bacon’s University career. We 
learn, for instance, that during the period of his residence in 
College, from April 5, 1573, to Christmas 1575, the Master’s 
parental care supplied him with so many pairs of shoes, a bow 
and quiver of arrows, that there was oil bought for his neck, 
and certain money paid to the ‘ potigarie’ when he was sick, 
and for meat probably as he was recovering, that he had a 


vi PREFACE, 


desk put up in his study, that his stockings were dyed at 
a cost of 12d., that his laundress’s bill from Midsummer to 
Michaelmas was 3 shillings, that his hose were mended, his 
windows glazed, two dozen silk points, a pair of pantofles and 
pumps bought for him, and a dozen new buttons set on his 
doublet. Some books the brothers brought with them from 
London. With others they were furnished by the Master, as 
Livy, Cicero, Demosthenes’ Olynthiacs, Homer’s Iliad, Cesar, 
Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, Sallust, and Hermogenes. There 
is an interval in the accounts from the latter part of August, 
1574, to the 21st of March following; during which time the 
plague raged in Cambridge, and the members of the Uni- 
versity were dispersed. The only record of Bacon’s residence 
at Trinity is a reminiscence of his own preserved in the Sylva 
Sylvarum (cent. ii. 151), which shows that at this early period 
he had begun to observe natural phenomena, ‘I remember,’ 
he says, ‘in Trinity College in Cambridge, there was an upper 
chamber, which being thought weak in the roof of it, was 
supported by a pillar of iron, of the bigness of one’s arm, in 
the midst of the chamber; which if you had struck, it would 
make a little flat noise in the room where it was struck, but it 
would make a great bomb in the chamber beneath.’ We may 
possibly have here a description of the rooms occupied by the 
two brothers, but if so they must have been in the buildings 
of King’s Hall, removed by Dr. Nevill in constructing the pre- 
sent Old Court. No tradition of their whereabouts remains. 
If we add to these fragments an anecdote related by Dr. Raw- 
ley, his chaplain and earliest biographer, we are in possession 
of all that is known of Francis Bacon up to the time that he 
completed his fifteenth year. Rawley’s story introduces us to 
a child of singular gravity and adroitness, the future Chan- 
cellor and courtier. The Queen ‘delighted much then to 
confer with him, and to prove him with questions; unto 
whom he delivered himself with that gravity and maturity 
above his years, that Her Majesty would often term him 
“The young Lord Keeper.”’ Being asked by the Queen how 
old he was, he answered with much discretion, being then 


PREFACE. vii 


but a boy, “ That he was two years younger than Her Ma- 
jesty’s happy reign ;” with which answer the Queen was much 
taken.’ Another anecdote from the same source, of which 
more than enough has been made, belongs to this period. 
‘Whilst he was commorant in the University, about sixteen 
years of age (as his lordship hath been pleased to impart unto 
myself), he first fell into the dislike of the philosophy of 
Aristotle; not for the worthlessness of the author, to whom 
he would ever ascribe all high attributes, but for the unfruit- 
fulness of the way; ‘being a philosophy (as his lordship used to 
say) only strong for disputations and contentions, but barren vA 
of the production of works for the benefit of the life of man; 
in which mind he continued to his dying day.’ 

The story which has been told above of the iron pillar in 
the chamber at Trinity shows that Bacon’s attention had 
been very early directed to the observation of sounds, and 
lends a probability to the supposition that it may have been 
at this time that he tried the experiment recorded in the 
Sylva Sylvarum (cent. ii. 140). ‘There is in St. James’s Fields 
a conduit of brick, unto which joineth a low vault ; and at the 
end of that a round house of stone; and in the brick conduit 
there is a window; and in the round-house a slit or rift of 
some little breadth; if you cry out in the rift, it will make a 
fearful roaring at the window.’ In all this there is a certain 
ring of boyishness. To this time also belongs the story of the 
conjuror (Sylva, cent. x. 946), who must have exhibited his 
tricks at Sir Nicholas Bacon’s house before Francis left 
England. 

But his father had in view for him a public career as states- 
man or diplomatist, and after he had spent nearly three years 
over his books at Cambridge, sent him to France to read men. 
On the 25th of September, 1576, we learn from Burghley’s 
diary, ‘Sir Amyas Paulet landed at Calliss going to be Amb. 
at France in Place of Dr. Dale.’ It was not till the February 
following that he succeeded to the post. Bacon apparently 
joined him after his arrival in Paris, for on Nov. 21, 1576, he 
was admitted of the grand company at Gray’s Inn, having 


Vili PREFACE. 


entered the Society on the 27th of June previous. He was sub- 
sequently ‘entrusted with some message or advertisement to 
the Queen; which having performed with great approbation, 
he returned back into France again, with intention to continue 
for some years there.’ (Rawley.) Here we find him still keen 
in his observation of natural phenomena, sounds as before 
occupying a great share of his attention. Let him describe 
what he heard in his own words written nearly fifty years 
later. ‘ For echoes upon echoes, there is a rare instance thereof 
in a place which I will now exactly describe. It is some three 
or four miles from Paris, near a town called Pont-Charenton ; 
and some bird-bolt shot or more from the river of Seine. 
The room is a chapel or small church. The walls all stand- 
ing, both at the sides and at the ends. Two rows of pillars, 
after the manner of aisles of churches, also standing; the roof 
all open, not so much as any embowment near any of the walls 
left. ‘There was against every pillar a stack of billets above a 
man’s height; which the watermen that bring wood down the 
Seine in stacks, and not in boats, laid there (as it seemeth) for 
their ease. Speaking at the one end, I did hear it return the 
voice thirteen several times: and I have heard of others, that 
it would return sixteen times: for I was there about three of 
the clock in the afternoon; and it is best (as all other echoes 
are) in the evening. .... I remember well, that when I went to 
the echo at Pont-Charenton, there was an old Parisian, who 
took it to be the work of spirits, and of good spirits. For 
(said he) call Satan, and the echo will not deliver back the 
devil’s name; but will say, va t’en ; which is as much in French 
as apage or avoid. And thereby I did hap to find that an 
echo would not return S, being but a hissing and an interior 
sound.’ (Sylva Sylvarum, cent. iii. 249, 251.) Another story 
which he tells of himself belongs to this period of his life. ‘I 
had, from my childhood, a wart upon one of my fingers: after- 
wards, when I was about sixteen years old, being then at Paris, 
there grew upon both my hands a number of warts (at the 
least an hundred) in a month’s space. The English ambassador’s 
lady, who was a woman far from superstition, told me one day, 


e 


PREFACE, 1x 


she would help me away with my warts: whereupon she got 
a piece of lard, with the skin on, and rubbed the warts all 
over with the fat side; and amongst the rest, that wart which 
I had had from my childhood: then she nailed the piece of 
lard, with the fat towards the sun, upon a post of her chamber 
window, which was to the south. The success was, that 
within five weeks’ space all the warts went quite away: and 
that wart which I had so long endured, for company.’ (Sylva 
Sylvarum, cent. x. 997.) The questions of sounds and mys- 
terious syypathies did not, however, occupy the whole of his 
active mind. It was while at Paris learning diplomacy that 
he invented the cypher which he describes at the end of the 
sixth book of the De Augmentis, and here too he probably 
saw that strange visionary, Guillaume Postell, in his retreat 
at the monastery of St. Martin des Champs. In the summer 
of 1577, the French Court was at Poitiers. Sir Amias Paulet, 
with Bacon probably in his suite, remained there from the end 
of July to the latter end of October. That Bacon was at 
Poitiers at some time during his residence in France we 
know from ‘his own account of a conversation with a cynical 
young Frenchman, perhaps a student, who afterwards became 
a man of considerable distinction. (Hist. Vite et Mortis, 
Works, ii. 211.) There is no evidence however that he him- 
self studied at the University there. 

But now an event occurred which changed the whole cur- 
rent of his life. On the 2oth of February, 1578-9, Sir Nicholas 
Bacon died, after an illness of only a few days. His death, by 
a strange coincidence, was foreshadowed by a dream, which 
his son upon after reflection appears to have regarded almost 
as a sign of the coming disaster. ‘I myself remember,’ he 
says, ‘that being in Paris, and my father dying in London, 
two or three days before my father’s death I had a dream, 
which I told to divers English gentlemen, that my father’s 
house in the country was plastered all over with black mortar.’ 
(Sylva, cent. x. 986.) A month later, on the 2oth of March, 
1578-9, Bacon left Paris, bearing with him a despatch and 
commendations from Sir Amias Paulet to the Queen. His 


Xx PREFACE. 


father, according’to Rawley, had accumulated a considerable’ 


sum of money for the purpose of purchasing an estate for his 
youngest son, but his sudden death prevented its accomplish- 
ment, and Francis was left with only a fifth part of his father’s 
personal property. Diplomacy was now abandoned as a career, 
his prospects. of a studious leisure became more distant than 
ever, and for one who would willingly have lived only to study, 
there was nothing left but to study how to live#. Soon after 
his return to England he appears to have entered upon a 
course of law at Gray’s Inn, and on the 27th of June, 1582, 
we find him admitted as an utter barrister. The next year 
he is seen abroad in the city in his barrister’s dress, and pro- 
mises to do well. Meanwhile he has made a beginning of 
the great work on which his fame was to rest, the first sketch 
of which he called, as he told Father Fulgentio forty years 
later, by the ambitious title of Temporis Partus Maximus. 

In 1584 Bacon appeared upon a new stage, which he never 
left for thirty years and upwards, and on which some of his 
greatest triumphs were achieved. On the 23rd of November 
he took his seat in the House of Commons as member for 
Melcombe Regis, in Dorsetshire. In D’Ewes’s Journal (p. 337), 
his name appears on the Committee appointed on the gth of 
December to consider the ‘Bill for redress of Disorders in 
Common Informers.’ In the next Parliament, which met 
Oct. 29, 1586, he sat for Taunton, and on the 4th of No- 
vember made a speech on ‘the great cause’ of Mary, Queen 
of Scots, but no report of it has been preserved. With other 
members of both Houses he attended (Nov. 12) upon the 


® Of his personal appearance at this time we can form an idea from 
the interesting picture painted by Hilliard in 1578, with the significant 
motto, showing that his intellectual pre-eminence was already becoming 
conspicuous, Si tabula daretur digna, animum mallem. ‘The artist is he 
of whom Donne says :— 
‘A hand or eye 
By Hilliard drawn, is worth a history 
By a worse painter made.’ 


— es 


PREFACE. X1 


Queen, to present a petition for the speedy execution of Mary. 
In the previous February he had been admitted to the high 
table at Gray’s Inn, and in due course became a bencher, 
Beyond the fact that he was on the ‘Committees appointed 
for conference touching a loan or benevolence to be offered 
to Her Majesty,’ and of the Bill for Attainder, and that he was 
one of those sent up to confer with the Lords about the Bill 
for continuance of Statutes, we hear no more of Bacon during 
the present Parliament. The next finds him member for 
Liverpool, busy on frequent committees, and reporting their 
proceedings to the House. The Marprelate controversy was 
now at its height, and Bacon delivered his judgement, full of 
wisdom and moderation, on the points in dispute, in a paper 
which remained unprinted during his lifetime, called ‘An 
Advertisement touching the Controversies of the Church of 
England.’ It contains the germs of his essay ‘Of Unity in 
Religion.’ . 

In 1589 he received his first piece of preferment in the 
form of the reversion of an office, which however did not fall 
in for nearly twenty years. Under the date of Oct. in this year 
we find the entry in Burghley’s printed diary, ‘A Graunt of 
the Office of Clerk of the Counsell in the Starr Chamber to 
Francis Bacon.’ The office was worth 1600/. or 2000/. a year, 
and was executed by deputy, but Bacon had to exercise the 
patience of hope till July 16, 1608; and meanwhile, as he said 
himself, ‘it was like another man’s ground buttalling upon his 
house, which might mend his prospect, but it did not fill his 
barn.’ (Rawley.) He was a poor man in purse for many years 
to come, toiling in a profession in which his heart was not; 
but, as he writes to Burghley, with as vast contemplative ends 
as he had moderate civil ends, for he had taken all knowledge 
to be his province. His highest ambition at this time was to 
be put in an office which should place him above the reach of 
want and leave him leisure to prosecute his intellectual con- 
quests. This was the career he longed for at thirty-one, and 
it is important to bear it in mind as helping in some degree to 
vindicate his motives in later life. 


Xil PREFACE. 


In February, 1591-2, his brother Anthony came to live in 
Gray’s Inn, and from the motherly solicitude of Lady Bacon 
for her eldest son’s religious welfare, we learn that Francis 
was negligent in the use of family prayers, and was not to be 
held up as a pattern to his brother, or resorted to for counsel 
in such matters. 

To the autumn of 1592 Mr. Spedding with great probability 
assigns the speeches in praise of Knowledge and of the Queen, 
which were apparently written for some Court device, perhaps 
that contrived by the Earl of Essex for the Queen’s day. In 
close connexion with the latter of these is the treatise entitled 
‘Certain observations upon a libel published this present year, 
1592,’ which Bacon wrote in reply to the Responsio ad edictum 
Regine Anglie of Father Parsons. 

In the Parliament which met on February rg, 1592-3, Bacon, 
who had hitherto been returned only by boroughs, now sat as 
member for Middlesex. It was in the course of this session 
that, according to Macaulay, ‘he indulged in a burst of patriot- 
ism, which cost him a long and bitter remorse, and which he 
never ventured to repeat.’ In this sounding sentence there is 
hardly a word of truth. What really happened may be briefly 
told. On the 26th of February Bacon, with Sir Robert Cecil 
and other leading members of the House, moved that a com- 
mittee of supply be appointed to provide against the dangers 
with which the country was threatened both by Rome and 
Spain, and other confederates of the Holy League. A few 
fragments of his speech in support of the motion have been 
preserved, and he himself was one of the committee appointed, 
Another committee was formed by the Lords, the two com- 
mittees consulted together, and the result of their conference 
was communicated to the House of Commons by Sir Robert 
Cecil. The Lords demanded at least a treble subsidy, payable 
in three years by two instalments each year; Bacon spoke 
next, ‘and yielded to the subsidy, but misliked that this House 
should join with the Upper House in the granting of it.’ 
(D’Ewes, Journal of the House of Commons, p. 483.) His 
opposition was solely in defence of the privilege of the House 


PREFACE. xiii 


of Commons, and to preserve this he moved, ‘that now they 
might proceed herein by themselves apart from their Lord- 
ships.’ After considerable discussion the question was ultim- 
ately put to the House, that no such conference should be 
had with the Lords, and. was carried by a majority of 217 to 
128. The point of privilege was yielded, and a motion of Sir 
Walter Ralegh’s for a general conference with the Lords 
carried unanimously. As the result of this, the original pro- 
position was so far modified that four years instead of three 
were to be allowed for the payment of the subsidies. Bacon 
‘assented to three subsidies, but not to the payment under six 
years,’ but he was outvoted and made no further difficulty. 
Such was the solitary act of patriotism of which Macaulay 
says Bacon was guilty. And even for this, he adds, he made 
the most abject apologies. Two letters of Bacon’s on this 
subject have been preserved, one to Lord Burghley, the other 
probably, as Mr. Spedding conjectures, to Essex. The tone 
of both is that of manly justification of his conduct ; in neither 
is there one syllable of apology or regret for what he had 
done. He is evidently surprised at being misunderstood. The 
Queen was angry at his speeches, and Bacon expresses his 
grief that she ‘ should retain an hard conceit’ of them, What 
follows is very instructive. ‘It mought please her sacred 
Majesty to think what my end should be in those speeches, 
if it were not duty, and duty alone. Iam not so simple but I 
know the common beaten way to please. And whereas popul- 
arity hath been objected, I muse what care I should take to 
please many, that taketh a course of life to deal with few.’ 

At this juncture the Attorney-Generalship was vacant, and 
whatever chance Bacon might have had, through the influence 
of Essex, of being appointed to the post, was entirely nullified 
by the Queen’s displeasure. For himself he was not anxious 
for the honour, but he assured Elizabeth, in a letter which was 
intended to appease her, that he was ready to do that for her 
service which he would not do for his own gain. ‘My mind,’ 
he says, ‘turneth upon other wheels than those of prof.’ Had 
it not been for this chance, however, he would probably have 


XIV PREFACE, 


relieved himself from the embarrassment of his debts by selling 
the reversion of his property and purchasing an annuity, and 
would then have abandoned a profession for which he had no 
love, and lived the life of a student. But he was kept in sus- 
pense during the summer of 1593, and the delay decided his 
future career. 

In March, 1593-4, he drew up a report, not printed in his 
lifetime, ‘ of the detestable treason, intended by Dr. Roderigo 
Lopez, a physician attending upon the person of the Queen’s 
Majesty,’ which had been traced out with great skill by Essex. 
The latter meanwhile was urging Bacon’s claims upon the 
Queen with a pertinacity and petulance which rather injured 
than furthered his cause. Heartsick with hope deferred, 
Bacon writes to his friend, ‘I will, by God’s assistance ..... 
retire myself with a couple of men to Cambridge, and there 
spend my life in my studies and contemplations, without look- 
ing back.’ On the 1oth of April Coke’s patent as Attorney- 
General was made out and delivered. By this appointment 
the Solicitorship became vacant, and Essex renewed his im- 
portunities with the Queen, who disparaged Bacon in his legal 
capacity as one who was not deep, but rather showed to the 
utmost of his knowledge, while she admitted he had ‘a great 
wit and an excellent gift of speech, and much other good 
learning.’ On the 27th of July, 1594, being detained by illness 
at Huntingdon on his way north, he paid a visit to Cambridge, 
and received the honorary degree of Master of Arts. The 
Queen was still relentless, but had given way so far as to 
employ him on the 13th of June in the examination of two 
persons in the Tower, who were implicated in a conspiracy. 
In August and September he is again at work upon business 
of the same kind. Still the long hoped-for promotion did not 
come. In the Christmas vacation of this year he amused him- 
self with beginning his ‘Promus of Formularies and Elegan- 
cies,’ and in writing speeches for an entertainment at Gray’s 
Inn. The suspense of more than a year and half was brought 
to an end by the appointment of Serjeant Fleming to the 
Solicitorship on the 5th of November, 1595. Essex was mor- 


ss ep a el Po ah LA eee 


PREFACE, . XV 


tified at the ill success of his suit, the failure of which had 
perhaps in some measure been due to his own want of judge- 
ment in pressing it. Lady Bacon said truly, ‘though the Earl 
showed great affection, he marred all with violent courses.’ 
But he generously resolved that his friend should not be alto- 
gether a loser by his friendship. The relation between them 
at this juncture is excellently expressed by Mr. Spedding. 
‘In the account between him and Bacon the obligation was 
not all on one side. Bacon owed him much for his friendship, 
trust, and eager endeavours to serve him. He owed Bacon 
much, not only for affection and zeal, but for time and pains 
gratuitously spent in his affairs. These he had done his best 
to requite in the best way—namely by advancing him in his 
profession; but having failed, he (not unnaturally) desired to 
make him some reparation.’ ‘ You shall not deny,’ said Essex, 
‘to accept a piece of land which I will bestow upon you.’ 
Bacon declined, but the Earl insisted, and what followed 
must be told in Bacon’s own words, because it shows in what 
light he viewed the respective duties of citizenship and friend- 
ship, and how fixed a principle it was with him that, like 
Pericles, he could only be a friend usque ad aras, so far, that 
is, aS was consistent with higher obligations. After in vain 
endeavouring to persuade Essex not to imitate the Duke of 
Guise and turn his estate into obligations, he said, ‘My Lord, 
I see I must be your homager and hold land of your gift: but 
do you know the manner of doing homage in law? Always it 
is with a saving of his faith to the King and his other lords: 
and therefore, my Lord’ (said I), ‘I can be no more yours 
than I was, and it must be with the ancient savings.’ It looks 
as if Bacon already foresaw that the impetuous rashness of 
Essex might at some time place him in such a position that 
the lower duty would have to give way before the higher. 
How strongly he felt this is shown by the closing sentence ot 
a letter to the Earl, which is very properly assigned to this 
period of his life, and carries with it a warning sound. ‘1 
reckon myself as a common (not popular, but common); and as 
much as is lawful to be enclosed of a common, so much your 


xvi PREFACE. 


Lordship shall be sure to have.’ Five years later he reiterated 
in the same tone, ‘I humbly pray you to believe that I aspire 
to the conscience and commendation first of bonus civis, which 
with us is a good and true servant to the Queen, and next of 
bonus vir, that is, an honest man.’ But of this anon, The 
result of the present negotiation was that Essex presented 
Bacon with a piece of land, which he afterwards sold to Rey- 
nold Nicholas for 1800/. 

At what precise time Bacon was appointed by the Queen 
one of her counsel learned in the law, is not quite certain. It 
has been supposed that the appointment was made as early as 
the beginning of 1592, and he is certainly described by this 
title in a lease of sixty acres of land in Zelwood Forest, Somer- 
setshire, which was granted him by the Crown, July 14, 1596. 
From the fact that he is not so described in the grant of the 
reversion of the lease of Twickenham Park, dated Nov. 17, 
1595, it would seem that he had been made Qucen’s counsel 
in the interval. Meanwhile he consoled himself for his pro- 
fessional disappointments by increased devotion to his favourite 
studies, and early in 1597 published, in a small volume, the first 
instalment of his Essays, which had been written some time 
before, and were already circulated in manuscript. From an 
expression in the dedication to his brother Anthony, he evid- 
ently regarded the publication as premature. ‘I doe nowe,’ 
he says, ‘like some that have an orcharde ill neighbored, 
that gather their fruit before it is ripe, to prevent stealing.’ 
The same volume contained the Colours of Good and Evil, and 
the Meditationes Sacre. Traces of his hand are also to be 
found in the ‘ Advice to the Earl of Rutland on his Travels,’ 
and to‘ Sir Fulke Greville on his Studies,’ which appear in the 
name of Essex, and belong to the beginning of 1596. 

On the 30th of April, 1596, the Mastership of the Rolls 
became vacant by the death of Lord Keeper Puckering, and 
the promotion of Egerton to his place. For this post Bacon 
was again a candidate, Essex as before supported his claim, and 
with the same result, suspense and ultimate disappointment. 
Burghley’s influence was exerted with no better success. He 


PREFACE. Xvii 


had endeavoured to procure the Solicitorship for his nephew, 
and, failing that, ‘the place of the Wards;’ probably, as 
Mr. Spedding conjectures, the office of Attorney of the 
Wards. But all came to nothing, as did another suit of a 
more private nature, which Bacon contemplated if he did not 
prosecute, and in which Essex again stood his friend. It is 
not certain that he ever actually proposed for the hand of 
Lady Hatton, the young and wealthy widow of Sir William 
Hatton, and granddaughter of Burghley. From an expression 
in one of his letters to Essex it is probable that he saw no 
opportunity of urging his suit with success, and on the 7th of 
November, 1598, the lady became the wife of his determined 
enemy, Sir Edward Coke. 

It was during the autumn of 1597 that an estrangement 
took place between Bacon and Essex. Warnings on the one 
side, which were unheeded on the other, ‘bred in process of 
time,’ says Bacon in his Apology, ‘a discontinuance of private- 
ness. . . . between his Lordship and myself; so as I was 
not called nor advised with, for some year and half before his 
Lordship’s going into Ireland, as in former time.’ After the 
brilliant success of the Cadiz expedition, Bacon wrote a letter 
of advice to the Earl touching his conduct; a letter full of the 
soundest wisdom, showing the clear apprehension which the 
writer had of the weak points of Essex’s character. The 
difference between the pclicy he recommended and the 
course which Essex adopted cannot be more strikingly put 
than in Bacon’s own words in his Apology: ‘I ever set this 
down, that the only course to be held with the Queen, was by 
obsequiousness and observance. . . My Lord on the other 
hand had a settled opinion that the Queen could be brought 
to nothing but by a kind of necessity and authority.” How 
true this was no man knew better by experience than Bacon 
himself, who ever in season and out of season gave him ‘the 
counsel of a wise and then a prophetical friend.” (Sir H. 
Wotton.) But it was all in vain. Essex’s nature was too 
impatient to follow a course which involved so much self- 
restraint. He went his own way, and in a few brief years 

b 


XVili PREFACE. 


followed the partial failure of the Island voyage, the total 
failure of the Irish expedition, his hasty return, the Queen’s 
displeasure, and then the final catastrophe. 

- But we must go back for a while to see in what matters 
Bacon was occupied. In 1595 the question of Star-Chamber 
Fees was undergoing investigation, and in consequence, cer- 
tain fees hitherto claimed by the Clerk had been restrained 
by the Lord Keeper. Bacon, who was immediately interested, 
addressed a paper to Egerton on the subject in July 1597. 
His estate at this time, as he confesses in another letter, was 
‘weak and indebted,’ a condition which he attributed in part 
to the slender provision made for him by his father, and 
greatly also to the plan of his own life, in which he ‘rather 
referred and aspired to virtue than to gain.’ Want was steal- 
ing upon him. But he was not disheartened. There were 
three means of preventing it: his practice, in which he was 
conscious of not playing his best; the prospect of a place 
under government; and the reversion of the clerkship of the 
Star-Chamber. The last of these he proposed to give up to 
the Lord Keeper’s son, if Egerton would obtain the Master- 
ship of the Rolls for him; but once more he failed, and the 
office was not filled up till the next reign. 

The ninth Parliament of Elizabeth met on the 24th of 
October, 1597, and Bacon sat as member for Ipswich. His 
first speech was on a motion which he brought forward 
‘against depopulation of towns and houses of husbandry, and 
for the maintenance of husbandry and tillage,’ a question 
which in after years possessed his mind, and was discussed in 
his Essay ‘Of the true Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,’ 
first published in 1612, and again in his History of Henry VII. 
in 1622, An examination of D’Ewes’s Journal of the House 
of Commons shows that his name is to be found on com- 
mittees for the consideration of every question of import- 
ance during this session, and that though the Queen had not 
yet forgiven his conduct on a former occasion, his position in 
the House was as high as ever. 

But if his reputation was increasing his debts were in- 


— 


PREFACE, x1X 


creasing too, and in September 1598 he was arrested on his 
way from the Tower, where he had been engaged in the in- 
vestigation of a plot for the murder of the Queen. He com- 
plained of the indignity thus offered him to Sir Robert Cecil 
and the Lord Keeper Egerton, but how he was relieved from 
it we have no information. A history of the conspiracy from 
his pen appeared in the following year. 

In the spring of 1599 Essex set out on his disastrous exped- 
ition to Ireland. Bacon had already so far renewed his 
intercourse with the Earl as to write him two letters of 
advice. A third Cassandra-like note of warning was sounded 
just before his departure, containing two maxims which Essex 
was only too apt to forget, ‘that merit is worthier than 
fame,’ and ‘that obedience is better than sacrifice.’ He 
landed in Dublin on the 15th of April, and on the 28th of 
September he startled the Queen at Nonsuch, by rushing 
travel-stained into her chamber while she was dressing, ‘her 
hair about her face,’ as a letter-writer of the time tells us. 
And what had he done meanwhile? Practically, as Mr. Sped- 
ding puts it, ‘whatever might be said in justification of this 
or that item of the account, the totals must stand thus :— 
Expended, 300,o00/. and ten or twelve thousand men: re- 
ceived, a suspension of hostilities for six weeks, with promise 
of a fortnight’s notice before recommencing them, and a 
verbal communication from Tyrone of the conditions upon 
which he was willing to make peace.’ Between ten and 
eleven o’clock the same night he was ordered to keep his 
room. His first plan of bringing over with him a part of 
the army to enable him to make conditions with the govern- 
ment, had been abandoned by the advice of his stepfather 
Blount, and his friend Southampton. But he took with him 
a strong body-guard of trusty men, ‘who might have secured 
him against any commitment.’ On the ist of October he 
was placed in the custody of the Lord Keeper at York 
House. Bacon, who at this time had constant access to the 
Queen, was charged by popular rumour with irritating her 
against Essex. ‘According to the ordinary charities of 

ba 


a 


xX PREFACE, 


Court,’ he says with quiet irony, ‘it was given out that I 
was one of them that incensed the Queen against my Lord 
of Essex.’ To Elizabeth’s plan of having ‘somewhat pub- 
lished in the Star-Chamber, for the satisfaction of the world 
touching my Lord of Essex his restraint,’ Bacon was firmly 
opposed, and his opposition gave her great offence. She 
charged him with being absent from the Star-Chamber when 
the declaration was made on the 29th of November. That 
he was absent we have his own evidence to prove, and he 
pleaded indisposition as the cause. An unjust suspicion fell 
upon him of having given the Queen an opinion in the cause 
of Essex in opposition to that of the Lord Chief Justice and 
the Attorney-General. His life was even threatened; but he 
had ‘the privy coat of a good conscience,’ and felt that these 
falsehoods would recoil upon their authors. Essex still re- 
mained in the custody of the Lord Keeper, and for some 
months not a word passed between the Queen and Bacon 
about him. But neither of them at this time knew the depth 
of Essex’s guilt. They knew nothing of his first design of 
landing in England with two or three thousand men, to make 
good his position till he could gain support. They knew 
nothing of the treasonable intention with which Montjoy 
succeeded to Essex’s command in Ireland; an intention 
which had no less a scope than with half his army to join the 
King of Scots in an armed demonstration to support his 
right to the succession, the party headed by Essex in England 
working to the same end. James was too timid or too wary 
to listen to such a proposal, and the plot was for the time 
abandoned. Before it was revived Montjoy had come to his 
senses, and then ‘utterly rejected it as a thing which he could 
no way think honest.’ 

In the meantime Essex was released from custody and 
allowed to retire to his own house, still however remaining 
under surveillance. Towards the end of the Easter term the 
Queen admitted to Bacon that the former ‘ proceeding in the 
Star-Chamber had done no good, but rather kindled factious 
bruits (as she termed them) than quenched them.’ She now 


PREFACE. xxi 


proposed to proceed by public information against Essex. 
But for this, Bacon urged, it was far too late; at which the 
Queen was offended. At the beginning of the next term the 
subject was again discussed between them, Bacon as before 
dissuading any public process. The Queen finally resolved 
that the matter should be heard before a commission at York 
House. Her counsel had their parts assigned to them. At 
first it was doubtful whether Bacon, in consideration of his 
relations with Essex, and the way in which he had consist- 
ently pleaded his cause, would be allowed any share in the 
proceedings. He begged to be excused, but held himself 
ready to obey the Queen’s commands, thinking that by so 
far yielding to her he might be in a better position to serve 
Essex. Up to this time it must be remembered he knew 
nothing of the Earl’s treasonous designs, and regarded his 
quarrel with the Queen as a storm which would soon blow 
over. In the distribution to the counsel of their several 
parts, Bacon was allotted one which seemed insignificant, and 
was given him as least calculated to do harm to Essex. The 
Privy Council with their assessors met at York House on the 
5th of June. Essex was acquitted of disloyalty, but censured 
for contempt and disobedience in neglecting his instructions 
and deserting his command. Bacon, by the Queen’s order, 
drew up a narrative of what had passed, in which he touched 
upon Essex’s faults with so tender a hand, that Elizabeth was 
moved and said, ‘she perceived old love would not easily be 
forgotten.’ Bacon with great adroitness took advantage of 
the expression. ‘Whereunto I answered suddenly, that I 
hoped she meant that by herself.’ In a short time Essex was 
released from the slight restraint which had been placed upon 
him, but forbidden to come to the Court. His fate was again 
in his own hands. 

So far it was proved that Bacon’s policy was the true one, 
and that by keeping on good terms with the Queen he could 
better serve Essex than by placing himself in opposition to 
her. His principles however remained the same as before. 
‘For my Lord of Essex,’ he writes to Lord Henry Howard, 


Xxil PREFACE. 


‘I am not servile to him, having regard to my superior duty. 
I have been much bound unto him. And on the other side, I 
have spent more time and more thoughts about his well- 
doing than ever I did about mine own.’ Still he had no 
suspicion of the dangerous secrets of which Essex was con- 
scious. His counsel was as ever patience, and for a time the 
Earl, to the outer world at least, seemed heedful of his advice. 
To his intimates he presented another aspect. ‘In my laste 
discourse,’ says Sir John Harington, ‘he uttered strange 
wordes, borderynge on suche strange desygns that made me 
hastene forthe, and leave his presence; thank heaven I am 
safe at home, and if I go in suche troubles againe, I deserve 
the gallowes for a meddlynge foole : His speeches of the Queene 
becomethe no man who hathe mens sana in corpore sano.’ 
(Nugae Antiquae, ii. 225, ed. 1779.) His patent for the 
monopoly of sweet wines was to expire at Michaelmas, and 
he petitioned for a renewal of the lease. His petition was 
refused and his patience at an end. From this time the 
Queen, who evidently was better informed than Bacon as to 
what Essex had really done, and supposed that Bacon knew 
as much as herself, was so angry at his importunity for his 
friend that she would no longer see him. For three months 
this estrangement lasted. It was not till after New Year’s 
Day, 1600-1, that Bacon was admitted to her presence, and 
then boldly and ‘with some passion’ spoke his mind. ‘Madam, 
I see you withdraw your favour from me, and now that I have 
lost many friends for your sake, I shall leese you too. . . . 
A great many love me not, because they think I have been 
against my Lord of Essex; and you love me not, because you 
know I have been for him: yet will I never repent me, that 
I have dealt in simplicity of heart towards you both, without 
respect of cautions to myself, and therefore vivus vidensque 
pereo.” The Queen was moved by the earnestness of his 
protestations, and spoke kindly to him as of old; but of Essex 
never a word. Henceforth Bacon determined to meddle no 
more in the matter, and never saw the Queen again till the 
Earl had put himself beyond the reach of intercession. He 


Rela aig CPR WA sete 


PREFACE. Xxiii 


now devoted his energies to his own affairs, which were still 
embarrassed, and to the business of his profession, in which 
he was gradually but surely rising. On the 24th of October, 
1600, he had been made Double Reader at Gray’s Inn, and 
had his lectures for the Lent term to prepare on the Statute 
of Uses. 

Up to the 8th of February, 1600-1, it is abundantly evident 
that Bacon had done his utmost to restore Essex to the 
Queen’s favour. His efforts were vain, but they were made, 
and were made, moreover, not only at the risk but with the 
result of bringing the Queen’s displeasure upon himself. And 
now came the crisis in which his worst forebodings were 
more than realised. Essex, left to his own devices and the 
company and counsel of men who used him as an instrument 
for their own ends, plunged deeper and deeper in guilt. As 
long ago as the previous August he had again sounded 
Montjoy on the subject of an armed demonstration in con- 
junction with the King of Scotland. But Montjoy turned 
a deaf ear. Still there were hopes from James. Meanwhile 
the secret which had hitherto been confined to a few was 
in danger of being divulged. The discontented spirits of all 
parties were encouraged to rally round Essex, though without 
knowing the full extent of the conspiracy they were intended 
to support. Before Christmas, Essex had determined to se- 
cure his access to the Queen in such sort as might not be 
resisted. Bythe end of January the plot had assumed a defin- 
, ite form. He was ‘resolved not to hazard any more com- 
mandments and restraints.’ On the 3rd of February the 
plan for attacking the Court was made and the parts assigned 
to the conspirators. Sir Christopher Blount was to seize the 
utter gate, Sir Charles Davers the presence, and Sir John 
Davies the hall and water-gate. The guard being over- 
powered and the Queen’s person secured, the Earl and his 
company were to enter from the Mews, and make their own 
terms. Cecil, Ralegh, and Cobham were to be removed. 
They had no intention of injuring the Queen; but, as Blount 
confessed on the scaffold, they were prepared, rather than 


XxXiv PREFACE. 


fail in their ends, to have even ‘drawn blood from herself.’ 
The gatherings at Essex House had attracted the attention 
of the Court, and on Saturday the 7th of February Essex was 
summoned before the Privy Council. He refused to go; and 
in the evening, fearing that the Lords knew more than they 
did, proposed to make the attack. But the guards were 
doubled at Whitehall, and next morning Charing Cross and 
Westminster were barricaded. There was nothing now left 
but to raise the City. At ten o’clock on Sunday morning, 
the Lord Keeper, the Earl of Worcester, Sir William Knollys, 
and the Lord Chief Justice repaired to Essex House. Essex’s 
men had been running hither and thither all night to summon 
his friends, and by this time wellnigh three hundred were 
assembled. The arrival of the Lord Keeper precipitated 
their action, Essex cried out that he should be murdered 
in his bed, that his enemies had forged his name, and that 
he was armed in self-defence. The Lord Keeper promised 
that he should have justice done, but it was now too late. 
Essex left him and his companions prisoners, and rushed out 
with some two hundred followers on foot, crying hysterically 
that plots were laid against his life, and that the country was 
sold to the Spaniard. Not a man stirred in his defence. The 
conspirators marched through the City as far as Fenchurch 
Street to the house of Sheriff Smith, and there Essex showed 
signs that his nerve had forsaken him. Making their way 
back to Ludgate Hill, they found the street closed against 
them. A fight ensued, in which one or two were slain on 
either side, Essex was shot through the hat, Blount wounded 
and taken prisoner. The Earl, with some fifty followers, es- 
caped by water to Essex House, and by ten o’clock in the 
evening surrendered. And so ended this miserable and ‘fatal 
impatience.’ But there was evidently a mystery which the 
Court had not penetrated, and to unravel it Bacon with others 
of her Majesty’s counsel was employed. They soon dis- 
covered the true nature of the plot. Judgement followed 
swiftly upon the offenders. On the 19th of February Essex 
and Southampton were arraigned. The evidence against 


Se 


PREFACE, XXV 


them was overwhelming. Bacon took his place among the 
counsel. ‘The office he had to perform was none of his 
seeking: it was laid upon him with the rest of his fellows. 
The time had come when he was obliged to choose between 
his Queen and one to whom he had tried his utmost to be 
a friend. Essex’s defence was, as before, that his life was in 
danger, that he took up arms for his own protection, and 
that the kingdom was betrayed to Spain. Bacon spoke twice, 
on both occasions recalling the attention of the Court to the 
true nature of the case, and showing that the private quarrel 
which had been alleged was a mere pretext. The defence 
broke down on all points, and the two Earls were condemned. 
Even those who blame Bacon for taking any part in the trial 
have nothing to urge against the manner in which he acquit- 
ted himself. Birch (Memoirs of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, 
ii. 499) says, ‘Mr. Francis Bacon’s behaviour towards the Earl 
at his trial was perhaps less exceptionable than his submitting 
to any share in it.’ Essex himself uttered no word of re- 
proach. He was too conscious that Bacon had stood by him 
in evil report and in good report, and how wise all his counsels 
had been. After a careful review of this strange eventful 
history, the whole course of which must have been inexpress- 
ibly painful to Bacon, it is difficult to see how, as a good 
citizen, whose first duty was to his country, he could have 
acted otherwise. His contemporaries passed no censure upon 
him. Essex, who laid the blame of his own treason upon 
his personal enemies, did not reckon Bacon among them. 
And these things being so, we may confidently expect at the 
hands of posterity a verdict not only of ‘not proven,’ but of 
‘not guilty.’ 

So much misapprehension has existed as to the real nature 
of the offence of Essex, and of Bacon’s share in his trial and 
condemnation, that it has been necessary to discuss it some- 
what in detail. With the Earl’s execution, however, Bacon’s 
part in the transaction did not terminate. Though the evid- 
ence was crushing and irresistible, the conduct of the trial had 
been slovenly, and the impression left by it confused, It was 


XXVi PREFACE. 


desirable that an authoritative statement should be drawn up, 
setting forth with all clearness the real nature of the offence, 
and the evidence on which judgement had been pronounced, 
and the task of drawing up such a statement was entrusted 
to the skilful pen of Bacon. The result was 4 Declaration of 
the Practises and Treasons attempted and committed by Robert 
late Earle of Essex and his Complices, against her Maiestie and 
her Kingdoms, &c., which was published in 1601. His in- 
structions as to the writing were very precise, and after 
a first draft had been made, it was submitted to ‘certain 
principal counsellors,’ who ‘made almost a new writing,’ so 
that Bacon himself ‘gave only words and form of style,’ and 
in this he nothing extenuated or set aught down in malice. 
The principal offenders being punished, he exerted himself 
to save the inferior actors, and with such good success that 
six out of nine were stayed from being attainted. 

In the course of the spring of 1601 he lost his brother 
Anthony, to whom he had always been greatly attached. 
His circumstances were by this somewhat improved, and with 
the 1200/. which he received from the fine of Catesby, one 
of the accomplices of Essex, he was enabled to get rid of 
some obligations which had pressed heavily upon him. 

In the last Parliament of Elizabeth, which met on the 27th 
of October, 1601, Bacon was returned both by Ipswich and 
St. Alban’s, a conspicuous proof that his conduct in the Essex 
conspiracy had not brought upon him the censure of the 
country. His voice, as of old, was heard, and his pen was still 
busy, on all important questions. 

With the death of Elizabeth on the 24th of March, 1602-3, 
and the accession of James, no great change took place in 
Bacon’s prospects. He was still allowed to continue one of 
the learned counsel. On the 3rd of July he writes to Cecil 
that he is forced to sell the skirts of his living in Hertford- 
shire to preserve the body, thereby leaving himself free from 
debt and with a little money in hand, ‘ 300/. land per annum, 
with a fair house, and the ground well timbered.’ He wishes 
to be made a knight because of some disgrace which had 


Se oars 
Se ea 


— 


ee ae 


PREFACE. XXvii 
. ~ 


been passed upon him, and because there were three new 
knights in his mess at Gray’s Inn, The most important 
reason for seeking this honour he keeps to the last—‘ because 
I have found out an alderman’s daughter, an handsome 
maiden, to my liking.’ But he desired especially that the 
honour should be conferred as a real distinction, and that he 
‘might not be merely gregarious in a troop.’ On the 23rd 
of July he gained his wish, but in the company of three 
hundred others. His ambition for professional advancement 
was quenched under the new sovereign. In the letter to Cecil 
which has already been referred to, he says, ‘My ambition 
now I shall only put upon my pen, whereby I shall be able 
to maintain memory and merit of the times succeeding.’ 
James, if not wise, was undoubtedly learned, and in his 
advent to the throne Bacon saw hopes of at last realizing 
his magnificent dreams of the regeneration of learning and 
the extension of the kingdom of man. And it may be that 
during this year (1603) he wrote the first book of The 
Proficience and Advancement of Learning. His other literary 
productions of this period are 4 Brief Discourse touching the 
Happy Union of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland, and 
Certain Considerations touching the better Pacification and Edific- 
ation of the Church of England. The latter of these may be 
regarded as the sequel to a tract on the same subject which 
he had written in 1589. It was partly printed in 1604, but 
not published, and was evidently composed with direct refer- 
ence to the subjects discussed at the Hampton Court con- 
ference. His Apology for his conduct in the Essex trial, 
which was addressed to Montjoy, now Earl of Devonshire, 
belongs to the same year. 

The first Parliament of the new reign met on the roth of 
March, 1603-4, and Bacon was again returned both by 
Ipswich and St. Alban’s, still taking the same prominent part 
in the proceedings of the House. His office as one of the 
learned counsel was confirmed to him by patent on the 18th 
of August, coupled with the grant of a pension of 60/. a year 
for life. His vacation was employed in drawing up Certain 


XXVill PREFACE. 


Articles or Considerations touching the Union of the Kingdoms of 
England and Scotland, in view of the Commission appointed 
to meet in October for the discussion of the question. A 
draft of a proposed proclamation touching his Majesty’s style 
was also prepared at the same time, but not used. Just as 
the Commission had commenced its sittings, the Solicitorship 
became vacant; but Bacon was again passed over, and Dode- 
ridge appointed. 

Still his professional occupations allowed him less leisure 
than ever, and when on the 24th of December the next 
meeting of Parliament was postponed till October, 1605, 
Bacon foresaw that, if he intended to finish his work on the 
Advancement of Learning, he must make good use of the 
interval. Mr. Spedding has pointed out that the first book 
was printed in all probability before the second was ready 
for the press, and that the second book shows marks of haste 
both in printing and composition. The entries in the books 
of the Stationers’ Company»? indicate that his first intention 
was to have issued the work both in Latin and English. 
Under the date of Aug. 19, 1605, we find, ‘Mr. Richard 
Ockould. Entred for his Copies vnder the handes of the B: 
of London & Mr. Feild warden, The firste parte of the Twoo 
bookes of St Frauncis Bacon, Of the proficience & advauncemt 
of Learninge divine and Humane to be printed bothe in 
Englishe & Lattin. xij4.’? And again, Sept. 19: ‘Mr. Ockold. 
Entred for his copie vnder the handes of my Lo. Bysshoop of 
Londof. and the wardens, A booke aswell in Latyn as in 
Englishe called The second book of frauncis Bacof. of the 
proficience and Advauncement of learninge Divine and 
humane. xij4.? We might almost infer from these two en- 
tries that Bacon in the course of the summer had resolved 
to issue the first book separately, either from inability to 
finish the second, or for some other reason, and that he 
afterwards changed his mind and printed the second very 


» For an opportunity of consulting these Iam indebted to the kind- 
ness of Mr. Greenhill. 


eae 


Fo 
a 


ee 


PREFACE. XxXix 


hastily. Dr. Playfer, Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cam- 
bridge, who had expressed the good liking he had conceived 
of the book, was applied to by Bacon to translate it into 
Latin, but the specimen of his version was too ornate for 
Bacon’s taste, and it was never completed. The two parts, 
in English only, were published together in quarto some time 
about the end of October, and then not by Richard Ockould 
but by Henry Tomes, with the following title: ‘The Twoo 
Bookes of Francis Bacon. Of the proficience and aduaunce- 
ment of Learning, diuine and humane. To the King. At 
London, Printed for Henrie Tomes, and are.to be sould at his 
shop at Graies Inne Gate in Holborne. 1605.’ Ina letter from 
Chamberlain to Carleton on the 7th of November, the appear- 
ance of Sir Francis Bacon’s new work on Learning is duly 
chronicled®, Any attention it might otherwise have attracted 
was no doubt greatly diminished by the event which then 
filled men’s minds, the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot. In 
the investigations which followed this discovery, Bacon was 
only slightly concerned. A prospect of a vacancy occurs in 
the Solicitorship in March, 1606-7, and Bacon urges Cecil to 
press his claims. But he had again to wait. 

In the hurry and business of this session, the gossip of 
Carleton gives us a glimpse of Bacon, the statesman and 
philosopher, in a new aspect. On the sith of May, 1606, 
he writes to Chamberlain, ‘Sir Francis Bacon was married 
yesterday to his young wench in Maribone Chapel. He was 
clad from top to toe in purple, and hath made himself and his 
wife such store of fine raiments of cloth of silver and gold 
that it draws deep into her portion. The dinner was kept at 
his father-in-law Sir John Packington’s lodging over against 


¢ In the present edition the text has been taken from that of 1605, 
corrected where necessary by the Errata and by the subsequent editions 
of 1629 and 1633. The spelling has been modernized throughout. In 
tracing the quotations I have been materially assisted by Wats’ trans- 
lation of the De Augmentis, and the recent editions of the Advancement 
by Mr. Markby and Mr. Kitchin, 


XXX PREFACE. 


the Savoy, where his chief guests were the three knights, 
Cope, Hicks, and Beeston; and upon this conceit (as he said 
himself) that since he could not have my L. of Salisbury in 
person, which he wished, he would have him at least in his 
representative body.’ Alice Barnham, who thus became the 
wife of Francis Bacon, was no doubt the same ‘handsome 
maiden’ whom he mentioned three years before to his cousin 
Cecil. She was the daughter of Benedict Barnham, a London 
merchant, whose widow took for her second husband Sir John 
Packington, a knight of Worcestershire. Lady Bacon brought 
with her a fortune of 220/. a year, which was settled upon 
herself, with an additional 500/. a year from her husband, 
a fact which at once disproves Lord Campbell’s charge that 
the match was a mercenary one. But how much of romance 
or even sentiment there was in it we have no means of know- 
ing. Bacon was now in his forty-sixth year, and his language 
three months later breathes not so much the tone of ecstasy 
as of tranquil satisfaction. ‘I thank God I have not taken a 
thorn out of my foot to put it into my side.’ No letter of 
their correspondence has been preserved, and from this time 
we hear nothing more of the lady which could tell us whether 
her influence over her husband was great or small. The 
gossip of fifteen years later credited her with a forward 
tongue, and from a sentence in Bacon’s will we learn 
that she had given him grievous cause of offence. She 
survived him many years, and married her gentleman 
usher. 

The subject of the Union with Scotland and the Natural- 
isation of the Scotch was still the prominent one before the 
House. On the former question we have a fragment of Bacon’s 
speech delivered on 25th Nov., 1606. On the latter he replied 
to Nicholas Fuller, 17th Feb., 1606-7. He spoke against the 
motion for the Union of Laws on the 28th of March, and on 
the 17th of June he reported to the House the speeches of 
Salisbury and Northampton at the conference concerning the 
petition of the merchants upon the Spanish grievances. The 
reward which he had so well earned came at last. Doderidge 


PREFACE. XxXxi 


was made King’s Serjeant, and Bacon became Solicitor General 
in his stead on the 25th of June, 1607. 

He had now no longer to fear that want would either steal 
upon him as a wayfaring man or assault him as an armed man, 
and in the greater tranquillity of mind which resulted he gave 
himself up to the developement of his plan for enlarging the 
borders of human knowledge. The Great Instauration seems 
now to have taken a definite form, and as a means of clearing 
the way for its reception he wrote the treatise called Cogitata 
et Visa, which must have been the product of the latter half 
of the year 1607. His professional work of the same period 
is represented by ‘A view of the differences in question 
betwixt the King’s Bench and the Council in the Marches,’ 
and by two prceclamations, the one touching the Marches, the 
other concerning Jurors. 

The next year (1608) is marked by the falling in of the 
clerkship of the Star-Chamber, by the death of William Mill 
on the 16th of July. Bacon had waited patiently for it nearly 
twenty years. In the summer vacation, and possibly during 
the unwilling leisure caused by an outbreak of the plague, he 
wrote his treatise In felicem memoriam Elizabethae, and towards 
the end of the year his discourse on the Plantation in Ireland, 
which will even now be read with interest. Letters to his 
friend Toby Matthew show that during the following year 
(1609) the Instauration was not laid aside. ‘My Instauration 
I reserve for our conference; it sleeps not.” He sent him ‘a 
leaf or two of the Preface, carrying some figure of the whole 
work.’ Shortly after he forwarded another portion, which 
may have been the Redargutio Philosophiarum. In the course 
of this year, also, he wrote and submitted to the judgement of 
the same friend, a little work of his recreation, as he calls it, 
the treatise De Sapientia Veterum, on the interpretation of the 
ancient fables of Greece and Rome. The Cogitata et Visa had 
undergone revision and elaboration at the same time, and a 
copy was sent in MS. to Bishop Andrewes, who had been 
translated from Chichester to Ely. 

The session of 1609-10 was occupied with disputes between 


XXXii PREFACE, 


the King and the Commons, on the subject of the King’s 
debts. Bacon spoke in favour of supply, and in defence of the 
King’s right of imposition. ‘Towards the end of August this 
year his mother died, and to the summer vacation Mr. Sped- 
ding refers ‘The beginning of the History of Great Britain.’ 
What were his occupations in 1611 we have no certain inform- 
ation. Perhaps he amused himself with elaborating his 
Essays, of which he published a much enlarged edition: in the 
following year. His letter to the King touching Sutton’s 
Estate, a report on the scarcity of silver at the Mint, and a 
charge on opening the Court of the Verge, show that his pro- 
fessional duties were not neglected. Salisbury’s death in 1612 
left an opening for the appointment of a Secretary of State, 
and Bacon offered his services to the King. The office was 
not filled up immediately, and soon after the Mastership of 
the Wards, vacant from the same cause, was given to Sir 
George Carey, though popular rumour assigned it to Bacon, who 
had drawn up a frame of declaration and instructions for the 
new Master. In the trial of Lord Sanquhar for murder (June 
27,1612), Bacon appeared in his capacity of Solicitor General 
as counsel for the prosecution. Three days later he made 
a speech before the Council and Judges, on the refusal of the 
Countess of Shrewsbury to be examined for aiding the Lady 
Arabella Stewart in her attempt to escape. 

The proposed marriage of the Princess Elizabeth to the 
Elector Palatine in 1612, gave Bacon additional employment 
in drawing up Instructions to the Commissioners for collect- 
ing the Aid which was levied on the occasion. Probably 
towards the end of November he published the second edition 
of his Essays. It was his intention to have dedicated them to 
Prince Henry; but the Prince’s unexpected death on the 6th 
of November prevented him from carrying this intention into 
effect, and the Essays were addressed to Sir John Constable, 
who had married Lady Bacon’s sister. ‘They must have ap- 
peared in the interval between the death of the Prince and 
the 17th of December, when they are referred to in one of 
Chamberlain’s letters. 


PREFACE. XXXili 


The marriage of the Princess, which had been postponed 
in consequence of her brother’s death, took place on the 14th 
ot February, 1612-13, and a masque was given as an enter- 
tainment in honour of the event by the gentlemen of Gray’s 
Inn and the Inner Temple. Bacon was the contriver of the 
device, which represented the marriage of the Thames and 
the Rhine. It was a work to which he was not new, and his 
Essay ‘Of Masques and Triumphs’ shows that he took interest 
in it. 

The Mastership of the Wards had again been vacant by the 
death of Sir George Carey, 13th November, 1612, and ‘Sir 
Francis Bacon certainly expecting the place, had put most of 
his men into new cloaks. Afterward when Sir Walter Cope 
carried the place, one said merrily that Sir Walter was Master 
of the Wards and Sir Francis Bacon of the Liveries.’ (Rawley.) 
As before, he might say sic nos non nobis. But the promotion 
for which he had almost served an apprenticeship was not 
long in coming. The death of Sir Thomas Fleming, Chief 
Justice of the King’s Bench, on the 7th of August, 1613, 
brought about a change. Sir Edward Coke, who had hitherto 
been Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, became Chief 
Justice of England and a Privy Councillor; Hobart was put in 
his place, and Bacon succeeded Hobart as Attorney General 
on the 26th of October. For effecting this change, though 
Bacon himself attributed it to the King, the Court favourite, 
Somerset, wished to appropriate some credit, and it was ap- 
parently with the view of releasing himself from the implied 
obligation, that Bacon took the whole charge of preparing a 
masque, which was given by Gray’s Inn in honour of the 
marriage of Somerset to the divorced Countess of Essex. 

The first professional work in which he was engaged after 
his appointment, was the delivery of a charge in the Star- 
Chamber concerning duels, on the 26th January, 1613-4. But 
there were two cases with which his name has been associated, 
and upon the telling of which much of the impression in 
modern times with regard to his character depends, These 
were the cases of St. John and Peacham. The charge against 

c 


XXXIV PREFACE. 


him with regard to the former, is that he employed the laws, 
which he was engaged in reducing and re-compiling, to the 
vilest purposes of tyranny, by appearing as counsel for the 
prosecution of Oliver St. John, who maintained that the King 
had no right to levy benevolences. As Bacon acted in this 
matter in a purely official capacity, it is scarcely necessary to 
inquire whether the charge against St. John was justified 
or not, and whether his conduct was so ‘manly and constitu- 
tional’ as Macaulay represents it. The circumstances were 
these. In June, 1614, the Parliament, to which Bacon had 
been returned by three constituencies, Cambridge University, 
Ipswich, and St. Alban’s, was dissolved without voting any 
supplies. As a means of meeting the King’s wants, it was 
proposed that a voluntary contribution should be raised, to 
which all who would should give as they were disposed. No 
compulsion was to be employed and no tax levied, but it was 
to be a benevolence in the strict sense of the word. On the 
11th of October, Oliver St. John, a gentleman of Marlborough 
(not the St. John of the Long Parliament), addressed a letter 
to the Mayor of that town, denouncing this kind of benevol- 
ence as contrary to law, reason, and religion, and charging 
the King with a violation of his coronation oath. For this he 
was tried on the 15th of April, 1615, in the Star-Chamber. 
The judges were unanimous, Coke leading the way, in sup- 
porting the legality of the benevolence, and St. John was 
condemned to a fine of 5000/., and to be imprisoned during 
the King’s pleasure. In this Bacon acted simply by the direc- 
tion of the Council, and even if he recommended the prose- 
cution, of which there is no evidence, he would have been 
fortified by the unanimous opinion of the judges. 

Peacham’s case was of a different nature, and the charge 
against Bacon founded upon it is even more serious. There 
were difficulties both of fact and law to be met, and Bacon, 
according to Macaulay, ‘was employed to settle the question 
of law by tampering with the judges, and the question of fact 
by torturing the prisoner.’ Edmund Peacham, a Somerset- 
shire clergyman, having brought libellous accusations against 


PREFACE. XXXV 


his diocesan, the Bishop of Bath and Wells, was sent up to 
Lambeth to be tried before the High Commission, and sen- 
tenced to be deprived of his orders on the 19th of December, 
1614. Before the sentence his house was searched, and a 
finished sermon was discovered, the contents of which were 
decided by the Council to be of a treasonable nature. It was 
thought, moreover, to indicate a state of disaffection in the 
part of the country to which Peacham belonged, and as he 
refused to criminate any accomplices, the Council resolved 
that he should be put to the torture. In this there is no 
evidence that Bacon had any hand whatever, further than that 
he, as Attorney General, was one of the Commission appointed 
by the Council to attend the examination of the prisoner, 
It is clear that by the common law the use of torture for 
extracting evidence was regarded as illegal, but it is equally 
clear that it was employed by the Council for discovery, and 
not for evidence; that is, not to make a prisoner criminate 
himself, but to get from him other information which it was 
desirable to obtain. Bad as we may think this to be, it is not 
Bacon who was to blame for it. There is proof in his own 
letters that he engaged in the proceeding with reluctance, 
and that the step was taken against his advice. How far he 
can be justified against the other charge, of tampering with 
the judges, depends upon a clear knowledge of what his inter- 
ference really amounted to, and this is not easy to arrive at. 
As the torture had utterly failed to extort from Peacham any 
proof of the existence of a conspiracy, it became a question 
whether he himself could be proceeded against for treason. 
On this point of law the King was anxious to obtain the 
opinion ot the judges of the King’s Bench. It is not denied 
that the Crown had a right to consult the judges on points of 
this kind, but it does not appear to have been the custom to 
consult them separately, as was done in this case. There was 
no question with regard to Peacham’s authorship of the 
sermon, which was in his handwriting. The points for the 
judges’ consideration were, first, whether the sermon, had it 
been published, would have supported an indictment for 
C2 


XXXVvi PREFACE. 


treason; and secondly, whether it was possible to establish a 
treasonable charge on the mere fact of composition. The 
idea of consulting the judges separately originated with the 
King. Whether he thought by this means to get a more 
genuine opinion from the others when they were not influenced 
by the presence and authority of Coke, or what was his 
motive, we have no means of knowing. That Bacon had 
anything to do with suggesting such a course, there is no 
evidence to show. What ke did was to carry out the King’s 
instructions, and to lay the case before the Lord Chief Justice 
for his opinion. Coke’s opposition was not exerted against 
the consultation of the judges, but against their being con- 
sulted separately. None of the judges of the King’s Bench 
had to try the case, and therefore it is hard to see with what 
truth Bacon’s conduct can be described as tampering with 
the judges in order to procure a capital conviction. Peacham 
was ultimately tried at the assizes at Taunton, on the 7th of 
August, 1615, and convicted of high treason, but the capital 
sentence was never carried into effect, because, as the report 
of his trial says of his offence, ‘many of the judges were of 
opinion that it was not treason.’ That his case excited any 
indignation in the country, is a simple invention of Lord 
Campbell's. 

On the 24th and 25th of May, 1616, Bacon took part as 
Attorney General in the trial of the Earl and Countess of 
Somerset for the murder of Sir Thomas Overbury. With 
the prosecution of the inferior agents in this mysterious crime 
he had nothing to do. During the early part of this year the 
health of the Lord Chancellor (Ellesmere) had been giving 
way, and Bacon was a suitor to the King for the office which 
seemed likely to be vacant. On the 9th of June he became a 
Privy Councillor, an appointment upon which he was formally 
congratulated by the University of Cambridge, which he 
represented in Parliament4. He had held the office of 


4 He now gave up his practice, though he retained his office of At- 
torney General, and employed his first leisure in addressing to the King a 
proposition for the compiling and amendment of the laws of England. 


PREFACE. XXXvVii 


University Counsel since the roth of November, 1613, and had 
been retained in the same capacity by Trinity College during 
the years 1614-16. It was not known till the 3rd of March, 
1616-7, that the Lord Chancellor resigned the Great Seal, 
which on the 7th of the same month was delivered by the 
King into the hands of Bacon. ‘Our new Lord-Keeper,’ says 
Chamberlain, ‘goes with great state, having a world of follow- 
ers put upon him, though he had more than enough before.’ 
On the first day of Term (May 7) he rode in pomp to West- 
minster, with a train of two hundred gallants, and delivered 
his inaugural speech in Chancery, in which he published the 
charge which the King gave him when he received the Seal, 
and the rules he had laid down for his own conduct. Such 
was his marvellous energy in his new office, that in the 
course of a month he had cleared off all arrears, and on the 
8th of June he reports to Buckingham that there is not one 
cause unheard. A week after his appointment the King took 
his departure for Scotland, leaving Bacon at the head of the 
Council to manage affairs in his absence. In the same year 
we find him using his influence with the King to dissuade him 
from the Spanish match, and with Buckingham to prevent the 
marriage of his brother, Sir John Villiers, with the daughter 
of Sir Edward Coke. The issue of both showed that his 
counsel was wise, but the King and Buckingham alike re- 
sented his interference. Coke’s animosity was of course not 
lessened by it. But for the present the career of Bacon’s 
prosperity was unchecked. On the 4th of January, 1617-8, he 
became Lord Chancellor, and on the 11th of July in the same 
year he was created Baron Verulam. In his inaugural speech 
as Lord-Keeper, he had announced his intention of reserving 
‘the depth of the three long vacations’ for the studies, arts, 
and sciences, to which in his own nature he was most in- 
clined. How well he had employed these moments of retire- 
ment from the business of his office became evident when, in 
October, 1620, he presented the King with the great work of 
his life, the Novum Organum, the object of which, he says, 
is to ‘enlarge the bounds of reason, and to endow man’s estate 


XXXVili PREFACE, 


with new value.’ He confesses that it is a fragment, and yet 
not written in haste, for he has been about it near thirty 
years. But he feels that. his own life is hastening to its close, 
and he wishes that a portion of his work at least should be 
saved. The end was now very near. On the 27th of 
January, 1620-1, he became Viscount St. Alban. His for- 
tune, which for nearly four years had borne him smoothly 
on, now raised him to his greatest height, as if to make 
the final catastrophe more dramatic and appalling. Parlia- 
ment met on the 30th. The Chancellor, in addressing 
the new Speaker, gave expression to a sentiment which, 
read in the light of subsequent events, seems prophetic, 
—‘It is certain that the best governments, yea, and the 
best of men, are like the best precious stones, wherein every 
flaw or icicle or grain are seen and noted more than in 
those that are generally foul and corrupted.’ Coke, who had 
not been in the House for many years, was returned as 
member for Liskeard. On the 5th of February he moved for a 
Committee to inquire into public grievances. A Committee 
was appointed to report concerning the Courts of Justice. 
Bacon, unsuspecting any malice, acted like a man who was 
certainly not conscious of any great delinquency. On the 
17th of February Sir E. Sackville reported to the House that 
the Chancellor willingly consented that any man might speak 
anything freely concerning his Court. On the 15th of March 
Sir Robert Phillips laid before the Lower House the report 
of the Committee on Courts of Justice. It came like a 
thunderclap. The Lord Chancellor was accused of corrup- 
tion in the exercise of his functions, and two instances were 
given as proofs. On the 19th the Lords received a message 
from the Commons requesting a conference concerning abuses 
in certain eminent persons. Bacon was absent through ill- 
ness. He sat in the House of Lords for the last time on 
Saturday, the 17th of March. Next day, Sir James Ley, 
Lord Chief Justice, was empowered by the King’s commis- 
sion to act as his substitute. On the Monday the con- 
ference for which the Lower House applied was granted, 


PREFACE. XXXixX 


and on the 20th the Lord Treasurer reported to the 
Lords that the Lord Chancellor was accused of bribery 
and corruption, and that the charge was supported by two 
cases alleged. Bacon, sick to death as he thought himself, 
and tortured by his hereditary malady, felt that his enemies 
had closed upon him. He knew of ‘the courses that had 
been taken for hunting out complaints’ against him, and 
begged only a fair hearing, that he might give them an 
ingenuous answer. He wrote to Buckingham: ‘I know I 
have clean hands and a clean heart, and I hope a clean house 
for friends or servants. But Job himself, or whosoever was 
the justest judge, by such hunting for matters against him, as 
hath been used against me, may for a time seem foul, espe- 


~ cially in a time when greatness is the mark, and accusation 


the game.’ And again, to the same: ‘I praise God for it, 
I never took penny for any benefice or ecclesiastical living ; 
I never took penny for releasing anything I stopped at the 
Seal; I never took penny for any commission, or things of 
that nature; I never shared with any servant for any second 
or inferior profit.’ To the King he said: ‘For the bri- 
beries and gifts wherewith I am charged, when the books 
of hearts shall be opened, I hope I shall not be found to have 
the troubled fountain of a corrupt heart, in a depraved habit 
of taking rewards to prevent justice ; howsoever I may be frail, 
and partake of the abuses of the times.” We must take into 
account these protestations when we come to consider his 
subsequent confession. The Houses adjourned on the 27th 
of March till the 17th of April. The day before they met, 
Bacon had an interview with the King. On the following 
day the Lord Treasurer reported to the Lords that the 
Chancellor desired two things of his Majesty :—1. That where 
his answers should be fair and clear to those things objected 
against him, his Lordship might stand upon his innocency,. 
2. Where his answers should not be so fair and clear, there 
his Lordship might be admitted to the extenuation of the 
charge; and where the proofs were full and undeniable, his 
Lordship would ingenuously confess them, and put himself 


xl PREFACE, 


‘ upon the mercy of the Lords. A few days later (April 22), 
Bacon, who had ascertained privately the particulars of the 
charge, wrote to the Lords: ‘I find matter sufficient and 
full, both to move me to desert my defence, and to move 
your Lordships to condemn and censure me.’ Why he thus 
avoided the trial is a mystery which has never yet been 
solved. He wished to resign the Seal, urging as a motive 
for clemency, ‘Neither will your Lordships forget, that there 
are witia temporis as well as vitia hominis; and the beginning 
of reformation hath the contrary power to the pool of 
Bethesda; for that had strength to cure him only that was 
first cast in, and this hath strength to hurt him only that is 
first cast in; and, for my part, I wish it may stay there and 
go no farther.’ His confession was regarded as insufficient, 
and it was ordered that the articles of the charge, now in- 
creased in number to twenty-three, should be laid before 
him. On the 30th of April his full confession, with the 
answers to the articles in detail, was read before the Lords. 
‘I do plainly and ingenuously confess,’ he says, ‘that I am 
guilty of corruption, and do renounce all defence.’ As after 
the severe self-examination which he underwent, he did not 
find himself blameless, it would be doing an ill service to his 
memory to excuse him. But, in confessing himself guilty of 
corruption, we must have regard to his own language. That 
Bacon took bribes for the perversion of justice no one has 
ventured to assert. Not one of the thousands of decrees 
which he made as Chancellor was ever set aside. None of 
his judgements were reversed. Even those who first charged 
him with accepting money admitted that he decided against 
them. What his own opinions were concerning judicial 
bribery we know from many passages in his writings, and 
it would argue him a hypocrite of the deepest dye. to suppose 
that he openly practised what he as openly denounced. 
In his speech in the Common Pleas (May 3, 1617) to Justice 
Hutton, he admonishes him: ‘That your hands, and the 
hands of your hands (I mean those about you) be clean, 
and uncorrupt from gifts, from meddling in titles, and from 


PREFACE. xli 


serving of turns, be they of great ones or small ones.’ In 
his Essay ‘Of Great Place,’ first published in 1612, and re- 
issued in 1625, he says: ‘For corruption: Do not only bind 
thine own hands, or thy servants’ hands, from taking, but 
bind the hands of suitors also: from offering.’ In confessing 
himself guilty of corruption, therefore, does he admit that 
the whole practice of his life had been a falsification of his 
principles? Let us see. Of the twenty-two cases of bribery 
with which he was charged, and which we may safely assume 
were all that the malice of his enemies could discover against 
him, there are but four in which he allows that he had in 
any way received presents before the causes were ended; 
and even in these, though technically the presents were made 
pendente lite, there is no hint that they affected his decision. 
During the four years of his Chancellorship he had made 
orders and decrees to the number of two thousand a year, 
as he himself wrote to the Lords, and of the charges 
brought against him there was scarcely one that was not two 
years old. The witnesses to some of the most important 
were Churchill, a registrar of the Court of Chancery, who 
had been discharged for fraud; and Hastings, who contra- 
dicted himself so much that his testimony is worthless, But 
we are more concerned with Bacon’s confession of guilt than 
with the evidence by which the charge was supported. Ina 
paper of memoranda which he drew up at the time, and 
which has been printed by Mr. Montagu (Bacon’s Works, xvi. 
p* 1. p. cccxlv), he writes: ‘ There be three degrees or cases, 
as I conceive, of gifts or rewards given to a judge. The first 
is of bargain, contract, or promise of reward, - pendente lite. 
And of this my heart tells me I am innocent; that I had no 
bribe or reward in my eye or thought when I pronounced 
any sentence or order. The second is a neglect in the 
judge to inform himself whether the cause be fully at an 
end, or no, what time he receives the gift; but takes it upon 
the credit of the party that all is done, or otherwise omits 
to inquire. And the third is, when it is received sine fraude, 
after the cause ended; which it seems, by the opinions of 


xlii PREFACE. 


the civilians, is no offence.’ In another draft he adds this 
comment: ‘For the first, I take myself to be as innocent 
as any born on St. Innocents’ day in my heart. For the 
second, I doubt in some particulars I may be faulty. And 
for the last, I conceived it to be no fault.’ 

Such is Bacon’s own interpretation of his confession, and 
we are bound to accept it, for it is borne out by twenty-two 
of the articles of the charge. To the twenty-third article, 
that he had given way to great exactions by his servants, ‘he 
confessed it to be a great fault that he had looked no better 
to his servants.’ With this confession, we may leave his 
name and memory, as he left it in his will, ‘to men’s charit- 
able speeches, and to foreign nations, and the next ages.’ 
The verdict can hardly be other than that he pronounced 
himself: ‘I was the justest judge that was in England these 
fifty years; but it was the justest censure in Parliament that 
was these two hundred years,’ This censure, pronounced on 
the 3rd of May by the Lords, was that he should pay a fine of 
40,000/, and be imprisoned in the Tower during the King’s 
pleasure; that he should thenceforth be incapable of holding 
any Office in the State, or of sitting in Parliament; and that he 
should not come within the verge of the Court. He had 
resigned the Seal to the King on the rst of May. It. had 
been decided by a majority of two that his titles were not to 
be taken from him. But the sentence of imprisonment was 
partially carried out, evidently to his great astonishment. On 
the 31st of May he was taken to the Tower, and instantly 
wrote a passionate letter to Buckingham, ‘Good my Lord, 
procure the warrant for my discharge this day.’ The order 
must have been given atonce. On the 4th of June he wrote to 
thank the King and Buckingham for his release. On the 7th® he 
dated a letter to the Prince of Wales from Sir John Vaughan’s 
house at Parson’s Green, whither he had been allowed to 
retire. On the 9th, Chamberlain writes to Carleton that the 


© The date usually given to this letter,‘ June 1,’ is obviously thcorrect. 
Mr. Spedding informs me that it should be ‘ June 7,’ 


PREFACE, xlili 


Lord Chancellor had obtained leave to go to his own home, 
and is talked of as President of the Council. On the 23rd, he 
reports that the Chancellor has removed from Fulham to his 
house at Gorhambury. Here he remained till the end of the 
year. From his retirement he writes to Buckingham (Sep- 
tember 5), ‘I am much fallen in love with a private life; but 
yet I shall so spend my time as shall, not decay my abilities 
for use.’ The occupation of his enforced leisure was the 
History of Henry VII, which was completed in manuscript 
by October. The fine inflicted by the sentence in Parliament 
was released by the King’s warrant on the 21st of September, 
but was assigned to trustees, that Bacon might be protected 
from the importunity of his creditors, He had nothing now 
but the pension of 1200/, a year which the King had recently 
given him, and his own private fortune. On being made Lord 
Keeper he had resigned not only the lucrative post of At- 
torncy General, but the clerkship of the Star-Chamber. By 
his fall he had lost 6000/. a year. A pardon was issued under 
the Privy Seal on the 17th of October, but it appears to have 
been stayed by the new Lord-Keeper. The prohibition which 
prevented him from coming within twelve miles of the Court 
was relaxed in the following March, and he was allowed to 
approach as near as Highgate. Buckingham was annoyed at 
his refusal to give up York House, and opposed his return to 
London. In the course of the year, however, the restriction 
was removed, and he took up his residence at Bedford House, 
his own mansion meanwhile having been surrendered. The 
publication of the History of Henry the Seventh in the 
spring, and the translation into Latin of the Advancement 
of Learning, kept him fully employed. In the latter work he 
is said to have been assisted by George Herbert. Writing to 
Bishop Andrewes the dedication to his Dialogue touching a 
Holy War, which was also the work of this year, he says: 
‘And again, for that my book of Advancement of Learning 
may be some preparation, or key, for the better opening of 
the Instauration; because it exhibits a mixture of new con- 
ceits and old; whereas the Instauration gives the new un- 


xliv PREFACE, 


mixed, otherwise than with some little aspersion of the old 
for taste’s sake; I have thought good to procure a translation 
of that book into the general language, not without great and 
ample additions and enrichment thereof, especially in the 
second book, which handleth the Partition of Sciences; in 
such sort, as I hold it may serve in lieu of the first part of the 
Instauration, and acquit my promise in that part.’ 

The provostship of Eton fell vacant in April 1623, and 
Bacon sought the appointment as ‘a retreat to a place of 
study so near London,’ but without success. The Advance- 
ment of Learning in its Latin form was issued this year under 
the title of De Augmentis Scientiarum, in nine books, the first 
closely corresponding with the English. The last two or 
three years of his life were occupied with dictating his Sylva 
Sylvarum, putting the last touches to his Essays, which were 
published in their final form in March 1625, and superintend- 
ing their translation into Latin with other works to be entitled 
Opera Moralia. ‘The Apophthegms were the occupation of a 
morning. It does not appear that the sentence of Parliament 
was ever entirely revoked. The name of Lord St. Alban’s, it 
is true, is among those of the Peers summoned to the first 
Parliament of Charles, but for some reason he did not take 
his seat in the House. On New Year’s Day, 1625-6, he 
wrote to Sir Humphry May: ‘The present occasion doth 
invite me to desire that his grace (i.e. Buckingham) would 
procure me a pardon of the King of the whole sentence. My 
writ for Parliament I have now had twice before the time, 
and that without any express restraint not to use it.’ His 
health, long feeble, would not have allowed him to attend, but 
he could have appointed a proxy. At length came death, the 
friend, whom for five years he had looked steadily in the face, 
and released him from all his troubles. A cold, caught in the 
process of an experiment to test the preserving qualities of 
snow, terminated in a gentle fever, and after lingering a week 
he passed quietly away in the early morning of Easter-day, 
April 9, 1626. He died at the Earl of Arundel’s house at 
Highgate, and was buried in the church of St. Michael, at 


PREFACE. xlv 


St. Alban’s. His chaplain, Dr. Rawley, ends the life which 
he wrote of his old master with words which form a fitting 
conclusion to every life of him: ‘ But howsoever his body 
was mortal, yet no doubt his memory and works will live, and 
will in all probability last as long as the world lasteth.’ And 
with this anticipation we leave Francis Bacon to the judge- 
ment of all time. 


3 W. A. W. 

i This Second Edition has been revised and corrected 

1 throughout, and some additions have been made to the 

4 Notes and Glossary. 

ra 

; W.A. W. 
April, 1873. 

Ms 


LB: eS aie EER La SE EM 


aa, 
sg a a a eae 
es a 


CALLNDATK 


OF tHE LIFE AND WORKS 


OF 


FRANCIS BACONS, 


1560-1. Jan. 22. Born at York 
House. 
1573. April 5. Went up to Trinity 
College, Cambridge. 
», June Io, Matriculated. 


1576. June 27. Entered at Gray’s 


Inn 

» Nov. 21. Admitted of the 
grand company of that 
society. 

»» Went to Paris with Sir Amias 
Paulet. 


1578-9. Feb. 22. Death of his fa- 
ther, Sir Nicholas Bacon. 
1582. June 27. Admitted as utter 
barrister. 
» About this time wrote Temporis 
Partus Maximus. 
1584. Nov. 23. Sat in parliament as 
member for Melcombe Regis. 
1586. Oct. 29. Member for Taunton. 
1588. Lent term. Elected Reader at 
Gray’s Inn. 
» Nov. Member for Liverpool. 
1589. Oct. 29. Reversion of the 
Clerkship of the Star-Cham- 
ber granted to him. 


1589. An Advertisement touching the 
Controversies of the Church 
of England (1640). 

+1592 Nov. 17. Discourses in praise 
of Knowledge and of the 

Queen (1734). 
»» Observations on a Libel (1657). 

1592-3. Feb. 19. Sat as member for 
Middlesex. 

1593-4. Jan. 25. First appearance 
as a pleader in court. 

1594. A true Report of Dr. Lopez his 
Treason (1657). 

» July 27. Made M.A. at Cam- 
bridge. 

1595. Nov. 17. Contributions to the 
Device presented by Essex 
to the Queen: printed by 
Mr. Spedding (1861). 

1595--6. Formularies and Elegancies 
(1859). 

+1596. Made Queen’s Counsel Extra- 
ordinary. 

1597. First edition of the Essays. 
Colours of Good and Evil. 
Meditationes Sacre. 


Maxims of the Law (1630). 


f In the list of his Works I have not included his speeches in Parliament or 
his arguments in law. The date of composition when it could be ascertained 
is given; the date of publication, when different from that of composition, is 


included within parentheses. 


Probable dates are indicated by a dagger + 


Those pieces of which the date is altogether uncertain are placed at the end. 


CALENDAR OF LIFE AND WORKS. 


1597. Oct. 24. Sat as member for 


Ipswich, 

1609. Oct. 24. Double Reader at 
Gray’s Inn. 

1600-1. Feb. 19. Trial of Essex and 
Southampton. 


1601. A Declaration of the Practises 
and Treasons attempted and 
committed by Robert late 
Earl of Essex, &c., drawn 
up by Bacon, 

Oct. 27. Returned to parlia- 
ment as member for Ipswich 
and St. Alban’s. 

1602. Letter to Cecil with Consider- 

ations touching the Queen's 
service in Ireland (1648). 

1602-3. Mar. 24. Death of Elizabeth. 

1603. July 23. Bacon knighted by 
James I. 

A Brief Discourse touching the 
Happy Union of the King- 
doms of England and Scot- 
land. 

+1603. Valerius Terminus of the Inter- 

pretation of Nature (1734). 
» De Interpretatione Nature Pro- 
@mium (1653). 
1603-4. Mar. 19. Returned again by 
Ipswich and St. Alban’s. 
1604. Certain Considerations touching 
the better Pacification and 
Edification of the Church of 
England (1640). 

Apology in certain imputations 
concerning the late Earl of 
Essex. 

Aug. 18. 
Counsel. 

Certain Articles or Consider- 
ations touching the Union of 
the Kingdoms of England 
and Scotland (1657). 

1605. Advancement of Learning. 
+1605. Cogitationes de Natura Rerum 
(1653). 
1606. May 10. Francis Bacon mar- 
ried Alice Barnham, 


Appointed King’s 


” 


xl vii 


+1606. Partis Instaurationis Secunda 
Delineatio et Argumentum 


(1653). 
1607. June 25. Made Solicitor Gen- 
eral, 

»  Cogitata et Visa (1653). 

+1607, Filum Labyrinthi (1734). 
1608. Inguisitio Legitima de Motu 
(1653). 

» Calor et Frigus (1734). 

» Historia Soni et Auditus (1658). 

» dn felicem memoriam Eliza- 
bethee (1658). 

» Afragment Of the true great- 
ness of Britain (1734). 

» July 16. The Clerkship of 
the Star-Chamber falls to 
him, 

+1608. Temporis 
(1653). 
»»  Aphorismi et Consilia (1653). 


Partus Masculus 


1608-9. Jan. 1. Discourse of the 
Plantation in Ireland 
(1657). 


1609. De Sapientia Veterum. 

1610. Death of his mother, Lady 
Anne Bacon, . 

The beginning of the History of 
Great Britain (1657). 

1611-12. Advice to the King, touch- 
ing Sutton’s Estate (1648). 

1612. Second edition of the Essays. 

+1612. Descriptio Globi Intellectualis 

(1653). 
1» Thema Celi (1653). 

1613. Oct. 26. Appointed Attorney 
General, 

1614. Returned to parliament 
Ipswich, St. Alban’s, 
Cambridge University. 

1616. June 9. Made a Privy Coun- 

cillor. 

Proposition to His Majesty 
touching the Compiling and 
Amendment of the Laws of 
England. 

+1616. De Fluxu et Refluxu Maris 


(1653). 


by 


and 


xviii 


+1616. De Principiis atque Originibus 
(1653). 

1616-7. Mar. 7, Made Lord Keeper. 

1617-8. Jan. 4. Made Lord Chan- 


cellor, 

1618. July 9. Created Baron Veru- 
lam. 

1620. Oct. Novum Organum pub- 


lished with Parasceve ad 
Historiam Naturalem et Ex- 
perimentalem. 
Jan. 27. Created Viscount 
St. Alban. 
1621. May 3. Sentenced by 
. House of Lords. 
In this interval were com- 
posed Abecedarium Nature 
(lost except a fragment pub- 
lished by Tenison, 1679); 
Inquisitiode Magnete (1658); 
Topica ingquisitionis de luce 
et lumine (1653); Sylva 
Sylvarum (1627); Offer of 
a Digest to be made of the 
Laws of England (1629). 
1622. History of Henry VII; Historia 
Naturalis et Experimentalis ; 
Advertisement touching an 
Holy War (1629). 
1623. De Augmentis Scientiarum libri 
ix; Historia Vite et Mortis ; 
History of the reign of Henry 
VIII (1629). 


1620-1, 
the 


1621-6. 


CALENDAR OF LIFE AND WORKS. 


Considerations touching a War 
with Spain (1629). 

» New Atlantis (1627). 

»»  Magnalia Nature (1627). 

» Dec. Apophthegms. 

< Translation of the Psalms. 

Third edition of the Essays. 

Apr. g. Bacon died at High- 
gate. 


1624. 


1625. 
1626. 


Of the following works the date of 


composition is doubtful :— 


Phenomena Universi (1653); Scala 
Intellectus and Prodromi (1653); 
Cogitationes de Scientia Humana 
(1653); De Interpretatione Nature 
Sententiea xii (1653); Short Notes 
for Civil Conversation (1648) ; 
Confession of Faith (1641); Prayers 
(1648, 1679) ; Imago Civilis Fulii 
Casaris (1658); Imago Civilis 
Augusti Cesaris (1658); <Addi- 
tions to Camden’s Annales (1717): 
In Henricum Principem Wallie 
Elogium (1763); Physiological 
and Medical Remains (1679). 
Between 1596 and 1604 Bacon 
wrote the Letter and Discourse to 
Sir Henry Savill, touching Helps 
for the Intellectual Powers (1657) ; 
and, after July 1608, Redargutio 
Philosophiarum (1653). 


(re ta nl sO NS EE AN Ca RO I i RD te ER RR AI ka SA RE MET AR RE RE RE I TORR AE 


Dedication to the King (1r~3). The treatise in two parts 


(A) Discredits of Learning , 
(i—v), arising from 


B) Dignity of Learning 
yg (vill), shown by 


BOOk 


[ i. The zeal and jealousy of dv 
II, The severity and arrogancy 
III. The errors and imperfectio 


x. their fortunes (iii, r—3); 
2. their manners _ iii, 4—10) ; 


L 3, the nature of their studie| 


- I. Divine testimony (vi) in 


a 
se 
| 


II. Human proofs (vii, viii) 
from the 


ANALYSIS. 


. I. OF THE EXCELLENCY OF LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE 


1. The excellency of learning and knowledge. 


2. What has been done for the advancement of learning, with the defects of the same, 


res (i. 2, 3). 
of Politicians (ii. 1—9), 


ms of learned men, from 


ef A : ; t, Fantastical learning (iv, 8—12), 
f Errors and vanities in the studies themselves (iv, ath ir Contentious learning (iv. 5—7). 


3. Delicate learning (iv. 2—4). 


neta 1. Affectation of antiquity and novelty, (v. ed 
B (iv. v) 9 [ 2, Distrust of new discoveries (v. 2). f ; 
3. Conceit that the best opinions prevail (v. 3). 
4. Premature reduction of knowledge to arts and methods (v. 4), 
5. Neglect of universality or pA7losophia prima (Vv, 5). 
Peccant humours (v. r~12), whic are { 6. Too great reverence for the intellect (v. 6). 
7, Mixture of knowledge with men’s inclinations (v. 7). 
8. Impatience of doubt (v. 8). 
9. Dogmatic delivery of knowledge (v. 9). 
10. Aim which men propound to themselves (v. 19). 
11, Mistaking of the end of knowledge (v, 11), 


The contemplative life ee Adam (6), and Abel (7). 
he i t f art : jf: s 
he learning of ie (3), Job (10), Solomon (11), Christ (12), the Apostles (13), the Fathers (14), the Jesuits (15). 


upreme honours paid to inventors of arts (vii. 1). 


The intercourse of man and man (vii. 2). 


. In peace; e.g. the Roman Emperors (vii. 4—8), Q. Elizabeth (vii. 9). 
‘States under learned princes { In var (vii. SE e.g. Alexander (vii. 11~21), Czesar (vii. 22—29), 
nfluence of learning upon + private virtue (viii. 1, 2 Xenophon (vii. 30). 


Power over the minds of men (viii, 3). 
Fortune and advancement (viii. 4). 
Pleasure (viii. 5). 

Immortality (viii. 6). 


(To face Page 1.] 


eee 


THE 
FIRST BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON; 


OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, 


DIVINE AND HUMAN. 


To the King. 


I. HERE were under the law, excellent King, both 

daily sacrifices and freewill offerings; the one 
proceeding upon ordinary observance, the other upon a 
devout cheerfulness: in like manner there belongeth to 
kings from their servants both tribute of duty and presents 
of affection. In the former of these I hope I shall not live 
to be wanting, -according to my most humble duty, and 
the good pleasure of your Majesty’s employments: for the 
latter, I thought it more respective to make choice of 
some oblation, which might rather refer to the propriety 
and excellency of your individual person, than to the 
business of your crown and state. 

2, Wherefore, representing your Majesty many times 
unto my mind, and beholding you not with the inquisitive 
eye of presumption, to discover that which the Scripture 
telleth me is inscrutable, but with the observant eye of 
duty and admiration; leaving aside the other parts of 
your virtue and fortune, I have been touched, yea, and 
possessed with an extreme wonder at those your virtues 

B 


2 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [2. 


and faculties, which the Philosophers call intellectual ; 
the largeness of your capacity, the faithfulness of your 
memory, the swiftness of your apprehension, the pene- 
tration of your judgement, and the facility and order of 
your elocution: and I have often thought, that of all the 
persons living that I have known, your Majesty were 
the best instance to make a man of Plato’s opinion, 
that all knowledge is but remembrance, and that the 
mind of man by nature knoweth all things, and hath 
but her own native and original notions (which by the 
strangeness and darkness of this tabernacle of the body 
are sequestered) again revived and restored: such a light 
of nature I have observed in your Majesty, and such a 
readiness to take flame and blaze from the least occasion 
presented, or the least spark of another’s knowledge de- 
livered. And as the Scripture saith of the wisest king, 
That his heart was as the sands of the sea; which though 
it be one of the largest bodies, yet it consisteth of the 
smallest and finest portions; so hath God given your 
Majesty a composition of understanding admirable, being 
able to compass and comprehend the greatest matters, 
and nevertheless to touch and apprehend the least; 
whereas it should seem an impossibility in nature, for 
the same instrument to make itself fit for great and 
small works. And for your gift of speech, I call to mind 
what Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augustus Ceesar: Augusto 
profluens, et que principem deceret, eloquentia fuit. For if 
we note it well, speech that is uttered with labour and 
difficulty, or speech that savoureth of the affectation of 
art and precepts, or speech that is framed after the imita- 
tion of some pattern of eloquence, though never so ex- 
cellent; all this hath somewhat servile, and holding of 
the subject. But your Majesty’s manner of speech is 


2] THE FIRST BOOK. 3 


indeed prince-like, flowing as from a fountain, and yet 
streaming and branching itself into nature’s order, full of 
facility and felicity, imitating none, and inimitable by any. 
And as in your civil estate there appeareth to be an emul- 
ation and contention of your Majesty’s virtue with your 
fortune; a virtuous disposition with a fortunate regiment; 
a virtuous expectation (when time was) of ‘your greater 
fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in the due 
time ; a virtuous observation of the laws of marriage, with 
most blessed and happy fruit of marriage; a virtuous and 
most Christian desire of peace, with a fortunate inclination 
in your neighbour princes thereunto: so likewise in these 
intellectual matters, there seemeth to be no less con- 
tention between the excellency of your Majesty’s gifts of 
nature and the universality and perfection of your learn- 
ing. For I am well assured that this which I shall say is 
no amplification at all, but a positive and measured truth ; 
which is, that there hath not been since Christ’s time any 
king or temporal monarch, which hath been so learned in 
all literature and erudition, divine and human. For let a 
man seriously and diligently revolve and peruse the suc- 
cession of the emperors of Rome, of which Cesar the 
Dictator, who lived some years before Christ, and Marcus 
Antoninus were the best learned; and so descend to the 
emperors of Grecia, or of the West, and then to the 
lines of France, Spain, England, Scotland, and the rest, 
and he shall find this judgement is truly made. For it 
seemeth much in a king, if, by the compendious ex- 
tractions of other men’s wits and labours, he can take 
hold of any superficial ornaments and shows of learning ; 
or if he countenance and prefer learning and learned 
men: but to drink indeed of the true fountains of learn- 
ing, nay, to have such a fountain of learning in himself, 
B2 


4 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [2. 


in a king, and in a king born, is almost a miracle. And 
the more, because there is met in your Majesty a rare 
conjunction, as well of divine and sacred literature, as of 
profane and human; so as your Majesty standeth in- 
vested of that triplicity, which in great veneration was 
ascribed to the ancient Hermes; the power and fortune 
of a king, the knowledge and illumination of a priest, and 
the learning and universality of a philosopher. This 
propriety inherent and individual attribute in your Majesty 
deserveth to be expressed not only in the fame and ad- 
miration of the present time, nor in the history or tradition 
of the ages succeeding, but also in some solid work, fixed 
memorial, and immortal monument, bearing a character 
or signature both of the power of a king and the differ- 
ence and perfection of such a king. 

3. Therefore I did conclude with myself, that I could 
not make unto your Majesty a better oblation than of 
some treatise tending to that end, whereof the sum will 
consist of these two parts; the former concerning the 
excellency of learning and knowledge, and the excel- 
lency of the merit and true glory in the augmentation and 
propagation thereof: the latter, what the particular acts 
and works are, which have been embraced and under- 
taken for the advancement of learning ; and again, what 
defects and undervalues I find in such particular acts: to 
the end that though I cannot positively or affirmatively 
advise your Majesty, or propound unto you framed par- 
ticulars, yet I may excite your princely cogitations to 
visit the excellent treasure of your own mind, and thence 
to extract particulars for this purpose, agreeable to your 
magnanimity and wisdom. 


oe | THE FIRST BOOK. 5 


I. 1. JN the entrance to the former of these, to clear 

the way, and as it were to make silence, to have 
the true testimonies concerning the dignity of learning to 
be better heard, without the interruption of tacit objec- 
tions ; I think good to deliver it from the discredits and 
disgraces which it hath received, all from ignorance ; but 
ignorance severally disguised; appearing sometimes in 
the zeal and jealousy of divines; sometimes in the severity 
and arrogancy of politiques; and sometimes in the errors 
and imperfections of learned men themselves. 


2. I hear the former sort say, that knowledge is of - 


those things which are to be accepted of with great limita- 
tion and caution: that the aspiring to overmuch know- 
ledge was the original temptation and sin whereupon 
ensued the fall of man: that knowledge hath in it some- 
what of the serpent, and therefore where it entereth into 
a man it makes him swell; Sczentea inflat: that Salomon 
gives a censure, Zhat there is no end of making books, and 
that much reading ts weariness of the flesh ; and again in 
another place, Zhat in spacious knowledge there is much 


contristation, and that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth | 


anxtely : that Saint Paul gives a caveat, Zhat we be not 
spoiled through vain philosophy : that experience demon- 
strates how learned men have been arch-heretics, how 
learned times have been inclined to atheism, and how the 
contemplation of second causes doth derogate from our 
dependence upon God, who is the first cause. 

3. To discover then the ignorance and error of this 
opinion, and the misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, 
it may well appear these men do not observe or consider 


that it was not the pure knowledge of nature and uni- \ 


versality, a knowledge by the light whereof man did give 
names unto other creatures in Paradise, as they were 


- | end: declaring not obscurely, that God hath framed the 


6 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [1.3 


brought before ‘him, according unto their proprieties, which 
gave the occasion to the fall: but it was the proud know- 
ledge of good and evil, with an intent in man to give law 
unto himself, and to depend no more upon God’s com- 
mandments, which was the form of the temptation. 
Neither is it any quantity of knowledge, how great soever, 
that can make the mind of man to swell; for nothing can 
fill, much less extend the soul of man, but God and the 
contemplation of God; and therefore Salomon, speaking 
of the two principal senses of inquisition, the eye and the 
ear, affirmeth that she eye zs never satisfied with seeing, 
nor the ear with hearing ; and if there be no fulness, then 
is the continent greater than the content: so of knowledge 
itself, and the mind of man, whereto the senses are but 
reporters, he defineth likewise in these words, placed after 
that Kalendar or Ephemerides which he maketh of the 
diversities of times and seasons for all actions and pur- 
poses; and concludeth thus: God hath made all things f- . 
beautiful, or decent, in the true return of their seasons: Also i . 
he hath placed the world in man’s heart, yet cannot man find al mea 
out the work which God worketh from the beginning to thé. 


- mind of man as a mirror or glass, capable of the image of 
the universal world, and joyful to receive the impression 
thereof, as the eye joyeth to receive light; and not only 
delighted in beholding the variety of things and vicissitude 
of times, but raised also to find out and discern the ordin- 
ances and decrees, which throughout all those changes 
are infallibly observed, And although he doth insinuate 
that the supreme or summary law of nature, which he 
calleth Zhe work which God worketh from the beginning to 
the end, is not possible to be found out by man; yet that 
doth not derogate from the capacity of the mind, but may 


I. 3.] THE FIRST BOOK. ti? 


be referred to the impediments, as of shortness of life, ill 
conjunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge over 
from hand to hand, and many other inconveniences, 
whereunto the condition of man is subject. For that 
nothing parcel of the world is denied to man’s inquiry 
and invention, he doth in another place rule over, when 
he saith, Zhe spirtt of man ts as the lamp of God, where- 
with he searcheth the tnwardness of all secrets. If then 
such be the capacity and receipt of the mind of man, it 
is manifest that there is no danger at all in the proportion 
or quantity of knowledge, how large soever, lest it should 
make it swell or out-compass itself; no, but it is merely 
the quality of knowledge, which, be it in quantity more or 
less, if it be taken without the true corrective thereof, hath 
in it some nature of venom or malignity, and some effects 
of that venom, which is ventosity or swelling. This cor- 
rective spice, the-mixture whereof maketh knowledge so”, 
sovereign, (charity which the Apostle immediately Y 
addeth to the=f6rmer clause: for so he saith, Knowledge 
bloweth up, but charity buildeth up ; not unlike unto that 
which he delivereth in another place: J/ J spake, saith he, 
with the tongues of men and angels, and had not chartty, it 
were but as a tinkling cymbal; not but that it is an 
excellent thing to speak with the tongues of men and 
angels, but because, if it be severed from charity, and not 
referred to the good of men and mankind, it hath rather 
a sounding and unworthy glory, than a meriting and 
substantial virtue. And as for that censure of Salomon, 
.concerning the excess of writing and reading books, and 
the anxiety of spirit which redoundeth from knowledge; 
and that admonition of Saint Paul, Zhat we be not seduced 
by vain philosophy ; \et those places be rightly understood, 
and they do indeed excellently set forth the true bounds 


Td 


| 
\ 


OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [1.3 


and limitations, whereby human knowledge is confined 
and circumscribed ; and yet without any such contracting 


1} or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the uni- 
_ versal nature of things; for these limitations are three: 


the first, Zhat we do not so place our felicity in knowledge, 


as we forget our mortality: the second, That we make 
| application of our knowledge, to give ourselves repose and 


contentment, and not distaste or repining: the third, Zhai 
we do not presume by the contemplation of nature to atiain to 
the mysteries of God. For as touching the first of these, 
Salomon doth excellently expound himself in another 
place of the same book, where he saith: J saw well that 
knowledge recedeth as far from ignorance as light doth from 
darkness and that the wise man’s eyes keep watch in his 
head, whereas the fool roundeth about in darkness: but 
withal I learned, that the same mortality tnvolveth them both. 
And for the second, certain it is, there is no vexation or 
anxiety of mind which resulteth from knowledge other- 
wise than merely by accident; for all knowledge and 
wonder (which is the seed of knowledge) is an impression 
of pleasure in itself: but when men fall to framing con- 
clusions out of their knowledge, applying it to their par- 
ticular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears 
or vast desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble 
of mind which is spoken of: for then knowledge is no 
more Lumen siccum, whereof Heraclitus the profound 
said, Lumen siccum optima anima ; but it becometh Lumen 
madidum, or maceratum, being steeped and infused in the 
humours of the affections. And as for the third point, it 
deserveth to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly _ 
passed over: for if any man shall think by view and * 
inquiry into these sensible and material things to attain 
that light, whereby he may reveal unto himself the nature 


ee 
I. 3+]. THE FIRST BOOK. & ) 


or will of God, then indeed is he spoiled by vain philo- 
-sophy: for the contemplation of God’s creatures and 
works produceth (having regard to the works and crea- 
tures themselves) knowledge, but having regard to God, 
no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken know- 
ledge. And therefore it was most aptly said by one of 
Plato’s school, Zhat the sense of man carrieth a resem- 
blance with the sun, which (as we see) openeth and revealeth 
all the terrestrial globe; but then again it obscureth and 
concealeth the stars and celestial globe: so doth the sense 
discover natural things, but wt darkeneth and shutieth up 
divine. And hence it is true that it hath proceeded, that 
divers great learned men have been heretical, whilst they | 
have sought to fly up to the secrets of the Deity by the | 
waxen wings of the senses. And as for the conceit that) 
too much knowledge should incline a man to atheism, 
and that the ignorance of second causes should make a 
more devout dependence upon God, which is the first 
cause; Aft, it is good to ask the question which Job 
éd of his friends: Will you lie for God, as one man will 
do for another, to gratify him? For certain it is that God | 
worketh nothing in nature but by second causes: and 
if they would-have it otherwise believed, it is mere im- 
posture, as it were in favour towards God; and nothing 
else but to offer to the author of truth the unclean 
sacrifice of alie. But further, it is an assured truth, and 


a conclusion of experience, that_a—ittl—or—superficial — 
knowledge of philosoph iret ind of man to | 


atheism, but a further_proceeding therein ring the 
mind back again to religion. For in the entrance of 
philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto 
the senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it 
dwell and ‘stay there it may induce some oblivion of the 


he aS 


10 / OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [l. 3. 


highest cause; but when a man passeth on further, and 
seeth the dependence of causes, and the works of Pro- 
vidence, then, according to the allegory of the poets, he 
will easily-believe that the highest link of nature’s chain 
must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter’s chair. To 
conclude therefore, let no man upon a weak conceit of 
sobriety or an ill-applied moderation think or maintain, 
_ that a man can search too far, or be too well studied in 
_ the book of God’s word, or in the book of God’s works, 
_ divinity or philosophy; but rather let men endeavour an 
endless progress or proficience in both; only let men 
beware that they apply both to charity, and not to 
swelling; to use, and not to ostentation; and again, 
that they do not unwisely mingle or confound these 
learnings together. 


IL x. And as for the disgraces—whteh—learning—re-__ 
,ceiveth from politiques, they be of this nature; that 


Jearning doth soften men’s minds, and makes them 
| more unapt for the honour and exercise of arms; that it 
{doth mar and pervert men’s dispositions for matter of 
government and policy, in making them too curious and 
irresolute by variety of reading, or too peremptory or 
‘(positive by strictness of rules and axioms, or too im- 
‘ oderate and overweening by reason of the greatness 


fexamples, or too incompatible and differing from the 
imes by reason of the dissimilitude of examples; or at 
‘least, that it doth divert men’s travails from action and 
‘fbusiness, and bringeth them to a love of leisure and 
/ privateness ; and that it doth bring into states a relaxa- 
4/tion of discipline, whilst every man is more ready to 
argue than to obey and execute. Out of this conceit, 
Cato, surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men 
indeed that ever lived, when Carneades the philosopher 


aaa 
Il. 1. | _ HE FIRST BOOK. 1] 


came in embassage to Rome, and that the youn n 
of Rome began to flock about him, being allured with 
the sweetness and majesty of his eloquence and learn- 
ing, gave counsel in open senate that they should give 
him his dispatch with all speed, lest he should infect 
and enchant the minds and affections of the youth; and 
at unawares bring in an alteration of the manners and 
customs of the state. Out of the same conceit or 
humour did Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage of 
his country, and the disadvantage of his own profession, 
make a kind of separation between policy and govern- 
ment, and between arts and sciences, in the verses so 
much renowned, attributing and challenging the one to 
the Romans, and leaving and yielding the other to the 
Grecians: Zu regere imperio populos, Romane, memenio, 
He tibi erunt aries, &c. So likewise we see that Anytus, 
the accuser of Socrates, laid it as an article of charge and 
accusation against him, that he did, with the variety and 
power of his discourses and disputations, withdraw young 
men from due reverence to the laws and customs of their 
country, and that he did profess a dangerous and per- 
nicious science, which was, to make the worse matter 
seem the better, and to suppress truth by force of elo- 
quence and speech. 

2. But these and the like imputations have rather a 
countenance of gravity than any ground of justice: for 
experience doth warrant, that both in persons and in 
times there hath been a meeting and concurrence in}, / 
learning and arms, flourishing and excelling in the same v 
men and the same ages. For as for men, there -cannot_ 
be a better nor the like-instance, as of that pair,Alexander » v 
the Great and Julifis Cesarthe Dictator ; whereof t 
was Aristotle’s scholar in philosophy, and the other was 


12 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [1. 2. 


Cigero’s rival in eloquence: or if any man had rather call 
for scholars that were great generals, than generals that 
were great scholars, let him take Epaminondas the 
Theban, or Xenophon the Athenian; whereof the one 
was the first that abated the power of Sparta, and the 
othef was the first that made way to the overthrow of the 
monarchy of Persia. And this concurrence is yet more 
visible in times than in persons, by how much an age 
is [a] greater object than a man. For both in Egypt, 
Assyria, Persia, Grecia, and Rome, the same times that 
are most renowned for arms, are likewise most admired 
for learning; so that the greatest authors and philosophers 
and the greatest captains and governors have lived in: the 
same ages. Neither can it otherwise be: for as in man 
the ripeness’ of strength of the body and mind cometh 
much about an age, save that the strength of the body 
cometh somewhat the more early, so in states, arms and 
learning, whereof the one correspondeth to the body, the 
other to the soul of man, have a concurrence or near 
sequence in times. 

3. And for matter of policy and government, that 
learning should rather hurt, than enable thereunto, is a 
thing very improbable: we see it is accounted an error 
to commit a natural body to empiric physicians, which 
commonly have a few pleasing receipts whereupon they 
are confident and adventurous, but know neither the 
causes of diseases, nor the complexions of patients, nor 
peril of accidents, nor the true method of cures: we see 
it is a like error to rely upon advocates or lawyers, which 
are only men of practice and not grounded in their books, 
who are many times easily surprised when matter falleth 
vut besides their experience, to the prejudice of the 
~ causes they handle: so by like reason it cannot be but a 


II. 3. } THE FIRST BOOK. 


matter of doubtful consequence if states be manag 
empiric statesmen, not well mingled with men grounded 
in learning. But contrariwise, it is almost without instance 
contradictory that ever any government was disastrous tha 
was in the hands of learned governors. For howsoever _ 
it hath been ordinary with politique men to extenuate and 
disable learned men by the names of pedanées ; yet in the 
records of time it appeareth in many particulars that the 
governments of princes in minority (notwithstanding the 
infinite disadvantage of that kind of state) have never- 
theless excelled the government of princes of mature age, 
even for that reason which they seek to traduce, which is, 
that by that occasion the state hath been in the hands of 
pedantes : for so was the state of Rome for the first five _ 
years, which are so much magnified, during the minority 
“of Nero; inthe hamds-of Seneca a pedants': so it was again, © 
for ten years’ space or more, during the minority of Gor- 
dianus the younger, with great applause and contentation 
in the hands of Misitheus a pedanti': so was it before that, 
in the minority of Alexander Severus, in like happiness, in 
hands not much unlike, by reason of the rule of the 
women, who were aided by the teachers and preceptors. 
Nay, let a man look into the government of the bishops _ 


» 


of as by name, into the government of Pius 
Quintus and Sextus Quintus in our times, who were both 
at their entrance esteemed but as pedantical friars, and he 
shall find that such popes do greater things, and proceed 
upon truer_principles of estate, than those which havé— 
d ee —~— - 

ascended to the papacy from an education ‘and breeding — 
in-affairs-of éstate and courts of princes; for although 


- fen bred in learning are perhaps to seek in points of 


convenience and accommodating for the present, which 
the Italians call ragiond di stato, whereof the same Pius 


OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [II 3- 


Quintus could not hear spoken with patience, terming 
them inventions against religion and the moral virtues ; 
yet on the other side, to recompense that, they are perfect 
in those same plain grounds of religion, justice, honour, 
and moral virtue, which if they be well and watchfully 
pursued, there will be seldom use of those other, no more 
than of physic in a sound or well-dieted body. Neither 
can the experience of one man’s life furnish examples and 
precedents for the events of one man’s life. For as it 
happeneth sometimes that the grandchild, or other de- 
scendant, resembleth the ancestor more than the son; so 
many times occurrences of present times may sort better 
with ancient examples than with those of the later or 
immediate times: and lastly, the wit of one man can no 
more countervail learning than one man’s means can hold 
way with a common purse. 

4. And as for those particular seducements or indis- 
positions of the mind for policy and government, which 
learning is pretended to insinuate; if it be granted that - 
any such thing be, it must be remembered withal, that 
learning ministereth in every of them greater strength 
of medicine or remedy than it offereth cause of indis- 
position or infirmity. For if by a secret operation it make . 
men perplexed and irresolute, on the other side by plain 
precept it teacheth them when and upon what ground to 
resolve ; yea, and how to carry things in suspense without 
prejudice, till they resolve. If it make men positive and 
regular, it teacheth them what things are in their nature 
demonstrative, and what are conjectural, and as well the 

| use of distinctions and exceptions, as the latitude of 
| principles and rules. Lit mislead by disproportion or 


'dissimilitude of examples, it teacheth men_the f f 


yee 


II. 4. | THE FIRST BOOK. 15 


cautions of application; so that in all these it doth-rectify 


more effectually than it can pervert. And these medicines 
it conveye much more forcibly by the 
quickness and penetration of examples. For let a man 
look into the errors of Clement the seventh, so lively 
described by Guicciardine, who served under him, or into 
the errors of Cicero, painted out by his own pencil in his 
Epistles to Atticus, and he will fly apace from being 
irresolute. Let him look into the errors of Phocion, and 
he will beware how he be obstinate or inflexible. Let 
him but read the fable of Ixion, and it will hold him 
from being vaporous or imaginative. Let him look into 
the errors of Cato the second, and he will never be one 
of the Antipodes, to tread opposite to the present world. 
5. And for the conceit that learning should dispose | 

men to leisure and privateness, and make men slothful ; 
it were a strange thing if that which accustometh the mind 
to a perpetual motion and agitation should induce sloth- 
fulness: whereas contrariwise it may be truly affirmed, 
that no kind of men love business for itself but those that 
are learned; for other persons love it for profit, as an 
hireling, that loves the work for the wages; or for honour, 
as because it beareth them up in the eyes of men, and 
refresheth their reputation, which otherwise would wear ; 
or because it putteth them in mind of their fortune, and 
giveth them occasion to pleasure and displeasure; or 
because it exerciseth some faculty wherein they take 
pride, and so entertaineth them in good humour and 
pleasing conceits toward themselves; or because it 
advanceth any other their ends. So that as it is said 
of untrue valours, that some men’s valours are in the 
eyes of them that look on; so such men’s industries 
are in the eyes of others, or at least in regard of their 


16 / OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [Il. 5. 


own designments: only learned men love business as 
an action according to nature, as agreeable to health of 
mind as exercise is to health of body, taking pleasure in 
the action itself, and not in the purchase: so that of all 
men they are the most indefatigable, if it be towards any 
business which can hold or detain their mind. 
j 6. And if any man be laborious in reading and study 
and yet idle in business and action, it groweth from some 
weakness of body or softness of spirit; such as Seneca 
speaketh of: Quidam tam sunt umbratiles, ut putent in 
turbido esse quicquid in luce est; and not of learning: well 
may it be that such a point of a man’s nature may make 
him give himself to learning, but it is not learning that 
breedeth any such point in his nature. 

». And that learning should take up too much time or 
leisure; I answer, the most active or busy man that hath 
been or can be, hath (no question) many vacant times of 
leisure, while he expecteth the tides and returns of busi- 
ness (except he be either tedious and of no dispatch, 
or lightly and unworthily ambitious to meddle in things 
that may be better done by others), and then the question 
is but how those spaces and times of leisure shall be filled 
and spent; whether in pleasures or in studies; as was 
well answered by Demosthenes to his adversary Aischines, 
that was a man given to pleasure and told him Zhat his 
orations did smell of the lamp ; Indeed (said Demosthenes) 
there ts a great difference between the things that you and I 
\,do by lamp-light. So as no man need doubt that learning 
W i expulse business, but rather it will keep and defend 

the possession of the mind against idleness and pleasure, 
‘which otherwise at unawares may enter to the prejudice 


of both. | 
8. Again, for that other conceit that learning should 


—, 


Ii. 8.] THE FIRST BOOK. 


un 
assuredly a mere depravation and calumny, without “all 
shadow of truth. For to say that a blind custom of 
obedience should be a surer obligation than duty taught 
and understood, it is to affirm, that a blind man may 
tread surer by a guide than a seeing man can by a light. 
And it is without all controversy, that learning doth make 
the minds of men gentle, generous, maniable, and pliant 
to government; whereas ignorance makes them churlish, 
thwart, and mutinous: and the evidence of time doth 
clear this assertion, considering that the most barbarous, 
rude, and unlearned times have been most subject to 
tumults, seditions, and changes. 

g. And as to the judgement of Cato the Censor, he 
was well punished for his blasphemy against learning, in 
the same kind wherein he offended; for when he was 
past threescore years old, he was taken with an extreme 
desire to go to school again, and to learn the Greek 
tongue, to the end to peruse the Greek authors ; which 
doth well demonstrate that his former censure of the 


Grecian learning was rather an affected gravity, than 


according to the inward sense of his own opinion. And 
as for Virgil’s verses, though it pleased him to brave the 
world in taking to the Romans the art of empire, and 
leaving to others the arts of subjects ; yet so much is 
manifest that the Romans never ascended to that height 
of empire, till the time they had ascended to the height of 
other arts. For in the time of the two first Ceesars, which 
had the art of government in greatest perfection, there 
lived the best poet, Virgilius Maro; the best historio- 
grapher, Titus Livius; the best antiquary, Marcus Varro ; 
and the best, or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that to 
the memory of man are known. As for the accusation 
Cc 


eee 


t8 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [IIl. 9. 


of Socrates, the time must be remembered when it was 
prosecuted ; which was under the Thirty Tyrants, the 
most base, bloody, and envious persons that have go- 
verned; which revolution of state was no sooner over, 
but Socrates, whom they had made a person criminal, 
was made a person heroical, and his memory accumulate 
with honours divine and human; and those discourses of 
his which were then termed corrupting of manners, were 
after acknowledged for sovereign medicines of the mind 
and manners, and so have been received ever since till 
this day. Let this therefore serve for answer to 
politiques, which in their humorous severity, or in their 
feigned gravity, have presumed to throw imputations 
upon learning; which redargution nevertheless (save that 
we know not whether our labours may extend to other 
ages) were not needful for the present, in regard of the 
love and reverence towards learning, which the example 
and countenance of two so learned princes, Queen 
Elizabeth and your Majesty, being as Castor and Pollux, 
lucida stdera, stars of excellent light and most benign 
influence, hath wrought in all men of place and authority 
in our nation. 

III. 1. Now therefore we come to that third sort of 
discredit or diminution of credit that groweth unto 
learning from learned men themselves, which com- 
monly cleaveth fastest: it is either from their fortune, 
or from their manners, or from the nature of their 
studies. For the first, it is not in their power ; and the 
second is accidental; the third only is proper to be 
handled: but because we are not in hand with true 
measure, but with popular estimation and conceit, it is 
not amiss to speak somewhat of the two former. The 
derogations therefore which grow to learning from the 


I. 1.] THE FIRST BOOK. ( ae 


fortune or condition of learned men, are either in respect 
of scarcity of means, or in respect of privateness of life 
and meanness of employments. 

2. Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned 
men usually to begin with little, and not to grow rich so 
fast as other men, by reason they convert not their labours 
chiefly to lucre and increase, it were good to leave the 
common place in commendation of poverty to some friar 
to handle, to whom much was attributed by Machiavel in 
this point ; when he said, That the kingdom of the clergy had 
been long before at an end, uf the reputation and reverence 
towards the poverty of friars had not borne out the scandal 
Of the superfluities and excesses of bishops and prelates. So 


a man might say that the felicity and delicacy of princes 


and h n i turned to rudeness 
and barbazism,ifthe-poverty-oftearning-had not kept 


ee but without any such advan- 
tages, it is worthy the observation what a_reyerent and— 
honoured thing poverty of fortune was*for some ages in | 
the Roman state, which nevertheless was a state without 
parattoxes:—Por we see what Titus Livius saith in his 
ntroduction: Ceverum aut me amor negotit susceptt fallit, 
aut nulla unquam respublica nec major, nec sanctior, nec 
bonis exemplis dilior futt; nec in quam tam sere avaritia 
luxuriaque immigraverint ; nec ubi tantus ac tam diu pau- 
periati ac parsimonie honos fuertt. We see likewise, after 
that the state of Rome was not itself, but did degenerate, 
how that person that took upon him to be counsellor to 
Julius Cesar after his victory where to begin his restora- 
tion of the state, maketh it of all points the most sum- 
mary to take away the estimation of wealth: Verum hec 
et omnia mala pariter cum honore pecuni@ desinent; si neque 


magistratus, neque alia vulgo cupienda, venalia erunt. To 
¢3 


20 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. | 111. 2. 


conclude this point, as it was truly said, that Rudor est 
virtutts color, though sometime it come from vice; so it 
may be fitly said that Paupertas est virtuti’s fortuna, though 
sometimes it may proceed from misgovernment and ‘ac- 
cident. Surely Salomon hath pronounced it both in 
censure, Qui festinat ad divitias non erit tnsons ; and in 
precept; Buy the truth, and sell tt not ; and so of wisdom 
and knowledge ; judging that means were to be spent 
upon learning, and not learning to be applied to means. 
And as for the privateness_or_obscureness (as it may be 
in vulgar estimation accounted) of life of contemplative 
men ; it is a theme so common to extol a private life, not 
taxed with sensuality and sloth, in comparison and to the 
disadvantage of a civil life, for safety, liberty, pleasure, 
and dignity, or at least freedom from indignity, as no 
man handleth it but handleth it well; such a consonancy 
it hath to men’s conceits in the expressing, and to men’s 
consents in the allowing. This only I will add, that 
learned men forgotten in states and not living in the eyes 
of men, are like the images of Cassius and Brutus in the 
funeral of Junia ; of which not being represented, as many 
others were, Tacitus saith, Lo tpso prefulgebant, quod non 
visebantur. 

3. And for meanness of employment, that which is 
most traduced to contempt is that the government of 
youth is commonly allotted to them; which age, because 
it is the age of least authority, it is transferred to the 
disesteeming of those employments wherein youth is con- 
versant, and which are conversant about youth. But how 
unjust this traducement is (if you will,reduce things from 
popularity of opinion to measure of eee appear 
in that we see men are more curious what they put into a 
new vessel than into a vessel seasoned ; and what mould 


III. 3.] THE FIRST BOOK. 21 


they lay about a young plant than about a plant cor- 
roborate; so as the weakest terms and times of all things 
use to have the best applications and helps. And will 
you hearken to the Hebrew rabbins? our young men 
shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams ; say 
they youth is the worthier age, for that visions are nearer 
apparitions of God than dreams? And let it be noted, 
that howsoever the condition of life of pedantes hath been 
scorned upon theatres, as the ape of tyranny; and that 
the modern looseness or negligence hath taken no due 
regard to the choice of schoolmasters and tutors; yet the 
ancient wisdom of the best times did always make a just 
complaint, that states were too busy with their laws and 
too negligent in point of education: which excellent part 
of ancient discipline hath been in some sort revived of 
late times by the colleges of the Jesuits; of whom, al- 
though in regard of their superstition I may say, Quo 
meliores, eo delertores; yet in regard to this, and some 
other points concerning human learning and moral mat- 
ters, | may say, as Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharna- 
bazus, Zalis guum sis, utinam noster esses. And thus 
much touching the discredits drawn from the fortunes of 
learned men. . 

4. As touching the manners of learned men, it is a 
thing personal and individual: and no doubt there be 
amongst them, as in other professions, of all tempera- 
tures: but yet so as it is not without truth which is said, 
that Adeunt sfudia in mores, studies have an influence and 
operation upon the manners of those that are conversant 
in them. 

5. But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for 
my part cannot find any disgrace to learning can pro- 
ceed from the manners of learned men; not inherent 


22 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [111. 5 


to them as they are learned; except it be a fault (which 
was the supposed fault of Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato the 
second, Seneca, and many more) that because the times 
they read of are commonly better than the times they live 
in, and the duties taught better than the duties practised, 
they contend sometimes too far to bring things to per- 
fection, and to reduce the corruption of manners to 
honesty of precepts or examples of too great height. 
And yet hereof they have caveats enough in their own 
walks. For Solon, when he was asked whether he had 
given his citizens the best laws, answered wisely, Vea of 
such as they would receive : and Plato, finding that his own 
heart could not agree with the corrupt manners of his 
country, refused to bear place or office; saying, That a 
man’s country was to be used as his parents were, that 1s, 
wth humble persuasions, and not with contestations. And 
Ceesar’s counsellor put in the same caveat, Von ad velera 
insiitula revocans que jampridem corruptis mortbus ludibrio 
sunt: and Cicero noteth this error directly in Cato the 
second, when he writes to his friend Atticus ; Caso optime 
sentit, sed nocet interdum retpublice ; loguitur enim tanquam 
in republicd Platonts, non tanquam tn face Romult. And 
the same Cicero doth excuse and expound the philo- 
sophers for going too far and being too exact in their 
_ prescripts, when he saith, Jsf’ ast’ preceplores virluts et 
magisirt videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura 
vellet protulisse, ut cum ad ultimum animo contendissemus, tbt 
tamen, ubt oportet, consisteremus: and yet himself might 
have said, Monitis sum minor ipse mets ; for it was his 
own fault, though not in so extreme a degree. 

6. Another fault likewise much of this kind hath been 
incident to learned men; which is, that they have es- 
teemed the preservation, good, and honour of their 


I11. 6. | THE FIRST BOOK. 23 


countries or masters before their own fortunes or safeties. 
For so saith Demosthenes unto the Athenians; // # 
please you to note tt, my counsels unto you are not such 
whereby I should grow great amongst you, and you become 
little amongst the Grecians ; but they be of that nature, as 
they are sometimes not good for me to give, but are always 
good for you to follow. And so Seneca, after he had con- 
secrated that Quznguennium Neronts to the eternal glory 
of learned governors, held on his honest and loyal course 
of good and free counsel, after his master grew extremely 
corrupt in his government. Neither can this point other- 
wise be; for learning endueth men’s minds with a true 
sense of the frailty of their persons, the casualty of their 
fortunes, and the dignity of their soul and vocation: so 
that it is impossible for them to esteem that any greatness 
of their own fortune can be a true or worthy end of their 
being and ordainment ; and therefore are desirous to give 
their account to God, and so likewise to their masters 
under God (as kings and the states that they serve) in these 
words; Lecce thi lucrefect, and not Ecce mthi lucrefect: 
whereas the corrupter sort of mere_politiques, that have 
not their thoughts established by learning in the love and 
apprehension of duty, nor never look abroad into univers- 
ality, do refer all things to themselves, and thrust them- 
selves into the centre of the world, as if all lines should 
meet in them and their fortunes; never caring in all 
tempests what becomes of the ship of estates, so they 
may save themselves in the cockboat of their own for- 
tune: whereas men that feel the weight of duty and 
know the limits of self-love, use to make good their ~ 
places and duties, though with peril; and if they stand in 
seditious and violent alterations, it is rather the reverence 
which many times both adverse parts do give to honesty, 


24 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ 111. 6. 


than any versatile advantage of their own carriage. But 
for this point of tender sense and fast obligation of duty 
which learning doth endue the mind withal, howsoever 
fortune may tax it, and many in the depth of their corrupt 
principles may despise it, yet it will receive an open 
allowance, and therefore needs the less disproof or ex- 
cusation. | 

». Another fault incident commonly to learned men, 
which may be more probably defended than truly denied, 
is, that they fail sometimes in applying themselves to 
particular persons: which want of exact application 
ariseth from two causes; the one, because the largeness 
of their mind can hardly confine itself to dwell in the 
exquisite observation or examination of the nature and 
customs of one person: for it is a speech for a lover, and 
not for a wise man, Saf’s magnum alter altert theatrum 
-sumus. Nevertheless I shall yield, that he that cannot 
contract the sight of his mind as well as disperse and 
dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. But there is a second 
cause, which is no inability, but a rejection upon choice 
and judgement. For the honest and just bounds of ob- 
servation by one person upon another, extend no further 
but to understand him sufficiently, whereby not to give 
him offence, or whereby to be able to give him faithful 
counsel, or whereby to stand upon reasonable guard and 
caution in respect of a man’s self. But to be speculative 
into another man to the end to know how to work him, or 
wind him, or govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is 
double and cloven and not entire and ingenuous; which 
as in friendship it is want of integrity, so towards princes 
or superiors is want of duty. For the custom of the 
Levant, which is that subjects do forbear to gaze or 
fix their eyes upon princes, is in the outward ceremony 


' 


It. 7.] THE FIRST BOOK. 25 


barbarous, but the moral is good: for men ought not by 
‘cunning and bent observations to picrce and penetrate 
into the hearts of kings, which the scripture hath de- 
clared to be inscrutable. 

8. There is yet another fault (with which I will con- 
clude this part) which is often noted in learned men, that 
they do many times fail to observe decency and discre- 
_tion in their behaviour and Carriage, and commit errors 
in small and ordinary points of action, so as the vulgar 
sort of capacities do make a judgement of them in greater 
matters by that which they find wanting in them in 
smaller. But this consequence doth oft deceive men, 
for which I do refer them over to that which was said by 
Themistocles, arrogantly and uncivilly being applied to 
himself out of his own mouth, but, being applied to the 
general state of this question, pertinently and justly ; 
when being invited to touch a lute he said He could 
not fiddle, but he could make a small town a great state. 
So no doubt many may be well seen in the passages of 
government and policy, which are to seek in little and 
punctual occasions. I refer them also to that which 
Plato said of his master Socrates, whom he compared 
to the gallipots of apothecaries, which on the outside had 
apes and owls and antiques but contained within so- 
vereign and precious liquors and confections ; acknow- 
ledging that to an external report he was not without 
superficial levities and deformities, but was inwardly re- 
plenished with excellent virtues and powers. And so 
much touching the point of manners of learned men. 

9. But in the mean time I have no purpose to give 
allowance to some conditions and courses base and 
unworthy, wherein divers professors of learning have 
wronged themselves and gone too far; such as were 


26 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [ll. 9. 


those trencher philosophers which in the later age of 
the Roman state were usually in the houses of great 
persons, being little better than solemn parasites; of 
which kind, Lucian maketh a merry description of the 
philosopher that the great lady took to ride with her in 
her coach, and would needs have him carry her little 
dog, which he doing officiously and yet uncomely, the 
page scoffed and said, Zhat he doubted the philosopher 
of a Stoic would turn to be a Cynic. But above all the 
rest, the gross and palpable flattery, whereunto many 
not unlearned have abased and abused their wits and 
pens, turning (as Du Bartas saith) Hecuba into Helena, 
and Faustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished the 
price and estimation of learning. Neither is the modern 
dedication of books and writings, as to patrons, to be 
commended: for that books (such as are worthy the name 
of books) ought to have no patrons but truth and reason. 
And the ancient custom was to dedicate them only to 
private and equal friends, or to entitle the books with 
their names: or if to kings and great persons, it was to 
some such as the argument of the book was fit and pro- 
per for: but these and the like courses may deserve 
rather reprehension than defence. 

10. Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration 
or application of learned men to men in fortune. For 
the answer was good that Diogenes made to one that 
asked him in mockery, How zt came to pass that philo- 
sophers were the followers of rich men, and not rich men 
of philosophers ? We answered soberly, and yet sharply, 
Because the one sort knew what they had need of, and the 
other did not. And of the like nature was the answer 
which Aristippus made, when having a petition to Dio- 
nysius, and no ear given to him, he fell down at his feet ; 


7 ee 


BAS cue 


III. 10. | THE FIRST BOOK. 


whereupon Dionysius: stayed and gave him the hearing, 
and granted it; and afterward some person, tender on 
the behalf of philosophy, reproved Aristippus that he 
would offer the profession of philosophy such an indig- 
nity as for a private suit to fall at a tyrant’s feet: but he 
answered, Jf was not his fault, but it was the fault of 
Dionysius, that had his ears in his feet. Neither was it 
accounted weakness but discretion in him that would not 
dispute his best with Adrianus Cesar; excusing himself, 
That tt was reason to yield to him that commanded thirty 
legions. These and the like applications and stooping to 
points of necessity and convenience cannot be disallow- 
ed; for though they may have some outward baseness 
yet in a judgement truly made they are to be accounted 
(gubsnisciotts to the occasion and not to the person. 

IV. 1. Now I proceed to those errors and vanities 
which have intervened amongst the studies themselves 
of the learned, which is that which is principal and 
proper to the present argument ; wherein my purpose is 
not to make a justification of the errors, but by a censure 
and separation of the errors to make a justification of 
that which is good and sound, and to deliver that from 
the aspersion of the other. For we see that it is the 
manner of men to scandalize and deprave that which 
retaineth the state and virtue, by taking advantage upon 
that which is corrupt and degenerate: as the heathens 
in the primitive church used to blemish and taint the 
Christians with the faults and corruptions of heretics. 
But nevertheless I have no meaning at this time to make 
any exact animadversion of the errors and impediments 
in matters of learning, which are more secret and remote 
from vulgar opinion, but only to speak unto such as do 
fall under or near unto a popular observation, 


— 


OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [IV.2. 


2. There be therefore chiefly three vanities in studies, 
whereby learning hath been most traduced. For those 
things we do esteem vain, which are either false or fri- 
volous, those which either have no truth or no use: and - 
those persons we esteem vain, which are either credulous, 
or curious; and curiosity is either in matter or words: 
so that in reason as well as in experience there fall out 


_ to be these three distem I may term them) of 
learning 4)the first, fantastical learning; the secén n- 
tentious_learning; and the delicate learning; vain 


“imaginations, vain altercations, and vain affectations; and 
with the last I will begin. Martin Luther, conducted (no 
doubt) by an higher providence, but in discourse of rea- 
son, finding what a province he had undertaken against 
the bishop of Rome and the degenerate traditions of the 
church, and finding his own solitude, being no ways 
aided by the opinions of his own time, was enforced to 
awake all antiquity, and to call former times to his suc- 
cours to make a party against the present time: so that 
the ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, 
which had long time slept in libraries, began generally: 
to be read and revolved. This by consequence did draw’ 
on a necessity of a more exquisite travail in the lan- 
guages original, wherein those authors did write, for the 
better understanding of those authors, and the better 
advantage of pressing and applying their words. And 
thereof grew again a delight in their manner of style and 
phrase, and an admiration of that kind of writing ; which 
was much furthered and precipitated by the enmity and 
Opposition that the propounders of those primitive but 
seeming new opinions had against the schoolmen; who 
were generally of the contrary part, and whose writings 
were altogether in a different style and form; taking 


ma in casters pee, 


IV. 2.] THE FIRST BOOK. 


liberty to coin and frame new terms of art to express 
their own sense, and to avoid circuit of speech, without 
regard to the pureness, pleasantness, and (as I may call 
it) lawfulness of the phrase or word. And again, because 
the great labour then was with the people (of whom the 
Pharisees were wont to say, Lxecradilis ista turba, que 
non novit legem), for the winning and persuading of them, 
there grew of necessity in chief price and request elo- 
quence and variety of discourse, as the fittest and forci- 
blest access into the capacity of the vulgar sort: so that 


these four causes concurring, the admiration of ancient_ 


authors, the hate of the schoolmen, the exact study of 


languages, and the efficacy of preaching, did bring inan 
“affectionate study of eloquence and copie of speech, which 


then began to flourish. This grew speedily to an excess ; 


for - men began-to hunt more after words than matter 


more after the choiceness of the phrase, and the round 
and clean composition of the sentence, and_ the sweet 
falling of the clauses, and the varying and illustration of 
their works with tropes and figures, than after_the weight 
of matter, worth of subject, soundness of argument, life 
of invention, or depth of judgement, Then grew the 
flowing and watery vein of Osorius, the Portugal bishop, 
to be in price. Then did Sturmius spend such infinite 
and curious pains upon Cicero the Orator, and Hermo- 
genes the Rhetorician, besides his own books of Periods 
and Imitation, and the like. Then did Car of Cam- 
bridge and Ascham with their lectures and writings 
almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and allure _all 
young men that were studious unto that delicate and 
polished kind of learning. Then did Erasmus take oc- 
casion to make the scoffing echo, Decem annos consumpsi 
in legendo Cicerone; and the echo answered in Greck 


be, 


30] OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [1V. 2. 


One, Asine. Then grew the learning of the schoolmen 
! to be utterly despised as barbarous. In sum, the whole 


a —- 


copie than weight. 


4. Here therefore is the first distemper of learning, | 
/ when men study words and not matter whereof, though 
a times, yet it hath 
been and will be secundum majus ef minus in all time. 
And how is it possible but this should have an operation 
to discredit learning, even with vulgar capacities, when 
they see learned men’s works like the first letter of a 
patent, or limned book ; which though it hath large flou- 
rishes, yet it is but a letter? It seems to me that Pygma- 
lion’s frenzy is a good emblem or portraiture of this 
vanity: for words are but the images of matter; and 
except they have life of reason and invention, to fall in 
love with them is all one as to fall in love with a picture. 


4. But yet notwithstanding it is a thing no tily to 
be condennal, to clothe and depen sbecuiiy Sh d, to “clothe and adorp-the-cbscurity_even 
ith sensible and_ plausible elocution. © 
For hereof we have great examples in Xenophon, Cicero, 
Seneca, Plutarch, and of Plato also in some degree; and 
hereof -likewise there is great use: for surely, to the 
severe inquisition of truth and the deep progress into. 
philosophy, it is some hindrance ; because it is too early . 
satisfactory to the mind of man, and quencheth the de-_ 
sire of further search, before we come to a just period. 
But. then if a man be to have any use of such knowledge 
in civil occasions, of conference, counsel, persuasion, dis- 
course, or the like, then shall he find it prepared to his 
é hands in those authors which write in that manner. _ But _ 


the excess of this is so justly contemptible, that as Her- 
cules, when he sa image of Adonis, Venus’ minion, 


Iv. 4.] THE FIRST BOOK, 31 


in a temple, said in disdain, Vi7 sacri es ; so there is none 
i of Hercules’ followers in learning, that is, the more severe 
and laborious sort of inquirers into truth, but will despise 
those delicacies and affectations, as indeed capable of no 
divineness. And thus much of the first disease or dis- 
temper of learning. 

5. The second which followeth is in nature worse than 
the former: for as substance of matter is better than 
beauty of words, so contrariwise vain matter is worse 
than vain words: wherein it seemeth the reprehension of 
Saint Paul was not only proper for those times, but pro- 
phetical for the times following ; and not only respective 
to divinity, but extensive to all knowledge: Devzla pro- 
fanas vocum novitates, et oppositiones falst nomints scientie. 
For he assigneth two marks and badges of suspected 
and falsified science : the one, the novelty and strange- 
ness of terms; the other, the strictness of positions, 
which of necessity doth induce oppositions, and so ques- 
tions and altercations. Surely, like as many substances 
in nature which are solid do putrify and corrupt into 
worms; so it is the property of good and sound 
ledge to putrify and dissolve into a number of subtle, 


idle, unwholesome, and (as I may term them) vermi e ? 
questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness and) eG 


life of spirit, but no soundness of matter or goodness of | 
quality. This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly — 

reign amongst the schoolmen: who having sharp and L-~~ 
strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small variety 

of reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells of a. 

few authors (chiefly Aristotle their dictator) as their per---—~§ ¢ 
sons were shut up in the cells of monasteries and col- ° Het 
leges, and knowing little history, either of nature or 

time, did out of no great quantity of matter and infinite 


AN 


OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [IV.5. 


tation of wit spin out unto us those laborious webs of 
learning’ which are extant in their books. For the wit 
and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the 
contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh accord- 
ing to the stuff and is limited thereby; but if it work 
upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is 
endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, 
admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of 
no substance or profit. 
6. This same unprofitable subtility or curiosity is of 
wo sorts; either in the subject itself that they handle, 
, when it is a fruitless speculation‘or controversy (whereof 
\there are no small number both in divinity and philo- 
‘sophy), orin the manner or method of handling of a 
knowledge, which amongst them was this; upon every 
particular position or assertion to frame objections, and 
to those objections, solutions; which solutions were for 
the most part not confutations, but distinctions: whereas 
indeed the strength of all sciences is, as the strength of 
the old man’s faggot, in the bond. For the harmony of a 
science, supporting each part the other, is and ought to 
be the true and brief confutation and suppression of all 
the smaller sort of objections. But, on the other side, if 
you take out every axiom, as the sticks of the faggot, one 
by one, you may quarrel with them and bend them and 
break them at your pleasure: so that as was said of 
Seneca, Verborum minutits rerum frangit pondera, so a 
man may truly say of the schoolmen, Questionum minulits 
sctentiarum frangunt soliditatem. For were it not better 
for a man in a fair room to set up one great light, or 
branching candlestick of lights, than to go about with 
a small watch candle into every corner? And such is 


\ their_method, that rests_not-so much upon evidence of _ 


IV. 6.] THE FIRST BOOK. 33 


truth proved by arguments, authorities, similitudes, ex- 
amples, as-upon_ parti par icular_confutations and solutions of 
every scruple, cavillation, and objection; breeding for the 
most part one question as fast as it solveth another; even 
as in the former resemblance, when you carry the light 
into one corner, you darken the rest; so that the fable 
and fiction of Scylla seemeth to be a lively image of this 
kind of philosophy or knowledge; which was trans- 
formed into a comely virgin for the upper parts ; but 
then Candida succinclam latrantibus inguina monstris : so 
the generalities of the schoolmen are for a while good 
and proportionable ; but then when you descend into 
their distinctions and decisions, instead of a fruitful 
womb for the use and benefit of man’s life, they end 
in monstrous altercations and barking questions. So 
as it is not possible but this quality of knowledge must 
fall under popular contempt, the people being apt to 
contemn truth upon occasion of controversies and alter- 
cations, and to think they are all out of their way which 
never meet; and when they see such digladiation about 
subtilties, and matter of no use or moment, they easily 
fall upon that judgement of Dionysius of Syracusa. Verda 
tsla sunt senum oltosorum. 

». Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those school- 
men to their great thirst of truth and unwearied travail 
of wit had joined variety and universality of reading 
and contemplation, they had proved excellent lights, to 
the great advancement of all learning and knowledge ; 
but as they are, they are great undertakers indeed, and 
fierce with dark keeping. But as in the inquiry of the 
divine truth, their pride inclined to leave the oracle of 
God’s word, and to vanish in the mixture of their own 
inventions ; so in the inquisition of nature, they ever left 

D 


34; OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [tv. 7. 


thé oracle of God’s works, and adored the deceiving and 
deformed images which the unequal mirror of their own 
minds, or a few received authors or principles, did re- 
present unto them. And thus much for the second 
disease of learning. 

8. For the third vice _Or disease of learning, which 
concerneth deceit or untruth, it is of all the rest _the_ 
foulest ; as that which doth destroy the essential form _ 
owledge, which is nothing but a representation of 
tuth:/for the truth of being and the truth of knowing 
are een no more than the direct beam and the 
beam reflected. ‘This vice therefore brancheth itself into 
two sorts; delight_in d i aptness_ to e- 
ted pe and credulity; which, although they 

ppear to be of a diverse nature, the one seeming to 
proceed of cunning and the other of simplicity, yet 

certainly they do for the most part concur: for, as the 
verse noteth, 

. Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est, 

an inquisitive man is a prattler; so upon the like reason 
a credulous man is a deceiver: as we see it in fame, that 
_-he th that will easily believe rumours, will as casil augment 
Tacitus wisely noteth, when he saith, /2ngunt om, cre- 
dunique : so great an affinity hath fiction and belief. 


g. This facility of credit and accepting or admitting 
things weakly authorized or warranted, ig of two kinds 
according to the subject: for it is either a belief of 


history, or, as the lawyers speak, matter of fact re gr else 
career aad ecie 

of ter of art and opinion. As to the former, we 
see the experience and inconvenience of this error in 
ecclesiastical history; which hath too easily received and 
registered reports and narrations of miracles wrought by 


IV. 9.] THE FIRST BOOK. 35 


martyrs, hermits, or monks of the desert, and other holy 
men, and their relics, shrines, chapels, and images: 
which though they had a passage for a time by the 
ignorance of the people, the superstitious simplicity of 
some, and the politic toleration of others, holding them | 
but as divine poesies; yet after a period of time, when 
the mist began to clear up, they grew to be esteemed but 
as old wives’ fables, impostures of the clergy, illusions of 
spirits, and badges of Antichrist, to the great scandal and 
detriment of religion. 

ro. So in natural history, we see there hath not been 
that choice and judgement used as ought to have been ; 
as may appear in the writings of Plinius, Cardanus, 
Albertus, and divers of the Arabians, being fraught with 
much fabulous matter, a great part not only untried, 
but notoriously untrue, to the great derogation of the 
credit of natural philosophy with the grave and sober 
kind of wits: ,wherein the wisdom and integrity of 
Aristotle is worthy to be observed; that, having made 
so diligent and exquisite a history of living creatures, 
hath mingled it sparingly with any vain or feigned 
matter: and,yet on the other side hath cast all pro- 
digious nayrations, which he thought worthy the record- 
ing, into one book: excellently discerning that matter 
of manifest truth, such whereupon observation and rule 
was to be byilt, was not to be mingled or weakened 
with matter of doubtful credit; and yet again, that 
rarities and reports that seem uncredible are not to be 
suppressed or denied to the memory of men. 

11. And as for the facility of credit which is yielded to 
arts and opinions, it is likewise of two kinds; either when 
too much belief is attributed to the arts themselves, or 
to certain authors in any art. The sciences themselves, 

D2 


36 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [IV.11. 


which have had better intelligence and confederacy with 
the imagination of man than with his reason, are three 
in number; astrology, natural magic, and alchemy : 
of which sciences, nevertheless, the ends or pretences 
are noble. For astrology pretendeth to: discover that 
correspondence or concatenation which is between the 
superior globe and the inferior: natural magic pretendeth 
to call and reduce natural philosophy from variety of 
speculations to the magnitude of works: and alchemy 
pretendeth to make separation of all the unlike parts 
of bodies which in mixtures of nature are incorporate. 
But the derivations and prosecutions to these ends, both 
in the theories and in the practices, are full of error 
and vanity; which the great professors themselves have 
sought to veil over and conceal by enigmatical writings, 
and referring themselves to auricular traditions and such 
other devices, to save the credit of impostures. And yet 
surely to alchemy this right is due, that it may be 
compared to the husbandman whereof sop makes 
the fable; that, when he died, told his sons that he 
had left unto them gold buried under ground in his 
vineyard ; and they digged over all the ground, and 
gold they found none; but by reason of their stirring 
and digging the mould about the roots of their vines, 
they had a great vintage the year following: so assuredly 
the search and stir to make gold hath brought to light a 
great number of good and fruitful inventions and ex- 
periments, as well for the disclosing of nature as for the 
use of man’s life. 

12. And as for the overmuch credit that hath been 
given unto authors in sciences, in making them dictators, 
that their words should stand, and not consuls to give 
advice; the damage is infinite that sciences have received 


— 


{V. 12.] THE FIRST BOOK. 37 


thereby, as the principal cause that hath kept them 

at a stay without growth or advancement. For hence | 
it hath comen, that in arts mechanical the first deviser 
comes shortest, and time addeth and perfecteth; but in 
sciences the first author goeth furthest, and time leeseth 
and corrupteth. So we see, artillery, sailing, printing, and 
the like, were grossly managed at the first, and by time 
accommodated and refined: but contrariwise, the philo- 
sophies and sciences of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, 
Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of most vigour at 
the first and by time degenerate and imbased ; whereof 
the reason is no other, but that in the former many wits 
and industries have contributed in one; and in the latter 
many wits and industries have been spent about the wit 
of some one, whom many times they have rather de- 
praved than illustrated. For as water will not ascend | 
higher than the level of the first springhead from whence 
it descendeth, so knowledge derived from Aristotle, and 
exempted from liberty of examination, will not rise again 
higher than the knowledge of Aristotle. And therefore 
although the position be good, Oportet discentem credere, . 
yet it must be coupled with this, Oportet edoctum judicare ; 
for disciples do owe unto masters only a temporary belief 
and a suspension of their own judgement till they be 
fully instructed, and not an absolute resignation or per- 
petual captivity: and therefore, to conclude this point, 
I will say no more, but so let great authors have their 
due, as time, which is the author of authors, be not 
deprived of his due, which is, further and further to 
discover truth. ‘Thus have I gone over these three 
diseases of learning; besides the which there are some 
other rather peccant humours than formed diseases, 
which nevertheless are not so secret and intrinsic but 


OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [IV.12. 


rat they fall under a popular observation and traduce- 

CAGLUSN ment, and therefore are not to be passed over. 
ek vat V. 1. The first of these is the extreme affecting of 
————~__ | two extremities : the one_antiquity, the other novelty ; 
“wherein it seemeth the children of time do take after the 
nature and malice of the father. For as he devoureth 
‘his children, so one of them seeketh to devour and 
suppress the other; while antiquity envieth there should 
be new additions, and novelty cannot be content to add 
but it must deface: surely the advice of the prophet is 
the true direction in this matter, State super vias antiquas, 
ef videle quenam sit via recta et bona et ambulate in ea. 
Antiquity deserveth that reverence, that men should make 
// \a stand thereupon and discover what is the best way ; 
/ but when the discovery is well taken, then to make pro- 
| ression. And to speak truly, Antiqguitas seculi juventus 
undt. ‘These times are the ancient times, when the 
orld is ancient, and not those which we account ancient 
rdine retrogrado, by a computation backward from our- 

elves. . 

2. Another error induced by the former is a distrust 


that anything should_be now to be found out, which ~~ 


the world should have missed and passed over so long 
time ; as if the same objection were to be made to time, 
that Lucian maketh to Jupiter and other the heathen 
gods; of which he wondereth that they begot so many 
children in old time, and begot none in his time; and 
asketh whether they were become septuagenary, or 
- whether the law Papra, made against old men’s mar- 
riages, had restrained them. So it seemeth men doubt 
lest time is become past children and generation; 
wherein contrariwise we see commonly the levity and 
unconstancy of men’s judgements, which till a matter 


v. 2.] THE FIRST BOOK. f 8g 


be done, wonder that it can be done ; and as soon as 
it is done, wonder again that it was no sooner done: 
as we see in the expedition of Alexander into Asia, 
which at first was prejudged as a vast and impossible 
enterprise ; and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livy to make 
no more of it than this, Wil aliud quam bene ausus vana 


contemnere. And the same happened to Columbus in the -~ 


western navigation. But in intellectual matters it is 
much more common; as may be seen in most of the 
propositions of Euclid; which till they be demonstrate, 
they seem strange to our assent; but being demonstrate, 
our mind accepteth of them by a kind of relation (as the 
lawyers speak) as if we had known them before. 

3. Another error, that hath also some affinity with the 
former, is a conceit that of former opinions or sects after 
variety and examination the best hath still prevailed and 
suppressed st; so as if a man should begin the 


Jabour of a new search, he were but like to light upon 


somewhat formerly rejected, and by rejection brought into 
oblivion: as if the multitude, or the wisest for the mult- 
itude’s sake, were not ready to give passage rather to that 
which is popular and superficial, than to that which is 
substantial and profound; for the truth is, that time 
seemeth to be of the nature_of_a_river_or_stream,-which 
carrieth down to us that which is light and blown _up,.and 
sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and solid. 

4. Another_error, of a diverse nature from all the 
former, is the over-early and peremptory reduction of | 
knowledge into arts and methods ; from “which time 
commonly sciences freteivesall Or no augmentation. 
But as young men, when they knit and shape perfectly, 
do seldom grow to a further stature; so knowledge, while 
it is in aphorisms and observations, it is in growth: but . 


~, 


40 Dor THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [V.4. 
4° 4 


when it once is comprehended in exact methods, it may 
perchance be further polished and illustrate and accom- 
modated for use and practice; but it increaseth no more 
in-bulk,and substance. 
5. Another error_which doth succeed that which we 
la ntioned, is, that after the distribution of particular 
arts and sciences, men have abandoned universality, or 
philosophia prima : which Ccanmmot-but~Cease and stop all 
progression. For no perfect discovery can be made upon 
a flat or a level: neither is it possible to discover the 
more remote and deeper parts of any science, if you 
stand but upon the level of the same science, and ascend 
not to a higher science. 
~ . 6 Another error hath proceeded from too great a 
e€ rence, and a kind of adoration of the mind and 
nderstanding of man ; by meanswhereof, men have 
“withdrawn themselves t00 much from the contemplation 
ofnature, and the observations of experience, and have 
tumbled up and down in their own reason and conceits. 
Upon these intellectualists, which are notwithstanding 
commonly taken for the most sublime and divine philo- 
sophers, Heraclitus gave a just censure, saying, Jen 
sought truth in their own little worlds, and not tn the great 
and common world ; for they disdain to spell, and so by 
degrees to read in the volume of God’s works: and 
contrariwise by continual meditation and agitation of wit 
do urge and as it were invocate their own spirits to 
divine and give oracles unto them, whereby they are 
deservedly deluded. 

». Another error that hath some connexion with this 
latter is, that men have used to infest their meditations, 
opinions, and doctrines, with some conceits which they 
have most admired, or some sciences which they have 


Vv. 7.] THE FIRST BOOK. wee 3 


most applied; and given all things else a tincture accord- 
ing to them, utterly untrue and unproper. So hath Plato 
intermingled his philosophy with theology, and Aristotle 
with logic; and the second school of Plato, Proclus and 
the rest, with the mathematics. For these were the arts 
which had a kind of primogeniture with them severally. 
So have the alchemists made a philosophy out of a few 
experiments of the furnace; and Gilbertus our country- 
man hath made a philosophy out of the observations of a 
loadstone. So Cicero, when, reciting the several opinions 
of the nature of the soul, he found a musician that held 
the soul was but a harmony, saith pleasantly, Hc ad arte 
sua non recessit, &c. But of these conceits Aristotle speak- 
eth seriously and wisely when he saith, Que’ respictunt 
ad pauca de facili pronunciant. 

8. Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste. 
to assertion without due and mature suspension of judge- 
ment. For the two ways of contemplation are not unlike 
the two ways of action commonly spoken of by the 
ancients: the one plain and smooth in the beginning, 
and in the end impassable; the other rough and trouble- 
some in the entrance, but after a while fair and even: so 
it is in contemplatjon ; if a man_will begin with certain- 
ies, he shall end i coubis but if he will be content to 
begin with doubts, hé’ ‘Shall end in certainties, 

Q. Another error is in,the manner of the tradition and 


I wh hr tn 


Va 


delivery 6 “of knowledve;-wittth-is for the most part magis- 


‘tral and peremptory, and not ingenuous and faithful ; 
in a sort as may be soonest believed, and not easiliest 
Se cecined. ~Te-teeine that ii Compendious treatises for 
‘practice that form is not to be disallowed: but in the 
true handling of knowledge, men ought not to fall either , 
on the one side into the vein of Velleius the Epicurean, \/ 


Pt 


~ 


) OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [V.9. 
f 
A 


Nil tam metuens, quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur ; 
nor on the other side into Socrates his ironical doubting 
of all things ; but to propound things sincerely with more 
or less asseveration, as they stand in a man’s own judge- 
ment proved more or less. 

1o. Other errors there are in the scope that men 
propound to themselves, whereunto they bend their en- 
deavours ; for whereas the more constant and devote 
kind of professors of ahy science ought to propound to 
themselves to make some additions to their science, they 
convert their labours to aspire to certain second prizes: 
as to be a profound interpreter or commenter, to be a 
sharp champion or defender, to be a methodical com- 
pounder or abridger, and so the patrimony of knowledge 
cometh to be sometimes improved, but seldom aug- 
mented. 

11. But the greatest error of all the rest is the mis- 


| | taking or misplacing of the last or furthest end of know- 
\ 


— 


edge. For men have entered into a desire of learning 
a ‘and knowledge, sometimes upon atural curiosity and 
|, inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertain their minds 
\ | with varia delight ; sometimes for_ornament_and 


i 


\ Teputation ; and sometimes to enable them to victory of 


| 

| ia ae ea and most Mes for Tucre and. 
| \ profession ; and seldom sincerely to give a true_a | 
AE apt of reasGns to the beasnr aad ues of men aa 
if there were sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to 

rest a searching and restless spirit; or a terrace for a 

wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with 

a fair prospect; or a tower of state for a proud mind to 

raise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground for 

strife and contention; or a shop for profit or sale; and 

not a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the 


— 


V. 11.] THE FIRST BOOK. 43 


relief of man’s estate. But this is that which will indeed 
dignify and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and action | 
may be more nearly and straitly conjoined and united 
together than they have been; a conjunction like unto 
that of the two highest planets, Saturn, the planet of rest 


and contemplation, and Jupiter, th 

and action. Howbeit, I do not mean, when I speak of use 
and action, that end before-mentioned of the applying of 
knowledge to lucre and profession; for I am not ignorant 
how much that diverteth and interrupteth the prosecution 
and advancement of knowledge, like unto the golden ball 
thrown before Atalanta, which while she goeth aside and 
stoopeth to take up, the race is hindered, 

Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit. 

Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates, to 
call philosophy down from heaven to converse upon 
the earth; that is, to leave natural philosophy aside, and 
to apply knowledge only to manners and policy. But as- 
__ both heaven and earth do conspire and contribute to the 


“use and benefit of man; so the end ought to be, from 


_both philosophies to separate and reject vain speculations, 
“and whatsoever is empty and void, and to preserve and 


“augment whatsoever is is solid and fruitful: that knowledge 
may not be as a courtesan, for pleasure and vanity only, 
or as a bond-woman, to acquire and gain to her master’s 
use ; but_as a spouse, for generation, fruit, and comfort, 
12. Thus have I described and opened, as by a kind 
of dissection, those peccant humours (the principal of 
them) which have not only given impediment to the 
proficience of learning, but have given also occasion to 
the traducement thereof: wherein if I have been too plain, 
it must be remembered, fidelia vulnera amanits, sed dolosa 
oscula malignantis. ‘This I think I have gained, that I 


44 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [V. 12. 


ought to be the better believed in that which I shall say 
pertaining to commendation ; because I have proceeded 
so freely in that which concerneth censure. And yet i 
have no purpose to enter into a laudative of learning, or 
to make a hymn to the Muses (though I am of opinion 
that it is long since their rites were duly celebrated), but 
my intent is, without varnish or amplification justly to 
weigh the dignity of knowledge in the balance with other 
things, and to take the true value thereof by testimonies 
and arguments divine and human. 

VI. 1. Kirst therefore let us seek the dignity of know- 
ledge_in the arch-type or first platform, which is in the 


attributes and acts of God, as far as they are—revealed to 


man and may be observed with sobriety ; wherein we may 


See namie Peres ant all learning is _. 
eS ee ae 
ahd therefore we must look for it by another name, that 
‘of wisdom or sapience, as the scriptures call it. 

*. It is so then, that in the work of the creation we see 
a double emanation of virtue from God ; the one referring 
more properly to-pawer, the other tousdom ; the one 
expressed in making the subsistence of the matter, and 
the other in disposing the beauty of the form. This being 
supposed, it is to be observed that for anything which 
appeareth in the history of the creation, the confused mass 
and matter of heaven and earth was made in a moment ; 
and the order and disposition of that chaos or mass was 
the work of six days; such a note of difference it pleased 
God to put upon the works of power, and the works of 
wisdom; wherewith concurreth, that in the former it is 
not set down that God said, Let there be heaven and earth, 
as it is set down of the works following; but actually, that 
God made heaven and earth: the one carrying the style 


VI. 2.] ‘THE FIRST BOOK. 45 


of a manufacture, and the other of a law, decree, or 
counsel. : 

3. To proceed to that which is next in order, from God 
to spirits ; we find, as far as credit is to be given to the 
Se ieP taerarchy of that supposed Dionysius the senator 
of Athens, the first place or degree is given to the angels 
of love, which are termed seraphim; the second to the 
angels of light, which are termed cherubim; and the 
third, and so following places, to thrones, principalities, 
and the rest, which are all angels of power and ministry ; 
so as the angels of knowledge and illumination are placed 
before the angels of office and domination. 

4. To descend from spirits and intellectual forms to 
sensible and material forms, we read the first form that 
was created waS-Tight, which hath a relation and cor- 
respondence in nature and corporal things to knowledge 
in spirits and incorporal things. 

5. So in the distribution of days we see the day 
wherein God did rest and contemplate his own works, 
was blessed above all the days wherein he did effect and 
accomplish them. 

6. After the creation was finished, it is set down unto 
as that man was placed in the garden to work therein; 
which work, so appointed to him, could be no other than 
work of contemplation ; that is, when the end of work is 
but for exercise and experiment, not for necessity ;. for 
there being then no reluctation of the creature, nor sweat 
of the brow, man’s employment must of consequence 
have been matter of delight in the experiment, and not 
matter of labour for the use. Again, the first acts which 
man performed in Paradise consisted of the two summary 
parts of knowledge; the view of creatures, and the im- 
position of names. As for the knowledge which induced 


46 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VI.6. 


the fall, it was, as was touched before, not the natural 
knowledge of creatures, but the moral knowledge of good 
and evil; wherein the supposition was, that God’s com- 
mandments or prohibitions were not the originals of good 
and evil, but that they had other beginnings, which man 
aspired to know; to the end to make a total defection 
from God and to depend wholly upon himself. 

4. To pass on: in the first event or occurrence after 
the fall of man, we see (as the scriptures have infinite 
mysteries, not violating at all the truth of the story or 


letter) an image of the two estates, the_contemplative _ 


state and the active state, figured in the two persons 
of al casas and in the two simplest and most 
primitive trades of life; that of the shepherd (who, by 
reason of his leisure, rest in a place, and living in view of 
heaven, is a lively image of a contemplative life), and that 
of the husbandman: where we see again the favour and 
election of God went to the shepherd, and not to the tiller 
of the ground. 

8. So in the age before the flood, the holy records 
within those few memorials which are there entered and 
registered, have vouchsafed to mention and honour the 
name of the inventors and authors of music and works in 
metal. In the age after the flood, the first great judge- 
~~trent-of-God upon the ambition of man was the confu- 
.sion of tongues ; whereby the open trade and intercourse 
of learning and knowledge was chiefly imbarred. 

g. To descend to Moyses the lawgiver, and God’s first 
pen: he is adorned by the scriptures with this addition 

and commendation, Zhat he was seen tn all the learning of 
the Egyptians ; which nation we know was one of the 
most ancient schools of the world: for so Plato brings in 
the Egyptian priest saying unto Solon, You Grectans are 


VI. 9.] |THE FIRST BOOK. ; 47 


ever children; you have no knowledge of antiquity, nor 
antiquily of knowledge. Take a view of the ceremonial 
law of Moyses; you shall find, besides the prefiguration — 
of Christ, the badge or difference of the people of God, 
the exercise and impression of obedience, and other 
divine uses and fruits thereof, that some of the most 
learned Rabbins have travailed profitably and profoundly 
to observe, some of them a natural, some of them a moral, 
sense or reduction of many of the ceremonies and or- 
dinances. As in the law of the leprosy, where it is said, 
If the whiteness have overspread the flesh, the patient may 
pass abroad for clean ; but of there be any whole flesh 
remaining, he ts to be shut up for unclean; one of them 
noteth a principle of nature, that putrefaction is more 
contagious before maturity than after: and another noteth 
a position of moral philosophy, that men abandoned to 
vice do not so much corrupt manners, as those that are 
half good and half evil. So in this and very many other 
places in that law, there is to be found, besides the theo- 
logical sense, much aspersion of philosophy. 

10. So likewise in that €x¢cé ent book of Job, if it be 
revolved with diligence, it will be found pregnant and 


swelling with_natural-philosophy ; as for example, cos- 
mography, and the roundness_of the world, Quz’ extendit 


aguilonem super vacuum, et appendit terram super nthilum ; 
wherein the pensileness of the earth, the pole of the north, 


‘and the finiteness or convexity of heaven are manifestly 


touched. So again, matter of astronomy; Sprrz/us ejus 
ornavit c@los, et obstetricante manu ejus eductus est Coluber 
tortuosus. And in another place, NMunguid conjungere 
valebis micantes stellas Pleiadas, aut gyrum Arclur? poteris 
disstpare P? Where the fixing of the stars, ever standing 
at equal distance, is with great elegancy noted. And in 


48 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VI. 10. 


another place, Quz factt Arcturum, et Oriona, et Hyadas, et 
intertora Ausir?t ; where again he takes knowledge of the 
depression of the southern pole, calling it the secrets of 
the south, because the southern stars were in that climate 
unseen. Matter of generation; Amnon sicut lac mulststt 
me, et stcut caseum coagulastt me? &c. Matter of minerals ; 
Habet argentum venarum suarum principia: et auro locus 
est in quo conflatur, ferrum de terra tollitur, et lapis solutus 
calore in @s vertitur : and so forwards in that chapter. 


11. So_likewise in the person of Salomon the-king;-we 
he gift or endowment of wisdom a#d learning, both 

in ~Salomon’s_ pettitten and _in_God’s -asse hereunto, 
preferred—before—allmother terrene and temporal felicity. 


By virtue of which grant or donative of God Salomon 
became enabled not only to write those excellent parables 
or aphorisms concerning divine and moral philosophy ; 
but also to compile a natural history of all verdure, from 
the cedar upon the mountain to the moss upon the wall 
(which is but a rudiment between putrefaction and an 
herb), and also of all things that breathe or move. Nay, 
the same Salomon the king, although he excelled in the 
glory of treasure and magnificent buildings, of shipping 
and navigation, of service and attendance, of fame and 
renown, and the like, yet he maketh no claim to any of 
those glories, but only to the glory of inquisition of truth; 
for so he saith expressly, Zhe glory of God ts to conceal a 
thing, but the glory of the king ts to find tt out ; as if, accord- 
ing to the innocent play of children, the Divine Majesty 
took delight to_hide.his-works, tothe end to have them 
found_out ; and as if kings could not obtain a greater 
honour than to be God’s playfellows in that game; con- 
sidering the great commandment of wits and means, 
whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them. 


VI. 12. | _THE FIRST BOOK. go ae 


12. Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the 
times after our Saviour came into the world; for our 
Saviour himself did first show his power to subdue 
ignorance, by his conference with the priests and doctors | 
of the law, before he showed his power to subdue nature 
by his miracles. And the coming of the Holy Spirit was 
chiefly figured and expressed in the similitude and gift of 
tongues, which are but vehicula scientie. 

13. So in the election of those instruments, which it 
pleased God to use for the plantation of the faith, not- 
withstanding that at the first he did employ persons 
altogether unlearned, otherwise than by inspiration, more 
evidently to declare his immediate working, and to abase 
all human wisdom or knowledge; yet nevertheless that 
counsel of his was no sooner performed, but in the next 
vicissitude and succession he did send his divine truth into 
the world, waited on with other learnings, as with servants 
or handmaids: for so we see Saint Paul, who was only 
learned amongst the Apostles, had his pen most used in 
the scriptures of the New Testament. 

14. So again we find that many of the ancient bishops 
and fathers of the Church were excellently read and 
studied in all the learning of the heathen; insomuch 
that the edict of the Emperor Julianus (whereby it was 
‘nterdicted unto Christians to be admitted into schools, 
lectures, or exercises of learning) was esteemed and ac- 
counted a more pernicious engine and machination 
against the Christian Faith, than were all the sanguinary 
prosecutions of his predecessors ; neither could the 
emulation and jealousy of Gregory the first of that name, 
bishop of Rome, ever obtain the opinion of piety or de- 
votion; but contrariwise received the censure of humour, 
malignity and pusillanimity, even amongst holy men; in 

E 


OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. |VI. 14. 


at he designed to obliterate and extinguish the memory 
of heathen antiquity and authors. But contrariwise it was 
the Christian church, which, amidst the inundations of the 
Scythians on the one side from the north-west, and the 
Saracens from the east, did preserve in the sacred lap and 
bosom thereof the precious relics even of heathen learn- 
ing, which otherwise had been extinguished as if no such 
thing hadever been. 

15. And we see before our eyes, that in the age of 
ourselves and our fathers, when it pleased God to call 
the Church of Rome to account for their degenerate 
manners and ceremonies, and sundry doctrines obnoxious 
and framed to uphold the same abuses; at one and the 
same time it was ordained by the Divine Providence, that 
there should attend withal a renovation and new spring’ 
of all other knowledges. And, on the other side we see 
the Jesuits, who partly in themselves and partly by the 
emulation and provocation of their example, have much 
quickened and strengthened the state of learning, we see 
(I say) what notable service and reparation they have done 
to the Roman see. 

16. Wherefore to conclude this part, let it be observed, 


[ that there be two principal duties and services, besides 


ornament and illustration, which philosophy and human 


re— 


learning do perform to faith and_religion. The one, 
“because they are an effectual inducement_to_th alt- 
ation of the glory of God, For as the Psalms and other 


“scriptures do often invite us to consider and magnify the 


great and wonderful works of God, so if we should rest 
only in the contemplation of the exterior of them as they 
first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a like 
injury unto the majesty of God, as if we should judge 
or construe of the store of some excellent jeweller, . by 


VI. 16.] THE FIRST BOOK. 


\ that only which is set out toward the street in his shop. 
| The other, because they minister_a_singular help and | 
| preservative against unbelief and error. For our Saviour 
saith, You err, not knowing the scriplures, nor the power 
of God ; laying before us two books or volumes to study, 
if we will be secured from error; first the scriptures, 
revealing the will of God, and then the creatures ex- 
pressing his power; whereof the latter is a key unto the | 
former: not only opening our understanding to conceive 
the true sense of the scriptures, by the general notions | 
of reason and rules of speech; but chiefly opening our 
belief, in drawing us into a due meditation of the omni- 
potency of God, which is chiefly signed and engraven 
upon his works. "Thus much therefore for divine testi- | 


tony and evidence concerning the true dignity and value _— Tue 
of Jearning.. 


VII. 1. As for human_proofs, it is so large a field, as 
in a discourse of this nature and brevity it is fit rather to 
use choice of those things which we shall produce, than 
to embrace the variety of them. First therefore, in the 
degrees of human honour amongst the heathen, it was 
the highest to obtain to a veneration and adoration as a 
God. ‘This unto the Christians is as the forbidden fruit. 
But we speak now separately of human testimony: ac- 
cording to which, -that which the Grecians call apotheosis, 
and the Latins re/atio tnter divos, was the supreme honour 
which man could attribute unto man: specially when it 
was given, not by a formal decree or act of state, as it 
was used among the Roman Emperors, but by an inward 
assent and belief. Which honour, being so high, had 
also a degree or middle term: for there were reckoned 
above human honours, honours heroical and divine: in 

the attribution and distribution of which honours we see 
: E 2 


EE 


52 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [VII.1. 


antiquity made this difference: that whereas founders 
and uniters of states and cities, lawgivers, extirpers of 
tyrants, fathers of the people, and other eminent persons 
in civil merit, were honoured but with the titles of worthies 
or demi-gods; such as were Hercules, Theseus, Minos, 
Romulus, and the like: on the other side, such as were 
inventors and authors of new arts, endowments, and 


rn geen 
commodities towards man’s life, were ever consecrated 


amongst the gods themselves;_as was Ceres, Bacchus, 


Mercurius, Apollo, and others; and justly ; for the merit 
of the former is confined within the circle of an age or a 
nation; and is like fruitful showers, which though they be 
profitable and good, yet serve but for that season, and for 
a latitude of ground where they fall; but the other is 
indeed like the benefits of heaven, which are permanent 
and universal. The former again is mixed with strife 
and perturbation; but the latter hath the true character of 
Divine Presence, coming in aura lent, without noise or 
agitation. 

2. Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in re- 
pressing the inconveniences which grow from man to man, 
much inferior to the former, of relieving the necessities 
which arise from nature; which merit was lively set forth 
by the ancients in that feigned relation of Orpheus’ theatre, 
where all beasts and birds assembled; and forgetting their 
several appetites, some of prey, some of game, some of 
quarrel, stood all sociably together listening unto the airs 
and accords of the harp; the sound whereof no sooner 


ceased, or was drowned by some louder noise, but every 


beast returned to his own nature: wherein is aptly de- 
scribed the nature and condition of men, who are full of 
savage and unreclaimed desires, of profit, of lust, of re- 
venge; which as long as they give ear to precepts, to laws, 


VII. 2.] THE FIRST BOOK. 


Be to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence 
| of books, of sermons, of harangues, so | 
peace maintained; but if these instruments be silent, or 
_that sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things | 

dissolve into anarchy and confusion. 
“3. But this appeareth more manifestly, when kings | 
themselves, or persons of authority under them, or other 
- governors in commonwealths and popular estates, are en- 
dued with learning. For although he might be thought 
partial to his own profession, that said Zhen should people 
and estates be happy, when either kings were philosophers, or 
philosophers kings ; yet so much is verified by experience, 
that under learned princes and governors there have been 
ever the best times: for howsoever kings may have their 
imperfections in their passions and customs; yet if they.be 
illuminate by learning, they have those notions of religion, 
| policy, and morality, which do preserve them and refrain 
them from all ruinous and peremptory errors _and_ex- 
| césses; whispering evermore in their ears, when coun- 
sellors and servants stand mute and silent. And senators 
or counsellors likewise, which be learned, do proceed upon 
more safe and substantial principles, than counsellors 
which are only men of experience: the one sort keeping 
dangers afar off, whereas the other discover them not till 
they come near hand, and then trust to the agility of 
their wit to ward or avoid them. 
| a 4. Which felicity of times under learned princes (to 
| keep still thé law of brevity, by using the most eminent 
| and selected examples) doth best appear in the age which 
ie passed from the death of Domitianus the emperor until the 
[a reign of Commodus; comprehending a succession of six 
| princes, all learned, or singular favourers and advancers of 
learning, which age for temporal respects was the most 


54 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VII. 4. 


happy and flourishing that ever the Roman empire (which 
then was a model of the world) enjoyed; a matter revealed 
and prefigured unto Domitian in a dream the night before 
he was slain; for he thought there was grown behind 
upon his shoulders a neck and a head of gold: which 
came accordingly to pass in those golden times which 
succeeded: of which princes we will make some com- 
memoration ; wherein although the matter will be vulgar, 
and may be thought fitter for a declamation than agreeable 
to a treatise infolded as this is, yet because it is pertinent 
to the point in hand, Wegue semper arcum tendtt Apollo, 
and to name them only were too naked and cursory, I will 
not omit it altogether. The first was Nerva; the excellent 
temper of whose government is by a glance in Cornelius 
Tacitus touched to the life: Postguam divus Nerva res 
olim insoctabiles miscursset, imperium et libertatem. And in 
token of his learning, the last act of his short reign left 
to memory was a missive to his adopted son Trajan, pro- 
ceeding upon some inward discontent at the ingratitude of 
the times, comprehended in a verse of Homer’s: 


Telis, Phoebe, tuis lacrymas ulciscere nostras. 


5. Trajan, who succeeded, was for his person not 
learned: but if we will hearken to the speech of our 
Saviour, that saith, He shat receiveth a prophet in the name 
of a prophet shall have a prophet’s reward, he deserveth to 
be placed amongst the most learned princes: for there 
was not a greater admirer of learning or benefactor of 
learning; a founder of famous libraries, a perpetual ad- 
vancer of learned men to office, and a familiar converser 
with learned professors and preceptors, who were noted 
to have then most credit in court. On the other side, 
how much Trajan’s virtue and government was admired 
and renowned, surely no testimony of grave and faithful 


VII. 5.] THE FIRST BOOK. 55 


history doth more lively set forth, than that legend tale 
of Gregorius Magnus, bishop of Rome, who was noted 
for the extreme envy he bare towards all heathen excel- 
lency: and yet he is reported, out of the love and estim- 
ation of Trajan’s moral virtues, to have made unto God 
passionate and fervent prayers for the delivery of his soul 
out of hell: and to have obtained it, with a caveat that 
he should make no more such petitions. In this prince’s 
time also the persecutions against the Christians received 
intermission, upon the certificate of Plinius Secundus, a 
man of excellent learning and by Trajan advanced. 

6. Adrian, his successor, was the most curious man 
that lived, and the most universal inquirer; insomuch as 
it was noted for an error in his mind, that he desired to 
comprehend all things, and not to reserve himself for the 
worthiest things: falling into the like humour that was 
long before noted in Philip of Macedon; who, when he 
would needs over-rule and put down an excellent musician 
in an argument touching music, was well answered by 
him again, God forbid, sir (saith he), that your fortune 
should be so bad, as to know these things better than I. 
It pleased God likewise to use the curiosity of this em- 
peror as an inducement to the peace of his Church in 
those days. For having Christ in veneration, not as a 
God or Saviour but as a wonder or novelty, and having 
his picture in his gallery, matched with Apollonius (with 
whom in his vain imagination he thought he had some 
conformity), yet it served the turn to allay the bitter 
hatred of those times against the Christian name, so as 
the Church had peace during his time. And for his 
government civil, although he did not attain to that of 
Trajan’s in glory of arms or perfection of justice, yet 
in deserving of the weal of the subject he did exceed 


56 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ vil. 6. 


him. For Trajan erected many famous monuments and 
buildings; insomuch as Constantine the Great in emul- 
ation was wont to call him Parzefarza, wall-flower, because 
his name was upon so many walls: but his buildings and 
works were more of glory and triumph than use and 
necessity. But Adrian spent his whole reign, which was 
peaceable, in a perambulation or survey of the Roman 
empire; giving order and making assignation where he 
went, for re-edifying of cities, towns, and forts decayed; 
and for cutting of rivers and streams, and for making 
bridges and passages, and for policing of cities and com- 
monalties with new ordinances and constitutions, and 
granting new franchises and incorporations ; so that his 
whole time was a very restoration of all the lapses and 
decays of former times. 

7. Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was a prince 
excellently learned, and had the patient and subtle wit 
of a schoolman; insomuch as in common speech 
(which leaves no virtue untaxed) he was called Cymini 
Sector, a carver or a divider of cummin seed, which is 
one of the least seeds; such a patience he had and 
settled spirit, to enter into the least and most exact 
differences of causes; a fruit no doubt of the exceeding 
tranquillity and serenity of his mind; which being no 
ways charged or incumbered, either with fears, remorses, 
or scruples, but having been noted for a man of the 
purest goodness, without all fiction or affectation, that 
hath reigned or lived, made his mind continually present 
and entire. He likewise approached a degree nearer 
unto Christianity, and became, as Agrippa said unto 
S. Paul, half a Christian ; holding their religion and 
law in good opinion, and not only ceasing persecution, 
but giving way to the advancement of Christians. 


VII, 8. | ‘THE FIRST BOOK. 57 


8. There succeeded him the first Divi /ratres, the two 
adoptive brethren, Lucius Commodus Verus, son to Aélius 
Verus, who delighted much in the softer kind of learning, 
and was wont to call the poet Martial his Virgil; and 
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus; whereof the latter, who ob- 
scured his colleague and survived him long, was named 
the Philosopher: who, as he excelled all the rest in 
learning, so he excelled them likewise in perfection of all 
royal virtues ; insomuch as Julianus the emperor, in his 
book intituled C@sares, being as a pasquil or satire to 
deride all his predecessors, feigned that they were all 
invited to a banquet of the gods, and Silenus the jester 
sat at the nether end of the table, and bestowed a scoff 
on every one as they came in; but when Marcus Philo- 
sophus came in, Silenus was gravelled and out of coun- 
tenance, not knowing where to carp at him; save at the 
last he gave a glance at his patience towards his wife. 
And the virtue of this prince, continued with that of his 
predecessor, made the name of Antoninus so sacred in 
the world, that though it were extremely dishonoured 
in Commodus, Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bare 
the name, yet when Alexander Severus refused the name 
because he was a stranger to the family, the senate with 
one acclamation said, Quomodo Augustus, sic et Antoninus. 
In such renown and veneration was the name of these 
two princes in those days, that they would have had it 
as a perpetual addition in all the emperors’ style. In this 
emperor’s time also the Church for the most part was 
in peace; so as in this sequence of six princes we do 
see the blessed effects of learning in sovereignty, painted 
forth in the greatest table of the world. 

9. But for a tablet or picture of smaller volume (not 
presuming to speak of your Majesty that liveth), in my 


58 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. |VII.9. 


judgement the most excellent is that of Queen Elizabeth, 
your immediate predecessor in this part of Britain; a prince 
that, if Plutarch were now alive to write lives by paral- 
lels, would trouble him I think to find for her a parallel 
amongst women. ‘This lady was endued with learning 
in her sex singular, and rare even amongst masculine 
princes; whether we speak of learning, of language, or 
of science, modern or ancient, divinity or humanity : and 
unto the very last year of her life she accustomed to ap- 
point set hours for reading, scarcely any young student 
in an university more daily or more duly. As for her 
government, I assure myself, I shall not exceed, if I do 
affirm that this part of the island never had forty-five 
years of better times; and yet not through the calmness 
of the season, but through the wisdom of her regiment. 
For if there be considered of the one side, the truth of 
religion established, the constant peace and _ security, 
the good administration of justice, the temperate use of 
the prerogative, not slackened, nor much strained, the 
flourishing state of learning, sortable to so excellent a 
patroness, the convenient estate of wealth and means, 
both of crown and subject, the habit of obedience, and 
the moderation of discontents; and there be considered 
on the other side the differences of religion, the troubles 
of neighbour countries, the ambition of Spain, and op- 
position of Rome ; and then that she was solitary and of 
herself: these things I say considered, as I could not 
have chosen an instance so recent and so proper, so I 
suppose I could not have chosen one more remarkable 
or eminent to the purpose now in hand, which is con- 
cerning the conjunction of learning in the prince with 
felicity in the people. 

10. Neither hath learning an influence and operation 


VII. 10. | THE FIRST BOOK. (sD 


only upon civil merit and moral virtue, and the arts or J 
temperature of peace and peaceable government; but“ 
likewise it hath no less power and efficacy in enablement 
“towards martial and military virtue and prowess; 

~ be notably represented in the examples of Alexander the 
Great-and Cesar the dictator, mentioned before, but 
now in fit place to be resumed: of whose virtues and 
acts in war there needs no note or recital, having been 
the wonders of time in that kind: but of their affections 
towards learning, and perfections in learning, it is per- 
tinent to say somewhat. 

11. Alexander was bred and taught under Aristotle 
the great philosopher, who dedicated divers of his books 
of philosophy unto him: he was attended with Callis- 
thenes and divers other learned persons, that followed 
him in camp, throughout his journeys and conquests. 
What price and estimation he had learning in doth not- 
ably appear in these three particulars: first, in the envy 
he used to express that he bare towards Achilles, in this, 
that he had so good a trumpet of his praises as Homer’s 
verses; secondly, in the judgement or solution he gave 
touching that precious cabinet of Darius, which was found 
among his jewels ; whereof question was made what thing 
was worthy to be put into it; and he gave his opinion for 
Homer’s works: thirdly, in his letter to Aristotle, after he 
had set forth his books of nature, wherein he expostul- 
ateth with him for publishing the secrets or mysteries of 
philosophy; and gave him to understand that himself 
esteemed it more to excel other men in learning and 
knowledge than in power and empire. And what use 
he had of learning doth appear, or rather shine, in all 
his speeches and answers, being full of science and use 
of science, and that in all variety. 


60 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, |VIl. 12 


12. And herein again it may seem a thing scholastical, 
and somewhat idle, to recite things that every man know- 
eth ; but yet, since the argument I handle leadeth me 
thereunto, I am glad that men shall perceive I am as 
willing to flatter (if they will so call it) an Alexander, or 
a Ceesar, or an Antoninus, that are dead many hundred 
years since, as any that now liveth: for it is the display- 
ing of the glory of learning in sovereignty that I pro- 
pound to myself, and not an humour of declaiming in 
any man’s praises. Observe then the speech he used of 
Diogenes, and see if it tend not to the true state of one of 
the greatest questions of moral philosophy ; whether the 
enjoying of outward things, or the contemning of them, 
be the greatest happiness: for when he saw Diogenes so 
perfectly contented with so little, he said to those that 
mocked at his condition, Were I not Alexander, I would 
wish to be Diogenes. But Seneca inverteth it, and saith ; 
Plus erat, quod hic nollet accipere, quam quod tlle posset 
dare. There were more things which Diogenes would have 
refused, than those were which Alexander could have given 
or enjoyed. 

13. Observe again that speech which was usual with 
him, Zhat he felt his mortality chiefly in two things, sleep 
and lust ; and see if it were not a speech extracted out of 
the depth of natural philosophy, and liker to have comen 
out of the mouth of Aristotle or Democritus, than from 
Alexander. 

14. See again that speech of humanity and poesy; 
when upon the bleeding of his wounds, he called unto 
him one of his flatterers, that was wont to ascribe to him 
divine honour, and said, Look, this ts very blood; this ts 
not such a liquor as Homer speaketh of, whitch ran from 
Venus’ hand, when it was pierced by Diomedes. 


VII. 15+] _ THE FIRST BOOK. 61 


15. See likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic, 
in the speech he used to Cassander, upon a complaint 
that was made against his father Antipater: for when 
Alexander happed to say, Do you think these men would 
have come from so far to complain, except they had just 
cause of grief? and Cassander answered, Fea, that was 
the matter, because they thought they should not be disproved ; 
said Alexander laughing: See the subtilties of Artstotle, to 
lake a matter both ways, pro et contra, &c. 

16. But note again how well he could use the same 
art, which he reprehended, to serve his own humour: 
when bearing a secret grudge to Callisthenes, because 
he was against the new ceremony of his adoration, feast- 
ing one night where the same Callisthenes was at the 
table, it was moved by some after supper, for entertain- 
ment sake, that Callisthenes, who was an eloquent man, 
might speak of some theme or purpose at his own 
choice ; which Callisthenes did; choosing the praise of 
the Macedonian nation for his discourse, and performing 
the same with so good manner as the hearers were much 
ravished: whereupon Alexander, nothing pleased, said, Z/ 
was easy to be eloquent upon so good a subject: but saith 
he, Zurn your style, and let us hear what you can say 
against us: which Callisthenes presently undertook, and 
did with that sting and life, that Alexander interrupted 
him and said, Zhe goodness of the cause made him eloquent 
before, and despite made him eloquent then again. 

17. Consider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that ex- 
cellent use of a metaphor or translation, wherewith he 
taxed Antipater, who was an imperious and tyrannous 
governor: for when one of Antipater’s friends com- 
mended him to Alexander for his moderation, that he 
did not degenerate, as his other lieutenants did, into the 


62 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VII. 17. 


Persian pride, in use of purple, but kept the ancient habit 
of Macedon, of black; Zrue (saith Alexander), dut Ant- 
pater ts all purple within. Or that other, when Parmenio 
came to him in the plain of Arbela, and showed him the 
innumerable multitude of his enemies, specially as they 
appeared by the infinite number of lights, as it had been 
a new firmament of stars, and thereupon advised him to 
assail them by night: whereupon he answered, That he 
would not steal the victory. 

18. For matter of policy, weigh that significant dis- 
tinction, so much in all ages embraced, that he made 
between his two friends Hephzstion and Craterus, when 
he said, Zhat the one loved Alexander, and the other loved 
the king: describing the principal difference of princes’ 
best servants, that some in affection love their person, 
and other in duty love their crown. . 

19. Weigh also that excellent taxation of an error, 
ordinary with counsellors of princes, that they counsel 
their masters according to the model of their own mind 
and fortune, and not of their masters’; when upon 
Darius’ great offers Parmenio had said, Surely I would 
accept these offers, were I as Alexander ; saith Alexander, 
So would I were I as Parmenio. 

20. Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply, which he 
made when he gave so large gifts to his friends and 
servants, and was asked what he did reserve for himself, 
and he answered, Hoge: weigh, I say, whether he had 
not cast up his account aright, because ofe must be the 
portion of all that resolve upon great enterprises. For 
this was Czesar’s portion when he went first into Gaul, 
his estate being then utterly overthrown with largesses. 
And this was likewise the portion of that noble prince, 
howsoever transported with ambition, Henry Duke of 


CT eee 
1 1 Ng ae ee ee 


VII. 20. | THE FIRST BOOK. 63 


Guise, of whom it was usually said, that he was the 
greatest usurer in France, because he had turned all his 
estate into obligations. 

21. To conclude therefore: as certain critics are used 
to say hyperbolically, Zhat if all sctences were lost they 
might be found in Virgil, so certainly this may be said 
truly, there are the prints and footsteps of learning in 
those few speeches which are reported of this prince: 
the admiration of whom, when I consider him not as 
Alexander the Great, but as Aristotle’s scholar, hath 
carried me too far. 

22. As for Julius Cesar, the excellency of his learning 
needeth not to be argued from his education, or his 
company, or his speeches; but in a further degree doth 
declare itself in his writings and works; whereof some 
are extant and permanent, and some unfortunately 
perished. For first, we see there is left unto us that 
excellent history of his own wars, which he intituled only 
a Commentary, wherein all succeeding times have admired 
the solid weight of matter, and the real passages and 
lively images of actions and persons, expressed in the 
greatest propriety of words and perspicuity of narration 
that ever was; which that it was not the effect of a 
natural gift, but of learning and precept, is well witnessed 
by that work of his intituled De Analogia, being a gram- 
matical philosophy, wherein he did labour to make this 
same Vox ad placitum to become Vox ad licttum, and to 
reduce custom of speech to congruity of speech; and 
took as it were the pictures of words from the life of 
reason. 

23. So we receive from him, as a monument both of 
his power and learning, the then reformed computation 
of the year; well expressing that he took it to be as 


64 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ VII. 23. 


great a glory to himself to observe and know the law of 
the heavens, as to give law to men upon the earth. 

24. So likewise in that book of his, Az/z-Ca/o, it may 
easily appear that he did aspire as well to victory of wit 
as victory of war: undertaking therein a conflict against 
the greatest champion with the pen that then lived, Cicero 
the orator. | 

25. So again in his book of Apophthegms which he 
collected, we see that he esteemed it more honour to 
make himself but a pair of tables, to take the wise and 
pithy words of others, than to have every word of his 
own to be made an apophthegm or an oracle; as vain 
princes, by custom of flattery, pretend to do. And yet if 
I should enumerate divers of his speeches, as I did those 
of Alexander, they are truly such as Salomon noteth, when 
he saith, Verba sapientum tanquam aculet, et tanquam clavt 
in altum defixt : whereof I will only recite three, not so de- 
lectable for elegancy, but admirable for vigour and efficacy. 

26. As first, it is reason he be thought a master of 
words, that could with one word appease a mutiny in his 
army, which was thus. The Romans, when their generals 
did speak to their army, did use the word JZzlizes, but 
when the magistrates spake to the people, they did use 
the word Qurrites. The soldiers were in tumult, and 
seditiously prayed to be cashiered; not that they so 
meant, but by expostulation thereof to draw Cesar to 
other conditions; wherein he being resolute not to give 
way, after some silence, he began his speech, Ago Quzriies, 
which did admit them already cashiered; wherewith they 
were so surprised, crossed, and confused, as they would 
not suffer him to go on in his speech, but relinquished 
their demands, and made it their suit to be again called 
by the name of ALi/ikes. 


Vil. 27] THE FIRST BOOK. 65 


27. The second speech was thus: Czsar did extremely 
affect the name of king; and some were set on as he 
passed by, in popular acclamation to salute him king. 
Whereupon, finding the cry weak and poor, he put it off 
thus, in a kind of jest, as if they had mistaken his sur- 
name; JVon Rex sum, sed Cesar ; a speech, that if it be 
searched, the life and fulness of it can scarce be ex- 
pressed. For, first, it was a refusal of the name, but yet 
not serious: again, it did signify an infinite confidence 
and magnanimity, as if he presumed Cesar was the 
greater title; as by his worthiness it is come to pass 
till this day. But chiefly it was a speech of great allure- 
ment toward his own purpose; as if the state did strive 
with him but for a name, whereof mean families were 
vested; for Rex was a surname with the Romans, as well 
as King is with us. 

28. The last speech which I will mention was used to 
Metellus: when Cesar, after war declared, did possess 
himself of the city of Rome; at which time entering into 
the inner treasury to take the money there accumulate, 
Metellus being tribune forbade him. Whereto Cesar 
said, Zhat tf he did not desist, he would lay him dead in 
the place. And presently taking himself up, he added, 
Young man, it ts harder for me to speak tt than to do tt; 
Adolescens, durius est miht hoc dicere quam facere. A 
speech compounded of the greatest terror and greatest 
clemency that could proceed out of the mouth of 
man. 

29. But to return and conclude with him, it is evident 
himself knew well his own perfection in learning, and 
took it upon him; as appeared when, upon occasion that 
some spake what a strange resolution it was in Lucius 
Sylla to resign his dictature; he scoffing at him, to his 

F 


66 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VII. 29. 


own advantage, answered, Zhat Sylla could not skill of 
letters, and therefore knew not how to dictate. 

30. And here it were fit to leave this point, touching 
the concurrence of military virtue and learning (for what 
example should come with any grace after those two of 
Alexander and Ceesar?), were it not in regard of the rare- 
ness of circumstance, that I find in one other particular, 
as that which did so suddenly pass from extreme scorn to 
extreme wonder: and it is of Xenophon the philosopher, 
who went from Socrates’ school into Asia, in the expedition 
of Cyrus the younger against King Artaxerxes. This 
Xenophon at that time was very young, and never had 
seen the wars before; neither had any command in the 
army, but only followed the war as a voluntary, for the 
love and conversation of Proxenus his friend. He was 
present when Falinus came in message from the great 
king to the Grecians, after that Cyrus was slain in the 
field, and they a handful of men left to themselves in the - 
midst of the king’s territories, cut off from their country 
by many navigable rivers, and many hundred miles. The 
message imported that they should deliver up their arms 
and submit themselves to the king’s mercy. ‘To which 
message before answer was made, divers of the army 
conferred familiarly with Falinus; and amongst the rest 
Xenophon happened to say, Why, Falinus, we have now 
but these two things left, our arms and our virtue; and tf 
we yield up our arms, how shall we make use of our virtue ? 
Whereto Falinus smiling on him said, Z/ L be not decerved, 
young gentleman, you are an Athenian: and I believe you 
study philosophy, and it ts pretty that you say: but you are 
much abused, tf you think your virtue can withstand the 
king’s power. Here was the scorn; the wonder followed: 
which was, that this young scholar, or philosopher, after 


f asin 
VIN. 30+ | THE FIRST BOOK. ( 67 y 


all the captains were murdered in parley by treason, con- 
a ducted those ten thousand foot, through the heart of all 
| the king’s high countries, from Babylon to Grecia in 
a safety, in despite of all the king’s forces, to the astonish- 
| ment of the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians 
| in times succeeding to make invasion upon the kings of 
Persia ; as was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian, 
attempted by Agesilaus the Spartan, and achieved by 
| Alexander the Macedonian, all upon the ground of the 
; act of that young scholar. 


VIII. 1. To proceed now from imperial and military 
virtue to moral _and—private_virtue; first, it is an assured 


truth, which is contained in the verses, 


Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes 
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros. 


It taketh away the wildness and barbarism and ferceness \ : 
of men’s minds; but indeed the accent had need be upon 
fideliter : for a little superficial learning doth rather work 
a contrary effect. It taketh away all levity, temerity, and 
insolency, by copious suggestion of all doubts and diffi- 
culties, and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on 
both sides, and to turn back the first offers and conceits 
of the mind, and to accept of nothing. but.examined and. 
tried... It_taketh away vain admiration of anything, which 
is the root of all weakness. For all things are admired 
either because they are new, or because they are great. 
For novelty, no man that wadeth in learning or con- 
templation throughly, but will find that printed in his 
heart, WVz2 novi super terram. Neither can any man 
marvel at the play of puppets, that goeth behind the 
curtain, and adviseth well of the motion.. And for mag- 
nitude, as Alexander the Great, after that he was used to 
great armies, and the great conquests of the spacious 
F 2 


oS i ae 


68 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VIIl. 1 


provinces in Asia, when he received letters out of Greece, 
of some fights and services there, which were commonly 
for a passage, or a fort, or some walled town at the most, 
he said, /¢ seemed to him, that he was advertised of the 
battles of the frogs and the mtce, that the old tales went of. 
So certainly, if a man meditate much upon the universal 
frame of nature, the earth with men upon it (the divine- 
ness of souls except) will not seem much other than an 
ant-hill, whereas some ants carry corn, and some carry 
their young, and some go empty, and all to and fro a little 
heap of dust. It taketh away or sO fear of death 


or adverse fortune ; which is one_of the \greatest impédi- 


ments of virtue, and imperfections of marmers. , For if a 

—man's mind be deeply seasoned with the consideration of 
the mortality and corruptible nature of things, he will 
easily concur with Epictetus, who went forth one day and — 
saw a woman weeping for her pitcher of earth that was 
broken, and went forth the next day and saw a woman 
weeping for her son that was dead, and thereupon said, 
Hert vidi fragilem frangt, hodie vidi mortalem mort. 
And therefore Virgil did excellently and profoundly couple 
the knowledge of causes and the conquest of all fears 
together, as concomz/anha. 


Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, 
Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum 
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari. 

2. It were too long to go over the particular remedies 
which learning doth minister to all the diseases of: the 
mind; sometimes purging the ill humours, sometimes 
opening the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, 
sometimes increasing appetite, sometimes healing the 
wounds and exulcerations thereof, and the like; and 
therefore I will conclude with that which hath rasionem 


a eee 


VIII. 2.] THE FIRST BOOK. 


totus ; which is, that it disposeth the constitution of the 
mind not to be fixed or settled in the defects thereof, but 


Stil to be capable and susceptible of growth and reform 
ation. For the unlearned man knows not what_it is to 
descend into himself, or to call himself to account, nor 
the pleasure Of that suavissima vila, indies sentire se fiert 
meliorem. The good parts he hath he will learn to show 
to the full, and use them dexterous y, but not much to. 
increase them. The faults he hath he will learn how to 
hide and colour them, but not much to amend them; ‘like 
an ill mower, that mows on still, and never whets his 
scythe. Whereas with the learned man it fares otherwise, 
that he doth ever intermix the correction and amend- 
ment of his mind with the use and employment thereof. 
Nay further, in general and in sum, certain it is that 
Veritas and Boni/as differ but as the seal and the print: 
for Truth prints Goodness, and they be the clouds of 
error which descend in the storms of passions and per- 
turbations. 

3. From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power_ 
and commandment, and consider whether in right reason 
there be any comparable with that wherewith know- 
ledge investeth and crowneth man’s nature. We see the 
dignity of the commandment is according to the dignity 
of the commanded: to have commandment over beasts, 
as herdmen have, is a thing contemptible: to have com- 
mandment over children, as schoolmasters have, is a 
matter of small honour: to have commandment over 
galley-slaves is a disparagement rather than an honour. 
Neither is the commandment of tyrants much better, over 
people which have put off the generosity of their minds: 
and therefore it was ever holden that honours in free 
monarchies and commonwealths had a sweetness more 


an 
7O OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [ VIII. 3. 
than in tyrannies, because the commandment extendeth 
more over the wills of men, and not only over their deeds 
and services. And therefore, when Virgil putteth himself 
forth to attribute to Augustus Cesar the best of human 
honours, he doth it in these words: 
Victorque volentes 
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo. 
\ But yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher 
than the commandment over the will: for it is a com- 
mandment over the reason, belief, and understanding of 
.man, which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth 
law to the will itself. For there is no power on earth 
/\ which setteth up a throne or chair of estate_in the spirits — 
,/ | and souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, 
j opinions, and beliefs, but. knowledge and learning. And 
therefore we see the detestable and extreme pleasure that 
arch-heretics, and false prophets, and impostors are trans- 
ported with, when they once find in themselves that they 
have a superiority in the faith and conscience of men: 550 
great as if they have once tasted of it, it is seldom seen 
that any torture or persecution can make them relinquish 
or abandon it. But as this is that which the author of the 
Revelation calleth the depth or profoundness of Satan, 
so by argument of contraries, the just and lawful sove- 
reignty Over men’s understanding, by force of truth rightly 
interpreted, is that which approacheth nearest to the simil- 
| itude of the divine rule. 
4. As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence of 
earning is not so confined to give fortune only to states 
y and commonwealths, as it doth not likewise give fortune 
to particular persons. For it was well noted long ago, 
that Homer hath given more men their livings, than either 
Sylla, or Caesar, or Augustus ever did, notwithstanding 


er OAS A OLA 


VIII. 4. | THE FIRST BOOK. 71 


their great largesses and donatives, and distributions of 
lands to so many legions. And no doubt it is hard to 
say whether arms or learning have advanced greater 
numbers. And in case of sovereignty we see, that if arms 
or descent have carried away the kingdom, yet learning 
hath carried the priesthood, which ever hath been in some 
competition with empire. 

5. Again, for_the pleasure and delight of knowledge 
and learning, it far surpasseth all other_in nature, For, 


‘shall the pleasures of the affections so exceed the plea- 
sure of the sense, as much as the obtaining of desire or 
victory exceedeth a song or a dinner? and must not of 
consequence the pleasures of the intellect or understand- 
ing exceed the pleasures of the affections ? in_all 
other pleasures there is satiety, and after they be used, 


REE ETE showeth well they be but 
deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures: and that it was 


the novelty which Tey and not the quality. And 
therefore we see that voluptuous men turn friars, and 
ambitious princes turn melancholy. But_of knowledge _ 
there is_no satiety, but satisfaction and appetite are per- - 
petually interchangeable; and therefore appeareth  t6 be 
good in itself simply, without fallacy or accident. Nei- 
CS Bilateria 
“ther is that pleasure of small efficacy and contentment 
to the mind of man, which the poet Lucretius describeth | 
elegantly, 
Suave mari magno, turbantibus zquora ventis, &c. 

It is a view of delight (saith he) 40 stand or walk upon 
the shore side, and to see a ship tossed with tempest upon the 
sea; or to be ina fortified tower, and to see two batiles join 


upon a plain. But tt_ts a pleasure incomparable, for the 
mind of man to be settled, landed, and fortified in the cer- 


tainty of truth ; and from thence_to descry.and_behald_the 


72 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ VIII. 5. 


errors, perturbations, labours, and wanderings up and down 
of other men. 

6. Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learn- 
ing man excelleth man in that wherein man excelleth 
beasts; that by learning man ascendeth to the heavens 
and their motions, where in body he cannot come; and 
the like ; let us conclude with the dignity and excellency 
of knowledge and learning in that whereunto man’s na- 
ture-doth most aspire, which is immortality or continu- 
ance; for to this tendeth generation, and raising of houses 

“and-families; to this tend buildings, foundations, and 
monuments ; to this tendeth the desire of memory, fame, 
and celebration ; and in effect the strength of all other 
human desires. We see then how far the monuments of _ 
wit and learning are more durable than the monuments. 
‘of power or of the hands. For have not the verses of 
Homer continued twenty-five hundred years, or more, 
‘without the loss of a syllable or letter ; during which time 
infinite palaces, temples, castles, cities, have been decayed 
and demolished? It is not possible to have the true pic- 
tures or statuaes of Cyrus, Alexander, Cesar, no nor of 
the kings or great personages of much later years; for 
the originals cannot last, and the copies cannot but leese 
of the life and truth. But the images of men’s wits and 
knowledges.remain.in books, exempted from the wrong 
of time and_capable-of perpetual renovation. Neither 
are they fitly to be called images, because they generate _ 
still, and cast their seeds in the minds’ of others, pro- 


~VOking an T causing infinite actions and opinions in n_suc- 


Penne 


~ ceeding ages. . So that if the invention of the ship w was 
‘thought so noble, which carrieth riches and commodities 
from place to place, and consociateth the most remote 
regions in participation of their fruits, how much more 


VIII. 6, } THE FIRST BOOK. 73 


are letters to be magnified, which as ships pass through | | 
the vast-seas of time, and make ages so distant to par- 
ticipate of the wisdom, illuminations, and inventions, the 
one of the other? Nay further, we see some of the phi- 
losophers which were least divine, and most immersed in 
the senses, and denied generally the immortality of the 
soul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever motions the 
spirit of man could act and perform without the organs of 
the body, they thought might remain after death ; which 
were only those of the understanding, and not of the 
affection; so immortal and incorruptible a thing did 
knowledge seem unto them to be. But we, that know 
by divine revelation that not only the understanding but 
the affections purified, not only the spirit but the body 
changed, shall be advanced to immortality, do disclaim 
in these rudiments of the senses. But it must be re- 
membered, both in this last point, and so it may like- 
wise be needful in other places, that in probation of | 
the dignity of knowledge or learning, I did in the be- 
ginning separate divine testimony from human, which 
method I have pursued, and so handled them both 
apart. 

4. Nevertheless I do not pretend, and I know it will 
be impossible for me, by any pleading of mine, to reverse 
the judgement, either of Aisop’s cock, that preferred the 
barley-corn before the gem; or of Midas, that being 
chosen judge between Apollo, president of the Muses, 
and Pan, god of the flocks, judged for plenty; or of 
Paris, that judged for beauty and love against wisdom 
and power; or of Agrippina, occedat mairem, modo im- 
peret, that preferred empire with any condition never so 
detestable; or of Ulysses, gui vetulam pretulit immort- 
alitati, being a figure of those which prefer custom and 


74 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VIII. 7. 


habit before all excellency; or of a number of the like 
popular judgements. For these things must continue as 
they have been: but so will that also continue where- 
upon learning hath ever relied, and which faileth not: 
JSustificata est sapientia a filits suis, 


BOOK II. OF WHAT HAS BEEN 


Acts of me 


Dedication to the King (1—15) defining | 


Defects of 


r Nat 


us Civ 
- I. History (i. 2—ili. 5) 3 


Ecc 


| Lit 
A 
Narrativ 


2 II. Poesy (iv. 15) Repress 
Allusive 


c 


(2 


(A) Human learning 
(i—xxii1) 
divided into 


| III. Philosophy (v—xxili) ‘ 


z Of be 
f The matter revealed 
(B) Divitie learning 
(xxiv, xxv) has 
two parts 


Of se 


L The nature of the revelation 


(Use and limits of reason i 


Conclusion, 


ANALYSIS. 


DONE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING HUMAN AND DIVINE, WITH THE DEFECTS OF THE SAME. 


1. Places of learning (4). 
rit towards learning (3—7) as regards | 2. Books of learning (5). 
3. The person of the learned (6). 


All dedicated to professiois and none to sciences at large (8). 

Smallness of reward for lecturers (9). 

Want of apparatus for experiments (10,11) |, ‘ 

Neglect of consultation in governors i eS Na ee is pet { of 

Want of mutual intercourse between the Universities of ur . 

Want of public appointment of writers or inquirers into the less known branches of knowledge (14). 


places of learning (8—r14) 


NS 9: We 


Of creatures. 
hiral (i. 3)4 08 marvels (i. 3, 4). 
Of arts (i. 5, 6). 


¢ Memorials (ii. 2) 


raga _ Chronicles. 
1 (ii 2) Perfect histories (ii. 4, 5); { Lives 
(ii. their deficiencies (ii. 6—9) ( Narrations. 


Antiquities (ii. 3) 


History of the Church (iii. 1). 
tlesiastical {of prophecy (iii. 2). 
Of Providence (iii. 3). 


prary (defective). : 
ppendices to history, orations, letters, sayings (iii. 4). 


Con 
ntative. 


) Divine, i.e. natural theology (vi. 1. 2). 


. Physics (vii. 4) : 

Science Metaphysics (vii. 3, 5—7), including mathematics (viii. 1, 2). 
Experimental. 

Prudence (viii. 3) { Philosophical 
Magical. 


) Natural (vii. viii. 5) | 


epi 5 i ae 
osmetic (x. 11). 
Body Athletics (x. 12). 


Sensual arts (x. 13). Invention (xiii. r—z0). 


Reason, to which belong J) Judgement (xiv). 
the arts of Memory (xv). 
Tradition (xvi—xix). 


: eee Nature of good (xx—xxi). , 
Will, which includes the { Catare of ine mind (xxii). 


as regards the Its nature - 1~3), 
anc 


Particular, or itidividual, < 
| Mind Faculties (xii—xxii) 


) Human (ix—xxiii) as regards the 


Conversation (xxiii. 3). 
Negotiation (xxiii. 4—45). 


Government (xxiii. 46—49). 


Conjugate ot Civil (xxiii), 
with reference to 


lief (xxv. 19), including arias ea 


: . Liturgy (xxv. 22). 
Fvice, including {Guy (xxv. 23). 


Sufficiency (xxv. 8, 9). 
UC Acquisition (xxv. r1o—18). 
h religion, xxv. 17). 


: Limits (xxv. 8). 
» its 


{To face Page 75] 


THE 
SECOND BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON; 


OF THE PROFICIENCE OR 


ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, 


DIVINE AND HUMAN. 


To the King. 


.. ie might seem to have more convenience, though it 

come often otherwise to pass (excellent king), that 
those which are fruitful in their generations, and have in 
themselves the foresight of immortality in their descend- 
ants, should likewise be more careful of the good estate 
of future times, unto which they know they must transmit 
and commend over their dearest pledges. Queen Eliza-. 
beth was a sojourner in the world in respect of her un- 
married life, and was a blessing to her own times; and 
yet so as the impression of her good government, besides. 
her happy memory, is not without some effect which doth 
survive her. But to your Majesty, whom God hath already 
blessed with so much royal issue, worthy to continue and 
represent you for ever, and whose youthful and fruitful 
bed doth yet promise many the like renovations, it is 
proper and agreeable to be conversant not only in the 
transitory parts of good government, but in those acts 
also which are in their nature permanent and perpetual. 
Amongst the which (if affection do not transport me) there 


76 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.  [1. 


is not any more worthy than the further endowment of 
the world with sound and fruitful knowledge. For why 
should a few received authors stand up like Hercules’ 
columns, beyond which there should be no sailing or dis- 
covering, since we have so bright and benign a star as 
your Majesty to conduct and prosper us? ‘To return 
therefore where we left, it remaineth to consider of what 
kind those acts are which have been undertaken and per- 
formed by kings and others for the increase and advance- 
ment of learning: wherein I purpose to speak actively 
without digressing or dilating. 

2. Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works are 
overcommen by amplitude of reward, by soundness of 
direction, and by the conjunction of labours. The first 
multiplieth endeavour, the second preventeth error, and 
the third supplieth the frailty of man. But the principal 
of these is direction: for claudus in via antevertil cursorem 
extra viam,; and Salomon excellently setteth it down, 
Lf the tron be not sharp, tt requireth more strength; but 
wisdom is that which prevaileth ; signifying that the 
invention or election of the mean is more effectual than 
any inforcement or accumulation of endeavours. ‘This 
I am induced to speak, for that (not derogating from the 
noble intention of any that have been deservers towards 
the state of learning) I do observe nevertheless that 
their works and acts are rather matters of magnificence 
and memory, than of progression and proficience, and 
tend ratlter to augment the mass of learning in the mult- 
itude of learned men, than to rectify or raise the sciences 
themselves. 

3, 1pe works or acts of merit towards learning are 
conversant about three objects; the places of learning, 
the books of learning, and the persons of the learned. 


3. | | THE SECOND BOOK. 79 


For as water, whether it be the dew of heaven, or the 
springs of the earth, doth scatter and leese itself in the 
ground, except it be collected into some receptacle, where 
it may by union comfort and sustain itself: and for that 
cause the industry of man hath made and framed spring- 
heads, conduits, cisterns, and pools, which men _ have 
accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn with accom- 
plishments of magnificence and state, as well as of use 
and necessity: so this excellent liquor of knowledge, 
whether it descend from divine inspiration, or spring 
from human sense, would soon perish and vanish to 
oblivion, if it were not preserved in books, traditions, 
conferences, and places appointed, as universities, col- 
leges, and schools, for the receipt and comforting of 
the same. 

4. The works which concern the seats and places of 
learning are four; foundations and buildings, endowments 
with revenues, endowments with franchises and privileges, 
institutions and ordinances for government; all tending 
to quietness and privateness of life, and discharge of 
cares and troubles; much like the stations which Virgil 
prescribeth for the hiving of bees: 

Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda, 
Quo neque sit ventis aditus, &c, 

5. The works touching books are two: first, libraries 
which are as the shrines where all the relics of the an- 
cient saints, full of true virtue, and that without delusion 
or imposture, are preserved and reposed ; secondly, new 
editions of authors, with more correct impressions, more 
faithful translations, more profitable glosses, more diligent 
annotations, and the like. 

6. The works pertaining to the persons of learned men 
(besides the advancement and countenancing of them in 


—_— 


" 


48 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.  [6. 


general) are two: the reward and designation of readers 
in sciences already extant and invented; and the reward 
and designation of writers and inquirers concerning any 
parts of learning not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted. 

4. These are summarily the works and acts, wherein 
the merits of many excellent princes and other worthy 
personages have been conversant. As for any particular 
commencrations, I call to mind what Cicero said, when 
he gave general thanks; Dzfictle non aliquem, ngratum 
quenquam preterire. Let us rather, according to the 
scriptures, look unto that part of the race which is before 
us, than look back to that which is already attained. 

8. First therefore, amongst so many great foundations 
of colleges in Europe, I find strange that they are all 
dedicated to professions, and none left free to arts and 
sciences at large. For if men judge that learning should 
be referred to action, they judge well; but in this they 
fall into the error described in the ancient fable, in which 
the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach had 
been idle, because it neither performed the office of mo- 
tion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, as the head doth: 
but yet notwithstanding it is the stomach that digesteth 
and distributeth to all the rest. So if any man think phi- 
losophy and universality to be idle studies, he doth not 
consider that all professions are from thence served and 
supplied. And this I take to be a great cause that hath 
hindered the progression of learning, because these 
fundamental knowledges have been studied but in pas- 
sage. For if you will have a tree bear more fruit than 
it hath used to do, it is not anything you can do to the 
boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth and putting 
new mould about the roots that must work it. Neither 
is it to be forgotten, that this dedicating of foundations 


8. | THE SECOND BOOK. Je 


and dotations to professory learning hath not only had a 
malign aspect and influence upon the growth of sciences, 
but hath also been prejudicial to states and governments. 


For hence it proceedeth that princes find a solitude in | 


regard of able men to serve them in causes of estate, 
because there is no education collegiate which is free ; 
where such as were so disposed mought give themselves 
to histories, modern languages, bodks of policy and civil 
discourse, and other the like enablements unto service 
of estate. 

g. And because founders of colleges do plant, and 
founders of lectures do water, it followeth well in order 
to speak of the defect which is in public lectures; namely, 
in the smallness and meanness of the salary or reward 
which in most places is assigned unto them; whether 
they be lectures of arts, or of professions. For it is 
necessary to the progression of sciences that readers be 
of the most able and sufficient men; as those which are 
ordained for generating and propagating of sciences, and 
not for transitory use. ‘This cannot be, except their con- 
dition and endowment be such as may content the ablest 
man to appropriate his whole labour and continue his 
whole age in that function and attendance; and therefore 
must have a proportion answerable to that mediocrity or 
competency of advancement, which may be expected 
from a profession or the practice of a profession. So 
as, if you will have sciences flourish, you must observe 
David’s military law, which was, Zha/ those which staid 
with the carriage should have equal part with those which 
were tn the action ; else will the carriages be ill attended. 
So readers in sciences are indeed the guardians of the 
stores and provisions of sciences, whence men in active 
courses are furnished, and therefore ought to have equal 


¥ 


$0 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.  [9. 


entertainment with them; otherwise if the fathers in 
sciences be of the weakest sort or be ill maintained, 
Et patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati. 

to. Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some 
alchemist to help me, who call upon men to sell their 
books, and to build furnaces; quitting and forsaking 
Minerva and the Muses as barren virgins, and relying 
upon Vulcan. But certain it is, that unto the deep, 
fruitful, and operative study of many sciences, specially 
natural philosophy and physic, books be not only the 
instrumentals; wherein also the beneficence of men hath 
not been altogether wanting. For we see spheres, globes, 
astrolabes, maps, and the like, have been provided as 
appurtenances to astronomy and cosmography, as well 
as books. We see likewise that some places instituted for 
physic have annexed the commodity of gardens for 
simples of all sorts, and do likewise command the use 
of dead bodies for anatomies. But these do respect but 
a few things. In general, there will hardly be any main 
proficience in the disclosing of nature, except there be 
some allowance for expenses about experiments; whe- 
ther they be experiments appertaining to Vulcanus or 
Deedalus, furnace or engine, or any other kind. And 
therefore as secretaries and spials of princes and states 
bring in bills for intelligence, so you must allow the 
spials and intelligencers of nature to bring in their bills ; 
or else you shall be ill advertised. 

11. And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to 
Aristotle of treasure for the allowance of hunters, fowlers, 
fishers, and the like, that he mought compile an history 
of nature, much better do they deserve it that travail in 
arts of nature. 

12. Another defect which I note, is an intermission or 


12.| _THE SECOND BOOK. 81 


neglect, in those which are governors in universities, 
of consultation, and in princes or superior persons, of 
visitation : to enter into account and consideration, whe- 
ther the readings, exercises, and other customs apper- 
taining unto learning, anciently begun and since conti- 
nued, be well instituted or no; and thereupon to ground 
an amendment or reformation in that which shall be 
found inconvenient. For it is one of your Majesty’s 
own most wise and princely maxims, Zhat 7m all usages 
and precedents, the times be considered wherein they first 
began ; which tf they were weak or ignorant, tt derogateth 
Jrom the authority of the usage, and leaveth tt for suspect. 
And therefore inasmuch as most of the usages and orders 
of the universities were derived from more obscure times, 
it is the more requisite they be re-examined. In this 
kind I will give an instance or two, for example sake, 
of things that are the most obvious and familiar. The 
one is a matter, which though it be ancient and general, 
yet I hold to be an error; which is, that scholars in 
universities come too soon and too unripe to logic 
and rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children and 
novices. For these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of 
sciences, being the arts of arts; the one for judgement, 
the other for ornament. And they be the rules and 
directions how to set forth and dispose matter: and 
therefore for minds empty and unfraught with matter, 
and which have not gathered that which Cicero calleth 
sylva and supellex, stuff and variety, to begin with those 
arts (as if one should learn to weigh, or to measure, or to 
paint the wind) doth work but this effect, that the wisdom 
of those arts, which is great and universal, is almost made 
contemptible, and is degenerate into childish sophistry 
and ridiculous affectation. And further, the untimely 
G 


82 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [12 


learning of them hath drawn on by consequence the 
superficial and unprofitable teaching and writing of them, 
as fitteth indeed to the capacity of children. Another is 
a lack I find in the exercises used in the universities, 
which do make too great a divorce between invention 
and memory. For their speeches are either premeditate, 
in verbis concepts, where nothing is left to invention; or 
merely extemporal, where little is left to memory. Whereas 
in life and action there is least use of either of these, but 
rather of intermixtures of premeditation and invention, 
notes and memory. So as the exercise fitteth not the 
practice, nor the image the life; and it is ever a true rule 
in exercises, that they be framed as near as may be to 
the life of practice; for otherwise they do pervert the 
motions and faculties of the mind, and not prepare them. 
The truth whereof is not obscure, when scholars come 
to the practices of professions, or other actions of civil 
life; which when they set into, this want is soon found 
by themselves, and sooner by others. But this part, 
touching the amendment of the institutions and orders of 
universities, I will conclude with the clause of Cesar’s 
letter to Oppius and Balbus, Hoc quemadmodum fiert 
possit, nonnulla mihi in mentem ventunt, et multa reperirt 
possunt: de tts rebus rogo vos ut cogttationem suscipiatis. 
13. Another defect which I note, ascendeth a little 
higher than the precedent. For as the proficience of 
learning consisteth much in the orders and institutions 
of universities in the same states and kingdoms, so it 
would be yet more advanced, if there were more intel- 
ligence mutual between the universities of Europe than 
now there is. We see there be many orders and found- 
ations, which though they be divided under several 
sovereignties and territories, yet they take themselves to 


13.] THE SECOND BOOK. 83 


have a kind of contract, fraternity, and correspondence 
one with the other, insomuch as they have provincials 
and generals. And surely as nature createth brotherhood 
in families, and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods 
in communalties, and the anointment of God super- 
induceth a brotherhood in kings and bishops, so in 
like manner there cannot but be a fraternity in learning 
and illumination, relating to that paternity which is attri- 
buted to God, who is called the Father of illuminations 
or lights. 

14. The last defect which I will note is, that there hath 
not been, or very rarely been, any public designation of 
writers or inquirers, concerning such parts of knowledge 
as may appear not to have been already sufficiently 
laboured or undertaken; unto which point it is an 
inducement to enter into a view and examination what 
parts of learning have been prosecuted and what omitted. 
For the opinion of plenty is amongst the causes of want, 
and the great quantity of books maketh a show rather 
of superfluity than lack; which surcharge nevertheless is 
not to be remedied by making no more books, but by 
making more good books, which, as the serpent of Moses, 
mought devour the serpents of the enchanters. 

15. The removing of all the defects formerly enu- 
merate, except the last, and of the active part also of 
the last (which is the designation of writers), are ofera 
basilica; towards which the endeavours of a private man 
may be but as an image in a crossway, that may point 
at the way, but cannot go it. But the inducing part 
of the latter (which is the survey of learning) may be 
set forward by private travail. Wherefore I will now 
attempt to make a general and faithful perambulation 
of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh 

G2 


84 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [15. 


and waste, and not improved and converted by the 
industry of man; to the end that such a plot made and 
recorded to memory, may both minister light to any 
public designation, and also serve to excite voluntary 
endeavours. Wherein nevertheless my purpose is at this 
time to note only omissions and deficiences, and not to 
make any redargution of errors or incomplete prosecu- 
tions. For it is one thing to set forth what ground lieth 
unmanured, and another thing to correct ill husbandry in 
that which is manured. 

In the handling and undertaking of which work I am 
not ignorant what it is that 1 do now move and attempt, 
nor insensible of mine own weakness to sustain my pur- 
pose. But my hope is, that if my extreme love to learning 
carry me too far, I may obtain the excuse of affection ; 
for that Z¢ zs not granted to man to love and to be wise. 
But I know well I can use no other liberty of judgement 
than I must leave to others; and I for my part shall be 
indifferently glad either to perform myself, or accept from 
another, that duty of humanity; JVam qui errantt comtter 
monstrat viam, &c. I do foresee likewise that of those 
things which I shall enter and register as deficiences and 
omissions, many will conccive and censure that some 
of them are already done and extant; others to be but 
curiosities, and things of no great use; and others to be 
of too great difficulty, and almost impossibility to be com- 
passed and effected. But for the two first, I refer myself 
to the particulars. For the last, touching impossibility, I 
take it those things are to be held possible which may be 
done by some person, though not by every one; and 
which may be done by many, though not by any one; 
and which may be done in succession of ages, though 
not within the hourglass of one man’s life; and which 


Ah inn AST OO 


Cee 


15. ] THE SECOND BOOK. 85 


may be done by public designation, though not by private 
endeavour. But notwithstanding, if any man will take to 
himself rather that of Salomon, Dicit piger, Leo est tn via, 
than that of Virgil, Possunt guia posse videntur, 1 shall be 
content that my labours be esteemed but as the better 
sort of wishes: for as it asketh some knowledge to de- 
mand a question not impertinent, so it requireth some 
sense to make a wish not absurd. 


I. 1 “THE parts of human learning have reference” 


to the three parts of man’s understanding, 


—) 


whichis the seat of learning: history to his memory, | 


poesy to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason. 
Divine learning receiveth the same distribution; for the 
spirit of man is the same, though the revelation of oracle 


and sense be diverse. So as theology consisteth also of | 


history of the church; of parables, which is divine poesy ; 


and of holy doctrine or precept. For as for that part _ 


which seemeth supernumerary, which is prophecy, it is 
but divine history; which hath that prerogative over 
human, as the narration may be before the fact as well 
as after. 

2. History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary ; 
whereof the three first I allow as extant, the Historia 
fourth I note as deficient. For no man hath Zijerarum. 
propounded to himself the general state of 
learning to be described and represented from age to 
age, as many have done the works of nature, and the 
state civil and ecclesiastical ; without which the history 
of the world seemeth to me to be as the statua of 
Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being wanting 
which doth most show the spirit and life of the person. 
And yet I am not ignorant that in divers particular 


86 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [l. 2. 


sciences, as of the jurisconsults, the mathematicians, the 
rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are set down some 
‘small memorials of the schools, authors, and books; and 
so likewise some barren relations touching the invention 
of arts or usages. But a just story of learning, containing 
the antiquities and originals of knowledges and their sects, 
their inventions, their traditions, their diverse administra- 
tions and managings, their flourishings, their Oppositions, 
decays, depressions, oblivions, removes, with the causes 
and occasions of them, and all other events concerning 
learning, throughout the ages of the world, I may truly 
affirm to be wanting. The use and end of which work 
I do not so much design for curiosity or satisfaction 
of those that are the lovers of learning, but chiefly for 
a more serious and grave purpose, which is this in few 
words, that it will make learned men wise in the use and 
administration of learning. For it is not Saint Augustine’s 
nor Saint Ambrose’ works that will make so wise a divine, 
as ecclesiastical history, throughly read and observed ; 
and the same reason is of learning, 

3. History of nature is of three sorts: of nature in 
course; of nature erring or varying ; and of nature altered 
or wrought; that is, history of creatures, history of mar- 
vels, and history of arts. The first of these no doubt is 
extant, and that in good perfection: the two latter are 
handled so weakly and unprofitably, as Iam moved to 
note them as deficient. For I find no sufi- 

as cient or competent collection of the works of 
Errantis, “ature which have a digression and deflexion 
from the ordinary course of generations, pro- 

ductions, and motions; whether they be singularities 
of place and region, or the strange events of time and 
chance, or the effects of yet unknown proprieties, or the 


Historia 


I. 3.] THE SECOND BOOK. 87 


instances of exception to general kinds. It is true, I 
find a number of books of fabulous experiments and 
secrets, and frivolous impostures for pleasure and strange- 
ness; but a substantial and severe collection of the 
heteroclites or irregulars of nature, well examined and 
described, I find not: specially not with due rejection of | 
fables and popular errors. For as things now are, if an _ 
untruth in nature be once on foot, what by reason of the 
neglect of examination, and countenance of antiquity, and 
what by reason of the use of the opinion in similitudes 
and ornaments of speech, it is never called down. 

4. The use of this work, honoured with a precedent 
in Aristotle, is nothing less than to give contentment to 
the appetite of curious and vain wits, as the manner of 
Mirabilaries is to do; but for two reasons, both of great 
weight ; the one to correct the partiality of axioms and 
opinions, which are commonly framed only upon com- 
mon and familiar examples; the other because from the 
wonders of nature is the nearest intelligence and passage 
towards the wonders of art: for it is no more but by 
following, and as it were hounding nature in her wander- 
ings, to be able to lead her afterwards to the same place 
again. Neither am I of opinion, in this history of mar- 
vels, that superstitious narrations of sorceries, witchcrafts, 
dreams, divinations, and the like, where there is an 
assurance and clear evidence of the fact, be altogether 
excluded. For it is not yet known in what cases and 
how far effects attributed to superstition do participate 
of natural causes: and therefore howsoever the practice 
of such things is to be condemned, yet from the specu- 
lation and consideration of them light may be taken, not 
only for the discerning of the offences, but for the further 
disclosing of nature. Neither ought a man to make 


88 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,  [I. 4 


scruple of entering into these things for inquisition of 
truth, as your Majesty hath showed in your own example ; 
who with the two clear eyes of religion and natural philo- 
sophy have looked deeply and wisely into these shadows, 
and yet proved yourself to be of the nature of the sun, 
which passeth through pollutions and itself remains as 
pure as before. But this I hold fit, that these narrations, 
which have mixture with superstition, be sorted by them- 
selves, and not to be mingled with the narrations which 
are merely and sincerely natural. But as for the nar- 
rations touching the prodigies and miracles of religions, 
they are either not true, or not natural; and therefore 
impertinent for the story of nature. 

5. For history of nature wrought or mechanical, I 
find some collections made of agriculture, 
and likewise of manual arts; but commonly 
with a rejection of experiments familiar and 
vulgar. For it is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto 
learning to descend to inquiry or meditation upon 
matters mechanical, except they be such as may be 
thought secrets, rarities, and special subtilties ; which 
humour of vain and supercilious arrogancy is justly 
derided in Plato; where he brings in Hippias, a vaunting 
sophist, disputing with Socrates, a true and unfeigned 
inquisitor of truth; where the subject being touching 
beauty, Socrates, after his wandering manner of induc- 
tions, put first an example of a fair virgin, and then of a 
fair horse, and then of a fair pot well glazed, whereat 
Hippias was offended, and said, More than for courtesy’s 
sake, he did think much to dispute with any that did allege 
such base and sordid instances. Whereunto Socrates an- 
swereth, Vou have reason, and tt becomes you well, being a 
man so trim in your vestiments, &c., and so goeth on in an 


Historia 


Mechanica. 


Ps ae Pe 


SELES RS 


eos 


I. 50] _ THE SECOND BOOK. | 89 


irony. But the truth is, they be not the highest instances 
that give the securest information; as may be well ex- 


pressed in the tale so common of the philosopher, that _ 
while he gazed upwards to the stars fell into the water ; 


for if he had looked down he might have seen the stars 
in the water, but looking aloft he could not see the water 


in the stars. So it cometh often to pass, that mean and~ 


small things discover great, better than great can discover 
the small: and therefore Aristotle noteth well, Zhat the 
nature of everything ts best seen in his smallest portions. 
And for that cause he inquireth the nature of a common- 
wealth, first in a family, and the simple conjugations of 
man and wife, parent and child, master and servant, which 
are in every cottage. Even so likewise the nature of this 
great city of the world, and the policy thereof, must be 
first sought in mean concordances and small portions. 
So we see how that secret of nature, of the turning of 
iron touched with the loadstone towards the north, was 
found out in needles of iron, not in bars of iron. 


6. But if my judgement be of any weight, the use of | 
history mechanical is of all others the most radical and 


fundamental towards natural philosophy; such natural 
philosophy as shall not vanish in the fume of subtile, 
sublime, or delectable speculation, but such as shall be 
operative to the endowment and benefit of man’s life. 
For it will not only minister and suggest for the present 
many ingenious practices in all trades, by a connexion 
and transferring of the observations of one art to the use 
of another, when the experiences of several mysteries 
shall fall under the consideration of one man’s mind; 


but further, it will give a more true and real illumination, 
concerning causes and axioms than is hitherto attained. \ 


For like as a man’s disposition is never well known till 


\ 


gO OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [I. 6. 


he be crossed, nor Proteus ever changed shapes till he 
was straitened and held fast; so the passages and vari- 
ations of nature cannot appear so fully in the liberty of 
nature as in the trials and vexations of art. 

II. x1. For civil history, it is of three kinds; not un- 
fitly to be compared with the three kinds of pictures 
or images. For of pictures or images, we see some are 
unfinished, some are perfect, and some are defaced. So 
of histories we may find three kinds, memorials, perfect 
histories, and antiquities ; for memorials are history un- 
finished, or the first or rough draughts of history ; and 
antiquities are history defaced, or some remnants of his- 
tory which have casually escaped the shipwreck of time. 

2. Memorials, or preparatory history, are of two sorts; 
whereof the one may be termed commentaries, and the 
other registers. Commentaries are they which set down 
a continuance of the naked events and actions, without 
the motives or designs, the counsels, the speeches, the 
pretexts, the occasions and other passages of action: for 
this is the true nature of a commentary (though Cesar, 
in modesty mixed with greatness, did for his pleasure 
apply the name of a commentary to the best history of 
the world). Registers are collections of public acts, as 
decrees of council, judicial proceedings, declarations and 
letters of estate, orations and the like, without a perfect 
continuance or contexture of the thread of the narration. 

3- Antiquities, or remnants of history, are, as was said, 
fanquam tabula naufragit: when industrious persons, by 
an exact and scrupulous diligence and observation, out of 
monuments, names, words, proverbs, traditions, private 
records and evidences, fragments of stories, passages of | 
books that concern not story, and the like, do save and 
recover somewhat from the deluge of time. 


as ae 


II. 4. | THE SECOND BOOK. gI 


4. In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign 
no deficience, for they are /anguam imperfecte misia ; and 
therefore any deficience in them is but their nature. 
As for the corruptions and moths of history, which are 
epitomes, the use of them deserveth to be banished, as 
all men of sound judgement have confessed, as those 
that have fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many 
excellent histories, and wrought them into base and 
unprofitable dregs. ; 

5. History, which may be called just and perfect his- 
tory, is of three kinds, according to the object which 
it propoundeth, or pretendeth to represent: for it either 
representeth a time, or a person, or an action. The first 
we call chronicles, the second lives, and the third narra- 
tions or relations. Of these, although the first be the | 
most complete and absolute kind of history, and hath 
most estimation and glory, yet the second excelleth it in 
profit and use, and the third in verity and sincerity. For 
history of times representeth the magnitude of actions, 
and the public faces and deportments of persons, and 
passeth over in silence the smaller passages and motions 
of men and matters. But such being the workmanship 
of God, as he doth hang the greatest weight upon the 
smallest wires, maxima é@ minimis suspendens, it comes’ 
therefore to pass, that such histories do rather set forth 
the pomp of business than the true and inward resorts 
thereof. But lives, if they be well written, propounding to 
themselves a person to represent, in whom actions both 
greater and smaller, public and private, have a commix- 
ture, must of necessity contain a more true, native, and 
lively representation. So again narrations and relations 
of actions, as the war of Peloponnesus, the expedition of 
Cyrus Minor, the conspiracy of Catiline, cannot but be 


Q2 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, Piles: 


more purely and exactly true than histories of times, 
because they may choose an argument comprehensible 
within the notice and instructions of the writer: whereas 
he that undertaketh the story of a time, specially of any 
length, cannot but meet with many blanks and spaces 
which he must be forced to fill up out of his own wit 
and conjecture. 

6. For the history of times (I mean of civil history), 
the providence of God hath made the distribution. For 
it hath pleased God to ordain and illustrate two exemplar 
states of the world for arms, learning, moral virtue, policy, 
and laws; the state of Grecia and the state of Rome; 
the histories whereof, occupying the middle part of time, 
have more ancient to them histories which may by one 
common name be termed the antiquities of the world: 
and after them, histories which may be likewise called by 
the name of modern history. 

7. Now to speak of the deficiences. As to the hea- 
then antiquities of the world, it is in vain to note them 
for deficient. Deficient they are no doubt, consisting 
most of fables and fragments; but the deficience cannot 
be holpen ; for antiquity is like fame, caput inter nubila 
condit, her head is muffled from our sight. For the his- 
tory of the exemplar states it is extant in good perfection. 
Not but I could wish there were a perfect course of 
history for Grecia from Theseus to Philopcemen (what 
time the affairs of Grecia drowned ‘and extinguished 
in the affairs of Rome), and for Rome from Romulus 
to Justinianus, who may be truly said to be ultmus 
Romanorum. In which Sequences of story the text of 
Thucydides and Xenophon in the one, and the texts 
of Livius, Polybius, Sallustius, Czesar. Appianus, Tacitus, 
Herodianus in the other, to be kept entire without any 


I. 7.] THE SECOND BOOK. 93 


diminution at all, and only to be supplied and continued. 
But this is matter of magnificence, rather to be com- 
mended than required: and we speak now of parts of 
learning supplemental and not of supererogation. 

8. But for modern histories, whereof there are some 
few very worthy, but the greater part beneath mediocrity, 
leaving the care of foreign stories to foreign states, be- 
cause I will not be curtosus tn aliena republica, I cannot 
fail to represent to your Majesty the unworthiness of the 
history of England in the main continuance thereof, and 
the partiality and obliquity of that of Scotland in the 
latest and largest author that I have seen: supposing that 
it would be honour for your Majesty, and a work very 
memorable, if this island of Great Brittany, as it is now 
joined in monarchy for the ages to come, so were joined - 
in one history for the times passed; after the manner of 
the sacred history, which draweth down the story of the 
ten tribes and of the two tribes as twins together. And 
if it shall seem that the greatness of this work may make 
it less exactly performed, there is an excellent period 
of a much smaller compass of time, as to the story of 
England; that is to say, from the uniting of the Roses to 
the uniting of the kingdoms; a portion of time wherein, 
to my understanding, there hath been the rarest varieties 
that in like number of successions of any hereditary 
monarchy hath been known. For it beginneth with the 
mixed adeption of a crown by arms and title; an entry 
by battle, an establishment by marriage; and therefore 
times answerable, like waters after a tempest, full of 
working and swelling, though without extremity of storm ; 
but well passed through by the wisdom of the pilot, 
being one of the most sufficient kings of all the number. 
Then followeth the reign of a king, whose actions, howso- 


94 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [11. 8. 


ever conducted, had much intermixture with the affairs of 
Europe, balancing and inclining them variably; in whose 
time also began that great alteration in the state eccle- 
siastical, an action which seldom cometh upon the stage. 
Then the reign of a minor: then an offer of an usurpation 
(though it was but as /edrzs ephemera). Then the reign of 
a queen matched with a foreigner: then of a queen that 
lived solitary and unmarried, and yet her government so 
masculine, as it had greater impression and operation 
upon the states abroad than it any ways received from 
thence. And now last, this most happy and glorious 
event, that this island of Brittany, divided from all the 
world, should be united in itself: and that oracle of rest 
given to Aineas, anfiqguam exquirite matrem, should now 
- be performed and fulfilled upon the nations of England 
and Scotland, being now reunited in the ancient mother 
name of Brittany, as a full period of all instability and 
peregrinations. So that as it cometh to pass in massive 
bodies, that they have certain trepidations and waverings 
before they fix and settle, so it seemeth that by the pro- 
vidence of God this monarchy, before it was to settle in 
your majesty and your generations (in which I hope it is 
now established for ever), it had these prelusive changes 
and varieties. 

9g. For lives, I do find strange that these times have so 
little esteemed the virtues of the times, as that the writings 
of lives should be no more frequent. For although there 
be not many sovereign princes or absolute commanders, 
and that states are most collected into monarchies, yet 
are there many worthy personages that deserve better 
than dispersed report or barren elogies. For herein 
the invention of one of the late poets is proper, and 
doth well enrich the ancient fiction. For he feigneth 


% 
$e, 
bs 
hy 
ae 


II. 9.] THE SECOND BOOK. 95 


that at the end of the thread or web of every man’s life 
there was a little medal containing the person’s name, 
and that Time waited upon the shears, and as soon as 
the thread was cut, caught the medals, and carried them 
to the river of Lethe; and about the bank there were 
many birds flying up and down, that would get the 
medals and carry them in their beak a little while, and 
then let them fall into the river. Only there were a few 
swans, which if they got a name would carry it to a 
temple where it was consecrate. And although many 
men, more mortal in their affections than in their bodies, 
do esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity 
and ventosity, 
Animi nil magne laudis egentes ; 

which opinion cometh from that root, on prius laudes 
contempsimus, quam laudanda facere desivimus: yet that 
will not alter Salomon’s judgement, Memoria justi cum 
laudibus, at impiorum nomen putrescet : the one flourisheth, 
the other either consumeth to present oblivion, or turneth 
to an ill odour. And therefore in that style or addition, 
which is and hath been long well received and brought 
in use, felicis memoria, pie memoria, bone memoria, we 
do acknowledge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it 
from Demosthenes, that dona fama propria possessto de- 
Junctorum ; which possession I cannot but note that in 
our times it lieth much waste, and that therein there is a 
deficience. 

10, For narrations and relations of particular actions, 
there were also to be wished a greater diligence therein; 
for there is no great action but hath some good pen 
which attends it. And because it is an ability not com- 
mon to write a good history, as may well appear by the 
small number of them; yet if particularity of actions 


96 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING [II. 10, 


memorable were but tolerably reported as they pass, the 
compiling of a complete history of times mought be the 
better expected, when a writer should arise that were fit 
for it: for the collection of such relations mought be 
as a nursery garden, whereby to plant a fair and stately 
garden, when time should serve. 

11. There is yet another partition of history which 
Cornelius Tacitus maketh, which is not to be forgotten, 
specially with that application which’ he accoupleth it 
withal, annals and journals: appropriating to the former 
matters of estate, and to the latter acts and accidents of a 
meaner nature. For giving but a touch of certain mag- 
nificent buildings, he addeth, Cum ex dignitale popult Ro- 
mani repertum sit, res tllustres annalibus, talia diurni’s urbis 
actis mandare. So as there is a kind of contemplative 
heraldry, as well as civil. And as nothing doth derogate 
from the dignity of a state more than confusion of de- 
grees, so it doth not a little imbase the authority of an 
history, to intermingle matters of triumph, or matters of 
ceremony, or matters of novelty, with matters of state. 
But the use of a journal hath not only been in the history 
of time, but likewise in the history of persons, and chiefly 
of actions; for princes in ancient time had, upon point 
of honour and policy both, journals kept, what passed 
day by day. For we see the chronicle which was read 
before Ahasuerus, when he could not take rest, contained 
matter of affairs indeed, but such as had passed in his 
own time and very lately before. But the journal of 
Alexander’s house expressed every small particularity, 
even concerning his person and court; and it is yet 
an use well received in enterprises memorable, as expe- 
ditions of war, navigations, and the like, to keep diaries 
of that which passeth continually. 


WI. 12.] THE SECOND BOOK. 97 


12. I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing 
which some grave and wise men have used, containing a 
scattered history of those actions which they have thought 
worthy of memory, with politic discourse and observation 
thereupon: not incorporate into the history, but separ- 
ately, and as the more principal in their intention ; which 
kind of ruminated history I thing more fit to place amongst 
books of policy, whereof we shall hereafter speak, than 
amongst books of history. For it is the true office of his- 
tory to represent the events themselves together with the 
counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions 
thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man’s judge- 
ment. But mixtures are things irregular, whereof no man 
can define. 

13. So also is there another kind of history manifoldly 
mixed, and that is history of cosmography: being com- 
pounded of natural history, in respect of the regions 
themselves; of history civil, in respect of the habitations, 
regiments, and manners of the people; and the mathe- 
matics, in respect of the climates and configurations to- 
wards the heavens: which part of learning of all others 
in this latter time hath obtained most proficience. For 
it may be truly affirmed to the honour of these times, 
and in a virtuous emulation with antiquity, that this great 
building of the world had never through-lights made in it, 
till the age of us and our fathers. For although they had 
knowledge of the antipodes, 


Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis, 
Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper, 


yet that mought be by demonstration, and not in fact; 

and if by travel, it requireth the voyage but of half the 

globe. But to circle the earth, as the heavenly bodies do, 

was not done nor enterprised till these later times: and 
H 


98 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [II. 13. 


therefore these times may justly bear in their word, not 
only plus ultra, in precedence of the ancient non ultra, 
and imitabile fulmen, in precedence of the ancient non 
imitabile fulmen, 
Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen, &c. 

but likewise zmzfadile celum; in respect of the many 
memorable voyages after the manner of heaven about 
the globe of the earth. 

14. And this proficience in navigation and discoveries 
may plant also an expectation of the further proficience 
and augmentation of all sciences; because it may seem 
they are ordained by God to be coevals, that is, to meet 
in one age. For so the prophet Daniel speaking of the 
latter times foretelleth, Plurzm7d pertranstbunt, et multiplex 
erit scientia: as if the openness and through-passage of 
the world and the increase of knowledge were appointed 
to be in the same ages; as we see it is already performed 
in great part: the learning of these later times not much 
giving place to the former two periods or returns of learn- 
ing, the one of the Grecians, the other of the Romans. 

III. 1. History ecclesiastical receiveth the same divi- 
sions with history civil: but further in the propriety 
thereof may be divided into the history of the church, 
by a general name; history of prophecy; and history of 
providence. The first describeth the times of the milit- 
ant church, whether it be fluctuant, as the ark of Noah, 
or moveable, as the ark in the wilderness, or at rest, as 
the ark in the temple: that is, the state of the church in 
persecution, in remove, and in peace. This part I ought 
in no sort to note as deficient; only I would the virtue 
and sincerity of it were according to the mass and 
quantity. But I am not now in hand with censures, but 
with omissions. 


UII, 2.] | THE SECOND BOOK. 99 


2. The second, which is history of prophecy, consisteth 
of two relatives, the prophecy, and the accomplishment ; 
and therefore the nature of such a work ought to be, that 
every prophecy of the scripture be sorted with the event 
fulfilling the same, throughout the ages of the world; both 
for the better confirmation of faith, and for the better 
illumination of the Church touching those parts of pro- 
phecies which are yet unfulfilled: allowing nevertheless 
that latitude which is agreeable and familiar unto divine 
prophecies; being of the nature of their author, with 
whom a thousand years are but as one day; and there- 
fore are not fulfilled punctually at once, but have 
springing and germinant accomplishment | 
throughout many ages; though the height 
or fulness of them may refer to some one 
age. This is a work which I find deficient; but is to 
be done with wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or not 
at all. 

3. The third, which is history of providence, con- 
taineth that excellent correspondence which is between 
God’s revealed will and his secret will: which though 
it be so obscure; as for the most part it is not legible 
to the natural man; no, nor many times to those that 
behold it from the tabernacle; yet at some times it 
pleaseth God, for our better establishment and the con- 
futing of those which are as without God in the world, 
to write it in such text and capital letters, that, as the 
prophet saith, He that runneth by may read it; that is, 
mere sensual persons, which hasten by God’s judge- 
ments, and never bend or fix their cogitations upon 
them, are nevertheless in their passage and race urged 
to discern it. Such are the notable events and examples 
of God’s judgements, chastisements, deliverances, and 

H 2 


Historia 
Prophetica, 


100 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [IIl. 3 


blessings: and this is a work which hath passed through 
the labour of many, and therefore I cannot present as 
omitted. 

4. There are also other parts of learning which are 
appendices to history. For all the exterior proceedings 
of man consist of words and deeds; whereof history 
doth properly receive and retain in memory the deeds, 
and if words, yet but as inducements and passages to 
deeds; so are there other books and writings, which are 
appropriate to the custody and receipt of words only; 
which likewise are of three sorts; orations, letters, and 
brief speeches or sayings. Orations are pleadings, 
speeches of counsel, laudatives, invectives, apologies, 
reprehensions, orations of formality or ceremony, and 
the like. Letters are according to all the variety of oc- 
casions, advertisements, advices, directions, propositions, 
petitions, commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory, of 
compliment, of pleasure, of discourse, and all other pas- 
sages of action. And such as are written from wise men 
are of all the words of man, in my judgement, the best ; 
for they are more natural than orations, and public 
speeches, and more advised than conferences or present 
speeches. So again letters of affairs from such as 
manage them, or are privy to them, are of all others the 
best instructions for history, and to a diligent reader the 
best histories in themselves. For apophthegms, it is a 
great loss of that book of Cesar’s; for as his history, and 
those few letters of his which we have, and those apo- 
phthegms which were of his own, excel all men’s else, so I 
suppose would his collection of apophthegms have done. 
For as for those which are collected by others, either I 
have no taste in such matters, or else their choice hath 
not been happy. But upon these three kinds of writings 


1. 4. THE SECOND BOOK, 101 


I do not insist, because I have no deficiences to propound 
concerning them. | 

5. Thus much therefore concerning history, which is 
that part of learning which answereth to one of the cells, 
domiciles, or offices of the mind of man; which is that 
of the memory. 

IV. 1. Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words 
for the most part restrained, but in all other points ex- 
tremely licensed, and doth truly refer to the imagination ; 
which, being not tied to the laws of matter, may at plea- 
sure join that which nature hath severed, and sever that 
which nature hath joined; and so make unlawful matches 
and divorces of things; Pictorzbus a/que poetis, dc. It 
is taken in two senses in respect of words or matter. 
In the first sense it is but a character of style, and be- 
longeth to arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the 
present. In the latter it is (as hath been said) one of the 
principal portions of learning, and is nothing else but 
feigned history, which may be styled as well in prose as 
in verse. 

2. The use of this feigned history hath been to give , 
some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those 
points wherein the nature of things doth deny it, the 
world being in proportion inferior to the soul; by reason 
whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of man, a more 
ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more 
absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of 
things. Therefore, because the acts or events of true 
history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind 
of man, poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more 
heroical. Because true history propoundeth the successes 
and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits of 
virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in 


102 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [IV.2. 


retribution, and more according to revealed providence. 
Because true history representeth actions and events more 
ordinary and less interchanged, therefore poesy endueth 
them with more rareness, and more unexpected and 
alternative variations. So as it appeareth that poesy 
serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality, and to 
delectation. And therefore it was ever thought to have 
some participation of divineness, because it doth raise 
and erect the mind, by submitting the shows of things 
to the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle 
and bow the mind unto the nature of things. And we 
see that by these insinuations and congruities with man’s 
nature and pleasure, joined also with the agreement and 
consort it hath with music, it hath had access and estim- 
ation in rude times and barbarous regions, where other 
learning stood excluded. 

3. The division of poesy which is aptest in the pro- 
priety thereof (besides those divisions which are common 
unto it with history, as feigned chronicles, feigned lives, 
and the appendices of history, as feigned epistles, feigned 
orations, and the rest) is into poesy narrative, represent- 
ative, and allusive. The narrative is a mere imitation of 
history, with the excesses before remembered : ; choosing 
for subject commonly wars and love, rarely state, and 
sometimes pleasure or mirth. Representative is as a 
visible history ; and is an image of actions as if they were 
present, as history is of actions in nature as they are, (that 
is) past. -Allusive or parabolical is a narration applied 
only to express some special purpose or conceit. Which 
latter kind of parabolical wisdom was much more in use 
in the ancient times, as by the fables of sop, and the 
brief sentences of the seven, and the use of hieroglyphics 
may appear. And the cause was, for that it was then of 


Iv. 3.] _ THE SECOND BOOK. 103 


necessity to express any point of reason which was more 
sharp or subtile than the vulgar in that manner, because 
men in those times wanted both variety of examples and 
subtilty of conceit. And as hieroglyphics were before 
letters, so parables were before arguments: and never- 
theless now and at all times they do retain much life 
and vigour, because reason cannot be so sensible, nor 
examples so fit. 

4. But there remaineth yet another use of poesy para- 
bolical, opposite to that which we last mentioned: for 
that tendeth to demonstrate and illustrate that which is 
taught or delivered, and this other to retire and obscure 
it: that is, when the secrets and mysteries of religion, 
policy, or philosophy, are involved in fables or parables. 
Of this in divine poesy we see the use is authorised. In 
heathen poesy we see the exposition of fables doth fall 
out sometimes with great felicity; as in the fable that the 
giants being overthrown in their war against the gods, 
the earth their mother in revenge thereof brought forth 
Fame : 

Illam terra parens, ira irritata Deorum, 

Extremam, ut perhibent, Coeo Enceladoque sororem 

Progenuit. 
Expounded that when princes and monarchs have sup- 
pressed actual and open rebels, then the malignity of 
people (which is the mother of rebellion) doth bring forth 
libels and slanders, and taxations of the states, which is 
of the same kind with rebellion, but more feminine. So 
in the fable that the rest of the gods having conspired 
to bind Jupiter, Pallas called Briareus with his hundred 
hands to his aid: expounded that monarchies need not 
fear any curbing of their absoluteness by mighty sub- 
jects, as long as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the 


104. OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [IV. 4. 


people, who will be sure to come in on their side. So in 
the fable that Achilles was brought up under Chiron the 
centaur, who was part a man and part a beast, expounded 
ingeniously but corruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth 
to the education and discipline of princes to know as 
well how to play the part of the lion in violence, and the 
fox in guile, as of the man in virtue and justice. Never- 
theless, in many the like encounters, I do rather think 
that the fable was first, and the exposition devised, than 
that the moral was first, and thereupon the fable framed. 
For I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that 
troubled himself with great contention to fasten the 
assertions of the Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient 
poets ; but yet that all the fables and fictions of the poets 
were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion. 
Surely of those poets which are now extant, even Homer 
himself (notwithstanding he was made a kind of scrip- 
ture by the later schools of the Grecians), yet I should 
without any difficulty pronounce that his fables had 
no such inwardness in his own meaning. But what 
they might have upon a more original tradition, is not 
easy to affirm; for he was not the inventor of many of 
them. 

5. In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can 
report no deficience. For being as a plant that cometh 
of the lust of the earth, without a formal seed, it hath 
sprung up and spread abroad more than any other kind. 
But to ascribe unto it that which is due, for the expressing 
of affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we are 
beholding to poets more than to the philosophers’ works; 
and for wit and eloquence, not much less than to orators’ 
harangues. But it is not good to stay too long in the 
theatre. Let us now pass on to the judicial place or palace 


Iv. 5.] THE SECOND BOOK. 105 


of the mind, which we are to approach and view with 
more reverence and attention. 

V. 1. The knowledge of man is as the waters, some 
descending from above, and some springing from be- 
neath; the one informed by the light of nature, the other 
inspired by divine revelation. The light of nature con- 
sisteth in the notions of the mind and the reports of the 
senses: for as for knowledge which man receiveth by 
teaching, it is cumulative and not original; as in a water 
that besides his own spring-head is fed with other springs 
and streams. So then, according to these two differing 
illuminations or originals, knowledge is first of all divided 
into divinity and philosophy. 

2. In philosophy, the contemplations of man do either 
penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to nature, or are 
reflected or reverted upon himself. Out of which several 
inquiries there do arise three knowledges; divine philo- 
sophy, natural philosophy, and human philosophy or 
humanity. For all things are marked and stamped with 
this triple character, of the power of God, the difference 
of nature, and the use of man. But because the distribu- 
tions and partitions of knowledge are not like several 
lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point; 
but are like branches of a tree, that meet in a stem, which 
hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and con- 
tinuance, before it come to discontinue and break itself 
into arms and boughs: therefore it is good, before we 
enter into the former distribution, to erect and constitute 
one universal science, by the name of phzlosophia prima, 
primitive or summary philosophy, as the main and com- 
mon way, before we come where the ways part and divide 
themselves; which science whether I should report as 
deficient or no, I stand doubtful. For I find a certain 


106 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [V. 2. 


rhapsody of natural theology, and of divers parts of logic; 
and of that part of natural philosophy which concerneth 
the principles, and of that other part of natural philo- 
sophy which concerneth the soul or spirit; all these 
strangely commixed and confused; but being examined, 
it seemeth to me rather a depredation of other sciences, 
advanced and exalted unto some height of terms, than 
anything solid or substantive of itself. Nevertheless I 
cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is current, 
that the same things are handled but in several respects. 
As for example, that logic considereth of many things as 
they are in notion, and this philosophy as they are in 
nature; the one in appearance, the other in existence ; 
but I find this difference better made than pursued. For 
if they had considered quantity, similitude, diversity, and 
the rest of those extern characters of things, as philo- 
sophers, and in nature, their inquiries must of force have 
been of a far other kind than they are. For doth any 
of them, in handling quantity, speak of the force of union, 
how and how far it multiplieth virtue? Doth any give 
the reason, why some things in nature are so common, 
and in so great mass, and others so rare, and in so small 
quantity? Doth any, in handling similitude and divers- 
ity, assign the cause why iron should not move to iron, 
which is more like, but move to the load-stone, which is 
less like? Why in all diversities of things there should 
be certain participles in nature, which are almost am- 
biguous to which kind they should be referred? But 
there is a mere and deep silence touching the nature and 
operation of those common adjuncts of things, as in 
nature: and only a resuming and repeating of the force 
and use of them in speech or argument. ‘Therefore, 
because in a writing of this nature I avoid all subtility, 


Vv. 2.] THE SECOND BOOK. 107 


— 


my meaning touching this original or universal philo- 
sophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by nega- 
tive: Lhat tt be a receptacle for all such profitable observ- 
ations and axioms as fall not within the compass of any 
of the special parts of philosophy or sciences, but are more 
common and of a higher stage. 
3. Now that there are many of that kind need not be 
doubted. For example: is not the rule, Si zn@gualibus 
@quala addas, omnia erunt inequalia, an axiom as well of 
justice as of the mathematics? and is there not a true 
coincidence between commutative and distributive justice, 
and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? Is not 
that other rule, Que im eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se 
conveniuni, a rule taken from the mathematics, but so 
potent in logic as all syllogisms are built upon it? Is 
not the observation, Omnia mutantur, nil intertt, a con- 
templation in philosophy thus, that the guan/um of nature 
is eternal? in natural theology thus, that it requireth the 
same omnipotency to make somewhat nothing, which at 
the first made nothing somewhat? according to the scrip- 
ture, Didict quod omnia opera, que fectt Deus, perseverent 
| in perpetuum ; non possumus ets quicquam addere nec au- 
| Jerre. Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely and | 
if largely discourseth concerning governments, that the way | 
to establish and preserve them, is to reduce them ad! 
| principia, a rule in religion and nature, as well as in civil | 
‘ administration? Was not the Persian magic a reduction | 
or correspondence of the principles and architectures of 
nature to the rules and policy of governments? Is not 
the precept of a musician, to fall from a discord or harsh 
accord upon a concord or sweet accord, alike true in 
affection? Is not the trope of music, to avoid or slide 
from the close or cadence, common with the trope of 


108 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [V. 3- 


rhetoric of deceiving expectation? Is not the delight of 
the quavering upon a stop in music the same with the 
playing of light upon the water? 
Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus, 

Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the 
organs of reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a 
cave or strait, determined and bounded? Neither are 
these only similitudes, as men of narrow observation may 
conceive them to be, but the same footsteps of nature, 
treading or printing upon several subjects or matters. 
This science therefore (as I understand it) I may justly 
report as deficient: for I see sometimes the profounder 
sort of wits, in handling some particular 
argument, will now and then draw a bucket 
of water out of this well for their present 
use: but the spring-head thereof seemeth to 
me not to have been visited; being of so 
excellent use both for the disclosing of nature and the 
abridgement of art. 

VI. 1. This science being therefore first placed as a 
common parent like unto Berecynthia, which had so 
much heavenly issue, omnes celicolas, omnes supera alta 
fenenles ; we may return to the former distribution of the 
three philosophies, divine, natural, and human. And as 
, concerning divine philosophy or natural theology, it is 
that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning 
God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of 
his creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed 
divine in respect of the object, and natural in respect of 
the light. The bounds of this knowledge are, that it 
sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion: 
and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God 
to convert an atheist, because the light of nature might 


Philosophia 
prima, sive 
de fontibus 
scientiarum. 


VI. 1.] THE SECOND BOOK. 109 


have led him to confess a God: but miracles have been 

wrought to convert idolaters and the superstitious, be- 

cause no light of nature extendeth to declare the will and 

f true worship of God. For as all works do show forth~ 

f the power and skill of the workman, and not his image, | 

| so it is of the works of God, which do show the omni- | 

potency and wisdom of the maker, but not his image. | 

And therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from 

the sacred truth; for they supposed the world to be the, 

image of God, and man to be an extract or compendious 

image of the world; but the scriptures never vouchsafe 

to attribute to the world that honour, as to be the image 

of God, but only she work of his hands ; neither do they 

| speak of any other image of God, but man. Wherefore 

ie by the contemplation of nature to induce and enforce >) 

the acknowledgement of God, and to demonstrate his | 
power, providence, and goodness, is an excellent argu- | 
ment, and hath been excellently handled by divers. But | | 
on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature, or 
ground of human knowledges, to induce any verity or 4 
persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judge- 
ment not safe: Da fider que fidet sunt, For the heathen 

i themselves conclude as much in that excellent and divine 

fable of the golden chain: Zhat men and gods were not? 

f able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but contrariwtse 

4 Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven. So as we 

} ought not to attempt to draw down or to submit the 

? mysteries of God to our reason; but contrariwise to raise 

® and advance our reason to the divine truth. So as in 

. 


ep this part of knowledge, touching divine philosophy, I am 
so far from noting any deficience, as I rather note an 
excess: whereunto I have digressed because of the ex? 
treme prejudice which both religion and philosophy bah | 


j 


110 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VI.1. 


received and may receive by being commixed together; 
as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, 
and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy. 

2. Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, 
which is an appendix of theology, both divine and natural, 
and is neither inscrutable nor interdicted. For although 
the scripture saith, Let no man deceive you in sublime dts- 
course touching the worship of angels, pressing into that he 
knoweth not, &c., yet notwithstanding if you observe well 
that precept, it may appear thereby that there be two 
things only forbidden, adoration of them, and opinion 
fantastical of them, either to extol them further than 
appertaineth to the degree of a creature, or to extol a 
man’s knowledge of them further than he hath ground. 
But the sober and grounded inquiry, which may arise out 
of the passages of holy scriptures, or out of the grada- 
tions of nature, is not restrained. So of degenerate and 
revolted spirits, the conversing with them or the employ- 
ment of them is prohibited, much more any veneration 
towards them; but the contemplation or science of their 
nature, their power, their illusions, either by scripture or 
reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom. For so the apostle 
saith, We are not ignorant of his stratagems. And it is no 
more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits, than to 
inquire the force of poisons in nature, or the nature of 
sin and vice in morality. But this part touching angels 
and spirits I cannot note as deficient, for many have 
occupied themselves in it; I may rather challenge it, in 
many of the writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastical. 

VII. 1. Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural 
‘theology (not divinity or inspired theology, which we re- 
serve for the last of all as the haven and sabbath of all 
man’s contemplations) we will now proceed to natural 


VII. 1.] THE SECOND BOOK. III 


philosophy. If then it be true that Democritus said, 
thal the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and 
caves ; and ir it be true likewise that the alchemists do so 
much inculcate, that Vulcan is a second nature, and im- 
itateth that dexteruusly and compendiously which nature 
worketh by ambages and length of time; it were good to 
divide natural philosophy into the mine and the furnace, 
and to make two professions or occupations of natural 
philosophers, some to be pioneers and some smiths ; 
some to dig, and some to refine and hammer. And surely 
I do best allow of a division of that kind, though in more 


familiar and scholastical terms; namely, that these be the ~ 


two parts of natural philosophy, the inquisition of causes, 
and the production of effects ; speculative, and operative ; 


natural science, and natural prudence. For as in civil _ 


matters there is a wisdom of discourse, and a wisdom of 
direction; so is it in natural. And here I will make a 
request, that for the latter (or at least for a part thereof) 
I may revive and reintegrate the misapplied and abused 
name of natural magic; which in the true sense is but 
natural wisdom, or natural prudence; taken according to 
the ancient acception, purged from vanity and super- 
stition. Now although it be true, and I know it well, 
that there is an intercourse between causes and effects, 
‘so as both these knowledges, speculative and operative, 
have a great connexion between themselves; yet because 
all true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double 
scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent, ascending 
from experiments to the invention of causes, and de- 
scending from causes to the invention of new experi- 
ments; therefore I judge it most requisite that these two 
parts be severally considered and handled. 

2. Natural science or theory is divided into physic and 


—— ad 


112. OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VII. 2. 


metaphysic: wherein I desire it may be conceived that I 
use the word metaphysic in a differing sense from that 
that is received. And in like manner, I doubt not but 
it will easily appear to men of judgement, that in this 
and other particulars, wheresoever my conception and 
notion may differ from the ancient, yet I am studious to 
keep the ancient terms. For hoping well to deliver 
myself from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous 
expressing of that I do propound; I am _ otherwise 
- zealous and affectionate to recede as little from antiquity, 
either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth and 
the proficience of knowledge. And herein I cannot a 
little marvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed 
in such a spirit of difference and contradiction towards 
all antiquity: undertaking not only to frame new words 
of science at pleasure, but to confound and extinguish all 
ancient wisdom : insomuch as he never nameth or men- 
tioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to confute and 
reprove ; wherein for glory, and drawing followers and 
disciples, he took the right course. For certainly there 
cometh to pass, and hath place in human truth, that 
which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth: 
Vent tn nomine patris, nec recipitis me; st quis venertt in 
nomine suo eum recipietts. But in this divine aphorism 
(considering to whom it was applied, namely to anti- 
christ, the highest deceiver) we may discern well that 
the coming in a man’s own name, without regard of 
antiquity or paternity, is no good sign of truth, although 
it be joined with the fortune and success of an eum 
recipies. But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will 
think of him that he learned that humour of his scholar, 
with whom it seemeth he did emulate; the one to con- 
quer all opinions, as the other to conquer all nations. 


saet, ~” 


2 Oc coe es a oe 
me + eee 


VII. 2.] THE SECOND BOOK. 113 


Wherein nevertheless, it may be, he may at some men’s 
hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as 
his scholar did: 


Felix terrarum predo, non utile mundo 
Editus exemplum, &c, 


So, 
Felix doctrine predo, 

But to me on the other side that do desire as much as 
lieth in my pen to ground a sociable intercourse between 
antiquity and proficience, it seemeth best to keep way 
with antiquity wsgue ad aras ; and therefore to retain the 
ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and 
definitions, according to the moderate proceeding in civil 
government; where although there be some alteration, 
yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, eadem ma- 
gistratuum vocabula, 

3- To return therefore to the use and acception of the 
term metaphysic, as I do now understand the word; it 
appeareth, by that which hath been already said, that | 
intend philosophia prima, summary philosophy and meta- 
physic, which heretofore have been confounded as one, 
to be two distinct things. For the one I have made as 
a parent or common ancestor to all knowledge; and the 
other I have now brought in as a branch or descendant 
of natural science. It appeareth likewise that I have 
assigned to summary philosophy the common principles 
and axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to 
several sciences: I have assigned unto it likewise the 
inquiry touching the operation of the relative and ad- 
ventive characters of essences, as quantity, similitude, 
diversity, possibility, and the rest: with this distinction 
and provision ; that they be handled as they have efficacy 
in nature, and not logically. It appeareth likewise that 

I 


114. OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ vil. 3. 


natural theology, which heretofore hath been handled 
confusedly with metaphysic, I have inclosed and bounded 
by itself. It is therefore now a question what is left 
remaining for metaphysic; wherein I may without pre- 
judice preserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity, 
that physic should contemplate that which is inherent in 
matter, and therefore transitory; and metaphysic that 
which is abstracted and fixed. And again, that physic 
should handle that which supposeth in nature only a 
being and moving; and metaphysic should handle that 
which supposeth further in nature a reason, understand- 
ing, and platform. But the difference, perspicuously ex- 
pressed, is most familiar and sensible. For as we divided 
natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of causes, 
and productions of effects: so that part which concerneth 
the inquiry of causes we do subdivide according to the 
received and sound division of causes. The one part, 
which is physic, inquireth and handleth the material and 
efficient causes; and the other, which is metaphysic, 
handleth the formal and final causes. 

4. Physic (taking it according to the derivation, and 
not according to our idiom for medicine) is situate in a 
middle term or distance between natural history and 
metaphysic. For natural history describeth the variety 
of things; physic the causes, but variable or respective 
causes; and metaphysic the fixed and constant causes. 

Limus ut hic durescit, et heec ut cera liquescit, 

Uno eodemque igni, 
Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay ; 
fire is the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax. 
But fire is no constant cause either of induration or colli- 
quation: so then the physical causes are but the efficient 
and the matter. Physic hath three parts, whereof two 


RS tg re ee 


VI. 4. ] THE SECOND BOOK. 115 


respect nature united or collected, the third contemplateth 
nature diffused or distributed. Nature is collected either 
into one entire total, or else into the same principles or 
seeds. So as the first doctrine is touching the contexture 
or configuration of things, as de mundo, de universitale 
rerum. The second is the doctrine concerning the prin- 
ciples or originals of things. The third is the doctrine 
concerning all variety and particularity of things; whether 
it be of the differing substances, or their differing qualities 
and natures ; whereof there needeth no enumeration, this 
part being but as a gloss or paraphrase that attendeth 
upon the text of natural history. Of these three I 
cannot report any as deficient. In what truth or per- 
fection they are handled, I make not now any judge- 
ment; but they are parts of knowledge not deserted by 
the labour of man. LD Aby 

5. For metaphysic, we have assigned unto it the in- 
quiry of formal and final causes; which assignation, as 
to the former of them, may seem to be nugatory, and 
void, because of the received and inveterate opinion, 
that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out 
essential forms or true differences: of which opinion we 
will take this hold, that the invention of forms is of all 


other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought, if it 


be possible to be found. As for the possibility, they are 


19 & 


ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can / 


see nothing but sea. But it is manifest that Plato, in his 
opinion of ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation 
situate as upon a cliff, did descry shat forms were the 
true object of knowledge; but lost the real fruit of his 
opinion, by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted 
from matter, and not confined and determined by matter ; 
and so turning his opinion upon theology, wherewith all 
12 


116 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VIL 5. 


his natural philosophy is infected. But if any man shall 
keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon action, 
operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and 
take notice what are the forms, the disclosures whereof 
are fruitful and important to the state of man. For as 
to the forms of substances (man only except, of whom it 
is said, Lormavit hominem de limo terre, et sptravit in 
faciem ejus spiraculum vite, and not as of all other crea- 
tures, Producant aque, producat terra), the forms of sub- 
stances I say (as they are now by compounding and 
transplanting multiplied) are so perplexed, as they are not 
to be inquired; no more than it were either possible or 
to purpose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds 
which make words, which by composition and _trans- 
position of letters are infinite. But on the other side 
to inquire the form of those sounds or voices which make 
simple letters is easily comprehensible; and being known 
“induceth and manifesteth the forms of all words, which 
consist and are compounded of them. In the same man- 
ner to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, 
of water, of air, is a vain pursuit: but to inquire the forms 
of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, 
of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of 
cold, and all other natures and qualities, which, like an 
alphabet, are not many, and of which the essences (up- 
held by matter) of all creatures do consist; to inquire, I 
say, the true forms of these, is that part of metaphysic 
which we now define of. Not but that physic doth make 
inquiry and take consideration of the same natures: but 
how? Only as to the material and efficient causes of 
them, and not as to the forms. For example, if the 
cause of whiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and it 
be rendered thus, that the subtile intermixture of air and 


Sn ae ae 


at 


i —_ aey 


Vil. 5. ] _ THE SECOND BOOK. 117 


water is the cause, it is well rendered; but nevertheless 
is this the form of whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, 
which is ever but vehiculum forme. This 
part of metaphysic I do not find laboured Dsjaphyeen 
and performed: whereat I marvel not: be- “" oe, 
cause I hold it not possible to be invented 
by that course of invention which hath been 
used ; in regard that men (which is the root of all error) 
have made too untimely a departure and too remote a 
recess from particulars. 

6. But the use of this part of metaphysic, which I re- 
port as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two 
respects: the one, because it is the duty and virtue of all 


mis et fini- 
bus rerum. 


knowledge to abridge the infinity of individual experience, | 


as much as the conception of truth will permit, and to 
remedy the complaint of vifa drevis, ars longa; which is 
performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of 


sciences. For knowledges are as pyramides, whereof | 
history is the basis. So of natural philosophy, the basis is - 


natural history; the stage next the basis is physic; the 
stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. As for the 
vertical point, opus guod operatur Deus a principio usque ad 
jinem, the summary law of nature, we know not whether 


man’s inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be the — 


true stages of knowledge, and are to them that are de- 
praved no better than the giants’ hills : 


Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam, 
Scilicet, atque Osse frondosum involvere Olympum. 


But to those which refer all things to the glory of God, 
they are as the three acclamations, Sancée, sancte, sancte/ 
holy in the description or dilatation of his works; holy 
in the connexion or concatenation of them; and holy in 


118 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VII. 6. 


the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. And 
therefore the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and 
Plato, although but a speculation in them, that all things 
by scale did ascend to unity. So then always that know- 
ledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity, 
which appeareth to be metaphysic; as that which con- 
sidereth the simple forms or differences of things, which 
are few in number, and the degrees and co-ordinations 
whereof make all this variety. The second respect, which 
valueth and commendeth this part of metaphysic, is that 
it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest 
liberty and possibility of works and effects. For physic 
carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to 
many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary 
flexuous courses of nature. But late undique sunt saptenti- 
us vie: to sapience (which was anciently defined to be 
rerum divinarum et humanarum sctentia) there is ever 
choice of means. For physical causes give light to new 
invention in szmlz materia. But whosoever knoweth any 
form, knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing that 
nature upon any variety of matter; and so is less re- 
strained in operation, either to the basis of the matter, 
or the condition of the efficient ; which kind of knowledge 
Salomon likewise, though in a more divine sense, elegantly 
describeth ; om arctabuntur gressus tui, et currens non 
habebrs offendiculum. The ways of sapience are not much 
liable either to particularity or chance. 

7. The second part of metaphysic is the inquiry of 
final causes, which Iam moved to report not as omitted 
but as misplaced. And yet if it were but a fault in order, 
I would not speak of it: for order is matter of illustration, 
but pertaineth not to the substance of sciences. But this 
misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great 


vil. 7.] THE SECOND BOOK. 119 


improficience in the sciences themselves. For the hand- | 


ling of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical in- 
quiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry 
of all real and physical causes, and given men the occa- 
sion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, 
to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery. 
For this I find done not only by Plato, who ever anchor- 
eth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others 
which do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discours- 
ing causes. For to say that “he hairs of the eye-lids are for 
a quicksel and fence about the sight ; ox that the firmness of 
the skins and hides of living creatures ts to defend them from 
the extremities of heat or cold ; or that the bones are for the 
columns or beams, whereupon the frames of the bodies of living 
creatures are built: or that the leaves of trees are for pro- 
tecting of the fruit; or that the clouds are for watering of 
the earth ; or that the solidness of the earth ts for the station 
and mansion of living creatures, and the like, is well in- 
quired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they 
are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but remoraes and 
hindrances to stay and slug the ship from further sailing ; 
and have brought this to pass, that the search of the 
physical causes hath been neglected and passed in silence. 
And therefore the natural philosophy of Democritus and 
some others, who did not suppose a mind or reason in 
the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof able 
to maintain itself to infinite essays or proofs of nature, 
which they term fortune, seemeth to me (as far as I can 
judge by the recital and fragments which remain unto us) 
in particularities of physical causes more real and better 
inquired than that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both 
intermingled final causes, the one as a part of theology, 
and the other as a part of logic, which were the favourite 


VX 


120 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [ VII. qe 


studies respectively of both those persons. Not because 
those final causes are not true, and worthy to be inquired, 
being kept within their own province; but because their 
excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a 
vastness and solitude in that tract. For otherwise, keep- 
ing their precincts and borders, men are extremely de- 
ceived if they think there is an enmity or repugnancy at 
all between them. For the cause rendered, that she hairs 
about the eye-lids are for the safeguard of the sight, doth 
not impugn the cause rendered, that prlostty 1s tnctdent to 
orifices of moisture; muscost fontes, &c. Nor the cause 
rendered, that she firmness of hides is for the armour of the 
body against extremities of heat or cold, doth not impugn 
the cause rendered, that contraction of pores is incident to 
the outwardest paris, in regard of their adjacence to foreign 
or unlike bodies: and so of the rest: both causes being 
true and compatible, the one declaring an intention, the 
other a consequence only. Neither doth this call in ques- 
tion, or derogate from divine providence, but highly con- 
firm and exalt it. For as in civil actions he is the greater 
and deeper politique, that can make other men the instru- 
ments of his will and ends, and yet never acquaint them 
with his purpose, so as they shall do it and yet not know 
what they do, than he that imparteth his meaning to those 
he employeth; so is the wisdom of God more admirable, 
when nature intendeth one thing, and providence draweth 
forth another, than if he had communicated to particular 
creatures and motions the characters and impressions of 
his providence. And thus much for metaphysic: the 
latter part whereof I allow as extant, but wish it confined 
to his proper place. 

VIII. 1. Nevertheless there remaineth yet another 
part of natural philosophy, which is commonly made a 


Rosie 


b : 

E 
Ab 
H 

( 


VIII. 1.] THE SECOND BOOK. 121 


principal part, and holdeth rank with physic special and 
metaphysic, which is mathematic; but I think it more 
agreeable to the nature of things, and to the light of order, 
to place it as a branch of metaphysic. For the subject of 
it being quantity, not quantity indefinite, which is but a 
relative, and belongeth to philosophia prima (as hath been 
said), but quantity determined or proportionable, it appear- 
eth to be one of the essential forms of things, as that that 
is causative in nature of a number of effects ; insomuch as 
we see in the schools both of Democritus and of Pytha- 
goras, that the one did ascribe figure to the first seeds of 
things, and the other did suppose numbers to be the 
principles and originals of things. And it is true also that 
of all other forms (as we understand forms) it is the most 
abstracted and separable from matter, and therefore most 
proper to metaphysic; which hath likewise been the cause 
why it hath been better laboured and inquired than any 
of the other forms, which are more immersed into matter. 
For it being the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme 
prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty 
of generalities, as in a champain region, and not in the 
inclosures of particularity, the mathematics of all other 
knowledge were the goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite. 
But for the placing of this science, it is not much ma- 
terial: only we have endeavoured in these our partitions 
to observe a kind of perspective, that one part may cast 
light upon another. 

2. The mathematics are either pure or mixed. To the 
pure mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle 
quantity determinate, merely severed from any axioms of 
natural philosophy; and these are two, geometry and 
arithmetic; the one handling quantity continued, and the 
other dissevered. Mixed hath for subject some axioms 


122 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. (VIII. 2. 


or parts of natural philosophy, and considereth quantity 
determined, as it is auxiliary and incident unto them. 
For many parts of nature can neither be invented with 
sufficient subtilty, nor demonstrated with sufficient per- 
spicuity, nor accommodated unto use with sufficient dex- 
terity, without the aid and intervening of the mathematics ; 
of which sort are perspective, music, astronomy, cosmo- 
graphy, architecture, enginery, and divers others. In the 
mathematics I can report no deficience, except it be that 
men do not sufficiently understand the excellent use of the 
pure mathematics, in that they do remedy and cure many 
defects in the wit and faculties intellectual. For if the 
wit be too dull, they sharpen it; if too wandering, they 
fix it; if too inherent in the sense, they abstract it. So 
that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of great 
use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to 
put itself into all postures; so in the mathematics, that 
use which is collateral and intervenient is no less worthy 
than that which is principal and intended. And as for the 
mixed mathematics, I may only make this prediction, 
that there cannot fail to be more kinds of them, as nature 
grows further disclosed. ‘Thus much of natural science, 
or the part of nature speculative. 

3. For natural prudence, or the part operative of na- 
tural philosophy, we will divide it into three parts, experi- 
mental, philosophical, and magical: which three parts 
active have a correspondence and analogy with the three 
parts speculative, natural history, physic, and metaphysic. 
For many operations have been invented, sometime by 
a casual incidence and occurrence, sometimes by a pur- 
posed experiment: and of those which have been found 
by an intentional experiment, some have been found out 
by varying or extending the same experiment, some by 


VIII. 3.] THE SECOND BOOK. 123 


transferring and compounding divers experiments the one 
into the other, which kind of invention an empiric may 
manage. Again by the knowledge of physical causes 
there cannot fail to follow many indications and designa- 
tions of new particulars, if men in their speculation will 
keep one eye upon use and practice. But these are but 
coastings along the shore premendo littus iniquum: for 
it seemeth to me there can hardly be discovered any 
radical or fundamental alterations and innovations in 
nature, either by the fortune and essays of experiments, 
or by the light and direction of physical causes. If 
therefore we have reported metaphysic defi- Mie 
cient, it must follow that we do the like of Magia sive 
natural magic, which hath relation thereunto. Physica 
For as for the natural magic whereof now Oferativa 
there is mention in books, containing certain 4% 
credulous and superstitious conceits and observations of 
sympathies and antipathies, and hidden proprieties, and 
some frivolous experiments, strange rather by disguise- 
ment than in themselves, it is as far differing in truth of 
nature from such a knowledge as we require, as the story 
of King Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of Bourdeaux, differs 
from Czsar’s Commentaries in truth of story. For it is 
manifest that Cesar did greater things de vero than those 
imaginary heroes were feigned to do. But he did them 
not in that fabulous manner. Of this kind of learning 
the fable of Ixion was a figure, who designed to enjoy 
Juno, the goddess of power; and instead of her had 
copulation with a cloud, of which mixture were begotten 


centaurs and chimeras. So whosoever shall entertain | 


high and vaporous imaginations, instead of a laborious 
and sober inquiry of truth, shall beget hopes and beliefs 


| 


| 


of strange and impossible shapes. And therefore we may | 


124 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ VIII. 3. 


note in these sciences which hold so much of imagination 
and belief, as this degenerate natural magic, alchemy, 
astrology, and the like, that in their propositions the de- 
scription of the means is ever more monstrous than the 
pretence or end. For it is a thing more probable, that 
he that knoweth well the natures of weight, of colour, of 
pliant and fragile in respect of the hammer, of volatile and 
fixed in respect of the fire, and the rest, may superinduce 
upon some metal the nature and form of gold by such 
mechanique as longeth to the production of the natures 
afore rehearsed, than that some grains of the medicine 
projected should in a few moments of time turn a sea 
of quicksilver or other material into gold. So it is more 
probable that he that knoweth the nature of arefaction, 
the nature of assimilation of nourishment to the thing 
nourished, the manner of increase and clearing of spirits, 
the manner of the depredations which spirits make upon 
the humours and solid parts, shall by ambages of diets, 
bathings, anointings, medicines, motions, and the like, 
prolong life, or restore some degree of youth or vivacity, 
than that it can be done with the use of a few drops or 
scruples of a liquor or receipt. To conclude therefore, 
the true natural magic, which is that great liberty and 
latitude of operation which dependeth upon the know- 
ledge of forms, I may report deficient, as the relative 
thereof is. ‘To which part, if we be serious and incline 
not to vanities and plausible discourse, besides the deriv- 
ing and deducing the operations themselves from meta- 
physic, there are pertinent two points of much purpose, 
Inventarium the one by way of preparation, the other by 
opum hum- way of caution. ‘The first is, that there be 
anarum. made a kalendar, resembling an inventory of 
the estate of man, containing all the inventions (being 


VIII. 3.] THE SECOND BOOK. 125 


the works or fruits of nature or art) which are now 
extant, and whereof man is already possessed; out of 
which doth naturally result a note, what things are yet 
held impossible, or not invented: which kalendar will 
be the more artificial and serviceable, if to every reputed 
impossibility you add what thing is extant which cometh 
the nearest in degree to that impossibility; to the end 
that by these optatives and potentials man’s inquiry may 
be the more awake in deducing direction of works from 
the speculation of causes. And secondly, that those ex- 
periments be not only esteemed which have an immediate 
and present use, but those principally which are of most 
universal consequence for invention of other experiments, 
and those which give most light to the invention of causes. 
For the invention of the mariner’s needle, which giveth 
the direction, is of no less benefit for navigation than the 
invention of the sails which give the motion. 

4. Thus have I passed through natural philosophy 
and the deficiences thereof; wherein if I have differed 
from the ancient and received doctrines, and thereby 
shall move contradiction, for my part, as I affect not 
to dissent, so I purpose not to contend. If it be 
truth, 

Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylve ; 


the voice of nature will consent, whether the voice of 
man do or no. And as Alexander Borgia was wont to 
say of the expedition of the French for Naples, that 
they came with chalk in their hands to mark up their 
lodgings, and not with weapons to fight; so I like better 
that entry of truth which cometh peaceably with chalk 
to mark up those minds which are capable to lodge 
and harbour it, than that which cometh with pugnacity 
and contention. 


126 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, {VIII 5. 


5. But there remaineth a division of natural philosophy 
according to the report of the inquiry, and nothing con- 
cerning the matter or subject: and that is positive and 


considerative; when the inquiry reporteth either an asser- - 


tion or a doubt. These doubts or mon liquets are of two 
sorts, particular and total. For the first, we see a good 
example thereof in Aristotle’s Problems, which deserved 
to have had a better continuance; but so nevertheless 
as there is one point whereof warning is to be given and 
taken. The registering of doubts hath two excellent 
uses: the one, that it saveth philosophy from errors and 
falsehoods; when that which is not fully appearing is not 
collected into assertion, whereby error might draw error, 
but reserved in doubt: the other, that the entry of doubts 
are as so many suckers or sponges to draw use of know- 
ledge; insomuch as that which, if doubts had not pre- 
ceded, a man should never have advised, but passed it 
over without note, by the suggestion and solicitation of 
doubts is made to be attended and applied. But both 
these commodities do scarcely countervail an inconveni- 
ence, which will intrude itself if it be not debarred; which 
is, that when a doubt is once received, men labour rather 
how to keep it a doubt still, than how to solve it; and 
accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see the familiar 
example in lawyers and scholars, both which, if they have 
once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after authorised for 
a doubt. But that use of wit and knowledge is to be 
allowed, which laboureth to make doubtful things certain, 
and not those which labour to make certain things doubt- 
ful. Therefore these kalendars of doubts I commend 
as excellent things; so that there be this caution used, 
that when they be throughly sifted and brought to resolu- 
tion, they be from thenceforth omitted, decarded, and not 


VIL. 5.] THE SECOND BOOK. 127 


continued to cherish and encourage men in doubting. 
To which kalendar of doubts or problems, I iy te) 
advise be annexed another kalendar, as much Praag 
or more material, which is a kalendar of 4.) in na- 
popular errors: I mean chiefly in natural wa. 
history, such as pass in speech and conceit, Catalogus 
and are nevertheless apparently detected and /4/#atum 
convicted of untruth; that man’s knowledge teases 
be not weakened nor imbased by such dross 
and vanity. As for the doubts or non liquets 
general or in total, I understand those differences of 
opinions touching the principles of nature, and the funda- 
mental points of the same, which have caused the diversity 
of sects, schools, and philosophies, as that of Empedocles, 
Pythagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, and the rest. For 
although Aristotle, as though he had been of the race of 
the Ottomans, thought he could not reign except the 
first thing he did he killed all his brethren; yet to those 
that seek truth and not magistrality, it cannot but seem 
a matter of great profit, to see before them the several 
opinions touching the foundations of nature. Not for any 
exact truth that can be expected in those theories ; for as 
the same phenomena in astronomy are satisfied by the 
received astronomy of the diurnal motion, and the proper 
motions of the planets, with their eccentrics and epicycles, 
and likewise by the theory of Copernicus, who supposed 
the earth to move, and the calculations are: indifferently 
agreeable to both, so the ordinary face and view of expe- 
rience is many times satisfied by several theories and 
philosophies; whereas to find the real truth requireth 
another manner of severity and attention. For as Aris- 
totle saith, that children at the first will call every wo- 
man mother, but afterward they come to distinguish 


in historia 
nature, 


128 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [VIII 5. 


according to truth; so experience, if it be in childhood, 
will call every philosophy mother, but when it cometh 
to ripeness it will discern the true mother. So as in 
the mean time it is good to see the several 
glosses and opinions upon nature, whereof 
it may be every one in some one point hath 
seen clearer than his fellows, therefore I wish some col- 
lection to be made painfully and understandingly de 
‘antiquts philosophiis, out of all the possible light which 
remaineth to us of them: which kind of work I find 
deficient. But here I must give warning, that it be done 
distinctly and severedly; the philosophies of every one 
throughout by themselves, and not by titles packed and 
faggoted up together, as hath been done by Plutarch. 
For it is the harmony of a philosophy in itself which 
giveth it light and credence; whereas if it be singled 
and broken, it will seem more foreign and dissonant. 
For as when I read in Tacitus the actions of Nero or 
Claudius, with circumstances of times, inducements, and 
occasions, I find them not so strange; but when I read 
them in Suetonius Tranquillus, gathered into titles and 
bundles and not in order of time, they seem more mon- 
strous and incredible: so is it of any philosophy reported 
entire, and dismembered by articles. Neither do I ex- 
clude opinions of latter times to be likewise represented 
in this kalendar of sects of philosophy, as that of Theo- 
phrastus Paracelsus, eloquently reduced into an harmony 
by the pen of Severinus the Dane; and that of Tilesius, 
and his scholar Donius, being as a pastoral philosophy, 
full of sense, but of no great depth; and that of Fracas- 
torius, who, though he pretended not to make any new 
philosophy, yet did use the absoluteness of his own sense 
upon the old; and that of Gilbertus our countryman, who 


De antiquis 
philosophiis, 


VUE. 5-] ‘THE SECOND BOOK. 129 


revived, with some alterations and demonstrations, the . 
opinions of Xenophanes; and any other worthy to be 
admitted. 

6. Thus have we now dealt with two of the three ‘ 
beams of man’s knowledge; that is radius directus, which 
is referred to nature, radius refractus, which is referred to 
God, and cannot report truly because of the inequality of 
the medium. There resteth radius reflexus, whereby man 
beholdeth and contemplateth himself. 

IX. 1. We come therefore now to that knowledge 
whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the 
knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more ac- 
curate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. 
This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural phi- 
losophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is 
but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of 
| nature. And generally let this beva rule, that all partitions 
of knowledges be accepted rather for lines and veins than 
| for sections and separations; and that the continuance 

and entireness of knowledge be preserved. For the 

contrary hereof hath made particular sciences to become 

barren, shallow, and erroneous, while they have not been 
‘ nourished and maintained from the common fountain. 
{ So we see Cicero the orator complained of Socrates and _ 
A his school, that he was the first that separated philosophy 
iM and rhetoric; whereupon rhetoric became an empty and 
verbal art. So we may see that the opinion of Copernicus 
touching the rotation of the earth, which astronomy itself 
cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the 
phainomena, yet natural philosophy may correct. So we 
see also that the science of medicine if it be destituted 
and forsaken by natural philosophy, it is not much better 
than an empirical practice. With this reservation therefore 

K 


130 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [1x. I. 


we proceed to human philosophy or humanity, which 
hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate or 
distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as 
human philosophy is either simple and particular, or con- 
jugate and civil. Humanity particular consisteth of the 
same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of know- 
ledges which respect the body, and of knowledges that 
respect the mind. But before we distribute so far, it is 
good to constitute. For I do take the consideration in 
general, and at large, of human nature to be fit to be 
emancipate and made a knowledge by itself: not so much 
in regard of those delightful and elegant discourses which 
have been made of the dignity of man, of his miseries, of 
his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his common 
and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard of the know- 
ledge concerning the sympathies and concordances be- 
tween the mind and body, which being mixed cannot be 
_ properly assigned to the sciences of either. 

2. This knowledge hath two branches: for as all 
leagues and amities consist of mutual intelligence and 
mutual offices, so this league of mind and body hath 
these two parts; how the one discloseth the other, and 
how the one worketh upon the other; discovery and 
impression. ‘The former of these hath begotten two 
arts, both of prediction or prenotion; whereof the one 
is honoured with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other 
of Hippocrates. And although they have of later time 
been used to be coupled with superstitious and fantastical 
arts, yet being purged and restored to their true state, 
they have both of them a solid ground in nature, and a 
profitable use in life. The first is physiognomy, which 
discovereth the disposition of the mind by the lineaments 
of the body. The second is the exposition of natural 


cA Sey a 


IX. 2.] TIIE SECOND BOOK. 131 


dreams, which discovereth the state of the body by the 
imaginations of the mind. In the former of these I note 
a deficience. For Aristotle hath very ingeni- )_.. Physio- 
ously and diligently handled the factures of promia, 
the body, but not the gestures of the body, de gestu sive 
which are no less comprehensible by art, and 0 cor- 
of greater use and advantage. For the linea- ?°* 
ments of the body do disclose the disposition and inclina- 
tion of the mind in general; but the motions of the coun- 
tenance and parts do not only so, but do further disclose 
the present humour and state of the mind and will. For 
as your majesty saith most aptly and elegantly, As she 
tongue speaketh to the ear so the gesture speaketh to the eye. 
And therefore a number of subtile persons, whose eyes 
do dwell upon the faces and fashions of men, do well 
know the advantage of this observation, as being most 
part of their ability; neither can it be denied, but that 
it is a great discovery of dissimulations, and a great direc- 
tion in business. 

3. The latter branch, touching impression, hath not 
been collected into art, but hath been handled dispers- 
edly; and it hath the same relation or anitistrophe that 
the former hath. For the consideration is double: either, 
how and how far the humours and affects of the body do 
alter or work upon the mind; or again, how and how far 
the passions or apprehensions of the mind do alter or 
work upon the body. The former of these hath been 
inquired and considered as a part and appendix of medi- 
cine, but much more as a part of religion or superstition. 
For the physician prescribeth cures of the mind in phren- 
sies and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also to 
exhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind, to confirm the 
courage, to clarify the wits, to corroborate the memory, 

K 2 


137. OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [1x. ps 


and the like: but the scruples and superstitions of diet 
and other regiment of the body in the sect of the Pytha- 
goreans, in the heresy of the Manichees, and in the law 
of Mahomet, do exceed. So likewise the ordinances in 
the ceremonial law, interdicting the eating of the blood 
and the fat, distinguishing between beasts clean and 
unclean for meat, are many and strict. Nay the faith 
itself being clear and serene from all clouds of ceremony, 
yet retaineth the use of fastings, abstinences, and other 
macerations and humiliations of the body, as things real, 
and not figurative. The root and life of all which pre- 
scripts is (besides the ceremony) the consideration of that 
dependency which the affections of the mind are submit- 
ted unto upon the state and disposition of the body. And 
if any man of weak judgement do conceive that this suffer- 
ing of the mind from the body doth either question the 
immortality, or derogate from the sovereignty of the soul, 
he may be taught in easy instances, that the infant in the 
mother’s womb is compatible with the mother and yet 
separable; and the most absolute monarch is sometimes 
led by his servants and yet without subjection. As for 
the reciprocal knowledge, which is the operation of the 
conceits and passions of the mind upon the body, we see 
all wise physicians, in the prescriptions of their regiments 
to their patients, do ever consider accidentia anim? as of 
great force to further or hinder remedies of recoveries: 
and more specially it is an inquiry of great depth and 
worth concerning imagination, how and how far it altereth 
the body proper of the imaginant. For although it hath 
a manifest power to hurt, it followeth not it hath the same 
degree of power to help. No more than a man can con- 
clude, that because there be pestilent airs, able suddenly to 
kill a man in health, therefore there should be sovereign 


Pee ogre Sore 


IX. 3.] THE SECOND BOOK. 133 


airs, able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the 
inquisition of this part is of great use, though it needeth, 
as Socrates said, a Delian diver, being difficult and pro- 
found. But unto all this knowledge de communi vinculo, 
of the concordances between the mind and the body, 
that part of inquiry is most necessary, which considereth 
of the seats and domiciles which the several faculties of 
the mind do take and occupate in the organs of the body; 
which knowledge hath been attempted, and is contro- 
verted, and deserveth to be much better inquired. For 
the opinion of Plato, who placed the understanding in 
the brain, animosity (which he did unfitly call anger, 
having a greater mixture with pride) in the heart, and 
concupiscence or sensuality in the liver, deserveth not to 
be despised; but much less to be allowed. So then we 
have constituted (as in our own wish and advice) the 
inquiry touching human nature entire, as a just portion 
of knowledge to be handled apart. 

X. 1. The knowledge that concerneth man’s body is 
divided as the good of man’s body is divided, unto which 
it referreth. The good of man’s body is of four kinds, \ 
health, beauty, strength and pleasure: so the knowledges \ 
are medicine, or art of cure: art of decoration, which is 
called cosmetic; art of activity, which is called athletic ; 
and art voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth erudi/us 
luxus. This subject of man’s body is of all other things 
in nature most susceptible of remedy; but then that 
remedy is most susceptible of error. For the same sub- 
tility of the subject doth cause large possibility and easy 
failing; and therefore the inquiry ought to be the more 
exact. 

2. To speak therefore of medicine, and to resume 
that we have said, ascending a little higher: the ancient 


134 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [X. 2. 


/opinion that man was mizcrocosmus, an abstract or model 
of the world, hath been fantastically strained by Paracelsus 
and the alchemists, as if there were to be found in man’s 
body certain correspondences and parallels, which should 
have respect to all varieties of things, as stars, planets, 
minerals, which are extant in the great world. But thus 
much is evidently true, that of all substances which nature 
hath produced, man’s body is the most extremely com- 
pounded. For we see herbs and plants are nourished 
by earth and water; beasts for the most part by herbs 
and fruits; man by the flesh of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs, 
grains, fruits, water, and the manifold alterations, dress- 
ings and preparations of these several bodies, before they 
come to be his food and aliment. Add hereunto that 
beasts have a more simple order of life, and less change 
of affections to work upon their bodies; whereas man in 
his mansion, sleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite varia- 
tions: and it cannot be denied but that the body of man 
of all other things is of the most compounded mass. The 
soul on the other side is the simplest of substances, as is 
well expressed : 
Purumque reliquit 
‘Ethereum sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem. 

So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy 
no rest, if that principle be true, that Mofus rerum est 
rapidus extra locum, placidus in loco, But to the purpose: 
this variable composition of man’s body hath made it as 
an instrument easy to distemper ; and therefore the poets 
did well to conjoin music and medicine in Apollo, be- 
cause the office of medicine is but to tune this curious 
harp of man’s body and to reduce it to harmony. So 
then the subject being so variable, hath made the art 
by consequent more conjectural; and the art being 


t! 


eee 
MS acai ie 


ng 


2S ee 


af 


X, 2.] THE SECOND BOOK. 135 


conjectural hath made so much the more place to be left 
for imposture. For almost all other arts and sciences 
are judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may term them, 
and not by the successes and events. The lawyer is 
judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue 
of the cause. The master in the ship is judged by the 
directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the 
voyage. But the physician, and perhaps the politique, 
hath no particular acts demonstrative of his ability, but 
is judged most by the event; which is ever but as it is 
taken: for who can tell, if a patient die or recover, or if a 
state be preserved or ruined, whether it be art or accident? 
And therefore many times the impostor is prized, and 
the man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see [the] weakness 
and credulity of men is such, as they will often prefer a 
mountebank or witch before a learned physician. And\ 
therefore the poets were clear-sighted in discerning this 
extreme folly, when they made A’sculapius and Circe bro- / 
ther and sister, both children of the sun, as in the verses, 


Ipse repertorem medicinz talis et artis 
Fulmine Phoebigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas: 


And again, 
Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos, &c. 

For in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches 
and old women and impostors have had a competition 
with physicians. And what followeth? Even this, that 
physicians say to themselves, as Salomon expresseth it 
upon an higher occasion, J/ zt befal fo me as befalleth to 
the fools, why should I labour to be more wise P And there- 
fore I cannot much blame physicians, that they use 
commonly to intend some other art or practice, which 
they fancy, more than their profession. For you shall 
have of them antiquaries, poets, humanists, statesmen, 


136 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. |X. 2. 


merchants, divines, and in every of these better seen than 
in their profession; and no doubt upon this ground, that 
they find that mediocrity and excellency in their art 
maketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their 
fortune; for the weakness of patients, and sweetness 
of life, and nature of hope, maketh men depend upon 
physicians with all their defects. But nevertheless these 
things which we have spoken of are courses begotten 
between a little occasion, and a great deal of sloth and 
default; for if we will excite and awake our observation, 
we shall see in familiar instances what a predominant 
faculty the subtilty of spirit hath over the variety of 
matter or form. Nothing more variable than faces and 
countenances: yet men can bear in memory the infinite 
distinctions of them ; nay, a painter with a few shells of 
colours, and the benefit of his eye, and habit of his 
imagination, can imitate them all that ever have been, 
are, or may be, if they were brought before him. No- 
thing more variable than voices; yet men can likewise 
discern them personally: nay, you shall have a duffon 
or pantomimus, will express as many as he pleaseth. 
Nothing more variable than the differing sounds of words; 
yet men have found the way to reduce them tq a few 
simple letters. So that it is not the insufficiency or in- 
capacity of man’s mind, but it is the remote standing or 
placing thereof, that breedeth these mazes and incom- 
prehensions. For as the sense afar off is full of mistaking, 
but is exact at hand, so is it of the understanding: the 
remedy whereof is, not to quicken or strengthen the 
organ, but to go nearer to the object; and therefore there 
is no doubt but if the physicians will learn and use the 
true approaches and avenues of nature, they may assume 
as much as the poet saith: 


X. 20} THE SECOND BOOK. 137 


Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes ; 
Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt. 


Which that they should do, the nobleness of their art 
doth deserve ; well shadowed by the poets, in that they 
made Aisculapius to be the son of [the] sun, the one being 
the fountain of life, the other as the second stream: but 
infinitely more honoured by the example of our Saviour, 
who made the body of man the object of his miracles, as 
the soul was the object of his doctrine. For we read not 
that ever he vouchsafed to do any miracle about honour 
or money (except that one for giving tribute to Cesar), 
but only about the preserving, sustaining, and healing 
the body of man. 

3. Medicine is a science which hath been (as we have 
said) more professed than laboured, and yet more la- 
boured than advanced; the labour having been, in my 
judgement, rather in circle than in progression. For I 
find much iteration, but small addition. It considereth 
causes of diseases, with the occasions or impulsions ; the 
diseases themselves, with the accidents; and the cures, 
with the preservations. The deficiences which I think 
good to note, being a few of many, and those such as 
are of a more open and manifest nature, I will enumerate 
and not place. 

4. The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and 
serious diligence of Hippocrates, which used 
to set down a narrative of the special cases 
of his patients, and how they proceeded, and 
how they were judged by recovery or death. ‘Therefore 
having an example proper in the father of the art, I shall 
not need to allege an example foreign, of the wisdom 
of the lawyers, who are careful to report new cases and 
decisions, for the direction of future judgements. This 


Narrationes 
medicinales. 


138 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. |X. 4. 


continuance of medicinal history I find deficient; which 
I understand neither to be so infinite as to extend to 
every common case, nor so reserved as to admit 
none but wonders: for many things are new in the 
manner, which are not new in the kind; and if men 
will intend to observe, they shall find much worthy to 
observe. 

5. In the inquiry which is made by anatomy, I find 
much deficience: for they inquire of the 
parts, and their substances, figures, and col- 
locations ; but they inquire not of the diver- 
sities of the parts, the secrecies of the passages, and the 
seats or nestling of the humours, nor much of the foot- 
steps and impressions of diseases. ‘The reason of which 
omission I suppose to be, because the first inquiry may 
be satisfied in the view of one or a few anatomies: but 
the latter, being comparative and casual, must arise from 
the view of many. And as to the diversity of parts, there 
is no doubt but the facture or framing of the inward parts 
is as full of difference as the outward, and in that is the 
cause continent of many diseases; which not being ob- 
served, they quarrel many times with the humours, which 
are not in fault; the fault being in the very frame and 
mechanique of the part, which cannot be removed by 
medicine alterative, but must be accommodate and pal- 
liate by diets and medicines familiar. And for the pas- 
sages and pores, it is true which was anciently noted, 
that the more subtile of them appear not in anatomies, 
because they are shut and latent in dead bodies, though 
they be open and manifest in live: which being supposed, 
though the inhumanity of axatomia vivorum was by Celsus 
justly reproved, yet in regard of the great use of this 
observation, the inquiry needed not by him so slightly 


Anatomia 
comparata. 


X. 5.] THE SECOND BOOK. 139 


to have been relinquished altogether, or referred to the 
casual practices of surgery; but mought have been well 
diverted upon the dissection of beasts alive, which not- 
withstanding the dissimilitude of their parts may suffi- 
ciently satisfy this inquiry. And for the humours, they 
are commonly passed over in anatomies as purgaments ; 
whereas it is most necessary to observe, what cavities, 
nests, and receptacles the humours do find in the parts, 
with the differing kind of the humour so lodged and 
received. And as for the footsteps of diseases, and their 
devastations of the inward parts, impostumations, exul- 
cerations, discontinuations, putrefactions, consumptions, 
contractions, extensions, convulsions, dislocations, ob- 
structions, repletions, together with all preternatural sub- 
stances, as stones, carnosities, excrescences, worms and 
the like; they ought to have been exactly observed by 
multitude of anatomies, and the contribution of men’s 
several experiences, and carefully set down both histo- 
rically according to the appearances, and artificially with 
a reference to the diseases and symptoms which resulted 
from them, in case where the anatomy is of a defunct 
patient ; whereas now upon opening of bodies they are 
passed over slightly and in silence. 

6. In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the 
cures of many, some as in their nature in- Inquisitio 
curable, and others as passed the period of ulterior de 
cure; so that Sylla and the Triumvirs never morbis in- 
proscribed so many men to die, as they do by savabilibus. 
their ignorant edicts: whereof numbers do escape with 
less difficulty than they did in the Roman proscriptions. 
Therefore I will not doubt to note as a deficience, that 
they inquire not the perfect cures of many diseases, or 
extremities of diseases; but pronouncing them incurable 


140 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [X. 6. 


do enact a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from 
discredit. 

7. Nay further, I esteem it the office of a physician 
not only to restore health, but to mitigate pain and 
dolors; and not only when such mitigation may conduce 
to recovery, but when it may serve to make 
a fair and easy passage. For it is no small 
felicity which Augustus Czesar was wont to 
wish to himself, that same Lushanasta; and 
which was specially noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, 
whose death was after the fashion and semblance of a 
kindly and pleasant sleep. So it is written of Epicurus, 
that after his disease was judged desperate, he drowned 
his stomach and senses with a large draught and in- 
eurgitation of wine; whereupon the epigram was made, 
Hinc Stygias ebrius hausit aquas; he was not sober 
enough to taste any bitterness of the Stygian water. But 
the physicians contrariwise do make a kind of -scruple 
and religion to stay with the patient after the disease is 
deplored; whereas in my judgement they ought both to 
inquire the skill, and to give the attendances, for the facil- 
itating and assuaging of the pains and agonies of death. 

8. In the consideration of the cures of diseases, I find 

a deficience in the receipts of propriety, re- 


De Euthan- 
asia exteri- 
ore. 


ee specting the particular cures of diseases: for 
expert- aie ) 
eis the physicians have frustrated the fruit of 


tradition and experience by their magistral- 
ities, in adding and taking out and changing gud pro 
quo in their receipts, at their pleasures; commanding so 
over the medicine, as the medicine cannot command 
over the disease. For except it be treacle and mthri- 
datum, and of late diascordium, and a few more, they tie 
themselves to no receipts severely and religiously. For as 


a THE SECOND BOOK. 141 


to the confections of sale which are in the shops, they 
are for readiness and not for propriety. For they are 
upon general intentions of purging, opening, comforting, 
altering, and not much appropriate to particular diseases. 
And this is the cause why empirics and old women are 
more happy many times in their cures than learned phy- 
sicians, because they are more religious in holding their 
medicines. Therefore here is the deficience which I find, 
that physicians have not, partly out of their own practice, 
partly out of the constant probations reported in books, 
and partly out of the traditions of empirics, set down and 
delivered over certain experimental medicines for the cure 
of particular diseases, besides their own conjectural and 
magistral descriptions. For as they were the men of the 
best composition in the state of Rome, which either being 
consuls inclined to the people, or being tribunes inclined 
to the senate; so in the matter we now handle, they be 
the best physicians, which being learned incline to the 
traditions of experience, or being empirics incline to the 
methods of learning. 

g. In preparation of medicines I do find strange, 
specially considering how mineral medicines yj a4: 
have been extolled, and that they are safer nature in 
for the outward than inward parts, that no balneis, et 
man hath sought to make an imitation by art 77s medi 
of natural baths and medicinable fountains: °”""™ 
which nevertheless are confessed to receive their virtues 
from minerals: and not so only, but discerned and dis- 
tinguished from what particular mineral they receive tinc- 
ture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like: which nature, 
if it may be reduced to compositions of art, both the 
variety of them will be increased, and the temper of them 
will be more commanded, 


142 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [X.10. 


10. But lest I grow to be more particular than is agree- 
able either to my intention or to proportion, 


Filum me- : : 

dicinale, sive 1 will conclude this part with the note of one 
de vicibus deficience more, which seemeth to me of 
medicina- greatest consequence ; which is, that the pre- 
rum, 


scripts in use are too compendious to attain 
their end: for, to my understanding, it is a vain and flat- 
tering opinion to think any medicine can be so sovereign 
or so happy, as that the receipt or use of it can work any 
great effect upon the body of man. It were a strange 
speech which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a 
man from a vice to which he were by nature subject. It 
is order, pursuit, sequence, and interchange of applica- 
tion, which is mighty in nature; which although it re- 
quire more exact knowledge in prescribing, and more 
precise obedience in observing, yet is recompensed with 
the magnitude of effects. And although a man would 
think, by the daily visitations of the physicians, that there 
were a pursuance in the cure: yet let a man look into 
their prescripts and ministrations, and he shall find them 
but inconstancies and every day’s devices, without any 
settled providence or project. Not that every scrupulous 
or superstitious prescript is effectual, no more than every 
straight way is the way to heaven; but the truth of the 
direction must precede severity of observance. - 

11. For cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effemin- 
ate: for cleanness of body was ever esteemed to pro- 
ceed from a due reverence to God, to society, and to 
ourselves. As for artificial decoration, it is well worthy 
of the deficiences which it hath; being neither fine 
enough to deceive, nor handsome to use, nor wholesome 
to please. | 


12. For athletic, I take the subject of it largely, that 


X. 12.] THE SECOND BOOK. 143 


is to say, for any point of ability whereunto the body of 
man may be brought, whether it be of activity, or of 
patience ; whereof activity hath two parts, strength and 
swiftness ; and patience likewise hath two parts, hardness 
against wants and extremities, and endurance of pain or 
torment; whereof we see the practices in tumblers, in 
savages, and in those that suffer punishment. Nay, if 
there be any other faculty which falls not within any of 
the former divisions, as in those that dive, that obtain a 
strange power of containing respiration, and the like, I 
refer it to this part. Of these things the practices are 
known, but the philosophy which concerneth’ them is not 
much inquired; the rather, I think, because they are sup- 
posed to be obtained, either by an aptness of nature, 
which cannot be taught, or only by continual custom, 
which is soon prescribed: which though it be not true, 
yet I forbear to note any deficiences: for the Olympian 
games are down long since, and the mediocrity of these 
things is for use; as for the excellency of them it serveth 
for the most part but for mercenary ostentation. 

13. For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in . 
them is of laws to repress them. For as it hath been 
well observed, that the arts which flourish in times while 
virtue is in growth, are military; and while virtue is in 
state, are liberal; and while virtue is in declination, are 
voluptuary: so I doubt that this age of the world is some- 
what upon the descent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary 
I couple practices joculary; for the deceiving of the 
senses is one of the pleasures of the senses. As for 
games of recreation, I hold them to belong to civil life 
and education. And thus much of that particular human 
philosophy which concerns = body, which is but the 
tabernacle of the mind. 


144. OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XI. 1. 


XI. 1. For human knowledge which concerns the 
mind, it hath two parts ; the one that inquireth of the 
substance or nature of the soul or mind, the other that 
inquireth of the faculties or functions thereof. Unto the 
first of these, the considerations of the original of the 
soul, whether it be native or adventive, and how far it 
is exempted from laws of matter, and of the immortality 
thereof, and many other points, do appertain: which 
have been not more laboriously inquired than variously 
reported ; so as the travail therein taken seemeth to have 
been rather in a maze than ina way. But although I am 
/ of opinion that this knowledge may be more really and 
soundly inquired, even in nature, than it hath been; yet 
I hold that in the end it must be bounded by religion, or 
else it will be subject to deceit and delusion. For as the 
substance of the soul in the creation was not extracted 
out of the mass of heaven and earth by the benediction 
of a producat, but was immediately inspired from God, so 
it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by 
accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which 
are the subject of philosophy; and therefore the true 
knowledge of the nature and state of the soul must come 
by the same inspiration that gave the substance. Unto 
this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two 
appendices; which, as they have been handled, have 
rather vapoured forth fables than kindled truth; divin- 
ation and fascination. 

2. Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided 
into artificial and natural; whereof artificial is, when the 
mind maketh a prediction by argument, concluding upon 
signs and tokens; natural is, when the mind hath a pre- 
sention by an internal power, without the inducement 
of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts; either when the 


XI. 2.] THE SECOND BOOK. 145 


argument is coupled with a derivation of causes, which is 
rational; or when it is only grounded upon a coincidence 
of the effect, which is experimental: whereof the latter 
for the most part is superstitious; such as were the hea- 
then observations upon the inspection of sacrifices, the 
flights of birds, the swarming of bees; and such as was 
the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For artificial divin- 
ation, the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst 
particular knowledges. The astronomer hath his predic- 
tions, as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like. 
The physician hath his predictions, of death, of recovery, 
of the accidents and issues of diseases. ‘The politique 
hath his predictions; O urbem venalem, et ctto perituram, 
st emplorem tnvenerit / which stayed not long to be per- 
formed, in Sylla first, and after in Cesar. So as these 
predictions are now impertinent, and to be referred over. 
But the divination which springeth from the internal 
nature of the soul, is that which we now speak of; which 
hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive and by 
influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposition, 
that the mind, when it is withdrawn and collected into 
itself, and not diffused into the organs of the body, hath 
some extent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore 
appeareth most in sleep, in ecstasies, and near death, and 
more rarely in waking apprehensions; and is induced and 
furthered by those abstinences and observances which 
make the mind most to consist in itself. By influxion, is 
grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or 
glass, should take illumination from the foreknowledge of 
God and spirits: unto which the same regiment doth like- 
wise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within itself 
is the state which is most susceptible of divine influxions ; 
save that it is accompanied in this case with a fervency 
L 


146 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [XI.2. 


and elevation (which the ancients noted by fury), and not 
with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other. 

3. Fascination is the power and act of imagination 
intensive upon other bodies than the body of the imagin- 
ant, for of that we spake in the proper place. Wherein 
the school of Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended 
natural magic have been so intemperate, as they have 
exalted the power of the imagination to be much one 
with the power of miracle-working faith. Others, that 
draw nearer to probability, calling to their view the secret 
passages of things, and specially of the contagion that 
passeth from body to body, do conceive it should like- 
wise be agreeable to nature, that there should be some 
transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit without 
the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have 
grown (now almost made civil) of the mastering spirit, 
and the force of confidence and the like. Incident unto 
this is the inquiry how to raise and fortify the imagin- 
ation: for if the imagination fortified have power, then 
it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it. And 
herein comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation 
of a great part of ceremonial magic. For it may be 
pretended that ceremonies, characters, and charms do 
work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil 
spirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him 
that useth it; as images are said by the Roman church 
to fix the cogitations and raise the devotions of them that 
pray before them. But for mine own judgement, if it 
be admitted that imagination hath power, and that cere- 
monies fortify imagination, and that they be used sin- 
cerely and intentionally for that purpose; yet I should 
hold them unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which 
God gave unto man, Jn sudore vullus comedes panem tuum. 


XI. 3.] THE SECOND BOOK. 147 


a For they propound those noble effects, which God hath 

¢ set forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, to 
: be attained by a few easy and slothful observances. De- 
ficiences in these knowledges I will report none, other 
than the general deficience, that it is not known how 
much of them is verity, and how much vanity. 

XII. 1. The knowledge which respecteth the faculties 
of the mind of man is of two kinds; the one respecting 
his understanding and reason, and the other his will, 
appetite, “uf g ection; whereof the former produceth 
position or tecreé, the Jatter_action or execution. It is 


true that the imagination is an agent or munczus, in both <n | 


provinces, both the judicial and the ministerial. For ~ 
sense sendeth over to imagination before reason have \, 
judged: and reason sendeth over to imagination before cs 


the decree can be acted. For imagination ever precedeth / 
voluntary motion. Saving that this Janus of imagination “~ 
hath differing faces: for the face towards reason hath the 
print of truth, but the face towards action hath the print 
of good; which nevertheless are faces, 

Quales decet esse sororum. 
Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; / 
but is invested with, or at least wise usurpeth no small) 
authority in itself, besides the duty of the message. For} 
it was well said by Aristotle, hat the mind hath over the 
body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bond-| 
man, but that reason hath over the imagination that com- 
‘ mandment which a magistrate hath over a free citizen ; who 
a may come also to rule in his turn. For we see that, in 
matters of faith and religion, we raise our imagination 
above our reason; which is the cause why religion sought 
ever access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, 
visions, dreams. And again, in all persuasions that are 

L2 


148 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [XIl.1. 


wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like 
nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance 
of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from 
the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any 
science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagin- 
ation, I see no cause to alter the former division. For 
as for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of imagination, 
than a work or duty thereof. And if it be a work, we 
speak not now of such parts of learning as the imagin- 
ation produceth, but of such sciences as handle and con- 
sider of the imagination. No more than we shal! speak 
now of such knowledges as reason produceth (for that 
 extendeth to all philosophy), but of such knowledges as 
do handle and inquire of the faculty of reason: so as 
poesy had his true place. As for the power of the 
imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the 
same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine De Anima, 
whereunto most fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for imagin- 
ative or insinuative reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, 
we think it best to refer it to the arts of reason. So there- 
fore we content ourselves with the former division, that 
y human philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the 
~ mind of man, hath two parts, rational and moral. 

2. The part of human philosophy which is rational, is 
of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, 
and seemeth but a net of subtility and spinosity. For as 
it was truly said, that knowledge is padulum animi; so in 
the nature of men’s appetite to this food, most men are 
of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, 
that would fain have returned ad ollas carnium, and were 
weary of manna; which, though it were celestial, yet 
seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So generally men 
taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, 


XII. 2.] THE SECOND BOOK. 149 


civil history, morality, policy, about the which men’s affec- 
tions, praises, fortunes do turn and are conversant. But 
this same /umen siccum doth parch and offend most men’s 
watery and soft natures. But to speak truly of things as 
they are in worth, rational knowledges are the keys of 
all other arts: for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, 
That the hand ts the instrument of instruments, and the mind 
ts the form of forms ; so these be truly said to be the art 
of arts. Neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm 
and strengthen: even as the habit of shooting doth not 
only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw 
a stronger bow. : 

3. The arts intellectual are four in number; divided 
according to the ends whereunto they are referred: for 
man’s labour is to invent that which is sought or pro- 
pounded; or to judge that which is invented; or to 
retain that which is judged; or to deliver over that 
which is retained. So as the arts must be four: art | 
of inquiry or invention: art of examination or judge- | 
ment: art of custody or memory: and art of elocution 
or tradition. 

XIII. 1. Invention is of two kinds much differing: the 
one of arts and sciences, and the other of speech and Y 
arguments. The former of these I do report deficient; \/ 
which seemeth to me to be such a deficience as if, in the 
making of an inventory touching the state of a defunct, it 
should be set down that there is no ready money. For 

| as money will fetch all other commodities, so this know- 
i ledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like 
., as the West Indies had never been discovered if the use 
R of the mariner’s needle had not been first discovered, 
; though the one be vast regions, and the other a small 
motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no |\ 


150 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [XIII.1. 


further discovered, if the art itself of invention and dis- 
covery hath been passed over. 

2. That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my 
judgement standeth plainly confessed; for first, logic 
doth not pretend to invent sciences, or the axioms of 
sciences, but passeth it over with a cuzgue in sua arte 
credendum. And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely, speak- 
ing of the empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, 
Lhat medicines and cures were first found out, and then after 
the reasons and causes were discoursed ; and not the causes 
jirst found out, and by light from them the medicines and 
cures discovered. And Plato in his Theaetetus noteth well, 
Lhat particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give 
no sufficient direction: and that the pith of all sciences, which 
maketh the arisman differ from the inexpert, ts in the middle 
propositions, which in every particular knowledge are taken 
Jrom tradition and experience. And therefore we see, that 
they which discourse of the inventions and originals of 
things refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather 
to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men. 

Dictamnum genetrix Creteza carpit ab Ida, 
Puberibus caulem foliis et flore comantem 
Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris 
Gramina, cum tergo volucres hesere sagitte, 
So that it was no marvel (the manner of antiquity being 
to consecrate inventors) that the Egyptians had so few 
human idols in their temples, but almost all brute: 
Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis, 
Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c. 
And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and 
ascribe the first inventions to men, yet you will rather 
believe that Prometheus first stroke the flints, and mar- 
velled at the spark, than that when he first stroke the 


XIII. 2.] THE SECOND BOOK. 151 


flints he expected the spark: and therefore we see the 
West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the 
European, because of the rareness with them of flint, 
that gave the first occasion. So as it should seem, that 
hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat for sur- 
gery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some 
part of physic, or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery, 
or generally to chance or anything else than to logic for 
the invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form 
of invention which Virgil describeth much other: 


Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes 
Paulatim. 


For if you observe the words well, it is no other method 
than that which brute beasts are capable of, and do put 
in ure; which is a perpetual intending or practising some 
one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute necessity 
of conservation of being. For so Cicero saith very truly, 
Usus uni ret deditus et naturam et artem se@pe vincit. And 
therefore if it be said of men, 


Labor omnia vincit 
Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas, 


it is likewise said of beasts, Quzs pstétaco docutt suum 
xaipe? Who taught the raven in a drowth to throw 
pebbles into an hollow tree, where she spied water, that 
the water might rise so as she might come to it? Who 
taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea of air, and 
to find the way from a field in flower a great way off to 
her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of 
corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it should take root 
and grow? Add then the word extundere, which im- 
porteth the extreme difficulty, and the word paulatim, 
which importeth the extreme slowness, and we are where 


152 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XIII. 2. 


we were, even amongst the Egyptians’ gods; there being 
little left to the faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty 
of art, for matter of invention. 
/ 3. Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak 
of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the 
principles of sciences may be pretended to be invented, 
and so the middle propositions by derivation from the 
principles; their form of induction, I say, is utterly 
vicious and incompetent: wherein their error is the 
fouler, because it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt 
nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, abused, and 
traduced nature. For he that shall attentively observe 
how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of know- 
ledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of, Aére? 
mellis celestia dona, distilling and contriving it out of 
particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the 
field and garden, shall find that the mind of herself by 
nature doth manage and act an induction much better 
than they describe it. For to conclude upon an enumer- 
ation of particulars, without instance contradictory, is 
no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can assure 
(in many subjects) upon those particulars which appear 
of a side, that there are not other on the contrary side 
which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested 
upon those sons of Issay which were brought before 
him, and failed of David which was in the field. And 
this form (to say truth) is so gross, as it had not been 
possible for wits so subtile as have managed these things 
y to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to 
“their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and 
scornful toward particulars; which their manner was to 
use but as Zzcfores and via/ores, for sergeants and whifflers, 
ad summovendam /urbam, to make way and make room for 


XIII, 3.| THE SECOND BOOK. 153 


their opinions, rather than in their true use and service. 
Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious 
wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are the 
very same in divine and human truth: for as in divine 
truth man cannot endure to become as a child; so in 
human, they reputed the attending the inductions (whereof 
we speak) as if it were a second infancy or childhood. 

4. Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly 
induced, yet nevertheless certain it is that middle propos- \ 
itions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature 
by syllogism, that is, by touch and reduction of them to 
principles in a middle term. It is true that in sciences 
popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity 
(because it pleaseth God to apply himself to the capacity of 
“ the simplest), that form may have use; and in natural phi- 
losophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, 
Que assensum parit, operts effeta est: but the subtilty of 


be ee Ts aa 


\% ‘A 


nature and operations will not be enchained in those bonds. 
For arguments consist of propositions, and propositions of 
words, and words are but the current tokens or marks y 


of popular notions of things; which notions, if they be 
grossly and variably collected out of particulars, it is not 
the laborious examination either of consequences or argu- 
ments, or of the truth of propositions, that can ever cor- 
rect that error, being (as the physicians speak) in the first 
4 digestion. And therefore it was not without cause, that so 
» many excellent philosophers became Sceptics and Aca- 
demics, and denied any certainty of knowledge or com- 
prehension; and held opinion that the knowledge of man 
extended only to appearances and probabilities. It is true 
that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony, 
Sctentiam dissimulando simulavit: for he used to disable 
his knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge: like 


os fe STAR he ig tines een ge a MeN 


154 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XIII. 4. 


the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would 
reign, but would not acknowledge so much. And in the 
later Academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also 
of acatalepsta (I doubt) was not held sincerely: for that 
all those which excelled in copie of speech seem to have 
chosen that sect, as that which was fittest to give glory to 
their eloquence and variable discourses ; being rather like 
progresses of pleasure, than journeys to an end. But 
assuredly many scattered in both Academies did hold it 
in subtilty and integrity. But here was their chief error ; 
they charged the deceit upon the senses; which in my 
judgement (notwithstanding all their cavillations) are very 
sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always 
immediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument, 
and by producing and urging such things as are too 
subtile for the sense to some effect comprehensible by 
the sense, and other like assistance. But they ought to 
have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intel- 
lectual powers, and upon the manner of collecting and 
concluding upon the reports of the senses. This I speak, 
not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek 
help: for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, 
can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of 
hand, which may be easily done by help of a ruler or 
compass. . 

5. This part of invention, concerning the invention of 
Experientia sciences, | purpose (if God give me leave) 
literata, and hereafter to propound, having digested it into 
interpretatio two parts; whereof the one I term exferten- 
soaakeole tia iterata, and the other ¢n/erpretatio nature: 
the former being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. 
But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a 
promise. 


XIII. 6.] _ THE SECOND BOOK. 155 


6. The invention of speech or argument is not properly 
an invention: for to invent is to discover that we know 
not, and not to recover or resummon that which we 
already know: and the use of this invention is no other 
but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already 
possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may 
be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our con- 
sideration. So as to speak truly, it is no invention, but a 
remembrance or suggestion, with an application; which 
is the cause why the schools do place it after judgement, 
as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because 
we do account it a chase as well of deer in an inclosed 
park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already 
obtained the name, let it be called invention: so as it 
be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of 
this invention is readiness and present use of our know- 
ledge, and not addition or amplification thereof. 

4. To procure this ready use of knowledge there are 
two courses, preparation and suggestion. ‘The former of 
these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting 
rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. And 
herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the 
Sophists near his time, saying, Zhey did as tf one that 
professed the art of shoe-making should not teach how to 
make up a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of 
shoes of all fashions and sizes. But yet a man might reply, 
that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, 
but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly 
customed, But our Saviour, speaking of divine know- 
ledge, saith, Zhat the kingdom of heaven ts like a good house- 
holder, that bringeth forth both new and old store: and we 
see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, 
that pleaders should have the places, whereof they have 


(156 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XIII.7. 


most continual use, ready handled in all the variety that 
may be; as that, to speak for the literal interpretation of 
the law against equity, and contrary; and to speak fer 
presumptions and inferences against testimony, and con- 
trary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great 
experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man 
shall have occasion to speak of (if he will take the pains), 
he may have it in effect premeditate and handled zm 
thest. So that when he cometh to a particular he shall 
have nothing to do, but to put to names, and times, and 
places, and such other circumstances of individuals. We 
see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes; who, 
in regard of the great force that the entrance and access 
into causes hath to make a good impression, had ready 
framed a number of prefaces for orations and speeches. 
All which authorities and precedents may overweigh 
Aristotle’s opinion, that would have us change a rich 
wardrobe for a pair of shears, 

8. But the nature of the collection of this provision or 
preparatory store, though it be common both to logic and. 
rhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here, where it 
came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the 
further handling of it to rhetoric. 

g. The other part of invention, which I term sugges- 
tion, doth assign and direct us to certain marks, or places, 
which may excite our mind to return and produce such 
knowledge as it hath formerly collected, to the end we 
may make use thereof. Neither is this use (truly taken) 
only to furnish argument to dispute probably with others, 
but likewise to minister unto our judgement to conclude 
aright within ourselves. Neither may these places serve 
only to apprompt our invention, but also to direct our 
inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is half a 


XIII. 9.] THE SECOND BOOK. 157 


knowledge. For as Plato saith, Whosoever seeketh, knoweth 
that which he seeketh for in a general notion: else how shall 
he know it when he hath found it? And therefore the larger 
your anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is 
your search. But the same places which will help us 
what to produce of that which we know already, will also 
help us, if a man of experience were before us, what ques- 
tions to ask; or, if we have books and authors to instruct 
us, what points to search and revolve; so as I cannot 
report that this part of invention, which is that which the 
schools call topics, is deficient. 

10. Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and 
special. The general we have spoken to; but the par- 
ticular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally 
as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour which ae 
hath reigned too much in the schools (which is, to be | 
vainly subtile in a few things which are within their com- | 
mand, and to reject the rest), I do receive particular 
topics, that is, places or directions of invention and | 
inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of great | 
use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences. _ 
For in these it holdeth, ars znventendt adolesctt cum inventis ; 
for as in going of a way, we do not only gain that part of 
the way which is passed, but we gain the better sight of 
that part of the way which remaineth: so every degree of 
proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which fol- 
loweth; which light if we strengthen by drawing it forth 
into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance 
our pursuit. 

XIV. 1. Now we pass unto the arts of judgement, 
which handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations; 
which as to induction hath a coincidence with invention. 
For in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the 


158 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. |XIV.1. 


same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth; all 
one as in the sense. But otherwise it is in proof by syl- 
logism ; for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, 
the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judge- 
ment of the consequence is another; the one exciting 
only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and 
exact form of judgement, we refer ourselves to that which 
we have spoken of interpretation of nature. 

2. For the other judgement by syllogism, as it is a 
thing most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been 
vehemently and excellently laboured. For the nature of 
man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his under- 
standing fixed and unmoveable, and as a rest and support 
of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to 
prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent ; 
and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas 
(that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling) to 
be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon 
the conversion is accomplished: so assuredly men have a 
desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within to keep them 
from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of 
falling. Therefore men did hasten to set down some 
principles about which the variety of their disputations 
might turn. 

3. So then this art of judgement is but the reduction of 
propositions to principles in a middle term. The prin- 
ciples to be agreed by all and exempted from argument ; 
the middle term to be elected at the liberty of every man’s 
invention ; the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and 
inverted; the one when the proposition is reduced to 
the principle, which they term a probation ostensive ; the 
other, when the contradictory of the proposition is re- 
duced to the contradictory of the principle, which is 


XIV, 3.] THE SECOND BOOK. 159 


that which they call per incommodum, or pressing an ab- 
surdity; the number of middle terms to be as the pro- 
position standeth degrees more or less removed from 
the principle. 

4. But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, 
the one by way of direction, the other by way of caution; 
the former frameth and setteth down a true form of con- 
sequence, by the variations and deflections from which 
errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged. To- 
ward the composition and structure of which form, it is 
incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propos- 
itions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple 
words. And this is that part of logic which is compre- 
hended in the Analytics. 

5. The second method of doctrine was introduced for 
expedite use and assurance sake; discovering the more 
subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their 
redargutions, which is that which is termed elenches. For 
although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth 
(as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in juggling 
feats, which, though we know not how they are done, 
yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be; yet the 
more subtile sort of them doth not only put a man besides 
his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgement. 

6. This part concerning elenches is excellently handled 
by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in 
example; not only in the persons of the Sophists, but even 
in Socrates himself, who, professing to affirm nothing, 
but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath 
exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallace, and 
redargution. And although we have said that the use of 
this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the de- 
generate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, 


160 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XIV.6. 


which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of 
very great advantage: though the difference be good 
which was made between orators and sophisters, that the 
one is as the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the 
race, and the other as the hare, which hath her advantage in 
the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker creature. 

7. But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a more 
ample latitude and extent than is perceived; namely, unto 
divers parts of knowledge; whereof some are laboured 
and other omitted. For first, I conceive (though it may 
seem at first somewhat strange) that that part which is 
variably referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to meta- 
physic, touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but 
an elenche. For the great sophism of all sophisms being 
equivocation or ambiguity of words and phrase, specially 
of such words as are most general and intervene in every 
inquiry, it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use 
(leaving vain subtilities and speculations) of the inquiry of 
majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, 
possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and the 
like, are but wise cautions against ambiguities of speech. 
So again the distribution of things into certain tribes, 
which we call categories or predicaments, are but cau- 
tions against the confusion of definitions and divisions. 

8. Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by 
the strength of the impression, and not by the subtilty 
of the illaqueation; not so much perplexing the reason, 
as overruling it by power of the imagination. But this 
part I think more proper to handle when I shall speak 
of rhetoric. 

g. But lastly, there is yet a much more important and 
profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I 
find not observed or inquired at all, and think good to 


XIV. 9.] THE SECOND BOOK. 161 


place here, as that which of all others’ appertaineth most 
to rectify judgement: the force whereof is such, as it 
doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some par- 
ticulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and 
corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of man is far, 
from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the 
beams of things should reflect according to their true | 
incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full 
of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and | 
reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false ap- | 
pearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature 
of the mind, beholding them in an example or two; as 
first, in that instance which is the root of all superstition, 
namely, that to the nature of the mind of all men it is 
consonant for the affirmative or active to affect more than 
the negative or privative. So that a few times hitting or 
presence, countervails oft-times failing or absence; as was 
well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him in 
Neptune’s temple the great number of pictures of such as 
had scaped shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Nep- 
tune, saying, Advzse now, you that think it folly to invocate 
Nepiune in tempest. Fea, but (saith Diagoras) where are 
they painted that are drowned? Let us behold it in another 
instance, namely, that the spirit of man, being of an equal ) 
and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in | 
nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth, | 
Hence it cometh, that the mathematicians cannot satisfy 
themselves except they reduce the motions of the celestial 
bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labour- 
ing to be discharged of eccentrics. Hence it cometh, that 
whereas there are many things in nature, as it were 
monodica, sut juris ; yet the cogitations of man do feign 
unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas no 
M 


162 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. | XIV.9. 


such thing is; as they have feigned an element of fire, to 
keep square with earth, water, and air, and the like. Nay, 
it is not credible, till it be opened, what a number of 
fictions and fantasies the similitude of human actions and 
arts, together with the making of man communis mensura, 
have brought into natural philosophy; not much better 
than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the 
cells of gross and solitary monks, and the opinion .of Epi- 
curus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who sup- 
posed the gods to be of human shape. And therefore 
Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked, why 
God should have adorned the heavens with stars, as if he 
had been an edits, one that should have set forth some 
magnificent shows or plays. For if that great work- 
master had been of an human disposition, he would have 
cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and 
orders, like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one 
can scarce find a posture in square, or triangle, or straight 
line, amongst such an infinite number; so differing an 
harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit 
of nature. 

ro. Let us consider again the false appearances im- 
posed upon us by every man’s own individual nature 
and custom, in that feigned supposition that Plato maketh 
of the cave: for certainly if a child were continued in a 
grot or cave under the earth until maturity of age, and © 
came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd 
imaginations. So in like manner, although our persons 
live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are included in 
the caves of our own complexions and customs, which 
minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions, if 
they be not recalled to examination. But hereof we 
have given many examples in one of the errors, or 


Lees > Li ge RRA lg, Soman ake OR no a sinetemmene 
SP nan tna Oe ae Ee = as - 


NRE a, “ 


XIV. to | THE SECOND BOOK. 163 


peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first 
book. | 
11. And lastly, let us consider the false appearances 
that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed 
and applied according to the conceit and capacities of 
the vulgar sort: and although we think we govern our 
words, and prescribe it well loguendum ut vulgus sentt- 
endum ut sapientes; yet certain it is that words, as a 
Tartar’s bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of 
the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judge- 
ment. So as it is almost necessary, in all controversies and 
disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, 
in setting down in the very beginning the definitions 
of our words and terms, that others may know how 
we accept and understand them, and whether they con- 
cur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want 
of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to 
have begun, which is, in questions and differences about 
words. To conclude therefore, it must be confessed that’ 
it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies \ 
and false appearances, because they are inseparable from 
our nature and condition of life; so yet nevertheless the 
caution of them (for all elenches, as was said, Elenchi 
are but cautions) doth extremely import the magni, sive, 
true conduct of human judgement. The de idolis ani- 
particular edenches or cautions against these mi bumani 
three false appearances, I find altogether “vs ¢ 
deficient. adventitiis. 
12. There remaineth one part of judgement of great 
excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly 
touched, as I may report that also deficient; which is the 
application of the differing kinds of proofs to the differing 
kinds of subjects. For there being but four kinds of 
M 2 


164 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XIV. 12- 


demonstrations, that is, by the immediate consent of the 
mind or sense, by induction, by syllogism, and by con- 
gruity, which is that which Aristotle calleth demonstration 
in orb or circle, and not @ notiortbus, every of these hath 
certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which re- 
spectively they have chiefest use; and certain others, 
from which respectively they ought to be excluded; and 
the rigour and. curiosity in requiring the more severe 
proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in con- 
tenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, 

hath been amongst the greatest causes of 


D ; : 
d ied detriment and hindrance to knowledge. The 
an. distributions and assignations of demonstra- 


tions, according to the analogy of sciences, 
I note as deficient. 

XV. 1. The custody or retaining of knowledge is either 
in writing or memory; whereof writing hath two parts, 
the nature of the character, and the order of the entry. 
For the art of characters, or other visible notes of words 
or things, it hath nearest conjugation with grammar; and 
therefore I refer it to the due place. For the disposition 
and collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in 
writing, it consisteth in a good digest of common-places ; 
wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to 
the use of common-place books, as causing a retardation 
of reading, and some sloth or relaxation of memory. 
But because it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges 
to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and 
full, I hold the entry of common-places to be a matter of 
great use and essence in studying, as that which assur- 
eth copie of invention, and contracteth judgement to a 
strength. But this is true, that of the methods of common- 
places that I have seen, there is none of any sufficient 


Xv. 1.] THE SECOND BOOK. 165 


worth: all of them carrying merely the face of a school, | 
and not of a world; and referring to vulgar matters and | 
pedantical divisions, without all life or respect to action. / 

2. For the other principal part of the custody of know- 
ledge, which is memory, I find that faculty in my judge- , - 
ment weakly inquired of. An art there is extant of it; 
but it seemeth to me that there are better precepts than 
that art, and better practices of that art than those re- 
ceived. It is certain the art (as it is) may be raised to 
points of ostentation prodigious: but in use (as it is now 
managed) it is barren, not burdensome, nor dangerous to 
natural memory, as is imagined, but barren, that is, not 
dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business \~ 
and occasions. And therefore I make no more estima- 
tion of repeating a great number of names or words 
upon once hearing, or the pouring forth of a number of 
verses or rhymes ex fempore, or the making of a satirical 
simile of everything, or the turning of everything to a 
jest, or the falsifying or contradicting of everything by 
cavil, or the like (whereof in the faculties of the mind 
there is great copie, and such as by device and practice 
may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder), than 
I do of the tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, baladines ; 
the one being the same in the mind that the other is in 
the body, matters of strangeness without worthiness. 

3. This art of memory is but built upon two intentions ; 
the one prenotion, the other emblem. Prenotion dis- 
chargeth the indefinite seeking of that we would re- 
member, and directeth us to seek in a narrow compass, | 
that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place of \ 
memory. Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual toimages / 
sensible, which strike the memory more; out of which / 
axioms may be drawn much better practique than that 


166 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XV.3. 


in use; and besides which axioms, there are divers moe 
touching help of memory, not inferior to them. But I did 
in the beginning distinguish, not to report those things 
deficient, which are but only ill managed. 

XVI. 1. There remaineth the fourth kind of rational 
knowledge, which is transitive, concerning the expressing 
or transferring our knowledge to others; which I will 
term by the general name of tradition or delivery. Tra- 
dition hath three parts; the first concerning the organ of 
tradition ; the second concerning the method of tradition ; 
and the third concerning the illustration of tradition. 

2. For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or 
writing: for Aristotle saith well, Words are the images of 
cogttations, and letters are the images of words. But yet 
it is not of necessity that cogitations be expressed by 
the medium of words. For whatsoever is capable of 
sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense, 
is in nature competent to express cogitations. And there- 
fore we see in the commerce of barbarous people, that 
understand not one another’s language, and in the prac- 
tice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that men’s minds 
are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to 
serve the turn. And we understand further, that it is 
the use of China, and the kingdoms of the High Levant, 
to write in characters real, which express neither letters 
nor words in gross, but things or notions; insomuch as 
countries and provinces, which understand not one an- 
other’s language, can nevertheless read one another’s 
writings, because the characters are accepted more gener- 
ally than the languages do extend; and therefore they 
have a vast multitude of characters, as many (I suppose) 
as radical words. 

3. These notes of cogitations are of two sorts ; the one 


naa 


wa ahi SRST eat 
FE Dace BPR aciipeamt see Te : 


XVI.3.] | —-~‘THE SECOND BOOK. 167 


when the note hath some similitude or congruity with the 
notion: the other ad placttum, having force only by con- 
tract or acceptation. Of the former sort are hieroglyphics 
and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics (things of ancient 
use, and embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the 
most ancient nations), they are but as continued impreses 
and emblems. And as for gestures, they are as transitory 
hieroglyphics, and are to hieroglyphics as words spoken 
are to words written, in that they abide not; but they 
have evermore, as well as the other, an affinity with the 
things signified. As Periander, being consulted with how 
to preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger 
attend and report what he saw him do; and went into 
his garden and topped all the highest flowers: signifying, 
that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping low of the 
nobility and grandees. Ad plact/um, are the characters 
real before mentioned, and words: although some have 
been willing by curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, 
to have derived imposition of names from reason and 
intendment; a speculation elegant, and, by reason it 
searcheth into antiquity, reverent; but sparingly mixed 
with truth, and of small fruit. This _por- 
tion of knowledge, touching the notes of 
things, and cogitations in general, I find not 
inquired, but deficient. And although it may seem of no 
great use, considering that words and writings by letters 
do far excel all the other ways ; yet because this part con- 
cerneth as it were the mint of knowledge (for words are 
the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as moneys 
are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that 
moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver), 
I thought good to propound it to better inquiry. 

4. Concerning speech and words, the consideration of 


De notis 


rerum, 


168 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XVI.4. 


them hath produced the science of grammar. For man 
still striveth to reintegrate himself in those benedictions, 
from which by his fault he hath been deprived; and as 
he hath striven against the first general curse by the in- 
vention of all other arts, so hath he sought to come forth 
of the second general curse (which was the confusion of 
tongues) by the art of grammar; whereof the use in a 
mother tongue is small, in a foreign tongue more; but 
most in such foreign tongues as have ceased to be vulgar 
tongues, and are turned only to learned tongues. ‘The 
duty of it is of two natures : the one popular, which is for 
the speedy and perfect attaining languages, as well for 
intercourse of speech as for understanding of authors; 
the other philosophical, examining the power and nature 
of words, as they are the footsteps and prints of reason: 
which kind of analogy between words and reason is 
handled sparsem, brokenly though not entirely; and there- 
fore I cannot report it deficient, though I think it very 
worthy to be reduced into a science by itself. 

5. Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the 
consideration of the accidents of words; which are mea- 
sure, sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness 
and harshness of them ; whence hath issued some curious 
observations in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider 
it, in respect of the verse and not of the argument. 
Wherein though men in learned tongues do tie themselves 
to the ancient measures, yet in modern languages it 
seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses 
as of dances: for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse 
is a measured speech. In these things the sense is better 
judge than the art; 


Coenz fercula nostre 
Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis, 


XVI. 5.] THE SECOND BOOK. 169 


And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and 
an unfit subject, it is well said, Quod ‘empore antiquum 
videlur, td incongruttale est maxime novum., 

6. For ciphers, they are commonly in letters, or alpha- 
bets, but may be in words. The kinds of ciphers (besides 
the simple ciphers, with changes, and intermixtures of 
nulls and non-significants) are many, according to the 
nature or rule of the infolding, wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, 
doubles, &c. But the virtues of them, whereby they are 
to be preferred, are three; that they be not laborious to 
write and read; that they be impossible to decipher; 
and, in some cases, that they be without suspicion. The 
highest degree whereof is to write omnia per omnia ; which 
is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion quintuple at 
most of the writing infolding to the writing infolded, and 
no other restraint whatsoever. This art of ciphering hath 
for relative an art of deciphering, by supposition unpro- 
fitable, but, as things are, of great use. For suppose that 
ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of them 
which exclude the decipherer. But in regard of the raw- 
ness and unskilfulness of the hands through which they 
pass, the greatest matters are many times carried in the 
weakest ciphers. 

». In the enumeration of these private and retired arts, 
it may be thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of 
sciences, naming them for show and ostentation, and to 
little other purpose. But let those which are skilful in 
them judge whether I bring them in only for appearance, 
or whether in that which I speak of them (though in few 
words) there be not some seed of proficience. And this 
must be remembered, that as there be many of great 
account in their countries and provinces, which, when they 
come up to the seat of the estate, are but of mean rank 


170 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XvI. 7° 


and scarcely regarded ; so these arts, being here placed 
with the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty 
things; yet to such as have chosen them to spend their 
labours and studies in them, they seem great matters. 

XVII. 1. For the method of tradition, I see it hath 
moved a controversy in our time. But as in civil busi- 
ness, if there be a meeting, and men fall at words, there 
is commonly an end of the matter for that time, and no 
proceeding at all; so in learning, where there is much 
controversy, there is many times little inquiry. For this 
part of knowledge of method seemeth to me so weakly 
inquired as I shall report it deficient. 

2. Method hath been placed and that not ‘amiss, in 
logic, as a part of judgement. For as the doctrine of 
syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of judgement upon 
that which is invented, so the doctrine of method con- 
taineth the rules of judgement upon that which is to be 
delivered ; for judgement precedeth delivery, as it follow- 
eth invention. Neither is the method or the nature of 
the tradition material only to the use of knowledge, but 
likewise to the progression of knowledge: for since the 
labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of 
knowledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that which in- 
spireth the felicity of continuance and proceeding. And 
therefore the most real diversity of method is of method 
referred to use, and method referred to progression: 
whereof the one may be termed magistral, and the other 
of probation. 

3. The latter whereof seemeth to be véa deserta et tnter- 
 clusa. For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a 
kind of contract of error between the deliverer and the 
receiver. For he that delivereth knowledge, desireth to 
deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not 


gar 


cidade 


2 ta gene nea crap ac 


sv ereinneae 


XVII. 3.] THE SECOND BOOK. 171 


as may be best examined; and he that receiveth know- 
ledge, desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant 
inquiry; and so rather not to doubt, than not to err: 
glory making the author not to lay open his weakness, 
and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength. a 

4. But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be 
spun on, ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were 
possible, in the same method wherein it was invented: and 
so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same 
anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth 
how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. 
But yet nevertheless, secundum majus ef minus, a man may 
revisit and descend unto the foundations of his know- 
ledge and consent; and so transplant it into another, as 
it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it 
is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter 
for the roots ; but if you mean to remove it to grow, then 
it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so the 
delivery of knowledges (as it is now used) is as of fair 
bodies of trees without the roots; good for the carpenter, 
but not for the planter. But if you will have sciences 
grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so 
you look well to the taking up of the roots. p¢ merhodo 
Of which kind of delivery the method of the © sincera, sive 
mathematics, in that subject, hath some 4d filios 
shadow: but generally I see it neither put ‘“" ‘¢7"™. 
in ure nor put in inquisition, and therefore note it for 
deficient. 

5. Another diversity of method there is, which hath 
some affinity with the former, used in some cases by 
the discretion of the ancients, but disgraced since by 
the impostures of many vain persons, who have made it 
as a false light for their counterfeit merchandises; and 


172. OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING [ XVII. 5. 


that is, enigmatical and disclosed. The pretence whereof 
is, to remove the vulgar capacities from being admitted 
to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve them to 
selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can pierce 
the veil. 

6. Another diversity of method, whereof the conse- 
quence is great, is the delivery of knowledge in aphor- 
isms, or in methods; wherein we may observe that it 
hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few 
axioms or observations upon any subject, to make a 
solemn and formal art, filling it with some discourses, 
and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into | 
a sensible method. But the writing in aphorisms hath 
many excellent virtues, whereto the writing in method 
doth not approach. 

7. For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial 
or solid: for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, 
cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; 
for discourse of illustration is cut off; recitals of exam- 
ples are cut off; discourse of connexion and order is 
cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off. So there 
remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good 
quantity of observation: and therefore no man can suffice, 
nor in reason will attempt, to write aphorisms, but he that 
is sound and grounded. But in methods, 


Tantum series juncturaque pollet, 
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris, 


as a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it 
were disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods 
are more fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to 
point to action; for they carry a kind of demonstration 
in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and there- 
fore satisfy. But particulars being dispersed do best 


XVII. 7.] THE SECOND BOOK. 173 


agree with dispersed directions. And lastly, aphorisms, 
representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to in- 
quire further; whereas methods, carrying the show of 
a total, do secure men, as if they were at furthest. 

8. Another diversity of method, which is likewise of 
great weight, is the handling of knowledge by assertions 
and their proofs, or by questions and their deter- 
minations. The latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately 
followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning, 
as it is to the proceeding of an army to go about to 
besiege every little fort or hold. For if the field be kept, 
and the sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller 
things will come in of themselves: indeed a man would 
not leave some important piece enemy at his back. In 
like manner, the use of confutation in the delivery of 
sciences ought to be very sparing; and to serve to re- 
move strong preoccupations and prejudgements, and not 
to minister and excite disputations and doubts. 

g. Another diversity of methods is, according to the 
subject or matter which is handled. For there is a great 
difference in delivery of the mathematics, which are the 
most abstracted of knowledges, and policy, which is the 
most immersed. And howsoever contention hath been 
moved, touching an uniformity of method in multiformity 
of matter, yet we see how that opinion, besides the weak- 
ness of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as 
that which taketh the way to reduce learning to cer- 
tain empty and barren generalities; being but the very 
husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced 
out and expulsed with the torture and press of the method. 
And therefore as I did allow well of particular topics for 
invention, so I do allow likewise of particular methods of 
tradition. 


174 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XVII. 10. 


to. Another diversity of judgement in the delivery and 
teaching of knowledge is, according unto the light and 
presuppositions of that which is delivered. For that know- 
ledge which is new, and foreign from opinions received, 
is to be delivered in another form than that that is agree- 
able and familiar ; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks 
to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he 
saith, Jf we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similt- 
tudes, &c. For those whose conceits are seated in popular 
opinions, need only but to prove or dispute; but those 
whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a 
double labour; the one to make themselves conceived, 
and the other to prove and demonstrate. So that it is 
of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and 
translations to express themselves. And therefore in the 
infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those con- 
ceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was 
full of parables and similitudes ; for else would men either 
have passed over without mark, or else rejected for para- 
doxes that which was offered, before they had understood 
or judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent 
parables and tropes are: for it is a rule, that whatsoever 
science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in 
aid of similitudes. 

11. There be also other diversities of methods vulgar 
and received: as that of resolution or analysis, of con- 
stitution or systasis, of concealment or cryptic &c., which 
I do allow well of, though I have stood upon those which 
De pruden- are least handled and observed. All which 
tia tradi- | have remembered to this purpose, because 
tonis. I would erect and constitute one general in- 
quiry (which seems to me deficient) touching the wisdom 
of tradition. 


XVIL.12.] THE SECOND BOOK. 175 


12. But unto this part of knowledge, concerning method, 
doth further belong not only the architecture of the whole 
frame of a work, but also the several beams and columns 
thereof; not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and 
figure. And therefore method considereth not only the 
disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the 
propositions: not as to their truth or matter, but as to 
their limitation and manner. For herein Ramus merited 
better a great deal in reviving the good rules of proposi- 
tions, KaOd\ov mparov, kata maytés &c., than he did in intro- 
ducing the canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is the 
condition of human things that, according to the ancient 
fables, ‘he most precious things have the most pernicious 
keepers) it was so, that the attempt of the one made him 
fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted 
that should design to make axioms convertible, if he 
make them not withal circular, and non-promovent, or 
incurring into themselves; but yet the intention was 
excellent. 

13. The other considerations of method, concerning 
propositions, are chiefly touching the utmost proposi- 
tions, which limit the dimensions of sciences: for every 
knowledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity 
(which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it 
solid), to have a longitude and a latitude; accounting 
the latitude towards other sciences, and the longitude 
towards action; that is, from the greatest generality to 
the most particular precept. The one giveth rule how 
far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the pro- 
vince of another, which is the rule they call Ka@auré; the 
other giveth rule unto what degree of particularity a 
knowledge should descend: which latter I find passed 
over in silence, being in my judgement the more material. 


170 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ Xv. 13. 


For certainly there must be somewhat left to practice ; 
but how much is worthy the inquiry. We see remote 
and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge to 
scorn of practical men; and are no more aiding to 
practice, than an Ortelius’ universal map is to direct the 
way between London and York. The better sort of 
rules have been not unfitly compared to glasses of steel 
unpolished, where you may see the images of things, 
but first they must be filed: so the rules will help, if they 
De produe- be laboured and polished by practice. But 
tione axio- how crystalline they may be made at the 
i el le first, and how far forth they may be polished 
aforehand is the question; the inquiry whereof seemeth 
to me deficient. 

-14. There hath been also laboured and put in prac- 
tice a method, which is not a lawful method, but a 
method of imposture; which is, to deliver knowledges in 
such manner, aS men may speedily come to make a show 
of learning who have it not. Such was the travail of 
Raymundus Lullius, in making that art which bears his 
name: not unlike to some books of typocosmy, which 
have been made since; being nothing but a mass of 
words of all arts, to give men countenance, that those 
which use the terms might be thought to understand the 
art; which collections are much like a fripper’s or broker’s 
shop, that hath ends of everything, but nothing of worth. 

XVIII. 1. Now we descend to that part which con- 
cerneth the illustration of tradition, comprehended in that 
science which we call rhetoric, or art of eloquence; a 
science excellent, and excellently well laboured. For 
although in true value it is inferior to wisdom, as it is 
said by God to Moses, when he disabled himself for 
want of this faculty, Aaron shall be thy speaker, and thou 


XVIII. 1.] THE SECOND BOOK. 177 


shalt be to him as God; yet with people it is the more ~~ 
mighty : for so Salomon saith, Sapiens corde appellabitur 
prudens, sed dulcis eloguio majora reperiet ; signifying that 
profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or 

_.admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an 
active life. And as to the labouring of it, the emulation 
of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time, and the 
experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of 
thetorics exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of 
examples of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes 
and Cicero, added to the perfection of the precepts of 
eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this art; and 
therefore the deficiences which I shall note will rather be 
in some collections, which may as handmaids attend the 
art, than in the rules or use of the art itself. 

2. Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the 
roots of this science, as we have done of the rest; the | 
duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagina- | 
tion for the better moving of the will. For we see reason | * 
is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means; \ 
by illaqueation or sophism, which pertains to logic ; by 
imagination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and 
by passion or affection, which pertains to morality. And 
as in negotiation with others, men are wrought by cun- 
ning, by importunity, and by vehemency; so in this 
negotiation within ourselves, men are undermined by in- 
consequences, solicited and importuned by impressions 
or observations, and transported by passions. Neither is 
the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that those 
powers and arts should have force to disturb reason, and 
not to establish and advance it. For the end of logic is mi 


teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to en- 
trap it. The end of morality is to procure the affections to 
‘N 


178 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XVIII2. 


obey reason, and not to invade it. The end of rhetoric is to 
fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it: 
for these abuses of arts come in but ex ob/:quo, for caution. 

3. And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though 
springing out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his 
time, to esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, re- 
sembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, 
and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the plea- 
sure of the taste. For we see that speech is much more 
conversant in adorning that which is good, than in 
colouring that which is evil; for there is no man but 
speaketh more honestly than he can do or think: and 
it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon, that 
because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of 
estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against elo- 
quence and good speech; knowing that no ‘man can 
speak fair of courses sordid and base. And therefore 
as Plato said elegantly, Zhat virtue, of she could be seen, 
would move great love and affection; so seeing that she 
cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the 
next degree is to show her to the imagination in lively 
representation: for to show her to reason only in sub- 
tility of argument was a thing ever derided in Chrysip- 
pus and many of the Stoics, who thought to thrust 
virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, 
which have no sympathy with the will of man. 

4. Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and 
obedient to reason, it were true there should be no great 
use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than 
of naked proposition and proofs; but in regard of the 
continual mutinies and seditions of the affections, 


; Video meliora, proboque, 
Deteriora sequor, 


XVII, 4.| THE SECOND BOOK. 179 


reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence 
of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination 
from the affections’ part, and contract a confederacy be- 
tween the reason and imagination against the affections ; 
for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to 
good, as reason doth. The difference is, that the affection 
beholdeth merely the present ; reason beholdeth the future 
and sum of time. And therefore the present filling the 
imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but 
after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made 
things future and remote appear as present, then upon 
the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth. 

5. We conclude therefore that rhetoric can be no 
more charged with the colouring of the worse part, than 
logic with sophistry, or morality with vice. For we know 
the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use 
be opposite. It appeareth also that logic differeth from 
rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close, 
the other at large; but much more in this, that logic 
handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth 
it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And 
therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between 
logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on 
the other, as participating of both: for the proofs and 
demonstrations of logic are toward all men indifferent 
and the same; but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric 
ought to differ according to the auditors : 


Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion, 


Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend 

so far, that if a man should speak of the same thing to 

several persons, he should speak to them all respectively 

and several ways: though this politic part of eloquence 
N 2 


180 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XVIII. 5. 


in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to 
want: whilst, by the observing their well- 
graced forms of speech, they leese the volu- 
bility of application: and therefore it shall 
not be amiss to recommend this to better 
inquiry, not being curious whether we place it here, or in 
that part which concerneth policy. | 

6. Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, 
Colores boni Which (as I said) are but attendances: and 
et mali, first, I do not find the wisdom and diligence 
simplicis et of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make 
comparati. — @ collection of the popular signs and colours 
of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which are 
as the sophisms of rhetoric (as I touched before). For 
example: 


De prudentia 
sermonis 
privati. 


Sophisma, 
Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum, 


Redargutio. 
Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces, 

Malum est, malum est (ingqutt emptor) ; sed cum recessertt, 
tum gloriabitur! ‘The defects in the labour of Aristotle 
are three: one, that there be but a few of many ; another, 
that their elenches are not annexed; and the third, that 
he conceived but a part of the use of them: for their use 
is not only in probation, but much more in impression. 
For many forms are equal in signification which are dif- 
fering in impression; as the difference is great in the 
piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat, 
though the strength of the percussion be the same. For 
there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing 
it said, Your enemies will be glad of this, 

Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridz, 


than by hearing it said only, This zs evzl for you. 


XVIII. 7.] +~«—-« THE SECOND BOOK. 181 


7. Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned 
before, touching provision or preparatory store for the 
furniture of speech and readiness of invention, which ap- 
peareth to be of two sorts; the one in resemblance to a 
shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things 
ready made up; both to be applied to that which is fre- 
quent and most in request. The former of these I will 
call anicthefa, and the latter formula. 

8. Anitthela are theses argued pro ef contra; wherein 
men may be more large and laborious: but 
(in such as are able to do it) to avoid prolixity 
of entry, I wish the seeds of the several argu- 
ments to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences, 
not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms of thread, 
to be unwinded at large when they come to be used; 
supplying authorities and examples by reference. 


Pro verbis legis. 
Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, que recedit a litera : 
Cum receditur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem, 


Antitheta 
rerum, 


Pro sententia legis. 
Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula. 


9. Hormule are but decent and apt passages or con- 
veyances of speech, which may serve indifferenuy for 
differing subjects; as of preface, conclusion, digression, 
transition, excusation, &c. For as in buildings there is 
great pleasure and use in the well casting of the stair- 
cases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, 
the conveyances and passages are of special ornament 


and effect. 
A conclusion in a deliberative. 


So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences 


future, 


XIX. 1. There remain two appendices touching the 


182 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XIX.1. 


tradition of knowledge, the one critical, the other pedant- 
ical. For all knowledge is either delivered by teachers, 
or attained by men’s proper endeavours: and therefore 
as the principal part of tradition of knowledge ‘concerneth 
chiefly writing of books, so the relative part thereof con- 
cerneth reading of books ; whereunto appertain incidently 
these considerations. ‘The first is concerning the true 
correction and edition of authors; wherein nevertheless 
rash diligence hath done great prejudice. For these 
critics have often presumed that that which they under- 
stand not is false set down: as the priest that, where 
he found it written of S. Paul Demzssus est per sportam, 
mended his book, and made it Demissus est per portam ; 
because spor/a was an hard word, and out of his reading: 
and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable 
and ridiculous, yet are of the same kind. And therefore, 
as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies 
are commonly the least correct. 

The second is concerning the exposition and explic- 
ation of authors, which resteth in annotations and com- 
mentaries: wherein it is over usual to blanch the obscure 
places and discourse upon the plain. 

The third is concerning the times, which in many cases 
give great light to true interpretations. 

The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judge- 
ment of the authors; that men thereby may make some 
election unto themselves what books to read. 

And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition 
of studies; that men may know in what order or pursuit 
to read. 

2. For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that differ- 
ence of tradition which is proper for youth; whereunto 
appertain divers considerations of great fruit. 


NAS ase SaeNeR ‘Rao noaMa 


XIX. 2.] _ THE SECOND BOOK. 183 


As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as 
with what to initiate them, and from what for a time to 
refrain them. 

Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the 
easiest, and so proceed to the more difficult; and in what 
courses to press the more difficult, and then to turn them 
to the more easy: for it is one method to practise swim- 
ming with bladders, and another to practise dancing with 
heavy shoes. 

A third is the application of learning according unto 
the propriety of the wits; for there is no defect in the 
faculties intellectual, but seemeth to have a proper cure 
contained in some studies: as, for example, if a child be 
bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the 
mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if 
the wit be caught away but a moment, one is new to 
begin. And as sciences have a propriety towards faculties 
for cure and help, so faculties or powers have a sympathy 
towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting: and 
therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what kinds of 
wits and natures are most apt and proper for what sciences. 

Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great 
consequence to hurt or help: for, as is well observed by 
Cicero, men in exercising their faculties, if they be not 
well advised, do exercise their faults and get ill habits as 
well as good; so as there is a great judgement to be had 
in the continuance and intermission of exercises. It were 
too long to particularise a number of other considerations 
of this nature, things but of mean appearance, but of 
singular efficacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of 
seeds or young plants is that that is most important 
to their thriving, and as it was noted that the first six 
kings being in truth-as tutors of the state of Rome in the 


184 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [ XIX. 2. 


infancy thereof was the principal cause of the immense 
greatness of that state which followed, so the culture 
and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible 
(though unseen) operation, as hardly any length of time 
or contention of labour can countervail it afterwards. 
And it is not amiss to observe also how small and mean 
faculties gotten by education, yet when they fall into great 
men or great matters, do work great and important 
effects: whereof we see a notable example in Tacitus 
of two stage players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by 
their faculty of playing put the Pannonian armies into 
an extreme tumult and combustion. For there arising a 
mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus Cesar, 
Blzesus the lieutenant had committed some of the mutin- 
ers, which were suddenly rescued; whereupon Vibulenus 
got to be heard speak, which he did in this manner: 
These poor innocent wretches appointed to cruel death, you 
have restored to behold the light; but who shall restore my 
brother to me, or life unto my brother, that was sent hither 
in message from the legions of Germany, to treat of the 
common cause P and he hath murdered him this last night 
by some of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him 
for his executioners upon soldiers. Answer, Llesus, what 
ts done with his body ? The mortalest enemies do not deny 
burial. When I have performed my last duties to the corpse 
with kisses, with tears, command me to be slain bestdes him a 
so that these my fellows, for our good meaning and our true 
hearts to the legions, may have leave to bury us. With which 
speech he put the army into an infinite fury and uproar: 
whereas truth was he had no brother, neither was there 
any such matter; but he played it merely as if he had 
been upon the stage. 

3- But to return: we are now come to a period of 


+ Ute yee 


XIX. 3.] THE SECOND BOOK. 185 


rational knowledges; wherein if I have made the divi- 
sions other than those that are received, yet would I not 
be thought to disallow all those divisions which I do not 
use. For there is a double necessity imposed upon me 
of altering the divisions. The one, because it differeth 
in end and purpose, to sort together those things which 
are next in nature, and those things which are next in 
use. For if a secretary of estate should sort his papers, 
it is like in his study or general cabinet he would sort 
together things of a nature, as treaties, instructions, &c. 
But in his boxes or particular cabinet he would sort 
together those that he were like to use together, though 
of several natures. So in this general cabinet of know- 
ledge it was necessary for me to follow the divisions of 
the nature of things; whereas if myself had been to 
handle any particular knowledge, I would have respected 
the divisions fittest for use. The other, because the 
bringing in of the deficiences did by consequence alter 
the partitions of the rest. For let the knowledge extant 
(for demonstration sake) be fifteen. Let the knowledge 
with the deficiences be twenty; the parts of fifteen are 
not the parts of twenty; for the parts of fifteen are three 
and five ; the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten. 
So as these things are without contradiction, and could 
not otherwise be. 


XX, 1. E proceed now to that knowledge which 

considereth of the appetite and will of 
man: whereof Salomon saith, Anée omnia, fil, custod? cor 
tuum ; nam inde procedunt achiones vite. In the handling 
of this science, those which have written seem to me to 
have done as if a man, that professed to teach to write, 
did only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters 


186 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XX.1. 


joined, without giving any precepts or directions for the 
carriage of the hand and framing of the letters. So have 
they made good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying 
the draughts and portraitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity; 
propounding them well described as the true objects and 
scopes of man’s will and desires. But how to attain 
these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the 
will of man to become true and conformable to these 
pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and un- 


profitably. For it is not the disputing, that moral virtues <— 


are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature; or 
the distinguishing, that generous spirits are won by doc- 
trines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and 
punishment; and the like scattered glances and touches, 
that can excuse the absence of this part. 

2. The reason of this omission I suppose to be that 
hidden rock whereupon both this and many other barks 
of knowledge have been cast away; which is, that men 
have despised to be conversant in ordinary and common 
matters, the judicious direction whereof nevertheless is 
the wisest doctrine (for life consisteth not in novelties 
nor subtilities), but contrariwise they have compounded 
sciences chiefly of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass 
of matter, chosen to give glory either to the subtility of 
disputations, or to the eloquence of discourses. But 
Seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence, /Vocet 
willis eloguentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem fact, sed sut. 
Doctrine should be such as should make men in love 
with the lesson, and not with the teacher; being directed 
to the auditor’s benefit, and not to the author’s com- 
mendation. And therefore those are of the right kind 
which may be concluded as Demosthenes concludes his 
counsel, Que si feceritis, non o atorem duntaxat in pre- 


XX, 2.] THE SECOND BOOK. 187 


sentia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiam non ita multo post 
Slatu rerum vestraram meliore. 

3. Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have 
despaired of a fortune, which the poet Virgil promised 
himself, and indeed obtained, who got as much glory of 
eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of the 
observations of husbandry, as of the heroical acts of 
Alineas : 

Nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum 

Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem. 
And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to 
write at leisure that which men may read at leisure, but 
really to instruct and suborn action and active life, these 
Georgics of the mind, concerning the husbandry and 
tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical de- 
scriptions of virtue, duty, and felicity. Wherefore the 
main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth 
to be into the exemplar or platform of good, and the 
regiment or culture of the mind: the one describing the 
nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, 
apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto. 

4. The doctrine touching the platform or nature of 
good considereth it either simple or compared; either 
the kinds of good, or the degrees of good; in the latter 
whereof those infinite disputations which were touching 
the supreme degree thereof, which they term felicity, 
beatitude, or the highest good, the doctrines concerning 
which were as the heathen divinity, are by the Christian 
faith discharged. And as Aristotle saith, Zhat young men 
may be happy, but not otherwise but by hope; so we must 
all acknowledge our minority, and embrace the felicity 
which is by hope of the future world. | 

Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of | 


| 


188 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XX. 5. 


the philosopher’s heaven, whereby they feigned an higher 
elevation of man’s nature than was (for we see in what 
height of style Seneca writeth, Vere magnum, habere fra- 
gilitatem hominis, securitatem Det), we may with more 
sobriety and truth receive the rest of their inquiries and 
labours. Wherein for the nature of good positive or 
simple, they have set it down excellently in describing 
the forms of virtue and duty, with their situations and 
postures; in distributing them into their kinds, parts, 
provinces, actions, and administrations, and the like: nay 
further, they have commended them to man’s nature and 
spirit with great quickness of argument and beauty of 
persuasions; yea, and fortified and entrenched them (as 
much as discourse can do) against corrupt and popular 
opinions. Again, for the degrees and comparative nature 
of good, they have also excellently handled it in their 
triplicity of good, in the comparisons between a contem- 
plative and an active life, in the distinction between virtue 
with reluctation and virtue secured, in their encounters 
between honesty and profit, in their balancing of virtue 
with virtue, and the like; so as this part deserveth to be 
reported for excellently laboured. 

6. Notwithstanding, if before they had comen to the 
popular and received notions of virtue and vice, pleasure 
and pain, and the rest, they had stayed a little longer 
upon the inquiry concerning the roots of good and evil, 
and the strings of those roots, they had given, in my 
opinion, a great light to that which followed; and spe- 
cially if they had consulted with nature, they had made 
their doctrines less prolix and more profound: which 
being by them in part omitted and in part handled with 
much confusion, we will endeavour to resume and open 
in a more clear manner. 


‘ 


XX. 7.] THE SECOND BOOK. 189 


S 7. There is formed in every thing a double nature of \ 
good: the one, as every thing is a total or substantive in \ 
itself; the other, as it is a part or member of a greater __ 
body: whereof the latter is in degree the greater and 
the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a | 
more general form. Therefore we see the iron in par- 
ticular sympathy moveth to the loadstone; but yet if it 
exceed a certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the 
loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth to the earth, 
which is the region and country of massy bodies : so may 
we go forward, and see that water and massy bodies 
move to the centre of the earth; but rather than to suffer 
a divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move 
upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty 
to the earth in regard of their duty to the world. This 
double nature of good, and the comparative thereof, is 
much more engraven upon man, if he degenerate not : 
unto whom the conservation of duty to the public ought 
to be much more precious than the conservation of life 
and being : according to that memorable speech of Pom- 
peius Magnus, when being in commission of purveyance 
for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with great 
vehemency and instance by his friends about him, that 
he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of 
weather, he said only to them, JVecesse est ut eam, non uf 
vivam. But it may be truly affirmed that there was never 
any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did 
so plainly and highly exalt the good which is commun- 
icative, and depress the good which is private and par- 
ticular, as the Holy Faith ; well declaring that it was the 
same God that gave the Christian law to men, who gave 
those laws of nature to inanimate creatures that we spake 
of before ; for we read that the elected saints of God have 


190 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, |XX.7. 


wished themselves anathematized and razed out of the 
book of life, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling 
of communion. 

8. This being set down and strongly planted, doth 
judge and determine most of the controversies wherein 
moral philosophy is conversant. For first, it decideth the 
question touching the preferment of the contemplative or 
active life, and decideth it against Aristotle. For all the 
reasons which he bringeth for the contemplative are pri- 
vate, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a man’s 
self (in which respects no question the contemplative life 
hath the pre-eminence), not much unlike to that com- 
parison, which Pythagoras made for the gracing and 
magnifying of philosophy and contemplation: who being 
asked what he was, answered, Zhai zf Hiero were ever at 
the Olympian games, he knew the manner, that some came 
to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as mer- 
chants to utter thetr commodttes, and some came to make 
good cheer and meet thetr friends, and some came to look 
on; and that he was one of them that came to look on. 


But men must know, that in this theatre of man’s life it is - 


reserved only for God and angels to be lookers on. Neither 
could the like question ever have been received in the 
church, notwithstanding their Prefosa im oculis Domini 
mors sanctorum ejus, by which place they would exalt 
their civil death and regular professions, but upon this 
defence, that the monastical life is not simple contem- 
plative, but performeth the duty either of incessant prayers 
and supplications, which hath been truly esteemed as an 
office in the church, or else of writing or taking instruc- 
tions for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses 
did when he abode so long in the mount. And so 
we see Henoch the seventh from Adam, who was the first 


XX. 8.] THE SECOND BOOK. Ig1 


contemplative and walked with God, yet did also endow 
the church with prophecy, which Saint Jude citeth. But 
for contemplation which should be finished in itself, with- 
out casting beams upon society, assuredly divinity knoweth 
it not. 

g. It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and 
Socrates, and their schools and successions, on the one 
side, who placed felicity in virtue simply or attended, the 
actions and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace and 
concern society; and on the other side, the Cyrenaics and 
Epicureans, who placed it in pleasure, and made virtue 
(as it is used in some comedies of errors, wherein the 
mistress and the maid change habits) to be but as a 
servant, without which pleasure cannot be served and 
attended; and the reformed school of the Epicureans, 
which placed it in serenity of mind and freedom from 
perturbation; as if they would have deposed Jupiter 
again, and restored Saturn and the first age, when there 
was no summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all 
after one air and season; and Herillus, which placed 
felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of the mind, 
making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming things 
according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluct- 
ation; which opinion was revived in the heresy of the 
Anabaptists, measuring things according to the motions 
of the spirit, and the constancy or wavering of belief: all 
which are manifest to tend to private repose and con- 
tentment, and not to point of society. 

ro. It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which 
presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things 
which are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and 
disturbance: as if it were not a thing much more happy 
to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to 


192 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [XX. 10. 


obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper 
fortune; as Consalvo said to his soldiers, showing them 
Naples, and protesting he had rather die one foot for- 
wards, than to have his life secured for long by one foot 
of retreat. Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly leader 
hath signed, who hath affirmed that @ good consctence ts a 
continual feast; showing plainly that the conscience of 
good intentions, howsoever succeeding, is a more con- 
tinual joy to nature, than all the provision which can be 
made for security and repose. 

11. It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy, 
which grew general about the time of Epictetus, in con- 
verting it into an occupation or profession; as if the 
purpose had been, not to resist and extinguish perturb- 
ations, but to fly and avoid the causes of them, and to 
shape a particular kind and course of life to that end; 
introducing such an health of mind, as was that health of 
body of which Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus, who did 
nothing all his life long but intend his health: whereas if 
men refer themselves to duties of society, as that health 
of body is best, which is ablest to endure all alterations 
and extremities; so likewise that health of mind is most 
proper, which can go through the greatest temptations 
and perturbations. So as Diogenes’ opinion is to be 
accepted, who commended not them which abstained, 
but them which sustained, and could refrain their mind 
in precipitio, and could give unto the mind (as is used in 
horsemanship) the shortest stop or turn. 

12. Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of 
application in some of the most ancient and reverend 
philosophers and philosophical men, that did retire too 
easily from civil business, for avoiding of indignities and 
perturbations: whereas the resolution of men truly moral 


— eg 


XX, 12.| THE SECOND BOOK. 193 


ought to be such as the same Consalvo said the honour 
of a soldier should be, e #/d@ crassiore, and not so fine as 
that every thing should catch in it and endanger it. 

XXI. 1. To resume private or particular good, it 
falleth into the division of good active and passive: for 
this difference of good (not unlike to that which amongst 
the Romans was expressed in the familiar or household 
terms of fromus and condus) is formed also in all things, 
and is best disclosed in the two several appetites in crea- 
tures; the one to preserve or continue themselves, and 
the other to dilate or multiply themselves; whereof the 
latter seemeth to be the worthier: for in nature the 
heavens, which are the more worthy, are the agent; and 
the earth, which is the less worthy, is the patient. In the 
pleasures of living creatures, that of generation is greater 
than that of food. In divine doctrine, deatius est dare 
guam accipere. And in life, there is no man’s spirit so | 
soft, but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he hath 
fixed in his desire, more than sensuality; which priority 
of the active good, is much upheld by the consideration 
of our estate to be mortal and exposed to fortune. For 
if we mought have a perpetuity and certainty in our plea- 
sures, the state of them would advance their price. But 
when we see it is but magni e@stimamus mort tardius, and 
ne glorieris de crastino, nescts partum diet, it maketh us to 
desire to have somewhat secured and exempted from 
time, which are only our deeds and works: as it is said, 
Opera eorum seguuntur eos, ‘The preeminence likewise of 
this active good is upheld by the affection which is natural 
in man towards variety and proceeding; which in the 
pleasures of the sense, which is the principal part of 
passive good, can have no great latitude. Cogifa guam- 
diu eadem feceris; ctbus, somnus, ludus; per hune circulum 

0 


194. OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XX. Ie 


curritur ; mort velle non tantum fortis, aut miser, aut prudens, 
sed ehiam fastidiosus potest. But in enterprises, pursuits, 
and purposes of life, there is much variety; whereof men 
are sensible with pleasure in their inceptions, progres- 
sions, recoils, reintegrations, approaches and _ attainings 
to their ends. So as it was well said, Vita sine propostito 
languida et vaga est. Neither hath this active good any 
identity with the good of society, though in some case it 
hath an incidence into it. For although it do many times 
bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it is with a respect 
private to a man’s own power, glory, amplification, con- 
tinuance; as appeareth plainly, when it findeth a contrary 
subject. For that gigantine state of mind which pos- 
sesseth the troublers of the world, such as was Lucius 
Sylla and infinite other in smaller model, who would 
have all men happy or unhappy as they were their friends 
or enemies, and would give form to the world, according 
to their own humours (which is the true theomachy), 
pretendeth and aspireth to active good, though it recedeth 
furthest from good of society, which we have determined 
to be the greater. 

2. To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of 
conservative and perfective. For let us take a brief review 
of that which we have said: we have spoken first of the 
good of society, the intention whereof embraceth the 
form of human nature, whereof we are members: and 
portions, and not our own proper and individual form: 
we have spoken of active good, and supposed it as a 
part of private and particular good.. And rightly, for there 
is impressed upon all things a triple desire or appetite 
proceeding from love to themselves; one of preserving 
and continuing their form; aeeeE of advancing and 
perfecting their form; aa a third of multiplying and 


XXI.2.] = THE SECOND BOOK. 195 


extending their form upon other things: whereof the 
multiplying, or signature of it upon other things, is that 
which we handled by the name of active good. So as 
there remaineth the conserving of it, and perfecting or 
raising of it; which latter is the highest degree of 
passive good. For to preserve in state is the less, 
to preserve with advancement is the greater. So in 
man, 

; Igneus est ollis vigor, et czlestis origo. 

His approach or assumption to divine or angelica] na- 
ture is the perfection of his form; the error or false 
imitation of which good is that which is the tempest of 
_ human life; while man, upon the instinct of an advance- 
ment formal and essential, is carried to seek an ad- 
vancement local. For as those which are sick, and find 
no remedy, do tumble up and down and change place, 
as if by a remove local they could obtain a remove in- 
ternal; so is it with men in ambition, when failing of 
the mean to exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual 
estuation to exalt their place. So then passive good is, 
as was said, either conservative or perfective. 

3. To resume the good of conservation or comfort, 
which consisteth in the fruition of that which is agree- 
able to our natures; it seemeth to be the most pure 
and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and the 
lowest. And this also receiveth a difference, which hath 
neither been well judged of, nor well inquired: for the 
good of fruition or contentment is placed either in the 
sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness and 
vigour of it; the one superinduced by equality, the 
other by vicissitude; the one having less mixture of evil, 
the other more impression of good. Whether of these is 
the greater good is a question controverted; but whether 

02 


{ 


196 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. | XXI. 3. 


man’s nature may not be capable of both, is a question 
not inquired. 

4. The former question being debated between Socrates 
and a sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and 
constant peace of mind, and the sophist in much de- 
siring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to ill 
words: the sophist saying that Socrates’ felicity was the 
felicity of a block or stone; and Socrates saying that 
the sophist’s felicity was the felicity of one that had the 
itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both 
these opinions do not want their supports. For the 
opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general con- 
sent even of the Epicures themselves, that virtue bear- 
eth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is, that 
virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations than 
in compassing desires. The sophist’s opinion is much 
favoured by the assertion we last spake of, that good of 
advancement is greater than good of simple preservation ; 
because every obtaining a desire hath a show of advance- 
ment, as motion though in a circle hath a show of pro- 
gression. 

5. But the second question, decided the true way, 
maketh the former superfluous. For can it be doubted, 
but that there are some who take more pleasure in en- 
joying pleasures than some other, and yet, nevertheless, 
are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them? So 
as this same, (Von uti ut non appetas, non appelere ut non 


~metuas, sunt animi pusilli et diffidentis. And it seemeth 


to me, that most of the doctrines of the philosophers are 
more fearful and cautionary than the nature of things 
requireth. So have they increased the fear of death in 
offering to cure it. For when they would have a man’s 
whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, 


ET 


XXI. 5.] THE SECOND BOOK. 197 


they must needs make men think that it is a terrible 


enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing. 


Better saith the poet: 

Qui finem vite extremum inter munera ponat 

Nature. 
So have they sought to make men’s minds too uniform 
and harmonical, by not breaking them sufficiently to con- 
trary motions: the reason whereof I suppose to be, be- 
cause they themselves were men dedicated to a private, 
free, and unapplied course of life. For as we see, upon 
the lute or like instrument, a ground, though it be sweet 
and have show of many changes, yet breaketh not the 
hand to such strange and hard stops and passages, as 
a set song or voluntary; much after the same manner 
was the diversity between a philosophical and a civil 
life. And therefore men are to imitate the wisdom of 
jewellers ; who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice 
which may be ground forth without taking too much of 
the stone, they help it; but if it should lessen and abate 


the stone too much, they will not meddle with it: so | 
ought men so to procure serenity as they destroy not 


magnanimity. 


6. Having therefore deduced the good of man which‘ 


is private and particular, as far as seemeth fit, we will 
now return to that good of man which respecteth and 


beholdeth society, which we may term duty; because the © 


term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and 
disposed towards others, as the term of virtue is applied 
to a mind well formed and composed in itself: though 
neither can a man understand virtue without some re- 


lation to society, nor duty without an inward disposition. 


This part may seem at first to pertain to science civil 
and politic: but not if it be well observed. For it 


198 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. | XXI. 6. 


concerneth the regiment and government of every man 
over himself, and not over others. And as in architecture 
the direction of framing the posts, beams, and other parts 
of building, is not the same with the manner of joining 
them and erecting the building; and in mechanicals, 
the direction how to frame an instrument or engine, is 
not the same with the manner of setting it on work and 
employing it; and yet nevertheless in expressing of the 
one you incidently express the aptness towards the other ; 
so the doctrine of conjugation of men in society differeth 
from that of their conformity thereunto. 

7. This part of duty is subdivided into two parts: 
the common duty of every man, as a man or member 
of a state; the other, the respective or special duty of 
every man, in his profession, vocation, and place. The 
first of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been 
said. The second likewise I may report rather dispersed 
than deficient; which manner of dispersed writing in 
this kind of argument I acknowledge to be best. For 
who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, 
virtue, challenge, and right of every several vocation, pro- 
fession, and place? For although sometimes a looker on 
may see more than a gamester, and there be a proverb 
more arrogant than sound, Zhat the vale best discovereth 
the hill; yet there is small doubt but that men can write 
best and most really and materially in their own profes- 
sions; and that .the writing of speculative men of active 
matter for the most part doth seem to men of experience, 
as Phormio’s argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal, 
to be but dreams and dotage. Only there is one vice 
which accompanieth them that write in their own pro- 
fessions, that they magnify them in excess. But gener- 
ally it were to be wished (as that which would make 


XXI. 7.] THE SECOND BOOK. 199 


learning indeed solid and fruitful) that active men would 
or could become writers. 

8. In which kind I cannot but mention, honor?s causa, 
your Majesty’s excellent book touching the duty of a king: 
a work richly compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, 
with great aspersion of all other arts; and being in mine 
opinion one of the most sound and healthful writings that 
I have read; not distempered in the heat of invention, 
nor in the coldness of negligence; not sick of dizzi- 
ness, as those are who leese themselves in their order, 
nor of convulsions, as those which cramp in matters 
impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, 
as those do who seek to please the reader more than 
nature beareth; and chiefly well disposed in the spirits 
thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for action; 
and far removed from that natural infirmity, whereunto 
I noted those that write in their own professions to be 
subject, which is, that they exalt it above measure. For 
your Majesty hath truly described, not a king of Assyria 
or Persia in their extern glory, but a Moses or a David, 
pastors of their people. Neither can I ever leese out 
of my remembrance what I heard your Majesty in the 
same sacred spirit of government deliver in a great 
cause of judicature, which was, Zha/ kings ruled by their 
laws, as God did by the laws of nature; and ought as 
rarely to put im use their supreme prerogative, as God doth 
his power of working miracles. And yet notwithstanding, 
in your book of a free monarchy, you do well give men 
to understand, that you know the plenitude of the power 
and right of a king, as well as the circle of his office and 
duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this excellent 
writing of your Majesty, as a prime or eminent example 
of tractates concerning special and respective duties: 


200 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXI. 8. 


wherein I should have said as much, if it had been written 
a thousand years since. Neither am I moved with certain 
courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in 
presence. No, it is flattery to praise in absence; that is, 
when either the virtue is absent, or the occasion is ab- 
sent; and so the praise is not natural, but forced, either in 
truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his oration 
pro Marcello, which is nothing but an excellent table of 
Ceesar’s virtue, and made to his face; besides the example 
of many other excellent persons, wiser a great deal than 
such observers; and we will never doubt, upon a full 
occasion, to give just praises to present or absent. 

g. But to return: there belongeth further to the hand- 
ling of this part, touching the duties of professions and 
vocations, a relative or opposite, touching the frauds, 
cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession, which 
hath been likewise handled: but how? rather in a satire 
and cynically, than seriously and wisely: for men have 
rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that 
which is good in professions, than with judgement to 
discover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as Salomon 
saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a 
mind to scorn and censure, shall be sure to find matter 
for his humour, but no matter for his instruction: Qua@- 
De cautelis 7M dertsort screntiam ipsa se abscondit; sed 
ene 7 studioso fit obviam. But the managing of 
artibus. this argument with integrity and truth, which 
I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best 
fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted. 
For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk, that if he see you 
first, you die for it; but if you see him first, he dieth: so is 
it with deceits and evil arts; which, if they be first espied 
they leese their life ; but if they prevent, they endanger. So 


XXI. 9.] THE SECOND BOOK. 201 


that we are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that 
write what men do, and not what they ought to do. For 


(ee 


it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the © 


columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the 
conditions of the serpent; his baseness and going upon 
his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, 
and the rest; that is, all forms and natures of evil. For 
without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an 
honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, 
to reclaim them, without the help of the knowledge of 
evil. For men of corrupted minds presuppose that 
honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and be- 
lieving of preachers, schoolmasters, and men’s exterior 
language. So as, except you can make them perceive 


_ that you know the utmost reaches of their own corrupt 


opinions, they despise all morality. Lon recipit stultus 
verba prudentia, nist ea dixeris que versantur in corde ejus. 

10. Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also 
appertain the duties between husband and wife, parent 
and child, master and servant. So likewise the laws of 
friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of companies, 
colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all 
other proportionate duties; not as they are parts of 
government and society, but as to the framing of the 
mind of particular persons. 

11. The knowledge concerning good respecting society 
doth handle it also, not simply alone, but comparatively; 
whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties between per- 
son and person, case and case, particular and public. As 
we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his 
own sons, which was so much extolled; yet what was 
said? 


Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores. 


202 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXI. IIe 


So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. 
Again, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to 
a supper certain whose opinions they meant to feel, 
whether they were fit to be made their associates, and 
cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant 
being an usurper, they were divided in opinion; some 
holding that servitude was the extreme of evils, and others 
that tyranny was better than a civil war: and a number of 
the like cases there are of comparative duty. Amongst 
which that of all others is the most frequent, where the 
question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small 
injustice. Which Jason of Thessalia determined against 
the truth: Aligua sunt tnjuste facienda, ut multa juste fiert 
bossint. But the reply is good, Auctorem presentis jus- 
uitte habes, sponsorem future non habes. Men must pursue 
things which are just in present, and leave the future to 
the divine Providence. So then we pass on from this 
general part touching the exemplar and description of 
good. 
XXII. 1. Now therefore that we have spoken of this 
fruit of life, it remaineth to speak of the hus- 
pe aiitra | Wandry that belongeth thereunto; without 
i which part the former seemeth to be no better 
than a fair image, or statua, which is beautiful to contem- 
plate, but is without life and motion; whereunto Aristotle 
himself subscribeth in these words: JVecesse est scilicet de 
virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. Inutile 
enim sere Juerit virtutem quidem nosse, acquirende autem ejus 
modos et vias ignorare. Non enim de virtute tantum, qua 
specie sit, querendum est, sed et quomodo sut copiam factal: 
utrumque enim volumus, et rem tpsam nosse, et ejus compotes 
fiert: hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nist sctamus et ex qut- 
bus et guomodo. In such full words and with such iteration 


XX 4. ] THE SECOND BOOK. 203 


doth he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in great com- 
mendation of Cato the second, that he had applied himself 
to philosophy, Mon ita disputandi causa, sed ita vivends. 
And although the neglect of our times, wherein few men 
do hold any consultations touching the reformation of 
their life (as Seneca excellently saith, De partbus vile 
quisque deliberat, de summa nemo), may make this part 
seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with that aphor- 
ism of Hippocrates, Qui gravt morbo correpti dolores non 
sentiunt, iis mens egrotat. They need medicine, not only 
to assuage the disease, but to awake the sense. And if ~) 
it be said, that the cure of men’s minds belongeth to 
sacred divinity, it is most true: but yet moral philosophy 
may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble 
handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, Zhat the eyes of the ~ 
handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress, and yet no 
doubt many things are left to the discretion of the hand- 
maid, to discern of the mistress’ will; so ought moral 
philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines 
of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within 
due limits) many sound and profitable directions. 

2. This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, 
I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced 
to written inquiry: the rather, because it consisteth of 
much matter, wherein both speech and action is often 
conversant; and such wherein the common talk of men 
(which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) is 
wiser than their books. It is reasonable therefore that 
we propound it in the more particularity, both for the 
worthiness, and because we may acquit ourselves for 
reporting it deficient; which seemeth almost incredible, 
and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those them- 
selves that have written. We will therefore enumerate 


204 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXII. 2. 


some heads or points thereof, that it may appear the 
better what it is, and whether it be extant. 

3. First therefore in this, as in all things which are 
practical, we ought to cast up our account, what is in 
our power, and what not; for the one may be dealt with 
by way of alteration, but the other by way of application 
only. The husbandman cannot command, neither the 
nature of the earth, nor the seasons of the weather; no 
more can the physician the constitution of the patient, nor 
the variety of accidents. So in the culture and cure of 
the mind of man, two things are without our command; 
points of nature, and points of fortune. For to the basis 
of the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is 
limited and tied. In these things therefore it is left unto 
us to proceed by application : 

Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendos 
and so likewise, 

Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo. 
But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of 
a dull and neglected suffering, but of a wise and indus- 
trious suffering, which draweth and contriveth use and ad- 
vantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary; 
which is that properly which we call accommodating 
or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth 
principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the 
precedent state or disposition, unto which we do apply: 
for we cannot fit a garment, except we first take mea- 
sure of the body. 

4. So then the first article of this knowledge is, to set 
down sound and true distributions and descriptions of the 
_ several characters and tempers of men’s natures and dis- 
positions; specially having regard to those differences 
which are most radical in being the fountains and causes 


XXII. 4.] THE SECOND BOOK. 205 


of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or com- 
mixture ; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in 
passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, 
that can satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be 
considered, that there are minds which are proportioned 
to great matters, and others to small (which Aristotle 
handleth or ought to have handled by the name of 
magnanimity), doth it not deserve as well to be con- 
sidered, that there are minds proportioned to intend many 
matters, and others to few? So that some can divide 
themselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it 
must be but in few things at once: and so there cometh 
to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pusillanimity. 
And again, that some minds are proportioned to that 
which may be dispatched at once, or within a short 
return of time; others to that which begins afar off, and 
is to be won with length of pursuit : 
Jam tum tenditque fovetque. 

So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which 
is commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So 
further deserved it to be considered by Aristotle, Zhaé 
there ts a disposition tn conversation (supposing it in things 
which do in no sort touch or concern a man’s self) to soothe 
and please; and a disposition contrary to contradict and 
cross: and deserveth it not much better to be considered, 
That there is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but 
in matter of more sertous nature (and supposing it still in 
things merely indifferent), to take pleasure in the good of 
another: and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at 
the good of another? which is that properly which we call 
good nature or ill nature, benignity or malignity: and 
therefore I cannot sufficiently. marvel that this part of 
knowledge, touching the several characters of natures 


206 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXII. 4. 


and dispositions, should be omitted both in morality and 
policy; considering it is of so great ministry and sup- 
peditation to them both. A man shall find in the trad- 
itions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men’s 
natures, according to the predominances of the planets; 
lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers 
of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts, lovers of 
change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest sort 
of these relations which the Italians make touching con- 
claves, the natures of the several cardinals handsomely 
and lively painted forthe A man shall meet with in 
every day’s conference the denominations of sensitive, 
dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, huomo di prima im- 
presstone, huomo dt ultima impressione, and the like: and 
yet nevertheless this kind of observations wandereth in 
words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions 
are found (many of them), but we conclude no precepts 
upon them: wherein our fault is the greater; because 
both history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly 
fields where these observations grow; whereof we make 
a few posies to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth 
them to the confectionary, that receipts mought be made 
of them for use of life. 

5. Of much like kind are those impressions of nature, 
which are imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, 
by the region, by health and sickness, by beauty and 
deformity, and the like, which are inherent and not 
extern; and again, those which are caused by extern 
fortune; as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, 
want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, con- 
stant fortune, variable fortune, rising per salfum, per 
gradus, and the like. And therefore we see that Plautus 
maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, 


XXII. 5.] THE SECOND BOOK, 207 


benignitas hujus ut adolescentuli est. Saint Paul concludeth 
that severity of discipline was to be used to the Cretans, 
increpa eos dure, upon the disposition of their country, 
Cretenses semper mendaces, male bestia, ventres pigrt. 
Sallust noteth that it is usual with kings to desire con- 
tradictories: Sed plerumque regie@ voluntates, ut vehementes 
sunt, sic mobiles, sepeque tpse sibt adverse. ‘Tacitus ob- 
serveth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the 
disposition: solus Vespasianus mutalus in melius, Pin- 
darus maketh an observation, that great and sudden 
fortune for the most part defeateth men guz magnam felt- 
cttalem concoguere non possunt, So the Psalm showeth it 
is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of for- 
tune, than in the increase of fortune: Divitie st affluant, 
nolite cor apponere. ‘These observations and the like I 
deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle as in 
passage in his Rhetorics, and are handled in some 
scattered discourses: but they were never incorporate 
into moral philosophy, to which they do essentially apper- 
tain; as the knowledge of the diversity of grounds and 
moulds doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the 
diversity of complexions and constitutions doth to the 
physician; except we mean to follow the indiscretion 
of empirics, which minister the same medicines to all 
patients. 

6. Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry 
touching the affections; for as in medicining of the body, 
it is in order first to know the divers complexions and 
constitutions; secondly, the diseases; and lastly, the 
cures: so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of 
the divers characters of men’s natures, it followeth in 
order to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind, 
which are no other than the perturbations and distempers 


208 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXII. 6. 


of the affections. For as the ancient politiques in 
popular estates were wont to compare the people to the 
sea, and the orators to the winds; because as the sea 
would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not 
move and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable 
and tractable, if the seditious orators did not set them in 
working and agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the 
mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and 
stayed, if the affections, as winds, did not put it into tumult 
and perturbation. And here again I find strange, as 
before, that Aristotle should have written divers volumes 
of Ethics, and never handled the affections, which is the 
principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where 
they are considered but collaterally and in a second 
degree (as they may be moved by speech), he findeth 
place for them, and handleth them well for the quantity ; 
but where their true place is, he pretermitteth them. For 
it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can 
satisfy this inquiry, no more than he that should generally 
handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature 
of colours; for pleasure and pain are to the particular 
affections, as light is to particular colours. Better tra- 
vails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument, as 
far as I can gather by that which we have at second hand. 
But yet it is like it was after their manner, rather in 
‘subtilty of definitions (which in a subject of this nature 
are but curiosities), than in active and ample descriptions 
and observations. So likewise I find some particular 
writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the af- 
fections; as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, 
of tenderness of countenance, and other. But the poets 
and writers of histories are the best doctors of this know- 
ledge; where we may find painted forth with great life, 


) ' 
XXII. 6.] THE SECOND BOOK. 209 


how affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified 
and refrained; and how again contained from act and 
further degree; how they disclose themselves ; how they 
work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify; how 
they are enwrapped one within another; and how they 
do fight and encounter one with another; and other the 
like particularities. Amongst the which this last is of 
special use in moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set 
affection against affection, and to master one by another; 
even as we use to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird 
with bird, which otherwise percase we could not so easily 
recover: upon which foundation is erected that excellent 
use of premium and pena, whereby civil states consist: 
employing the predominant affections of fear and hope, 
for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the 
government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle 
one faction with another, so it is in the government 
within. 

7. Now come we to those points which are within our 
own command, and have force and operation upon the 
mind, to affect the will and appetite, and to alter man- 
ners: wherein they ought to have handled custom, 
exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, 
company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, 
books, studies: these as they have determinate use in 
moralities, from these the mind suffereth; and of these 
are such receipts and regiments compounded and de- 
scribed, as may serve to recover or preserve the health 
and good estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to 
human medicine: of which number we will insist upon 
some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it 
were too long to prosecute all; and therefore we do 
resume custom and habit to speak of. 

P 


210 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXII. 8 


8. The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent 
opinion, that of those things which consist by nature, 
nothing can be changed by custom; using for example, 
that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up, it will 
not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing, 
we do not learn to see or hear the better. For though 
this principle be true in things wherein nature is per- 
emptory (the reason whereof we cannot now stand to 
discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature 
admitteth a latitude. For he mought see that a strait 
glove will come more easily on with use; and that a 
wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew; and that 
by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger; and 
that by use of enduring heat or cold, we endure it the 
better, and the like: which latter sort have a nearer re- 
semblance unto that subject of manners he handleth, 
than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing 
his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit, he 
ought so much the more to have taught the manner of 
superinducing that habit: for there be many precepts 
of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there 
is of ordering the exercises of the body; whereof we will 
recite a few. 

g. The first shall be, that we beware we take not at 
the first, either too high a strain, or too weak: for if 
too high, in a diffident nature you discourage, in a con- 
fident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and so a 
sloth; and in all natures you breed a further expectation 
than can hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end: if 
too weak, of the other side, you may not look to perform 
and overcome any great task. 

1o. Another precept is, to practise all things chiefly at 
two several times, the one when the mind is best dis- 


XXII. 10. ] THE SECOND BOOK. 211 


posed, the other when it is worst disposed; that by the 
one you may gain a great step, by the other you may 
work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make 
the middle times the more easy and pleasant. 

1r. Another precept is, that which Aristotle men- 
tioneth by the way, which is to bear ever towards the 
contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature 
inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, or 
making a wand straight by bending him contrary to his’ 
natural crookedness. 

12. Another precept is, that the mind is brought to 
anything better, and with more sweetness and happiness, 
if that whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention, 
but éanguam aliud agendo, because of the natural hatred of 
the mind against necessity and constraint. Many other 
axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and 
custom; which being so conducted, doth prove indeed 
another nature; but being governed by chance, doth 

commonly prove but an ape of nature, and bringeth forth 
that which is lame and counterfeit. 

13. So if we should handle books and dies and 
what influence and operation they have upon manners, 
are there not divers precepts of great caution and direc- 
tion appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the fathers 
in great indignation call poesy vznum demonum, because 
it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? 
Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, 
wherein he saith, That young men are no fit auditors of 
moral philosophy, because they are not settled from the 
boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time 
and experience? And doth it not hereof come, that those 
excellent books and discourses of the ancient writers 
(whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most effectually, 

P2 


212 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXII. 13. 


by representing her in state and majesty, and popular 
opinions against virtue in their parasites’ coats fit to be 
scorned and derided), are of so little effect towards honesty 
of life, because they are not read and revolved by men in 
their mature and settled years, but confined almost to 
boys and beginners? But is it not true also, that much 
less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy, 
till they have been throughly seasoned in religion and 
morality; lest their judgements be corrupted, and made 
apt to think that there are no true differences of things, 
but according to utility and fortune, as the verse de- 
scribes it, Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur,; and 
again, Lile crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hic diadema: which 
the poets do speak satirically, and in indignation on 
virtue’s behalf; but books of policy do speak it seriously 
and positively; for so it pleaseth Machiavel to say, Zha) 
tf Caesar had been overthrown, he would have been more 
odious than ever was Caittline; as if there had been no 
difference, but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and 
blood, and the most excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) 
of the world? Again, is there not a caution likewise to 
be given of the doctrines of moralities themselves (some 
kinds of them), lest they make men too precise, arrogant, 
incompatible; as Cicero saith of Cato, Jz Marco Catone 
hec bona que videmus divina et egregia, ipsius scitole esse 
propria; que nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non 
a natura, sed a magwtro? Many other axioms and advices 
there are touching those proprieties and effects, which 
studies do infuse and instil into manners. And so like- 
wise is there touching the use of all those other points, 
of company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in 
the beginning in the doctrine of morality. 

14. But there is a kind of culture of the mind that 


—EE 


XXII. 14+] THE SECOND BOOK. 213 


seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest, 
and is built upon this ground; that the minds of all men 
are at some times in a state more perfect, and at other 
times in a state more depraved. ‘The purpose therefore 
of this practice is to fix and cherish the good hours of | 
the mind, and to obliterate and take forth the evil. The 
fixing of the good hath been practised by two means, 
vows or constant resolutions, and observances or ex- 
ercises; which are not to be regarded so much in 
themselves, as because they keep the mind in continual 
obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been prac- 
tised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation | 
of that which is past, and an inception or account de novo 
for the time to come. But this part seemeth sacred and 
religious, and justly; for all good moral philosophy (as 
was said) is but an handmaid to religion. 

15. Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, 
which is of all other means the most compendious and 
summary, and again, the most noble and effectual to the 
reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which 
is, the electing and propounding unto a man’s self good 
and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reason- 
able sort within his compass to attain. For if these two 
things be supposed, that a man set before him honest | 
and good ends, and again, that he be resolute, constant, 
and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould 
himself into all virtue at once. And this is indeed like 
the work of nature; whereas the other course is like the 
work of the hand. For as when a carver makes an 
image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh ; 
as if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the 
body is but a rude stone still, till such times as he comes 
to it. But contrariwise when nature makes a flower or 


214 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXII. 15. 


living creature, she formeth rudiments of all the parts at 
one time. So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man 
practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to forti- 
tude, nor the like: but when he dedicateth and applieth 
himself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the pur- 
suit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto 
him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform 
himself thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth 
excellently express himself, that it ought not to be called 
virtuous, but divine: his words are these: Jmmanitah 
autem consentaneum est opponere eam, que supra humantia- 
tem est, herotcam stve divinam virtulem: and a little after, 
Nam ut fere neque vitium neque virtus est, sic neque Det: 
sed hic quidem status altius quiddam virtute est, tlle ahiua 
guiddam a vitio, And therefore we may see what celsi- 
tude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan in 
his funeral oration; where he said, Zhat men needed to 
make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would con- 
tinue as good lords to them as Trajan had been, as if he 
had not been only an imitation of divine nature, but a 
pattern of it. But these be heathen and profane passages, 
having but a shadow of that divine state of mind, which 
religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by 
imprinting upon their souls charity, which is excellently 
called the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth 
and fasteneth all virtues together. And as it is elegantly 
said by Menander of vain love, which is but a false 
imitation of divine love, Amor melior Sophista levo ad 
humanam vitam, that love teacheth a man to carry himself 
better than the sophist or preceptor, which he calleth 
left-handed, because, with all his rules and preceptions, 
he cannot form a man so dexteriously, nor with that 
facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can 


Se ne eR 


nisin hate ea 


XXII. 15. ] THE SECOND BOOK. 215 


do: so certainly, if a man’s mind be truly inflamed with | 
charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection 
than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a 
sophist in comparison of the other. Nay further, as 
Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though 
they raise the mind, yet they do it by distorting and 
uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses; but only love doth 
exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth 
settle and compose it: so in all other excellencies, though 
they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess. Only 
charity admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to 
be like God in power, the angels transgressed and fell; 
Ascendam, et ero similis altissimo: by aspiring to be like 
God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; £rz¢s 
sicut Diz, scientes bonum et malum: but by aspiring to a 


similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor | 


angel ever transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto 
that imitation we are called: Dvligtte tnimicos vestros, 
benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, ef orate pro persequentibus et 
calumniantibus vos, ut stits filit Patris vestri qui in calis 
est, qui solem suum oriri factt super bonos et malos, et plutt 
super justos et injustos. So in the first platform of the 
divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, 
Optimus Maximus: and the sacred scriptures thus, J/zserz- 
cordia ejus super omnia opera ejus. 

16. Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral know- 
ledge, concerning the culture and regiment of the mind; 
wherein if any man, considering the parts thereof which 


I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but — 


to collect into an art or science that which hath been 
pretermitted by others, as matter of common sense and 
experience, he judgeth well. But as Philocrates sported 
with Demosthenes, You may not marvel (Athenians) that 


: 
| 


216 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXII. 16, 


Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I 
drink wine; and like as we read of an ancient parable of 
the two gates of sleep, 

Sunt gemine somni porte: quarum altera fertur 

Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris; 


Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto, 
Sed falsa ad coelum mittunt insomnia manes; 


so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a 
sure maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor 
(of wine) is the more vaporous, and the braver gate (of 
ivory) sendeth forth the falser dreams. 

17. But we have now concluded that general part of 
human philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, 
and as he consisteth of body and spirit. Wherein we may 
further note, that there seemeth to be a relation or con- 
formity between the good of the mind and the good of 
the body. For as we divided the good of the body into 
health, beauty, strength, and pleasure; so the good of 
the mind, inquired in rational and moral knowledges, 
tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without 
perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and 
strong and agile for all duties of life. These three, as in 
the body, so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly 
sever. For it is easy to observe, that many have strength 
of wit and courage, but have neither health from per- 
turbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings: 
some again have an elegancy and fineness of carriage, 
which have neither soundness of honesty, nor substance 
of sufficiency: and some again have honest and reformed 
minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage 
business: and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely 
all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise determined 
that the mind ought not to be reduced to stupid, but to 


ici la el 


XXII. 17. ] THE SECOND BOOK. 217 


retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it, than 
in the strength and vigour of it. 


XXIII. 1. Ge knowledge is conversant about a 
subject which of all others is most 
immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom. 
Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, That the Romans 
were like sheep, for that a man were betler drive a flock of 
them, than one of them; for ina flock, of you could get but 
some few go right, the rest would follow: so in that respect 
moral philosophy is more difficile than policy. Again, 
moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of 
internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an 
external goodness; for that as to society sufficeth. And 
therefore it cometh oft to pass that there be evil times 
in good governments: for so we find in the holy story, 
when the kings were good, yet it is added, Sed adhuc 
populus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum 
suorum. Again, states, as great engines, move slowly, 
and are not so soon put out of frame: for as in Egypt 
the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so govern- 
ments for a time well grounded, do bear out errors fol- 
lowing; but the resolution of particular persons is more 
suddenly subverted. ‘These respects do somewhat qualify 
the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge. 

2. This knowledge hath three parts, according to 
the three summary actions of society; which are con- 
versation, negotiation, and government. For man seeketh 
in society comfort, use, and protection: and they be three 
wisdoms of divers natures, which do often sever: wisdom 
of the behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of 
state. 

3. The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over 


\ 


218 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. | XXII. 3- 


much affected, but much less despised; for it hath not 
only an honour in itself, but an influence also into busi- 
ness and government. The poet saith, ec vultu destrue 
verba tuo: a man may destroy the force of his words 
with his countenance: so may he of his deeds, saith 
Cicero, recommending to his brother affability and easy 
access; lVil interest habere ostium apertum, vullum clausum ; 
it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and 
to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. 
So we see Atticus, before the first interview between 
Cesar and Cicero, the war depending, did seriously 
advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of 
his countenance and gesture. And if the government of 
the countenance be of such effect, much more is that 
of the speech, and other carriage appertaining to con- 
versation ; the true model whereof seemeth to me well ex- 
pressed by Livy, thought not meant for this purpose: Ve 
aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxtus; quorum alterum est 
aliene libertatts oblitt, alterum sue: the sum of behaviour 
is to retain a man’s own dignity, without intruding upon 
the liberty of others. On the other side, if behaviour 
and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may 
pass into affectation, and then Quid deformius quam 
scenam in vitam transferre, to act a man’s life? But 
although it proceed not to that extreme, yet it consumeth 
time, and employeth the mind too much. And therefore 
as we use to advise young students from company 
keeping, by saying, Amuzct fures temporis: so certainly the 
intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief 
of meditation. Again, such as are accomplished in that 
form of urbanity please themselves in it, and seldom 
aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in 
it do seek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation 


eae Ie RS 


XXL. 3. | THE SECOND BOOK. 219 


is, almost everything becometh; but where that is 
not, it must be supplied by puntos and compliments. 
Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an 
over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of 
decency, which is time and season. For as Salomon 
saith, Qui respictt ad ventos, non seminal; et quit respictt 
ad nubes, non metet: a2 man must make his opportunity, 


as oft as find it. ‘To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me 


as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of 
a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it 
ought not to be too curious; it ought to be shaped so as 
to set forth any good making of the mind and hide any 
deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait or 
restrained for exercise or motion. But this part of civil 
knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I 
cannot report it for deficient. 

4. The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath 
not been hitherto collected into writing, to De negotiis 
the great derogation of learning, and the  serendis. 
professors of learning: For from this root springeth 
chiefly that note or opinion, which by us is expressed in 
adage to this effect, that there is no great concurrence 
between learning and wisdom. For of the three wisdoms 
which we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom 


of behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part de- \_- 


spised, as an inferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation; 
for wisdom of government, they acquit themselves well 
when they are called to it, but that happeneth to few; 
but for the wisdom of business, wherein man’s life is most 
conversant, there be no books of it, except some few 
scattered advertisements, that have no proportion to the 
magnitude of this subject. For if books were written of 
this as the other, [ doubt not but learned men with mean 


220 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXIII. 4: 


experience, would far excel men of long experience with- 
out learning, and outshoot them in their own bow. 

5. Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this 
knowledge should be so variable as it falleth not under 
precept; for it is much less infinite than science of govern- 
ment, which we see is laboured and in some part re- 
duced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient 
Romans in the saddest and wisest times were professors ; 
for Cicero reporteth, that it was then in use for senators 
that had name and opinion for general wise men, as 
Coruncanius, Curius, Leelius, and many others, to walk 
at certain hours in the Place, and to give audience to 
those that would use their advice; and that the particular 
citizens would resort unto them, and consult with them of 
the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing of a son, 
or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and 
every other occasion incident to man’s life. So as there 
is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private causes, 
arising out of an universal insight into the affairs of the 
world; which is used indeed upon particular cases pro- 
pounded, but is gathered by general observation of cases 
of like nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero 
writeth to his brother, De petitione consulatus (being the 
only book of business that I know written by the ancients), 
although it concerned a particular action then on foot, 
yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and 
politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a 
perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But 
chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place 
amongst divine writings, composed by Salomon the king, 
of whom the scriptures testify that his heart was as the 
sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly 
matters, we see, I say, not a few profound and excellent 


pee Ng eG a ee ee ea 


.XXIIL 5.] THE SECOND BOOK. 221 


cautions, precepts, positions, extending to much variety 
of occasions; whereupon we will stay a while, offering to 
consideration some number of examples. 

6. Sed ef cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes 
aurem tuam, ne forle audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi. 
Here is commended the provident stay of inquiry of that 
which we would be loth to find: as it was judged great 
wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’ 
papers unperused, 

Vir sapiens, st cum stulto contendertt, sive trascatur, 
sive rideat, non inveniet requiem. Here is described the 
great disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking 
a lighter person than himself; which is such an engage- 
ment as, whether a man turn the matter to jest, or turn it 
to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways 
quit himself well of it. 

Quit delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum, postea sentiet 
eum contumacem. Here is signified, that if a man begin 
too high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly end in 
unkindness and unthankfulness. 

Vidistt virum velocem in opere suo? coram regtbus stabi, 
nec ertt inter ignobiles. Here is observed, that of all virtues 
for rising to honour, quickness of despatch is the. best; 
for superiors many times love not to have those they 
employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and diligent. 

Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole, cum adoles- 
cente secundo quit consurgit pro eo. Here is expressed that 
which was noted by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius; 
Plures adorant solem orientem quam occidentem vel meri- 
dianum. 

St spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum 
tuum ne dimiseris; quia curatio faciet cessare peccata 
maxima. Here caution is given, that upon displeasure, 


2,2, OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [XXIII. 6. 


retiring is of all courses the unfittest; for a man leaveth 
things at worst, and depriveth himself of means to make 
them better. 

Erat ctvitas parva, et pauct tn ea virt: ventt contra eam 
rex magnus, et vallavit eam, tnstruxttque munitiones per 
gyrum, et perfecta est obsidio; inventusque est in ea vir 
pauper et saptens, et liberavit eam per sapientiam suam; et 
nullus deinceps recordatus est homints tllius pauperis. Here 
the corruption of states is set forth, that esteem not virtue 
or merit longer than they have use of it. 

Mollis responsio frangit tram. Here is noted that 
silence or rough answer exasperateth; but an answer 
present and temperate pacifieth. 

Iter pigrorum quast sepes spinarum. Here is lively 
represented how laborious sloth proveth in the end: for 
when things are deferred till the last instant, and nothing 
prepared beforehand, every step findeth a brier or im- 
pediment, which catcheth or stoppeth. 

Melior est fints orationis quam principium. Here is 
taxed the vanity of formal speakers, that study more about 
prefaces and inducements, than upon the conclusions and 
issues of speech. 

Quz cognoscit in Judicio factem, non bene facit; iste et pro 
buccella pants deseret veritatem. Tere is noted, that a 
judge were better be a briber than a respecter of per- 
sons; for a corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly as a 
facile. 

Vir pauper calumnians pauperes similis est imbri vehem- 
enit, in quo paratur fames. Here is expressed the ex- 
tremity of necessitous extortions, figured in the ancient 
fable of the full and the hungry horseleech. 

Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupia, est justus cadens 
coram impio. Were is noted, that one judicial and 


ar a ee rage ah Tae a 


ER OW A RE ee oe a ee ae a ee 


XXIII, 6.] THE SECOND BOOK. 223 


exemplar iniquity in the face of the world doth trouble 
the fountains of justice more than many particular injuries 
passed over by connivance. 

Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et dictt hoc non 
esse peccaium, particeps est homicidiz, Here is noted, that 
whereas men in wronging their best friends use to ex- 
tenuate their fault, as if they mought presume or be bold 
upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their 
fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety. 

Noli esse amicus homint tracundo, nec ambulato cum 
homine furioso. Were caution is given, that in the election 
of our friends we do principally avoid those which are 
impatient, as those that will espouse us to many factions 
and quarrels. 

Qui’ conturbat domum suam, possidebit ventum. Tere 
is noted, that in domestical separations and breaches men 
do promise to themselves quieting of their mind and con- 
tentment; but still they are deceived of their expectation, 
and it turneth to wind. 

Filius sapiens letifical patrem: filius vero stultus mestitia 
est mairi sue. Here is distinguished, that fathers have 
most comfort of the good proof of their sons; but 
mothers have most discomfort of their ill proof, because 
women have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune. 

Quiz celat delictum, quertt amictiiam,; sed qui allero ser- 
mone repetit, separat federatos. Here caution is given, that 
reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty, and 
passing over that which is past, than by apologies and 
excusations. 

In omni opere bono ertt abundantia; ubi autem verba 
sunt plurima, tbi frequenter egestas. Here is noted, that 
words and discourse aboundeth most where there is 
idleness and want. 


224 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [ XXIII. 6. 


Primus in sua causa justus; sed venit altera pars, et 
inguiret in eum. Here is observed, that in all causes 
the first tale possesseth much; in sort, that the pre- 
judice thereby wrought will be hardly removed, except 
some abuse or falsity in the information be detected. 

Verba bilinguis quast simplicta, et ipsa perventunt ad 
tntertora ventris. Here is distinguished, that flattery 
and insinuation, which seemeth set and artificial, sink- 
eth not far; but that entereth deep which hath show of 
nature, liberty, and simplicity. 

Qut erudit derisorem, tpse sibt injuriam Sactt ; ef quit 
arguit impium, stbt maculam generat. Here caution is 
given how we tender reprehension to arrogant and scorn- 
ful natures, whose manner is to esteem it for contumely, 
and accordingly to return it. 

Da sapienti occastonem, et addetur et sapientta. Here is 
distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that 
which is but verbal and swimming only in conceit; for 
the one upon the occasion presented is quickened and 
redoubled, the other is amazed and confused. 

Quomodo tn aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic 
corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus. Here the mind 
of a wise man is compared to a glass, wherein the images 
of all diversity of natures and customs are represented ; 
from which representation proceedeth that application, 

Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit. 

”. Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these 
sentences politic of Salomon than is agreeable to the 
proportion of an example; led with a desire to give 
authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as 
deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also 
attended them with brief observations, such as to my 
understanding offer no violence to the sense, though I 


XXIII. 7.] THE SECOND BOOK. — 225 


know they may be applied to a more divine use: but 
it is allowed, even in divinity, that some interpretations, 
yea, and some writings, have more of the eagle than 
others; but taking them as instructions for life, they 
mought have received large discourse, if I would have 
broken them and illustrated them by deducements and 
examples. 

8. Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but 
it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the more 
ancient times; that as men found out any observation 
that they thought was good for life, they would gather 
it and express it in parable or aphorism or fable. But 


for fables, they were vicegerents and supplies where’ 


examples failed: now that the times abound with his- 
tory, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And 
therefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest 
for this variable argument of negotiation and occasions 
is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for govern- 
ment; namely, discourse upon histories or examples. For 
knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of particu- 
lars, knoweth the way best to particulars again. And it 
hath much greater life for practice when the discourse 
attendeth upon the example, than when the example 
attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of 
order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance. For 
when the example is the ground, being set down in an 
history at large, it is set down with all circumstances, 
which may sometimes: control the discourse thereupon 
made, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern for 
action; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse’s 
sake are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and 
carry a servile aspect towards the discourse which they 
are brought in to make good. 
Q 


226 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXIII. 9. 


g. But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, 
that as history of times is the best ground for discourse 
of government, such as Machiavel handleth, so histories 
of lives is the most proper for discourse of business, 
because it is more conversant in private actions. Nay, 
there is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter 
than them both, which is discourse upon letters, such 
as are wise and weighty, as many are of Cicero ad 
Afticum, and others. For letters have a great and more 
particular representation of business than either chronicles 
or lives. ‘Thus have we spoken both of the matter and 
form of this part of civil knowledge, touching negotiation, 
which we note to be deficient. 

10. But yet there is another part of this part, which 
differeth as much from that whereof we have spoken 
as sapere and szbt sapere, the one moving as it were to 
the circumference, the other to the centre. For there 
is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom 
of pressing a man’s own fortune; and they do some- 
times meet, and often sever. For many are wise in 
their own ways that are weak for government or coun- 
sels; like ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but 
very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans 
did take much knowledge of: Mam fol sapiens (saith the 
comical poet) fing:t fortunam sibt; and it grew to an 
adage, Maver guisque fortune proprie; and Livy aittri- 
buted it to Cato the first, Zz hoc viro tanta vis animé 
et ingenit tnerat, ut quocungue loco natus esset stbi ipse 
Jortunam facturus videretur. 

11. This conceit or position, if it be too much declared 
and professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and 
unlucky, as was observed in Timotheus the Athenian, 
who, having done many great services to the estate in 


XXIII. 11.| THE SECOND BOOK. 227 


his government, and giving an account thereof to the 
people as the manner was, did conclude every particu- 
lar with this clause, And in this fortune had no part. 
And it came so to pass, that he never prospered in any 
thing he took in hand afterward. For this is too high and 
too arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of 
Pharaoh, Dicis, Pluvius est meus ef ego fect’ memet ipsum: 
or of that which another prophet speaketh, that men offer 
sacrifices to their nets and snares; and that which the 
poet expresseth, 


Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro, 
Nunc adsint! 


For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and un- 
blessed: and therefore those that were great politiques 
indeed ever ascribed their successes to their felicity, and 
not to their skill or virtue. For so Sylla surnamed him- 
self Felix, not Magnus. So Cesar said to the master of 
the ship, Cesarem portas et fortunam ejus. 

12. But yet nevertheless these positions, Mader quis- 
que fortune sue: Sapiens dominabitur astris: Invia virtutt 
nulla est via, and the like, being taken and used as spurs 
to industry, and not as stirrups to insolency, rather for 
resolution than for the presumption or outward de- 
claration, have been ever thought sound and good; and 
are no question imprinted in the greatest minds, who 
are so sensible of this opinion, as they can scarce con- 
tain it within. As we see in Augustus Cesar (who was 
rather diverse from his uncle than inferior in virtue), how 
when he died he desired his friends about him to give 
him a plaudite, as if he were conscient to himself that he 
had played his part well upon the stage. This part of 
knowledge we do report also as deficient: not but that it 
is practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to 

Q2 


228 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXIII. 12. 


writing. And therefore lest it should seem to any that 
‘Faber for. it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is re- 
tune, sivede quisite, as we did in the former, that we 
ambitu vite. set down some heads or passages of it. 

13. Wherein it may appear at the first a new and un- 
wonted argument to teach men how to raise and make 
their fortune; a doctrine wherein every man perchance 
will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till he see the 
difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as 
virtue; and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a 
true politique, as to be truly moral. But the handling 
hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and 
in substance. In honour, because pragmatical men may 
not go away with an opinion that learning is like a lark, 
that can mount, and sing, and please herself, and nothing 
else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk, 
that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon 
the prey. In substance, because it is the perfect law of 
inquiry of truth, that nothing be in the globe of matter, 
which should not be likewise in the globe of crystal, or 
form; that is, that there be not any thing in being and 
action, which should not be drawn and collected into con- 
templation and doctrine. Neither doth learning admire 
or esteem of this architecture of fortune, otherwise than 
as of an inferior work: for no man’s fortune can be 
an end worthy of his being; and many times the worthi- 
est men do abandon their fortune willingly for better 
respects: but nevertheless fortune as an organ of virtue 
and merit deserveth the consideration. 

14. First therefore the precept which I conceive to 
be most summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to 
obtain that window which Momus did require: who see- 
ing in the frame of man’s heart such angles and recesses, 


XXIII. 14. | THE SECOND BOOK. 229 


found fault there was not a window to look into them; 
that is, to procure good informations of particulars 
touching persons, their natures, their desires and ends, 
their customs and fashions, their helps and advantages, 
and whereby they chiefly stand: so again their weak- 
nesses and disadvantages, and where they lie most 
open and obnoxious; their friends, factions, depend- 
ences; and again their opposites, enviers, competitors, 
their moods and times, So/a virt molles adilus ef tempora 
noras; their principles, rules, and observations, and the 
like: and this not only of persons, but of actions; what 
are on foot from time to time, and how they are con- 
ducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and the 
like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only 
material in itself, but without it also the knowledge of 
persons is very erroneous: for men change with the 
actions; and whiles they are in pursuit they are one, and 
when they return to their nature they are another. These 
informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, 
are as the minor propositions in every active syllogism ; 
for no excellency of observations (which are as the major 
propositions) can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there 
be error and mistaking in the minors. 

1g. That this knowledge is possible, Salomon is our 
surety, who saith, Comsilium in corde virt tanquam aqua 
profunda; sed vir prudens exhauriet tllud, And although 
the knowledge itself falleth not under precept, because it 
is of individuals, yet the instructions for the obtaining of 
it may. 

16. We will begin therefore with this precept, accord- 
ing to the ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom 
are slowness of belief and distrust; that more trust be 
given to countenances and deeds than to words; and in 


230 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 16. 


words rather to sudden passages and surprised words 
than to set and purposed words. Neither let that be 
feared which is said, Yrontt nulla fides, which is meant of 
a general outward behaviour, and not of the private and 
subtile motions and labours of the countenance and 
gesture; which, as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is Amzmz 
janua, the gate of the mind. None more close than 
Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, Evenim vultu 
offensionem conjectaverat. So again, noting the differing 
character and manner of his commending Germanicus 
and Drusus in the senate, he saith, touching his fashion 
wherein he carried his speech of Germanicus, thus; 
Magis tn spectem adornatis verbis, quam ut penttus sentire 
crederetur: but of Drusus thus; Pauctortbus sed intentior, 
et fida oratione: and in another place, speaking of his 
character of speech, when he did any thing that was 
gracious and popular, he saith, that in other things he 
was velut eluctaniium verborum; but then again, solusius 
loguebatur quando subveniret. So that there is no such 
artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded coun- 
tenance (vulfus jussus), that can sever from a feigned 
tate some of these fashions, either a more slight and 
careless fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious 
and wandering, or coming from a man more drily and 
hardly. 

17. Neither are deeds such assured pledges, as that 
they may be trusted without a judicious consideration of 
their magnitude and nature: Fraus sibi tn parvis fidem 
presiruit ut majore emolumento fallat; and the Italian 
thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, 
when he is better used than he was wont to be without 
manifest cause. For small favours, they do but lull men 
asleep, both as to caution and as to industry; and are, as 


XXIII. 17.] THE SECOND BOOK. 231 


Demosthenes calleth them, A/:mentfa socordi@a. So again 
we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that 
particular which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Pri- 
mus, upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcilement which 
was made between them; whereupon Mutianus advanced 
many of the friends of Antonius, Simul amicis gus pre- 
fecturas et tribunatus largitur: wherein, under pretence to 
strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from him 
his dependences. 

18. As for words, though they be like waters to phy- 
sicians, full of flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to 
be despised, specially with the advantage of passion and 
affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a stinging and 
incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his 
dissimulation, when he said, You are hurt because you do 
not reign; of which Tacitus saith, Audifa hac raram 
occultt pectoris vocem elicuere ; correplamque Graco versu 
admonutt, tdeo ledt quia non regnaret. And therefore the 
poet doth elegantly call passions tortures, that urge men 
to confess their secrets : 

Vino tortus et ira. 

And experience showeth, there are few men so true to 
themselves and so settled, but that, sometimes upon heat, 
sometimes upon bravery, sometimes upon kindness, some- 
times upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open 
themselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter- 
dissimulation, according to the proverb of Spain, Di men- 
tira, y sacaras verdad: Teil a lie and find a truth. 

19. As for the knowing of men which is at second 
hand from reports ; men’s weaknesses and faults are best 
known from their enemies, their virtues and abilities from 
their friends, their customs and times from their servants, 
their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends, 


232 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, | XXIII. 19. 


with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, 
and the opinions conceived by superiors or equals are 
deceitful; for to such men are more masked: Verior 
Jama e domesticis emanat. | 

20. But the soundest disclosing and expounding of 
men is by their natures and ends, wherein the weakest 
sort of men are best interpreted by their natures, and the 
wisest by their ends. For it was both pleasantly and 
wisely said (though I think very untruly) by a nuncio 
of the pope, returning from a certain nation where he 
served as lidger; whose opinion being asked touching 
the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished 
that in any case they did not send one that was too wise; 
because no very wise man would ever imagine what they 
in that country were like to do. And certainly it is an 
error frequent for men to shoot over, and to suppose 
deeper ends, and more compass reaches than are: the 
Italian proverb being elegant, and for the most part true: 


Di danari, di senno, e di fede, 
C’é ne manco che non credi: 


There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less 
good faith than men do account upon. . 

21. But princes, upon a far other reason, are best 
interpreted by their natures, and private persons by their 
ends. For princes being at the top of human desires, 
they have for the most part no particular ends whereto 
they aspire, by distance from which a man mought take 
measure and scale of the rest of their actions and desires ; 
which is one of the causes that maketh their hearts more 
inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to inform ourselves 
in men’s ends and natures of the variety of them only, 
but also of the predominancy, what humour reigneth 


ati aAtiD sat comennce incest Sgtagphied dteeisusine digitata alan tation 


| 
| 
| 
| 


XXIII. 21.] THE SECOND BOOK. 233 


most, and what end is principally sought. For so we 
see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by Petronius 
Turpilianus in Nero’s humours of pleasures, me/us ¢jus 
rimatur, he wrought upon Nero’s fears, whereby he brake 
the other’s neck. 

22. But to all this part of inquiry the most com- 
pendious way resteth in three things: the first, to have 
general acquaintance and inwardness with those which 
have general acquaintance and look most into the world; 
and specially according to the diversity of business, and 
the diversity of persons, to have privacy and conversation 
with some one friend at least which is perfect and well 
intelligenced in every several kind. The second is to 
keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy ; 
in most things liberty: secrecy where it importeth; for 
liberty of speech inviteth and provoketh liberty to be 
used again, and so bringeth much to a man’s knowledge; 
and secrecy on the other side induceth trust and inward- 
ness. The last is the reducing of a man’s self to this 
watchful and serene habit, as to make account and 
purpose, in every conference and action, as well to 
observe as to act. For as Epictetus would have a phi- 
losopher in every particular action to say to himself, £7 
hoc volo, et etiam institutum servare; so a politic man in 
everything should say to himself, Z¢ hoc volo, ac etiam 
aliquid addiscere. I have stayed the longer upon this 
precept of obtaining good information, because it is a 
main part by itself, which answereth to all the rest. But, 
above all things, caution must be taken that men have 
a good stay and hold of themselves, and that this much 
knowing do not draw on much meddling; for nothing is 
more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in 
many matters. So that this variety of knowledge tendeth 


234 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII 22. 


in conclusion but only to this, to make a better and freer 
choice of those actions which may concern us, and 
to conduct them with the less error and the more 
dexterity. 

23. The second precept concerning this knowledge is, 
for men to take good information touching their own 
person, and well to understand themselves: knowing 
that, as S. James saith, though men look oft in a glass, 
yet they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein as 
the divine glass is the word of God, so the politic glass 
is the state of the world, or times wherein we live, in the 
which we are to behold ourselves. 

24. For men ought to take an unpartial view of their 
own abilities and virtues; and again of their wants and 
impediments; accounting these with the most, and those 
other with the least; and from this view and examination 
to frame the considerations following. 

25. First, to consider how the constitution of their 
nature sorteth with the general state of the times; which 
if they find agreeable and fit, then in all things to give 
themselves more scope and liberty; but if differing and 
dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to be 
more close retired, and reserved: as we see in Tiberius, 
who was never seen at a play, and came not into the 
Senate in twelve of his last years; whereas Augustus 
Czesar lived ever in men’s eyes, which Tacitus observeth, 
alia Tiberio morum v1a. 

26. Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with 
professions and courses of life, and accordingly to make 
election, if they be free; and, if engaged, to make the 
departure at the first opportunity: as we see was done 
by Duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to a 
sacerdotal profession, but quitted it soon after in regard 


PO LRN OLE 


XXII. 26.] THE SECOND BOOK. 235 


of his parts and inclination ; being such, nevertheless, 
aS a man cannot tell well whether they were worse for 
a prince or for a priest, 

27. Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom 
they are like to have competitors and concurrents ; and to 
take that course wherein there is most solitude, and them- 
selves like to be most eminent: as Cesar Julius did, who 
at first was an orator or pleader; but when he saw the 
excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others, 
for eloquence, and saw there was no man of reputation 
for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom the state was 
forced to rely, he forsook his course begun toward a 
civil and popular greatness, and transferred his designs 
to a martial greatness. 

28. Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and de- 
pendences, to proceed according to the composition of 
their own nature: as we may see in Cesar, all whose 
friends and followers were men active and effectual, but 
not solemn, or of reputation. 

29. Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide them- 
selves by examples, in thinking they can do as they see 
others do; whereas perhaps their natures and carriages 
are far differing. In which error it seemeth Pompey was, 
of whom Cicero saith, that he was wont often to say, 
Sylla potuit, ego non potero? Wherein he was much 
abused, the natures and proceedings of himself and his 
example being the unlikest in the world; the one being 
fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn, 
and full of majesty and circumstance, and therefore the 
less effectual. 

But this precept touching the politic knowledge of our- 
selves hath many other branches; whereupon we cannot 
insist, 


236 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. { XXIII. 30. 


30. Next to the well understanding and discerning of 
a man’s self, there followeth the well opening and re- 
vealing a man’s self; wherein we see nothing more 
usual than for the more able man to make the less 
show. For there is a great advantage in the well set- 
ting forth of a man’s virtues, fortunes, merits; and 
again, in the artificial covering of a man’s weaknesses, 
defects, disgraces; staying upon the one, sliding from 
the other; cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing 
the other by exposition, and the like. Wherein we see 
what Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the greatest 
politique of his time, Omnium gue dixeral feceratque arte 
quadam osteniator: which requireth indeed some art, lest 
it turn tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation 
(though it be to the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me 
rather a vice in manners than in policy: for as it is said, 
Audacter calumniare, semper aliquid heret: so, except it 
be in a ridiculous degree of deformity, Audacter te vendita, 
semper aliquid heret, For it will stick with the more 
ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom 
and rank do smile at it and despise it; and yet the 
authority won with many doth countervail the disdain 
ofafew. But if it be carried with decency and govern- 
ment, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; 
or at times when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety 
(as in military persons) ; or at times when others are most 
envied ; or with easy and careless passage to it and from 
it, without dwelling too long, or being too serious; or 
with an equal freedom of taxing a man’s self, as well 
as gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling or put- 
ting down others’ injury or insolency; it doth greatly 
add to reputation: and surely not a few solid natures, 
that want this ventosity and cannot sail in the height 


askacalii 


XXIII, 30.] THE SECOND BOOK. 237 


of the winds, are not without some prejudice and disad- 
vantage by their moderation. 

31. But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, 
as they are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least 
necessary that virtue be not disvalued and imbased under 
the just price; which is done in three manners: by of- 
fering and obtruding a man’s self; wherein men think he 
is rewarded, when he is accepted; by doing too much, 
which will not give that which is well done leave to settle, 
and in the end induceth satiety; and by finding too soon 
the fruit of a man’s virtue, in commendation, applause, 
honour, favour; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, 
let him hear what is truly said; Cave ne insuetus rebus 
majortbus videaris, si hec te res parva sicuti magna delectal. 

32. But the covering of defects is of no less importance 
than the valuing of good parts; which may be done like- 
wise in three manners, by caution, by colour, and by con- 
fidence. Caution is when men do ingeniously and dis- 
creetly avoid to be put into those things for which they 
are not proper: whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet 
spirits will thrust themselves into matters without differ- 
ence, and so publish and proclaim all their wants. Colour 
is when men make a way for themselves to have a con- 
struction made of their faults or wants, as proceeding 
from a better cause or intended for some other purpose. 
For of the one it is well said, 

Szpe latet vitium proximitate boni, 
and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see 
that he pretend the virtue that shadoweth it; as if he 
be dull, he must affect gravity; if a coward, mildness; 
and so the rest. For the second, a man must frame some 
probable cause why he should not do his best, and why 
he should dissemble his abilities; and for that purpose 


238 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. | XXIII. 32. 


must use to dissemble those abilities which are notorious 
in him, to give colour that his true wants are but in- 
dustries and dissimulations. For confidence, it is the last 
but the surest remedy; namely, to depress and seem to 
despise whatsoever a man cannot attain; observing the 
good principle of the merchants, who endeavour to raise 
the price of their own commodities, and to beat down the 
price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth 
this other; which is to face out a man’s own defects, 
in seeming to conceive that he is best in those things 
wherein he is failing ; and, to help that again, to seem on 
the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in 
those things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it 
commonly in poets, that if they show their verses, and you 
except to any, they will say Zhat that line cost them more 
labour than any of the rest; and presently will seem to 
disable and suspect rather some other line, which they 
know well enough to be the best in the number. But above 
all, in this righting and helping of a man’s self in his own 
carriage, he must take heed he show not himself dis- 
mantled and exposed to scorn and injury, by too much 
dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show 
some sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind 
of fortified carriage, with a ready rescussing of a man’s 
self from scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed upon 
men by somewhat in their person or fortune; but it ever 
succeedeth with good felicity. 

33. Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible 
endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient 
to occasion; for nothing hindereth men’s fortunes so 
much as this: Jdem manebat, neque idem decebat, men are 
where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore 
to Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, 


XXIII. 33.] THE SECOND BOOK. 239 


he addeth that he had versatile ingenium. And thereof 
it cometh that these grave solemn wits, which must be 
like themselves and cannot make departures, have more 
dignity than felicity. But in some it is nature to be 
somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and not easy to turn. 
In some it is a conceit that is almost a nature, which is, 
that men can hardly make themselves believe that they 
ought to change their course, when they have found good 
by it in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely, 
how Fabius Maximus would have been temporizing still, 
according to his old bias, when the nature of the war 
was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other 
it is want of point and penetration in their judgement, 
that they do not discern when things have a period, but 
come in too late after the occasion; as Demosthenes 
compareth the people of Athens to country fellows, when 
they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then 
they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. 
In some other it is a lothness to leese labours passed, and 
a conceit that they can bring about occasions to their ply ; 
and yet in the end, when they see no other remedy, then 
they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that 
gave for the third part of Sibylla’s books the treble price, 
when he mought at first have had all three for the simple. 
But from whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of 
mind proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial; and 
nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our 
mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune. 
34. Another precept of this knowledge, which hath 
some affinity with that we last spake of, but with differ- 
ence, is that which is well expressed, Fats accede detsque, 
that men do not only turn with the occasions, but also 
run with the occasions, and not strain their credit or 


of 


240 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXIII. 34. 


strength to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in 
their actions that which is most passable: for this will 
preserve men from foil, not occupy them too much about 
one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the most, 
and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they under- 
take; which cannot but mightily increase reputation. 

35. Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have 
some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I 
understand it; and it is that which Demosthenes uttereth 
in high terms; Z¢ guemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum 
ducat tmperator, sic et a cordatis virts res ipse ducende@ ; 
ut que tpsis videntur, ea gerantur, et non ipst eventus per- 
segut coganitur. Yor if we observe we shall find two 
differing kinds of sufficiency in managing of business: 
some can make use of occasions aptly and dexterously, 
but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own plots 
well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of 
which is very unperfect without the other. 

36. Another part of this knowledge is the observing a 
good mediocrity in the declaring, or not declaring a man’s 
self: for although depth of secrecy, and making way 
(gualis est via navis in mart, which the French calleth 
sourdes menées, when men set things in work without 
opening themselves at all), be sometimes both prosperous 
and admirable; yet many times diss¢mulatio errores parit, 
gui dissimulatorem ipsum ilaqueant. And therefore we 
see the greatest politiques have in a natural and free 
manner professed their desires, rather than been reserved 
and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla 
made a kind of profession, that he wished all men happy or 
unhappy, as they stood his friends or enemies. So Cesar, 
when he went first into Gaul, made no scruple to profess 
That he had rather be first in a village than second at Rome. 


* 


a i ia 


XXIII. 36. | THE SECOND BOOK. 241 


So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what 
Cicero saith of him, A//er (meaning of Cesar). non recusat, 
sed quodammodo postulat, ut (ut est) stc appelletur tyrannus. 
So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that 
Augustus Czsar, in his very entrance into affairs, when 
he was a darling of the senate, yet in his harangues to 
the people would swear, J/a parentis honores consequi liceat 
(which was no less than the tyranny), save that, to help 
it, he would stretch forth his hand towards a statua of 
Czesar’s that was erected in the place: and men laughed, 
and wondered, and said, Is it possible? or, Did you ever 
hear the like? and yet thought he meant no hurt; he did 
it so handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were 
prosperous: whereas Pompey, who tended to the same 
ends, but in a more dark and dissembling manner, as 
Tacitus saith of him, Occulfor non melior, wherein Sal- 
lust concurreth, Ore probo, animo inverecundo, made it his 
design, by infinite secret engines, to cast the state into 
an absolute anarchy and confusion, that the state mought 
cast itself into his arms for necessity and protection, and 
so the sovereign power be put upon him, and he never 
seen in it: and when he had brought it (as he thought) 
to that point, when he was chosen consul alone, as never 
any was, yet he could make no great matter of it, because 
men understood him not; but was fain in the end to go 
the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by colour 
of the doubt of Czsar’s designs: so tedious, casual, and 
unfortunate are these deep dissimulations: whereof it 
seemeth Tacitus made this judgement, that they were 
a cunning of an inferior form in regard of true policy; 
attributing the one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius; 
where, speaking of Livia, he saith, Z/ cum artibus mariti 
simulatione filid bene composita: for surely the continual 
R 


242 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXIII. 36. 


habit of dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, 
and not greatly politic. 

37. Another precept of this architecture of fortune is 
to accustom our minds to judge of the proportion or 
value of things, as they conduce and are material to our 
particular ends: and that to do substantially, and not 
superficially. For we shall find the logical part (as 1 may 
term it) of some men’s minds good, but the mathematical 
part erroneous; that is, they can well judge of conse- 
quences, but not of proportions and comparison, pre- 
ferring things of show and sense before things of sub- 
stance and effect. So some fall in love with access to 
princes, others with popular fame and applause, sup- 
posing they are things of great purchase, when in many 
cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. 
So some measure things according to the labour and 
difficulty or assiduity which are spent about them; and 
think, if they be ever moving, that they must needs 
advance and proceed; as Cesar saith in a despising 
manner of Cato the second, when he describeth how 
laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose, 
Hee omnia magno studio agebat. So in most things men 
are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest 
means to be best, when it should be the fittest. 

38. As for the true marshalling of men’s pursuits 
towards their fortune, as they are more or less material, 
I hold them to stand thus. First the amendment of their 
own minds. For the remove of the impediments of the 
mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune, than the 
obtaining fortune will remove the impediments of the 
mind. In the second place I set down wealth and 
means; which I know most men would have placed first, 
because of the general use which it beareth towards all 


: XXIII. 38.] THE SECOND BOOK. 243 


variety of occasions. But that opinion I may condemn 
with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that 
moneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) 
the true sinews of the wars are the sinews of men’s arms, 
that is, a valiant, populous, and military nation: and he 
voucheth aptly the authority of Solon, who, when Croesus 
showed him his treasury of gold, said to him, that if 
another came that had better iron, he would be master 
of his gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed, 
that it is not moneys that are the sinews of fortune, but ; 
it is the sinews and steel of men’s minds, wit, courage,} 
audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In Y 
the third place I set down reputation, because of the 
peremptory tides and currents it hath; which, if they be 
not taken in their due time, are seldom recovered, it 
being extreme hard to play an after game of reputation. 
And lastly I place honour, which is more easily won by 
any of the other three, much more by all, than any of 
them can be purchased by honour. To conclude this pre- 
cept, as there is order and priority in matter, so is there 
in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of the 
commonest errors: while men fly to their ends when they 
should intend their beginnings, and do not take things in 
order of time as they come on, but marshal them accord- 
ing to greatness and not according to instance; not 
observing the good precept, Quod nune inslat agamus. 

39. Another precept of this knowledge is not to em- 
brace any matters which do occupy too great a quantity 
of time, but to have that sounding in a man’s ears, Sed 
Jugit interea fugit irreparabile tempus: and that is the 
cause why those which take their course of rising by pro- 
fessions of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, 
and the like, are not commonly so politic for their own 

R 2 


| 
. 
j 


244 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIIT. 39» 


fortune, otherwise than in their ordinary way, because 
they want time to learn particulars, to wait occasions, and 
to devise plots. 

40. Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate 
nature which doth nothing in vain; which surely a man 
may do if he do well interlace his business, and bend not 
his mind too much upon that which he principally in- 
tendeth. For a man ought in every particular action 
so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to have 
one thing under another, as if he cannot have that he 
seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a second, or 
so in a third; and if he can have no part of that which 
he purposed, yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; 
and if he cannot make anything of it for the present, yet 
to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come; and 
if he can contrive no effect or substance from it, yet to 
win some good opinion by it, or the like. So that he 
should exact an account of himself of every action, to 
reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed and confused 
if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more 
impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For 
he that doth so leeseth infinite occasions which intervene, 
and are many times more proper and propitious for some- 
what that he shall need afterwards, than for that which he 


urgeth for the present; and therefore men must be per-. 


fect in that rule, Hee oportet facere, et lla non omittere. 

41. Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage 
a man’s self peremptorily in any thing, though it seem 
not liable to accident; but ever to have a window to fly 
out at, or a way to retire: following the wisdom in the 
ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted when their 
plash was dry whither they should go; and the one moved 
to go down into a pit, because it was not likely the water 


ri as 
os 


RR 


XXIII, 41.] THE SECOND BOOK. 245 


would dry there ; but the other answered, True, but if it 
do, how shall we get out again? 

42. Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient 
precept of Bias, construed not to any point of perfidious- 
ness, but only to caution and moderation, 2? ama fan- 
quam inimicus fulurus et odi tanquam amaturus. For it 
utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark themselves 
too far into unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, 
and childish and humorous envies or emulations. 

43. But I continue this beyond the measure of an 
example; led, because I would not have such know- 
ledges, which I note as deficient, to be thought things 
imaginative or in the air, or an observation or two much 
made of, but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is 
hardlier made than a beginning. It must be likewise con- 
ceived, that in these points which I mention and set down, 
they are far from complete tractates of them, but only as 
small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no man I suppose 
will think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without 
all this ado; for I know they come tumbling into some 
men’s laps; and a number obtain good fortunes by dili- 
gence in a plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping 
themselves from gross errors. 

44. But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a 
perfect orator, doth not mean that every pleader should 
be such; and so likewise, when a prince or a courtier 
hath been described by such as have handled those sub- 
jects, the mould hath used to be made according to the 
perfection of the art, and not according to common prac- 
tice: so I understand it, that it ought to be done in the 
description of a politic man, I mean politic for his own 
fortune. 

45. But it must be remembered all this while, that the 


246 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXIII. 45. 


precepts which we have set down are of that kind which 
may be counted and called Bone Artes. As for evil arts, 
if a man would set down for himself that principle of 
Machiavel, Zhat a man seek not to attain virtue ttself, but 
the appearance only thereof; because the credit of virtue is 
a help, but the use of wt ts cumber: or that other of his 
principles, Zhat he presuppose, that men are not filly to be 
wrought otherwise but by fear; and therefore that he seek 
to have every man obnoxious, low, and in stratt, which 


the Italians call semznar spine, to sow thorns: or that. 


other principle, contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, 
Cadant amict, dummodo inimict intercidant, as the triumvirs, 
which sold every one to other the lives of their friends 
for the deaths of their enemies: or that other protestation 
of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble states, to the end 
to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their fortunes, 
Ligo st quid in fortunis mets excttatum sit incendium, td 
non aqua sed ruina restinguam: or that other principle 
of Lysander, Zhat children are to be deceived with comfits, 
and men with oaths: and the like evil and corrupt posi- 
tions, whereof (as in all things) there are more in number 
than of the good: certainly with these dispensations from 
the laws of charity and integrity, the pressing of a man’s 
fortune may be more hasty and compendious. But it is 
in life as it is in ways, the shortest way is commonly the 
foulest, and surely the fairer way is not much about. 

46. But men, if they be in their own power, and do 
bear and sustain themselves, and be not carried away 
with a whirlwind or tempest of ambition, ought in the 
pursuit of their own fortune to set before their eyes not 
only that general map of the world, Zhat all things are 
vanity and vexation of spirit, but many other more par- 
ticular cards and directions: chiefly that, that being 


XXIII. 46. | THE SECOND BOOK. 247 


without well-being is a curse, and the greater being the 
greater curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded, and 
all wickedness most punished in itself: according as the 
poet saith excellently: 

Quz vobis, que digna, viri, pro laudibus istis 


Premia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum 
Dii moresque dabunt vestri. 


And so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to 
look up to the eternal providence and divine judgement, 
which often subverteth the wisdom of evil plots and 
imaginations, according to that scripture, He hath con- 
ceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing. And 
although men should refrain themselves from injury and 
evil arts, yet this incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of 
a man’s fortune leaveth not tribute which we owe to 
God of our time; who (we see) demandeth a tenth of 
our substance, and a seventh, which is more sstrict, of 
our time: and it is to small purpose to have an erected 
face towards heaven, and a perpetual groveling spirit 
upon earth, eating dust as doth the serpent, A/jue affigit 
humo divine particulam aure. And if any man flatter 
himself that he will employ his fortune well, though he 
should obtain it ill, as was said concerning Augustus 
Cesar, and after of Septimius Severus, Zhat ecther they 
should never have been born, or else they should never have 
died, they. did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent 
of their greatness, and so much good when they were 
established; yet these compensations and satisfactions 
are good to be used, but never good to be purposed. 
And lastly, it is not amiss for men in their race toward 
their fortune, to cool themselves a little with that conceit 
which is elegantly expressed by the Emperor Charles the 
Fifth, in his instructions to the king his son, Zha/ fortune 


248 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXIill. 46. 


hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that tf she be too 
much wooed she ts the farther off. But this last is but a 
remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: let men 
rather build upon that foundation which is as a corner- 
stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein they join close, 
namely that same Primum querite. For divinity saith, 
Primum quertte regnum Det, et tsta omnia adjicientur vobts : 
and philosophy saith, Pr¢mum querite bona animt; cetera 
aut aderunt, aut non oberunt, And although the human 
foundation hath somewhat of the sands, as we see in 
M. Brutus, when he brake forth into that speech, 
Te colui (Virtus) ut rem; ast tu nomen inane es; 

yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may 
serve for a taste of that knowledge which I noted as 
deficient. 

47. Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge 
secret and retired in both these respects in which things 
are deemed secret; for some things are secret because 
they are hard to know, and some because they are not 
/ fit to utter. We see all governments are obscure and 
invisible : 

Totamque infusa per artus 
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet. 


Such is the description of governments. We see the 
government of God over the world is hidden, insomuch 
as it seemeth to participate of much irregularity and con- 
fusion. ‘The government of the soul in moving the body 
is inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly 
to be reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of 
antiquity (the shadows whereof are in the poets) in the 
description of torments and pains, next unto the crime of 
rebellion, which was the giants’ offence, doth detest the 
offence of futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this 


XXIII. 47.] THE SECOND BOOK. 249 


was meant of particulars: nevertheless even unto the 


general rules and discourses of policy and government | 


there is due a reverent and reserved handling. 


48. But contrariwise in the governors towards the | 
governed, all things ought as far as the frailty of man “ 


permitteth to be manifest and revealed. For so it is 
expressed in the scriptures touching the government of 
God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and 
shady body, is in the view of God as crystal: Z% in con- 
spectu sedis tanqguam mare vitreum simile crystallo. So 
unto princes and states, and specially towards wise senates 
and councils, the natures and dispositions of the people, 
their conditions and necessities, their factions and com- 
binations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, 
in regard of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom 
of their observations, and the height of their station where 
they keep sentinel, in great part clear and transparent. 
Wherefore, considering that I write to a king that is a 
master of this science, and is so well assisted, I think it 
decent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to 
obtain the certificate which one of the ancient philo- 
sophers aspired unto; who being silent, when others 
contended to make demonstration of their abilities by 
speech, desired it mought be certified for his part, Zha/ 
there was one that knew how to hold his peace. 

49. Notwithstanding, for the more public part of 
government, which is laws, I think good to note only one 
deficience ; which is, that all those which have written of 
laws, have written either as philosophers or as lawyers, 
and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they 
make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and 
their discourses are as the stars, which give little light 
because they are so high. For the lawyers, they write 


“A 


250 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [ XXIII. 49- 


according to the states where they live what is received 
law, and not what ought to be law: for the wisdom of a 
lawmaker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there 
are in nature certain fountains of justice, whence all civil 
laws are derived but as streams: and like as waters do 
take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which 
they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions 
and governments where they are planted, though they 
proceed from the same fountains. Again, the wisdom of 
a lawmaker consisteth not only in a platform of justice, 
but in the application thereof; taking into consideration 
by what means laws may be made certain, and what are 
the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and incer- 
tainty of law; by what means laws may be made apt and 
easy to be executed, and what are the impediments and 
remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws 
touching private right of meum and ‘uum have into the 
public state, and how they may be made apt and agree- 
able ; how laws are to be penned and delivered, whether 
in texts or in acts, brief or large, with preambles, or with- 
out ; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time 
to time, and what is the best means to keep them from 
being too vast in volumes, or too full of multiplicity and 
crossness; how they are to be expounded, when upon 
causes emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon 
responses and conferences touching general points or 
questions; how they are to be pressed, rigorously or 
tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity and 
good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law 
are to be mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in 
several courts; again, how the practice, profession, and 
erudition of law is to be censured and governed; and 
many other points touching the administration, and (as I 


XXIII. 49.] THE SECOND BOOK. 251 


may term it) animation of laws. Upon which I insist the 
less, because I purpose (if God give me p, pruden- 
leave), having begun a work of this nature in sia legislat- 
aphorisms, to propound it hereafter, noting ra, sive, de 
it in the mean time for deficient. aaa dead 

50. And for your Majesty’s laws of England, I could 
say much of their dignity, and somewhat of their defect ; 
but they cannot but excel the civil laws in fitness for the 
government: for the civil law was non hos quesitum munus 
in usus; it was not made for the countries which it 
governeth. Hereof I cease to speak, because I will not 
intermingle matter of action with matter of general 
learning. 


XXIV. d Bass have I concluded this portion of 
learning touching civil knowledge; and 

with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; 
and with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And 
being now at some pause, looking back into that I have 
passed through, this writing seemeth to me (sz nunguam 
Jallit imago), as far as a man can judge of his own work, 
not much better than that noise or sound which musicians 
make while they are in tuning their instruments: which 
is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the 
music is sweeter afterwards. So have I been content to 


tune the instruments of the Muses, that they may play — 
that have better hands. And surely, when I set before © 


me the condition of these times, in which learning hath 
made her third visitation or circuit in all the qualities 
thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of this 
age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the 
travails of ancient writers; the art of printing, which com- 
municateth books to men of all fortunes; the openness 


— ‘ ed 


re 


252 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XxIv, 


of the world by navigation, which hath disclosed multi- 
tudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the 
leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men 
so generally in civil business, as the states of Grecia did. 
in respect of their popularity, and the state of Rome, in 
respect of the greatness of their monarchy; the present 
disposition of these times at this instant to peace; the 
consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies 
of religion, which have so much diverted men from other 
sciences; the perfection of your Majesty’s learning, which 
as a phoenix may call whole vollies of wits to follow you; 
and the inseparable propriety of time, which is ever more 
and more to disclose truth; I cannot but be raised to this 
persuasion that this third period of time will far surpass 
that of the Grecian and Roman learning: only if men will 
know their own strength, and their own weakness both; 
and take, one from the other, light of invention, and not 
fire of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition of 
truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or orna- 
ment; and employ wit and magnificence to things of 
worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar and of 
popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall 
~ please himself or others in the reprehension of them, they 
shall make that ancient and patient request, Verbera, sed 
audi; let men reprehend them, so they observe and 
‘weigh them. For the appeal is lawful (though it may be 
it shall not be needful) from the first cogitations of men 
to their second, and from the nearer times to the times 
further off. Now let us come to that learning, which both 
the former times were not so blessed as to know, sacred 
and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and port of all men’s 
labours and peregrinations. 


PE LOT ST Te LE Oe 


PLE NLT LE. AO SE 


XXV. 1] THE SECOND BOOK. 253 


XXV. 1. ‘TH prerogative of God extendeth as well | 
to the reason as to the will of man; _ 
so that as we are to obey his law, though we find a re- | 
luctation in our will, so we are to believe his word, though / 
we find a reluctation in our reason. For if we bong | / 
only that which is agreeable to our sense, we give consent | 
to the matter, and not to the author; which is no more | 
than we would do towards a suspected and discredited | 
witness; but that faith which was accounted to Abraham | 
for righteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah | 
laughed, who therein was an image of natural reason. 

2, Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy 
it is to believe than to know as we now know. For in 
knowledge man’s mind suffereth from sense; but in belief 
it suffereth from spirit, such one as it holdeth for more 
authorised than itself, and so suffereth from the worthier 
agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man glorified; for 
then faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are 
known. 

3. Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which 
in our idiom we call divinity) is grounded only upon the 
word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature: 
for it is written, Cel: enarrant gloriam Dei; but it is not 
written, Cali enarrant voluntatem Det: but of that it is 
said, Ad legem et testimonium: st non fecerint secundum 
verbum tstud &c. This holdeth not only in those points 
of faith which concern the great mysteries of the Deity, 
of the creation, of the redemption, but likewise those 
which concern the law moral truly interpreted: Love 
your enemies: do good to them that hate you: Be like to your 
heavenly Father, that suffereth his rain to fall upon the just 
and unjust. ‘To this it ought to be applauded, Mec vox 
hominem sonat: it is a voice beyond the light of nature. 


254 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [XXv. 3. 


So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a 
libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moral- 
ities, as if they were opposite and malignant to nature; 
Et quod natura remittit, invida jura negant. So said 
Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander’s messengers, that 
he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other 
of the wise men of Grecia, and that he held them for 
excellent men: but that they had a fault, which was that 
they had in too great reverence and veneration a thing 
they called law and manners. So it must be confessed, 
that a great part of the law moral is of that perfec- 
tion, whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire: how 
then is it that man is said to have, by the light and law 
of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and vice, 
justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus, because the 
light of nature is used in two several senses; the one, 
that which springeth from reason, sense, induction, argu- 
ment, according to the laws of heaven and earth; the 
other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by 
an inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, 
which is a sparkle of the purity of his first estate; in 
which latter sense only he is participant of some light 
and discerning touching the perfection of the moral law: 
but how? sufficient to check the vice, but not to inform 
the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as well moral 
as mystical, is not to be attained but by inspiration and 
revelation from God. 

4. The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, 
and the latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it 
is not for nothing that the apostle calleth religion our 
reasonable service of God; insomuch as the very cere- 
monies and figures of the old law were full of reason and 
signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry 


win se bi alt 


seeping 


XXV. 4.] THE SECOND BOOK. 255 


and magic, that are full of non-significants and surd cha- 
racters. But most specially the Christian faith, as in all 
things so in this, deserveth to be highly magnified; hold- 
ing and preserving the golden mediocrity in this point 
between the law of the heathen and the law of Mahumet, 
which have embraced the two extremes. For the religion 
of the heathen had no constant belief or confession, but 
left all to the liberty of argument; and the religion of. 
Mahumet on the other side interdicteth argument alto- 
gether: the one having the very—face of error, and the 
other of imposture: whereathe Fait) doth both admit 
and reject disputation with difference. 

5. The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: 
the former, in the conception and apprehension of the 
mysteries of God to us revealed; the other, in the in- 
ferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon, 
The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves ; but 
how? by way of illustration, and not by way of argument. 
The latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument. 
In the former we see God vouchsafeth to descend to our 
capacity, in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may 
be sensible unto us; and doth grift his revelations and 
holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth 
his inspirations to open our understanding, as the form of 
the key to the ward of the lock. For the latter, there is 
allowed us an use of reason and argument, secondary and 
respective, although not original and absolute. For after 
the articles and principles of religion are placed and ex- 
empted from examination of reason, it is then permitted 
unto us to make derivations and inferences from and 
according to the analogy of them, for our better direction. _ 
In nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are 
examinable by induction, though not by a medium or 


256 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXV. 5. 


syllogism ; and besides, those principles or: first positions 
have no discordance with that reason which draweth down 
and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth 
not in religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of 
greater and smaller nature, namely, wherein there are not 
only postfa but plactfa,; for in such there can be no use 
of absolute reason. We see it familiarly in games of wit, 
as chess, or the like. The draughts and first laws of the 
game are positive, but how? merely ad plact/um, and not 
examinable by reason; but then how to direct our play 
thereupon with best advantage to win the game, is arti- 
ficial and rational. So in human laws there be many 
grounds and maxims which are placi/a juris, positive upon 
authority, and not upon reason, and therefore not to be 
disputed: but what is most just, not absolutely but rela- 
tively, and according to those maxims, that affordeth a 
long field of disputation. Such therefore is that second- 
ary reason, which hath place in divinity, which is grounded 
upon the place/s of God. 

6. Here therefore I note this deficience, that there hath 
De usu legit. NOt been, to my understanding, sufficiently 
imo rationis inquired and handled the true limits and use 
humane in of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of 
divinis. divine dialectic: which for that it is not done, 
it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of true con- 
ceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into 
that which is not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating 
inferences and contradictories, to examine that which is 
positive. The one sort falling into the error of Nicodemus, 
demanding to have things made more sensible than it 
pleaseth God to reveal them, Quomodo posstt homo nasct 
cum sit senex ? ‘The other sort into the error of the dis- 
ciples, which were scandalized at a show of contradiction, 


sa eal 


XXV. 6.| THE SECOND BOOK. 257 


Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis? Modicum, et non videbttis me; 
et tlerum, modicum, et videbttis me, &c. 

7. Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of 
the great and blessed use thereof; for this point well 
laboured and defined of would in my judgement be an 
opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of curious 
speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the fury 
of controversies, wherewith the church laboureth. For it 
cannot but open men’s eyes, to see that many contro- 
versies do merely pertain to that which is either not re- 
vealed or positive; and that many others do grow upon 
weak and obscure inferences or derivations: which latter 
sort, if men would revive the blessed style of that great 
doctor of the Gentiles, would be carried thus, ego, non 
dominus s and again, secundum consilium meum, in opinions 
and counsels, and not in positions and oppositions. 
But men are now over-ready to usurp the style, on ego, 
sed dominus ; and not so only, but to bind it with the 
thunder and denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the 
terror of those which have not sufficiently learned out of 
Salomon, that Zhe causeless curse shall not come. 

8. Divinity hath two principal parts; the matter in- 
formed or revealed, and the nature of the information 
or revelation: and with the latter we will begin, because 
it hath most coherence with that which we have now last 
handled. The nature of the information consisteth of 
three branches; the limits of the information, the suffici- 
ency of the information, and the acquiring or obtaining 
the information. Unto the limits of the information be- 
jong these considerations ; how far forth particular per- 
sons continue to be inspired; how far forth the Church is 
inspired; and how far forth reason may be used: the 
last point whereof I have noted as deficient. Unto the 

s 


258 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXV.8. 


sufficiency of the information belong two considerations; 
what points of religion are fundamental, and what perfec- 
tive, being matter of further building and perfection upon 
one and the same foundation; and again, how the grada- 
tions of light according to the dispensation of times are 
material to the sufficiency of belief. 

g. Here again I may rather give it in advice than note 
De gradibus it as deficient, that the points fundamental, 
unitatisin and the points of further perfection only, 
eivitate Det. ought to be with piety and wisdom distin- 
guished: a subject tending to much like end as that I 
noted before; for as that other were likely to abate the 
number of controversies, so this is like to abate the 
heat of many of them. We see Moses when he saw the 
Israelite and the Egyptian fight, he did not say, Why strive 
your but drew his sword and slew the Egyptian: but 
when he saw the two Israelites fight, he said, You are 
brethren, why strive you? If the point of doctrine be an 
Egyptian, it must be slain by the sword of the spirit, and 
not reconciled; but if it be an Israelite, though in the 
wrong, then, Why strive you? We see of the fundamental 
points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, He that ts 
not with us ts against us ; but of points not fundamental, 
thus, He that ts not against us 1s with us. So we see the 
coat of our Saviour was entire without seam, and so is 
the doctrine of the scriptures in itself; but the garment 
of the church was of divers colours and yet not divided. 
We see the chaff may and ought to be severed from the 
corn in the ear, but the tares may not be pulled up from 
the corn in the field. So as it is a thing of great use well 
to define what, and of what latitude those points are, which 
do make men merely aliens and disincorporate from the 
Church of God. 


XXV. 10.] THE SECOND BOOK. 259 


10. For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon 
the true and sound interpretation of the scriptures, which 
are the fountains of the water of life. The interpretations 
of the scriptures are of two sorts ; methodical, and solute 
or at large. For this divine water, which excelleth so 
much that of Jacob’s well, is drawn forth much in the 
same kind as natural water useth to be out of wells and 
fountains; either it is first forced up into a cistern, and 
from thence fetched and derived for use; or else it is 
drawn and received in buckets and vessels immediately 
where it springeth. The former sort whereof, though 
it seem to be the more ready, yet in my judgement is 
more subject to corrupt. This is that method which 
hath exhibited unto us the scholastical divinity; where- 
by divinity hath been reduced into an art, as into a 
cistern, and the streams of doctrine or positions fetched 
and derived from thence. 

11. In this men have sought three things, a summary 
brevity, a compacted strength, and a complete perfection ; 
whereof the two first they fail to, find, and the last they 
ought not to seek. For as to brevity, we see in all sum- 
mary methods, while men purpose to abridge, they give 
cause to dilate. For the sum or abridgement by con- 
traction becometh obscure; the obscurity requireth ex- 
position, and the exposition is deduced into large com 
mentaries, or into common places and titles, which grow 


‘to be more vast than the original writings, whence the 


sum was at first extracted. So we see the volumes of the 

schoolmen are greater much than the first writings of the 

fathers, whence the Master of the Sentences made his 

sum or collection. So in like manner the volumes of the 

modern doctors of the civil law exceed those of the an- 

cient jurisconsults, of which Tribonian compiled the digest. 
$2 


260 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ XXvV. Il. 


So as this course of sums and commentaries is that which 
doth infallibly make the body of sciences more immense 
in quantity, and more base in substance. 

12. And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced 
into exact methods have a show of strength, in that each 
part seemeth to support and sustain the other; but this 
is more satisfactory than substantial: like unto buildings 
which stand by architecture and compaction, which are 
more subject to ruin than those that are built more 
strong in their several parts, though less compacted. But 
it is plain that the more you recede from your grounds, 
the weaker do you conclude: and as in nature, the more 
you remove yourself from particulars, the greater peril of 
error you do incur: so much more in divinity, the more 
you recede from the scriptures by inferences and conse- 
quences, the more weak and dilute are your positions. 

13. And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, 
it is not to be sought; which makes this course of arti- 
ficial divinity the more suspect. For he that will reduce 
a knowledge into an art, will make it round and uniform: 
but in divinity many things must be left abrupt, and con- 
cluded with this: O altttudo sapientie et scientie Det! 
quam incomprehenstbilia sunt udicia ejus, et non investiga- 
biles vie gus. So again the apostle saith, Lx parie sct- 
mus; and to have the form of a total, where there is but 
matter for a part, cannot be without supplies by sup- 
position and presumption. And therefore I conclude, that 
the true use of these sums and methods hath place in 
institutions or introductions preparatory unto knowledge: 
but in them, or by deducement from them, to handle the 
main body and substance of a knowledge, is in all sciences 
prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous. 

14. As to the interpretation of the scriptures solute 


he 


XXV. 14.] THE SECOND BOOK. 261 


and at large, there have been divers kinds introduced 
and devised; some of them rather curious and unsafe 
than sober and warranted. Notwithstanding, thus much 
must be confessed, that the scriptures, being given by 
inspiration and not by human reason, do differ from all 
other books in the author: which by consequence doth 
draw on some difference to be used by the expositor. 
For the inditer of them did know four things which no 
man attains to know; which are, the mysteries of the 
kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, 
the secrets of the heart of man, and the future succession 
of all ages. For as to the first it is said, He ‘hat presseth 
into the light, shall be oppressed of the glory, And again, 
Vo man shall see my face and live. To the second, When 
he prepared the heavens I was present, when by law and 
compass he tnclosed the deep. To the third, Werther was 1 
needful that any should bear witness to him of man, for he 
knew well what was in man. And to the last, From the 
beginning are known to the Lord all his works. 

15. From the former two of these have been drawn 
certain senses and expositions of scriptures, which had 
need be contained within the bounds of sobriety; the 
one anagogical, and the other philosophical. But as to 
the tormer, man is not to prevent his time: Videmus 
nunc per speculum tn enigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem: 
wherein nevertheless there seemeth to be a liberty granted, 
as far forth as the polishing of this glass, or some moder- 
ate explication of this enigma, But to press too far 
into it, cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow 
of the spirit of man. For in the body there are three 
degrees of that we receive into it, aliment, medicine, 
and poison: whereof aliment is that which the nature of 
man can perfectly alter and overcome ; medicine is that 


262, OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, | XXV.15. 


which is partly converted by nature, and partly converteth 
nature ; and poison is that which worketh wholly upon 
nature, without that, that nature can in any part work 
upon it. So in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason 
cannot at all work upon and convert is a mere intoxica- 
tion, and endangereth a dissolution of the mind and 
understanding. 

~~ 16. But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on 
foot of late time by the school of Paracelsus, and some 
others, that have pretended to find the truth of all natural 
_ philosophy in the scriptures; scandalizing and traducing 
all other philosophy as heathenish and profane. But there 
is no such enmity between God’s word and his works; 
neither do they give honour to the scriptures, as they 
suppose, but much imbase them. For to seek heaven 
and earth in the word of God, whereof it is said, Heaven 
and earth shail pass, but my word shall not pass, is to seek 
temporary things amongst eternal: and as to seek divi- 
nity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the dead, 
so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead 
amongst the living: neither are the pots or lavers, whose 
place was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought 
in the holiest place of all, where the ark of the testimony 
was seated. And again, the scope or purpose of the spirit 
of God is not to express matters of nature in the scrip- 
tures, otherwise than in passage, and for application to 
man’s capacity and to matters moral or divine. And it 
is a true rule, Auctoris aliud agentis parva auctorifas. For 
it were a strange conclusion, if a man should use a simili- 
tude for ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from 
nature or history according to vulgar conceit, as of a 
basilisk, an unicorn, a centaur, a Briareus, an hydra, or 
the like, that therefore he must needs be thought to affirm 


spear oi 


XXV. 16.] THE SECOND BOOK. 263 


the matter thereof positively to be true. To conclude 
therefore these two interpretations, the one by reduction 
or xnigmatical, the other philosophical or physical, which 
have been received and pursued in imitation of the rab- 
bins and cabalists, are to be confined with a nol’ alfum 
sapere, sed time. 

17. But the two latter points, known to God and un- 
known to man, touching the secrets of the heart and the 
successions of time, doth make a just and sound difference 
between the manner of the exposition of the scriptures 
and all other books. For it is an excellent observation 
which hath been made upon the answers of our Saviour 
Christ to many of the questions which were propounded 
to him, how that they are impertinent to the state of the 
question demanded; the reason whereof is, because not 
being like man, which knows man’s thoughts by his words, 
but knowing man’s thoughts immediately, he never an- 
swered their words, but their thoughts. Much in the like 
manner it is with the scriptures, which being written to 
the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, 
with a foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing 
estates of the church, yea and particularly of the elect, 
are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude 
of the proper sense of the place, and respectively towards 
that present occasion whereupon the words were uttered, 
or in precise congruity or contexture with the words 
before or after, or in contemplation of the principal scope 
of the place; but have in themselves, not only totally or 
collectively, but distributively in clauses and words, in- 
finite springs and streams of doctrine to water the church 
in every part. And therefore as the literal sense is, as it 
were, the main stream or river; so the moral sense chiefly, 
and sometimes the allegorical or typical, are they whereof 


264. OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXV. 17. 


the church hath most use: not that I wish men to be 
bold in allegories, or indulgent or light in allusions ; 
but that I do much condemn that interpretation of the 
scripture which is only after the manner as men use to 
interpret a profane book. 

18. In this part touching the exposition of the 
scriptures, I can report no deficience; but by way of 
remembrance this I will add. In perusing books of 
divinity, I find many books of controversies, and many of 
commonplaces and treatises, a mass of positive divinity, as 
it is made an art: a number of sermons and lectures, and 
many prolix commentaries upon the scriptures, with har- 
monies and concordances. But that form of writing in 
divinity which in my judgement is of all others most rich 
and precious, is positive divinity, collected upon particular 
texts of scriptures in brief observations; not dilated into 
commonplaces, not chasing after controversies, not re- 
duced into method of art; a thing abounding in sermons, 
which will vanish, but defective in books which will re- - 
main, and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am 
persuaded, and I may speak it with an ads¢t cnvidia verbo, 
and no ways in derogation of antiquity, but as in a good 
emulation between the vine and the olive, that if the 
choice and best of those observations upon texts of 
scriptures, which have been made dispersedly in sermons 
within this your Majesty’s island of Brittany by the space 
Emanationes ©© these forty years and more (leaving out the 
scriptura-  largeness of exhortations and applications 
rum in doc- thereupon) had been set down in a con- 
trinas posit- tinuance, it had been the best work in di- 
fvas. vinity which had been written since the 
Apostles’ times. 

1g. The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds; 


1 oS a ign in a 


XXV. 19.| THE SECOND BOOK. 265 


matter of belief and truth of opinion, and matter of ser- 
vice and adoration; which is also judged and directed by 
the former: the one being as the internal soul of religion, 
and the other as the external body thereof. And there- 
fore the heathen religion was not only a worship of idols, 
but the whole religion was an idol in itself; for it had no 
soul, that is, no certainty of belief or confession: as a 
man may well think, considering the chiefdoctors of their 
church were the poets: and the reason was, because the 
heathen gods were no jealous gods, but were glad to 
be admitted into part, as they had reason. Neither did 
they respect the pureness of heart, so they mought have 
external honour and rites. 

20. But out of these two do result and issue four main 
branches of divinity; faith, manners, liturgy, and govern- 
ment. Faith containeth the doctrine of the nature of 
God, of the attributes of God, and of the works of God. 
The nature of God consisteth of three persons in unity of 
Godhead. The attributes of God are either common to 
the Deity, or respective to the persons.’ The works of 
God summary are two, that of the creation and that of 
the redemption; and both these works, as in total they 
appertain to the unity of the Godhead, so in their parts 
they refer to the three persons: that of the creation, in 
the mass of the matter, to the Father; in the disposition 
of the form, to the Son; and in the continuance and 
conservation of the being, to the Holy Spirit. So that 
of the redemption, in the election and counsel, to the 
Father; in the whole act and consummation, to the Son; 
and in the application, to the Holy Spirit; for by the 
Holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by the 
Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit. This work 
likewise we consider either effectually, in the elect; or 


266 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXv. 20. 


privately, in the reprobate; or according to appearance, 
in the visible church. 

21. For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in 
the law, which discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, 
according to the edition thereof, into the law of nature, 
the law moral, and the law positive; and according to the 
style, into negative and affirmative, prohibitions and com- 
mandments. Sin, in the matter and subject thereof, is 
divided according to the commandments; in the form 
thereof, it referreth to the three persons in Deity: sins of 
infirmity against the Father, whose more special attribute 
is power; sins of ignorance against the Son, whose attri- 
bute is wisdom; and sins of malice against the Holy 
Ghost, whose attribute is grace or love. In the motions 
of it, it either moveth to the right hand or to the left; 
either to blind devotion, or to profane and libertine trans- 
gression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth 
liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. 
In the degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into 
thought, word, or act. And in this part I commend much 
the deducing of the law of God to cases of conscience; for 
that I take indeed to be a breaking, and not exhibiting 
whole of the bread of life. But that which quickeneth 
both these doctrines of faith and manners, is the elevation 
and consent of the heart; whereunto appertain books of 
exhortation, holy meditation, Christian resolution, and 
the like. 

22. For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the re- 
ciprocal acts between God and man; which, on the part 
of God, are the preaching of the word, and the sacra- 
ments, which are seals to the covenant, or as the visible 
word; and on the part of man, invocation of the name 
of God; and under the law, sacrifices; which were as 


iat 


oy De RS 


XXV. 22.] THE SECOND BOOK. 267 


visible prayers or confessions: but now the adoration 
being 72 spirttu et veritate, there remaineth only vé/ul? 
labiorum ; although the use of holy vows of thankful- 
ness and retribution may be accounted also as sealed 
petitions. 

23. And for the government of the church, it con- 
sisteth of the patrimony of the church, the franchises of 
the church, and the offices and jurisdictions of the church, 
and the laws of the church directing the whole; all which 
have two considerations, the one in themselves, the other 
how they stand compatible and agreeable to the civil 
estate. 

24. This matter of divinity is handled either in form 
of instruction of truth, or in form of confutation of false- 
hood. ‘The declinations from religion, besides the priva- 
tive, which is atheism and the branches thereof, are three ; 
heresies, idolatry, and witchcraft : heresies, when we serve 
the true God with a false worship; idolatry, when we wor- 
ship false gods, supposing them to be true; and witch- 
craft, when we adore false gods, knowing them to be 
wicked and false. For so your Majesty doth excellently 
well observe, that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. 
And yet we see though these be true degrees, Samuel 
teacheth us that they are all of a nature, when there is 
once a receding from the word of God; for so he saith, 
Quast peccatum artolandi est repugnare, et quast scelus tdolo- 
latria nolle acqutescere. 

25. These things I have passed over so briefly because 
I can report no deficience concerning them: for I can 
find no space or ground that lieth vacant and unsown in 
the matter of divinity: so diligent have men been, either 
in sowing of good seed, or in sowing of tares. 


268 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


4S have I made as it were a small globe of the 

intellectual world, as truly and faithfully as I could 
discover; with a note and description of those parts 
which seem to me not constantly occupate, or not well 
converted by the labour of man. In which, if I have in 
any point receded from that which is commonly received, 
it hath been with a purpose of proceeding zm melius, and 
not 22 aliud, a mind of amendment and proficience, and 
not of change and difference. For I could not be true 
and constant to the argument I handle, if I were not 
willing to go beyond others; but yet not more willing 
than to have others go beyond me again: which may 
the better appear by this, that I have propounded my 
opinions naked and unarmed, not seeking to preoccupate 
the liberty of men’s judgements by confutations. For in 
anything which is well set down, I am in good hope, that 
if the first reading move an objection, the second reading 
will make an answer. And in those things wherein I 
have erred, I am sure I have not prejudiced the right by 
litigious arguments; which certainly have this contrary 
effect and operation, that they add authority to error, and 
destroy the authority of that which is well invented. For 
question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, as on 
the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I 
claim and challenge to myself as mine own. The good, if 
any be, is due /anguam adeps sacrifict’, to be incensed to 
the honour, first of the Divine Majesty, and next of your 
Majesty, to whom on earth I am most bounden. 


rents 


— 


oe Mea 


ee em ee 


NOTES. 


BOOK I, 


P. 1. [1] See Lev. xxii. 18; Num. xxviii. 2, 3. [3] upon ordinary 
observance: ex rituali cultu. (7, 8] according ...employments: Omitted 
in Lat. [14-17] and... admiration: Omitted in Lat. [15] Prov. 
XXV. 3. 

P. 2. [8] Plato, Phaedo, i. 72; Meno, ii. 81; Comp. Theeet. i. 166, 
191; Arist.de Memor. 2; Anal. Pr. ii. 21; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 24. 
57. [10] notions: motions in ed. 1605, but corrected in the Errata 
to that edition. [17] 1 Kings iv. 29. [17, 18] For the construction 
see note on p. 20, 1. 26. [23] ‘should’ used for ‘would.’ [26] Tac. 
Ann. xiii, 3. Augusto prompta ac profluens queque deceret principem 
eloquentia fuit. [32,33] all this...subject: Lat. nescio quid servile 
olet, nec sui juris est. 

P. 3. [15] perfection: profection in ed. 1605; corrected in Errata. 
[20-27] Lat. Percurrat qui voluerit imperatorum et regum seriem, et juxta 
mecum sentiet, omitting the particular dynasties. 

P. 4. [6] Hermes: Hermes Trismegistus, fabled to be an Egyptian 
priest, philosopher, and king. The author of the works ascribed to 
him was probably a Neoplatonist of the second or third century. 
Ficinus (Argum. in Merc. Tris. Pimandr.) says, Trismegistum vero 
termaximum nuncuparunt, quoniam et philosophus maximus, et sacerdos 
maximus, et ree maximus extitit. [19] the former: the Lat. adds gue 
levior est, neque tamen ullo modo pretermittenda. In his letter to Toby 
Matthew, Bacon speaks of the first part of the Advancement ‘ but as 
a page to the latter.’ [22] the latter: Lat. posterior vero pars (quod 
caput rei est), 

P. 5. [7] ignorance severally disguised: Lat. ignorantia non sub uno 
schemate. [17] 1 Cor. viii. 1. [18] Eccl. xii. 12. [20] Eccl. i. 18. 
[22] Col. ii. 8. [25] Among the causes of atheism Bacon enumerates. 
‘lastly, learned times, specially with peace, and prosperity: for troubles 
and adversities doe more bow mens mindes to religion.’ Ess. xvi. 
p. 66. [32] Mr. Ellis gives the following note on the corresponding 
passage in the De Augmentis: ‘This reference to the imposition of 
names in Paradise in illustration of natural knowledge, is common in the 
writings of the schoolmen. Thus S. Thomas Aquinas in discussing 


270 NOTES. 


the question “utrum primus homo habuerit scientiam omnem,” after 
stating objections alleged against the affirmative opinion, thus com- 
mences his refutation of them. ‘Sed contra est quod ipse imposuit 
nomina animalibus, ut dicitur Gen. 2. Nomina autem debent naturis 
rerum congruere ; Ergo Adam scivit naturas omnium animalium, et pari 
ratione habuit omnium aliorum scientiam.”’ Comp. also the treatise 
Of the Interpretation of Nature (Works, iii. 219, ed. Spedding and 
Ellis): ‘For behold it was not that pure light of natural knowledge, 
whereby man in paradise was able to give unto every living creature 
a name according to his propriety, which gave occasion to the fall; 
but it was an aspiring desire to attain to that part of moral knowledge 
which defineth of good and evil, whereby to dispute God’s command- 
ments and not to depend upon the revelation of his will, which was the 
original temptation.’ [33] Gen. ii. 19, 20. 

P. 6. [11] Eccl. i. 8. [13 &c.] Comp. Of the Interpretation of 
Nature, p. 220. [18, 31] Eccl. iii. 11. 

P. 7. [6] he doth in another place rule over: Lat. satis clare alibi 
docet. [7] Prov. xx. 27. [12 &c.] Comp. Of the Interpretation of 
Nature (Works, vol. iii. p. 222). [19] 1 Cor. viii. 1. [21] 1 Cor. xili.1. 
rar eCol: t1.,8. 

P. 8. [12] Eccl. ii. 13, 14. [15] roundeth about: Lat. oberrat. [20] 
Comp. Plato, Thezt. i. p. 155 d; Arist. Metaph. i. 2. Hesiod (Theog. 
+80) makes Iris the daughter of Thaumas. [26] Heraclitus the pro- 
found: Lat. Heraclitus ille obscurus. [27] abyh énpi) Yux} copwrarn 
kata Tov ‘Hpdxderrov oxev. Plut. De Esu Carnium, i. 6. 4. Schow 
conjectured that aiyi) énpi) Yuxt) copwrarn was a corruption of ain 
Pux) copwrarn: gyph having been in the first instance a gloss upon 
ain and afterwards adopted into the text; a change which necessitated 
the further alteration of ain to aivyf to make sense. Stobzeus, ed. 
Gaisford, v. 120. The proverb is again quoted by Bacon, Ess. xxvi. p. 
112: ‘Heraclitus saith well, in one of his zenigmaes; Dry light ts ever 
the best. And certaine it is, that the light, that a man receiveth, by 
counsell from another, is drier, and purer, then that which com- 
meth from his owne understanding, and iudgement; which is ever 
infused and drenched in his affections and customes.’ Comp. Apoph. 
268; Adv. of Learning, p. 149, l. 3. [31]—p. 9. [11] Compare the 
corresponding passage Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 218. 

P. 9. [5, 6] broken knowledge: ‘contemplation broken off, or losing 
itself. Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 218. [6] one of Plato’s 
school: Philo Judzus, De Somniis, p. 577 E. (ed. Turnebus, Franc. 
1691). [7] Comp. Apoph. 120. [14] A reference to the fable of 
Icarus. [15 &c.] Comp. Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 219. 
[20] Job xiii. 7,9. [26 &c.] Comp. Ess. xvi. p. 64: ‘It is true, that 
a little philosophy inclineth mans minde to Atheisme; but depth in 


BOOK lI. 271 


philosophy, bringeth mens mindes about to Religion: for while the 
minde of man, looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes 
rest in them, and goe no further: but when it beholdeth, the chaine 
of them, confederate and linked together, it must needs flie to providence, 
and deitie,’ 

P. ro. [5] Hom. Il. viii. 19. Comp. also p. 109, 1. 24. Plato, 
Theet. i. 153 ¢. [25] too incompatible and differing: Lat. nimis 
extravagantia. [31] Plutarch, Cato, 22; Pliny, N. H. vii. 31. 

P. 11. [15] Virgil, An. vi. 852. [16] Plato, Apol. Socr. i. 19, 
24 &c. Xenophon, Mem. i. 1. 1. [28] Comp. Ess. lviii. pp. 237, 
238: ‘In the youth of a state, armes doe flourish: in the middle age 
of a state, learning; and then both of them together for a time: 
in the declining age of a state, mechanicall arts and merchandize’ 

P. 12. [9] a greater: So ed. 1640; ‘a’ is omitted in edd. 160s, 1629, 
1633. [14-20] Comp. Ess. lviii. pp. 237, 238, quoted above. [16] 
about an age: i.e. about the same age. According to Aristotle (Rhet. 
li. 14. § 4) the body is strongest from thirty to thirty-five, the mind 
at forty-nine. [25] a few pleasing receipts: Lat. pauca guedam medica- 
menta que illis videntur panchresta. [27] the complexions of patients: 
Lat. egrotorum habitus. [28] peril of accidents: Lat. symptomatum 
pericula. See p. 137, 1. 20. 

P. 13. [16] Suetonius, Nero, 7; Tac. An. xiii, [17] Gordianus ITI, 
(238-244) married the daughter of Misitheus, of whom Gibbon (e. vii.) 
says, ‘ The life of Misitheus had been spent in the profession of letters, 
not of arms; yet such was the versatile genius of that great man, that, 
when he was appointed Preetorian preefect, he discharged the military 
duties of his place with vigour and ability.’ Capitolinus, Gordian. Tert. 
c.23. The name Misitheus is supposed to be corrupted from Temesitheus 
or Timesitheus. [20] Alexander Severus succeeded after the murder of 
his cousin Elagabalus, March 10, 222. ‘ But as Alexander was a modest 
and dutiful youth of only seventeen years of age, the reins of govern- 
ment were in the hands of two women, of his mother Mamza, and of 
Mesa his grandmother. After the death of the latter, who survived but 
a short time the elevation of Alexander, Mamza remained the sole-regent 
of her son and of the empire.’ Gibbon, c. vi. [24] Pius V. (Michele 
Ghislieri) was a Dominican and had been Grand Inquisitor. He was 
Pope from 1565 to 1572. The victory over the Turks off Lepanto was 
won in his time. See Bacon, Adv. touching an Holy War (vii. p- 19). 
Sixtus V. (Felice Peretti) was appointed by Pius V. vicar-general of the 
Franciscans, and afterwards promoted to the College of Cardinals as 
Cardinal Montalto. He succeeded Gregory XIII. in 1585, and reigned 
till 1590. Gibbon (c. 70) says of him, ‘ The genius of Sixtus the Fifth 
burst from the gloom of a Franciscan cloister. See Ranke, Hist. of 
the Popes, trans. Foster, Books iii. and iv, [26] pedantical: So all the 


27% NOTES. 


copies of ed. 1605 which I have seen. Mr. Markby quotes prejudicial as 
the reading of others. [33] ragioni di stato: reasons of state, political 
considerations. 

P. 14. [1] Catena, Vita di Pio V. p. 31 (ed. 1586), reports a saying of 
the Pope, something to this effect, with reference to the maxim of Louis 
XI. of France, ‘Chi non s& simulare non s& regnare.’ See also 
Gabutius, Vita Pii V. lib. vi.c. 7 (Acta Sanctorum, 5 Maii, ed. 1866), 
and lib. ii. c. 3. [9] Lat. ad regendos eventus vite etiam in uno homine. 
Perhaps the reading of the English should be ‘for the events even of 
one man’s life.’ [27] positive and regular: Lat. pertinaces et diffictles. 
[30] latitude: Lat. constantiam. 

P. 15. [5] Guicciardini, Hist. xvi. 5. [8] Cic. ad Att. xvi. 7. [9] 
Phocion: see his life by Plutarch. [11] Pindar, Pyth. ii. 21 &c.° 
Bacon interprets the fable of Ixion in the present work, p. 123. [13] 
Cicero, Ep. ad Att. ii. 1. 

P. 16. [2] according to nature: nature consentaneis. [4] and not in 
the purchase: i.e. not in that which is acquired by it. [10] Seneca, 
Ep. i. 3. Quidam adeo in latebras refugere, ut putent in turbido esse, 
quicquid in luce est, from Pomponius. [24] Plutarch, Demosth. viii. 2, 
where the story is told of Pytheas, not Wschines. Comp. Apoph. 114. 
[32] of both: The Latin adds et negotiorum et literarum., 

P. 17. [4] duty taught and understood: officium oculatum. [8] mani- 
able: Some copies of ed. 1605 read amiable. [10, 11] Lat. guod ex 
historia clarissime patet. [14] Plutarch, Cato, ii.6. Cic. Acad. Quest 
ii. 2. § 5; De Senect. i. § 3. 

P. 18. [2] The Thirty Tyrants: After the battle of Agospotami 
(Sept. B.c. 405), which virtually terminated the Peloponnesian War, 
a committee of thirty was appointed for the government of Athens, 
with Critias and Theramenes among the chief. Their rule lasted 
only eight months (s.c. 404-403) and was put an end to by Thrasy- 
bulus. [9] for sovereign medicines: i.e. to be sovereign medicines. 
[20] Hor. Od. i. 3. 2. [21] influence: A word derived from the old 
astrology. See Eng. vers. of Job xxxviii. 31. 

P. 19. [8] Lat. Fratribus mendicantibus (pace eorum dixerim). [8, 8) 
to some friar...to whom: Compare for the construction, Book ii. 
§ 10. p. 80, Il. 4, 5. [10] Machiavelli, Disc. sopra Liv. iii. 1. Quoted 
for a different purpose in the tract On the Controversies of the Church 
(Bacon’s Life and Letters, ed. Spedding, i. 80). [31] Epist. 1. ad C. 
Czesarem, De Republica Ordinanda, ascribed to Sallust. 

P. 20. [1] A saying attributed to Diogenes the Cynic. See Diog. 
Laert. vi. 54. [6] Prov. xxviii. 22. [7] Prov. xxiii. 23. [13] For 
the construction ‘in comparison of,’ see Judg. viii. 2, 3. [22] Tac. 
Ann. iii. 76: Sed prefulgebant Cassius atque Brutus, eo ipso quod effigies 
eorum non visebantur. [25] traduced to contempt: i.e. contemptuously 


pea Pater ha 


aed a 


- wae a 


BOOK 1. 273 


paraded, [26, 27] Which age, because it is the age of least authority, 
it is transferred &c.: Observe the looseness of construction in the 
unnecessary repetition of the pronoun #: the words ‘ which age’ being 
placed foremost in the sentence without any government as a kind of 
nominativus pendens. Other examples occur in the course of this book, 
pp. 2, ll. 17, 18; 39, ll. 10, 11, 32, 33; 48, ll. 20-24. Comp. the 
Authorized Version of John xiii. 3, 4; ‘ Jesus knowing... he riseth &c.’ 

P. 21. [4] Joel. ii. 28. Comp. Ess. xlii. p. 175: ‘ A certaine rabbine, 
upon the text; Four young men shall see visions, and your old men shall 
dreame dreames ; inferreth, that young men are admitted nearer to God 
then old; because vision is a clearer revelation, then a dreame.’ ‘The 
‘rabbine’ is Abrabanel. [6] they: Some copies of ed. 1605 read the. 
[8] condition...hath: In ed. 1605 the reading is conditions... hath; 
in ed. 1633, conditions...have. [9g] Comp. Florio’s Montaigne, p. 60, 
ed. 1603: ‘I have in my youth oftentimes beene vexed, to see a Pedant 
brought in, in most of Italian Comedies, for a vice or sporte-maker.’ 
[16-21] The whole clause is modified in the De Augmentis to avoid 
giving offence to the Roman Catholics. It there stands as follows: 
quorum cum intueor industriam solertiamque tam in doctrina excolenda 
quam in moribus informandis, illud occurrit Agesilai de Pharnabazo &c. 
[17] A saying of Diogenes. See Diog. Laert. vi. 46. Comp. Apoph. 
266. [21] Plutarch, Ages. xii. 5. [28] Ovid, Epist. xv. 83. Quoted 
again in Ess. l. p. 205. [28-30] Lat. atque literas, nisi incidant in 
ingenia admodum depravata, corrigere prorsus naturam et mutare in melius. 
[33] not inherent: The negative is superfluous, or something has been 
omitted. The Latin has nullum occurrit dedecus literis ex literatorum 
moribus, quatenus sunt literati, adherens, where ‘inherent’ is taken as 
referring to ‘disgrace,’ and not to ‘manners,’ as Mr. Spedding explains 
it: ‘not [I mean, from such manners as are] inherent &c.’ 

P. 22. [11] Plutarch, Solon, 15; Bacon, Apoph. 93. [14] Plato, 
Epist. vii. p. 331. Mr. Ellis suggested that Bacon probably took it 
from Cicero, Epist. Fam. i. 9. 18. [17] Epist. i. ad Cas. De Republica 
Ordinanda. [20] Cic. ad Att. ii. 1. 8: optimo animo utens et summa fide, 
nocet interdum reipublice. Dicit enim tanquam in Platonis woduteig, non 
tanquam in Romuli face, sententiam, [23] doth excuse and expound: 
Lat. molli interpretatione excusat. [25] Cic. pro Murana, 31: Etenim 
isti ipsi mihi videntur vestri preceptores et virtutis magistri fines officiorum 
&c. [29] Ovid, Ars Amat. ii. 548. 

P. 23. [2] Demosthenes, De Cherson, p. 106. [8] quinquennium 
Neronis: See Aurelius Victor, De Cesar. vy. 2. [10] The Latin adds, 
magno suo periculo, ac postremo precipitio. (13) the casualty of their 
fortunes: Lat. instabilitatis fortuna. [20] Matt. xxv. 20. [21 &c.] 
Compare with this Essay xxiii. ‘Of wisdome for a man’s selfe.’ [23] 
nor never ; Observe the double negative. [25] lines: Some copies of ed. 

3 


274 NOTES. 


1605 read times. [27] estates: Perhaps we should read estate; Lat. de 
reipublice navi. [31] stand: i. e. stand firm, keep their position; Lat. 
incolumes permaneant, 

P. 24. [3, 4] howsoever fortune may tax it: Lat. uteunque ee quando- 
que a fortuna mulctentur. [10] Lat. quod non facile se applicent et accom- 
modent, [16] Ascribed to Epicurus by Seneca, Ep. i. 7. § 11. Quoted 
again in Ess. x. p. 36: ‘It is a poore saying of Epicurus; Satis magnum 
alter alteri theatrum sumus: as if man, made for the contemplation of 
heaven, and all noble obiects, should doe nothing, but kneele before a 
little idoll, and make himself subiect, though not of the mouth (as beasts 
are) yet of the eye; which was given him for higher purposes.’ [Ib.] 
not: Omitted in some copies of ed. 1605. [18] Lat. aciem animi, instar 
oculi. [19] Lat. Secunda vero causa est probitas morum et simplicitas. 
[27] Lat. wt illum inflectas, verses, et ad libitum circumagas. [31] the 
custom of the Levant: Lat. mos Orientis. Comp. Her. i. 99. 

P. 25. [3] Prov. xxv. 3. [14] Plutarch, Them. ii. 4; Cimon, ix. 1. 
Quoted again in Ess. xxix. p. 118: ‘The speech of Themistocles the 
Athenian, which was haughtie and arrogant, in taking so much to 
himselfe, had been a grave and wise observation and censure, applied at 
large to others. Desired at a feast to touch a lute, he said; He could 
not fiddle, but yet he could make a small towne,a great citty.’ [20] Lat. 
quibus tamen in communi vita et quotidianis reculis nihil imperitius. [22] 
Comp. Apoph. 196; Plato, Symp. iii. p. 215; Xen. Symp. v. 7. 
Socrates is compared not to ‘the gallipots of apothecaries’ but to the 
images of Silenus, of which Rabelais (Gargantua, prol.) says, ‘ Silenes 
estoyent jadiz petites boytes, telles que voyons de present es bouticques 
des apothecaires; painctes au dessus de figures joyeuses et frivoles.’ 
Mr. Spedding, with great probability, conjectures that Bacon may have 
had this passage in his mind. [24] Lat. gue exterius inducebantur simiis, 
ululis, satyrisque. 

P. 26. [3] solemn parasites: Lat. barbatos parasitos. [4] Lucian, De 
Mercede Conductis, 33, 34. [6] Lat. catulum suum Meliteum. [12] Du 
Bartas, Second Jour de la Semaine: 

‘Tous ces doctes esprits dont la voix flatteresse, 

Change Hécube en Héléne, et Faustine en Lucresse, 

Qui d'un nain, d’un batard, d’un archerot sans yeux, 

Font, non un dieutelet, ains le maistre des dieux,’ &c. 
See also Judith, bk. v. [14] modern: The ed. of 1605 has morall, which 
is corrected in the Errata to moderne, the reading of edd. 1629, 1633. 
(Ib.} dedication: ed. 1605 has dedications. It is curious that the 
translator in the De Augmentis followed the uncorrected copy: neque 
vero nimis laudo morem illum receptum libros patronis nuncupandi. [26] 
Aristippus, not Diogenes. See Diog. Laert. Aristip. ii. 69. Comp. 
* Apoph. 161. 


cnet matin es 


BOOK 1. 275 


P. 27. [5] Diog. Laert. Aristip. ii. 79; Apoph. 86. [10] Spartianus 
(Vita Hadriani, § 15) tells this story of Favorinus. Apoph. 160. [24] 
Lat. etiam ea que impolluta et in statu suo manserunt. (25) the state: the 
article was not unfrequently employed where we should now use a 
possessive pronoun. See Glossary. 

P. 28. [6] The Latin adds, quando nimirum aut in rebus inanibus opera 
insumitur, aut circa verborum delicias nimium insudatur. [10] Lat. 
doctrina fucata et mollis. [12-31] The whole of this passage is much 
abridged in the Latin, apparently to avoid offending the Roman 
Catholics. See p. 21, ll. 16-21, note. In the De Augmentis the 
following is substituted : Intemperies ista, in luxurie quadam orationis sita 
(licet olim per vices in pretio habita fuerit), circa Lutheri tempora miris modis 
invaluit. In causa precipue fuit, quod fervor et efficacia concionum tune 
temporis ad populum demulcendum et alliciendum maxime vigebat ; illa autem 
populare genus orationis poscebant. Accedebat odium et contemptus illis 
temporibus ortus erga scholasticos, &c. 

P. 29. [4-15] And again... flourish: Omitted in the Latin. [5] 
then: that then in ed. 1605, corrected in Errata. [6] John vii. 49. [23] 
Osorius, bishop of Sylves in Algarve, died 1580; wrote De Rebus 
Gestis Emanuelis, 1574. On his redundant style see Ascham, The 
Scholemaster, pp. 110, 129-131, ed. Mayor. [24] Sturmius: Joannes 
Sturmius, born at Sleida, October 1, 1507, died March 3, 1589, was 
called the German Cicero. He was professor at Paris and Strasburg, 
and wrote In Partitiones Oratorias Ciceronis Dialogi Quatuor, Scholia 
in Hermogenem, De Imitatione Oratoria Libri Tres, and De Periodis 
Liber, to all of which Bacon refers, besides many other works. (27] 
Car of Cambridge: Nicholas Carr (1523-1568) succeeded Sir John 
Cheke as Regius Professor of Greek in 1547. He obtained a great 
reputation by his translations into Latin of the Olynthiacs and Philip- 
pics of Demosthenes, Plato’s Dialogue on the Laws, and the Oration of 
ZEschines against Ctesiphon. Besides these he wrote prefaces to the 
Symposium and other dialogues of Plato, as well as to Hschines, 
Theocritus, Sophocles, and some orations of Demosthenes. [28] Ascham: 
Roger Ascham (1515-1568), in his Scholemaster, is constantly sounding 
the praises of Cicero, whom he calls his master. [32] Erasmus, Colloq. 
‘ Decem jam annos @tatem trivi in Cicerone.’ Echo. ‘ ove.’ 

P. 30. [5] is: Omitted in ed. 1605. [8] secundum majus et minus: i.e. 
to a greater or less degree. See p.171,1.12. [13] Pygmalion: Ovid, 
Metam. x. 243. [32] The Scholiast on Theocr. v. 21 attributes this 
story of Hercules to Cleander év Sevrépy Trav maporpiov. Bacon inserted 
it in his Promus, fol. 16 a. [33] minion: migmon, ed. 1605. 

P. 31. [5] In the De Augmentis another kind of style is mentioned as 
somewhat more healthy than the last-mentioned, though not altogether 
free from vanity. The whole object of this is that the words should be 

T2 


| 276 NOTES. 


pointed, the sentences concise, and the composition rather twisted than 
flowing. Instances are found largely in Seneca, less in Tacitus and 
Plinius Secundus. [13] Lat. neque theologiam tantum, sed etiam omnes 
scientias respicere videtur, ([Ib.] 1 Tim. vi. 20. Quoted again in Ess. ili. 
p. 11. [17] the strictness of positions: Lat. rigor dogmatum, [26|—p. 
32 [9] This kind... profit: The original of this passage is to be found 
in Bacon’s Cogit. de Sci. Hum. Frag. i. cog. 10 (Works, iii. 187). 

P. 32. [7] cobwebs: ed. 1605, copwebs, the older form of spelling. In 
Old English, ‘atter cop’ (A. S. dttor coppa) is a spider. [20] See 
ZEsop, Fab. 52. Vis unita fortior: Bacon, Colours of Good and Evil, 
p. 255, ed. W. A. Wright. [27] Quintil. x. 1: Si rerum pondera 
minutissimis sententiis non fregisset, consensu potius eruditorum quam 
puerorum amore comprobaretur. Quoted again in Ess, xxvi. p. 105. 

P. 33. [10] Virg. Ecl. vi. 75. Bacon makes use of the same figure in 
his book Of the Interpretation of Nature (Works, iii. 232, ed. Spedding). 
[22] of Adyou gov yepovri@or. Diog. Laert. Plato, iii. 18. Quoted again 
in Nov. Org. i. 71. [29]—p. 34. [4] but as they are... unto them: 
Omitted in the Latin, for the same reason as before. For the original 
form see Of the Interp. of Nat. p. 224. [30] fierce with dark keeping: 
that is, as Mr. Ellis explains it, fierce with being kept in the dark, like 
animals. He quotes from Bacon’s Cogitationes de Scientia Humana, 
ist frag. cog. 10 (Works, iii. 187): ferocitatem autem et confidentiam eam 
que illos qui pauca sequi solet (ut animalia in tenebris educata): 
acquisivissent. 

P. 34. [8] the essential form: Lat. ipsam naturam animamque. [19] 
Hor. Epist. i. 18.69. [24] Tac. Ann. v. 10; comp. Hist.i. 51. [25] 
‘hath’ for ‘have’: a loose construction, not uncommon in Bacon. See 
p. 35, 1. 26: ‘Such whereupon observation and rule was to be built.’ 
Also p. 109, 1. 33, and Ps. xiv. 7, Pr. Bk. ‘Destruction and unhappiness 
is in their ways.’ [29] or, as: ‘or’ is omitted in ed. 1605, but inserted 
in Errata and in edd. 1629, 1633. 

P. 35. [3-10] which though... religion: Omitted in the Latin as 
before, pp. 21, 28, 33. [3] had a passage for a time: The ed. 1605 
reads, ‘had a passage for time.’ Perhaps it should be, ‘ had passage for 
a time,’ that is, ‘were current for a time.’ [13] Plinius: ‘ Plinius 
secundus of Verona; a man of great Eloquence, and industry inde- 
fatigable, as may appear by his writings, especially those now extant, 
and which are never like to perish, but even with learning it self; that 
is, his natural History. He was the greatest Collector or Rhapso- 
dist of the Latines, and as Swetonius observeth, he collected this piece 
out of two thousand Latine and Greek Authors. Now, what is very 
strange, there is scarce a popular error passant in our dayes, which 
is not either directly expressed, or diductively contained in this work.’ 
Sir T. Brown, Vulgar Errors, book i. chap. 8, p. 33 (ed. 1658). [Ib.] 


Reese 22 SiN 


a a el ae 


BOOK 1. 277 


Cardanus. ‘We had almost forgot eronimus Cardanus, that famous 
physician of Milan, a great enquirer of truth, but too greedy a receiver 
of it. He hath left many excellent discourses, Medical, Natural, and 
Astrological ; the most suspicious are those two he wrote by admonition 
in a dream, that is, De subtilitate et varietate rerum.’ Ibid. p- 36. [14] 
Albertus: ‘ Albertus Bishop of Ratisbone; for his great learning and 
latitude of knowledge sirnamed Magnus, Besides Divinity, he hath 
written many Tracts in Philosophy; what we are chiefly to receive with 
caution, are his natural tractates, more especially those of Minerals, 
Vegetables and animals, which are indeed chiefly Collections out of 
Aristotle, dilian, and Pliny, and respectively contain many of our popular 
Errors.’ Ibid. p. 35. [22] side: The edd. of 1605, 1629, 1633, read 
‘sake.’ The book De Mirabilibus Auscultationibus, to which Bacon 
refers, is not Aristotle’s. See p. 87. [26] ‘was’ for ‘were.’ See p. 34, 
l. 25, note. 

P. 36. [1] Lat. que plus habent ex phantasia et fide quam ex ratione et 
d trationibus. [12] the derivations and prosecutions to these ends: 
That is, the subsidiary channels leading to these ends and the modes in 
which they have been followed. The Latin has, vie atque rationes que 
ducere putantur ad hos fines. [19] /Esop, Fab. 33; comp. Nov. Org. i. 
85. [32] consuls: counsels in ed. 1605, corrected to consuls in Errata. 
Mr. Spedding conjectured that Bacon probably wrote counsell’s, and his 
conjecture is adopted by Mr. Kitchin. The Latin has, dictatoria guadam 
potestate munivit ut edicant, non senatoria ut consulant, which again looks 
as if the translator had the uncorrected copy before him. 

P. 37. [2-20] For hence... Aristotle: The original form of this 
passage is seen in the book Of the Interpretation of Nature (Works, iii. 
226, 227). [3] deviser: ‘device’ (Interpretation of Nature). [6] 
artillery, sailing, printing: ‘ painting, artillery, sailing’ (Interpretation of 
Nature). [16-20] For as... Aristotle: ‘ For knowledge is like a water 
that will never rise again higher than the level from which it fell; and 
therefore to go beyond Aristotle by the light of Aristotle is to think that 
a borrowed light can increase the original light from which it is taken’ 
(Interpretation of Nature), [21] Aristot. Soph. El. i. 2. [28-30] Lat. 
ut authori authorum et veritatis parenti, Tempori, non derogetur. [32] 
peccant humours: Lat. vitiosi humores. 

P. 38. [6] Alluding to the old fable of Kronos, [11] Jer. vi. 16; 
quoted again in Ess. xxiv. p. 100, [16] Comp. Nov. Org. i. 84: Mundi 
enim senium et granda@vitas pro antiquitate vere habenda sunt; que 
temporibus nostris tribui debent, non juniori @tati mundi, qualis apud 
antiquos fuit, Illa enim q@tas, respectu nostri antigua et major, resfectu 
mundi ipsius nova et minor fuit. The observation is quoted by Fuller in 
his chapter on The true Church Antiquary (Holy State, ii. 6). {25} 
Not Lucian but Seneca. See Lactantius, De Falsa Religione, i, 16. 


278 NOTES. 


P. 39. [6] Liv. ix. 17; quoted again in Nov. Org. i. 97, and Of the 
True Greatness of Britain (Works, vii. 50). Comp. Of the Interpretation 
of Nature, p. 224, for the original of this passage. [10, 11] which till 
they be demonstrate, they seem &c.: Observe the looseness of 
construction and the unnecessary repetition of the pronoun, Comp. ll. 
32, 33. [16] hath still prevailed: Lat. semper obtinuisse, [23-26] Comp. 
Noy. Org. i. 71 ; Of the Interpretation of Nature (Works, iii. 227). In 
Essay liii. p. 213 Bacon uses the same figure in speaking of Fame: 
‘Certainly, Fame is like a river, that beareth up things light and swolne, 
and drownes things waighty and solide.’ [32, 33] So knowledge, while 
it is in aphorisms and observations, it is in growth: Another instance of 
the same construction as has been noticed before, p. 20, ll. 26, 27; p. 
39, ll. 10, 11. See p. 48, ll. 20-24; p. 129, + 23, 

P. 40. [2] illustrate: ed. 1633 has illustrated. [8] philosophia prima: 
See p. 105, l. 29; p. 113, l. 20. [22] Heraclitus: In Sextus Empiricus, 
Ady. Logicos, i. § 133. [25-29] for they... deluded: The original 
form of this passage is to be found in the treatise Of the Interpretation of 
Nature, p. 224. 

P. 41. [3] See Nov. Org. i. 63, 96. [8] Gilbertus: William Gilbert of 
Colchester (1540-1603), Fellow of St. John’s Coll. Cambridge, and 
physician to Elizabeth and James I., wrote ‘De Magnete, magneticisque 
corporibus, et de magno magnete tellure; Physiologia nova &c. 1600,’ 
‘His work,” says Dr. Whewell (Hist. of Ind. Sc. book xii. ch. 1), 
‘contains all the fundamental facts of the science, so fully examined 
indeed, that even at this day we have little to add to them.’ Comp. with 
the whole of this passage Nov. Org. i. 54, 64. [12] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 
i. 10. 20, Hic ab artificio suo non recessit, speaking of Aristoxenus. [14] 
Aristot. De Gener. et Corrup. i. 2, quoted again in the treatise Of the 
Interpretation of Nature, p. 231. [18] The same comparison is made 
use of in the last-mentioned treatise, p. 250. [19] the two ways of 
action commonly spoken of by the ancients: Bacon probably refers to 
Xenophon (Memorabilia, ii. 1. 20), who quotes Hesiod, Works and Days, 
287-292, and introduces Prodicus’s fable of the choice of Hercules. 

P. 42. [1] Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 8.18. Comp. Nov. Org. i. 67. 
[2] Socrates: See p. 153, 1. 31. [8] devote: So ed. 1605. Ed. 1633 
has devoute. [17] Comp. S. Bernard, Serm. 36 in Cant. [28] terrace: 
ed. 1605 tarrasse. ' 

P. 43. [5,6] Comp. Macrob. in Somn. Scip. i.12. [7-14] Comp. Of 
the Interpretation of Nature, p. 222: ‘And knowledge that tendeth to 
profit or profession or glory is but as the golden ball thrown before Ata- 
lanta, which while she goeth aside and stoopeth to take up she hindereth 
the race.” [14] Ovid, Metam. x.667. [16] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 4. 10. 
[23-26] Comp. Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 222. [29] have: 
hath in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. [32] Prov. xxvii. 6. 


<hr? <8 he oe erat 


BOOK I, 279 


P. 44. [12] arch-type: Arch-tipe in ed. 1605; Arch-type edd. 1629, 
1633. [Ib.] first platform: exemplari. Comp. Ess. xlix. p- 194: ‘Sol 
have made a platforme of a princely garden, partly by precept, partly by 
drawing, not a modell, but some generall lines of it.’ [18] Comp. Prov. 
vili. 22-31. [33] Gen.i. 1. 

P. 45. [4] Hooker, Eccl. Pol. i. 4. § 1, 2. [5] Dionysius, De Celesti 
Hierarchia, 6, 7, 8,9. A work erroneously ascribed to Dionysius the 
Areopagite. The epithet ‘supposed’ shows that Bacon believed it to be 
spurious. The Latin has merely gue Dionysii Areopagite nomine evul- 
gatur. Thomas Heywood, in his Hierarchie of the Blessed Angels 
(1635), divides them into Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones, Dominations, 
Vertues, Powers, and Principats. See also Milton, Par. Lost, v. 601, 
772, 840. [15] Gen. i. 3. [22] Gen. ii. 3. [32] Gen. ii. 19. 

P. 46. [1] Comp. pp. 5,6. [7] In a note on the corresponding pas- 
sage of the De Augmentis Mr. Ellis quotes from S. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summ. Theol. Sec. Secund. q. 163. a. 2: Primus homo peccavit princip- 
aliter appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad scientiam boni et mali, sicut 
serpens ei suggessit, ut scilicet per virtutem proprie nature determinaret sibi 
quid esset bonum et quid malum ad agendum. [13] Gen. iv. 2. [23] Gen. 
iv. 21,22. [25] Gen. xi. [30] Acts vii. 22. Comp. Of the Interpreta- 
tion of Nature, p. 219. [32] Plato, Tim. iii. 22. Comp. Nov. Org. i. 
71; Apoph. 223. 

P. 47. [11] Lev. xiii. 12, 13. [14-18] Among the Regales A phorismi 
or maxims of King James I. edited by W. Stratton, 1650, is the follow- 
ing, evidently borrowed from this passage: ‘As it is a principle of nature, 
that putrifaction is more contagious before maturity than after; so it is 
a position of Moral Philosophie, that men abandoned to vice, do not so 
much corrupt manners, as those that are half good and half evill’ (p. 165). 
In De Augm. iii. 1, Bacon gives as a rule in physics, Putredo serpens 
magis contagiosa est quam matura. [24] Job xxvi. 7. [28] Job xxvi. 13. 
[30] Job xxxviii. 31. 

P. 48. [1] Jobix.9. [5] Jobx.10. [7] Job xxviii.1,2. [12] 1 Kings 
iii. 5, &c. [17] verdure: verdor edd. 1605, 1629, 1633, which Mr. 
Spedding would retain as another form of the word. It probably only 
represents the current pronunciation. The corresponding passage of the 
treatise Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 220, has ‘all that is green.’ 
[18] the moss upon the wall: The English version of 1 Kings iv. 33 
has hyssop. Bacon followed the rendering of Junius and Tremellius, 
[19] Nov. Org. ii. 30. [20-24] Nay, the same Salomon the king, 
although he excelled... yet he maketh &c.: The same loose construction 
as before, pp. 20.1. 27; 39. Il. 11, 32, 33. [26] Prov. xxv. 2. Comp. 
the corresponding passage Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 220. 

P. 49. [4] Luke ii. 46. [8] Acts ii. 1. [18] who was only learned: 
i.e. the only learned man among the Apostles. Lat. gui inter Apostolos 


280 NOTES. 

solus literatus fuit. [22] fathers: Father in ed. 1605. [24] Amm. Marc. 
xxii. 10. 7; xxv. 4.19. Comp. Gibbon, ch. 23; Juliani Epist. xlii. The 
Lat. adds cetera viri egregii. [30] Paulus Diaconus, iii. par. 33. Comp. 
Ess. lviii. p. 232 ; Gibbon, ch. 45. 

P. 50. [4] Scythians: The Scythians or Tartars invaded the Gothic 
empire A.D. 375. See Gibbon, ch. 26. [5] Saracens: The Arabs under 
Abubeker conquered Syria a.p. 633-639. See Gibbon, ch. 51. [9-16] 
And we see. .. knowledges: Omitted in the Latin. [22 &c.] With this 
paragraph compare Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 221. [27] Pss. 
xix. Civ. 

P. 51. [3-8] Comp. Nov. Org. i. 89. [4] Matt. xxii. 29. This text 
is made the subject of the section De Heresibus in Bacon’s Medita- 
tiones Sacre. [25] See Herodian, Hist. iv. 2, [26] dives in some 
copies of ed. 1605. [32] honours heroical: honour heroicall in edd. 
1605, 1629, 1633. 

P. 52. [1-19] Comp. Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 223: ‘The 
dignity of this end (of endowment of man’s life with new commodities) 
appeareth by the estimation that antiquity made of such as guided there- 
unto. For whereas founders of states, lawgivers, extirpers of tyrants, 
fathers of the people, were honoured but with the titles of Worthies or 
Demigods, inventors were ever consecrated amongst the Gods them- 
selves. And if the ordinary ambitions of men lead them to seek the 
amplification of their own power in their countries, and a better ambi- 
tion than that hath moved men to seek the amplification of the power of 
their own countries amongst other nations, better again and more worthy 
must that aspiring be which seeketh the amplification of the power and 
kingdom of mankind over the world; the rather because the other two 
prosecutions are ever culpable of much perturbation and injustice; but 
this is a work truly divine, which cometh im aura leni without noise or 
observation.’ [9] as was: So in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. For construc- 
tion compare Luke v. 10. [13, 14] fer a latitude of ground: Lat. pro 
amplitudine tractus terre, [18] coming in: In ed. 1605 this is printed 
com- in, the first syllable occurring at the end of a line. It was altered 
to commonly in in edd. 1629, 1633, but the passage Of the Interpretation 
of Nature above quoted, and the Lat. veniuntque in aura leni, show that 
‘coming in’ is the true reading. The Vulgate of 1 Kings xix. 12 és post 
ignem sibilus aur@ tenuis. Bacon uses the expression again in a letter to 
Sir Toby Matthew (Life and Letters, ed. Spedding, iii. 74). [24] Phile- 
strati Junioris Imagines, vii. Comp. Discourse on the Plantation in 
Ireland (Life and Letters, iv. 117), and De Sapientia Veterum, IT. 

P. 53. [10] Plato, Repub. v. p. 473. A favourite saying of Antoninus 
Pius (Capitolinus, Vit. Ant. P.c. 27). Rabelais, Gargant. i. 45. [31] six 
princes: six sciences in ed. 1605, corrected in Errata, [33] for temporal 
respects: We should say ‘in temporal respects.’ 


Remora”. al 


BOOK I. 281 


P. 54. [3] Suetonius, Dom. 23, quoted again in Ess. xxxv. p. 150, and 
in a letter from Bacon to King James on a Digest of the Laws of 
England. [7-13] of which... altogether: de quibus sigillatim sed brevis- 
sime verba faciam. The following paragraphs, as far as p. 58, l. 32, are 
much condensed in the Latin. [11] Hor. Od. ii. 10.19. [15] Tac. 
Agric. 3: et guamquam primo statim beatissimi seculi ortu Nerva Cesar res 
olim dissociabiles miscuerit principatum ac libertatem. [21] Hom. II. i. 42; 
tigevavy Aavaol éud Sdxpva cotor BéAeoow. Dio Cass. (Xiphilinus) lxviii. 
p. 771. [24] Matt. x. 41. 

P. 55. [2] This story is told of Gregory the Great in his life by Paulus 
Diaconus, c. 27, and in that by Joannes Diaconus, lib. ii. c. 44; and is 
referred to by Joannes Damascenus, De iis qui in Fide Dormierunt, c. 
16. See also Dante, Purgatorio, cant. x. 73 &c. Vision of Piers Plough- 
man, 6857-6907, ed. T. Wright. [10] Plin. Epist.x.96. [12] Adrian: 
Dio Cass. lxix. 3, 11. [17] Philip of Macedon: Some copies of ed. 
1605 have ‘and Macedon.’ The story is told by Plutarch, de Adul. et 
Amico, 27; Symp. ii. I. 12; and repeated by Bacon, Of the Interpreta- 
tion of Nature, p. 230, Apoph. 159. [26] It was not Hadrian, but Alex- 
ander Severus, who is said, in his life by Lampridius (c. 29), to have 
had, in the shrine where his dares were placed, figures of Apollonius, 
Christ, Abraham, Orpheus, and others. And again (c. 43), Christo tem- 
plum facere voluit, eumque inter deos recipere. [32] Trajan’s: Mr. Sped- 
ding conjectures Trajan, which no doubt is more correct, though Trajan’s 
is probably what Bacon wrote. 

P. «6. [3] Aurelius Victor, Epit. xli. 13. Quoted again in a Letter 
from Bacon to King James, Of a Digest to be made of the Laws of 
England (Cabala, p. 75). [11] policing: the regulating and governing 
of a town. Edd. 1605, 1629 have pollicing, ed. 1633 pollishing. ‘He 
gave also multitudes of charters and liberties forthe comfort of corpora- 
tions and companies in decay.’ Bacon, Offer of a Digest of the Laws of 
England. [16] Antoninus: the three old editions have Antonius. [19] 
Dio Cassius, Ixx. 3. Comp. Juliani Cesares, ‘If his wit be not apt to 
distinguish or find differences, let him study the schoole-men ; for they 
are cymini sectores.’ Bacon, Ess. 1. p. 206. [31] Acts xxvi. 28. 

P. 57. [2] Lucius Ceionius Commodus, son of /Elius Cesar, and 
Marcus Annius Verus, were adopted by Antoninus Pius, and on his 
death in 161 succeeded him with the titles of L. Aurelius Verus and 
M. Aurelius Antoninus. [4] Spartianus, Vit. Alii Veri, c. 5: idem 
Martialem epigrammaticum poetam Virgilium suum dixisse. [6] Lucius 
Verus died of apoplexy a.p. 169: Marcus Aurelius survived till a.p. 180. 
[10] Juliani Ceesares, xviii. [22] Lampridius, Vita Severi, 5-10. [31] 
the world: ‘the’ omitted in ed. 1605, 

P. 58. [1-5] Compare Bacon’s Letter to the Lord Chancellor, touching 
the history of Britain, where he speaks of Queen Elizabeth in nearly the 


282 NOTES. 


same words. [3] lives: lynes in.ed. 1605. [6] rare: grace in some 
copies of 1605; others read great. In the Errata it is corrected to rare, 
and this is the reading of edd. 1629 and 1633. [12] her: So in some 
copies of ed. 1605; others read the. [30] to the purpose: that is, as 
regards the purpose &c. 

P. 59. [12] Plutarch, Alex. 8.§ 1. [19] Achilles: Plut. Alex. 15. § 3. 

(22] Pliny, H. N. vii. 30; Plutarch, Alex. 26.§ 1. [2 5] Plutarch, Alex. 

54 

: P. 60. [1-10] And herein...praises: Omitted in the Latin. [14] 
Plutarch, Alex. 14. § 2. [17] Seneca, De Benef. v. 4.§ 4. [23] Plutarch, 
De Adulatore et Amico, 25; Alex. 22. § 2. [27] The Latin adds, cum 
tam indigentia quam redundantia nature, per illa duo designata, mortis 
sint tanquam arrhabones. [31] Seneca, Ep. Mor. vi. 7. § 12. Plutarch, 
Alex. 28. § 1. [32] Hom. Il. v. 340; ixdp olds wép re peer paxdpera 
Oeotat. 

P. 61. [2] Plutarch, Alex. 74. § 2. [6, 7] that was the matter: We 
should say, that was the point. Lat. hoc ipsum animos eis dedit. [15] 
Plutarch, Alex. 53. § 2. Quoted again by Bacon in his Letter to the 
King on a Digest of the Laws of England (Cabala, p. 76). [24, 25] 
Lat. Callisthenes negotium in se recepit, idque tam acerbe tamque aculeate 
prestitit &c. [29] translation: Bacon uses this word as the rendering of 
metaphor, borrowing it from the Lat. translatio as employed by Cicero. 
[30] Plutarch, Apoph. Reg. et Imp. Alex. 17. Mr. Ellis has pointed 
out that Bacon, following Erasmus, misunderstood the story. Holland 
translates it: ‘ When some there were who much praised unto him the 
plainenesse and homelie simplicitie of Antipater, saying that he lived an 
austere and hard life, without all superfluities and delicious pleasures 
whatsoever: Well (quoth he) Antipater weares in outward shew his 
apparell with a plaine white welt or guard, but he is within all purple 
(I warrant you) and as red as scarlet (’Avrtmarpos Aeveondpudds éamt, TA 
& eviov ddAomdppupos).’ 

P. 62. [3-9] Plutarch, Alex. 31. § 5. Quoted again in Ess. xxix. 
p. 120. [13] Plutarch, Alex. 47. § 3. [19] according to the model of 
their own mind: Comp. Hor. Epist. i. 7. 98, Metiri se quemque suo 
modulo ac pede verum est. [21] Plutarch, Alex. 29. § 3. [25] Perdiccas, 
according to Plutarch, was the only one of Alexander’s friends who 
asked the question. Plutarch, Alex. 15. § 2. [30] Plutarch, Ces, rr. 
§ 1. Crassus became surety to Czesar’s creditors for 880 talents, before 
he was allowed to take the prztorship in Spain. [32] This story of the 
Duke of Guise had been heard by Bacon when he was in France in 1 576. 
In his Apology concerning the Earl of Essex, he says, in reference to 
Essex’s offer of a piece of land, ‘ My answer, I remember, was, that for 
my fortune it was no great matter; but that his lordship’s offer made 
me to call to mind what was wont to be said, when I was in France, of 


Raa. 
Ss 


BOOK 1. 283 


the duke of Guise, that he was the greatest usurer in France, because he 
had turned all his estate into obligations; meaning that he had left him- 
self nothing, but only had bound numbers of persons to him.’ 

P. 63. [4-8] To conclude... prince: Omitted in the Latin. [14] his 
company: that is, his companions, the company he kept. The Latin 
has ex familiaribus. [20] the real passages: This expression, which is 
omitted in the translation, either means the actual occurrences or the 
truthful descriptions of them. [21] lively images: We should say 
‘vivid pictures.’ [25] Suetonius, Jul. Cees. 56; Quintil. i. 7. § 34. This 
work, De Analogia, in two books, is again referred to by Bacon, De 
Augm. vi. 1, in which passage he is doubtful whether it treated of what 
we should call philosophical Grammar, and not rather of elegance and 
purity of language. It is quoted by Cicero (Brutus, 72) under the title 
of ‘De ratione Latine loquendi,’ and in the first book Czesar is said to 
have laid down as a maxim verborum delectum originem esse eloquentia. 
Aulus Gellius (i. 10) quotes another precept from the same book that 
an unusual word is to be avoided like a rock (ut tanquam scopulum sic 
fugias insolens verbum). Again (ix. 14) he appeals to the Second Book 
of the De Analogia as an authority for the forms hujus die and hujus 
specie, and to the work generally (xix. 8), without mentioning the book, 
for the opinion that harena, celum, triticum could only be used in the 
singular, and that guadrige could only occur in the plural. Compare 
also iv. 16. [28-30] This passage is slightly modified in the Latin 
translation, which is thus rendered into English by Wats: ‘ that words, 
which are the images of things, might accord with the things them- 
selves, and not stand to the arbitrement of the vulgar.’ [32] Suet. Jul. 
Cees. 40. 

P. 64. [3] Anti-Cato: According to Suetonius (Jul. Cas. 56) this 
was in two books. It was written in answer to Cicero’s panegyric on 
Cato, and is quoted by Aulus Gellius (iv. 16). Compare Cicero ad Att. 
xii. 40, 41, xiii. 50; Plutarch, Jul. Cees. 54. § 3. [4] victory of wit: 
Archbishop Trench in his Select Glossary has given an excellent quota- 
tion from Bp. Reynolds, which illustrates the difference between the 
present and past usages of the word ‘wit. ‘ For I take not wit in that 
common acceptation, whereby men understand some sudden flashes of 
conceipt, whether in stile or conference, which like rotten wood in the 
darke, have more shine then substance; whose use and ornament are 
like themselves, swift and vanishing; at once both admired and for- 
gotten; but I understand a setled, constant, and habituall sufficiency of 
the understanding, whereby it is inabled in any kind of learning, theory, 
or practice, both to sharpnesse in search, subtilty in expression, and dis- 
patch in execution.’ Reynolds, The Passions and Faculties of the Soul, 
c, xxxix. p. 514. [8] These Apophthegms (Cic. ad Fam. ix. 16), or 
Dicta collectanea as they are called by Suetonius (Jul. Cees. 56), were 


284 NOTES. 


among the works which Augustus suppressed. [16] Eccl. xii. 11, from 
the Vulgate, though not quite literally. [21] Suetonius, Jul. Cees. 70. 
[25] cashiered: cassiered in ed. 1605, a form of spelling which points 
to the derivation of the word from Fr. casser. In Wats’s trans. of De 
Augm. the Latin is rendered, ‘and seditiously prayed to be cassed.’ 
[26] by expostulation thereof: Lat. hoe postulato. 

P. 65. [6] Suetonius, Jul. Cees. 79. [15] Rex was a surname with the 
Romans: comp. Hor. Sat. i. 7.1; Bacon, Apoph. 186, [17] Plutarch, 
Jul. Cees. 35. § 4. 

P. 66. [1] Suet. Jul. Cees. 77. [15] Xen. Anab. ii. 5.37. [16] the 
great king: of Persia. [25] The saying here ascribed to Xenophon is 
in Schneider’s edition of the Anabasis (ii. 1. § 12) given to Theopompus. 
Xenophon, who is described as serving merely as a volunteer, and hold- 
ing no command in the army, could hardly have taken part in the parley 
with Phalinus, Diodorus (xiv. p. 409) attributes the speech to Proxenus. 
In Stephens’s edition of 1561, which Bacon may have used, the reading 
is Zevopav. 

P. 67. [7] Jason the Thessalian (assassinated B.c. 370) was later than 
Agesilaus, though Bacon mentions him first. See Smith’s Hist. of 
Greece, p. 473. [8] Agesilaus: See Plut. Ages. 153; Smith’s Hist. of 
Greece, p. 439, &c. The date of the attempted invasion of Persia by 
Agesilaus was B.c. 396-394. Compare Bacon’s treatise, Of the True 
Greatness of Britain (Works, vii. 50): ‘And those that are conversant 
attentively in the histories of those times, shall find that this purchase 
which Alexander made and compassed was offered by fortune twice 
before to others, though by accident they went not through with it; 
namely, to Agesilaus, and Jason of Thessaly. For Agesilaus, after he 
had made himself master of most of the low provinces of Asia, and had 
both design and commission to invade the higher countries, was diverted 
and called home upon a war excited against his country by the states of 
Athens and Thebes, being incensed by their orators and counsellors, 
which were bribed and corrupted from Persia, as Agesilaus himself 
avouched pleasantly, when he said That an hundred thousand archers 
of the kings of Persia had driven him home: understanding it, because 
an archer was the stamp upon the Persian coin of gold. And Jason of 
Thessaly, being a man born to no greatness, but one that made a fortune 
of himself, and had obtained by his own vivacity of spirit, joined with 
the opportunities of time, a great army compounded of voluntaries and 
adventurers, to the terror of all Greecia, that continually expected where 
that cloud would fall, disclosed himself in the end, that his design was 
for an expedition into Persia, (the same which Alexander not many 
years after achieved,) wherein he was interrupted by a private conspiracy 
against his life, which took effect.” (14, 15] Ovid, Ep. Pont. ii. 9. 47. 
Ovid has Adde quod for scilicet. Mr. Ellis has pointed out that the 


BOOK 1, 285 


origin of this saying is to be found in a fragment of Theophrastus: 
done? yap % madeia, nat todro mavres Spodroyova. uepody tas Yvyxas, 
dpaipotoa 7d Onpid@des Kal dyvwpov (Stobzi Florilegium, ed. Gaisford, iv. 
App. p. 55, ed. 1822). [23] examined and tried; observe the Latinized 
construction of the participles. [29] Eccl. i. 9 (‘There is no new 
thing under the sun’), quoted from memory. [30, 31] The Latin 
has, qui pone aule@a caput inserens organa quibus moventur et filamenta 
cernit. 

P. 68. [3] for a passage: that is, a pass or ford. The Latin has 
propter pontem aliquem. [4] Plutarch (Ages. 15. § 6) relates that Alex- 
ander called the battle between Antipater and Agis a battle of mice, 
The news was brought to him soon after the battle of Arbela. [9] 
Compare Seneca, Nat. Queest. i. prol. § 10: Formicarum iste discursus est 
in angusto laborantium, [20] See Epictetus, Enchir. 33, and Simplicii in 
Epict. Comm, c, 33. The dramatic form of the story is apparently 
Bacon’s own. [24] Virg. Georg. ii. 490. [33] rationem totius: appa- 
rently referring to Eccl. xii. 13. 

P. 69. [5] Plato, Alcib. Prim. ii. 133. [6] Mr. Spedding quotes 
another form of this sentence as Bacon had entered it in the Promus, 
‘Suavissima vita indies meliorem fieri.’ It appears to be derived from 
Xenophon, Memor. i. 6. § 8. The same sentiment occurs in Dante, 
Parad. xviii. 58, quoted by Mr. Ellis. Comp. also Adv. to the E. of 
Rutland (Works, ix. p. 7). 

P. 70. [6] Virg. Georg. iv. 561. [9] over the will: The Latin adds 
licet liberam et non astrictam, [23] Rev. ii. 24. [24] force: face in ed. 
1605, corrected in Errata. [31] A saying of Hiero’s, recorded by Plu- 
tarch (Reg. et Imp. Apoph.), is perhaps what Bacon was thinking of. 
Xenophanes complained that his poverty did not allow him to keep two 
servants. ‘ How is that?’ said Hiero: ‘Homer, whom you worry with 
abuse, dead as he is, supports more than ten thousand.’ 

P. 71. [10] exceed the pleasure of the sense: So in the Errata to ed. 
1605. The original editions have ‘exceed the senses.’ The Lat. is 
oblectamenta sensuum excedent, The true reading is probably ‘ exceed 
the pleasures of the senses.’ [15] satiety: sacietie,ed. 1605. [16] ver- 
dure: In edd. 1605, 1629, 1633, it is verdour, which perhaps shows what 
the old pronunciation was. In Cotgrave’s French Dict. and Florio’s 
Ital. Dict. of 1611, the spelling of the word is as we have it. See note 
on p. 48, 1. 17. [17] deceits of pleasure: that is, deceptive, unreal 
pleasures. The Lat. has umbras tantum et fallacias voluptatum. [20] 
ambitious princes: Bacon was perhaps thinking of the Emperor Charles 
V., who resigned the crown of Spain in favour of his son in 1556, and 
retired to the monastery of San Yuste. See Ess. xix. p. 76. [22] ‘it,’ 
that is, ‘knowledge,’ is omitted as the subject of ‘appeareth.’ The 
whole sentence stands thus in the Lat.: ut necesse sit hujus delectationis 


286 NOTES. 


bonum simplex esse, non ex accidente, ut cum fraude. [27] Lucr. ii, 1-10, 
quoted again in Ess. i. p. 3. 

P. 72. [11] to this tend: tend is omitted in ed. 1605, but added in the 
Errata. [19] infinite: used loosely for ‘innumerable.’ The Lat. has 
innumera. It occurs once in the same sense in Shakespeare, Tim. of 
Ath. v. 1. 37: ‘a satire against the softness of prosperity, with a dis- 
covery of the infinite flatteries that follow youth and opulency.’ [Ib.] 
have been decayed: that is, have been brought to decay, fallen into 
decay. [21] statuaes: so in ed. 1605. ‘Statua’ was the old form of 
the word while still unnaturalized which Bacon adopted. See Glossary 
to his Essays. [23, 24] cannot but Jleese of the life and truth: that is, 
cannot but lose some of the life and truth. 

P. 73. [4] Bacon here refers to Aristotle and his followers. [11] 
affection: The true reading is probably affections, as in l. 14. [25] 
Pheedr, iii. 12. Quoted again in Ess. xiii. p. 48. It was a favourite 
fable with Bacon. Comp. Of the True Greatness of Britain (Works, 
vii. 57): ‘In which people (i.e. the Swiss) it well appeared what an 
authority iron hath over gold at the battle of Granson, at what time one 
of the principal jewels of Burgundy was sold for twelve pence by a poor 
Swiss, that knew no more a precious stone than did Esop’s cock.’ 
See Commines, B. v. c. 2. [26] Midas: Ovid, Metam. xi. 153, &c. 
[29] Paris: Eurip. Troad. 924, &c. [30] Tac. Ann. xiv. 9, Occidat 
dum imperet. [31] any: Omitted in ed. 1605, but added in the Errata. 
[32] Hom. Od. v. 218; Plutarch, Gryll. 1; Cic. de Orat.i. 44. Quoted 
again in Ess. viii. p. 27. 

P. 74. [2] must: Omitted in ed. 1605, but added in the Errata. [4] 
Matt. xi. 19, quoted from the Vulgate. 


BOOK .u. 


P. 75. [1-7] Comp. Ess. viii. p. 26: ‘Yet it were great reason, that 
those that have children, should have greatest care of future times; unto 
which, they know, they must transmit their dearest pledges.’ [9-12] 
and yet so... survive her: Omitted in the Lat., apparently for the reason 
mentioned in note on p. 21, ll. 16-21. [19] affection: Lat. studium 
meum erga literas. 

P. 76. [3] Hercules’ columns: The two rocks Calpe (Gibraltar) and 
Abyla (Ximiera, or Febel el Mina) on either side of the Straits of Gibraltar 
were so called by the ancients, as being supposed to mark the end of 
the western wanderings of Hercules, and so the limits of early geogra- 
phical knowledge in that direction (comp. Pindar, Nem. ili. 35; Herod. 
iv. 42, 181, 185). Pliny says of the Straits of Gibraltar (Hist. Nat. iii. 
proem. trans. Holland, ed. 1601): ‘Of both sides of this gullet, neere 
unto it, are two mountaines set as frontiers and rampiers to keepe all in: 
namely, Abila for Africke, Calpe for Europe, the utmost end of Hercules’ 


ESTE 


BOOK II, 287 


Labours. For which cause, the inhabitants of those parts call them, 
The two pillars of that God; and doe verily beleeve, that by certaine 
draines and ditches digged within the Continent, the maine Ocean, before 
excluded, made way and was let in, to make the Mediteranean seas, 
where before was firme land: and so by that meanes the very face of 
the whole earth is cleane altered.’ The origin of the legend is probably 
to be sought in the fact that the Pheenicians were the great navigators 
of the ancient world, and that Melkarth, the Greek Hercules, was their 
tutelary deity. In any case ‘the pillars of Hercules,’ which, like the 
ultima Thule of a later period, once denoted the extreme limit of geo- 
graphical discovery in one direction, are used metaphorically by Bacon 
to denote the limit of any investigation whatever. [10] Lat. sermone 
quodam activo et masculo. [12] ground: the foundation or basis of an 
argument. [16] supplieth: Lat. swccurrit. [17] direction: Perhaps we 
should read ‘ soundness of direction,’ as before. Lat. consilii prudentia et 
sanitas. [Ib.] S. Augustine, Serm. clxix. (vol. v: p. 569, ed. Ant. 1700): 
Melior it claudus in via, quam cursor preter viam. See Nov. Org. i. 61. 
In the Promus (vii. p. 200) it stands, Melior claudus in via quam cursor 
extra viam. Ben Jonson, in his Sylva, quotes it in a different form, 
* Aegidius cursu superat—A cripple in the way out-travels a footman, or 
a post out of the way:’ St. Giles being the patron saint of cripples, 
[19] Eccl. x. 10. Quoted again in a modified form in the treatise Of 
the Interpretation of Nature (iii. p. 223): ‘for as Salomon saith excel- 
lently, The fool putteth to more strength, but the wise man considereth which 
way, signifying the election of the mean to be more material than the 
multiplication of endeavour.’ 

P. 77. [7] accomplishments: Lat. ornamentis. [20] discharge of 
cares: Lat. vacationem a curis, [23] Virg. Georg. iv. 8. [27] and that 
without delusion or imposture: Omitted in the translation. See note to 
p. 21, | 16, 

P. 78. [9] Cic. Orat. post reditum in Senatu, xii. 30: Nam difficile est 
non aliquem, nefas quemquam preterire. [11] Phil. iii. 13. [14] I find 
strange: Lat. demiror, [18] the ancient fable: The fable of the belly 
and the members told by Menenius Agrippa, Livy, ii. 32. See Shake- 
speare, Cor. i, 1. 99, &c. [24] universality: the study of general princi- 
ples. Lat. contemplationibus universalibus. 

P. 79. [1] professory learning: the teaching which has for its object 
one special branch of study. [2] malign aspect and influence: This 
metaphor is derived from the old astrology, in which the planets were 
supposed to exercise control over human destinies. See Trench, English 
Past and Present, Lect. iv. p. 180, ed. 4. [15] The Lat. adds presertim 
apud nos. [17] Readers: i.e. lecturers. [22, 23] to appropriate his 
whole labour, and to continue his whole age in that function and at- 
tendance: i.e. to devote his whole energy and to spend his whole life in 


288 NOTES. 


discharging and attending to the duties of his office. [23-26] and 
therefore. .. profession: Omitted in the Lat.. [28] 1 Sam. xxx. 22. 

P. 80. [3] Virg. Georg. iii. 128. [4, 5] some alchemist. .. who call: 
For another example of this loose construction see p. 19, ll. 8, 9, ‘some 
friar. ..to whom,’ &c. [10] Physic: Lat. medicina. [17] Lat. nec usu 
mortuorum corporum ad observationes anatomicas destitui. [28] Pliny, 
Hist. Nat. viii.17. [31] travail: In edd. 1605, 1629, 1633, ¢ravailes. 
(31, 32] much better... nature: Lat. certe majus quiddam debetur its, qui 
non in saltibus nature pererrant, sed in labyrinthis artium viam sibi aperiunt. 
Mr. Spedding explains ‘arts of nature’ as ‘working upon and altering 
nature by art.’ In p. 86 ‘history of arts’ is equivalent to ‘history of 
nature altered or wrought.’ But from the expressions in the Latin 
translation it would rather seem that ‘ by arts of nature’ Bacon intended 
those recondite and intricate operations which are the subjects of inves- 
tigation by the experimental philosopher, as the chemist for example, 
and which are contrasted with the more external manifestations with 
which the naturalist deals, as the windings of a labyrinth with the open 
glades of a forest. See Nov. Org. preef. 

P. 81. [27] Cic. De Orator. iii. 26. [28] Cic. Orator. 24. 

Poo2; | 72) Circ: bp. ad Att. 1x.°7, 

P. 83. [2] Lat. adeo ut habeant prefectos (alios Provinciales, alios Gene- 
rales) quibus omnes parent. [9]. James i.17. [23] Aaron, not Moses. 
See Exod. vii. 12. [26] opera basilica, works for a king: Perhaps 
Bacon was thinking of the basilica facinora of Plautus (Trin. iv. 3. 23). 
[29] the inducing part: the introductory part. Lat. speculativa illa 
pars. 

P. 84. [16] Amare et sapere vix Deo conceditur. Publ. Syr. Sent. 15. 
Quoted again in Ess. x. p. 37. Comp. Ovid, Met. ii. 846: Non bene 
conveniunt nec in una sede morantur Majestas et amor. [20] Quoted from 
Ennius by Cicero, De Off. i. 16. 

P. 85. [3] Prov. xxii. 13. [4] Virg. Ain. v. 231. [9-21] This 
paragraph is much enlarged in the De Augmentis, ii. 1. [22] De 
Aug. ii. 4. In the De Augmentis Bacon makes only two divisions 
of History, natural and civil; including in the latter history ecclesi- 
astical and literary. 

P. 86. [5] a just story of learning; i.e. an accurate history. [21] 
In De Augm. ii. 2 the same division is made but at greater length. 
[32] the strange events of time and chance: Lat. casuum (ut ait ille) 
ingenia, 

P. 87. [11] it is never called down: Lat. nunqguam postea exter- 
minantur aut retractantur. [13] The treatise De miris auscultationibus 
attributed to Aristotle is now believed not to be by him. Bacon 
again refers to it in p. 35, 1. 24. [Ib.] is nothing less than: i.e. is 
by no means intended, [16] axioms: Mr. Kitchin, in his edition of 


hates aoe 


AE er ~ 


BOOK II, 289 


the Novum Organum, App. A., has shown that Bacon uses ‘axiom’ 
to denote any general principle of the lowest degree of generality. 
And in this he is followed by Sir Isaac Newton, who gives the title 
of ‘ Axiom’ to all ‘ general experimental truths,’ to the ‘laws of motion,’ 
which are purely inductive and not at all ‘self-evident’ truths, to the 
principles of optics, &c. 

P. 88. [4] In the treatise ‘Dzemonologie, in forme of a Dialogue,’ 
in three books, printed among the works of James I., p- 93, ed. 1616. 
[5] Comp. Nov. Org. i. 120, sol enim aque palatia et cloacas ingreditur, 
neque tamen polluitur, And Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale, quoted by Mr. 
Kitchin: ‘Certes holy writ may not be defouled, no more than the 
sonne that schyneth on a dongehul’ (vol. iii. p. 168, Percy Soc. ed.). 
{7-9] I hold fit, that these narrations... be sorted by themselves, 
and not to be mingled &c.: For other instances of this mixed con- 
struction, see Ps. Ixxviii. 4, 8 (Pr. Bk.): ‘That we should not hide... 
but to shew &c.’ ‘That they might put their trust in God, and not 
to forget &c.’ [23] Plato, Hippias Major, iii. 291. 

P. 8g. [3] the philosopher: Thales. See Plato, Theat. i. 174; Diog. 
Laert.i. 34. [9] Arist. Polit. i. 3. § 1; Phys. i. 

P. go. [1] Proteus: Virg. Georg. iv. 386, &c. [5] De Augm. ii. 6. 
[22] of the world: i.e. in the world. [27] as was said: See above, 
1. 13. In this paragraph Bacon perhaps had in his mind Camden’s 
Remaines concerning Britaine (1605). 

P. 91. [2] In the discourse on the Union of the Kingdoms (Life and 
Letters, iii. p. 94) Bacon gives instances in nature of those bodies 
which were imperfecte mista, and concludes, ‘So as such imperfect 
minglings continue no longer than they are forced, and still in the 
end the worthiest gets above.’ He probably had this in his mind 
when he called such histories the salvage of the deluge of time. [5] 
epitomes: Bacon elsewhere (p. 175) condemns Ramus for ‘ introducing 
the canker of epitomes” Here he refers probably to the Epitomes of 
Florus, Aurelius Victor, and others. [10] De Augm. ii. 7. [26] the 
true and inward resorts: Lat. veros fomites et texturas subtiliores. Perhaps 
we should read fontes. [27] The Latin adds neque enim de elogiis et 
hujusmodi tionibus jejunis loguimur. [32] Referring to 
Thucydides, Xenophon, and Sallust. 

P. 92. [4, 5] specially of any length: This refers to the length of the 
period contemplated by the history, not to the history itself. The 
Latin has a different idea, presertim que etate scriptoris multo antiquior 
sit; where the true reading would be quod... antiquius. [5]—p. 93. 
[4] Omitted in the Latin. [22] Virg. Ain. iv. 177. [29] Justinianus: 
Born a.p. 483; reigned from 527 to 565. [Ib.] Ultimus Romanorum: 
Used of Cassius by Tacitus (Ann. iv. 34) and of Brutus and Cassius 
by Suetonius (Tib. 61). [33] to be kept: ‘are’ is omitted in the 

U 


2.90 NOTES. 


construction. Comp. p. 94, l. 8, ‘and yet her government so mascu- 
line’ where the copula is omitted. 

P. 93. [8] Cicero, De Off. i. 34. Comp. Tac. Hist. i. 1. [10] in 
the main continuance thereof: Lat. guatenus ad corpus ejus integrum. 
[12] George Buchanan, who wrote Rerum Scoticarum Historia. To 
this James I. evidently refers in the second book of his Basilicon Doron, 
where he reckons among unpardonable crimes ‘the false and vnreverent 
writing or speaking of malicious men against your parents and pre- 
decessors’ (Works, p. 158). [21] Bacon himself endeavoured to carry 
out the plan which he here suggested; but the only part of the work 
which was completed was the History of Henry VII, published in 1622, 
during his retirement. Besides this he left a fragment of the history of 
the reign of Henry VIII. In his letter to the Lord Chancellor touching 
the history of Britain, to which reference has been made before (p. 58, 
note), he speaks in nearly the same words of the defects of previous 
histories. [24] hath been: Observe the construction, and see p. 52, 1.9. 
[27] By Henry VII. Compare Bacon, Henry VII. p. 3: ‘There were 
fallen to his lot, and concurrent in his Person, three seuerall Titles to 
the Imperiall Crowne. The first, the Title of the Lady Elizabeth, 
with whom, by precedent Pact with the Partie that brought him in, 
he was to marry. The second, the ancient and long disputed Title 
(both by Plea, and Armes) of the House of Laucaséer, to which he was 
Inheritour in his owne Person. The third, the Title of the Sword or 
Conquest, for that he came in by victorie of Battaile, and that the King 
in possession was slaine in the Field.’ [33] Henry VIII. 

P. 94. [5] Edward VI. and the attempt of the Duke of Northumber- 
land to place Lady Jane Grey on the throne. [6] Comp. Biss; eure 
p. 127: ‘A civill warre, indeed, is like the heat of a feaver.”? [7] Mary, 
married to Philip of Spain. [{Ib.] Elizabeth. [8] and yet her govern- 
ment so masculine: The copula is omitted as in p. 92, l. 33. [8-11] 
and yet...thence: Omitted in the Latin. [12] divided from all the 
world: Comp. Virg. Ecl. i. 67, Et penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos. 
[14] Virg. Ain. iii. 96. [18] Comp. p. 134, 1]. 25, and Ess. xi. p. 43, 
‘And as in nature, things move violently to their place, and calmely 
in their place” [23] it: redundant. [32] Ariosto, Orlando Furioso, at 
the end of the 34th book and the beginning of the 35th. Mr. Singer, 
in Notes and Queries, v. 232, was the first to point out the source of 
this reference. [33] the ancient fiction: The fable of the three fates, 
Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos. The allusion is more distinctly given 
in the Latin translation. 

P. 9s. [14] Virg. Ain. v. 751. [15] Plin. Ep. iii. 21: Nam postquam 
desiimus facere laudanda, laudari quoque ineptum putamus. [17] Prov. 
x. 7. [24] Cicero, Phil. ix. 5. § 10: Vita enim mortuorum in memoria 
vivorum est posita, The sentiment appears to have been borrowed from the 


LDL LET LL LOL LE LOE 


BOOK II. 291 


law of Solon quoted by Demosthenes adv. Lept. p. 488, ua) Aéyew ands 
Tov TeOvedra, 

P. 96. [7] De Aug. ii. 9. [Ib.] partition: portion in ed. 1605, cor- 
rected in Errata. [12] giving but a touch of certain magnificent build- 
ings: that is, but slightly alluding to them, (13] Tac. Ann. xiii, 31, 


' [15] a kind of contemplative heraldry: that is, as is explained in the 


Latin, a heraldry by which the rank of books as well as of persons 
may be distinguished. [22] time: Mr. Spedding reads times, [24] 
what passed day by day: For the construction compare Hamlet, i. 
I. 33: ‘ What we two nights have seen,’ [25] Esth. vi. 1. [28] Plut. 
Symp. i. 6. 1; Alex. 23. § 2, 76, &c. 

P. 97. [1] De Aug. ii. 10. [4] Mr. Ellis, in his note on the corres- 
ponding passage of the De Augmentis, remarks that ‘the most cele- 
brated work of this kind is one with which Bacon was familiar,— 
the Discorsi of Macchiavelli, of which the narrative part is derived 
from Livy.’ See what Bacon himself says, p- 225. [22] Comp. Of the 
Interpretation of Nature (Works, iii. 22 5): ‘For at that time the world 
was altogether home-bred, every nation looked little beyond their own 
confines or territories, and the world had no through lights then, as it 
hath had since by commerce and navigation, whereby there could 
neither be that contribution of wits one to help another, nor that 
variety of particulars for the correcting of customary conceits.’ See 
also Nov. Org. i. 84. [27] Virg. Georg. i. 2 50. 

P. 98. [1] in their word: Lat. in symbolo suo. [2] plus ultra: Charles 
the Fifth’s motto. [3] imitabile fulmen: referring to the invention of 
gunpowder. [5] Virg. Ain. vi. 590. [7] Fernando de Magalhaens (or 
Magellan) was the first navigator who sailed round the world, 1519- 
1522. Drake’s voyage was in 1577-1579. [14] Dan. xii. 4. The 
quotation in the text, which is from the Vulgate, is altered in the Latin 
to augebitur scientia. [21] De Aug. ii. 11. [22] in the propriety 
thereof: Lat. proprio vero nomine. 

P. 99. [11] Ps. xc. 4; 2 Pet. iii. 8. [23] 1 Cor. ii. 14. [26] Eph. 
ii. 12. [28] Hab. ii. 2. This very common form of misquotation of 
this passage appears to have had its origin in Coverdale’s Version ; 
‘that who so commeth by, may rede it” The correct rendering is 
that given in the English Bible; ‘that he may run that readeth it.’ 

P. 100, [4] De Aug. ii. 12. [26] it is a great loss of that book of 
Czsar’s: A loose construction equivalent to ‘it is a great loss, viz. the 
loss of that book of Czesar’s.’ 

P. 101. [4-6] one of the cells...which is that of the memory : 
Comp. Burton, Anat. of Mel. Part I. Sec. 1. Mem. 2. Subs. 4. ‘The 
fourth creek, behind the head, is common to the cerebel or little brain, 
and marrow of the back-bone, the least and most solid of all the rest, 
which receives the animal spirits from the other ventricles, and conveys 


U2 


2.92 NOTES. 


them to the marrow in the back, and is the place where they say the 
memory is seated.’ Vigo defines the brain as ‘a substance full of 
marrowe diuided into three ventricles, of which there is one in the 
fore part which is greater then the other three. The-second is in 
the middest. ‘The third hath his residence in the hinder part. And 
therefore after Galens iudgement, it is the foundation of imagination, 
and of deuising, and of remembrance’ (Works, fol. 6b, Lond. 1586). 
Compare Chaucer, Knight’s Tale, 1378: 


‘Engendrud of humour malencolyk, 
Byforne in his selle fantastyk.’ 


(7] Differently arranged in De Augm. il. 13, where much new matter 
is introduced. [13] Hor. De Art. Poet. 9. [19] may be styled: that 
is, may have this title of ‘feigned history,’ whether written in prose or 
verse. 

P. 102. [16] After this paragraph there is added in the De Aug- 
mentis one on Dramatic Poetry. [32] The seven wise men were Solon, 
Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Chilon, Cleobulus, and Periander of Corinth. 
Instead of the last, Plato (Protag. i. 343) enumerates Myso. Their 
maxims have been collected in Orelli’s Opuscula Graecorum veterum 
sententiosa et moralia. As other instances of parabolical wisdom the 
Latin mentions tessere Pythagore, and enigmata sphingis. The former 
of these are associated with Egyptian hieroglyphics by Plutarch (De 
Isid. et Osir. 10) in a passage which Bacon probably had in his 
mind. 

P. 103. [15] Both these fables are quoted by Bacon in his fifteenth 
Essay, ‘Of Seditions and Troubles,’ with substantially the same com- 
ments, In the De Augm. is substituted a lengthened discussion of the 
fables of Pan, Perseus, and Dionysus. See also Wisdom ul the Ancients, 
c. 9. [21] Virg. En. iv. 178. [30] Thetis, not Pallas. See Hom. 
TE 4. 390, occ. 

P. 104. [2] Achilles: Hom. I. xi. 832; Plutarch (De Musica, xl. 4). 
[4] Machiavel : The Prince, c. 18. Mr. Ellis, in his note on this 
passage, suggested that ‘As two of the animals are the same it is 
possible that Macchiavelli was thinking of what was said of Boniface 
VIII. by the predecessor whom he forced to abdicate,—that he came 
in like a fox, would reign like a lion, and die like a dog.’ [11] Chry- 
sippus: a Stoic philosopher, born B.c. 280. Bacon here refers to 
what Cicero says of him, De Nat. Deor. i. 15, §§ 38-41. [13] the 
fictions: ‘the’ is omitted in some copies of ed. 1605. [16-20] Surely 
...meaning: The construction of this sentence is imperfect, though the 
sense is clear. [16] Homer: The same remark is made by Rabelais (Gar- 
gantua, prol.) of the allegorical interpretations of Homer by Plutarch, 
Eustathius, Heraclides Ponticus and Cornutus. [17] ‘To the Greeks 


See 


BOOK II. 293 


Homer was in fact a Bible, and guarded with all the care and all the 
piety that belong to such a book.’ Prof. Blackie, Art. on Homer, 
Encyc. Brit. eighth ed. This is true generally, and not only of ‘the 
later schools of the Grecians.’ ‘But what really conveys a more 
vivid impression of the influence of Homer in Greek education, than 
any anecdotes about schools and schoolmasters, is the very apt and 
easy way in which all Greek men are everywhere found quoting Homer 
from memory, and applying it for the need of the moment, by a sort 
of habitual “ accommodation,” just as we see many a devout father of 
the Christian Church, and the ancient Jews, constantly quoting the 
Old Testament, without any curious inquiry as to the exact critical 
propriety of the text so applied.” Blackie, Homer and the Iliad, i. 
308. [24] this ¢hird part of learning: It should be ‘this second.’ 
[27-32] But... harangues: Omitted in De Augm. 

'P. 105. [3] The third book of the De Augm. begins here. [29] philo- 
sophia prima: See p. 40, 1. 8. 

P. 106. [1] a certain rhapsody: Lat. farraginem quandam et massam 
inconditam. [27] The instances of these ‘ participles in nature’ given by 
Bacon in the De Augm. are, moss, which is intermediate between putre- 
faction and a plant; fish that adhere and do not change their place and 
are between a plant and an animal; mice and other animals which are 
between those propagated by putrefaction and those propagated by 
impregnation; bats, which are between birds and quadrupeds; flying 
fish, between birds and fish; seals, between fish and quadrupeds, and so 
on. See Nov. Org. ii. 30. 

P. 107. [8] Euclid, Elem. Book i. Axiom 4. [9, 10] an axiom.. 
mathematics: In some copies of ed. 1605, and in the edd. of 1629 and 
1633, this clause is inserted by mistake after the following sentence. 
The error is noted in the Errata at the end of a copy of ed. 1605 in the 
Bodleian Library, and the true reading is given, preceded by the follow- 
ing remark: ‘In some few Bookes, in Ff: fol. 21, and the beginning of 
the second page thereof, there is somewhat misplaced, and to be read 
thus.’ The catchword of the previous page is‘ And.’ [10] This ana- 
logy between commutative (or corrective) and distributive justice is 
derived from Aristotle (Eth. v. 3, 4). Of distributive justice Sir Alex- 
ander Grant in his notes on the passage gives the following summary: 
‘Justice implies equality, and not only that two things are equal, but 
also two persons between whom there may be justice. Thus it is a 
geometrical proportion in four terms; if A and B be persons, C and D 
lots to be divided, then as A is to B, so must C be to D. And a just 
distribution will produce the result that A+C will be to B+ D in the 
same ratio as A was to B originally. In other words, distributive 
justice consists in the distribution of property, honours, &c., in the state, 
according to the merits of each citizen.’ And of corrective, or as Bacon 


294 NOTES. 


calls it commutative, justice, he says: ‘Corrective justice goes on a prin- 
ciple, not of geometrical, but of arithmetical proportion; in other words, 
it takes no account of persons, but treats the cases with which it is con- 
cerned as cases of unjust loss and gain, which have to be reduced to the 
middle point of equality between the parties.’ (Grant’s Aristotle, ed. 2, 
ii. pp. 108, 112.) [13] Eucl. Elem. Bk. i. Axiom 1. Whately, Logic, 
ii. 3. § 2; Nov. Org. ii, 27. [16] Ovid, Met. xv. 165. [18] Comp. 
Bacon, Sylva Sylvarum, cent. i. § 100 (Works, ii. 383, ed. Spedding): 
‘There is nothing more certain in nature than that it is impossible for 
any body to be utterly annihilated; but that as it was the work of the 
omnipotency of God to make somewhat of nothing, so it requireth the 
like omnipotency to turn somewhat into nothing.’ [21] Eccl. ili, 14, 
quoted from the Vulgate. [23] Machiavelli, Disc. sopra Livio, iii. 1. 
[27] the Persian magic: ‘Plato commends this Magia, and calls it 
Machagistia, and 0e@v Ocpameia the worship of the Gods; and saith, that 
the Kings of Persia learned it, as a knowledge of diuine mysteries, 
wherein by the worlds Common-wealth they were instructed to gouerne 
their owne.’ Purchas his Pilgrimage, p. 366, ed. 1614. The passage 
of Plato referred to is Alcib. Prim. ii. 121, but the remark of Purchas 
is apparently derived from the Apologia of Johannes Picus Mirandula 
(p. 121, ed. 1557)- That Plato called Magia by the mystic name of 
Machagistia is stated by Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiii. 6. § 32). [30] 
Comp. Bacon, Sylva Sylvarum, cent. ii. 113: ‘ There be in music certain 
figures or tropes; almost agreeing with the figures of rhetoric, and with 
the affections of the mind, and other senses. First, the division and 
quavering, which please so much in music, have an agreement with the 
glittering of light; as the moon-beams playing upon a wave. Again, 
the falling from a discord to a concord, which maketh great sweetness 
in music, hath an agreement with the affections, which are reintegrated 
to the better after some dislikes; it agreeth also with the taste, which is 
soon glutted with that which is sweet alone. The sliding from the close 
or cadence, hath an agreement with the figure in rhetoric which they 
call preter expectatum ; for there is a pleasure even in being deceived’ 
(Works, ed. Spedding, ii. 388, 389). Comp. also Nov. Org. ii. 27, and 
Of the Interp. of Nat. (vol. ili. p. 230). 

P. 108. [1] See Quint. Inst. Or. vi. 3; Cic. de Orat. ii. 63. § 255. [2] 
with: Some copies of the ed. 1605, according to Mr. Spedding, read 
‘which. [4] Virg. En. vii.g. [5] Comp. Nov. Org. ii. 27, where the 
same illustrations are given of what Bacon calls ‘ conformable instances’ 
or ‘physical similitudes.’ From these he deduces the principle, organa 
sensuum et corpora, que pariunt reflexiones ad sensus, esse similis nature. 
[6] the eye with a glass: i.e. a looking-glass. Lat. oculus enim similis 
speculo, [20] De Augm. iii. 2. [22] Virg. Ain. vi. 788. [28] Lat. 
scientia, seu potius scientia scintilla. [32] Comp. Ess. xvi. p. 64: ‘And 


BOOK II. 295 


therefore, God never wrought miracle, to convince Atheisme, because 
his ordinary works convince it.’ 

P. 109. [10] Comp. Macrobius, in Somn, Scip. ii. 12: Ideo physici 
mundum magnum hominem, et hominem brevem mundum esse dixerunt. 
[13] Gen. i; Ps. viii. 3, 6. Comp. Bereshith Rabba, § 8: ‘Rabbi 
Tiphrai, in the name of R. Acha (says), the superior beings were created 
in the image and likeness (of God), and do not increase and multiply ; 
the inferior increase and multiply, but were not created in the image and 
likeness (of God).’ [24] See p. 10, 1. 5. [33] hath: Observe the con- 
struction as in p. 34, 1. 25, ‘so great an affinity hath fiction and belief’ 

P. 110. [4] Otherwise .. spirits: i.e. with respect to the nature of 
angels and spirits the case is different. Comp. p. 158, 1. 2. Lat. Secus 
est quod ad angelorum et spirituum naturam attinet. [7] Col. ii. 4, 18. 
[15-17] Lat. ceterum sobria circa illos inquisitio, que vel per rerum cor- 
porearum scalam ad eorum naturam pernoscendam ascendat, vel in anima 
humana veluti in speculo eam intueatur neutiquam prohibetur. [23] 2 Cor. 
ii. 11. [27] many: ‘ The theory of angels and that of fallen spirits form 
a large and not very profitable chapter in every Summa Theologiz.’ 
(Ellis.) See Reginald Scot’s Discourse concerning Devils and Spirits. 
[30] De Augm. iii. 3. 

P. 111. [2] Diog. Laert. ix. 72: éy Bv0G yap } dAnbeaa. Cic. Acad. 
Post. i.12. [3] Paracelsus, Lib. Meteor. cap. 4. [9] pioneers: ‘ Pion- 
ners’ in ed. 1605. [17-23] And here .. superstition: Omitted in the 
Lat. [33] De Augmz. iii. 4. 

P. 112. [8] from mistaking: i.e. from being misunderstood. Comp. 
D'Ewes, Journal of the House of Commons, p. 560: * Mr. Winch, one 
of the Committee in the Bill to keep horses from stealing, &c.’ [12] 
Comp. what Bacon says of Aristotle, p. 127. [23] John v. 43- [31] 
his scholar: Alexander the Great. 

P. 113. [4] Adapted from Lucan, x. 20 &c. Mr. Ellis has pointed 
out that Bacon has changed not only the order ot words but the con- 
struction. The whole passage stands thus: 

‘Illic Pellzi proles vesana Philippi, 
Felix preedo, jacet, terrarum vindice fato 
Raptus; sacratis totum spargenda per orbem 
Membra viri posuere adytis, Fortuna pepercit 
Manibus, et regni duravit ad ultima fatum. 
Nam sibi libertas unquam si redderet orbem 
Ludibrio servatus erat, non utile mundo 
Editus exemplum, &c,’ 
[11] usgue ad aras: i.e. so far as is consistent with religious obligations. 
Plutarch (De Vitioso Pudore, vi.) relates that Pericles, when asked to 
perjure himself for his friend, replied, pexp rod Bwpod pidos elul. See 
also Plut. Preecepta Ger. Reipubl. xiii. 17; Aul. Gellius, Noct. Att. i. S 


296 NOTES. 


Bacon introduces it again in a characteristic passage of his Apology 
concerning the Earl of Essex (Life and Letters, iii. 142): ‘For every 
honest man, that hath his heart well planted, will forsake his king 
rather than forsake God, and forsake his friend rather than forsake his 
king; and yet will forsake any earthly commodity, yea and his own 
life in some cases, rather than forsake his friend. I hope the world hath 
not forgotten these degrees, else the heathen saying, Amicus usque ad 
aras, shall judge them.’ [15] Tac. Ann. i. 3. [20] philosophia prima: 
See p. 105. [32] Lat. id solummodo cavendo ut physice, non logice trac- 
tentur. 

P. 114. [10] a being and moving: The Lat. adds, e¢ naturalem necesst- 
tatem. [12] platform: Lat. ideam. [15] productions: probably a mis- 
print for ‘production.’ See p. 111, 1. 14. The Lat. has productionem 
effectuum. [17] The division here referred to is Aristotle’s, as given in 
the First Book of the Metaphysics: ‘ The efficient cause is that which 
acts—the material cause that which is acted on; as when the fire melts 
wax, the former is the efficient, the latter the material cause of the effect 
produced. The formal cause is that which in the case of any object 
determines it to be that which it is, and is thus the cause of its various 
properties ; it is thus the “ratio essentize,” the Adyos Tis ovcias. The 
final cause is that for the sake of which any effect takes place, whether 
the agent is or is not intelligent.’ Ellis’s note on the corresponding 
passage of the De Augmentis. [27] Virg. Ecl. viii. 80. 

P. 115. [20] Mr, Ellis (Gen. Preface, p. 29) says that Bacon ‘has repeat- 
edly denied the truth of the scholastic doctrine that Forms are incogno- 
scible because supra-sensible.’ See Nov. Org. i. 75; il. 2. [23| See Nov. 
Org. ii. 1: Date autem nature formam, sive differentiam veram, sive naturam 
naturantem, sive fontem emanationis .. invenire, opus et intentio est humane 
scientig, Mr. Ellis, in his General Preface to the Philosophical Works 
(pp. 28-31), after pointing out that in Bacon’s system ‘substance is con- 
ceived of as the causa immanens of its attributes, or in other words it is the 
formal cause of the qualities which are referred te it,’ divides these quali- 
ties into primary and secondary ; the former being those which belong to 
substance as its essential attributes, the latter those which are connected 
with it by the relation of cause and effect. He then shows that Bacon’s 
‘conception of the nature of Forms relates merely to the primary quali- 
ties of bodies. For instance, the Form of heat is a kind of local motion 
of the particles of which bodies are composed, and that of whiteness a 
mode of arrangement among those particles. This peculiar motion or 
arrangement corresponds to and engenders heat or whiteness, and this in 
every case in which those qualities exist. The statement of the distin- 
guishing character of the motion or arrangement, or of whatever else 
may be the Form of a given phenomenon, takes the shape of a law; it 
is the law in fulfilling which any substance determines the existence of 


BOOK II. 2.97 


the quality in question.’ Bacon himself, in the Novum Organum, speaks 
of forma rei as ipsissima res (ii. 13), of forme as vere rerum differentia 
and leges actus puri (i. 75), and asserts that res and forma differ only as 
apparens et existens, aut exterius et interius, aut in ordine ad hominem et in 
ordine ad universum (ii. 13). [29] Plato, Repub. x. 1. [33] See pp. 4%, 
119; Nov. Org. i. 96. 

P. 116. [7] Gen. ii. 7. [9] Gen. i. 20, 24. [9, 10] the forms of 
substances, I say: Lat. species inguam creaturarum, (15) Comp. 
Plato, Philebus, ii. 17. [31] Nov. Org. ii. 23; Of the Inter. of Nat. p. 
236. 

P. 117. [2] See Nov. Org. ii. 23: Efficiens vero semper ponitur nil aliud 
esse quam vehiculum sive deferens forme. [16] Hippocrates, Aph. i. 1. 
[22] Eccles. iii. 11. [25] to them that are depraved: Lat. apud homines 
propter scientia inflatos et theomachos, (26) the giants’ hills: Perhaps we 
should read ‘three’ for ‘the.’ The Lat. has ¢res moles gigantea, (27) 
Virg. Georg. i. 281, 282. [31] Rev. iv. 8. 

P. 118. [1] law: Some copies of ed. 1605 read ‘loue.’ [2] Plato, 
Parmen. 165, 166. ‘This view of the Parmenides is probably. derived 
from the Argumentum of Ficinus. Parmenides of Elea travelled with 
Zeno to Athens, circ. B.c. 460. [15] Comp. Of the Inter. of Nature, 
p. 235: ‘for the poet saith well Sapientibus undique late sunt vie.’ (17) 
Cic. de Off. i. 43; Tusc. Disp. iv. 26; De Fin. ii. 12. § 37. [24] sense: 
Some copies of ed. 1605 have ‘sort,’ but one at least has ‘sens,’ which is 
evidently the true reading, as appears from the Lat. sensu magis divino. 
[25] Prov.iv.12. [30] misplaced: The Lat. adds, solent enim inguiri 
inter physica non inter metaphysica. 

P. 119. [2] On the injury to philosophy by the investigation of final 
causes see Nov. Org. i. 48, 65; ii. 2. [5] satisfactory and specious 
causes: Lat. speciosis et umbratilibus causis, [7] Plato, Timeeus, iii. 44 
&c. anchoreth: ‘ancreth’ in ed. 1605. [8] Aristotle, Phys. ii. 8. 2; 
Galen, De Usu Partium; Xenophon, Memor. i. 4. See on this subject 
Prof. Sedgwick’s Disc. on the Studies of the Univ. of Cambridge, 5th ed. 
App. p. 150. [14] frames: ‘frame’ in ed. 1605. The Lat. has fabrica, 
and perhaps the true correction of the sentence would be to read ‘is’ for 
‘are’ in the next line. [24] Democritus: Cic. Tuse, i. 11; Diog. Laert. 
ix. 44, 45- 

P. 120. [11] Virg. Ecl. vii. 45. [32] De Augm. iii. 6. 

P. 121. [6] as hath been said: See p. 106. [10] Democritus and 
Pythagoras: See Arist. De Anima, i. 2; Met. i. 4, 5; Iamblichus, Vit. 
Pythag. xii. 59. [21] champain: ‘champion’ in ed. 1605. [30] merely 
severed: Lat. penitus abstractam. 

P. 122. [7] intervening: ‘interueyning’ in ed. 1605. [8] enginery : 
‘Inginarie’ in ed. 1605. Lat. Machinaria. [12] See p, 183, and comp. 
Ess. 1. p. 205. [24] De Augm. iii. 5. 


298 NOTES. 


P, 123. [2] Lat. que magis ingeniosa quidem res est et sagax, quam 
philosophica. [7] Hor. Od. ii. 10. 3. [16] in books: Among others the 
Magia Naturalis of Baptista Porta, published in 1589. [22] Bacon uses 
the same comparison in his treatise Of the Interpretation of Nature 
(Works, iii. 234). The story of King Arthur of Britain was compiled 
from the French legends by Sir Thomas Malory about the year 1470, 
and was first printed by Caxton in 1485. Sir John Bourchier, Lord 
Berners, the translator of Froissart, also translated from the French, at 
the request of the Earl of Huntingdon, the romance of Sir Hugh of 
Bourdeaux, a knight of the age of Charlemagne (Warton, Hist. of Eng. 
Poetry, ili. 342, ed. 1824), This was printed by William Copland 
about 1540. In Burton’s time these romances were the favourite reading 
of the country squires. ‘If they read a book at any time.. ’tis an 
English chronicle, S' Huon of Bordeaux, Amadis de Gaul, &c., a play- 
book, or some pamphlet of news.’ (Anat. of Mel.i. p. 205, ed. 1813). 
The romance of Hugh of Bourdeaux supplied the incidents of Wieland’s 
Oberon. For a summary of it see Dunlop’s History of Fiction, i. 394- 
419 (ed. 1816). Monfaigne (i. 25, trans. Florio, p. 85, ed. 1603) says, 
‘of King Arthur, of Lancelot du-Lake, of Amadis, of Huon of Burdeaux, 
and such idle time-consuming, and wit-besotting trash of bookes wherein 
youth doth commonly ammuse it-selfe, I was not so much as acquainted 
with their names.’ [27] the fable of Ixion: Pindar, Pyth. ii. 21. 

P. 124. [19] medicines, motions: Lat. medicinas proprias, accommodata 
etiam exercitia. [21] Lat. quam quod hoe fier possit per guttas pauculas, 
aut scrupulos alicujus pretiosi liguoris aut quintessenti@. [32] This inven- 
tory was intended to occupy the tenth chapter of the treatise Of the 
Interpretation of Nature. 

P. 125. [9] deducing: ‘diducing’ in ed. 1605. [15] In the De Aug- 
mentis Bacon omits the example of the mariner’s compass and sub- 
stitutes the experiments made by Drebbel on the artificial congelation 
of water by means of ice and saltpetre. To this he again alludes in 
the fifth book of the De Augmentis. See Mr. Ellis’s note (Works, i. p. 
628, note 1). [24] Virg. Ecl.x. 8. [26] See Nov. Org. i. 35. Alex- 
ander (properly Roderigo) Borgia was Pope Alexander VI., and the 
expedition of the French was that under Charles VIII. in 1494. Bacon 
quotes the story again in his Redargutio Philosophiarum (Works, iii. 
558), and in his Hist. of Hen. VII. (Works, vi. 158). 

P. 126. [1] De Augm. iii. 4. [5] Non liguet was a Roman legal 
formula, by which the judge declared his inability to decide upon 
the guilt or innocence of the accused: like the Scotch not proven. [14, 
15] the entry of doubts are: An instance of a loose construction of 
frequent occurrence, in which the verb agrees in number with the 
substantive interposed between it and its subject. Comp. Shakespeare, 
Hamlet, i. 2. 36-38: 


BOOK U1. 299 


‘Giving to you no further personal power 

To business with the king, more than the scope 

Of these delated articles allow.’ 
Compare also Sanderson, Serm. iv. Ad Magistratum (Works, vol. ii. p. 
274, ed. Jacobson, 1854): ‘The result of these particulars amount in 
the whole to this.’ An example in which the intervening substantive is 
in the singular is in Mid. Night’s Dr. iii. 2. 97 :— 

‘With sighs of love that costs the fresh blood dear.’ 


And again, Com. of Err. v. 1. 69, 70:— 
‘The venom clamours of a jealous woman 
Poisons more deadly than a mad dog’s tooth,’ 


[15] ‘use,’ in the sense of interest or increase: Lat. incrementa. 

P. 127. [14] The Lat. omits Empedocles and adds Philolaus, Xeno- 
phanes, Anaxagoras, and Leucippus. [16] In 1574 Amurath III. on 
succeeding to the throne caused his five brothers to be strangled, and 
in 1595 Mahomet III. removed all his brothers in the same way and 
caused ten of his father’s wives and concubines to be drowned (Knolles, 
Hist. of the Turks, pp. 919, 1056, ed. 1603). See Nov. Org. i. 67. 
[18] Lat. samen iis, qui non regnum aut magisterium sed veritatis ingui- 
sitionem atque illustrationem sibi proponunt, [24] the received astronomy: 
That is, the Ptolemaic system, in which the earth was the centre of the 
universe. See p. 97, l. 32, Ess. xxiii. p. 96, and Shakespeare, Troilus 
and Cressida, i. 3. 85: ‘The heavens themselves, the planets, and this 
centre. On the slowness with which the Copernican theory was diffused, 
and especially Bacon’s opposition to it, see Whewell’s Hist. of the Ind. 
Sciences, i, 404-412, ed. 1847. Copernicus died in 1543, and his 
opinions were introduced into England mainly through Giordano Bruno, 
who came over about 1583. [31] Arist. Phys. i. 1. 

P. 128, [7-11] In the Latin the sources of information are indicated ; 
viz. the lives of the philosophers, Plutarch’s collection of their opinions, 
the quotations of Plato, the refutation of Aristotle, and the scattered 
notices in Lactantius, Philo, Philostratus, and the rest. [12] severedly: 
The editions of 1605, 1633 all read ‘severely,’ but ‘severedly’ is the 
reading in ed. 1629 and in the Errata to ed, 1605. Mr. Markby reads 
‘severally’ in the same sense. [23, 24] The Latin more clearly, Negue 
absimilis est ratio philosophiea, quando proponitur integra, et quando in 
frusta concisa et dissecta, [26] Theophrastus of Hohenheim, called 
Paracelsus, was born at Einsiedlen near Zurich in 1493; died at 
Salzburg in the 47th year of his age, 24 Sept. 1541. His works on 
chemistry and medicine were collected in ten volumes and printed at 
Frankfort in 1603. [28] Severinus: Petrus Severinus, a Danish phy- 
sician, born at Ripen in 1542, died in 1602, The work in which he 
reduced into harmony the philosophy of Paracelsus was Idea Medicine 


300 NOTES. 


Philosophice, 4to. Basil. 1571. [Ib.] Tilesius: a misprint for Telesius, 
as it stands in the De Augmentis, though the editions of 1605, 1629, 
1633 of the Advancement read ‘Tylesius.’ Bernardino Telesio of 
Cosenza (1508-1588), according to the Latin, revived the philosophy 
of Parmenides, and turned the weapons of the Peripatetics against 
themselves. He wrote De Rerum Natura in nine books (Napoli, 1586), 
De Colorum Generatione (1570), and De Mari (1570). See Maurice, 
Mod. Philosophy, p. 162. [29] Donius; Augustino Doni, a physician 
of Cosenza, wrote two books De Natura Hominis, 4to. Basil. 1581. 
{Ib.] as a pastoral philosophy: i.e. as Bacon explains it in the treatise 
De Principiis atque Originibus, a philosophy which contemplates the 
world placidly and at its ease. See also p. 46, 1. 14. [30] Fracas- 
torius: Hieronymus Fracastorius, poet and physician, born at Verona 
1483. Paul III. appointed him physician in ordinary. to the Council 
of Trent, with a salary of ninety thalers a month. He died of apoplexy, 
Aug. 6, 1553, on his estate near Verona. Neither Donius nor Fraca- 
storius is mentioned in the Latin, but there is substituted ‘ Patricius the 
Venecian, who hath sublimated the fumes of the Platonists’ ( Wats’ 
trans. ed. 1640). [33] Gilbertus: See p. 41, 1. 8. 

P. 129. [2] For Xenophanes the Latin has Philolaus. [10] De 
Augm. iv. 1. [11] Plato, Alcib. Pr. ii, 124; Protag. i. 343; Cic. de 
Legg. i. 22. §§ 58, 59. Tv@& cavrdv is one of the sentences which are 
said to have been written over the entrance to the temple of Apollo 
at Delphi. [17] Comp. Seneca, Ep. Mor. xiv. 1. 2: Faciam ergo, quod 
exigis, et philosophiam in partes non in frusta dividam, Dividi enim illam, 
non concidi, utile est. [24] Cicero, De Orat. iii. 16, 19. Comp. Of the 
Interpretation of Nature (Works, iii. 228). [27] Comp. Of the Inter- 
pretation of Nature (Works, iii. 229): ‘And therefore the opinion of 
Copernicus in astronomy, which astronomy itself cannot correct, because 
it is not repugnant to any of the appearances, yet natural philosophy 
doth correct.’ Observe the change in the text of ‘appearances’ to 
phainomena and of ‘doth correct’ to ‘may correct. [28] The Latin 
adds que nunc quoque invaluit, [31, 32] the science of medicine, if 
it be destituted...i¢ is not much better &c.: For examples of a 
similar redundancy of the pronoun see p. 39, Il. 11, 33. 

P. 130. [26] Aristotle: in his Physiognomica. [27] Hippocrates: 
in his Preenotiones. [31] physiognomy: used in a wider sense than 
at present. 

P. 131. [4] the factures of the body: Lat. corporis fabricam dum 
quiescit, [12]‘¥Foras the tongue speaketh to the eares, so doeth the 
gesture speake to the eyes of the auditour. LBasilicon Doron, book iii. 
(Works of King James I. p. 183). [24] affects of the body: Lat. tem- 
peramentum corporis. 

P. 132. [2] the Pythagoreans: Referring to the precepts against eat- 


BOOK 11, 301 


ing beans (Cic. de Div. i. xxx. 62) and the fish melanurus, to which 
Plutarch gives a mystical signification (De Educ. Pueror. 17). [3] 
Manichees : ed. 1605 has Man:cheas. For the rules of life which Manes 
laid down for his followers see Mosheim, Eccl. Hist. cent. 3. part. ii. ch. 
5-§ 10. [4] Mahomet: ‘During the month of Ramadan, from the 
rising to the setting of the sun, the Musulman abstains from eating, 
and drinking, and women, and baths, and perfumes; from all nourish- 
ment that can restore his strength, from all pleasure that can gratify 
his senses.” Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. 50. [Ib.] do exceed: Lat. 
omnem modum superant, (5) See Lev. iii. 17; xi. [7] the faith: Lat. 
Christiana fides. {12] the ceremony: the Lat. adds et excercitium obedi- 
entia, (16] question=call in question: Lat. in dubium revocare. [19] 
Lat. qui simul cum matris affectibus compatitur, et tamen e corpore matris 
suo tempore excluditur. 

P. 133. [3] Apoph. 236. Said by Socrates of a treatise of Heraclitus 
which had been lent him by Euripides (Diog. Laert. ii. 22). The same 
is told of Crates (Diog. Laert. ix. 12). [11] Plato, Timzeus, iii. 69, 70, 
referred to by Montaigne, Ess. ii. 12, See Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. to. 
[13] Lat. cum tumori et superbie@ sit propior. [15] In the Latin is 
added a reference to the classification of the intellectual faculties, 
fancy, reason, and memory, according to the ventricles of the brain. 
[19] De Augm. iv. 2. [25] Tac. Ann. xvi. 18. [26] Lat. Subjectum 
istud medicine (corpus nimirum humanum). The word ‘ other’ is super- 
fluous. Compare Ess. ix. p. 35: ‘We will adde this, in generall, 
touching the Affection of Envy; that of all other Affections, it is the 
most importune, and continuall.’ 

P. 134. [1] See Plato, Timzeus, iii. 43 &c. [2] Severinus (see above 
p. 128) in his Idea Medicine Philosophice, pp. 36, 37, after describing 
the researches of the physician as ranging through the whole economy 
of nature, proceeds: Hisce perceptis ad humanam rempublicam descendit, 
et diuina quidem analogia, maioris mundi dispositionem tanquam parentis, 
microcosmo accommodat, elementa constituit humane nature consentanea: 
in his semina foueri, et astra, calestia, rea, aquatica, terrestria demonstrat: 
&c. See also Crollii Basilica Chymica, p. 80 (ed. 1643), and Bacon, 
Wisd. of the Ancients, ch. 26. [22] Virg. En. vi. 747. [25] See Ess. 
xi. p. 43: ‘And as in nature, things move violently to their place, and 
calmely in their place: so vertue in ambition is violent, in authoritie 
setled and calme.’ In his Promus or Common-place Book, fol. 8 8, 
Bacon entered, ‘ Augustus rapide ad locum leniter in loco.” [29] Ovid, 
Met. i. 518, 521. 

P. 135. [2] are: Added in Errata to ed. 1605. [3] by acts and 
masterpieces: Lat. virtute sua et functione, [14] the: Omitted in 
the early editions. [16] mountebank: ‘Montabanke’ ed. 1605. [20] 
Virg. En. vii. 772. [23] Virg. Hn. vii. 11. [28] Eccl. ii. 15. 


302 NOTES. 


P. 136. [11, 12] Lat. quantum obtineat imperii intellectus subtilitas et 
acumen. [19, 20] yet men can likewise discern them personally: Lat. 
hujus tamen discrimina in singulis personis facile internoscimus. [26] 
incomprehensions: Lat. acatalepsias. See p. 154, 1. 4. [32] avenues: 
printed in italics in ed. 1605 as if it were a foreign word. 

P. 137. [1] Altered from Ovid, Rem. Am. 525, the true reading being 
Nam quoniam variant animi, variamus et artes. Some editions have 
variabimus artes. [3-13] This paragraph is inserted in the De Aug- 
mentis near the beginning of the chapter, after eruditus luxus (p. 133, 
1. 25).. [5] the sun: ‘the’ is omitted in ed. 1605. /Esculapius is 
said to have been the son of Apollo and Coronis. [11] Matt. xvii. 
27. The miracle was not wrought for the payment of the Roman 
tribute but for the tax which was due to the Temple. [20] accidents: 
Used here in the sense of ‘symptoms,’ as in p. 12. [26] Hippocrates: 
in his work De Epidemiis. [29] how they were judged: i.e. how the 
cases were decided. 

P. 138. [5] and if men will intend to observe: Lat. qui autem ad 
observandum adjiciet animum. [17] being comparative and casual: Lat. 
que comparativa est et casum recipit. [21] cause continent: Mr. Ellis 
quotes the following passage from Celsus from which this phrase is 
taken: Igitur hi qui rationalem medicinam profitentur hee necessaria esse 
proponunt: Abditarum et morbos continentium causarum notitiam, deinde 
evidentium, &c. Celsus, Preefatio. [31] Celsus, De Re Medica, pref. 
Incidere autem vivorum corpora et crudele et supervacuum est. [32] the 
great use: Some copies of ed. 1605 omit ‘ the.’ 

P. 139. [26] passed: So in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. See Phineas 
Fletcher's verses in Sorrowes Ioy, 1603 (Poems, ed. Grosart, iii, 268) : 


‘Wearie of passed woe, and glad of present ioy.’ 


[27] Sylla: Plutarch, Sylla,c. 31. 

P. 140. [9] Suetonius: Aug. g9. [10] Antoninus Pius: See his Life 
by Capitolinus (c. 12) in Hist. Aug. Script.: Atgue ita conversus quasi 
dormiret, spiritum efflavit apud Lorium. [12] Diog. Laert.x.15. [16] 
From the Latin translation by Sambucus (Antw. 1566) of a Greek 
epigram quoted by Diogenes Laertius, x. 15. [24] the receipts of 
propriety, respecting the particular cures of diseases, i.e. medicines 
appropriate to particular diseases: Lat. particulares tamen medicinas 
yue ad curationes morborum singulorum proprietate quadam spectant. 
[31] treacle: Lat. Theriaca. [32] The Latin adds et confectione Alkermes. 
The following is Mr. Ellis’s note on the corresponding passage of the 
De Augm.: ‘ Theriaca, from which treacle is a corruption, is the name 
of a nostrum invented by Andromachus, who was physician to Nero. 
_ For an account of the history and composition of mithridatum, see 
Celsus, v. 23. The invention of what was called diascordium is 


BOOK It. 303 


ascribed to Fracastorius, who speaks of it as “ Diascordium nostrum” 
in his De Cont. Morb. Cur. iii. 7. The confection of Alkermes in its 
original form seems to have been invented by Mesué, an Arabian 
physician. About Bacon’s time what was called mineral kermes, 
which was a preparation of antimony, was a popular medicine, but it 
is probable that he here refers either to the confection of Mesué or 
to some modification of it.’ 

P. 141. [1] the confections of sale which are in the shops: Lat. medi- 
camenta illa que in officinis prostant venalia, [2] for readiness and not 
for propriety : i.e. they are compounded for immediate use and not with 
reference to the particular disease. [10] probations: In old MS. books 
of receipts it is common to find probatum est written against such as have 
been tried and found effectual. [21] I do find strange: Lat. mirari subit, 
[23] extolled: i.e. by the school of Paracelsus. [33] more commanded: 
i.e. more under control. Some copies of ed. 1605 read ‘commended.’ 
The Lat. has pro arbitrio regere. 

P. 142. [23] no more: Observe the repetition of the negative. We 
should now say ‘any more.’ See p. 208, 1. 19. [29] artificial decora- 
tion: i.e. painting the face. Lat. adulterina illa decoratio, gue fucos et 
pigmenta adhibet. [31] Mr. Spedding conjectures ‘ wholesome to use, 
nor handsome to please.’ [33] I take the subject of it largely: Lat. 
eam sensu intelligimus paulo largiori quam accipi consuevit, 

P. 143. [3] patience; i.e. endurance: Lat. tolerantia. [7] The Latin 
adds ‘in the prodigious strength of madmen.’ [16] which though it be 
not true, &c.: Compare, for this construction, p. 81, 1, 11, and Shake- 
speare, Merch. of Ven. i. 3. 137: 

‘Who if he break, thou may’st with better face 
Exact the penalty.’ 


[23] Comp. Bacon, Ess. lviii. p. 237; quoted in note to p. 11, 1. 28. 

P. 144. [1] De Augm. iv. 3. [17,18] by the benediction of a pro- 
ducat: as in the fifth day of creation. See Gen. i. 20, 24: Producant 
aque .. producat terra, See p. 116, ll. 5-9. 

P. 145. (6, 7] Lat. Etiam Chalde@orum Astrologia solennior, non multo 
melior. [13] Sallust, Bell. Jug. 39. [16] referred over: i.e. to the ‘ par- 
ticular knowledges’ among which the various kinds of artificial divina- 
tion are distributed ; as astronomy, medicine, politics, and the like. [24] 
near death: As an illustration of this belief in the possession of the 
prophetic power by persons at the point of death, compare Shakespeare, 
Rich, II. ii. 1. 31, 32: 

‘Methinks I am a prophet new inspired 
And thus expiring do foretell of him.’ 
[28] Plato, Timeeus, iii. 71: oloy év xarémrpy dexopévy Timovs. 
P. 146. [1] fury: Comp. Ovid, Met. ii. 640; vaticinos concepit mente 


CLOMIOLE TE Le 


304 NOTES. 


furores. [6] See Paracelsus, De Vermibus, c. x. (p. 243, ed. 1603): 
Quanguam admitio imaginationem et fidem esse tam potentes, ut per eas nos 
ipsos reddere sanos aut egros. valeamus: imo quod maius est, possumus in 
@lernum servari, vel perdi, secundum usum in quem assumt@ fuerint. See 
also Crollii Basilica Chymica, Preef. Admon. pp. 70-77 (ed. 1643). [9] 
miracle-working faith: Comp. Matt. xvil. 20. [10] the secret passages 
of things, &c.: Lat. occultas rerum energias et impressiones, sensuum irra- 
diationes, contagionum de corpore in corpus transmissiones. [16] now 
almost made civil: Lat. facte quasi populares. [26] The reference to the 
Roman church is omitted in the Latin. [32] oppcsing to: i.e. in oppo- 
sition to, repugnant to. [33] Gen. iii. 19. 

P. 147. [3-6] For this sentence are substituted in the Latin two desi- 
derata on Voluntary Motion, and on Sense and the Sensible, with a dis- 
cussion of the Form of light. [7] De Augm.v. 1. [13-16] Lat. Nam 
sensus idola omnigena phantasie tradit, de quibus postea ratio judicat: at 
ratio vicissim idola electa et probata phantasie transmittit, priusquam fiat 
executio decreti. [21] Ovid, Met. ii. 14. [25] Arist. Pol. i. 3. 

P. 148. [1] impressions: ‘impression’ in ed. 1605. The plural seems 
necessary here from what follows, although ‘other’ is used as an adjec- 
tive with singular nouns. See Shakespeare, Cymbeline, iii. 4.144. [3] 
In the Latin this is expressed more clearly ; that where the minds of men 
are in any way wrought upon by rhetorical artifices, the imagination is 
roused till it triumphs over the reason, and as it were does it violence, 
partly by blinding and partly by exciting it. On the office of rhetoric 
see p. 177. [6] the former division: i.e. the division which is given at 
p. 85. [8-15] And if it be .. his true place: Omitted in the Latin. [17] 
in the doctrine De Anima: See p. 146. [21] the former division: See 
p. 144. [27] pabulum animi: Cicero, Acad. Quest. ii. 41. Est enim 
animorum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio con- 
templatioque nature. Comp. also De Senect. 14. [30] ad ollas carnium: 
to the flesh-pots (of Egypt), Num. xi. 4-6. 

P. 149. [3] lumen siccum: See p. 8, 1. 26. [6] Aristotle, De Anima, 
ili. 8. [11] to shoot a nearer shoot: Lat. ut melius quis collimet. [18] 
‘These divisions are adopted from Peter Ramus; the artes logicz in- 
cluding what Ramus calls Dialectic and Rhetoric, of which the former 
is divided into Inventio and Judicium, and the latter into Elocutio and 
Pronunciatio.’ Ellis’s note on De Augm. v. I. [22] De Augm. v. 2. 

P. 150. [6] Arist. Prior. Anal. i. 30; Eth. Mag. i. 1.17. [9] See 
Celsus, De Re Medica, i. 1, where he gives it as the opinion of the Em- 
pirics. [12] The reference to the Theztetus isa mistake. It is corrected in 
the Latin to the more general assertion Plato non semel innuit. Bacon was 
perhaps thinking of the Philebus, p. 17. [19] See Plutarch, De Solertia 
Animalium, c. 20. [21] Virg. AEn. xii. 412. [28] Virg. Afn. viii. 698. 

P. 151. [1-4] Omitted in the De Augm. but retained in substance in 


BOOK IU. 305 


the Cogitata et Visa (Works, iii. 614). Acosta, in his Natural Hist. of 
the Indies, describes the. mode of obtaining fire by rubbing two sticks 
together (Bk. iii.ch. 2). In the English translation of this book (p. 119, 
ed. 1604) there is a misprint of ‘stones’ for ‘sticks,’ ‘the manner to 
strike fire in rubbing two s‘ones one against another,’ where the Spanish 
has ‘palos.’ [5] to a wild goat for surgery: See the passage quoted on 
the previous page from Virgil. [6] the ibis: ‘The like device to this, 
namely of clystres, we learned first of a foule in the same gypt, which 
is called Ibis (or the blacke Storke).’ Holland’s Pliny, viii. 27 (ed. 1601), 
This and the previous illustration are both mentioned by Montaigne, 
Ess. ii, 12. [7] the pot-lid that flew open for artillery: Of the discovery 
of guns we read, in the English translation of Pancirolli Rerum Mira- 
bilium Libri Duo (Lond. 1785, p. 384), ‘ All Histories do agree in this, 
that a German was Author of this Invention, but whether his Name be 
known, or whether he was a Monk of Friburg, Constantine Ancklitzen, 
or Bertholdus Swartz (as some call him) a Monastick too, is not so very 
certain. Tis said he was a Chymist, who sometimes for Medicines kept 
Powder of Sulphur in a Mortar, which he covered with a Stone. But it 
happened one Day as he was striking Fire, that a Spark accidentally 
falling into it, brake out into a Flame, and heav’d up the Stone. The 
Man being instructed by this Contingency, and having made an Iron 
Pipe or Tube together with Powder, is said to have invented this 
Engine.’ The story is found in Polydore Vergil (De Inventoribus 
Rerum, ii, 11). [8] Comp. Agatho, quoted by Arist. Eth, Nic. vi. 4: 
Téxvn TUXHY EoTEpfe Kal TUXH TEXVNv. [11] Virg. Georg. i. 133. [14] 
do put in ure: i.e.douse. [17] Cic. Pro Balbo, 20: Assiduus usus uni 
rei deditus et ingenium et artem sepe vincit, [{20] Virg. Georg. i. 145: 
vicit in the original. [22] Persius, Prol. 8: Quis expedivit Psittaco suum 
xaipe. [23] See Holland’s Pliny, x. 43. [24] pebbles: ‘pibbles’ in 
ed. 1605 ; as in Shakespeare, Coriolanus, v. 3. 56, the first folio has, 


‘Then let the Pibbles on the hungry beach | 
Fillop the Starres,’ 


[28] ‘Looke what seeds or graines they do lay up for provision, sure 
they will be to gnaw it first, for feare they should sprout and take root 
again and so grow out of the earth.’ Holland’s Pliny, xi. 30. ‘The 
supposed grains of corn are no doubt the nymph. Huber repeatedly 
observed ants in the act of tearing the integument in which the young 
ant was enclosed, in order to facilitate its exit.’ Ellis’s note on De 
Augm. v. 2, p. 619. This again is mentioned by Montaigne, Ess. ii. 12. 

P. 152. [1] See p. 150, 1. 26. [5] Nothing is said of Plato in the 
translation. [14] Virg. Georg. iv. 1. [21] for who can assure: Lat. 
quis enim in se recipiet, {23] not other; ‘any other’ in some copies of 
ed. 1605. [24] 1 Sam. xvi. [25] Issay: So in the edd. of 1605, 1629, 

x 


306 NOTES. 


1633. Jsai is the form of the word in the Bishops’ Bible. [32] The 
lictores and viatores were both attendants upon a Roman magistrate, the 
business of the former being to clear the way and of the latter to sum- 
mon persons before him. So that lictores corresponds to ‘ whifflers,’ 
and viatores to ‘ sergeants.’ 

P. 153. [5] Referring to Matt. xviii. 3. Compare Of the Interpreta- 
tion of Nature (iii. p. 224); ‘It is no less true in this kingdom of know- 
ledge than in God’s kingdom of heaven, that no man shall enter into it 
except he become first as a little child.’ [10] in subject of nature: Lat. in 
rebus naturalibus que participant ex materia. [17] In this sentence Bacon 
appears to have had in his mind what he afterwards said of the investig- 
ation of final causes: xam causarum finaliuna inquisitio sterilis est, et tan- 
quam virgo Deo consecrata nihil parit (De Augm. iii. 5). In speaking of 
these (p. 119, 1. 5) he calls them ‘satisfactory and specious causes; ’ 
while in the present passage he characterizes them as producing assent 
but barren of result. [20] the current tokens or marks of popular 
notions of things: See again pp. 166, 167, and Arist. Interp. i. 1. 2. 
[21] notions: Lat. notiones ipse (que verborum anime sunt), For the 
construction, see p. 143, 1. 16. [32] Cic. Acad. Queest. il. 5. § 15: 
Socrates autem, de se ipso detrahens in disputatione, plus tribuebat iis 
quos volebat refellere. Ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti 
solitus est ea dissimulatione quam Greci eipwveiay vocant. See also Brutus, 
Co8s 

P. 154. [1] Tiberius: Tac. Ann. i. 7. 11. [4] acatalepsia : incompre- 
hensibility, the doctrine of the impossibility of attaining absolute truth. 
Cic. Acad. Quest. ii. 6. 18. See Nov. Org. i. 37. [9] in both acade- 
mies: The Lat. adds, multo magis inter Scepticos, [10] in subtilty and 
integrity: Lat. simpliciter et integre, as if the reading had been, as it pro- 
bably should be, ‘in simplicity and integrity.’ [14] by help of instru- 
ment: Lat. ope instrumentorum. Perhaps we should read ‘ instruments.’ 
With this whole passage compare what Bacon says in his treatise Of the 
Interp. of Nat. (Works, iii. 244): ‘That the information of the senses is 
sufficient, not because they err not, but because the use of the sense in 
discovering knowledge is for the most part not immediate. So that it is 
the work, effect, or instance, that trieth the Axiom, and the sense doth 
but try the work done or not done, being or not being.’ [29] experientia 
literata: In the De Augmentis this is explained at some length as treat- 
ing of the methods of making experiments. [30] interpretatio nature: 
The Lat. adds, sive Novum Organum. Of these two divisions Bacon 
says, in the De Augmentis, the former proceeds from one experiment to 
another; the latter from experiments to axioms, which in their turn 
lead to new experiments. 

P. 155. [1] De Augm. v. 3. [23] Aristotle, Soph. El. ii. 9. [30] 
Matt. xill, 52. 


BOOK II, 307 


P. 156. [5] being broken unto it by great experience: Lat. longa doctus 
experientia, [6] Cic. Orat. xiv. 45, 46. [8] in thesi: ‘in these,’ ed. 1605, 
corrected in Errata. [23] See p. 181, 

P. 157. [1] Plato, Menon, ii. p. 80. [12] See Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 22, 
16,17. [22] See Nov. Org. i. 130. [23] in going of a way: i.e. in 
going on or along a road. [29] In the De Augm. is here inserted an 
example of a special topic, de gravi et levi. [30] De Augm. v. 4. 
(31, 32] which... which: There is a little confusion of construction 
here, the first ‘ which’ referring to ‘arts,’ and the second to ‘judgement,’ 

P, 158. [2] otherwise it is: i.e. it is otherwise. Comp. p. 110, 1. 4. 
[14] Aristotle, De Motu Anim. 2, 3. [16] Atlas: See Hom. Od. i, 
52-54. [31] principle: Some copies of ed. 1605 read ‘ principles.’ [Ib.] 
probation ostensive: or ‘ ostensive reduction, because you prove, in the 
first figure, either the very same conclusion as before, or one which implies 
it.” Whately, Logic, ii. 3. § 5. 

P. 159. [1] ‘ Reductio ad impossibile. By which we prove (in the first 
figure) not directly that the original conclusion is ¢rue, but that it cannot 
be false; i.e. that an absurdity would follow from the supposition of its 
being false.’ Whately, Logic, ii. 3, § 6. [2] the number of middle 
terms to be; i.e. greater or less, [29] Seneca, Ep. Mor. 45. § 8; sic 
ista sine noxa decipiunt, quomodo prestigiatorum acetabula et calculi, in 
quibus me fallacia ipsa delectat. [23] doth not only put a man besides 
his answer: Lat. non solum id prestant ut non habeat quis quod respondeat, 
[27] the Sophists: The Lat. specifies Gorgias, Hippias, Protagoras, 
Euthydemus, and the rest. [28] See the beginning of the Theztetus. 

P. 160. [23] categories or predicaments: Of Aristotle’s enumeration 
of Existences, as the basis of Logic, Mr. Mill says, ‘The categories, or 
predicaments—the former a Greek word, the latter its literal interpreta- 
tion in the Latin language—were intended by him and his followers as 
an enumeration of all things capable of being named; an enumeration 
by the summa genera, i.e. the most extensive classes into which things 
could be distributed.’ Logic, i. p. 60. They were ten in number: sub- 
stance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, time, place, position, 
and habit. [31] This section is expanded in the Latin into a discussion 
of the ‘idols’ or fallacies of the human mind; the idols of the tribe, the 
cave, the marketplace, and the theatre. See Nov. Org. i. 39-68. 

P, 161. [10] false appearances: Lat. idola. [16] See Essay xxxv. 
p- 152. These are what Bacon elsewhere calls the Idols of the Tribe. 
[18] This story is told of Diagoras by Cicero, De Nat. Deor. iii. 37, 
and of Diogenes the Cynic by Diogenes Laertius, vi. 59. See Bacon, 
Nov. Org. i. 46. [23] Nov. Org. i. 45. [32] monodica, sui juris: as 
if from pdévos and din. The word Bacon intended to use was mona- 
dica, unique, which he then might have rendered sui generis instead of 
sui jurts. 

xX 2 


308 NOTES, 


P. 162. [1] is: Compare Macbeth, i. 3. 1413 
‘ And nothing is 
But what is not.’ 
{Ib.] an element of fire: Empedocles recognised the existence of four 
elements, earth, air, fire, and water, and among these gave the most 
important place to fire. Heraclitus assumed the elemental principle to 
be fire, as the most subtle and active of the elements. See Tennemann, 
Manual of the Hist. of Phil. §§ 103, 106, trans. Johnson. [5] Prota- 
goras affirmed that man is the measure of all things. Arist. Met. x. 6. 
[7] The Anthropomorphites, who were a branch of the Monophysites, 
held that God was of human shape, and interpreted literally all the 
passages in the Scriptures in which mention is made of his eye, ear, arm, 
or hand. See Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. 47; Nicephorus, Hist. Eccl. 
xiii. 10. The monastic sect of Audzeans, founded by Audzeus, or Audius, 
in Mesopotamia in the fourth century, maintained that the expression, 
‘God created man in his own image,’ is to be understood in its most 
literal sense. A sect of Anthropomorphites was in existence in Italy in 
the tenth century. [8] Epicurus: Cic. De Nat. Deor. ii. 17, &c. Comp. 
Of the Interp. of Nat. p. 241, for the original form of much in this para- 
graph. [11] Cic. De Nat. Deor. i. 9, § 22: Quid autem erat quod concu- 
pisceret Deus, mundum signis et luminibus, tanquam edilis, ornare? [Ib.] 
Epicurean: In the ed. of 1605 this is spelt Epicurian, but in p. 191 the 
spelling is the same in the old as in the modern editions. The word in 
Bacon’s time was pronounced with the accent on the third syllable, as 
in Shakespeare, Ant. and Cl. ii. i. 24: 
‘ Epictirean cooks 
Sharpen with cloyless sauce his appetite.’ 

[13] The curule ediles were at first appointed to take charge of the 
ludi Romani, but the ludi scenici, or dramatic representations, and the 
ludi megalesii also came under their control. ‘The decoration of the 
Argentarie, with the gilded shields of the Samnites, at the triumph of 
Papirius, in B.c. 309, is said to have first suggested to the Aediles the 
idea of ornamenting the Forum and its vicinity with statues, pictures, 
embroidery, and other works of art, during solemn processions and the 
celebration of the public games.’ (Ramsay, Rom. Ant. p. 159.) [19] 
number : ‘numbers’ in some copies of ed, 1605. [22] Let us consider 
again: i.e. Again, let us consider, &c. These false appearances are the 
Idols of the Cave. See Nov. Org.i.42. [24] Plato, Repub. vii. sub init. 

P, 163. [1] in our first book: See p. 40. [3] These are the Idols of 
the Marketplace : See Nov. Org. i. 43. [7] This is quoted as a saying 
of Aristotle by Roger Bacon, Opus Majus,i. 4: Quare Philosophus dicit in 
secundo Topicorum, quod sentiendum est ut pauci, licet loguendum sit ut plures, 
He was perhaps thinking of Aristotle, Top. ii. 2.5. ‘He that wyll wryte 
well in any tongue, must folowe thys councel of Aristotle, to speake as 


PETEREBS 


BOOK II. 309 


the common people do, to thinke as wise men do,’ Ascham’s Toxophilus, 
ed. Arber, p. 18. [9] The Tartars, says Dr Giles Fletcher, in his Russe 
Commonwealth, c. 19. p. 67 (ed. 1591), ‘are very expert horsemen, 
& vse to shoot as readily backward, as forward.’ And Maundevile 
(Voyage, &c., p. 304, ed. 1727): ‘ And 3ee schulle undirstonde, that it is 
gret drede for to pursue the Tartarines, 3if thei fleen in Bataylle. For in 
fleynge, thei schooten behynden hem, and sleen bothe men and Hors.’ 
Comp. Speech on the Subsidy Bill (Life and Letters, ii. 89) : ‘Sure I am 
it was like a Tartar’s or Parthian’s bow, which shooteth backward.’ 
[30] so slightly touched: The Lat. has siguidem Aristoteles rem notavit, 
modum rei nullibi persecutus est. 

P. 164. [2] syllogism: ‘sophisme’ in ed. 1605, corrected in Errata. 
[3] Arist. Prior. Anal. ii. 5 ; Post. Anal. ii. 13. [4-7] The construction 
here is loose. We ought correctly to read, ‘ every of these hath certain 
subjects ...in which respectively it hath chiefest use ; and certain others, 
from which it ought. &c. But Bacon regarded ‘every of these’ as 
equivalent to ‘all these,’ and finished the sentence accordingly. A 
similiar construction is found in Shakespeare, Mid. N.’s Dr. ii, 1. go-g2: 

‘Contagious fogs, which falling in the land 

Have every pelting river made so proud, 

That they have overborne their continents.’ 
[16] De Augm. v. 5. [18, 20] for: i.e. as for. [28] a matter of great 
use and essence: Lat. magni prorsus rem esse usus et firmitudinis. [31] 
and contracteth judgement to a strength: Lat. et aciem judicii in unum 
contrabat, 

P. 165. [6] An art there is extant of it: Cornelius Agrippa, in his 
Vanitie of the Sciences, has a chapter ‘Of the Arte of Memorie:’ 
‘ Among these Artes, the Arte of Memorie is also accoumpted, whiche 
(as Cicero saithe) is nothing els, but a certaine induction and order of 
teaching, consisting of places and Images, as it were in a paper, deuised, 
firste in Caracters by Simonides Melito, afterwarde broughte to perfection 
by Metrodorus Scepticus.... Cicero hath written thereof in his newe 
Rhetorike, Quintilian in his Institutions, Seneca, and of the fresher sorte, 
Franciscus Petrarcha, Mareolus of Verona, Petrus of Ravenna, and 
Hermannus Buschius, and others, but vnworthie of rehersal, men little 
knowen ’ (Eng. trans. cap. 10, ed. 1575). Giordano Bruno also wrote an 
Ars Memoriz. [27] dischargeth : i.e. dismisses, relieves us of. 

P. 166. [3] distinguish: i.e. assert distinctly, decide. Bacon refers to 
what he said on p. 84: ‘my purpose is, at this time, to note only 
omissions and deficiencies, and not to make any redargution of errors, or 
incomplete prosecutions.’ [5] De Augm. vi. 1. [12] the organ of 
tradition: The Latin adds gue et grammatica dicitur. [13] Arist. De 
Interp. i. 1. [15] it: Omitted in editions of 1605, 1629, 1633. [24] 
China, and the kingdoms of the High Levant: In Acosto’s Naturall and 


410 NOTES. 


Morall Historie of the East and West Indies, lib. vi. chap. v. (Eng. tr. 
1604), is an account ‘Of the fashion of Letters, and Bookes, the Chinois 
vsed.’ ‘They have no Alphabet, neither write they any letters, but all 
their writing is nothing else but painting and ciphering: and their letters 
signifie no partes of distinctions, as ours do, but are figures and 
representations of things, as of the Sunne, of fire, of a man, of the sea, 
and of other things. The which appears plainely, for that their writings 
and Chapas, are vnderstood of them all, although the languages the 
Chinois speake, are many and very different ...So as things being of 
themselves innumerable, the letters likewise or figures which the Chinois 
vse to signifie them by, are in a maner infinite’ Of the Japanese, to 
whom probably Bacon refers as the people of the High Levant or far 
East, Acosta says in the same chapter, ‘I have had some of their 
writings shewed me, whereby it seemes that they should have some 
kinde of letters, although the greatest part of their writings, be by the 
characters and figures, as hath bin saide of the Chinois.’ Acosta is in all 
probability the source of Bacon’s information, for, from the expression 
‘ And we understand further,’ which in the Latin is rendered ‘Quinetiam 
notissimum fieri jam ccepit,’ it was clearly but recently acquired, and 
there is other evidence that he had read his book. 

P. 167. [11] The story of Thrasybulus sending to consult Periander is 
told by Aristotle (Polit. iii. 13). In Herodotus (v. 92) it is Periander 
who sends to Thrasybulus. Compare with this Livy’s version (i. 54), 
where it is applied to Tarquinius Superbus. The form of the tale as it 
appears in Herodotus is adopted by Plutarch (Sept. Sap. Conv. 2). [16] 
grandees: In ed. 1605 grandes, which probably represents the early 
pronunciation of the word, with the accent on the first syllable. In 
Burton’s Anat. of Mel. (Democritus to the Reader, p. 34, ed. 1628), it is 
found in the form grandy: ‘For in a great person, right worshipfull Sir, 
a right honourable Grandy, ’tis not a veniall sinne.’ In the first edition 
of the Advancement the word is printed in italics, an indication that it 
was not yet naturalised, but had been adopted from the Spanish or 
Italian. [28] words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits: 
See p. 153; ‘words are but the current tokens or marks of popular 
notions of things.’ [31] Perhaps Bacon had in his mind the paper money 
of the Chinese, of which an account had been given by Rubruquis and 
confirmed by Marco Polo (Travels, Bk. ii. c. 18, trans. Marsden; il. 24, 
ed. Yule). Colonel Yule in his edition of Marco Polo (i. pp. 380-385) 
says it was in use as early as the gth cent. 

P. 168. [4] the first general curse: Gen. iii. 16-19. [6] the second 
general curse: Gen. xi. 6-8. [7, 8] in a mother tongue: ‘in another 
tongue’ ed. 1605, corrected to ‘in mother tongue’ in the Errata and in 
edd. 1629, 1633. The Latin has linguis quibusque vernaculis. [32] Mart. 
ix, 83. 


a a ee ie ST ih 


GIANNI Shae oe 


BOOK II. git 


P. 169. [11] decipher: ‘discypher’ in ed. 1605. [13] Of this kind of 
cipher Bacon gives an example in the De Augm., which he says was 
invented by him at Paris. [30] words: some copies of ed. 1605 read 
‘markes.’ 

P. 170. [4] labours and studies: some copies of ed. 1605 read ‘labours 
studies,’ and Mr. Spedding, considering that one of these words is a 
correction of the other, reads ‘studies’ alone. [5] De Augm. vi. 2. 
‘Besides Ramus himself and Carpentier, one of the principal persons in 
this controversy was the Cardinal D’Ossat, of whom some account will 
be found in De Thou’s memoirs.’ (Ellis.) [14] The first book of the 
Dialectica of Ramus is De Inventione, the second De Judicio, and of the 
latter the last four chapters are on Method. [19] invention: ‘inventions’ 
in ed, 1605, corrected in Errata. [29] Cicero, Pro Celio xviii. 42: Ergo hac 
deserta via et inculta atque interclusa jam frondibus et virgultis relinquatur. 

P. 171. [1] be: Omitted in ed. 1605. [7] to be spun on: i.e. to be 
spun continuously, without break. ([Ib.] intimated: Mr. Spedding 
conjectures ‘insinuated.’ The Latin has insinuanda, But in distinguish- 
ing in the De Augmentis the two kinds of Methods, Magistralis and 
Initiativa, Bacon says ‘ Magistralis siquidem docet; Initiativa intimat,’ 
and therefore, as in this passage he is speaking of the latter of these, 
‘intimated ’ is probably the true reading. [9] knowledge induced: that 
is, derived by induction. Lat. scientia per inductionem acquisita. [12] 
secundum majus et minus : to a greater or less extent. See p. 30, 1. 8. 

P. 172. [1] enigmatical and disclosed: In the De Augm. he dis- 
tinguishes them as Acroamatica and Exoterica. In this passage Bacon's 
remarks apply to the enigmatical method. [16] except they should be 
ridiculous: We should now say ‘ unless they would be ridiculous.’ [26] 
Hor. Ars Poet. 242. [31] demonstration in orb or circle: See p. 164. 

P. 173. [8] The scholastical method which is condemned previously. 
See pp. 32, 33. [13] indeed: Mr. Spedding interprets this as equivalent 
to ‘although indeed.” Rather, perhaps, ‘would’ is used for ‘ should.’ 
The difficulty is evaded in the Latin translation, which is as follows: 
Illud tamen inficias non ierim urbem aliquam magnam et munitam a tergo 
relinquere haudquaquam semper tutum esse. ‘Piece’ in the sense of 
‘fort’ occurs in Fairfax’s Tasso, Book vii. st. go. Bacon gives this 
as an example of what he means by keeping the field and pursuing ‘ the 
sum of the enterprise.’ A general will not waste his strength in attack- 
ing some small fort when an important position is held by the enemy in 
his rear, and the teacher of a science will only employ confutation ‘to 
remove strong preoccupations and prejudgements’ from the minds of 
his pupils, and not to refute their minor cavils and doubts. Modern 
editions read ‘some important piece with an enemy.’ [29] shells: 
‘shales’ in ed. 1605. [31] particular topics for invention: See pp. 156, 


157- 


312 NOTES, 


P. 174. [1] judgement: The Latin has here Sequitur aliud Methodi dise 
crimen, in tradendis scientiis cum judicio adhibendum. Method has been 
described (p. 170) as a part of judgement, and here the one word 

.seems to have been substituted for the other. [5] agreeable: i.e. to 
received opinions. Lat. opinionibus jampridem imbibitis et receptis affinis. 
(7] Arist. Eth. Nic. vi. 3. The opinion alluded to in this passage is 
generally supposed to be that of Plato (Thezt. p. 197) and not 
Democritus. Mr. Ellis conjectured that Bacon might inadvertently have 
substituted one name for the other. [10] need only but: One of these 
words is redundant. We should say ‘need only’ or ‘need but.’ [22] 
Mr. Ellis quotes Plato, Politic. li. 277: xademdv, pr mapadelypaot xpo- 
pevov, ixavas évbeixvvcOai Te Tov peCdvev. [27] The Latin adds to 
these diversities of methods Diereticam and Homericam. 

P. 175. [8] Ramus (Dialect. lib. ii. c. 3) divides the axioms or first 
principles of sciences (axiomata artium) as follows: Axioms are either 
true or false. Of true axioms, some are true contingently, others 
necessarily. A necessary axiom must be true in all cases, and the 
predication is then said to be xara wavrés. It must be homogeneous, 
that is, its parts must be essentially connected together, as form with the 
thing formed, the subject with its proper adjunct, genus with species : in 
this case it is said to be «a6? airé. Thirdly, it must be catholic or 
universal, that is, the converse of the proposition must be true as well as 
the proposition itself, when it is xa@éAo0u mp@rov. To these three rules 
Ramus gives the fanciful names of the law of truth (kata mayrés), the law 
of justice (xa@’ até), and the law of wisdom (KaOdAov mp@rov). It is the 
last law which is referred to in the concluding sentence of this paragraph. 
[11] the canker of epitomes: In p. 91 Bacon calls epitomes ‘the 
corruptions and moths of history. [13] Referring probably to the 
dragons which kept the garden of the Hesperides and the golden fleece. 
Compare also Shakespeare, As You Like It, ii. 1. 12-14: 


‘Sweet are the uses of adversity, 
Which like the toad, ugly and venomous, 
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.’ 


[26-28] and the longitude... precept: Lat. longitudo vero sumitur a 
summa propositione ad imam in eadem scientia. [30] which is the rule they 
call xadavrd: Omitted in the Latin. See note on p. 175, 1. 8. 

P. 176. [5] Ortelius: Abraham Ortel, or Ortelius, born June 9, 1527, 
at Antwerp, and called the Ptolemy of his time. He was appointed 
geographer to the King of Spain, and died June 26, 1598. Prefixed to 
his Theatrum Orbis Terrarum is a map of the world called Typus Orbis 
Terrarum, to which Bacon probably alludes. [20] Raymundus Lullius: 
born at Palma in Majorca in 1235. He was at first steward to King 
James of Majorca and High Chamberlain ; or, as others say, a merchant 


BOOK Il. 313 


like his ancestors. His early life was licentious, but he afterwards con- 
ceived a disgust for the world, and when forty years of age studied 
Latin and Arabic at Paris, While preaching Christianity in Africa he 
was stoned by the natives, and carried off by a Genoese vessel, on board 
of which he died off the coast of Majorca, March 26, 1315. For an 
account of his art, which he said was revealed to him on a mountain, see 
Maurice’s Medizval Philosophy, pp. 244 &c. Cornelius Agrippa says 
of it, ‘herein I wil admonishe you, that this Arte auaileth more to the 
outwarde shewe of the witte, and to the ostentation of Learning, than to 
gette knowledge: and hath much more presumptuousnesse, than effi- 
cacie.” Of the Vanitie and Uncertaintie of Artes and Sciences, cap. 9 
(Engl. trans. ed. 1575). [27] De Augm. vi. 3. [Ib.] which concerneth 
the illustration of tradition: Lat. de illustratione sermonis. [33] Adapted 
from Ex. iv. 16. See Ex. vii. 1. 

P. 177. [2] Prov. xvi. 21, quoted from the Vulgate from memory. 
[8] hath made: Observe the loose construction, the singular being used 
for the plural. [18] The Latin adds, Rhetorica certe Phantasie quemad- 
modum Dialectica Intellectui subservit: Rhetoric is to the imagination 
what logic is to the understanding. [23] morality: Lat. Erhicam, ethics 
or moral philosophy. [26] Lat. aut argumentorum fallaciis obruimur. 

P. 178. [2] to fill the imagination: Lat. phantasiam implere observa- 
tionibus et simulachris, [4] Plato, Gorg. i. p. 462, &c. [13] Thue. iii. 
42. [18] Plato, Pheedr. iii. 250; see also Cic. De Off. i. 5. 14; de Fini- 
bus, ii. 16. 52; Rabelais, Pantag. ii. 18. For the opposite sentiment 
compare Pope, Essay on Man, Ep. ii. 217: 


‘Vice is a monster of so frightful mien, 
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen.’ 


[23] The Latin adds, a Cicerone. See Cicero, De Fin. iv. 18, 19; Tusc. 
Disp. ii. 18. 42. [26] with the will: Lat. cum phantasia et voluntate, 
[32] Ovid, Metam. vii. 20. 

P. 179. [16] See Aristotle, Rhet. i. 1.14. [18] The comparison is 
attributed to Zeno; Cicero, Orat. xxxii. 113; De Finibus, ii. 6. 17; 
Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Mathem. ii. 7. Bacon uses it again, though in 
a different context, in his letter to Toby Matthew, upon sending him 
part of Instauratio Magna (Life and Letters, iv. 137): ‘And to speak 
truth, it is to the other but as palma to pugnus, part of the same thing 
more large.’ [19] palm: ‘pawme’ in ed. 1605. [23] Arist. Rhet. i. 2. 
7. [29] Virg. Ecl. viii. 56. [32] respectively; i.e. in terms adapted 
to the persons addressed. 

P. 180. [g] attendances: See p. 177, ‘and therefore the deficiences 
which I shall note will rather be in some collections, which may as 
handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself.’ The 
Latin has gue (ut ante diximus) ejus sunt generis, ut pro appendicibus potius 


314 NOTES. 


censeri debeant, quam pro portionibus artis ipsius, et pertinent omnia ad 
Promptuariam. (11] Aristotle, Rhet. i. 6, 7; Top. i.12, &c. [14] Bacon 
refers to the Colours of Good and Evil which he published with the first 
edition of his Essays in 1597. In the Latin twelve examples are given 
of these sophisms. [19] Hor. Ep. ii. 2.11, [20] Prov. xx. 14. [31] 
Arist. Rhet.i. 6. [32] Virg. Ain. ii. 104. 

P. 181. [2] See pp. 155, 156. [9g] Of these Antitheta forty-seven 
examples are given in the De Augmentis, of which the instance on this 
page is the last but one. [22] For examples of these formula, see the 
‘Promus of Formularies and Elegancies’ printed by Mr. Spedding in 
the seventh volume of his edition of Bacon. Three others are given 
from Cicero in the De Augmentis. [33] De Augm. vi. 4. 

P. 182. [1] the other pedantical: Lat. altera pedagogica. [4, 5] con- 
cerneth chiefly writing of books: The editions of 1605, 1629, and 1633 
read ‘concerneth chiefly ix writing of books.’ The true reading is pro- 
bably ‘ consisteth chiefly in writing &c.’ In the Latin it is im scriptione 
librorum consistit. [11] Inthe De Augm. the story of the priest is 
omitted and another substituted of a proposed emendation of a passage 
in Tacitus, Hist. i. 66. [Ib.] As the priest: I am afraid that this tale 
must share the fate of many other good stories, when their genuineness 
is put to the test. The Vulgate rendering of the passage in question is 
in sporta and not per sportam, a reading which leaves no room for the 
point of the story as Bacon tells it. Nor, so far as I can ascertain, is 
per sportam to be found in any Latin version. [12] Actsix. 25. [17] 
as it hath been wisely noted: Lat. guod nonnemo prudenter notavit, [31] 
Lat. Ad Pedagogicam quod attinet, brevissimum foret dictu, consule scholas 
Fesuitarum : nihil enim, quod in usum venit, his melius. Bacon has already 
(p. 21) expressed his appreciation of the services rendered by the Jesuits 
to education. 

P. 183. [6] courses: Mr. Spedding conjectures ‘cases.’ [7] See Essay 
XXXViii. p. 159: ‘ Hee that seeketh victory over his ature, let him not 
set himselfe too great, nor too small tasks: for the first will make him 
deiected by often faylings; and the second will make him a small pro- 
ceeder, though by often prevailings. And at the first, let him practise 
with helps, as swimmers doe with bladders, or rushes: but after a time, 
let him practise with disadvantages, as dancers doe with thick shooes. 
For it breeds great perfection, if the practise be harder then the use.’ 
[13] See Essay 1. p. 205: ‘So if a mans wit be wandring, let him study 
the mathematicks; for in demonstrations, if his wit be called away 
never so little, he must begin again.’ [25] Cicero, de Orat. i. 33. Comp. 
Essay xxxviil. p. 160; ‘ Let not a man force a habit upon himselfe, with 
a perpetuall continuance, but with some intermission. For both the 
pause reinforceth the new onset; and if a man, that is not perfect, be 
ever in practise, he shall as well practise his errours, as his abilities ; 


PLO pm Po 


BOOK 11. 315 


and induce one habite of both; and there is no meanes to helpe this, but 
by seasonable intermissions.’ [33] and as it was noted; by Machiavelli, 
Disc. sopra Livio, i. 19. 

P. 184. [2] was: Observe the construction, the whole of the previous 
clause being the nominative. Or else we have here another instance of 
a common error, by which the verb is made to agree in number with 
the last substantive which precedes. [10] Tac. Ann. i. 16-22, quoted 
from memory. In the Latin Bacon strongly recommends acting as a 
branch of education, for though of ill repute as a profession yet as a 
part of training it is one of the best. In this he fortifies himself by the 
practice of the Jesuit schools. [15] mutiners, i.e. mutineers, the old 
form of spelling in Bacon’s time. Compare pionners for pioneers (p. 111) 
in ed. 1605. In Shakespeare’s Temp. iii. 2. 41 the word is spelt muti- 
neere in the first folio, but in Coriol. i. 1. 254 it is mutiners as here. 

P. 185. [13] that he were like to use: i.e. that he might be likely to 
use. [16] had been to handle: We should now use the verb ‘to have’ 
instead of the verb ‘to be’ in this idiom. But the latter was formerly 
common. See Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven.i. 1. 5: 


‘But how I caught it, found it, or came by it, 
What stuff ’tis made of, whereof it is born, 
I am to learn.’ 


[27] De Augm. vii. 1. [29] Prov. iv. 23. 

P. 186. [10] they pass it over altogether: Another instance of the 
redundance of the pronoun, as in p, 20, 1. 27. [12] by habit and not by 
nature: See Aristotle, Eth. Nic. ii. 1. [13] Arist. Eth. Nic. x. 10. [27] 
Seneca, Ep. ad Lucil. 52. § 14. [33] Demosthenes, Olyn. ii. 8. 

P. 187. [10] Virg. Georg. iii. 289. [29] were as the heathen divinity: 
Lat. qu@ ethnicis instar theologie erant. [30] Aristotle, Eth. Nic. i, 10; 
Rhet. ii. 12. 

P. 188. [3] than was: Lat. quam cujus illa esset capax. [4] Seneca, 
Ep. ad Lucil. 53. § 12, quoted again in Essay v. p. 16: ‘It is true 
greatnesse, to have in one, the frailty of a man, and the security of a 
god.’ [18] their triplicity of good: the threefold division of good as it 
relates to mind, body, and estate. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. i. 8. 2. The 
comparison between a contemplative and an active life: See Arist. Eth. 
Nic. x. 6-8. [21] honesty and profit: Arist. Rhet.i.6. [Ib.] balanc- 
ing of virtue with virtue: Arist. Eth. Nic. iii. iv. 

P. 189. [12] rather than to suffer: We should say ‘ rather than suffer.’ 
[21] being in commission of purveyance for a famine; i.e. being com- 
missioned to make provision for a famine. [25] Plutarch, Pomp. c. 50. 
[33] St. Paul in Rom. ix. 3, and Moses in Exod. xxxii. 32. Comp. Ess. 
xiii. p. 50; ‘ But above all, if he have St. Pauls perfection, that he would 
wish to be an anathema from Christ, for the salvation of his brethren, 


H3tG NOTES. 


it shewes much of a divine nature, and a kinde of conformity with Christ 
himselfe.’ 

P. 190.'[1] anathematized: ‘anathemized’ in ed. 1605, corrected in 
Errata. [15] The story is told by Cicero (Tusc. Disp. v. 3) from Hera- 
clides Ponticus of Leo tyrant of Phlius, not of Hiero. See Iamblichus, 
Vita Pythag. xii. 58. [21] this theatre of man’s life, &c.: the reference 
is to Gen. i. where after each of the six days’ work ‘God saw that it 
was good.’ Compare Essay xi. p. 40: ‘ For ifa man, can be partaker of 
Gods theater, he shall likewise be partaker of Gods rest.’ [24] Ps. 
cxvi. 15. [27] simple: So ed. 1605; the editions of 1629, 1633 read 
‘simply.’ [30] or taking: Some copies of ed. 1605 have ‘ or in taking,’ 
others ‘and in taking:’ in the Errata to ed. 1605 the reading is ‘or 
taking,’ and this is adopted in edd. 1629, 1633. [31] Ex. xxiii. 

P. 191. [1] Gen. v. 24. [2] Jude 14. The apocryphal Book of Enoch 
was brought from Abyssinia by Bruce, and translated into English by 
Abp. Laurence. [4] knoweth it not: Some copies of ed. 1605 read 
‘knoweth it, decideth it not.” The Latin has nescit eam certe Theologia. 
The compositor’s eye had been caught by the following line. [6] Zeno, 
the Stoic, who died 8.c. 263. [10] the Cyrenaics: founded by Aristip- 
pus of Cyrene, who flourished 8.c. 366. Their doctrines terminated in 
Epicureanism, [15] Lat. nec minus illam alteram Epicuri scholam, quast 
reformatam. [19] Comp. Ovid, Met. i. 107: 


‘Ver erat sternum, placidique tepentibus auris 
Mulcebant zephyri natos sine semine flores.’ 


[20] and Herillus: Lat. denique et illam explosam Pyrrhonis et Herilli 
scholam. Herillus of Carthage flourished about B.c. 264, Cic. de Fin. 
iv. 14. [24] revived: Some copies of ed. 1605 read ‘receued.’ [29] 
Epictetus, Enchir. 1-7. 

P. 192. [2] Consalvo: Fernandez Consalvo, or Gonsalvo, of Cordova, 
the Great Captain. This story is told by Guicciardini, Hist. vi. 2. 
[3,4] he had rather die .. than to have: Observe the looseness of the 
construction. See p. 189, 1.12. [5] leader: So edd. 1629 and 1633, 
and some copies of ed. 1605; others have ‘reader.’ Lat. dux et impera- 
tor. [6] hath signed: ‘to sign ¢o’ a document is to attest it by affixing 
one’s signature, and hence to attest generally. [Ib.] Prov. xv. 15. [18] 
Aristotle, Rhet. i. 5. § 10. [24] Mr. Ellis has shown that this was the 
opinion of Aristippus and not of Diogenes. Diog. Laert. Aristip. ii. 75 
TO Kpatety Kat pry HTTAGOa HSovav dpiorov, ov Td wr xpHoOa. [25] dvé-— 
xov kai dréxov was the maxim of Epictetus. [26] refrain: to bridle, 
rein in, as it were; a figure from horsemanship. [29] want of applica- 
tion: Lat. ineptitudinem ad morigerandum. Mr. Spedding rightly explains 
it as ‘ want of compliance or accommodation.’ 

P. 193. [1] This saying of Consalvo is quoted again in Essay lvii, 


TEE POT po 


BOOK It, 317 


p- 229; in Apoph. 180; and in the Speech against Duels (pp. 28, 29. 
ed. 1614). See note on the Essay. [4] De Augm. vii. 2. [8] Plautus, 
Pseud. ii. 2. 14, Condus promus sum procurator peni. Baret (Alvearie) 
gives: ‘He that hath the keeping of a storehouse, or drie larder: alsoa 
buttler. Promus.’ And ‘A Steward, or he that keepeth the store of 
houshold, Condus.’ Bacon in this passage evidently regards condus as 
the officer who collected the stores, and promus the one who dispensed 
them, so called guia promit quod conditum est, [11, 12] whereof the 
latter seemeth to be the worthier: In the Latin this is expanded; Atque 
hic posterior, qui Activus est et veluti Promus, potentior videtur et dignior ; 
ille autem prior, que Passivus est et veluti Condus, inferior censeri potest. 
[16] Acts xx. 35. [17] but esteemeth, i.e. but he esteemeth. [23] the 
State: Lat. securitas et mora, [24] Seneca, Nat. Quest. ii. 59. § 7. 
[15] Prov. xxvii. 1. [28] Rev. xiv. 13. [32] Sen. Ep. x. 1. § 6, quoted 
also in Essay ii. with slight variations from the original, ‘eadem feceris,’ 
for jamdiu idem facias,’ and ‘fortis aut miser aut prudens’ for ‘ prudens 
et fortis aut miser.’ 

P. 194. [6] By Seneca, Ep. 95. § 46: Vita sine proposito vaga est 
[7] any: ‘and’ ed. 1605; ‘any’ is the reading of 1629, 1633. [8] 
though in some case it hath an incidence into it: Lat. guamquam 
nonnunguam ambo coincidant, [13] gigantine: i.e. seditious, rebel- 
lious, like the giants who warred against the gods. See p. 103, and 
Ess. xv. [16] Sylla’s epitaph, written by himself, was this,—‘ That no 
man did euer passe him, neither in doing good to his friends, nor in 
doing mischiefe to his enemies.’ North’s Plutarch, p. 488 (ed. 1631). 
Compare p. 240, l. 30, [19] active good: Lat. bonum activum indivi- 
duale saltem apparens, [20] See p. 189. [23] For let us take.. and 
rightly: Omitted in the Latin. [33] multiplying and extending their 
form upon other things: The ed. of 1605 has ‘ multiplying their fourm 
and extending upon other things.’ 

P. 195. [6] in state: Lat. in suo statu, [9] Virg. En. vi. 730. [30] 
by equality: ‘by the equality,’ ed. 1605, corrected in the Errata. [31] 
evil; ‘ Euils’ in some copies of ed. 1605. 

P. 196. [4] See Plato, Gorgias, i, 462, 494. [19-20] Compare what 
Bacon says in Essay xix. p. 76: ‘ That the minde of man is more cheared, 
and refreshed, by profiting in small things, then by standing at a stay in 
great.’ [27] Plutarch, Solon. 7. Again quoted by Bacon in Cogit. de 
Sc. Hum. frag. 3 (Works iii. 197). [31] Comp. Essay ii. p. 6: ‘Certainly, 
the Stoikes bestowed too much cost upon death, and by their great pre- 
parations made it appeare more fearefull.’ 

P. 197. [4] Juv. Sat. x. 358; quoted again in Ess. ii. p. 7. The true 
reading is spatium for finem, [10-16] For as... life: Omitted in the 
Latin. 

P. 198. [22] Comp. Ess. xlviii. p. 200; ‘ For lookers on, many times, 


318 NOTES, 


see more then gamesters: and the vale best discovereth the hill’ [27] 
of active matter: i.e. concerning subjects of active life. [29] The story 
is told by Cicero, De Orat. ii. 18. 75. 

P. 199. [4] The Basilicon Doron, written by King James for the in- 
struction of his eldest son, Prince Henry, and published in 1603. It is 
in three books: the first, ‘Of a kings Christian dutie towards God; 
the second, ‘Of a kings dutie in his office ;’ and the third, ‘Of a kings 
behaviour in indifferent things.’ [9] not sick of dizziness: Lat. non 
vertigine aliquando corripitur, The edition of 1605 has ‘ Dusinesse,’ 
which is corrupted to ‘ Businesse’ in the editions of 1629 and: 1633. 
[11] nor of convulsions .. impertinent: Lat. non digressionibus distrahitur, 
ut illa que nihil ad rhombum sunt expatiatione aliqua flexuosa complectatur. 
[23] a great cause of judicature: Mr. Spedding says, ‘ Probably in the 
case of Sir Francis Goodwin, in 1604, when the question was whether it 


belonged to the House of Commons or the Court of Chancery to judge 


of the validity of an election.’ [28] The title of this work of king James 
is ‘The True Lawe of Free Monarchies, or the reciprock and mutuall 
dutie betwixt a free king, and his naturall subiects.’ It was first 
published anonymously in 1603, and was afterwards included in the 
collected edition of the king’s works published in 1616. 

P. 200. [10] In the De Augm. Bacon quotes the example of Pliny the 
younger in his panegyric on Trajan. [14] part: ‘partie’ in ed. 1605, 
corrected in Errata. [25] Prov. xiv. 6. [30] Comp. Shakespeare, Cym- 
beline, ii, 4. 107: 


‘It is a basilisk unto mine eye, 
Kills me to look on’t.’ 


[32] which .. they leese: Another example of the redundance of the 
pronoun. See note on p. 21, 1. 26. 

P. 201. [2-17] Comp. Bacon, Meditationes Sacre, 3. [16] Prov. 
xviii. 2, quoted from the Vulgate. [18] for construction, see p. 52, 1. 9. 
[30] Lucius Brutus: See Livy, bk. ii. 5. [33] Virg. AEn. vi. 823; facta 
for fata is the true reading, but the latter is also found in the De Aug- 
mentis. . 

P. 202. [2] This discussion is related by Plutarch, Brutus, xii. 2. [11] 
Comp. Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. iv. 1. 216: 


‘To do a great right, do a little wrong.’ 


[12] Plutarch, De Sanitate Praecepta, 24; Praecepta Gerund. Reip. 24; 
Bacon, Apoph. 138. [20] De Augm. vii. 3. [26] Aristotle, Magn. 
Mor. i. I. 

P. 203. [3] Cicero, Pro Murzena, 30. § 62. [6] Seneca, Ep. 71. § 2, 
{9] Hippocrates, Aphorism. ii.6. [13,14] Lat. attamen philosophiam 
moralem in famulitium theologie recipi instar ancille prudentis et pedisseque 


BOOK II, 319 


Sidelis, que ad omnes ejus nutus presto sit et ministret, quid prohibeat? [15] 
Ps. cxxiii. 2. [20] as it may yield of herself: Observe that the neuter 
reflexive pronoun ‘itself’ had not come generally into use. [24]—204. 
[2] the rather .. extant: Instead of this the Latin has only, Zam igitur, 
ex more nostro, cum inter desiderata collocemus, aliqua ex parte adum- 
brabimus. 

P. 204. [7] the husbandman cannot command, neither, &c.: Observe 
the double negative, as in Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven, iii. 4. 11: 


*I never did repent for doing good, 
Nor shall not now,’ 


[11] without our command: i.e. beyond our control. [12-26] For to 
the basis..apply: Altered in the Latin. [16] Virg. En. v. 710, 
‘Superanda omnis fortuna ferendo est.’ [23] properly: ‘ property’ in 
ed. 1605, corrected to ‘ properly’ in the Errata and in ed. 1629, 

P. 205. [2-31] wherein .. malignity: Omitted in the Latin. [6] Aris- 
totle, Eth. Nic. iv. 7. [10] to few: Mr. Spedding conjectures that we 
should read ‘to intend few.’ [18] Virg. En. i. 22. [20] See Ex. xxxiv. 
5. [21] Aristotle, Eth. Nic. iv.6. [30] properly: This is the reading 
of edd. 1605, 1629, 1633, but Mr. Spedding alters it to ‘ property,’ as in 
p. 204, l. 23. 

P. 206. [2] Lat. eum utrique scientie clarissimum luminis jubar affundere 
possit. (6] These different dispositions are arranged according to the 
planets which are supposed to predominate over them: Saturn, Jupiter, 
Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon. Comp. p. 43: ‘Saturn, 
the planet of rest and contemplation, and Jupiter, the planet of civil 
society and action.’ [6] Compare Bacon’s Letter to Lord Burghley 
(Life and Letters, i, 108): ‘not as a man born under Sol, that loveth 
honour; nor under Jupiter, that loveth business (for the contemplative 
planet carrieth me away wholly).’ [8-23] A man shall find .. use of 
life: This is entirely omitted in the Latin, and another paragraph sub- 
stituted which is partly made up of a sentence previously omitted (p. 203, 
ll. 24-28), and of a passage of some length in which Bacon points to 
the wiser historians as the source from which to gather materials for 
this treatise on the several characters of natures and dispositions. [9] 
For some of these ‘relations’ see Ranke’s History of the Popes, App. 
§§ 5, 6 (trans. Foster). [16] is: ‘as’ in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. [21] 
posies: ‘ poesies’ is the spelling of ed. 1605. [26] by the region: Lat. 
patria, [32] Plautus, Miles Gloriosus, iii. 1. 40. 

P, 207. [4] Tit. i. 12, 13, quoting from Epimenides, [6] Sallust, 
Bell. Jug. 113. This is quoted again in Essay xix. p. 77, and there 
attributed to Tacitus: ‘For it is common with princes, (saith Tacitus) 
to will contradictories. Sunt plerumque regum voluntates vehementes, 
€ inter se contrarie, For it is the solecisme of power, to thinke to 


320 NOTES. 


command the end, and yet not to endure the meane.’ [9] Tacitus, 
Hist. i. 50; quoted again in Essay xi. p. 42. [11] Pindar, Olym. i. 55. 
of Tantalus: xaraméWoar péyav OdABov ove éduvacbyn. [14] Ps. Ixii. 10. 
[17] Arist. Rhet. ii. 12-17. [28] it is in order: i.e. the order is. 

P, 208. [1] politiques: ‘in politiques,’ ed. 1605, corrected in Errata . 
and in edd. 1629, 1633. [2] Solon, Fr. i. 8 (ed. Gaisford), referring to 
Pisistratus. See Bacon’s Apoph. 232, and Cicero, Pro Cluentio, 49. 
Solon’s lines.are : 

°EE dvéuov 5 Oddacoa rapdcoera, hy S€ rs abtiy 
Mz) «uwvn mdvrov éori Sixaorarn. 
*"Avipav 5S é« peyddov médus OAAUTAL K. T. A, 


[12] affections, which is, &c.: for ‘which are, &c.’ in modern usage. It 
is not necessary to suppose that this is a mistake of Bacon’s. The sub- 
stantive verb is frequently found to agree with the subject which follows 
it, as in Chaucer (Cant. Tales, 1. 14625), ‘Peter! i¢ am I, See also 
p. 226, 1, 22, and Shakespeare, Rich. II. v. 5. 55, 56: 
‘Now sir, the sound that tells what hour it is 
Are clamorous groans.’ 


[13] Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 1-11, Comp. Eth. Nic. ii. 4. 1. [19] For the 
repetition of the negative see note on p. 142, 1. 23. [29] Plutarch and 
Seneca wrote on Anger, and Plutarch has treatises of comfort upon 
adverse accidents (addressed to his wife and to Apollonius), and of 
tenderness of countenance (wep) Svowmias) or bashfulness. Seneca too 
has a dialogue de Consolatione. [30] of comfort upon adverse accidents: 
Omitted in Lat. 

P. 209. [2] and how again contained from act and further degree: 
i.e. how restrained from leading to actions and reaching a greater 
height. [4] how they gather and fortify: Omitted in the Latin. [13] 
premium and pena: The doctrine of rewards and punishments is familiar 
to the readers of Butler’s Analogy. [25] these as they have determinate 
use in moralities: Lat. hee enim sunt illa que regnant in moralibus, 
From which Mr. Spedding conjectures we should read ‘these are they 
&c.’ [27] described: Perhaps we should read ‘ prescribed.’ [28] serve: 
‘seeme’ in ed. 1605, corrected in Errata. [30] insist: ‘visit’ in ed. 
1605, corrected in Errata and in edd. 1629, 1633. 

P. 210. [1] Aristotle, Eth. Nic. ii. 1. 2. [22] as there is: We should 
now say, ‘as there are,’ but Bacon uses ‘there is’ like the Fr. i y a. 
[26] diffident: ‘different’ in ed. 1605, corrected in Errata and in edd. 
1629, 1633. [29] in the end: ‘on the end’ in ed. 1605, corrected in 
Errata. 

P. 211. [3] the knots and stonds of the mind: Lat. nodos obicesque 
animi. [4] the more easy: ‘the more easily’ in ed. 1605, corrected in 
Errata and edd, of 1629, 1633. Mr. Spedding says, ‘Possibly Bacon 


BOOK II, 321 


wrote run more easily. The translation has facile et placide delabentur.’ 
[5] Aristotle, Eth. Nic. ii. 9.5. [9g] bending: So ed. 1633; ‘ bynding’ 
ed. 1605 ; ‘binding’ ed. 1629, [24] St. Augustine (Confess. i. 16) calls 
poetry vinum erroris ab ebriis doctoribus propinatum, and Jerome, in one 
of his letters to Damasus (Ep. 146), says, Demonum cibus est carmina 
poetarum. Both these quotations are combined in one passage by Cor- 
nelius Agrippa, De Incert. &c. c. 4, and hence Bacon may have com- 
pounded the phrase vinum demonum, which he uses again in Essay i. 
p. 2: ‘One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesie vinum demo- 
num; because it filleth the imagination, and yet it is, but with the 
shadow of a lie.’ [28] Aristotle, Eth. Nic. i. 3.5. Mr. Ellis, in his 
note on the corresponding passage of the De Augmentis, points out 
that ‘ Aristotle, however, speaks not of moral but of political philosophy. 
It is interesting to observe that the error of the text, which occurs also 
in the Advancement of Learning, has been followed by Shakespeare in 
Troilus and Cressida : 
“ Not much 
Unlike young men, whom Aristotle thought 
Unfit.to hear moral philosophy.” 


See Hector’s speech in the second scene of the second act.’ Mr. Sped- 
ding has shown that the same error is committed by Virgilio Malvezzi 
in his Discorsi sopra Cornelio Tacito. 

P. 212. [12] Seneca, Herc. Furens, 251. [13] Juvenal, Sat. xiii. 105, 
[16] Machiavelli, Disc. i. 10. [24] incompatible: Lat. insociabiles, 
[Ib.] Cicero, Pro Murzena, xxix. 61. [31] See p. 209, 1. 22-25. 

P. 213. [15] as was said: See p, 203. 

P. 214. [8] Which state of mind: i.e. With regard to, or concerning 
which state of mind, [10] Aristotle, Eth, Nic. vii. 1.1. [17] Pliny, 
Paneg. c. 74. Pro nobis ipsis quidem hac fuit summa votorum, ut nos sic 
amarent dii quomodo tu, This panegyric was not a funeral oration, as 
Bacon describes it, but was delivered at the beginning of the reign of 
Trajan, who survived Pliny. [25] Col. iii. 14. [26] as: Omitted in ed. 
1605, but inserted in the Errata and edd. 1629, 1633. [27] Menander: 
‘Not Menander, but Anaxandrides.’ (Ellis.) See Meineke Graec, Com. 
Frag. ili, 199: 
épws cogiarod yiyverar di5doKados 
cKaod TOAD Kpeittav mpds Tov dvOpwmav Bioy. 


Compare Dryden’s Cymon and Iphigenia, 

P. 215. [5] Xenophon, Symp. i. 10, [11] See Nov. Org. praef. [12] 
transgressed: Lat. prevaricati sunt, [13] Is. xiv. 14. [14] Gen. iii. 5. 
[18] Matt. v. 44; Luke vi. 27, 28. [24] Ps. cxlv. 9. [27] concerning 
the culture and regiment of the mind: Lat. de Georgicis animi. (33) 
Demosthenes, De Falsa Legatione, p. 355. This story is omitted in the 

Y 


322 NOTES. 


Latin, and is made use of by Bacon (Nov. Org. i. 123) for illustrating 
the difference between his own philosophy, which he compares to wine, 
and the philosophy which was current in his time. 

P, 216. [4] Virg. En. vi. 894. [18] See p. 133, 1. 21. [19] inquired 
in rational and moral knowledges: i.e. investigated with reference to 
what is known in reason and morals. Lat. si juxta moralis doctrine scita 
illud contemplemur, [22] agile: ‘agill’ in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. The 
same spelling is found in the early quartos of Shakespeare, Romeo and 
Juliet, ili, 1.162. [24] easy: ‘easilye’ in ed. 1605; ‘easie,’ edd. 1629, 
1633. [28, 29] which have neither strength of honesty, nor substance 
of sufficiency: Lat. illis tamen non suppetit aut probitas animi ut velint aut 
vires ut possint recte agere, ‘Sufficiency’ is here used in the sense of 
‘capacity,’ ‘ability,’ as in 2 Cor. iii, 5, ix. 8, and in Bacon, Essay lv. 
p. 221; ‘such as have great places under princes, and execute their places 
with sufficiency,’ [30] that can neither become themselves: i.e. who 
can neither act gracefully. Lat. gui tamen nec sibi ipsis ornamento sunt. 
[31] And those in whom this conjunction is found, he adds in the Latin, 
are men endued with a kind of stoic gloom and insensibility, who do the 
deeds of virtue but enjoy none of its pleasures. [33] reduced to stupid: 
i.e. rendered stupid. Compare ‘leaveth it for suspect,’ p. 81,112. Mr. 
Kitchin suggests stupidity or stupor. 

P. 217. [3] De Augm. viii. 1. [6] Plutarch, Cato, 8. [7] a man 
were better: i.e. might better, which is the reading of some modern 
editions. [8,9] if you could get but some few go right: i.e. to go 
right. See Abbott’s Shakespeare Grammar, § 349. [16] 2 Chron. xx. 33, 
of the kingdom of Judah under Jehoshaphat. The early editions have 
dixerat for direxerat, but the latter is the correct reading of the De Aug- 
mentis. [20] Gen. xl. [23, 24] These respects... knowledge: Instead 
of this sentence the Latin has, Hoc denique Ethicam gravat, Politica suc- 
currit, [28] comfort, use, and protection: The Latin explains these as 
comfort against solitude, assistance in business, and protection against 
injuries, 

P. 218. [2] In the Latin; the value of conversation is compared to 
that of action in oratory. [3] Ovid, De Arte Amat. ii, 312. [6] 
Quintus Cicero, in his book De Petitione Consulatus (xi. 44), says: 
Curaque ut aditus ad te diurni nocturnique pateant; neque solum foribus 
edium tuarum sed etiam vultu ac fronte que est animi janua; que st 
significat voluntatem abditam esse ac retrusam, parvi refert patere ostium. 
[10] Cicero, Ep, ad Att. ix. 12. [11] the war depending: Lat. bello 
adhuc fervente, [17] Livy, xxiii. 12: Si reticeam aut superbus aut ob- 
noxius videar, &c, [23] affectation: ‘affection’ in ed. 1605 ; corrected 
in Errata and edd. 1629, 1633. [Ib.] Quid deformius, &c. See An- 
titheta, xxxiv. [31] form: ‘howr’ in ed. 1605, corrected to ‘fourme’ 
in Errata: ‘forme’ is the reading of ed. 1629, ‘hour’ of ed. 1633. 


iy 
#: 
i 
a 
# 
. 
a 
ee 
a 
eI 
Bi; 


a a a 


BOOK Ill. 323 


Mr. Spedding reads ‘honor.’ If any conjecture were necessary, 
‘humour’ might be suggested. ([Ib.] in it: ‘in name’ ed. 1605, 
corrected in Errata and ed. 1629. Mr. Spedding conjectures that 
the true reading may be ‘in the same,’ though he prints ‘in name’ 
doubtfully. 

P. 219. [6] Eccl. xi. 4, quoted again in Essay lii., ‘Of Ceremonies 
and Respects’ (p. 212): ‘Salomon saith; He that considereth the wind, 
shall not sow, and he that looketh to the clouds, shall not reape. A wise 
man will make more opportunities then he findes. Mens behaviour 
should be like their apparell, not too strait, or point device, but free 
for exercise or motion.’ The whole Essay should be read in connexion 
with this passage. [15] hath been elegantly handled: A MS. note in 
the margin of a copy of the Advancement of Learning (ed. 1605) in the 
Cambridge Univ. Library is ‘per il Guazzo, that is, Stefano Guazzo, 
who wrote La Civil Conversatione in four books, The first three 
books were translated into English by George Pettie in 1581. Another 
edition, including a translation of the fourth book by B. Young, ap- 
peared in 1586. [20, 21] Comp. Advice to the Earl of Rutland on his 
travels: ‘An authority of an English proverb, made in despite of 
learning, that the greatest clerks are not the wisest men.’ (Spedding’s 
Letters and Life of Bacon, ii. 12.) See Montaigne, Ess. i. 24, and 
a saying of Heraclitus of Ephesus, woAvpadin véov od dddoxe (Diog. 
Laert. ix. 1). [24] for wisdom of behaviour: i.e. with regard to 
wisdom of behaviour. [30] except some few scattered advertisements : 
Lat. preter pauca quedam monita civilia in fasciculum unum vel alterum 
collecta. [33] as the other: i.e. as of the others. Lat. sicut de ceteris, 
[Ib.] with mean (i.e. moderate) experience: Lat. aliquo experientia 
manipulo instructi, 

P. 220. [2] and outshoot them in their own bow: Lat. et proprio 
illorum (quod dicitur) arcu ust magis e longinguo ferirent. Bacon uses 
the same expression in Essay lv. p. 220. [9] Cicero, De Orat. iii. 33. 
§§ 133,134. ([Ib.] it was then in use: i.e. in the times of which he 
was writing, a little before his own. Lat. paulo ante sua secula. [12] 
in the Place: Lat. in foro. [20] cases: So in ed. 1605; ‘causes’ in 
ed, 1629, 1633. Lat. im casibus particularibus. [21] cases: ‘causes’ 
in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. Lat. casuum consimilium. Perhaps we 
should read ‘cases’ in both instances. [22] Q. Cicero: ‘Q.’ is omitted 
in ed. 1605, but added in the Errata, and in edd. 1629, 1633. [24] 
Mr. Ellis adds Frontinus’s tract De Agua@ductibus. [31] 1 Kings 
iv. 29. 

Riek [3] The number of examples in the De Augmentis is in- 
creased to thirty-four, which are arranged in a different order and 
discussed at much greater length. The 14th and 21st in the Advance- 
ment are omitted altogether in the De Augmentis, The quotations, 

Y 2 


324 NOTES. 


except that on p. 224, 1.1, are from the Vulgate, which will be found 
in many cases to differ materially from the English Version. [4] 
Eccl. vii. 21. [6] commended: ‘concluded’ in ed. 1605, corrected 
in Errata.. [8] Plutarch, Pomp. 20; Sert. 27. [10] Prov. xxix. 9. 
[17] Prov. xxix. 21. [21] Prov. xxii. 29. [26] Eccl. iv. 15. [28] 
Plutarch, Pomp. xiv. 2; Tacitus, Ann. vi. 46. Quoted again in Essay 
xxvii. p. 108: ‘For when he had carried the consulship for a frend 
of his, against the pursuit of Sylla, and that Sylla did a little resent 
thereat, and began to speake great, Pompey turned upon him againe, 
and in effect bad him be quiet; For that more men adored the sunne 
rising, then the sunne setting. [31] Eccl. x. 4. : 

P. 222. [4] Eccl. ix. 14, 15. [Ib.] et pauci: ‘et? is omitted in ed. 
1608. [5] vallavit: the true reading, but vadavit is in the old editions 
and in the De Augmentis. [9] corruption: So in edd. 1629, 1633: 
‘corruptions’ in ed. 1605. [11] Prov. xv. 1. [14] Prov. xv. 19. 
[16] deferred: ‘differred’ in ed. 1605. [19] Eccl. vii. 8. [20] about 
prefaces and inducements: Lat. de sermonum suorum aditu atque in- 
gressu. [23] Prov. xxviii. 21. [25] Compare Essay xi. p. 42: ‘As 
for facilitie; it is worse then bribery. For bribes come but now 
and then; but if importunitie, or idle respects lead a man, he shall 
never be without. As Salomon saith; To respect persons, is not good; 
for such a man will transgresse for a peece of bread” [26] lightly: so 
in ed. 1605; ‘highly’ in edd. 1629, 1633. [28] Prov. xxviii. 3. [32] 
Prov. xxv. 26. Comp. Essay lvi. p. 222: ‘One foule sentence doth 
more hurt, then many foule examples. For these doe but corrupt 
the streame; the other corrupteth the fountaine.’ 

P. 223. [4] Prov. xxviii. 24. Omitted in the Latin. [10] Prov. 
xxii, 24. [15] Prov. xi. 29. [20] Prov. x. 1; quoted again in Essay 
vii. p. 24. [25] Prov. xvii.g. [30] Prov. xiv. 23. [32] aboundeth: 
So in ed. 1605. Compare Shakespeare, Rich. II. ii. 1. 258: 


‘Reproach and dissolution hangeth over him.’ 


P. 224. [1] Prov. xviii. 17. [3] in sort: So in ed. 1605; ‘in such 
sort,’ edd. 1629, 1633. [6] Prov. xviii. 8. Omitted in the Latin. [7] 
Here: ‘there’ in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. [11] Prov. ix. 7. [Ib.] 
sibi: ‘tibi’ in some copies of ed. 1605, [12] generat: ‘gerit’ in ed. 
1605, corrected in Errata. [16] Prov. ix. 9. [21] Prov. xxvii. 19, 
[26] Ovid, De Art. Am. i. 760, [29!—p. 225. [7] led with a desire... 
examples: The Latin has only, dignitate et rei ipsius et authoris longius 
provecti. 

P. 225. [3] more of the eagle: In Mr. Ellis’s copy of Montagu’s ed. 
of Bacon I find the following MS. note: ‘More of the eagle—that is, 
more of a mystical and recondite character. The allusion is to the 
eagle as the symbol of S. John, and to the character of his gospel. 


h 
: 


BOOK Il. 325 


As is known, the four beasts in Ezechiel are taken by S. Jerome to 
typify the 4 evangelists.’ [6] deducements: ‘diducements’ in ed, 1605. 
[13] for fables: Lat. quod ad fabulas. [17] of negotiation and 
occasions: Lat. de negotiis et occasionibus sparsis, [18] See p. 97. 
{28] may: ‘manye’ in ed. 1605, corrected to ‘may’ in the Errata, 
Some copies of ed. 1605 have ‘maye.’ [30] action: ‘gaine’ in ed. 
1605, corrected in Errata and edd. 1629, 1633. Mr. Spedding con- 
jectures aime. . 

P. 226. [3] histories: So all the old editions. We should probably 
read ‘history.’ [5] because it is: The edd. of 1605, 1629, 1633 have 
simply ‘is.’ The reading of the text is from the Errata to ed. 1605. 
Mr. Markby mends the passage thus: ‘so history of lives is the most 
proper for discourse of business, for discourse of business is more con- 
versant in private actions.’ Mr. Spedding prints, ‘so histories of Lives 
is the most proper for discourse of business, as more conversant in 
private actions.’ In the text of ed. 1605 the passage stands thus: 
‘so Histories of Liues is the moste proper for discourse of businesse 
is more conversante in priuate actions.’ [9] great: Mr. Spedding 
conjectures ‘nearer.’ Perhaps ‘greater’ may be the true reading, ed. 
1605 having ‘greate.’ The Latin is, epistole magis in proximo et ad 
vivum negotia solent representare. (12] of this part of civil knowledge, 
touching negotiation: Lat. portionis prime doctrine de negotiis, que tractat 
occasiones sparsas. [14, &c.] Read with this passage Essay xxiii., ‘ Of 
Wisedome for a Mans Selfe’ [22] like ants, which is &c.: For the 
construction compare 1. 4 above, and p. 208, 1.12. Perhaps we should 
read ‘like an ant, which is &c.’ Comp. Ess. xxiii. p. 96:.*An ant 
is a wise creature for it selfe; but it is a shrewd thing, in af orchard, 
or garden.’ [24] Plautus, Trinummus, ii. 2. 82, [26] This proverb 
is usually ascribed to Appius Claudius. See the treatise De Republ. 
Ordin., i. 1, formerly attributed to Sallust. Both this and the following 
quotation are repeated in Essay xl. ‘Of Fortune.’ [27] Livy xxxix. 40. 
[30] Read with this paragraph Essay xl. 

P, 227. [3] Plutarch, Sylla, vi. 5. [7] Ezek. xxix. 3. [8] Hab. i, 
16, [10] The Latin adds de contemptore Deum Mezentio, (11) Virg. 
En. x. 773. [Ib.] missile: ‘inutile’ in ed, 1605, but corrected in 
Errata, [12] The Latin adds another story of Julius Coesar from 
his life by Suetonius, c. 77. [16] Plutarch, Sylla, vi. 5. [18] Plutarch, 
Cesar, c. 38. [19] positions: Lat. sententia. [20] Sapiens dominabitur 
astris: Mr. Ellis says, ‘This sentence is ascribed to Ptolemy by 
Cognatus.’ Compare Albumazar, i. 7: 

‘Indeed, th’ Egyptian Ptolomy the wise 
Pronounc'd it as an oracle of truth, sapiens dominabitur astris.’ 
[Ib.] Invia virtuti &c.: Ovid, Met. xiv. 113. (29) Suetonius, Octay, 


99. 


326 NOTES, 


P. 228. [13] because pragmatical men, &c.: i.e. in order that, &c. 
[20] the giobe of crystal: See p. 249, 1.9. [32] Lucian, Hermotim. 
20. The story is again alluded to in Essay xlv. p. 180. 

P. 229. [9] Virg. Ain. iv. 423. [20, 21] For an explanation of the 
terms major and minor propositions in a syllogism, see Fowler’s 
Deductive Logic, ch. iii. p. 81. [25] Prov. xx. 5. [31] Nape xal 
pépvac’ amoreiv, dpOpa tadra trav dpevdv, a saying of Epicharmus 
quoted by Cicero, Epist. ad Att. i, 19. 8, and again by Q. Cicero, 
De Petit. Cons. x. 39: ‘quamobrem ’Emxappetoy illud teneto, nervos 
atque artus esse sapientice, non temere credere.’ [32] Comp. Ess. vi. 
p. 20: ‘For the discovery, of a mans selfe, by the tracts of his counten- 
ance, is a great weaknesse, and betraying: by how much, it is many 
times, more marked and beleeved, then a mans words.’ 

P. 230. [3] Juv. ii. 8. [6] Q. Cicero, De Petit. Consul. xi. 44. [8] 
Tacitus, Ann. i. 12. [13] Tacitus, Ann.i. 52. [18] Tacitus, Ann. iv. 
31. [26] This paragraph and the following (‘As for words... ¢ruth’) 
are transposed in the Latin. [28] Livy, xxviii. 42. [29] Mr. Ellis 
quotes the Italian proverb: 


‘Chi mi fa pitt caresse che non suole 
O m’a ingannato, o ingannar mi vuole. 


[32] For small favours, &c.: i.e. As for small favours, &c. 

P. 231. [1] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. 33, Wolf’s Latin translation. 
See Ellis’s note on De Augm. vi. 3 (vol. i. p. 681). Compare The 
Colours of Good and Evil, 10. p. 265 (ed. W. A. Wright): ‘As when 
Demosthenes reprehended the people for harkning to the conditions 


offered by King Phillip, being not honorable nor equall, he saith they 


were but aliments of their sloth and weakenes, which if they were 
taken away, necessitie woulde teach them stronger resolutions.” [2] 
are: See note on p. 126,1.14. [6] Tacitus, Hist. iv. 39. [10] Lat. 
sunt quidem illa (ut de urinis loquuntur medici) meretricia. [16] Tacitus, 
Ann. iv. 52. See Suetonius, Tib. 53. [21] Hor. Ep. i. 18. 38. [27] 
This proverb is again quoted in Essay vi. ‘Of Simulation and Dis- 
simulation, p. 21. [29] As for the knowing of men, &c. This 
paragraph and the following are transposed in the Latin. [30] weak- 
nesses: The reading of ed. 1633; edd. 1605 and 1629 have ‘ weak- 
nesse.’ 

P. 232. [2] or equals: Omitted in the translation. [3] Q. Cicero, 
De Petit. Consul. v. 17, quoted again in Essay lv. p. 220. [10] Lat. 
ubi tanquam ordinarius resederat, [29] Prov. xxv. 3. 

P. 233. [3] Tacitus, Ann. xiv. 57. [4] rimatur: ‘rinacur’ in ed. 
1605, corrected in Errata. [23] Epictetus, Enchir.c.g. [25] In the 
Latin this is more fully expressed: Et hoc volo, atque etiam aliquid quod 
in futurum usui esse possit addiscere, 


Te Sia Rite Re i eae, a Ee. 


k 
4 


BOOK 11, 327 


P. 234. [1] but only: i.e. but, or only. We have an instance of 
the same reduplication in p. 174, 1. 10: ‘For those whose conceits 
are seated in popular opinions, need only but to prove or dispute” [7] 
James i. 23, 24. [14] these... those: The first referring to the nearer, 
the second to the more distant antecedent. [26] Tacitus, Ann. i. 54. 
The Latin quotes the instance of Pericles. [31] by Duke Valentine: 
Lat. a Valentino Borgia, Czesar Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI., 
who was made Duke of the Valentinois. Guicciardini, vi. 3. If 
Bacon had lived now he might have quoted the instance of Talleyrand, 
who began life as an ecclesiastic, and was an Abbé and Bishop of 
Autun before he became the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
the first diplomatist in Europe. 

P. 235. [6] Plutarch, Cesar, c. 3. [12] transferred: ‘transgressed’ 
in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. The Latin has, éranstulit se ad artes militares 
et imperatorias ; ex quibus summum rerum fastigium conscendit. [16] all 
whose friends and followers: The Latin adds, Antonius, Hirtius, Pansa, 
Oppius, Balbus, Dolabella, Pollio, reliqui. [24] Cicero, Epist. ad Att. 
ix. 10, [27] and pressing the fact: Lat. quigue factum in omnibus 
urgeret, 

P. 236. [11] Tacitus, Hist. ii. 80; quoted again in Essay liv., ‘ Of 
Vaine-Glory,’ which may be read in connexion with this paragraph. 
[16] Mr. Ellis suggests that ‘this precept seems taken from the advice 
given by Medius to Alexander’s sycophants.’ See Plutarch, De Adulat. 
et Amico, c. 24. [Ib.] calumniare: ‘calumniari’ in ed. 1605, corrected 
in Errata. It is attributed to Machiavelli in a letter from the Earl 
of Derby to his son (Peck’s Desiderata Curiosa, lib. xi. p. 38, ed. 
1735): Fortiter calumniare, aliquid adherebit. See also Bacon, Works, 
viii. 148. [25] as in military persons: Comp. Ess. liv. p. 217: ‘In 
militar commanders and soldiers, vaine glory is an essentiall point; 
for as iron sharpens iron, so by glory one courage’ sharpneth another.’ 
[28] taxing, i.e. censuring. [29] gracing, i. e. praising, complimenting. 
[31] Comp. Ess. liv. p. 217: ‘And those that are of solide and sober 
natures, have more of the ballast, then of the saile.’ 

P. 237. [8] satiety: Spelt ‘saciety’ in ed. 1605. [11] Rhetor. ad 
Heren. iv. 4, quoted by Mr. Ellis: Videte ne insueti rerum majorum 
videamini, si vos parva res sicuti magna delectat. [21] their wants, 
i.e. their defects. [26] Ovid, Ars Amand. ii. 662. 

P. 238. [7] that passeth this other, i.e. in impudence. [23] rescus- 
sing: So edd. 1605 and 1629; ed. 1633 has the modern form ‘ rescuing.’ 
See Glossary. [25] by somewhat in their person or fortune: The 
Latin illustrates this by instances of deformed persons, bastards, and 
men branded with some mark of disgrace. Comp. Essay xliv., ‘ Of 
Deformity,’ p. 178: ‘Whosoever hath anything fixed in his person, 
that doth enduce contempt, hath also a perpetuall spurre in himselfe, 


328 NOTES. 


to rescue and deliver himself from scorne: therefore all deformed 
persons are extreme bold.’ [27] Paragraphs 32-38 are arranged in 
the Latin in the following order; 35, 32, 36, 37, 33, 34, 38- [31] 
Cicero, Brut. 95; of the ‘fluent and luxuriant speech’ of Hortensius. 
See Essay xlii. p. 175- [33] Livy xxxix. 40; quoted again in 
Essay xl. 

P. 239. [8] Machiavelli, Disc. sopra Livio, iii. 9. [14] Demosthenes, 
1 Phil. § 46. [21] See Aulus Gellius, i. 19; Bacon, Essay xxi. p. 89; 
Colours of Good and Evil, p. 264. [30] Lucan, viii. 485. 

P. 240. [2] from foil: i.e. from being foiled or repulsed. Lat. a 
repulsa. [3] please the most: i.e. the majority of people. Lat. e¢ 
pauciores offendemus. [10] Demosthenes, 1 Phil. § 45. [18] unperfect : 
‘vnperfite’ in ed. 1605. [22] Prov. xxx. 19. [27] Comp. Essay vi. 
p- 19: ‘Certainly the ablest men, that ever were, have had all an 
opennesse, and francknesse of dealing; and a name of certainty, and 
veracity; but then they were like horses, well mannaged; for they 
could tell passing well, when to stop, or turne.’ Sir H. L. Bulwer 


(Historical Characters, i. 400) says of Talleyrand: ‘ What struck the 


vulgar, and many, indeed, above the vulgar, who did not remember 
that the really crafty man disguises his craft, was the plain, open, 
and straightforward way in which he spoke of and dealt with all 
public matters, without any of those mysterious devices which dis- 
tinguish the simpleton who is in the diplomacy from the statesman 
who is a diplomatist.’ [30] Plutarch, Sylla, 38. See p. 194. [32] 
Plutarch, Cees. xi. 2. 

P. 241. [2] Cicero, Ep. ad Att. x. 4.§ 2. [6] darling: Spelt ‘dear- 
ling’ in ed. 1605. [7] Cicero, Ep. ad Att. xvi. 15. § 3. [10] Czesar’s: 
See p. 55,1. 32. [Ib.] and men laughed: So in ed. 1605; edd. 1629, 
1633 have ‘whereat many men laughed.’ [12] the like: So ed. 1605 ; 
‘the like to this’ edd. 1629, 1633. [Ib.] thought: So edd. 1629, 1633; 
‘though’ ed. 1605. [16] Tacitus, Hist. ii. 38. [17] Sallust apud 
Sueton. De Claris Gram. c. 15. [27] casual: Lat. casibus obnoxia. 
[30] Compare Essay vi. p. 18: ‘Dissimulation is but a faint kind 
of policy, or wisdome; for it asketh a strong wit, and a strong heart, 
to know when to tell truth, and to doe it. Therfore it is the 
weaker sort of politicks, that are the great dissemblers.’ [32] Tacitus, 
Ann. v. I. 

P. 242. [10] but not of proportions and comparison, i.e. of the 
relative values of things. Lat. de pretiis vero imperitissime. [22] Czesar, 
Bell. Civ. i. 30. Compare Essay xxvi. p. 104: ‘So certainly, there 
are in point of wisdome, and sufficiency, that doe nothing or little, 
very solemnly; Magno conatu nugas.’ [31] In the second place: ‘the’ 
is omitted in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. 

P. 243. [2] Compare Essay xxix. p. 121, where Machiavelli is again 


ini pane Raa 


BOOK IW, 329 


referred to (Disc. sopra Liv. ii, 10), Nervos belli pecuniam infinitam ; 
_ Cicero, Phil. v. 2. 5. In Diog. Laert. iv. 48, rdv tAodrov veipa mparypd- 
raw is quoted as a saying of Bion’s. See also Plutarch, Cleom. 27. 
[6] Lucian, Charon, 10-12. [13] In the third place: ‘the’ is omitted 
in edd. 1605, 1629. [14, 15] Compare Shakespeare, Julius Cesar, 
iv. 3. 218-221, [16] it being extreme hard to play an after game 
of reputation: Lat. Ardua enim res, famam pracipitantem retrovertere. 
[26] Virgil, Ecl. ix. 66. [29] Virgil, Georg. iii. 284, 

P. 244. [1] fortune: So in ed. 1605; ‘fortunes’ in edd. 1629, 1633. 
[5] Comp. pp. 211, 213. [6,7] and bend not...intendeth: Omitted 
in the Latin. [17-19] So that he should exact...and not to stand 
&c.: This mixed construction is of very common occurrence, It 
should be, of course, either ‘So that he should exact...and not stand 
&c.,’ or ‘So that he ought to exact...and not to stand &c.’ See note 
on p. 88, ll. 7-9. [18] an account: So in ed. 1605; ‘an’ is omitted in 
edd. 1629, 1633. [26] Matt. xxiii. 23; Luke xi. 42. [30]—p. 245. 
[2] Omitted in the Latin. The story is told again in the Colours 
of Good and Evil, 4. 

P. 245. [5] Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 13. § 4; Cicero, De Amic. 16. 
Bacon, Apoph. 182. [8] troublesome spleens: Lat. molestis et turbidis 
odiis, [26] ‘The allusion is probably to Macchiavelli’s Principe, and 
to the Cortigiano of Castiglione.’ (Ellis.) 

P. 246. [4] Machiavelli, Il Principe, 17, 18. [12] Cic. Pro Rege 
Deiot. ix. 25: Pereant amici, &c. [16] *Pope Alexander... was 
desirous to trouble the waters in Italy, that he might fish the better.’ 
Hist. of Hen. VII. (Works, vi. 113). [17] Cic. Pro Mur. xxv. 51. 
[19] Plutarch, Lys. 8. [25] Bacon had entered this maxim in his 
Promus or Commonplace book, ‘In actions as in wayes the neerest 
y° fowlest’ (Works, vii. 209). [31] Eccl. ii. 11. 

P. 247. [5] Virg. /En. ix. 252. [8] The Latin quotes Cic. Ep. ad 
Att. ix. 12, Atque eum ulciscentur mores sui. [11] Job xv. 35. [20] 
Hor. Sat. ii. 2. 79. [23] Aurelius Victor, Epit. i. 28. [24] Spartianus, 
Vit. Sept. Sev. c. 18; Bacon, Apoph. 98. [33] Charles V., after 
raising the siege of Metz, is reported to have said, ‘ Fortune, I now 
perceive, resembles other females, and chooses to confer her favours 
on young men, while she turns her back on those who are advanced 
in years. Robertson, Charles V. ch. ix. 

P. 248. [6] Matt. vi. 33. [10] sands: ‘same’ in ed. 1605, corrected 
in Errata and edd. 1629, 1633. Mr. Spedding reads ‘sand.’ The 
reference of course is to Matt. vii. 24, 27. [11] The dying exclamation 
of Brutus, according to Dio Cassius, xlvii. 49. The Latin is a trans- 
lation of part of two Greek iambics: 

@ rAjpov dperi Adyos dp’ Had’, ey 5é ce 
ws épyov joxovy, av 8° dp’ édovAeves rvxp. 


330 NOTES. 


See Plut. De Superstitione, 1, where part is quoted. [16] In De Augm. 
vill. 3 the subject is treated quite differently. The remarks on the 
secret part of government are entirely omitted, and the apology to 
the king for passing over the subject in silence is transferred to the 
beginning of the book. The remainder of the chapter is taken up 
with two dissertations, the one, De Proferendis Finibus Imperii, which 
corresponds with Essay xxix. ‘Of the True Greatnesse of Kingdomes 
and Estates;’ the other, De Justitia Universali. The former of these 
is said to have been translated into Latin by Hobbes of Malmesbury. 
[22] Virg. En. vi. 726. [33] futility: ‘facilitie’ in ed. 1605, corrected 
to ‘futilitie’ in Errata. The correction is adopted in edd. 1629, 1633. 
[Ib.] Sisyphus and Tantalus: See Hom. Od. xi. 582-600; Cic. Tusc. 
Disp. i. 5. 10; iv. 16. 35. Sisyphus was punished because he had 
betrayed the designs of the gods (Servius on Virg. En. vi. 616), 
Tantalus divulged the secrets of Zeus. 

P. 249. [9] Rev. iv. 6. [18-25] Transferred in the De Augm. to 
the beginning of the book. [24] The story is told of Zeno; Plut. De 
Garrulitate; Diog. Laert. vii. 24. 

P. 250. [16] Comp. Ess. lvi. p. 227: ‘For many times, the things 
deduced to judgement, may bee meum and tuum, when the reason and 
consequence thereof may trench to point of estate: I call matter of 
estate, not onely the parts of soveraigntie, but whatsoever introduceth 
any great alteration, or dangerous president; or concerneth manifestly 
any great portion of people.’ 

P. 251. [3, 4] The same in all probability as the dissertation in the 
De Augm., ‘De justitia universali.. [6] This paragraph is omitted in 
the Latin. [9] Virg. En. iv. 647. [19] Virg. Ecl. ii. 27. 

P. 252. [15] only if: i.e. if only. [24] Made by Themistocles to 
Eurybiades: Plut. Reg. et Imper. Apoph. [25] so they observe: i.e. 
provided that they observe. [31] Sabbath: ‘Sabaoth’ in ed. 1605, 
— corrected in edd. 1629, 1633. This confusion between Sabaoth (‘hosts’) 
and Sabbath (‘rest’) is by no means uncommon, though in p. IIo, 
1. 32, ‘Sabbath’ is printed correctly in ed. 1605. Even as late as the 
middle of the last century Dr. Johnson, in the first edition of his 
Dictionary, treated the two words as synonymous. Other examples 
are found in Spenser (F. Q. viii. 2): 


‘But thenceforth all shall rest eternally 
With him that is the God of Sabaoth hight: 
O! that great Sabaoth God, grant me that Sabaoth’s sight.’ 


And the second quarto of Shakespeare’s Mer. of Ven. iv. 1. 36, has 
‘Sabaoth’ for ‘ Sabbath,’ which is the reading of the first quarto and of 
the folios. 

P. 253. [1] De Augm. ix. 1. [9] Rom. iv. 22. [10] Gen. xviii. 12. 


ipl nei ee eee ee 


BOOK I. 331 


[12] of: So in ed, 1605; omitted in edd. 1629, 1633. [18] 1 Cor. xiii. 
12. [23] Ps. xix. 1. [25] Isa. viii. 20. [29] Matt. v. 44, 45. [32] it 
ought to be applauded: i.e. this applause ought to be given. [Ib.] 
Virg. En. i. 328. 

P. 254. [4] Ovid, Met. x. 330. [5] Plutarch (Alex. 65) calls him 
Dandamis, Strabo (xv. 64) Mandanis. [28] Comp. with this paragraph 
Hooker, Eccl. Pol. i. 8, 9; iii. 8.9. [31] Rom. xii. 1. 

P. 255. [1] non-significants and surd characters: See p. 169, in the 
paragraph on ciphers. [22] grift: ‘grifte’ in edd. 1605, 1629; ‘graft’ 
in ed. 1633. 

P. 256. [20] This and the three following paragraphs are consider- 
ably modified in the Latin. [31] John iii. 4. 

P. 257. [1] John xvi. 17. [5, 6] an opiate to stay and bridle, &c. 
The metaphor is better preserved in the Latin: utpote que futura sit 
instar opiate cujusdam medicine, que non modo speculationum quibus 
schola interdum laborat inania consopiat, verum etiam controversiarum 
furores que in ecclesia tumultus cient nonnihil mitiget. (13) if men: ‘ of 
men’ in ed. 1605, corrected in Errata. [14] 1 Cor. vii. 12. [15] 1 Cor. 
vii. 40. [17] 1 Cor. vii. 10. [21] Prov. xxvi. 2. 

P. 258. [3] further: Some copies of ed. 1605 have ‘sounder,’ others 
‘furder” [7] With this paragraph compare Ess. iii. ‘Of Unity in 
Religion,’ and the notes upon it. [15] Ex. ii. 11, 12. [17] Ex. ii. 13; 
Acts vii. 26. [22] Matt. xii. 30. [24] Luke ix. 50. [25] John 
xix. 23. [26] garment: Some copies of ed. 1605 have ‘ garmente,’ 
others ‘gouernment. [27] Ps. xlv. 10 (Prayer Book version). [29] 
Matt, xiii. 29. 

P, 259. [3] In the Latin Bacon explains that he treats here only of 
the method, not of the authority, of interpretation, which is founded 
upon the consent of the church. (6] John iv. 13,14. [11-13] The 
former... corrupt: Omitted in the Latin. [18] Paragraphs 11-13 
are omitted in the Latin. [30] the Master of the Sentences: Peter 
Lombard, bishop of Paris; so called from his Sum of Theology, 
in four books, entitled ‘The Sentences.’ [33] ‘Tribonianus, was 
successively quzestor, consul, and master of the offices to Justinian... 
In av. 530 Tribonianus, then queestor, was commissioned with sixteen 
others to compile the Digest or Pandect.’ (Smith’s Dict. of Biog.) 

P. 260. [12] the weaker do you conclude: i. e. the weaker are your 
conclusions. [22] Rom. xi. 33. [24] 1 Cor. xiii. 9. [33] in the Latin 
the substance of paragraphs 14 and 15 is much condensed. 

P. 261. [2] curious: So some copies of ed. 1605 ; others have ‘ruinous.’ 
[12] From the Vulgate of Prov. xxv. 27. [14] Ex. xxxiii. 20. [Ib.] 
Prov. viii. 27. [16] John ii. 25. [18] Acts xv. 18. [20] two of these : 
So ed. 1605; ‘of these two’ in edd. 1629, 1633. [24] 1 Cor. xiii. 12. 

P. 262. [8] the latter; i.e. the philosophical exposition, [9] The 


332 NOTES. 


Latin adds that it had its beginning with the Rabbins and Cabbalists. 
See p. 263. [16] Mark xiii. 31. [19] Comp. Luke xxiv. 5. [28] The 
authority of one who is treating of a different ~ubject is of small 
weight, i.e. in regard to those things which he only mentions in- 
cidentally. : 

P. 263. [5] Matt. xxiv. 35. Noli altum sapere was the motto of the 
printer Robert Stephens. [12] See, for an example of answers of this 
kind, Luke ix. 47, 48. 

P. 264. [20-32] For...times: Omitted in the Latin. In its place 
is substituted an application to theology of the illustration he makes 
use of in Ess. lvi. p. 223, in reference to the administration of justice: 
‘And where the wine-presse is hard wrought, it yeelds a harsh wine, 
that tastes of the grape-stone.” The following is Mr. Spedding’s trans- 
lation of the passage in the De Augm.: ‘Certainly as we find it in 
wines, that those which flow freely from the first treading of the 
grape are sweeter than those which are squeezed out by the wine- 
press, because the latter taste somewhat of the stone and the rind; 
so are those doctrines most wholesome and sweet which ooze out of 
the Scriptures when gently crushed, and are not forced into controversies 
and common places,’ [21] Livy ix. 19. [26] island: So edd. 1629, 
1633; ‘islands’ in ed. 1605. [Ib.] Brittany: ‘Brittanie’ in ed. 1605. 
[33] Paragraphs 19-25 (The matter...sowing of tares) are omitted in 
the Latin. 

P. 265. [8] Comp. Ess. iii. p. 8: ‘For you may imagine, what kinde 
of faith theirs was, when the chiecfe doctors, and fathers of their church, 
were the poets. But the true God hath this attribute, that he is a 
jealous God; and therefore, his worship and religion will endure no 
mixture, nor partner.’ 

P. 266. [1] privately: So edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. Mr. Spedding, with 
great probability, reads ‘privatively.’ [20] thought, word, or act: Comp. 
Plato, Protag. i. 348 D. [32] man: So edd. 1629, 1633; ‘mans’ in ed, 
1605. 

P. 267. [2] John iv. 23, 24, [Ib.] Hosea xiv. 2. [15] privative: 
‘ primitive’ in ed. 1605, corrected in Errata and edd. 1629, 1633. [22] 
witchcraft is the height of idolatry: See King James’s treatise on 
Demonology, iii. 6: ‘it is the highest point of Idolatry.” [26] 1 Sam. 
XV. 23. 

P. 268. [23] question: i.e. the raising of doubts, which he describes 
just before as ‘litigious arguments.’ [26] See Lev. i. 8, 12, &c. 


gi 
es 
ES 


GLOSSARY. 


A redundant. ‘Ina readiness:’ p. 155, 1. 25. 

Abate, v. 4. To beat down, lower, depress: p. 12,1. 5. Compare Shake- 
speare, Coriolanus, iii. 3. 132: 

‘ Till at length 
Your ignorance . . . . - 
© « « « « deliver you as most 
A bated captives to some nation 
That won you without blows.’ 

Abstracted, adj. Abstract: p. 114, |. 8. 

Abuse, v. ¢. To deceive: p. 159, |. 24; p. 242, 1. 23. Compare Shake- 
speare, Tempest, v. i. 112: 

‘Whether thou be’st he or no, 
Or some enchanted trifle to abuse me, 
As late I have been, I not know.’ 

Abuse, sb. Deception: p. 224, 1. 5. 

Abused, p. p. Deceived: p. 66, |. 31; p. 235, 1. 25. 

Accent, sb. Emphasis: p.67, 1.17. Compare Shakespeare, Hamlet, ii. a. 
489: ‘ Well spoken, with good accent and good discretion.’ 

Accepted of. Accepted: p. 5,1. 12. 

Accept of, v. ¢. To accept, admit: p. 67, 1. 23. 

Acception, sb. Acceptation, meaning: p. 111, 1. 22; p. 113, 1. 17. 

Accidents, sb. The accidents of a disease are its symptoms: p. 12, |. 28; 
p- 137, 1. 20; p. 145, 1.12; p. 204,1. 10, See Cotgrave (Fr. Dict. ed. 
1632): ‘Symptome: m. A symptome; an affect, passion, or accident 
accompanying a disease.’ Bacon, in a letter to his mother, says: ‘In truth 
I heard Sir John Scidmore often complain, after his quartain left him, that 
he found such a heaviness and swelling, specially under his ribs, that he 
thought he was buried under earth half from the waist, and therefore that 
accident is but incident.” (Works, viii. 300.) 

Accommodate, p. p. Accommodated; p. 138, 1. 25. See consecrate. 

Accomplishments, sb. Ornaments: p. 77, |. 7. 

Accordingly, adv. In accordance therewith: p. 126, 1. 24; Pp. 234, 
1. 29. Compare the phrase in the Litany: ‘that both by their preaching 
and living they may set it forth, and shew it accordingly.’ The word is 
by no means obsolete, but the force of it is often missed. 

According to. Corresponding to, in harmony with: p. 16, L a. 

Accords, sb. Harmonies: p. 52, |. 28. 

Account, v. i. To count, reckon: p. 232, |. 22. 

Accouple, v. ¢, To couple: p. 96, 1. 9. 


334 } GLOSSARY. 


~ 


Accumulate, p. p. Accumulated; the old form of participles derived from 
the Latin: p. 18, 1. 6; p. 65, 1. 20. Comp. Accommodate. 

Accurate, adj. Worked out with care: p. 213, |. 1. 

Accustom, v.i. To use, be accustomed: p. 58, 1.9; p. 77,1. 7. 

Acquaint, v. ¢. To accustom, familiarize: p. 67, 1. 21. Compare Shake- 
speare, Tempest, ii. 2. 41: ‘Misery acquaints a man with strange bed- 
fellows.’ 

Addition, sb. Title: p. 95,1. 20. According to Cowel (Law Dict. s. v.) 
it signifies ‘a title given to a man besides his Christian and surname, 
shewing his estate, degree, mystery, trade, place of dwelling, &c.” Com- 
pare Shakespeare, Coriolanus, i. 9. 66: 

‘Caius Marcius Coriolanus! Bear 
The addition nobly ever!’ 
And Macbeth, i. 3. 106: 
‘He bade me, from him, call thee thane of Cawdor: 
In which addition, hail, most worthy thane !’ 
See also Lear, ii. 2. 26. 

Adeption, sb. An obtaining, acquisition: p. 93, 1. 27. 

Adjacence, sb. Contiguity: p. 120, |. 15. 

Adoptive, adj. Adopted: p. 57, 1.2. ‘Adoptive brethren’ = brothers by 
adoption, 

Advance, v.t. To promote: p. 231, 1. 5. 

Adventive, adj. Coming from without, adventitious: p. 113, 1. 29; 

ePoil ads il 

Advertised, p. p. Informed: p. 68, 1. 4; p. 80, 1. 27. 

Advertisement, sb. Information: p. 100, 1. 16. Notice: p. 219, 1. 31. 

Advise, v.i. To consider: p. 67, 1.31; p. 161, 1. 21. 

Advised, p.p. Deliberate, well considered: p. 100, 1. 22. Compare Shake- 
speare, Merchant of Venice, i, 1. 142: 

‘I shot his fellow of the selfsame flight 
The selfsame way with more advised watch.’ 

Affect, sb. Affection, disposition: p. 131, 1.24. Compare Shakespeare, 
Love’s Labour ’s Lost, i. I. 152: 

‘For every man with his affects is born.’ 

Affectionate, adj. Zealous, devoted, attached: p. 29, 1. 14. Eagerly 

_ desirous, studious: p. 112, 1. 10, Compare Bacon, Hist. of Hen. VIL, 
p. 17 (ed. 1622): ‘So he being truly informed, that the Northerne parts 
were not onely affectionate to the House of Yorke, but particularly had 
been deuoted to King Richard the third.’ 

After, adv. Afterwards: p. 18, 1.9; p. 67, 1. 7. 

Afterward, adv. Afterwards: p. 27, 1.2; p. 127, 1. 33. 

Agreed, p.p. Agreed to, admitted: p. 158, |. 27. 

All, used where now we should use ‘any’: p. 17, ll. 2, 7: p. 56,1. 27. 
Comp. ‘ without all contradiction’ (Heb. vii. 7). 

Allege, v.¢. To quote: p. 88, 1. 30; p. 199, 1. 31. 

All one. The same: p. 30,1. 17; p. 158, 1. 1. 

Allow, v.t. To approve: p. 20, 1.18; p. 111.1. 11. Compare Luke xi, 
48: ‘Truly ye bear witness that ye allow the deeds of your fathers.’ 

Allowance, sb. Approval: p. 24, 1.6. So Shakespeare, Hen, VIII. iii. 2, 
322: ‘ Without the King’s will or the state’s allowance.’ 


muEEEpHict wos 


GLOSSARY. <8 


Allusive, adj. Figurative: p. 102, 1. 22, 28. Todd quotes from South 
(Serm. ii. 276), ‘ The foundation of all parables, is some analogy or simili- 
tude between the tropical or allusive part of the parable, and the thing 
couched under it and intended by it.’ 

Almost, adv. Apparently in the sense of ‘most of all,’ or ‘ generally’: 
p. 163, 1. 11. Bacon uses it in the same way in Essay xliii. p. 176; 
‘Neither is it almost seene, that very beautifull persons, are otherwise of 
great vertue.’ 

Aloft, adv. Upwards: p. 89, 1. 6. 

Ambages, sb, Circuitous ways or methods: p. 111, 1.6; p. 124, 1. 18. 
Compare Bale, Image of both Churches (p. 260, Parker Soc.) ; ‘Evident 
will these secret mysteries be unto him, which are privily hid unto other 
under dark ambages and parables,’ 

Amplification, sb. Exaggeration: p. 3, 1. 17. Shakespeare uses ‘ ampli- 
fied’ in the sense of ‘ exaggerated’ in Coriolanus, v. 2. 16: 

‘His fame unparallel’d, haply, amplified.’ 

Anatomy, sb. A body used for dissection: p. 80, 1. 18; p. 138, ll. 16, 28; 
p- 139, 1. 17. 

Animosity, sb. Courage: p. 133, 1. 12. Cotgrave (Fr. Dict.) gives, 
‘Animosité: f. Animositie, stoutnesse, courage, metall, boldnesse, resolution, 
hardinesse.’ 

Anointment, sb. Anointing: p. 83, 1. 5. 

Answerable, adj. Corresponding: p. 93, 1. 29; p. 162, 1. 9. Compare 
Shakespeare, Taming of the Shrew, ii. 1. 361: 

‘Six score fat oxen standing in my stalls, 
And all things answerable to this portion.’ 

Ant (p. 151, 1. 28), a feminine noun, as in Prov. vi. 6. 

Antistrophe, sb. Literally, that part of a song sung by a chorus of 
dancers when they retraced their steps in the dance. It corresponds to a 
previous ‘strophe.’ Bacon uses it of ‘correspondence’ generally: p. 131, 
1, 22. 

Antiques, sb. Grotesque figures: p. 25, 1. 24. Compare Shakespeare, 
Much Ado, iii. 1. 63: 

‘If black, why, Nature, drawing of an antique, 
Made a foul blot.’ 

Apace, adv. Swiftly: p. 15,1. 8. 

‘Apparently, adv, Openly, manifestly: p. 127, 1. 7. Compare Shake- 
speare, Comedy of Errors, iv. 1. 78: 

‘I would not spare my brother in this case, 
If he should scorn me so apparently.’ 

Application, sb. Appliance: p. a1, 1. 3. Accommodation, adaptation: 
p- 192, 1. 30; p. 204, Il. 6,15, 24. Comp. p. 204, 1. 23, ‘which is 
that properly which we call accommodating or applying.’ See also p. 26, 
1, 25. 

Peas v.i. To accommodate, adapt oneself: p. 204, 1. 26. Used re- 
flexively, p. 24, 1. 10. ‘To apply ones selfe to others, is good: so it 
be with demonstrations that a man doth it upon regard, and not upon 
facilitie.” Essay lii. p. 211, Used transitively in the sense of, to devote 
oneself to: p. 41, Ll. 1. 

Apprompt, v,;, To prompt: p. 156, 1. 32. 


336 GLOSSARY. 


Apt, adj. Fit, suitable: p. 181, 1. 22. Compare Shakespeare, Jul. Ces. 

ii. 2.97: ‘A mock Apt to be render’d.’ 

Arefaction, sb. Drying, the act or state of growing dry: p. 124, |. 14. 
Arrogancy, sb. Arrogance: p. 5, 1.9; p. 88, 1. 22. Compare Shake- 
speare, Hen, VIII. ii. 4.:110: 
‘But your heart 
Is cramm’d with arrogancy, spleen, and pride.’ 
Artificial, adj. Constructed with art, ingenious, skilfully contrived: p. 125, 
1.5. So in Shakespeare, Timon of Athens, i. I. 37: 
‘ Artificial strife 
Lives in these touches, livelier than life.’ 
Artsman, sb. One skilled in the liberal arts: p. 150, 1. 15. 
As=that, in the phrases ‘so as’: p. 4, 1. 4; p. 16, 1. 28, &c. ‘insomuch 

Qs BGO 102,,. SUCH <a OF oe. Oly le 23, 

As. As that: p. 23,1.5. As for instance: p. 26, 1. 15. 

Ask, v.t. To require: p. 85, 1.6. Comp. Essay vi. p. 18; ‘It asketh a 
strong wit, and a strong heart, to know, when to tell truth, and to doe it.’ 

Aspect, sb. The appearance of a planet, which varied with its position 

among the stars: p. 145, 1. 10. Used metaphorically, p. 79, |. 2, with a 

reference to the old astrological belief in the power exercised by the planets 

upon the fate of man. So Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. i. 3. 92: 

‘Whose medicinable eye 
Corrects the ill aspects of planets evil.’ 

So also Essay ix. p. 29. 
Aspersion, sb. Sprinkling; and so, intermixture: p. 47,1. 20; p. 199,1. 6. 
Assure, v.i. To ensure, guarantee: p. 152, 1.21. Used transitively by 

Shakespeare, 3 Hen. VI. iii. 3. 240: 

‘This shall asswre my constant loyalty.’ 
Assured, p.p. Safe, secure: p. 171, l. 18. 
As touching. With respect to: p.8,1. 10. See Matt. xviii. 19. 
Astrolabe, sb. An ancient astronomical instrument for taking the height 
of the stars &c. Chaucer wrote a treatise upon it for the use of ‘little 
Lewis’ his son: p. 80, l. 13. 
Athletic, sb. The art of activity: p. 133, 1. 24. We now use ‘athletics’ 
in the same seuse. 
Attend, used as a transitive verb, p. 153, |. 6. 
Attended, p.p. Accompanied: p. 224, I. 32. 
Attend upon. To accompany: p. 225, ll. 23, 24. 
cpa ae adj. Gifted with authority: p. 253, 1.16. Authenticated: 
P- 34, 1. 27. 
Awake, v. ¢. To awaken, rouse: p. 203, 1. II. 
‘We must awake endeavour for defence.’ 
Shakespeare, K. John, ii. 1. 81. 


BB. 


Backward, adv. Backwards; p. 38, I. 19. 

Baladine, sb. A ballet dancer: p. 165,1.22. Cotgrave (Fr. Dict. ed. 1632) 
gives, ‘ Baladin: m. A common dauncer of galliards, and other stirring, 
or liuely Ayres.’ 

Bare = Bore; past tense of ‘bear’: p. 59, |. Ig. 


GLOSSARY, 337 


Basilisk, sb. A fabulous creature described by Pliny (viii. 33, xxix. 19) asa 
serpent, of which many marvels are told: p. 200, 1. 30, note; p. 262, 1. 32. 

Battle, sb. A body of troops: p. 71,1. 30. ‘ They were more ignoraut 
in ranging and arraying their battailes.’ Essay lviii. p. 237. 

Be, 3 plu. Are: p. 10, 1. 17; p. 23,1. 5; p. 50, L. 23. In the phrase 
“had been to handle’; p. 185, 1. 16. 

Because, conj. In order that: p. 228, 1.13. See Matt. xx. 33, 

Become, used reflexively, p. 216, 1. 30. ‘Can neither become themselves’ 
=can neither act in a graceful or becoming manner.’ 

Beholding, part. Beholden, indebted: p. 104, |. 30. ‘The stage is more 
beholding to love, then the life of man.’ Essay x. p. 36. 

Bent, adj. Crooked, twisted ; and so, sinister: p. 25, l. 2. 

Besides, prep. Beside: p. 12, 1. 32; p. 159, 1. 23. 

Bird-witted, adj. Incapable of fixed attention, volatile: p. 183, 1. 14. 

Blanch, v.¢. To flinch from, avoid: p. 182, 1. 21. ‘Some are never 
without a difference, and commonly by amusing men with a subtilty, 
blanch the matter.’ Essay xxvi. p. 106: 1, 32: 

Blasphemy, sb. In its literal sense of defamation or slander: p. 17, 1. 15. 
Compare the use of ‘ blaspheme’ in Shakespeare, Macbeth, iv. 3. 108: 

‘Since that the truest issue of thy throne 
By his own interdiction stands accursed, 
And does blaspheme his breed,’ 

Blemish, v.¢. ‘To stigmatize: p. 27, |. 28, 

Blow up, v.t. To inflate: p. 7, 1. 20. 

Blown up, p.p. Inflated: p. 39, 1. 25. 

Bond-woman, sb. A female slave: p. 43, 1. 25. 

Borne out, p~.p. Compensated for; p. 19, |. 12. 


' Bounden, p.p. Bound, indebted: p. 268, |. 28. 


Braver, adj. Finer, more beautiful: p. 216, 1. 10. 
‘The Duke of Milan 
And his more braver daughter could control thee.’ 
Shakespeare, Tempest, i. 2. 439. 

Break, v.¢. To train: p. 197, 1. 12. Still used of horses. 

‘Why, then thou canst not break her to the lute?’ 
Shakespeare, Taming of the Shrew, ii. 1. 148. 

Briber, sb. A taker of bribes: p. 222, 1. 25. 

Brittany, sb. Britain: p. 93, 1.14; p. 94, ll. 12, 17; p. 264, 1. 26. In 
the first and last of these passages the word is spelt ‘ Brittanie’ in ed. 
1605. On the other hand, what we call ‘ Brittany ’ is uniformly, I believe, 
called ‘ Britaine’ in Bacon’s Hist. of Hen. VII. 

Broken, p.p. Trained: p. 156, 1. 5. 

Buckle, v.¢, To bend: p. 102, |. 10, 

Buffon, sb. The old spelling of ‘buffoon’: p. 136, 1. 20. Florio (Ital. 
Dict. 1611) has ‘ Buffonare, to ieast or play the buffon.’ 

But only. This expression is found where we should now use one or 
other of the words: p, 234,1. 1. So ‘only but’ is used for ‘but’ or 

- only’: p. 174, 1. 10. Compare Shakespeare, Meas. for Meas. iii. 1. 3: 

‘The miserable have no other medicine 
But only hope.’ 
By how much. In the same proportion as: p. 12, 1.8; p. 129, |. 13. 


Zz 


338 GLOSSARY, 


C. 


Called down, f.p. Cried down, decried; p. 87,1. 11. 

Capable, adj. In the construction ‘ capable to lodge’ instead of ‘ capable 
of lodging’: p. 125, 1. 31. 

Capable of. Able or apt to receive: p. 6,1. 23. Ina passive sense. 

* Abhorred slave, 
Which any print of goodness will not take, 
Being capable of all ill.” Shakespeare, Tempest, i. 2. 353. 

Caption, sb. Deception, fallacy, in argument: p. 159, 1.33. From the 
Lat. captio as used by Cicero, De Fato, xiii. 30, 8c. 

Card, sb. A chart: p. 246, 1. 33. Comp. Essay xviii. p. 72: ‘ Let him carry 
with him also some card or booke describing the country, where he travelleth.’ 

Carefulness, sb, Anxiety: p. 8,1. 24. Comp. Ezek, xii. 18, 19. 

Carnosity, sb. A fleshy excrescence: p. 139, 1. 14. 

Carriage, sb. Baggage: p. 79,1. 29. See Judg. xviii. 21. 

Case, sb. ‘In some case’=in some cases, sometimes: p. 194, I. 8. 

Cast, v.t. To consider, plan: p. 181,1. 26. Comp. Luke i. 29, and Bacon, 
Essay xlv. p. 183: ‘ Cast it also, that you may have roomes, both for 
summer, and winter,’ 

Casual, adj. Uncertain, subject to accident: p. 241, 1. 27. Comp. Colours 
of Good and Evil, p. 248: ‘Sometimes because some things are in kinde 
very casuall, which if they escape, prove excellent,’ Having reference 
to special-cases $-p, 138-1 17, : 

Casualty, sb. Uncertainty, instability: p. 23, 1.13. See Bacon’s Colours 
of Good and Evil, p. 256 (ed. W. A. Wright), ‘this colour will bee 
reprehended or incountred by imputing to all excellencies in compositions 
a kind of povertie or at least a casualty or ieopardy.’ 

Cautel, sb. Deceit: p. 200, 1. 16. 

‘And now no soil nor cautel doth besmirch 

The virtue of his will.” Shakespeare, Hamlet, i. 3. 15. 
‘Cautelle: f. A wile, cautell, sleight; a craftie reach, or fetch, guilefull 
deuise or endeuor; also, craft, subtiltie, trumperie, deceit, cousenage.’ 
Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Cautionary, adj. Full of cautions: p. 196, I. 30. 

Caveat, sb. A caution, warning: p, 22, ll. 9,17; p. 55,1. 7. 

Cavillation, sb. A cavil, objection: p. 33, 1.3; p- 154,112. ‘Cavil- 
lation, A cauill; a wrangling proposition, ouerthwart reason; also, a 
cauilling.’ Cotgrave, Fr. Dict, 

Cease, v. t. To cause to cease: p. 40, 1. 8; p. 56,1. 32. 

Celsitude, sb. Loftiness, height: p. 214, 1.15. ‘Celsitude: f. Celsitude, 
highnesse, excellencie; (tearmes conferred on Princes).’ Cotgrave, Fr. 
Dict. 

Censure, v.#. To judge, give an opinion: p. 84, 1. 23; p. 250, 1. 32. 

‘That I, unworthy body as I am, 
Should censure thus on lovely gentlemen.’ 
Shakespeare, Two Gent. of Ver. i, 2. Ig. 


ri ale mace 


GLOSSARYF. hei 


Censure, sb. An opinion, judgement: p. 5, 1. 18; p. 7, lL 28; P- 49, 
1, 32. ‘The speech of Themistocles the Athenian, which was haughtie 
and arrogant, in taking so much to himselfe, had been a grave and 
wise 20 ggasi and censure, applied at large to others,’ Essay xxix. 
p. 118. 

Ceremonies, sb, Superstitious rites: p. 146, 1. 23. 

‘For he is superstitious grown of late, 
Quite from the main opinion he held once 
Of fantasy, of dreams and ceremonies.’ 
Shakespeare, Julius Cesar, ii. 1, 197. 

Certify, v.t. To give information of: p, 154, 1. 13. 

Challenge, v.¢, Toclaim: p. 11,1.13. Comp, Ex, xxii. 9. 

Challenge, sb. Claim: p. 198, I. 21. 

‘And not of any challenge of desert.’ 
Shakespeare, 1 Hen. VI, v. 4. 153. 

Champain, adj. Level, like a plain: p. 121, 1. 21. 

Charity, sb. Used in the same sense as in 1 Cor. xiii. 1, &c., for the 
Greek dydmn. p. 214, |. 24. 

Ciphering, sb, Writing in cipher: p. 169, 1. 16. 

Circuit of speech. Circumlocution: p. 29, 1. 2. Compare Cotgrave 
(Fr. Dict.): ‘ Circuition de paroles. A circumlocution, paraphrase, great 
circumstance of words ; a going about the bush.’ 

Circumferred, ~.~. Carried round: p. 105, |. 15. 

Civil, adj. Public, popular: p. 146, 1.16. The Latin has quasi populares. 

Civility, sb. Civilization, refinement: p. 19, |. 17. ‘And a man shall 
ever see, that when ages grow to civility and elegancie, men come to build 
stately, sooner then to garden finely.’ Essay xlvi. p. 186. 

Clear, v.¢. To make clear or manifest: p. 17, 1.11. This is the sense 
in which it is understood in the Latin of the De Augmentis, but it appears 
to be used in the present passage in the legal sense ‘ to justify.’ 

Cleave, v.i. To adhere: p. 18, l. 26. 

Climate, sb. Region: p. 48,1.4. ‘Climat: m. A clyme, or Clymate; a 
diuision in the Skie, or Portion of the world, betweene South and North,’ 
Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

The ancient geographers ‘ divided the space comprehended between the 
equator and the pole into thirty parts, which they denominated Climates 
or Inclinations, viz. twenty-four between the equator and polar circle, and 
six between the polar circle and the pole.’ Dict. of Science and Art, ed. 
Brande and Cox. 

Close, sb. A cadence in music: p. 107, |. 33. 

‘The setting sun, and music at the close, 
As the last taste of sweets, is sweetest last.’ 
Shakespeare, Richard II, ii. 1. 12. 
Close, adj. Secret: p. 230, 1. 7. 
‘The close contriver of all harms.’ 
Shakespeare, Macbeth, iii. 5, 7. 
Close, adv. Closely, secretly: p. 234, I. 22. 
‘Stand you thus close, to steal the bishop’s deer?’ 
Shakespeare, 3 Hen. VI, iv. 5. 17. 
Coarctation, sb. Restriction: p. 8, 1. 3. 
Z2 


340 GLOSSARY, 


Cockboat, sb. <A small boat: p. 23, 1. 28. Called a ‘cock’ by Shake- 
speare, Lear iv. 6. 19: 

‘Yond tall anchoring bark 
Diminish’d to her cock.’ 

Cogitations, sb. Thoughts: p. 4,1. 28; p. 70,1. 14, &c. Comp. Dan. 
vii. 28. 

Colliquation, sb. Melting, liquefaction: p. 114, 1. 30. ‘Colliquation: f. 
A colliquation; a consumtion of the radicall humor, or substance of 
the bodie; also, a melting, resoluing, dissoluing.” Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Colour, sb. Pretext: p. 24,1. 26. ‘To give colour,’ p. 238, I. 2. 

Columbine, adj. Dove-like: p. 201, 1. 4. ‘Colombain: m. ine: f, Doue- 
like; of the nature of Doues; of, or belonging to, Doues.’ Cotgrave, 
Fr. Dict. 

Combustion, sb. Heat, feverish excitement: p. 184, 1. 13. 

Comen, p.p. Come: p. 37, |. 3; p. 60, 1. 25; p. 188, 1. 24. So ‘be- 
comen’ for ‘become.’ ‘Sir Robert Clifford (who was now becomen the 
state informer).’ Hist. of Hen, VII. (Works, vi. p. 152). See also 
Overcommen. ‘ 

Comfort, v.¢. To strengthen: p. 77, 1.4. ‘Not contented thus to have 
comforted and assisted Her Majesty’s rebels in England, he procured a 
_rebellion in Ireland.’ Bacon, Observ. on a Libel (Works, viii. 194). 

Comfortable, adj. Strengthening: p. 148, 1. 32. - 

Comforting, sb. Strengthening, a verbal noun: p. 77,1. 14. 

Comical, adj. Comic: p. 226, 1. 25. 

Commanded, p. p. Controlled: p. 141, 1. 33. See p. 140, ll. 29, 30 
Ti. 230; 1320. 

Commandment, sb. Command: p. 48, 1. 32; p. 69, Il. 20, 23, 24, &c 

Commenter, sb. Commentator: p. 42,1. 12. 

Commixed, p.p. Mixed: p. 110, 1. 1. 

‘The smile mocking the sigh, that it would fly 
From so divine a temple, to commix 
With winds that sailors rail at.’ 

Shakespeare, Cymb. iv. 2. 55. 

Commodity, sb. Convenience, advantage: p. 80, I. 16. 

‘Commodity, the bias of the world.’ 
Shakespeare, K. John, ii. 1. 574. 

Commonalty, sb. A corporation: p. 56,1]. 11. Spelt also communalty, 
p. 83, 1. 5. ‘Communauté: £& The comminaltie, or common people; 
.... also, a societie, brothernood, corporation, or companie incorporate.’ 
Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Common place, sb. The subject of a thesis or discussion: p. 19,1. 8. 
‘Some have certaine common places, and theames, wherein they are good, 
and want variety.’ Essay xxxii. p. 136. 

Commutative, adj. Relating to exchange: p. 107, 1. 11. See note. 
Johnson defines ‘ commutative justice’ as ‘that honesty which is exercised 
in traffick ; and which is contrary to fraud in bargains.’ 

Compacted, p.p~. Compact, consolidated: p. 259, l. 19; p. 260, I. Io. 
See Eph. iv. 16. 

Compaction, sb.. The being fastened together or consolidated: p. 260, 1. 8. 

Compass, sb. A pair of compasses: p. 154, l. 25. ‘Compas: m. A 


ee MOT 


GLOSSARY. 341 


compasse; a circle, a round; also, a paire of compasses.’ Cotgrave, 
Fr. Dict. 

Compass, adj. Circuitous: p. 232, 1. 17. 

Compatible, adj. Sympathetic: p. 132, l. 19. ‘Compatible: com. Com- 
patible, concurrable; which can abide or agree together; or indure, or 
beare with, one another,’ Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Complexion, sb. The constitution both of mind and body : p. 12, 1. 27; 
p. 162, 1. 30, Hence it denotes a natural tendency or inclination, 
Comp. Shakespeare, Meas. for Meas. iii. 1. 24: 

‘Thou art not certain; 
For thy complexion shifts to strange effects, 
After the moon.’ 
Compounded, p. p. Compound: p. 134, l. 19. 
Conceit, sb. Conception: p. 20, 1.17; p. 102, 1. 29; p. 174, 1. 9. 
‘Hear me without thine ears, and make reply 
Without a tongue, using conceit alone.’ 
Shakespeare, K. John, iii. 3. 50. 

Conclude, v.¢. To lay down as a conclusion: p. 206, 1. 17. 

Concordance, sb. Agreement, harmony: p. 89, 1. 16; p. 130, 1. 16. 

Concupiscence, sb. Eager desire, lust: p. 133, 1.14. See Rom. vii. 8. 

Concurrent, sb. A rival: p. 235, 1.4. ‘Concurrent: m. A concurrent, 
corriuall, competitor.’ Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Confectionary, sb. One who makes confections or conserves: p. 206, 
1], 22. See x Sam. viii. 13. 

‘But myself, 
Who had the world as my confectionary.’ 
Shakespeare, Timon of Athens, iv. 3. 260. 

Confer, v.i. To consult: p. 66, 1.24. See Gal. i. 16. To contribute: 
p. 102, 1. 6. 

Confidences, sb. Unusual in the plural: p. 227, 1. 13. See Jer. ii. 37. 

Congregate, adj. Collected: p. 130, l. 3. 

Conjugate, adj. United; p. 130, 1. 4. 

Conjugates, sb, Things related to, and so resembling each other: p. 161, 
1, 33. Johnson defines a conjugate as ‘Agreeing in derivation with 
another word, and therefore generally resembling in signification.’ Bacon 
uses it in a wider sense. 

Conjugation, sb. Relation, connexion, combination; p. 89,1. 12; p. 164, 
l. 19; p. 198, 1. 10. 

Conscient, adj. Conscious: p. 227, 1. 30. 

Consecrate, p.p. Consecrated: p. g5, |. 10. 

‘The imperial seat, to virtue consecrate.’ 
Shakespeare, Tit. And, i. 1. 14. 

- Compare accommodate, accumulate, alienate, copulate, corroborate, dedic- 
ate, excommunicate, degenerate, demonstrate, devote, dilute, enumerate, 
illuminate, illustrate, incorporate, palliate, premeditate, &c. 

Consequent, sb. ‘ By consequent’ =in consequence, consequently: p. 134, 
L'a: 

Conserve, v.¢. To preserve: p. 195, I. 4. 

‘Thou art too noble to conserve a life 
In base appliances.’ Shakespeare, Meas. for Meas. iii. 1. 88. 


342 GLOSSARY. 


Considerative, adj. Requiring consideration or reflection: p. 126, 
1. 4. Compare Demonstrative. 

Consist, v.i. To stand firm, subsist, remain settled: p. 145, |. 273 
p. 209, 1. 13; p. 210, 1.2. Comp. Col. i. 17.‘ Consister. ‘To consist, 
be; rest, reside, abide; to settle, stand still, or at a stay.” Cotgrave, 
br ict: 

Consociate, v.t. To associate, unite: p. 72, 1. 32. 

Consort, sb. Fellowship: p. 102, |. 14. 

Constitute, v.i. To establish: p. 130, 1. 9. 

Construe, v.i. To interpret: p. 50, 1. 33; p. 245, 1. 4. 

‘Construe the times to their necessities.’ 
Shakespeare, 2 Hen. IV, iv. 1. 104. 

Contain, v.t. To hold in, as the breath: p. 143, 1. Io. 

Contained, p.p. Restrained: p. 209, 1. 2; p. 261, 1. 22. 

Contemplative, sb. One devoted to contemplation: p. 191, 1. 1. 

Contend, v.i. To strive, endeavour: p. 22, 1. 6. 

Content, sb. The thing contained: p. 6, 1. 13. 

Contentation, sb. Contentment: p. 13,1. 18. 

Contention, sb. Effort, exertion: p. 104, 1. 12; p. 184, 1. 6. 

Contestation, sb. Strife, debate: p. 22,116. ‘ Contestation: f. A con- 
testation ; a protestation, taking, or calling to witnesse; also, a contesting, 
striving, debating, reasoning, brabling about a matter.’ Cotgrave, 
Fr. Dict. 

‘Your wife and brother 
Made wars upon me; and their contestation 
Was theme for you.” Shakespeare, Ant. and Cl. ii. 2. 43. 

Continent, adj. Containing; ‘the cause continent’=the containing 
cause: p. 138, I]. 21. 

Continent, sb. The thing containing: p. 6, 1. 13. 

‘Heart, once be stronger than thy continent, 
Crack thy frail case! | Shakespeare, Ant. and Cl, iv. 14. 40. 

Continue, v.t. ‘To continue his whcle age’=to devote his whole life 
continuously: p. 79, l. 22. 

Continued, p.p. Kept, caused to remain: p. 162, 1. 25. 

Contract, sb. Convention, agreement: p. 167, 12: 

Contrariwise, adv. On the contrary: p. 13, 1. 3; p- 15, 1.19. See 
2.Cor, ie 7. 

Contristation, sb. Sadness: p. 5, 1. 21. 

Convenient, adj. Suitable: p. 58, 1. 21. 

Conversant, adj. ‘ Are conversant about ’=have to do with, are con- 
cerned with: p. 76, l. 32. 

Converse, v.i. To dwell or abide; and so, to associate: p. 43; had, 
‘I have, since I was three year old, conversed with a magician, most 
profound in his art.” Shakespeare, As You Like It, v. 2. 66. 

Conversion, sb. A turning round, revolving: p. 158, |. 19. 

Convince, v.t. To convict, refute: p. 108, 1. 31. See John viii. 46. 

Copie, sb. Copiousness: p. 29, 1. 143 p. 30,145 P. 154, is. 

Copy. ‘To change copy’=to change, shift about: p. 221, age CENen 
Callisthenes changing copy, spake boldly many things against the Mace- 
donians.’ North’s Plutarch, Alex. p. 701 (ed. 1631). 


mgemTTe he 


GLOSSARY, 343 


Corroborate, v.¢. To strengthen: p. 131, |. 33. 

Corroborate, p.p. Confirmed in strength, grown strong: p. 21, |. 1. 
‘There is no trusting to the force of nature, nor to the bravery of words ; 
except it be corroborate by custome.’ Essay xxxix. p. 162. 

Corrupt, v.i. To become corrupt: p. 259, |. 13. ‘Likewise glorious 
gifts and foundations, are like sacrifices without salt; and but the painted 
sepulchres of almes, which soone will putrifie, and corrupt inwardly.’ Essay 
xxxiv. p. 148. 

Cosmetic, sb. The art of decoration: p. 133, 1. 24. 

Countenance, sb, Appearance, semblance: p. 11, 1. 26. ‘A counte- 
nance of gravity ’=an appearance of importance. 

Countervail, v.¢. To counterbalance, outweigh: p. 14, 1.15; p. 161, 
Ls $7,. 

‘But come what sorrow can, 
It cannot countervail the exchange of joy.’ 
Shakespeare, Rom. and Jul. ii. 6. 4. 

Course, ‘ In course’ =in its due order: p. 86, 1. 22. 

Cramp in, v.¢. To force, press in: p. 199, 1. 11. The modern cram. 

Creature, sb. Anything created: p. 110, 1. 13. See Rom. i. 25; viii. 19. 
‘The first creature of God, in the workes of the dayes, was the light of 
the sense.’ Essay, i. p. 2. 

Crossness, sb. Intricacy: p. 250, |. 24. 

Cryptic, sb. Concealment: p. 174, 1. 27. 

Cumber, sb. Encumbrance: p. 246, 1. 6. 

Curiosity, sb. Nicety: p. 32, 1. Io. 

‘Wherefore should I 
Stand in the plague of custom, and permit 
The curiosity of nations to deprive me.’ 
Shakespeare, Lear, i. 2. 4. 

Curious, adj. Careful to excess, scrupulous, careful, nice: p. 10, 1. 21; 

p. 20, 1. 32; p. 180, 1.6. Wrought with care: p. 134, 1. 30. 
‘ His body couched in a curious bed.’ 
Shakespeare, 3 Hen. VI, ii. 5. 53. 

Customed, p.p. Frequented by customers: p. 155, l. 29. 


D. 


Decarded, p.p. Discarded: p. 126, 1. 33. 

Decayed, p.p. Brought to decay: p. 72,1. 19. ‘Decay’ is used transi- 
tively in Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, i. 5.82: 

‘Infirmity, that decays the wise. 

Decency, sb. Comeliness, propriety: p. 216, ll. 21, 26; p. 219, Il. 4, 5. 
‘Decence: f. Decencie, seemelinesse, comelinesse, handsomenesse.’ Cot- 
grave, Fr. Dict. 

Decent, adj. Becoming, appropriate; p. 6,119; p. 181, 1.22. ‘In beauty, 
that of favour, is more then that of colour, and that of decent and gracious 
motion more then that of favour.’ Essay xliii. p. 176. 


344 GLOSSARY, 


Declination, sb. Decline: p. 143, 1.25. ‘And the one of them said, That 
to be a secretary, in the declination of a monarchy, was a ticklish thing, 
and that he did not affect it.” Essay xxii. p. 94. 

Deducement, sb. Deduction: p. 225, 1.6; p. 260, 1. 30. 

Defeat, v.¢. To ruin, undo: p. 207,1. 11. ‘ Desfaire. To vndoe; breake, 
defeat, discomfit, ouercome; ruine, destroy, ouerthrow.’ Cotgrave, Fr. 
Dict. 

Deficience, sb. Deficiency: p. 84, Il. 6, 22; p. 118, l. 33. 

Define of. To define: p. 116, 1. 28; p. 257, |. 5. 

Defunct, sb. A dead man: p. 149, 1. 26. 

Degenerate, ~.p. Degenerated: p. 81,1. 32. ‘Reduce things, to the 
first institution, and observe, wherein, and how, they have degenerate.’ 
Essay Xi. p. 41. 

Degrees, sb. Ranks in society: p. 96, |. 17. 4 

Delectable, adj. Delightful: p. 64, 1.17; p. 89, 1. 24. 

‘Making the hard way sweet and delectable.’ 
Shakespeare, Rich. II. ii. 3. 7. 

Delectation, sb. Delight: p. 102, 1. 7. ‘Delectation: f. Delectation, 
delight, pleasure, oblectation.” Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Delicacy, sb. Effeminacy: p. 19, 1.14. ‘ Delicatesse: f. Delicacie, dainti- 
nesse, tendernesse, nicenesse, wantonnesse, effeminacie; sensualite.’ Cot- 
grave, Fr. Dict. | 

Delicate, adj. Affected, effeminate: p. 28,1. 10. 

Deliver, v.¢. To pronounce, communicate, as a message: p. 7, I. 21. 
‘The former delivers the precepts of the art; and the latter the perfection,’ 
Essay xlv. p. 181. 

Demand, v. ¢. To ask, simply; not as now, to ask with authority or as 
aright: p. 85,1. 7. See 2 Sam. xi. 7. 

Demonstrate, p.p. Demonstrated: p. 39, ll. Io, II. 

Demonstrative, adj. Capable of demonstration, demonstrable: p. 14, 
1, 29. 

2 ‘He sends you this most memorable line, 
In every branch truly demonstrative.’ 
Shakespeare, Hen. V, ii. 4. 89. 

Dependences, sb. Dependents: p. 279, 1. 7; pe 231, 1. 93 p. 235, 
aes 

Depending, p.p. Impending; p. 218, 1. 11. 

Deplored, p.p. Despaired of: p. 140, 1. 20. 

‘Your love, sir, like strong water 
To a deplor’d sick man, quicks your feeble limbs 
For a poor moment,’ 
Albumazar, i. 2. (Dodsley’s Old Plays, vii. 115, ed. 1825.) 
Depravation, sb, Depreciation, defamation, slander: p. 17, l. 2. 
‘Apt, without a theme, 
For depravation.’ Shakespeare, Tr, and Cr, v. 2. 132. 

Deprave, v.t. To defame, depreciate, disparage: p. 27, 1.25; p. 37,1. 15. 
‘If affection lead a man, to favour the lesse worthy in desert, let him 
doe it without depraving or disabling the better deserver.’ Essay xlix. 
p. 202. 

Depredation, sb. A robbing, plundering: p. 106, |. 6, 


GLOSSARY, 345 


Derivation, sb. Originally, the turning of a stream into another channel: 
p. 36, 1.12. See gote. 

Derived, p.p. Drawn off, as in channels: p, 259, Il. 9, 17. 

Descry, v.¢ To observe, discern: p. 71, 1. 33; p. 115, l. 29. 

‘Moreover, to descry 
The strength o’ the enemy,’ Shakespeare, Lear, iv. 5. 13. 
Designation, sb, Appointment: p. 78, ll. 1, 3; p. 83, 1. 12; p- 84, 1. 4. 
Designment, sb. Design: p. 16, 1. 1. 
‘Served his designments 
In mine own person,’ Shakespeare, Coriolanus, v. 6. 35. 

Desolate, v.¢. To render desolate: p. 231, 1.8. ‘Desoler, To desola’e ; 
make lonelie, solitary, deavelie, or desart; to deuast, waste extreamely, 
ruine vtterly.” Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Despite, sb, Spite: p. 61, 1. 27. . 

‘Full of despite, bloody as the hunter, 
Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, iii. 4. 243. 

Destituted, p.p. Left destitute, abandoned: p. 129, 1. 31. Bacon uses 
‘destitute’ as a verb in Essay xxxiii. p. 143: ‘It is the sinfullest thing in 
the world, to forsake or destitute a plantation, once in forwardnesse.’ 

Determinate, adj, Definite: p. 209, |. 25. 

Determination, sb. The solution or decision of a question: p, 173, l. 7. 
It is now used rather in the sense of ‘ resolution’ which itself once was 
equivalent to ‘ solution.’ 

Devote, adj. Devoted: p. 42, 1. 8. 

Dexteriously, adv. Dexterously: p. 214, 1. 32. This is the form of the 
word in the editions of 1605, 1629, 1633, aud in Shakespeare, Twelfth 
Night, i. 5. 66: ‘ Dexteriously, good madonna.’ In p. 240,1. 15, the word 
is spelt as usual. 

Diascordium, sb. P.140,1. 32. See note. 

Dictature, sb, Office of dictator, dictatorship: p. 65, 1. 33. 

Difference, sb, A distinguishing mark, a badge: p. 4,1. 143 p. 47,1. 4. 
In heraldry a difference is ‘a figure added to a coat of arms to distinguish 
the persons or families who bear the same arms, and to indicate their 
nearness to the original bearer.’ (Webster, Dict.) Hence, in Shakespeare, 
Haml. iv. 5. 183; ‘O you must wear your rue with a difference’; and, 
Much Ado, i, 1, 69; ‘Let him bear it for a difference between himself 
and his horse. 

Differing, adj. Different: p. 10,1. 25; p. 28, 1. 33, &c. 

Difficile, adj. Difficult: p. 217,1. 10. ‘ Difficile: com. Difficile, difficult ; 
hard, vneasie, troublesome, intricate, painefull, almost impossible.” Cot- 
grave, Fr. Dict. 

Digested, p.p. Arranged: p. 154, Il. 28. ‘We have cause to be glad 
that matters are so well digested.’ Shakespeare, Ant. and Cl. il. 2. 179. 
Digladiation, sb. Literally, a combat with swords; hence, a quarrel or 

controversy: p. 33, |. 20. 

Dilatation, sb. Dilation, expanded description: p. 117, 1. 32. 

Dilute, adj. Diluted; and so, feeble: p. 260, |. 16. 

Disable, v.¢. Literally, to disqualify; then, to pronounce disqualified, to 
disparage: p. 13, l. 7; p. 153, |. 32; p. 176, 1. 32. Comp. Shakespeare, 
As You Like It, v. 4. 80; ‘ He disabled my judgement.’ 


346 | GLOSSARF 


Disallowed, p.p~. Disapproved: p. 27,1.13; p. 41,131. See 1 Pet. 
ii, 4, 7. $ 

Discern, v.t. To distinguish between, recognize: p. 136, 1. 20. ‘To 
discern of’: p. 203, 1. 18. Comp. ‘accept of,’ ‘ define of.’ 

Discharge, sb. The phrase ‘ discharge of cares’ signifies delivery from the 

_ charge or burden of cares: p. 77, I. 20. 

Discharged, p.p. Dismissed, got rid of: p. 187, 1. 30. 

Disclaim in. To disclaim all share in, renounce: p. 73, 1.15. ‘You 
cowardly rascal, nature disclaims in thee: a tailor made thee.’ Shake- 
speare, Lear, ii. 2. 59. 

Discontents, sb. Causes of disaffection: p. 58, 1. 23. 

‘His discontents are unremoveably 
Coupled to nature.’ Shakespeare, Tim. of Ath. v. 2, 227. 

Discontinuation, sb. A solution of continuity: p. 139, 1. 11. 

Discourse of reason. The power of inferring one thing from another; 
the reasoning faculty, as distinguished from reason: p. 28, 1.13. Com- 
pare Shakespeare, Haml. i. 2. 150: 

‘A beast, that wants discourse of reason, 
Would have mourn’d longer.’ 
And Troilus and Cressida, ii. 2. 116: 
‘Or is your blood 
So madly hot that no discourse of reason 
Nor fear of bad success in a bad cause, 
Can qualify the same?’ 
Shakespeare uses ‘ discourse’ alone in the same sense, Haml. iv. 4. 36: 
‘Sure, he that made us with such large discourse, 
Looking before and after, gave us not 
That capability and godlike reason 
To fust in us unused.” 

Discoursing, adj. Discursive, shifting: p. 119, 1. 9. The figure is 
evidently taken from a sandbank. See p. 120, Il. 1-5. 

Discover, v.t. To uncover, lay bare: p.g, 1.10. Comp. Ps. xxix. 9g. 

Disesteem, v.t. To depreciate, undervalue: p. 20,1. 28. ‘Disestimer. To 
disesteeme, neglect, contemne, set naught by, make no reckoning of.’ 
Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Disguisement, sb. A disguising, disguise: p. 123, 1. 19. 

Disincorporate, adj. Disincorporated, dissevered: p. 258, I. 32. 

Dismantled, p.p. Unmasked, stripped of disguise: p. 238, 1. 19. Com- 
pare Shakespeare, Lear, i. 1, 220: 

Po Nae SNC 2 eek oe yeas 

. . « Should in this trice of time 
Commit a thing so monstrous, to dismantle 
So many folds of favour, 

Dispose, v.t, To arrange: p. 44, 1. 23; p. 81, 1. 25. 

Disposition, sb. Arrangement: p. 44, ]. 27. Of studies, says Bacon, 
their chief use ‘for ability, is in the iudgement and disposition of busi- 
nesse. Essay 1. p. 204. 

Distaste, sb. Disgust: p. 8,1. 8. ‘ Prosperity is not without many feares 
and distastes.’ Essay v. p. 17. 

Distemper, v.t. To derange, disorder: p. 134, 1. 28. * The malignancy 


GLOSSARY. 347 


of my fate might perhaps distemper yours.’ Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, 
a %. 5. 
Distinguish, v.i. To assert distinctly, decide: p. 166, 1. > 
Disvalued, p.p. Depreciated: p. 237, |. 3. 
‘But in chief 
For that her reputation was disvalued 
In levity.” Shakespeare, Meas. for Meas. v. 1. 221. 

Divers, adj. Different; and so, several: p. 25, 1. 32; p. G5, 1.-3i.. 7 Foe 
indeed, every sect of them, hath a divers posture, or cringe by themselves,’ 
Essay iii. p. g. 

Diverse, adj. Different: p. 39, |. 27; p. 85, I. 15. 

Divination, sb. Foretelling of future events: p. 87,1. 25.‘ Diuination, 
or Southsaying, & telling things by coniecture. Mantice.’ Baret, 
Alvearie. 

Divulsion, sb. A tearing asunder: p. 189, |. 13. ‘Divulsion: f. A divul- 
sion, or pulling vp; also, a cutting, section, or division.’ Cotgrave, 
Fr. Dict, 

Dogmatical, sb, Dogmatical statement, dogma: p. 152, I. 30. 

Dolor, sb. Grief, suffering: p. 140, 1.5. ‘A minde fixt, and bent upon 
somewhat, that is good, doth avert the dolors of death.’ Essay ii. p. 7. 
Domestical, adj. Domestic: p. 223, 1.16. ‘Domestique: com. Domes- 

ticall, housall, of our household.’ Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Donative, sb. A gift, largess: p. 48, 1.14; p. 71, 1.1. ‘For their men 
of warre; it isa dangerous state, where they live and remaine in a body, 
and are used to donatives” Essay xix. p. 81. 

Dotation, sb. Endowment: p. 79, |. 1. 

Doubt, v.i. To hesitate through fear, and then, to fear: p, 16,1. 28; 
p. 26, 1. 8. 

‘I doubt some danger does approach you nearly.’ 
Shakespeare, Macb. iv. 2. 67, 

Droumy, adj. Turbid: p. 246, 1.16. Halliwell (Arch. and Prov. Dict.) 
gives the word as a Devonshire provincialism. Chaucer uses ‘ drovy.’ 

Drown, v.i. To be drowned: p. 92, 1. 27. 

Drowth, sb, Drought: p. 151, 1. 23. Compare Pericles, iii, Gower, 8. 

Dulceness, sb. Sweetness, p. 238, |. 21. 


E. 


Easiliest, adv. Most easily: p. 41, |. 29. 

Eestasy, sb, A trance: p. 145, 1. 24. A state in which the functions of 
the senses are temporarily suspended, Such was the ‘trance’ («oraais) 
into which the Apostle Peter fell (Acts x. 10). See Shakespeare, Oth. 
iv. I. 80; 

‘I shifted him away, 
And laid good ’scuse upon your ecsfasy.’ 

Eccentrics, sb. According to the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, the 
supposed circular orbits described by the planets about the earth, which 
was not in the centre: p. 161, |. 30. 


348 GLOSSARY. 


Edition, sb. Promulgation, publication: p. 266, 1. 5. 

Effectual, adj, Energetic, effective, practical: p. 235, 1. 17. ‘ Neither 
can they (i.e. vain persons) be secret, and therefore not effectuall.’ Essay 
liv, p. 216. 

Elected, p.p. Chosen: p. 158, |. 28. 

‘Why hast thou gone so far, 
To be unbent when thou hast ta’en thy stand, 
The elected deer before thee?’ Shakespeare, Cymb. iii. 4. 112. 

Election, sb. Choice: p. 46,1.18; p.49,1.9. ‘But contrariwise in 
favour, to use men with much difference and election, is good.’ Essay 
xlviii. p, 199. See also Haml. iii. 2. 69. 

Elegancy, sb. Elegance: p. 47,1. 33; p. 64,1.18. ‘ But yet, since 
princes will have such things (i, e. masques), it is better, they should be 
graced with elegancy, then daubed with cost. Essay XxXxvii, p. 156. 

Elenche, sb. From the Greek éAeyxos, a term in logic, which is defined 
as ‘a syllogism by which the adversary is forced to contradict himself’: 
p: 150s, 18, 255 pa 200, Io 4. 

Elogy, sb. A panegyric, eulogy: p. 94,1. 31. 

Emancipate, p.p. Emancipated, set free: p. 130, at, 

Embased, p.p. Debased, deteriorated: p. 127, 1.9. ‘And that mixture 
of falshood, is like allay in coyne of gold and silver; which they make 
the metall worke the better, but it embaseth it.’ Essay i. p. 3. 

Embassage, sb. An embassy. ‘To come in embassage’=to come on an 
embassy: p. 11,1.1. ‘Iwill... do you any embassage to the Pigmies.’ 
Shakespeare, Much Ado, ii. 1. 277. 

Emulate with. To emulate, vie with: p. 112, 1. 32. The construction 
is an imitation of the Latin ‘ emulari cum aliquo.’ 

Emulation, sb. Envy, rivalry in a bad sense; p. 49, 1. 29. 

‘Whilst emulation in the army crept.’ 
Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. ii. 2, 212. 
It is now used exclusively in a good sense, as in p. 50, |, 18, 

Enable, v.¢. To make able, to qualify: p. 12, l. 22; p. 42, 1. 23. Comp. 
Ap ike 1 Te. 

Enablement, sb. A qualifying or making able, qualification: p. 59, 
oi eee arf id bao 

End. ‘To the end’=in order: p. 17, 1. 19; p. 46, 1. 6; p. 48, 1. 29. 
‘Nay, some undertake sutes, with a full purpose, to let them fall; to the 
end, to gratifie the adverse partie, or competitour.’ Essay xlix. p. 201. 

Endeavour, v.¢. To strive after, aim at, attempt: p. 10,1. 10. Obsolete 
construction. 

‘But I’ll endeavour deeds to match these words.’ 
Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. iv. 5. 259. 

Engaged, p.p. Literally, bound by a gage or pledge; and so, pledged or 
committed to a certain course of conduct: p. 234, 1. 29. 

Engine, sb. A contrivance, device, requiring ingenium or skill: p. 241, 
1. 18. 

Enginery, sb. Engineering: p. 122, |. 8. 

Enterprised, p.p. Attempted, undertaken: p. 97, 1. 33. ‘And therefore 
is not by any to be enterprised, nor taken in hand, unadvisedly.’ Marriage 
Service. 


me gOS cece 


, GLOSSARY, 349 


Entitle, v.¢. To give a title to, designate : p. 26, 1. 19. 

Enucleate, v.¢ To extract as a kernel: p. 256, |. 27. 

Enumerate, ~.p. Enumerated: p. 83, |. 24. 

yoo e adj. Malicious ; used ina much stronger sense than at present: 
Pp. 10, |. 3. 

‘But none can drive him from the envious plea 
Of forfeiture, of justice, and his bond. 
Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. iii. 2. 285. 

Envy, sb. Ill-will: p. 55, 1. 3. 

Envy, v.i. To bear ill-will, to grudge: p. 38, 1. 8. 

Epicure, sb. An Epicurean; p. 196, |. 13. 

Essence, sb. Essential importance: p. 164, 1. 30. 

Estate, ep State; p. 13, ll. 28, 30; p. 23, 1. 27; p. 70, 1. 13. Condition: 
p. 43, 1. 1. 

Esteem of. To esteem, reckon, estimate: p. 178, 1. 6; p. 228, 1. 24. 
* Whosoever esteemeth too much of amorous affection, quitteth both riches, 
and wisedome.’ Essay x. p. 37. Comp. ‘ define of, ‘ discern of.’ 

Estuation, sb. Fermentation, agitation of mind: p. 195, 1. 20. 

Every, pron. Each: p. 14,1. 21; p. 136, 1. 1. ‘ Every of them is carried 
swiftly, 4 the highest motion, and softly in their owne motion,’ Essay 
xv. p. 56. 

Examinable, adj. Capable of being examined: p. 255, 1. 33; p. 256, 
l. Io. 

Exceed, v.i. To be excessive: p. 132, 1. 4. 

* Marg. I saw the Duchess of Milan’s gown that they praise so. 

Hero. O, that exceeds, they say.’ Shakespeare, Much Ado, iii. rie yo 
Excellency, sb. Excellence: p. 55,1. 3. ‘As if nature, were rather busie, 
not to erre, then in labour, to produce excellency.’ Essay xiii. p. 176. 
Except, p.p. Excepted: p. 68,1. 8; p. 116, 1. 6. ‘Christ in the truth of 

our nature was made like unto us in all things, sin only except.’ Art. XV. 

Excusation, sb. Excuse: p. 24, 1. 6; p. 181, 1. 25. * Prefaces, and 
passages, and excusations, and other speeches of reference to the person, 
are great wasts of time.’ Essay xxv. p. 102. 

Exemplar, adj. Pattern, used as an adjective; conspicuous: p. 92, Il. 10, 
24; p. 222, 1. 33. 

Exhibit, v.¢. To administer as a remedy; a medical term: p. 131, 
R22. 

Expect, v.¢. To await: p. 16, 1. 18. 

‘Let’s in, and there expect their coming.’ 
Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. v. 1, 49. 

Expedite, adj, Unencumbered, expeditious, speedy; p. 159, I. 16. 

Expostulation, sb. Demand: p. 64, |. 26. 

Expulse, v.¢. To drive out, expel: p. 16, 1. 29; p. 173, |. 30. 

‘For ever should they be expulsed from France.’ 
Shakespeare, 1 Hen. VI. iii. 3. 25. 

Exquisite, adj, Elaborate, minute; p. 24, |. 14; p. 28, lL 23; p. 35, 
1. 20. 

Extemporal, adj. Extemporary: p. 82, 1. 8. ‘Sir Nathaniel, will you 
hear an extemporal epitaph on the death of the deer?’ Shakespeare, 
Love’s Labour’s Lost, iv. 2. 50. 


350 GLOSSARY. 


Extensive, adj. Capable of being extended: p. 31, 1. 13. Compare 
demonstrative. 

Extenuate, v.¢. To lessen, depreciate: p. 13, 1. 6. ‘ Extenuating and 
blasting of your merit.’ Bacon, Letter of Advice to Essex (Works, ix. 41). 

‘Speak of me as I am; nothing extenwate, 
Nor set aught down in malice.’ 
Shakespeare, Oth. v. 2. 342. 

Extern, adj. External: p. 106, 1. 16; p. 199, |. 20. 

‘When my outward action doth demonstrate 
The native act and figure of my heart 
In compliment extern.’ Shakespeare, Oth. i, 1. 63. 

Extinguish, v.i. To be extinguished: p. 92, 1. 27. 

Extinguishment, sb. Extinction; p. 191, 1. 21. 

Extirper, sb. An extirpator: p. 52, 1. 2. 

Extreme, adv. Extremely: p. 243, 1. 16. ‘Acting in song, especially 
in dialogues, hath an extreme good grace. Essay XXXvil. p. 156, 
ito. 

Extremely, adv. ‘Most extremely compounded ’=compounded in the 
most extreme degree: p. 134, 1. 8 

Exulceration, sb. An ulcer; p. 68, 1. 32. 


F. 


Face out, v.¢. To confront boldly, brazen out: p. 238, |. 8. 

Facile, adj. Easily swayed, fickle, pliant: p. 222, 1. oa dof Th they 
(i.e. judges) be facile, and corrupt, you shall have a servant, five times 
worse than a wife.’ Essay vili. p. 27. 

Facility, sb. Pliancy: p. 238, 1. 21. See quotation under Apply. 

Facture, sb. Shape, form: p. 131, |. 4; p. 138, 1. 19. ‘ Facture : 
f. The facture, workemanship, framing, making of a thing.” Cotgrave, 
Fr. Dict. 

Faculty, sb. Power, influence: p. 136, 1. 12. 

‘Besides, this Duncan 
Hath borne his faculties so meek.’ 
Shakespeare, Macb. i. 7. 17. 

Fair, adj. Handsome: p. 32, I. 30. ‘It is a reverend thing, to see an 
ancient castle, or building not in decay; or to see a faire timber tree, 
sound and perfect.’ Essay xiv. p. 52. 

Faith, sb. The Christian faith or religion: p. 49, 1. 10; p. 132, 1. 73 
p. 255, 1. 11. 

False, adv. Falsely: p. 182, 1. 11. 

Fallace, sb. Fallacy: p. 159, |. 30. 

Fallacy, sb. Deception: p. 71, 1. 22. ‘Fallace: f. A fallacie; guile, 
deceit, wile, tromperie, a craftie tricke, cheating, sleight, cousening deuice.’ 
Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Fall out, v.i. To happen; p. 28,1. 7; p. 103, 1. 16. 

Fame, sb. Report, rumour: p. 34, 1 21. See Gen. xlv. 16, ‘Seditious 
tumults, and seditious fames, differ no more, but as brother and sister, 
masculine and feminine.’ Essay xv. p. 55. 


ee 


GLOSSARY, 351 


Fastest, adv, Most closely: p. 18, I. 26. 

Felicity, sb. Luck, good fortune; p, 227, 1. 15. ‘The pencill of the 
holy Ghost, hath laboured more, in describing the afflictions of Iob, 
then the felicities of Salomon.’ Essay v. p. 17. 

Find strange. To wonder: p. 78, 1. 14; p. 94, 1. 25; p. 141, Lat. 
‘It cannot be found strange, it cannot be wondered at: p. 149, 1. 33. 
Lat. non est cur miretur quispiam. 

Fitteth, is befitting: p. 82, 1. 3. 

Fixing, sb. Fixed position: p. 47, 1. 32. Compare ‘ fixure’ in Troilus 
and Cressida, i. 3. 101. 

Flexuous, adj. Winding, intricate: p. 118, 1. 15. 

Fluctuant, adj. Floating: p. 98, 1. 26. 

Fly, v.t. To chase flying, as with a hawk: p- 209, |. 10. * But now, 
if a man can tame this monster, and bring her to feed at the hand, 
and govern her, and with her ly other ravening fowle, and kill them, 
it is somewhat worth.’ Essay of Fame, p. 240. 

For=as for: p. 71, |. 8. 

Force. ‘ Of force’=of necessity, necessarily: p. 106, 1. 7. 

Forth, redundant in the phrases ‘how far forth,’ ‘as far forth’: 
p. 176, 1. 12; p. 257, 1. 30. ‘Forth of’=out of; p. 231, lL 14. See 
Gen. viii. 16. 

Fortify, v.i. To become strong: p. 209, I. 4. 

Forwards. In the phrase ‘so forwards’=so forth, so on: p. 48, 1. 9. 

Frame. ‘Out of frame’=out of order: p. 217, 1. 19. ‘And therfore, 
when great ones, in their owne particular motion, move violently... . 
it is a signe, the orbs are out of frame.’ Essay xv. p. 56, 

Fret, v.¢. To eat away: p. gI,1. 7. See Lev. xiii. 55. 

Frets, sb. p. 162, 1. 17. Figures in architecture, used in ornamenting 
the roofs of houses, ‘formed by small fillets intersecting each other 
at right angles.’ Parker's Glossary of Architecture. The Egyptian key 
pattern is a familiar example. ‘ Fringotteries ; f. Frets; cranklings, wrigled 
flourishing, in caruings, &c.’ Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. A.S.fretu, an ornament, 

Fripper, sb. A dealer in old clothes: p. 176, 1. 25. ‘Fripier: m. A 
Fripier; or broker; a mender, or trimmer vp of old garments, and 
a seller of them so mended.’ Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. Shakespeare (Temp. 
iv. I, 225) uses ‘a frippery’ for an old-clothes shop. 

Fro, prep. From: p. 68, 1. ro. 


“Fume, sb, Vapour, smoke; used metapherically: p. 89, 1. 25. 


Funambalo, sb. A rope-dancer; p. 165, 1. 23. ‘ We see the industry 
and practice of tumblers and funambulos, what effects of great wonder 
it bringeth the body of man unto.’ Bacon, Disc. touching Helps for 
the Intell. Powers (Works, vii. p. 99). 

Futility, sb. Idle talkativeness, blabbing of secrets: p. 248, 1. 33. 
Bacon (Essay vi. p. 20) uses the adjective ‘futile.’ ‘As for talkers 
and futile persons, they are commonly vaine, and credulous withall. 
And again in Essay xx. p. 84. 


B52 i) (GLOSSARY, 


G. 


Gamester, sb. A player at any game; not necessarily a gambler: p. 198, 
E323, 

Generosity, sb, Nobility: p. 69, 1. 30. 

Gigantine, adj. Giantlike: p. 194,1.13. Referring to the war of the 
giants against Jupiter. 

Glance, sb. An allusion, hint: p. 57,1. 17. 

Glass, sb. A mirror: p.108, 1.6; p. 161, 1.6; p. 176,197. In the New 
Atlantis Bacon uses ‘glass’ for ‘lens’ (Works, iii. 162). 

Glory, sb. Ostentation: p. 7, 1. 27; p. 113, l. 19; p. 171,:1. 4. See 
Essay lvi. p. 224, 1. 31: ‘ Whatsoever is above these, is too much; and 
proceedeth either of glory and willingnesse to speake ; or of impatience to 
hear, &c. 

Go, v.¢. Used in a transitive sense: p. 83, I. 209. 

Go about. To endeavour: p. 173,1. 10. See Rom. x, 3. 

Grace, v.t. To compliment, praise: p. 236, 1. 29. Comp. Essay Ivi. 
p- 225: ‘There is due from the iudge, to the advocate, some commend- 
ation and gracing, where causes are well handled, and faire pleaded.’ 

Gravelled, ~.p. Puzzled. To be gravelled=to hesitate: p. 57, 1. 15. 
“Nay, you were better speak first, and when you were gravelled for 
lack of matter, you might take occasion to kiss.” Shakespeare, As You 
Like It, iv. 1. 74. 

Grecia, sb. Greece; p. 2,1. 25; p. 12, 1. 10. See Dan. viii. 21. 

Grecians, sb. Greeks; p. 11, 1.15. Comp. Joel iii. 6. 

Grift, v.¢. To graft: p. 255,122. The ed. of 1605 has grifte, which 
in ed. 1629 became grift, and in ed. 1633 graft, Baret (Alvearie, s. v.) 
gives ‘To griffe. Inserere arbori.’ 

Grossly, adv. Clumsily, unskilfully: p. 37, 1.7; p. 153, 1. 22. 

Grot, sb. A grotto or cave: p. 162, 1. 26. 

Ground, sb, The plain-song of a tune, on which the variations or descants 
are made: p. 197, |. 11. 

Ground, sb, Foundation: p. 76,1. 12. 

Ground, v.t. To lay the foundation of: p. 113, 1. 9. 

Grounded, p.p. Well founded: p, 110, 1,15. ‘ Well grounded’=with 
good foundations: p, 217, 1. 21. 

Grounds, sb. Soils: p. 207, 1. 20. Among the disadvantages in the 
site of a house, Bacon enumerates ‘want of fruitfulnesse, and mixture 
of grounds of severall natures,’ Essay xlv. p. 180, 


H. 


Hand. To bein hand with=to have in hand, to treat of: p. 18,1. 30; 
Pp. 08,32. 

Hap, v.i. To happen: p. 61,1. 4, ‘The remnant of people, which hap 
to be reserved, are commonly ignorant and mountanous people, 
Essay lviii. p. 232. 


GLOSSARY, 353 


Hardlier, adv. With more difficulty: p. 245, 1. 15, 

Hardliest, adv. With most difficulty: p. 217, 1. 5. 

Hardness, sb. Hardiness: p. 143, 1. 4. 

Harmonical, adj, Harmonious: Pp. 197, 1. 7. 

Heat, sb. Anger: p, 221, |. 15. 

Henoch, sb. Enoch: p. 190, 1. 33. This form is adopted in the older 
English versions of the Old Testament, and in the Authorized Version 
of I Chr. i. 3, while in the New Testament the Greek form Enoch is 
followed, 

Herdman, sb. A herdsman: p. 69, 1. 25. See Gen. xiii, 7e 

Heroical, adj. Heroic: p. 18, 1. 6; p. 51, 1. 32, &e: 

‘But ‘gainst your privacy 
The reasons are more potent and heroical.’ 
Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. iii. 3. 192. 

Heteroclite, sb. A word irregularly declined: p. 87, |. 4. 

His. Its: p. 89,1. 10; p. 120, |. 31; p. 148, l. 15. 

His, used as the sign of the genitive. ‘Socrates his ironical doubting ;’ 
49,1 2. 

Historiographer, sb. Historian: Pp 17, 1 36. 

Hold, v.¢. To keep to: p. 141, 1. 7. To restrain, withhold: p. 15, 1. 11. 

Hold of. To pertain to, have to do with: p..2, L 32; p. 124, 1. a3 
p. 228, |. 16. 

Holden, p.p. Held: p. 69, 1. 31. 

Holpen, p.p. Helped: p. 92, |. 22. See Ps. Ixxxiii. 8; Dan. xi. 34. 

Honesty, sb. Used to denote high and honourable character, and hence 
transferred to moral beauty and grace: p. 22,1. 8. 

Humanist, sb. A student of the humanities (litere humaniores): p. 135, 
1. 33. The term is still used in the Scotch universities. 

Humanity, sb. The knowledge of man; human philosophy, as distin- 
guished from natural theology and natural philosophy: p. 105, |. 19; 
p. 130, 1. 1. It is contradistinguished from divinity in p, 28, l. 20; 
p- 58, 1. 8. 

Humorous, adj. Fanciful, capricious: p. 18, 1. 12; p. 245, 1.9. ‘As 
humorous as winter.’ Shakespeare, 2 Hen. IV, iv. 4. 34. 

Humour, sb. Caprice: p. 49, |. 32. 

‘In humours like the people of this world, 
Shakespeare, Rich. II, v. 5. 10. 


I, 


Ice, sb. A flaw in a jewel: p. 197, 1. 17. Compare the Fr. glagons, 
which Cotgrave explains ‘Isicles, or flakes of yce; also, flawes in stones 
resembling flakes of yce.’ 

Ill, adj. Bad: p.69,1.11. ‘Neither is it il aire onely, that maketh an i] 
seat, but i// wayes, ill markets,’ Essay xlv. p. 180. 

Ilaqueation, sb, An entangling in argument, a sophism: p. 159, 1. 17; 

297, by ar 

insaionss p.p. Illuminated, enlightened: p. 53, 1. 16. 

Illustrate, v.. To render illustrious: p. 37,1. 16. 

Tilustrate, p.p. Illustrated: p. 40, |. 2. 

Aa 


354 GLOSSARY. 


Imaginant, sb. One who imagines: p. 132, l. 29; p. 146, 1. 4. 

Imbarred, p.~. Interrupted, checked: p. 46, 1. 27. 

Imbase, v.t. To debase, degrade: p. 37,1. 11; p. 96,1. 18. ‘ Nuptiall 
love maketh mankinde; friendly love perfecteth it; but wanton love 
corrupteth, and imbaseth it.’ Essay x. p. 38. / 

Immediate, adj. Closely connected, proximate: p.14,1.14. ‘ Zmmediate 
times’ are those which are not separated by any interval from the 
present. 

Immediately, adv. Directly, without the intervention of anything else: 
p. 154, 1. 14. Now generally used of time only. 

Import, v.t. To have a bearing upon, affect: p. 163, 1. 24. 

Impostumation, sb. An abscess: p. 139, |. II. 

Imprese, sb. A device with a motto: p. 167,1.6. ‘An Jmprese (as the 
Italians call it) is a devise in picture with his Motte, or Word, borne by 
noble and learned personages, to notifie some particular conceit of their 
owne.’ Camden, Remaines, p. 158 (ed. 1605). 

Impression, sb. Stamp, lasting character; used in a moral sense: p. 47, 
l. 5. Comp. p. 214, 1. 24; ‘by imprinting upon their souls charity :’ 
and p. 69, 1. 173; ‘for truth prints goodness.’ 

Improficience, sb. Want of progress or proficiency: p. 119, 1. I. 

Impulsion, sb. Impulse, impelling cause: p. 137, 1. 19. 

In, prep. Into: p. 72, 1. 28. ‘Conversant in’=conversant with: p. 75, 
1.16. With verbal nouns in is used like the Latin gerund: ‘ while 
they are in tuning their instruments,’ p. 251, 1.22. Comp. ‘im depart- 
ing,” Gen. xxxv. 18; ‘im seething,’ 1 Sam, ii. 13; ‘ia building,’ 
1 Kings vi. 7. 

Incensed, p.p. Burnt: p. 268, 1. 26. 

Incensing, adj. Exasperating: p. 231, 1. 14. 

Inception, sb. Beginning: p. 194, 1. 4; p. 213, 1. 13. 

Incertainty, sb. Uncertainty: p. 250, |. 13. 

Incidence, sb. Coincidence: p. 122, 1. 30. ‘It hath an incidence into 
it’ =it coincides with it: p. 194, 1. 9g. 

Incidently, adv. Incidentally: p. 182, 1.6; p. 198, 1. 9. 

Included, p.p. Shut up, inclosed: p. 162, 1. 29. 

Incompatible, adj. Incongruous: p. 10, |]. 25. Used here in an obsolete 
construction, See also p. 212, |. 24. 

Incomprehension, sb. Want of comprehension: p. 136, 1.26. A trans- 
lation of the Greek acatalepsia, p. 154, 1. 4. 

Inconvenient, adj. Unsuitable: p. 81, 1. 8. 

Incorporal, adj. Incorporeal: p. 45,1. 17: 
‘ Alas, how is’t with you, 
That you do bend your eye on vacancy, 
And with the incorporal air do hold discourse?’ 
Shakespeare, Haml. iii. 4. 118. 
Incorporate, p. p. Incorporated: p. 36, 1.11; p. 97, 1. 5. 
‘No, it is Casca; one incorporate 
To our attempts.’ Shakespeare, Jul. Ces. i. 3. 135. 

Incurring, pr. p. Running: p. 175, 1. 18. 

Indifferent, adj. Impartial: p. 21,1. 31. See Ecclus. xlii. 5. Belonging 
to all alike, common: p. 113, |. 27. 


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GLOSSARY, 355 


Indifferently, adv. Impartially: p. 84, l. 19. Comp. Prayer for the 
Church Militant: ‘ That they may truly and indifferently minister justice.’ 

Inditer, sb. A composer: p. 261, |. 8. 

Induced, p.p. Derived by induction: p. 171, 1. 9. 

Inducemeat, sb. An introduction: p. 83, 1. 16; p. 144, |. 32; p. 222, 
l. 21. 

Inducing, adj. Introductory, preliminary : p. 83, |. 29. 

Indulgent, adj. Apt to indulge: as ‘indulgent in allusions,’ p. 264, 1. 2. 

Induration, sb. Hardening: p. 114, |. 29. 

Infinite, adj. Innumerable: p. 72, |. 19; p. 194, |. 15. See note on 
p. 72. 

i sg v.t. To weaken, invalidate: Pp. 159, I. 29. 

Influxion, sb. Inflowing, influence, intromission: p. 145, Il. 20, 27, 32. 

Infolded, p.p. Involved: p. 54, |. ro. 

Inform, v.¢. To instruct, teach: p. 108, 1. 31; p. 254, 1.24. ‘To in- 
form ourselves in’=to inform or instruct ourselves with regard to: 
Pp. 232, I. 30. 

Informed, p.p. Taught: p. 257, 1.22; p. 264,1.33. Animated: p. 105, 
1. 5. Comp. Shakespeare, Coriol. v. 3. 71: 

‘Inform 
Thy thoughts with nobleness,’ 

Ingenious, adj. Ingenuous: p. 236, 1. 23. 

Ingurgitation, sb. An immoderate draught: p. 140, 1. 14. 

Inherent to. Inherent in: p. 21, 1. 33. . 

Injury, sb. Insolence, contumely: p. 236, I. 30; p. 238, |. 20. 

Inquire, v.t. To investigate: p. 89, 1. 11; p. 110, Il. 14, 25, &c. 

Inquisition, sb. Inquiry, investigation: p. 6, 1. 10; p. 48, 1. 25; p. 88, 
1. 1, &c. See Deut. xix. 18; Ps, ix. 12. 

Inquisitor, sb. Searcher: p. 88, |. 24. 

Insatisfaction, sb. Dissatisfaction: p. 210, I. 29. 

Insinuate, v.t. To introduce indirectly, by winding courses: p. 14, 1. 19. 

Insinuation, sb. Intertwining, intimate connexion: p. 102, 1.12. Indi- 
rect argument: p. 178, |. 29. 

Insinuative, adj. Winding itself in, insinuating: p. 148, 1. 10. 

Insolency, sb. Insolence: p. 67,1. 20; p. 227,1.22. ‘To give moderate 
liberty, for griefes, and discontentments to evaporate, (so it be without too 
great insolency or bravery) is a safe way. Essay xv. p. 61. 

Instance, sb. Urgency: p. 189, 1.23; p. 243, l. 25. 

Instrumental, sb. An instrument: p. 80, |. 11. 

Intelligence, sb. ‘To have intelligence’=to have an understanding, to 
correspond: p, 36, 1.1. ‘The arch-flatterer, with whom all the petty 
flatterers have intelligence, is a mans selfe.’ Essay x. p.37. See Dan, xi. 
30. Information: p. 80, 1. 25, 

Intelligenced, p.p~. Informed: p. 233, |. 13. 

Intelligencer, sb. An informer: p. 80, 1. 26. 

‘Richard yet lives, hell’s black intelligencer, 
Only reserved their factor, to buy souls 
And send them thither.’ Shakespeare, Rich. III, iv. 4. 71. 

Intend, v.¢. To aim at, direct the attention to: p. 135, 1. 31; p. 138, 

1.6; p. 192, 1.19; p. 205, 1. 9; p. 218, 1. 22. ‘The intending of 
Aa2 


356 GLOSSARY. 


the discretion of behaviour’ = attention to, &c.: p. 218, 1.29. ‘Romulus, 
after his death (as they report, or faigne) sent a present to the Romans; 
that, above all, they should intend arms.’ Essay xxix. p.125. Ibid. p. 126, 

Intendment, sb. Intention: p. 167, 1. 19. 

Intensive, adj. ‘Intensive upon’ =directed to: p. 146, |. 4. 

Intent, sb. Intention, purpose: p. 6,1. 3. See John xiii. 28. 

Interlace, v.¢. ‘To mix: p. 244, 1. 6. ‘Interlace not businesse, but 
of necessitie.” Essay xi. p. 41. 

Intervenient, adj. Incidental: p. 122, 1. 18. ‘When there is matter 
of law, intervenient in businesse of state.’ Essay lvi. p. 227. 

Into, prep. ‘Hath an influence into’=hath an influence upon: p. 2131/2. 
Comp. p. 250, ll. 16, 17. ‘Immersed into’ =‘immersed in,’ p. 121, 1. 18. 

Intrinsic, adj. Internal; and so, hidden: p. 37, |. 33. Compare the use 
of ‘ inward.’ 

Invent, v.¢. To find out, discover: p. 149, |. 15. 

Invention, sb. Finding, discovery: p. 11, |. 30; p. 149, |. 22. 

Inveterate, adj. Long established: p. 115, l. 20. 

Invocate, v.¢. To invoke: p. 40, 1. 275 p. 161, h ar. 

Inward, adj. Hidden, secret: p. 248, |. 28. 

Inwardness, sb. Hidden sense: p. 104,!.20. Intimacy: p. 233, ll. 8, 18. 

Trony, sb. An ironical speech: p. 88, |. 33. 

Issay. The old form of spelling ‘ Jesse’: p. 152, |. 25. 

Iteration, sb. Repetition: p. 137, 1. 18; p. 202, l. 33. ° Truth tired 
with iteration.’ Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. iii. 2. 183. 


J. 


Joculary, adj. Belonging to jest or juggling: p. 143, a8; 
Joy, v.i. To rejoice: p. 6, 1.25. ‘There is no man, that imparteth his 
ioyes to his frend, but he éoyeth the more.’ Essay xxvii. p. 110. 
Judge, v.i. To give judgement, decide: p. 73, |. 28. 
Judged, p.p. Decided: p. 137, 1. 29. 
Jurisconsult, sb. A lawyer: p. 85, 1. 32: p. 259, |. 33. 
Just, adj. Exact: p. 85,1. 4. 
‘If thou cut’st more 
Or less than a just pound.’ 
Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. iv. I. 327. 


K. 


Kindly, adj. Natural: p. 140, 1.12. So in the Litany, ‘the Aindly fruits 
of the earth.’ 

Knit, v.i. To become compact: p. 39, |. 31. 

Knowledge, sb. A branch of knowledge, a science: p. 32, L 55; 
p. 60, 116; o* To take knowledge of’ =‘ to recognize’: p. 69; 1:43 
p. 226, |. 24. 


L. 


Laboured, p.p. Elaborated: p. 78, 1. 43 p. 220, 1. 6. 
Large, adj. Diffuse: p. 181, |. Lo. 


2 pig 


GLOSSARY, 357 


Latitude, sb. Extent: p. 52, 1. 14; p. 258, 1. 31. 

Laudative, sb. A eulogy: p. 44, |. 4; p. 100, 1.13. ‘The funerall 
laudatives and monuments for those that died in the wars,’ Essay 
xxix. p. 129. 

Learnings, sb. Branches of knowledge: p- 49, I. 17. 

‘Puts to him all the learnings that his time 
Could make him the receiver of.’ 
Shakespeare, Cymb, i. 1. 43. 

Least wise. ‘At least wise’ =at least: p. 147, |. 23. 

Leese, v.t. To lose: p. 37,1. 5; p. 72,1. 23; p. 77,1. 2; p. 239, 1. 18. 
‘For that that he winnes in the hundred, he Jeeseth in the shire.’ Essay 
xix. p. 80, 

Legend, adj. Legendary: p. 55,1. £., 

Levant, High. The far East: p. 166, 1. 24. The Latin has ‘quod in 
Chine et provinciis wltimi orientis in usu hodie sunt &c.’ 

Levant, sb. The East: p. 24, 1. 32. 

Levity, sb. Lightness, in its literal sense: p. 116, |. 23. 

Lidger, sb. A resident ambassador: p. 232, 1. 11. Spelt also leiger. 

‘Lord Angelo, having affairs to heaven, 

Intends you for his swift ambassador, 

Where you shall be an everlasting leiger.’ 
Shakespeare, Meas. for Meas, iii. 1. 59. 

Lieth, as much as: p. 113,1.9. See Rom. xii. 18. 

Like, adj. Likely: p. 39, 1. 18; p. 185, |. 10. 

Liker, adj. More likely: p. 60, 1. 25. 

Lighter, adj. More foolish, or less grave: p, 221, |. 13. 

Lightly, adv. Easily: p. 222, 1. 26. ‘ The traitor in faction lightly goeth 
away with it.’ Essay, li. p. 208. 

Limned, pf. p. Drawn, illustrated with drawings, illuminated: p. 30, I. 12. 

Lively, adv. Vividly: p. 15, 1.5; p. 52, 1.23; p. 55,1. 4. ‘ Lively 
describing Christian resolution,’ Essay v. p. 17. 

Long, v.i. To belong: p. 124, I. Io. 

Longanimity, sb. Patience, longsuffering: p. 205, 1. 19. 

Long time. Long: p. 28, |. 21. 

Lothness, sb. Unwillingness, dislike: p. 239, 1. 18. 

Lubricity, sb. Slipperiness:; p. 201, |. 6. ‘Lubricité: f. Lubricitie, 
slipperinesse, vncertaintie.’ Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Lucre, sb. Gain: p. 19,1.7; p. 42,1. 24. ‘The stratagems of prelates 
for their owne ambition and Jucre.’ Essay xvii. p. 69. 


M. 


Magistracy, sb, The holding the office of magistrate : p. 206, I. 30. 
Magistral, adj. Dogmatic: p. 41,1. 27; p. 141, 1.14; p. 170, lL. 27. 
Magistrality, sb. Dogmatism: p. 127, 1. 19; p. 140, |. 27. 
Magnify, v.t. To make much of, to extol: p. 13, 15; £73) 1 1. 
Comp. Ps. xxxiv. 3. 
Main, adj. Important: p. 80, 1. 19. 
. Malice, sb, Evil disposition: p. 38, |. 6. 


358 GLOSSARY, 


Malign, adj. Malignant, injurious: p. 79, 1. 2. 

Maniable, adj. Manageable, tractable: p.17, 1.8. ‘Maniable: com. 
Tractable, wieldable, handleable,’ &c. Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Mansion, sb. A dwelling-place: p. 119, 1, 18; p. 134,117. See John 
xiv. 2. 

Manurance, sb, Manuring, fertilizing: p. 184, 1. 4 

Manured, ~.~. Cultivated: p. 84, 1. 10, 

Mar, v.¢. To injure: p. Io, 1. 20. 

Marvel, v.z. To wonder: p. 112, |. 13. 

Materially, adv. Solidly, soundly: p. 198, 1. 26. 

Mathematic, sb. Mathematics: p. 121, 1. 2. Comp. athletic, cosmetic, 
metaphysic, physic, 

Matter, sb, The point or essential part of a subject: p. 61, 1. 7. Comp. 
Albumazar, ii. 4: 

‘Then vouch a statute, and a Latin sentence, 
Wide from the matter,’ 

May =can: p. 141, 1. 31. Comp. Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. i. 3. 7: ‘May 
you stead me.’ And Ps, cxxv. 1, Pr. Bk. ‘ Mount Zion, which may not be 
removed,’ 

Mean, sb. Means, medium: p. 76,1. 21; p.195,1.19. ‘For it is the 
soloecisme of power, to thinke to command the end, and yet not to 
endure the meane.’ Essay xix. p. 77. 

Mean, adj. Moderate: p. 219, 1. 33. 

Means, sb, Wealth: p. 20, ll. 8, 9. Used as a singular noun: p. 242, 1. 24. 

Mechanicals, sb. Mechanics: p. 198, 1. 5. The word occurs in a different 
sense in Shakespeare, Mid. N’s. Dr, iii. 2. 9. 

‘A crew of patches, rude mechanicals.’ 

Mechanique, sb. Mechanism: p. 124, 1. 10; p. 138, 1. 24, 

Medicinable, adj. Medicinal; p. 141, 1. 26. In Shakespeare, Oth. v. 2. 
351, where the Quartos read, 

‘Drop tears as fast as the Arabian trees 
Their medicinal gum,’ 
the Folios have medicinable. See also Much Ado, ii. 2. 5; Troilus and 
Cressida, iii. 3. 45. 

Medicine, v.t. ‘To administer medicine to: p. 207, |. 27. 

Mercurius, apparently not yet Anglicised: p. 52,1, 10. Comp, Acts xiv. 
12. 

Mere, adj. Absolute: p. 106, 1. 29. 

‘I have engaged myself to a dear friend, 
Engaged my friend to his mere enemy.’ 
Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. iii. 2. 265. 

Merely, adv. Absolutely, simply: p. 88, 1.10; p. 121, 1. 30; p. 258, 
1.32. 

: ‘We are merely cheated of our lives by drunkards.’ 
Shakespeare, Temp. i. I. 59. 

Meriting, adj. Meritorious: p. 7,1. 27. 

Message, ‘Came in message’=came as a messenger: p. 66, 1. 16. 

Metaphysic, sb. Metaphysics: p. 112, Il. 1,2; p. 113, 1. 18. Bacon’s 
definition is given on p. 114. 

Minion, sb. A darling: p. 30, 1. 33. In ed. 1605 it is printed migmon 


GLOSSARYF. 359 


in mistake for mignon. ‘Mignon: m. A minion, fauorite, wanton, 
dilling, darling.” Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Minister, v.¢. To supply, furnish: p. 14,1. 21; p. 51,1. 2. 

Ministry, sb. Service: p. 206, 1. 2. 

Mirabilaries, sb. Collections of marvels: p. 87, 1. 15. 

MITHRIDATUM, sb. See note on p. 140, 1. 31. ‘Methridat: m. 
Methridate; a strong Treacle, or Preservatiue deuised at first by the 
Pontian King, Mithridates.’ Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. ‘The first he (i.e. 
Mithridates) was also who devised sundrie kinds of antidots or countre- 
poisons, whereof one reteineth his name to this day.’ Holland’s Pliny, 
XXV. 2, 

Model, sb. A small plan; and so, a compendium: p. 54,1. 2. The Lat. 
has ‘ totius orbis tunc epitome.’ Measure, scale: p. 62, 1.19 ; p. 194, l. 15. 

Moe, adj. More: p. 22,1. 3; p. 166, 1. 1. 

Monastical, adj. Monastic: p. 190, |. 27. 

Moneys, sb. Coins, pieces of money: p. 167: Il. 29, 31. 

Morality, sb. Moral philosophy: p. 177, 1. 23. 

Morigeration, sb. Obsequiousness: p. 26, |. 24. 

Mortalest, adj. Most deadly: p. 184, |. 25. 

Most, adv. Mostly: p. 94, 1. 29. 

Motions, sb. Exercises: p. 124, l. 19. 

Mought. Might: p. 79,1.7; p.80,1.30. ‘The part of Epimetheus, 
mought well become Prometheus, in the case of discontentments.’ 
Essay xv. p. 61. 

Mountebank, sb. A quack doctor: p. 135, 1.16. Cotgrave (Fr. Dict.) 
gives: ‘Charlatan: m. A Mountebanke, a cousening drug-seller, a 
pratling quack-saluer.’ See Essay xii. p. 45: ‘As there are moun- 
tebanques for the naturall body: so are there mountebanques for the 
politique body.’ 

Move, v.¢. To excite: p. 125,1. 21. To propose: p. 244, 1. 32. 

Moyses. The old spelling of ‘ Moses,’ from the Vulgate Moyses: p. 46, 
1, 28, &c. Bacon is not uniform in adopting this spelling. See p. 83, 
Ne 

Mutiner, sb. A mutincer: p. 184, 1.15. See note. 

Mystery, sb. A craft or trade: p. 89, 1. 29. ‘Mestier: m. A Trade, 
Occupation, Misterie, Handicraft.’ Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. Comp. Chaucer, 
Cant. Tales, Prol. 615: 

‘In youthe he lerned hadde a good mester ; 
He was a wel good wright, a carpenter.’ 


N. 


Nature, sb. Used in the phrase ‘ it is nature’ for ‘it is natural ;’ as ‘ it is 
reason’ for ‘ it is reasonable:’ p. 239, 1. 3. 

Nature, sb. Kind: p. 7,1. 15; p. 168, 1.11. ‘ Flowerede-lices, and lillies 
of all natures.’ Essay xlvi. p. 187. 

Navigation, sb. A sea voyage: p. 96,1. 31. 

Near hand, adv. Near: p. 53,1. 25. 


360 GLOSSARY, 


a 


Negotiation, sb. Transaction of business: p. 219, 1.17; p. 225, 1.173 
Pp. 226, 1 333% 

Neighbour, adj. Neighbouring: p. 58,1. 25. See Jer. xlix. 18, 1. 40. 

Nestling, sb. A place for building a nest; hence applied to the place 
where humours may breed: p. 138,1.13. ‘That the birds may have 
more scope, and naturall neaséling.’ Essay xlvi. p. 194. 

Nether, adj. Lower: p. 57,1. 13. See Ex. xix. 17. 

Wew. In the phrase ‘one is new to begin’=‘one has to begin anew’: 
p. 183, |. 16. j 

Non-promovent, adj. Literally, not advancing: p. 175, 1. 17. The 
epithet is applied to axioms as equivalent to ‘ circular’ and $ incurring 
into themselves.’ 

Nor...not. Double negative: p. 120, Il. 11, 13. 

Nor never. Double negative: p. 23, 1. 23. 

‘This England never did, mor never shall, 
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror.’ 
Shakespeare, K. John, v. 7. 112. 

NOU a4 4 MOF? pi 4c ilc 10; 14 5 97271, 03 :p. 186,411 49; 23 5p. 240, 
1. 17. ‘Is it not hard, Nerissa, that I canzot choose one nor refuse 
none? Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. i. 2. 28. 

Notably, adv. Remarkably, conspicuously: p. 59, |. 17. 

Note, sb. Mark, sign: p. 44, |. 28; p. 166, 1. 33. 

Note, v.¢. To denote: p. 146, 1. 1. 

Nothing, adv. In no respect: p. 251, 1. 23. 

Nothing less than =anything but: p. 87, 1.13. ‘The use of this work 

. is nothing less than to give contentment &c,’ that is, it is so little 

intended to give contentment to the appetite of curious and vain wits that 
nothing is less so. Comp. Stubbs, Anatomie of Abuses, fol. 5 (ed. 1585) : 
‘Pride of the hatre is perpetrate, when as a man liftyng hymself on high, 
thinketh of hymself, aboue that whiche he is: dreamyng a perfection of 
himself, when he is nothyng lesse. . 

Null, sb. A non-significant cipher: p. 169, |. 7. 


o 

Oblation, sb. An offering: p. 1, 1.10; p. 4, 1.17. 

Obnoxious, adj. Exposed, p. 229, 1. 7. In dread of punishment: p. 246, 
Leg. 

Obsoureness, sb. Obscurity: p. 20, I. 10. 

Obtain, v.i. To attain: p. 51, 1.22. Comp. Essay vi. p. 19: ‘ But if a 
man cannot obfaine to that iudgment, then it is left to hima) vanes to 
be close, and a dissembler.’ 

Occupate, v.¢. To occupy: p. 133, 1. 8. 

Occupate, p.p. Occupied: p. 268, 1. 4. 

Of, redundant in the phrases ‘ accept of,’ p. 63, 1. 23: ‘esteem of, p. 178, 
1. 6; p. 228, 1. 24: ‘define of,’ p. 287, 1.5: ‘discern of,’ p. 203, 1. 18 
‘meaning of, p. 241,1. 2. ‘The reverence of laws and government :’ 
p. 17,1. 1. We should now use for. Comp. ‘a zeal of God,’ Rom. x. 2. 
‘Of’ used partitively for ‘some of": p. 72, 1. 24, ‘cannot but leese of the 
life and truth.’ See p. 135, 1. 33. ‘ To participate of’ =to participate in; 


or ae ae 


GLOSSARY, 361 


P- 73, 1.3; p.87, 1.28. *To gtow of’=to grow from: p. 16, 1. ro. 
‘Invested of’ = invested with: P.4,1.55 p. 214,17. ‘In comparison 
of’: p. 20, 1. 13. ‘Of the one side’=on the one side: p. 58, 1.16. * Of 
herself’ =by herself, alone: p. 58, 1. 26. * Of consequence’ =in conse- 
quence, consequently: p. 71, |. 12. 

Offer, sb. An attempt: p. 94, 1. 5. ‘ Many inceptions are but as Epicurus 
termeth them, ¢entamenta, that is, imperfect offers, and essayes.’ Colours 
of Good and Evil, p. 266. 

Oft, adv. Often: p, 25, 1. 12. ‘ 

Omnipotency, sb. Omnipotence; P. 51, 1. 13; p. 107, 1. 19. Is, xl, 
cont, 

On, p. 171, 1.7. See note. 

One. The same; in the phrases ‘much one,’ p. 146, 1. 8; ‘all one,’ p, 158. 
1, 2. 

Only, adv. Alone; ‘Saint Paul, who was only learned amongst the 
Apostles,’ signifies that he alone of the Apostles was a learned man: 
p. 49, 1. 18; p. 80, l. 10. Comp. Collect for Thirteenth Sunday after 
Trinity, ‘of whose only gift it cometh,’ 

Only but. Used for ‘but’ or ‘ only’: p- 174,1. 10. See But only. 

Open, v.t, To explain, or make plain; P. 43,1. 27. Comp. Acts xvii. 3. 
To disclose or reveal: p. 240, 1. 24. 

Opened, p.p. Explained: p. 162, ]. 3. 

‘And in regard of causes now in hand, 
Which I have ofen’d to his grace at large, 
As touching France,’ Shakespeare, Hen, V, i. 1. 78. 

Operation, sb. Influence, effect: Pp. 94, 1. 9; p. 211, 1. a2. ‘A good 
sherris-sack hath a two-fold operation in it.’ Shakespeare, 2 Hen, LV, 
iv. 3. 104. 

Operative, adj. Effective, productive: p, 89, I. 9. 

‘Our foster-nurse of nature is repose, 
The which he lacks; that to provide in him, 
Are many simples operative, whose power 
Will close the eye of anguish,’ 
Shakespeare, Lear, iv. 4. 14. 
Opinion, sb, Reputation: P- 49, 1. 31; p. 87, 1. 10; p. 220, 1. 10. 
‘But fish not, with this melancholy bait, 
For this fool gudgeon, this opinion,” 
Shakespeare, Mer, of Ven. i, 1. 102. 

Opposing, adj, Repugnant: p. 146, |. 32. 

Opposite, sb, An opponent: p. 229, 1.8. ‘Betake you to your guard; 
for your opposite hath in him what youth, strength, skill, and wrath 
can furnish man withal,’ Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, iii. 4. 2533 and 
again, I, 293. 

Ordainment, sb. Ordination: p. 23, 1. ¥7, 

Order. ‘To be in order’=to be the true order of proceeding: p, 207, 
1. 28, 

Ordinary, adj. Customary: p. 13, l. 6. 

Ostensive, adj, p. 158, 1. 31. See note. 

Other, pron. Others: p, 14, 1. 6; p. 62, 1. 16; p. 160, 1. 10, 

Outwardest, adj. Outermost: p. 120, |. 15. 


362 GLOSSARY. 


s 


Over, redundant in ‘command over,’ p. 140, Il. 29, 30. 

Overcommen, p.p. Overcome, achieved, accomplished: p. 76, |. 13. 
Compare Essay xxxiv, p. 146, See Comen. 

Over usual. ‘Too customary: p. 182, |, 21. 


: 


Painful, adj. Laborious: p. 243, 1. 32. ‘I think we have some as 
painful magistrates as ever was in England,’ Latimer, Sermons, p. 142 
(Parker Soc.). 

Painted forth, p.p. Depicted: p. 57, 1.31; p. 206, 1.11; p. 208, 1. 33. 

Painted out, p.p. Depicted: p. 15, 1. 7. 

Palliate, p.p. Palliated: p. 138, 1. 25. 

Pantomimus, sb. A mimic: p. 136,1. 21. ‘Pantomime: m. An Actor 
of many parts in one Play; one that can represent the gesture, and 
counterfeit the speech, of any man.’ Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Parcel, sb. A part. ‘Nothing parcel’=no part: p. 7,1. 5. 

‘Many a thousand, 
Which now mistrust no parcel of my fear.’ 
Shakespeare, 3 Hen. VI. v. 6. 38. 
Participant, adj. Partaking: p. 254, 1. 22. 
Particular, adj. Private: p. 185, 1, 12. 
‘But value dwells not in particular will.’ 
Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr, ii. 2. 53. 

Particular, sb. A private affair; used of an individual case: p. 8, 1. 22; 

p. 156, 1. 9. 
2 Though no man lesser fears the Greeks than I, 
As far as toucheth my particular,’ 
Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr, ii. 2. 9. 

Pasquil, sb. A satire: p. 57,1. 10. ‘Sometimes contrived into pleasant 
pasquils and satires, to move sport.’ Bacon, Obs, on a Libel (Works, viii. 
148). ‘Pasquille: f, A Pasquill; a Libell clapt on a Poste, or Image.’ 
‘Pasquin: m. The name of an Image, or Poste in Rome, whereon Libels 
and defamatorie Rimes are fastened, and fathered; also, as Pasquille.’ 
Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. The statue still stands at the corner of the Palazzo 
Braschi, near the Piazza Navona, 

Passage, sb. A ford, or pass: p. 56, 1. 11; p. 68, 1. 3. Comp. Judges 
xii. 6; 1 Sam, xiii. 23. Metaphorically, a proceeding, process, transaction, 
course: p. 25, l. 193 p. 91, 1. 21; p. 100, 1.18; p. 146, 1. 11, ‘To 
give passage’ = to give way: p. 39,1. 21. ‘In passage’ =in passing, cur- 
sorily: p. 78, 1. 28; p. 205, 1. 3; p. 207, 1.173 p. 262, 1. 26. 

Passed, adj. Past: p. 93,1. 16; p. 139, 1. 26; p. 239, 1,18. See note 
on p. 139, and compare Drayton, Polyolbion, i, 383: 

‘And by his present losse, his passed error found,’ 

Pastor, sb, A shepherd: p. 199, 1. 21. See Jer. xxiii. I, 2. 

Patience, sb. In its literal sense of endurance of suffering: p. 143, Il. 3, 4. 

Peccant, adj. Morbid, unhealthy: p. 37, 1. 323 p. 43, |. 28. ‘L’humeur 
peccante. The corrupt, or corrupting humor in the bodie.’ Cotgrave, 
Fr, Dict. 


este: 


es ee 


ce 


GLOSSARY. z 363 


Pedanti, sb, A pedant: p. 13, Il. 16, 19, Plur. pedantes : p. 13, Il. 7, 14; 
p. 21,1. 8. From the It. pedante, which appears not to have been quite 
naturalised in 1605. ‘ Pedante’ occurs in Florio’s Worlde of Wordes, 
1598; and in Shakespeare’s Love’s Labour’s Lost, iii, 1, 179, ‘A domi- 
neering pedant o'er the boy,’ it must have been pronounced as a dis- 
syllable, The first ed. of this play was publ'shed in 1598, 

Pedantical, adj. Pedantic: p, 13, 1. 26; p. 165, 1. 3. 

Pensileness, sb. Suspended condition; p, 47,1, 20. 

Percase, adv, Perhaps: p. 209, |. 11. 

Peremptory, adj, Destructive : p. ea; 1, x8, : 

Perfective, adj. Capable of being perfected or improved: p. 258, 1. 2. 
Compare Demonstrative. 

Peruse, v.t, To review: p, 3,121. See Shakespeare, Rich. Il, iii, 3. 53. 

‘That from this castle’s tatter’d battlements 
Our fair appointments may be well perused,’ 

Phainomena, p. 129, |. 30.. This mode of spelling shows that the word 
in Bacon’s time had not become fully naturalised, though in p. 127, |. 23 
it appears in its usual form. Later still in the Reliquiza Wottoniane 
(p. 101, ed. 1655) I find phainomenon. 

Physic, sb, Physics, or physical science: p. 111, 1. 335 Pp. I14,1. a1, 

Pilosity, sb. Hairiness: p. 120, |. ro. 

Place, sb. A passage of an author or book: p. 7,1. 323 p, 8, Laas p. 
190, 1, 25. A topic or subject of discourse: p. 155, 1.33. A piazza, or 
public square ; here, the Forum: p. 220, l. 12; p. 241,1.10. ‘To give 
place’ =to yield: p. 98, 1. 19. 

Plash, sb, A shallow pool, a puddle: p. 244, 1. 32. 

Platform, sb, Plan: p. 44, 1.12; p.114, 1.12. Pattern: p, 187, 1. 19. 
See note on p. 44. 

Ply, sb, Bend, bias: p. 239, 1. 19. ‘For it is true, that late learners, 
cannot so well take the plie.’ Essay xxxix. p. 164. 

Poesy, sb, A poem: p. 35, 1.6. Poetry: p. 60, 1. 28; p. 211, 1. 25. 

Point, sb. In the phrase ‘ was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed’: 
p. 253, 1. 10; where the Latin has de hujusmodi re extitit quam irrisui 
habebat Sarah, 

Police, v.¢, To regulate: p. 56, 1.11. ‘Spain,’ says Bacon, in his Observa- 
tions on a Libel (Works, viii, 169) ‘is not in brief an enemy to be feared 
by a nation seated, manned, furnished, and pollicied as in England ;’ where 
two MSS, read polliced. 

Politique, sb. A politician: p. 5, 1.9; p. 10,1. 17; p. 18, . 12, &e, In 
Pp. 13, 1. 6, it is used as an adjective ; ‘ politigue men’ = politicians. 

Popular estate. A democracy: p. 53, 1.8; p. 208, 1.1. ‘Therefore, we 
see it (i.e, boldness) hath done wonders, in popular states,’ Essay xii, 
Py 45. 

Popularity, sb, Democratic character: p, 252, 1. 5. 

Populous, adj, Numerous: p. 243, 1.5. See Deut. xxvi. 5. 

Portugal, adj. Portuguese: p. 29, l. 23. 

Position, sb, The laying down of a law: p, 147,1. 11. A maxim, senti- 
ment: p. 221, 1.1; p. 227,1.19; p. 246, 1, 20, 

Possess, v.i. To prepossess: p. 224, l. 3. 

Practique, sb, Practice: p. 165, |. 33. 


364 GLOSSARY. 


Practise, v.i. To plot: p.179,1.2. ‘He will practise against thee by 
poison.” Shakespeare, As You Like It, i, 1. 156. 
Pray in aid. To call in to one’s assistance: p. 174, {. 32. 
‘A conqueror that will pray in aid for kindness, 
Where he for grace is kneel’d to.’ 
Shakéspeare, Ant. and Cl. v, 2. 27. 
Sir T, Hanmer in his note on this passage says: ‘ Praying in aid is a term 


used for a petition made in a court of justice for the calling in of help ~ 


from another that hath an interest in the cause in question,’ 
Precedent, adj. Preceding, previous: p. 82, 1. 26; p. 214, |. 7. 
‘Our own precedent passions do instruct us 
What levity’s in youth,’ 
Shakespeare, Tim. of Ath, i, I. 133. 
Preception, sb. Precept: p. 214, 1. 31. 
Prefer, v.f. To promote: p. 3,1. 31. See Esth. ii. 9; Dan, vi. 3. 
Preferred, p.p. Recommended: p. 203, l. 14. 
‘Large gifts have I bestow’d on learned clerks, 
Because my gift preferr’d me to the king.’ 
Shakespeare, 2 Hen. VI, iv. 7. 77. 
Preferred before. Preferred to: p. 48,1. 13. See Johni. 15, 
Prelusive, adj. Preliminary, introductory: p. 94, 1. 23. 
Premeditate, p.p. Premeditated: p. 82, 1.6; p. 156, 1. 8. 
Prenotion, sb. Foreknowledge: p. 130, 1. 25; p. 145, |. 23. 
Preoccupate, v.t. To preoccupy: p. 268, ]. 14. 
Preposterous, adj. Inverted in order; literally, having the last first- 
Poses lc als 
Prescript, sb. A prescription: p. 22,1. 253 p. 132, 1.11; p. 142, |. 5. 
Present, v.¢. To represent: p. 100, 1. 2. 
‘Ay, my commander: when I presented Ceres, 
I thought to have told thee of it.’ 
Shakespeare, Temp. iv. 1. 167. 
Present, adj. Immediate: p. 222, 1.13. ‘ Present speeches ’ = speeches 
made on the spur of the moment, impromptu speeches: p. 100, |. 22. 
‘In present ’= Lat. in presenti, at present: p. 202, |. 16, 
Presention, sb. Presentiment: p. 144, |. 31. 
Press, v.t. To pursue eagerly: p. 226, 1. 19. ‘Pressing the fact” seems 
to mean ‘urgently pursuing the business in hand’: p. 235, Eas 
Pretence, sb. The thing pretended or aimed at: p. 124, ey -* 
Pretend, v.i. To aim at, propose as an end or object: p. 36, ll. 5, 7, 103 
BD. 21%, L132. 
Pretermit, v.t. To pass by: p. 208, 1. 17; p. 215, |. 30. 
Prevent, v.i. To anticipate: p. 200, 1. 333; p. 261, 1.24. Comp. Ps. 
cxix. 148. 
Prevented, p.p. Anticipated: p. 171, 1. 10. 
Price, sb. Value: p. 26, 1. 13; p. 29, 1. 8, &c. See Matt. xiii. 46. ‘To 
be in price’ =to be valued: p. 29, |. 24. 
Prime, adj. Chief, excellent: p. 199, |. 32. 
Prince, used of Queen Elizabeth: p. 58, 1. 2. 
Print, sb. Impression, of a seal: p. 69, |. 16. 
Privateness, sb, Privacy: p. 10, 1. 29; p. 15,1. 16, &c. Comp. Essay 


SRE een 


SPE EPEC GINO 


GLOSSARY. 365 


xi, p. 39: ‘Nay, retire men cannot, when they would; neither will they, 
when it were reason: but are impatient of privatenesse, even in age, and 
sicknesse, which require the shadow.’ 

Probably, adv, With probability, in a probable manner: p. 156, 1. 29. 

Probation, sb. Trial; and hence, proof from experience: p. 14], l. 10; 
p. 158, l. 31. 

Proceed, v.i. ‘It proceedeth’ =the result is: p. vy, 1. 3. 

Proceeding, sb. Progress: p. 170, 1. 9; p. 173, ll. 9, 10; Pp. 193, |. 30. 

Proceeding upon. Resulting from: p. 1, 1. 2, 

Profession, sb. Means of living, livelihood : P- 42, 1. 25; p. 43, Ll. 9. 

Professory, adj. Professional: p. 79, 1. 1. See p. 43, 1 9, So, 

Proficience, sb. Progress, advancement : p. 43, 1. 30; p. 76, 1. 27. 

Profiting, sb. Profit, advantage: p. 183, 1. 19. 

Progression, sb. Progress: p. 76,1. 27; p. 78, l. 27. 

Promiscuous, adj. Mixed indiscriminately: p. 113, |. 27. 

Proof, sb. Experiment: p. 119, 1. 27.‘ Good or ill proof’ is the proving 
or turning out good or ill: p. 223, Il. 22, 23. 

Proper, adj. One’s own: p, 182, 1. 3. 

Propriety, sb. Peculiarity: p. 1, 1. 10; p. 4,1.9; p.6,1. 1. Property : 
p. 113, 1. 18; p. 212, 1. 28; p. 252, 1.12. ‘Receipts of propriety’ = 
specific receipts, proper or peculiar to certain diseases: p. 140, lL. 24, 
‘Not for propriety’=not appropriate to particular diseases, as Bacon 
explains afterwards: p. 141, 1. 2. 

Prosecution, sb. Investigation: p. 84, 1. 7. 

Provocation, sb. Incitement: p. 50, 1. 18. 

Punctual, adj, Minute: p. 25, |. 21. 

Puntos, sb. Minute observances, punctilios: p. 219, 1. 2. 

Purchase, sb. Acquisition, that which is acquired: p. 16,1. 4. Value: 
p. 242, 1. 14, 

Pureness, sb, Purity: p. 29, |. 3, 

Purgament, sb. An excretion: p. 139, l. 6. 

Pursuance, sb. A prosecuting or following out, sequence; p. 142, |. Ig. 

Pursued, ~.p. Followed out: p. 106, 1. 14. 

Pursuit, sb, Consecutiveness, sequence: p. 142, 1. 13; p. 182, . 2g. 

Pusillanimity, sb. Littleness of mind: p. 49, l. 33; p. 205, 1. 13. 

Put forth, v.refl. To endeavour: p. 70, l. 2. 

Put to, v.t. To apply: p. 156, |. ro. 

Pyramides, sb. p.117,1. 18. The old form of the word before it was 
naturalised, Compare Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra, v. 2. 61: 

‘Rather make 
My country’s high pyramides my gibbet.’ 
In Minsheu’s Spanish Dictionary (1599), s.v. Piramide, the singular is 
given as ‘pyramis,’ But Cotgrave (Fr. Dict.) and Florio (Ital. Dict.) 
both use ‘ piramides’ as singular. 


Q. 


Question, v.¢. To call in question: p, 132, L. 16. 
Quintuple, adj. Fivefold: p. 169, 1. 14. 
Quit, v.refl. To get quit of, relieve oneself; p, 221, 1. 16. 


366 GLOSSARY, 


R. 


Raven, used as a feminine noun, p. 151, 1. 23. In the Authorized Version 
it is masculine. 

Reach, sb. A contrivance: p. 232, ]. 17. 

Reader, sb. A lecturer: p. 78, 1.1; p. 79, 1.17. Still retained in the 
Universities and the Inns of Court. 

Reason. ‘By reason’=because: p. 19, 1. 6; p. 167, 1. 20. ‘It was 
reason’ =it was reasonable: p. 27,1. 10. ‘It is reason’: p. 64, I. 19. 
Receipt, sb. Power of receiving, capacity: p. 7,19. Reception: p. 77, 

L143" p:-100, 1.10, 

Receive, v.¢. To admit: p. 157, 1. 18. 

Recess, sb. A withdrawal, retirement: p. 117, 1. Io. 

Recompense, v.¢. ‘To compensate for: p. 14, I. 3. 

Reconcilement, sb, Reconciliation: p. 223, 1. 27; p. 231, 1. 4. 

Redargution, sb. Reply, refutation: p. 18, 1.14; p. 84, 1. 6; p. 159, 
1. 18, ‘Redargution: f. A redargution, checking, reprouing, reprehend- 
ing, controwling.’ Cotgrave, Fr. Dict. 

Reduced. ‘Reduced to stupid’ =rendered stupid: p, 216, 1. 33. 

Re-edify, v.t. To rebuild: p. 56, 1. 9. 

Reflect, v.i. To be reflected: p. 161, 1. 7. 

Refrain, v.t. To restrain, hold in check as with a bridle: p. 53, L. 17; 
Pleo cl. 33 prod, 120. 

Regiment, sb. Regimen, training: p. 3, 1.6; p.97,1. 19. Rule, govern- 
ment: p. 58, 1. 15. , 

Region, sb. Climate, atmosphere: p. 206, 1. 26. See note on Hamlet, ii. 
2.472. 

Regular, adj. Rigid in adhering to rule, methodical: p. 14,1. 28. Bacon 
had previously (p. 10, 1. 22) spoken of one of the charges brought against 
learned men that they were ‘too peremptory or positive by strictness of 
rules and axioms.’ For the word see Essay xxx. p. 133. 

Reintegrate, v.¢. To restore: p. 111, 1. 19. 

Relation, sb. p. 39, 1.12. ‘ Relation is, where, in consideration of law 
two times, or other things are considered so as if they were all one ; and 
by this.the thing subsequent is said to take his effect by relation at the 
time preceding.’ Cowel’s Law Dictionary, ed. 1727. Narrative, story: 
G55, 1, 24:5-P. 005 15:3. 

Reluctation, sb. Struggle, violent effort, reluctance ; p. 45, 1. 27 ; p. 188, 
Oe Lose Pat ate Sel Bae fe 

Remembered, p.p. Mentioned: p. 102, |. 23; p. 174, 1. 30. 

Remora, sb. A fabulous fish, which was supposed to delay the progress of 
a vessel by adhering to its bottom; and so generally, a hindrance: p. 119, 
1. 20. * Many holde opinion, that in that last and famous sea-fight, which 
Antonie lost against Augustus, his Admirall-gallie was in her course staied 
by that little fish, the Latines call Remora, and the English a Sucke-stone, 
whose propertie is, to stay any ship he can fasten himselfe vnto.’ Mon- 
taigne’s Essaies, transl. Florio, p. 270, ed. 1603. 

Remove, sb. Removal: p. 98, 1. 29; p. 242, 1. 28. 

Reposed, p.p. Laid up as in store: p. 77, |. 28. 


GLOSSARY. 367 


Reprehensions, sb, Reproofs: p. 100, |. 14. 

Reprove, v.¢. To refute: p. 112, |. 19. 

Repugnancy, sb. Repugnance: p. 120, |. 7; p. 240, L. 8. 

Rescussing, sb. Rescuing: p. 238, 1.23. Rescous and Rescusser are the 
old law terms for rescue and rescuer, and although I have not been able to 
find any other instance of the occurrence of rescussing, I have not hesi- 
tated to retain it, as it is found in the editions of 1605 and 1629. Chaucer 
(Cant, Tales, 2645) uses rescous : 

‘And in the rescous of this Palamon 
The stronge kyng Ligurgius is born adoun.’ 

Resemble, v.¢. To compare: p. 178, |. 6. 

Resort, sb. Spring, source: p. 91, 1.26. Comp. Essay xxii. p. 95: ‘the 
resorts and falls of businesse.’ 

Respective, adj. Having respect or reference to: p. 31,1. 12. Appro- 
priate: p.1, 1.9. Special, relative: p. 114, ll. 25, 29, 30; p. 198, |. 14. 
Peculiar: p. 265, 1. 20. 

Respectively, adv, Appropriately: p. 179, I. 32. Relatively: p. 263, 
1. 24. 

Respect, sb. Consideration: p. 53, 1. 33; p. 194, 1. 10; p. 217, |. 23; 
p. 228, 1. 28. ‘For bribes come but now and then; but if importunitie, 
or idle respects lead a man, he shall never be without,’ Essay xi. p. 42. 
See Hamlet, iii. 1. 68. 

Rest, v.i. To remain: p. 129,1.8. ‘Since therefore they must be used, 
in such cases, there resteth to speake, how they are to be brideled.’ Essay 
XXXVi. p. 154. 

Retire, v.t. To withdraw: p. 103, I. 12. 

Reverent, adj. Reverend, venerable: p. 19, 1. 18. 

Reverted, p.p. Turned back: p. ros, |. 16. 

Revolve, v.¢. To reflect upon: p. 3, l. 21; p. 157, 1.9. 

Revolved, p~.p. Considered, reflected upon: p. 28, 1. 22; p. 212, 1. 4. 

Rhapsody, sb. A patchwork, confused mixture: p. 106, 1. 1. * This 
concerneth not those mingle-mangles of many kindes of stuffe, or as the 
Grecians call them Rapsodies.’ Florio's Montaigne, p. 68, ed. 1603. 

Rh>torics, sb. Rhetoric: p. 177, |, 9. . 

Round about, v.i. To roam about: p. 8,1.15. ‘ For a man may wander 
in the way, by rounding up and down.’ Bacon, Of the Interp. of Nature 
(Works, iii. 232). 

Rudiment, sb, An elementary form: p. 48, 1. I9. 

Rule over, v.¢ To decide, as a judge decides a point of law: p. 7, 1. 6. 


Sabbathless, adj. Restless: p. 247, 1. 14. 

Sacramental, adj. Bound by an oath or solemn obligation: p. 146, 1. 24. 

Saddest, adj. Most serious, most important: p. 220, |. 8. 

Sake. For....sake: As in the phrases ‘for entertainment sake’: p. 61, 
1. 16; ‘ for demonstration sake’: p. 185, 1. 21; ‘for example sake,’ p. 81, 
1. 16; ‘assurance sake,’ p. 159, 1. 16. Compare Hooker, Eccl. Pol. i. 
p- 156 (ed, Keble); ‘for that work sake which we covet to perform,’ 


368 GLOSSARY. 


Sale, sb. ‘Confections of sale’ =confections which are offered: for sale: 
p.14i Lit. 

Salomon, sb. Solomon: p, 20,1,5. The old form of the name in the 
Geneva Bible. 

Sapience, sb. Wisdom: p. 44, 1. 18; p. 118, 1. 16. 

Satisfactory, adj. Bacon uses this word on three occasions in a sense 
which, so far as I am aware, has not been noticed in the dictionaries. 
‘These satisfactory and specious causes’ (p. 119, 1. 5); ‘by way of 
argument or satisfactory reason’ (p. 153, 1. 16); ‘more satisfactory than 
substantial’ (p. 260, 1. 7). See also p. 30, 1. 26. From these instances it 
appears that an explanation is satisfactory which merely stops the mouth 
of the inquirer, and, as Bacon says of Mirabilaries, gives ‘ contentment to 
the appetite of curious and vain wits’ (p. 87). Again, in the same spirit 
he speaks of the methods of tradition of knowledge in his time; ‘he that 
receiveth knowledge desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant 
inquiry: and so rather not to doubt, than not to err’ (p. 171). Compare 
the use of ‘ satisfy,’ p. 172, 1. 33. 

Scale. ‘By scale’=by degrees, step by step; p. 118, 1. 4. 

Scape, v.t. To escape: p. 161, 1. 20, 

Science, sb. Knowledge, erudition: p. 59, 1. 32. 

Scope, sb. Mark to aim at; and so, aim, object; p. 42, 1. 6. 

Seducement, sb. Seduction: p. 14,1.17; p. 153, 1. 3. 

Seeing, used as an adjective, p. 76, 1. 6. 

Seek, to. ‘To be ¢o seek’=to be at a loss: p. 13,1. 313 p. 25,1. 20 
‘For if you reduce usury, to one low rate, it will ease the common bor- 
rower, but the merchant will be fo seeke for money.’ Essay xli. p. 171. 

Seen, ~.p. Versed, skilled: p. 25,1. 19; p. 46, l. 30; p. 136, 1.1. 

Seem much, to. To appear a great thing: p. 3,1. 28. So ‘to think 
much’ is to reckon highly as an act of importance, 

Segregate, adj. Separate: p. 130, 1. 2; p. 216, 1. 13. 

Septuagenary, adj. Seventy years old: p. 38, 1. 28. 

Service, sb. Used especially of military service ; a campaign or engage- 
ment: p. 68,1. 2, We speak of a soldier having ‘seen service.’ 

Set forward, v.¢. To further, promote: p. 83, 1. 30. See 1 Chr. xxili. 4. 

Set into, v.¢. To set to, apply oneself to: p. 82, 1. 18. 

Seven. The seven wise men of Greece: p. 102, 1. 32. See note. 

Sever, v.i. To be separated: p, 216, 1. 24; p. 217, 1. 29; p. 226, |, 20. 

Several, adj. Separate: p. 185, 1.14. See Matt, xxv. 15. 

Severally, adv. In several ways: p. 5, 1. 7. 

Severe, adj, Rigidly accurate: p. 87, |. 4. 

Severedly, adv. Separately: p, 128, l. 12. 

Shall, used for ‘ will’: p. 80, I. 27. 

Shape, v.i. To acquire shape or form: p. 39, 1. 31. 

Shoot, sb. A shot: p. 149, 1. 11. 

Shoot over, v.i. To overshoot the mark: p. 232, 1. 16. 

Should, used for ‘would’: p. 2, 1. 23; p. 66,15; p. 126, 1.173; p. 155; 
1. 28. 

Show, sb. Semblance, appearance: p. 3, l. 30; p. 102, 1. 9. See Is. ili. 9. 

Side. ‘On the other side’=on the other hand: p. 35, 1. 22. So also ‘of 
the other side’: p, 210, 1. 30. 


GLOSSARY, 369 


Sign unto, v.:. To attest: p. 192, 1. 6. 

Signify, v.¢. To indicate: p. 65, 1. 9. 

Similitude, sb. Likeness: p. 70, l. 26; p. 215, 1. 16. Comparison 
p- 87, 1. 10; p. 147, 1. 32. 

Simples, sb. Herbs; p. 80,1. 17. 

Sincereness, sb. Sincerity: p. 195, |. 29. 

Skill, v.i. To understand, know: p. 66, 1. 1. Comp. 1 Kings v. 6; 
2 Chr. ii. 7, 8, xxxiv. 12. 

Slug, v.t. To delay, hinder: p. 119, |. 21. 

Sobriety, sb. Temperance in its widest sense, sobermindedness : p. 1% 
1. 75 p. 44, 1. 14; p. 216, 1. 8. 

Softest, adj. Most effeminate: p. 195, 1. 25. 

Softness, sb. Effeminacy: p. 16, l. 9. 

Solemn, adj. Grave, decorous: p. 235, ll. 18, 27. 

Solidness, sb. Solidity: p. 119, l. 17. 

So long time. So long: p. 38, 1. 23. 

Solute, adj. Free, unfettered: p. 259, 1. 4; p. 260, I. 33. 

Some, used with a singular, p. 194, 1. 8 

Sometime, adv. Sometimes: p. 20,1. 2; p. 122,1. 29. ‘As it is seene 
sometime in friars,’ Essay x. p. 38. 

Soothe, v.t. To flatter: p. 205, |. 23. 

‘Thou art perjured too, 
And soothest up greatness.’ 
Shakespeare, K. John, iii. 1, 124. 

Sophister, sb. A sophist: p. 160, 1. 3 

‘A subtle traitor needs no sophister.’ 
Shakespeare, 2 Hen. VI. v. I. 191. 

Sorcery, sb. Fortune-telling by casting lots: p. 87, |. 24. 

Sort, sb. A class of persons; p. 29, 1. 10; p. 163, 1. 6. 

‘ The shallowest thick-skin of that barren sort,’ 
Shakespeare, Mid. N.’s Dr. iii. 2, 13. 
‘In sort’ =in such a manner: p. 224, 1. 3; p. 255, 1. 21. 

Sort, v.i. To agree: p. 14, 1.12; p. 234, 1.18. ‘A frend may speak, 
as the case requires, and not as it sorteth with the person,’ Essay xxvii. 
p. 115. 

Sortable, adj. Agreeable, suitable: p. 58, 1. 20, 

Sounding, adj, ‘That which merely gives forth a sound; and so, meta- 
phorically, hollow, unsubstantial: p. 7, |. 27. 

Spacious, adj. Widely extended: p. 67,1. 33. Not used now of coun- 
tries. 

Spake. Spoke; past tense of ‘speak’: p. 64, |. 23. 

Sparkle, sb. A spark: p. 238, 1. 22; p. 254, 1. 21. 

Speak to. To speak of or upon, as atopic: p. 157, 1. 13. 

Speak unto. To speak of, or with reference to: p. 27, |. 33. 

Specially, adv. Especially: p. 51, |. 27. 

Speculation, sb. Inquiry, investigation: p. 87, 1. 30; p. 125, 1. Io. 

Speculative, adj. Inquisitive: p. 24, l. se p. I1I, 4 14. 

Spial, sb. A spy: p. 80, ll. 24, 26. ‘But yet their trust. towards them, 
hath rather beene as to good spialls, and good whisperers; then good 
magistrates, and officers,’ Essay xliv. p. 179. 


370 GLOSSARY. 


Spinosity, sb. Thorniness: p. 148, |. 26. 

Spleen, sb. Ill humour, anger; of which the spleen was believed to be 
the seat: p. 245, 1. 8. 

‘If she must teem, 
Create her child of spleen; that it may live, 
And be a thwart disnatured torment to her.’ 

Shakespeare, K. Lear, i. 4. 304. 
See also the quotation under Arrogancy. 

Stand, v.i. To stand firm, keep one’s position: p. 23, 1. 313 p. 36, 1. 32. 
See Eph. vi. 13. To stop: p. 210, 1. 8. 

Stand with. To be consistent with: p.112,1.11. ‘It is true, speedie 
profit is not to be neglected, as farre as may stand, with the good of 
the plantation, but no further.’ Essay xxxiii. p. 139. 

State, sb. Original condition: p. 27, 1. 26; p. 195, |. 6. Estate: p 149, 
1. 26. ‘Certainly who hath a state to repaire, may not despise small 
things.’ Essay xxviii. p. 117. Stability: p. 193, 1,23. ‘In the favours 
of others or the good windes of fortune we have no state or certainty.’ 
Colours of Good and Evil, p. 262. 

Station, sb. A standing-place: p. 119, 1. 17. 

Statua, sb. Statue: p. 72, 1. 21; p. 85, 1. 29; p. 202, 1. 24; p. 241, l. 9. 

‘Even at the base of Pompey’s statua.’ 
Shakespeare, Jul. Ces. iii. 2. 192. 

Stay, sb. A standstill: p. 37, 1. 2. ‘He that standeth at a say, when 
others rise, can hardly avoid motions of envy.’ Essay xiv. p. 52. 

Stay, v.i. To stand still, rest: p. 119, 1. 5. To dwell: p. 233, 1. 26. 

Still, adv. Constantly: p. 39, 1. 16; p. 69, 1. 11; p. 72, |. 28. 

‘Thou call’dst me up at midnight to fetch dew 
From the séill-vex'd Bermoothes.’ 
Shakespeare, Tempest, i. 2. 229. 

Stond, sb. An impediment, hindrance: p. 211, 1. 3. ‘The removing of 
the stonds and impediments of the mind doth often clear the passage and 
current of a man’s fortune.’ Bacon, Disc. touching Helps for the Intell. 
Powers (Works, vii. 99). See also Essay xl. p. 165. 

Stood upon. Insisted upon: p, 8, 1. 30; p. 174, 1. 28. ‘But it is so 
plaine, that every man profiteth in that hee most intendeth, that it needeth 
not be stood upon.’ Essay xxix. p. 126. 

Story, sb. History: p. 86,1. 4; p. go, 1. 32. See 2 Chr. xiii. 22. 

Strait, adj. Tight: p. 210, 1.10; p. 219, |. 13. 

Straitly, adv. Strictly: p. 43, 1. 3. See Gen. xliii. 7. 

Stroke. Struck; the preterite of ‘strike’: p. 150, ll. 32, 33. 

Stupid. ‘Reduced to stupid’ =rendered stupid: p. 216, 1. 33. Compare 
‘leaveth it for suspect,’ p. 81, 1. 12. 

Style, sb. Title or formula, designation: p. 44, 1. 33; p. 57, |. 27. 

Style, sb. The pen of the ancient Greeks and Romans, one end of 
which was pointed for the purpose of writing on the wax tablets; 
the other broad and flat to erase what had been written. Hence the 
Latin phrase vertere stylum, to turn the style,=to erase, and this is 
imitated by Bacon, p. 61, 1. 23. 

Styled. See note on p. 101, 1.19. Perhaps we should read ‘may be so 
styled.’ 


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GLOSSARY. 371 


Subject, adj. Liable: p. 259, |. 13. 
*A widow, husbandless, subject to fears.’ 
Shakespeare, K. John, iii. 1. 14. 

Subject, sb. Used as a collective noun for the people: p. 55, l. 33, as in 
Hamlet, i. 1. 72. 

Suborn, v.¢. Like the Lat. subornare, to furnish, equip: p. 187, l. 14. 

Subsistence, sb. Substance: p. 44, |. 22. 

Substantive, adj. Substantial: p. 106, 1. 8. 

Subtility, sb. Subtilty; the old form of spelling, which Bacon most 
frequently adopts; from Lat. subéilitas: p. 32,1. 10; &c. 

Success, sb. The result or issue of an action, good or bad: p. 101, 1. 31: 
p. 135, 1.4. It was formerly used with some qualifying adjective. See 
Josh. i. 8, 

Such one. Such, such a one: p. 253, 1. 15. 

Succours. Plural for singular: p. 28, 1. 18. 

Suddenly, adv. Quickly, hastily: p. 184, 1. 16; p. 234, 1. 8. 

‘Muse not that I thus suddenly proceed.’ 
Shakespeare, Two Gent. of Ver. i. 3. 64. 
‘And suddenly resolve me in my suit.’ 
Id. Love’s Lab. Lost, ii. 2. 110. 

Suffice, v.i. To be competent: p. 172, |. 23. 

Sufficient, adj. Competent, able: p. 79, 1. 18; p. 93, 1 325 p. 221, 
1. 25. ‘ Sufficient men’ =men of capacity, ability. 

Sufficiency, sb. Ability, capacity: p. 216, 1.29. See 2 Cor. iii. 5. 

Summary, adj. Chief, most important: p. 6, 1. 30; p. 19, 1. 303 P. 45 
Ski 

Suppeditation, sb. Assistance: p. 206, |. 2. 

Supply, v.t. To assist: p. 76, |. 16. 

Suppose, v.t. To imagine: p. 267, 1. 19. 

Supposed, adj. Fictitious, imaginary: p. 45, |. 5. ‘Upon supposed 
fairness.’ Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. iii. 2. 94. ‘Wounding supposed 
peace.’ Id. 2 Hen. IV. iv. 5. 196. 

Surcharge, sb. Surfeit: p. 83, 1. 20. 

Surd, adj. Literally, without sound, unmeaning: p. 255, 1. I. 

Suspect, adj. Suspected, suspicious: p. 81, 1. 12; p. 260, 1.19. * Cer 
tainly in Italy, they hold it a little suspect in popes, when they have often 
in their mouth, padre commune.’ Essay li. p. 208. 

Swelling, sb. Inflation of mind by pride: p. 10, 1. 13. Compare 2 Cor. 
xii. 20. 

Syntax, sb. Arrangement: p. 182, 1. 28. 

Systasis, sb. See p. 174, l. 27. 


ye 


Table, sb. A tablet, picture: p. 57,1. 31. ‘A pair of cables,’ p. 64, 1. 10. 
‘Who art the ¢able wherein all my thoughts 
Are visibly character’d and engraved.’ e 
Shakespeare, Two Gent. of Ver. ii. 7: 3: 


Bb 2 


372 GLOSSARY. 


Taint, v.t. To sully, tarnish: p. 27,1. 28. With the use of ‘blemish and 
taint’ in this passage, compare Mecca iv. 3. 124: 
‘The taints and blames 1 laid upon myself.’ 
Take up, v.refl. To check oneself: p. 65, 1. 23. 
Take upon. ‘To arrogate, assume to oneself: p. 65, 1. 31. 
Tax, v.t. To censure: p. 24, 1. 4; Pp. 135, l. 14. In the former passage 
the Latin translation takes the word in the modern sense. See note, 
‘They ¢ax our policy and call it cowardice.’ 
Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. i. 3. 197. 
ms tion, sb. Censure, reprehension: p. 62, 1. 17; p. 103, 1. 27. ‘You'll 
be whipped for taxation one of these days.’ Shakespeare, As You Like 
it, 1. 3-01; 
eae rasa, sb. Temperament : Paty a6. P- 59,12. ‘The best 
composition, and ¢emperature is, to have opennesse in fame and opinion; 
secrecy in habit; dissimulation in seasonable use; and a power to faigne, 
if there be no remedy.’ Essay vi. RG 22, 
Tenderness, sb, Sensitiveness: p. 192, 1. 29. ‘ Tenderness of coun- 
tenance’ =bashfulness: p. 208, 1. 31. 
‘Lest I give cause 
To be suspected of more ¢enderness 
Than doth become a man.’ 
Shakespeare, Cymb. i. 1. 94. 
Term, sb. Limit, termination: p. 129, 1. 14. 
Terrene, adj, Earthly: p. 48, 1. 13. 
‘ Alack, our éerrene moon 
Is now eclipsed.’ Shakespeare, Ant. and Cl. iii. 13. 153. 
ae pron, That which: p. 66,1. 30; p. 110, 1.8; p. 112, 1.93 p. 155; 
I 


The, “used for the possessive pronoun ‘its’: p. 27, 1. 26. Compare the 
version in the panels Bible of Lev. xxv. 5: ‘ That which groweth of 
the owne accord of thy haruest, thou shalt not reape.’ And also Holland’s 
Plutarch, p. 812 (ed. 1603): ‘ Aristotle and Plato doe holde, that matter 
is corporall, without forme, shape, figure and qualitie, in che owne nature 
and propertie.’ 

The, redundant. ‘At the first:’ p. 37, ll. 7, 11.‘ The which:’ p. 37,1. 313 
p. 234, 1. 10. ‘Other she heathen gods’: p. 38, 1. 25. 

Theomachy, sb. A battle with the gods: p. 194, |. 18. 

Theory, sb. Speculation: p. 111, 1. 33. 

Think much. To take ill, grudge: p. 88, 1. 30. 

Through-lights, sb. Lights or windows on both sides of a room: p. 97; 
1. 25. Comp. Essay xlv. p. 183. 

Throughly, adv. Thoroughly; p. 67, 1. 28; p. 86, 1. 19. See Matt. 
iii, 12. 

Through-passage, sb. Transit, traversing: p. 98, 1. 15. 

Thwart, adj. Perverse: p. 17, 1. Io. 

“Create her child of spleen; that it may live, 
And be a thwart disnatured torment to her.’ 
Shakespeare, K. Lear, i. 4. 305. 

To, prep. ‘Designed to ” = designed for: p. 2345 see Comp. * si to,’ 

p. 43, 1. 25; ‘employ éo,’ p. 252,1. 20, ‘To’ redundant in ‘rather than 


nia ace Sead 


GLOSSARY, 373 


to suffer’: p. 189, 1. 12. Comp. Colours of Good and Evil, p. 262; ‘ Yet 
you shall seldome see them complaine, but fo set a good face upon it.’ 

Tongue, sb. Language: p. 17, l. 19. 

Touch, sb. ‘To give a touch of’=to allude to, mention slightly: p. 96, 
1,12. Testing, examination, p. 153, 1. 11, as of gold by the touch-stone. 

Touching, prep. Concerning: p. 59, |. 22; p. 88, |. 25. 

Tractate, sb. A treatise: p. 245, 1. 17. 

Tradition, sb. The delivery of knowledge: p. 166, 1. 8; p. 170, 1. 5; 
p. 176, 1. 28. 

Traduced, p.p. In the passage in which this word occurs, p. 20, 1. 25, 
‘traduce’ appears to be used with a distinct reference to its original mean- 
ing ‘to lead along, lead in procession,’ and so ‘to parade. Hence 
‘traduced to contempt’ would mean ‘ paraded contemptuously, or so as to 
excite contempt.’ 

Traducement, sb. Misrepresentation, calumny: p. 38, 1.1; p. 43, 1. 31. 

‘?T were a concealment 
Worse than a theft, no less than a traducement, 
To hide your doings,’ Shakespeare, Cor, i. 9. 22. 

Translation, sb. A metaphor: p. 61, 1.29. See note. 

Travail, v.i. To labour: p. 49,1. 7; p. 80, l. 31. 

Travail, sb, Labour: p, 10, |, 27; p. 28, 1. 23, &c. Travails=pains. 
p- 208, 1. 22, See Num. xx. 14, Lam. iii. 5. 

Treacle, sb. p. 140, 1. 31. Formerly ¢riacle from Gk. Onpraxh, an antidote 
to the viper’s poison. ‘‘‘ Treacle,” or “ triacle,” as Chaucer wrote it, was 
originally a Greek word, and wrapped up in itself the once popular belief 
(an anticipation, by the way, of homeeopathy), that a confection of the 
viper’s flesh was the most potent antidote against the viper’s bite.... 
Expressing first this antidote, it then came to express any antidote, then 
any medicinal confection or sweet syrup; and lastly that particular syrup, 
namely, the sweet syrup of molasses, to which alone it is now restricted.’ 
Trench, English Past and Present, fourth ed. p. 188, Coverdale’s version 
of Jer. viii. 22 is—‘ I am heuy and abashed, for there is no more Triacle 
at Galaad ;’ and of Jer. xlvi, 11—‘ Go vp (o Galaad) and bringe ¢riacle 
vnto the doughter off Egipte.’ 

Trepidation, sb, Trembling; used in a literal sense: p. 94, 1. 19. 

Triplicity, sb. A threefold combination or nature: p. 4, |. 5; p. 188, 1. 18, 

Trivial, adj. Trite, commonplace: p. 174, 1. 17. 

Trope, sb, A figure, generally of speech; here applied to music: p, 107, 
ll. 32, 33. 

Tutor, sb. A guardian: p, 21,1. 11; p. 184,11. See Gal. iv. 2. 

Typocosmy, sb. p.176,1. 21. Defined by Blount and others ‘a figure 
or type of the world.” But this does not appear to me satisfactory. 
Among ‘the means that help the understanding and faculties thereof’ 
Bacon enumerates ‘Lullius Typocosmia.” ‘To reduce surnames to a 
Methode, is matter for a Ramist, who should happly finde it to be a 7ypo- 
cosmie,’ Camden, Remaines, p. 95, ed. 1605. It seems rather to mean 
an orderly arrangement of the figures or types which play such an im- 
portant part in the Art of Lullius, 

Tyrannous, adj. Tyrannical: p. 61, I. 30. 
Tyranny, sb. Absolute power: p. 241, 1. 8; p. 202, 1. 8. 


374 GLOSSARY, 


Us 
Unawares, at. Unexpectedly: p. 11, lL 73; p. 16, L 31. Comp. Ps. 


xxxv. 8. 

Uncivilly, adv. Rudely: p. 25,1. 14. 

Uncomely, adv. Ungracefully, awkwardly: p. 26, |. 7. 

Unconstancy, sb. Inconstancy: p. 38, 1. 33. 

Uncredible, adj, Incredible: p. 35, 1. 28. 

Understandingly, adv. Intelligently: p. 128, 1. 8. 

Undertake, v.t. To deal with, contend with: p. 221, 1 12. 

Undervalue, sb, Depreciation: p. 4, l. 25. 

Universality, sb. The study of general principles: p. 78, 1. 24. 

Unlikest, adj. Most unlike: p. 235, 1. 26. 

Uumanured, p.p. Uncultivated: p. 84, 1. 8. 

Unmovable, adj. Immovable: p. 158, lL. 13. 

Unpartial, adj. Impartial: p. 234, 1. 12. 

Unperfect, adj. Imperfect: p. gt, 1 1; p. 240, L 18 In the latter 
passage the ed. of 1605 has unper/ite. 

Unproper, adj. Improper: p. 41, l. 2. 

Unsafety, sb, Insecurity: p. 236, lL. 24. 

Untaxed, p.p. Uncensured: p. 56, 1. 19. 

Unwinded, p.f. Unwound: p. 181, 1. 15. 

Unwrap, v.t. To disentangle: p. 246, |. 16. 

Upon, prep. Used in phrases where we should now employ other pre- 
positions. ‘Upon a natural curiosity’=‘out of a natural curiosity’: 
p. 42, 1. 20. ‘Proceeding upon some inward discontent’ = proceeding 
from, &c.: p. §4, 1.19. ‘ Upon a more original tradition’: p, 104, 1. 21. 
‘Upon displeasure’: p. 221, 1. 33. ‘Upon heat’: p. 231, 1. 23, &c. ‘To 
take advantage upon’ =to take advantage of: p. 27,1, 26. ‘To do good 
upon’=to do good to: p. 201, 1.9. ‘Multiplying and extending their 
form upon other things’: p. 195, 1. 1. ‘Study upon’: p. 222, 1, 21. 
‘Be bold upon’: p. 223, 1.8. See Glossary to Bacon’s Essays. 

Wre-s0y Uses p, Vet, |. 153° p- 171, 1. 27: 

Use, v.i. To be accustomed: p. 21,1. 3; p. 40,1. 31. 

Use, sb. Usance, interest, increase: p. 126, 1. 15. 


Vv. 


Value, v.t. To give value to: p. 118, 1. Io. 

Vaporous, adj, Boastful, vain: p. 15. 1.12; p. 123, L 31. 

Variably, adv. Unsystematically: p. 153, 1. 22. 

Vastness, sb. A waste, wilderness: p. 120, |. 5. 

Vehemency; sb, Vehemence: p. 177, 1. 25. 

Ventosity, sb. Windiness: p. 7, 1. 16; p. 95, 1. 13. 

Verdure, sb. Literally, greenness; and so, vegetation generally: p. 48, 
Pe ea 

Verity, sb. Truth: p. 91,1. 18; p. 109, |. 20. 


GLOSSARY. 375 


Vermiculate, adj, Intricate, winding, like the moving of a worm: p. 31, 
1, ae. ; 

Versatile, adj. Changeable: p. 24, 1. 1. 

Vestiments, sb. Vestments, dress: p. 88, 1. 33. ‘Vestimento, as Veste, 
any vestiment or vesture.’ Florio, Ital. Dict. 

Vicissitude, sb. Change: p. 6,1. 26. Order of things: p. 49, 1. 16. 

Void, adj. Empty: p. 43,1. 22. 

Vollies, sb. Flights: p. 252,1. 11. From Fr. volée a flight of birds. 

Volubility, sb. Rolling or twisting motion: p. 201, l. 6 

Voluble, adj. Capable of revolving: p. 239, l. 27. 

Voluntary, sb. A volunteer: p. 66, |. 14. 

Voluptuary, adj. Belonging to pleasure: p. 133, 1. 25; p. 143, I. 26. 

Vulgar, adj. Common, familiar: p. 54,1. 8. 


Ww. 


Wait on. To attend: p. 49, 1. 17. 

Wait upon. To attend: p. 95, |. 3. 

Want, sb. Defect, deficiency: p. 237, ll. 21, 23. 

Warrant, v.i. To attest: p. 11,1. 27. 

Watch candle, sb. A night light: p. 32, 1. 32. Compare Albumazar ii. 
9g; ‘ Why should I twine mine arms to cables, and sigh my soul to air? 
Sit up all night like a watching candle, and distil my brains through my 
eyelids?’ ‘My good old mistress was wont to call me her watch-candle, 
because it pleased her to say I did continually burn (and yet she suffered 
me to waste almost to nothing).’ Bacon, Letter to King James (Works, 
x. 280). 

Water, sb. A piece of water: p. 105, 1.9. Compare Tennyson, Morte 
d’Arthur: 

‘On one side lay the ocean, and on one 
Lay a great water, and the moon was full.’ 

Wavering, sb. Oscillation: p. 94, 1. 19. 

Way, in the phrase ‘to hold way with’=to keep pace with: p. 14, l. 16. 
So ‘ to keep way with,’ p. 113, 1. 10; ‘to take the way’=to take steps 
or measures: p. 173, |. 27. 

Way, sb. Aroad: p. 144,1. 11; p. 246, 1. 25. 

Ways. ‘No ways’=in no way: p. 28, 1.16; p. 56, l. 25; p. 221, L 15. 

Weal, sb. Welfare, prosperity: p. 55, l. 33. 

Wear, v.i. To suffer from wear or use: p. 15, 1. 24. 

Went of=were current about: p. 68, |. 5. 

Were better, p. 217,1. 7; p. 222, 1. 25. We should now say ‘a man 
had better,’ or ‘it were better for a man &c.’ 

What time. At which time, when: p. 92, |. 27. 

Whereas, adv, Where: p. 68, 1. 9. 

Whether, pron. Which, of two: p. 195, l. 32. 

bc: Sam, rel. pr. Who; used of persons: p. 9, I. 18; p. 28, 1. 213 p. 233, 

12. 


376 GLOSSARY. 


Whiffler, sb. An officer whose duty it was to clear the way for a proces- 

sion: p. 152, 1. 32. 

‘Which like a mighty wwhiffler ’fore the king.’ 
Shakespeare, Hen. V. v. Chor. 12. 

Wit, sb. Our modern word ‘intellect’ expresses as nearly as possible the 

meaning which ‘wit’ had in Bacon’s time: p. 33, 1. 26. See note on 

p. 64, 1. 4, and comp. Essay vi. p. 18; xliv.p. 179. ‘Games of wit’ are 

games of skill or science as opposed to games of chance: p. 256, 1. 7. 
With, prep. Occurs where we should now use ‘by.’ ‘ Waited on with’ = 

attended by: p. 49,1.17. ‘Attended with’ =attended by: p. 59, I. 14. 
Withal, prep. With: p. 24,1.3. Placed after the case it governs. 
Within, prep. Among: p. 46, |. 21. 
Without, prep. Beyond: p. 185, 1, 25; p. 204, 1.11. Comp. 2 Cor. x. 

| ae He 
Word, sb. Motto: p. 98, 1. 1. 

‘And the device he bears upon his shield 
Is a black Ethiope reaching at the sun; 
The word, ‘Lux tua vita mihi.’ 
Shakespeare, Per. ii. 2. 21. 

Work, ‘To set on work’=to set working: p. 198, 1. 7. So ‘to set in 

work’ =to put in motion: p. 240, |. 23. 
Worthy, sb. A hero: p. 52,1. 4. Comp. ‘the nine worthies’ and Nah. 

ii, 


op 
Wrought, ~.~. Influenced, worked upon: p. 177, 1. 24. 


Anagogical, adj. Mystical: p. 261, 1. 23. 

Consul, sb. Loosely used for ‘ counsellor,’ ‘ senator”: p. 36, 1.32. Come 
pare Shakespeare, Othello, i. 1. 25; i. 2. 43. 

Piece, sb. A castle or fort: p. 173, 1.14. See Jewell’s Works (Parker 
Soc. ed.), i. 485. 


Additional Notes. 


P. 18 [2]. Socrates however was not put to death till B.C. 399. : 

P. 228 [20]. Dr. Thompson, the Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, 
has pointed out to me that the origin of Bacon’s ‘ globe of matter and 
‘globe of crystal or form’ is probably the opatpos aic@nrds and the 
aaipos vontdés of Empedocles as interpreted by Proclus. See Proclus in 
Timzum, p. 160 D, and Simplicius in Physica, p. 7 b. 


THE END, 


BINDING C--~ MAY2 11985 


B Racon, Francis. 

1191 Advancement of learning 
1920 

cop.2 


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